University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Crimes of honor: an international human rights perspective on violence against women in South Asia

(USC Thesis Other)

Crimes of honor: an international human rights perspective on violence against women in South Asia

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content

CRIMES OF HONOR:
AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE
ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SOUTH ASIA

by

Archana Agarwal

_________________________________________________________________

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLITICAL SCIENCE)

December 2008

Copyright 2008 Archana Agarwal

ii

Dedication
To my mother, Nilam

and my niece, Avantika

for inspiring me.

iii
Acknowledgements
This Dissertation has been a long journey. I would like to express my gratitude and
thanks here to all those people who helped me along the way.
I thank my supervisor, Dr. Alison Dundes Renteln, for her wonderful guidance
and on going mentorship. Without her this dissertation would not have been possible. I
thank her for challenging me intellectually, for offering advice, for her insightful
comments on my work and above all for her constant encouragement and support. It was
her faith in my abilities that kept me going. I would also like to thank my committee
members, Dr. Nancy Lutkehaus and Dr. Richard Dekmejian, for reading my manuscript
and for their excellent feedback.
I am indebted to the University of Southern California, the Department of
Political Science and its staff, especially Jody and Veronica, for making my life as an
international student easier with their help and support. I thank Dean Joan Metcalf
Schaefer, Center for Religion and Civic Culture, Center for Law, History and Culture and
Unruh Institute of Politics for the various research awards I received. I would like to
extend special thanks to the Sociology Department, Dr. Lisa Bitel (Professor, History
Department) and Dr. Peter Mancall, Director of USC-Huntington Early Modern Studies
Institute for the graduate student assistantships. I am especially grateful to Dr. Mancall
for the Research Assistant position, which not only offered financial support but also has
been an enriching experience.
This research was also enabled by the kind assistance of organizations like Acid
Survivors Foundation, Bangladesh National Women’s Lawyers’ Association and

iv
Naripokkho in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and Human Rights Law Network, Lawyers Collective,
Saheli Resource Center, Sakshi and Jagori in New Delhi, India.
I also want to thank a few of my friends and colleagues with whom I have shared
this journey. I am grateful to Jinee, Sangha and Sanjay for their intellectual inputs and
comments and for their invaluable friendship. I have shared some of the toughest and best
moments of my graduate school life with them. I am also thankful to Linda, Maya, Nadia
and Randa for their friendship and support. I also want to thank Patrick, Subas, Kanchan,
Ishani, Murali, Ratan, Sun-Young, Shilpa, Saurabh, Nimusha and Heather for their
friendship and for providing the lighter moments during times of stress.
I could not have completed this work without the love and support of my family. I
am grateful to my parents, Nilam and Mahabir Agarwal, for their love and the
opportunities they provided me. My sisters, Vandana and Ranjana; my brothers, Vikas
and Vishal; my sisters in law, Sangeeta and Preeti; and my brothers in law, Alok and
Manoj; have given me everything I could hope for and more during these years. My
nieces, Avantika and Ankita; and my nephews, Aditya, Akshat, Shreyas and Anmol, have
made my life happier with their presence and unconditional love. They provide me with
the motivation to strive to be a better person. I also want to thank my in laws, Helen and
Balaji Andrews, and my sister in law, Rose, for their constant encouragement and
support.
Finally, I thank my husband and my best friend, Nishanth Balaji, for being my
pillar of strength. Without his support and encouragement, this dissertation would not
have been possible. His faith in me, his patience and companionship during some of the
most stressful times, made this journey easier. I cannot thank him enough for his

v
generous assistance with editing and for inspiring in me a love for learning and reading
outside my interests.

vi
Table of Contents

Dedication ii
Acknowledgements iii
Abstract vii
Chapter I: Introduction 1
The Influence of 'Honor' in Violence against Women
Chapter II 57
Honor Killings in Pakistan: An Analysis with Examples of the Case of Samia
Sarwar and Mukhtar Mai
Chapter III 120
In the Name of ‘Honor’: Acid Attacks on Women in Bangladesh
Chapter IV 173
Honor Violence against Women during the 2002 Gujarat Conflict:
Case of Zahira Sheikh and Bilqis Yakoob
Chapter V 225
Analysis of Honor Related Violence and the Role of International Human Rights
Instruments
Chapter VI 252
Conclusion
Bibliography 257

vii
Abstract
This dissertation examines the phenomenon of honor related violence beyond
honor killings as I argue that honor crimes do not always amount to murder but can take
various manifestations and should be recognized as such. I do so with the help of three
case studies: honor killings in Pakistan, acid attacks against women in Bangladesh and
use of rape as a weapon of war during the internal conflict in Gujarat, India.
In this study, I propose a reconceptualization of the categories usually employed
by the literature in order to broaden our understanding of honor related violence. I
explore the origins of the crime, the concept of suitor rejection, honor and shame, their
societal and legal implications and the responses of the legislative and judicial systems of
these nations. I demonstrate that these crimes are manifestations of unequal power
relations that reinforce men’s control and domination over women. I look at the socio,
cultural, political and economic reasons for the perpetuation of honor crimes against
women in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India while attempting to shift the focus from
associating honor crimes with Islamic cultures. I also analyze the legal framework and
the ways in which existing laws, meant to protect women from violence, are interpreted
and implemented by the courts. There are flaws in the legal framework, which contribute
to impunity for the perpetrators of human rights violations. Therefore, I argue that
international human rights law provides the framework for expanding the rights and
protections available to women.
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to look at different forms of violence
against women through the lens of honor crimes. It provides a comparative analysis
honor crimes while suggesting that these crimes are not unique to Islamic countries or

viii
Third world cultures. It is a part of our patriarchal society that sees women in certain
roles and their bodies as repositories of honor or the property of men. Religion and
culture, as a result, just become tools to enforce these roles and to assure compliance.
Law, thus, must play a more important role in protecting women from violence.

1
Chapter I: Introduction
The Influence of ‘Honor’ in Violence against Women

“Virtuous is the girl who suffers and dies without a sound.”
1

“There must be no impunity for gender-based violence. Let me be clear. What we
are talking about is not a side issue. It is not a special interest group of concern to
only a few. What we are talking about are not only women’s rights but also the
human rights of over one half of this globe’s population…Violence against
women concerns not only women, but above all the rest of us.”
2

Violence against women is one of the most shameful human rights violations, and
it is probably the most pervasive. It knows no boundaries of geography, culture or wealth,
and as long it continues, there can be no real progress towards equality, development and
peace.
3
Exacerbating the problem is the fact that violence in general across the globe has
not abated. Whether it breaks out as a full-scale war, ethnic or religious conflict,
terrorism or the violence that regularly affects many poor and disenfranchised
communities, there is a growing sense of injustice and insecurity in the world that, in a
vicious cycle, increases the violence against women. And yet almost thirty years after the
adoption of the most important women’s rights document by the United Nations, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), the position of women continues to be subordinate and marginalized both
under international law and domestic legal systems. This continued marginalization of
women’s interests by the international legal system is not only a reflection of a

1
Mineke Schipper, “Mankind’s Proverbial Imagination: Critical Perspectives on Human Universals As a
Global Challenge, “ in Beyond Dichotomies, edited by Elisabeth Mudimbe-Boyi, 69-92, Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2002: 80.

2
Sergio Vieira de Mello, UN Commissioner for Human Rights, as quoted in Gloria Jacobs, ed., Not a
Minute More: Ending Violence against Women, New York: UNIFEM, 2003.

3
Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, March 8, 1999.

2
thoroughly gendered system, but also reveals the inadequacy of international law to deal
with situations when women’s rights are in conflict with the rights to freedom of religion
and culture.
4
There is a constant struggle to strike a balance between protecting the
human rights of women without infringing upon the rights of groups to follow their
religious traditions and preserve their cultural beliefs. However, most of the time conflict
between rights occurs not because there is disagreement over the need for protection of
women’s rights, but because the perpetrators of violence use religious and cultural rights
or customary norms as a defense against punishment. Any attempt to protect women from
violence can be undermined by the misuse of a cultural relativist claim that members of
other cultural systems are not subject to international human rights standards. This
distortion of cultural relativism is used to claim that perpetrators can avoid responsibility
for private acts of violence; that universal human rights are yet another element of a
‘Western’ conspiracy to undermine non-western societies, and that outsiders must
subscribe to a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another nation.
Every year thousands of women are killed or violent crimes are committed against
them all over the world. A lot of this violence occurs because of some actual and many
perceived actions by women that might be deemed ‘dishonorable’ by the family or the
larger community. This specific form of violence against women is referred to as ‘honor
killing’ both by the popular media and academia. There is so much written on this topic,
especially on ‘honor killings’ in non-western cultures, and still there remains
ambivalence among many as to its true definition. I wonder what it means to a layperson
who has not read several academic books on the topic and if the subject inspires as much

4
Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright, “Feminist Approaches to International Law,”
The American Journal of International Law 85 (1991): 613-645.

3
passion or even reaction in them as much as it does for researchers like me. So I try to
think back to when I did not know that I was a feminist or was not aware of most of the
human rights literature to reflect on whether I had any awareness of the concept or any
perception of honor crimes.
There is one story I distinctly remember, and I feel it is important for me to tell
this story because a lot of what I think and write is colored by this story among many
others that I experienced growing up. My older sister had a friend who died mysteriously
one day. I was shocked at the news but what was even more shocking to me was that the
others were not as bewildered. We were all told that she took her own life, but I knew
that was not true just like everyone else. But to my amazement that reality did not seem
to affect the rest as much. My sister’s friend belonged to the same sub caste of Hindu
religion as I do. We are pretty traditional, conservative, and patriarchal and above all we
marry within our own caste.
5
All my life I have been told what is the right way to behave,
what I should wear, how I should talk, why I should not talk to men outside of the family.
I had curfews that were never imposed on my brothers and above all I was acculturated
into thinking that getting a good husband at the right age was most important thing in my
life. Moreover not fulfilling any of these roles would always amount to fights with my
parents, threats of not allowing me to continue with my education, and so on. I always
thought it was so unfair that I, along with my sisters, were the bearers of our family’s
honor. I am fortunate that I broke away from it, but millions of women all over the world,
probably live under similar or worse threats to their person and life. Those not as

5
Caste is a system of rigid social stratification characterized by difference in inherited rank or privilege,
social status, occupation, profession or race. In Hinduism caste system restricts the occupation of their
members and their association with members of other castes. The Indian caste system is especially
characterized by endogamy. Even though the Indian Constitution has outlawed caste-based discrimination,
it persists in various forms all over India.

4
fortunate as I was are becoming victims of a crime of honor everyday and some even
succumb to their worst fate, an ‘honor killing’. My sister’s friend had fallen in love with
someone outside her community and the boy was from a lower caste. Her parents were
against the relationship and she was put under house arrest until her family could arrange
a match for her. Her parents behaved as if they had lost everything and were embarrassed
to be seen in public. They had lost their ‘honor’. All of a sudden she dies. Everyone
spoke in hushed tones of how the parents may be involved, but no one said anything to
the police. The police did not care either. Within a few days everyone forgot about the
incident and her parents were more than happy to not have her in their life anymore. In
fact, because her death was explained away as a suicide, it restored their honor in a
certain way. If this were to happen in 2008, I for sure would have termed it as an honor
killing and it still remains my first memory of what family honor means and how women
in their ‘self’ embody that honor.
This story is a good example of the biases that exists in our societies. Honor
killing is not a practice limited to certain cultures, but is much more widespread in some
societies. It probably just does not get as much attention when it happens elsewhere. It
may not occur everywhere as often as it does in certain countries, but that does not mean
it mainly happens in countries like Pakistan and Jordan.
Therefore, the main purpose of this dissertation is to broaden our understanding of
honor related violence beyond honor killing as I argue that honor crimes do not always
amount to murder but can take various manifestations and should be recognized as such. I
do so with the help of three case studies: honor killings in Pakistan, acid attacks against
women in Bangladesh and use of rape as a weapon of war during the internal conflict in

5
Gujarat, India. I chose these three cases because they highlight the various forms that
honor crimes might take. I start with the example of honor killings in Pakistan because it
is the classic example of what consists honor crimes. It also provides the background to a
better understanding of the concept of honor and its influence in violent crimes against
women. The other two case studies help demonstrate why there is a need to include the
other forms of violence usually not analyzed as part of the honor related phenomena
within the rubric of honor crimes. While there is hardly any scholarship on acid violence,
most of the studies on the use of rape as a weapon of war focus either only on
international conflicts or large scale conflicts with implications for international
community.
In this dissertation, with the help of the three case studies, I aim to propose a
reconceptualization of the categories usually employed and to shift the focus from
associating honor crimes with Islamic cultures. The failure to do so will amount to
stereotyping non-western cultures as inferior and exploitative of women. Any sincere
attempt at a truly global women’s human rights movement needs to break away from
such divisions while still acknowledging that cultural differences exist. I also argue that
international law can be a vehicle for change and can extend women’s human rights to
the most vulnerable aspects of their life. While the importance of effective domestic laws
cannot be emphasized enough, it is also imperative to recognize the significant role
international law can play in exerting pressure on domestic legal systems to hold
perpetrators accountable. International law also has a key role to play in raising
awareness of women’s human rights in both domestic and international tribunals.

6
Typically ‘honor killing’ occurs when a male family member kills the ‘deviant
female’ in an attempt to restore his family’s honor. It is an act of violence committed
against a female by one or more of her family members mainly because of her alleged
participation in unacceptable sexual behavior that results in the loss of the female’s
virginity, or pregnancy or her participation in unacceptable social behavior such as
socializing with males outside her immediate family.
6
Even though most associate honor
crimes with murder only, honor crimes also include, but are not limited to, a range of
other violent acts against women such as attempted murder, acid attacks, dowry deaths,
rape, and female infanticide.
7
The Centre of Islamic and Middle Eastern Laws (CIMEL)
and The International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS)
8

define crimes of honor to encompass “a variety of manifestations of violence against
women, including ‘honor killings’, assault, confinement or imprisonment, and
interference with choice in marriage, where the publicly articulated ‘justification’ is
attributed to a social order claimed to require the preservation of a concept of ‘honor’

6
Ferris K. Nesheiwat, “Honor Crimes in Jordan: Their Treatment Under Islamic and Jordanian Criminal
Laws,” Penn State International Law Review 23, no. 2 (2004): 253.

7
Kathryn Christine Arnold, “Are the Perpetrators of Honor Killings Getting Away with Murder? Article
340 of the Jordanian Penal Code Analyzed Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women,” American University International Law Review 16 (2001): 1346.

8
The International Center for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS) is an international
human rights organization based in London and Center of Islamic and Middle Eastern Laws (CIMEL) is a
research center in the Law Department of the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of
London. The book Honour: Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence against Women is the outcome of a five year
project on the “Strategies to Address Crimes of Honour” undertaken by the two organizations. As part of
the broader project they have also established an online bibliography on “crimes of honour” consisting of
an annotated bibliography and case summaries, available at http://www.soas.ac.uk/honourcrimes. The
project, which began in 1999, aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of “crimes of honour”.

7
vested in male (family and/or conjugal) control over women and specifically women’s
sexual conduct: actual, suspected or potential.”
9

I use this expansive definition for my project because limiting ‘crimes of honor’
to ‘honor killings’ leaves out of the analysis the widespread use of violence not
amounting to murder but which still use honor as their motivation so that it can act as a
mitigating factor in a court of law. However, I do acknowledge that there cannot be one
definition that can encompass the wide variety of violence perpetrated in the name of
honor as in some contexts the range of female behavior considered to violate ‘honor’
goes beyond sexual conduct to include other behaviors that may challenge or be
perceived as challenging male control. Welchman and Hossain, in their book, caution that
the definition of ‘crimes of honor’ is by no means straightforward and that its meaning is
inherently problematic.
10
They suggest, for example, that the terminology employed is
imprecise, and susceptible to “exoticisation,” particularly in the West.
11
Lama Abu-Odeh
in her work also cautions against the same fallacy of both the orientalist construction that
the East is different from the West and also the idea shared by Euro-American popular
culture that while the West has “passion” the East has “Honor”.
12
Another problem with
the use of the phrase ‘crimes of honor’ is that it lends support to the idea that honor is
intricately tied to women and women’s behavior, thus implying that women embody the

9
Simone Cusack and Rebecca J. Cook, “Book Review: Honour: Crimes, Paradigms and Violence against
Women, edited by Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, London: Zed Books, 2005,” Human Rights
Quarterly 29 (2007): 524.

10
Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, “Introduction,” in Honour: Crimes, Paradigms and Violence against
Women, edited by Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, London: Zed Books, 2005: 4.

11
Welchman and Hossain, Honour, 4.

12
Lama Abu-Odeh, “Comparative Speaking: The “Honor” of the “East” and the “Passion” of the “West”,”
Utah Law Review 2 (1997): 289.

8
‘honor’ of males.
13
Some have even argued that the processes of naming specific forms
of violence against women as ‘honor crimes’ entail the displacement of this violence
from juridical discourse and the laws meant to address the crime.
14
They observed how
courts in India have managed to denaturalize honor crimes as something that does not
belong to everyday patriarchal practices of a ‘secular’ nation like India but as something
belonging to primordial and backward spaces in the interior of Pakistan that is a state
based on feudal and communal ideology.
15
While one has to be mindful of such
categorizations, it also helps at the same time to identify crimes of honor so that they can
be simultaneously subjected to competing legal spheres of customary laws, family law,
criminal law and international law. “Crimes of Honor may thus include violations of a
range of rights as well as the more ‘paradigmatic’ ‘honor killings’.”
16

The purpose of this study, therefore, is to look at different forms of violence
against women through the lens of honor crimes. I do so in order to investigate whether
law, both domestic and international, is equipped to protect women from various forms of

13
Welchman and Hossain, Honour, 6.

14
Pratiksha Baxi, Shirin M. Rai and Shaheen Sardar Ali, “Legacies of Common Law: ‘Crimes of Honour’
in India and Pakistan,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 7 (2006): 1249.

15
Baxi, “Legacies of Common Law,” 1249; In the case of Sujit Kumar and others v State of UP and others,
2002 (45) ACC 79, the Allahabad High Court pronounced a judgment in response to the petition of a young
couple seeking the court’s help, since they feared that they would be killed for violating caste norms by
marrying each other. The judgment elaborates judicial disapproval of ‘honor killings’ or ‘harassment of
people who love each other and want to get married’. The Court takes note of the accounts published in the
newspapers to support its observation that ‘honor killings’ have been permitted by state machinery: “The
barbaric practice of ‘honor killings’ that is, killing of young women by their relatives or caste or
community by marrying or wanting to marry a man of another caste, community or whom the family
disapproves of, is frequently reported to take place in Pakistan which is State based on feudal and
communal ideology. However, this Court has been shocked to note that in our country also, which boasts of
being a secular and liberal country ‘honor killings’ have been taking place from time to time, and what is
deeply disturbing is that the police and other authorities do not seem to take steps to check these disgraceful
and barbaric acts. In fact such ‘honor killing’, far from being honorable are nothing but pre meditated
murder.”

16
Welchman and Hossain, Honour, 5.

9
violence, especially those that impinge upon the non-derogable right to life and the right
against torture.
17
While I do analyze domestic law and its application in national courts, I
take the stance that the international legal system has largely failed to address the
problem of violence. It is my view that the international legal system is constructed in
such a way that it privileges other rights over women’s rights. Just as women are
considered inferior to men in many societies, protection of their rights is also considered
to be a matter of “low politics” as opposed to the more important “high politics” which is
dominated by men and their concerns.
18

Regardless of the inherent bias in international law, it is important to take note of
significant developments in the international arena while recognizing that much is yet to
be done for the advancement of women’s rights. Human rights scholars and activists
moved gender-based violence from the shadows to the foreground when the Commission
on the Status of Women (CSW), established by the United Nations Economic and Social
Council in 1946 to promote implementation of the principle that men and women and
shall have equal rights, decided, in principle, to prepare a single, comprehensive and
internationally binding instrument to eliminate discrimination against women. The
ensuing instrument was the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
against Women, or the Women’s Convention, which was adopted in 1979. It became the
most comprehensive and detailed charter of equality for women under international law.

17
In International Human Rights Law there are certain rights that can never be derogated or suspended,
even in time of war or other public emergencies. Most notable among these rights are the right to life, the
prohibition of torture, the ban on slavery, and the prohibition against the retroactive imposition of criminal
penalties.

18
“Low politics” refers to domestic welfare issues and are of lesser importance to international community
because their significance is relegated to intranational relations. “High politics” is considered the substance
of international relations and refers to the macro-management of strategic state interests. Debra Davis,
“Symposium: Violence against Women: International Solutions Symposium,” Women’s Rights Law
Reporter 18 (1997): 263-281.

10
It provided the basis for realizing equality between men and women and became a major
human rights treaty to target culture as an influential force shaping gender roles. Even
though the convention lacks such substantive rights as protection from violence, it paved
the way for legal reforms that increasingly recognize violence against women as a
violation of human rights, as a public health problem, and as a crime against women and
society.
19
However laudable these initiatives are, they have some disquieting implications.
Most of these instruments, which were adopted to stop violence against women and to
make up for CEDAW’s failure to do so, take the United Nations approach to gender
based violence that focuses on the concept of ‘harmful traditional practices’.
20
Yet it does
not address the new forms of violence that are increasingly becoming widespread. For
example, rape and forced impregnation as weapons during conflicts, acid attacks and
honor killings are some such forms of violence that have not been covered by the
international law. Because these forms of violence are comparatively new, there are
hardly any existing international or domestic legal bodies for seeking redress. As a result,
perpetrators go unpunished, or their punishments are not commensurate with the crimes.

19
There have been various declarations and human rights mechanisms that have come into force after the
adoption of the Women’s Convention in 1979: General Recommendation 19 on Violence against Women
(1992), Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993), Special Rapporteur on violence
against women, its causes and consequences (1994), Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference
on Women in Beijing (1995), General Assembly Resolution 52/86 on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice Measures to Eliminate Violence Against Women (1997), Statute of the International Criminal Court
(Rome Statute,1998), Optional Protocol to CEDAW (1999), General Comment 28 on equality of Rights
Between Men and Women (Article 3, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2000), UN
Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, Peace and Security (2000), UN Convention on Transnational
Organized Crime (2000), etc.

20
The concept has been developed within the United Nations as a way of naming and combating some of
the most blatant forms of male domination against women.

11
This focus on harmful traditional practices is also problematic because it is
concerned only with practices in non-western societies, with one exception.
21
As a result,
the approach as applied gives the impression that the metropolitan centers of the West
contain no ‘traditions’ or ‘culture’ harmful to women, and that the forms of violence that
are present are idiosyncratic and individualized rather than culturally condoned.
22

In this study, I will study rape and forced impregnation as weapons of war, acid
attacks, and honor killings, to advance the argument that they are all crimes of honor, and
international law, in its present form, does not provide necessary mechanisms to protect
women from these new forms of violence. As long as the international system continues
to sanction a legal regime which considers women’s rights to be subordinate to other
rights, women’s lives will not be valued properly. Any practice or form of violence that is
harmful to women’s health, mind and body is a violation of their non-derogable rights.
Therefore, it should be deplored and not be accepted because it is “traditional.” The
political-legal systems need to respond to those who defend their actions by presenting
cultural or religious justifications by rejecting these arguments. Women, just as men,
have the right to human dignity and to preserve their bodily integrity. To condone
violence against women based on cultural or religious grounds would be a misuse of
these human rights.

21
The single exception to this focus is the category of ‘violence against women’, characterized in the 1995
Fact Sheet as ‘other forms of non-traditional practices, such as rape and domestic violence’, and
acknowledged to be a global phenomenon (United Nations 1995: 22-3, 44).

22
Bronwyn Winter, Denise Thompson and Sheila Jeffreys, “The UN Approach to Harmful Traditional
Practices: Some Conceptual Problems,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 4, no.1 (2002): 72.

12
The International Human Rights Framework for the Study of Violence against
Women
I. Human Rights Discourse: Most human rights scholarship revolves around the debate
about whether or not there are any true human rights,
23
or addresses the question of
whether the notion of human rights is a Western concept.
24
While scholars like
Donnelly,
25
Alston,
26
and Shestack,
27
agree that human rights do exist and the concept
“derives from the inherent dignity of the human person,”
28
they fail to recognize the
cross-cultural bias in such an approach. This calls into question the very notion that
human rights are universal and thus acceptable to all. A cross-cultural understanding that
sheds light on a common core of acceptable rights to gain cultural legitimacy has been
proposed by scholars like Renteln.
29
An’Naim goes a step further by suggesting that we
need to broaden and deepen universal consensus on the formulation and implementation

23
Maurice Cranston, What Are Human Rights?, New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1978.

24
R. Panikkar, “Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?,” Diogenes 120 (1982): 75-102.

25
Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Human
Rights Conception,” American Political Science Review 76 (1982): 303-316; Jack Donnelly, Universal
Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.

26
Philip Alston, ed., Promoting Human Rights through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1999; Philip Alston and Frederic Megret, eds., The United Nations and Human Rights:
Critical Appraisal, Second Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

27
Jerome J Shestack, “The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 20 (1998):
201-234.

28
Donnelly, “Human Rights and Human Dignity,” 304.

29
Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism, Newbury Park:
Sage Publications, 1990; Alison Dundes Renteln, “The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the
Consequences for Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 7 (1985): 514-540.

13
of human rights through internal reinterpretation of, and cross-cultural dialogue about,
the meaning and implications of basic human values and norms.
30

One problem is that there is no single ‘non-western’ view, just as there is no one
‘western’ understanding of human rights. However, there is agreement that there are
several main issues central to the whole human rights debate: the question of universality
versus cultural relativism;
31
the so-called right to intervene versus the state sovereignty
defense against international intervention and the imposition of sanctions;
32
competing
priorities among different categories of human rights;
33
and concepts of individual rights
versus citizen duties. What is troubling is that mainstream human rights approaches are
based on the assumption that human rights norms are gender neutral or unaffected by
gender. These approaches do not recognize that structural imbalances of power between
men and women, the systemic nature of discrimination against women and the general
absence of women in law creation and the fact that implementation processes continue to
reflect disproportionately the experiences of men and exclude the experiences of
women.
34

30
Abdullahi A. An’Naim, ed. Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus,
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992.

31
Makau Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2002; Sandra D. Lane and Robert A. Rubenstein, “Judging the Other: Responding to
Traditional Female Genital Surgeries,” Hastings Center Report 26 (1996): 31-40.

32
George A. Lopez and David Cortright, “Economic Sanctions and Human Rights: Part of the Problem or
Part of the Solution?,” International Journal of Human Rights 1, no.2 (1997): 1-25; Christopher Wall,
“Human Rights and Economic Sanctions: The New Imperialism,” Fordham International Law Journal 22
(1998): 577-611.

33
Maurice Cranston, “Are There Any Human Rights?,” Daedalus 112 (1983): 1-18; Will Kymlicka,
Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

34
Deborah L Rhode, Speaking of Sex: The Denial of Gender Inequality, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1997; Llana Landsberg-Lewis, ed., Bringing Equality Home: Implementing the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, New York: UNIFEM, 1998,
39-40.

14
II. Assessment of Feminist Analyses of International Law
It would not be wrong to say that international law has largely resisted feminist analysis.
It was only in the 1980s that some specifically feminist perspectives began to develop in
human rights law. An understanding emerged that women’s equality and non-
discrimination between men and women, as well as women’s equal enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, do not occur automatically as a result of the overall
protection and promotion of human rights.
35

In one of the most important feminist analyses of international law, Charlesworth,
Chinkin and Wright argue that both the structures of international lawmaking and the
content of the rules of international law privilege men. If women’s interests are
acknowledged at all, they are marginalized.
36
The Human Rights Committee, for example,
has outlined the scope of the right to life without reference to the issue of female
infanticide.
37
Similarly, a 1993 study of the work of the then UN Commission on Human
Rights Special Rapporteur on Torture, Professor Kooijimans, found that he rarely

35
Charlesworth, “Feminist Approaches to International Law,”1991; Charlotte Bunch, “Women’s Rights as
Human Rights: Towards a Re-Vision of Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 12 (1990): 486-498;
Christine M. Chinkin, “Gender Inequality and International Human Rights Law,” In Inequality,
Globalization, and World Politics, edited by Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, 95-121, Oxford, NY:
Oxford University Press, 1999; Arvonne S. Fraser, “Becoming Human: The Origin and Development of
Women’s Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 21, no.4 (1999): 853-906; Nancy Kim, “Toward a
Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence between Western Imperialism and Uncritical
Absolutism,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 25 (1993): 49-105; Rebecca J. Cook, ed. Human Rights
of Women: National and International Perspectives, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994;
Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, ed. Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law, Washington, D.C.: The
American Society of International Law, 1993; Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, “Women’s Rights as
Human Rights – Rules, Realities, and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform,” Brooklyn Journal of
International Law 21, no. 3 (1996): 605-677; Aarti Rao, “Right in the Home: Feminist Theoretical
Perspective on International Human Rights,” National Law School Journal 1 (1993): 62-81; Fernando R.
Teson, “Feminism and International Law: A Reply,” Virginia Journal of International Law 33 (1993): 647-
84.

36
Charlesworth, “Feminist Approaches to International Law,”1991.

37
Andrew Byrnes, “Women, Feminism and International Human Rights Law – Methodological myopia,
Fundamental Flaws or Meaningful Marginalization? Some Current Issues,” Australian Yearbook of
International Law 12 (1988-1989): 216-223.

15
considered the application of norms of international human rights law or international
humanitarian law to women.
38
Hence, many scholars argue that women’s position can be
compared to the position of Third World states as both groups are said to encounter the
paternalistic attitude that they must be properly trained to fit into the world of men and
developed countries, respectively.
39
However, this similarity of their positions in
international law has not led to any call by the developing nations for incorporating
feminist perspectives. The power structures and decision-making processes in these
societies are just as exclusive of women as in western societies, and the rhetoric of
domination and subjugation has not encompassed women who remain the poorest and
least privileged.
40
Therefore, feminists emphasize the need for further study of traditional
areas of international law from a perspective that regards gender as important and to
question the assumptions of neutrality and universal applicability of norms of
international law: “Feminist research holds the promise of a fundamental restructuring of
traditional international law discourse and methodology to accommodate alternative
world views.”
41

The real question, however, is whether a reorientation of international law is
likely to have any real impact on women. Feminists have always questioned the utility of
attempts at legal reform in domestic law and warn against attributing too much power to

38
Women in the Law Project. Token Gestures: Women’s Human Rights and UN Reporting: The UN
Special Rapporteur on Torture. Washington DC: International Human Rights Law Group, 1993: 5-6.

39
Brigit Brock-Utne, “Women and Third World Countries: What Do We Have in Common?,” Women’s
Studies International Forum 12, no 5 (1989): 496-97.

40
K. Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World. London: Zed Books, 1986; Cynthia
Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics, Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1997.

41
Charlesworth, “Feminist Approaches to International Law,”644.

16
law to alter basic political and economic inequalities based on sex.
42
After all law is a
mechanism of the state and by attributing importance to legal reforms, we face the danger
of both endorsing and enhancing the power of the state. The State is not gender-neutral;
together with the law, it continues to be the embodiment of male power over women.
43

Thus, the centrality of the state in international law means that many of its structures
reflect patriarchal norms.
Another problem in having a state-centered approach is the historic respect
international law has given to the principle of noninterference in states’ domestic affairs.
Consequently many of the injustices that women experience under domestic law have
gone largely unrecognized.
44
In addition, most of the violence against women takes place
in the ‘private’ sphere, which has resulted in the abandonment of women interests where
their rights are most at stake. Feminist analysts, for the same reason, are skeptical of the
legal distinction between public and private sectors of life and condemn a human rights
framework that construes the civil and political rights of individuals as belonging to
public life while neglecting to protect the infringements of those rights in the private
sphere of familial relationships.
45

The state should be held accountable even for those violations that are the result
of a systematic failure on the part of the state to guarantee the political and legal

42
Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law, New York: Routledge, 1989: 25, 81-82.

43
Catharine A MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1989: 244.

44
Cook, Human Rights of Women, 1994; Celina Romany, “Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the
Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 6 (1993):
87-126.

45
Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1999; Romany, “Women as Aliens,”1993; Dallmeyer, ed. Reconceiving Reality, 1993; Karen Knop,
ed., Gender and Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

17
protections necessary to ensure the basic rights of women. States should respond
appropriately to potential or actual private conduct, and “to organize the governmental
apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public power is exercised, so
that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human
rights.”
46
In its 1988 Velasquez Rodriguez decision,
47
the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights imposed liability on Honduras for its lack of due diligence in preventing
unexplained disappearances. Similarly, holding states responsible for the failure to
protect women from violence in the private realm would then seem to be a necessary step
towards any meaningful attempt at ending gender violence.
Feminist approaches have also led to the re-characterization of rape in the
domestic laws of many states by successfully arguing that rape crime should be placed
within the context of modern criminal violence, it must be totally separated from all
traditional concepts of chastity, and it should break away from the common law of
consent in marriage. As a result rape changed from being construed as a sexually
motivated crime committed by a superior force to being viewed as a crime of power and
dominance committed through sexual difference and vulnerability.
48
Scholars have also
argued that in international law violence systematically inspired by the state to subjugate
women is a form of torture.
49
However, the international law may not be inclined to

46
Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (1988), Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Ser. C) No. 4, at 92,
Para 166.

47
Ibid, 13.

48
Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape, New York: Ballantine Publishing
Company, 1975.

49
Deborah Blatt, “Recognizing Rape as a Method of Torture,” New York University Review of Law and
Social Change 19 (1992): 821-833; Rhonda Copelon, “Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes against

18
accept such an argument. In Ireland v. UK even though the European Court of Human
Rights was willing to condemn violence on moral grounds, the Court did not agree that
“the inhuman and degrading punishment” amounted to “torture” in this instance.
50
This
case shows the difficulty that advocates of the feminist approach in international law face
when they contend that sexual violence should be considered torture.
Besides dealing with the issues of the public/private divide and whether or not
states can protect women’s rights in the private sphere, feminist legal theory has also
confronted with another challenge, namely there is no single school of feminist
jurisprudence.
51
There are different voices, which reflect on the relationship between
‘western imperialism’ and ‘cultural relativism’.
52
On the one hand, Kim considers the
relativist criticism of feminism as a form of Western imperialism misguided because
gender oppression is systematic and cross-cultural.
53
Coomaraswamy, on the other hand,
believes that there is ideological resistance to the human rights for women in the non-
Western countries because of the refusal to accept the ‘Western’ values in and of
themselves.
54
A culturally relativist position is important if we are to have any universal

Women in Humanitarian Law,” Hastings Women’s Law Journal 5 (1994): 243-266; Catharine A.
MacKinnon, “Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace,” UCLA Women’s Law Journal 4 (1993): 59-86.

50
Ireland v. United Kingdom (1978), European Court of Human Rights, 169.

51
Hilaire Barnett, Sourcebook on Feminist Jurisprudence, London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1997.

52
Alison Dundes Renteln, The Cultural Defense, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004; Nancy Kim,
“Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence between Western Imperialism and
Uncritical Absolutism,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 25 (1993): 49-105; Radhika Coomaraswamy,
“To Bellow like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and the Discourse of Rights,” In Human Rights of Women:
National and International Perspectives, edited by Rebecca J. Cook, 39-57, Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1994; J. Oloka-Onyango and Sylvia Tamale, “The Personal is Political,” or Why
Women’s Rights are Indeed Human Rights: An African Perspective on International Feminism,” Human
Rights Quarterly 17, no. 4 (1995): 692-731.

53
Kim, “Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights,” 49.

54
Coomaraswamy, “To Bellow like a Cow,” 40.

19
understanding and acceptance of the concept of human rights, but scholars like Alison
Slack have identified the opposing concern between the absolute right of “cultural self-
determination” and the right of the individual not to be subjected to a tradition or practice
that might be harmful or fatal.
55
It is not possible to identify an analytic framework that
all would embrace. For the purpose of this study I would argue that the right to culture
should end when it starts infringing on the human right to life and the right to be free
from violence. This is so because right to life is the most basic of all fundamental human
rights and also the most violated one. It is necessary to prioritize this fundamental right
over others otherwise the possibility of its infringement will only multiply.

III. Development of International Law on Women’s Rights within the UN
In spite of the pervasiveness of violence against women and the varied nature of the
problem, the United Nations has been slow to respond. In 1993, almost fifty years after
its creation, the United Nations finally formally recognized women’s rights as human
rights and interpreted violence against women as a human rights abuse. It promised to
integrate gender issues throughout the system of the United Nations to ensure that women
enjoy human rights on an equal basis with men. An outline of the development of
women’s human rights within the United Nations and the international institutional
recognition of violence against women as a human rights abuse will demonstrate the
failure of the international system and the inadequacy of the women’s convention to
address violence against women.

55
Alison T. Slack, “Female Circumcision: A Critical Appraisal,” Human Rights Quarterly 10 (1988): 470.
Her argument rests on the issue of consent, noting that the female genital surgeries are performed on
children who “have no say in the matter”.

20
One of the most significant developments for the protection of Women’s human
rights was the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, which is often described as an international bill
of rights for women.
56
Consisting of a preamble and 30 articles, it defines what
constitutes discrimination against women and sets up an agenda for national action to end
such discrimination.
57
As of June 2008, 185 countries – over ninety percent of the
members of the United Nations – are party to the convention, binding itself to do nothing
in contravention of its terms. Despite the fact that CEDAW has such a broad consensus, it
has proved ineffective because it only applies to States that have ratified it, and there is a
lack of compelling sanctions for non-compliance. The Committee with the authority to
enforce the treaty’s provisions has very limited powers. Above all else, the most serious
problem is that the ratification of CEDAW is subject to numerous reservations.
58

It is hardly surprising to see such a high level of ratification, given the
extraordinary use of reservations. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, reservations that are not compatible with the object and purpose of the

56
United Nations, Division for the Advancement of Women, Department of Social and Economic Affairs,
CEDAW Text. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm

57
Ibid.

58
Andrew Byrnes and Jane Connors, “Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A Complaints Procedure for
the Women’s Convention?” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 21 (1996), 679-784; Julie A. Minor,
“An Analysis of Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women,” Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 24 (1994): 137-
53; Kristin Choo, “Unequal under Law: In Many Nations Laws Sanction Discrimination against Women,”
American Bar Association Journal 86 (2000): 48-51; Roberta Jacobson, “The Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,” in The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical
Appraisal, edited by Philip Alston, 444-472, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991; Shelley Wright, “Human
Rights and Women’s Rights: An Analysis of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women,” in Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A Global
Challenge, edited by Kathleen E. Mahoney and Paul Mahoney, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993.

21
Convention should not be permitted.
59
And yet, CEDAW has the highest number of
reservations entered by different countries and furthermore many of these reservations
seem to have crossed this line.
60
For example, the Maldives entered a reservation in the
following terms: “The Government of the Republic of Maldives will comply with the
provisions of the Convention except those which the Government may consider
contradictory to the principles of the Islamic Sharia upon which the laws and traditions of
Maldives is founded.”
61
Some states have reservations on whole areas of entitlement.
Upon acceding to the Convention, Pakistan made a declaration in the following terms:
“The accession by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the Convention
is subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” In a
few other instances states have made reservations that would seem to remove their
obligation to implement the Convention as a whole.
62

Another major drawback of the convention and one that is a critical oversight is
that it does not explicitly protect against violence as a human rights abuse. As a result, in

59
Article 18 of the Convention provides that “A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting
the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to
become a party to the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry
into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed”. See also Article 19
on the ‘formulation of reservations’.

60
Liesbeth Lijnzaad, Reservations to the United Nations Human Rights Treaties: Ratify or Ruin, London:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1994.

61
List of Reservations entered on CEDAW is available on UN website. Among other countries making
such reservations with reference to Islam are Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, and Malaysia.

62
India reserved on the articles relating to cultural and customary practices. The Government of Malaysia
declared that Malaysia's accession is subject to the understanding that the provisions of the Convention do
not conflict with the provisions of the Islamic Sharia law and the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. See
Andrew Byrnes, “Using International Human Rights Norms in Constitutional Interpretation to Advance
Human Rights of Women,” Paper presented at the 50th Anniversary Conference, Faculty of Law,
University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. 23-26 July 1998; Belinda Clark, “The Vienna Convention Reservations
Regime and the Convention on Discrimination against Women,” American Journal of International Law 85
(1991): 281-321; Rebecca J. Cook, “International Human Rights Law Concerning Women: Case Notes and
Comments,” Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 23 (1990): 779-818.

22
1992, the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women issued a General
Recommendation No.19, which describes gender-based violence as a form of
discrimination that “seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a
basis of equality with men.”
63
In December 1993, the General Assembly adopted the
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women
64
which is a comprehensive
document outlining the responsibilities of governments, international organizations, and
NGOs in eliminating violence against women. Although a declaration, unlike a treaty, is
not a legally binding document merely expressing the consensus of the General Assembly,
this Declaration did open the door for greater recognition of violence against women as a
human rights abuse and led to the further advancement of the cause by formally
acknowledging the problem. It also served as the framework for the mandate of the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and
consequences.
65
In 1996, Radhika Coomaraswamy, a prominent Sri Lankan feminist
activist, was appointed as the special rapporteur on violence against women.
66
She
observed that the control of knowledge systems of the world by men has legitimized and

63
United Nations, Division for the Advancement of Women, available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/committee.htm and
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recomm.htm.

64
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women. A/RES/48/104, adopted by the UN General
Assembly, 20 December 1993.

65
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Integration of
the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women, Economic and Social
Council, 59
th
Sess., Item 12(a), Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/22003/75/Add.1
(February 27, 2003).

66
Special Rapporteurs are special representatives or independent experts appointed by the Human Rights
Commission to deal with major problems related to human rights violations, such as violence against
women, torture, racism, etc. These experts are unpaid and generally employed in the legal profession, the
academic world or other related fields. In discharge of their duty they undertake fact finding country visits,
transmit urgent appeals and communications to States regarding alleged cases and submit annual thematic
reports to the Human Rights Commission.

23
trivialized violence against women and ensured that hardly any remedial action was taken
by either states or individuals to minimize women’s experience of violence.
67

In 1999, the United Nations adopted an Optional Protocol to the Women’s
Convention, as a response to the ineffectiveness of the previous efforts in ending gender
discrimination.
68
The Optional Protocol gives individual women the right to petition a
United Nations committee to enforce their rights if their governments fail to do so.
69
It
contains two separate procedures: a communications procedure that allows individual
women or groups to submit claims alleging that they have been victims of violence to the
CEDAW Committee and an inquiry procedure that allows the Committee to initiate
inquiries into grave or systematic violations of women’s human rights.
70
It hardly seems
likely, however, that the Optional Protocol will rectify the problems of CEDAW because
the terms of the Optional Protocol encompass almost the same provisions as CEDAW.
71

Like CEDAW, the terms of the Optional Protocol apply only to States parties to both the
CEDAW and the Optional Protocol. As of July 15
th
, 2008, only 77 countries, out of 185
UN member states that are party to the Convention, were parties to the Optional Protocol,
which entered into force on December 22, 2000.
72
It also has a ratification procedure,
which is subject to reservations. The Committee wields little power, continues to depend

67
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Integration of
the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women.

68
United Nations, Division for the Advancement of Women, available at
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/indx.htm.

69
Article 2, available at www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/indx.htm.

70
Article 2, 8, available at www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/indx.htm.

71
Kerri L. Ritz, “Soft Enforcement: Inadequacies of Optional Protocol as a Remedy for the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,” Suffolk Transnational Law Review 25
(2001): 191-216.

72
Signatures to the Optional Protocol, available at www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/indx.htm.

24
on self-reporting by states, and lacks compelling sanctions and penalties for violations of
CEDAW. Under current procedures, Committee decisions are not legally binding;
therefore, the parties do not have to implement its recommendations.
73

Human rights mechanisms are considered limited because the Optional Protocol
and other human rights agreements are considered “soft law”.
74
As soft law relates to
guidelines of conduct, it is not binding and contains no penalties or sanctions for non-
compliance by state parties.
75
Governments continue promising to protect women’s rights,
but these promises remain unfulfilled.
76
Even if their intentions are true, authorities lack
the willingness to take political risks. Officials regard anything that challenges the
already existing domestic laws or the underlying religious and cultural beliefs as
threatening political and social stability.

IV. Women’s Rights versus the Rights to Religion and Culture
For centuries, arguments based on religion and culture have been used to justify and
perpetuate both sex and race discrimination. For example, all major religions in the world

73
Susan Halliday, “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, Sex Discrimination: Speeches and Submissions,” 2000, available at
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/sexdiscrimination/speeches/s749.html; Amnesty International USA, “The
Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention: Enabling Women to Claim Their Rights at the
International Level, 1997,” available at http://amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1997/IOR/15100497.htm.

74
Christopher Wall, “Human Rights and Economic Sanctions: The New Imperialism,” Fordham
International Law Journal 22 (1998): 583.

75
Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, New York: Routledge
Publications, 1997; A.E. Boyle, “Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law,”
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48, no. 4 (1999): 901-913.

76
Amnesty International USA, “‘Why Are We Still Waiting?’ The Struggle for Women’s Human Rights,
1998,” available at http://www2.amnesty.se/wom.nsf/7b0.../d31d2de13bfe6925c12565.

25
have historically supported and justified slavery.
77
While there seems to be widespread
agreement that religious and cultural norms can no longer serve as justifications for
discrimination against racial, ethnic, or religious groups,
78
religious and cultural norms
nevertheless continue to be the most prevalent and widely accepted justifications for
discrimination on the basis of sex.
79
Although most countries around the world allegedly
support equality between the sexes, incorporated both in national and international laws,
there is widespread acceptance of the notion that groups have the right to maintain
religious and cultural norms that discriminate against women.
80

Even though modern liberal theory is commonly understood as guaranteeing
similar rights to both men and women, a tremendous gap exists between this
understanding of liberal theory and the reality of both liberal theory and practice in
relation to discrimination against women.
81
The controversies surrounding female genital
mutilation, sati, honor killings, acid attacks, and the plight of the Agunah are
manifestations of this tension. All of these practices are defended as a necessary part of a

77
Courtney W. Howland, “The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality Rights
of Women: An Analysis under the United Nations Charter,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 35
(1997): 271-377.

78
Gila Stopler, “Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals Tolerate Religious and Cultural
Practices that Discriminate Against Women,” Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 12 (2003): 154-221.
79
Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis,
Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2000.

80
For example, liberal democracies such as India and Israel maintain religious family laws that
discriminate against women. See Esther Tager, “The Chained Wife,” Netherlands Quarterly of Human
Rights 4 (1999): 425-457; Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women; Ayelet Shachar, “Reshaping the
Multicultural Model: Group Accommodation and Individual Rights,” Windsor Review of Legal and Social
Issues 8 (1998): 83-111.

81
Stopler, 2003; Deborah L. Rhode, Speaking of Sex: The Denial of Gender Inequality, Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997; Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women: Democracy,
Feminism, and Political Theory, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1989.

26
religion or culture, but states are reluctant to acknowledge that these practices are closely
linked to the control of female sexuality and movement.
82

The debate has instead become a conversation about colonialism and imposed
western values.
83
Western journalistic accounts and scholarship have variously labeled
practices such as female circumcision as a “crime of gender,” “torture,” “barbarism,”
“ritualized torturous abuse,” etc.
84
‘The veil’ and emancipation of women from
“primitive” customs became one of the justifying reasons for the attack on Afghanistan.
As a result, many Arab and African women, even those who were against the practice,
voiced concerns about the West’s portrayal of the barbarism of underdeveloped countries
as a validation of the view of the “primitiveness” of Arabs, Muslims and Africans.
85
The
Western attack on the cultural practices of “the East” was seen as a “paternalistic”
reminder of a “bygone era of colonial domination”.
86
But, as mentioned earlier, violence
does not have geographical boundaries. Crime of ‘Honor’ in “the East” becomes the
crime of ‘passion’ in the “West”.
87
Western nations and feminists have to acknowledge
that human rights abuses do not occur solely in “other” countries, but that their own
nations also are guilty of similar indignities. For this reason, scholars like Narayan have

82
Radhika Coomaraswamy, “Identity Within: Cultural Relativism, Minority Rights and the Empowerment
of Women,” George Washington International Law Review 34 (2002): 483-513.

83
Hope Lewis, “Between Irua and “Female Genital Mutilation: Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the
Cultural Divide,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 8 (1995): 1-54.

84
Sandra D. Lane and Robert A. Rubenstein, “Judging the Other: Responding to Traditional Female
Genital Surgeries,” Hastings Center Report 26 (1996): 31-40.

85
Nahid Toubia, ed., Female Genital Mutilation: A Call for Global Action. New York: Women Inc, 1993;
Seble Dawit and Salem Mekuria, “The West Just Doesn’t Get It,” New York Times. December 7, 1993.

86
Soheir Morsey, “Safeguarding Women’s Bodies: The White Man’s Burden Medicalized,” Medical
Anthropological Quarterly 5, no. 1 (1991): 19.

87
Lama Abu-Odeh, “Comparatively Speaking: The ‘Honor’ of the ‘East’ and the ‘Passion’ of the ‘West’,”
Utah Law Review 2 (1997): 287-307.

27
reiterated that while feminist theories and political agendas need to be responsive to the
diversity of women’s lives, both within and across national contexts, they have to be
careful of painting a picture of cultural differences among women that might constitute
“cultural essentialism”.
88

In response, many scholars have suggested internal critique of religious
jurisprudence and development of a feminist Islamic jurisprudence which would lead to
change from within as a more culturally sensitive solution.
89
Nussbaum, in her study of
the sex equality case in India, Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan, also suggests that internal
reform is the appropriate strategy in any decent functioning democracy.
90

Accommodation of group rights is another way of balancing the conflict.
91
An-Naim has
suggested that implementation of international human rights norms will improve if those
norms are shown to be a legitimate evolution of the cultural tradition of the particular
community. This approach may require the “innovative reinterpretation” of traditional
norms in order to bring them into line with the present formulation of international
standards.
92

Although respect for cultural and religious practices should be encouraged, one
should not forget that religious and cultural justifications for violations of women’s rights

88
Uma Narayan and Sandra Harding, eds., Decentering the Center: Philosophy for a Multicultural,
Postcolonial, and Feminist World, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000:81.

89
Azizah Y. Al-Hibri, “Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women’s Rights.” American Journal
of International Law and Policy 12, no. 1 (1997): 1-44; Alison Jagger and Iris Young, A Companion to
Feminist Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998.

90
Martha C. Nussbaum, “International Human Rights Law in Practice: India: Implementing Sex Equality
through Law,” Chicago Journal of International Law 2 (2001): 35-58.

91
Vrinda Narain, “Women’s Rights and the Accommodation of “Difference:” Muslim Women in India,”
Southern California Review of Law and Women’s Studies 8 (1998), 43-69.

92
Abdullahi Ahmed An’Naim, “Islamic Law, International Relations, and Human Rights: Challenge and
Response” Cornell International Law Journal 20 (1987): 3-4.

28
are most of the time serving political interests or are a reflection of the local balance of
power in the interests of the ruling group.
93
Eager to appear tolerant towards other
cultures and religions, while at the same time happy to avoid conflict, states too readily
embrace cultural and religious practices that blatantly discriminate against women.
94
The
means to prevent this is to restrict religious and cultural freedoms by the fundamental
right to bodily integrity, and the rights against torture and discrimination.
95
Even though
it may not be widely accepted in many parts of the world, international law requires that
religious arguments are not used to defend or pardon subjugation when dealing with
women’s rights.
96
And yet the perpetrators of violence have been able to find suitable
defense in the garb of religious arguments. However, it is not only religion and the
human right to culture, which has provided excuses. International Humanitarian Law
(IHL), which is meant to protect all, combatants and non-combatants, men and women,
during war and peacetime, in its application has also failed to shield women from abuse.
As I will show, existing laws are not sufficient in themselves to protect women from
violence, which makes it important to discuss the possible adverse consequences of
maintaining the status quo.

93
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Universal versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a
Construct,” Michigan Journal of International Law 15 (1994): 307-403.

94
For example, see Shah Bano Case (1985) 3 S.C.R. See also Asghar Ali Engineer, ed., The Shah Bano
Controversy, Bombay: Orient Longman, 1986; See also Stopler, “Countenancing the Oppression of
Women”; Donna J. Sullivan, “Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict
Resolution,” Journal of International Law and Politics 24 (1992): 795-856.

95
Michelle Lewis Liebeskind, “Preventing Gender Based Violence: From Marginalization to Mainstream
in International Human Rights,” Revista Juridica Universidad de Puerto Rico 63: 653.

96
Amy Small Bilyeu, “Trokosi-The Practice of Sexual Slavery in Ghana: Religious and Cultural Freedom
as Human Rights,” Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 9 (1999): 457-503; Liebeskind,
“Preventing Gender Based Violence.”

29
V. Women and the Law of War
Women experience armed conflict in ways different from men. These effects vary widely
across cultures depending on the nature of their roles in particular societies. However,
one thing that is clear: conflicts often exacerbate inequalities and worsen the condition of
women irrespective of the nature of conflict, whether it is armed conflict, riots or civil
unrest.
97
Conflicts in many parts of the world such as Yugoslavia, India, Sudan, Eastern
Congo, Gulf War, Guatemala, Rwanda, have shown that women have been specific
targets of violence because of their gender and for what they represent, namely the
“property” and the “honor” of the enemy, available for appropriation along with the
enemy’s other possessions.
98
However, women are not always victims of the men from
the enemy side. Female troops serving in the Iraq war have reported sexual assault from
the fellow American soldiers.
99

As the numbers of victims continue to increase, the Department of Defense either
chooses not to respond or downplays the assault on women. In India, in 2002, the attack
on the Muslim community and especially the women in Gujarat, was similarly trivialized

97
Judith Gardam and Hilary Charlesworth, “Protection of Women in Armed Conflict,” Human Rights
Quarterly 22, no.1 (2000): 148-166; Adrien Katherine Wing and Sylke Merchan, “Rape, Ethnicity, and
Culture: Spirit Injury from Bosnia to Black America,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 25, no.1
(1993): 1-48; Charli R. Carpenter, “Surfacing Children: Limitations of Genocidal Rape Discourse,” Human
Rights Quarterly 22 (2000): 428-477; Christine M. Chinkin, “Peace and Force in International Law,”
Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 25 (1993): 203-230; Charlesworth, The Boundaries of International
Law; Suzanne A. Kim, “Betraying Women in the Name of Revolution: Violence Against Women as an
Obstacle to Democratic nation-Building in South Africa,” Cardozo Women’s Law Journal 8 (2001): 1-20.

98
Beth Stephens, “Humanitarian Law and Gender Violence: An End to Centuries of Neglect?,” Hofstra
Law and Policy Symposium 3 (1999): 87-109; Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery, New York, London:
New York University Press, 1979; Beverly Allen, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

99
Amy Herdy and Miles Moffeit, “Camouflaging Criminals,” Amnesty Now 29 (2004): 24-26.

30
by the state and central government as ‘a result of just another clash between Hindus and
Muslims.’
100

In July of 1995, the Prime Minister of Japan announced he would send official
letters expressing “humble apologies” to hundreds of women victims of Japanese
brutality during World War II.
101
In August of 1996, the first letters were sent to these so-
called “comfort women”.
102
Even though this was the first international apology for
crimes committed against women during the war, it was Susan Brownmiller who in her
1975 book first documented stark accounts of rape and other sexual atrocities committed
during the two World Wars, as well as the rape of women in conflicts in East Pakistan
and Vietnam.
103
If rape has always been known to occur in war, it was also defined as a
war crime by the customary international law even before the Laws of War was codified
in the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Yet, the utilization of rape and other violence
against women during times of war has been the accepted rule, largely ignored when they
occur and even afterwards.
104
Instead, wartime rape has been exploited for its propaganda
value, but when the time comes for prosecution it is often overlooked or treated as a

100
Threatened Existence: A Feminist Analysis of the Genocide in Gujarat. Report by the International
Initiative for Justice (IIJ), December 2003. http://www.onlinevolunteers.org/gujarat/reports/iijg/2003/. This
events is discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.

101
T. R. Reid, “Japan to Apologize to ‘Comfort Women’,” Washington Post, July 13 (1995): A18.

102
“Comfort Women” is the term used to describe the hundreds of thousands of women who were forced to
serve as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers fighting in Asian nations during the war. Reid, “Japan to apologize
to ‘Comfort Women’,”A18; see also Yoshiaki Yoshimi, Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese
Military during World War II, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

103
Brownmiller, Against Our Will, 1975.

104
Beth Stephens, “Humanitarian Law and Gender Violence: An End to Centuries of Neglect?,” Hofstra
Law and Policy Symposium 3 (1999): 87-109; Ingeborg Breines, Dorota Gierycz and Betty A. Reardon eds,
Towards a Women’s Agenda for a Culture of Peace, UNESCO Publishing: United Nations Division for the
Advancement of Women, 1999.

31
subcategory of crimes against civilians. What makes it worse is that it is yet to be
recognized as a crime of gender.
105

The recognition that rape is not only a form of sexual violence against women but
also a mode of ethnic cleansing
106
brought international attention to the widespread rapes
in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
107
Evidence of forced
impregnation and forced motherhood helped fuel moral indignation because rape-induced
pregnancy was presented as a worse crime against women than rape itself. Rape was
construed as genocidal because of forced impregnation’s unique role in undermining and
dishonoring the victimized culture.
108
Ethnic rape was used as a carefully planned and
effective war strategy designed to terrorize entire communities, by driving them from
their homes and demonstrating the power of the invading forces.
109
Even more disturbing
was that most of these women were forcibly impregnated thereby being coerced into

105
Catherine N. Niarchos, “Women, War and Rape: Challenges Facing the International Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia,” Human Rights Quarterly 17 (1995): 649-690.

106
“Ethnic cleansing is a formal domestic policy of removing ‘undesirable’ minority populations from a
given territorial unit on the basis of religion, ethnicity, political affiliation, or ideology to create
homogeneity in the larger population.”

107
Adrien Katherine Wing and Sylke Merchan, “Rape, Ethnicity, and Culture: Spirit Injury from Bosnia to
Black America,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 25, no.1 (1993): 1-48.

108
Charli R. Carpenter, “Surfacing Children: Limitations of Genocidal Rape Discourse,” Human Rights
Quarterly 22 (2000): 428.

109
Amy E. Ray, “The Shame of It: Gender Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and the Failure of
International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries,” The American University Law Review 46
(1997): 793-840; Christopher C. Joyner, “Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former Yugoslavia:
The Case for an International War Crimes Tribunal,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 22
(1994): 235-274; Stephen Schwartz, “Rape as a Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia,” Hastings
Women’s Law Journal 5 (1994): 69-88.

32
motherhood in order to ‘pollute’ the bloodline itself.
110
For these women, there was
virtually no way out of a life of continuous pain and suffering.
111

The failure to address many of the problems experienced by women as a result of
armed conflict can be attributed to the boundaries of IHL.
112
Increasingly, scholars are
focusing on the unreality of the rigid divisions between human rights law, IHL and
refugee law.
113
Modern armed conflict involves the whole population and its effects are
far-reaching and long-term. The IHL, with the exception of the Fourth Geneva
Convention dealing with occupied territories, only applies while armed conflict
continues.
114
For women in particular, the cessation of hostilities often just marks the
beginning of their battle for survival, a process that is markedly different from the post
conflict experiences of men.
115

Even though there have been ad hoc international tribunals set up to prosecute
those responsible for war crimes, in practice, however, the tribunals records have been

110
Maria B. Olujie, “Coming Home: The Croatian War Experience,” Unpublished Draft on file with The
American University Law Review 29 (1993): 23.

111
Linda A. Malone, “Beyond Bosnia and in Re Kasinga: A Feminist Perspective on Recent Developments
in Protecting Women from Sexual Violence,” Boston University International Law Journal 14 (1996): 319-
340.

112
Judith Gardam and Hilary Charlesworth, “Protection of Women in Armed Conflict,” Human Rights
Quarterly 22, no.1 (2000): 148-166.

113
Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ed, The Problem of Refugees in the Light of Contemporary International Law
Issues, Boston: Brill Academic Publishing, 1995; Malone, “Beyond Bosnia and in Re Kasinga.”

114
Edward K. Kwakwa, The International Law of Armed Conflict: Personal and Material Fields of
Application, Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.

115
Vesna Nikolic-Ristanovic, “Living Without Democracy and Peace,” Violence Against Women 5, no.1
(1999): 63-80.

33
inconsistent at best because of financial limitations.
116
Moreover, the sensitivity reflected
in the tribunals’ original mandate has not always been reflected in its practice.
117
While
international law has neither adequately protected women from violence nor provided
proper remedies, women continue to be targeted as members of the ‘other’ community, as
symbols of the community’s honor and as the ones who sustain the community and
reproduce the next generation. This has become an all too common aspect of larger
political projects of genocide, crimes against humanity, and subjugation.
118

Discourses on Honor
I. Concept of Honor: The honor ethic as it applies to women’s sexuality is not a new
phenomenon; it is neither unique to Pakistan nor specific to Islamic cultures. It is
prevalent in all kinds of societies, especially agrarian and tribal ones, countries with
parallel legal systems and is on the rise in European and Latin American countries.
Feminists such as Nira Yuval-Davis have argued that all fundamentalist religious
movements, whether Christian, Jewish, Hindu or Muslim, use the control of women’s
bodies symbolically, to assert a wider agenda of authoritarian political and cultural social

116
Viseur Sellers and Kaoru Okuizumi, “Intentional Prosecution of Sexual Assaults,” Transnational Law
and Contemporary Problems 7 (1997): 45-80; Minna Schrag, “The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: An
Interim Assessment,” Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 7 (1997): 15-22.

117
Julie A Hastings, “Silencing State-Sponsored Rape In and Beyond a Transnational Guatemalan
Community,” Violence Against Women 8, no. 10 (2002): 1153-1181; Fionnuala Ni Aolain, “Radical Rules:
The Effects of Evidential and Procedural Rules on the Regulation of Sexual Violence in War,” Albany Law
Review 60 (1997): 883-905; Human Rights Watch/Africa. Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the
Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath, 1996, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm.

118
Guglielmo Verdirame, “Testing the Effectiveness of International Norms: UN Humanitarian Assistance
and Sexual Apartheid in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2001): 733-768; Robyn Dixon,
“In Sudan, Rape’s Lasting Hurt,” Los Angeles Times, September 15, 2004.

