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Decisions to ratify the Kyoto Protocol: a Latin American perspective on poliheuristic theory
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Decisions to ratify the Kyoto Protocol: a Latin American perspective on poliheuristic theory
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Content
DECISIONS TO RATIFY THE KYOTO PROTOCOL:
A LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON POLIHEURISTC THEORY
by
Amy Margaret Below
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)
December 2008
Copyright 2008 Amy Margaret Below
ii
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank many people for their support and advice throughout the
dissertation process. I would first like to thank Dr. Sheldon Kamieniecki for suggesting
that I to return to graduate school and pursue a PhD and for starting me off on the right
path in the program. I would also like to thank Ms. Kara Hunter for helping me make
that difficult decision to become a student yet again. Of course a big thank you is
necessary for my committee members Drs. Carol Wise, Juliet Musso and my invaluable
adviser Dr. Patrick James. I want to thank Dr. Wise for sharing with me her expertise in
Latin America, in particular helping provide me with those ever-important first contacts
in a foreign country. My dissertation was also most definitely improved because of my
interview contacts in Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela who volunteered their time to
speak with me. I also want to thank Dr. James for being the ever-diligent adviser and
reading multiple drafts of my dissertation and helping guide me through the entire
process- and for being so prompt responding to the copious amounts of emails I’ve sent
him. Of course no list of acknowledgements would be complete without thanking my
mom, dad and brother for all their love, support and long phone calls that sustained me
over the last years.
iii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………..ii
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………...v
List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………….vi
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………..vii
Chapter 1:
To Join or Not to Join & How Do You Decide?..............................................................1
The Issue of Global Warming......................................................................................... 3
A Prelude to a Protocol................................................................................................... 4
A Protocol is Born .......................................................................................................... 6
Dissertation Roadmap..................................................................................................... 8
Chapter 2:
Literature Review………………………......……………………….………………….11
The Rise of the Individual............................................................................................. 11
An Environmental Application..................................................................................... 35
Environmental Latin America....................................................................................... 40
Latin American Foreign Policy..................................................................................... 47
Concluding Remarks..................................................................................................... 58
Chapter 3:
Methodological Underpinnings…………………………………….…………….……61
Theory Testing Case Study........................................................................................... 61
Process-Tracing............................................................................................................. 64
Data collection .............................................................................................................. 65
Case Selection............................................................................................................... 73
Concluding Remarks..................................................................................................... 81
Chapter 4:
Argentina: Menem’s Voluntary Commitment to the U.S………………....…………82
The Evolution (or Vacillation) of Argentine Foreign Policy........................................ 83
Argentina, the Environment and The Kyoto Protocol .................................................. 91
President Menem and Poliheuristic Theory................................................................ 107
Concluding Remarks................................................................................................... 123
iv
Chapter 5:
Mexico: Zedillo’s Move for Leadership & Stewardship………………...………….125
Interdependence and Nonintervention in Mexican Foreign Policy ............................ 125
Mexico, the Environment and The Kyoto Protocol.................................................... 135
President Zedillo and Poliheuristic Theory................................................................. 157
Concluding Remarks................................................................................................... 169
Chapter 6:
Venezuela: Chavez’s Change of Heart…………………………………………….…172
The Extension of Venezuelan Foreign Policy ............................................................ 172
Venezuela, the Environment and The Kyoto Protocol ............................................... 183
The Beginnings of the Chavez Revolution ................................................................. 192
President Chavez and Poliheuristic Theory ................................................................ 208
Concluding Remarks................................................................................................... 223
Chapter 7:
Contributions from Carlos, Ernesto and Hugo………………………………...……225
Poliheuristic Theory’s Overall Appraisal ................................................................... 227
The Prioritization of Domestic Political Concerns Reconsidered .............................. 229
The Noncompensatory Principle Revisited ................................................................ 240
The Uniqueness of Low Politics and Non-Crisis Situations....................................... 241
Suggested Considerations for Poliheuristic Theory.................................................... 244
Additional Research.................................................................................................... 247
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………248
APPENDIX A…………………………………………………………………………..272
APPENDIX B…………...……………………………………………………………...281
v
List of Tables
Table 7.1 Analyses Summary by President and Decision-making Phase....................... 226
Table 7.2 Contribution to Poliheuristic Theory Development........................................ 246
vi
List of Figures
Figure 4.1 Menem’s Policy Options and First Phase Eliminations……………………110
Figure 4.2 Menem’s Remaining Policy Options and Phase Two Eliminations………..120
Figure 5.1 Zedillo’s Policy Options and First Phase Eliminations…………………….160
Figure 5.2 Zedillo’s Remaining Policy Options and Phase Two Eliminations……...…166
Figure 6.1 Chavez’s Policy Options and First Phase Eliminations…………………….214
Figure 6.2 Chavez’s Remaining Policy Options and Phase Two Eliminations………...220
Figure 6.3 Changes to Chavez’s Remaining Options due to Russia’s Ratification…….221
vii
Abstract
Theories of foreign policy analysis have been successfully applied to a seemingly
wide array of case studies. They have been used to explain why individuals or collectives
have decided to invade another country, rescue hostages or wage war, for example. In
other words, they have largely been applied to high politics or crisis situations. This
study takes one such theory and applies it to a different class of low politics, non-crisis
cases in order to test its generalizability. The following study applies poliheuristic theory
to three cases of environmental foreign policy decision-making. Specifically, the theory
is tested against the cases of President Carlos Menem of Argentina, President Ernesto
Zedillo of Mexico and President Hugo Chávez and their decisions to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol and join the global climate change regime. This new application has
implications not only for the generalizability and general strength of poliheuristic theory,
but for foreign policy analysis more generally and environmental and Latin American
foreign policy decision-making more specifically. The results of the study provide
support for the foundations of the theory in that all three presidents utilized a combination
of cognitive and rational decision strategies to reach their final decision. The results are
less supportive of the specific prediction that the decision-makers eliminate policy
options early in the process based on a primary criterion of domestic political concerns.
The results instead reveal the presidents prioritized international or personal concerns. In
the end, the study advocates for some re-theorizing of poliheuristic theory to better
explain low politics and non-crisis situations in general and environmental and Latin
American/developing nations foreign policy decisions in particular.
1
Chapter 1
To Join or Not to Join & How Do You Decide?
The discipline of international relations (IR) is ripe with theories that attempt to
explain decision-maker behavior in foreign policy. Under the influence of realist theory
that has historically dominated the study of IR, especially in the U.S., theories of foreign
policy analysis are commonly applied to issues such as the struggle for power, the use of
force, and, of course, waging war. In this way, most theories have attempted to explain
high politics and security issues. However, having been largely applied to a limited set of
foreign policy case studies, their ultimate generalizability remains questionable.
According to King, Keohane and Verba, “we should always try to specify the bounds of
applicability” (1994:103). In the quest for maximum leverage, it is important to realize
that, “most useful social science theories are valid under particular conditions…or in
particular settings” (ibid.). This study seeks to strengthen foreign policy analysis theory
by testing existing theory within a new realm of empirical case studies.
One such theory of foreign policy analysis that, while still in the formative stages,
has largely been applied to high politics case studies is poliheuristic theory (PH). The
uniqueness of PH is that it is a theory that combines the logic of rational choice theory
with ideas borrowed from cognitive psychology that acknowledge how individuals do not
always make rational decisions. The result is a theory comprised of two decision-making
phases. In the first, decision-makers use cognitive heuristics to narrow the field of
possible policy options to a more manageable set. In the second, decision-makers
employ more traditionally rational decision strategies to select their final policy choice.
2
This study serves to test the generalizability of PH by applying it to the relatively
young subfield of international environmental relations. As is explained in greater detail
in Chapter 3, the cases chosen for analysis are the decisions of three Latin American
presidents to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (The Protocol). Via its application to these three
new cases, this study will assess whether or not the theory can explain environmental
foreign policy decision making or whether this subfield lies beyond the bounds of its
ability to explain decision-making behavior.
Thus, the test performed herein will highlight the theory’s strengths and
weaknesses, the results of which may be used to strengthen, modify and/or improve
existing theory or pave the way for the creation of new theories altogether. The results
will be used to inform any reconceptualization necessary for PH, and could also be used
to inform theorizing in the field of foreign policy analysis at large (as well as have
potential impacts on theorizing in political psychology). Thus, any confirmation of the
theory or challenges to it would be beneficial, not only to PH, but to other similar theories
that attempt to explain foreign policy (or other political) decision making. Expected
contributions could regard the rational versus cognitive debate, the use of the
noncompensatory principle or provide support for a particular level of analysis as being
the most influential. The results will inform the study decision making as a whole, as
well as that particular to environmental issues, Latin America and developing nations.
This study will also have practical importance as regards current and future
international environmental decision making. The use of international environmental
policy case studies as a testing ground can facilitate a better understanding of how policy
3
decisions are made in a subfield of growing global concern and importance. Especially
as the international community continues its struggle with addressing global
environmental change, obtaining a better understanding of how such foreign policy
decisions are made will be beneficial in years to come. The results could have specific
significance for the global climate change regime. As The Protocol is set to expire in
2012 and as new rounds of negotiations are already underway, any insight that can be
gleaned from previous negotiations and decision making would likely benefit the latest
and future rounds.
As previously mentioned, the case chosen to test PH is that of the ratification of
The Protocol, the international manifestation of the global climate change regime. What
follows is a brief introduction to the issue of climate change and The Protocol.
The Issue of Global Warming
The earth’s hospitable temperature is naturally maintained by the greenhouse
effect.
1
Short-wave solar radiation passes through the atmosphere and heats the earth’s
surface. Long-wave terrestrial radiation is then emitted from the surface back upward
and is partially absorbed by the atmosphere keeping the surface warm enough to support
life. Scientists have generally concurred that there has been an “enhancement” of the
greenhouse effect wherein more radiation is being trapped in the atmosphere, thus
heating the surface above what would occur naturally. This phenomenon is what is
referred to as global warming.
1
The majority of the following three sections is borrowed from Below (2008).
4
What scientists believed trapped the radiation was an increase in greenhouse
gases (GHGs) (IPCC, 1990). Greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous
oxide, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), ozone and water vapor. The largest source of GHGs
is the burning of fossil fuels to generate energy. Two of the largest contributors are
industry and automobiles.
2
Scientists have also confirmed that deforestation was
contributing to global warming. Trees act as a natural sink for carbon dioxide and help
regulate the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Increased rates of deforestation
were rapidly decreasing the amount of the gas that could be absorbed naturally.
A Prelude to a Protocol
In response to growing consensus in the international scientific community
(Hempel 2003; Hoffmann 2005), in 1988 the World Meteorological Organization and the
UN formed the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to objectively study
and assess “climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and
mitigation” (IPCC 2006). The IPCC’s first report, released in 1990, concluded that GHG
emissions from human activity were enhancing the natural greenhouse effect and warned
of the need to reduce significantly certain emissions to, at the very least, stabilize
concentrations at current levels.
Based on these conclusions, the International Negotiating Committee (INC) was
formed in 1990 and charged with preparing what would become the United Nations
2
Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and ozone have both natural and human
sources, but CFCs are only produced industrially. While water vapor has the largest
impact on the greenhouse effect, it is regulated naturally and humans have little impact
on the concentration of water vapor in the atmosphere.
5
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to be unveiled at the 1992 Earth
Summit. The INC met several times in 1991 and 1992 but negotiations were often
difficult, largely because of U.S. opposition to any strict emission reductions that it
believed would hurts its economy.
The UNFCCC required yearly meetings to review implementation of the
Convention. At the first Conference of the Parties (COP 1) in 1995 in Berlin, even with a
new president, the U.S. was still resistant to making any commitments. At COP 2 in
Geneva, the U.S. stated that it would be willing to consider binding commitments and
time frames only if they could trade emission credits with developing nations (Hempel
2003).
Prior to COP 3, the U.S. Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution by an
overwhelming vote of 95 to 0 signaling to President Clinton that the Senate was not in
favor of any binding commitments and would not ratify an agreement if signed by the
President (Victor 2004). The Resolution also expressed the Senate’s dissatisfaction with
the proposed exemption for developing nations. The Protocol was not expected to
require developing nations to reduce their emissions but would require developed nations
to make some sort of measurable reduction. Via the resolution, the Senate expressed its
strong opinion that such restrictions and allowances are unfair to developed nations,
especially considering that emissions from developing nations are expected to increase
and eventually surpass those of the developed world. (The importance of this U.S.
position will become clear in the following case studies.)
6
A Protocol is Born
Following long and intense negotiations at COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan (many, but not
all, instigated by perceived disparities in responsibility between developed and
developing nations), the majority of industrial nations and some Eastern European
countries together wrote The Protocol. The Protocol was intended to correct some of the
deficiencies of the original, voluntary UNFCCC and serve as a legally binding agreement
to reduce GHGs emissions.
The crucial and most controversial component of The Protocol is its division of
the world into two distinct halves: developed and developing nations. Developed nations,
termed Annex-I nations, included Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) nations (as of 1992) and economies in transition (i.e., the Russian
Federation and other Eastern European states). These countries are required to reduce
their GHG emissions below a base rate of 1990 emissions during the commitment period
2008 to 2012. Reduction rates vary in percentage reduction by country but should all be
above five percent (of 1990 levels). Developing nations, termed non-Annex I nations, are
not subject to emission reduction timelines. In addition, Annex-I nations are required to
assist non-Annex I parties by providing financial and technological assistance, largely via
The Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms.
3
This division of the world into two groups is the
3
The three flexibility mechanisms built into the Protocol are 1) clean development
mechanisms, 2) joint implementation programs and 3) emissions trading. They are
intended to help nations meet their reduction targets via market-based mechanisms.
Clean development mechanisms allow nations with reduction requirements (Annex I
nations) to earn credit for investing in projects that reduce emissions in developing (non-
Annex I) nations. Joint implementation programs allow for a similar pairing but between
two Annex-I nations. The emissions trading mechanism in effect creates the carbon
7
manifestation of The Protocol’s idea of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” All
nations have the common responsibility to address global warming, but each county’s
responsibility to do so is different. Basically, industrialized nations have been the biggest
contributors to the problem and thus have a greater responsibility to act.
Built into The Protocol was an internal mechanism stating that emission
reductions would not be imposed and timelines would not be implemented until 55
parties, representing at least 55 percent of 1990 emissions, had ratified. The Protocol was
open for signatures from March of 1998 to March of the following year by which time 84
nations had signed. Unfortunate for its advocates, the 84 nations did not comprise the
necessary 55 percent of total emissions to set The Protocol in motion.
Regardless, signatories were hopeful and continued to meet annually. Yet despite
growing confirmation of rising temperatures and the anthropogenic effects on global
climate, there was rarely any consensus or progress on major issues. The U.S. was often
to blame. When George W. Bush was narrowly elected president in 2000 the difficulties
with the U.S. position intensified. Although during his presidential campaign Bush
claimed to support environmental causes, upon taking office his actions were noticeably
less environmentally-friendly.
By 2001, many countries had signed and ratified The Protocol, but signatory
countries still did not constitute the required 55 percent of global emissions. This placed
increased pressure on countries like the U.S. and Russia who constituted some of the
market wherein nations that have a surplus of emission credits (who have reduced more
than the required amount) can sell these credits to another nation that is running a deficit
(who need to reduce more emissions to meet their target).
8
biggest polluters and whose emissions would help The Protocol attain the necessary
percentage. Many in the international community looked to the U.S., but under Bush’s
leadership, the nation refused to ratify. It is in this context that three presidents in this
study had to make the decision whether or not they should ratify The Protocol. Facing
the same international context but different domestic conditions, each president made his
decision in ways somewhat explicable using an application of PH. However, as will
become apparent in later chapters, the theory is not able to sufficiently explain their exact
decision processes.
Dissertation Roadmap
This study begins with a review of existing literature including summaries of the
origins and evolution of both rational choice and cognitive theories as specifically applied
to foreign policy decision making. The review includes discussion of the perceived
“rational versus cognitive” debate as well as the application of both to environmental
decision making. As the case studies selected are Latin American nations, the review
naturally includes a review of work on environmental issues in the region as well as a
summary of the discourse on Latin American foreign policy.
Chapter 3 describes the methodology of the study and includes a description of
data collection and case selection. A process-tracing approach was used to determine the
decision-making processes and then PH was applied to each case. Data for the process
tracing was collected via United Nations and national documentation, public speeches
and personal interviews. This chapter also introduces the cases chosen for study. A
9
single region was selected in order to control for regional variability and Latin America
was chosen because of its proximity and relations with the U.S. It was also chosen
because of some of the unifying characteristics of its member nations. The three nations
chosen for analysis were Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela. Among other reasons, these
states were selected as they are all large producers and consumers of oil and large
emitters of GHGs, very important concerns in the global climate change regime.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 contain case studies and analyses of Argentina, Mexico and
Venezuela, respectively. Each chapter is divided into three main sections. The first
presents an historical account of each nation’s foreign policy with a focus on the
decisions and context of the decision-maker under analysis (Presidents Menem, Zedillo
and Chavez, respectively). This first section also includes a brief summary of
environmental problems and policy-making in the respective country. The second
section describes the decision-making process, via process-tracing, that led each president
to make his final policy choice. The final section is an application of PH to the decision-
making process and an assessment of its performance in the individual case study.
Chapter 7 concludes the study by providing an overall appraisal of PH’s
application. The cumulative results of all three of the preceding chapters suggest that
while the fundamental theorizing behind PH is supported, the specific requirements in the
theory’s first phase are less so. The results suggest that, with respect to these three case
studies, domestic political concerns were not the primary criterion used by the decision-
makers and that additional attention should be paid to this particular aspect of the theory.
Overall, this study argues it is not likely PH, in its current form, can be successfully
10
applied to all environmental foreign policy decision making. By extension, this casts
some doubt on PH’s applicability to other low politics and non-crisis decision scenarios.
The study concludes with suggestions for enhancements to the theory as well as for future
research in this area.
11
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter provides a summary of existing literatures that provide the
foundational support upon which the present study is built. It begins with a summary of
rational choice and cognitive decision making literature, including the discourse on a
perceived debate between the two camps. It then continues with a more detailed
discussion of theories of foreign policy analysis and a section devoted to poliheuristic
theory, the theory tested in this study. The discussion of decision making ends with a
discussion specific to environmental decision making. The second half of this chapter
includes a discussion of environmentalism in Latin America, including issues of the
North-South divide and environmental problems and protection in the region. This is
followed by a summary of existing literature on foreign policy in Latin America and the
question as to whether a unified theory exists.
The Rise of the Individual
Realism, neorealism and other structuralist and systemic theories have shaped the
fundamentals of research and understanding in the field of international relations (IR)
since the field’s inception. These theories provide parsimonious and clear explanations
for state behavior in the international system. Nations are rational actors within a system
that dictates behavior. Aside from the infrequent anomaly, states act based on the
12
outcome of rational calculations.
4
As it shares many of these fundamental precepts,
Rational Choice Theory (RCT), borrowed from economics, has been applied to years of
study to explain thousands of cases of international behavior.
In recent decades, however, a new challenger has taken the field. Many scholars
have come to find that realist and systemic theories utilizing RCT have not been able to
successfully explain all state behavior. What they have found is that the state is not a
homogenous unit, but instead a conglomerate of individual decision-makers.
5
With this
understanding, individuals and groups of individuals have become the nucleus of study
thereby necessitating an emphasis on the individual unit of analysis. To do so, the field
has borrowed from another field, this time that of psychology. Political scientists and IR
scholars have learned of the benefits of applying concepts from social and cognitive
psychology to political situations with great success.
6
Although this alternative approach
to explaining international behavior is part of a growing literature and has many
followers, it is not necessarily a direct threat to the validity of rational models. A handful
of theories have been developed and tested that combine rational and cognitive theories
into one. It is one such theory, poliheuristic theory, on which this study focuses.
4
For example, decision makers rely on expected value, and in instances such as Pearl
Harbor, will chose a bad gamble over certain defeat.
5
The bureaucratic politics literature, including Allison (1971) and Allison and Halperin
(1972), is a strong example of theorizing about the component parts of a government and
how they interact and make decisions.
6
One such scholarly outgrowth of the cross-pollination of ideas is the journal Political
Psychology. Topics have included articles on emotion and perception and their effects on
decision making, identity and politics, personality and political leadership and how
individual belief systems (on race, democracy, human rights, etc.) affect political
behavior, to name just a few.
13
Our Rational Past and Present
From the influential ideas of Adam Smith and other renowned economists,
political science has adopted the notion of the rational actor. This positivist perspective
posits that actors behave based on rational calculations. When provided with perfect
information, actors behave in accordance with their self interest and act to maximize
benefits. Actors rationally assess alternatives and choose the one that provides the most
benefit. What this means for political science research is that, if all actors behave
rationally, then when faced with the same set of circumstances, all actors will behave in a
predictable manner.
7
Thus, RCT is a parsimonious and generalizable theory that should
be able to explain virtually all political behavior.
When applied to international political behavior, RCT becomes more complex as
the primary actor becomes not a person but a nation-state and as the conditions to which
one reacts expand to encompass the entire international system. Nonetheless, the basic
simplicity of the model persists. The first adjustment for a realist application to IR is that
individuals are no longer the decision-making unit; they are traditionally replaced by
nation-states. States are seen as a collective of individuals that share an overriding
“national interest in foreign policymaking” (Rosati 2000, 46) and together act as a unitary
rational actor thinking and acting “rationally in their quest for power, wealth, and
7
William Riker’s 1962 work The Theory of Political Coalitions, a classic in RCT, used
economic and game-theoretic models to explain why and how politicians form coalitions.
This piece laid the groundwork for the future of rational choice theorizing in both
domestic and international politics.
14
prestige” (Ibid., 45). Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) write that these unitary
rational actors strategically select “actions to maximize expected utility given particular
aims” (18).
Another adjustment is that under the dominant realist understanding of IR,
systemic factors determine behavior. Actors respond to existing international conditions,
including power centers/polarity and regional or world hegemons (threatening or
existing). States make calculative decisions based on power politics in an anarchic
system. They make choices based on the desire to stay alive and, then, increase their
world-wide power and status.
The literature, however, is not unanimously supportive of the idea that behavior is
driven solely by the international system. While Hans Morgenthau (1978) believed that
systemic factors (the struggle for power) were determining conditions, not domestic ones,
Stephen Krasner (1978) saw international behavior as emanating from a push and pull of
both domestic and international factors, but ultimately advocated for the dominance of
international variables. One of the most well-known applications of RCT to IR is Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman’s War and Reason (1992). The authors use a
combination of quantitative (using statistics and game theory) and qualitative (using case
studies) methods to analyze what conditions lead to war versus negotiation. They
determined that while international conditions are important, domestic political
considerations cannot be overlooked.
8
8
Bueno de Mesquita has also written other important rational choice works including his
1981 The War Trap (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press) and the follow-up in 1985
15
This debate between domestic and international sources of behavior is emblematic
of a similar persistent challenge, that of the agency-structure debate. According to
realism/neorealism and the power politics tradition, structure is the dominant of the two.
As previously summarized, actors behave rationally as dictated by international
conditions. The counter perspective highlights agency and the role of individuals or
states in decision making. The former focuses on social structures while the latter is
concerned with purposive behavior (Carlsnaes 1992). Structuralists are generally more
supportive of rationalist theories, while agency advocates recognize human limits and
are, thus, more likely to acknowledge the existence of non-traditionally rational
behavior.
9
Although alternative literature does exist, international relations scholarship to
date focuses heavily on the structural causes of behavior. Valerie Hudson writes that
“this is a severe theoretical handicap, for to lack a robust concept of the ‘agent’ in IR
means to be at a disadvantage when trying to explain or project significant change and
noteworthy creativity” (2005, 4). At the risk of discounting Hudson’s concerned
observation, it is arguable that this same division has led to advances in the field of IR via
the constant dialogue between advocates of both viewpoints. Although strides have not
been dramatic, the debate has lead to the eventual growth and popularity of new subfields
“The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model” (American Political
Science Review 79:156-177).
9
See Alexander Wendt’s 1987 article “The Agent-Structure Debate in International
Relations Theory” for a more detailed discussion of the debate as well as works by Singer
(1961) and Dressler (1989). Wendt’s work served as the motivation for numerous works
in International Studies Quarterly and The Journal of Conflict Resolution among other
noted political science journals.
16
and theories incorporating human agency and non-rational decision making that has
benefited IR as a whole.
Rationality v. Cognition
Just as applications of RCT to decision making and IR are abundant in the
literature (i.e., Booth, James and Meadwell 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992;
Fearon 1994), there is a growing contingent of work criticizing rational explanations.
Scholars have re-analyzed historical cases or highlighted anomalous ones to show that
RCT cannot always adequately explain decision-making behavior. In addition to
substantive criticisms, scholars have taken issue with the application of RCT on
theoretical grounds. As James Morrow (1997) summarizes, “most of the objections to
rational choice theory arise from the specific content of what rational choice means” (17).
Sylvan and Chan (1984) sum up nicely some of the most common critiques of
using RCT to explain foreign policy decision making and international behavior. One,
they object to the traditional billiard-ball conception of states in international relations.
Two, they find it difficult to accept that nation-states are monolithic or unitary actors.
Three, they disagree with the idea that decision-makers are “classic rational actors” (2).
Four, the authors are skeptical that “leaders in different countries or cultures share the
same views of reality” (Ibid).
10
His comment the result of critiques such as these, Rosati
(2000) wrote “International relations theorists should not rely on the overly simplistic and
naïve assumptions of rational choice. Instead, they should turn to bounded rationality
10
The order presented here has been changed from Sylvan and Chan’s original sequence
(see pages 2-3).
17
and a cognitive approach and ground their theories in a more realistic psychology” (74).
The following pages will use Sylvan and Chan’s criticisms as an outline to elaborate
upon the perceived weaknesses of RCT and present how cognitive theories can help fill
in the gaps RCT leaves behind.
To begin, according to the “billiard ball” concept of IR, states are billiard balls
each seeking to maximize power. Similar to the “black box” concept, all states are
generally similar as any real differences are discounted. What transpires within each
state (inside the ball or box) is irrelevant, thus presenting a homogenized view of the
state. Hans Morgenthau, one of the most famous realist scholars, agreed with such an
interpretation. He wrote that, “To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the
motives of statesmen is both futile and deceptive.” One should instead “consider all
decision-makers to be alike” (1978, 6). The billiard ball concept, then, discounts the
agency of individual decision-makers arguing that they act as a collective unit, the unit
being the state. Sylvan and Chan disagree with the theories complete disregard of human
elements, expressing instead that individuals do matter.
This question of where decisions are truly made, within individuals or groups of
individuals, brings to light another frequently debated topic in the literature, that of level
of analysis. Billiard ball theorists and realists such as Morgenthau suggest that the
nation-state is the unit of analysis. Neorealists and structural realists such as Kenneth
Waltz argue for the primacy of systemic conditions.
Personifying an increasingly popular perspective, Joe Hagan (2001) has been a
critic of the dominance of systemic conditions in his criticism of structural realism.
18
Hagan, largely a FPA scholar, specifically writes about the inability of structural-realist
theory to explain the outbreak of WWI and WWII as well as the outbreak of the Cold
War.
11
According to Hagan, the decisions to instigate war in each case were so complex
that “the responses to international threats by the great power leaders were not entirely
obvious” (10) and, thus, not clearly explained by systemic factors. He concludes that
“decision-making dynamics cannot be inferred directly from international and domestic
structures” (35). Instead, individuals are the source of decisions. They should be the
units of analysis.
The literature has also been increasingly critical of the assumption that states are
monolithic, unitary actors. Although praise and blame for policy successes or mishaps
are often attributed to the state itself, “countries do not act; people act” (Rosati 2000).
Governments are often personified to look as though they make decisions, but those
decisions are ultimately made by individuals or, in some instances, a single individual.
However, the burgeoning literature on the topic has yet to come down on either side of
the debate. Perhaps it never will. For example, Margaret Hermann (2001) writes about
three types of decision units: powerful leaders, single groups, and coalitions of
autonomous actors. According to Herman, which unit makes the decision is dependent
on the particular situation. Robert Jervis (1976) similarly writes that the level of analysis
may vary from issue to issue. Rational Choice Theory does not account for such
situational variances, nor would the variances truly matter.
11
Hagan (2001) cites works by Snyder (1991), Rosecrance and Stein (1993), Kupchan
(1994) and Levy (1990-91) as further support for his conclusion.
19
Although cognitive theorists believe the level of analysis should be the individual,
this does not infer that all other levels are irrelevant. Cognitive theories acknowledge the
importance of all other units as the human mind acts as a filter through which all others
must pass. Robert Jervis (1976) writes extensively about the importance of individual
perception. As Jervis proposes, the way individuals perceive greatly impacts their policy
choices. Decision-makers are influenced by their perceptions of the international system,
the domestic situation, other individuals and their policy options.
Rational Choice Theory has also been criticized on the basis of one of its
fundamental assumptions that humans are rational actors. Studies based both in the
laboratory and in empirical case studies have found that individuals often make decisions
that run contrary to a generalized conception of classically rational behavior. In fact,
subjects often make what could be termed non-rational or irrational decisions. This is so
because, as many scholars suggest, humans often (if not always) violate the rudiments of
RCT. Many scholars have analyzed cases wherein the decisions made could be classified
as non-rational (for example, Quattrone and Tversky 1988).
For example, Herbert Simon (1957) argues that decision-makers rarely conduct
complex calculations because they are cognitively restricted from doing so. Humans are
inhibited from making completely rational decisions largely because of the way they are
hard-wired. Be they psychological, cultural or other, there are limits on the brain’s
ability to calculate without error. Instead, humans use other cognitive strategies (to be
explained in detail in the following pages). Simon similarly writes that people seldom
maximize utility, one of the most fundamental tenants of RCT. They often make choices
20
that do not provide them with maximum benefit. Decision-makers have also been found
to seldom make holistic choices. They do not always consider all possible decision
options, but instead focus only on a truncated list of alternatives. By doing so, the final
decision, regardless how rational could not be considered so. Accounting for such
critiques, Stein and Welch (1997) write,
On a weak understanding of rationality, we may nonetheless describe
almost all leaders of states as ‘rational,’ because they virtually always
have some notion of their goals and some reason (though not necessarily
the best reasons) for believing that their choices will promote those goals.
But on a strong understanding of rationality, these choices are almost
never rational. (52)
To conclude Sylvan and Chan’s four points is their contention that leaders in
different cultures do not have the same perceptions of reality and, thus, would not
conform to the same definition of rationality. Stated simply, the authors critique RCT’s
cross-cultural generalizability. Due to cultural influences and pressures, individual
decision-makers in different countries or regions may not have the same reaction to the
same set of international conditions. In a similar vein, Rosati (2000) warns of the danger
of “applying a Western, especially American-oriented, cognitive orientation to different
societies with different cultures” (71). What may seem rational to Westerns, or
Americans specifically, may be anything but in another culture. This, however, does not
necessitate that one behavior is rational and the other not. Instead, it calls for some level
of cultural sensitivity or variability that RCT does not presently account for.
Walter Carlsnaes (1992) brings to light another perceived weakness in the
application of RCT: its inability to explain change. Citing the work of other prominent
21
scholars (including Przeworski 1985 and Lebow and Stein 1989), Carlsnaes summarizes
that RCT does not account for how individuals can produce new conditions or how actor
preferences change in ways not anticipated by the theory. If individuals react to existing
conditions, preferences and the conditions would never change until existing conditions
change. Then how would existing conditions change? Rational Choice Theory does not
explain how change occurs. Throughout history individuals have made a variety of
policy choices under the same or similar conditions thereby instigating change. Rational
Choice Theory does not explain this phenomenon.
In light of the criticisms of RCT delineated above and the direct or indirect
support for cognitive theories that they provide, cognitive theories are additionally
appealing in that they take a very different and unique approach to analyzing and
explaining foreign policy decision making. Whereas rational theories focus on
“preferences” and “outcomes,” cognitive theories focus on “beliefs” and “processes”
(Rosati 2000; Mintz 1997). Rational theories are most interested in explaining why one
policy option was chosen over another. They focus on end results and thus focus on
predictive power (outcome validity) as a top priority. In contrast, cognitive theories are
concerned with how decisions are made. They concentrate on explaining the process by
which decision-makers arrive at their final decisions, including understanding the factors
that dictated the process. These theories focus on process validity.
A final note on the appeal of cognitive theories is the realization that utilizing
them could help fill in some of the gaps left by RCT. These new theories could explain
some of the anomalies in systemic explanations, especially explanations of conflict and
22
war (Hagan 2001).
12
Some of the most common examples are studies of Adolf Hitler and
his impact on the causes of WWII and the role of individuals in the origins of the Cold
War (Herrmann 1985; Larson 1985; Yergin 1977).
The Road to Cognition
As a result of the aforementioned critiques of RCT, many scholars have shifted
their focus of study to concentrate on individual decision-makers and human cognition.
One of the earliest publications calling for the prominence of individual decision-makers
in the analysis and explanation of foreign policy behavior was written in 1954 by Richard
C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Buton Sapin. Although originally only a short pamphlet,
their work (and the 2002 revisited version by Hudson, Chollet and Goldgeier) has
become one of the foundational pieces in the field. Advocating a new approach, the
authors argued that human decision-makers are the key theoretical intersection between
all levels of analysis. Encapsulating their position, the authors concluded that,
“information is selectively perceived and evaluated in terms of the decision-maker’s
frame of reference. Choices are made in the basis of preferences which are in part
situationally and in part biographically determined” (2002, 134).
However, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin’s work did not spark a revolution in IR.
Other scholars also conducted early work linking cognition and foreign policy (Simon’s
crucial work on bounded rationality in 1957, Nathan Leite’s work on operational codes in
12
Theories of cognitive psychology have been more successful at explaining decisions of
war and conflict largely because they have been primarily applied to such decisions. This
study intends to apply one such theory to an under-studied type of decision.
23
1951 and Ole R. Hoslti’s work on belief systems and national images in 1962) but
analytic (rationality) theories continued to dominate the field. The 1970s, however, saw
the roots of real change with significant works by Graham T. Allison (1971), George
Steinbruner (1974), Robert Jervis (1970, 1976), Robert Axelrod (1973, 1976) and Irving
Janis (1972). Some have called this surge of theorizing and analysis the beginning of the
cognitive paradigm (Levy 2003; Rosati 2000).
One field that IR theorists have benefited from the most is that of psychology.
Social and cognitive psychologists had developed many theories explaining how
individuals make decisions and they had applied them to political decision making, but
few had made the transition and be used by IR scholars. The relatively young subfield of
political psychology has been working to bridge the two fields for almost 50 years.
Political psychologists contest that “beliefs, psychological processes and personalities of
individual decision-makers explain a significant amount of the variation in foreign policy
behavior of states in the international system, and that these variables are not endogenous
to systemic structures or domestic interests” (Levy 2003, 255). Some of the earliest signs
in the field were seen in the 1960s and 1970s as applications of psychology to political
decisions were first taught in undergraduate and graduate courses in a small number of
academic departments across the country.
13
While it has made significant strides, the
field has not yet completely synthesized the ideas and work of psychologists and political
scientists.
13
See Sears, Huddy and Jervis (2003) Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology,
especially Chapters 1 (by Sears, Huddy and Jervis) and 8 (by Levy) for a solid
background on the field and history of political psychology.
24
Where most of the work is being conducted in IR is in the young field of Foreign
Policy Analysis (FPA). FPA incorporates both rational and cognitive decision strategies,
but focuses substantial effort on understanding the role of individual decision-makers in
explaining foreign policy behavior. The field assumes that most international behavior
and change originates in humans, acting individually or collectively. Although Realist
and rationalist theories still dominate (especially in the U.S.), cognitive theories of FPA
have gained increasing clout in IR. Valerie Hudson (2005) writes about the importance
of FPA and suggests that it provides the theoretical grounding upon which all IR theory is
based because “all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human
decision-makers acting singly or in groups” (1), (italics original). This being true, the
continual analysis of cognitive theories in foreign policy decision making is crucial to the
advancement of the field of IR.
The value of FPA and the accumulated mass of analyses successfully using
individual-level cognitive theories may very well lead to the advent of another subfield
within IR, behavioral international relations. Decades of evidence in support of these
theories has convinced many scholars that IR behavior frequently (if not always) strays
from the rational actor model (Mintz 2007). In fact, the creation of this new subfield
within the International Studies Association has been discussed. However, some scholars
are hesitant as they see many challenges to such a field (James 2007).
25
The Debatable Debate
Within the active research agenda, some political psychologists/foreign policy
analysts have presented their work as strict competitors and alternatives to RCT.
However, a growing group of scholars paint a different, less antagonistic, picture
recognizing that cognitive theories do not yet present a united front, one able to
realistically threaten the survival of RCT. Instead, many such scholars see a scenario
wherein the two decision theories complement each other. Some of these scholars
question whether the famous debate between rational and cognitive theories even exists.
Steinbruner’s work on cybernetics (1974) is one example of an alternative to
RCT. According to Steinbruner, decision-makers do not make thoughtful, conscious and
rational decisions, but instead make decisions simply, automatically and often times
subconsciously. Another recent direct challenge to RCT comes from Kristin Renwich
Monroe’s presentation of perspective theory. Monroe (2001) writes about the rational
paradigm that she sees under stress ala Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm shifts. Rational Choice
Theory does well at explaining certain types of phenomena but not others, yet the theory
continues to dominate only because no satisfactory alternative has been presented.
Monroe intends to change this. She proposes the use of perspective theory which
considers decisions a function of identity and self-perception. The theory “argues that
how we see ourselves in relations to others sets and delineates the range of options actors
find available, not just morally but empirically” (151). According to Monroe, RCT would
be a subset of perspective theory.
26
Much other work in the field could also been seen as presenting alternatives
because they focus on the fact that individuals make decisions based on their personal
beliefs, experiences and personality. However, this does not infer that individuals make
irrational decisions. Reliance on such strategies is not irrational per se, it only becomes
irrational when “perseverance and denial dominate openness and flexibility” (Tetlock and
McGuire 1986, 160). Simon’s (1957) notion of bounded rationality, upon which most
cognitive theories are based, is an example of non-traditionally rational decision making.
Individuals do not make purely rational decisions, but search for the alternative that will
help them reach or surpass their aspiration level for that situation. Instead of ending the
search when they encounter the optimal policy alternative, decision-makers take a
“satisficing” approach and stop when they find an alternative that satisfies them. This is
not necessarily irrational but, perhaps, suboptimal. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1954)
similarly write that individuals do not act irrationally but purposefully. Although not
fully rational, human activities are explicitly motivated. They are not random and
irrational.
Irrational or otherwise, the accumulation of cognitive theories does not present a
direct threat to RCT. In addition to the common critique that laboratory data and
laboratory-based theories cannot be successfully transferred to real-world situations, one
main reason why cognitive theories do not present a direct threat is that the field lacks a
unified theory. What exists is an array of similar and sometimes overlapping, and on
occasion disparate theories. Together, cognitive theories can explain deviations from
RCT, but “there is no single cognitive theory of choice, and cognitive psychologists have
27
identified no dominant decision rule” (Stein and Welch 1997, 53).
14
Somewhat
addressing this major concern, some scholars have called for situational specifications,
delineations of specific conditions under which each theory, cognitive or rational, applies
(see Geva and Mintz 1997, Kahler 1998, Tetlock and McGuire 1986). As a result, there
would ultimately be no grand theory, but smaller, more situationally specific theories. In
this way, cognitive theories would not be an alternative, but a supplement to RCT.
All this begs the question whether or not there is a true “debate” between
cognitive and rational theories. For some, the debate is an inevitable reality, but for
others it is more of a “pseudo-debate” (Rosati 2000, 49). A debate infers (usually) two
contradictory and incommensurable positions. However, cognition and rationality are not
necessarily intolerable bedfellows. Psychological theories can supplement rational
theories (Farkas 1996; Kahler 1998; Geva and Mintz 1997). Geva and Mintz’s edited
work Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate (1997) focuses
primarily on this position. The authors of the individual chapters
15
either defend rational
or cognitive theories or find common ground between the two, as do the editors. The
editors conclude that the two theories are great complements because the strengths of one
mirror the weaknesses of the other. One example of a theory that tries to bridge the gap
between cognitive and rational theories is offered by Geva, Mayhar and Skorick (2000).
The authors propose the use of a cognitive calculus. Cognitive calculus theory combines
14
Stein and Welchs’ sentiments have been echoed (or echo) many other scholars
including Mintz 1997 and Kahler 1998
15
Chapter authors include Alex Mintz & Nehemia Geva, James D. Morrow, Jack S.
Levy, Janice Gross Stein & David A. Welch, Steven J. Brams, Marc V. Simon & Harvey
Starr, Zeev Maoz, Dina A. Zinnes & Robert G. Muncaster and Steven B. Redd.
28
outcome validity and process validity via the use of the political information processing
simulator, a new computerized processing tracing instrument. Poliheuristic theory is
another (more popular) theory that acknowledges that decision-makers use both cognitive
and rational decision strategies when making foreign policy decisions.
Cognitive Theories
The field of FPA has grown considerably in the last three decades as numerous
scholars have advanced a variety of theories to explain foreign policy decision-making.
In addition to Steinbruner’s work on cybernetics (1974) and Jervis’s work on perception
and misperception (1976), previously mentioned, are numerous theories emphasizing the
importance of individual decision-makers and the role of human cognition.
For example, many scholars have written about the role personality plays in
decision making, postulating that it matters who the individual decision-maker is. Much
work focuses specifically on presidential personality (Etheredge 1978; George and
George 1998; Hermann 1984).
16
Others study whether or not individual personalities can
be categorized into specified personality types or typologies in order to simplify analysis
and advance explanation. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (2002) created a sixfold typology
based on the role individuals see themselves playing.
17
Holsti (1976) categorizes
16
See Greenstein (1992) as well as his foreword in George and George (1998) for a
discussion of the importance of studying personality.
17
These typologies include the communicator, innovator, traditionalist, literalist, power-
seeker and career servant (pp. 138-139).
29
decision-makers by cognitive processes while others still do so by leadership style
(Hermann et al 2001).
18
Scholars have similarly studied the cognitive processes of individuals focusing on
operational codes, belief systems, and schemas. The earliest work in this area was
conducted by Nathan Leites (1951) with his study of the operational code of the
Politburo. According to George’s (1969) interpretation of Leite’s work, an operational
code serves “as a prism that influences the actor's perceptions and diagnoses of the flow
of political events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations” (191). In this
way, an operational code is a set of beliefs about politics and political action that serves
as guidelines and norms which, in the end, influence decision strategies. Others to write
on operational codes include McClellan 1971; Walker 1983; and Walker, Schafer and
Young 1998 and 1999.
Related to the concept of operational codes is the study of belief systems wherein
scholars argue that beliefs and attitudes play a large role in decision-making behavior. In
essence, how a decision-maker believes a situation to be is more influential that any
objective reality. For example, Holsti (1962) found that John Foster Dulles’ beliefs and
image of the Soviet Union (of the “enemy”) greatly affected his decision making during
the Cold War. Rosati (1984) similarly found that the most accurate explanation of the
Carter administration’s foreign policy behavior would need to include an understanding
of its image of the international system. A related concept in the literature is work on
schema theory, or about how an individual makes sense of the complex world around
18
Hermann et al’s leadership styles include crusaders, strategists, pragmatists and
opportunists (p. 95).
30
them. In his well-known 1973 piece, Axelrod writes that when an individuals receive
new information they try to fit it into their pre-existing view of the world, and do so with
attention to cognitive consistency. Schema theory does not describe how individuals
make policy decisions per say, but partially explains how they process information.
Additional literature focuses on how decision-makers process information via the
use of specific, and commonly considered literary, heuristics. One prominent example is
the use of metaphors and analogies, the latter having received more attention in the
literature. Although different, as Shimko (1994) clarifies, “both involve understanding
something in terms of something else” (659). Scholarship on the use of analogies argues
that decision-makers look to past events when faced with foreign policy decisions. These
historical analogies are used to help make sense of and order the situation at hand.
Analogies that are most available (the most recent chronologically) or representative (the
most related to the present situation) and, therefore, the most cognitively available are
frequently the ones chosen. Decision-makers use these historical examples to help
explain the current scenario and suggest the most appropriate or inappropriate behavior.
Some notable analyzes include Khong’s (1992) analysis of the use of analogies during
the Vietnam War and Houghton’s (2001) analysis of uses during the Iran hostage crisis.
Neustadt and May (1986) provide multiple analyses of the use of analogies in both
national and international decision situations.
Sharing in this goal of understanding and explaining how leaders make policy
decisions and based on the logic of economists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
(1979), prospect theory seeks to explain decision making under risk. The theory argues
31
that decisions are not factors of individual dispositions but are the result of a cognitive
response to existing conditions. Stated simply, prospect theory predicts that decision-
makers tend to be risk averse in a domain of gains and risk acceptant in a domain of
losses. Therefore, individuals are less likely to make a “risky” decision when things are
going well, but are more likely to do so when things are not, when they perceive
themselves to have less at stake. Rose McDermott’s 1998 book is a well-known
application of prospect theory to international relations and American foreign policy,
specifically. In her book, McDermott emphasizes the importance of framing, of how
individuals perceive their present situation, as well as how the theory can explain why
individuals often make decisions that do not promote the greatest expected utility or are
non-optimal (as is predicted by RCT). Among other cases, McDermott’s book analyses
President Carter’s seemingly non-rational decisions to rescue the hostages in Iran and to
grant the Iranian Shah asylum in the U.S.
19
Poliheuristic Theory
Another theory that breaks down the decision-making process in order to explain
how individuals make decisions and one that similarly relies on ideas from cognitive
psychology is poliheuristic theory. Poliheuristic theory (PH), largely attributable to Alex
Mintz, fits well into the cognitive v. rational debate as it combines rational and cognitive
decision processes. The theory acknowledges that individuals do make rational
19
McDermott’s 1992 article also analyses the Iran hostage issue in terms of framing and
risk taking.
32
decisions but suggests that individuals also impart an element of what can be termed
irrationality or cognitive heuristics (or “short-cuts”). The word “poliheuristic” can be
broken down into its subparts, the first (“poli”) meaning “many” and the second
(“heuristic”) meaning “short cut”. Aptly named, the theory argues that decision-makers
employ a mixture of decision strategies. Specifically, PH depicts the decision-making
process as being comprised of two phases, the first relying on cognitive decisions and the
second relying on more traditionally rational evaluations.
The first phase invokes “less than fully rational” behavior. In this phase decision-
makers narrow the list of possible policy options to a more manageable set. Policy
options are evaluated and eliminated based on cognitive decisions such as those based on
personal beliefs, values and individual personality.
20
In this preliminary stage,
individuals are recognized as being less traditionally rational in that they are cognitively
satisficing, rather than (as rational theories assume) maximizing. A decision can be
“good enough” to survive the first phase without being the most advantageous.
Decisions are also made in this first phase according to the noncompensatory
principle. If one option does not meet an individual’s primary criterion it is eliminated.
Its failure to meet this criterion cannot be compensated for by high marks on other
criteria. According to PH, this primary criterion is most often domestic political
considerations and it acts as the yardstick by which individuals measure each option
(Mintz 2004). According to Mintz, “decision-makers measure…in terms of political
20
Such information is deduced from research on the individual and their decision-making
and from interviews either with the individual or individuals knowledgeable of the
process.
33
consequences above all else.” In this way, “politics is the essence of decision” (2004,
103). Such considerations include public opinion, the presence of domestic opposition
and the decision-maker’s overall popularity (Mintz 2004).
More conventional rational decision making comes into play in the second phase.
Options remaining after the first elimination are evaluated based on analytical reasoning
and a final and “best” option is chosen using cost-benefit (choosing the option that
maximizes benefits and minimizes costs), expected-utility (choosing the option with the
overall highest utility) or lexicographic (choosing the option with the highest value on a
dimension most important to the decision-maker) decision strategies.
Most applications to date have centered on decisions relating to the use of force
and crisis situations. Some examples include decisions to test nuclear weapons
(Sathasivan 2003), to instigate a military uprising (Mintz and Mishal 2003), for the U.S.
to attack Iraq (Mintz 1993) and decisions to use force in China (James and Zhang 2005;
Ye 2007).
21
In contrast, other scholars have studied less-realist oriented issues such as
coalition formation (Mintz 1995), the use of negotiation (Eisenband 2003) and the
influence of advisers (Redd 2000), but these studies are considerably fewer in number.
Scholars have also conducted studies to examine some of the theoretical
foundations and possible extensions of the theory. For example, Brandon J. Kinne (2005)
applies PH to non-democratic states. An analysis of a personalist autocracy (Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq), a military autocracy (Musharraf’s Pakistan) and a single-party autocracy
(Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet party) confirmed his assumption that regardless of regime
21
See Table 1 and Table 2 in Mintz (2004) for a more thorough list of examples.
34
type, decision-makers strive to stay in power. It is this political consideration against
which decision-makers use the noncompensatory principle. Decision-makers use the
goal of staying in power as the prime determinant in the elimination of policy options,
thus satisfying PH’s requirements that political considerations are paramount.
Although PH has had many successful applications, the theory has its critics. Eric
Stern (2004) enumerates five “blind spots and limitations” of the model (110-111). First,
PH fails to discuss how problems are detected, how decision-makers are activated and
how decision units are formed in the real world. Second, with the exception of domestic
political constraints, the theory does not consider other contextual and institutional
variables. Third, PH cannot (or has yet to) explain historical decision-making scenarios
wherein leaders made foreign policy decisions even in the face of strong political
opposition. Four, because decision-makers differ in their sensitivity to the domestic
political context, Stern believes that sensitivity to domestic political concerns should be
seen as a contingent, not a general phenomenon. Finally, Stern argues that PH should
consider political constraints as dynamic, not static, factors.
In terms of dynamic versus static conditions, Mintz, Geva, Redd and Carnes
(1997) conducted a computer-based process-tracing analysis to consider the effect of
dynamic versus static choice sets on decision making. The authors found that the
introduction of a new alternative in the midst of a crisis caused decision-makers to shift
their strategy from a dimension-based to alternative-based strategy. They concluded that
this is evidence in support of PH and its two-stage decision-making process wherein
decision-makers switch strategies from the first to the second phase. Although this can
35
be seen as advancement in support of the theory, it does not specifically speak to Stern’s
critique. Additionally, the authors allude to other unexplored themes and make
suggestions for future research including work on “emerging” and “disappearing”
alternatives.
With additional suggestions for further research and testing of PH, Mintz (2004)
suggests that one of the next steps for the theory is the application to “key issues and
puzzles” and “other important domains in international relations” which include
“economic aid and trade decisions, environmental decisions, [and] financial decisions”
(9-10) [italics added]. Mintz explicitly acknowledges that PH has a unique ability to deal
with complex issues which include environmental decisions, promising for this study.
An Environmental Application
In light of the literature review above and the focus of this study, what follows is
a review of how environmental issues fit into the rational v. cognitive debate.
Unfortunately, the literature has little to contribute. Few scholars have attempted to
analyze and compare the application of either rational or cognitive decision theories
against environmental decision-making scenarios. A thread does exist, however, in terms
of rationality and collective action issues, which environmental issues most often are.
Applying the same rationality premise of individuals to collective actions (such as
those dealing with international environmental issues), it would follow logically that
groups (comprised of individuals), would act in accordance with their collective interest.
However, when public goods are involved, there is often a collective action problem. As
36
Mancur Olson (1965) writes, members of a group will continue seeking to maximize their
personal self interest and will only seek to maximize group benefits if “there is coercion
to force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive” that is not offered to those not
part of the group is available (2).
22
If these conditions are not present, individual actors
are unlikely to partake in the collective and are likely to become “free-riders.” In this
scenario, there is no incentive to contribute to the attainment of the group objective (i.e.,
restrict one’s own behavior) if one can reap the benefits without doing so. Thus,
collective action theory suggests that, absent incentives to join, individual rational actors
will not take part in collective action. Herein lays the collective action problem.
The collective action problem is highly applicable to international environmental
decision making, especially when decisions involve resources of the global commons
(i.e., air and oceans). Garrett Hardin, in his seminal 1968 piece The Tragedy of the
Commons, warned about the inherent dangers in protecting these common pool resources.
According to Hardin, individuals will seek personal gains to the detriment of the
collective good. Using the example of shared land, Hardin wrote that herdsmen would
continue to add sheep to the land because it would benefit them on an individual basis,
knowing full well that additional sheep will eventually deplete collective food sources
(the land). To overcome this problem, Hardin calls for mutual coercion mutually agreed
upon.
Elinor Ostrom has also written extensively on issues of collective action and
common pool resources (for example Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 2002; Dietz, Ostrom and
22
See Oliver (1993) for a discussion of collective action that includes various critiques of
Olson’s work.
37
Stern 2003). In spite of Hardin’s tragic warnings, however, Ostrom believes individuals
can overcome common pool resource problems and protect the environment. Self-
interest does not always dominate. As Ostrom and her co-authors write (2002),
“Communication, trust, the anticipation of future interactions, and the ability to guide
agreements and rules sometimes control behavior well enough to prevent tragedy. So the
drama of the commons does not always play out as tragedy” (5). Specific to the rational
v. cognitive debate, Ostrom (1990) argues that there are four internal variables that affect
individual choice: “expected benefits, expected costs, internal norms and discount rates”
(37). In addition, all of these variables are influenced by norms. In the end, then, all
decisions are affected by norms and are not determined by strictly rational calculations.
Along these lines, in Ostrom’s 2002 book, Kopelman, Weber and Messick outline
the role of nine independent variables that affect an individual’s ability to overcome
commons dilemmas: social motives, gender, payoff structure, uncertainty, power and
status, group size, communication, causes and frames (116).
23
In doing so, they devote
much time to the role of psychological variables in decision making. They highlight the
fact that an individual’s characteristics do matter and they differ from individual to
individual, thereby inferring that a generalized rational actor model is not appropriate.
A small number of scholars have taken it upon themselves to try and develop a
behavioral theory of collective action to rival that of Olson and capture what truly
23
Also see Chapter 4 by Kopelman, Weber and Messick in Ostrom (2002) for a summary
of experimental research on commons dilemmas as well as the many other authored
chapters discussing common pool resource problems.
38
happens in the international community.
24
Lubell et al. (2006) employ a statistical
approach to finding an empirically suitable model. They adapt their model after the
collective interest model used to explain protest behavior and social movement
participation and applied it to air quality activism in Texas. The authors found that the
model, which incorporates demand for public goods into individual utility calculations,
can be potentially generalized to any type of collection action problem.
Writing specifically about the application of RCT to environmental policy, Toke
(2000) argues that game theory, specifically, and rational choice, more generally, do
provide some insights into environmental policy decisions but that their usefulness is
limited. Toke sets out asking whether or not RCT, owing much of its logic to economics,
can be adequately applied to issues outside conventional economics, as well as to issues
wherein people’s preferences (have and will) change. Both of these conditions describe
the history and future of environmental issues. As part of his argument, Toke writes that
“the process of weighing up costs and benefits, being an interpretive process, cannot
satisfactorily be modeled by game theory since the costs or benefits associated with a
particular strategy or outcome are interpreted through discourse” (49). He then uses the
“classic prisoner’s dilemma” (51) of global warming as an example, but suggests that, in
fact, the phenomenon is seen as such because it “merely reflects the dominant belief
system” (52).
Under the assumption that actors (individuals or nation states) have overcome the
collective action problem and have agreed to contribute to environmental protection,
24
Lubell et al. (2006) write that Ostrom called for such a model in her 1998 presidential
address to the American Political Science Association.
39
Huang (2002) writes about compliance with international environmental law. In doing so,
Huang chooses not to discount completely the value of RCT. Instead, he modifies it by
incorporating emotions. As opposed to the common notion that emotions and rationality
are diametrically opposed, he considers them complementary. Applying insights from
cognitive and social psychology, Huang advances the utility of a psychological game-
theoretic model based on “the discipline of shame” (S240). The model is based on the
idea that actors hope to avoid “losing face” in the international community. Especially
effective in cases of soft environmental law where agreements are not legally binding,
actors tend towards compliance because they are concerned about their international
image. Stated simply, “all that matters is the second actor cares about what other actors
think of its behavior” (S250).
Scholars have also looked to psychology and sociology to determine whether
individual characteristics affect environmental behavior, both of decision-makers and
members of the general public. In his study of the environmental dispositions of
decision-makers, Craik (1970) writes that personalities should be studied, specifically
personality dimensions such as dominance, nurturance, sociability, and tolerance. Stets
and Biga (2003) have drawn explicitly from psychology (attitude theory) and sociology
(identity theory) to create a theoretical model of environmental behavior.
25
According to
their model, the components of environmental behavior include self-identity, attitudes,
25
See Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) for a discussion of attitude theory and Burke et al.
(2003) for a recent discussion of identity theory.
40
gender, gender identity and political ideology.
26
The findings of their study (survey
research), suggested that environmental identity (and its prominence, commitment and
salience) significantly influence pro-environmental behavior. Although linking attitudes
with environmental behavior has been more common in the literature (for example,
Tarrant and Cordell 1997; Buttel 1987; Van Liere and Dunlap 1981), Stets and Biga
suggest that identity is a more substantial determinant.
Decades later, theories of collective action and incentive-based cooperation are
still used to explain the presence or lack of collaboration on international environmental
protection (Ostrom, 1990; Young, 2001; Sandler, 2004). In general, these works
continue to debate and discuss whether environmental decisions are made based on
cognitive or rational decision-making. Although virtually none of said work has applied
to Latin America specifically, this study attempts to draw some conclusions about how
Latin American leaders make decisions on environmentally-based collective action
problems.
Environmental Latin America
Latin America has some of the most rich and biologically diverse ecosystems in
the world. In fact, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela are all
considered megadiverse countries (UNEP 2000), some of the most biologically diverse
26
See Figure 2 on page 405 of their book for a graphical depiction of the model.
41
on the planet.
27
Unfortunately, these ecosystems are increasingly threatened by pollution
and development practices condoned by local and federal governments. Although the
specific type and extent differs by country, some of the regions biggest environmental
problems include deforestation and land use change and the resulting loss of habitat and
biodiversity, air and water pollution and population growth. (The latter underlies almost
all environmental problems.) Each nation has taken steps to address these environmental
problems and improvements have been made, but many scholars believe that the
impediments to successful environmental policy are greater than narrowly-targeted
environmental policies can overcome.
Literature on environmental problems and responsive politics and policy in Latin
America is somewhat small (as, say, compared to complementary literature on
environmental politics and policy in the U.S., Western Europe and Scandinavian
countries). Often such discussions of problems in the region are incorporated into
literature on environmental policies in the developing world, often referred to as the
Third World or Global South (Islam et. al. 2002; Najam 2005; Peritore 1999). There is
also a growing, yet small, literature on grassroots environmentalism and the relationship
of indigenous peoples to the land that is often specific to Latin America (Blaser 2004,
Clay 1988, Hall 2002). The former will be discussed in greater detail below.
27
The World Monitoring Conservation Centre, a part of the UN Environmental
Programme, has named 17 countries megadiverse. These countries are extremely diverse
and, together, contain 60-70 percent of the world’s biodiversity.
42
North versus South
A number of scholars have written about tensions that exist between the Global
North and Global South and the problems that they raise for the protection of the global
commons.
28
As Sanderson (1993) writes, “…the North blames the South for the worst
environmental abuses and mismanagement, while the South demands that international
equity issues be addressed as a precondition for environmental policy improvement”
(232). In addition, the North argues for more free trade in order to alleviate poverty and
thus poverty-induced environmental degradation in the South while the South criticizes
the North’s imperialist agenda as not being environmentally-friendly in its own right.
Skeptics argue that environmental problems, especially on the global level, will persist
until both sides of the development divide come to a better understanding of the other’s
perspective and, in the case of the North, make credible efforts to improve their own
environmental politics and regulations. Until this time, the South believes the North has
no right to insist on tougher regulations in the South when they continue to exploit their
own land and resources (Tulchin 1991).
The issue of deforestation is a prime example of the frustration evident in the
relationship between the North and South. For one, the North believes the South should
limit, or prohibit altogether, the clear-cutting of forests as it contributes to global
28
This argument between the North and South is anything but novel as it has persisted for
decades. Sanderson (1993 and 1994) highlights the prominence of such tension in its
current form beginning in the 1970s.
43
warming, yet it does little to address the loss of its own forests (Sanderson 1993).
29
This
is particularly the case for Europe, the U.S. and Canada. Compounding the previous
point, Latin America, in particular, is frustrated by the narrow-minded attention the North
gives particular environmental problems in the South. The region suffers from a
multitude of environmental problems; unfortunately, most international attention is
focused on the destruction of rainforests and the animals that make the forests their home.
Accentuated by the murder of Brazilian rubbertapper and labor leader Chico Mendes in
1988, the North has focused a majority of its environmental activism and, often times, its
criticism on the destruction of rainforests, namely the Amazon Rainforest. As Roberts
and Thanos (2003) write, Latin Americans are “understandably frustrated when outsiders
devote more attention to the cute fuzzy creatures of the jungle (…) than to people
struggling to meet their basic needs” (3). The reality is that many communities often feel
obligated to cut, or even clearcut, forests in order to provide food and other means to
subsist (i.e., economically).
In general, deforestation is the result of changing demand for land use. The most
common culprit is an increased need for agricultural lands and grazing land for livestock
(UNEP 2002). Some scholars believe such a need is driven fundamentally by
globalization and the expansion of global trade and investment.
30
Latin America has
responded to such global pressures by switching to non-traditional exports in hope of
29
Trees act as a natural sink for carbon dioxide, the most prominent and damaging GHG,
and thus help temper global warming by absorbing carbon dioxide and maintaining
naturally balanced levels in the atmosphere.
30
See Muñoz (1996b) for further discussion of the free trade versus the environment
debate in Latin America, particularly Chapter 4.
44
gaining in the international market. These new exports demand more natural resources
and, thus, the clear-cutting of forests to support increased agricultural and ranching-
related exports (Gwynne and Kay 2004). Of the forests that do remain, very few are
managed sustainably. Instead, landowners (and/or the government) employ a mining
approach wherein an area is abandoned once all commercial value has been extracted
(UNEP 2002). This practice often limits future land use possibilities forever. The land is
often left nutrient-depleted and unfertile; it is then unable to support successful crops of
any kind.
The Sources of Environmental Problems
Latin America also faces many environmental dilemmas that are rooted in
accelerating population growth and urban development. For example, air and water
pollution have become significant problems in many Latin American capitals and urban
areas. These problems are largely the result of poor planning in the face of
unprecedented population growth, especially in urban areas. However, it is not growth
rates alone that negatively affect the environment but development style “and the patterns
of production and consumption that it engenders” (UNEP 2002, 20). In essence, a major
source of environmental deterioration is unplanned urbanization. The large increase in
automobiles and commuting distances and a lack of adequate pollution control policies
are largely to blame. Compounding the problem, when policies do exist, enforcement is
often weak or non-existent. According to the United Nations (UNEP 2002), the
45
challenge is not to provide more policies and laws, but to strengthen the government’s
ability to enforce policies and laws already on the books.
Many scholars also attribute the region’s environmental problems to external debt
burdens (Bárcena and de Miguel 2003; McGurk and Nierenberg 1992; Sanderson 1993).
McGurk and Nierenberg (1992) believe they do so in two ways. One, indebted nations
are forced to rely on export-intensive modes of production in order to earn money quickly
and cheaply (as previously mentioned in terms of demand for deforestation). This means
less attention can be paid to pollution control or long-term environmental concerns. Two,
since public funds are already scarce, debtors cannot invest in modern, clean technologies
that provide for more environmental protection. Underfunded and preoccupied with
paying off its debt, Latin America does not have the luxury of prioritizing environmental
protection. Tulchin (1991), however, sees the same indebtedness as an opportunity to
strengthen environmental protection. The debt situation can force Latin America to
impose stronger environmental regulations (and enforce them) in return debt relief or in
debt-for-nature swaps.
31
Sanderson (2003) disagrees with the hypothesized direct causal link between debt
and a lack of environmental protection and claims that such an argument is often made
without proof. Writing specifically about deforestation, Sanderson argues that there are
31
Debt-for-nature swaps are agreements between developing/debtor nations and their
creditors wherein the developing nation promises environmental protection in return for
debt forgiveness. In Latin America, countries that have participated in debt-for-nature
swaps include Ecuador, Costa Rica and Bolivia.
46
often other intervening variables such as domestic growth rates and international market
pricing that affect deforestation, not external debt alone.
The Sources of Environmental Protection
Despite the many obstacles Latin America faces, countries in the region have
taken positive steps toward environmental protection within their own state. They have
also coordinated regional protection efforts.
32
They have worked in concertación, or in
concert with each other. In fact, Latin America was the first region in the developing
world to organize regional ministerial conferences in order to address common
environmental problems (Muñoz 1992). Two examples include the 1990 Action Plan for
the Environment in Latin America and the Caribbean and the 1991 Inter-American
Program of Action for Environmental Protection. Latin American nations have also
played an active role in the formation and implementation of international environmental
agreements and institutions ranging from ozone depletion to hazardous waste to
biodiversity (MacDonald and Nielson 1997). They often took the lead role in
negotiations, hosted conferences and otherwise made vital contributions to international
environmental efforts (Ibid.)
Such a turn towards stronger environmentalism is arguably the result of changing
domestic priorities coupled with growing international activity and pressure (MacDonald
and Nielson 1997). MacDonald and Stern (1997) include in their list of domestic and
international factors, development and trade-related affairs (including economic
32
See the first issue of The Journal of Environment & Development, July 1992, for a
number of articles dealing with early environmental attention in Latin America.
47
liberalization), economic integration (including the environmental side agreement of
NAFTA), and democratization and growing pressures from environmental NGOs. They
also give credit to the rising costs of environmental neglect. Governments are ever
realizing the “very large cost to their economic development resulting from pollution,
particularly in urban areas” (Ibid.7).
Regardless of these advances, Latin America still has much work to do in terms of
environmental protection and sustainable development. Many of the previously
mentioned hurdles require local, national, regional and international attention and may
take years or decades to overcome. In 1991, Tulchin wrote that many Latin Americans
see environmentalism as a luxury for privileged groups and they believe that
environmental protection will somehow impede economic development. A decade later,
and despite many policy advances, environmental problems have persisted. Many
increased in severity. The 2002 UNEP report echoed Tulchin’s assessments by arguing
that sustainable development was constrained by cultural inertia. The report added other
impediments including “vested interests in the unequal distributional structure, the
absence or insufficiency of general and applied knowledge, the severity of cumulative
processes of environmental deterioration and the high cost of reversing them” in addition
to “a variety of institutional shortcomings” (202).
Latin American Foreign Policy
While theories designed to explain U.S. and European foreign policy are plentiful
and have been empirically tested time and again, many believe it is not appropriate to
48
mechanistically apply them to foreign policies of Latin America. Nations in the region,
and their respective decision-makers, face a different set of existing conditions and have
different policy concerns and priorities that do not fit well into these pre-existing molds.
Inevitably, a literature specific to Latin American foreign policy has emerged although its
development lags behind that of literature explaining foreign policies of the West. While
theoretical threads are woven throughout the existing literature, there has yet to emerge a
unified mid-range theory to explain foreign policy behavior of the region.
Some Background
Historically, the study of Latin America in the international system was a
compilation of atheoretical histories and descriptions of state interactions.
33
There was
little to no study of foreign policy formulation or the factors influencing foreign policy-
making (Atkins 1990). One of the first attempts to specifically study foreign policy-
making was conducted by Davis and Wilson in 1975. Others to follow included two
volumes by Ferris and Lincoln (1981) and Lincoln and Ferris (1984) as well as work by
Drekonja and Tokatlián (1984). Other early works on Latin America and international
relations include Bailey (1967), Parkinson (1974), Davis and Wilson (1975), Treverton
(1977) and Puig (1984). Lowenthal (1983) provides a thorough summary of early
research (including people, institutions and topics) through the early 1980s. (Considering
the time period under investigation in this study, the following literature review will
focus on more recent work from the 1990s to the present.)
33
See Atkins (2001) for a discussion of the history of scholarly study on Latin America
and IR.
49
Many books and articles on Latin America and international relations focus on a
single nation’s international behavior. A majority of edited books on the topic have
adopted a comparative perspective, compiling a number of chapters on the foreign policy
behavior of individual nations. The same books are likely, however, to include
introductory and/or concluding chapters that synthesize the analyses of individual nations
into a proposal of regionalized foreign policy (i.e., Muñoz and Tulchin 1996; Mora 2003;
Roett and Paz 2003). What is lacking in the literature, however, is adequate attention to
foreign policy decision making (as opposed to an explanation of general international
behavior). Research “often fail(s) to examine the internal dynamics of the process and
thereby miss(es) an important part of the picture (Hey 1997, 632). Fortunately, there has
been a growing trend toward more analysis of foreign policy formulation and the factors
that influence foreign policy behavior.
The majority of scholarly research on Latin America’s international behavior has
emerged since the end of WWII. After the war, states made a conscious decision not to
perpetuate the status quo (following in line with larger nations) and, instead, pursue their
own interests and their own foreign policies (Drekonja-Kornat 1986). This gave birth do
a “new” Latin American foreign policy and “growing status for the region within the
international system” (Ibid. 239). This general trend continued until the Cold War when
foreign policy options were restricted. During Cold War, smaller states were forced to
design foreign policies with attention to Europe and the superpowers (Hey 1998). As a
result, Latin American states, proximate neighbors with the regional hegemon, had one of
50
three foreign policy options: ally with and cooperate with the U.S., stand opposed to the
U.S. and face possible repercussions, or hide (Tulchin and Espach 2001).
The severe economic crisis of the 1980s led to another behavioral shift. Harsh
economic times forced the region’s nations to focus on immediate concerns, specifically
domestic economic conditions. In the 1990s, however, as the economic situation
improved a spirit of pan-Americanism was awakened (Tulchin and Espach 2001) as
regionalism and cooperation became more popular. Unfortunately, in the late 1990s,
instability returned to the region (i.e., Mexico’s economic crisis in 1995) and
international behavior reverted accordingly. Lowenthal (1994) focuses on the position of
Latin America in a post-Cold War world, in particular its relations with other regions of
the world and with respect to certain policy issues. In his concluding chapter, Lowenthal
acquires a more optimistic view of the 1990s by arguing that, in the mid 1990s, the
prospects for hemispheric relations were more promising than ever, or at least since the
1960s.
A Theory of Latin American Foreign Policy?
Many theories have been said to explain the behavior of Latin American states in
the international arena both past and present. Unfortunately, existing research on Latin
American foreign policy is sparse and has yet to coalesce into a coherent or stable
literature. Nevertheless, some of the most common theories attempting to explain the
region’s foreign policy are dependency theory, structuralist theory and realist theory (Hey
51
1997; Mora 2003; Roberts 2003).
34
These theories rely on the assumption that Latin
American states are set in such a predicament that their foreign policies must react to the
desires and behavior of more powerful developed nations, specifically the regional
hegemon (the U.S.). In fact, most states’ foreign policy “constituted a mimetic reflex of
the behavior of the classical great powers rather than an alternative foreign policy”
(Drekonja-Kornat 1986, 239). Moreover, according to Tulchin (2001), with the
exception of Brazil, Latin American states are third and fourth tier players and, thus,
continue to be “ruletakers” and not “rulemakers.”
35
As Latin America is part of the Global South and, thus, has had to turn to the U.S.
and other states for economic, developmental and security assistance, dependency theory
is the most common theory in the literature. Hey (1997) writes that dependence is the
essence of Latin American foreign policy.
36
Dependency theory suggests that the policy
34
For early works applying dependency theory see Cardoso and Faletto (1969),
Bodenheimer (1971) and Prebisch (1981). Cardoso is a former president of Brazil.
Bodenheimer’s work focuses on relationship between dependency and foreign policy
making. Prebisch is the Argentine economist credited with originating the structural
dependency school of thought. For early works from a systemic/realist perspective see
Bailey (1967). See Atkins (2001) for descriptions of the many competing paradigms in
international relations including those mentioned here.
35
Tulchin (2001) also argues that, with the exception of Mexico and Argentina, (as of
2000) Latin America states “have shown little confidence or innovation in exploring
options for enhanced roles in world affairs” (3). Taken together, Brazil, Mexico and
Argentina are among the most active internationally.
36
Hey (1993) identifies from the literature four types of dependency behaviors:
compliance, consensus, counterdependence, and compensation. With roots in realist
theory, compliant behavior is the result of a hegemon’s economic superiority and its
resultant ability to compel specific policy decisions from weaker states. Grounded in
dependency theory, consensus policies are arrived at via agreement and cooperation
between core and periphery nations. Counterdependence policies arise from a retaliation
52
choices of dependent states are restricted in that they are reliant in many ways (largely
economic and developmentally) on larger, more powerful states. At the same time, Hey
(1993) criticizes the use of a generalized theory of dependence to explain foreign policy
behavior for all of Latin America. In reality, she posits, dependency can manifest itself
differently in each state, thereby dictating a variety of foreign policy responses.
Expressing her disdain for such a presumption, Hey writes that it is “shortsighted and
somewhat condescending to presume that all Latin American states’ foreign policy
behavior must be interpreted within their relationship with the USA” (551). As an
alternative, she argues that foreign policies react to domestic determinants as well. Such
variables include interest group pressure, leadership style, regional relations with other
dependent states and a state’s historical record of foreign policy.
Although dependency theory remains prominent in the literature, Muñoz (1996b)
believes that theoretical approaches have changed over time- from dependency theory to
neorealism or bureaucratic politics. At the same time he recognizes that Latin America is
still plagued by the persistent and fundamental problems of poverty and inequality
(reflected in dependency theory). He further suggests additional changes in Latin
America foreign policy including a turn from national autonomy to regional autonomy,
prompted by an increased internationalization of economic affairs (actualized by such
of sorts from the economic core-periphery dependent relationship. These policies are
anti-core. Compensation behavior, in contrast, is not the result from a government’s anti-
core sentiment, but is implemented in response to popular opinion against the dependent
economic relationship.
53
entities as MERCOSUR and NAFTA).
37
Nations have come to the realization that
foregoing an amount of national sovereignty and cooperating regionally may help them
better attain goals of economic development.
In terms of commonalities reflected throughout the literature, Muñoz (1996b) has
recognized three general themes that inform Latin American foreign policy: the desire to
maximize national and regional autonomy, the desire to develop, and cognizance of the
position of the U.S. In her analysis of the literature, Hey (1997) adds to this list of most
cited influential variables poor economic resources, regime ideology (combined with
leader ideology), and the global distribution of power and wealth (a categorization
combining realist/systemic concerns and develop world status).
In particular reference to the works of Muñoz and Tulchin (1996) and Mace and
Thérien (1996), Hey (1998) extracts additional foreign policy themes. One external
consideration that weighs heavily of foreign policy decision making common to both
works is that of economic liberalization. (Hey points out, however, that the within the
neoliberal agenda the distinction between domestic and international economics is often
blurred.) Issues of democratization and leadership are also prevalent themes- the move
toward democratization in the region and the effect of individual leaders (personalism) on
policy behavior. A final commonality is that of culture, particularly cultural shifts that
have profound impacts on the direction of a country’s foreign policy.
38
37
MERCOSUR is el Mercado Común del Sur or the Common Market of the South.
NAFTA is the North American Free Trade Agreement.
38
Ebel et. al. (1991) also write about the effects cultural style have on international
politics in the region. Their analysis includes five variables they find impact the cultural
54
The preceding paragraphs exemplify an apparent weakness in the literature- that it
lacks a unified theory of Latin American foreign policy and, thus, any organized claims
about causal relationships (Hey 1997 and 1998; Mora 2003). Scholars have proposed
plausible explanations for foreign policy behavior, but the diverse collection of theories
has not coalesced into a discernable mid-range theory for the region. As Mora (2003)
writes, “few have incorporated empirical findings and theoretical reflections into a
whole” (2). Denying such criticisms, some argue that regional theory may not even be
possible as the states, including those in Central America and the Caribbean, South
America and North American Mexico, are so significantly diverse that it is difficult to
generalize an explanation of their behavior.
A contingent of scholars argues the contrary. They believe that a theory of Latin
American foreign policy is possible (i.e., Ferris and Lincoln 1981) or, at least, that
common observations can be made (Atkins 1996). Hey (1997) argues that Latin
American countries share multiple characteristics, such as a history of colonialism and
export-dependent economies, that provide theoretical grounds for mid-range theory.
Drekonja-Kornat (1986) similarly points out that an overarching theory already exists as
states in the region exhibit a general pattern of behaviors. Although states occasionally
deviate from the norm, a common thread connects all their foreign policy behavior.
style of Latin American foreign policy: “1) the relative absence of inter-state violence in
inter-American relations; 2) the role of the United States as hemispheric caudillo; 3) the
limited participation in foreign policy formulation; 4) the separation of foreign and
domestic policy establishments; and 5) the economic dependence on advanced states”
(49).
55
In an attempt to correct for the weakness she sees, Hey (1997) presents three
theoretical building blocks that can lead to a theory of Latin American foreign policy.
The three dimensions upon which foreign policy differentiate are: 1) pro-core v. anti-
core, 2) autonomous v. dependent and 3) economic v. political-diplomatic. The first two
categorizations focus on a nation’s relation to the core, in other words to the U.S. The
third centers on the economic and other dependence on the core and the resulting latitude
a nation has with its own foreign policy. (A nation’s latitude in formulating foreign
policy decreases as its economic vulnerability to the core increases.) In an attempt to
generalize Latin American foreign policy into two realms, Hey concludes that “in
general, political policy is subject to a myriad of explanations whereas economic policy is
explained by the differential in relative economic power capabilities between core and
peripheral actors within the hemisphere” (650). In other words, politically-oriented
foreign policy is the result of a variety of factors, not withstanding core/periphery
relationships, but economic foreign policy is specifically the result of such relationships.
Economic policy is less sensitive to various independent variables and is more sensitive
to geopolitical concerns. For example, political policy is affected by regime type,
leadership and domestic political context, to name just a few factors, whereas economic
policy is dependent solely on the regional distribution of power.
Appropriate Levels of Analysis
Apart from generalized theories to explain Latin American foreign policy,
scholars have also investigated the most important variables affecting the formulation of
56
foreign policy. Although different scholars advocate a variety of variables spanning the
levels of analysis spectrum (individual, state, international, global), in order to explain the
behavior of Latin American states, there is a general consensus on the primacy of
international factors. However, the influence of individual leaders and domestic
conditions are not discounted entirely.
For example, although the primacy of presidential influence has been challenged
in political science literature, Hey (1993) argues that, in most of Latin America, the
president maintains control of foreign policy decisions. Moreover, as compared to the
other branches of government (legislative and judicial), the executive has strong hold on
policy formulation (Atkins 1996). A number of dominant and charismatic state leaders
(Castro of Cuba, Chavez of Venezuela, Fujimori of Peru, Pinochet of Chile, etc.) have
made their mark on both domestic and foreign policy. It is arguable that had they not
been the presiding decision-maker, their nations’ policies would have been markedly
different.
Without completely discounting the role of leadership, there is some concurrence
that an individual’s influence is tempered by domestic and international factors,
international/hemispheric being the stronger of the two (Hey 1997; Mora 2003). In terms
of domestic variables, Mora writes that these are more variable, and suggests that the
state of the domestic economy is a critical element. In fact, in Latin America the
importance of political factors has now been replaced by the primacy of economic ones.
Atkins (1996) also writes of the importance of domestic factors, including interest groups
57
(social elites, peasants (campesinos), and specific commercial sectors, for example),
public opinion and the church.
Although not unanimous, there is some consensus in the literature as to the two
most important factors affecting Latin American foreign policy: political leadership and
U.S. hegemony (Hey 1998). Such agreement lends support to James Rosenau’s 1966
argument that idiosyncratic and systemic variables are the strongest determinants of the
foreign policy of small, developing states. However, Hey (2008) suggests that, based on
empirical research, the order of importance should be reversed, placing greater weight on
systemic variables. Leaders play an important role in foreign policy-making but they
make their decisions within an international context and must behave according to
contextual forces.
Other scholars warn against narrowing the list of all probable factors to one or
two key determinants. Instead, they advocate the “kitchen sink” approach (Hey 1997,
van Kaveren 1996) under the assumption that all levels of analysis affect foreign policy
choices. In a similar vein, Mora (2003) concludes, from the accumulation of chapters in
his edited volume, that the best explanation for Latin American foreign policy is “at the
nexus of all levels” (6). However, he also concludes that systemic influences, in
particular those emanating from the U.S., cannot be discounted, thereby awarding
international factors if not but a bit more significance. It is virtually certain that Latin
American states make at least some consideration of the U.S.’s position when
formulating their own foreign policy.
58
Suggestions for future research in the field include focusing on the intersection
between individual and systemic variables (Mora 2003) and the development of
integrated theory that incorporates the multiple explanatory variables that influence
foreign policy formulation and considers their relative importance and the effects on each
other (Hey 1997).
In terms of this study and the application of PH to Latin American foreign policy,
the results could be telling. PH focuses on the individual level, but also allows for the
influence of domestic factors in the first phase (predicting that decision-makers apply a
primary criterion of domestic political concerns to eliminate policy options). If the
results of the study support PH in its entirety, then it strengthens the argument for the
primacy of the domestic level, and to a lesser extent, the individual. If, however, upon
application the results do not reveal the importance of domestic factors but instead
suggest that systemic factors are more influential in a leader’s decision making it would
suggest that these systemic factor are paramount. If leaders prioritize different factors
(i.e., one prioritizes domestic and another international), it suggests that, perhaps, the
individual level holds the most explanatory weight. Thus, the conclusions in Chapter 7,
regardless of the outcome, will serve as a noteworthy contribution to continuing debate in
the literature on Latin American foreign policy.
Concluding Remarks
With the study of foreign policy decision making continuously growing and
evolving, it is important to constantly push the limits of understanding. It is important for
59
the progress of the field to strive for the most thorough understanding of phenomena,
including understanding the most important variables that affect decision making and the
interaction of those variables. It is equally valuable to test theories against an increasing
number of case studies. Although debate still remains as to the superiority of rational
versus cognitive theories to explain decision making, the subfield of foreign policy
analysis has embraced the advancements of cognitive psychology and has provided its
scholars with both a competing and complementary research agenda. A number of
scholars profess that the presence of and combination of both may, in fact, ultimately be
the most successful technique to explain foreign policy decision making. Advocates of
poliheuristic theory are some of these very scholars.
With the advancement of intellectual capital in mind, the debate between
rationality and cognition in the world of environmental decision making and
environmental protection is yet to be fully developed, although some scholars have taken
the first steps. Thus, an application of theories of foreign policy decision making to
environmental case studies is warranted. Such case studies in Latin America, in
particular, will provide an interesting test. The region suffers from multiple
environmental ailments, most of which are rooted in the fact that it is made up of
developing states and the rapid and poorly planned development that has taken place over
the last few decades. States within the region have made efforts to address their problems
and have coordinated regionally, yet problems persist. Latin America’s foreign policy
behavior is similarly plagued by a lack of development and dependency of more powerful
core nations, particularly the U.S. Although literature on Latin American foreign policy
60
decision making is growing, additional studies on the topic and in new issues areas, for
example the environmental topic of this study, will contribute nicely to the field as a
whole.
61
Chapter 3
Methodological Underpinnings
This chapter lays out the methodological foundation of the present study. It
begins with a discussion of the value of the case study method and using case studies to
test existing theory. It is followed by a description of the process-tracing method utilized
in the study as well as a defense of its use- the ability to open up the “black box” that
many other studies cannot or fail to do. The chapter then goes on to outline the data
collection process including a description of the primary and secondary sources used.
The study also includes a field research component including interviews conducted in the
case study countries. Thus, the chapter also outlines how interviews were conducted and
provides specifics about interview selection and process. This discussion is followed by
an explanation of case selection, including the selection of The Protocol as the decision
studied, Latin America as the region and Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela as the three
case study countries.
Theory Testing Case Study
According to Thomas Kuhn
39
, scientific knowledge progresses via the constant
questioning and testing of accepted scientific norms. While the development of new
theory is the means by which science most ably moves forward, testing existing theory is
the motor behind the movement. New theory comes into being when anomalies are
found in existing science (the prevailing paradigm). Herein lies the importance of theory-
39
Kuhn’s most referenced work is The Structure of Scientific Revolution (1962).
62
testing analyses. In fact, according to Stephen Van Evera (1997), “evidence infirming
theories transcend in importance evidence confirming theories” (43). As a relatively new
subfield within the discipline of international relations, FPA theories will benefit greatly
from continued testing.
According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005), theory testing “aims
to strengthen or reduce support for a theory, narrow or extend the scope conditions of a
theory, or determine which of two or more theories best explains a case, type, or general
phenomenon” (109). Not seeking to refute the theory in its entirety, this study hopes to
strengthen PH by providing additional evidence in support of the theory and thereby
broadening its scope or by eliminating certain phenomena that it cannot explain, thereby
narrowing its scope. In order to conduct the test, this study applies PH to three new case
studies. If, after thorough analysis, PH cannot adequately explain the key decision-
making processes, one of two actions should be taken. One, the theory should be
narrowed to no longer include such cases (and/or similar cases). Perhaps, then, another
theory should be created to better account for the cases removed. Two, PH should be
amended or in some way altered to better explain the larger class of cases. The latter
option would mean PH would be able to explain more cases but with less specificity.
Analysis of PH in the three case studies will suggest which of the two options is most
appropriate.
63
Although often critiqued by quantitative scholars for their lack of generalizability
and reliability (among other noted weaknesses)
40
, case studies contribute greatly to the
accumulation of knowledge in the field.
41
In contrast to large-N analyses, the ability to
investigate one case in depth can elucidate within-case variance, overlooked variables or
shed light on specific causal processes that would not be captured in quantitative study.
Although both large-N quantitative studies and small-N case studies are valuable forms
of scientific inquiry, there are some strong advantages to case study research.
42
Eckstein
(1997) writes that case studies “are valuable at all stages of the theory-building process,
but [are] most valuable” in “the state at which candidate theories are ‘tested’” (80). In
40
For example, case studies have been criticized for being overly descriptive and not
analytic (more like storytelling), for their lack of objectivity and rigor, as well as being
insufficiently quantifiable. They have also been critiqued for selection biases and for
their inability to provide for strong cross-case analysis.
41
Harry Eckstein (1975) and Arend Lijphart (1975) provide some of the most commonly
referenced and used types of case studies. Eckstein divides case studies into five
different typologies: 1) configurative idiographic, 2) disciplined-configurative, 3)
heuristic, 4) plausibility probes and 5) crucial case studies. Lijphart writes about six
types: 1) atheoretical, 2) interpretive, 3) hypothesis-generating, 4) theory confirming, 5)
theory infirming, and 6) deviant. The scholars’ types are not mutually exclusive as there
are overlaps between their distinctions. To use Lijphart’s types, this study lies in between
a theory confirming and infirming case study. See Chapter 7 for further elaboration.
42
George and Bennett (2005) provide a brief but good list of advantages on page 19. The
list includes their potential for achieving high conceptual validity, their strong procedures
for fostering new hypotheses, their value as a useful means to colosely examine the
hypothesized roleof causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases, and their
capacity for addressing causal complexity.
64
light of Ekstein’s statement, this study utilizes case studies to contribute to the further
development of PH.
43
Process-Tracing
Poliheuristic theory will be tested via three case studies using a process-tracing
procedure. The technique involves the step-by-step investigation and analysis of causal
processes, specifically decision-making processes. In sharp contrast to theories allowing
for “black box” decision processes, PH specifically details two phases of decision
making, breaking down each decision into multiple stages of complexity. Thus, a
process-tracing study is a perfect methodology to test PH in that it will enable to
researcher to look closely at each stage in the process, taking into consideration various
stimuli (variables) as well as the individual personalities of each decision-maker.
Specifically, process-tracing opens up the “black box” and focuses on its contents,
uncovering a multitude of stimuli, how the stimuli react with each other and how
decision-makers react to said stimuli. The researcher attempts “to reconstruct actors’
definitions of the situation” and to “develop a theory of action” (George and McKeown
1985, 35). Instead of searching for causal processes between independent and dependent
variables, researchers seek to understand the mental and decision-making processes of
specific actors (individuals, groups or other entities). In doing so, “the process-tracing
technique has a chance of constructing a reasonably complete account of the stimuli to
43
McKeown (1999) summarizes and adds to the ongoing debate in the literature
regarding the importance and role of case studies in social science. His piece focuses on
a review of King, Keohane and Verba’s influential 1994 book Designing Social Inquiry.
65
which an actor attends” (Ibid, 36). Although process tracing is “unlikely to yield strong
causal inferences because more than one mechanism can be activated” due to possible
multiple causality, “it does provide some test of hypotheses,” (King, Keohane and Verba
1994, 228).
This study seeks to uncover the decision-making processes of individual actors,
specifically presidents, and will use process-tracing to analyze the full context
surrounding the decision, including political (domestic and international), social,
economic and personal variables. The process-tracing method will help uncover the
specific processes by which each president reacted to these variables and used various
cues to arrive at his final decision.
Data collection
Source documentation
Process-tracing was made possible due to thorough data collection and analysis of
primary (including semi-structured interviews) and secondary sources. Data for this
study was collected initially via UNEP archival documents including written
documentation from various Conferences of the Parties as well as individual country
reports as compiled by the UNFCCC. Most such documents are available on the
UNFCCC Online Library and Documentation Centre. The library includes statements
from national representatives and negotiators from the three case study countries. The
initial data collection phase also included a survey of printed interviews with and
speeches by the decision-makers themselves, both in English and Spanish journals and
66
newspapers. Other sources include newspaper articles (both from the U.S. and Latin
America), academic reports and other industry and country reports.
As should be done with the analysis of primary and secondary sources, care was
taken to acknowledge the contextual framework surrounding the writing and publication
of the documents. As George and Bennett (2005) warn, researchers should pay attention
to “the meaning and significance of what is said” and “should consider who is speaking,
to whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances” (99, italics original). In most
instances, documents used in this study were written and published by government
officials in environmental or other pertinent and related agencies with close relation to
the decision-makers (presidents) that are the subjects of analysis. Thus, documents were
analyzed with attention to the overt or hidden “political and personal goals of those
officials who control their release” (Ibid. 100). For example, country reports and other
similar documents submitted to UNEP in accordance with convention/protocol
requirements to report progress were written by environmental ministries and were most
likely written in a favorable light to highlight any and all national advancements. The
same may be true with public statements and speeches. It is necessary to consider the
speaker, the audience and the context of their chosen words. For example, an individual
may speak differently to individuals than in front of all COP delegates.
67
Field Research: Elite Interviews
Primary and secondary source data were used in conjunction with information
gathered from semi-structured interviews, all part of three-month long field research.
44
Of the many reasons for carrying out field research, it was deemed necessary for this
study for two main reasons.
45
First, relatively little is known about the subject. Virtually
no research has been conducted on environmental foreign policy decision making in
Latin America, especially as regards ratifying The Protocol, and thus very little has been
written on the topic. Going directly to the source and interviewing decision-makers is the
most effective way to learn about this little-known topic. Second, research in the field is
necessary to “get an insider’s view of reality” (Singleton and Straits 2005, 308) and
understand, from someone who was a part of (or very close to) the process, what actually
transpired. In this way, field research allowed for gathering data via multiple methods.
Knowing that acquiring concurring data from multiple sources increases overall data
validity, this combination helps address common critiques that case studies have a
perceived weakness in validation. This “triangulation” of methods is also an excellent
method of data collection that facilitates effective process-tracing.
Although the individual decision-makers under investigation are presidents,
interviews with former and current presidents were not possible. This does not, however,
44
Direct/indirect observations were not possible because the presidential decisions under
investigation are historical case studies. It was not possible to be present for actual
negotiations or to speak with individuals during the decision process because the
processes considered in this study took place, generally speaking, during the period 1997
to 2005.
45
See Singleton and Straits (2005) Chapter 10 for a more complete list of reasons to
conduct field research as well as a thorough description of methodology.
68
invalidate any study into their decision-making processes. Many scholars have
conducted insightful analyses of presidential decision making (Caldwell and McKeown
1993; Foyle 1999; George and George 1998; Herman 1984; Holsti 1983) relying on data
gathered from secondary sources. For this study, many interviewees had working and/or
personal relationships with their presidents and were able to provide valuable information
crucial to understanding presidential decision making as regards The Protocol.
A point to consider is that presidents are the quintessential politicians. It is not
certain that, even if interviewed, they would always provide truthful responses to
inquiries, especially when they do not want to be viewed as opposing internationally
accepted norms (such as taking action to address global climate change or prevent
environmental harm). Therefore, accumulating numerous accounts (in print or in person)
of the presidents’ behavior from sometimes opposing perspectives may provide a more
accurate depiction of actual behavior, thus further supporting the use of multiple methods
and field study.
Anticipating that only those in high-level governmental posts had knowledge of
the decision-making process
46
, elite interviews were conducted for this study (See
Appendix B). As defined by Lewis Dexter in his book Elite and Specialized Interviewing
(1970), an elite interview is an interview with any interviewee “who in terms of the
current purposes of the interviewer is given special, nonstandardized treatment” (5).
They are treated as and deferred to as experts in the subject under discussion. In most
46
This suspicion was later validated. In interviews it was confirmed that those outside of
government (and even some inside) had little, if any, knowledge of the process. In
addition, in all three case studies the general public was not involved and had little, if
any, knowledge of the process.
69
situations the interviewer is willing to let the interviewee define the problem or situation
(Dexter 1970) and interviews are less structured. Often times interviews evolve into
conversations. Elite interviewing is the most appropriate form of data collection for this
study because “the behavior of interest can best be described and explained by those who
are deeply involved in the political process” and because it can provide “a more
comprehensive and complicated understanding of political phenomena than other forms
of data collection” (Johnson, Joslyn and Reynolds 2001, 275). Few people have
knowledge of the interworkings of the presidents’ decisions and only those closest to the
presidents and negotiators can shed light on the true decision-making processes.
Interviewees chosen to provide their perspectives were selected from a purposive,
nonprobability sample. They were not chosen at random but were contacted in order to
present a balanced and accurate account of each president’s decision making behavior,
thereby enhancing “the informational value of evidence by maximizing variation”
(Singleton and Straits 2005, 341). This strategy was necessary for two reasons. One
reason is due to the small sample frame. There is a limited number of individuals with
gainful knowledge of events, particularly of how presidents made this specific policy
decision. (Few people were involved in the closed decision-making processes or know
much about the president’s role in it). A non-random sample was also necessary in order
to best control for possible contradictions in information obtained from sources within a
single country (i.e., different perspectives from those in academia and/or different
government agencies or between people with different policy objectives). Thus,
interviewees were chosen to represent a cross-sectional sample of occupational and
70
policy positions. Random selection would not have resulted in such a representative
sample.
Also, as is characteristic of field research, sampling is a continuous and evolving process
(Singleton and Straits 2005) and thus is not necessarily systematic or random.
Interviewees were initially contacted due to their mention or prominence in
primary and secondary source documentation as having been directly involved in Kyoto
negotiations, because they were advisors to negotiators or because they were part of their
country’s environmental or foreign ministry during the time in question. Additional
contact information was obtained via an internet search for each country’s environmental
and foreign ministries or universities where many former government officials are now
employed as faculty. Often, current government representatives provided referrals to co-
workers or other employees that were involved in the decision-making process during the
preferred time frame. Finally, subjects were also obtained via snowball sampling.
Subjects provided names and contact information for additional interviewees.
Interviewees ranged in age (though specific ages were not asked of subjects) and
gender and their positions ranged from university faculty to former environmental
ministers to UN representatives to members of non-governmental environmental
organizations. As most subjects were college-educated and held high-level government
posts, the vast majority had a strong command of the English language. Thus, most
interviews were conducted in English. A few were conducted primarily in Spanish with
English utilized when necessary.
71
Interviewees were initially contacted via an email message requesting their
participation. If they agreed to participate, prior to conducting the interview,
interviewees were sent, via email, background information on the project. Interviewees
were notified that the project was a doctoral dissertation and that the finished product
would have limited readership. If, however, at a later date the information obtained from
their interview would become part of a larger, published product they would be notified
and asked for additional permission to include their responses. Requesting permission to
make their responses public was necessary as, although responses were about a third
party and not necessarily about personal information, comments about their superiors or
other government officials could have potentially negative impacts on their future career.
In addition, any comments made during the interviews that respondents wished to keep
confidential or “off the record” will remain so.
In instances where interviews could not be conducted due to time or geographic
constraints, additional contacts responded to a survey consisting of a list of questions
(See Appendix A). The questionnaire was written in English and translated into Spanish.
Subjects were given a choice of receiving the questionnaire in English or Spanish and
were allowed to respond in the language of their choice. Questions were largely opened-
ended although some provided specific options so as to ensure that interviewees
responded thoroughly and did not fail to consider some lines of reasoning and so that the
researcher would be able to obtain the most crucial information necessary to later conduct
a successful analysis.
72
Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured (or focused) fashion. Semi-
structured interviews with open-ended questions have been found to be a successful
technique for providing “detail, depth and an insider’s perspective, while at the same time
allowing hypothesis testing” (Leech 2002, 665).
47
The questionnaire was also used as a
guideline for personal interviews although discussion often jumped from point to point
and did not always follow the same trajectory. This was done to provide interviewees
freedom in their responses and to be able to follow new thoughts and ideas if necessary.
Often times open-ended questions evolved into in-depth and enlightening discussions on
particularly interesting topics. Responses were recorded via note taking both during and
immediately following the interviews.
Because interviews were open-ended and interviewees were selected from a
variety of occupational and policy positions and therefore possessed a variety of
perspectives, interviewees sometimes provided contradictory data. Such instances were
dealt with on a case-by-case basis. In most situations, the contradictions themselves
provided valuable insight into the complexity of decision making and did not affect the
outcome of the analysis.
47
This December 2002 volume of Political Science and Politics contains a collection of
essays entitled “Interview Methods in Political Science” with an introduction by Beth L.
Leech. Subjects of the essays include conducting and coding, semistructured interviews,
and ethical and validity and reliability issues.
73
Case Selection
Why the Kyoto Protocol?
Keeping in mind criticisms of selection bias common of case study research
48
,
cases for this study were chosen to afford methodologically strong tests of PH. The case
of the Kyoto Protocol was chosen as a contrast to most existing applications of PH. As
most studies have investigated and tested “high politics” and/or crisis events,
environmental case studies can be classified as “low politics” and non-crisis decision
events. Comparatively, this policy genre is traditionally less “sexy” than “high politics”
issues, thus alleviating some outside pressure, be it from the public or other public
officials, possibly resulting in different decision-making processes. It may be that
decision-makers have more flexibility and leeway in their decisions or that they can make
decisions more autonomously. Additionally, environmental foreign policy decisions
generally do not take place under severe time constraints. Decision-makers have the
luxury of making their policy decisions more slowly, again, possibly allowing for
different decision-making processes. Using this environmental case study will test PH in
a new issue area, the results of which will suggest whether or not PH can adequately
explain the decision-making processes in the new class of cases.
The case of The Protocol, itself, is an excellent choice for case study for many
reasons. First, it is one of very few truly global environmental agreements. Therefore, it
provides great opportunity to study a treaty formulated around international norms and
with international pressure to join. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
48
For example see King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) and Geddes (1989).
74
Ozone Layer (1987) is another example of an international environmental treaty and a
number of scholars have written about the treaty and even the negotiations leading up to
its ratification (Benedick 1991), but there is considerably less written on negotiations and
decision making for the Kyoto Protocol, especially as concerns developing nations. (See
Literature Review for a thorough discussion of existing literature on The Protocol.) In
addition, because The Protocol is international, a future study comparing decision-
making processes in developed and developing countries would be possible and perhaps
very fruitful.
The Protocol is also a good choice for case study because of the inherent amount
of complexity. Not only is climate change an environmental issue, but it has an
undeniable link with energy and economic issues, thus linking it with a multitude of
different industries, agencies and other vested interests. The Protocol is also linked to
many cultural and social issues as indigenous peoples play a large role in the debate over
deforestation (trees act as a natural sink for CO
2
). Undeniably, one of the biggest issues
in The Protocol, and one that encompasses the previous two comments, is that of
development. Many nations see limiting emissions as limiting development, be it
economic, industrial, political or social. Overall, it is obvious that most decisions to
ratify The Protocol are complex. Thus, The Protocol is a strong test case for PH.
49
If the
theory can successfully explain the most complex of decision making, its generalizability
is extended thereby lending additional support to the theory’s overall strength.
49
Van Evera (1997) advocates that investigators choose cases that provide “the most
strong tests” (76).
75
Practically speaking, The Protocol is also an excellent case choice because it is
timely and relevant. In approximately the last five years, climate change and The
Protocol have become more accepted and even fashionable topics of discussion in
popular culture, the scientific community, media and government. This is the case
worldwide. While many in the international community saw the importance of this topic
a decade ago, the remainder of nations (including the United States) has recently started
seriously discussing the issue in policy circles. Academia, specifically the social
sciences, is also becoming more attuned to the importance of and value in studying
climate change and approaches to addressing the resultant impending problems.
In addition to Al Gore’s film An Inconvenient Truth and Gore and the IPCC’s
shared awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize, climate change and The Protocol’s rise in
popularity can also be attributed to the fact that The Protocol is set to expire in 2012. A
new agreement will have to be written to succeed it. It is a dubious task at best. The first
rounds of negotiations have already begun (COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia, December 3-14,
2007) and, unfortunately, many of the same controversies that plagued Kyoto
negotiations linger. Thus, close study of negotiations, debates and decision making
during Kyoto rounds could prove invaluable in helping better address these same issues
in future rounds- in hopefully facilitating the crafting of a more “successful” successor
agreement.
76
Why the Latin American cases?
In order to adequately study decision making as regards ratification of The
Protocol and effectively test PH, three specific case studies were chosen. Selection was
first made in order to provide a contrast to the only other study testing PH against The
Protocol decision making (Below 2008) which analyzed decision making in the United
States. Since PH did well explaining decision making in this developed (and arguably
the most industrialized) country, the current study will test PH against case studies in the
developing world. This comparison is of interest due to The Protocol’s delineation of the
world into two: Annex I (developed) nations and non-Annex I (developing) nations.
Future comparisons between decision making in developed and developing nations could
also prove fruitful.
This study will focus on countries within one region in order to control for
regional and cultural variables. The region chosen for study is Latin America and it was
chosen because all nations are considered, according to The Protocol, Non-Annex I
countries. Although there is developmental variation among nations, as concerns The
Protocol they all have developing nation status.
Latin America was also selected because, compared to other developing regions,
it has a number of growing democracies. Analyzing decision-making processes in
democratic regimes would be a good test of existing theory as many existing analyses
have been conducted using this regime type (especially Below 2008). Comparing the
decision-making processes of individuals in highly democratic regimes to those in non-
democratic regimes may yield interesting results regarding the different decision-making
77
processes in different regimes, but it is not the focus the present study. Instead, accepting
the notion that decision making in democracies is a more complex process (due to a
larger number of actors and veto points), testing democracies would be a stronger test of
PH.
50
Latin America was also selected due to its proximity to the US. It is hypothesized
that the U.S. played a role in many countries’ decisions to ratify. The U.S. is traditionally
a vocal player in international agreements and plays a crucial role in the climate change
regime as it is the biggest emitter of GHGs, specifically CO
2
. The U.S. position in talks
has been both controversial and critical because the nation has refused to ratify and has
asked that developing nations do more to reduce their own emissions. In terms of
selecting cases based on this theory (although a minor theory in this paper), countries in
Latin America would provide a solid testing grounds as, in comparison to other
developing regions, most Latin American nations have a long history of relations with
their neighbor to the north (be it positive, negative, close or distant).
Finally, many nations in the region rely heavily on oil and/or petroleum exports or
imports. Because of the close relationship between climate change and oil (the
combustion of oil emitting CO
2
), countries whose economies rely on oil are likely to have
more complex decisions to make. A prime concern is that if importing nations cut down
on their imports it could negatively affect the oil producer’s economy. In the end,
climate change seems to pit international pressure and environmental wellbeing against
50
The results presented in Chapters 4-7, however, suggest that the decision-making
processes in each of the three case studies varied in their level of “democraticness.” This
has interesting implications for cross-democracy comparative study.
78
income and economic stability. Additionally, the U.S. relies heavily on oil imports from
Latin America, even more so than from the Middle East, thus potentially complicating
relationships.
The individual nations chosen for this study are Argentina, Mexico and
Venezuela. They were chosen because they would be strong tests of PH because of the
apparent complexity of critical domestic and international factors. First, the three nations
are the largest producers and consumers of petroleum/crude oil in the region and are also
the biggest emitters of CO
2
. (See Appendix A.) These attributes factor heavily in
deliberations of climate change policy. Countries that are large producers and consumers
of petroleum (and/or oil) stand much to risk by agreeing to reduce GHG emissions. Not
only would they have to reduce the amount of petroleum that they use, but they would
eventually export less if other nations agree to reduce their emissions as well. From their
perspective, a “successful” climate change treaty would mean many domestic
concessions or losses. The fact that these three countries are also the largest emitters of
CO
2
means that the task of reducing emissions would be great and thus the decision to do
so would be a heavy one. The fact that these countries could face difficult decisions in
ratifying The Protocol translates into an interesting test of PH.
51
In terms of international factors, Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela are all
actively seeking a place on the international stage, thus also making them excellent case
studies. Argentina has been seeking a way to align itself with the developing world,
51
Testing less complex cases may also provide sufficient tests of PH, but the complex
cases stand to yield more interesting and provocative results. Such results could prove
more advantageous if a reworking of the theory is necessary.
79
especially Europe and the U.S., for years, some say even to the point of distancing itself
from the rest of Latin America. Mexico finds itself caught in between the developed and
developing world. Statistically speaking, the nation has been creeping up in ranks of
developmental measures and it has become a member of the OECD (especially
interesting in terms of its classification according to The Protocol). Venezuela has
become the renegade nation in Latin America making international alliances of its own.
The fact that all three nations are internationally active and are trying, to varying degrees,
to move themselves towards First World status makes for interesting case studies.
The three countries were also chosen based on a variance of the hypothesized
effect relations with the U.S. had on their decision to ratify. The U.S., the arguable
global hegemon, is a large importer and consumer of oil and subsequently has been the
largest emitter of GHGs. The U.S. had refused (and still refuses) to ratify The Protocol
and has asked developing nations to do their part and reduce their own emissions
(although not required to in The Protocol). Mexico, sharing thousands of miles of border
with the U.S., has a history of collaborating with its neighbor to the North on a variety
transboundary issues. Argentina is geographically, though not politically, far removed
from the U.S. and has taken big steps towards aligning itself with the regional hegemon.
Venezuela, especially with the election of President Hugo Chavez, has had a turbulent
and at times highly antagonistic relationship with the U.S.
As with the previous domestic factors, these international attributes continue to
add complexity to the decision-making process, thereby providing more data-rich and
difficult tests of PH. If the theory can explain complex decisions in these three countries
80
it is possible that it can explain less complex ones as well. If the theory does not fare
well, thorough analysis of these cases could provide abundant information for further
theory development.
Although Brazil fits most of the selection criteria (it is a large producer and
consumer of petroleum and a significant emitter of CO
2
), it was not selected as a case
study for two key reasons. One is because it has the reputation of being one of the most
environmentally-conscious nations in the region (along with Costa Rica) and,
subsequently, there may have been less complexity in the president’s decision making.
Brazil was also not selected because, of developing nations and developing nations in
Latin America specifically, Brazil is the most often studied. Much more literature exists
documenting environmental issues in Brazil than in any other Latin American nation. A
secondary goal of this study is to contribute to the literature in areas that are lacking and
thus other nations were chosen.
In addition to meeting the preceding selection criteria, Argentina was also chosen
because it is somewhat of a deviant case.
52
It will provide an interesting analysis and test
of PH that the other cases cannot.
In sum, Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela were selected as case studies because
they share many similar characteristics and are thus comparable cases. They are all big
52
This study does not seek to explain causal mechanisms and identify key independent
variables but is testing a theory of decision making. Thus, it is not possible to classify a
case a being a “deviant” in terms of decision-making processes until minimal research
has been undertaken. If this were not the case, the fact that Argentina was the only
country to voluntarily restrict its emissions even though it was not mandated to by the
Protocol, would likely make it a deviant case. Argentina is termed “somewhat” deviant
for this reason.
81
producers and consumers of petroleum/oil, are large emitters of CO2 and they are all
active players (relatively speaking) on the world stage. The three cases simultaneously
provide for an interesting comparison because of their differences. They have different
governmental structures, key players, political and economic contexts and different
relations with the U.S.
The selection of these cases also adheres to many of Van Evera’s (1997)
suggestions for case selection (see pages 79-87). They are data-rich cases (complexity to
be explored in process-tracing), they resemble current situations of policy concern (the
relevancy of The Protocol), they are well matched for controlled cross-case comparison
(both with each other and with the U.S.), they contain an outlier case (Argentina) and
they test for previously omitted types of tests (environmental foreign policy in Latin
America).
Concluding Remarks
In summary, this study provides a strong test of PH due to the chosen
methodology and case selection. Via the analysis of pertinent documentation and the
results of personal interviews, this study attempts to recreate the decision-making
processes of three Latin American presidents in their decision to ratify The Protocol.
Doing so provides for a sound test of PH against new and different case studies than it
has commonly been applied to in the past. Testing the theory against new cases will
yield important results regarding the theory’s generalizability and overall explanatory
value.
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Chapter 4
Argentina: Menem’s Voluntary Commitment to the U.S.
In the international climate change community, Argentina is known as a bit of a
rebel, or put in more positive words, proactive. Argentina not only ratified The Protocol
but agreed to voluntarily reduce its GHG emissions. In doing so, Argentina stepped away
from the comfort of its developing-nation status to (theoretically) join the ranks of the
developing world. It was the first developing nation to do so, to commit to go above and
beyond what was required of it in The Protocol. This was a big risk for Argentina, but
one that its president, Carlos Saul Menem, was willing to take.
Before tracing the steps that led Menem to make this remarkable decision, the
following chapter will provide a description of the international and domestic context
within which the president made this decision. It includes an historical account of
Argentine foreign policy before and during Menem’s administrations as well as a
discussion of environmental issues and policy in the country. Following this is an
account of the process by which Menem came to make his decision, highlighting public
announcements made both by the president himself and Argentine convention delegates.
The chapter concludes with the application of PH to the decision-making process and an
assessment of its success.
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The Evolution (or Vacillation) of Argentine Foreign Policy
Like many nations, Argentina has had a turbulent past begetting great changes in
regime type and leadership and, as a result, foreign policy strategy. Throughout the
country’s history, Argentine foreign policy “has oscillated between the two distinct poles
of attraction” (Mullins 2006). At times, Argentine leaders have emphasized regional
alliances or have adopted isolationist strategies in the international arena. At others, the
priority was closer ties and alignment with the West, particularly the U.S. Aldo C. Vacs
(2003) describes Argentine foreign policy in the twentieth century as a similar composite
of divergent strategies. He writes that Argentine foreign policies “were characterized by
an unwieldy mix of nationalism and internationalism, assertiveness and subordination,
hegemonic aspirations and pragmatism, and neutralism and alignment” (188).
In the nineteenth century, Argentine foreign policy centered on economic issues
and leaders focused foreign affairs on trade, paying special attention to countries that
imported Argentine products. At this time, the U.S. was of little trade importance and
thus Argentine foreign policy paid little deference to its northern neighbor (Tulchin
1996).
53
Despite the directives of the Monroe Doctrine (U.S. President Monroe’s 1823
declaration that Europe should not interfere with the New World, including Latin
America), Argentina practiced its own form of policy independence by choosing to
maintain close ties with Europe, especially as regarded trade (Mullins 2006).
Just after the turn of the century, relations between the U.S. and Argentina began
to sour. This was largely initiated by post-Great Depression policy in the U.S. that
53
This 1996 piece was also published in a Tulchin’s edited book Argentina: The
Challenges of Modernization (1998).
84
imposed harsh protectionist policies that attempted to boost the domestic economy
(Levine 2001). Although Argentina remained neutral throughout WWI as did U.S.-
Argentine relations, the bilateral relationship took a turn for the worse during WWII. For
one, Argentina refused to join the Pan American Defense Alliance. In addition, although
Argentina had hoped to remain similarly neutral throughout the second war, the desire to
trade with Europe was strong and Argentina continued to do so throughout the war. The
U.S. misinterpreted Argentina’s policy decisions as “pro-Nazi” and imposed a trade
embargo on Argentina (Levine 2001).
After WWII, the policy position of Argentina shifted somewhat with the election
of President Juan Domingo Perón. The Great Depression a recent memory, Perón was
not especially interested in foreign affairs; he was instead interested in domestic issues,
for example working class issues, industrialization and the nationalization of industry.
Perón wanted to build a strong nation and a distinct Argentine identity that was not
susceptible to foreign influence, especially Communism (Levine 2001). A byproduct of
this nationalist and populist focus, Argentina’s foreign policy preferences became
isolationist in character as the government focused on issues on the homefront. To this
day, Peronism (or Justicialism) is characterized by nationalist sentiment, a strong federal
government and strong interests in accommodating business, industry, labor and the poor.
However, Perón’s foreign policies only lasted as long as his presidency.
When the military junta commandeered power in 1955, the government placed
increased importance on foreign capital and made clear attempts to engage the country in
international economic institutions and, thus, back into the international community.
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Argentina became involved in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Vacs 2003).
Overall, during military rule, attitudes towards the U.S. were “somewhat
ambivalent” (Mullins 2006).
54
Both Argentina and the U.S. were anti-Communist, but
this did not ensure amicable relations as President Carter was a champion of human rights
and the junta was accused of excessive and horrendous human rights abuses. Some of
that bad air was lifted, however, with the election of Ronald Reagan and his heavily-
focused anti-Communism agenda. Relations continued to improve throughout the 1980s,
though not because of any attempt to do so. The U.S. and Argentina shared similar views
on the conflicts in Central America (Nicaragua and El Salvador) (Mullins 2006).
Arguably a contributor to the junta’s demise in 1983 was its decision to invade the
Malvinas (Falkland Islands) in 1982. General Leopoldo Galtieri hoped the invasion of
the islands that both Argentina and Great Britain claimed as their own would serve two
directives: 1) put Argentina on the map as a powerful international force and 2) create a
stronger sense of Argentine nationalism. The invasion failed on both accounts. As to the
first goal, the invasion actually created a negative international image of the country.
Most Western states aligned with Great Britain; most Latin American states officially
54
The military junta ruled Argentina from 1955 to 1973. In 1973, Perón was again
elected president after 18 years in exile (during the junta’s rule) although he served as
president for just over a year until he passed away, leaving the presidency to his wife
Isabel. Military rule returned to Argentina in 1976, truncating Isabel’s rule, at which
time the military condoned the “Dirty War” which lasted until 1983 when democracy
returned to the country. The Dirty War was a state-sponsored period of violence against
the Argentine people. During this time, approximately 30,000 people “disappeared”
(were stolen from their homes and places of work, kept hostage, tortured and most
killed), often for “crimes” as minor as speaking against the government or associating
with someone who has.
86
aligned with Argentina, though the show of solidarity was largely rhetorical (Vacs 2003).
The invasion painted Argentina as a naïve nation with ambitions beyond its capabilities.
As to the second, the unequivocal defeat of the ill-prepared Argentine forces prompted a
domestic backlash that prompted an eventual regime change. Leadership was forced back
into the hands of civilians.
As the newly elected democratic president in 1983, Raúl Alfonsín hoped to
improve Argentina’s international image, post Malvinas. His foreign policy emphasized
the country’s reinsertion in the international stage. Feeling that reinsertion was a “vital
facet of the nations’ transition to democracy and its redefinition of itself,” Alfonsín
exerted effort to make and retain positive relations with as many states as possible
(Tulchin 1996, 165). Thus, Alfonsín targeted and implemented independent yet active
foreign policy that did not favor the U.S. or play to a traditional superior, European
national identity. Instead, Alfonsín declared Argentina a Western, non-aligned and
developing nation. Argentina was culturally and political inline with the West yet it was
not militarily aligned with the West or any particular Western state. In addition, Alfonsín
intentionally called his country a developing nation in order to keep alliances in the
South, and especially in Latin America, on good terms. In this way, the democratic
administration was following “correct policy.” As opposed to previous governments that
formulated foreign policy in terms of the way they imagined Argentina fitting into the
international stage or how they hoped it would, Alfonsín’s policies recognized the real
world as it truly was (Tulchin 1996). His policies were termed more realistic in nature
and goal.
87
Woven throughout the constant oscillations of Argentine political regimes and
foreign policy is an undulating thread of assertive national identity. A result of increased
immigration at the beginning of the twentieth century, a strong, and at times defensive,
nationalism or sense of argentitnidad was born (Mullins 2006). Coupled with economic
success, this strong national pride led to a sense of Argentine grandeur, or grandeza
nacional, that would become a strong influence on Argentine foreign policy for years to
come (Mullins 2006).
This strong national identity, or at times the lack of one such as after the Malvinas
debacle, constantly dictated Argentine foreign policy. Since WWII, the nation has
suffered from an identity crisis constantly flip-flopping between Western, Southern and
independently Argentine personas. However, one ever-present identity that has often
alienated neighbors and allies alike is the notion of Argentine exceptionalism. Argentina
has often thought of itself as superior to its Latin American neighbors and as having more
in common with the West, particularly Europe. A severe, yet common, critique of this
perception is that it is just that, a perception; it is a perception out of line with reality.
Leaders have often made foreign policy decisions based on Argentine superiority and an
over-exaggerated sense of the country’s international importance and its power and
capabilities. At other times, leaders have sought policy prestige similarly out of line with
the reality of Argentina’s place in the international arena. President Menem has been
criticized for straining for such prestige in his alliance with the U.S., to the detriment of
the well-being of the Argentine people.
88
Menem: The Early Years
The presidency of Carlos Saúl Menem was yet another chapter in the ever-
changing chronicle of Argentine foreign policy. Menem was elected president of
Argentina in the summer of 1989. His first term was a roller coaster one with ebbs and
flows of popularity underscored by a constant drive to reinsert his country into the
international community. Menem was the first Peronist elected president since the death
of the party’s namesake. However, the new president’s plan for the country did not
adhere closely to the ideas advanced by Peronism. In fact, many of his policies ran in
direct opposition to traditional Peronist ideology. Both Menem’s supporters and critics
were stunned by such a departure from party lines, but many gave the newly-elected
president the benefit of the doubt (New York Times July 1989).
Early into Menem’s presidential term this benefit of the doubt seemed to pay off.
Within the first two and half months Menem had “woven a kind of magic over the
Argentines” (Christian 1989) and he had tamed the country’s soaring inflation. But by
the eight month mark the situation had worsened. Within less than one year the
administration had run through three economic ministers, four central bank presidents
and three emergency economic plans. Such repeated shifts in policy and personnel led to
declining support for the president as well as a declined perception of government
credibility (New York Times March 1990).
In terms of presidential policy, one of Menem’s main directives upon taking
office was, in his own words, the “fluid insertion of Argentina in the international field”
(Christian 1989). In particular, he desired strengthened ties with the U.S. Recognizing
89
the unavoidable status of the regional hegemon, Menem said “…everyone knows that
within the context of the United Nations, there is one country that is the leader and that is
the United States. There is no doubt of this” (Nash 1991a). In order to align his country
with the indisputable leader, Menem made numerous visits to the U.S., some before he
was elected president. U.S. presidents (and other government officials and dignitaries)
also made many trips to the South American nation. Hoping to distance himself from
Peronist isolationist policies of the past, in a September 1989 visit with President Bush,
Menem said that he hoped the visit “will end an old and stupid legend” about the
perceived anti-Americanism of Peronism and that it will “lift all shadows from relations
between the United States and Argentina” (Christian 1989). As a gesture of his
commitment to improved ties, Menem sent military forces (two warships, a cargo plane
and approximately 450 troops) to assist in the war in the Persian Gulf.
However, such devotion to the U.S. earned Menem harsh criticism, both from his
own countrymen and from other Latin American nations. Nevertheless, the two
presidents continued their courtship seemingly undaunted. One such censure was the
accusation of playing “the role of Latin American puppet” for President Bush (Christian
1990). Amidst violent protests of his visit, President Bush praised Menem’s support in
the Gulf as “a clear sign that you are assuming your rightful place as a leader among
freedom-loving nations” (Dowd 1990). The mutual admiration was not confined to
public appearances. After publicly exchanging venerations, Menem invited Bush to a
doubles match, the rodeo and a state dinner (Ibid.).
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President Bush’s visit highlighted a critical point in Menem’s presidency. He was
gaining support and respect abroad but was losing popularity back home. Inflation
continued and accusations of personal scandal and government corruption were growing
in number and intensity. As an Argentine political analyst and poll-taker said, “There is a
danger that the public is beginning to think that perhaps he is really a frivolous man,
involved in little scandals almost every day and paying attention to the irrelevant and
trivial, and not to the main public programs” (Nash 1991a). This is not to infer that all
Argentines were unhappy with the work of their president. Director of research at the
Center for Study of the State and Society Jorge Balan said, “Maybe we don’t like the
clownish things he does, but he at least gets things done. He has shown a lot of executive
authority” (Nash 1991a).
Exhibiting such authority, in November of 1991 in an 18-minute speech on
national television, Menem announced his plan for sweeping transformations of the
nation’s economy. In an attempt to reverse historic protectionism and state intervention
that had been “asphyxiating” the Argentine economy, he announced wide-ranging
deregulation of the national economy (Nash 1991b). Menem wanted Argentina to
embrace a free-market economy aligned with the developed world, particularly the U.S.
To revitalize the economy his plan was to privatize numerous sectors, thereby making
them subject to international as well as domestic market forces.
Largely a result of these sweeping economic changes, by the end of 1991,
Menem’s approval ratings were revived, recovering from a low of below 20 percent and
reaching a high of 70 percent in December. Such improvements evolved despite the
91
persistent presence of personal and governmental scandal (Nash 1992). Perhaps the
largest variable affecting the surge in support for the president was the historically low
rate of inflation, the lowest in twenty years.
Although he was not a candidate, Menem’s popularity may have helped him win
big in national elections in October of 1993. His Peronist party was the overwhelming
victor in nationwide elections. This benefited Menem as it helped him build support for a
necessary change to the Constitution in order to allow him run for re-election.
55
The
following month, Menem got another boost in his quest for re-election when former
president and leader of the Radical party, Raul Alfonsín, agreed to support the desired
constitutional changes. After a successful amendment to the Constitution, Menem was
victoriously re-elected president in May of 1995. He won comfortably with
approximately 50 percent of the vote.
Argentina, the Environment and The Kyoto Protocol
Environmental Argentina?
The political and economic changes in Argentina in the 1990s (restructuring and
privatization) brought low inflation, manageable foreign debt, banking reforms and
balanced trade accounts. As a result, the nation became one of the most politically and
economically stable countries in South America. Such changes and increased status
successfully (if but for a time) also increased the country’s standard of living.
Unfortunately, such growth came at a price as it simultaneously placed greater strain on
55
The Argentine Constitution forbade presidential re-election. The only way Menem
could run for president again was via an official change to the Constitution.
92
the environment. For example, Argentina became one of Latin America’s largest
producers and consumers of energy, particularly oil. Argentine energy consumption rose
by more than 30 percent from 1990 to 2000 (almost double 1980 levels) (The World
News Network 2000). Increased growth and development also meant increased use of
other natural resources and a resulting increase in levels of pollution. The federal
government, however, was slow to follow with environmental regulation, at least until
nearing the end of the 1990s.
In 2000, reflecting the nation’s growing affluence in the region, Argentina had the
second highest per capita energy consumption (behind Venezuela) (EIA 2007).
56
In that
same year, the country produced around 800,000 barrels a day and consumed about
500,000 a day; it had approximately 2.8 billion barrels of oil in reserve. Unfortunately,
for a nation with such a hunger for oil, few anticipate much potential for exploration and
production beyond existing reserves in the future (Hillstrom and Hillstrom 2004).
The country is also a leading emitter of carbon dioxide in the region, including
both emissions from fossil fuels and land use change (USAID 2007). Although Latin
American emissions were below the world average in the 1990s and its carbon intensity
(relation of carbon emissions produced to GDP) was somewhat low, emissions continued
to increase and are expected to constitute a greater percentage of world-wide and regional
emissions in the future. The greatest sources of GHG emissions in Argentina are the
result of deforestation and increased livestock. (Livestock, especially cows, emit
methane, although not the most prevalent, the most intense GHG.)
56
For a global perspective, it is important to remember that Argentina’s high rate of
energy consumption was only one-fifth of that of the U.S.
93
Aside from these issues, however, Argentina is a relatively un-contaminated
country and its environmental ailments are not as severe as they are elsewhere in the
developing world. The problems it does suffer from are largely found in urban areas and
are the result of poorly planned urban development. The absence of anti-dumping laws
and proper sewage in cities has led to measurable water pollution and a lack of adequate
potable water for many urban inhabitants. A lack of automobile exhaust emission
controls and industrial emission controls has similarly led to serious air pollution
problems in big cities, especially Buenos Aires (Cambridge Country Report 1999).
Such inabilities to protect against environmental deterioration are the result of
some key governmental weaknesses. As evidenced above, the nation suffers from
insufficient policies to protect against contamination. In addition, environmental
legislation is largely sectoral; there is no overarching federal framework to provide
guidance to individual sectors of the economy. In fact, Argentina is one of the few Latin
American countries that does not have overarching environmental legislation (Cameron
and Zillman 2001). As a result, any existing laws, such as a few general statues
governing air pollution and hazardous waste (Ibid.), provide piecemeal solutions at best.
Some examples of legislation include a natural gas vehicle program (1984)
57
, a street
light efficiency program (1998) and a project to reduce emissions from the flaring of
natural gas (1994). Argentina has also begun addressing deforestation problems by
implementing aforestation programs that plant new trees.
57
By the end of the twentieth century, Argentina had amassed the largest fleet of natural
gas vehicles in the world (Suárez 1999).
94
When federal legislation does exist, it is often weak and easily ignored on the
provincial level. In addition, the federal agency responsible for environmental issues, the
Secretariat of Natural Resources and Human Environment (created in 1991 under
Menem), often does not have adequate financial resources to implement and enforce
environmental laws. Moreover, exacerbating these twentieth (and twenty-first) century
difficulties is the fact that environmental protection has historically received low priority
from past governments. Historically adhering to a traditional economic growth versus
environmental protection paradigm, past administrations placed greater value on
economic development. Argentine officials often chose to overlook pollution that
resulted from economically productive activities.
Argentine Steps Prior to Kyoto
Prior to 1992 and the Rio Earth Summit when climate change first demanded
attention as an international issue, Argentina had done little on its own to address the
problem. (In Argentina’s defense, neither had most nations.) It did, however, establish
the National Climate Change Commission in 1991 under the Science and Technology
Secretariat as a coordinating and planning body to handle climate change and related
issues. One of the earliest attempts to regulate the energy sector, and the only framework
document in that sector, dates back to 1985 and the establishment of the Rational Use of
Energy Program. Addressing the nation’s inability to meet rising energy demand, the
nationwide program was designed to oversee and regulate energy use via a program of
conservation, substitution and the development of new energy sources (Cameron and
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Zillman 2001). The Energy Secretariat has also addressed energy efficiency issues in its
Rational Energy Use Office (Ibid.). However, most likely a reflection of Menem’s
market-oriented reforms, much regulatory responsibility (especially in the energy
generation sector) is vested within the “enlightened self-interest” of the private sector and
market-based competition (Ibid.). The government relies on market forces to achieve
greater energy efficiency and to reduce energy-related pollution.
In January of 1997, Argentina dutifully submitted its First National
Communication as required by the UNFCCC. The document included the most recent
data and information on the country’s greenhouse (National Inventories) for the years
1990 through 1994.
In June of that same year, in a speech to the UN, Menem spoke about the
importance of protecting the environment, though he stopped short of mentioning specific
problems and specific measures Argentina or the international community should take.
He did, however, mention that in the reform of the Argentine Constitution the addition
was made guaranteeing “the right of all individuals to enjoy a healthy and balanced
environment capable of satisfying their present needs without jeopardizing those of future
generations” (Menem 1997, 27).
58
Speaking in generalities, Menem said “It is time for
us to put a definitive end to the idea of choosing between economic development and the
preservation of the environment” (Menem 1997, 27). He concluded his speech by stating
58
Other Latin American countries to do the same include Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador,
Nicaragua and Paraguay. The wording chosen for the Argentine Constitution follows
very closely to the definition of sustainable development adopted at the 1992 Earth
Summit.
96
“The time has come to set aside promises; the time has come to take action” (Ibid. 28).
In the following months, Menem would do just that.
The Pre-Kyoto Meeting of the Minds
As the Kyoto COP-3 neared, two presidents met in Bariloche, Argentina.
President Menem welcomed President Clinton to one of the southernmost points of
Argentina on a beautiful day in mid-October. Among other issues, the two leaders
discussed global warming and their shared interest in addressing the problem. What
made this meeting most notable was the men’s unity on a controversial point- that
developing nations must do their part to reduce GHGs. Clinton subtly, yet with not-so-
modest pressure, requested that Argentina, although it would not be required to do so in
the upcoming Protocol expected to emerge in December, agree to reduce its GHG
emissions.
Expressing his point of view, Clinton said “this is clearly a global problem in
which we must all do our share. The strategy we embrace today does not ask developing
nations to sacrifice the legitimate aspirations of their people for economic growth” (CNN
1997). Taking the liberty of speaking for his entire country, Menem responded, “We
agree with the United States when you say that a global problem such as climate change
requires a global answer from all countries” (Ibid.). With this gesture Menem looked to
stand in solidarity with the U.S.’s view that all nations should limit GHG emissions, not
97
just developed nations. In this moment, Menem became the first leader of a developing
nation to take such a stance.
59
At this meeting, the presidents signed the Presidential Declaration of Bariloche.
The Declaration stated that “…Developed countries must meet their obligations, and
developing countries must participate meaningfully in this global regime, including by
addressing emission limits for developing countries” (as quoted in Fletcher 1991). In this
vein, the presidents agreed to participate in joint implementation projects wherein the two
nations would coordinate reduction efforts, the U.S. assisting Argentina. More
specifically, companies could buy and sell pollution credits to each other (though the
scenario would likely be Argentina selling credits to the U.S.). By agreeing to the
Declaration, Argentina in effect agreed to obligatory, yet realistic, reduction targets
(Bouille and Girardin 2002). Posturing aside, however, neither leader spoke of any
specific reductions plans.
In a display of their comradery, after their public declaration, the two presidents
played a friendly round of golf.
Menem and Alsogaray Lay the Foundation
Hoping to impart a last minute impression on his ally before his big speech,
Clinton telephoned Menem to ask for his support at the third COP in Kyoto, Japan
(December 3-10, 1997). To Menem, Clinton expressed the concerns he had about
ratification which, among others, included the common perception that the world is split
59
Clinton had also approached Venezuela, Brazil and other nations earlier in his South
American trip with the same proposition but did so to no avail (Bennet 1997).
98
into two parts: the culprits (Annex-I nations) and the victims (non-Annex I nations)
(Federovisky 1997).
At the conference, Maria Julia Alsogaray, Argentina’s Secretary for Natural
Resources and Human Environment, spoke before 165 delegates in hopes of loosening
some of the tension, especially of that between the developed and developing nations.
Alsogaray called for the support of clear and demanding goals for the reduction of GHGs,
but did so by suggesting that developing nations voluntarily reduce emissions. She added
that nations should not be coerced into action, maintaining that measures should be
voluntary. However, if voluntary measures are agreed to, they should be considered
binding commitments (Federovisky 1997).
Despite her efforts, in the end there was no consensus on the issue of voluntary
commitments and no mention of these commitments in the final version of The Protocol
(Bouille and Girardin 2002). The most opposition to her plan came from the Group of 77
and China (the largest intergovernmental organization of developing nations) who held
firm to their beliefs that the overwhelming majority of the burden lies with the
industrialized world. The group believed that it is the developed world’s responsibility to
reduce emissions, not the responsibility of the developing world. Therefore, from the
perspective of the G-77 and China, voluntary commitments are not necessary and would
not be discussed.
Irrespective of the difficulties Alsogaray faced in trying to gain support for her
plan, Menem persevered. In front of the entire conference, the Argentine president
announced his promotion of voluntary reductions for non-Annex I countries. No specific
99
details were set and no official announcement was made, but Menem was one step closer
to paving the “third way.” His announcement was not well received by a majority of
delegations.
The Kyoto Announcement
The follow-up conference (COP4) was hosted by Argentina and was held in
Buenos Aires November 2-13, 1998. Secretary Alsogaray was elected president of the
COP and took on great responsibility for the two-week proceedings. What was to come
was a historical announcement from President Menem. Although his pronouncement
pleased U.S. delegates, developing nations were not as happy, nor were many members
of the Argentine Congress.
Despite expressed opposition at COP3 and at smaller meetings prior to COP4,
Alsogaray continued to advocate for the addition of voluntary commitments on the behalf
of the developing world. In her opening statement to the COP Alsogaray said
…just like the industrialized world is to a large extent responsible for this
critical present condition of climate change, we are also convinced that
we, the developing nations, do have the necessary conditions- and ethical
duty- to embrace social, economic and technological development models
pledging for sustainable development…instead of keeping on arguing
about who’s to be blamed for the past, which led us to the present
condition, we take the necessary steps so as not to be blamed for the
future. (Alsogaray 1998)
Alsogaray was also determined to keep the issue of voluntary commitments alive
such that she took the initiative to place the item on the conference’s provisional agenda.
However, the G-77 and China were equally persistent in their refusal to discuss the
100
matter.
60
Alsogaray was eventually forced to remove the item from the agenda and,
instead, suggested informal discussions between interested parties (Jahnke 1999).
Although informal and tangential to the primary sessions, these discussions were
nevertheless significant as they “formed part of the meeting’s backdrop,” (Jahnke 1999,
3) underscoring and setting the tone of many negotiations.
After the conference concluded, the Argentine delegation admitted that they did
not, in earnest, expect that voluntary commitments would be accepted. They had hoped
that the issue would at least be discussed and, thus, could indirectly serve as a counter
argument to any objections Annex-I nations would have to ratification (Bouille and
Girardin 2002). (If some non-Annex I countries were taking steps to reduce emissions,
Annex-I countries could not argue that they are not doing their fair share.)
From a converse perspective, bringing up the issue of voluntary commitments yet
again was a huge mistake. It only served to anger many delegates and increased tension
among non-Annex I nations (Sari 2005). For example, upset with her persistent
advocacy of voluntary commitments (even though the idea had been rejected previously),
a Chinese delegate accused Alsogaray of not being true to her role as COP president and
favoring the position of her home country (BBC 1998). In an interview in Argentine
newspaper La Nación, Alsogaray expressed her irritation with the reprimand she received
from the delegate. Ambassador Raul Estrada Oyuela of Argentina remarked that the
reaction Alsogaray received was “awful, strong and impolite,” especially considering she
60
China, Brazil and India were the most outspoken in voicing their opposition to any
emission limits for developing nations.
101
was a representative of the home country (Oyuela 2007).
61
In the interview, Alsogaray
was on the defensive against continued attacks when she said “The people who are
accusing us of playing politics to ignore solutions should examine their own consciences
and see all the delays they are causing” (BBC 1998).
The removal of the topic from the formal agenda did not deter President Menem
from pursuing his own agenda. Menem began the final phase of the conference by
making a formal announcement that Argentina will make a voluntary commitment to
reduce its GHG emissions for the target years 2008 to 2010. In reference to the record
high temperatures set in the last two years and recent flooding in Central America,
Menem said “We cannot ignore the warnings that nature has made this year…The planet
is painfully warning all humankind” (Menem 1998). Separating himself from all other
non-Annex I nations, Menem stated
…not only the highly developed countries can contribute to the
establishment of a new world order. The emerging countries also have the
responsibility of taking their own initiatives to face and overcome all the
challenges that the next century encompasses. Argentina does not intend
to make efforts outside the system. We want to set objectives within the
Convention. We have not been able to do so thus far, but we will keep on
working to achieve this objective at the fifth meeting of the Conference.
Meanwhile, we will define the targets that will determine our growth with
less carbon emissions. (Menem 1998)
By making such a strong gesture, Menem was hopeful his country could erase
“the false option between economic growth and environmental protection” (Ibid.). As
61
Raul Estrada Oyuela is touted as the “father of the Kyoto Protocol” as he is credited
with the birth of the document. Oyuela worked tirelessly until the early morning hours to
ensure that he had the approval and consent of all nations for the creation of the Protocol
in 1997. He remained very active in subsequent international meetings.
102
evidence, Menem pointed out, Argentina’s economy grew six percent in the last decade
but greenhouse gas emissions per capita grew by only one percent (Ibid.).
In light of Menem’s bold announcement, Alsogaray later clarified that
Argentina’s goals would not be reductions in the classical sense, but limits on the growth
of emissions (Stevens 1998), and would, thus, simultaneously allow for some growth and
development (largely economic). Specific reduction amounts and timetables would
follow at COP5. Argentina would spend the next year devising the appropriate binding
target.
U.S. delegates and many environmentalists were visibly pleased by Menem’s
announcement.
62
Stuart Eizenstat, head of the U.S. delegation said, “…this is the kind of
commitment we needed to make the promise of Kyoto a reality…this demonstrates that
we have come a long way” (Warrick 1998). Michael Oppenheimer of the Environmental
Defense Fund also showed his approval by saying, “It is a major breakthrough. I don’t
think there’s any doubt about it” (Stevens 1998).
The Clinton administration was also very pleased by Menem’s decision, although
the announcement came as little surprise. Administration officials consulted with Menem
days before the speech, and, just as before COP3, Clinton made a phone call to Menem
the day before the Argentine president’s speech to offer encouragement. However,
according to officials at the White House, the administration made Menem no specific
assurances of reciprocal gestures on the behalf of the U.S. (Warrick 1998), at least
beyond what had already been agreed to.
62
Environmental and other related NGOs are able to participate in all climate change
conferences as observers.
103
Others were much more skeptical and cautious as such an action drew a clear
distinction between Argentina and the rest of the developing world. For example,
Friends of the Earth representatives called the move politically divisive as it would make
negotiations even more difficult for the poorer developing nations. They would not be
able to make voluntary reduction commitments of their own (Houlder 1998). Some
Europeans feared that a split within non-Annex I countries would make already difficult
negotiations exceedingly more so (Warrick 1998).
In addition to inciting disagreement between nations, Menem’s announcement
also caused tensions within Argentina. At the COP, Menem announced that the
Argentine Senate had already approved ratification of The Protocol. The only remaining
obstacle was passing the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies. This statement
oversimplified the hurdle Menem had yet to overcome within his own legislative branch.
In actuality, Argentina could not ratify The Protocol because there was not a sufficient
number of deputies to discuss the issue (there was no quorum).
63
According to Deputy
Mabel Müller, leader of the Commission on Natural Resources, the Frepaso (the
opposition party) requested an additional week to analyze the possibility of ratification in
the Commission on Foreign Relations. Müller lamented that it would have been nice if
the president could have announced Congress’s ratification when he made his
announcement at the COP, but this was not possible. If, however, deliberations went
smoothly, a decision could be made within the week, assuming there were enough
deputies for a quorum (Clarín 1998). Nothing was certain.
63
The real reason for the lack of quorum was not publicized.
104
Menem’s announcement did have some positive repercussions. Within hours of
his announcement, the Kazakh delegation told U.S. diplomats that it had plans to make a
similar announcement of voluntary reductions. In addition, Raul Castellini, head of the
Argentine delegation at COP4, said that as many as 20 other developing nations,
including South Korea and Chile, were also considering voluntary commitments
(Navarro and Sandels 1998). Moreover, the following day, the U.S. delegation signed
The Protocol. To some, this move was seen as the probable next step in a carefully
choreographed exchange between Clinton and Menem. Menem made his move, Clinton
his, but neither made any binding decisions. Argentina had yet to set any binding targets
and the U.S. still had not ratified.
Setting the Target
In January of 1999, Menem made yet another visit to the United States to visit
with Clinton. The two leaders discussed many issues including the Malvinas/Falklands
dispute, terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, the open skies agreement and
trade (Dobbins 1999). One of Clinton’s primary concerns was the discussion of Iraq and
Bosnian peacekeeping. Argentina was about to begin a two year term on the UN Security
Council and having an ally on the Council would be a great benefit for Clinton. Clinton
and Vice President Al Gore also praised Menem for the evolution of Argentina into a
more stable and democratic country (Ross 1999) and for the leadership he had shown in
climate change (Dobbins 1999). Menem then promised full support for the Gulf War and
expressed his personal support for the American president in reference to Clinton’s
105
threatening impeachment (Dobbins 1999). Epitomizing the personal relationship that had
matured between the leaders, Menem told Clinton “I want you to know you have in me a
true friend” (Ross 1999).
Beginning in April, Menem began to take the steps he promised he would (in
front of the Convention and to the Clinton Administration). By presidential decree N°
377/99 (and thereby sidestepping Congressional authority) he established the National
Commission for the Formulation and Proposal of the Greenhouse Gas Emission Target
with the Secretary for Natural Resources and Sustainable Development (SRNDS) and
Alsogaray at the helm. Bouville and Girardin (2002) suggest that Menem chose
Alsogaray and SRNDS because “it had the highest political backing and represented the
position closest to the Clinton Administration” (139). Other government agencies
participated to varying degrees, but Alsogaray was the ringleader.
Back in 1997, Argentina was one of the first to submit its National
Communication as required by the UNFCCC. Now in October 1999, Argentina
submitted the Revision of the First National Communication. It was in this document
that the country announced its binding reductions that would take place for the target
period 2008 to 2012 (the same commitment period to which Annex-I nations are bound).
In the document, Argentina justified its reductions in light of the environmental, social
and economic consequences of climate change, all the while still adhering to the idea of
“common but differentiated responsibility.” In the end, the equation used to derive the
reduction target was a dynamic one based on both emissions and GDP: E = 151.5 *√P
where E is emissions measured in tons of carbon equivalent and P is GDP in 1993
106
Argentine pesos. The document justifies the use of 151.5 as a constant as it most often
guarantees effectual emission reductions when tested against the various likely future
scenarios.
64
Others believe, however, that the equation was more likely the result of U.S.
influence. For one, Argentina had a U.S. grant and U.S. specialists to help them study the
issue. Two, although there has been much after-the-fact justification of the constant
151.5, some question where this magic number came from originally. Oyuela said it
came from the Americans and its origins were not made clear (Oyuela 2007).
At COP5 in Bonn, Germany (October 25 to November 5), Argentina officially
announced its target for reducing emissions. Under the scenario proposed by Argentina,
making the voluntary commitment would entitle the country to benefits beyond
technology transfers (conferred upon all non-Annex I nations in The Protocol) to include
benefits from the international permit trading market as well. Both would be a benefit to
the country. In fact, Argentina’s commitment was conditional upon the extension of this
and other mechanisms to the non-Annex I nation. In this way, Menem announced that
Argentina was a model for other developing nations to follow (arguing under the
assumption that they, too, would be able to benefit from the extension of flexibility
mechanisms) (Navarro and Sandels 1998). Menem was proposing a “new way” (Menem
1998) or a “third way” (Bouille and Girardin 2002) for the developing world to
participate in The Protocol.
64
See Bouille and Girardin (2002) pages 140-144 for a more thorough discussion of the
derivation of this equation.
107
President Menem and Poliheuristic Theory
What follows is the application of PH to the Argentine case study. The analysis
will consider the components of the theory in relation to President Menem’s decision
making. It will assess whether or not Menem eliminated unacceptable policy options in
the first phase based on cognitive heuristics and in reference to a primary criterion of
domestic political concerns using the noncompensatory principle. The analysis will then
consider PH in terms of Menem’s second phase decision making and whether or not the
president employed more traditionally rational decision strategies to come to his final
decision.
First Phase
A One-Man Decision
While policy decisions in democracies are largely thought to be the result of
consensus or, at the very least, consideration of a variety of concerns, perspectives and
suggestions, this is not always the case. Argentina’s decision to voluntarily reduce its
GHG emissions was not the result of lengthy deliberations or consultations. Instead, the
decision was made at the top, with President Menem, and it was made with very little
influence from others. In providing a foundation upon which to discuss Menem’s
decision making (and in citing work by Henry Kissinger), Respondent A explained how
people generally believe that decisions are made in the highest levels of office (i.e., by
presidents and their most trusted cabinet members). In reality, however, most decisions
are made somewhere in the middle ranks by officials that work in ministries/agencies and
108
by the higher-up’s advisors. The only time decisions are made in a top-down fashion is
when a president “needs to produce something” and in these cases policies are tailor-
made by the presidents for specific occasions.
65
In providing this backdrop, Respondent
A inferred that Menem’s decision to voluntarily reduce the nation’s emissions was one
such time wherein a president took the lead in tailoring foreign policy in order to meet a
particular policy objective.
As further evidence that Menem was the sole policy maker and that his decision
was not based on democratic processes, respondents reported that the decision-making
process was closed and did not consider the public’s or other groups’ opinions.
According to Respondent B, the decision was made via a closed process within the
Cancellería (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MRE) or the Foreign Ministry).
Although the decision to join the climate change regime is one that primarily involves
environmental issues, the maximum authority on climate change had nothing to do with
the environment (Respondent B).
66
To the president, it was a foreign policy issue.
Menem gave decision-making authority to the Cancellería of which, in reality, he was the
ultimate arbiter.
At this point, it is appropriate to discuss the role of María Julia Alsogaray. As she
was appointed the first Secretary of the Environment by Menem and was Secretary when
65
Respondent A gave the examples of President Kennedy’s surge to commercialize
satellite communications and President Eisenhower’s atoms for peace program.
66
Climate change issues were originally managed by the Cancellería until Alsogaray was
announced head of the environmental ministry and decided she would like to manage it.
There was a constant fight between the ministry and the Cancellería over who should
have decision-making authority over the issue (Respondent B).
109
the decision was made to agree to a voluntary commitment, she was a prominent actor in
the decision-making process. However, she was not the decision-maker; that authority
remained in the Cancellería and with Menem. Nonetheless, Alsogaray and Menem had a
close relationship that stemmed from family ties. Alsogaray’s father, Alvaro Alsogaray,
a conservative politician and a close friend of Menem’s, helped Menem in his campaign
for president. To show his gratitude, Menem appointed Alsogaray’s daughter the task of
privatizing the state telephone and steel companies and later appointed her to the position
of Secretary of the Environment. She soon became the most powerful woman in
Argentina (Levine 2001). However, she remained subservient to Menem. For example,
according to Respondent B, Alsogaray made the announcement at COP4 about
Argentina’s commitment even though she did not agree with the decision. She made the
announcement at Menem’s request. Also, similar to Menem, Alsogaray had virtually no
background in environmental issues. Before becoming a government employee she was
an engineer. As Respondent A recalled, Alsogaray claimed that she was qualified to be
environmental secretary because her husband was a birdwatcher. Most respondents noted
Alsogaray’s lack of environmental background and poor qualifications to serve as
environmental minister. Nonetheless, that was the position she held.
The previous discussion not only serves to illustrate the authority and autonomy
Menem had when making his decision, but it also helps lay the foundation for an analysis
of his decision-making process a la PH. In order to determine whether or not PH can
adequately explain Menem’s decision-making strategy, the prescriptions of PH will now
110
be applied to each phase of Menem’s decision making process. To begin, Figure 4.1
presents the foreign policy options that originally lay before Menem as well as the
options eliminated in the first phase.
Figure 4.1 Menem’s Policy Options and First Phase Eliminations
These nine options were selected, first, based on the most obvious options that lay
before each country. As with all international conventions/protocols, there is an option to
ratify or not ratify. Coupled with the first two is the option of doing neither and
postponing ratification until a later date. This is, in effect, the “making no decision”
decision which is always an option in decision making scenarios. The remaining six
options were selected as they were conceptualized to be the other possible options,
options that were discussed by many developing nations that were also considering
ratification. These options were discovered during preliminary research and were found
to be possible options for at least one other developing nation. If one option was
A. Ratify (only)
D. Ratify & Voluntarily
Reduce Emissions
G. Propose Non-Annex
I Targets
H. Negotiate with the
U.S.
E. Negotiate with
Non-Annex I States
B. Wait to Ratify
I. Propose Totally New
Agreement
F. Align with Non-Annex
I States Against the U.S.
C. Don’t Ratify (only)
111
considered by a nation, it was likely an option for all other developing nations as well and
was including in the initial set.
67
Domestic Political Concerns?
The first question to be asked is whether or not Menem’s primary criterion for the
elimination of policy options adheres to PH’s prediction that decisions are made on the
basis of domestic political concerns. As predicted by existing literature on Menem’s
general foreign policy behavior, the president made most foreign policy decisions based
on his desire to align with the U.S. As specifically regards The Protocol, this ambition
was made evident in numerous speeches given by the president and in the observations of
those with knowledge of the decision-making process. It is also evident in the lack of
concern for domestic conditions and even in Menem’s failure to consider the domestic
plausibility of implementing his commitment.
The prioritization of U.S. interests in Menem’s foreign policy agenda is
corroborated by Respondents A and C. Referencing relaciones carnales
68
and the idea of
core/periphery state relations, Respondent A emphasized that Menem’s prime concern
67
PH does not include an explanation of how decision makers come to define their initial
option set. The theory starts by assuming this set already exists. This is one weakness of
the theory in that it does not consider this preliminary phase. However, it is not at issue
in this study. This study tests PH as is. See Sylvan and Voss’s 1998 book Problem
Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making for a thorough discussion of the issue.
68
The phrase “relaciones carnales” or “carnal relations” refers to the exceptionally strong
ties between the U.S. and Argentina throughout the 1990s. Via various policy decisions
and verbal endorsements, Argentina supported the U.S. unconditionally. Not limited to
scholarly commentary, this phrase was/is used even in the highest offices of both
governments. See Escudé (2003) for an extended discussion of the relationship.
112
was aligning with the U.S. The respondent also referenced the close collaboration
(personal conversations between presidents and other primary decision-makers, etc.) as
illustrations of the influence the relationship had on Menem’s decision. Similarly,
Respondent C stated that Menem simply wanted to do what the U.S. wanted him to.
Whatever Clinton asked of him, Menem was willing to accommodate.
Respondents also confirmed that Menem’s decision making was not guided by
environmental concerns. Respondents A and D expressed strong understanding that
Menem knew virtually nothing about environmental issues, especially climate change.
He had no background in environmental issues and did not make efforts to educate
himself. According to Respondent A, Menem “had no idea about climate change.” What
he did know a lot about and what he wanted to prioritize in his term(s) as president was
foreign policy and improved relations with the U.S. This became his primary criterion
for eliminating unsatisfactory policy options. However, they were not the only
justifications given for Argentina’s decision to make the voluntary commitment.
If taken at face value, comments by Alsogaray suggest that the justification for
making the commitment resides in the financial benefits Argentina would gain by making
the commitment. Alsogaray claimed that Argentina would benefit greatly from
technology transfers and other forms of investment in the country as well as from its
participation in the international emissions trading market (ISIA 1999). In fact,
Respondent C commented that all Alsogaray was interested in was money. As evidenced
by her past roles in the privatization of industry, her primary concern was improving
conditions for Argentine business and industry.
113
In reality, Alsogaray over-exaggerated the possible financial benefits of a
voluntary commitment. For one, technology transfers and other financial benefits to arise
from participating in clean development mechanisms would already be available with a
simple ratification of The Protocol and nothing more. These are available to all non-
Annex I signatory countries. Thus, assuming Alsogaray had at least a basic knowledge of
the Protocol, this would not be justification enough for making a voluntary commitment.
Availability of international emission trading markets was another story. According to
the Protocol, the markets are only available to Annex-I countries. Thus, in order to
benefit financially from the markets and any other flexibility mechanisms reserved for
Annex-I nations, Argentina would either have to assume Annex-I status or gain support
for an amendment to The Protocol. Both scenarios were unlikely as they entailed
additional negotiations and, technically, amendments cannot be made until after The
Protocol takes effect (once it reaches the mandated 55 percent) which looked in no way
eminent. Argentina could benefit, though, via the joint implementation agreement it
made with the U.S. (predicted to be as much as $700 million a year for preserving
carbon-absorbing forests).
69
Thus, although the argument of financial advancements for Argentina is plausible,
it is not likely that this was the driving force behind Menem’s decision to commit to
voluntary reductions. These benefits were largely publicized by Alsogaray and the
environmental ministry, but it was Menem who made the decision and he had made clear
his desire to be a part of the international community and the international climate change
69
Unfortunately, such an option would, most likely, not be available to other developing
nations were they to follow Argentina’s lead.
114
regime. He made little reference to the financial benefits of ratification or of voluntary
commitments, thereby making any argument that Menem made the decision based on
domestic concerns weak.
Although not justification in itself, Menem’s lack of consultation with other
sectors and the public further augments the proposition that the decision was not based on
domestic politics. For example, some academics and industry had reservations (Bouille
and Girardin 2002), but there was little procedure for them to interject their opinions into
the process. These groups were effectively blocked from participation because
negotiations were difficult to follow and monitor (Bouille and Girardin 2002) and
because, as previously mentioned, the decision-making process was closed. Respondent
C, however, stated that there was no real opposition from industry to contend with
anyway. Similarly, there was no real opposition from the general public. This was
because the public was largely unaware of climate change in general and of The Protocol
and the option to ratify The Protocol more specifically (Respondent D). Additionally,
there were no roundtable discussions for interested stakeholders to express their concerns
and opinions (although such roundtables were held after the decision was made)
(Respondent E). To compound matters, even when COP4 was held in Buenos Aires the
national press did little to cover the events and educate the public on the significance of
the conference (Respondent A). In contrast, the relatively small environmental
community was aware of climate change and The Protocol and was active in expressing
their concerns. Greenpeace was one of the most vocal non-governmental organizations,
organizing protests and running education campaigns, but its impact was not great.
115
Climate change remained a relatively unknown phenomenon in Argentina. In addition,
although they did serve a valuable societal purpose, their efforts ultimately had little
effect on Menem’s decision (Respondent A). Overall, Menem did not have to engage in
a high level of politicking or contend with the many opposing voices that are commonly
associated with domestic political decision-making, at least within the first phase.
Menem was able to bypass public and other input as he was not vulnerable to
domestic political pressure in the traditional sense; he was not worried about re-election
or about gaining sufficient political support for his policies. Menem had already served
out his first term as president and had enough support to amend the Argentine
Constitution thereby allowing him to run for a second term. In 1995 he was re-elected
with just over 50% of the vote. He felt comfortable with his approval ratings and relative
popularity. Although Menem himself was not very vocal about the possibility, there was
talk of him trying to run for a third term in 1999 but conflict within his own Peronist
party and a grandfather clause in the constitution specifically precluding Menem for
running for a third term made this impossible. In addition, Menem’s dictatorial and
flamboyant governing style freed him from having to worry about approval from
congress or the judiciary.
70
The president was known to liberally exercise his right to use
presidential decrees in order sidestep congressional approval. In comparison to other
democracies, Menem had a fair amount of control over the other two branches of
government.
70
Menem was known for wearing expensive suits, driving fast cars and socializing with
celebrities. He is known for marrying a model and television host 35 years his minor and
is twice divorced. His rule was similarly showy, making monumental changes to the
Argentine economy and constitution, often bypassing democratic channels.
116
Not only did Menem fail to consult with his countrymen and women before
making his decision, but he also failed to consider any negative repercussions agreeing to
voluntary emission reductions would have for his country. The president neither
conducted nor commissioned any studies to understand the plausibility of reducing
emissions in the developing nation before committing support to Clinton. Although there
was general talk about new investments and employment, there was no systematic
evaluation of benefits and no analysis of the probable economic impacts of reducing
emissions (Bouille and Girardin 2002).
In terms of setting the reduction target, about which discussions did not occur
until years after the initial commitment was made public, there was no serious discussion.
There was no concurrence with the energy sector (Bouille and Girardin 2002) or other
logically involved sectors or agencies. In fact, the final equation used to determine the
appropriate amount of reductions (E = 151.5 *√P) was, according to Respondent A, set
somewhat arbitrarily. The constant of 151.5 was chosen by U.S. representatives with no
reasonable justification for whether or not it was appropriate for Argentina’s political and
economic context. Moreover, Respondent A said the U.S.’s suggestion to use GDP as a
guide to establish reductions was not appropriate for Argentina; it “was a mistake.”
(GDP reflects the flux of money, not necessarily production. Argentina had an
agriculturally-driven economy where prices did not reflect amounts of production but
international markets, making GDP a poor indication of the health of its primary
economy.)
117
Non-compensatory Principle?
The next question to ask is whether or not Menem employed the non-
compensatory principle in the elimination of possible policy options. In the first phase of
decision making, Menem eliminated policy options A, B, C and F based on his primary
criterion of appeasing the U.S. (see Figure 4.1 on page 110). Heeding Clinton’s request
for developing nations to reduce their emissions and intending to repair and improve
relations between the two governments, Menem was quick to eliminate any policy option
that would not speak to the request of the preferential ally. Options A, B and C would
clearly not suffice as the U.S. was not only calling for action, but action beyond mere
ratification. Option F was also eliminated as it would obviously upset the U.S., unifying
the developing world against it.
The elimination of Option F is the clearest example of the non-compensatory
principle at work. Although aligning with non-Annex I nations would help improve
relations with the developing world, particularly Argentina’s regional neighbors, such an
alliance would obviously upset the U.S. and be in strict defiance of Clinton’s request.
The elimination of this option clearly illustrates the prioritization of relations with the
U.S. over relations with other nations. The benefits of pleasing non-Annex I nations
would not compensate for the detriment to U.S.-Argentine relations. Option B, waiting
to ratify, could also potentially appease other nations as it would demonstrate to the U.S.
that Argentina and, by virtue of representation, other developing nations will not jump at
its every request. However, according to Menem’s prioritization, he would rather
appease the U.S. than, basically, everyone else. In contrast, Options D, G, H and I would
118
likely upset many developing nations, but they were not eliminated as options because
they had potential to appease, or at least not upset the U.S. As prescribed by the concept
of satisficing, these options were not necessarily ideal, but they were strong enough
options to survive to the second phase. Thus, at the end of the first phase, surviving
options permitted Argentina the ability to reduce its emissions, either voluntarily or via
some form of negotiated agreement, all options that could potentially be a policy
response approved by the U.S.
Cognitive Heuristics?
Evidence from the analyses above provides support for the argument that Menem
indeed used cognitive heuristics to narrow his field of policy options in the first phase of
the decision-making process. More specifically, the president eliminated policy options
based on personal preferences. Menem exhibited, unabashedly, a clear desire to align
with the U.S. and to behave as it requested. Thus, his preference was to select a policy
that would allow him to do just that. There is considerable evidentiary support to bolster
this claim.
The first is exemplified in the meeting between Clinton and Menem and the
signing of the Presidential Declaration of Bariloche. The fact that Menem pledged his
support for Clinton’s request in October of 1997, even before The Protocol had been
written and approved by the international community, suggests that Menem made up his
mind before the decision was officially laid on the table, at least to the point that he
would support voluntary reductions, generally speaking. Specifics were yet uncertain.
119
Respondents D and E corroborate this argument. Respondent D said that Menem knew
from the very beginning that he wanted to ratify. Both respondents commented that
Menem saw The Protocol as a historic opportunity to become an active and visible actor
in the international arena, an opportunity he did not want to pass up.
In this way, Menem made his decision backwards. He did not assess the
feasibility of a commitment before agreeing to it. In fact, there was no way Menem could
have known what he was actually agreeing to or if his country could even carry out the
promise to which he had already committed it. Respondent A pointed out that Argentina
had no domestic climate change policy. There was no existing policy upon which to
gauge the possible impacts of (more) stringent emission reductions. Menem was, in
effect, committing Argentina to a foreign policy even though it lacked a corresponding
domestic policy. With so many unknowns, Menem did not make a calculative decision in
the early stages of decision making. Instead, he determined which options would not
meet his primary criterion and eliminated them.
Menem also had the luxury of not having to contend with or reconcile a number
of contrasting opinions and thus could make his decision based on personal preferences.
Given his governing style and the relative sense of security he felt in formulating his own
foreign policy, Menem was able to make sure that the only policy options left for
consideration were those that would allow him to continue with his objective of allying
with Clinton and the U.S. This was affirmed by Respondent comments that Menem
directed his early decisions based on the personal preference of formulating U.S.-friendly
foreign policy.
120
Second Phase
Rational Decision Strategy?
The final step in testing PH’s ability to explain Menem’s decision is to determine
whether or not Menem utilized rational decision strategies in the second phase of the
decision-making process. Figure 4.2 presents the five remaining policy options post-
phase one eliminations and shows which final option remained after the president
analyzed the political costs and benefits of each.
Figure 4.2 Menem’s Remaining Policy Options and Phase Two Eliminations
In order to conduct the analysis it is important to recognize a distinction between
the case studies traditionally used to test PH and the case studies in this analysis. As
previously mentioned, PH has been overwhelmingly applied to high politics issues and
crisis situations which normally take place over a relatively short period of time, ranging
anywhere from a day to a number of months. In the scenarios herein, the decision-
making processes are elongated and extend over a number of years. Because of the fact
that the issue was not a crisis and, thus, not time sensitive, each decision-maker was able
D. Ratify & Voluntarily
Reduce Emissions
G. Propose Non-Annex
I Targets
H. Negotiate with the
U.S.
E. Negotiate with
Non-Annex I States
I. Propose Totally New
Agreement
Would appease U.S. by setting
example for others but not force
others to follow
Could appease U.S. but could
upset Non-Annex-I allies
Could appease U.S. but could
upset Non-Annex I allies
Could appease U.S. but risk
overstepping boundaries and
upsetting U.S.
May not necessarily upset U.S.
but other states in international
community
121
to take more time in deliberations. In the case of Menem, although the first phase of the
process (eliminating options based on his primary criterion) required little time, the
second phase lasted years. Menem made his primary decision in 1997, but the
announcement of emissions targets was not made until 1999. (Congress did not ratify
The Protocol until 2001; however, the present analysis focuses on the decision-making
behavior of the president.) With this in mind, Menem had the flexibility to test out
options before committing to a final decision. But first, he eliminated two of the five
remaining options.
Although of the five remaining options none would immediately upset the U.S.
(thus they survived the first phase), two options, when analyzed more closely, were quick
to be eliminated. Option H, negotiating with the U.S., might not immediately send out a
red flag, but Menem would be walking a fine line as negotiations could turn sour and
Menem could jeopardize the relationship he had been grooming. Besides, Menem had
shown that he was willing to act in line with Clinton’s directives, all the while displaying
no glimpse of defiance or hesitation. Option I, proposing a completely new agreement
outside The Protocol, though it would not necessarily upset the U.S., would almost
certainly distress relations with many other nations. Many other nations in the West,
whom Menem wished to remain on good terms with, had already agreed, formally or
informally, to The Protocol. They had invested years of work and considerable resources
to ensure The Protocol’s survival and were anxious for its mandates to take effect.
Proposing a competing treaty would not only anger individual nations, including many
powerful ones, but send a message to the international community as a whole that
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Argentina was inflexible, uncooperative and possibly even insubordinate. This left
Options D, E and G.
Given the lack of time constraints, Menem was able to test out each option before
making his final decision. Alsogaray and the other Argentine delegates were instructed
to push for virtually all three of these options simultaneously. The first of the three to be
eliminated was Option G, proposing non-Annex I targets for others to follow. The
developing world had expressed its opposition to any proposal that would require
developing nations to reduce their emissions. Menem and the Argentine delegation
quickly learned that the costs of pursuing this option would be much too great as it would
clearly anger the majority, if not all, of its existing allies. The delegation was, however,
able to pursue Options D and E.
With Menem’s devotee Alsogaray at the helm, the Argentine delegation
continued to promote its own voluntary commitment while attempting to negotiate with
non-Annex I nations to do the same. However, they found the resistance too strong and
the potential cost of pushing any further too great. The more persistent Argentina was the
more persistent were its adversaries. In the end, the delegation weakened the pressure on
non-Annex I nations yet continued to pursue its own voluntary commitment. While
advancing Option E became too confrontational, Option D remained the least costly
while still providing the most overall benefit (keeping in mind Menem’s main policy
objective). Menem would still be able to respond to Clinton’s request and fortify
bilateral relations and in the process upset the least amount of other nations and current or
123
potential allies. Argentina would become an example for others to follow, winning
Clinton’s praise, but would not force others to do the same.
Concluding Remarks
Overall, PH does a good job explaining the fundamentals of Menem’s decision
making process. The theory accurately predicted that Menem would use cognitive
heuristics to simplify the number of possible policy options to a more manageable set.
Early on, Menem eliminated options that did not perform well according to his primary
criterion of appeasing the U.S. and President Clinton’s request for Argentina to do its fair
share and reduce its GHG emissions. PH also correctly predicted that Menem would
eliminate policy options based on the non-compensatory principle. Even though some
options would likely prove beneficial in terms of relations with other developing nations,
if the option would upset the U.S. it was eliminated. Similarly, if an option was not ideal
on other accords but looked to appease the U.S. that was sufficient to survive to the
second round. PH also correctly predicted that Menem would take a more calculative
approach in choosing his final policy. He weighed the costs and benefits, still wary of his
primary criterion, and chose the option that provided him the most benefit at the least
cost. He chose to appeal to Clinton’s request and commit to voluntarily reducing
Argentina’s GHG emissions, but stopped short of imposing such restrictions on other
nations (at least for the present).
Where PH did not fare as well is in the prediction that Menem’s primary criterion
would be based on domestic political concerns. PH did not fail outright, but its accuracy
124
is not absolute. The fact that there was little domestic discussion before the decision was
made and that Menem did not know for certain (or at all) what impacts his commitment
would have on the domestic economy and certain sectors of society suggest that domestic
concerns were not a top priority for Menem. Neither was environmental concern.
Instead, as evidenced by his own words and the observations of others, Menem was most
concerned with international status and relations with the U.S. This appears an
international concern. However, it is possible that what looks like an international
concern, aligning with the hegemon, is, in reality, a concern for domestic well-being.
Aligning with the U.S. could bring economic and other benefits to the developing nation.
This discussion will be resumed in the final analysis in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 5
Mexico: Zedillo’s Move for Leadership & Stewardship
Under the same pressure from the U.S. to reduce its GHG emissions, Mexico, led
by President Ernesto Zedillo, made a different policy decision than did Menem of
Argentina. Advancing his country’s image of environmental stewardship and hoping to
improve its image as an international leader, Zedillo was sure to ratify The Protocol.
However, the president would not go as so far as to commit Mexico to voluntarily
reducing its emissions. For his non-Annex I nation, abiding by The Protocol in its
present form was sufficient.
Following the format of the previous chapter, this chapter will summarize
Mexican foreign policy, both prior to and during Zedillo’s administration, before
describing the president’s decision-making process. The introductory sections also
include a discussion of environmental problems and environmental policy-making in
Mexico. After tracing the decision-making process, the chapter will conclude with the
application of PH to the process and with statements about PH’s ability to explain
Zedillo’s decision making.
Interdependence and Nonintervention in Mexican Foreign Policy
Second only to Brazil, Mexico is the largest country in Latin America with a
strong presence in the region.
71
Even though the nation ranks among the wealthiest in the
71
In 1997, Mexico had the second biggest population in Latin America, behind Brazil
(CIA 1997).
126
developing world and in 1998 was the tenth largest trading country in the world
(González 2001), Mexico has historically been overlooked in international politics (Snarr
2002).
72
This is likely the result of Mexico’s past (of foreign invasions) and its historical
choices of foreign policy. Although Mexico has not had as many vacillations in foreign
policy strategy as Argentina, largely because of seventy years of rule by one party (the
Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI), the country has made profound changes in
its approach to international relations. At the same time, two seemingly contradictory
themes have directed Mexican foreign policy in the twentieth century: interdependence
and nonintervention. Mexican presidents have experimented with a delicate balance of
the two throughout history based on both domestic and international factors. By the late
1990s, Mexico’s foreign policy began to more heavily favor interdependent relations, all
the while careful not to infringe on the strong sense of Mexican self-determination.
One of the main components of Mexican foreign policy is a strong adherence to
national autonomy and self-determination. Largely the result of a history of violations of
Mexican sovereignty (i.e., the Spanish invasion 1519 to 1521, the Mexican-American
War when the U.S. annexed Mexican territory 1846 to 1848, and the war with France in
1838), Mexican governments have often been wary of outside interference in their
domestic affairs. Thus, fueled by national distrust, for most of the twentieth century
Mexico prioritized nonintervention both in its own affairs and in the affairs of other
nations (Snarr 2002). This predilection was reflected in Mexico’s foreign policy in the
72
In 1997, Mexico ranked second in GDP (in billions of US dollars) among all Latin
America nations. Brazil ranked first. Mexico ranked fourth behind China, India and
Brazil in highest GDP among all developing nations (International Monetary Fund 1999).
Mexico left the G-77 to join the OECD in 1994.
127
1950s and 1960s as relations with other nations were “distant and defensive” (Chabat
1996, 152). Mexico maintained closed economic and political systems and seldom
interacted with other states, nor did it have much interest in doing so.
Relations with its neighbor to the north have vacillated over the years, but on
balance have remained at least superficially amiable (although exceptions do exist). Prior
to World War II U.S.-Mexico relations were both cordial and stable (Mora 2003). After
the War, the two were described as being party to a “special relationship,” or a kind of
tradeoff understanding. As long as Mexican governments could provide relative stability,
the country could maintain its “relative autonomy” from the U.S. (Chabat 1996).
However, the autonomous relationship was, in reality, largely superficial. Interdependent
relations had already blossomed along the U.S.-Mexico border in essence bypassing the
live-and-let-live agreement (Chabat 1996).
73
In the 1970s, under Presidents Luis Echeverría (1970 to 1976) and José López
Protillo (1976 to 1982), Mexico began adopting a more active international posture.
Under Echeverría’s leadership, the country became increasingly more assertive in
international affairs. Forced by the unsuccessful economic model applied in the 70s,
Echeverría was forced to look beyond Mexico for answers; “for the first time in decades
the answer to an internal challenge was to be found in the external world” (Chabat 1996,
149). Echeverría chose to search for solutions to domestic problems among his friends in
the developing world (Snarr 2002). Beyond looking to is neighbors for bi-lateral
assistance, Mexico began to get involved in generalized regional issues. In doing so,
73
At this incipient stage, border relations focused on the legal and illegal movement of
Mexican workers, trade and other financial matters (Chabat 1996).
128
Mexico began championing and leading the struggle for Third World causes, for example
the socialist movement in Chile.
This expansion of Mexican foreign relations could be characterized as
simultaneously diverse and limited. The new policy, termed a “diversification of
dependency,” acknowledged the necessity to interact with the outside world but
maintained a weariness of its dangers. To temper the risk of increased exposure to and
reliance on other states, Mexico engaged with many states at the same time (Chabat
1996). Mexico became more dependent on others nations, but was careful not to rely too
heavily on particular nations. This policy was additionally strategic as it reduced reliance
on the U.S. and replaced it with interactions with multiple states, mainly throughout
Europe and Latin America (Starr 2006). Unfortunately, Mexico’s relations were
diversified in rhetoric only (Chabat 1996). In fact, the new policy actually had the
inverse effect of making Mexico more vulnerable to external shocks, as was evidenced in
1982 when the policy’s limitations were palpably revealed.
After a surge in the 1970s, in 1982 world-wide oil prices experienced a
remarkable drop. This had a commanding impact on oil-producing Mexico. Having
increased its foreign debt to help address ailing domestic conditions, the decline in
revenue made it impossible for Mexico to meet its foreign debt obligations. However,
Mexico would not be alone as its shortfall created a ripple effect throughout Latin
America. Embroiled in economic crisis, Mexico needed a radical solution.
Economic change- an opening of the Mexican economy- was the response.
Breaking with past policy and forced to act by the worsening economic situation, the de
129
la Madrid government (1982 to 1988) began embracing economic liberalization. de la
Madrid began reducing the role of government in economic affairs; he deregulated and
privatized industry and lifted trade barriers, eventually becoming party to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986.
Throughout the 1980s, Mexico continued to diversify its relations, careful not to
upset, too greatly, any strategic relationship. Mexico continued to be active regionally,
strengthening ties with its neighbors and playing a moderate role in Latin American
affairs. For example, under de la Madrid, Mexico joined the Contadora Group, an
organization of states working to find a peaceful solution to the violence in Central
American.
74
However, Mexico’s involvement in Central America often clashed with
U.S. interests and U.S. foreign policy. Mexico and the U.S. were also at odds over Cuba
as Mexico was a strong critic of the U.S. embargo. However, because of the debt crisis,
Mexico could not afford to radically alienate the U.S. In fact, one foreign policy goal
was to entice the U.S. into assisting with the worsening economic crisis (Randall 2006).
Mexico’s behavior during the Cold War further illustrated its goal of diversified
foreign relations. Refusing to bow to pressure from the regional hegemon, Mexico stood
adamant not to align with the U.S.’s anti-communist position. Instead, Mexico spoke
harshly of the U.S. and took a prominent and vocal position as one of the leaders of the
nonaligned movement. At times Mexico also stood on its own, in effect alienating itself
from other nations. For example, Mexico (and Argentina) objected to the Organisation of
American States resolution to condemn former Guatemalan president Jacobo Árbenz for
74
Other members of the Contadora Group include Colombia, Panama and Venezuela.
130
what the U.S. perceived as communist policy (Snarr 2002).
75
In this way, Mexico took
care to remain relatively neutral during a period characterized by the bipolarization of the
entire international system. Mexico chose to align with nobody by aligning with
everybody. It recognized and aligned with nearly every regime across the board
(Crandall 2003). Crandall (2003) argues that such a position was strategic for Mexico as
it was aimed at deflecting questions and criticisms about its own undemocratic practices.
The same policy had the added benefit of raising its international activity and credibility
in the eyes of many foreign nations.
The period after the Cold War had profound effects on Mexican foreign policy as
the international context, including the effects of globalization and economic
liberalization, increasingly permeated Mexico’s nationalistic walls of state sovereignty.
Taking office in 1988, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988 to 1994) was even more
committed to neoliberal policies than his predecessors (Snarr 2002). Accepting the
economic realities of the new world, Salinas intensified the process of economic
liberalization. His foreign policies emphasized bilateral relations and free trade as well as
the strengthening of Mexico’s role in the international community. The event that
arguably had the most significant impact on Mexico, both domestically and
internationally, and the pinnacle of Salinas’s liberalization process was his decision to
join NAFTA.
75
In 1952, Árbenz instigated agrarian reforms that expropriated (uncultivated portions of)
private property that was reallocated to families without land. The hope was to create a
more equal distribution of land in the country. This upset upper-class landowners as well
as the U.S. who accused Árbenz of implementing communist policy. The U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency then organized a coup against the Guatemalan president.
131
From the beginning of his term as president, Salinas was also worried about his
country’s international image (Chabat 1996). This concern “contributed to making
Mexico’s political and social conditions the subject of external criticism” (Mora 2003,
20). Mexico was the target of much harsh criticism due to its slow political reform and
transition to democracy. The criticism came from a multitude of nations as well as from
national and international NGOs (such as Amnesty International and Americas Watch),
but little originated from the U.S. government (Chabat 1996). In fact, bilateral relations
improved significantly during George H.W. Bush’s administration (corresponding with
Salinas’s first four years in office). During this time, the relationship became stronger
than it had been in previous decades, by far surpassing the cool rapport of the “special
relationship” (Chabat 1996). The two countries coordinated on many common projects,
most of all NAFTA.
Salinas’s decision to join NAFTA serves as a prime example of how Mexico
continued to deal with the effects of international pressure while still adhering to its dual
foreign policy priorities of interdependence and nonintervention. Most obviously,
Salinas’s decision to join NAFTA was largely the result of international pressure, both
from the international community and the U.S., to further integrate into the international
economy. But responding to said pressure had some negative effects back home. On the
same day that Mexico joined NAFTA, Zapatista’s in Chiapas violently protested the
agreement. The armed rebellion attracted international attention and much criticism, but
Mexico did not appreciate or welcome foreigners intruding in its domestic affairs. While
132
the government had embraced economic integration, it yearned to retain the autonomy to
manage domestic issues on its own.
Presidencialismo in Mexico
Mexico has a long tradition, dating back to the Aztecs in the thirteenth century, of
strong centralized power (Snarr 2002). This power is centralized within the executive
branch and especially in the office of the president (Camp 2007, Hamilton 2006). This
was especially true throughout the last seven decades of PRI rule. This period of semi-
authoritarian rule is commonly referred to as “presidentialism” or “presidencialismo.”
Under these presidentialist governments, presidents assumed “meta” constitutional
powers as the bicameral legislature was relatively week and the Senate passed virtually
all presidential bills with ease. Thus, most presidential legislation passed with
overwhelming support (Camp 2007). One of the few institutional constraints on the
executive is presidential term limits. According to the Mexican constitution, each
president is limited to a term of six years, or a sexenio, and it not permitted to run for re-
election.
Regardless of this limitation, the president has historically been the dominant
actor in formulating Mexican foreign policy (Snarr 2002). However, the shift toward
economic liberalization has begun to transform the historical dynamic. The decision-
making process has become less centralized. Whereas foreign policy decision making
was once controlled by the president and the foreign affairs ministry, it has slowly
become more fragmented and compartmentalized. For example, usurping some of the
133
ministry’s responsibilities, foreign trade and treasury agencies have gained greater
control of the formulation of economic foreign policy (González 2001). This change
became more prominent in the late 1990s under the rule of President Ernesto Zedillo
(1994-2000).
The Zedillo Sexenio
Ernesto Zedillo came to the presidency somewhat by accident as the PRI
candidate chosen by out-going president Salinas, Luis Donaldo Colosio, was assassinated
while campaigning in Tijuana. Nevertheless, Zedillo, the second choice candidate, was
elected president by a wide margin in relatively honest elections (by Mexican standards)
and took office December 1, 2004.
76
Zedillo came to office during difficult times as he
inherited a political system in transition, an economic crisis that sparked demonstrations,
marches and protests, including the rebellion in Chiapas, and continued human rights
abuses (Snarr 2002, Lawson 2004, Hamilton 2006, Camp 2007). All these difficulties
culminated in a damaged international image for the nation. Thus, Zedillo spent much of
his first year in office addressing Mexico’s growing economic and credibility crises
(Gonzalez 2001).
To do so and in hopes of obtaining international financial support to overcome the
domestic economic crisis, the president focused considerable attention on re-establishing
the confidence of foreign investors, especially the U.S. Zedillo worked aggressively to
76
Mexico has a long tradition of corrupt and fraudulent elections that have included vote
buying, missing ballot boxes, and suspicious tabulations. Such practices have most
likely been responsible for over 70 years of PRI rule.
134
create a “good neighbor” and “reliable partner” image in the eyes of the U.S. This led to
closer collaboration with the U.S. on economic and other social issues (drug trafficking,
immigration, etc.) (González 2001). Zedillo was eventually successful as Mexico
received economic assistance from President Clinton, the International Monetary Fund
and other international lending agencies totaling over 50 billion U.S. dollars. The
assistance further illustrates Mexico’s growing interdependence and the further erosion of
state sovereignty.
The Zedillo administration also faced harsher international criticism than its
predecessors for the country’s slow pace of democratization and related human rights
abuses (Mora 2003). Ceding to these external pressures, the president was forced to
gradually open up discussions of domestic matters to other nations and international
organizations. As a result, Zedillo was forced to incorporate more democratic ideals and
human rights issues into Mexican foreign policy. However, keeping in line with
traditional Mexican foreign policy, this opening was permitted, but with limits. Mexico
welcomed collaboration but was ever-mindful of the potential for others to abuse the
invitation (Mora 2003).
Zedillo also faced changing domestic conditions and pressures to democratize.
The small advances in democratization begun in previous administrations allowed for
greater social participation and the emergence of political opposition in the country.
Within this context of greater political diversity were loud voices insisting on political
transformation away from the dominance of the PRI. This created an opportunity for
Zedillo to simultaneously address domestic urgings and international pressures and trends
135
to lead Mexico toward further democratization (Mora 2003). Although there was some
domestic opposition to democratization, this opportunity helped Zedillo restore
international and domestic credibility.
By 1997, Zedillo had already made his mark on Mexican politics. Although it
had yet to translate into higher incomes, the economy had taken a turn for the better,
showing signs of stabilization (Camp 2007). Zedillo continued with and accelerated the
economic liberalization of previous presidents and worked to increase democracy in the
country.
77
Zedillo was also responsible for the eventual intentional and unintentional
reduction of presidential power (Camp 2007). Crandall (2003) wrote that Zedillo was a
“selfless martyr” as he placed “the nation’s welfare above personal political gain” (185).
His work to reduce presidential power eroded his own power as well as that of the reign
of his own PRI.
Mexico, the Environment and The Kyoto Protocol
What Ails the Mexican Environment
Compared to other Latin American nations, Mexico has a relatively long history
of environmental protection and regulation, largely necessitated by the county’s many
environmental problems. Years of rapid industrialization since World War II, including
intense development in the 1980s, has had harsh impacts on Mexico’s environment, both
in terms of natural areas and resources and human health (Mumme 1995; Mumme 2002).
77
Zedillo and his two predecessors (de la Madrid and Salinas) earned degrees from U.S.
universities. This arguably predisposed them to economic liberalization and drew them
closer in line with U.S. economic and political thought.
136
For example, increasing demand for agricultural land and urbanization has threatened
Mexico’s great biodiversity. (Mexico is one of the world’s twelve mega-diverse
countries.) Mexico is also well-known for its terrible air quality, particularly in the
capital. Mexico City, one of the largest urban centers in the world (by population), is
unluckily situated in a large basin. Air pollution (predominantly from industry and
automobiles) is trapped by the surrounding mountains and the resulting inversion layer.
The city’s heavily polluted air (with high levels of ground level ozone and particulate
matter) has negatively affected the health of its inhabitants, especially children.
78
Mexico is also a large producer and consumer of oil. Although not an OPEC
member, Mexico is among the world’s top oil exporters. Mexico is also a large oil
consumer. In terms of oil production, consumption and export, Mexico has consistently
ranked among the top ten or fifteen countries in the world. Largely due to the country’s
consumption of oil, Mexico is also one of the fifteen biggest emitters of GHGs (Garcia
2003). However, Mexico’s emissions are still less than two percent of the world’s
emissions and per capita emissions are on target with that of other developing nations
(Garcia 2003).
79
Emissions are largely produced by fuel used to generate electricity but
78
It is important to note that, in general, air pollution is not directly related to greenhouse
gas emissions (and climate change). Localized air pollution is largely the result of
ground level ozone, particulate matter, smog (the result of nitrous oxides, volatile organic
compounds, etc.). Carbon dioxide, the main anthropogenic greenhouse gas, is generally
not considered an air pollutant. Thus, the sources of Mexico City’s polluted air are not
necessarily the same as those that contribute to climate change.
79
Mexico’s per capita emissions in 1995 were 3.5 tons per year, whereas the average for
OECD countries was much higher at 10.8 tons per year (Thomas 1999).
137
are also produced in the process of landuse change, in agriculture and in the oil and gas
industry (SEMARNAP 1997).
Fueled by concern for the ailing environment and related health issues, a vocal
environmental movement has emerged in Mexico dating back to the late 1960s (Somuano
2006). The movement benefited from the nation-wide increase in social mobilization in
the 1980s and even greater growth in the 1990s due to increased attention to and concern
for environmental degradation, an increase in financial resources and the transfer of
expertise from international movements and organizations, especially from the U.S. (Díez
2006). Two events in particular in the 1990s facilitated the growth of the environmental
movement both in size (number of environmental non-governmental organizations or
ENGOs) and in strength: preparatory discussions for the 1992 UN Conference on the
Environment and Development and talks leading up to Mexico’s signing of NAFTA and
its environmental side agreements.
80
Even though 55 percent of respondents in a survey believed protecting the
environment was more important than economic growth or job creation (Delgado et al.
2006) and that environmental (along with human rights) NGOs are the most influential
advocate groups in the policy-making process (Somuano 2006), ENGOs have neither
aimed at nor have been successful in having a great impact on Mexican environmental
policy. What they have done is provide a forum for discussion and project planning
(Ibid.). Overall, public awareness of environmental issues and involvement in policy-
making in Mexico remains low (Mumme and Iybecker 2002).
80
Toledo and Velazquez (1995) note that, of all the ENGOs that existed in the mid-
1990s, 83 percent were created between 1985 and 1994.
138
The fact that civil society has not been able to have a mentionable influence on
environmental policy is but one of many factors that has impeded more effective
environmental management in Mexico. Other impediments include competition with
other policy goals, the lack of funds and other resources, the entrenched politics of the
one-party political system, and the lack of an environmental culture. For example, as
with other developing nations, environmental management in Mexico must compete with
numerous other policy issues for time and resources, issues that both the general public
and the government find more fundamental. Such policy issues include economic
development and growth, employment, public health and education. Environmental
policy also suffers as it lacks sufficient federal funding and other essential resources.
Although funding has increased under the Zedillo administration and the environmental
ministry receives a larger percentage of total federal expenditures than eleven other
ministries, this amount is inadequate to address the totality of environmental issues (Díez
2006). Additionally, Mexico has devoted comparatively little federal monies to pollution
abatement and conservation compared to other OECD nations. Spending 0.8 percent of
GDP annually, this figure places Mexico at the bottom with Spain and Hungary (Mumme
and Iybecker 2002). In relation to other Latin American countries, however, Mexico is
the regional leader in per capita expenditures. Unfortunately, funding remains
insufficient. Even though the environmental ministry’s 1997 budget was an increase of
33 billion over 1995’s budget, expenditures were narrowly- and regionally-focused and
did not have a substantial impact on environmental conditions nationwide (Ibid.).
81
81
Funds were primarily spent on new water and other infrastructure and were
139
Related to a lack of financial resources, Mexico also has a shortage of training resources
(Dasgupta 1999).
82
Mexico has also had difficulty with environmental management because of
political and cultural traditions. For one, over seventy years of one-party government has
left its “political and bureaucratic stamp” on Mexican policy-making (Mumme and
Iybecker 1988, 26). With virtually all the political authority lying in the office of the
president, ministries with symbolic authority over environmental issues have been limited
in resources and ability to enforce their own policies. In addition, government
institutions traditionally lack both the organization and the power to reach their objectives
(Delgado et al. 2006). This has fostered a culture of un-environmentalness in that the
government responds to environmental demands “through rhetorical or symbolic reform”
(Mumme and Iybecker 1998, 29). Some ministry officials have even admitted to lax
enforcement of environmental laws and a general unwillingness to penalize violators
(Mumme and Iybecker 1998).
Yet in spite of these many obstacles to effective environmental management, the
Mexican government has become increasingly aware of environmental problems and has,
over a series of decades and presidential sexenios, begun to implement more successful
environmental policy.
concentrated in Mexico City and along the U.S. border (Mumme and Iybecker 2002).
82
See Díez (2007) for a thorough discussion of the history of the environmental
movement in Mexico.
140
A History of Environmental Management
83
Although under the PRI’s rule environmental issues traditionally took a back seat
to other social and political priorities, Mexican presidents have preformed successively
better than their predecessors. In general, environmental policy in Mexico began with a
focus on contamination and public health issues (or “brown” issues) but eventually grew
to include the conservation and preservation of natural places and resources (or “green”
issues) and eventually acquired a more holistic perspective of environmental
management. Early legislation was largely symbolic as it lacked governmental support
(in terms of capacity, funds and/or presidential interest). However, with time the
presidents’ attention to environmental issues and environmental legislation became both
stronger and more earnest.
The earliest mention of concern for environmental quality, though very general in
nature, dates back to 1917 and the Mexican Constitution. The Constitution spoke of a
general well-being (“estado de bienestar”) including social and economic well-being and
the conservation of natural resources (SEMENARP 2000). However, it was not until the
1970s that environmental concern translated into government attention and policy. The
administrations of Echeverría and Portillo addressed environmental concern but mostly
with symbolic gestures and prestige-oriented policies with insufficient governmental
support (Mumme et al. 1988).
83
This section depends significantly on Mumme et al.’s (1988) very thorough work on
environmental policy spanning the presidencies of Echeverría, Portillo, de la Madrid and
Salinas.
141
During Echeverría’s reign, the environment was a low priority and received little
presidential attention. Development was a high priority and it was expressed that
development would lead to a healthier environment (Mumme et al.1988). Any attention
the environment did receive was fragmented (environmental issues were not treated as
their own issue and thus authority rested in various agencies within the government) and
enforcement of any regulations was weak. There were a few key acts under this
administration worth mentioning. One is the 1971 Law for the Prevention and Control of
Air Pollution Originating from Smoke and Dust (Reglamento para la Prevención y
Control de la Contaminación Atmosférica Originada por Humos y Polvos). The law
created antipollution controls for industry and permitted the regulation of emissions from
vehicles. This became the predecessor to the Secretary of Health. Also, in 1972, the
president created the Under-secretary for Environmental Improvement (la Subsecretaría
de Mejoramiento del Ambiente) but its main services were education, training, and data
collection, not necessarily writing and enforcing legislation.
Portillo’s sexenio was largely more of the same until the last years of his term
when he implemented multiple environmental initiatives and revised the 1971 air
pollution law. Early in his term (in1978) and under mounting public pressure to address
worsening air pollution, Portillo established the Intersecretarial Commission for
Environmental Health and undertook a major initiative to regulate industrial emissions.
However, expressing their dissatisfaction with insufficient government support 90
142
técnicos in the air quality department resigned (Mumme et al. 1988).
84
Thus, by the end
of his term as president, Portillo had not done much to raise the status of environmental
issues in the federal government’s agenda. With the exception of some increased federal
funds for air pollution in Mexico City, the environment remained a low governmental
priority with interest residing among middle-range governmental officials, academics and
professional organizations (Mumme et al. 1988).
85
Although previous presidents did pay limited attention to environmental issues, it
was not until de la Madrid’s sexenio that environmentalism became a sincere part of the
presidential agenda. de la Madrid even made the environment one of his campaign issues
(Gallagher 2004). The new government incorporated environmental issues into national
plans and policy statements, held state and regional conferences drawing considerable
media attention and the PRI even began to incorporate environmental issues into its party
platform (Mumme et al. 1988). One of de la Madrid’s most important contributions to
environmental management came with the creation of the Secretary of Urban
Development and Ecology (la Secretaría de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecología or SEDUE).
The significance of the new secretariat was twofold. One, it combined housing and
ecology into a single ministry. Two, it elevated ecological issues to cabinet-level status.
Unfortunately, despite de la Madrid’s success at highlighting environmental and
ecological issues in Mexico within the public, media and the federal government, actual
84
Técnicos are scientists with proper training in their respective scientific field. They are
often contrasted with politicos or politicians who normally have no technical training
and, instead, have a history of government employment.
85
See Sonnenfeld (1992) for a description of environmentalism in Mexico from 1940 to
1980, with specific attention to agriculture and the green revolution.
143
improvements in environmental protection were not a marked improvement on his
predecessors (Mumme et al. 1988).
de la Madrid’s successor, President Salinas, set himself apart from previous
presidents when it came to making actual strides in environmental protection and
legislation.
86
However, some of his efforts stirred up controversy among environmental
groups both abroad and at home. After making issue of environmental problems on the
campaign trail, upon taking office in 1988 Salinas quickly enacted the General Law of
Ecological Balance and Environmental Protections (that superseded the 1982 law) that be
“the legal foundation for all Mexican environmental protection.” (Gallagher 2004, 63).
In terms of specific issues, Salinas prioritized environmental pollution in Mexico City
(i.e., air pollution and greenspace) as well as garbage collection and reforestation efforts.
What was arguably Salinas’s most notable action was abolishing SEDUE and
creating the new Secretary of Social Development (la Secretaría de Desarollo Social or
SEDESOL). This new “mega-agency” divided responsibility into two semiautonomous
agencies, the National Institute of Ecology (Instituto Nacional de Ecología or INE) (that
later became a prominent player in climate change policy) and the Federal Attorney
General for Environmental Protection. Unfortunately, despite these strides forward,
implementation of policy under Salinas continued to be fragmented and sporadic and
dominated by políticos instead of técnicos. Some of these weaknesses were effectively
addressed when President Zedillo took office.
86
See Mumme (1992) for a full description and analysis of Salinas’s environmental
policy.
144
Internationally, Salinas implemented many highly publicized environmental
policies that earned him accolades from the international community, including the first
“Green Nobel Prize” from United Earth (Mumme et al. 1988). Salinas had an active
environmental foreign policy joining the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES) and implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity,
the Montreal Protocol and the UNFCCC. Salinas was also active in bilateral
environmental agreements as he, within a pre-NAFTA context, coordinated with
President George H.W. Bush on environmental issues along the U.S.-Mexican border.
This coordination was the result of the environmental side agreement or North
American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) between Canada,
Mexico and the U.S. that accompanied NAFTA. The intent of the NAAEC was to create
more standardized and compatible technical and environmental standards in the
participant countries without reducing the level of environmental protection in any
country and creating an incentive for businesses to move to a country with lower
standards. Although it was not pleased with all aspects of the agreement, the Salinas
administration felt pressured into agreeing to the NAAEC as it saw Mexico’s
acquiescence as crucial to the passage of NAFTA.
87
The Clinton administration would
not agree to NAFTA without the NAAEC and Mexico did not want to run the risk of
losing out on the trade opportunity, an opportunity that was crucial to Salinas’s economic
87
According to the NAAEC, the agreement was meant to make nations impose existing
domestic environmental laws and regulations. If a nation exhibited a pattern of failing to
enforce its laws, international action was acceptable to force the nation to comply (i.e.,
impose fines). However, from NAAEC’s inception until 2000, no complaints were
submitted against the U.S., only against Canada and Mexico (Abel 2003). See Araya
(2002) for an elaborated discussion of Mexico’s trials with NAFTA and the NAAEC.
145
strategy. As Andrea Abel (2003) wrote, Mexicans saw the NAAEC as a “bitter pill they
had to live with in order for the U.S. to sign NAFTA.”
Environmental Policy-Making in Mexico
In line with other governmental transformations that took place in the 1990s and
especially under Zedillo, environmental policy was increasingly liberated from the grip of
the federal government, particularly that of the president. According to Díez (2006),
environmental policy-making was “part of the so-called ‘second-stage’ process in the
1990s in which greater participation has been encouraged by international institutions,
national governments, practitioners within the developing community and international
agreements” (168). As a result, the policy-making process was accessible to a greater
number of vested interests whose voices were increasingly considered in policy
formulation. The process became more inclusive and participatory, though limits
remain.
88
The process is best described as partially open as certain segments of the
population continue to be excluded, for example indigenous groups. In addition,
wealthier ENGOs with more resources and the private sector have more direct access to
the process than is generally awarded to others. Furthermore, although environmental
groups are increasingly consulted for their expertise, because the process is still
dominated by government officials with considerable discretion, environmental leaders
are often cautious about participating (Mumme 1995). The decision-making process
88
Díez (2006) and Pulver (2007) suggest that with the election of Vicente Fox in 2000
environmental management regressed (due to diminished presidential interest) and the
influence of these new groups in the decision-making process declined.
146
employed to decide whether or not to ratify The Protocol in some ways is an example of
the aforementioned opening. It is an example of a move away from presidential- and
politico-dominated policy-making.
Mexico’s Green Leaders
Early in his presidency, Zedillo announced that he would give high priority to
environmental issues. Although it never became one of his top priorities, this statement
did foreshadow its increased prominence on the presidential agenda. As a result, Zedillo
was arguably the most environmental president in recent Mexican history. Some
postulate that this support for the environment was influenced by his personal interests in
scuba diving and coral reefs (Díez 2006). What most likely had the largest impact on his
pro-environment stance was growing domestic and international pressure to address
environmental problems, both global and domestic (Díez 2006). Two of his most
prominent and significant actions as president were his advocacy for natural areas and the
creation of an environmental ministry. First, during his term, Zedillo created thirty new
Natural Protected Areas, the most by any other Mexican president (Díez 2006). In doing
so the president exhibited his dedication to the natural environment as well as his ability
to exercise his executive authority in the name of environmental protection. Moreover, it
gave environmental protection a prominent place on the presidential agenda.
The other crucial action was the creation of the first environmental ministry in
1994, his first year as president, in accordance with the request of the 1992 UNCED.
This again exhibited the president’s sincerity for government attention to the
147
environment, as well as his dedication to abiding by international (UN) imperatives. The
new ministry, the Secretary of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries (la
Secretaría de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca or SEMARNAP)
89
, would
become the centralized authority for all environmental management.
Another momentous gesture was Zedillo’s appointment of Julia Carabias Lillo to
head SEMARNAP. Unlike most ministry heads, Carabias was not a career politician (or
a politico); she had no political experience. Further separating her from the ranks of the
usual ministry heads, Carabias had never met the president before her appointment and
was not affiliated with the PRI.
90
In fact, she was a trained biologist and was a researcher
and academic who had been critical of the government’s failure to adequately address
environmental issues. She was well-respected in the academic and environmental
communities and had appeal beyond the Mexican border. In covering a story about
Carabias’s role in the termination of the Mitsubishi salt plant, journalist Matt Smith wrote
that “for her commitment to neutral scientific analysis of environmental issues, Carabias
won the praise of academic researchers in both the United States and Mexico” (2001).
Part of Carabias’s agenda was to promote the evolution of environmental management
from “brown” issues to more “green” issues. Other reforms included continuing to open
the environmental policy-making process and make it more participatory. While she was
relatively successful with this latter goal, the process remained somewhat “limited and
89
SEMARNAP would eventually become SEMARNAT, the Secretary for the
Environment and Natural Resources, as it is named to this day.
90
Ministry heads and other executive positions were regularly filled by presidential
cronies with strong ties to the executive and the PRI. They were not necessarily
specialists in the areas to which they were appointed to work/lead.
148
unequal, characteristics that show a move toward increased pluralism” (Díez 2006, 93).
Carabias, together with Zedillo, would continue greening Mexican policy, including
foreign policy, with the decision to ratify The Protocol.
Preparing for The Protocol
Although the scientific community in Mexico began studying possible climate
change in the 1960s and 1970s, climate change did not emerge as the focus of
government attention until the early 1990s and as a result of the UNFCCC in 1992.
91
Early studies were insufficient, decentralized and the results were only disseminated to a
small number of groups interested in climate change. This was largely due to a lack of
communication and coordination as well as a lack of interest and knowledge of climate
change in the general public (Garcia 2003). As a result, INE and la Universidad Nacional
Autónoma de México (UNAM) began coordinating efforts to facilitate a more unified
study of the issue. After the 1992 conference, Mexico received financial and technical
assistance from the U.S., in the form of the Country Studies Program, to further their
efforts and the study of climate change in Mexico.
92
The country study would include
three sections covering a GHG inventory, GHG future emission scenarios, and an
assessment of Mexico’s vulnerability to climate change.
91
Some early examples include studies by el Instituto Mexicano de Recursos Naturales
Renovables on possible temperature increases due to increasing levels of CO
2
and the
1977 creation of el Centro de Ciencias de la Atmósfera at UNAM.
92
After the 1992 UNCED conference, at which time the U.S. did not want to sign any
climate change agreement, the U.S. offered funding to developing nations so that they
can do their part (Respondent F). The U.S. called for proposals in 1993 and 1994.
Mexico submitted applications for consideration and one was accepted.
149
Beginning in 1993, the Mexican government sponsored a number of workshops
and conferences, both domestic and international, that produced numerous studies and
publications on topics ranging from the GHG inventories to mitigation policies to
strategies for adapting to the foreseen impacts of climate change (SEMARNAP 1997).
One prominent report to come out of the early dialogue was a preliminary version of the
first national greenhouse inventory in 1995.
Also in 1995, Carlos Gay Garcia of UNAM created the “Ad-Hoc Group” aimed to
coordinate inter-secretarial dialogue on climate change policy. The dominant
contributors were SEMARNAP, INE and UNAM. The Group prepared Mexico’s policy
position and served as the main source of Mexico’s climate change policy prior to the
COPs (Pulver 2007). Garcia became the lead expert for the Mexican delegation for the
UNFCCC COPs and the delegation head for Subsidiary Body meetings. He maintained
these positions until Carabias took over as head coordinator for the county’s climate
change program. Around the same time, April 1997, the Ad-Hoc Group was converted
into a more formal Inter-ministerial Committee for Climate Change under the purview of
SEMARNAP. The new group included a larger representation of federal ministries than
the previous informal group.
Exemplifying the expansion of ministries formally participating in the climate
change policy debate was the Secretary of Energy’s (la Secretaría de Energia or SENER)
heightened involvement in early 1997 (Pulver 2007)
93
. Prior to 1997, SENER was not
especially active in the policy debate. With interests in protecting Mexico’s oil economy,
93
Luis Téllez was Secretary of SENER from 1997 to 2000.
150
SENER was one of the only voices to stand up against implementing climate change
policy. When discussions of voluntary commitments became more prominent, SENER
completely rejected the idea (Respondent G). In the eyes of SENER, it was not the time
for non-Annex I countries to discuss the issue. Reducing emissions is the responsibility
of Annex-I countries. However, SENER’s position was not set in complete opposition to
Carabias and other environmentalists and academics. What the ministry rejected was the
present discussion of commitments. SENER advocated that Mexico wait for other
countries to make reductions first. In this way, Mexico should be in no hurry to sign The
Protocol (Respondent G).
Dissension in the Ranks?
Although virtually all other interested and vested parties were supportive of
Mexico’s signing The Protocol, including the Foreign Relations Ministry (la Secretaría de
Relaciones Exteriores or SRE)
94
and Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), Mexico’s state-
owned petroleum company, there was some dissention on smaller points.
95
Voluntary
commitments was one such point. At COP 3 in Kyoto, Carabias wanted to propose that
developing nations make small commitments to reduce emissions, not large
commitments, but some action beyond what The Protocol required from non-Annex I
94
José Angel Gurría was Secretary of SRE from 1994 to 1998 and María del Rosario
Green Macías was Secretary from 1998 to 2000.
95
There was little resistance from industry as they were not highly educated on the topic.
The relation between oil, manufacturing, etc. and climate change was not a top priority.
The public also played a small role. Public representatives that did participate were
supportive of signing/ratifying.
151
countries (which was no emission reductions). Garcia warned against doing so because
he felt that other developing nations would object immediately. Carabias did suggest
small commitments and the idea was “promptly shot down” (Respondent F). Carabias,
nonetheless, felt that at even suggesting the commitment was a measurable success
(Respondent F).
On the last night of COP3 Ambassador Oyuela, chairman of the conference, had a
very tense and chaotic night as he worked to deal with and coordinate some of these very
same issues. He ran from room to room, from delegation to delegation trying to reach
consensus on voluntary commitments before the final document was accepted. There
was strong opposition from most developing countries, especially Brazil, China and
India, making consensus among all developing nations highly unlikely. At one point in
the night Oyuela had the consent, though unofficially and not publicly, of both Mexico
and South Korea that each would agree to make commitments. Oyuela spoke with the
Mexican delegation, presenting them with a proposal, but no agreement was made. Very
late in the night (around 3 am), a Mexican delegation representative came to Oyuela with
a document containing proposed commitments, but by that late hour it was too late. The
Protocol was already a closed document (Respondent A).
There were also other disagreements between academics and government
officials. All agreed that Mexico should sign The Protocol. This was not at issue. The
point of contention was over how much Mexico could or should do beyond signing the
agreement, what actions the country should take to address climate change. Academics
assessed (from multiple studies conducted on feasibility, etc.) that Mexico could do more
152
than it was doing to address GHG emissions and other related issues such as
deforestation. In contrast, government representatives expressed that Mexico was already
doing and had already committed itself to as much as it possibly could. Mexico would do
all it could but not at the expense of economic growth. In their eyes, Mexico, considering
its domestic context and status as a developing nation, was already an exemplary nation
doing more than most countries of similar status. Academics, on the other hand, found
such a response from government officials an excuse. Officials were highly concerned
about the signal they were sending the international community. They wanted to portray
Mexico as a country of relatively limited means (non-Annex I) that was committing itself
to as much as possible (Respondent F).
Mexico’s Communication to the World
In accordance with the UNFCCC mandate that developing countries present their
first national communication three years after the Convention goes into effect, Mexico
submitted its First National Communication at COP3.
96
Mexico was one of the first
countries to submit their national communication and the first developing nation to do so.
The document included the results from studies on different climate scenarios and
Mexico’s vulnerability to climate change. The document also made clear Mexico’s
stance on “common but differentiated responsibilities” and the importance it places on
domestic conditions. For example, the document states “Con esta primera comunicación
nacional, México cumple su compromiso y reitera su apoyo a la Convención Marco de
96
Mexico was a signatory party to the UNFCCC when it went entered into force in 1994,
thus it was required to submit its first national communication by 1997.
153
las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático, bajo el principio de responsabilidad
común pero diferenciada, en correspondencia con sus circunstancias nacionales”
97
(INE
1997, 6). This is a stance that Mexico adopted early on and continued to promote at all
subsequent COPs and climate change deliberations. Mexico has always held strong to
the idea established in the UNFCCC that all nations have a responsibility to address
climate change, but each nation (developed versus developing) is responsible to different
degrees.
The first communication also includes mention of other domestic steps the
country was taking to mitigate the possible effects of climate change. These included the
Protected Natural Area program, the Forestry Program, and improvements to the National
Reforestation Program. However, many of these efforts and others advertised and
promoted by the government benefited the environment in general or air pollution in
Mexico City, worthy causes to address, but they often did not address climate change
specifically (Respondent F).
The Protocol was open for signatures beginning March 1998. Mexico was one of
the first nations to sign on June 9, 1998.
98
97
Translation: With this first national communication, Mexico complies with its
commitment and reiterates its support for the UNFCCC, under the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities, in accordance with its national circumstances.
98
The UNFCCC website dates Mexico’s signature for June 9
th
. A 1999 SEMARNAP
publication records the date in May.
154
Reinforcing the Mexican Position
Later that year, at COP 4 in Buenos Aires, Carabias addressed the convention.
She spoke about the norm of collective action agreed to in Kyoto but also stressed that “it
is urgent that industrialized countries show their will to lead the global effort” (Carabias
1998). She then turned her attention to Mexico and how it has punctually fulfilled its
requirements by submitting its first national communication but highlighted that Mexico
still faces challenges, namely balancing climate change mitigation against economic
growth and providing a reasonable standard of living for the Mexican people. The
Secretary also spoke of continued action in Mexico including the National Program on
Climate Action that would be open for public consultation before the end of the year.
Another important topic mentioned was flexibility mechanisms and the hope that all
countries could come to an agreement on how they will be used (Carabias 1998). Mexico
had great interest in the Clean Development Mechanisms as it could award the country
great financial benefits.
Throughout 1998 and 1999 the Intersecretarial Committee coordinated and
solicited the public participation and that of other interested voices. This work and
continued governmental and academic study culminated in the National Climate Change
Action Plan (la Estrategia Nacional de Acción Climática) in 2000.
In 1999 SEMARNAP published Atención de México a los compromisos
internacionales relacionados con la Agenda 21 addressing Mexico’s advances towards
155
implementing Agenda 21.
99
In a section on Mexico’s participation in international
agreements, the report includeda summary of the stance the country took in Kyoto. In
addition to a reaffirmation of Mexico’s stance of “common but differentiated
responsibilities,” the report affirmed that the country’s decision to sign The Protocol was
not purely for the sake of the convention but because of a genuine concern for climate
change’s foreseeable environmental and social impacts (SEMARNAP 1999).
Specifically, the document states “se señaló que México continuará con una política
responsable en relación con el cambio climático, en virtud de que la política nacional
aspira a controlar la contaminación, mejorar la eficiencia energética e incrementar los
servicios ambiéntales de las áreas forestales del país” (SEMARNAP 1999, 20).
100
The
report also reiterated the importance of CDMs for Mexico and that the successful use of
this mechanism could promote cooperation between countries involved, suggesting that
CDMs could provide more than pure financial benefits.
At the end of 1999, at COP5 in Bonn, Germany, Carabias again addressed the
convention. In her first address, the Secretary reiterated Mexico’s accomplishments and
expressed her concerns about the progress of developed nations. Expressing unease,
Carabias said “we are concerned about industrialized countries being retarded in fulfilling
their commitments” (Carabias 1999). She ended her address to the high-level segment
with words to incite leadership: “we must renew our political commitment, at the highest
99
Agenda 21 is an agreement established at UNCED in 1992 emphasizing the tenants of
sustainable development.
100
Translation: “…it was signaled that Mexico would continue with a responsible climate
change policy, by virtue of the national policy aspiring to limit emissions, improve
energy efficiency and improve environmental services in the country’s forest areas.”
156
leel, to send a clear message to all countries and all sectors to let them know that we are
promoting the Kyoto Protocol seriously and decisively” (Carabias 1999).
On the eve of Mexico’s ratification, the National Climate Change Action Plan
was published. Possibly in response to the continued controversy over the appropriate
responsibilities for developed and developing nations and the failure of many key nations
to ratify (or even show interest in doing so), the Plan boldly states “México mantiene un
estricto apego al principio de responsabilidades comunes con esfuerzos diferenciados,
especialmente, en la atención a los problemas ambientales globales” (INE 2000, 17).
101
This was one of the strongest pronouncements of Mexico’s stance on the issue to date.
Also in 2000, SEMARNAP published another document about environmental
management in general. The report stressed, again, the importance Mexico placed on a
necessary “spirit of international cooperation” (SEMARNAP 2000, 555). The report also
highlighted how Mexico’s domestic climate change policy is the result of multilateral
negotiations.
In an interview published by the Environment News Service also nearing the
official announcement of Mexico’s ratification, Jose Luis Samaniego, coordinator of
international affairs at SEMARNAP, spoke out strongly against the hesitancy of some
developed nations to address climate change. Samaniego expressed that developed
nations are responsible for the majority of GHG emissions and that it is “legitimate” that
they start taking action (Guzman 2000). While Samaniego admitted that developing
101
Translation: Mexico maintains a strict adherence to the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, especially as regards global environmental problems.
157
nation emissions should be evaluated and that these countries should make an effort to
reduce emissions, Mexico proposes that it “should be done equitably” (Cevallos 2000).
When the new Mexican Senate convened in September of 2000, one of their first
tasks was to decide whether or not to heed Zedillo’s recommendation and approve
ratification of The Protocol. The Senate agreed with the president and the official
UNFCCC date of Mexico’s ratification is September 7, 2000.
President Zedillo and Poliheuristic Theory
First Phase
Zedillo the Arbiter
From the previous account of the process by which Mexico came to ratify The Protocol it
is evident that the president did not play the predominant role. Although Zedillo’s true
zeal for environmental protection in general, and climate change specifically, is not
necessarily contested but qualified, this concern for the environment coupled with
Mexico’s history of environmental legislation and a desire to play a leadership role in the
international arena made Zedillo’s overall decision to ratify relatively simple. What
required more deliberation was the decision of exactly how Mexico would approach
ratification. Would Zedillo follow Menem’s lead and commit his country to emission
reductions in line with the U.S.’s request or would the president chose another means to
his support for The Protocol? These latter decisions were largely made by Carabias and
the rest of the climate change community
158
Whether or not Zedillo was concerned about environmental protection is not to
dispute. His record of environmentalism, including the passage of environmental
legislation and, perhaps most importantly, the creation of SEMARNAP and the
appointment of Carabias as its head, illustrate his concern quite well. What is more
contestable is the president’s concern for, or at least knowledge of, climate change in
particular. According to Respondent G, Zedillo was very concerned about climate
change. Respondent F similarly echoes that Zedillo became increasingly aware of the
importance of climate change, but was less convinced of the president’s knowledge of the
phenomenon or its complexity. The environment was an “inconvenient truth for Zedillo”
in that he had to make a decision on The Protocol at the same time that he was faced with
other pressing issues such as negotiating NAFTA that appeared more pressing
(Respondent F). Although Zedillo arguably elevated the environment in the presidential
agenda more than past Mexican presidents, it was never the top priority (Respondent F).
Climate change may also not have been a worry for Zedillo as he relied heavily
upon and confided in and trusted his ministry leaders to lead him in the right direction.
Respondent G recalls Zedillo listening to arguments from all related ministries before
trying to find consensus and make decisions. (It is important to bear in mind, however,
that there was little dissention between ministries and other interested parties.)
Respondent F recollects that the argument actually to ratify was presented to the
president (by Carabias and others) and that the decision was not highly compromising.
Zedillo relied heavily on SEMARNAT and INE for advice, confident that they would
“cover his back” and thus “not much was at stake.” In the end, the decision to ratify was
159
“a bit of a default decision” (Respondent F). This does not, however, infer that Zedillo
was absent from the decision-making process. Respondents G and F recall that Zedillo
was present throughout. Respondent G noted that the president was advised of current
discussions and dilemmas on a regular basis.
Domestic Political Concerns?
In order to test the ability of PH to explain Zedillo’s decision-making process it is
important to first ask whether or not the elimination of policy options in the first phase
was based on domestic political concerns. Figure 5.1 presents the policy options that lay
before President Zedillo. The three policy options eliminated in the first phase were the
options to wait to ratify, not to ratify and to propose a totally different agreement outside
of The Protocol. As discussed below, these options were eliminated early on as they
would not meet Zedillo’s primary criterion of advancing The Protocol and thereby
enhancing Mexico’s image as a committed international player and upcoming
international leader (henceforth referred to as the criterion of “leadership and
stewardship”). Such a primary criterion falls in line with the president’s overall foreign
policy agenda. It is also interesting to note that it is follows the trajectory of
contemporary Mexican foreign policy. Most important, the fact that this was indeed the
president’s primary criterion is supported by respondents intimately involved in the
decision-making process.
160
Figure 5.1 Zedillo’s Policy Options and First Phase Eliminations
As is also seen in the foreign policy behavior of presidents before him, Zedillo’s
foreign policy agenda centered on the dual concepts of interdependence and
nonintervention as well as diversification of dependency. Zedillo looked to remain in the
good graces of the U.S. but was equally cautious to become or remain on good terms with
the international community as a whole, as well as with its individual parts. (A main
impetus for this was the hope of financial assistance for Mexico’s ailing economy.)
Zedillo was not looking to upset any members of the developed world or those in the
developing world, including regional neighbors. The Protocol presented the opportunity
to stay in the good graces of both vital groups. First, The Protocol was an opportunity to
demonstrate to the developed world Mexico’s commitment to both environmental
protection and UN leadership. The Protocol also presented Mexico with the prospect of
helping elevate Mexico’s international image by becoming a respected leader of the
developing world.
Augmenting a positive trend in domestic environmental protection, Mexico had
been an active participant in the international climate change regime from the start, even
heading some COP segments. Zedillo and Carabias had no intention of turning back at
such a critical juncture. They, especially Carabias and other delegates, had much
A. Ratify (only)
D. Ratify & Voluntarily
Reduce Emissions
G. Propose Non-Annex
I Targets
H. Negotiate with the
U.S.
E. Negotiate with
Non-Annex I States
B. Wait to Ratify
I. Propose Totally New
Agreement
F. Align with Non-Annex
I States Against the U.S.
C. Don’t Ratify (only)
161
invested in the process and in the successful implementation of The Protocol. Therefore,
not ratifying The Protocol was a virtual a non-option. However, implicit in this reason is
the signal that ratification would send to the international community. Ratification would
show the world community that Mexico was a serious participant in the international
environmental movement. The gesture would simultaneously demonstrate Mexico’s
commitment to multi-lateral cooperation and the UN-lead process, reinforcing Mexico’s
image as an active and valuable member of the international community. All this
considered, Zedillo eliminated Option C. There was little to no discussion of not
ratifying The Protocol.
The Protocol also presented an opportunity for Mexico to display its leadership
abilities. Ratifying and ratifying early would place Mexico atop the list of active and
proactive non-Annex I nations, giving it more influence in negotiations and discussions
with other countries. The question delegates and ministers asked themselves was “Why
not us?” (Respondent G). If Mexico could take the lead among developing nations and
do its part to help international efforts, why not? In this way, Mexico could take the lead
among non-Annex I nations with the hopes of persuading the developing world to
become part of the international agreement. However, Mexico’s leverage would ideally
not be limited to the Third World. Mexico would also be in a better position to exert
pressure on Annex I nations. For example, having ratified The Protocol Mexico would
have more credibility and thus more leverage to pressure European nations to move faster
in fulfilling their Annex-I obligations (Respondent G). In the end, ratifying early would
allow Mexico to assume the role of non-Annex I leader increasing both its international
162
status and its ability to pressure other nations into ratifying and/or abiding by The
Protocol. This meant that Option B, wait to ratify, was not an appealing alternative for
Zedillo. Early ratification would bring many advantages for the country, its delegates
and its international image.
Option I was similarly eliminated as it would not meet Zedillo’s primary criterion
of leadership and stewardship, inclusive of showing a commitment to multi-lateralism.
Even though the U.S. had suggested discussing alternatives outside of The Protocol and
Zedillo was not looking to upset the U.S., the Mexican president preferred to work within
the existing structure. Mexico had been a proponent of the UNFCCC and subsequent
conferences for years and did not wish to abandon the system it had worked so hard to
facilitate. Removing itself from The Protocol or participating in any side agreement
would also have the effect of challenging the UN as well as all other KP supporters, a
move that would likely portray Mexico as a defector or even a traitor to global efforts.
Additionally, the environmental community in Mexico believed that global warming was
a multi-lateral issue, not a bi-lateral one (Respondent G). Working within the multi-
lateral UN structure was the only way to proceed. As Option I would require just the
opposite, it was eliminated.
In sum, Zedillo was able to quite expeditiously eliminate Options B, C and I as
they did not meet the president’s primary criterion and allow Zedillo the opportunity to
promote The Protocol and take a leadership position as a willful and valuable participant
in the UN-lead, multi-lateral effort. All other options (A, D, E, F, G, and H) remained
viable alternatives as they are variants of the option to ratify. All of them included or
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allowed Mexico to take some action toward addressing climate change. None of them
precluded Mexico from taking action or becoming a vocal proponent and leader in the
global climate change regime. All of these options also required additional and specific
consideration, likely requiring a deep understanding of science, and economics. The
president left this to the educated discretion of his advisors, namely Carabias.
Noncompensatory Principle?
The next question to consider is if Zedillo used the non-compensatory principle in his
decision to eliminate just three options and keep six for further consideration. To begin,
Options B and I both leave open the possibility that “better” options could surface (either
in the future or in an alternative agreement), options better for Mexico than those already
incorporated into The Protocol. However, the paths to these plausible (though not likely)
improvements would likely paint a negative picture of Mexico, a picture of an
uncooperative country unwilling to work within the existing UN framework. Although
these two alternatives could lead to a better outcome in the end, the road to those
outcomes was not worth the risk. The uncertain benefits could not compensate for the
negative (or at least not positive) image Mexico would be projecting to the world. Option
C is less illustrative of the non-compensatory principle. In Zedillo’s eyes, there are few
redeeming qualities in the option that could compensate for the options inability to meet
the president’s criterion. Not ratifying was not acceptable.
Early in the decision process none of the remaining policy options stood out as
being strong frontrunners for Zedillo, though the remaining six policy options were
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reasonable enough to survive to the second phase. They were satisfactory options that
required further research and consideration.
Cognitive Heuristics?
A thorough look into the decision-making process reveals that the president definitely
utilized cognitive heuristics in narrowing the set of policy options that initially lay before
him. First, although Zedillo is known for the expedited erosion of presidentialism in
Mexico, he was still very powerful and able to exert his will and incorporate his personal
preferences into policy-making. As previously summarized, Zedillo desired to work
within the international community and become a reliable and good member of that
community. Ratifying The Protocol would allow him to do just that. Refusing to ratify
or choosing to take alternative measures would have the opposite effect. Second, one
cannot forget Zedillo’s commitment to environmental causes. Refusing to ratify and
choosing another alternative would likely not be acceptable by these standards. It just so
happened that these two criteria coincided- ratifying The Protocol promoted both
environmental protection and an active international role for Mexico. Although only a
counterfactual could truly support this proposition, it is conceivable that if ratifying The
Protocol did not meet Zedillo’s general criterion (if the document itself was different, for
example) he would have taken a different stance and foregone ratification in favor of an
option that met the criterion. However, this scenario is unlikely as Mexico was heavily
involved the early evolution of The Protocol and the document was largely to its liking.
165
That Zedillo employed cognitive heuristics is also supported from the
observations of those intimately involved in the process. Respondent F stated that the
president did not have much of a decision to make. There was little doubt within the
administration that Zedillo would support ratification. There was not a lot of controversy
or a strong amount of contestation and his most trusted advisers in SEMARNAP and INE
were in favor of ratification. Thus, Zedillo could make his first phase decisions based on
his own preferences unimpeded by opposition voices. The first phase decision to
eliminate unattractive options was also relatively easy for Zedillo because simple
ratification would not require Mexico to do anything beyond what it was already doing.
As a non-Annex I country, any commitments would be voluntary and at the country’s
discretion. With the larger question of whether or not to ratify taken care of, Zedillo
would leave the specifics of ratification to the “experts” and to the second phase.
Second Phase
Rational Decision Strategy?
The last step is to determine whether Zedillo utilized rational decision strategies to arrive
at his final policy choice. Figure 5.2 presents the six policy options that survived to the
second phase as well as Zedillo’s final policy choice.
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Figure 5.2 Zedillo’s Remaining Policy Options and Phase Two Eliminations
Similar to the scenario of the Argentine case study, due to the lack of sincere time
constraints, Zedillo and the Mexican delegates had the luxury to try out options before
committing to a final decision. As Zedillo was willing to defer some authority to his
trusted ministers, the final decision reflects less of the president’s preferences and more
the judgments of Carabias and the climate change community. Zedillo deferred to their
expertise. As previously argued, Zedillo attentively listened to the recommendations of
his ministers and from there made his final assessment.
If in the first phase Zedillo focused concern on interdependence and the
diversification of dependency, the second phase emphasized nonintervention and state
sovereignty. Put another way, the first phase focused on Mexico the OECD country and
international leader whereas the second incorporated concern for Mexico the non-Annex
I nation. The second phase considered the limitations commonly ascribed to a
developing nation, which Mexico still was. It was in phase two that it became apparent
D. Ratify & Voluntarily
Reduce Emissions
F. Align with Non-Annex
I States Against the U.S
.S.
G. Propose Non-Annex
I Targets
E. Negotiate with
Non-Annex I States
H. Negotiate with the
U.S.
Would allude that Mexico could
do more than currently was doing
Could not come to an agreement
and upset some Non-Annex I
allies
Would portray negative image of
Mexico
Attempted but too late and did not
want to upset Non-Annex I allies-
unpopular idea
Could violate Mexican
sovereignty
A. Ratify (only)
Allows for both Mexican
personas: OECD and non-Annex I
167
Mexico is a country with “its foot in two worlds” (Respondent F). Zedillo’s final
decision would illustrate his and Carabias’s awareness of this fact.
With the luxury of time on their side, Zedillo and the Carabias-led Mexican
delegation were able to test the waters on Options D, E, F and G. Mexico was involved
in various discussions among developing nations to consider the appeal and feasibility of
voluntary commitments and other alternatives for non-Annex I nations. What the
delegation eventually learned (and in some cases faster than others) was that opposition
to any additional measures was too strong. Countries like Brazil, China and India that
opposed emission reductions for non-Annex I nations were formidable negotiators. As a
result, Options E, F and G were eliminated because the developing world could not reach
consensus and thus any policy option along those lines was dead in the water. In cases
where agreement did arise, the decision was in favor of not imposing any additional
measures and supporting The Protocol as is. As the result of multiple failed negotiation
attempts, Mexico learned that pressing issues further would be to its detriment and it
would likely lose valuable allies. Option F, aligning in opposition to the U.S., was
additionally unattractive as it would present Mexico, as well as the other nations, in a
negative light. Mexico could appear inflexible and combative. Keeping within the
confines of The Protocol was more appealing. By doing so, Mexico would still be
standing up against U.S. pressure but in a more subtle and internationally acceptable way.
Following Argentina’s lead to voluntarily reduce emissions (Option D) was also
eventually eliminated as a viable option largely because making such a commitment was
unacceptable to the rest of Latin America (Respondent G). Following Argentina’s lead
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would upset many of Mexico’s Latin American allies. In fact, Mexico’s suggestion of
such commitments upset and offended many non-Annex I countries and pursuing the
option further became too unpopular and dangerous for Mexico. In addition, imposing a
voluntary commitment was asking for more than Mexico was capable of, or at least more
than what Mexico wanted others to believe it was capable of (Respondent F). Mexico
was a developing nation that was already exceeding expectations; it could not do more
than it was already committed to. Mexico was constrained by domestic conditions.
Although it was advanced by developing nation status and had officially become an
OECD member, Mexico had to consider the imperative of economic development.
Making a commitment to reduce emissions would put additional stress on the country
and, in essence, punish the country. Mexico was willing to do all it could, but not at the
expense of economic growth. Exemplifying this perspective, it was SEMARNAT’s
stance that it would absolutely advance and contribute to efforts to avoid climate change
but it would do so by its own national agenda, not by any such uniformed commitment
(Respondent G).
102
Option H, negotiating with the U.S., was similarly eliminated as it threatened to
violate Mexican sovereignty. As it did to most non-Annex I nations, the U.S. pressured
Mexico to reduce its emissions and/or otherwise become more active in addressing global
climate change. Zedillo and his administration, however, stood firm in the face of the
102
Recall that others within the Mexican climate change community, namely some
academics and researchers, believed that Mexico was capable of doing more than it
already was doing. In the end, however, the perspective that Mexico’s means were
limited and that the country was already doing all that it could became the country’s
official negotiation stance.
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U.S. In illustration, the foreign ministry expressed that it had the sovereign right to
decide what it wanted (Respondent G). It would not be bullied by the U.S. Appeasing
the U.S. was not worth relinquishing its sovereign right to decide for itself what was in
the nation’s best interest. As an added benefit, not succumbing to U.S. pressure would
help Mexico gain some level of prestige in the eyes of many nations. Mexico would be
seen as standing up for itself and not becoming a lackey of the U.S., as had been a fear in
years past.
After all was said and done, Option A was the remaining viable option. It
allowed Zedillo to accommodate his primary policy criterion of leadership and
stewardship. Fundamentally, Option A would appease the greatest audience. Ratifying
early would present Mexico as a leader in the eyes of the developed world while not
alienating the developing world. By ratifying The Protocol with no delay and officially
doing nothing more Mexico could take a stance as an international leader and
environmental advocate and avoid threatening its own sovereignty as well as that of other
non-Annex I nations. Mexico could simultaneously play the role of a good international
citizen and not neglect its economic and developmental needs. In the end, Option A
would allow Mexico to keep one foot securely positioned each of the two worlds.
Concluding Remarks
The above analysis suggests that PH does a sufficient job explaining the first
phase of decision making and predicting that Zedillo would eliminate policy options
based on his main policy criterion of international leadership and environmental
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stewardship. However, it is not certain that this criterion conforms to PH’s prediction
that the president’s criterion would be domestic political considerations. As in the
Argentine analysis, PH does accurately predict Zedillo’s use of the non-compensatory
principle and the use of cognitive heuristics.
PH is less successful at adequately capturing the fact that Zedillo deferred so
greatly to his administration, specifically Julia Carabias Lillo. In essence, the president
allowed the Mexican delegation to make a calculative decision and present him with a
final policy choice. This is not to infer that the president was a passive participant. He
was informed throughout the process and was the final arbiter but he, in effect, contracted
the decision making out to the environmental ministry and his trusted environmental
minister. Zedillo eliminated unacceptable policy options in the first phase, leaving
Carabias and others to determine, using their expertise, what surviving option was most
viable and acceptable. Largely via a process of trial and error, the delegation determined
that ratifying The Protocol early but not officially committing itself or others to any
additional measures was the optimal choice. Zedillo, deferring to his environmental
minister, supported the decision (a decision that also met with his criteria) and passed
along the recommendation to the Senate for approval.
The results thus suggest that PH would benefit from parsing out in greater detail
how decisions are made in non-crisis situations. With time on their side, the Mexican
delegation was able to pursue a number of policy options and test their plausibility in the
real world. When an option became too difficult to pursue any longer and proved
disadvantageous to Mexico’s domestic and international status it was abandoned.
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Therefore, the Mexican case study suggests that PH would more accurately explain
Zedillo’s decision-making process if it would incorporate a trial and error component into
its description of second phase decision making.
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Chapter 6
Venezuela: Chavez’s Change of Heart
Like Menem’s Argentina, Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela stood out among its Latin
American counterparts when it came to ratifying The Protocol. The leader of a
developing nation highly dependent the productivity of its oil industry, Chavez had no
intentions of ratifying The Protocol. That was until around 2004 when the President
abruptly changed his mind and his public discourse. With a change in international
context, Chavez re-evaluated the costs and benefits of ratifying and decided to join the
majority of the international community in ratifying The Protocol.
As was done in the preceding two chapters, this chapter begins with a summary of
Venezuelan foreign policy, including a brief discussion of U.S.-Venezuelan relations.
After a discussion of environmental issues and policy in the country follows the
description of Chavez’s decision-making process and how he was led to make his initial
decision as well as his final decision. The chapter concludes with the application of PH
to this process and an assessment of its ability to explain the process.
The Extension of Venezuelan Foreign Policy
Venezuelan foreign policy in the early twentieth century was limited-- nothing
like what it eventually evolved into just a few decades later. Prior to the world wars,
Venezuela was relatively isolated from the outside world as the government prioritized
domestic issues, notably the national economy. Interactions with other nations were
limited to neighbors (border disputes) and a few trading partners (mainly for the sale of
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coffee). Largely the result of the production and export of oil after WWI, Venezuela’s
outlook on the international system soon changed. Its leaders began to acknowledge the
realities of power politics and the benefits to be had by foregoing its isolationist stance in
favor of increased international relations, especially trade relations. As it did for both
Argentina and Mexico, the Cold War and the end of the Cold War further transformed the
balance of the international system and the opportunities that rested therein. For
Venezuela, the trade and sale of oil became a driving force in its relations with other
nations and this “new” world expanded the opportunities to do so. Venezuela’s
increasing desire to expand its oil industry and petroleum trade coupled with the fact that
the country was a relatively stable democracy made for a new approach to foreign policy,
one with expanded relations that promoted democracy and development.
103
The
importance of oil in Venezuelan foreign policy increased exponentially with the election
of Hugo Chávez Frías in 1998.
In addition to external forces and changes in international context, Venezuelan
foreign policy is also affected by influences closer to home. De Silva and Hillman (2003)
emphasize the profoundness of both domestic influences and individual leadership. For
instance, they write that “it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of individual
leadership in the evolution of foreign policy” (160). Throughout the country’s history,
presidents and other government leaders have greatly influenced the formulation and
trajectory of Venezuelan foreign policy. One leader in particular, Simón Bolívar (19th
century revolutionary that worked to liberate and unite Latin America), has had a lasting
103
This section summarizes and extends points made by Da Silva and Hillman (2003).
174
impact on foreign relations in Latin America, particularly in Venezuela, even decades
after his death.
104
Bolívar’s teachings of political and economic integration (though
largely within Latin America in Bolívar’s day) have arguably influenced Venezuela’s
active membership in the UN, OPEC, the Organization of American States and The Latin
American Integration Association (Haggerty 1990). President Hugo Chavez most
prolifically invokes Bolivarian ideals in reference to his foreign policies.
Da Silva and Hillman (2003) also draw attention to domestic influences particular
to Venezuela that affect the country’s foreign policy. For example, the country has a
“complex political culture in which internal instability has filtered external influence”
(145). Ever-present domestic political complications and tensions have tempered the
impact that outside influences have on Venezuelan politics and policy. International
factors are not impotent, but their impacts can be muted or altered in a variety of ways
depending on domestic conditions. This in turn affects how foreign policy is formulated
and presented to the public.
The array of influences on Venezuelan foreign policy is visible in a brief
summary of the country’s politics and foreign policy choices in the last 60 years. From
democratically-elected presidents to dictators and back to democratically-elected
presidents, Venezuelan leaders have adopted policies in line with their priorities and
attuned to international and domestic conditions.
104
Simón Bolívar, also known as “El Libertador” (“The Liberator”), has been
immortalized for his work to liberate countries in Central and the northern part of South
America from Spanish rule. A native of Caracas, he created and became president of
Gran Colombia (1821 to 1830), a republic uniting present day territories of Colombia,
Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama and including parts of Costa Rica, Peru, Brazil and
Guyana. Bolívar was also president of Peru (1824 to 1826) and Bolivia (1825 to 1826).
175
During the brief democratic period lasting from 1945 to 1948, Venezuela
president Rómulo Bentancourt adopted traditionally democratic foreign policies. The
country was an active partner with its neighbors in Latin America & the Caribbean as
well as with the U.S. and was an advocate for multilateralism and democracy around the
world. With the 1948 military coup and the instatement of the military junta, foreign
relations changed, but not were not completely reversed. During this ten-year period,
from 1948 to 1958, the junta maintained regional relations with both Latin America and
the U.S., though relations took on a noninterventionist stance. Venezuelan leaders
emphasized national security and the integrity of national borders. As far as relations
with the U.S., they were actually strengthened. The junta displayed an image of
“unconditional support” for U.S. policies (Da Silva and Hillman 2003, 149). Although
most military regimes do not seek acceptance from other nations and are not known for
their acquiescent behavior, the junta in Venezuela hoped for recognition from the U.S.
and was even supportive of some foreign investment. During the junta’s reign, foreign
policies also became more divergent from domestic concerns. Foreign relations, such as
attaining the good graces of the U.S., became a priority (Da Silva and Hillman 2003).
The result of popular insurrection and even some dissension within the military
itself, the junta eventually fell in 1958 and was replaced by another succession of
democratic governments. The foreign policies of the democratically-elected presidents
shifted back to advance traditionally democratic ideals. Some principles that guided their
policies included respect for human rights, nonintervention and peaceful dispute
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resolution (Haggerty 1990).
105
The 1961 Constitution was written with similar
democratic principles in mind. The new document was intended to preserve and
propagate democracy as well as institute ideals of cooperation and national sovereignty in
the Venezuelan government and society. The Constitution was also intended to serve as
a unifying agent of Venezuelan foreign policy for decades to come.
In another monumental move that would have significant effects on Venezuelan
foreign policy for years to come, and arguably more influential than the adoption of the
Constitution, was Venezuela’s active promotion and participation in the creation of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960.
106
With the advent of
OPEC and Venezuela’s active promotion of the organization came a more outward-
looking foreign policy. The democratic government was interested in a diversification of
relations, in particular a repositioning of international economic relations. Aligning with
other OPEC countries fit with this policy directive. As an active OPEC nation Venezuela
was also concerned with preserving stable (or otherwise profitable) world oil prices, the
value of which had considerable impact on the domestic economy. Thus, Venezuela had
strong interests in protecting its oil reserves and thus adopted strongly nationalist oil
policy.
105
Haggerty (1990) includes a more detailed list of principles that Venezuelan presidents
have stated directed their foreign policy during the resurgence of democracy. The list
includes the rights of all peoples to self-determination, the right of all peoples to peace
and security, support for the elimination of colonialism and a call for significantly higher
export prices for developing countries’ primary products.
106
Other original OPEC members include Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
177
The foreign policies of the first two democratic administration post-junta
(Betancourt from 1959 to 1964 and Raúl Leoni from 1964 to 1969) supported democratic
regimes and opposing tyrannical ones, tyrannical to the right or the left. Under their
leadership and in a statement virtually denouncing their own predecessors, Venezuela
engaged with fellow democracies but refused diplomatic relations with governments that
formed as the result of military coups. However, as the number of countries in Latin
America led by non-democratically elected governments increased, Venezuela found
itself increasingly isolated. As a result, policies were eventually loosened in the late
1960s and early 1970s to again permit diplomatic relations with Argentina, Panama, Peru
and most communist countries (Haggerty 1990).
The first Pérez administration (1974-1979) benefited from an increase in world-
wide oil prices, or the “oil boom,” of the 1970s. The economic windfall was so huge that
it allowed the president to raise minimum wage, eliminate unemployment, control
inflation, expand social services, and create and subsidize new and existing industries
(Hellinger 2006). Life was good and “all things seemed possible” (Hellinger 2006, 479).
Life was so good that the era is often referred to as “Tan barato, dame dos!” (Hellinger
2006, 479).
107
Under the influence of delusions of grandeur, of increased affluence and
stature, Perez was motivated to set forth the “New International Economic Order” that
would, based on the premise of an international economic transformation, help integrate
and elevate Venezuela in the international economy.
107
Translation: “So cheap, give me two!”
178
Comfort at home translated into increased activity on the international stage.
Venezuela engaged in active foreign relations, especially with its Latin American &
Caribbean neighbors. Venezuela was supportive of emerging democracies in the region
and often offered oil to such countries as way to help alleviate their heavy debt burdens.
For example, President Pérez supplied the Sandinista National Liberation Front with
materials and general aid to overthrow Nicaragua’s dictator. Venezuela later sent UN
peacekeeping troops to Nicaragua (the first such troops in Venezuelan history) and
provided Nicaragua with oil to help with its huge oil debt. Venezuela later revoked the
oil assistance because the Nicaraguan government was not making sufficiently
expeditious strides towards democracy. Venezuela was also active multilaterally and in
1983 joined the Contadora Group (along with Colombia, Mexico and Panama) to address
mounting tensions in Central America.
108
From the boom of the 1970s through the 1980s, Venezuela’s income was greater
than in any other period in its history (Da Silva and Hillman 2003). However, in the end
there was little to show for the financial gains. The government had invested little more
in social programs and the new industries begun under Pérez had become internationally
uncompetitive (Hellinger 2006). In addition, the country somehow found itself with a
large foreign debt that had a significant impact on Venezuela’s foreign policy decisions
for years to come.
Where had all the money gone? Elites tended to blame the Venezuelan people.
In their view, the Venezuelan people had grown accustomed to high oil rents and had
108
See previous discussion of the Contadora Group on page 135.
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become lazy. The general public, on the other hand, saw the situation differently. Since
the country had received money but it never made its way down to the poorer classes, it
must have stopped at the top. The elites were to blame for squandering the wealth
(Hellinger 2006). In fact, corruption was indeed to blame. It was so prevalent that “petty
corruption became a way of life” (Hellinger 2006, 480). Elites in the military,
government and business pocketed large sums of money, many finding secure homes for
their new fortunes abroad. Many in the Lusinchi administration (1979 to 1984) were
party to corruption and other scandals.
For a time, Venezuela was recognized as an exceptional democracy in the region,
one with an affluent and thriving society. Venezuela was a nation pursuing democratic
policies at home and promoting democracies abroad. Unfortunately, in the mid-1980s
(1985 to 1986) oil prices fell dramatically yet again and the domestic economy suffered.
By 1989, the Venezuelan people had hit their limit and revolted, partaking in rioting and
looting (resulting in both human and financial costs). Tensions hit their highest with an
unsuccessful coup attempt against President Pérez in 1992 lead by Hugo Chavez. As
news of domestic tension and stories of government corruption surfaced, Venezuela’s
international image was quickly tarnished.
Under mounting debt, President Pérez’s second term in office (1989 to 1993) was
characterized by an openness to foreign investment. Pérez facilitated an expansion of
foreign relations, largely by removing limitations imposed by previous administrations.
He was supportive of foreign capital as he opened up local markets to foreign companies.
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Pérez also looked to improve regional integration and cooperation by revitalizing activity
in the Andean Group and the Group of Rio (Da Silva and Hillman 2003).
109
With the election of Rafael Caldera in 1994, the direction of foreign policy was
effectively altered and took the back seat domestic concerns and hemispheric relations.
Caldera criticized growing globalization and the International Monetary Fund and
focused attention on the domestic economy. Caldera also publicly expressed his concern
for corruption and poverty (Da Silva and Hillman 2003), requesting the creation of an
Inter-American Convention against Corruption and the 1994 Summit of the Americas.
Caracas and Washington: A Forgiving Friendship
Venezuela and the U.S. have maintained relatively hospitable and cooperative
relations for most of the twentieth century. Venezuelan foreign policy recognized the
importance of good relations with its neighbor to the north, the most important trading
partner of its most important export- oil. Although there were times in their histories
when the two nations disagreed over various state-sponsored behavior, the two rarely
spoke overly critical of each other. In fact, the two nations maintained positive and solid
109
The Andean Group, started in 1969 by the Treaty of Cartagena, is a regional
organization to facilitate economic and social cooperation and enhance the international
economic competitiveness of its members. Original member states include Bolivia,
Chile, Ecuador and Peru. Venezuela joined in 1973. (Chile withdrew in 1976 and Peru
suspended its membership in 1992.) Established in 1986, the Rio Group has wider
membership among Latin American & Caribbean nations and was originally signed by
declaration (in Rio de Janeiro) by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru,
Uruguay and Venezuela. The group is thought, by some, to serve as an alternative to the
OAS without U.S. dominance.
181
relations throughout the Punto Fijo period (1958 to 1998) because of oil.
110
All this
changed when Chavez became president in 1999.
In the years following World War II, U.S.-Venezuelan relations were good as
each was one of the other’s most important trading partners. The two countries relied
heavily on each other. The U.S. counted on oil imports from Venezuela to keep its oil-
intensive economy thriving and Venezuela relied on the significant income it received
from selling petroleum to the U.S. Both countries’ reliance on the other was so strong
that maintaining the relationship often took precedence over other policy objectives. For
example, the U.S. supported General Marcos Pérez’s dictatorship (1952 to 1958), a move
somewhat uncharacteristic of stated U.S. policy, in the hopes of being able to secure a
constant flow of Venezuelan petroleum for itself as well as its allies (Romero 2004). In
return, the junta was an unconditional supporter of the U.S.
This relationship was tested, however, when, in 1958, the U.S. began restricting
oil imports. Such restrictions “became one of the most important sources of irritation in
the relations between the two countries” (Da Silva and Hillman 2003, 151-152).
Venezuelans thought the U.S. had imposed excessively harsh restrictions on their
products. Trade-related tensions were aggravated by the fact that most of Venezuela’s
foreign debt was owed to U.S. banks (Haggerty 1990).
110
The Punto Fijo Pact was a 1958 power-sharing agreement between the three main
political parties (la Unión Republicana Democrática, Acción Democrática and la Comité
de Organización Política Electoral Independiente) intended to protect the nascent
democracy. According to the agreement, the three parties pledged to support the winner
of the election and the winning parties created a coalition government, thereby creating
exclusive competition between two parties. Some credit the Pact with facilitating forty
years of democratic rule in Venezuela. The Pact stood until Chavez was elected president
in 1998, the first third party candidate to win since the Pact’s inception.
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The relationship was further tested under the first Caldera administration (1969 to
1974). Caldera was known to publicly express his disdain for current U.S.-Venezuelan
trade agreements. Caldera also established close relations with communist countries,
including the Soviet Union, and became closer allies with oil-rich pariah states like Iran
and Iraq. Such actions introduced an element of uneasiness in Washington and a sense of
instability in the relationship. Nevertheless, the two nations kept the lines of friendship
open.
Despite trade issues that ebbed and flowed over the years which exacerbated
minor squabbles and in the face of other foreign policies that often clashed outright, U.S.-
Venezuelan relations remained generally close throughout the Cold War period.
Venezuelan foreign policy in the bipolar years focused on maintaining positive relations
with a wide array of nations, regardless of regime type. The government fostered ties
with communist and authoritarian governments as well as with the U.S. (and its
accompanying anti-communist policies). During the first Caldera administration (1969 to
1974), the president established close relations with communist countries, including the
Soviet Union, and became closer allies with oil-rich pariah states like Iran and Iraq. Such
actions introduced an element of uneasiness in Washington and a sense of instability in
the relationship (Romero 2004). Venezuela also supported the Argentine junta during the
Falklands/Malvinas conflict with Britain (in 1982) and disagreed with the U.S. in terms
of how to approach Nicaragua’s struggling government. In spite of these apparently
contrasting foreign policies, the U.S. and Venezuela kept the lines of friendship open.
Certain differences were overlooked when convenient or necessary to preserve the
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overarching friendship. This forgiving friendship began to collapse when Hugo Chavez
came to power.
Venezuela, the Environment and The Kyoto Protocol
Green, Brown and Black in Venezuela
Like Mexico, Venezuela is one of the six megadiverse countries in Latin America.
The country is home to extensive biological diversity in its lush forests and natural areas.
In fact, over 50 percent of the country is covered with such forests (Gonzalez and Nagel
1996). In order to protect these areas, there are a total of 45 national parks in Venezuela
(Ministerio del Poder Popular para el Ambiente 2008). Money from the oil boom helped
finance the creation of many of these parks. Also like Mexico, the capital city of
Venezuela, Caracas, is extremely urban and has fallen to the typical environmental
problems of large, highly populated cities.
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Venezuela has also found a blessing and a
curse in its vast mineral and oil resources. Mining and drilling, especially in
environmentally sensitive areas, has led to considerable controversy and confrontation
between business and some government interests and local communities and
environmentalists. Petroleum, the country’s most abundant resource and the staple of its
economy, has taken on monolithic dimensions in terms of Venezuelan domestic and
foreign policy.
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Eighty-seven percent of Venezuela’s approximately 25 million people live in urban
areas. One out of every five people lives in Caracas (Hellinger 2006).
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When asked for the most pressing environmental problems facing Venezuela, the
leaders of three prominent Venezuelan ENGOs were very critical of environmental
policy under Chavez (Kuiper 2005)
112
. According to these leaders, some of the biggest
problems include water pollution and a shortage of clean water, mining and logging, and
increased pressure on national parks (including that from tourism and mining) (Kuiper
2005). The disposition of both toxic and solid waste is another large problem in
Venezuela (Gonzalez and Nagel 1996).
Arguably the biggest environmental concern (for environmentalists, concerned
citizens and some government officials) in Venezuela has to do with oil. And Venezuela
has lots of it; “it almost literally floats on oil” (Wiarda 2005). With 6.8 percent of the
world’s proven oil reserves including 80 billion barrels of conventional crude oil,
Venezuela is ranked as having the sixth largest reserve in the world (Arriagada 2006).
113
In 1925, oil became the number one export for Venezuela and remained so until
international prices fell sharply in 1986 (Lombardi 2003). Today, oil accounts for
approximately 75 percent of the country’s export earning, 25 percent of its GDP and just
under half of government revenue (Encyclopedia of the Nations 2007). Unfortunately for
the Venezuelan people, this natural resource wealth did not translate proportionately into
a wealthy country. Throughout most of the boom period, price per barrel of oil was
actually relatively low, under US $10. Under these low prices, Venezuela managed to
increase its foreign debted to nearly US $ 36 million (Ibid.). In addition, oil income that
112
The three ENGOs were Amigransa, Tierraviva, and Bioparques.
113
Venezuela is ranked sixth after Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi.
Together, Mexico and Venezuela are home to the majority of all Latin American reserves
(Arraigada 2006).
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was invested back in the country was not distributed equitably throughout society and
was not used to strengthen other parts of the economy (Wiarda 2005; Arriagada 2006).
In environmental terms, the most destructive aspect of Venezuela’s oil wealth is
the unparalleled government subsidy and the subsequent indiscriminate use of oil by the
Venezuelan people. Partly as a result of the subsidy and other government policies and
speeches, the majority of the Venezuelan people believe that the oil is their own and they
deserve to pay very little for it. The government subsidy on oil is so high and the
resulting price of gasoline so low that it is more expensive to buy a bottle of drinking
water than to fill up a tank of gas. Gas is so cheap that “a gallon of gas costs about the
same as a large hen’s egg and a liter costs less than a single photocopy” (Ceasar 2005).
Most people are happy with the low prices.
114
In fact, the overwhelming majority believe
that virtually-free oil is a birthright. When interviewed, Caracas pollster Luis Vicente
Leon said that “Venezuelans believe that they live in an oil field. They feel they own the
oil, and therefore should not pay for it” (Ceasar 2005). In fact, when President Pérez
attempted to impose neoliberal policies in 1989 that included a price hike for gasoline,
the Venezuelan people took to the streets and rioted in vehement opposition making any
future similar price hikes very unlikely.
Although providing inexpensive gasoline is one of the most popular public
policies in the country, the subsidy leads to environmental and social deterioration. First,
with prices so low there is no incentive to conserve. Most Venezuelans do not hesitate to
114
Virtually the only group complaining are gas station owners because they cannot raise
prices to cover other rising costs associated with keeping their stations open (and
profitable) (Ceasar 2005).
186
fill up their tanks and drive as much as they deem necessary. This causes heavy traffic
congestion, especially in Caracas where traffic jams last for miles as cars and SUVs
crawl along at a snail’s pace. In turn, the congestion leads to unhealthy air pollution and
an increase in carbon dioxide emissions. In fact, a study commission by the Assembly in
2002 found that per capita carbon dioxide emissions were more than double the average
of its Latin American neighbor (Ceasar 2005). The gas subsidy is additionally
detrimental for the country as it seizes funds that could be used for other public services.
The government subsidizes other commodities, but nothing like gasoline. Leon believes
that Chavez will continue the subsidy as it “gives the message that he’s concerned about
everybody” (Ceasar 2005). In reality, however, schools, hospitals, and public transit, for
example, suffer at the mercy of the subsidy while those that really benefit are in the upper
class (Ibid.).
PDVSA: “A State within a State”
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the state-owned oil company has had a
tumultuous past yet has prevailed as the strongest company in the country with
considerable influence on government policy. The power and influence of any other
Venezuelan companies pale in comparison to the “behemoth that is PDVSA” (Hellinger
2006, 487). PDVSA was created in 1975 after the nationalization of the oil industry. It
eventually became so powerful that it “became something of a state within a state”
(Mommer 2003, 131). PDVSA and its top executives became the virtual decision-makers
for all national oil policy. During the Apertura, or opening, which began in 1986/1987
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under President Lusinchi, the oil industry was once again opened up to international and
multinational ownership. When Chavez became president the trend was reversed yet
again and PDVSA was switched back to national ownership. In mid-2002 Chavez named
Alí Rodriquez, former Minister of the Ministry for Energy and Mines (MEM) under
Chavez and Secretary General of OPEC, president of PDVSA. Two of Rodriquez’s main
policy objectives were to reduce international holdings in the company and return the
company to the purview of the MEM (Hellinger 2006).
Legislation and Management
Modern day environmental legislation began in Venezuela in the midst of the oil
boom in the 1970s. One of the earliest and most important pieces of legislation was the
1976 Organic Law of the Environment which defined the overarching goals for
government policy of environmental conservation. That same year another highly
influential piece of legislation, the Organic Law of Central Administration, was passed.
This law established the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (Ministerio
de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales or MARN) and designated environmental
responsibilities to their appropriate groups/agencies. MARN, which began operating in
1977, was the first of its kind in Latin America (Kuiper 2005; Respondent H).
MARN was given vast responsibilities as an executive agency. In broad terms,
one of its largest responsibilities was overseeing and analyzing the environmental
impacts of development (Nieto 2004). For most of its history, however, it has focused on
water services (Devir and Riofrancos 2008). Budget allocation for water-related
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management and infrastructure constituted between 78 and 93 percent of the Ministry’s
total spending. Since its inception, total federal allocations for MARN have ranged from
3.9 to 5.7 percent of the national budget. By 1996, MARN’s total budget had grown to
US $319 million. However, because of fiscal constraints throughout the federal
government, within two years the budget decreased by 30 percent (Lopez and Jordan
2000).
Two additionally important pieces of legislation that, along with the previous two,
help form the legal framework for environmental management in Venezuela were written
in 1983 and 1992 (Lopez and Jordan 2000). The 1983 Organic Law of Territorial
Organization created 25 different categories of areas that need special attention or Areas
Under Special Administrative Regimes (Áreas Bajo Administración Especial).
Respondent H argues that Venezuela is the regional and world leader in terms of land
preservation as 64 percent or the country’s territory is in some way set aside for
preservation. The 1992 Environmental Penal Law designates penalties for violating
environmental laws or regulations. Included is the ability to punish public sector
employees who allow permits for activities that negatively affect the environment
without the proper environmental impact assessment. By the late 1980s there were
already over 80 laws and 400 plus resolutions, decrees and provisions in some way
dealing with the environment (Aguirre 1988). However, even though legislation was in
the books and attention was pledged to the cause, actions have not always followed the
words.
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Efficiency, Actions and Will: Three Scarce Resources
Despite existing legislation and promises of environmental stewardship, many
environmentalists in Venezuela are not satisfied with the current level of environmental
protection in their country. Many just “shake their heads” (Ceasar 2004). Be it because
of government stalemate or inactivity, the country’s history as an oil nation or because of
the pacification of environmental voices in the country, many environmentalists have
expressed their concerns. According to Lusbi Portillo, professor and head of ENGO
Homo et Natura, since Chavez has taken office, the environmental movement has hit an
all time low, lower than under previous administrations (Nieto 2004).
Some of the obstacles to better environmental management are institutional.
Environmental advocates must weave through extensive and intricate bureaucratic
requirements, making many efforts inefficient. Such bureaucracy is also susceptible to
government corruption (Denvir 2008). One such example can be found in the
application, or lack thereof, of the Environmental Penal Law. In the past, is has not been
uncommon for officials to overlook violations and, in effect, nullify the law (Denvir
2008). Another large impediment is found in the structure and functioning of MARN.
The internal organization of the Ministry and a lack of proper coordination make for
inefficiency and delays (Denvir 2008). Externally, the fact that MARN has overlapping
authority with multiple other agencies, including Ministries of Agriculture and Health
and Social Development, further exacerbates coordination difficulties and inefficiency
(Denvir 2008).
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What may be at the root of this problem is, as some critics argue, is a general lack
of political will (Kuiper 2005). From the general public to high ranking government
officials, there is a shortage of either ecological consciousness or incentive to take action,
or both. The critique is that many government officials, including the president, do not
have the environmental consciousness and awareness to impel them to take action. There
are often positive words spoken about the environment and about the country’s desire to
manage the environment, but actions have not always matched the words. There is a
discontinuity between words and deeds. As Manuel Diaz, president of the Venezuelan
Environmental Foundation, says “If Chavez would only act according to what he says,
then we’d have an environmentalist Venezuela” (Ceasar 2005). Other critics reference
contradictions in Venezuela’s environmental policies (Kozloff 2006). In and interview,
environmentalist and professor Jorge Hinestroza highlighted the contradictions in
Chavez’s coal policies. Hinestroza acknowledges that the president has used money from
coal extraction towards beneficial social programs, but questions whether the costs and
benefits of coal extraction are fairly balanced when he said, “I wonder whether it is
legitimate to destroy nature to favor a majority which is socially marginalized” (Kozloff
2006). Many coal mines interrupt indigenous populations and settlements.
Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution has also had negative repercussions,
although likely unintentional, on the environmental movement. The Revolution has
successfully created and managed social programs that have “dampened social tensions”
(Kozloff 2006) and, thus, damped the people’s spark to fight against the government for
environmental causes. The Revolution has similarly raised the people’s expectation for
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change and given them the hope that the new regime will improve their lives, making a
struggle additionally unnecessary.
Similar sentiments can also be seen in the prevalence and strength of ENGOs
under the Chavez administration. While the plight of some ENGOs has improved, under
Chavez some have become worse off. In general, however, they have become weaker in
recent years (Denvir 2008). As with many sectors, public and private, during the oil
boom, ENGOs surged in the 1970s. They have since been on the decline. Though many
still exist, partly the result of Chavez’s accusing the organizations of being traitors to the
Revolution, some have switched their focus to work on less-controversial topics such as
environmental education or have at least been more aware of outward image (Denvir
2008).
115
Perhaps one of the most obvious obstacles to sound environmental management
in Venezuela is its oil legacy. Speaking to sense of ownership and entitlement that many
Venezuelans feel about their mineral wealth, Portillo said, “In an oil culture where we
were taught that oil, coal and minerals make us rich, where can you go? PDVSA is
supposedly ours now, it has been rescued from multinational corporations, this is what
people believe, and this makes our work as ecologists even harder” (Nieto 2004). Any
aspirations to replace oil and/or gasoline with alternative energy sources or to propose
competing sources would likely require a cultural and mental shift.
115
In 2000, environmentalists organized a caravan and protested in the streets of Caracas
against Chavez’s proposed energy line to Brazil. Upset by their display, the president
accused the protestors of being traitors to the government and dependent on foreign
funds. Rodolfo Castillo Ruiz of ENGO Bioparques said that after the accusations “we
seem to be doomed by the government” (Kuiper 2005).
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The Beginnings of the Chavez Revolution
Hugo Chavez Frías, a small-town boy from Barinas who came from Christian
Democratic parents, was elected president in 1998 in one of the most surprising elections
in the nation’s history. This third party candidate was elected by the largest margin in
history (Crisp 2000). Despite constant opposition to his policies, Chavez has remained a
popular president in his country, largely because of his allure to lower classes and the
advances he has made in social programs. Internationally, however, Chavez has acquired
a less than amicable image, especially in the eyes of the U.S.
Wielding his executive authority from day one, Chavez wasted no time getting
accustomed to the role of president. His first year in office, 1999, was an extremely busy
year. In his inaugural speech, Chavez announced his intentions to create a National
Constituent Assembly (Maya 2003). One of its first tasks was to draft a new Venezuelan
constitution.
116
(After the first election, of the 131–member Assembly 125 were Chavez
sympathizers (Ellner 2008).) Among other notable changes, the new constitution
centralized power in the executive, lengthened the president’s term to six years and
allowed for immediate presidential reelection. In terms of policy, the constitution also
recognized the importance of national interest in regional economic integration as well as
the role of the state in formulating economic policy (Da Silva and Hillman 2003).
116
Creating the Assembly and writing a new constitution was controversial. Such
procedures were not permitted under the 1961 Constitution. Chavez’s changes were
initially met with opposition from the existing Congress, but a decision by the Supreme
Court siding with Chavez validated the process (Crisp 2000). Creating the new
Assembly was also criticized internationally.
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Two other extremely notable events initiated by Chavez in 1999 included the
renaming of the country and a reemergence of Venezuelan activity in OPEC. First, in
honor of his revered Simón Bolívar, Chavez and his Constituent Assembly took the
liberty of renaming the country the “Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.” Scholars have
suggested different justifications for the change. For example, Daniel Hellinger sees the
name change as a “reaffirmation that Chavez’s revolution intended to invoke the
Liberator’s philosophy for its underlying principles” (2006, 484). Da Silva and Hillman
write that the change, inspired by a new sense of independence, sovereignty, nationalism,
regional unity and anti-hegemonic ideals, was intended to shift the country’s international
and self image (2003). Chavez also reinvigorated his country’s participation in OPEC
that had waned during the Pérez and Caldera administrations. This relationship with
OPEC would become a cornerstone of Chavez’s foreign policy in the years to come.
Before the year was up, Chavez would demonstrate his unpredictable behavior
towards the U.S., one that would characterize much of his presidency. In September,
Chavez met with President Clinton and spoke at the UN General Assembly and U.S.
Chamber of Commerce. His comments were “positive and encouraging” (Ellner 2008,
197). Just three months later, Venezuela was hit by terrible rain storms and devastating
flooding. But when the U.S. offered to send assistance, in the form of Marine Corps
engineers and bulldozers, it was denied. Chavez did not want the U.S.’s help. Chavez
also refused to allow U.S. surveillance planes to use Venezuelan airspace to patrol for
drug traffickers along the Colombian border (Ellner 2008).
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After the first year and a half of his presidency, which was largely dominated by
government adjustments and the creation of the new constitution, Chavez received
considerable support for his work in the July 2000 elections. Despite ever-present anti-
Chavista opponents, the president won virtually 60 percent of the vote (Maya 2003).
This gave him greater leverage to continue his revolution.
Hugo, Fidel and OPEC
Later that year, Chavez began fortifying friendships around the world, all
facilitated by his country’s oil wealth. As his new role as president of an oil-rich nation,
Chavez presented to OPEC members a proposal to stabilize oil prices at higher levels and
offered to host the organization’s second summit in Venezuela. Chavez traveled to home
countries of all ten other member nations to personally invite the leaders to his country,
thereby “catapult[ing] Chavez onto the center stage of the organization” (Ellner 2008,
207). One notable visit was Chavez’s trip to Iran, one of the first by a state leader since
the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein was pleased by the visit and proposed that Venezuela
take on the role of OPEC’s secretary general (Ellner 2008).
Chavez also made strides in his developing relationship with Fidel Castro. In
October of 2000, the two leaders agreed to the Integral Cooperation Accord which set up
a barter-exchange system where Venezuela offered Cuba oil in return for goods and
services. (The goods were largely medical-related and services were mostly skilled
workers such as physicians, educators and athletes.) Cuba benefited immensely from the
oil and the goods and services provided to Venezuela were key to the success of some of
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Chavez’s social programs (Arriagada 2006). The Accord was also an expression of
ideological solidarity with the Cuban revolution and marked a significant change in
Venezuelan foreign policy toward the island nation (Da Silva and Hillman 2003). In
2001, the agreement was altered in that Venezuela would no longer provide Cuba with
oil, but cash. The entire agreement was eventually terminated after the 2002 coup.
The year 2001 marked an even greater divergence in the foreign policies of
Venezuela and the U.S. as Chavez’s continued with even greater vigor towards creating a
multipolar international system (Romero 2004). Chavez’s intensifying friendships with
Cuba and China as well as its ever-increasing role in OPEC and its public support of
Colombian insurgents aimed the two countries on contradictory paths, Venezuela towards
multipolarity and the U.S. towards unipolar world. To Chavez, a unipolar system was the
equivalent of U.S. hegemony, something he wanted to avoid at all costs (Ellner 2008).
Instead, Chavez foresaw various blocs to which it would become party: OPEC, the
Caribbean community of nations and MECOSUR (Ibid.).
The Gloves Come Off in 2002
In the post-9/11 world, relations in Venezuela grew tenser, both between
Presidents Chavez and Bush and between Chavez supporters and anti-Chavistas. First,
the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq in March of 2002 brought U.S.-
Venezuelan relations to their worst. Chavez did not agree with the invasion or Bush’s
“with us or against us” approach or his use of “terrorism to fight terrorism” (Ellner 2008;
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Da Silva and Hillman 2003, 159). Chavez’s disdain for Washington’s behavior was
made beyond evident when he held up pictures of apparent U.S. bombing victims in
Afghanistan and said it was “a slaughter of innocents” (Ellner 2008, 198). This was not
the only escalation of tensions that Chavez would be involved in.
In December of 2002 and spanning into January of the 2003, in protest of Chavez,
PDVSA officials locked out employees thereby virtually shutting down oil production in
the country for two months to severely hurt the economy. In retaliation, Chavez initiated
mass firings and refilled the positions with new employees loyal to him.
Earlier that same year came an event that had even larger repercussions. On April
11, 2002, anti-Chavistas attempted to overthrow President Chavez. Although many of the
specifics are disputed to this day, it is arguable that the coup was a success in that
businessman Pedro Carmona was installed an interim president. What is highly
contested, even by Chavez himself, is whether or not Chavez actually resigned the
presidency. There is no written account of him doing so. The entire coup lasted less than
two days and Chavez was immediately reinstated as president. Either way, the coup (or
coup attempt) had many political implications. Perhaps the most critical impact the coup
had on international relations was on U.S.-Venezuelan relations. Bilateral relations were
arguably at their lowest point after the coup as Chavez publicly accused the Bush
administration of having a hand in the coup against him. Steve Ellner (2008) writes that
the Bush administration supported to coup on many levels. Advocacy group Democracy
Now! has found documentary evidence that the administration at least knew about the
coup before it happened (Democracy Now! 2004). Regardless of the extent of
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involvement, Chavez was consistent in blaming the American president and some of his
top officials.
Starting in 2003, the verbal attacks on the Bush administration would increase in
number and severity. Mentions of environmental problems, specifically global warming,
would eventually emerge, most often in the form of the blame game. Chavez repeatedly
blamed Bush and the American imperialist way of life for global warming and its
impacts. Although President Chavez did not often publicly discuss climate change until
the a few years after he took office, the country had already accumulated a short history
of addressing the global problem.
Venezuela’s Early Efforts
A developing nation, Venezuela has not been a significant contributor to global
GHG emissions; its emissions constitute only 0.48 percent of the world total (Kozloff
2007). Within Latin America, however, Venezuela ranks third in emissions behind
Brazil and Mexico as well as in petroleum production and consumption (See Appendix A
on page 272).
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The primary source of carbon dioxide emissions in the country is energy
generation (the combustion of fossil fuels) and the petrochemical industry (MARN 1999).
In the city of Caracas itself, the primary source is automobiles which constitute 90
percent of total emissions (MARN 1999).
In terms of what the country has done to address these emissions and climate
change more broadly, early efforts date back to 1992. In that year and by presidential
117
According to Kozloff (2007), the Chavez government states that Venezuela ranks
fourth in greenhouse gas emissions, behind Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.
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decree N° 2.237, President Pérez created la Comisión Nacional de Normas Técnicas
(National Commission for Technical Norms) intended to unite groups working on
atmospheric contamination more effectively (MARN 1999). Also in 1992, the
Venezuelan government signed the UNFCCC. (The agreement would later be ratified by
the National Congress in December of 1994.) The following year, in October 1993,
inline with the UNFCCC’s requirements, Venezuela began work on its Country Study.
Similar to Mexico, Venezuela’s study was partially funded with assistance from the U.S.
Country Studies Program as well as the Global Environment Facility and UNEP. The
study was coordinated by both MARN and MEM under the guidance of the Office of
International Affairs in MARN. The study included a national emissions inventory, future
emissions scenarios, and assessments of possible abatement strategies and potential
impacts. The study also served as the foundation for the preparation of their national
climate change action plan and the first steps towards meeting the national requirements
set forth in the UNFCCC.
Throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, there was little federal
legislation governing air/atmospheric pollution. The record for climate change-related
policies was even weaker. In reference to the state of federal air pollution policy,
Respondent I attested that there was activity in terms of adhering to the Montreal
Protocol (addressing the ozone layer), but overall air pollution policy was “poor” and
“weak.” Respondent H said that policies were “contradictory and incongruent.” In
particular to climate change-oriented policy, Respondent I recalled that the state was
“very poor.” Prior to the country’s ratification there was no policy to speak of. The
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respondent added that there was much discussion over policy but little action. The
amount of discourse, however, though still largely internal, was growing. Regardless,
Respondent H spoke of an eight year delay in formulating and implementing policy.
Because of contradictions and terrible readings on the subject, there was still no real
functioning centralized national office of climate change prior to ratification.
In the international community, by contrast, Venezuela took a more active role in
formulating climate change policy, towing the party line for developing nations at many
COPs. At COP3 in Kyoto, country delegates joined with most other non-Annex I nations
in agreement that the current convention was not the place to discuss the efforts of
developing nations, but to discuss what actions industrialized nations should be taking.
When Mexico proposed further discussion on voluntary commitments, Venezuelan
delegates voted to have the entire draft article deleted (IISD 1997). Venezuela also spoke
for the plight of developing nations by calling for more financial and technical support
from industrialized nations (IISD 1998). At COP5 in 1999, the Venezuelan delegation
emphasized that the country would valiantly do its part to address the issue of climate
change and wanted recognition for doing so.
We realize that our share of sacrifices as a result of the UNFCCC process
will be higher than that of most countries, even though our historic and
present greenhouse gas emissions are practically insignificant in
comparison…While resigned to this fact, it is our firm position that Article
4.8 of the Convention, which provides for actions to minimize adverse
effects on developing countries, must not be construed as merely a pious
expression of good intentions, but as a fundamental provision that must be
fully and effectively implemented so as to ensure that our share of
sacrifices will not be disproportionate and exorbitant to the point of
reversing our already difficult progress toward sustainable development.
(FCCC 1999)
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Venezuela Paves its Own Path
Although Venezuela stood strong with the position of most non-Annex I nations,
it also paved out a position of its own. As the only OPEC nation in Latin America,
Chavez’s country stood in opposition to its neighbors.
118
In anticipation of COP 6 and in
response to being asked about the likelihood of reaching a consensus in Latin American
prior to the meeting, Ambassador Oyuela said, “Venezuela has its own circumstances as
a petroleum exporter, and wants nothing to do with measures to reduce oil consumption”
(Cevallos 2000b). Illustrating Venezuela’s unique concerns in the region, and also prior
to COP 6, Evelyn Bravo, head of international relations and the environment at MEM,
expressed concern for foreseen “adverse impacts implied by application of the protocol”
for her petroleum-exporting country (Cevallos 2000a). Concern lie in the obvious fact
that efforts by Venezuela or the international community at large to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions would almost certainly have distressing impacts on Venezuela’s largest
source of income. Likely as a result of such concerns, in 2000 Venezuela announced that
it planned to wait to ratify The Protocol until the U.S. ratifies (Cevallos 2000a). A
similar sentiment was officially expressed in Venezuela’s 2002 Country Profile. The
document stated that “…la posición de la Delegación de Venezuela ha sido la de aplazar
cualquier decisión al respecto, hasta tanto no se obtengan datos certeros sobre la
118
Ecuador joined OPEC in 1973 but suspended its membership from December of 1992
to October of 2007, precisely the time frame within which The Protocol was negotiated.
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influencia real de las actividades antropogénicas sobre el clima” (United Nations
2002).
119
By 2002 Latin American representatives had announced an impressive yet
seemingly difficult plan to obtain 10 percent of its energy from renewable resources by
2010. The Venezuelan delegation supported the plan, but at the time of the
announcement no plans were underway in Venezuela to help the country attain this goal.
MARN Minister Ana Elisa Osorio said that it was state policy to actively support
renewable energy and that her country was already making great strides; sixty percent of
the energy in Venezuela came from hydropower which is a clean energy source (Cevallos
2002).
120
By making this statement Osorio was reinforcing Venezuela’s verbal support
of The Protocol and measures to address climate change while simultaneously revealing
its unwillingness to implement any changes.
American Imperialism: The True Cause of Global Warming
In 2003 the war of words between Presidents Bush and Chavez became ever more
intense. Bush took a more hard-line stance than in the first two years as president (and
119
Translation: “…the position of the Venezuelan Delegation has been to postpone any decision on the
matter until accurate data are obtained on the real influence of the anthropogenic activities on climate.”
120
The “environmentalness” of hydropower is contested, even among environmentalists.
While the production of energy from water (normally via the use of damns) is a
comparatively clean process, the building of damns often has negative impacts on the
surrounding areas including to riverbed environments, fish and other biological
populations and even to human settlements and recreation that rely on river flow. The
creation of damns, however, can also have positive repercussions as it often creates new
recreation areas behind damns and can benefit certain ecosystems.
202
than in Clinton’s previous administrations) including ratcheting up the criticisms of
Venezuelan foreign policy and President Chavez directly. The U.S.’s disputed
involvement in the 2002 coup added insult to injury. At this point, Chavez exchanged his
defensive strategy for an offensive one and retaliated with equally harsh verbal attacks.
A new element to emerge in this latest round of insults was Chavez’s use of
“imperialism” when describing U.S. foreign policy. Chavez did not have issue with
American capitalism per say, but with Washington’s imperialistic behavior and
hegemonic foreign policies. Chavez made it clear that, in contrast to his positive
relations elsewhere in the world, Bush and his administration in Washington, D.C. were
his number one enemy (Ellner 2008).
121
However, Chavez did not always speak with such disdain about the U.S. At times
he was publicly supportive, speaking with reverence for the U.S. political system. He
even personally congratulated president-elect Bush on wining the election (Romero
2004). This was but one side of Chavez’s foreign policy persona. The very next day
Chavez might blatantly challenge Bush’s leadership and imperialist policy decisions.
From the outside, Chavez’s public position on the U.S. is contradictory. But from
Chavez’s perspective, there is “no incompatibility between maintaining good relations
with Washington and seeking to reduce U.S. influence throughout Latin America”
121
Chavez and many Venezuelans make a distinction between Americans and American-
style capitalism (which they like) and the Bush administration and its imperialist policies
(which they do not). Caracas has impressive American-style shopping malls and its
citizens are huge Major League Baseball fans. Yet while sitting in the mall watching
American teams play on television, they are quick to criticize the American president.
Although Chavez often derides capitalism in his speeches, the underlying distinction is
often understood (Respondent K).
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(Romero 2004, 143). Chavez aimed to maintain relatively cordial relations with the U.S.
but derided its policy decisions, at least until he had more leverage to bolster stronger
attacks.
Providing him with such strengthened political capital and legitimacy, on August
15, 2004 Chavez easily won a recall election with a reported 95 percent of the vote.
Although opposition to the president remained, it was left visibly smaller and
demoralized (Hellinger 2006). In the wake of his victory, Chavez’s harsh words for the
U.S. continued. This time the accusations were stronger and he began blaming the U.S.
for the world’s most pressing environmental problem.
On September 26, 2004, on his weekly television program “Aló Presidente!”
(Hello Presidente!), Chavez lambasted capitalism and praised a transformation project
away from capitalism now underway in Venezuela (Ministerio del Poder Popular para la
Comunicación y la Información 2004a). He passionately declared that the presiding neo-
liberal and capitalistic structure must be changed and that imperialism “wants to destroy
the Venezuelan state in order to get its hands on the wealth of Venezuelans.” Luckily, he
had already launched a transformation in his country away from a “false democracy” (ala
the U.S.) to a “true democracy,” a “Bolivarian democracy.” In the same speech, Chavez
also made one of his first public accusations that the recent string of natural disasters was
the result of industrialization in the developed world. Chavez dismissed the idea that the
recent group of hurricanes was natural by saying “This is the result of global warming
and it must make people reflect about caring about the planet’s ecological equilibrium,
for which the world’s industrialized countries are primarily responsible.”
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The following month, on his October 17
th
program Chavez used ever harsher
words to describe capitalism and drew a clearer causal link between capitalism and global
warming. He blamed capitalism for destroying the world’s natural ecological balance.
Calling capitalism “the path for the world’s destruction” and “the devil’s economic
model,” he said that it was responsible for global warming and its destructive
repercussions.
The following month Minister Osorio announced that the Venezuelan government
was willing to ratify The Protocol (Venpres 2004). Along with this announcement was
Osorio’s statement that a new department was to be created that will combine the several
ministries already involved in climate change issues. Referencing the 2003 national
inventory, Osorio said that the results were “very encouraging” and that, even though her
country is not obligated to implement policies, Venezuela is ready to cooperate in the
international climate change regime (Venpres 2004). Although the announcement
appears out of place, it was the result of careful calculation.
The Extent of Russian Influence
Osorio’s statement is better understood by taking a look at another country’s
decision to ratify The Protocol- that of Russia. When President Bush announced, in
March of 2001, that The Protocol was “dead” and the U.S. would not ratify, all eyes
turned to Russia. Russia’s ratification would help The Protocol reach the necessary 55
percent of 1990 emissions and the treaty could enter into force. With an economy
heavily reliant on oil production and export, Russia was not quick to jump on board.
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Although the Russian delegation, at the 2002 Earth Summit, announced that it would
ratify “soon,” Russian president Vladimir Putin dragged his feet (Greenpeace 2003). Just
over a year later at COP9 in 2003, the delegation said that it was considering ratification.
Then in September of 2004 Russia announced that it was examining a draft law on The
Protocol.
In possible anticipation of Russia’s eventual ratification, Chavez began
intensifying economic and other ties with Putin. That October Venezuelan Vice
President Jose Vicente Rangel visited Moscow. Officials from both countries announced
new plans for billions of dollars worth of deals to boost trade between their two nations,
including the trade or sale of helicopters and fighter jets. This meeting was followed by
Chavez’s visit to Moscow in November. The two presidents discussed military
cooperation as well as a joint venture between PDVSA and Lukoil (Russia’s oil giant).
The presidents also discussed The Protocol. A statement approved by both men declared
that they “welcome moves designed to implement the Kyoto Protocol.” (ITAR-TASS
2004). They agreed to coordinate efforts to better fight climate change as part of the
international community. Russia and Venezuela have similar approaches to addressing
critical international issues and they would work together.
Both nations had great incentive to improve relations with the other.
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One
rationale with close relation to The Protocol is the fact that Russia wished to become a
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Russia would need Venezuela’s
consent to join. Improved relations would help assure Chavez’s consent. Russia would
122
For more discussion of the growing friendship between Chavez and Putin see Katz
(2006).
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also need the consent of the European Union (EU). The EU and Russia came to an
unofficial agreement that if Russia ratified The Protocol it would recommend Russia for
WTO membership. In this scenario, the EU and Venezuela had something Russia wanted
(WTO approval) and Russia had something Venezuela wanted (a strong partner to ally
with against the US, weapons, etc.). The Protocol then became a virtual bargaining chip.
Russia would ratify and Venezuela would have to face a world wherein The Protocol was
finally a reality but the two would work together. Chavez knew Putin was intending to
ratify before many others. In the end, after much negotiation and deal making, Russia
officially ratified The Protocol November 18, 2004. This meant that The Protocol would
enter into force on February 16, 2005 for all signatory countries.
It was in the midst these negotiations and meetings that Osorio announced
Venezuela’s willingness to ratify.
In the Face of the U.S.
With discussions of ratification under way in Venezuela, the jabs at the U.S. and
its continued failure to ratify began in earnest. For example, in response to criticism from
U.S. Ambassador William Brownfield that Venezuela should observe the international
agreements it has signed, Vice President Rangel said that “Venezuela respects all the
international agreements that it has signed, and we expect the United States respects its
own agreements.”
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Rangel continued by saying, “…we have criticized the fact that the
United States has not signed the Kyoto Protocol and has not joined the International
123
The U.S. signed The Protocol November 12, 1998 and had no intention of ratifying,
while Venezuela never signed but was in the midst of ratifying.
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Criminal Court. We have criticized that, but the U.S. has a sovereign right to make such
moves” (el Universal 2004). In the same breath he criticized the U.S. for not ratifying
but recognized its sovereign right to do so, a right that Venezuela holds dear. Rangel
could chastise the U.S.’s policies but respect its authority to make its own decisions.
Ratification Discrepancies
According to comments by Farias in a 2005 article in el Nacional, Venezuela’s
ratification of The Protocol was published in the Official Gazette on December 7, 2004,
thereby making it law in the country. The same article states that the country’s
ratification was published by el Nacional on its website on February 17,
2005. According
to the official UNFCCC website, Venezuela’s official date of ratification was February
18, 2005. Respondent J clarified that The Protocol was officially ratified in 2005 but
Chavez said he would “try” ratification in 2004. The “true” date of ratification is still
disputed. Respondent K recalled that the problem originated within the UN embassy.
Postscript: Chavez the Relentless
Although they occurred after Venezuela’s ratification and technically beyond the
period of analysis, it is worth noting the intensification of Chavez’s criticisms of the U.S.,
especially in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. After Venezuela became party to The
Protocol, Chavez’s accusations that U.S. imperialism and the American way of life were
to blame for global warming exploded. In his address on Aló Presidente September 7
(Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la Información 2005), Chavez
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spoke about the importance of a recent climate change study and, as if he had agreed all
along, said that the ocean temperatures have “obviously” increased more in the last few
years than in past centuries. He scolded the U.S. government for failing to ratify The
Protocol despite its already visible effects. In reference to the recent hurricane and
drawing a direct link between climate change and the U.S., Chavez said “Katrina is
spelled with a K of Kyoto.” At the same time that he chided Bush for his behavior he
showed signs of sympathy for the American hurricane victims by offering hundreds of
soldiers and workers to aid in aftermath.
A few weeks later, Chavez made his sentiments for the Bush administration even
more public in his address to the UN General Assembly. He again expressed sympathy
for the hurricane victims but was also quick to attest that neoliberalism “is precisely the
basic cause of the great evils and tragedies that our peoples are experiencing” (United
Nations 2005).
President Chavez and Poliheuristic Theory
Chavez’s Ideology & Personality
The way Chavez makes decisions is very much tied to his political ideology and
to his image of how a president should rule. Chavez’s ideology has strong roots in the
work of one of the most famous political theorists and one of the most famous Latin
American leaders: Jean Jacques Rousseau and Simón Bolívar. According to Wiarda
(2005), Rousseau is Chavez’s intellectual inspiration and Bolivar his political. From
Rousseau, Chavez adopts the leadership principle that runs in the vein of Plato’s
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philosopher kings. Born leaders such as Chavez personify the general will of the people
and can rule without directly conferring with others. The king/leader knows what is in
the people’s best interest and makes decisions accordingly. In this form of government
there is no need for regular and competitive elections, intermediaries like civil society, or
a messy system of checks and balances or other institutions that only serve to make the
charismatic and wise leader’s job more difficult. As a result, political (and other)
decisions in Venezuela are almost entirely made by one person- President Chavez.
Chavez does not delegate and rarely shares authority; “he likes to have a hand in
everything” (Marcano and Tyszka 2007, 273). What he takes from Bolívar are his ideals
on leadership and political goals of a united (physically or ideologically) Latin America.
Bolívar directs his policies and Rousseau directs the means he uses to attain these
policies.
Chavez’s decision-making style relies on more than on political ideology alone.
The president is also well known for having a strong personality, so strong that it
dominates his leadership and decision making. Among some of the kinder comments, he
has been called a “rebellious and controversial international presence” (Da Silva and
Hillman 2003). Almost everyone can agree that he is a charismatic leader. Many see this
dynamic personality and his biting words and envision a demagogic leader who designs
foreign policy to appeal to nationalist sentiment. Some say that he often plays the victim
to what ever adversary is at hand to arouse sympathy (Marcano and Tyszka 2007).
Others say that Chavez’s policy decisions are founded on the quest for power for power’s
sake. His policies and geopolitical ambitions do not reflect national interests but one
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man’s craving for ever-increasing power. Luis Miquilena, a former Minister of Justice
and the Interior, said that he was a humble man that got carried away “by the temptations
of power” (Marcano and Tyszka 2007, 150). Former UN Ambassador Francisco Arias
Cárdenas said that Chavez “lives in the clutches of a paranoia to preserve his power. The
preservation of his power is his own personal hell, and that is why he is constantly at
battle” (Marcano and Tyszka 2007, 275).
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Other that know him well often have a more nuanced description of the president.
His former psychiatrist said that Chavez just wants to be loved; “He needs to be listened
to, paid attention to, admired, even idolized” (Marcano and Tyszka 2007, 274). Chavez’s
former Vice President Rangel, however, has a somewhat different perspective on the
president citing that Chavez is not as impulsive as many say, “but he is an extremely
deliberate person. Everything he does is the result of planning” (Marcano and Tyszka
2007, 262). To provide an example, former U.S. ambassador John Maisto recalls a
conversation with Chavez wherein they discussed U.S.-Venezuelan tensions. Chavez
said “Don’t worry, ambassador, I know where the red line is. And I’m not going to cross
that line, I just go up to that little edge” (Marcano and Tyszka 2007, 207-8). This
statement more than suggests that Chavez is well in control of his verbal assaults and
accusations. Rather than emotional outbursts, his beratings are strategy.
Ellner (2008) disagrees with the exceptionalist thesis that Chavez’s politics and
policy are the result of his personality. Instead, he stresses transformation, economic
issues, resistance and popular mobilization as the impetuses for his policy. He further
124
See Ellner (2008) for a thorough discussion of Chavez’s personality-driven policy
making and his rebuke of this perspective.
211
stresses that it is not a mere personality conflict that draws Chavez and Bush to blows. In
reality it is clash of national interests. The following application of PH to The Protocol
case study will help elucidate, for this example, just what drove Chavez’s decision to
ratify the treaty- personality or policy, or both.
First Phase
Chavez the Philosopher King
According to respondent accounts, in the present case study Chavez was the chief
decision-maker and final arbiter in the decision to ratify The Protocol. Although
Chavez’s new 1999 constitution officially transferred the primary foreign policy-making
authority from the president to the Cabinet of Ministers, thereby making the decision-
making process appear less personal, in reality Chavez was still in charge (Respondent
K). When it came down to it, the Venezuelan people believed in Chavez and believed in
the importance of the role of the president (Respondent K). Respondents I and J
concurred that Chavez’s role in the ratification process was extremely influential and
even fundamental. In fact, the actual decision-making process was secretive and
guarded, leaving only a select few in the know (Respondent H).
The Venezuelan people were certainly not in the know. The public knew very
little about the subject or that (and when) the decision was being made in their own
government. The public was generally apathetic to the issue (Respondent I). As a result,
there was virtually no public opinion on the issue, no public involvement and no public
pressure (Respondent K). Chavez the philosopher king had no intention of changing this.
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Chavez also did not have to contend with pressure from NGOs or ENGOs (other issues
were more salient). The lack of social pressure can in part be attributed to the very
minimal exposure the issue had in the media. What Chavez did have to contend with was
the subtle yet visible divide from within his cadre of ministries and PDVSA.
Especially since Chavez took office and appointed pro-Chavez employees to
replace striking PDVSA workers, the oil company has had immense influence over
policy-making in Venezuela. Its influence is surprisingly significant considering it is a
company and not a government agency. In illustration of the extent of PDVSA’s power,
Respondent K stated that the company has all the control in policy decisions if the issue
area is in any way related to oil or energy. In virtually all policy decisions, PDVSA has
the last word. Presidents have facilitated this power. Such a scenario normally was not a
problem for Chavez as his policy objectives usually coincided with PDVSA’s. In the
case of The Protocol, though, the two powerhouses were not in complete agreement. For
Chavez, there was another perspective to consider.
When it came to opinions over whether or not Venezuela should ratify there were
two main camps. MARN represented environmental concerns and favored ratification.
PDVSA and MEM represented petroleum and energy interests and were strongly against
ratification. MRE, the agency originally entrusted to make the final policy decision, was
the intermediary actor and moderate voice in the discussion. MRE was more apathetic on
the decision and thought climate change was an issue for developed states, yet it was
cognizant not to upset PDVSA (Respondent K). The agency organized meetings,
including the first of its kind on the topic, between the petroleum sector, MARN and
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interested and knowledgeable academics in an effort to coordinate a national position
(Respondent J). Respondent K recalls that Chavez originally “put the issue on the table”
but Respondent J recounts events differently. The two opposing positions were brought
to Chavez. Regardless, both agreed that Chavez made the final decision and served as
the final arbiter between the disagreeing factions. Although it had firm feelings about
ratification, MARN did not hold as much clout in the eyes of Chavez as did the
petroleum and energy sectors. PDVSA did not voice its opinion loudly, but it was
nonetheless a louder voice in the ears of Chavez (Respondent I). However, as previously
mentioned, this time the voice was not music to Chavez’s ears (Respondent K).
Chavez actually expressed interested in supporting environmental causes just as
he had initially supported human rights.
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Supporting both classically democratic issues
could help place Venezuela among some of the most powerful nations in the world and
could help elevate Venezuela to higher status in Latin America and among developing
nations. Chavez had spoken publicly a number of times about the importance of
environmental preservation/conservation and addressing climate change (Respondents H
and I). Ratifying The Protocol would fall inline with this rhetoric. Yet Chavez has been
criticized for being all talk and no action (Respondent I). Climate change might be
another instance where presidential policy fails to follow presidential promises. While
Respondent H attests that Chavez had much clarity on the topic, Respondents I believed
the president understood little (he was a military man by training) and Respondent K said
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To provide an example, Respondent K noted that Venezuela was the first Spanish
speaking country to ratify the Rome Statute (even though it has done nothing since).
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that, although the president liked to portray himself as environmental (having grown up
in the countryside), he did not have any true concern for the environment.
126
Thus, while
Chavez may have been initially lured by the opportunity to make an environmental
commitment on the international stage, there were other concerns to consider.
Domestic Political Concerns?
The preceding discussion argues that Chavez had sole decision-making authority in
deciding whether or not to ratify The Protocol and lays the foundation to analyze the
ability of PH to explain, in greater detail, the president’s entire decision-making process.
Figure 6.1 depicts the original policy options that lay before the Venezuelan president
and the options that he eliminated in the first phase.
Figure 6.1 Chavez’s Policy Options and First Phase Eliminations
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Respondent K cited two examples. One involves the South American pipeline that
Chavez wants to run from Venezuela down to Argentina- straight through the Amazon
jungle. The other involves the electric connection between Venezuela and Brazil.
President Caldera wanted to sell hydropower created from dams in Venezuela to Brazil.
Unfortunately for Caldera, environmentalists were outraged because a cable would have
to run through the jungle. Their objections were too much for Caldera and he had to
abandon the project. When Chavez took office he was not bothered by
environmentalists’ objections and proceeded with the project immediately.
A. Ratify (only)
D. Ratify & Voluntarily
Reduce Emissions
G. Propose Non-Annex
I Targets
H. Negotiate with the
U.S.
E. Negotiate with
Non-Annex I States
B. Wait to Ratify
I. Propose Totally New
Agreement
F. Align with Non-Annex
I States Against the U.S.
C. Don’t Ratify (only)
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Option F is included in the Venezuelan case study largely for continuity. In
contrast to both Argentina and Mexico, Option F was not seen as a viable option for
Chavez. As is easy to comprehend and as Ambassador Oyuela highlighted, Venezuela
was had unique circumstances and disagreed with its Latin American neighbor states. As
a result, uniting with other non-Annex I nations was a virtual non-option. There would
be little agreement upon which to base cooperation. Aligning with OPEC nations might
be a suitable alternative to uniting with non-Annex I nations. However, this option was
also unlikely as OEPC nations were relatively uninvolved in the process. In addition,
organizing efforts in opposition to the U.S. would be too detrimental to their collective
image.
Options D and G were quickly eliminated as they ran contrary to Chavez’s energy
policy and status as a member of OPEC. Although Option G does not outwardly call for
emission reductions, the option infers that Venezuela would abide by any targets it
proposed for all non-Annex I nations. Agreeing to reduce the country’s emissions was
unacceptable for two main reasons. One, it would hurt the nation’s economy. If
Venezuela reduced its use of petroleum, and more importantly, if other nations reduced
their use and Venezuela could no longer count on the revenue of its main export, the
economy would be hit hard. For example, this could threaten social and other
government-funded programs and policies that many Venezuelans had grown to
appreciate and depend on (and that were the pride of Chavez’s presidency). Respondent I
would add to this discussion the fact that Chavez had a personal interest in ensuring high
petroleum prices and continued high rates of petroleum export. He had grown very
216
accustomed to his elevated quality of life (“the Chavez way of life”) that included
wearing expensive custom-made suits and flying around the world on his private plane,
all of which was financed by government funds. Reducing emissions was equally
unacceptable in that PDVSA, MEM and OPEC did not approve and Chavez was much
attuned to their desires as they were largely his own. No other OPEC nations had ratified
(and, besides Ecuador, none would until December of 2004).
Options E, H and J were also quickly eliminated in the first phase. As Chavez
and his delegates speaking on his behalf publicly expressed, reducing GHG emissions
and otherwise addressing global climate change was an issue for the developed world.
Industrialized nations were to blame for the effects that were already becoming visible
and it was their responsibility to take action. Respondent J pointed out Chavez’s
commitment to common but differentiated responsibilities. Thus, as evidenced by the
Venezuelan delegation’s refusal to discuss voluntary commitments and any other efforts
on the behalf of non-Annex I nations at COP3, The Protocol is not the place to discuss
the developing world’s commitments beyond what is already called for in the document
(which is realistically very little). Chavez was not willing to discuss the issue further and
Options E, H and J would require just that.
The question at hand is whether or not these options were eliminated based on
domestic political concerns. An argument could be made that the elimination of Options
D and G were just so. They ran contrary to Chavez’s national energy policy and would
hurt the domestic economy, in turn affecting Chavez’s popularity and security as
president. The strongest link to domestic political concerns could be seen in Chavez’s
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concern for PDVSA. A dominant voice in Venezuelan politics, Chavez did not wish to
make a decision that the company would not support. However, PDVSA did not hold
more power than the president. Chavez was the philosopher king and was the final
arbiter of foreign policy. He could make the decision he wanted. Besides, Chavez
largely saw eye to eye with the oil giant. It is not likely that he would make a decision
that would contradict PDVSA.
It is less likely that the elimination of Options E, H and J was based on domestic
political concerns. Instead, they were eliminated for personal reasons, as a matter of
principle and identity. Chavez’s country was not responsible for past emissions and
current emissions equaled less than one percent of the world’s total. There was no need
for his country to suffer while countries like the U.S. continued to pollute. Thus, there
was no need to negotiate with other non-Annex I nations or with the U.S. As it stood,
The Protocol was sufficient as it did not require developing nations to adopt any emission
reductions. Taking a stance against further negotiations would also feed into Chavez’s
self-purported image as “an oil-rich, third-world militant” (Romero 2004, 148).
It is, however, plausible to consider these latter actions the result of domestic
political concerns if one considers Chavez’s international behavior as means to affect his
popularity back home. Assuming the role of the victim (developing nation) and opposing
the imperialist giant helps him with the support of the Venezuelan people and thus
secures his power and presidency.
Options A, B and C were not eliminated in the first phase. Option A, ratifying
and doing nothing more, would not require Venezuela to take any significant action and
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thus would not necessarily hurt the economy. Ratifying would also please MARN and
others in various ministries that favored this option. However, it had the potential to
upset PDVSA. Though not the ideal option, Chavez was initially enticed by ratification.
Thus, the option was attractive enough to survive to the next phase. Options B and C had
the most immediate appeal. Waiting to ratify would not commit Chavez to anything and
likely appease the most people (in Venezuela). Refusing to ratify would please PDVSA
and OPEC nations, two entities that held much capital in Venezuelan politics and with
whom Chavez shared similar policy objectives.
Noncompensatory Principle?
The next question to ask is whether or not Chavez used the noncompensatory
principle to eliminate policy options. Because it is not clear whether Chavez applied a
singular primary criterion to eliminate options, the answer to this question is problematic.
First, it is clear that Options D and G were eliminated using the noncompensatory
principle if the primary criterion is abiding by Chavez’s energy policy or, if extended,
domestic political concerns. Both options could have benefits for Chavez and Venezuela
(for instance portraying Chavez as a cooperative and proactive leader in Latin America
and thereby its improving his overall international image), but they were not strong
enough to overcome the fact that reducing emissions would run contrary to Chavez’s
energy policy and likely hurt the national economy. The elimination of E, H and J were
arguably eliminated based on the noncompensatory principle although the primary
criterion used differs. Even though negotiating had the possibility of yielding beneficial
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outcomes, it was the act of negotiating alone that was unacceptable to Chavez. A
possible, though not guaranteed, positive outcome could not override the fact that
negotiating would necessitate that Chavez waver from his public stance.
Cognitive Heuristics?
The final question to ask in phase one is whether Chavez eliminated options based on
cognitive heuristics. This answer is perhaps the easiest to answer of the first three. Yes,
Chavez utilized cognitive heuristics to eliminate policy options that did not meet with his
approval. Being the ultimate decision-maker in his country, Chavez was quick to
eliminate the six options. He did not confer with others. He did not debate the issues. In
his mind, for his country and his image, Venezuela would not consider voluntary
emissions and would not entertain further discussions on the matter. As Respondent I
recalls about Chavez’s decision-making style, in general and in respect to this case study
in particular, he was authoritative, aggressive and impulsive. Respondent H similarly
attested that Chavez was “firme” (decisive and unwavering). Thus, as these options did
meet with the president’s immediate approval they were not viable, would not be
discussed and would not receive further consideration.
Second Phase
Rational Decision Strategy?
Figure 6.2 illustrates the three policy options that survived to the second decision-
making phase. All three options were initially deemed satisfactory alternatives. In the
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second phase Chavez determined which one provided him with the highest overall utility.
Although Option A would not require his country to take any action and would please
MARN and other environmentalists including those abroad, ratifying would not bring
Chavez’s country much benefit beyond a positive international image and it could come
at the risk of a negative impression in the eyes of fellow OPEC nations whose friendship
the president had been courting. Not ratifying, by contrast, would theoretically fall in
line the closest with Chavez’s energy policy. Chavez could unite with its fellow OPEC
nations in a principled stance against limiting the use of petroleum. However, such
posturing has its risks. Publicly refusing to ratify would mean adopting a position
identical to that of the U.S. Chavez had built a career out of separating himself from the
Bush administration and criticizing Washington’s foreign policies. Mimicking the U.S.
would be hypocritical.
Figure 6.2 Chavez’s Remaining Policy Options and Phase Two Eliminations
Option B provided Chavez with the perfect balance between Options A and C.
Chavez would not have to consent to ratification and would simultaneously avoid
aligning itself with President Bush. Waiting to ratify would effectively be not ratifying
with the added benefit of not having to publicly denounce The Protocol. In essence, this
option allowed Chavez to avoid making any true decision and avoid choosing between
A. Ratify (only) B. Wait to Ratify C. Don’t Ratify (only)
Provides balance and flexibility PDVSA against ratification,
MARN in favor, against Chavez
image
Could create negative
international image
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the two remaining alternatives (Respondent J). It was a strategic decision for the
president. Thus, after more careful consideration than was applied in the first phase,
Chavez decided to wait to ratify. Venezuela’s official position was to defer ratification
until the science is more conclusive (akin to Bush’s concerns), but also to wait for the
U.S. to ratify. This placed Bush in the hotseat. Unofficially, Chavez chose to postpone
ratification until Russia’s impending ratification (Respondent H).
The Other Second Phase
Rational Decision Strategy?
While waiting to ratify became Venezuela’s official position from 2000 on, the context
within which the decision was made began to change in 2002 and was modified in
earnest in 2004 with Russia’s informal and then formal announcement that it would ratify
The Protocol. With the understanding that The Protocol would soon take effect, Chavez
re-evaluated his earlier decision. This meant a reassessment of the utility of each of the
three most appealing policy options. Respondent J said that, in his opinion, Russia’s
decision bore great influence on Chavez’s next decision. Figure 6.3 depicts the results of
the new evaluation.
Figure 6.3 Changes to Chavez’s Remaining Options due to Russia’s Ratification
A. Ratify (only) B. Wait to Ratify C. Don’t Ratify (only)
Weakened international
image
Added benefit of being able to
criticize the U.S.
Weakened international
image
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Under the new scenario, waiting to ratify and not ratifying lost some of their
initial appeal. Not only was The Protocol entering into force, but it was doing so because
another oil-producing country decided to ratify. This gave Chavez’s OPEC-related
justifications for waiting less validity. Even though aligning with PDVSA and his own
energy policy would suggest not ratifying, Chavez now saw more benefit in ratifying.
Becoming a signatory party to The Protocol would give even more credence to Chavez’s
verbal abuse of President Bush. Chavez could legitimately claim he was behaving as a
responsible and cooperative environmental leader and that Bush was being recalcitrant
and stubborn. Russia’s ratification provided Chavez the opportunity to stand tall and
criticize the Bush administration with increased vigor and sense of superiority.
Respondent I support this argument by stating that the most important factor affecting
Chavez’s new decision was international status. The decision was made for show, for
other countries to see. According to Respondent J, Russia’s ratification gave Chavez a
new opportunity to become an environmental presence in the world (or at least appear to
be). Chavez did not wish to be “outside the international community” and ratifying The
Protocol would be Chavez’s key in. Overall, the benefits of Chavez’s new position were
twofold. On the one hand, his joining in the climate change regime would improve his
international image. On the other, his increased derisions of Bush would likely increase
his approval rating back home. Thus, Option A became the alternative awarding Chavez
the highest overall utility.
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Concluding Remarks
Upon reflection, PH fared relatively well in its application to the Venezuelan case
study though it ran into similar problems that it did with the Argentine and Mexican case
studies. The Venezuelan case also highlights that, in its current form, PH does not
account for contextual changes that dramatically change decision-making strategy. First,
PH was most successful at explaining Chavez’s use of cognitive heuristics in the first
phase and traditionally rational decision strategies in the second phase. Chavez and his
Rousseauian leadership style quickly eliminated policy options in the first phase that did
not appeal to him and fit with his perception of the world. Venezuela was an oil-
producing, developing nation. It would not reduce GHG emissions nor advocate that
others reduce their own emissions. It would negotiate the issue further. KP negotiations
were meant to determine and solidify the steps developed nations would take to address
climate change; they were not the forum to discuss the developing world. In the second
phase was where Chavez more deliberately considered the three remaining policy
alternatives. In weighing his options the president decided that he would benefit most
from not making a decision, or by publicly deciding the wait to ratify.
PH did not fare as well in terms of explaining Chavez’s primary criterion for
eliminating unacceptable policy options. While domestic political concerns explain why
Options D and G were eliminated, it is not clear that these same concerns explain whey
Options E, H and J were eliminated. Though a connection to domestic political concerns
could be drawn by extension, there are better and more direct explanations for these
eliminations. This issue will be discussed further in the following chapter. Because it is
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not clear that Chavez employed a single primary criterion to eliminate options it is
difficult to determine whether or not he also used the noncompensatory principle as
described by PH. Chavez was loyal to his two criterion, but by definition, the manner by
which the president eliminated options was not noncompensatory.
This particular case study highlights a situation not accounted for in PH- when
there are substantial contextual changes that require the decision-maker to change their
decision and, in effect, make two decisions. This situation is not necessarily
incompatible with PH but is a factor that the theory presently does not consider. Does
such a severe change mean that there are two completely separate decisions that should
be analyzed separately? Is it one continuous decision interrupted by external shocks? Or
should the analysis and explanation consider, as this chapter does, that the decision-
maker effectively makes two separate phase two decisions? Perhaps different cases call
for a different approach. This issue will be explored further in the following chapter.
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Chapter 7
Contributions from Carlos, Ernesto and Hugo:
What They Say About Poliheuristic Theory
Analysis of the preceding case studies is both supportive of PH and suggestive of
issues that should be (re)assessed in order to ensure the theory’s ability to explain a wider
class of cases more effectively, in other words to improve its generalizability. In addition
to revealing examples of the hidden truths behind why some state leaders ratify
international environmental agreements, results of the individual analyses suggest that the
theory accurately explains the two stage decision-making process wherein decision-
makers rely on cognitive heuristics to narrow the initial field of possible policy options to
a more manageable set and then utilize traditionally more rational calculations to select
from that list their final policy. In all three cases, the scenario played out accordingly.
However, the case studies, individually and as a collective, indicate that some of PH’s
more specific stipulations do not accurately explain Menem, Zedillo or Chavez’s decision
making. For example, the presidents’ primary criterion for eliminating unacceptable
policy options was not always domestic political concerns, or at least domestic political
concerns simply defined. A synthesis of the analyses also suggests conclusions about
how PH could be amended, or otherwise altered, to better address low politics and non-
crisis cases and other issues that the theory presently does not consider sufficiently. After
explicating the aforementioned points, the chapter ends with suggestions for future
research to build off the conclusions herein.
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The cases study analyses of Presidents Menem, Zedillo and Chavez share many
similarities and many differences. They also all contribute to a better understanding of
how presidents in Latin American countries in the 1990s and 2000s make decisions
regarding international environmental policy. Although unfortunately not shocking, their
decisions were not always driven by a desire to do what is best for the environment.
Instead, they were driven by political or personal reasons, sometimes tangentially related
to or unrelated to environmental protection. Similarly, the rationale behind ratification
decisions was complex, involving multiple players, perspectives and policy areas. For
purposes of this study, however, the most important results and conclusions to be drawn
relate to PH’s ability to explain the decision-making processes of each president. Table
7.1 summarizes the results of each application, breaking the findings down by decision
phase and the main components of each.
Table 7.1 Analyses Summary by President and Decision-making Phase
MENEM ZEDILLO CHAVEZ
PHASE ONE
Primary Criterion Appease the U.S.
“Leadership &
Stewardship”
Energy Policy & Personal
Principles
Domestic Political
Concerns*
Likely Possibly Yes/Possibly
Noncompensatory
Principle
Yes Yes No
Cognitive Heuristics Yes Yes Yes
PAHSE TWO
Rational Decision
Strategy
Yes: Cost-Benefit
Analysis
Yes: Expected Utility Yes: Expected Utility
* If a primary criterion could be interpreted as a domestic political concern it is denoted as “likely.” If a
criterion might be consider a domestic political concern but the link is more tenuous, it is denoted as
“possibly.” If a gradient is applied, it would run from strongest to weakest- “yes,” “likely,” “possibly.”
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Poliheuristic Theory’s Overall Appraisal
Cumulatively, the results of the three case studies throw much support behind the
theoretical foundations upon which PH is based and, arguably, its largest contribution to
decision-making literature. In all three cases, the decision-makers used cognitive
heuristics to eliminate policy options from a list of possible options making the list more
manageable. All three cases similarly highlight that the three presidents also then utilized
more traditionally rational decision strategies to come to their final policy decision.
Menem quickly eliminated unacceptable policy options based on his personal
preference to appeal to the U.S. and President Clinton’s request, rather than on any
rational calculations. Menem did not seriously consider the possible effects voluntarily
agreeing to reduce GHG emissions would have on Argentina’s economy. Furthermore,
because the public and industry did not know much about the issue or voice any
substantial opinions about ratification, Menem had the luxury of basing this first phase of
his decision making on his own preferences. Menem and his delegation then had the
luxury of being able to conduct a more calculative test of the remaining policy options,
eventually arriving at one option that provided the most overall benefit at the least cost.
By voluntarily agreeing to reduce emissions Menem could appeal to Clinton’s request
and avoid the awkward and potentially dangerous scenario of continuing to pressure other
non-Annex I nations to agree to do the same
Zedillo similarly utilized cognitive heuristics to rule out, what were to him, poor
policy options. Zedillo quickly ruled out any option that did not involve in some way
ratifying The Protocol. There was such little analysis that, as Respondent F recalls, there
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really was not much of a decision to be made at all. Mexico had been an active player in
negotiations leading up to and in the creation of The Protocol that not ratifying was
effectively not an option. Continuing to advance The Protocol and doing so on the
international stage was the only viable option. The specifics of how to do so would be
settled later. Zedillo also had the option of advising Carabias and other delegates to try
out the remaining options and see which they could pursue with the least amount of
opposition and cost to the country and its image. Zedillo also delegated much of the
detailed calculations to Carabias and her ministry. They were to determine which
particular option would yield the most benefit. In the end, ratifying The Protocol and
officially committing to nothing else at the time would appease the greatest audience.
Following suit, Chavez also was quick to eliminate undesirable policy options
using cognitive heuristics. The ultimate decision-maker in Venezuela, Chavez could
easily eliminate options based on his personal preferences. Chavez did not have to
contend with any opposition from the public or industry (besides energy). In fact, there
was little sincere contestation (as he sees it) to Chavez’s policy decisions in general and
certainly to his environmental decisions. As a result, Chavez was able to quickly
eliminate policy options that did not align with his energy policy and his opinion of what
his oil-producing and developing country should do and could do. Reducing emissions
and even discussing reducing emissions was not acceptable. In both of Chavez’s second
phases the president took a more calculative approach. In the first, Chavez assessed that
waiting to ratify would award him the best of both worlds. By effectively not making an
official decision, the president could avoid upsetting PDVSA and countering his own oil
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interests and avoid the pitfalls associated with publicly refusing to ratify. After Russia’s
announcement, Chavez’s second was equally as calculated as he reassessed the maximum
benefit under the new set of conditions. There were now more benefits to ratification.
With The Protocol entering into force, Chavez could ratify and avoid any stigma
associated with not joining the regime with the new added bonus of being able to speak
down to Bush for the U.S.’s failure to ratify. Chavez could tout himself as a selfless
leader, a man above President Bush.
The Prioritization of Domestic Political Concerns Reconsidered
As a group, the results of the analyses do not wholly support PH’s assessment that
decision-makers eliminate undesirable policy options based on how they perform against
the primary criterion of domestic political concerns. Chavez’s concern for his energy
policy and the impacts reducing emissions would have on the Venezuelan economy as
well as on relations with PDVSA are the most supportive, though the findings from the
other case studies are less so.
Menem’s primary criterion was appeasing the U.S. He eliminated options that
would not appease Clinton’s pleas for developing nations (targeting Argentina) to take it
upon themselves to reduce emissions. As was substantiated by existing literature,
respondent assessments and Menem’s own speeches, the president’s foremost concern
was aligning with the U.S. Such an alignment would presumably improve Argentina’s
international status and provide the country with a powerful and wealthy ally. It is a
prime example of core/periphery relations and a periphery country hoping to get as close
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to the core nation as possible. It is an example of the profound effect international factors
can have on presidential decision making. In addition, Menem showed little concern for
domestic affairs and for potential impacts his decision could have on the country. It,
thus, looks that Menem’s primary criterion was based on international factors, not
domestic ones.
However, it is possible to conceive of Menem’s concern as being founded in
domestic constraints. Improving relations with the U.S., a wealthy country, could have
positive ramifications for Argentina. Obviously, it could help alleviate some of the
economic problems Argentina was experiencing. Improved relations could provide
Argentina with a valuable trading partner, creating an important and much needed source
of income. A closer and more trusting relationship might also yield assistance with
Argentina’s foreign debt. In the end, appeasing Clinton on this particular matter could
mean greater benefits in other policy areas down the road. Under the present assessment
of the situation, Menem’s primary criterion is ultimately founded on domestic concerns.
Thus, Table 7.1 on page 226 uses the word “likely” to denote that a connection between
Menem’s criterion and domestic concerns is likely. To extend further this line of
thought, Menem’s criterion could then be based on domestic political concerns as
improved economic conditions would likely improve the president’s approval ratings and
overall popularity. This last statement may be moving one step too far as Menem was
not even eligible for re-election and thus his popularity was arguably of lesser concern in
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the decision-making process.
127
Nonetheless, an argument could be made that Menem’s
primary criterion was domestic in nature. What does this say about PH? A look at
Zedillo’s and Chavez’s decision making will make the argument more clear.
Zedillo’s primary criterion termed “leadership & stewardship” is similarly
categorized as an international concern, though it could also, by extension, be considered
a domestic one. Although Zedillo deferred much of the specifics to Carabias and
SEMARNAP, early on he knew that he wanted to support The Protocol. He wanted to
advance The Protocol, thereby enhancing Mexico’s international image and clout as an
environmental, regional, and perhaps global leader. This criterion is obviously related to
international factors. Also in illustration of a developing nation hoping to improve its
international status, a policy decision attuned to this concern would ideally raise
Mexico’s status in the eyes of individual leaders and the international community as a
whole.
If teased out a step further one could conceivably argue that Zedillo’s concerns
were ultimately domestic. An improved international status would translate into
improved economic and social conditions for the nation. Mexico could gain better
standing in the international community and improve relations with other nations,
presumably powerful and wealthy nations, that could improve trade or help reduce the
nation’s debt. In comparison to the earlier extension of Menem’s criterion, however, this
127
In the current (and latest) version of the Argentine Constitution, written in 1994 by
Menem, Section 90 stipulates that the president can only be re-elected once. Written with
Menem in mind, the Constitution stipulates that a president cannot be elected to a third
term. Menem showed initial interest in trying to circumvent the stipulation but conceded
after exerting only modest effort.
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extrapolation is less compelling. The eventual beneficial impacts on Mexico’s domestic
situation are less likely. Whereas Menem’s alignment with the U.S. could have direct
implications for Argentina’s economy, improving Mexico’s general status as an
environmental leader and supporter of multilateral efforts would have less immediate
impacts. Possible future domestic impacts are not discounted, they are just further
removed, both temporally and situationally. For this reason, Table 7.1 on page 226
contains the word “possibly.” It is possible to make the argument that Zedillo had
domestic concerns in mind, though it is not “likely.”
The Chavez case study has mixed results. From analysis it appears that Chavez
had dual primary criteria. He prioritized both his energy policy (inclusive of the
country’s production and export of oil and PDVSA’s interests) and his nation’s identity
as an oil-producing and developing nation (not to mention his identity as an unyielding
statesman).
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Thus, on the one hand, one of Chavez’s criteria is clearly that of domestic
concerns. He is unwilling to commit his country to emission reductions that he feels
would be a hardship for his country and its economy. On the other hand, the other
criterion could possibly be considered a domestic concern although it is more likely that
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These two criteria could be subsumed into one, as is in Zedillo’s case, to create a
general “oil identity” criterion. However, in terms of eliminating policy options in the
first phase it is apparent that Chavez enlisted two separate criteria. He eliminated
Options D and G on the basis that they would be in conflict with Venezuela’s petroleum-
based economy and PDVSA/oil interests and eliminated Options E, H and I not because
they would negatively affect the economy (in fact they could potentially benefit the
economy depending on the outcome), but because the options stood in opposition to the
president’s opinion of what his non-Annex I nation should be required to do. In Zedillo’s
case, the two sub-criteria are more closely related. Furthering The Protocol and being a
good environmental steward would improve the country’s international status, reputation
and, to some extent, global influence.
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policy options were eliminated based on personal reasons. Chavez is a leader of a non-
Annex I nation, a nation not responsible for the present state of the climate change issue.
In comparison to the big polluters, Venezuela’s emissions are minor. Chavez is also the
leader of a developing nation that does not have the resources to make reductions.
Chavez is also a strong leader, a leader of principle. His country is not responsible, does
not have the means and will not discuss reductions of any kind.
In a similar vein as the Mexican case study, it is possible that Chavez eliminated
Options E, H, and I for domestic reasons. He knew that discussing reductions was not in
his country’s best interest. This argument is not entirely sound as it is uncertain what
outcome negotiations would have; the outcome could be positive. In many instances,
though, Chavez was not even willing to discuss reductions. It was neither the time nor
place nor appropriate. The argument could also be made that such international posturing
would improve Chavez’s popularity back home and thus be the result of domestic
political concerns. This argument is similarly weak as Chavez, despite the constant
opposition of anti-Chavistas, maintained high approval ratings as evidenced by the
overwhelming support in presidential and other elections.
129
In addition, the issue of
climate change and environmental issues generally resonated weakly with the public and
it is unlikely that his popularity would be greatly affected by his decision in the matter.
As a whole, the primary criteria used by the presidents do not provide strong
support for PH. From the analyses provided herein, including direct assessments from
129
In 1989 Chavez won the presidency with the largest margin in history. In the 2000
election he won 60 percent of the vote. In the 2004 recall election he won 95 percent of
the vote. Even after the 2002 coup his ratings remained high and the opposition was, at
least temporarily, subdued.
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individuals intimately involved in the decision-making process, the presidents’ decisions
in the first phase were based on international or personal factors. Although arguments
can be made that the presidents’ primary criteria are ultimately founded on domestic
concerns (i.e., a concern for international status is a domestic concern in disguise), to be
able to do so one must expand the analysis, consider the scenario with a wider lens.
Working under this assumption, is it possible to reduce all concerns to domestic
concerns? Can such an expansion eventually become hyper-expansion?
This paper suggests that the answer to the latter question is “Yes.” International
factors should be considered factors in their own right. The same applies to individual-
level factors. Short of entering into a theoretical discussion of levels of analysis (that is
not the objective of this study), suffice it to say that the analyses suggest that international
factors cannot be discounted. In fact, in specific instances (especially Menem and
arguably Zedillo) decision-makers failed to consider the domestic implications of policy
options when making their preliminary eliminations
The results of this study go one step further to suggest that international factors
may be more prominent in cases with developing nations, particularly those in Latin
America. Although ever aware of the activity of other countries, developed nations are
less concerned with what a majority of the world’s nations are doing. Countries like
Germany, Japan and the U.S. often have nominal concern for the behavior of less-
developed nations like Ecuador, Ghana and Thailand. The same is not true in reverse.
Less-developed and developing nations are more aware of developed nations and their
policies than the developed nations are of them and theirs. This is especially true in the
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case of a regional or global hegemon. Developing nations must be aware of the
hegemon’s behavior and desires and are often cautious to be or remain in the hegemon’s
good graces in order to maintain or improve their place in the international community.
130
This concept echoes notions of core-periphery theory, where there is a strong relationship
between the core and periphery and semi-periphery nations, as well as dependency
theory. The results show that all three presidents were highly aware of the international
context within which they were making their decisions. In fact, each incorporated at least
some international factors into their primary criterion. Although only three case studies
are represented, the results do suggest that, at least, for developing nations in Latin
America, presidents prioritize international concerns when making their preliminary
eliminations.
Up to this point, this conclusion has glanced over the issue of domestic political
concerns in lieu of a simpler comparison of domestic versus international priorities. The
generalized comparison provides some suggestions for the future development of PH, but
an assessment of domestic political concerns is necessary. The results from all three case
studies do not provide much support for PH in that the presidents did not seemingly
prioritize concerns for their political survival using conventional means, conventional by
democratic, or more specifically U.S. democratic, standards.
Kinne (2005) addresses a similar issue when he writes about the differences in the
manifestation of political concerns in democracies versus autocracies. Kinne writes that
130
In the case of Venezuela, Chavez was very aware of the regional hegemon but
ultimately chose to do the opposite. He was cognizant to separate himself and his
policies from the U.S. and President Bush.
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regardless of regime type, all decision-makers strive to maintain power. What differs
between regimes is the means by which they do so. Kinne draws from the 2003 work of
Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow and their “selectorate theory.”
According to the theory, all states contain a selectorate, or a body of individuals
responsible for selecting the state’s leaders. The selectorate takes different shapes in
different regimes (the general public or constituents, a political party or political
coalition), but in all regimes leaders hope to gain the support of the selectorate and gain
or retain political power.
While Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela are not autocracies but democracies,
Kinne’s (and Bueno de Mesquita et. al.’s) work can be applied to the present study
nevertheless. Because the presidents were making decisions on international
environmental policy, an area of lesser concern to their populations, and because in each
country the presidents have commanding control over policy formulation (especially
foreign policy formulation), they were able to make more autocratic-like decisions, at
least in the first phase. Thus, their selectorates may take a different shape and the means
to appease them may be different.
Zedillo and Chavez provide the best examples. For Zedillo, his selectorate was
most likely the PRI and other political allies. He was less concerned with the general
public than with important persons within the party. While valid, this argument has its
weaknesses in that Zedillo was responsible for the incremental dilution of the power of
the presidency and the PRI’s over 70 year reign. Chavez’s selectorate is twofold. The
first component is the typical democratic electorate. Although he ruled authoritatively,
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insiders suggest that Chavez’s rants against Bush and U.S. imperialism are part of his
grand strategy to gain popular support and continue to prevail in elections. The second
component is PDVSA and the oil industry. Although the president is more powerful than
PDVSA, the two share similar interests and rely on each other to remain in power. Thus,
it is possible to argue that what may look like international or other concerns are truly
domestic political concerns manifest in a different form. The ends are the same but the
means are different.
Another perspective on the issue of PH and domestic political concerns is
provided by Stern (2004). Among other critiques and comments on the theory, Stern
argues that since “decision-makers differ greatly in their sensitivity to and degree of
autonomy with respect to the domestic political context,” sensitivity to this “context
should be seen as a contingent rather than a general phenomenon” (110). Stern highlights
variables such as leadership style (i.e., pragmatists versus crusaders), regime type and
political situation (i.e., degree of autonomy) and proximity to elections as key factors that
can affect a decision-maker’s susceptibility to domestic political context. For example,
Menem, having already adjusted the Argentine constitution to permit his re-election,
could not run for a third term and, thus, was less susceptible to domestic political
concerns than he would have been, say, prior to his re-election. Chavez was also less
susceptible as he was consistently re-elected by significant margins. At the time in
question, his power was generally secure. Additionally, it was the case that all three
presidents had substantial leader autonomy. Even though each was democratically
elected and ruled a country with institutionalized checks and balances, the checks were
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weak and the presidents were not significantly restricted in their decision making. Thus,
the case studies examined in this paper support Stern’s notion that different decision-
makers could be more or less susceptible to political concerns depending on context.
Menem, Zedillo and Chavez were operating in contexts wherein they were less
susceptible to domestic political concerns. Thus, PH’s claim that all leaders prioritize
domestic political concerns may not explain this particular subset of cases.
Building off of Stern’s work is an additional suggestion that decision-makers are
more or less susceptible to domestic political pressure not solely on the basis of
contextual variables but based on issue area. Because the three presidents were making
decisions on environmental foreign policy, an issue area of little public interest in their
countries, they were less susceptible to political pressure and had additional leeway in
their decision making. Respondents in all case studies recalled that the public, ENGOs
and even industry presented little formidable opposition or even interest in the decision
(at the time).
131
Simply stated, the presidents were not highly susceptible to pressure
because there was none. The presidents could make decisions (particularly in the first
phase) without worrying about consulting others or that there would be negative
repercussions to their actions.
Thus, this paper argues that Stern’s (2004) work and the new argument presented
herein combine to provide the best description of the presidents’ environmental foreign
131
Note that there was interest in environmental policy and some participation in each
country though, as respondents recalled, it did not affect the presidents’ decision making
processes.
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policy decision making as regarded ratifying The Protocol.
132
Based on the political
context in each country and the policy area under consideration, Menem, Zedillo and
Chavez were less susceptible to domestic political concerns and thus, in the first decision-
making phase, were able to prioritize international and personal criteria. Each president
had vast decision-making authority and faced little opposition or domestic pressure.
Although more study is needed beyond these three case studies, this analysis
suggests a wider generalization about environmental foreign policy decision making in
developing countries, specifically Latin American nations. Because these nations and
their presidents have other, more pressing policy issues to debate and because there is a
resultant lack of public interest or knowledge, presidents have more authority to make
decisions on their own. They are likely to use cognitive heuristics (based on personal
preference, etc.) to eliminate unacceptable policy options in the first phase and their
primary criteria are more likely to be tied to international concerns, specifically foreign
relations with powerful states or empowered status in the international community, than
developed, democratic nations.
132
Such a conclusion may be limiting, however. Other examples of environmental
foreign policy decision making, such as bi-lateral disputes, may yield different results.
One such example is in the Argentina-Uruguay pulp mill controversy. In 2005, the
Finnish company Botnia received the environmental authority from the Uruguay
government to build a pulp mill on the River Uruguay, the river that serves as a boundary
between Argentina and Uruguay. The Argentine government, public and environmental
groups were extremely upset by the decision and argued that granting permission
breached a bi-lateral treaty that obliged both countries to consult the other before taking
such action and would lead to a polluted river. The controversy has sparked considerable
debate and protest and has caused a rift between the usually amicable neighbors. In this
scenario, a president would be most deft to listen to domestic voices. A president would
likely be bound by domestic constraints. This alludes to a plausible difference between
international and bi-lateral decision making.
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It is also interesting to note that in each of the three cases the decision to ratify
The Protocol was not solely based on environmental concerns (although Zedillo did
express some sincere concern for the environment). In fact, each president used
ratification as a tool to help them attain larger goals in other policy arenas. Menem used
ratification as a means to improve relations with the U.S. Zedillo’s ratification helped to
raise the country’s international status as cooperative leader and environmental steward.
Chavez eventually used his ratification as justification for harsher criticisms of the Bush
administration. Overall, in countries that do not or feel they cannot focus attention on
environmental foreign policy it is plausible that they see environmental foreign policy
decisions in a unique light; they see them a means towards other ends. Future
international environmental negotiations should keep this reality in mind.
The Noncompensatory Principle Revisited
PH’s prediction that each president will use the noncompensatory principle to
eliminate policy options in the first phase faired better than domestic political concerns.
The use of the principle was confirmed in the cases of Menem and Zedillo but not of
Chavez. In Menem’s case, no other conceivable benefits could overcome a policy option
that did not appease the U.S. If an option did not meet his primary criterion it was
quickly eliminated. For Zedillo, the case was similar. The president immediately
eliminated any policy options that did not include ratifying The Protocol and thereby
elevate Mexico’s image as a convincing environmental and other leader. In the case of
Venezuela, however, PH did not fair as well, namely because Chavez had two distinct
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primary criteria. With two main criteria, Chavez did not prioritize one over the over in a
noncompensatory fashion. Options D and G were eliminated because they did not fall in
line with Chavez’s energy policy. Options E, H and I could have fallen in line, but
Chavez was not willing to test the waters. It is likely, however, that Chavez’s criterion of
his personal principles- including the notion that his was a country not responsible for
global warming and should not be one to reduce emissions- could be considered the
stronger of the two criteria. Hypothetically speaking, even if reducing emissions or
promoting other nations to do so would not go against Venezuelan energy policy and hurt
the economy, Chavez would still eliminate both options as it was not Venezuela’s place
as a non-Annex I nation to reduce emissions. Reduced to the same explanation, global
warming is not the responsibility of non-Annex I nations. The same would not work in
reverse. If, for some reason Options E, H and I meet Chavez’s personal criteria, it is not
likely that the president would eliminate the options because they stood opposed to his
energy policy. In fact, it is conceivable that negotiations could turn out to benefit
Venezuela.
The Uniqueness of Low Politics and Non-Crisis Situations
A larger question this study aims to answer is whether or not it matters in the
application of PH if the policy decisions regard low politics issue areas or non-crisis
situations. In comparison to the array of studies on high politics and crisis situations, the
results suggest it does make a difference. For example, the fact that environmental
foreign policy is a low politics issue awarded presidents more leeway and more authority
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in their decision making. Although coupled with the fact that the governments were
structured to facilitate a strong executive, the fact that the presidents were faced with the
low politics policy issue awarded them more leeway in making their decisions. They had
extensive freedom to frame the issue (largely by the quick elimination of unacceptable
options in the first phase) and direct future discussions. The presidents were also
awarded more authority, either in their ability to make the decision more unilaterally
and/or to delegate the decision to others.
Chavez had the most authority in his decision making. Of the three, his final
decision most reflected his personal preferences and decision style. Menem also had a
commanding influence on his country’s decision to reduce emissions. He made the
decision early on to voluntarily reduce emissions and utilized the help of his
environmental minister and others to find the means to do so and solidify his final
decision. Zedillo also had considerable authority in his decision making, though manifest
in a different way. In the first phase he used his authority and in the second he delegated
the authority. Having great trust in Carabias and his ministry, the president entrusted
these others with determining exactly what form the final policy should take. Overall,
when compared to presidents in the majority of other PH applications, Menem, Zedillo
and Chavez were less constrained in their decision making.
However, it warrants noting that in many countries today (especially in the U.S.)
environmental foreign policy may demonstrate some of the characteristics of high politics
areas. There is growing public concern and pressure as well as pressure from Congress
and state governments to address climate change. Therefore, it may be the case that
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environmental foreign policy decisions, and climate change-related decisions in
particular, are characteristically low politics issues in certain countries and not in others.
To illustrate, if there was a spectrum spanning from low to high politics it might run
concurrently with a continuum of developing to developed nations. Environmental
foreign policies are likely to take on the characteristics of low policies in developing
nations and acquire more high politics traits with lateral movement towards more
developed and industrialized nations. This spectrum may also shift with time. Climate
change is a topic increasing in global importance and concern, largely because the
conceived potential impacts of global warming have expanded beyond environmental
issues to encompass economic, social and health oriented issues. That said, with time,
climate change may transform into a “higher” type of policy issue across the board.
The fact that the decision to ratify The Protocol is a non-crisis issue is also
important. What became evident from the case studies is that because time was not a
factor the presidents could employ a trial and error tactic. In the cases of Menem and
Zedillo, the presidents instructed their environmental ministers and delegations to follow
the leads of different options and see what happened. When delegates ran into too much
resistance or an option proved too detrimental to pursue further it was eliminated. The
final policy option was the one that proved most successful. Because ratification was not
a crisis issue Chavez had the luxury of originally making a non-decision. In contrast to
decisions to invade a country or rescue hostages, Chavez had time on his side and was
able to delay making a decision. Once one option became the clear winner (after Russia
244
officially ratified and set The Protocol in motion) Chavez could make his ultimate
decision.
Taken together, the cases from the current study demonstrate that each of the
three presidents was able to make expeditious decisions to eliminate options in the first
phase and, contrastingly, took their time in making their final decisions in the second.
While this assessment does not stray considerably from PH, it provides a more nuanced
explanation of the decision-making processes likely as regards low politics and non-crisis
decision making.
Suggested Considerations for Poliheuristic Theory
In addition to the above discussion, the case studies and analyses highlight some
issues that PH does not currently account for. First, a synthesis of the analyses suggests
that PH may not be applicable to a wider array of case studies than to which is has been
previously applied. There may be limits to PH’s generalizability. Most obviously, PH
may not be applicable to all environmental foreign policy decisions, particularly those in
developing countries. Specifically, the fact that these are most often non-crisis situations
opens the door for much flexibility in decision-making processes thereby making
generalizability more difficult. The sheer fact that these decisions can take years paves
the way for considerable variability that is difficult to categorize.
The specific example of Venezuela proposes that PH does not account for the
possibility of changing external (or internal) contexts. In decision processes that can span
years, there are likely to be contextual changes that alter the trajectory of the existing
245
process. Alterations could be small and virtually insignificant or could change the entire
perspective of the decision-maker, as it did in Chavez’s case. Should the process be
considered two separate ones, points A to B and then B to C? Or should it have two
second phases, as was applied in this study? PH would benefit from addressing and
considering more dynamic decision making, especially if it is to also be applied to low
politics and non-crisis scenarios.
The question then becomes: Should changes be made to PH? The answer
depends on where one sits on the perennial generalizability versus parsimony debate.
Making the theory more applicable to these new classes of cases would entail more
specificity and more complexity, most definitely to the detriment of parsimony. But,
doing so could add to the theory’s generalizability. This study argues that the basics of
the theory are valid and do not need alteration. All three presidents utilized cognitive
heuristics to narrow the field of possible policy options to a more manageable set and
then utilized more calculative decision strategies to make their final decision. Specificity
beyond this basic level is more problematic. After additional study it may be possible to
make PH a multi-track theory where different conditions beget different processes and
key considerations. Distinctions could be made between high and low politics issues,
crisis and non-crisis situations, developed and developing nations and between different
regime types (levels of democracy). Although there is the possibility of creating an über-
complex theory, such a strategy is at least worth contemplating.
An alternative strategy would be to make the predictions in the first phase as
general as they are in the second. According to PH, a decision-maker utilizes a rational
246
decision strategy in the second phase, though the theory does not require a specific
strategy. It allows for at least three. The first phase predictions could be made equally as
generous by allowing for a small set of possible primary criteria, depending on the
particular context. For example, a decision-maker in a developed and democratic country
making a high politics decision would a primary criterion of domestic politics while a
leader making the same decision in a developing and less democratic country would have
a primary criterion of international concern. Table 7.2 summarizes the contributions,
such as this, that this study makes to the development of PH.
Table 7.2 Contribution to Poliheuristic Theory Development
This study supports:
1. the theoretical basis behind PH that the decision-making process is composed of two
phases.
2. the claim that decision-makers employ cognitive heuristics in the first phase in order to
narrow the policy options to a more manageable set.
3. the claim that decision-makers employ traditionally rational decision strategies in the
second phase in order to chose a final policy option.
This study suggests that:
1. decision-makers do not always prioritize domestic political concerns.
2. primary decision criteria in the first phase can be affected by
a. the type of policy (high versus low politics issues).
b. immediacy and temporal constraints (crisis versus non-crisis situations).
c. developmental status (developed versus developing nations).
d. regime type (inclusive of level of democracy).
3. in low politics decisions decision-makers have more freedom to make decisions
(especially in the first phase) than in high politics decisions,
a. this includes more authority to make decisions on their own or delegate
decision making.
4. in non-crisis situations decision-makers can employ a trial-and-error method to make
their final decision.
5. some adjustments should be made to PH to improve its successful application to a
wider set of cases. These include:
a. acknowledging the greater variability in low politics and non-crisis decision
making.
b. accommodating internal and external contextual changes.
247
Additional Research
While this study does have its weaknesses, including the fact that the sample size
is limited to three presidents making decisions on one policy, it does provide valuable
suggestions and contributions to augment existing literature. Further research would be
additionally rewarding and help substantiate or invalidate the suggestions herein. Such
study should include expanding the number of cases to include developed and developing
nations in other regions as well as other environmental foreign policy decisions such as
the ratification of the Montreal Protocol. Study should also include different types of
environmental foreign policy decisions, just as existing literature considers a wide variety
of high politics issue areas. Other possible examples to consider should include both
international and bi- and multi-lateral foreign policy issues. Such examples include the
protection of endangered species, cross-border pollution, water rights and the disposal of
hazardous waste. Future research should also acquire a comparative component where
the aforementioned different categories could be more adequately assessed (i.e.,
developed versus developing, etc.).
248
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APPENDIX A
Oil Production/Consumption and CO
2
Emissions in Latin America
This data advised case study selection, as referenced throughout the text. This
information is also alluded to in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 in general discussions of oil
production/consumption and GHG emissions. The highlighted numbers represent the
highest numbers in the region (with the exception of Brazil) and, thus, the three countries
chosen for analysis.
Note: Tables were created via the USAID Latin America and the Caribbean website. The
data is available via the website (http://qesdb.usaid.gov/lac/docdownload.html) or in print
(Latin America and the Caribbean: Selected Economic and Social Data, 2007. USAID.
Development Statistics).
Production of Crude Oil, NGPL, and Other Liquids
(Thousand Barrels per Day)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Antigua and Barbuda 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Argentina 882.1 896.7 850.2 809.1 850.4 840.1 840.1 797.1 773.6
Aruba 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bahamas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Barbados 0.9 1.6 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Belize 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bermuda 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bolivia 37.5 43.2 40.8 39.4 43.9 46.2 41.7 60.0 61.4
Brazil 1,068.5 1,228.5 1,390.8 1,497.7 1,533.7 1,717.1 1,800.5 1,791.0 1,989.4
British Virgin Islands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cayman Islands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chile 14.4 13.3 12.4 10.9 11.7 11.3 11.4 10.6 10.2
Colombia 656.3 736.9 820.8 694.3 626.6 578.9 544.5 532.8 529.8
Costa Rica 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cuba 33.0 34.0 40.0 42.0 50.0 47.3 55.2 66.5 81.1
Dominica 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dominican Republic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ecuador 391.2 379.5 376.6 398.2 415.0 395.0 413.3 530.2 534.0
El Salvador 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Falkland Islands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
273
French Guiana 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Grenada 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Guadeloupe 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Guatemala 15.6 23.8 23.3 20.7 21.1 18.0 22.0 19.8 17.2
Guyana 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Haiti 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Honduras 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Jamaica 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Martinique 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 3,410.6 3,494.6 3,345.0 3,450.0 3,560.1 3,585.2 3,788.9 3,825.0 3,760.0
Montserrat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Netherlands Antilles 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nicaragua 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Panama 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Paraguay 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Peru 119.3 116.6 107.0 99.5 97.1 96.9 92.4 94.1 111.3
Puerto Rico 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
St. Lucia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
St. Vincent and Grenadines 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Suriname 5.0 7.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Trinidad and Tobago 131.8 130.4 135.0 146.5 139.1 152.1 182.5 164.9 181.9
Turks and Caicos Islands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uruguay 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Venezuela 3,498.0 3,382.0 3,085.8 3,440.0 3,316.3 2,906.4 2,564.5 2,837.9 2,846.0
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual
274
Petroleum Consumption (Quadrillion Btu)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Antigua and Barbuda 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008
Argentina 0.979 1.027 1.062 1.042 0.969 0.882 0.916 0.944 0.963
Aruba 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014
Bahamas 0.048 0.054 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.057 0.057 0.055
Barbados 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.015 0.019
Belize 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.014
Bermuda 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009
Bolivia 0.070 0.078 0.089 0.095 0.092 0.097 0.095 0.101 0.106
Brazil 4.173 4.304 4.373 4.394 4.491 4.382 4.220 4.345 4.447
British Virgin Islands 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Cayman Islands 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006
Chile 0.465 0.486 0.496 0.476 0.469 0.473 0.480 0.498 0.511
Colombia 0.569 0.578 0.554 0.555 0.544 0.523 0.533 0.535 0.530
Costa Rica 0.064 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.076 0.080 0.085 0.084 0.087
Cuba 0.434 0.425 0.427 0.426 0.444 0.442 0.441 0.433 0.436
Dominica 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Dominican Republic 0.172 0.176 0.200 0.224 0.232 0.237 0.235 0.230 0.235
Ecuador 0.272 0.280 0.259 0.261 0.281 0.285 0.293 0.305 0.312
El Salvador 0.067 0.078 0.079 0.078 0.081 0.081 0.087 0.085 0.088
Falkland Islands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
French Guiana 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014
Grenada 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
Guadeloupe 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.029
Guatemala 0.099 0.120 0.122 0.121 0.135 0.132 0.133 0.138 0.143
Guyana 0.015 0.020 0.021 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.021 0.022
Haiti 0.020 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025
Honduras 0.053 0.061 0.064 0.059 0.069 0.076 0.077 0.089 0.092
Jamaica 0.141 0.144 0.148 0.143 0.144 0.147 0.153 0.154 0.156
Martinique 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.032
Mexico 3.674 3.872 3.862 4.014 3.945 3.818 3.809 3.902 4.081
Montserrat 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Netherlands Antilles 0.162 0.162 0.156 0.156 0.158 0.151 0.144 0.145 0.149
Nicaragua 0.042 0.048 0.051 0.051 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.057 0.059
Panama 0.168 0.185 0.172 0.169 0.176 0.167 0.169 0.190 0.194
Paraguay 0.043 0.049 0.055 0.051 0.049 0.051 0.053 0.053 0.055
275
Peru 0.327 0.331 0.335 0.327 0.321 0.316 0.319 0.339 0.348
Puerto Rico 0.379 0.388 0.399 0.423 0.451 0.447 0.456 0.471 0.486
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
St. Lucia 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005
St. Vincent and Grenadines 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Suriname 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.026
Trinidad and Tobago 0.046 0.044 0.046 0.050 0.058 0.058 0.065 0.068 0.058
Turks and Caicos Islands . . . . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Uruguay 0.076 0.092 0.101 0.090 0.070 0.077 0.077 0.081 0.082
Venezuela 0.898 0.906 0.906 0.985 1.076 1.139 1.082 1.093 1.186
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 0.117 0.121 0.125 0.132 0.192 0.191 0.225 0.235 0.207
Source: Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual
276
Petroleum Consumption (Thousand Barrels per Day)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Antigua and Barbuda 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.50 3.51 3.53 3.74 4.04 4.00
Argentina 476.26 491.57 523.20 510.93 474.39 438.30 449.99 471.79 480.00
Aruba 6.01 6.08 6.08 6.51 6.53 6.53 6.98 7.06 7.00
Bahamas 21.99 24.56 22.29 22.22 21.84 22.26 26.60 26.96 26.00
Barbados 9.19 9.49 9.74 10.82 10.37 10.37 10.57 7.10 9.00
Belize 3.19 3.21 3.26 4.71 6.26 6.01 6.29 6.75 7.00
Bermuda 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.66 3.63 3.67 3.98 4.25 4.40
Bolivia 36.45 40.41 43.47 48.10 46.74 46.72 46.26 49.62 52.00
Brazil 2,030.68 2,095.92 2,130.31 2,166.28 2,206.08 2,131.60 2,055.68 2,122.81 2,166.00
British Virgin Islands 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.48 0.60 0.60
Cayman Islands 2.37 2.41 2.41 2.39 2.41 2.41 2.50 2.70 2.70
Chile 228.18 239.24 244.26 235.90 232.49 233.96 235.77 244.63 250.00
Colombia 286.51 289.02 277.40 277.49 271.18 261.20 265.36 267.52 264.00
Costa Rica 31.01 34.97 35.75 36.28 37.59 39.66 41.92 41.56 43.00
Cuba 200.00 194.00 195.00 195.00 203.60 201.51 204.85 201.22 202.00
Dominica 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.75 0.82 0.88 0.77 0.80
Dominican Republic 84.12 86.25 99.24 110.06 113.95 116.15 115.28 114.07 116.00
Ecuador 134.88 137.23 128.40 130.54 139.97 141.73 146.06 151.90 155.00
El Salvador 32.16 37.79 38.31 38.06 39.41 39.01 42.36 41.93 43.20
Falkland Islands 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.24
French Guiana 6.16 6.27 6.27 6.34 6.35 6.53 6.81 6.62 6.70
Grenada 1.55 1.39 1.39 0.96 1.61 1.74 1.76 1.78 1.80
Guadeloupe 11.76 11.76 11.76 12.43 12.66 12.88 13.39 13.72 14.00
Guatemala 48.46 58.09 59.16 59.29 65.90 64.56 64.98 67.57 70.00
Guyana 7.36 9.29 9.86 10.81 11.10 11.27 11.08 10.07 10.50
Haiti 9.43 8.93 10.03 10.33 11.23 11.60 11.55 11.84 12.00
Honduras 25.29 29.01 30.63 28.11 33.00 36.34 36.54 41.85 43.00
Jamaica 66.06 66.73 68.59 65.64 66.20 67.78 70.43 71.33 72.00
Martinique 13.13 13.15 13.15 13.35 13.46 13.67 14.24 14.67 15.10
Mexico 1,854.05 1,948.64 1,957.44 2,036.36 2,008.69 1,949.76 1,948.58 1,995.92 2,078.23
Montserrat 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.46 0.48
Netherlands Antilles 73.73 73.66 71.18 70.96 71.86 70.51 65.76 66.39 68.00
Nicaragua 19.55 22.37 23.96 24.02 25.58 25.42 25.64 27.17 28.00
Panama 76.56 84.66 78.40 77.38 80.28 76.59 77.57 88.03 90.00
Paraguay 20.88 23.89 26.94 25.10 24.06 25.05 26.02 26.09 27.00
Peru 156.55 158.64 160.52 156.79 153.87 152.34 154.22 161.96 166.00
277
Puerto Rico 179.25 183.54 189.14 201.35 213.86 212.05 217.81 222.76 230.00
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.79 0.87 0.90
St. Lucia 1.47 1.47 1.47 2.33 2.44 2.49 2.74 2.68 2.70
St. Vincent and Grenadines 1.01 1.19 1.19 1.21 1.23 1.31 1.38 1.47 1.50
Suriname 9.82 9.92 9.92 10.33 10.88 11.46 11.73 12.22 12.00
Trinidad and Tobago 22.47 21.84 23.35 24.68 29.00 28.31 31.34 32.45 28.00
Turks and Caicos Islands . . . . 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Uruguay 37.11 44.18 48.38 43.18 34.11 37.04 36.69 38.47 39.00
Venezuela 454.57 456.76 461.21 499.71 544.47 570.67 540.64 552.85 598.00
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 58.26 60.30 62.44 66.08 91.70 93.24 108.78 110.90 98.00
Source: Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual
278
Total CO2 emissions from fossil-fuels (thousand metric tons of carbon)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Antigua and Barbuda 92 91 95 96 96 101 109 113
Argentina 35,868 36,326 38,491 37,315 34,845 32,895 35,491 38,673
Aruba 511 462 466 570 572 582 588 588
Bahamas 475 489 490 490 490 568 510 548
Barbados 245 312 330 323 331 334 324 346
Belize 106 101 164 188 194 203 213 216
Bermuda 126 126 135 135 135 144 144 150
Bolivia 2,684 2,816 2,579 2,245 2,005 1,876 2,715 1,902
Brazil 81,310 85,102 86,362 88,271 90,597 88,756 85,426 90,499
British Virgin Islands 16 16 16 16 16 18 21 23
Cayman Islands 77 77 76 77 77 79 83 85
Chile 16,075 15,933 17,284 16,261 15,091 15,643 15,722 17,025
Colombia 17,681 17,980 15,414 15,741 15,215 14,989 15,647 14,629
Costa Rica 1,355 1,452 1,505 1,509 1,534 1,546 1,766 1,747
Cuba 6,631 6,543 6,842 6,875 6,617 6,881 6,623 7,042
Dominica 22 21 22 28 31 28 31 29
Dominican Republic 4,974 5,095 5,147 5,486 5,518 5,863 5,800 5,357
Ecuador 5,057 6,175 5,897 5,822 6,541 6,708 6,334 7,983
El Salvador 1,570 1,580 1,554 1,566 1,622 1,644 1,740 1,682
Falkland Islands 13 10 10 10 12 12 12 12
French Guiana 245 264 266 267 268 274 274 274
Grenada 56 52 56 56 60 59 60 59
Guadeloupe 419 416 433 445 450 459 467 473
Guatemala 2,072 2,387 2,435 2,781 2,878 3,000 2,905 3,333
Guyana 435 451 450 431 414 422 409 394
Haiti 388 336 363 373 434 460 457 479
Honduras 1,134 1,268 1,293 1,372 1,558 1,647 1,771 2,077
Jamaica 2,899 2,653 2,664 2,814 2,898 2,811 2,926 2,889
Martinique 554 557 543 553 560 594 347 352
Mexico 115,279 116,256 113,718 114,276 117,337 114,285 118,687 119,473
Montserrat 13 14 13 13 13 15 17 17
Netherlands Antilles 2,008 925 881 897 908 925 1,106 1,115
Nicaragua 855 933 989 1,028 1,085 1,072 1,041 1,093
Panama 1,625 1,625 1,537 1,570 1,910 1,592 1,649 1,544
Paraguay 1,143 1,228 1,228 1,006 1,043 1,089 1,129 1,140
279
Peru 7,206 7,264 7,829 7,598 7,345 7,248 7,308 8,590
St. Kitts and Nevis 28 28 28 28 28 31 34 34
St. Lucia 85 81 92 96 96 79 96 100
St. Vincent and Grenadines 36 44 45 42 48 50 53 54
Suriname 577 583 587 580 618 614 611 623
Trinidad and Tobago 5,051 5,798 6,965 7,586 7,797 8,426 8,833 8,880
Uruguay 1,436 1,422 1,682 1,339 1,271 1,205 1,216 1,494
Venezuela 46,417 48,757 48,750 44,203 45,406 38,183 42,433 47,084
Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Center (CDIAC), Oak Ridge National Laboratory
280
CO
2
: Total emissions including land use change (source: WRI)
[Thousand metric tons of carbon dioxide]
1997 1998 1999 2000
Argentina 196,021 195,828 201,211 196,657
Bahamas 1,741 1,792 1,796 1,796
Belize 22,761 22,402 22,284 22,139
Bolivia 98,863 98,616 96,771 96,042
Brazil 1,747,871 1,735,247 1,723,634 1,708,850
Chile 69,348 69,336 76,158 69,774
Colombia 179,732 180,394 169,142 169,471
Costa Rica 14,874 15,265 15,257 15,180
Cuba 18,991 19,589 20,797 22,560
Dominican Republic 17,015 18,690 19,258 20,507
Ecuador 82,689 82,008 80,159 81,703
El Salvador 9,950 10,200 10,018 9,985
Guatemala 66,678 67,196 66,732 66,709
Guyana 38,160 37,610 37,095 36,506
Haiti 3,506 3,351 3,419 3,420
Honduras 22,560 22,853 22,647 22,554
Jamaica 11,954 12,443 12,454 12,946
Mexico 467,385 485,037 480,407 482,911
Nicaragua 59,240 58,668 58,037 57,321
Panama 54,550 54,951 53,916 53,225
Paraguay 25,748 25,608 25,282 24,206
Peru 221,657 219,696 218,566 215,395
Suriname 2,144 2,166 2,177 2,148
Uruguay -19,574 -18,905 -17,451 -17,995
Venezuela 281,674 294,199 281,844 283,211
Source: World Resources Institute, EarthTrends Database
281
APPENDIX B
Interview Respondents
Note: This appendix has been removed in order to protect the anonymity of respondents.
It may be available upon request from the author.
Abstract (if available)
Abstract
Theories of foreign policy analysis have been successfully applied to a seemingly wide array of case studies. They have been used to explain why individuals or collectives have decided to invade another country, rescue hostages or wage war, for example. In other words, they have largely been applied to high politics or crisis situations. This study takes one such theory and applies it to a different class of low politics, non-crisis cases in order to test its generalizability. The following study applies poliheuristic theory to three cases of environmental foreign policy decision-making. Specifically, the theory is tested against the cases of President Carlos Menem of Argentina, President Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico and President Hugo Chávez and their decisions to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and join the global climate change regime. This new application has implications not only for the generalizability and general strength of poliheuristic theory, but for foreign policy analysis more generally and environmental and Latin American foreign policy decision-making more specifically. The results of the study provide support for the foundations of the theory in that all three presidents utilized a combination of cognitive and rational decision strategies to reach their final decision. The results are less supportive of the specific prediction that the decision-makers eliminate policy options early in the process based on a primary criterion of domestic political concerns. The results instead reveal the presidents prioritized international or personal concerns. In the end, the study advocates for some re-theorizing of poliheuristic theory to better explain low politics and non-crisis situations in general and environmental and Latin American/developing nations foreign policy decisions in particular.
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Creator
Below, Amy Margaret
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Core Title
Decisions to ratify the Kyoto Protocol: a Latin American perspective on poliheuristic theory
School
College of Letters, Arts and Sciences
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
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Politics
Publication Date
12/16/2008
Defense Date
08/07/2008
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University of Southern California
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Tag
argentina,Carlos Menem,climate change,environmental policy,Ernesto Zedillo,foreign policy analysis,Hugo Chavez,international policy,International relations,Kyoto Protocol,Mexico,OAI-PMH Harvest,poliheuristic theory,Venezuela
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Mexico
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Venezuela
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Tags
Carlos Menem
climate change
environmental policy
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foreign policy analysis
Hugo Chavez
international policy
Kyoto Protocol
poliheuristic theory