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See it want it buy it: the changing face of the early adopter in high technology and the tech industry's targeted public relations campaigns

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See it want it buy it: the changing face of the early adopter in high technology and the tech industry's targeted public relations campaigns

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Content SEE IT WANT IT BUY IT THE CHANGING FACE OF THE EARLY ADOPTER IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND THE TECH INDUSTRY’S TARGETED PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGNS by Eli Menaker A Thesis Presented to the FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS (STRATEGIC PUBLIC RELATIONS) May 2011 Copyright 2011 Eli Zelig Menaker ii Epigraph “Never before in history has innovation offered promise of so much to so many in so short a time.” - Bill Gates iii Dedication For Margaux, of course, And for my parents Joanna and Steven Menaker iv Acknowledgements This thesis would not have been possible without the support of numerous friends, family members and professors, all of whom helped me craft my thoughts and edit this work. First, to my parents, whose constant support has brought me success and happiness and motivated me to find and pursue my passion. Furthermore, the several months’-long conversation attempting to explain to them what, exactly, I was getting a Master’s Degree in, helped me define my future. Second, to Jenn Floto, who not only advised me throughout the dissertation process, but also provided a crucial sounding board for my thoughts and theories. Her moral support and honesty helped not only guide this thesis to completion, but also steered my course work throughout graduate school. Third, to my sister Margaux, whose drive and ambition were cut short too young, but in whose memory I take on new challenges and strive for the greatness she would undoubtedly have achieved. Fourth, to my friends, for taking my survey and helping me to gather so many useful responses. I promise we can all hang out now. Fifth, to Stephanie Kagel, my personal trainer, who not only kept my body healthy while my mind deteriorated, but also helped me to both network with very useful contacts and refine my thoughts. v Finally, to my thesis readers, Professors Jian “Jay” Wang and Jonathan Kotler, for taking time to read my work and for introducing me to the world of strategic public relations. vi Table of Contents Dedication iii Acknowledgments iv List of Tables vii List of Figures viii Abstract ix Chapter 1: Introduction: The Line Outside the Store 1 Chapter 2: Hypothesis and Thesis Statement 4 Chapter 3: Research Methodology 7 Chapter 4: The Technology Adoption Life Cycle 9 Chapter 5: Why Have the Early Adopters Changed? 14 Chapter 6: Apple Unveilings – The Steve Jobs Approach 16 Chapter 7: BlackBerry Unveilings – Copying the Steve Job’s Style… With A Twist 20 Chapter 8: A Tale of Two Technologies 24 Chapter 9: Android Unveilings – Entering the Market At Its Peak 31 Chapter 10: Surveying The Adopters 40 Chapter 11: Software Launches and The Rise of Social Networking 50 Chapter 12: Barriers to Technology Adoption 57 Chapter 13: Conclusion and Recommendations 64 Glossary of Common Terms 68 Bibliography 71 vii List of Tables Table 1: How Soon After 1998 Did You Purchase a Laptop Computer? 44 Table 2: How Soon After 2002 Did You Purchase a Smartphone? 45 viii List of Figures Figure 1: Audience cut-away at the October 25, 2001 Apple Unveiling of iPod in Cupertino, CA 5 Figure 2: A Side-By-Side Comparison of RIM CEO Mike Lazaridis and Apple CEO Steve Jobs Tablet Unveiling 22 Figure 3: A line forms outside a Sprint store in Alexandria, Virginia at 7:45 AM on June 4, 2010 – the day of the HTC EVO 4G release. 37 Figure 4: Early adopters lineup around a corner on June 4, 2010 waiting for the release of the Android EVO 4G. 38 Figure 5: At 7:30 AM a line forms in Washington, DC on June 4, 2010, for the Android HTC EVO 39 Figure 6 1: Survey Respondent’s Age 43 Figure 7: Technology Adoption Scale 47 ix Abstract This thesis set out to determine in what way early adopters of high technology have changed in the past three decades. From the release of the first computer for mass consumption, to the release of the iPad, this thesis looks at the demographic shift of consumers and how it effects the product launch, release and marketing campaigns. By deconstructing product launch campaigns through the years we can see how the adopters have been targeted both successfully and unsuccessfully. This thesis also looks at the effect of potential adoption barriers and how they have changed as well as how they relate to different adopter types. A survey, conducted by the author, sheds some light on the motives and demographics of adopters as well as how they see themselves in relation to technology consumption. The results reveal an apparent change as technology becomes more of a lifestyle accessory, and less focused on business or information technology needs. The author also pieces together several outside studies about marketing to early adopters and various demographic groups. 1 Chapter 1: Introduction: The Line Outside the Store Rain was reported in the early hours of May 16, 1994, as a modest group lingered outside a Wal-Mart store in Seattle. The store wouldn’t open for another hour, but this group waited in the rain, eager to be the first to own Apple’s latest innovation. This product would undoubtedly revolutionize the computer industry. As they waited, they compared knowledge about the specs and design features they had read about in trade magazines and seen at tech conferences. They talked about the instrument’s built-in track pad and 16-bit stereo, its swap-out CPU daughter card, the 9.5” Dual Scan passive color/B&W displays, and the fact that it was the first of its kind to include Ethernet through an AAUI port. On that day, Apple Computer released the PowerBook 540c. Macintosh sold over 500,000 of these early laptops and the 540c was crowned as an overwhelming success. In a November 2000 survey by “Insanely Great Macintosh,” the 540c ranked second best of all time in Macintosh PowerBook models. 1 Did you buy one? Did someone buy one for you? Did you ask for one for Christmas or your birthday? Did you queue up outside Wal-Mart on May 16, 1994, to be an early adopter of the latest in laptop technology? Heavy winds swept through Seattle on November 10, 2001, as a small line formed outside an Apple retailer. The group shifted their collective feet, anxious for the store to open, fawning over a large advertisement for the latest innovation from Apple – a device 1 (Davison) 2 that would put “1,000 songs in your pocket.” 2 They had all heard or read the Steve Jobs quote from the MacWorld Conference and Expo: “Apple has invented a whole new category of digital music player that lets you put your entire music collection in your pocket and listen to it wherever you go.” 3 Since the first-generation 5GB iPod was released, there have been 22 iterations of iPod products with over 220 million units sold globally. Unless you are one of the ten percent of the population who bought a different hard drive-based MP3 player, you probably own an iPod product – or five. 4 It wasn’t raining on April 3, 2010, as throngs of consumers crowded outside the Apple Store in Seattle’s University Village at 8:30 AM, waiting to get their hands on the first iPads to be released. They stood impatiently, discussing the cool new innovations, the sleek design, and the bold, easy-to-use display they had seen in online videos and mainstream magazine and newspaper articles. The iPad sold 300,000 units on its first day of availability. One month later, Apple had sold one million. 5 As of December 25 th , 2010, 14.79 million iPads had been purchased worldwide. So what changed? Obviously, the high-tech industry began catering to a wider audience. It’s easy to see how Steve Jobs helped move technology to a more user-friendly platform and create 2 (Hormby, and Knight) 3 (Frith) 4 (Hormby, and Knight) 5 (Harvey) 3 avenues for everyday use. But when a product such as the iPad sells, in its first day, more than half the total number of PowerBook 540cs ever sold, it is about more than just a great product. Those people standing outside stores on the launch or release dates of tech products are the early adopters, sometimes called “lighthouse” customers or consumers. Throughout this thesis, we will expand our understanding of the early adopter, but for now let’s give a simple definition: An early adopter is the first consumer to purchase a product and act as an ambassador and strong supporter of that product. He or she often knows a great deal about the product before its release. Early adopters are the consummate trendsetters for their in-group or demographic. The broader the demographic of early adopters for your product, the wider the base established in your next set of consumers – the early majority. 4 Chapter 2: Hypothesis and Thesis Statement The lines outside the stores are examples of a steady demographic shift in the early adopters of high technology over the past two decades. The self-labeled tech geeks of the early ’90s were the early adopters of the majority of technology products. This was the base to which companies like Apple and Microsoft catered when launching their products. Initial public relations and marketing strategies were designed with a specific image in mind for their primary early consumers. The success of the PowerBook 540c is a great example of how new tech innovations were rewarded by early adopters who understood the specifications and details of the product. But we can see by total volume sales that the audience for those early laptops was rather slim, and the demographic group purchasing them was primarily businessmen, tech geeks and any others with a firm finger on the pulse of new technology. The iMac and iPod were some of the earliest attempts to broaden the market for computers and tech products. For most people, it wasn’t about the specs or the design capabilities; rather, it was the look, feel and quality of the iMac and iPod that led them to sell so well. Yet when looking at video from the October 23, 2001, launch of the iPod, we see an audience filled with computer industry analysts and trade-magazine media, rather than the young generation that would almost immediately adopt the iPod as a symbol of their decade. (See Figure 1) 5 Figure 1 Audience cutaway at the October 25, 2001, Apple unveiling of iPod in Cupertino, CA (Screenshot, Apple Music Event 2001-The First Ever iPod Introduction. 3 April 2006. Youtube. Web.) Today, the iPad’s success is unmatched in early sales of a tech product, and we see jazzy notebooks being used across all demographics, for any number of purposes and with no end in sight for continued sales growth among burgeoning audiences. So if growth in the tech industry is so measurably magnificent, where is the problem? The issue stands with the product launch itself, and with the early public relations and marketing tactics that often fail to adequately target and inform the changing face of the new early adopters in high technology. This thesis sets out to discover and, hopefully prove, that as the past two decades have shown dramatic change in early adopters, public 6 relations and marketing strategies aimed at them have remained somewhat stagnant. The primary focus will be the demographics of age, gender and occupation. A more thorough study would include a broader definition including income, family size, race and ethnicity. Though Apple is the pinnacle of consumer technology, we will also look at Research In Motion Ltd., creators of the BlackBerry; Google, creators of Android smartphones; and social media platforms like Twitter and Foursquare. We will look at the successes and failures of product launch and the positioning and strategic audience targeting used by technology companies. Who were the early adopters? Who are they now? Who will they be? How are they targeted? In what ways are they being overlooked? 