CENPA-178~02 |
Save page Remove page | Previous | 2 of 6 | Next |
|
small (250x250 max)
medium (500x500 max)
Large (1000x1000 max)
Extra Large
large ( > 500x500)
Full Resolution
All (PDF)
|
This page
All
|
Loading content ...
wnoHHt ^BBHBl mit himself as an individual, not as part of a sub-group. We called a first party congress for September 1962 and managed to bring many influential and representative Africans out of Mozambique to help draw up the policy guidelines of the new movement. Kitchen: What were the major policy lines agreed on at that first congress in Dar es Salaam? Mondlane: There were three. First, we accepted it as a fact of life that Salazar's Portugal was unable to accept the idea of self-determination and that there was no prospect of negotiating political changes leading toward independence. We had to establish a clandestine political force within Mozambique to prepare the people for the very difficult task of liberating the country. Secondly, we decided to establish a clandestine military program. Thirdly, we agreed to establish an educational program that would emphasize leadership training. Kitchen: Why were you so certain from the beginning that force would be necessary? Mondlane: Portugal is controlled by a government which does not even accept the idea of democracy and individual freedom for the people of metropolitan Portugal. Consequently it is inconceivable that it would voluntarily accept the idea that colonial peoples like ourselves should have these rights, much less independence. Portugal cannot be compared with such colonial powers as France or Britain. The Salazar regime does not believe in frank, logical, and peaceful dialogue; it expects obedience. For this reason, we found it necessary to assume from the beginning that liberation would require the use of force. Kitchen: Where did you first turn for assistance in training and equipping frelimo'.v military force? Mondlane: At the September 1962 conference we discussed this problem at considerable length. At that time, the only African state that had had a successful military experience against a determined and well-armed colonial power was Algeria. It was logical, then, that we should turn to Algeria. We arranged to meet with President Ahmed Ben Bella to propose a program of preparation for our people. The Algerian Government received our request favorably, and the first group of freedom fighters was sent to Algeria within less than six months. Their training served as a basis for further training of Mozambicans in East Africa and later in Mozambique itself. By September 1964, when we launched our first military action, we had a force of 250 well-trained and equipped young men. Kitchen: Is frelimo's military arm still based on the Algerian model? Mondlane: The Mozambican army is a guerrilla army in the most modern sense of this term. The original program was established with Algerian advice and training, and was thus shaped on the basis of the Algerian experience in fighting against the French Army. In three years of fighting, however, we have acquired experience of our own, plus ideas from reading widely on various techniques of guerrilla warfare, and from contacts with other liberation struggles elsewhere. Thus we have developed our own conception of the struggle and are slowly but definitely tailoring our techniques to the specific problems of Mozambique. Successful guerrilla warfare must be rooted in reality. In Mozambique, that means it must take into account the nature of our terrain, the kind of people the Portuguese are, and their proportion in the country. Kitchen: You said that 250 frelimo troops launched the military phase of the revolution in September 1964. How many trained men do you now have in the field? Mondlane: Within a year after the war began on September 25, 1964—which we now celebrate as national liberation day—we had more than 1,500 trained troops. In two years, we had more than 7.000. Now we have over 8,000 trained, well-equipped men and women. Kitchen: Can some areas of Mozambique he said to be under frelimo control? Mondlane. Our army i^ fighting in one- third of the country, and I would say that about one-fifth of the total area of Mozambique (with a population of almost a million out of the total population of 7 million) is under our virtual control. Kitchen: Is military activity directed primarily against the Portuguese military or against the entire colonial presence in Mozambique? Mondlane: We had to grapple with this question at our first congress. Given the imbalance of forces, we had to determine exactly whom to shoot in Mozambique. For reasons of morality, strategy, and economy, we had to choose the army first. So our men are trained in the techniques of fighting primarily the Portuguese Army, the police, the pide (the Portuguese political police), and all the bodies that are related to the military establishment, including spies. Secondly, we are concerned with certain administrative centers outside the army which support the army. Certain economic projects that support the Portuguese Army are also targets of our attack. But we do not regard economic projects as a primary target because the natural resources of Mozambique are our own, even though they may be controlled by the Portuguese today. Exceptions must sometimes be made for military reasons, but we try to preserve the little economic development that has taken place in Mozambique when we can. This, I think, is as clear as I can make it. Kitchen: There have been reports from time to time of frelimo "terrorist" attacks on Portuguese civilians and on pro- Portuguese Africans in Mozambique. Are these true? Mondlane: We do not encourage attacks on civilians of any kind, be they black, white, colored, or Asian, so long as they are not armed to fight against us and are not cooperating with the Portuguese Army. The reason for our prohibition of attacks on civilians of all races is that we are not fighting against the Portuguese people as such. We are fighting the Portuguese Government and its colonial, exploitative, imperialist establishment in Mozambique. Any Portuguese whites or Asians or any people who are not traditional Mozambican people and who may wish to stay in Mozambique after we become free are welcome—even as members of freumo. Even church groups who are working in t^e -bush are safe. We have had cases of Catholic bishops and priests moving about in complete safety in our area because we knew they were not serving in the Portuguese Army. In 1966, for example, a Catholic priest was sent by the Bishop of Portugal to a province in the area where we are fighting to search for some white families who had disappeared. The Portuguese had been spreading stories that our men had raped, killed, and eaten these white women and their children. In fact, we helped the priest go through our bases into Tanzania, where he found all the white people; we then gave him permission to return to Mozambique, where he is now working. frelimo militants had taken those white people out of the war area to safehaven when they asked to bec removed, and helped the priest who was sent to find them. Surely this is conclusive proof that we do not harm anybody who is not our enemy, regardless of his race, religion or color. Kitchen: Do your military forces encounter any suspicion or antipathy from Mozambicans when they seek to establish control in a given area? Mondlane: We have little opportunity to find out because the Portuguese authorities define all black people in an area as guerrillas as soon as the area is affected by guerrilla action. They bombard and attack civilians, and the civilians very promptly abandon whatever feelings (Continued on Page 49) 32 AFRICA REPORT, NOVEMBER 1967 wja&- -*m~~ .. ...:-^tt^---1yntffe-*ViV>iT-;r-riii^ff-<,Ha^Y-iA,tf!^ .*.!„■-; i..frr.Vn iittniirlii'ifrir
Object Description
Description
Title | CENPA-178~02 |
Filename | CENPA-178~02.tiff |
Full text | wnoHHt ^BBHBl mit himself as an individual, not as part of a sub-group. We called a first party congress for September 1962 and managed to bring many influential and representative Africans out of Mozambique to help draw up the policy guidelines of the new movement. Kitchen: What were the major policy lines agreed on at that first congress in Dar es Salaam? Mondlane: There were three. First, we accepted it as a fact of life that Salazar's Portugal was unable to accept the idea of self-determination and that there was no prospect of negotiating political changes leading toward independence. We had to establish a clandestine political force within Mozambique to prepare the people for the very difficult task of liberating the country. Secondly, we decided to establish a clandestine military program. Thirdly, we agreed to establish an educational program that would emphasize leadership training. Kitchen: Why were you so certain from the beginning that force would be necessary? Mondlane: Portugal is controlled by a government which does not even accept the idea of democracy and individual freedom for the people of metropolitan Portugal. Consequently it is inconceivable that it would voluntarily accept the idea that colonial peoples like ourselves should have these rights, much less independence. Portugal cannot be compared with such colonial powers as France or Britain. The Salazar regime does not believe in frank, logical, and peaceful dialogue; it expects obedience. For this reason, we found it necessary to assume from the beginning that liberation would require the use of force. Kitchen: Where did you first turn for assistance in training and equipping frelimo'.v military force? Mondlane: At the September 1962 conference we discussed this problem at considerable length. At that time, the only African state that had had a successful military experience against a determined and well-armed colonial power was Algeria. It was logical, then, that we should turn to Algeria. We arranged to meet with President Ahmed Ben Bella to propose a program of preparation for our people. The Algerian Government received our request favorably, and the first group of freedom fighters was sent to Algeria within less than six months. Their training served as a basis for further training of Mozambicans in East Africa and later in Mozambique itself. By September 1964, when we launched our first military action, we had a force of 250 well-trained and equipped young men. Kitchen: Is frelimo's military arm still based on the Algerian model? Mondlane: The Mozambican army is a guerrilla army in the most modern sense of this term. The original program was established with Algerian advice and training, and was thus shaped on the basis of the Algerian experience in fighting against the French Army. In three years of fighting, however, we have acquired experience of our own, plus ideas from reading widely on various techniques of guerrilla warfare, and from contacts with other liberation struggles elsewhere. Thus we have developed our own conception of the struggle and are slowly but definitely tailoring our techniques to the specific problems of Mozambique. Successful guerrilla warfare must be rooted in reality. In Mozambique, that means it must take into account the nature of our terrain, the kind of people the Portuguese are, and their proportion in the country. Kitchen: You said that 250 frelimo troops launched the military phase of the revolution in September 1964. How many trained men do you now have in the field? Mondlane: Within a year after the war began on September 25, 1964—which we now celebrate as national liberation day—we had more than 1,500 trained troops. In two years, we had more than 7.000. Now we have over 8,000 trained, well-equipped men and women. Kitchen: Can some areas of Mozambique he said to be under frelimo control? Mondlane. Our army i^ fighting in one- third of the country, and I would say that about one-fifth of the total area of Mozambique (with a population of almost a million out of the total population of 7 million) is under our virtual control. Kitchen: Is military activity directed primarily against the Portuguese military or against the entire colonial presence in Mozambique? Mondlane: We had to grapple with this question at our first congress. Given the imbalance of forces, we had to determine exactly whom to shoot in Mozambique. For reasons of morality, strategy, and economy, we had to choose the army first. So our men are trained in the techniques of fighting primarily the Portuguese Army, the police, the pide (the Portuguese political police), and all the bodies that are related to the military establishment, including spies. Secondly, we are concerned with certain administrative centers outside the army which support the army. Certain economic projects that support the Portuguese Army are also targets of our attack. But we do not regard economic projects as a primary target because the natural resources of Mozambique are our own, even though they may be controlled by the Portuguese today. Exceptions must sometimes be made for military reasons, but we try to preserve the little economic development that has taken place in Mozambique when we can. This, I think, is as clear as I can make it. Kitchen: There have been reports from time to time of frelimo "terrorist" attacks on Portuguese civilians and on pro- Portuguese Africans in Mozambique. Are these true? Mondlane: We do not encourage attacks on civilians of any kind, be they black, white, colored, or Asian, so long as they are not armed to fight against us and are not cooperating with the Portuguese Army. The reason for our prohibition of attacks on civilians of all races is that we are not fighting against the Portuguese people as such. We are fighting the Portuguese Government and its colonial, exploitative, imperialist establishment in Mozambique. Any Portuguese whites or Asians or any people who are not traditional Mozambican people and who may wish to stay in Mozambique after we become free are welcome—even as members of freumo. Even church groups who are working in t^e -bush are safe. We have had cases of Catholic bishops and priests moving about in complete safety in our area because we knew they were not serving in the Portuguese Army. In 1966, for example, a Catholic priest was sent by the Bishop of Portugal to a province in the area where we are fighting to search for some white families who had disappeared. The Portuguese had been spreading stories that our men had raped, killed, and eaten these white women and their children. In fact, we helped the priest go through our bases into Tanzania, where he found all the white people; we then gave him permission to return to Mozambique, where he is now working. frelimo militants had taken those white people out of the war area to safehaven when they asked to bec removed, and helped the priest who was sent to find them. Surely this is conclusive proof that we do not harm anybody who is not our enemy, regardless of his race, religion or color. Kitchen: Do your military forces encounter any suspicion or antipathy from Mozambicans when they seek to establish control in a given area? Mondlane: We have little opportunity to find out because the Portuguese authorities define all black people in an area as guerrillas as soon as the area is affected by guerrilla action. They bombard and attack civilians, and the civilians very promptly abandon whatever feelings (Continued on Page 49) 32 AFRICA REPORT, NOVEMBER 1967 wja&- -*m~~ .. ...:-^tt^---1yntffe-*ViV>iT-;r-riii^ff-<,Ha^Y-iA,tf!^ .*.!„■-; i..frr.Vn iittniirlii'ifrir |
Archival file | Volume12/CENPA-178~02.tiff |