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Remember us this time tomorrow: a testimonial history of the foreign community during the Kwangju Uprising

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Remember us this time tomorrow: a testimonial history of the foreign community during the Kwangju Uprising

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Content Remember Us This Time Tomorrow:
A Testimonial History of the Foreign
Community During the Kwangju Uprising
By
Steve Literati IV
A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC DANA AND DA VID DORNSIFE COLLEGE OF LETTERS, ARTS
AND SCIENCES
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirement for the Degree
MASTERS OF ARTS IN
EAST ASIA AREA STUDIES
August 2020
Copyright 2020 Steve Literati IV
“I remain assured in hard experience that neither by national guns nor by national gods will
mankind be saved, but only by the genuine regard for all members of the human family.”
- Miner Searle Bates
i
Table of Contents
Epigraph…………………………………………………………………………………………i
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………iii
Introduction - The Foreigners of Kwangju…………………………………………………….. 1
1.1 Historiography…………………………………………………………………………...7
Chapter 1: Kwangju From the Eyes of the Foreign Community……………………………… 12
2.1 Beginning - Thursday May 15th to Sunday May 18th, 1980……………….................12
2.2 Response - May 19th to 22nd 1980…………………………………………………....21
2.3 “We were of Kwangju” - May 23th to May 27th 1980………………………………...36
2.4 Fallout - After May 27th……………………………………………………………….43
Chapter 2: Motivation and Impact - “The kind of sentiment anyone would have”………….... 48
Conclusion - “Into the forefront of history”…………………………………………………... 66
4.1 Epilogue………………………………………………………………………………..70
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………... 73
Appendix………………………………………………………………………………………. 75
Fig. 1: Tim Warnberg’s Peace Corp Profile ……………………………………………….75
Fig. 2: Image of Military taken by David Dolinger………………………………………..75
Fig. 3: Charles Betts Huntley………………………………………………………………76
Fig. 4: Map of areas of unrest by Paul Courtright…….….….…….………………………76
Fig. 5: Tim Warnberg carrying victims………………………………….…………………77
ii
Abstract
The following thesis analyzes the Kwangju Uprising through the lens of the foreigners living in
and around Kwangju who became intimately involved in the crisis, and attempts to analyze
both why they became involved and their impact on the crisis. While previous histories on the
Uprising have utilized foreign accounts in analyzing the events in question, there has been little
research into how these foreigners participated in the Uprising beyond an eyewitness role. This
thesis finds that the foreigners who became involved in Kwangju had a direct impact in the
events in question, providing shelter to individuals targeted by the regime, acting as translators
between foreign press and locals, directly intervening by protecting protestors from military
retribution and violence, and in some cases actively working with armed groups against the
military, among other examples. The reasons that the foreigners were motivated rarely was a
result of any sense of a political predisposition, but an immediate reaction to the crisis as it
unfolded, and an emotional response to the violence they witnessed first hand or were related
to by friends and neighbors. After the crisis, the foreign community continued to prove
effective by providing documentation of the events in question to foreign outlets, following
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkek’s theory of Transnational Advocacy Networks.
iii
I. Introduction
The Foreigners of Kwangju
The Kwangju Uprising - from May 18th 1980 to May 27th, 1980 - is a major turning
point in contemporary South Korean history, and the history of Asia as a whole. What began as
a student protest in the southern city of Kwangju, the Kwangju Uprising began as a student
demonstration against the nascent Chun Doo-hwan regime and the extension of martial law
across the country starting on May 18th which spiralled into a popular mass uprising centered
in the city of Kwangju on Kŭmnamno street, with protests accompanying in other cities in the
southern Honam region. By the end of the Uprising on May 27th, military forces brutally re-
entered the city and killed citizens in the city and effectively ended the protests. Estimates
range wildly, with the highest reported at more than 2500 dead . With this being said, however,
1
Kwangju became a galvanizing event for the democratization movement (Minjung) in South
Korea and represents the first instance in the 1980s of a major mass movement in Asia
protesting against authoritarian rule. In the years following the tragedy of Kwangju, democracy
movements in Asia throughout the 1980s would emulate Kwangju, from the Philippines’
People Power Revolution to Tiananmen Square, and eventually led to the end of military rule
in South Korea in 1987 during the June Struggle .
2
Bruce Cumings, Bruce. Korea’ s Place in the Sun : a Modern History (Updated ed. New York ;: W. W. Norton,
1
2005), p. 383.
“Human Rights Documentary Heritage 1980 Archives for the May 18th Democratic Uprising against Military
2
Regime, in Gwangju, Republic of Korea”, UNESCO Memory of the World, last modified 2017. https://
tinyurl.com/y4ewum56
1
Although the 1960s and 1970s saw major protest movements against the Park regime
and in many ways laid the groundwork for the Kwangju Uprising , the roots of this mass
3
conflict were in 1979. As a result of fears around a global fuel shortage, inflation rates in South
Korea reached 18.3 percent and led to a halving of annual GDP growth, and recession. In
response to the worsening economic crisis at the beginning of the year, large protests by both
workers and social movement groups began to form against then-President Park Chung Hee.
The YH Company labor dispute and protest resulted in Park ousting Kim Young Sam
from the National Assembly, the main opposition leader to Park’s DRP, (Democratic Republic
Party, or Minju Gonghwa Dang). This only exacerbated Park’s increasingly tenuous rule over
South Korea, as the United States withdrew its ambassador William Glysteen and mass protests
erupted in the cities of Busan and Masan. Faced with mounting pressures and finding fewer
and fewer allies who would support Park Chung Hee’s increasingly draconian and ineffective
responses to the unfolding crises , Park was assassinated on October 26, 1979 by the head of
4
the KCIA, Kim Jae-gyu. Although there were initial hopes in both South Korea and across the
world that South Korea would transition into democratic governance under Ch’oe Kyu-ha, by
December 12th of that year, Major General Chun Doo-Hwan, along with assistance from
Major Generals Roh Tae Woo and Chŏng Ho-yong, assumed control over the military and
became the de facto leader of South Korea. By February of 1980 Chun had violently expunged
any opposition against his rule and would soon unleash an immensely violent crackdown in
early May.
Paul Chang, Protest Dialectics: State Repression and South Korea’ s Democracy Movement, 1970-1979
3
(Stanford University Press; 2015) pg. 3
ibid., 204
4
2
While student protesters were the ones who initiated the protest, the brutal crackdown
by the military led to mass support of the protestors from people in Kwangju, including
foreigners living in and around Kwangju at the time. What we see in the Kwangju Uprising is
the transformation of a protest movement largely seen as a student movement to one being far
broader in scope than High School and University students, and incorporating groups across a
wide range of socio-economic factors and backgrounds. The Kwangju Uprising is often
examined through the lives of the citizens who found themselves opposed to the military
dictatorship , the brutality of the special forces sent into the city, and/or the failure on the part
5
of American policy leaders in preventing the tragedy. While such scholarship in English is
6
helpful for understanding the legacy of Kwangju, the role of foreigners living in the city of
Kwangju tends to be de-emphasized, despite the clear importance that foreigners played in
aiding and rescuing people within the city.
This thesis attempts to understand how these individuals became involved in the
Uprising, why they became involved, and their impact on the Kwangju Uprising. Kwangju for
the non-Koreans became a question of moral quandary - in many cases, their decision to
become involved was a result of an immediate impulse rather than a premeditated event. In the
words of psychologist Eva Fogelman to describe rescuers in the Holocaust, showed “an
impulsive response to an immediate situation” . This “impulsive response” led to the foreigners
7
contributing their part into what Jung-woon Choi describes as the “Absolute
See: George Katsiaficas “Remembering the Kwangju uprising” in Socialism and Democracy.
5
See: Samsung Lee, “Kwangju and America in Perspective” from Asian Perspective.
6
Eva Fogelman. “The Rescuer Self,” in The Holocaust and History : the Known, the Unknown, the Disputed, and
7
the Reexamined. Ed. Berenbaum, Michael, and Peck, Abraham J. Bloomington: (Indiana University Press, 1998),
p. 1.
3
Community” (Chŏltae Gongdongch’e) in Kwangju, in which “citizens did not differentiate
their lives from that of the others...all distinctions between humans disintegrated as disparate
individuals joined together as one” . By examining the foreigner community, we understand
8
how fully and complete the Absolute Community was, and may draw parallels with other
historical examples of collective action across nationalities during times of immense violence.
Based on the evidence left behind in journals, interviews, and archives, I will argue that the
foreigner community became intimately involved in the Uprising and were an important force
by sheltering protestors and individuals targeted by the regime or fearful for their safety;
working with foreign journalists as translators and in other roles to relay the events to the
outside world; documenting evidence of atrocities that could be presented to either the US
government, foreign journalists, and then-acting President Choi Kyu-ha; actively intervening to
prevent mass violence and in some extreme cases; and finally working beyond a humanitarian
capacity and working with anti-Chun elements to resist politically the regime. The range of
political opinions and experiences range widely, but all were at some level agnostic towards the
political situation occurring in Korea pre- and post-Kwangju. By understanding the role of
foreigners in Kwangju during the Uprising, we understand a deeper interconnected web of
relief efforts by different organizations in trying to prevent a greater escalation of the conflict
and to inform the outside world of the atrocities committed by the Chun Doo-hwan regime.
What is most striking of these individuals is how their transformation from foreign observers to
active participants mirrors the same transformative process that many in Kwangju also
experienced in responding to actions by the military.
Jung-woon Choi, “The Formation of an “Absolute Community”” in Contentious Kwangju, ed. Gi-wook Shin and
8
Kyung Moon Hwang. (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003.) pg. 4.
4
The foreigner community within Kwangju was a small but diverse group, representing
multiple faiths, nations, and occupations. Some individuals had connections to Korea that
spanned decades and even generations; some arrived only two years previously. What unites
them as a group, however, was not their separation as being distinctly foreigners from the
larger community of Kwangju and the larger Chŏnnam province, but rather their
transformation into becoming directly involved in the events of Kwangju. The Absolute
Community did not just bring the Korean citizens of Kwangju and Chŏnnam province together;
it brought together a diverse group of individuals across nationalities, classes, and creeds who
became intimately involved with the Uprising. Likewise, through the expanded roles of
foreigners during the Uprising - not just within the foreign community in Kwangju itself, but
the expanded network of institutions, journalists, and advocates - the foreigners involved in
Kwangju played an important role in providing outside pressure on the regime. They, in other
words, demonstrate Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s theory of Transnational
Advocacy Networks and the “boomerang pattern,” in which states that although domestic
groups are unable to effect change in authoritarian systems, these domestic groups are able to
utilize broader alliances of transnational groups through journalists, church groups, and human
rights lawyers, to bring this pressure to bear on the regime in question.
With the major success of the 2017 Korean film “A Taxi Driver” (T’aeksi Unjŏnsa),
there has been a renewed awareness around the roles that foreigners played in the Uprising.
Based on the real life story of famed German news reporter Jürgen Hintzpeter and taxi driver
Kim Sa Bok, the film chronicles the events of the Uprising through the unlikely partnership
these two individuals develop over the course of those ten days. The film, while being an
5
excellent piece of historical film-making that captures many aspects of the Uprising, conflates
Hintzpeter as the first and only foreigner present in Kwangju over the course of the Uprising,
and downplays and even writes out the roles that other foreigners played during the Uprising -
whether it was missionary Charles Betts Huntley offering his makeshift photo studio to
9
Hintzpeter to develop his photos, to even expunging the role that Hintzpeter’s assistant played
during the Uprising. While such issues can be forgiven for a movie in order to create an
effective and engaging story, the broader historicality of the Uprising was much more diverse
than what is suggested. With the upcoming 40th Anniversary of the Uprising, several
foreigners who were present during the Uprising - among them, former Peace Corp V olunteers
(PCV) Paul Courtright and David Dolinger - have slated several memoirs for simultaneous
English and Korean translations to be published both in the United States and South Korea. As
such, there is an increasing need to examine who these individuals were, what brought them to
Kwangju in the first place, and what role they played over the course of those ten days in May,
1980 and after. While past histories of these individuals have painted them as observers to the
conflict, even by the memoirs and observations left behind by these individuals, their absence
in the collective academic history is one that must be challenged to fully understand the true
scope of the Kwangju Uprising.
This thesis will proceed in three parts. The first part of this thesis has provided an
overview of the topic, and will provide an overview of the historiography in English relating to
foreigners in Kwangju, and attempt to analyze what has been missing in the literature thus far.
The second part of this thesis will be a narrative history provided by both archival documents
Martha Huntley, interview by Steve Literati IV , March, 17th-April 29th, 2019, email.
9
6
and testimonials to track the events of Kwangju from the foreigner perspective and attempt to
document how and why these individuals became involved. The second part of this thesis will
also analyze the behaviors of these individuals in relation to other mass tragedies - most
directly to the roles of the Righteous Among Nations during the Holocaust and the
international community in Nanjing during the Nanjing Massacre in an attempt to
contextualize the motivations these individuals had. The final section of this paper will provide
conclusions relating to the foreign community in Kwangju, as well as areas relating to the
Uprising that still need to be researched.
Historiography
Previous scholarship in English on the role of Americans and foreigners more broadly
has been primarily limited to research conducted by a handful of academics who were present
during the events in question. Two accounts in particular - Tim Warnberg’s “The Kwangju
Uprising: An Inside View,” published in 1987 in Korean Studies and Linda Lewis’ Laying
Claim to the Memory of May: a Look Back at the 1980 Kwangju Uprising, as well as Donald
Clark’s The Kwangju Uprising: Shadows over the Regime in South Korea provide valuable
understanding of the role of foreigners during the Kwangju Uprising and.
Tim Warnberg’s “The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View,” published in Korean Studies
in 1987, represents one of the first accounts of the Kwangju Uprising in English. Warnberg’s
research drew from journals, testimonials, and documents collected from the Americans within
the city and analyzes both the sociological reasoning for escalating violence starting on May
18th and the coverage of the event in foreign presses. Warnberg was then a Peace Corps
7
volunteer in Kwangju. As an eyewitness to the initial outbreak of violence, Warnberg notes that
the crowd was mostly “ambivalent” and interested in watching student protestors in downtown
Kwangju. However, as the situation quickly escalated, “there was little time to group and
discuss the rapidly changing situation; people were reacting too fast,” and by 3 o’clock, there
was a “conspicuous shift” by the military as special forces were brought in and charged the
crowd. While temporarily creating a moment of calm, Warnberg argues that this action only
“encouraged a much more serious cycle of violence” .
10
Warnberg also focused on how Kwangju was covered in the Soviet Union, North
Korea, China, and South Korea. In both North Korea and the Soviet Union, the Kwangju
Uprising was blamed on decisions in Washington. Soviet accounts, however, found an
opportunity to chastise the Chinese, stating “Chinese hegemonists are acquiescing to U.S.
moves,” while the Chinese attacked the South Korean “fascists” who will receive “history’s
11
harsh judgement”. South Korean press accounts that were able to reach mass circulation,
however, were full of half-truths and attempted to greatly minimize the events. Warnberg
points out that this lack of transparency proved detrimental to the South Korean government at
this time. Published in 1987 before both the June Struggle and the 1987 Presidential election
which would usher in the end of military rule, Warnberg’s article argued that although the Chun
regime was able to suppress the Uprising, the victory “may yet prove Pyrrhic”. Due in part to
the government unable or unwilling to conduct a thorough investigation, “claims to legitimacy
will continue to be summarily dismissed” he warned that and made calls for a “more even-
Tim Warnberg, “The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View.” Korean Studies 11 (January 1, 1987). http://
10
search.proquest.com/docview/1311654759/. P. 50.
ibid., p. 46
11
8
handed report complete with facts, figures, and information from the hospitals of Kwangju” .
12
His hope in this article was to “present a picture of the initial confrontation and subsequent
events that eventually led to a full-scale armed revolt” and encourage greater dialogue of how
13
the South Korean government handled the situation.
Linda Lewis’ Laying Claim to the Memory of May: A Look Back at the 1980 Kwangju
Uprising provides a broader in-depth analysis of the foreigner community in Kwangju beyond
Warnberg’s narrative. Linda Lewis’s book is based on her own research notes from the city
during the Uprising . Lewis, at this time was working on her doctoral dissertation, and had
arrived in Kwangju approximately a day or two before the start of the Uprising and took
meticulous notes about the event as it unfolded. These notes became part of her larger scholarly
work, and along with other testimonials from foreigners in the city, eventually culminated in
Laying Claim to the Memory of May, which was first published in 2003 and represents one of
the most comprehensive studies on the Kwangju Uprising in English. Lewis’ book is divided
into three parts: the first is based on her notes from the Uprising and represents her own
testimonial to the events that unfolded. The second part focuses on the 1980s and up to the
Fifth Republic in 1987, and on the inability to “speak or write or think freely about May
1980” . The final part is about the commemoration of Kwangju in the late 1990s and the
14
evolution of research between 1995 and 2000.
ibid., 53-54.
12
ibid., 34
13
Linda Lewis. Laying Claim to the Memory of May : a Look Back at the 1980 Kwangju Uprising (Honolulu:
14
University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2002). p., xxi.
9
Lewis’ book focuses primarily on the ways of understanding Kwangju within the terms
of Korean history, and uses the accounts of foreigners during the Uprising to showcase how
foreigners “bore witness” to the atrocities committed by the Chun Doo-hwan. She does not
mention any of the allegations put forth by the foreign community, nor the means by which
foreigners were active during the Uprising. For instance, while Tim Warnberg puts forward
Martha Huntley’s account of “Ms. Kim/Ms. Ch’oe,” an alias who was sent to Kwangju by
then-acting President Ch’oe Kyu-ha , Lewis does not mention the alleged event despite
15
corroboration from Martha and Charles Betts Huntley. Likewise Arnold Peterson’s allegation
that the ROKAF planned to bomb the city and the decision by the missionaries to stay is
subsequently missing in Lewis’ work as well even though Lewis uses his memoir as well.
Lastly, there is The Kwangju Uprising: Shadows of the Regime in South Korea, edited
by Donald N. Clark in 1988. Published in the subsequent months after the June Struggle of
1987 and compiling chapters from Linda Lewis, Mark Peterson, amongst several other Korean
and American eyewitnesses, the book represents an invaluable account of the Uprising from
the perspectives of those who bore witness to it. Originally part of a panel in Boston, The
Kwangju Uprising: Shadows of the Regime in South Korea comes one year after Warnberg’s
publication and notes that “American scholars of Korea, like other friends of the Korean
people, were witnesses to the events of 1979-1980”. Clark also states “we have an abiding
interest in the lives of our Korean colleagues, an in the stance our government takes towards
the Korean people” . Although both Linda Lewis and Mark Peterson, two important
16
Warnberg, p. 45
15
Donald Clark, ed. The Kwangju Uprising : Shadows over the Regime in South Korea Boulder: Westview Press,
16
1988., 6.
10
eyewitnesses to the Uprising are presented in the book, the broader range of foreigners within
the Uprising remain silent. Much like Lewis’ own book that was eventually published in 2003,
Shadows of the Regime in South Korea instead focuses on the accounts of Korean sources and
newspaper accounts, utilizing foreigner accounts primarily as eyewitness accounts devoid of
direct intervention into the Uprising. The decisions made by non-Koreans and their impact on
the Uprising are primarily negative in nature, as both US Ambassador William Gleysteen and
General John A. Wickham are interviewed and discuss their decisions and failure to properly
address the causes of the state sponsored violence before, during, and after the Kwangju
Uprising. The decisions by foreigners within the city, however, remain outside the realm of the
book.
At the moment, there is very little in the English academic literature that discusses the
multiplicity of ways in which the foreign community engaged in helping and rescuing people
caught up in the violence that occurred during the Kwangju Uprising, the reasoning and
motivations for acting, and the risks that these families and individuals put themselves in. The
agency of foreigners - amongst many people throughout the entirety of the Uprising - tends to
be deemphasized while the roles of foreigners as observers is sometimes overemphasized to the
detriment of understanding the events of Kwangju as a whole. Refocusing on the foreign
community not as observers but as participants is important to understanding the full scope of
the Uprising, and to understand the means by which observers became actors over the course
of the Uprising is necessary to re-examine.
11
I. Kwangju From the Eyes of the Foreign Community
Beginning - Thursday May 15th to Sunday May 18th, 1980
The full scale of the catastrophe did not become apparent to the foreign community at
the same time. Similar to the broader community in Kwangju, the full scope and scale of
violence that occured on May 18th was not fully understood by the general population who
were not present. There was a sense among several eyewitnesses that the days before May 18th
was a “calm before the storm,” as Arnold Petereson reflected on it years later, but there were
intermittent signs of the violence that would occur early on. Some foreigners, like Charles
Betts and Martha Huntley, witnessed early disturbing signs of the violence to come as early as
the 16th. However, of all the foreigners who were present during those initial days, only a
handful of individuals - most importantly for this study, PCV Tim Warnberg - was present at
the initial explosion of violence at Ch'ŏnnam University on the 18th. By the end of the 18th,
however, it became clear to almost everyone that something deeply troubling had happened,
and these individuals found themselves in the middle of it.
Thursday, May 15th through Saturday May 17th saw the emergence of several student-
led protests against Chun Doo-hwan rumors circulating around and the extension of Martial
Law across the country, which would take place early on May 17th, and Kwangju was no
exception. In Kwangju itself, there were approximately 500 protesters - mostly university and
high school students gathered to demonstrate , as one foreigner Martha Huntley ryley observed,
“peaceably as they did every year when the weather got good” . This sense of banal
17
familiarity seems widespread across the city, as a large number of bystanders had come to
Martha Huntley, Interview.
17
12
observe this initial protest . These initial protests lacked any sense of the mass violence that
18
would be following in the next few days, and were mild even compared to protests outside of
Kwangju. Over 50,000 students had massed in Seoul on the 15th which resulted in protestors
19
armed with rocks and bottles throwing them at police, who responded with tear gas in order to
dispel the crowd, but this seemed rather common and even mild compared to the previous year
of mass protest against then-president Park Chung Hee.
Unbeknownst to those gathered, though, was the build-up of military forces within the
city. Paratroopers had been dispatched to every major city in South Korea outside Busan as
early as May 3rd to familiarize themselves with the terrain of the city , and there was a mass
20
deployment of troops to Kwangju underway on Saturday, May 17th from the 33rd and 35th
battalions of the 7th Special Forces Brigade, often referred to “Black Berets,” elite units of the
Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) trained for urban warfare for a potential North Korean
incursion into South Korea in the event of hostilities under the command of General Chung
Ho-yŏng . While previous sources have made note of this build-up, it appears that foreigners
21
were among the first to witness this military occupation. The Huntleys, a Presbyterian
missionary family had lived in South Korea for about fifteen years by 1980. Charles Betts and
Martha, along with their youngest children Michael (10) and Jenny (9) along with Sandy and
Kitty Marks, volunteers from Christian organization called the “Friendship Force,” who had
Peterson, Arnold, Kwangju Sa’tae., trans. Chŏng, Dong-sŏp. (P’ulbit, Seoul), 1995., p. 183
18
Clark, p 12
19
Henry Scoots-Stokes, Lee Jai-eui and Dae Jung Kim. The Kwangju Uprising : Eyewitness Press Accounts of
20
Korea’s Tiananmen Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2000., p. 29
Ibid.,
21
13
volunteered at the Kwangju Christian Hospital where Charles Betts Huntley worked arrived on
May 17th at the Kwangju Train Station to head to Taejŏn where special forces soldiers were
being deployed.
Upon arriving at the station, the train station was crawling with soldiers, and it seemed
like they were the only civilians present in the whole place. Martha Huntley had tried to get a
train ticket beforehand on the 16th, but was denied by the station staff because of “the
soldiers”. Despite this, Martha Huntley were able to buy tickets to board the train once at the
station. However once they boarded the train, the scene was much worse; Martha Huntley
remembers seeing soldiers drinking heavily and breaking out into fights. One soldier in
particular, Martha Huntley remarks, was “weaving and waving a broken beer bottle,
threatening people”. The whole scene left Martha Huntley, along with the rest of the company
shaken; “the Marks were bug eyed and so were we”. The Huntleys rarely ever took the train to
Taejŏn, but the Marks were insistent, saying they wanted to see the countryside . The
22
Huntley’s eldest daughters - Mary and Susan - were attending the Korea Christian Academy in
Taejŏn, and they were all going to see her in the school’s annual Easter performance of the
Sound of Music. They would arrive back in Kwangju around 3:30 PM the next day, soon after
the start of the Uprising began.