7 Chapter 3: Research Methodology The author will pinpoint and deconstruct early adopters across all demographics throughout the three target decades in order to identify significant shifts, growth and influence of demographic groups over the years. If a notable change can be found, it would point strongly to a new emerging class of early adopters. These early adopters will be differentiated by their motivations to purchase; their persuasion to buy, or their persuasion of others to buy; and their intentions for product use. Once this is demonstrated, we will attempt to link our found evidence to a sharp change in early adopters. The second and key part of this hypothesis stems from an evaluation and deconstruction of major high-tech product launches over the past 30 years – specifically pinpointing targeted or intended audiences. Identifying primary audiences for tech companies will help to indicate areas where public relations and marketing campaigns were successful or flawed in the months preceding product launch. It will be especially important to focus on the unveiling of tech advances. The way a tech company announces a new product – and to whom it announces it – are great determiners of the early adopter audience and of the targeted/ intended audience – the two are not always the same. Furthermore, the author will survey over 200 technology consumers about their purchasing habits and timeline to adoption of new tech products. The survey will try to focus on demographic differences as well as how individuals place themselves along the technology adoption life cycle. 8 Interviews with experts in the field of technology public relations will help to show trends in new technology campaigns. Shorter interviews with general consumers will give a brief insight into reasons for purchasing and early adoption of new products. Identifying the motivation of both technology companies and consumers in relation to product launch will be key to our understanding of the change in early adopters as well as the adaptation both successfully and unsuccessfully of marketing and public relations launch campaigns. 9 Chapter 4: The Technology Adoption Life Cycle The Technology Adoption Life Cycle is a model that “describes the market penetration of any new technology product in terms of a progression in the types of consumers it attracts throughout its useful life.” 6 Put simply, it allows businesses and marketing teams to divide consumers into four major groups: early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards. Early adopters or lighthouse customers are consumers who want to be the first to purchase a new product. They are on the front lines of technology and often buy the product within its first month of release. According to Moore, early adopters “are people who find it easy to imagine, understand and appreciate the benefits of a new technology, and to relate these potential benefits to their other concerns.” 7 Our definition of early adopters will likely shift throughout this thesis, but it is important to remember that whatever early adopters’ reasons for buying a product, they do so early, and with a vast amount of information about the product. This conclusion is based on some third-party reviews, but mostly on public relations and marketing campaigns from the companies themselves. Early majority are arguably the most important group to a company when it comes to profit. These consumers look for utility and practicality in their products. They can approach products somewhat cautiously and are heavily influenced by reviews and the 6 (Moore 11) 7 (Ibid. 12) 10 opinions of early adopters. “They know that many of these newfangled inventions end up as passing fads, so they are content to wait and see how other people are making out before they buy in themselves.” 8 Innovations depend on the early majority to succeed. If no early majority arises or their numbers are too few, the product will fail before it reaches any broader audiences. A good example of this is the Segway Personal Transport device, the two-wheeled electric vehicle released in 2001. Though well hyped and unique in its design and function, the Segway wasn't feasible for the early majority audience. The Technology Adoption Life Cycle ended with early adopters and the product drifted to fringe audiences such as campus or mall security. The lesson here is that an energized early adopter class will lead to a profitable and large early majority. But if the early adopter regrets his or her purchase decision, the negative reviews and influence will diminish the early majority interest. Late majority are the most cautious group. They wait for a product to become well established in the technology culture before they consider purchasing. They are often fearful that the product will become obsolete soon after they buy, or that a newer, better version will be introduced – as is the case with many tech products, especially within the Apple brand. Laggards are the last to buy a product, though this does not stem, as one might suspect, from caution or trepidation about making a poor purchase decision. Instead, laggards are neutral disinterested buyers who have no connection to the technology industry or its products. They may be technophobes, are often 60+ years of age, and only 8 (Ibid. 13) 11 “…buy a technological product…when it is buried so deep inside another product…that they don’t even know it is there.” 9 Laggards are not susceptible to marketing techniques and so it is not in the interest of tech companies to pursue this audience. It should be noted that some versions of the Technology Adoption Life Cycle model include a smaller and often difficult-to-define group known as innovators. Innovators often seek new technology on their own – they shop more on the basis of the next major revolution or breakthrough rather than brand name. For example, an innovator would want to buy the first computer tablet device to be released because it was something being discussed by tech companies as the next step; however, he or she wouldn’t just buy an iPad through brand loyalty to Apple. Innovators can be very important to a product’s third-party credence, but because they are such a small portion of the consuming population, they are less important to this thesis. Like laggards, innovators are rarely responsive to marketing tactics, unlike early adopters who are the most aware of a new product’s specs and reviews. The Technology Adoption Life Cycle is very useful to tech product companies that are trying to target certain groups at different times of a product's availability. For example, a tech product that had been on the shelves for 5 months would be of little interest to an early adopter, and anyone buying the product at that time would not be classified as such. This means that a solid understanding of demographics of distinct prospect groups based on the product characteristics is necessary to craft a campaign targeting and influencing the right people. This is essentially the crux of this thesis: 9 (Ibid. 13) 12 attempting to discover whether the early adopter has changed while campaign tactics have remained stagnant. Before we continue, there is one more thing we must understand: Just because someone is an early adopter of one tech product does not mean he or she will be an early adopter of all, or even any other, tech product. There are “types” of people who seem to be early adopters throughout generations, but someone who buys an iPad the second month it is released may have waited several years before buying an iPhone. This is primarily due to what Everett Rogers referred to as “The Early Adopter Tax” 10 The early adopter tax means the price a consumer pays for buying a product early, before any of the bugs are worked out and before the 2.0 or later version has made improvements. It also means they usually pay a premium for a product. This tax has become much steeper in the past decade as products like smart phones, iPads, MP3 players etc. are being revolutionized and relaunched at astounding rates. This is in stark contrast to the release of laptop computers and cell phones throughout the ’80s and ’90s. Let’s explore this further. Say a company releases Product X. This product is top of the line and the first in a new technology innovation. The company has no intention of releasing a Product X2.0 and so early adopters flock to Product X with a strong understanding of its pros, cons and potential bugs. The early adopter tax here is relatively low since, even though Product X may be improved down the line, the early adopter wants to use the technology now. It is worth it to them not to wait a year or so for an upgrade that may not even come. 10 (Rogers 283) 13 However, say the same company releases Product Y. Product Y is similarly cutting edge, but now that company has shown a history of updating its products only months after the initial release. Product Y2.0 is likely to be released in only a month or two with better quality, higher storage capacity, etc. Furthermore, Product Y3.0 could be released in a year, and at the rate the company has shown it is moving toward new innovation, Product Y3.0 could be far more advanced than the original Product Y. In this case, the early adopter tax is amazingly steep. An early adopter of the product would own an outdated version within a year at the least, and since costs are often highest when first released, they will have literally and figuratively paid more for this product than it is worth. The hypothetical above is exactly how the tech industry has changed in the past three decades and would account greatly for the demographic shift in early adopters. As devout technology consumers begin to see the early adopter tax increase, they will stray away from becoming an early adopter of the technology platform and opt instead for becoming an early adopter of the best iteration of that platform. This means a new group would transplant them as early adopters of the original product release. 11 11 (Wasow) 14 Chapter 5: Why Have the Early Adopters Changed? In the past twenty years, the technology industry has experienced an unprecedented boom in innovation and popular consumer products. Companies have expanded their audiences so much that persons of almost any age can be found using everything from smartphones to MP3 players. Additionally, products once seen as fringe or only for businesspeople on the go, such as laptops, have replaced desktop computers as the leading seller for personal use. 12 With a wider audience, however, came the more severe spotlight and the always- dangerous reviews of third party audiences. The tone of the reviews began to change and third-party consumers deconstructed the devices based on very different qualities. The story of the personal computer business exemplifies how a market evolves. The innovators [or early adopters] who purchased the first Altairs and Apples were mainly computer freaks who liked to play with the system and make it perform interesting tricks by programming it in arcane ’machine language.’ Some early users were even sharp enough to modify hardware. 13 The point made by Davidow here is that these early adopters, like those in line for the first laptop 540c, cared about the technology of the product. They had a firm understanding of its potential and its flaws and were willing to accept those flaws because it allowed them to tinker – like buying a rundown house with the prospect of fixing it up yourself. 12 (Murphy) 13 (Davidow 31) 15 This approach to technology is all but gone, as companies like Apple have made it beyond difficult to tamper with or alter their products. You rarely see a custom-altered iPod. So tech geeks were forced to put their trust in the company to, over time, make the alterations and improvements they were planning to make on their own. Apple has such a dedicated, cult-like fan base precisely because of its willingness to listen and respond to comments from consumers. This is the beginning of how we see the shift in early adopters of high technology. As tech companies became more refined and began catering to larger audiences, tech geeks realized that buying a product in its infancy meant that product would be sub-par. This, too, can be traced to the increase in competition between the tech companies. As more companies began vying for a share of the growing technology audience, the importance of being first on the scene with a revolutionary innovation was amplified. To this end, companies began releasing ideas that were half-formed and then updating them later. The fact that the first iPod released with a 5GB memory was followed only 2 months later with the exact same model but with a 10GB memory meant the early adopters of the 5GB iPods paid an extremely high early adopter tax. Those attuned to the tech industry likely began feeling cheated when they saw non- tech geeks walking around with superior versions of the products they had bought first, with the intention of being the leading edge of the technology revolution. These tech geeks likely faded into early majority, waiting for a product to become established and well reviewed as a consistent and high-end piece of technology before they bought it. 14 14 (Wortham) 16 Chapter 6: Apple Unveilings – The Steve Jobs Approach The second part of this thesis shows how the marketing campaigns for major tech companies have failed to adequately adjust to the changing face of early adopters. This section will examine how companies launched new tech products; how they unveiled them, and to what audience; and how they followed up unveilings with pre-release campaigns to promote awareness and instill interest into specific early adopter audiences. If you’ve seen one unveiling of an Apple product, you’ve seen them all. Beginning in 1984 with the introduction of the Macintosh 128K, all the way up to the unveiling of the iPad, the only variation we see in Apple product launches is that Steve Jobs gets older, and the products get sleeker. The 128K computer was famously teased with the now- iconic Superbowl commercial depicting a woman breaking down the barriers of society in a dystopian future – obviously referencing the George Orwell novel “1984.” The product was then unveiled two days later, at the annual shareholder’s meeting on January 24, 1984, to a crowd of nearly three thousand. After a lengthy spiel discussing the history of Apple and computer technology, Jobs walked over to a canvas case at center stage and opened the bag to reveal the first 128K Macintosh. Jobs inserted a floppy disk and the computer spoke, introducing itself briefly then introducing once again, Steve Jobs. Andy Hertzfeld, one of the original Apple design team members describes the moment. “Pandemonium reigns as the demo completes. Steve has the biggest smile I’ve 17 ever seen on his face, obviously holding back tears as he is overwhelmed by the moment. The ovation continues for at least five minutes before he quiets the crowd down.” 15 The release of Apple products at shareholder meetings and running through the technological specifics with the CEO is a rather different approach to product launches. Most companies’ shareholder meetings are uninspired litanies of the company’s quarterly earnings and future projections. But Apple has a long history of turning these once- monotonous affairs into full-on pep rallies showcasing new products, services and innovations. As we’ll see later, this style eventually became the new paradigm among technology companies. For the unveiling of the first Macintosh, made specifically for office and business use – with a very minute personal audience – this setting is appropriate. But fast-forward fifteen years and we see the new innovation of the iMac followed swiftly by the iBook. Both products were introduced in the same forum, with the same gimmick, to the same demographic. The next year the iBook personal laptop was introduced; in 2001, the iPod; in 2007, the iPhone; and in 2010, the iPad – all unveiled at events for shareholders and the Mac elite. The evolution of technology, the timeline in which it surges forward, is sparse in the early years and crowded leading up to the present. So it is with all innovation. Once an idea like air travel or space travel is first achieved, the steps to the next great success become shorter and shorter. As the technology surges forward, the marketing tactics and strategies must also adapt and improve in order to maximize audience potential. 15 (Hertzfeld) 18 This is not to say that the audiences at these Mac events aren’t strongly invested and interested in Mac products, but rather that they would be more likely to want the best version of the product rather than the 1.0 release. Look again at the unveiling of the iPod and note the audience camera cutaway shows no signs of the initial target demographic. (See Figure 1 above) The early adopter iPod audience was primarily young students looking to carry larger amounts of songs on an MP3 storage unit. It’s hard to argue with Apple’s incredible success – a record-setting $20 billion in sales during the fiscal fourth quarter of 2010 speaks for itself – but the truth is it has thrived on quality products. 16 Many of those products withstood the test of time and earned positive consumer reviews. Initially, however, these products got negative reviews or were approached by the trade magazines very skeptically. David Pogue of The New York Times wrote in a March 31, 2010, review of the iPad from the point of view of two potential audiences. To the techies, he said, “The bottom line is that you can get a laptop for much less money – with a full keyboard, DVD drive, U.S.B. jacks, camera-card slot, camera, the works. Besides: If you’ve already got a laptop and a smartphone, who’s going to carry around a third machine?” 17 His review for everyone else, i.e., the non-tech consumer, said, “The Apple iPad is basically a gigantic iPod Touch…The bottom line is that the iPad has been designed and 16 (Goldman) 17 (Pogue) 19 built by a bunch of perfectionists. If you like the concept, you’ll love the machine. The only question is: Do you like the concept?” 18 It’s hard to argue with 14 million units sold in less than a year, but Pogue’s point is not without merit. His argument to tech geeks is that the things they enjoy about tech products can’t really be found here, or can be found in higher quality and caliber in laptop products. The only victory for techies here, Pogue says, is the iPad’s size convenience. 18 (Ibid.) 20 Chapter 7: BlackBerry Unveilings – Copying the Jobs Style… With a Twist Steve Jobs may not have invented the marketing strategy of the CEO unveiling a product at a shareholder event, but he is probably the most famous CEO-spokesperson, due in large part to his consistency over the past twenty-seven years. And with his success, it is no wonder that CEOs throughout the technology sector have rushed to mimic his style. There is great merit in this tactic; by having the CEO manage the unveiling, you lend a high level of transparency and authenticity to the product being introduced. Also, by launching at annual shareholder meetings, you can connect with arguably the most invested members of your company. Of course, shareholders aren’t the only ones present at these unveilings. Members of the media, trade magazines and, in more recent years, high-profile tech bloggers are among the audience; however, few mainstream consumers can be found there. This means that the unveiling of these products is still inexorably limited to a small group of committed individuals whose primary concern is most likely an increase in stock prices. The overall point here is that consumers are hearing about the new technology launches from a select few media groups and bloggers. The new generation of early adopters, the new demographic, is banned from the room. On October 25, 2010, Research In Motion (RIM), the telecommunication and wireless giant behind the BlackBerry smartphone, introduced their latest creation, the BlackBerry PlayBook. The PlayBook is RIM’s answer to the iPad, the company’s version 21 of a tablet. The PlayBook was unveiled during the keynote address on the first day of the Adobe MAX conference in Los Angeles, CA. The Adobe MAX conference is an annual gathering of “thousands of designers, developers and business leaders [who] shape the future of digital media…” 19 The PlayBook was introduced by RIM CEO Mike Lazaridis and Adobe Systems CTO Kevin Lynch. Lazaridis showed the product in front of tech bloggers, shareholders and business leaders, pacing the stage, carrying the PlayBook and demonstrating the capabilities on a large projection screen behind him. The release of the PlayBook and iPad are nearly indistinguishable. Both take place in large auditoriums in front of mostly supportive and invested crowds who, although at the forefront of the technology world, are not the mass consumer or even the majority of early adopters. (See figure 2) 19 (Adobe Max) 22 Figure 2 A side-by-side comparison of RIM CEO Mike Lazaridis and Apple CEO Steve Jobs tablet unveiling (Screenshot Left, RIM Unveils the BlackBerry PlayBook. 27 September 2010. Youtube. Web.) (Screenshot Right, Apple iPad Unveiled. 27 January 2010. Youtube. Web.) So far, we have focused mainly on the product launch itself, but this is just the beginning of a marketing campaign. Though the PlayBook was announced and demoed in October of 2010, it won’t be released until April 10, 2011. That gives the marketing team at RIM almost six months to put their strategy to work and reach the target audience that will become either their greatest champions or strongest critics. Already RIM has shown initiative in marketing toward a younger generation and more mainstream set of early adopters. At the 2011 South by Southwest (SXSW) Music Festival, always a hotbed of new technology, BlackBerry will be hosting a late-night party showcasing the PlayBook. This marketing strategy was devised by Edelman Public 23 Relations and speaks directly to the success of software launches like Twitter and Foursquare at previous festivals. 20 In all likelihood, the PlayBook will sell very well among new early adopters, especially those wary of Apple products for whatever reason. RIM may not be the first tablet on the market, but the company has shown in the past that sometimes, waiting to enter a market can be far more successful than being first on the shelves. Though the product unveiling remains stagnant and unremarkable, post-launch, pre- release marketing by RIM has proven very lucrative over the years. Going back to the early days of RIM, we see a company that fully understood the benefits of positioning a product as a superior alternative, rather than a cutting-edge or revolutionary game changer. 20 (Atkins) 24 Chapter 8: A Tale of Two Technologies There are two famous cases in technology marketing that stand out as contrasting examples of marketing techniques. The first is RIM’s brilliant positioning of a new product within an established market; the second is TiVo’s uphill struggle to market a new sector of technology, requiring a massive amount of consumer education. Looking at these stories, we can see the difficulties faced by tech companies in understanding their audiences and not only identifying their early adopters, but also grasping their barriers to purchasing. RIM was founded in 1984 and worked primarily on two-way paging and wireless e- mail networking. In the late 90s, pagers were simple notification devices that alerted users with the phone number of the person paging them. The user would then return the call via telephone. In 1997, RIM released the BlackBerry Inter@ctive Pager. The revolutionary pager “…could hold names, email addresses, phone and fax numbers and incoming and outgoing messages.” 21 The thing to realize is that this was the first hand- held two-way e-mail text communication device. But that kind of new technology wasn’t very common or understood outside the tech-savvy underworld of the late 90’s. So RIM decided to market the BlackBerry as an “interactive pager” rather than a mobile e-mail device. Steve Blank, a serial entrepreneur, founder of eight Silicon Valley startups and professor of entrepreneurship at UC Berkeley, Stanford and Columbia, explains: 21 (Blank) 25 RIM positioned the BlackBerry as an ‘interactive pager’ because pagers were something people could understand. While the device was actually doing email, people understood it as ‘the pager that you could respond with.’ While phrases like ‘mobile email and packet switching’ didn’t mean a thing to RIM’s first customers, the ‘interactive pager’ positioning proved important in attracting early adopters. 22 The point here is that the general public was familiar with a pager, but a two-way e- mailing device that worked through a wireless data network was too new to become mainstream lingo. The difficulty in creating an entirely new product was positioning it in a way that people would understand. In this case, many who adopted the product might have dismissed it as too advanced or too complex – a device built just for tech geeks. We don’t just have to take Blank’s word for it, though. RIM founder and co-CEO Mihalis “Mike” Lazaridis talks about the initial marketing challenge of the BlackBerry: The key thing to remember was that e-mail was not a new idea for anyone that went to school in the early ’80s. But industry was rather slow to adopt it. Not because of anything with industry, but because technology just hadn’t reached the kind of ubiquity that it needed. It had to reach a certain critical mass so that there was somebody to send it to. What we realized was that, in 1997 and before, there was a paging culture in North America…We decided to build a very advanced pager. It looked like a pager; it was the size of a pager; it even seemed to operate like a pager. Except that it was a full-blown two-way email terminal… We spent a lot of time getting [the strategy] right, knowing that the market was not ready for it. We disguised what later became the BlackBerry as a pager. 23 22 (Ibid.) 23 (Livingston 149) 26 The point here is that RIM had the perfect opportunity to package the BlackBerry as “the first packet switched interactive messaging network,” 24 but instead they chose a more modest approach that would pay massive dividends down the line. They expanded their early adopter audience by shifting their marketing strategy away from the tech geeks and onto a larger audience. This new audience included anyone who used pagers, which in the late ’90s included doctors, lawyers and many more business professionals. BlackBerry quickly became the technology of choice for those professionals. RIM succeeded in becoming the forerunner in an established area of technology: pagers. RIM decided not to attempt the far more difficult task of creating a new category and, presumably, spending millions in marketing educating toward a generation whose knowledge and usage of e-mail was limited at best. Instead, they chose to stick to a market where the barrier to entry was significantly lower and the mainstream awareness was higher. This means they could market their product as the best, most useful pager that did things other pagers couldn’t. It rocketed them to the top of an existing market and, as smartphones became more prominent in the early ’00s, it was easy to shift from marketing the device as a pager shift since their product was already doing many of the things promised by new developers. All they had to do was repackage the BlackBerry as a smartphone with some significant upgrades and their built-in audience would respond. 25 On the other end of the spectrum, we see a now-infamous case of marketing a brand- new technology whose initial strategy failed due to poor audience understanding. Shortly 24 (Blank) 25 (Blank) 27 after the release of the BlackBerry, a company called TiVo Inc. was being formed in California. The initial intent of the company was the creation of home networking devices, but co-founder Mike Ramsay expressed concern over this technology. “The idea of a server is fine, but how do you explain it to the average consumer? We learned very quickly that this was going to be a hard sell and a hard thing technologically.” 26 TiVo Inc. instead began working on a digital video recorder and eventually became the first to release the now ubiquitous technology. The DVR did things few ever dreamed possible, from recording shows without the struggle of setting up a VCR, to setting up season passes and automatically recording new episodes of your selected shows, even pausing live TV. It seemed simple enough to sell such a useful product. “TiVo’s product needed very little explanation. After a demo, if you knew what a VCR was you knew what a TiVo was. You got it.” 27 Had TiVo Inc. simply followed RIM’s logical step of positioning their new advancement as “a segment of an existing market” 28 , they could have entered the established VCR sector as the top of the line in TV recording hardware. The problem came with the CEOs wanting to distance themselves from what they thought of as outdated technology. Ramsey was adamant that the technology stand alone with its own merits. “…[TiVo is] a massively distributed, incredibly complicated system. 26 (Livingston 188) 27 (Blank) 28 (Ibid.) 28 So, when somebody says, ‘It’s just like a VCR,’ you want to attack them.” 29 Ramsey even had this problem with potential venture capitalist investors: They said ‘Oh, that just sounds like a VCR.’ (Anytime anyone says that to me, I go completely nuts.) So we had this challenge of explaining, ‘It’s actually not a VCR. It’s a lot more sophisticated and uses a hard disk, and therefore you can record and playback simultaneously and do clever things like pause live TV, and so on.’ 30 Ramsey’s company had created what was, without a doubt, a revolutionary product, but his pride in that achievement kept him from realizing that marketing a product as a new market segment led to a slower understanding by mainstream consumers, resulting in a smaller and more homogenous class or demographic of early adopter. So now the public has to be educated on what the product does, and how it works, and why it’s different from a VCR. The adoption curve becomes much steeper as people with little to no technology background turn to late majority and even laggards when they presumably would have jumped at a new and improved VCR that eliminated the bulky clutter of VHS tapes and added the new feature of pausing live TV. The simplicity in that marketing strategy is all upside, both to consumers who catch on quick and investors who make quicker profits and establish a foothold in a market before it’s even formed. Eventually, when DVR technology became more popular and part of everyday parlance, the TiVo would already be on the market with its capabilities 29 (Livingston 191) 30 (Ibid. 189) 29 intact, and a second generation of TiVo could be launched under the newly formed segment, thus eliminating for TiVo Inc. the difficulty of creating that segment themselves with a single product. The fallout of Ramsey’s hubris was that TiVo spent years educating consumers on a new market segment and “…trying to convince users that the box they wanted to buy as a better VCR was really something different.” 31 Who cares if a person understands the inner workings of a product? It’s the job of marketing or public relations to position the product in the best light, at the best time, to the best audience. But when a consumer walks into the store, picks a product off the shelf and goes to pay, the last thing on the manufacturer’s mind should be whether the consumer actually understands the product’s machinery and parts. In the midst of numerous other trials for TiVo Inc., including the rise of competing products; negative campaigning from Hollywood; objections from cable companies; and even several patent lawsuits, the company ended up spending hundreds of millions of dollars on education marketing campaigns, bent on defining a new technology sector. 32 Perhaps the BlackBerry and TiVo are not entirely comparable as two separate markets, but if we look at some basic numbers, we see that RIM sold $15 billion in 2010. Over the last decade they’ve recorded $9 billion in profits. TiVo, on the other hand, sold $240 million in 2010, and actually lost $400 million in the past decade. 33 31 (Blank) 32 (Ibid.) 33 (Ibid.) 30 The takeaway from these two stories is that technology experts often get caught up in the specifics of their work and the impressive capabilities of what they’ve created. And who’s to blame them? They are proud of their advancements and want the world to see how truly revolutionary their product is. But this is unreasonable. Education about a product costs money from a marketing standpoint. Marketing’s primary job is to drive sales, but if campaigns have to focus massive parts of their strategy on consumer education and new market promotion, there is less time and money to be spent on audience research and targeted launches. In effect, you are forced to create an audience, rather than utilize existing consumers who have already shown interest in existing products similar to your new and improved product. 31 Chapter 9: Android Unveilings – Entering the Market at its Peak The Android operating system is a difficult concept for most users. Consumers hear about Droid phones and a company called Android, but the phones are sold by a variety of companies: Samsung, Motorola, HTC, Sprint Nextel, and Sony Ericsson. Android itself isn’t a phone company – people may say they have a Droid phone, but it’s not equivalent to saying they have an iPhone or BlackBerry. The iPhone and BlackBerry smartphones and operating systems are all made by Apple and RIM, respectively. Every aspect of the phone is designed, manufactured and marketed in house. Many consumers incorrectly assume Android is a Google phone, built to compete against the iPhone and BlackBerry, but the truth is far more complex. In 2005, Google bought a small start-up company called Android. According to co- founder Andy Rubin, the company had been working to develop “…smarter mobile devices that are more aware of its owner’s location and preferences.” 34 Rumors swirled around the blogosphere and technology trade magazines that Google was getting ready to release a phone, dubbed by tech bloggers “the gPhone”. For months, tech geeks pondered over the capabilities of such a phone, nearly salivating over the competition it would bring to Apple and RIM. 35 Then, on November 5, 2007, Google announced it was not working on a handset device, but rather an open-source operating system (OS) software platform designed for 34 (Elgin) 35 (Cheng) 32 use in mobile devices. Put simply, Google and Android had created phone software that could easily communicate with all the sub-parts of that phone. Gareth Beavis, mobile phones editor for TechRadar.com, describes it as: …making all sections of the system like Lego bricks. …[Before], developers might have struggled to break down the bits of a mobile phone OS, and even if successful, would find that getting one part of the system to talk to another was very difficult…But with Android, the rules were changed. Fancy making a GPS application that used SMS location updates? The two sections would fit together nicely. If you wanted to add in some location data from the net too? Just pop on a web piece too. 36 Competitors drew an enormous sigh of relief. This wasn’t the major unveiling they were expecting or the game-changing revelation opponents had feared. Microsoft CEO, Steve Ballmer, said, “Their efforts are just some words on paper.” 37 Symbian (a company that develops OS systems for Nokia) CEO Nigel Clifford disregarded the announcement as just “…another Linux platform…There’s 10, 15, 20, maybe 25 different Linux platforms out there.” 38 But that wasn’t the only surprise Google had in store. Google was also meeting with major mobile carriers, software companies, application developers, commercialization companies, semiconductor companies and handset manufacturers to create the Open Handset Alliance (OHA). The OHA is an alliance of member organizations – initially 34, and now consisting of more than 80 different companies – whose stated goal is to 36 (Beavis) 37 (Williams, M.) 38 (Ibid.) 33 “…accelerate innovation in mobile and offer consumers a richer, less expensive, and better mobile experience.” 39 Major contributing alliance members include Google, HTC, Samsung, LG, T-Mobile, Dell, Intel, Motorola, Qualcomm and Texas Instruments. The idea behind the alliance was to promote openness in direct contrast to the closed system of Apple products, a system often criticized, especially within the tech-geek world,. These closed-systems allowed for few user changes, additions or alterations of the baseline software. The OHA “…sounded the theme of openness at every opportunity: ‘Open Software, Open Device, Open Ecosystem.’” 40 Google, Android and the OHA had realized that the global audience was beginning to move away from the personal computer (PC). Mobile devices, specifically cell phones, were becoming the primary way to connect with one another, but complaints about the mobile market were numerous and varied – consumers often felt limited and even cheated by their carriers. Every year since 2002, the wireless sector managed to place at or near the top of the Better Business Bureau's tally of the most complained-about industries. …[Cell phone] plans were expensive, pricing was complex and capricious, and the phones never lived up to expectations. Constant innovation…was anathema to phone companies. 41 The OHA decided to involve the consumer in one of the most brilliant marketing strategies ever used in the technology industry. The strategy worked to differentiate their 39 ("openhandsetalliance.com") 40 (Stross 40) 41 (Roth) 34 products from Apple’s “...a self-contained, jewel-like masterpiece locked in a sleek protective shell,” 42 and simultaneously surpass the barriers to entry into the mobile market. Android mimicked BlackBerry’s entry into the pager market by simplifying their product positioning, thus capturing an already existing audience. Android entered the smartphone market, targeting already frustrated users who abhorred Apple’s locked system while simultaneously complaining about the weaknesses of the market’s alternatives. Google showcased their open-source philosophy immediately, posting a free Android software developer’s kit online along with a Developer Challenge. Creators who built the best applications for the Android system would share $10 million in prize money. Anything from “…a great social networking tool, say, or a handwriting recognition program. The Challenge was an open call; anyone was invited to take a shot.” 43 Now, instead of one company, building one type of phone with one network, Android would be available on a wide variety of smartphones and a variety of carriers. Any company in the OHA could build Droid phones, supporting the Android software, creating a much larger audience and filling a gap in the cellular phone market. The clear marketing strategy here was to pick up the audience that was left behind by Apple: those who understood OS technology and wanted the ability to alter the base product. The nearly 1,800 people who submitted entries to the Developer Challenge 42 (Ibid.) 43 (Ibid.) 35 represented a microcosm of tech-savvy consumers whose turf had been taken over by “hipsters” and the more mainstream public. Matthew Le Veque, Senior Vice President and Director of Digital Strategies at the Rogers Group, says the change in early adopters stemmed from a change in how the products themselves were viewed. “Compared to when early adopters were the IT department and who needed the biggest and fastest and best technologies, today many of these technologies are lifestyle accessories rather than business necessities.” 44 This isn’t to say that many tech geeks don’t enjoy Apple products – they do – but those developers familiar with Linux systems and open source technology had been left out. The philosophy of Android was the same as Wikipedia or Foursquare: the platform was created by the company, but the power was placed in the hands of the users. Each phone became customizable and consumers chose their own level of involvement. If you wanted a smartphone that only did the basics of e-mail, web-browsing, texting and phone calls, you could have that. However, if you wanted more interconnectivity between applications, like a text message system that could include a GPS location from which you sent the text, that was possible, too. Google didn’t want to make a gPhone because creating something so similar to the iPhone would sell poorly. The iPhone had a hold on the market and one of, if not the strongest built-in audiences in the technology industry; “…the Android team had violated 44 (Le Veque) 36 an essential tenet of the wireless industry: that users are too dumb and dangerous to be trusted with downloadable software.” 45 A gPhone would simply compete for a market-share that was already locked down. Android’s power wasn’t in getting tech geeks to simply buy their product, but also to develop it and, once developed, those same tech geeks became the strongest third-party endorsers of the product. As the most trusted early adopters, the tech geeks lent legitimacy to the product and boosted sales among non-tech-savvy consumers wary of the iPhone’s price or technical features. But now, many who could not afford the iPhone were lining up for new Android smartphones that were unencumbered by AT&T or a single monolithic device and platform. We see from the pictures of the Sprint HTC EVO 4G launch that the early adopter lines are a scattered demographic, not filled with any single audience type. (See Figure 3-5) 45 (Ibid.) 37 Figure 3 A line forms outside a Sprint store in Alexandria, Virginia at 7:45 AM on June 4, 2010 – the day of the HTC EVO 4G release. (Line in front of Sprint store in Alexandria, VA [Online image] Available. http://www.engadget.com/2010/06/04/htc-evo-4g-launch-day-line-watch/ June 4. 2010) 38 Figure 4 Early adopters line up around a corner on June 4, 2010, waiting for the release of the Android EVO 4G. (Line in front of Sprint store in New York, NY [Online image] Available. http://www.engadget.com/2010/06/04/htc-evo-4g-launch-day-line-watch/ June 4. 2010) 39 Figure 5 At 7:30 AM a line forms in Washington, DC on June 4, 2010, for the Android HTC EVO (Line in front of Sprint store in Washington, D.C. [Online image] Available. http://www.engadget.com/2010/06/04/htc-evo-4g-launch-day-line-watch/ June 4. 2010) Unfortunately, no complete study has been done that adequately pinpoints the various demographics who bought Android phones over BlackBerrys or iPhones, but the Android consumer is without a doubt diverse, as was Google’s intention. With so many choices in mobile carriers and cell phone hardware running the Droid system, Google benefits from a wider market penetration. Google, Android and the OHA identified an audience whose smartphone needs were not being met, and catered directly to those needs at the minimum price and lowest barrier to market entry. 40 Chapter 10: Surveying the Adopters In order to test this thesis’ hypothesis that the past two decades have shown a dramatic demographic shift in early adopters, we will examine the results of a recent survey conducted by the author. The survey’s purpose was to establish a technology purchasing timeline and correlate it with demographic information. The most important question of this survey related to where individuals ranked themselves along the Technology Adoption Life Cycle. In order to construct a useful and relevant survey that would yield significant results, the survey objectives had to be clear and unambiguous. The survey consisted of nine short questions and specifically avoided leading questions or demographic bias toward respondents. The first three questions focused on collecting basic demographic information from respondents. This information was critical to identifying possible changes in early adopter behavior and background. Question one asked for the respondent’s age and gave the following options: 18-25, 26-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60 and 61 or over. These six age groups represent significant demographics in technology adoption and should provide a meaningful divide when analyzing results. Question two asks for the respondent’s gender. While gender is often asked for in marketing surveys, it is especially important here, since the vast majority of self- 41 proclaimed tech geeks are male. 46 An increase in female early adopters would signify a potentially crucial demographic shift. Question three has respondents choose an occupation from a drop-down menu. If they do not fall under one of the listed categories, a fill-in box is left with the title “other.” Question four asks, “How many of the following do you own?” The choices are: personal desktop computer, personal laptop computer, smartphone (iPhone, BlackBerry, Android, etc.), Tablet (iPad, Archos, PC Slate, etc.). This question is important early in the survey; it gets the respondents to think about the amount of technology products they own, and to separate those who are large consumers of technology from those who aren’t. It is important to note, however, that a consumer who buys a lot of technology products is not necessarily an early adopter. Following from this, questions five through eight all ask respondents to “approximate to the best of your recollection” when they purchased or adopted the product. Question five asks, “How soon after 1998 did you purchase your first desktop computer?” The options: Prior to 1998, ’98-99, ’00-’02, ’03-’05, ’05-present, and N/A or can’t remember. Question six asks, “How soon after 1999 did you purchase a Laptop computer?” The options: Prior to 1999, ’99-’00, ’01-’02, ’03-’05, ’05-present, and N/A or can’t remember. Question seven asks, “How soon after 2002 did you purchase a smartphone? Note: The BlackBerry was released in 2002, the iPhone was released in 2007.” The options: Prior to 2002, ’02-’03, ’04-’06, ’07-’08, ’08-’09, ’09-present, and N/A or can’t remember. Question eight asks, “How soon after 2010 did you purchase a 46 (Ovide) 42 tablet? Note: The iPad was released in April 2010.” The options: Prior to 2010, April- June ’10, July-Sep ’10, Oct-Dec ’10, Jan-Feb ’11, and N/A or can’t remember. The final question asks respondents to place themselves on a technology adoption scale. Since this scale is not a commonly known system, I used alternative wording to identify the different adoption rankings. Question nine asks, “Where on the scale would you usually place yourself?” The options are: “First to buy and try out a new tech product”, “Will wait to buy on advice from third party (friends, family, online review etc.)”, “Will wait till product is well established in society or community,” and “I rarely buy tech products, but when I do it’s been around for awhile.” These four responses correspond with the beliefs and values of early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards, respectively. The survey was sent out online with a hyperlink and a request to forward the link to anyone not on the list who might be interested in completing the survey. In total, 231 persons responded. The percentage of respondents in each age group can be seen in Figure 6 below. 43 Figure 6 When looking at the numbers of respondents who owned specific types of technology products, we see that 90% own personal laptops, 57% own smartphones, 36% own desktop computers and only 11% own a tablet. This is consistent with what we would expect. Over half the respondents were under 30 and were adopting technology at a time when the laptop was becoming the more reasonable and worthwhile investment, especially when that age group was going off to college (where a laptop is almost a necessity). Only 26 of the respondents own tablets, which isn’t surprising considering their recent release. All 26 can be categorized as early adopters. It is interesting, then, to note how many of those were early adopters of other forms of technology. When we filter the 44 results, we find that 61% purchased desktop computers prior to 1998. But looking at smartphones and laptops, there is an apparent shift. (See Tables 1 and 2) Table 1 45 Table 2 The majority of the early adopters of tablets bought smartphone and laptop technology much later in the technology cycle than they bought tablets. Furthermore, 61% of those who bought tablets were female. This leads to some tricky analysis and identifies some potential weak points in the survey. The first issue is the question of when respondents purchased a desktop computer. The survey timeline was set with 1998, the year the iMac was released, as the base line. But with 61% of tablet owners and 43% of total respondents having purchased a desktop prior to 1998, the data received is too varied to be useful. It’s impossible to note who the real early adopters of desktop computers were. For example, if a person bought an Apple II in 1984, they would be considered an early adopter, but what if they bought a similar such product in 1986? This 46 would more likely place them as early majority. The point here is that isolating early adopters of desktop computers is far more difficult due to the long timeline of availability of the product. With laptops, smartphones and tablets the responses are far more useful. These products were released rather evenly by various companies and were made specifically for the general consumer. Early desktops, on the other hand, were initially marketed primarily toward information technology groups and businesses. The most useful and telling aspect of the survey is where people place themselves on the technology adoption scale. As we would expect, the smallest number of respondents were self-identified early adopters. The largest group was early majority, then late majority and finally, laggards. (See Figure 7) 47 Figure 7 This graph perfectly demonstrates the technology adoption life cycle as explained in chapter four. The smallest group is the early adopters who test the products and become either third-party advocates or critics. The largest group is the early majority who buy the technology after it has been reviewed and demonstrated. The late majority is slightly smaller than the early majority, as consumers in this group grow more comfortable with the idea of purchasing or notice the technology is becoming more widespread. Finally, the laggards are a smaller group than either the early majority or late majority as technology becomes more and more of a mainstay in society. It should be noted that in actuality, many of those who identified themselves as laggards based on the question were more likely late majority than true laggards. Of the 48 55 respondents who answered, “I rarely buy tech products but when I do it’s been around for awhile,” 49 of them said they owned a laptop, 19 said they owned a smartphone and 17 said they owned a desktop. Though they may not be buying the technology themselves or doing so very soon after release, the majority do own tech products, unlike true laggards who are disinterested in technology as a whole. Another salient detail from the survey was the age of those who bought the tablet. Over 50% of tablet owners were over the age of 50. This is not necessarily counter to the hypothesis of this thesis, but does show that technology like tablets is more likely to be purchased by those with disposable income. Conversely, almost 60% of smartphone owners were under the age of 30, and the vast majority of that number were actually under 25. One reason for this maybe the utility of the smartphone, in addition to its positioning as a lifestyle necessity. The results of this survey, while useful in some respects, fail to give an overall view of changing habits. The reason for this is that an individual’s motivation, as well as exactly when they bought a product, requires a more in-depth interview. These aspects truly define where one falls in the technology adoption scale. Furthermore, individual technologies have different early adopters and so consumers cannot easily be grouped into one category. Instead, a consumer is an early adopter in relation only to the specific product they adopt rather than to all technology products. This survey is useful only as a preliminary measure and it is apparent from the results that more objective questions and a detailed overview of participants would be required in further study. 49 This survey would be a good precursor to focus groups and individual interviews. Drawing upon a person’s full demographic background, style and motivation are all very important in determining their likelihood to adopt a product at a certain stage. Surveys cannot accurately divide respondents into adopter groups since the respondents are making judgment calls about themselves that can often be flawed or, at the very least, biased. To fully prove this hypothesis, more data would need to be collected and a much wider study would need to be conducted, delving deep into various demographics and their purchasing habits. 50 Chapter 11: Software Launches and The Rise of Social Networking So far, we have focused on technology hardware and the launch campaigns that target early adopters. However, software launches, specifically social media and microblogging sites, have shown skillful use of targeted marketing in the early days of their product launch and mass availability. Launching software is not the same as launching hardware. With hardware, like a smartphone, the consumer must first be made aware of the product, then convinced to come in and purchase it. The barriers to consumer adoption are numerous with hardware, as everything from price to functionality and even warranty must be taken into consideration – a concept that will be explored further in the next chapter. With software, the barriers are smaller. The product exists, and can be accessed at any time by any user. The level of involvement of that user may vary from day to day, but ultimately adopters choose their level of consumption; it is no longer the binary reality of owning or not owning the product. Instead, today’s social media software like Twitter and Foursquare is free to use and readily available online or in mobile application format. Twitter and Foursquare are great examples of identifying a target audience and reaching that target market early. Twitter went live on July 15, 2006. The audience for Twitter was initially very small, but nine months later, Twitter showcased their software at the 2007 South by Southwest (SXSW) Music Festival in Austin, Texas. Twitter would become the paradigm of social 51 networking launches – the model that would inspire dozens of social networking websites and mobile software companies. Twitter founder Evan Williams explains: We launched [Twitter] nine months before – to a whimper. By the time SXSW 2007 rolled around, we were starting to grow finally and it seemed like all of our users (which were probably in the thousands) were going to Austin that year. 47 Williams and his co-founders realized that a festival like SXSW, where both their current users and a sizeable base would be in attendance, could spur Twitter’s slow growth into the social media market. Current users would act as third-party brand ambassadors for Twitter. Next: how to make the social experience visual. People twittering at the festival would look no different than those texting unless the tweets could be read by non-user attendees, who would then be inspired to join Twitter themselves. We created a Twitter visualizer and negotiated with the festival to put flat panel screens in the hallways. This is something they’d never done before, but we didn’t want a booth on the trade show floor, because we knew hallways is where the action was. We paid $11K for this and set up the TVs ourselves. (This was about the only money Twitter’s *ever* spent on marketing.) 48 Williams had a great understanding of his audience and knew a simple booth wouldn’t be enough to attract a critical mass of users. Prior to the festival, Twitter traffic averaged around 20,000 tweets per day – that number nearly tripled during the festival to 47 (Williams, E.) 48 (Ibid.) 52 an average of 60,000 tweets per day. 49 Many consider the SXSW festival to be Twitter’s real launch date, even though it had been around for several months before the event. Twitter’s public relations campaign succeeded because they were able to identify an audience that was already using similar products and social networking sites. They distinguished themselves from other groups unveiling products at the festival by demonstrating the real effects of social networking, showing the users the end result of the tool by putting tweets on screens,. Two years later, a location-based check-in service called Foursquare launched at SXSW. Foursquare allowed users to check in at specific hot-spots using the GPS Location tool on their mobile device. Once checked in, users could earn points and badges that could be retrieved for special deals at their check-in locations. Hot on the coattails of Twitter’s success, digital applications and software developers realized the potential for early adopter markets at these festivals. Foursquare co-founder Naveen Slvadurai explains, “We started building Foursquare in late 2008, but we really kicked things into gear in early 2009 so we’d have something ready to launch at SXSW – it gave us a deadline to shoot for.” 50 Slvadurai and his co-founder Dennis Crowley knew they had a built-in audience with the SXSW festival. Twitter’s enormous gains during and after the 2007 festival highlighted a burgeoning crossover demographic of mobile application consumers and music festival attendees. 49 (Douglas) 50 (Kessler) 53 In one sense, music festivals represent a microcosm of the digital and social media society. Applications like Twitter and Foursquare are valuable at festivals, where constant updates and location services enhance the shared experience already supplied by the communal atmosphere. Tweeting about when a band will be playing, where the best festival food can be found, or checking in at a location where your friends can find you easily all work toward demonstrating product utility. After the concert, it is easy for users to take the software concept and apply it to the world at large. Dozens of social networking start-ups have followed Twitter and Foursquare’s example, using SXSW or similar festivals as their product launch pad. The festival users represent a built-in, captive and engaged consumer audience who will potentially return home as brand ambassadors and third-party endorsers. The software benefits from the unsolicited recommendations and hype built by this early adopter audience, and as proven with Twitter and Foursquare, the marketing is very cheap or even free. Senior Vice President Matthew Le Veque at the Rogers Group agrees that technology consumers are an intrinsic part of modern festivals. “Look at Coachella and South by Southwest, everyone is holding up their Droids and iPhones all filming the show. Nobody’s doing lighters anymore. It’s become less about the information technology and more about contemporary lifestyle.” 51 When applying these techniques to hardware, it’s not hard to see the potential for success. While the release of an Apple or RIM product may still require a large marketing budget, the amount spent could be significantly lessened if launches or product 51 (Le Veque) 54 demonstrations were made in such a way that allowed for faster adoption by the target market. The SXSW Festival has been a forerunner of social network software launches and their ability to showcase a product’s potential while publicizing advances to the early adopters of high technology. Unsurprisingly, that same audience is the perfect target for high-tech hardware - iPhones, BlackBerry smartphones, iPods, tablets, etc., unveiled in this platform would sell very well, especially if there was a way to weave the marketing into the festival. The iPod was one of the first products released where multiple improved iterations followed close on the heels of the original. But now that this is a mainstay of tech products, imagine if the iPod was released today. Many might see its potential, but only those looking to be the first to own an iPod – or who weren’t fully aware, or didn’t care about improvements – would buy it first. Unveiling the iPod at a massive music festival like SXSW or Coachella would be an incredibly well crafted modern strategy. The audience would likely be instantly interested in the product, since the thought of buying and listening to music is already the focus of its attention. Furthermore, given the cost of festivals, this audience is obviously willing to spend disposable income on music-related events and, subsequently, music-related devices. A great tagline to go with this release could be: “There is no substitute for seeing them live, but when you can’t do that, why not carry your favorite bands in your pocket.” Or simpler, “Until you see them live again, carry _______ band(s) in your pocket.” 55 The only precaution for the above-mentioned tactic is that this type of release might make the audience members feel they are being pandered to, or that their festival medium is being invaded. But if the campaign includes some festival bands’ albums or songs or a “Best of the _____ Festival” album on their iPod with purchase, this feeling might be lessened. The trick is to zero in on your audience, says Le Veque. “It’s always important to get your marketing message to where your target audience is looking, listening. Figure out, what is the most effective way to get to the eyes, ears and hearts of the target audience?” 52 A festival launch may not have the flair of a Steve Jobs discussion and product introduction, but the truth is that the modern early adopters don’t care about the gigabytes or technical specifications of a Steve Jobs unveiling. That can come later, as the improvements to the product are released. Omar Wasow, an internet analyst and co-founder and strategic advisor for social networking website BlackPlanet.com, points out the reluctance of techies to adopt the first iteration. “In tech circles, the number 1 is feared and revered. A 1.0 release might install buggy, system-crashing software, or it might offer a thrilling glimpse of the future. When Apple launched the first iPad less than a year ago, many tech experts couldn’t ‘see a good use for the machine’ and argued that ‘Apple’s iPad was just a big iPod Touch.’” 53 The Apple faithful who will buy any product Apple offers are not necessarily the tech 52 (Le Veque) 53 (Wasow) 56 geeks. In fact, far more buy the product as a lifestyle accessory, while the tech geeks seek a certain utility that can, at times, prove elusive. 57 Chapter 12: Barriers to Technology Adoption So far this thesis has explored the reasons why early adopters have changed over the past three decades and analyzed major technology companies’ approaches to product unveiling. But there is another aspect of technology adoption that is crucial to the understanding of early adopter evolution. As product innovation increases and consumers are inundated with upgrades and the offer of cutting edge technology, new barriers are erected between the technology companies and their target market. 54 According to a 2009 study by Michael Antioco and Mirella Kleijnen entitled Consumer Adoption of Technological Innovations, there are two basic categories for barriers to technology consumption. The first type is a functional barrier, “…where consumers evaluate the consequences of adoption in terms of usage, value, and risk.” 55 The other type of barrier is psychological, “…which mostly arise through conflicts with consumers’ prior beliefs (tradition and image).” 56 Antioco and Kleijnen go on to split these barriers into sub-categories. The three types of functional barriers are usage barriers, value barriers and risk barriers. 57 The usage barrier is relatively straightforward. If a consumer is used to a certain product and a new product arises that directly challenges the other product, this creates a substantial barrier 54 (Antioco, and Kleijnen) 55 (Ibid.) 56 (Ibid.) 57 (Ibid.) 58 to adoption. The user is comfortable with the current product because they know how it works and have learned over time how to use it. A perfect example of this is TiVo. Here we have a product that took some training in order to be used properly and had a steep learning curve. By sticking with their VCR, some potential users would feel relaxed and content. It is a technology they understand and know how to use, and there is no compelling reason to switch. For others, the utility of the product would have outweighed the barriers to use: the TiVo (or any DVR) would represent such a great advancement that learning to use it would be a small price to pay for the efficacy of the product. The value barrier relates to “…performance-to-price ratio compared with product substitutes.” 58 Put another way, the value barrier means that unless the product offers significant benefits over a less expensive or already adopted technology, the consumer will avoid the product. A 2007 study showed value was quickly becoming the largest barrier to consumption for most buyers. …risk often is considered the strongest impediment to new product/service adoption. However, a recent domain-specific market study confirms that consumer risk perceptions are indeed decreasing, possibly because of the rapid diffusion of… technology in today’s society, which has made more and more consumers familiar with the transactional possibilities of their… devices 59 Apple products are a great example of the value barrier. Many customers are willing to pay more because of Apple’s continued quality and customer service, etc. However, 58 (Ibid.) 59 (Kleijnen, Ruyter, and Wetzels) 59 others see less expensive alternatives as an equal value, or they don’t see enough difference in the product’s offerings to spend more on the product. The risk barrier, as mentioned above, is often a major obstruction to new technology adoption. Risk is the main barrier that separates early adopters from the others on the technology adoption scale. “…[R]isk causes consumers to… resist an innovation until they learn more about it.” 60 The risk here is both financial and performance based. Buying a technology product is often a long-term investment. Early adopters take a huge risk, both with the early adopter tax and with potential bugs and the need for upgrades – not to mention the risk of their new purchase being obsolete in a few months. All three of these functional barriers, usage, value and risk, greatly influence a consumer’s motivations to purchasing. Those with no barrier, who see the product as easy to use, high in value and low in risk, will become that product’s early adopters. Other consumers will need more time for their barriers to fall. This is crucial in positioning a product, because if your primary audience of a technology product is a demographic who usually approaches technology with strong barriers to adoption, you will need to allay their fears before you can gain any market penetration. Much of the success of Twitter and Foursquare stemmed from the low barriers to adoption for SXSW attendees. There was no risk, since it cost them nothing to try the product. The only barrier to usage was having a cell phone, and was made even easier with a smartphone, which, according to the above survey, was well adopted by the 60 (Antioco, and Kleijnen) 60 younger generation. Finally, the value to concertgoers proved high, since Twitter allowed them to visualize the social network’s output via on-screen displays. The other type of barrier Antioco and Kleijnen discuss is the psychological barrier. This, too, is split up into sub-categories: tradition and image. The tradition barrier refers to cultural norms or established beliefs regarding a product and the ways in which the adoption of that product may challenge social norms. 61 The tradition barrier is lessened over time as the technology saturates the various markets. It is also easy to see how the tradition barrier will fall quickly as functional barriers are overcome. The adoption of personal laptops for younger generations, specifically college students, likely carried a high tradition barrier, as personal computers were initially seen for professional home or office use. Laptops were likely seen as extravagances built specifically for businessmen on the go rather than students. However, the value, usage and risk barriers were easy to overcome as the functionality of owning a laptop in college became clear. These factors would have easily outweighed any negative conventions or traditions still held by the older generations. The final barrier is image. Unlike tradition, image is a barrier that has become far more important in the past decade or so, as technology adopters often make purchasing decisions based on the social status associated with ownership or usage of the product. Antioco and Kleijnen argue that products stemming from platforms or businesses with established images have the benefit of boosting adoption of a new innovation as that image is associated with the new product. “Apple, for example, has exploited its image 61 (Antioco, and Kleijnen) 61 tremendously when introducing innovations within its existing product range. Many of their products are compatible with each other in various ways… and have consistently transferred their strong image from one product to the next.” 62 Apple’s image is one of the company’s largest strengths, but it has taken decades to build that level of brand loyalty. One poor-quality product is enough to erect a lasting image barrier that will push away potential adopters and could require years to overcome. In some ways, the image barrier is the most complex, since it has little to do with the actual product and more to do with the brand. Different barriers are important to different demographic groups. Consumers’ motivation to adopt a new technology tends to be based on that product’s functionality rather than the perceived ease of use of the product. Therefore, “…users tend to overcome difficulties in using new technology if the benefits of usage are substantive.” 63 This means that marketing campaigns must be exceedingly aware of their target audiences at different points in sales. The first target audience, the early adopter, cares mostly about image and value. Their risk barrier is low, since they are willing to try the product early; their usage barrier is low, as they are always looking to learn new technology; and their tradition barrier is low because they enjoy breaking the status quo and parading their individuality. Breaking the tradition barrier directly affects their image 62 (Ibid.) 63 (Porter, and Donthu) 62 and purchasing the new innovation, “…offers consumers the opportunity to satisfy an idiosyncratic desire for uniqueness.” 64 Early majority adopters likely will similarly possess low tradition barriers, low usage barriers, but high risk and value barriers. The early majority are concerned with adopting a product too early, before it has been proven and tested and reviewed. Positive reviews lower the risk barrier and allow the consumer to understand the value of the product. The image barrier for early majority consumers is also low, but for different reasons than for the early adopters. Rather than a desire to be unique and cutting edge, the early majority don’t want to appear out of the loop. “…[P]eople infer identity from product choices that are publicly visible, made from a large choice set, and that take time and effort to make.” 65 The early majority consumers overcome their barriers when they see the image success of early adopters and their fears of buying a useless or over-hyped product are allayed. Late majority adopters have a moderate tradition barrier and high usage, value and risk barriers. Image doesn’t enter into their concept of purchasing. They buy the product when the risk has all but disappeared and the technology has become ubiquitous, easy to use and valuable for their lifestyle. These initial barriers are what keep them from impulse decisions. Finally, laggards have extremely high barriers in all four areas. They are often content with the things they have and don’t see, or even consider, the usefulness of new 64 (Antioco, and Kleijnen) 65 (Berger, and Heath) 63 technology products. Because so many of their barriers to adoption are so high, it is hardly worth the effort of marketing professionals to target this audience. A strong understanding of these barriers and how they change over time is critical to modern product launches. A company like Apple may have significantly decreased the risk barrier in early and late majority buyers, but a new company can’t take the same approach. On the other hand, Apple’s very low image barrier means many of their early adopters are potentially more interested in the status symbol associated with ownership. 64 Chapter 13: Conclusions and Recommendations This thesis set out to demonstrate the recent demographic shift in early adopters of high technology and scrutinize the early stages of marketing and public relations campaigns of major technology companies. By looking into the approach of Apple, Research In Motion, Android, TiVo, Twitter and Foursquare, we were able to gain a better understanding of the methods used to reach early target audiences. Marketing and public relations is not a hard science. Everything from the launch strategies that failed to the unveiling tactics that succeeded was created in the interest of driving sales and boosting the company’s bottom line. But taking a step back from the technological proliferation and cutthroat race to be number one amongst consumers, we can identify some common threads among the companies, and among consumers, that lead to strategies with the highest rate of success. To begin, tech companies need to define each stage of their sales expectations. They need to pinpoint demographics and audiences who will want to buy their products in the first months. Then they need to identify the audiences who will buy their product in the first few years, and eventually target the late adopters who could embrace the technology even further down the line. The technology companies must begin to realize that as their industry, and their products as a whole, becomes more omnipresent, their audiences will change. It’s not as simple as different people will begin buying their products, but rather that each product has its own unique set of early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards. 65 The early adopters will not always be the tech-involved company loyalists. Many of them will wait for the improved version as the pace with which technology and innovation reinvents itself steadily accelerates. Detailing a product’s uses and correlating that to the expectations of the audience will help marketing professionals pinpoint their targets. Apple will always have a group of staunch loyalists lining up to buy their products first. Apple’s competitors too will have loyalists, as well as an audience who loathe Apple’s product design and strategy. It’s not enough to simply create a useful, groundbreaking, innovative new technology. Clear marketing strategies and tactics must be in place to ensure the highest level of market penetration and audience awareness. The lesson learned from TiVo is that understanding details of a technology is not crucial to high volume sales. Audiences are far more comfortable when they can place a technology in terms they understand. Great leaps forward in innovation create high adoption barriers. Risk, usage, value and tradition all play negatively against a product positioned as so revolutionary it can hardly be categorized. In the mid-late 1980s, technology products were designed and marketed to businesses, business professionals and information technology experts. There is no question the adoption demographic of technology has expanded immensely in the last three decades, but an expanding audience doesn’t necessarily signal an early adopter shift. But if we look at the results of the case studies of Apple, RIM and Android, if we look at the social media launches of Twitter and Foursquare, and if we look at the barriers 66 to technology adoption, we see a new wave of early users who aren’t focused on the utility of the product, but instead are far more interested in the product image, value and associated social status. The hypothesis of this thesis suggested there was a significant demographic change in the early adopters of technology. That aspect was more or less proved with the success of product launches that targeted a broader audience. If early adopters of technology were still strongly the tech geek, then the TiVo’s strategy would have been far more lucrative. The other side of the hypothesis contends that launch and unveilings by tech companies fail to adequately address the target market. While this is true in some cases, again looking at TiVo, we see far more success and awareness that the market field has changed. Though Apple unveiling’s still take place in a conference hall of shareholders, the company and others like it have proven they are far from oblivious to adoption trends. Taking cues from Twitter, Foursquare and other social networking sites, these companies have made large efforts toward including their products at “younger” and varied events. In the future, barriers will likely decline even more as the generation born into technology abundance grows older. The next step for tech company marketing teams will be to isolate audiences through social media, and find more locations or events like SXSW where they can launch, unveil and hype their products. With companies like Foursquare spending no money on advertising and Twitter’s spending only $11,000 in their first year, hardware companies will begin to shift their focus, and align with where their consumers are looking and listening. Research In Motion CEO Mike Lazaridis asks all the right questions marketing and 67 PR teams must ask. “…[H]ow do you intercept a market trend? How do you intercept an industrial trend? How do you package what you’ve learned and what’s happening in the technology space so that it has new value to customers? How do you find those customers?” 66 The next generation of early adopters will depend on the companies and their ability to intercept the appropriate market for each individual technology, as well as every major launch and subsequent iteration of their products. Maybe soon, we’ll get the unveilings out of the conference room and into the larger, more diverse public arena. 66 (Livingston 149) 68 Glossary of Common Terms To understand the early adopter mentality, we need a basic understanding of some tech and PR terms that will be commonly used throughout this thesis. 1) Early Adopter – A person who is the first to buy or utilize a new product, service or technology. Early adopters are often very aware of a products history and attuned to the marketing campaigns used. They follow the product closely in the time between unveiling and launch. Most early adopters purchase or begin using a product within the first 1-2 months of its release. 2) Trendsetter – Similar to an early adopter, a trendsetter is an early adopter whose influence causes others to begin using the product as well. Trendsetters are passionate about a product’s practicality and often groundbreaking nature. The trendsetter is instrumental in persuading the early majority (see below). 3) Early Adopter Tax – The price, not necessarily monetary, that an early adopter pays for buying a new product early on. This can include a higher opening price, more system bugs, more eventual updates required and an inferior product as compared to better iterations that are released later. 4) Innovators – Consumers who are so in tune with the technology world that they buy the first release of a product intent on altering and improving that product. They are not usually brand loyalists and instead care about the functionality and cutting-edge nature of the product. 5) Early Majority – Persons who are among the second group of people to buy a product. Usually influenced by early adopters and trendsetters, early majority buyers will purchase a product anywhere between four months and two years after initial release. They often take advice from third-party friends, family or acquaintances who have bought the product. 6) Late Majority – Persons who are among the third group of people to buy a product. Late majority buyers wait until the product is very well established in global or local culture and has a wide audience range of success. They cave in to buying the product, but only when they’ve seen the improved version of the product released. In some cases, late majority buyers may truly desire the product but hold off because they are wary of an early adopter tax (see above) that will place their product out of date only months after they’ve bought it. 69 7) Laggards – Persons who are among a category that avoids technology products at all costs. They are not interested in buying devices that might make their life simpler, or is more advanced, due to a frustration they find in learning to use the product. They are usually of an older generation where the learning curve and barriers to using a given product are so high that they disdain innovation. 8) Techno Joy – A strong enjoyment of technology products and their everyday uses. A consumer with techno joy falls under the early adopter or early majority category. He or she buys a product because it makes his or her life simpler or provides a high level of entertainment. 9) Technophobe – A person with a strong fear of technology products and the difficulties associated with them. A technophobe usually falls under the laggard category and avoid buying tech products at all costs due to an inability to use them or understand their functionality. 10) Mainstream – Current trends or practices among the majority of an audience or consuming population. The mainstream among technology adopters includes the most purchased or sought-after advances, as well as technology that has become common in everyday use. 11) Marketing – The act of targeting a specific audience or multiple audiences with a product or service you have released. Marketing supports sales. 12) High Technology – Also called high tech, this is any product, device, instrument or software that is on the cutting edge of advancement and offers new or relatively new innovation. The term is very general and can apply to a variety of products and market sectors. Marketing departments use the term to loosely apply to any technology product they sell. 13) Positioning – Identification of a promotion strategy (price, packaging, advertising, launch campaign) that will best reach a target audience. 14) Open Handset Alliance – An alliance of 80 businesses including Google, HTC, Dell, Intel, Motorola, Qualcomm, Texas Instruments, Samsung, LG and T-Mobile, focused on developing open source software systems for mobile devices and other technologies. 15) Open Source – Products that allow access by users to the basic source code and permit modifications and redistribution of the original coding. This allows for more creation and design by the individual user rather than a closed system. 70 16) Hardware – The physical building blocks that make up computer technology systems. The physical computer itself is an example of hardware. Hardware and software work in combination to create the end product. 17) Software – The programs and data that run on hardware and communicate with the computer hardware, giving it basic instructions on what to do and display. Hardware and software work in combination to create the end product. 18) Handset – A term used for cell phones to describe the basic hardware that is the device itself, excluding the software that runs on the phone. 19) Smartphone – Advanced mobile phone offering additional features including e-mail, internet connectivity and various applications. Smartphones are like handheld personal computers. 20) Tablet – A portable personal mobile computer that is larger than a mobile phone, but smaller than a laptop. 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Asset Metadata

Creator Menaker, Eli Zelig (author)

Core Title See it want it buy it: the changing face of the early adopter in high technology and the tech industry's targeted public relations campaigns

School Annenberg School for Communication

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program Strategic Public Relations

Publication Date 05/04/2011

Defense Date 04/01/2011

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Apple,BlackBerry,Google,iPad,iPhone,OAI-PMH Harvest,product launch,Public Relations,RIM,Technology,unveiling

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Floto, Jennifer D. (committee chair), Kotler, Jonathan (committee member), Wang, Jian (Jay) (committee member)

Creator Email elimenaker@gmail.com,emenaker@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m3899

Unique identifier UC1217956

Identifier etd-Menaker-4569 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-470420 (legacy record id),usctheses-m3899 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Menaker-4569.pdf

Dmrecord 470420

Document Type Thesis

Rights Menaker, Eli Zelig

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu