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The Army’s process to evaluate costs versus benefits: a case study on the change of command ceremonies

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The Army’s process to evaluate costs versus benefits: a case study on the change of command ceremonies

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The Army’s Process to Evaluate Costs Versus Benefits: A Case Study on the Change of
Command Ceremonies
by
Ryan Malin

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC ROSSIER SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

December 2020

Copyright 2020 Ryan Malin

ii
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my dissertation chair, Dr. Jennifer Phillips, whose direct,
thoughtful, and engaging feedback significantly enhanced my writing, thinking, and work ethic
required to be successful in this doctoral research. I would also like to thank my dissertation
committee members, Dr. Don Murphy and Dr. Helena Seli, whose valuable feedback and insight
challenged me to exceed my expectations throughout this process.

iii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... ii
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. v
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ vi
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... vii
Chapter One: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1
Organizational Context and Mission .................................................................................. 2
Organizational Goal ............................................................................................................ 3
Related Literature ................................................................................................................ 4
Importance of the Evaluation .............................................................................................. 5
Description of Stakeholder Groups ..................................................................................... 6
Stakeholder Group for the Study ........................................................................................ 7
Purpose of the Project and Questions ................................................................................. 8
Methodological Framework ................................................................................................ 9
Definitions ........................................................................................................................... 9
Organization of the Project ............................................................................................... 12
Chapter Two: Review of the Literature ........................................................................................ 13
Influences on the Problem of Practice .............................................................................. 14
Role of Stakeholder Group of Focus ................................................................................ 25
Clark and Estes’ (2008) Knowledge, Motivation, and Organizational Influences
Framework ........................................................................................................................ 26
Conceptual Framework ..................................................................................................... 46
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 51
Chapter Three: Methods ............................................................................................................... 52
Participating Stakeholders ................................................................................................ 52
Interview Sampling Criteria and Rationale ....................................................................... 53
Interview Sampling (Recruitment) Strategy and Rationale .............................................. 54
Observation Sampling Criteria and Rationale .................................................................. 56
Data Collection and Instrumentation ................................................................................ 57
Data Analysis .................................................................................................................... 59
Credibility and Trustworthiness ........................................................................................ 60
Ethics and Role of Researcher .......................................................................................... 60
Bias ................................................................................................................................... 62
Chapter Four: Findings ................................................................................................................. 64
Participating Stakeholders ................................................................................................ 65
Results Research Question One ........................................................................................ 67
Results Research Question Two ....................................................................................... 83
Synthesis of Findings ........................................................................................................ 88

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Chapter Five: Recommendations for Practice to Address KMO Influences ................................ 91
Integrated Implementation and Evaluation Plan ............................................................. 103
Limitations and Delimitations ......................................................................................... 116
Strengths and Limitations of the Approach .................................................................... 119
Future Research .............................................................................................................. 121
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 122
References ................................................................................................................................... 124
Appendix A ................................................................................................................................. 142
Appendix B ................................................................................................................................. 146

v
List of Tables
Table 1: Organizational Mission, Global Goal, and Stakeholder Goal…………………………….7
Table 2: Knowledge Influences, Types, and Assessment for Analysis…………………………...34
Table 3: Motivational Influences and Assessments for Analysis…………………………………40
Table 4: Organizational Influences and Assessments for Analysis……………………………….46
Table 5: Participants……………………………………………………………………………...66
Table 6: Production Loss Costs Concept………………………………………………………....71
Table 7: Findings and Totaled Response………………………………………………………....90
Table 8: Summary of Knowledge Influences and Recommendations……………………………92
Table 9: Summary of Motivation Influences and Recommendations…………………………….96
Table 10: Summary of Organization Influences and Recommendations…………………………99
Table 11: Outcomes, Metrics, and Methods for External and Internal Outcomes……………..105
Table 12: Critical Behaviors, Metrics, Methods, and Timing for Evaluation………………….106
Table 13: Required Drivers to Support Critical Behaviors……………………………………..108
Table 14: Components of Learning for the Program……………………………………...........111
Table 15: Components to Measure Reactions to the Program…………………………………112

vi
List of Figures
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of the Change of Command Ceremonies…………………….50
Figure 2: Procedural Knowledge of the Cost-benefit Analysis………………………………….74
Figure 3: Sample of the Cost-benefit Analysis Tool…………………………………………...115

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Abstract
This study applies the Clark and Estes (2008) gap analysis model as the methodological
framework to determine how senior advisors of the U.S. Army evaluate the costs of ceremonies.
This research focused on the change of command ceremonies at a specific division to gain an
understanding of how these senior advisors determine the value of the change of command
ceremonies, how the ceremonies impact combat readiness posturing, and if the organization
prioritizes cost reduction efforts for the change of command ceremonies. Through literature
review and interviews of 10 senior advisors, this research was able to identify the knowledge,
motivation, and organizational influences associated with the change of command ceremonies.
This study uncovered production loss costs associated with these ceremonies, and whether these
influences were present at the organization and amongst the senior advisors. The findings
discovered gaps in all three influence types. Senior advisors lacked both the critical skills
regarding cost-benefit analysis and an understanding of production loss costs, and the
organization did not provide the necessary support for senior advisors to evaluate the value of the
change of command ceremonies. The study concludes with recommendations, consisting of a
robust training-based solution and an implementation plan to close the gaps.

1
Chapter One: Introduction
This study addressed the problem of the Army lacking an effective process to evaluate
resource and production loss costs for the change of command ceremonies and its impact on
combat readiness training. Research into this problem of practice also presented an area of
exploration and opportunity for the Army to develop strategies for effective evaluation strategies
to increase potential training time. For the purposes of this study, the excessive use of resources
to sustain the practice of the Army’s change of command ceremonies has been examined as the
example of just such a need for evaluation of resource expenditures in comparison to the overall
value of the activity. These ceremonies exist to mark the authority transfer from one
commanding officer to another (Department of the Army, 2014). In attendance are all of the
soldiers under the command, assembled in a mass formation, ranging from 600 to 20,000
soldiers (Department of the Army, 2012b). During each of these ceremonies, soldiers experience
a loss of production cost; whether firing a rifle, developing tactics, or maintaining physical
fitness, soldiers must disrupt their valuable combat readiness preparations to set up, tear down,
and attend these events (Saum-Manning et al., 2019). This production loss cost negatively
impacts the Army’s highest priority: combat readiness (Esper, 2017). Additionally, attendance is
mandatory for the soldiers. When a commander conducts a change of command ceremony, his or
her troops stand in a stationary position, as explained in the Army’s corresponding instruction
manual (Department of the Army, 2012b).
Sustaining this 250-year-old tradition, among others such as accountability formations,
fire guard duty, and holiday safety briefings, while other combat assets have struggled to achieve
maximum combat readiness demonstrates that this is a problem (Esper, 2017; Wong & Gerras,
2015). Calculating production loss costs (elaborated in the definitions section) for an

2
organization starts by taking the average hourly wage of an employee and multiplying that by the
number of employees. The production loss costs for these ceremonies extend beyond the
$404,200 per hour financial cost, and impact critical combat readiness (Zou et al., 2016;
Aboagye et al., 2016). Each command position is a two-year assignment, requiring every
organization at each of the four echelons (company, battalion, brigade, and division) to execute a
change of command (Department of the Army, 2014). In other words, each soldier is likely to
attend at least two per year. This problem is important to address because this tribute to
ceremony, tradition, and discipline may be restricting the Army’s efficiency, potential, and
capabilities (Wong & Gerras, 2015), and must all be considered when determining the value of
these events through cost-benefit analysis (Department of the Army, 2016a).
Organizational Context and Mission
The organization of focus was the Division, a pseudonym selected to protect the identity
of the specific organization analyzed in this study, consisting of approximately 20,000 active-
duty soldiers, located within the continental United States. The Division’s mission has been
described as the following: to deploy trained and combat-ready forces to conduct decisive action
to prevent, shape, and win in combat operations in support of US national interests.
From records obtained from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a report on the
Division’s demographics was obtained. Of the Division’s roughly 20,000 soldiers, 91% were
male and 9% were female. Ethnicity was reported as the following: 78% as
unknown/other/unknown, 8% as Mexican, 3% as Puerto Rican, 3% as other Hispanic, and the
remaining 8% were comprised of assorted ethnicities of less than 2% each. Race was reported as
the following: 73% White, 18% Black, 5% Asian, 3% other/unknown, and 1% as American
Indian. The following was reported as the education levels of the soldiers assigned to the

3
Division: 4.37% earned an associate degree, 11.97% earned a bachelor’s degree, 2.25% earned a
master’s degree, and .12% earned a doctorate degree.
Organizational Goal
The Division’s aspirational goal presented in this research is to reduce the production loss
costs per change of command ceremony by 25%. This goal would translate to either a 25%
reduction in the number of soldiers required to participate, or a 25% reduction of hours spent to
rehearse, prepare, and conduct the change of command ceremonies. This would mean that a
change of command ceremony consisting of 1,000 participants and a four-hour time span would
need to be reduced to either 750 participants or to a three-hour time span. This goal reflects the
Division’s priorities and lines of effort, supporting the focus on combat readiness. This reduction
will allow more time and resources to be used toward combat-readiness tasks necessary for
deployment posture to meet the Division’s primary mission. To achieve a satisfactory level of
combat-readiness, the Division and its approximately 20,000 soldiers, must be current on all
qualifications and certifications, current on immunizations and medical requirements, and
cleared of any administrative restrictions. This has been an ongoing struggle due to high turnover
rates amongst personnel, resource availability, and time restrictions. Readiness levels are
reported from the company level (approximately 200-300 soldiers) through sophisticated
tracking systems known as the Digital Training Management System (DTMS) and through the
Medical Protection System (MEDPROS). These systems allow the visibility of each
organization's status. Key leadership personnel attend quarterly meetings to discuss the status
updates and struggles to ensure numbers are within tolerance. The commanding general of the
Division sets the standards, using guidance from the Department of Defense at the strategic level.

4
Related Literature
The literature referenced addresses the Division’s guidance on change of command
ceremonies as well as the research that explains the fiscal, mental, and professional impact of
these events. The Army’s Training Circular #3-21.5 (TC 3-21.5) serves as the primary source for
instructions on how to execute ceremonies, such as change of command ceremonies (Department
of the Army, 2012b), and shall be referenced throughout this document when discussing the
Army’s official guidance on ceremony execution. The then-Secretary of the Army Mark Esper
(2017) published an announcement online, describing first, second, and third priorities for the US
Army. These priorities have targeted areas for improvement, such as readiness, modernization,
and reform, each having substantial association and relevance to the problem of practice. As the
senior civilian official in the Army, his published direction has been fundamentally relevant to
the topics and will be frequently referenced when discussing the organizational goal. When
comparing practices outlined in TC 3-21.5 (Department of the Army, 2012b) against the
organizational goals published by Esper (2017), performance gaps were evaluated using Clark
and Estes’ model of assessing knowledge, motivation, and organizational gaps, along with the
cost-benefit assessment (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Literature is examined in Chapter Two that discusses the relationship between many
aspects of the change of command ceremonies as well as the inefficiencies (Brunett et al., 2007),
fiscal costs (Romano & Nunamaker, 2001), and impact on employee well-being (Luong &
Rogelberg, 2005; Rogelberg et al., 2012) of organizational meetings. Data is also be presented
that identifies effective strategies toward the Division’s improved execution of the change of
command ceremony (Rogelberg et al., 2007). Additionally, literature establishes a strong
urgency for the organization to conduct evaluation of practices (Drew & 3M Meeting

5
Management Team, 1994), facilitating toward more effective practices to help reduce costs,
maximize productivity, and close the gap on combat readiness.
Comparing the Division’s guidance against relevant literature, research, and studies was
evaluated using the Clark and Estes (2008) gap analysis. Evaluating the problem of practice
through the use of the related literature identified performance gaps, supported by peer-reviewed
research. Applying the principles and theories gleaned from the related literature helped develop
strategies and recommendations for the Division to close the identified performance gaps.
Importance of the Evaluation
It is important to evaluate the organization’s current performance levels in relation to its
aspirational performance goal to reduce the production loss costs per change of command
ceremony by 25%, contributing to the Division’s efforts to increase training time toward
compliant levels of combat-readiness. Evaluating current performance levels and desired
performance goal levels is necessary when developing subsequent steps to close the performance
gap (Clark and Estes, 2008). The cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a standard practice that is
universally used across all modern business models (Boardman et al., 2017; Newcomer et al.,
2015; Pearce, 2016).
The importance of evaluating the change of command ceremonies coincides with the
then-Secretary of the Army’s third priority: reform. This is described as improving the efficiency
of tasks that consume time, resources, and personnel (Esper, 2017), making the organization’s
performance evaluation a priority as well as a responsibility. The Division continues to strive to
achieve optimal combat-readiness percentages by maximizing efficiency and may benefit from
an evaluation of some of its practices using the Clark and Estes (2008) model. The Division may
discover opportunities to close the performance gap and achieve or exceed the organizational

6
goal directed by the then-Secretary of the Army (Esper, 2017). The consequences of an absence
of evaluation can impede on the organization’s potential. Kirkpatrick (2006), Boylan (2017), and
Ebrahim (2010) pointed out the value and responsibility to evaluate an organization’s practices.
Description of Stakeholder Groups
There are key stakeholder groups that make a significant contribution to the Division’s
primary goal. Given their contributions, stakeholders also benefit from achieving the
organization’s aspirational goal: to reduce the production loss costs per change of command
ceremony by 25%. This allows more time and resources to be used toward combat-readiness
training and related tasks necessary for deployment posture. These stakeholder groups consist of:
commanders, the commanding officer for each subordinate unit, that will generate the orders to
achieve the organizational goal; the mid-level NCOs, regarded as the mid-level managers, that
will ensure proper execution the commander’s orders as per the guidance and direction of the
senior advisors; the Division’s G8 section, responsible for programming and resourcing of the
Division’s activities through meticulous accountability and analysis (Office of the US Army
Deputy Chief of Staff, 2020); and the Division’s senior advisors, responsible for developing and
implementing strategies to reduce production loss costs associated with the change of command.
Division senior advisors consist of only Command Sergeants Major (CSMs) and First Sergeants
(1SGs).

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Table 1
Organizational Mission, Global Goal, and Stakeholder Goal

Stakeholder Group for the Study
While the overall aspirational goal of the Division is a joint effort that requires several
stakeholders to make significant contributions, the stakeholder group for the study was the senior
advisors: Command Sergeants Major (CSMs) and First Sergeants (1SGs). CSMs and 1SGs serve
as advisors to their designated commander. The colloquial term senior advisors was developed
for this research to label these CSMs and 1SGs as a single group, recognizing their near-identical
roles and responsibilities in the Division. These senior enlisted members typically have the most
experience and military education within the organization. CSMs and 1SGs primarily manage
the organization's resources, training, and personnel (Department of the Army, 2015).
Commanders of every organization adhere to the strict guidelines of the duties and
responsibilities published in the Army’s Regulation 600-20 (Department of the Army, 2014).
Although the senior advisors help manage the resources, training, and personnel of the
organization, the commanders hold the responsibility of these elements. For every commanding
officer serving in a command position, he or she is matched with a senior advisor counterpart.
These senior advisors leverage their wealth of experience and military education to assist their
Organizational Mission
The mission of the Division is to deploy trained and combat-ready forces to conduct decisive
action to prevent, shape, and win in combat operations in support of US national interests.
Organizational Goal
Reduce the production loss costs per change of command ceremony by 25%.
Senior Advisors’ Goal
Develop and implement strategies to reduce production loss costs associated with the change
of command.

8
commanders in all aspects of the organization. Together, the pair comprises the command team,
a term used to acknowledge the unified effort of the organizational leadership (Department of the
Army, 2012c).
These stakeholders were the focal group of this study because of their influence on the
organization. Serving as both mentors to their mid-level managers and advisors to their
commanders, these stakeholders leverage their influence, which extends vertically throughout the
chain of command (Department of the Army, 2012c). Their insight on change of command
ceremonies, production loss costs, and soldier well-being made this stakeholder group ideal for
this study.
Purpose of the Project and Questions
The purpose of this project aimed to evaluate stakeholder knowledge, motivation, and
organizational influences associated with the Division’s change of command ceremonies and the
impact toward achieving the organizational goal. While a complete evaluation project would
focus on all Division stakeholders, for practical purposes, the stakeholders focused on in this
analysis were the senior advisors (CSMs and 1SGs) assigned to the Division.
As such, the questions that guided this study were the following:
1. What are the senior advisors’ knowledge and motivation related to developing and
implementing strategies to reduce production loss costs per ceremony?
2. What is the interaction between organizational culture and context and senior advisors’
knowledge and motivation to develop and implement strategies to reduce production loss
costs?

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3. What are the recommendations for organizational practice in the areas of knowledge,
motivation, and organizational resources related to developing and implementing
strategies to reduce production loss costs per ceremony?
Methodological Framework
McEwan and McEwan (2003) discussed how qualitative research involves the researcher
considering various interpretations and explanations on what is taking place. To best explore
some of the interpretations of the production loss costs and the associated knowledge,
motivation, and organizational influences, the stakeholders were asked open-ended questions to
help the researcher gain a holistic understanding of the problem of practice (Clark & Estes,
2008). Qualitative research also allowed the opportunity for subsequent questions or
clarification, important in this research with the senior advisors; interviewees may have been
unfamiliar with the concept of production loss costs and would require a brief explanation before
proceeding with the interview. This is conducive to the qualitative approach. Therefore, the
intent was to administer qualitative research for this study. Utilizing an inductive approach
helped identify theories, trends, and concepts among senior advisors. The deductive approach
was utilized when the qualitative research uncovered or generated facts from which to draw
conclusions. This approach validated subsequent assertions and arguments as facts based on
qualitative research discoveries.
Definitions
Combat readiness: Soldiers must be approved in several categories before they can be
considered for a deployment to a combat environment. The soldier must not have any medical or
administrative delinquencies as these may disrupt the soldier’s ability to engage in combat

10
operations. If a soldier is combat-ready, he or she is considered deployable and ready to deploy
to a combat environment (Milley, 2016).
Company: This is an element typically commanded by a captain and consists of
approximately 100-200 personnel (Congressional Research Service, 2018).
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA): This is a process that compares the advantages to the
disadvantages of a task or event (Pearce, 2016). Using the CBA measures the value of the task or
event and provides leaders the date to help make well-informed decisions.
Battalion: This is an element typically commanded by a lieutenant colonel and consists of
approximately 500-900 personnel (Congressional Research Service, 2018).
Brigade: This is an element typically commanded by a colonel and consists of
approximately 3,900-4,500 personnel (Congressional Research Service, 2018).
Division: This is an element typically commanded by a major general and consists of
approximately 12,000-18,000 personnel (Congressional Research Service, 2018).
Drill and ceremony: This concept allows disciplined and well-coordinated movements of
troops. The execution of drill and ceremony helps cultivate esprit de corps, discipline, and
tradition, reinforcing the concept of precise task execution through commands by the leadership
(Department of the Army, 2012b).
Formation: This is a group of soldiers gathered in a rank and file structure. These are
used to demonstrate discipline and order, helping to facilitate efficiency with inspections,
movements, and accountability in a uniform manner.
Garrison: This is the non-tactical environment of a military installation. This is the area
that accommodates offices, retail stores, and housing developments.

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G8: This is a support section within the Division and consists of a staff of approximately
5-10 personnel. The section is responsible for the programming, analysis, and resourcing of the
Division’s activities (Office of the US Army Deputy Chief of Staff, 2020).
Meeting: A focused interaction of cognitive attention, planned or chance, where people
agree to come together for a common purpose, whether at the same time and the same place, or
at different times in different locations (Romano & Nunamaker, 2001). This is defined to help
identify parallels between meetings and the change of command ceremonies.
Noncommissioned officer (NCO): This is a classification of an enlisted service member
either serving in or capable of serving in a leadership position. In the Army, soldiers of the rank
of corporal or above are NCOs and are typically supervising units from 4-soldier teams to
division-sized units of 20,000 members (Department of the Army, 2015).
Parade field: This is an open field dedicated to military ceremonies. Unlike a park, these
fields a free of courts, gymnasiums, and other humanmade features that would obstruct the
military formations, other than bleachers for audience members.
Production loss costs: This is a term used to identify the cost that the organization incurs
when an employee’s duty or productivity is suspended by a disruption, such as an unnecessary or
unproductive meeting (Romano and Nunamaker, 2001). The amount referenced in this article is
determined by the average salary of a Division soldier, divided by the average amount of hours a
Division soldier works in a year. This hourly wage is multiplied by the number of participating
soldiers, establishing the production costs per event or ceremony.
Senior advisors: This term is not a formal title but will help facilitate classifying the
stakeholder group of study. This term refers to the NCOs of the ranks CSM and 1SG. Soldiers of
these ranks are assigned to a commissioned officer counterpart and assist in leading

12
organizations. Senior advisors typically have the most military experience in the organization
and, in addition to advising commanders, manage the unit’s resources, training, and personnel.
Organization of the Project
This project consists of five chapters. Chapter one provides an overview of the problem
of practice and introduction to the evaluation research. Chapter Two explores the literature
involved in the problem of practice. In addition to the discussed literature, Chapter Two will
refer to the Clark and Estes (2008) model to identify the organization’s gaps in performance,
focusing on the knowledge, motivation, and organizational aspects. Chapter Three details the
methodology of the data collection process and the participants studied. Chapter four analyzes
the data and the results. Finally, chapter five discusses the solutions to close the performance gap
within the organization, supported by the data and analysis from the research, and concluding
with recommendations for a plan for implementation.

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Chapter Two: Review of the Literature
Chapter Two reviews the relevant literature and evaluate the stakeholder’s knowledge,
motivation, and organizational influences associated with the cost of the Division’s change of
command ceremonies and how this contributes to the performance gaps in combat readiness
training. The evaluation begins with literature and Army publications that discuss the history and
purpose of the change of command ceremonies and their evolved value in today’s Division. This
is followed by a discussion on the concept of production loss costs associated with the change of
command ceremonies and how this concept is used in determining value. Although the concept
of production loss costs is applied to the change of command ceremonies as an example, the
intent of this research was to draw attention to production loss cost as a concept to be applied in
other Army programs, serving as a vital component in the cost-benefit analysis.
The chapter continues by discussing the role of the stakeholders and how they contribute
to the change of command ceremonies and the organization’s aspirational goal. The final section
will elaborate on the findings to help identify the most significant influences from which to
conduct subsequent analysis and research. The final section will compare the literature findings
with the knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences, which contributed to identifying
any performance gaps in the organization.
The execution of each change of command ceremony requires a substantial amount of
resources (Department of the Army, 2012b). The most significant costs associated with the
ceremonies are the production loss costs. The Commanding General of the Division has received
his orders from the then-Secretary of the Army, announcing that the highest priority is combat
readiness (Esper, 2017). The change of command ceremonies do not directly contribute to the
Division's combat readiness. Instead, the valuable training time and professional development

14
efforts toward combat readiness are paused for soldiers to attend and participate in the
ceremonies, typically consuming between two and twelve hours per person, depending on the
size of the ceremony and the number of rehearsals required (Department of the Army, 2012b).
This loss of valuable training productivity is commonly referred to as production loss cost.
This chapter will examine the how production loss is calculated (Department of Defense,
2017; Aboagye, Jensen, Bergström, Hagberg, Axén, & Lohela-Karlsson, 2016) and examine its
impact on training time available for combat readiness and other organizational functions (Zou et
al., 2016; Luchman & González-Morales, 2013) through supported literature. Through this
examination, literature will be presented, showing how change of command ceremonies are
comparable to practices and events conducted by civilian organizations, such as large meetings
or appointment ceremonies of senior Executive branch officials (Romano & Nunamaker, 2001;
Department of the Army, 2012b). Identifying and discussing these similarities have contributed
to evaluating the problem of practice. The relevant literature and research exploring the concepts
of meetings have supplemented the existing research regarding change of command ceremonies.
Influences on the Problem of Practice
The practice evaluated in this research is the change of command ceremony. The
Division typically conducts between 50 and 100 of these ceremonies each year, according to
Sergeant N. Smith (personal communication, September 20, 2019), (pseudonym), the Division’s
band operations representative who manages all band requests for support for every change of
command executed by the Division. In the absence of an available database or ceremony tracker
maintained by the Division, the band served as a reliable resource to help determine the quantity
and frequency of change of command ceremonies; the Division’s band is routinely requested for
each change of command ceremony (N. Smith, personal communication, October 26, 2019).

15
Each ceremony requires the attendance of all personnel within that commander’s
jurisdiction, assembled in a rank-and-file, military mass formation. These mass formations allow
the outgoing and incoming commanders to address their soldiers. These soldiers remain in a
stationary position for the duration of the ceremony, which typically last approximately one
hour. The ceremony consists of a sequence of formalities, speeches, and inspections, honoring
the leadership, tradition, and lineage of the organization and its rich history (Department of the
Army, 2012b).
The problem of practice centered on the Division leadership’s level of ability to
determine the costs of the change of command ceremonies. The review of literature addresses
various aspects of the change of command ceremonies, as well as comparable practices that exist
in civilian organizations of similar composition, such as meetings, gatherings, and special events
that require the organization to congregate in a single location. Research from these practices
augmented the limited insight and data available on change of command ceremonies and helped
evaluate the problem of practice. The influences covered in this section will include costs in
areas of production loss, mental impact, and combat readiness associated with change of
command ceremonies.
Mental Impact Diminishes Trust, Morale, and Well-being
Rogelberg et al., (2012) explained that disruptions due to meetings reduce employee
morale, motivation, and satisfaction, while increasing fatigue, stress, and frustration. Much of the
findings were the result of the Luong and Rogelberg (2005) research that analyzed the mental
impact of meetings amongst the 37 participants. Subsequent research showed nearly identical
results (Rogelberg et al., 2010; Rogelberg et al., 2007), specifically when employees were
unclear of their participation in the meetings or the objective of the meeting. Mandatory

16
attendance also seemed to be a significant factor that negatively impacted mental well-being. The
perception amongst the employees have been that meetings are rarely necessary, thus making
most meetings a waste of time. The effects move beyond lowered morale and increased
frustration, to diminished trust and faith in the organizational leadership (Luong & Rogelberg,
2005). Despite the employee perceptions, Luong and Rogelberg (2005) stressed that there are
many benefits to meetings, making meetings an essential practice. However, time and frequency
of the meetings need attention so as to maintain high levels of motivation and job satisfaction.
This concept extends beyond just the duration of the meeting as well.
Researchers noted that there is additional production loss after the meeting has
concluded, known as meeting recovery syndrome (Romano & Nunamaker, 2001), otherwise
known as the time employees spend conversing about what had just transpired. Although
meetings can benefit the organization, especially when used as a decision-making tool,
unproductive or unnecessary meetings can exhaust the organization of its most vital resources:
time, employee well-being, and money.
These concepts have translated to many aspects of the Division’s change of command
ceremonies and a range of potential other activities that are not directly contributing to combat
readiness requirements. A massive assembly of all soldiers to one location can have a profound
impact on the mental well-being, especially due to the disruptive nature of the event and the
mandatory attendance. Unlike a business meeting that fosters two-way discussions, change of
command ceremonies are a one-way conversation between the commanders and his or her
soldiers. The result is a meeting with even less engagement than a traditional meeting, leaving
the participating soldiers to possibly assume that their role in the ceremony is not critical.

17
However, change of command ceremonies can and often do take place with or without
the presence of the soldiers on the field. This was evident when inclement weather factors moved
ceremonies indoors, without the soldier formations due to venue capacity restrictions,
inadvertently costing less than the outdoor alternative. According to the Division’s band
representative, even when weather is ideal, some organizations opt to have no formations as a
backdrop (N. Smith, personal communication, October 26, 2019). Smith, claiming to have
attended over 100 change of command ceremonies, explained that this is informally referred to
as a stripped-down ceremony and that this rare situation is the result of the organization being far
too busy with training or other high-operational tempo activities. Although anecdotal, this
assertion is supported by photographs of these stripped-down ceremonies on the Department of
Defense’s public website for official photo and video content (Department of Defense, 2019).
Change of command ceremonies can take place with or without the formations on the
parade field. This may leave some soldiers – whom were designated to stand in the formation –
questioning their purpose in the ceremony if their contribution is not necessary. Pink (2011)
described purpose as the individual’s contribution to something larger than themselves. Soldiers
lacking an understanding of their purpose can have a profound impact on their intrinsic
motivation, diminishing the collective trust and commitment to the organization (Pink, 2011). If
a meeting consists of participants whose attendance is not required, then Rogelberg et al. (2009)
asserted that the meeting will be perceived as a waste of time. This can start to erode the trust
between employees and leadership within the organization (Miller, 2001).
Trust may be considered a vital component for most organizations, but it is even more
crucial in an organization such as the Division, which routinely deploys to combat environments.
In a study from 2010, an Army Division was assessed through questionnaires regarding the trust

18
between soldiers and their leadership. Results showed that the 75% of the participants
reconsidered the trust in their immediate leaders prior to a combat deployment (Sweeney, 2010).
Trust becomes more relevant during deployments because soldiers are exposed to physical and
mental vulnerabilities that are unique to the combat environment (Kolditz, 2007). Sweeney’s
(2010) results showed strong transfer of trust levels from the peacetime activities to the
subsequent combat deployment. A leader’s poor management of the organization’s time can
deteriorate trust in the crucial time in the months prior to a combat deployment, impacting the
organization’s time available to train toward combat readiness.
Not all of the mental impact of change of command ceremonies are negative. Turner
(1969) initially reported how ceremonies can help the organization negotiate the turbulent
implementation of the organizational change. Honoring tradition through ceremony keeps a
consistency and predictability that many individuals value (Leanna &. Barry, 2000). The social
order that is reinforced in ceremonies help the organization maintain a firm foundation while
other organizational changes occur (Islam & Zyphur, 2009). Other developing research has
suggested that ceremonies have served as a therapeutic tool to help those suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Johnson et al., 1995). These studies indicated that individuals
suffering from combat-related PTSD felt reductions in symptoms, attributed to the safety and
allegiance to the collective group that the ceremonies offer; the social acceptance and feeling of
belonging rendered significant therapeutic value to the individuals (Johnson et al., 1995).
Leaders must inventory and account for such benefits when conducting cost-benefit analysis of
the change of command ceremonies.

19
Correlation with Training Time Available for Combat Readiness
Combat readiness is a term used to describe an organization’s level of preparedness for
combat operations, and incorporates administrative tasks, medical clearances, and a wide range
of training requirements. Administrative tasks include currency on life insurance contracts,
dependent paperwork, and performance evaluations (Department of the Army, 2010). Training
requirements vary depending on the organization, but generally include tasks such as rifle
qualification currency, combat life saver (first aid) certification, unit battle drill validations, and
physical fitness assessment (Department of the Army, 2010). Altogether, a soldier’s combat
readiness requires approximately 20 different tasks are current. To achieve the desired results,
soldiers must dedicate significant time and effort, scheduling combat readiness tasks between
other organizational tasks that require mandatory participation, such as squad battle drills, field
training exercises of site, and change of command ceremonies.
A significant effort has been made to help the Division achieve the highest levels of
combat readiness, requiring reductions in superfluous tasks to help liberate time for vital
training. While serving as the Secretary of the Army, Mark Esper helped facilitate these efforts
by publishing orders to remove unnecessary training that did not contribute to the readiness goals
(Esper, 2017). Although strategizing to maximize the use of valuable time is showing
improvements, this is still of great concern throughout the Army’s organizations. Wong and
Gerras (2015) found that there were simply not enough hours in a year to accomplish the Army’s
required annual training tasks. Commanders were expected to accomplish 297 days of training
with only 256 days available for training. The infeasibility of the task was only exposed after
research found substantial evidence of unethical behavior linked to erroneous training reports

20
and doctored records (Wong & Gerras, 2015), showing a false depiction of the Army’s combat
readiness.
Much of the training sessions scrutinized by Wong and Gerras (2015) were not directly
related to combat tactics. Instead, most of the training pertained to professional development of
soldier character, knowledge, and behavior which attribute to a soldier’s ethical conduct in both
garrison and combat. For example, some of the Army’s annual requirements involve Sexual
Harassment/Assault and Prevention Response (SHARP) training and Equal Opportunity (EO)
training. Neither necessarily directly enhance combat tactics. However, both help organizations
cultivate a safe and cohesive work environment, emphasizing trust and Army values
(Department of the Army, 2014). Navy Rear Admiral Ann M. Burkhardt, the director of the
Defense Department’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, announced in 2018 that
sexual assault reports had risen 9.7% since the year prior (Ferdinando, 2018). Some may argue
that this type of training is just as important as tactical training when developing the highest
levels of combat readiness.
Wong and Gerras’ (2015) purpose of their publication was not to lobby or remove non-
combat enhancing training, but to increase awareness on the time constraints and to evaluate how
the valuable training time is being spent. Mr. Esper has responded by removing some of the
unnecessary training tasks, such as mandatory weekend safety briefings and media awareness
training, to allow additional training time for the higher-priority tasks (Esper, 2017). This
removal was an effort to increase the Army’s training time available for combat readiness, which
has been a struggle to maintain in recent years as the Army engages in combat operations beyond
Afghanistan and Iraq (Humud, 2016).

21
Shortly after Mr. Esper’s directives were implemented, improvements soon followed as
presented by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Milley, in his testimony to
congress in March of 2019. General Milley reported that of the Army’s 58 brigades,
approximately 28 met combat readiness goals (United States Senate Committee on Armed
Service, 2019). These were a sharp increase from General Milley’s report one year prior, when
he stated that about five of the 58 brigades met combat readiness goals (United States Senate
Committee on Armed Service, 2018). General Milley attributed freeing up time as one of the
methods that helped achieve higher levels of readiness amongst the brigades by reducing lower-
priority tasks (United States Senate Committee on Armed Service, 2019). Utilizing this strategy
reinforces the need to evaluate all practices to help support these readiness goals- practices such
as the change of command ceremonies.
Production Loss Costs Due to Inactivity
Research by Romano and Nunamaker (2001) examined the production loss costs when
organizations assemble large numbers of employees for events. Although this research examined
meetings in particular, the concepts and principles can be applied to any event that incorporates
forced attendance to a central location. Their findings identified significant disruption of
employees’ productivity. Although these employees are still on duty and receiving pay,
production is suspended and delayed until the disruption is removed. In the Army context,
production is considered the activities that develop or support the organization’s combat
readiness (Department of the Army, 2020). Subsequent research by Burnett et al. (2007) showed
additional costs include the time and logistics, and can quickly compound the resources needed.
Corporations struggle with this by requiring meetings to assemble leadership from the
subordinate organizations, sometimes in various time zones, requiring airfare, hotel

22
accommodations, and rental cars. This has been described as the single event sunk cost (Burnett
et al., 2007).
The single event sunk cost concept regarding forced attendance to a central location
applies to the change of command ceremony in two versions. The first version applies to the
local attendees; The Division and all of its subordinate organizations are scattered across
approximately 19 square miles (United States Census Bureau, 2000). Change of command
participants do not have the luxury of attending a ceremony in an adjacent parade field. Often the
participants conduct many peripheral activities that lead to the main event which require
traveling across the 19 square miles. The second version applies to those outside the local area;
The honorees typically invite his or her leadership, peers, and mentors to attend, pooling
attendees from locations around the world, and considered Very Important Persons (VIPs) at the
ceremony. Pending approval from his or her commander, the VIPs will attend the ceremony,
funded by the Department of Defense (Department of Defense, 2016b).
Both versions of the single event sunk cost share similarities in the findings discussed by
Romano and Nunamaker (2001), and Burnett et al. (2007): disruption to employee production in
order to attend the event. These costs need to be compiled and weighed against the benefits of
these ceremonies (Department of the Army 2016a). This compilation of costs help determine the
value of the ceremony.
Commanders frequently insist that the participants in the formations be armed. This
means that all of the soldiers on display on the parade field for the ceremony must have their
issued weapon on their person. For this to occur, weapons must be issued from the arms room,
which may be located miles away, but within the 19 square miles. The simple task of issuing
weapons can take several hours, according to an arms room supervisor at the Division (A. Smith,

23
personal communication, August 28, 2019). Storing weapons in the organization’s arms room is
standard protocol for all organizations within the Division. Rather than have one single arms
room for the entire Division, arms rooms are located and managed at each battalion, servicing
500-900 soldiers. To accommodate such an influx, the issuing of weapons takes approximately
four hours (A. Smith, personal communication, August 28, 2019).
In addition to the issuing of each weapon, all soldiers need to return their weapons upon
completion of the change of command ceremony, taking approximately the same amount of
time. Imbedded in the issuing and returning of the weapons are the travel times to each location:
place of duty, battalion arms room, ceremony venue, back to battalion arms room, and back to
the place of duty. Other tasks include uniform inspections, set up and tear down tasks, and full-
dress rehearsals. What began as a one-hour ceremony has quickly accumulated several hours of
subordinate tasks, all of which can be attributed to the single event sunk cost and production loss
costs.
The production loss costs discussed in this section are objective values that can be
accurately identified, depending on the level of detail and information on each attendee and
participant. Taking inventory of all of the production loss costs will provide the organization
with relevant information when conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the change of command
ceremony. The concept of taking inventory of production loss costs is a vital tool that ensures
that the organization accounts for time and resources (Romano & Nunamaker, 2001) used to
support change of command ceremonies and other events that may involve a disruption to the
employee production. This concept represents only half of the cost-benefit analysis (Department
of the Army, 2016a), but acknowledges that salaried employees carry a cost for their role in such
events.

24
Techniques Toward Improvement
If the Division intends to maximize the available time toward achieving its priority of
combat readiness, research has uncovered strategies that can be applied to the change of
command ceremonies as well as to other programs and activities. Rogelberg et al. (2007)
recommended developing mechanisms that measure performance and effectiveness of
organizational practices. This not only requires an assessment tool to be established, but the staff,
training, and time must also be identified Rogelberg et al. (2012) suggested that improving one
meeting per week can generate significant benefits to the health and motivation of the
employees. Utilizing employee surveys are effective tools that can be utilized toward positive
change in meetings and can be implemented through the three-stage model three (Rogelberg et
al., 2012). Similar to cost-benefit analysis, this model is more specific to the meetings. Stage one
assesses the invested value of the meeting; stage two assess the return value; and stage three is
the formulation and implementation of the change strategy (Rogelberg et al., 2012). This third
stage is where the one meeting per week can be utilized to discuss the assessments and surveys
from stages one and two to help construct a plan to develop an extremely productive meeting
template. While leadership can evaluate the production loss cost results of such assemblies,
employees can also give feedback on what the perceived benefits are of the organizational
practices as this influences employee satisfaction (Rogelberg et al., 2012).
Leaders should be encouraged to experiment and consider the adoption of progressive
and innovative alternatives to the classic versions of some traditional practices (Drew & 3M
Meeting Management Team, 1994). Streamlining these practices can increase efforts toward the
organizational goal, increase productivity, and revitalize employee morale. Burnett et al. (2007)
suggested that organizations leverage technology to maximize the efficiency of meetings. They

25
published that utilizing the computer-mediated system (CMS) to facilitate meetings can
drastically reduce the resources required to implement a gathering of personnel, such as a
meeting or change of command ceremony. The CMS uses platforms such as Microsoft Office
Live Meeting, Lotus Sametime, and Zoom to conduct both synchronous and asynchronous
meetings to minimize organizational disruption and flow if information (Burnett et al. 2007).
These platforms have evolved since 2007, but the fundamentals can useful when developing
strategies understanding the other tools available to leaders.
The Department of the Army (2016) echoed these sentiments when it published doctrine
in 2016 about performance management in the organization, explaining that leaders should not
tolerate wasteful, ineffective, or unsafe ways of doing business. The doctrine stated that leaders
should foster a culture of innovation within their organizations, and constantly challenge
inefficiencies. Additionally, leaders must make information and knowledge-based decisions and
manage risk while ensuring their organizations' authorities, missions, plans, and goals remain
aligned (Department of the Army, 2016a). This direction, in conjunction with Esper’s (2017)
third priority of reformation of inefficient processes and tasks, indicate that the Division has the
support, both of leadership and of evidence, to experiment with techniques toward improvements
in the problem of practice.
Role of Stakeholder Group of Focus
Senior advisors serve at all middle to upper leadership and management positions
throughout the subordinate organizations within the Division. Alongside almost all
commissioned officer positions at the Division is an enlisted soldier counterpart. With enlisted
paygrades ranging from E1 Private to E9 Command Sergeant Major, the senior advisors are the
most senior Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) within the organization, holding the paygrades

26
of E8 First Sergeant and E9 Command Sergeant Major. The Army described these positions as
the trainers, mentors, and disciplinarians to their subordinates while also serving as a source of
wisdom, counsel, and influence to the commanders (Department of the Army, n.d.b). With
NCOs having a rich history, which dates back to the Continental Army, senior advisors carry on
the legacy and credibility that maintain the order and discipline of their units (Department of the
Army, 2015).
Additionally, the Army has demanded that senior advisors meet the changing needs of the
modern NCO Corps by applying critical thinking and problems solving to enhance capabilities
and adaptability in the ever-changing operational environment (Department of the Army, 2015).
The then-Secretary of the Army, Mark Esper, has emphatically supported this attention of an
Army of progressive and adaptable leaders, challenging leaders at all levels to consider changes
to policies, processes, and tasks that exhaust time and resources (Esper, 2017). Senior advisors at
the Division are currently situated in the unique position of influence. In a book published by the
office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the role of the senior advisor is to serve as the mentor and
trusted counselor to the commanders (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). Commanders rely of their
senior advisors to leverage their experience and serve as consultants, influencing and offering
insight to better equip the commander in the decision-making process. This influence inspires
critical thinking, which may allow opportunity for significant organizational change in the
problem of practice.
Clark and Estes’ (2008) Knowledge, Motivation, and Organizational Influences
Framework
This section of the chapter provides insight on the stakeholder’s knowledge, motivation,
and organizational influences involved in the Division’s change of command ceremonies. The

27
Clark and Estes’ (2008) framework served as the gap analysis tool for evaluating this problem of
practice. This problem-solving process was based on understanding the stakeholder goal with
regard to the organizational goal and identifying assumed performance influences in the areas of
knowledge, motivation, and organization (KMO) based on general theory, context-specific
literature, and an existing understanding of the organization. This section will discuss the
stakeholder’s knowledge of the production loss concept, their self-efficacy perceptions involved
in the reduction of production loss costs, and their authority in the execution of the ceremonies.
Knowledge and Skills-Related Influences
This section is an examination of the literature relevant to the stakeholder knowledge and
skills associated with the costs of the change of command ceremonies. The evaluation of the
stakeholder knowledge and skills associated with the execution of these ceremonies is important
when considering the impact on combat readiness (Alkin, 2008). Krathwohl (2002) explicitly
structured a revision of the knowledge dimensions as an extension of Bloom’s taxonomy of
educational objectives. These dimensions help categorize the level of cognition and can be
applied in the organizational context. It is theorized that the Division is demonstrating
knowledge gaps that fall along various categories of Krathwohl’s (2002) knowledge dimensions.
Referenced in this study will be two types of knowledge as presented by Krathwohl
(2002): procedural, and conceptual. Procedural knowledge refers to the sequence of steps
required to accomplish a task. Conceptual knowledge refers to the ability to string together bits
of information into an understanding of a bigger picture. Each serve as a type of knowledge
discussed in the evaluation of the Division’s change of command ceremonies and are necessary
when comparing the costs versus the benefits, arming the leadership with the tools necessary to
make well-calculated decisions (Department of the Army 2016a; Niebuhr et al., 2013).

28
Understanding the Concept of Production Loss Costs
Senior advisors need to understand the concept of production loss costs. Little or no
familiarity of production loss costs and the application the costs have in the organization’s
practices can be considered a lack of conceptual knowledge. Krathwohl (2002) described this
knowledge dimension as the knowledge of certain elements and objectives and their role in the
cognitive process dimension. There may be static facts, such as hourly wage, number of
participants, and time used for the change of command ceremony. However, conceptual
knowledge requires the senior advisor to understand those elements’ role in the overall objective
in the holistic view. Although there are subsequent dimensions that comprise the knowledge gap
in the change of command ceremonies, this gap stems from stakeholders lacking the conceptual
knowledge of the production loss costs. Evaluation of the stakeholders’ understanding of this
conceptual knowledge is important for the purposes of research.
The senior advisors help lead and manage the subordinate organizations within the
Division. Senior advisors assume responsibility of the resources, training, and personnel of their
respective units. Production loss costs describe the cost for employees to be paid when there is
little or no productivity (Gram, 2013). During these change of command ceremonies, the
majority of the participants serve as the visual backdrop, with thousands of soldiers standing in a
mass formation for the duration of the ceremony (Department of the Army, 2012b). Production
loss costs range from $17,964.44 per hour for a company-sized unit to $404,200 per hour for a
division-sized unit (Dahlman, 2007; “United States Army,” 2018).
In addition to the time spent during the ceremony, there is substantial time spent
marching troops into position and antecedent rehearsals as outlined in the Army’s instruction
manual for the change of command ceremonies (Department of the Army, 2012b). Burnett et al.

29
(2007) explained the often-overlooked production loss time embedded in the travel time for such
practices in advance of official meetings. According to The Division’s garrison map, its
subordinate organizations have soldiers scattered across approximately 19 square miles,
requiring ceremony participants to march several miles to the ceremony location.
Romano and Nunamaker (2001) defined a meeting as, “a focused interaction of cognitive
attention, planned or chance, where people agree to come together for a common purpose,
whether at the same time and the same place, or at different times in different places” (p.1). With
the same basic concept of the change of command ceremonies, meetings are a consistent source
of loss production amongst many organizations (Romano & Nunamaker, 2001). Rogelberg et al.
(2012) explained that leaders admit to doing little or nothing to account for the return on
investment associated with meetings. Likewise, the Division does not have any strategy guidance
or doctrine that instructs leaders on how to assess the return on investment with the change of
command ceremonies and their associated practices (Department of the Army, n.d.). Without
such resources, it is possible that the Army leaders are unaware of the production loss costs
associated with the change of command ceremonies.
The production loss cost concept may represent a microcosm of a much bigger issue
when evaluating the other military programs, exercises, and events. Leaders should be
integrating the production loss costs into the overall event value assessment (Zilhaver, 2017). In
2017, the then-Acting Secretary of the Army charged the Army to update its method of
measuring costs. As of September of 2017, the Army has begun development on methods to
measuring tasks effectiveness toward the Army’s primary goal: readiness (Zilhaver, 2017). “In
essence, commanders will no longer merely report how much money they spent, but are required
to measure the cost of their requirements against the potential benefit those requirements deliver

30
toward increasing unit readiness” (Zilhaver, 2017, p. 3). As the Army continues to develop this
method, the end state may require leaders to evaluate the organization’s practices to justify the
resources needed.
Understanding the Relationship Between Ceremonies and Training Time Available for
Combat Readiness
In order for the senior advisors to develop and implement effective strategies to reduce
production loss costs, senior advisors need to understand the relationship between reducing the
change of command ceremony costs and training time available for combat readiness. Krathwohl
(2002) described conceptual knowledge as the comprehension of smaller elements and their role
and contribution toward the larger function. The role of ceremonies supports the broader culture
of the military organizations, reinforcing discipline and tradition (Department of the Army
2012b). However, absent in the regulation is the relationship between change of command
ceremonies and combat readiness discussed; combat readiness is not even mentioned.
In other words, the relationship between the time spent on ceremonies and combat
readiness training may be unclear the Division’s soldiers. A study by the Rand Corporation
found that Army leaders viewed many time-consuming and non-mission essential activities are
counterproductive to combat readiness, citing ceremonies as an example of such activities
(Saum-Manning et al., 2019). Although the research consisted of 120 soldiers, the perceived
understanding is not a universal perception that is generalizable throughout the Army. Luong and
Rogelberg (2005) asserted that the understanding of a meeting’s concept, productivity
assessment, and effectiveness will vary depending on the perspective of the individual. Not all
participants in the change of command ceremonies may be aware of the purpose of the
ceremonies. Senior advisors’ understanding of the relationship between ceremony and training

31
time available for combat readiness were required to be evaluated. This evaluation helped
identify the level of conceptual knowledge amongst the senior advisors.
Since meetings within the organization are a substantial investment of resources,
assessing and evaluating meetings are necessary to ensure sufficient return on the investment
(Rogelberg et al., 2012). The Army has acknowledged this concept by developing a new strategy
to evaluate practices, requiring leaders to measure practices’ effectiveness toward achieving the
primary goal of combat readiness (Zilhaver, 2017). Not only does the empirical evidence
indicate the necessity of meeting evaluation, but the Army may soon require such evaluations as
part of the change of command events.
The Division hosts many types of ceremonies, such as remembrance ceremonies,
funerals, retirements, and promotions, for the purpose of honoring an achievement or sacrifices
of an individual or group of individuals. Such ceremonies clearly mark the events and link the
audience to the purpose and intent. However, some ceremonies, much like the change of
command ceremonies, struggle to clearly convey the intended purpose of the ceremony’s
message (Nielbo & Sørensen, 2013). These ceremonies may only have the implication of
reinforcement of organizational norms and culture (Islam & Zyphur, 2009), leaving the
understanding of purpose absent. Without full comprehension of the purpose, workers are prone
to leaving these events dissatisfied and stressed (Rogelberg et al., 2009). Although research on
the comprehension of purpose from military ceremonies is extremely limited, having an unclear
purpose or objective in large meetings in the civilian organizations seems too prevalent
(Rogelberg et al., 2012; Rogelberg et al., 2009; Leach et al., 2013). If these perceptions are at all
indicative of the military counterparts, this lack of purpose or understanding may be contributing
to the performance gap.

32
Ability to Evaluate the Costs of the Change of Command Ceremonies
Assuming that the senior advisors consolidated the production loss costs, the subsequent
step would be to apply procedure to make cost-benefit recommendations in the execution of
these ceremonies. Senior advisors must be able to evaluate the value of the ceremonies and
compare it to the associated costs. Krathwohl (2010) described procedural knowledge as the
ability to apply skills and algorithms toward methods of inquiry. Such is the case with the change
of command ceremonies, requiring senior advisors to exercise procedural knowledge to utilize
algorithms to assess production loss costs and determine whether this cost was worth the value of
the event. For example, if these ceremonies are essential to the discipline and tradition of the
organization, then this value would need to be compared to the associated costs and other
priorities.
The Department of the Army’s (2016) publication on improving organizational
performance specifically outlined, in great detail, the need for continuous evaluation on cost in
relation to performance tasks. Although the needs were addressed in this publication, it does not
make reference toward implementation on ceremonies. Additionally, nowhere was any
assessment or evaluation protocol mentioned in the Department of the Army (2012b) guide on
executing change of command ceremonies. Senior advisors may be understanding the need for
ceremonial cost assessments, but it is unclear whether the senior advisors are provided any
guidance or tools on how to implement.
In addition to the Army’s heavy emphasis on the need for evaluation of tasks, substantial
research supports this perspective in the execution of corporate meetings of similar scope
(Rogelberg et al., 2012; Drew & 3M Meeting Management Team, 1994; Patanakul et al., 2016).
Evaluating the event’s time management and effectiveness is a critical business practice

33
associated with successful organizations (Rogelberg et al., 2007). All aspects of each event
should be assessed for its value to the organization and leadership needs to understand the value
of everyone’s time (Mankins, 2004); this includes both costs and benefits. Literature from both
private and government organizations agree that at least minimal measures and analysis of
organizational practices is necessary and beneficial to the organization (Department of the Army,
2016a; Rogelberg et al., 2012; Drew & 3M Meeting Management Team, 1994; Patanakul et al.,
2016). Applying the procedural knowledge of cost analysis by measuring the lost training time to
the ceremony time will allow stakeholders to assess and compare the beneficial value of the
change of command ceremonies.
Table 2 shows the description of the knowledge influence, the specific knowledge type,
and the method for assessment. The table is divided into three categories: assumed knowledge
influence, knowledge type, and knowledge influence assessment. The assumed knowledge
influence states what the stakeholder should know. The knowledge type identifies the category
the assumed knowledge influence is cataloged. The knowledge influence assessment describes
the method by which the stakeholder's level of comprehension is retrieved.

34
Table 2

Knowledge Influences, Types, and Assessment for Analysis

Assumed Knowledge Influence Knowledge Type Knowledge Influence Assessment
Senior advisors need to understand
the concept of production loss costs.
Conceptual

Interviews with senior advisors to
evaluate their level of
comprehension regarding
production loss costs in the Army.
Senior advisors need to understand
the relationship between reducing
the change of command ceremony
costs and training time available for
combat readiness.
Conceptual Interviews with senior advisors to
evaluate their understanding of the
relationship between reducing
production loss costs and training
time available for combat
readiness.
Senior advisors must evaluate the
value of the ceremonies and
compare it to the associated costs.
Procedural

Interviews with senior advisors to
determine how they evaluate the
value of the ceremonies.

Motivational Influences
This portion of the chapter examines motivation literature relevant to the organization’s
aspirational goal of a 25% reduction in production loss costs to allow more time and resources
toward combat readiness training. Motivational influences contribute to the Division’s
performance toward the stakeholder goal. Clark and Estes (2008) explained that employee
motivation can impact the performance toward the organizational goal. This section will explore
the literature relevant to the Division’s reduction efforts with the production loss costs associated
with the change of command ceremonies. Motivational aspects will include the stakeholders’
confidence in their ability to reduce production loss costs and their ability to influence their
commanders. This section will also evaluate the stakeholders’ attribution by discussing their
belief in how the ceremonies contribute to the organization’s aspirational goal. These are
important topics to discuss because they contribute to performance gaps which, subsequently,
impact the organizational goal (Clark & Estes, 2008) regarding combat readiness training.

35
Self-efficacy
The theory of self-efficacy centers around an individual’s perceived ability to accomplish
a given task (Bandura, 2005), and serves as an indication of the motivation levels (Pintrich,
2003). The Clark and Estes (2008) model establishes the importance of evaluating the
motivational categories to identify deficiencies which may be affecting performance, such as
self-efficacy. The subsequent sections will discuss the stakeholders’ perceived ability of two
tasks: the ability to reduce production loss costs and the ability to influence the officer-
counterparts toward implementing change.
Perceived Ability to Reduce Costs. The senior advisors need to have confidence that
they are capable of accomplishing their tasks associated with the cost reductions of the change of
command ceremonies. Shamir et al., (2000) stated that the soldiers’ efficacy beliefs within the
organization affect morale, leadership, and performance, playing a vital role in the organizational
goals. It is important for the organization to ensure the leaders have a strong sense of self-
efficacy to fulfill the organizational goals (Pintrich, 2003). An evaluation of the senior advisors’
was necessary for determining its involvement in possible performance gaps.
Reducing production loss costs is a daunting task, which requires reliable assessment
measures and comprehensive techniques (Aboagye et al., 2016). Members of the organization
with a strong sense of self-efficacy will see such a daunting task as a challenge to be mastered,
rather than a threat to be avoided (Bandura, 1997). Studies show that higher levels of self-
efficacy transfer to increased performance and problem-solving capabilities (Wong, 2019). Army
leaders at all levels must exercise rigorous efforts to constantly assess costs against the benefits
of the organizations’ tasks (Batchelor, 2012). Batchelor (2012) further elaborated on this concept
by emphasizing, in great detail, the importance of the Army's eight-step cost-benefit analysis

36
paradigm, which allows the senior advisors to take inventory on the tasks to help make better
decisions and efforts toward reductions in production loss costs. Zilhaver (2017) also stresses the
urgency of cost reduction efforts and cites the Forces and Organization Cost Estimating System
(FORCES) as another tool leaders can use. There are systems available, but it is unclear if the
Division’s senior advisors are aware of their potential ability to contribute to the reduction
efforts. Production loss costs and cost-benefit analyses are not tasks that are discussed in the
duties and responsibilities of the Army’s senior NCOs (Department of the Army, 2012b). If
senior advisors are tasked with assisting in the reduction of production loss costs, they may
struggle with self-efficacy since this concept of production loss costs is neither discussed nor
referenced in any Army-wide publications (Department of the Army, n.d.).
Perceived Ability to Influence Officers. The Army organizations are structured to
embrace a mutually influential relationship between each commander and his or her senior
advisor (Department of the Army, 2012b). Research showed that leaders who embraced feedback
from subordinates and peers improved trust, morale, and overall effectiveness of the
organization; this gave employees a voice and stimulated multi-directional influence, enhancing
the decision-making process (Grant & Ashford, 2008; Milliken et al., 2003; Wong, 2019). Such
influence is also referred to as upward influence (Wong, 2019), and the research shows
overwhelming benefits to the organization (Atwater et al., 1995; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1988;
Milliken et al., 2003; Wayne et al., 1997; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). This perceived efficacy toward
the influence of the leaders can impact not just the individual’s behavior, but the organizational
goals (Bandura, 2000). Senior advisors must perceive that they have the ability to influence their
officers in executing changes necessary to help achieve the organizational goal.

37
Senior Advisors’ Perceived Attribution of Their Efforts
Attribution theory is a person’s explanation of what or who influenced and facilitated the
success of a subsequent task or event (Anderman & Anderman, 2006). If an assigned task is
completed successfully, the individual’s ability to identify a cause for this success is considered
the attribution. Regardless of whether the cause has been accurately identified, the individual’s
perception of the cause is what classifies this as the attribution theory (Anderman & Anderman,
2006). Subsequently, the individual’s perceived attribution determines his or her emotion,
affecting the motivation (Weiner, 1985; Weiner, 2007). This perceived attribution was examined
in the context of the senior advisors’ belief in their ability to reduce production loss costs
associated with the change of command ceremonies.
There are three causal dimensions of attribution theory (Weiner, 2014): locus, stability,
and controllability. The locus refers to where the individual perceives the source of the cause of
the event; the individual may attribute the results of an activity on either internal or external
factors. If an individual blames poor results on his or her lack of ability, the locus is internal.
Blaming poor results on the weather is example of an external locus. Stability refers to the
perceived consistency of the factor identified as the cause of the outcome. For example, if the
weather is relatively inconsistent from day to day, it would be considered unstable. If the factor
is the location and the location is consistently the same, it would be considered stable.
Controllability refers to the level of control the individual has on the factor identified as the
cause of the outcome. The individual may not have control of the weather, but may have full
control of the location. Either can be considered the cause for a task to be successful or a failure,
but both represent different controllability levels of the perceived attribution (Weiner, 2014).

38
Attributing success with ability produces positive motivational consequences (Wigfield
& Eccles, 2000). If the senior advisors can attribute their efforts to the goal of reducing
production loss costs, the results could improve motivation and close any possible performance
gaps within the organization. Additionally, Schunk (1983) suggested that attributional feedback
can also facilitate the improvement in motivation. This can be discussed and evaluated between
commanders and the senior advisors.
What must be determined is to what level the senior advisors think that their contribution
influences the change of command ceremonies. Much can be gleaned from the Weiner’s (2014)
research, which explained that an individual’s perceived attribution weighs heavily on the
individual’s motivation. Applying this to the role of the senior advisors, it is important that they
perceive their performance efforts in the change of command ceremonies impact the outcome.
This concept is routinely referred to as meaningfulness of work (Lis, 2015) or the psychological
meaningfulness (Kahn, 1990; Spreitzer, 1995; May et al., 2004). Emerging research has shown
that when employees understand and accept the meaningfulness of their work – rather than
motivated by incentive or punishment – a wide range of benefits develop, such as morale,
performance, communication, and trust amongst leadership (Bellah et al., 1985; Cameron, 2012;
Wrzesniewski et al., 1997).
Lis (2015) compared these concepts against the Army’s leadership doctrine and
determined that these meaningfulness concepts are practiced and thoroughly discussed in the
Army’s leadership requirements model (Department of the Army, 2012c). This shared
understanding between research and Army doctrine reinforces the concept that members of the
organization need to understand their meaningfulness in their work. For example, if the senior
advisor perceives his or her role as inconsequential and having no impact on the change of

39
command ceremony’s cost reductions goals, then he or she will lack the motivation to implement
reduction efforts.
Dejoy (1994) asserted that attribution theory extends beyond mere motivation; the
individual’s perceptions in the workplace not only impact behavior, but they can also alter an
individual’s expectations of self or others. Applying this theory to the senior advisors would
suggest that lacking any perception of his or her contribution can lower performance
expectations amongst others within his or her jurisdiction. Senior advisors are responsible for the
training, mentoring, and professional development with those whom they lead (Department of
the Army, n.d.b). The value of the senior advisor’s perception of his or her role in reduction
efforts may potentially have a profound effect in other performance expectation areas within the
organization.
Senior Advisors’ Perceived Value of Reduction Efforts
Effective organizations ensure that the employees recognize the value in the efforts
(Burke & Hutchins, 2007). This requires the organization to establish a link between the
employee’s actions and the organizational goals (Chiaburu & Lindsay, 2008). In research
conducted by Chiaburu and Lindsay (2008) found that employees who perceived their actions to
have value toward the organizational goals demonstrated improved motivation and job
performance. The research examined training at the organization and the employees’ perceptions
of the trainings’ application to work performance. Chiaburu and Lindsay (2008) concluded with
the recommendation for organizations to devote time and resources communicating the
application and value of the training efforts.
Clark and Estes (2008) describe utility value as a motivational tool that effective
organizations leverage to increase performance. More specifically, when motivation is low to

40
accomplish less-desirable tasks, ensuring the employees focus on the benefits and necessity
toward the organizational goal can be leveraged to close the motivation gap. In the context of the
Division, the senior advisors must be able to recognize the value the reduction efforts toward the
organizational goal. This research assessed the senior advisors’ levels of perceived value of the
Division’s reduction efforts.
Table 3 shows the specific motivational influences and the questions that will serve as a
tool for assessing and analyzing. The table consists of two categories: Assumed Motivation
Influence and Motivational Influence Assessment. Assumed Motivation Influence refers to the
type of motivation by which the stakeholder is affected. The Motivational Influence Assessment
poses the focal question that helps identify the motivational issue that prevents higher levels of
performance.
Table 3
Motivational Influences and Assessments for Analysis
Assumed Motivation Influence Motivation Type Motivational Influence Assessment
1. Senior advisors need to have
confidence in their ability to
reduce production loss costs.
Self-Efficacy Interviews will determine the senior
advisor’s level of confidence in their
ability to reduce production loss
costs.
2. Senior advisors need to have
confidence in their ability to
influence their officer counterparts
toward implementing change.
Self-Efficacy Interviews will determine the senior
advisor’s level of confidence in their
ability to influence the officers
toward implementing change.
3. Senior advisors need to believe
their actions can reduce production
loss costs.
Attribution Interviews will determine the senior
advisor’s level of belief of their
actions’ impact on reducing
production loss costs.
4. Senior Advisors need to see
value in reducing production loss
costs for change of command
ceremonies.
Value Interviews will determine the senior
advisor’s level of value they perceive
the reduction efforts to have.

41
Organizational Influences
Even when employees exceed expectations of the knowledge and motivation needed for
exceptional performance, organizational influencers may attribute to the performance gaps
(Clark & Estes, 2008). Inefficient procedures, wasteful processes, inadequate resources, and
misaligned hierarchies are all examples of organizational influencers that contribute to
performance gaps within the organization (Clark & Estes, 2008). The organizational influencers
extend beyond the infrastructure, to the culture of the organization, consisting of the cultural
model(s) and practices of the organization (Clark & Estes, 2008; Kezar, 2001; Schein, 2004).
This section will examine the organizational influencers that may be restricting the performance
potential of the Division in achieving the stakeholder and organizational goals.
This portion of the chapter examines the literature related to cultural models and cultural
settings relevant to the organization’s aspirational goal of a 25% reduction in production loss
costs to allow more time and resources toward combat readiness training. This section will
analyze some of the organization’s suspected gaps associated with resource and time-allocation
and will compare these deficiencies to the findings of the related literature. The analysis helped
determine the organization’s performance gaps as it related to the organizational influencers.
Prioritizing Reduction Efforts
The cultural model is a term described by Gallimore and Goldenberg (2010) as “the
shared mental schema or normative understandings of how the world works, or ought to work”
(p. 47). In this model, change is exercised through the use of symbolic actions, language, or
metaphors (Feldman, 1991). The change of command represents the transition of authority from
one commander to the next, through a display of ceremony and the passing of the organization’s
colors (Department of the Army, 2012b). The way the Division prioritizes the reduction efforts

42
can be considered a cultural model; the Division’s priorities are a shared mental schema that is
understood by the leadership within the organization.
Prioritizing cost reduction efforts is a universal strategy across most organizations,
including government agencies such as the US Army (Geiger, 2017). Walewander (2012)
published the findings of his research, concluding that history proves the US military thrives
when being required to do more with less, in times of limited resources. This forces leadership to
utilize innovation and creativity to develop aggressive measures toward efficiency, creating
sustainable strategies that boost organizational productivity (Walewander, 2012). Substantial
research from experts in business strategies have determined that organizations must utilize cost
reduction strategies to maintain a competitive advantage (Alhuraish et al., 2015; Charaffi, et al.,
2016; Mousa, 2013; Pfeffer, 2010). This strategy is understood by the Department of the Army
and has disseminated the importance and value of the strategy’s application in all Army
organizations (Department of the Army, 2016a).
Understanding the cultural model of the organization is valuable when analyzing and
discussing the organizational performance gaps. This understanding helps develop a holistic
approach to the research by taking into account the organization’s values, norms, and procedures.
The subsequent inquiry and research regarding the Division’s change of command ceremonies
will require further analysis of the groups, environment, and the individuals within the
organization (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Part of the cultural model in the Division is the level of priority it gives reduction efforts
associated with the change of command ceremony. Clark and Estes (2008) posits that effective
organizations ensure that organizational messages, policies, and procedures that govern the work
are aligned with or are supportive of organizational goals. For the Division to be effective, the

43
messaging, policies, and procedures regarding its priority on reduction efforts should be aligned
with the organizational goal. This cultural model of the Division was evaluated, assessing the
Division’s level of priority toward reduction efforts and its alignment with the organizational
goal.
Provide Time and Resources Necessary to Evaluate Ceremonies
Effective organizations require sufficient work processes and material resources to
achieve the organizational goal (Clark & Estes, 2008). Cultural settings are described as the
social furniture in the workplace (Tharp & Gallimore, 1988). The time and resources can be
considered the cultural settings for the Division. To close the organizational performance gap, it
is necessary for the cultural settings to be aligned with the organizational goal. For the Division
to adequately evaluate the benefits of the change of command ceremonies, there must be
sufficient time and resources to support this effort.
As with many competitive organizations, the Army is in under pressure with expectations
to execute the same tasks with less resources (Batchelor, 2012). Evaluating the learned skills and
training creates an accountability system capable of improving the organization (Dowd & Shieh,
2013; Golden, 2006). Such accountability systems can support the leadership in making data-
driven decisions (Bensimon, 2005), allowing efficient use of organizational resources. Effective
organizations ensure sufficient resources are available for expected results; however, when
scarce, resources are aligned with organizational priorities (Clark & Estes, 2008). This
philosophy is heavily supported in the Army’s eight-step cost-benefit analysis paradigm
(Batchelor, 2012). In this paradigm, the organization develops a comprehensive system that
accumulates both the quantifiable and non-quantifiable costs and benefits involved in task or

44
event, determining the overall value. Once compiled, the benefits must outweigh the costs for the
task or event to be implemented (Batchelor, 2012).
Recognizing the focus of comprehensive strategic evaluations in the corporate arena, the
Department of the Army commissioned a team to research and provide feedback of these
strategies, resulting in the Performance Management Users’ Guide, (Department of the Army,
2016a). A significant portion of the publication discussed the cost-benefit analysis, identifying
Army leaders to be responsible for the continued assessment to maximize organizational
performance. The publication also cites corporate practices of efficiency, such as Lean Six
Sigma and Business-Process Reengineering, recognizing beneficial and credible achievements in
the civilian organizations that use comprehensive process evaluation techniques. Embedded in
the document are the distribution orders, which indicates that this document was distributed to
the Division’s parent organization, and presumably down to the Division (Department of the
Army, 2016a).
The sentiments of assessing the efficiency of business practices were echoed by MIT’s
Rogelberg et al. (2009), who described the necessity of assessment in such assemblies. Change
of command ceremonies, which mirror the traits of large-scale corporate meetings, require a
method to measure the cost versus benefit to help establish value. However, the Army currently
has only one course that trains on efficiency and cost-benefit analysis, indicating an emerging
priority (Batchelor, 2012)
Provide Time and Resources to Develop a Plan
For the organization’s aspirational goal to be accomplished, time and resources need to
be allotted for the leadership to develop a plan for reduction efforts. The allocation of time and
resources, especially when formalized in a supported process, can be considered part of the

45
cultural setting (Gallimore and Goldenberg, 2010). This concept of establishing the time and
resources for plan development is commonly referred to as strategic planning (Wolf & Floyd,
2013; Spee & Jarzabkowski, 2011; Moran & Brightman, 2000; Bryson, 2018). Utilizing strategic
planning is crucial for effective organizational performance (Başarı et al., 2017). Strategic
planning is necessary in effectively identifying and achieving an organization’s desired goals
(Kaufman et al., 2003) and, in doing so, increases an organization’s overall performance by
implementing through collaborative efforts and showing leadership support (Mittenthal, 2002).
Even though organizations acknowledge the value and importance of strategic planning,
the efforts do not always reach the target. Patanakul et al. (2016) studied 16 government projects,
many within the Department of Defense, and found that many of the projects fell short of
expectations due to time allocation for proper planning. Kotter (2007) identified a lack of
systematic planning as one of the eight leadership errors that prevent organizations from
achieving the desired organizational change. The Division is responsible for providing the
cultural setting that supports the organizational goal. The amount of time the Division allocates
toward planning must was evaluated in order to identify any possible organizational influencers
attributed to the performance gaps.

46
Table 4
Organizational Influences and Assessments for Analysis
Assumed Organizational Influences

Organizational Influence Assessment
Cultural Model Influence 1:
(Model) The Division leadership needs to
prioritize reducing production loss costs
associated with change of command
ceremonies.
Interviews with the senior advisors will
determine how the division prioritizes the
reduction efforts associated with the change
of command ceremonies.
Cultural Settings Influence 1:
(Settings) The Division needs to allocate time
and resources to evaluate the value of the
change of command ceremonies.
Interviews with the senior advisors will
determine how much time and how many
resources are allocated to evaluate the value
of the change of command ceremonies.
Cultural Settings Influence 2:
(Settings) The Division needs to provide time
and resources for leaders to develop a plan to
reduce production loss costs and evaluate the
reduction efforts.
Interviews with senior advisors will determine
how much time and how many resources are
allocated to developing plans to reduce
production loss costs and the evaluation of
these efforts.

Conceptual Framework: The Interaction of Stakeholders’ Knowledge and Motivation and
the Organizational Context
The purpose of the conceptual framework was to discuss the relationships between the
stakeholders’ knowledge, motivation, and organizational influencers. Utilizing experiential
knowledge and research helped construct the conceptual framework, going beyond merely
summarizing literature and empirical evidence (Maxwell, 2013). The intent of adding the
experiential knowledge served as a source of subjective insight upon which to establish unique
theories to examine, rather than serve as a bias (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992). Until this section, the
influencers have been presented and discussed independently; this conceptual framework applied
the experiential knowledge and research to construct theories of possible relationships between
the influencers, posing diverse perspectives examined in this study.

47
The influencers mentioned above will discuss the three knowledge, three motivational,
and three organizational influencers. The limited number of influencers for this study was a
result of literature review and experiential knowledge. Distilling the number of influencers
allows narrowed focus, efforts, and concentration on the most significant aspects of the study
while acknowledging other possible areas for subsequent research.
Knowledge Influencers
Knowledge influencer #1 stated that senior advisors need to understand the concept of
production loss costs; knowledge influencer #2 stated that senior advisors need to understand the
relationship between reducing the change of command ceremony costs and training time
available for combat readiness; and knowledge influencer #3 stated that senior advisors must
know how to evaluate the value of the ceremonies and compare it to the associated costs. The
primary reason these influencers were selected was due to their general concepts being a topic of
discussion in a recent Army publication (Department of Army, 2016a). This document was
distributed to the Division’s parent unit in 2016, identifying the need for performance
improvement measures at all Army organizations to help maximize combat readiness levels
(Department of the Army, 2016a). Outlined in the publication were the methods and strategies
that leaders must exercise toward efficient and effective practices. Utilizing experiential
knowledge, these strategies seem to coincide with the organization’s aspirational goal referenced
in this dissertation. In other words, the language in the Army’s performance management
document identified leaders at the senior advisor level to be able to assess weak performance
practices and develop alternative strategies to reduce inefficiencies, sharing substantial
similarities in the language of the selected knowledge influencers.

48
Motivational Influencers
Motivational influencer #1 stated that the senior advisors need to have confidence in their
ability to reduce production loss costs; motivational influencer #2 stated that the senior advisors
need to have confidence in their ability to influence their officer counterparts toward
implementing change; motivational influencer #3 stated that senior advisors need to believe their
actions can reduce production loss costs; and motivational influencer #4 states that senior
advisors need to see value in reducing production loss costs for change of command ceremonies.
These influencers were selected because they require confidence, a significant element in the
composition of a senior advisor. All senior advisors are leaders in the Division. The Army’s
primary leadership doctrine, ADRP 6-22, described confidence as a necessary component of a
leader’s presence (Department of the Army, 2012c). Because the Army’s literature places such
high regard and necessity on confidence, it is assumed to be a critical component toward
achieving the organizational goal.
Organizational Influencers
Organizational influencer #1 stated that the division leadership must prioritize reducing
production loss costs associated with change of command ceremonies; organizational influencer
#2 stated that the Division must allocate time and resources to evaluate the value of the change
of command ceremonies; and organizational influencer #3 stated that the Division needs to
provide time and resources for leaders to develop a plan to reduce production loss costs and
evaluate the reduction efforts. These influencers were selected because they are a necessity for
the organization’s aspirational goal. Modifying organizational practices requires time for
assessment and planning (Moran & Brightman, 2000; Bryson, 2018). This was reiterated in the

49
Army’s Performance Management publication, stressing the importance of using assessments
and resources toward desired objectives (Department of the Army, 2016a).
Influencer Interactions
If the Division provided adequate time to evaluate the ceremonies’ value and to plan for
reduction strategies associated with the change of command ceremonies, the senior advisors
would develop corresponding knowledge and skills which are relevant to the aspirational goal.
The Division’s ability to prioritize and allocate time and resources will facilitate the senior
advisors’ development of the knowledge discussed in knowledge influencers. This ability’s
relevance extends beyond the change of command ceremonies to other tasks, events, and
missions that stand to benefit from assessments and evaluations. The acquired knowledge and
skills would presumably boost the confidence (Grossman & Salas, 2015) of the senior advisors,
addressing the motivational influencers. With the obtained knowledge and motivation, the senior
advisors would significantly impact the organizational influencers. Senior advisors’ ability to
influence commanders on policies and practices could shape what type of training, time, and
resources the Division is able to provide. In theory, all three types of influencers are interrelated
and work interdependently toward the organization’s aspirational goal to develop and implement
strategies to reduce production loss costs associated with the change of command.

50
Figure 1
Conceptual Framework of the Change of Command Ceremonies

Note. The figure above shows the knowledge and motivational influencers in the orange circle.
This circle resides within the blue organizational influencer circle, indicating that the Division
controls the knowledge and motivation influencers of the senior advisors. Although all
influencers may be interrelated, the organization is responsible for the inducing the change
Motivation (Self-efficacy): Senior advisors need to
have confidence in their ability to reduce production
loss costs.

Motivation (Self-efficacy): Senior advisors need to
have confidence in their ability to influence their
officer counterparts toward implementing change

Motivation (Attribution): Senior advisors need to
believe their actions can reduce production loss
costs.

Motivation (Value): Senior advisors need to see
value in reducing production loss costs for change of
command ceremonies.

The Division
Organizational Goal (Cultural Setting): The Division needs to provide time and
resources for leaders to develop a plan to reduce production loss costs and
evaluate the reduction efforts.
Organizational Goal (Cultural Setting): The Division must allocate time and
resources to evaluate the value of the change of command ceremonies.
Organizational Goal (Model): The Division leadership must prioritize reducing
production loss costs associated with change of command ceremonies.
Develop and implement strategies to reduce production
loss costs associated with the change of command
ceremonies.

.
Knowledge (Conceptual): Senior advisors need to
understand the concept of production loss costs.

Knowledge (Conceptual): Senior advisors need to
understand the relationship between reducing the
change of command ceremony costs and combat
readiness.

Knowledge (Procedural): Senior advisors must
know how to evaluate the value of the ceremonies
and compare it to the associated costs.
Senior Advisors

51
necessary to achieve the organization’s aspirational goal. The stakeholder goal is represented in
the black box and serves as the subordinate step toward the organizational goal. For the Division
to achieve its aspirational goal, the Division must address the problem of practice by
implementing change, which will instigate subsequent change in knowledge and motivational
influencers.
Summary
The intention of this evaluation study was to explore the knowledge, motivational, and
organizational barriers involved in reducing the cost of the Division’s change of command
ceremonies by 25% as a model to be used in examining reduction evaluation processes for other
Army programs and activities. The literature has explained the ceremonies’ production loss costs
and their impact on the Division’s mission (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009; Department of the Army,
2016a; Rogelberg et al., 2007). The Army’s regulations, guidance, and directives from the
Division’s leadership were also examined, suggesting possible discrepancies between policy and
practice (Department of the Army, 2016a; Department of the Army, 2012b; Kimmons, 2019).
Additionally, literature identified the senior advisors’ role (Department of the Army, 2014;
Department of the Army, 2017) in the knowledge, motivational, and organizational gaps in
performance (Clark & Estes, 2008) associated with the change of command ceremonies
(Department of the Army, 2012b). To best evaluate and attain the qualitative data, interviews
with the senior advisors of the change of command ceremonies have served as the data collection
method and will be presented in Chapter Three.

52
Chapter Three: Methods
Chapter Three concentrates on the participating stakeholders, data collection and
instrumentation, data analysis, credibility and trustworthiness, validity and reliability, ethics, and
limitations and delimitations using interviews regarding the Army’s change of command
ceremony. The research focused on a specific division in the Army, using the pseudonym of the
Division, and examined the resources exhausted to sustain such ceremonies.
This chapter explains the strategies, criteria, and protocols that helped maximize the
amount and quality of the data available through interviews. In addition to explaining the
structure of the research, this chapter also provides some rationale and justification for the
decisions made when criteria and methods were selected. The structure also ensures that the
focus is on the research questions:
1. What are the senior advisors’ knowledge and motivation related to developing and
implementing strategies to reduce production loss costs per ceremony?
2. What is the interaction between organizational culture and context and senior advisors’
knowledge and motivation to develop and implement strategies to reduce production loss
costs?
3. What are the recommendations for organizational practice in the areas of knowledge,
motivation, and organizational resources related to developing and implementing
strategies to reduce production loss costs per ceremony?
Participating Stakeholders
The stakeholder group of focus was the 200-member senior advisor group, which helps
lead, mentor, and train their 20,000-member Division. For the purposes of this study, the senior
advisors must have been serving as a 1SG or CSM had some familiarity with the change of

53
command ceremonies, and had attended one of the top two levels of the Army’s professional
develop system (United States Army Human Resources Command, 2019). This set of criteria
helped establish credibility, context, and legitimacy in the interviews by ensuring participants
were well-qualified, and provided responses rich in data and insight.
Interview Sampling Criteria and Rationale
This research examined many aspects of the change of command ceremony. Although
many of these aspects have been covered in the Army’s drill and ceremony doctrine (Department
of the Army, 2012), having experience in participating in the change of command ceremonies
were expected to increase sampling credibility and validity. Chein (1981) explained that those
selected for sampling are not selected because they represent the average opinion, but because of
their competence and experience. This research intended to use senior advisors who had
experienced the change of command ceremonies. This experience was expected to help provide
valuable insight when these ceremonies were examined. Therefore, sampling required
participants to have participated in at least one change of command ceremony since serving in a
senior advisor position at the Division.
Criterion 1
The participants of the interviews were required to have some familiarity with change of
command ceremonies. Familiarity included serving as the event coordinator, attending as a
participant, or attending as an audience member for the change of command ceremony. This
familiarity was vital to the interview because change of command ceremonies served as the focus
of the study and the foundation of the research questions.

54
Criterion 2
Participants were required to be either a CSM or 1SG. The rationale for this criterion was
because these were the ranks of the stakeholder group of focus. The research questions
specifically addressed the knowledge and motivational performance gaps of the CSMs and the
1SGs. Exceptional circumstances such as those of lesser rank temporarily serving in a CSM or
1SG position or those who have been demoted from said rank did not qualify for this criterion.
Participants must have been currently of the rank of CSM or 1SG during the time of the
interview.
Criterion 3
Participants must have completed either the Sergeant Major Course or the Master Leader
Course, which are the two highest levels of the Army’s professional development system (United
States Army Human Resources Command, 2019). These courses were designed by the NCO
Leadership Center of Excellence at Fort Bliss, serving as the institution that prepares senior
NCOs for their roles and responsibilities as the senior advisors in the organizations (The NCO
Leadership Center of Excellence, n.d.). This criterion was expected to help ensure that the
participants had been exposed to the concepts of the military ceremony through Army course
curriculum, allowing the research questions to extract rich data from credible and knowledgeable
sources.
Interview Sampling (Recruitment) Strategy and Rationale
The sampling strategy consisted of a qualitative approach, which incorporated
nonrandom sampling. Specifically, the strategy was purposeful sampling through the use of
convenience and snowball sampling. Merrian and Tisdell (2016) explained that the criteria used
in purposeful sampling should reflect the purpose of the study and should be justified and

55
explained in the research. Because of the sampling criteria, random sampling would not have
been practical; participants were required to meet a set of criteria that specified their eligibility as
a senior advisor. Since the research questions focused on the senior advisors, the researcher
needed to target specific soldiers within the Division, requiring purposeful sampling that allowed
to researcher to select those soldiers meeting the criteria. Purposeful sampling removed ineligible
senior advisors from the sampling. To supplement these efforts, the researcher utilized the
snowball strategy, allowing the sampling size to extend beyond the immediate reach of the
researcher.
Merriam and Tisdell (2016) described convenience sampling as selection based on ease
and opportunity. This sampling was ideal due to the researcher’s profession. As a Master Leader
Course (MLC) instructor, the researcher routinely served in close proximity to the Division’s
senior advisors. The intent was to contact the senior advisors who had recently graduated MLC.
This convenience sampling served a practical purpose; through becoming familiar with these
senior advisors through MLC, the researcher already knew who met the criteria and was able to
solicit their participation. Those who were qualified were contacted via email.
To help recruitment efforts, the researcher also utilized snowball sampling. Merriam and
Tisdell (2016) described this technique as an effective means of leveraging participants’ social
and professional network to refer the researcher to other candidates who fit the criteria. This
strategy was expected to help achieve the target number of participants for the research, which
was to interview between 10 and 20 participants. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested sampling
until a point of saturation. Based on his 18 years of experience with the problem of practice and
informal discussions with senior advisors, the researcher had targeted an assumed saturation
point between 10 and 15 interview participants. Setting a maximum number of interviews to 20

56
participants allowed additional opportunity to reach the saturation point. The researcher intended
to have a number of qualified participants that exceeded the assumed saturation point, to ensure
that the number of participants would not limit the research. Utilizing the snowball sampling
helped generate a roster of 25 eligible senior advisors willing to participate in the research,
exceeding the saturation maximum of 20.
For ethical purposes, solicitation through convenience sampling was conducted after the
participants graduated from MLC, removing any perceived conflict of interest between the
researcher as the instructor, and the participant as the student. Further explanation on this will be
discussed in the Ethics section of Chapter Three. This recruitment strategy-maintained alignment
with the research questions, which specifically sought to evaluate the senior advisors. The
interviews consisted of questions that identified the senior advisors’ knowledge and motivation
influencers affiliated with the change of command ceremonies. Their responses also offered
insight on the possible organizational influencers that contributed to any performance gaps.
Observation Sampling Criteria and Rationale
The researcher intended to observe the change of command ceremonies – including their
dress rehearsals – in the field to gain a deeper understanding of the event and how the senior
advisors impacted the events. The researcher planned to observe the senior advisors’ role in the
ceremonies, as well as their possible attempts to reduce production loss costs during rehearsals.
However, due to COVID-19
1
, change of command ceremonies were either heavily modified
from the status quo or cancelled in order to adhere to the safety policies and guidance

1
COVID-19 was virus that caused a global pandemic and, as of October 1, 2020, had killed 1.02
million people and prompted aggressive strategies to reduce the spread of the virus such as
implementing social distancing, restricting large gatherings, and mandating personal protective
equipment be worn (Center for Disease Control, 2020).

57
disseminated by the Division and its supervisory organizations. Any data collected from the
modified ceremonies would not have been indicative to standard ceremonial practices.
Therefore, the researcher abandoned observations and relied primarily on the interviews as the
source of data collection.
Data Collection and Instrumentation
The purpose of the qualitative data collection was to explore and examine a phenomenon
to build upon already existing knowledge (Leavy, 2017). When intending to explore, describe, or
explain, Leavy (2017) suggested that qualitative research is likely the appropriate method. The
research questions served as the source from which to determine how the data were to be
collected and what questions were to be asked during interviews (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Two of the three research questions required insight from the senior advisors as they provided
explanations and descriptions regarding their knowledge and motivation influencers. Therefore,
interviews were the ideal instrument used to extract the relevant data, coinciding with the
guidance of Leavy (2017) and Merriam and Tisdell (2016).
Interview Protocol
The interviews for this study were semi-structured, which allowed some flexibility in the
questioning for best responses while maintaining a list of questions upon which to remain
focused and guided (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Creswell (2014) identified interviews as being
the primary data collection strategy for qualitative research, suggesting open-ended questions to
retrieve the rich data desired for the research. To best capture the data needed to answer the
research questions, a series of open-ended questions were organized that set a suitable foundation
for the interviews with the senior advisors. Responsible research allowed different outcomes to
replace the researcher’s hypotheses. Maxwell (2013) referred to this as tunnel vision, and the

58
semi-structured, open-ended interview protocol for this study lessened the likelihood of such
inflexibilities.
These open-ended questions aligned the conceptual framework that existed between
knowledge, motivation, and organizational influencers. For example, the senior advisors’ level of
knowledge may have manifested into possible performance gaps derived from motivational
influencers. Having ensured proper alignment between interview questions and research
questions supported the conceptual framework.
Interview Procedures
The researcher took diligent steps to ensure that proper interview procedures were in
place several weeks before the execution of the first interview. The 10 interviews were scheduled
according to the convenience of the interviewee; this fortified the comfort and openness
necessary to extract fruitful responses and data from the interviewees. Since the senior advisors
are amongst some of the most senior of leaders at the Division, their availability was quite
limited. Because of the limited availability, the researcher intended to conduct only one
interview per interviewee, eliminating the need to schedule multiple interviews with the same
interviewee. Each interview was between 45 and 90 minutes and took place between June 1,
2020, and July 15, 2020, which allowed approximately six weeks to complete all 10 interviews.
All interviews were conducted in English, eliminating any need for translation.
To record the interviews in compliance with University of Southern California protocol,
all interviews were conducted on the Zoom application. This application recorded all interviews
into both video and audio format, allowing post interview referencing easy to review. Relying on
this application required both interview parties to have acceptable internet service. When
communication began to deteriorate during the interview due to faulty internet service,

59
participants were asked to repeat their responses. In the rare event of repeated disruption,
interviews were rescheduled for a time that allowed better internet service. No other method was
considered for these interviews.
Data Analysis
All interviews were transcribed through the application Zoom. Although Zoom generated
the transcription, data needed to be cleaned as Zoom lacked complete and accurate
transcriptions. To help clean data, researcher referred to the audio recordings to verify accuracy
and to complete missing words or phrases. Data from the interviews were organized using the
application Atlas.ti to best catalogue the information. In addition to each interview being
catalogued, each relevant comment was categorized by its relationship to the research questions
and KMO influences. The KMO influences helped establish a foundation from which to create a
set of a priori codes. These a priori codes served as the list of categories from which to relate to
each relevant comment.
Responses were coded through Atlas.ti, allowing a single comment or response to be
categorized in multiple categories. This keeps a single comment or response being limited or
bound to a single category, which may have reduced the accuracy of the findings. The comments
and responses were then segmented into groups of like responses. This process helped identify
themes and trends amongst the participants. Since some comments related to several KMO
influencers, the application allowed multiple inputs, enabling single-to-many or many-to-many
relationships between interview comments and categories. This technique avoided restrictive
options that may have limited the data analysis and subsequent findings.

60
Credibility and Trustworthiness
Two strategies were developed to ensure high levels of credibility and trustworthiness
were established and sustained throughout the duration of the research. To support
trustworthiness, the first strategy ensured that the research and data collection incorporated
member checks. Maxwell (2013) described this as an essential strategy when trying to avoid any
misinterpretations of data by corroborating with those interviewed. Interpretations of the findings
were presented to the interviewees to help refine the data interpretation by providing insight and
clarification.
The second strategy required the researcher’s position be declared, which Merriam and
Tisdell (2016) described as the researcher presenting his or her biases or beliefs on the research
topic to help create transparency between the reader and the research. This disclaimer was
presented by the researcher prior to data collection, establishing candid insight on the
researcher's approach to the data collection. The intention behind deploying these two strategies
was to promote credibility and trustworthiness in the data collection process.
Ethics and Role of Researcher
The researcher was not assigned to the Division nor was he affiliated in the chain of
command at any of the Division’s parent organizations. This organizational distance between the
researcher and participants allowed minimal perception of coercion or influence. Creating this
hierarchical distance between researcher and participant was important because it avoided the
possibility of a participant being influenced by the researcher due to their duty positions, which
could have corrupted the responses and subsequent data (Leavy, 2017). Additionally, the senior
advisors were at the rank equal to or greater than the rank of the researcher, further minimizing
any possibility of intimidation or pressure between researcher and participants.

61
Eight of the ten participants were attendees of a leadership development course, where
the researcher served as an instructor. This course was a 15-day leadership course, which some
members of the Division attended. Any solicitation or notification of research did not occur until
after attendees graduated to limit the perception of influence by the researcher over the
participants. The two remaining participants were obtained through snowballing and were
colleagues of the eight that were solicited through the course.
Soliciting for Participants
Graduates of the leadership course who were assigned to the Division were contacted and
asked to participate in the research. Contact information of recent graduates was collected from
the course’s graduate archive. Those contacted were asked a series of question to determine
whether they met the stakeholder group criteria. Asking attendees after graduation helped
minimize any opportunity for coercion or influence. The researcher was prepared to disclose or
discuss all aspects of the research to the participants. The graduates that met the criteria were
sent the consent form, which addressed the Institutional Review Board requirements, as
discussed by Rubin and Rubin (2012). Participants were required to be informed of the context
of the study, any possible risks, and that they can withdraw from the study at any point of the
research (Glesne, 2011; Rubin & Rubin, 2012). Due to the nature of the study and anonymity of
the participants, there did not seem to be any notable risk to the participants. Regardless, the
intent was for each participant to sign a consent form, which consisted of a narrative covering all
aforementioned concerns. Since the researcher planned to audio record all interviews, the
consent form included a description of the recording procedures.

62
Certification
The researcher developed competencies in ethical inquiry standards and practices by
receiving training and certification from the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI)
Program. The CITI Program required that those enrolled complete courses that educated students
on the proper administration of research and data collection (CITI Program, 2019). The training
focused the on ethical execution of research using social behavioral human subjects, necessary
for the research and interviews with the senior advisors. The researcher completed certification
on November 29, 2019.
Bias
Merriam and Tisdell (2016) discussed both the pros and cons of the researcher's bias and
the need for the researcher to be forthcoming with identifying such biases. Possible biases
identified by the researcher were the participant's combat experience and qualifications;
researcher’s opinion of the change of command ceremonies; and the interviewee’s opinion of the
researcher. Although conducting research in an objective manner free of biases, actively
acknowledging and presenting the possible biases served as a strong practice toward objectivity
(Harding, 1993; Leavy, 2017),
Combat Experience
Soldiers with combat deployments wear the combat patch on the right sleeve and serves
as an identifier to other soldiers of the level of experience. The combat patch has often been a
source of discrimination in some military communities, hazing or ostracizing those without the
combat patch. Although it is unclear how this could influence the research, the researcher was
aware of the importance of its identification.

63
Researcher’s Opinion
Ordered to participate in over 50 change of command ceremonies, the researcher retained
a moderate level of bias against this tradition. His substantial familiarity and bias with
ceremonies came from a single perspective and failed to consider other perspectives, such as that
of the audience member, civilians, spectators, and the commanders changing positions. This bias
was expected to be diminished through research of empirical evidence and interviews of the
senior advisors. The researcher did realize that the intent of this research was to evaluate the
Division’s cost-benefit analysis of its practices. The change of command ceremony represented a
microcosm, indicative of an Army-wide cost-benefit analysis that continues to be utilized in
many other tasks. The researcher was determined to ensure that the bias did not interfere or
corrupt the research findings.
Interviewees’ Opinion
Since the interviewees were solicited from the list of recent graduates of the researcher’s
organization, there may have be some animosity against the researcher. For example, some of
these recent graduates (interviewees) may have not been pleased with the score they received
from their instructor (researcher). This allowed the potential for contamination in the execution
of the interview and the subsequent results. To minimize such a scenario, the researcher did not
solicit recent graduates whom were assessed by the researcher. With five other instructors on
staff, the researcher was easily able to select from those assessed by other instructors, therefore
reducing possible animosity toward the researcher.

64
Chapter Four: Findings
Chapter Four focuses on the findings regarding the senior advisors’ knowledge and
motivation influences as well as the perceived organizational support toward the organization’s
aspirational goal. The purpose of this study was to determine what gaps would need to be closed
in order for the organization to achieve the desired goal. The data collection was schedule to be
obtained through interviews as well as observations of the change of command ceremonies.
However, due to the COVID-19 epidemic, the Division’s policies regarding large social
gatherings made the change of command ceremonies reduced to media-broadcasted events with
few to no audience members. This atypical structure to the ceremonies was not indicative of the
status quo, and the plan to conduct observations were abandoned, making the interviews the sole
source of the data collection. While less than ideal, since the focus of the study was to
understand the perception and experience of senior advisors in relation to reducing production
loss costs, the study moved forward with these limitations. Through a series of interviews, the
senior advisors were asked questions that helped to understand their position and capabilities to
facilitate the organizational goal. These questions were developed and guided by three research
questions. Although all three questions established the foundation of the data collection, the third
research question refers to the recommendations, which is discussed in Chapter Five.
1. What are the senior advisors’ knowledge and motivation related to developing and
implementing strategies to reduce production loss costs per ceremony?
2. What is the interaction between organizational culture and context and senior advisors’
knowledge and motivation to develop and implement strategies to reduce production loss
costs?

65
3. What are the recommendations for organizational practice in the areas of knowledge,
motivation, and organizational resources related to developing and implementing
strategies to reduce production loss costs per ceremony?
Participating Stakeholders
The participants consisted of 10 senior noncommissioned officers assigned to the
Division, holding the rank of either First Sergeant or as Command Sergeant Major. They were
serving as the senior advisors in their organizations, each with at least 12 years in the Army.
Table 5 presents the basic information and experience levels of each of the participants. Each
participant was asked approximately 13 questions to determine findings based on their
knowledge, motivation, and organizational influencers.
Combat Role refers to the type of job the soldier is expected to perform while deployed to
combat operations. In general, these are split between two categories: combat arms, expected to
engage enemy combatants, and support personnel, expected to support those engaged with the
enemy. Although both combat roles assume similar levels of risk while deployed, each role has
different perspectives and outlooks on change of command ceremonies and combat readiness.
This category was recorded to identify any possible relationship.
The younger senior advisors seemed to have more knowledge — both conceptual and
procedural — when discussing production loss costs and cost-benefit analysis. The two youngest
senior advisors showed no knowledge gap, while the two oldest senior advisors displayed the
greatest knowledge gap. While the younger participants appeared to give responses that
demonstrated a pattern of introspection and a desire to understand the purpose behind Army
activities, the older participants responded with comments that stressed and valued conformity.
For example, the younger participants routinely responded with phrases such as, “I’m always

66
wondering about that”; “I’ve asked about that”; or “These never made sense to me,” while the
older participants responded with phrases such as “It’s just how we do it”; “It’s not my concern”;
or “It’s not our job to ask why.” This may represent a relationship between age and response;
however, this is difficult to conclude due to the small sample size of the participants.
Table 5
Participants
Pseudonyms Gender Combat Role Serving as Senior
Advisor
Years of
Service
Age
Senior Advisor 1 Male Support Personnel 24 months 25 44
Senior Advisor 2 Male Support Personnel 8 months 22 40
Senior Advisor 3 Male Combat Arms 45 months 23 46
Senior Advisor 4 Female Support Personnel 20 months 18 39
Senior Advisor 5 Male Combat Arms 27 months 22 41
Senior Advisor 6 Male Combat Arms 11 months 17 35
Senior Advisor 7 Female Support Personnel 25 months 18 36
Senior Advisor 8 Male Combat Arms 32 months 18 38
Senior Advisor 9 Male Combat Arms 6 months 19 37
Senior Advisor 10 Male Combat Arms 36 months 23 42

67
Findings of Research Question One: What are the Senior Advisors’ Knowledge and
Motivation Related to Developing and Implementing Strategies to Reduce Production Loss
Costs per Ceremony?
During the 10 interviews, six findings emerged that addressed Research Question One.
Findings One, Two, and Three specifically pertain to the gaps in knowledge, with the first
finding being that the senior advisors lacked an understanding of the concept of production loss
costs. This finding shared a close relationship with the second finding: Senior advisors lack the
knowledge of how to evaluate the value of the ceremonies and compare it to the associated costs.
The third finding was that half of the senior advisors had either no understanding or a vague
understanding of the relationship between reducing production loss costs and increasing training
time available for combat readiness.
Findings Four, Five, and Six relate to the assumed motivation influences that address
Research Question One. Finding Four revealed that the senior advisors are confident in their
ability to influence their commander, organization, and change. This finding was identified as an
asset, meaning the results reached at least the 70% threshold of senior advisors having
substantive positive responses. Establishing this threshold also helped to determine the limit to
what was considered a gap. In the case of Finding Four, only 10% of the senior advisors
expressed a gap, while the overwhelming 90% showed no evidence of a gap. Therefore, Finding
Four was considered an asset.
Findings Five and Six were identified as gaps. Both pertained to motivation influences.
However, unlike Finding Four, these findings did not meet or exceed the 70% threshold,
indicating a sufficient level of responses conveying a gap that addresses Research Question One.

68
All six findings, comprised of three knowledge influences and three motivation influences,
address Research Question One: five substantiated as gaps and one as an asset.
Most of the findings were based on polarized results. Interviewee responses were easily
discernible between either “yes” or “no” when categorizing respondents as having that
knowledge or motivation influence. However, some of the findings included a third classification
of “vague.” This helped classify those responses that were situated between yes and no when
addressing the findings. The intent of the researcher was not to add unnecessary complexity to
classifications, but to add articulation to the findings. This added category became a factor when
drawing conclusions from the responses and assessing the senior advisors’ knowledge and
motivation influences.
Finding One: Senior Advisors Lack the Conceptual Knowledge of Production Loss Costs
Clark and Estes (2008) asserted that gaps in stakeholder knowledge can prevent the
organization from achieving its goals. Understanding the concept of production loss costs is a
significant component to managing an organization because it helps develop an accurate
depiction of the organization’s performance and productivity during an event (Romano &
Nunamaker, 2001). Evaluating current performance levels and desired performance goal levels is
necessary when developing subsequent steps to close the gap (Clark and Estes, 2008). Leaders
need to understand how production loss costs impact the organization’s mission, employee well-
being, and overall productivity of the workforce. This conceptual knowledge is the foundation
from which subsequent tasks are based toward achieving the organization’s aspirational goal.
This deficiency is considered a stakeholder knowledge gap and represents the first finding.
The interview consisted of five questions that either directly or indirectly asked about
production loss costs. The intent was to establish the senior advisor’s level of understanding of

69
production loss costs, even if they were unfamiliar with the term. Since the term production loss
costs may not have been as widely used in their organization as similar-sized corporations, the
interviewer allowed some opportunity to clarify the term. The intent of this brief clarification
was to assess the senior advisor’s understanding and familiarity with the concept even though
they may never had labeled the concept as production loss costs.
None of the senior advisors were familiar with the term production loss costs. After the
interviewer clarified the term using similar terms such as inactivity costs and missed opportunity
costs, two of the ten had a strong understanding of the concept. Subsequent questioning indicated
that they claimed to have applied it in the decision-making at their organization. Senior Advisor
6 emphatically stated that they “would equate [production loss cost] toward time that we could
have spent training for a deployment, or readiness, or even time with our families.” Senior
Advisor 7 demonstrated their understanding of production loss costs by telling a story that
exemplified their application of the concept. They had factored in production loss costs to justify
a reduction in personnel to be used in “another pointless ceremony.” These two senior advisors
effectively conveyed a strong understanding of production loss costs and applied the concept in
their role at the organization.
Five of the ten stated that the concept made sense after a brief rephrasing but stated they
had never applied such a concept in their supervisory activities or even paid attention to it.
Senior Advisor 4 stated, “ya, it makes sense. I guess if they’re out there, ya know, it’s got to cost
something. I just don’t really think about it because we all get paid a salary.” Similar comments
were made by the other four senior advisors, and all were quick to interject their stories, as if to
demonstrate their new understanding of production loss costs. “This applies to every time we
hurry up and wait,” stated Senior Advisor 10. However, when asked, all five struggled to explain

70
how the concept could be applied in practice at the Division, possibly because they had not
previously been aware of the concept, as several comments eluted to. This casted doubt on their
conceptual knowledge, representing a vague understanding of the production loss cost concept.
Three of the ten stated that they still did not understand the concept, even after attempts
were made to clarify the term. “That still doesn’t make sense; we get paid no matter what. Does
it matter what we’re doing?” stated Senior Advisor 3. Senior Advisor 5 claimed that there were
no production loss costs associated with change of command. This senior advisor failed to
elaborate when asked to do so. Senior Advisor 2 simply stated that they understood the words the
interviewer was using, but they were still unable to make sense of the concept of production loss
costs.
Each of these three groups represent varying levels of the conceptual understanding of
production loss costs. Although two of the senior advisors appeared to have a strong
understanding, 80% of the participants either did not apply or understand the concept. The two
with the strongest understanding also were the two youngest of the participants. Of the three who
demonstrated no understanding of the concept of production loss costs, one was the oldest of the
participants, while the other two were above the age of 40. No other demographic categories —
such as combat role, gender, or years of service — appeared to have any relationship with the
participants’ responses addressing this conceptual knowledge. Overall, the majority of the
participants showed an overall lack of conceptual knowledge of production loss costs. If the
organizational goal is to reduce the costs associated with change of command ceremonies, a lack
of understanding will impede the achievement of this goal.
Table 6 presents the senior advisors’ knowledge of concept of production loss costs.
Participants were marked as a “yes” in the second column if they were able to convey a general

71
understanding of the production loss costs concept to an extent that they could demonstrate how
to apply the concept in practice. Participants were marked “vague” in the third column if they
required some rephrasing and elaboration on the question.
Table 6
Production Loss Costs Concept
Pseudonyms Familiar with Production Loss Costs Concept
Senior Advisor 1 Vague
Senior Advisor 2 No
Senior Advisor 3 No
Senior Advisor 4 Vague
Senior Advisor 5 No
Senior Advisor 6 Yes
Senior Advisor 7 Yes
Senior Advisor 8 Vague
Senior Advisor 9 Vague
Senior Advisor 10 Vague

Finding Two: Senior Advisors Lack the Knowledge of How to Evaluate the Value of the
Ceremonies and Compare it to the Associated Costs
The senior advisors were asked about how they determine the value of the change of
command ceremonies and compare that to the associated costs. Although some organizations
have adopted industry-specific models, the cost-benefit analysis is a standard practice that is
universally used across all modern business models (Boardman et al., 2017; Newcomer et al.,

72
2015; Pearce, 2016). The intent was to evaluate whether senior advisors knew how to assess
costs against the benefits of the activities such as change of command ceremonies and would
establish the senior advisors’ level of procedural knowledge of a cost-benefit analysis or a
similar model. Rather than being asked a close-ended question, the interviewer asked participants
to describe how they would conduct a cost-benefit analysis of a change of command ceremony.
An explanation of a cost-benefit analysis procedure would validate the senior advisor’s
procedural knowledge, while a poor explanation would conclude a lack of procedural
knowledge.
Of the ten participants that were asked how they would determine the value or account
for the gains and losses of a ceremony, two specifically referenced a cost-benefit analysis. Both
were able to effectively communicate a process on how they would calculate costs of a change of
command ceremony, including production loss costs. Senior Advisor 6 stated, “Not just the
soldiers on the field but the fly-over and the fuel for those.” Although both were able to assess
costs, they admitted that determining the benefits would be much more difficult and subjective.
“I think the benefits outweigh the costs - I just don’t know how to quantify it with a dollar
amount,” explained Senior Advisor 7. Regardless of their inability to accurately quantify all of
the benefits, they had the procedural knowledge of how to determine the ceremony’s value.
Soldiers 3, 9, and 10 were able to give a very vague description of a process they would
use. “There’s probably some formula out there that would show how much everyone’s time is
worth, and then just compare that to what we’re gaining from [the change of command
ceremony],” stated Senior Advisor 4. Two of the participants disregarded the production loss
costs in their process. “I think the costs would be minimal; maybe food and refreshments or
something, but not much more than a couple hundred bucks,” according to Senior Advisor 8.

73
Although minimal, this does represent some procedural knowledge since Senior Advisor 8 was
able to continue and describe comparing the couple of hundreds of dollars against the benefits,
such as honor, morale, and tribute to the outgoing commander.
The remaining three participants were unable to describe any type of procedure to
determine the value of a ceremony. “As far as the money thing goes, I have no idea how any of
that works,” stated Senior Advisor 6. When asked how they would compare the costs and
benefits of a change of command ceremony, Senior Advisor 3 responded with, “I don’t think
there is a correlation between the two.” Subsequent attempts to rephrase and explain the question
yielded similar responses from this participant. At this point during this interview, the body
language and demeanor of the Senior Advisor 3 through the Zoom interview indicated that this
senior advisor was getting agitated by the questioning as they struggled with the responses.
Amongst the 10 senior advisors, two had demonstrated substantial procedural knowledge
on determining a change of command ceremony’s value. Although three of the participants
understood a vague overview of a cost-benefit analysis, the remaining five expressed no
competency in the procedural knowledge. The senior advisors will need to develop this
procedural knowledge in order to achieve the organization’s aspirational goal. Having the
knowledge to compare costs versus benefits will provide leadership the tools necessary to make
well-calculated decisions (Department of the Army 2016a; Niebuhr et al., 2013) and provide
accurate evaluations on performance and the effectiveness of organizational practices (Rogelberg
et al., 2007). This gap impedes the organization’s ability to achieve its goal of reducing
production loss costs since half the senior advisors lack sufficient procedural knowledge to
execute a cost-benefit analysis on a change of command ceremony.

74
Figure 2 shows the level of procedural knowledge each participant demonstrated during
the interviews. None indicates that the participant showed no procedural knowledge of a cost-
benefit analysis. Minimal indicates that the participant had some idea of a cost-benefit analysis
procedure but was unable to draw any correlation with production loss costs. Vague indicates
that the participant was able to vaguely describe a cost-benefit analysis procedure, while
Significant indicates that the participant demonstrated significant procedural knowledge
regarding cost-benefit analysis.
Figure 2
Procedural Knowledge of the Cost-benefit Analysis

Finding Three: Most Senior Advisors Understand the Relationship Between the Change of
Command Ceremonies and Training Time Available for Combat Readiness
Wong and Gerras (2015) exposed the Army’s difficulty in finding enough time to
adequately train for combat readiness and compliance-related tasks, forcing leaders to forge
None
30%
Minimal
20%
Vague
30%
Significant
20%

75
figures in reports to hide any delinquencies. Shortly their findings were published, the then
Secretary of the Army Mark Esper (2017) took action by reducing the number of lower priority
training events in an effort to grant leaders more time to focus on the higher priority training
events to establish better combat readiness. This demonstrated how trimming time from one area
allows more time to be available in another area. Such is the relationship between the time
reduced on the change command ceremonies allows for more time available for combat
readiness tasks and training events.
To determine whether the senior advisors possessed this conceptual knowledge,
participants were asked directly, “How would you describe the correlation, if any, between the
change of command ceremonies and time available for combat readiness training?” This opened-
ended question allowed the participant to elaborate on their level of understanding of such a
correlation. The outcome found some alignment with Finding One regarding the conceptual
knowledge of production loss costs. Five participants gave solid, succinct responses that
demonstrated the conceptual knowledge. Two gave dubious responses that lacked much
substance and required repeated attempts to rephrase or elaborate on the question. Three did not
understand the concept of production loss costs even after rephrasing — Soldiers 2, 3, and 5 — a
did not possess the conceptual knowledge of a relationship between the change of command
ceremonies and training time available for combat readiness.
Soldiers 2, 3, and 5 gave responses that were dismissive of any correlation on the basis of
the change of command ceremony’s importance to the culture of the Army. For example, Senior
Advisor 5 stated, “Doing less ceremonies doesn’t have anything to do with combat readiness;
ceremonies need to happen because it’s important to the Army.” The senior advisor seemed to
view the threat of diminishing ceremonies as grounds to reject any possible correlation. Senior

76
Advisor 3 gave a similar response: “The ceremonies are important to the troops; it means
something to them. Cutting ceremonies won’t make anyone better in combat.” Senior Advisor 2
explained that they did not understand any correlation. When subsequent attempts were made to
rephrase and help clarify the question, their response remained the same.
Five of the participants demonstrated conceptual knowledge of the correlation. Each
responded with a description similar in form, explaining a series of logical steps that would
arrive at the conclusion of a correlation. For example, Senior Advisor 7 stated, “Well ya, if you
save time five hours on a ceremony, that gives you five hours to do training, which should make
you more combat effective.” All seven responded in a manner that suggested that a correlation
was an obvious conclusion. Two senior advisors noted that making too much time available
could have diminishing returns. “If there’s too much time available, the Army will find some
other stupid [training event] to keep us busy,” stated Senior Advisor 9. “If we get rid of some
ceremonies, they’ll just find something else to replace it with,” stated Senior Advisor 4.
Senior Advisor 4 and 8 responses were dubious and far less convincing of having
knowledge of the correlation. When asked the open-ended question, each requested rephrasing.
“Might there be a connection between the two?” stated the interviewer. Senior Advisor 4
responded with, “They’re both things that we are told to do; is that what you’re talking about?”
After additional discussion to clarify on behalf of the interviewer, Senior Advisor 4 eventually
responded with, “Ya, I guess there are third and fourth order of effects with a ceremony. Maybe
that has something to do with readiness.” Senior Advisor 8’s interaction took a similar path,
eventually arriving with the response of, “There are operating costs for the ceremonies. I don’t
think it’s much, but I guess money could go to fund readiness…activities.” These responses were
considered vague, having not the depth of understanding for confirmation on this knowledge, but

77
more than those who rejected any correlation, as discussed with the first three participants in this
finding.
Although the half of the participants demonstrated substantial knowledge of the
relationship between change ceremonies and training time available toward combat readiness,
two were questionable and three did not at all. This addresses Research Question One by
assessing the senior advisors’ level of knowledge related to reducing production loss costs per
ceremony. Understanding the correlation is considered a conceptual knowledge as it is the
comprehension of smaller elements and their role and contribution toward the larger function
(Krathwohl, 2002). Clark and Estes (2008) assert that effective organizations close such
knowledge gaps amongst the stakeholders. Five expressed a vague or no understanding,
representing a knowledge gap that impedes the senior advisors’ ability and effectiveness to
achieve the stakeholder goal.
This is subjective in interpretation and could be generalized as seven with at least some
understanding (yes), and three with no understanding (no). However, given the role,
responsibility, and influence these senior leaders exercise, the researcher chose to add a third
category of “vague” to help classify and represent the level of knowledge of these senior
advisors. This helps articulate those that responses that have situated between yes and no.
Finding Four: Senior Advisors Are Confident in Their Ability to Influence Their
Commander, Organization, and Change
As discussed in Chapter Two, the self-efficacy motivation influences were split between
two similar aspects: self-efficacy in senior advisors’ abilities to reduce production loss costs, and
their ability to influence their officer counterparts toward implementing change. As the research
developed and interviews progressed, these two influences became merged in respondent

78
interpretation as a single influence. The researcher combined these to one succinct phrase that
captured the senior advisors’ overall confidence in their ability to influence the commander,
organization, and change. Therefore, all subsequent references to these two self-efficacy
influences will be identified as a single finding and as a single asset.
The interviews strove to identify the motivation of the senior advisors in reducing
production loss costs. This was done by asking the senior advisors about their confidence in
implementing organizational change, influencing change, and influencing their commanders. The
intent was to focus specifically on their confidence while disregarding their level of knowledge
on reduction strategies. Regardless whether the senior advisors knew effective strategies to
implement, the task was to assess their confidence levels.
All but one of the senior advisors described high levels of confidence in their ability to
influence the organization and their commander toward change. “I know I’m just a First
Sergeant, but I feel I have a lot influence with my commander and [their] decisions on how to
run the unit,” stated Senior Advisor 6. Similarly, three other senior advisors claimed to feel lucky
to be in a unit that embraced their influence in the organization. Five of the senior advisors
justified their confidence by referencing their experience. “I’ve been doing this stuff for over 20
years, it’s my job to influence change and make things happen; we’ve earned that respect,” stated
Senior Advisor 3. However, Senior Advisor 5 was the only participant that lacked the confidence
to influence the organization, citing a bad command climate and relationship with their
commander: “[The commander] does whatever [they] want to do; I don’t have much say so.”
Though the senior advisors seemed to have some doubts on what exactly would need to
be done to reduce production loss costs, they revealed to be quite confident in executing
strategies once developed. An abundant 90% of the participants indicated this confidence, while

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one senior advisor lacked the confidence to influence their commander or cost reduction efforts.
This finding represents a strong asset amongst the stakeholders: self-efficacy. The senior
advisors’ high levels of confidence can be a tool to leverage influence and change toward
reducing production loss costs associated with the change of command ceremonies.
Finding Five: Not All of the Senior Advisors Believe That Their Actions Can Reduce
Production Loss Costs
To address the senior advisors’ motivation, the participants were asked if they believe
their actions could reduce production loss costs. A person’s belief in their efforts represents a
motivation influence (Clark & Estes, 2008), and Bandura (1977) found that those who have
positive beliefs of their effectiveness will outperform those who doubt their own abilities. The
intent of assessing the beliefs of the senior advisors was to determine whether there were any
attribution gaps amongst the senior advisors. The findings showed that only six of the 10
participants claimed to have at least some belief in their actions, while four had no belief that
their actions would make any impact to reduce production loss costs.
While four of the participants gave substantive, affirmative responses regarding their
beliefs, two demonstrated some ambivalence. Senior Advisor 1 stated, “Ya, I think we’d make
some difference, technically, but not enough to really notice.” Senior Advisor 10 stated, “I guess
it’s a drop in the bucket.” These responses indicate that the senior advisors may believe that their
efforts are making an impact, it is relatively insignificant when seen in the Army-wide context.
Although the interview question did not incorporate any context outside of the Division, the two
participants seemed to have implied a much larger application, and therefore believed their
contribution as relatively insignificant. This perceived insignificance refers to these senior
advisors’ external locus of control, defined as outcomes being determined by factors beyond the

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individual’s impact (Bashler et al., 2008). Although these findings indicate low levels of
motivation, evidence has shown that those with a perception of an external locus of control
perform better after attributional retraining (Ruthig et al., 2004).
Similarly, the four who did not believe their efforts made any impact gave responses that
referenced their role and contribution in a much larger context. “Any attempts we would make at
our level don’t make a difference in the least,” stated Senior Advisor 3. Soldiers 2, 5, and 9 made
comments akin to Senior Advisor 3’s comments. These responses show that the participants’
beliefs were that any efforts made to reduce production loss costs would be significantly
overshadowed by the volume of the Army. Although rationale would assert that any effort makes
even a minimal amount of cost reduction, their argument was that it was reduced to zero.
An employee lacking the belief that their actions make an impact is the attribution theory
that Anderman and Anderman (2006) explain compromises employee motivation and subsequent
work performance. For the senior advisors to be best positioned to achieve their stakeholder goal,
they must implement effective strategies to resolve this motivation influence and close the gap.
In regard to Research Question One, 40% of the participants revealed beliefs and discord in
attribution that indicated gaps when applied to the Clark and Estes (2008) framework.
Finding Six: Most of the Senior Advisors Valued the Reduction Efforts
Employees that recognize the value of the organization’s efforts are linked to increased
motivation and work performance (Chiaburu & Lindsay, 2008; Burke & Hutchins, 2007). The
interviews intended to determine the senior advisors’ perceived value of the reduction efforts.
Exploring whether the participants saw value in the reduction efforts would address Research
Question One by assessing the perceived value as an indicator of motivation. Clark and Estes
(2008) discussed this utility value as factor in motivation gaps and how leveraging perceived

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value can compensate for low levels of motivation when executing less-desirable tasks. Effective
organizations ensure the employees recognize the value by conveying the link between efforts
and organizational goals (Chiaburu & Lindsay, 2008).
The findings of the interviews discovered that seven of the 10 (70%) participants
recognized the value of the reduction efforts. Soldiers 7 and 10 were quick to point out that such
efforts make a difference, even in the context of the Army. “Every little bit helps. Even 20
minutes saved is 20 minutes they can spend with their families,” stated Senior Advisor 10. Two
senior advisors mentioned the value the efforts had on the junior soldiers: “[Reduction efforts]
make a difference to the juniors. They see that we respect their time and don’t want to waste
valuable time, they remember that. Maybe it‘s enough to reenlist, maybe not, but they notice that
stuff,” explained Senior Advisor 8. These responses showed optimism and positive perceptions
of value on reduction efforts.
Three of the participants conveyed perceptions of no value of the reduction efforts. Their
comments seemed reminiscent of Finding Five, as they made the relationship toward the larger
context of the Army. “[Reduction efforts] aren’t worth it. Saving some time in ceremonies isn’t
going to make any kind of difference. It’s the Army. They’ll find something else to keep us busy.
Not worth it,” stated Senior Advisor 3. “I think it’s a losing battle. Any time saved is gonna end
up being nothing when all is said and done. If we save time on these ceremonies, they’ll be
longer with other ceremonies,” explained Senior Advisor 5. These three senior advisors shared a
pessimistic outlook on the value of any reduction efforts, citing the Army’s commitment to
replace any time saved with another event with similar characteristics. In answering Research
Question One, the interviewed participants conveyed an overall moderate level of perceived
value, with an uninspired 30% indicating they saw no value in the reduction efforts. This

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indicates that there is a minor gap in motivational influence in accordance with the Clark and
Estes (2008) framework.
Some may argue that 70% indicating positive findings does not represent a gap
substantial enough to be considered a problem needing to be addressed. However,
acknowledging the position, authority, and influence these senior advisors exercise must be taken
into account. Senior advisors are of the pay grade E8 and E9. By law, these ranks are limited to
no more than 3.75% of the enlisted personnel (Congressional Research Service, 2019). These
senior advisors are considered the most knowledgeable and influential amongst the enlisted
members. Selections and promotions have occurred throughout each of these senior advisors’
careers with the assumption that those with the fewest performance gaps had achieved promotion
to such ranks. Although 70% maybe an acceptable level of tolerance for most stakeholders in the
organization, the researcher considers these stakeholders to be held to similar standards and
relatively free of gaps. Therefore, the researcher has identified this finding — minor as it is — as
a gap. To achieve their expected level of performance and their stakeholder goal, this motivation
influence must be addressed to close this gap represented by the 30% of the participants.
Summary
When utilizing the Clark and Estes (2008) model to identify gaps, the findings identified
three knowledge gaps, two motivation gaps, and one motivational asset in response to Research
Question One. As presented earlier, the senior advisors’ knowledge pertaining to reducing
production loss costs were short of sufficient. To best situate the organization toward achieving
its aspirational goal, these stakeholders must have the necessary skills to accomplish the
antecedent tasks. Otherwise, the senior advisors will not be effective in implementing reduction

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efforts without the associated knowledge, such as conceptual knowledge of production loss costs
and the procedural knowledge of conducting a cost-benefit analysis.
Although 90% of the participants showed substantial levels of confidence in their ability
to influence their commanders and their organization toward change, other areas of motivation
did not sustain the same levels. Finding Five showed mixed findings with 40% confirming belief,
20% expressing some belief, and with 40% denying and belief their efforts making an impact.
Findings Six showed approximately 30% opposing any perceived value of the reduction efforts.
This motivational influence regarding confidence will likely be a beneficial tool when
implementing organizational change, such as reducing production loss costs associated with the
change of command ceremonies. However, Findings Five and Six represent gaps that will need
to be addressed in order to effectively implement the desired efforts toward the organization’s
aspirational goal.
Findings of Research Question Two: What is the Interaction Between Organizational
Culture and Context and Senior Advisors’ Knowledge and Motivation to Develop and
Implement Strategies to Reduce Production Loss Costs?
Organizational change can be developed and produce intended results when leaders focus
on the alignment of the organizational culture (Schneider et al., 1996). To address Research
Question Two, the interviews consisted of questions that asked the senior advisors of their
perceptions of the Division’s culture and alignment with reducing production loss costs. The
intent was to determine if the Division established a culture that supported the senior advisors’
ability to accomplish their stakeholder goal. This organizational culture includes policies,
procedures, and communications that support the efforts (Clark & Estes, 2008). Deficiencies in
these areas can lead to gaps and an inability to achieve the organization’s aspirational goal.

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The interviews uncovered possible gaps in the organizational culture, indicating no
current presence of an alignment with the organization’s aspirational goal of reducing production
loss costs. These are the senior advisors’ perceptions of the organizational culture, revealed
through a series of questions that asked participants to describe the Division level of support and
priority toward reducing production loss costs. The participant responses generated three
findings that addressed Research Question Two. These findings were grouped into one of the
following categories: asset, moderate gap, and substantial gap. The researcher developed a 90%
threshold to determine these categories. In general, findings with at least 90% response
consistency determined the finding to be on either end of the spectrum: asset or substantial gap.
Mixed, inconsistent, or findings with less than 90% consistency were determined to be a
moderate gap.
Finding Seven: The Organization Does Not Prioritize Cost Reduction Efforts
The senior advisors were asked to describe the Division’s level of priority to reduce
production loss costs associated with the change of command ceremonies. The purpose of this
question was to address Research Question Two by detecting a cultural model that supports cost
reduction efforts. All of the senior advisors described a cultural model at the Division that had no
priority to reduce production loss costs associated with the change of command ceremonies.
Seven of the participants found the question to be humorous. “There is no priority to
reduce costs. It’s, like, the opposite of that. Each commander wants to out-do the previous
commander,” stated Senior Advisor 6. “Why would anyone want to reduce costs? They’re not
paying for it!” explained Senior Advisor 1. Similar responses continued throughout the duration
of the interviews, each reacting to the question as if it were an absurd proposition.

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These responses indicated that the senior advisors’ perception of the Division’s priority to
reduce production loss costs was nonexistent. If the organizational goal is to reduce production
loss costs associated with change of command ceremonies, the Division would be ineffective in
achieving due to the organizational gap. Clark and Estes (2008) posit that effective organizations
convey messages and policies that support the organizational goals and values. If polices
regarding the prioritizing of reduction efforts were in place, the messaging may have not been
conveyed to the senior advisors, who reported no priority toward cost reduction from the
Division.
Finding Eight: The Division Does Not Provide Training and Resources to Evaluate the
Value of the Change of Command Ceremonies
The senior advisors were asked to describe the Division’s support — with training and
resources — to allow senior advisors to evaluate the value of change of command ceremonies.
The intent was to identify the Division’s infrastructure to facilitate evaluation efforts. Ideally, the
senior advisors would be provided training to conduct cost-benefit analysis, as well as resources
— such as toolkits, study guides, job aids, or mobile apps — that would support the ability to
evaluate the value of ceremonies. However, similar to Finding Seven, all of the participants
agreed that the Division provided neither training nor resources for senior advisors to evaluate.
The support to provide training and resources for evaluation represent the organization’s
cultural settings, which Gallimore and Goldenberg (1998) describe as “people coming together to
carry out joint activity that accomplishes something they value” (p. 48). Activities such as
evaluations of practice have been routinely discussed by experts as an integral responsibility of
effective organizations (Kirkpatrick, 2006; Boylan, 2017; Ebrahim, 2010). More so, since the

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organization’s aspirational goal specifically addresses the reduction of costs, the organization
must support evaluation practices in some method.
Regardless, all of the senior advisors’ responses described the Division as not currently
having such support for the aspirational goal. “It’s possible someone gets trained on that stuff,
but I’m not tracking anything,” explained Senior Advisor 5. “I doubt anyone is doing this stuff or
is getting trained on this stuff. It’s not a thing that happens in the Army” stated Senior Advisor 1.
Two of the senior advisors took a position that eluded to this type of training not being
necessary: “[this training] doesn’t happen because we aren’t a business. We aren’t trying to make
a profit”; “My job is to train for combat, not train for cost estimates.” These comments described
their perceptions that the Division did not provide the training. However, the comments about
such as “I’m not tracking anything” suggest that it is possible that the Division is providing the
training and resources, but that such support resides with another section, office, or individual —
not the senior advisors.
The Department of Defense maintains strict policies that protect the welfare of its service
members as well as security interests when authorizing research to be conduct within their
organizations. Since this research was not initiated nor directly supported by the Department of
Defense, access to credible documents —such as training priorities, policies, and procedures —
were prohibited, making validation through the triangulation of data limited to interviews.
The Division’s G8 section is trained on cost-benefit analysis and comptroller duties.
However, if the senior advisors are expected to implement cost reduction efforts, effective
organizations should provide the training necessary to execute such tasks. The absence of
support from the organization represents an organizational influencer as a gap; the Division’s

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aspirational goal and expectation for the senior advisors is not aligned with the Division’s
support.
Finding Nine: The Division Provides Neither Time nor Resources for Leaders to Develop a
Plan to Reduce Production Loss Costs
In order for the senior advisors to execute the Division’s aspirational goal of cost
reduction, the leaders must develop a plan. Strategic planning is necessary in effectively
identifying and achieving an organization’s desired goals (Kaufman et al., 2003) and, in doing
so, increases an organization’s overall performance by implementing through collaborative
efforts and showing leadership support (Mittenthal, 2002). Although strategic planning is
universally agreed as a crucial responsibility in any effective organization, the responses from
the senior advisors provided no indication of the Division allotting time nor resources toward
developing a plan.
In the absence of some of the necessary antecedent tasks — support, resources, and time
— to implement cost reduction efforts, providing time to plan was also not perceived to be made
available by the Division. In other words, without reduction efforts existing, there is naturally no
resources for a non-existent effort. Senior Advisor 7 captured this in their response when asked
to describe the Division’s support for strategic planning regarding cost reductions with the
change of command ceremonies’ by stating, “there’s no time set aside to plan for [cost reduction
efforts] because it’s not something that’s done. If we knew that minimizing costs was an
objective, then maybe we could figure out some time to plan that out, even if it was just a few
minutes before a rehearsal.” The senior advisor continued by explaining that the Division’s
priority is perceived to be in complete contradiction. “If anything, the planning goes the other

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way — leaders try to find ways to get more fanfare and more people involved rather than doing
less,” stated Senior Advisor 7.
Soldiers 10 and 3 emphatically gave similar accounts of the organization’s stance on
supporting planning efforts for cost reductions for the change of command ceremonies. “There’s
not training or even discussion about lower ceremony costs. Have you seen these ceremonies?
Do they look like they’ve put time and energy into cutting costs?” described Senior Advisor 10.
However, most of the senior advisors revealed that if the Division prioritized and trained for cost
reduction support, the senior advisors would be able to find time to plan to accommodate these
priorities. In other words, the senior advisors implied that they would hypothetically make time
available once the guidance is received.
Summary
The organizational influencers extend beyond the infrastructure to the culture of the
organization, consisting of the cultural model(s) and practices of the organization (Clark & Estes,
2008; Kezar, 2001; Schein, 2004). Findings Seven, Eight, and Nine demonstrate that the senior
advisors do not perceive the Division to have the sufficient models and settings necessary to
fulfill the organization’s aspirational goal. Therefore, these findings are considered gaps due to
the organizational influences. In order change to be effectively implemented, the Division must
close these gaps. Recommendations will be presented in Chapter 5.
Synthesis of Findings
Based on the Clark and Estes (2008) framework, the research identified both gaps and
assets corresponding to each of the influences: knowledge, motivation, and organization. Table 7
presents the findings with the consolidated by the participants. The findings were placed into one
of three possible categories: asset, moderate gap, and substantial gap. Assets were those findings

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that showed over 70% of the participants presenting no evidence of a gap. Moderate gap was
used to identify the findings with mixed results with no overwhelming results that show either
full presence or no presence of a gap. The substantial gap identifies the findings of an
overwhelming majority of the participants indicating strong perceptions of a gap; this required
consistent responses (yes/vague/no) to meet or exceed a threshold of 70%, indicating a
significant presence of a gap, and were categorized as a substantial gap.
One asset was identified, Finding Four, which determined that 90% of the senior advisors
conveyed significant confidence in their ability to influence their commander, organization, and
change. This asset can be leveraged to implement change toward achieving the organization’s
aspirational goal. Findings One, Two, Three, Five, and Six presented evidence of some gaps and
were categorized as a moderate gap. These will need to be addressed in order for the
stakeholders to be positioned best for desired results. Findings Seven, Eight, and Nine all
addressed Research Question Two and showed strong evidence of a gap. All three were
categorized as a substantial gap and will need to be resolved in order to achieve the
organization’s aspirational goal. Clark and Estes (2008) posited that effective organizations can
implement required changes toward the organizational goal by closing the gaps. For the Division
to best position itself to achieve its goal, the aforementioned gaps must be strategically
minimized through a series of recommended changes that will be presented in Chapter Five.

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Table 7
Findings and Totaled Response
Finding Description of the Finding Yes Vague/
Some
No
The Senior Advisors’…
1 Have Knowledge of Production Loss Costs… 2 5 3
2 Can Evaluate the Value… 2 3 5
3 Understand Correlation with Combat Readiness… 5 2 3
4 Have Confidence to Influence… 9 0 1
5 Believe in The Impact of Their Actions… 4 2 4
6 Value Reduction Efforts… 7 0 3
The Organization…
7 Prioritizes Cost Reduction Efforts… 0 0 10
8 Provides Training and Resources… 0 0 10
9 Provides Time and Resources to Plan… 0 0 10

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Chapter Five: Recommendations for Practice to Address KMO Influences
This section presents recommendations to strategically address the gaps through a
training program that follows the New World Kirkpatrick Model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick,
2016). The recommendations are founded and supported by theory and research proven to be
effective in addressing these types of gaps. The intent is for these recommendations to be
implemented by the organization in order to achieve the aspirational goals.
Knowledge Recommendations
The knowledge influences in Table 8 represent the complete list of validated knowledge
influences identified as gaps. These knowledge influences were generated through the literature
review in this field of study, setting the foundation from which to establish interviews that would
address the research questions, and validated through the findings. These validated influences are
supplemented with recommendations for the organization, based on theoretical principles.

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Table 8
Summary of Knowledge Influences and Recommendations
Validated
Knowledge
Influence

Principle and Citation Context-Specific Recommendation
Senior advisors need
to understand the
concept of
production loss costs.
(D)
Integrating auditory and
visual
information maximizes
working
memory capacity (Mayer,
2011).
Provide information from the Army’s
Cost Analysis manual as a reference
and incorporate time-cost apps for
phones to integrate an interactive
experience in understanding the
concept of production loss costs.
Senior advisors must
understand the
relationship between
reducing the change
of command
ceremony costs and
the training time
available for combat
readiness. (D)
Information learned
meaningfully and connected
with prior knowledge is
stored
more quickly and
remembered
more accurately because it is
elaborated with prior learning
(McCrudden et al., 2006).
Leverage the senior advisors’ prior
knowledge on combat readiness
training time and apply that to the
time spent on change of commands.
The Division’s G8 can provide the
training that will help the senior
advisors understand the correlation
by linking the two events.
Senior advisors must
evaluate the value of
the ceremonies and
compare it to the
associated costs. (P)
Modeled behavior is more
likely to be
adopted if the model is
credible, similar (e.g.,
gender, culturally
appropriate), and the
behavior has functional value
(Denler et al.,
2009).

Opportunities for learners to
check
their progress and adjust their
learning
strategies as needed increases
knowledge (Denler et al.,
2009).

The Division’s G8 section
(comptrollers) can train the senior
advisors by demonstrating and
modeling the cost-benefit analysis for
the change of command ceremonies.
This will show practical value
through process application.

The senior advisors can practice their
learned knowledge during practical
exercises to ensure competency. The
Division’s G8 will provide
performance feedback to the senior
advisors.

The Division’s G8 can serve as the
section responsible for checking the
senior advisors’ progress and
implemented strategies. The G8 will
also provide feedback on the senior
advisors’ progress.

Provide Training that Utilizes Prior Knowledge and Visual Information

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Two declarative knowledge influences were identified as gaps in the research. The first
found that the senior advisors need to understand the concept of production loss costs. The
interviews indicated that only two senior advisors possessed substantial knowledge of the
concept of production loss costs. The second finding asserted that senior advisors must
understand the relationship between reducing the change of command ceremony costs and
increasing training time available for combat readiness, with results showing only half the
respondents having conclusively possessed this declarative knowledge. These represent
knowledge deficiencies necessary to achieve the stakeholder goal. Enhancing the employees’
knowledge on vital workplace components can help achieve performance goals and help bridge
gaps (Clark and Estes, 2008). To help develop these declarative knowledge influences,
integrating auditory and visual information maximizes working memory capacity (Mayer, 2011).
Additionally, information learned meaningfully and connected with prior knowledge is stored
more quickly and remembered more accurately because it is elaborated with prior learning
((McCrudden et al., 2006).). To leverage both of these principles, it is recommended that the
senior advisors be provided information and training through mobile phone applications and by
building from prior knowledge of being an NCO, such as duties as a personnel manager, training
manager, and staff position NCO.
Utilizing auditory and visual information will maximize the memory capacity (Mayer,
2011). This principle is utilized through the use of the Army’s Cost Analysis manual and a time-
cost calculator application for the senior advisors’ mobile phones. Integrating production-
oriented phone applications into the workplace can increase effectiveness and efficiency of the
organization’s training and operations (Panepinto, 2014). The time-cost calculator allows the
senior advisors to input raw data (number of personnel, hours at the ceremony, rehearsal hours

94
needed) and calculate the cost. To better understand the relationship between cost reduction and
combat readiness training time, senior advisors will be drawing from their knowledge of combat
readiness activity costs and applying that to the calculated ceremony costs. Connecting the prior
knowledge will allow more accurate memory storage (McCrudden et al., 2006). In other words,
training the senior advisors will incorporate cost calculation apps as well as the Army Cost
Analysis manual to build on already-existing fundament knowledge that the senior advisors have
exercised as a senior NCO, such staffing platoons and developing comprehensive training
schedules.
Developing Understanding of the Process Through Modeling
The participants show low levels of possessing the procedural knowledge regarding the
cost-benefit analysis. The senior advisors need to understand the process of the cost-benefit
analysis of the change of command ceremonies in order to effectively implement efforts to
achieve the stakeholder goal. This can be achieved through modeling. Modeled behavior is more
likely to be adopted if the model is credible, similar, and the behavior has functional value
(Denler et al., 2009). It is recommended that the Division’s G8 section model the process,
allowing senior advisors to obtain the necessary procedural knowledge. Further, providing
opportunities for the learners to check their progress are beneficial toward knowledge retention
(Denler et al., 2009). Therefore, it is also recommended that the modeling be supplemented by
learner checks, requiring the Division’s G8 instructors to check the progress of the senior
advisors.
Behavior modeling has been shown to substantially improve the learners’ skills through
changes in their knowledge structures or mental models (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009). After the
modeling, senior advisors can execute cost-benefit analyses through the use of practical exercises

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established by the G8. The G8 will provide feedback on the senior advisors’ performance.
Division G8’s modeled behavior of the cost-benefit analysis process will reduce the senior
advisors’ knowledge gap, giving the senior advisors a holistic understanding of the procedural
knowledge.
Motivation Recommendations
The motivation influences in Table 9 represent the complete list of the validated
motivation influences. These motivation influences were established throughout the literature
review process and validated in the data collection and findings process of the research. These
validated influences are supplemented with recommendations for the organization, based on
theoretical principles.

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Table 9
Summary of Motivation Influences and Recommendations
Validated Motivation
Influence*

Principle and Citation Context-Specific Recommendation
Senior advisors need
to believe their actions
can reduce production
loss costs (Attribution)
Providing feedback that
stresses the process of
learning,
including the importance of
effort, strategies, and
potential
self-control of learning will
result in positive
performance outcomes
(Anderman & Anderman,
2006).

The Division G8 section will ensure
that the training focuses on the
learning process and the importance of
the effort rather than focusing on the
impact the reduction efforts make on
the larger Army context.
Senior Advisors need
to see value in
reducing production
loss costs for change
of command
ceremonies (Value)
Rationales that include a
discussion of the
importance
and utility value of the
work or learning can help
learners develop positive
values (Eccles, 2006;
Pintrich, 2003).
The Division G8 section will present
data that shows the utility value in the
reduction efforts using the Army Cost
Analysis manual as well cultivate
discussions on the value of the
reduction efforts.

Provide Feedback to Help Senior Advisors Attribute Success to Effort
Nearly half of the senior advisors interviewed indicated that they did not attribute success
to their effort, representing a gap in motivation. Anderman and Anderman (2006) discovered that
providing feedback that targets the importance of effort, strategies, and potential self-control of
learning increases the individual’s motivation. These are internal controllable factors that are
managed by the senior advisors. Pintrich (2003) found that motivation was increased when
individuals understood that their self-determined effort translated to positive outcomes. When
senior advisors receive feedback on these areas, the senior advisors are able to attribute their
performance outcomes to their efforts. The recommendation is for the Division G8 to provide

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feedback to their senior advisor, with a focus on the individual effort. This feedback will increase
the senior advisor’s belief in the significant impact of their efforts to reduce production loss
costs. The feedback should be administered through a one-on-one counseling, but can be
modified to adjust time constraints.
Rueda (2011) stated that attribution refers to the beliefs an individual has about the
reasons for the outcome and control at a task or activity. Van Vuuren et al. (2007) found that
feedback from supervisors not only improved the employee performance, but the employee
satisfaction as well. This concept can be applied to the Division by closing the motivation gap
through feedback to help increase employee performance and satisfaction, with the Division’s
G8 serving as the supervisory position in the context of cost-benefit analysis and production loss
cost techniques; the Division’s G8 is best suited for and are most knowledge to address these
concerns, as their duties specifically address comptroller tasks, cos-benefit analysis, and
coordinating financial management practices and policies (Department of the Army, 2014b).
Discuss Rationales to Improve Senior Advisors’ Value for Production Loss Costs
Interview results indicated three of the senior advisors found no value in reducing
production loss costs associated with the change of command ceremonies, suggesting a minor —
almost negligible — gap. However, this was considered a gap due to rank of the senior advisors
and their expected level of competency. This represents a motivation influence which experts
asserted can be addressed by rationalizing through discussion, supplemented by evidence that
supports the value of the change effort (Eccles, 2006; Pintrich, 2003). This principle posits that
the senior advisors can see the value once the value is presented and discussed. It is
recommended that the Division’s G8 apply this principle by cultivating a discussion with the

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senior advisors and presenting them with the supporting data that serve as evidence to value of
the reduction efforts.
The Division’s G8 can utilize the Army’s Cost Analysis manual to execute a cost-benefit
analysis to demonstrate empirically the value of the reduction efforts. Allowing the opportunity
for the senior advisors to discuss and rationalize will help them acknowledge the value in the
reduction efforts. The senior advisors accepting the value of the reduction efforts will close the
motivation influence gap and will contribute in their efforts toward achieving their stakeholder
goal.
Organizational Recommendations
The organization influences in Table 10 represent the complete list of validated
organizational influences. These organizational influences were established early on in the
research and validated in the data collection and findings process as gaps. In addition to
influence, the table also presents the theoretical principle to address the organization influence
and the recommendation to best approach the gap.

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Table 10
Summary of Organization Influences and Recommendations
Validated Organization
Influence

Principle and Citation

Context-Specific Recommendation
(Model) The Division
leadership needs to
prioritize reducing
production loss costs
associated with change
of command
ceremonies.
Organizations are effective
when they are able to
ensure that organizational
messages, rewards, policies
and procedures that govern
the work of the
organization are aligned
with or are supportive of
organizational goals and
values (Clark and Estes,
2008).
The Division should create a policy
that establishes the organization’s
cost reduction goals.

The policy will also explain the
overview of procedures on the cost
reduction goal along with the purpose
and reasoning behind the
implementation.
(Settings) The Division
needs to provide
training and resources
to evaluate the value of
the change of
command ceremonies.
Ensuring staff’s resource
needs are being met is
correlated with increased
student learning outcomes
(Waters et al., 2003).
The Division should develop a
training program, supported by
resources, to best educate the senior
advisors on the process of cost-
benefit analysis for change of
command ceremonies.

(Settings) The Division
needs to provide time
and resources for
leaders to develop a
plan to reduce
production loss costs
and evaluate the
reduction efforts.
Effective change efforts
ensure that everyone has
the resources (equipment,
personnel, time, etc.)
needed to do their job, and
that if there are resource
shortages, then resources
are aligned with
organizational priorities
(Clark and Estes, 2008).

The Division should grant time for
the stakeholders to implement the
reduction efforts.

The Division should designate the G8
as the office of primary responsibility
(OPR) for this implementation
program.

Publish the Cost Reduction Priorities
Every participant interviewed reported that the Division did not currently prioritize any
cost reduction efforts for the change of command ceremonies. This was expected since the
reduction efforts were part of the aspirational goal, yet to be implemented. Regardless, the
absence of this priority demonstrates a lack of alignment between what the organization is

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communicating and the organization’s aspirational goal, representing a cultural model as the gap.
Clark and Estes (2008) found that effective organizations ensure that messages, rewards,
policies, and procedures that govern the work are aligned with or are supportive of the
organizational goal. In the context of the Division, this implies that the Division would need to
establish an infrastructure that supports the organizational goal to reduce production loss costs
associated with the change of command ceremonies. Therefore, it is recommended that the
Division create and publish a policy that establishes the organization’s cost reduction goals to
close the gap regarding the stakeholders’ ability to achieve the organizational goal.
Prioritizing cost reduction efforts is a universal strategy across most organizations,
including government agencies such as the US Army (Geiger, 2017). Sabatier and Mazmanian’s
(1979) research found that one requirement for effective efforts to an organizational goal was to
support the efforts with statutes or policies, showing the commitment from the organizational
leadership. The Division publishing, posting on their websites, and emailing policies that clearly
identify the organization’s cost reduction goals will ensure that the Division’s leadership has
established an endorsement and commitment to the reduction efforts, leaving little opportunity
for ambiguity. Additionally, the Army supports this behavior, having published the purpose of
policies in the Army Regulation 600-20, stating that policies are necessary when identifying
goals and objectives to be achieved (Department of the Army, 2014).
Provide Time and Resources for Training and Planning
Two of the organizational influences represented cultural settings as the gap: the Division
needs to provide training and resources to evaluate the value of the change of command
ceremonies; and the Division needs to provide time and resources for leaders to develop a plan to
reduce production loss costs and evaluate the reduction efforts. To generalize, these represent a

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single cultural setting that states that the Division must provide time and resources to reduce
production loss costs.
All of the participants interviewed stated that the Division did not provide time or
resources to develop a plan to reduce production loss costs. Additionally, the senior advisors
asserted that they were unfamiliar with cost-benefit analysis because the division did not provide
training and resources on how to evaluate the value of the change of command ceremonies.
These discrepancies represent a cultural setting as an organizational gap of stakeholders
achieving the organization’s aspirational goal. Clark and Estes (2008) explained that effective
change efforts ensure that everyone has the resources (equipment, personnel, time, etc.) needed
to do their job. Providing those resources needs in the training environment is correlated with
increased learning outcomes (Waters et al., 2003). Applying these principles to the Division’s
change of command ceremonies would require the organization to include adequate time and
resources for learning the cost-benefit analysis process and for the senior advisors to plan
reduction efforts. These efforts would consist of allocating an hour pre-ceremony, and an hour in
the post ceremony, allowing the planning time for reduction efforts, and an AAR (After Actions
Report/Review) to evaluate the reduction efforts to develop better strategies for subsequent
ceremonies.
Effective organizations require sufficient work processes and material resources to
achieve the organizational goal (Clark & Estes, 2008). The Division must provide such support
in order to educate their senior advisors on the cost-benefit analysis. Proving the training and
resources will help secure the senior advisors’ knowledge of how to evaluate the value of
ceremonies. Such accountability systems can support the leadership in making data-driven
decisions (Bensimon, 2005), potentially increasing the organization’s effectiveness. To

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accomplish this task, the Division must task a section to conduct the training, allocate necessary
resources, such training aids and classroom(s), and to provide training time on the long-range
calendar.
The concept of establishing the time and resources for plan development is commonly
referred to as strategic planning (Wolf & Floyd, 2013; Spee & Jarzabkowski, 2011; Moran &
Brightman, 2000; Bryson, 2018). Utilizing strategic planning is crucial for effective
organizational performance (Başarı et al., 2017). Strategic planning is necessary in effectively
identifying and achieving an organization’s desired goals (Kaufman et al., 2003) and, in doing
so, increases an organization’s overall performance by implementing through collaborative
efforts and showing leadership support (Mittenthal, 2002). Division needs to incorporate
additional time into the change of command ceremonies, allowing necessary time for planning
and evaluating the reduction efforts.
The Division’s G8 section will serve as the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for the
cost reduction efforts. As introduced in the Department of Defense’s (2020) joint publication of
military definitions, the OPR serves as the lead section held accountable for the actions
necessary to achieve the desired actions. To ensure that various sections of work in concert
requires an OPR to coordinate and facilitate these efforts. As the OPR, the G8 will initiate
discussions with the Division command team; the Division’s G3 section, responsible for the
training schedule development; and the Division’s G4, responsible for resource acquisition.
These efforts will require presentations, discussions, consultation, and the development of a
proposal to help rally the support necessary to achieve these desired goals. As the subject matter
experts in cost-benefit analysis, the Division’s G8 must serve as the OPR for the implementation
of these efforts.

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Integrated Implementation and Evaluation Plan
The plan for the implementation and evaluation utilizes the New World Kirkpatrick
Model, established by Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2016). This model establishes the foundation
and strategy necessary to track the progress of the recommended efforts. The four levels of the
New World Model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016) are used to address the gaps identified
during data collection using the Clark and Estes (2012) gap analysis. The model consists of four
levels, each with a series of benchmarks, observations, and tasks designed to properly inventory
the necessary elements in training the organization. As instructed by the authors, the New World
Model is applied through the levels in reverse order: Level 4, results; Level 3, behavior; Level 2,
learning; and Level 1, reaction.
Organizational Purpose, Need, and Expectations
The mission of the Division is to deploy trained and combat-ready forces to conduct
decisive action to prevent, shape, and win in combat operations in support of US national
interests. The Division is prepared for these mission demands by maintaining sufficient levels of
combat readiness, requiring substantial amounts of time and resources. These efforts are
supported by the organization’s aspirational goal: to reduce the production loss costs per change
of command ceremony by 25%. This will allow more time and resources to be made available
for use toward combat readiness training necessary for deployment posture.
The senior advisors must develop and implement strategies to reduce production loss
costs associated with the change of command. Establishing the stakeholder goal will serve as
vital indicators of the trajectory of the reduction efforts. The senior advisors’ goal is not a direct
reduction effort but is instead the foundation from which the reduction efforts will be based. This
goal was selected due to its role in the subsequent steps toward the organization’s aspirational

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goal. The senior advisors’ goal merely establishes the position for the organization to implement
the reduction efforts.
The purpose of reducing production loss costs is to allow more time to be available for
the Division’s combat readiness training. Any reductions in the personnel attending the
ceremonies or preparing for the ceremonies can translate to more time available for soldiers to
train, prepare, and develop. This research examined the knowledge, motivational, and
organizational gaps that prevented reduction efforts to occur. The recommendations serve as a
solution to eliminate the barriers that restrict the cost reduction efforts and will maximize the
time available for the Army’s primary mission: combat readiness.
Level 4: Results and Leading Indicators
Table 11 shows the proposed Level 4: Results and Leading Indicators and outlines the
outcomes, metrics, and methods for both the external and internal outcomes for the Division. The
expectation is that if the internal outcomes are achieved to a satisfactory degree, then the
subsequent external outcomes will be achieved. This sequence helps to ensure that the results are
predictable by using the internal outcomes as indicators.
Several outcomes serve as indicators of the trajectory of the recommended efforts to
reduce production loss costs. Since reduced time at ceremonies potentially allows more time to
be available for combat readiness training, an expected outcome would be higher levels of
combat readiness levels across the Division. These metrics can be monitored through the Army’s
Digital Training Management System. The most significant outcomes internal to the organization
would be the increase in time and resources available to the workforce. More training time, more
time to maintain medical compliance, and less resources used for ceremonies and ceremony

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preparations are all expected outcomes, indicating that the organization is on course to achieve
the desired goal.
Table 11
Outcomes, Metrics, and Methods for External and Internal Outcomes
Outcome Metric(s) Method(s)
External Outcomes
1. Increased Division-wide
levels of combat readiness.
Track percentage changes
of the Division’s readiness
levels.
Utilize the Army’s Digital
Training Management System
(DTMS)
2. Increased public
confidence in military
efficiency and resourcing.
The percentage of public
support of the military’s
efficiency.
Administer surveys to the public.
3. Increased combat
effectiveness.
Greater success rate as
percentages of successful
combat operations.
Review of consolidated military
AARs and through the CALL site
(Center for Army Lessons
Learned).
Internal Outcomes
2. Increased time available
to conduct combat
readiness training.
The number of hours each
unit spends at the range.
Obtain the range records from the
training schedule on DTMS or
from records from range control.
3. Increased time for
ensuring medical
compliance for combat
deployments.
The number or percentage
of the Division that is
within medical
compliance.
Utilizing the commander’s
dashboard for the medical
readiness database (MEDPROS).
4. Reduced numbers of
soldiers required to attend
the ceremonies.
The number of soldiers in
attendance.
Count the number of soldiers in
attendance.
5. Reduced time used for
rehearsals and preparation.
The number of hours used
to prepare and rehearse.
Log the number of hours used to
prepare and rehearse.

Level 3: Behavior
When implementing the New World Kirkpatrick Model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick,
2016), Level 3 assess the behavior of those who participated in the intervention. The intent is for
the learned objectives be exercised in the senior advisor behavior. Ideally, the training was
retained, and the senior advisors have incorporated the new concepts into practice, demonstrating
a new behavior. In problematic outcomes, behavior does not change and the gap persists.

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Therefore, behavior is assessed during Level 3 to determine the rate of successful training
implementation.
Critical Behaviors
Several critical behaviors will serve as indicators to the trajectory of the organization’s
change efforts. The senior advisors are expected develop strategies to reduce the costs associated
with the change of command ceremonies. These strategies will be tracked and assessed based on
their success and outcomes. This will ensure strategic planning is sufficiently helping to achieve
the organization’s aspirational goal. Once strategies have been developed, the senior advisors
must implement cost reduction efforts. If the senior advisors are able to demonstrate these
behaviors, they will serve as positive indicators that the change efforts are leading toward the
achievement of the organizational goal.
Table 12
Critical Behaviors, Metrics, Methods, and Timing for Evaluation
Critical Behavior Metric(s)
Method(s)
Timing
1. Senior advisors
developing
reduction strategies.
Consolidated tracker of
reduction strategies and
rated based on success
outcome.

Strategies will be
tracked by the G8
and outcomes will
be discussed.
Discussions will
occur twice per
month between G8
and senior advisors.
2. Senior advisors
implementing cost
reduction efforts.
The fiscal amount in
production loss costs.
G8 conducts a CBA
to assess the impact
of the reduction
efforts.
G8 conducts a CBA
twice per month.

Required Drivers
Drivers will facilitate and support the stakeholders and the organization to achieve the
desired goals. These will also help sustain the desired behaviors crucial to the success of the
change efforts. The counseling and feedback from G8 to the senior advisors will increase both
the motivation and knowledge gaps. Additional support will be implemented through rewards,

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specifically by publicly acknowledging the senior advisors who demonstrate superior execution
of the critical behaviors. Another valuable driver is the G8’s performance in the reduction
efforts. Although the G8 is not the stakeholder of focus, their cost-benefit analysis throughout the
implementation of the reduction efforts will serve as the vital accountability mechanism needed
to measure the results. Their continued cost-benefit analysis will be a significant driver that will
help determine the level of success the reduction efforts may achieve.

Table 13

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Required Drivers to Support Critical Behaviors
Method(s) Timing
Critical
Behaviors
Supported
1, 2, 3 Etc.
Reinforcing

The G8 provides the job aid, including Army’s Cost Analysis
manual, to the senior advisors.
Ongoing 1 & 2
The G8 provides training, modeling, and demonstrations of
the CBA process to the senior advisors.
Ongoing 2
The Division provides time and resources toward training the
senior advisors on CBA procedures in order to evaluate the
value of ceremonies.
Ongoing 1 & 2
The G8 presents distributes data to the senior advisors,
showing the benefits of the reduction efforts, intended to
cultivate open candid discussion on the value of the reduction
efforts.
Ongoing 1 & 2
The Division communicates and publishes a policy that
expresses the organization’s cost reduction goal, including
purpose and reasoning of the reduction goal.
Initially 1 & 2
The Division allocates time for senior advisors to plan for
reduction efforts.
Ongoing 2
Rewarding

The Division publicly acknowledges superior efforts achieved
by the senior advisors, based on the data results quantified by
the G8’s CBA.
Ongoing 2
Monitoring

G8 conducts the Cost-Benefit Analysis to account and
quantify the reduction efforts.
Ongoing 2
Counseling and feedback is administered to the senior
advisors by the G8.
Ongoing 1 & 2
Level 2: Learning
Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick’s (2016) formulated a Level 2: Learning that described the
portion of the New World Kirkpatrick Model that addressed the participants’ learning in the
process of the training evaluation. This is the level from which the participants are obtaining the
intended skills, knowledge, confidence, and commitment needed to increase performance. This
model instructs that this level is a benchmark that ensures the training efforts are in the
appropriate trajectory toward achieving the organizational goal. This also allows efforts to be

109
modified to adapt to change when unpredictable situations are leading toward a less desirable
course.
Learning Goals
Upon completion of the recommended solutions to reduce production loss costs, the
stakeholders will be able to:
1. Understand and discuss the concept of production loss costs associated with
change of command ceremonies, (C)
2. Understand and discuss the relationship between production loss costs and combat
readiness, (C)
3. Evaluate the value of the ceremonies and compare it to the associated costs, (P)
4. Develop and implement cost reduction strategies, (P)
5. Realize the value in reducing production loss costs for change of command
ceremonies (Value).
Program
The aforementioned listed learning goals will be obtained through a comprehensive
training program that gives significant emphasis on production loss cost concepts and an
overview of cost-benefit analysis. The senior advisors will be taught how to calculate the
production loss costs, how the costs can negatively impact the organization’s performance, and
how production loss costs correlate with the organization's primary mission: combat readiness.
The training will consist of two 6-hour days and will include classroom instruction and practical
exercises that require the learners utilize their learned skills.
The training will be hosted by the Division G8. All learners will be provided with a
digital version of the Army’s Cost Analysis manual from which they will be able to refer to

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methods and strategies on cost-benefit analysis. In addition to instructing on these strategies, the
Division G8 will give an overview of time-cost apps that may assist in developing and assessing
reduction efforts. Throughout the duration of the training, instructors will conduct an hourly
assessment that will consist of questions verbally presented to the learners prior to their hourly
break.
Components of Learning
Ensuring that the learners understand the procedural knowledge of the cost reduction
strategies will facilitate the conceptual knowledge of the strategies. Therefore, it is necessary for
the learners to be assessed on their retention of the procedural knowledge. This can serve as a
prerequisite for the subsequent learning, scaffolding the knowledge and skills necessary to be
effective in implementing the reduction efforts. Through this training will also be an increase in
the learners’ motivation toward the learning objectives and performance. Table 14 lists the
methods and timing of the recommended assessments.

Table 14
Components of Learning for the Program
Method(s) or Activity(ies) Timing
Declarative Knowledge

Knowledge checks using formative assessments by
questioning the classroom.
Each hour, right before each
break.

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Knowledge checks using summative assessment by multiple
choice test.
At the end of the first day of
training.
Procedural Skills

Demonstrate the process of conducting a cost-benefit
analysis through a practical exercise.
At the end of the second day.
Demonstrate the process of developing cost reduction
strategies and a plan to implement. This can be in the form
of a briefing to the instructors.
At the end of the second day.
Attitude

Discussions about the knowledge learned. Upon return from each break,
right before the next training
block.
Instructors’ observations and informal feedback from the
learners.
Throughout the training.
Retrospective pre- and post- assessment At the beginning and end of
each day.
Confidence

Discussions about the knowledge learned At the end of the training,
similar to an AAR.
Commitment

Discussions about the knowledge learned At the end of the training,
similar to an AAR.
Survey about the day’s learned skills. On a digital form presented at
the end of each day’s training.

Level 1: Reaction
The purpose of this level is to assess the learners’ perception of the training’s engagement
and relevance to the senior advisors. It is recommended that the Division’s G8 administer several
tools to obtain the learners’ perceptions of the training. The recommendation is for G8 to utilize
a dedicated outside observer to track, log, and record key behaviors of the learners that indicate
the level of reaction. This observer must have no instructional duties; this will allow them the
freedom to take notes without being hindered by multitasking. This coincides with the strategy
presented by Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2016), suggesting the dedicated observer to monitor
and record participant reactions. The instructor will periodically conduct pulse checks, creating
some formative feedback through the training. This will also allow superficial changes to be

112
made to the instruction, such as classroom temperature, seating arrangements, speaker volume,
and other factors that can be addressed to ensure optimal instruction is being administered.
The Division’s G8 can host a dinner upon the training completion, held at the local Army
dining facility. Such an environment will allow candid feedback from the learners without
“holding them hostage” (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016, p. 41). This dinner is to be optional,
reducing the number of respondents but improving the quality of the responses. Within 24 hours
of the training completion, the Division’s G8 must deploy a survey that covers the perceptions of
the training program. Approximately one week afterward, the G8 will send reminders to the
learners in an effort to increase response rates.
Table 15
Components to Measure Reactions to the Program
Method(s) or Tool(s) Timing
Engagement

Discussion at the local dining facility. Upon completion of the training during the dining
facility’s dinner hours.
Pulse checks with open-ended questions
for learners.
Throughout the duration of the training.
Relevance

Outside observer to notate and record
participant behaviors and perceptions
associated with the reactions.
Throughout the duration of the training.
Customer Satisfaction

Course evaluation via online survey. Survey emailed out twice: once right after training
completion and a reminder one week later.

Evaluation Tools
To best assess the outcomes of the organizational efforts, Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick
(2016) assert that leveraging evaluation tools will best serve this purpose. These tools can take
the shape of many forms to accommodate the various types of efforts, training, and desired
outcomes of the organization. Such tools can range from tests, observations, interviews, surveys,

113
and discussions, or the tools can be administered through combinations of several individual
tools at once. The purpose of these evaluation tools is to establish checks on trajectory of the
training efforts and to modify as necessary, giving leaders periodic and sequential feedback
throughout the entire process.
Immediately Following the Program Implementation
Evaluations will occur immediately after the program is implemented to gauge the
trajectory of the planned efforts. At Levels 1 and 2 of the training, data will be collected using
tools developed specifically for this program. The observations, feedback from the Day 2 dinner,
and the results of the practical exercise will be stored on a Google sheets document, allowing
multiple edits simultaneously to occur from several observers and recorders. While the
observations will be recorded by a designated observer, the dinner feedback and results of the
practical exercise will be uploaded by the primary instructor tasked from the Division G8.
Delayed for a Period After the Program Implementation
Six weeks after the implementation of the program, the strategic planning tracker will be
emailed to the senior advisors to assess the Level 3 behaviors. This tracker will show what
strategies have been planned and what their success rate has been. The data will have been
consolidated by the G8, with success results also generated by the G8’s data collection on
production loss costs. This will determine if the senior advisors are conducting effective planning
strategies, a behavior that is required in order to achieve the desired results of the program.
To measure the external outcomes at Level 4, the Division will use the Army’s Digital
Training Management System (DTMS) to assess combat readiness and combat effectiveness.
DTMS allows commanders to record the completed training tasks assigned to their organization.
This will serve as the data collection and reporting tool that will be used to determine whether

114
improvements in combat readiness. Commanders at each echelon will be able to see the
Division’s combat readiness levels by using the commander’s dashboard view. Although the data
is continuously updated, data will be captured six weeks following the program’s
implementation in order to best track the efforts. This will capture any improvements or declines
in the readiness levels, serving as an indicator of the reduction efforts’ impacts.
Other internal outcomes at Level 4 will be measured using a cost-benefit analysis tool.
This will assess the number of soldiers, time, resources, and other associated costs of the change
of command ceremonies. The first three battalion-level change of command ceremonies will be
assessed using the cost-benefit analysis tool approximately six weeks following the program’s
implementation. This will be considered an approximate time target due to the uncertainty of
when the change of command ceremonies will occur.

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Figure 3
Sample of the Cost-benefit Analysis Tool

Data Analysis and Reporting
The program tools discussed will serve as the mechanisms to consolidate all the relevant
data. The Division’s G8 will be responsible for the consolidation and analyze the data for a
summarized report for the commanding general of the Division. Analysis will consist of relevant
findings, progress, and the value of the program overall. Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2016)
recommended a less is more technique when presenting the final report, filtering out the noise
while delivering the signal. The intent will also be to present data with graphical representation
to enhance the message trying to be conveyed. Although the aforementioned tools are delivered
partially with some graphical representations through the dashboard, these data will still need to
be converted to a more succinct graphical representation.

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Summary
The New World Kirkpatrick Model was used to design a credible training program to
address the gaps identified through this study. To develop this program, gaps were identified
using the Clark and Estes (2008) model. From there, the program design then transitioned to the
New World Kirkpatrick Model to develop a training program that would close the gaps. This
model requires a series of four levels to be established. Much like a backward planning process
that starts with the endpoint and works the timeline backward, the New World Kirkpatrick
Model starts by designing the final level, Level 4, and working backward to Level 1. Starting at
the desired outcomes at Level 4 gives the program design the necessary breadth to fill in the
antecedent steps.
At each level, various tasks and benchmarks are identified, with specified stakeholders
charged with responsibilities to achieve the desired outcomes. With data collected throughout the
process, discrepancies can be identified early on in the program rather than at the conclusion of
the training cycle. Data are also collected well after the implementation of the training to ensure
intended outcomes are on the correct trajectory. Data is consolidated and reported with efficient
tools to best convey the relevant information. At each level, an analysis — similar to an after
actions review (AAR) — is conducted. This will ask if the expectations were met. If yes, then
why? If not, then why not? This analysis will serve as a tool to monitor the program’s
implementation and allow opportunity to adjust as necessary.
Limitations and Delimitations
Three significant factors of this research restricted the breadth and depth of the data. The
research consisted of nonrandom sampling, using participants through convenience and
snowballing technique. Using this strategy limited what could be applied to the many; instead,

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this strategy primarily served to uncover findings to a small subset of the field (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016), giving direction and guidance for subsequent studies.
The behavior of the participants limited the research. Since the researcher was sometimes
of subordinate rank than those being interviewed, participants’ compliance to the structure of the
interview had the possibility to not remain intact; some participants may have had to depart from
the interview unexpectedly or become impatient with the questions. To avoid such a situation,
the researcher ensured participants were aware of the time and intent of the interview as part of
the protocol. Additionally, some participants may not have been honest, especially when asked
questions regarding their knowledge or competency. To mitigate untruthfulness, Merriam and
Tisdell (2016) recommend using triangulation: using the intersection of several findings to
confirm accuracy. The observations were going to serve as the mechanism to triangulate,
corroborating actions in practice during the change of command ceremonies with the interview
responses. However, triangulation did not occur because observations were abandoned as a result
of COVID-19.
An additional factor that limited this research was the lack of prior studies conducted on
change of command ceremonies. Research on the change of command ceremonies primarily
discussed the intangible elements of the ceremonies, such as the honor, lineage, and tradition
aspects. However, very little research was available that discussed the monetary and production
loss costs associated with the change of command ceremonies. This limitation was mitigated by
drawing parallels with meetings and similar sunk loss cost events.
The sample size also limited the research. Although the interviews reached the saturation
point, the sample size only consisted of approximately 5% of the total number of senior advisors
assigned to the Division. The delimitations set for this research was the organization of focus.

118
The Division captured and represented a microcosm of gaps that may exist Army wide, but the
boundaries set by the researcher only studied the Division.
The most disruptive limitation was the national and global response to the COVID-19
pandemic. This study intended to observe two to three change of command ceremonies and their
associated planning and rehearsal events to address elements of the research questions. The
purpose was to observe and record any reduction efforts by the senior advisors during the
ceremony planning, rehearsal, and execution of the changes of command. However, due to the
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, policies were implemented to safeguard the Division
soldiers from exposure, drastically altering the status quo execution of the change of command
ceremonies. In general, ceremonies were reduced to less than 20 participants and few to no
audience members. Because of these changes, the researcher abandoned the observations,
limiting the data collection.
Delimitations were constructed by the researcher, restricting and setting boundaries to the
areas of study (Simon & Goes, 2013). The delimitation for this research was the number of
interviews. Estimates were determined by the researcher’s experience and discussions with other
senior advisors, resulting in a range of 10 to 20 participants. The researcher forecasted that the
saturation point will be reached before the 20
th
interview. However, 20 participants would have
allowed some latitude should the estimates have been inaccurate. The minimum number of
interviews was set at 10 to ensure that the reasonable amount of data was collected to answer the
research questions.
A significant delimitation was the Department of Defense’s context of this research. As
per the Department of Defense Instruction 3216.02, research involving human subjects requires
many levels of approval be considered “DoD-supported” (US Army Human Research

119
Protections Office, 2019), and is typically initiated by the Department of Defense. This study
obtained the standard Institutional Review Board approval and additional approvals were
required from the Division and a commanding officer to assume responsibility and oversight of
the researcher’s data collection. However, this study was not considered a “DoD-supported”
study, as defined by the Department of Defense, but was considered authorized, prohibiting the
solicitation and procurement of any official documents from the Division. The researcher’s
choice to execute an authorized study instead of a DoD-supported study set boundaries on the
data collection, resulting in a delimitation to this research.
Strengths and Limitations of the Approach
This research utilized the Clark and Estes (2008) framework as the primary method to
identify the gaps in the organization. Once identified, the research transitioned to the New World
Kirkpatrick Model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016) to design a series of training
recommendations that addressed the gaps uncovered in the findings. These comprehensive
training recommendations created an alignment with the gaps found using the Clark and Estes
(2008) model. When applied to the Division’s change of command ceremonies, the Clark and
Estes (2008) uncovered the gaps and the New World Kirkpatrick Model (Kirkpatrick &
Kirkpatrick, 2016) addressed these gaps. Much like all methodological approaches, this tandem
approach carries with it both strengths and limitations.
The Clark and Estes (2008) framework showed great benefits in this research due to its
ability to address the gaps in a palatable manner. Unlike other gap analysis tools such as SWOT
analysis and McKinsey 7S, the Clark and Estes asserts that gaps can be placed any of the three
influences: knowledge, motivation, and organization. This concept narrows the focus to three
categories, allowing large organizations — such as the Division — to compartmentalize the gaps

120
into elements that can systematically identified and then addressed through an implementation
plan. Limiting the research to the stakeholder group of focus narrowed the focus even further,
creating a resolution program that is manageable and able to be implemented at the Division
level in the Army.
The greatest limitation to this approach was the ambiguity in identifying particular
elements within the organization as the source of the gap. In the context of a large government
organization, such as the Division, research determined that the organization required
recommendations to close the gap. However, the framework of the study did not specifically
allow the researcher to be able to identify what aspect of the organization — leadership, funding,
mission, bureaucracy — was the source of the gap. In the event that leadership would have been
identified as the accountable agent, implementing a change effort may still be restricted or
prohibited due to Army-wide policies and procedures. For example, had research recommended
assigning a soldier or position to conduct cost-benefit analyses for change of command
ceremonies, organizational structures mandated by the Army may restrict the Division ability to
create additional duties and positions, which would leave some ambiguity in identifying
accountability for the organizational gap.
Additionally, due to the nature of the Division’s mission, few staff members’ positions
allow for time or resources for data collection and aggregation. The Division’s mission and
priorities involve the warfighting effort and proper preparedness for combat operations. This
framework and training recommendation approach are intended for organizations with the
resources for such data collection and aggregation. The Division does not employ soldiers to
conduct this type of research and instead relies on Army-wide government agencies, such as the
Government Accountability Office, to conduct the necessary research and provide

121
recommendations. Although comprehensive, the Clark and Estes (2008) gap analysis and New
World Kirkpatrick Model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016) expect the organization to have a
staff or infrastructure that can support these data collection procedures; the Division does not
currently staff such positions that meet these expectations.
Future Research
The Army would benefit from studies that evaluate more of its traditional practices.
Subsequent research could look beyond ceremonies — such as change of responsibility
ceremonies, induction ceremonies, and patch ceremonies — to other activities that tend to
consume large amounts of time and personnel — such as safety briefings, accountability
formations, and close-out formations — to add empirical evidence to the practices. Evaluating
these practices could initiate inquiry into improvement strategies to a practice that has seen very
little change in the last 250 years. Future research in this area could potentially revise, update, or
at least reduce the time spent on current practices, freeing up the finite time available for
warfighter preparations and combat readiness. In other words, promoting evaluation through
research can result in a more effective Army.
During this research, the COVID-19 epidemic required many practices and events to
adjust to accommodate social distancing policies and reduce the spread of the virus. This
situation prompted ceremonies to be executed with minimal participants while streaming the
events on social media. Future research on the impact of these modified ceremonies and other
similar practices during the COVID-19 epidemic could help determine the costs and benefits of
such events when participation, time, and resources were significantly reduced. This presents a
unique opportunity to research alternative methods to implementing ceremonies without an
intervention from the researcher.

122
Conducting research and inquiry into Army practices will draw relevant and appropriate
analysis to these activities and promote a military that is not beyond reproach. In other words, in
addition to generating a more effective Army, research promotes a culture of progress and
learning in the Army. Conducting analysis and providing feedback are accepted and practiced in
effective and innovative organizations (Denning, 2005); the Army, too, emphasizes these
practices in its instructional doctrine (Department of the Army, 2012c; Department of the Army,
2016a; Department of the Army, 2020). Continuing research, especially with the support of the
Department of Defense, will reinforce that the Army’s culture is in alignment with the doctrine it
publishes. It is recommended that future research focus on evaluating Army practices that
involve copious amounts of production loss costs.
Conclusion
This study evaluated an Army entity’s resourcing and processes for assessing production
loss costs using change of command ceremonies and their impact on the training time available
for combat readiness. The stakeholder group of focus was the senior advisors, due to their
substantial influence on the subordinate organizations as both leaders and managers. The
conceptual framework used to conduct the evaluation was the Clark and Estes (2008) gap
analysis model. The literature review established the empirical foundation necessary to develop
profound understanding of the problem of practice. Interviews served as the source from which
to establish an understanding of how the Division and its senior advisors perform. This research
found gaps in the knowledge, motivation, and organization influences.
The research sought to address these gaps by developing recommendations based on
theory, research, and experience, to close the gaps and to address the Army’s understanding of
production loss costs. The change of command served as a microcosm of the possibility of much

123
larger gaps within the Army. However, identifying these gaps through the change of command
ceremony present an opportunity for other areas of potential improvements. Although this
research uncovered potential for increasing performance at the Division and with its soldiers, the
implication of these findings is that the Army must evaluate how it uses its finite time in order to
achieve or maintain its primary goal of combat readiness (Zilhaver, 2017).
Applying the concepts, findings, and recommendations proposed through this research to
other Army practices may alter the Army’s perceptions and understanding of production loss
costs. Brining awareness to production loss costs while stressing the importance of cost-benefit
analysis can serve as the influence to evaluate other practices, eventually increasing the efficient
and responsible use of the organization’s time. Increasing efficiency through more effective
practices will result in a more effective military force.

124
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Appendix A
Interview Protocol
The researcher in this study will interview between 10 and 20 participants. These
participants are enlisted soldiers of the rank First Sergeant or Command Sergeant Major, serving
as the senior advisors in the Division. Standardized questions have been developed by the
researcher and are structured in a logical sequence to best gain comprehensive and rich data.
Parenthetical notations reference the relationship with the conceptual framework or research
questions. The script below will be utilized to establish a standardized and consistent
introduction that will incorporate all the vital elements and disclaimers of the interview process.
Good morning/afternoon. Thank you for taking time out of your schedule to
accommodate this research. Today I will be asking you a series of questions that will help me
determine some of the gaps in the Division. These questions will focus on specific aspects of the
cost-benefit analysis of the change of command ceremonies: knowledge, motivation, and
organizational gaps between the current performance level and the desired performance level.
The intent is to gain insight of your role and impact on the change of command ceremonies, and
your role and impact in the cost reduction efforts associated with the change of command
ceremonies. Be advised that this study does not allow for incentives or payment for participants
in compliance with dual compensation rules. This study is not funded or sanctioned by the
Department of Defense.
At no point are you obligated to answer any questions. You may withdraw at any point
during the interview or well after the interview, should you have a change of consent.
Withdrawal from this research is permitted up until the publication. Your name, organization,
and any other identifiable features will be given pseudonyms to ensure anonymity. Pending your

143
consent, the interview will be recorded through the Zoom application, capturing both audio and
video of the interview. Pending any questions, please review the consent form and sign at the
bottom.
Interview Questions
1. Tell me about your experiences with change of command ceremonies? (K1, K2;
Experience and behavior question); (Patton, 2015)
2. Describe to me the ideal change of command ceremony. (K1, K2, K3; Ideal position
question); (Strauss, Schatzman, Bucher, & Sabshin, 1981)
3. What do you think about efficiency of the training time spent to conduct change of
command ceremonies? (K1, K3; Opinion and values question); (Patton, 2015)
4. What are your thoughts or perceptions on the costs of the change of command
ceremonies? (K1); (Strauss, Schatzman, Bucher, & Sabshin, 1981)
5. What is your understanding of production loss costs? (K1); (Patton, 2015)
6. As a 1SG/CSM, how might you determine the costs of ceremonies? (K1; Knowledge
question); (Patton, 2015)
7. How would you describe the correlation between reducing production loss costs
associated with the change of command ceremonies and combat readiness? (K2); (Patton,
2015)
“Since considering some of the costs associated with the ceremonies...”
8. What efforts are made to reduce costs of ceremonies? (O2, O3; Knowledge question);
(Patton, 2015)
9. What type of influence, if any, do you have with your commander? (M2; Opinion
question); (Patton, 2015)

144
10. Describe your role, if any, in reducing costs of ceremonies. (RQ1, RQ2, M1, M2, M3;
Experience and behavior question); (Patton, 2015)
11. Describe your confidence in your ability to influence reduction efforts? (M4, M3, M1;
Feelings question); (Patton, 2015)
“The Secretary of Defense has announced that the Army’s #1 priority is combat readiness...”
12. How would you describe the Division’s level of priority to reduce the costs of the change
of command ceremonies? (O1, O2, O3; Experience and behavior question); (Patton,
2015)
13. How would you describe the Division’s level of support – providing time and resources –
for leaders to determine the value of some of these tasks, such as change of command
ceremonies? (O2)
Probing Questions
1. What do you mean?
2. How do your efforts make an impact? Tell me more about that.
3. Give me an example of that.
4. Walk me through the experience.
5. Would you explain that?
6. What makes you feel that way?
Interview Conclusion
Is there anything else you would like to share? If not, this concludes my questioning. I
greatly appreciate your time, insight, and overall contribution you brought to this research. As a

145
reminder, your identity will remain anonymous. Please let me know if you have any questions or
concerns regarding the research. Thanks again.

146
Appendix B
Consent Form
INFORMED CONSENT FOR RESEARCH
Study Title: The Army’s process to evaluate costs versus benefits of the change of command
ceremonies

Principal Investigator: Ryan Malin

INTRODUCTION

We invite you to take part in a research study. Please take as much time as you need to read the
consent form. If you find any of the language difficult to understand, please ask questions. If you
decide to participate, you will be asked to sign this form. A copy of the signed form will be
provided to you for your records.

KEY INFORMATION

The following is a short summary of this study to help you decide whether or not you should
participate. More detailed information is listed later on in this form.

1. Being in this research study is voluntary – it is your choice.

2. You are being asked to take part in this study because you meet the requirements
necessary for this research. The purpose of this study is to gather data regarding change of
command ceremonies. Your participation in this study will last between 30 and 60 minutes. This
will include an interview with a series of questions.

3. You may not receive any direct benefit from taking part in this study. However, your
participation in this study may help us learn more about the strategies Army leaders use to assess
the value of events.

DETAILED INFORMATION

PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to understand how first sergeants and command sergeants major
assess the value of Army ceremonies. We hope to learn more about production loss costs, and the
impact they make on Army events. You are invited as a possible participant because you meet
the requirements necessary for this research. About 15 participants will take part in the study.

147
BENEFITS

There are no direct benefits to you from taking part in this study. However, your participation in
this study may help us learn more about how the Army assess the value of ceremonies.

PRIVACY/CONFIDENTIALITY

We will keep your records for this study confidential as far as permitted by law. However, if we
are required to do so by law, we will disclose confidential information about you. Efforts will be
made to limit the use and disclosure of your personal information. We may publish the
information from this study in journals or present it at meetings. If we do, we will not use your
name.

The University of Southern California’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) may review your
records.

Officials of the U.S. Army Research Protections Office and the Army Research Laboratory’s
Human Research Protection Program are permitted by law to inspect the records obtained in this
study to ensure compliance with laws and regulations covering experiments using human
subjects.

Your information or samples that are collected as part of this research will not be used or
distributed for future research studies, even if all of your identifiers are removed.

The investigators are required to report certain cases with the potential of serious harm to you, or
others, such as suicidality or child abuse to the appropriate authorities.

NEW INFORMATION

We will tell you about any new information that may affect your health, welfare, or willingness
to stay in the research.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION

It is your choice whether or not to participate. If you choose to participate, you may change your
mind and leave the study at any time. Refusal to participate or stopping your participation will
involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

If you stop being in the research, already collected data may not be removed from the study
database. You will be asked whether the investigator can continue to collect data from your
records. If you agree, this data will be handled the same as the research data. No new information
or samples will be collected about you or from you by the study team without your permission.

The study site may still, after your withdrawal, need to report any safety event that you may have
experienced due to your participation to all entities involved in the study. Your personal

148
information, including any identifiable information, that has already been collected up to the
time of your withdrawal will be kept and used to guarantee the integrity of the study, to
determine the safety effects, and to satisfy any legal or regulatory requirements.

CONTACT INFORMATION

If you have questions, concerns, complaints, or think the research has hurt you, talk to the
investigator at 910-527-3294.

This research has been reviewed by the USC Institutional Review Board (IRB). The IRB is a
research review board that reviews and monitors research studies to protect the rights and
welfare of research participants. Contact the IRB if you have questions about your rights as a
research participant or you have complaints about the research. You may contact the IRB at
(323) 442-0114 or by email at irb@usc.edu.

STATEMENT OF CONSENT

I have read (or someone has read to me) the information provided above. I have been given a
chance to ask questions. All my questions have been answered. By signing this form, I am
agreeing to take part in this study.

Name of Research Participant Signature Date Signed
(and Time*)

Person Obtaining Consent
I have personally explained the research to the participant using non-technical language. I have
answered all the participant’s questions. I believe that the participant understands the information
described in this informed consent and freely consents to participate.

Name of Person Obtaining Signature Date Signed
Informed Consent (and Time*)

Abstract (if available)

Abstract This study applies the Clark and Estes (2008) gap analysis model as the methodological framework to determine how senior advisors of the U.S. Army evaluate the costs of ceremonies. This research focused on the change of command ceremonies at a specific division to gain an understanding of how these senior advisors determine the value of the change of command ceremonies, how the ceremonies impact combat readiness posturing, and if the organization prioritizes cost reduction efforts for the change of command ceremonies. Through literature review and interviews of 10 senior advisors, this research was able to identify the knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences associated with the change of command ceremonies. This study uncovered production loss costs associated with these ceremonies, and whether these influences were present at the organization and amongst the senior advisors. The findings discovered gaps in all three influence types. Senior advisors lacked both the critical skills regarding cost-benefit analysis and an understanding of production loss costs, and the organization did not provide the necessary support for senior advisors to evaluate the value of the change of command ceremonies. The study concludes with recommendations, consisting of a robust training-based solution and an implementation plan to close the gaps.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Malin, Ryan Elliot (author)

Core Title The Army’s process to evaluate costs versus benefits: a case study on the change of command ceremonies

School Rossier School of Education

Degree Doctor of Education

Degree Program Organizational Change and Leadership (On Line)

Publication Date 11/18/2020

Defense Date 10/22/2020

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Army,ceremony,command,Military,OAI-PMH Harvest,tradition

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Phillips, Jennifer (committee chair), Murphy, Don (committee member), Seli, Helena (committee member)

Creator Email rmalin@usc.edu,ryan.e.malin@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c89-399859

Unique identifier UC11666666

Identifier etd-MalinRyanE-9130.pdf (filename),usctheses-c89-399859 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-MalinRyanE-9130.pdf

Dmrecord 399859

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Malin, Ryan Elliot

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA