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Challenges from below: the origins of status competitions in world politics

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Challenges from Below:
The Origins of Status Competitions in World Politics

Alex Yu-Ting Lin

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

December 2021

Copyright 2021 Alex Yu-Ting Lin

i

Acknowledgement
Academia is a social enterprise, and I am grateful for all the help I have gotten. I had the
privilege of working with wonderful friends and colleagues at the University of Southern
California, the George Washington University, and Harvard University. My apologies for any
omissions – they are unintentional and reflect my path towards absent-mindedness.
First, I thank my chair, David Kang, for his steadfast guidance. Early on, I thought he
overstated the importance of professional norms: always showing up ready for workshops,
and the value of reputation in the field, etc. It was only later on that I realized he was right
all along, and that these are foundational things that every young scholar needs to internalize.
Pat James has always been encouraging, especially as a fellow Canadian, and his support was
instrumental throughout graduate school. I appreciate Saori Katada’s mentorship, and for an
opportunity to RA for her. From there, we published several articles together. Steven Lamy
was unwavering in his support, and I had the pleasure of serving as his teaching assistant
multiple times, during which I benefited tremendously from his mentorship. Brian Rathbun
is generous with his time. And without him saying “well why don’t you look into this status
stuff more”, this dissertation would not exist. I thank Ronan Fu for the always-provocative
discussions, as we shared a deep commitment to theory. My POIR friends made the process
an enjoyable one: Victoria Chonn-Ching, Dave Ebner, Brian Knafou, Stephanie Kang, Ellen
Kim, Ada Li, Xinru Ma, Suzie Mulesky, Paul Orner, Kyuri Park, Mao Suzuki, Jackie Wong,
Mingmin Yang, and Shiming Yang. Nayoung Lee has always been supportive, especially by
arming me with snacks as I tried to finish this dissertation. Pongkwan Sawadipakdi and I
remained good friends even after I left LA, and we talked deeply about work and life.
I had wonderful mentors and friends at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies,
the George Washington University. I thank Charles Glaser for giving me a chance to go to
Washington DC. I am indebted to him for providing important feedback and later becoming
a committee member. I learned a great deal from Alexander Downes and the way he gives
feedback: giving constructive feedback means offering solutions. Eleni Ekmektsioglou, Dani
Gilbert, Vanes Ibric, Alexander Kirss, Igor Kovac, Kendrick Kuo, Doyoung Lee, Daisuke
Minami, Shahryar Pasandideh, Tim McDonnell, Travis Sharpe offered excellent suggestions.
I thank Shahryar for being a wonderful friend during and after GW, and for his always-sharp
insights and reading the many things I send him. He and I have yet to determine which one
of us is the “greedy state”. But if we both are, then “what security dilemma”? Doyoung was
very generous with sharing resources and insights from day one. His support – especially
“Chinese food at Farragut West”– was instrumental to my ability to stay on task. Alex Kirss
often articulated my arguments better than I did, and he always offered excellent comments
and insights. However, I do not thank him for giving me the habit of saying “folks” or binging
on tater tots at Tonic. Eleni and I brought good luck to each other by exchanging fellowship
statements, and she has always been a voice of reason in my life.
I had a productive time at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard University. I really appreciate Kelly Greenhill’s mentorship, and for being the

ii

sounding board as I tried to work through difficult theoretical issues. I thank Stephen Walt
for detailed comments on my job market paper, and for encouraging me to be patient with
hard theoretical questions rather than settling for easy arguments. Steven Miller’s guidance
was crucial during my time in residence, where he always took his time to encourage me to
look at the bigger picture even during very difficult times. Sean Lynn-Jones is a real hero for
offering pages of detailed written comments on the various parts of my dissertation. I
sincerely hope the final product has usefully incorporated his insights. Morgan Kaplan was
generous with his time and I thank him for an illuminating conversation on my dissertation
right before COVID lockdowns. Last, but not least, I thank Susan Lynch for all of her support.
Without her, I probably would break everything on my first day and get kicked out thereafter.
Comments I received at the Conflict, Security, and Public Policy Working Group at
Harvard really shaped my thinking. I appreciate the support from David Arceneaux, Hyun-
Binn Cho, Augusta Dell’Omo, Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch, Dan Jacobs, William James, Renanah
Joyce, John Holland-McCowan, Kacie Miura, Robert Ralston, Ariel Petrovics, Sara Plana,
Avery Schmidt, Sanne Verschuren, and Audrye Wong. I thank Binn, Kacie, and Audrye for
their support beyond academics, and Yeajin Yoon was a wonderful “office hallway neighbor”.
I feel guilty for freeriding on the coffee that David makes every day – just kidding, not really.
I washed the coffee kettle…sometimes. Avery personified what a perfect friend looks like: so
intelligent, yet always so willing to help. Lindsay Hundley symbolized what prosocial
orientation and upstanding behavior looks like in academia. Steve Herzog, I hope one day
you will recover from the “does your theory generalize to Iceland” question. Robert, David,
Avery, Augusta and I were the survivors of the “COVID Brattleship”. Despite the comradery,
and even though we talk on a near-daily basis, Robert still refuses to share his butter chicken.
Beyond the institutions I was formally affiliated with, this project benefited from the
help of many individuals. I thank Pengfei Zhao for her insights early on, but especially during
the summer of 2017 in Beijing. Our conversations then shaped the basic intuition of the
argument. Nicholas Anderson provided detailed feedback on my job market paper and
practice job talk; his incisive comments sharpened my thinking. Steven Ward, as my
discussant at ISA 2019, provided very encouraging feedback. Sebastian Rosato kindly invited
me to present at the Emerging Scholars in Grand Strategy Conference at the University of
Notre Dame in May 2020. There, I appreciate the feedback I received from Michael Desch,
Eugene Gholz, Rosemary Kelanic, Dan Lindley, and Joseph Parent. Joslyn Barnhart offered
extensive suggestions both when she gave a talk at GW in 2019, and then again at the Notre
Dame conference as my discussant. Her pages of written comments helped me think through
the theory and empirics. Randall Schweller kindly invited me to present at the New Wave
Realism Conference at the Ohio State University in April 2021. There, I appreciate the
feedback I received from Don Casler, Andrew Goodhart, and John Mueller.

iii

Table of Contents

Acknowledgement i
List of Tables v
List of Figures vi
Abstract vii

Chapter 1. Introduction 1

Part I: Theory

Chapter 2. Theory: Posing Challenges without Being Equals 14
• Definition of concepts
• The logic of up and down
• Mechanisms of provocations from below
• Consequences of provocations from below

Part II: Identifying Provocations from Below

Chapter 3. Challenges from Below: The Sources of Status Dissatisfaction 63
• Expected observable implications
• Research design
• Validating status makers: nationwide survey in China
• Text analysis of Chinese foreign ministry statements from 1978-2018
• Illustrating the causal mechanisms
o Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979
o South China Sea disputes
• Counterarguments
• Discussion

iv

Part III: Consequences of Provocations from Below

Chapter 4. Starting the Fire: The Blame Game 98
• Expected observable implications
• Identifying status concerns
• Case selection and background
• US-China-Philippines disputes in the South China Sea, 2009 to 2016
• Measuring blame transference: China’s media coverage of South China Sea
• Consequences of blame transference: US-China contestation for primacy
• Discussion

Chapter 5. Adding Fuel to the Fire: The Imitation Game 139
• Expected observable implications
• Case selection and background
• Austro-Hungarian-Serbian relations from 1878 to 1914
o 1878-1903: Serbia as a vassal state
o 1903-1907: Serbia breaking free
o 1908: The “Serbian Problem” and the Bosnia Crisis
o Perceptions of Provocations from Serbia
o A Final Attempt at Saving Face: Austria-Hungary in 1914
• Discussion

Chapter 6. Conclusion and Ways Forward 165

References 176

Appendix 191
• Appendix #1: Survey on status markers
• Appendix #2: Selecting the number of topics
• Appendix #3: All topics and top words
• Appendix #4: Validation
• Appendix #5: Sensitivity Analysis

v

List of Tables

Table 1. Summary of Concepts 1
Table 2. Summary of Competing Theories and Expected Observable Implications 66
Table 3. Status Issues 73
Table 4. Chinese Respondents Rank Status Markers 75
Table 5. List of Established Powers 76
Table 6. Status Topics and Top 20 Words 81
Table 7. China’s Status Dissatisfaction, 1978-2018 85
Table 8. China’s Most Severe Status Complaints, 1978-2018 86
Table 9. Material vs. Status and Expected Observable Implications 105

vi

List of Figures

Figure 1. Number of Territorial Claims, 1816-2001 in Europe 57
Figure 2. Locating Status Complaints 78
Figure 3. The Temporality of China’s Status Dissatisfaction, 1978-2018 88
Figure 4. Main Triggers of China’s Status Complaints 94
Figure 5. Identifying Status Motive 104
Figure 6. China’s Position towards Philippines over the South China Sea Disputes 120
Figure 7. China’s Blame Attribution in the South China Sea 121

vii

Abstract
Why do rising powers become dissatisfied with their status and challenge the existing order
and/ or initiate conflict? The answer is essential for analyzing the causes and dynamics of
interstate competition, and it has clear implications for contemporary US-China relations. In
this dissertation, I advance a bottom-up theory of how status competitions unfold in world
politics. My theory overturns the conventional wisdom, which suggests that status
dissatisfaction and interstate competition happen when the established powers at the top of
the hierarchy refuse to recognize the rising powers as equals. My theory unfolds in two steps.
First, I argue that provocations from smaller states can make rising powers become
insecure about their status, and rising powers are especially sensitive to such provocations
in the initial stages of power transitions because they tend to “kiss up kick down” early on.
Through automated text analysis of primary documents from China’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs from 1978 to 2018 (N = 8581), I find that provocations from smaller states trigger
the majority of China’s complaints about its status, and such provocations are especially
salient in the early days of China’s rise. In fact, provocations from smaller states trigger 70%
of China’s most severe status complaints. I validate these results through a nationwide
survey in China (N = 4080), and I illustrate the causal mechanisms through (archival)
evidence from the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 and the going South China Sea disputes.
Second, I argue that provocations from smaller states can trigger and/ or exacerbate
the competition for status between rising powers and the established powers. In “the blame
game”, provocations from smaller states can start the fire. I illustrate this dynamic by tracing
how the South China Sea disputes evolved between the US, China, and the Philippines from
2009 onwards. Using an original dataset of official Chinese media coverage of the South
China Sea disputes from 2009 to 2020 (N = 428), I show how China tried to address its status
insecurities arising from the Philippines’ provocations by blaming the US and its allies to
save face internationally and retain domestic legitimacy. Yet, China’s blame strategy created
action-reactions between the US and China, triggering the US-China competition for status.
In “the imitation game”, provocations from smaller states can add fuel to the fire. I
illustrate this dynamic by intentionally replicating the existing status literature’s empirics
on status competitions among European great powers before World War I. I show that status
disputes between Austria-Hungary and Serbia from 1903 to 1914 – and the former’s decision
to take military actions in 1914 – exacerbated the preexisting competition for prestige
among the Powers. The Monarchy’s initial motivation was to restore its prestige through
limited military actions in the face of provocations from Serbia, again suggesting that status
dissatisfaction and interstate competition can often unfold from the bottom-up – even in the
empirical setting that the existing status literature favors.

1

Chapter 1
Introduction

“After you improve yourself, you can manage your family; after your family is managed, you
can govern your state; only then, can you govern the world.”

– The Book of Rites, on the importance of taking care of smaller things first before
rising to become a worthy leader

Puzzle and Argument
Why do rising powers become dissatisfied with their status – social influence, national
prestige, and ranking in the international system? In recent years, there has been a
revitalization of interest in why states pursue status and the consequences of such pursuits.
This literature suggests that states which are dissatisfied with their status are more likely to
adopt competitive policies to challenge the existing order and/ or initiate interstate conflict.
1

1
Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Aggression,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1964), 95–119;
Thomas J. Volgy and Stacey Mayhall, “Status Inconsistency and International War: Exploring the Effects of
Systemic Change,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 1 (March 1995), 67; William C. Wohlforth,
“Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (2009), 28–57; Deborah
Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy,”
International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2010), 63–95; Michelle Murray, “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power
Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War,” Security Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4
(November 2010), 656–688; William C. Wohlforth, “Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conflict,” in T.V. Paul,
Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, ed., Status in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 115–140; Joslyn Barnhart, “Status Competition and Territorial Aggression: Evidence
from the Scramble for Africa,” Security Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (July 2016), 385–419; Joslyn Barnhart,
“Humiliation and Third-Party Aggression,” World Politics, Vol. 69, No. 3 (July 2017), 532–568; Jonathan
Renshon, “Status Deficits and War,” International Organization, Vol. 70, No. 03 (2016), 513–550; Jonathan
Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2017); Steven M. Ward, “Lost in Translation: Social Identity Theory and the Study of Status in World Politics,”
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 4 (December 2017), 821–834; Steven M. Ward, Status and the
Challenge of Rising Powers (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Andrew Q. Greve and Jack S.
Levy, “Power Transitions, Status Dissatisfaction, and War: The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895,” Security
Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (January 2018), 148–178; Michelle Murray, The Struggle for Recognition in International
Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018); Joslyn
Barnhart, The Consequences of Humiliation: Anger and Status in World Politics (Cornell University Press, 2020);
Joslyn Barnhart, “The Consequences of Defeat: The Quest for Status and Morale in the Aftermath of War,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Online first.

2

Thus, understanding the causes of status dissatisfaction is essential for analyzing the causes
and dynamics of interstate competition, especially during power transitions,
2
or how the
other states might manage rising powers. Indeed, the status research program has gained
considerable attention in part due to its relevance for contemporary US-China relations.
Existing explanations suggest that a rising power becomes dissatisfied with its status
when the established powers at the top of the international hierarchy fail to recognize it as
an equal,
3
or when the rising power compares itself against said established powers.
4
Thus,
virtually all existing explanations share a fundamental premise: status dissatisfaction, and
the resultant interstate competition, unfold via a top-heavy process underpinned by the
rising power’s desire – and failure – to become an equal to the established powers. However,
these arguments are in tension with empirical records. As Lebow notes, the majority of wars
during historical power transitions were fought between rising powers and smaller states.
5
If status dissatisfaction comes from a rising power’s interactions with the established
powers,
6
it is unclear why most wars were fought between rising powers and smaller states.
The existing arguments also have difficulty explaining why contemporary China is so
fixated with affirming its superiority over smaller states. For example, during the 2010
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) Meeting, then-
Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, emphatically stressed that “China is a big country and

2
For a classical statement on the importance of status or prestige in power transitions, see Robert Gilpin, War
and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
3
Renshon, Fighting for Status, chap. 6; Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, 40–50; Murray, The
Struggle for Recognition in International Relations, 7.
4
Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers,” 68–70; Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great
Power War,” 37.
5
Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), 116–23.
6
Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” 30; Renshon, Fighting for Status, 220.

3

other countries are small countries and that is just a fact” when responding to perceived
slights from smaller states.
7
Likewise, during his visit to the United States in February 2016,
China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, asked the Philippines to stop provoking China in the South
China Sea. Wang considered these incidents to be insulting since it was impossible for the
Philippines to outmuscle China: he warned that the tendency for smaller countries to “bully
and disrespect” China should not continue.
8

My theory, “challenges from below”, suggests that perceived
9
provocations from
smaller states
10
is an important but undertheorized reason for why a rising power can
become dissatisfied with its status. Fundamentally, status informs patterns of superiority
and inferiority. Hence, assessment of one’s status involves looking up and looking down.
11

That is, in addition to wanting recognition from the other established powers, a rising power
must necessarily care about whether smaller states defer.
12
By neglecting the logic of
“looking down”, the existing explanations have an omitted variable problem. Provocations
from smaller states can make a rising power become dissatisfied with its status by violating
its self-conception as an actor which is currently is in the middle of the hierarchy (i.e., below
the established powers but above smaller states), and by creating impression management

7
The Washington Post, “U.S. Takes a Tougher Tone with China,” July 29, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906416.html.
8
BBC Chinese, “Wang Yi Defends Chinese Actions in South China Sea in Speech at CSIS (translated title),”
February 25, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2016/02/160225_china_us_sea_wangyi.
9
Smaller states may have perfectly legitimate reasons for resisting the rising powers. Hence, my argument
focuses on provocations from smaller states as perceived by the rising powers.
10
For stylistic consistency, I use “smaller states” to refer to smaller political actors, which says nothing about
the political status of actors such as Taiwan or Tibet. In addition, whether they are sovereign states or not does
not alter the basic intuition of my argument: that provocation from below is significant.
11
I thank David Kang for suggesting these terms.
12
Yuen Foong Khong, “The American Tributary System,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 6, No.
1 (March 2013), 23; Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics Of Asymmetry (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); Reinhard Wolf, “Taking Interaction Seriously: Asymmetrical Roles and the Behavioral
Foundations of Status,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 25, No. 4 (December 2019), 1186–1211.

4

problems for the rising power where the other actors in the system may deny the rising
power’s status claims because it is failing to secure deference from smaller states. In fact, as
I will argue, there is a life cycle as to how status dissatisfaction develops: a rising power can
start out by seeking deference from smaller states before becoming more concerned about
recognition from the established powers. That is, rising powers tend to “kiss up, kick down”
13

early in the power transition. The existing literature cannot and does not explain this
temporality due to its focus on the rising power-established powers interactions.
Once the salience of “looking down” is established, one can then theorize how denial
from the established powers and provocation from smaller states might interact to create
variations in the dependent variable of interest: interstate competition. Deductive logic
would suggest that power transitions should be most dangerous when the established
powers do not offer recognition and when smaller states engage in provocations at the same
time. I theorize two pathways – “the blame game” and “the imitation game” – to this outcome.
In the first pathway, termed “the blame game”, the rising power and the established
powers may not be interested in, or ready to, compete for status. In other words, there is no
active status competition. However, provocations from smaller states can make a rising
power become insecure about its status, and this can trickle up to start the fire between the
rising power and the established powers. Specifically, the (elites within the) rising power
may have incentives to adopt diplomatic or military actions to discipline a provocative
smaller state. In fact, the (elites within the) rising power may blame the established powers
for what the smaller states are doing, both to save face internationally and to retain domestic
legitimacy. Indeed, in these blame narratives, the rising power is the victim of foul play: the

13
I thank Sean Lynn-Jones for suggesting this term.

5

established powers are using the smaller states as pawns to provoke the rising power.
However, once adopted, these blame-transferring narratives and “disciplinary” actions
taken by the rising power against smaller states may elicit concerns from the established
powers, which may adopt diplomatic or military countermeasures. In turn, the established
powers’ reactions may crystallize the belief within the rising power that the established
powers have indeed been abetting the smaller states all along. Thus, what begins as face-
saving strategies for the rising power may create the social origins of spiral dynamics
between the rising power and the established powers.
14
In this regard, “the blame game” is
a direct response to Jervis’ call to arms that security dilemma theory needs to (1) incorporate
status in the parameter of state motives, and (2) move beyond two-player interactions to
consider the potential externalities generated by third-party actors.
15
Doing so will not only
clarify why and how inadvertent escalations occur for reasons unrelated to security (at least
initially), but also how such escalations might be avoided or resolved.
In the second pathway, termed “the imitation game”, the rising power and the
established powers are already in an active status competition. In this context, smaller states
may take advantage of the window of opportunity to advance their own (status) claims while
the actors at the top of the hierarchy are too preoccupied with competing against each other.
However, sometimes such actions from smaller states may end up provoking the rising

14
For how status or identity concerns might contribute towards security dilemmas, see Jennifer Mitzen,
“Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” European Journal of
International Relations 12, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 341–70, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066106067346;
Murray, “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics”; Wohlforth, “Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conflict.”
15
For why these two parameters are the crucial way forward for security dilemma theory, see Robert Jervis,
“Dilemmas About Security Dilemmas,” Security Studies 20, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 418–19,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2011.599189. For a similar critique about the need to include status in the
parameter of state motives in analyzing security dilemmas, see Michael F. Joseph, “Explaining Peace in a
Complex and Uncertain World: Multi-Dimensional Preferences, Great Power Rivalry, Diplomacy, and Peace”
(Ph.D. Dissertation, The George Washington University, 2018), 1–5.

6

power and/ or its allies. This can add fuel to the fire by motivating the rising power and/ or
its allies to adopt even more competitive strategies to avoid a scenario in which it
simultaneously lacks recognition from above and deference from below. As such, this is a
scenario in which provocations from smaller states “push things over the edge” by
exacerbating preexisting status competitions between the rising power and the established
powers. In this regard, “the imitation game” addresses the puzzle as to why rising powers
would adopt competitive strategies to challenge the established powers, even though
previous research from adjacent fields suggests that conciliatory postures should be the
sensible strategy in dealing with status disputes with peers and superiors. Contrary to
Ward’s answer which focuses on how denial from above may empower hawkish elites within
rising powers,
16
“the imitation game” highlights another reason: provocations from smaller
states render conciliatory strategies unappealing. If the status competitions at the top do not
stop, provocations from below will follow; when provocations from below do happen, the
status competitions at the top may worsen. The potential for this vicious cycle thus motivates
deviations from the conciliatory strategies and lead to competition.

Significance
Incorporating the logic of “looking down” overturns scholarly understanding of how and
when status dissatisfaction can arise and motivate interstate competition. On the question
of how, my theory points to the unexplored theoretical possibility that status competition
can unfold via bottom-up processes. This offers a corrective to the conventional wisdom,
which maintains that competition unfolds via top-heavy processes: namely, if and when the

16
Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers.

7

rising power and the established powers do not agree about their relative ranking vis-à-vis
each other.
17
Instead, my theory suggests that whether competition unfolds also depends on
whether smaller states defer to the rising power.
18
This means that a status-seeking rising
power is doubly difficult to satiate: not only does it need recognition from above as
conventionally theorized, it also needs deference from below. This also implies that the
interaction of these two dynamics – denial from above and provocations from below, as
illustrated in “the blame game” and “the imitation game” respectively – can better specify the
pathways to interstate competition than existing explanations.
On the question of when, if rising powers can be especially sensitive to provocations
from smaller states early on given their tendency to “kiss up kick down”, then competition
could unfold even sooner than conventionally theorized. Indeed, existing scholarship has
suggested that rising powers and the established powers sometimes have rational incentives
to bargain incrementally early on and only compete later in the power transition.
19
Similarly,
for arguments which posit that rising powers turn towards revisionism after experiencing
persistent status denials from the established powers,
20
the assumption is that competition
also happens later in the process as a last resort strategy to force status adjustments when
all other options have been exhausted. My argument implies that provocations from smaller
states and the resultant rising power status dissatisfaction can provide a factor for why the
rising power and the established powers might compete even sooner, reducing the time

17
Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” 30.
18
Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?”
International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2006), 6.
19
Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 4. On why the
rising power and the established powers may want to cooperate early on and procrastinate on dealing with
potential problems, see David M. Edelstein, Over the Horizon: Time, Uncertainty, and the Rise of Great Powers
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017).
20
Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers.

8

horizon for competition.
21
This is the basic intuition of “the blame game”: even when the
rising power or the established powers are not interested in, or ready to, compete for status,
provocations from smaller states can create third-party externalities that trigger this process.
Furthermore, observers are increasingly debating about the opportunities and
challenges associated with China’s rise.
22
If China might become more competitive and
challenge the existing order because of status dissatisfaction,
23
then it is necessary to
pinpoint the sources of such dissatisfaction. Indeed, China is typically invoked to justify the
relevance of the (re)emerging status research program to contemporary affairs,
24
since
China often cites wanting to recover its lost status as a key feature of its strategic
narratives.
25
My argument suggests that provocations from smaller states can complicate the

21
David M. Edelstein, Over the Horizon, 24–25.
22
E.g., Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?,” International Security,
Vol. 30, No. 2 (2005), 7–45; John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,”
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 2010), 381–396; Randall L. Schweller and
Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” International
Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2011), 41–72; G. John Ikenberry, “Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China,
and Middle State Strategies in East Asia: Between the Eagle and the Dragon,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol.
131, No. 1 (2016), 9–43; David C. Kang, American Grand Strategy and East Asian Security in the 21st Century
(Cambridge University Press, 2017); Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape
Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017); David Shambaugh, “U.S.-China Rivalry in
Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive Coexistence?” International Security, Vol. 42, No. 04 (May 2018),
85–127.
23
For how status concerns might shape US-China relations, see Christopher Layne's introduction in
“Roundtable 11-11 on Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower,” H-Diplo | ISSF,
https://issforum.org/roundtables/11-11-unrivaled.
24
Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers”; T. V. Paul, Deborah W. Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, eds.,
Status in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Yuen Foong Khong, “Power as Prestige
in World Politics,” International Affairs, Vol. 95, No. 1 (January 2019), 119–142; Xiaoyu Pu, Rebranding China:
Contested Status Signaling in the Changing Global Order (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2019);
Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, chap. 7; Steven Ward, “Status, Stratified Rights, and
Accommodation in International Relations,” Journal of Global Security Studies, online first; Steve Chan,
Thucydides’s Trap?: Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of Sino-American Relations (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2020), chap. 9.
25
William A. Callahan, “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism,” Alternatives,
Vol. 29, No. 2 (March 2004), 199–218.

9

execution of US engagement
26
or accommodation
27
strategies towards China; such
provocations also undermine the US’ ability to remain offshore.
28
This is because whether
smaller states defer to China or not is largely outside of US control, yet the consequences of
such decisions from smaller states create complications for US foreign policy.
29

For example, liberal internationalists contend that the US can and should engage
China by socializing it into the existing international order through the potential for shared-
leadership.
30
My theory highlights a fundamental difficulty associated with implementing
this strategy. Leadership-sharing is not only determined by whether the US recognizes China
as an equal; it also depends on whether smaller states defer to China.
31
Unfortunately, these
two dynamics do not always track at a one-to-one ratio. In other words, there are multiple
potential veto players to China’s bid for leadership. It follows that even if the US wants to
engage China, periodic provocations from smaller states – and US responses towards these
situations – may pull in the opposite direction and offer stimuli which China may misperceive
as evidence of containment. On the other hand, for proponents of offshore balancing and
restraint, their strategies are predicated on whether the US can remain offshore for as long

26
Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Lean Forward,” Foreign Affairs, January
2013.
27
Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and
Accommodation,” International Security 39, no. 4 (April 2015): 49–90; T. V. Paul, “The Accommodation of Rising
Powers in World Politics,” in Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present, and Future, ed. T. V. Paul (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2016), 3–32.
28
Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the
Face of Temptation,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (April 1997), 5–48; Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New
Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Cornell University Press, 2015); John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The
Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, June 2016, 70–83.
29
I thank Stephen Walt for point this out.
30
G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign
Affairs, January 2008, 23–37.
31
Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order,” 4.

10

as possible. Yet, provocations from smaller states create episodes during which the US may
be tempted or compelled to intervene and go onshore.
To be clear, my theory should not be read as a naïve argument which offloads the
responsibilities of US-China competition to the smaller states. However, my theory does
point to the complexities of managing US-China-smaller state relations if status is a motive
which drives Chinese foreign policy – and if such motive compels China to be fixated with
provocations from smaller states, even if said provocations may not always create
substantive material losses for China. That is, even disputes between China and smaller
states over symbolic issues can create the potential for US-China tension. Thus, regardless of
whether the goal is to integrate China into the existing international order or to ensure that
US can adopt a restrained posture, the implications of my theory suggest that US foreign
policy must find ways to manage the deleterious effects of status disputes between China
and smaller states to remove these disputes as potential pathways to US-China conflict.
32

Even if resolving these status disputes may be extremely difficult or impossible, US strategy
must at a minimum avoid exacerbating such disputes between China and the smaller states.

32
I thank Charles Glaser for pointing this out.

11

Structure of the Dissertation and Key Findings
I advance two theoretical propositions: that provocations from below matter, and
that provocations from below can trigger and exacerbate the status competition between the
rising power and the established powers.
To demonstrate the salience of “provocations from below”, Chapter 3 uses automated
text analysis to examine an original dataset which contains statements from China’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) from 1978 to 2018 (N = 8581). My results indicate that provocations
from smaller states trigger approximately 56% of China’s complaints about its status,
whereas the established powers trigger only 44% of the observations. In fact, provocations
from smaller states trigger 70% of China’s most severe status complaints, and provocations
from smaller states are especially salient in the earlier days of China’s rise. I validate the
status markers which guide my text analysis through an original nationwide survey in China
(N = 4080), which asks respondents to assess the most important markers that China needs
to obtain and sustain in order to secure great power status. Then, to illustrate the casual
mechanisms that underpin the empirical patterns I identify in my text analysis, I draw on
archival evidence and case studies involving the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 and the South
China Sea disputes. The mixed-method design I utilize in this chapter – text analysis,
validated through surveys and archival evidence – provides a transparent template for
triangulating status dissatisfaction that can be replicated with other rising powers.
Then, to illustrate “the blame game”, Chapter 4 traces how the South China Sea
disputes evolved between the US, China, and the Philippines from 2009 to 2016. More
specifically, I show how such disputes evolved from being bilateral territorial disputes
between China and the regional claimants, to a means through which China and the US assess

12

and defend their position in the existing order. The empirical discussions of this chapter will
unfold in three steps. First, through a discussion of escalating tensions throughout 2009-
2013, I show how provocations from the Philippines made China become insecure about its
status. Second, through hand-coding of an original dataset of Chinese media coverage of the
South China Sea from 2009-2020 (N = 428). I show how China tried to address its status
insecurities arising from the Philippines’ behaviors by blaming the US and its allies. Third, I
discuss the consequences of China’s blame transference strategy: creating signaling
problems and spiral dynamics between the US and China, in effect triggering the US-China
status competition. I conclude by discussing the broader theoretical implications from this
chapter. I also discuss the implications of my analysis as related to contemporary US-China
relations with respect to mutual accommodation and future trajectories in flashpoints such
as the South China Sea.
Finally, to illustrate “the imitation game”, Chapter 5 “replicates” the existing status
literature’s empirical focus on status competitions at the top of the European hierarchy from
1881 to the outbreak of World War I. My case selection strategy is intentional: to show that
even if I were to debate the existing status literature on its own terms, my theory – the logic
of “looking down” and its consequences – is still operational. That is, the geopolitical context
in Europe where major powers were landlocked against each other with similar socio-
cultural attributes should present an easy test for the existing theories which focus on
upward social comparisons and status denial from above. In contrast, such geopolitical
context should set up a hard test against my theory. In this chapter, I show that longstanding
status disputes between Austria-Hungary and Serbia from 1878 to 1914 was a crucial
variable that the existing status literature neglects. Despite having some initial success in

13

treating Serbia as a vassal state, the Monarchy’s ability to do so deteriorated as the status
competition among the European great powers unfolded. Thus, the familiar “provocations”
from Serbia in 1914 were only seen as provocative by Austria-Hungary because of the
Monarchy’s violated expectations stemming from its increasing inability to subjugate Serbia
into the role of a vassal state. Indeed, Austria-Hungary’s military actions in 1914 were
initially intended to be limited, with the aim of restoring the Monarchy’s prestige and
preventing it from suffering status denial from the Powers and provocations from Serbia.
The main takeaway of the Chapter is to show that provocations from smaller states can
create the impetus for status dissatisfaction and interstate competition by “adding fuel to the
fire”. I conclude this chapter by demonstrating that the findings from this Chapter, when
combined with the rest of the dissertation, demonstrates the viability and desirability of a
bottom-up theory of how status competitions unfold in world politics.

14

Chapter 2
Theory: Posing Challenges without Being Equals

My central contention is that provocations from smaller states can trigger and exacerbate
the status competition between the rising power and the other established powers. This
chapter develops the theoretical basis underpinning this claim.
To this end, I proceed in two steps. First, I show why a rising power would care about
provocations from smaller states.
33
I begin by establishing the proposition that status
assessments involve “looking up” and “looking down”, and thus a status-seeking rising
power is motivated by two logics. First, a rising power wants recognition from superiors and
peers (i.e., the established powers). Second, a rising power wants deference from inferiors
(i.e., the smaller states). The existing literature has largely focused on the first logic while
neglecting the second logic. If a stable hierarchy is made up of superiors and inferiors, then
these two inputs necessarily co-produce variations in a rising power’s status and
dissatisfaction thereof. As such, I offer a theory of why the “looking down” logic matters and
identify two mechanisms through which provocations from smaller states lead to a rising
power’s status dissatisfaction: violated expectations and impression management failure.
Building on these discussions, I then theorize the consequences of provocations from
smaller states by examining how denial from above and provocation from below interact to
produce status dissatisfaction and interstate competition. I outline two scenarios: (1)

33
The smaller states may have perfectly legitimate reasons for behaving the way they do. My claim is not that
they are in the wrong for not acting in line with the rising power’s interests. My claim here is that from the
perspective of the rising power, actions which are not in line with its interests might be perceived as provocative.
In this manuscript, I use “perceived provocation” and “provocation” interchangeably.

15

provocations from smaller states “start the fire” by triggering the status competition
between the rising power and the other established powers, (2) provocations from smaller
states “add fuel to the fire” by exacerbating an ongoing status competition between the rising
power and the established powers. My objective is to underscore the importance of
examining provocation from smaller states. I do so by highlighting escalation dynamics
which cannot be explained through conventional frameworks focusing on rising power-
established power interactions.

Definition of Concepts
I offer the following working definitions. Status is often used in variegated ways and
interchangeably with other related concepts such as reputation.
34
However, I emphasize two
central elements. First, status entails social respect. A high-status actor possesses attributes
which are held to be desirable in a community, are shown voluntary deference by others, or
are perceived as trustworthy.
35
Second, status refers to ranking in the social hierarchy,
making it a positional good.
36
Given the intersubjective nature of status, an actor’s claim to
high status is only valid if other members of the community acknowledge it. Else, in
situations wherein actors claim high status, but others disagree, that would create the

34
Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annual Review of
Political Science 17, no. 1 (May 11, 2014): 371–93, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421.
35
Eric M. Anicich et al., “When the Bases of Social Hierarchy Collide: Power Without Status Drives Interpersonal
Conflict,” Organization Science, November 23, 2015, 123–40, https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2015.1019; Alison
R. Fragale, Jennifer R. Overbeck, and Margaret A. Neale, “Resources versus Respect: Social Judgments Based on
Targets’ Power and Status Positions,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 47, no. 4 (July 2011): 767–75,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.03.006; Joe C. Magee and Adam D. Galinsky, “Social Hierarchy: The Self‐
Reinforcing Nature of Power and Status,” The Academy of Management Annals 2, no. 1 (January 2008): 351–98,
https://doi.org/10.1080/19416520802211628.
36
Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” 39; Larson and Shevchenko, “Status
Seekers,” 69; Jonathan Mercer, “The Illusion of International Prestige,” International Security 41, no. 4 (April
2017): 137–38, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00276; Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, 35.

16

impetus for status dissatisfaction. Therefore, status dissatisfaction is defined as scenarios in
which the actor has a set of expectations of how others should treat it but becomes
dissatisfied because the others do not behave in the way it expected.
Indeed, status is different from other concepts such as reputation, which need not be
positional or socially desirable – one could have a reputation for being lazy, which says
nothing about his or her ranking in the hierarchy or the desirability of this reputation.
Likewise, status is distinct from wealth and power, because material capabilities may not
necessarily translate into social acknowledgement. Hence, to have status means that the
actor occupies a high position in some rank hierarchy and that the actor’s position there is
underpinned by some social consent from other actors within that hierarchy.
The independent variable, provocation (from smaller states), is defined as an action
that outrages the recipient and motivates the recipient to retaliate. This definition follows
the emerging scholarship on provocations in international politics.
37
Provocations can take
form through substantive actions such as military attacks,
38
engagements which are not
consistent with standard operation procedures (e.g., buzzing airplanes),
39
or “symbolic
moves” that disrespects the recipient (e.g., rude diplomatic gestures, or deliberatively
pressing on something that the recipient holds dearly).
40
These actions create outrage in the

37
Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006):
49–80; Todd H. Hall, “On Provocation: Outrage, International Relations, and the Franco–Prussian War,” Security
Studies 26, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 1–29, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1243897; Allan Dafoe,
Sophia Hatz, and Baobao Zhang, “Coercion and Provocation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2020; Barnhart, The
Consequences of Humiliation; Allan Dafoe and Jessica Weiss, “Provocation, Public Opinion, and International
Crises: Evidence from China” (n.d.); Hyun-Binn Cho, “Provocation, Signaling, and Unwanted Crisis Escalation”
(Dissertation Project, 2018).
38
Dafoe, Hatz, and Zhang, “Coercion and Provocation,” 10–11.
39
Dafoe, Hatz, and Zhang, 12.
40
Dafoe, Hatz, and Zhang, 12–14.

17

recipient by “challenging or violating [the recipient’s] values and goals”.
41
Indeed, “values
and goals” can entail a variety of considerations, such as strategic calculations (would others
also engage in provocations too if retaliation is not adopted?)
42
or nonmaterial
considerations, such as an actor’s status.
43
Indeed, driven by these considerations,
provocations are said to increase the recipient’s willingness to retaliate.
44
Hence,
provocations require some of sort of expectation held by the recipient as to how others
should behave and violation of this expectation.
The dependent variable, interstate competition, is defined as adversarial relations
between two actors, including but are not limited to: arms races, postures to gain greater
social influence, to military conflict. This definition encompasses peacetime competition –
including challenges to an existing order and global governance – and wartime conflict. The
opposite would be interstate cooperation: arms control and restraint in military strategies,
or willingness to work within status quo international institutions. Note that I am more
focused on the competitive or cooperative dynamics created by status dissatisfaction (or lack
thereof), wherein actual interstate conflict is only one possible outcome. It may very well be
that states today use non-militaristic means to compete, including through instruments such
as institutional balancing
45
or economic statecraft.
46
In other word, states may compete and

41
Hall, “On Provocation,” 3.
42
Dafoe, Hatz, and Zhang, “Coercion and Provocation,” 17.
43
Barnhart, “Status Competition and Territorial Aggression”; Hall, “On Provocation.”
44
Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 69; Dafoe and Weiss, “Provocation, Public Opinion, and
International Crises: Evidence from China,” 5; Dafoe, Hatz, and Zhang, “Coercion and Provocation,” 9; Cho,
“Provocation, Signaling, and Unwanted Crisis Escalation.”
45
Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 7–45; T. V.
Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy,” International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 46–71; Kai He,
“Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power
Strategies in Southeast Asia,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 3 (2008): 489–518.
46
David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1985); Michael
Mastanduno, “Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security: Agendas for Research,” Security
Studies 9, no. 1–2 (September 1, 1999): 288–316, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419908429402; Daniel

18

hold adversarial relations with each other, but this competition may or may not result in
militarized conflict. This outcome depends on a variety of other contingent factors.
There are three types of actors in my framework: the rising power, established
powers, and the smaller states. By rising powers, I mean actors with rapidly expanding
material capabilities (military and economic). These actors are also characterized by the
ambition
47
to change the status quo, either through revolutionary or incremental means.
48

This implies two possibilities. A rising power can be a non-great power rising to become a
great power for the first time. It could also refer to an actor that is already a great power but
is rising in terms of its ranking vis-à-vis other great powers. To make this more concrete:
imagine, for the sake of example, great powers are defined as the top 10 countries in the
international system. A rising power can be rising into top 10 for the first time, or it could be
an actor that is moving from top 5 to top 2. I consider both actors as rising powers. By
“established powers”, I mean countries with the material capability and social influence to
plausibly claim global or regional leadership. These actors are either near peers, peers, or
superiors: actors which are just below or just above the rising power in question. For
convenience, I will use “superiors and peers” to refer to this category of actors.

Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge England ; New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors,
Grand Strategy, and State Control, 1 edition (Ithaca ; London: Cornell University Press, 2016); Ambassador
Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 2016); Cynthia Roberts, Leslie E. Armijo,
and Saori N. Katada, The BRICS and Collective Financial Statecraft (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press,
2017); Saori N. Katada, Japan’s New Regional Reality: Geoeconomic Strategy in the Asia-Pacific (Columbia
University Press, 2020).
47
Manjari Chatterjee Miller, “The Role of Beliefs in Identifying Rising Powers,” The Chinese Journal of
International Politics 9, no. 2 (June 2016): 201, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow006.
48
For a classical statement on incremental revisionism (which means slow, within-the-system changes) and
revolutionary revisionism (which means rapid, overthrow-the-system changes), see Robert Gilpin, War and
Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

19

By “smaller states”, I mean states which cannot realistically compete with the
established powers for influence and leadership. This definition differs from conventional
definitions in the existing literature, especially in discussions of alignment dynamics in the
Asia Pacific. Ross, for example, defines secondary states as states which cannot engage in war
with any other actor in the system and must “seek security through their relationships with
other great powers”, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Singapore,
Indonesia, and Malaysia.
49
Likewise, Ikenberry defines secondary states as those which rely
on the US for security cooperation and China for trade and investment, which include “Japan,
South Korea, Australia, and most of the ASEAN countries”.
50
These conventional definitions
include Japan as a secondary state. If pursued, these definitions will work in favor of my
argument, as China and Japan frequently engage in disputes of various kinds. Hence, I adopt
a definition that excludes Japan, which will in turn work against my argument. For
convenience, I refer to this category of actors as “inferiors”. I use “inferiors” only in terms of
the hierarchical standing and not any other loaded connotations

Table 1. Summary of Concepts
Concept Definition
Status Social respect and ranking in the hierarchy
Provocation Outrageous actions that invite retaliation
Competition Adversarial relations
Rising powers Countries with expanding material capabilities and social influence
Established powers Countries that can credibly claim regional or global leadership
Smaller states Countries that cannot credibly claim regional or global leadership

49
Robert S. Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia,”
Security Studies 15, no. 3 (September 2006): 357, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410601028206.
50
Ikenberry, “Between the Eagle and the Dragon,” 10.

20

I note two further considerations. First, some might wonder why I lump middle powers like
Brazil into the category of “established powers”. This choice is justified because my purpose
is to demonstrate the effects of provocations from clear inferiors – not just peers or near-
peers who are slightly below. My objective is to distinguish between “those who are
somewhat comparable” vs. “those who are clearly not comparable”. In addition, the more
actors I include into the “established powers” category, the less likely my empirical results
would favor my theoretical argument. This is because if my conceptualization of “established
powers” category only includes one or two actors, then my theoretical argument and
empirical tests become trivial, since virtually every actor (minus the one or two actors at the
very top of the hierarchy) would count as provocations from below. In other words, by
including middle powers into the “established powers” category, I am setting up a hard-test
against my theory and empirics. While there is indeed some variation within the ‘those who
are sort of close’ category (e.g., United States and Brazil are clearly not equal), this variation
is not my focus and does not alter either the theory or empirics.
Secondly, some might wonder why I only look at rising powers. If I am right, then all
actors should dislike provocations from inferiors – not just rising powers. This is valid.
However, I scope my analysis to rising powers because during powers transitions, these are
most likely actors to exhibit demand for higher status. To be clear: selecting on actors which
are more likely to exhibit demand for higher status does not, ex ante, bias the selection
towards actors that might care about provocation from below. Also, rising powers are really
the only ones who might act on the status dissatisfaction. This is relevant because my interest
is in the consequences of status dissatisfaction: interstate competition. As research in social
psychology has shown, only powerful actors would act on their status dissatisfaction and

21

engage in interpersonal conflict, whereas less powerful actors may either resolve status
dissatisfaction internally or adopt more conciliatory strategies.
51
Hence, I scope on rising
powers while acknowledging that provocation from below should theoretically lead to status
dissatisfaction for all actors. The only difference is the propensity and ability to act.

Status Dissatisfaction and Interstate Competition
A line of scholarship links status dissatisfaction to interstate competition. However, where
does such dissatisfaction come from? Existing scholarship focuses on the rising power’s
interactions with the other established powers. Broadly conceived, there are two
mechanisms. First, status dissatisfaction arises when the established powers do not
recognize the rising power as an equal or actively deny a rising power’s status or identity
claims.
52
Persistent denials may create the perception of status immobility; this can
empower hardliner elites in the rising power and propel it to adopt a more aggressive foreign
policy posture.
53
Second, since actors derive their identity from membership in social
groups,
54
rising powers will compare their “achievements and qualities to a reference group,
one that is equal or slightly superior”.
55
Unfavorable results from such comparisons within
relevant social groups can generate dissatisfaction.
56

51
Nathanael J. Fast, Nir Halevy, and Adam D. Galinsky, “The Destructive Nature of Power without Status,”
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48, no. 1 (January 2012): 391–94,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.07.013; Anicich et al., “When the Bases of Social Hierarchy Collide.”
52
Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, 40–50; Murray, The Struggle for Recognition in International
Relations, 7.
53
Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers.
54
Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers”; Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “An Integrative Theory of
Intergroup Conflict,” in William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel, ed., The Social Psychology of Intergroup
Relations (Monterey, California: Brooks/ Cole, 1979), 33–47; Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and
Great Power War.”
55
Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers,” 68–70.
56
Renshon, “Status Deficits and War.”

22

Unfortunately, the role that smaller states can play in triggering a rising power’s
status dissatisfaction is almost entirely absent from this discussion.
57
Indeed, dissatisfaction
is the key independent variable which causes interstate competition in both power
transition theory and the existing status literature in international relations (IR). For power
transition theory, dissatisfaction comes from unfair distribution of resources. Here, power
transition theorists might plausibly defend their focus on the rising powers’ interactions
with the other established powers because the latter actors tend to be the ones who design
existing institutions and distribute resources. In this context, the existing status literature
makes a powerful case that social variables need to be included in the set of motivations over
which rising powers can become dissatisfied. Yet, by making this case, it is no longer
defensible to only focus on the rising powers’ interactions with the other established powers.
As I will demonstrate below, the theoretical proposition that provocations from smaller
states matter in triggering a rising power’s status dissatisfaction is embedded within the
very internal logic of how hierarchies function.

The Logic of Looking Up and Down
If status informs patterns of superiority and inferiority,
58
then rising powers will want
recognition from superiors and peers and deference from inferiors. That is, for an actor
which is currently somewhere in the middle of the hierarchy and is interested in moving up,

57
For a possible exception, see Lebow 2010 for a discussion as to why actors might care about slights from
inferiors. However, there is less discussion on why would rising powers care about slights from smaller states
and why this might lead to kinetic action.
58
Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annual Review of
Political Science, Vol. 17, No. 1 (May 2014), 375; David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2009); Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers”; Janice Bially Mattern and Ayşe
Zarakol, “Hierarchies in World Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 70, No. 03 (2016), 624–625, 638;
Renshon, Fighting for Status, 33.

23

(e.g. a rising power), there are two referent groups that it has relations with. The first
referent group would be superiors or peers to the rising power. In this relationship, the
rising power is the subordinate. Given that the rising power’s objective is to rise to the top
of the hierarchy, it follows that it would want these superiors and peers to recognize it as an
equal and obtain the privileges that come with the improved ranking. The second referent
group would be the inferiors to the rising power. In this relationship, the rising power is the
superior. Given this, the rising power would expect the inferiors to show deference. Hence,
a rising power has two missions: (1) equalize with peers and superiors by obtaining
recognition from these actors, and (2) subjugate inferiors by obtaining deference from them.
Since status acquisition requires recognition from above and deference from below, it
follows that when an actor is acquiring and evaluating its status, it is looking up and looking
down. This is the reason why countries manage their impressions in front of, and project
their status claims to, multiple audiences – the international audience (i.e., the established
powers) and the regional audience (i.e., the smaller states).
59

What exactly is the rising power looking for in terms of “recognition from above” and
“deference from below”? Status claims are circumscribed by what the international
community at the time thinks that high-status actors are entitled to and expected to perform.
Indeed, the “looking up and down” logic is especially apparent in the acquisition of status
markers in international politics – the “stratified rights [and] privileges restricted to actors
with high enough standing”.
60
Existing IR scholarship posits that contemporary high-status

59
Pu, Rebranding China: Contested Status Signaling in the Changing Global Order, chap. 3.
60
Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 1987); Ward, “Status, Stratified Rights, and Accommodation in International Relations,” 1.

24

states enjoy two privileges: (1) participation in, and influence within, prestigious institutions
and global governance,
61
and (2) greater ability to maintain and exercise sovereignty.
62

First, high-status states exercise influence over international affairs by participating
in prestigious institutions. Membership in these institutions and influence therein become
litmus tests for the rising power to evaluate whether its superiors and peers consider it an
equal. For example, Japanese leaders in the late 19
th
and early 20
th
Centuries thought that
membership in the League of Nations or participation as one of the five great powers at the
Paris Peace Conference cemented Japan’s great power status.
63
Second, high-status states
have more sovereignty. As Lake writes, by entering into a hierarchy, subordinate actors cede
a part or all of their sovereignty to the dominant state in exchange for security or economic
benefits.
64
As such, moving up in the hierarchy requires acquiring more sovereignty, so that
the rising power becomes the one interfering in others’ affairs, not the other way around.
Substantively, the pursuit and exercise of sovereignty can take shape in two ways: (1) self-
governance without foreign interference, or (2) sovereignty as extraterritorial reach.
Sovereignty as self-governance without foreign interference is important to an actor’s
status because fundamentally, being treated as an equal means that others cannot get to
dictate what the actor’s policy would look like. This is a point that Radin and Reach make

61
Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2007), 84; Deborah Welch Larson, T. V. Paul, and William C. Wohlforth, “Status and World
Order,” in Deborah Welch Larson, T. V. Paul, and William C. Wohlforth, ed., Status in World Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7; Paul, “The Accommodation of Rising Powers in World Politics,” 5; Marina
G Duque, “Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 62, No.
3 (September 2018), 578.
62
David A. Lake, “Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics,” International
Security 32, no. 1 (2007): 48.
63
Steven Ward, “Race, Status, and Japanese Revisionism in the Early 1930s,” Security Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4
(October 2013), 611; Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, chap. 4.
64
Lake, “Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics,” 48.

25

when commenting on how contemporary Russia thinks about great power status: unlike the
other European powers which are “less sovereign” because they may have to consult “with
the United States or other countries to develop or execute their policy”, Russia should be
entitled to great(er) autonomy given its great power status.
65
This is because the US-Russia
relationship is one of equals, not superior-subordinate.
Another way in which the exercise of sovereignty happens is through extraterritorial
reach. This can take shape in the form of attempting to establish a “sphere of influence”
wherein the actor imposes “some amount of control over a given territory or polity and
[exclude] other external actors from exercising the same kind of control”.
66
In short, this
means imposition of one’s sovereignty at the expense of the target’s sovereignty. There is
consensus within the existing scholarship that great powers are marked by their right and
ability to intervene and stake claims in their sphere of influence.
67
For example, Barnhart
suggests that status-conscious actors tend to double-down on the assertion of their
sovereignty, especially in disputed territories, in order to reaffirm their claims to spheres of
influence and “signal [their] intentions of maintaining the expansive foreign policy of…high-
status state[s]”.
68
Thus, status considerations create motivations for actors to impose their
sovereignty on their surroundings to establish political control over other states.
To summarize: entry into prestigious institutions will require that the established
powers recognize the rising power as an equal. Also, to exercise sovereignty and fend off

65
Andrew Radin and Clint Reach, Russian Views of the International Order (Santa Monica, California: RAND
Corporation, 2017), 18.
66
Van Jackson, “Understanding Spheres of Influence in International Politics,” European Journal of International
Security, Online first, 1.
67
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press,
1977); Barnhart, “Status Competition and Territorial Aggression,” 386; T. V. Paul, “Accommodating Rising
Powers,” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5; Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, 189–190.
68
Barnhart, “Status Competition and Territorial Aggression,” 395.

26

interference, this would require that the established powers treat the rising power as an
equal. Yet, to stake and defend a sphere of influence, this usually requires that the smaller
states in that sphere show acquiescence towards the rising power’s claims. Thus, acquisition
of status necessarily requires recognition from above and deference from below.

Looking Down: Mechanisms of Provocation from Below
Yet, by only focusing on the “looking up” dynamic, the existing scholarship has neglected the
“looking down” aspect. How do provocations from below lead to the rising power’s status
dissatisfaction? Provocations from smaller states create two kinds of problems for the rising
power. First, such provocations violate the expectations that the rising power comes to hold
in terms of the privileges that it should already be entitled to, given its estimation of its social
position. This mechanism has to do with self-conception. Second, provocations from smaller
states undermine the rising power’s impression management. The other actors in the
international system may refuse to confer status to the rising power upon witnessing the fact
that the rising power is having issues dealing with smaller states. This mechanism has to do
with audience perception. The following figure offers a stylized representation of my theory.
The underlined text highlights what I will demonstrate in the subsequent section.

27

Self-conception and Violated Expectations
The first mechanism, “violated expectations”, has to do with how provocations from smaller
states undermine the rising power’s self-conception as a rising power. When “looking down”,
the rising power is dealing with smaller states. In this relationship, the rising power
conceptualizes itself as the superior. Consequently, the desire for deference from smaller
states is neither prospective nor aspirational. From the rising power’s perspective, it is not
longing to be a superior to the smaller states. It already considers itself as being superior.
After all, a rising power cannot be a rising power (i.e., somewhere in the middle of the
hierarchy) if its superiority to the smaller states (i.e., at the bottom of the hierarchy) is not
already a social fact. Hence, the rising power will readily expect a set of rights and privileges
to govern its interactions with the smaller states. Furthermore, given the asymmetrical
relations in terms of material capabilities and social influence, the rising power will hold the
estimation that receiving deference from smaller states should be easier than receiving
recognition from the other established powers. Note that these expectations flow from the
rising power’s subjective estimation – not whether these estimations are objectively valid.
In fact, the reason why status dissatisfaction might arise via violated expectations is precisely
because there is often a disconnect between the rising power’s subjective expectations and
objective reality. Indeed, to the rising power, bending the will of social superiors is, all else
being equal, a much harder enterprise than bending the will of social inferiors.
In fact, the weaker the smaller state, the more salient this belief would be. Thus,
Barnhart is right to observe that “losing a war to a weaker state…will likely call into question
the standing of the defeated state: the more rapid the defeat and the weaker the opponent,

28

the more grave the status threat” (italics added).
69
When those below the rising power
engage in provocative actions and/ or emerge victorious, this is status-threatening because
it suggests that perhaps these smaller states are not below the rising power after all, and that
the rising power’s self-assessments of its social position is overly optimistic. This violates
the rising power’s self-conception as being above these smaller states.
70
This is a problem. If
the rising power is not above smaller states, then it cannot be in the middle of the hierarchy.
If it is not in the middle of the hierarchy, then the rising power is even further away from
equalizing with the other established powers than initially conceived. Indeed, if even the
smaller states, over whom the rising power should enjoy absolute advantage, do not defer,
then who will? Thus, while the lack of recognition from the other established powers
generates status dissatisfaction through “I cannot get what I really value from superiors and
peers”, provocations from smaller states does so through “I expect deference, but even the
‘low-hanging fruits’ are not falling in line”.
In fact, there is also a difference as to when the rising power expects recognition from
other established powers versus deference from smaller states. Research from social
psychology has shown that actors who are rising in an organizational setting (i.e., risers) are
more likely to seek de-escalation as a first strategy against superiors or peers, where
confrontation is only used as a last-resort strategy.
71
This is because if recognition from

69
Barnhart, “Humiliation and Third-Party Aggression,” 536.
70
On ontological security and need for stable identity in relation to others, see Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological
Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” European Journal of International Relations,
Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 2006), 341–370; Murray, The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations.
71
M. Afzalur Rahim, “A Measure of Styles of Handling Interpersonal Conflict,” The Academy of Management
Journal, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1983), 370; Marc A. Fournier, D. S. Moskowitz, and David C. Zuroff, “Social Rank
Strategies in Hierarchical Relationships,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 83, No. 2 (August
2002), 425; Helen X. Chen, Xuemei Xu, and Patrick Phillips, “Emotional Intelligence and Conflict Management
Styles,” International Journal of Organizational Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 3 (January 2019), 458–470.

29

superiors and peers are more valuable but harder to obtain, then risers are more likely to be
patient even if the superiors and peers are not offering recognition quite just yet. This is also
sensible because the superiors or peers have access to more resources and institutional
influence with which they can impose costly punishment.
Conversely, risers are more likely to immediately adopt retaliatory efforts in the face
of provocation from below.
72
The willingness to engage in “down-hierarchy” escalation
“signals a readiness to escalate in rank contests, through which the high(er)-ranking
contestants intimidate low-ranking [counterparts]” to resolve the situation.
73
Risers expect
inferiors to offer deference right away, and hence provocations from below can never be
tolerated. The willingness to engage in “down-hierarchy” aggression against lower-ranking
adversaries is also sensible since such endeavor is less costly (inferiors have less resources
or institutional influence with which to wage retaliation) and more likely to be successful
(because inferiors also fear punishment from the riser, so they, too, will adopt a more
conciliatory strategy against the riser).
As such, obtaining recognition from the other established powers is a longer-term,
aspirational mission in which the rising power will be more patient. This is certainly
consistent with scholarship in IR which has pointed out why rising powers might prefer
incremental revisionism in the early stages of the power transitions.
74
Yet, securing
deference from smaller states is a mission that the rising power expects to actualize right
away and is not afraid to engage in down-hierarchy aggression to enforce deference out of

72
Fournier, Moskowitz, and Zuroff, “Social Rank Strategies in Hierarchical Relationships.”
73
Fournier, Moskowitz, and Zuroff, 425.
74
G. John Ikenberry, After Victory (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 40; Schweller and Pu, “After
Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline”; Ward, “Lost in Translation,” 27.

30

inferiors. In short, rising powers have incentives to “kiss up kick down” in the early stages of
power transitions. This temporal dynamic should be especially relevant for new rising
powers, rising powers which recently started trying to restore their past glory,
75
or recently
humiliated rising powers.
76
For rising powers like these, while they want recognition from
the other established powers, such expectations would be unrealistic given their
circumstances. On the other hand, these rising powers can still readily expect deference from
smaller states despite their relatively weak(ened) position. As the Chinese proverb goes, the
body of a starved camel is still bigger than a living horse: regardless of the weak(ened)
position, the rising power (the “starved camel”) nevertheless commands a higher position
than a smaller state (the “living horse”). Thus, as far as the rising power is concerned, smaller
states are in no position to engage in provocations of any kind under any circumstance.

Audience Perception and Impression Management Failure
In the second mechanism, “impression management failure”, provocations from smaller
states undermine the rising power’s status claims. This mechanism has to do with audience
perception. Fundamentally, status recognition/ demotion in a community unfolds in three
stages. First, both the actor and the audience will develop some baseline understanding of
what high-status actors should do or have. Second, the actor will be judged on whether it
succeeds or fails to perform on these metrics. Third, once the audience has had opportunities
to assess whether the actor succeeds or fails to perform on these metrics, they update their
beliefs about the actor’s status. It follows that the rising power has an incentive to manage

75
Joshua Freedman, “Status Insecurity and Temporality in World Politics,” European Journal of International
Relations, Vol. 22, No. 4 (December 2016), 797–822.
76
Barnhart, “Status Competition and Territorial Aggression.”

31

its impression to the audience. Indeed, status-seeking actors often offer “explanations…to
support their claims to positive image or social identities”.
77

As noted earlier, one of the status markers in contemporary international politics is
sovereignty in terms of extraterritorial reach: command of a sphere of influence
78
and/ or
being the leader of some order wherein “smaller and weaker states [are] willing to accept
[the actor’s]…authority”.
79
It follows that deference from smaller states is one of the
requisite social capitals that a rising power must acquire to prove its qualification as a high-
status actor. Provocations from smaller states, especially from the rising power’s (perceived)
sphere of influence, signal to the other actors that the rising power has not obtained this
social capital. Indeed, this is at the heart of Barnhart’s observation that humiliated actors
tend to become more aggressive in asserting territorial claims in their sphere of influence.
When an actor suffers an episode of humiliation, its claims to positive image or high-status
are called into question. Hence, the humiliated actor has an incentive to (re)demonstrate to
the international audience that it still deserves high-status despite the humiliating episode.
In fact, given my arguments earlier about smaller states being “low-hanging fruits”,
both the rising power and the audience are likely to perceive the task of securing deference
from smaller states as being one of the easiest to perform. Given this, provocations from
smaller states undermine the rising power’s impression management strategies. After all,
one cannot claim to have high status, if it even fails to secure deference from smaller states.

77
Philip E. Tetlock and Ariel Levi, “Attribution Bias: On the Inconclusiveness of the Cognition-Motivation
Debate,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January 1982), 301.
78
Barnhart, “Status Competition and Territorial Aggression,” 386; Paul, “Accommodating Rising Powers,” 5;
Ward, “Lost in Translation,” 822.
79
Mario E. Carranza, “Rising Regional Powers and International Relations Theories: Comparing Brazil and
India’s Foreign Security Policies and Their Search for Great-Power Status,” Foreign Policy Analysis, 256–259;
Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order,” 4.

32

This seems to be one of the first steps, if not the first step, to any meaningful pursuit of a high-
status position. Thus, provocations from smaller states engender episodes during which the
international audience might demote the rising power because it has failed to perform a
crucial metric that is expected of the rising power.
From this, one could see why it is imperative that the rising power retaliates against
provocative smaller states. Retaliations not only help the rising power preserve its self-
conception as a rising power, but also signal to the audience that the rising power intends to
stand firm in the face of provocations from below. This is because the rising power wants to
show that it is willing and able to perform in line with expectations. To invoke a firm example:
the mid-level manager will punish a provocative low-level worker not just to bring the low-
level worker back in line, but also to signal to her superiors and peers that this is not going
to be a problem moving forward. This is done to protect her chance at future promotion.
In fact, one can take a more pessimistic perspective: provocations from smaller states
provide the pretexts through which the established powers can deny the rising power’s
status claims. This implies that the other established powers might be driven by other (self-
interested) motivations to secure their existing social positions. As such, they use
provocations from smaller states as an excuse to deny the rising power’s status claims to be
an equal. This dynamic may unfold in the form of the established powers intervening to
“mediate the problems” between the rising power and the smaller states. From the
established power’s perspective, this helps maintain stability. It also consolidates the
established power’s status because it reaffirms its extraterritorial reach: the ability to
intervene in the rising power’s (perceived) sphere of influence.

33

However, this happens at the expense of the rising power’s status: its extraterritorial
reach in its (perceived) sphere of influence is compromised by interventions from the other
established powers. As noted earlier, spheres of influence are necessarily exclusionary: the
extent to which one has control of the sphere is in part dependent on one’s ability to exclude
other actors from having the same influence. When the other established powers intervene,
this creates the perception that the rising power needs the others’ help to deal with smaller
states. This creates, if not reaffirm, the perception that the rising power and the other
established powers are not equals. After all, the former seems to be dependent on the latter
to perform a basic task (securing deference from smaller states) that is expected of high-
status actors. This makes the rising power not-high-status. In short, provocations from
smaller states undermine a rising power’s impression management efforts.

34

Consequences of Provocation from Below
What are the consequences of provocations from below in terms of interstate competition?
As alluded to earlier, provocations from below and denial from superiors and peers often
interact. This produces four ideal types of scenarios, summarized below:
80

Denial from above

Provocation
from below
Yes No

Yes

Extreme dissatisfaction
(Outcome 1)

Contingent dissatisfaction
(“Outcome 2)
(“The Blame Game”)

No

Contingent dissatisfaction
(Outcome 3)
(“The Imitation Game”)

Satisfaction
(Outcome 4)

80
I thank Morgan Kaplan for suggesting that I organize my arguments in a 2x2 table, and for a stimulating
conversation which clarified the logics.

35

In the bottom-right cell, Outcome 4, this is a scenario in which the rising power enjoys
recognition from above and deference from below. In this arrangement, all other actors
within the community are showing the rising power the respect that it would prefer to have.
Deductively, rising powers in this outcome are more likely to work with the status quo and
engage in cooperative policies. This is because it is possible for them to receive the status
they want within current arrangements. Even if the rising power would like to pursue any
changes, they may do so through incremental means opposed to aggressive means. In this
world, rising powers can afford to be patient and work within the system, as the benefit of
working within the system is much higher than the benefit of adopting competitive strategies.
In the top-left cell, Outcome 1, this is a scenario in which the rising power is
experiencing both denial from above and provocations from below. Deductively, this is a
situation in which the rising power should be the most dissatisfied with its status. After all,
essentially all relevant actors within this hierarchy are rejecting the rising power’s status
claims. Thus, the challenge for the rising power is doubly difficult here, because it is racing
to obtain both recognition from above and deference from below. It also means that the rising
power in this world is doubly difficult to accommodate, because accommodating it invariably
requires that both the established powers and the smaller states adopt behaviors which are
amenable to the rising power’s status claims. In fact, since these two logics interact, then
there is a vicious cycle. That is, to get recognition from superiors and peers, the rising power
would need, among other things, deference from below. But to get deference from below, the
rising power would need recognition from above. Outside of a systemic shock (e.g.,
hegemonic war), this vicious cycle seems hard to break out. Therefore, this outcome should

36

be the scenario in which the rising power is extremely dissatisfied with its status and is most
likely to use competition and conflict to rectify its status quagmire.
81

The two remaining cells are most appropriately described as contingent
dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction exists, but perhaps not at a level that justifies revolutionary
revisionism quite just yet. However, depending on how subsequent dynamics unfold, and
indeed contingent upon the strategies adopted by the established powers and the smaller
states, there may be potential to move to Outcome 1 (extreme dissatisfaction) or Outcome 4
(satisfaction). Since my focus is on status dissatisfaction, I will restrict my discussions below
to how Outcome 2 and Outcome 3 might move towards Outcome 1. However, more
importantly, the dynamics contained in these two cells highlight the value-added from
incorporating provocation from smaller states. That is, they point to the mechanisms
through which (extreme) status dissatisfaction develops and motivates interstate
competition – mechanisms that the existing literature cannot arrive at because they do not
incorporate provocation from below as a variable.
82

Outcome 2 is what I would refer to as a “starting the fire” dynamic, which is a situation
in which provocations from smaller states trigger the status competition between the rising
power and the established powers. In this outcome, the status competition between the
rising power and the established powers may exist but remain largely muted; provocations
from smaller states activate this competition and bring it out to the open, because (the
leadership within) the rising power has an incentive to transfer the blame onto the

81
For how status concerns might lead to revolutionary revisionism in which the rising power uses aggressive
means to try and fundamentally alter the existing order or system because it cannot gain the status it would
like to gain in the existing arrangement, see Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers.
82
I thank Kelly Greenhill for recommending that I highlight this point.

37

established powers for what the smaller states are doing. However, this “blame transference”
can activate the status competition by motivating the established powers to adopt a more
aggressive strategy in dealing with the rising power. This in turn creates the perception that
the established powers are in fact denying the rising power’s status claims, moving Outcome
2 (contingent dissatisfaction) towards Outcome 1 (extreme dissatisfaction). For shorthand,
I will refer to this outcome as “the blame game”.
Outcome 3 is what I would refer to as a “add fuel to the fire” dynamic, which is a
situation in which provocations from smaller states exacerbate pre-existing status
competition between the rising power and the established powers. In this outcome, the
status competition between the rising power and the established powers is already active,
and provocations from smaller states make it even worse. This is because the smaller states
have sociological and rational incentives to take cues from the established powers and
become more adventurous. Yet, the consequence of this “imitation game” is the worsening
of a pre-existing status competition, wherein the rising power is now dealing with both
denial from above and provocations from below. This moves Outcome 3 (contingent
dissatisfaction) to Outcome 1 (extreme dissatisfaction). For shorthand, I will refer to this
outcome as “the imitation game”.

38

Starting the Fire: The Blame Game
This section outlines “the blame game” in three steps: description of blame transference,
motivation for blame transference, and consequence of blame transference.

The following graph highlights this escalation pathway.

1. Description of Blame Transference
In this world, the rising power experiences provocation from smaller states, but the
established powers are not actively denying the rising power’s status quite just yet. In this
context, the rising power’s objective is to try and resolve provocations from smaller states
as quickly as possible. This is both to ensure that smaller states remain deferential, but also
to prevent a “trickle-up” problem in which the established powers may decide to demote the
rising power’s status upon seeing the fact that it is experiencing provocations from smaller
states. If the rising power succeeds in securing deference from smaller states and preventing

39

“trickle-up”, then Outcome 2 (contingent dissatisfaction) moves to Outcome 4 (satisfaction);
if the rising power fails, then Outcome 2 (contingent dissatisfaction) moves to Outcome 1
(extreme dissatisfaction).
In other words, the starting condition of this scenario is that the status competition
between the rising power and the established powers is dormant, as opposed to active. In a
dormant status competition, the rising power and the established powers may compete for
influence and prestige within status-quo bounds. The rising power and the established
powers may even have a baseline level of cooperation. This is not unrealistic, since early on
in the power transition, the rising power and the established powers in fact have an incentive
to bargain incrementally, rather than resorting to active competition right away.
83
Likewise,
the elites within the rising power and the established powers may procrastinate on dealing
with the impending power transition because they favor short-term payoffs from
cooperation while delaying the need to compete.
84
Hence, at the beginning of “the blame
game”, the seeds for status competition between the rising power and the established
powers may exist, but such competition is not active. Empirically, one might think of the US
“congagement” strategy towards the rising China before the Trump administration as an
example of mixing competition and cooperation together.
The game begins with the smaller state provoking the rising power. As noted earlier,
to defend its status, the rising power is likely to respond by engaging in down-hierarchy
aggression to try and get the smaller states back in line. This is the rising power’s first
strategy. If the smaller states back down, then Outcome 2 moves to Outcome 4, and the

83
Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
84
Edelstein, Over the Horizon: Time, Uncertainty, and the Rise of Great Powers.

40

problem is resolved. However, if the rising power repeatedly fails to get the smaller states to
back down, then it may adopt a second strategy: blame one (or more) of the established
powers for what the smaller states are doing.
85
This blame transference strategy can include
open accusations of the established powers using smaller states as pawns to discredit the
rising power and manufacture trouble in the rising power’s sphere of influence.

2. Motivation for Blame Transference
Why would the rising power blame the established powers for what the smaller states are
doing? Blame transference is appealing to the (elites within the) rising power for two
reasons: (1) maintaining self-conception as a high-status actor, (2) damage-control strategy
intended for the international and the domestic audience.
Provocations from smaller states increase the tendency for rising powers –
specifically, the elites therein – to engage in self-serving bias, a type of attribution error.
Research in social psychology has shown that individuals and groups tend to attribute
successes to their own disposition, such as personality, characteristics or hard work. In
contrast, actors are more likely to attribute failures to the external environment by blaming
situational factors which are outside their control.
86
For example, a student is likely to
attribute receiving a good grade to the fact that she is hardworking, whereas the student may

85
For instance, if there are ten established powers, the rising power can blame one of them for abetting the
provocative smaller state, hoping to convince the remaining nine to not demote the rising power’s status.
86
Walter G Stephan and David Rosenfield, “Egoism and Attribution,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
33, no. 4 (1976): 435–41; Gifford Weary Bradley, “Self-Serving Biases in the Attribution Process: A
Reexamination of the Fact or Fiction Question,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36, no. 1 (1978):
56–71; Keith W. Campbell and Constantine Sedikides, “Self-Threat Magnifies the Self-Serving Bias: A Meta-
Analytic Integration.,” Review of General Psychology 3, no. 1 (1999): 23–43; James Shepperd, Wendi Malone,
and Kate Sweeny, “Exploring Causes of the Self-Serving Bias,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2, no.
2 (March 2008): 895–908, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00078.x.

41

attribute receiving a bad grade to the fact that the instructions were not clear, or that the test
is too difficult. Previous research has offered two explanations for why actors are influenced
by self-serving bias: self-enhancement and self-presentation.

2.1. Self-Enhancement and Self-Conception
Self-enhancement refers to the motivation to sustain one’s sense of self-worth.
87
As
mentioned earlier, actors have prior beliefs and expectations of who they are and their social
status. And these self-assessments tend to be overly positive. Consequently, when outcomes
which are not consistent with these self-assessments happen, actors look for reasons to
explain the failure. In these contexts, actors “are disinclined to look to their (lack of) ability
and effort as a possible cause because their ability and effort were often the reason for the
positive expectations in the first place”.
88
As Shepperd et al. note, “negative outcomes
prompt two possible conclusions: the negative outcome was internally caused…and the
positive self-[conception] is false, or the negative outcome was externally caused and the
positive self-[conception] remains accurate”.
89
Thus, self-serving bias is a self-defense
mechanism for actors to cope with failures and still preserve their self-conception.
Earlier, I argued that provocations from smaller states undermine the rising power’s
self-conception as a rising power. In the aftermath of provocations from a smaller state, two
sets of contradictory beliefs arise. Belief #1 is that the rising power is rising, and the increase
in status should come with recognition and deference from other actors. For reasons
explained earlier, (elites within) the rising power will think that it is more likely for smaller

87
Shepperd, Malone, and Sweeny, “Exploring Causes of the Self-Serving Bias,” 896.
88
Shepperd, Malone, and Sweeny, 899–900.
89
Shepperd, Malone, and Sweeny, 901.

42

states to offer deference since smaller states are perceived to be inferiors. Belief #2,
triggered by provocations from smaller states, suggests that maybe the rising power’s status
is not increasing after all because even the most likely actors to offer deference, are not doing
so. Thus, there is a fundamental tension between Belief #1 and Belief #2. If the rising power
– or elites therein – want to maintain Belief #1, then the best way to do this is to attribute
the negative outcome to some external, situational factor.
Therefore, elites could blame the provocations from smaller states as premeditated
attempts from the other established powers to deny the rising power’s status. Through this
blame transference, it is possible for (elites within) the rising power to resolve the tension
between Belief #1 and Belief #2. If these smaller states are only engaging in provocations
because they have been instructed to do so, then the tension between Belief #1 and Belief #2
disappears. More precisely, smaller states are not provoking the rising power because the
latter is not high status. The smaller states are doing so because they have been used by the
other established powers as pawns. Therefore, placing the blame on the other established
powers allows the rising power and its elites to preserve a positive self-conception.

2.2. Self-Presentation and Audience Perception
Self-presentation refers to the process in which actors attempt to present a positive image
to relevant others – that is, the audience.
90
This has to do with the impression management
dynamics noted earlier. In this context, blame transference is a core element of an actor’s

90
Robert M. Arkin, Jerry M. Burger, and Alan J. Appelman, “Social Anxiety, Self-Presentation, and the Self-
Serving Bias in Causal Attribution,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1980, 23–35; Barry R.
Schlenker, Impression Management: The Self-Concept, Social Identity, and Interpersonal Relations (Monterey,
Calif: Brooks/Cole, 1980); James T. Tedeschi, Impression Management Theory and Social Psychological Research
(Academic Press, 1981).

43

self-presentation strategy. In order to foster a positive image in the eyes of their peers, actors
“claim personal responsibility for successes but not failures in an attempt to influence how
others perceive them”.
91
This impression management strategy can also target constituents
within the organization as well. For example, politicians often engage in deflection to foster
a positive image in the eyes of their constituents, or to prevent their constituents from
holding them accountable for perceived failures.
92
By transferring blame to external,
situational factors, one retains and defends her positive image to the community.
Blame transference is therefore a damage-control strategy. There are two audiences:
the international and the domestic. On the international side, provocations from smaller
states are damaging because the other states may see the rising power as low status. Again,
this is because the other states are evaluating the rising power’s status based on a set of
metrics such as the establishment of a sphere of influence, which necessarily requires that
the rising power secure deference from smaller states. To limit the damage that the smaller
states can cause, one of the strategies that the rising power can adopt is to blame the other
established powers for the smaller states’ behavior. By transferring blame onto the other
established powers, elites within the rising power could demonstrate that smaller states are
not provoking the rising power because the rising power is low status. Instead, these
provocations are premeditated foul plays from the other established powers, and thus the

91
Bradley, “Self-Serving Biases in the Attribution Process: A Reexamination of the Fact or Fiction Question,”
63–66; Shepperd, Malone, and Sweeny, “Exploring Causes of the Self-Serving Bias,” 898.
92
R. Kent Weaver, “The Politics of Blame Avoidance,” Journal of Public Policy 6, no. 4 (1986): 371–98;
Christopher Hood, “Credit Claiming, Blame Avoidance, and Negativity Bias,” in The Blame Game, Spin,
Bureaucracy, and Self-Preservation in Government (Princeton University Press, 2011), 3–23,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7tc57.5; John M. Schuessler, Deceit on the Road to War: Presidents, Politics,
and American Democracy, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015); Ran
Ran, “Understanding Blame Politics in China’s Decentralized System of Environmental Governance: Actors,
Strategies and Context,” The China Quarterly 231 (September 2017): 634–61,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741017000911.

44

rising power is in fact a victim of injustice. As such, blame transference is a way to ensure
that the audience does not attribute provocations from smaller states to the disposition of
the rising power (i.e., low status) but rather situational factors (i.e., premeditated foul play).
Domestically, the constituents – from citizens to rival elites – may hold the ruling
elites responsible for the fact that even smaller states are provoking the rising power as if
there were no consequences. Again, it is relatively understandable if the rising power has
trouble obtaining recognition from the established powers. But if it is experiencing open
provocations from “low-hanging fruits”, then this provides a perfect pretext under which
rival elites may attempt to discredit the ruling elites for incompetence. As such, provocations
from smaller states may become useful pretexts with which internal power struggles might
be waged. The ruling elites therefore confront a dilemma: (1) admit that the provocations
from smaller states happen because of their incompetence, or (2) attempt to deflect the
blame and claim that some third party is instructing the smaller states to manufacture
trouble. For ruling elites who would like to maintain the ruling coalition and preserve
domestic legitimacy, the former option is decidedly more appealing than the latter. Indeed,
this intuition follows directly from previous studies which have shown that leaders can use
hostile rhetoric – even if it is cheap talk – against a foreign adversary to deflect blame and
retain domestic support.
93
Consequently, there are rational incentives for the ruling elites
within the rising power to blame the established powers for what the smaller states are
doing, rather than admitting their incompetence. As such, blame transference is a damage-
control strategy and may target both the international and the domestic audience.

93
Erin Baggott Carter, “Diversionary Cheap Talk: Economic Conditions and US Foreign Policy Rhetoric, 1945-
2010,” International Interactions 46, no. 2 (March 3, 2020): 163–98,
https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2020.1688319.

45

3. Consequence of Blame Transference
While there are clear incentives for (elites within) the rising power to engage in blame
transference, this strategy creates a number of problematic consequences.
For the rising power, there is a basic dilemma: “relen[ting] to the smaller states” and
suffer even more status loss, or “respond[ing] assertively” which then alarms the other
established powers.
94
For reasons addressed earlier, the rising power has an incentive to
adopt the latter outcome if it fails to get the smaller states to fall back in line. However, the
hostile rhetoric coming out of the rising power, as a part of the blame transference strategy,
will motivate the established powers into thinking that the rising power may indeed have
malign motives. Even if the hostile rhetoric is often cheap talk, in low information
environments, they become the only information with which the established powers may
attempt to discern the rising power’s motives. Indeed, by taking actions to “punish” smaller
states, the rising power runs the risk of losing rhetorical legitimacy, which might
compromise its peaceful rise by leading the other established powers to believe that the
rising power is a threat to the existing order.
95
According to this logic, the rising power’s
down-hierarchy aggression against the smaller states – and the concurrent blame
transference strategy – are but the harbingers of the rising power’s longer-term ambitions.
Consequently, the established powers may be motivated to take countermeasures to
check the rising power’s status ambitions. Yet, because of these actions from the established
powers, the rising power may think that the established powers do intend to impose a glass

94
Edelstein, Over the Horizon: Time, Uncertainty, and the Rise of Great Powers, 25.
95
Stacie E. Goddard, When Right Makes Might: Rising Powers and World Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2018).

46

ceiling onto the rising power’s status claims after all – because even “legitimate” down-
hierarchy “disciplinary action” to put a smaller state back in place is met with so much
resistance from the other established powers. In other words, provocations from smaller
states – in combination of the sequence of events described above – can create the perception
of status immobility that Ward argues as being essential to propelling the rising power
towards revolutionary revisionism.
96

The combination of these events therefore alters the way in which the rising power
and the established powers interpret each other’s motives. The blame transference strategy,
while appealing from the rising power’s perspectives, may bring Outcome 2 to Outcome 1
from a structural standpoint. The net effect is higher levels of status dissatisfaction on the
part of the rising power and the activation of the status competition between the rising
power and the established powers. In this way, provocations from smaller states shorten the
“time horizon” before competition occurs,
97
and the status dynamics I illustrate provide one
microfoundation as to why this is the case.
More crucially, the status dynamics triggered by provocations from smaller states, if
not properly managed, provide one pathway to spiral dynamics between the rising power
and the established powers. While provocations from smaller states usually do not create
severe security threats for the rising power,
98
they do create a pressing need for the rising
power to reaffirm its status. Yet, the concrete actions that the rising power can adopt to

96
Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers.
97
Edelstein, Over the Horizon: Time, Uncertainty, and the Rise of Great Powers, 24–25.
98
This is a general statement. I acknowledge that in certain circumstances, smaller states can and do win
militarized conflicts against stronger adversaries, either through threatening to escalate to the nuclear level,
through asymmetrical non-conventional means, or with the support of great power patrons. For a classical
statement as to how weaker actors can win against stronger adversaries, see Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak
Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, Illustrated edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

47

reaffirm its status and secure deference from smaller states (e.g., symbolic shows of force,
short-of-war coercion, military exercises, or arming
99
in disputed territories
100
) may create
real security threats for the smaller states and the established powers.
101
In turn, this invites
countermeasures from smaller states and the established powers – ranging from political
rebukes to military moves. The former further entrenches the rising power’s sense of status
dissatisfaction, whereas the latter generates real security threats for the rising power.
In other words, what begins as jostling for social influence and finger-pointing as a
face-saving strategy may create the conditions which are conducive to competitive military
strategies and the onset of security dilemmas. In short, provocations from smaller states can
provide the social origins of spiral dynamics.

99
Murray, “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics.”
100
The arming itself may not contribute much towards the rising power’s ability to carry out its military
missions. For example, see Pasandideh 2020 for an excellent analysis on why the operational benefits of China's
new islands in the South China Sea are overstated once one accounts for limitations in radar coverage and
geography. Note that his claim is not that the islands cannot provide any operational benefits, but that (1) to
fully access these benefits requires China to adopt costly adjustments to its force structure and paying political
and diplomatic costs because these adjustments can be highly provocative, and (2) the benefits can be gained
(at a lower cost) without militarizing the islands.
101
Wohlforth, “Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conflict.”

48

Adding Fuel to the Fire: The Imitation Game
This section outlines the “the imitation game” in three steps: description of imitation,
motivation for imitation, and consequence of imitation.

The following graph highlights this escalation pathway.

1. Description of the Imitation Game
In this world, the rising power is experiencing status denials from the established powers,
but the smaller states are not actively provoking the rising power. Here, the rising power’s
objective is to resolve the status denials from above as quickly as possible. This is to (1)
ensure that the superiors and peers would recognize the rising power as an equal, and (2)
ensure that the inferiors do not imitate the superiors and peers.

49

The first logic has been ably demonstrated by the existing status scholarship in IR.
102

It follows directly from the observation that rising powers want recognition as an equal by
the most prestigious actors in the system – and the intrinsic and instrumental benefits that
come with this recognition. However, what is less discussed is the downstream effects of
persistent and visible status denials from the established powers. Ward offers one possibility:
they create domestic and psychological consequences that propel the rising power towards
revisionism.
103
Status denials from above gradually empower domestic hawkish elites
within the rising power and allow these hawks to dominate the rising power’s foreign policy
decision-making process. This alters the rising power’s foreign policy orientation, or
“type”.
104
In turn, this dynamic propels the rising power towards revolutionary revisionism.
However, there is another downstream effect, which arguably takes place even faster
than the consequences that Ward identifies. If the established powers do not offer
recognition to the rising power, this creates incentives for the smaller states to imitate the
behavior and also provoke the rising power. As will be explored in the next section, this is
both because the other established powers’ behaviors offer a source for sociological mimicry,
and also because following the established powers’ lead will provide greater strategic
insulation from blowback since the rising power is busy dealing with the established powers.
If true, and if rising powers are driven by the desire to become an equal to the established

102
E.g., Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”; Larson and Shevchenko, “Status
Seekers”; Renshon, Fighting for Status.
103
Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers.
104
For classical statements on state “types”, see Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the
Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72–107, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539149;
Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other,” Security Studies 7,
no. 1 (September 1997): 114–55, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429336; Charles L. Glaser, Rational
Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 2010).

50

powers, then recognition from the established powers is not only a value in itself, but also
because it has implications for whether smaller states are more likely to offer deference.
In terms of outcomes, if the rising power succeeds in obtaining recognition from the
established powers and avoids the deleterious downstream effects, then Outcome 3
(contingent dissatisfaction) moves to Outcome 4 (satisfaction). If the rising power fails to
obtain recognition from the established powers and the smaller states also become more
provocative, then Outcome 3 (contingent dissatisfaction) moves to Outcome 1 (extreme
dissatisfaction). In short, the main difference between “the blame game” and “the imitation
game” is that in the latter situation, the fire (competition between the rising power and the
established powers) is already burning and provocations from smaller states add fuel to the
fire, whereas in the former situation, provocations from smaller states start the fire.

2. Motivations for the Imitation Game
Why would smaller states become more provocative while the established powers are
denying the rising power’s status claims? Relatedly, why would obtaining recognition from
the established powers solve this problem for the rising power?
Beginning with the first question: in general, provoking a stronger adversary – such
as a rising power – is always a risky proposition for smaller states. Yet, empirically, smaller
states often engage in such behavior. For example, from 1816 to 1996, “54 percent of all
conflicts involving major powers have been classified as those in which a minor power was
the aggressor, and the frequency [of these conflicts] has increased relative to wars between

51

great powers in the post-Second World War period”.
105
This puzzling phenomenon has
generated a series of scholarship to understand why smaller states provoke, and even
initiate war against, a stronger adversary. Among the conditions identified are the following:
the smaller states perceive the adversary’s culture to be inferior,
106
the smaller states have
specific-domain “escalation dominance” (e.g., having naval superiority despite overall
inferiority),
107
domestic instability,
108
foreign support,
109
when smaller states are risk-
acceptant,
110
or that the smaller states may fight a stronger adversary and accept short-term
loss in order to build a reputation for resolve to deter future aggression.
111

However, many explanations converge on a baseline condition: that smaller states
tend to take advantage of the “window of opportunity” during which the stronger adversary,
such as the rising power, is busy elsewhere.
112
Why? Broadly conceived, there are two (non-
mutually exclusive) motivations here: sociological and rational.

105
Michael P. Fischerkeller, “David versus Goliath: Cultural Judgments in Asymmetric Wars,” Security Studies 7,
no. 4 (June 1998): 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419808429357.
106
Fischerkeller, “David versus Goliath.”
107
Jan Angstrom and Magnus Petersson, “Weak Party Escalation: An Underestimated Strategy for Small States?,”
Journal of Strategic Studies 42, no. 2 (February 23, 2019): 282–300,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1559154.
108
Marinko Bobic, Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers: A Comparative Study of the Post-Cold War
Era, 1 edition (Bristol University Press, 2019).
109
Steve Chan, “Major-Power Intervention and War Initiation by the Weak,” International Politics 47, no. 2
(March 2010): 163–85, https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2010.6; Michael A. Allen, Sam R. Bell, and K. Chad Clay,
“Deadly Triangles: The Implications of Regional Competition on Interactions in Asymmetric Dyads,” Foreign
Policy Analysis, May 30, 2016, orw026, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw026; Bobic, Why Minor Powers Risk
Wars with Major Powers.
110
Jeffrey D. Berejikian, “David versus Goliath: Risk and Weaker State Confrontation,” Foreign Policy Analysis,
April 29, 2016, orw037, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw037.
111
Angstrom and Petersson, “Weak Party Escalation.”
112
Chan, “Major-Power Intervention and War Initiation by the Weak”; Hong-Cheol Kim and Patrick James, “The
Paradox of Power Asymmetry: When and Why Do Weaker States Challenge US Hegemony?,” All Azimuth: A
Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace 5, no. 2 (June 20, 2016): 5–5, https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.257674;
Scott F Abramson and David B. Carter, “Systemic Instability and the Emergence of Border Disputes,”
International Organization, Forthcoming.

52

2.1. Sociological reasons
Social learning theory suggests that actors develop behaviors by taking cues from their social
environment. Actors tend to imitate behaviors from “models” (that is, the actor being
imitated), and status dynamics determine when and why imitations happen. All else being
equal, models with “high[er] status, prestige, and power are much more effective in evoking
matching behavior in observers than models of low standing”.
113
This is because “the actions
of models who have gained some status are more likely to be [perceived as] successful and
hence have greater functional value for observers”.
114
Hence, low-status actors tend to
imitate high-status actors both to create positive self-conception, and to derive the same type
of benefits and rewards that high-status actors have access to.
For the former logic, imitating from high-status actors is a way for low-status actors
to signal similarity with the high-status actor. This is a bonding strategy through which low-
status actors increase their standing within the organization by presenting themselves as
being “just like” the high-status actors.
115
For low-status actors who are insecure about their
status or have experienced social exclusion, mimicry is especially prevalent because
imitation is a way in which low-status actors can gain acceptance.
116
For the latter logic,

113
Albert Bandura, Social Learning Theory (New York, New York: General Learning Press, 1971), 18.
114
Bandura, 19.
115
Tanya L. Chartrand and John A. Bargh, “The Chameleon Effect: The Perception–Behavior Link and Social
Interaction,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76, no. 6 (1999): 893–910; Clara Michelle Cheng and
Tanya L. Chartrand, “Self-Monitoring without Awareness: Using Mimicry as a Nonconscious Affiliation Strategy,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85, no. 6 (December 2003): 1170–79,
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.6.1170; Tessa A.M. Lansu, Antonius H.N. Cillessen, and Johan C.
Karremans, “The Effects of Social Status and Self-Esteem on Imitation and Choice of a Popular Peer,” Journal of
Relationships Research 6 (2015): e14, https://doi.org/10.1017/jrr.2015.11.
116
M. J. Prinstein, J. Boergers, and A. Spirito, “Adolescents’ and Their Friends’ Health-Risk Behavior: Factors
That Alter or Add to Peer Influence,” Journal of Pediatric Psychology 26, no. 5 (August 2001): 287–98,
https://doi.org/10.1093/jpepsy/26.5.287; Jessica L. Lakin and Tanya L. Chartrand, “Exclusion and
Nonconscious Behavioral Mimicry,” in The Social Outcast: Ostracism, Social Exclusion, Rejection, and Bullying,
Sydney Symposium of Social Psychology Series (New York, NY, US: Psychology Press, 2005), 279–95; Jessica L.
Lakin, Tanya L. Chartrand, and Robert M. Arkin, “I Am Too Just like You: Nonconscious Mimicry as an Automatic

53

imitating from high-status actors is a way for low-status actors to possibly increase the
rewards and benefits they receive. By assumption, high-status actors are successful at
obtaining rewards and benefits. By imitating these high-status actors, low-status actors hope
that “engaging in similar behavior will lead to [similar] eventual reward”.
117

In other words, imitation in social hierarchies are driven by intrinsic and
instrumental reasons. For these reasons, when high-status actors behave in a certain way,
these behaviors become institutional norms that motivate mimicry from subordinates.
118

When high-status actors implement positive institutional norms, they facilitate efficient
collective action, because low-status actors accept the high-status actors’ credibility and

Behavioral Response to Social Exclusion,” Psychological Science 19, no. 8 (August 2008): 816–22,
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02162.x.
117
Bandura, Social Learning Theory; Howard M. Weiss, “Subordinate Imitation of Supervisor Behavior: The Role
of Modeling in Organizational Socialization,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 19, no. 1 (June
1, 1977): 91, https://doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073(77)90056-3.
118
Michael E. Brown, Linda K. Treviño, and David A. Harrison, “Ethical Leadership: A Social Learning
Perspective for Construct Development and Testing,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
97, no. 2 (July 1, 2005): 117–34, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.03.002; David M. Mayer et al.,
“Encouraging Employees to Report Unethical Conduct Internally: It Takes a Village,” Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes 121, no. 1 (May 1, 2013): 89–103, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.01.002;
Kristin Smith-Crowe and Danielle E. Warren, “The Emotion-Evoked Collective Corruption Model: The Role of
Emotion in the Spread of Corruption Within Organizations,” Organization Science 25, no. 4 (April 1, 2014):
1154–71, https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2014.0896; Mary Bardes Mawritz et al., “A Trickle-down Model of
Abusive Supervision,” Personnel Psychology 65, no. 2 (2012): 325–57, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-
6570.2012.01246.x; David M. Mayer et al., “How Low Does Ethical Leadership Flow? Test of a Trickle-down
Model,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 108, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 1–13,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.04.002; David M. Mayer, Maribeth Kuenzi, and Rebecca L. Greenbaum,
“Examining the Link Between Ethical Leadership and Employee Misconduct: The Mediating Role of Ethical
Climate,” Journal of Business Ethics 95, no. 1 (September 1, 2010): 7–16, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-
0794-0; Susan T. Fiske, Beth Morling, and Laura E. Stevens, “Controlling Self and Others: A Theory of Anxiety,
Mental Control, and Social Control:,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, July 2, 2016,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167296222001; Francis J. Flynn and Emily T. Amanatullah, “Psyched Up or
Psyched Out? The Influence of Coactor Status on Individual Performance,” Organization Science 23, no. 2 (July
20, 2010): 402–15, https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1100.0552; Brent Simpson, Robb Willer, and Cecilia L.
Ridgeway, “Status Hierarchies and the Organization of Collective Action,” Sociological Theory 30, no. 3
(September 1, 2012): 149–66, https://doi.org/10.1177/0735275112457912; Christopher W. Bauman, Leigh
Plunkett Tost, and Madeline Ong, “Blame the Shepherd Not the Sheep: Imitating Higher-Ranking Transgressors
Mitigates Punishment for Unethical Behavior,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 137
(November 1, 2016): 123–41, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2016.08.006.

54

follow.
119
Conversely, unethical or bad behaviors can also diffuse in organizational settings:
prior instances of these behaviors, if adopted by high-status actors, motivate social contagion
and encourage others to behave in similar ways.
120
In fact, the institutional sanctioning effect
is especially salient for motivating mimicry. This is because in contexts where institutional
norms are set by the superiors, subordinates are less likely to be blamed since it is generally
assumed that they have less agency
121
and are only “following the script”.
122

In the context of international politics, Linos has already shown that countries tend
to draw lessons from other high-status and rich countries and emulate their policies,
123

whereas Lin and Katada have shown that the behaviors of high-status actors become
aspirational standards towards which other actors can strive.
124
Indeed, status dynamics can
be important for motivating learning processes and policy diffusion. Hence, when smaller
states see that the established powers are refusing to recognize the rising power’s status,
these behaviors from the established powers can create a parameter of acceptable and/ or
desirable behavior within the hierarchy. For reasons outlined earlier, the smaller states may

119
Simpson, Willer, and Ridgeway, “Status Hierarchies and the Organization of Collective Action”; Erik W. de
Kwaadsteniet and Eric van Dijk, “Social Status as a Cue for Tacit Coordination,” Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology 46, no. 3 (May 1, 2010): 515–24, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.01.005; Thomas R. Zentall,
“Social Learning Mechanisms: Implications for a Cognitive Theory of Imitation,” Interaction Studies 12, no. 2
(November 2011): 233–61.
120
Bauman, Tost, and Ong, “Blame the Shepherd Not the Sheep,” 138.
121
Alison R. Fragale et al., “The Higher They Are, the Harder They Fall: The Effects of Wrongdoer Status on
Observer Punishment Recommendations and Intentionality Attributions,” Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes 108, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 53–65, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.05.002.
122
Bauman, Tost, and Ong, “Blame the Shepherd Not the Sheep,” 125; D.A. Gioia, “Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics:
A Script Analysis of Missed Opportunities,” Journal of Business Ethics 11, no. 5–6 (1992): 379–89,
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00870550.
123
Katerina Linos, The Democratic Foundations of Policy Diffusion: How Health, Family, and Employment Laws
Spread Across Countries (Oxford University Press, 2013).
124
Alex Yu-Ting Lin and Saori N. Katada, “Striving for Greatness: Status Aspirations, Rhetorical Entrapment, and
Domestic Reforms,” Review of International Political Economy, 2020.

55

imitate both to enhance their self-conception and rewards. This last point about
instrumental rewards provides a perfect segue into the rationalist motivations for imitation.

2.2. Rational reasons
To be sure, there are also rational motivations for why smaller states tend to imitate the
other established powers in provoking the rising power during “windows of opportunity”.
For example, Angstrom and Petersson note that Finland used “Nazi Germany’s attack on the
Soviet Union in June 1941 to launch its own offensive a few weeks later to reclaim territory
it had lost during the Winter War”. In this logic, smaller states might escalate “against a
stronger adversary while [the latter] is pre-occupied in armed conflict with an equal”.
125

Indeed, Kim and James find that “comparatively weak but strongly motivated challengers
may interpret the hegemon’s military intervention elsewhere as a window of
opportunity”.
126
This is because the hegemon’s preoccupation elsewhere implies "reduced
strength, which encourages [the weaker challenger] that they can achieve functional power
parity with the hegemon”.
127
Just because the hegemon has 100 submarines does not mean
that it can use all 100 submarines in a mission against the smaller state: it depends on other
considerations, such as whether the hegemon has other potential adversaries to deter.
128

Likewise, Abramson and Carter note that most territorial claims in Europe from
1816-2001 congregate around periods of hegemonic instability. This is because “states with
latent territorial claims take advantage of heightened opportunity when the relevant great

125
Angstrom and Petersson, “Weak Party Escalation,” 289.
126
Kim and James, “The Paradox of Power Asymmetry,” 6.
127
Kim and James, 9.
128
I thank Shahryar Pasandideh for making this point on multiple occasions.

56

power's ability to actively intervene to preserve the status quo is in question”.
129
In fact, most
of the claims during this period came from smaller states, since the “window of opportunity”
is especially appealing for the smaller states who typically would not be as adventurous
given the potential high costs of staking territorial claims against stronger adversaries. A
common-denominating element of these arguments is that during these “windows of
opportunity”, the likelihood and ability for the strong adversary to punish the smaller actor
reduces. In turn, this decreases the smaller state’s cost of provoking a stronger adversary,
giving it the incentives to imitate the established powers.
Hence, during these “windows of opportunity”, attempts from the rising power to
retaliate against the smaller states become constrained by two considerations: (1) the rising
power may not have the resources or attention to deal with the smaller states while also
dealing with the established powers, and (2) ex ante, the rising power is uncertain whether
the established powers will use the rising power’s troubles with the smaller states as a
pretext to intervene or not.
130
Here, unlike the sociological motivations, the considerations
are instrumental and strategic. Namely, if the rising power is busy elsewhere, then the cost
of provocation reduces and the operational plausibility of provocation increases.

129
Abramson and Carter, “Systemic Instability and the Emergence of Border Disputes.”
130
Chan, “Major-Power Intervention and War Initiation by the Weak.”

57

Figure 1. Number of Territorial Claims, 1816-2001 in Europe

Source: Scott F Abramson and David B. Carter, “Systemic Instability and the Emergence of
Border Disputes”. Forthcoming, International Organization

2.3. Motivation for the rising power
Why would gaining recognition from the other established powers solve these issues for the
rising power? The answer can be obtained by reverse-engineering the aforementioned
sociological and rational logics.
From a sociological standpoint, if the established powers recognize the rising power
as an equal, then this creates the motivations for smaller states to also recognize the rising
power. Indeed, the same social learning logic for why smaller states might provoke the rising
power if they see the established powers disrespecting the rising power, could also work to

58

motivate smaller states to respect the rising power. If the smaller states observe that the
established powers recognize the rising power as an equal, they might mimic this behavior
to enhance their status by signaling similarity with high-status actors. In fact, whether this
actually happens is not necessary for my purposes. A weaker version of this claim, which is
that the rising power believes and hopes that this would happen, would be sufficient. One
might call this the “prison fight logic”: for a new inmate who wants to enhance her social
standing in the prison, one strategy is convince the alpha recognize her as an equal, usually
but not always through defeating the alpha in a fight. Thereafter, the logic goes, the betas will
likely follow once the new inmate achieves status parity with the alpha.
131
In other words,
obtaining recognition from the other established powers creates social capital for the rising
power – social capital with which it might motivate smaller states to defer.
From a rational standpoint, if the rising power were to obtain recognition from the
established powers, it regains the attention and resources which it can then use to deal with
provocative smaller states. Status competitions, and the substantive strategies through
which states might wage such competitions, are inherently costly. They often involve
conspicuous consumption: costly investments designed to signal social status, ranging from
endeavors like the Apollo Project during the Kennedy Administration to the treasure fleet
during the Ming Dynasty.
132
In these cases, “leaders embarked on costly endeavors to
legitimate their claims to leadership” despite being fully cognizant of the fact that these
endeavors are probably “colossal waste of resources if measured in direct economic or

131
I thank David Lake for clarifying this logic in response to my presentation at a conference in Beijing in 2019.
132
Paul Musgrave and Daniel H. Nexon, “Defending Hierarchy from the Moon to the Indian Ocean: Symbolic
Capital and Political Dominance in Early Modern China and the Cold War,” International Organization 72, no.
03 (2018): 591–626, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000139.

59

military terms”.
133
If the established powers were to offer recognition, the rising power’s
need to compete for status through conspicuous consumption attenuates. In turn, the
resources and attention that would have been spent on the status competition, the “status
dividend”, can be directed elsewhere – i.e., consolidating its sphere of influence and dealing
with provocative smaller states. Assuming that the rising power is constrained by finite
resources and attention, obtaining recognition from the other established powers therefore
has strategic implications: the rising power is no longer “too busy”.

3. Consequences of the Imitation Game
The imitation game resolves a fundamental tension between two propositions from previous
scholarship. It also shows how a rising power might move from contingent dissatisfaction to
extreme dissatisfaction, which in turn has implication for the rising power’s increased
propensity to engage in competitive strategies.
The first, as noted in my survey of research from social psychology and organizational
behavior, is that risers typically find up-hierarchy aggression unappealing because superiors
and peers tend to have more material resources and institutional influence with which they
can retaliate. Thus, risers tend to resolve conflict with these actors through conciliatory and
incremental means as a first strategy and only resort to conflict when all alternative
strategies have been exhausted. In other words, risers tend to be patient in dealing with
superiors and peers, especially early on. Certainly, this is consistent with previous IR
scholarship: rising powers have incentives to work within the status quo and profit by
freeriding on the institution created by the established powers. The second, posited by the

133
Musgrave and Nexon, 592.

60

existing status literature in IR, is that rising powers tend to become status dissatisfied
through their interactions with the other established powers; given this dissatisfaction,
competition and conflict ensues. These two propositions are in fundamental tension: it is not
clear, ex ante, why dissatisfaction with superiors and peers would encourage conflict
behavior instead of conciliatory behavior.
134
Theoretically, to resolve this tension, something
must create the motivation for deviation from a patient, conciliatory strategy.
In rationalist models such as Giplin’s, departure from this incremental strategy is
driven by the fact that the cost of going to war is lower than the benefit from going to war.
Yet, as Ward rightfully notes, Gilpin himself appeals to “emotions like anxiety, and the
tendency for events to ‘escape from human control’” to explain the deviation.
135
For Ward,
his answer is that revolutionary revisionism is driven by the domestic and psychological
consequence of persistent status denials from the established powers. However, even this
takes time, as hawks would still have to come to dominate the decision-making process. In
other words, the mechanism Ward identifies necessarily has a lag effect. My previous
discussions point to another answer, one which might be more immediate. In a two-player
world in which the rising power is only dealing with the established powers and the latter
does not offer recognition, there are incentives for the rising power to remain patient and
use a more conciliatory strategy until it can be fairly certain that it can win in a military
conflict. Yet, once one includes smaller states in the framework, this is no longer the case.
The rising power cannot afford to be patient because of the potential for imitation. This
possibility makes a conciliatory strategy from the rising power against the other established

134
See Ward 2020 for a replication of previous scholarship which posits that status dissatisfaction necessarily
leads to conflict initiation.
135
Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, 28.

61

powers unappealing, because the rising power is racing against time to get recognition from
the established powers, in order to ensure that the smaller states do not become more
provocative. This is because once the smaller states imitate, then the dilemma is once again
“relenting to smaller states and losing more status” or “retaliating at the risk of creating more
trouble with the established powers”.
If the rising power does succeed in obtaining recognition from the other established
powers, then the danger of smaller state imitation attenuates, and Outcome 3 (contingent
dissatisfaction) moves to Outcome 4 (satisfaction). However, if the rising power does not
obtain recognition from the other established powers and the smaller states imitate, this
creates a problem: the rising power in this world is now facing pressure from top and bottom.
This further entrenches the rising power’s status problems, because this is an extremely
difficult vicious cycle to break. The smaller states look to the established powers for deciding
whether to respect the rising power or not, and the established powers look to the smaller
states for deciding whether to share leadership with the rising power or not. Once the rising
power finds itself in this vicious cycle, then not only does this outcome increases the level of
status dissatisfaction, but interstate competition and/ or conflict also becomes more
appealing than a conciliatory, “work-within-the-system” strategy.
The following graph summarizes my argument.

62

63

Chapter 3
Challenges from Below: The Sources of Status Dissatisfaction

“China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact”.

- Then-Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, on why smaller countries should be
deferential in the South China Sea disputes at 2010 ASEAN Meeting

In this chapter, I empirically demonstrate that rising powers become dissatisfied with their
status due to provocations from smaller states, and that rising powers are especially
sensitive to such provocations given their tendency to “kiss up, kick down” early on.
To do so, I first propose a new measurement of status dissatisfaction based on
automated text analysis, guided by benchmarks of what high status actors expect in terms of
privileges and rights. I extract these benchmarks from the existing literature and empirically
validate them through an original nationwide survey in China (N = 4080). Results from my
automated text analysis of statements from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1978 to
2018 (N = 8581) indicate that provocations from smaller states trigger 56% of China’s
complaints about its status, whereas the established powers trigger only 44% of the
observations. In fact, provocations from smaller states trigger 70% of China’s most severe
status complaints, and provocations from smaller states are especially salient in the earlier
days of China’s rise. Finally, to illustrate the casual mechanisms – violated expectations and
impression management failure – I draw on archival evidence and case studies involving the
Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 and the South China Sea disputes.
This chapter will unfold as follows. First, I specify the expected observable
implications of my theory. Second, I discuss the research design and justify the logic

64

underpinning the proposed measurement strategy. Third, I report the results and
contextualize these results through archival evidence and case studies. Fourth, I discuss the
implications of these findings for subsequent chapters.

Expected Observable Implications
In the theory chapter, I argued that a rising power assesses its status by looking up and
looking down. The “looking down” logic is currently neglected. Yet, it is crucial to the
development of a better understanding of how status dissatisfaction arises within rising
powers. If I am right, then we should expect to observe the following:

H1: Provocations from smaller states should be a significant source of a rising power’s
status dissatisfaction (cumulative logic).
Furthermore, based on research from social psychology and organizational behavior, I also
argued that risers tend to adopt a more conciliatory and patient strategy in addressing
disputes with superiors and peers, at least early on. In contrast, risers tend to be very ready
to engage in down-hierarchy aggressions, in order to ensure deference from inferiors. As
such, rising powers have incentives to “kiss up, kick down” during the earlier stages of the
power transition. In other words, there is a temporality logic which underpins the
development of a rising power’s status dissatisfaction. Thus, whereas H1 deals with overall
trends (i.e., cumulative sum), H2 incorporates this temporality (i.e., how primary triggers of
status dissatisfaction shift as the power transition unfolds).
H2: Provocations from smaller states should be especially salient in the earlier stages of
the power transition (temporal logic).

65

If the existing literature is right, then we should expect to observe the following:

H0: The majority of a rising power’s status complaints should be triggered by the
established powers (alternative hypothesis).

66

Table 2. Summary of Competing Theories and Expected Observable Implications

Theory Mechanism Expected Trigger of Dissatisfaction

Power transition theory
136

Unfair distribution of resources

Established powers

Existing status literature
137

Upward social comparison/ status
denial

Established powers

Status Insecurity

Provocation from smaller states

Provocations from smaller states are
significant

Provocations from smaller states should be
especially salient in the earlier stages of the
power transition

136
Organski and Kugler 1980.
137
Wohlforth 2009; Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Paul et al. 2014; Renshon 2017; Ward 2017b.

67

Research Design

Case Selection and Generalizability
My theory aims to specify a wider range of inputs which can make rising powers become
dissatisfied with their status, based on first principles of how hierarchies function: through
the logic of “looking up and down”. Contemporary China is selected as a plausibility probe to
assess whether and how the “looking down” logic operates – that is, how salient the logic is,
and when it is most salient. Analyzing the “looking down” logic is especially important for
understanding how status dissatisfaction develops within actors (including but not limited
to rising powers) which operate in environments of asymmetry: actors whose most
important political relations and/ or geopolitical context are populated by smaller states.
19
th
and early 20
th
Century US would be one such example, where it was not
landlocked against the other established powers but instead surrounded by Latin American
countries and Canada. For instance, in explaining the US motivation for declaring war against
Mexico in 1846, then-President James Polk, using “a language more common to dueling
and…affairs of honor”, noted that through a series of provocative maneuvers over low-
material-stake issues, Mexico had “insulted the United States to such a degree that honor
required the southern neighbor be punished”.
138
The US had “borne more insult, abuse,
insolence and injury [from Mexico] than any one nation has ever before endured…[and so
has] no alternatives but to extort by arms the respect” it deserves from Mexico.
139
Indeed,

138
Amy S. Greenberg, A Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln, and the 1846 U.S. Invasion of Mexico (New York: Vintage,
2013), 95.
139
Greenberg, A Wicked War, 95.

68

“Mexico, inferior in both race and power, must necessarily bend to the will of [the US]”.
140
As
Sarah Polk, James Polk’s wife, explained: the US “honor must be upheld at all costs”.
141

Other such examples include: contemporary Russia, which sees Eastern Europe as an
indispensable part of its identity as a great power while seeing military interventions therein
as a legitimate exercise of its rights as a great power
142
, or contemporary India with its
continual skirmishes with Pakistan. This argument also travels to premodern Asia. In
explaining why the relationship between China and Vietnam from 968 to 1885 was so
enduring, Womack argues that the relationship was “a patriarchal one of unequal but stable
roles that guaranteed China’s recognition of Vietnam’s autonomy and Vietnam’s deference
to China”.
143
Conversely, when Koguryo – one of the three kingdoms of Korea – refused to
pay tributes and acknowledge premodern China’s centrality from 598 to 907, the Sui and
Tang dynasties launched a series of wars against Koguryo to protect their position in the
Confucian hierarchy, sometimes at the cost of domestic stability and financial ruin.
144

Thus, my plausibility probe expands the existing status literature’s empirical focus,
which tends to rely on evidence from European great power politics.
145
If one were to start
examining status politics through a multipolar setting wherein great powers were
landlocked against each other with similar socio-cultural attributes, then one might be

140
Greenberg, A Wicked War, 95.
141
Greenberg, A Wicked War, 96.
142
Ted Hopf, “Identity, Legitimacy, and the Use of Military Force: Russia’s Great Power Identities and Military
Intervention in Abkhazia,” Review of International Studies 31 (2005): 225–43.
143
Brantly Womack, China Among Unequals: Asymmetric Foreign Relationships In Asia (Singapore: World
Scientific Publishing Company, 2010), 186.
144
Christina Lai, “Realism Revisited: China’s Status-Driven Wars against Koguryo in the Sui and Tang Dynasties,”
Asian Security, Online first, 1–19.
145
E.g., Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”; Barnhart, “Status Competition and
Territorial Aggression”; Renshon, Fighting for Status; Murray, The Struggle for Recognition in International
Relations.

69

inclined to believe that status dissatisfaction comes from misrecognition by the established
powers. However, by examining other empirical cases, a different set of theoretical
arguments becomes possible: provocations from smaller states matter, and that it is crucial
for theories of status dissatisfaction to specify this.

Measuring Status Dissatisfaction
There are two conventional ways of measuring status dissatisfaction. The first approach
calculates the gap between material capability and social respect, measured by the number
of diplomats that other countries send to a country.
146
While this approach might reveal
which actors could be suffering from status dissatisfaction, diplomatic stationing data does
not allow me to assess my question: who triggers status dissatisfaction in these actors? In
the second approach, scholars will look for smoking gun statements in which leaders claim
that “we are going to war because we are dissatisfied with our status (or honor, respect,
prestige, etc.)”. While this approach has its merits, it is less suitable for my purposes since I
am offering a systematic assessment of how salient provocations from smaller states are.
As such, I adopt a new measurement strategy based on automated text analysis. This
approach offers another option for future studies of status politics – one which focuses on
status dissatisfaction as expressed during state interactions. This is valuable because status
is established and exercised in relational contexts.
147
I use Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA),
a type of unsupervised topic model that is used to detect topics latent in a collection of

146
Melvin Small and J. David Singer, “The Diplomatic Importance of States, 1816–1970: An Extension and
Refinement of the Indicator,” World Politics, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July 1973), 577–599; Volgy and Mayhall, “Status
Inconsistency and International War”; Renshon, Fighting for Status.
147
Duque, “Recognizing International Status.”

70

documents. Here, as opposed to searching for smoking gun statements individually, I subject
my empirical analysis to the entire collection of foreign policy statements from China’s MFA
from 1978 to 2018. The transparency allows for replication. Furthermore, as opposed to
looking for smoking-gun statements with certain keywords such as “status”, “respect”, or
“prestige”, I identify status-related documents by using theoretically-motivated benchmarks
on what status entails. The intuition is that if issue A is seen as being crucial to the
obtainment of status, and the actor in question is complaining about issue A, then one might
think of this instance as an expression of status dissatisfaction.
In the theory chapter, I argued that the existing status literature suggests that a rising
power will try to obtain two privileges which are exclusively reserved for high-status actors
within the international system: (1) membership and influence in international
organizations, and (2) greater exercise of sovereignty. These are the benchmarks I use.
With respect to membership and influence in international institutions, Chinese
leaders have consistently emphasized that China needs more representation, and they have
tied this need for representation to the achievement of great power status. Since the Jiang
Zemin and Hu Jintao eras, Chinese leaders have continually signaled China’s intention to rise
peacefully as a responsible great power which contributes towards global governance.
148

For example, in his speech delivered at the 18
th
National Congress in 2012, Hu commented
that China will be more active in international affairs and will be a responsible great power
to deal with global challenges. To this end, China will:
develop stable great power relations, which also entails building good
relations with China’s neighbors and deepening mutually-beneficial
cooperation. China will endeavor to increase the representation and voice of

148
Rosemary Foot, “Chinese Strategies in a US-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging,”
International Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006): 86.

71

developing countries in international affairs…This means actively
participating in multilateralism, supporting the endeavors of the United
Nations (UN), G20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and BRICs
members.
149

This narrative has staying power across different leaders. For example, Xi states that reform
of global governance to increase China and other developing countries’ voice is needed.
150

Likewise, during his speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18
th
CCP Central Committee
meeting, Xi Jinping states that distribution of economic power is drastically shifting, yet
global economic governance does not reflect this new configuration. Representation and
inclusiveness are lacking.
151
This means giving newly industrialized countries (NICs) and
developing countries more representation and voice in international institutions.
152
As Pang
et al. have demonstrated, championing for greater representation for NICs has been a
consistent strategy for China to enhance its great power status.
153
Thus, the desire to have
more say is a key narrative in Chinese conceptions of how to achieve status.
Second, with respect to wanting more sovereignty, in the Chinese context,
sovereignty can be understood in two substantive ways: sovereignty as self-governance
without foreign interference, and sovereignty as protection of territorial integrity and
national unification, both of which are central elements of China’s articulation of “core

149
Communist Party of China, “Hu Jintao’s Report at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China (Translated Title),” November 8, 2012, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1118/c64094-19612151-
11.html.
150
Jinping Xi, The Governance of China, vol. 2 (Beijing, China: Intercultural Press, 2014), 444.
151
Government of People’s Republic of China, “Communist Party Launches the 135 Initiative after the Fifth
Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee,” November 3, 2015, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-
11/03/content_2959432.htm.
152
Xinhua, “Chairman Xi Jinping’s Full Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the World Economic Forum 2017 in
Davos (Translated Title),” January 18, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-01/18/c_1120331545.htm.
153
Xun Pang, Lida Liu, and Stephanie Ma, “China’s Network Strategy for Seeking Great Power Status,” The
Chinese Journal of International Politics 10, no. 1 (March 1, 2017): 1–29.

72

interests”.
154
Sovereignty of these two kinds is crucial to analyzing China’s status concerns
because Chinese leaders have clearly indicated that the respect of core interests is
foundational to the “new type of great power relations” and China’s peaceful rise.
155
For
example, in Deng Xiaoping’s meeting with Margaret Thatcher in 1982 regarding Hong Kong’s
handover, he made it clear that sovereignty is not negotiable:
Sovereignty is not something that is open to discussion...If we do not reclaim
Hong Kong, the CCP government would just be like the late Qing government,
and CCP leaders would be like Li Hongzhang…If we do not reclaim Hong Kong
in fifteen years, citizens have no reason to trust us.
156

Here, Deng cites the era of unequal treaties during the late 19
th
Century and early 20
th

Century to explain why Chinese sovereignty is not negotiable. Scholars have suggested that
the “century of humiliation” narrative is deeply connected to how Chinese elites think about
rising (or returning) to great power status. For example, Kaufman suggests that China’s
experience during the “century of humiliation” shapes the Chinese elites’ perception of the
nature of the international system and informs the political debate on how China should
rise.
157
The memory of being told by European great powers what to do is something that
cannot happen again. As such, Chinese leaders are quite sensitive to foreign interference,
especially from the other established powers in affairs which they consider as domestic
issues. If the other established powers get to dictate what China does with its domestic

154
The State Council, PRC, “China’s Peaceful Development,” September 6, 2011,
http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284646.htm.
155
The Beijing News, “Xi Jinping Delineates ‘New Great Power Relations’ Using Three Points (Translated Title),”
June 10, 2013, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2013/0610/c364320-21807158.html; BBC Chinese, “Xi Jinping:
China-US Great Power Relations - No Confrontations and No Conflict (translated title),” September 9, 2014,
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2014/09/140909_rice_china_us; Jinping Xi, The Governance of
China, vol. 1 (Beijing, China: Intercultural Press, 2014), 249.
156
People’s Publishing House, Deng Xiaoping’s Quotes: Volume III, vol. 3 (Beijing, China, 1993), 3–12.
157
Alison Adcock Kaufman, “The ‘Century of Humiliation,’ Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the
International Order,” Pacific Focus 25, no. 1 (April 1, 2010): 1–33, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1976-
5118.2010.01039.x.

73

politics, then by definition China is not being treated as an equal. Again, being told what to
do is only normal in superior-subordinate relationships – not in a relationship of two equals.
Finally, with respect to sovereignty as territorial integrity and national unification,
Chinese leaders have placed a high premium on ensuring territorial integrity against
secession movements. For example, the 1992 white paper notes that “there is no room for
haggling on the fundamental principle that Tibet is an inalienable part of China”.
158

Furthermore, in a 2014 speech delivered during his meeting with the Honorary Chairman of
the Kuomintang, Wu Po-Hsiung, Xi commented that stable cross-Strait relations is essential
to the “revitalization of the Chinese civilization”.
159
A similar narrative was invoked with
respect to Hong Kong and Macau, in which Xi claimed that their “destinies are linked to the
mainland and are vital to the revitalization of the Chinese Dream”.
160
On the international
front, China is involved in several territorial disputes, namely in Northeast Asia (e.g., Diaoyu
Islands) and in South China Sea (e.g., Paracel Islands; Spratly Islands). Indeed, being able to
stake and defend these territorial claims are explicitly labeled as key aspects of what it means
for China to rise as a great power in Xi’s personal writings on governing China.
161

The following table summarizes the three status-issues and their target audience.
Table 3. Status Issues
Target Audience
Issue
Established Powers Smaller States
Influence in international organizations Yes No
Sovereignty as lack of foreign interference Yes No
Sovereignty as territorial integrity Yes Yes

158
Michael D Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior—Part One: On ‘Core Interests,’” China Leadership Monitor, no.
34 (July 2010): 8.
159
Xi, The Governance of China, 2014, 1:234.
160
Xi, 1:227.
161
Xi, The Governance of China, 2014, 2:444.

74

Critics might reasonably suggest that many of these issues, such as respect of
territorial interests, are material issues.
162
Critics might further point out that the inclusion
of sovereignty as territorial integrity favors my argument. To empirically validate the fact
that these benchmarks reflect how China assesses its status, I fielded an original nationwide
survey in China (N=4080) in July 2020. The survey asked respondents to rank a number of
attributes-based and relational-based status markers proposed by the existing literature.
163

The results show that all the benchmarks I employ perform better than the possession of
nuclear weapons, which the existing literature has long established as being a status symbol
in international politics.
164
The results also show that sovereignty as territorial integrity is
in fact the most important status marker to the Chinese respondents. Thus, its inclusion is
justified, and its exclusion is in fact going to bias observers away from accurate
understanding of how China might understand its status (dissatisfaction).
Granted, my survey does not draw from an elite sample. However, at a minimum,
insights from the population – which is consistently exposed to party rhetoric on what it
means for China to achieve (great power) status – provide useful first-cut evidence that

162
On why status and material issues need not be mutually exclusive, see Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth,
“Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” 382. Granted, one cannot call every material issue a status issue
and vice versa. However, a reasonable line might be drawn based on the following criteria. If an issue has never
been linked to a country’s status, and status narratives are suddenly invoked to justify a country’s actions
during crises, then this justification is ad-hoc. Conversely, if an issue has consistently been referred to as being
crucial to the country’s status even during peacetime, then even if it generates material payoffs, then such issue
is both a status and a material issue. For example, a state may want nuclear weapons to deter adversaries, but
it could also want nuclear weapons to enhance its status. These motives can coexist; see Scott D. Sagan, “Why
Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3 (1996):
54–86.
163
The difference between attributes-based and relational-based attributes is that the former focuses on
acquisition of certain capabilities whereas the latter requires recognition from other actors. One might argue
that the acquisition of attributes-based markers is precisely to obtain relational-based attributes (e.g.,
acquiring nuclear weapons might increase the actor’s status and therefore the actor gets invited to prestigious
clubs). See Duque, “Recognizing International Status.” Both in my theory and text analysis, I only include the
relational-based attributes since my focus is on who triggers status dissatisfaction.
164
Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?”; Lilach Gilady, The Price of Prestige: Conspicuous
Consumption in International Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018).

75

complements my text analysis of statements from China’s MFA.
165
For details on how the
survey was administered and how the results were calculated, see Appendix 1.

Table 4: Chinese Respondents Rank Status Markers
Status Markers Score (1-6, 6 highest)
Sovereignty as territorial integrity 4.06
Strong military 3.76
Strong economic performance 3.47
Influence in international organizations 3.32
Sovereignty as lack of foreign interference 3.27
Possession of nuclear weapons 3.11

Operationalization of Actors
By “established powers”, I mean countries with the material capability and social influence
to contend for global or regional leadership. Many conventional measures focus on material
indices such as military or economic capabilities.
166
In line with my focus on status, I include
social influence. I measure this through a country’s contribution towards international
institutions, which can be an important venue through which countries show their ability
and willingness to exhibit leadership. For the material component, I average the CINC scores
by country and year from 1978 to 2018.
167
For the social component, I use a country’s
contribution towards the United Nations regular budget from 2016-2018.

165
For why the elite vs. population difference is sometimes overstated and misguided, see Joshua D. Kertzer,
“Re-Assessing Elite-Public Gaps in Political Behavior,” American Journal of Political Science, Online first.
166
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts, Cornell
Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), 15.
167
German Federal Republic (GFR, 1955-1990) is collapsed with Germany (GMY)

76

Table 5. List of Established Powers
CINC Top 10 UN Contribution Top 10
United States United States
United Kingdom Japan
China China
Russia Germany
Germany France
France United Kingdom
India Brazil
Japan Italy
Italy Russia
Turkey Canada

A country is an established power if it appears in either list. This results in eleven, not
counting China: United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, France, Japan, India, Italy,
Turkey, Brazil, and Canada. Some of these countries are clearly established powers, whereas
others are borderline. As mentioned earlier, I adopt this broad definition to set up a hard test
against my argument: the more established powers I include, the less likely my empirical
results will support my argument. This is because if my operationalization of “established
powers” only includes the one or two actors at the very top, then my theory and empirics
become trivial, since virtually every actor counts as provocations from below. For “smaller
states”, I mean states which cannot compete with the established powers for influence and
leadership. I include any state which does not belong in the eleven aforementioned countries.

Methods

My dataset includes statements made by MFA spokespersons during regular press
conferences from 1978 to 2018 (N=8581). I selected these statements for two reasons. First,
a survey of statements issued by Chinese leaders or foreign ministers reveals that their
statements tend to focus on China’s accomplishments and rarely contain direct criticisms.

77

Second, when fielding questions from domestic and foreign press, MFA spokespersons
address tough questions regarding developments around the world while responding with
the official stance. Consequently, statements from MFA spokespersons are a better fit given
greater variation of displayed (dis)satisfaction and issues discussed.
I did not collect statements directly from MFA’s website because it only makes
statements from 2016 to 2018 available. Thus, while my corpus may not include every
statement made by MFA’s spokespersons, the statements that do get published in People’s
Daily are statements that the Party considers the most important. If anything, my corpus
excludes perfunctory correspondences between MFA spokespersons and the press, as
statements of this kind would most likely not make it into People’s Daily. In addition, critics
might question whether these statements are true representations of what Chinese elites
think; instead, private meeting minutes might be better. Aside from data availability issues,
this concern is less applicable for my research question. If the question is about Chinese
strategic intentions, then Chinese officials might mispresent their views in public statements.
However, if status acquisition requires recognition from other actors, then Chinese elites
have an incentive to be clear and genuine about their status needs.
In June 2018, I scraped the full transcripts (i.e., not paraphrased) of these statements
from People’s Daily, China’s state-owned newspaper which is considered as the most
authoritative media outlet that represents the official party line. To locate statements by
Chinese MFA spokespersons, I used the search terms “ 外交部发言人
168
+ the spokesperson’s
name” for all spokespersons from 1978 to 2018. The units of analysis are the
correspondences: the press asks the spokespersons about an issue and the spokespersons

168
Chinese for MFA spokesperson.

78

respond. My quantity of interest is what I call status complaints: instances in which China is
complaining about its status due to the action of other states. To identify them, I use
sentiment analysis to find documents in which China is issuing a complaint. I then use LDA
topic modeling to find documents in which China is talking about status-related topics.
Documents that sit at the intersection of these two sets are status complaints. The following
figure illustrates the intuition.

Figure 2. Locating Status Complaints

After preprocessing the texts such as removing punctuations or stop words, I first conduct
sentiment analysis through a dictionary-based method, using the Chinese lexicon dictionary
developed by the Natural Language Processing and Sentiment Analysis (NLPSA) Lab at
Status documents
(LDA topic modeling)

Complaint documents
(Sentiment analysis)

Status complaints

79

Academia Sinica in Taiwan.
169
In this dictionary, Chinese words are assigned a weighted
score based on how positive or negative they are, not just a 1 (positive) or 0 (negative) binary.
For each entry, I calculate its sentiment score by the following formula:

𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =
(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 ∗ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔 ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 ∗ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔 ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 )
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡 ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑡 ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦

An entry is a “complaint” if it is below the 60
th
percentile of the sentiment scores. While 60
th

percentile may seem high, it is reasonable because I am dealing with diplomatic statements
which are more circumspect than everyday statements. To demonstrate that my results are
not generated by this parameter choice, I conduct a sensitivity analysis, moving the
sentiment threshold by decrements of 5%. Results from the sensitivity analysis, detailed in
Appendix #5, suggest that my main results (in Table 6) are robust at every threshold.
I then use LDA topic modeling to identify documents which are related to status based
on the theoretical benchmarks I established earlier. LDA assumes that each collection of
documents, such as my corpus, contains a set of topics. It uses co-occurrence of words to
detect topics across the collection of documents, as well as sorting documents into these
topics.
170
However, this does require researchers to select the number of topics. There is a
tradeoff between selecting a smaller number of topics versus a higher number of topics.
Selecting a smaller number means that the topics will be broader. However, when sorting
documents into topics, there is a higher likelihood for false positives – for example, a

169
Shih-Ming Wang and Lun-Wei Ku, “ANTUSD: A Large Chinese Sentiment Dictionary,” Proceedings of the Tenth
International Conference on Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC 2016), Paris, France, 2016, 2697–2702.
170
David M Blei, Andrew Y. Ng, and Michael I. Jordan, “Latent Dirichlet Allocation,” The Journal of Machine
Learning Research 3, no. 3/1 (2003): 993–1022.

80

document which is not substantively related to the topic is categorized into the topic anyway
because the topic is the best fit among bad fits. Conversely, selecting a higher number of
topics means that the topics will be more granular, leading to higher precision. However, the
tradeoff is that for any substantive theme (e.g., South China Sea), there may be multiple
topics which are related to that theme.
I selected 150 topics. This is justified since my dataset covers forty years of Chinese
diplomatic interactions with the world which necessarily entails a wide array of activities
and actors. In addition, to mitigate the drawbacks of selecting a higher number of topics, I
aggregate the topics based on their substantive similarity after modeling – for example, if
there are multiple topics which have to do with the South China Sea, they are pooled together
(see Table #5). This strategy is superior to selecting a smaller number of topics ex ante
because it would reduce the likelihood for false positives while providing full transparency
on how the pooling is done. Appendix #2 provides further detailed justifications. Appendix
#3 lists the topics and their top words. Furthermore, LDA requires that researchers conduct
validation tests to ensure that topics, and the ways in which documents are sorted, are
interpretable and valid.
171
Appendix #4 contains the validation procedures and results.

171
Justin Grimmer and Brandon M. Stewart, “Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content
Analysis Methods for Political Texts,” Political Analysis, Vol. 21, No. 03 (2013), 4.

81

A document is identified as a status document if it belongs to the following topics.

Table 6. Status Topics and Top 20 Words
Theoretical Category Topic Words
More say in global governance

150
应对 (response), 发展中国家 (developing
countries), 国际 (international), 全球
(global), 改革 (reform), 能力 (capacity), 框
架 (framework), 目标 (objective), 挑战
(challenge), 加强 (improve), 共同
(common), 责任 (responsibilities), 各国
(all countries), 原则 (principle), 提供
(provide), 支持 (support), 承诺 (promise),
提高 (increase), 帮助 (help), 公约
(convention), 面临 (confront), 社会
(society), 联合国 (UN), 环境 (environment)
Sovereignty without foreign
interference
4
人权 (human rights), 中国 (China), 中国政
府 (Chinese government), 保护 (protect),
问题 (problem), 状况 (situation/
condition), 基本 (basic/ fundamental), 促
进 (promote), 人民 (citizens), 民主
(democracy), 干涉 (interfere), 文化
(culture), 自由 (freedom), 内政 (domestic
politics), 平等 (equal), 这是 (this is), 搞
(provoke/ manipulate), 事实 (fact), 取得
(obtain), 别国 (other countries)
12
报告 (report), 中国 (China), 发表 (publish),
内政 (domestic politics), 干涉 (interfere),
自由 (freedom), 年度 (annual), 所谓 (so-
called), 国际 (international), 停止 (stop),
委员会 (committee), 依法 (legal), 反对
(oppose), 宗教 (religion), 美国国务院 (US
Department of State), 对此 (on this issue),
部分 (part), 事实 (fact), 指责 (condemn),
近日 (recently)
57
台湾 (Taiwan), 联合公报 (Joint
Communique), 反对 (oppose), 承诺
(promise), 三个 (three), 中美 (US-China),
一个 (one), 原则 (principle), 台独
(Taiwanese independence), 中美关系 (US-
China relations), 美国政府 (US

82

government), 美方 (US), 政策 (policy), 恪
守 (abide), 武器 (weapons), 坚决 (firmly),
严重 (grave; serious), 干涉 (interference),
违反 (violation), 内政 (domestic politics)
114
西藏 (Tibet), 中国 (China), 内政 (domestic
politics), 干涉 (interfere), 分裂 (secession),
活动 (activities), 一部分 (a part of/ some),
停止 (stop), 支持 (support), 宗教
(religion), 接触 (come into contact), 从事
(involved in), 反对 (oppose), 外国 (other
countries), 祖国 (motherland), 独立
(independence), 利用 (exploit), 事务
(affairs), 承认 (recognition), 领土
(territory)
Sovereignty as territorial
integrity
18
主权 (sovereignty), 尊重 (respect), 国际法
(international law), 领土完整 (territorial in
tegrity), 国家 (countries), 原则 (principle
s), 国际 (international), 维护 (protect), 违
反 (violate), 准则 (principles), 独立 (indepe
ndence), 遵守 (abide), 基本 (fundamental),
得到 (gain/ obtain), 侵犯 (violation), 承认
(recognition), 必须 (must), 宗旨 (principl
e), 法律 (law), 宪章 (charter)
19
交涉 (negotiate), 提出 (raise/ express), 严
正 (severe), 中方 (Chinese side), 要求
(demand), 立即 (immediately), 对此 (on
this issue), 就此 (on this issue), 强烈不满
(strongly dissatisfied), 严重 (severe), 停止
(stop), 已向 (already), 多次 (many times),
切实 (firmly), 损害 (damage), 允许
(permit), 不顾 (disregarding), 再次 (again),
敦促 (demand), 违背 (violate)
33
菲律宾 (Philippines), 中国 (China), 表示
(express), 进行 (in-progress), 方面 (side),
政府 (government), 国家 (country), 双边
(bilateral), 本报 (this report), 再次 (again),
建立 (establish), 解决 (resolve), 前
(previous), 主要 (main), 目的 (objective),
提交 (institute), 导致 (resulting in), 遵守
(abide)

83

67
南海 (South China Sea), 争议 (dispute), 主
权 (sovereignty), 行为 (actions), 宣言
(declaration), 海域 (sea), 领土 (territory),
南沙群岛 (Spratly Islands), 菲律宾
(Philippines), 建设 (build), 国际法
(international law), 非法 (illegal), 稳定
(stability), 自由 (freedom), 维护 (protect),
直接 (direct), 地区 (area), 单方面
(unilateral), 各方 (all sides involved), 尊重
(respect)
82
钓鱼岛 (Diaoyu Islands), 领土 (territory),
主权 (sovereignty), 非法 (illegal), 岛屿
(islands), 固有 (existing), 日方 (Japan), 海
域 (sea), 附属 (subsidiary), 拥有
(possession), 侵犯 (violation), 南沙群岛
(Spratly Islands), 无可争辩 (indisputable),
附近 (around/ surrounding), 日本 (Japan),
中国 (China), 争议 (dispute), 重申
(reiterate), 事实 (fact), 停止 (stop)
108
台湾 (Taiwan), 一个 (one), 台湾当局
(Taiwan’s “government”), 所谓 (so-called),
中国 (China), 两个 (two), 原则 (principle),
一部分 (a part of/ some), 参与
(participate), 制造 (building/ provoking),
分裂 (secession), 没有 (no), 承认
(acknowledge), 图谋 (plotting), 唯一 (only
one), 主权国家 (sovereign country), 加入
(join), 世界 (world), 中华人民共和国
(People’s Republic of China), 企图
(attempting)

84

After locating status complaints, I code them by hand into the following three categories:
Category #1: China makes a status complaint against a smaller state, due to the
actions of a smaller state.

Category #2: China makes a status complaint against an established power, due to
the actions of a smaller state.

Category #3: China makes a status complaint against an established power, due to
the actions of an established power.

An example of category #1 would be China complaining against Vietnam or the Philippines
for incursions into the South China Sea. An example of category #2 would be Lee Deng Hui’s
visit to the US in 1995. China complained against the US for condoning and supporting Lee’s
actions, but the instance was triggered by Lee’s alleged decision to symbolically promote
Taiwanese independence through the visit.
An example of category #3 would be China complaining against the US publishing
reports that criticize China’s human rights records, which China considers as an interference
of its domestic politics and breach of sovereignty. Likewise, when China issues a complaint
against Japan due to issues related to the Diaoyu Islands, that would be coded as 3. Finally,
when China complains about the lack of representation in international organizations such
as the United Nations (UN), or when China is complaining about unfair treatment over treaty
negotiations, these instances are also coded as 3. Thus, the key difference between category
#2 and category #3 would be who triggered the actions. For example, instances in which the
US unilaterally passed legislations regarding Tibet or Taiwan are coded as 3, since Taiwan
or Tibet does not have a role.

85

Results
The main results of my text analysis are summarized in Table 7.

Table 7. China’s Status Dissatisfaction, 1978-2018
Category Number of Complaints

Smaller states 238 (32%)
Established powers, because of actions by smaller states 180 (24%)
Established powers 328 (44%)

Total 746

Assessing the Cumulative Logic
My results suggest that 32% of China’s status complaints are caused by actions from smaller
states. 24% of China’s status complaints are directed at the other established powers but
caused by actions from smaller states. 44% of China’s status complaints are caused by
actions from the other established powers. These results provide support for H1.
Cumulatively, 56% of China’s status complaints from 1978 to 2018 are triggered by
provocations from smaller states, whereas conventional explanations – upward social
comparison and status denial from the other established powers – account for only 44% of
the observations. This disconfirms H0.
Indeed, one might reasonably point out that counting frequencies of China’s status
complaints is misleading. Perhaps China really cares about complaints against the other
established powers, whereas its complaints against smaller states are perfunctory. In other
words, entries should not be counted as if they were qualitatively equivalent.
172
To address

172
I thank Pengfei Zhao for raising this point and for offering potential solutions.

86

this possibility, I make use of the metadata on where an entry is published in People’s Daily.
If the entry is published in Section 1 (“front page/ important news”), there is good reason to
believe that China really cares about the incident. Likewise, the lower the sentiment score,
the more likely that China is really provoked by the incident. Thus, I isolate entries which are
published in Section 1 and have sentiment scores below the 25
th
percentile. These entries
might be conceived as incidents which really provoked China, given the placement of the
report and the language used.

The following table reports the results.

Table 8. China’s Most Severe Status Complaints, 1978-2018
Category Number of Complaints

Smaller states 32 (52%)
Established powers, because of actions by smaller states 11 (18%)
Established powers 18 (30%)

Total 61

These results lend even greater support for my argument: 70% of China’s most severe status
complaints are triggered by smaller states, whereas only 30% of such complaints are
triggered by the established powers.

87

Assessing the Temporality Logic
To assess H2, the temporality logic, I plot the proportion of China’s status complaints from
1978 to 2018 in Figure 3. Results provide support for H2, which suggests that provocations
from smaller states should be more salient than misrecognition from the other established
powers in the earlier stages of the power transition. As one can see from the graph,
provocations from smaller states dominated China’s status complaints until around early
2000s. As the power transition unfolded, misrecognition from the other established powers
came to gain greater salience. This is in line with my theoretical expectations. Earlier in the
power transition, China readily expected deference from smaller states, and hence status
disputes between China and smaller states dominated the former’s status grievances.
However, as the power transition progressed and China became less patient with
obtaining recognition from the other established powers, status disputes between China and
the other established powers grew in proportion. The theoretical implication is that there is
a “life cycle” as to how status dissatisfaction develops: the rising power will be more sensitive
to provocations from smaller states in the early stages of the power transition before
eventually becoming more concerned about misrecognition from the established powers. As
the results show, this is a dynamic that the existing literature cannot and does not explain
because of its exclusive focus on rising power-established power interactions.

88

Figure 3. The Temporality of China’s Status Dissatisfaction, 1978-2018

Illustrating the Mechanisms
Violated Expectations at Work
For category #1: China is not making social comparisons against Vietnam or the Philippines.
These smaller states also have little say in deciding whether China can join prestigious
international institutions. However, one can see that China frequently issues status
complaints due to the actions of smaller states. Instead, the theoretical underpinning of
category #1 is that for an actor which is aspiring for a higher position, provocations from
smaller states violate its self-conception.
For example, during the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, Deng Xiaoping claimed that
the Chinese motivation was to deal with continuous “provocations [from] the Vietnam[ese]

89

troops inside the Chinese territory”.
173
The fundamental problem, as Deng explained in his
meeting with Jimmy Carter in Washington DC before China mobilized its forces, was that “the
Vietnamese [were] extremely arrogant [and] claim[ed] to be…the third most powerful
military nation in the world, after the United States and the Soviet Union”. Deng was
especially offended by the fact that “the Vietnamese [were] very conceited [by claiming] that
one Vietnamese soldier can fight 30 Chinese soldiers”
174
– which the Chinese officials at the
time considered to be a sign of growing “insolence” from Vietnam.
175
Indeed, Vietnam
attempted to be, and acted as if, it were superior to China. Thus, the military campaign was
a way for China to teach Vietnam an “appropriate limited lesson”,
176
which Vice Premier Li
Xiannian described as a “slap in the face…to warn and punish [Vietnam]”.
177

To this end, Deng reassured Carter that the campaign will be a “limited action” where
Chinese troops will “quickly withdraw [and] deal with it like a border incident”.
178
Citing the
precedent of the Sino-Indian War of 1962 where Chinese troops withdrew after the incident,
Deng promised Carter ahead of time that China’s mission will last “10-20 days, to be followed
by withdrawal”.
179
As revealed by the justifications prior to mobilization, and the actual
withdrawal of Chinese troops in line with the justifications, the motivation was less about
actually gaining territory, since China retreated from the advances it made during the

173
Foreign Relations of the United States, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Document 212”
(Department of State, United States of America, January 1979), Volume XIII, China - Office of the Historian.
174
Foreign Relations of the United States, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Document 205”
(Department of State, United States of America, January 29, 1979), Volume XIII, China - Office of the Historian.
175
Xiaoming Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979-1991
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 47.
176
Foreign Relations of the United States, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Document 205.”
177
Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War, 47.
178
Foreign Relations of the United States, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Document 205.”
179
Foreign Relations of the United States, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Document 207”
(Department of State, United States of America, January 30, 1979), Volume XIII, China - Office of the Historian.

90

campaign. Instead, it was to put a provocative smaller state back to its place: Chinese
mobilization represented an “effort to shatter Hanoi’s self-image of invincibility”.
180
As one
Vietnamese general remarked after the war, the lesson for Vietnam was clear: “we must learn
how to live with our big neighbor".
181
That is, the dispute was less about territorial gain;
instead, the Chinese elites used it as a litmus test with which they assessed and affirmed
China’s position relative to Vietnam – namely, whether Vietnam is showing China the respect
and privileges that it expected given its (self-perceived) superiority over Vietnam. Indeed, if
China was aspiring to equalize with the US and the Soviet Union, accepting provocations from
Vietnam would undermine this self-conception.
A more recent example of this logic can be found in China’s domestic debates over the
South China Sea disputes, where hardliners are becoming more vocal in staking their policy
positions. In the past, softliners who favored cooperation dominated policy thinking in the
2000s.
182
However, they are increasingly losing influence, especially in the face of persistent
provocations from the Philippines and Vietnam. The softliners “now need to deal with the
powerful arguments of… the hardliners” who believe that the “courage and ability to
confront conflicts [against smaller adversaries]…is the mind-set and criterion of a mature
great power” (italics added).
183
Indeed, given China’s status as a “mature great power”, it
should be able to stake and defend claims in the South China Sea. And given its status relative
to these smaller states, China should also not be subject to provocations from them over

180
Foreign Relations of the United States, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Document 226”
(Department of State, United States of America, March 1979), Volume XIII, China - Office of the Historian.
181
Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War, 123.
182
Feng Zhang, “Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea and the Future of Regional Security,” Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 132, No. 3 (September 2017), 435–466.
183
Zhang, “Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea," 464.

91

these issues. Hence, to be a mature great power (i.e., to fulfill its self-conception as a great
power), China must confront provocations from below.

Impression Management Failure at Work
Entries in category #2 present an interesting dynamic. While China is complaining against
the other established powers, the motivation is not demanding to be recognized as an equal,
nor is it making social comparisons. Instead, these entries reveal dynamics in which
provocations from smaller states are creating impression management problems for China
– and China’s subsequent attempts to defuse these problems. As noted earlier, provocations
from smaller states can be status-threatening because China is failing to secure deference
from smaller states. These dynamics create incentives for “blame transference”, in which the
rising power tries to blame the established powers for what the smaller states are doing to
deflect the failure – and to caution the established powers from intervening, which will in
turn undermine its sovereignty.
For instance, as far as China is concerned, the most recent tension in the South China
Sea started in 2008/9 and intensified when the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings
against it in 2013. Aside from issuing complaints against the Philippines, China’s MFA
attempted to create a set of narratives to condemn the US, and sometimes Japan, for
supporting the Philippines from the shadows. For example, in May 2015, Hua Chunying,
MFA’s spokesperson, stated that “some people in the Philippines are getting a little bit too
hopped-up, playing a game of duets with some people in other countries [the US] while

92

inflating the China threat. It is an eye-catching duet”.
184
In another series of comments
between March 2015 and April 2016, Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Spokesperson Hua
reiterated: “We have said many times already. The Philippines’ decision to institute the
arbitration is attempting to deny China’s territorial claims over the Spratly Islands. Clearly
someone [the US] is pulling the strings from the shadows and manipulating this entire
incident – the so-called arbitration case has no legitimacy”.
185
As Sun Jianguo, an admiral of
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) put succinctly, “the other established powers are
helping smaller states from the shadows, so that the smaller states can disrespect China”.
186

According to these Chinese narratives, the Philippines would only dare to challenge
China on these territorial claims with support from the other established powers. Yet, as far
as observers know, the US did not explicitly instruct the Philippines to initiate the arbitration.
If anything, when the South China Sea disputes started to intensify in 2012, the US explicitly
refused to clarify whether its security commitment to the Philippines entails involvement in
a Spratly scenario. This was juxtaposed against the US position in the East China Sea, where
it explicitly reaffirmed that the US-Japan Security Treaty applied to the Senkaku Islands.
Granted, the US did eventually get more involved in the China-Philippines disputes as time
went on; however, China’s blame narrative began before that. For example, during the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Meeting in July 2010, China’s Foreign Minister at the time,

184
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, "Regular Press Conference held by Ministry of
Foreign Affairss Spokesperson Hua Chunying on May 15th, 2015 (translated title)," May 15, 2015,
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//pds/gjhdq/gj/yz/1206_9/fyrygth/t1264185.htm
185
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, "Regular Press Conference held by Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Hua Chunying on April 20th, 2016 (translated title)," April 20

2016,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1357119.shtml.
186
Global Times, “PLA: Some Countries Are Engaged in ‘Great Powers Support Small Powers, These Small
Powers Then Bullies Other Great Powers’ (translated title).,” http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2016-
06/9009529.html.

93

Yang Jiechi, said that “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that
is just a fact”, clearly displaying concerns about the lack of respect that China is subjected to.
In that same speech, he warned against the US for using the South China Sea as a pretext to
pivot back into Asia.
Hence, the Chinese blame narratives might be better understood as a deflection
mechanism. That is, it is a way to ensure that the international audience does not attribute
provocations from the Philippines to the disposition of China (i.e., low status) but rather
situational factors (i.e., Philippines receiving help from the US). The purpose is to discourage
other international actors from demoting China’s status because of provocations from the
Philippines. Furthermore, the narrative is to warn against the US for using the Philippines’
actions to intervene and create further infringement of Chinese sovereignty.

Counterarguments
It is necessary to address two potential counterarguments. First, perhaps China is quite
dissatisfied with the established powers but is afraid of complaining against them. This is
theoretically plausible but empirically unsound. For example, China has always been quite
vocal at voicing its displeasure against the US for criticizing its human rights records and
interfering with its domestic politics. This practice started back in the 1980s and continues
to the present. Likewise, China has always been quite vocal at voicing its displeasure against
Japan over issues related to the Diaoyu Islands, frequently summoning Japan’s ambassador
to China or recalling its ambassador to Japan. For this counterargument to work, critics
would have to demonstrate two propositions: that China is afraid of complaining against the

94

established powers, and that, counterfactually, China would have complained even more if it
were not afraid.
Second, critics might point out that there are more smaller states than established
powers. Thus, of course there will be more instances in which smaller states trigger China’s
status complaints. At the theoretical level, if there are indeed more smaller states than
established powers, then it is even more important that observers pay attention to how
provocations from smaller states might trigger a rising power’s status dissatisfaction. At the
empirical level, there are only so many smaller states which are consistently at odds with
China: Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Tibet, whereas China tends to be triggered by
the established powers such as the US, Japan, India, and international organizations (IOs) led
by said powers. The following figure shows the main triggers of China’s status dissatisfaction.

Figure 4: Main Triggers of China’s Status Complaints

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Indeed, China’s status concerns are unlikely to be triggered by smaller states which are too
far away and have limited diplomatic interactions with China. While it is true that the
universe of smaller states is larger than the universe of established powers, not all smaller
states are sufficiently close or politically relevant to China. In this way, status is local, as
previous scholarship suggests.
187

Discussion
In this chapter, I have empirically demonstrated that provocations from smaller states is a
significant source of a rising power’s status dissatisfaction, and that such provocations are
especially salient in the earlier stages of the power transition. Results from my text analysis
of statements from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1978 to 2018 have shown that
the majority of China’s complaints about its status are triggered by smaller states, and that
China is especially sensitive to provocations from smaller states early on in the power
transition. In other words, my empirics provide support for both H1 (the cumulative logic)
and H2 (the temporality logic). Furthermore, I have illustrated the causal mechanisms which
I identified in the previous chapter through archival evidence and case studies involving the
Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 and the South China Sea disputes. The mixed-method
approach I have adopted in this chapter – text analysis driven by theoretically-informed
benchmarks, direct validation of these benchmarks through surveys, and archival evidence
and case studies to illustrate the causal mechanism – provide a replicable template with
which one can analyze how status dissatisfaction develops within other rising powers.

187
Renshon, “Status Deficits and War”; Duque, “Recognizing International Status.”

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Findings from this chapter point to two theoretical implications. First, my findings
directly challenge conventional arguments about how status dissatisfaction develops. The
conventional story suggests that a rising power becomes dissatisfied with its status while
interacting with the other established powers (i.e., through lateral or upward dynamics).
However, the empirical findings from this chapter suggest that much more analytical
attention should be dedicated to how the rising power interacts with the smaller states (i.e.,
through downward dynamics). Indeed, status is about looking up and looking down, and this
chapter has demonstrated the importance of “looking down” and how it operates.
Second, and having established the proposition that “looking down” is salient,
findings from this chapter point to the need for a bottom-up theory of how status
dissatisfaction drives interstate competition. The conventional wisdom is that status-driven
interstate competition unfolds if and when the rising power and the established powers do
not agree about their relative ranking vis-à-vis each other.
188
Yet, if “looking down” is so
prevalent in the empirical world, then the implication is that whether competition unfolds
also depends on whether smaller states defer to the rising power or not.
189
In fact, if rising
powers can be especially sensitive to provocations from smaller states early on, then
competition could unfold even sooner than conventionally argued. That is, existing
scholarship has suggested that rising powers and the established powers sometimes have
rational incentives to bargain incrementally early on and only compete later in the power
transition.
190
Similarly, for arguments which posit that rising powers turn towards

188
Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” 30.
189
Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?”
International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2006), 6.
190
Powell, In the Shadow of Power, chap. 4. Also, on why the rising power and the established powers may want
to cooperate early on and procrastinate on dealing with potential problems, see David M. Edelstein, Over the
Horizon: Time, Uncertainty, and the Rise of Great Powers (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017).

97

revisionism after experiencing persistent status denials from the established powers,
191
the
assumption is that competition also happens later. My argument implies that provocations
from smaller states and the resultant rising power status dissatisfaction can provide a factor
for why the rising power and the established powers might compete even sooner.
Accordingly, in the chapters that follow (Chapter 4 and 5), I examine the mechanisms
through which provocations trigger (i.e., start) and exacerbate (i.e., make worse) the status
competition between the rising power and the established powers.

191
Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers.

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Chapter 4
Starting the Fire: The Blame Game

“The political underpinnings of the South China Sea Arbitration are very clear: the US provided
covert support and encouraged the Philippines to initiate the Arbitration. Japan, the US lackey,
also secretly provided logistical support to the Philippines at the Arbitration Tribunal. Just like
that, the ‘pathogen’ that created the South China Sea disaster came into existence”.

- People’s Daily, July 22, 2016, “The ‘Cancer Cell’ of International Law”

In this chapter, I empirically illustrate the scenario in which provocations from smaller states
can “start the fire” between the rising power and the established powers.
In this mechanism, termed “the blame game”, the rising power and the established
powers may not be interested in, or ready to, compete for status. In other words, there is no
active status competition at the beginning. However, provocations from smaller states can
make a rising power become insecure about its status, and this can “start the fire” between
the rising power and the established powers. Specifically, discrepancies in blame attribution
can create signaling problems between the rising power and the established powers. From
the rising power’s perspective, its rhetoric and/ or actions in the form of “disciplining” the
provocative smaller states are intended to defend its status, which has been called into
question. In fact, the rising power – and the elites therein – may decide to blame the
established powers for what the smaller states are doing to save face internationally and
retain domestic legitimacy. However, from the established powers’ perspective, the rising
power’s reactions towards smaller states might be interpreted as evidence of the rising
power’s motive to challenge the established power’s position in the existing order. As such,
the established powers may take diplomatic or military countermeasures. In turn, the

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established powers’ countermeasures will motivate the rising power to believe that the
established powers intended to deny the rising power’s status all along. These dynamics can
trigger the competition for status between the rising power and the established powers and
give way to the onset of spiral dynamics. I illustrate this mechanism by tracing how the South
China Sea disputes evolved between the US, China, and the Philippines from 2009 to 2016.
More specifically, I show how such disputes evolved from being bilateral territorial disputes
between China and the regional claimants, to a means through which China and the US assess
and defend their status in the existing order.
This chapter will unfold as follows. I begin by specifying the expected observable
implications, including a discussion of how one might separate material and status concerns.
I then discuss my case selection strategy. Thereafter, my empirical discussions of the South
China Sea disputes will unfold in three steps. First, through a discussion of escalating
tensions from 2009 to 2013, I show how provocations from the Philippines made China
become insecure about its status. Second, and through an original dataset of Chinese media
coverage of the South China Sea from 2009 to 2020, I show how China tried to address its
status insecurities arising from the Philippines’ behaviors by blaming the US and its allies.
Third, I discuss the consequences of China’s blame transference strategy: creating signaling
problems between the US and China and triggering the US-China status competition. I
conclude by discussing the theoretical and substantive implications from this chapter.

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Expected Observable Implications
As noted in the theory chapter, in a blame game scenario, a rising power’s complaints in
response to a provocative smaller state should unfold in the following sequence (H3):
• Rising power blames the smaller states only (i.e., limited to no blame
transference) in its external and domestic communications.
• Rising power blames the established powers for abetting the smaller states (i.e.,
blame transference begins).
• Rising power focuses blame on the established powers (i.e., blame transference
crystallizes).
Moreover, these dynamics can trigger the status competition between the rising power and
the established powers, which leads to the following expected observable implications (H4):
• Rising power and the other established powers increasingly hold negative views
towards each other’s status ambitions.
• Rising power and the established powers start to engage in direct competition.

Identifying Status Concerns
In Chapter 3, I noted and empirically demonstrated that high-status actors want more
sovereignty. One of the ways in which this desire manifests itself is through sovereignty as
territorial integrity. For Chapter 3, establishing this benchmark was sufficient to guide my
text analysis. However, since the present chapter deals with qualitative evidence and
process-tracing, it is important that I discuss how status concerns might be observed in
process, especially in territorial disputes. This is important because a natural and valid

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default understanding is that territorial disputes are about material motivations like security
or economic gains. Thus, a discussion of how one might begin to disentangle material
motivations from status motivations is warranted.
My strategy, described below, focuses on the differences that these motivations
create in terms of the actor’s objectives and when/ how they become satiated. The first step
to my inferential strategy is to specify, ex ante, the actions that status-seekers tend to pursue:
the obtainment of items that the community regards as status markers. The reason for
establishing these baselines upfront is so that observers will actually have the theoretical
basis for claiming that an action is taken for status reasons.
192
This is to avoid backwards-
inducing all rationally-suboptimal outcome to status reasons. Without this baseline, a
rationally-suboptimal outcome can just be driven by non-status factors. For example, in daily
contexts, not all poor investments are status-driven: some are just poor investments. In
order for poor investments to be status-driven, there has to be a baseline motivation that
links said poor investment to the actor’s possible obtainment of status markers.
To borrow an analogy from criminal law: it is insufficient to look at the actus reus
(“the criminal act”). Instead, to establish a criminal offense, one needs to establish the mens
rea (“the guilty mind”). Likewise, to identify status concerns, it is insufficient to look at the
“status reus” (“the status act”). Instead, it is necessary to establish the “status rea” (“the
status mind”): there needs to be a status motivation for pursuing an action. And, as shown in
the survey I conducted in Chapter 3, status markers can – and should – be empirically
validated. Thus, status is only potentially operant, if all high-status actors are expected by the
community to pursue X or behave in X way. And if the actor in question pursues X or behaves

192
I thank Ronan Tse-min Fu for this insight.

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in X way, then one has reasons to suspect (though not necessarily conclude quite just yet),
that the actor may be driven by status.
Once this baseline has been established, one can then more carefully assess whether
the actor in question is pursuing X because of status reasons or not. Actors driven by
different motivations will hold different benchmarks for understanding success. For example,
an actor may want to have a Ferrari, the “X” in this example. Ferraris are usually regarded as
a status marker in modern society, thus the “status rea” is established. While the intended
action is the same (wanting a Ferrari), the actor’s measures for success are very different.
The material motivation for wanting a Ferrari is that it is a fast and well-made car, whereas
the status motivation is that having a Ferrari will allow the actor to obtain social standing.
For an actor who is only driven by material motivations, the mission is complete once
the actor owns the Ferrari. For an actor who is driven by status motivations, the mission is
only complete if the actor also receives the social recognition that comes with the Ferrari. In
other words, accomplishing the material objective is necessary but not sufficient. Conversely,
there is another possibility in which the material objective may remain indeterminate (i.e.,
not getting the car yet), but the status objective is achieved (i.e., other people respect the
actor for her hard work to try and get the car). In other words, this second scenario points
to sequencing: the material objective may be indeterminate or unaccomplished, but as long
as the status objective is met, the status-driven actor can be satiated.

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Conceptually, one could thus think of an actor as being driven by status if:

1. The actor is not just concerned about material objectives, but also has status
objectives (i.e., wants the car for material reasons, but also wants the social status
that comes with the car).

2. The actor prioritizes the accomplishment of status objectives over material objectives
(i.e., whether the actor gets the car or not is secondary to getting the social status that
the car is supposed to give the actor).

Scenario #1 therefore characterizes a mixed motive situation, wherein the actor wants the
accomplishment of both material and status objectives. In other words, if the actor gets the
Ferrari and becomes satisfied, this actor is not driven by status. On the other hand, if the
actor gets the Ferrari and remains dissatisfied and continues to demand social respect, then
one has good reasons to conclude that the actor is driven by status. Scenario #2 is a situation
wherein the actor prioritizes status objectives over material ones. In other words, if the actor
accepts an indeterminant material outcome but emphasizes that he or she needs to be
respected in the process, one has good reasons to conclude that the actor is driven by status.
The difference between the two scenarios I have identified above and the
conventional way of understanding and identifying status is the focus of analysis. The
conventional way focuses on the rationally-suboptimal outcome. Instead, what I propose
here focuses on the process – namely, how the process of status-seeking might be
distinguished through necessary/ sufficient conditions or sequencing of priorities. That is,
Scenario #1 is about necessary/ sufficient conditions: a status-seeker will regard the
accomplishment of material objectives as necessary but not sufficient. Scenario #2 is about
sequencing of priorities: the accomplishment of the material objective can be delayed, but
the status-seeker will care about whether due respect is paid in the process.

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Figure 5. Identifying Status Motive

Empirical Illustration: South China Sea Disputes from 2009-2016
Case Selection, Background, and Temporal Scope
I use the case of escalation in the South China Sea between 2009 and 2016 to illustrate how
the actions of smaller states could trigger the competition for status between the US and
China. There are three criteria for case selection. First, the issue under contestation is related
to status. Second, in T1, both the rising power and the established powers are not engaged in
active competition to displace each other’s position in the existing order. Third, the smaller
state is not receiving instructions from the established powers, at least not at T1.
For first criterion, as demonstrated in Chapter 3 through the nationwide survey
results, China does appear to regard sovereignty in terms of territorial integrity as the most
important status marker. In addition, in line with Scenario #2 outlined above, the South
China Sea disputes have been a scenario in which China showed the willingness to delay the

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accomplishment of the material objective (gaining physical control of the disputed
territories) while prioritizing the status objectives (establishment of favorable bilateral
relations in which smaller states show China respect). The following table summarizes how
different objectives lead to different expected observable implications.

Table 9. Material vs. Status and Expected Observable Implications
Action Objectives Expected Observable Implications
Claiming
Islands
Material 1. Wants physical control of the territory

2. Maximizes material gains

Claiming
Islands
Status 1. Sidesteps physical control of the territory

2. Gives up (relative) gains in exchange for respect

3. Litmus test of influence and regional leadership

An actor that is driven by material motivations would want physical possession of the
territory. It might also want to maximize the gains from possessing the territory. After all,
taking and defending territory is costly, so benefits must outweigh costs. Conversely, for an
actor driven by status motivations, physical possession of the territory is secondary and can
be delayed, as long as its counterparts show respect in dealing with the disputes. To facilitate
this outcome, the actor might even give up relative gains and offer material concessions.
The nine-dash lines, which is typically cited as evidence for Chinese aggression, have
been in play since 1950s. It is neither new or actively pursued as if China wants or expects
quick closure. Quite the contrary, the Chinese leadership has been quite willing to sidestep
the disputes for the time being so that all regional claimants can explore joint ventures in the

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disputed areas. This policy was first articulated in the 1970s as a part of Deng Xiaoping’s
principles of “shelving differences and seeking joint development”. Granted, before 2000s,
China did opportunistically occupy some islands and reefs. However, since around 2002,
Beijing took a more conciliatory approach. For example, China signed the Declaration of
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) with the twelve members of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which affirmed the parties’ willingness to respect
international law and use peaceful means of resolving the disputes. From 2002 to 2009, DoC
was understood as the equilibrium. During this time, Beijing’s posture in the South China Sea
might be described as accommodative: willing to sidestep the resolution of the territorial
disputes to foster friendly bilateral relations.
193
As Taylor notes, this was the one dispute
wherein China showed such willingness, which was quite different from China’s “no-
compromise” approach when it comes to Taiwan’s sovereignty issue.
194

Building good bilateral relations with Southeast Asian states by offering material
concessions must be viewed in the context of China’s broader attempt to establish regional
leadership during this period. For example, in his comparative study of Chinese and Japanese
strategies of negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) with ASEAN, Yoshimatsu notes that
China was much more willing to offer material concessions
195
and accept loss of relative

193
Michael Yahuda, “China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, no.
81 (May 2013): 450, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2012.748964; Andrew Scobell, “The South China Sea
and U.S.-China Rivalry,” Political Science Quarterly 133, no. 2 (2018): 438, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12772;
Feng Zhang, “Is Southeast Asia Really Balancing against China?,” The Washington Quarterly 41, no. 3 (July 3,
2018): 193, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1520573.
194
Brendan Taylor, “The South China Sea Is Not a Flashpoint,” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 1 (January 2,
2014): 104, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2014.893176.
195
These measures included: Early Harvest Programs wherein tariffs are reduced/ removed before the FTA is
ratified; extending World Trade Organization (WTO) rights to non-WTO ASEAN members; or negotiating
through multilateral fora with ASEAN states so that the latter has greater bargaining advantage.

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gains as a means of reassuring ASEAN states and demonstrating regional leadership.
196
This
is juxtaposed against the Japanese approach, which was based on careful calculation of costs
and benefits as well as short-term payoffs. Indeed, as Chin and Stubbs note in their analysis
of the China-ASEAN FTA, “demonstrating benign international economic leadership and
providing tangible and rhetorical support to developing countries and regions became an
essential element of China’s strategy”.
197
This strategy has been colloquially referred to as
the “charm offensive”: making concessions, either through favorable FTA terms and/ or
sidestepping territorial disputes, to consolidate regional leadership.
Throughout 2009 to 2016, China gradually eschewed this more accommodative
approach. However, with the benefit of hindsight, one could see that this principle seems to
have returned after 2016, as least in dealing with the Philippines. For example, as a part of
the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for joint energy exploration signed between
China and the Philippines in 2018, it is reported that the Philippines would take sixty percent
of the profits and China would take forty percent; in fact, this uneven 6:4 split was proposed
by the Chinese.
198
However, the key premise to this deal is that it must be predicated on
“mutual respect, fairness, and mutual benefit”.
199

196
Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, “Domestic Political Institutions, Diplomatic Style and Trade Agreements: A
Comparative Study of China and Japan,” New Political Economy 15, no. 3 (September 2010): 413,
https://doi.org/10.1080/13563461003602238.
197
Gregory Chin and Richard Stubbs, “China, Regional Institution-Building and the China–ASEAN Free Trade
Area,” Review of International Political Economy 18, no. 3 (August 2011): 282,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09692291003762548.
198
Reuters, “Agreeing to a 6:4 (Philippines: China) Split in Profits in Joint Ventures in the South China Sea: What
Does Xi Jinping Obtain?,” November 20, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/hk-media-china-ph-us-1121-
idCNKCS1NQ04G.
199
CSIS, “A Closer Look at China’s Proposal for Joint Exploration with the Philippines,” Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, November 21, 2018, https://amti.csis.org/closer-look-chinas-proposal-joint-
exploration-with-philippines/; Phil Star, “Philippines, China Sign MOU on Joint Gas, Oil Developement,”
November 21, 2018, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/11/21/1870458/philippines-china-sign-
mou-joint-gas-oil-developement.

108

Using territorial claims as litmus tests for status seems to be applicable to China’s
other territorial disputes as well. Hall, for example, notes that both China and Japan seem to
place greater emphasis on the symbolic value of claiming Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands as being
more related to standing, influence, and status, and less for their material (strategic or
security) value.
200
Indeed, as Glaser notes, “the importance of the maritime and sovereignty
disputes in the South China Sea and East China Seas [have been blown] far out of proportion
to their material value”.
201
It would be hard to imagine why this would be the case, if status
concerns are not at least a part of the equation. In layperson terms, China’s strategy might
thus be described as: “as long as you show me some respect, I am happy to give up relative
gains at this moment”. An actor who is purely or even primarily driven by material
motivations might find such proposals unappealing, because one would be giving up tangible
material payoffs in exchange for “fuzzy” social respect.
Thus, the South China Sea disputes is a case in which China appears to prioritize
status objectives over material objectives by way of sequencing. That is to say, it is
proactively offering material concessions (sidestepping the dispute, 6:4 profit split) in
exchange for social respect, much like how premodern China granted smaller tributary
states formal autonomy in exchange for symbolic respect.
202
To be more concrete, what
would this “respect” look like? An example can be found from a quote by the Prime Minister
of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, on the South China Sea disputes in 2019:

200
Todd Hall, “More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 4 (September 3, 2019).
201
Leif-Eric Easley, Patricia Kim, and Charles L. Glaser, “Correspondence: Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S.
Relations with China and Taiwan,” International Security 40, no. 4 (April 2016): 189.
202
David C. Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (Columbia University Press,
2010); B. Womack, “Asymmetry and China’s Tributary System,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 5,
no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 37–54, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pos003; Zhang, “Chinese Thinking on the South
China Sea and the Future of Regional Security.”

109

We have to accept the fact that China is a big power. You know, the Malay states have
existed near China…and survived because we know how to conduct ourselves…In the
past we used to send to China gold and silver flowers every year as a symbol of our
being practically, well, subservient to them.
203

As seen, there is clear acknowledgement about the unequal relationship between China and
Malaysia – even if the material objective (solving the territorial dispute) remains unachieved.
Thus, I focus on the time period between 2009 (when China’s accommodative stance
eroded) and around 2016 (when China returned to the more accommodative stance vis-à-
vis the Philippines). If China was aiming to maximize material gains, the return to the more
accommodative stance in 2016 would not have been observed. Instead, what we should be
seeing is a China pressing its advantage and maximizing gains over an increasingly
deferential Philippines under Duterte.
204
In other words, from 2009 to 2016, China appears
to be more concerned about receiving respect from smaller states – that is, driven by a status
motive – rather than trying to resolve the territorial dispute altogether.
For the second criterion, at the starting point of my analysis (2009), both China and
the US were not in active, intense competition against each other for status. In other words,
China was clearly #2, and the US was clearly #1, and that this was tacitly understood on both
sides. For example, Former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, stated in 2011 (italics added):
Some in our country see China’s progress as a threat to the United States, while some
in China worry that America seeks to constrain China. In fact, we believe a thriving
China is good for China, and a thriving China is good for America. President Obama

203
Benar News, “In Interview, Malaysian PM Speaks on China, Regional Balance of Power, Race Politics,”
September 27, 2019, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/malaysian/question-answer-
09272019150003.html.
204
One might argue that China returned to this accommodative stance because US deterrence was effective.
This might explain why China would de-escalate. However, it fails to explain why China would return to the
strategy of actively giving up relative gains on joint ventures in exchange for good bilateral relations with the
Philippines.

110

and I have made very clear that the United States is fundamentally committed to
developing a positive and cooperative relationship with China.
205

At this time, there was still optimism that US engagement will allow China to become a
responsible stakeholder. Conversely, calls for (re)balancing and containment were largely
symbolic because the assets actually deployed were miniscule compared to what was
operationally required.
206
In other words, there is good reason to believe that the US during
this time was largely interested in incorporating China into the existing (US-led) order.
Likewise, the consensus within China during this time was that it may want to change
some aspects of the status quo, but not in a way that directly challenges the US position in
the existing order – or at least not yet. For example, creating an alternative China-led formal
alliance seems to be a minority position in China.
207
Instead, most Chinese academics and
thinktankers support building informal partnerships around the US alliance, which implies
a more circumspect approach, one that might not necessarily imply driving the US out of Asia
altogether. Even as of 2018, there remains a deep division as to whether China is suffering
from strategic overstretching and should be more cautious.
208
In other words, nationalist
narratives aside, there were no pretenses within China that it could challenge the US for the
#1 position during the temporal scope of my analysis.
For the third criterion, there was no direct evidence that the US was actively
emboldening smaller states to initiate challenges, at least in T1. While the Philippines is a

205
Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy (blog), November 10, 2011,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/.
206
Aaron L. Friedberg, “Bucking Beijing: An Alternative U.S. China Policy,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 5 (2012): 48–
51.
207
Ruonan Liu and Feng Liu, “Contending Ideas on China’s Non-Alliance Strategy,” The Chinese Journal of
International Politics 10, no. 2 (June 1, 2017): 151–71.
208
Xiaoyu Pu and Chengli Wang, “Rethinking China’s Rise: Chinese Scholars Debate Strategic Overstretch,”
International Affairs 94, no. 5 (September 1, 2018): 1019–35, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy140.

111

formal US ally, it was not clear that the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) entails an obligation
from the US to intervene if conflict arose over the Spratly Islands. Indeed, when the South
China Sea disputes intensified in 2012 over the Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines urged the
US to clarify whether the MDT extends to the Spratly Islands, only to be told that the US
would not take sides in the territorial disputes between the Philippines and China,
209
while
refusing to make the commitment that the US would defend the Philippines over a Spratly
scenario.
210
This was juxtaposed against the US position in the East China Sea, where it
explicitly reaffirmed in 2014 that the US-Japan Security Treaty applied to the Senkaku
Islands. In fact, this was one of the reasons why Duterte was so critical of the US alliance
when he took office in 2016: that there was no clear indication from the US that in a South
China Sea contingency, the MDT would indeed compel US intervention. In other words, there
was a real fear of potential US abandonment from the perspective of the Philippines. This
would not be observed if the US had been instructing the Philippines to provoke China from
the outset. Granted, the US did become involved as the disputes went on. However, this was
later in the process, not during T1.

Escalation in the South China Sea
How is it that China and the US would end up in an active status competition, even though
both began by trying to defend their standing in the existing order? In line with my theory, I
submit that smaller states can trigger this dynamic – even if inadvertently.

209
The Philippines Star, “Joker Says Mutual Defense Treaty Useless,” The Philippines Star, May 3, 2012,
https://news.abs-cbn.com/nation/05/03/12/joker-says-mutual-defense-treaty-useless.
210
Zack Cooper, “Analysis | The U.S. Quietly Made a Big Splash about the South China Sea,” Washington Post,
March 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/19/us-quietly-made-big-splash-about-
south-china-sea/.

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One might understand the escalation as being two-stage: 2009-2012 (tensions
building up) and 2013-2016 (climax of the tensions). In both time periods, smaller states
triggered China’s status insecurities by demonstrating that the latter’s charm offensive and
bids for regional leadership were failing. In fact, the smaller states typically did this in front
of China’s peers: the US and its allies like Japan. These actions prompted China into taking
measures to defend and reassert its status. Yet, such actions in turn prompted the US and its
allies to believe that China had ambitions to overturn the existing order. The more China
blamed the US (and Japan) for what the Philippines was doing to save face, the more
entrenched the US-China action-reaction dynamic became. The net effect was that both the
US and China increasingly saw the South China Sea disputes as a means through which they
can assess and defend their status in the existing order.

Provocation from Below and China’s Status Insecurity
Phase I, 2009-2012
What prompted China to eschew the more accommodative stance in 2009? Observers
typically point to China’s submission of its nine-dashed line claims to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on May 7
th
, 2009 as evidence for increasing
Chinese assertiveness. However, it is important to note that this action was taken in response
to what happened the day before. On May 6
th
, Vietnam and Malaysia submitted a joint
application to UNCLOS to seek recognition of extended continental shelves. Article 76 of
UNCLOS stipulates that the default continental shelf is 200 nautical miles from a country’s

113

coastline. However, countries can extend this claim to 350 nautical miles, if it can be
demonstrated that the area is a natural prolongation of the landmass owned by the countries.
For Vietnam and Malaysia, the extended claims would give them more fishing rights.
For China, however, the move from Vietnam and Malaysia infringed upon Chinese territorial
claims. From a broader geopolitical perspective, it demonstrated that China’s aspirations for
regional leadership had been a policy failure. The move from Vietnam and Malaysia was
perceived by China as an act of provocation wherein smaller states were taking advantage of
China’s accommodative posture. For China, such behavior from smaller states like Vietnam
or Malaysia were systematic, as summarized by Fu Ying (Vice Foreign Minister from 2009-
2013) and Wu Shicun (President of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies):
Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and some other ASEAN countries were half-
hearted about the DOC. They kept on transforming and expanding occupied islands,
reinforcing their administrative management of them…this continuously enraged the
Chinese public and media, eliciting sustained attention.
211

Tensions further escalated at the ASEAN Summit Meeting in July 2010 held at Hanoi. At this
meeting, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the “the United States, like every
nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime
commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea”.
212
Many observers saw
this comment as the watershed moment that signaled the beginning of the “Pivot to Asia”.
However, it is important to note two things. First, Clinton made the remarks after the smaller
states publicly criticized Chinese behavior, starting with Vietnam’s Foreign Minister,

211
The National Interest, “South China Sea: How We Got to This Stage,” 2016,
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/south-china-sea-how-we-got-stage-16118.
212
U.S. Department of State, “Remarks at Press Availability: Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State,” July 23,
2010, //2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145095.htm.

114

followed by ministers from other ASEAN countries.
213
Thus, Clinton was reacting towards
what was already happening in the meeting. Second, substantively, Clinton’s remarks were
essentially a reiteration of the DoC principle:
The United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for
resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion. We oppose the use or
threat of force by any claimant. The United States does not take sides on the
competing territorial disputes over land features…The U.S. supports the 2002
ASEAN-China declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea.
214

In other words, there was neither any commitment that the US would intervene on behalf of
the smaller claimants nor any coercive threats asking the Chinese to back down. Yet, China’s
Foreign Minister at the time, Yang Jiechi, clearly took issue with what was seen as an episode
of public affront. Upon his return into the room after a brief exit, Yang responded by telling
the US to stay out of the South China Sea, to deter what Beijing saw as an emerging strategy
from smaller states like the Philippines or Vietnam to invite the US into publicly confronting
and embarrassing China.
215
To the smaller states, Yang stressed that “China is a big country
and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact”.
216

Make no mistake: smaller states like Vietnam or the Philippines were trying to defend
their interests. However, China perceived their behaviors as violation of China’s goodwill for
adopting a more accommodative strategy. Most importantly, despite almost a decade of
charm offensive, Chinese expectations of receiving deference from smaller states, measured
in terms of how (and not necessarily if and when) these territorial disputes might be handled,
were clearly violated. Indeed, there was no pretension from China that the South China Sea

213
Geoff Dyer, “Hillary Clinton: The China Hawk,” Financial Times, September 5, 2016,
https://www.ft.com/content/92b23c8e-7349-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a.
214
U.S. Department of State, “Remarks at Press Availability: Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State.”
215
Scobell, “The South China Sea and U.S.-China Rivalry,” 215.
216
The Washington Post, “U.S. Takes a Tougher Tone with China.”

115

disputes would be solved any time soon. However, how the smaller states dealt with the
disputes was the problem: not only did the smaller states’ open defiance towards China in
front of the US create an episode of embarrassment, but it also showed that China’s bid for
regional leadership was failing. In other words, the smaller states triggered the beginning of
China’s insecurities about its influence and standing. For example, a 2012 People’s Daily
report noted that “in dealing with territorial disputes such as the Scarborough Shoal, China
will stand firm against noncompliant (smaller) states but is willing to be patient on
resolution of the disputes, as expected of a great power”.
217

Phase II, 2012-2014: Rising Tensions
This section examines how disputes between China and the Philippines from 2012 to 2014
further deepened China’s status insecurities. To keep discussions tractable, the aim is to
provide an overview on the key events during two decision-points: (1) the 2012 Scarborough
Shoal incident and the Philippines’ initiation of the UNCLOS Arbitration in 2013, and (2) the
Second Thomas Shoal escalation in 2013/4. My aim is to contextualize how these decision-
points set the stage for blame transference from China, and how such dynamic created
tension between the US and China.

Scarborough Shoal Incident and the Philippines Initiates the Arbitration
On April 8
th
, 2012, Chinese fishing vessels were spotted operating around the Scarborough
Shoal, which sits right off the west coast of the Philippines but within the Chinese nine-
dashed claims. The standoff began when the Philippines sent out warships to detain Chinese

217
People’s Daily, “Chinese Law Enforcement Boats Leave Disputed Areas,” April 24, 2012.

116

fisherpersons, and tension escalated when two Chinese surveillance ships positioned
themselves between the Chinese vessels and the Filipino warships to prevent the detainment.
There was some initial willingness from both sides to de-escalate in search of a diplomatic
solution – for example, the Philippines recalling its warships in exchange for law
enforcement ships, or China reducing the number of ships operating in the area. However,
such talks stalemated over details on which side should recall their vessels first.
Furthermore, there were disagreements as to whether Chinese fishing vessels could
withdraw with their loots, which the Philippines saw as illegal.
In response to the stalemate, the Philippines shifted strategies by 1) declaring its
intention to settle the dispute through international arbitration; 2) asking for US
intervention, and 3) seeking support from other ASEAN members.
218
However, while the US
reaffirmed its commitment to the Philippines after American and Filipino officials met on
April 30
th
, 2012, it did not clarify whether the US-Philippines MDT would obligate US military
intervention in a Spratly scenario. Privately, the US officials were frustrated with the
Philippines’ change in strategy and management of the crisis by actively inviting US
involvement and running the risk of further provoking China.
219
For China, the Philippines’
“internationalization of the disputes” by involving the US and ASEAN was quite provocative,
as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that the move will only “complicate the problem”

218
Jerry E. Esplanada, “Philippines to Seek US Help in Dealing with China over Spratlys Issue,” April 26, 2012,
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/34857/philippines-to-seek-us-help-in-dealing-with-china-over-spratlys-
issue-dfa; Michael J Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone
Deterrence (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017), 106–8, https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/170505_GreenM_CounteringCoercionAsia_Web.pdf?OnoJXfWb4A5gw_n6G.8azgEd8zRIM4
wq.
219
Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, 110.

117

and “would not be helpful for resolving the issue”.
220
Likewise, because of internal divisions
among ASEAN members (i.e., Cambodia’s support of China), it was not possible for ASEAN to
reach a unanimous decision which was required to issue a joint declaration in support of the
Philippines. After several rounds of failed negotiations and finger-pointing from all sides, the
Philippines initiated the South China Sea Arbitration by instituting arbitral proceedings
against China to the UNCLOS in January 2013.

Second Thomas Shoal Escalation
In May 2013, and by way of protesting against the Arbitration, the Chinese increased its
presence around the Second Thomas Shoal, which sits in the middle of the Spratly Islands. In
1999, the Filipino government intentionally parked a desolate warship, the Sierra Madre, on
top of the Shoal as a garrison from which the Filipino navy operated, and also as a way to
claim the disputed area. Starting in May 2013, Chinese surveillance and patrol ships
increasingly operated around the Shoal. Observers saw this as China’s attempt to pressure
the Filipino garrison, though the Chinese typically defended such actions by claiming that
this was to prevent the Philippines from transporting building material for any new
structures in addition to the Sierra Madre. Again, despite initial willingness from all sides to
de-escalate, tensions remained mostly due to disagreements on whether the Philippines was
only sending supplies to its garrison, or whether China’s suspicion that the Philippines was
delivering building material was valid.
221

220
People’s Daily, “Chinese Law Enforcement Boats Leave Disputed Areas.”
221
Frances Mangosing, “China Raises Concerns over PH’s Reported Development Plans on Ayungin Shoal,”
Inquirer, May 29, 2013, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/75939/china-raises-concerns-over-phs-reported-
development-plans-on-ayungin-shoal.

118

However, at least as late as January 2014, China was still trying to convince the
Philippines to retract the Arbitration, offering in exchange to withdraw its coast guards from
the Scarborough Shoal, effectively giving up the gains that China made during the 2012
Scarborough Incident.
222
In fact, the Chinese offer also promised economic aid and
increasing investment in the Philippines. While there was debate on why the Philippines
decided to reject the deal, the Philippines decided to proceed with the Arbitration anyway.
The net effect of these failed attempts to get the Philippines to back down was the beginning
of China’s island-building projects in the South China Sea (i.e., “the Great Wall of Sand”) in
late 2013 and early 2014.

The Blame Game: Dynamics and Consequences
Measuring Blame Transference
How did China attribute blame for escalation in the South China Sea? My theoretical
expectation would suggest that attribution of blame should focus on the smaller states first.
As the disputes went on and China’s status insecurities were increasingly triggered by
provocations from smaller states, one should observe an increasing attempt from China (and
its elites) to blame the established powers for what the smaller states were doing, both to
save face internationally but also to retain domestic legitimacy.
To systematically measure the blame transference dynamic, I scraped documents
related to the South China Sea and the Philippines from People’s Daily from 2009-2020
223

222
Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, 182.
223
I scrape three extra years of data from 2018 to 2020 to see the legacy and consequences of these blame
transference attempts.

119

(N=428). I locate them through the search term “South China Sea( 南海) + Philippines ( 菲律
宾). These documents have the unique attribute of being “external-facing” and “internal-
facing” at the same time. They are external because the entries typically come from MFA
statements from the regular press conferences. They are internal because they are published
in People’s Daily, which communicates with the domestic audience.
I hand-code each entry on two dimensions. First, I determine whether the statement
was an instance of reassurance or warning. Conceptually, one might think of instances of
reassurance as statements in which China is expressing concerns about developments in the
South China Sea but is still offering “offramps” or “talking nicely” to facilitate cooperative
behavior or de-escalation. Second, I determine the statement’s target country. Thus,
conceptually, documents in which China is issuing a warning towards a particular country
might be understood as instances in which China is attributing blame – who is the actor that
is creating trouble in the South China Sea and is therefore the target of the warning. In
instances in which China warns more than one country in the same entry, I duplicate these
entries in my dataset: one entry for one country. To validate my coding, I plot all Chinese
reactions towards the Philippines from 2009 to 2020 as follows:

120

Figure 6. China’s Position towards Philippines over the South China Sea Disputes

These patterns have face validity: after 2009, China was increasingly concerned about
provocations from the Philippines. Tensions reached the climax in 2016 in response to the
Arbitration outcome. After Duterte assumed office in June 2016 and took a more deferential
foreign policy posture towards China, China’s rhetoric returned to one of reassurance once
again. Coincidentally, this return towards reassurance provides additional evidence for my
earlier claim that as long as smaller states show deference in the process or the means

121

through which the territorial disputes are handled, China remains largely willing to
reciprocate in kind, even if the actual disputes remain unresolved.
Having validated my hand-coding, I plot China’s warnings towards all involved actors
from 2009 to 2020 as follows.
Figure 7. China’s Blame Attribution in the South China Sea

As one can see from the figure, initially China attributed increasing tension in the South China
Sea to the Philippines until ~2012. Around 2013, China started to issue more warnings
towards the US (and Japan), suggesting an increased tendency to blame the US and Japan for

122

being at fault for the disputes and tensions in the South China Sea. In 2016, the US, Japan, and
Australia (together) trigger the majority of China’s blame attribution of the disputes. Finally,
after 2016, China essentially started to attribute all problems in the South China Sea
completely to the US and Japan, as seen in the datapoints from 2017 to 2019. These numbers
provide support for H3, which suggests that a rising power’s blame attribution early on will
focus on the smaller states, before attributing the blame to the established powers.
A counterargument must be addressed immediately. One might point out that a
reason why China increasingly blamed the US and Japan is because they were in fact
increasingly involved as the disputes went on.
224
However, as noted earlier, during the
height of the Scarborough incident (2012-2014), the US neither wanted to get explicitly
involved nor was willing to explicitly reaffirm in public whether the US-Philippines MDT
would obligate the US to intervene in a South China Sea contingency. In turn, the US position
created concerns from the Philippines about abandonment. China has information on both
the US position and the Philippines’ fears for abandonment, given these US-Philippines
correspondences took place in the public. Yet, the blame attempts started in 2013 and
intensified thereafter. Critics might also suggest that US Freedom of Navigation Operations
(FONOPs) were the reasons why China started blaming the US in 2013. However, the US has
been operating FONOPs against China every year
225
starting in 2007.
226
In other words,
while the numbers may or may not have increased,
227
US FONOPs was a constant feature in
the region that predates the beginning of the blame transference attempts in 2013.

224
I thank Kacie Miura and Audrye Wong for this insight on separate occasions.
225
I thank Rachel Esplin Odell for sharing her data on US FONOPs.
226
Xinhua, “South China Sea Disputes: History and Realistic Thinking,” Xinhua News, May 12, 2016,
www.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-05/12/c_128977813.htm.
227
To the author’s knowledge, there is no database that systematically establishes the frequency of FONOPs by
year. This is because not all FONOPs are announced in public – hence Odell’s data, referenced above, only

123

Yet, and by way of previewing the subsequent discussions: blame transference is not
just about increasing frequency of blame-attribution to the US and Japan starting in 2013.
Frequency is a useful first-cut evidence, but there was also a qualitative shift in China’s
narrative regarding the South China Sea disputes. In the initial periods (2009-2012), China
blamed the Philippines for inviting the US into the South China Sea and tried to stay as silent
as possible on whether the US was trying to be involved or not. As the disputes unfolded, and
especially around the Arbitration decision (2016), China revised its narrative: it started to
point out that ever since 2012, there was evidence that the US was instructing the Philippines
to create trouble in the South China Sea all along. In other words, there is a subtle but real
shift in narrative. In the beginning, the narrative was that it was the Philippines which was
attempting to internationalize the dispute by inviting the US in. After 2016, the narrative was
that the US was actively encouraging the Philippines to create trouble all along.

Constructing Blame
In the initial periods (2009-2012), Chinese officials largely blamed the Philippines for
escalation in the South China Sea and refrained from attributing the Philippines behavior to
US abetment. For example, on July 15, 2011, People’s Daily published an editorial noting that
“US involvement is something that some ASEAN countries and other interested parties really
desired; some countries even openly announce that they will borrow American strength to
balance China”.
228
A similar tone was adopted in an editorial on August 2, 2011, which noted

determines whether a FONOP took place in a given a year. However, the general understanding is that FONOPs
intensified in 2015, suggesting that the FONOPs were responses to, not the cause of, blame transference.
228
People’s Daily, “Making Cooperation Possible (Translated Title),” People’s Daily, July 15, 2011, sec. 3. “ 美国
的参加是某些东盟国家及其一些利益集团非常期待的事情，有些国家的领导人甚至公开表示要借美国的力
量来 “ 平衡中国”

124

that “the ASEAN nations anticipate the US Pivot to Asia; especially for countries with
sovereignty disputes with China, they want to leverage the US to internationalize the South
China Sea disputes”.
229
Likewise, in response to a meeting between President Aquino and
Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda on September 28, 2011, China’s official response was that
“the Philippines is trying to publicize the South China Sea disputes in international fora as a
way to frame the disputes as a regional/ international problem (as opposed to a bilateral
dispute between the claimants). By leveraging its status as a smaller state and the ‘weaker
side’, the Philippines is trying to win international sympathy and control the narrative,
thereby internationalizing the South China Sea disputes”.
230
Finally, in response to the US-
Philippines Ministerial Dialogue on April 30, 2012, a report published on May 3, 2012
claimed that “the Philippines was leveraging its position as the weaker side to beg for help
everywhere, trying to borrow the strength of the US by invoking the US-Philippines MDT”.
231

There are two noteworthy observations. First, the official narrative coming out of
China at this point was that the South China Sea disputes was a bilateral dispute between
China and the Philippines, and that it was the Philippines that was trying to invite the US into
the disputes. Second, the official narrative at this point was careful to not directly claim
whether the US wanted to get involved or not. To the extent that the US was involved, the
blame was attributed to the Philippines for inviting the US in. This narrative was also
consistent with the fact that China intentionally remained silent regarding the various joint

229
People’s Daily 2011b. “ 它们对美国的“ 重返亚洲” 是有所期待的，其中某些与中国有主权争端的国家，则希
望借美国来推动南海问题国际化”.
230
People’s Daily 2011c. “ 菲方希望，通过在国际场合多谈南海问题，把南海问题从有主权争议国家之间的问
题上升为“ 地区问题” ，并以“ 小国” 、“ 弱势” 来赢得国际舆论同情，占据舆论制高点，促使南海问题国际化”
231
People’s Daily, “Philippines Pays Attention to US-Philippines 2+2 Meeting (Translated Title),” May 3, 2012,
sec. 21. “ 中菲南海黄岩岛对峙以来，菲律宾一面摆出一付弱者的样子，四处“ 诉苦求援” ，一面又不断暗示美
菲之间有共同防御条约，希望借助美国力量”

125

military exercises that the US and the Philippines engaged in during this early period (April
16, 2012; December 31, 2012). At this time, the US accommodated Chinese sensitivities by
removing certain activities from the US-Philippines joint military exercises to avoid
unnecessary provocations. In response, the Chinese recognized this diplomatic gesture from
the US and reciprocated by being silent about the exercises, also to avoid unnecessary US-
China escalation.
232
For observers of China’s MFA speech patterns, silence – especially for
items as sensitive as US-Philippines joint military exercises while an active territorial dispute
was happening – is highly unusual. Thus, the response (or lack thereof) is indicative of
China’s intentions to avoid unnecessary complications with the US at this point.
Yet, despite the series of concessions made by China from 2011 to 2013 in exchange
for the Philippines to not proceed with the Arbitration, the Philippines was adamant. These
events called into question China’s status: if it were a truly a regional leader and was
recognized by the smaller states as such, it should not have been subject to this type of
treatment from the Philippines. It also created an episode of public embarrassment for China
and revealed a shortcoming in its geoeconomic strategy: despite decades of charm offensive
and offering concessionary trade deals to Southeast Asian nations, China was unable to turn
these economic carrots into real influence. Therefore, from the Chinese perspective, the
status stakes became even higher: (1) either accept the Philippines’ behaviors and suffer
status loss, (2) or frame itself as a victim.
Indeed, it was in this context do we see the crystallization of the rhetoric that the US
was to blame for the Philippines’ actions. As a result, the narrative changed, especially after
the Philippines initiated the Arbitration in January 2013. In the context of such perceived

232
Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, 104.

126

affront from the Philippines, blame transference began. China’s MFA released a series of
statements condemning the US, and sometimes Japan, for supporting the Philippines from
the shadows. For example, in May 2015, Hua Chunying, MFA’s spokesperson, bluntly stated
that “some people in the Philippines are getting a little bit too hopped-up, playing a game of
duets with some people in other countries [the US] while inflating the China threat. It is an
eye-catching duet”.
233
In another series of comments between March 2016 and April 2016,
Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Spokesperson Hua reiterated: “We have said many times
already. The Philippines’ decision to institute the arbitration is attempting to deny China’s
territorial claims over the Spratly Islands. Clearly someone [the US] is pulling the strings
from the shadows and manipulating this entire incident”.
234
China claimed that this was a
part of the “Pivot to Asia”,
235
where the US allied with Japan and used the Philippines to
provoke China over the South China Sea issue” – a typical strategy from “the US and western
countries to raise their voice and…accuse China of violating ‘international law’”.
236

In fact, perhaps the most revisionist narrative arose when the Arbitration decision
was about to be announced on July 12, 2016, which overwhelmingly ruled against China’s
claims against the Philippines. On July 11, 2016, People’s Daily published the following:
There is now evidence suggesting that, starting from the Scarborough Incident in
April 2012, the US was using “international law” to stir up trouble in the South China
Sea. There is also evidence suggesting that this is a conspiracy: it is precisely because
the Americans were helping from the shadows, that the Philippines eschewed

233
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, “Regular Press Conference Held by MFA
Spokesperson Hua Chunying on May 15th, 2015 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China.”
234
Global Times, “Wang Yi: Someone Is Pulling the Strings Behing Philippines’ Arbitration Case, China Is Not
Interested - Global Times,” March 8, 2016, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2016-03/8670734.html;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, “Regular Press Conference Held by MFA Spokesperson
Hua Chunying on April 20th, 2016 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China.”
235
People’s Daily, “A New Chapter in China’s New Great Power Relations (Translated Title),” April 14, 2016,
sec. 7. “ 美国继续推进针对中国的亚太再平衡” 战略，联合日本、菲律宾等国在南海问题上挑衅中国”
236
People’s Daily, “The Political Farce in the Name of International Law Needs to End (Translated Title),” July
8, 2016. “ 也是美国等西方国家故伎重施的例子… 把“ 违反国际法” 的莫须有罪名安在中国头上”

127

diplomatic dialogues with China, effectively creating the current quagmire in the
Sino-Philippines relations.
237

As the foregoing quote shows, the narrative at this point was not simply that the US was
helping the Philippines in 2016; the narrative at this point was to attribute everything that
had happened since 2012 to the US – which, of course, is inconsistent with the rhetorical
restraint that China exhibited earlier in staying as silent as possible about US involvement.
In another report on July 19, 2016, the People’s Daily once again reiterated the same position:
“a series of evidence now demonstrates that the Philippines stirred up the problem in the
South China Sea under US abetment – not to solve the bilateral territorial disputes between
China and the Philippines but to deny China its territorial sovereignty in the region”.
238

These blame-transferring narratives might thus be viewed through the lens of
motivated reasoning and/ or impression management strategies. It was not that China was
low status and that was why smaller states were disrespecting China; it was also not the
incompetence of the Chinese elites that caused the Philippines to provoke China. Instead,
China was facing these provocations from smaller states because of “manufactured
encirclement” from the established powers like the US or Japan. Namely, the established
powers were actively using the smaller states as pawns to embarrass China. However, if this
logic informed the Chinese position all along, there was no reason why Chinese officials
would refrain from using this (very convenient) narrative starting from 2009, or to stay

237
People’s Daily, “Using International Law as a Pretext, Pre-Determined Outcomes (Translated Title),” July 21,
2016, sec. 21. “ 现有证据已经表明，自 2012 年 4 月黄岩岛事件前，就已经有美国人在捣鼓用“ 国际司法” 手段
炒热南海问题的阴谋。也有证据表明，正是美国背后作祟，才促使菲律宾在黄岩岛事件末期作出放弃对话
的决定，使中菲关系陷入僵局”
238
People’s Daily, “Insisting on the Dual-Track Model to Deal with the South China Sea Problem (Translated
Title),” July 19, 2016. “ 一系列事实表明，菲律宾在美国的推动下炒热南海问题，不是为了解决菲律宾与中国
之间的争议，而是企图借此否定中国在南海的领土主权”

128

silent about the joint military exercises that the Philippines and the US conducted. If anything,
these military exercises would have provided the perfect ammunitions with which blame
narratives could be constructed from 2011 to 2013. Likewise, if this were a reflection of
reality, the Philippines would not have been so concerned about potential abandonment
from the US. The fact that this narrative only gained traction as the situation in the South
China Sea deteriorated suggests that such narrative was adopted both as an impression
management strategy to prevent China from losing more face internationally, but also to help
insulate the Chinese elites from being criticized for being incompetent – so incompetent that
even smaller states like the Philippines dared to provoke and disrespect China.

Consequences of the Blame Transference: US-China Contestation for Primacy
Because of the Philippines actions, both China and the US were increasingly enmeshed in an
active competition for status. To China, there was increasing (misplaced) certainty that the
US was using the South China Sea disputes to deny China’s status. To the US, there was
increasing (misplaced) certainty that China was a challenger to the existing order.
From China’s perspective, it came to see the disputes in the South China Sea as a part
of a broader ploy from the US to deny China’s rightful status in the region. For example, a
report published on April 10, 2014 in People’s Daily noted that “in recent years, the US is
touting its ‘Pivot to Asia’, constantly motivating some regional claimants to stir up trouble,
as a way to consolidate its status in the Asia Pacific”.
239
To China, the US strategy of provoking
disputes in the South China Sea through proxies like the Philippines reflected a fundamental

239
People’s Daily, “The US Should Do What Improves Security in the Asia Pacific (Translated Title),” April 10,
2014. “ 近年来美国高调“ 重返亚太” ，不时拉拢一些甘愿出头的地区盟国出来挑事儿，以期巩固其在亚太地区
事务上的地位”

129

anxiety on the part of the US that “China would one day replace [it]”.
240
Consequently, the
South China Sea disputes “quickly became a tool through which the US could cling onto its
status as the regional hegemon”.
241
Specifically:
The US is begrudgingly eschewing its proactive hegemony in favor of passive
hegemony. That is, the US went from being confident in its ability to lead the world,
to becoming skeptical of its own status as the leader; the US went from building and
maintaining the world order to promote peace as a means of elevating its
international status, to undermining the very order it had built to protects its
international status.
242

Indeed, in a report published in September 2016, several months after the Arbitration
decision came out in July 2016, People’s Daily offered the following assessment of the broader
geopolitical significance of the South China Sea disputes:
With declining overall power, but especially in terms of economic power, the US is
now concerned about its status and standing as “lao da” (translation: the big brother/
the mafia boss who calls the shots) in the Asia Pacific. How to protect its Cold War
alliances is now the foremost concern of the American elites. If economic levers no
longer work, then the US can only fall back to military and security levers.
243

Indeed, per the logic espoused by the foregoing quotes, the South China Sea became a pretext
through which the US can soothe its status anxieties and deny China’s rightful status in the
Asia Pacific.
244

240
People’s Daily, “Stirring Up in the South China Sea Will Not Work (Translated Title),” March 11, 2016, sec. 5.
“ 担心中国有一天会取代美国”
241
People’s Daily, “Support for China’s South China Sea Position Increases (Translated Title),” July 12, 2016, sec.
3. “ 南海问题迅速成为美国维护地区霸权地位... 的重要抓手”
242
People’s Daily, “Selfish Geopolitical Strategy (Translated Title),” September 18, 2016, sec. 5. “ 美国不得不开
始由昔日的“ 积极霸权” 转变为“ 消极霸权” ，即由对自己领导世界的能力充满信心，转变为对维持自己的领导
地位力不从心；由倾向于通过建立和维持世界秩序与和平提升国际地位，转变为倾向于通过扰乱和破坏世
界秩序与和平保住现有地位”.
243
People’s Daily, “The ‘Interfere Everywhere’ Worldview (Translated Title),” September 18, 2016, sec. 5. “ 在
美国整体实力尤其是经济实力明显下降的情况下，如何继续维护美国在亚太地区的老大地位，维持在冷战
时期形成的盟国体系，是美国战略精英们考虑的首要问题。经济牌不行了，美国自然要打军事和安全牌”
244
People’s Daily, “How the US Became the Source of Instability,” September 18, 2016.

130

For the US, its comments and actions at the beginning of 2009 reflected its desire to
defend the status quo and the existing US-led order. Indeed, observers generally note the
more accommodative stance that the Obama administration took towards China around
2008.
245
Yet, as the South China Sea disputes unfolded, the US began to see Chinese behaviors
(in particular, China’s hostile rhetoric or kinetic actions against the Philippines) as evidence
for increased Chinese assertiveness.
246
Johnston’s LexisNexis search shows that US news
articles which mention ‘assertive’ within five words of ‘China’ went from around ~20 articles
in 2009, to ~120 in 2010, to ~140 in 2011. During the same time period, there was
corresponding attempt in the US to frame the South China Sea disputes as a litmus test to the
durability of the rules-based international order.
247
For example, through a Factiva search of
key US newspapers, Fravel and Miura show that “the majority of articles including the terms
‘China’ and the ‘South China Sea’ also included a reference to the ‘rules-based order’ or
‘liberal international order’ starting in 2011, but especially after 2013.

245
Scobell, “The South China Sea and U.S.-China Rivalry.”
246
Michael D Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 32 (2010): 1–19;
Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?,” International Security 37, no. 4
(April 1, 2013): 9–10, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00115. Neither Swaine nor Johnston agree with the
proposition that China was actually becoming more assertive, even if for different reasons – they merely note
that the meme was forming in the US.
247
Scobell, “The South China Sea and U.S.-China Rivalry,” 201.

131

Source: Taylor Fravel and Kacie Miura, “A Perfect Storm: Power Transitions and Territorial Disputes”, working
manuscript, p. 37.

Indeed, there was increasing perception in American discourses that the South China Sea
disputes is not just a set of territorial disputes between China and other regional claimants.
Instead, these disputes were invariably tied to US influence in the region and ability to
uphold the current order
248
– in other words, US status. Consequently, to defend the current
order, the US may need to take a firmer stance on the South China Sea disputes so as to
defend its credibility and influence therein.
Somewhat ironically, after Duterte took office in 2016 and adopted a more deferential
foreign policy posture towards China, China reciprocated by returning to a more
accommodative posture towards the Philippines by offering investment opportunities and

248
Taylor Fravel and Kacie Miura, “Stormy Seas: The South China Sea in US-China Relations,” in Security and US-
China Relations: Differences, Dangers, and Dilemmas, ed. Avery Goldstein and Jacques deLisle, 2019, 14.

132

the 6:4 joint ventures as noted earlier. In effect, Duterte’s Philippines retreated to the
sidelines. However, the fabric of US-China relations fundamentally changed. While the US
began as a reluctant player throughout 2009-2015, it gradually became a main player
because of its (misplaced) certainty that China is a challenger to the existing order. For China,
its assessment that the US is trying to deny its rightful status as an emerging power in the
Asia Pacific also became more entrenched as the blame transference, and US reactions to
blame transference, crystallized.

Discussion
In this chapter, I illustrated how provocations from the Philippines made China become
insecure about its status, and how this encouraged action-reaction dynamics between the US
and China. Specifically, China felt affronted by the Philippines’ behavior in the South China
Sea. To save face internationally and to retain domestic legitimacy, China constructed a set
of narratives to blame the US for what the Philippines was doing. Yet, this blame transference
strategy created signaling problems between the US and China and propelled these actors
into an active competition for status. In effect, smaller states like the Philippines – even if
they were defending their legitimate interests – “started the fire” between the US and China.
What are the broader implications of my analysis? The mechanism highlighted in this
chapter might be conceptualized as a three-player security dilemma involving status as a
motive. As noted by Jervis, traditional security dilemma theory tends to (1) focus on two
players and (2) neglect status, even though “concerns for respect and status can rationally
lead to behavior that is quite different from that which is generated by [security dilemma

133

frameworks]”.
249
As he goes on to note, “to the extent that many countries, including the
leading powers, now have a high degree of security, these motives may become even more
important”.
250
Wohlforth suggests that this means that “solving the security problem does
not necessarily solve the status problem”.
251
That is, if one actor remains aggrieved due to
status reasons, then the dilemma will persist even if the “security problem” is resolved by
reassurance through costly signaling.
252
In other words, Wohlforth highlights the complexity
of action-reaction dynamics if status is involved, because it means there are two sets of
motives over which states become aggrieved: security and status. In short, dual-motive
actors are doubly difficult to satiate in action-reaction dynamics.
Based on the discussions in this chapter, I submit another implication of
incorporating status as a potential state motive when analyzing spiral dynamics: the
threshold required for action-reaction to occur is lower. One can understand threshold here
in two ways: the type of actions that might trigger action-reaction, and the type of actors that
might trigger action-reaction. On the type of action: this chapter showed that even symbolic
disrespect or provocative rhetoric that may or may not result in substantive loss may trigger
a rising power’s status insecurities, which can in turn generate blame transference and
action-reaction dynamics between the rising power and the established powers. After all,
despite the rhetoric at times, China was never in any real risk of losing the disputed areas
because of what the Philippines was doing, even when the US became more involved. In
contrast, in a traditional security dilemma framework, these instances of ‘symbolic

249
Jervis, “Dilemmas About Security Dilemmas,” 419–20.
250
Jervis, 419–20.
251
Wohlforth, “Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conflict,” 137.
252
James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414;
Andrew H. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton University Press, 2005); Glaser,
Rational Theory of International Politics.

134

disrespect’ or ‘provocative rhetoric’ might have been dismissed as cheap talk or low-stake
issues over which actors might not decide to engage in action-reaction. This means that once
status is incorporated into the traditional model, it often does not “take much”, by way of the
types of actions, to trigger spiral dynamics.
On the type of actors: one of the starting assumptions of traditional security dilemma
theory is that the actors must have the operational capacity to credibly pose a threat.
Otherwise, no amount of signaling failure will trigger spiral dynamics if one side is simply
incapable of holding the other side’s security interests at risk.
253
This usually imposes a set
of restrictive conditions in terms of who can trigger action-reaction dynamics. Especially in
an asymmetrical relationship, the smaller state usually needs to have a powerful patron, or
the ability to prevail in unconventional warfare and/ or to escalate to the nuclear level to
overcome conventional inferiority. In other words, there is a restrictive range of scenarios
in which smaller states would be able to trigger action-reaction dynamics between itself and
a stronger actor, or between a stronger actor and another stronger actor. This is not to say
that it is impossible for the smaller states to do so, but it is to say that the conditions under
which this can happen are much more restrictive.
This changes once one incorporates status into the framework. Here, a smaller state
does not necessarily need to pose a real security threat to the rising power. Instead, it just
has to create enough impression management problems for the rising power. That is, the
smaller state only has to provoke the rising power in a way that the rising power might lose
face if it does not respond appropriately given its relative social rank over the smaller state.

253
This is an informal way of phrasing the importance of the offense-defense balance in regulating the severity
of security dilemmas: in a defense-dominant situation, action-reaction will be limited. See Jervis 1978 and
Glaser 1997.

135

To return to an example I used in the theory chapter: the low-level worker does not need to
have the power to fire the mid-level manager to jeopardize the latter’s career in the company;
instead, the low-level worker just has to create enough impression management problems
that the high-level managers may refuse to promote the mid-level manager. In a similar vein,
this implies that the means through which the smaller state poses status problems to the
rising power does not require the former to possess the operational capacity to threaten the
latter’s security interests. In fact, the less materially-capable a smaller state, the more status
threat its provocations will pose to the rising power. That is, despite the obvious asymmetry,
the smaller state still “dares” to provoke the rising power. And if the rising power does not
respond in these “low-hanging fruit” situations, it risks serious damage to its status. Indeed,
as Barnhart rightfully notes, the weaker the actor is, the graver the status threat.
254
As such,
even actions from smaller states that may or may not pose real security threats to the rising
power, can potentially trigger action-reaction dynamics between the rising power and the
established powers for status reasons. It follows that there is an expanded set of actors which
can trigger action-reaction between the rising power and the established powers, once status
is incorporated into the framework.
Thus, the mechanism illustrated in this chapter highlights a different way in which
status competitions may begin even if the rising power and the established powers are either
(1) uninterested in competing for status,
255
or (2) not interested in competing for status
quite just yet.
256
Conventional wisdom would suggest that status competitions start because

254
Barnhart, “Humiliation and Third-Party Aggression,” 536.
255
In Wohlforth’s framework, this implies that both actors have “defensive status ambitions” in only wanting
to defend their current rank without ambitions to overtake the other side.
256
This relaxes the foregoing assumption: it may be that at least one of the actors is driven by “offensive status
ambitions” in wanting to overtake the other side in ranking – but it may be operating with a longer time horizon
and thus not interested in doing so at the moment

136

the rising power wants to challenge the established power’s position in the existing
international system to force status adjustments, or when the established powers deny the
rising power’s status claims.
257
In other words, status competition in the conventional story
is intentional. This chapter builds on the nascent scholarship which suggests that status
competitions start because of (status) signaling failure: when the rising power misperceives
that the established powers want to deny its status, or when the established powers
misperceive that the rising power wants to challenge their primacy.
258
I advance an answer
for why (status) signaling failure of this sort comes to be. Provocations from smaller states
may make the rising power become insecure about its status. Once the rising power takes
actions to address its status insecurity, these actions may be misperceived by the established
powers as evidence that the rising power wants to challenge their primacy. Any
countermeasures from the established powers in response may be perceived by the rising
power as evidence that the established powers want to deny the rising power’s status. The
net effect, of course, is the onset an active status competition that none of the actors involved
may have wanted in the first place.
My analysis has clear implications for US-China relations and points to two possible
outcomes. The first is that if China is motivated by status concerns in the South China Sea in
addition to any material concerns such as military calculations or economic issues such as
fishing rights, then it may be doubly difficult to satiate. That is, not only does China need to
be satiated on material fronts, but its status demands also need to be catered to. And, if a

257
Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers; Murray, The Struggle for Recognition in International
Relations.
258
Wohlforth, “Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conflict”; Xiaoyu Pu, “One Mountain, Two Tigers: China, the
United States, and the Status Dilemma in the Indo-Pacific,” Asia Policy 14, no. 3 (July 2019): 25–40. They call
this “status dilemma”.

137

status-driven China might be sensitive to provocations from smaller states like the
Philippines, and if the US tends to have little control over these smaller states, then resolving
the South China Sea situation is a multi-dimensional chess game. It is multi-dimensional
because China is driven by two motives, and third-party actors may activate China’s status
dissatisfaction in a way that the US has little control over. In this interpretation, resolving
the South China Sea disputes and the resultant US-China tension is extremely difficult.
However, there is a second and a more optimistic rendering that is potentially borne
out of my empirics on Sino-Philippines relations after 2016/7, wherein if the Philippines
showed symbolic deference, China responded in kind. In this interpretation, as long as
China’s status concerns are placated through “due respect” and “due protocols” in the process
of handling the South China Sea disputes, the actual resolution of the disputes is not
something that China is pursuing right now. In other words, this is a “Scenario #2” problem:
as long as China’s status needs can be accommodated, it is willing to sidestep the
accomplishment of the material objectives at this point (i.e., physical control of the disputed
territories). In this interpretation, resolving the South China Sea disputes, or at least limiting
the damage these disputes can create for US-China relations, is possible. It requires that
China and the smaller states find some equilibrium or diplomatic arrangement in which “due
respect” and “due protocols” are established and followed.
Yet, while this more optimistic story is certainly possible, two difficult questions
remain. First, even if it is true that paying “due respect” or “following due protocols” may
placate China’s status needs and reduce tension in the South China Sea, these things can
generate ambiguous goalposts that may move depending on the international context or
China’s own domestic political needs. In other words, there is a real possibility for slippery

138

slope. Thus, “paying due respect” or “following due protocols” is possible but not simple, and
it may lead to salami-slicing. The situation becomes even more difficult if the domestic
politics of smaller states prevent these things from happening. Second, it is unclear whether
China’s status dissatisfaction has evolved from being fixated with establishing its superiority
over the smaller states, to now being fixated with establishing its equal status with the US.
In the earlier periods examined in this chapter, China may have just been preoccupied with
establishing superiority over smaller states. However, its status needs may have evolved
with the crystallization of the blame transference narratives. In fact, even if the Chinese elites
themselves do not believe these blame narratives, the rhetoric sent to the domestic audience
after 2013 onwards may tie the elites’ hands anyway. Likewise, it is unclear whether the US
has now developed a set of entrenched beliefs that China has “offensive status ambitions”.
If so, then US-China relations may be beyond “the blame game”, where solving the
China-smaller state status disputes can resolve the US-China tension because there is no real
clash of status-preferences between the US and China. Instead, US-China relations may now
be headed for “the imitation game” where solving the China-smaller state status disputes can
contain but not resolve the US-China tension because there is now a real clash of status-
preferences between the US and China. The empirical question as to whether the US and
China are headed for the “imitation game” cannot be adjudicated at the time of writing.
However, in the next chapter, I use historical examples to illustrate “the imitation game” and
show what this worst-case scenario, in theory, would look like – while leaving open the
question of whether US, China and the rest of Asia are headed for this game.

139

Chapter 5
Adding Fuel to the Fire: The Imitation Game

“Everywhere one finds doubts about the future of the monarchy…which is no longer respected
even by its smallest neighbors…the public has no idea how much skill and circumspection has
to be expended, is being expended, in order to defend our positions against the unfavorable flow
of the current; the view has existed for a long time that…a knock-out punch would be
necessary…[only then,] Austria-Hungary itself would again believe in itself.

- Berthold Molden, editor of Fremdenblatt, the semi-official paper of the
Ballhausplatz
259
, remarking on July 6, 1914 about the sentiment in Vienna’s foreign
policy establishment before Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia

In this chapter, I empirically illustrate the scenario in which provocations from smaller states
can “add fuel to the fire” between the rising power and the established powers.
In this mechanism, termed “imitation game”, the rising power (and its allies)
260
and
the established powers are already in an active competition for status. For reasons noted in
the theory chapter, such active competition for status at the top of the hierarchy creates
“windows of opportunity” which smaller states tend to exploit and engage in more
adventurous actions. As a result, smaller states are more likely to adopt actions that might
be perceived as provocative by the rising faction. In turn, these actions from smaller states
might propel the rising faction to adopt even more competitive strategies to avoid a scenario
in which it simultaneously lacks recognition from peers and deference from inferiors. That

259
The location where the highest decision-making organs reside in Vienna. Thus, Ballhausplatz is a “figure-
of-speech” for the ultimate political authority in Austria, like “Downing Street” for Britain.
260
Granted, Austria-Hungary was technically not a rising power. However, given alliance dynamics featured so
centrally in World War I, and given that it was Austria-Hungary’s decision to go war against Serbia that led to
German mobilization, I will simplify the multitude of European great powers into two camps: “Central Powers”
(the rising faction) and “Entente Powers” (the established faction) to remain consistent with the riser-
established framework adopted throughout this dissertation. While acknowledging this wrinkle in the set-up,
my objective here is to illustrate how provocations from below could add fuel to the fire at the top.

140

is, the rising faction might have the incentives to be more circumspect in dealing with the
established powers – but not in response to provocations from below. Consequently,
provocations from below can “add fuel to the fire” and exacerbate the tension between the
rising faction and the established faction, leading to interstate competition.
I illustrate this mechanism by tracing how Austria-Hungary’s desire (from 1878) and
failure (from 1903-) to treat Serbia as a vassal state provided the impetus for status
dissatisfaction and escalation in 1914. My argument stands in contrast to the existing status
literature, which has hitherto focused on the competition for status at the top of the
European hierarchy from 1881 onwards. In effect, I am “replicating” the existing literature’s
empirics and showing that the failure to incorporate the “looking down” logic leads to
omitted variable bias and under-specification of how interstate competition unfolds.
Instead of appealing to new empirical cases, I am thus debating the existing literature
on its own terms. I show that Austria-Hungary’s failed attempt to secure deference from
Serbia is a crucial variable that the existing status literature has neglected. Indeed, the
existing status literature has exclusively focused on the competition for status between the
Central Powers and the Entente Powers in the Scramble for Africa
261
and the naval arms-
racing for prestige reasons at the time.
262
The events in 1914 are thus conventionally
understood as natural extensions of these broader trends that finally propelled the already-
tense Powers into interstate competition. In contrast, I show that the seeds for the events in
1914 were in fact rooted in Austro-Hungarian-Serbian relations since the 1880s. That is,

261
Joslyn Barnhart, “Status Competition and Territorial Aggression: Evidence from the Scramble for Africa,”
Security Studies 25, no. 3 (July 2, 2016): 385–419; Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict
in World Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017), chap. 6.
262
Renshon, Fighting for Status, chap. 6; Michelle Murray, “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The
Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War,” Security Studies 19, no. 4 (November 23, 2010):
656–88.

141

Austria-Hungary enjoyed initial success in establishing its political influence over Serbia and
treating it as a vassal state. However, when Serbia sought and achieved greater
independence after 1903, this created the impetus for status dissatisfaction on the part of
Austria-Hungary – its expectations of Serbia being a deferential vassal state were violated.
That is, “provocations” from Serbia in 1914 were only seen as “provocative” by Austria-
Hungary because of the latter’s longstanding expectation but inability to subjugate the latter.
Thus, as I will show later, Austria-Hungary’s military actions in 1914 against Serbia
were initially intended to be limited and designed to restore the Monarchy’s prestige and
prevent it from suffering further status loss – so much loss that even smaller (vassal) states
like Serbia would dare to disrespect it. In other words, there was indeed the familiar
chainganging dynamics which followed from Austria-Hungary’s military campaign, and that
such chainganging dynamics did provide the pathways to escalation. There was also an
active competition for status between the Central Powers and the Entente Powers since 1881.
All of these dynamics were important. Yet, the missing link in all of these stories is Austria-
Hungary’s longstanding desire but inability to secure deference from Serbia, rooted in the
former’s “looking down” assessment. Without Austria-Hungary’s decision to go to war
against Serbia, chainganging among European powers probably would not have
happened.
263
Thus, it is crucial to understand the motivations which propelled Austria-
Hungary to “set fire to Europe” by issuing an ultimatum to Serbia. Indeed, the British Foreign
Minister at the time, Edward Grey, called the ultimatum “the most formidable
document…addressed by one State to another that was independent”.
264
My answer is: that

263
For a similar assessment about how escalation may have been avoided had the July Crisis of 1914 been
managed like any other crises during the era, see Renshon, Fighting for Status, 216.
264
Renshon, 224.

142

is because Austria-Hungary did not see Serbia as an independent state. Instead, it saw Serbia
as a vassal state – one which failed to defer to the Monarchy and must be “disciplined”.
This chapter will unfold as follows. I will begin by specifying the expected observable
implications. I then discuss my case selection strategy. Thereafter, my empirical discussions
will trace Austro-Hungarian-Serbian relations from 1878 to 1914. This discussion will unfold
in five steps: (1) Serbia as a vasal state from 1878 to 1903; (2) Serbia breaking free since
1903, (3) the Bosnian Crisis in 1908, (4) perceptions from Austria-Hungary, and (5) Austro-
Hungarian considerations in 1914. I conclude this chapter by summarizing the key empirical
arguments and highlighting the broader theoretical implications.

Expected Observable Implications
In the theory chapter, I suggested that smaller states have incentives to take advantage of
the “window of opportunity” created by the competition for status between the rising
powers and the established powers.
H5: During periods of status competition between the rising power and the established
powers, smaller states are more likely to be provocative.
I further suggested that the actions taken by smaller states during this “window of
opportunity” would exacerbate the pre-existing status competition. If true, we expect to see
the following:
H6: If there is already an active status competition between the rising powers and the
established powers, provocations from smaller states should exacerbate this dynamic.

143

Case Selection and Background
There are two conditions for case selection. The first condition is that the competition for
status has to be active already. The existing status literature has already devoted
considerable attention to highlight the competition for prestige between the European great
powers since the 1880s. Generally, the existing literature points to two sets of arenas in
which the Europeans great powers competed for status.
One such arena is the pursuit of territory that allegedly had little “material or
economic value”.
265
Barnhart, for example, focuses on the “Scramble for Africa from 1881
onwards. She suggests that competition for territory unfolded in Africa, in part, because of
France and Germany’s status concerns. For France, staking territorial claims in Africa was in
response to the humiliating defeat it suffered during the Franco-Prussian War and the loss
of Alsace and Lorraine.
266
The logic is that the humiliation derived from involuntary loss of
territory can be addressed by reacquiring the lost territory or by taking territory elsewhere
to signal that the humiliated actor still has the intention and ability to maintain an “expansive
foreign policy” that high-status actors are entitled to.
267
For Germany, as a relatively
newcomer, it felt that its rights and privileges as a member of the great power club was

265
Barnhart, “Status Competition and Territorial Aggression,” 409. I agree with Barnhart’s conclusion that the
territorial scramble in Africa may have, in part, been driven by status considerations. However, consistent with
the model I developed in Chapter 4, I disagree that “little material or economic value” is of use in identifying
status concerns. Recall that my basic position is that not all rationally suboptimal outcomes are driven by status
concerns, and not all status pursuits result in rationally suboptimal outcomes. Instead, how status concerns
should be identified here should unfold in two steps, following the logic in Chapter 4. First, territorial
acquisition was seen as a status marker by the community at the time – which Barnhart herself notes on page
395. This establishes the “status rea” – or the “status mind”, mirroring the “criminal mind”. Second, one can
identify status concerns on the basis that Germany did receive territorial concessions from France – but it
continued to be dissatisfied, ostensibly about not being a “part of the club”. In other words, this is a “Scenario
#1” situation: gaining the material stake is necessary but not sufficient because the actor also seeks social
respect. This is an actor that is “doubly difficult” to accommodate because it is driven by both material and
status motives.
266
Barnhart, 399.
267
Barnhart, 395.

144

disrespected by Britain and France.
268
Renshon notes that Germany’s “Weltpolitik” was
driven by the disconnect between the status that Germany felt it deserved and the status
which was afforded by “the small, exclusive club of major European powers”.
269
That is,
“Germany…considered her place among the major powers incommensurate with her
potential as the most industrialized country on the continent”;
270
it “needs a place in the
sun”.
271
Thus, during the two Moroccan Crises, Germany’s objective was less about territorial
gain but more so to “prevent England and France from deciding important international
diplomacy without regard for Germany”.
272
Because of these status-seeking strategies from
Germany and France, the other European powers also had to respond in kind, leading to a
general status competition among the powers in the form of territorial scramble in Africa.
Another arena through which the European great powers competed for relative
status was through naval arms-racing. Murray reports that dreadnaught warships were seen
as symbols of great power status. As such, Germany built these warships as a way to obtain
recognition of its identity as a great power – even if its external security environment did not
necessarily compel it to do so, or that these warships were not the best use of its resources
given its military missions and political objectives.
273
Renshon likewise points out that

268
Barnhart, 395.
269
Renshon, Fighting for Status, 198.
270
Renshon, 193.
271
Renshon, 197.
272
Renshon, 201.
273
Murray, “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics.” I find Murray’s argument that naval armsracing was
driven by status considerations to be generally plausible. However, I once again disagree that the “rational
suboptimality” of the arming-decision is a useful guide for identifying status concerns. In line with the earlier
footnote on Barnhart and territory expansion: it is that the dreadnaught battleships were seen as status
symbols at the time, which Murray does note. However, the salient action is that despite almost out-arms-racing
Britain (which Renshon notes, in 2017, 216), Germany remained dissatisfied because of the lack of social
respect. In other words, this is another “Scenario #1” situation: (near) accomplishment of the material objective
is necessary but not sufficient. Thus, status motives may be operational in this context, but it is not the
“suboptimality” of the arming decision that offers useful identification.

145

Germany’s pursuit of a large navy was to “imitate his cousins in Great Britain and preserve
Germany’s place in the ‘Concert of Great Powers’”.
274
As such, arming from the European
great powers were partially driven by the need for their identity as a great power to be
recognized (e.g., Murray’s analysis) or seen as a bargaining strategy to force rank
adjustments (e.g., Renshon’s analysis). In other words, starting from 1880s onwards, the
European great powers were already in active competitions for status against each other.
The second condition is that provocations from smaller states – in this case, Serbia –
has to take place after 1881, which was when the status competition among the European
great powers started to take place according to the existing literature. The Principality of
Serbia came into existence in 1817 via the Serbian Revolution. However, it did not gain
formal independence until the Congress of Berlin in 1878. As I will demonstrate later, for the
first few decades after Serbia gained formal independence in 1878, Austria-Hungary
exercised a high degree of political control over the Obrenović family which ruled Serbia
until 1903. During this period, the Obrenovićs agreed to a series of unequal arrangements
that effectively reduced Serbia to a satellite state from an economic and political perspective.
In fact, it was precisely these arrangements that fomented the unpopularity of the
Obrenovićs in Serbia and, correspondingly, rising Serbian nationalism. These two dynamics
later led to the downfall of the Obrenović Dynasty during the May Coup of 1903. Before King
Peters replaced the Obrenović elites in 1903 and the Balkan War of 1911, Austria-Hungary
treated Serbia as a satellite state and the Obrenović elites were largely amenable to this
arrangement. As such, until as late as 1903, Serbia was deferential to the Monarchy – that is,

274
Renshon, Fighting for Status, 207.

146

it was a “dependency of Vienna”
275
– and did not engage in “provocations” in a systematic
way. This fulfills the second condition of my case selection.

Austro-Hungarian-Serbia Relations, 1878-1914
In this section, I show how the events in 1914 were in fact driven by Austria-Hungary’s
attempt – and failure – to rule Serbia as a vassal state. Specifically, in July 1914 Austria-
Hungary made outrageous demands on Serbia and refused to accept any compromises.
Granted, Austria-Hungary used the assassination of the Duke as a pretext for going to war.
However, what were the underlying motivations and contexts that propelled this decision?
I argue that the events in 1914 were rooted in a longstanding status dispute between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia that surfaced after King Peter came into power in 1903 – a
dispute which finally reached critical mass in 1914. There was a fundamental tension
between Austria-Hungary’s desire to see Serbia as a deferential vassal state and a Serbia that
increasingly became more emboldened to seek independence after 1903.
To this end, my analysis below will unfold as follows: (1) Austro-Hungarian-Serbian
relations from 1878 to 1903, where Serbia largely deferred as a vassal state, (2) Serbia
breaking free from 1903 to 1907, (3) The Bosnian Crisis of 1908 and its aftermath, (4)
Austro-Hungarian perceptions of Serbian provocations, and (5) Austro-Hungarian status
concerns and the issuing of the 1914 Ultimatum.

275
A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary.
(New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 187.

147

1878-1903: Serbia as a Vassal State
The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia on July 23, 1914 has been referred to as the "last
challenge to Serbia to choose between vassalage and annihilation...a policy which the Dual
Monarchy followed with remarkable persistence [from 1878] to July 1914".
276
Indeed,
Austria-Hungary’s desire to treat Serbia as a vassal sate has been longstanding. In the
aftermath of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the European great powers recognized the fact
that Serbia was within the Habsburg sphere of influence.
277
Court Gustav Kálnoky, Austria-
Hungary’s Foreign Minister at the time, explained why it was important for the Monarchy to
establish and/ or maintain political influence over Serbia:
The pivot of our power position in the south-east lies in Belgrade. As long as we are
not firmly established there, whether directly or indirectly, we remain constantly on
the defensive on the Danube, the Lim and even on the Sava. If Serbia, by whatever
means, is subordinate to our influence, or better still, if we are the masters in Serbia,
then we can be at ease concerning our possession of Bosnia and its appendages and
our position on the lower Danube and in Rumania (italics added).
278

Given Serbia’s geopolitical importance, it was instrumental for the Monarchy to secure
deference from Serbia. At this point, Kálnoky “was content to have a peaceful and flourishing
independent Serbia in friendly relations with [Austria-Hungary]”.
279
Austria-Hungary did
treat Serbia as a vassal state by offering it protection against Bulgaria in the war of 1886.
280

In fact, the Obrenović elites were ready to sell Serbia to the Habsburgs. However, Kálnoky
“thought [Serbia was] not worth buying: [the Monarchy already had] the advantages of Serb
dependence without the national troubles which the inclusion of Serbia in the Monarchy

276
Walter Harrington Crawfurd Price, The Dawn of Armageddon: The Provocation by Serbia (Ann Arbor,
Michigan: University of Michigan Library, 1917), 3–4.
277
John W. Mason, The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 1867-1918, 2nd edition (London ; New
York: Routledge, 1996), 74.
278
Mason, 58.
279
Mason, 59.
280
Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary., 159.

148

would involve”.
281
Instead, the Monarchy was more interested in establishing its influence
over Serbia using indirect instruments, rather than full annexation.
To this end, Austria-Hungary used a series of political and economic instruments to
establish influence over Serbia – with the goal of turning it into an “Austrian colony”.
282
To
begin with, Austria-Hungary imposed a Customs Union as a means of enhancing its control
over Belgrade. During the three years following the Congress of Berlin, Austria-Hungary
imposed a Treaty of Commerce onto Serbia and accomplished two objectives. First, the
Treaty restricted Serbia’s economic activities to the production of cereals, fruits, and live-
stocks. Second, the Treaty monopolized Serbia’s exports of these items to the Monarchy.
Through this Treaty, the Austria-Hungary controlled 90% of Serbia’s exports and 80% of
Serbia’s imports, creating the belief in Belgrade that Serbia was economically dependent on
the Monarchy. During the same time, Milan Obrenović, Serbia’s king, agreed to a series of
commercial treaties and railway agreements which were highly favorable for Austria-
Hungary and further increased Serbian economic dependence on the Monarchy. Likewise,
there was a secret political treaty in which Serbia agreed to not “conclude any treaties with
a foreign power without Austria’s permission”.
283

Indeed, what Austria-Hungary was after during this period was not equality with
Serbia. Instead, Austria-Hungary sought domination over, and deference from, Belgrade,
“and the principle of self-government [for Serbia] was entirely foreign to the ideas which
ruled at Vienna and Budapest”.
284
The political control that the Monarchy exercised over

281
Taylor, 159.
282
Price, The Dawn of Armageddon: The Provocation by Serbia, 8.
283
Mason, The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 1867-1918, 58.
284
Price, The Dawn of Armageddon: The Provocation by Serbia, 8.

149

Belgrade through the Obrenović family, and the economic stranglehold that the Monarchy
established through the Treaty of Commerce, effectively turned Serbia into a satellite state.
At the same time, it sowed the seeds of Serbian discontent.
There are three noteworthy observations from the foregoing survey of Austria-
Hungary-Serbian relations from 1878 to 1903. First, Austria-Hungary saw Serbia as being
important to her geopolitical interests in the Balkans. Second, Austria-Hungary saw its
relationship with Serbia as being formally and informally unequal: as a vassal state, Serbia
was expected to show deference to the Monarchy. Third, during this period, Austria-Hungary
used a series of political and economic instruments to control Serbia. And Serbia, under the
Obrenović family, complied. In other words, Austria-Hungary wanted deference from Serbia,
and deference was what it received. This was the expectational baseline that Austria-
Hungary wanted and worked with from 1878 to 1903. Unfortunately, this was also the
baseline that was violated from 1903 to 1914, when Serbia became more emboldened to
seek independence from the Monarchy in the context of rising Serbian nationalism and
turmoil in Europe created by competition among the great powers.

1903-1907: Serbia Breaking Free
The period of 1903 to 1908 was characterized a series of events in which Serbia gradually
sought to establish greater independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. To begin with,
the Obrenović family through which the Monarchy controlled Serbia faced domestic political
problems. In 1885, the Monarchy wanted Milan Obrenović to mobilize against Bulgaria. King
Milan obliged with the demand. However, he became so unpopular with the Serbian
population because of this decision, which contributed towards his abdication in 1889. His

150

successor, Alexander Obrenović, became enmeshed in a series of personal scandals,
unpopular policies, and continual deference to Austria-Hungary to the exclusion of outside
options like Russia. These factors contributed towards the May Coup of 1903 which ended
the Obrenović rule in Serbia. In this context, Peter Karađorđević (King Peter) came into
power. The change in leadership was significant because it signaled the beginning of Serbia’s
new foreign policy direction. For my purposes here, two changes are noteworthy.
First, instead of near-total deference to Austria-Hungary to the exclusion of other
European great powers, Serbia under King Peter hedged by establishing closer relations with
Russia. Indeed, this was partly done by taking advantage of the competitive dynamics
between the European great powers at the time, that Serbia found a willing potential patron
in Russia. Second, unlike under the Obrenović rule, Serbia refused to continue to be a vassal
state for Austria-Hungary. For example, in 1905, when the Treaty of Commerce which was
established after the Congress of Berlin was about to expire, Serbia resisted the terms which
were imposed onto it by Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary contributed towards this
outcome by “withdrawing the privileges hitherto accorded to [Serbia] while insisting upon
the maintenance of [Austro-Hungarian privileges]”.
285
In part, this reflected the longstanding
view from the Monarchy that Serbia was not to be treated on equal terms– it was a vassal
state, and thus an asymmetrical deal was deemed appropriate given the social relationship
and relative ranking between the Monarchy and Serbia.
To the Monarchy’s surprise, Serbia resisted – unlike the years past. Serbia first
responded to the unfavorable terms by denying Austrian loans, then “provocatively bought

285
Price, 13–14.

151

arms from France instead of from the Skoda works in Bohemia”.
286
Operating with the priors
that Serbia would eventually capitulate and defer, Austria-Hungary responded by taking a
heavy-handed approach and declared the “Pig War” of 1906, closing the frontier to Serbian
livestock.
287
This was an attempt to economically coerce Serbia into backing down – which
Austria believed would work. However, this maneuver, too, turned out to be
counterproductive. The coercive strategy from Austria-Hungary instilled a sense of
dissatisfaction in the Serbians and contributed towards rising Serbian nationalism. In
response, Serbia diversified its live-stock export destinations to places like Italy and Malta,
effectively reducing its economic dependence on the Monarchy.
Indeed, Serbia was able to diversify its trade portfolio and reduce its political
dependence on the Monarchy in part because of the general competition for relative status
and influence among the European great powers at the time. Entente powers like Russia,
Italy, or France would seek to establish superiority over their competitors by helping the
smaller states that their competitors were having problems with. At best, this strategy can
swing the smaller state in question closer to their own sphere of influence; at worst, this
strategy can peel the smaller state in question away from their competitor’s sphere of
influence. And this was exactly what happened in the years that followed, especially during
the Bosnian Crisis of 1908. During this time, Serbia established much closer political
relations with Russia than it did in the years past. This contributed towards Serbia’s
(perceived) ability to stand firm, which in turn provided further opportunities for Austria-
Hungary to feel provoked.

286
Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary., 215.
287
Mason, The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 1867-1918, 74.

152

1908: The “Serbian Problem” and the Bosnian Crisis
Due to the events from 1903 to 1907, Austrian elites were now convinced that there was a
“Serbian Problem” that had to be dealt with.
288
Serbia’s attempt to break free of the
Monarchy’s political and economic control were seen as provocations by Austria-
Hungary.
289
Indeed, Serbia’s actions were “provocative” because Austria-Hungary’s baseline
was that Serbia is a vassal state, and thus any depatures from this baseline is “provoative”.
With this, the foreign policy elites now tailored their strategy around “defeating the South
Slav conspiracy”.
290
The military elites favored instigating crises with which the Monarchy
would justify taking military action against Serbia, with the goal of either turning Serbia
(back) into a vassal state or annihilating it
291
– effectively seeking to re-establishing the status
relationship between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
This was important because during the same time, Austria-Hungary (along with its
ally Germany) had already suffered a humiliating diplomatic defeat at the Algeciras
Conference of 1906, which was an attempt to resolve the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905. In
the context of my theoretical framework: Austria-Hungary was now potentially facing denial
from above by the Entente Powers and provocations from below by Serbia – a formerly
subservient state which was supposed to be a vassal state, but no longer wanted to behave
as such. Indeed, Serbian “provocations” were especially problematic because the Balkans
were generally considered to be the Monarchy’s sphere of influence after the Congress of

288
Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary., 216.
289
Price, The Dawn of Armageddon: The Provocation by Serbia, 20.
290
Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary., 216.
291
Price, The Dawn of Armageddon: The Provocation by Serbia, 20.

153

Berlin. Thus, “provocations” from a vassal state that was supposed to be in its sphere of
influence was especially damaging for Austria-Hungary’s status and prestige.
In response, Austria-Hungary decided to annex the provinces of Bosnia and
Hercegovina in 1908. This served several purposes. First, as Baron Aehrenthal, Ambassador
of the Monarchy to St. Petersburg, noted that the time, the Monarchy’s “policy of making
Serbia economically and politically dependent and treating her as a neglible quantity has
foundered”.
292
The alternative strategy is to acquire Bosnia and Hercegovina and hope that
through the Monarchy’s dealings with these provinces that they can help “bring Serbia under
the sceptre of the Hapsburgs”.
293
At the same time, acquiring these provinces would also
weaken Serbia’s position and prevent it from becoming even more emboldened. As such, the
acquisition of these provinces were driven by the Monarchy’s desire to re-establish the
status relationship between the Monarchy and Serbia. Second, the territorial acquisition was
to show to the European great power peers that Austria-Hungary still deserved great power
status because it was willing and able to engage in expansionist foreign policies that high-
status actors were expected to perform. To Aehrenthal, a “bold and active policy” through
annexation was necessary to “restore [the Monarchy’s] prestige”.
294

Austria-Hungary’s decision to annex Bosnia and Hercegovina led to the Bosnian Crisis.
Unfortunately for the Monarchy, the way in which the Crisis unfolded did anything but to
restore its prestige. At the beginning stages of the Crisis, Aehrenthal and Alexander Izvolsky,
Russia’s Foreign Minister at the time, struck a preliminary bargain: Austrian support for the

292
Albertini Luigi, Origins of the War of 1914, trans. Isabella M. Massey (London, England: Oxford University
Press, 1965), 191.
293
Luigi, 192.
294
Luigi, 191.

154

opening of the Constantino Straits in return for Russian consent to the annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
295
The problem, however, was twofold. First, Aehrenthal and Izvolsky
never formalized the agreement on paper. Consequently, there was substantial ambiguity in
terms of the bargain’s precise terms. Historians generally agree that the problem stemmed
from the fact that Aehrenthal was a master of “slipping important statements into
conversation in such a way that they passed unnoticed”, whereas Izvolsky was “often not
firm in personal conversation – and [was] unwilling to say anyhting which might appear to
be displeasing to his interlocutor”.
296
As such, there were gaps in understanding in terms of
issues such as whether the annexation was something that other European great powers had
to agree to as well. Second, and relatedly, because there was never a formally codifed
agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia, the Russian Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin
and the Czar refused to acknowledge the bargain. This was especially the case since the
Russian public opinion did not attach significance to the Strait of Constantino, but it found
the annexation of the two provinces to be highly problematic. As such, the Czar openly
expressed discontent with Izvolsky and renounced any bargains made by Izvolsky.
In the end, Britain and France did not agree to Russia’s demands for the Strait of
Constantino, which they saw as a unilateral revision to the Treaty of Berlin. Germany
remained steadfast in her support for Austria-Hungary, as the German Foreign Secretary
noted that “I have faith in [Austria’s] judgement and…I consider that [Austria is] in a position
to judge the situation in Serbia, and all that it involves, more accurately than I can”.
297
Russia,
constrained both by the difficult diplomatic position it found itself in because of Izvolsky’s

295
Luigi, 195, 206.
296
Luigi, 209.
297
Luigi, 231.

155

“bargains” with Austria-Hungary, and the fact that its military was still recuperating from
the heavy losses suffered in the Russo-Japanese War, eventually capitulated. Without
support from Russia or any other Powers, Serbia capitulated as well and was forced to state
that its rights in the Balkans were not infringed upon by the Austro-Hungarian fait accompli
on the two provinces.
Yet, despite the material victory (i.e., it did annex the two provinces), Austria-
Hungary emerged from the Crisis suffering status loss. Even though Serbia eventually
capitulated, it did contemplate about going to war against the Monarchy. Indeed, the Serbian
Foreign Minister at one point openly said to the English minister in Belgrade that “there were
many Serbs in favour of war, and that, even if it were to end in defeat and the incorporation
of Serbia into the Monarchy, it would at least give Serb patriots satisfaction”.
298
This was a
problem because the Balkans were essentially regarded by the rest of the European great
powers as Austria-Hungary’s sphere of influence after the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Yet, a
“vassal state” in this sphere of influence openly contemplated challenging the Monarchy.
Regardless of whether Serbia would prevail or not, that it even openly contemplated war
was itself provocative and status-demoting for the Monarchy. That is, it “pulled the
[Monarchy] down to the Serb level and raised the standing of Serbia”.
299

298
Luigi, 222.
299
Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary., 217.

156

Austro-Hungarian Perceptions of Provocation from Serbia
The events throughout 1878 and 1908 were underpinned by a fundamental mismatch
between Austria-Hungary’s expectations and the extent to which Serbia was willing to meet
these expectations. Indeed, the Monarchy started with a baseline which it had preferred: the
Obrenović family were highly deferential to the Monarchy – for example, agreeing to the fact
that Serbia could not conclude any agreements in foreign affairs without consulting the
Monarchy first, or King Milan agreeing to go to war against Bulgaria in 1885 at the
Monarchy’s request despite the fact that Serbia had no stake in the fight. From 1878 to 1903,
the Monarchy used a series of “pacific means” that effectively turned Serbia into a vassal
state. Thus, the status relationship between the Monarchy and Serbia was unequal, but both
sides agreed on this equilibrium, and thus there were no sentiments of status dissatisfaction.
However, at the turn of the century, the Obrenović family lost power and the rising
Serbian nationalism drove a series of events that began to violate the Monarchy’s
expectations. Events such as the Pig War or the Bosnian Crisis not only reduced Serbia’s
political and economic dependence on the Monarchy, but also represented instances in
which Serbian actions were seen as “provocative” by the Monarchy. From the Monarchy’s
perspective, Serbia was supposed to be a vassal state, but somewhere in the process it
stopped being a vassal state. The problem was as follows:
The Monarchy would seem to have failed to recognize that, following the attainment
of administrative independence…in 1878…[Serbia] thereby obtained the right to
treat other nations on a basis of equality. She continued to treat Serbia as a country
to be exploited in the interest of her political or commercial ambitions. Her
reclamations universally took the form of demands. She recognized neither Serbia’s
right to accord her commercial policy with her national interests, nor refuse proposed
stipulations if they were considered disadvantageous. Serbia was regarded as a vassal

157

state, and any refusal to accept Austrian propositions was treated as a hostile action
(italics added).
300

Thus, Austria-Hungary essentially operated with lofty expectations of how deferential Serbia
should be given their relative standing (patron vs. vassal). Yet, despite changing
circumstances, the Monarchy never updated its expectations. Instead, it held onto these
expectations and treated any Serbian actions that departed from these baselines as
“provocations”. Indeed, Serbian actions were often regarded as “challenges from below” that
undermined the Monarchy’s status and prestige.
Such sentiments were well-documented in the foreign policy establishment in Austria
– or more precisely, within the military branches of the establishment. For example, during
the Bosnian Crisis, Danzer’s Armee-Zeitung, an organ which was in close contact with the
Austrian Chief of Staff, ran a front-page article in its publication in January 1909:
If our power were as organized, as unchallenged, and as impressive…we could lightly
dispense with an ultimatum and wait for things to take their course, standing at ease.
But because our prestige in foreign eyes is undermined, because we are thought to be
weaker than we are, because we are measurelessly underrated, we cannot for that very
reason do otherwise than invoke the ultima ratio of nations, seizing the favorable
occasion, and in the first place replying to Serbian provocations with the sword as
forcefully and emphatically as our self-respect and interest demand…If we go into
battle…and return victorious, we shall not only have conquered a foreign land: we
shall have won back Austrian self-respect (italics added).
301

As the quote suggests, Serbian provocations are a consequence of the Monarchy’s general
status deficit at the time. That is, because of the general competition for status among
European great powers that had been unfolding since 1881, the Monarchy’s prestige “in
foreign eyes” was undermined. Consequently, the Monarchy was “measurelessly
underrated”. That is, the Bosnian Crisis happened right after the humiliation that the

300
Price, The Dawn of Armageddon: The Provocation by Serbia, 30.
301
Luigi, Origins of the War of 1914, 265.

158

Monarchy had suffered at the Algeciras Conference of 1906. Because of the status deficit,
even Serbia – ostensibly a vassal state in the eyes of the Monarchy since 1878 – now dares
to engage in provocations. If left unaddressed, such provocations can further undermine the
Monarchy’s status. Thus, to avoid denial from the European great power peers and
provocations from inferiors like Serbia, it was imperative that Austria-Hungary disciplines
Serbia via military actions to regain its self-respect.
Granted, the Bosnia Crisis of 1908 ended without kinetic conflict because Aehrenthal
realized that the costs of conflict outweighed the benefits, and the Austrian diplomats won
out against the Austrian military. However, sentiments of status dissatisfaction persisted.

A Final Attempt at Saving Face: Austria-Hungary in 1914
The familiar narrative of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914, and
the ensuing July Crisis, is well-documented in the existing IR literature. With the benefit of
hindsight, observers know how this ended: escalation among European great powers
through chaingaining. We also know that Austria-Hungary issued a highly demanding
ultimatum which Britain’s foreign minister, Edward Grey, noted was unusual for a sovereign
state to send to another sovereign state, as noted earlier. To retain my analytical focus, I will
dedicate my attention on the status motivations from the perspective of Austria-Hungary for
engaging in such actions.
As noted earlier, Austria-Hungary became concerned about its status deficit during
and after the Bosnian Crisis. Such deficit not only comes from denial from above in the form
of humiliation from the other Powers, but also provocations from below in the form of Serbia
refusing to defer as it should be doing as a vassal state. As such, after the assassination in

159

June 1914, there were serious discussions of how Austria-Hungary should proceed. Berthold
Molden, editor of fremdenblatt, the semi-official paper of the Ballhausplatz and a member of
the foreign policy establishment, offered the following assessment on July 6, 1914:
Everywhere one finds doubts about the future of the monarchy…which is no longer
respected even by its smallest neighbors…the public has no idea how much skill and
circumspection has to be expended, is being expended, in order to defend our
positions against the unfavorable flow of the current; the view has existed for a long
time that…a knock-out punch would be necessary…[only then,] Austria-Hungary itself
would again believe in itself. (italics added).
302

As revealed by the quote, the problem with Serbian provocations was twofold. First, Serbia,
through the series of actions since 1903 to the June 1914, was effectively altering its
relationship with the Monarchy. As opposed to being a deferential vassal state, it was now
openly disrespecting Austria-Hungary on multiple occasions. Thus, it is only by re-
establishing the unequal status relationship between the Monarchy and Serbia would the
former “again believe in itself”, as Molden notes.
Second, provocations from Serbia were effectively understood as a consequence of
the general status deficit that the Monarchy suffered at the time. That is, the European
audience at the time was already skeptical of whether Austria-Hungary was a great power
because of the events in the Scramble for Africa. As such, provocations from Serbia “added
fuel to the fire”: it was not just the European great powers that did not recognize Austria-
Hungary as an equal. In fact, even a “smallest neighbour” like Serbia now dared to openly
challenge the Monarchy. In the interest of preserving Austria-Hungary’s standing in the eyes
of its peers, Molden went on to note that a “knock-out” punch would be necessary.
How should the “knock-out” punch be executed? Molden remarked in the same report:

302
Mason, The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 1867-1918, 108.

160

As far as Serbia is concerned, we would, after the victory, probably limit ourselves to
teaching it a lesson and reducing it by taking away its Macedonian territories, which
would be given over to Bulgaria. What other advantages we could arrange for
ourselves might still be considered: at least at first they scarcely could be very
obvious. [However], It is doubtful that an annexation of Serbia would be popular.
303

I highlight two observations from this quote. First, Austria-Hungary mistakenly thought that
mobilization against Serbia in 1914 was going to be localized and limited. That is, the
purpose was to teach Serbia a lesson and punish it for the assassination.
304
In other words,
the intention was to “discipline” Serbia and “put it back to its place” so that it stops engaging
in provocations and defer as a vassal state. In fact, all sorts of scenarios and outcomes were
contemplated by Molden and his contemporaries: “a punitive expedition, followed by an
indemnity; annexation of part of Serbia; or partition of Serbia with Bulgaria and
Roumania.
305
However, total annexation of Serbia was never the aim. The various scenarios
all predicated on limited actions to punish Serbia and reduce it back to vassalage.
Second, the fact that Molden was already discussing about what to do with the spoils
of war “after the victory” (e.g., giving Macedonian territories to Bulgaria) suggests that
Austria’s foreign policy establishment thought that this was a limited mission that the
Monarchy would easily prevail and that Serbia will be capitulating. With hindsight, the
events in 1914 clearly did not happen this way. However, Molden’s comments do reflect the
mentality with which the foreign policy elites operated at the time: that Serbia was a vassal
state and it can be coerced to back down because the relationship between the Monarchy
and Serbia was obviously asymmetrical – so asymmetrical that the Monarchy can afford to
count its spoils before the battle even began. The plan was: teach Serbia a lesson, where

303
Mason, 108.
304
Mason, 70.
305
Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary., 231.

161

victory was essentially preordained, and the outcome will “reassert the position of Austria-
Hungary as an independent Great Power”.
306

Molden was hardly alone in holding these assessments. Baron von Giesl, Austria-
Hungary’s ambassador to Belgrade, wrote back to Austria on what should be done in
response to the assassination as the Crisis unfolded:
We must settle our account with Serbia…both in order that our Monarchy may
preserve its position as a Great Power, and even in order that it may continue to exist as
a Great Power, a war is inevitable. If we hesitate to place our relations with our
neighbour on a clear basis, we must share the responsibility for the difficulties and
unfavorable conditions of the conflict…If we are resolved to present formidable
demands, together with a demand for a real control – for only a control of this kind
will succeed in cleaning out the Augean stables of Pan-Slav agitation – we must take
into consideration all the possible consequences of our action…half measures and
protracted negotiations, resulting in a mixed compromise, would be the hardest blow
that could be dealt at the credit of Austria (italics added).
307

The italicized phrases reveal two insights. First, von Giesl’s comments suggests that whether
Austria-Hungary escalated against Serbia will have grave implications for the Monarchy’s
status as a great power. If the Monarchy’s superiority over Serbia was not clearly
(re)established, this will create problems for the Monarchy’s standing among its peers. In
line with my analysis of Austro-Hungarian-Serbian relations since 1878, “clear basis”
effectively means that the Monarchy needs to “reduce Serbia to the status of a vassal”.
308

Second, von Giesl’s proposed solution was that the Monarchy had to demand for “real control”
to “clean out” the Slav nationalists within Serbia. This position was consistent with the
clauses of the Ultimatum that immediately preceded the war, wherein the Monarchy
demanded that it be able to essentially interfere in Serbian domestic affairs in order to

306
Taylor, 233.
307
Price, The Dawn of Armageddon: The Provocation by Serbia, 35.
308
Price, 40.

162

remove elements which were not friendly towards the Monarchy and its interests. Right
before the Monarchy declared war, Serbia accepted all clauses except for clauses that would
result in domestic interference. These were the clauses that informed Edward Grey’s
assessment that the Ultimatum was “the most formidable document…addressed by one State
to another that was independent”. After all, in theory, sovereign states which are equal in
relationship and standing do not get to interfere in each other’s domestic political affairs.
Indeed, there was a reason why von Giesl suggested that “real control”, and the
domestic interference clauses that would enable “real control”, were even appropriate:
Austria-Hungary did not consider Serbia as an independent, sovereign nation. Had Austria-
Hungary considered Serbia an independent nation, these clauses would not have been
appropriate considering the normal course of conduct between two sovereign states.
However, the Monarchy instead considered Serbia as a vassal state since 1878, and hence
the actions that Serbia had taken since 1903 to 1914 (e.g., throwing out the Obrenović family,
rejecting the Customs Union and Treaty of Commerce, or even contemplating going to war
against the Monarchy during the Bosnian Crisis, etc.) were all perceived as provocations.
Again, this is because Serbia was supposed to be deferential given the relative status between
the Monarchy and Serbia. As Count Mensdorff, the Monarchy’s ambassador to London at the
time, explained to Edward Grey: these domestic interference clauses in the Ultimatum were
justified because “Serbia had always been regarded as [a vassal state] that is in the Austrian
sphere of influence”.
309

309
Price, 66.

163

Discussion
In this chapter, I illustrated how provocations from Serbia towards Austria-Hungary “added
fuel to the fire” by exacerbating the ongoing competition for status between the Central
Powers and the Entente Powers. The existing status literature has ably demonstrated that
the Central Powers and the Entente Powers have been fighting over relative status via
territorial scrambles in Africa or arms-racing since 1881. In this conventional view where
the logic of “looking down” is not explicitly incorporated, events in July 1914 merely
provided the pretext for these Powers to finally mobilize.
This chapter offers another perspective: the events in 1914 are most appropriately
understood as the culmination of longstanding status disputes between Austria-Hungary
and Serbia, stemming from the former’s desire and failure to subjugate the latter as a vassal
state. That is, as Serbia sought and gained more independence after 1903, Austria-Hungary
increasingly saw Serbian maneuvers as being problematic because it was losing respect from
a small state that was supposed to be in its sphere of influence. Thus, the Ultimatum and the
military mobilization from Austria-Hungary in July 1914 were really a part of a limited
mission to teach Serbia a lesson as a way to protect the Monarchy’s status and prestige.
What are the broader theoretical implications? My analysis suggests that the events
in 1914 cannot be reduced to providing the justifications for mobilization, as the existing
literature would have it. Instead, the events in 1914 highlight the importance of explicitly
incorporating the logic of “looking down” to assess the dynamics and consequences of
provocations from below. This is because status competitions at the top of the hierarchy tend
to destabilize the system and attract the attention of the great powers, making them “too
busy with each other”. This can create windows of opportunities for smaller states to be

164

more adventurous, as Serbia did after 1903 in the context of the power vacuum in the Balkan
area. In fact, sometimes great powers compete for status via proxy measures such as
supporting the smaller states which are in dispute with their competitors. For example,
Austria-Hungary saw Serbian rejection of the renewal of the Treaty of Commerce throughout
1903-1907 to be highly provocative because it represented an instance in which the vassal
state refuses to defer to the Monarchy. Yet, a reason why Serbia was able to do this in a
sustainable manner without capitulating was because other great powers – like Italy, France,
and Russia, in their attempt to prevail over their peers – were more than willing to be patrons
and help Serbia diversify its trade and political relationships. Yet, if Serbia was able to reduce
its economic dependence on Austria-Hungary, there was even less incentives for it to be
deferential.
In theoretical terms, this implies that there is an interaction effect between denial
from above and provocations from below: status competitions at the top of the hierarchy
create opportunities for smaller states to engage in “provocations from below”. In turn,
“provocations from below” can exacerbate the status competition at the top of the hierarchy.
Indeed, without the Serbian provocations and the Austro-Hungarian responses, the familiar
chainganging dynamics probably would not have happened. As Renshon notes, Germany was
quite content with playing a game of brinksmanship where it would “provoke crisis in [hopes
that] other states would blink” to gain international standing, but to do so without actually
engaging in conflict.
310
This indirect, circumspect strategy stemmed from German concerns
for British naval superiority and the coercive ability of other Entente Powers. This was
consistent with my theoretical expectations: risers tend to adopt a circumspect approach in

310
Renshon, Fighting for Status, 199.

165

dealing with those at the top of the hierarchy as a first strategy. Thus, had Austro-Hungarian-
Serbian status disputes not unfold the way it did in July 1914, Renshon observes that the
German strategy almost worked: the British navy in July 1914, due to budgetary strain, was
“on the verge of deserting the command-of-the-sea doctrine” which provided the basis for
British prestige in the European hierarchy.
Thus, even in a geographical context wherein great powers were landlocked with
each other and thus one should expect status competitions to be driven by “looking up”
dynamics, the actual trigger to conflict was rooted in “looking down” dynamics in the form
of Austro-Hungarian-Serbian status disputes. Indeed, if July 1914 was the trigger for
mobilization, and if July 1914 was the culmination of several decades of status disputes
between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, then provocations from below cannot be simply
treated as a pretext. Instead, it must be directly incorporated into the theoretical frameworks
on how status concerns might motivate interstate competition.

166

Chapter 6
Conclusion

In this dissertation, I argued that provocations from smaller states can trigger and
exacerbate the competition for status between the rising power and the established powers.
The main theoretical contribution I offer is twofold. First, the existing literature has largely
reduced status competitions to a two-player game involving the rising power and the
established powers. That is, the reason why rising powers become dissatisfied with their
status is because they want to – but fail to – become equals with the established powers.
However, assessment of status is about looking up and looking down. By neglecting the logic
of “looking down”, the existing literature suffers from an omitted variable bias problem.
This is important, and second, because incorporating the “looking down” logic alters
our understanding how and when status dissatisfaction arises and drives interstate
competition. On the question of how: if rising powers are sensitive to provocations from
below, then status dissatisfaction can arise from the bottom-up, generated through status
disputes between the rising power and smaller states. In other words, not only can status
dissatisfaction arise from a rising power’s failure to become an equal to the established
powers, such sentiments can also arise from the smaller states’ refusal to offer deference.
This implies that status-seeking rising powers can be doubly difficult to satiate because they
need recognition from above and deference from below. And when the rising power fails to
secure deference from below, this can trickle-up to alter the political relations between the
rising power and the established powers, thereby triggering or exacerbating the status
competition between the rising power and the established powers.

167

On the question of when: if rising powers are especially sensitive to provocations
from below early on in the power transition given their propensity to “kiss up kick down”,
then status-driven interstate competition may unfold even earlier than conventionally
assumed. That is, the existing literature will evaluate whether and when competition unfolds
by assessing the relationship between the rising power and the established powers. This is
a position that inherently assumes that competition unfolds later in the process, given that
it is only after persistent status denials from the established powers that the rising power
will turn towards radical revisionism.
311
In other words, competition is a last-resort strategy.
The theory I propose, instead, suggests that competition over status may occur even sooner
because the rising power will at all times expect smaller states to defer for self-conception
and audience perception reasons. The negative externalities arising from these status
disputes between the rising power and the smaller states can trickle up to motivate
competition between the rising power and the established powers – even if the rising power
and the established powers are not engaged in active competition quite just yet.
To substantiate these arguments, Chapter 3 empirically demonstrated that
provocations from below are significant, and they are especially salient in the initial stages
of power transitions. Through automated text analysis of primary documents from China’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1978 to 2018 (N = 8581), I found that provocations from
smaller states trigger the majority of China’s complaints about its status, and such
provocations are especially salient in the early days of China’s rise. In fact, provocations from
smaller states trigger 70% of China’s most severe status complaints. Furthermore, through
(archival) evidence from the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 and the going South China Sea

311
Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers.

168

disputes, I showed that provocations from smaller states can violate the rising power’s self-
conception and create impression management problems that compel the rising power into
adopting aggressive rhetoric and/ or actions to defend its status. The empirical findings from
this chapter suggested that status dissatisfaction can come from the bottom-up.
In Chapter 4, and building on the insights from Chapter 3, I showed how provocations
from smaller states can trigger the competition for status between the rising power and the
established powers – even when these actors are not interested in, or ready to, compete. To
illustrate “the blame game”, I traced how the South China Sea disputes evolved between the
US, China, and the Philippines from 2009 onwards. By analyzing Chinese media coverage of
the South China Sea disputes from 2009 to 2020 (N = 428), I showed how China tried to
address its status insecurities arising from the Philippines’ provocations by blaming the US
and its allies to save face internationally and retain domestic legitimacy. Yet, China’s blame
strategy created spiral dynamics between the US and China, where both sides began to stake
their status and standing in the existing international order on the South China Sea disputes
– even after the Philippines retreated to the sidelines after 2016/7 under Duterte. The net
effect is the onset of an inadvertent US-China competition for status even though both sides
may not be ready or willing to do so in the early 2010s.
In Chapter 5, I demonstrated how provocations from smaller states can add fuel to
the fire by exacerbating pre-existing status competition between rising powers and the
established powers. I illustrate this dynamic by replicating the existing status literature’s
empirics on status competitions among European great powers before World War I. I show
that status disputes between Austria-Hungary and Serbia from 1903 to 1914 exacerbated
the preexisting competition for status among the Powers and motivated Austria-Hungary to

169

take actions in 1914, which then triggered German involvement per the usual chainganging
stories. The Monarchy’s initial motivation was to restore its prestige through limited military
actions in the face of provocations from Serbia, again suggesting that status dissatisfaction
and interstate competition can unfold from the bottom-up.

Implications

How can status needs be satiated?

I have largely focused on how status dissatisfaction can arise and drive interstate
competition. However, as indicated in the diagrams in my theory chapter, there is a different
but related question: how can states accommodate status-seekers? I briefly attempted to
answer these questions at the end of Chapter 4. Mainly, my point then was that these are
hard questions: one can imagine the answers to range from very easy to very hard. It can be
very easy because it may be that the status-seeker may accept lip service and substantively
empty offers as long as its status needs are symbolically catered to. It can be very hard
because the status-seeker can be highly sensitive, and status needs tend to be amorphous.
As a result, satisfying status needs is essentially dealing with an unclear and constantly
shifting goalpost. If the first interpretation is valid, then adroit diplomacy that pays more
attention to “due respect” in the process of addressing difficult flashpoints and challenges
such as territorial disputes might contribute towards de-escalation. If the second
interpretation is valid, then the problem is that the rising power is doubly difficult to
reassure in that it has two motives – one of which, status, is unclearly defined.
What is at stake? Understanding how status-seeking rising powers might be satiated
is ultimately the first step to potentially managing their rise. This has clear implications for

170

contemporary US-China relations: if China is indeed driven by status, and if China’s
preoccupation with status will motivate it to be sensitive towards provocations from smaller
states, then how should US grand strategy proceed?
On one hand, the US can adopt an activist grand strategy and use such provocations
to keep China busy and down. However, this is risky because it may propel China to move
from contingent dissatisfaction to extreme dissatisfaction, a possibility which was identified
in the theory chapter. Conversely, the US can adopt a more restrained grand strategy and use
economic and diplomacy levers to limit the deleterious effects of status disputes between
China and the smaller states. This is hard to execute because it assumes that the US has
control over smaller states, and the very act of US attempting to “mediate” the disputes
between China and the smaller states might be status-demoting for China. This is because
the very act of “meditation” shows that the US and China are not equals if the former is
helping the latter resolve problems it should be able to resolve – a possibility which was also
identified in the theory chapter when I discussed the dynamics of spheres of influence.
However, the value of my dissertation is to provide a framework for analyzing the
challenges and the feasibility of executing these strategic options. The key starting
assumption in my theory is that status adjustment is not a two-player process. Indeed, if the
conventional explanations were to be adopted, then one would assess the “progress bar” of
US-China competition by examining their dyadic interactions. This is incomplete at best and
misleading at worst, since the US-China status competition may have already started, albeit
in latent form, because of status disputes between China and smaller states. Consequently,
the conventional way of assessing the “progress bar” of US-China status competition may

171

misperceive both the source (from bottom-up) and timing of competition (early on). Because
of these biases, the solutions that these frameworks offer also become incomplete.
My theory suggests that there are two critical junctures during power transitions
wherein status adjustments between the rising power and the established powers are
possible. Depending on which juncture the US and China find themselves in, the sources of
status dissatisfaction and the strategies through said dissatisfaction might be ameliorated
differ. First, if the escalation dynamic is largely driven by “the blame game”, then the ideal
(though not easy) strategy is to nip things in the bud, so as to contain the status disputes
between China and the smaller states from spilling over to become a US-China contestation
for primacy in the existing order. Findings from Chapter 4 are instructive here. Hindsight is
always 20/ 20, but there was a real opportunity from both the US and China to limit the
amount of blame transference from 2013 to 2016. Granted, there were action-reaction in
terms of low-intensity military actions in the South China Sea (i.e., the so-called gray-zone
coercion attempts). However, a majority of the action-reaction between the US and China
took place at the rhetorical level in the form of verbal incendiary jabs at each other which
further created signaling problems. Indeed, rhetoric generates limited payoffs but
substantial downsides. That is, states are not going to talk their way into winning a status
competition. Yet, states can definitely talk their way into signaling problems and the onset of
status competitions, as I have shown in Chapter 4.
To limit blame transference would thus require restraint from both sides: for China
to be cognizant that while blame transference might be an appealing short-term strategy to
save face internationally and retain domestic legitimacy, it is suboptimal from a long-term
perspective. For the US, the key is to understand China’s need to project its status claims in

172

front of multiple audiences, and how this sometimes creates the need for China to engage in
more hostile rhetoric than necessary or result in mixed messages.
312
As such, I differ from
the existing status literature by arguing that a two-player competition for status between the
US and China has to be created through adroit diplomacy from both sides in the form of
preventing third-party issues from becoming a part of the equation. That is, a two-player
game should not be taken for granted as the default analytical baseline that observers can
automatically proceed with, especially when considering how their models might apply to
issues related to contemporary US-China relations and Asian security.
Second, if the escalation dynamic is driven largely by “the imitation game”, then the
ideal strategy is to recognize that the status competition is going to remain but define better
arenas through which said competition occurs to limit its intensity. At the time of writing
this document, it is unclear whether the US and China are headed for “the imitation game”.
However, the South China Sea disputes still provide useful insights to consider moving
forward. As I showed in Chapter 3 and 4, the US and China ended up staking their
contestation for standing on the South China Sea disputes. Again, with the benefit of
hindsight, this is suboptimal because by staking the US-China status competition on the
South China Sea, the US-China status competition inherits all the features that have defined
the South China Sea disputes since the 1970s – longstanding, protracted with no clear and
easy solutions. Thus, if the US and China stake their status competition on something that
cannot be solved and/ or have no easy positive-sum outcomes, then the status competition
itself will become hard to solve and/ or have no easy positive-sum outcomes. Conversely, if
the status competitions were defined by the US and China in areas of global governance and

312
Pu, Rebranding China: Contested Status Signaling in the Changing Global Order.

173

international institutions, where it is possible to create positive-sum outcomes such as
adjusting membership in selective institutions or facilitate joint-ventures between the
geopolitical institutions led by China and the US, then one can imagine a possible – even if
not easy – solution to the US-China status competition. These implications are preliminary,
and I highlight them with the luxury of hindsight. However, they offer some starting points.
Finally, beyond questions related to US-China relations and power transitions, the
general question as to how status-seekers might be satiated may speak to other literatures
and policy-relevant questions as well. For example, in the nuclear proliferation literature,
there is a longstanding argument that some proliferators obtain nuclear weapons because
such weapons are seen as symbols of prestige that will elevate their country’s status. This
applies to smaller state like Iran
313
or North Korea
314
which lack international recognition,
or borderline established powers like Brazil which want to better cement their status as
(regional) leaders.
315
If pursuit for status (partially) explains these proliferator’s decision to
obtain nuclear weapons, then at least a part of encouraging these proliferators to concede or
freeze their nuclear programs will involve satiating their status needs.
What would this even look like? Can “status side payments”, such as asking North
Korea to engage in verifiable compliance efforts in exchange for membership in prestigious
international institutions or more participation in global affairs, be an effective positive
inducement strategy that operate in addition to tangible items like economic aid? What are

313
Sidra Hamidi and Ariel F.W. Petrovics, “Beyond Hedging: Iran’s Many Motives for Enrichment” (n.d.).
314
Stephen M. Walt, “Give North Korea All the Prestige It Wants,” Foreign Policy, March 2018,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/15/give-north-korea-all-the-prestige-it-wants/.
315
Stephen Herzog, “After the Negotiations: Understanding Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control” (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Yale University, 2021).

174

the costs and benefits of adopting these strategies? How would they even be executed? These
are questions that have clear theoretical and policy impacts which merits further attention.

Ways Forward

How states compete for status
This dissertation has examined why states compete for status. However, there is an equally
important question moving forward: how states compete for status. In an era where
interstate competition does not always need to unfold via territorial conquests or armed
conflict but instead focuses on the maximization of political influence and national prestige
through other means of statecraft,
316
how do states compete for status?
Conventional wisdom holds that states win status competitions by enhancing their
status: obtaining nuclear weapons,
317
joining prestigious institutions,
318
or contributing
towards global governance by demonstrating moral authority
319
and socialization.
320
The
intuition is straightforward: states win status competitions by gaining more status over their
adversaries. However, there is an alternative strategy that states can employ concurrently
that is completely unexplored in the existing literature: how states might make their
adversaries lose status.
This intuition underpins an entire research program. I contend that information
warfare, executed through foreign influence operations, is an essential strategy through

316
Randall L. Schweller, “Rational Theory for a Bygone Era,” Security Studies 20, no. 3 (July 2011): 467–68.
317
Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?”; Gilady, The Price of Prestige.
318
Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth, Status in World Politics.
319
William C. Wohlforth et al., “Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social
Dimension of Status Seeking,” Review of International Studies 44, no. 3 (July 2018): 526–46.
320
Johnston, Social States.

175

which modern states compete for status. I propose the following research questions. Some
of them are already in progress.
1. How rising powers might use influence operations to smear the established
powers into status loss in the eyes of third-party states (data already collected).
2. How the established powers might manage status loss domestically, so as to
prevent fragmentation and decline from within (manuscript in progress).
3. How the established powers might conduct counter-operations of their own to
defend their status in the eyes of third-party states.
4. When and why are counter-operations (in)effective?

176

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191

Appendix for Challenges from Below

Appendix #1: Survey on status markers
In July 2020, I fielded a nationwide survey in China through Qualtrics. Recruitment of respondents, also done by Qualtrics, was
balanced on the 2010 National Population Census in China to the extent possible, notwithstanding the fact that the internet
population tends to be better educated than the real population. Respondents provided consent to participate, and they were
notified of their right to withdraw from the survey at any point they wish. 4080 adult respondents finished the entire survey.
Respondents were paid for completing the survey. The following lists the descriptive statistics on demographics.

Characteristics Survey sample 2010 Census

Gender
Male 55% 51.27%
Female 45% 48.73%

Education
University or above 53% 9%
Senior High School 27.5% 13%
Junior High School 11.6% 37.9%
Elementary School 2% 26%

Age
15-59 88% 70.14%
60-65 8% 13.26%
65+ 4% 8.87%

Ethnicity
Han Chinese 89% 91.51%
Minority 11% 8.49%

192

The survey question was: “On a scale of 1 to 6, 1 being the most important and 6 being the least important, please rank the
following options in terms of the most important attributes for China to build and sustain great power status”. Respondents
were given the six benchmarks derived from the existing literature. The order through which these benchmarks appeared to
each respondent was randomized. I calculated the survey results as follows. A response of “1” gets 6 points, “2” gets 5 points, “3”
gets 4 points, and so on. The reverse coding is to improve the readability of the results I present in the main text (Table 6). The
cumulative sum for each status marker was then divided by the total number of respondents, 4080. This generates a number on
a scale of 1 to 6, where higher number means more important to the respondents.
For transparency, I visualize the raw data without the reverse coding as follows. In these graphs, 1 means the most important,
and 6 means the least important, as originally conveyed in the survey.

193

Appendix #2: Selecting the number of topics
To determine the optimal number of topics, I combine statistical estimation and judgement based on substantive knowledge.
First, I utilize the LDA Tuning package in R created by Nikita Murzintcev, which provides four estimation methods.
321
The
simulations, graphed below, suggests that the ideal number of topics should be around 30-50.

321
Griffiths and Steyvers “Finding Scientific Topics,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 101, no. Supplement 1 (April 6, 2004): 5228–35,
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0307752101., Cao et al. “A Density-Based Method for Adaptive LDA Model Selection,” Neurocomputing, Advances in
Machine Learning and Computational Intelligence, 72, no. 7 (March 1, 2009): 1775–81, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2008.06.011., Arun et al. “On
Finding the Natural Number of Topics with Latent Dirichlet Allocation: Some Observations,” in Advances in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, ed.
Mohammed J. Zaki et al. (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010), 391–402., and Deveaud et al. “Accurate and Effective Latent Concept Modeling for Ad Hoc
Information Retrieval,” Revue Des Sciences et Technologies de l’Information - Série Document Numérique, June 2014, 61–84,
https://doi.org/10.3166/DN.17.1.61-84..

194

I then cross-validate these estimations using the perplexity test, which measures how well a probability model predicts
a sample. Lower perplexity score means better model fit. The results, graphed below, suggests that 150 topics is the optimal
model. Here, I turn to substantive knowledge to adjudicate whether 30-50 or 150 is better. Having more topics will yield more
granular classification, whereas having less topics will create a model which lumps issues together. For this reason, I selected
150 as the number of choice. This is because my dataset covers almost 40 years of events, which means that issues covered by
my dataset tend to be variegated, so greater granularity is necessary.

195

Appendix #3: All topics and top words
Topic Top 20 Words
Topic 1
香港 (Hong Kong), 英国 (Britain), 联合声明 (joint statement), 问题 (problem), 安排 (arrange), 情况 (situation), 繁荣 (prosperous), 不要 (do
not), 规定 (regulations), 事务 (affairs), 产生 (produce), 是否 (whether or not), 顺利 (successful), 单方面 (unilateral), 选举 (elections), 问
(ask), 必须 (necessary), 保持 (maintain), 提交 (submit), 方案 (proposal)
Topic 2
赴 (visit), 出席 (attend), 举行 (hold event), 特使 (special envoy), 宣布 (announce), 本报 (this newspaper), 北京 (Beijing), 部长 (Minister), 周
年 (anniversary), 政府 (government), 应邀 (responding to invitation), 派 (send), 首都 (capitol), 独立 (independence), 主席 (chairperson), 应
(should), 严格 (strict)
Topic 3
目前 (current), 进行 (ongoing), 正在 (currently), 已经 (already), 准备 (prepare), 计划 (proposal), 方面 (aspect), 是否 (whether or not), 正
(currently), 研究 (researching), 考虑 (contemplating), 近期 (in near future), 情况 (situation), 主要 (main), 影响 (impact), 目的 (objective),
愿意 (willing), 工作 (work), 实施 (implement), 今年 (this year)
Topic 4
人权 (human rights), 中国 (China), 中国政府 (Chinese government), 保护 (protect), 问题 (problem), 状况 (situation), 基本 (basic), 促进
(promote), 人民 (citizens), 民主 (democracy), 干涉 (interfere), 文化 (culture), 自由 (freedom), 内政 (domestic politics), 平等 (equal), 这是
(this is), 搞 (provoke), 事实 (fact), 取得 (obtain), 别国 (other countries)
Topic 5
和平 (peace), 进程 (process), 实现 (actualize), 希望 (hope), 努力 (endeavor to), 推进 (promote), 和解 (reconciliation), 早日 (soon), 各方 (all
sides involved), 继续 (continue), 稳定 (stability), 支持 (support), 结束 (end), 政治 (politics), 推动 (facilitate), 尽早 (as early as possible), 社
会 (society), 共同努力 (work together), 切实 (practical), 一步 (step)
Topic 6
问题 (problem), 态度 (attitude), 采取 (adopt), 负责 (responsible), 客观 (objective), 希望 (hope), 公正 (fair), 处理 (deal with), 强调
(emphasize), 认真 (serious), 建设性 (constructive), 继续 (continue), 务实 (practical), 灵活 (flexible), 出 (outcome), 诚意 (sincere), 充分
(fully), 主张 (advocate), 得到 (obtain/ achieve), 过程 (process)
Topic 7
以色列 (Israel), 中东 (Middle East), 巴勒斯坦 (Palestine), 和平 (peace), 和谈 (peace talks), 进程 (process), 中东地区 (Middle East region),
努力 (endeavor to), 阿拉伯 (Arab), 支持 (support), 认为 (think), 公正 (fair), 实现 (actualize), 早日 (soon), 恢复 (restore), 各方 (all sides
involved), 推动 (promote), 解决 (solve), 基础 (foundational), 冲突 (disputes)
Topic 8
伊拉克 (Iraq), 希望 (hope), 危机 (crisis), 恢复 (restore), 尽快 (as soon as possible), 北京 (Beijing), 和平解决 (peaceful resolution), 早日
(soon), 武器 (weapons), 得到 (obtain/ achieve), 呼吁 (call for), 继续 (continue), 战争 (war), 努力 (endeavor to), 局势 (situation), 重建
(rebuild), 执行 (execute), 恶化 (deteriorate), 发表谈话 (deliver statement)

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Topic 9
工作 (work), 情况 (situation), 介绍 (introduce), 相关 (relevant), 部门 (department), 了解 (understand), 机制 (mechanism), 通报 (reports),
启动 (initiate), 开展 (carry out), 高度重视 (highest priority), 安排 (arrangement), 做好 (doing a great job), 官员 (official), 负责人 (director),
目前 (currently), 赴 (visit), 进展 (progress), 各项 (various), 方面 (all aspects)
Topic
10
友好 (friendly), 访问 (visit), 代表团 (representatives), 全国人大常委会 (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress), 议会
(meeting), 议长 (chairperson), 应 (should/ responding to), 邀请 (invite), 正式 (formal), 率领 (leading), 委员长 (chairperson), 宣布
(announce), 今天 (today), 进行 (proceed), 将于 (about to), 招待会 (reception), 副委员长 (vice chairperson), 国会 (congress), 电 (report), 我
国 (our country)
Topic
11
问 (ask), 对此 (on this issue), 有何 (what), 评论 (comment), 请问 (ask), 日前 (earlier), 答记者问 (press correspondence), 答 (answer), 中方
(China), 媒体报道 (media reports), 关系 (relationship), 这一 (this), 中国 (China),近日 (recently), 希望 (hope), 大局 (grand scheme), 公开
(open), 一贯 (consistent), 一贯主张 (consistent position), 称 (express)
Topic
12
内容 (content), 予以 (giving), 正在 (currently), 影响 (impact), 方向 (direction), 报道 (report), 表示 (express), 立场 (position), 了解
(understanding), 下午 (afternoon), 提问 (raising a question), 复杂 (complicated), 近年来 (recent years), 条件 (condition), 相关 (relevant),
一个 (one), 时说 (said), 上午 (morning), 共和国 (republic)
Topic
13
中国 (China), 包括 (including), 在内 (included), 北京 (Beijing), 方面 (aspect), 范围 (range), 作出 (expresses), 内容 (content), 注意 (attention),
均 (all), 问题 (problems), 大量 (large amount), 方式 (means), 得到 (obtain), 行动 (action), 可能 (possible), 亚洲 (Asia), 必将 (necessarily), 政
策 (policy), 双边关系 (bilateral)
Topic
14
中美 (US-China), 中美关系 (US-China relations), 美国 (US), 两国 (both countries), 贸易 (trade), 双方 (bilateral), 正常 (normal), 美 (US), 两
国人民 (citizens of both countries), 分歧 (divergent), 利益 (interests), 健康 (healthy), 符合 (suitable), 共同利益 (common interests), 基础
(foundational), 建设性 (constructive), 之间 (between), 给予 (give), 发展 (development), 美方 (US)
Topic
15
指出 (point out), 所谓 (so-called), 做法 (method), 这种 (this), 企图 (attempting), 破坏 (undermine), 事实 (fact), 完全 (completely), 干扰
(interfere), 制造 (manufacture), 行为 (behavior), 对此 (on this issue), 这是 (this is), 要求 (demand), 不会 (no), 违背 (against/ violate), 利用
(exploit), 目的 (objective), 严重(severe), 公然 (openly)
Topic
16
总统 (president), 当选 (elected), 相信 (believe), 先生 (mr.), 前 (before), 表示祝贺 (congratulates), 北京 (Beijing), 领导 (leaders), 友好
(friendly), 人民 (people), 新 (new), 选举 (elections), 发展 (development), 共同努力 (work together), 一定 (must), 报道 (reports), 评论
(commentary), 时间 (time), 高度重视 (paying great attention to), 更大 (greater)

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Topic
17
北京 (Beijing), 上述 (aforementioned), 进行 (ongoing), 今天 (today), 三国 (trilateral), 招待会 (reception), 电 (reports), 这是 (this is), 应 (in
response to), 今天下午 (this afternoon), 首都 (capitol), 谈判 (negotiations), 德 (Germany), 之后 (after), 感到 (feel), 欧洲 (Europe), 制定
(devise), 联合声明 (joint statement)
Topic
18
主权 (sovereignty), 尊重 (respect), 国际法 (international law), 领土完整 (territorial integrity), 国家 (country), 原则 (principle), 国际
(international), 维护 (defend), 违反 (violate), 准则 (principle), 独立 (independence), 遵守 (abide), 基本 (basic), 得到 (obtain), 侵犯 (violate),
必须 (must), 宗旨 (principle), 法律 (law), 宪章 (Constitution)
Topic
19
提出 (expresses), 交涉 (negotiate), 严正 (severe), 中方 (China), 要求 (demands), 立即 (immediately), 对此 (on this), 就此 (on this), 强烈不满
(severely dissatisfied), 严重 (severe), 停止 (stop), 已向 (already), 多次 (many times), 切实 (firmly), 损害 (harm), 允许 (permit), 不顾
(disregard), 再次 (again), 敦促 (urge), 违背 (against)
Topic
20
事件 (incident), 发生 (happened), 谴责 (condemn), 造成 (result in), 袭击 (attack), 强烈 (strongly), 受伤 (injure), 死亡 (casualty), 平民
(cilivian), 伤亡 (casualty), 人员伤亡 (casualty), 首都 (capitol), 严重 (severe), 予以 (give), 行径 (behavior), 暴力 (violence), 重大 (important),
大量 (large amount), 调查 (investigation)
Topic
21
主席 (chairperson), 总统 (president), 习近平 (Xi Jingpin), 国家 (country), 邀请 (invite), 国事访问 (state visit), 宣布 (announce), 应
(responding to), 本报 (this newspaper), 共和国 (republic), 进行 (engage), 开幕式 (opening ceremony), 关注 (paying attention to), 战略
(strategic), 近日 (recent days), 建设性 (constructive), 首次 (first time), 提交 (submit)
Topic
22
方面 (side), 表示 (express), 努力 (endeavor to), 近期 (recently), 之间 (between), 政治 (politics), 中国 (China), 相互尊重 (mutual respect), 本
报 (this report), 报道 (reports), 问题 (problem), 处理 (address), 更大 (bigger), 声明 (statement), 更加 (more), 接受 (accept), 过程 (process),
抵达 (arrive)
Topic
23
交换意见 (exchange opinions), 共同 (mutual), 关心 (caring), 领导人 (leaders), 双边关系 (bilateral), 访华 (visit China), 国际 (global), 访问期
间 (during the visit), 深入 (deepening), 访问 (visit), 问题 (problem), 地区 (regional), 会见 (meeting), 重大 (important), 双方 (both sides), 举
行会谈 (held meetings), 期间 (duration), 广泛 (broad), 首次 (first time), 进一步 (further)
Topic
24
合作 (cooperate), 发展 (develop), 领域 (area), 重要 (important), 共同 (mutual), 深化 (deepening), 推进 (promote), 务实 (practical), 战略
(strategic), 全面 (comprehensive), 进一步 (further), 文件 (document), 深入 (deepening), 互信 (confidence-building), 成果 (results), 建设
(building), 介绍 (introduce), 加强 (building), 相信 (believe), 推动 (promote)

198

Topic
25
协议 (agreement), 签署 (signing), 全面 (comprehensive), 协定 (agreement), 谈判 (negotiations), 达成 (achieve), 各方 (all sides), 继续
(continue), 执行 (execute), 框架 (framework), 政治 (politics), 最终 (final), 欢迎 (welcome), 实施 (implement), 重要 (important), 履行
(fulfill), 一项 (one), 两 (two), 切实 (practical), 内容 (content)
Topic
26
中方 (China), 表示 (expresses), 回答 (responds), 今后 (from now on), 目的 (objective), 非常 (very), 不懈努力 (persevere), 复杂
(complicated), 顺利 (smoothly), 致力于 (endeavor to), 联系 (contact), 当前 (current), 政治 (politics), 完全 (complete), 合理 (reasonable), 在
内 (including), 成员 (member)
Topic
27
会见 (meeting), 北京 (Beijing), 国务委员 (State Councillor), 一行 (group), 唐家璇 (Tang Jiaxuan), 代表团 (reprensentatives), 客人 (guests),
主席 (chairperson), 副 (deputy), 委员 (committee member), 部长 (minister), 下午 (afternoon), 参加 (participate), 团长 (group leader), 率领
(lead), 前 (before), 上午 (morning), 副部长 (vice minister), 副委员长 (vice chairperson)
Topic
28
联合国 (United Nations), 秘书长 (Secretary General), 宪章 (Constitution/ Charter), 决议 (resolution), 支持 (support), 国际 (global), 联合国
大会 (UN General Assembly), 宗旨 (principle), 广大 (broad), 参加 (participate), 组织 (organization), 原则 (principle), 得到 (achieve), 组成
(constituted by), 机构 (organization), 审议 (review), 体现 (reflects), 成员国 (member states), 参与 (participate)
Topic
29
发表 (express) , 表示 (express) , 言论 (statement), 评论 (comment on), 对此 (on this issue), 讲话 (statement), 再次 (again), 最近 (recently),
有何 (what), 公开 (publicly), 问 (ask), 注意 (pay attention to), 事 (issue), 不要 (do not), 日前 (earlier in time), 称 (said), 感到 (feels), 这是
(this is), 一事 (on the issue), 已经 (already)
Topic
30
近日 (recent days), 条件 (conditions), 继续 (again), 做出 (make), 方式 (method), 接受 (accept), 决定 (decide), 旨在 (objective), 目前
(currently), 扩大 (proliferation), 有效 (effective), 坚持 (firmly support), 介绍 (introduce), 目标 (objective), 和平 (peace), 特别 (special), 相
互尊重 (mutual respect), 高度 (height), 此前 (previous)
Topic
31
总理 (premier), 国务院 (State Council), 温家宝 (Wen Jiabao), 访问 (visit), 正式 (formal), 李克强 (Li Keqiang), 首相 (prime minister), 朱镕基
(Zhu Rongji), 李鹏 (Li Peng), 邀请 (invite), 建交 (establishing diplomatic relations), 电 (report), 之后 (after), 政府 (government), 阿富汗
(Afghanistan), 国家 (country), 表示 (expressed), 举行会谈 (holding meetings), 是否 (whether or not), 工作 (work)
Topic
32
中国 (China), 北京 (Beijing), 不会 (will not), 一个 (one), 国际 (international), 最近 (recent), 成为 (become), 指责 (condemn), 尊重 (respect),
经济 (economic), 要 (should/ need), 确认 (confirm), 国际法 (international law), 过程 (process), 协调 (coordinate), 创造 (produce), 各国
(each country), 出 (produce), 文件 (document)

199

Topic
33
菲律宾 (Philippines), 中国 (China), 表示 (express), 进行 (progress), 方面 (aspect), 政府 (government), 国家 (country), 双边 (bilateral), 本报
(this newspaper), 再次 (again), 建立 (establish), 解决 (resolve), 前 (prior), 主要 (main), 目的 (objective), 提交 (submit), 导致 (result in), 遵
守 (abide)
Topic
34
不同 (different), 原则 (principle), 开展 (begin), 时间 (time), 精神 (spirit), 包括 (include), 应该 (should), 不能 (cannot) , 进一步 (one step
further), 发表谈话 (delivered a statement), 一系列 (a series of), 一项 (one), 回答 (respond), 努力 (endeavor to), 平等 (equalty), 责任
(responsibility), 技术 (technique), 未来 (future), 即将 (immediate)
Topic
35
组织 (organization), 合作 (cooperate), 上海 (Shanghai), 成员国 (member state), 国际 (international), 成员 (member),加入 (join), 理事会
(council), 地区 (area), 国 (country), 会议 (meeting), 成为 (become), 旨在 (objective), 成立 (establish), 元首 (heads of state), 今年 (this year),
共同 (common), 主要 (main), 参与 (participate), 间 (between)
Topic
36
问 (ask), 对此 (on this issue), 有何 (what), 评论 (comment), 报道 (report), 答记者问 (press correspondenc), 答 (answer), 请问 (ask), 注意
(attention), 近日 (recent days), 提出 (put forth), 力量 (power), 人员 (personnel), 予以 (provide), 企图 (attempt), 最终 (final), 建立 (build),
目前 (current), 评价 (evaluation), 均 (also/ all)
Topic
37
问题 (question), 立场 (position), 一贯 (consistent), 明确 (clear), 坚持 (firmly uphold), 主张 (advocate), 重申 (reiterate), 涉及 (involving), 强
调 (emphasize), 变化 (change), 这一 (this), 坚定 (firm), 阐述 (set forth), 始终 (always), 支持 (support), 和平解决 (peaceful resolution), 文件
(docment), 改变 (change), 应该 (should), 表达 (express)
Topic
38
俄罗斯 (Russia), 俄 (Russia), 北京 (Beijing), 举行 (holding event), 战略 (strategic), 两国 (two countries), 元首 (heads of state), 进一步
(further), 例行 (routine), 委员会 (committee), 德 (German), 国 (country), 体现 (manifest), 会晤 (meeting), 共同 (common), 本报 (this
report), 顺利 (smoothly), 应 (should), 讨论 (discuss), 国务委员 (State Councilor)
Topic
39
局势 (situation), 关注 (focus), 当前 (current), 稳定 (stable), 希望 (hope), 十分 (fully), 高度 (height/ great), 发展 (develop), 国内 (domestic),
形势 (situation), 事态 (issue), 目前 (current), 一直 (all along), 密切 (closely), 出现 (appear), 保持 (maintain), 恢复 (restore), 引起 (trigger),
事情 (issue), 能力 (capability)
Topic
40
中方 (China), 表示 (express), 希望 (hope), 注意 (paying attention to), 表态 (expressed position), 近日 (recent days), 问 (ask), 强调
(emphasize), 继续 (continue), 认为 (think), 事态 (situation), 评价 (assessment/ evaluation), 带来 (bring), 回答 (answer), 目的 (objective),
方向 (direction), 当前 (current), 双方 (two sides), 电 (report), 秩序 (order)

200

Topic
41
海域 (sea), 澳大利亚 (Australia), 工作 (work), 马来西亚 (Malaysia), 目前 (current), 海上 (maritime), 继续 (continue), 抵达 (arrive), 参与
(participate), 联合 (united/ allied/ together), 协调 (coordinate), 行动 (action), 开展 (begin to), 进行 (progress), 约 (approximate), 区域
(area), 信息 (information), 相关 (relevant)
Topic
42
问题 (question), 没有 (no), 不能 (cannot), 应该 (should), 接受 (accept), 指出 (point out), 认为 (think), 存在 (exist), 完全 (complete), 改变
(change), 必须 (necessary), 这种 (this type), 事情 (issue), 之间 (between), 立场 (position), 现在 (current), 是否 (whether or not), 强调
(reemphasize), 方面 (aspect), 已经 (already)
Topic
43
东盟 (ASEAN), 中国 (China), 地区 (region), 建立 (build/ establish), 关系 (relationship), 合作 (cooperate), 会议 (meeting), 成立 (establish),
马来西亚 (Malaysia), 国 (country),今年 (this year), 准则 (principle), 外长 (foreign ministers), 去年 (last year), 首次 (first time), 互信 (mutual
trust), 落实 (implement), 此前 (before this), 共同 (common), 泰国 (Thailand)
Topic
44
中国 (China), 北京 (Beijing), 回答 (respond), 日前 (earlier), 举行 (holding), 指出 (pointed out), 表明 (indicate), 加强 (consolidate/ reinforce),
国际 (international), 完全 (fully), 出发 (departure), 这一 (on this), 了解 (understanding), 最近 (recent), 现在 (current), 各国 (each country),
必要 (necessary), 广泛 (broad), 实施 (implement), 事 (issue)
Topic
45
表示 (express), 接受 (accept), 认为 (thinks), 接受 (accept), 采访 (interview), 可能 (possible), 成为 (become), 需要 (need), 此前 (earlier), 不
会 (will not), 一个 (this), 媒体 (media), 政府 (government), 未来 (future), 时间 (time), 一直 (always), 中国外交部 (China’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs), 已经 (already), 前 (previous)
Topic
46
副 (vice), 总理 (prmier), 兼 (concurrent), 国务院 (State Council), 将于 (is expected to), 首相 (prime mnister), 宣布 (announce), 大臣
(cabinet), 邀请(invite), 协调 (coordinate), 这是 (this is), 高级 (high-level), 首次 (first time), 重建 (rebuild/ reestablish), 高度重视 (paying
great attention to/ treating seriously), 部署 (deploy), 两国 (two countries), 双边关系 (bilateral relations), 共同努力 (working together), 挑
衅 (provocation)
Topic
47
中国 (China), 中国政府 (Chinese government), 北京 (Beijing), 大使 (ambassador), 驻 (stationed), 今天 (today), 重大 (important), 一直
(always), 近日 (recent days), 强调 (reemphasize), 负责 (responsible), 作出 (made), 一系列 (a series of), 一个 (one) , 感到 (felt), 实行
(implement), 防止 (prevent), 周年 (annual), 非常 (very), 关注 (paying attention to)
Topic
48
解决 (resolve), 谈判 (negotiations), 协商 (negotatiations), 对话 (talks), 分歧 (disagreement), 争端 (dispute/ point of contention), 问题
(problem), 方式 (method), 寻求 (looking for), 妥善解决 (proper resolution), 之间 (between), 一贯主张 (consistent position), 手段 (method),
和平解决 (peaceful resolution), 坚持 (firmly uphold), 存在 (exist), 途径 (path), 希望 (hope), 认为 (think), 双边 (bilateral)

201

Topic
49
埃及 (Egypt), 王 (king), 高度 (highly), 秩序 (order), 本报 (this report), 表示 (express), 影响 (affect), 这是 (this is), 领导人 (leader), 正在
(currently), 赞赏 (praise), 事情 (issue), 社会 (society), 紧张 (tension), 未来 (future), 予以 (give this), 问题 (problem), 最近 (recent), 努力
(endeavor to)
Topic
50
维护 (maintain), 和平 (peace), 稳定 (stable), 地区 (region), 共同 (common), 大局 (situation/ grand scheme of things), 致力于 (endeavor to),
出发 (departure), 秩序 (order), 坚定 (firm), 体现 (manifest), 一道 (together), 意愿 (willingness), 协商 (negotiate), 推进 (promote), 必须
(needed), 主张 (express), 回应 (respond), 中国 (China), 繁荣 (prosperous)
Topic
51
经济 (economics), 贸易 (trade), 发展 (development), 投资 (investment), 世界 (world), 开放 (liberalize), 全球 (global), 推进 (promote), 区域
(regional), 促进 (promote), 环境 (environment), 改革 (reform), 平衡 (balance), 政策 (policy), 建设 (build), 水平 (standard), 持续 (continue),
企业 (industry), 重要 (important), 扩大 (widen)
Topic
52
合作 (cooperate), 加强 (augment), 领域 (area), 能源 (energy), 开展 (start/ expand), 共同 (common), 交流 (exchanges), 互利 (mutually-
beneficial), 愿 (willing to), 进一步 (further), 促进 (promote), 平等 (equal), 愿意 (willing to), 探讨 (explore), 主张 (advocate), 长期 (long-
term), 成为 (become), 不断 (sustainable), 国 (country), 双边 (bilateral)
Topic
53
国际 (international), 社会 (society) , 普遍 (normal), 有助于 (conductive to), 给予 (provide), 发出 (put forth), 近年来 (in recent years), 参加
(participate), 全面 (comprehensive), 手段 (methods), 认真 (diligent), 理解 (understanding), 发表 (present/ express), 迅速 (rapid), 改善
(improve), 下午 (afternoon), 务实 (pragmatic), 呼吁 (urge), 始终 (all along)
Topic
54
局势 (situation), 冲突 (conflict), 呼吁 (urge), 升级 (upgrade), 克制 (restrain), 保持 (keep), 避免 (prevent), 进一步 (further), 立即
(immediately), 停止 (stop), 紧张局势 (tense situation) , 紧张 (tense), 关切 (asking out of concern) ,恶化 (deteriorate), 各方 (each side), 造成
(result in), 导致 (result in), 尽快 (as soon as possible), 深表 (deepy), 采取 (adopt)
Topic
55
代表 (representative), 北京 (Beijing), 特别 (special), 主要 (main), 举行 (holding event), 国家 (country), 事务 (affairs), 国务委员 (State
Council), 理解 (understanding), 前往 (going to), 例行 (regular), 出席 (attend), 近期 (recently), 给予 (give), 负责人 (representative), 推动
(promote), 国际 (global), 外 (outside), 参加 (participate)
Topic
56
进行 (engage in), 应 (should), 宣布 (announce), 北京 (Beijing), 邀请 (invite), 访问 (visit), 正式 (formal), 德 (German), 例行 (regular), 招待会
(reception), 高度重视 (paying great attention to), 基础 (foundational), 可能 (possible), 根本 (basic), 各方 (all sides), 澳大利亚 (Australia),
努力 (endeavor to), 部长 (minister), 主席 (chairperson)
Topic
57
台湾 (Taiwan), 联合公报 (Joint Communique), 反对 (oppose), 承诺 (promise), 三个 (three), 中美 (US-China), 一个 (one), 原则 (principle),
台独 (Taiwanese independence), 中美关系 (US-China relations), 美国政府 (US government), 美方 (US), 政策 (policy), 恪守 (adhere), 武器
(weapons), 坚决 (firmly), 严重 (severe), 干涉 (interfere), 违反 (violate), 内政 (domestic politics)

202

Topic
58
叙利亚 (Syria), 决议 (resolution), 安理会 (Security Council), 联合国安理会 (UN Security Council), 各方 (all sides), 政治 (politics), 联合国
(UN), 支持 (support), 危机 (crisis), 解决 (resolve), 制裁 (sanctions), 呼吁 (urge), 执行 (execute), 行动 (actions), 尽快 (as soon as possible),
阿拉伯 (Arab), 一致 (consistent), 使用 (use), 有助于 (conducive to)
Topic
59
应 (should), 宣布 (announce), 进行 (progress), 访问 (visit), 邀请 (invitation), 正式 (formally), 将于 (about to), 北京 (Beijing), 国 (country),
工作 (work), 今天下午 (this afternoon), 力量 (power), 近年来 (in recent years), 只能 (can only), 外长 (Foreign Minister), 本国 (this country),
扩大 (expand), 方案 (proposal)
Topic
60
中方 (China), 保持 (keep), 沟通 (communicate), 表示 (express), 继续 (continue), 密切 (closely), 协调 (coordinate), 一直 (continue), 愿
(hope), 各方 (each side), 高度 (great attention), 推进 (promote), 推动 (promote), 渠道 (channel), 当前 (current), 势头 (situation), 关注
(paying attention), 接触 (contact), 已经 (already), 面临 (confront)
Topic
61
中方 (China), 问题 (problem), 作出 (made), 这一 (on this issue), 妥善处理 (proper treatment), 立场 (position), 表明 (expressed), 多次 (many
times), 要求 (demand), 就此 (on this), 反应 (reaction), 回应 (respond), 近日 (recently), 关切 (paying attention to), 重大 (important), 注意
(paying attention to), 上述 (aforementioned), 问 (ask), 诚意 (sincere), 期间 (duration)
Topic
62
泰国 (Thailand), 得到 (obtain), 近日 (recently), 友好邻邦 (friendly neighbor), 问题 (problem), 下午 (afternoon), 友好 (friendly), 中方
(China), 认真 (serious), 方向 (direction), 表示 (expressed), 做出 (made), 发生 (happened), 讨论 (discussion), 谈到 (mentioned), 态度
(attitude), 停止 (stop), 委员 (committee member), 今年 (this year)
Topic
63
回答 (answer), 提问 (question), 中外记者 (Chinese and foreign reporters), 主持 (host), 例行 (regular), 本报 (this report), 消息 (news), 下午
(this afternoon), 发布 (publish), 有效 (effective), 一贯主张 (persistent position), 通报 (report), 当前 (current), 势力 (power), 态度 (attitude)
Topic
64
六方会谈 (Six-party talks), 各方 (all sides), 进程 (progress), 团长 (party head), 代表团 (team of representatives), 落实 (implement), 朝鲜半
岛 (Korean Peninsula), 朝鲜 (North Korea), 无核化 (denuclearization), 行动 (actions), 进展 (progress), 协商 (negotiations), 推动 (promote),
尽早 (as soon as possible), 推进 (promote), 共同 (common), 承诺 (promise), 核 (nuclear), 具体 (substantive), 确定 (confirm)
Topic
65
招待会 (reports), 今天 (today), 北京 (Beijing), 今天下午 (this afternoon), 电 (report), 邀请 (invitation), 这位 (this), 两个 (two), 明确
(obvious), 国家 (country), 中国政府 (China government), 这是 (this), 应 (should), 引起 (triggered), 结束 (end), 今后 (from now on), 注意
(attention), 看到 (saw), 途径 (pathway), 和平 (peace)
Topic
66
中方 (China), 关切 (attention), 表示 (expressed), 利益 (interests), 严重 (severe), 损害 (violate), 敦促 (urge), 不要 (do not), 对此 (on this), 核
心 (core), 造成 (result in), 切实 (firmly), 事 (issue), 要求 (demand), 重大 (severe), 表达 (express), 强烈 (strongly), 双边 (bilateral), 停止
(stop), 敏感 (sensitive)

203

Topic
67
南海 (South China Sea), 争议 (disputes), 主权 (sovereignty), 行为 (actions), 宣言 (statement/ proclamation), 海域 (sea), 领土 (territory), 南
沙群岛 (Spratly Islands), 菲律宾 (Philippines), 建设 (building), 国际法 (international law), 非法 (illegal), 稳定 (stable), 自由 (freedom), 维护
(protect), 直接 (direct), 地区 (area), 单方面 (unilateral), 各方 (all sides), 尊重 (respect)
Topic
68
法国 (France), 德国 (Germany), 表示 (expressed), 英国 (England), 法 (France), 看到 (saw), 国 (country), 已经 (already), 国家 (country), 欧
洲 (Europe), 战争 (war), 今年 (this year), 原因 (reason), 恢复 (restore), 大量 (large amount), 具体 (substantive), 愿意 (willing), 国际
(international)
Topic
69
报告 (report), 中国 (China), 发表 (express/ publish), 内政 (domestic politics), 干涉 (interfere), 自由 (freedom), 年度 (annual), 所谓 (so-
called), 国际 (international), 停止 (stop), 委员会 (committee), 依法 (legal), 反对 (against), 宗教 (religion), 美国国务院 (US Department of
State), 对此 (on this issue), 部分 (part), 事实 (fact), 指责 (condemn), 近日 (recent)
Topic
70
中方 (China), 本报 (this report), 表示 (expressed), 例行 (regular), 北京 (Beijing), 当日 (today), 问 (ask), 是否 (whether or not), 目的
(objective), 维护 (protect), 重申 (reiterate), 中国政府 (Chinese government), 强调 (emphasize), 赴 (attending), 支持 (support)
Topic
71
美国 (US), 国务卿 (Secretary of State), 华盛顿 (Washington), 政策 (policy), 美国政府 (US government), 美 (US), 国内 (domestic), 处理
(process/ deal with), 主要 (main), 称 (claimed), 国会 (Congress), 认为 (thinks), 单方面 (unilateral), 打击 (attack), 导致 (resulting in), 这一
(this), 伤害 (harm), 允许 (permit), 一项 (one), 创造 (production)
Topic
72
报道 (report), 称 (allege), 媒体 (media) , 没有 (no), 官员 (officials), 证实 (demonstrate/ prove), 可能 (possible), 回应 (reply), 消息 (news),
相关 (related), 本报 (this report), 指责 (condemn), 未 (not yet), 媒体报道 (media reports), 人士 (individuals), 予以 (endow/ give), 当天
(today), 目前 (current), 必要 (necessary), 根本 (fundamental)
Topic
73
表示 (express), 中国政府 (Chinese government), 哀悼 (grieving), 家属 (family), 慰问 (condolences), 人员 (individuals), 深切 (deeply), 人民
(citizens), 发生 (happened), 中国外交部 (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 发表谈话 (made the statement), 继续 (continue), 感到 (feel),
深表 (deeply), 一事 (on this issue), 答记者问 (media correspondence), 对此 (on this), 表达 (express), 就此 (on this), 当天 (today)
Topic
74
应 (should), 访华 (visiting China), 北京 (Beijing), 宣布 (announce), 邀请 (invitation), 来华 (visiting China), 将于 (about to), 国务委员 (State
Councillor), 工作 (work), 中国 (China), 胡锦涛 (Hu Jintao), 亚洲 (Asia), 磋商 (negotiate), 外长 (Foreign Minister), 希望 (hope), 是否 (whether
or not), 年度 (annual)
Topic
75
表示 (expressed), 欢迎 (welcome), 赞赏 (praise), 积极 (proactive), 有助于 (will be helpful), 支持 (support), 恢复 (restore), 对此 (on this), 努
力 (endeavor to), 早日 (as early as possible), 希望 (hope), 缓和 (ameliorate), 举措 (measure), 作出 (made), 做出 (made), 实现 (actualize), 尽
早 (as soon as possible), 共同努力 (work together), 一定 (must), 十分 (fully)

204

Topic
76
有利于 (will be helpful), 稳定 (stability), 和平 (peace), 符合 (meets the standard), 地区 (regional), 利益 (interest), 根本利益 (fundamental
interest), 世界 (world), 维护 (safeguard), 亚太地区 (Asia-Pacific), 发展 (develop), 共同利益 (common interests), 繁荣 (prosperity), 指出
(pointed out), 事 (issue), 愿望 (hope), 表示 (expressed), 今天 (today), 内容 (content)
Topic
77
条约 (treaty), 中国 (China), 国家 (country), 中国政府 (Chinese government), 公司 (company), 导弹 (missiles), 国际 (global), 武器 (weapon),
制裁 (sanctions), 技术 (technology), 相关 (related), 实施 (implement), 今天 (today), 实行 (actualize), 上述 (aforementioned), 这一 (this), 防
止 (prevent), 帮助 (help), 严格 (strict), 本国 (this country)
Topic
78
外长 (foreign minister), 外交部长 (foreign minister), 王毅 (Wang Yi), 外交大臣 (foreign minister), 国外 (foreign), 两 (two), 访问 (visit), 招
待会 (reception), 外交 (diplomacy), 联合国大会 (UN General Assembly), 领导人 (leaders), 两国关系 (bilateral relations), 期间 (period), 中
方 (China), 秘书长 (secretary general), 亚洲 (Asia)
Topic
79
希望 (hope), 能够 (can), 问题 (problem), 回答 (answer), 得到 (obtain/ receive), 尽快 (as soon as possible), 妥善解决 (adequate resolution),
提问 (raised question), 出现 (appear), 非常 (very), 中方 (China), 看到 (see), 之间 (beween), 大局 (grand scheme of things), 出发 (departure),
应该 (should), 协商 (negotiate), 遵守 (abide), 保持 (maintain), 明确 (clear)
Topic
80
回答 (answer), 提问 (asked), 时说 (commented), 今天 (today), 北京 (Beijing), 最近 (recent), 一事 (issue), 这位 (this), 希望 (hope), 进一步
(further), 官方 (official), 必将 (should), 合理 (reasonable), 上述 (aforementioned), 期待 (hope), 民族 (civilization), 时期 (time), 一贯
(consistent), 中国政府 (Chinese government), 之间 (between)
Topic
81
取得 (obtain), 积极 (proactive), 进展 (progress), 成果 (result), 推动 (promote), 希望 (hope), 期待 (hope), 全面 (comprehensive), 顺利
(smooth), 共同努力 (work together), 能够 (can), 不断 (endless), 一系列 (a series of), 评价 (evaluation), 势头 (situation), 即将 (imminent),
务实 (pragmatic), 重要 (important), 意愿 (willingness), 目标 (target)
Topic
82
钓鱼岛 (Diaoyu Islands), 领土 (territory), 主权 (sovereignty), 非法 (illegal), 岛屿 (islands), 固有 (pre-existing), 日方 (Japan), 海域 (sea), 附
属 (affiliated), 拥有 (own), 侵犯 (violate), 南沙群岛 (Spratly Islands), 无可争辩 (indisputable), 附近 (surrounding), 日本 (Japan), 中国
(China), 争议 (disputes), 重申 (reiterate), 事实 (fact), 停止 (stop)
Topic
83
应 (should), 进行 (progress), 宣布 (announce), 访问 (visit), 正式 (formal), 北京 (Beijing), 将于 (imminent), 例行 (regular), 上海 (Shanghai),
今天 (today), 单方面 (unilateral), 赴 (visit), 帮助 (help), 访华 (visit China), 年度 (annual), 我国 (our country), 部长 (minister), 协定
(agreement)
Topic
84
表示 (expressed), 声明 (statement), 发表声明 (statement), 声明 (statement), 中国外交部 (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 不会 (will
not), 这一 (on this), 当天 (today), 称 (said), 发表 (expressed/ published), 已经 (already), 国家 (country), 呼吁 (urge), 强调 (emphasize), 做
出 (make), 明确 (clear), 一个 (one), 过去 (past), 联合国安理会 (UN Security Council), 政治 (politics)

205

Topic
85
问 (ask), 有何 (what), 对此 (on this issue), 评论 (comment), 中方 (China), 答记者问 (when asked by reporters), 时说 (commented when
asked), 请问 (ask), 近日 (recently), 回答 (answer), 报道 (report), 答 (answer), 期间 (time), 世界 (world), 最近 (recent), 争取 (try to obtain),
保持 (maintain), 未 (not)
Topic
86
问题 (problem), 伊朗 (Iran), 伊朗核 (Iran nuclear), 谈判 (negotiations), 外交 (diplomacy), 各方 (all sides), 努力 (endeavor to), 希望 (hope),
妥善解决 (adequate resolution), 对话 (dialogue), 解决 (resolution), 和平解决 (peaceful resolution), 寻求 (finding), 继续 (continue), 当前
(current), 制裁 (sanctions), 认为 (thinks) , 长期 (long-term), 全面 (comprehensive), 尽早 (as soon as possible)
Topic
87
反对 (oppose), 坚决 (firmly), 表示 (expressed), 对此 (on this), 形式 (manner/ format), 一贯 (consistent), 强烈不满 (strongly dissatisfied),
做法 (behavior), 不顾 (disregard), 方式 (manner/ format), 恪守 (abide), 这一 (on this), 强烈 (severe), 多次 (many times), 中国政府 (Chinese
government), 中方 (China), 国际 (international), 行为 (behavior), 问题 (problem), 近年来 (recent years)
Topic
88
问题 (problem), 双方 (both sides), 交换 (exchange), 看法 (thoughts), 意见 (opinion), 期间 (duration), 访华 (visit China), 共同 (common), 关
心 (paying attention to), 认为 (thinks), 形势 (situation), 广泛 (wide), 当前 (current), 进一步 (further), 介绍 (introduce), 阐述 (explain/
elaborate), 一致 (consistent), 不同 (different), 增进 (promote), 谈到 (when discussed)
Topic
89
公约 (Convention), 履行 (comply), 规定 (regulations), 承诺 (promise), 义务 (obligations), 责任 (responsibilities), 法律 (law), 承担 (uphold),
相关 (relevant), 权利 (privilege), 保护 (safeguard), 要求 (demand), 实施 (implement), 原则 (principle), 今后 (henceforth), 严格 (strict), 全
面 (comprehensive), 过程 (process), 违反 (violate), 认真 (serious)
Topic
90
进行 (progress), 访问 (visit), 应 (should), 邀请 (invite), 正式 (formal), 宣布 (announce), 上述 (aforementioned), 四国 (four countries), 共和
国 (republic), 将于 (about to), 北京 (Beijing), 主席 (chairperson), 来华 (visit China), 问题 (problem), 造成 (cause/ result in), 最大 (largest),
利用 (utilize), 外交 (diplomacy), 阐述 (explain/ elaborate), 事态 (situation)
Topic
91
本报 (this report), 北京 (Beijing), 例行 (regular), 上述 (aforementioned), 落实 (substantiate), 应 (should), 公开 (public), 改变 (change), 进
行 (progress), 加强 (augment), 了解 (understanding), 切实 (firmyl), 政府 (government), 泰国 (Thailand), 扩大 (expand), 商定 (economic/
business transactions)
Topic
92
对话 (dialogue), 双方 (both sides), 举行 (host), 共同 (common), 战略 (Strategic), 主持 (host), 经济 (economic), 商定 (economic/ business
transactions), 北京 (Beijing), 首次 (first time), 机制 (mechanism), 国务委员 (State Concillor), 交流 (interactions), , 高层 (high-ranking), 本报
(this report), 期待 (anticipate), 第二次 (second time), 今年 (this year), 表示 (expressed)
Topic
93
半岛 (Peninsula), 朝鲜半岛 (Korean Peninsula), 各方 (all sides), 朝鲜 (Chosun/ Korea), 和平 (peace), 对话 (dialogue), 实现 (actualize), 无核
化 (denuclearization), 维护 (keep/ safeguard), 稳定 (stable), 形势 (situation), 局势 (situation), 缓和 (ameliorate), 当前 (current), 希望
(hope), 核 (nuclear), 中方 (China), 协商 (negotiations), 和平解决 (peaceful resolution), 目标 (target)

206

Topic
94
表示 (expressed) , 之后 (from now on), 均 (all), 始终 (since the beginning), 一次 (once), 来华 (visit China), 过程 (process), 正常 (normal), 切
实 (firmly), 严重 (severe), 建议 (suggestion), 感到 (feel), 加强 (augment), 取得 (obtain), 今年 (this year), 人士 (people), 良好 (good), 近日
(recently), 出现 (appear)
Topic
95
支持 (support), 恐怖主义 (terrorism), 国际 (international), 社会 (society), 打击 (suppress), 维护 (safeguard), 稳定 (stable), 中方 (China), 势
力 (forces), 形式 (format), 坚定 (firmly), 反对 (oppose), 努力 (endeavor to), 安全 (safety), 愿同 (hope to work together), 继续 (continue), 所
作 (behavior), 实施 (implement), 威胁 (threat), 不懈努力 (continued endeavors)
Topic
96
美方 (US), 美国 (US), 美 (US), 中方 (China), 敦促 (urge), 中美关系 (US-China relations), 停止 (stop), 美国政府 (US government), 违反
(violate), 法 (law), 损害 (damage), 造成 (result in), 近日 (recently), 美国国务院 (US Secretary of State), 错误 (mistake), 不利于 (not
conducive), 行径 (behavior), 中美 (US-China), 请问 (ask), 允许 (permit)
Topic
97
主席 (chairperson), 总统 (president), 胡锦涛 (Hu Jintao), 国家 (country), 国事访问 (state visit), 邀请 (invitation), 宣布 (announce), 应
(should), 进行 (progress), 此前 (before this), 建立 (establish), 遭到 (receive), 本报 (this report), 今天 (today), 工作 (work), 将于 (about to),
扩大 (expand), 保护 (protection), 企业 (industry) , 表达 (communicate)
Topic
98
新闻 (news), 发布会 (conference), 今天 (today), 今天下午 (this afternoon), 我国 (our country), 北京 (Beijing), 这位 (this person), 举行 (host),
最近 (recently), 这是 (this is), 中国外交部 (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 提出 (raised), 今年 (this year), 引起 (triggered), 现在 (now),
中国政府 (Chinese government), 确认 (confirm), 下午 (this afternoon)
Topic
99
中方 (China), 表示 (expressed), 一贯 (consistent), 日前 (recently), 对此 (on this issue), 积极 (proactive), 相信 (believe), 近期 (recently), 人
民 (people/ citizens), 目前 (recently), 必要 (necessary), 中国外交部 (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 公正 (fair), 立场 (attitude), 一部分
(partial), 国内 (domestic), 事实 (fact)
Topic
100
发展 (develop), 改善 (improve), 关系 (relations), 两国关系 (bilateral relations), 希望 (hope), 政治 (politics), 基础 (foundations), 困难
(difficulty), 影响 (effect/ affect), 重视 (paying great attention to), 重要 (important), 当前 (current), 出现 (appear), 消除 (dissolve), 原则
(principle), 障碍 (obstacle), 之间 (between), 切实 (firmly), 面临 (confront), 回到 (return to)
Topic
101
提出 (raised), 问题 (problem), 主张 (advocate), 建议 (suggest), 使用 (use), 方案 (proposal), 提交 (raised), 指出 (point out), 这一 (this is), 方
面 (aspect), 认为 (thinks), 审议 (judgment), 内容 (content), 研究 (research), 认真 (serious), 目标 (target), 外 (outside/ foreign), 讨论
(discuss), 一项 (one item), 中国 (China)

207

Topic
102
世界 (world), 各国 (all countries), 重要 (important), 发展 (development), 促进 (promote), 具有 (contain), 意义 (meaning), 影响 (effect/
affect), 最大 (largest), 国家 (country), 共同 (common), 成为 (become), 建立 (establish), 广泛 (broad), 国际 (global), 成功 (success), 一次
(one time), 产生 (produce), 精神 (spirit), 繁荣 (prosperity)
Topic
103
提供 (provide), 阿富汗 (Afghanistan), 中国政府 (Chinese government), 援助 (aid), 人道主义 (humanitarian) , 帮助 (assist), 人民 (citizens),
紧急 (emergency), 重建 (rebuild), 决定 (decide), 工作 (work), 需要 (need), 支持 (support), 考虑 (contemplate), 发生 (happened), 友好
(friendly), 困难 (difficulty), 早日 (recently), 中国外交部 (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Topic
104
外交部长 (foreign minister), 访问 (visit), 邀请 (invite), 宣布 (announce), 正式 (formal), 应 (should), 进行 (progress), 王毅 (Wang Yi), 国务
委员 (State Councillor), 共和国 (republic), 将于 (about to), 北京 (Beijing), 重申 (reiterate), 原则 (principle), 国务院 (State Council), 今天下
午 (this afternoon)
Topic
105
关系 (relations), 发展 (develop), 两国 (two countries), 基础 (foundations), 建交 (establish diplomatic relations), 友好合作 (friendly
cooperation), 建立 (establish), 两国人民 (citizens of both countries), 和平共处 (peaceful co-eixstence), 友好 (friendly), 五项原则 (five
principles), 睦邻友好 (friendly neighbor), 长期 (long-term), 两国关系 (bilateral relations), 根本利益 (fundamental interests), 周年
(anniversary), 符合 (consistent with), 重视 (paying great attention to), 互利 (mutually-beneficial), 原则 (principle)
Topic
106
日本 (Japan), 历史 (history), 亚洲 (Asia), 侵略 (aggression), 日方 (Japan), 军国主义 (militarism), 反省 (reflect), 邻国 (neighboring countries),
正视 (pay serious attention), 日本政府 (Japanese government), 人民 (people), 实际行动 (substantive actions), 过去 (past), 日本首相
(Japanese Prime Minister), 战争 (war), 敦促 (urge), 感情 (feelings), 内阁 (cabinet), 表态 (expressed attitude), 承诺 (promise)
Topic
107
委员会 (committee), 人民 (people), 全国 (the whole country), 选举 (elections), 尊重 (respect), 选择 (choice), 国家 (country), 最高 (highest),
成立 (establish), 政治 (politics), 顺利 (smoothly), 民族 (civilization), 机构 (organization), 公布 (announce), 重建 (rebuild), 领导 (leadership),
举行 (holding), 获得 (obtatin), 独立 (independence), 这是 (this is)
Topic
108
台湾 (Taiwan), 一个 (one), 台湾当局 (Taiwan’s governing bodies), 所谓 (so-called), 中国 (China), 两个 (two), 原则 (principle), 一部分 (a
part of), 参与 (participate), 制造 (manufacture), 分裂 (secession), 没有 (no), 承认 (admit), 图谋 (conspiracy), 唯一 (only), 主权国家
(sovereign country), 加入 (join), 世界 (world), 中华人民共和国 (People’s Republic of China), 企图 (attempt)
Topic
109
需要 (need), 一定 (must), 中国外交部 (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 今天 (today), 这一 (this), 下午 (this afternoon), 创造 (create), 予
以 (give) ,谈到 (spoke about), 处理 (take care of), 事情 (issue), 北京 (Beijing), 现在 (now), 情况 (situation), 途径 (pathway), 相信 (trust), 不
断 (continue), 两个 (two)

208

Topic
110
出席 (attend), 论坛 (forum), 峰会 (summit), 举行 (holding), 亚洲 (Asia), 会议 (meeting), 开幕式 (opening ceremony), 发表 (publish/
announce), 领导人 (leaders), 经济 (economics), 与会 (attending the meeting), 应邀 (responding to invitation), 世界 (world), 期间 (duration),
今年 (this year), 讲话 (speech), 外国 (foreign countries), 应 (should), 召开 (host), 旨在 (the objective is)
Topic
111
北京 (Beijing), 本报 (this report), 报道 (report), 例行 (regular), 国务院 (State Council), 进一步 (further), 评论 (commentary), 目的 (purpose),
发布 (publish/ announce), 审议 (judgment/ verdict), 中国 (China), 要求 (demand), 基础 (foundation), 两国关系 (bilateral relations), 人民
(citizens), 就此 (on this), 过去 (past), 邻国 (neighboring countries)
Topic
112
两国 (two countries), 双方 (both sides), 合作 (cooperate), 交流 (exchange), 领域 (area), 交往 (interact), 增进 (promote), 扩大 (expand), 良
好 (healthy), 不断 (continued), 高层 (high-ranking), 友好 (friendly), 重要 (important), 发展 (develop), 保持 (continue), 推动 (promote), 经
贸 (economic and trade), 两国关系 (bilateral relations), 互信 (mutual trust), 文化 (culture)
Topic
113
努力 (endeavor to), 作出 (making), 继续 (continue), 做出 (making), 贡献 (contribution), 积极 (proactive), 一道 (together), 愿 (willing), 推动
(promote), 促进 (promote), 愿意 (willing), 不懈努力 (continue to endeavor to), 赞赏 (praise), 发展 (develop), 体现 (manifest), 更大 (larger),
一如既往 (as always), 重视 (paying great attention to), 强调 (emphasize), 不断 (continued)
Topic
114
西藏 (Tiber), 中国 (China), 内政 (domestic politics), 干涉 (interfere), 分裂 (secession), 活动 (movements), 一部分 (partial), 停止 (stop), 支
持 (supporting), 宗教 (religion), 接触 (contact), 从事 (involved in), 反对 (oppose), 外国 (foreign countries), 祖国 (motherland), 独立
(independence), 利用 (exploiting), 事务 (affairs), 承认 (acknowledge), 领土 (territory)
Topic
115
关系 (relations), 发展 (develop), 进一步 (further), 促进 (promote), 加强 (improve), 友好合作 (friendly cooperation), 相信 (trust), 之间
(between), 合作 (cooperate), 增进 (promote), 重视 (paying great attention to), 良好 (healthy), 推动 (promote), 全面 (comprehensive), 必将
(necessary), 深化 (deepen), 一次 (one), 向前 (moving forward), 坚持 (maintain), 了解 (understand)
Topic
116
安全 (safety), 国家 (country), 地区 (area), 部署 (install), 战略 (strategic), 威胁 (threaten), 维护 (maintain), 保障 (promise), 计划 (proposal),
注意 (careful), 平衡 (balance), 不利于 (not conducive to), 和平 (peace), 破坏 (destroy), 正视 (take it seriously), 首次 (first time), 不断
(endless), 迅速 (quickly), 必要 (necessary), 配合 (cooperate)
Topic
117
活动 (activities), 中国 (China), 进行 (progress), 北京 (Beijing), 从事 (involved in), 招待会 (reception), 参加 (participate), 今年 (this year), 指
责 (condemn), 允许 (allow), 本报 (this report), 是否 (yes or no), 干扰 (interfere), 导致 (resulting in), 官方 (official), 磋商 (bargain), 发出
(sending out), 保障 (promise), 成为 (become), 共同利益 (common interest)

209

Topic
118
中国 (China), 均 (all), 措施 (measures), 即将 (about to), 发表 (publish/ announce), 可能 (possible), 坚定 (firmly), 确保 (ensure), 立场
(position), 成为 (become), 基本 (basic), 明确 (clear), 建交 (establishing diplomatic relations), 涉及 (involved in), 提高 (raise), 出发
(departure), 信息 (information), 中国政府 (Chinese government)
Topic
119
会议 (meeting), 召开 (hosting), 举行 (hosting), 讨论 (discuss), 讨论 (discussion), 出席 (attend), 与会 (attending meeting), 参加 (attend), 第
二次 (second), 联合 (united), 协调 (mediate), 委员会 (committee), 主持 (host), 代表 (representative), 首次 (first), 理事会 (council), 首都
(capitol), 即将 (about to), 此前 (before this), 派 (send), 准备 (prepare)
Topic
120
国家 (country), 非洲 (Africa), 支持 (support), 发展 (develop), 阿拉伯 (Arab), 开展 (expand), 方式 (method), 中国 (China), 理解
(understanding), 友好 (friendly), 选择 (selection), 世界 (world), 帮助 (helping), 认为 (thinks), 之后 (after), 进一步 (further), 可能 (possible),
北京 (Beijing)
Topic
121
中国 (China), 外国 (foreign countries), 中国政府 (Chinese government), 企业 (industry), 进行 (progress), 调查 (investigation), 进入 (enter),
正常 (normal), 部分 (partial), 依法 (according to law), 法律 (law), 事件 (situation), 中华人民共和国 (People’s Republic of China), 再次
(again), 予以 (give), 大量 (large amount), 部门 (department), 立即 (immediate), 渠道 (channels)
Topic
122
新 (new), 一个 (one), 表示 (expressed), 重要 (important), 阶段 (stage), 认为 (think), 这是 (this is), 结束 (end), 进入 (enter), 全面
(comprehensive), 需要 (need), 时期 (time period), 文件 (document), 成功 (success), 继续 (continue), 政治 (politics), 非常 (very), 核心 (core),
一步 (one step)
Topic
123
配合 (cooperate), 表示 (expressed), 合作 (cooperate), 处理 (treatment), 不会 (will not), 根本 (fundamental), 例行 (regular), 准备 (prepare),
有助于 (will be helpful for), 正常 (normal), 今后 (from now on), 去年 (last year), 证实 (confirm), 世界 (world), 联系 (communicate), 一次
(one), 中方 (China), 实行 (actualize), 支持 (support)
Topic
124
双方 (two sides), 达成 (achieve), 共识 (consensus), 问题 (problem), 磋商 (negotiate), 一致 (agreed), 原则 (principle), 协商 (negotiate), 两国
(two countries), 落实 (substantiate), 讨论 (discuss), 尽早 (as soon as possible), 精神 (spirit), 接触 (contact), 具体 (concrete), 方案 (proposal),
进一步 (one step further), 共同努力 (work together), 是否 (yes or not), 今后 (from now on)
Topic
125
柬埔寨 (Cambodia), 越南 (Vietnam), 问题 (problem), 解决 (resolve), 政治 (politics), 公正 (fair), 全面 (comprehensive), 实现 (actualize), 军
队 (army), 合理 (reasonable), 支持 (support), 继续 (continue), 最近 (recent), 真正 (real), 诚意 (sincere), 侵略 (aggression), 两 (two), 国
(country), 国际 (global), 民主 (democracy)

210

Topic
126
磋商 (negotiate), 北京 (Beijing), 举行 (host), 副部长 (vice minister), 中国外交部 (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 事务 (affairs), 助理
(assistant), 部长 (minister), 国务卿 (Secretary of State), 深入 (deepen), 今天 (today), 官员 (officials), 交换意见 (exchange thoughts), 工作
(work), 商定 (agreements), 下午 (afternoon), 来华 (visit China), 秘书长 (Secretary General), 广泛 (broad)
Topic
127
北京 (Beijing), 本报 (this report), 例行 (regular), 宣布 (announce), 出席 (attend), 是否 (yes or no), 活动 (activities), 副委员长 (vice
committee chairperson), 联合 (united), 商定 (agreements), 两国关系 (bilateral), 希望 (hope), 国外 (foreign), 处理 (treatment)
Topic
128
会谈 (meeting), 问题 (problem), 举行 (host), 核 (nuclear), 进行 (progress), 参加 (participate), 讨论 (discuss), 认为 (thinks), 同意 (agree), 继
续 (continue), 希望 (hope), 直接 (directly), 去年 (last year), 是否 (yes or no), 态度 (attitude), 中国外交部 (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs),
接受 (accept), 一直(continue), 做出 (make), 立场 (position)
Topic
129
邀请 (invitation), 进行 (progress), 宣布 (announce), 访问 (visit), 正式 (formal), 将于 (about to), 北京 (Beijing), 期间 (duration) , 杨洁篪 (Yang
Jiechi), 国务委员 (State Councillor), 看法 (opinion), 官员 (officials), 非常 (very), 符合 (in agreement with), 共和国 (republic), 答记者问
(responded when asked by reporters), 谈到 (mentioned)
Topic
130
巴基斯坦 (Pakistan), 印度 (India), 表示 (expressed), 北京 (Beijing), 真诚 (sincere), 上述 (aforementioned), 友好邻邦 (friendly neighbor), 首
都 (capitol), 介绍 (introduce), 联合 (united), 社会 (society), 答记者问 (responded when asked by reporters), 希望 (hope), 方向 (direction),
中国外交部 (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 方面 (aspect), 增进 (promote), 评论(commentary)
Topic
131
主席 (chairperson), 江泽民 (Jiang Zemin), 总统 (president), 邀请 (invitation), 今天 (today), 应 (should), 进行 (progress), 招待会 (reception),
国事访问 (state visit), 国家 (country), 宣布 (announce), 将于(about to), 我国 (our country), 中华人民共和国 (People’s Republic of China),
今天下午 (this afternoon), 政府 (government), 今后 (from now on), 意义 (meaning)
Topic
132
欧盟 (European Union), 国家 (country), 欧洲 (Europe), 高级 (high-ranking), 国际 (global), 表示 (expressed), 一个 (one), 政策 (policy), 今年
(this year), 实施 (implement), 机制 (mechanism), 全球 (global), , 代表 (representative), 措施 (measures), 可能 (possible), 组织
(organization), 反对 (against), 应对 (address)
Topic
133
人员 (personnel), 驻 (stationed/ deployed), 公民 (citizens), 安全 (safety), 使馆 (consulate), 名 (name), 机构 (organization), 目前 (now), 要
求 (demand), 确保 (ensure), 协助 (assist), 尽快 (as soon as possible), 事件 (incident), 时间 (time), 保护 (protect), 立即 (immediate), 情况
(situation), 前往 (going to), 部门 (department), 联系 (contact)
Topic
134
发展 (development), 和平 (peace), 军事 (military affairs), 政策 (policy), 道路 (path), 坚持 (persist), 走 (embark), 稳定 (stability), 奉行
(abiding by), 军队 (military), 力量 (power), 威胁 (threat), 世界 (world), 互信 (mutual trust), 领域 (area), 始终 (from beginning to end), 增进
(increase), 表示 (expressed), 原因 (reason), 正常 (normal)

211

Topic
135
领导人 (leaders), 会晤 (meeting), 举行 (host), 非正式 (informal), 期间 (duration), 出席 (attend), 今年 (this year), 一次 (one time), 双边
(bilateral), 未来 (future), 重大 (important), 去年 (last year), 第二次 (second time), 各方 (each side), 表示 (expressed), 配合 (cooperate), 国
务委员 (State Councillor), 韩国 (Korea), 争取 (seizing the opportunity), 进一步 (further)
Topic
136
日本 (Japan), 日方 (Japan), 中日 (China-Japan), 中日关系 (Sino-Japanese relations), 日本政府 (Japanese government), 东京 (Tokyo), 首相
(Prime Minister), 日本首相 (Japanese Prime Minister), 联合声明 (joint statement), 文件 (document), 精神 (spirit), 内阁 (cabinet), 期间
(duration), 大局 (grand scheme of things), 做出 (make), 制造 (produce), 事 (issue), 防止 (prevent), 解决问题 (solve the problem)
Topic
137
问题 (problem), 解决 (solve), 政治 (politics), 努力 (endeavor to), 基础 (foundation), 早日 (as soon as possible), 合理 (reasonable), 认为
(thinks), 得到 (obtain), 所作 (the behavior), 公正 (justice), 精神 (spirit), 全面 (comprehensive), 考虑 (contemplate), 一个 (one), 一贯主张
(consistent position), 这一 (this), 致力于 (contribute towards), 两个 (two), 基本 (foundational)
Topic
138
本报 (this report), 北京 (Beijing), 表示 (expressed), 例行 (regular), 当日 (today), 正确 (correct), 近日 (recently), 媒体(media), 报道 (report),
共同 (common), 联合 (united), 已经 (already), 商定 (agreement), 日前 (recently), 国际 (global)
Topic
139
发展 (development), 推动 (promote), 稳定 (stable), 共同努力 (work together), 愿 (willing), 向前 (moving forward), 健康 (healthy), 关系
(relationship), 继续 (continue), 不断 (continue), 一道 (together), 两国关系 (bilateral relations), 高度重视 (paying great attention to), 愿同
(willingness), 持续 (continue), 长期 (long-term), 战略 (strategic), 重视 (paying great attention to), 共同利益 (common interests), 中方
(China)
Topic
140
外交 (diplomacy), 北京 (Beijing), 本报 (this report), 部长 (minister), 宣布 (announces), 例行 (regular), 大臣 (cabinet member), 杨洁篪 (Yang
jiechi), 对外 (external-facing), 渠道 (channels), 工作 (work), 首相 (prime minister), 访华 (visit China), 方向 (direction), 中国 (China), 外交
部长 (foreign minister), 保障 (guarantee), 深表 (deeply)
Topic
141
政府 (government), 决定 (decide), 北京 (Beijing), 间 (duration), 作出 (made), 上述 (aforementioned), 内容 (content), 是否 (yes or no), 应对
(address), 情况 (situation), 建立 (build), 同意 (agree), 产生 (produce), 问题 (problems), 表示 (expressed), 部分 (part), 未来 (future), 最终
(final), 支持 (support)
Topic
142
作用 (function), 发挥 (exert), 积极 (proactive), 建设性 (constructive), 推动 (promote), 继续 (continue), 中方 (China), 重要 (important), 各
方 (all sides), 支持 (support) , 愿 (willing), 一直 (continue), 一道 (together), 评价 (evaluation), 问题 (problem), 致力于 (contribute towards),
更大 (bigger), 始终 (from beginning to end), 机制 (mechanism), 变化 (change)
Topic
143
韩国 (Korea), 朝鲜 (Chosun) , 韩 (Korea), 进行 (progress), 表示 (expressed), 朝鲜半岛 (Korean Peninsula), 联合 (united/ joint), 本报 (this
report), 举行 (host), 改善 (improve), 关系 (relations), 强调 (emphasize), 当天 (on that day), 之间 (between), 战争 (war), 相关 (related), 方
向 (direction), 渠道 (channel)

212

Topic
144
中方 (China), 表示 (expressed), 本报 (this report), 例行 (regular), 当日 (on that day), 精神 (spirit), 坚定 (firm), 近期 (recent), 做出 (made),
回应 (respond), 相关 (related), 敦促 (urge), 今年 (this year), 真正 (real/ actual)
Topic
145
采取 (adopt), 措施 (measure), 行动 (actions), 切实 (substantive), 可能 (possible), 要求 (demand), 进一步 (one step further), 消除 (resolve) ,
影响 (affect/ effect), 导致 (result in), 必要 (necessary) ,保护 (protect), 一系列 (a series of), 制定 (implement), 一贯主张 (consistent position),
公布 (public), 原因 (reason), 单方面 (unilateral), 带来 (bring), 不同 (different)
Topic
146
中国 (China), 北京 (Beijing), 南非 (South Africa), 今天 (today), 进行 (progress), 这是 (this is), 国家 (country), 最近 (latest), 新 (new), 一事
(the issue), 争取 (try to obtain), 领导人 (leaders), 旨在 (the objective is), 一次 (once), 公布 (announce), 予以 (give), 这一 (this), 成功
(successful), 重申 (reiterate), 实行 (substantiate)
Topic
147
苏丹 (Sudan), 地区 (area), 中方 (China), 和平 (peace), 表示 (expressed), 双方 (both sides), 继续 (continue), 平等 (equal), 冲突 (conflict), 关
注 (paying attention to), 工作 (work), 首都 (capitol), 间 (between), 和平解决 (peaceful resolution), 全面 (comprehensive), 希望 (hope), 同
意 (agree to), 正式 (formal)
Topic
148
中方 (China), 印尼 (Indonesia), 表示 (expressed), 回答 (answer), 愿意 (willing), 推动 (promote), 各项 (various items), 开展 (develop), 官员
(officials), 接触 (contact), 今后 (from now on), 提问 (raised the question), 实现 (substantiate), 加强 (improve), 负责人 (person in charge),
平等 (equal), 共同努力 (working together)
Topic
149
人民 (citizens), 中国政府 (Chinese government), 当局 (the governing body), 强烈 (strongly), 谴责 (condemn), 支持 (support), 发表谈话
(delivered a statement), 今天 (today), 民族 (civilization), 行径 (behavior), 立即 (immediately), 公然 (public), 坚决 (firmly oppose), 广大
(broad), 完全 (fully), 严重 (severe), 遭到 (received), 感情 (feelings), 指出 point out), 伤害 (hurt)
Topic
150
国际 (global), 应对 (response), 发展中国家 (developing country), 全球 (global), 发展中国家 (developing country), 全球 (global), 改革
(reform), 挑战 (challenge), 能力 (capability), 目标 (goal), 框架 (framework), 加强 (improve), 社会 (society), 共同 (together), 提供 (provide),
各国 (each country), 面临 (confront), 原则 (principle), 方面 (side), 提高 (increase), 持续 (continue), 环境 (environment)

213

Appendix #4: Validation

I perform two validation tests.

The first validation test involves testing whether the frequency of documents track with the years in which the event covered
by the documents happened. For example, if a set of documents has been identified as being related to Diaoyu Island disputes,
then we should expect these documents to appear more frequently between 2010 to 2012, when the disputes were the most
intense in real life. I provide four examples here.

214

My first example is topic 82, Diaoyu Island disputes, which should be the most intense between 2010 and 2012 when a series of
incidents broke out, such as the nationalization of the Islands in 2012 by the Noda administration. From the top left corner of
the graph, one can see that this topic is indeed the most salient during 2010-2012. I repeat similar tests for Malaysia Airlines
370 crash (topic 41, which happened in 2014), South China Sea disputes (topic 67, which intensified after 2010), and the
Cambodian-Vietnamese war (topic 125, where the peace talks began in 1985 and concluded in 1989). All results are consistent
with expectations, validating my model.

215

In my second validation test, I examine differences in sentiment scores between topics. If my model and sentiment analysis are
performing well, I expect sentiment scores for documents belonging to “sovereignty”, “one China policy”, “South China Sea (SCS)”,
“US-China-Taiwan relations”, “Tibet”, and “Diaoyu Islands” to have lower average sentiment scores in comparison to documents
belonging to positive topics, such as “China’s partnerships”, “economic cooperation”, “globalization”, “Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO)”, or “Sino-ASEAN and Sino-Russia Cooperation”. This is because the former group of topics contains
contentious issues over which the MFA is more likely to express dissatisfaction, whereas the latter group of topics entails China’s
diplomatic achievements, which are more likely to receive praises from the MFA. The following graph presents the results. They
are consistent with expectations, validating my model and sentiment analysis.

216

Appendix #5: Sensitivity Analysis
The following table summarizes my results at different sentiment percentiles. The expected observable implication is that
smaller states (the cells highlighted in yellow) should trigger a significant portion of China’s status complaints. This number
should hover around 56% or so, consistent with the results I present in the main text. Results from the sensitivity analysis
suggest that moving the threshold around does not alter my results.

Sentiment Percentile 1 2 3 Total

% for 1 % for 2 % for 3 1+2
55% 233 177 321 731

0.318741 0.242134 0.439124 0.560876
50% 230 171 311 712

0.323034 0.240169 0.436798 0.563202
45% 211 165 304 680

0.310294 0.242647 0.447059 0.552941
40% 209 153 294 656

0.318598 0.233232 0.448171 0.551829
35% 202 143 282 627

0.322169 0.22807 0.449761 0.550239
30% 192 134 263 589

0.325976 0.227504 0.44652 0.55348
25% 162 119 244 525

0.308571 0.226667 0.464762 0.535238
20% 147 105 218 470

0.312766 0.223404 0.46383 0.53617
15% 111 81 186 378

0.293651 0.214286 0.492063 0.507937
10% 82 54 136 272

0.301471 0.198529 0.5 0.5
5% 43 31 82 156

0.275641 0.198718 0.525641 0.474359

Legend:
Category #1: China makes a status complaint against a smaller state, due to the actions of that smaller state.

Category #2: China makes a status complaint against a great power, due to the actions of a smaller state.

Category #3: China makes a status complaint against a great power, due to the actions of that great power

Abstract (if available)

Abstract Why do rising powers become dissatisfied with their status and challenge the existing order and/ or initiate conflict? The answer is essential for analyzing the causes and dynamics of interstate competition, and it has clear implications for contemporary US-China relations. In this dissertation, I advance a bottom-up theory of how status competitions unfold in world politics. My theory overturns the conventional wisdom, which suggests that status dissatisfaction and interstate competition happen when the established powers at the top of the hierarchy refuse to recognize the rising powers as equals. My theory unfolds in two steps. ❧ First, I argue that provocations from smaller states can make rising powers become insecure about their status, and rising powers are especially sensitive to such provocations in the initial stages of power transitions because they tend to “kiss up kick down” early on. Through automated text analysis of primary documents from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1978 to 2018 (N = 8581), I find that provocations from smaller states trigger the majority of China’s complaints about its status, and such provocations are especially salient in the early days of China’s rise. In fact, provocations from smaller states trigger 70% of China’s most severe status complaints. I validate these results through a nationwide survey in China (N = 4080), and I illustrate the causal mechanisms through (archival) evidence from the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 and the going South China Sea disputes. ❧ Second, I argue that provocations from smaller states can trigger and/ or exacerbate the competition for status between rising powers and the established powers. In “the blame game”, provocations from smaller states can start the fire. I illustrate this dynamic by tracing how the South China Sea disputes evolved between the US, China, and the Philippines from 2009 onwards. Using an original dataset of official Chinese media coverage of the South China Sea disputes from 2009 to 2020 (N = 428), I show how China tried to address its status insecurities arising from the Philippines’ provocations by blaming the US and its allies to save face internationally and retain domestic legitimacy. Yet, China’s blame strategy created action-reactions between the US and China, triggering the US-China competition for status. ❧ In “the imitation game”, provocations from smaller states can add fuel to the fire. I illustrate this dynamic by intentionally replicating the existing status literature’s empirics on status competitions among European great powers before World War I. I show that status disputes between Austria-Hungary and Serbia from 1903 to 1914ㅡand the former’s decision to take military actions in 1914ㅡexacerbated the preexisting competition for prestige among the Powers. The Monarchy’s initial motivation was to restore its prestige through limited military actions in the face of provocations from Serbia, again suggesting that status dissatisfaction and interstate competition can often unfold from the bottom-upㅡeven in the empirical setting that the existing status literature favors.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Lin, Alex Yu-Ting (author)

Core Title Challenges from below: the origins of status competitions in world politics

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science and International Relations

Degree Conferral Date 2021-12

Publication Date 11/20/2023

Defense Date 07/31/2021

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag hierarchy,international relations theory,interstate conflict,OAI-PMH Harvest,revisionism,security studies,status,US-China relations

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Kang, David (committee chair), Glaser, Charles (committee member), James, Patrick (committee member), Junn, Jane (committee member)

Creator Email alexyutinglin@gmail.com,linyutin@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC17239461

Unique identifier UC17239461

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