34
control.
119
Ortner finds the pattern of family honor evident in Latin American and
Mediterranean peasant societies, among nomadic peoples in the Middle East and
Southwest Asia, and various Indian castes and Chinese elites.
120
In her view, the pattern
of family honor and its redemption does not seem to be confined to any particular type of
society or to any consistent stratum. Baker, Gregware and Cassidy, argue that cultural
and personal systems of honor that depend on the behavior of others are an integral part
of the killing of women by the male members of their families.
121
What is common to all
these cultures is that they possess a certain notion of honor where women who are seen to
be stepping out of line are murdered so that male sense of 'honor', whether it relates to
person, family or group, can be preserved and protected or restored.
122
Although there
seems to be a commonality to the idea that women’s bodies are the possession of men
and the repository of their honor, there seems to be no agreement as to what constitutes
dishonorable behavior. As the meaning of the term ‘improper behavior’ for women and
girls seems to expand to include other acts of self-determination that may be perceived as
challenges to traditional or customary norms, so has the definition of what defiles a
family’s honor. Consequently this has led to increased violence towards women, both
inside and outside of the home. Therefore, there is a need to examine the concept of
‘honor’ itself to get to the crux of the issue.

119
Pnina Werbner, “Honor, Shame and the Politics of Sexual Embodiment among South Asian Muslims in
Britain and Beyond: An Analysis of Debates in the Public Sphere,” International Social Science Review 6,
no. 1 (2005): 34.

120
S. Ortner, “The Virgin and the State,” Feminist Studies 4 (1978): 19-35.

121
Nancy V. Baker, Peter R. Gregware and Margery A. Cassidy, “Family Killing Fields: Honor Rationales
in the Murder of Women,” Violence Against Women 5, no. 2 (1999): 165.

122
Urvashi Butalia, “When Culture Kills – Urvashi Butalia’s View From the South,” New Internationalist,
December 2003, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JQP/is_363/ai_111617785 (last visited
April 23, 2008).

35
For most definitions honor goes hand in hand with shame. Shame is, in one sense,
nothing more than the loss of honor.
123
Miller, however, clarifies the point that in
Mediterranean cultures, shame was female sexuality itself, and thus a man’s honor
consisted in making sure his women remained inviolate.
124
For others, male honor is
associated with ghairat, izzat, humiliation, respect, virtue, merit, and rank, and it can also
refer to caste and class status, public reputation. It can be determined by things such as
achievements, courage, generosity and family origin. By contrast, female honor is
determined by their sexual behavior, their chastity or purity.
125
In the context of honor
killing it is always about the loss of one of these elements and the resulting shame that
has occurred due to actual or perceived sexual deviation by a family’s women. Thus
male honor can be acquired, it can grow and can of course be lost; in contrast a woman
and her relatives do not acquire or achieve honor; it can only be injured or besmirched.
126

Kandiyoti agrees that femininity in Islamic society is an ascribed status whereas
masculinity is something to be achieved; masculinity should be seen as a process,
something that by definition can never be permanently achieved because the danger of
being un-manned is always present through female misbehavior.
127
This stress on female
sexuality, however, disguises the fact that domestic violence against women has many

123
William Ian Miller, Humiliation, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993, 118.

124
Ibid, 118.

125
Manar Hasan, “The Politics of Honor: Patriarchy, the State and the Murder of Women in the Name of
Family Honor,” Journal of Israeli History: Politics, Society and Culture 21, no. 1 (2002): 5.

126
Ibid, 6.

127
Deniz Kandiyoti ed., Women, Islam and the State, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.

36
different and complex causes, not all of them related to adultery.
128
The wearing of a
headscarf or veil, for example, is also a signal of respect within the customary notions of
honor and shame, which surround the right to control the sexuality and reproductive
powers of women’s bodies.
129
Not veiling in some societies may thus signify a loss of
that control thereby bringing shame to the family.
In this context, women’s bodies become a tool by which social order is
maintained but also through which inter-family or community feuds are waged over the
rape of a woman. Tor Aase, however, shows how feuds are not always linked to women’s
chastity. For him, attacks on female chastity constitute just one type of challenge to male
honor and thus blood feuds can also be fought over disagreements concerning land rights,
water rights and other issues.
130
Woman are therefore caught in a vicious circle where
revenge takes place by raping the enemies’ women and then the women are killed in the
name of honor to relinquish the shame brought upon by the rape. In such circumstances
control of women becomes a symbol of male power and revenge killing becomes a public
display of that power. Killing for the sake of individual and collective honor thus is not a
crime but becomes a heroic act because restoration of family honor actually means that a
family re-establishes its credibility as protector of female chastity.
131
Bourdieu agrees

128
Werbner, “Honor, Shame and Politics of Sexual Embodiment,” 28.

129
Ibid, 26. Veil or veiling by women is a highly contested issue and has become heavily politicized in the
Western world after September 11attacks. It is important to understand that even though it is seen as a
‘symbol of oppression’ in the Western world, for many women in Arab and Muslim societies it holds a
positive value. See Fadwa El Guindi, Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance, New York: Berg, 1999.

130
Tor Aase ed., Tournaments of Power: Honor and Revenge in the Contemporary World, Burlington,
Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002, 7.

131
Ibid.

37
“the sentiment of honor is lived out openly before other people.”
132
And that is why in
many countries where honor killings occur, men who are arrested after their act proudly
display their handcuffs or voluntarily go to the police stations to confess to their crime.
Rape, honor, and blood feuds are hence inextricably linked. Shahla Haeri shows
how men wage war through women’s bodies instead of fighting with each other because
a ‘brave adversary is supposed to break down under the grief and dishonor of the
violation of his womenfolk’.
133
She talks about ‘political rape,’ which she argues is a
modern improvisation on the theme of ‘feudal’ ‘honor rape.’
134
In the context of political
rape, rape is not just a show of dominance, an instrument of oppression or an effort at
making a public example of raped women in attempt to keep other women in their place.
Haeri looks at the rape incidents of three women,
135
all of whom were associated with
Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party, all of which occurred during the year following
Benazir Bhutto’s ouster in 1990, and all of them took place in Karachi from where the
Bhutto family hails. She argues that these rapes were politically motivated and therefore

132
P. Bourdieu, “The Sentiment of Honor in Kabyle Society,” in Honor and Shame: The Values of
Mediterranean Society, edited by J.G. Peristiany, 193-244, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966.

133
Shahla Haeri, “The Politics of Dishonor: Rape and Power in Pakistan,” in Faith and Freedom: Women’s
Human Rights in the Muslim World, edited by Mahnaz Afkhami, 161-174, New York: Syracuse University
Press, 1995, 169.

134
Ibid,162.

135
The three women were Rahila Tiwana, Khurshid Begum and Veena Hayat. Rahila Tiwana was a
Pakistan People’s Party student activist and was raped because she refused to cooperate with the Sindh
authorities to fabricate charges of sexual misconduct and national security allegations against Benazir
Bhutto and her husband. As a result she was arrested on the pretext that she had been given weapons and
ammunition and had passed on secret messages to Indian agents. She was raped and tortured during the
interrogation following her arrest. Khurshid Begum, a washerwoman whose husband used to be a PPP’s
supporter, was raped by policemen for political reasons. According to her, after the rape one of the
policeman told her “ask Benazir to help you now?” in order to make sure the rape and message is known to
Benazir Bhutto. Veena Hayat, a woman of the elite and a close friend of Benazir Bhutto and her husband,
was allegedly raped by the Karachi head of Pakistan’s CIA who was also the son in law of the then
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. She was raped because she was a close friend of the opposition leader,
Benazir Bhutto.

38
involved an act of revenge aimed at humiliating and dishonoring a powerful and
potentially threatening rival, Benazir Bhutto. Even though she was not the one who was
raped, the fact that the female members of her party were raped symbolizes her dishonor
and thus she herself was considered ‘raped’ by association.
136
The premise of such
symbolism is that a leader who is unable to protect herself or her followers can hardly
protect her country from being invaded by its ‘enemies,’ real or imagined.
137

Consequently, it can be argued that the honor rationale seems to have no real basis in
cultural or religious terms but is used more as a tool to justify tribal customs or social
norms that are exploitative of women.
The anthropologist, Julian Pitt-Rivers provides what is considered the best-known
definition of honor:
Honour is the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society.
It is his estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, but it is also the
acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized by society, his right to
pride.
138

Pitt-Rivers, however, in a later work offers an analysis of honor in terms of what he calls
three facets: “a sentiment, a manifestation of this sentiment in conduct, and the evaluation
of this conduct by others.”
139
Frank Henderson Stewart, in his book, challenges the notion
that honor is a sentiment, a character trait or what we think of as reputation. He instead
proposes “we look on honor as a right, roughly speaking the right to be treated as having

136
Haeri, “The Politics of Dishonor,” 170.

137
Ibid.

138
Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honor,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David Sills, vol. 6,
N.p.: Macmillan, Free Press (1968): 503.

139
Ibid, 503-511.

39
a certain worth.”
140
Thus, Stewart mainly concerns himself with personal honor because
for him this kind of honor is a ‘right.’ He stipulates that in order to constitute personal
honor the ‘right’ in question must have the following features:
1. It can be lost.
2. In order to retain it one must follow certain rules. These rules are the code
of honor. The people who follow the same code of honor and recognize each other as
doing so constitute an honor group.
3. The honor group has in its language at least one word or phrase that is
frequently used to refer to the right in question.
141

This model, Stewart believes, can contribute to the development of a cross-
culturally valid concept of honor. Although the personal attributes that constitute
honorableness or an honorable reputation vary from one society to another, he says, the
right to a good name is something widely shared across cultures.
142
At the same time, in
his work, he refutes the widely held notion that honor is a phenomenon found mainly in
the Mediterranean basin because the Mediterranean is not a clearly defined culture area.
For him all societies have a certain notion of honor even though they do not necessarily
share similar ideas about honor.
143

Maris and Saharso, in contrast, argue that notion of honor and honor killing is as
much about gender as about culture, and honor killing is ultimately based on specific

140
Frank Henderson Stewart, Honor, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994, 21.

141
Ibid, 145.

142
Stanley Brandes, “Book review: Honor by Frank Henderson Stewart,” American Ethnologist 23, no. 1
(1996): 151.

143
Ibid, 152.

40
cultural notions of proper gender relations that particularly limit the autonomy of
females.
144
Theories about the historical origins of the honor system and honor killing
usually indicate that the tradition originated in societies where there was no strong central
state with a monopoly on the use of violence. The control of women’s rather than men’s
sexuality therefore became instrumental to the group’s survival because it is through
women that the biological and cultural reproduction of the group takes place.
145
However,
they contend that if this were true, then why did the practice not become obsolete when
the groups migrated to western developed countries with a strong constitutional state?
146

The reason is that honor killing cannot be explained in purely cultural terms. Indeed,
various factors like the perpetrator’s socio-economic status, incomplete family network
and social consequences of the loss of family honor encourage killing for honor.
147
It is
useful to employ Johan Galtung’s tripartite model of violence here to conceptualize
domestic violence within the patriarchal cultures. According to Galtung, there are three
forms of violence.
148
The first form is direct violence, which may include physical,
emotional or sexual acts of aggression. The second form is indirect or structural violence,
which includes institutionalized oppression and exploitation. The third form is cultural
violence, which he defines as relatively permanent aspects of a culture that support,
encourage, generate or legitimate either direct or indirect violence. Drawing from
Galtung’s view, I argue that South Asian cultures are used to legitimizing violence

144
Cees Maris and Sawitri Saharso, “Honour Killing: A Reflection on Gender, Culture and Violence,” The
Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences 37, no. 1 (2001): 62.

145
Maris and Saharso, “Honour Killing,” 59.

146
Ibid, 69.

147
Ibid.

148
Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” Journal of Peace Research 27 (1990): 291-305.

41
against women in its direct or structural form. Cultural violence is expressed through
unequal power structures that subordinate women to their male family members. Hence,
“honor killing is about women’s rights in the sense that the underlying notions about
proper gender relations severely limit women’s autonomy, and in the sense that women’s
right to life is subordinated to male honor.”
149
I, therefore, take a feminist perspective on
domestic violence, which in congruence with Galtung’s view, points to the necessity of
including the larger structural and socio-cultural aspects of a society, which provides the
framework for various forms of violence against women.
Therefore, I think Tahira Khan, whose work provides a historical materialist
explanation of honor related violence is important in the sense that it goes beyond
socialist feminist perspectives and delves into the more Marxist realm of historical
materialism. In her book she identifies forces other than culture and discriminatory
structures that play a major role in the occurrence of violence against women.
150
She
writes:
Honor/passion crimes against women are physically committed by the family men,
socially accepted by the immediate community, religiously facilitated through
discriminatory teachings and dictats, legally recognized by the lawyers and
judiciary, and politically endorsed by the patriarchal institutions of the state.
151

While she does look at motives behind honor related violence other than the
notion of honor, she takes the position that behind all forces involved in the occurrence of
honor related violence, the primary reason is the economic system that constructs such
honor/shame codes in a particular society where man’s honor and shame relies on his

149
Maris and Saharso, “Honour Killing,” 70.

150
Tahira S. Khan, Beyond Honour: A Historical Materialist Explanation of Honor Related Violence,
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, xxiii.

151
Ibid, 130.

42
family woman’s body and sexual conduct.
152
For her the economic forces, production
relations and material conditions are the major determinants of gender relations, roles,
status, and rights in family and society.
153

Many other scholars, like Uma Narayan and Manar Hasan, agree that more often
than not economic interests are hidden behind the cultural explanations of violence
against women. Works on domestic violence, Sati, dowry murder, acid burning, etc. have
explored the economic motives behind such acts. Narayan, in her work on India, shows
how dowry murders can primarily be explained by the commercialization of the
institution of dowry under the influence of an increasingly market-dominated modern
economy. Dowry murders, according to her, are, in fact, motivated by outright economic
gain.
154
We can say that honor and shame have varied meanings and therefore, their
significance is inevitably ambiguous, dynamic and shifting. Werbner, through her
discussion of the headscarf debate amongst Muslims in Britain, shows that the
anthropological honor and shame model, to the extent that it focuses exclusively on
female sexual transgression, is limited in several important senses.
155
While
anthropological studies have shown that shame is linked to notions of the body, of
sexuality and of the good and the bad woman, it is mainly from the male point of view.
Feminist discourse, by comparison, locates shame as a form of patriarchal power that

152
Ibid.

153
Khan, Beyond Honour, 167.

154
Uma Narayan, Dislocating Cultures, Identities, Traditions and Third World Feminism, New York:
Routledge, 1997, 110-111. Also see c

155
Werbner, “Honor, Shame and Politics of Sexual Embodiment,” 28.

43
seeks to control women’s sexuality and their freedom.
156
This form of power is not
controlled by some central institution but rather is located within key institutions and
practices like the family, kinship, religion, state, and heterosexuality. Shame, therefore,
functions as a normalizing discourse, by exerting power through positing the normal and
the abnormal, the shameful and the honorable.
157

II. Patriarchy and Honor Norms to Control Women’s Sexuality: Violence against
women in general and domestic violence in particular needs to be examined within the
context of patriarchy because honor is usually associated with the males of a society.
Gerda Lerner defines patriarchy as “the manifestation and institutionalization of male
dominance over women and children in the family and the extension of male dominance
over women in society in general.”
158
She uses the term “paternalistic dominance” which
she describes as “the relationship of a dominant group, considered superior, to a
subordinate group, considered inferior, in which the dominance is mitigated by mutual
obligations and reciprocal rights.”
159
This hierarchical relationship is accompanied by an
ideology that perpetuates the cultural acceptance of patriarchal beliefs. According to
Dobash and Dobash, one essential part of this ideology is the “hierarchical relationship
between the husband and wife..., which…continues to be the foundation of male

156
Kalpana Viswanath, “Shame and Control: Sexuality and Power in Feminist Discourse in India,” in
Embodiment: Essays on Gender and Identity, edited by Meenakshi Thapan, 313-334, Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1997, 324.

157
Ibid, 324.

158
Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, 239.

159
Ibid.

44
supremacy and of the subordination of women in the society and in the marriage.”
160

Sylvia Walby, likewise, defines patriarchy “as a system of social structures and practices
in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women.”
161
Patriarchy exists as a system of
social relations and is composed of patriarchal relations in paid work, state, sexuality and
cultural institutions.
162
Male violence is systematically condoned and legitimized by the
state’s reluctance to intervene against it. Consequently a belief in the dominant position
of one group over another and inferior position of women becomes a part of accepted
social relations.
The inherent concept of social dominance in a patriarchal belief system engenders
the need to maintain this dominance to ensure power which in turn promotes
competitiveness and aggressiveness as masculine traits. Charlene Spretnak argues that
these patriarchal beliefs engender militarism as the very act of war comes to represent
manhood.
163
She states that part of the exercise of social dominance “is dehumanizing
‘the other’ – women, people of color, or foreign nations – and idealizing oneself.”
164
So a
patriarchal belief system not only hierarchizes the genders but also devalues women,
relegating them to a lower status where using force to keep them in that place becomes
consistent with the ideology of patriarchy. Sexual inequality within the home is related to
and reflective of the power differential between the sexes in the society at large.

160
R.E. Dobash and R. Dobash, Violence against Wives, New York: The Free Press, 1979, 45.

161
Sylvia Walby, Theorizing Patriarchy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1990, 20.

162
Ibid, 21.

163
Charlene Spretnak, “Naming the Cultural Forces that push us toward War,” Journal of Humanistic
psychology 28 (1983): 104-114.

164
Ibid, 106.

45
Domestic violence as a way to control women becomes a core of this gender inequality.
Dobash and Dobash, in their research based upon in-depth interviews with battered wives
and male batterers, indicate that incidents of wife beating tended to occur due to the
man’s sexual jealousy, his perceptions that his wife did not carry out her domestic duties,
or the wife’s arguments that challenged his position and authority in the household.
165

V. Geetha’s work on ‘woman battering’ within the family furthers the argument
that violence against women is connected to patriarchal belief systems which emphasize
the need to control women, especially their sexuality.
166
She outlines how this practice
embodies notions of honor and female sexuality where ‘battering’ is symptomatic of the
sexuality of everyday life as women experience it in the context of marriage and the
family. Drawing upon the experience of women from the district of Snehidi in India, she
argues that constructions of female sexuality and honor operate to determine the
subordinate position of women. Understanding masculinity is central to analyzing how
husbands represent their familial, economic and social status and their power within the
family. Suspicion within marital relationships is used by men to control female
independence. A husband may accuse his wife of promiscuity, calling into question her
'honor' including her competence as a good, chaste wife and dutiful mother. This also
allows him to keep the children away from her. Hence, violence against women is often
carried out in the name of honor in order for men to assert their superiority both within
the community and family.

165
Dobash, Violence against Wives, 1979.

166
V. Geetha, “On Bodily Love and Hurt,” in A Question of Silence? The Sexual Economies of Modern
India, edited by Mary E. John and Janaki Nair, 304-331, New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1998.

46
This is not to say that patriarchal attitudes are the only explanation of violence
against women. There indeed are other individual, familial, psychological or socio-
cultural factors that contribute to this phenomenon. However, patriarchal belief about
dominance and power definitely influence how people view violence against women.
This male sense of honor leads to gender role socialization, so that those who transgress
the gender-based norms ought to be socially and physically sanctioned. The gender roles
not only help to narrow her role to her sexuality and reproductive capabilities but also to
limit her cultural image to that of an object or commodity.
167

In cultures where women are considered property of their men, violation of
women becomes the tool of revenge against male adversaries, as there is no better way to
attack someone’s honor or to restore one’s own than an assault on its women. However, it
must be mentioned here that women may themselves become willing participants, which
leads to a preoccupation with their bodies, appearance and to perpetuation of violence by
women on other women. The example of this self-objectification is the desire to go to any
length to stay thin or look the way that is considered traditionally beautiful. It also helps
explain why mother-in-laws are prime suspects in dowry related violence. Women who
were objectified when they got married tend to perpetuate the same on their daughter-in-
laws.

167
Objectification of women refers to treating women and their bodies as objects. Commodification further
turns women into commodities that may be traded, damaged or destroyed for financial gains or to settle
personal vendettas. Sexual objectification, an act of cultural violence in itself, becomes a key element in the
oppression of women. Rape or sexual assault, thus, can be seen as an act of objectification as rape is often
used as a means to punish the woman or someone the woman is related to, or to establish power and
dominance, or merely for the sake of enjoyment.

47
Methodology: Applying the Patriarchal Notion of ‘Honor’ to the Case Studies
Violence against women in the name of honor is an outcome of a wide range of complex
conflicts inside the family and outside. As discussed earlier, it is also a very broad
concept. Since honor crimes cover a wide range of issues, of which the politics of
sexuality and reproduction is only one, its use should be analyzed as such. This
dissertation analyzes the phenomenon of honor crimes against women in the context of a
patriarchal discourse on ‘honor’, thus exploring the politics of honor bound up with
interests of the state. I aim to show that honor killings are not part of some essentialist
“Arab mentality”
168
but that an important reason for its perpetuation in these countries is
the legal system that serves both the government and the guardians of tradition.
169

Consequently, to attribute this to Islamic religion or to Arab societies will be wrong
because the practice can also be found among Christian or Hindu communities and in
non-Arab Islamic countries such as Pakistan and Turkey. The societies where the practice
persists are not homogenous and therefore one must analyze the interests of the rulers and
other groups and their influence on these societies and their legal systems.
In my research I use the works of Mandelbaum and Dube as my starting point for
a comparative understanding of ideas of honor, shame and the status of women in South
Asia. Anthropologist David G. Mandelbaum, in his book Women’s Seclusion and Men’s
Honor, interprets the literature on traditional gender roles and their meanings in the South
Asian countries of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
170
According to him, the core of most

168
Hasan, “The Politics of Honor,” 32.

169
Ibid.

170
David G. Mandelbaum, Women’s Seclusion and Men’s Honor: Sex Roles in North India, Bangladesh,
and Pakistan, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988.

48
gender relations in South Asia is the concepts of izzat or honor and purdah or veil, which
must be observed to maintain honor. While the term purdah “has been used narrowly, for
specific traits of physical covering and spatial enclosure,” he takes the broader usage
“which also includes the beliefs and values about the behavior of women, the restrictions
on their movements outside the household and the requirements for their respectful and
deferential demeanor within the home.”
171
Purdah, thus, becomes a code of conduct that
is closely bound up with izzat, the concept of male and family honor. This code of
conduct may require women to cover their heads and/or faces, restrain their voices and
eye contact in the company of unrelated men and men of their husbands’ families, and to
even maintain a certain distance from her husband and children in public. Since purdah is
closely related to the concern over the management of female sexuality, women’s
seclusion augments the patriarchal family honor.
By the same corollary, as men are often dependent on women for their status, it
becomes imperative to protect women’s sexuality so that they do not bring dishonor to
the family. Thus for Mandelbaum, the ideology of honor and shame has at its centre the
control of women’s sexuality and allowing its expression only within legitimate spaces. It
becomes essential both for the men of a family to control women’s sexuality and for
women to do so themselves. So not only do women follow the honor codes but also
become the main enforcer of those codes on the young and unwilling. These discourses
all place the honor of the woman and the family upon the behavior of women, especially
in terms of their movements and in the control of their sexuality. It is important to stress
that these discourses are all male, and look at honor and shame from the male point of
view and treat women as merely symbols.

171
Mandelbaum, Women’s Seclusion and Men’s Honor, 2.

49
Similarly, Leela Dube, in her book Women and Kinship, provides a systematic
comparison of women’s position in the three kinship systems of patrilineal, matrilineal
and bilineal societies found in South Asia.
172
Her work is different from Mandelbaum’s
though because she compares both South Asia and South-East Asia and as a result offers
regional perspectives on gender as well. What is similar is that, like Mandelbaum, she
also cites overarching patriarchal ideology as being responsible for the manner in which
female sexuality is managed, especially through notions of group honor, shame, purdah
(seclusion) and control over reproduction. At the same time she argues that relative
egalitarianism between the sexes appears to be the norm in South East Asian social
organizations and thus the major differences exist between the two regions and not within.
For her South Asian societies are characterized by strong patriliny, patrilocality, and
patrifocal family structure where women have limited rights over resources and
inheritance and their sexuality is managed by men through dependence, seclusion and
segregation.
173

Women’s sexuality is rigidly controlled in South Asia because sexuality and
reproduction cannot be separated in the cultures of this region and additionally because
virginity at marriage is cherished both in Hinduism and in Islam.
174
This emphasis on
virginity is what has led to the widespread practice of marrying off girls as early as
possible and thus the responsibility for protecting an unmarried girl lies with her father
and brothers, the patrilineal male kin. This responsibility for protection gives males the

172
Leela Dube, Women and Kinship: Comparative Gender Perspectives on Gender in South and Southeast
Asia, Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University Press, 1997.

173
Ibid, 7.

174
Ibid, 49.

50
right to exercise power over the females and any transgression leads to the loss of male
power and resultant shame. Since shame means losing honor, ‘honor’ of males and of the
larger family rests in that of their women and often leads to men dictating every facet of
their behavior. Correspondingly, the violation of women’s sexuality has become essential
for demonstrating superiority over another group’s men.
175
This is one of the main
reasons why the use of rape as a weapon of war has become so widespread. During the
1971 War between India and Pakistan, which gave birth to Bangladesh as a nation,
Pakistani soldiers raped thousands of Bengali women. In my study of violence against
women during the Gujarat pogrom in India I will discuss in more detail how women
become specific targets during communal or caste violence.
Another aspect of male control over female sexuality in South Asia is that not
only is it rooted in patriarchy, but it is also rooted in a consciousness of territoriality and
group solidarity, which Dube calls corporate control.
176
So even though men in a family
may not impose strict restrictions on their women, the local councils of village elders,
like the panchayats in India or jirga in Pakistan, may take it upon themselves to regulate
female behavior and impose punishments for transgressions. I will show in my chapter on
honor killings in Pakistan, how these jirgas pronounced murders and rapes as an attempt
to settle disputes and restore not just family honor but the honor of the community.
177

175
Dube, Women and Kinship, 57.

176
Ibid, 51.

177
I will like to clarify here that this is not the only role that the local governing councils play in these
countries. They offer many advantages as well and especially with the rise of women’s participation in
Indian Panchayats, there has been a positive impact of women’s lives. A lot of these councils also play the
role of adjudicators on matters of family or personal law and act as the informal judicial system in countries
where access to the police and courts are very limited.

51
Like Mandelbaum, Dube also argues that the ideology of Purdah, with its
attendant code of behavior, permeates all spheres of life in South Asia and is rigidly
connected to the idea of women’s seclusion and men’s izzat.
178
Though she admits that
with the idea of women’ segregation differences exist between Hindus and Muslims,
179

she maintains that purdah has drawn its legitimacy from religion, both in Hinduism and
Islam, and has served to sustain a strongly patriarchal family structure as well as unequal
gender relations.
180
However, it would be wrong to assume uniformity in gender roles or
observance of purdah amongst the Muslims and Hindus of South Asia.
181
They both
agree that there is inherent danger in the use of a single, overgeneralized, Asian model.
They also agree that women’s propriety is but one avenue of ennoblement for a male and
although there are differences of detail based on wealth, age, area, educational level, and
most importantly, Hindu and Muslim religions, there is a reciprocal relationship between
purdah and izzat, between women’s seclusion and men’s honor, across the region. One
main reason for this similarity between the two otherwise disparate religions is that the
great majority of Muslims on the subcontinent are descended from converts to Islam.
182

The three countries share many cultural, regional similarities, a common colonial

178
Dube, Women and Kinship, 62.

179
For Hindus, division of domestic space and the veiling of women’s faces are aimed at protecting female
sexuality and are linked to rules of kinship and marriage. It also concerns the observance of relationships of
respect within the family. However, for Muslims purdah is directed towards keeping women out of the
sight of strangers and outsiders. Amongst Muslims the notion of women as fitna, signifying danger, and the
concern with protecting men from temptation by keeping women unseen and unheard are more essential.
180
Dube, Women and Kinship, 64.

181
There are many differences in the way women cover their face or head, especially between Hindu and
Muslim women. Also, purdah rules are less stringent among lower caste and class women. One important
reason for this is their contribution to the economic activities of the family, like working in the fields, etc.

182
Mandelbaum, Women’s Seclusion, 76.

52
history
183
and the idea that honor is achieved through a strict enforcement of traditional
codes on women derives from Islam, Hinduism and South Asian traditions.
184
What
makes these countries interesting case studies is that even though they share the same
colonial history, all three chose different paths in terms of their politics, form of
government and the role religion would play in the formation of the State. It is beyond
the scope of my work to discuss the differences that stem from caste, class, religious and
regional diversity. However, I do aim to use the similarities to argue that there is a
general notion of honor and shame in South Asia and the forms of violence I discuss here
and that similar cultural ideologies of purity and pollution, honor and shame and purdah
play an important role in controlling women’s behavior and the spaces they occupy.
It thus becomes very important to challenge this patriarchal belief system, to
explore the culture of violence and oppression and to examine its ideological
underpinnings and its structural support in the social, political, and legal systems. I do so
by looking at three different forms of violence, which I argue are different manifestations
of the same ‘crime of honor’. ‘Honor killings’ are the most overt form of an honor crime,
which is aimed at restoring the honor that has been taken away by another’s behavior.
Rape and forced impregnation, on the other hand, are less about restoring one’s own
honor and more about divesting the ‘other’ of their honor. Finally, acid attack is both
about restoring the honor that was allegedly lost and stripping the honor of the woman
because of whose action it was lost. !

183
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were but one country before it was partitioned into India and Pakistan
during its independence in 1947. Pakistan was geographically divided into two parts, East Pakistan and
West Pakistan. However, after the war of 1971 between India and Pakistan, East Pakistan split from
Pakistan to become Bangladesh.

184
Silvie Bovarnick, “Universal human rights and non-Western normative systems: a comparative analysis
of violence against women in Mexico and Pakistan,” Review of International Studies 33 (2007): 68.

53
To analyze these forms of violence I employ the international human rights
framework because it offers a methodology for determining government obligations to
promote and protect the human rights of women. It consists of mechanisms available for
holding governments accountable if they fail to meet those obligations. This framework
also offers a basis for challenging discriminatory laws, its implementation, and the State’s
obligations to take effective measures to prevent and protect women from violence. It
remains unclear the extent to which these international instruments can pave the way for
legal reforms. Analyzing court cases within this framework allows us to focus on the
ways in which the legal system has helped prevent or legitimize violence and to examine
which mechanisms are most effective. Even though some progress has been made in
holding accountable perpetrators of violence against women at the international level, this
is often not reflected in national prosecutions.!
By taking this approach, I also aim to analyze the legal framework and the ways
in which existing laws, meant to protect women from violence, are interpreted and
implemented by the courts. There are flaws in the legal framework, which contribute to
impunity for the perpetrators of human rights violations. For example, the availability of
defenses for crimes against women that are based on traditional and stereotypical notions
of the appropriate roles and privileges of women, act as grounds for mitigation of
criminal penalties. In other cases, even if legislation does not condone violence directly,
the laws may be discriminatory by privileging patriarchal beliefs over women’s interests
or by not acknowledging the extent of the violence. Even where the legal framework
outlawing violence against women is in place, it has failed because of inadequate
punishment, community complicity or the existence of parallel legal systems.

54
My work here is primarily relies on human rights literature for its framework. I
also have used several human rights reports, country reports on status of women prepared
not just by the government agencies but also by the non-governmental organizations,
especially the reports from the issue specific organizations. I use many court cases,
especially the cases that received extensive media coverage and were considered legal
milestones by the women’s rights activists in the fight against violence. These court
judgments provided the foundation to build my arguments about the relative efficacy of
the legal system. Most of these reports and cases were collected during my fieldwork in
India from various sources including library collections, local newspapers, NGOs
focusing on human rights and organizations working to provide legal aid to the poor and
disenfranchised sections of society.
185
Several conversations with people working in
these organizations afforded insights. They also were a great source of brainstorming and
inspiration.
I want to acknowledge the possible limitations of this study. As mentioned earlier,
I do rely on a shared notion of honor as understood in the countries of India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh to make a generalized argument about how notions of honor and shame are
very often connected to violence against women. There is always the danger of
essentializing certain cultures and practices while trying to promote a universal notion of
human rights. I have tried to be careful not to take a Western standpoint and steer away
from any generalizations of Third world cultures by taking a more cross-cultural
approach to my understanding of the concepts and practices. However, there is a reason
why I chose these countries as my case studies. Because I come from India, I have an

185
This research was conducted during two different trips to India. First was during Summer 2005 and the
other was in December 2006.

55
advantage of not only knowing the language but also a better understanding of the history
of the region, its culture and traditions. Also because of this I very often let a lot of my
own personal experiences reflect very heavily on an otherwise academic argument. The
most notable limitation, though, will have to be the relative absence of the use of
interviews. Personal interviews with the survivors of violence, law makers and lawyers
who argue for/against the law in court, would have provided me with unique insight into
the nature of violence and my understanding of it but due to various reasons, many of
which were technical, this was not possible. I have tried to overcome this limitation by
using interviews from secondary sources, conducted by the organizations whose reports I
have widely used in my research.
There is of course the general difficulty in studying violence against women
because of the problem of underreporting. Very often, violence is so entrenched in
everyday life, it is not even recognized as abuse and thus not considered to be worth
reporting. When reported, very few ever make it to the newspapers and courts because of
the attitude of the society in general and the state machinery in particular. There is a
whole lot that can be done; this is just my humble attempt at trying to get there.

Chapter Outline
In chapter 1 I have provided a literature review and a theoretical framework for analyzing
violence against women. In Chapter 2, I focus on honor crimes in Pakistan, specifically
‘honor killings’. I analyze the social, cultural, political and economic reasons for its
perpetuation. I also look at the national and international legal safeguards available to

56
protect women from honor killings and make use of court cases to look at how the legal
system has responded to the problem
In Chapter 3, I focus on acid violence in Bangladesh and like the second chapter
analyze the social, cultural, political and economic reasons for its continuance in the
Bangladeshi context. Again I look at legal safeguards available to deal with acid violence
and the role NGOs have played in expanding the constitutional protection accorded to
women.
In Chapter 4, I focus on the use of rape and forced impregnation as a political
weapon during armed conflicts, particularly in the context of communal conflict in India.
I argue that rape as a weapon is closely linked to notions of honor and humiliation. I also
look at how rape in such contexts amounts to genocide and the failure/successes of the
courts in dealing with such crimes despite the existence of a wide range of laws
applicable to these crimes.
In Chapter 5, I provide a comparative analysis of my research findings while
suggesting that honor crimes and violence against women are not unique to Islamic
countries or Third world cultures. It is a part of our patriarchal society that sees women in
certain roles and their bodies as repositories of honor or the property of men. Religion
and culture, as a result, just become tools to enforce these roles and to assure compliance.
Law, thus, must play a more important role in protecting women from violence and I will
address the way in which that can be made possible. In Chapter 6, I conclude with my
final remarks, observations and implications of this study.

Chapter II
Honor Killings in Pakistan: An Analysis with Examples of the Case of Samia
Sarwar and Mukhtar Mai

In this last decade much has been written in the local and international press about
rampant violence against women in Pakistan and rest of the non-western world. The
Afghanistan and Iraq wars following 9/11 have brought the issue of women’s human
rights to an unprecedented level of attention, especially their condition in the Muslim
world. The images of women in Afghanistan and Iraq became one of the rallying cries for
justifying the wars against the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. Also at the same time it
fueled anti-western, anti-universal human rights sentiments in these and many other
countries. While this increasing international interest, along with economic growth
brought on by globalization, has improved many lives in developing countries, it has also
led to a religious backlash against modernity and increase in violence against women in
countries like Pakistan as it slides through the predicament of crises of identity and
legitimacy. One of the most important reasons for the growth of this violence is the
challenge to the traditional patriarchal structures posed by women who have dared to
cross the boundaries of conduct prescribed by a male dominated society. These acts of
misconduct can range from choosing to enter the workforce to private actions which may
be perceived as challenging male authority or allegedly dishonoring the family’s name
and its standing in the community. Punishment for such behavior may range from murder
to other forms of crimes of honor like acid attacks, stove burning and rape.
In this chapter, I look at honor killings under the rule of law in Pakistan. Honor
killings are not unique to Pakistan yet I chose this case study because the incidents in

58
Pakistan accounts for 25% of honor killings in the world.
1
While providing a general
historical and cultural background of honor killings in Pakistan, I seek to analyze the
broadening scope of crimes of honor by discussing the applicable substantive and
procedural national laws and the effectiveness of the administration of criminal justice.
The chapter includes a critical analysis of the amendments to the laws brought by General
Zia-ul-Haq in 1979 as part of his ‘Islamization’ process and of the more recent
amendments made to the criminal law on crimes of honor. I discuss the responsibility of
the state as a signatory to the various international human rights treaties including the
CEDAW. The chapter also evaluates the validity of the parallel legal systems and
effectiveness of the state agents in implementing the laws and eradicating cultural
violence on women. By providing a detailed analysis of how the state and judicial bodies
fail to address the issue, and at times, condone the heinous crime committed against
women, I aim to identify the factors for the continuance and more recently, rise in honor-
related violence in Pakistan. I think this is important because in order to hope for any
significant change and to make recommendations it is imperative to understand the
reasons behind the persistence of a practice that is condemned by most and yet practiced
by many.

Honor Killings in Pakistan
In Pakistan, hundreds of women, of all ages, in all parts of the country and for a variety
of reasons connected with perceptions of honor are killed every year. It is most often
carried out by family members whereby they kill women – daughters, mothers, wives,

1
Rabia Ali, The Dark Side of ‘Honour’: Women Victims in Pakistan, Lahore: Women’s Resource Center,
Shirkat Gah, 2001, 9.

59
sisters – as punitive or remedial measures against female or sexual ‘crimes’ such as
relationships outside of marriage, marrying a man of their choice, seeking divorce,
punishment for the suspicion of an inappropriate relationship with another man, or even
having been raped by another man. Basically anything that can be believed to have
brought shame to the family can lead to violence against the women, which is not always
murder; women are sometimes also maimed, burned or attacked by acid. The practice
known as ‘honor killing’ may vary from culture to culture but it is not difficult to justify
honor killings in the Pakistani society one way or another. Findings from a research
conducted by Shirkat Gah, women’s resource center in Pakistan, in 2001, identify various
underlying causes for honor killings. However, these causes are not just limited to
reasons emanating from unacceptable sexual behavior but also reflect on the economic
aspect of the practice. Women are murdered to take over their share of inheritance or for
not bringing dowry. The honor related crimes have also assumed a commercial aspect
where the decision maker takes five or ten percent as commission from the fine imposed
as punishment and sometimes reserve the right to sell off the women in question to make
money. Amnesty International in its 1999 report explains how honor killing has become
an industry in Pakistan where women have monetary worth in themselves in tribal society
and can be exchanged for money. Many also use the excuse of honor as a blanket cover
for a multitude of sins, most commonly to avoid death penalty or punishment for the
murder.
2

2
Amnesty International, 1999, 24.

60
The Criminal Law (Amendment Act, 2004)
3
defines the crime of honor killing in
section 299 of Pakistan Penal Code as an “offence committed in the name of or on the
pretext of honor means an offence committed in name or on the pretext of karo kari,
4

siyah kari
5
or similar other customs or practices.” This section has been introduced by
amending criminal law to legally define the crimes of honor on the pretext of customary
practices. Before the Amendment Act 2004 there was no definition of honor crimes in the
criminal law of Pakistan. Broadly speaking honor killing refers to the murder of women
and sometimes men under the pretext of restoring and/or reviving the ‘lost honor’ of a
family. The practice is most prevalent in rural areas where there still exists clan and tribal
or family kinship system. Methods of carrying out honor killings vary across the country.
In the southern province of Sindh, where it is often referred to as "karo kari", the victim
is hacked to death, often with the complicity of the community. Among the tribal Pashtun
communities in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan in the southwest,
where the practice is known as "tur", the victim can be hacked, stabbed, burned or shot.
In both cases, the practice's name means "black" in the local languages, in reference to
the perceived culturally unacceptable behavior of the victim. In Punjab, the killings -
usually by shooting - are more often based on individual decisions and carried out in

3
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2004 was enacted on January 2, 2005 to amend the Pakistan Penal
Code, 1860 and Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.

4
Karo Kari is a compound word literally meaning ‘black male’ and ‘black female,’ metaphoric terms for
adulterer and adulteress. Being so labeled leads means that both man and woman allegedly guilty of having
an illicit affair will be murdered. But more often than not it is the women who are killed and men get away
with some other form of punishment. Karo Kari is a colloquial name of honor killing in rural areas of
southern Pakistani province of Sindh.

5
Siyah Kari is the colloquial name of honor killing tradition in Pakistani province of Baluchistan.

61
private.
6
In some cases, jirgas, or tribal councils, decide that the woman should be killed
and send men to execute her. Women are never given an opportunity to give their version
of events; most significantly of all, often the making of the allegation alone suffices to
defile a man's honor and, concomitantly, to justify killing the woman. Most of the cases
go unreported and when reported the perpetrators are not brought to justice. It is reported
that only a handful of the perpetrators are arrested, and most of them receive only token
punishment or the heirs of the victims are allowed to forgive the accused or accept
compensation (diyat) in place of imprisonment.
According to the non-governmental Human Rights Commission of Pakistan,
which started reporting and keeping records on honor crimes from 1996 onward, karo
kari killings in Sindh for the year 2000 was estimated at 410, showing a continuously
rising trend over the years – 432 in 1993, 776 in 1994, 864 in 1995, 864 in 1996, 750 in
1997, 800 in 1998 and 886 in 1999.
7
In 2002, it was around 823, 938 in 2003, and about
1200 in 2004.
8
According to official statistics in 2006, as many as 1261 women were
murdered in the name of honor in Pakistan.
9
But unofficial statistics show that the
number of victims is much higher because according to some reports up to 70 percent of
the cases go unreported since close family members are mostly involved in these killings
and also in part because police are often ‘hand in glove with the perpetrators of the

6
Sanchita Hosali ed., Selected International Human Rights Materials Addressing ‘Crimes of Honour’,
London: CIMEL/INTERIGHTS Project on Strategies to Address Crimes of Honour, 2003, 66.

7
Annual Report on Human Rights in Pakistan, Lahore: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
Publications, 2000, 71.

8
Data collected by HRCP.

9
This figure is reported by Prime Minister’s advisor on Women Development. Since the year 2000, the
government of Pakistan also started paying attention to the issue of honor related violence and started keep
data on the incidences of honor killings.

62
crimes.’ The data shows that the highest number of honor killings was perpetrated in
Punjab province followed by Sindh, the North-West Frontier Province, and the
southwestern province of Baluchistan. In eighty percent of the reported cases, a man is
stated to have murdered his wife. It is reported in 2001 that on an average, two women
are killed every day in Pakistan for what they deem as ‘defiling the family honor’. The
increase in number of honor killings can be attributed to various socio-economic reasons.
The failure to punish the perpetrator or even condemn such behavior obviously plays a
very big role in the ascendancy of violence against women. Some have argued about the
role of a post 9/11 world that has led to political, religious and social upheaval in
Pakistan as it is going through major internal transformation and intense international
scrutiny.
10
This transformation has led to the growth of Islamic fundamentalism and
Mullahisation
11
of Pakistan that has less to do with Islam and more about violent struggle
for power. These religious groups have been aided and abetted by the government of
Pakistan and the US state department in order to fight their war on terror. As a result,
these rapidly changing global economic and political realities have led to more
conservative policies, which have resulted in more misogynistic legislation, stricter
segregation, and more gender-biased social attitudes toward women. Amir Jafri, in his
work, argues that honor killing is not new but fundamental political shifts in the last few
years have led to a surge in media attention to karo kari.
12
He notes that only since the
naming of the karo kari act as honor killing has the debate attained a particular vigor in

10
Amir H. Jafri, “Karo Kari (Honor Killing) in Pakistan: A Hermeneutic Study of Various Discourses,”
Dissertation, 2003, 11.

11
Similar to Talibanization where there is a rapid rise of the utopian version of Islam and the power of the
Mullahs.

12
Jafri, “Karo Kari in Pakistan”, 13.

63
Pakistani society. Because of the sensational nature the issue has generated a lot of media
attention during the last few years. According to some other studies the issue of honor
related violence started receiving attention when it got on the agenda of women’s rights
and human rights organizations due to the interest of Western donor agencies.
13
While
there has been scholarly work on the notion of honor in Mediterranean societies, it has
been scant in Pakistan because of the sensitive nature of the subject and local cultural
constraints of reporting on such events. But when in 1990s, NGOs received funding and
social consultancy firms were commissioned to research the issue, within three to four
years all this research based activism brought the issue of honor related violence into the
national and international limelight. Then started the occasional BBC documentary,
Nightline discussion, National Geographic special, and other western media coverage that
has looked it from a Western human rights viewpoint, arguably to its own peril.
14

Shahnaz Khan explores another aspect of this political situation where women’s
sexuality is regulated and moral women are prized. Application of strict rules on women
not only provides for docile daughters, mothers and wives but also provides docile
workers who will accept difficult and poorly paid working conditions without organizing
for change.
15
She argues that capitalism requires moral workers and with the push for free
markets and structural adjustment programs advocated by IMF and the World Bank, the
state tends to regulate women’s sexuality and perpetuates the continuation of
discriminatory laws and evokes Islam to justify prosecution of women for Zina.
16

13
Khan, Beyond Honor, 148.

14
Jafri, “Karo Kari in Pakistan”, 16.

15
Shahnaz Khan, “Zina and the Moral regulation of Pakistani Women,” Feminist Review 75 (2003): 86.

16
Zina laws are discussed in detail in a later section of this chapter.

64
“Regulation of women’s sexuality helps build a case for national morality…Increasing
structural inequality and growing societal violence can then be explained away as a lack
of individual morality, rendering the cost of globalization and military spending
invisible.”
17

Examples of Honor Killing
"The Government of Pakistan vigorously condemns the practice of so-called
honor killings. Such acts do not find a place in our religion or law. Killing in the name of
honor is murder, and it will be treated as such."
18

“You must understand the environment in Pakistan…This has become a money
making concern. A lot of people say if you want to go abroad and get a visa for Canada
or citizenship and be a millionaire, get yourself raped.”
19

Both these statements are by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf who on one
hand condemns the practice and promises to do whatever he can to stop honor killings,
but on the other hand he belittles the suffering and trauma of the survivors of honor
crimes. The second statement was made in response to the publicity Mukhtar Mai’s story
received in the international press and had become an issue of national shame for
President Musharraf’s government.
20
I will begin this chapter by providing an overview
of the two cases, Samia Sarwar and Mukhtar Mai, which garnered a lot of publicity and

17
Khan, “Zina and the Moral Regulation of Pakistani Women,” 97.

18
President Pervez Musharraf, April 2000.

19
Glenn Kessler and Dafna Linzer, “Musharraf: No Challenge from Bush on Reversal,” Washington Post,
September 13, 2005, A19. Musharraf denied ever having made the statement and asserted that Pakistan did
not deserve to be singled out on the issue of violence against women.

20
This is discussed in detail in the next few pages of this chapter.

65
formed the backdrop for most of the debates surrounding honor killings in Pakistan and
elsewhere.

The Case of Samia Sarwar
One example of honor killing in Pakistan which shows the disturbing pattern of violence
and the struggle for justice is the case of Samia Sarwar. Samia was married to her cousin,
a medical doctor, who subjected her to frequent beatings and torture, according to her
lawyer, Asma Jahangir.
21
After her husband threw her down the stairs of their home when
she was pregnant with their second child, Samia returned to her parents’ home and
pleaded with her parents to let her seek a divorce.
22
Her parents could not bear the shame
that a divorce would bring upon the family name and threatened to kill her if she sought
legal action against her husband.
23
She continued to live in her parents’ home for five
years until she got the opportunity to flee in March 1999, when her parents left on a
pilgrimage. She fled to Lahore and sought help from the law firm AGHS and its women’s
shelter, Dastak, which was run by two prominent lawyers and human rights advocates,
Hina Jilani and Asma Jehangir.
24
While at Dastak she refused to see male relatives but

21
Carol Ann Douglas, “Pakistan: Women Oppose Honor Killings,” Off Our Backs, August/September 1999,
pg.3.

22
Rachel A. Ruane, “Murder in the Name of Honor: Violence Against Women in Jordan and Pakistan,”
Emory International Law Review 14 (2000): 1523; Yolanda Asamoah-Wade, “Women’s Human Rights and
‘Honor killings’ in Islamic Cultures,” Buffalo Women’s Law Journal 8 (2000): 21.

23
Sheila Dauer, “Honor Killings and the End of Human Rights,” National Council of Jewish Women
Journal 24, no. 3 (2001): 18.

24
Ibid. AGHS, Pakistan’s first all-female law firm, was founded in 1991 by four women, including sisters
Asma Jahangir and Hina Jilani, two of Pakistan’s most prominent women’s and human rights lawyers and
activists.

66
agreed to meet her mother who was to hand over papers needed for the divorce.
25
In April
1999 she arranged a meeting with her mother at the law firm. Her mother arrived at the
meeting escorted by two men. When Jilani asked all but the mother to leave, one of the
men, her uncle, pulled out a gun and shot at both Samia and Hina Jilani. Samia died
instantly, while Hina Jilani narrowly escaped injury.
26
In the aftermath of the
assassination, members of the Peshawar Chamber of Commerce, of which Samia’s father
is chairman, publicly stated that the honor killing was in accordance with religious and
tribal traditions.
27
The Chamber, along with several religious organizations accused Hina
Jilani and her sister, Asma Jahangir, of being non-believers and issued a fatwa calling on
believers to kill them for “misleading women.”
28
When the opposition party, Pakistan
People’s Party, Senator Iqbal Haider presented a resolution condemning the killing of
Samia Sarwar, another Senator Ilyas Bilour referring to Asma Jehangir and Hina Jilani
said: “We have fought for human rights and civil liberties all our lives but wonder what
sort of human rights are being claimed by these girls in jeans.”
29
The Pakistani public
also, overwhelmingly sided with her parents because of the widely held belief that by
seeking a divorce she had dishonored her family. Many social commentators argued in
the media that since the killing was in accordance with their tradition, it could not be a

25
Ruane, “Murder in the Name of Honor,” 1524.

26
Ibid.

27
Asamoah-Wade, “Women’s Human Rights,”21.

28
Douglas, “Pakistan: Women Oppose Honor Killings,” 3.

29
Amnesty International, Pakistan: Violence Against Women in the Name of Honor, New York: Human
Rights are Women’s Rights, 1999, 21.

67
crime. Some even suggested that the parents should have obtained a jirga
30
verdict before
undertaking the killing to lend it legitimacy.
31
Even though there was no doubt that Samia
Sarwar was murdered, under the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance of the Pakistani law, which
allows the heir of the victim to forgive the murderer, her mother and uncle went
unpunished.
32

The Case of Mukhtar Mai
Another highly publicized honor killing case is of Mukthar Mai, which occurred in a
small town in the Punjab province. On June 22, 2002, Mukhtar Mai was gang raped by
several men in the village of Meerawalla in Pakistan.
33
After the men raped her, they
stripped Mukhtar Mai of her clothing and threw her out of the hut and she was forced to
walk naked through the village to her home.
34
The rape was carried out on the orders of
the Mastoi village tribal council (jirga) as a punishment for a transgression supposedly
committed by her twelve-year-old brother; he was accused of having sexual relations
with a woman of the higher Mastoi tribe.
35
The boy had denied the accusation and

30
Jirga in the tribal areas of Pakistan, particularly among the Pashtun, is the quasi-formal assembly of
community elders. On matters of individual and collective conduct their word is considered final and
binding. Principally it is a council of the elders and leaders of clans, sub-tribes, and tribes. Practically, all
community affairs, both public and private as well as violations of the tribal code are subject to its
jurisdiction. Traditionally, a jirga is only a meeting at a time of need and has no hierarchical structure and
thus it cannot be considered an organization.

31
M. Ziauddin, “The Legitimacy of Honour Killing,” Dawn, May 8, 1999.

32
Qisas and Diyat Ordinances are discussed in detail in a later section of this chapter.

33
Mazna Hussain, “Take My Riches, Give Me Justice: A Contextual Analysis of Pakistan’s Honor Crimes
Legislation,” Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 29 (2006): 223.

34
Tina R. Karkera, “The Gang-Rape of Mukhtar Mai and Pakistan’s opportunity to Regain its Lost Honor,”
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 14 (2006): 165.

35
Hussain, ‘Take My Riches,” 223.

68
explained that three Matsoi men had kidnapped and sodomized him earlier in the day,
and when he threatened to report the incident, they concocted the story about the affair.
36

His sister, Mukhtar Mai, apologized for her brother’s alleged behavior, however, the
council ignored the apology. The village council decided that the boy had impugned the
honor of the tribe by engaging in sexual relations with its female member and thus
ordered that Mai be raped in order to restore its honor.
37
Unlike many other victims in her
situation, Mai decided to file a police complaint against the rapists and tribal council and
what followed after that quickly gained international attention.
38

36
Karkera, “The Gang-Rape of Mukhtar Mai,” 163.

37
Hussain, ‘Take My Riches,” 223, 224; Karkera, “The Gang-Rape of Mukhtar Mai,” 164; Nina Khouri,
“Human Rights and Islam: Lessons from Amina Lawal and Mukhtar Mai,” The Georgetown Journal of
Gender and the Law 8 (2007): 103.

38
The local police knew of the rape, however, they initially did nothing. Little was done about the charge
until the village imam (prayer leader) declares that a great sin has been committed and asks the villagers to
report the matter to the police. He also informs a reporter about the incident who publishes the story in the
local press and then is immediately picked by the international media and the Punjab government asks the
police to take immediate action. 20 days after the incident a case is registered against 14 men, 4 of the
accused are charged with raping Ms Mai while the rest are booked for abetment. On 31 August 2002, the
trial court convicts 6 of the 14 men sentencing them to death. In September the State and Mukhtar Mai file
separate appeals in the Multan High Court against the acquittal of the eight men. Meanwhile Mai uses the
money she received as compensation from the government to set up two schools in her village. Her courage
and efforts are acknowledged worldwide and generous donations are made for her school. On March 3,
2005, the Multan High Court reverses the trial court’s judgment on the basis of “insufficient evidence” and
“faulty investigations”. The court acquits five of the six while the death sentence of the sixth is commuted
to life imprisonment. The acquittals cause an international outcry and human rights groups call upon the
Pakistan government to intervene. As a result, on March 11, 2005, Pakistan’s highest Islamic court, the
Sharia court, suspends the Lahore High Court's acquittal of the five men. The court rules that the Lahore
High Court does not have the jurisdiction to hear appeals in cases tried under Islamic laws. Within a few
days the Supreme Court - Pakistan's highest judicial forum - intervenes to set aside the ruling by the Sharia
court. The Supreme Court says it will hear the final appeal in the case. It rules that the Lahore High Court
verdict will stand till such time that the appeal in the Supreme Court is decided. The five acquitted are
ordered to be released. Ms Mai appeals to President Musharraf to order the re-arrest of the four men
released saying she fears for her life. The five men released earlier are re-arrested along with the eight
others who had been found not guilty at the original trial in 2002. Mukhtar Mai files an appeal in the
Supreme Court against the acquittal of five men sentenced to death by the Supreme Court. Meanwhile Ms
Mai is prevented from traveling abroad by the government. Officials say the security measures are in place
for Ms Mai's own safety and that she can travel abroad once the courts have dealt with her case. The travel
ban on Ms Mai is widely condemned, locally and internationally. Critics say the move is to stop Ms Mai's
case generating bad publicity for Pakistan abroad. She withdraws her application for US visa and her
passport is taken from her. The same day, the government announces that her name has been removed from
the Exit Control List. But the removal was meaningless as her passport has been taken away and she cannot

69
These two cases have become notorious examples of violence against women in
Pakistan and exemplify what is wrong with the Pakistani political, legal and social system
insofar as it fails to protect its women from such brutalities.

Status of Women in Pakistan
Women in Pakistan live in a world structured around strict religious, family and tribal
customs that essentially force them to live in submission. In a nation where Islamic law
dictates traditional family values and is enmeshed in the legal system, Pakistan’s political
system discriminates against women. Although women constitute approximately forty-
eight percent of the population, they were only a small percentage of the labor force.
39

According to a World Bank report the literacy rate for women in Pakistan is only 25
percent, ninety three percent of rural women and seventy two percent of urban woman
are illiterate; the maternal mortality rate is very high at 600 per 100,000 births. According
to HRCP report only two percent of Pakistani women participate in the formal sector of
employment.

travel anyway. By June 2005 Supreme Court suspends the acquittals of the five men convicted and orders
that they and eight others found not guilty at the original trial be held pending retrial. The case is still
pending in the Supreme Court. Mukhtar Mai meanwhile has won several awards and recognition for her
courage and the work she is doing in Pakistan to help other women. Glamour magazine named her the
‘Glamour woman of the year’ in 2005; her autobiographical book became very popular; international
dignitaries like Laura Bush praised her. However, she continues to live in fear for her life and her family in
Pakistan; prominent news analysts like Nicholas D. Kristof write about her regularly in New York Times.
However, Mukhtar Mai still continues to live in fear of her and her family’s life in Pakistan. It was because
of all this international attention Musharraf’s government decided to place restrictions on her movement
because it hurt international image of Pakistan. This timeline has been taken from various news sources
including BBC News, “Mukhtar Mai-History of a Rape Case,” 28 June, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4620065.stm (last visited June 11, 2008); www.wikipedia.org;
Nicholas D. Kristof "A Heroine Walking in the Shadow of Death," New York Times, April 4, 2006,
available at http://select.nytimes.com/2006/04/04/opinion/04kristof.html (last visited June 11, 2008);
Nicholas D. Kristof, "A Woman’s Work Earns Her Enemies," The New York Times, April 8, 2007,
available at http://select.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/opinion/08kristof.html (last visited June 11, 2008).

39
United Nations Women’s Indicators and Statistics, 1994.

70
The situation of women in Pakistan varies greatly depending on the geographical
location and class. Although urban and upper class women may enjoy certain privileges,
the majority remain disadvantaged and are designated as second class citizens due to
systematic discrimination perpetuated by social and cultural norms and attitudes. A
woman is regarded as inferior from the time of her birth, an event which is acknowledged
with despair rather than joy. The girl child is viewed as a form of liability – someone who
will not be able to contribute anything to the family. Her only asset then is her power of
reproduction and that of being a sexual object.
40
The expectation that a bride’s family
will have to pay a dowry has added to the sense of seeing girls as a liability. Even though
dowry is not sanctified as a religious requirement in Islam, it has become a sort of
cultural tradition on the Indian subcontinent. Another consequence of this attitude is the
prevalence of child marriages because families try to get rid of the burden as early as
possible and also to ensure the purity or chastity of girls. The concept of Watta Satta
(exchange marriages) is still common and is a direct consequence of preference for
cousins so that control over the estate can be maintained. As a result many women are
married off to paternal cousins who can be much younger than they are.
41
Women are
primarily viewed as being owned by her father or brothers before marriage, and her
husband after marriage. This commodification of women is the biggest factor
contributing to violence against women and that is mostly why any attempt by women to
marry someone of her choice is dealt with punishment. According to Human Rights

40
Khawar Mumtaz and Farida Shaheed, eds., Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back?
Lahore: Vanguard, 1987.

41
Ibid.

71
Watch in 1999 approximately seventy to ninety percent of Pakistani women were subject
to domestic violence.
42

Poverty poses another challenge as most households have been headed by the
husband/father who is the sole breadwinner of the family. As a result, women’s rights to
work, own property, and inherit are constantly violated. The need to keep immovable
property within the family has led to women being denied their right to inherit. Women
can take up work only with permission from their male family members. Women’s
participation in the economic arena is disproportionately low, with women constituting
only 28 percent of the country’s labor force.
43
Most of the women are either employed in
the informal sector that does not give them much protection or they work in fields
without any compensation. Women’s employment in the formal sector is slowly changing
in urban areas with the spread of globalization and also because rising poverty has forced
families to send their young daughters to the workforce. However, the men of the family
still mostly control their income.
Women have enjoyed political rights historically, at least according to the formal
law. The Constitution of Pakistan gives women the right to vote, and the right to hold any
elected post including the position as Prime Minister and President. However, the actual
practice is different from theory. Despite the fact that Pakistan has had a woman Prime
Minister, this does not mean women are well represented in the legislature. In 1998, there
were only seven female members of the federal parliament, five in the National Assembly
out of a total of 207 and two in the Senate out of eighty three; one women among 483

42
Human Rights Watch, Crime or Custom? Violence Against Women in Pakistan, New York, Washington:
Human Rights Watch USA, 1999, 1.

43
Ibid, 24.

72
male members of the four provincial legislatures; two women cabinet ministers; and three
women judges in the provincial high courts.
44
Women are also completely excluded from
the traditional and informal decision making systems present in rural communities across
Pakistan such as the jirga and panchayat. The Local Government Ordinance, 2000,
specifically reserved 33 percent seats for women, due to which 40,000 women are now
elected. The jirgas and panchayats, though, in certain districts issued statements
forbidding women to either vote, or run for elections. Even when they do vote, men of
the family decide for whom they vote.
A brief review of women’s socio, economic and political status in Pakistan
indicates that there is a huge gap between their formal rights as citizens with equal rights
and the culture which treats them as second-class citizens. Although my focus here is on
the legal aspects of the problem and the laws pertaining to violence against women in
general and honor crimes in particular, one must assess cultural barriers to enforcement.
When considering women’s legal position in Pakistan, it is imperative to evaluate the
whole range of laws as well as customary practices, tribal codes and social measures
undertaken to form legislation favorable to women. The following section, focusing on
formal laws, will examine the Hudood Ordinance 1979, Qisas and Diyat Ordinance 1991,
the Law of Evidence 1984, the parallel judicial systems, the Family Laws Ordinance
1961, the criminal justice system and CEDAW to which Pakistan is a signatory. After
analyzing the formal laws, I turn to societal/attitudinal, cultural obstacles to enforcement
of the law.

44
Human Rights Watch, Crime or Custom, 24.

73
Rule of Law and Women
I. Hudood Ordinance
Gender equality is specifically guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan. Article 9 of the
Constitution states, “No person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance
with law.” Article 25 of Pakistan’s Constitution unequivocally states, “All citizens are
equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of the law.” Article 25 (2) also says,
“there shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone.” Despite these constitutional
obligations, discriminatory social/cultural traditions, and the interpretation of the law
undermines the principle of the right to life for all persons as it applies to women.
Pakistan, ever since its independence, has been unable to resolve the tension between its
attempts to identify herself as a modernizing Islamic society which guarantees
democratic freedom to its populace and the theocratic ideals underlying the nation’s
freedom movement.
45

The state of Pakistan was formed after the partition of British India in 1947. The
partition was along religious lines as Pakistan’s founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
advocated for a separate nation-state because he wanted to secure the political rights of
Muslims who otherwise would have been a minority in Hindu dominated India. Thus,
religion has always been central to the identity of the Pakistani people and the role of
Islam in Pakistan’s political life has always dominated the process of state building.
46

Jinnah, who was an advocate for women’s rights, died just thirteen months after the

45
Hussain, ‘Take My Riches,” 237.

46
Katherine M. Weaver, “Women’s Rights and Shari’a Law: A Workable Reality? An Examination of
Possible International Human Rights Approaches through the Continuing Reform of the Pakistani Hudood
Ordinance,” Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 17 (2007): 485.

74
creation of Pakistan and the succession of leadership that followed after his death began a
chain of Islamization of Pakistan’s constitution and its political and social life.
47

Agreements to make Pakistan more ‘Islamic’ have been a continuous part of the
country’s history as each time a government felt threatened or insecure it resorted to
Islamic rhetoric in the hope of gaining legitimacy and prolonging its existence.
48
The
most significant in terms of its impact has been the military regime of General Zia-ul-
Huq who overthrew Bhutto’s democratically elected government in a military coup and
imposed martial law. His claim to power was supported by right-wing religious parties
and by feudal landlords because Bhutto had introduced agricultural reforms that
threatened their power base.
49
There have been several documents known as the
Constitution of Pakistan, and as of 2008 the existing constitution was the Constitution of
1973, which was enacted by the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1973. It empowers
the court to determine whether a law is repugnant to Islam and to direct the government
to change it.
50
When Zia seized power as dictator in 1977 he depended on Islamic values

47
Hussain, ‘Take My Riches,” 238; Weaver, “Women’s Rights and Shari’a Law,” 487.

48
Ibid.

49
Shahnaz Khan, Gender, Religion, Sexuality and the state: Mediating the Hadood Laws in Pakistan,
London, Ontario: Center for Research on Violence Against Women and Children, 2001: 3.

50
Evan Gottesman, “The Reemergence of Qisas and Diyat in Pakistan,” Columbia Human Rights Law
Review 23 (1992): 435; Pakistan Constitution 1973, part VII, chapter 3A, 203D states:
(1) The Court may, (either of its own motion or) on the petition of a citizen of Pakistan or the
Federal Government or a Provincial Government, examine and decide the question whether or
not a law or provision of law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, as laid down in the
Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet, hereinafter referred to as the Injunctions of
Islam…
(2) If the Court decides that any law or provision of law is repugnant to the Inunctions of Islam, it
shall set out in its decision:
(a) the reasons for it holding that opinion; and
(b) the extent to which such law or provision is so repugnant;
and specify the day on which the decision shall effect (Provided that no such decision
shall be deemed to take effect before the expiration of the period within which appeal
there from may be referred to the Supreme Court or, where an appeal has been so

75
to legitimize his regime and to consolidate his power.
51
He initiated Nizam-e-Mustafa
(the system of the Prophet Muhammad), a process of Islamization of the laws and the
social fabric of Pakistan.
52
The period saw the introduction of highly discriminatory
legislation, media onslaughts by state agencies to propagate the ‘Islamic’ vision of
women’s status. There were also several other measures which not only resulted in
further derogation of women’s rights, but also reinforced biased attitudes regarding
women’s more limited role in society.
53
Although a democratic government returned in
1988, elected officials have mostly refrained from challenging the fundamentalist laws
established during Zia’s reign consequentially women remained most vulnerable to
violation of their rights to life and liberty.
Of the many changes brought about during the process of Islamization, the
Hudood
54
Ordinance, promulgated by President Zia in 1979, was the most retrogressive.
It not only sought to define the notion of a “chaste” Pakistani citizen but also to codify
this notion in order to bring Pakistan into “conformity with the injunctions of Islam.” In
such a context, as women were visualized as the recognized symbols of morality in the
culture, the regulation of their sexuality became a crucial component of Zia’s Nizam-e-

referred, before the disposal of such appeal).

51
Weaver, “Women’s Rights and Shari’a Law,” 487.

52
Khan, “Gender, Religion, Sexuality and the State,” 3.

53
Hina Jilani and Eman M. Ahmed, “Violence against Women: The Legal System and Institutional
Responses in Pakistan,” in Violence, Law and Women’s Rights in South Asia, edited by Savitri
Goonesekere, 148-206, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, London: Sage Publications, 2004: 149.

54
Hudood means “prevention, hindrance, restraint, prohibition and hence a restrictive ordinance or statute
of Allah respecting things lawful and unlawful.”

76
Mustafa.
55
The Hudood Ordinance, which as of 2008 is no longer a part of the standard
Pakistan Penal Code, subsumes adultery, fornication, rape and prostitution under the
rubric Zina treating them as offences against the state. The ordinance introduced the
sexual offenses of Zina (extra marital sexual relations) and Zina-bil-jabr (rape).
Pakistan’s previous rape laws, a remnant of the British colonial rule, had defined rape as
compulsory sexual intercourse. Some of the significant differences between the law of
Zina and the law it repealed are:
(a) The current law assumes that rape can be committed by either a man or a
woman, whereas the former categorically defined it as male-specific crime;
however, its also narrowed the circumstances in which rape can be said to have
occurred;
56

(b) The current law eliminated the concept of statutory rape which enabled a man
to be prosecuted for rape when the victim was a girl under the age of fourteen
years, regardless of her consent;
57

(c) The legal possibility of marital rape was eliminated and all sexual relations
outside of marriage were essentially considered a criminal act. For the first time
in Pakistan’s history, fornication (extra marital sex) was rendered illegal and
along with adultery, non compoundable, non-bailable and punishable by stoning,
flogging and death;
58

(d) The punishments prescribed by the current Islamic law are dependent on the
quality of witnesses rather than heinousness of the crime or the degree of physical
and mental injury to the person of the victim.
59

The Hudood ordinance specifically defines Zina in article 4 as: “A man and a
woman are said to commit Zina if they willfully have sexual intercourse without being

55
Ayesha Jalal, “The Convenience of Subservience: Women and the State of Pakistan,” in Women, Islam
and the State, edited by Deniz Kandiyoti, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.

56
Human Rights Watch, Crime or Custom, 33.

57
See Pakistan Penal Code, Chapter XVI, Offenses Affecting the Human Body, of Rape, Section 375 (5).

58
Khan, “Gender, Religion, Sexuality and the State,” 1.

59
Jilani, “Violence against Women,” 166.

77
validly married to each other.”
60
Article 5 sets out the types of Zina that are subject to
hadd, the highest punishment (which includes flogging or stoning):
61

(1) Zina is liable to hadd if-
(a) it is committed by a man who is an adult and is not insane with a woman to
whom he is not, and does not suspect himself to be married.
(b) it is committed by a woman who is an adult and is not insane with a man to
whom she is not, and does not suspect herself to be married.
(2) Whoever is guilty of Zina liable to hadd shall, subject to the provisions of this
Ordinance, -
(a) if he or she is a mushan (adult Muslim male), be stoned to death at a public
place; or
(b) if he or she is not mushan, be punished, at a public place; with whipping
numbering one hundred stripes.

Under its heading of zina, the Zina Ordinance includes the category “zina-bil-
jabr” which lays out the definition and punishment for sexual intercourse against the will
or without the consent of one of the parties. Article 6 specifies the parameters and
punishments for rape, zina-bil-jabr:
62

(1) A person is said to commit zina-bil-jabr if he or she has sexual intercourse
with a woman or man, as the case may be, to whom he or she is not validly
married, in any of the following circumstances, namely:
(a) against the will of the victim;
(b) without the consent of the victim;
(c) with the consent of the victim, when the consent has been obtained by putting
the victim in fear of death or of hurt; or
(d) with the consent of the victim, when the offender knows that the offender is
validly married to the victim and that the consent is given because the victim
believes that the offender is another person to whom the victim is or believes
herself or himself to be validly married.

60
Asifa Quraishi, “Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of Pakistan from a Woman-Sensitive
Perspective,” Michigan Journal of International Law 18 (1997): 288.

61
The Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance No. VII of 1979, Article 5, available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/zia_po_1979/ord7_1979.html#6 (last visited May 7, 2008).
Hereinafter Zina Ordinance.

62
Zina Ordinance, Article 6.

78
Zina-bil-jabr is liable to hadd if it is committed in the circumstances specified
above in sub-section 1 and 2 of article 5. Finally, the Zina Ordinance then specifies the
evidence required to prove both zina and zina-bil-jabr. The necessary evidentiary
elements were laid out in Article 8, which states that proof of zina or zina-bil-jabr liable
to hadd shall be in one of the following forms, namely:
63

(a) the accused makes before a Court of competent jurisdiction a confession of
the commission of the offence; or
(b) at least four Muslim adult male witnesses, about whom the Court is satisfied,
having regard to the requirements of tazkiyah al-shuhood (credibility of
witnesses), that they are truthful person and abstain from major sins, give
evidence as eyewitnesses of the act of penetration necessary to the offence.
Provided that, if the accused is a non-Muslim, the eyewitnesses may be non-
Muslims.
64

When the requirements of the hadd punishments cannot be met (either through a
confession or four male witnesses), the action is punished through article 10 under Tazir
(discretionary punishment under the Zina Ordinance) where other direct or circumstantial
evidence of the commission of offense is available.
65
The maximum Tazir punishment for
zina and zina-bil-jabr is rigorous imprisonment of ten and four to twenty five years
respectively.
66
In case of zina-bil-jabr committed by a gang of two or more people, the
Tazir punishment is a mandatory death sentence.
67
For the purposes of Tazir, no
distinction is made between a mushan and non-mushan offender. Because of the strict

63
Zina Ordinance, Article 8.

64
Ibid.

65
Zina Ordinance, Article 10.

66
Ibid, Article 10 (3).

67
Ibid, Article 10 (4).

79
evidentiary requirements for Hadd punishments, the overwhelming majority of rape cases
have been tried at the Tazir level of evidence and punishment.
68

There are many implications of these laws. Proponents of the law have argued
that it is meant to modify the existing law so as to bring it in conformity with the
injunctions of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah and thus codifies the
Islamic law of illegal sexual relations. In reality, however, the Zina Ordinance regulates
what constitutes ethical behavior in sex. More generally it governs within the family and
the social institution of marriage in ways that arguably violate women’s fundamental
rights under the constitution, and tenets of Islam.
69
The opponents of Hudood laws have
argued that the Zina Ordinance is blatantly discriminatory on its face as well as in its
consequences.
70

The foremost concern has been proving or disproving consent, rather than forceful
coercion or violation, which shifts the focus of all subsequent prosecution from the
aggressor to the victim.
71
Evidence of consent can include delay in reporting, lack of
physical evidence, testimony about the victims’ poor moral character,
72
animosity

68
Human Rights Watch, “Crime or Custom?,” 36. Evidence for Tazir punishment is governed by the
standard evidence code (Qanun-e-Shahadat) which was introduced by General Zia in 1984. The Evidence
code states: unless otherwise provided in any law relating to the enforcement of Hudood…in matters
pertaining to financial or future obligations…the instruments shall be attested to by two men or by one man
and two women…in all other matters, the court may accept, or act on, the testimony of one man or one
woman. Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Section 17.

69
Khan, “Zina and the Moral regulation of Pakistani Women,” 76.

70
Moeen H. Cheema, “Cases and Controversies: Pregnancy as Proof of Guilt Under Pakistan’s Hudood
Laws,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 32 (2006): 149.

71
Afiya Zia, Sex Crime in the Islamic Context: Rape, Class and Gender in Pakistan, Lahore: ASR
Publications, 1994, 17.

72
Article 151 (4) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order of 1984, Pakistan’s law of evidence, allows the “immoral
character” of the victim to be admitted into evidence.

80
between the parties, a valid marriage contract between the parties, or insufficient physical
resistance.
73
The onus of providing proof thus rests with the victim a requirement which
ensures that most women fail to report the rape. Furthermore the evidentiary rules
requiring four adult Muslim men to witness the “act of penetration” and testify make it
highly unlikely for the rapist to receive hadd punishment. If four women witness a rape,
their testimony would not satisfy the evidentiary requirement and the perpetrator may be
acquitted. Additionally if a woman does not have physical signs of rape or of struggle
such as bruises and scratches, she is often seen as not having resisted and thus the judicial
system views the woman not as a victim but instead an “immoral” woman.
74
The woman
can be categorized as the rapist herself since it is often assumed that she seduced the
man.
75

An even more serious consequence of the Zina Ordinance was that rape victims
feared coming forward to report their perpetrators because of judicial conversion of rape,
zina-bil-jabr, to consensual zina if insufficient proof was presented to sustain a rape
conviction.
76
If she is unable to convince the court, her allegation of rape is in itself
considered as a confession of zina and the victim effectively implicates herself and is
liable to Tazir punishment. In Pakistani culture, where the honor of a family is dependent
on the chastity of its women, the potential shame of being accused of extra marital or
non-marital sex was enough of a threat to discourage victims from filing complaints.

73
Weaver, “Women’s Rights and Shari’a Law,” 493.

74
Alice Bettencourt, “Violence Against Women in Pakistan,” Human Rights Advocacy Clinic, Litigation
Report, 2000, 9.

75
Khan, “Gender, Religion, Sexuality and the State,” 1.

76
Weaver, “Women’s Rights and Shari’a Law,” 493.

81
Above all, if the victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, pregnancy can be used
against her as a proof of zina under hadd, triggering highest of penalties because
pregnancy is considered a confession, which requires hadd punishments without four
male witnesses.
77
Many trial courts are quick to assume that the victim is only alleging
rape to cover up the illegitimate pregnancy.
78
According to an Amnesty International
report, more than one third of all Pakistani women in prison are being held due to having
been accused or found guilty of zina.
79
Although 95 percent of the prisoners charged for
zina are released upon trial, they face years of incarceration before trial and suffer various
forms of physical, emotional and sexual torture.
80

One such case that drew national and international media attention because of the
impact of new law on women was that of Safia Bibi.
81
In 1985, Safia Bibi, a sixteen-year-
old nearly blind domestic servant, was allegedly raped by her landlord/employer and his
son and became pregnant as a result of those rapes. Succumbing to family pressures,
Safia Bibi did not file a complaint with the police until she could no longer hide her
pregnancy. When she charged the men with rape, she was unable to prove the allegation,
as she was the only witness against them. Her pregnancy instead was cited as evidence of
extra-marital sex. At the trial, the Sessions Court convicted Safia Bibi of Zina and
sentenced her to three years rigorous imprisonment, fifteen lashes and a fine of thousand

77
Ibid; Cheema, “Cases and Controversies,” 151.

78
Ibid, 151.

79
Amnesty International, “Pakistan: No Progress on Women’s Rights,” 1998, 11.

80
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in Pakistan in 1997, Lahore, Pakistan:
Maktaba Jadeed Press, 1997; Human Rights Watch, Double Jeopardy: Police Abuse of Women in Pakistan,
USA, 1992.

81
Safia Bibi v. The State, P.L.D. 1985 Federal Shariat Court 120.

82
rupees. Due to public pressure, on appeal, the Federal Shariat Court reversed her
conviction for zina. In another case, Jehan Mina, a thirteen-year-old girl became pregnant
as a result of rape and became pregnant.
82
She could not convince the court that rape had
occurred because she, too, lacked the testimony of four eyewitnesses and was therefore
was convicted of zina on the evidence of her illegitimate pregnancy. She was sentenced
to three years rigorous imprisonment and a punishment of one hundred lashes. The FSC
upheld Jehan Mina’s conviction on appeal, but reduced her offense from zina liable to
hadd to zina liable to tazir and her sentence was reduced to three years imprisonment and
ten lashes.
83

Many Pakistani human rights activists have argued that the interpretation and
application of the Ordinance have been class based. As a result the most vulnerable
members of society – impoverished, illiterate women, female children – have been the
most affected suffering the laws repercussions.
84
Studies have shown that most of the
women who have been implicated in such cases belong to the rural areas or the urban
poor.
85
That is women who cannot afford or do not have access to lawyers are those who
are the most likely to be charged and jailed.
86
The law prescribes no minimum age of
criminal liability so even young children have been known to be charged with the crime

82
Jehan Mina v. The State, P.L.D. 1983 Federal Shariat Court 183.

83
Cheema, “Cases and Controversies,” 140.

84
Asma Jahangir and Hina Jilani, The Hadood Ordinances: A Divine Sanction, Lahore: Rhotac Books,
1988; Khan, “Zina and the Moral Regulation of Pakistani Women,” 77; Weaver, “Women’s Rights and
Shari’a Law,” 494.

85
Hina Jilani, “Whose Laws? Human Rights and Violence Against Women in Pakistan,” in Freedom from
Violence: Women’s Strategies from Around the World, edited by Margaret Schuler, 63-74, New York:
UNIFEM, 1992, 72.

86
Khan, “Zina and the Moral Regulation,” 77.

83
of extra-marital sex or rape.
87
Under the law the hadd penalty cannot be given to children
of either gender. However, Section 2(a) of the Hudood Ordinance states: ‘Adult means a
person who has attained, being a male, the age of eighteen years or being a female, the
age of sixteen years, or has attained puberty.’ Thus, the law differentiates between boys
and girls on the age factor and makes girls as young as 10 or 11 who have reached
physical puberty liable to hadd punishment as an adult. If the girl is Muslim and was
married off at a young age, the hadd penalty is stoning to death, a 100 lashes if she is
unmarried or a non-Muslim.
88
Additionally, there are no laws that specifically deal with
the offence of incest or child sexual abuse. Section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code
does deal with the sexual abuse of a child, but only considers it a crime if the abuser
‘kidnaps or abducts any person under the age of 10.’ Where it is normally parents who
are the abusers, they are not liable to punishment under this section because they cannot
illegally take away their child from their own custody.
89
Thus, cases of incest are seldom
reported and even more rarely recognized by the courts because judges are usually
reluctant to admit that there has been incest in Pakistani society.
90

Shahnaz Khan, in her research, has shown that many of the women incarcerated
under zina-related charges are not there because of sex crimes but because their families
or husbands used the zina laws to jail the women when they acted against their families’
wishes.
91
For example, in a 1987 case, 24-year-old Roshan Jan filed for divorce against

87
Jilani, “Whose Laws?” 72.

88
Jilani, “Violence against Women,” 170.

89
Ibid, 174.

90
Ibid, 175.

91
Khan, “Zina and the Moral Regulation,” 77.

84
her husband on the grounds of severe physical mistreatment, and moved into her
neighbor’s house. Her husband lodged an FIR (First Information Report) alleging that she
was committing adultery (zina) with the married neighbor. On the basis of this FIR,
Roshan Jan was arrested and incarcerated, without legal aid, awaiting trial for zina.
92

Critics have argued that these laws have allowed families to draw upon the power
of the state to help regulate the sexual morality of their women and thus have the net
effect of reinforcing the socio-economic subservience of women to the predominantly
patriarchal family structures. The injustice of this law is most apparent in cases of
trafficking of women.
93
Women from Bangladesh, who have been forcibly taken to
Pakistan, often via India for the purpose of domestic or sexual servitude, are also charged
and imprisoned under the Hudood laws. When they are rescued from their captors or
brothels, instead of treating them as victims, they have been charged with zina laws.
94

II. Qisas and Diyat Resolution
Pakistani law is even more inadequate in protecting women from domestic violence and
in penalizing batterers. Most acts of domestic violence are ot explicitly prohibited by a

92
Sabiha Sumar and Khalid Nadvi, “Zina: The Hadood Ordinance and its Implications for Women,”
Women Living Under Muslim Laws Dossier #3, Montpellier, France: International Solidarity Network,
1988, 11; Khan, “Gender, Religion, Sexuality and the State,” 4.

93
Jilani, “Whose Laws?” 73; Khan, “Gender, Religion, Sexuality and the State,” 4.

94
Between 100 to 150 Bangladeshi women, and sometimes women from India, are illicitly taken to
Pakistan each month. The majority are lured by the promise of employment, but often end up in brothels
where they are compelled to provide sexual services, or in private homes where they are forced to work as
domestic servants, or in some cases forced into marriage to much older men. Once in Pakistan, they are
exploited by instilling in them the fear that they are illegal entrants into Pakistan and can be arrested if they
expose their captors. Also considering that the average age of these girls is fifteen years, few ever try to run
or complain. When these brothels are raided, these women are charged under the zina law instead of being
treated as victims.

85
specific, targeted, and distinct set of laws, but are encompassed by the Qisas and Diyat
Ordinance of 1990.
95
The ordinance was introduced by way of Criminal Law
Amendment Ordinance VII of 1990 promulgated by the president. It remained operative
in the form of Ordinances for a considerable length of time and after seven years it
became an Act on April 4, 1997 as the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1997.
96
This
new body of Islamic criminal laws deals with murder, attempted murder and the crime of
causing bodily hurt (both intentional and unintentional). In short the Act covered all
offences against the human body and provided for Qisas (retribution) and Diyat
(bloodmoney, compensation).
The amendment had far-reaching consequences for the legal prosecution of
homicide in general and honor killings in particular. The Ordinance’s most sweeping
changes involved a complete rewriting of the Pakistan Penal Code’s sections 299 to 308.
The new law introduced several major changes and mainly three areas can be identified
in the legal provisions in the present formal legal system of Pakistan which provide a
basis for general leniency by the courts for mitigation of punishment and sometimes no

95
The Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1990, commonly knows as the Qisas and Diyat
Ordinance, 1990, amended the Pakistan Penal Code (Sections 299 to 338) and the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The Qisas and Diyat Ordinance, which had been kept in force by invoking the president’s power
to re-issue it every four months, was formally enacted into law in April 1997. Under Article 89 of the
Constitution, the president is empowered to promulgate an ordinance if the National Assembly is not in
session and circumstances require immediate legislation. An Ordinance lapses in four months if the
assembly does not endorse it sooner. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has severely
criticized the use of ordinances by several presidents to bypass parliamentary debate and govern without
national consensus, as well as the practice of reintroducing, time and again, the same ordinance when the
specified four-month period has lapsed without action by the National Assembly. They have even criticized
the manner in which the ordinance was enacted into law in 1997. They have complained that the relevant
bill was rushed through parliament without debate and the president gave his assent forthwith while
ignoring the opposition’s plea for fullest discussion on this important and controversial measure. Human
rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 1997, 34.

96
Hassam Qadir Shah, “Reflections on the Law of Qisas and Diyat,” in Shaping Women’s Lives: Laws,
Practices and Strategies in Pakistan, edited by Farida Shaheed, Sohail Akbar Warraich, Cassandra Balchin
and Aisha Gazdar, 253-267, Lahore: Shirkat Gah, 1998, 255.

86
punishment at all for the murderer in cases involving murder of a female relative in the
name of honor. First of all the new law privatized justice by converting serious crimes
like murder and aggravated assault into crimes against the individual rather than the state.
Accordingly, rights are bestowed upon victims of serious intentional batteries as well as
the heirs of murder victims. The victim or the heir (known as wali) may enforce qisas
punishment (death in the case of murder or physical retribution in the case of serious
injury) or settle for diyat (negotiated compensation paid in exchange for pardoning the
assailant or murderer) or waive his rights altogether.
97

Secondly, a new categorization of murder was introduced along with new
categories of punishment. The original PPC had a provision that if a homicide were
committed by the offender ‘while deprived of the power of self control by grave and
sudden provocation’ it would not be classified as murder.
98
The qisas and diyat ordinance
did away with the provisions relating to ‘grave and sudden provocation’ and every
unnatural death of a person at the hands of another was now considered murder,
removing all previous categorizations such as manslaughter and culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.
99
The same crime of intentional murder (qatl-i-amd) can now be
punished variously with death as qisas, death or with life imprisonment as tazir (when a
voluntary and true confession has been made or when there is evidence as outlined by

97
Gottesman, “The Reemergence of Qisas and Diyat in Pakistan,” 442.

98
Yasmin Zaidi, “Pakistan Scan,” in Violence Against Women in South Asia: A Regional Scan of Efforts to
End it Violence Against Women in South Asia: A Regional Scan of Efforts to End it, edited by Ritu Menon,
45-94, New Delhi: UNIFEM, 2002, 66.

99
Sohail Akbar Warraich, “Honour Killings and the Law in Pakistan,” in Honour: Crimes, Paradigms, and
Violence Against Women, edited by Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, 78-110, New York: Zed Books,
2005, 85.

87
Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat), or with a sentence of up to 25 years imprisonment
(when qisas is not applicable).
100

Even though omission of the provision of ‘grave and sudden provocation’ seemed
like a good change in text, judicial practice has managed to use Section 302(c) of the
amended PPC to circumvent harsh punishments for honor crimes. Section 338F of PPC
which “expressly permits the court to assess the culpability of…the accused not only
under the statutory provisions of law but also under the injunctions of Quran and
Sunnah,” has allowed courts to have almost unlimited discretionary powers to interpret
the provisions of the law in accordance with their own understanding or interpretation of
the injunctions of Islam and thereby has actually broadened the scope of these
exceptions.
101
In the case of Abdul Nabi vs. the State,
102
the judge held that though the
provision of grave and sudden provocation has been amended by Qisas and Diyat
Ordinance, “this does not mean that now Zina related plea of grave and sudden
provocation cannot be raised at all and if established cannot serve as mitigating
circumstance for awarding lesser punishment.” The judge said that to prove such a plea
the offender had to provide evidence that the victims were committing zina. “If the plea is
established through such evidence it will serve as a mitigating circumstance for awarding
lesser punishment under clause (c) of Section 302 PPC.”
Thus, mitigation of sentences in the case of honor killings has continued unabated
and in fact the Pakistan courts have extended its application to all manner of situations.

100
Shah, “Reflections on the Law,” 256.

101
Ruane, “Murder in the Name of Honor,” 1541.

102
Abdul Nabi vs. the State, 1997 SD 115.

88
One court decided “the right of self-defense is wider under Islamic law than in the
amended PPC and could be invoked by male defendants in honor killings.”
103
According
to that court, the Quran establishes men as the “custodians of women,” therefore, a man
who kills another man for defiling his property acts in self-defense.
104
In some cases of
honor killings and murders judges have even relied on the evidence of the number of
injuries inflicted upon the deceased. In the case of Fatal Din vs. the State,
105
the murdered
found the deceased in a compromising position with his sister and killed him. The plea of
grave and sudden provocation was based upon the number of stab wounds on the body.
The court held that “numbers of injuries showed that the same were caused in a fit of
frenzy and had it been merely suspicion, he would have avenged the family honor with
just a few blows.”
106

Courts have also condoned killings in cases where they have been committed on
mere suspicion and removed any standards for deciding whether there was sufficient
provocation. In the case of Mohd.Yaqub alias Ayyub vs. the State,
107
a brother killed a
man and then tried to kill his sister on mere suspicion that they were having an affair
because he saw them coming out of a sugarcane fields from different sides. His
punishment for murder under Section 302 PPC was reduced to five years from life
sentence. Since the High Court considered the circumstances sufficient enough to raise a
genuine suspicion in his mind, it was a case of grave and sudden provocation. It was also

103
Ruane, “Murder in the Name of Honor,” 1541.

104
Ibid.

105
Fatal Din vs. The State, 1983 P.Cr.L.J. 692.

106
Ibid.

107
Mohd. Yaqub alias Ayyub vs. The State, PLD 1984, Lahore 358.

89
stated by one of the judges that “no hard and fast rules could be laid down and that the
age, environment, occupation and individual character had to be kept in mind while
determining the matter.”
108
The inherent gender bias in judicial reasoning is even more
glaring in cases where courts are more than willing to readily accept any suggestions of
immorality on the part of murdered women and use them to justify lesser sentences.
109

Thirdly, different sentences for murder were introduced, depending not on the
intensity of the crime, but rather on the form of proof of murder and the relationship of
the offender to the deceased.
110
Under the previous law there was no category of murder
that did not provide for imprisonment. In the new law, unintentional murder, or qatl-bis-
sabab, is exempted from the punishment of even a single day’s imprisonment; the only
punishment being the payment of diyat or blood money.
111
Furthermore, murder is not
liable to qisas “when any wali (heir) of the victim is a direct descendant, how low-so-ever,
of the offender.”
112
Section 306 (b) and (c) of PPC automatically exempt certain relatives
from qisas or tazir under section 302 (b). Thus, a husband who had murdered his wife
will be exempt from the qisas or maximum (capital) punishment if he has children from
the marriage
113
or parents/grandparents who murder their child/grandchild are also

108
Shahla Zia, Violence Against Women and their Quest for Justice, Lahore: Simorgh Women’s Resource
and Publications Center, 1998, 67.

109
Jilani, “Violence against Women,” 159.

110
Warraich, “Honour Killings,” 85.

111
Shah, “Reflections on the Law,” 257.

112
Pakistan Penal Code, Section 306 (c).

113
In the case of Federation of Pakistan vs. Gul Hassan Khan, PLD 1989 SC 633, Gul Hassan filed a
petition in Supreme court after he was sentenced to death under Section 302(a) PPC for killing his wife.
She was survived by their 2 year old child. The Supreme Court ruled that the offender sentenced to death as
Qisas under Section 302(a) PPC was in gross violation of the law. The Court held that Section 306(c) PPC
clearly laid down that murder committed by the husband of his wife leaving behind children was liable to

90
exempt. Such offenders can be sentenced only to diyat but diyat in such cases, entailing
compensation from one family member to another, hardly acts as a deterrent.
114
Although
courts can impose tazir punishment in a spousal murder case with a maximum of fourteen
years imprisonment the courts are directed to weigh the decision to impose tazir
punishment depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case.
115
In light of the
biased attitudes of the courts with respect to domestic violence, the fact that punishment
has been left to the discretion of judges has a deep impact upon honor killings
prosecution. According to a 1999 report by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan,
out of 303 women reported by national newspapers as being killed, 269 were known to
the killers, out of which 198 were killed by their brother, father, husband or son.
The law of qisas and diyat has made offenses relating to the human body
compoundable
116
and in the event of murder, a person’s legal heir(s) have the right to
make a compromise with the offender under Sections 309 and 310. In the first provision,
legal heirs can forgive the murderer in the name of God without getting any monetary
compensation in the form of diyat, while under section 310 the legal heirs can
compromise after receiving diyat in their respective shares. Thus, if the case is being
heard under qisas or a qisas sentence has been pronounced, any one of the heirs may

Qisas. The Court said the punishment for murder not liable to Qisas was provided under Section 308 PPC.
The Supreme Court did not consider the provisions laid down in Section 309 of the same statute, which
states that the right of Qisas shall not be waived in the case where the legal heir of the victim is a minor
child or the government. The Court also overlooked the provision under Section 308(2) PPC, which states
that if an offender is not liable to the punishment of Qisas, the court can in addition to the punishment of
Diyat may punish the offender with imprisonment as Tazir. Thus the law gives carte blanche to any man
who has a minor child to kill his wife at his whim and to escape punishment of Qisas.

114
Human Rights Watch, Crime or Custom, 42.

115
Pakistan Penal Code, Section 308 (2).

116
To compound an offence is to settle a charge (without entering a conviction) between the alleged victim
and the Accused.

91
waive their right of qisas or accept a compromise.
117
Considering the fact that most of the
perpetrators of honor killings are close relatives, it is most likely that the victim’s heirs
will choose to ‘forgive’ and accept a compromise with the murderer.
118
Apart from its
discriminatory treatment of women as victims of violent crime, women as the heirs of the
victims have also been discriminated against under this law. Women are not treated
equally in the matter of disbursement of diyat and are sometimes altogether excluded. For
example, if the husband of a woman is murdered, she gets only one eighth of the blood
money if she happens to be the sole surviving widow; in the event that the deceased
leaves more than one widow, they will share the one eighth equally among themselves.
On the other hand, if the deceased is a woman, the husband, according to inheritance
shares, will receive one quarter of the diyat (and a half if they had no children); i.e.
double what a widow receives. A further problematic effect of the law does not arise
directly from the actual text of the law but indirectly from the application of the law in
Pakistan’s social circumstances where women are not considered ‘decision-makers’. As a
result women are even more susceptible to pressure from family members to accept a
compromise when her family members or close relatives are killed. Additionally, in
Pakistan, where there is a great disparity in wealth, there have been issues concerning the
inability of a poor offender to negotiate settlement and the inadequate deterrent effect of
diyat on a wealthy offender. Discrepancies in wealth also results in coercion and
corruption.

117
Warraich, “Honour Killings,” 86.

118
In Samia Sarwar’s case, the accused moved an application under Section 345 Cr.P.C. for a compromise
and Samia’s legal heirs, her abusive husband and two children, agreed to a compromise waiving their right
of Qisas. The court accepted the settlement and ruled that the said offence is compoundable and legal heirs
of the deceased have waived their right of Qisas. Under Section 338(e) of PPC, the judge could punish the
offender with life imprisonment as Tazir, but he chose to overlook the provision.

92
III. Parallel Judicial Systems
Another impact of Zia’s attempt to bring Pakistan back to its Islamic core of values was
the setting up of Shariat courts as a ‘parallel’ to the ‘mainstream’ judicial system.
General Zia needed legal cover for his martial law as it was only partially recognized by
the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Thus the Federal Shariat Court, along with Shariat
Appellate Bench, was incorporated into the Constitution to counter the effects of the
Supreme Court, which included within its purview the power of judicial review. This
gave oversight of the acts and actions of the President to a favorably inclined judicial
body.
119

When there was no moral justification left to extend the martial law, Zia used
Islamization as the reason for its continuance and the Council of Islamic Ideology was
reactivated and given the task to codify the Hudood Laws. In order to enforce these laws
a system of court was required, therefore, the legal provision was set in place for creation
of Shariat Benches in the High Courts.
120
He undermined the independence of the civilian
court system with the introduction of the High Court level of Shariat Benches,
reorganized and centralized as the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) in 1980,
121
to review all

119
Shaheen Sardar Ali and Kamran Arif, “Parallel Judicial Systems in Pakistan and Consequences for
Human Right,” in Shaping Women’s Lives: Laws, Practices and Strategies in Pakistan, edited by Farida
Shaheed, Sohail Akbar Warraich, Cassandra Balchin and Aisha Gazdar, 29-60, Lahore: Shirkat Gah, 1998,
36.

120
Fatiman Ihsan and Yasmin Zaidi, “The Interplay of CEDAW, National Laws and Customary Practices
in Pakistan: A Literature Review,” in Conceptualising Islamic Law, CEDAW and Women’s Human Rights
in Plural Settings: A Comparative Analysis of Application of CEDAW in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan,
edited by Shaheen Sardar Ali, 199-265, New Delhi: UNIFEM South Asia Regional Office, 2006, 217.

121
The Federal Shariat Court’s jurisdiction exceeds that of the High Courts because it alone has
“revisional” powers. It can, either on its own or in response to a citizen’s petition, review any provision of
Pakistani law to determine “whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of
Islam, as contained in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet.” Constitution of Pakistan, Part VII,
Article 203D (1). If it finds the law repugnant, the FSC can declare the law invalid and force the legislature
either to amend it or let it lapse. In addition, the FSC can change any finding or sentence in any case

93
laws to ensure that none was repugnant to the Quran or the Sunnah (exemplary sayings
and directives of the prophet Muhammad) and to hear appeals in certain criminal matters
including Hudood cases.
122
Judges of the FSC were to be appointed by the President who
could also modify their term of appointment or assign to them any other office.
123
In
effect, General Zia created a President’s court and was not above reconstituting it when
its decisions were not to his liking.
124
Initially created to determine whether a law was in
conformity with the injunctions of Islam, the Shariat courts assumed jurisdiction for
family law matters and criminal law falling under the Hudood Ordinances while the civil
system continued to have jurisdiction over the ‘fundamental rights violations’.
125
Any
appeals against FSC’s decision went directly to the Shariat bench of the Supreme Court.
Considering that a number of Ulemas (religious scholars) sit in FSC, it is highly unlikely
that they will interpret the law in a fashion favorable to women’s rights. The tension
between the parallel elements of the judicial system and hierarchy of courts was most
evident during the Mukhtar Mai case.
126

decided under the Hudood laws. This includes the ability to change an acquittal to a conviction without
risking double jeopardy. Constitution of Pakistan, Part VII, Article 203 (D). This arrangement, in effect,
gives the FSC sweeping and barely reviewable revisional powers. These include the power of self-review.
The FSC has the legal authority to alter its own decisions. Constitution of Pakistan, Part VII, Article 203E
(9). This power has provided an incentive to the government to try to influence it. The FSC’s decisions are
binding on all High Courts and thus on all of the courts that are subordinate to the High Courts.
Constitution of Pakistan, Part VII, Article 203G. The High Courts’ decisions are binding only on the lower
courts. Constitution of Pakistan, Part VII, Article 201. Appeals from the High Courts and the FSC in
criminal cases may be taken to the Supreme Court.

122
Appeals from Hudood criminal convictions resulting in sentences greater than two years’ imprisonment
are the exclusive province of the FSC.

123
Ali and Arif, “Parallel Judicial Systems in Pakistan,” 36.

124
Ibid.

125
Weaver, “Women’s Rights and Shari’a Law,” 489.

126
This tension/confusion over the jurisdiction is discussed in the beginning of this chapter.

94
Confusing geographically specific parallel judicial systems have also emerged
over the years in certain areas of Pakistan. For example, in some parts of Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA),
a different judicial system exists with neither area being operated under the same legal
system as the rest of Pakistan. Additionally the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), a law
introduced by the colonial administration in 1901, still applies in FATA and PATA areas.
This legal system was designed by the British to rule through a class of local citizens who
not only enjoyed social influence and status within society but were also loyal to the
British.
127
The objective was to present a policy of non-interference in their century’s old
system of riwaj (custom), but the real purpose was to avoid establishing a universally
recognized judicial system in those regions thereby denying them the basic human right
of equality and equal protection of laws. The FCR gave wide discretionary powers to
administrative and political agents as well as to elders and leaders to administer justice
according to sharia and tribal customs.
128
Both the substantive and procedural provisions
of the FCR were in violation of the basic fundamental principles of the administration of
justice as it denies the accused due process of law and the entire procedure was based on
a system of inquiry rather than presenting of evidence.
129
Appeals to the superior judiciary
are denied to persons subject to FCR.
In these tribal and rural areas, disputes were settled or mediated by a council of
elders called the jirga. In Pakistan, where a majority of people live in rural areas, the

127
Ali and Arif, “Parallel Judicial Systems in Pakistan,” 45.

128
Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development, Realising Our Rights: Holding the State
Accountable for Violence Against Women in the Asia Pacific Region, Bangkok, Thailand: APWLD, 2005,
91.

129
Ali and Arif, “Parallel Judicial Systems in Pakistan,” 46.

95
tribal councils are the first and often final decision makers. Such councils were composed
only of men, particularly the tribal chiefs and feudal lords, known as the sardars. For the
most part, the sardars support the customary practices and rules that allow the male
members of the family to sell, buy, and exchange women as commodities and kill and
murder them in the name of honor. The jirga system was first introduced by the British,
under the FCR, to try criminal or civil cases in tribal areas. These jirgas were given the
power to settle disputes arising out of zan (woman), zar (money) and zamin (land). Later,
when Pakistan came into existence, jirga was legalized in tribal areas along with FATA
and PATA. Even though the council was abolished in other areas, they continued to
operate in violation of Pakistani law while Pakistan ignores their continued existence.
130

As a matter of fact, after the repeal of West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment)
Act in 1969, in Sindh province, any trial held with the aid of private persons is illegal and
its orders cannot be executed. Nevertheless these sort of trials continue take place. The
reason for this need for a tribal council system can be attributed to various factors like an
overburdened Pakistani judiciary system and its inaccessibility in rural and tribal areas.
Tribal council members were respected for their positions and thus obeyed; and reliance
on customary and unwritten laws, which provides for an informal, quick and usually
trusted system of laws.
131

Despite the many positive roles that tribal councils may play, apparent abuses of
power, like orders for gang rapes and even murder in the name of resolving disputes or
restoring honor, has become known in the last decade, even more so after the Mukhtar

130
Karkera, “The Gang-Rape of Mukhtar Mai,” 174.

131
Ibid.

96
Mai case. While the legitimacy of honor killings was taken for granted by jirga, they treat
the murderer as the victim because of the damage done to his honor and property. The
sardars who preside over jirgas try to secure an appropriate settlement between the two
parties. The settlement is usually sought by the relatives of the man who has been
declared a karo and the objective is to preempt revenge and therefore to appease the
relatives of the kari. As a part of the settlement women were often used as a commodity
to barter and surrender to the rival family/tribe to settle the dispute, to free or seek pardon
for the murderer or to end bloody feuds between men of rival groups. In Sindh it is called
faislo, in NWFP, Swara, in Punjab, Vani and in Balochistan Badl. The consent of the girl
is obviously never required. While in theory the tribal honor code of honor applies to
both men and women equally, men often go unpunished for their immoral behavior or
illicit relationships whereas women are killed for the mere suggestion of their
participation in sexual conduct outside marriage. Even though technically a man’s honor
is only partially restored by killing the kari, as the man involved has to be killed too, the
jirgas have allowed the karo to escape death by making him pay compensation instead.
132

As if the existence of government mandated parallel judicial systems were not
enough, the Taliban militants also set up permanent Islamic courts in Pakistan’s
Mohmand tribal area.
133
Until 2008 the Taliban was divided into four judicial zones, each
having two judges and a permanent court address but they used mobile courts with no
permanent offices or judges to settle criminal and financial disputes.
134
Their hope was

132
Ruane, “Murder in the Name of Honor,” 1536.

133
M. Ilyas Khan, “Taleban Set Up ‘Pakistan Courts’,” BBC News, July 15, 2008.

134
Ibid.

97
that the permanent courts would show the diminishing authority of the central and local
governments as the Taliban already controls large areas of Pakistan’s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the border with Afghanistan and also runs a
vast network of mobile courts in the rest of the FATA areas. About 20 local religious
scholars issued dozens of judgments each day in these areas with cases ranging from land
transactions and loan disputes to family and personal matters. In March 2008, a couple
was killed by Taliban as an ‘honor killing’ after they were allegedly found guilty of
adultery by the court.
135

Theoretically, dispute resolution forums were designed to end conflicts, to bring
the accused and the victims to agree to a settlement, but in practice the end results are
discrimination of the marginalized sections of society. Many human rights organizations
have asked for the elimination of these tribal councils, but the state appears to acquiesce
to the practice, rarely trying to interfere with its decisions. Yet Mukhtar Mai’s case
demonstrated that the state could be forced to act under intense pressure from national
and international actors.

IV. Muslim Family Law Ordinance
The process of Islamization is connected to the period of General Zia, what is often
overlooked is the fact that family laws in Pakistan are also based on religious beliefs.
136

At Independence in 1947 Muslim family laws were not codified. They were based upon

135
Ibid.

136
Asma Jahangir, “The Origins of the MFLO: Reflections for Activism,” in Shaping Women’s Lives:
Laws, Practices and Strategies in Pakistan, edited by Farida Shaheed, Sohail Akbar Warraich, Cassandra
Balchin and Aisha Gazdar, 93-106, Lahore: Shirkat Gah, 1998, 93.

98
religious traditions and were known as personal laws. The Muslim League’s demands for
the codification of the Sharia culminated in the enactment of the 1937 Muslim Personal
Law (Shariat) Application Act. The Act provided that in all matters covered by the Act,
MPL was to replace custom as the ‘rule of decision’.
137
After Independence, a series of
Sharia Acts were enacted by Pakistan’s provincial legislatures and the shariat (religious
traditions) was applied to marriage, dissolution, divorce, maintenance, dower,
guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust property etc. but inheritance of agricultural property
was specifically excluded.
138
The law sought to deprive women their right to inherit
agricultural land. This was later removed in the 1950s and 1960s in the various provinces
of Pakistan.
The Muslim Family Law Ordinance (MFLO) was, however, not implemented
until 1961 when the military government of Field Marshal Ayub Khan promulgated the
ordinance. It was introduced following the recommendations for reform by the
Commission on Marriage and Family Laws, to ensure that women were given their
proper place in society according to the fundamentals of Islam.
139
It was meant to curb
erratic divorce practices and second marriages and basically review MPL, which had
become a conservative and rigid force under colonial rule, failing to respond to
progressive forces and changing needs even after independence. MFLO, however, did not
out rightly ban polygamy, nor did it make the penalty provisions adequate enough to act

137
Siobhan Mullally, “As Nearly as May be: Debating Women’s Human Rights in Pakistan,” Social and
Legal Studies 14(2005): 347.

138
Jahangir, “The Origins of MFLO,” 93.

139
Mullally, “As Nearly as May be,” 347.

99
as an effective deterrent.
140
Similarly, though the procedure for divorce is to be rigidly
followed, yet no effective method was formulated to obtain compensation like dower and
maintenance for the aggrieved woman. The Ordinance also made amendments to Child
Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 and the Dissolution of the Muslim Marriages Act 1939. The
minimum age of marriage was raised to 16 for girls and 18 for boys. However, a child
marriage once performed is considered valid, unless it is not consummated.
Many of the provisions in the MFLO were considered to be favorable towards
women and still a milestone when compared to the personal laws. As a result, the
Ordinance was labeled ‘un-Islamic’ from the outset and a resolution was proposed in the
National Assembly that condemned it for being contrary to Islam. Because of the
restrictions placed in the 1962 and 1973 Constitution, which granted MFLO a ‘protected’
status, the Ordinance could not be challenged as being inconsistent with fundamental
rights.
141
Ever since that time there have been several challenges to the law from the more
orthodox sections of the society and the FSC even though MFLO is not the most liberal
family law, which just goes to show how much opposition there is to any attempt at
giving women equal rights. And the only reason these challenges have not been
successful is because it has not been tested on the principles of fundamental rights. All
the challenges thus far have been with regard to MFLO being contrary to Islam. And the
few rights that were granted to women through MFLO was taken away by the 1979
Hudood Ordinance as they both conflict with each other and it is often left to courts to
decide which law to follow.

140
Ihsan and Zaidi, “The Interplay of CEDAW,” 215.

141
Jahangir, “The Origins of MFLO,” 100.

100
V. The Criminal Justice System
In addition to Pakistani laws being discriminatory, the judicial system has exacerbated
the problem by failing to view violence against women as a serious violation of women’s
human rights. The judicial system, including but not limited to police officials,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judicial medical examiners and judges, proved to be
plagued by gender bias. This bias is reflected in the number of violent crimes against
women that go unpunished, let alone investigated. General Zia’s Islamization efforts
worsened the situation for women. The potential for misuse of power by the police and
jail authorities had always existed but successive periods of martial law further increased
the powers of law enforcement agencies and eroded safeguards against abuses. While
most law enforcement agencies do not enforce women survivors’ fundamental rights,
police abuse has been one of the biggest problems because the local police are ultimately
responsible for the prevention and detection of crime. When violence occurs, victims first
turn to police to seek protection and redress. Simply changing laws is never enough
because those laws have to be upheld by its protectors and in highly illiterate and rural
country like Pakistan, going to a police station may seem like the only recourse.
According to an Amnesty International report, many women who go to police stations to
file complaints regarding domestic violence are “beaten, kicked and raped in the police
stations to humiliate them, to intimidate them or to extract money.”
142
Police officials
often failed to file reports, lose reports or even ‘persuade’ women not to file a report. In
the unlikely event that a report is even filed, very few were thoroughly investigated and
rarely are the accused arrested or even charged with the crimes.

142
Manar Waheed, “Domestic Violence in Pakistan: The Tension Between Intervention and Sovereign
Autonomy in Human Rights Law,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 29 (2004): 953.

101
The readiness on the part of the police to exclude the crime of honor killing from
their purview is a consequence of several interrelated factors. First, the police are just a
reflection of the larger patriarchal system and societal attitude towards women, which
does not hold them in high regard. Most feel that it is a legitimate killing and those who
commit it are doing it just to protect their honor or ghairat.
143
Bribing police officers is
another reason that has led to the growth of honor killing industry. The Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan reported that Jacobabad (a city in the province of Sindh) topped
the list in number of honor killings.
144
Police stations in Jacobabad were considered ‘gold
mines’ in police circles because of the high incidence of honor killings in that area. A
bribe of at least 150,000 to 200,000 rupees is required to suppress an honor-killing
incident.
145
In few cases of honor killing where there were convictions, most of the
accused literally got away with murder by obtaining a razinama (compromise agreement)
presented to and accepted by the police.
146
Police also acted as agents of tribal or feudal
leaders who presided over the jirgas. In this context, the police ended up functioning as

143
In the case of Mst. Humaira Mehmood vs.. The State and others, PLD 1999 Lahore 494, Humaira
Khokhar against her family’s wishes secretly married Mehmood Butt, who belonged to a different tribe.
When her family found out about the wedding, she was physically tortured and forced to put her thumb
impression on the marriage contract with her cousin. Because her father threatened her and filed a
complaint of offence of zina, she went to a women’s shelter to seek support. Her father was able to send
police officers to retrieve her from the shelter because he is a prominent member of the Legislative
Assembly of Punjab. Humaira’s father falsely claimed that Mehmood was a second husband since Humaira
was already married. Therefore, Humaira was punishable under the "zina" law for her relationship with
Mehmood was deemed adulterous. However, due to efforts by Shirkat Gah, the case was taken to Lahore
High Court and the court ruled that Humaira and Mehmood’s marriage was legal and the false allegations
of the father were dismissed. In this case the judge especially admonished the police officials handling the
case and in his judgment noted that the police played an instrumental role in harassing and illegally
arresting Humaira and her husband. He observed that the police officials acted in a manner, which
demonstrated total disregard of law of the land and of their mandate. This case is discussed in greater detail
in chapter 5.

144
Girls aged 3 among 382 killed under Karo Kari, Dawn, Karachi, December 23, 2002.

145
Ali, “The Dark Side of Honour,” 27.

146
Ibid, 28.

102
agents not of the State that employs them but of feudal lords who probably ordered the
rape/killing in the first place as part of the dispute settlement.
147

Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto started a number of police stations entirely
staffed by women. They were intended to make women feel more comfortable in lodging
complaints related to domestic violence and also to make police system more accessible
to women.
148
However, most of them remained under equipped, ineffective, and virtually
inoperable. Police personnel receive little if any gender sensitization training to assist
female victims of violence and discrimination. Despite court orders and regulations
requiring that female suspects be interrogated only by female police officers, women
continue to be detained and abused by male police officers at regular police stations.
149

On the rare occasion that a domestic violence claim makes it into the legal system,
the survivor is faced with many obstacles involving legal representation, medical
examiners and judiciary. Most prosecutors openly disclose their gender bias and the few
who do have the courage to accept such cases are faced with death threats. Medical
doctors for the state who are responsible for collecting evidence of rape also tend to be
biased against victims and believe that if a woman did not have signs of resistance such
as bruises and scratches, then the rape did not occur. An unmarried woman’s virginity is
also used to determine whether it is likely that a woman was raped or not.
150

Unfortunately, if the case does make it to court, the judges, more often that not,
review cases in the context of patriarchal traditions and therefore, base their decisions on

147
Ibid.

148
Ruane, “Murder in the name of Honor,” 1544.

149
Ibid.

150
Bettencourt, “Violence Against Women in Pakistan,” 2000.

103
Islamic law, whose interpretation is left to the discretion of the judge.
151
This is especially
evident in the context of honor killings where a woman’s ‘immoral’ conduct is deemed
an acceptable cause of death since, in the view of many judges; an honorable man is
compelled to kill. The Qisas and Diyat laws have made it even easier for the judges to
misinterpret existing laws, to let the accused go with a small fine or a drastically reduced
prison sentence and to sometimes even acquittal.
152
The main problem remains that
judges view domestic violence as private, domestic disputes and are more than willing to
let customs prevail in the courtroom over law. According to a 1999 Amnesty
International report, of the sixty ‘bride-burning’ cases that made it to the prosecution
stage (though 1600 cases were actually reported), only two resulted in convictions.
153
The
lack of protection by the police and punishment by the courts reflects the failure of the
government of Pakistan to protect its women and guarantee their fundamental right to be
free from violence and discrimination.

CEDAW and Pakistan’s Legislative Measures
While the domestic laws can be the most significant source for reform, the international
legal system has also played an important role in expanding the rights of women by
persuading nations to both ratify and implement international legal instruments. Pakistan
is a signatory to the Women’s Convention, but it continues to violate many of its
provisions. Through its ratification of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1996, Pakistan assumed the obligation to

151
Waheed, “Domestic Violence in Pakistan,” 960.

152
Various such cases have been discussed during the course of this chapter.

153
Amnesty International, 1999, 26.

104
protect women from sexual and other forms of gender-based violence perpetrated by state
agents and private actors alike. However, Pakistan acceded to the Convention making a
declaration that “the accession by the government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to
the convention is subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan.” It also entered into a reservation stating, “the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan declares that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of
article 29 of the Convention.” The declaration was a compromise to enable Pakistan to
accede to the Convention without delaying the matter inordinately and was carefully
worded to make sure it did not go against the object and purpose of the Convention while
assuaging those who had misgivings about the Convention.
By adopting this convention, Pakistan agreed to incorporate the provisions that
are set forth in order to end discrimination against women. But it failed to incorporate
many of these provisions into domestic law and into Pakistani society. One important
issue identified in the Women’s Convention is the need to eliminate cultural practices and
customs that discriminate against women. Both Article 2(f) and 5(a) specifically state that
state parties agree to modify customs and practices that discriminate against women.
Article 2 (g) calls for state parties to repeal all national laws that discriminate against
women.
154
Article 4 (c) obligates the state to undertake measures to promote and protect
the rights, safety and well being of its citizens, including from violation by other
citizens.
155
When Pakistan ratified the Convention and issued its reservation, it did not
make a reservation concerning these articles nor did it state that Pakistani customs and

154
See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

155
Ibid.

105
practices were to be prioritized over constitutional or international law. In its country
report though, the government of Pakistan cited customs, practices and misinterpretations
of religion as justifications for indulging in acts of discrimination against women.
156

Additionally, Pakistan failed to submit its initial report that was due in 1997 to the
Committee on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women as
provided for under Article 18 of the Women’s Convention. It was not until 2005 that
Pakistan submitted its first report to the Committee, combined with the second and third
report. The delayed report arguably revealed a lack of commitment by the government of
Pakistan to fulfill its international obligations.
In December 2000, the Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention that
guarantees judicial remedies to individuals under the Women’s Convention entered into
force. Individuals, groups of individuals, persons given consent and acting on behalf of
an individual and/or a group are allowed to file confidential complaints with the
Committee against states who are party to both the Women’s convention and the
Optional Protocol.
157
It additionally affords the committee the ability to investigate
situations that involve “grave and systematic violations by a State party of rights set forth
in the Convention.”
158
Because the states that ratify the Protocol are not allowed to
submit reservations, Pakistan, to date, has not ratified the Optional Protocol. In fact the
government’s response to the Committee question as to when it plans to ratify the
Optional Protocol stated that Pakistan would take this up “at the right time,” while it is

156
Second Shadow Report, Talibanisation and Poor Governance: Undermining CEDAW in Pakistan,
produced by Shirkat Gah with inputs from 23 other organizations, April 15, 2007, 11.

157
Articles 1 and 2, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women.

158
Optional Protocol, Article 8(1).

106
actively pursuing the policy of gender mainstreaming and gender equality.
159

Unfortunately, it has also not ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, which recognizes serious crimes of violence against women as crimes against
humanity.
Despite these lacunae in upholding its commitment to the Women’s Convention,
Pakistan has adopted some positive legislative measures owing to immense pressure and
lobbying from women’s rights activists as well as various national and international
human rights organizations. These policies were also enacted in response to the intense
criticism that Mukhtar Mai case brought upon President Musharraf himself. Pakistan’s
human rights records, especially when it came to protecting its women, became a major
source of embarrassment for its government, which continued to seek economic and
military aid from US and other western countries. Various legislative measures, though
constantly contested and altered due to opposition from the religious right, were
undertaken which can be considered a positive step in the right direction, even though it
is nowhere near the promise of fulfillment of basic human rights for women. In the next
section I discuss some of the important bills adopted at the beginning of the 21
st
century
that sought to address the problem of violence against women.

I. Criminal Law Amendment Act 2004
After 5 years of struggle by human rights activists and NGOs against the crime of honor
killings, a bill amending the P.P.C. and Cr.P.C. was passed into law on January 2, 2005,

159
Responses to the list of issues and questions for consideration of the combined initial, second and third
periodic report of Pakistan, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 3bth Session,
U.N.Doc. CEDAW/C/PAK/Q/3/Add.1 (March 1, 2007), 12.

107
by then President Musharraf, also known as the Honor Killings Bill. The Bill stated that
the perpetrator of a crime against women will serve no fewer than ten years in prison and
made the death penalty as the maximum punishment in extreme cases like honor
killings.
160
Additionally, under the bill, no police officer with a ranking lower than
superintendent may investigate honor crimes.
161
It was the first legislation ever passed to
officially acknowledge the problem of honor crimes. While the Bill represents significant
improvement over the existing laws, its effectiveness remains unclear. Women’s rights
advocates criticize the Bill for being defective and incomplete as male family members
guilty of murdering a female relative are not liable to receive the maximum
punishment.
162
Considering that male family members perpetuate the vast majority of
criminal acts against women under the pretext of honor, the Bill does not do much to
deter such crimes. The Bill also does not address the obstacle posed by the Qisas and
Diyat laws, which gives the power of forgiveness to the victim or her family. It fails to
contain a clause appointing the government as the heir of the victim. Some have even
argued that although increasing the penalties for honor crimes may have been well-
intentioned, the measure is actually detrimental as the maximum imprisonment or death
penalty arguably discourages courts from convicting the accused altogether.
163
For
example, a judge of the Superior judiciary once declared that the “life term was much too
harsh a punishment for a man who killed for honor and such a person deserved the lowest

160
Christina A. Madek, “Killing Dishonor: Effective Eradication of Honor Killing,” Suffolk Transnational
Law Review 29(2005): 66.

161
Ibid.

162
Hussain, “Take my Riches,” 239.

163
Ibid, 240.

108
penalty prescribed by the law.”
164
Finally, the Bill had no provisions to ensure that other
parties, who are typically involved in such incidents, including tribal council members or
relatives, would also be liable for punishment.
165
The Bill also refused to characterize
honor killing as intentional murder, leaving defendants subject to mitigating
provisions.
166

II. Law Reform Ordinance 2006
In 2006 President Musharraf promulgated an ordinance to facilitate release on bail of
women detained on various charges, including violation of the Hudood laws.
167
As this
was a presidential ordinance, it was only effective for 4 months. It was re-promulgated
once (8 November, 2006), but lapsed again. Bowing to fierce opposition from hard line
Islamic lawmakers, the government had to defer a vote on Protection of Women Act
2006 and thus the need for the presidential ordinance.
168
The provision has not been made
law, nor has the government stated any intention to re-issue the Ordinance. In any case,
the Ordinance ignores the security and livelihood issues of women so released. Without a
support network to assist them and fearing that they would be targeted by their own
family members upon release, several women have declined to be freed from jails in

164
Shadow Report, 22.

165
Hussain, “Take my Riches,” 240.

166
Ibid.

167
Asian Centre for Human Rights, “Appeasing the Mullahs: Protection of Women (Criminal Laws
Amendment) Bill 2006 of Pakistan,” September 13, 2006, available at
http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2006/132-06.htm (last visited June 20, 2007).

168
ACHR, September 13, 2006.

109
NWFP and Sindh.
169
This lack of foresight resulted in at least 4 women being murdered
after being released on bail under this provision in Punjab in 2006.
170
As many as 1300
women prisoners out of the total 6500 languishing in jails were expected to have been
released but the significant confusion regarding procedure has delayed the release of most.

III. Protection of Women Act 2006
Two years after the Honor Killings Bill was passed, a new statute entitled “Protection of
Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, came into force in Pakistan. Amid fierce
criticism and protest from religious parties, President Musharraf signed the Bill into law.
It aims to eliminate discrimination and hardships caused by the previous Hudood
Ordinance. The Pakistan penal code was based on civil law and not the Sharia and the
Bill places rape laws under the penal code. It does away with harsh conditions that
previously required victims to produce four male witnesses and exposed them to
prosecution for adultery if they were unable to prove the crime.
171
Heterosexual
consensual sex outside of marriage continued to be criminalized; however, the Act
provides that a court will investigate such complaints before formal charges are laid. In
addition, sentences of capital punishment and flogging for consensual extra-marital sex
were abolished. However, this offence remains punishable by sentences of up to five
years in prison and/or a fine.
172

169
HRCP, State of Human Rights in 2006, 122.

170
Shadow report, 22.

171
Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006, available at
www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/2006/wpb.html (last visited June 19, 2007).

172
Human Rights Watch, “Pakistan,” World Report 2007, January 11, 2007.

110
Again, even though many human rights activists welcomed the new legislation as a
step in the right direction, others said that the Act fell short of its stated intentions.
173

Many criticized the Act by saying it is not very different from the Hudood Ordinance
which they had lobbied to abolish. The Act failed to remove several discriminatory
provisions in the Ordinance it amended and gave “leeway to the judiciary to interpret the
law in the most orthodox way.”
174
Sentences of stoning and amputation were still
possible. The definition of adulthood still discriminated against girls, as adult culpability
begins on attaining puberty or 16 years for female and 18 years for male. This provision
of puberty as adulthood was not tied to other laws such as the Child Marriage Restraint
Act and Majority Act, which did not take puberty into account. Testimonies of female
and non-Muslim citizens remain absent, which means that women cannot be
eyewitnesses in cases of zina liable to hadd, and non-Muslims can only be witnesses if
the accused is non-Muslim. The Hudood laws were applicable to religious minorities,
which constitutes discrimination on the basis of religion. A BBC article suggested that
reporting cases under the Act would be much harder because complainants would have to
report to the district sessions court, which have limited hours and locations, instead of at
local police stations, which were more accessible, especially for those in rural areas.
175

IV. Prevention of Anti-Women Practices (Criminal Law Amendment) Bill, 2006
As of September 2008, the Bill had not been enacted into Law. It sought to ban various

173
HRCP 2007, 199.

174
Ibid.

175
Syed Shoaib Hasan, “Strong Feelings over Pakistan Rape Laws,” BBC News, November 15, 2006.

111
customs that deny women the right to marry or subject them to forced marriages and is a
key part of the plan to empower women.
176
This Bill would add a new chapter to the
Pakistan Penal Code whereby depriving a woman of her inheritance would be punishable
with seven years imprisonment or with a fine or both.
177
It would also outlaw customs
such as vani and swara, in which young girls are given away in marriage to settle feuds.
It further seeks to punish the practice of marrying women to the Quran with up to three
years in jail.
178
The Bill also proposes that husbands who bring charges of infidelity
against their wives under Islamic law but fail in their cases could face charges of slander
and the wife would be given the power to initiate divorce proceedings.
179

Introduced through the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2004, the existing Section
310-A has failed to address the issue. Human rights groups documented numerous
instances in 2005 and 2006 in which the decisions made by jirgas (non-formal dispute
resolution forums held by local elders/leaders) victimized women.
180
No action was taken
despite a superior court ruling to eliminate all such non-formal proceedings that violate
human rights. The informal traditional forums of adjudication on matters relating to
violence against women continue to be part of the justice system. Rulings regularly
violate women's rights and all too frequently promote violence against women to "settle a

176
BBC News, “Women’s Bill in Pakistan Assembly,” February 13, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6358837.stm (last visited June 20, 2007).

177
Irfan Ghauri and Zulfiqar Ghuman, “Prevention of Anti-Women Practices Bill moved in National
Assembly,” Daily Times, February 14, 2007, available at
http://www.dailytimes.com/pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C02%5C14%5Cstory_14-2-2007_pg1_2 (last
visited June 20, 2007).

178
BBC News, February 13, 2007.

179
Ibid.

180
HRCP Report 2005, 2006.

112
dispute." New schemes promoting non-formal dispute resolution forums under the
leadership of untrained local persons (e.g., the U.N.D.P. supported Musalihat Anjumans)
are thus problematic and not a solution to a poorly resourced and trained judiciary and an
ill-informed public.
181
Finally, whereas the existing provision (310-A) provides a
minimum of three years rigorous imprisonment that may extend to ten years, the current
Bill proposes to remove the minimum rigorous imprisonment of three years and to reduce
the maximum imprisonment to three years. It does not provide any monetary
compensation to female victims; nor does it automatically annul any such marriage,
failing to address the martial status of women who may have been married off in this
manner. Should they be considered legally married, women will have to face lengthy
procedures for dissolution of marriage.
182

Despite these news laws and their inherent weaknesses, there remains a gap
between the legal framework and customary practices. Additionally the existing legal
provisions continued to discriminate against women, undermining the equality of their
legal status. For example, the Human Trafficking Ordinance, 2002, deals with external
human smuggling only, and failed to address the issue of internal trafficking of women,
particularly carried under cover of the customary practice of bride price and its link with
the external trafficking of women. An alternate report called the shadow CEDAW report,
prepared by Shirkat Gah and various other non-governmental/human rights organization,
was presented to the CEDAW committee as a response to Pakistan’s official submission
of its country report. The report foregrounds two overarching obstacles for gender
equality that signal an absence of political will and ownership of the State’s obligations

181
Shadow Report, 23.

182
Ibid.

113
under CEDAW.
183
First, the government failed to address and to curb what was termed
the country’s “Talibanization” which undermined the government’s own initiatives.
Second, the inadequate or faulty governance mechanisms and implementation continued
to undermine the positive measures taken by the government, obstructing meaningful
progress under the different articles of CEDAW. This inaction indicates a lack of political
will to give meaningful effect to Pakistan’s obligations as a state party to the Convention.
The Report states that the government’s inability to make progress to effectively respond
to the challenges being mounted by militant, armed, politico-religious elements using the
pretext of religion to institute “Talibanization” of Pakistan has led to an unchecked
spread in influence of these groups which severely obstructs the access for girls to
educational institutions, health facilities; impedes women’s job opportunities and their
participation in political process; restrains exercise of legal rights and franchise; and
creates an environment that encourages discrimination against women and non-
Muslims.
184

183
Second Shadow Report.

184
Ibid, 7. According to the report the influence of ultra-conservative militant groups has strengthened
after the 2002 general elections that, for the first time, returned substantial numbers of representatives of
politico-religious parties to parliament and provincial assemblies. In the previous elections, Islamic
fundamentalists have never won more than five percent of votes. This time things changed, particularly in
the NWFP and Baluchistan where a coalition of six religious parties has shown a dramatically improved
showing at the polls. While the ascendance of these parties in provinces bordering Afghanistan is a cause of
worry politically, these results come as a particular blow to the women's movement in the country.
According to Khawar Mumtaz of Shirkat Gah, a leading women's organisation in Pakistan, the pro-Taliban
fundamentalists groups in the NWFP began targeting organisations working with women soon after the
United States began bombing Afghanistan in October 2001. Although some of that stopped once it was
evident that a change of government was inevitable in Afghanistan, their determination to hustle out all
such activists has remained undiminished. At one point eight offices of NGOs, many of them working in
the areas of health and education of women, were attacked and razed to the ground. The homes of the
directors of these organisations were also attacked. And later, targeted killings and bomb blasts continued.
These attacks on women, girls’ schools and women’s organizations have already led to the closure of
schools. In the 2005 Local Government elections, no woman was allowed to contest women’s reserved
seats in Kohistan District and women were barred from voting in several areas of the NWFP. And we all
know about the seize of the famous Pakistani shrine by pro-Taliban fighters in a show of support for the
radical leaders of the Red Mosque that was stormed by Pakistan’s arm this month after its clerics launched

114
Another serious impediment to progress is the visible lack of ownership of
commitments under international instruments and agreements amongst government
officials even at senior levels. This stems from a failure to proactively and systematically
promote knowledge about both national and international laws relating to women
amongst policy makers and implementers. Since the CEDAW Committee sent a list of
questions in 2006, the enactment of the Women Protection Act has addressed many of the
problems in the previous Hudood laws. However, information about these legal reforms
has not filtered down to the police and all sections of the judiciary as they continue to
register cases under the previous provisions.
185

The Ministry of Women’s Development, the national machinery on women in
Pakistan, has been marginalized within the national bureaucracy and is constrained both
in financial and human resources. It is unfortunate that retired military men and men from
the civil service hold several key positions in the Ministry as they have no track record of
any contribution to the women’s cause. The National Commission on the Status of
Women has not enjoyed independence or influence and has been constrained by its
mandated constitutional role as no separate machinery or an enabling environment exists
for implementing and monitoring the provisions of CEDAW. Pakistan ratified the UN
Convention on the rights of the Child in November 1990, entering a general reservation
that the “provisions of the Convention shall be interpreted in the light of the principles of
Islamic laws and values.” After a re-evaluation of the reservation, Pakistan withdrew its

a Taliban-style anti vice campaign in the capital. Bashirullah Khan and Miran Shah, “Militants seize Shrine
in Pakistan,” abc News, July 30, 2007; Kalpana Sharma, “No Honor in These Killings,” The Hindu,
November 3, 2002, available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/mag/stories/2002110300560300.htm

185
Shadow Report, 21.

115
reservation on 23 July 1997.
186
This demonstrates the fact that withdrawal of reservations
is possible if there is enough political will. Pakistan’s government right now, does not
seem to have the willingness to take up the cause of women which is considered
politically risky; rather it prefers to continue to do what is safe and to appease political
fractions.

Conclusion
Pakistan is a country built on a religious identity. However, it does not mean that the
source of all women’s issues can be blamed on religion, culture or traditions. Afiya
Shehrbano Zia, a women’s rights activist, argues that the state is routinely entrenched in
gendered roles as defined by the state itself as well as cultural norms. Women are
immobilized in this mutually beneficial patriarchal relationship and without the state
playing any overt role in this systemic cycle of violence it appears to be hard to break the
cycle.
187
We let the state off the hook when violence is blamed on traditional patriarchy
and bad social policy. It is but a part of the larger scheme of direct, structural or cultural
violence. It is also a result of the militarized state that is supported by the international
community and global financial institutions. However, this same co-operation with the
western world is used by the governmental and political establishment to convince its
populace that they are being coerced to adhere to universal human rights and thus it is

186
Combined Initial, Second and Third Periodic Reports of State Parties: Pakistan, Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Consideration of reports submitted by State Parties under
article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination against Women, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/PAK/1-3, August 3, 2005, 2.

187
Afiya Shehrbano Zia, “A State of Suspended Belief,” Economic and Political Weekly, June 7, 2008.

116
nothing but another form of western imperialism including their military and financial
support.
The aim then is to bridge the gap between human rights and religion, particularly
when existing international conventions have been portrayed to be weak mechanisms for
promoting change in the non-western world.
188
Katherine Weaver uses Morocco to give
an apt example of how the religious text can be formulated into a human rights document
thereby showing how public policy goals can be rendered in conjunction with the
precepts of traditional Islamic law.
189
Morocco reformed its Mudawana (code of personal
status like the personal laws) using the legal interpretive structures already in place and
thus successfully defining its Shari’a law as a protective device for its women rather than
a persecutory one.
190
Knowing that the reforms could be divisive, the Moroccan
government used Islamic law, not international human rights rhetoric, to shape and
reinforce the reforms and made sure to maintain a distinctly Muslim identity by using the
equality verses and normative principles in Sharia and leaving behind the contextually
and culturally sanctioned discrimination.
191
“The country reformed its Shari’a system
while still leaving it intact: marriage, polygamy, divorce, child custody, and inheritance
are still under the Mudawana, but all have been changed to better protect women’s rights
and equality.”
192
Pakistan could also use the Moroccan example as a model to reform its
laws instead of claiming that human rights are inherently incompatible with the latter.

188
Weaver, “Women’s Rights and Shari’a Law,” 503.

189
Ibid, 504.

190
Ibid, 505.

191
Ibid, 504-505.

192
Ibid, 506.

117
Such an approach will also fit with the arguments of many non-Western scholars that for
any real change to occur the reforms have to come from within.
It was a widely held belief during India and Pakistan’s freedom movement that
issues of women’s social upliftment and political enfranchisement should be raised only
after gaining independence, even though women participated actively in the freedom
movement. What the national leaders then and even now continue to forget is that
protecting women from violence is not very different from the agenda of state building as
one cannot hope to build a strong nation when half of its populace is not even guaranteed
the basic right to life. The problem is that the State is now paying for the Islamic rhetoric
it employed since independence to gain legitimacy because the same false Islamic
ideology is now being exploited by the Taliban and various other militant factions for
purely political reasons. The task before feminists and human rights activists who have
always been seen as urban, middle class, westernized women becomes even more
complicated under such social and political uncertainties and they face the threat of being
co-opted by other parties. They continuously struggle to define themselves as secular
while trying to make sure not to alienate their supporters in a deeply religious country.
The secular women’s struggle in Pakistan should not be seen as a struggle
between Islam and modernity. Rather it is a dilemma faced by most Muslim feminists
who are positioned in a complicated network of cultural and colonial histories and gender
relations in their societies. They have managed to challenge Islamization in two
important ways.
193
First, Women’s Action Forum (WAF) and other women’s groups
emphasized universal human rights and international conventions to argue that there

193
Amina Jamal, “Transnational Feminism as Critical Practice: A Reading of Feminist Discourses in
Pakistan,” Meridians 5, no. 2 (2005): 69.

118
should be no legal discrimination among citizens on the basis of gender and religion.
They did so by representing the state’s Islamization program not as a social, political, and
economic reconstruction of society but as a project aimed at reducing the status of
women and minorities and depriving them of their rights.
194
They also argued that it was
in fact, the responsibility of the state to uphold the rights of citizens by disallowing (mis)
interpretations of the Quran and Hadith since this was against both Islamic justice and the
constitutional rights of its citizens. Second, they drew on modern theories of the state to
insist that the Pakistani state override all other claims to authority such as familial, tribal
or religious and act as neutral arbiter of interests within the nation when the rights of the
individual collide with the interests of the “community.”
195

Muslim feminists have to deal with the general distrust of the universal doctrine
of human rights and its condemnation as a tool of western imperialism but as Kandiyoti
indicates, they must develop strategies “to accommodate diversity and difference without
undermining the legal and ethical grounds on which the right to difference itself can
continue to be upheld.”
196
A noncritical stance toward religion and culture seem to betray
feminist principles, but a critical stance creates a backlash against NGOs. However, there
are different ways in which women’s NGOs can respond to fundamentalism and
fundamentalist ideology: by reinterpreting the Quran, by networking and establishing ties
with the religious community, by using religion strategically and by using and advancing

194
Ibid.

195
Ibid.

196
Deniz Kandiyoti as quoted in Jamal, “Transnational Feminism,” 59.

119
secular thought and arguments.
197
While attacks of neo-imperialism and fears of co-
option by the donor agencies are legitimate and will continue despite efforts, it is almost
impossible to de-link from the global advocacy processes and its implications.

197
Afshan Jafar. “Engaging Fundamentalism: The Case of Women’s NGO’s in Pakistan.” Social Problems
54, no. 3 (2007): 265.

Chapter III
In the Name of ‘Honor’: Acid Attacks on Women in Bangladesh

Bophal is aged only 24, but feels like she is just waiting to die. Everyday is
a day of pain, suffering, misery and humiliation for her. Three years ago,
someone poured two bottles of acid over her head and body. Today, her
face, arms and back are covered with horrible scars, and half her head is
bald. She spends her days crying and hiding from the world, afraid to go
outside. She is not dead but not fully alive. “Now, I am half human and half
ghost,” she says. “The person who did this to me, why did not they kill me
right away, by shooting or stabbing me? Why did they let me live, in this
condition?”
1

‘Acid violence’ describes an attack against an individual in which sulfuric,
hydrochloric, or nitric acid is employed as a weapon to cause severe burns. The results
are permanent disfigurement for the victim, often blindness and sometimes hearing loss,
depending on where the acid falls. Acid continues to burn after the attack is over, unlike
other burn injuries, as it eats into the skin and tissue, often down to the bone. The purpose
of this chapter is to describe and understand acid throwing as a common form of gender
based violence in Bangladesh. In this chapter while explaining the phenomenon of acid
violence and looking at the reasons for its perpetuation in Bangladesh, I will argue that
acid violence is a ‘crime of honor’. Many will disagree with this argument because the
understanding and definition of violence in the name of honor is traditionally limited to
honor killings. It is my contention that a distinction needs to be made between honor
crimes and honor killings because responses to perceived or alleged transgressions of
‘honor’ do not necessarily result in homicide.

1
Project Against Torture, Living in the Shadows: Acid Attacks in Cambodia, Phnom Penh: LICADHO,
2003, 1.

121
Welchman and Hossain use the term ‘crimes of honor’ to “encompass a variety of
manifestations of violence against women, including ‘honor killings’, assault,
confinement or imprisonment, and interference with choice in marriage, where the
publicly articulated ‘justification’ is attributed to a social order claimed to require the
preservation of a concept of ‘honor’ vested in male (family and/or conjugal) control over
women and specifically women’s sexual conduct: actual, suspected or potential.”
2
They
argue that in some contexts, the range of female behavior considered to violate ‘honor’
goes beyond sexual conduct to include other behaviors that challenge male control. One
of the most common motives behind acid attacks is a woman’s rejection of sexual
advances by men or refusal of marriage proposals. Even though this act does not fit into
the traditional definition of honor crimes
3
as it has nothing to do with women’s sexual
conduct per say, it can still be described as one because men may still consider the act of
refusal as a challenge to their masculinity and thus as a perceived loss of honor. This is
because in many societies the ideal of masculinity depends on a notion of honor – of an
individual man, or a family or a community – and is fundamentally connected to policing
female behavior and sexuality.
Codes of honor serve to construct not only what it means to be a woman but also
what it means to be a man, and hence are central to social meanings of gender. Honor is
thus intrinsically linked to norms of ownership and control of women’s bodies. The

2
Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, eds., Honour: Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence Against Women,
London: Zed Books, 2005, 4.

3
Crime of honor is traditionally defined as the killing of a woman by her father or brother for engaging in,
or being suspected of engaging in, sexual practices before or outside marriage. In her 1999 Report, the UN
Special Rapporteur on violence against women defines “honor in terms of women’s assigned sexual and
familial roles as dictated by traditional family ideology. Thus, adultery, premarital relationships (which
may or may not include sexual relations), rape and falling in love with an ‘inappropriate’ person may
constitute violations of family honor,” in Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its
causes and consequences, UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/68 10 March 1999, paragraph. 18.

122
concept of honor is thus used to rationalize violence against women. This is founded on
the notion that a person’s honor depends on the behavior of others and that behavior,
therefore, must be controlled. In this case, honor is seen as residing in the bodies of
women. Thus, the behavior of women becomes an essential component in one’s self
esteem and community regard.
4

Even though women are not the only victims of acid violence, they constitute the
majority of acid victims. This is because in Bangladesh an ideal woman’s role is
paradoxical as a woman is both nothing – nothing as an individual, her physical well
being is not significant – and everything, her social status as a daughter and as a married
woman is all important; as a symbol of the family honor and pride felt by men. The
rationale of throwing acid on women may be understood by referring to the cultural value
of honor, ‘izzat’, which is important both in the relationship between husband and a wife
and before a daughter’s marriage. A family’s izzat must be preserved at all costs and
augmented whenever possible and “if the honor of a family’s women is lost, so also is
family’s entire public position.”
5
Izzat takes in the zealously sought qualities of prestige,
status, rank, esteem, respect and self-respect and it can be earned or lost depending on the
behavior of the women in the family. Hegemonic cultural forces and practices, reinforced
by ideologies of ‘purity’, ‘honor’ and ‘chastity’, make it difficult for individual women or
girls to resist the ‘inevitability’ of marriage, since it constitutes an integral part of the

4
Nancy V. Baker, Peter R. Gregware and Margery A. Cassidy, “Family Killing Fields: Honor Rationales in
the Murder of Women,” Violence Against Women 5, no. 2 (1999): 165.

5
David G. Mandelbaum, Women’s Seclusion and Men’s Honor: Sex Roles in North India, Bangladesh, and
Pakistan, Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1988, 20.

123
social identity of both men and women.
6
The emphasis on marriage leads to further
subordination of women by dominant social groups because of the need to regulate
female sexuality, mobility, labor and social identity. As a result girls grow up creating
their identity around the concept of lojja (shame) and the boys around that of izzat, honor
and social prestige. Many have noted that shame (or lojja) in the Bangladeshi context
carries connotations beyond the word’s English equivalent; it is seen as a positive quality,
invoked to prevent transgression of social norms.
7
As a virtue, it is inculcated in girls
from an early age, embodied in gestures, behavior, movement and clothing. Purdah (veil),
therefore, becomes another means of social control that substitute for individual
responsibility. Women in Bangladesh, like many other societies of the world, are judged
by their physical beauty and submissiveness to men. They are expected to live up to
ideals such as modesty, obedience and patience. On one hand, acid throwing has become
a form of punishment for those who have in some way refused to conform to the
standards of obedience forced upon them by the culture. The emphasis on a woman’s
beauty, on the other hand, explains why most of the acid attacks are targeted toward a
woman’s face.
In much of the world honor surfaces as a rationale for many forms of violence
against women, including their murder, and thus it is important to recognize them as
crimes of honor. Thus, it is my argument and the broader theme of this dissertation that
crimes of honor are not only limited to honor killings but are also actions that remove
from an individual or collectivity:

6
Dina M. Siddiqi, “Of Consent and Contradiction: Forced Marriages in Bangladesh,” in Honour: Crimes,
Paradigms, and Violence Against Women, edited by Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, 282-307, London:
Zed Books, 2005, 292.

7
Siddiqi, “Of Consent and Contradiction,” 291.

124
The stain of dishonor, both gendered and locally defined, through the use of
emotional, social or physical coercion over a person whose actual or imputed
actions have brought that dishonor; physical force may involve killing the
transgressor of the code of honor.
8

According to the above definition, acid violence can and should be defined as a
crime of honor.
Honor crimes may, depending on the exact circumstances, violate rights to life,
liberty and bodily integrity, the prohibition on torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment; the prohibition on slavery; the right to
freedom from gender based discrimination and sexual abuse and exploitation; the
right to privacy, to marry and found a family.
9

Identifying acid violence as a crime of honor will allow us to look at the gendered
nature of the violence and its patriarchal and cultural roots. This in turn may lead to
modification of customs that discriminate against women and help to find an effective
remedy.

Lack of Scholarship
There is very little written about acid violence especially in the western press. Most of
those who are aware of the phenomenon of acid violence have gained that knowledge
because they either saw the 20/20 segment on ABC network, which was first of its kind
or through a report on the famous Oprah Winfrey show.
10
There are occasional articles in
the Western press about incidences of acid violence which primarily just report the
incident without getting into too much detail about its roots as a result they leave the

8
Purna Sen, “Crimes of Honour, value and meaning,” in Honour: Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence
Against Women, edited by Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, 42-63, London: Zed Books, 2005, 50.

9
Radhika Coomaraswamy, “Violence against women and ‘crimes of honor,” in Honour: Crimes,
Paradigms, and Violence against Women, edited by Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, xi-xiv, London:
Zed Books, 2005: xii.

10
Faces of Hope: Teen Launches Crusade to Stop Acid Attacks against Women in Bangladesh, 20/20 ABC
News Report, November 1, 1999.

125
impression that it is a problem of the third world and emblematic of the backwardness of
oriental cultures that exemplify the oppression of women. Even in countries where acid
violence is prevalent most of the written material is primarily limited to newspaper
articles or NGO reports without much scholarly work. Most of the available research has
been carried out by South Asian women studying in either US or Europe. Their data
depended largely on anthropological research, which consisted of fieldwork and
interviews.
I tried to conduct field research but certain visa rules for Indian nationals made it
extremely difficult for me to visit Bangladesh during the course of my Ph.D. I did,
however, rely on the services of a Bangladeshi national whom I hired to assist me in
collecting research materials from Bangladesh. He visited the NGOs, with whose
representatives I had spoken over the phone such as the Acid Survivors Foundation (ASF)
and Bangladesh National Women Lawyer’s Association (BNWLA), on my behalf and
helped in copying and mailing the materials to me. I have primarily relied on the material
I collected during my field research in India, scholarly work available in western press,
newspaper articles, NGO reports, phone conversations and materials collected and sent to
me by my friend in Bangladesh. Although I looked into various dimensions of the
phenomenon of acid violence based on available sources, it is likely more research is
needed.

Acid Violence in Bangladesh
It is widely recognized that women are subjected to various forms of violence including
acid attacks because existing gender relations invariably relegate them to a subordinate

126
position. Within the global context of violence against women and girls, acid violence in
Bangladesh is the worst form of violence and violation of their human rights. The
alarming increase of acid-throwing cases from mid 1990s in Bangladesh and some
international media attention to the issue has led to a misconception that acid violence is
engrained in Bangladeshi society and also that it may be related to Islamic fundamentalist
men throwing acid in the faces of women who are not veiled. However, acid violence
does not occur in Bangladesh alone. Other countries, including India, Pakistan, Malaysia,
Italy, Egypt, Cambodia and some African nations, specifically Nigeria and Uganda have
reported incidents of acid violence. In fact incidences of acid attacks in India are
probably higher in number but much smaller in terms of percentage because of the sheer
difference in the size and population of the two countries.
The first documented case of acid violence in Bangladesh dates back to 1961 and
the first reported case of acid violence was in 1976. The number of acid attacks increased
steadily in the two decades following Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, from
approximately a dozen each year to about fifty per year in the mid-1990s. But in the
1990s, cases reported by NGOs and the government shot up to two hundred and fifty per
year and has leveled off since then. The highest number of incidents in a year of three
hundred and sixty six was reported in 2002. Information gathered from different sources
shows that apart from the reported cases, there are a significant number of unreported
cases of acid attack. For example, in 2003 Ain O Shalish Kendra reported a total of two
hundred and forty nine victims; Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association
reported two hundred and fifty four; while according to the report of Acid Survivors
Foundation the number of acid victims in the same year was four hundred and ten. It

127
implies a possibility that a considerable number of cases are either not reported to the law
enforcement agencies or to the newspapers. While reported incidents of acid attacks in
the past few years have only ranged from 150 to 450 cases per year, other forms of
reported violence have been consistently higher in number. In such a context, acid
throwing against women and girls has to be seen within the larger trend of increasing
violence against women.
It is difficult to get accurate statistics on acid violence in Bangladesh, as many of
the cases are not reported due to fear of further retaliation. Furthermore, there is a lack of
an information infrastructure in the form of consistent, reliable data gathering and
management in governmental and non-governmental organizations. In theory tracking the
cases should be relatively easy, given that acid violence nearly always necessitates
hospitalization and that there are few private facilities in Bangladesh but almost, without
exception, most agencies have used newspaper reports as their source of information
about the incidences of acid violence. The office of the Inspector General of Police has
collated information from reports filed at police stations; however, it costs money to file a
report with the police, which serves as a further deterrent to reporting.
11
In addition to the
prohibitive cost, the general lack of confidence in police efficiency also deters many
survivors from reporting the attack.
Despite taking into account the inconsistent tracking of acid throwing incidents
and the fact that the actual number of cases might be higher than those reported, the
incidence of acid attacks may not seem high when compared to other forms of violence
against women like rape, dowry deaths, domestic violence, etc. Nevertheless it is

11
Kate Wesson, “A Situational Assessment of Acid Violence in Bangladesh,” Development in Practice 12,
no. 1 (2002): 96; According to a report from one survivor, it had cost her family the equivalent of US$15,
at least a week’s wages, to file the case.

128
important to focus on acid violence because it is part of a wider pattern of gender
violence and is one of the most brutal forms of male aggression against women. Because
it is cheap, the availability of acid makes it an easy weapon to obtain to use against
women and girls. In Bangladesh, acid is readily accessible in the form of sulphuric,
hydrochloric, and nitric acid. It costs less than US$1 for a small bottle and is sold in
Dhaka on the street and in small shops. Although steps have been taken
12
to regulate the
sale of acid to the public, this crime is nevertheless on the rise. There is no guarantee that
the closure of shops selling acid will stop acid violence as the acid that is available from
used and discarded batteries is more than enough to cause all of the acid violence in
Bangladesh.
The most common motive behind acid violence is revenge for rejection of sexual
advances from men, refusal of marriage proposal, not granting the husband permission
for a second marriage, not accepting the husband’s extramarital affairs, failure to give
dowry, and disputes over family property. In most cases, the perpetrators are so-called
lovers or are husbands, cousins, relatives, and local hooligans. The consequences of acid
attack are severe lead not only to death and serious physical wounds but also to severe
psychological and emotional trauma. In Bangladesh, where most people live in remote
rural areas, the chances of receiving appropriate and timely treatment for acid burns are
slim. For the few who do have reconstructive surgeries with the help of organizations
such as Acid Survivor Foundation (ASF), the acid survivor invariably faces societal
isolation and ostracism, with little or no chance of ever finding work or getting married.
Added to the psychological strain of visible disfigurement, the acid survivor becomes a
victim of both physical and cultural trauma.

12
The various steps are discussed in a later section of this chapter.

129
According to a scientific study done to investigate psychosocial aspects of acid
burns scarring in Bangladesh and to compare it with the study of psychological
adjustment of acquired facial deformities reported in Western populations, affected
individuals experience major problems with social interaction and respond with social
anxiety and avoidance similar to that described in populations who have disfigurements
in the West, but the degree of psychological morbidity appeared to be much greater
amongst the Bangladeshi women.
13
This is attributed to the fact that most women in
Bangladesh rely on their husbands for financial support. As their physical disfigurement
takes away their chances of ever getting married, they are left with no means of survival.
In this context, one must look at the status of women in Bangladeshi society to better
understand their vulnerability to such abuses as well as the complexity of the
rehabilitation process afterwards.

Status of Women in Bangladesh

There are various socio-economic, political, and cultural factors that contributed to the
increased vulnerability of women to male violence. Jahan and Islam in their study of
violence against women identified several of these factors:
14

i) a growing tendency towards acceptance of violence in society, mainly due to
certain socio-political factors;
ii) the unquestioning acceptance of patriarchal gender ideology and gender
relations in all the social structures, including family, community and the state;
iii) increasing poverty and adverse conditions brought about by changing socio-
economic process; and

13
A. Mannan, S. Ghani, A. Clarke, P. White, S. Salmanta and P.E.M. Butler, “Psychosocial outcomes
derived from an acid burned population in Bangladesh, and comparison with Western norms,” Burns 32
(2006): 239.

14
Roushan Jahan and Mahmuda Islam, Violence Against Women in Bangladesh: Analysis and Action,
Dhaka: Women for Women and South Asian Association for Women Studies, 1997.

130
iv) society’s basic reluctance to drastically change patriarchal laws and policies,
which perpetuate male dominance over women.

These underscore the fact that gender violence is not new in Bangladesh, but
family violence remains the most under-reported crime in the country. Several factors,
interacting and reinforcing each other, contributed to the continued non-reporting and
under-reporting of family violence in general and marital violence in particular, thereby
obstructing social recognition of the extent and seriousness of this problem. According to
various studies conducted from 2001-2003 by the Bangladesh National Women Lawyers’
Association, the main ones years are:
15

i) the universal acceptance of gender-inequality buttressed by social and
religious sanctions in favor of male dominance of women in every sphere of
life, including the right of a husband to physically chastise a wife;
ii) the deep-seated reverence felt for family as an institution for regulating sexual
behaviors and the continuity of the social order;
iii) the prevalent social notion of the centrality of marriage in a woman’s
existence;
iv) the prevalent middle-class bias of regarding such violence as peripheral and
v) the fear of social censure and resulting loss of face.

There is generally widespread violence in the political arena and a corresponding
deterioration in the law and order situation. Black money from the underground economy,
the patronage of unemployed cohorts of men called mastaans (or musclemen), application
of rigorous repressive measures to stop public protests, elimination of political opponents
through intimidation, abduction, even murder, and the rise of religious fundamentalism
are just some of the factors that have made women extremely vulnerable to violence.
16

15
Bangladesh National Women Lawyers’ Association (BNWLA), Report on Violence against Women in
Bangladesh, BNWLA: Dhaka, 2001, 2002, 2003.

16
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Violence against Women in South Asia, New
York: United Nations, 2000.

131
Jahan
17
notes the ambiguity surrounding the question of violence against women
in Bangladesh. On the one hand, violence is held in repugnance and can even provoke
outrage. Jahan gives the example of a man in Northern Bangladesh who sprayed acid on
and killed his new wife because he considered her dowry inadequate; villagers later
hacked him to death for abusing his wife in that way. Yet, on the other hand, violence
against women is legitimized, tolerated and even accepted. Jahan attributes this to the fact
that gender inequality, leading to gender violence, is deeply embedded in the culture and
society of Bangladesh. All Bangladeshi institutions permit, and even encourage, the
demonstration of unequal power between the sexes. Bangladesh, fortunately or
unfortunately, has a unique amalgamation of cultures, which allows for the oppression of
women. Tradition, religion, patriarchy and paternalistic attitudes in the socioeconomic
and legal spheres create an atmosphere of negative traditionalism, religious
fundamentalism, male proprietariness, and female subjugation.
18

Bangladesh is predominantly Muslim. While Islam allows for gender equity in the
religious and spiritual spheres (i.e., equality of all believers in terms of equal obligation
to pray, give alms and prohibition of evil), it contains ambiguous messages when it
comes to equality of the sexes in the socio-cultural sphere. According to Monsoor,
19

specific verses of the Quran set men as superior over women, but women have the right

17
Roushan Jahan, “Hidden Wounds, Visible Scars: Violence against women in Bangladesh,” in Structures
of Patriarchy: State, Community and Household in Modernizing Asia, edited by B. Agarwal, London, UK:
Zed Books, 1988.

18
Shamim, “Dowry and Women’s Status”; Monsoor, “From Patriarchy to Gender Equality.”

19
Monsoor, “From Patriarchy to Gender Equality.”

132
to receive care and maintenance. Moreover, as mentioned previously, gender-selective
interpretation of Quranic verses perpetuate the system of male supremacy.
20

Second, Bangladesh, formerly East Bengal, and then East Pakistan, shares two of
the oldest and richest cultural traditions of the world. It has the double-edged fortune of
tracing its cultural and social roots to the Vedic civilization, as well as to the Islamic
culture. The crystallization of the Bengali language, Bangla, from classic Sanskrit during
the Indian medieval period provided the region with the linguistic basis for creating its
own unique cultural identity. By the time Islam spread to India, almost five centuries
after the life of the Prophet, it clearly accorded women a subordinate religious and social
status. This combined with the cultural clashes between the religion and the new converts
(originally Hindus and Buddhists), subjugated women’s position further since both
traditions maintain clearly the superiority of men.
21

Because of the confluence of these two cultures, it is a country of cultural
paradoxes. Modern day Bangladeshis adhere simultaneously to the principles of Islam
and to their Bengali culture. The paradox is evident in the manner in which the purdah
system is practiced in Bangladesh. Because of the poverty level, lower class women
especially, have no choice but to work outside the house. Thus, public veiling is not
practical. Yet, their symbolic acceptance of purdah is evident in the manner in which
women carry themselves: with shyness, demureness, lowered eyes, and a general
reluctance to interact with men other than those related to them by blood or marriage.
22

20
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Violence against Women in South Asia.

21
Ibid; Monsoor, “From Patriarchy to Gender Equality.”

22
B.N. Ramusack, “Women in South Asia,” in Women in Asia, ed. B.N. Ramusack and S. Sievers,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999; Monsoor, “From Patriarchy to Gender Equality.”

133
Even among those who do not veil themselves, younger women are more
secluded than older women. This again comes from the paradoxical belief that women
must protect themselves from the lust of men; yet, women are believed to have no control
over their sexuality and therefore, must be contained.
23
Younger women are believed to
be more vulnerable in both ways, in not being able to resist males as well as possessing
more skills to seduce them. Thus, when younger women venture out, either for work or
school, the perception that they are actually breaking (symbolic) purdah and defying the
cultural norms makes them easy and justified targets for many forms of violence,
including acid attacks.
In Bangladesh, when a woman is unable or unwilling to live up to the
expectations of her husband or his family, she is subjected to many forms of violence,
including acid attacks, because she has dared to say no, either actively or passively. The
motivating factor seems to be revenge and the ultimate way to avenge the perceived
affront to male pride and honor is to destroy the woman, permanently and irreversibly. As
Chowdhury writes, the underlying theme seems to be, “If I can not have you when I want
you, no one can.”
24

A question that arises is why, if the male perpetrator is so powerful, do the men in
the victim’s family do little or nothing? The powerlessness of the victim’s family is
rooted in the religious and cultural belief that the female child is merely a temporary
“visitor” in her parents’ home until she is ready to be sent to her husband’s home where
she truly belongs. A popular saying in many of the languages spoken in South Asia,

23
Monsoor, “From Patriarchy to Gender Equality.”

24
E.H. Chowdhury, “If I can’t have you, then no one can,” Star Weekend Magazine, 1996, 10-12.

134
including Bangla, summarizes this sentiment eloquently: “Educating your daughter is like
watering your neighbor’s yard.”
25

The female’s identity is tied to, and merely an extension of, the male members of
her family—father, brother, husband and even her son. In other words, she is the shadow
image, always considered in relation to the males in her family.
26
Her character and
behavior reflect on the family honor. Baker, Gregware and Cassidy
27
write that when
honor depends on the behavior of others, it serves as a useful fiction in preserving male
dominance and controlling female behavior. Moreover, such thinking serves to justify
repressive control measures within the home and restricts the female’s participation
outside the home. Thus, if she is forced back to her maternal home, the dishonor and
humiliation are not hers but of her maternal family. The only way to restore that honor is
to do whatever is necessary so that she can be taken back by the husband and his family.
In Bangladesh, women are valued least in the household, after the male, his
children, and his property.
28
Conservative, religion-bound Bangladesh encourages its
male member to grow up with the belief that they are the superior gender and therefore,
have complete rights over women.
29
Not only men but also women may perceive
violence, to a certain extent, as being legitimate. Schuler et.al., emphasize that in general

25
Monsoor, “From Patriarchy to Gender Equality”; Fisher cited in Hayward, Breaking the Earthenware
Jar.

26
Hayward, Breaking the Earthenware Jar.

27
N.V. Baker, P.R. Gregware & M.A. Cassidy, “Family Killing Fields: Honor Rationales in the Murder of
Women,” Violence against Women 5, no. 2 (1999): 164-184.

28
Asian Cultural Forum on Development, South Asia Women Workshop, Bangkok, 1987; Shamim,
“Dowry and Women’s Status.”

29
Shakespeare Shil, “Men use acid to scar Bangladeshi women who say no,” available at
http://www.geocities.com/HotSprings/Bath/5900/menuseac.htm

135
the women interviewed consider men as their legitimate guardians and recognize their
right to punish them for any improper behavior.
30
With marriage, which is strictly
patrilocal,
31
the young bride enters a new household as a stranger, owing respect and
obedience to the husband and the in laws, who as “guardians” substitute the members of
the parental family. On the basis of her own experience, Nazneen, describes the relation
of a bride with her in laws as involving emotional and physical violence which is
“strongly backed by cultural norms.”
32
She describes the “in-law syndrome” as a form of
“social disease”. “From the first day of her married life the bride is bound to obey not
only her husband, but also his mother, father, sister and brothers. They all have the right
to discipline the bride; and it is the bride’s family that will try its best to keep the groom’s
family satisfied by fulfilling their financial demands.”
33

Unmarried women are victimized, but married women are also in jeopardy. In a
growing number of cases involves physical violence against married women occur
because of unfulfilled requests of dowry. Dowry is in many cases, in Bangladesh as well
as in India, the cause of the eponymous ‘dowry deaths’ perpetrated, mainly by the
husband but also by the other members of the husband’s family. The phenomenon of
dowry deaths has been escalating in Bangladesh from 1988-2008. There was sharp
increase from 1995 to 1998 where the number of cases of dowry related violence almost
doubled. The daughter-in-law has the lowest position in the home of her husband, and her

30
S.R. Schuler, S.M. Hashemi, A.P. Riley and A. Akhter, “Credit Programs, Patriarchy and Men’s
Violence Against Women in Rural Bangladesh,” Journal of Social Science and Medicine 43, no. 12 (1996).

31
Marriage in Bangladesh is patrilocal only among Hindus and Muslims. There are Buddhists and other
religious minorities who follow the opposite rule.

32
Roksana Nazneen, “Violence in Bangladesh,” in Violence against women: Philosophical Perspectives,
edited by Stanley G. French, Laura Martha Purdy and Wanda Teays, London: Cornell University Press, 77.

33
Nazneen, “Violence in Bangladesh,” 80.

136
status is inextricably tied to whether she gives birth to sons or not. Having sons gives
women a relative position of power and higher status in most South Asian communities.
In many households, the vicious cycle is repeated with the mother in-law later becoming
abusive towards her son’s wife.

Legal Status of Women in Bangladesh
The official Bangladesh state narrative on gender violence is critical for understanding
the state’s role in not offering services for women who endure violent attacks. Meghna
Guhathakurta has argued that the Bangladesh state is a “soft state” that is unable to
institutionalize firmly its own statist interests. Thus, even more so than other states
(which also are pressured by multiple interests), Bangladesh caters to diverse, fragmented
and often contradictory interests, e.g., international capital, donor governments, the rural
rich, the urban middle class, and certain state functionaries, e.g., the army, the police
force, bureaucracy, etc.
34
Such fragmentation in the state’s discourse is reflected in the ad
hoc and contradictory nature of many of its policies, especially those relating to women.
The state intervenes in those social processes that perpetuate imposition and
internalization of oppressive structures to which women are subordinated. Such processes,
argues Guhathakurta, embrace social customs and practices, religious codes and beliefs
and social legislation. The ‘soft’ state functions in ambiguity when it seeks to sustain and
support discriminatory practices, and yet it allows spaces for the practices to be
challenged. In this section I try to demonstrate this nature of the Bangladeshi state
whereby on one hand it offered space for discriminatory practices towards women to be

34
Meghna Guhathakurta, “Gender Violence in Bangladesh: The Role of the State,” Journal of Social
Studies 30 (1985): 78.

137
challenged; yet on the other hand it allowed those practices to continue by not intervening
strategically or systematically.
The Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees equality of all citizens before the law.
Based on the principles of secularism, nationalism, socialism, and democracy, the
Constitution strictly prohibits any sort of discrimination. Article 28(1) of the Constitution
states “the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion,
race, caste, sex, or place of birth.” Article 28(2) states “Women shall have equal rights
with men in all spheres of the state and of the public life.” These egalitarian principles of
equality have not, however, been fully realized. Women continue to face gender
discrimination at all stages of life, both socially and institutionally, in the family and in
the public sphere.
The emphasis on “State and public life” in Article 28(2) has been detrimental to
women’s emancipation because it has indirectly acknowledged that the government will
not exert its authority to guarantee equal rights in the personal sphere. The primary
impediment to the recognition of women’s rights in Bangladesh lies in the fact that the
Muslim Personal Law, Islamic principles governing individual conduct within the family
context, defines women’s rights in marriage, divorce, guardianship of children, and
inheritance.
35
Rather than characterizing women’s rights as individual and inalienable,
Muslim law frames them as “community or religious rights.”
36
The practical result is that
women’s rights, though provided for in the constitution, are primarily governed by

35
Michele Brandt and Jeffrey A. Kaplan, “The Tension Between Women’s Rights and Religious Rights:
Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh, and Tunisia,” Journal of Law and Religion 12 (1995-
1996): 122.

36
Ibid.

138
religious or community custom, making legislating in this area difficult.
37
The male bias
of communal values thus makes accountability for crimes against women difficult to
achieve thereby exposing women to extreme vulnerability and inconsistent treatment.
This inconsistent treatment is evident in all spheres of personal laws. Religion-
based discriminatory inheritance laws do not permit women to have an equal share of
property as their male counterparts.
38
For example, under the Muslim law of inheritance,
male inheritors receive double that of the female inheritors. Similarly a wife also gets a
share from husband’s property, though only a fraction as the son’s share is much more
than that of the mother and daughter. On one hand, under the Hindu law, women do not
have any right to inherit, while on the other, Christian women get equal share of property
as men. Thus there are discriminations among the women of different communities. What
is worse is the ramifications of such discriminatory inheritance laws. Since women
mostly do not inherit family property, people do not want to have a daughter and there is
a preference for a son.
The precedence accorded to Sharia (religious) personal law in all personal matters
curtail women’s rights in marriage, divorce, custody and guardianship as well. Besides
the double share of inheritance men are also given the right to polygamy, unilateral
divorce and guardianship over wife and children, including the right to physical
chastisement. Muslim marriage is contractual in nature and no marriage of Muslims of
marriageable age (legal age of marriage is 18 years for men and 16 years for women)
would be valid without the consent given by both parties in the presence of responsible

37
Brandt, “The Tension Between Women’s Rights and Religious Rights,” 122.

38
Shahnaz Huda, “Protection of Women’s Human Rights in Bangladesh: Legal Framework,” in State of
Human Rights in Bangladesh: Women’s Perspective, edited by Khaleda Salahuddin, Roushan Jahan and
Latifa Akanda, Dhaka: Women for Women, 2002, 151.

139
witnesses. Yet guardians, especially in rural areas, still exercise their right not only of
arranging marriage but also of declaring consent on behalf of the bride without consulting
her. In addition, the witnesses to the marriage must either be two males or one male and
two females – females alone cannot be witnesses.
39
With regards to divorce Muslim
jurisprudence confers on the husband almost absolute power to divorce but denies like
freedom to the wife.
40
Consequently the wife can obtain divorce only when the couple
mutually agrees to the wife’s proposal for divorce and she either forgoes her dower or
gives him something in return for his consent to release her from her marital bond.
41

Besides the law, the absence of effective agencies offering intervention/support and the
inordinate time and expenses involved in litigation prevent many women from seeking
redress for domestic violence through divorce or criminal proceedings. The Family Laws
Ordinance of 1961, since amended in 1982, has modified these sweeping male rights to
some extent but women’s socio-economic powerlessness and wide spread ignorance of
their legal rights limit the scope of effective legal protection from male oppression and
violence. A 2004 survey finding of Nagorik Uddog ( a non-governmental organization)
reveals that 82.7% of the women do not know anything about inheritance law and 65.6%
do not know anything about their father’s property. Moreover, 80.9% of the divorcee and
77.8% of abandoned women are not aware of their share in their father’s property.
42

39
Ibid, 152.

40
Ibid, 154.

41
1bid, 155.

42
Steps Promoting Gender Equality, Human Rights and Good Governance, Steps Towards Development,
Issue 4, 2004, 15.

140
Legal Status of Bangladeshi Women under CEDAW
Despite the lacunae in constitutional safeguards and protection accorded to women,
Bangladesh is a signatory to various international human rights instruments. It ratified the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
in November 1984. Upon accession, the Government of Bangladesh made the following
reservation: “The Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh does not consider
as binding upon itself the provisions of articles 2, 13 (a) and 16 (1) (c) and (f) as they
conflict with Sharia law based on Holy Quran and Sunna.”
43
On 23 July 1997, the
Government of Bangladesh notified the Secretary-General that it had decided to
withdraw the reservation relating to articles 13 (a) and 16 (f) made upon accession and
continued its reservation to Article 2 and 16.1 (c), which underlines the core principle of
equality and non-discrimination. What is striking about these reservations though is that
Bangladesh does not have any ‘Sharia law’ as such. Rather, certain provisions of the
Sharia are codified into the legislation, such as the Muslim Family Law Ordinance. On
the other hand, Muslims are not the only population in the country. There are sizeable
non-Muslim communities to whom the Sharia is not applicable.
Bangladesh has ratified the Optional Protocol during UN Millennium session in
September 2000 and is one of the first ten countries to ratify which enabled the Protocol
to enter into force. Thus, Bangladesh has demonstrated strong commitments for
implementing CEDAW by ratifying the Optional Protocol. As CEDAW did not have
equal mandatory status like other International Human Rights Conventions, with legal
authority at the international level for investigating complaints of gross violation of

43
List of Reservations to CEADW, available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations.htm

141
human rights, introduction of the Optional Protocol provided CEDAW with a legal basis
to investigate complaints, lodged by person/groups of countries that ratified the protocol.
In its fifth periodic country report submitted to the CEDAW Committee in 2004,
the report outlined a number of legal initiatives taken by the government in the past to
ensure equality and protection of women’s rights. These include (a) The Muslim Family
Laws Ordinance of 1961; (b) The Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980 and its amendment in
1986; (c) The Family Court Ordinance of 1985; (d) The Child Marriage Restraint Act of
1929; (e) The Muslim Marriage and Divorce Registration Act of 1974. The report also
outlined a number of new provisions undertaken by the government to combat violence
against women; Prevention of Women and Child Repression Act 2000, Acid Control Act
2002 and Acid Crime Prevention Act 2002.
44
The report recognizes that these laws have
been fairly inadequate in reducing violence against women due to a lack of effective
implementation and due to women’s, as well as men’s ignorance about their legal rights.
So it is not just the content but the application of laws as well that put women in a
disadvantaged position as compared to men. While the report acknowledges that the
major obstacle towards implementation of these laws is the existence of Personal Laws
45

which acts as a major impediment for women in exercising their fundamental human
rights regarding marriage, divorce, custody of children, alimony, the government has still
not withdrawn its reservation to Article 2 which underlines the core principle of equality
and non-discrimination.

44
These laws are discussed in detail in a later section of this chapter.

45
Fifth Periodic Report of State Parties: Bangladesh, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/BGD/5 (January 3, 2003), 11.

142
Legal Initiatives
In spite of constitutional and international human rights guarantees, and more stringent
laws, women’s lives remain in jeopardy in Bangladesh where violence against women
has become a common phenomenon. Apart from provisions contained in the Penal Code
dealing with crimes committed against women, several laws were enacted to combat
crimes of which women are the victims. The Penal Code of 1860 defines and prescribes
the punishment for a variety of crimes against women including rape, trafficking,
willfully causing miscarriage, acid throwing and so forth. Other laws safeguarding
women from violence include the Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act of 1933, the
Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980, the Children’s Act of 1974, etc. However, the increasing
rate of violence and the factors contributing to it showed the inadequacy and
ineffectiveness of these laws. As a result, during the 1980’s, the increasingly vocal
demand by the women’s organizations supported by conscientious public opinion against
gender-violence induced the government to undertake a number of steps and measures to
reduce incidences of violence against women. The major ones are: enactment of laws and
promulgation of ordinances designed to protect women against violence by providing
rigorous punishment for such acts; provision of support services for victims of violence;
and affirmative action for achieving gender-equity.
46
Of the legal measures undertaken by
the government in the 1980s, the most important ones were the enactment of (i)Dowry
Prohibition Act of 1980 which was later amended by the Dowry Prohibition Ordinance,
1982, prohibiting dowry in all forms and making it punishable by imprisonment up to
five years but not less than one year; (ii) Muslim Family Laws (Amendment) Ordinance,

46
Roushan Jahan, Hidden Danger: Women and Family Violence in Bangladesh, Dhaka: Women for
women, 1994, 126.

143
1982, restraining indiscriminate divorce and polygamy; (iii) Cruelty to Women
(Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance, 1983, providing for punishment by imprisonment for
life for kidnapping or abducting women, trafficking in women, cruelty for dowry and
rape as well as abetment of such offences; (iv) Ordinance inserting the new section 326-A
in the Penal Code providing for capital punishment for acid-throwing; and (v) Family
Courts Ordinance, 1985, providing for summary trial of offences regarding marriage,
dower, maintenance, and guardianship and custody of the children.
47
Appreciating that
legal measures are often not enough, the government also established some support
services. A National Advisory Committee for prevention of Violence against Women was
set up by the government. The main function of the committee was to review the cases of
violence against women and adopt measures to resist violence and collect statistics on the
instances of violence.
As manifestations of the government’s concern, these laws appeared as
appropriate steps. However, the laws and the way it was formulated, enacted and
implemented, contains loopholes. Moreover, none of the laws were designed to change or
challenge the basic gender inequality which gives rise to gender violence. For example,
the Dowry Prohibition Act did not challenge the widespread social acceptance of dowry
and some technical weaknesses in the formulation of the law, e.g., the hair splitting
definition which differentiates ‘gifts’ from ‘dowry’, the time limit set for complaints to be
filed to court, weakened the application and implementation of this law. On one hand, the
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, by removing some of the bar imposed by Sharia law,
expanded women’s access to justice, but by its very limited scope it applied to a small

47
Ibid, 29.

144
number of cases only.
48
On the other hand, the Cruelty to Women Ordinance that
provided for the death penalty and life imprisonment did not actually lead to a decrease in
the number of reported cases of violence for which rigorous punishment was imposed.
49

The demand by women lawyers and activists for establishment of family courts with
clear jurisdiction to be set up at local levels all over the country under the existing
ordinance was also not met. The women’s cell established by the Directorate of Women’s
Affairs for handling cases of violence against women lacked the financial and human
resources required to meet the demands of thousands of complaints it receives every
year.
50

The Nari O Shishu Nirjaton Domon Act of 2000 (Prevention of Women and
Children Repression Act) was passed in response to the escalating problem of violence
against women and children in the 1990s.
51
After Parliament held a series of dialogues
with NGOs, human rights organizations and feminist groups, the law was passed. It
aimed to establish stringent punishments for crimes against women and children; it
replaced several other laws namely Cruelty to Women Deterrence Ordinance of 1985 and
the Women and Children Repression Act of 1995. The Act of 2002 imposed the death
penalty for several offenses including murder or attempt to commit murder by acid
throwing, for trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, for death caused due to rape and gang
rape, for murder/attempt to murder for dowry. The Act was also the first enacted law that

48
Ibid, 127.

49
Ibid, 128.

50
Ibid, 129.

51
Huda, “Protection of Women’s Human Rights in Bangladesh,” 158.

145
contained a provision for safe custody which although practiced for a long time was not
part of the legal system.
52

Although the law provided for harsh punishments, experience with the law
indicates that provisions it could not effectively deter offenders or ensure their
prosecution due to various loopholes.
53
First, there were problems with the law in terms
of definition and lack of clarity. Domestic violence was not recognized as a crime in its
own. Murder of women, if not as a result of rape, acid throwing or dowry, did not come
under this proposed Act, nor does sexual assault and molestation. Matters related to anti-
terrorism were included in the same Act as offenses related to violence against women.
Second, because the punishments were so severe, for example the death penalty for
dowry related violence, that either some victims ultimately do not wish to file cases or in
some cases women are too eager to file wrongful suits. Third, although strict punishments
have been included in the Act, law enforcement has not been improved to ensure success
of the law. According to Dhaka’s “The Daily Star” on 14 January 2001, “participants at
an opinion exchange program on ‘social initiatives to prevent acid pouring’…observed
that despite the enactment of the new law preventing repression of women, such crimes
continue unabated due in part to a lack of proper implementation of the law and
negligence by the law enforcement agencies.”
54
The Acid Survivors Foundation (ASF),

52
Ibid, 158; The Act also introduced laws regarding sexual harassment. Special courts have been set up
with Session Judges or Additional Session Judges in each district. It provides for completion of the
investigation of such offence within 60 days of the filing of the First Information Report (FIR). There is
also a provision for completion of the trial within 90 days of filing of the case. The act also contains a
provision for refusing the accused any bail during the period of investigation.

53
Siddiqui, Sadaf Saaz Siddiqui, Proposed Nari O Shishu Nirjaton Domon Act 1998: A Review, Dhaka:
Naripokkho, 1998.

54
The Daily Star “Gender Gap Cause of Acid Throwing.” January 14, 2001, available at
http://www.dailystarnews.com/200101/14/n1011410.htm

146
established in May 1999, states that only one in ten attackers was ever put on trial. Of
approximately 750 reported assaults in between 1998 and spring 2001, only 25
perpetrators were found guilty. Of the 25 guilty sentences handed down, 9 received the
death penalty in cases where the victim was partially or fully blinded.
55

Even though the 2000 Act was designed to deter cruelty to women and children in
the form of abuse, injury, or death using corrosive, poisonous or combustive substances
for any reason, it did not specifically define the term acid violence or acid burn injury.
The Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association, a partner of ASF, drafted a
Public Interest Litigation
56
against easy access to acid and presented it to the Bangladeshi
government. After months of review, in 2002, government passed two new laws: The
Acid Crime Prevention Act and the Acid Control Act, restricting import and sale of acid
in open markets and prescribing the death penalty for acid throwing offence.
57
Most
importantly the new laws strengthened the existing provisions of the Women and Child
Repression Act. The Acid Control Act regulates the import, export, use and waste
management of corroding substances and any violence of license agreements may lead to
a maximum of 15 years in prison. The National Acid Control Council (NACC) is
mandated to develop policies and monitoring systems for the production, trade and
deposit of acid and to develop medical, rehabilitation and legal support services for the

55
Jordan Swanson, “Acid Attacks: Bangladesh’s Efforts to Stop the Violence,” in Harvard Health Policy
Review Archives 3, no. 1 (2002), available at
http://www.sdnpbd.org/sdi/international_days/women_day/2004/acid1.htm

56
Public Interest Litigation allows interested individuals and groups to bring cases on behalf of others.

57
Bangladesh National Women Lawyers’ Association (BNWLA), Report on Violence against Women in
Bangladesh, BNWLA: Dhaka, 2002, 32.

147
victims of acid violence. Accordingly District Acid Control Committees (DACC) worked
to implement the decisions of NACC.
58

The new acts made acid violence cases cognizable without recourse to bail, while
prescribing capital punishment for the accused with fines of Tk100,000 (Bangladeshi
currency) if the victim died, lost eye sight or hearing ability, or was injured in the face,
breasts or sexual organs. If any other part of the victim’s body was burned, the accused
would have to face a maximum of 14 years in jail and a fine of Tk 50,000. For attempted
acid throwing, the accused would face a minimum three-year in jail extendable up to 14
years along with a fine of Tk 50,000. The Act reduced the period of investigation to a
mandatory maximum 60 days, and acid violence related cases are now tried by the Acid
Tribunal Court where there is a direct instruction to complete the case within 90 days. It
also proposed legal actions against investigation officers if they failed to complete the
inquiry of a case within 30 days. The law granted victims the right to obtain a medical
certificate from any government recognized hospital.
Despite enactment of the new laws to combat acid violence the implementation
remains ineffective. It is estimated that few of the attackers are ever punished and the
process is riddled with loopholes.
59
For instance, it is difficult for the case investigation to
be completed within the allotted time because the investigating officers work on
multiples cases simultaneously. The new laws have increased their work pressure
tremendously without increasing the number of officers. If the investigative officers do
not produce results in the allotted time, they are penalized or fined. Unable to produce

58
Acid Survivors Foundation, Annual Report, 2005, 19.

59
Elora Halim Chowdhury, Feminist Negotiations: Contesting Narratives of the Campaign against
Acid Violence in Bangladesh, Dissertation, 2004, 287.

148
results because of case overload or system gaps elsewhere, their work suffers or fails
altogether.
While the 60 day stipulation to complete the investigation is mandatory, the same
is not so for the 90 day trial.
60
Instead, that is a “directory.” The reason behind this is that
although a trial might be completed in the lower court within 90 days, it would still have
to pass the higher court for appeal. That is, the defendant can appeal at the higher court to
reverse the verdict by the lower court. Innumerable cases are thus pending in the higher
court. Verdicts are sometimes reversed in the higher court where the judge reviews the
case file, but does not see or hear actual witnesses. Since acid cases are emotionally
charged because of the graphic nature of the crime writ large on the face of the female
victims, in the lower court the verdict is more likely to be in favor of the ‘victim’ because
the judge sees her disfigured face. On the other hand, many expert witnesses are
unwilling to testify as they lose a lot of income due to long waiting periods and frequent
postponement of trials. Ultimately the complaints cannot be proven due to lack of
evidence.
61

One of the most powerful factors in the escalation of the acid violence thus is the
fact that the legal system in Bangladesh, especially in the lower levels of courts, is
fraught with corruption, political influence and delays. For example, the case brought
against Jannatul’s assailant was held up because the magistrate in her district decided to
take a two-month vacation.
62
Perpetrators are rarely brought to justice primarily because
of the corruption and collusion among the members of law enforcement agencies,

60
Chowdhury, Feminist Negotiations, 287.

61
Acid Survivors Foundation, Annual Report 2005, 19.

62
The Daily Star, January 14, 2001.

149
criminal justice system, and power holders.
63
The consequences for the assailants are
mild compared to the trauma the victims suffer. Most of the perpetrators are more
influential or in a more economically advantageous position to the victim. They can
influence witnesses, police and public prosecutors and as a result witnesses refrain from
testifying because of threats from the perpetrators family. Police and attorneys are known
to prosecute scapegoats instead of the accused perpetrator if he or his family has political
influence. Some culprits are able to post bail, despite the severity of their cases.
64

According to Naripokkho officials, a prison warden even directed the execution of a
scapegoat who was in prison for a minor crime but loathed by the guards, in place of the
real attacker, who paid off the warden.
65
In most cases, the perpetrators are affiliated with
local mastaans. Mastaans tend to be backed by local politicians. In a country where jobs
are hard to come by, and begging on the street is the best alternative unless one can pull
strings, the relationship between the mastaans and the politician is symbiotic – they
protect each others interests and/or people. The mastaans intimidate people in the
neighborhood to vote for the politician, whereas the latter knows that without them, he or
she may lose his or her constituency. Thus, the partnership is powerful and in most cases,
invincible. When an attack occurs, the perpetrator most often seeks protection from these
mastaans who take refuge behind politicians. The victim’s family, having neither power
nor money, is left totally helpless and is at the mercy of its oppressors.
66

63
Durriya Meer, Twentieth Century Barbarism: Culture, Gender, and Acid Violence, Dissertation,
Deprtment of Psychology, Wright State University, 2002, 53.

64
The Daily Star, January 14, 2001.

65
Swanson, Acid Attacks, 2002.

66
Elora Halim Chowdhury and Durriya Meer, Rehabilitation of Survivors of Acid Violence, Dhaka:
UNICEF, 1998.

150
Globalization And Violence Against Women
Political clout and muscle power aside, even more alarming is the realization, especially
among women’s rights activists, that the wave of acid attacks in the 1990s apparently
coincided with a new push by Bangladeshi women to assert their rights.
67
The 1990s saw
the growing popularity of what is widely known as “micro-credit.” This term refers to
small financial loans given to women by different organizations to help them set up small
businesses.
68
This in turn, allowed them to seek economic independence and gave them
the confidence to refuse demands for dowries. They also refused to give consent to their
husbands taking a second wife. In a society where women are traditionally passed from
father to husband to serfs, many of these women, who would otherwise have had no
choice but to subject themselves to constant abuse because of the financial dependence
on men, are now willing to fight back. However, their perceived disobedience makes
them the victims of a far more heinous and life-destroying crime. Officials believe that
the increase in acid attacks is due to a male backlash against a disruption of the traditional
division of labor and the household hierarchies implied in it.
69

The new labor demands associated with globalization have helped precipitate a
rise in acid attacks because they challenge the existing gendered division of labor.
Globalization of the national economy has had a significant effect on Bangladeshi
government policy. To attract multinational corporations into taking advantage of cheap

67
M. Ganguly, “Cowardly Acts of Passion,” TIME Asia 153, no. 4, February 1, 1999, available at
http://www.time.com/time/asia/asia/magazine/1999/990201/acid_women1.html

68
Feminist News, “Men Burn Women with Acid in Bangladesh,” May 1998, available at
http://www.projectbangladesh.org/femina.htm

69
Uli Schmetzer, “Acid ruins women's faces and their dreams,” News from Bangladesh, Chicago Tribune
Foreign Correspondent, January 31, 1999, available at http://www.projectbangladesh.org/acidruin.htm; G
Ganguly, “Cowardly Acts of Passion,”1999.

151
labor in Bangladesh, the government developed new policies that led to the growth of the
export-oriented garment industry.
70
In the short span of 15 years, Bangladesh emerged as
the eighth largest garment exporter to the United States in 1991.
71
A major source of
foreign exchange, the garment sector grew at a compound rate of 125 percent from 1977
to 1991 and garment industry became the largest employer of women.
72
Almost overnight
a labor force of approximately 200,000 young women appeared in Dhaka, the capital of
Bangladesh. Cited as evidence of a modern environment that allows talent to make it
through sheer effort, the garment industry was also hailed as the liberator of women.
73

However, the preference for hiring women is, in fact, an employer preference for a
compliant low cost workforce. It is the “docility and dispensability” of these women that
makes them so attractive to employers.
74

Initially, the recruits were not the poorest of the poor; they were women of the
rural middle class, which means that these families may live in brick houses and have
land, but they are cash poor. Women in these families are poorer and have less control
over the finances. Despite their lack of cash, social convention prevents them from
seeking work as sharecroppers. It is not surprising, therefore, that these women are
recruited as garment factory workers by industrialists, who have created “socially

70
Santi Rozario, “Claiming the campus for female students in Bangladesh,” Women’s Studies International
Forum 24 (2001): 157-166.

71
Fauzia Erfan Ahmed, “The Rise of the Bangladesh Garment Industry: Globalization, Women Workers,
and Voice,” National Women’s Studies Association Journal Vol. 16, no. 2 (2004): 34.

72
Anisul M. Islam and Munir Quddus, “The Export Garment Industry in Bangladesh: A Potential Catalyst
for Breakthrough,” in The Economy of Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects, edited by Abu N. M. Wahid
and Charles E. Weiss, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996: 167.

73
Acid Survivors Foundation, Annual Report (2005), 35.

74
Naila Kabeer, “Women’s Labor in the Bangladesh Garment Industry: Choices and Constraints,” in
Muslim Women’s Choices: Religious Beliefs and Social Reality, edited by Camille Fawzi El Solh and Judy
Mabro, Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1994: 168.

152
acceptable” work for them.
75
In fact, many of these women are village kin. Belonging to
the same village ensures trust and the industrialists were perceived as “village heroes,”
who had made good, and would care by providing their kin with jobs.
76
Thus, the
industrialists were able to persuade reluctant male guardians that the honor and propriety
of the women would be protected in the factory, which also allowed spatial segregation
between the sexes. Initially, this sense of kinship was more important than prestige
because it assured the women and their families that there would be no sexual
exploitation. Interestingly enough, this allowed the young unmarried girls from poor rural
families who had left their villages to have more control over their money and has given
them greater voice and more decision making power at home. That the work in the
garments factory had damaged their sexual reputation, making them considerably less
eligible for marriage, did not deter them from speaking confidently about the future.
“Because I am self-sufficient, I can go where I want and marry whom I want.”
77
There is
increasing evidence to suggest that violence against women increases when gender
relations are being transformed and the traditional male privilege is challenged. When
women are forced to become economic providers out of necessity, they are in a position
to challenge gender stereotypes by entering socially unacceptable situations to earn a
living. In such situations, they are especially vulnerable to male violence.
Thus, such encroachment from women into paid employment has posed a
challenge to male supremacy in Bangladesh, and women who have achieved increased

75
Acid Survivors Foundation, Annual Report 2005, 38.

76
Ibid.

77
Nazli Kibria, “Culture, Social Class, and Income Control in the Lives of Women Garment Workers in
Bangladesh,” Gender and Society 9, no. 3 (1995): 304.

153
economic autonomy are more likely to experience resistance and hostility from men.
Nonetheless, deteriorating economic conditions, high unemployment rates among male
breadwinners, the increasing number of landless households, and the lack of agricultural
work for male laborers has forced some men to allow their wives, daughters, and mothers
to participate in the paid labor force.
78
In urban centers, women are often the sole wage
earners, and they are expected to take care of their household responsibilities as well.
79

Women who are burdened with both housework and paid labor and who fail to
perform their traditional gender roles often are victimized by their husbands. For example,
Ashma Begum worked in an export-oriented garment factory and was the sole
breadwinner of the family. She returned home late from work. Her unemployed husband
who gained some financial privilege from her income was irate because she did not
prepare his dinner. Later, he threw sulfuric acid on her face, disfiguring her.
80
Ashma
Begum’s victimization reflects a reactionary backlash against women’s increasing
autonomy caused partly by the process of globalization. It also reflects men’s increasing
insecurity about the erosion of patriarchal privilege in Bangladesh. One can make the
case that globalization and the structural adjustment policies of the government of
Bangladesh have brought to fore the latent gender divisions thus explaining the increased
violence against women

78
Afroza Anwary, “Acid Violence and Medical Care in Bangladesh: Women’s Activism as Carework,”
Gender and Society 17, no.2 (2003): 308.

79
Rozario, “Claiming the campus for female students in Bangladesh,” 2001.

80
The Daily Star, “Ghastly Acid Attack on 5,” January 1, 1998, available at
http://www.geocities.com/HotSprings/Bath/5900/ghastlly.htm

154
Survivor Stories and the Gender Dimension of Acid Attacks
There are many such survivor stories, a few of which I mention below to underscore the
reasons for escalation of acid violence against women. These stories help to identify
certain patterns of violence which have to be understood in order to make any meaningful
attempt to reduce the number of acid attacks.
Josna:
An 18 year old girl of Sherpur district was severely acid burnt by her husband. At their
wedding there was no talk of dowry because the husband, who was Josna’s cousin,
wanted to marry her of his own free will. However, a few days later the husband started
to force Josna to bring money from her father. Josna’s father, a poor man, was unable to
pay the dowry. The husband, then, started torturing her and married a second wife. Josna
filed suit for divorce, to her husband dismay. One day he asked Josna to bring a glass of
water and then cleared the water to pour acid into the glass. Before Josna could realize
what was happening, the husband threw the glass full of acid onto her face. As of date the
husband was in hiding.
81

Rahela:
A garment worker and a housewife near Savar of Dhaka district, Rahela was gang raped,
stabbed and burned by acid. She was rescued from the scene three days after the brutal
attack. She battled for her life at Dhaka Medical College Hospital and even named her
attackers, however she died after thirty three days in the hospital. None of the criminals
have been arrested.
82

81
Steps Promoting Gender Equality, Human Rights and Good Governance, 2004, 26.

82
Daily Janakantha, Bangladeshi newspaper, September 4, 2004.

155
Shahina:
Shahina Khatun of Kaliganj upazila of Satkhira district received severe burn injuries
when her husband Shahidul Islam threw acid on her on December 25, 2001. The attack
was an act of revenge against Shahina for filing a case against Shahidul for demanding
dowry. Though police arrested the accused, the trial as of date had not begun due to some
legal impediments. Arrested earlier in the dowry case, Shahidul had come out on bail
from jail and took revenge on Shahina by burning her face, mouth and left eye.
83

Anjuman Ara:
Anjuman Ara Khatun of village Muhundi of Tala Upazila received burn injuries on her
face, throat and chest when her husband Masumbillah allegedly threw acid on her on
December 19, 2001. Immediately after the incident Masumbillah divorced Anjuma
saying that she had an ugly face. The attack was said to be an act of revenge against her
for her alleged pre-marital relationship with another man named Sadruddin. Police did
not prepare the charge sheet or apprehend the accused.
84

Jonaki:
Jonaki was divorced by her husband Moti Mia, an alcoholic cycle-van driver, after she
gave birth to a daughter. She was married off to him by her father because he could not
afford to feed her. After the divorce Jonaki went back to her father’s home and lost her
two year old daughter when the child drowned. She began a new chapter in her life by
working in a factory. Three men in her neighborhood made sexual advances and when
she refused, the three – Saidul, Alam and Ripon – threw acid on her while she was asleep.
A case was filed against all three men and Saidul was sentenced to life imprisonment

83
The Bangladesh Observer, “Acid Victims Passing Days in Untold Agony,” March 15, 2002.

84
The Daily Star, “Ghastly Acid Attack on 5,” January 1, 1998.

156
while the other two were acquitted. Jonaki was treated for her burns at the district health
complex but had to return home when she could no longer afford the treatment. Being the
eldest in the family she had to return to her job in the factory to support her father and
siblings. She was later raped and became pregnant as a result. She was forced out of the
area with her illegitimate child and she had nowhere to go until she found support from
Acid Survivors Foundation.
85

Jharna:
Jharna Begum, a homemaker, was burnt by acid by her half brothers over a property
dispute. They claimed their right to a piece of land that Jharna would have inherited from
her mother. Since her mother was in a polygamous relationship, her half brothers did not
want to share any inheritance with her as her father had not put any of his land in her
name. Jharna had arranged for village mediation (Salish) where her half brothers agreed
to offer her another plot of land and rice and grain in exchange for the land under dispute.
However, after the Salish, they gave her nothing. They continued their harassment by
beating her and threatened to throw her out of the village. On the night of February 21
2005 they threw acid on her when she was alone with her son. Jharna’s mother filed a
case in the police station naming the three assailants; however, not one of them had been
arrested as of 2008. The relatives continue to harass them to withdraw the case while
Jharna, her mother and her husband continue to live under financial hardship.
86

Bina Akhter:

85
Voice: A Quarterly Newsletter, Acid Survivors Foundation, Issue 4, July 2005: 7.

86
Voice: A Quarterly Newsletter, Acid Survivors Foundation, Issue 3, April 2005: 14.

157
Bina was a student of class ten from Hazaribag. Local mastaans (hired enforcer) would
harass her and her cousin Mukti. On the night of August 26, 1996, Dano – a local
mastaan who had acquired the pet name by making homemade bombs out of Dano milk
containers – and his gang entered Bina’s home with the aim of throwing acid at Mukti.
Bina’s face and hands were burnt in the struggle when she tried to protect her cousin. The
attackers were still at large, and Dano was said to be under the protection of the local
Member of Parliament.
87

Selina:
Selina is a student of class four from Narayanganj. Kader, a local boy, repeatedly
propositioned Selina. After she declined, Kader attacked her on the night of December 12,
1996. It was Shob-e-barat, a religious holiday, and Selina was returning home after
performing Oju, ritual ablutions before prayers. Kader is in custody and his family is
threatening Selina’s father with additional attacks in order to facilitate their son’s bail.
88

Amina:
Amina, 17, was a student of class VIII when she was married without any promise of
dowry. Following the wedding, her husband and his family demanded dowry, Amina
refused and returned to her parents’ home. On January 1
st
, 1997, her husband Asikur and
his brother threw acid on her face. The perpetrators evaded the authorities and fled to
India and threatened Amina’s family to make them withdraw the charges.
Ruma:
Ruma, 15, is a student in class IX from Torail, Kishoreganj. Local boys used to harass her
on the way to school. After Ruma rejected their advances, on the night of April 4
th
, 1997,

87
Jahan, Hidden Danger, 75.

88
Ibid.

158
Mizan, Alal and Rafik broke into her home and threw acid on her face while she was
asleep. Ruma’s brother and sister were also burnt. Rafik is out on bail and the other two
are trying to get out on bail.
There is a recurring theme in these and many other accounts. The women dared to
say “no”; or their families had not given “enough” dowry. The attackers were young men
who lived in the same neighborhood as the women. They came at night in a large group.
They seemed to have acquired the acid without much difficulty. A few have been arrested
but were later released on bail. Many were in hiding and many are threatening the women
and their families to make them drop the charges.
Nicoletta Del Franco, in her work on acid violence in Bangladesh, identified three
main patterns of acid attacks.
89
The first pattern, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is
connected to marital relations, domestic conflict and the hierarchy of command inside the
family disrupted by the changing economic roles of women in the household. The second
pattern is connected to the rejection of professed love or marriage proposal by women
and finally the third pattern concerns the disputes between different families. Violence
against married women due to unfulfilled requests for dowry is also a part of the first
pattern. The phenomenon of dowry deaths has almost doubled from 1995 to 1998, from
124 in 1995 to 239 in 1998. What is surprising is that the Muslim tradition, unlike the
Hindu tradition, does not prescribe any form of dowry. Rather it is the bridegroom who
should confer the mehr, a fixed amount of money due in case of divorce as established in
the marriage contract. Despite the religious prescription and meaning, in much of the
Indian subcontinent, for both Hindus and Muslims, dowry has become a kind of

89
Nicoletta Del Franco, “Changing Gender Relations and New Forms of Violence: Acid Throwing Against
Women in Bangladesh and the NGO Response,” A Master’s Thesis, 1999:15.

159
obligatory economic compensation to the bridegroom’s family for taking the bride off her
parent’s hands. Schuler laments that “in rural Bangladesh dowry has evolved into a
system of institutionalized extortion, often fuelled by violence against young wives.”
90

Women are beaten and even murdered if the parents do not pay as promised or do not
respond to further requests. Dowry as practiced in Bangladesh is a significant example of
a misappropriation of tradition where a cultural practice persists but with a new meaning
due to the change brought about by market conditions and increased poverty. In the past
dowry could have been seen as having only a symbolic value or arising out of the
necessity of guaranteeing the bride some wealth in the absence of inheritance rights. In
2008, especially in the rural areas and among the poor, dowry’s commoditization
simultaneously expresses and reinforces the preference for a son, and transforms women
into financial liabilities for their parents. Both dowry and preference for a son thus
becomes central to the values and practices through which women are socially defined as
a subordinate category.
Male violence, thus, can be seen as a direct expression of patriarchal power:
men’s ability to resort to physical force to impose their own goals or to block women’s
ability to achieve theirs. Although such violence is exercised by individual men against
individual women in the context of inter-personal relationships, the structural support for
male violence is evident insofar as it is often overlooked by authorities based on social or

90
S. R. Schuler et.al, “Credit Programs, Patriarchy and Men’s Violence Against Women in Rural
Bangladesh,” Journal of Social Science and Medicine 43, no.12 (1996): 1733.

160
religious norms that give men the authority to ‘discipline’ their wives on various
grounds.
91

Kabeer considers male violence as a “agency-related” indicator that can be used
to measure women’s empowerment.
92
She suggests that estimates of male violence need
to be understood in context to determine what led to violence in order to distinguish
between cases where such violence was an assertion of male power in the absence of
change, and those where it was an attempt to assert male power in response to changes in
women’s agency.
93
Condemning violence against women does not obviate the need to
understand the meaning of such violence; and understanding the meaning of this violence
helps to take us beyond the presumption of male violence and female victimhood to
recognizing the fact that in some situations, male violence may be a response to women’s
assertion of their rights. The cases of dowry related violence could be seen as examples
of assertion of male power in the absence of change that has led to situations of
powerlessness, worsened by poverty. The story of Ashma Begum, Rahela or Jonaki, on
the other hand, can be seen as examples of assertion of male power in response to the
new reality of women working outside the traditional boundaries and becoming
economically independent.
According to Franco, an analysis of the pattern of relationship between adolescent
males and females helps us to understand the stories of Bina, Ruma, Selina and all others
cases of acid throwing that involve the rejection of a marriage or “love” proposal. In a

91
Naila Kabeer, “The Conditions and Consequences of Choice: Reflections on the Measurement of
Women’s Empowerment.” United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1-58. Discussion
Paper No. 108 (1999): 21.

92
Ibid, 23.

93
Ibid.

161
country like Bangladesh where social control is strong, friendships between males and
females are not encouraged. The education system does not allow girls and boys to
understand a little bit more about each other and develop friendships. This leads to a
contradiction between a traditional education that stresses the separation of the sexes and
prohibits any relationship before marriage, and a reality that brings occasions of contact
between male and female adolescents who do not have the instruments to recognize and
deal with their emotions and sexual desires. Men can not understand women’s refusal in
any other way than as an insult to their sense of honor and they take revenge by throwing
acid. It is a way for them to reassert their power while forcing the women to seclusion
and hiding. Acid, in this sense has a strong symbolic meaning to a loss of face. Because
acid attacks lead to permanent disfigurement which hinders the public life of the victim
forever and their marriage, it allows men to lay claim over their victim which was
previously denied to them.

NGOs and the Anti-acid Violence Movement
As a result of the legal vacuum in which women and other minorities remain vulnerable
to abuse and discrimination and without having a voice to seek protection of their
constitutional rights, NGOs in Bangladesh have taken on an increasing role in addressing
legal and political issues beyond their traditional focus, such as strengthening economic
and social programs.
94
The strong presence of NGOs in Bangladesh dates back to 1971,
when Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) gained independence from West Pakistan in a

94
Habib Zafarullah and Mohammas Habibur Rahman, “Human Rights, Civil Society and Nongovernmental
Organizations: The Nexus in Bangladesh,” Human Rights Quarterly 24 (2002): 1017.

162
dramatic Bengali uprising against the Pakistan military Junta.
95
The civil war resulted in
the combined death and emigration of more than ten million Bengalis, as well as the
depletion of the country’s resources. The newly declared nation, though now politically
independent from Pakistan, was heavily dependent on international aid for the country’s
food supply.
96
The country’s dire economic condition attracted the attention of
international donors in general and NGOs in particular, most of which were funded by
international aid. NGOs in Bangladesh, as a result, have multiplied quickly since the late
1970s.
97
Few countries have witnessed the dramatic growth of NGOs as much as
Bangladesh, which currently has a total of 26,000 registered NGOS.
98
According to one
estimate, Bangladesh has 3.5 NGOs per square mile, the greatest number of foreign
NGOs per square mile of any country.
99

In 2008, Bangladesh had one of the best organized and far reaching women’s
movement, led by NGOs, against gender violence in South Asia.
100
This is not to say that
there is a significant improvement in the lives of women but at least the NGOs have
managed to fill in the gap between society and state, seeking to promote the welfare of
the people through grass roots initiatives and development programs. The growth of
women’s activism has even led to greater adherence to country’s obligation under the
women’s convention. In 1993, Bangladesh presented its Second Periodic Report to

95
Janice H. Lam, “The Rise of the NGO in Bangladesh: Lessons on Improving Access to Justice for
Women and Religious Minorities,” George Washington International Law Review 38 (2006): 104.

96
Ibid.

97
Zafarullah and Rahman, “Human Rights, Civil Society and Nongovernmental Organizations,” 1014.

98
Lam, “The Rise of the NGO in Bangladesh,” 104.

99
Feroze Ahmer, “NGO Invasion: Bangladesh, a Case Study,” Khilafah Magazine, Jan 2002, available at
http://www.bangladesh.com/forums/religion/8966-ngo-invasion-bangladesh-case-study.html

100
Hayward, Breaking the Earthenware Jar, 2000.

163
CEDAW which had numerous mistakes and gaps. Moreover its structure and scanty
length might have led one to question how seriously the government of Bangladesh took
its responsibility to women’s equality.
101
By contrast, the combined Third and Fourth
Periodic Report
102
presented to CEDAW in July 1997, was a dramatic improvement. Not
only was the New Report written in accordance with Article 18 of the Convention, but
there was also an analysis of the situation of women under all of the articles of the
Convention.
103
Significantly, there were changes made in the New Report’s preparation
process, notably the involvement of representatives of women’s NGOs. It was the
mutually interactive process that took place between CEDAW, domestic women’s NGOs,
Bangladeshi women activists and transnational women’s NGOs that led to the changes
that occurred in Bangladesh’s reporting process to CEDAW.
104

Women’s NGOs in Bangladesh have carved out a role for themselves in the
domestic and international legal community and therefore, have created a process by
which change can be effected. It was the women’s NGO Naripokkho, a women’s
advocacy group in Bangladesh, which first successfully turned acid attacks against
women into a public issue by mobilizing influential national and international players and
making strategic yet uneasy alliances with them. Elora Halim Chowdhury, in her work on
the campaign against acid violence in Bangladesh, traces the development of the focused

101
See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Consideration of Reports
submitted by States Parties under article 18 of the Convention: Second Periodic Reports of States Parties
(Bangladesh), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/13/Add.30 (1990).

102
See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Consideration of Reports
submitted by States Parties under article 18 of the Convention: Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of States
Parties (Bangladesh), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/BGD/3-4 (1997).

103
For details about the specifics of Article 18, see Part I.B.

104
Afra Afsharipour, “Empowering Ourselves: The Role of the Women’s NGOs in the Enforcement of the
Women’s Convention,” Columbia Law Review 99 (1999): 157.

164
efforts of Naripokkho during 1995-2003, to help understand the particular trajectory of an
issue based campaign.
105
She organizes it in three stages to clarify the dynamics of the
acid campaign: the first, during the years of 1995-1998, took place when members and
staff of Naripokkho began systematically devising a social campaign to transform
incidences of acid attacks into a public issue. The second, during the years of 1998-1999,
occurred when the success of the Naripokkho actions led to a diversification and
proliferation of actors who engaged with the campaign in multiple ways, thereby
expanding and changing its scope. And the third, during the years of 1999 to present,
transpired when the Acid Survivors Foundation (ASF), established in 1999 through the
funding and support of Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the
United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF-Bangladesh, and backed by multilateral and
bilateral donors as well as strong civil society constituency, gradually took over the role
of the consolidated service-providing agency to assist acid violence survivors. The third
stage concurrently witnessed the gradual dissolution of Naripokkho’s involvement with
the campaign as well as the articulation of ‘Women in Development’-centered strategy in
providing services to acid victims.
106

Naripokkho’s involvement with the issue of Acid violence began in 1995 when
one of its members, Nasreen Huq, who eventually became the coordinator of the acid
campaign, was contacted by the relatives of Nurnahar, a teenaged girl who was attacked
by acid by a rejected suitor, to support their legal action against the aggressors. Thus
began the Naripokkho activists’ initiative to build the anti acid campaign by developing a

105
Elora Halim Chowdhury, “Feminist Negotiations: Contesting Narratives of the Campaign against Acid
Violence in Bangladesh,” Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism 6, no.1 (2005): 169.

106
Chowdhury, “Feminist Negotiations,” 170.

165
network of allies such as journalists, activists, philanthropists, medical and legal
professionals, and international donors who could potentially assist the creation of a
public discourse on acid violence. “The emergent and loose network produced a
campaign, the principal strategy of which was the internationalization of a domestic issue,
thereby reinforcing voices of local women activists and affecting national policy
development priorities.”
107
Naripokkho’s focus on acid burns was part of an overall
campaign on violence against women, and they made the visibility of the survivors a key
element of the campaign. Its efforts led to the emergence of a network of young girls and
women who had endured acid violence. Naripokkho’s approach was motivated by the
belief that the experiences of the survivors should be central to the shaping of the
campaign and its objectives – that the women who were the survivors would also be the
leaders of the campaign.
A combination of Naripokkho’s successful efforts in conceptualizing acid
violence as a national and international issue along with its efforts to bring UNICEF on
board the acid campaign set in motion the creation of Acid Survivors Foundation. In
1999, at the time of its creation, a milestone in Naripokkho’s campaign, the ASF
ostensibly became the coordinating organization to provide services for acid survivors.
When it was founded, ASF primarily provided medical and rehabilitative services. Over
the years it developed legal, research and prevention units and became the umbrella
organization for all other NGOs working on acid violence. The rationale of creating a
new umbrella organization lay in the necessity to co-ordinate different efforts including
fund raising. The proliferation of actors has resulted in Naripokkho’s diminished role in
shaping the narrative of the campaign. ASF’s primary objective is “to provide on-going

107
Chowdhury, “Feminist Negotiations,” 172.

166
assistance in the treatment, rehabilitation and reintegration into society of survivors of
acid violence by identifying and improving existing services and to also work to prevent
further acid throwing attacks.” The mission of the ASF is “to aid the recovery of acid
violence survivors to a condition as near as possible to that of their premature situation by
providing treatment, rehabilitation, counseling and other support during their
reintegration into society and afterwards. Simultaneously the Foundation will work to
prevent further acid violence in Bangladesh.”
108

Most scholars who have worked on acid violence in Bangladesh criticized ASF’s
approach as it is divergent from the earlier survivor-centered strategy that Naripokkho
had developed, which focused on the empowerment of the survivors to be leaders in the
anti-acid campaign. ASF’s approach, which is primarily welfarist, does not really
confront the root causes of the problem. The choice to remain a small volunteer group
given by Naripokkho allowed them to be less dependent on foreign funds and thus
guarantee of a certain degree of autonomy of action and thought. In the
institutionalization of the anti-acid violence campaign into the ASF, the resources came
primarily from Western donors such as UNICEF and CIDA, but not without strings
attached or without ramifications for the shape of the campaign. While international aid
helps to institutionalize women’s political struggles, the flipside of this
institutionalization is that feminists must frame their struggles in terms of a
developmentalist aid framework in order to receive the funding, and consequently this
generates schisms and unintended effects on the movement dynamics.
109
“The

108
ASF organizational profile.

109
Amrita Basu, “Globalization of the Local/Localization of the Global: Mapping Transnational Women’s
Movements,” Meridians 1, no.1 (2000): 68-84.

167
envelopment of the acid campaign by a donor-driven intervention eclipsed its radical
vision of structural change and women’s empowerment into a neoliberal one of
incremental change and individual transformation.”
110
The new strategy emphasized
income generation through skills training as the means to empower socially marginalized
women, thereby integrating women into the productive machinery of the state which
ultimately do not interrupt wider hierarchical structures in either Bangladeshi society or
international development regime. Thus the ASF provided services to integrate survivors
into development programs without disrupting gender inequities or confronting systemic
and institutional gender discriminatory practices and values contributing to gendered
abuse. “This development may be about economic growth or welfare schemes, but above
all it is about peaceful change. The discourse thus excludes elements of conflict, struggle
and resistance”
111
Targeting in a piecemeal manner, a specific group of women carries
the risk of isolation and depoliticizing the issue. The acid survivors became deviants in
need of rehabilitation. The welfare discourse, says Del Franco, cannot go a long distance
because it lacks a long-term vision to change the social system. However, this does not in
any way underestimate the important headway ASF has made in the campaign. One of its
most noteworthy achievements was to lobby the government to pass new and more
stringent laws, namely the Acid Crime Prevention Law 2002 and Acid Control Law 2002
to prosecute perpetrators of acid violence and more effectively criminalize the sale of
corrosive substances without license. Survivors receive centralized medical, legal and

110
Chowdhury, “Feminist Negotiations,”169.

111
Meghna Guhathakurta, “The Aid Discourse and the Politics of Gender: A Perspective from
Bangladesh,” Journal of Social Studies 65 (1994): 109.

168
rehabilitative services like never before. The ASF pitched itself as a service provider and
has made significant headway into providing these services. As of December 2005 they
had helped 2210 acid survivors. The problem is that it has remained limited to such work
so far.

Conclusion
Despite the frequency of acid attacks and the high traumatic acuity of each incident, acid
violence has remained a little known phenomenon. International concern about acid
violence was generated about 6 years ago when a documentary made by British TV
Network on acid burns in Bangladesh was aired in England, Canada, Spain, Italy, and
few other countries of the world. Corporation Dermoestatica, an anesthetic surgery based
company of Spain, came forward to help the victims and formed Acid Burn Women Aid
Group, Bangladesh. Some of the victims of acid burns were sent to Spain and the
company met all the costs involved, including treatment; hospital and travel costs.
Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), an Italian NGO, sent a group of plastic surgeons
to Dhaka to treat the victims and train the local doctors in plastic surgery. The Canadian
International Agency (CIDA), UNDP and UNICEF came forward to help the acid victims
in their treatment, psychotherapy, and rehabilitation. Though commendable, the
international help is limited and cannot be relied upon to sustain an anti acid violence
movement. Moreover, the foreign donor agencies tend to advance an all too simple
progress narrative of victims of violence from Third World countries being saved and
repaired by benevolent First World institutions.

169
ASF, donor driven and financed by UNICEF, on the other hand, has gradually
transformed the survivor-centered campaign that Naripokkho developed into a welfarist
one, which does not always resonate with the experiences of the women who have
endured acid attacks.
112
For instance, survivors are increasingly being treated as ‘clients’
who are channeled into various productive schemes designed by the rehabilitation
program of ASF. In the absence of real choices, women are actively incorporated into
service positions which do very little to disrupt systems of hierarchies based on gender,
class, race and nationality. Still the work done by ASF is essential and it is the only
organization that is able to provide medical, legal, psychological and social reintegration
support to the acid survivors.
However, to provide sustainable means of support and an environment where
women’s rights are treated as equal to those of men, a government sensitive to the needs
of women is as important as a vibrant women’s rights movement. Bangladesh has had
two women heading the government consecutively for the last 15 years but the ominous
scale of corruption and violence during their regimes did not advance much confidence in
their rules in the hearts of women either. Both Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina,
party leaders of the two most prominent parties, Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Awami
League respectively, are right now behind bars following an anti-corruption drive
launched by the current caretaker government headed by Army General Moeen Uddin
Ahmed. In January 2007 his army took over control of Bangladesh and installed an
interim government of state-sponsored bureaucrats, postponed parliamentary elections

112
Elora Halim Chowdhury, “The Limits of Transnational Organizing: The Success and Failure of the
Campaign against Acid Violence in Bangladesh.” Adhunika (2004): 9, available at
http://www.adhunika.org/issues/AcidViolence_EHC.html

170
and declared a state of emergency.
113
Even after 16 months, the much promised elections
and civil liberties took a backseat.
114

The caretaker government unveiled the National Women’s Development Policy
(NWDP) on 8
th
March 2008, setting aside one-third of parliamentary seats for women
and suggested arrangements for direct election to the reserved seats. It also suggested the
appointment of an adequate number of women, if necessary, under the related section of
the constitution to the highest-level of Cabinet Division and the policy-making level of
the administration. Bangladesh Mohila Parishad and other women’s organizations hailed
the declaration of the policy only to later realize that the government had quietly changed
the National Policy for Advancement of Women (NPAW), negating some of its crucial
equality principles to come up with the new policy.
115
The original policy was formulated
in 1997, following the United Nations Beijing Women’s Conference, which reflected the
goals of the women’s movement and was in tune with the Women’s Convention.
116
For
example, the 1997 policy had 104 principles, grouped into 14 areas of concern but the
new policy got rid of some of these principles and changed others in a way that make
them self-contradictory.
117
It also dropped highly important equality provisions like equal
inheritance rights from its goals.
Yet, the new policy has created resentment among the Islamic scholars and
groups against the equal right of women because according to them this goes against

113
Ishaan Tharoor, “General Command,” Time Magazine, June 19, 2008.

114
Ibid.

115
Qurratul Ain Tahmina, “Bangladesh: Women’s Policy Sneakily Changed by Government,” Intel Press
Service, July 27, 2008.

116
Tahmina, “Bangladesh,” 2008.

117
Ibid.

171
Sharia. Ever since protests and demonstrations against the policy have been taking place
in different parts of the country. As a result of these protests, the government formed an
Ulema committee (headed by religious scholars) in April to review the women’s
development policy and offer recommendations. The committee as expected, in its
recommendations, strongly opposed the policy calling it “anti-Islamic” and asked the
government to delete six sections and amend fifteen others deemed to be against Muslim
religious sentiments and laws.
118
Succumbing to the violent protests by the hard-line
Islamist groups, the government retreated from its pledge of reserving 40 percent seats
for women at all tiers of the local government system for three consecutive terms.
As if that was not enough, in July 2008, Bangladesh Khelafat Andolan called
upon the government to make women ineligible from becoming head of the government
or the state.
119
It further urged the government to take a stand against foreign interference
in internal affairs and asked for a reduction of the role played by NGOs. Such attitudes
towards women and government’s willingness to surrender to flawed religious arguments
to deny women their equality rights is definitely not in line with promoting the cause of
women in Bangladesh. Even though several women’s organizations have been protesting
against the government’s stance on NWDP and threaten to seek tougher measures, the
Islamic hardliners have managed to convert a ‘developmental issue’ into a ‘religious one’.
The declaration of NWDP in 2008 was the result of a thirty-year struggle by rights
activists to ensure women’s constitutional rights. It was consistent with the Constitution
and was prepared in the light of Bangladesh’s Millennium Development Goals to achieve

118
Shakhawat Liton, “Women’s Reserved Seats in Local Government: Government Retreats from Pledge,”
The Daily Star, May 12, 2008.

119
“Make Women Ineligible to Become Head of Government, State Khelafat Andolon tells Government in
Dialogue,” The Daily Star, July 13, 2008.

172
overall national development. Right now among the 300 legislators in general seats, only
seven are women, including Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina. The immediate
future of NWDP looks bleak, once again illustrating that women’s rights are ‘low
politics’, as opposed to other political concerns and realities, the ‘high politics’ of the
state.

173
Chapter IV
Honor Violence against Women during the 2002 Gujarat Conflict:
Case of Zahira Sheikh and Bilqis Yakoob

In this chapter I look at how rape and other forms of sexual violence against women are
used by men to divest the ‘other’ of their honor and identity because of the way the
identity of a community is constructed around the bodies of women. There are two ways
in which this sort of identity formation takes place. The first is through the rape of
women of minority groups, which signifies the rape of the community to which the
woman belongs and is justified as demonstrating the community’s inherent immorality. It
also becomes an assertion of difference and separateness of the moral position of the
dominant community.
1
The second is through allegations, by the dominant group, of rape
and aggression against their own women by men of minority communities, which helps
to demonstrate the ‘lack of character’ of minority men who show scant respect for
women. This then serves to justify the total disregard of constitutional and other
safeguards for women of these minority groups and the aggression against them, thus,
becomes an integral part of the identity formation.
2
In a later part of this chapter I
demonstrate how these two forms of identity formation and the apparent irony is brought
into play by the Hindu rightwing to both appeal to Hindu men to join them in the attacks
and to justify the violence thereafter. By examining the sexual violence against women in
Gujarat, I intend to argue that rape, during conflict situations - whether domestic or

1
Kalpana Kannabiran, “Rape and the Construction of Communal Identity,” in Embodied Violence:
Communalising Women’s Sexuality in South Asia, edited by Kumari Jayawardena and Malathi De Alwis,
32-41, London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1996, 33.

2
Ibid.

174
international - is methodical and pre-planned and is tightly bound to beliefs about honor
and shame.
There is a systematic way in which women are attacked and their bodies are
violated during armed aggression. Since the struggle for power is carried out on women’s
bodies, establishing control over women through rape has come to be viewed by some as
a legitimate means of carrying out this struggle.
3
While sexual violence was once
considered an inevitable byproduct of war, “it is now recognized that women and girls
are regularly and intentionally targeted for abuse, particularly sexual abuse.”
4
In just the
last decade, the international community has witnessed atrocities of sexual violence on an
unimaginable scale. Abuses in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Sudan,
East Timor and the more recent exposure of the mass rape and sexual enslavement of
some 200,000 so called “comfort women” by Japanese military personnel during World
War II,
5
are not just examples of the scale of violence but also an indication of the
widespread use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. What is common to these conflicts
is the intersection of rape, ethnicity and culture.
6
Even though rape is pervasive across the
globe, what makes these situations unique is that most of the mass rapes are motivated by
differences in race, religion, ethnicity or political affiliation. In almost all of the conflicts
mentioned above there is a cultural significance to raping ‘enemy’ women behind which
lies the institutionalization of attitudes and practices that regard and treat women as

3
Kannabiran, “Rape,” 34.

4
Kelly D. Askin, “The Quest for Post-Conflict Gender Justice,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
41 (2003): 509.

5
Katha Pollitt, “Cold Comfort,” The Nation, June 11, 2001, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20010611/pollitt (last visited July 30, 2007).

6
Adrien Katherine Wing and Sylke Merchan, “Rape, Ethnicity, and Culture: Spirit Injury from Bosnia to
Black America,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 25, no.1 (1993): 1-48.

175
property.
7
Women, therefore, are considered to have sought after assets, the most
important of which is tied to their productive and reproductive labor power.
8
This
explains why during sectarian conflicts, rape is used as a means of ethnic cleansing,
particularly designed to drive women from their homes or destroy their possibility of
reproducing within and ‘for’ their community.
9
Concepts of virtue and family honor add
to this objectification of women into assets. Just like one protects his/her property, men
feel the need to protect woman’s chastity or virginity to maintain the reputation of her
family and community. A violent armed conflict merely exacerbates the underlying
gender biases that existed in society prior to the conflict and rape exacerbates women’s
vulnerability to these social and cultural issues.
Wing and Merchan calls this combination of the physical, social, cultural and
psychological effects of rape as an infliction of “spirit injury” upon the victim.
10
They use
Patricia Williams’ definition to define spirit injury as the “disregard for others whose
lives qualitatively depend on our regard.”
11
On an individual level, spirit injury is a
consequence of the victim’s loss of self-esteem due to the racially or ethnically motivated
sexual assault, while on a group level it is the cumulative effect of individual spirit

7
Meredeth Turshen, “The Political Economy of Rape: An Analysis of Systematic Rape and Sexual Abuse
of Women During Armed Conflict in Africa,” in Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict
and Political Violence, edited by Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark, 55-68, London and New York:
Zed Books, 2005, 60.

8
Turshen, “The Political Economy of Rape,” 56.

9
Rhonda Copelon, “Gendered War Crimes: Reconceptualizing Rape in Time of War,” in Women’s Rights
Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives,” edited by Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, 197-214,
New York: Routledge, 1995, 205.

10
Wing, “Rape, Ethnicity, and Culture,” 1-48.

11
Ibid, 1.

176
injuries, which leads to the devaluation and destruction of a way of life or of an entire
culture.
12

I want to mention here my own experience during communal riots, which
preceded the one that happened in Gujarat in 2002. I feel it is important to make note of it
because it has significantly shaped how I view communal relations and the resultant
tensions that ensue after a conflict. When I was 12 years old, communal violence between
Hindu and Muslim communities broke out in various parts of India as a consequence of
the demolition of a Muslim mosque by religious Hindu groups. Initially it was
concentrated in the state of Uttar Pradesh where the mosque was located. Within a few
weeks it spread to other parts of the country including the neighborhood where I lived in
Patna, in the state of Bihar. I say neighborhood because I still do not know the scope of
the violence or where it started or how much it spread. All I know is one night I heard the
sound of incessant gunfire, multiple bomb blasts and people shouting. We lived under
martial law for more than three months.
We lived in a locality comprising of twenty-five identical houses and families of
almost identical backgrounds because we all shared the same language, caste, region and
religion. We were all Hindus belonging to the affluent ‘Marwari’ business caste. Our
residential community was surrounded by Muslim neighborhoods with which we had a
harmonious relationship until that night. Suddenly for all of us it was our Muslim
neighbors who started the riots and instead of seeing them as just another group caught in
communal crossfire, we saw them as representing everything evil that Islam is made out
to be. For us they were fanatic, ready to kill, plunder and rape our women. Expectedly my
father and the other men were scared. I had never seen them behave this way before.

12
Ibid, 1.

177
They were frightened about what was going to happen to all of us but more than that they
were fearful of the consequences of such an attack on their women, their wives, sisters
and daughters. At that point I found their fear to be legitimate and thought I understood
why all the women were asked to evacuate and take temporary shelter with friends and
relatives in areas where it was safer. Even though a curfew was imposed all day and night,
our families managed to get the women moved to safety with the help of friends in the
police and administration. The men stayed back. They stayed because now that the
women were gone they could defend their property. They no longer had to defend their
honor as the bearers of honor were safe somewhere else. My mother refused to leave
because she decided that she would rather die with her husband than live the life of a
widow. But she forced her daughters to go stay with her friends.
Even though I was aware of my father’s logic for his actions, I could never totally
comprehend why he would rather have his sons and himself killed than see his wife and
daughter raped. However, I know now that it is the same logic that guides the actions of
millions of men throughout the world. It is the same reasoning that leads to violence
against women in the name of honor because men are directly dependent on women for
their honor and status in society.
13
It is this patriarchal construction of male and female
sexuality that makes women vulnerable because of their bodies. “They are seen as being
in danger of violation, especially of sexual violation by men.”
14
It is because of these
notions that rape is seen as the ultimate tool to violate a woman and consequently the
symbol of honor of the enemy community. In fact in Hindi language there is a word for

13
This argument is discussed in further detail in a later part of this chapter.

14
Kalpana Viswanath, “Shame and Control: Sexuality and Power in Feminist Discourse in India,” in
Embodiment: Essays on Gender and Identity, edited by Meenakshi Thapan, 313-334, Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1997, 318.

178
rape which is rarely used by women but instead they always use the metaphorical ‘izzat
lootna’ which literally translates as ‘losing one’s honor’.
15
Thus the women not only
embody the shame and honor of the family and community but also become an active
participant in this patriarchal system by projecting the notions of honor unto
themselves.
16

Therefore, it can be argues, that the consequences of rape are particularly severe
in traditional, patriarchal societies because in these societies women often bear the brunt
of orthodox ideologies that valorize their reproductive roles, both social and biological. In
their roles as social reproducers, women carry the responsibility of preserving and
passing on the community’s traditions and culture to the next generation. Because of their
reproductive capacity, women become symbols of the community, and of its “honor.” As
a result rape committed by someone of the same cultural or ethnic group may not be
regarded in the same manner as if it were committed by someone from a different group.
The fact that women are perceived as the bearers of the community’s honor makes them
vulnerable to all forms of violence and abuse at the hands of the rival communities in
times of conflict, riot and flight. That is why, according to Catherine MacKinnon, the
most dramatic occurrence of rape against those of different cultural, ethnic, and religious
backgrounds takes place during war.
17
Women in a war zone not only risk being killed
but may also suffer sexual abuse, torture, malnutrition, psychological abuse, fear,
violence at the hands of men who have returned from war, emotional trauma from loss or

15
Viswanath, “Shame and Control,” 323.

16
I have discussed later in this chapter how the Hindu right has been successful in drawing women into
their organizations and making them active participants in violence against the men and women of the
‘other’ community.

17
Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Turning Rape into Pornography: Post-Modern Genocide,” Ms. Magazine
July/Aug (2003): 24-30.

179
forced separation from their children, husbands, or other relatives, and discrimination and
violence in refuges.
18

As the abuse of women during wartime has been widely documented, one could at
least expect a certain degree of agreement in public opinion on the topic; among feminists
for example. However, it is apparent that the variety of forms of wartime violence against
women and the variety of wars require diverse explanations and the existing theories
reveal some disagreement in understanding the phenomenon. There are various
approaches employed to understand the phenomenon, ranging from ideological, political,
ethnic to gendered explanations. One can usually point to two main types of approaches:
those which emphasize women as a targeted group and a collective object of violence,
19

while the other, ethnically centered, is sometimes described as a “genocidal” approach to
sexual war violence that stresses the ethnic group of violated women as being targeted
and collectively violated. Proponents of this approach warn of the danger, referred to by
Mackinnon as the “feminist whitewash,” in focusing too completely on gender such that
we deny the conflict-specific details that are unique to these women’s experiences.
20

Thus, the goal should be to “recognize situational differences without losing sight of the
commonalities.”
21
Meredeth Turshen in her work has tried to categorize how we think
about gender violence during armed conflict and while doing so recognizes how women’s
rights activists have successfully managed to put rape during wartime on the international

18
Vesna Nikolic-Ristanovic, “Living Without Democracy and Peace: Violence Against Women in the
Former Yugoslavia,” Violence Against Women 5, no.1 (1999): 69.

19
Mostly propagated by Belgrade Feminists.

20
Catherine A. MacKinnon, “Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace,” UCLA Women’s Law Journal 4 (1993): 65.

21
Julie Mertus and Pamela Goldberg, “A Perspective on Women and International Human Rights After the
Vienna Declaration: The Inside/Outside Construct,” New York University Journal of International law and
Policy 26 (1994): 230.

180
agenda.
22
And yet while the sexual abuse of women during armed conflict is no longer
just considered spoils of war and there have been prosecutions for gender specific
violence, there are not many convictions. There is a need to differentiate the many
circumstances of rape and present a more nuanced analysis of this violence because as
Turshen puts it, systematic rape is a “socially constructed experience produced by a series
of deliberate policy decisions, and therefore it is neither inevitable nor unchangeable.”
23

However, what one can aim for from analyzing it is to identify the kinds of policies likely
to protect women or to mitigate some experiences of rape.

Wartime Rape and Genocide
In the past century alone there were several documented cases of mass sexual abuse of
women during various wars: the Rape of Nanjing in 1937; the case of “comfort women”
and sexual slavery in Japanese camps throughout Asia during World War II; the
pervasive rape of German women at the end of WWII; rapes during the Bangladesh-
Pakistan war in 1971; and the mass rapes of women during the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia
and Rwanda in 1990s. I discuss here the examples of the wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda
because of the widespread awareness of these two conflicts and because of the
contribution of feminist theory and international women’s human rights movements to
the changes in international law following the two wars. It was during the prosecutions
for war crimes following the two wars, that rape for the first time was recognized as an
instrument of genocide. Another reason I make reference to these wars is to draw
parallels between the sexual violence during these wars and the violence in Gujarat in

22
Turshen, “The Political Economy of Rape,” 55.

23
Ibid, 56.

181
2002 and to show that conflicts, whether national or international, make women, as a
group, most vulnerable to violence and abuse. The use of rape as a political weapon is
thus directly connected to woman’s status as a symbol of honor and as a means for
retribution.
During the 1992-1995 armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter
referred to as Bosnia), there were widespread and serious crimes committed against
civilians, prisoners of war, and civilian property, including killing, torture, rape, forcible
displacement, and indiscriminate and deliberate attacks on civilian targets. Many of the
crimes were committed in territory controlled by Bosnian Serb forces. While the
estimates of the total number of casualties in the Bosnian war vary—from early estimates
putting the number above 200,000, to the later studies placing the number at around
100,000
24
—there is little disagreement that the majority of war crimes were committed
by Bosnian Serb forces. Among the 161 persons indicted by the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, seventy-seven are ethnic Serbs suspected of committing war
crimes in Bosnia.
25

The process of disintegration of Yugoslavia followed by the growth of
nationalism, ethnic conflicts, and economic crises, deeply changed the lives of women
and made their vulnerability to violence greater than ever. Under the influence of state-
directed nationalism and totalitarianism, widespread violence was perpetrated by the

24
Human Rights Watch, “A Chance for Justice: War Crime Prosecutions in Bosnia’s Serb Republic,”
Human Rights Watch 18, no. 3 (2006): 3.

25
See website of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Indictments and
Proceedings, available at http://www.un.org/icty.

182
Serbian forces systematically trying to exterminate Croatians and Muslims.
26
As in any
other war, in the war in the former Yugoslavia, women were victims of rapes, rape threats,
intimidation by rape, sexual slavery in the context of forced mistress systems, and forced
prostitution – both military prostitution and prostitution as a means of survival. Women
were abused sexually in the areas of conflict (during operations and occupation), as well
as in the areas that were directly involved with the conflict but in which different ethnic
groups still lived together.
27
The Serbs had a policy of ethnic cleansing.
28
In the course of
this genocide more than 20,000 women were raped, sexually assaulted, forcefully
impregnated and in many cases held captive to the point where they could not obtain a
legal abortion.
29
Numerous accounts of rapes indicate that Serb perpetrators have taunted
their victims with words to the effect, “Now you’ll have a Serb baby.
30
Although most
reported rapes have been attributed to Serb forces, rapes have been committed on a

26
Steve Kuan, “Alien Tort Claims Act-Classifying Peacetime Rape as an International Human Rights
Violation,” Houston Journal of International Law 22 (2000): 457.

27
Nikolic-Ristanovic, “Living Without Democracy,” 69.

28
MacKinnon, “Crimes of War,” 63.

29
There is no definite number that exists. The Bosnian government spoke about 50,000 to 60,000 raped
Muslim women and claimed to possess information for 13,000 cases. On the other side, the Commission
for War Crimes, created in the former Yugoslavia, stated that 800 Serbian women were raped in Muslim
detention sites. Later, a special report of the European Community released on January 8, 1993, cited
20,000 raped Muslim women, while drawing attention to “possible exaggerations.” Tadeusz Mazowiecki,
head of the special U.N. envoy for human rights, concluded in his report that no reliable estimate of the
total number of victimized women could be reached. Amnesty International, in its report of January 21,
1993, did not venture to estimate the total number of rapes, although it claimed that the phenomenon was
widespread. Also see, M. Cherif Bassiouni and Marcia McCormick, “Sexual Violence: An Invisible
Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia,” International Human Rights Law Institute Occasional Paper,
DePaul University (1996): 10.

30
Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Economic
and Social Council, 50
th
Sess., Item 12, Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47,
November 17, 1993.

183
significant scale by Muslim and Croatian forces as well against Serbian women.
31
While
the data on rape and other atrocities given by the Bosnian government were accepted as
unquestionable by the media and politicians from all parts of the world, at the same time,
the fact that Serbian women were also raped was completely ignored. That kind of
presentation of war rapes promoted the hatred and hostility of Muslims and Croats and
encouraged them to go forward with raping Serbian women for revenge.
32
When political
and military aims were achieved, experts recognized that it was very difficult to
determine the actual number of raped women.
33

What is significant about this conflict was that we learned of the systematic rape
of women in this war almost simultaneously with its occurrence, affording us the
opportunity to examine its dimensions and its consequences.
34
The deliberate use of rape
as a weapon of war was a central strategy in the Serbian effort to seize and maintain
territorial control in the former Yugoslavia. Although the Serbian policy of ethnic
cleansing included various methods, it was the use of rape as a weapon of war that
captured the media’s eye and the world’s attention.
35
The media around the world
focused sharply on the heinous sexual violence that the Serbs committed against women
and the news of atrocities sparked the international community to act, in order to prevent
future war-related rapes. Although reports of rape and other abuses have become known

31
Jeri Laber, “Bosnia: Questions of Rape,” New York Review of Books 40, no. 6 (1993): 4.

32
Nikolic-Ristanovic, “Living Without Democracy,” 67-68.

33
Rape and Sexual Assault, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, Annex IX, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2
(Vol. V) (1994).

34
Diane Orentlicher, No Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the
Former Yugoslavia, Washington, D.C.: International Human Rights Law Group, 1993, 1.

35
Mirta Drago, “Woman-Human rights: Rape, the Unpunished War Crime,” Inter Press Services, June 8,
1995.

184
before this conflict, little or nothing was done to prevent or punish such crimes. Reports
of rape have always been used to garner public support for fighting a war; however, after
the war is over, women’s reports of rape become suspect as many begin to doubt that
they even took place. Usually, the abuses are covered up afterward, by the survivors as
well as by the perpetrators.
36
However, the systematic employment of gender violence as
a tool of genocide in the former Yugoslavia from 1992-93 brought new attention to this
phenomenon. As early as 1993, the United Nations Security Council acted to enforce the
international community’s duty to punish those responsible for grave violations of
physical integrity by authorizing the creation of a War Crimes Tribunal.
37
Significantly,
under the Tribunal it was “the first time sex crimes had been tried in an international
court under the auspices of the United Nations.”
38

Despite these successes, all the attention from the world media and international
organizations had a rather troubling effect on the lives of these women. As journalist
Linda Grant
39
observed, the argument over how many women were raped and why,
deflected attention from another serious issue: What has happened to the women in the
wake of this ordeal? In reference to the rape of Belgian women committed by Germans
during the World War II and how rape suddenly became symbolic of Belgian humiliation,
Susan Brownmiller wrote, “this unprecedented attention had little to do with
understanding the rights of women. It had a lot to do with the evolution of a new form of

36
Beth Stephens, “Humanitarian Law and Gender Violence: An End to Centuries of Neglect?” Hofstra Law
and Policy Symposium 3 (1999): 90.

37
See website of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Indictments and
Proceedings, at http://www.un.org/icty.

38
Sarnata Reynolds, “Deterring and Preventing Rape and Sexual Slavery During Periods of Armed
Conflict,” Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice 16 (1993): 625.

39
Linda Grant, “Where have all the raped Bosnian women gone?” The Guardian, September 1993, 11.

185
battle –the scientific use of propaganda.”
40
Similarly, in the Yugoslav war, the real
sufferings of raped women were overshadowed by the state-controlled media campaign
from all sides involved in the war, whose aim was to prove the guilt of the other side and
to promote the war by challenging their own people to extract vengeance.
41
Unfortunately,
the international community and media from all over the world followed suit and used
this kind of propaganda as well.
Survivors of rape in all cultures experience an overwhelming sense of shame and
self-blame. However, in order to fully understand both the purpose and effect of these
rapes, we must appreciate the significance of rape within the former Yugoslavia where
culture attaches a particular stigma to rape.
42
Within these cultures “honor” is paramount
and shame results from a loss of honor and although both men and women are bound to
be honorable, women are the objects through which men’s honor is determined.
43
Thus
women’s chastity becomes the primary tool through which a woman’s honor is
determined, while “soil” and “blood” are metaphors for male honor in these cultures.
44

To Serbian aggressors, occupying a woman’s uterus is synonymous with occupying
physical territory.
45
Rape is used to “pollute and water down” the bloodline, and through
the use of rape, the Serbs “can violate not only the territory but also the bloodlines” of the

40
Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape, New York: Ballantine Publishing
Company, 1975, 40.

41
Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces, London, UK,
1993.

42
Wing, “Rape, Ethnicity, and Culture,” 13.

43
Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery, New York and London: New York University Press, 1979, 179.

44
Amy E. Ray, “The Shame of it: Gender Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and the Failure of
International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries,” The American University Law Review 46
(1997): 805.

45
Ibid.

186
Bosnians and Croatians, exacerbating the humiliation of the loss.
46
The Serbian forces
who committed these mass rapes were well aware of the cultural significance of the rape
of women in these cultures and that’s why their campaign to use rape as a war strategy
was a particularly effective weapon in their effort to dominate, humiliate, and completely
subjugate the women, their families, and their communities.
47
As a result of Serbs use of
systematic rape, in particular, and ethnic cleansing, in general, nearly two-thirds of
Bosnia was put under Serbian control.
During the Rwandan genocide of 1994 Hutu soldiers or members of the
interahamve militia murdered an estimated one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Large
scale, strategic and systematic gender based violence was an intrinsic feature of the
genocide. Like the conflict in Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda also involved the
utilization of widespread violence against women, including rape, sexual slavery and
sexual mutilations. Conservative estimates show that more than 250,000 women were
victims of sexual violence.
48
According to a Human Rights Watch report, during April
and early May of 1994, many women were distributed to male militia members for sexual
abuse instead of being killed. The numbers of children murdered and women kept alive to
serve the sexual demands of their captors reached a peak in mid-May. It is argued by
Human Rights Watch that this escalation indicated that a decision to commit this sort of
violence had been made at the national level and was being implemented in local

46
Ray, “The Shame of it,” 806.

47
Ivana Nizich, “Violations of the Rules of War by Bosnian Croat and Muslim Forces in Bosnia-
Herzegovina,” Hastings Women’s Law Journal 5 (1994): 52.

48
J. Ann Tickner, Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post Cold Was Era, New York:
Columbia University Press, 2001.

187
communities.
49
The mass rapes, forced sexual servitude and repeated demonization of
Tutsi women as a particular threat to the Hutu society by the Hutu militias were “fueled
by propaganda that portrayed Tutsi women as high-class seductresses – beautiful women
who would corrupt a pure Hutu society.”
50
“During the widespread violence, women
were raped by individuals, gang-raped, raped with sharpened stakes and gun barrels and
held in sexual slavery, sometimes alone, sometimes in groups. In many cases the genitals
and breasts of rape victims were mutilated.”
51
About 35 percent of these women became
pregnant as a result of the rapes and by conservative estimates there are 2000 to 5000
unwanted children in Rwanda who are also known as “enfants mauvais souvenir,”
children of bad memories.
52

Genocide in Gujarat
Despite the thousands of women raped and prostituted during World War II, Vietnam and
the Bangladesh-Pakistan war, in no other conflict, until the war in Yugoslavia, was
anyone ever tried for rape as a war crime.
53
The public nature of the terrorism of women
in the former Yugoslavia and later Rwanda is therefore unique, affording us the
opportunity to examine the dimensions and consequences of similar atrocities against
women during situations of conflict. It allows us to identify the ways in which domestic

49
Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, New York: Human Rights Watch,
1999.

50
James C. McKinley Jr., “Legacy of Rwanda Violence: The Thousands Born of Rape,” New York Times,
September 23, 1996.

51
Ibid.

52
Ibid.

53
Rhonda Copelon, "Gendered War Crimes: Reconceptualizing Rape in Time of War," in Women's Rights,
Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives, edited by Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, 197-214,
New York: Routledge, 1995, 197.

188
and international law fail to comprehend the gendered nature of the violence in order to
protect the patriarchal structure of the existing legal systems.
The use of systematic rape and sexual violence as a strategy for terrorizing and
brutalizing women during the Gujarat conflict echoes the experiences of women in
Rwanda, Bosnia, Bangladesh, etc. In Gujarat, as in all these other countries, women have
been targeted as members of the ‘other’ community, as symbols of the community’s
honor and as the ones who sustain the community and reproduce the next generation.
This has become an all too common aspect of larger political projects of genocide, crimes
against humanity and subjugation. In Gujarat, sexual violence against Muslim women as
well as against women in inter-religious marriages is central to the organized political
project of ‘Hindutva’.
54
The politics of gender were integral in the making of a Hindutva
militia that carried out the carnage throughout the state of Gujarat against the minority
community and the use, abuse and control of women were critical aspect of the pogrom
conducted in March-April 2002.
On 27
th
February 2002, the Sabarmati Express train carrying a large group of
Hindu kar sevaks
55
arrived at the station in Godhra, Gujarat. The kar sevaks were
returning from the demolished Babri Masjid (mosque) site in Ayodhya, which was
destroyed by a Hindu mob a few years earlier as it was allegedly claimed to be built on

54
‘Hindutva’ or ‘Hinduness’ is a word used to describe movements advocating Hindu Nationalism. The
former ruling party in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is closely associated with a group of
organizations that promote Hindutva. They collectively refer to themselves as the ‘Sangh Parivar’ and
include the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal.

55
Kar sevaks is the term used for the volunteers willing to offer free services for community activities. It is
the term that has been appropriated by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) for the volunteers that it gathers
for what it calls the ‘Ram Janmabhoomi’ (birthplace of Lord Rama) movement. Every time there is a show
of strength of the VHP and its allies, these kar sevaks are gathered in large numbers from all over the
country and taken to the site of the agitation. Many a times people join in with the full knowledge of why
they are going but there are also some who go because it is usually a pilgrimage to some holy site. (IIJ
Report, 2003).

189
top of the remains of Lord Rama’s birthplace. The pilgrimage was aimed at volunteering
services for the building of a Ram temple at the disputed site but the mood of the
returning passengers was angrily emotional as they had not been able to accomplish the
construction of the temple and it had been more than fifteen years since the Mosque was
brought down.
56
When the train stopped, the passengers got into arguments with the
Muslim vendors and passengers. As the train was about to leave the station, one of its
compartments was set on fire, which led to the death of 59 people, mostly Hindus. No
one knows the exact cause of the fire or who was behind the attack but according to some
accounts it was the molestation of a young Muslim girl by kar sevaks, which infuriated
the Muslims to torch the compartment.
57
Some evidence shows that the inflammable
substance must have been thrown from inside the train but since the Muslim mob had
gathered in the region to protest the treatment of Muslims at the platform, they were
immediately blamed for the fire.
58
By late evening there were statements from the Gujarat
government and the Hindu right wing organizations that this was an attack on the kar
sevaks because they were returning from the Babri mosque site and rumors were printed
in the ‘Sandesh’ newspaper that Hindu women from the Sabarmati Express had been

56
Martha C. Nussbaum, “Genocide in Gujarat: The International Community Looks Away,” Dissent
Summer (2003): 15.

57
The Muslim crowd had gathered at the station after hearing of mistreatment of Muslims by the kar sevaks
and since the area adjacent to the tracks contained Muslim dwellings, it took less than 15 minutes for it to
become a mob.

58
Nussbaum, “Genocide in Gujarat,” 15; A report in The Times of India, on February 28 stated: "Officials
said a mob, enraged by the provocative slogan shouting by the VHP activists, attacked the train just after it
left Godhra railway station at 6.30 a.m.… Officials said it was possible that some passengers from Godhra
traveling by the train had been harassed along the way by the VHP activists returning from Ayodhya and
they had incited the mob to attack the passengers after getting off the train… However, other accounts say
that the mob was waiting to pounce on the train because they knew the VHP and Bajrang Dal activists were
returning from Ayodhya."

190
abducted, raped and had their breasts cut off.
59
The paper even claimed that there was an
alleged hand of the Islamic terrorists from Pakistan and its intelligence service, the ISI,
and branded the areas with Muslim population as ‘mini Pakistan’.
60

What followed in the next 72 hours was murderous violence against Muslims that
swept across the state. The attackers were Hindus, many of them highly politicized,
shouting Hindu-right slogans such as “Jai Sri Ram” and “Jai Hanuman” along with “kill,
destroy, slaughter.” About 2000 Muslims were killed,
61
113,000 people had to take
shelter in relief camps and thousands of others who were displaced had to take refuge
with relatives in Gujarat or outside.
62
The attack did not target only the lives of the
Muslims but it was also directed at the destruction of the entire Muslim community and
that is why many have argued about the genocidal intent of the attacks. The attacks
extended to Muslim businesses and all other means of economic survival including
handcarts, taxis, small shops, industrial complexes, etc. Fires burnt 1150 hotels and over
1000 trucks in the city of Ahmedabad alone, which severely affected the hotel and
transport industry, which were business mainly run by Muslims, thus leading to an
estimated loss of $ 780 Million.
63
Even the places of worship were not spared and about
270 mosques and dargahs were destroyed as part of the attack on the cultural symbols of

59
Saheli, “Carnage in Gujarat: Women are Targeted as Never Before,” Newsletter May-August (2002): 2;
Sandesh is a local incendiary newspaper. They retracted the rumor later on but it was tucked in the inside
pages and came too late.

60
Anuradha M. Chenoy, “Gujarat Carnage: The Politics of Gender in the Politics of Hate,” Aman Ekta
Manch Digest 3 (2002): 1.

61
Although the official figure is 762, about 2000 people were missing or killed according to unofficial
estimates.

62
Threatened Existence: A Feminist Analysis of the Genocide in Gujarat. Report by the International
Initiative for Justice (IIJ), December 2003, available at
http://www.onlinevolunteers.org/gujarat/reports/iijg/2003/ (last visited July 24, 2004), 2.

63
Ibid.

191
the Muslim community.
64
What is shocking though is the careful and methodical way in
which the attack was executed. Even though the Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi
and the then national government headed by the right wing BJP party claimed that the
violence against Muslims was a result of ‘spontaneous’ reaction to the inhuman burning
at Godhra which is symptomatic of communal riots, a closer look at what followed after
the incident and continued for almost four months reveals that it clearly was not an
outcome of the Godhra carnage alone. Rather it was a part of the implementation of the
most distorted notion of ‘Hindutva’ propounded by the BJP-VHP-RSS-Bajrang Dal
65
that
had been systematically built over the years.
66
The aiding and abetment of the violence
by the administration and the police and the wide scale mobilization of Hindus from all
walks of life makes it appear to be more like a pogrom or genocide.
The sequence of events, gathered by several NGOs and human rights activists,
and presented in various reports confirms the collusion of the police and local politicians
in the carnage.
67
Gujarat and the whole country were on a red alert due to the aggressive

64
IIJ Report, 2003, 2.

65
Bharatiya Janata Party, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Bajrang Dal
together form what is popularly know as the Sangh Parivar.

66
Saheli, “Carnage in Gujarat,” 2; the notion of ‘Hindutva’ and the role played by Sangh Parivar is
discussed in detail in a later part of this chapter.

67
Over 50 reports on the violence in Gujarat have been made public. Most of these reports were prepared
right after the violence in Gujarat by citizens and groups that descended on Gujarat to cover the carnage or
to provide help. There have been reports by statutory bodies, human rights organizations (both national and
international), special initiatives by eminent citizens, reports of foreign missions, press releases, etc. Some
of the reports that I have relied on for this chapter are the ones which have entirely or mostly focused on the
2002 violence in Gujarat. Some of these are: National Human Rights Commission, Proceedings of the
Human Rights Commission on the Situation in Gujarat, July 2002; National Commission for Women,
Report of the Committee Constituted by the National Commission for Women to assess the status and
situation of women and girl children in Gujarat in the wake of the communal disturbance, Delhi, April
2002; Human Rights Watch, We Have no Orders to Save You: State Participation and Complicity in
Communal Violence in Gujarat, Vol. 14, no. 2, 2002; Amnesty International India: the State must ensure
redress for the victims: A Memorandum to the Government of Gujarat on its duties in the aftermath of the
violence, April 2002; Communalism Combat, Genocide: Gujarat 2002 March-April 2002, Mumbai;

192
mobilization by the VHP for rebuilding the Ayodhya movement and in Mumbai, a city in
the neighboring state of Maharashtra, the police made as many as 8000 preventive arrests
in the first week of March to keep the situation under control. However, in Gujarat, even
after the incident at the Godhra railway station, the Gujarat police arrested only two
people in Ahmedabad and both were Muslims.
68
On the evening of February 27th itself
the burnt bodies of the kar sevaks were brought to Ahmedabad and were off-loaded in
full view of around 500 people who were waiting outside the hospital to make maximum
political capital out of the incident.
69
The time of arrival of the bodies was broadcast on
radio to ensure that there was a huge crowd and local TV channels showed images of the
bodies to raise public anger. Even the two day bandh (curfew) in the state on February 28
and March 1
st
called by the Sangh Parivar,’ was not used by the administration to move
swiftly to control the situation but it was used by them as a clear announcement of
hostility and backlash against Muslims and to mobilize their wide network to unleash
violence in urban areas.
70
Muslims, thus, became a community defined by religion, and
homogenously clubbed as opponents to the temple project, and on February 27
th
, cast
afresh as the criminals behind the burnt train carriage and its 59 casualties.
71
Given this

Concerned Citizens, Tribunal-Gujarat 2002, Crime against Humanity: An Inquiry into the Carnage in
Gujarat: List of Incidents and evidence, Vol. I and II, published by A. Dharkar for Citizens for Justice and
Peace, Mumbai, October 2002; The Survivors Speak, How has the Gujarat massacre affected minority
women? Fact finding by a women’s panel, Sponsored by Citizen’s Initiative, Ahmedabad, April 2002.

68
Communalism Combat, Genocide: Gujarat 2002, Mumbai: Sabrang Communications and Publishing,
2002, 14.

69
Ibid.

70
A Report on Gujarat: CPI (M) and AIDWA delegation report, 2002, available at:
http://www.sacw.net/Gujarat2002/CPMAIDWA2002gujaratreport.html.

71
Submissions to the CEDAW Committee for seeking Intervention on Gender Based Crimes and the
Gendered Impact of the Gujarat Carnage 2002: The Citizens Committee for Extraordinary Report on
Gujarat, India, 2003, 5.

193
background, it was not surprising that the carnage began on the morning of February 28
and although the RAF (Rapid Action Force, meant to deal with riots and unrest) was
called in, no adequate powers were given to the forces and infact there are reports that the
RAF men were made to sit in the officers’ mess and was not ordered to control the
situation outside.
72

The pattern of violence indicates prior planning because according to reports the
violence was state wide, affecting at least nineteen of Gujarat’s twenty-four districts
simultaneously between February 28
th
and March 3rd.
73
That it was well planned was
also obvious from how well equipped the rioters were with gas cylinders, swords, petrol-
bombs and mobile phones besides voters lists and sales tax details for identifying the
Muslim shops.
74
The mobs of 500 to 5000 people targeted not just Muslim residential
areas but also residential and commercial properties in Hindu dominated areas that bore
no visible signs of Muslim ownership and possession.
75
The information on the location
of Muslim homes and shops were gathered well before the attacks as a part of the long
process of anti-Muslim indoctrination started by the Hindu-right groups.
76
The police

72
Communalism Combat, Genocide, 14.

73
IIJ Report, 2003, 195.

74
Asghar Ali Engineer, ed., The Gujarat Carnage, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003, 19. According to a
Human Rights Watch Report (2002), the attacks were planned well in advance of the Godhra incident. The
report stated that the Hindu mobs were guided by computer print outs listing the addresses of Muslim
families and their properties, information obtained from the Ahmedabad municipal corporation among
other sources, and embarked on a murderous rampage confident that the police was with them. In many
cases, the police led the charge, using gunfire to kill Muslims who got in the mobs’ way. A key BJP state
minister was reported to have taken over police control rooms in Ahmedabad on the first day of the carnage,
issuing orders to disregard pleas for assistance from Muslims. Portions of the Gujarati language press
meanwhile printed fabricated stories and statements openly calling on Hindus to avenge the Godhra attacks.

75
The Citizens Committee Report, 2003, 6.

76
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence and India’s Future, Cambridge,
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007, 20.

194
were given strict instructions not to intervene and for 72 hours, the police and the State
Reserve Police (SRP), as described by eyewitnesses, failed to respond to pleas for help
and not only stood by while the looting, arson, rape and murder were being carried out
but also actively participated in it.
77
Reports now reveal that there was an infiltration of
the police force by the Sangh Parivar, which started a year before, and these same
policemen were rewarded afterwards. Similarly there were mass transfers of officers who
took prompt action to curb the communal violence.
78
There was also very little
humanitarian relief and medical assistance given to the Muslims and whatever aid did
come through was from the civil society institutions.
It is important to emphasize the role played not only by the state government but
also the government of India, led by the BJP, which had the power and ultimate
responsibility to stop this flagrant breakdown of law and order. It has been noted that one
of the most significant breaches by the government during this whole instance was the
failure to dismiss the Gujarat government, under Article 356 of the Constitution of India,
for its inability of unwillingness to maintain law and order.
79
While the BJP government
justified the 3 days of well orchestrated massacres and targeting of Muslims lives,
property, livelihood, and religious shrines as a “Hindu backlash” or “spontaneous mob
violence or reaction,” the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, under pressure from the
non-BJP constituent, addressed the country on television three days after the rioting
started. He did not visit Gujarat until thirty-six days after the pogrom and he visited

77
Saheli, “Carnage in Gujarat,” 3.

78
Ibid, 4.

79
Paul R. Brass, “The Gujarat Pogrom of 2002,” Contemporary Conflicts, March 26, 2002, available at
http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/archives/gujarat/brass/ (last visited August 1, 2007).

195
Godhra first, thus clearly expressing solidarity with the Hindus who had been killed.
Additionally, he took with him on his tour of Gujarat central minister Uma Bharati,
member of the VHP, whose speeches during the 1991 elections and prior to the
destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya in 1992 were not only considered hostile to
Muslims but also played a huge part in inciting violence against them. Furthermore, in
the second week of April 2002, at a meeting of the BJP in Goa, stated, “wherever there
are Muslims they do not want to live with others. Instead of living peacefully, they want
to preach and propagate their religion by creating fear and terror in minds of others.”
80

Not only did the Central government stand by the state government but it also denied
Amnesty International and other international organizations permission to come and
investigate the situation in Gujarat.
81
While it was well covered by the media initially, the
long term consequences, the continuing dislocation caused by intimidation, economic
boycott, and the failure of the state government in providing security to those affected by
the carnage was no longer an issue after the actual physical violence stopped.
82

While there is no definite way to confirm what actually transpired and who was
responsible for the attack on the Sabarmati Express, in July 2002, results of an official
investigation by the Ahmedabad based Forensic Science Laboratory stated that the fire on
the train could not have been set by the mob from the outside as had been alleged.
83
The
report claimed that the fire had to have been set from inside the train. It has also been
alleged that the Godhra train victims may not have all been Hindu activists, whose deaths

80
IIJ Report, 2003, 48.

81
Ibid.

82
The Citizens Committee Report, 2003, 5.

83
Smita Narula, “Overlooked Danger: The Security and Rights Implications of Hindu Nationalism in
India,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003): 49.

196
were allegedly avenged in the retaliatory killings of Muslims, and one of the reasons for
such claims is that the railway authorities have consistently refused to publish the list of
passenger names.
84
Whatever the truth, nothing can ever justify the violence that
followed. The pre-planned nature of the attack, especially the abuse of women, makes it
even harder to believe the claims made by the Hindu right.

Women as the ‘Other’ and symbols of Community’s Honor
The genocidal tendency of the violence was most evident in the way women’s bodies
became the target for the most brutal forms of violence in Gujarat. Several hundred
Muslim girls and women were reportedly stripped and dragged naked before their own
families. They were then raped, often gang-raped, beaten with sticks or trishuls
85
and
swords, had breasts cut off and wombs slashed opened by swords and rods violently
pushed into their vaginas before a large number of them were cut into pieces or burned to
death. According to reports, there were between 250 and 330 girls and women victims
among the dead, the majority of whom had been raped or gang-raped before their
murder.
86
No one knows the exact number of women who were raped but survived
because most of them refused to come forward and those who did try to file complaints
were dissuaded or threatened retribution by the police. What is most tragically ironic is

84
Narula, “Overlooked Danger,” 49.

85
Tridents – emblem of Hindu God, Shiva.

86
Amnesty International, India: Justice, the Victim-Gujarat State Fails to Protect Women from Violence,
London: Amnesty International, Stop Violence against Women, 2005, 17.

197
that the Hindu mob in their quest for safeguarding the honor of their women,
87
subjected
hundreds of Muslim women to rape and other forms of sexual violence. The extent of the
violence against women and the state response afterward, show how women’s bodies
become signifiers of the conflict.
The women in this context, i.e., communal conflicts as the backdrop, suffer
attacks in two different ways.
88
Firstly, because they are members of a collective and like
others in the group they are also likely to be attacked. But at the same time, they are the
biological and cultural reproducers of the targeted community and their bodies symbolize
the body of the community and its boundaries. The Hindu Right used these gender
metaphors to construct a narrative of rape and Hindu hurt by the other community and
enabled a response of revenge and genocide, which was then justified by the theory of
action-reaction to the Godhra incident.
89
This sort of incitement to sexual violence as a
means of proving the masculinity of the ‘Hindu’ man is, however, not new to the political
project of Hindutva as it has been evident in their propaganda even before the violence in
2002.
Even though there has been an increase in the incidence of communal conflict in
India in the last couple of decades, it is not a new phenomenon in Indian history. It is
widely acknowledged that the roots of present day communalism in India lie, in large part,
in the partition of 1947, which divided its people along religious lines into two countries,

87
The violence was claimed to be a reaction to the incendiary news spread by Hindu right newspapers and
pamphlets, which spread the rumor that Hindu women were abducted from the Sabarmati Express by
Muslims and have been raped, and their breasts cut off.

88
IIJ Report, 2003, 34.

89
Chenoy, “Gujarat Carnage,” 2.

198
India and Pakistan.
90
It is important that I mention partition here because many of the
questions of identity that became important at the time of partition are significant in 2008
and also partly explains the hostility between the two communities. The differences and
divisions between the Hindu and Muslim communities always existed but the partition
created more rifts and strengthened the existing ones.
During the partition, both communities, Hindu and Muslim, used the weapon of
rape to humiliate and dishonor the ‘other’ community and used forcible impregnation to
plant the ‘seed’ of one community into the women of other community.
91
Both countries
also fought over ‘recovering’ ‘their’ women who had been abducted by the other
community during the partition as a retaliatory measure because the honor of the
community and of the nation was seen to reside in the bodies of women.
92
It was also an
assertion of identity and a humiliation of the rival community through the appropriation
of its women and therefore, when it was accompanied by forcible conversion and
marriage it was meant to outrage both family and community honor and religious
sentiment.
93
Violation of their women’s bodies was considered tantamount to a violation
of the body of the nation. It has also been reported, in the context of partition, that several
Hindu and Sikh families killed the women of their own community to save them from

90
Urvashi Butalia, “Women and Communal Conflict: New Challenges for the Women’s Movement in
India,” in Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence, edited by
Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark, 99-114, London and New York: Zed Books, 2005, 102.

91
Ibid, 103.

92
Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin, “Abducted Women, the State and Questions of Honour: Three
Perspectives on the Recovery Operation in post-Partition India,” in Embodied Violence: Communalising
Women’s Sexuality in South Asia, edited by Kumari Jayawardena and Malathi De Alwis, 1-31, London and
New Jersey: Zed Books, 1996, 5.

93
Ibid.

199
being violated and thus bringing dishonor to the community through a violation of their
bodies by men belonging to another religious community.
94

Thus, communalism in India in the 21
st
century has become more about Hindu
communalism and has taken on a different meaning than elsewhere where it stands in
opposition to the concept of secularism or tolerance of all religions.
95
Hindu
communalism, as defined by Urvashi Butalia, seeks to right certain so-called historical
wrongs,
96
including the wrongs done during the partition, that have ‘hurt’ the
‘sentiments’ of its people.
97
It is these people who are now said to be rising up to confront
the enemy who is not so much the outsider, but the enemy within, the Indian Muslims,
who, they believe, draws its support from ‘outside’, in this case Pakistan.
Communalism, therefore, advocates violence to undo the wrongs. Operating
within the patriarchal structures of power, it implies advocacy of sexual violence towards
women because women become “the symbol of violence as the shame and subjection of
her community is represented in her.”
98
It is a deeply patriarchal ideology at another level
where it seeks to draw women out of their homes in limited ways, to participate in riots

94
Butalia, “Women and Communal Conflict,” 103.

95
Ibid, 101.

96
These historical wrongs are considered to be the invasions and conversions by Islam, conversions by
Christianity, and the rape of its women by members of the ‘other’ religion. In the context of partition, the
Hindu right still argues that the Muslims who stayed behind in India instead of moving to Pakistan do not
belong in India and question their loyalty to India at all times. Many attacks on them are meant as an
attempt to ‘put them in their rightful place’ and they strongly believe that all Muslims should be driven
away to Pakistan, as that is where they belong and not in India, which according to the Hindu right should
be a Hindu nation. The sangh parivar continues to use this theory as part of their propaganda to emphasize
that Muslims who remained in India after the partition of the country were “internal enemies”. Christians
are also part of the list of adversaries.

97
Butalia, “Women and Communal Conflict,” 101.

98
Kamala Visweswaran as quoted in Kumari Jayawardena and Malathi De Alwis, eds., Embodied Violence:
Communalising Women’s Sexuality in South Asia, London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1996, xvii.

200
and demonstrations, and then push them back into their designated spaces and roles.
99

“Each instance of communal conflict is later used instrumentally to bring home to women
the danger they suffer from the ‘other’ community and the necessity therefore of
preserving the boundaries of their own community.”
100
A wide range of data and
information collected by the fact finding teams who visited the affected areas in Gujarat,
have revealed that the violence did not affect only the minority women but the women
from all communities were affected by the fear and terror promoted by the state and the
police.
101
Hindu women, too, were caught in a fear psychosis about attacks by the ‘other’
which largely stemmed from rumors that were being systematically spread by communal
organizations in different areas, through pamphlets and booklets, as well as rumor
mongering by the local press.
102
But, as discussed earlier, the patriarchal ideology
manifested itself differently when some Hindu women took an active part in violence, in
small yet significant numbers. Area reports reveal that women were part of the attacking
mobs and looting and some prominent women leaders were even named in various
testimonies. This sort of involvement of women in communal ideologies and conflicts
has made it even more difficult for women’s rights activists to challenge the violent,
patriarchal agendas of communal parties in India.
Controlling the autonomy of women, whether by making them active participants
in violence or by limiting their role in the family, lies at the heart of the Hindu
fundamentalist agenda. Women are expected to conform to the strict confines of

99
Butalia, “Women and Communal Conflict,” 102.

100
Ibid, 101.

101
Violence in Vadodara: A Report, People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Vadodara and Vadodara
Shanti Abhiyan, May 2002, 122.

102
Ibid.

201
womanhood within their religious codes and also be willing to participate in the agenda
of construction of a Hindutva society.
103
It is this same patriarchal ideology that when
reflected on the ‘other’ makes the rape of their women synonymous with dishonoring
their community. The ‘enemy other’ would thus be hurt the most if ‘their women’ were
dishonored through bodily abuse and the impact of abuse lasts long after the violence has
subsided. This is why rape was not the only form of sexual assault but there were many
others like verbal abuses, molestation and humiliation that persist. The control of the
Muslim ‘other’ through gender and sexual domination became the central political
strategy of the Hindutva project in Gujarat and Hindu men saw it as their function and
duty to violate the bodies of Muslim women.
104
A common stereotype that exists in India
is that the Muslims produced more children than the Hindus; therefore the rapes were
also an attempt at impregnating their women with a Hindu child. Bangles were sent to
those Hindu groups that refused to participate in the violence and the men while inflicting
violence exposed their penises in front of Muslim women to show that they were true
men. It was mostly an act of physical and sexual intimidation.
The sexual assault incidents were not just random events but were part of a
widespread and pre-planned attack, which was conducted with a significant measure of
complicity by the state. It has been largely reported that violence, including the mass use
of rape and sexual assault, occurred with the knowledge of highly placed State actors, and,
in many instances, were carried out with the full participation and support of the

103
Chenoy, “Gujarat Carnage,” 3.

104
IIJ report, 2003, 34.

202
police.
105
The victims testimonies and personal accounts of the women reveal not only
the indifference of the police towards their plight but also that they actively colluded with
the mobs attacking them and participated in the atrocities committed. The police even
conducted “combing operations” in the bastis (areas) of the minority community to assist
the mobs in identifying Muslims households and in some instances they hit pregnant
women in the stomachs and shouted that the children be killed even before they were
born.
106
According to several eyewitnesses, police told the survivors that they were
explicitly instructed not to act for at least 72 hours and many testimonies also reveal how
the police actively aided, abetted and in some cases led the mobs.
107

The complicity of the state was also seen in the transfer of those police and
administrative officials who had protected the victims or sought to contain the violence in
March 2002.
108
They were instead replaced by compliant officers to ensure that it would
be nearly impossible to even register criminal complaints against the attackers. After the
attacks, there was also very little humanitarian and medical assistance given to the
Muslims. Most of the relief camps sprung up in Muslim dominated areas as that is where
they ran for safety and it has been local Muslim leaders and civil society institutions that
provided shelter and food to hundreds of thousands of people.
109
Besides the open spaces
in Muslim dominated areas, the relief camps were set up in graveyards, mosques, and

105
IIJ report, 2003, 35.

106
At the Receiving End: Women’s Experiences of Violence in Vadodara, Report by People’s Union for
Civil Liberties, PUCL Vadodara and Vadodara Shanti Abhiyan, May 31, 2002, 7.

107
The Citizens Committee Report, 2003, 8.

108
Ibid.

109
How Has the Gujarat Massacre Affected Minority Women? The Survivors Speak: Fact Finding by a
Women’s Panel, Sponsored by Citizen’s Initiative, April 2002, 26.

203
religious schools and many of these camps were not granted official recognition by the
government.
110
Additionally the supply of provisions by the state was severely inadequate.
The camps were overcrowded with no adequate roof or floor cover or toilets.
111
This lack
of private, secure space and bathing/toilet facilities meant continuing physical exposure,
indignity and trauma for women. Even the compensation amount announced by the state
government was higher for the dead in the Godhra train incident, Rs. 200,000, while it
was only Rs.100,000 for those killed in the carnage after the Godhra incidents.
112
After
much opposition and debate, the compensation was fixed at 150,000 for everyone.
113
The
government’s bias against compensating the Muslim community was also obvious when
it refused foreign aid to supplement the state funds, the same foreign funds that were
explicitly sought by the state and the central government to meet rehabilitation needs of
the victims of a massive earthquake in Gujarat in 2001. Furthermore, procurement of the
compensation claims was conditional upon fulfillment of claim forms, assessments and
procedures, which was almost impossible for a displaced and brutalized community.
114

The economic targeting of the Muslims left them destitute with their businesses and

110
Even in those camps that were recognized, the official figures of people living there were much lower
than the actual numbers. As a result the food and subsistence allowance even in the officially recognized
camps were severely inadequate.

111
In one of the camps, for example, where some facilities were available, there was only one mobile toilet
with 4 chambers to serve nearly 9000 people.

112
The Citizens Committee Report, 2003, 9.

113
This was not because of the obvious discrimination in compensating the dead, but because the Vishwa
Hindu Parishad, The Hindu right wing organization, agreed to settle for a reduced compensation.

114
The Citizens Committee Report, 2003, 10. The compensation offered by the government technically
covered death, injury, loss of household items, cash for affected people not in camps, ex gratia payment,
house reconstruction support and compensation for loss of employment/livelihood. But the disparity in real
loss and the amount offered as compensation basically heightened the sense of injustice felt by members of
the Muslim community.

204
neighborhoods systematically destroyed. Basically the state left no stone unturned to
make sure that the rehabilitation process was not easy for those affected.

Legal Redress: Indian and International Law
The access to legal redress for the victims of violence has not inspired much confidence
in the justice system. The entire criminal justice system works on the premise that any
crime committed is an offence against the State and that the burden of the proof lies on
the State. But when there is complicity of the police and the administration itself in the
crimes committed, there is little hope for justice for the marginalized sections of the
society. This was widely evident in Gujarat as well. There was a huge contrast in
numbers arrested for the Godhra train case and the carnage, as also in numbers of the
accused released on bail.
115
The government even wants to try them under different laws,
Muslims under POTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act) and Hindus under the Indian Penal
Code.
116
POTA has been extensively criticized by the human rights defenders due to its
close resemblance to the much misused and now lapsed Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities Act of 1985 (TADA) and the Patriot Act in the US. Like the Patriot Act, POTA
was also enacted soon after September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States and the
legislation allowed security agencies to hold suspects for up to 180 days without filing
charges. However, in practice, the law was often used against marginalized communities
such as Dalits (also called untouchables), indigenous groups, Muslims and the political

115
The Citizens Committee Report, 2003, 10.

116
Bhikhu Parekh, “Making Sense of Gujarat,” Seminar 513 (2002): 2.

205
opposition.
117
By September 2003, there were 240 persons booked under POTA in
Gujarat alone and out of these 240 persons, 239 were from Muslim community.
118
There
has not been even one person booked under POTA for committing violence against
Muslims.
119

There were numerous FIRs filed by eyewitnesses naming local VHP, BJP and
Bajrang Dal leaders as instigators or participants in the attacks but few, if any, of these
leaders were ever arrested.
120
Police, however, more than willingly filed charges against
Muslim youth arbitrarily detained during combing operations. Of the 62 members of the
minority community booked under POTA by the Government Railway Police for the
attack on the Sabarmati Express, at least seven were minors under sixteen.
121

Additionally, by February 2003, almost a year after the violence began, not a single trial
related to the events had resulted in a conviction. Eyewitnesses bartered their security and
the security of their loved ones in exchange for turning hostile witnesses or for retracting
their earlier statements.
122
All of this clearly reflects the indiscriminate bias of the
administration against the minority population.

117
Human Rights Watch, “India: POTA Repeal a Step Forward for Human Rights, Government should
Dismiss all POTA Cases,” Human Rights News, September 22, 2004. The law was repealed after Congress
Party led Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government came to power in 2004. The new government
also appointed a Central Review Committee to review all cases brought under POTA and was given one
year to review all cases.

118
IIJ Report, 2003, 96.

119
Ibid.

120
Human Rights Watch Report, “We Have No Orders to Save You: State Participation and Complicity in
Communal Violence in Gujarat,” Human Rights Watch Publications 14, no. 3 (2002): 6.

121
The Next Generation: In the Wake of the Genocide, A Report on the Impact of the Gujarat Pogrom on
the Children and the Young, Supported by Citizens Initiative, Ahmedabad and Action Aid India, Kolkata,
2002, 21.

122
Narula, “Overlooked Danger,” 50.

206
It has been a difficult process securing justice for the victims of Gujarat because
of the failure of the state machinery to protect those who were killed or raped during the
violence. The family members who tried to get justice on the victim’s behalf later
continued to face serious challenges and obstacles in securing justice. Many witnesses to
the crimes were themselves killed; there were delays in the registering of complaints and
collection of evidence; many who lived, but lost their home, moved away.
123
Additionally
the widespread use of fire had destroyed most of the forensic evidence. And still there
were several cases involving survivors with enough evidence to take to court and some
finally did but without much help from police, medical practitioners, judiciary and the
state government. There were hasty trials, cases were registered against ‘unnamed’
persons and some two thousand cases were closed citing lack of evidence.
124
Others,
including the two cases I analyze, led to acquittals because the prosecution failed to build
up a strong case and the state failed to protect the witnesses. All of that changed in 2004
after the Indian Supreme Court, faced with mounting pressure from human rights groups
and riot victims, decided to intervene by ordering several cases to be reopened and in
some instances ordered a retrial.
125
By looking primarily at the cases of Bilqis Yakoob
Rasool and Zahira Sheikh, I aim to demonstrate a range of failures by the state to fulfill
the standard of due diligence under national and international obligations to prevent grave
human rights abuses perpetrated against women, protect victims and bring the
perpetrators of these crimes to justice. These two cases are considered extremely

123
Nussbaum, The Clash Within, 36.

124
Sanjoy Majumder, “Landmark Judgement Raises Hope,” BBC News, February 24, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4747082.stm (last visited July 28, 2007).

125
Ibid.

207
important because they have come to symbolize the carnage and complicity of the state
government during the violence. Since these two cases have already reached the
conviction stage compared to many others reported, they are able to show the systemic
failings most fully.

Best Bakery (Zahira Sheikh) Case
One of the most notorious cases to come out of Gujarat carnage was that of nineteen-
year-old Zahira Sheikh, also known as the Best Bakery case, who was the primary
witness to the killings of fourteen people including her father and the burning of their
place of business, Best Bakery in Vadodara on March 1, 2002. After the surviving family
members were able to identify their attackers, twenty-one accused were arrested and
brought to trial. However, during the trial, Zahira Sheikh recanted her earlier testimony to
the police, as did another forty-four of seventy-one witnesses.
126
The court, as a result,
acquitted all of the accused on June 27, 2003, without looking into the reasons for the
withdrawal of their statements. In July 2003, Zahira Sheikh and her mother, appearing
before the National Human Rights Commission, charged that associates of the accused
had threatened them with harsh consequences if they did not withdraw their eyewitness
accounts.
127
The NHRC petitioned the Supreme Court stating that the circumstances of
the acquittal had violated the victims’ right to a fair trial and sought direction for re-
investigation and retrial of the case outside of Gujarat.
The State then appealed against the acquittals, which was later described by the
Supreme Court as “not up to the mark and neither in conformity with the required case”,

126
Nussbaum, The Clash Within, 37.

127
Amnesty International, India: Justice, 105.

208
which was rejected by the Gujarat High Court in December 2003.
128
After Zahira filed an
appeal against the acquittals, in April 2004 the Supreme Court overturned the High Court
judgment and ordered a retrial outside Gujarat in the adjacent state of Maharashtra
emphasizing the trial court and the High Court’s duty to actively search for truth rather
than passively record evidence presented to it.
129
In this landmark judgment the Supreme
Court reflecting its indignation at the poor quality of investigation, witness protection,
and legal argument, further stated that the duty and responsibility of the lower courts to
render justice was greater “in a case where the role of the prosecuting agency itself is put
in issue and is said to be hand in glove with the accused, parading a mock fight and
making a mockery of the criminal justice system itself.”
130

Meanwhile, Zahira also moved to Maharashtra and sought shelter and legal
assistance from an NGO, Citizens for Peace and Justice, headed by Teesta Setalvad, an
activist lawyer.
131
Once the trial began in October 2004, Zahira Sheikh again retracted
her statement saying that the original judgment passed by the Gujarat trial court was
correct and she claimed that Teesta Setalvad pressured her into lying to court.
132
The case
continued in court where Zahira’s sister in law, Yasmin identified eleven of the accused

128
Nussbaum, The Clash Within, 37.

129
Amnesty International, India: Justice, 105.

130
Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and Another v. State of Gujarat and Others, 2004 4 SCC 158, para 55.

131
Teesta Setalvad is also a journalist and editor of the journal Communalism Combat and was the
convener of the Concerned Citizens’ Tribunal, which took down much of the evidence from witnesses after
the massacre. She has been much lauded for her work in the case and has won numerous awards both in
India and abroad, including the Nuremberg International Human Rights Award. She got involved in the
Best Bakery Case as she had met with the witnesses several times during her work for Concerned Citizens
Tribunal and after hearing from Zahira and her family about the threats they had received she decided to
help them out. She provided protection for Zahira in Mumbai and prevailed on the Supreme Court to order
the change of venue.

132
Ratna Kapur, “Normalizing Violence: Transnational Justice and the Gujarat Riots,” Columbia Journal
of Gender and Law 15 (2006): 922.

209
and also mentioned threats against her own sister. However, other members of her family
kept retracting their statements and stayed out of reach of the media under the protection
of Gujarat police, who had earlier portrayed her as a liar but offered complete state
protection and special care and treatment after she came out against the NGO.
133

Evidence surfaced that all of this was organized and financed by a Vadodara based
organization with links to the Sangh Parivar and that Zahira was paid off by the BJP
Member of Parliament to withdraw her earlier statements.
134
Finally the Supreme Court
of India ordered a thorough inquiry into the contradictory statements by Zahira Sheikh
and Teesta Setalvad and despite the change in venue, the local Gujarat police in
Vadodara registered a complaint against Setalvad in April 2005 alleging that Zahira and
her brother had been taken from their houses at knife-point by her aides and taken to
Mumbai, where they were kept in a hotel and threatened at gunpoint. Meanwhile Yasmin
continued to stick to her story identifying the accused and the Mumbai special court
decided to prosecute Zahira for perjury. She was also ousted from the Muslim community
for her retractions and was rendered as a traitor by the Muslim personal law board.
135

In February 2006, the court finally convicted nine of the twenty-one people
accused of murder, sentencing them to life imprisonment. It acquitted eight others while
issuing warrants for the arrest of four missing persons.
136
In March 2006 Zahira Sheikh
was found guilty of perjury by the Supreme Court and sentenced to serve one year in
prison. She was also ordered to pay a fine of 50,000 rupees and her failure to do so will

133
Kapur, “Normalizing Violence,” 922.

134
Nussbaum, The Clash Within, 41.

135
Kapur, “Normalizing Violence,” 923.

136
Majumder, “Landmark Judgement,” 2006.

210
lead to another year of imprisonment.
137
Many considered the case to be a landmark
judgment and a vindication of India’s much maligned judicial system.
138

Bilqis Yakoob Case
Nineteen-year-old Bilqis Yakoob Rasool was five months pregnant and fleeing from her
village along with her family when a Hindu mob gang-raped her and other female
relatives and killed fourteen members of her family, including her three year old daughter
before her eyes. She was left for dead and so escaped being killed as well. On the
following day, 4 March 2002, she reported the rape and killings of 14 relatives along with
the names of the attackers, but the First Information Report (FIR) stated that some 500
unnamed attackers had killed several people after raping two women but spared Bilqis, as
she was pregnant. After reaching Godhra relief camp on 5
th
March, she filed another FIR
in the Godhra Town police station but the police recorded only seven deaths claiming that
the other bodies could not be found. Police also chose to proceed on the first FIR
claiming that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not allow the filing of several
complaints and in January 2003 they closed the case citing inconsistencies in her
statements. However, Bilqis argued that the police refused to include the names in the
FIR because they were respectable persons in the village and that she was threatened and
harassed by the police regularly.
After hearing her case the National Human Rights Commission arranged for legal
aid and appointed prominent lawyers to argue her case in the Supreme Court. In April

137
Geeta Pandey, “Best Bakery Perjurer Surrenders,” BBC News, March 10, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4784776.stm (last visited July 28, 2007).

138
Majumder, “Landmark Judgement,” 2006.

211
2003, Bilqis filed a petition in the Supreme Court with the help of NHRC for the
quashing of the magistrate’s order that closed her case. Yielding to her petition, the
Supreme Court in December 2003 directed the Central Bureau Investigation (CBI), a
federal police agency, to reinvestigate the case. Having found evidence of deliberate
cover up by police and medical officers, the CBI in early 2004 arrested 20 people, 12 of
whom were charged with rape and murder, six police officers alleged to have covered up
the crime, and two doctors who had failed to collect medico-legal evidence. In August
2004, the Supreme Court directed that the case be transferred to suitable court in Mumbai
on the grounds that the “atmosphere of Gujarat was not conducive for proceedings” and
directed that a public prosecutor be appointed to her case by the central government.
139

Six years after the incident, the Mumbai Court handed down life sentences to
eleven of the accused on separate charges of murder, rape and criminal conspiracy and a
three-year imprisonment to another policeman who was convicted for lodging a false FIR.
One accused died in the course of the trial and the court acquitted seven. While the
convicts plan to appeal the verdict, Bilqis plans to appeal against the acquittal of five
policemen and two doctors in the case.
140
During the time of the trial Bilqis and her
family were regularly threatened and were forced to change residence 18 times.
141

However, she continues to fear for her life and will probably never return to Gujarat
because the state failed to ensure her security in the first place.
Even though sentences were finally delivered in both the cases, it is not too
encouraging because there are still several hundreds of other cases that are pending and it

139
Malik Rashid Faisal, “Justice Delayed, not Denied,” The Sunday Indian, February 3, 2008.

140
Aarti Dhar, “I stand Vindicated: Bilqis Bano,” The Hindu, January 22, 2008.

141
Faisal, “Justice Delayed,” 2008.

212
is disconcerting to know that justice to the victims of the communal carnage is not
possible in the state of Gujarat.
142
The Gujarat government has already closed more than
1600 cases claiming lack of any evidence despite the reopening of 1594 cases for
reinvestigation after the Supreme Court of India order in August 2004.
143
Justice still
eludes the victims of many other massacres and many of these cases are yet to reach the
stage of a trial, leave alone judgment in the courts. While members of the Hindu mob that
killed Muslims were not even arrested, the 84 Muslims allegedly accused in the Godhra
train burning case continue to languish in custody with bail being denied.
144
This is
despite the fact that the Central Review Committee on POTA (Prevention of Terrorist
Activities) cases had decreed in May 2005 that none of the alleged offences in this case
warranted the invocation of POTA.
145
Consequently, the courts had to decide on the
matters relating to bail for the accused. Finally, in February 2007, the Supreme Court
ruled that these accused could file bail applications before it. Yet, to this date, these have
not been heard. The plight of those internally displaced is a continuing one since as many
as 5000 families continue to live in relief colonies without basic amenities or official
recognition from the government of Gujarat which continues to assert that all those
displaced have been rehabilitated. There also continues to be social and economic
boycotting of Muslim communities in the state. According to the Sachar Committee
report Gujarat continues to reel under a state of economic apartheid and ghettoization of

142
Tariq Anwar, “After Bilqis Bano - Ensure Justice for All,” TwoCircles.net, January 28, 2008, available
at http://www.twocircles.net/2008jan28/after_bilkis_bano_ensure_justice_all.html (last visited June 28,
2007).

143
Ibid.

144
Ibid.

145
Ibid.

213
Muslims and that ever since the 2002 riots, the polarization of communities in Gujarat
has acquired a physical dimension.
146
Even the human rights activists engaged in
pursuing justice for the victims of violence in Gujarat face frequent harassment, very
similar to what Teesta Setalvad had to endure.
The complicity and direct participation of state officials in the violence is nothing
short of genocidal behavior. The near impunity with which the trials were conducted and
the ongoing failure of the rehabilitation process has undermined legal protections
afforded to minorities and women not only under Indian law but international law as well.
The preamble of the Indian Constitution declares India as a “sovereign socialist secular
democratic republic” which ensures to all citizens “liberty of thought, expression, belief,
faith and worship.” The way secularism is understood in India is that the Constitution
guarantees equality of rights for all regardless of religion, the exercise of religious
freedom and tolerance, and the rejection of discrimination based on religion or belief.
147

Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Indian Constitution prohibits discrimination on the grounds
of religion and guarantees to all its citizens the right to equal treatment before the law and
the right to equal protection of the laws. There are several other provisions that guarantee
equality in religious practices and affairs and despite such expansive rights provided by
the Constitution, the law has very often failed to provide protection to minority
communities.

146
Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India, A Report, Prime Minister’s
High Level Committee, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, November 2006. The Rajinder Sachar
Committee was appointed by the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, as a high level committee for
preparation of report on social, economic and educational status of the Muslim community of India. It was
tabled in Parliament on November 30, 2006, 20 months after obtaining the terms of reference from the
Prime Minister’s Office. Rajinder Sachar, a former Supreme Court judge, led the Committee and the above
comment was made by Prof. T.K. Oommen, one of the committee members, while commenting on the
report before the parliament.

147
Narula, “Overlooked Danger,” 59.

214
India is also party to several international treaties that make it responsible under
human rights law for failing to exercise due diligence to prevent, protect and provide and
effective remedy for abuses not only by the state or its agents but also private actors.
Most notably, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires
state parties to respect the rights of the Covenant, an obligation which the Human Rights
Committee has stated extends to protecting against acts inflicted by non-state actors, that
is those acting in their private capacity. As per CEDAW General Recommendation 19,
gender based violence is discriminatory because it targets women differently on the basis
of their sex and societal rules attached to being female. State accountability for gender-
based violence perpetrated by private actors is based on the principle of ‘due diligence’,
which is also enshrined in CEDAW articles 2 and 5. For example, under article 2(e) the
“Convention calls on state parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise.” Under
international law and specific human rights covenants, States may also be responsible for
private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to
investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation.
148
Radhika
Coomaraswamy, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women in 1995 also
concluded that “in the context of norms recently established by the international
community, a State that does not act against crimes of violence against women is as
guilty as the perpetrators. States are under a positive duty to prevent, investigate and
punish crimes associated with violence against women.”
149

148
General Recommendation 19, para 9.

149
Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and
consequences, 1995, UN Doc.E/CN.4/1995/42/Add.2, para 72.

215
Even though legal coverage has been provided under several other international
instruments, the biggest failure of the Indian state has been with regard to its failure to
protect the minority community and to prosecute those responsible for rape and sexual
abuse of women and girls under the Genocide convention. The violence in Gujarat has
been described by many as constituting crimes against humanity and akin to genocide as
per the definition of genocide offered in the UN convention on genocide.
150
Given the
centrality of rape in the events that took place, the intent to cause serious bodily or mental
harm and physical destruction in whole or in part, fits with the definition of genocide.
151

The crimes against women and on the community through the bodies of women, were not
just intended to kill and destroy but the pattern and nature of the crimes reveal that it was
designed to inflict acute suffering even before killing them. In this sense rape and sexual
violence were used as a weapon of torture and genocide with the intent of destroying not
just the lives, but also the morale, the spirit and dignity of the community.
152
The crimes
also fall within the parameters of the ‘genocide’ under Article 6 of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court. Although India has not ratified the Rome Statute, the
jurisprudence embodied in it is a statutory recognition of the prohibition against torture,

150
According to Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to the group; (c) Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children
of the group to another group.

151
Nussbaum, “Genocide in Gujarat,” 20.

152
Akayesu Judgment; this case is discussed in much detail in chapter 5.

216
genocide and crimes against humanity, all of which are part of ‘jus cogens’
153
or
customary international law or norms.
154

Another reason why the violence in Gujarat cannot be considered as mere acts of
a mob that got out of control is because of the evidence of long and deliberate
construction of hatred against the Muslims by the Hindu Right in India. The build up of
‘imaginary insecurity’
155
among Hindus, perpetuating stereotypes of the Muslim
community and propounding the notion of a Hindu nation where minorities can live only
if they ‘toe their line’, has been taking place over the years.
156
In order to destroy the
community by attacking their means of survival, the RSS and VHP had been circulating
pamphlets for a few years urging ‘good’ Hindus to economically boycott Muslims by
asking them not to employ Muslims and not to buy anything from Muslim- owned
enterprises. One of the pamphlets issued on March 28, 2002 urged the reader to
“annihilate the enemy and lighten the burden of sin which the country is carrying.”
157

Hindus who did not participate in the violence and tried to help their Muslim neighbors
too were attacked. So it is safe to say that Muslims were attacked and raped because of
their religion and so to claim that they were sought because of their imagined complicity
in the precipitating event at Godhra would be simply wrong.
158
Slogans of “Kill,

153
Jus Cogens are peremptory norms, a fundamental principle of international law that is accepted by the
international community of states as a norm from which no derogation is ever permitted.

154
The Citizens Committee Report, 2003, 18.

155
Hindu fundamentalists repeatedly try to link the Muslims who allegedly attacked the train to Pakistan
and to international terrorism. The current world atmosphere and the indiscriminate use of the ‘war on
terror’ agenda by the United states have made it easier for them to use this ploy.

156
Saheli, “Carnage in Gujarat,” 2.

157
Ibid, 5.

158
Nussbaum, The Clash Within, 44.

217
slaughter! They killed our Hindus, so now kill them all, destroy their society”; indicate
the clear intent to destroy Muslim society.
Human rights activists have demanded that Narendra Modi, chief minister of
Gujarat, should be held criminally responsible for the violence apart from conspiring, and
spouting provocations and insults. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in its
Akayesu judgment suggested that infliction of conditions of life should be “construed as
methods of destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members
of the group, but which, ultimately seek their physical destruction.”
159
By this standard
Narendra Modi can be held responsible for his actions and for his failure to prevent the
killings. As an individual in superior commanding position with knowledge or the
obligation to know what was happening across the state of Gujarat, an argument used
both in ICTR and ICTY judgments, he had criminal responsibility when an entire range
of criminal acts takes place in a widespread and systematic manner pursuant to a plan or
policy.
What was even more saddening in the aftermath of the violence was the absence
of moral outrage and large-scale public statements denouncing the massacre from the
international community. According to Martha Nussbaum, who has done extensive work
in this field, former president Clinton was the only one among the world leaders to issue
a long statement condemning the atrocities, saying that the events in Gujarat were among
the saddest events since he left office.
160
The only other event that led to much media
attention was the denial of US visa to chief minister Narendra Modi in 2005 by the US
state department. This was achieved after outpouring of protests from and circulation of

159
Akayesu Judgment; this case is discussed in much detail in chapter 5.

160
Nussbaum, The Clash Within, 49.

218
petitions signed by concerned academics and rights groups in both US and India. The
BJP called this denial an “insult to the entire nation” but this sort of mobilization of
shame probably did more to the cause of justice for victims and led to a growing
consensus that the Gujarat violence was a form of ethnic cleansing.
Indira Jaising, a prominent Supreme Court lawyer and activist, used a different
strategy to bring justice to the victims and to hold Narendra Modi and several other top
officials of the Gujarat state government accountable in court.
161
She brought charges
against them seeking damages on behalf of a British citizen, Mohammed Salim Dawood,
who suffered severe injuries and whose companions were murdered as a result of attacks
on Muslims on February 28, 2002.
162
The charges alleged that the crimes directly resulted
from “acts of omission and commission” on the part of the Gujarat government officials,
including Modi.
163
What is significant about this case, no matter the outcome, is that
instead of bringing a simple wrongful death action on Dawood’s behalf, Jaising brought a
civil action suit for violation of fundamental rights and charged Modi and others with
violation of International Genocide Convention.
164
She hoped that the case would force
Modi to appear in court and his claim that the violence was spontaneous will not hold
ground because of the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Best Bakery and Bilqis Bano
case. The aim of the case was to obtain damages of over Rs. 22 crore as personal

161
Indira Jaising is an eminent Supreme Court lawyer and activist and was elected to UN’s Committee on
Elimination of Discrimination against Women in July 2008. She has fought several landmark cases
focusing on human rights and protection of rights of women. She has led the prosecution in two of India’s
most successful sex-equality cases. She has also represented the victims of the Bhopal tragedy in the
Supreme Court in their claim for compensation against the US giant Union Carbide Corporation.
Jaising also was the founder secretary of the Lawyers Collective, an organization that provides legal help to
the poor and the needy.

162
Nussbaum, The Clash Within, 42.

163
Ibid.

164
Ibid, 43.

219
compensation from Modi and State government for the victims of Gujarat, including
Dawood, and that the court will reject Modi’s claims of sovereign immunity from the
award of compensation.
165
The Supreme Court in 2007 dismissed petitions seeking
transfer of suits to a competent court in Mumbai. As of August 2008 the trial in the case
was pending in Gujarat.

Conclusion
In July 2002, the BJP government of Gujarat dissolved the State’s legislative assembly
and called for elections in October. However, the Chief Election Commissioner of India
noted that such early elections, considering the circumstances, could not be “free and
fair”. Elections were finally scheduled for the 12
th
of December and it led to an
overwhelming victory for Narendra Modi’s incumbent government, which won 126 seats
out of 182-seat Gujarat Assembly. One cannot help but question the role played by the
impending electoral process in the violence. It is not difficult to conclude from reports of
the campaigning as well as pre-poll interviews and the election results themselves that the
Gujarat killings were used effectively to consolidate Hindu sentiment and voting behind
the BJP, a party that was in decline in the state before the pogrom.
166
Even though the
Election Commission had restricted any direct exploitation of the Godhra and

165
Such a claim is feasible in Indian court because in Nilabati Bera v. State of Orissa, the Supreme Court
of India observed that the constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution enabling the
award of compensation for contravention of a fundamental right cannot be defeated by claim of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity where the only practicable mode of enforcement of fundamental rights can
be the award of compensation. The Court while referring to article 9(5) of the ICCPR in this case indicated
that an enforceable right to compensation is not alien to the concept of enforcement of a guaranteed right.

166
Brass, “The Gujarat Pogrom of 2002,” 2002.

220
Akshardham killings,
167
the BJP made use of slogans and videos designed to inspire fear
and hatred of Muslims among Hindu voters.
168
Modi’s anti-Muslim rhetoric seemed to
work amongst most Hindus who were pleased by the revenge and retaliation that was
taken upon the Muslims in the state and the election result was an endorsement of the
Modi Government’s blatant intention of establishing Hindu Rashtra (nation) in the state.
The re-election of Narendra Modi was disheartening not only because of the role
played by the institutions of the Gujarat government in the carnage but also because, for
many, it signified a victory of communalism over secularism in one of most vibrant
democracies of the present century. One is forced to question the supposed relationship
between democracy and secularism in such a scenario. There exists a rather substantial
academic debate on the relationship between secularism and democracy and in many
countries, including India, secularism has come to mean ‘tolerance’ of other religions, a
value of non-discrimination, acceptance of difference and mutual respect. But the
“overwhelming participation of ordinary citizens in the targeted violence against
Muslims” underscores the fact that democracy itself is no guarantee of secularism.
169

However, what democratic governance does in such an instance is that it “normalizes

167
On September 24, two Muslim terrorists attacked a very well known Akshardham Hindu temple
complex in the capital city of Gandhinagar, a mere hundred yards away from the home of Chief Minister
Modi. 37 persons were killed and 81 were injured in the attack before the two gunmen were shot dead by
commandos dispatched by the central government. On this occasion, contrary to their previous response to
the Godhra killings and the pogrom that followed, the two most prominent BJP leaders, Prime Minister
Vajpayee and Home Minister L. K. Advani, rushed immediately to the scene, where, characteristically,
they blamed Pakistan for the attack, although the head of the sect that controls the temple was reported to
have urged Vajpayee to “show restraint” and refused “to blame anyone.

168
Brass, “The Gujarat Pogrom of 2002,” 2002.

169
Nivedita Menon, “Living with Secularism,” in The Crisis of Secularism in India, edited by Anuradha
Dingwaney Needham and Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, 118-140, Durham and London: Duke University Press,
2007, 121.

221
violence, almost as a social cost of democratic politics.”
170
Targeted violence on women,
thus, becomes just part of a larger problem and women’s bodies continue to provide
necessary sites for the production of competitive politics. Upendra Baxi calls this the
‘rape culture’, which:
Signifies ways of doing party politics and managing governance in which brutal
collective assaults on women remain enclosed in contrived orders of impunity. In
an operative ‘rape culture’ then the women’s right to be and remain human
depend not on the normative necessity of law or constitution but on the sheer
contingency of politics, law, and administration as well as of the ways of social
protest and action.
171

In a ‘rape culture’, violence against women, a social disaster, is euphemistically
termed as ‘unfortunate’, just like natural catastrophes, and not ‘unjust’.
172
How these
injustices are normalized is by demonstrating that the violence against the Muslim
community, and Muslim women in particular, was partly a product of the legal, political,
and religious discursive practices of the Hindu Right and thus should be addressed within
the framework of transitional justice.
173
Transitional justice focuses on gross human
rights violations and addresses the immediate, individual harm or injury, but fails to look
at ordinary forms of violence. It “fails to engage with the broader discursive construction
of Muslim and Hindu subjectivity in the discourse by the Hindu Right and how these
subjectivities have come to be embedded in law.”
174
Women, in such a discourse are

170
Upendra Baxi, “The Second Gujarat Catastrophe,” May 27, 2002, 4, available at
http://sacw.insaf.net/Gujarat2002/2ndGujaratCatastrophe.pdf (last visited August 8, 2007).

171
Baxi, “The Second Gujarat Catastrophe,” 4-5.

172
Ibid.

173
Ratna Kapur in her article “Normalizing Violence,” defines transitional justice as a term that generally
refers to justice that is provided to individuals or groups during a period of transition, which usually takes
the form of prosecuting perpetrators for gross human rights violations and obtaining redress for the victims
of horrific crimes.

174
Kapur, “Normalizing Violence,” 925.

222
always reduced to a victim with no agency, from all sides of the debate, and thus
someone who needs to be protected and rehabilitated. It fails to address the deeper
structural and ideological concerns and tends to treat such violence as an aberration, as
being outside the terms of liberalism and liberal rights.
175
While it is extremely important
to delve into the issue of Hindu majoritarianism in India and the broader context that
enables the production of extraordinary violence, law and courts will continue to remain
important as recourse for justice. What cannot be emphasized enough is that the law
needs to move beyond its limited focus on the individual rights violations and the role
that the legislative bodies can play in achieving that goal.
The coalition led by the Congress Party under the banner of the UPA, which
formed the government at the center in 2004, collectively drafted a Common Minimum
Program (CMP) as its road map. A part of this program was a commitment to a
comprehensive Communal Violence (Suppression) Bill that was first circulated in April
2005. This demand for a law on communal violence emerged because of a brutal record
of recurring violence in the country and the increasing occurrence of gender-based crimes
in communal attacks. The Bill was meant to ensure accountability of the State and
Central governments and reparation and rehabilitation of the victims according to
accepted international covenants. But the draft legislation circulated by the government,
according to civil society groups and human rights activists, only “adds draconian powers
to the State and to the armed forces in communal situations, which experience has shown
tends to be used mostly against minorities and marginalized groups.”
176
Additionally, the

175
Kapur, “Normalizing Violence,” 926.

176
The Hindu, “Draft Communal Violence Bill Unsatisfactory,” May 19, 2005, available at
http://www.hindu.com/2005/05/19/stories/2005051907251200.htm (last visited August 7, 2007).

223
Bill only sought to punish after communal disturbances had occurred and after the
appropriate government had declared the area as “communally disturbed” and strengthens
the shield of protection enjoyed by the State, its political leaders and its bureaucrats for
the acts of omission and commission in these crimes.
177
It was also felt that the proposed
law was “irrelevant” to the challenges of communal governance because many of the
special powers accorded in the Bill could be used against the minorities in the same way
as the Narendra Modi government did under POTA.
178
What is most problematic though
is that the Bill mentions sexual violence in the context of communal attacks in a cursory
manner only, without any acknowledgement of the fact that sexual violence is
increasingly playing a fundamental role as an engine for mobilizing hatred and
destruction against religious minorities. After immense pressure on the government
through various campaigns, which reflected the civil society’s lack of support for the Bill,
the government shelved its version of the bill and has asked for a new draft from the
members of the civil society who have been active on the issue. The draft, which was
submitted to the government on January 24, 2008, is likely to be introduced in the
parliament before the end of the year. One can only hope that the Bill, if passed, will not
just be a cosmetic exercise but an honest attempt at dealing with communal violence.
However, like I mentioned earlier, while legislative efforts are important, it will
not be very successful until it recognizes the role that honor concepts play in social
conflicts. It is not even be sufficient to call them social conflicts because of the political
ends served by most of these conflicts. Notions of honor have become deeply entrenched
with the reasons for sexual violence, which in turn has become a political weapon and

177
The Hindu, “Draft Communal Violence Bill,” 2005.

178
Ibid.

224
fundamental part of conflicts. It may be difficult to escape from the obsession with
women’s bodies, but it is certainly possible to make sure that our laws provide enough
protection against sexual violence and better justice to those affected by the violence.

Chapter V
Analysis of Honor Related Violence and the Role of International Human Rights
Instruments

As I discussed in the previous chapters, honor concepts and views about women are
embedded in broader societal structures. Honor related violence is, therefore, directly
connected to the discriminatory social, political and legal systems. However, honor
crimes are not limited to the Indian subcontinent. They are part of a larger phenomenon,
which allows men to control women’s sexuality and impose restrictions on their behavior.
While honor killing may not be prevalent everywhere, the idea of a male sense of honor
exists in almost every society. Anthropologists have found these cultures of honor in
many parts of the world, including the Mediterranean Europe, the Middle East, Latin
America and the American South.
1
In these cultures while male honor depends on public
reputation that can be achieved, female honor is more about the avoidance of certain
behaviors, especially sexual indiscretion. While men can acquire honor by virtue of their
character and public behavior, they can as easily lose it because of ‘dishonorable’
behavior of their women. Even though this relationship between man’s honor and
woman’s behavior exists everywhere, it does not by itself explain why certain societies,
in this case India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, are more prone to honor violence than others.
In this chapter I explore the reasons for its perpetuation in the South Asian
countries of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is not possible to come up with an answer
to such a complex question as there is not one explanation for its continuance. However, I
do begin with the premise that honor crimes in South Asia are just a part of the larger

1
Joseph A. Vandello and Dov Cohen, “Culture, Gender and Men’s Intimate Partner Violence,” Social and
Personality Psychology Compass 2 (2008): 656.

226
problem of violence against women all over the world. My research, especially in this
chapter, is merely an attempt at investigating some of these reasons and its policy
implications. In doing so I will focus on the legal culture of the three countries and use
court cases as examples to show how the respective legal systems have responded to the
problem of gender based violence. This is not meant to argue that the law is primarily
responsible in creating a culture of acceptance of honor related violence. There are other
factors which are probably equally important but in vastly diverse countries of South
Asia it is difficult to assign responsibility to social, political or religious reasons without
the risk of over generalizing and essentializing third world cultures. Such an endeavor
will be counterproductive to the purpose of this dissertation which is to work towards
reducing the number of incidents of violence against women through greater
understanding without increasing the gap between the idea of universal human rights and
its acceptance in the non western world.
A comparative analysis of the three case studies reveals that honor crimes have
become traditionally socially accepted forms of discrimination against women in India,
Pakistan and Bangladesh. This acceptance of abuse of women is not only connected to
the traditional notions of honor but has deep roots in the patriarchal system which
ascribes inferior status to its women. The prejudice against a girl child exists before her
birth and it continues throughout her life. The preference for a male child not only
subjects women to undue pressure during pregnancy but also puts the life of an unborn
child or an infant girl in danger because of practices like female foeticide and infanticide.
Even though sex determination tests are banned in India, the practice continues unabated

227
because of a lack of government oversight. It was estimated that between 1981 and 1991
over one million female fetuses were lost due to selective abortions.
2

One of the most reprehensible practices plaguing efforts at ascribing women equal
status in these societies is that of dowry, a practice where the family of the bride provides
the groom and his family with money and property in exchange for the marriage of their
daughter to their son. The demands for dowry could range from a small amount in cash to
a sum equivalent of years of family income. A failure to fulfill these demands could
result in ‘dowry murder’, where the bride is killed by the husband and his family. The
tradition that sets an expectation of receiving a dowry from the girl’s family during a
marriage ensures that women are seen as economic liabilities throughout the Indian
subcontinent. This is one of the biggest causes for female foeticide and infanticide. The
practice of paying and receiving dowry was banned in India by the Dowry Prohibition
Act of 1961. Still on an average a dowry death is reported in India every seventy-seven
minutes according to a 2008 report of National Crime Record Bureau.
A strong women’s movement against dowry violence in the 1980s made laws
more stringent, and this led to a reduction in the number of dowry deaths. However with
the rise in consumerism fueled by globalization in the 1990’s and 2000’s, demands for
dowry continue to rise. Due to rampant poverty many families in the Indian subcontinent
do not invest in their daughters’ education and prefer to get them married at a very young
age, often to much older men or even as second wives. One of the main reasons for child
marriage is the importance placed on a girl’s virginity and families do not want to be
responsible for protecting the chastity of their daughter. Any rumor of ‘dishonorable’

2
Shannon S. Ragsdale and Vanessa D. Campbell, “Protection of the Female Child: The Mothers of Our
Future-Case Studies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka,” Tulsa Journal of Comparative and
International Law 7(1999): 185.

228
behavior on the girl’s part can significantly diminish her chances for getting married and
could affect the honor of her family.
In such a social setting it is not difficult to see why the idea of ‘honor’ has
become so important for both men and women. However, there are various other factors
which force men to cling to the notion of ‘male honor’ and to become more protective of
their women. One important reason, as discussed in the case of Bangladesh, was the
economic climate. As more women entered the workforce, and challenged the traditional
gender role of men as breadwinners, violence against women working outside the home
also increased. In the last decade, hundreds of thousands of women found jobs in the
private sector because of the spread of globalization and liberalization of a state run
economy. Many of these jobs required women to work outside home and spend less time
on their household activities. Men saw this as a challenge not only to their authority but
also to their masculinity particularly in a society where it was not very common for
women to have paid employment. These insecurities led to increased violence against
women and increased obsession with women’s sexuality because they worked with men
who were not related to them.
Another reason, and according to me the most important, is the inefficacy of the
legal system in providing protection to the vulnerable sections of society. I discuss it in
further detail later in this chapter but first I wish to revisit the question whether honor
violence against women is unique to South Asian or non-Western cultures. Is there more
violence against women in the Third World countries of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
than in the United States or Western Europe, as one could assume from reading human

229
rights reports or from Western news media coverage? It is extremely important to address
this question for a work of this nature to have any legitimacy outside western academia.
The contemporary human rights discourse on women, especially human rights
reporting on South Asia, has been often criticized for relying too much on the most static
and patriarchal understandings of culture to establish a basis for intervention or
advocacy.
3
Many of these criticisms have been fueled not only by the international
human rights discourse which very often tends to focus on the universal human rights
versus cultural rights dichotomy but also by the work of prominent feminist scholars like
Susan Moller Okin. Her work relies on a basic assumption that culture is patriarchal and
most cultures are suffused with gendered practices and ideologies that disadvantage
women relative to men.
4
While there was nothing incorrect about this remark, she also
said that immigrant minority cultures claiming group rights or using cultural defense are
often more patriarchal in their practices than the western majority culture. She utilized
cases like the head scarf debate in France or female circumcision where cultural defenses
had been used most successfully to argue that cultural rights are often invoked against
women’s rights. What she found most problematic was that many of the culturally
endorsed practices that are oppressive to women remained in the private sphere where
courts could not enforce the women’s rights.
5
She, therefore, suggested that immigrant
women could be “much better off if the culture into which they were born were either to

3
Kamala Visweswaran, “Gendered States: Rethinking Culture as a Site of South Asian Human Rights
Work,” Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2004): 485.

4
Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

5
Ibid, 23.

230
become extinct” or be encouraged to alter itself to the degree where it guarantees equality
of women at least to the level of the majority culture.
6

The major criticism of her work has been that she tends to oversimplify culture
and regards non-Western cultures almost by definition as more patriarchal than Western
liberal cultures which reinforces the idea that non-Western women are “vulnerable to
death by culture.”
7
Leti Volpp argues that this is due to the assumption that gender
subordination is integral to the non-Western culture.
8
Media portrayals of certain forms
of violence like dowry murders and female circumcision helped create the imagery where
we situate all third-world women in cultural contexts that required them to be subordinate
and reduced their status to those of victims only. Such a depiction deprived women of
any agency and merely made them representatives of a culture which requires
intervention from the western world for its rescue. Volpp, in her work, demonstrated how
culture was invoked to explain forms of violence against Third World women while the
incidents of sexual violence in the Western world were seen as reflecting the behavior of
a few deviants, rather than a part of the larger culture.
9
Furthermore, Volpp contended
that we assume that the non-Western cultures are static entities and preclude the
understanding that minority cultures, like all cultures, undergo constant transformation.
10

As a result there is a tendency to overlook the contested discourses within communities

6
Ibid, 22-23.

7
Leti Volpp, “Feminism versus Multiculturalism,” Columbia Law Review 101 (2001): 1185-86.

8
Ibid, 1185.

9
Ibid, 1186-1187.

10
Ibid, 1192.

231
and how cultural experiences are affected by race, gender, class, caste, religion, and
sexual orientation.
Culture is not a homogenous entity. By assigning too much emphasis to culture
one may tend to downplay the diversity in cultural practices and over emphasize the role
played by it without looking into the real reasons for abusive practices against women.
Kamala Visweswaran criticizes the naming of culturally specific practices such as dowry
deaths and honor killings by human rights instruments as a means of validating universal
principles of justice by pointing out how violence against women is culturally
constructed.
11
For her, relying on cultural explanations undermines the domestic civil
rights movement and the agency of the South Asian feminist theorists and activists. It
also obscures the pervasiveness of sexual violence in the Western world where culture is
not seen as part of the problem. Most importantly it obfuscates the role played by the
Western countries in eroding the very rights that it seeks to protect through its support of
military dictatorships in countries like Pakistan. Visweswaran, therefore, suggests that we
need to move beyond the universal human rights versus cultural rights dichotomy and
rather focus on an analysis of state-level involvement in these practices.
12

As a South Asian researcher in a western setting working on human rights
violations in the third world, I have found myself challenged by the same questions. Even
though I am from India and consider my work to be from a South Asian perspective, very
often it is regarded as a Western view on third world cultures. I have grappled with such
conflicts and try not to overestimate the role played by culture in these societies.
However, I also acknowledge that just as it is unjustified to make assumptions about non-

11
Visweswaran, “Gendered States,” 2004.

12
Ibid, 501-504.

232
Western cultures and view them all through the same lenses; it is equally unjustified to
expect that all traditions of other cultures be judged as acceptable under their own
cultural setting. One of the foremost examples of traditional practices in this debate has
been that of female genital mutilation (FGM). While the practice has received extensive
criticism in western press, in the view of proponents of tolerance and cultural integrity
the practice is seen as no different from practices such as breast augmentation or other
potentially harmful voluntary medical procedures.
13
Cecilia Wainryb argues that such a
comparison ignores the fact that FGM is very often carried out by force on young girls.
14

Even when the girls are older, as in FGM, and so many other practices around the world,
the consent of the woman is not sought. Even though one can argue that women in the
western world carry out painful procedures due to social pressure promoted by a certain
conception of beauty, it still does not amount to the use of physical force and coercion.
15

From a cultural relativist perspective it is imperative to understand the meanings within
which one functions to fully understand a person’s behavior. However, it is not necessary
to privilege the status of culture at the cost of equal status for victims. One has to strike a
balance as an unapologetic view on either side is not very useful for the human rights
agenda. Violence against women is not some unique phenomenon specific to the ‘other’
cultures. It is about hierarchical gender relations in and outside the family and is a
common predicament of women across nations, classes and religions. It is not easy to

13
Cecilia Wainryb, “Moral Development in Culture: Diversity, Tolerance, and Justice,” in Handbook of
Moral Development, edited by Melanie Killen and Judith Smetana, 211-240, New Jersey: Routledge, 2006,
17.

14
Ibid.

15
Ibid.

233
change attitudes or to ‘leave’ one’s culture. But the need to recognize these challenges is
essential to come up with effective policy proposals.
While it is appealing to suggest new policies to deal with honor crimes against
women, I do not think that lack of laws and policies are the main obstacles. Rather it is
the lack of implementation and enforcement of existing laws. Gender equality is
enshrined in the constitutions of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh but the courts so far have
failed to protect women and to extend the guarantee of equality to the private sphere,
where various personal laws based on religion are recognized. Questions of marriage,
divorce, inheritance, guardianship and custody are governed by personal laws, which are
based on religion. One reason for women’s unequal status in the public sphere has been
their unequal status in the personal sphere and the fact remains that the protection
accorded to women through civil law is outweighed by the inequalities reflected in many
areas of personal law. This not only refers to the inadequacy of the law in protecting
women from male violence but also to the provisions in the law which reflects society’s
attitudes towards the position of women in society. Courts, as a result, tend to take a
conservative, rigid and traditional approach when interpreting law. Instances where the
courts have managed to rise above the societal constraints and have referred to or applied
international human rights instruments, the impact of such decisions have been restricted
by legislative impediments or inefficacy. Nowhere is this pattern more apparent than in
the cases relating to women’s rights, and especially those rights that are governed by
personal laws. There are various debates within the countries to amend the personal laws
but most of such efforts have not yielded any results so far.

234
Still it cannot be denied that law has been a significant site of women’s rights
struggles. What we need is better enforcement to ensure that the legal system provides
equal protection to all its citizens not just in principle, but also in action. The human
rights movement in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh has achieved significant milestones,
and it continues to mobilize support not only for domestic laws but also for the
implementation of various international treaties which have been ratified by these
countries. Women’s rights activists have come to increasingly rely on the various
international instruments, especially CEDAW, to both challenge discrimination in
national laws and to expand its narrow judicial interpretation.
In the earlier chapters I looked at domestic laws and their application through the
use of court cases as examples. I also provided a theoretical discussion of the impact of
CEDAW or its absence in the three South Asian countries. I will discuss here a few cases
relating to sexual violence where judges have considered international treaties either as
part of national law or as an aid in interpreting national law. I will also briefly discuss
International Criminal Tribunals to examine the possibilities that an International
Criminal Court may have in addressing violence against women. It is important to do so
because any policy proposal addressing violence should not just focus on domestic laws
as the international system provides more innovative ways to expand the available legal
protections. The scope of international law is much wider and has been used to support
affirmative action policies as well as to strike down laws that are in violation of
international treaties. Providing example of these cases may be a valuable exercise in
order to convince the national courts to make use of the Women’s Convention. It will
also help to make the argument that judicial intent is as important as the law itself.

235
Legislature can enact laws and governments may ratify international treaties, but it is
ultimately the judges who interpret and apply these laws. Unfortunately all three cases
discussed below have come out of Indian courts. There are cases where the Pakistani and
Bangladeshi courts have referred to international documents but in my research I did not
find a case concerning violence against women.
One of the most significant judgments regarding the application of CEDAW by
domestic courts in a national context came out of India. In the Vishaka v. State of
Rajasthan,
16
case concerning sexual harassment of women in workplace, the Indian
Supreme Court ruled that the guidelines on harassment in the Women’s Convention are
binding on the nation through its ratification of the treaty.
17
In this case a petition was
brought to the Supreme Court by a group of women activists and NGOs for the
enforcement of the fundamental rights of working women following an incident of gang
rape of a social worker by her own colleagues in a village in Rajasthan, and the failure of
local officials to investigate. The petitioners argued that they and other women who work
were unsafe and not protected from harassment in the workplace because of the failure of
both the employers and the legal system to address this problem.
18
There were no laws in
India that prohibit sexual harassment in the workplace and relying on provisions of the
Indian constitution, on the CEDAW, and the CEDAW Committee’s General
Recommendation 19 on violence against women, the NGOs argued that the court should

16
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997, 6 SCC 241; SC 3011. The writ petition was filed by Vishaka, a
non-governmental organization working for gender equality by way of Public Interest Litigation seeking
enforcement of fundamental rights of working women under Article 21 of the Constitution.

17
Nussbaum, “Sex, Laws and Inequality,” 103.

18
Martha C. Nussbaum, “ India, Sex Equality and Constitutional Law,” in The Gender of Constitutional
Jurisprudence, edited by Beverly Baines and Ruth Rubio-Marin, 174-204, Cambridge, United Kingdom:
Cambridge University Press, 2005, 197.

236
draft a law to compensate for the Indian Parliament’s inaction.
19
The legal question that
the court had to resolve was whether the State actually had an obligation to protect
women from sexual harassment because the Constitution prohibited discrimination on the
basis of sex, and guaranteed just and humane condition of work, but it did not refer
explicitly to sexual harassment.
The Court in its decision noted the fact that “the present civil and penal laws in
India do not adequately provide for specific protection of women from sexual harassment
in workplaces and that enactment of such legislation will take considerable time.”
20

However, the Court for the first time explicitly defined sexual harassment
21
and laid
down certain guidelines
22
for due observance at all workplaces or other institutions until

19
Llana Landsberg-Lewis, ed., Bringing Equality Home: Implementing the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, New York: UNIFEM, 1998, 18.

20
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, judgment, 2.

21
The definition of sexual harassment employed by these guidelines is a close paraphrase of the definition
provided by the CEDAW Committee in General Recommendation 19: “sexual harassment includes such
unwelcome sexually determined behavior (whether directly or by implication) as physical contact and
advances; a demand or request for sexual favors; sexually colored remarks; showing pornography; and any
other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature. Where any of these acts is
committed in circumstances where-under the victim of such conduct has a reasonable apprehension that in
relation to the victim’s employment or work, whether she is drawing a salary, or honorarium or voluntary,
whether in government, public or private enterprise, such conduct can be humiliating and may constitute a
health and safety problem. It is discriminatory for instance when the woman has reasonable grounds to
believe that her objection would disadvantage her in connection with her employment or work including
recruiting or promotion or when it creates a hostile work environment. Adverse consequences might be
visited if the victim does not consent to the conduct in question or raises any objection thereto,” Vishaka v.
State of Rajasthan decision, 9-10.

22
1. All the employers in charge of work place whether in the public or the private sector, should take
appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment without prejudice to the generality of his obligation, he
should take the following steps: a) Express prohibition of sexual harassment which includes physical
contact and advances, a demand or request for sexual favors, sexually colored remarks, showing
pornographic or any other unwelcome physical, verbal/ non-verbal conduct of sexual nature should be
noticed, published and circulated in appropriate ways. b) The rules and regulations of government and
public sector bodies relating to conduct and discipline should include rules prohibiting sexual harassment
and provide for appropriate penalties in such rules against the offender. c) As regards private employers,
steps should be taken to include the aforesaid prohibitions in the Standing Orders under the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. d) Appropriate work conditions should be provided in respect of
work, leisure, health and hygiene to further ensure that there is no hostile environment towards women at

237
appropriate legislation was enacted to ensure the prevention of sexual harassment of
women. Not only did the Court identify sexual harassment as a separate illegal behavior
but also the ‘unwelcomeness of the behavior’ was made a critical factor, thereby making
the impact of such actions on the recipient more relevant than the intent of the perpetrator,
which is to be considered.
In this landmark judgment, the Court stated that “in the absence of domestic
law…the contents of International Conventions and norms are significant for the purpose
of interpretation of the guarantee of gender equality, right to work with human dignity in
Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the safeguards against sexual
harassment implicit therein.”
23
The Court further elaborated that “any International
Convention not inconsistent with the fundamental rights and in harmony with its spirit
must be read into these provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to promote

work places and no employee woman should have reasonable grounds to believe that she is disadvantaged
in connection with her employment.
2. Where such conduct amounts to specific offences under the Indian Penal Code or any other law the
employer shall initiate appropriate action in accordance with the law, by making a complaint with the
appropriate authority.
3. Victims of sexual harassment should have the option to seek transfer of the perpetrator or their own
transfer.
The Court also provided for a complaint mechanism and procedures pertaining to filing of complaints:
Employers must provide a Complaints Committee which is to be headed by a woman, of which half
members should be women; Complaints Committee should also include an NGO or other organization-
which is familiar with sexual harassment; Complaints procedure should be time bound; Confidentiality of
the complaints procedure has to be maintained; Complainant or witnesses should not be victimized or
discriminated against- while dealing with complaints.; and the Committee should make an annual report to
the concerned Government department and also inform of the action (if any) taken so far by them. The
Court also made some other provisions: guidelines should be prominently notified to create awareness as
regards the rights of the female employees; the employers should assist the persons affected, in cases of
sexual harassment by outsiders or third parties; sexual harassment should be discussed at workers meetings,
employer-employee meetings and at other appropriate forums; and finally both Central and State
governments are required to adopt measures including legislations to insure that private employers also
observe these guidelines.

23
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, judgment, 7.

238
the object of the constitutional guarantee.”
24
Although the Women’s Convention was not
directly part of the domestic law of India, the Court found that by ratifying CEDAW and
by making official commitments at the 1995 Beijing World Conference on women, India
had endorsed the international standard of women’s human rights and thus decided that it
could be used to interpret national laws and to elaborate and give further meaning to the
constitutional guarantees.
25
The Court especially relied on article 11 and 24 of CEDAW,
which deals with discrimination against women in the field of employment and the need
for States to adopt measures for the full realization of rights recognized in the Convention,
respectively.
What is noteworthy is the Court also looked for inspiration to the Beijing
Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA region,
which was accepted as the minimum standards necessary to be observed in order to
maintain the independence and effective functioning of the Judiciary.
26
Against this
background the Court declared, “It is now an accepted rule of judicial construction that
regard must be had to international conventions and norms for constructing domestic law
when there is no inconsistency between them and there is a void in the domestic law.”
27

Therefore, “in the absence of enacted law to provide for the effective enforcement of the
basic human right of gender equality and guarantee against sexual harassment and abuse,
more particularly against sexual harassment at work places, the Court laid down

24
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, judgment, 7.

25
Landsberg-Lewis, Bringing Equality Home, 18.

26
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, judgment, 8. The objectives of the judiciary mentioned in the Beijing
Statement are: to ensure that all persons are able to live securely under the Rule of Law; to promote, within
the proper limits of the judicial function, the observance and the attainment of human rights; and to
administer the law impartially among persons and between persons and the state.

27
Ibid, 9.

239
guidelines for due observance at all workplaces, until a legislation is enacted for the
purpose.”
28
These guidelines were developed as a collaboration effort between the
women’s NGO lawyers, the Solicitor General and the panel of Supreme Court judges
who heard the case.
29
However, it must be noted here that these guidelines have faced
some criticism as well. The guidelines are not applicable to the self-employed and
unorganized sectors like the agriculture and construction, which employ a majority of the
rural women workers.
30
It has also been criticized for being unjust to employees since the
complaint committees do not specifically allow for employee participation and have a
tendency to act as the mouthpiece of the employer.
31
And of course the biggest criticism
has been that committee recommendations were not binding on the employer and
therefore the judgment is a good example to show that laws can be effective only when
they are implemented.
While Vishaka was a class action, the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council
v. A.K. Chopra was an adversarial litigation.
32
It is the first case in which the Supreme
Court applied the law laid down in Vishaka case and upheld the dismissal of a superior
official of the Delhi based Apparel Export Promotion Council who was found guilty of
sexual harassment of a subordinate female employee at the place of work on the ground
that it violated her fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. In this
case, A.K. Chopra, the chairman of the council, taking advantage of his superior position

28
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, judgment, 10.

29
Landsberg-Lewis, Bringing Equality Home, 19.

30
Kirti Singh, “Violence against Women and the Indian Law,” in Violence, Law and Women’s Rights in
South Asia, edited by Savitri Gooneskere, 77-147, New Delhi, London: Sage Publications, 2004, 95.

31
Ibid.

32
Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625.

240
allegedly tried to sexually harass his private secretary through unwanted overtures,
insistence that she accompany him to places outside the workplace and attempted
molestation.
33
Upon her complaint the internal inquiry process found him guilty and he
was removed from his post. The respondent thereupon filed a writ petition before the
High Court, the first court of judicial review, which ordered his reinstatement after
holding that “it is not even possible to come to a conclusion that there is an attempt to
molest as there has been no physical contact.”
34

The Supreme Court upheld Chopra’s dismissal in a strongly worded judgment
saying that lenient action in such cases was bound to have a demoralizing effect on
workingwomen and called the entire approach of the High Court faulty.
35
The Court said
that sexual harassment results in violation of the fundamental right to gender equality and
the right to life and liberty while recognizing that “sexual harassment of a female at the
place of work is incompatible with the dignity and honor of a female
36
and needs to be

33
Christine Chinkin, “Sexual Harassment: An International Human Rights Perspective,” in Directions in
Sexual Harassment Law, edited by Catharine A. MacKinnon and Reva B. Siegel, 655-671, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2004, 666.

34
Press Trust of India, “Dismissal in Sexual Harassment Case Upheld,” Indian Express, January 21, 1999,
available at http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19990121/02150115.html (last visited May
15, 2008).

35
Press Trust of India, 1999. The Supreme Court elaborated on this point by saying that “the High Court
appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority
is the sole judge of the facts. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed
before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority, over the factual findings
recorded during departmental proceedings while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court
cannot normally speaking substitute its own conclusion with regard to the guilt of the delinquent for that of
the departmental authorities.”

36
The Courts usage of the concept of female dignity and honor may seem a little problematic and is a
reflection of the patriarchal ideology of the judiciary. There is no need for the Court to bring up the
question of female honor here as the argument can be made solely on the basis of violation of women’s
human rights. It is the idea that the Indian Supreme Court should attach such great importance to the
violation of women’s dignity and honor that seems troublesome. Most courts continually reinforce the old
stereotypes of women and place a premium on the notion of honor and chastity in the rape cases. Indian
Supreme Court has used similar arguments in other cases as well. In the case of State of Karnataka v.

241
eliminated and there can be no compromise with such violations.”
37
What is significant
about this case is that, like the Vishaka case, the Court drew upon the message of
CEDAW, the Beijing Platform for Action and ICESCR to argue that “these international
instruments cast an obligation on the Indian State to gender sensitize its laws and to see
that its message is not allowed to be drowned.”
38
The Court further emphasized that the
Court and counsel must never forget the core principle embodied in the international
conventions and must give due regard to international conventions and norms for
constructing domestic laws, especially in circumstances where there is no inconsistency
between them and there is a void in domestic law.
39
Therefore, the Court did not get into
the precise provisions of the instruments and subject them to legalistic interpretation
instead they looked at their overall message and content of equality.
40

Chairman, Railway Board vs. Chandrima Das
41
, is another important case where
the court referred to an international instrument in its decision. In this case, a petition was
filed in the High Court, under Article 22 of the Constitution of India, against various
railway authorities of the Eastern Railway claiming compensation for the victim, Hanuffa

Krishnappa (A.I.R. 2000 SC 1470), which dealt with the rape of an 8-year-old girl by a 49-year-old male,
the Court stated “sexual violence apart from being a dehumanizing act is an unlawful intrusion of the right
to privacy and sanctity of a female. It is a serious blow to her supreme honor and offends her self-esteem
and dignity.” It further remarked, “it is an irony that while we are celebrating woman’s rights in all spheres,
we show little or no concern for her honor.” This type of interpretation prevents the legal system from
affording protection to women whom it does not believe to be chaste. There is also, very often, a reiteration
of the damage done to the ‘family honor and name’ reinforcing the notion of a woman’s chastity as being
the property of her husband, father or brother.

37
Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, judgment, 12.

38
Ibid.

39
Ibid.

40
Chinkin, “Sexual Harassment,” 666.

41
Chairman, Railway Board and Others v. Chandrima Das and Others A.I.R. 2000 SC 988. Chandrima
Das is an advocate of the Calcutta High Court who represented Hanuffa Khatoon.

242
Khatoon. Hanuffa Khatoon, a Bangladeshi national, was waiting for her train at the
Howrah station in Calcutta, India, when railway employees tricked her and forced her
into a locked room where she was gang raped by a group of four station employees.
When she managed to escape back to the station, she found another railway employee
who offered to assist her and invited her to spend the night with his wife and children.
Instead he took her to a rented place where he raped her and tried to suffocate her.
Hearing her cries, the landlord called the police.
The High Court awarded Rupees one million as compensation. An appeal was
filed by the state contending that the railway was not liable to pay the compensation to
the victim as she was a foreigner and that the remedy for compensation lies in the domain
of private law and not public law. The state claimed that the victim should have
approached the Civil Court for seeking damages and should have not gone to the High
Court under Article 226. Considering the above arguments, the court upheld the High
Court’s prior decision and observed, “where public functionaries are involved and the
matter relates to the violation of fundamental rights or the enforcement of public duties,
the remedy would be avoidable under public law. It was more so, when it was not a mere
violation of any ordinary right, but the violation of fundamental rights was involved- as
the petitioner was a victim of rape, which was a violation of fundamental right of every
person guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.” The Supreme Court also held
that the relief can be granted to the victim for two reasons- firstly, on the ground of
domestic jurisprudence based on the Constitutional provisions; and secondly, on the
ground of Human Rights Jurisprudence based on the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which has international recognition as the ‘Moral Code of Conduct’.

243
This case was a landmark judgment because the Supreme Court of India not only
declared rape to be a violation of the fundamental right to live with human dignity under
the Indian Constitution but also under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
Court even extended Article 21’s protection to include all rape victims, regardless of
whether or not they are citizens, stating “rape is a crime not only against the person of a
woman, it is a crime against the entire society. It destroys the entire psychology of a
woman and pushes her into deep emotional crisis. Rape is therefore the most hated crime.
It is a crime against basic human rights and is violative of the victim’s most cherished
right, namely, right to life which includes right to life with human dignity.”
42
Martha
Nussbaum, in her work on sex equality law in India, has used the Indian Supreme Court
Judgment as an example to show how a national legal tradition may deepen and
strengthen its fundamental rights through incorporation of the rights guaranteed in the
international documents it has ratified.
43

National courts remain the most appropriate forums for seeking justice, for
various reasons including the fact that most evidence and witnesses are normally there.
44

But the fact that large-scale human rights violations are generally carried out with the
complicity of the state agents or by private actors where states fail to protect the victims,
national courts may not be able to render justice as they are part of the state apparatus.

42
Brooke B. Grandle, “Choosing to Help or to Advance Their Agenda: A Comparative Look at How the
Supreme Courts of India and the United States Approach Violence against Women,” Women’s Rights Law
Reporter 24 (2003): 91-92.

43
Martha C. Nussbaum, “Sex, Laws, and Inequality: What India can Teach the United States,” Daedalus
131 (2002): 103.

44
Antonio Cassese, “The Role of the Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight Against
International Criminality,” in Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and
Cambodia, edited by Cesare P. R. Romano, Andre Nollkaemper and Jann K. Kleffner, 3-15, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004, 4.

244
The international tribunals and various other mechanisms like the International Criminal
Court assume greater significance in this regard as they are the only other institution one
can rely on to bring to justice people accused of atrocities committed either on their own
territory or abroad. Couple of such ad-hoc tribunals is the International Criminal Tribunal
for Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which was established
by the United Nations Security Council after the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992-
93, and the genocide in Rwanda during 1994. These tribunals not only recognized that the
injustices women suffer is not an inevitable byproduct of war but also defined the crime
of rape under international law while setting the standard for any future prosecutions for
rape and sexual violence against women by recognizing rape as torture, as a crime against
humanity and by setting command responsibility for rape.
One such case, which led to the first genocide trial by the ICTR since the adoption
of the Genocide Convention in 1948, is the Akayesu case. The reason this is a landmark
case is because the ICTR defined rape and sexual violence for the first time in
international law. Rape was found to constitute “a physical invasion of a sexual nature
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.”
45
Sexual violence,
which includes and is broader than rape, was defined as “any act of a sexual nature which
is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.”
46
Thus sexual
violence was not considered to be limited to physical invasion of the human body and
“may include acts that do not involve penetration or even physical contact.”
47
Tribunal
also noted “the coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical

45
Prosecutor v. Akayesu ICTR -96-4-T, September 1998, para 598; hereinafter judgment.

46
Ibid, para 598.

47
Ibid, para 688.

245
force… Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or
desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain
circumstances, such as armed conflict.”
48

Jean-Paul Akayesu was the bourgmestre (mayor) of Taba commune in Rwanda,
which gave him significant authority or influence over military, political and civil
activities in Taba. As a result of mass crimes committed in his territory by Hutus against
Tutsis and Hutu moderates, Akayesu was charged with genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes for crimes including murder, rape, torture and other inhumane
acts.
49
The Trial Chamber convicted Akayesu of genocide and crimes against humanity,
including historic convictions of rape as a crime against humanity and as an instrument of
genocide. It considered the scope and elements of genocide in its September 2, 1998
judgment and held that to incur responsibility for genocide, any one of an enumerated list
of acts
50
must be committed against an individual specifically because the individual
belonged to a racial, ethnic, religious or national group. Thus, the trial chamber found
him guilty of genocide for actually participating in beatings, killings and rapes of Tutsi
women in some instances and for abetting, ordering or encouraging “by his presence and

48
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para 688.

49
The case was part of the several prosecutions that arose out of the massacres of perhaps a million Tutsi in
Rwanda in 1994.

50
The Genocide Convention defines the crimes of genocide in Article 2: Genocide means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group, as such:
a. Killing members of the group;
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

246
actions” the rape of numerous women outside his communal offices.
51
The argument was
that rape and sexual violence may constitute genocide in the same way as any other act,
provided they cause ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ and meets the intent requirement. It
was noted by trial chamber that “intent is a mental factor which is difficult, even
impossible to determine…intent can be inferred from a certain number of presumptions
of fact…such as the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a
country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on
account of their membership of a particular group, while excluding the members of other
groups, can enable the chamber to infer the genocidal intent of a particular act.”
52
Thus,
Akayesu was found individually to be criminally responsible for genocide for abetting the
infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on Tutsi women for the purpose of
destroying the Tutsi group as such.
53

The Akayesu decision was hailed as evidence of the progress in the campaign for
women’s human rights internationally and was used as case law by International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. In the Celebici case, a trial chamber of the ICTY
characterized the rape of Bosnian women prisoners at the Celebici prison camp as acts of
torture and became the first case since the Tokyo military tribunal to test the principle of
‘command responsibility’ in which civilian or military leaders are held responsible for
crimes of those in their command.
54
The tribunal found Hazim Delic, a Bosnian Muslim

51
Akayesu Judgment, para 706.

52
Ibid, para 523.

53
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Are Women Human? and Other International Dialogues, Cambridge, London:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006, 239.

54
Prosecutor v Delalic, Mucic, Delic and Landzo (hereinafter Celebici), Case No. IT-96-21-I, March 1996,
paras 475-497.

247
deputy camp commander, guilty of grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and war
crimes for the rapes he committed. Zdravko Mucic, the Bosnian Croat camp commander,
was found to have command responsibility for the violations of international
humanitarian law committed by guards at the Celebici camp, including crimes of sexual
assault. In considering whether rape is a form of torture, the trial chamber established the
necessary elements of torture in the context of armed conflict and recognized the opinion
of, inter alia, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, that
violence directed against a woman because she is a woman is a form of discrimination for
the purposes of defining torture.
55

However, ICTY has been largely reluctant to charge rape as an act of genocide
and has used other rubrics to indict perpetrators for rape and sexual violence; it has used
Akayesu decision in at least ten cases to indict for rape as genocide.
56
Ten is not a
significant number, especially when compared to ICTR that has four times as many, it did
pave the way for Milosevic’s indictment in 2001.
57
It has also been incorporated in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which clarifies that genocide by
causing serious bodily or mental harm “may include, but is not necessarily restricted to,
acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment.
58
What is most
interesting though is that rape was not even among the initial charges against Akayesu.
The indictment was amended only after witnesses testified about sexual assaults, which
led to pressures from human rights groups and from Judge Navanethem Pillay of South

55
Celebici Case, para 493.

56
MacKinnon, Are Women Human, 240.

57
Ibid.

58
Rome Statute, International Criminal Court, Article 6(b) Fn 3.

248
Africa,
59
who actually temporarily suspended the proceedings so that new evidence of
rape could be included.
60
Taking its lead from the Convention against Torture, the
tribunal noted that both torture and rape are crimes that violate personal dignity and that
often further specific purposes like intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination,
punishment, control or destruction of a person.
61
The tribunal thus decided that rape
committed with aid of a public official is torture and convicted Akayesu on an additional
charge of direct and public incitement to commit genocide because of his encouragement
of these crimes.
62

The ICTY and ICTR were created by the United Nations Security Council in
response to the atrocities committed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. However, the
jurisdictions of the two tribunals are limited to adjudicating crimes committed in those
territories and thus the world community felt the need for a permanent international
criminal court. The ICC was conceived as a response to the limitations of these ad-hoc
tribunals as a permanent independent judicial body, created by the international
community of states, through the Rome Statute to prosecute the gravest crimes under
international law including genocide, other crimes against humanity, war crimes and the
crime of aggression. With the creation of the International Criminal Court, the
establishment of future ad-hoc tribunals similar to those of ICTY and ICTR will be
superfluous and it is no longer a viable option because they are too expensive, trials are

59
She is currently the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Her four year term began on
September 1, 2008.

60
Diane Marie Amann, “Prosecutor v. Akayesu. Case ICTR-96-4-T,” The American Journal of
International Law 93, no. 1 (1999): 196.

61
Ibid, 197.

62
Ibid.

249
too lengthy and it is too difficult to get the cooperation of national authorities of the local
state or foreign states.
63
There should not be a conflict between the institutions currently
operating or are about to start operation in the near future because they are concerned
with crimes that occurred before the entry into force of the Rome Statute and thus ICC’s
jurisdiction does not reach further back than July 1
st
, 2002. The Preamble to the Rome
Statute states the primary reason for establishing the ICC is to put an end to the impunity
for the perpetrators of most serious crimes of concern to the international community and
to contribute to their prevention.
64
However, even though ICC is mandated to achieve
these goals, it will not be possible unless there are measures taken at the national level for
effective investigation and prosecution and cooperation at the international level.
65
The
Preamble states that it is the duty of every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over
those responsible for international crimes. ICC is required when the national courts fail to
exercise their jurisdiction.
As of June 1
st
2008, none of the countries of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are
state parties to the Rome Statute. Even though Bangladesh was the first South Asian
country to have signed the Rome Treaty of the International Criminal Court, it never
ratified the Statute. While Pakistan had voted in favor of adopting the final text, India
abstained and now Pakistan has linked its ratification to India ratifying the treaty. All
three countries are worried about the jurisdiction of the ICC and relevance of national
courts. But ICC will not replace national courts, and will only be complementary to

63
Cassese, “The Role of the Internationalized Courts,” 12.

64
Markus Benzing and Morten Bergsmo, “Some Tentative Remarks on the Relationship Between
Internationalized Criminal Jurisdictions and the International Criminal Court,” in Internationalized
Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia, edited by Cesare P. R. Romano,
Andre Nollkaemper and Jann K. Kleffner, 407-416, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 408.

65
Ibid.

250
national criminal jurisdictions. The court will only act when countries themselves are
unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute and this inability and unwillingness too is
not presumed but would be determined at the pre-trial chamber of the ICC. The Rome
Statute even provides options for countries when implementing under the
complementarity principle that they have the choice as to whether or not they want to
investigate or prosecute a crime themselves. Therefore, it is up to each state to decide if it
wants to incorporate the ICC crimes into its domestic laws in order to allow for such
domestic prosecution as it is a key issue for all states which are parties for the treaty but
who may have residual concerns regarding possible unwanted prosecutions of their
nationals.
Some have argued that the Statute of the ICC would have been more acceptable if
it had contained an opt-in provision whereby a state could accept the jurisdiction of the
ICC by declaration, possibly for a specified period, and this might be limited to a
particular conduct or to conduct committed during a particular period of time.
66
The
inclusion of ‘armed conflict not of an international character’ in defining war crimes in
Article 8 of ICC Statute has been a main reason for concern, especially for India.
Conflicts in Kashmir, the Northeast region or what happened in Gujarat could be referred
to ICC as it falls under the definition of what constitutes international crimes. On the
other hand, Pakistan has found an easier excuse for not ratifying ICC Statute by linking it
to India’s ratification. The main issue is that the prosecutions that these countries are
trying to avoid are the exact reasons which necessitate the existence of such a body.
Sadly, the leaders who have the right to ratify such international mechanisms are the ones
who stand to lose when such an instrument is put in place. Consequently it is imperative

66
Usha Ramanathan, “India and the ICC,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 3, no. 3 (2005): 627.

251
that the people and other civil society organizations apply pressure on their leaders and
create a national mandate where such ratification can become possible.

Chapter VI
Conclusion
I began this dissertation by focusing on forms of violence against women that amounted
to an infringement of their non-derogable right to life and right against torture, namely
acid attacks, honor killings and the use of rape as weapons of war. The reason I decided
to concentrate on these forms of violence rather than violence against women in general
was because they were on the rise in many parts of the world and my research revealed
that there is a need for more work on this important subject. However, during my
research a central theme emerged out of three case studies: a familiar justification was
used in discussions of all three forms of violence. Avenging the loss of honor, protecting
one’s own honor, or divesting another of their honor was the primary motivation behind
most of these crimes. This was even used in courts as an argument for mitigation by the
perpetrators. The perception of what defiles honor appeared to have been continually
stretched to the point where the smallest act of defiance could be seen as undermining
family and community honor. Two main factors seemed to contribute to the rationale of
honor killings, an honor code where women are expected to obey social norms and the
concept of women as a commodity. Even though honor may also be located in material
wealth, family name and public reputation, the language and expression of honor seemed
to reside in the woman’s body.
1

In this dissertation I looked at three different forms of honor crimes in Bangladesh,
Pakistan and India. I explored the origins of the crime, the concept of suitor rejection,
honor and shame, their societal and legal implications and the responses of the legislative

1
Amnesty International USA, Pakistan: Violence against Women in the Name of Honor, New York:
Human Rights are Women’s Rights, 1999, 27.

253
and judicial systems of these nations. All of these crimes were manifestations of unequal
power relations that reinforced men’s control and domination over women. It was further
perpetuated through a process of institutionalization of the social and religious practices
in society, as well as legitimized through the political, legal and economic systems. There
exist certain fundamental similarities when it comes to the status of women in India,
Bangladesh and Pakistan. While India’s constitution may provide stronger and more
equitable laws, especially in comparison to Pakistan, which still has in place the
discriminatory Hudood laws, the attitude toward women remains much the same. The
reliance on religious personal laws makes women even more vulnerable to discrimination
in the private sphere. The immense opposition from various religious groups against
reform or replacement of personal laws with a uniform civil code does not only stem
from their fear of being incorporated by the majority culture but also resistance to
granting sexual equality to women. Some of the assimilation fears are genuine which are
further fueled when human rights debates criticize third world religions for the plight of
their women. While it is important to reform the existing domestic laws, it is equally
imperative to figure out ways to improve the implementation of international laws in
municipal settings. Reform efforts have to come from within these countries. Moroccan
reform of their Mudawana code, discussed in chapter two, serves as a good example of
how it is possible to achieve this goal. However, an international code addressing the
problem of violence against women could be equally effective.
Article 21 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women empowers the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women to make suggestions and issue general recommendations based on the

254
examination of reports and information received from States parties.
2
In its General
Recommendation 19, adopted in 1992, the Committee for the first time explicitly focused
on violence against women and indicated that “legislation to remove the defence of
honour in cases of assault or murder of a family female member” was among the
measures necessary to overcome family violence.
3
Subsequently, in 1997 and 2000, the
Committee in its concluding comments directed to Turkey and Jordan, raised concerns
about several provisions in their Penal Code that allowed less rigorous sanctions or
penalties for ‘honor killings’. The Committee has raised similar concerns in its
concluding comments on several state parties. The Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 28 also
identifies several human rights like the right to life, right to non-discrimination and right
against torture as being compromised in the context of gender based violence.
Even though these efforts are commendable, they have not been very effective as
of yet in guaranteeing compliance from the state parties. An additional Optional Protocol
to the Women’s Convention or a General Recommendation with stricter language
specifically addressing honor-related violence can go a long way. Categorization of an
activity as a violation of human rights attracts state responsibility for the activity in
international law. An international instrument that does not merely suggest but requires
state parties to take effective measures at curbing honor crimes will be able to hold states
accountable for their failures. It is a realistic concern that many States might not be

2
Suggestions are usually directed at United Nations entities, while general recommendations are addressed
to States parties and usually elaborate the Committee's view of the obligations assumed under the
Convention.

3
General Recommendation 19, available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom19.

255
willing to ratify such an agreement, but it will be very difficult for them to make a case
against doing so. So far, most states have used reservations on religious and cultural
arguments to certain articles in the Women’s Convention as a convenient excuse not to
comply with those policies, but no State can truly argue that their religion or culture
sanctions honor crimes against women. As a result an international legal policy can have
two-fold effect. It may shame nations into ratifying the international instruments and also
bring worldwide attention to women’s human rights violations.
This dissertation represents another attempt at bringing attention to a devastating
worldwide problem. While my research by no means is exhaustive, it does strive to
broaden our understanding of honor-related violence beyond honor killings. It also argues
in favor of invoking international human rights norms to influence state, legal and
individual behavior. Most importantly, it helps create awareness, which is imperative for
a more conscientious enforcement of legal standards. A very good example of how
awareness can create effective grass-root mobilization against a problem is that of the
AIDS campaign. Even though the number of people suffering from AIDS has been rising,
there is a growth in awareness as well. The campaign has not only educated people on
how to prevent and treat the disease but the knowledge has helped curb discrimination
against those infected by HIV virus. One of the main reasons why the disease was able to
spread so fast and wide was because of the lack of awareness and reluctance of the states
to treat it as a considerable problem. It is my contention that the international community
does not need to wait to address an issue until it reaches a certain level of importance.
Rather there is a need for preemptive work as well. Preventing human rights violations is
as important as protecting those who have been violated.

256
There is no doubt that clear violations of international law on the rights of women
occur daily in most parts of the world. On one hand, the laws that discriminate against
women remain on the books and are actively enforced, and discrimination in access to
government resources continues unchecked. On the other hand, from an international
human rights standpoint, the process of guaranteeing fundamental rights for all has been a
most difficult task. Creating a universally applicable framework of human rights in a
culturally and politically diverse world is challenging. The wide variety of approaches on
this topic range from seeing culture as an important filter through which international
human rights norms must pass to become meaningful and effective, to approaches, which
see culture as the powerful impediment to the realization of human rights. As human
rights researchers, we need to move beyond the ‘clash of civilizations’ perspective and
instead focus on interactions between actors and institutions, on domestic power struggles
and other forms of political contests. Only then will it be possible to make the protection
of human rights a reality for women across the globe.

257
Bibliography

Aase, Tor, ed. Tournaments of Power: Honor and Revenge in the Contemporary World.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002.

Abdul Nabi vs. the State, 1997 SD 115.

Abu-Nasr, Donna. “Making it Dishonorable to Kill for ‘Honor’; Law: Reformers are
trying to Dismantle Customs that Let Men Murder women they Suspect of Soiling the
Family Name.” Los Angeles Times. July 9, 2000, pg. 1.

Abu-Odeh, Lama. “Comparatively Speaking: The ‘Honor’ of the ‘East’ and the ‘Passion’
of the ‘West’.” Utah Law Review 2 (1997): 287-307.

Abou-Alsamh, Rasheed. “Saudi Rape Case Calls for Reform.” The New York Times.
December 1, 2007.

Acid Survivors Foundation. Annual Report, 2005.

Acid Survivors Foundation. Voice: A Quarterly Newsletter. Issue 4, July 2005.

Acid Survivors Foundation. Voice: A Quarterly Newsletter. Issue 3, April 2005.

Acid Survivors Foundation. Voice: A Quarterly Newsletter. Issue 7, April 2006.

Acid Survivors Foundation. Voice: A Quarterly Newsletter. Issue 5-6, October 2005 -
January 2006.

Acid Survivors Foundation. 5
th
Annual Report, 2003.

Acid Survivors Foundation. “Acid Throwing Fact Sheet.” Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2001.

Afary, Janet. “The Human Rights of Middle Eastern and Muslim Women: A Project for
the 21
st
Century.” Human Rights Quarterly 26, no.1 (2004): 106-125.

Afkhami, Mahnaz, ed. Faith and Freedom: Women’s Human rights in the Muslim World.
Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995.

Afroz, Tureen. “Judicial Interpretation of Polygamy: Revisiting Jesmin Sultana v
Mohammad Elias.” The Daily Star. April 7, 2007.

Afsharipour, Afra. “Empowering Ourselves: The Role of the Women’s NGOs in the
Enforcement of the Women’s Convention.” Columbia Law Review 99 (1999): 129-172

258
Ahmad, Khabir. “Pakistan Unveils Wide-Ranging Changes to Human-Rights
Procedures.” The Lancet 355 (2000): 1624.

Ahmed, Fauzia Erfan. “The Rise of the Bangladesh Garment Industry: Globalization,
Women Workers, and Voice.” National Women’s Studies Association Journal 16, no.2
(2004): 34-45.

Akanda, Latifa and Ishrat Shamim. Women and Violence: A Comparative Study of Rural
and Urban Violence against Women in Bangladesh. Dhaka: Women for Women: A
Research and Study Group, 1985.

Ain o Salish Kendro. Human Rights in Bangladesh: 1998. Dhaka: The University Press
Limited, 1999.

Allen, Beverly. Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

Al-Hibri, Azizah Y. “Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women’s Rights.”
American Journal of International Law and Policy 12, no. 1 (1997): 1-44.

Al-Hibri, Azizah Y. “Islamic Law.” In A Companion to Feminist Philosophy, edited by
Alison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion Young, 541-549. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell
Publishers, 1998.

Al-Hibri, Azizah Y. “Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third World/Minority
Women?.” In Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, edited by Susan M. Okin, 41-46.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Al-Hibri, Azizah Y. “Marriage Law in Muslim Countries: A Comparative Study of
Certain Egyptian, Syrian, Moroccan, and Tunisian Marriage Laws.” International Review
of Comparative Public Policy 4 (1992): 227-244.

Ali, Rabia. The Dark Side of ‘Honour’: Women Victims in Pakistan. Lahore: Women’s
Resource Center, Shirkat Gah, 2001.

Ali, Salma. Violence Against Women in Bangladesh 2002. Dhaka, Bangladesh:
Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association, 2003.

Ali, Salma. Violence Against Women in Bangladesh 2001. Dhaka, Bangladesh:
Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association, 2002.

Ali, Shaheen Sardar and Kamran Arif. “Parallel Judicial Systems in Pakistan and
Consequences for Human Right.” In Shaping Women’s Lives: Laws, Practices and
Strategies in Paksitan, edited by Farida Shaheed, Sohail Akbar Warraich, Cassandra
Balchin and Aisha Gazdar, 29-60, Lahore: Shirkat Gah, 1998.

259
Alston, Philip, ed. Promoting Human Rights through Bills of Rights: Comparative
Perspectives. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.

Alston, Philip and Frederic Megret, eds. The United Nations and Human Rights: A
Critical Appraisal, Second Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

Amann, Diane Marie. “Prosecutor v. Akayesu. Case ICTR-96-4-T.” The American
Journal of International Law 93, no. 1 (1999): 195-199.

Amnesty International. India: Justice, the Victim-Gujarat State Fails to Protect Women
from Violence. London: Amnesty International, Stop Violence against Women, 2005.

Amnesty International USA. “The Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention:
Enabling Women to Claim Their Rights at the International Level, 1997.”
http://amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1997/IOR/15100497.htm

Amnesty International USA. “‘Why Are We Still Waiting?’ The Struggle for Women’s
Human Rights,” 1998. Available at
http://www2.amnesty.se/wom.nsf/7b0.../d31d2de13bfe6925c12565

Amnesty International USA. Pakistan: Violence against Women in the Name of Honor.
New York: Human Rights are Women’s Rights, 1999.

Amnesty International. “Pakistan: No Progress on Women’s Rights,” 1998. Available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA33/013/1998/en/dom-
ASA330131998en.html

Amnesty International United Kingdom. Pakistan: Honour Killings of Girls and Women.
London: Amnesty International, 1999.

Amnesty International. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces.
London, UK. 1993.

An’Naim, Abdullahi A. “Islamic Law, International relations, and Human Rights:
Challenge and Response.” Cornell International Law Journal 20 (1987): 317-336.

An’Naim, Abdullahi A., ed. Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for
Consensus. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992.

Anwar, Tariq. “After Bilqis Bano - Ensure Justice for All.” TwoCircles.net. January 28,
2008. Available at
http://www.twocircles.net/2008jan28/after_bilkis_bano_ensure_justice_all.html (last
visited June 28, 2008).

Anwary, Afroza. “Acid Violence and Medical Care in Bangladesh: Women’s Activism
as Carework.” Gender and Society 17, no. 2 (2003): 305-313

260

Aolain, Fionnuala Ni. “Radical Rules: The Effects of Evidential and Procedural Rules on
the Regulation of Sexual Violence in War.” Albany Law Review 60 (1997): 883-905.

Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625.

Arakawa, Maki. “A New forum for Comfort Women: Fighting Japan in United States
Federal Court.” Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 16 (2001): 174-200.

Arin, Canan. “Femicide in the Name of Honor in Turkey”. Violence against Women 7, no.
7 (2001): 821-825.

Arnold, Kathryn Christine. “Are the Perpetrators of Honor Killings Getting Away with
Murder? Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code Analyzed Under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.” American University Law
Review 16 (2001): 1343-1409.

Arzt, Donna E. “The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States.”
Human Rights Quarterly 12, no.2 (1990): 202-230.

Asamoah-Wade, Yolanda. “Women’s Human Rights and ‘Honor Killings’ in Islamic
Cultures.” Buffalo Women’s Law Journal 8 (1999): 21-23.

Ashraf, Syed Firdaus. “Life's Ugly Face: Mumbai offers nothing to the victims of acid
throwing, not even hope.” India Abroad. July 27, 2001.

Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development. Realising Our Rights: Holding
the State Accountable for Violence Against Women in the Asia Pacific Region. Bangkok,
Thailand: APWLD, 2005, 91.

Asian Cultural Forum on Development. South Asia Women Workshop. Bangkok:
Thailand, 1987.

Aslam, Maleeha. The Process and Impact of Ideologization of Islam in Pakistan. Mphil
Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2003.

Associated Press Worldstream. “15-year-old arrested in France for allegedly throwing
acid at Jewish school.” July 24, 2005. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-
111385849.html (last visited March 27, 2008).

Augustine-Adams, Kif. “Gendered States: A Comparative Construction of Citizenship
and Nation.” Virginia Journal of International Law 41 (2000): 93-139.

Baker, N.V., P. R. Gregware and M. A. Cassidy. “Family Killing Fields: Honor
Rationales in the Murder of Women.” Violence against Women 5, no. 2 (1999): 164-184.

261
Bamgbose, Oluyemisi. “Africa at the Crossroads: Current Themes in African Law: v.
Women and the Law in Africa: Legal and Cultural Approaches to Sexual Matters in
Africa: The Cry of the Adolescent Girl.” International and Comparative Law Review 10
(2001/2002): 127-144.

Bangladesh National Women Lawyers’ Association (BNWLA). Report on Violence
against Women in Bangladesh. Dhaka: BNWLA, 2001-2003.

Bangladesh Observer, The. “Acid Victims Passing Days in Untold Agony.” March 15,
2002.

Bangladesh Observer, The. “7 Acid Survivors seek to get Vocational Training.” June 3,
2001.

Bangladesh Observer, The. “Acid Victims Suffer due to Delay in Getting Justice.” June 1,
2002.

Barnett, Hilaire. Sourcebook on Feminist Jurisprudence. London: Cavendish Publishing
Limited, 1997.

Barry, Kathleen. Female Sexual Slavery. New York, London: New York University Press,
1979.

Bart, Pauline and Eileen Geil Moran, eds. Violence against Women: The Bloody
Footprints. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992.

Baruah, Bonita. “Romeo on the Rampage.” Sunday Times of India, Special Report.
August 1, 2004.

Bassiouni, M. Cherif and Marcia McCormick. “Sexual Violence: An Invisible Weapon of
War in the Former Yugoslavia.” International Human Rights Law Institute Occasional
Paper, DePaul University (1996): 1-48.

Basu, Amrita. “Globalization of the Local/Localization of the Global: Mapping
Transnational Women’s Movements.” Meridians 1, no.1 (2000): 68-84.

Bauer, Nancy. Simone De Beauvoir, Philosophy, & Feminism. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2001.

Baxi, Upendra. “The Second Gujarat Catastrophe.” May 27, 2002, 4. Available at
http://sacw.insaf.net/Gujarat2002/2ndGujaratCatastrophe.pdf (last visited August 8,
2007).

Baxi, Pratiksha, Shirin M. Rai and Shaheen Sardar Ali. “Legacies of Common Law:
‘Crimes of Honour’ in India and Pakistan.” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 7 (2006):
1239-1253.

262

BBC News. “Dhaka men in acid attacks protest.” March 8, 2005.
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/4329733.stm (last visited March 26,
2008).

BBC News. “Bangladesh Acid Attacks Soar.” January 30, 2002.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1791513.stm (last visited May 24, 2007).

BBC News. “Mukhtar Mai-History of a Rape Case.” June 28, 2005. Available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4620065.stm (last visited June 11, 2008).

BBC News. “Women’s Bill in Pakistan Assembly.” February 13, 2007. Available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6358837.stm (last visited June 20, 2007).

Begum, Anowar Ara. “Acid Violence: A Burning Issue of Bangladesh—Its Medicolegal
Aspects.” The American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology 25, no. 4 (2004):
321-323.

Begum, Hasna. Women in the Developing World: Thoughts and Ideals. New delhi:
Sterling Publishers, 1990.

Begum, Hamida Akhtar. “Combating Domestic Violence through Changing Knowledge
and Attitude of Males: An Experimental Study in Three Villages of Bangladesh.”
Empowerment 12 (2005): 53-74.

Begum, Hamida Akhter and Shamsun Nahar. A Study on Acid Violence in Mymensingh.
Dhaka: Women for Women, 2003.

Benson, Jann and Dan Lyons. Strutting and Fretting: Standards for Self-Esteem. Niwot,
Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 1991.

Benzing, Markus and Morten Bergsmo. “Some Tentative Remarks on the Relationship
Between Internationalized Criminal Jurisdictions and the International Criminal Court.”
In Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia,
edited by Cesare P. R. Romano, Andre Nollkaemper and Jann K. Kleffner, 407-416. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Bettencourt, Alice. Violence Against Women in Pakistan. Human Rights Advocacy Clinic,
2000. http://www.du.edu/intl/humanrights/violencepkstn.pdf (last visited April 9, 2008).

Bhuiyan, Rabia. Aspects of Violence against Women. Dhaka: Institute of Democratic
Rights, 1991.

Bhuiyan, Rabia. Legal Rights of Hindu Women in Marriage and Divorce. Dhaka: Women
for Women, 1986.

263
Bilyeu, Amy Small. “Trokosi-The Practice of Sexual Slavery in Ghana: Religious and
Cultural Freedom as Human Rights.” Indiana International and Comparative Law
Review 9 (1999): 457-503.

Black, ratna. “Despite Harassment and Discrimination Acid Burn Victims Will Never
Stop Fighting.” Journalism Component.
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Bridge/5486/journ.html (last visited March 27, 2008).

Blatt, Deborah. “Recognizing Rape as a Method of Torture.” New York University
Review of Law and Social Change 19 (1992): 821-833.

Bloom, Leslie Rebecca. Under the Sign of Hope: Feminist Methodology and Narrative
Interpretation. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1998.

Bond, Johanna E. “International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic
Exploration of Women’s International Human Rights Violations.” Emory Law Journal 52
(2003): 71-186.

Bovarnick, Silvie. “Universal human rights and non-Western normative systems: a
comparative analysis of violence against women in Mexico and Pakistan.” Review of
International Studies 33 (2007): 59-74.

Boyle, A.E. “Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law.”
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48, no. 4 (1999): 901-913.

Brandes, Stanley. “Book review: ‘Honor’ by Frank Henderson Stewart,” American
Ethnologist 23, no. 1 (1996): 151-152.

Brandt, Michele and Jeffrey A. Kaplan. “The Tension Between Women’s Rights and
Religious Rights: Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh, and Tunisia.” Journal
of Law and Religion 12 (1995-1996): 105-142.

Brass. Paul R. “The Gujarat Pogrom of 2002.” Contemporary Conflicts. March 26, 2002.
Available at http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/archives/gujarat/brass/ (last visited August 1,
2007).

Breines, Ingeborg, Dorota Gierycz and Betty A. Reardon eds. Towards a Women’s
Agenda for a Culture of Peace. UNESCO Publishing: United Nations Division for the
Advancement of Women, 1999.

Brock-Utne, Brigit. “Women and Third World Countries: What Do We Have in
Common?.” Women’s Studies International Forum 12, no 5 (1989): 495-503.

Brownmiller, Susan. Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape. New York: Ballantine
Publishing Company, 1975.

264
Bunch, Charlotte. “Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Towards a Re-Vision of Human
Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly 12 (1990): 486-498.

Butalia, Urvashi. “When Culture Kills – Urvashi Butalia’s View From the South.” New
Internationalist. December 2003.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JQP/is_363/ai_111617785 (last visited April 23,
2008)

Butalia, Urvashi. “Women and Communal Conflict: New Challenges for the Women’s
Movement in India.” In Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and
Political Violence, edited by Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark, 99-114. London
and New York: Zed Books, 2005.

Byrnes, Andrew and Jane Connors. “Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A
Complaints Procedure for the Women’s Convention?.” Brooklyn Journal of International
Law 21 (1996), 679-784.

Byrnes, Andrew. “The ‘Other’ Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.” The Yale Journal of International
Law 14, no.1 (1989): 1-68.

Byrnes, Andrew. “Using International Human Rights Norms in Constitutional
Interpretation to Advance Human Rights of Women.” Paper presented at the 50th
Anniversary Conference, Faculty of Law, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. 23-26 July
1998.

Byrnes, Andrew. “Women, Feminism and International Human Rights Law –
Methodological myopia, Fundamental Flaws or Meaningful Marginalization? Some
Current Issues.” Australian Yearbook of International Law 12 (1988-1989): 205-241.

Cairns, Douglas L. Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient
Greek Literature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Caldwell, Paulette M. “A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender.” Duke Law Journal 40 (1991): 365-396.

Cassese, Antonio. “The Role of the Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight
Against International Criminality.” In Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone,
East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia, edited by Cesare P. R. Romano, Andre Nollkaemper
and Jann K. Kleffner, 3-15. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Castetter, Marie D. “Taking Law into Their Own Hands: Unofficial and Illegal Sanctions
by the Pakistani Tribal Councils.” Indiana International and Comparative Law Review
13 (2003): 543-578.

265
Carpenter, Charli R. “Surfacing Children: Limitations of Genocidal Rape Discourse.”
Human Rights Quarterly 22 (2000): 428-477.

Carpenter, Charli R. “Some Other Conceptual Problems: A Reply to Winter, Thompson
and Jeffrey’s Critique of the UN’s Approach to HTP’s.” International Feminist Journal
of Politics 6, no.2 (2004): 308-313.

Chairman, Railway Board and Others v. Chandrima Das and Others A.I.R. 2000 SC 988.

Chakraborty, Sanghamitra. “The Devi’s Advocate.” Outlook India Magazine. September
27, 2004.

Charlesworth, Hilary. “Symposium on Method in International Law: Feminist Methods in
International Law”. The American Journal of International Law 93 (1999): 379-394.

Charlesworth, Hilary and Christine Chinkin. The Boundaries of International Law: A
Feminist Analysis. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2000.

Charlesworth, Hilary and Christine Chinkin. “The Gender of Jus Cogens.” Human
Rights Quarterly 15 (1993): 63-76.

Charlesworth, Hilary, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright. “Feminist Approaches to
International Law.” The American Journal of International Law 85 (1991): 613-645.

Chaudhry, Amrita. “Shame and Scandal in the Family.” The Sunday Express. January 30,
2005.

Cheema, Moeen H. “Cases and Controversies: Pregnancy as Proof of Guilt Under
Pakistan’s Hudood Laws.” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 32 (2006): 121-160.

Chen, Martha Alter. A Quiet Revolution: Women in Transition in Rural Bangladesh.
Cambridge: Schenkman Books, 1983.

Chenoy, Anuradha M. “Gujarat Carnage: The Politics of Gender in the Politics of Hate.”
Aman Ekta Manch Digest 3 (2002): 1-7.

Chinkin, Christine M. “Gender Inequality and International Human Rights Law.” In
Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics, edited by Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire
Woods, 95-121. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Chinkin, Christine M. “Peace and Force in International Law.” Studies in Transnational
Legal Policy 25 (1993): 203-230.

Chinkin, Christine M. “Women’s Rights as Human Rights under International Law.” In
Understanding Human Rights, edited by Conor Gearty and Adam Tomkins. London:
Mansell Press, 1995.

266

Chinkin, Christine M. “Sexual Harassment: An International Human Rights Perspective.”
In Directions in Sexual Harassment Law, edited by Catharine A. MacKinnon and Reva B.
Siegel, 655-671. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

Choo, Kristin. “Unequal under Law: In Many Nations Laws Sanction Discrimination
against Women.” American Bar Association Journal 86 (2000): 48-51.

Chowdhury, Bristi. Burning Passions: A Study of Acid Violence in Bangladesh. Dhaka:
Naripokkho, 1997.

Chowdhury, Bristi. “When Survival is Victory.” Slate. Dhaka, June 2002: 19-21.

Chowdhury, Elora Halim. “Feminist Negotiations: Contesting Narratives of the
Campaign against Acid Violence in Bangladesh.” Meridians: Feminism, Race,
Transnationalism 6, no.1 (2005): 163-192.

Chowdhury, Elora Halim. “Feminist Negotiations: Contesting Narratives of the
Campaign against Aid Violence in Bangladesh.” Dissertation. Clark University. March 8,
2004.

Chowdhury, Elora Halim. “If I can’t have you, then no one can.” Star Magazine
November 1 (1996): 10-12.

Chowdhury, Elora Halim. “Strength, Solidarity and Courage: Survivors of Acid Violence
Demand Justice.” Star Magazine May 16 (1997): 4-12.

Chowdhury, Elora Halim. “The Limits of Transnational Organizing: The Success and
Failure of the Campaign against Acid Violence in Bangladesh.” Adhunika. December
2004. http://www.adhunika.org/issues/AcidViolence_EHC.html (last visited June 22,
2007).

Chowdhury, Elora Halim and Durriya Meer. Rehabilitation of Survivors of Acid Violence.
Dhaka: United Nations International Children’s Educational Fund, 1998.

Chowdhury, Najma. “Bangladesh: Gender issues and Politics in a Patriarchy.” In Women
and Politics Worldwide, edited by Barbara J. Nelson and Najma Chowdhury, 92-114.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.

Chowdhury, Najma, Hamida Akhtar Begum, Mahamuda Islam and Nazmunnessa Mahtab,
eds. Women and Politics. Dhaka: Women for Women, 1994.

Clark, Belinda. “The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on
Discrimination against Women.” American Journal of International Law 85 (1991): 281-
321.

267
Combined Initial, Second and Third Periodic Reports of State Parties: Pakistan,
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Consideration of
reports submitted by State Parties under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination
of All Form of Discrimination against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PAK/1-3 (August
3, 2005).

Communalism Combat. Genocide: Gujarat 2002. Mumbai: Sabrang Communications
and Publishing, 2002.

Cook, Rebecca J., ed. Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994.

Cook, Rebecca J. “State Responsibility for Violations of Women’s Human Rights.”
Harvard Human Rights Journal 7 (1994): 125-175.

Cook, Rebecca J. “International Human Rights Law Concerning Women: Case Notes and
Comments.” Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 23 (1990): 779-818.

Coomaraswamy, Radhika. “Identity Within: Cultural Relativism, Minority Rights and the
Empowerment of Women.” George Washington International Law Review 34 (2002):
483-513.

Coomaraswamy, Radhika. “To Bellow like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and the Discourse
of Rights.” In Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives, edited
by Rebecca J. Cook, 39-57. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994.

Coomaraswamy, Radhika. Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women,
its causes and consequences, 1996. UN Doc.E/CN.4/1995/42/Add.2.

Copelon, Rhonda. “Gendered War Crimes: Reconceptualizing Rape in Time of War.” In
Women’s Rights Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives,” edited by Julie
Peters and Andrea Wolper, 197-214. New York: Routledge, 1995.

Copelon, Rhonda. “Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as
Torture.” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 25 (1994): 291-335.

Copelon, Rhonda. “Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes against Women in
Humanitarian Law.” Hastings Women’s Law Journal 5 (1994): 243-266.

Cranston, Maurice. What Are Human Rights?. New York: Taplinger Publishing
Company, 1978.

Cranston, Maurice. “Are There Any Human Rights?.” Daedalus 112 (1983): 1-18.

Crowell, Nancy A. and Ann W. Burgess, eds. Understanding Violence against Women.
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996.

268

Coday, Dennis. “Acid Throwing Attacks on the Rise.” National Catholic Reporter. April
16, 2004.

Cusack, Simone and Rebecca J. Cook. “Book Review: ‘Honour’: Crimes, Paradigms and
Violence against Women, edited by Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, London: Zed
Books, 2005.” Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2007): 524-533.

Daily Janakantha. Bangladeshi newspaper. September 4, 2004.

Daily Star, The. “Gender Gap Cause of Acid Throwing.” January 14, 2001.
http://www.dailystarnews.com/200101/14/n1011410.htm (last visited May 16, 2007).

Daily Star, The. “Ghastly Acid Attack on 5.” January 1, 1998.
http://www.geocities.com/HotSprings/Bath/5900/ghastlly.htm (last visited March 27,
2008).

Daily Star, The. “Make Women Ineligible to Become Head of Government, State
Khelafat Andolon tells Government in Dialogue.” July 13, 2008.

Dalacoura, Katerina. Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights: Implications for International
Relations. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998.

Dallmeyer, Dorinda G., ed. Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law.
Washington, D.C.: The American Society of International Law, 1993.

Dauer, Sheila. “Honor Killings and the End of Human Rights.” National Council of
Jewish Women Journal 24, no. 3 (2001).
http://proquest.umi.com/libproxy.usc.edu/pqdweb?did=625216421&sid=4&Fmt=3&clien
tld=5239&RQT=309&VName=PQD (last visited November 18, 2007).

Davis, Debra. “Symposium: Violence Against Women: International Solutions
Symposium.” Women’s Rights Law Reporter 18 (1997): 263-281.

Davies, Miranda, ed. Women and Violence: Realities and Responses Worldwide. London
and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1994.

Dawit, Seble and Salem Mekuria. “The West Just Doesn’t Get It.” New York Times.
December 7, 1993.

Delamont, Sara. Feminist Sociology. London: Sage Publications, 2003.

Del Franco, Nicoletta. “Changing Gender Relations and New Forms of Violence: Acid
Throwing Against Women in Bangladesh and the NGO Response.” A Master’s Thesis.
IDS: University of Sussex. September 1999.

269
Dhar, Aarti. “I stand Vindicated: Bilqis Bano,” The Hindu, January 22, 2008.
Dixon, Robyn. “In Sudan, Rape’s Lasting Hurt.” Los Angeles Times. September 15, 2004.

Dobash, R. Emerson and Russell P. Dobash, eds. Rethinking Violence Against Women.
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1998.

Dobash, R. Emerson and Russell P. Dobash. Violence against Wives. New York: The
Free Press, 1979

Donnelly, Jack. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2003.

Donnelly, Jack. International Human Rights. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.

Donnelly, Jack. “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-
Western Human Rights Conception.” American Political Science Review 76 (1982): 303-
16.

Douglas, Carol Anne. “Pakistan: Women Oppose Honor Killings.” Off Our Backs 29,
no.8 (1999): 3.

Drago, Mirta. “Woman-Human rights: Rape, the Unpunished War Crime.” Inter Press
Services. June 8, 1995.

Dube, Leela. Women and Kinship: Comparative Gender Perspectives on Gender in South
and South-East Asia. Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University Press, 1997.

Dugger, Celia W. “Kerosene, Weapon of Choice for Attacks on Wives in India.” The
New York Times. December 26, 2000.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F02E0DD1338F935A15751C1A9669C
8B63&scp=1&sq=&st=nyt (last visited March 26, 2008).

Duza, Asfia and Hamida A. Begum. Emerging New Accents: A Perspective of Gender
and Development in Bangladesh. Dhaka: Women for Women, 1993.

Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. Violence against Women in
South Asia. New York: United Nations, 2000.

Emerton, Robyn, Kristine Adams, Andrew Byrnes and Jane Connors, eds. Women’s
Human Rights: Leading International and National Cases. London, Portland: Cavendish
Publishing Limited, 2005.

Engineer, Asghar Ali, ed. The Shah Bano Controversy. Bombay: Orient Longman, 1986.

Engineer, Asghar Ali, ed. The Gujarat Carnage. New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003.

270
Engle, Karen. “International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet.”
Michigan Journal of International Law 13 (1992): 517-610.

Enloe, Cynthia. Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International
Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

Epp, Charles R. The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in
Comparative Perspective, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998.

Etienne, Margareth. “Addressing Gender-Based Violence in an International Context.”
Harvard Women’s Law Journal 18 (1995): 139-170.

Ewing, Anthony P. “Establishing State Responsibility for Private Acts of Violence
against Women under the American Convention on Human Rights.” Columbia Human
Rights Law Review 26 (1995): 751-800.

Faga, A., D. Scevola, M.G. Mezzetti and S. Scevola. “Sulphuric acid burned women in
Bangladesh: A Social and Medical Problem.” Burns 26 (2000): 701-709.

Faisal, Malik Rashid. “Justice Delayed, not Denied.” The Sunday Indian. February 3,
2008.

Fatal Din vs. The State, 1983 P.Cr.L.J. 692.

Faqir, Fadia. “Intrafamily Femicide in Defence of Honour: The Case of Jordan.” Third
World Quarterly 22, no. 1 (2001): 65-82.

Feminist News. “Men Burn Women with Acid in Bangladesh.” May 1998.
http://www.projectbangladesh.org/femina.htm

Feminist Majority Foundation. “Acid Attacks on Iraqi Women Increase.” Feminist.org.
July 8, 2005. http://feminist.org/news/newsbyte/uswirestory.asp?id=9145 (last visited
June 29, 2007).

Feroze, Ahmer “NGO Invasion: Bangladesh, a Case Study.” Khilafah Magazine. January
2002. http://www.bangladesh.com/forums/religion/8966-ngo-invasion-bangladesh-case-
study.html (Last visited March 27, 2008).

Fifth Periodic Report of State Parties: Bangladesh, Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties
under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination
against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/BGD/5, January 3, 2003.

Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the

271
Commission on Human Rights, Economic and Social Council, 50
th
Sess., Item 12,
Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47, November 17, 1993.

Filkins, Dexter. “Honor Killings Defy Turkish Efforts to End Them.” New York Times.
July 13, 2003, 1.3.

Forges, Alison Des. Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. New York:
Human Rights Watch, 1999.

Forster, Christine, Imrana Jalal, Vedna Jivan and Madhu Mehra, eds. A Digest of Case
Law on the Human Rights of Women: Asia Pacific. Chiangmai, Thailand: Asia Pacific
Forum on Women Law and Development, 2003.

Fraser, Arvonne S. “Becoming Human: The Origin and Development of Women’s
Human Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly 21, no.4 (1999): 853-906.

French, Stanley G., Wanda Teays and Purdy, Laura M. Purdy , eds.. Violence Against
Women: Philosophical Perspectives. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998.

Galanter, Marc and Jayanth Krishnan. “Personal Law and Human Rights in India and
Israel.” Israel Law Review 34 (2000): 101-133.

Galey, Margaret E. “International Enforcement of Women’s Human Rights.” Human
Rights Quarterly 6 (1984): 463-490.

Galtung, Johan. “Cultural Violence.” Journal of Peace Research 27 (1990): 291-305.

Ganguly, Meenakshi. “Cowardly Acts of Passion: Women in Bangladesh, Long Targets
of Abuse, Now Must Cope with an Especially Brutal Trend – Disfiguring Acid Attacks.”
TIME Asia 153, no. 4, February 1, 1999.
http://www.time.com/time/asia/asia/magazine/1999/990201/acid_women1.html (last
visited March 27, 2008).

Gardam, Judith and Hilary Charlesworth. “Protection of Women in Armed Conflict.”
Human Rights Quarterly 22, no.1 (2000): 148-166.

Gardam, Judith and Michelle Jarvis. “Women and Armed Conflict: The International
Response to the Beijing Platform for Action.” Columbia Human Rights Review 32 (2000-
2001): 1-65.

Geetha, V. “On Bodily Love and Hurt.” In A Question of Silence? The Sexual Economies
of Modern India, edited by Mary E. John and Janaki Nair, 304-331. New Delhi: Kali for
Women, 1998.

Ghauri, Irfan and Zulfiqar Ghuman. “Prevention of Anti-Women Practices Bill moved in
National Assembly.” Daily Times, February 14, 2007, available at

272
http://www.dailytimes.com/pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C02%5C14%5Cstory_14-2-
2007_pg1_2 (last visited June 20, 2007).

Global Policy Forum, Resource on International Criminal Tribunals and Special Courts.
Available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribindx.htm.

Goldfarb, Sally F. “Symposium: Applying the Discrimination Model to Violence Against
Women: Some Reflections on Theory and Practice.” American University Journal of
Gender, Social Policy and Law 11, no. 2 (2003): 251-270.

Gooneskere, Savitri, ed. Violence, Law and Women’s Rights in South Asia. New Delhi,
London: Sage Publications, 2004.

Gottesman, Evan. “The Reemergence of Qisas and Diyat in Pakistan,” Columbia Human
Rights Law Review 23 (1992): 433-461.

Gowlland-Debbas, Vera, ed. The Problem of Refugees in the Light of Contemporary
International Law Issues. Boston: Brill Academic Publishing, 1995.

Grandle, Brooke B. “Choosing to Help or to Advance Their Agenda: A Comparative
Look at How the Supreme Courts of India and the United States Approach Violence
Against Women.” Women’s Rights Law Reporter 24 (2003): 83-99.

Grant, Linda. “Where have all the raped Bosnian women gone?” The Guardian.
September 1993,11.

Green, Jennifer, Rhonda Copelon, Patrick Cotter and Beth Stephens. “Affecting the Rules
for the Protection of Rape and Other Gender Based Violence Before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Feminist Proposal and Critique.”
Hastings Law Journal 5 (1994): 171-222.

Greenber, Judith G. “Criminalizing Dowry Deaths: The Indian Experience.” American
University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 11 (2003): 801-846.

Griffiths, Anne . “Gendering Culture: Towards a Plural Perspective on Kwena Women’s
Rights.” In Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives, edited by Jane K. Cowan,
Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, Richard A. Wilson, 102-126. Cambridge, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Gonzalez, Wendy M. “Karo Kari: Honor Killing.” Women’s Law Journal 9 (2000-2001):
22-25.

Guhathakurta, Meghna. “The Aid Discourse and the Politics of Gender: A Perspective
from Bangladesh.” Journal of Social Studies 65 (1994): 101-114.

273
Guhathakurta, Meghna. “Gender Violence in Bangladesh: The Role of the State.” Journal
of Social Studies 30 (1985): 77-90.

Guindi, Fadwa El. Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance. New York: Berg, 1999.

Haeri, Shahla. “The Politics of Dishonor: Rape and Power in Pakistan.” In Faith and
Freedom: Women’s Human Rights in the Muslim World, edited by Mahnaz Afkhami,
161-174. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995.

Halliday, Susan (2000). “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sex Discrimination: Speeches and
Submissions.” http://www.hreoc.gov.au/sexdiscrimination/speeches/s749.html.

Harding, Sandra. Is Science Multicultural? Postcolonialisms, Feminisms and
Epistemologies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.

Hasan, Syed Shoaib. “Strong Fellings over Pakistan Rape Laws.” BBC News, November
15, 2006.

Hassan, Yasmeen. “The Fate of Pakistani Women.” International Herald Tribune, March
25, 1999.

Hastings, Julie A. “Silencing State-Sponsored Rape In and Beyond a Transnational
Guatemalan Community.” Violence Against Women 8, no. 10 (2002): 1153-1181.

Hasan, Manar. “The Politics of Honor: Patriarchy, the State and the Murder of Women in
the Name of Family Honor.” Journal of Israeli History: Power, Society and Culture 21,
no.1 (2002): 1-37.

Hayward, Ruth Finney. Breaking the Earthenware Jar: Lessons from South Asia to End
Violence against Women and Girls. Kathmandu: UNICEF, 2000.

Hegland, Mary Elaine. “Shi’a Women’s Rituals in Northwest Pakistan: The
Shortcomings and Significance of Resistance.” Anthropological Quarterly 76, no. 3
(2003): 411-442.

Herdy, Amy and Miles Moffeit. “Camouflaging Criminals.” Amnesty Now 29 (2004): 24-
26.

Hernandez-Truyol, Berta Esperanza. “Women’s Rights as Human Rights – Rules,
Realities, and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform.” Brooklyn Journal of
International Law 21, no. 3 (1996): 605-677.

Hernandez-Truyol, Berta Esperanza. “Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future
Developments in International Law: Panel I: Human Rights and Civil Wrongs at Home
and Abroad: Old Problems and New Paradigms: Sex, Culture, and Rights: A

274
Re/Conceptualization of Violence for the Twenty-First Century.” Albany Law Review 60
(1997): 607-634.

Hindu, The. “Draft Communal Violence Bill Unsatisfactory.” May 19, 2005. Available
at http://www.hindu.com/2005/05/19/stories/2005051907251200.htm (last visited August
7, 2007).

Hosali, Sanchita, ed. Selected International Human Rights Materials Addressing ‘Crimes
of Honour.’ London: CIMEL/INTERIGHTS Project on Strategies to Address Crimes of
Honour, 2003. Available at http://www.soas.ac.uk/honourcrimes.

Hossain, Sara, Tania Amir, Khaleda Khatun, Sultana Kamal and Sultana Akhta. “The
Suppression of Violence against Women and Children Bill 1998: Some Suggestions for
Changes.” The Daily Star. April 23, 1998.

How Has the Gujarat Massacre Affected Minority Women? The Survivors Speak: Fact
Finding by a Women’s Panel. Sponsored by Citizen’s Initiative, April 2002.

Howland, Courtney W. “The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and
Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis under the United Nations Charter.” Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law 35 (1997): 271-377.

Howland, Courtney W., ed. Religious Fundamentalism and the Human Rights of Women.
New York: Palgrave, 2001.

Huda, Shahnaz “Protection of Women’s Human Rights in Bangladesh: Legal
Framework,” in State of Human Rights in Bangladesh: Women’s Perspective, edited by
Khaleda Salahuddin, Roushan Jahan and Latifa Akanda, 150-161. Dhaka: Women for
Women, 2002.

Humaira Mehmood v. the State and Others, PLD 1999 Lahore 494.

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Annual Report on Human Rights in Pakistan.
Lahore: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan Publications, 2007.

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Annual Report on Human Rights in Pakistan.
Lahore: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan Publications, 2000.

Human Rights Watch. “A Chance for Justice: War Crime Prosecutions in Bosnia’s Serb
Republic,” Human Rights Watch 18, no. 3 (2006): 1-40.

Human Rights Watch/Africa. Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan
Genocide and its Aftermath, 1996. http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm

Human Rights Watch. Crime or Custom? Violence Against Women in Pakistan. New
York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

275

Human Rights Watch. Double Jeopardy: Police Abuse of Women in Pakistan. New York:
Human Rights Watch, 1992.

Human Rights Watch. Pakistan: World Report 2007. January 11, 2007.

Human Rights Watch. “India: POTA Repeal a Step Forward for Human Rights,
Government should dismiss all POTA Cases.” Human Rights News. September 22, 2004.

Human Rights Watch. “We Have No Orders to Save You: State Participation and
Complicity in Communal Violence in Gujarat.” Human Rights Watch Publications 14, no.
3 (2002): 1-70.

Hussain, Altaf. “Kashmir Women Face Acid Attacks.” BBC News. August 10, 2001.
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1484145.stm (last visited June 29, 2007).

Hussain, Mazna. “Take my Riches, Give me Justice: A Contextual Analysis of Pakistan’s
Honor Crimes Legislation.” Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 29 (2006): 223-246.

Huq, Jahanara, Ishrat Shamin, Nazma Chowdhury and Hamida Akhtar Begum, eds.
Women in Politics and Bureaucracy. Dhaka: Women for Women, 1995.

Huq, Jahanara, Hamida Begum, Khaleda Salahuddin, and S. Rowshan Qadir, eds. Women
in Bangladesh: Some Socio-Economic Issues. Dhaka: Women for Women, 1983.

Ihsan, Fatiman and Yasmin Zaidi. “The Interplay of CEDAW, National Laws and
Customary Practices in Pakistan: A Literature Review.” In Conceptualising Islamic Law,
CEDAW and Women’s Human Rights in Plural Settings: A Comparative Analysis of
Application of CEDAW in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, edited by Shaheen Sardar Ali,
199-265. New Delhi: UNIFEM South Asia Regional Office, 2006, 217.

Independent, The. “Harsh Laws do Little to Prevent Acid Throwing.” July 2, 2002.
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-54634568.html (last visited March 27, 2008).

Independent, The. “Acid Victims.” April 29, 2002. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-
52693549.html (last visited March 27, 2008).

Independent, The. “Acid Throwing.” May 4, 2001. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-
45992877.html (last visited March 27, 2008).

Independent, The. “Acid Attack Continues.” July 17, 2000.
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-45882216.html (last visited March 27, 2008).

Independent, The. “Young man to die for throwing acid in Gazipur. September 18, 2001.
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-46994460.html (last visited March 27, 2008).

276
IRIN News. “Iraq: Acid Attacks on ‘Immodest’ Women on the Rise.” July 4, 2005.
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=25229 (last visited June 29, 2007).
Islam, Mahmuda. Whither Women’s Studies in Bangladesh. Dhaka: Women for Women,
1994.

Ireland v. United Kingdom, (5310/71) ECHR 1,18 January 1978.

Islam, Anisul M. and Munir Quddus. “The Export Garment Industry in Bangladesh: A
Potential Catalyst for Breakthrough.” In The Economy of Bangladesh: Problems and
Prospects, edited by Abu N. M. Wahid and Charles E. Weiss. Westport, CT: Prager,
1996.

Jacinto, Leela. “Acid Attacks: A Brutal Crime of Passion.” ABC News. September 3,
2003. http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=79130 (last visited June 29, 2007).

Jacobs, Gloria. Not a Minute More: Ending Violence against Women. New York:
UNIFEM, 2003.

Jacobson, Roberta. “The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women.” In The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal, Second
Edition, edited by Philip Alston and Frederic Megret, 444-472. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1991.

Jafar, Afshan. “Engaging Fundamentalism: The Case of Women’s NGO’s in Pakistan.”
Social Problems 54, no. 3 (2007): 256-273.

Jafri, Amir H. Karo Kari (Honor Killing) in Pakistan: A Hermeneutic Study of Various
Discourses. Dissertation, 2003.

Jagger, Alison and Young, Iris. A Companion to Feminist Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers, 1998.

Jahan, Roushan. Hidden Danger: Women and Family Violence in Bangladesh. Women
for Women. Dhaka: Women for Women, 1994.

Jahan, Roushan. “Hidden Wounds, Visible Scars: Violence against women in
Bangladesh.” In Bina Agarwal (ed.) Structures of Patriarchy: State, Community and
Household in Modernizing Asia, edited by Bina Agarwal, 199-211. London, UK: Zed
Books, 1988.

Jahan, Roushan and Mahmuda Islam, eds. Violence against Women in Bangladesh:
Analysis and Action. Dhaka: Women for Women and South Asian Association for
Women Studies, 1997.

Jahangir, Asma. “The Origins of the MFLO: Reflections for Activism.” In Shaping
Women’s Lives: Laws, Practices and Strategies in Paksitan, edited by Farida Shaheed,

277
Sohail Akbar Warraich, Cassandra Balchin and Aisha Gazdar, 93-106. Lahore: Shirkat
Gah, 1998, 93.

Jahangir, Asma and Hina Jilani. The Hadood Ordinances: A Divine Sanction. Lahore:
Rhotac Books, 1988.

Jalal, Ayesha. “The Convenience of Subservience: Women and the State of Pakistan.” In
Women, Islam and the State, edited by Deniz Kandiyoti, Philapdelphia: Temple
University Press, 1991.

Jamal, Amina. “Transnational Feminism as Critical Practice: A Reading of Feminist
Discourses in Pakistan.” Meridians 5, no. 2 (2005): 57-82.

Jayawardena, K. Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World. London: Zed Books,
1986.

Jehan Mina v. The State, P.L.D. 1983 Federal Shariat Court 183.

Jesmin Sultana v Mohammad Elias, 17 BLD (1997).

Jilani, Hina and Eman M. Ahmed, “Violence against Women: The Legal System and
Institutional Responses in Pakistan,” in Violence, Law and Women’s Rights in South Asia,
edited by Savitri Goonesekere, 148-206, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, London: Sage
Publications, 2004.

Jilani, Hina. “Whose Laws?: Human Rights and Violence Against Women in Pakistan.”
In Freedom from Violence: Women’s Strategies from Around the World, edited by
Margaret Schuler, 63-74, New York: UNIFEM, 1992.

Johnson, Kay. “Chinese Orphanages: Saving China’s Abandoned Girls.” The Australian
Journal of Chinese Affairs 30 (1993): 61-88.

Johnson, Lyman L. and Sonya Lipsett-Rivera, eds. The Faces of Honor: Sex, Shame and
Violence in Colonial Latin America. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1998.

Joseph, Ammu. “Another face of Violence.” The Hindu. August 15, 2004, V05.

Joyner, Christopher C. “Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former Yugoslavia:
The Case for an International War Crimes Tribunal.” Denver Journal of International
Law and Policy 22 (1994): 235-274.

Kabeer, Naila. “Women’s Labor in the Bangladesh Garment Industry: Choices and
Constraints.” In Muslim Women’s Choices: Religious Beliefs and Social Reality, edited
by Camille Fawzi El Solh and Judy Mabro. Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1994.

278
Kabeer, Naila. “The Conditions and Consequences of Choice: Reflections on the
Measurement of Women’s Empowerment.” United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development, 1-58. Discussion Paper No. 108, 1999.

Kabeer, Naila. “The Quest for National Identity: Women, Islam and the State in
Bangladesh.” Feminist Review 37 (1991): 38-58.

Kahn, Marissa. “Honor Killings in Pakistan: Women’s Rights versus a Nation’s Honor.”
Oxford Journal of Anthropology 2, no.2 (2006): 1-14.

Kannabiran, Kalpana. “Rape and the Construction of Communal Identity.” In Embodied
Violence: Communalising Women’s Sexuality in South Asia, edited by Kumari
Jayawardena and Malathi De Alwis, 32-41. London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1996.

Kapur, Ratna. “The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native”
Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics.” The Harvard Human
Rights Journal 15 (2002): 1-37.

Kapur, Ratna. “Normalizing Violence: Transnational Justice and the Gujarat Riots.”
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 15 (2006): 885-927.

Karat, Brinda and Jagmati Sangwan. “Concepts/Frameworks of Domestic Violence:
Community Codes and Honour Killings: The Haryana Experience.” Paper Presented at
Seminar Organized by The Council for Social Development on ‘Domestic Violence in
India: Issues and Concerns’. March 22, 2005.

Karim, Samaha M. “Application of International Human Rights Norms by Domestic
Courts.” The Daily Star. June 14, 2008.

Karkera, Tina R. “Current Event: The Gang-Rape of Mukhtar Mai and Pakistan’s
Opportunity to Regain its Lost Honor.” American University Journal of Gender, Social
Policy and the Law 14 (2006): 163-176.

Kessler Glenn and Dafna Linzer. “Musharraf: No Challenge from Bush on Reversal.”
Washington Post, September 13, 2005, A19.

Khan, Bashirullah and Miran Shah. “Militants seize Shrine in Pakistan.” abc News, July
30, 2007.

Khan, M. Ilyas. “Taleban Set Up ‘Pakistan Courts’.” BBC News. July 15, 2008.

Khan, Mizanur Rahman. “Acid Throwing Incidents on the Rise.” The Independent. May
22, 2001. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-45995903.html (last visited March 27,
2008).

279
Khan, Tahira S. Beyond Honour: A Historical Materialist Explanation of Honour Related
Violence. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Khan, Shahnaz. “Zina and the Moral Regulation of Pakistani Women.” Feminist Review
75 (2003): 75-100.

Khan, Shahnaz. Gender, Religion, Sexuality and the state: Mediating the Hadood Laws in
Pakistan. London, Ontario: Center for Research on Violence Against Women and
Children, 2001: 1-14.

Khouri, Nina. “Human Rights and Islam: Lessons from Amina Lawal and Mukhtar Mai.”
The Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 8 (2007): 93-109.

Khurshid, Roksana Noor. “Acid Attacks on Women in Bangladesh.” A Master’s Thesis.
University of Dhaka. December 2004.

Kibria, Nazli. “Culture, Social Class, and Income Control in the Lives of Women
Garment Workers in Bangladesh.” Gender and Society 9, no. 3 (1995): 289-309.

Kilbourne, Susan. “The Wayward Americans: Why the USA has not ratified the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child.” Child and Family Law Quarterly 10, no.3 (1998):
243-256.

Kim, Nancy. “Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence
between Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism.” Columbia Human Rights Law
Review 25 (1993): 49-105.

Kim, Suzanne A. “Betraying Women in the Name of Revolution: Violence Against
Women as an Obstacle to Democratic nation-Building in South Africa.” Cardozo
Women’s Law Journal 8 (2001): 1-20.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific
Research in Qualitative Research . Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1994.

Khair, Sumaiya and Masuda Rehana Begum. “Violence and Repression Against Women
and Children: An Unending Agenda.” In Human Security in Bangladesh: In Search of
Justice and Dignity, United Nations Development Program, 101-112. Bangladesh: UNDP,
2002.

Knop, Karen, ed. Gender and Human Rights. Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004.

Knudsen, Are. “License to Kill: Honour Killings in Pakistan.” Chr. Michelsen Institute
Working Paper 1 (2004): 1-24.

280
Kogacioglu, Dicle. “The Tradition Effect: Framing Honor Crimes in Turkey.”
Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 15, no.2 (2004): 119-151.

Kotalova, Jitka. Belonging to Others: Cultural Construction of Womanhood among
Muslims in a Village in Bangladesh. Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1996.

Kressel, Gideon M., Alessandro Bausani, Joseph Ginat, Roger Joseph, A.M. Khazanov,
Simha F. Landau, Emmanuel Marx and Moshe Shokeid. “Sororicide/Filliacide: Homicide
for Family Honor.” Current Anthropology 22, no. 2 (1981): 141-158.

Kristof, Nicholas D. "A Heroine Walking in the Shadow of Death." New York Times,
April 4, 2006. Available at http://select.nytimes.com/2006/04/04/opinion/04kristof.html
(last visited June 11, 2008).

Kristof, Nicholas D. "A Woman’s Work Earns Her Enemies." New York Times, April 8,
2007. Available at http://select.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/opinion/08kristof.html (last
visited June 11, 2008).

Kuan, Steve. “Alien Tort Claims Act-Classifying Peacetime Rape as an International
Human Rights Violation,” Houston Journal of International Law 22 (2000): 451-479.

Kumar, Radha. “Women’s Peacekeeping during Ethnic Conflicts and Post-Conflict
Reconstruction.” National Women’s Studies Association Journal 13, no.2 (2001): 68-73.

Kurkiala, Mikael. “Interpreting Honour Killings: The Story of Fadime Sahindal (1975-
2002) in the Swedish Press.” Anthropology Today 19, no.1 (2003): 6-7.

Kurtz, Lester R. and Jennifer E. Turpin, eds. “‘Violence Against Women’ and ‘Women
and War’.” Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict 3. San Diego: Academic Press,
1999.

Kwakwa, Edward K. The International Law of Armed Conflict: Personal and Material
Fields of Application. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.

Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Laber, Jeri. “Bosnia: Questions of Rape.” New York Review of Books 40, no. 6 (1993): 1-
4.

Landsberg-Lewis, Llana, ed. Bringing Equality Home: Implementing the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. New York: UNIFEM,
1998.

Lane, Sandra D. and Robert A. Rubenstein. “Judging the Other: Responding to
Traditional Female Genital Surgeries.” Hastings Center Report 26 (1996): 31-40.

281

Lam, Janice H. “The Rise of the NGO in Bangladesh: Lessons on Improving Access to
Justice for Women and Religious Minorities.” George Washington International Law
Review 38 (2006): 101-130.

Lehr-Lehnhardt, Rana. “Treat Your Women Well: Comparisons and Lessons from an
Imperfect Example Across the Waters.” Southern Illinois University Law Journal 26
(2002): 403-442.

Lerner, Gerda. The Creation of Patriarchy. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1986.

Lewis, Hope. “Between Irua and “Female Genital Mutilation: Feminist Human Rights
Discourse and the Cultural Divide.” Harvard Human Rights Journal 8 (1995): 1-54.

Liebeskind, Michelle Lewis. “Preventing Gender-Based Violence: From Marginalization
to Mainstream in International Human Rights.” Revista Juridica Universidad de Puerto
Rico 63 (1994): 645-668.

Lijnzaad, Liesbeth. Reservations to the United Nations Human Rights Treaties: Ratify or
Ruin. London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994.

Liton, Shakhawat. “Women’s Reserved Seats in Local Government: Government
Retreats from Pledge.” The Daily Star. May 12, 2008.

Lopez, George A. and David Cortwright. “Economic Sanctions and Human Rights: Part
of the Problem or Part of the Solution?.” International Journal of Human Rights 1, no.2
(1997): 1-25.

MacKinnon, Catharine A. Are Women Human? and Other International Dialogues.
Cambridge, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006.

MacKinnon, Catharine A. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989.

MacKinnon, Catharine A. “Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace.” UCLA Women’s Law
Journal 4 (1993): 59-86.
MacKinnon, Catharine A. “Sex Equality under the Constitution of India: Problems,
Prospects, and ‘Personal Laws’.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 4, no. 2
(2006): 181-202.

MacKinnon, Catharine A. “Turning Rape into Pornography: Post-Modern Genocide.” Ms.
Magazine July/Aug (2003): 24-30.

Madek, Christina A. “Killing Dishonor: effective eradication of Honor Killing.” Suffolk
Transnational Law Review 29 (2005): 53-77.

282

Mahoney, Kathleen. “Theoretical Perspectives on Women’s Human Rights and Strategies
for their Implementation.” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 21, no.3 (1996): 799-
856.

Mahoney, Kathleen E. and Paul Mahoney, eds. Human Rights in the Twenty First
Century. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993.

Mahtab, Nazmunessa and A.K. Azad Khan. “Violence Against Women.” Observer
Magazine. July 14, 2000.

Maier, Sylvia. “Honour Killings and the Cultural Defense in Germany.” Unpublished
Paper.

Majumder, Sanjoy. “Landmark Judgement Raises Hope.” BBC News, February 24, 2006.
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4747082.stm (last visited July 28,
2007).

Malanczuk, Peter. Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law. New York:
Routledge Publications, 1997.

Malone, Linda A. “Beyond Bosnia and in Re Kasinga: A Feminist Perspective on Recent
Developments in Protecting Women from Sexual Violence.” Boston University
International Law Journal 14 (1996): 319-340.

Mandelbaum, David G. Women’s Seclusion and Men’s Honor: Sex Roles in North India,
Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988.

Mannan, A., S. Ghani, A. Clarke, P. White, S. Salmanta and P.E.M. Butler.
“Psychosocial outcomes derived from an acid burned population in Bangladesh and
comparison with Western norms.” Burns 32 (2006): 235-241.

Maris, Cees and Sawitri Saharso. “Honour Killing: A Reflection on Gender, Culture and
Violence.” The Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences 37, no. 1 (2001): 52-73.

Martel, Rene. “Acid-throwing victim makes sense of her life.” Filipino Reporter. August
30, 2001.

Mayell, Hillary. “Thousands of Women Killed for Family ‘Honor’.” National
Geographic News. February 12, 2002.

Mayer, Ann Elizabeth. “Universal versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or
a Clash with a Construct”. Michigan Journal of International Law 15 (1994): 307-403.

283
Mayer, Ann Elizabeth. “Islamic Law and Human rights: Conundrums and
Equivocations.” In Religion and Human Rights: Competing Claims? edited by Carrie
Gustafson and Peter Juviler, 177-198. New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1999.

McColgan, Aileen. Women under the Law: The False Promise of Human Rights. Harlow:
Longman Publishers, 2000.

McKinley Jr., James C. “Legacy of Rwanda Violence: The Thousands Born of Rape.”
The New York Times. September 23, 1996.

Meer, Durriya. Twentieth Century Barbarism: Culture, Gender and Acid Violence.
Dissertation. Wright State University. September 2002.

Menon, Nivedita. “Living with Secularism.” In The Crisis of Secularism in India, edited
by Anuradha Dingwaney Needham and Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, 118-140. Durham and
London: Duke University Press, 2007.

Mertus, Julie and Pamela Goldberg. “A Perspective on Women and International Human
Rights After the Vienna Declaration: The Inside/Outside Construct.” New York
University Journal of International law and Policy 26 (1994): 201-230.

Merry, Sally Engle. Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law
into Local Justice. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006.

Miller, William Ian. Humiliation: And Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and
Violence. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993.

Minor, Julie A. “An Analysis of Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.” Georgia Journal of
International and Comparative Law 24 (1994): 137-53.

Mendelbaum, David G. Women’s Seclusion and Men’s Honor: Sex Roles in North India,
Bangladesh and Pakistan. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1988.

Menon, Ritu and Kamla Bhasin. “Abducted Women, the State and Questions of Honour:
Three Perspectives on the Recovery Operation in post-Partition India.” In Embodied
Violence: Communalising Women’s Sexuality in South Asia, edited by Kumari
Jayawardena and Malathi De Alwis, 1-31. London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1996.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory,
Practicing Solidarity. Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2003.

Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 945.

Mohd. Yaqub alias Ayyub vs. The State, PLD 1984 Lahore 358.

284
Monsoor, Taslima. From Patriarchy to Gender Equity: Family Law and its Impact on
Women in Bangladesh. Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 1999.

Morsey, Soheir. “Safeguarding Women’s Bodies: The White Man’s Burden
Medicalized.” Medical Anthropological Quarterly 5, no. 1 (1991): 19-23.

Moshan, Brook Sari. “Comment: Women, War, and Words: The Gender Component in
the Permanent International Criminal Court’s Definition of Crimes against Humanity.”
Fordham International Law Journal 22 (1998): 154-184.

Muhammad Hefzur Rahman v. Shamsun Nahar Begum 15 BLD (1995) 34.

Mullally, Siobhan. “As Nearly as May be: Debating Women’s Human Rights in
Pakistan.” Social and Legal Studies 14 (2005): 341-358.

Mumtaz, Khawar. “Advocacy for an end to Poverty, Inequality, and Insecurity: Feminist
Social Movements in Pakistan.” Gender and Development 13, no. 3 (2005): 63-69.

Mumtaz, Khawar and Farida Shaheed, eds. Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One
Step Back?. Lahore: Vanguard, 1987.

Mutua, Makau. Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002.

Narayan, Uma. Dislocating Cultures, Identities, Traditions and Third World Feminism.
New York/London: Routledge , 1997.

Narayan, Uma and Sandra Harding, eds. Decentering the Center: Philosophy for a
Multicultural, Postcolonial, and Feminist World. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
2000.

Narain, Vrinda. “Women’s Rights and the Accommodation of “Difference:” Muslim
Women in India.” Southern California Review of Law and Women’s Studies 8 (1998), 43-
69.

Narula, Smita. “Overlooked Danger: The Security and Rights Implications of Hindu
Nationalism in India.” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003): 41-67.

Nayak, Meghana V. “The Struggle over Gendered Meanings in India: How Indian
Women’s Networks, the Hindu Nationalist Hegemonic Project, and Transnational
Feminists Address Gender Violence.” Women and Politics 25 (2003): 71-96.

Nazneen, Roksana. “Violence in Bangladesh.” In Violence against women: Philosophical
Perspectives, edited by Stanley G. French, Laura M. Purdy and Wanda Teays, 77-91.
London: Cornell University Press, 1998.

285
Nesheiwat, Ferris K. “Honor Crimes in Jordan: Their Treatment Under Islamic and
Jordanian Criminal Laws.” Penn State International Law Review 23 (2004): 251-281.

News Network. Miseries of Millions in Bangladesh: A compilation of News Network
Features. Dhaka, Bangladesh: News Network, 2005.

News 24. “Women Die of Acid Attacks.” March 24, 2004.
http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,6119,2-10-1462_1502616,00.html (last
visited June 29, 2007).

Niarchos, Catherine N. “Women, War and Rape: Challenges Facing the International
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia.” Human Rights Quarterly 17 (1995): 649-690.

Nikolic-Ristanovic, Vesna. “Living Without Democracy and Peace.” Violence Against
Women 5, no.1 (1999): 63-80.

Nizich, Ivana. “Violations of the Rules of War by Bosnian Croat and Muslim Forces in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Hastings Women’s Law Journal 5 (1994): 25-52.

Nouraie-Simone, Fereshteh, ed. On Shifting Ground: Muslim Women in the Global Era.
New York: The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2005.

Nussbaum, Martha C. The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence and India’s
Future. Cambridge, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007.

Nussbaum, Martha C. “International Human Rights Law in Practice: India: Implementing
Sex Equality through Law.” Chicago Journal of International Law 2 (2001): 35-58.

Nussbaum, Martha C. “Sex, Laws, and Inequality: What India can teach the United
States.” Daedlus 131 (2002): 95-106.

Nussbaum, Martha C. “Genocide in Gujarat: The International Community Looks
Away.” Dissent summer (2003): 15-23.

Nussbaum, Martha C. “India, Sex Equality and Constitutional Law.” In The Gender of
Constitutional Jurisprudence, edited by Beverly Baines and Ruth Rubio-Marin, 174-204.
Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Obiora, L. Amede (1997). “Feminisn, Globalization, and Culture: After Beijing.” Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies 4 (1997): 355-406.

Okin, Susan Moller. Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1999.

Okin, Susan Moller. Justice, Gender and the Family. New York: Basic Books, 1989.

286
Oldenburg, Veena Talwar. Dowry Murder: The Imperial Origins of a Cultural Crime.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Oloka-Onyango, J. and Sylvia Tamale. “The Personal is Political,” or Why Women’s
Rights are Indeed Human Rights: An African Perspective on International Feminism.”
Human Rights Quarterly 17, no. 4 (1995): 692-731.

Olujie, Maria B. “Coming Home: The Croatian War Experience.” Unpublished Draft on
file with The American University Law Review 29 (1993): 23.

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women. Available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/ (last
visited July 20, 2008).

Orentlicher, Diane. No Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and Gender-Based
Violence in the Former Yugoslavia. Washington, D.C.: International Human Rights Law
Group, 1993.

Ortner, S. “The Virgin and the State.” Feminist Studies 4 (1978): 19-35.

Packer, Corinne A. A. Using Human Rights to Change Tradition: Traditional Practices
Harmful to Women’s Reproductive Health in Sub-Saharan Africa. Antwerpen, New York:
Intersentia, 2002.

Pandey, Geeta. “Best Bakery Perjurer Surrenders.” BBC News, March 10, 2006.
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4784776.stm (last visited July 28,
2007).

Panikkar, R. “Is the notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?.” Diogenes 120
(1982):75-102.

Parekh, Bhikhu. “Making Sense of Gujarat.” Seminar 513 (2002): 1-12.

Pateman, Carole. The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory.
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1989.

Penn, Michael L. and Rahel Nardos. Overcoming Violence Against Women and
Girls: The International Campaign to Eradicate a Worldwide Problem. Lanham,
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2003.

People’s Health Movement. “Acid Violence – Renu Mala Rina.” August 12, 2005.
http://phmovement.org/voices/rina.html (last visited February 2, 2007).

Pereira, Faustina. The Fractured Scales: The Search for a Uniform Personal Code.
Calcutta: Popular Prakashan, 2002.

287
Peristiany, J. G. ed. Honor and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1966.

Peters, Julie and Andrea Wolper. Women’s Rights, Human Rights: International
Feminist Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 1995.

Pitt-Rivers, Julian. “Honor,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, edited
by David Sills, vol. 6, N.p.: Macmillan, Free Press, 1968, 503-511.

Plant, Valerie. “Honor Killings and the Asylum Gender Gap.” Journal of Transnational
Law and Policy 15 (2005): 109-129.

Pollitt, Katha. “Cold Comfort.” The Nation. June 11, 2001. Available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20010611/pollitt (last visited July 30, 2007).

Press Trust of India. “Dismissal in Sexual Harassment Case Upheld.” Indian Express.
January 21, 1999. Available at
http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19990121/02150115.html (last
visited May 15, 2008).

Prince, Maswoodur Rahman. Women Issues: Contemporary Themes. Dhaka, Bangladesh:
Nazu Prokashani, 2001.

Professor Nurul Islam v Government of Bangladesh 57 DLR (HCD) (2005) 201.

Project Against Torture. Living in the Shadows: Acid Attacks in Cambodia. Phnom Penh:
Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO), 2003.

Prosecutor v. Akayesu ICTR -96-4-T, September 1998.

Prosecutor v Delalic, Mucic, Delic and Landzo Case No. IT-96-21-I, March 1996.

Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006. Available at
www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/2006/wpb.html (last visited June 19, 2007).

Quddus, Md. Abdul, M. Solaiman and M. Rezaul Karim. Rural Women in Households in
Bangladesh: With a case study of three villages in Comilla. Comilla, Kotbari: Bangladesh
Academy for Rural Development, 1985.

Quenivet, Noelle N.R. Sexual Offenses in Armed Conflict and International Law. Ardsley,
New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2005.

Quraishi, Asifa. “Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Law of Pakistan from a
Woman-Sensitive Perspective.” Michigan Journal of International Law 18 (1997): 287-
320.

288
Ragsdale, Shannon S. and Vanessa D. Campbell. “Protection of the Female Child: The
Mothers of Our Future-Case Studies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.”
Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law 7(1999): 177-198.

Rahman, Anika. “Religious Rights versus Women’s Rights in India: A Test Case for
International Human Rights Law.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 28, no. 2
(1990): 473-498.

Rahman, Mishu. “Let US Stand United against Acid Violence.” Observer Magazine.
August 26, 2005.

Rahman, Muhammad Mahmudur, Salma Mobarek and Abdus Salek. “Social
Mobilization Strategies for Elimination of Gender Discrimination: with particular
emphasis on violence against women.” Empowerment 11 (2004): 59-74.

Ramanathan, Usha. “India and the ICC,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 3, no.
3 (2005): 627-634.

Ramusack, B.N. “Women in South Asia.” In Women in Asia: Restoring Women to
History, edited by B.N. Ramusack and S. Sievers. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1999.

Rao, Aarti. “Right in the Home: Feminist Theoretical Perspective on International
Human Rights.” National Law School Journal 1 (1993): 62-81.

Rape and Sexual Assault, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, Annex IX,
U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2, Vol. V, 1994.

Ravikant, Namratha S. “Dowry Deaths: Proposing a Standard for Implementation of
Domestic Legislation in Accordance with Human Rights Obligations.” Michigan Journal
of Gender and Law 6 (2000): 449-497.

Ray, Amy E. “The Shame of It: Gender Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and
the Failure of International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries.” The
American University Law Review 46 (1997): 793-840.

Raza, Anjana. “Mask of Honor – Causes behind Honor Killings in Pakistan.” Asian
Journal of Women’s Studies 12, no. 2 (2006): 88-106.

Reanda, Laura. “Human Rights and Women’s Rights: The United Nations Approach.”
Human Rights Quarterly 3, no. 2 (1981): 11-31.

Rebien, Kerstin. “Man Jailed for ‘Honor Killing’ that Shook Germany.” Guardian. April
14, 2006. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329457601-103532,00.html
(last visited September 26, 2006).

289

Rehof, Lars Adam. Guide to the Travaux Préparatoires of the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
Dordrecht: Maritinus Nijhoff Pubishers, 1993.

Reid, T.R. “Japan to Apologize to ‘Comfort Women’.” Washington Post, July 13,1995:
A18.

Renteln, Alison Dundes. The Cultural Defense. New York: Oxford University Press,
2004.

Renteln, Alison Dundes. International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism.
Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990.

Renteln, Alison Dundes. “The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the
Consequences for Human Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly 7 (1985): 514-540.

Renzetti, Claire M., Jeffrey L. Edleson and Raquel Kennedy Bergen, eds. Sourcebook on
Violence Against Women. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and
consequences, Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective:
Violence Against Women, Economic and Social Council, 59
th
Sess., Item 12(a),
Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/22003/75/Add.1, February 27, 2003.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and
consequences, Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective:
Violence Against Women, The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, Economic and Social Council, 62
nd
Sess., Item 12(a),
Commission on Human Rights, U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61, January 20, 2006.

Report of the Working Group on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women
and Children, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 42
nd
Sess., Item 19, U.N.Doc.
E/CN.4/1986/42, February 4, 1986.

Report on Gujarat: CPI (M) and AIDWA delegation report, 2002. Available at
http://www.sacw.net/Gujarat2002/CPMAIDWA2002gujaratreport.html.
At the Receiving End: Women’s Experiences of Violence in Vadodara. Report by
People’s Union for Civil Liberties. PUCL Vadodara and Vadodara Shanti Abhiyan, May
31, 2002.

Responses to the list of issues and questions for consideration of the combined initial,
second and third periodic report of Pakistan, Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, 3bth Session, U.N.Doc. CEDAW/C/PAK/Q/3/Add.1,
March 1, 2007.

290
Reynolds, Sarnata. “Deterring and Preventing Rape and Sexual Slavery During Periods
of Armed Conflict.” Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice 16 (1993):
601-632.

Rhode, Deborah L. Speaking of Sex: The Denial of Gender Inequality. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997.

Ritz, Kerri L. “Soft Enforcement: Inadequacies of Optional Protocol as a Remedy for the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.” Suffolk
Transnational Law Review 25 (2001): 191-216.

Romany, Celina. “Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private
Distinction in International Human Rights Law.” Harvard Human Rights Journal 6
(1993): 87-126.

Roy, A.K. “Bringing Succour to the Victims of Acid Throwing.” The Independent. May
28, 2001. http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1P1-45097340.html (last visited March 27,
2008).

Rozario, Santi. “Claiming the campus for female students in Bangladesh.” Women’s
Studies International Forum 24 (2001): 157-66.

Ruane, Rachel A. “Murder in the Name of Honor: Violence Against Women in Jordan
and Pakistan.” Emory International Law Review 14 (2000): 1523-1578.

Russell, Diana E.H. and Roberta A. Harmes, eds. Femicide in Global Perspective. New
York: Teachers College Press, 2001.

Saeed, Rana Riaz. “Women Status in Pakistan under Customs and Values and the
Controversial Hudood Ordinance 1979.” Ideas: Law and Economics, December 2004.
http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwple/0501003.html (last visited November 18, 2007).

Safia Bibi v. The State, P.L.D. 1985 Federal Shariat Court 120.

Saheli. “Carnage in Gujarat: Women are Targeted as Never Before.” Newsletter May-
August (2002): 1-31.

Salahuddin, Khaleda, Roushan Jahan and Latifa Akanda, eds. State of Human Rights in
Bangladesh: Women’s Perspective. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Women for Women: A Research
and Study Group, 2002.

Saliba, Therese, Carolyn Allen and Judith A. Howard, eds. Gender, Politics and Islam.
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002.

Sarkar Lotika and B Sivaramayya. Women and Law: Contemporary Problems. Dhaka,
Bangladesh: Academic Publishers, 1994.

291

Schmetzer, Uli. “News from Bangladesh - Acid ruins women's faces and their dreams.”
Chicago Tribune Foreign Correspondent. January 31, 1999.
http://www.projectbangladesh.org/acidruin.htm

Schrag, Minna. “The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: An Interim Assessment.”
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 7 (1997): 15-22.

Schuler, Margaret, ed. Freedom From Violence: Women’s Strategies from Around the
World. New York: UNIFEM, 1992.

Schuler, S.R., S.M. Hashemi, A.P. Riley and A. Akhter. “Credit Programs, Patriarchy and
Men’s Violence against Women in Rural Bangladesh.” Journal of Social Science and
Medicine 43, no. 12 (1996): 1729-1742.

Schwartz, Stephen. “Rape as a Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia.” Hastings
Women’s Law Journal 5 (1994): 69-88.

Scott, Joan Wallach. The Politics of the Veil. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University
Press, 2007.

Second Shadow Report. Talibanization and Poor Governance: Undermining CEDAW in
Pakistan. Produced by Shirkat Gah with inputs from 23 other organizations, April 15,
2007.

Sellers, Viseur and Kaoru Okuizumi. “Intentional Prosecution of Sexual Assaults.”
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 7 (1997): 45-80.

Sen, Purna. “Crimes of Honour, value and meaning.” In Honour: Crimes, Paradigms,
and Violence Against Women, edited by Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, 42-63. New
York: Zed Books, 2005.

Sever, Aysan and Yurdakul, Gokcecicek (2001). “Culture of Honor, Culture of Change:
A Feminist Analysis of Honor Killings in Rural Turkey”. Violence Against Women 7,
no.9 (2001): 964-998.

Shachar, Ayelet. “The Paradox of Multicultural Vulnerability: Individual Rights, Identity
Groups, and the State.” In Multicultural Questions, edited by Christian Joppke and
Steven Lukes, 87-129. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Shachar, Ayelet. “Reshaping the Multicultural Model: Group Accommodation and
Individual Rights.” Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues 8 (1998): 83-111.

Shaheed, Farida, Sohail Akbar Warraich, Cassandra Balchin, Aisha Gazdar, eds. Shaping
Women’s Lives: Laws, Practices and Strategies in Paksitan. Lahore: Shirkat Gah, 1998.

292
Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Nadera. “Femicide and the Palestinian Criminal Justice System:
Seeds of Change in the Context of State Building?” Law and Society Review 36 (2002):
577-603.

Shamim, I. “Dowry and Women’s Status: A Study of Court Cases in Dhaka and Delhi.”
In Intimate Violence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by E.C. Viano, 265-275.
Washington, D.C.: Hemisphere Publishing, 1992.

Shamsie, Muneeza. “A Matter of Dishonour.” Index on Censorship 31, no. 4 (2002): 191-
195.

Sharma, O.C. Crime against Women. New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1994.
Sharma, Kalpana. “No Honor in These Killings.” The Hindu, November 3, 2002,
available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/mag/stories/2002110300560300.htm

Shelton, Dinah. Remedies in International Human Rights Law. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000.

Shestack, Jerome J. “The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights.” Human Rights
Quarterly 20 (1998): 201-234.

Shil, Shakespeare. “Men use acid to scar Bangladeshi women who say no.” March 18,
1999. http://www.geocities.com/HotSprings/Bath/5900/menuseac.htm (last visited
March 27, 2008).

Shrestha, Manoj. “Acid Attacks: Men are Waging Chemical Warfare on Women and
Getting Away with it.” Nepali Times E Special. March 18, 2007 – May 24, 2007.
http://www.nepalitimes.com/issue/349/Nation/13549 (last visited June 29, 2007).

Siddiqi, Dina M. “Of Consent and Contradiction: Forced Marriages in Bangladesh.” In
Honour: Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence Against Women, edited by Lynn Welchman
and Sara Hossain, 282-307. London and New York: Zed Books, 2005.

Siddiqui, Sadaf Saaz. Proposed Nari O Shishu Nirjaton Domon Act 1998: A Review.
Dhaka: Naripokkho, 1998.

Singh, Aparna. “Acid Truth.” The Sunday Times of India. August 1, 2004, 11.

Singh, Gautam. “India’s Acid-Attack Victims Seek Justice, Compensation.” Los Angeles
Times. June 6, 2004, A8.

Singh, Kirti. “Violence against Women and the Indian Law.” In Violence, Law and
Women’s Rights in South Asia, edited by Savitri Goonesekere, 77-147. New Delhi,
London: Sage Publications, 2004.

293
Slack, Alison T. (1988). “Female Circumcision: A Critical Appraisal.” Human Rights
Quarterly 10 (1988): 437-86.

Smart, Carol. Feminism and the Power of Law. New York: Routledge, 1989.

Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India, A Report.
Prime Minister’s High Level Committee, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India.
November 2006.

Sobhan, Salma. Legal Status of Women in Bangladesh. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Bangladesh
Institute of Law and International Affairs, 1978.

Spender, Dale. There’s Always Been a Women’s Movement this Century. Boston:
Pandora Press, 1983.

Spretnak, Charlene. “Naming the Cultural Forces that push us toward War.” Journal of
Humanistic psychology 28 (1983): 104-114.
Stephens, Beth. “Humanitarian Law and Gender Violence: An End to Centuries of
Neglect?.” Hofstra Law and Policy Symposium 3 (1999): 87-109.

Steps Promoting Gender Equality, Human Rights and Good Governance. Steps Towards
Development, Issue 4, 2004.

Stewart, Frank Henderson. Honor. Chicago and London: The university of Chicago Press,
1994.

Stopler, Gila. “Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals Tolerate
Religious and Cultural Practices that Discriminate Against Women.” Columbia Journal
of Gender and Law 12 (2003): 154-221.

Submissions to the CEDAW Committee for seeking Intervention on Gender Based Crimes
and the Gendered Impact of the Gujarat Carnage 2002: The Citizens Committee for
Extraordinary Report on Gujarat, India, 2003.

Sullivan, Donna J. “Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for
Conflict Resolution.” Journal of International Law and Politics 24 (1992): 795-856.

Sumar, Sabiha and Khalid Nadvi. “Zina: The Hadood Ordinance and its Implications for
Women.” Women Living Under Muslim Laws Dossier #3, Montpellier, France:
International Solidarity Network, 1988, 11.

Sundar, Nandini. “Divining Evil: The State and Witchcraft in Bastar.” Gender,
Technology and Development 5, no. 3 (2001): 426-448.

Swanson, Jordan, “Acid Attacks: Bangladesh’s Efforts to Stop the Violence.” Harvard
Haelth Policy Review Archives 3, no. 1 (2002).

294
http://www.sdnpbd.org/sdi/international_days/women_day/2004/acid1.htm (last visited
February 22, 2007).

Tager, Esther. “The Chained Wife.” Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 4 (1999):
425-457.

Tahmina, Qurratul Ain. “Bangladesh: Women’s Policy Sneakily Changed by
Government.” Intel Press Service. July 27, 2008.

Tahzib-Lie, Bahia. “Applying a gender perspective in the area of the right to freedom of
religion or belief.” Brigham Young University Law Review 3 (1999): 967-988.

Tanveer, Khaled. “Judge orders Pakistani man blinded for throwing acid on his
fiancée.” Associated Press Worldstream. December 12, 2003.

Tapper, Richard and Nancy Tapper. “Marriage, Honour and Responsibility: Islamic and
Local Models in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.” Cambridge Anthropology 16,
no. 2 (1992): 3-21.

Taylor, Lisa M. “Saving Face: Acid Attack Laws after the UN Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.” Georgia Journal of
International and Comparative Law 29 (2001): 395-426.

Teays, Wanda. “The Burning Bride: The Dowry Problem in India.” Journal of Feminist
Studies in Religion 7 (1991): 29-52.

Teson, Fernando R. “Feminism and International Law: A Reply.” Virginia Journal of
International Law 33 (1993): 647-84.

Terzieff, Juliette. “Pakistan’s Acid-Attack Victims Press for Justice.” Women’s E News.
July 13, 2004. http://www.womensnews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/1908/context/archive
(last visited June 29, 2007).

Tharoor, Ishaan. “General Command.” Time Magazine. June 19, 2008.

The Next Generation: In the Wake of the Genocide, A Report on the Impact of the
Gujarat Pogrom on the Children and the Young. Supported by Citizens Initiative,
Ahmedabad and Action Aid India, Kolkata, 2002.

The Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance No. VII of 1979. Available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/zia_po_1979/ord7_1979.html#6 (last
visited May 7, 2008).

Threatened Existence: A Feminist Analysis of the Genocide in Gujarat. Report by the
International Initiative for Justice (IIJ), December 2003.
http://www.onlinevolunteers.org/gujarat/reports/iijg/2003/ (last visited July 24, 2004).

295

Tickner, J. Ann. Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post Cold Was
Era. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

Toubia, Nahid, ed. Female Genital Mutilation: A Call for Global Action. New York:
Women Inc, 1993.

Tuhiwahi Smith, Linda. Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous People.
New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1999.

Turshen, Meredeth. “The Political Economy of Rape: An Analysis of Systematic Rape
and Sexual Abuse of Women During Armed Conflict in Africa.” In Victims, Perpetrators
or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence, edited by Caroline O. N.
Moser and Fiona C. Clark, 55-68. London and New York: Zed Books, 2005.

Twine, France Winddance and Kathleen M. Blee, eds. Feminism and Antiracism:
International Struggles for Justice. New York: New York University Press, 2001.

UNICEF Bangladesh. Countering Acid Violence and Supporting Survivors in Bangladesh.
Dhaka: UNICEF, 2000.

United Nations. “Harmful Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and
Children.” Fact Sheet No. 23, 1995.

Van Ness, Peter, ed. Debating Human Rights: critical essays from the United States and
Asia. New York: Routledge, 1999.

Vandello, Joseph A. and Dov Cohen. “Culture, Gender and Men’s Intimate Partner
Violence.” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2 (2008): 652-667.

Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras. Judgment of July 29, Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (Ser. C) No. 4, 1988.

Verdirame, Guglielmo. “Testing the Effectiveness of International Norms: UN
Humanitarian Assistance and Sexual Apartheid in Afghanistan.” Human Rights
Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2001): 733-768.

Violence in Vadodara: A Report, People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Vadodara
and Vadodara Shanti Abhiyan, May 2002.

Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241.

Viswanath, Kalpana. “Shame and Control: Sexuality and Power in Feminist Discourse in
India.” In Embodiment: Essays on Gender and Identity, edited by Meenakshi Thapan,
313-334. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997.

296
Visweswaran, Kamala. “Gendered States: Rethinking Culture as a Site of South Asian
Human Rights Work.” Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2004): 483-511.

Volpp, Leti. “Feminism versus Multiculturalism.” Columbia Law Review 101 (2001):
1181-1218.

Waheed, Manar. “Domestic Violence in Pakistan: The Tension Between Intervention and
Sovereign Autonomy in Human Rights Law.” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 29
(2004): 937-975.

Walby, Sylvia. Theorizing Patriarchy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers,
1990.

Walker, Anne S. “Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice at International Criminal Court.”
Globalnet 91 (1997).

Wall, Christopher. “Human Rights and Economic Sanctions: The New Imperialism.”
Fordham International Law Journal 22 (1998): 577-611.

Warren, Mary Anne. “Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection.” Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 3 (1987): 683-692.

Warrick, Catherine. “The Vanishing Victim: Criminal Law and Gender in Jordan.” Law
and Society Review 39 (2005): 315-345.

Wax, Emily. “Ethiopian Rape Victim Pits Law v. Culture.” washingtonpost.com, June 7,
2004.

Weaver, Katherine M. “Women’s Rights and Sharia Law: A Workable Reality? An
Examination of Possible International Human Rights Approaches through the Continuing
Reform of the Pakistani Hudood Ordinance.” Duke Journal of Comparative and
International Law 17 (2007): 483-510.

Welchman, Lynn and Sara Hossain , eds. Honour: Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence
Against Women. New York: Zed Books, 2005.

Werbner, Pnina. “Honor, Shame and the Politics of Sexual Embodiment among South
Asian Muslims in Britain and Beyond: An Analysis of Debates in the Public Sphere.”
International Social Science Review 6, no.1 (2005): 25-47.

Wesson, Kate. “A Situational Assessment of Acid Violence in Bangladesh.”
Development in Practice 12, no. 1 (2002): 96-100.

White, Sarah C. Arguing with the Crocodile: Gender and Class in Bangladesh. London:
Zed Books, 1992.

297
Wilkinson, Tracy. “Activists Seek End to Jordan’s ‘Honor’ Killings; Despite Royal
Support, Efforts to Outlaw Practice – in which males murder female kin who shame the
family – Face Strong Opposition from Islamists.” Los Angeles Times. March 11, 2000, pg.
2.

Willsher, Kim. “Baby the Latest Victim in Acid Attacks.” The Age. March 20, 2003.
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/03/19/1047749823010.html (last visited June 29,
2007).

Wing, Adrien Katherine and Sylke Merchan. “Rape, Ethnicity, and Culture: Spirit Injury
from Bosnia to Black America.” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 25, no.1 (1993):
1-48.

Wing, Adrien Katherine. “A Critical Race Feminist Conceptualization of Violence: South
African and Palestinian Women.” Albany law Review 60 (1997): 943-976.

Winter, Bronwyn. “Women, the Law, and Cultural Relativism in France: The Case of
Excision.” Signs 19, no.4 (1994): 939-974.

Winter, Bronwyn, Denise Thompson and Sheila Jeffreys. “The UN Approach to Harmful
Traditional Practices: Some Conceptual Problems.” International Feminist Journal of
Politics 4, no.1 (2002): 72-94.

Wolfwood, Theresa. “Amnesty Vows to Dishonour ‘Honour’ Killings.” Herizons. July 1,
2005, 6-7.

Women for Women. Women and Politics: Empowerment Issues – A Seminar Report.
Dhaka: Women for Women,1995.

Women for Women. Stop Violence against Women. Dhaka: NGO Committee on Beijing
Plus Five, 2001.

Women in the Law Project. Token Gestures: Women's Human Rights and UN Reporting:
The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture. Washington DC: International Human Rights
Law Group, 1993.

Wright, Shelley. “Human Rights and Women’s Rights: An Analysis of the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.”
In Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A Global Challenge, edited by Kathleen E.
Mahoney and Paul Mahoney. Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993.

Wu, Elizabeth. “Splash of Death: Victims of Acid Attacks find new Life in the West.”
CityBeat 8, no. 2, April 11-17, 2002.

298
Xinhua News Agency. “Dhaka to assist victims of acid throwing, natural calamities.”
September 4, 2002. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-91040858.html (last visited
March 27, 2008).

Yoshimi, Yoshiaki. Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during
World War II. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

Youngs, Gillian. “Private Pain/Public Peace: Women’s Rights as Human Rights and
Amnesty International’s Report on Violence against Women.” Signs 28 (2003): 1209-
1230.

Zafarullah Habib and Mohammad Habibur Rahman, “Human Rights, Civil Society and
Nongovernmental Organizations: The Nexus in Bangladesh.” Human Rights Quarterly
24, no. 4 (2002): 1011-1034.

Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and Another v. State of Gujarat and Others, 2004 4 SCC 158.

Zaman, Habiba. “Violence Against Women in Bangladesh: Issues and Responses.”
Women’s Studies International Forum 22, no. 1 (1999): 37-48.

Zia, Afiya. Sex Crime in the Islamic Context: Rape, Class and Gender in Pakistan.
Lahore: ASR Publications, 1994.

Zia, Shahla. Violence Against Women and their Quest for Justice. Lahore: Simorgh
Women’s Resource and Publications Center, 1998.

Ziauddin, M. “The Legitimacy of Honour Killing.” Dawn, May 8, 1999.

Zoepf, Katherine. “A Dishonorable Affair.” The New York Times. September 23, 2007.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract This dissertation examines the phenomenon of honor related violence beyond honor killings as I argue that honor crimes do not always amount to murder but can take various manifestations and should be recognized as such. I do so with the help of three case studies: honor killings in Pakistan, acid attacks against women in Bangladesh and use of rape as a weapon of war during the internal conflict in Gujarat, India.

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

Greening law: a socio-legal analysis of environmental human rights in India

PDF

The impact of 9/11 on the judicial treatment of Middle Eastern asylum applicants in the U.S. courts

PDF

The elephant and the mouse that roared: the prospects of international policy and local authority in the case of the convention on international species (CITES)

Asset Metadata

Creator Agarwal, Archana (author)

Core Title Crimes of honor: an international human rights perspective on violence against women in South Asia

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publication Date 12/04/2008

Defense Date 10/17/2008

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag human rights,OAI-PMH Harvest,south Asia,violence against women,women in South Asia,Women's rights

Place Name Asia (continents), Bangladesh (countries), Gujarat (city or populated place), India (countries), Pakistan (countries)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Renteln, Alison Dundes (committee chair), Dekmejian, Richard H. (committee member), Lutkehaus, Nancy (committee member)

Creator Email agarwal.archana@gmail.com,archanaa@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m1868

Unique identifier UC1203363

Identifier etd-Agarwal-2534 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-137146 (legacy record id),usctheses-m1868 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Agarwal-2534.pdf

Dmrecord 137146

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Agarwal, Archana

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu