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University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses
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Gender and sexuality in Dutch, British, and US politicial debates on multiculturalism, Islam, and Muslims between 1999 and 2006
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Gender and sexuality in Dutch, British, and US politicial debates on multiculturalism, Islam, and Muslims between 1999 and 2006
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Content
GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN DUTCH, BRITISH, AND US POLITICAL
DEBATES ON
MULTICULTURALISM, ISLAM, AND MUSLIMS BETWEEN 1999 AND 2006
by
Jung-Whan de Jong
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(SOCIOLOGY)
August 2009
Copyright 2009 Jung-Whan de Jong
ii
Dedication
For Mies, George, and Ziv
iii
Acknowledgements
The completion of my doctorate and dissertation has been made possible by the love,
support, guidance, feedback, and encouragement of so many people in my past and
present. I especially would like to thank the following people: my partner and soul mate -
Ziv - for his unconditional patience, love, and support; my mom and dad - Mies and
George - who never stopped believing in me (even when they told us that I could not do it
all those years ago and did we prove them wrong!); my dear friends - Gerald, Ric, and
Colin - for their friendship and support; auntie Anne, for those wonderful times in
London; my dissertation committee - Elaine Bell Kaplan, Michael Messner, and Alison
Dundes Renteln - for their patience, mentorship, guidance, and insightful comments; and
the Sociology Department - especially Stachelle Overland and Amber Thomas - for all of
their help over the years. Thank you all!
iv
Table of Contents
Dedication ii
Acknowledgements iii
Abstract v
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Chapter 2: Multiculturalism in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, 33
and the United States
Chapter 3: Research Methods 56
Table 1: A sample of Categories in the Netherlands Un-collapsed 62
Figure 1: Example of Axial Coding 67
Chapter 4: The Netherlands 70
Chapter 5: The United Kingdom 134
Chapter 6: The United States 180
Chapter 7: Conclusion: Sexuality and Gender in Debates on 222
Islam and Muslims
Bibliography 257
Appendix I: Dutch Categories identified at the first
data collection stage 273
Appendix II: British Categories identified at the first
data collection stage 274
Appendix III: US Categories identified at the first
data collection stage 275
v
Abstract
This dissertation explores how Dutch, British, and US political parties used gender and
sexuality in discussions about Muslims, Islam, and cultural diversity in party brochures,
pamphlets, and platforms between 1999 and 2006. Differences in parties’ use of gender
and sexuality can be explained by looking at the way in which they constructed national
identity and their attitude towards cultural diversity. In the Netherlands, sexuality
(particularly LGBT rights) and gender (women’s equality) were used to emphasize the
importance of inburgering (integration) of Muslims. Both were considered part of Dutch
norms and values - the ‘intolerance of intolerance’ - and, through this inclusion, the
Dutch national identity. British and US parties excluded gender and, especially, sexuality
from their construction of national identity. They also seldom engaged in discussions
about Islam and Muslims. In the few instances that they did, only a handful of parties
linked these discussions to sexuality or gender. Furthermore, I examine how gender and
sexuality contributed to the racialization of Muslims and Islam in the Netherlands.
Political parties portrayed Muslims as a homogenous racial group whose religious beliefs
and cultural practices were incompatible with those prevalent in mainstream society. It is
through discussions about the social presence of Muslims and Islam that gender and
sexuality played important roles in their racialization. This dissertation adds to the body
of work in political sociology, which lacks a focus on gender and sexuality. Both,
however, play important roles in politics, the establishment of political institutions,
multiculturalism, and the construction of nationalism. It also contributes to the sociology
of race. Research on race misses concrete discussions of the way in which it intersects
with religion, nationalism, gender, and sexuality.
1
Chapter One: Introduction
The ‘Religious Identity Line’
Modood (2006) observes that the problem of the 21
st
century is no longer one of
the ‘color line’ (DuBois 1903), but one of ‘religious identity’. This observation is
particularly true for Dutch society between 1999 and 2006, the time period that this
dissertation focuses on. During this period, political parties debated whether Muslims and
Islam formed a threat to Dutch democracy. This dissertation examines how gender and
sexuality were used in political debates on Islam and Muslims in three countries: the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I argue that the ways in which
parties discussed sexuality and gender can be explained by looking at their construction
of national identity and attitude towards cultural diversity. Both, in turn, were influenced
by each country’s social history. While I, technically, make cross-national comparisons,
countries’ different political systems and social histories complicate in-depth discussions
of these comparisons. (Later on in this Chapter, I will explain how both may affect the
data analysis.) Because of this difficulty, I focus predominantly on the Netherlands and
use the British and US case studies to bring out the contours of the Dutch situation more
clearly.
I used Pandit’s (1996) grounded theory approach (which lets theory emerge from
data rather than data from theory) to identify and analyze discourses embedded in Dutch,
British, and US party brochures, pamphlets, and platforms (see Chapter Three). I
2
analyzed these documents because they are the ‘public calling cards’ of parties. They
represent their official public stance on issues. Because I used grounded theory, this
dissertation is not based on a set of testable hypotheses. Instead, I formulated two
research questions for which I hoped that the theory would help me find answers:
1. How are gender and sexuality used in political debates on Muslims and Islam
in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States between 1999 and
2006?
a) What role does national identity play in the use of gender and sexuality
in these political debates?
2. How do gender and sexuality contribute to the racialization of Muslims in the
Netherlands between 1999 and 2006?
My dissertation adds to the body of work in political sociology. Political
sociology tends to lack a focus on gender and sexuality, even though both play important
roles in politics, the establishment of political institutions, multiculturalism, and the
construction of nationalism. It also contributes to the sociology of race. Research on race
often misses discussions of the ways in which it intersects with religion, gender,
nationalism, and sexuality. In the remainder of this Chapter and in Chapter Two, I will
explain in more detail the theoretical assumptions on which my dissertation rests, how I
became interested in the topic, and why I am using brochures, pamphlets, and political
platforms as research data. I also will discuss the concepts of nationalism and
3
multiculturalism in more detail and provide an historical overview of race and ethnic
relations in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States with a specific
focus on Muslims.
The Lower House Debate
I grew up in the Netherlands, but it was not until the late 1990s that I began to
take notice of sociologist Pim Fortuyn. I recall seeing him for the first time in 1997, while
he was engaged in a heated debate with Social-Democratic politician-turned-television
host Marcel van Dam on the current affairs program The Lower House. Fortuyn (1997)
had been invited to discuss his new book, Against the Islamitization of Our Culture:
Dutch Identity as Foundation, in which he warned of the increasing “Islamic threat” to
Dutch democracy. The book’s main argument was inspired by Samuel Huntington’s
(1996, 1993) The Clash of Civilizations. In Huntington’s 1993 Foreign Affairs article he
states:
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will
not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among
humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states
will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal
conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different
civilizations. The clash of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. (P. 22)
Fortuyn too believed that a “clash of civilizations” was inevitable. He stated that this
clash would take place not only between, but also within states.
4
Fortuyn explained that in the Netherlands, parliamentary democracy acted as the
buffer between church and state. This buffer provided a permanent separation between
the two institutions and safeguarded Dutch democracy and democratic values such as
freedom of speech. He alleged that in Islam such separation was not allowed, leading to
the absence of democracy in Muslim countries. Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands,
who were unfamiliar with democracy, therefore, were likely to reject the ‘foreign’
democratic ideals on which Dutch society was founded. During the debate, Van Dam
angrily responded that Fortuyn overstated any supposed Islamic threat since Muslims
comprised less than six percent of the Dutch population.
1
He accused Fortuyn of
generalizing the atypical beliefs of a small minority in the Muslim community to create a
culture of fear that served to forcibly strip Muslims of their cultural identity.
Fortuyn also claimed that domestic violence was a common occurrence in Dutch
Muslim communities. He attributed the violent mistreatment of women to the patriarchal
agrarian societies from which Muslim families migrated. Due to the division of labor in
these societies, masculinity (men’s field labor) was valued over femininity (women’s
house work) and women treated as inferior to men. Fortuyn worried that, because of
Muslims’ tendency to reject democratic values, the Dutch state was unable to protect the
rights of Muslim women. He urged the government to find a way to instill the values of
1
According to the Central Bureau for Statistics, in 1996, the Netherlands counted
15,493,889 inhabitants. Of these inhabitants, 2,498,715 had roots outside of the
Netherlands (either first or second generation) and 1,171,113 outside of the West -
Europe, the United States, or Canada (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2008).
5
social equality in Muslims, even if this meant through forceful integration and
assimilation. Van Dam retorted that Fortuyn’s claim was another gross generalization and
falsely portrayed all Muslim men as ‘wife beaters’. He called Fortuyn a populist who
played on the people’s fear of foreigners and immigration and who exploited these fears
to sell his book. Van Dam concluded that Fortuyn’s statements did little to help the
integration of Muslims. Fortuyn ignored the diversity that existed among Muslims, Van
Dam maintained. Different groups of Muslims had different needs and could not be
squeezed into a ‘one-size-fits-all’ racial group classification (VARA 1997).
The Fortuyn-Van Dam debate was reflective of the ongoing discussions about the
presence of Muslims and Islam in Dutch society. Fortuyn’s claim of domestic violence in
Muslim families shows how gender was used to demonstrate Islam’s and Muslims’
perceived incompatibility with Dutch democratic values. To Fortuyn, concerns about
gender inequality were sufficient reason to call for Muslims’ forced assimilation. Van
Dam, on the other hand, saw Fortuyn’s statement as a way to eliminate multiculturalism.
The Lower House debate raises intriguing questions. Was Fortuyn’s concern for
Muslim women genuine or a political strategy to manipulate public opinion and to garner
support for the forced assimilation of Muslims? Did Fortuyn’s book reflect the general
public’s concern about the economic, cultural, and political impact of the influx of
Moroccan and Turkish immigrants into Dutch society? Was Van Dam’s dismissal of
domestic violence in Muslim communities a way to safeguard multiculturalism by
circumventing difficult ethical and moral questions about cultural authenticity and
6
fundamental human rights (after all, if culture is ‘authentic’ then whose rights should the
government protect)?
2
Between 1997 and 2001, while living in the United Kingdom, I noticed that
similar political discussions about the presence of Islam and Muslims in society were
taking place. The tone of these discussions, however, was different; sexuality and gender
were rarely used to illustrate the need for Muslims to integrate and/or assimilate into
British society. Upon moving to the United States, in 2001, I made the same observation:
discussions about Islam and Muslims were seldom framed in gendered or sexualized
terms. Instead, they focused on themes of ‘terrorism’ and ‘national security’. I became
intrigued by the different ways in which debates about the same topic - Muslims, Islam,
and cultural diversity - were conducted and wanted to explore why sexuality and gender
dominated political discussions in the Netherlands, but not those in the United Kingdom
and the United States. I also was curious about Van Dam’s concluding remarks and
wondered whether political statements about Islam and Muslims (like those made by
Fortuyn), indeed, could contribute to Muslims’ racialization. If so, I wondered, what roles
would gender and sexuality play in this process?
I decided to write my dissertation on discussions of gender, sexuality, Muslim,
and Islam in brochures, pamphlets, and platforms published by political parties in the
Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States between 1999 and 2006. I wanted to
examine how gender and sexuality were used in these discussions and how debates about
2
See, for instance, Alison Dundes Renteln’s (2005) The Cultural Defense.
7
multiculturalism, Islam, and Muslims could contribute to racialization. I chose to study
political documents because these serve as the ‘public calling cards’ of political parties.
Statements made in these documents cannot be retracted or claimed to be ‘taken out of
context’ - they “are what they are”. I decided not the use press-releases as these were,
primarily, composed for the journalistic field. I wanted to use documents that were
specifically targeted at the general public. Intended as propaganda, these documents
explain party’s political stances in the clearest-possible terms. Furthermore, I chose
political brochures and pamphlets because they are often-used, but little studied in
political communication (see Raymond 1987; Stein and Benoit 2004). Most studies
focusing on political (campaign) communication either examine television
advertisements (see Benoit 1999; Kaid and Johnston 2001) or presidential debates (see
Kraus 2000; Benoit and Brazeal 2002). While studies of these advertisements and debates
are important, they do not provide a complete picture of political (campaign)
communication. I decided to exclude Internet blogs, as they would expand the scope of
this dissertation.
I chose the time period 1999 and 2006, because it included the terrorist attacks of
9/11, the murder of Dutch director Theo van Gogh by Islamist
3
Mohamed Bouyeri in
2004
4
, and the London bombings in 2005. Billig (1995) suggests that nationalism is an
3
Islamists believe that Islam is both a religion and a political ideology.
4
Van Gogh, a well-known director and columnist, used his art to challenge the
‘intolerance of intolerance’ - the Dutch tendency to accommodate rather than debate. He
8
omnipresent yet unexpressed part of everyday life. However, he argues, it is always ready
to be mobilized in the wake of a catalytic event. I assumed that the aforementioned events
intensified discussions about national identity and the role of Muslims and Islam in the
West even more than they already were and, therefore, would allow me to retrieve more
in-depth data. Choosing 1999 as starting point also allowed me to compare political
discussions pre- and post-9/11.
As my reference to Billig indicates and I mentioned at the beginning of this
Chapter, I expected the construction of national identity to play an important role in
parties’ different political uses of sexuality and gender themes. I believed that the
presence of high levels of gender equality and sexual and religious freedom in Dutch
society - as part of the Dutch national identity - influenced the political debates on
argued that, although ‘intolerance of intolerance’ had contributed to a relatively
harmonious multicultural society, it also prevented society from openly and critically
debating problems caused by multiculturalism. It led to self-censorship out of fear of
being seen as intolerant and racist. Amidst growing concerns about the cultural presence
of Islam (like the increasing presence of women wearing burqas and hijabs in public
places) and global terrorism, Muslims became easy targets for Van Gogh’s sharp tongue.
He stated that hijabs had been invented by “backwards medieval geiteneukers” (a crude
term for someone who has sex with a goat) and criticized Muslims for their conservative
attitudes towards gender equality and homosexuality.
In the early morning of November 2, 2004 Van Gogh was shot, stabbed, and his
throat slashed in Amsterdam-East. Van Gogh’s killer, Mohammed Bouyeri, was a young
Dutchman of Moroccan descent who belonged to the Islamist Hofstad Network. Network
members are followers of the Takfir Wal-Hijra ideology. This ideology advocates a ‘war’
against ‘infidels’, Christians, Jews, and apostate Muslims. By wearing, for instance,
western clothing or drinking alcohol, Takfir Wal-Hijra followers try to gain access to and
attack western societies from the inside. Their ultimate goal is the restoration of ummah,
which is the religious unification of all Muslims (Groen and Kranenberg 2006). To
Bouyeri, Van Gogh was an enemy of Islam and he stood in the way of establishing
ummah (Chorus and Olgun 2005; Buruma 2006).
9
multiculturalism and Islam by focusing on homophobia and sexism. The assumed link
between sexuality, gender, and nationalism has been discussed in the scholarship of Joane
Nagel (1998). She argues that gender plays an important role in the making of nations
and maintains:
This is not to say that women do not have roles to play in the making and
unmaking of states: as citizens, as members of the nation, as activists, as leaders.
It is to say that the scripts in which these roles are embedded are written primarily
by men, for men, and about men, and that women are, by design supporting actors
whose roles reflect masculinist notions of femininity and of women’s proper place
[in the nation]. (P. 243)
5
In other words, Nagel suggests that hegemonic nationalism in the West is linked
to hegemonic masculinity and therefore to middle class values, whiteness, and
heterosexuality - since hegemonic masculinity represents dominant forms of manhood. In
light of the Dutch situation, Nagel’s argument left me thinking whether hegemonic
nationalism in the Netherlands was changing; that women and homosexuals started to
play more prominent roles in its construction. I wondered whether that could be the
reason that most Dutch parties focused on sexual and gender equality in their assessment
of Islam and Muslims. Also, the perceived prohibition of sexual freedom and gender
equality are the two issues that for most westerners separated Islam from other religions
(Puar 2006). Given the use of a ‘homosexual defense’ by political parties, could it also be
that these considered Islam and Muslims simply more of a threat to the moral fiber of
society than gender equality or homosexuality?
5
See also Alan Dundes’ (1997) From Game to War and Other Psychoanalytic Essays on
Folklore.
10
To examine these questions, I developed a study that looked at the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
6
While, technically, I compare the themes
and categories that emerged from the Dutch, British, and US data, this dissertation is not
an in-depth, cross-national comparison between the three countries. As I mentioned at the
beginning of this Chapter, I included the United Kingdom and the United States,
primarily, to bring out the contours of the Dutch case study more clearly. I intended to
identify differences and similarities between the discussions of Dutch, British, and US
parties on Muslims, Islam, and integration. Based on these findings, I then hoped to
6
My motivation to write this dissertation was not only based on scholarly curiosity.
Towards the end of the 1990s, the Dutch media began publishing articles on the alleged
unwillingness of second and third-generation Muslim youth (particularly males) to
integrate into Dutch society. These youth, the media reported, were involved in crime and
failed to respect LGBT rights and women’s equality. My friends (some of whom had
been victims of gay bashing by young Turkish and Moroccan males) and I began to
discuss what the bounds of social tolerance ought to be in a multicultural society.
I was introduced to articles written by British gay rights activist Peter Tatchel
(Islamic Fundamentalism in Britain) and feminist scholar Susan Okin (Is
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?), in which both called for critical debates on the social,
political, and legal limits of tolerance. Their articles made quite an impression on me and
raised questions about the longevity of and dilemmas faced in multicultural societies.
Should societies adhere to the multicultural principles of social tolerance even if these
violated the rights of other, historically, more well-established minority groups? Is Islam
inherently incompatible with western culture? Would hate crimes against the LGBT
community have increased without the presence of Muslims? Does the presence of
Muslims really set back women’s rights? Is Islam, inherently, more intolerant than other
religions such as Judaism or Christianity?
Throughout the years, I have thought about these questions. Muslims, women,
and the LGBT community are all marginalized groups that, at one point or another, faced
some form of discrimination: Islamophobia, sexism, or homophobia. Would it then be
justified to discriminate against one group, e.g., Muslims, to protect the rights of another,
e.g., the LGBT community? I did not expect this dissertation to find answers to these
questions, because many of them fall outside the scope of my research. However, I did
hope to gain more insight into how others - political parties - felt about these issues.
11
determine whether the inclusion of gender and sexuality in these discussions by Dutch
parties was unique to the Netherlands or, perhaps, reflective of a larger, international
trend.
Because of the different political systems and social histories of the countries I
looked at, making in-depth comparisons would be difficult. In Chapters One and Two, I
state that, historically, the United States is a nation of immigrants. By contrast, Dutch and
British societies did not become racially or - to a certain degree - ethnically diverse until
the middle of the twentieth century, when the colonial empires of both countries
collapsed.
7
These different histories could explain, for instance, why US parties were
much more welcoming of immigrants than Dutch and British: they were, socially,
culturally, economically, and politically prepared for it. Furthermore, the Netherlands has
a varied multi-party and proportional representation system. Since the 19th century, no
one party has been able to govern by itself (which requires the majority of the 150
parliamentary seats). Governments, therefore, are made up out of coalitions of two or
more parties.
8
The United Kingdom, like the Netherlands, has a multi-party system which
7
The Dutch province of Friesland has its own official language and the United Kingdom
consists of the territories of Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales.
8
In the Netherlands there currently exist 21 national parties: Christen-Democratisch
Appel; ChristenUnie; Democraten 66; De Groenen; Europa Transparant; GroenLinks;
Libertaristische Partij; Moslim Democratische Partij; Nieuwe Communistische Partij
Nederland; Nieuwe Midden Party; NL Mobiel; Onafhankelijke Senaatsfractie; Partij van
de Arbeid; Partij voor de Vrijheid; Partij voor Naastenliefde; Partij voor de Dieren;
Socialistische Partij; Staatskundig Gereformeerde Partij; Verenigde Senioren Partij;
12
consists of 16 parties. Some of these parties operate only within the territories of Wales
(e.g., Plaid Cymru), Scotland (e.g., SNP), or Northern Ireland (e.g., Social Democratic
and Labour Party), while others, e.g., the Conservatives, exist nationwide.
9
Although the
United Kingdom has a multiparty system, for most of the twentieth century the country
has been ruled by one of two parties: the Conservatives or Labour. The British political
situation, thus, is similar to that in the United States. For centuries, the United States has
been governed by either the Democratic or Republican Party, even though there are
several smaller ‘Third Parties’ such as the Constitution Party, Green Party, and
Libertarians. Despite the presence of these smaller parties, because of the electoral
dominance of the Democrats and Republicans and the ‘winner takes all’ nature of
national elections, it can be argued that the United States has in essence a two-party
system.
The different political systems influence the tone and nature of parties’ political
campaigns; their interaction with the general public and (potential) voter base. The
Republicans and Democrats function as umbrellas for a wide range of factions. For
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie; Vooruitstrevende Integratie Partij; and Vrijheid
en Diversiteit.
9
The Labour Party, Conservative Party, Liberal Democrats, Scottish National Party (only
in Scotland), Sinn Féin (only in Northern Ireland), Plaid Cymru (only in Wales), Social
Democratic and Labour Party (only in Northern Ireland), Respect Coalition, Ulster
Unionist Party (only in Northern Ireland), Scottish Green Party (only in Scotland),
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (only in Northern Ireland), Progressive Unionist Party
(only in Northern Ireland), Green Party in Northern Ireland, Green Party of England and
Wales, British National Party, and the UK Independence Party.
13
example, supporters of the Democratic Party range from Christian conservatives to
liberals. In contrast, the smaller parties in the Netherlands and United Kingdom, such as
D66 or UKIP, attract voters by taking ‘non-mainstream’ stances on social issues such as
immigration or LGBT rights. Because the Democrats and Republicans have a diverse
electorate to please, they cannot afford to alienate parts of their constituency by taking
perceived controversial stances on these issues. That means that the language of the
Democrats and Republicans in political communications tends to be more restraint,
vaguer, than that used by, especially, the smaller parties in the Netherlands or the United
Kingdom. These parties attract voters with their special interest agendas. To give an
example, while the Democrats, publically, may argue that marriage is between one man
and one woman, in-depth discussions or deviating stances towards gay marriage may take
place outside of official party discourse, such as in politicians’ Internet blogs.
Differences in political systems, thus, influence the tone of public political
discourses and the ways in which parties make use of these. These differences, however,
do not affect my data analysis and the themes and categories that emerge from it. Given
the representational function of parties’ brochures, pamphlets, and platforms, discourses
embedded in these documents are part of their public political profiles. Parties statements
(or lack thereof) on issues discussed in offical documents are reflective of their public
stance towards these issues. It could be argued that the general public is capable of
reading between the lines; that they understand that a party’s official stance on, e.g.,
abortion, is not how it really feels about it. However, analysis of the general public’s
14
intepretation and use of parties’ messages is outside the scope of my dissertation. This
study focuses on how and what parties write about in their documents. An understanding
of a country’s political system is indeed important when examining how political
statements are formed or used in campaigns. Such an understanding, however, does not
influence the analysis of these statements as they are presented to the general public. As I
stated earlier on in this Chapter, once they are documented, statements simply “are what
they are.”
Lastly, I chose to study the Netherlands, the United States, and the United
Kingdom for several reasons. I mentioned earlier that I was curious why debates on
Muslims, Islam, and multiculturalism in the Netherlands seemed different in tone from
debates in the United Kingdom and the United States. This curiosity, coupled with the
fact that I have lived in all three countries for a significant number of years and,
therefore, developed an emotional attachment to each of them, speak English and Dutch
fluently, and am intimately familiar with the Dutch, British, and US political systems and
social histories, made me decide to focus on the three countries. Next, I will elaborate
why I choose grounded theory as a research method in more detail.
Grounded Theory
Because of the lack of research on the topic, I was not sure how to develop a
theoretical framework that allowed me to research the same topic in three socially,
culturally, and politically different nations. I decided to use Pandit’s (1996) version of
15
the grounded theory approach - a qualitative content analysis method (see Chapter Two
for more discussion on grounded theory). In grounded theory, the researcher lets the data
speak for itself allowing theory to emerge from the data. Traditional grounded theory, as
developed by Glaser and Straus (1967), suggests that the researcher collects and analyzes
data with an open mind. Pandit, on the other hand, does not object to researchers
entering the research fields with assumptions and encourages the researcher to conduct a
literature review to (1) develop research questions and (2) situate the emerging grounded
theory in. He also believes in the use of convenient case studies. Choosing a particular
time period to collect data, therefore, is perfectly valid. He does emphasize that research
assumptions or theorizing cannot guide the data analysis: data still has to speak for itself.
Before I will discuss the method of grounded theory in more detail in Chapter
Three, it is necessary to obtain a deeper understanding of racialization, nationalism,
multiculturalism, and Muslims in Dutch, British, and US societies. I will first discuss the
concept of racial formation, of which racialization is an important element. Second, I will
examine how intersectional studies of nationalism have linked national identity to
constructions of gender, sexuality, religion, and race. Next, I will provide an overview of
the history of multiculturalism in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and in the United
States. Lastly, I will provide a historical overview of Muslims in the different societies.
This Chapter’s overview of the literature on racialization, nationalism, multiculturalism,
Islam, and Muslims is an important element of grounded theory because it helps to situate
16
my research findings within a larger theoretical and historical framework (see Pandit
1996). Next, I will take a more in-depth look at racial formation.
Racial Formation, Gender, and Sexuality
The concept of racialization is part of Omi and Winant’s (1994) racial formation
theory. They state that racial formation is “the process by which social, economic and
political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by which
they are in turn shaped by racial meanings” (p. 61). Omi and Winant maintain that racial
formation takes place at the micro and macro levels of society. At the micro level,
individuals have to develop an awareness of the role that race plays in their lives - e.g., in
the construction of their identity - and in society. Once they have developed such
awareness, they then, collectively, begin (re)negotiating racial categories with the state. If
they succeed in doing so, Omi and Winant suggest, then ‘racial formation’ has taken
place. In racial formation, racialization is a tool used to (re)establish social hierarchy.
10
10
In The Lower House debate, Van Dam accused Fortuyn of contributing to the
‘racialization’ of Muslims. Van Dam’s accusation needs, however, further explanation. In
racialization, Muslims as a diverse ethnic group would be classified as a homogeneous
racial group. Indeed, Fortuyn’s comments on the supposed anti-democratic nature of
Islam, domestic violence, and patriarchy in the ‘Muslim community’ ignore the cultural
and religious diversity and social class divisions that exist within the Muslim community.
The use of Muslim ‘community’ instead of ‘communities’, falsely, homogenizes Muslims
and Islam. While Fortuyn’s statements contribute to the homogenization of Muslims,
they do not assign them a racial group identity. His focus on Muslims of a particular
region, in this case Morocco, however, does contribute to their racialization. By not
distinguishing between Muslims of North African, Middle Eastern, Asian, North
17
Omi and Winant’s work challenged how scholars thought about race at a time
when most still treated it as a biological reality. Their work suggested that (1) race is a
social construction (its meaning shifts over time and through negotiation with political
and legal institutions), (2) race-thinking is hegemonic (it permeates all aspects of our
social lives), and (3) its construction is used by dominant groups and institutions (e.g., the
government) to maintain power and control over marginalized groups in society. It
provides insight into the social function of race and how racial categories are created.
11
Racial formation theory, however, lacks a concrete focus on the roles that gender and
sexuality play in the development of racial categories. Omi and Winant recognize that
gender and sexuality “constitute ‘regions’ of hegemony in which certain [racial] projects
American, or Eastern European descent, ‘Muslim’ becomes synonymous with
‘Moroccan’.
11
Omi and Winant developed racial formation theory, specifically, with the United States
in mind. Yet, Anthony Marx’s (1998) Making Race and Nation, which compares racial
formation and racialization processes in the United States, South Africa, and Brazil,
demonstrates that the concepts of racial formation and racialization can be applied to any
ethnically diverse nation where (1) race is central to nation building and (2) national
identity, historically, shaped the ways in which race is (socially, culturally, politically,
economically, and legally) used. In the Netherlands Indies, for instance, colonialism
created racial classifications that were related to citizenship, diplomacy, and social class.
Javanese royalty were assigned ‘equal-to-Dutch’ legal status (which granted them
educational and economic privileges) because of their buffer role between the locals and
the Dutch colonists. By giving royalty special status, the colonists were able to secure
their loyalty and cooperation in maintaining a system of racial stratification, which kept
Indonesians at the bottom of the hierarchy. Although Javanese royalty were not perceived
as ‘European’ (that category was reserved for those born in the Netherlands, Indonesian
women married to Dutch men, or the children of a Dutch father and Indonesian mother),
they were considered part of the ‘Dutch’ racial classification; a classification which was
based on (formal and informal) citizenship rather than biology (see also Stoller 2002).
18
can take shape” (p. 68). They do not address, however, how these regions shape racial
projects. Omi and Winant argue that constructions of race intersect with those of gender
or sexuality, but do not delineate these intersections. It, also, is unclear whether they
envision gender and sexuality as mutually exclusive categories. For instance, gender,
class, race, and sexuality - as systems of oppression - are often seen as separate spheres of
experience. In reality, however, the systems overlap. These ambiguities raise some
important questions. For instance, what role does sexuality play in the construction of
‘black masculinity’ (hooks 2003)? Do heterosexual white men and women experience
race universally? The work of scholars such as Kimberle´ Crenshaw (1989) and Patricia
Hill Collins (1990) fill in some of the gaps that are lacking in racial formation theory (see
also hooks 1981; Davis 1981; Connell 1987, 2002; Crenshaw 1989; Hill Collins 1990;
Lipsitz 1994; Mosse 1997; Schwartz and Rutter 1998; Findlay 1999; Nagel 1998, 2000,
2003; Feree et al. 1999; Nakano Glenn 2002; Donovan 2006; Naber 2006; Puar 2007;
Jamal and Naber 2008).
Crenshaw coined the term ‘intersectionality’ in 1989. She believed that race and
feminist scholars did not address black women’s experiences with discrimination
properly. Crenshaw states that black women encounter discrimination both as women and
as members of a marginalized racial group. Therefore, she recommends that race and
feminist scholars focus on how constructions of gender and race interact - intersect. This
allows them to, more comprehensively, understand black women’s lives. Hill Collins
19
(1990) adds that structures of race and gender intersect to create a so-called “matrix of
domination”; that gender and race are, inherently, interwoven.
In recent years, scholars like Nagel (2000), have added sexuality to the list of
intersecting systems of oppression. Nagel envisions the connection between race, gender,
and sexuality as circular. She argues that racial boundaries are preserved by gendered
forms of sexual expression, e.g., heteronormativity (see also Halberstam 1998). In turn,
Nagel contends, normative forms of sexual expression are based on hegemonic
masculinity, e.g., the ‘white, middle class, heterosexual male’ (see also Vance 1995;
Hopkins 2002; Connell 2005). Lastly, these understandings are rooted in sexuality
(heterosexuality) and race, e.g., ‘white masculinity’ versus ‘black masculinity’ (see also
Wallace 1980; Carbado 1999; Cohen 1999; Mendelberg 2001; Manatu 2002; Hooks
2003; Shimizu 2007).
This dissertation moves beyond Crenshaw’s and Hill Collins’ women-oriented
scholarship to show that intersectional theory can be applied to other sociological fields
as well. I use the basic premise of intersectionality - that gender, race, and sexuality
intersect in the construction of social inequality - to explore (through grounded theory)
how political discussions about sexuality and gender contributed to the racialization of
Muslim women and men. By focusing on Muslims and politics, I introduce religion and
the nation as additional systems of oppression.
Earlier in this Chapter, I speculated about the roles that nationalism and national
identity played in the racialization of Muslims. In order to obtain a deeper understanding
20
of both concepts, next, I will provide an overview of the literature on nations and
nationalism.
Nations and Nationalism
The study of nationhood and nationalism has been dominated by the work of
scholars such as Kohn (1946), Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983), Breuilly (1985), Smith
(1986), Greenfeld (1992), Hobsbwam (1992), Chatterjee (1993), Billig (1995), Habermas
(2001, 1998), McCrone (1998), Hechter (2000), Marx (2003, 1998), and Connor (2004,
1994). It is outside the scope of this Chapter to provide an in-depth review of the large
amount of research that these scholars have produced. However, I will give a brief
overview of the various ways in which nationalism has been discussed.
12
The early studies that looked at nationhood emerged after World War Two and
examined the histories of nationalist movements (see Kohn 1946). In the 1970s and
1980s, scholars began to focus on the nation itself and debate whether it predated the
development of nationalism. From these debates, several theoretical approaches emerged.
The subjective approach is the classical way of defining nationalism (see Kohn 1946;
Gellner 1983; Smith 1986; Connor 2004, 1994). This approach focuses on shared factors
such as religion, language, or history. The existence of these factors within a specific
territory makes that territory (and its people) a ‘nation’. An example would be the
12
For a more comprehensive discussion of the scholarship on nations and nationalism,
Spencer and Wollman’s Nations and Nationalism: A Reader (2005) provides an
excellent, in-depth overview of the various theories on and strands of nationalism.
21
primordialist theory of nationalism, which maintains that nations came into existence as
soon as mankind appeared.
Like the subjective approach, the objective approach focuses on shared language
or religion as the basis of the nation. It differs from subjectivism in that it places
consciousness central - people’s awareness that they are part of a ‘nation’ (see Anderson
1983; Gellner 1983; Breuilly 1985; Hobsbwam 1992; Greenfeld 1992). One of the
prominent scholars of the objective approach is Anderson (1983), who sees the nation as
‘imagined’. Anderson maintains that the nation is imagined because its members do not
know most of their fellow members, but nonetheless feel strongly connected to them (as
their fellow country women and men). People, thus, imagine the boundaries of a nation
despite the fact that these boundaries do not, physically, exist.
A third approach is the Marxist-conflict, which maintains that the nation is
constructed (through national discourses) by elites who want to regulate the people that
live in it (Ting 2008). Lastly, scholars have used a mix of theoretical approaches. Smith
(1986), for instance, combines primordialism and modernism to create an ‘ethno
symbolist’ view.
13
Ethno-symbolism argues that there are several preconditions in order
for a nation to develop. Greenfeld and Eastwood (2005) assert that there, first, needs to be
a desire for an autonomous homeland among the people that inhabit a territory.
Furthermore, they argue, this homeland has to be surrounded by hostile elements. These
13
Modernists believe that the idea of ‘national loyalty’ did not come into existence until
the 1800s. National loyalty, they argue, was constructed by European states through
national discourses. These states saw its development as fundamental to modernization.
22
elements will help to develop a sense of urgency to protect its borders. This sense of
urgency, then, establishes collectivity among the territory’s inhabitants. Finally,
Greenfeld and Eastwood maintain, the territory needs to contain a shared language,
traditions, archival records, script, and culture.
For the purpose of this research, I am using a Marxist-conflict/objective approach
to conceptualize nationalism. For instance, politicians such as Pim Fortuyn used national
identity to marginalize Muslims. However, as Pryke (1998) observes, nationalism also is
constructed as an ideology that “insists that the interests of the nation [as imagined by
elites] take precedence over all others” (p. 532). Outsiders and their cultural practices,
e.g., Muslims, therefore, are seen as harmful to the nation.
Pandit (1996) argues that grounded theory findings need to be situated within a
larger theoretical context to be fully understood. Therefore, in addition to Nagel (1998,
2000, 2003), I will rely on the works of Gilroy (1991), Rieffer (2003), and Mosse (1997,
2006, 2008) to interpret my theoretical findings. These scholars focus on race, religion,
and - like Nagel - sexuality to discuss nationalism and nationhood.
Race, Religion, Gender, and Sexuality in Nationalism
Earlier in this Chapter, I discussed Nagel’s (1998) argument that gender plays an
important role in the construction of the nation. She asserts that, historically, the nation
has been constructed by men for men. Scholars such as Barker (1981), Miles (1987), Hall
(1989), Gilroy (1991), Marx (1998), Ordover (2003), and Ogbar (2004) believe that race
23
and ethnicity are the most important factors in the construction of a national identity.
These scholars maintain that the discourses that construct ‘race’ also establish and
monitor the nation’s boundaries. Race, ultimately, determines who is a national in- or
outsider. Rieffer (2003) observes that research on nationalism has neglected the
belonging of religion to constructions of nationalism (see also Spohn 2003). He notes that
religion continues to play an important role in nationalist discourse. For instance,
Beasley’s (2004) study of how American presidents defined American national identity
from 1885 to 2000, finds that shared ways of thinking were rooted in “Puritan notions of
an American civil religion - of Americans as God’s chosen people” (p. 47). Beasley’s
finding is not surprising because, as Rieffer argues, in societies where the separation
between church and the state is weak, it is more likely that religion will play an important
role in the construction of national identity.
Lastly, since Mosse (1985) published Nationalism and Sexuality, scholars began
to concentrate on the relationship between sexuality and nation building (see Liu 1991;
Porter and Hall 1995; Ferber 1998; Lipsitz 1998; Pryke 1998; Nagel 2000; Nakano Glenn
2002; Stoller 2002; Ordover 2003; Donovan 2006). These scholars studied the
importance of sexuality in the imagining of the nation, for instance, the use of sexual
stereotypes to construct ‘undesirables’ as national, racial, and ethnic outsiders. A good
example is the work of Donovan (2006). He argues that at the turn of the twentieth
century, newly arrived European immigrants were framed as suppliers of white women to
the sex trade, thereby framing them as criminals and sexually deviant ethnic and racial
24
outsiders. The theoretical insights that emerge from the aforementioned scholars’
research is best summarized in the work of Ferber (2004) on hate group literature. While
she ignores the influence of religion on national identity, her research does show how
hate groups use ideologies of gender and sexuality to construct and maintain racial and
ethnic boundaries. Her work also demonstrates how the idea of the nation is socially
constructed and, therefore, not bound by physical borders. Ferber maintains that white
supremacist literature establishes perceived racial or ethnic ‘others’ as “sexually
dangerous” and group insiders as “racially healing.” White supremacists, she argues,
believe that the regulation of sexuality - e.g., the prohibition of interracial relationships -
will safeguard ‘racial purity’ and, thereby, protect the racial group.
In the first part of this Chapter, I recounted The Lower House debate during which
Van Dam accused Fortuyn of trying to remove multiculturalism from Dutch society. In
order to contextualize Van Dam’s accusation, I will provide an overview of the
conceptualization of multiculturalism. Because cultural diversity is an important element
in political debates in all three nations, I will also discuss the historical emergence of
multiculturalism in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States. Finally,
because my dissertation focuses on Muslims and Islam, I will provide background
information on the historical presence of Muslims and Islam in each country.
25
Multiculturalism
The term ‘multiculturalism’ was first used during political debates on how to
reconcile Canada’s French and English speaking populations in the 1960s. In 1971,
following publication of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism
Report, the Canadian government implemented multiculturalism as legal policy. The
government hoped that de jure multiculturalism would help to establish cultural dualism
(Renteln 1999). At present, only Canada
14
and Australia
15
are, officially, multicultural
societies. Some countries have institutionalized de facto multiculturalism in order to
facilitate the integration and increase the legal protection of ethnic minority groups. The
United Kingdom’s safety helmet exemption for Sikhs is an example of a policy that
honors the multicultural ideology of respect for diversity. In the United Kingdom, Sikhs -
who wear turbans for religious reasons - do not have to wear safety helmets on
14
The 2003 Canadian Multiculturalism Act states that:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government of Canada to (a)
recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the
cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of
all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural
heritage; (b) recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism is a
fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity and that it
provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada’s future” (1985, c. 24,
4th Supp.).
15
The 1999 (in 2003 revised) New Agenda for Multicultural Australia report shows the
Australian government’s commitment to multiculturalism or, as then-prime minister John
Howard (2003) notes, to promote “diversity, understanding and tolerance in all areas of
endeavor” (p. 1).
26
construction sites or while driving scooters, because these would require them to remove
their turbans.
In the United States, multiculturalism developed in the 1970s and, initially,
focused on primary and secondary education. This early multiculturalism was “a
grassroots attempt at community-based racial reconstruction through that vital local
institution, the neighborhood public school” (Newfield and Gordon 1996:76). Vertovec
(1998) identifies two developments that contributed to the emergence of
multiculturalism: (1) the educational and economic advancement and political
organization of immigrant and ethnic minority groups, and (2) the emergence of a
“postmodern left” in university faculties. He argues that the political organization and
mobilization of ethnic minority groups contributed to ‘identity politics’. Identity politics
refer to political activism that serves to advance the interests of groups that are
marginalized because of a shared identity. The “postmodern left” was composed of
academics that associated themselves with progressive politics. They used a Marxist and
deconstructionist approach to take apart white cultural hegemony in education, e.g., the
development of ‘Critical Whiteness Studies’ (see Epstein 1997).
16
In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, multicultural policies developed in
the 1960s, as a response to the influx of non-white immigrants into Dutch and British
16
For more discussion on Critical Whiteness Studies, see works by scholars such as
Roediger (1991, 1994), Rogin (1996), Hill (1997), Lipsitz (1998), Ware and Back (2002),
and Feagin and O’Brien (2003).
27
mono-racial and mono-cultural societies.
17
Both countries experienced an increase in
non-white immigration after the dismantling of the British and Dutch colonial empires in
the 1940s and 1950s, and a post-war economic reconstruction boom. In the Netherlands
and United Kingdom, multiculturalism focused on establishing equality for all through
implementation of anti-discrimination laws and social integration programs. In the United
States, much of multicultural activism focused on the celebration of cultural diversity.
The different foci of US and Dutch and British multicultural ideologies should be
understood within the political and social contexts in which these were formed. Ireland
(2004), for instance, studied the integration of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims into
European societies. He concluded that ethnic relations in these societies were shaped by
“institutional engineering” - e.g., welfare systems and integration policies. Kurtehn
(1997) argues that in the United States the incorporation of immigrants in US society was
determined by individualism. He suggests that this meant that each individual had a
responsibility to find work. It also meant that there should be no preferential treatment
based on race or ethnicity since that would create a labor market with unequal
opportunities. An immigrant’s failure to economically succeed, Kurtehn notes, was
attributed to her or his lack of motivation and cultural capital - not to the functioning of
society itself. In contrast, he concludes, British and Dutch emphasis on social integration
17
In Britain there were some nascent regional and national identities like Scottish, Welsh
and Irish.
28
(through welfare systems and other government policies) enabled multicultural policies to
address issues of race and ethnicity in terms of institutionalized social inequality.
The above introduction, briefly, describes how multiculturalism emerged in each
of the three countries. (A more detailed discussion will follow later). Yet, it does not
contain a definition of multiculturalism. Despite an extensive literature review, I found no
overarching ‘one size fits all’ definition. Multiculturalism is shaped and molded by the
society it was formed in and therefore has different meanings in different settings.
Verkuyten (2007) maintains that, depending on the situation, multiculturalism can refer
to attitudes, beliefs, practices, policies, or ideologies. In other words, as Powell (2003)
observes, “[a]ttempting to define multiculturalism is like trying to pick up a jellyfish -
you can do it, but the translucent, free-floating entity turns almost instantly into an
unwieldy blob of amorphous abstraction” (p. 156). For instance, scholars have likened
multiculturalism to multiethnicity (see Brubaker 1992; Okin 1994; Kymlicka 1995;
Downey 1999; Spinner-Halev 2001; Kurien 2004; Maly 2005; Scheffer 2007);
multiracialism (see Martiniello 1998)
18
; and to citizenship (Taylor 1992; Brubaker 1992;
Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2000; Kivisto 2002). The most obvious error scholars, therefore,
can make is trying to define multiculturalism in universal terms. Given the immense
amount of interdisciplinary scholarship, such definitions become theoretically
unworkable. I see multiculturalism as a postmodern concept. That means, as Modood
18
I find this equation problematic because it presents a one-dimensional interpretation of
multicultural ideology. It implies that ethnicity and race are the same; yet race is one of
many elements that make up an ethnic identity.
29
argues (1997), that its interpretation is dependent on a nation’s historical racial and ethnic
diversity, political system, and cultural and religious traditions (see also Barry 2001).
Therefore, after I will discuss the different types of multiculturalism, I shall take a more
detailed look at the historical, social contexts in which multiculturalism emerged in each
country and how these translated into policies and practices.
Types of Multiculturalism
McLaren (1994) identifies three main types of multiculturalism: (1) conservative,
(2) liberal (of which left liberal is a more progressive strand) and (3) critical
multiculturalism (see also Parrillo 2008). Parrillo (2008) describes conservative
multiculturalists, such as Schlesinger (1991) or Ravitch (1978), as assimilationists who
want national cohesion through the development of a common identity. He maintains
that, while they respect cultural diversity, they also believe that this diversity needs to be
contained within a dome of mainstream society’s cultural norms and values. Cultural or
ethnic diversity is expected to contribute to one shared American identity. Liberal and left
liberal multiculturalists see society as inherently unequal. McLaren (1994), for instance,
suggests that there are insufficient social and educational opportunities available for
people to compete, equally, for employment. He adds that educational opportunities
under affirmative action would help to right those wrongs. Lastly, critical
multiculturalism attempt to deconstruct the so-called “binary of sameness and difference”
that dominates most thought on multiculturalism. They believe that deconstruction of this
30
binary can be achieved through the establishment of more fluid - umbrella - ethnic
identities.
The above described strands provide some insight into the different
conceptualizations of multiculturalism. It is, however, in the criticism that they attract
that these differences become especially clear. Goldberg (1994), for example, criticizes
conservative multiculturalists for not treating ‘whiteness’ or the majority culture as an
‘ethnicity’ or a ‘culture’. By assuming that whiteness and the majority culture are the
standard against which minorities are being measured, conservative multiculturalists are
making both hegemonic. He maintains that culture, then, becomes another way of talking
about race and does little to fight racial inequality. Liberal and left liberal
multiculturalists receive criticism from all ends of the political spectrum. Barry (2001),
an egalitarian liberal, is critical of liberal multiculturalism because he believes that it
contributes to political divisiveness along cultural lines (e.g., Black Nationalism).
19
He
argues that this divisiveness, in turn, leads to dangerous nationalist movements.
Furthermore, Barry maintains, “a politics of multiculturalism undermines a politics of
redistribution” (p. 8). In other words, multiculturalism is selective and thus promotes
inequality. Taylor (1994) criticizes Barry and other egalitarian liberals for developing the
19
For an excellent article on Black Nationalism see J. Herman Blake’s Black Nationalism
(1969). This article is interesting because it was written at a time when the Black
Nationalism movement was going strong. For a more in-depth discussion of Black
Nationalism, see Herbert Neilly’s (2005) Black Pride: The Philosophy and Opinions of
Black Nationalism: A Six-Volume History of Black Culture.
31
concept of ‘procedural liberalism’. Procedural liberalism is modeled after the idea of
‘neutral application of rights’. He maintains that this kind of liberalism is too neutral and,
therefore, will be unable to accommodate the diversity of people with different cultural
backgrounds. Taylor proposes instead a ‘politics of recognition’, which stresses the idea
of ‘cultural authenticity’.
20
Critical multiculturalists argue that left-liberal multiculturalism divides the
political left. Grossberg (1992), for example, believes that a focus on culture rather than
race turns attention away from racism. He suggests that it prevents a joint struggle against
white supremacy and racism. Similarly, Alund and Schierup (1991) assert that liberals or
left liberals do little to promote social justice and challenge racial or ethnic hegemony.
Finally, conservative critics see all forms of multiculturalism as anti-democratic and anti-
egalitarian. They feel that multicultural policies, such as Affirmative Action, favor one
group over the other (see D’Souza 1991, 1995). Although Schlesinger (1991) is
20
Joppke (1996) argues that Taylor’s idea of ‘authenticity’ turns ethnic identity into a
universal master status. He maintains that authenticity allows for little flexibility in group
members’ social and cultural identification. Joppke notes that this neglect is, especially,
harmful for ‘minorities within minorities’. Authenticity ignores the diversity that exists
within ethnic minority groups. For instance, it facilitates situations in which the
oppression of women or lesbians and gay men is justified as part of the ‘authentic’
cultural norms in a group (see also Fraser 1996; Okin 1999; Volpp 2001; Winter 2001;
Reitman 2005; Hirsi Ali 2003, 2007; Shachar 2007).
Kurien (2004) explains that marginalized immigrant groups often develop more
conservative, sometimes even fundamentalist, interpretations of the religious or cultural
practices of their homeland. They want to maintain some connection to their country of
origin, yet overcompensate in doing so. Finally, Renteln (2005) raises an important legal
question in The Cultural Defense: What happens to legal defenses if ethnicity is
authentic? Does that mean that a cultural defense - cultural practices as mitigating factors
for certain illegal behaviors - should be accepted?
32
considered a conservative multiculturalist, I discuss him as a conservative critic because
his argument is echoed by many anti-multiculturalists - like Pim Fortuyn in the
Netherlands. Schlesinger maintains that multiculturalism creates divisions and a lack of
cohesion in society (see also Barry 2001). He argues that it challenges the development
of a unified American national identity.
In this Chapter, I discussed the different theories on nationalism and provided a
condensed overview of some of the strands of multiculturalism in the West. In the next
Chapter, I will discuss the emergence of country-specific forms of multiculturalism in the
Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States.
33
Chapter Two: Multiculturalism in the Netherlands, United
Kingdom, and the United States
Dutch and British Immigration
The main difference between Dutch, British, and US societies is that the two
former are not ‘immigrant nations’ in the American sense of the word. While the
Netherlands and United Kingdom cannot be considered ‘nations of immigrants’, they
have always had ethnically diverse societies. The United Kingdom of Great Britain
consisted of England, Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland and numerous colonies all
over the world. Furthermore, Solomon (1989) maintains, it had a significant Jewish
population which migrated to the United Kingdom at the turn of the twentieth century
and a large French Protestant population in the Southeast of England, which fled France
in the 17
th
century. The Kingdom of Netherlands consisted of Friesland (a province with
its own official language), Catholic provinces in the south such as Maastricht and
Brabant, as well as the colonies of the Netherlands Indies (Indonesia), New Guinea,
Suriname, and the Netherlands Antilles.
Immigration laws in both countries up to the 1940s - when their colonial empires
began to crumble - had been rather flexible in allowing immigration to each nation.
Poynting and Mason (2007), for example, point out that the British Nationality Act of
1948 allowed people from former colonies to become citizens of the Commonwealth,
thereby granting them the right to take up residency in the United Kingdom. In the
Netherlands Indies, people of mixed Dutch/Indonesian or full Indonesian descent could
34
become legally and socially classified as Dutch and obtain Dutch citizenship as long as
the father or husband was of European Dutch descent. Yet, Patterson (1969) argues, once
Britons became concerned about the possible influx of non-white citizens into British
society, in the 1960s, the country’s laissez-faire immigration policies became much
stricter. Levinson (2005) asserts that newly developed immigration laws, such as the
Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1968)
21
, the Immigration Act (1971)
22
, and the British
Nationality Act (1981)
23
restricted the movement of non-white immigrants and,
especially, those from former colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. Poynting and
Mason (2007) add that these Acts racialized the basis of the British immigration system.
The end of World War Two coincided with the decline of the British and Dutch
colonial empires. This first wave of immigration, therefore, consisted predominantly of
immigrants from former colonies and Commonwealth nations that had become
independent. For instance, Indonesian independence, in 1945, led to an influx of native-
born Dutch citizens, their Indonesian spouses, and Dutch educated Indonesian officials to
Dutch society. Adding to the first wave of colonial immigrants were economic
21
Before the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1968), most citizens of Commonwealth
countries (e.g., India, Pakistan, and the Caribbean) were allowed to migrate to the United
Kingdom. After 1968, only immigrants with government-issued passports were allowed
to migrate. In 1971, the Immigration Act amended the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration
Act.
22
The Immigration Act (1971) restricted primary immigration to the United Kingdom.
23
The British Nationality Act reclassified citizenship of the United Kingdom into three
categories: (1) British citizenship, (2) British Dependent Territories citizenship, and (3)
British Overseas citizenship.
35
immigrants who were recruited during the post-war reconstruction economic boom as
guest laborers in the 1950s and 1960s. Initially, these consisted of Irish (in the United
Kingdom) and Southern Europeans (in both countries). In the Netherlands, guest laborers
from Southern Europe were replaced by those from Turkey and Morocco in the 1970s.
Thus, although the Netherlands and the United Kingdom had not been nations of
immigrants in the traditional sense, immigration was at the root of most of their post-war
social, cultural, political, and economic changes. Multicultural policies emerged in
Britain and the Netherlands, in the late 1970s, because their governments were
unprepared to deal with the ethnic and racial diversity immigration had brought to their
countries. Next, I will provide a more detailed look of the emergence of multiculturalism
in the Netherlands and United Kingdom.
The Netherlands
24
In the previous section, I mentioned that the first wave of immigration of non-
white Dutch coincided with the independence of the Netherlands Indies and New Guinea
in the 1940s. Vink (2007) notes that there were no government policies in place to deal
with the legal and social integration of immigrants into Dutch society for most of the
1950s and 1960s. He argues that the government believed that repatriates from the former
24
Given the scope of the historical literature on race and ethnic relations in the
Netherlands, I was forced to provide a condensed overview. Hans van Amersfoort’s
Immigration and the Formation of Minority Groups: The Dutch Experience 1945-1975
(1982) and Rob Witte’s Racist Violence and the State (1996) give excellent insight into
historical race and ethnic relations up to the 1990s in the Netherlands.
36
colonies were “Dutch enough” to integrate without any problems and, therefore, needed
little government assistance. Furthermore, ‘guest laborers’ were expected to leave the
country once their employment was no longer required. This meant that, up to the 1960s,
Dutch integration rules provided little government assistance for immigrants. This was,
problematic because Dutch society was far from colorblind. Most non-whites faced racial
discrimination in employment, the housing market, and in their everyday social lives.
However, Vink maintains, because of the government’s attitude, immigrants had few
legal resources on their side. Racism increased at the end of the 1970s as the economy
went into a recession and competition for employment rose. Unemployment and
recession increased the anti-immigration backlash and facilitated the rise of extreme right
wing political parties like the Centrum Democraten (Centre Democrats).
Belying their tolerant image, the Dutch have had a long relationship with
racialized-thinking, dating back to the 16
th
century. Blakely (1994) argues that this
created a paradoxical situation: after the horrors of World War II and the Jewish
holocaust, the last thing they wanted was being seen as racist. At the same time, he notes,
Dutch culture seemed to be, historically, rooted in ideologies of race. Blakely maintains
that the Dutch had been actively involved in the slave trade; making their Golden Age
fortune in the 16
th
century from their East Indian Company trade in spices and African
slaves. To justify slavery, ideologies of race were embedded in Dutch nationalism. He
argues that the country’s historical relationship with race-thinking is the reason why
37
racial tensions arose in the 1950s and 1960s, when a large group of non-white peoples
entered the up till then relatively homogenous Dutch society.
Dutch society had been one of accommodation - mutual tolerance of diversity -
but at the same time, racial ideology refused to grant non-whites equality to whites.
Accommodation promoted tolerance of diversity, yet many of the Dutch cultural
traditions were rooted in racist stereotypes. For instance, Nederveen Pieterse’s White on
Black (1995) shows how racial stereotypes about blacks played prominent roles in Dutch
nursery culture - with many rhymes referring to blacks as “Sambos” and “niggers”.
Blakely (2001) argues that children’s books were used to transmit images of blacks to
mass audiences. One such image was that of Zwarte Piet (Black Pete). Every 5
th
of
December, Sint Nicolaas (the Dutch version of Santa Claus) arrives in the Netherlands by
steamship from Spain. He rides his white horse through the streets of the Netherlands,
while a group of black slaves walk beside him, carrying large bags of presents and sweets
for the children.
25
Because there were few blacks in the Netherlands, traditionally white
men in ‘black face’ played the part of Black Pete
26
. Pete is friendly and simple, yet
25
Sint Nicolaas is said to be the Turkish Bishop of Mira, known for his kindness to the
poor. His helpers were enslaved Moors. However, in Dutch popular culture, the Moor
slaves resembled Eastern and Western Africans more than they did the Moors of Berber
and Arab descent.
26
It is interesting that there are few black Black Pete’s in today’s Dutch society. This
shows that concerns about racism are still alive and that white Dutch are aware of the
racial sensitivity surrounding the Sint Nicolaas feast. It would be politically incorrect and
racially insensitive to ask a black person to play a black person who traditionally only
exists in ‘black face’.
38
menacing at the same time: he flogs disobedient children with sticks and takes them away
in his bag ‘to make gingerbread’ out of them. Blakely (2001) suggests that the negative
portrayal of Pete was a pretty common one for blacks in Dutch culture at the turn of the
twentieth century. Overall, he argues, they were “consistently depicted as inferior and
animalistic, cannibalistic dwellers of wild lands lacking in culture. Their native societies
[were] described either as tyrannical or as totally chaotic” (p. 198).
The Netherlands as ‘Immigrant Nation’
The government’s laissez faire attitude towards the social integration of
minorities was criticized in the Scientific Government Council for Government Policy’s
Report Ethnic Minorities (WRR 1979). The Council believed that the government’s
attitude had contributed to social inequality among and cultural isolation of ethnic
minorities in Dutch society.
27
It, therefore, recommended the development of the first
social integration policies in the Netherlands (Penninx 2005; Vink 2007). Penninx (2005)
and Vink (2007) list some of the policies and legislation the government introduced as a
result of the Council’s recommendations. For instance, in 1985, it implemented voting
rights for immigrants who had been in the Netherlands for a minimum of five years
(Memorandum of the Dutch Government 1983). Furthermore, from 1992 to 1997, the
27
This predication was later echoed by Scheffer, whose essay The Multicultural Drama
(2000) and book The Land of Arrival (2007) criticized the Dutch laissez faire attitude
towards social integration. He argued that multiculturalism had led to the segregation of
ethnic minority groups.
39
government allowed for dual citizenship. It hoped that by enabling immigrants to
maintain legal ties with their home countries, they would feel more comfortable
integrating into Dutch society. The government also introduced new anti-discrimination
legislation. For instance, an amendment to Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution stated, “All
persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in all circumstances. Discrimination
on the groups of religion, belief or political opinion, race or sex or any other grounds
shall not be permitted.” In 1994, it introduced the Equal Treatment Act, which established
the Equal Treatment Commission (ETC). The ETC examined cases of direct and indirect
discrimination in employment and education. Lastly, federal funding was set aside for
improving education at so-called ‘black’ (ethnic minority dominated) schools. These
schools could use the funding to hire teachers or to provide bilingual education for
immigrant students. These integration policies aimed to improve the legal status and
socio-economic conditions of minorities and facilitate their integration. Vink (2007)
states:
Minorities, it was argued, needed to be provided with the opportunity to maintain
and develop their own cultural identities. This meant, in negative terms that
“within the wide boundaries of the Dutch legal order” the government should not
interfere with the identity expressions of these groups; and, more positively, that
minority groups had the same rights as other ‘identity groups’ as far as obtaining
public subsidies for broadcasting, education and other welfare activities. (P. 341)
He concludes that the Dutch approach provided “a classic illustration of liberal multiculturalism
in action: A relative liberal immigration and naturalization policy combined with a strong anti-
discrimination policy and a group based identity policy” p. 341.
40
Bagley (1973) attributes the existence of liberal multiculturalism to the Dutch
model of verzuiling (literally: pillarization). He explains that pillarization enabled
Protestants, Catholics, and socialists to live side-by-side in their own communities.
Bagley notes that each pillar consisted of a micro-society that contained, for instance, its
own schools, labor unions, broadcasting networks, newspapers, universities, political
organizations, and social clubs. While domed by Dutch national identity, Protestants or
Catholics could live their lives without having little direct contact with each other.
Pillarization faded out in the late 1970s due to the emergence of integration policies.
However, he maintains, the legal structures for pillarization had remained intact. Vink
(2007) adds that, because these structures still existed, the rapidly growing Moroccan and
Turkish Muslim communities - by then the largest ethnic minority groups in the
Netherlands - could claim federal money to fund their own schools and broadcasting
networks. This led to the institutionalization of Islam in Dutch society. The government
hoped that the institutionalization - or rather pillarization - of Islam would help to
integrate Muslims into society.
In the 1980s, however, the Dutch public began to lose faith in the effectiveness of
the government’s integration policies. Unemployment in minority communities and
especially among young Moroccans and Turks was high. Although institutional racism
was a major factor in the failing of these policies, minority groups themselves received
most of the blame. Public opinion faulted Muslims for refusing to obtain the cultural
capital that was deemed necessary to succeed in society. Many believed that Islam and
41
Muslims refused to respect the Dutch tradition of cultural pluralism. Islam had been
expected to become another pillar in the Dutch accommodation system; yet, when that
did not happen people, like Fortuyn, began to believe that the nature of Islam did not
allow for such compromise. As a result, Islam was perceived as a rigid, fundamentalist
religion and culture, and therefore deemed incompatible with the structure, norms, and
values of Dutch society. Van Bruijnessen (2006) argues that the Dutch wanted Muslims
to distance themselves from their ethnic identity. This would prove their loyalty to the
nation. Joppke (2007) adds that “the supposedly difference-friendly, multicultural
Netherlands [was] urging migrants to accept ‘Dutch norms and values’ in the context of a
policy of civic integration” (p. 2).
Towards the end of 1990s, support for liberal multiculturalism had significantly
faded. Vink (2007) offers two explanations for its demise. First, he argues, liberal
multiculturalism was tied to the Dutch system of pillarization. Therefore, once the system
collapsed, so did multiculturalism. Second, Vink claims, a change in the political climate
- led by populist leaders such as Geert Wilders, Rita Verdonk, and Pim Fortuyn - had
moved Dutch society towards conservative liberalism. Scheffer (2000, 2007) offers
another explanation: Dutch society had, simply, never been multicultural. Vink’s
observation, that society began to move away from liberal multiculturalism, is supported
by the policies the government enacted in the late 1990s. For instance, in 1997, it
repealed the Dual Citizenship Law and, in 1998, adopted a Law on Civic Integration of
Newcomers. The Law on Civic Integration of Newcomers encouraged immigrants to
42
become socially and economically self-sufficient. In 2006, the Civic Integration Abroad
Act entered into force. The Act restricted immigration through family reunification and
obliged prospective immigrants to take a ‘civic integration’ examination. In preparation
of the exam, immigrants - and particularly those who intended to apply for permanent
residency - were required to watch the film Coming to the Netherlands. The film included
images of topless sunbathing women and lesbians and gay men holding hands
(www.naarnederland.nl). These images, the Act suggested, were part of Dutch culture. It
stipulated that by taking and passing the exam, applicants agreed to accept
homosexuality, women’s rights, and sexual freedom as fundaments of the Dutch national
identity.
The United Kingdom
28
On April 20, 1968, Conservative Member of Parliament Enoch Powell gave a
speech at the Midland Hotel in Birmingham. In this speech, he expressed his concern
about the enactment of the Race Relations Act (1968). Powell was particularly worried
about what this Act and the continuing influx of immigrants might do to the norms and
values of British society. The Act was created in response to the racial discrimination that
many non-white immigrants faced upon arrival in the United Kingdom. It made it illegal,
28
Given the scope of the historical literature on race and ethnic relations in the United
Kingdom, I was forced to provide a condensed overview. However, John Solomon’ Race
and Racism in Britain (2003) gives excellent insight into historical race and ethnic
relations up to the 1990s in the United Kingdom.
43
for instance, for anyone to refuse housing, employment, or public services to a person on
the grounds of color, race, ethnic, or national origins. Powell believed that the Act would
open the floodgates to non-white immigrants who wanted to take advantage of its
provisions. He feared that these immigrants would be unable to assimilate into British
society because of their foreign culture. Subsequently, Powell perceived non-white
immigration as a threat to ‘Britishness’ - pre-1960s norms and values. He proclaimed:
For these dangerous and divisive elements the legislation proposed in the Race
Relations Bill is the very pabulum they need to flourish. Here is the means of
showing that the immigrant communities can organize to consolidate their
members, to agitate and campaign against their fellow citizens, and to overawe
and dominate the rest with the legal weapons which the ignorant and the ill-
informed have provided. As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding; like the
Roman, I seem to see the River Tiber foaming with much blood. (1968)
Abbas (2005) argues that concerns about the changing cultural nature of British
society, as worded by Powell, were translated in the formulation of a ‘race relations
problematic’. He maintains that part of this ‘problematic’ was the question of how to deal
with the assimilation of non-white immigrants into society. Abbas explains that, at first,
from the 1950s to 1970s, the British government supported the newly arrived immigrants
with social service programs, hoping that this support would help them to assimilate.
These efforts were unsuccessful and responding to this failure, in the late 1960s,
multiculturalism emerged as a policy framework. The government encouraged Britons to
recognize the positive cultural contributions that immigrants brought to society. Yet, he
argues, deep in its heart, the government also believed that Britain faced a ‘race relations
problematic’ because of immigration. Abbas adds that the government’s attitude created
44
an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, it tightened the country’s, already restrictionist,
immigration policy towards non-whites. At the same time, it complimented this policy
with a flexible race relations management for ethnic minority groups that were already
present in British society.
Despite the Race Relations Act, immigrants still faced significant discrimination
and economic disadvantage. Between the late 1970s and mid-1980s, the multicultural
approach was, therefore, increasingly critiqued by ethnic minority groups for being
ineffective. Under Margaret Thatcher and John Major’s Conservative Party rule, in the
1980s and 1990s the government further restricted immigration and citizenship laws. The
Conservatives believed that further restriction of immigration would, eventually, lead to
disappearance of the race relations problematic and the need for multicultural policies
(Abbas 2005). During this time, discontent among minority groups rose to new highs,
cumulating in the Brixton Riots of April 11, 1981. Scarman (1981) argues that the
Brixton Riots are considered the worst in 20
th
century British race relations history. They
resulted in more than three hundred police and civilian injuries and millions of pounds in
property damage.
29
29
The Brixton area in London was socially disadvantaged and home to people of,
predominantly, African Caribbean descent. In an attempt to clear the area of street crime,
the Metropolitan Police began Operation Swamp 81. This Operation allowed the police
to stop and search individuals they suspected of ‘wrong-doing.’ The local community had
not been consulted about the Operation and, therefore, tensions between the community
and the police escalated. On the evening of April 11, the police were accused of failing to
provide medical assistance to a youth who had been stabbed. As conflicting accounts of
the event spread through the community, crowds turned on to the police.
45
In 1997, Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’ came to power. Unlike the Conservatives,
the party embraced multiculturalism and Britain’s ethnically diverse society. In his first
term of office (1997-2001), Blair, therefore, ratified the Human Rights Act (1998)
30
,
commissioned the Macpherson Report (1999) (on Metropolitan police’s mishandling of
the investigation of the racist murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence)
31
, and passed
the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000.
32
In 2000, New Labour also commissioned the
Runnymede’s Trust Commission Report on The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain
33
, which
came to be known as the Parekh Report. The Runnymede Trust Commission, an
independent think-tank, was asked to recommend ways in which the government could
fight the racial discrimination of and social inequality among Britain’s ethnic minorities
(Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain 2000).
Chair of the Runnymede Trust Commission, Bhikhu Parekh, identified six
principles that he saw as foundational to the government’s anti-discrimination and social
30
The Human Rights Act puts into practice the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the
European Convention on Human Rights.
31
In 1993, Lawrence was stabbed to death by a group of white youth as he waited for a
bus in South London. The youth were later identified and arrested. However, they were
never convicted because of the police’s mishandling of evidence and witness testimonies.
The Report concluded that the investigation had been severely hampered by institutional
racism within the Metropolitan police (Body-Gendrot 2004).
32
As a result of the Macpherson Report, the Race Relation Act of 1976 was amended so
it would apply to the police and other public authorities.
33
In January 1998, the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain was set up by
the Runnymede Trust. The Trust was an independent think-tank devoted to the cause of
promoting racial justice in Britain.
46
equality agenda. First, Parekh argued, individuals had equal worth irrespective of their
color, gender, ethnicity, religion, age, or sexual orientation. Second, he maintained,
British citizens were both individuals and members of religious, ethnic, cultural, and
regional communities. Parekh stated that Britain was a “community of citizens” and a
“community of communities”. Third, he asserted, British citizens had different needs and
equality required that these differences were taken into full account. Fourth, Parekh
maintained, British society needed to be cohesive as well as respectful of diversity. That
meant that it had to find a way to promote diversity while simultaneously encouraging a
collective sense of belonging. Fifth, he stated, every society needed a shared body of
norms and values, but also respect moral differences. Lastly, Parekh argued, racism had
no place in a British society (Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic
Britain 2000).
Parekh believed that it was necessary to create a society where all citizens and
communities felt valued and had equal social, cultural, political, and economic
opportunities. Yet, he argued, obstacles like institutionalized racism and a ‘soft’
government stood in the way of achieving this vision. Parekh concluded that these
obstacles had to be addressed through policies that were supported by legislation and
administrative measures. Above all, he maintained, they required a fundamental shift in
the way that ‘Britishness’ (as an exclusive racial and ethnic identity) was constructed
(Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain).
47
The Parekh Report came just at the right time. Tensions caused by decades of
institutional racism (as witnessed in the Brixton Riots) resurfaced in 2001. Clashes
between white supremacists and Pakistani Muslims in Burley, Bradford, and Oldham
34
contributed to a change in society’s attitude towards ethnic diversity. First, they shifted
the focus from a “celebration of multicultural diversity” to “communities that lack
cohesion” (Cantle 2001). Second, they turned the ‘race relations problematic’ into a
‘Muslim Asian problematic’ (Abbas 2005). Lewis (1994) and Poynting & Mason (2007)
argue that concerns about Islam in British society had increased since the Salman
Rushdie affair. In 1989, Muslim Asians in Bradford burned effigies of Rushdie and
copies of his book the Satanic Verses (1988). The book, they maintained, ridiculed the
Prophet Mohammed. Images of the protesters were broadcasted all over the world. While
the Muslim community had hoped that their protests would be understood, the images
had the opposite effect. Lewis and Poynting & Mason maintain that, rather than feeling
sympathy for the Muslim cause, non-Muslims condemned their protests as anti-
democratic. Favell (1998) suggests that Muslims’ support for the fatwa that was issued
against Rushdie by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran further outraged the non-
Muslim community.
The Rushdie Affair did not only portray Muslims as intolerant, but also split the
category ‘Asian’ along faith lines - those who were Muslim and those who were not.
34
Lewis (1994) calls these cities Britain’s ‘Islamabads’ because of their large Pakistani
populations.
48
Therefore, it was not surprising that the Cantle Report (Cantle 2001), commissioned by
the Home Secretary to look into the cause and aftermath of the Bradford riots, confirmed
what many British had known for decades: people in ethnic minority communities lived
segregated lives. The report implied that this segregation was seen as unwillingness by
some minority groups - especially Muslims - to conform to the British norms and values
of freedom, tolerance, and democracy. Subsequently, racism against Muslim Asians was
widespread. The latter observation is supported by Saeed’s (2007) study of British media
representations of Muslim Asians. Saeed found that they were often portrayed as ‘alien
others;’ within discourses of ‘deviance’ and ‘un-Britishness’ (see also Webster 1997;
Pool 2002).
The Cantle Report recommended that the government, police, and community
leaders work together to desegregate ethnic minority communities. The Report further
suggested that the institutionalization of an oath of national allegiance would help to ease
racial tensions and promote a meaningful concept of citizenship. Abbas (2005) maintains
that the type of language in the report was “a reminder of some of the debates in this area
in the 1970s and 1980s when the assimilated rhetoric kept on reemerging at times of
crises and important turning points in the history and development of “race relation”” (p.
159). Kundnani (2007) adds that, since 2001, “The new conventional wisdom [under the
New Labour government] is that a national story of Britishness must be promoted in
order to bind the nation together around a set of cover values to which minorities must
49
assimilate” (p. 24). Like in the Netherlands, British values, thus, became the litmus test
for citizenship.
Emergence of Multiculturalism in the United States
As a political ideology, multiculturalism in the United States emerged out of the
civil rights movement in the early 1970s. It was used to dismantle America’s ‘common
culture’, which critics deemed too Eurocentric. Gordon and Newfield (1996) maintain
that multiculturalism:
… promised independence to various cultures to negotiate their own relations to
the national whole … It underwrote alliances among racial minorities grounded in
resistance to Euro-American norming. [Multiculturalism] sponsored contacts
among people of color that avoided white mediation and oversight by white
opinion. (P. 4)
Gordon and Newfield’s assertion raises several questions: Why was an attack on
America’s common culture deemed necessary? Why did multiculturalism focus on
education (see McCormick 1984; Gordon and Newfield 1996; Vertovec 1998; Bryson
2005)? Had the US Civil Rights Movement not granted equality to all people in the
United States and righted the wrongs of slavery, Indian removal, Chinese exclusion, and
Japanese and Italian interment?
To answer these questions, more historical background of US society is needed.
Rex (1995) and Kivisto (2002) trace the formation of multiculturalism in the United
States back to colonialism and immigration: for instance, the conquest of native
Americans’ land; slavery; and the first, second, and (after passage of the 1965 Hart-
50
Cellar Act
35
) third and fourth waves of immigration in the 19
th
and 20
th
centuries. These
immigrants, Rex (1995) argues, were expected to enter a ‘melting pot’. Once they settled
in this ‘pot’, they would abandon their ethnicity in favor of a single Anglo-Saxon based
culture. However, he maintains, because the melting pot was developed with European
immigrants in mind, it did little to deal with the problems of, for instance, the newly
emancipated African Americans. US society had to find a way for blacks (and Native
Americans) to achieve equality with white Americans. Out of these efforts emerged the
Civil Rights Movement.
The Civil Rights Movement played an important role in the 1954 Brown v. Board
of Education Supreme Court case (which ended legal segregation) and enactment of the
Civil Rights (1964) and Voting Rights (1965) Acts. Despite these milestones, in the late
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, African Americans were still overrepresented in the lower and
impoverished classes (see Moynihan 1965, 1969; Wilson 1987). One potential reason for
this overrepresentation was given by Stokely Carmichael who coined the term
‘institutional racism’ in the late 1960s. Doob (1999) defines institutional racism as “the
legacy of past racist behavioral pattern. Specifically [it] refers to the discriminatory racial
practices built into such prominent structures as the political, economic, and education
systems” (p. 8). The idea of institutional racism is further supported by Winant (2001),
who argues that race was the “key force driving world development” (p. 21). If modernity
is rooted in racism and society in modernity than, inevitably, social institutions will favor
35
The Act abolished the national origin quotas that were part of immigration policies.
51
one race over the other. Social equality thus existed on levels; it consisted of glass
ceilings stacked upon each other. While the Civil Rights Movement, arguably, managed
to shatter the glass ceiling of political inequality, it only made holes in the next one that
would have granted them equal access to economic privilege (Citrin et al. 2001).
The concept of multiculturalism was developed at a time when civil rights
activists began to actively criticize the perceived lack of upward mobility in the black
community. Multiculturalism was envisioned as a challenge to hegemonic culture.
Activists saw in education one of the main avenues to achieve this goal. Multiculturalism
could replace Eurocentric, mono-cultural education with a curriculum that acknowledged
ethnic diversity in society. McCormick (1984) and Bryson (2005) argue that it would
teach the next generation that US society consisted of many different histories and
cultures other than the European one they were socialized in.
Stratton and Ang (1998) note that “multiculturalism has gained acceptance among
sectors of the public at large but has not become state sponsored” (p. 138). That is
because since the late 1990s, attitudes towards immigrants and immigration have changed
significantly. Citrin et al. (2001) argue that immigration, “a source of new claimants for
cultural recognition, [posed] an immediate problem for the multicultural project…A
majority of the public rejected the notion of preferential treatment for immigrants
whatever their background” (p. 262). The rejection of multiculturalism as preferential
treatment manifested itself in the anti-Affirmative Action movement of the mid-1990s,
which was supported mostly by conservatives (see D’Souza 1991; Schmidt 1997). In the
52
1980s, attitudes towards multiculturalism moved from the ideological left to the center
and conservative liberal. People wanted to enjoy cultural diversity, but did not want this
diversity to interfere with or go against a common American identity and its norms and
values. This contradictory position is illustrated by what Fish (1997) calls “boutique
multiculturalism”. People get pleasure from an African music festival, but do not tolerate
the 1989 fatwa brought against Salman Rushdie.
Next, I will provide a brief overview of the emergence of Islam in the United
States and discuss people’s attitudes towards Muslims. Incorporating discussions of
religion in research on US multiculturalism is highly needed, given its noticeable absence
in the literature (with a few exceptions, for instance, Kurien 2006).
Islam and Muslims in the United States
When discussing multiculturalism and 9/11, scholars often focus on Arab
Americans (see Cainkar 2002; Saliata 2006; Maira 2007; Jamal and Naber 2008). This
dissertation does not focus on ‘Arab Americans’, but rather ‘Muslims’. Muslims in the
United States come from a variety of ethnic and geographical backgrounds: Asia, the
Middle East, Europe, Africa, and in the case of white converts and African American
Muslims, the United States. Also, many Arab Americans are not Muslim but Christian.
Alexseev (2006) identifies five waves of Muslim immigration to the United States. He
maintains that the first Muslims that entered the United States came as slaves from
Africa, although he admits that there exists little evidence for this assertion. The second
53
wave of Muslims consisted of Anglo-Saxon converts to Islam who already lived in the
United States. Alexseev states that the first large wave of Muslims - technically the third
wave - came to the United States from the Greater Syria region (the Ottoman province)
between 1880 and 1930. While this wave included Muslims, a large number were
Christians who called themselves ‘Syrians’ upon settling in the United States. Third wave
immigrants, mostly, came to the United States for economic gain - as temporary workers.
Some of these immigrants, however, were political refugees who did not want to be
enlisted in the Ottoman army (see also Naff 1985).
The fourth wave of Muslims emerged from the African American community.
Alexseev (2006) suggests that this period should be divided into two overlapping eras,
the period of the Proto Islamic and Orthodox Islamic movements. Proto Islamic
movements were represented by the Nation of Islam from the 1940s onward. Laremont
(1999) states that the Nation of Islam was mostly concerned with the building of an
autonomous African American community within a white society. Out of the Proto
Islamic organizations emerged the Orthodox-Islamic movement. The Orthodox-Islamic
movement was modeled after Sunni Islam, which is the largest denomination of Islam in
the world (Laremont 1999). Leonard (2004) argues that the shift from Proto to Orthodox
Islam in the African American community was started by Elijah Muhammad’s son
Wallace D. Mohammed. He aligned the Nation of Islam with mainstream Sunni teachings
and Shari'ah law after his father died in 1975.
54
Alexseev maintains that the final wave of immigrants changed the face of the
established Arab American community. With the passing of the 1965 Hart-Cellar Act
and the founding of Israel, a large number of Middle Eastern immigrants moved to the
United States; either because they were displaced (as in the case with Palestinians) or for
educational and professional purposes. He maintains that their arrival introduced a well-
educated, professional middle class of Muslims into existing Arab American
communities - most of which, historically, were comprised of working class immigrants.
They formed organizations such as the Muslim Student Association (1963), which gave a
political, visible face to the Arab American community. It is because of the increased
political visibility that these immigrants brought to Arab American communities that,
nowadays, most Arabs in the United States are associated with Islam.
Conclusion
In the review of the literature on racialization, nationalism, and multiculturalism
in Chapter One and in this Chapter, I showed why I expected national identity to be an
important element in my research. For example, in the Netherlands, gender, sexuality,
race, social class, and religion worked together to construct national identity. I assumed,
therefore, that focusing on national identity construction would explain why, for example,
in Dutch society gay rights played an important role in political debates on Islam,
Muslims, and integration. I also showed why multiculturalism is a concept that cannot be
universally defined; how its meaning and policies need to be contextualized within
55
historical locales. Lastly, I showed how an understanding of the roles of diaspora and
culture are needed to examine why immigrants were received the way that they were; and
why dominant society may have become fearful of these immigrants. This discussion
showed that these processes often are linked to global economic, cultural, and political
factors (see also Appadurai 1996; Featherstone et al. 1995; Beynon 2002; Poole 2000;
Allievi & Nielsen 2003; Barlow 2003; Dines and Humez 2003; Gentz and Kramer 2006;
McChesney 2008).
56
Chapter Three: Research Methods
Grounded Theory
Grounded theory was developed by Glaser and Strauss in their 1965 work on
people dying in hospitals. During their research, they developed a methodology that other
researchers could use to analyze their qualitative data sets with. In The Discovery of
Grounded Theory (1967) Glaser and Strauss propose that theories should emerge from
data instead of being deducted from testable hypotheses. This means that, rather than first
developing a hypothesis based on an existing theory, the researcher starts with the
collection of her or his data. In the data, she or he marks key points with codes, which
then are grouped together in categories. Based on the analysis of these categories a theory
is created.
In my dissertation, I use the grounded theory method because no prior research on
discussions of gender, sexuality, Islam, and Muslims in Dutch, British, and US political
documents exists. Grounded theory, therefore, enables me to research my dissertation
topic without a pre-existing theoretical framework in place. I can let insights emerge from
the data as they are collected and analyzed, and then use these insights to build on the
existing theories of race, multiculturalism, and nationalism discussed in Chapters One
and Two.
57
I conducted my data analysis in three stages and eight steps as laid out by Pandit
(1996):
Stage One: Research Design
1. Formulate a research question based on a literature review and research
assumptions.
2. Select case studies; focus on those cases that are theoretically useful—that test
and/or extend the theory.
Stage Two: Data Collection
3. Enter the research field using flexible and opportunistic data collection
methods.
4. Develop a case study data base and data collection protocol.
Stage Three: Data analysis
5. Open Coding: develop concepts and categories.
6. Axial Coding: develop connections between categories and sub-categories.
7. Theoretical replication across cases.
8. Research closure.
Stage One: Research Design
Stage one consists of two steps: (1) conduct a literature review to develop
research questions and (2) select case studies that are theoretically useful - that can help
answer the research questions. In Chapter One, I formulated the following two questions:
1. How are gender and sexuality used in political debates on Muslims and Islam
in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States between 1999 and
2006?
a) What role does national identity play in the use of gender and sexuality
in these political debates?
58
2. How do gender and sexuality contribute to the racialization of Muslims in the
Netherlands between 1999 and 2006?
I also spent some time speculating about a theoretical framework that could explain why
gender and sexuality played an important role in discussions on Islam and Muslims in the
Netherlands, but not in the United Kingdom and the United States. This speculation
allowed me to select three theoretically useful case studies (the Netherlands, United
Kingdom, and the United States) and helped to establish a framework to situate the
emergent grounded theory within - to establish the domain to which my findings,
eventually, can be generalized.
Stage Two: Data Collection
In order to start the research process, I first had to decide on the type of data I
would be collecting. Data collection in qualitative research can be conducted in three
ways: through interviews, through observation, or through analysis of documents
(Merriam 1998). I decided to collect and analyze political documents - brochures and
pamphlets - that are accessible to the general public. By accessible, I mean that these
documents were easily obtainable in libraries or downloadable as PDF files via the World
Wide Web; they were not solely published for registered members of a party. I used these
documents because they are reflective of a party’s ‘public profile’ and can, therefore, be
treated as its official ideological stance on a social issue. Furthermore, Trent and
59
Friedenberg (2004) argue, unlike for instance spot advertising, brochures allow for much
longer and more in-depth messages to be conveyed to the general public. Finally, because
parties publish their own documents, the information these contain are ‘unsolicited’; they
cannot argue that their points of view are edited (e.g., as in news paper interviews). To
limit the research scope, I decided not to include Internet blogs or television campaign
advertisements in the analysis. I do realize, however, that nowadays many political
debates are, especially, conducted in cyber space.
I collected the data from three locations: the University of Groningen’s
Documentatie Centrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen (Documentation Centre Dutch
Political Parties) in the Netherlands, the London School of Economics’ Pamphlet
Collection in the United Kingdom, and the democrats.org, gop.com, and 4president.org
websites. (For more specific information on the data collection processes, see the
introductions to Chapters Four, Five, and Six). Next, I established a data collection
protocol. First, I categorized documents according to (1) political party, (2) year of
publication, and (3) event. I coded for year of publication and event so I could
synchronize political happenings during the year of publication with the codes and
categories discussed in the documents. Due to the lack of data on smaller national or
regional political parties, I chose to focus only on data published by political parties that
60
dominated the national elections in each country during the research period. In total, I
coded data for fourteen political parties.
36
In the Netherlands, I categorized data into seven party categories:
1. Christen-Democratisch Appel (CDA - Christen Democrats)
2. Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA - Labor Party)
3. Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD - People’s Party for
Freedom and Democracy)
4. Democraten66 (D66 - Democrats66)
5. Christen Unie (CU - Christian Union)
6. Staatskundig Gereformeerde Party (SGP - Reformed Party)
7. Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF - List Pim Fortuyn).
In the United Kingdom, I categorized data into five party categories:
1. New Labour (Labour)
2. Conservative and Unionist Party (Conservatives)
3. Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems)
36
Founded in 2008, Rita Verdonk’s Trots op Nederland (Proud of the Netherlands) was
excluded from the data analysis.
61
4. United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP)
5. British National Party (BNP)
In the United States I categorized data into two party categories:
1. Democratic Party (Democrats)
2. Republican Party (Republicans)
Stage Three: Data analysis
After assigning the collected data to the three categories, I began the ‘open
coding’ process. Open coding means reading documents line by line and marking those
text segments that suggest a concept or category. This open coding process was largely
unstructured because I had no idea yet of the range of categories I would end up with or
how I would define each category. Furthermore, I had yet to develop uniform coding
procedures (see the section on memos) since I was still shifting through the large amount
of data. This initial coding process went on for several months. When the code set
became too large to manage, I began the process of finding concepts and developing
categories (see Table 1).
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1) Asylum
2) Black/White Schools
3) Burhka
4) Christianity
5) Citizenship
6) Civil Partnership
7) Crime
8) Criminals
9) Culture
10) Death Penalty
11) Defense
12) Democracy
13) Disadvantage
14) Double Nationality
15) Dutch
16) Education
17) Emancipation
18) Euthanasia
19) Family
20) Female Circumcision
21) Foreigners
22) Gay marriage
23) Hirsi Ali
24) Homosexuality
25) Honor Killing
26) Human Rights
27) Hymen Reconstruction
28) Immigration
29) Individualism
30) Integration
31) Iraq
32) Islam
33) Israel
34) Juvenile Delinquency
35) Language
36) London Bombing
37) Lover Boys
38) Madrid
39) Media
40) Muslims
41) National safety
42) Neighborhood
43) Netherlands
44) 9/11
45) Pim Fortuyn
46) Police
47) Politics
48) Poverty
49) Public Safety
50) Religion
51) Responsibility
52) Security
53) Sexuality
54) Shared
55) Social Stability
56) Terrorism
57) Theo van Gogh
58) Welfare
59) Women’s rights
60) Youth
Table 1. A Sample of Categories in the Netherlands Un-collapsed
As Table 1 illustrates, many of the categories overlapped and in order to condense
the number of categories, I started to compare categories and codes against other
categories and codes and collapsed those that had characteristics in common. For
instance, codes for ‘juvenile delinquency’ and ‘criminals’ were collapsed into a ‘crime’
category. Other categories, e.g., ‘police’ and ‘public safety’ were collapsed into a
63
‘security’ category. A more detailed discussion of the codes and categories will be
provided in Chapter Four and Appendices I, II, and III. During the open coding stage, I
wrote memos to provide contextualized information on the fragments of texts highlighted
in the documents. This information could refer to the overall tone of the article, provide
background on some piece of legislation mentioned in the segment, or allowed me to read
between the lines and make notes on what I believed was ‘really’ going on. Memos were
particularly important for the Dutch documents; since these segments had to be translated
in English, some of their nuanced meanings became lost in translation. For instance, there
is no English term to accurately describe the Dutch word inburgering. Inburgering is a
process similar to assimilation, but has a much stronger meaning - it particularly refers to
notions of citizenship, acceptance of core norms and values, and social responsibility. By
adding memos to the Dutch codes, I retrieved some of the cultural meanings of translated
Dutch text segments (I will discuss the memo in more detail later on).
Coding and Frames
I mentioned earlier that in grounded theory the researcher begins with the open
coding process, then moves on to identifying concepts and groups these concepts into
categories. After I established categories such as ‘integration’ and ‘religion’, I used frame
analysis to place the codes and concepts within a larger discursive context (frames)
through the writing of memos. Goffman (1974) defines frames as “schemata of
interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences
64
or life experiences” (p. 21). Pan and Kosicki (2000) argue that framing is an important
part of understanding political debates: they provide the texture of political discourses.
Zald (1996) adds that in political debates frames mobilize people and, subsequently,
increase politicians’ influence. Therefore, he maintains, frames can help politicians’
chances of winning. Lastly, Spector and Kitsuse (1987) note that frames are often used to
emphasize policy matters. They argue that frames, for instance, can recommend an
appropriate course of action to resolve or prevent a problem. However, frames do not
always have to be textual. The cover of a 2001 CDA pamphlet on social integration
shows a photograph of a white and a brown-skinned boy playing soccer on a dirt field in
front of a large, grim-looking apartment complex. In the accompanying memo I wrote:
The party is trying to show the positive side of multiculturalism and integration.
Showing boys actively involved in sports is a positive representation - especially
given the concerns about adolescent masculinity and crime during this time
period. Showing boys from different ethnic backgrounds playing together also is a
positive representation. It makes assumptions about childhood innocence - when
skin color does not matter yet - and sends a hopeful message to adults: if children
get along, we can too. I do have issues with this picture. Showing them in front of
a large council-estate like housing complex is problematic. It confirms my own
stereotypical perceptions of ethnic minority youth. It makes me think that one or
both of the boys must be living there (why would they otherwise be playing on
the field in front of it) and that therefore he/they must be socially and
economically disadvantaged. It does not occur to me to assume that perhaps the
white boy lives in the estate and the brown-skinned boy - from a wealthier
neighborhood - is simply visiting his friend. Given the composition of tenants in
council estates in the Netherlands (mainly ethnic minorities) and assuming both
boys live in the same building or neighborhood, would the white boy have played
with the brown-skinned boy had he lived in a more whites-dominated
environment? Having them play soccer rather than another sport such as tennis,
swimming, or field hockey adds to the feeling of ‘disadvantage’, since soccer is
an inexpensive sport to play. CDA believes that group activities such as sports are
good ways for minority and majority groups to establish bonds and will be
65
beneficial for minority integration. Yet, given today’s sports-economy, it makes
me wonder whether sport is not inadvertently being portrayed as an alternative to
education - as a more viable means to socially and economically advance in
society for certain groups. I do not think this picture evokes the right Image for
what the party is trying to express. I realize that my own assumptions and biases
may influence my analysis, but even so, the picture raises too many questions. I
wonder whether showing both boys studying in a class room would make a
different, more positive impression.
Revisiting this memo is interesting because it confronts me with some of my personal
biases. As I will discuss in the validity and reliability section, personal biases can
influence the grounded theory findings, but are hard to control for. However, by critically
revisiting and rewriting memos on a regular - weekly - basis, or letting secondary coders
read the memos, the researcher has a way to keep research bias relatively under control.
Focused Coding
The process of integration is the final stage of developing grounded theory. It
enables the reshaping of categories, which gives them deeper meaning (Lindlof and
Taylor 2002; Charmaz 2006). Integrating categories starts with axial coding. Axial codes
establish connections between categories. This results in the creation of new categories or
themes that cover a range of categories. For instance, the ‘crime prevention’ code in a
PvdA report was linked to the ‘social responsibility’ code in another PvdA document. In
turn, this new ‘crime-social responsibility code’ could be linked to a VVD ‘forced
integration minority immigrants’ code; in the process also creating an ‘ideological link’
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code between the centre left politics of the PvdA and center right politics of the VVD.
Axial coding thus makes connections within and between party categories.
Memos
Throughout the coding process, I divided texts up in segments and wrote memos
on them. These memos were part of the uniform coding procedure. For each segment, I
established: (1) what issue a party was talking about; (2) when this issue took place; (3)
what other events where going on during time of discussion; (4) how the issue fit in with
the rest of the section in which it was discussed and with the rest of the document; and (5)
how the issue fit in with the party’s other documents. Based on these questions, I
constructed an overall discourse of the segment. For instance, a CDA report segment
discussing how ‘Mosques’ needed to take ‘social responsibility’ in monitoring ‘out of
control Moroccan youth’ (codes in inverted commas) was accompanied by the following
memo:
This section talks about Mosques and the role of Mosques in establishing social
stability among ‘out of control’ Muslim youth. It is interesting how churches are
not expected to keep an eye on ‘out of control’ youth but Mosques are. This is
reflective of the significant influence Mosques are believed to have on Muslims;
one that trumps the influence of parents. This segment makes assumptions about
Muslims families as well as the role of religion (the Mosque) in Islamic
communities. It suggests that families are unable to control their children and that
religion plays an important role in the education/socializing of children. It also fits
in with discussions about the separation between church and state in the rest of the
CDA documents and the political climate at the time (2000) in general. It is
interesting that politicians like Pim Fortuyn are accusing Islam of failing to
provide a separation between church and state while at the same time, the CDA
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expects a religious institution akin to the church to become a solution for social
problems.
I wrote hundreds of such memos, which I integrated to look for emerging patterns and out
of which final analytical concepts emerged. Based on the coding of data and sorting and
integrating of memos, I noticed reoccurring patterns emerging. For instance, in the Dutch
case study, I found the following connection between the categories ‘Netherlands’,
‘sexuality’, ‘gender’, ‘religion’, ‘Islam’, and ‘integration’ (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Example of Axial Coding
5. G ender
2. Integration
3. Islam
1. Religion
SGP
CU
CDA
4. Sexuality
* intimacy
*homosexuality
*emancipation
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In the accompanying memo, I explained this connection as follows:
The category of sexuality was coded for numerous concepts, including intimacy
(only allowed in marriage), homosexuality (e.g., gay marriage) and emancipation
(e.g., a woman’s autonomy over her own body). All three of these codes were also
found in the categories of ‘Islam’ (the fact it received its own category is
reflective of its outsider position in Dutch politics and society), ‘gender’,
‘integration’ and ‘religion’. Within the category of ‘religion’, I coded for three
parties: the SGP, CU and CDA - parties which have their roots in ‘Christianity’.
While ‘sexuality’ was linked to these parties, and these parties linked to each
other through ‘religion’, only the SGP and CU would condemn issues such as
‘gay marriage’. The CDA would take a more neutral stance. Finally, codes in all
five categories could be found in the category ‘Netherlands’: meaning that the
language/frames in these codes suggested a kind of homeland and sense of
national collectivity.
It is through axial coding and the writing of accompanying memos that grounded theory,
eventually, emerges.
Theoretical Replication, Validity, and Reliability
La Sorte (2005) argues that theoretical replication “confirms and extends” the
emerging grounded theory framework. I, therefore, decided to apply the established
categories from the Dutch case study (see Chapter Four) to the studies of the United
Kingdom and the United States. This not only allowed me to test the validity of the
grounded theory method by replicating the Dutch case, but also to study the contours of
the Dutch case in more detail by focusing on differences and similarities in political
discussions between each country.
69
Finally, as with any form of data analysis research bias is a valid concern. Yen
(1993) maintains that validity is, particularly, difficult to obtain in qualitative research
because the researcher tends to incorporate her/his own biases in the study. I disagree
with Yen that bias is of special concern to qualitative research. Quantitative data analysis
is just as much exposed to research bias; especially since it relies on interpretations of
numerical data which are difficult to contextualize. However, I do address bias as a
potential methodological concern in three ways. First, I strictly followed the guidelines of
grounded theory as laid out by Pandit (1996). Second, I completed a thorough literature
review to verify any grounded theoretical findings. Third, I documented my thoughts
throughout the data collec8tion and analysis in verifiable memos.
In Chapters One, Two, and Three, I spent some time contextualizing my research
within the available literature and discussing the methodology used to analyze the data. In
the next three Chapters, I will discuss the collected data for each country.
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Chapter Four: The Netherlands
Data Collection
In 2007, I visited the Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen
(DNPP - Documentation Centre Dutch Political Parties) in Groningen - a university city
in the north-east of the Netherlands. The DNPP was founded in 1973 with as goal to
provide systematic and accessible documentation, and information regarding Dutch
political parties. In 1991, the Centre became affiliated with the University of Groningen -
one of the largest and most respected Universities in the country. The DNPP is small and
housed on the top floor of the University’s tall library building. Though small in size, it
contains a large collection of political documentation. These documents provide
information on the activities that Dutch political parties engage in outside of the Second
Chamber of Parliament. This outward-focus is well-suited for my research, since I am
interested in the public image of parties; their documented activities directed towards the
general public. Out of the 21 national parties that currently exist in the Netherlands; I
concentrated only on those that were represented in the Second Chamber of Parliament
between 1999 and 2006. This narrowed my focus to eleven parties:
1. Christen-Democratisch Appel (CDA - Christen Democratic Appeal)
2. Christen Unie (CU - Christen Union)
3. Democraten66 (D66 - Democrats 66)
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4. Partij voor de Dieren (DP - Party for Animals)
5. Groen Links (GL - Green Left)
6. Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF - List Pim Fortuyn)
7. Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA - Labor Party)
8. Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV - Party for Freedom)
9. Socialistische Partij (SP - Socialist Party)
10. Staatskundig Gereformeerde Party (SGP - State Reformed Party)
11. Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD - People’s Party for Freedom
and Democracy)
For the PvdA, the largest party during the research period, I found the most
number of documents: 122. For the rest of the parties, I found 62 (CDA), 56 (D66), 50
(VVD), 45 (SGP), 38 (CU), 28 (LPF), 8 (PVV), 8 (GL), 7 (SP), and 0 (DP). A substantial
number of documents were missing for the PVV, GL, SP, and DP. The DNPP explained
to me that its collection relies on parties’ donations and that it had not received
publications from these parties for quite some time. To avoid reliability issues, I omitted
all four parties from the analysis. I was comfortable omitting them from my dissertation
because the remaining seven represented the spectrum of political ideologies: from the
left to the conservative right. In total, I coded and categorized 401 brochures, reports, and
pamphlets.
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During the open coding stage, I established 104 categories, which was far too
ambitious to work with. (See Appendix I.) With so many categories, it was impossible to
find emerging patterns between different categories and codes, even with the help of the
qualitative data analysis software program ATLAS.ti. Through rigorous re-coding and re-
categorization, I was able to collapse 104 into 8 broad categories: ‘gender’, ‘integration’,
‘Islam’, ‘national identity’, ‘religion’, ‘security’, ‘sexuality’, ‘social cohesion’, and
‘other’. The ‘other’ category consisted of documents that fell outside the scope of this
research, e.g., that discussed budget proposals or measures to resolve environmental
pollution. I therefore excluded the ‘other’ category from the data analysis. Each category
represents a theme and next I will provide an overview of what this theme stands for.
Categories:
Integration
Successful social integration brings ethnic minority groups into the mainstream of
society and provides them access to the services and benefits available to all other
members of that society. Integration should not be confused with cultural assimilation,
the latter focusing on the (forced) adoption of aspects of the dominant culture. Parties
may want an ethnic group to integrate, but can still support cultural diversity. In the
Netherlands, the integration category contains themes that address how political parties
can successfully bring immigrants into mainstream society, e.g., through Affirmative
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Action-like policies, and that evaluate whether past and existing policies have succeeded
in doing so.
37
Social Cohesion and Security
Themes in these two categories portray a society in which individualism is the exception
and collectivity the norm. Jenson (2002) identifies five dimensions to social cohesion: a
sense of belonging, inclusion, active citizenship, equality, and legitimacy of institutions.
These elements are the glue that holds a diverse society together. Without these elements,
society would fall in a state of anomie (Durkheim 1933). Social cohesion, thus, can be
seen as a form of organic solidarity in which institutions work together to produce social
stability. Cohesion tends to be discussed in combination with themes such as ‘security’
and ‘integration’. Political parties establish this connection as follows: in a well-
37
In Chapter One, I mentioned that, from the 1960s onwards, the Netherlands had turned
into an immigrant society with people arriving from its ex-colonies as well as countries
such as Morocco and Turkey. Assuming that the Dutch tradition of social tolerance
would help to integrate the newcomers, the government adopted a laissez faire attitude
towards integration. In the controversial essay The Multicultural Drama (2000), Scheffer
argues that the government’s approach had failed miserably. Laissez faire integration
policies left generations of immigrants in permanent disadvantage. Scheffer’s essay
caused quite the uproar when it was published, because Dutch politics had always pride
itself on its successful integration policies. The controversy surrounding Scheffer’s book
is surprising, since data clearly show parties’ concern about integration and
multiculturalism before 2000. Scheffer’s argument was further supported by a report
published by the Central Bureau of Statistics (2004). In the report, its writers, Vrooman
and Hoff conclude that ethnic minorities have been consistently overrepresented in the
lowest income brackets in society between 1997 and 2003. Whether or not integration
was perceived as successful, it was seen as a means to improve immigrants’ socio-
economic status.
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integrated society its members are active citizens. Active citizenship contributes to
financial and physical security. Security leads to inclusion, a sense of community, and
eventually social cohesion. Security, thus, does not only refer to law enforcement’s
protection against crime or terrorism, but also feelings of financial and social comfort. A
failure of any of these elements - e.g., security, integration, or active citizenship - will
lead to a breakdown in social cohesion.
Gender
Connell (1987) argues that gender means the “practice organized in terms of, or in
relation to, the reproductive division of people into male and female … Gender practice
might be organized in terms of three, or twenty, social categories” (p. 141). Using this
conceptualization, themes in the ‘gender’ category deal with practices that are relevant to
the assumed roles of women and men in society. These themes include a focus on women
in the family, but also homosexuality and religion. In discussions of sexual identity, for
instance, gender is used to condemn same sex practices while debates on religion and
Muslim women’s dress are used to emphasize the incompatibility of Islam’s cultural
practices with Dutch norms and values. Themes in the gender category are linked to all
seven categories, which supports Connell’s argument that constructions of gender cannot
be understood in isolation from other social categories. Discussions about gender focus
mainly on women. Men and masculinity have become hegemonic in Dutch politics and,
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subsequently, the impact of masculinity - as a construct of power - is excluded from
discussions on multiculturalism, integration, and social equality.
Sexuality
The sexuality category focuses mostly on sexual orientation and heternormativity, as in
debates about the family or gay marriage which became legalized in 2000. Some of the
parties also use sexuality to address themes of ethnicity, religion, and terrorism. For
instance, the CDA party discusses the double standard that exists in ‘Muslim culture’.
Unlike men, women are not allowed to casually date nor have sex before marriage. This
observation links sexuality to gender (women and men’s sexual role expectations),
religion (Islam, which informs Muslim culture), and ethnicity (Muslims’ cultural
practices).That CDA also uses security - fear of terrorism - to call for a ban on
prostitution, arguing that sex trafficking funds terrorist activities.
National Identity
The national identity category focuses on traditions, norms, and values that are
considered part of the Dutch national identity - of ‘Dutchness’. Some of these elements
are the Dutch language, emphasis on education and financial independence, separation
between church and state, freedom of opinion and religious expression, and social
equality for all members of Dutch society. National identity in the Netherlands, therefore,
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is an intersectional concept relying as much on language as it does on perceptions of
sexual equality.
Religion and Islam
In political documents, the theme of ‘religion’ crosses over into discussions of all other
categories and, therefore, is difficult to discuss by itself. In Dutch society, ‘religion’ is
equated with Christianity. For most parties, the values underlying the Dutch democracy
are rooted in Christianity, such as respect for people’s identities and freedom of worship.
Christianity, therefore, is part of hegemonic nationalism and seldom discussed as ‘a
religion’. Instead, it has become a standard against which other religions are measured. It
is, therefore, not surprising that Islam is framed as a type of ethnicity rather than faith. In
discussions of Islam, parties focus on Muslims and their cultural expression, e.g., women
wearing the hijab, rather than situating these expressions within the Islamic faith - seeing
the veil as a woman’s expression of her commitment to the Prophet. The only time that
Islam is discussed as a faith is in the context of religious fundamentalism. Yet, even then,
parties do not explain what Islamic fundamentalism exactly entails and how it differs
from strands of moderate and liberal Islam. Islam also is linked to social class; Moroccan
Muslims in particular are framed as agrarian laborers who are socially and economically
disadvantaged, in the process equating Islam with the working-class. Lastly, since
discussions of Islam permeate all other categories in the Netherlands, it would be
superfluous to discuss it as a separate category.
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Discussion
Because of parties’ shared political ideologies, I divided them into three categories: ‘the
Religious Right’ (CDA, CU, and SGP), ‘the Left’ (PvdA and D66) and ‘the Right’ (VVD
and LPF). This Chapter will proceed as follows: first, I will provide a brief overview of
the parties’ histories. Next, I discuss the themes that emerged from the data. In Chapter
Seven, I use the data analysis to answer two questions: how do sexuality and gender
inform discussions about integration and multiculturalism, and how do these discussions
contribute to the racialization of Muslims?
38
The Religious Right:
Christen Democratisch Appel
The Christen Democratisch Appel (CDA) was founded on 11
th
October 1980,
when three Protestant and Catholic parties - the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (ARP), the
Christelijk Historische Unie (CHU) and the Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP) - decided to
work closely together. The three parties had a long history of political cooperation and
governed together in cabinets before World War II. The CDA is a ‘confessional party’,
which means that the Bible is used as a source of inspiration rather than a mandate on
how to politically govern. The CDA’s ideological platform is based on four values that
38
Throughout this Chapter, I inserted extracts from the political documents I analyzed.
Since these documents are written in Dutch (my native language), I translated them into
English.
78
have their roots in Catholicism and Protestantism. These values are stewardship, shared
responsibility, solidarity, and justice. Stewardship suggests that our planet is a gift from
God: we have been entrusted the earth and must safeguard it for future generations.
Therefore, each one of us has the responsibility to preserve its environment for
generations to come. The CDA also believes in the idea of ‘sphere sovereignty’. Sphere
sovereignty is a Neo-Calvinist concept that suggests that everyone should contribute to
society and share the responsibility and burden to make society work. There should not
be one single organization that controls all of society. Instead, society should be governed
through cooperation between local, provincial, national, and European governments.
The party is ideologically center-right; relatively liberal on environmental and
social issues (e.g., reduction of emission gasses, improvement of the health care system’
and support for asylum seekers), but conservative on issues such as sexuality, abortion,
and euthanasia. These conservative leanings are rooted in its Christian background. For
instance, the party strongly opposes euthanasia as it believes that it interferes with God’s
will and only supports abortion if the life of a woman is in danger.
Christen Unie
In 2000, the Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (GPV) and the Reformatorische
Politieke Federatie (RPF) decided to work together as the Christen Unie (CU). Due to
secularization, the once traditional pillar system was gradually disappearing from Dutch
society. Subsequently, several religious pillars had started to open its doors to members
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of other religious affiliations. The GPV and RPF decided to follow suit and work more
closely together with Christians from other Protestant denominations. Like the parties
that came together to form the CDA, the collaboration between the GPV and RPF also
was a good fit. Although rooted in different forms of Protestantism (Dutch Reformed and
Reformational), both parties believed in a society and government whose organization
and functioning were rooted in Biblical fundaments, particularly the Ten
Commandments. By working together, the GPV and RPF believed to have a much
stronger chance of spreading God’s word to the rest of society.
Staatskundige Gerformeerde Partij
The Staatskundige Gerformeerde Partij (SGP) was founded in 1918 and is the
oldest political party currently active in the Second Chambers of Parliament. Until 1918,
the SGP was part of the ARP (which together with the CHU and KVP now makes up the
CDA). The ARP wanted a new political direction and establish alliances with other
religious parties. Unlike some forms of Protestantism, (e.g., Liberated), the ARP believed
in the plurality of the Church: God had given people different identities and therefore
different belief systems. A group of conservative members did not agree with the idea of
plurality and were, subsequently, unhappy with the party’s religious direction. They
decided to form the SGP, thereby rejecting the ARP’s Neo-Calvinism and adhering to a
sober, orthodox Protestant doctrine. The SGP’s political platform, like that of the CU and
the CDA, is based on Biblical norms and values as laid out in the Dutch Reformed
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Confession Writings. It rejects homosexuality, gay marriage, gay adoption, euthanasia,
and abortion and advocates freedom of religious expression.
Integration:
CDA
In the period between 1999 and 2001, codes such as ‘shared responsibility’,
‘integration’, ‘norms and values’, ‘respect’, ‘humanity’, ‘identity’, and ‘freedom of
expression’ were used to discuss the integration of immigrants - and especially
Moroccans - into Dutch society. The CDA believed that successful integration was a
shared responsibility: immigrants needed to adhere to Dutch norms and values, and
autochthon Dutch had to make the newcomers feel welcome. The party stated:
The integration of newcomers is a reciprocal process between Dutch society who
welcomes the newcomers and the newcomers who learn the Dutch language,
take notice of Dutch legislation, learn about [Dutch] culture and history and
show respect for all of these. (Vertrouwen in Nederland, Vertrouwen in Elkaar
2006:32)
It is, however, difficult to pinpoint the CDA’s precise stance towards cultural diversity
and integration because of its interpretation of ‘freedom of expression’. In some
documents, freedom of expression was discussed as an absolute right and linked to
‘identity’, but in most others it was treated as a conditional one. For instance, in Notitie
Minderheden/Cohesie in de Samenleving (1999) the party argued that everyone had a
right to an identity and, therefore, to their cultural expressions; this right was mandated in
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the Bible. The CDA stated, that “having an identity is one of the most existential needs of
human beings. [Therefore], there should always be room for cultural and religious
experience and expression as part of the integration process” (p. 3).
However, the CDA also indicated that this experience and expression should take
place within the context of the core values and norms of Dutch society. In the same
document, the party maintained that “proficiency of the Dutch language and adherence to
the in the Netherlands essential values, norms and forms of interaction are an absolute
necessity” (p. 3). In other words, as the CDA stated in Een doorstart: Via integratie naar
participatie (2000):
Newcomers live in the Netherlands. The Netherlands has a dominant
Christian and humanistic culture, which will remain dominant. Within the
conditions of integration, participation, the dominant culture, Dutch norms, values
and laws, the individual identity develops and contributes to society. (P. 3)
This meant that freedom of expression or individuality, as a fundamental right, was only
fundamental within the context of Dutch core norms and values. Overall, the party’s
attitude towards cultural diversity was one of conservative multiculturalism: diversity
was there to be celebrated as long as it contributed to the unity of the dominant society.
An example of the CDA’s ambiguous stance towards cultural diversity was its
1999 call for dialogue between Christians and members of other religions. The purpose of
this dialogue was to emphasize that all religions had an equal place in Dutch society. That
same year, however, the CDA repeatedly emphasized the importance of inburgering of
immigrants. During the inburgering process, immigrants are schooled in the traditions
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and history of the Netherlands. They are educated in the Dutch language and told of the
importance of Dutch values such as education, financial independence, and social
equality. Thus, on the one hand the party indicated that all religious and thereby cultural
expressions were equal, while on the other hand, it suggested that inburgering was a
necessary condition for immigrants to be considered ‘true’ citizens.
The Effects of 9/11
The terrorist attacks on the United States on 9/11 and the murder of Van Gogh in
2004 had a hardening effect on the CDA’s stance towards integration and cultural
diversity. In 1999, the party was a staunch supporter of the creation of an Islamic pillar;
of government subsidizing of Islamic organizations, schools, and media. By 2006, the
party had completely withdrawn its support for pillarization . The CDA stated that the
existence of an Islamic pillar had done little for the integration of Muslims in society, as
witnessed in the murder of Van Gogh (see Chapter One) and the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism. Both were seen as signs that Muslims had not embraced the Dutch
values of freedom of speech and pluralism. Therefore, the CDA stated, there needed to be
mandatory inburgering of immigrants and especially emphasis on the emancipation of
immigrant women (a reasoning I will discuss in more detail in the ‘gender’ category).
While the CDA took a hard-line against religious fundamentalism, it had to walk
an ideological tightrope. The party had to ensure that religious fundamentalism would not
take hold in Dutch society and thus set strict bounds to freedom of religious expression.
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At the same time, as a religious party itself, it needed to support freedom of religious
expression so it could maintain its own religious identity. This balancing act explains the
party’s continuing emphasis on ‘core norms and values’. The CDA asserted:
Religion and faith are a source of inspiration and help to shape lives based on
deeper values. There needs to be room for this. Besides the Jewish, Christian and
humanistic traditions, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and other faiths also are part of
our society. Based on Christian norms and values, the CDA is committed to work
towards a society in which respect for each other is of great importance. Religion,
however, can never be a legitimization for behavior that goes against the core
values of our Christian society. (Vertrouwen in Nederland. Vertrouwen in Elkaar
2006:33)
Once freedom of religious expression was defined through a framework of Dutch
traditions, norms, and values, the party was able to condemn those religious practices it
did not agree with and that went against its Christian beliefs.
CU
The CU framed integration in negative terms during the research period, linking it
to codes such as ‘crime’, ‘disenfranchisement’, ‘fundamentalism’, and ‘unemployment’.
It claimed that immigrants’ failed integration was evidenced in their high unemployment
and crime rates. The CU was concerned that unsuccessfully integrated minority youth
would become disenfranchised. Disenfranchised youth looking for a sense of belonging
would find this in religious fundamentalism and organized crime. In turn, crime and
fundamentalism prevented youth from successfully integrating, completing a self-
perpetuating cycle. Therefore, the party stressed that the government play an active role
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in the integration of Muslim youth into society, e.g., by keeping them in school. It argued
that “Muslim youth who feel that they are part of our society and who are fully integrated
are in a much stronger position to resist religious radicalization and recruitment for the
jihad” (Verkiezingsprogramma Christen Unie 2006:36).
SGP
The SGP’s discussion of integration was less negative and centered mainly on
education. The party emphasized that schools played an important role in the
development of active - socially involved - citizens. Active citizenship was seen as a vital
ingredient of effective integration. The party was, therefore, alarmed by the sub-standard
quality of education in ‘black schools’ - inner-city schools with a high number of enrolled
ethnic minority students.
39
It attributed the poor quality of education to immigrant
students’ lack of Dutch language skills and the absence of qualified teachers in inner-city
neighborhoods. The party argued:
The so-called ‘black’ schools are increasingly having trouble finding suitable
teachers and the outflow of personnel is much higher than in ‘normal’ schools.
Aside from being teachers, educators also are social workers and surrogate
parents. Teachers at these schools, therefore, need extra [financial and
government] assistance. (SGP-Verkiezingsprogramma 2002:40)
39
The Dutch concept of ‘black schools’ is confusing in the context of US studies of race.
Since black schools do not refer to schools predominantly populated by students of
African descent, the use of ‘black’ is mainly a political term. Yet, its use in a negative
context is indicative of the role racism plays in Dutch politics.
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The SGP decided that a mandatory spread of immigrants from Turkey and Morocco in
particular was necessary to prevent geographic concentration of ethnic minority groups. It
reasoned that by making neighborhoods more ethnically diverse, black schools eventually
would disappear and immigrant students have a better chance at integrating successfully
into society.
While the SGP was concerned about black schools and the integration of ethnic
minority students, it never addressed the presence of third-generation immigrant children
in these schools. By not distinguishing between first and third generation students, the
party implied that being born in the Netherlands did not guarantee one’s integration. The
reason for this stance is found in the SGP’s attitude towards pillarization. Like the post-
9/11 CDA, the SGP did not support the creation of an Islamic pillar. The concentration of
Muslims in certain neighborhoods and the existence of Islamic schools and media created
an environment in which Muslims had little incentive to integrate. They could get by
without having to learn the Dutch language or culture. Therefore, the SGP stated,
immigrants and their children (whether first, second, or third generation) should be forced
to integrate through inburgering.
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Security:
CDA
Prior to 9/11, security referred to themes of ‘personal safety’, ‘domestic violence’,
concerns about ‘youth crime’ and ‘vandalism’, ‘neighborhood deterioration’, ‘financial
security’, and an improved ‘health care system’. The party stated:
For many Dutch citizens, ‘safety’ is one of the most important social issues. Over
the last few decades, crime in the Netherlands has rapidly increased. Of particular
concern is the explosive growth of crime among youth. Youth crime has
become more violent and is being committed at an increasingly younger age.
Furthermore, crime has become unpredictable, anyone can become a victim and
increasingly crimes occur in places and at times when we least expect it. (Samen
Nederland veiliger maken 1999:4)
‘Terrorism’, ‘Islam’, or the ‘Middle East’ was seldom mentioned, except in the context of
the state of Israel. The establishment of Israel, the CDA argued, was mandated by God
and, therefore, should be supported at all costs. The party was, however, mostly
concerned with Russia’s ability to proliferate a new nuclear arms race. It argued that,
“The safety and stability within Europe is determined by the results of reform in the
Middle - and Eastern European nations, the Balkan countries and particularly the Russian
Federation” (Veiligheid kent geen grenzen 2000:7).
9/11 abruptly shifted concerns from Russia and minority youth to those about
‘global and domestic terrorism’, ‘religious fundamentalism’ and, interestingly, the ‘drugs
and sex-trafficking trade’. The latter concern combined themes of terrorism with those of
women’s rights and sexuality. Sex work (whether voluntarily or, as in the sex trafficking
trade, forced) was seen as morally reprehensible and one of the main sources of funding
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for terrorist activities. The CDA argued in Agenda voor een veiligheidsbeleid tegen
terrorism (2002) that, “related to terrorism are the activities of international crime cartels,
especially the drug and trafficking in women trades. Although these trades also exist
without connections to terrorism, they provide financial support to terrorist activities” (p.
6). The party argued that, therefore, a ban on prostitution (which it linked to the
trafficking in women) would serve women’s quest for equality (by de-objectifying them),
help in the fight against ‘moral decay’ in society, and end the funding of terrorist
activities.
Religious Fundamentalism
Documents show that the CDA was particularly concerned that male youth were
being recruited for terrorist activities by Islamists. It stated that Dutch Islamic schools
were experiencing shortages of teachers who were qualified to teach Islam. Because these
teachers could not be found in the Netherlands, they were recruited from abroad - mainly
Morocco and the Middle East. Yet, these qualified teachers tended to be trained in
conservative forms of Islam. Once in the Netherlands, they passed this knowledge on to
their young, impressionable students. These students were living in permanent
disadvantage, isolated from other-thinking people through pillarization, and dissatisfied
with the status quo. Being taught by Islamists, the CDA argued, was a recipe for religious
radicalism.
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The CDA’s discussion of Islam and radicalism focused only on young men and
ignored conservative Islam’s effect on young women. It claimed that young women were
kept on a much tighter leash by their parents and, therefore, had fewer opportunities to
rebel or become involved with crime or fundamentalism. The party asserted that:
Girls are kept under strict surveillance by parents, while boys are left to their own
devices. Because parents keep a strict eye on girls, they tend to do better in school
than boys. Boys roam the streets, neglect school and oftentimes have trouble
finding employment. They want to achieve everything in a brief period of time
and are impatient. Because of this impatience, they are easy prey for criminals
and religious fundamentalists. (De uitdaging die inburgering heet 2003:11)
Groen and Kranenberg’s (2006) study of the Islamist Hofstadnetwerk (of which Van
Gogh’s killer Mohammed Bouyeri was a member), however, shows that despite the
obstacles women faced, men and women both were attracted to Islamic fundamentalism
and played leadership roles in fundamentalist organizations (such as the Hofstadnetwerk).
They argue that most men and women gravitated towards religious fundamentalism out
of protest against the marginalization of Muslims in the West.
CU and SGP
Compared to the CDA, the CU and SGP had few discussions on security between
1999 and 2006. Both parties stated that it was the government’s task to protect its citizens
against ‘evil’ and because this duty was assigned by God, protecting Dutch citizens
should always have top priority. Pre-9/11, the parties did not define the type of evil the
government had to fight. After 2001, however, documents focused on the global threat of
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terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The CU and SGP stated that these threats had
increased feelings of insecurity and fear among the Dutch. These feelings, in turn, had
negatively affected social cohesion. In order to restore social stability, both parties
argued, the government should actively fight terrorism through international and national
cooperation with foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The SGP
maintained:
An important condition [for becoming part of Dutch society] is having respect for
the democratic rules of ‘the game’. But there is much fear about the lack of
respect for these rules. The terrorist attacks [on 9/11] by Muslim fundamentalists
are an example of this. The government needs to make it crystal clear that, in the
Netherlands, there is no room for immigrants who engage in terrorist activities or
approve of such activities. (Tussen Naiviteit en Realisme 2004:9)
Social Cohesion:
CDA
Earlier, I discussed how integration and security were linked to themes of social
cohesion. One element I have not yet discussed is the role of the family. The CDA saw
the traditional family unit as the cornerstone of society. The family was the place where
Dutch norms and values were passed on to the next generation and responsible citizens
raised. The party argued that:
[The family] sustains our society. Of course there are situations when exceptions
are preferred. However, that does not negate the natural and empirically
determined facts that the traditional family is a much better place to raise
children than other forms of cohabitation. (Het Civilistisch Manifest 2000:17)
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The CDA added that:
A family means rules and concerns, but also attention for each other. The family-
stage is the ‘rush hour of life’. A busy and expensive stage of life. The future of
the Netherlands is built on this. Here, children learn the basics. Therefore, we
have to treasure the family. (Vetrouwen in Nederland. Vetrouwen in elkaar
2006:8)
It recognized that the family had changed since the 1960s, with the emergence of single
parent and same sex families, and working mothers. Despite the changes in family forms,
CDA documents continued to focus on women as the nucleus of the traditional family.
Because the party assigned women ‘mother of the nation’ status, it also held them
responsible for keeping the family unit together (the role of the father in the family was
largely ignored). As I will discuss in more detail in the ‘gender’ category, the CDA
believed that women’s emancipation played a key role in the stabilization of the family
unit.
CU and SGP
The CU and SGP too believed that the family was an important element in social
cohesion. The CU stated that “The best environment to promote social cohesion remains
the family. A stable family life is of great importance to the positive development of
children and therefore deserves the highest priority” (Samen Leven naar bijbelse waarden
2003:2). Rather than focusing on the wife and mother, like the CDA, the parties’
discussions centered on the next generation: the children. They argued that there was too
much emphasis on materialism in society and, subsequently, people were losing sight of
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that what really mattered: social relationships. The laissez faire economic market had
created a generation of overworked parents who had little time and energy left to spend
with their children. Additionally, the CU argued, an underfunded educational system
failed to give children the attention they needed. This led to a generation of
disenfranchised youth who were not only susceptible to crime, but also the lures of
‘sinful secularism’: sex, drugs and other excesses. Secularism - as reflected in the decline
in morals and values - was considered a serious threat to social cohesion. Therefore, both
parties claimed, it was time for a much needed debate on ‘good and evil’.
Gender:
CDA
In 1998, unhappy with the stern social and economic direction the CDA had
taken, voters handed the party a significant loss during the parliamentary elections. The
CDA went from being the country’s second largest party in 1994, to becoming the third
largest behind the PvdA and the VVD. The party reflected that:
The Christen-democracy has to make several important choices. Choices that
will determine the future of the Christen-democracy. Choices about the Christian
background of the movement, her message and the people she wants to reach, her
attitude towards trends and developments in culture, and the way in which the
CDA as an organization communicates and functions. (De Christen-democratie
na het millennium 1998:4)
Therefore, for most of 1999, the CDA reflected on its political and ideological future,
wondering how it could establish itself as a broad, mainstream party without losing its
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loyal Christian, conservative voter base. The party maintained that one of its biggest
stumbling blocks was its image. It argued that “The [party] is perceived as
condescending, religious, conservative, culturally pessimistic and old fashioned. In the
eyes of the next generation, the CDA has missed the boat and does not connect with the
current, modern attitudes towards life” (De Christen-democratie na het millennium
1998:7).
As part of its reflective process, the party focused on the changing roles of women
in society. Since the late 1960s, when the second wave of feminism took place, women
had entered the workplace and institutions of higher education in droves. The CDA
conceded that its political leadership had not reflected this new reality and remained too
male dominated. The party maintained that, “The CDA is not a role model when it comes
to the participation of women [in party politics]. Despite twenty years of discussions
about the necessity of women’s participation in party politics, women remain
underrepresented” (Meer Partij met Vrouwen 1998:10). The party, therefore, promised to
assign women to more politically high-profile positions in its leadership in an attempt to
attract more women members. It considered the participation of women in party politics
important, not because they would be able to vote on women’s issues, but because it
would create a numerical balance between men and women and portray the party as truly
democratic.
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Emancipation, Family, and Integration
In earlier discussions of social cohesion, I mentioned that women - as the
caregivers in the family - were expected to keep the family unit stable. The CDA believed
that, in order to ensure the well-being of the family, the well-being of women stood
central: their independence and autonomy. The party especially focused on maternity
leave. Women often decided to take time out from the labor market to start a family. Yet,
maternity leave left women at a disadvantage once they returned to work and many found
it difficult to pick up where they had left off. The CDA did not want inflexible maternity
leave policies to interfere with women’s ‘duty’ to start a family and made it a goal to
bring flexible maternity leave and affordable day care facilities onto its political agenda.
CDA’s discussions of women’s emancipation and the family also linked gender to
themes of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘integration’. The link between gender and ethnicity was
particularly strong in 2002. Polls indicated that the Pim Fortuyn’s LPF party’s popularity
(rooted in its anti-immigration agenda) had been at the expense of the CDA’s voter base
(de Telegraaf 2002). As a result, the party shifted its focus from internal reflection to
concerns about the integration of Muslims which, the party suddenly decided, had been
ignored for much too long. Because women played a fundamental role in the family and
the family was foundational to society, the integration of Muslim women became one of
the party’s main political issues. The CDA asserted that integration could be achieved
through women’s emancipation; their emancipation would stabilize the family unit and a
stable family would integrate much more effectively into society.
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The party argued that:
Women are often dependent on their husbands and not able to live an independent
live, even though they play an important role in the raising and education of their
children. This dependence cannot lead to - for the woman - undesirable limitation
of her freedom. (De uitdaging die inburgering heet 2003:10)
It continued:
Because of their central role in the family, much is dependent on women and,
therefore, the government needs to invest more time and money in their
emancipation. Women need to be helped out of their social isolation. Yet, the
integration and emancipation of many women is slow and it seems that little
progress is being made. Women are often preoccupied with survival in their social
environments and caring for their families. They hardly have time for their own
needs and desires, let alone to make an effort to integrate. Therefore, specific
attention to minority women and their situation in the inburgerings process is of
great importance. (De uitdaging die inburgering heet 2003:15)
Like Pim Fortuyn, the CDA was especially concerned with patriarchy in Muslim
communities. It argued that first and second generation Muslim men seldom allowed
wives to leave their homes for social activities. As a result, Muslim women became
increasingly isolated and acquired little knowledge of the Dutch language or customs.
Because of this lack of understanding of Dutch society, mothers were losing control over
their westernizing children. This was of particular concern for sons (daughters were
mostly kept under strict control of their parents) who were caught between Islamic rules
regulating their social behavior, expectations of masculinity, and the social and sexual
freedoms that Dutch society offered.
Due to absent fathers and mothers with little authority, young Muslim men were
mostly left to their own devices. This lack of control, the CDA stated, resulted in
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substandard performances in schools and high truancy and high school drop out rates.
Unemployed young men without high school diplomas were vulnerable to crime and
religious fundamentalism, which both hindered social integration and formed a threat to
security. Independent, assertive, and well-educated mothers and wives would be able to
play much more authoritative roles in the upbringing of their ‘out of control’ sons. The
CDA failed to explain, however, how mothers would be able to regain control over and
the respect of their sons. The party also did not mention the emancipation of daughters in
Muslim communities.
Domestic Violence
Throughout the research period, the party focused on violence against women in
ethnic minority communities. The CDA was concerned with increases in ‘honor killings’,
female genital mutilation, and domestic violence and argued that cultural tradition or
religion could never justify such violence. In Geweld tegen Vrouwen (1999) the party
asserted:
All over the world, female genital mutilation and honor killings are being justified
on traditional, cultural or religious grounds. Closer to home, women and girls also
are physically assaulted or killed, with the perpetrators using implicit or explicit
appeals to religious reasons. One can give thousands of examples of women who
have experienced violence in the name of religion, culture or tradition. Such
violence can and will never be justified. (P. 31)
Data supported the CDA’s concerns about honor killings and female genital
mutilation. In 2003, the media reported on the killing of an 18-year old Dutch-Turkish
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woman. Her father had taken the young woman to Ankara on a supposed holiday and
shot her upon arrival. The woman had ‘shamed’ her family by not wearing a headscarf
and by socializing with Dutch women. In 2005, the media reported on the murder of a 32-
year old Muslim woman by her estranged husband. The woman was shot at the doorstep
of a women’s shelter in the North of Holland. Her murder was the third such killing in ten
months.
In 2006, The Dutch Ministry of Health reported 64 recorded incidents of genital
mutilation of female children, which is mostly practiced in East African Muslim
communities. Female genital mutilation ranges from removal of the labia and clitoris to,
in the most extreme cases, the partially sewing together of the labia. The main reason
behind this practice is to ensure a girl’s virginity before marriage. Concerned about these
figures, the Ministry considered the implementation of a measure, first introduced in
France, that required parents of girls from Muslim countries (who were about to take
their daughters back for a ‘vacation’) to sign an anti-genital mutilation contract. By
signing the contract, they acknowledged that genital mutilation was an illegal practice,
whether carried out in the Netherlands or in their home country. The Ministry did not
explain how it intended to monitor violations of the contract.
Central Bureau of Statistics data, in 2004, showed that although they accounted
for less than six percent of the Dutch population, sixty percent of those in women’s
shelters were Muslim. These statistics show that Muslim women, increasingly, managed
to escape violent relationships, but also shed light on a serious social problem that
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seemed to be prevalent in Muslim communities: domestic violence. The CDA did not
discuss why domestic violence in Muslim families was, allegedly, such a common
phenomenon, e.g., by elaborating on the roles that patriarchy and machismo played. It did
become clear why the CDA focused on domestic violence in immigrant communities. In
addition to being a serious human rights violation, violence against Muslim women
prevented their emancipation. Given the important role of women in the family, domestic
violence hindered the integration of immigrant families. Therefore, the party argued,
“providing women with information, and particularly migrant and refugee women, about
human rights and available ways to report human rights violations is of significant
importance” (Geweld tegen Vrouwen 1999:38).
The party’s discussion of minority women’s emancipation left important
questions unanswered. Where were the husbands in the upbringing of their children?
Why would men want to give up the benefits of patriarchy? Would men receive further
education on the importance of gender equality in the Netherlands other than through
inburgering? If patriarchy was inherent to interpretations of Islam, should religious
leaders play a much more central (and enlightened) role in women’s emancipation?
Domestic violence, genital mutilation, or honor killings, clearly are problems in which
men and masculinity play an important role. After all, men seldom become victims of
honor killings and, at least to a much lesser degree, of domestic of violence. Discussions
of men’s contributions to these acts of violence, therefore, should not only shed light on
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the role of masculinity in religion and gender relations in Muslim communities, but also
provide insight into possible ways to fight violence against women more effectively.
CU
The CU hardly discussed gender, which is not surprising given the male
dominated histories of the GPV and RPF. Both parties argued that women’s roles should
be confined to the domestic and not the political sphere. This trend was continued by the
CU until 2002, when the first woman, Huizinga-Heringa, was voted into the Second
Chamber with preferential votes.
40
After the 2002 elections, the CU wondered whether
women should receive more prominent positions in the party leadership in light of
Huizinga-Heringa’s unexpected electoral victory. Yet, it was unsure on how to offer them
these positions while simultaneously dealing with a conservative and male dominated
voter block and in 2006, the party had yet to find the right balance.
SGP
Gender was also sparingly discussed in SGP documents. This too was not
surprising since, up to 2006, women were not allowed to become members of the party.
The SGP strongly opposed feminism and did not believe that women were equal to men -
40
On ballots, politicians of a particular party are ranked based on seniority. If a party
wins two seats, the politicians ranked one and two are usually first in line for those seats.
However, if a politician who is, e.g., ranked eighth receives more preferential votes than
the one ranked number two, she or he will be in line for the second seat.
99
although it did concede that they were ‘equal of value.’ The party’s stance towards
women members conflicted with Article 1 of the Constitution, which prohibits
discrimination based on gender. It also conflicted with the government’s ratification of
the 1991 UN Treaty for the Rights of Women. This Treaty forbids the discrimination of
women in the public and political spheres of society. Subsequently, in September 2005 a
lawsuit was brought against the SGP by several civil rights organizations. The Lower
Court ruled that the Dutch state was not allowed to subsidize the party as long as the SGP
refused women membership. The state appealed the verdict, arguing that the ruling
conflicted with the Wet Subsidiëring Politieke Partijen (the Law on Subsidizing Political
Parties, which allows the government to subsidize political parties) and intervened with
parties’ political sovereignty. The Appeals Court supported the Lower Court’s verdict
and the state was forced to withdraw its financial support. The SGP once more appealed
the verdict, this time to the Council of State which, in 2007, ordered the government to
reinstate the SGP’s subsidizes (LJN: BC0619). In 2006, fearing further political outfall
over the controversy, the party promised that it would allow women access to its
membership. Political functions, however, would remain in the domain of men.
Sexuality:
CDA, CU, and SGP
There were only a handful of discussions about sexuality in CDA, CU, and SGP
documents between 1999 and 2006, and most of these discussions focused on gay
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marriage. The CDA expressed its support for full civil partnership for lesbians and gay
men. Because sexual orientation was an identity and identity a fundamental human right,
lesbians and gay men should not be discriminated against. The CDA, however, was not
pro-gay marriage and defined marriage as a union between a woman and a man - two
people who could produce offspring. In a gay marriage, they argued, a third person had to
become involved to conceive a child, making it legally and morally too complicated to
call it ‘marriage’ in the Biblical sense. Yet, it did believe that through full civil
partnership and protected by Article 1 of the Constitution, lesbians and gay men would be
able to receive equal rights (and responsibilities) under the law. The party asserted that:
We cannot deny that same sex couples should be recognized by the government.
However, [in the past] the CDA believed that gay marriage was unnecessary
because domestic partnership provided legal protection. Because of this legal
protection, the majority of the CDA voted in 2000 against gay marriage. Now
legal equality between homosexual and heterosexual couples has been established
in the Netherlands, the CDA sees no reason to object to [gay marriage]. The
majority of the party, therefore, voted for adoption of foreign children by
homosexual couples. (Standpunten 2006:7)
The CU and SGP considered homosexuality an act against nature and strongly
opposed gay marriage as well as civil partnership. The CU maintained that “marriage is
between one man and one woman. Other forms of cohabitation are different and cannot
be seen as equal to marriage. The so-called law on gay marriage, therefore, needs to be
revoked” (Samen leven naar bijbelse waarden 2003:2). The SGP added that:
God created the institution of marriage as a gift to humanity. The essence of
Biblical marriage rests in the fact that it is a union between a man and a woman.
[Gay marriage] changes the essential character of marriage. Sex-difference as a
characteristic of marriage disappears. In other words, marriage is no longer
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exclusively seen as a union between a man and a woman. (Homohuwelijk en
adoptie door homoparen 2000:2)
Like the CDA, both parties also believed that lesbians and gay men should not be
discriminated against based on their sexual orientation. The CU argued that “rejection of
the sexual practice by considering this a sin should not be punishable. The discriminatory
insulting of someone because of his sexual orientation should be punishable. In such
instance, a person is harmed in his humanity” (Een blad voor de mond 2000:57).
The CDA also linked sexuality to religion and gender roles. It discussed the
double standards that existed in Muslim communities for sexually active, single women
and men. The party wrote that “Muslim girls and women consider it unfair that men do
not have to justify their sexual behaviors. If a boy is sexually ‘out of control’, he is ‘the
man’, if a girl does the same she is a ‘whore’” (De uitdaging die inburgering heet
2003:11). The party argued that this double standard was reflective of the gender
inequality that existed in the Muslim community. It stated that the use of religion and
culture to infringe on a woman’s fundamental right of freedom (even if this involved the
religious taboo of sex before marriage) would never be justified in Dutch society.
Finally, the SGP linked sexuality to the family, prostitution, and morality. In an
incoherently worded text, the party maintained:
A [heterosexual, married] couple promises to be faithful. This promise, however,
is often broken. In the case of a divorce, a judge should be involved at all times.
Especially when it involves children. For them, it is a traumatic experience when
parents decide to live separate lives. Mediation needs to determine whether a
marriage can be saved or not. Couples have to be faithful to each other. Every
brothel is one too many. There is room for sexuality within marriage. The
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increase in sexually transmitted diseases illustrates the consequences of a liberal
sexual moral. (SGP-Verkiezingsprogramma 2002-2006:15)
The Political Left:
Partij van de Arbeid
In 1946, the Social Democratische Arbeiders Partij (SDAP), the Vrijzinnig
Democratische Bond (VDB), and the Christelijk-Democratische Unie (CDU) merged to
form the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA). The PvdA has its roots in Marxist socialism,
which takes a conflict approach towards social change. In Marxist socialism, class
struggle is seen as the main way to achieve change in society. Since tensions between the
‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ have led to political unrest, Marxist socialism emphasizes public
ownership and an equal distribution of goods to re-establish social stability.
Socialist workers also rebelled against the importance of religion in politics,
because of elitism and materialism in church leadership. Subsequently, in the 20
th
century
two strands of socialism emerged: on the one hand Leninists who wanted to ban religion
from party politics through revolution. On the other hand, Social-Democrats who wanted
to change society through reformation and not revolution. Through cooperation with the
VDB and CDU, the SDAP established a mainstream party that was based on an ideology
of liberalism, religion, and humanism. The newly formed PvdA rejected religious
pillarization and created a party that appealed to most voters. Its political platform
focuses on interculturalism, social cohesion, social equality, and anti-discrimination.
103
Democraten66
The Democraten66 (D66) was founded in 1966 by Hans van Mierlo and Hans
Gruijters. 1960s society was characterized by a call for more active citizen participation
in and democratization of Dutch politics. D66 believed that politics based on pre-war
ideologies of political representation were in need of change. Like the PvdA, the party
opposed religious pillarization. It also argued that voters should have a more direct say in
the development of national and regional policies, and the governing of the country. D66
is a pragmatic party and, therefore, governs by what it believes works and does not work.
This approach means that the party tends to adhere to both conservative and socially
liberal ideas.
Integration and Social Cohesion
PvdA
In most PvdA documents, integration and social cohesion were discussed jointly.
In these discussions inburgering became a euphemism for integration and was seen an
essential ingredient of social cohesion. Between 1999 and 2000, the party frequently
expressed its concern over the unsuccessful inburgering of ‘people’ in society. In these
early documents, the party did not make a distinction between immigrants or autochthon
Dutch. It argued that anyone who does not function well socially - e.g., is involved in
crime or a high school drop out - is a threat to cohesion. The PvdA reasoned that failed
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integration of both immigrants and autochthon Dutch led to social disadvantage,
disenfranchisement, criminal behavior, a breakdown of solidarity, and ultimately of
social stability. To prevent this breakdown, the PvdA maintained, it was the
government’s duty to create the social and economic conditions necessary for the
successful (re)integration of children from socially disadvantaged families, unemployed
high school drop outs and immigrants - although it did not out-line what these conditions
were.
The 2000-2003 period was characterized by the political rise of the LPF and the
May 6, 2002 murder of its leader Pim Fortuyn.
41
Fortuyn’s slaying resulted in a
devastating electoral loss for the PvdA on May 15, 2002. The PvdA saw its seats in the
41
Since the 1997 Lower House debate, Fortuyn had become a popular and controversial
fixture in Dutch politics. In February 2002, he had founded his own party, Lijst Pim
Fortuyn (LPF), and become a thriving force behind a rapidly growing nativist, anti-
immigration movement. On May 6, 2002, around 6 pm, environmentalist Volkert van der
Graaf lay in wait as Fortuyn, his security personnel, and a news crew left the television
and radio studios in Hilversum (the headquarters of Dutch broadcasting). He had just
taped a radio interview with Dutch DJ Ruud de Wilde and while both continued their
conversation in front of the studios, Van der Graaf walked up and fired several shots at
Fortuyn. Being in the heart of the Dutch radio and television industry, news crews were
quick to broadcast live images of Fortuyn’s last moments.
According to a statement released by the Ministry of Justice (November 23,
2002), Van der Graaf saw in Fortuyn a threat to vulnerable groups in society. He was
concerned about Fortuyn’s generalizing, stigmatizing political points of view and the
polarizing way in which he presented these to the general public. Van der Graaf was
particularly troubled by the increasing political power Fortuyn was set to gain after the
elections, seeing no other way than to kill him. Fortuyn’s death and Van der Graaf
confession threw the Dutch political establishment of balance. LPF supporters accused
politicians of other parties of being complicit in Fortuyn’s murder by consistently
demonizing him as racist and xenophobic. In the elections that followed, the LPF won 26
seats, becoming the country’s second largest party.
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Second Chamber of Parliament fall from 45 to 23. Former PvdA voters had joined the
LPF out of sympathy with the slain Fortuyn. They also joined the LPF because its anti-
immigration and ‘though on crime’ stance had resonated with them.
42
The PvdA admitted
that it had failed to adequately address voters’ concerns about multiculturalism,
immigration, and integration. In Europees radicaal rechts en de sociale-democratie
(2003) the party reflected that it:
Indeed, had not given convincing answers to the problems that many voters
had with multiculturalism. It was not that the party never discussed these issues,
but rather that it failed to recognize that these were urgent matters. On top of that,
the party leadership underestimated for much too long the problematic aspects of
immigration. (P. 15)
After the 2002 elections, documents therefore showed a shift in codes that were
used to discuss integration. Instead of focusing on ‘people’, the PvdA began to focus
specifically on the integration of ‘ethnic minorities’. It stated:
As long as anyone can remember, Dutch society has opened its doors to
newcomers. In the last few decades, the influx of newcomers has not only
increased, but also become more visible. The Netherlands, just like other western
countries, has become a colorful society. Many new Dutchmen are ingeburgerd
and enrich our society with their work and culture. These developments also pose
a problem. The influx of asylum seekers and economic migrants is considerable,
and the two groups are increasingly difficult to distinguish from one another. Poor
knowledge of the Dutch language and discrimination prevents inburgering and
limits the social-economic opportunities of the new Dutchmen. Certain
cultural norms from outside of the Netherlands do not fit in with Dutch norms and
values. Immigrants and autochthon Dutch are both concerned about the loss of
their own identity and the boundaries of tolerance. (Samen voor de Toekomst
2002:14)
42
In the May 2002 elections, the LPF won 26 seats in the Second Chamber of Parliament,
becoming the country’s second largest party behind the CDA.
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The ‘LPF effect’ - a negative focus on ethnic minorities - became clear in the
party’s linking of integration to themes such as ‘failure’, ‘high school drop outs’, ‘crime’,
and ‘unemployment’. The PvdA saw in interculturalism a solution to the failed
integration of minority groups. Inteculturalism recognized cultural diversity and the
equality of human beings despite cultural differences between them. Multiculturalism
attempted to manage cultural diversity, while interculturalism attempted to build bridges
between different cultures - it saw a reciprocal relationship between cultures. The PvdA’s
emphasis on interculturalism translated into the belief that autochthon Dutch and
immigrants both had a responsibility in integration. The Dutch had to acknowledge that
racism - individual and institutional - existed and treat newcomers and their cultures as
equals. The immigrants had to make an effort to learn about the Dutch culture, traditions,
norms, and values through inburgering.
At first glance, interculturalism seems to be in contrast with the PvdA’s emphasis
on inburgering. For instance, it is unclear to what degree immigrants’ cultures became
part of a ‘Dutch culture’ upon integration. However, the PvdA did not view inburgering
as a form of assimilation, but as part of interculturalism. By learning about Dutch culture
and the Dutch language, immigrants would be able to effectively function in Dutch
society. They did not have to give up their own cultural identity, but develop respect for
Dutch cultural traditions. While the PvdA believed in cultural diversity, it did establish
some limits to this diversity. It argued that the Dutch state had the authority to determine
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what behaviors they would and would not accept from immigrants. The PvdA maintained
that:
We are of the opinion that Dutch norms and, historically, established social codes
and agreements set boundaries around the ways in which immigrants can express
their culture and identity. Some things are, therefore, permitted such as the
wearing of headscarves in the classroom or establishment of mosques and Islamic
schools, while others are prohibited such as women’s genital mutilation. Some
things will be considered socially undesirable, such as certain forms of interaction
between men and women or the one-sided focus on world news through
satellite dishes
43
, but these are part of public rather than legal debates. (Integratie
en immigratie 2002:17)
Finally, the PvdA saw freedom of religion as a fundamental right, but one only permitted
within the limits of Dutch law. That meant that religious organizations were not allowed
to call for armed conflict (jihad), recruit for terrorist purposes, spread hatred in the name
of religion, or oppress women and gay men.
Gender
The PvdA’s discussions about gender were linked to security and integration. In
discussions on security, the party strongly condemned violence against women and
especially ‘honor killings’ and ‘female genital mutilation’. It encouraged the government
to come down heavily on perpetrators and advocates of such violence. Codes in the
integration category, focused on the emancipation of minority women. Like the CDA, the
PvdA believed that emancipation was a condition for integration. The party emphasized
43
For many Dutch people satellite dishes are symbols of failed integration. Rather than
watching Dutch television, immigrants prefer to ‘import’ media from their home country.
108
the importance of education in women’s emancipation process. Education was perceived
as a means for ethnic minority women and girls to break free from the shackles of
patriarchy in their communities. The PvdA recommended that girls and women who
wished to be educated against the wishes of their families receive government protection
against possible physical retributions. This recommendation suggested, once again, that
domestic violence in immigrant families was not an uncommon.
Like the CDA, the party’s biggest concern about the emancipation of women was
the influence of religion. The party believed that the government always should protect
women’s rights even if inequalities were religiously mandated. The PvdA maintained
that:
In interpretations of the Qur’an and embedded in immigrants cultural traditions
are elements that prohibit the emancipation and development of the woman.
Traditional ways of thinking about man-woman relationships limit women’s
freedom of movement in serious ways [e.g., not being allowed to go outside or to
attend school]. The government has a duty to interfere when women are being
(violently) oppressed. Honor killings, genital mutilation and domestic violence
need to be punished at all times. (Integratie en immigratie 2002:59)
Sexuality
Discussions about sexuality mainly focused on sexual orientation and ethnicity.
The PvdA believed in equal rights for lesbians and gay men and supported gay marriage.
It repeatedly stressed the need for debates in ethnic minority communities about sexual
equality. It was particularly concerned about homophobia and hate crimes against
lesbians and gay men in Moroccan communities, where homosexuality was considered a
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taboo and sin. The PvdA’s stance towards equality, women’s rights, and homosexuality is
best illustrated by a statement it made in a brochure titled Respekt (2001). In the brochure
the party stated that:
Over the last few years, there has been an increase in polarization and
discrimination between groups in society. We can ask migrants to show respect
for existing values and norms and Dutch democracy, and for acceptance that in
the Netherlands men and women, homosexuals and heterosexuals have equal
rights. Special attention should be given to the position of women and
homosexuals. We support them if they which to emancipate, even if this happens
against the wishes of their families, tradition or religion. And we will not tolerate
it when homosexuals are being attacked or spat on or women called ‘whores’ for
walking on the streets without a headscarf or with make-up on. (P 9)
This statement makes two important points. First, by mentioning the headscarf, it shows
that discussions about women’s rights and sexuality mainly focused on the Muslim
community. Second, it shows that social equality - in this instance sexual and gender -
was considered an important, fundamental element of the Dutch democracy.
Security
Pre-9/11, discussions involving security focused on a more equal distribution of
income between the social classes and on crime prevention. In both of these discussions,
the PvdA emphasized solidarity and social cohesion. It maintained that once people
developed a sense of collectivity, they would start looking out for each other. Feelings of
financial and social security could only develop in a true community. The PvdA
emphasized that the federal government, police, and judiciary had to work together to rid
streets of crime and violence. However, the party warned that local governments and the
110
Dutch people also needed to make an effort to create safe environments in their own
communities. It argued that:
People should treat each other with respect, while the state, too, has to be
respectful of its citizens. No one should feel unsafe in their own neighborhood. If
people display disrespectful, rude behavior, we should be able to reprimand them.
The government needs to take responsibility and nip crime in the bud, but citizens
have a responsibility to do the same. (Voor verantwoordelijkheid, respect en
solidariteit 2002:1)
After 9/11 and the murder of Van Gogh, themes abruptly shifted from crime and
financial security to domestic and international terrorism. In these discussions, again
youth were at the center. This time, the party linked youth to ethnicity and religion. The
PvdA believed that the radicalization of Islamic youth needed to be countered and saw
effective and fast integration as part of the solution. It assumed that youth who were
employed and well-integrated in society had little inclination to become involved with
radical elements, even though Van Gogh’s killer, Mohammed Bouyeri, was a well-
educated and seemingly well integrated young man. By focusing on ethnic minority
youth, Islam and terrorism, security was no longer a matter of people committing
senseless acts of violence or crime, but one specifically of young Muslim men potentially
committing terrorist acts.
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Integration, Social Cohesion, Gender, and Sexuality
D66
In discussions on social cohesion, integration, sexuality or gender few differences
were found between the PvdA and D66. Both parties supported social-liberal rights such
as freedom of expression, equality for women and homosexuals, and freedom of religion.
Both also supported cultural diversity yet believed that this diversity came with its
limitations. D66 indicated that Dutch norms and values always came first if challenged
by religious groups. The party used the example of the emancipation of Moroccan
women. D66 stated that:
It is of growing concern to us that minority girls who have integrated and are
emancipated are experiencing serious problems at home. Their parents do not
understand them and accuse them of having become “too Dutch”. D66 therefore
proposes that minority girls, whose decision to inburger are being resisted by
their families, receive adequate government assistance. Also, oftentimes, parents
do not allow Dutch-Moroccan girls to return to the Netherlands after a holiday in
Morocco. The Dutch embassy in Rabat needs to be prepared to give these girls
legal advice. (Wie meedoet telt mee 2002:3)
The party argued that in most interpretations of Islam girls and women were not expected
to live independent lives. The problems D66 described in its statement, exemplified some
of the difficulties Muslim girls and women experienced if they became ‘too westernized’.
One of the main differences between the PvdA and D66 can be found in the
latter’s stance towards secularism. The party strongly believed that religion had no place
in politics. It advocated a separation between church and state; one that needed to be
equally enforced on all religions. Because of their belief in a secular society, D66
112
opposed religious pillarization and was unhappy with the existence of an Islamic pillar.
Such a pillar, it argued, did little to foster integration since in a pillarized society people
lived side-by-side without interaction. In Wie meedoet telt mee (2002), D66 maintained
that:
We cannot solve the immigrant problem through pillarization. Not by
segregating people by religion, life style, social class or ethnic origin. So if we say
that everyone has to participate and develop, we mean: integration. We want
immigrants who decide to stay in the Netherlands to focus their attention on
Dutch society. (P. 1)
The party therefore opposed government subsidizing of ethnic minority organizations and
institutions such as Islamic media or schools. It argued that Islamic schools -with their
tradition of separate entrances for girls and boys - prohibited the integration of girls and
boys in society, and Islamic media discouraged immigrants from learning the Dutch
language.
Like the PvdA, D66 emphasized inburgering as an essential component of
integration and social cohesion. While the PvdA stressed the importance of inburgering
without establishing concrete rules about the process, D66 was much more specific. It
argued that, because many did not finish the inburgerings course, immigrants would have
to pay a deposit which they would receive back upon successful completion.
Security
Pre-9/11, discussions of security focused predominantly on social cohesion.
Increases in employment had led to more stress in the workplace and less empathy for
113
each other. D66 believed that society had become one of individualization.
Individualization, it believed, was not a good development because too much
privatization prevented the development of social cohesion. Therefore, it suggested more
investment in child care, the environment and crime prevention to improve social life.
Post 9/11, the party saw crime prevention as one of the most important elements to
recreate a livable society. It used the murders of Fortuyn and Van Gogh to illustrate
increases in senseless crime. Furthermore, D66 maintained, tensions between minorities
and autochthon Dutch also were on the increase. All of these developments were signs
that the integration process was stalling and debates about immigration and integration
becoming more ethnically polarized.
Post-9/11, terrorism was the party’s other major concern. It saw terrorism as one
of the biggest threats in the 21
st
century, but was conflicted about how to fight it. D66
wondered how much of the fundamental freedoms - privacy rights or freedom of
religious expression - Dutch society was prepared to give up in order fight terrorism.
The party maintained:
With Schiphol [airport] as gateway to Europe, as ally of the US, with troops in
Afghanistan and more recently in Iraq, with Osama Bin Laden mentioning our
country in one of his speeches, the Netherlands is a realistic target for terrorists.
This was illustrated by the murder of Theo van Gogh. From the social-liberal
perspective, fighting terrorism is a challenge. Fundamentalist terrorists hate
social-liberal accomplishments such as freedom of expression, equality
between men and women, and homosexuals and heterosexuals. The open, tolerant
society that enables such freedoms, in our opinion, has to be protected. At the
same time, social-liberals know that you cannot be free if you do not feel free.
The main question is: how much are we prepared to sacrifice for safety? How
much privacy, how much anonymity, how much freedom of movement would we
114
have to give up to achieve a ‘terrorism-free’ security state? (Effectieve
terreurbestrijding 2005:3)
Indicative of its pragmatic nature, the party did not want to support repressive rules just
to be seen as ‘tough on terror’. It also did not want to reject repressive rules just because
leftwing parties saw these as indicative of the larger power of the state. Instead, D66
wanted to work from the view point that effectiveness was the measure; it wanted to look
at which rules helped and which did not to safeguard Dutch society’s freedom.
The Political Right:
VVD
The Volkspartij voor Vrijheid and Democratie (VVD) was founded on January
24, 1948, by supporters of two small liberal parties: the Vrijzinnig Democratisch Bond
(VDB), which later merged into the PvdA, and the Liberale Staatspartij (LS). The VVD
was later joined by economically conservative members of the PvdA who had been
unhappy with the increasingly socialist direction the PvdA was taking. The VVD is a
centre right party, socially liberal on issues such as gay marriage, abortion, women’s
rights, and euthanasia but economically conservative. The party believes in a laissez fare
economy and a society with little interference from the government.
115
LPF
In November 2001, Fortuyn became the leading candidate of Leefbaar Nederland
(LN), a coalition of small local parties that were concerned with the changing quality of
life in Dutch society. The party was rapidly gaining votes among a cross section of the
Dutch population, especially at the expense of moderate parties such as the PvdA and
CDA. Then, in a February 10, 2002 interview with de Volkskrant newspaper, Fortuyn
called Islam “barbaric” and “backwards” for its treatment of women and gay men. He
also proclaimed that the borders should be closed to further immigration from non-
western countries. LN’s leaders asked Fortuyn to leave the party. Although populist, the
party was not anti-immigration and its leaders feared that Fortuyn’s comments had
harmed its popularity. The same day he was dismissed from LN, Fortuyn founded his
own party, Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF). His party’s platform was built on a ‘tough on
immigration and crime’ stance, demands for less government interference and
bureaucracy, and improvement of the educational system.
Integration and Social Cohesion
VVD
Compared to the political left and religious parties, the VVD had surprisingly
little to say about integration and social cohesion. It did repeatedly argue that there was
too much poverty among immigrants in Dutch society, implying that integration efforts
116
had not been successful. Also, compared to autochthon Dutch, immigrants were
underrepresented in the educational system and the labor market - two of the key
elements in integration. It recognized that this inequality was partly due to institutional
racism, which prevented immigrants from full participation society. Yet, in accordance
with its individualist ideology, the VVD primarily held immigrants responsible for their
failed integration. Despite claims of institutional racism, it opposed Affirmative Action
measures, stating that these went against the ‘equality for all’ principle. The party
asserted that:
Regarding the underrepresentation [of minorities] in the labor market, the
government should not establish policies that support positive discrimination. Not
only has the past shown that such policies do not deliver significant results, a
policy based on favoring one group of people over another because of their
ethnicity is just as reprehensible as discriminating against that group because of
their ethnicity. Current positive discrimination policies, therefore, need to be
retracted as soon as possible. (Politieke Kernpunt Programma 2002:20)
The VVD argued that unemployment among immigrants was related to their lack
of proficiency in the Dutch language. It argued that many immigrants continued to
struggle with the language because of a lack of motivation and that immigrant parents
were doing little to convince their children - and especially sons - to stay in schools. The
VVD asserted, “Education plays a crucial role in solving the ‘ethnic minority problem’.
However, much of what is learned through education won’t be useful if it is not
supported by the parents” (Politieke Kernpunten Programma 1999:11).
Like the CDA, the VVD believed that immigrant families were out-of-sync with
the demands that Dutch society placed on independent adults. It saw both developments
117
as problematic, since language and education were necessary for integration and
citizenship. In an attempt to motivate immigrants to work harder on their integration, the
party established some ground rules. The VVD stated that “long term unemployment
indicates that a immigrant is insufficiently integrated into Dutch society. Therefore, long
term unemployed immigrants will have to participate in an inburgerings course”
(Politieke Kernpunten Programma 1999:11). It added that people who whished to stay in
the Netherlands on permanent basis or wanted to acquire Dutch citizenship also needed to
go through inburgering. The party did not consider, however, that long term
unemployment was not necessarily related to a migrant’s unwillingness to integrate, but
rather the result of institutional racism.
The VVD noted that problems with integration - black schools, pillarization,
poverty, unemployment - mainly occurred in cities such as Amsterdam or Rotterdam with
large ethnic minority communities. This, they argued, was evidence of these cities’
inability to absorb the continuing influx of immigrants. The constant influx in ethnically
homogenous neighborhoods contributed to the further segregation of society. Unlike the
SGP, however, the VVD did not believe in the forced relocation of immigrants. The party
maintained that, “The concentration of minorities in certain neighborhoods is a problem,
but the government has no means to actively deal with this problem. A mandatory spread
of minorities [to other neighborhoods] would be too much of an invasion of their
freedom” (Politieke Kernpunten Programma 2000:20). Therefore, instead, it proposed to
limit the immigration of ethnic minority immigrants to the Netherlands all together.
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One theme that was frequently discussed in the context of immigration was that of
‘family reunification’. First-generation immigrants were often men who moved to the
Netherlands for economic reasons, leaving behind wives and children in their home
countries. Through reunification laws, they were able to bring their wives and children to
the Netherlands. The VVD wanted to put a limit on family reunification because it saw
inburgering as a multigenerational process. The consistent influx of non-western
immigrants through family reunification would hinder this process. The party’s stance on
family reunification contradicts its emphasis on the family as the cornerstone of Dutch
society. The VVD feared that a breakdown in family values would lead to increases in
crime and a collapse in social cohesion. The party therefore wanted to make the family
‘healthy’ again. By placing limits on family reunification for immigrants, it made a
statement about the conceptualization of the family as an autochthon ethnic unit and
indicated that immigrant families were not considered to be foundational to Dutch
society.
Gender
While the PvdA and CDA discussed gender themes such as women’s
emancipation at great length, the VVD hardly discussed gender at all. The party argued
that the Dutch had a proud tradition of freedom of speech, anti-discrimination based on
race or sexual orientation, equality for women and men, and separation between church
and state. The VVD maintained that it:
119
Strives to make everyone in the Netherlands feel at home and behave
accordingly. Dutch norms and values, as they are laid out in the Constitution,
are worthwhile defending. We are proud that freedom of expression,
prohibition of discrimination based on race or sexual orientation and also equality
between men and women are part of our civilization. (De liberale toekomst
2002:3)
The party, thus, stated that equality between women and men was part of the fabric of
Dutch society.
Sexuality
Compared to its discussion of gender, the VVD wrote substantially more about
sexuality. It was a strong supporter of lesbian and gay rights. In a discussion on gay
marriage in 1999, before its legalization in 2000, the party wrote:
Whereas increasingly more people prefer to live in a family form other than the
traditional family and homosexuality is fully accepted in society, marriage is still
reserved for heterosexuals. This does not do justice to the variety of life styles
that exist in the Netherlands and expresses, implicitly, a value judgment.
(Politieke Kernpunt Programma 1999:13)
The VVD believed that the government should let citizens live their lives in accordance
with their own belief systems about morality. They, therefore, needed to take a norm and
value neutral approach to governing. Defining marriage in heterosexual terms did not
only violate anti-discrimination laws, the party argued, but also made value judgments
about homosexuality whose sentiments were no longer reflected in society.
The VVD also linked Islam to sexuality. The party understood that in different
cultures and religions, such as Islam, different attitudes towards homosexuality existed.
120
However, it maintained that these differences did not justify discrimination based on
sexual orientation. Although every individual had a right to her or his own moral belief
system, these rights were framed by the authoritative power of the Dutch constitution.
The party, therefore, hoped that Islam could go through a similar adjustment process as
Protestantism and Christianity had between the 1970s and 1990s. Christian parties did not
condone the homosexual practice, yet recognized that homosexuality was an identity that
needed to be tolerated. The VVD admitted that such a process would be difficult, since in
Islam both the identity and the practice of homosexuality are condemned. The VVD’s
desire for a ‘Dutch-Islam’ suggests that in its current form, Islam was deemed
incompatible with the norms and values in Dutch society. It also shows that sexuality,
especially homosexuality, and religion played an important role in the construction of the
Dutch identity and the perception of Islam and Muslims as non-Dutch others.
Security
Discussions about security pre and post 9/11 hardly focused on terrorism. They
did focus on the overrepresentation of Moroccan and Turkish youth in crime statistics
(CRIEM 1999). The VVD identified two reasons behind this overrepresentation: the
failed integration of minority youth which was caused by cultural differences. The party
argued that because of cultural differences, such as machismo, minority male youth living
on the brink of society were less likely to seek social service assistance. Their failure to
seek help allowed many of the young men to fall through the cracks of society into the
121
criminal circuit. The party therefore stressed that the government should force
unemployed, high school drop outs to accept social service assistance (although the VVD
did not explain how it planned to enforce this) and reiterated once more the importance of
education in inburgering.
Integration and Social Cohesion
LPF
During the LPF’s brief political life (from 2002 to 2008), the main thread running
through its campaigns was that of ‘national pride’. The LPF used every available
opportunity to remind the Dutch to be proud of their culture. Dutch traditions, norms, and
values, the party argued should receive priority over ‘foreign’ traditions. Like the VVD
and the other parties, the LPF defined Dutch norms and values in terms of freedom of
opinion, sexual and gender equality, and a separation between church and state. In its
documents, the party expressed concerned about the state of Dutch society. It feared that
the Netherlands was no longer a unified society, but had become a ‘salad bowl’. An
opponent of multiculturalism, the LPF maintained that the mix of cultures contributed to
the absence of a Dutch national identity. The party thought that the Dutch government
needed to do more to protect Dutch traditions and core norms and values.
The party made restoration of Dutch culture and the Dutch national identity the
main focus of its campaigns. It maintained in Deltaplan Integratie (2004) that:
122
Communication with minorities and immigrants about Dutch norms and values
needs to be based on the point of view that integration into the Dutch society
cannot be à la carte. The Dutch constitution is not a menu card. The Dutch
system of norms and values and the achievements of our democratic state are an
inextricable whole. With the freedom of religion in hand, denying freedom of
expression can and will not be tolerated. Rejecting integration à la carte means
that integration, as in France, needs to take on the character of assimilation.
Concretely, this means that when values of a cultural or religious minority group
clash with the fundamental values of the Dutch society, these always have to
make way for the Dutch values. Discrimination of women and homosexuals
and the mixing of religion and government are not accepted in the Netherlands.
Only through complete acceptance of our essential norms and values is full Dutch
citizenship possible. Those who do not agree with these values need to ask
themselves whether they wish to stay here. (P. 2)
The LPF’s statement on freedom of religion was a clear jibe at the Muslim
community, whom the LPF accused of refusing to participate in critical debates about the
role of Islam in society. The failure to critically reflect on one’s own religion was to the
LPF a sign of unenlightenment. The party stated that the Dutch government needed to
concretely identify the fundamental norms and values in society, and ensure that these
received legal protection. Ironically, the values the party identified in its discussions of
Dutchness (equality of women and men, freedom of opinion, separation between church
and state) were already protected by Article 1 of the Dutch constitution. The LPF,
however, wanted Article 1 abolished, since it allowed intolerant Muslims to hide behind
the protection of religious freedom (de Volkskrant 2002).
There is little difference between the VVD’s and LPF’s policies on immigration.
Both parties believed in limiting immigration flows. In a 2001 newspaper interview,
Fortuyn proclaimed, that he was not anti-Muslim or anti-immigration. He stated that he
123
was concerned about the social problems that accompanied immigration and that it was
not wise to make these problems bigger by letting in immigrants from rural Muslim
communities who refused to assimilate (de Telegraaf 2001). Like the VVD, the LPF saw
inburgering as a multigenerational process. The party maintained that:
Integration can only succeed when generations [of immigrants] become more
embedded in Dutch society, adopt the norms of this society. The LPF, therefore,
sees a further limitation of immigration as a necessary condition for the success of
the recovery of society. (Deltaplan Integratie 2004:3)
Another reoccurring theme in the LPF’s discussions was that of education. Given
its importance in the integration process (teaching immigrants about Dutch society) the
party wanted high quality education with little government interference and bureaucracy.
Government interference and bureaucratic rules negatively impacted the educational
system, because schools could not implement those rules that they deemed necessary to
improve the quality of their school’s education. It argued that determining what worked
and did not work in the class room should be left to the teachers and not politicians.
Given its resistance to pillarization, the LPF also did not believe in the existence of
Islamic schools, since such schools only delayed immigrants’ integration. Finally, the
LPF argued that parents had a responsibility to raise active, well integrated citizens. They
shared this responsibility, however, with schools. Schools, thus, not only had an
educational but also child-rearing role. Because of this dual responsibility, the LPF
stressed the importance of quality education.
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Security
Post 9/11 and the murders of Fortuyn and Van Gogh, discussions of security
focused on crime prevention. The LPF wanted a government that was tough on crime.
Such a government would make people feel safe again and contribute to social cohesion.
The party argued:
The Aanvalsplan Tegen Geweld [Attack Plan against Violence] will put an end
to the government’s soft and lazy attitude towards threats against our safety. The
plan aims to prevent violence and to establish strict guidelines to punish violence.
We can put an end to violence by being tough on those who commit violence.
Society feels that the government is too soft on criminals and ignores the victims
of crime. While violence was on the increase, the government kept on writing
reports. In such an atmosphere violence flourishes! (Aanvalsplan tegen geweld
2002:1)
The LP proposed a three strikes law similar to that in the United States and mandatory
minimum sentences for violent crimes. It claimed that having surveillance cameras on the
streets would also help people feel safer. The party wanted the introduction of a jury
system especially when dealing with murders and believed that having a court television
covering trials would provide more openness of the judicial system.
Gender
Like the CDA and PvdA, the LPF party was concerned about the position of
minority women in immigrant communities and linked these discussions to themes of
crime and ethnicity. In the introduction to Deltaplan Integratie (2004), it repeated
Fortuyn’s Lower House Debate claim that ethnic minority women were disproportionally
125
victims of domestic violence. This, the LPF argued, was the result of the patriarchal
culture that existed in many rural immigrant families. It stated that Moroccan women
were desperate to make their voices heard; that they were being treated even worse by
their husbands than the autochthon Dutch were aware of. The party therefore proposed
that:
Every immigrant who legally resides in the Netherlands signs a contract. By
signing the contract, he agrees to adhere to Dutch norms and values and to
distance himself from certain non-Western norms. The immigrant thereby accepts
the equality between man and woman, the separation of church and state and the
equality between homosexuals and heterosexuals. By signing the contract, the
immigrant explicitly distances himself from practices such as female genital
mutilation, honor killings and discrimination against women in general. Violation
of these conditions will lead to his expulsion from the Netherlands. (Deltaplan
Integratie 2004:10)
It was unclear how the LPF intended to implement the plan given the Constitutional
freedoms of expression and religion. Furthermore, other than the abovementioned
proposal, the LPF did not provide a concrete plan to actively fight domestic violence,
honor killings, and genital mutilation in minority communities.
Sexuality
The LPF framed sexuality - or rather freedom of sexuality - as a fundamental civil
right and as part of the Dutch tradition of ‘intolerance of intolerance.’ By claiming sexual
equality to be part of the Dutch tradition, it could adhere to conservative ideals regarding
some forms of social oppression, such as freedom of religion, yet also to liberal ideas
about others, such as sexual non-conformity. In its few discussions about sexuality, the
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party mainly focused on homosexuality and Muslims’ intolerance towards the Dutch gay
community. The LPF took foreign born and educated Imams, such as the Rotterdam
based Khalil el-Moumni, to task who proclaimed that homosexuality was an illness and
sin (NOVA 2003). It suggested that in order to remain in the Netherlands, these Imams
needed to attend a mandatory training to educate them on Dutch norms and values.
Conclusion:
Integration, Social Cohesion and Security
Discussions of social cohesion, security, integration, crime, religion, and gender
within the parties focused mainly on immigration. Furthermore all of these topics were
interrelated. These linkages between them were established by the main argument which
was ‘immigrants and particularly immigrant families needed to integrate into Dutch
society’. Their failure to do so would result in their children, especially their sons,
dropping out of high school with an insufficient amount of knowledge of the Dutch
language and Dutch society’s core norms and values. This lack of knowledge, especially
in terms of their Dutch language skills, would lead to unemployment and poverty.
Poverty, in turn, caused feelings of disenfranchisement and increased the vulnerability of
young immigrant males to the lures of crime and religious fundamentalism. Crime and
fundamentalism caused insecurity and a breakdown of social cohesion, because only in
societies where people feel safe and secure would social cohesion develop.
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There are several important observations to make in this line of reasoning. The
first involves the emphasis on immigrants in discussions about crime, integration, and
social cohesion. For instance no party, apart from the PvdA in 1999, discussed integration
outside the context of ethnicity. Second, statistics indicate the overrepresentation of
minority males in crime (CRIEM 1999). This overrepresentation means that discussions
about ‘vulnerable youth’ and the ‘lures of crime’ in fact relate to ethnic minority youth.
Third, given the absence of documents about other forms of religious fundamentalism,
e.g., Christian or Hindu, and the parties’ post-9/11 focus on terrorism, ‘religious
fundamentalism’ becomes a euphemism for ‘Islamic fundamentalism.’ The parties’ focus
on terrorism and Islam, Muslims’ visibility as the largest minority group in Dutch
society, and the above mentioned observations turn discussions on integration, security,
and social cohesion predominantly into discussions about Muslims and Islam.
Lastly, racism - individual or institutional - is rarely mentioned as a factor in
social cohesion or integration. The burden to integrate, therefore, is placed on the
shoulders of immigrant women and men. The obstacles they face because of institutional
racism are largely ignored. Crime, disenfranchisement, and high school drop out rates,
then, are seen as inherent to failed integration rather than the possible results of
institutional racism. Integration can only be successful if a society allows immigrants to
integrate. However, the bounds of autochthon Dutch’s willingness to embrace newcomers
into society and the roots of this potential unwillingness were left unexplored in parties’
documents.
128
Inburgering
All parties believed in the positive influence of inburgering on integration. The
LPF and D66 felt so strongly about inburgering that they wanted to make it mandatory
for all immigrants. The PvdA, CDA and CU saw it as a way to help immigrants adjust to
Dutch society. Finally, the VVD maintained that forced inburgering was justified when
there were clear signs of failed integration among immigrants, e.g., high unemployment
or crime rates. Discussions on inburgering were unclear about the nature of the concept:
whether it was one of assimilation or not. Although the PvdA saw inburgering as a tool
to help immigrants integrate in society, parties’ discussions indicate that inburgering
really was a euphemism for assimilation. For instance, freedom of expression was
permitted, but only once the immigrant understands the bounds of Dutch norms and
values. Cultural expressions were allowed as long as they did not interfere with Dutch
values and norms which, as D66 stated, should always have priority over ‘foreign’
cultural practices. Practices that went against Article 1 of the Dutch constitution, such as
‘female genital mutilation,’ ‘honor killings’, hate crimes against homosexuals, or the
involvement of religion in politics were seen as un-Dutch - and above all illegal - and
therefore not tolerated.
Terrorism
9/11 and the murders of Pim Fortuyn (2002) and Theo van Gogh (2004) had a
significant impact on discussions of security themes. Post 9/11, these abruptly shifted
129
from ‘Russia’, ‘vandalism’ and ‘financial security’ to ‘international and domestic
terrorism’ and ‘religious fundamentalism.’ The smaller religious parties, already
uncomfortable with the presence of Islam in Dutch society, were particular concerned
with terrorism and linked these concerns to Islamic fundamentalism. Fear of terrorism
and fundamentalism allowed them to reiterate the Christian nature of society and the
threat that Islam formed to Christianity. Mainstream parties like the PvdA and CDA, with
a broad electorate base to please, made it clear that fundamentalism was the exception
and not the norm in Islam. They added that an entire community should not be held
responsible for the actions of a few. Still, by linking fundamentalism to Islam and
terrorism, security debates became debates about Islam and domestic and international
terrorism by stealth.
Gender
Connell (1987) argues that gender is comprised of numerous social categories.
Indeed, parties’ discussions involving gender focused on many different elements: gender
and sexuality, gender and ethnicity, gender and the family, gender and violence, and
gender and integration. The CDA and CU focused on the woman’s role in the family.
They believed that women, as the caregivers in the family, were the glue that held the
family unit together. Since norms and values were taught and passed on in the family, it
was considered one of the cornerstones of society. The parties reasoned that a happy,
emancipated mother and wife would contribute to a stable family and cohesive society. It
130
did not occur to the parties that an emancipated woman would demand that her husband
shares child raising and housekeeping responsibilities and that, therefore, the structure of
the traditional family unit would permanently change. In the CDA and CU’s views,
emancipation would keep the woman confined to the caregiver role in the family.
Discussions on gender also focused on women and violence. All parties were appalled by
violence against women and especially domestic violence. For the CDA, violence against
women was not only reprehensible because it violated their human rights, but because it
destabilized the family unit. This was one of the main reasons it focused on integration
and domestic violence: domestic violence hindered the emancipation of the woman and
the integration of her family.
Men and masculinity were seldom discussed in the party documents. This was
surprising given parties’ emphasis on patriarchy in immigrant cultures. In order to change
a patriarchal society, both women and men need to be educated on the equal rights of
women. By excluding men from their discussions, parties placed the burden of social
change on immigrant women’s shoulders. Furthermore, claims about patriarchy in
immigrant cultures were never contextualized. By failing to contextualize discussions on
domestic violence and patriarchy, it was suggested that male immigrants were inherently
violent or Islam a fundamentally sexist and violent religion. Furthermore, patriarchy in
Muslim communities is caused and perpetuated by conservative interpretations of the
Qur’an. Therefore, religious leaders play an important role in the emancipation of
Muslim women and education of Muslim men. Yet their roles were not discussed either.
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Gender was also mentioned in connection to cultural practices. Debates on Islam and
women’s dress turned women into symbols of the religion’s cultural incompatibility with
Dutch attitudes towards gender equality and women’s rights. By focusing on the
headscarf as cultural rather than religious symbol, Islam was turned into an ethnicity
rather than a faith.
Sexuality
In 2000, gay marriage was legalized and in many of the documents parties
debated whether to support it or not. While CDA, CU, and SGP did not support gay
marriage, they did believe in the existence of a ‘homosexual identity’. Since sexual
orientation was considered an identity, homosexual should not be discriminated against.
The SGP, CU, and CDA maintained this, however, did not mean that the sexual act was
tolerated. It did mean that one could ‘hate the sin but love the sinner’. The PvdA, D66,
VVD and LPF all supported legal rights for homosexuals, including gay marriage and
gay adoption. The VVD maintained that the freedom to live one’s life as one wanted was
a fundamental right in the Netherlands. Discrimination of homosexuals based on sexual
orientation, therefore, was not tolerated.
Sexuality was not only discussed in relation to homosexuality; it was also linked
to discussions about gender and ethnicity. For example, the CDA mentioned the double
standard that existed in Muslim communities for sexually active single women and men.
Women who had multiple sexual encounters were considered ‘sluts’, while men were
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considered ‘studs’. This double standard led the PvdA to warn that Dutch society would
not tolerate it if women were called ‘whores’ for not wearing a headscarf or wearing
make-up.
44
Religion and Islam
A clear distinction between religion and Islam was made in parties’ documents.
Christianity was taken as the norm against which Islam was held. Christianity had
become hegemonic and therefore was never discussed on the same terms as Islam. While
Christianity was discussed as a faith - a belief system - Islam was mainly discussed in
terms of its cultural practices, e.g., the wearing of headscarves. Parties’ concerns about
Islam centered on two issues: religious fundamentalism and the separation of church and
state. Most discussions linked Islam to fundamentalism, especially post 9/11. Yet, from
these discussions it did not become clear whether fundamentalism was the product of
failed integration or of Islam as an inherently radical religion. The second concern was
that of the separation between church and state. Parties like the SGP and CU portrayed
Islam as inherently political and therefore undemocratic because in Muslim societies
there was no separation of church and state. Ironically, while the SGP and CU proclaimed
their support for a secular society, they also believed that the Dutch state should govern
44
The hijab has become the cultural symbol in discussions about inequality in Islam,
because of the power inequalities that are associated with it. As the PvdA’s warnings
indicates, a woman’s decision to not wear a hijab has more serious consequences than a
man’s decision to not wear a skullcap. For instance, men are not likely to be murdered for
refusing to wear a head covering.
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according to Biblical fundaments. This, according to D66, was an example of the state’s
failure to enforce a strict separation of church and state on all religions.
Nationality
In discussions about ‘Dutchness’, ‘norms and values’ were mentioned on
numerous occasions. In these discussions, they were linked to themes such as ‘language’,
‘education’, ‘equality’, ‘employment’ and a ‘separation of church and state’. While the
importance of language in national identity formation is understandable (since this
provides a sense of collectivity), it was not clear why and how education or financial
independence was a part of the Dutch national identity. The ambiguity of ‘norms and
values’ made it difficult to concretely analyze the nationality category. For instance, it
can be assumed that education or economic independence is important because it helps to
stabilize society and establish social cohesion; yet the link between these codes and
national identity is unclear.
From the discussion, one thing did become clear: in Dutch society discrimination
of any kind was not tolerated. Tolerance and equality were seen as inherent parts of
Dutchness. Ironically, this anti-discrimination ideal was framed within the context of
Dutch norms and values. In this context, the rights of women and homosexuals trumped
those of Muslims who believed in patriarchy and considered homosexuality a sin.
Immigrants’ right to freedom of expression was protected by the Dutch constitution, but
also bound by the core norms and values of society which, in the end, had priority.
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Chapter Five: The United Kingdom
Data Collection
The London School of Economics’ Pamphlet Collection (PC) hosts an impressive
collection of political documents - some dating back to the late 19
th
century. In 2007, I
visited the PC for three weeks to collect data on five of the eleven parties that are
currently represented in the House of Commons: the Labour Party (New Labour),
Conservative and Unionist Party (Conservatives), Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems), United
Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP), and the British National Party (BNP).
45
I chose
New Labour, the Conservatives, and the Lib Dems for the reason that they were the three
largest parties in the House of Commons between 1999 and 2006. I added UKIP and the
BNP, because both played important roles in regional politics at the time.
For New Labour, the largest party, I retrieved 57 documents. For the rest, I found
45 (Conservatives), 34 (Lib Dems), 29 (UKIP), and 25 (BNP) pamphlets and brochures.
To analyze the data, I used the same 8 categories that were established in Chapter Three
for theoretical replication purposes (see Chapter Two): ‘gender’, ‘integration’, ‘Islam’
(which this time I will discuss as a separate category), ‘national identity’, ‘religion’,
‘security’, ‘sexuality’, ‘social cohesion’, and ‘other’. I added two categories that
45
Conservative and Unionist Party, Democratic Unionist, Independent Conservative,
Independent Labour, New Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, Respect, Scottish National
Party/Plaid Cymru, Sinn Fein, Social Democratic & Labour Party, Ulster Unionist,
United Kingdom Independent Party.
135
specifically emerged from the British data, namely ‘Europe’ and ‘equality’. (For codes
see Appendix II).
This Chapter follows the same set up as Chapter Four; first, I will provide a brief
overview of the party’s history. Next, I will discuss the data I retrieved and analyzed.
The Extreme Right:
The British National Party (BNP)
The BNP is an extreme right party, which only grants membership to ‘indigenous’
- white - Britons.
46
The party was founded in 1982, when it merged with the New
National Front and the British Movement. The party is primarily concerned with
stemming the influx of non-white immigrants to the UK. Because of uncontrolled non-
white immigration, the BNP argues, indigenous Britons soon will become a minority in
their own country. The party denies that it adheres to a white supremacist ideology, but
does believe that biological differences between races and ‘racial purity’ exist. To
maintain racial purity, it opposes interracial relationships between whites and ‘non-white
others’. The BNP’s political agenda can be summed up with the statement ‘indigenous
Britons first’, which it applies to all areas of social life.
46
The BNP classifies white English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish and Ulster peoples as
‘indigenous’.
136
Europe
Between 1999 and 2006, the BNP consistently expressed its opposition to the
UK’s membership of the European Union (EU). In Taking back our freedom (2001) the
party maintained that:
It would be possible for the British National Party’s European parliamentary
election manifesto to be the shortest such document ever printed, for our policy
in relation to the European Union can be summed in three words: ‘Get Britain
Out!’ … We believe that the nations of Europe should be free to trade and
cooperate whenever it is mutually beneficial, but should not be forced into a
political and economic straightjacket. (P. 1)
The party, thus, adhered to an isolationist agenda and argued that the EU had too much
control over British politics and everyday life. It was particularly unhappy with the
establishment of the European Constitution (the Constitution)
47
and feared that, once it
was ratified, the UK would lose all of its political sovereignty. In 2004, the year that the
Constitution was signed by EU member states, the BNP called for a public referendum. It
wanted the British people and not the New Labour government to decide whether the
country should adopt a European Constitution or not. The government denied the party’s
request, but to date has yet to ratify the Constitution.
47
The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe aims to simplify decision making
processes in the EU. In 2004, all EU member states signed the Treaty. While most
members have since ratified the Constitution, it was rejected by the French and Dutch in
public referenda.
137
Social Cohesion
The BNP maintained that British society lacked cohesion and attributed this to
immigration. The party was concerned about unemployment, which averaged three
percent between 2000 and 2006 (Office for National Statistics 2009). It reasoned that
immigration caused unemployment because immigrants - willing to work for a lower
salary - took jobs away from indigenous Britons. The BNP maintained that
unemployment led to poverty, poverty to discontent, and discontent to a breakdown of
social cohesion. It also objected to the import of foreign goods, which it believed
negatively affected employment in the UK. The party stated:
The BNP calls for the selective exclusion of foreign made goods from British
markets and the reduction of foreign imports. We will ensure that our
manufactured goods are, wherever possible, produced in British factories
employing British workers. When this is done, unemployment in this country will
be brought to an end, and good, well-paid employment will flourish, at last getting
our people back to work and ending the waste and injustice of having more than 4
million people in a hidden army of the unemployed concealed by Labour
statistical fiddles …We are pledged to ensure that all vital national assets are
restored to British ownership. We also call for preference in the job market to be
given to native Britons. (British workers first 2002:3)
Furthermore, the BNP asserted, immigration threatened Britain’s national security
since immigrants brought extremist Islamic ideologies with them into the country. This
was of great concern because, the party warned, it was Islamists who had been
responsible for 9/11 and the July 7, 2005 (7/7) terrorist attacks on the United States and
in United Kingdom. In a 2001 brochure titled A New Britain, the party wrote:
Recent arrests of cells of Islamic terrorists living in the country, plotting mass
murder in Britain illustrate the link between illegal immigration and terrorism.
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The link between illegal immigration and crime in our communities - including
the ruthless exploitation of the immigrants themselves - is also well documented.
(P. 15)
Despite this claim, in none of its documents did the party provide evidence of the “well
documented” link. The absence of evidence is particularly interesting since none of the
7/7 bombers were illegal immigrants and all were British-born. Because of the lack of
contextualization, the BNP portrayed all British Muslims as illegal immigrants.
Besides controlling immigration to the UK, the BNP believed that education was
vital to the reestablishment and maintenance of social stability. It argued that through
education, youth were taught the skills necessary to succeed in the labor market and saw
in employment a deterrent against the lures of crime. Unfortunately, the BNP argued, the
UK had one of the worst education systems in Europe. These low education standards led
to high truancy, drop-out, and illiteracy rates for secondary and high school students. It
blamed Britain’s poor education system on ‘modern’ teaching techniques and
bureaucracy that kept teachers tied to their desks filling out unnecessary paper work.
Although it did not explain what ‘modern’ teaching techniques exactly were, it did
maintain that teachers should have more authority in the class room and the power to
discipline unruly students. The BNP asserted that:
We are against the trendy teaching methods that have made Britain one of the
most poorly educated nations in the Western world. We will restore discipline in
the classroom, give authority back to teachers and give far greater educational
resources to train young people in the industrial and technological skills necessary
in the modern world. (Education- discipline, standards, achievement 2001:1)
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In addition to unemployment, immigration, and subpar education, the BNP
blamed ‘political correctness’ for the lack of social cohesion. The party argued that
political correctness had limited white Britons’ Freedom of Speech by preventing them
from expressing their concerns about multiculturalism. The lack of Freedom of Speech
had alienated them from society, which was worsened by the New Labour government’s
adherence to multicultural policies. These policies, the BNP argued, created segregated,
ethnic and racial pillars rather than foster a common British identity. Although it believed
in racial segregation, it objected to the fact that cultures other than the British were able
to flourish in society.
In order to restore social cohesion, the party called for a repeal of
multiculturalism, an end to ‘positive discrimination’ (which, it maintained, had turned
white Britons into second class citizens)
48
, and restoration of Freedom of Speech. In its
2005 Election Manifesto, the BNP proclaimed that it would also abolish the Race
Relations Amendment Act 2000 (which prohibited discrimination based on race or
ethnicity)
49
and “all politically-correct indoctrination of the police, teachers, and other
public employees” (p. 20). In none of its publications did the party explain what it meant
48
Positive discrimination is not legal in the United Kingdom, except for disabled people.
According to the Race Relations Act 1979 and Race Relations Amendment Act 2000, it is
illegal to treat people less favorably on the ground of race, color, nationality, ethnic
background. What the BNP calls positive discrimination is, in fact, equalities legislation.
49
The Race Relations Act 1979 was amended in 2000 by the Race Relations Amendment
Act 2000.
140
by “politically correct indoctrination” or elaborate on how this indoctrination threatened
social cohesion.
Integration
Throughout the research period, discussions of integration were linked to
multiculturalism, race, and immigration. The BNP consistently referred to
multiculturalism as ‘multiracialism’.
50
It stated that multiracialism had contributed to the
decline of Britons as a racial group and blamed immigration for this. For one, the party
argued, the birth rate of non-whites was higher than that of whites, turning indigenous
Britons into a numerical minority. Second, immigration contributed to an increase in
interracial relationships. Children out of these relationships, it maintained, diluted the
white race pool. Interestingly, the BNP’s concern about the positive correlation between
immigration and interracial relationships implies that for many Britons racial differences
and racial purity were non-issues. Nevertheless, the party believed that, because of
excessive immigration, indigenous Britons as a race would inevitably cease to exist and
therefore opposed further immigration. It maintained:
To ensure that the British people retain their homeland and identity, we call for an
immediate halt to all further non-white immigration, the immediate deportation of
illegal immigrants, and the introduction of a system of voluntary resettlement
whereby those non-white immigrants who are legally here will be encouraged, but
not compelled, to return to their lands of ethnic origin. The BNP will ensure that
the proper financial and material provisions are available for this, with the aim of
50
Multicultural policies also relate to Welsh, Scots and Gaelic speakers and not just
racial groups.
141
halting and reversing the trend towards a non-white Britain, and ensuring that the
British people have a homeland and retain their unique identity. (Immigration -
time to say NO! 2001:1)
The BNP saw multiracialism as a Marxist ideology which falsely assumed that all
cultures and races were equal. The party elaborated on this statement in its General
Election Manifesto (2005):
We do not accept the absurd superstition - propagated for different though
sometimes overlapping reasons by capitalists, liberals, Marxists and theologians -
of human equality. Whether the now totally discredited feminist argument that
men and women are innately the same, to the partly refuted egalitarian claim that
everyone within a given population is born as a blank slate with the same innate
potential, or the still dominant Politically Correct denial of the existence of
differences on average between members of different races - we reject all these
irrational myths. (P 16)
The BNP continued:
This must not be taken to mean or imply that we believe that any particular
ethnic group or race is ‘superior’ or inferior’; we simply recognize that - as
any biologist would be able to predict, and the new medical science of
pharmacogenetics is now confirming - human populations which have undergone
micro-evolutionary changes while being separated for many thousands of years
have developed differences in many fields of endeavor, susceptibility to health
problems, behavioural tendencies and such like. To deny such differences on the
grounds of egalitarian dogma has always been wrong, but to continue to do so in
the light of the latest medical evidence is to condemn people to unnecessary
suffering on the account of racially specific health problems. We therefore believe
that the myth that ‘we are all the same under the skin’ will soon be as discredited
as its feminist equivalent, and that all political parties will have to drastically
amend their thinking to reflect the new reality in the not too distant future. (P. 16)
Although it alleged that no one race was superior over the other, the above
statement shows that the BNP clearly believed that biological differences between races
existed. The party maintained that these differences were at the core of ethnic and racial
142
conflict. Racism and ethnocentrism, the BNP maintained, were not the result of ‘false
consciousness’, economics, or imperialism but rather inherent to human nature. The
party, therefore, supported a Section 28 style proscription (which prohibited the
‘promotion’ of homosexuality in public schools) against the ‘promotion’ of racial
integration in schools and media. The BNP hoped that by creating a racially and
ethnically segregated society, racial and ethnic conflict could be eliminated. The party’s
view of ethnic conflict and race is interesting since, historically, armed conflict between
the English, Welsh, Irish and Scottish - the so-called ‘indigenous’ peoples - have always
existed.
Security
All of the BNP’s discussion about security focused on crime. The party believed
that crime had become ‘uncontrollable’ and that it was time for a much needed ‘crack
down’. The public had lost its faith in British law enforcement, it argued, and this faith
needed to be restored so feelings of security among the British people could be
reestablished. The BNP blamed bureaucracy and political correctness for preventing law
enforcement from doing their jobs properly. The party alleged that the law was on the
side of the criminals and not the innocent victims of crime, and stated that courts and
police needed to refocus their attention on victims’ fundamental rights.
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British Identity
In discussions about immigration, multiculturalism, and integration, the BNP
evoked the protection of a ‘British Identity’ - Britishness - as a defense against claims of
ethnocentrism and racism. It argued that under New Labour’s multicultural policies,
‘immigrant cultures’ had blossomed. Consequently, immigrants had little incentive to
integrate into society. The BNP stated that these ‘immigrant cultures’ threatened
traditional British culture, yet did not explain what this British culture consisted of. The
closest the BNP came to defining Britishness was in its 2001 Election Manifesto. In the
Manifesto the party argued that:
We demand the right to preserve our culture, heritage, and identity. Our national
character and native institutions are a precious inheritance, for which our
ancestors have paid a high price over the centuries. They are not to be casually
thrown away in the name of “modernization” that is often no more than a thinly-
veiled cover for a quasi-Marxist cultural war against all things white, European
and male. (P. 21)
Britishness, thus, was seen as both unique to the UK, but also rooted in the culture of
white men of European origin: in masculinity, pan-ethnicity, and race. The BNP did not
elaborate on how British culture differed from that of, e.g., Dutch white men or discussed
the contributions of women to Britishness.
Gender and Sexuality
In the few times gender and sexuality were discussed between 1999 and 2006, the
party focused on interracial relationships, homosexuality, and Islam. In White Lies,
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Daniels (1997) argues that white supremacy is rooted in gender and sexuality. White
supremacist ideology focuses predominantly on women as the ‘mothers of the nation’
51
and sex (voluntary or forced) as a means by which non-whites attempt to undermine
racial purity. Using Daniels’ argument, the BNP’s concerns about interracial
relationships, ultimately were concerns about sexuality. ‘Racial purity’ could only be
maintained if sexual intercourse between people of different races was regulated. Unlike
most white supremacist parties, the BNP did not link gender to racial purity; suggesting
that both women and men could become ‘race traitors’.
Discussions of sexuality also centered on homosexuality. The party saw
homosexuality as ‘unnatural’, supported Section 28, and opposed civil partnerships for
lesbians and gay men. While the BNP considered homosexuality ‘immoral’, they argued
that sexuality was a matter of private concern. Homosexuals, therefore, were tolerated as
long as they remained in the closet. Lastly, the party linked sex and gender to Islam. In a
leaflet titled Militant Muslims in London demonstrate against mild Danish cartoons of
Muhammad (2006), the BNP warned that the ‘Islamification’ of British society stripped
women of their autonomy. It stated:
We all saw the effects of militant Islam on 7/7 when home grown Muslim
terrorists carried out brutal terrorist attacks on our capital city - slaughtering 56
innocent people and injuring many hundreds more. But the effects of Islam on
Britain are much further reaching: Arranged marriages; barbaric ritual slaughter
which makes a mockery of animal welfare laws; Muslim dress in schools,
51
This focus is similar to the CDA’s perception of the woman - the wife and mother - as
the core of the traditional family; especially given the role of the family in social
cohesion.
145
mosques in our towns and cities, and further restrictions on free speech. Nearly
half of all Muslims admit to wanting to see Sharia Law forced onto Britain. This
would make the Muslim Koran the source of all law. Among other things it bans
women from going out in public without wearing headscarves and fully covering
their bodies. It turns women and non-believers into second class citizens; forbids
alcohol and replaces democracy with the rule of fanatical Imams and Mullahs.
Only the British National Party speaks out against both Muslim extremist
terrorism and the threat that ‘mainstream’ Islam poses to our British culture,
heritage and ways of life. (P. 1)
Although the party considered women and men inherently unequal (and argued that
claims to the contrary were ‘feminist myths’), it maintained that there should not be any
value judgments attached to these differences. Like race, one sex was not superior over
the other. Islam, the BNP maintained, did not make that distinction and therefore was an
inherently sexist religion.
Islam
Pre-1999, the BNP was concerned about the presence of Jews and blacks in
British society. It believed that both ‘races’ were a threat to British culture and especially
the white race pool. Since 1999, as the Pakistani population in Britain increased to
747,285 in 2001, to become the second largest minority group behind East Indians, the
BNP focused all its attention on Islam and Muslims Asians (National Statistics 2009).
Ironically, post-1999, the party attempted to create alliances with religious groups who
also opposed Islam, such as orthodox Jews, Hindus, and Sikhs.
The period after 9/11 (in particular after the 7/7 bombings) saw an increase in
concerns about British born Muslim terrorists. The 7/7 was seen as evidence of Islam and
146
Muslims’ incompatibility with British norms and values. The 2006 protests against the
publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper
Jyllands-Posten (visual depictions of the Prophet are considered sacrilegious) were used
as further evidence of Islam’s anti-democratic nature. In a leaflet condemning the
demonstrations, the BNP argued that aside from extremist ideology, Islam would also
bring arranged marriages, Muslim dress in schools, mosques, and further restrictions on
free speech to the UK (BNP 2006).
Although the BNP condemned Islam as sexist, extremist, and anti-democratic, the
party argued that it was not ‘racist’ against Muslims - conflating Muslims as ethnic group
with Muslims as homogenous racial group. The party maintained that:
The BNP is widely known as the only British political party warning of the
danger posed to our democracy, traditions and freedoms by the creeping
Islamification and dhimmitude of Britain. This does not, however, mean that
we’re are against Islam per se. As far as we are concerned it is simply another
foreign mindset whose adherents are welcome to do whatever it instructs them to
do – in their own countries. We insist on our right to resist and reverse the
Islamification of Britain, and to oppose the ‘Eurabie’ project of the French and
Italian liberal elites. (General Election Manifesto 2005:50)
However, in an interview with the British Broadcasting Cooperation in 2005, the leader
of the BNP, Nick Griffin, reversed its view of Islam and Muslims by explaining that it
was inherently violent and a threat to society because it had expanded by “rape” and the
“point of the sword”. Griffin’s statement, thus, implied that Islam was not just a threat
because it advocated violence, but because it turned Muslim men into potential rapists.
Rape was seen as a way for Muslims to annihilate the white, ‘European’ race. This
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statement supports Daniel’s (1997) argument that debates about racial purity and
ethnocentrism, ultimately, were debates about power, gender, and sexuality.
The Political Right:
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
UKIP is a populist, rightwing party which was formed in 1993 by members of the
Anti-Federalist League (AFL). The AFL had as goal to oppose the Treaty on the
European Union (the Maastricht Treaty). Similarly, UKIP’s main goal is to advocate the
withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU. Like the BNP, the party feels that
membership of the EU infringes on the country’s sovereignty. Since its founding, the
party has moved from being a single issue party to having stances on other issues, such as
immigration, as well.
Social Cohesion
UKIP believed that the EU infringed on Britain’s sovereignty and stifled its
citizens’ fundamental freedoms. It particularly felt that ratification of the Human Rights
Act 1998
52
had negatively impacted Britons’ Freedom of Speech. The party argued,
52
The Human Rights Act 1998 ratified the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights 1998. By ratifying the Convention, it acknowledged the establishment of the
European Court of Human Rights. The Convention protects, for instance, the right to
privacy and freedom of expression. It also prohibits human rights abuses such as torture.
It allows citizens of EU member states, who feel that their rights have been violated by a
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“There is no one ‘correct’ view on immigration, the European Union, devolution,
multiculturalism, education, women’s rights, fox hunting or anything else. [We believe]
that the British people are well capable of using their traditional Freedom of Speech
responsibly - just as they have always done” (The Manifesto 2001:9-10). However, UKIP
argued, people felt that they could no longer freely express their opinions because of the
‘politically correct’ atmosphere created by the Act. The party, therefore, rallied against
what it perceived as political correctness. In its 2001 Manifesto, UKIP argued:
The right to freedom of speech means exactly that - the freedom to say what you
like. Few freedoms are unlimited though, and this particular right carries with it
responsibilities to other people, notably the responsibility not to grievously
offend. That said, however, this responsibility has in recent times become codified
into a bizarre and extreme set of beliefs and behaviours by those in authority,
which has now earned the title of ‘Political Correctness’. (P. 9)
UKIP went on to tell the story of the 78 year old George Staunton from Toxteth in
Liverpool. The party wrote:
In June 1999, [George Staunton] was arrested and charged with the crime of
‘Racially Aggravated Criminal Damage,’ after putting a UKIP poster on a wall,
and writing alongside “Don’t forget the 1945 war”, and “Free speech for
England”. As reported in the Daily Telegraph of July 10
th
, Mr Staunton, who
served in the Merchant Navy during the Second World War, feels that his country
has let him down: “I don’t see the problem. My slogans are not hurting anyone
and they’re not racist. I just believe in free speech and the right for the UK to rule
itself. With all the crime in this area, I couldn’t believe they nicked me for writing
on a building that’s being pulled down anyway. They arrested me on June 9
th
-
election day. I didn’t even get the chance to vote because they banged me up for
supporting democracy”. (P. 9)
state (not an individual), to take their case to the Court. The Court’s decisions are,
however, recommendations and not legally binding.
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UKIP maintained that because people felt politically powerless due to political
correctness, many declined to participate in the British democracy, e.g., by not voting
during elections. This, the party maintained, was problematic because active citizenship
was seen as a vital element of social stability (see also Jenson 2002). Therefore, to foster
social cohesion, UKIP suggested that the UK withdrew from the EU and advocated the
repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 and restoration of Freedom of Speech.
Integration
UKIP repeatedly stated that the UK was ‘full’ and that, therefore, there was need
for a permanent ban on immigration. The party asserted that:
The UK population at sixty million is higher than ever before. We live on a small
island. Our towns and cities are overcrowded, our roads clogged up, and our
railways are grinding to a halt. Hospitals and the Social Services cannot cope, and
new housing estates are covering the countryside. Last year, the government
allowed into the UK an extra two hundred thousand people, but mass immigration
is the last thing Britain needs at present. The UK Independence Party will put an
end to mass immigration. In particular, there will be no more entry for economic
migrants. Britain is full up, and an immigrant’s country of origin almost always
needs its skilled people far more than we do. (Give us a Better Future 2005:11)
UKIP argued that immigration standards had been executed with little oversight under
New Labour. Subsequently, in terms of population, every six months a city the size of
Cambridge was added to the UK.
UKIP claimed that it did not want to end immigration out of racist or ethnocentric
motivations, but because immigration strained health care, education, and other social
services. In fact, the party portrayed itself as ‘all inclusive’ and, in its 2005 Manifesto,
150
stated that it was guided by the principle of ‘non-discrimination.’ This meant, UKIP
argued, that it supported people of all races and religious convictions as long as they
shared the party’s mission. It maintained:
The UK Independence Party is an inclusive party and is guided by the principle of
non-discrimination: we seek the support of persons of all races and religions who
share our aims. The party’s commitment to non-discrimination receives special
attention in the constitution. The Party has recently advertised in media like the
African Caribbean Voice newspaper, Gay Times and the London Jewish News to
highlight the threats posed by the EU to minorities. The Party consists of former
socialists, Conservatives and Social Democrats. (The Manifesto 2001:2)
While the party touted its advertisements in various minority media, it did not discuss
how its actual policies aimed to serve these communities.
Security
UKIP believed that crime and lawlessness destabilized society. The party argued
that people felt unsafe due to the lack of police officers on the streets. Increased visibility
of officers would help to restore the public’s faith in law enforcement. In return, these
renewed feelings of safety would contribute to social stability. Additionally, the party
believed, improving job opportunity, reforming education, restoring local democracy, and
reinforcing ‘family values’ would help to fight criminality. The party failed to explain
how restoration of family values and local democracy would contribute to this fight. Still,
UKIP maintained, “with a greater sense of purpose and belonging, the crime problem will
become easier to manage, even drug-related crime and the anti-social behaviour
associated with binge-drinking” (The Manifesto 2001:17).
151
British Identity
As an inwardly focused party, the centrality of ‘Britishness’ in UKIP’s
discussions does not come as a surprise. The party wanted to withdraw from the EU
because its policies interfered with the ‘British way of life’. It called for children to be
schooled in the heritage and traditions of British society and the party was a strong
advocate of ‘uniculturalism’. Uniculturalism, coupled with UKIP’s desire to close the
borders to further immigration, indicated that the party wanted a society that was
culturally homogenous - one in which British traditions, norms, and values were easily
recognizable. Yet, similar to the BNP’s discussion of Britishness, UKIP never explained
what these British norms and values were.
Islam
UKIP linked its discussions of integration and crime to Islam. In one of its Policy
Briefs, it quoted a survey by The Times newspaper which reported that “10% of British
Muslims regard the July 7
th
bombers as ‘martyrs’ and that 16% think the bombing was
wrong, but the cause nevertheless justified” (Criminal Justice Policy 2006:8). The party
went on to blame New Labour’s multiculturalism for these statistics. It argued that lax
asylum seeker policies in the 1990s, had allowed radical Imams to enter British society.
Many of these Imams, UKIP claimed, had been implicated in violent activities in the
Middle East and were now spreading radical ideologies in British Muslim communities.
It stated that, protected by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Race Relations
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Amendment Act 2000, Imams were allowed to incite religious violence without any legal
repercussions.
Gender and Sexuality
Discussions of gender and sexuality were virtually non-existent during the
research period. Because UKIP believed in freedom of the individual and equality for all,
its omission of gender and sexuality meant that it believed that these were non-issues -
after all, they were protected by the same laws as any other identity. Also, given its
rejection of political correctness, taking a specific stance towards gay or women’s rights
would have been seen as undesirable. The party believed that there was no one “‘correct’
view on immigration, the European Union, devolution, multiculturalism, education,
women’s rights, fox hunting or anything else” (Manifesto 2001:9-10). UKIP, thus, would
have to justify why it singled out sexuality and gender, but not religion, social class, or
race for special attention and protection.
The Centre Right:
The Conservative and Unionist Party (Conservatives)
The Conservative and Unionist Party (better known as the Conservatives) was
established in 1912, when the Conservative Party merged with the Liberal Unionists. The
Conservative Party has roots in the Tory Party, which was founded in 1678. Because of
these roots, the Conservatives are often called ‘Tories’. The party is politically centre
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right and wants a society with a small government and large personal freedom. It believes
in free enterprise and individual responsibility, and argues that hard work and ambition
should be proportionally rewarded. In its 2001 Election Manifesto, the party states that
these are “conservative values” - the values of the “forgotten majority”.
53
It is this
“forgotten majority” that the Conservatives, predominantly, focus on.
Social Cohesion
For the Conservatives, personal freedom was an important element in social
cohesion. In its 2005 Election Manifesto the party stated, “Conservatives believe that
personal happiness and economic success alike flourish when individuals and families are
free to seize opportunities in their own way. It is the task of the government to increase
opportunities and remove barriers to them” (p. 1). People, therefore, should be able to
exercise responsibility, e.g., choose which schools their children will attend. This
responsibility, the Conservatives argued, was the characteristic of a truly ‘free society’.
The party also emphasized the role of the ‘nuclear family’ in establishing social
cohesion. The Conservatives believed that the traditional (two parent, opposite sex)
family was the vessel through which children were taught the norms and values of
conservatism. However, it argued ‘family values’ had been scaled back due to political
correctness. On top of that, families were struggling financially. With all of these
53
The forgotten majority is similar to the silent majority President Nixon talked about in
the 1970s. Both focused on the traditional, nuclear family.
154
obstacles, passing on conservative norms and values to the next generation was becoming
increasingly difficult. The party argued:
The task of bringing up children is made much harder when families keep less of
what they earn, because the Government is taking more. Labour has increased
taxes on hardworking families. After four years of Labour, a typical family was
paying 670 pounds more tax per year than when the Government took office.
Despite al the evidence that marriage provides the best environment for bringing
up children, married couples do not fit into Labour’s politically correct agenda.
(Time for common sense 2001:8)
In order to help the family find its footing financially, the Conservatives proposed to
lower income tax for traditional families and increase tax credits for those with children
under the age of 5. It also proposed a Married Couple’s Allowance which would provide
new families with a tax cut. Finally, the party intended to establish better and more
affordable child care services for mothers and fathers who wished to reenter the labor
market. The Conservatives’ ignored the single family. Since it argued that the traditional
family was the best place for a child to grow up, financial assistance for single families
(who oftentimes needed such assistance more than two parent households) should have
been a top priority. In addition to the single family, the Conservatives ignored the
existence of same-sex families and did not explain why same-sex parents would not do as
good job in parenting as opposite sex parents. The party’s discussion about conservative
and family values and political correctness is also characterized by vagueness. From the
examined documents, it is unclear how the Conservatives conceptualized family values or
established a link between these values and political correctness.
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Lastly, the Conservatives believed that education was an important part of social
cohesion because it gave children the tools to financially and socially succeed. Yet, like
the BNP, the party noted that the educational system was in dire need of repair.
Secondary school drop out rates were alarmingly high and students left primary school
unable to write properly. The Conservatives stated that this was the result of the
government’s interference with the educational system. It maintained that teachers - not
politicians - should run schools and promised to cut their paperwork and restore
discipline in the class room. Bureaucracy was a theme that ran throughout the party’s
discussions on social cohesion. It reasoned that too much bureaucracy prevented citizens
from making their own choices. In a society were people’s choices were controlled by the
government, discontent and social instability would develop. The Conservatives,
therefore, wanted a decentralized government and bring decision-making processes back
to the level of the community and the individual.
Integration
Between 1999 and 2006, party discussions about integration focused
predominantly on immigration. The Conservatives argued that New Labour’s ‘open-door
immigration policy’ had increased the influx of immigrants to unacceptable levels.
Britain’s immigration system was in chaos and this lack of oversight encouraged
illegality. It therefore suggested a quota on immigration. Unlike UKIP or the BNP, the
Conservatives never argued that Britain was ‘full’ or established links between
156
immigration and terrorism. Other than claims about illegality, the party did not explain
why limits on immigration were necessary or how the quota would stem the flow of
illegal immigrants to Britain. The party did want to reassure the public that their actions
were not motivated by racism. In its 2005 Election Manifesto, it therefore stated that “It’s
not racist to impose limits on immigration” (p. 1), but did not explain what, then, limits
on immigration exactly were.
Between 1999 and 2006, a noticeable shift in the party’s attitude towards ethnic
diversity took place. While between 1999 and 2001, the Conservatives firmly believed in
assimilation and uniculturalism, towards the end of 2006, the party had started to
acknowledge that British society consisted of many different cultures. It maintained that
society had socially and economically benefitted from immigration
54
and that cultural
diversity enriched Britons’ lives. This shift in attitude towards diversity and integration
coincided with the popularity of New Labour as a mainstream, socially inclusive party.
Under leadership of the more progressive David Cameron, in 2005, the Conservatives
started to portray a more inclusive, ethnically diverse image to attract a larger voter base.
Gender and Sexuality
In 2001, The Guardian newspaper reported that the female vote was moving from
the Conservatives to New Labour (The Guardian 4/5/2001). The paper attributed part of
54
For instance, the National Health Services could not hire enough British-born nurses
and doctors and thus hired medical personal from abroad. Also, immigrants were often
used in agriculture for cheap labor. Cheap labor in turn kept prices for fresh produce low.
157
this move to the fact that women had become more leftwing. It argued that the other part
was caused by the lack of women’s issues on the Conservatives’ political agenda. The
Conservatives certainly were not a ‘women’s party’. Documents indicate that between
2001 and 2006, little was written about gender or gender equality. In 2003, the party
briefly mentioned that women were paid less in the work place than men and suggested
that this gender pay gap was something that needed to be addressed. It did not, however,
provide concrete solutions as to how this gap could be closed or address other forms of
gender inequality.
None of the party’s documents focused on sexuality. While sexuality was not
discussed in official party documents, an analysis of newspaper articles indicated a clear
shift in the party’s attitude towards homosexuality between 2004 and 2006. The
Conservatives had always supported Section 28 (since it was introduced by the party
under leadership of Margaret Thatcher in 1987) and opposed civil partnerships for
lesbians and gay men. Yet, under Cameron, attempts to broaden its voter base began to
focus on the pink vote. The Conservatives rejected New Labour’s attempt to repeal
Section 28 in 2003, yet in 2004 arranged a conference titled Supporting Young Lesbians,
Gay Men and Bisexuals - the Way Ahead. The Way Ahead was the party’s first step
towards building relations with the conservative LGBT community. In 2004, the
Conservatives also helped pass the Civil Partnership Act, which gave lesbian and gay
couples rights similar to married couples.
158
Security
Party documents on public safety focused on crime and juxtaposed its own ‘tough
on crime’ stance against New Labour’s perceived ‘soft on crime’ policies. In a 1999
pamphlet, a white elderly woman stated, “In 1997, I was mugged, I voted Labour. I want
someone to stand up for me, not the mugger” (p. 1). Another leaflet (2002) stated:
How would you feel if a bloke on early release attacked your daughter? 1,109,017
violent crimes last year. More than 21,000 violent criminals let out of prison
early. He’s [Tony Blair] not tough on crime or the causes of crime. Conservatives
know that crime and the fear of crime is the biggest concern for so many people,
young and old and from every community. You don’t have to settle for this. We
will take action to fix there problems, to improve people’s lives and the
communities they live in. We will put the law abiding majority first. Violent
crime soars but Labour puts gloss on it. Imagine five more years of it. Are you
thinking what we’re thinking? Vote conservative. (P. 1)
The Conservative Party believed that under New Labour, criminals received protection of
the law, while victims’ rights were ignored. This, the party argued, was part of the
political correctness that hampered the police and criminal justice system.
The supposed breakdown of the criminal justice system led to fear in British
society and was worsened by centralization of the police force and bureaucracy. Like all
parties, the Conservatives promised to cut bureaucracy (which would put more police
officers on the streets), give tougher sentences to criminals and build more prisons. It
argued that people would feel safer with more police officers around and proposed to
implement a ‘cops in shops’ initiative. This initiative would have police officers do their
paperwork in places visible to the public.
159
Lastly, the party linked safety to the countryside and the future of inner cities. The
countryside was threatened by the building of new housing developments. Families were
fleeing from inner-cities to the countryside out of fear of crime and substandard
education. Improvement of education, increasing employment, and fighting crime in
inner cities, therefore, were seen as important goals to keep the countryside green.
Religion and Islam
The Conservatives reached out to its religious base by promoting traditional
family values, however, religion or Islam was not discussed in its documents. Even after
the politically charged aftermaths of 9/11 and 7/7, the party stayed quiet on the impact of
religious fundamentalism, or religion in general, on the fabric of society. One reason
could be that the Conservatives did not want to alienate a potential voter base by profiling
Islam, as the British Muslim population grew in size.
The Political Left:
The Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems)
The Liberal Democrats were formed in 1988, after the Liberal Party merged with
the Social Democratic Party. Currently, it is the third largest party behind New Labour
and the Conservatives in the House of Commons. The party promotes a social liberalism
that calls for minimal state intervention - especially in personal affairs - and support for a
160
welfare state. They are the most outward focused of all parties in the House of Commons,
supporting multiculturalism, equal civil liberties for all, and EU membership.
Social Cohesion
The Lib Dems believed that the protection of civil liberties was a fundamental
element of social cohesion. Women and men needed to get the opportunities to pursue
their aims, develop their talents, and fulfill their social, cultural, political, or economic
potential. One of the key roles of the state in society, therefore, was to enhance the liberty
of the individual and create opportunities for expression and diversity. The party
suggested that well-developed, happy individuals contributed to a cohesive society.
The Lib Dems noted that there were several fundamental criteria to civil liberty.
First, it believed that discrimination needed to be fought in all spheres of society.
Equality between people (regardless of age, sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
sexual orientation, or disability), therefore, had to be advocated at all times. Second, the
government needed to advance people’s quality of life by improving the educational and
health care systems, increasing pensions, contributing to a thriving economy, working
towards a greener environment, and fight crime. Third, the Lib Dems saw the family -
both traditional and non-traditional - as one of the building blocks of society. It therefore
wanted to give families more financial and social security by reducing tax for the lowest
paid, improve child support services, and allow for flexibility in family-friendly working
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practices. All of these factors were aimed to contribute to a decent standard of living -
quality of life - which ultimately would help foster a sense of community and belonging.
Integration
Between 1999 and 2006, discussions on integration focused on multiculturalism
and race. The Lib Dems supported traditional, non-assimilatory multiculturalism. Unlike
parties in the Netherlands, the Lib Dems felt that all cultures should be equally respected,
regardless whether they were compatible with western culture or not. In its Ethnic
Minority Manifesto (2005) the party wrote:
The reality of Britain today is that it is a multi-ethnic, multi-faith and therefore
diverse society. It is a richer society as a result - culturally, socially and
economically. The Liberal Democrats embrace that Britain and we celebrate it.
We will ensure that our laws reflect that diversity, protecting minorities from
violence, discrimination and harassment. The popularity of the Liberal Democrats
amongst the ethnic minority communities of Britain is not just about our stand on
international issues [such as the war in Iraq]. Our policies resonate because the
ethnic minority communities in this country understand that opportunity and
freedom are not just slogans, they need to be put into practice by political parties
with affordable policies that will make Britain better. (P. 1)
The Lib Dems believed that the celebration of diversity, e.g., improvement of racial
equality, multicultural education, and reform of immigration law, was the solution to
racism and xenophobia. However, it did not concretely explain how multiculturalism
could resolve the religious and ethnic tensions that emerged in British society between
Muslims and non-Muslims after 9/11.
162
Security
Between 1999 and 2006, security discussions focused on two themes: ‘financial
security’ and ‘fear of crime.’ The party promised to tackle poverty, especially among
children, old age pensioners, and ethnic minorities. Poverty, it argued, led to social
exclusion, a diminished quality of life and, therefore, prohibited the formation of a strong
cohesive society. Most of its discussions, however, focused on fear of crime, which the
party considered a second major social problem.
It proposed several solutions to fight crime and put an end to the fear surrounding
it. Like the other parties, the Lib Dems intended to cut bureaucracy and put more police
on the streets. It also believed that the underlying social causes of crime needed to be
addressed. In order to do so, the party proposed a set of policies that embraced issues
such as education, housing, community regeneration, youth work, health and child care,
and drug and alcohol strategies. In their discussions on crime, the Lib Dems mainly
focused on youth. It believed that it could keep young people away from crime by
involving them and their families in tackling criminal behavior through initiatives such as
youth courts, Acceptable Behavior Contracts
55
, and Parental Control Agreements.
56
55
Acceptable Behaviour Contracts are contracts between youth aged 10 to 18 and a local
housing office or the local police. The contract stipulates that, by signing it, the youth
agree that they will not engage in any ‘prohibited behaviors’ as defined in the contract.
56
Parental Control Agreements are similar in nature to Acceptable Behaviour Contracts.
Under the agreement, parents agree to take responsibility for their children’s behaviors.
163
Gender
The Lib Dems acknowledged that emancipation had accomplished a great deal to
improve the position of women in society, but stated that more work needed to be done
before women had achieved true equality. It stated:
Women have made great strides over the past twenty years, but for many, the old
injustices and inequalities remain and new problems have arisen. Liberal
Democrats policies address the problems of women who have not been given an
equal opportunity. We want to ensure that all individuals have the opportunity to
discover and develop their own potential. Our goals are not equality of outcome
but real equality of opportunity. (Policy Briefing 18 2003:1)
The party maintained that women, for instance, continued to earn much less than men in
paid employment. The Lib Dems also pointed out that, although they made up half of the
workforce, only few women were employed in upper management roles. Furthermore, it
addressed the unequal treatment of women in health services; the fact that women
oftentimes had to wait nine weeks or more to receive the results of their pap smear tests.
To facilitate women’s path to full equality, the Lib Dems proposed improved health
services for women, the strengthening of anti-discrimination laws, giving part-time
workers (since women often worked part-time) the same rights as full time employees,
and allowing parental leave to be shared between both parents. The party, thus, pushed
for legislation that ensured women’s equality and opportunities in pay, benefits, and job
status, and encouraged greater enforcement of equalities legislation.
164
Sexuality
In comparison to the other themes, the Lib Dems published a significant amount
of material on sexuality and particularly homosexuality. The party strongly believed that
an individual should be able to live her or his life as she or he saw fit. This meant a life
without discrimination, guarantees of personal privacy, and equality under the law
(including marriage). Equal rights, the Lib Dems maintained, applied to a person’s
sexuality in the same way as they applied to a person’s race, gender, religion, or belief.
The party stated:
Liberal Democrats value and relish the diversity of British society. We welcome
the contribution lesbians and gay men make to our society, often without proper
acceptance of their sexuality. Barriers to lesbian and gay men playing a full part
in the life of the community must be removed. It is a key role of the State to
enhance the liberty of the individual and nurture diversity. Liberal Democrats
recognise that in Britain today, lesbians and gay men lack basic rights, and are
denied equal citizenship. Many areas of the law, including criminal law, are
clearly discriminatory in their effect, and equal opportunities legalisation in
Britain fails to protect lesbians and gay men from discrimination in some areas of
life. (Police Briefing 17 2003:1-2)
It, therefore, proposed to implement an Equality Act that would prohibit discrimination
on the basis of race, sex, religion, sexual orientation, disability, age, or gender identity.
The Lib Dems further suggested that:
The Liberal Democrats would establish a scheme for the civil registration of
partnerships. This will give two unrelated adults who wish to register a settled
personal relationship legal rights which are at present only available to married
couples, including for example maintenance, property, inheritance, pensions,
immigration, tax and social security, rights as next of kin, adoption and fostering
and employee benefits. Discrimination cannot be eliminated by legislation alone.
Attitudes need to be changed. Liberal Democrats would repeal section 28 of the
1988 Local Government Act, which gives legal sanction to discrimination,
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prevents schools taking effective measures against bullying and hampers
responsible sex education. (Police Briefing 17 2003:1-2)
Lastly, the party wanted incitement of homophobic hatred to be an offence on the same
basis as inciting racial hatred was. Similarly, the Lib Dems wanted to ensure that offences
to which racial or religious exacerbation charges could be attached included homophobia.
British Identity
The party did not concretely discuss the idea of a ‘British identity’. However, its
emphasis on civil liberties and multiculturalism suggested that British society was one in
which individual freedom, fundamental human rights, and ethnic diversity were
foundational.
Islam
The Lib Dems and the Conservatives were the only parties in whose documents
discussions about Islam and religion were virtually none existent. While the other parties
linked Islam to nationalism, integration, security, and social cohesion, the few times the
Lib Dems mentioned religion was in the context of civil liberties and equal rights; to
ensure that freedom of belief and religious expression were protected under the law. The
lack of data on religion in general and Islam in particular is interesting given the
politically and emotionally charged aftermath of 9/11 and particularly 7/7. One reason
why the Lib Dems did not discuss categories of Islam or religion was because it assumed
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that all Britons had equal rights and fundamental civil liberties. Profiling Muslims and
Islam would defeat the purpose of the party’s egalitarian mission. Furthermore, after the
invasion of Iraq in 2003, many Muslim voters left New Labour (who had supported the
war in Iraq) for the Lib Dems (who had opposed the invasion). Criticism of Islam or the
profiling of Islam and Muslims would have alienated a significant new voter base.
The Labour Party (New Labour)
Social Cohesion
New Labour’s goals and values - establishment of a ‘strong community’,
‘decency’, ‘hard work’ and ‘rights that are matched by responsibilities’ - were not that
much different from those of the Conservatives. One of the main differences between
both was the latter’s focus on social justice and the eradication of poverty. New Labour
saw in poverty and unemployment one of the main threats to social cohesion. Economic
stability, it argued, contributed to a strong and cohesive society. By eradicating poverty,
society could become socially mobile and prosperous for all Britons and not just the
privileged few. The party believed that the government should play an important role in
this; it was their task to ensure market growth and a fair distribution of services and
goods.
Like the Conservatives and Lib Dems, New Labour believed that the family was
in need of government assistance; in particular affordable child and day care services, and
extended maternity and paternity leave. The party therefore stated in its 2001 Manifesto
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that “Labour is committed to improving the life of so-called hardworking families” (p.1).
It did not emphasize the traditional family in its discussions of social cohesion, thereby
recognizing that families came in all shapes.
New Labour was an outward focused party; an ideology that was reflected in its
support of membership of the European Union (although it had yet to adopt the Euro and
ratify the European Constitution) and framing of education. Education, it argued, was
important because it made the British workforce viable in a globally competitive world.
The party was concerned about the highly educated work forces in China and India,
whose economies competed with that of the UK. It felt that, in order for the economy to
grow, the talents of all persons in society needed to be maximized.
Security and Islam
Employment was seen as an important element in social cohesion because, New
Labour stated, it contributed to feelings of financial security. In addition to ‘financial
security,’ party documents focused on ‘crime’ and, after 9/11, ‘terrorism’. New Labour
was concerned about increasing crime rates because it diminished people’s quality of life.
In its 2001 Election Manifesto it stated that:
Fighting crime and its causes is a key part of Labour’s vision of a Britain with
stronger, safer communities. There can be no greater freedom than the right to
live free from fear and intimidation, and that is why reducing crime and disorder
will always be a top priority for Labour. (P. 4)
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In order to fight crime, the party wanted more police officers on the streets in high crime
areas. It demanded that all criminals would be tested for drugs and, if found positive,
compelled to take treatment or risk losing bail. Additionally, it intended to invest in drug
education and prevention strategies.
The party recognized the threat of global terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and vowed to work together with the international
community to fight both. New Labour’s stance on domestic terrorism was more nuanced.
The party acknowledged that there was a social need to come down on religious
fundamentalism, e.g., increase the time law enforcement could hold terrorist suspects. At
the same time, it recognized that many of these anti-terrorism provisions profiled and
alienated Muslims. Especially after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, New Labour was
concerned about losing Muslim votes to the Lib Dems. In an attempt of damage control,
New Labour published extensively on its relationship with the Muslim community. In a
booklet titled Delivering for Muslim Communities (2005), the party wrote:
This booklet gives us all a chance to reflect on the influence and contribution that
the Muslim community has made to Britain and particularly the partnership that
has always existed between British Muslims and Labour. As a well established
and important part of our multi-faith nation, British Muslims have contributed
hugely to this country’s success, prosperity and culture. … I believe that the
Labour Party and British Muslims have a shared common purpose on social
justice and equality. I believe we have the same vision of a multicultural and
multi-religious Britain going forward not back. (P. 3)
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The booklet also touted Labour’s contributions to the Muslim community. It stated:
Labour protected the right of Muslim girls and women to wear the hijab in school
and the workplaces.
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We have made a manifesto to make incitement to religious
hatred a crime. We have made a manifesto commitment to protect the Muslims
community against religious discrimination. (P. 4)
To calm feelings about the war in Iraq, Labour added:
Labour is working for peace and security in an uncertain world. Labour
acknowledges that many Muslims disagreed with the government’s decision over
Iraq. We respect and understand that view. But we can all unite in a vision for a
peaceful and democratic Iraq. Labour has: intervened in Kosovo to protect
Muslims from ethnic cleansing. Acted as a key partner in rebuilding Bosnia.
Work to revive peace in the Middle East. Supported renewed dialogue between
Pakistan and India on Kashmir. Appointed the first British Muslim ambassadors.
We will continue to work for an independent Palestinian state alongside a secure
Israel. Champion Turkey’s membership of the European Union. Help in the
reconstruction of Bosnia and Afghanistan. Support dialogue between India and
Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. (P. 9)
National Identity
New Labour believed in a multicultural society and saw the British identity as one
that included the cultures of its many different ethnic minority groups. This view was
indicative of its outward focus: Britishness was not composed out of one single shared
57
Some Muslim girls and women wear the hijab with pride. When I posted a question on
Yahoo! Answers (a discussion board) asking why women felt pride in wearing the hijab,
many of the replies (purportedly from women, although that is difficult to determine)
stated that they wore it as a sign of their commitment to the Prophet. They also felt that
the hijab protected them from the sexualized glares of men other than their husbands.
However, given the power inequalities in most Muslim communities, not all women can
decide for themselves whether they wish to wear the hijab or not. Especially given the
social and at times physical repercussions, they simply have no choice. Talking about a
‘right’ therefore is relative to the situation of the woman.
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majority culture, but rather cultures of the many different ethnic groups that existed in the
United Kingdom. The party maintained that:
Labour believes that Britain can be a model of a multicultural, multi-racial
society. We have made major legal change [Human Rights Act 1998, the Race
Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, the repeal of Section 28]; now is the time to
build the inclusive society in tune with British values. (Strong and safe
communities 2005:33)
While the Conservative Party argued that membership of the European Union
infringed on national identity, New Labour maintained that UK’s culture, security and
prosperity could not be seen as separate from Europe. The party therefore suggested that
the UK could be part of the EU without fear of losing its national identity, since
Britishness had never existed in isolation to begin with.
Equality
Gender, sexuality and integration were discussed under the theme of equality,
which was a major element in the party’s focus on social justice. It argued that in a
modern, successful economy and inclusive society everyone had equal rights. Accepting
these values would help to establish a modern Britain. New Labour stated that “a
commitment to equality requires the active promotion of human rights into every sphere
of government and society” (Programme for a real Labour government 2004:14). It
proposed the establishment of a Commission for Equality and Human Rights which
would review the feasibility of developing a Single Equality Act. The Act would:
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consolidate, extend and harmonise the law to cover gender, race, disability,
homophobic and transgender discrimination; introduce a positive duty on the
public and private sector to promote equality, including mandatory pay audits to
close the gender and race pay gap. (Programme for a real Labour government
2004:12)
The party also supported the implementation of Article 13 of the Race and Employment
Directives (2002), which would prohibit discrimination at the work place on the grounds
of religion or belief, sexual orientation, and age.
One of New Labours’ main goals was to dispel myths about the Human Rights
Act 1998 and rightwing parties’ claims of ‘political correctness’. In its 2006 Mission
Statement, it wrote that it wanted to defend and enhance human rights. This meant to
ensure that human rights legislation was properly understood and to combat the
misreporting of the implementation and application of the Human Rights Act 1998 and
subsequent claims of political correctness ‘having gone mad’.
Gender and Sexuality
Most of New Labour’s discussions of gender focused on women in the domestic
sphere: help with childcare costs, guaranteeing a nursery place for young children and
more flexible maternity measures. The party, however, recognized that women faced
other inequalities as well. For instance, it was concerned about the gender pay gap that
existed between men and women and established the Women and Work Commission to
monitor and report on this gap. New Labour was the only party that linked gender to
ethnicity and that recognized the unique circumstances of ethnic minority women in
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social inequality. Ethnic minority women not only faced sexism, but also ethnic and
racial discrimination. It, therefore, wanted to empower black and ethnic minority women
so they could build cohesion within their communities. The party did not elaborate on
how this cohesion - coalition formation - would help in their fight for equality.
New Labour was a vocal supporter of LGBT rights. It argued that Section 28 was
anti-gay legislation that needed to be repealed and believed that Civil Partnership
legislation would give same sex couples the chance of gaining legal status for their
relationships. While supportive of equal rights for lesbians and gay men, it did not
support gay marriage. The lack of support for gay marriage could be attributed to New
Labour’s voter base, which consisted of religious and ethnic minority voters for whom
homosexuality was a taboo. Still, the party expanded laws on hate crimes to include
sexual orientation and passed the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which allowed
transsexuals to legally change gender (e.g., in their passports).
Conclusion:
Social Cohesion
There were two similarities between parties’ discussions of social cohesion:
emphasis on the importance of the family and on education. The family was seen as a
place where responsible, active citizens were raised and norms, values and traditions
passed on to the next generation. There were, however, differences in how parties
conceptualized the family. The Conservatives referred to the ‘traditional family,’
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envisioning it in heteronormative terms. New Labour and the Lib Dems took a gender
neutral approach, thereby acknowledging that families came in many different forms.
The parties also agreed that education was an essential element of cohesion. In
schools, students acquired the social and cultural capital necessary to be competitive in
the labor market. They reasoned that failure to earn a high school diploma would lead to
unemployment; unemployed youth, in turn, would be vulnerable to the lures of crime.
Because of the important role of education, UKIP and the Conservatives were concerned
about falling education standards. Both parties contributed the decline to increased
bureaucracy and political correctness. Bureaucracy, they argued, kept teachers behind
their desks in stead of in the class room, filling out unnecessary paperwork. UKIP linked
the subpar education standard to political correctness facilitated by the Human Rights Act
1998. The party argued that “Now we have the ridiculous situation where teachers can be
disciplined or even dismissed for restraining violent children, and appear to have lost the
right of self defense” (UKIP 2005:7). This statement implied that it was difficult for
teachers to discipline unruly students under the Human Rights Act 1998, because any
student who felt ‘unfairly’ punished could take them to the European Human Rights
Court. UKIP’s assumption was incorrect, however, since the Court can only deal with
complaints against states - not individuals.
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National Identity
‘Britishness’ was a difficult concept to analyze because of the vague terms in
which it was defined. In their discussions on integration, cohesion, and immigration, at
some point parties inevitably would refer to a ‘British national identity’ using terms such
as ‘norms’, ‘values’ and ‘traditions’ to describe it, but never concretely defined what they
meant by these terms. The BNP considered the British countryside and historic towns an
important element of Britishness. To them, these were part of a nostalgic throwback to a
pre-1950s monocultural society. For the Conservatives, the British Pound and monarchy
were part of the national identity. Yet none of the five parties explained what they meant
by ‘British norms and values’. It, therefore, remained unclear how Britishness as a
cultural identity differed from, e.g., ‘Dutchness’.
I believe that the vagueness of the concept was born out of ignorance - parties
themselves were unsure how to define it - but also a strategic political move.
‘Britishness’ resonated in society; it had an important symbolic meaning. If people
believed the ‘national identity’ was under threat of foreign cultures, voters would be,
likely, inclined to repeal those laws they held responsible for this threat. Yet, by not
defining who or what was part of Britishness, parties were able to protect themselves
against claims of racism or ethnocentrism while simultaneously engaging in it. The
British national identity, thus, took on a chameleon-like form. By leaving it undefined,
the concept could represent whatever parties wanted it to represent. Building on historic
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white racism and ethnocentrism in British society, Britishness created in- and out-groups
without parties actual assigning racial or ethnic identities to these groups.
Political Correctness
Rightwing parties blamed political correctness for the breakdown in social
cohesion. Political correctness had contributed to increasing crime rates, falling education
standards, and a decline in active citizenship among Britons. First, the parties argued, law
enforcement was unable to do its job because of the Human Rights Act 1998, which
protected the right of defendants to a fair trial. Second, teachers were afraid to discipline
unruly students because of potential legal consequences. Lastly, parties maintained,
political correctness had silenced people’s Freedom of Speech - a fundamental right,
ironically, protected by the Human Rights Act 1998. As a result, disillusioned Britons
refused to participate in the democracy, e.g., by not voting in elections.
Although they were frequently mentioned together, a link between the Human
Rights Act 1998 and political correctness was never established. Given the nature of the
Act and the right wing context in which political correctness tended to be used, it can be
assumed that: 1) police no longer could profile criminals based on their race, gender,
sexual orientation, social class, or religious beliefs or violate their fundamental human
rights in the process of criminal investigations
58
; 2) the European Human Rights Court
58
The 2005 Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System Report showed that
blacks were six times more likely to be stopped and searched by police than whites. The
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acknowledged that the criminal justice system was not fool proof or free of bias; and 3)
Britons were unable to engage in hate speech otherwise forbidden by, e.g., the Race
Relations Amendment Act 2000. The latter assumption is especially likely since none of
the rightwing parties discussed the need of equalities legislation in British society; how
institutionalized inequality required the special protection of minorities.
Immigration, Integration, and Multiculturalism
Discussions of integration were linked to immigration. The BNP, UKIP, and the
Conservatives believed that integration was an important theme because multiculturalism
was negatively affecting the British national identity. The parties attributed the loss of
cultural identity to two factors: the uncontrolled influx of immigrants and New Labour’s
championing of multicultural policies. Integration helped to establish social stability by
creating unity. Multiculturalism, the three parties argued, only led to social
fragmentation.
The BNP was concerned about the influx of immigrants for several reasons. It
feared that immigrant cultures would take over Britishness. The party also believed that
immigration would turn indigenous Britons into a numerical minority and, through
interracial relationships, the white British race eventually would disappear. Lastly, the
BNP worried that immigrants would take away jobs from indigenous Britons,
report also showed that Asians were twice as likely to be stopped and searched by the
police than whites.
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contributing to unemployment among whites
59
. Unemployment, in turn, would cause
dissatisfaction, leading to alienation and social instability.
From 1999 to and 2004, the Conservatives maintained that all immigrants needed
to assimilate and rejected the idea of multiculturalism. Towards the end of 2006, a shift in
attitude towards multiculturalism had taken place. Under the leadership of David
Cameron, the Conservatives had moved towards the political center on social issues like
ethnic diversity and GLBT rights, in an attempt to attract a broader voter base. The party
had always viewed the social benefits of multiculturalism with suspicion, yet after 2004,
reluctantly, acknowledged that cultural diversity and immigration enriched British society
and positively contributed to the economy.
Throughout the research period, the Lib Dems and New Labour celebrated
multiculturalism. For them, British society was made up out of many different cultures
and they stressed that integration should not be equated with assimilation. Integration -
like the PvdA’s conceptualization of inburgering - was a means to ensure that immigrants
would function effectively in British society without losing their cultural identity.
Religion and Islam
The few discussions on religion were linked to Islam and terrorism. UKIP argued
that under multiculturalism and the Human Rights Act 1998, Muslims had been allowed
59
This concern is contradicted by data that indicate that on average unemployment was
the highest (60%) among foreign-born minorities during the research period (National
Statistics 2009).
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to bring religious fundamentalism into the UK. Islam, therefore, threatened the country’s
national security. The BNP evoked Britishness to argue that Islam was an inherently
violent, anti-democratic, and sexist religion - values that could not be tolerated in British
society. The party therefore called for a ban on immigration to prevent Islamists from
entering the country. New Labour discussed Islam in more positive terms. After being
criticized by (and losing a large part of) its Muslim voter base - for supporting the
invasion of Iraq in 2003 - the party went out of its way to remind the public of its historic
ties to the British Muslim community. It vowed to fight Islamophobia in all spheres of
society and to review anti-terrorism laws that disproportionately targeted Muslims of
Asian descent.
The Lib Dems and Conservatives did not discuss religion or Islam. The Lib Dems
briefly mentioned that religious beliefs were protected by the same laws that protected
other fundamental freedoms. Therefore, it can be assumed that singling out one religion
for special attention (whether positive or negative) would have gone against its
egalitarian mission. The Conservatives’ silence on Christianity can be attributed to the
fact that the party’s values, in essence, were Christian values. It opposed gay marriage,
LGBT rights, and supported the traditional family and family values. Its silence on Islam
in the wake of 9/11 and particularly 7/7 is more puzzling. Unlike the Lib Dems, the party
did not argue that religious freedom was a fundamental human right nor did it tout its
longstanding relationship with the Muslim community like New Labour. Instead, it
remained mum on the whole issue. Given the popularity of New Labour and the Lib
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Dems among Muslim voters, the party, probably, had to walk a political tightrope. It did
not want to alienate a potentially powerful voter base by singling out Islam for criticism,
but also did not want to offend its Christian supporters by praising Islam for its
contributions to the multicultural society.
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Chapter Six: The United States
Data Collection
Encouraged by the amount of data I was able to retrieve in the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom, I began my research in the United States with high hopes. I decided
to focus on the nation’s two largest and oldest parties: the Democrats and Republicans.
The first sign that things would not go as planned came when the headquarters of both
parties informed me that they did not keep public archives of political documents. The
ensuing quest to find these documents led me to the Institute of Governmental Studies at
the University of California at Berkeley, Tulane University’s Political Ephemera
Collection and Duke University’s Presidential Campaign Memorabilia Collection. While
these libraries and collections contained materials on regional and state election
campaigns, they did not hold the national party brochures and pamphlets that I was
looking for. I had used nationally distributed documents for the Dutch and British case
studies and did not want to use regional or state documents for my discussion of the
United States.
One option was to focus on presidential campaign television advertisements
(which are kept at Stanford University’s Political Communication Lab) or Internet blogs.
In today’s Internet society, many of the parties’ discussions, likely, took place in
cyberspace. However, since I had excluded television advertisements and blogs from the
Dutch and British case studies (to limit the research scope), I decided to exclude them
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from this case study as well. I wanted to remain consistent in my methodological
approach and an analysis of television advertisements (given the influence of moving
images on framing) or blogs (which oftentimes contain hyperlinks) requires a different
methodological approach than that of a paper document.
I decided to focus on the Republicans’ and Democrats’ Political Platforms, which
were published in 2000 and 2004. The Platforms, composed during the parties’ National
Conventions, provide insight into their public stance on issues such as integration,
security, or women’s rights. Both parties function as umbrellas for a wide range of
factions whose political ideologies exist on a continuum. Political Platforms, therefore,
are an attempt to portray a united politically ideological front. As I discussed in Chapter
One, this may, potentially, complicate the data analysis. Because the Republicans and
Democrats try to please a broad range of voters, Political Platforms tend to compromise
on the depth of their discussions and the political stances they take towards certain issues.
A lack of discussion on LGBT rights in Republican Party documents, therefore, does not
mean that these rights were of non concern to factions within the party, e.g., the Log
Cabin Republicans.
Political Platforms, however, are targeted at a general public who may or may not
have knowledge of the debates that are taking place behind closed doors or in cyberspace.
To most members of the general public, Political Platforms simply are what they are:
documented representations of a party’s political agenda. Statements made in these
documents (or even the lack thereof), no matter how ambiguous or vague, are still
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representative of that party’s public stance. Because Political Platforms serve a similar
purpose to party brochures and pamphlets, I felt comfortable including these in my
analysis.
Using the Way Back Machine, I also retrieved downloadable PDF brochures from
the Bush/Cheney (2000 and 2004), Gore/Lieberman (2000) and Kerry/Edwards (2004)
campaign websites. The Way Back Machine is a unique tool that allows users to browse
through eighty-five billion web pages which have been archived since 1996. The
Bush/Cheney, Gore/Lieberman and Kerry/Edwards election websites no longer exist, but
by entering their web addresses in the Machine’s search engine, I was able to retrieve
archived pages for 2000 and 2004. Via these pages, I downloaded brochures on issues
such as crime, women’s rights, civil rights, GLBT rights, and terrorism. Because the
presidential and vice-presidential candidates had been nominated by their parties, their
political ideals - for the large part - can be viewed as the ideals of the majority of
Democratic and Republican voters at the time. Together with the Political Platforms,
these documents would give insight into the parties’ stances on issues ranging from social
cohesion to terrorism.
As in Chapter Five, I analyzed the materials using the categories established in
Chapter Four for theoretical replication purposes. Similar to the British case study, I
found that there was no need for manipulation of data analysis to force this consistency as
the codes fit perfectly into the established categories. (See Appendix III).
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The set-up of this Chapter follows that of Chapters Four and Five. I will provide a brief
overview of the history of the parties. Next, I will discuss the data for each category.
The Democratic Party
In 1772, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison founded the Democratic-
Republican Party - back then known as the Republican Party. Jefferson and Madison
established the party in opposition to Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist Party, which
supported a strong nationalist government. The Democratic-Republican Party’s political
ideology (better known as ‘Jeffersonian Democracy’) advocated a strict interpretation of
the US constitution and strong state rights. In 1800, the Democratic-Republican Party
came to power when Jefferson was elected President. However, in the 1820s, the
Democratic-Republicans broke up into the Democrats and the Whig Party. While to date,
the Democrats are considered centre left politically, it is difficult to pinpoint a unified
ideology: its factions range from the political left to the religious right. Yet, in the last
few decades, the centre and social-liberal factions have dominated party politics.
Social Cohesion
In the Democrats’ 2000 and 2004 Political Platforms and campaign materials, the
party declared that the development of ‘liveable communities’ was vital to social
cohesion. The party stated that:
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Across America a new movement is emerging as citizens work together to build
more livable communities. These are communities where the streets are safe and
schools are good, where high wage jobs are not hours away from home, where
people can get to work and run their errands without spending hours stuck in
traffic, where they can breathe clean air and drink clean water, where the spirit of
community reigns. (P. 16)
These conditions, the party argued, would foster a sense of belonging among its
inhabitants - a cohesive society. Economic prosperity and particularly employment were
seen as the driving force behind the development of the liveable community. First,
employment was perceived as a deterrent against crime. The party reasoned that people
with jobs were less likely to be lured into the criminal circuit. Second, with fewer crimes
on the streets, more money could be spent on improving the education system.
Improvement of the education system was considered a precondition for prosperity.
In the last half a century, the US had become the wealthiest and most powerful
nation on earth. However, the Democrats warned, in the global Information Age
maintaining such a high level of wealth required a strong educational foundation.
Therefore, education, job training and developing practical skills were of essential
importance to US society. Unfortunately, the ‘opportunity gap’ - the skills Americans
needed to be competitive in the global economy - was widening between the United
States and the rest of the industrialized world. In the 2000 Platform the party argued that:
Democrats understand that America will not long remain first in the world
economically unless we become first in the world educationally. We cannot
continue to generate a fifth of the world’s economic output if a third of our
students do not meet basic reading standards. We cannot stay number one in high
technology jobs if we remain last in the percentage of degrees awarded in science.
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In today’s knowledge-based economy, it’s just that simple. Education leads to the
future success and security of our country and citizenry. (P. 7)
The Democrats saw education as a vital element of prosperity, but also citizenship. In
schools, American norms and values - hard work, personal responsibility, individual
liberty, equality, stewardship, and faith - were passed on to the next generation. Because
of their important role in the development of responsible and active citizens, schools
needed to employ highly qualified teachers (and compensate them accordingly), equip
class rooms with the latest technology in order to bridge the digital divide, eliminate
crime and violence from their grounds, and close the achievement gap between students
of color and white students. The latter goal shows that the Democrats recognized that
institutional barriers prevented most minority students from doing well in the education
system. Yet, the party failed to address how it would try to resolve issues of institutional
discrimination and why race played such an important role in it.
Similar to political discussions on social cohesion in the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom, the family was perceived as one of the cornerstones of US society. In
the Democrats’ 2004 Platform, the party stated that “strong families blessed with
opportunity, guided by faith, and filled with dreams are the heart of a strong America”
(2004:26). In 2000, Gore added, “Nothing is more important to a society than raising
children. Though no government can raise a child, it can provide tools parents need to
raise children and build a strong nation - child by child, family by family, community by
community” (Gore 2000:11). The family was seen as the ‘heart of America’, because it
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was there (and in schools) that children were raised to become responsible, hard working,
and spiritual citizens who would keep economic prosperity alive. The role of faith in the
party’s conceptualization of the family is something that stands out. The Democrats’
statement, “strong families blessed with opportunity, guided by faith” (2004:26), suggests
that families lead by secular beliefs could not be considered part of the ‘heart of
America’. The role of faith in defining ‘strong families’ is the first indication of the
permeating role of religion in Democrats’ discussions on a variety of social issues.
In the Democrats’ vision of the family, the party emphasized ‘responsible
parenting’. Three themes were associated with ‘responsible parenting’, namely ‘morals
and values’, ‘strong relationships’, and ‘fatherhood’. First, responsible parents needed to
fight negative media influence and, particularly, violent and sexual content on television
and the Internet. This argument contained elements of social libertarianism as well as
classic conceptualizations of children and childhood as ‘innocent’. It assumed that adults,
unlike children, would be able to deal with images of sex and violence or at least were
able to distinguish between fact and fiction. The party’s discussion about sex, violence,
and childhood was framed in middle class terms. It did not address the situation of
children who lived in conditions that were beyond their parents control - e.g., in violent
urban ghettos where real-life violence or sexuality were hard to avoid.
In the second theme, responsible parenting was linked to the development of
strong relationships. In these relationships, once again, faith played a central role. The
Democrats argued that community and faith-based organizations should help couples to
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prepare for and strengthen their marriage and relationships. Strong relationships, in turn,
would help couples to become better parents. From the party’s discussion it is unclear
whether these benefits also applied to same-sex or unmarried couples. Lastly, responsible
parenting was linked to fatherhood and social class. The Democrats maintained:
Promoting responsible fatherhood is the critical next phase of welfare reform and
one of the most important things we can do to reduce child poverty. Three times
more men acknowledged paternity in 1998 than in 1993. This is a first step
toward giving to a child the emotional and financial support a father must give to
merit the name. Democrats believe in cracking down on deadbeats who abandon
their children. So we must require all fathers who owe child support to pay or go
to work; strengthen child support enforcement, including increasing the amount of
child support that gets paid directly to poor families; and make it harder for
parents who owe child support to get new credit cards. However, we also
recognize that, in addition to dead beat dads there are dead broke dads. Thus
Democrats support helping those men who want to reconnect with their families
and who want to become a positive force in the lives of their children. (Political
Platform 2000:27)
By focusing on child poverty, single mothers, and deadbeat fathers, ‘responsible
parenthood’ again was framed in middle-class terms. The focus on middle class values
and norms does not come as a surprise since expansion of the middle class was seen as
one of the Democrats’ main goals. The party reasoned that a strong (‘responsible’), well-
educated middle class would keep the economy afloat and prosperity alive.
Finally, the Democrats perceived the environment as an important element in the
development of social cohesion. A clean environment contributed to an increased quality
of life. Happy and healthy people, in turn, would be more productive workers. While
good for the economy, above all, society had a moral and spiritual obligation to take good
care of it. Like the CDA, CU, and SGP in the Netherlands, the Democrats believed in the
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idea of religious stewardship. Nature was ‘a gift of God’; something Americans had on
loan and needed to pass on to future generations. Therefore, the party stated, “We have to
do what’s right for our earth because it is the moral thing to do” (Political Platform
2000:32).
Social Cohesion and Security
In addition to prosperity, education, norms and values, and the family, discussions
of social cohesion focused on security, crime, terrorism, and the war in Iraq. The
Democrats argued that it was the government’s basic duty to establish law, order, and
freedom and to keep citizens safe from domestic and international security threats. Safety
from crime was an important element of social cohesion because, the party argued in its
2000 Platform:
When crime is rampant, families are forced off the streets and behind closed
doors. When children are ducking for cover, they have a hard time reaching for
their dreams. When people are afraid to walk in their own neighborhood,
communities are robbed of the basic sense of decency and togetherness. When an
overburdened justice system lets thugs of easy, good parents have a harder time
teaching their children right from wrong. (P. 22)
Crime fragmented society and prevented ‘liveability’ and ‘good parents’ from passing on
norms and values to their children. The party, however, did not elaborate on the criteria
that set ‘good’ parents apart from ‘bad’ parents. It also did not discuss the social barriers
that contributed to people’s varying abilities to parent responsibly, such as economic
inequality.
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Crime
Discussions of crime were linked to seven themes: ‘victims’ rights’, ‘revolving
door’, ‘drugs and gangs’, ‘guns’, ‘hate crimes’, ‘domestic violence’ and ‘crime
prevention’. Like UKIP and the Conservatives in the United Kingdom, the Democrats
believed that there had been too much emphasis placed on the rights of criminals. It
stated, “Too often we bend over backward to protect the right of criminals …” (Political
Platform 2000:23). The party, therefore, supported passage of a Victim’s Rights
Amendment to the US Constitution. The Amendment would give victims of crime the
right to, e.g., file for financial compensation from their attacker(s). Second, in order to
prevent a ‘revolving door’ scenario where criminals entered and re-entered prison as drug
addicts, the Democrats insisted that inmates were to be tested and treated for drug
addictions while still in prison. Only ‘clean’ inmates would be eligible to be released.
Discussions of the third theme pointed at drugs as the main cause behind street crime and
gang violence. Therefore, the Democrats stated, the demand for drugs needed to be
eradicated and the public educated on the social and physical consequences of drug use.
Fourth, although the party supported the right of Americans to bear arms, it also
argued that gun violence should be fought on all fronts in society - with stronger laws and
stricter enforcement of these laws. The party wanted to keep guns out of the hands of
criminals and away from children. For that reason, it supported the Brady Handgun
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Violence Prevention Act (1993)
60
and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act (1994).
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Finally, party discussions on crime were linked to themes of ‘sexuality’ and
‘gender’. The Democrats argued that:
The very purpose of hate crimes is to dehumanize and stigmatize - not only to
wound the victim, but also to distort the American conscience. Every crime is a
danger to Americans’ lives and liberty. Hate crimes are more than assaults on
people, they are assaults on the very idea of America. They should be punished
with extra force. Protections should include hate violence based on gender,
disability or sexual orientation. And the Republican Congress should stop
standing in the way of this pro-civil rights, anti-crime legislation. (Political
Platform 2000:25)
Furthermore, the party suggested that women receive more extensive legal protection
against domestic violence, e g., through the Violence against Women Act (1994).
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Similar to discussions on domestic violence in CDA documents in the Netherlands, the
Democrats did not explain how it intended to put an end to domestic violence. It did not
acknowledge that domestic violence is an institutional problem. Protecting women
against violence in the family does not necessarily break the cycle of violence if
institutional gender inequalities remain unchallenged. Therefore, in addition to
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The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act requires potential buyers of handguns to
undergo a background check.
61
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act prohibits the sale of semi-
automatic weapons to civilians.
62
The Violence against Women Act (1993) provides funding to improve the investigation
and prosecution of violent crimes committed against women.
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protecting women against violence, men need to be educated on the consequences of
domestic violence for women and children.
Crime and International Security
In 2000, security was also discussed from a global perspective. The peace and
security of Americans, the party argued, was interwoven with that of citizens in the rest
of the world. Therefore, international cooperation was seen as a vital element in
establishing and maintaining global peace. The party believed that the government
needed to be dominant enough to scare away potential aggressors, but also engage in
diplomacy whenever possible. Pre-9/11, the Democrats were mostly concerned with the
ability of Russia, China, and Iran to create weapons of mass destruction. It particularly
worried about new types of weapons and warfare: biological and cyber. Terrorism was
discussed as an increasingly likely threat against the United States, yet Middle Eastern
countries were not specifically mentioned as potential aggressors.
Discussions on security post-9/11 focused on global terrorism and the war in Iraq.
The Democrats wanted to win the ‘war on terror’; stop the spread of weapons of mass
destruction; and promote democracy and freedom around the world and particularly in
Iraq. In order to achieve these goals, the party stated that the United States had to rely on
diplomacy as well as its military prowess. The war in Iraq had cost the United States
much international good-will and the Democrats wanted to work on re-establishing
relationships with allies in the rest of the world.
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The party framed the war on terror in ideological rather than religious terms. In
the 2004 Political Platform, the party stated:
At the core of this [the war on terror] conflict is a fundamental struggle of ideas:
democracy and tolerance against those who would use any means and attack any
target to impose their narrow views. The war on terror is not a clash of
civilizations [see Huntington 1993]. It is a clash of civilizations against chaos.
(P. 5)
The Democrats, thus, argued that ideological differences played a role in the terrorist
attack on the United States, but did not address the religious roots of these ideological
differences. This could be seen as a politically strategic move since the party did not want
to alienate Muslim allies in the Middle East or its American Muslim population. The
increase in hate crimes against and racial profiling of Arab Americans (and anyone
resembling a ‘Muslim’) following 9/11 (Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination
against Arab Americans 2002) shows that non-Muslims and the US government, in
reality, did frame the ideological differences in religious terms. By leaving Islam out of
the picture and not explaining that the war on terror was not a war against all of Islam but
one specific strand (fundamentalist), ‘Islam’ became fundamentalist by stealth.
Religion
Religion not only permeated discussions of security, but also those of social
cohesion, integration, and national identity (which I will address further on in this
Chapter). The Democrats proudly asserted that it honored the centrality of faith in the
lives of the American people and the freedom of Americans to worship. It saw
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stewardship as part of the fundamental values and norms in American society, and
considered families guided by faith the heart of a strong America. Although the term
‘faith’ surfaced in many party discussions, in none of the documents was it defined. In
CDA, CU, and SGP discussions in the Netherlands, faith was clearly equated with
Christianity. Democrats, however, never made a distinction between different types of
religions such as Christianity, Islam, Judaism, or Hinduism. Part of the vagueness
surrounding faith can be attributed to the party’s emphasis on freedom of religious
expression. Singling out one faith over the other would defy those values. At the same
time, for instance, by emphasizing the concept of religious stewardship it becomes clear
that the party’s interpretations of faith, mostly, are rooted in Christianity. The role of
religion in Democrats’ documents is in contrast with the idea that US society was
fundamentally secular. It shows that, in the Democrats’ view, religion - and especially
Christianity - was foundational to US norms and values.
Integration
Immigrants and their cultures were seen as important parts of the ‘tapestry of
American life’. The Democrats believed that immigrants made society more vibrant and
the workplace more productive. Yet, the party acknowledged that dealing with ethnic
diversity was not an easy task. It pointed at persistent signs of ethnic and racial division,
discrimination, and growing segregation in schools and neighborhoods. While the
Democrats celebrated ethnic diversity, the party also believed that integration of
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immigrants was a necessary means to stabilize society. It believed that ethnic and racial
divisions would continue to grow as long as ethnic and racial pillars existed in society;
pillarization contributed to social fragmentation. Integration, on the other hand,
contributed to an environment in which US norms and values would be shared by all
citizens. That did not mean, however, that immigrants or ethnic groups had to give up
their unique cultures. Norms and values could be shared without loss of ethnic or cultural
identity; and shared norms and values, in turn, would help to establish a stronger
community. While the Democrats believed that immigrants had responsibilities, the party
also argued that the government had an obligation to fight discrimination and end racial
segregation. It therefore supported affirmative action policies to put an end to
institutional racism and the development of hate crime and anti-discrimination
legislation. Despite the challenges that ethnic diversity and immigration had brought to
society, the party saw both as part of the American identity and the country’s spiritual
mission. It argued that:
Democrats believe that God has given the people of our nation not only a chance,
but a mission to prove to men and women throughout this world that people of
different racial and ethnic backgrounds, of all faiths and creeds, can not only work
and live together, but can enrich and ennoble both themselves and our purpose.
(Political Platform 2000:35)
The above statement once more indicates that the Democrats’ framing of norms and
values were rooted in a religious ideology.
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Gender
A large number of documents published in 2000 and 2004 discussing gender
focused on women’s rights. In these discussions, the Democrats recognized that women
continued to face social inequality - particularly in the workplace. The party mentioned
that women consistently earned less than men in similar positions of employment. It
asserted that, “We believe a day’s work is worth a day’s pay, and at a time when women
still earn 77 cents for every dollar earned by men, we need stronger equal pay laws and
stronger enforcement of them” (Political Platform 2000:83). Therefore, the Democrats
maintained, the party would work hard to close the pay gap between men and women,
and urged Congress to ratify the Paycheck Fairness Act (1998). The Act would strengthen
protections for women against compensation discrimination, e.g., by holding employers
accountable for pay violations. Census data indicated, however, that 4 years later,
despites promises to implement equal pay laws, women of all races still had a lower
annual medium income than men (Census Bureau 2005).
As I mentioned in my earlier discussion of social cohesion and crime, Democrats
also were concerned about domestic violence against women. The party called for better
legal protections to assist victims of domestic violence such as the reauthorization of the
Violence against Women Act (1994). The Democrats’ main discussion about women’s
rights, however, focused on abortion and a woman’s right to choose. The party supported
Roe v. Wade (1973) and considered a woman’s autonomy over her body a fundamental,
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constitutional right.
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When it came to reproduction, it argued, the woman - not the
government - should decide what contraceptive options worked best for her. The
Democrats stated:
Because we believe in the privacy and equality of women, we stand proudly for a
woman’s right to choose, consistent with Roe v. Wade, and regardless of her
ability to pay. We stand firmly against Republican efforts to undermine that right.
At the same time, we strongly support family planning and adoption incentives.
Abortion should be safe, legal, and rare. (Political Platform 2000:84)
Similar to discussions about women in the Netherlands and United Kingdom, the
theme of ‘women’ was largely tied to discussions about the family. Campaign materials
addressing inequality of women in the work place, for instance, devoted a large section
on the Family and Medical Leave Act. The Act allowed people to take unpaid leave to
take care of new born babies or a sick relative. While the Family and Medical Leave Act
was gender neutral in content, its inclusion in ‘equality for women in the workplace’
implies that it was specifically aimed at female workers. Other themes such as ‘help in
balancing work and the family’ (Kerry 2004), ‘fighting for children’s health’ and
‘working for our children’ (Gore 2000) also were included in sections that focused on
women’s inequality. The party, thus, framed women’s issues in the context of the family
and children. Also, by generalizing discussions about ‘women’ and ignoring social class,
racial, or ethnic divisions among them, it was assumed that women’s issues were one-
63
Roe v. Wade (1973) ruled that state and federal laws banning or restricting abortion
violate a woman’s constitutional right to privacy.
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dimensional. It implied that racial discrimination or class status had no effect on a
woman’s situation in the work place, health, or role in the family.
Not all discussions about gender focused on women’s issues. Of all the parties I
studied, the Democrats were the first to concretely discuss men’s roles in the family.
Discussions about deadbeat fathers shifted the focus from women to men’s
responsibilities in childcare and fighting child poverty. The party argued that child
support laws needed to be strictly enforced to hold men accountable for the children they
fathered. Furthermore, it called for support - e.g., in the form of employment services -
for fathers who wanted but could not afford to pay child support for their children. Child
support, the Democrats argued, was one of the main instruments to fight child poverty in
single parent families with. The discussion of deadbeat fathers, however, also reinforced
gender roles. It discussed men mainly in the context of the caretaker rather than caregiver
of the family.
Sexuality
In 2000 and 2004, party discussions about sexuality focused on sexual orientation
and especially homosexuality. Homosexuality was linked to themes of ‘hate crimes’ and
the ‘family’. In America, the party argued, everyone had the right to live according to her
or his moral conviction. Hate crimes based on race, religious affiliation, gender, sexual
orientation, and disability, therefore, should always be punished. The party also believed
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that work place discrimination based on sexual orientation should be prohibited and
supported the Employment Non-Discrimination Act.
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In his campaign materials, presidential hopeful Al Gore maintained that it was
time for Americans to recognize that “the issues that face gays and lesbians in this
country are not narrow, special interests - they are a matter of basic human civil
rights….dignity and fundamental rights for all Americans must include homosexuals”
(Gore 2000). Gore believed that lesbians and gay men deserved fundamental civil rights
and that lesbian and gay families should be assigned equal responsibilities, benefits, and
protections as heterosexual families. However, the right to marry was not seen as one of
them. Gore aligned himself with party politics by arguing that for the last two hundred
years marriage had been defined at the state level and, therefore, should continue to be
defined as such. This meant that states had the right to ban gay marriage or impose other
restrictive regulations on GLBT communities. The state-rights principle, though, goes
against the ideal of ‘equality for all’ and in the past has been used to justify the
criminalization of ‘undesirable practices’ such as interracial marriages or same-sex sexual
relations between consenting adults.
Gore and the Democrats’ stance towards gay marriage is not only contradictory,
but also ambiguous. While both believed that marriage was not a fundamental civil right,
they also did not support Bush’s Federal Marriage Amendment Act, which defined
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The Employment Non-Discrimination Act forbids discrimination based on sexual
orientation in the workplace.
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marriage as a union between a woman and a man. The Democrats argued that “we
repudiate President Bush’s divisive effort to politicize the Constitution by pursuing a
“Federal Marriage Amendment.” Our goal is to bring Americans together, not drive them
apart” (Political Platform 2004:35). This ambiguous stance is characteristic of the US
political system. In order to appease its broad voter base, the Democrats avoided taking a
concrete stance on a socially and politically controversial issue.
The inclusion of sexual orientation in hate crime and work place discrimination
legislation shows that progress has been made since the 1950s, when ‘out’ lesbians and
gay men had no legal rights (Johnson 2004). At the same time, Gore and the Democrats’
reluctance to define marriage in non-heterosexual terms serves as a reminder that only
since Lawrence vs. Texas (2003) same-sex sexual relations between consenting adults
were decriminalized and, therefore, true civil equality still has a way to go.
National Identity
Like the political parties in the Netherlands and United Kingdom, the Democrats
argued that the common civic culture was grounded in shared values: hard work, the
family, diversity, equality, personal responsibility, individual liberty, and faith. These
were the values that tied Americans together as a society and that represented their
national identity. In its 2000 Platform, the party argued:
America will become much more diverse in the coming century. But while much
is changing, much remains. Our common civic culture - one grounded in the
values most Americans share: work, family, personal responsibility, individual
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liberty, and faith - ties us together. Our common ground - our shared civic
institutions - makes us whole. In the years to come, we must celebrate our
diversity and focus on strengthening the common values and beliefs that make us
one America - one nation, under God, with liberty and justice for all. (P 37)
It remained unclear what the party’s conceptualization of the national identity looked
like; how ‘hard work’ and ‘the family’ set Americans apart from the Dutch or British.
What the above statement does show is that, once again, religion was perceived as a
major part of America’s social, economic, cultural and political life and therefore its
national identity.
The Republican Party
The term ‘Republican’ was first used in 1792, by supporters of Thomas Jefferson.
The Jefferson supporters favored a decentralized government with limited powers. The
Republicans of 1792, however, should not be confused with the present-day Republican
Party. In the 1830s, the Republicans - then part of the Democratic-Republican Party -
evolved to become the Democratic Party. The Republican Party (the Grand Old Party) as
we currently know it has its roots in the 1850s. Anti-slavery leaders opposed the
extension of slavery into Kansas and Nebraska. During meetings to discuss the
development of the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act in Ripon (Wisconsin) and Jackson
(Michigan), they decided to form the present-day Republicans. Like the Democrats,
Republican factions range from social and economic moderates (e.g., Rudi Giuliani) to
those on the Christian right (Pat Robinson).
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Social Cohesion
‘Strong communities’ - the ‘heart and soul’ of the nation - were a re-occurring
theme in the Republicans’ Political Platforms. The party argued that the strength of the
community could be measured by the people that lived in it: successful and active
citizens. Therefore, the government had to provide a framework in which people could
start building ‘better lives’. That framework consisted of seven elements: protection of
the family, education, the economy, the cultural and natural environments, security, civil
rights, and faith. I will discuss the first four themes in this section, and ‘security’, civil
rights’ and ‘faith’ separately.
The Republicans maintained that the traditional family was “society’s central core
of energy” (Political Platform 2000:21) and that, therefore, efforts to strengthen family
life were also efforts to improve the life of everyone else in society. A strong community
rested on the existence of ‘strong families’. In their discussion of the family, the
Republicans’ focused predominantly on children. Children were seen as vital to society
because they were the next generation who had to keep the community together. The
family was perceived as the place where “the virtues that sustain democracy” (Political
Platform 2000:21) - conservatives values such as hard work, fiscal responsibility, faith,
and education - were taught.
The party acknowledged that families came in many different forms, but stated
that the heterosexual, two parent (married) family was the ideal - the ‘strong family’ - to
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strive for. The party conceptualized marriage as the legal union between one man and one
woman and supported a Federal Defense of Marriage Act.
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It stated:
We support the traditional definition of “marriage” as the legal union of one man
and one woman, and we believe that federal judges and bureaucrats should not
force states to recognize other living arrangements as marriages. We rely on the
home, as did the founders of the American Republic, to instill the virtues that
sustain democracy itself. That belief led Congress to enact the Defense of
Marriage Act, which a Republican Department of Justice will energetically
defend in the courts. For the same reason, we do not believe sexual preference
should be given special legal protection or standing in law. (Party Platform
2000:19)
The Republicans cited unnamed studies which showed that children had the best chance
to succeed in society if they were raised by a mother and father in the same family. This
type of family, the Republicans maintained, provided stability and instilled a sense of
discipline, responsibility, and character in children. The Republicans did not explain why
same-sex or single parent families would be unable to provide a sense of discipline,
character, or a stable home environment for their children and contribute to a cohesive
society.
Like the Democrats, the Republicans also focused on the role of the father in the
family. The party argued that fathers played an essential role in providing emotional
stability for their children. The Republicans cited, once again, unnamed studies that
indicated that children who had ‘responsible fathers’ in their lives faired much better in
schools and steered away from crime and drugs. Therefore, it maintained, the promotion
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The Federal Defense of Marriage Act defines marriage only as a legal union between
one man and one woman.
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of ‘responsible fatherhood’ had not only benefits for the children, but also for their
families and the community. It was not clear whether ‘responsible fatherhood’ was
envisioned within a two-parent family context only. The Democrats’ ‘deadbeat fathers’
discussion, for instance, suggested that fathers could be ‘responsible’ even if they were
not a direct part of the family (or gay). However, given the Republicans’ emphasis on the
two parent heterosexual family, it seems unlikely that this would be the case.
Education
The next precondition for a strong community was the availability of high quality
education. Education prepared children for their full participation in society and kept the
American workforce competitive. The Republicans saw in children “America’s most
precious asset” (2000:12). The party asserted:
The children who enter schools today will leave as young adults, full of dreams
for the future. They will soon become the scientists and researchers who make
great discoveries, the engineers and mathematicians who build our communities,
the doctors and nurses who heal and comfort the sick, the teachers who will
educate the next generation, the leaders who transform government, the poets,
artists, and writers who entertain and inspire. Every child deserves a first-rate
education, because every child holds infinite potential, and we should give them
every opportunity to reach it. (Political Platform 2000: 129)
The Republicans linked high quality education to five ways themes: ‘strong parental
involvement’, ‘excellent teachers’, ‘safe and orderly classrooms’, ‘high academic
standards’ and a ‘vibrant economy’. Parental involvement and cooperation between
parents and teachers were emphasized because the Republicans saw improvement of the
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education system as a state, local and family responsibility - not a federal obligation.
Furthermore, the party argued, excellent teachers were at the vanguard of education
reform. Yet, teachers faced disrespect and physical danger in the class room. Teachers’
attempts to maintain order and to appropriately discipline unruly students were severely
hampered at the expense of the quality of education. The party considered discipline in
the class room a serious issue, but did not provide any concrete solutions on how to
resolve the problem.
The Republicans also established a reinforcing link between the economy and the
quality of the education system. It argued that a thriving economy provided the taxes
necessary to fund the education system. In turn, a high quality education system produced
a highly skilled workforce which kept the economy strong. Education and the economy
thus were seen as reinforcing each other and both perceived as the foundation of
prosperity.
Environment
Lastly, the party focused on the role of the natural environment in developing a
strong community. The Republicans argued that environmental pollution affected
citizens’ physical health. It believed in the idea of stewardship and argued that the
environment had to be turned over to the next generation increased and not weakened in
value. The party maintained that the economy played an important role in the protection
of the environment, since prosperity provided society with the financial means to protect
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it. In turn, a flourishing natural environment would enhance people’s quality of life and
make them much happier and more productive workers. While the party emphasized the
importance of stewardship, it added that too little attention was given to ‘cultural
pollution’. It argued:
There is much to celebrate in contemporary culture, but also much to deplore: The
glorification of violence, the glamorizing of drugs, the abuse of women and
children, whether in music or videos, advertising, or tabloid journalism. Still,
there are individuals and organizations using their power as citizens and
consumers to advance a cultural renewal in all aspects of American life. We
support and applaud them. (Political Platform 2000:19)
Cultural pollutants, thus, had to be removed to protect the moral fabric of society. For
instance, The Republicans argued that, e.g., therefore, the protection of children from
pornography by placing V-chips in school and library computers was not an attempt to
infringe on freedom of speech, but rather a question of morality.
Security
In 2000, party discussions about security focused on crime. The Republicans
believed that in order to maintain a strong community, the government had to restore
public safety and fight against drugs and violence in schools and on the streets, crimes
against women and against children. Because of the social importance to keep children on
the right track, the party paid special attention to juvenile delinquency. It argued that
rising crime among increasingly younger delinquents required a complete overhaul of the
justice system. This overhaul would provide stricter punishment guidelines for juvenile
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offenders, open up criminal proceedings to their victims and the general public, make
conviction records more readily available to the general public and hold parents and
judges accountable for the behaviors of (repeat) offenders. Lastly, the party linked
juvenile delinquency to masculinity by suggesting that positive male role models would
“put fatherless boys on the right road to manhood” (Political Platform 2000:25).
It does not come as a surprise that discussion in 2004 focused mostly on the war
on terror. The Republicans argued that America was defending peace and democracy by
‘taking the war against terror to the enemy’ in Iraq and Afghanistan. The party defended
the military’s invasion of both countries by arguing that they were confronting terrorists
overseas so they did not have to ‘confront them on American soil’ - to prevent another
9/11. The Republicans supported the four principles of counterterrorism policy that were
established by the Commission on Combating Terrorism in 1985. First, the United States
would never make concessions to terrorists, because these would lead to more terrorist
actions and undermine the United States’ moral authority. Second, the United States
would isolate and economically punish state sponsors of terrorism. Third, the country
would do everything in its power to bring individual terrorists to justice. Lastly, the
country would provide support to other governments in combating terrorism. The
Republicans argued that the war against terror was not just about safeguarding American
society against foreign threats, but also about bringing democracy to totalitarian regimes
such as Afghanistan and Iraq and in the broader Middle East. The party used Iraq as
example. It argued:
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Three years ago, the ruler of Iraq was a sworn enemy of America who provided
safe haven for terrorists, used weapons of mass destruction, and turned his nation
into a prison. Saddam Hussein was not just a dictator; he was a proven mass
murderer who refused to account for weapons of mass murder … Today, the
dictator who caused decades of death and turmoil, who twice invaded his
neighbors, who harbored terrorist leaders, who used chemical weapons on
innocent men, women, and children, finally stands before the bar of justice. Iraq,
which once had the worst government in the Middle East, is now becoming an
example of reform to the region. Iraqi security forces are fighting beside coalition
troops to defeat the terrorists and foreign fighters who threaten their nation and
the world. Today, because America and our coalition helped to end the violent
regime of Saddam Hussein, and because we are helping to raise a peaceful
democracy in its place, 25 million Iraqis are free and the American people are
safe. (Political Platform 2000:81)
Finally, as it did with education and the environment, the party linked the war against
terror to the economy. It argued that poverty, weak social institutions, and corruption
could make already politically and socially weak states extra vulnerable to terrorist
networks. Therefore, poverty needed to be eradicated in order for terrorist threats to
diminish. A strong world economy would enhance the United States’ national security by
advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. It also would help to
strengthen US communities, since economic growth - spurred by free trade - would create
new jobs and higher incomes. Thriving international trade would lift people out of
poverty, economically and politically strengthen weak states, encourage economic and
legal reform, and enhance the fight against corruption (Political Platform 2004:35).
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Integration
The Republicans saw the United States as a ‘nation of immigrants’. It argued that
the country’s “ethnic diversity within a shared national culture was unique in [the entire]
world” (Political Platform 2000:22). Therefore, it welcomed all immigrants who entered
the country lawfully, who were prepared to obey the law, and were able to take care of
themselves and their families financially. The party maintained that immigration was
beneficial to society; it strengthened the economy and enriched American culture.
Furthermore, in the post-9/11 climate, immigrants helped to defend the country during
times of war.
While the Republicans celebrated cultural diversity, the party believed that
integration was an essential component of that diversity and, particularly, when it came to
the English language. English as a common language, the party argued, united all
Americans. It enabled people from all over the world to come together and work towards
a strong society. The Republicans saw in the English language the fastest way to enter
mainstream American life: to achieve the American Dream of home ownership and well-
paying employment. The party asserted that:
With English as our nation’s common language, people from every corner of the
world have come together to build this great nation. English empowers. For
newcomers, it is the fastest route to mainstream American life, better paying jobs,
and owning a piece of the American Dream. Furthermore, fluency in English
should be the goal of bilingual education. (Political Platform 2000:133-134)
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The Republicans did emphasize that knowledge of other languages was important in the
competitive global market place, and therefore also advocated foreign language training
in schools.
Equality
The party’s Political Platforms and campaign materials stressed that equality was
one of the cornerstones of society. The Republicans therefore opposed discrimination
based on sex, race, age, religion, creed, disability, or national origin. The party
maintained that it would enforce anti-discrimination statutes at all times. It called on
Americans to reject hatred and bigotry and to denounce those who practiced or promoted
racial, ethnic, or religious intolerance, but excluded homophobia. From its discussions, it
never becomes evident why the party opposes homosexuality. While religion and
conservatism could be reasons for the exclusion of homosexuality, the Democrats also
used religious language in its documents, yet supported the inclusion of sexual
orientation in anti-discrimination legislation. Furthermore, Log Cabin Republicans were a
lesbian and gay faction of the Republicans. Religion or conservative ideology, thus, does
not automatically explain why the party refused to discuss homosexuality.
While the Republicans opposed discrimination of most groups in society, the
party did not believe in affirmative action. It stated that it would attain its goal of equal
opportunity without quotas or other forms of preferential treatment. The party argued that
they believed in ‘affirmative access’. Affirmative access would ensure that all
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disadvantaged individuals, regardless of racial or ethnic background, had the opportunity
to compete for employment or education. In its 2000 Political Platform, the party stated
that:
Our nation is a land of opportunity for all, and our communities must represent
the ideal of equality and justice for every citizen. The Republican Party favors
aggressive, proactive measures to ensure that no individual is discriminated
against on the basis of race, national origin, gender, or other characteristics
covered by our civil rights laws. We also favor recruitment and outreach policies
that cast the widest possible net so that the best qualified individuals are
encouraged to apply for jobs, contracts, and university admissions. (P. 152)
The party added that, “Because we are opposed to discrimination, we reject preferences,
quotas, and set-asides based on skin color, ethnicity, or gender, which perpetuate
divisions and can lead people to question the accomplishments of successful minorities
and women” (p. 152). The concept of affirmative access ignored, however, the economic
and educational advantage that social privilege had given middle and upper class whites
and heterosexual men. It assumed that all citizens compete from the same starting point,
thereby ignoring historical or institutional racism and other forms of inequalities.
Religion and Islam
The Republicans maintained that US society was founded on faith and argued that
self-government was rooted in religious conviction. The Constitution prevented the
establishment of state sponsored religion and while the party respected the separation of
church and state ideal, it also supported the right to free exercise of religion. When it
came to religious diversity, the Republicans argued, America was a working example of
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religious liberty. The nation was home to millions of Christians, Jews, and Muslims who
lived in apparent harmony and all contributed to a common American culture. While the
party touted the pluralist nature of religion in US society, its linkage to the founding of
the nation suggests that religion was defined in Christian, biblical terms.
Religion was not only seen as an important part of a strong society, but it also
guided Republicans’ foreign policy agenda. It saw America’s role to lead the world
toward greater freedom, opportunity, and prosperity. These efforts were accompanied by
the US desire to promote religious liberty. In fact, the Republicans made the protection
and promotion of ‘religious freedom’ abroad a central principle of its foreign policy
agenda. Interestingly, this emphasis on religion is in conflict with its reoccurring
statements that the war against terror was not a ‘battle of faiths’.
Gender
Like the Democrats, discussions of gender in Republican documents
predominantly focused on women. The Republicans linked discussions of women to the
family, healthcare, and reproductive rights. First, the Republicans suggested that efforts
to build healthier families had to start with women. This statement shows once more that
women were perceived as the primary caregivers in and heart of the family.
66
Second, the
party maintained that women were underrepresented in medical research and often did
66
The focus on women as the heart of the family is reflective of the idea that women are
the mothers of the nation.
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not have access to the appropriate level of medical care and treatment. Therefore,
Republicans wanted health care initiatives targeted specifically at the needs of women
through expanded research, treatment, disease management and prevention and screening
initiatives. Third, Republicans tackled the woman’s right to choose. It argued that the
unborn child had a fundamental individual right to life. The Republicans therefore
supported a Human Life Amendment to the Constitution and wanted the Fourteenth
Amendment to apply to unborn children. The party’s stance towards a woman’s right to
choose shows that the Republicans were not really concerned about women’s health
issues, but more about the moral issue of the ‘unborn child’.
In 2000 and 2004, discussions about gender not only focused on women’s health
and reproductive rights, but also on men and ‘responsible fatherhood’. Men were seen as
vital to the stability of society. The party argued that without the influence of male role
models, especially fatherless children would slip into a life of crime. Responsible
fatherhood, thus, was seen as an important element that kept society and the family
together. However, by linking single motherhood to crime, the party ignored the many
single (and same-sex) parent families where children grew up well-adjusted. Lastly,
women were used to justify the war on terror. The party argued that:
Under the ruthless grip of the Taliban regime, Afghan girls were barred from
getting an education, and women were banned from holding jobs and were
publicly whipped when they did not follow the Taliban’s rules. Afghanistan’s new
constitution affords equal rights to all Afghan citizens, and Afghan women are
now being integrated into the economic, social, and political life of their liberated
country. (Political Platform 2000:112)
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Furthermore, the Republicans argued, the invasion in Iraq had put an end to the use of
rape by Sadam Hussein’s military to dishonor families and the country’s new constitution
- thanks to the US invasion - had made it illegal to discriminate on the basis of gender,
ethnicity or religion.
The Republican’s discussion of women’s rights in Afghanistan and Iraq achieved
three goals: it framed the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq not only as wars against terror, but
also as moral wars to end social inequality in these countries. Second, by specifically
singling out women’s abuses and framing them as victims of male oppression, the
Republicans’ reinforced the masculinity of the war on terror while criticizing patriarchy
in the Middle East. Lastly, given the emphasis on religious freedom, the discussion
juxtaposed women’s civil liberties in the Christian West against their abuses in the
Islamic Middle East. One should wonder, however, how much women’s positions have
improved after the US government removed the Taliban from power. In 2009, the Afghan
government passed legislation that allowed for spousal rape and legalized the right of
men to control the lives of their wives and daughters, e.g., to prohibit them from leaving
home without permission to go to school or work.
Sexuality
Discussions about sexuality focused on two themes: same-sex marriage, and
contraception. As I mentioned earlier, the remarkable thing about sexual orientation was
the fact that it was not discussed in any of the party’s documents. It was merely alluded to
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in terms of same-sex marriage. Its omission from anti-discrimination measures was never
justified - not even within religious terms. I stated earlier that this omission is not that
surprising. First of all, the Republicans consisted of moderates like Rudi Giuliani and
those on the religious right like Pat Robinson. Finding a middle ground between these
ideological opposites would not have been straightforward. Instead, the party may have
found it easier to leave controversial topics unspoken and up to states to decide on. Also,
the inclusion of sexual orientation in anti-discrimination legislation would have made it
more difficult for the party to reconcile its ‘equality for all’ stance with its support for the
Federal Marriage Amendment Act.
Lastly, the Republicans linked sexuality to contraception (especially abortion), the
family, and religion. It argued that faith based organizations could help best in family
planning by teaching abstinence until marriage. Abstinence from sexual activity was seen
as the only protection that was one-hundred percent effective against out-of-wedlock
pregnancies (and thus a preventative against abortion and single parenthood) and sexual
transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS. In 2000, Bush stated:
For children to realize their dreams, they must learn the value of abstinence. We
must send them the message that of the many decisions they will make in their
lives, choosing to avoid early sex is one of the most important. We must stress
that abstinence isn’t just about saying no to sex; it’s about saying yes to a happier,
healthier future. (Abstinence Education 2000:1)
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National identity
Like the Democrats, the Republicans discussed national identity in vague terms.
The party argued that faith, diversity, hard work, personal responsibility, quality
education, equality, and liberty were all part of the common American identity. Because
these were the same values that contributed to a strong community, national identity
played an important role in the establishment of a strong, cohesive community. In fact,
Republicans believed that adherence to these values would allow people from all ethnic
and social class backgrounds to realize the ‘American dream’ - to own a home, send their
children to good schools, and have steady, well-paying jobs. The values that contributed
to the construction of national identity also guided the party’s foreign policy vision. This
is particularly significant because foreign policy is the party’s ‘calling card’ to the rest of
the world; it establishes how it wants itself to be seen globally. The Republicans claimed
that, in addition to global and national security, the war on terror intended to bring
democracy, religious freedom, liberty, equality, and prosperity to Afghanistan and Iraq.
There are two things that stand out in the party’s discussions of national identity.
It is unclear what the American national identity exactly entails; how values such as
diversity or equality distinguish Americans from people with other nationalities. Second,
the party stresses the importance of equality in the establishment of social cohesion and
national identity. Yet, as I discussed earlier, sexual orientation was excluded from any
equality and anti-discrimination legislation. Subsequently, the LGBT community was
shut out of the party’s construction of the national identity.
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Conclusion:
Social Cohesion
The Democrats’ framed social cohesion within the context of the ‘liveable
community’. The party’s concept of the ‘liveable community’ resembled that of the
Republican’s ‘strong community’ since both focused on economic and social self-
sustainability. In both communities, employment was emphasized because it provided
financial security and funded the education and health care systems. Both parties also
viewed the family as one of the cornerstones of the community. The family was central to
the community because it was the place where children grew up and norms and values of
mainstream society passed on. There were some differences in how parties
conceptualized the family. The Democrats recognized that families came in all forms,
without framing it in specific terms. The Republicans also acknowledged that families
came in different forms and shapes yet stated that the ideal consisted of two heterosexual,
married parents.
Because the family facilitated the social education of children, both parties
emphasized the role that ‘responsible parenting’ should play in their upbringing.
Although ‘responsible’ was never concretely defined, one of its elements was the
protection of children from the harmful influences of pornography and violence in
popular culture. The reasoning behind this was that children were too young to deal with
the realities of society - nudity and violence. Yet, the party did not address the large
number of children who grew up in situations where they were confronted with violence
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or sex on a daily basis. Both parties’ failure to include these children in their discussion
indicates that ‘responsible parenting’ was mostly framed within middle class terms.
Integration
The Democrats and Republicans believed that immigrants were an inherent part
of US society. They claimed that, historically, the United States had been a ‘nation of
immigrants’ and believed that this was a tradition that should be continued. However,
they provided some preconditions to immigration: immigrants had to enter society legally
and adopt US norms and values. While both parties believed in cultural diversity, they
also maintained that social integration - shared norms and values - would lead to a more
cohesive society. The Republicans pointed specifically at the English language, claiming
that the goal of bilingual education should be enhancing immigrants’ fluency in English.
Mastering the English language would make it easier for them to integrate into society
and achieve the American Dream. The Democrats did not emphasize any specific
elements in the integration of immigrants. It did mention that God had made US society
diverse so the nation could prove to rest of the world that people of different backgrounds
could live together in harmony.
Security
Both the Republican and Democratic parties framed security in terms of crime
and terrorism. Pre-9/11, the Democrats were concerned that crime would impede the
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establishment of the ‘liveable community’ and, therefore, supported strict anti-crime
measures such as gun control legislation and anti-drug campaigns. Crime, the party
argued, fragmented society and as a result prevented ‘responsible parents’ from passing
on society’s norms and values to their children. The Republicans’ discussion of security
focused predominantly on stricter punishment guidelines for juvenile offenders. The
party’s focus on punishment shows that it was more interested in tackling the
consequences rather than the causes of youth crime, such as the lack of after school
programs, employment or recreational facilities for youth.
It does not come at a surprise that post-9/11, both parties’ discussions of security
focused on the war on terror. The Democrats wondered whether the United States should
have entered into the war in Iraq. The party claimed that it had not been convinced by the
intelligence information offered by the Bush administration, even though most
Democrats had voted in favor of the war. The Republicans defended itself by stating that
the intelligence information, at the time, suggested that Iraq had an arsenal of weapons of
mass destruction. The Bush administration had merely acted on the perceived threat.
Although the parties’ views on the war in Iraq differed, both agreed that the war
on terror was not a war against religion or Islam, but rather against ideology. The absence
of discussions of religion in security is puzzling. Both parties repeatedly emphasized the
role of faith - and especially Christianity - in American norms and values. These norms
and values, in turn, played an important role in the US’ foreign policy vision (especially
that of the Republicans). It also was evident that Al-Qaida’s ideological fundamentalism
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was rooted in Islam. The war on terror, therefore, was undeniable a war rooted in
religious ideology. It is likely that the parties avoided making the war on terror a religious
war so they would not alienate important allies in the Middle East or its Muslims voter
base at home.
Gender
Unlike discussions on gender in the Netherlands and United Kingdom, the
Republicans and Democrats focused on women and men. The Democrats discussed
women’s rights in the work place and linked these discussions to the family. For instance,
a focus at women and pay discrimination was linked to themes such as ‘fighting for
children’s health’ or ‘help in balancing work and the family’. The Republicans’
documents linked discussions on women’s rights to themes such as reproduction and
contraception, and particularly the party’s opposition against a woman’s right to choose.
In both parties’ documents, men were framed in the context of fatherhood. The
Democrats showed concern about deadbeat fathers and their impact on child poverty. The
Republicans feared that a lack of male role models would lead to increases in crime
among young fatherless boys. Neither party discussed the impact of the absence of male
role models on girls’ lives. Lastly, gender was discussed in legal terms, as both parties
called for its inclusion in anti-discrimination and hate-crime legislation.
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Sexuality
The Democrats made an effort to place sexual orientation onto its political
agenda. The party emphasized social equality for the GLBT community and stressed that
hate crime statutes and anti-discrimination provisions should include sexual orientation.
While the Democrats supported civil partnership for lesbians and gay men, it did not,
however, support gay marriage. Its failure to support gay marriage can be explained by
the wide ranges of Democratic voters the party had to appease - from liberals to Christian
conservatives - as well as the party’s overall roots in religious ideology.
For the Republicans, sexual orientation was a non-issue. The party did not include
it in its anti-discrimination statutes nor discussed equality for the GLBT community. The
only time the Republicans alluded to sexual orientation was in their discussion of the
family; their opposition against same-sex marriage and exclusion of same-sex parenting
in discussions on responsible parenthood.
National Identity
There was remarkable little difference between the conceptualization of ‘national
identity’ between the Democrats and the Republicans. Both parties valued faith, freedom,
equality, diversity, and personal responsibility. They also stressed the importance of
education, economic prosperity, and integration (especially in terms of the English
language) in US society as these were seen as preconditions to achieve the American
Dream. Well integrated, educated citizens would help to keep the economy alive and
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through steady employment be able to own a home and send their children to good
schools. Yet, as I mentioned previously, the elements that made up national identity were
rather vague. It is unclear how values such as equality or faith set Americans aside as a
national group from those in other countries. It did become clear, however, that these
values were perceived to play an important role in the development of social cohesion -
strong communities - and in achieving the American dream.
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Chapter Seven: Sexuality and Gender in Debates on Islam and
Muslims
This Chapter begins by providing an overview of the ways in which the eight
categories (social cohesion, integration, security, religion, Islam, sexuality, nationalism,
and gender) were discussed in documents published by the different Dutch, British, and
US parties between 1999 and 2006. It is the next step towards developing a grounded
theory, because it helps to identify differences and similarities in discussions of themes
between the parties in the three countries. In Part Two of this Chapter, I address the
research questions in relation to these differences and similarities and it is from these
discussions that a grounded theory emerges.
A Summary of Categories:
Social Cohesion
I mentioned in Chapter Four, that without cohesion, society would fall into a state
of anomie (Durkheim 1933). Parties’ discussions about the eight established themes
indicate that they already believed that society and the people in it were in a state of
social and moral disarray. Discussions of themes such as ‘crime prevention’,
‘stabilization of the family unit’, ‘integration of immigrants’, ‘employment’, ‘quality
education’, ‘same-sex marriage’, and ‘religious fundamentalism’ suggest that these were
all political areas of concern; issues that, urgently, needed to be worked on. The views of
society expressed by the different parties, across the board, were both pessimistic and
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optimistic. Discussions on quality education, for instance, indicated that parties were well
aware of the need to improve the education system and of the importance of such
improvement to the stability of society. The documents, thus, showed certain optimism:
society could be ‘fixed’ if only the right policies - of the right party - were put in place.
In order to (re)establish social cohesion, parties in all three countries focused on
five themes: (1) the family, (2) education, (3) employment, (4) the environment, and (5)
equality. Discussions around these themes differed according to political ideology rather
than a party’s geographical location.
The Family
Dutch, US, and British parties discussed the family within two themes: “the
family as cornerstone of society” and “integration of ethnic minorities.” The family was
seen as a corner stone of society because without it society would collapse. It was framed
as a place where norms, values, and traditions were passed on to society’s next generation
and active citizens were raised.
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How the family was visualized depended on the
political ideology of the party in question. Conservatives, such as the CDA or
Republicans, defined the family in traditional terms: as a unit headed by an opposite-sex
married couple. Left-leaning parties such as the PvdA, New Labour, and the Democrats
67
Citizenship was defined in adult terms: only those who economically and politically
contributed to society and were mentally ready to fully understand the duties of being a
citizen were considered ‘active citizens’.
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recognized that ‘the family’ had changed over the years and defined it in gender-neutral
terms; implying that it could be headed by a same-sex couple or single parent.
In the Netherlands, the rightwing CDA and LPF linked the family to ‘women’ and
the ‘integration of Muslim immigrants’. Both parties saw women as the heart of the
family and to keep the family healthy and stable, women’s happiness was central. The
parties believed that women’s emancipation would contribute to that happiness. The
CDA and LPF extended their line of reasoning to women in Muslim families; families
who were perceived as having serious problems integrating into Dutch society. They
believed that these women were systematically oppressed, leading them to feel isolated,
powerless, and out of touch with their westernizing children. Helping Muslim women to
emancipate would establish a power balance between husband and wife, and help them
regain control over their children. A healthy and stable Muslim family, led by a strong
independent woman, would be able to integrate into society much more effectively. It
never occurred to the LPF or CDA that emancipated women would want to break free
from the confines of the traditional family and that, subsequently, the structure of the
family would change. In the LPF and CDA’s vision, women had little agency.
None of the Dutch and British parties linked men to the family, reaffirming that it
was conceptualized as the sole domain of the woman and, thereby, establishing her as the
‘mother of the nation’. It was the woman, as heart and soul of the family, who
contributed to social cohesion and, ultimately, the stability of the nation. In the United
States, men played more visible - yet still traditional - roles in discussions of the family.
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In Republican documents, the theme of ‘responsible parenting’ was linked to ‘responsible
fatherhood’, both of which conceptualized the father as ‘financial caretaker’. The
Democrats focused on ‘deadbeat fathers’ and argued that men’s failure to financially
contribute to the raising of their children would lead to increases in child poverty. In both
parties’ documents the role of the father, thus, was framed in financial terms and parties
ignored the importance of fathers’ emotional presence in children’s lives.
Finally, in the United States and the Netherlands, the family was discussed within
a religious framework. In the Netherlands, discussions of the family and religion took
place by linking it to integration and Muslims. In the United States, the Democrats and
the Republicans focused on the role of faith in the functioning of the family. The parties
argued that ‘strong families were guided by faith’; by religious norms and values. The
link between faith and the family implied that secular families were not as ‘strong’ and
unable to contribute to social cohesion in the same way that families ‘guided by faith’
would. Since the family was one of the building blocks of society, its link to ‘faith’ and
Islam illustrates the central role religion played in the conceptualization of ‘society’ in
the United States and the Netherlands (see Rieffer 2003; Beasley 2004).
Education and Employment
There were a few noticeable differences between the ways in which parties
discussed the roles of education and employment in social cohesion. In all three
countries, education was seen as important to society because, like the family, schools
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were a vessel to teach children about social norms, values, and traditions. Furthermore,
parties argued, in the competitive Global Information Age, education helped to prepare
children to become economically competitive so they could contribute to a thriving
economy. As the Republicans explained, a thriving economy was essential for social
cohesion because it helped to fund education, health care, home ownership (as part of the
American Dream), and pension plans.
Particularly in the Netherlands, parties’ discussions about integration and social
cohesion emphasized ‘financial independence’. All were in agreement that financial
independence was one of the preconditions of successfully integration - of inburgering.
Parties did not state why financial independence was so important to society, but it is
likely that they did not want immigrants to become a financial burden to the state. The
links between integration, Muslims, and financial independence shows that discussions of
integration were framed by social class. Families who were financially dependent on
government assistance (the lower classes that migrated from agrarian societies) caused
Dutch parties the most concern and were seen as particularly difficult to integrate into
society. In none of the parties’ documents was a distinction made between the integration
of working and middle class Muslim immigrants. There are several reasons for that.
Working class Muslims who migrated to the Netherlands did so for financial or family
reunification purposes. Middle class Muslims with well-paying jobs in their home
country had no obvious reason to migrate to the Netherlands. Those that did make the
journey had the financial means to integrate effectively into society. They were able to
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afford homes in good neighborhoods and sent their children to ‘non-black schools’.
Because they tended to live in heterogeneous neighborhoods, this meant that they were in
frequent contact with autochthon Dutch and a range of differing opinions; making them
less likely to hold rigid religious beliefs about social diversity. Lastly, because middle
class Muslims were in employment and their children likely attended integrated schools,
parties had few concerns about the link between high school drop-outs, unemployment,
crime, and religious fundamentalism (although Mohammed Bouyeri, Van Gogh’s killer,
was a University educated, middle class young man).
I mentioned earlier that in the United Kingdom and, especially, the Netherlands
education was linked to ‘crime’ and ‘religious fundamentalism’. Youth who dropped out
of high school were portrayed as likely to become unemployed. Subsequently,
unemployed youth would look for income in the criminal circuit or, if living at the fringes
of society, for a sense of belonging in religious fundamentalism. Given the framing of
religious fundamentalism in the context of the ‘War on Terror’ and, therefore, Islam,
concerns about unemployed youth and fundamentalism predominantly focused on
Muslims and Islam. The link between Islamic fundamentalism, education, and Muslims
was illustrated by Dutch parties’ concerns of pillarization. Post 9/11, the VVD and D66,
for instance, worried that pillarization led to the establishment of all-Muslim schools
where conservative strands of Islam were being taught. Given the perceived lower socio-
economic status of Muslims in Dutch society and their treatment as a ‘social problem’ by
political parties and the rest of society, the VVD was concerned that fundamentalist ideas
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would take hold among socially disenfranchised and culturally isolated Muslim youth,
and that these youth would become domestic security threats.
Finally, parties in all three countries were concerned about the quality of the
education system. Conservative parties such as UKIP and the Republicans blamed
government interference for creating a bureaucratic environment that kept teachers out of
the class rooms and tied behind their desks filling out unnecessary paperwork.
Furthermore, UKIP and the Conservatives argued that under left-wing political rule, it
had become impossible for teachers to appropriately discipline students due to a climate
of ‘political correctness’. The Conservatives frequently referred to New Labour’s
ratification of the Human Rights Act as having led to teachers’ fear of being taken to the
European Court of Human Rights by their students.
In the Netherlands, parties showed concern for so-called ‘black schools’ - schools
with a high number of ethnic minority and immigrant students. Due to language problems
and a lack of qualified teachers, students in these schools were at an educational
disadvantage compared to students in ‘non-black schools’. As a result, they feared that
students would drop out of school, leading to unemployment and crime. The CDA,
therefore, called for the resettlement of immigrant families into more heterogeneous
neighborhoods, so that eventually ‘black schools’ would disappear. It did not take into
consideration that autochthon Dutch might move out of neighborhoods with immigrant
populations or take their children to more homogenous - white - schools, leading to the
reestablishment of ‘black schools’. The VVD opposed the CDA’s plan, claiming that
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forced relocation of immigrant families infringed on their rights. Instead, the VVD
offered, immigration should be curtailed so that immigrants already present in the
Netherlands could integrate. The party saw integration as a multi-generational process
and by stemming the influx of new immigrants, as immigrants integrated, black schools
also would become more integrated. Other than the VVD and CDA, none of the other
Dutch parties offered solutions for the ‘black school’ problem.
The Environment
All parties agreed that a clean and healthy environment contributed to happy,
healthy, and, therefore, productive citizens. Furthermore, they were in agreement that
governments would be able to use the money otherwise spent to clean up the environment
for other projects - such as improving the quality of the education system. In the
Netherlands and United States, religious parties linked the environment not only to social
cohesion, but also to religion with the idea of ‘stewardship’. The CDA, CU, SGP,
Democrats, and Republicans believed that the environment was a gift from God and,
therefore, something society was obliged to pass on to the next generation. It was
society’s duty to take care of it and to make sure that the next generation could enjoy an
environment increased in value.
In the United Kingdom, the BNP and UKIP linked the environment to
immigration and nationalism. Both parties argued that the countryside was being
destroyed by the continuing influx of immigrants. Because they considered the
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countryside an important part of the British national identity and social cohesion, this was
of great concern to both. The BNP and UKIP maintained that influx of new immigrants
had led to overcrowding in cities and in order to accommodate the newcomers, housing
projects were being built in Britain’s green belts. Destruction of the traditional English
countryside was seen as one less element autochthon Britons could, collectively, identify
with. Finally, the Republicans were the only party who defined the environment in moral
terms. They argued that the ‘moral environment’ was being polluted by images of sex
and violence in popular culture. Parents, therefore, had a responsibility to shield young,
impressionable children from these images until they were old enough to separate fact
from fiction.
Equality
Parties in all three countries - except for the BNP who adhered to an ideology of
racial segregation - agreed that in a cohesive society, people had the right to live their
lives free of crime or discrimination. They were divided, however, on how discrimination
should be defined. All left wing and some Dutch right wing parties (VVD, CDA, and
LPF) wanted sexual orientation to be included in anti-discrimination legislation. Being
gay, these parties argued, should be protected by the same laws that protected
heterosexuals’ civil rights. Furthermore, they believed that lesbians and gay men should
have the right to marry or at least to enter into civil partnerships. The BNP, Republicans,
and Conservatives maintained that sexual orientation (unlike sex, gender, age, religion,
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creed, disability, or national origin) was not a right that deserved protection because it
was ‘unnatural and sinful’ behavior, and they rejected the idea of same-sex marriage. The
BNP added that it would tolerate homosexuality as long as lesbians and gay men
remained in the closet. In the Netherlands, religious parties such as the CU and SGP were
more conflicted about their stance on sexual orientation and discrimination. They saw
sexual orientation as an identity and believed that ‘identity’ was ‘God given’ and a
fundamental human right. Lesbians and gay men, therefore, should not be discriminated
against based on their sexual orientation. However, the parties did not accept same-sex
sexual practices or support same-sex marriage, arguing that one should ‘love the sinner,
but reject the sin.’ While sexuality was a hot button issue, most parties did agree on the
inclusion of gender in anti-discrimination legislation. The parties focused on women, and
maintained that they had the right to be treated as equals to men, especially in the work
place. The SGP and the BNP were the only ones who objected to this argument, claiming
that women were of ‘equal of value’ to, but not ‘the equal of’ men. The BNP called
claims to the contrary ‘feminist myths’. The SGP’s stance towards women’s equality was
not surprising since it had admitted women as members only since 2006.
In the Netherlands, equality was further discussed in the context of Islam,
Muslims, and cultural diversity. Parties such as the PvdA, LPF, CDA, VVD, and D66
argued that Muslims had equal rights to autochthon Dutch, such as freedom of religious
expression, but noted that these rights were framed by the Dutch constitution and by the
norms and values held high in Dutch society. In the parties’ documents, the idea of
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‘cultural authenticity’ was an important element in discussions about equality and
fundamental civil rights. For instance, the PvdA and VVD acknowledged that in the
Moroccan community homosexuality was a taboo, but did not agree that Muslims,
therefore, were free to discriminate against homosexuals within or outside of their
community. Similarly, in some Muslim communities, female genital mutilation was a
‘tradition’, yet Dutch law prohibiting violence against women made this a criminal
offense. There were certain rights and regulations, the parties felt, that trumped the
cultural and religious freedoms of Muslims. The secular D66 was particularly adamant
that religious rights should never override those of civil rights in Dutch society. Lastly,
religious parties such as the CU and SGP believed that while Muslims had the freedom to
religious expression, this freedom should not conflict with the Christian norms and values
on which society was built, e.g., one’s right to an identity. The right to an identity meant
that Muslims, like Christians, needed to show tolerance towards social diversity. The
PvdA and VVD acknowledged that because Islam was ‘one-dimensional’, this was not
going to be easy. They expressed hope, however, that in time a ‘Dutch-Islam’ would
emerge. ‘Dutch-Islam’ was envisioned as a more liberal strand of Islam, which respected
religious and cultural diversity.
Parties in the United Kingdom and United States did not single out Islam as a
religion that needed special protection or Muslims as a people that should hand over
some of their fundamental civil rights. These parties merely stated that all religions were
protected under anti-discrimination legislation without going into any specifics. In the
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United States and United Kingdom, Islam was not framed within the context of British or
US ‘norms and values’. In the Netherlands, however, Dutch norms and values were
portrayed as a distinct part of the Dutch national identity. Therefore, any religious or
cultural expression seen as going against these was condemned as un-Dutch. For
instance, parties had no problem with Muslims women wearing the hijab or burqa in
public, but reminded them that in certain public offices, e.g., law enforcement, such face
and head coverings went against the office’s secular image.
Integration
Discussions about integration in all three countries focused on immigrants and
cultural and ethnic diversity. Yet, there were some differences in how these discussions
took place. I argued in Chapter Two that America was a ‘nation of immigrants’, unlike
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This difference explains why parties in these
countries used discussions of integration to address a ‘race relations problematic’ (e.g.,
the BNP or LPF), while the Democrats and Republicans focused on the celebration of
diversity and immigrants’ positive contributions to society. Although the Republicans
and Democrats saw immigrants as part of the ‘tapestry of the American life’, they also
believed that integration was an important step towards becoming ‘American’.
Integration for the Republicans contributed to social cohesion through the sharing of
common norms and values. That did not mean, however, that immigrants had to give up
their unique cultural expressions.
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In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, parties focused on immigrants as ‘a
social problem’. For instance, UKIP, the Conservatives, and BNP worried what the influx
of immigrants would do to the cultural and economic fabric of British society. The BNP
believed that immigrants ‘diluted the white race pool’ and took jobs away from
‘indigenous whites’. In the Netherlands, the LPF and VVD wanted a ban on immigration
because they were concerned that immigrants would strain social and financial resources
or change the democratic nature of society. The Dutch parties were particularly
disillusioned with the results of pillarization and believed that the establishment of an
‘Islamic pillar’ had done little to integrate Muslims into Dutch society. The idea of
pillarization resembled that of the salad-bowl; it was supposed to find a place for
Muslims in society where they could practice their own beliefs and live among them-
selves, yet frame these practices by the norms and values of the larger society. The
parties pointed at the murder of Van Gogh to argue that, despite pillarization, religious
fundamentalism was alive and well. They believed that the ‘one-dimensional’ nature of
Islam was to blame for Muslims’ failure to function within a pluralist society. Therefore,
they called for the inburgering of immigrants to turn them into a part of Dutch society
and suggested that, once Muslims were sufficiently ingeburgerd they would not feel a
need to return to (voluntary) religious or cultural isolation. Lastly, in discussions of
integration in all three countries, the burden of integration was mainly placed on the
shoulders of the immigrants. Institutional or individual discrimination, for instance, was
not discussed as a potential barrier to immigrants’ efforts to integrate. This oversight
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assumed that all autochthons were willing to welcome immigrants with open arms and
that racism or other forms of discrimination could be countered with integration. In this
context, hate crimes were seen as symptomatic of minority groups’ failed integration
rather than societies’ institutionalized hostilities against ‘outsiders’.
Security
There were only a few differences in parties’ discussions of security pre-9/11.
Parties in all three countries expressed their concerns about street crime, vandalism,
feeling safe in one’s neighborhood, juvenile delinquency, and financial security (e.g.,
unemployment). While financial security was mentioned in some of the parties’
discussions, most focused on crime. Parties were concerned about crime because it
destabilized society; in a society were people felt unsafe there was disconnect and little
cohesion. Pre-9/11, terrorism was not yet high on the political agenda of any party.
Instead, in all three countries, discussions of crime focused on juvenile delinquency.
Unemployed youth were seen as attractive bait for criminals. Because juveniles were the
next generation to hold society together, parties were concerned about their inability to
contribute to social cohesion. They, therefore, proposed strict new regulations and
punishments for juvenile delinquents in order to ‘lead them back onto the straight path’.
Post 9/11, a distinct shift in how security was framed took place. Parties were still
concerned with financial security, street crime, and juvenile delinquency, but also with
global and international terrorism and religious fundamentalism. As expected, the
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Republican and Democratic parties focused on the ‘War in Iraq’, and debated whether
they should have gone to war in the first place. The Democratic Party felt that the United
States had lost much international good-will when it invaded Iraq, while the Republicans
defended its actions by pointing at the perceived threat of Iraqi weapons of mass
destructions. For the Republicans, the ‘War in Iraq’ was not just about fighting enemies
on enemy territory, but also about spreading democratic values, such as freedom of
religion, to the rest of the world. This emphasis on religion, once more, shows its
centrality in the Republicans’ conceptualization of society.
In Europe, the 2004 Murder of Van Gogh and the 2005 London bombings had a
magnifying effect on political discussions on security. Parties became even more
concerned about terrorism and especially domestic terrorism, since the perpetrators had
been British and Dutch born citizens. The LPF and BNP in particular warned against the
threat of Islamic fundamentalism, both domestically and internationally, juxtaposing the
democratic ideals of freedom of religion and equality in the West against intolerance in
Islam and among Muslims.
Sexuality
I mentioned earlier that in all three countries, parties’ discussions of sexuality
were linked to social equality and the family. In the Netherlands, sexuality focused on
sexual orientation - LGBT rights and same-sex marriage. All parties believed that
homosexuals should not be discriminated against based on their sexual identity because
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having an identity was seen as a fundamental human right. That did not mean, however,
that the religious parties supported the idea of gay marriage or condoned same-sex sexual
relationships. Generally, however, both left and rightwing parties were in agreement that
homosexuality had become a culturally and legally accepted part of Dutch society. By
making the inburgerings movie Coming to the Netherlands (which showed same sex
couples holding hands and kissing, and topless women sunbathing) a mandatory part of
the inburgerings process, the government made citizenship or permanent residency
conditional on accepting equal rights for women and lesbians and gay men. Lastly,
parties like the CDA and PvdA linked sexuality to ethnicity by discussing the double
standard that existed when it came to women’s and men’s sexuality (women who had
pre-marital sex were often considered ‘whores’ while men were seen as ‘studs’) and
homophobia in Muslim communities.
In the United Kingdom and the United States, discussions on sexuality also
focused on sexual orientation and whether lesbians and gay men should have equal rights
to heterosexuals, including the right to marry. As expected, the conservative parties
argued that sexual orientation had no place in anti-discrimination laws and opposed same
sex marriage. Left-leaning parties agreed that sexual orientation should be part of anti-
discrimination legislation, but were not all in agreement on whether same-sex marriage
should be legalized. For instance, while the Lib Dems wholeheartedly supported same-
sex marriage, the Democrats believed that its legalization was something that should be
left to the states to decide. However, as a smaller party in a multi-party system, the Lib
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Dems had much less to lose by being outspoken about gay marriage than the Democrats
who were a large umbrella party.
Religion and Islam
In the United Kingdom, the theme of religion focused only on Islam. The BNP
called Islam a sexist, extremist, and anti-democratic religion, while UKIP linked the
presence of Imams in British society to the increase in religious fundamentalism post-
9/11. Discussions of Islam were seldom in-depth; they never focused on Islam as a faith
(a spiritual belief system build on six pillars
68
), discussed different strands of Islam (there
are many different varieties around the world depending on the region where it is
practiced), or the role it played in Muslims’ every-day lives. By linking Islam only to
themes of ‘violence’, ‘crime’, and ‘terrorism’, parties such as the BNP and UKIP
portrayed Islam and Muslims as inherently violent and unenlightened, and therefore as
ethnic outsiders.
In the United States discussions of religion were covert but omnipresent. As I
discussed earlier, in the Democrats’ and Republicans’ documents, ‘faith’ guided
discussions of national cohesion, the environment, security, and the family. Yet in none
of these discussions did the party define what it meant by ‘faith’ or explain why religion
played an important role in the every-day lives of Americans. Islam was not mentioned in
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There are six pillars in Islam: Hahadah (declaration of faith), Salaah (prayer), Zakat
(charity), Saum (fasting), Hajj (pilgrimage), Ijma (used to resolve theological conflicts),
and Sharia (the sacred law of Islam).
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connection to religion or any other categories (except, indirectly, to ‘security’). Cainkar
(2003) argues that pre-9/11, Muslims were politically and culturally invisible. She
ascribes this to the racial and ethnic diversity among Muslim peoples in the United States
and, therefore, their numerical invisibility. Subsequently, Muslims were identified by
their race rather than their religion; a person could be characterized as ‘Arab Muslim’,
‘Indonesian Muslim’, or ‘Black Muslim’, but never simply ‘Muslim’ as a homogeneous
ethnic construct. Islam was perceived as a religion rather than the ‘master status’ of one’s
ethnicity. Post-9/11, Cainkar (2003) continues, the ‘War on Terror’ did push Muslims
into the limelight, equating them from then on with ‘Arabs’. Though Cainkar’s argument
is supported by Salaita’s (2006) study on racial stereotypes pre- and post 9/11,
discussions in Democrats and Republicans’ documents showed little evidence of this.
In the Netherlands, religion was discussed in relation to several themes: the
environment (the idea of stewardship), democracy (emphasis on secularism and
separation of church and state), sexuality (the idea that sexual orientation, as an identity,
was assigned by God), and integration (the integration of Muslims into society and
Islam’s incompatibility with pluralism). Although ‘religion’ was linked to all of these
themes, party documents predominantly linked it to Islam and Muslims. Islam, clearly, is
a religion, yet was seldom framed as such. Rather, parties treated Islam as an ethnicity
and especially the cultural expression of Moroccan immigrants. Because Moroccans were
the second largest minority group in the country, it was much easier for parties to equate
the ethnicity of Islam’s practitioners with the religion than in the United States.
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Gender
Connell (1987) points out that gender can seldom be discussed as an isolated
construct. Indeed, discussions of gender were related to the family (women as the heart of
the traditional family), ethnicity (Muslim women in immigrant communities), inequality
(unequal pay in the labor market), crime (female genital mutilation and domestic
violence), social class (Muslim women in patriarchal, working class immigrant families),
sexuality (the double sexual standard that existed for women and men in Muslim
communities), and religion (Islam). It is interesting that men and masculinity were mostly
absent from political discussions, except for the Republicans’ and Democrats’ discussion
of responsible parenting and fatherhood. The absence of masculinity in discussions of
gender confirms Nagel’s (1998) argument that politics, per definition, are masculine and
because it is not hegemonic women and femininity stand out. It also demonstrates that
there was little awareness (or sense of urgency) of men’s roles in the perpetuation of
women’s inequality. For instance, the CDA voiced concern about the power imbalance
that existed in Muslim families, e.g., leading to domestic violence, yet relieved men of
any responsibility to correct this imbalance by emphasizing the need of women’s
emancipation in this process.
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Nationalism
Nationalism in the United Kingdom and the United States was discussed in vague
terms. Parties mentioned British or US ‘norms and values’ or stated that ‘hard work’,
‘diversity’, and ‘equality’ were part of a country’s national identity, but never concretely
identified what these values were or why they were typically ‘British’ or ‘American’.
From their discussions on nationalism, it never became clear what set aside an
‘American’ from a ‘Britton’. In Chapter One, I discussed Nagel (1998) and Mosse (1985)
who claimed that sexuality played important roles in the construction of nationalism in
the West. Their arguments are illustrated by the Republicans’ discussion of equality. The
party claimed that ‘equality’ was an important element of national identity, yet refused to
grant it based on sexual orientation. By excluding homosexuality from equality, the
GLBT communities were shut out of construction of the national identity.
In the Netherlands, nationalism was also defined through themes such as ‘norms
and values’, ‘hard work’, ‘financial independence’, ‘language’, ‘equality’, and
‘separation between church and state’. While it was unclear how these themes exactly
contributed to the Dutch national identity, what set discussions about nationalism in the
Netherlands apart from the United Kingdom and the United States were the limits that
were placed on the social freedoms of Muslims and parties’ justification for these limits.
Muslims were allowed to express themselves religiously and culturally, but within the
bounds of (legal) toleration in Dutch society. Expressions that went against these bounds,
such as the oppression of women or homophobia were rejected. This rejection was
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institutionalized through the Civic Integration Abroad Act and the earlier discussed
movie Coming to the Netherlands. Coming to the Netherlands showed that
homosexuality and women’s autonomy had become commonly accepted parts of the
legal and cultural fabric of Dutch society. In this context, Muslims were framed as ethnic
outsiders who had to accept the norms and values underlying Dutch society - such as
sexual and gender equality - in order to become true members of that society.
Gender, Sexuality, and Islam in Racialization
At the start of this Chapter, I provided a summary of the different ways in which
the categories of social cohesion, integration, security, religion, Islam, nationalism,
sexuality, and gender were discussed by parties in each of the three countries. Based on
these summaries, I identified similarities and differences between themes in the eight
categories. It is based on these differences and similarities that I explore the research
questions established in Chapter One:
1. How are gender and sexuality used in political debates on Muslims and Islam
in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States between 1999 and
2006?
a) What role does national identity play in the use of gender and sexuality
in these political debates?
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2. How do gender and sexuality contribute to the racialization of Muslims in the
Netherlands between 1999 and 2006?
Gender and Sexuality in Political Debates on Muslims and Islam in the
United Kingdom and the United States
The BNP, UKIP, and New Labour were the only British parties who discussed
Islam and Muslims in their brochures and pamphlets. UKIP was concerned about the
presence of Imams who were spreading radical ideologies in British society. It blamed
New Labour for allowing these Imams to enter the country under lax asylum seeker
policies in the 1990s. Because of these policies, UKIP argued, British society was
threatened by home-grown Islamic fundamentalists.
New Labour, on the other hand, praised Muslims for their contributions to the
United Kingdom. The party stated that British Muslims were a well-established part of
society and that they had contributed immensely to the nation’s prosperity. Muslims and
New Labour, it continued, also shared the same vision of social justice and equality. New
Labour’s positive framing of Muslims was an attempt to re-establish its Muslim voter
base. In 2003, the party had voted in favor of the invasion of Iraq. As a result, many
Muslim voters had abandoned the party for the Lib Dems, who had opposed the war. In
an attempt to mend fences with Muslim voters, the party, inadvertently, established them
as ‘others’. New Labour mention of “contributions to British society” and “attitude
towards social justice and equality” suggested that these contributions or this attitude
were not to be taken for granted. It established British Muslims as well-integrated
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‘others’ rather than equal citizens of the British nation. Both parties discussed Islam and
Muslims for political reasons. UKIP emphasized the merit of its anti-immigration agenda
by discussing the dangerous consequences of New Labour’s immigration policies. New
Labour touted its relationship with the Muslim community to regain an important voter
block. Neither party linked Islam and Muslims to gender or sexuality, although gender
(women’s equality) and sexuality (GLBT rights) were separately discussed.
The BNP was the only party who linked gender and sexuality to its discussion of
Muslims and Islam. In the leaflet Militant Muslims in London demonstrate against the
mild Danish cartoons of Muhammad (2006), the party warned that the growing presence
of Islam in British society would set back women’s emancipation. This ‘Islamification’
would strip white women of their autonomy. For instance, the party argued, they would
no longer be able to walk the streets without a head covering. The BNP’s statement was
both anti-immigration and anti-Islam. The only way in which Islam could legally impact
the autonomy of white non-Muslim women would be through the nationwide
introduction of Shari law or other drastic changes to British and EU human rights
legislation. This was unlikely since white non-Muslim Britons were the numerical
majority in the country. The BNP’s statement, however, warned white Britons of the
ramifications of unrestricted immigration. Too many immigrants would not only lead to
extinction of the ‘white race’, but also give unwanted ethnic minority groups dangerous
political powers. It is ironic that the BNP used women’s rights to frame Islam as sexist
and undemocratic, because the party was distinctly anti-feminist. It called claims of
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women’s equality to men ‘feminist myths’ and maintained that women were ‘equal of
value’.
During the research period, Republican and Democratic party documents made no
reference to Islam or Muslims. It could be argued that Islam was alluded to through the
‘War on Terror’. Government actions such as the wire-tapping or racial profiling of
Muslim Americans suggests that the ‘War on Terror’ was more than just a ‘clash of
ideologies’, as the Republicans claimed, but rather a clash between Islam and the West.
Nagel (1998) and Enloe (2000) argue that war and the military, essentially, are
patriarchic and masculine institutions. For instance, Nagel maintains that the language
used in wartime often serves to feminize the enemy (see also Dundes 1997). Puar (2006)
argues that the infamous Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq - naked prisoners stacked
upon each other - had as a goal to feminize and sexualize the prisoners and, through the
outrage the images caused in the Middle East, to equate Islam with sexism and
homophobia. After all, ‘what was wrong with men being naked together’. While there is,
indirectly, a case to make for the gendering of the ‘War on Terror’, a documented link
between this war and Islam - and thus gender and Islam - remains weak.
National identity was generally discussed in vague terms in the United Kingdom
and the United States. Links were made to values such as ‘equality’ and ‘diversity’, but
these values were never concretely defined in British or US documents. Earlier, I
discussed how political systems could influence the tone of discussions in documents.
However, the smaller parties in the United Kingdom were as vague in their construction
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of national identity as the larger umbrella parties in the United States. In the United
States, the Democrats and Republicans did frame equality as part of the norms and values
of US society. Both discussed equality in terms of rights for women, disabled people, or
old age pensioners. Yet the Republicans - unlike the Democrats - Excluded the right not
to be discriminated against on the grounds of sexual orientation from those cited as
deserving equal protection from the law. In terms of diversity, both parties agreed that
legal immigrants were a welcome addition to US society, conditional on their integration.
None of the themes connected to national identity, however, were linked to Islam (other
than a mention that freedom of religion - which would include Islam - was a ‘protected
right’).
In order for ‘a national identity’ discourse to emerge from parties’ documents,
there needs to be some consensus among parties on the elements that are perceived as
unique to an American identity. While the Democrats and Republicans agreed that gender
equality was such an element (as reflected in its proposed inclusion in anti-discrimination
legislation), there was a lack of consensus on sexual orientation. Similarly, in British
party documents, there was little consensus on the role of sexual orientation in social
equality. Regardless whether anti-discrimination legislation contributed to the
construction of an American national identity, the data show that Islam and Muslims
were not linked to themes of national identity, gender, or sexuality.
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Gender and Sexuality in Political Debates on Muslims and Islam in the
Netherlands
The data indicates that discussions of gender and sexuality were used to
demonstrate why there was a need for Muslims to integrate into Dutch society. It is
important to emphasize, however, that sexism or homophobia where not the only reasons
why parties wanted Muslims’ to integrate. Sexism and especially homophobia - given the
lack of rights for homosexuals in most western countries - symbolized what Dutch
society stood for: ‘intolerance of intolerance’. ‘Intolerance of intolerance’ was a left-over
of Dutch pluralism - the era of pillarization when Protestants, Catholics, and Socialists
lived peacefully side-by-side. It meant that in a pluralist society, people may not always
agree with a certain life style, but they still have to tolerate that fact that it exists. Across
the board, parties felt that Muslims lacked the ability of being tolerant of diversity. Some
politicians, like Fortuyn, blamed the absence of a separation of church and state in
Muslim communities for the rejection of pluralism. As Fortuyn mentioned in the Lower
House debate, Muslim immigrants who grew up in undemocratic societies may not know
any better and adhere to the belief that there is only one true religion and one way of life.
How did parties use gender in their discussions on Islam and Muslims? Parties
used gender to point out the sexism that existed in patriarchic Muslim communities and
to emphasize the need for Muslim women to emancipate. By urging the emancipation of
Muslim women, they protested women’s treatment in Islam and sent a warning to
Muslim men (and women) that gender equality was an important element of the Dutch
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democracy. Similarly, parties used gender equality to condemn practices such as female
genital mutilation and domestic violence; to show that Dutch society would not tolerate
infringements on women’s fundamental right. Lastly, gender was linked to sexuality to
point out the double sexual standards that existed for Muslim women and men. All of
these discussions served to juxtapose liberated autochthon Dutch women against
oppressed women in Muslim communities. The use of gender, thus, served to emphasize
some of the fundamental rights that existed in society and that were part of the national
identity.
In addition to gender, sexuality was linked to sexual orientation and homophobia.
Parties were concerned about the rights of lesbians and gay men in Muslim communities,
and the ways in which Muslims responded to the GLBT community in general. In a
society where same-sex marriage was legalized in 2000, homophobic behavior was
considered unacceptable. The VVD argued that, over the years, homosexuality had
become a common part of Dutch society; a fact that should be accepted by those that
wished to live there. This belief was echoed by the Dutch government who made sexual
orientation and gender equality a part of the Civic Integration Abroad Act and, thereby, of
its official, legal stance towards social equality. Muslims’ rights, thus, were framed by
the social and legal bounds of toleration that existed in Dutch society. Sexuality and
gender were fundamental parts of those bounds. Parties used sexism and homophobia to
make a statement: Muslims had a right to freedom of religion and expression, but these
should not interfere with the rights of others - more established minorities - in society.
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Gender and Sexuality and the Racialization of Muslims in the
Netherlands between 1999 and 2006
I mentioned in Chapter One that I was intrigued by Van Dam’s Lower House
debate claim that Fortuyn’s statements on sexism and domestic violence in Muslim
communities contributed to the racialization of Muslims. Based on the collected data, I
found that Muslims were racialized in four ways. First, all immigrants in the Netherlands
were portrayed as Muslims. None of the parties specified which ethnic group they were
talking about when they referred to ‘immigrants’. By referring only to Muslims and Islam
when discussing themes relating to immigration and integration, in the long run, the term
‘immigrant’ became synonymous with ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’.
Second, parties treated ‘Muslims’ as a homogenous ethnic and racial group,
thereby ignoring the diversity that existed within the Muslim community. In 2006, 5%
(approximately 850,000) of 16,334,210 Dutch citizens identified themselves as Muslim.
Of this 5%, 38% were of Turkish descent, 31% of Moroccan, and the remainder had roots
in Suriname, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Pakistan, Iran, the Netherlands, Egypt,
Indonesia, and Tunisia (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2009). Despite this ethnic and
racial diversity, parties’ discussions focused predominantly on Moroccan Muslims.
Turkish Muslims, the largest minority group, were seldom discussed in relation to Islam.
This is most likely because Turkish society is officially secular and Turkey is currently in
negotiations to enter the European Union. Unlike Moroccans, Turks were seen as part of
Europe. Through parties’ discussion, ‘Muslim’ became synonymous with ‘Moroccan’.
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Third, Islam was framed as a cultural practice, not a religion. It was seldom talked
about in the same faith-based terms like Christianity. For instance, while religious parties
used ‘the word of God’ to justify their stances against abortion, euthanasia, or same-sex
marriage, the Prophet Mohammed was never mentioned- or allowed to be used - to
‘justify’ sexist or homophobic stances taken by some Muslims towards women’s rights
and homosexuality. Fourth, Islam was framed as incompatible with Dutch norms and
values. Parties alleged that Islam and Muslims were out of touch with the demands that
were placed upon adults in societies in the West, such as an emphasis on education,
financial independence, recognition of equality for women and lesbians and gay men, and
a separation of church and state. By equating Muslims with Moroccans (despite the racial
diversity that existed in Muslim communities) and portraying Islam as an expression of
ethnicity, Muslims were portrayed as a racial rather than religious group. Furthermore, by
pointing at Islam and Muslims’ incompatibility with Dutch norms and values - using
gender inequality and homophobia - they were portrayed as national outsiders.
Sexuality, Gender, Race, and Intersectionality
In Chapter One, I argued that Omi and Winant’s (1994) racial formation theory fails to
elaborate on the roles that gender and sexuality play in the construction of racial
categories. I then mentioned how the work of intersectional scholars such as Crenshaw,
Hill Collins, and Nagel has attempted to address this flaw. Finally, I stated that this
dissertation moved beyond the feminist scholarship from which intersectionality
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originated. Instead of focusing on the way that women experience inequality, I used the
basic premise of intersectionality to explore the racialization of Muslim women and men.
Keeping the aforementioned statements in mind, I will address the following questions:
Do my research findings support the argument that gender and sexuality contributed to
the construction of racial categories? And how has my dissertation contributed to the
scholarship on intersectionality?
The answer to the first question is a partial “yes”. The data show that sexuality
and gender contributed to the construction of race, but mostly in the Netherlands. The
follow-up question would then be: how did they contribute to the construction of race in
the Netherlands? Nagel’s Ethnicity and Sexuality (2000) looks at the way in which
ethnicity and race are sexualized. She argues that the proscription of sexual behavior
(who can do what with whom) establishes boundaries around ethnic and racial groups.
For instance, the BNP, publically, opposed interracial relationships. Non-whites - and
especially Muslims as a non-white, non-Christian minority group - were portrayed as
sexually dangerous because they formed a threat to the purity of the white race. The
Dutch data, however, do not support Nagel’s argument. Unlike the BNP, Dutch parties
showed no objections to Muslim women or men engaging in consensual sexual
relationships with Dutch non-Muslims. Furthermore, parties displayed no concrete
expectations of sexually normative behavior. Some parties, such as the CDA, stressed the
importance of the traditional family while others, like the SGP, rallied against gay
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marriage. Yet, neither of these parties used heterosexuality as a condition for Dutch
(informal) citizenship.
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I found that sexuality and gender contributed to the construction of Muslims as a
racial group through what they represented. In Dutch political discourses, sexuality and
gender represented ‘social equality’. Parties focused on sexism and homophobia to
emphasize the national importance of ‘intolerance of intolerance’. Gender and sexual
equality were framed as fundamental rights and, as such, part of traditional norms and
values. In turn, these norms and values were linked to the construction of Dutch national
identity. Rejection of equality between men and women or of homosexuality was seen as
rejection of the national identity. Parties’ discussions about sexuality and gender that
portrayed Muslims (and particular North African Muslims) as sexist and homophobic,
established Muslims as national and, through their racialization, racial outsiders.
There is a potential problem with this line of reasoning. The SGP and CU both
considered homosexuality a sin. In addition, the SGP described women as ‘equal of
value,’ but not ‘equal to’ men. Yet, none of the Dutch parties made an effort to exclude
SGP or CU voters from the Dutch national identity. I suggest that parties’ reluctance to
take SGP or CU voters to task over their sexist and homophobic attitudes was because
they already were formal and informal citizens. Furthermore, while the parties opposed
homosexuality as a sexual practice, they argued that homosexuality as an identity
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Nagel’s work focuses predominantly on the United States. Historical race relations in
the US could account for the differences in attitudes towards interracial relationships
between the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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deserved protection. In contrast, Islam condemned both the practice and identity and,
thereby, rejected any form of equality for lesbians and gay men. I also believe that in the
post-9/11 political and social climate, and especially after the murder of Theo van Gogh,
Dutch society was wary of Muslims and Islam. In that sense, Muslims’ religion
influenced how they were socially perceived. Muslims as a religious group were seen as a
potential (ideological) security threat to the Dutch democracy. Types of behavior that
were deemed indicative of fundamentalism, e.g., women wearing a hijab or burqa, would
set of alarm bells.
What do the above discussed findings indicate about the influence of gender and
sexuality on the construction of race? My findings show that this influence was not
rooted in state policy (e.g., anti-miscegenation laws), sexualization (e.g., portraying
Muslim Arab men as sexually deviant), or behavior (e.g., interracial relationships), but
that political discussions about gender and sexuality served a similar, racializing function.
Furthermore, my findings suggest that sexuality and gender did not influence the
construction of the ‘Muslim race’ as ‘identities’ - masculinity/femininity, straight/gay -
but rather as ‘political and symbolic concepts’: ‘violence against women’, ‘hijab, ‘gay
marriage’, ‘female genital mutilation.’
That brings me to my final question: in what ways has my dissertation contributed
to intersectional scholarship? The contribution of this dissertation is twofold. Foremost, it
has shown that in addition to gender and sexuality, religion and national identity played
important roles in the racialization of Muslims. It, thereby, established both as systems of
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oppression. Especially in societies with large religious minority populations it can be
expected that religion and nationalism influence how, for instance, Muslim women
experience inequality (see Buitelaar 2006). Most intersectional studies focus on a
standard set of systems: gender, race, sexuality, and social class. I suggest that
nationalism and religion should be included in this list. Furthermore, by moving beyond
feminist theory and using intersectionality to examine the racialization of Muslim women
and men, I have shown that the theory can be applied to other fields of study as well.
Using intersectionality in political sociology, for example, gives insight into how nations
and nationalism are constructed. Most studies of nationalism focus on race (Barker 1981;
Hall 1989; Gilroy 1991; Ogbar 2004), religion (Rieffer 2003; Spohn 2003; Beasley
2004), gender (Nagel 2000; 2003), or sexuality (Mosse 1985; Pruke 1998; Stoller 2002;
Ordover 2003; Donovan 2006) as separate spheres. Nagel’s Masculinity and Nationalism
(1998) is one of the few that have looked at the ways in which these constructions
intersect. She does not, however, include a focus on religion. Religion should be included
in discussions of nationalism; my findings show that race, gender, sexuality, and religion
all played important roles in the construction of the Dutch national identity.
Finally, intersectionality complicates research on multiculturalism. Using
intersectionality to examine debates about multiculturalism exposes the complexities
inherent in power relations. For instance, the inburgering of Muslim immigrants was
encouraged not only because they were perceived as ‘non-European’, ‘non-Dutch’, or
‘non-Christian’, but also because their attitudes towards gender and sexual equality did
255
not fit in with the existing norms and values in Dutch society. This incompatibility, in
turn, was attributed to the fundamentalist tendencies of Islam, which subsequently was
framed as an ‘undemocratic’ religion. Debates about Muslim immigrants and
inburgering, thus, are not just debates about multiculturalism, but also about political
representations of sexuality and gender, religion, national identity and, eventually, race.
By complicating discussions about multiculturalism, a more realistic picture of power
relations in society emerges. It allows scholars who study such debates to read between
the lines and ask what types of integration politicians are really talking about, e.g., racial
or sexual.
What is Next?
On February 10, 2009, far-right politician Geert Wilders was barred from entering
the United Kingdom where he had planned to show his movie Fitna (2008). The
controversial movie shows in graphic detail some of the consequences of Islamic
fundamentalism such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2004 murder of Van Gogh, the
2005 London bombings, and the aftermath of suicide bombings in Israel. A large section
of the movie is devoted to images of men stoning and flogging women who were victims
of rape or accused of adultery, and the hanging of men accused of having engaged in
homosexual encounters. The central message of the movie is that Islam is an inherently
violent and barbaric religion, which threatens the very ideals of western societies: those
of fundamental human rights.
256
The British authorities argued that Wilder’s anti-Islam views threatened social
cohesion in the United Kingdom and therefore formed a threat to the country’s public
security. Upon his arrival, at Heathrow Airport, with camera crews following his every
move, Wilders was escorted back to his airplane by a crowd of police officers. Since the
images of Wilders being denied entrance to the United Kingdom were broadcasted in the
Netherlands, his party, Group Wilders, sky-rocketed in the election polls. Wilders’ use of
gender and sexuality in his political discourse is the latest signal that Dutch politicians, at
all ends of the political spectrum, continue to use these constructs as political tools.
257
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Appendix I
Dutch Categories identified at the first
data collection stage
1. Asylum Seekers
2. Black/White Schools
3. Boys’ Independence
4. Change
5. Christianity
6. Citizenship
7. Civil Partnership
8. Constitution
9. Core Values
10. Crime
11. Culture
12. Cultural Diversity
13. Death Penalty
14. Democracy
15. Deterioration
16. Disadvantage
17. Disenfranchised
Muslim Youth
18. Dual Nationality
19. Education
20. Emancipation
21. Empathy
22. Euthanasia
23. Financial
Independence
24. Freedom of
Expression
25. Freedom of Religion
26. Freedom of Speech
27. Fundamentalism
28. Gay Adoption
29. Gay Marriage
30. Gender
31. Girls’ Independence
32. Globalization
33. Global Security
34. Identity
35. Immigration
36. “Inburgering”
37. Individualism
38. Integration
39. International
Cooperation
40. Iraq
41. Imams
42. Intimacy
43. Islam
44. Israel
45. Juvenile Delinquency
46. Laissez-Faire
47. Language
48. “Lover Boys”
49. Media
50. Mosques
51. Muslims
52. Muslim Youth
53. Muslim Terrorists
54. National Security
55. Neighborhood
56. Netherlands
57. Norms and Values
58. 9/11
59. Out of Control Youth
60. Pim Fortuyn
61. Police
62. Politics
63. Pollution
64. Poverty
65. Prostitution
66. Refugees
67. Religion
68. Religious Prosecution
69. Religious Freedom
70. Responsibility
71. Russia
72. Safety
73. Secularism
74. Security
75. Separation Church
& State
76. Sex Trafficking
77. Sexuality
78. Sexuality and
Media
79. Sexuality and
Public Space
80. Shared
Responsibility
81. Social Change
82. Social Cohesion
83. Social
Relationships
84. Solidarity
85. Terrorism
86. Theo van Gogh
87. Unemployed
88. Vandalism
89. Violence against
Women
90. Violence against
Minority Women
91. Violence against
Muslim Women
92. Welfare
93. Women and Family
94. Women’s Genital
Mutilation
95. Women in the
Labor Market
101. Women and
Sexuality
102. Women and Social
Stability
103. Women’s Rights
104. Youth
274
Appendix II
British Categories identified at the first
data collection stage
1. Acceptable Behavior
2. Contracts
3. Anti-Globalization
4. Asylum Seekers
5. Biological Race
6. British Pound
7. Britishness
8. Building Block
9. Bureaucracy
10. Civil Liberties
11. Civil Partnership
12. Conflict Theory
13. Countryside
14. Crime
15. Danish Cartoons
16. Education
17. Euro
18. European Union
19. European
Constitution
20. Ethnocentrism
21. Ethnic Minority
22. Family
23. Family Values
24. Fear of Crime
25. Freedom
26. Freedom of Speech
27. Full
28. Gender
29. Homosexuality
30. Human Rights Act
1998
31. Illegal Immigration
32. Imams
33. Immigration
34. Indigenous whites
35. Inequality
36. Inner-city
37. Institutional Racism
38. Integration
39. Interracial
Relationships
40. Islam
41.
42. Islamophobia
43. Islamic Fundamentalism
44. Isolationism
45. Laissez Faire
46. Language
47. Monarchy
48. Muslims
49. Multiculturalism
50. Multiracialism
51. 9/11
52. Nondiscrimination
53. Nuclear Family
54. Parental Control
Agreements
55. Police
56. Political Correctness
57. Positive Discrimination
58. Poverty
59. Primary Purpose Rule
60. Quality of Life
61. Quasi-Marxist
62. Qur’an
63. Race
64. Racism
65. Racial Purity
66. Race Relations Act 1979
67. Race Relations
Amendment Act 2000
68. Scarf
69. Section 28
70. Security
71. 7/7
72. Sexuality
73. Single Equality Act
74. Social Cohesion
75. Social Segregation
76. Sovereignty
77. Terrorism
78. Traditional Family
79. Unemployment
80.
81. Uniculturalism
82. Victims’ rights
83. Violence
84. Voter base
85. White Privilege
86. White Supremacy
87. Women and Labor
Market
88. Youth
275
Appendix III
US Categories identified at the first
data collection stage
1. Afghanistan
2. Globalization
3. Building Block
4. Civil Rights
5. Contraception
6. Crime
7. Democracy
8. Diversity
9. Domestic Violence
10. Education
11. Environment
12. Ethnic Minority
13. Faith
14. Family
15. Family Values
16. Foreign Policy
17. Freedom
18. Freedom of Religion
19. Freedom of Speech
20. Gender
21. Homosexuality
22. Illegal Immigration
23. Immigration
24. Inequality
25. Integration
26. Iraq
27. Islam
28. Juvenile Delinquency
29. Language
30. Liveable Community
31. Moral Pollution
32. Muslims
33. Multiculturalism
34. 9/11
35. Nondiscrimination
36. Nuclear Family
37. Positive Discrimination
38. Poverty
39. Prosperity
40. Racism
41. Religion
42. Responsible Fatherhood
43. Role model
44. Security
45. Sexuality
46. Sexual Orientation
47. Social Cohesion
48. Stewardship
49. Strong Community
50. Terrorism
51. Traditional Family
52. War on Terror
53. White Privilege
54. Women and Labor
Market
55. Woman’s Right to
Choose
56. Women’s Equality
Abstract (if available)
Linked assets
University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses
Asset Metadata
Creator
Jong, Jung-Whan de
(author)
Core Title
Gender and sexuality in Dutch, British, and US politicial debates on multiculturalism, Islam, and Muslims between 1999 and 2006
School
College of Letters, Arts and Sciences
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Program
Sociology
Publication Date
07/20/2009
Defense Date
06/15/2009
Publisher
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(original),
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Tag
Multiculturalism,Netherlands,OAI-PMH Harvest,Politics
Place Name
Netherlands
(countries),
United Kingdom
(countries),
USA
(countries)
Language
English
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(provenance)
Advisor
Kaplan, Elaine Bell (
committee chair
), Messner, Michael A. (
committee member
), Renteln, Alison Dundes (
committee member
)
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dejong@usc.edu,mjwdejong@yahoo.com
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