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mit himself as an individual, not as
part of a sub-group. We called a first
party congress for September 1962 and
managed to bring many influential and
representative Africans out of Mozambique to help draw up the policy guidelines of the new movement.
Kitchen: What were the major policy
lines agreed on at that first congress in
Dar es Salaam?
Mondlane: There were three. First, we
accepted it as a fact of life that Salazar's
Portugal was unable to accept the idea
of self-determination and that there was
no prospect of negotiating political
changes leading toward independence.
We had to establish a clandestine political
force within Mozambique to prepare the
people for the very difficult task of liberating the country. Secondly, we decided
to establish a clandestine military program. Thirdly, we agreed to establish
an educational program that would emphasize leadership training.
Kitchen: Why were you so certain from
the beginning that force would be
necessary?
Mondlane: Portugal is controlled by a
government which does not even accept
the idea of democracy and individual
freedom for the people of metropolitan
Portugal. Consequently it is inconceivable
that it would voluntarily accept the idea
that colonial peoples like ourselves should
have these rights, much less independence. Portugal cannot be compared with
such colonial powers as France or Britain.
The Salazar regime does not believe in
frank, logical, and peaceful dialogue; it
expects obedience. For this reason, we
found it necessary to assume from the
beginning that liberation would require
the use of force.
Kitchen: Where did you first turn for
assistance in training and equipping
frelimo'.v  military force?
Mondlane: At the September 1962 conference we discussed this problem at
considerable length. At that time, the only
African state that had had a successful
military experience against a determined
and well-armed colonial power was Algeria. It was logical, then, that we should
turn to Algeria. We arranged to meet
with President Ahmed Ben Bella to propose a program of preparation for our
people. The Algerian Government received our request favorably, and the first
group of freedom fighters was sent to
Algeria within less than six months. Their
training served as a basis for further
training of Mozambicans in East Africa
and later in  Mozambique itself.
By September 1964, when we launched
our first military action, we had a force
of 250 well-trained and equipped young
men.
Kitchen: Is frelimo's military arm still
based on the Algerian model?
Mondlane: The Mozambican army is a
guerrilla army in the most modern sense
of this term. The original program was
established with Algerian advice and
training, and was thus shaped on the basis
of the Algerian experience in fighting
against the French Army. In three years
of fighting, however, we have acquired
experience of our own, plus ideas from
reading widely on various techniques of
guerrilla warfare, and from contacts with
other liberation struggles elsewhere. Thus
we have developed our own conception
of the struggle and are slowly but definitely tailoring our techniques to the
specific problems of Mozambique. Successful guerrilla warfare must be rooted
in reality. In Mozambique, that means it
must take into account the nature of our
terrain, the kind of people the Portuguese
are, and their proportion in the country.
Kitchen: You said that 250 frelimo
troops launched the military phase of the
revolution in September 1964. How many
trained men do you now have in the
field?
Mondlane: Within a year after the war
began on September 25, 1964—which
we now celebrate as national liberation
day—we had more than 1,500 trained
troops. In two years, we had more than
7.000. Now we have over 8,000 trained,
well-equipped  men and women.
Kitchen: Can some areas of Mozambique
he  said   to   be   under   frelimo   control?
Mondlane. Our army i^ fighting in one-
third of the country, and I would say
that about one-fifth of the total area of
Mozambique (with a population of almost a million out of the total population
of 7 million) is under our virtual control.
Kitchen: Is military activity directed
primarily against the Portuguese military
or against the entire colonial presence in
Mozambique?
Mondlane: We had to grapple with this
question at our first congress. Given the
imbalance of forces, we had to determine
exactly whom to shoot in Mozambique.
For reasons of morality, strategy, and
economy, we had to choose the army first.
So our men are trained in the techniques
of fighting primarily the Portuguese
Army, the police, the pide (the Portuguese political police), and all the bodies
that are related to the military establishment, including spies. Secondly, we are
concerned with certain administrative
centers outside the army which support
the army. Certain economic projects that
support the Portuguese Army are also
targets of our attack. But we do not regard economic projects as a primary target because the natural resources of
Mozambique are our own, even though
they may be controlled by the Portuguese
today. Exceptions must sometimes be
made for military reasons, but we try to
preserve the little economic development
that has taken place in Mozambique
when we can. This, I think, is as clear as
I can make it.
Kitchen: There have been reports from
time to time of frelimo "terrorist" attacks on Portuguese civilians and on pro-
Portuguese Africans in Mozambique.
Are these true?
Mondlane: We do not encourage attacks
on civilians of any kind, be they black,
white, colored, or Asian, so long as they
are not armed to fight against us and
are not cooperating with the Portuguese
Army. The reason for our prohibition of
attacks on civilians of all races is that
we are not fighting against the Portuguese
people as such. We are fighting the
Portuguese Government and its colonial,
exploitative, imperialist establishment in
Mozambique. Any Portuguese whites or
Asians or any people who are not traditional Mozambican people and who
may wish to stay in Mozambique after
we become free are welcome—even as
members of freumo.
Even church groups who are working
in t^e -bush are safe. We have had cases
of Catholic bishops and priests moving
about in complete safety in our area
because we knew they were not serving
in the Portuguese Army. In 1966, for
example, a Catholic priest was sent by
the Bishop of Portugal to a province in
the area where we are fighting to search
for some white families who had disappeared. The Portuguese had been
spreading stories that our men had raped,
killed, and eaten these white women and
their children. In fact, we helped the
priest go through our bases into Tanzania,
where he found all the white people; we
then gave him permission to return to
Mozambique, where he is now working.
frelimo militants had taken those white
people out of the war area to safehaven
when they asked to bec removed, and
helped the priest who was sent to find
them. Surely this is conclusive proof
that we do not harm anybody who is not
our enemy, regardless of his race, religion
or color.
Kitchen: Do your military forces encounter any suspicion or antipathy from
Mozambicans when they seek to establish
control in a given area?
Mondlane: We have little opportunity to
find out because the Portuguese authorities define all black people in an area
as guerrillas as soon as the area is affected by guerrilla action. They bombard
and attack civilians, and the civilians
very promptly abandon whatever feelings
(Continued on Page 49)
32
AFRICA REPORT, NOVEMBER 1967
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