By the time that Kwangju woke up on May 18th, 1980, there had been a major clash
between students and military forces at Chŏnnam University, as soldiers charged the protesters
with fixed bayonets on their M-16, and had beaten, stabbed, and clubbed the students, leaving
10 students injured. However, the students regrouped and reorganized, and marched to the
Martha Huntley, Interview. P. 5-7. According to Martha Huntley, the Marks commented that they understood
22
why the Huntleys never took the train to which Martha explained that this sort of behavior never occured before.
14
Catholic Center down Kŭmnam Avenue (Kŭmnamno), one of the central arteries of the city
replete with shops, malls, stories, hotels and civilians. News of the morning conflict did not
seem to reach the civilians observing the demonstration. Much like the days before, a large
crowd had gathered to watch the procession which included Peace Corp V olunteer (PCV) Tim
Warnberg, including several other PCVs from nearby villages. Warnberg had been living in
Southern Korea since 1978, as part of the K-45 Class of PCVs, and by this time moved in
23
with a local family with whom he developed a close relationship with. As the crowd gathered,
they saw police and protestors clash back and forth - one police taunting the crowd by running
out of the police line and shaking his fist, protestors in response threw stones, and in response
the police and troops continued to fire tear gas canisters, until the cycle repeated . Even then,
24
“the initial violence did not seem serious compared to the many other demonstrations we had
previously witnessed in Seoul” according to Warnberg.
By 3:00 though, the paratroopers had arrived, cutting the passage down Kŭmnam
Avenue in two, and charged the crowd indiscriminiately beating and attacking everyone
present, failing to discriminate protestor from bystander. Warnberg and a fellow PCV named
Eric Tanquist ran for safety into one of the many stores that lined the Avenue along with
several other protestors. Chased closely behind them were the paratroopers, who proceeded to
corner the group and began to viciously beat the Korean students with baton. As Warnberg
wrote in his own testimonial, the group was beaten one-by-one until the soldier arrived at
This group of PCVs includes Tim Warnberg, David Dolinger, Judi Chamberlin, Carolyn Turbybill, and Steven
23
Clark Hunziker, amongst others, who all participated in varying levels both during and after the Uprising; this
class in particular would be well represented over the course of 1980.
Warnberg, 38-39.
24
15
Warnberg and Tanquist, and “stopped, startled, hesitated a moment and then ran out ”.
25
However, it seems that Warnberg made a split decision while confined in the store that differs
greatly from his own account of events. As fellow PCV Paul Courtright explained:
“[the] Soldiers came in and started beating the shit out of the protesters as well,
and it was Tim who got in between the soldiers and the young people, and so put
himself in harm's way and helped some of those young people from probably
getting killed .
26
Whatever the details, it seems that Warnberg’s presence dissuaded the soldiers from
attacking, and that following this initial event Warnberg, along with several other
foreigners, would be identified several more times throwing himself between protestors
and soldiers in order to prevent them from being attacked.
In the immediate fallout from this initial scrum, Black Beret forces continued to
attack indiscriminately, and no other case exemplifies this particular aspect than
Reverend Arnold Peterson’s account of the first day. Peterson had been working as a
Baptist minister within Kwangju, and by 1980 was on year three of a three-year religious
project he referred to as a “crusade”. Working in conjunction with the Korea Baptist
Convention and the Florida Baptist Convention, they had planned a series of large public
events to attract public interest in the local Baptist denominations, which would
culminate in a “city-wide” crusade in Kwangju from May 18th-21st. While the Florida
delegates joined their Korean counterparts on the first day and were able to attend
services without incident, it became increasingly clear to Peterson that the situation was
Warnberg, 39
25
Paul Courtright, interviewed by Steve Literati IV , April 4th 2019, Audio, 1:11:32. However, other PCVs do not
26
testify as to whether Tanquest was present during the Uprising.
16
becoming dire - several Floridian pastors stated that they smelled tear gas near the hotel
when they returned for lunch . When Peterson arrived at the hotel where the Floridians
27
had been staying, several pastors including Arnold Peterson’s wife, Barbara, reported that
a police jeep had discharged a pepper gas canister into a crowd and were only 15 feet
away from the attack. They were “still trying to wash the pepper gas from their faces”
28
when Peterson arrived. Peterson noted that the police, who had fired the gas canister and
were “trained in crowd control and handling student demonstrations” had been replaced
29
by the Black Beret special forces by this time. The introduction of the Black Berets
would increase the level of violence and brutality, which would seem to only inflame
popular sentiment against the regime.
By this time the Black Berets descended on the crowd gathered on Kŭmnam Avenue,
the Huntleys and Marks had arrived at the Kwangju Bus Station - after the experience on the
train, the Marks were quite happy to take the Huntley’s preferred method of bus. Hailing a taxi
to head back to their residence in the Yangnim-dong neighborhood of Kwangju did the slow
realization of what was happening set in. The taxi driver took a “circuitous route” back to their
residence and explained in much the same vague reasoning as the ticket staff at the train station
- “because of the soldiers”. Upon finally arriving home, their phone continued to ring and
seemed only to stop when phone lines were cut in the city; stories came in of people that the
Huntleys knew
Peterson, p. 187
27
Ibid., p. 188
28
Ibid., p. 189
29
17
[...] being attacked that morning as they were walking to church, pulled off buses
and beaten, all kinds of wild, crazy, violent stuff. We heard that people were
pouring onto the downtown streets, literally pulling up the sidewalks to have
concrete to throw at the soldiers.
While the Huntleys may not have not witnessed the descent into violence at 3:00, they
began to hear of the total scale of violence occurring:
We heard of taxi drivers who had opened their cabs to people being chased by
groups of soldiers, and that several had been shot; and we heard that some police
who opened their stations up to take in people being chased had been shot…
Yet even in the early stages of the tragedy do we see the emergence of civic identities
being engaged in the form of the Absolute Community being expressed to the Huntleys.
In among one of the most famous aspects of the Uprising, “The cab drivers ended up
offering their taxis to the people, not just students but Kwangju people of all ages, to use
to find out what was going on, and to resist” .
30
While Peterson’s account comes second hand as he was attending different
churches in Kwangju, he was able to record several accounts of violence that parallels
both Martha Huntley’s and Tim Warnberg’s account. Sharing a taxi with another
passenger, the taxi driver reported that “an undisclosed” number of students had been
killed that afternoon, and simply stated “they are killing our students” As the day
31
continued, several delegates from the Florida Convention witnessed confrontations
between students and protestors, and the increasing mass scale of the beatings seemed to
have startled everyone, with some hearing the treads of tanks rolling into the city.
ibid., p 6
30
Peterson, p. 193
31
18
Peterson as well as the the Korean and Florida Conventions would host their planned
mass prayer as part of their crusade at 7:30, but agreed to keep it short as the curfew
would begin at 9:00 that night .
32
No one - student protester , casual onlooker, foreigner - could fully grasp what
had occured on May 18th, and how much violence had been delivered at the hands of
the government soldiers. In reading and recording the accounts of these foreigners, it
becomes clear that the foreigners were ill prepared to expect the level of violence and
state oppression that was unfolding around them. Initial responses to the violence were
often reflecting a sense of bewilderment and, in the case of Warnberg, an ad hoc and
impulsive response to intervene. However, in these initial responses we see the early and
dramatic transformation of these individuals away from observers and towards
intervention and action. In the case of the Petersons and Huntleys, we see that they are
intimately aware of events occurring through their contact with the larger Kwangju
community - rather than being isolated as a result of their foreign-ness, they were deeply
integrated into the social networks of their neighborhoods. In the case of Warnberg, he
was present at the initial protest and his ad hoc decision to intervene would be one of
many that would occur during the course of the next couple of days.
The growing awareness across the population of Kwangju of the intense
escalation of mass violence by the military only inflamed passions and galvanized a
much wider response against the military. The student protests that “came when the
weather became good” evolved into cause celebre for the citizens Kwangju as a result of
Ibid., p. 194.
32
19
the indiscriminate and widespread violence - Kwangju students had been beaten up,
Kwangju businessmen had been pulled off busses and stabbed, Kwangju churchgoers
had been pulled out of service and attack. Had the Chun regime simply allowed local
police forces who were trained in crowd control to handle the initial protests, the
Uprising probably would have ended by May 18th at 3:30PM. As the Uprising would
progress, regime soldiers would only escalate the scale of their violence in response to
the growing malcontent towards soldiers and their draconian tactics. It did not help that
many units sent to Kwangju were based in Kyŏngsang province, a region friendly to the
regime and historically antagonistic to Chŏlla/Honam region replete with distinctive
33
accents that further othered the Kwangju citizenry; additionally, given Martha Huntley’s
account of these soldiers on the 17th, were possibly inebriated and released of their
inhibitions to conduct.
The response from those within the first hours and days of the Uprising was
more often an expression of spontaneous shock rather than any sense of premeditated
intervention. In Tim Warnberg’s case, there is a clear but spontaneous shift in behavior
away from passive observer and towards active participant, throwing himself between
protestors and soldiers. While Warnberg’s pattern of behavior was the most dramatic and
instantaneous, he would be joined the following day by other foreigners who responded
in other humanitarian means. What is most striking of these accounts thus far is that they
parallel many accounts of non-foreign eyewitnesses during the first couple of days of the
Henry Scott-Stokes, “Old Grudges Spur a New Revolt in South Korea”, from New York Times, May 25th 1980
33
Collection 358, Box 66, Folder 5, Archival Collection on Democracy and Unification in Korea, UCLA Special
Collections, Los Angeles, United States
20
conflict; there was an immediate shock at the intense escalation of violence by Black
Beret Soldiers, and a spontaneous ad hoc response to the soldiers by aiding in the
protests by whatever means necessary. Whether foreigner or local, this perceived
onslaught on Kwangju became a catalysing force to resist what was happening to their
city, and a means by which people became involved. All in all, the decision to act was
ever pre-ordained but rather an immediate response to crisis and violence.
Response - May 19th to 22nd 1980
By Monday May 19th, while the scale of violence had not abated, the full scope of that
first day began to set in, and the consequences that would follow. In the early morning, Charles
Betts Huntley, along with Martha Huntley, gathered with several other missionary families
(The Petersons, the Huntleys, the Underwoods, and the Dudleys) at the Kwangju Christian
Hospital to donate blood. Jean W. Underwood remembered that the hospital was inaugurated
34
in the early hours as people gathered to donate blood, and Martha Huntley recounts that she
was unable to donate blood because her hands were shaking so much. Only Katherine Dudley,
one of several missionary members who dot this story, was able to donate blood . Another
35
woman, Marian Pope, who had arrived from Canada and lived near Sajik Park in Kwangju,
would be active throughout the Uprising as a nurse and would be on the front lines of treating
injured citizens at the Kwangju Christian Hospital . As has been well documented during the
36
Jean W. Underwood. “An American Missionary’s View” in Contentious Kwangju, ed. Gi-wook Shin and
34
Kyung Moon Hwang. (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003.) p. 33.
Ibid., 34
35
Ibid., 42
36
21
first day of the Uprising, there was a sense of incredulousness that emerged among the citizens
of the city; a sense that, in the words of one woman whose son was nearly captured and beaten
to death by soldiers, “What’s happening? Why are they doing this?” . Some citizens even
37
wondered if Communists had somehow infiltrated the ROKA military , a deep irony in that
38
the Chun Doo-Hwan regime would justify its actions in Kwangju by claiming that the city had
been infiltrated by North Korean Communists.
Reactions to the military, and the subiquent response by civilians, would only increase
in the morning as well. At around 11:30, Warnberg was on his way to work and encountered a
large crowd in front of the Catholic Center on Kŭmnam Avenue where many had gathered to
watch the “relatively small” number of people shouting anti-government slogans opposite of
military personnel. Much like the previous day, a large number of citizens were present on
Kŭmnam Avenue for business, and much like the previous day as well, the military charged the
crowd indiscriminately attacking protestors and onlookers. During this attack, a middle-aged
housewife screamed at Warnberg “for help as soldiers tried to wrest her teenage son away”.
According to Warnberg, he “managed to convince the soldier to let the boy go, but not until he
rapped the boy on the head and truck me across the face with his club” . However, it seems
39
more likely that based on other eyewitness accounts and the intensity of the situation,
Warnberg did not engage in a civil diplomatic exchange with the soldier, but may have
physically tried to use his body as shield to protect the teenager from attack.
Warnberg, p. 40
37
Paul Courtright, Eyewitness Account of Demonstrations in Seoul and Kwangju”. June 1980. Unpublished
38
Journals.
Warnberg, p. 40
39
22
By Tuesday, May 20th, news of the conflict in Kwangju had spread both in the
countryside and globally despite attempts by the Chun Doo-Hwan regime’s media blackout.
Paul Courtright was working as a PCV in the Chŏnnam village of Naju on Hansen’s Disease at
the time, and was not present to witness the explosion of violence at Kŭmnam Avenue. He was
taking several of his patients suffering from Hansen’s Disease from the countryside to seek
treatment in Sunch'ŏn, and had to transfer in Kwangju on the 20th; by the time they boarded
the bus to Sunch'ŏn, Courtright saw a young man being shot at point blank and killed right on
the street by the military . Tanquist, who according to Courtright lived in Sunch'ŏn, was able
40
to escape from Kwangju and informed Courtright the “real details ” on May 18th. Leaving his
41
patients with Tanquiest, Courtright tried to return back to his village but found his place
blocked “with boulders” and found himself staying with Warnberg in Kwangju the night of
May 20th. As someone who knew the local geography quite well, Courtright was able to move
in and out of Kwangju relatively well but would rely on Warnberg during the Uprising. This
proved particularly consequential for the people of Naju as he was given a list of names and
numbers of college students from villagers who were studying at Chŏnnam University where
violence broke out in order to check on their safety. In trying to find the students, Courtright
was greatly helped by the Korean homestay family that Warnberg lived with. The mother of the
family was able to reach out and track these individuals, who luckily had escaped the violence
from Chun forces.
Paul Courtright, interviewed by Steve Literati IV , April 4th 2019, Audio, 1:11:32.
40
ibid.
41
23
Despite the effort by the government to crack down on dissidents in the city, and try to
control the movement of both people and information in and out of the city, it was becoming
clear that restricting movement was next to impossible. Another PCV named David Dolinger
tried to enter the city. According to Dolinger’s testimonial, after being dropped off by the bus
near the entrance of the city, Dolinger proceeded to walk into Kwangju down a relatively
empty highway. A military truck driving away from the city passed him, which he proceeded to
photograph ; the truck stopped soon after and two soldiers got out to harass Dolinger and
42
demand his camera. After a heated exchange that escalated to physical threats both in Korean
and English, Dolinger held his ground and promised he would not publish the photos, and the
soldiers left. There was a sense in Dolinger’s testimonial that the reason why the soldiers
finally left him alone was that he was a non-Korean; either a sense that harming an American
could spell further complications for their actions, that this particular American seemed
stubborn enough to not balk down from their threats, or simply a perception that this was a
Korean problem for Koreans to deal with, and a non-Korean would mostly stand on the
sidelines is unclear. Whatever the case, the privilege that separated the foreign community
from the violence faced by their fellow citizens was thin and transgressed.
By Wednesday 21st, the military realized that the violent suppression of the populace
was turning futile, and withdrew military forces from the ground. However, while the
paratroopers were pulled out, the military began to deploy helicopters to attack and slaughter
civilians. While the deployment and very existence of gunships has proven controversial
particularly among the revisionist Right in South Korea, the foreigner community provided
David Dolinger, Interviewed by Steve Literati IV May 3 2019, Audio, 59:32. See Image 2.
42
24
undoubtable proof that these gunships were in the sky and raining death from above. Charles
Betts Huntley, who was working at the Kwangju Christian Hospital recalled:
One of my own greatest shocks was to see the x-rays of the wounded. The bullets being
used by these Martial Law troopers were breaking apart on contact with a person’s
body! Instead of remaining in one piece, the bullet would break into inoperable
fragments in our patients’ arms, legs, and spinal cords. A normal military round stays in
one piece and passes through a human body, wounding the “enemy” soldier, but not
killing him, or her. One of these will pass through trees to reach the enemy soldier. But
these frangible little bullets, if they were traveling at close to muzzle velocity,
fragmented. There were also bodies! We still have pictures of some of those bodies.
And we remember those dead nameless people on occasion. The pictures remind us of
humankind’s unlimited ability to be inhuman to humankind .
43
Charles Betts Huntley would take several copies of the x-rays to ensure that the total
documentation would be preserved in case the military entered the hospital and provided them
to foreign journalists.
However, documentation was not the only means by which the foreigner community
began to act and intervene in the conflict. One of the primary acts of the missionaries was to
use their homes as sanctuaries from the soldiers. Much like Dolinger and Warnberg, the
missionary families were placing themselves at great risk. As an anecdotal example of this, the
military had sent an individual who was in his first year in military school to spy on the
Huntleys. Martha Huntley describes him as “like a son to us”. This individual was rather
unwilling to participate in spying on people he had developed such familial feelings for, as
Martha Huntley explains: “He was very apologetic - I told him not to worry I'd be glad to tell
them what we were doing!..I never knew exactly what he told them but I doubt he reported
Charles Betts Huntley, “When it wasn’t fun (The Kwangju Incident of May, 1980),” 5.18 International Society,
43
last modified Dec. 2005. https://tinyurl.com/y4s4qcfo
25
anybody who was staying with us” . Martha Huntley recalls another incident in which one of
44
her daughters, Jenny, begged soldiers who were barging into their home looking for dissidents
to “please [not] hurt our cat” . The Huntleys, Arnold Peterson, The Underwoods, and the
45
Dudleys all were able to provide shelter during the Uprising. While a precise count seems
difficult, we know that the Huntleys, who sheltered the most, protected 22 individuals while
Arnold Peterson sheltered 12 at his home . Based on these figures, the Underwoods and
46
Dudleys likewise hid similar numbers of people, and that these four families and the larger
church community sheltered at least 50 individuals total and possibly upwards of 100 .
47
Additionally, these faith-based groups were neither singularly local nor foreign, but
represented deeply-imbedded institutions that utilized both foreign and local aid during the
Uprising. Martha Huntley, for instance, notes the incredible help that the Korean Presbyterian
Mission provided during the Uprising. The Korean Presbyterian Mission represented both the
Northern and Southern branches of the American Presbyterian Church, and was integrated into
the main Korean Presbyterian Church. The Mission was extremely helpful in monitoring the
Martha Huntley, unpublished interview.
44
Martha and Jenny Huntley, “Memories of the Gwangju Uprising with Martha Huntley and her 2 daughters,”
45
interview by Kurt Achin, Koreascape, TBS, May 14th, 2018, audio, 23:33. https://tinyurl.com/yyrwuv3l. This cat
would prove to be a source of frustration for Martha Huntley. During one of the nights in which there was intense
gunfire around their home and the family along with those sheltered were trying to hide in the basement, Martha
Huntley was trying to find this cat and put on its flea collar. Martha distinctly remembers the sense of anger at this
cat and her inability to put this flea collar as the violence was breaking out near their home. Yet, as Martha
Huntley explained, this was not just an anger at the cat, but an immense anger at the situation she found herself in
- trapped as troops meant to protect the civilian population were killing citizens all around them, and she wasn’t
even able to put this flea collar on this cat as they fired outside. This moment, while banal on its surface, indicates
the immense psychological strains that the foreigners found themselves in rather unusual ways.
Peterson, Arnold, Kwangju Sa’tae., trans. Chŏng, Dong-sŏp. (P’ulbit, Seoul), 1995.
46
Peterson, p. 222. Each family refused to keep names of individuals sheltered in their homes but did keep a head
47
count of who was there due to fear of possibly being forced to reveal names. In addition, in conjunction with other
missionaries and local church groups, church grounds were used to house individuals. Arnold Peterson wrote that
at least 3 individuals took shelter in the Presbyterian Church, and 20 more around the grounds . This again points
to the fact that missionaries worked in conjunction with larger local church institutions to better leverage aid.
26
situation in Kwangju behind the scenes in Seoul, Taejŏn, and Sunch’ŏn and were able to
provide large shipments of food - particularly bread - as the Mission knew that “Americans like
bread” . Likewise, Arnold Peterson coordinated quite extensively with Ch’ang Se-gyun, a
48
local Baptist pastor in order to shelter individuals from the military. Such relationships with
larger church institutions suggest a deep integration between the American missionary
community and the citizens of Kwangju during this time. Without the help of the larger church
networks in Korea, the Huntleys and the rest of the missionary community may not have been
able to aid as many individuals as they did.
While the Peace Corp volunteers would not shelter individuals to the same extent as the
missionary families, Tim Warnberg’s homestay family became a locus of activity and
coordination for the different PCVs. In many ways, Warnberg was seen in many ways to
become a de facto leader of the group; both Dolinger and Courtright recalled that Tim seemed
the most immersed into the community in Kwangju, and was someone who could be relied on
amongst the PCVs to help be a friendly face. Tim Warnberg’s network of PCVs - Dolinger,
Courtright, and another PCV named Judi Chamberlin - was able to work with foreign
journalists in translating eyewitness accounts from citizens in Kwangju, to find and locate
student protests from outside the city to ensure their safety to their families living in the
countryside, and in coordination with the Peace Corp Director to relay information of the
events to then-U.S. Ambassador William Glysteen. Warnberg additionally was unique in being
one of the few foreigners who could not only speak Korean at near fluency, but could also
Martha Huntley, Interview, p. 7. The decision for local denominations to intervene in the Uprising seemed
48
overwhelmingly to be on the side of providing humanitarian aid for citizens save for the Mormon Church, who
Martha Huntley claimed that the large majority of the denomination marched out of the city and left the people in
Kwangju embittered towards the Mormons.
27
speak Korean Sign Language, as several testimonials indicate that Warnberg could
communicate with several deaf individuals.
The news of Kwangju was spreading globally as well, as reporters from across South
Korea and the world arrived to cover the event. While Jürgen Hintzpeter arrived on the 18th
and is among the most famous of these journalists to report what was happening to the outside
world. Here too the foreign community became vital to the efforts of the Uprising, forming a
necessary niche translating between Korean eyewitnesses and the non-Korean speaking foreign
press. Oftentimes, the Peace Corp V olunteers and the Missionaries worked side by side with
each other, rarely recognizing who the others were. PCV Judi Chamberlin in particular seemed
to have been quite helpful in coordinating both with the missionaries, the PCVs, and the
journalists. It was through Judi Chamberlin that Arnold Peterson and the other missionaries
were able to meet AP Reporter Terry Anderson and help translate between Anderson and the
Kwangju citizenry . Warnberg also met with Anderson to help translate for Kwangju citizens
49
at the Provincial Capital building. Paul Courtright was paired with Robin Moyer, a
photographer and reporter from Time magazine and both Warnberg and Courtright worked
with a contingent of German and Danish reporters , while Dolinger was working with another
50
contingent of German reporters at the Kwangju Christian Hospital where Charles Betts
Huntley worked .
51
Peterson, p. 230. According to Peterson, Anderson snuck into the city by first taking a taxi near the city and
49
then biking through the military lines into Kwangju.
Courtright, interview. This may be a result of Hintzpeter, but testimonials point to a great number of German
50
reporters willing to risk their lives and enter Kwangju in order to report what was going on.
Dolinger, interview.
51
28
Many people seemed quite eager to speak to the foreign journalists, as there was a
feeling that the journalists would not be censored by the Chun regime and could communicate
to the outside world the atrocities being committed by the Chun regime. Courtright tells of an
especially heartbreaking episode of an older woman who approached him near the Post Office
in Kwangju, telling him “in no uncertain terms, that...her voice is meaningless - only me as a
foreigner can make sure the rest of world knows what the military’s done to them” . Many
52
Korean journalists, on the other hand, were “pointedly excluded,” and avoided by civilians as
many were angry at “the inaccurate reports appearing in the domestic press”. Warnberg,
however, points out that the Korean journalists were deeply upset about what was happening,
and tried to communicate to the rest of South Korea what was taking place. Warnberg talked
with an “ reporter from the Dong-a Ilbo, who “was very upset” and stated that his reports were
being censored by the Chun regime in Seoul . Yet here too, it seems that many foreigners were
53
able to offer logistical help as well that went beyond being a translator; Charles Betts Huntley
was an amateur photographer and set up a film development studio in his home, which was
where Hintzpeter developed his photos while in Kwangju .
54
These journalists would likewise prove helpful in another aspect. On May 21st, the
Petersons were having an early dinner at 5:00 PM with several foreign journalists. When
asking how they were able to enter the city, the journalists explained that “they had put signs
on the their cars saying “Foreign Press” and had been able to bribe their way past
Courtright, interview. .
52
Warnberg, p. 43. This may be Kim Ch’ung-gŏn, who described the barbarity of the military as “human
53
hunting,” which was subsequently censored (see: Jung-woon Choi, “The Formation of an “Absolute
Community”” in Contentious Kwangju, p. 4).
Martha Huntley, Interview., p. 7
54
29
roadblocks” . Arnold and Barbara decided that they should try to do the same thing in order to
55
get the Florida team members to leave, and would recruit John Underwood as a second driver.
In discussing this idea with the Huntleys, there was increasing concern about the safety of the
children, as there continued to be gunfire throughout the night . In what may have been one of
56
the most excruciating moments for both the Huntleys and Petersons, there was a discussion on
who should stay and who should leave. The Petersons, much like the Huntleys, had children
who were attending the Korea Christian Academy in Taejon and it was decided that Barbara
should join the mission out of the city to be with their children. Martha and Charles Betts
allowed their children to make the decision whether to join this escape mission out of the city.
Michael, age 10, had a history of being sensitive to loud sounds and the continued gunfire
exacerbated the issue. Jenny, age 9, decided to stay. Martha and Charles Betts decided they
should stay.
By 7:30 AM May 22nd, the escape mission was preparing to leave the city with Arnold
Peterson driving one car, and John Underwood another. The fighting from the previous night
had continued into the next morning. Martha Huntley recounted that she did not know when or
even if she would see her children again . Heading towards the Petersons’ residence, she
57
reported being shot at: “we were just dodging bullets...just there on the street, coming in this
direction” . Both cars were equipped with large American flags and signs reading “foreigner’s
58
Peterson, p. 219.
55
Ibid., p. 220
56
Martha and Jenny Huntley, interview by Kurt Achin.
57
Underwood, p. 33.
58
30
car”, and as the small convoy was heading down “the first large street”, they were greeted by
applause from those who passed by. Their aim, according to Peterson, was to get to
Sŏngjongni, where the train station was in the hands of the citizens. There were no trains
running, and so tried to head towards Shinhŭng, where they were able to get tickets and have
the group leave by 10:13AM. Attempting to return back to the city, Underwood and Arnold
were stopped by a “platoon of soldiers” who were guarding the road; after some negotiating,
the soldiers allowed the two men to return but “cautioned that the city would soon be under
attack” . Once entering into the city, they were escorted by three civilians on motorcycles to a
59
rotary in Paekŭndong, and arrived at home by 11:15.
With the military pulling out of the city the day on Wednesday the 21st, Thursday the
22nd saw Kwangju under the control of the citizen population. A citizens council, formed from
a wide swath of religious, business, and student leaders, attempted to negotiate directly with
the military, and were rebuffed. In response approximately 10,000-40,000 to upwards of
60
100,000 citizens gathered outside the Provincial Capital in a demonstration of mass
61
democracy to debate the ongoing situation. The meeting led to many guns from “radical
youths” as Peterson referred to them, to turn in their guns that had been raided in and around
Kwangju. By Saturday, almost all the guns would be turned in, although there seems to have
been a handful of armed citizens who would continue to serve as a militia against the military.
Peterson, p. 222
59
Courtright Journal, Page 4
60
Peterson, p. 223
61
31
As other towns and regions began to rise up and demonstrate against the Chun regime,
it seems at times that the collective decision to resist by non-violent means occured sui generis.
Courtright relayed a particularly moving event for himself that he witnessed first hand outside
Kwangju. A large crowd had gathered to raid a cache of weapons left behind by the military in
the countryside. After opening up the facility, the crowd seemed unsure as to what to do with
these weapons. An older gentleman, who Courtright remembers as saying that he fought
against the Japanese as an anti-colonial resistance fighter, stated that utilizing these guns would
make them no better than the soldiers killing them indiscriminately. The crowd came to a
unanimous decision based on the testimony of the former anti-colonial resistance fighter n that
the best thing to do was to destroy these guns, and so every proceeded to form a line of people
taking guns from the arsenal and bringing them down the line to a group of people who
proceeded to smash the weapons on the ground .
62
There were, however, deeply concerning incidents as well. Sometime later during the
Thursday mass meeting at the Provincial Capital in Seoul, there seems to have been some
incident involving “spies”. Arnold Peterson, reporting what fellow Pastor Ch'oe Jang-sŏp who
was present at the incident, stated that “a few communist spies” had been captured by the
citizens and were subsequently taken to the edge of the city and turned over to the military.
Paul Courtright, who was present at the incident on the other hand, presents a very different
situation. Two spies were brought in by the crowd, one a KCIA Agent and the other “of
questionable origin”. The crowd “would have killed these people if they were not restrained”
63
Courtright, interview.
62
Courtright Journal, p. 4.
63
32
and it seems that the spies were subsequently released. Warnberg, states that there was only one
individual present but faced a similar scene as to what Courtright described: “he would have
been torn to pieces on the pot if his student bodyguards had not zealously protected him.
People spit at him, yelled obscenities, and tried to kick and punch him” . When asked about
64
this particular incident from his journals, Courtright stated that he did not remember. Whatever
the case of this incident was, it shows that the crowd mentality that permitted the same sort of
collective humanitarianism to peacefully destroy a massive arsenal in and around the city could
also lead to anger and even violence.
That Thursday would prove to be deeply consequential for the foreigners living in the
city. Reports began to circulate that the “American Embassy” had fled the city to the US
Airforce base in Sŏngjongni. Several citizens saw leaving the city was David Miller, the head
of the United States Information Service (USIS) and was the highest level US government
official in the city who had fled on Tuesday, May 20th and had conflated the Peterson and
Underwood mission as the “American Embassy” fleeing. Miller, according to several accounts,
had been in contact with several Americans living in the city and urging them to leave, and by
all accounts it seems that few headed his warning. Linda Lewis, writing in her journal at the
time, recalls Miller urging Lewis to leave and citing the Petersons as likewise leaving and a
sense of incredulity of this idea . Whether confusing the escape mission as Peterson leaving
65
the city, or attempting to persuade other Americans from fleeing, Miller’s decision proved to be
an inflection point in how both the foreigners in the city and the Kwangju citizenry began to
Warnberg, p.43
64
Lewis, p. 26
65
33
think of the American government’s response to the crisis, or lack thereof. Several
eyewitnesses speaking off record had very negative things to say about Miller and his decision
to leave the city for the USAF base at Sŏngjongni. One individual stated that he believed that
Chun Doo-hwan minders had been sent beforehand in order to prevent Miller from interacting
directly with people in the city. Whether true or not, Miller’s flight belied a sense that the
American government was uninterested or unwilling to pay attention to what was unfolding in
the city. Miller’s flight from the city would only intensify feelings that the American
government was unable or unwilling to help the city during its time in need. Speaking with the
family that Lewis was staying with at that time, Lewis recalls that the homestay father called
Miller a “real bastard” who failed in is duties to inform the US government about what was
happening, stating “if he were, the US would do something” .
66
This however, may prove difficult to prove that Miller was willingly ignorant of the
Uprising. There is evidence, although circumstantial, that when Miller fled the city, Miller
smuggled out several incriminating photos and documents that showcased the brutality of the
regime, and provided them to the Catholic Church as part of a whistleblowing action against
the American government. There was also the very real possibility that Miller’s insistence on
Americans leaving the city was following Government protocol to ensure that the Americans
inside the city would not be targeted by the regime in a reprisal, or the possibility of being
caught in the crossfire. Potentially, their involvement in the Uprising and their Korean
associates might also become targets of reprisal as well. Indeed, in the months after the
Uprising, many Americans who had participated at varying levels reported being followed by
Lewis, p. 18.
66
34
minders from the regime, and would even see members of the KCIA arrive in the US to warn
the extended families about revealing what happened in Kwangju. Based on Martha Huntley’s
testimonial, and the accounts of several individuals after the Uprising, there is some evidence
that Miller was acting as a true public servant in an attempt to save lives. Whatever the case
may be, Miller seemed adamant in getting the Americans out of the city, and almost all the
Americans equally as adamant about staying . This disagreement would escalate later that day
67
on Thursday May 22 at around 5:00PM; First Sergeant David “Dave” Hill, a friend that Arnold
Peterson knew, was able to call the Peterson home and informed Peterson that the US Air Force
was considering a “forced entry” of Kwangju in order to rescue several Americans located in
the city. Peterson explained that there was not need for such action; however, it seems that the
idea of this rescue came from “false fears created by reports made to the Air Force by David
Miller” .
68
Whatever the reason, the possibility of a forced entry into Kwangju by the American
Air Force might have proved to be a disaster. A little less than one month earlier, American
special forces tried to make a similar forced entry into Tehran as part of a rescue mission to end
the Iranian Hostage Crisis, which ended with eight US servicemen dead and no end to the
Crisis in sight. A similar attempt to do so to save many Americans who seemed determined to
stay in the city could have inflamed the situation further, possibly leading to an even greater
escalation of violence, with the result of more people being killed. Another botched rescue
Martha Huntley, in her interview, stated that there had been a contingent of Mormons in the city who left by
67
Tuesday of that week.
Peterson, p. 225. While telephone lines in and out of Kwangju had been cut by this time, the phonelines from
68
Sŏngjongni was outside the military lines imposed by the military, but part of the Kwangju phone system.
35
attempt could have likewise damaged the credibility of the Carter Administration, which would
ultimately lose public confidence as a result of the Iran Hostage Crisis.
This insistence by Miller, however, contrasts the seeming inaction by the Carter
Administration to adequately intervene in the crisis. On that same Thursday, May 22nd, White
House officials met with staff members from the State Department, CIA, and NSC to discuss
the ongoing situation in Kwangju. The meeting, which took place from 4:00-5:15 PM EST,
discussed the possibility of directing a carrier located in the Coral Sea to the coast of South
Korea in the event that North Korea took advantage of South Korean soldiers are-deployed to
Kwangju. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski summed up the approach thusly: “in
the short term support [for Chun Doo-hwan], in the longer term pressure for political
evolution” . What is particularly striking in this memo, however, is what is missing; there was
69
no mention of David Miller, nor any mention of any reports from events on the ground. It
appears that without any intelligence from Kwangju itself, policy makers were flying blind in
handling the Kwangju Uprising.
“We were of Kwangju” - May 23th to May 27th 1980
Friday, May 23rd began unusually for many across the city. It was the first time that the
city did not wake up to the sound of gunfire. Yet as the final days of the Uprising would
commence, the foreigners inside the city would come face-to-face with the scale of violence
that would fall on the city and surrounding areas during the next couple of days. There
While both Chamberlin and Warnberg are attributed to being at the Monday meeting, Dolinger, and Courtright
69
were not at the meeting and seemed unaware of the possibility of the ROKAF bombing the city. Additionally, on
See National Security Council, Summary of Conclusions, May 30th 1980, p. 2. http://timshorrock.com/wp-
content/uploads/CHEROKEE-FILES-White-House-NSC-meeting-on-Kwangju-May-22-1980.pdf
36
continued to be a stream of journalists entering into the city and meeting with the foreigners
and acting as intermediaries between local protests and journalists. However, the role of acting
as an intermediary was not limited to foreign journalists and locals. In the case of the Huntleys,
it seems like they might have even operated as intermediaries between then-acting President
Choi Kyu-ha and the local community.
On Friday, May 23rd a nurse with the Kwangju Christian hospital who were very close
to the Huntleys appeared at their residence with a woman she introduced as “Ms. Kim,” a
former nursing student of hers who lived in Seoul. Both women were extremely frightened
after the entire family next door had been murdered the night before , and were seeking
70
shelter from the violence. Within the hour of her arrival, the phone at their home rang - which
seemed quite strange, as the phone lines had been cut since the 18th. Went into the basement of
their home to answer the phone in secret and to his surprise, the caller from the other side
claimed to be from the Blue House, and was asking if “Ms. Kim” was alright and had found
shelter. Both Charles Betts and Martha learned later, “Ms. Kim” was actually “Ms. Ch’oe” and
was distantly related to the acting-President Ch'oe Kyu-ha. President Ch’oe was not being
informed by the military cadre under Chun Doo-hwan of the full scale and scope of the
violence and sent “Ms. Ch’oe” to investigate the situation. Once confirming the details,
Charles Betts took “Ms. Ch’oe” to meet the patients attacked by the regime, and to meet with
as many staff members of the hospital as possible. She stayed quite some time with the
Huntleys - Martha states it was several days - and then left for Seoul by helicopter. Before
This incident appears to have been unrelated to the mass killings of civilians by the government according to
70
Martha Huntley; “a disgruntled stepson got a gun, as many people in Kwangju had, and had used it to settle his
scores”.
37
leaving, however, “Ms. Ch’oe” As a sign of thanks, “delivered to us from the helicopter a big
bag of several US [brand foods], coffee, etc.” It seems that her investigation caught the eye of
the Chun regime, and so both herself and her husband hurriedly left for the United States .
71
By Sunday, May 25th there was an increased sense that the situation was deeply
deteriorating. In the morning, several PCVs (Tim Warnberg, Judi Chamberlin, Dave Dolinger,
and Paul Courtright) had gathered before to discuss the necessity of smuggling information out
of Kwangju and to then-US Ambassador William Glysteen in Seoul. A strong sense prevailed
among the PCVs that if US President Jimmy Carter and the Peace Corps were aware of what
was happening in Kwangju, he would be able to stop the violence occuring and force Chun to
withdraw the military. While there are disagreeing accounts of how a decision was made, PCV
Paul Courtright would be the PCV to try to leave Kwangju and try to smuggle out information
to the Ambassador. Courtright, according to his interview, tried getting out a few days before
but was blocked by tanks from the ROKA. Paul tried again early the following morning, on
Monday 26th, and was able to climb over a mountain towards the south of Kwangju and was
able to avoid military personnel along the way .
72
Arriving in his village, Courtright contacted the Health Department he was working for,
who in turn contacted the Peace Corps office in Seoul. From his village, Courtright made his
way to another city , and took a bus all the way up to Seoul. Arriving in Seoul on Tuesday,
73
May 27th at around 8 or 9PM, Courtright met with the Peace Corps director who scheduled an
Martha Huntley, interview. p. 8.
71
Paul Courtright, interview.
72
Courtright, Interview. There is some ambiguity as to whether this was the provincial capital of Muan or Mokpo.
73
38
appointment with US Ambassador to South Korea William Glysteen. Both individuals waited
several hours to meet with embassy staff, who seemed rather disorganized. Courtright recalls
that the embassy staff seemed rather overwhelmed concerning, and may have been
disorganized due to the military re-entering the city on Tuesday, May 27th. However, both
Courtright and the Peace Corps director waited several hours, expecting to meet with someone
from the embassy. No meeting occurred, and left dejected. As Courtright recalls, “there was no
interest or understanding what the people [of Kwangju] had actually gone through”. Despite
the inaction by the US Government and the Carter Administration, it was the Peace Corps
office that “believed in us” and prevented the Chun Doo-hwan regime from “not getting us
kicked out of the country, because we loved it, and Kwangju and that area was our home” .
74
The Peace Corps Mission in South Korea would come to a close in 1981.
While Courtright was away, there was a gathering of several missionaries who
remained in the city on the morning of Monday the 26th that included the Huntleys, Arnold
Peterson, and the Underwoods as well as PCVs Judi Chamberlin and Tim Warnberg. Both
Peterson and the Huntleys received word through their contacts at Sŏngjongni that the ROKAF
“had made plans to bomb the city as one part of their attack” to recapture the city and urged
75
everyone to leave. This information led to a great deal of discussion among the Underwoods,
Huntleys, Dudleys, and Peterson, as well as PCVs Judi Chamberlin and Tim Warnberg who
were present - but on Monday morning the group came to a unanimous decision, and it seems
76
Courtright, Interview.
74
Peterson, p. 63.
75
Warnberg, p. 46.
76
39
clear that abandoning the city was never an option. As Jean W. Underwood states in her
testimonial, “No one thought we should go. We all felt that any impact we might have made by
our presence would be lost if we left now”. Peterson’s military contact after the Uprising told
him “that the Korean military had considered bombing the city and [the USAF] feared for our
safety” .
77
It seems that had the ROKAF indeed had bombed the city, the death count of the final
day may have been far greater in number, and indeed the decision by the assembled group may
have been enough to dissuade the ROKAF from the attack. However, it should be noted that
the decision to stay in the city was an incredibly risky one on the part of those assembled, and
the type of risk that David Miller may have been able to prevent had the Americans listened
and the ROKAF proceeded regardless in bombing the city. Additionally, there seems to be little
to no evidence to prove conclusively that the decision by the assembled in Kwangju was
sufficient in preventing the ROKAF from the attack. Until there is documented evidence from
either the ROKAF or the US Air Force at Sŏngjongni, there remains only circumstantial,
though intriguing evidence. Based on their accounts however, one may draw an important
conclusion on how these individuals perceived their roles within the Uprising. Now more than
ever, they saw themselves fundamentally as much part of Kwangju as any other person born or
raised in the city, and who had participated in the protests against the regime. As Martha
Huntley explained succinctly, “we were of Kwangju, too” .
78
Underwood, p. 37.
77
Martha Huntley, interview. p. 9
78
40
David Dolinger expressed this sentiment, and by his own testimonial, proceeded to take
a firmer stance against the Chun regime. Much like Warnberg, Dolinger actively intervened in
preventing soldiers from attacking citizens and used himself as a shield against attacks.
However, by Monday, May 26th, Dolinger had been working with the citizen militias that had
formed in the wake of the Uprising against the ROKA, and was by that night monitoring the
military communications from the ROKA units stationed outside the city. As Dolinger
explained, ROKA units were communicating in English in order to prevent the citizen militias
from listening in, and Dolinger translated the communications from English to Korean .
79
Dolinger’s decision to actively work with the militias is unique among other accounts of
foreigners. Although it is estimated that 85%-95% of arms seized by the militias by this point,
Dolinger’s testimonial indicates that there were still armed groups present, although it does not
seem like Dolinger actively took up arms. Many foreigners seemed largely opposed to armed
conflict against the regime. The Huntleys, as had been mentioned previously, were unwilling to
shelter any armed individuals and persuaded those who utilized their home to avoid any
military conflict. Dolinger’s decision to join the militia would have dire consequences later on.
Based on Warnberg’s account, it seems that Dolinger was present with Warnberg and
Chamberlin when the military re-entered at around 3:00 AM on May 27th started early, at
around 3:00 in the morning. One hour previous to the attack, the US State Department declined
to mediate in the crisis, stating “we recognize that a situation of total disorder and disruption in
a major city cannot be allowed to go on indefinitely” . While the initial plan to re-enter the
80
Dolinger, interview
79
Clark, p. 14
80
41
city and suppress the Uprising seemed to have been in the works previous to the statement ,
81
the timing does not seem coincidental. Four regiments of the 20th Infantry Division, each
comprising 3,000 quickly re-entered the city. Warnberg recounts that a woman’s voice from the
Provincial Capital “pleaded for people to come...and defend themselves”. The pleas continued
for about an hour until they were finally silenced by gunfire . Peterson in his memoir
82
recounted he almost slept through the beginning of a “war” mostly out of fatigue from the
previous 10 days, and was only woken up by the sound of “very long sustained automatic
gunfire” . Many accounts - both Korean and non-Korean - seem to express a similar sentiment
83
as Peterson’s account: fatigue had finally overtaken the city.
The final recapture came swift, and by 5:45 it seems that the fighting had ended. Radio
reports at the time stated that only two persons were killed and four soldiers wounded in the
course of the early morning fighting. General John A. Wickham Jr., the commander-in-chief of
US forces in South Korea recalled from his memoirs that military commanders were given
orders “to avoid unnecessary bloodshed” but that “unfortunately, some resistance, especially
around the capital, had to be resolved with deadly force” . Warnberg, who was present on the
84
ground and witnessed the full scale of violence inflicted by the military, recalls a much dire and
darker scene. By 8:30, Warnberg, Chamberlin, and Dolinger left the residence and went into
the city, and saw “pools of blood along the streets”. Before reaching the Provincial Capital
General Wickham, Korea on the Brink : a Memoir of Political Intrigue and Military Crisis 1st Brassey’s ed.
81
Washington, D.C: Brassey’s, 2000., pg. 145
Warnberg, p. 45
82
Peterson, p. 239
83
Wickham, p. 146.
84
42
building, they had counted 15 bodies. Upon arriving at the Provincial Capital, Warnberg saw
“the half-burnt body of a student” who he had talked to a few days before in a second-story
window well . The Kwangju Uprising had ended, but in the pursuing days there continued to
85
be action, and particularly from the foreigners.
Fallout - After May 27th
While the Uprising had officially ended, it was clear that the mass political suppression
that had caused the Uprising in the first place would continue, and in some ways with greater
frequency in the immediate aftermath of May 27th. While the foreigner community had wared
their welcome thin with the nascent Chun regime, it was clear though that the foreigner
community would continue to find means of utilizing their privilege to help friends and loved
ones after May 27th, and became integral to communicating to the outside world the full scope
of events in Kwangju. However, there would be some level of retribution by the hands of the
Chun regime against the foreigners, with varying degrees of success.
While the PCV were targeted, the missionaries were able to use their clout in the
community to effectuate change where they could. Although the Uprising officially ended,
military officials continued to perpetuate a campaign of violence and repression, as individuals
would be rounded up and thrown in prison. Ch’ang Se-kyun, whom Arnold Peterson had been
coordinating with throughout the Uprising and who had joined with the student protests on
Thursday May 22nd to form a citizens council, had apparently been arrested and detained by
the military on Friday the 30th. Peterson and Ch’ang’s wife looked desperately for Ch’ang, and
by June 4th Arnold made contact with the commanding general’s office and, according to Jean
Warnberg, p. 45
85
43
W. Underwood, “threatened to go to the foreign press unless he could talk with the general and
find out what was happening” to Pastor Ch’ang. The military acquiesced, and Ch’ang was
86
released at 10:00 PM the same day. The missionary families would continue to be followed by
agency of the Chun regime, with varying degrees of success. Martha Huntley, for instance,
stated that they would continued to be followed by Chun agents in the weeks after the
Uprising, but did not seem to pay much heed to these agents . However, in the aftermath of
87
the Uprising, the Huntleys were able to raise approximately $40,000 through the Presbyterian
General Assembly to aid families that were “bereaved and injured” and an additional $5,000 to
be distributed immediately to the Kwangju Christian Hospital and to the Huntleys to cover
emergency out-of-pocket expenses the Huntleys had incurred during the Uprising .
88
While the missionaries proved successful at resisting and even petitioning the regime
for redress, the situation with regards to the PCVs was less successful. In particular, both Tim
Warnberg and David Dolinger would face some consequences for their actions, and in David’s
case he would be expelled from the Peace Corp as a result of his involvement monitoring
ROKA transmissions. There is some controversy with regards to how this information became
known to the Peace Corp offices in Korea, as Dolinger has stated that he believes PCV
Courtright had relayed this information during the Embassy visit on the 27th, while Courtright
has stated that Dolinger’s involvement in the Uprising was well known previous to his arrival.
Regardless of how the Peace Corp found out about Dolinger’s participation, he was quickly
Underwood, p. 41.
86
Martha Huntley, Interview, p. 13
87
G Thompson Brown, Korea the Kwangju Uprising June 30, 1980, Collection 358, Box 55, Folder 9, Archival
88
Collection on Democracy and Unification in Korea, UCLA Special Collections, Los Angeles, United States.
44
expelled from service. Similar to the Huntley’s testimonial, Courtright commented that there
were several minders who followed both himself and Warnberg in the following months, and
Warnberg’s family in Minnesota was visited by KCIA agents who warned them that they
should remain quiet about the events in Kwangju . However, it seems that Warnberg had
89
served the entirety of his Peace Corp service by the time the Uprising concluded, so there was
little action the Peace Corp Office could do.
Yet it seems that in the month after the Uprising, the current and former PCVs would
prove to be important conduits for spreading information of the Uprising outside of Korea. In
one of the more bizarre aspects of their work, Tim Warnberg, Paul Coutright, David Dolinger,
amongst a few others, would become invaluable sources of what happened during the Uprising
and in some cases, had no idea that they would serve as an invaluable source of information to
the outside world. Paul Coutright would take leave of the Peace Corp in the immediate
aftermath of the Uprising on a trip to Taiwan - his father had been a member of USAID and
Paul had spent time in Taiwan as a child . During that time in Taiwan, Courtright would
90
compile his own written testimonial of the events as they happened, as well as areas in which
he had witnessed mass protests. In the following month, Courtright’s journal would find its
way to a man named Jon M. Nakajima, the chairman of the Japanese Emergency Christian
Conference on Korean Problems, who unbeknownst to Courtright himself, would publish
Courtright’s journal as “What I Saw in Kwangju - from my diary”. Although Courtright’s name
was not included, his journal was included in what became part of a massive report on July
Carolyn Turbybill, Interviewed by Steve Literati IV ., Feb. 14, 2020, audio, 1:07:26.
89
Coutright, Interview
90
45
24th, 1980 by Nakajima’s Christian Emergency Conference on Korean Problems that
documented some of the wide scale abuses that took place in the city .
91
Courtright’s journal was not the only piece of evidence that would cross national
boundaries as samizdat on the Uprising. Dolinger’s initial photo of the military vehicle leaving
Kwangju that led to a confrontation between himself and two other ROKA soldiers was given
to two other PCVs - along with dozens of other photos, testimonials, and statements from a
wide swath of sources living in and participating in the Uprising - who would bring this
information to Sweden. Former PCVs Carolyn Turbybill and Steven Clark Hunziker had
trained with Dolinger and Warnberg as PCVs and had left the Peace Corp by the time the
Uprising occurred. Turbybill and Hunziker received a substantial amount of documents that
included testimonials from Warnberg and Dolinger’s photos from an unnamed source near the
end of June from a source who Turbybill does not wish to identify. Turbybill and Hunziker then
fled to Tokyo in the hopes of disclosing the documents, but Turbybill stated that they decided
against it after hearing reports of KCIA agents abducting Korean dissidents from Japan and in
particular the 1973 kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung. It is possible that Courtright’s journal might
have reached Nakajima by way of Turbybill and Hunziker during this time, but remains
difficult to properly pinpoint. Turbybill and Hunziker left Japan for Sweden, citing Sweden’s
reputation for protecting human rights and by June 20th, 1980 Turbybill and Hunziker helped
92
publish a full report in Sweden through the Dagens Nyheter. There had been interest in the
What I Saw in Kwangju - from my diary, by J.M. Nakajima, Chairman of the Japanese Catholic Council for
91
Justice and Peace, July 24, 1980, July 24, 1980, Collection 358, Box 55, Folder 9, Archival Collection on
Democracy and Unification in Korea, UCLA Special Collections, Los Angeles, United States.
Turbybill, Interview
92
46
story as reporters from the Dagens Nyheter were kicked out of South Korea according to
Turbybill , and so the newspaper interviewed the pair and placed the whole story on their front
93
page. This report, which cites Dolinger and Warnberg, as well as “priests who were in Kwangju
at the time” and documents about 1,500-2,000 dead. Turbybill and Hunziker would
94
eventually leave Sweden and with Dolinger would continue to publish reports on the Uprising
being interviewed by the Milwaukee Journal in August and then publishing three separate
accounts through Covert Action in December 1980.
While the foreign community served as vital conduits of samizdat for the Uprising and
continuing to petition the regime against unlawful arrests, the psychological damage that the
foreigner community would experience would manifest in the weeks, months, and years after
May 27th. Much like the larger community involved in Kwangju, the foreigners inside the city
began to feel the after-effects of the conflict almost immediately. Amongst the community still
alive, the Uprising continues to elicit strong emotional responses - many expressed a sense of
anger over what they had seen, and a sense of survivors guilt from witnessing the conflict.
Others would develop PTSD that would haunt them for years to come. These traumas,
however, sadly seem to be the norm amongst many who bore witness to the crisis regardless of
nationality. A 2009 study by the Chosun University Medical College of Kwangju found that
PTSD was widespread among individuals who were involved in the Uprising, and in particular
those who had been wounded during the Uprising; after almost 30 years, this group continued
Carolyn Turbybill, follow-up notes, interviewed by Steve Literati IV , May 8th, 2020, text,
93
Stockholm Korean Papers - English Translation Associated Press Release. June 20, 1980, Collection 358, Box
94
55, Folder 9, Archival Collection on Democracy and Unification in Korea, UCLA Special Collections, Los
Angeles, United States.
47
to show “the worst mental health” in terms of high levels of anxiety and depression. This group
likewise “suffered from economic difficulty” as a result of receiving “insufficient social
support” . In the case of the foreign community, these traumas would continue, and in many
95
cases would inform both their motivation to stay outside the realm of history in the proceeding
years.
II. Motivation and Impact - “The kind of sentiment anyone would have”

Throughout the Uprising, foreigners who became involved faced deeply conflicting
motivations for intervening, and apprehensions about how their intervention may be perceived.
Baptist missionary Arnold Peterson, who was actively involved in sheltering protestors and
escorting fellow parishioners out of the city, expressed deep discomfort during the Uprising
that felt like he was “politically involved”. Discussing with fellow missionary John
Underwood, Underwood convinced Peterson that what was happening was “more than a
political issue. Atrocities had been committed and the issue was now more a question of right
vs. wrong” . These sentiments around the morality of their participation likewise is echoed in
96
other accounts and interviews. Dolinger simply stated it was something that had to be done ,
97
while Martha Huntley stated that “We never considered leaving Kwangju. Whatever was
Kim, Sh, Kim, Hr, Park, Sh, and Lee, Mi. “Prevalence of PTSD in a Sample of Victims of Gwangju Democratic
95
Uprising.” European Neuropsychopharmacology 19 (September 2009): S586–S586.
Peterson, Arnold, Kwangju Sa’tae., trans. Chŏng, Dong-sŏp. (P’ulbit, Seoul), 1995), p. 61.
96
Dave Dollinger, interviewed by Steve Literati IV , May 3rd, 2019, Audio, 58:47.
97
48
happening, we had to stay there with the other people of Kwangju and do whatever we could to
help” .
98
Strictly speaking, the decision to become involved was self-evident for these
individuals, and were not beholden to their particular political leanings or even understanding.
They themselves maintain a deep distance to the political beliefs of the protestors while
showing deep personal and moral connections to these individuals. These comments, made
after the Uprising and in some cases coming almost 40 years to the date of the Uprising speak
to the fact that many of these individuals were not motivated by political considerations. They
at best tried to refrain as best as they could from engaging in the political questions in South
Korea during their lives, and tried to maintain some distance from the political discourse
happening around them during this time. Even today, while many of these individuals have
opinions regarding the transition of South Korea from military dictatorship to democracy and
Korea’s current political situation, they refrain from framing their actions within any political
leanings at that time. Martha Huntley and Barbara Peterson, wife of Arnold Peterson, penned a
letter to the South Korean National Assembly to ask that several members of the conservative
Liberty Korea Party (Chayu han'guk tang) be reprimanded for pedalling falsehoods around the
Uprising by perpetuating the false narrative that North Koreans and Communist sympathizers
instigated the Uprising. Huntley and Peterson compared them to Holocaust deniers, stating
“their denials would wipe away the reality of the suffering and loss of millions of people to the
world, and the truth of history itself. We would hate to see the same thing happen in South
Martha Huntley, unpublished interview
98
49
Korea” . David Dolinger, who proudly expressed his deep dislike with former-President Park
99
Geun-hye and related his intense dislike of her likewise insists that what prompted him to act
was a sense of morality outside the confines of politics. We may conclude that even if we can
express some scepticism around how politically motivated these individuals were, political
motivations represent at best a minimal motivating factor for these individuals and fail to
address the means by which these individuals initially became involved, and continued to act
during the Uprising. Rather than being politically involved, the Uprising in fact made these
individuals political.
While these individuals represented come from a wide swath of ages and backgrounds,
what unites them is that the Kwangju Uprising was not a political event, but rather a moralistic
one. This transformation was in many ways forced; they found themselves in the middle of an
escalating conflict and were confronted by the most explicit use of coercive power that the
state possesses. While the Minjung movement had been continuing to criticize the Park
government and had been explicit in its distaste of extending martial law, it took the violence
of Kwangju to make these criticisms of the government apparent to the most agnostic political
actors - the foreign community. Hence, framing their decision to intervene should be framed
within the moralistic terms of these individuals, and the decision making processes involved in
allowing one to act and become involved. In other words, these individuals were shocked into
acting.
Eva Fogelman, in her research on the Rescuers, describe the transition from observer to
rescuer in terms of a singular cognitive process; one witnesses that individuals are in danger,
Tae-gyu Kim, “US citizens send letter demanding punishment of LKP members who deny Gwangju
99
Massacre,”Hankyoreh, Feb. 22nd, 2019. https://tinyurl.com/vylzgrsl.
50
and in response individuals come to the conclusion that these individuals may be seriously
injured - or even killed - if they do not intervene. The onus to intervene becomes deeply
ingrained, personal, and immediate; one may either do something, or feel the immense and
almost unbearable guilt of doing nothing. Most often, it seems that once these individuals
found themselves in this cognitive binary, the choice becomes obvious: they get involved.
There was a deep-seated interest in the well-being of individuals around them, and a strong
sense of morality among these individuals. Upon reflecting on their behaviors, there is a sense
of self-evidence with regards to their decision. Matha Huntley framed it simply: “whatever was
happening, we had to stay there with the other people of Kwangju and do whatever we could to
help” . Here again we find another parallel between the thinking of those in the foreigner
100
community and the Righteous Among Nations. Take for instance, the following comment as
stated by famed rescuer Chinue Sugihara on his motivations for saving Jews during the
Holocaust:
You want to know about my motivations, don’t you? Well. It is the kind of
sentiment anyone would have when he actually sees refugees face to face,
begging with tears in their eyes. He just cannot help but sympathize with them...
I ventured to do what I did, confronting this most difficult situation - and
because of this reason, I went ahead with redoubled courage.
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Sugihara’s seemingly incredulous response to why he became a rescuer is illuminating in
understanding why, almost forty years later on another continent, Warnberg suddenly
transformed from an individual running for his own life to throwing himself as a human shield
between protesters and the military. This sentiment also reflects the reasoning behind the
Martha Huntley, unpublished interview.
100
Hillel Levine, In Search of Sugihara: the Elusive Japanese Diplomat Who Risked His Life to Rescue 10,000
101
Jews from the Holocaust (New York, N.Y: Free Press, 1996). P. 15.
51
Huntleys used their home as a shelter for those seeking safety from the violence. Once it
became inescapable for these individuals to come face to face with suffering, there was no
other choice but to act. The scale of the suffering for these individuals was inescapable not
only for the city itself, but for themselves as well.
This prompts an important question then; why were they there in the first place? What
permitted these individuals to be receptive to this awareness in the first place? Based on the
evidence compiled thus far, it is clear that many who were present in the area were already
predisposed to a high standard of personal empathic and moralistic values. Those who stayed
or entered the city were predominately from either faith-based or service based backgrounds or
careers; the PCVs were were involved in a wide variety of community based services aimed at
helping both the rural and urban communities in Chŏnnam, while the missionaries likewise
were involved in both proselytizing and providing services for the community. Dolinger, for
instance, grew up in the Quaker faith, and while claiming that he was not religious by the time
he went, Quaker instilled within him a sense of moral and social responsibility . Some of
102
these predispositions were even multigenerational, and fostered by years and even decades of
exposure; Charles Betts own connections to proselytizing in Korea go back several
generations, according to Martha Huntley . Likewise, the Underwood family has a long and
103
historic connection to Korea, going back to Horace Grant Underwood and the foundation of
Yonsei University. By the time of the Uprising, Martha and Charles Betts Huntley had lived in
Dolinger, Interview.
102
Martha Huntley, Unpublished Interview.
103
52
Korea for close to two decades, and had deep empathetic connections to Kwangju but to people
in Korea more broadly:
We had loved the Korean people from the start; have always felt esteem,
admiration, affection and love and often amazement at Koreans for their
intellectual acuteness, love of learning, commitment and dedication, their
graciousness, and their kindness and acceptance to us .
104
For Martha, it is clear that there was an immediate sense of empathy towards the local
community that was fostered over 20 years. These backgrounds not only situate these
individuals to be well embedded within the communities they lived in, but predisposed them to
becoming integrated within the communities they served.
By this time both Charles Betts and Martha had lived in South Korea since 1965, and in
Chŏllanam since 1967. By May 17th 1980, the Huntleys had established themselves deeply not
just in Chŏllanam Provence but within Kwangju itself. Kwangju attracted them for many
reasons - Seoul felt too large, while living out in the countryside in Sunch'ŏn felt too small and
“at that time was one of the strongest of the Presbyterian areas, with many flourishing churches
after years of missionary work” . They had felt that working in Kwangju offered the greatest
105
opportunity for them - there were only seven Presbyterian congregations in a city of 730,000
people at the time, and there was the Kwangju Christian Hospital where Charles Betts Huntley
would work and volunteer at. There was a great sense of attachment to Chŏnam and Kwangju
specifically, but so too a sense that their work and their lives as missionaries were separated
from the protests going on in the city and South Korea at that time.
Martha Huntley, interview, p.2
104
Martha Huntley, interview, p.2
105
53
Of particular importance too was the deep sense of community and connection that
these individuals felt towards the community they were a part of, and in turn, how this
community likewise felt towards them. At times, this was potentially even a romantic
relationship. Several other PCVs testified to the fact that Tim Warnberg was deeply ingrained
in the Korean community, being able to speak Korean at a far higher level than other PCVs but
also being able to communicate in Korean sign language as well. Of the foreigners in Kwangju
during the Uprising, Warnberg was the only individual who had a romantic relationship with a
Korean - by this time Warnberg had formed a romantic relationship with a man in Kwangju.
Warnberg was worried about this man’s safety, as he would be soon leaving for the mandatory
military service in South Korea by the time the Uprising began . Warnberg’s homosexuality
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was seemingly well known and accepted among the PCVs, but given homophobic attitudes in
the 1980s, it is clear that this fact as well as this man’s relationship to Warnberg was kept
secret.
It is important to note here that Warnberg’s relationship was on an one side of a
spectrum expressed by those in and around Kwangju before, after, and during the Uprising;
much like Martha Huntley felt a deeply felt empathy towards Koreans and the Honam region in
particular, the relationship was rarely framed as one between foreigner/local, but one in which
these individuals had deeply personal relationships and in turn were interwoven into the
communities they lived in - their foreignness was a useful tool to shelter protesters during the
Uprising, but their foreignness was only so important. In other words, the people who they saw
being attacked on the street were part of the deeply imbedded social relationships that were
Carolyn Turbyfill, Interview. David Dolinger, Interview.
106
54
under threat starting on May 18th at around 3:00PM, and these deeply imbedded social
relationships helped foster the Absolute Community as a total unit that could organize during
the events of the Uprising.
These predispositions to high empathic and moralistic values likewise parallels
Fogelman’s work in profiling the Righteous Among Nations during the Holocaust. Fogelman
classifies the rescuers into several subcategories that help explain the means by which
individuals were predisposed to rescuing. Fogelman for instance talks about what she describes
as “Judeophile,” individuals who had positive and sympathetic connotations for Jewish people
as a result of a myriad of different relationships over the course of their life. Others, such as
what Fogelman refers to as the “Moral rescuers,” “had a strong sense of who they were and
what they lived for” and had strong emotional, religious, or ideological motivations and
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backgrounds to intervene. A third group, the “Concerned Professionals,” were drawn into
helping Jews due to the virtue of their occupations, and maintained a sense of obeying a higher
law as a result. In the Kwangju case, however, it is clear that the foreign community does not
fit neatly into these categories. The Huntleys, who had deep emotional affections to Korean
people and the city of Kwangju itself, were at the same time, highly resolute in their moral
decision making (once it was made), and felt a deep need to act as a result of their “calling” as
missionaries. At other times, it is apparent that he was simply disgusted by what they saw, and
entered into the cognitive binary that concluded in action. It may be the case that these
categories do not work in the context of Kwangju, and that those foreigners in Kwangju who
Fogelman, The Rescuer Self, p. 6
107
55
were there were predisposed to intervening due to two or even three of the categories that
Fogelman describes.
While the initial means of intervention may be different person to person, it seems clear
that these different actions were a result more often of happenstance than anything else. When
Martha Huntley was asked if she would have placed herself in between soldiers and protesters
in the same fashion that Warnberg and Dolinger did, Martha Huntley flatly stated that she
would have, had she been present during the initial stages of the Uprising . Most Protestant
108
missionaries living in the city were not near the centers of violence during the initial explosion
of violence, while there are accounts of several Irish monks located within the Catholic Center
on Kŭmnam Avenue who likewise threw themselves between protestors and soldiers similar to
Warnberg, Chamberlin, and Dolinger. One may likewise draw a similar conclusion based on
why so few PCVs sheltered protests during the early hours of the Uprising like the
Missionaries - most of the PCVs lived outside of Kwangju, and the only PCV who lived in
Kwangju lived with a family.
Most often, the initial act to intervene by members of the foreign community in
Kwangju was never pre-emptive. The immediate decision was based on an impulsive response
- Warnberg was present during the initial stages of the Uprising while the Huntleys were not
entirely aware of the scale and scope of the catastrophe until they arrived at the Kwangju
Christian Hospital and saw the bodies on the 19th. After the initial decision to act, the
foreigners in Kwangju were still motivated to repeat behavior by actively intervening and
helping where they could. The reasons for this sustained commitment are diverse: a fear for the
Martha Huntley, interview. p. 14.
108
56
well-being and safety for the people around them, a sense of moral obligation to what was
happening, or an immediate revulsion to the violence around them. What is most fundamental
to not just the rescuers in Kwangju but in some other mass atrocities is, in the words of Eva
Fogelman, “an awareness, courage, and ability to accept personal responsibility and
acknowledge that, ‘these human beings will die if I do not intervene” .
109
This process of impulsive response and moral commitment, however, should not
mitigate how difficult the decision to act was, despite its seeming inevitability. Early on, many
testimonials speak to the fact that they did not sense a threat to their lives as they were
foreigners and did not look Korean, but as the violence escalated there became a greater
concern about their safety. This sense of threat never came from the citizens of Kwangju, but
from the ROKA military. Both the Huntleys and the Peterson had children in their homes, and
debated about allowing their children to stay in the city. Both the Huntleys and Petersons were
able to escort members of their family and the international community out of Kwangju before
news of the bombing on May 26th. On May 22nd at 7:30 AM, Arnold Peterson, along with a
few other missionaries went to the town of Sŏngjongni to escort his wife Barbara Peterson,
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their children, and members of the Florida Baptist Team who had arrived in Kwangju for a
conference and were caught in the middle of the Uprising, out of the city for safety. Along the
way, they were escorted by Kwangju citizens who also feared for the missionaries’ safety .
111
Fogelman, p. 11.
109
Martha Huntley and Jean W. Underwood both stated that the group was heading to Taejŏn to the north while
110
Arnold Peterson in his memoir writes that they were heading to Sŏngjongni to the east. It seems probable that
based on Peterson’s memoirs, the only route available for people out of the city at this time was to Sŏngjongni,
and from there they would go up to Taejŏn.
Peterson, p. 221.
111
57
These deeper motivations also provide the means by which to analyze the Kwangju
Uprising more broadly. The decision to act was a difficult one that nonetheless was apparent to
all who intervened. The Kwangju Uprising was not just as an effort by the Chun Doo-hwan
regime to suppress an uprising in South Korea, or a conflict between Chŏnnam provence
citizens and Kyŏngsang provence soldiers, but rather the response by a broad collection of
individuals who found themselves connected by a common idea. Journalists who were present
at the time, citizens who participated in the Uprising, and foreigners all speak to a deep
attachment to Kwangju and the larger Chŏnnam region as home, or a deep attachment and
admiration to both the city of Kwangju and Chŏnnam provence. Beyond the broad swath of
reasons to get involved, all maintain an underlying attachment to a sense of Kwangju and
Chŏnnam as home.
This civic identification fits into what Jung-woon Choi refers to as the “Absolute
Community” (Chŏltae Gongdongch’e) of Kwangju, in which “citizens did not differentiate
their lives from that of the others...all distinctions between humans disinitraged as disparate
individuals joined together as one” . Many of the testimonials speak to the strong communal
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spirit that prevailed in Kwangju and the larger Chŏnnam provence during the Uprising as
people from different ages and backgrounds contributed as best they could to the ongoing
conflict. This sense of Absolute Community is quite clear among the testimonials present
beyond age and class, and ultimately includes nationality as well. The foreigners felt a deep
sense of connection to the city and region and therefore a responsibility to join the larger
Uprising in whatever means they could best aid. The Absolute Community also extended from
Jung-woon Choi, “The Formation of an “Absolute Community”” in Contentious Kwangju, ed. Gi-wook Shin
112
and Kyung Moon Hwang. (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003.) pg. 4.
58
the broader Kwangju and Chŏnnam citizenry to the foreign community as well: whether it was
armed escorts provided by the Kwangju citizens for the missionaries, support from local
church institutions, or homestay families, it is clear that the separation between foreigner/
Korean was blurred during the Uprising. Had the conflict continued past May 27th, the
privileged position the foreign community may have retained may have been ultimately
ignored by Chun forces. In this fashion, the foreign community that stayed became as much
part of the Absolute Community as the larger Kwangju citizenry that participated in the
Uprising.
Beyond the immediate means by which these individuals aided and helped during the
Uprising by sheltering, translating, and at times directly intervening to prevent further death,
what can we say of the impact of these individuals? When extrapolating the role of foreigners
in the Kwangju Uprising, what ultimately can we conclude was their role? Based on the
accounts and interviews, the foreigner community as a group was not on the front line of the
Minjung movement, nor were the among the first protestors at Ch'ŏnnam University and
Kŭmnamno Road on the day of May 18th. Save for David Dolinger, none took on an active
role of resisting the regime. Rather, their role parallels the roles of most Kwangju citizens in
the city in aiding and intervening as concerned citizens, but their roles in the Uprising may
have played an integral part in proliferating the spread of the Uprising.
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s theory of Transnational Advocacy Networks
are and the “boomerang pattern” apt in explaining the role of foreigners in their impact on the
Uprising. Keck and Sikkink argue that once governments are able to stymie effective measures
to hold it accountable, such as demonstrating against the government, domestic groups can
59
utilize transnational networks in order to find other means of bypassing government controls.
In this way, they may search out “international allies to try and bring pressure on their states
from outside” and in effect the pressure to hold the government accountable returns back in
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the form of a “boomerang”. In the case of the Kwangju Uprising, international allies were
present within the city; when Korean reporters were blocked from reporting on what was
happening and the city was systematically cut off from outside communication, international
reporters were able to enter in and cover the crisis occurring. In other cases, the international
allies within the city were able to utilize their own connections to larger networks to provide
aid; whether this was the Presbyterian Church providing bread for the Huntleys, Peterson’s
status as a Baptist Minister rescuing an innocent man, or the Peace Corp V olunteers providing
documentation of atrocities to the American government and the international community, the
foreigners played a unique role in the Absolute Community in providing assistance and
pressure during and after the Uprising.
In thinking of the Absolute Community as an important factor in motivating the foreign
community to act, we likewise draw larger patterns of behavior from the Kwangju Uprising to
other mass atrocities, particularly the Rape of Nanking, in which civic identification and a
connection to the victims led to individuals spared from state violence to risk that privilege in
order to intervene. Among the International Committee for the Safety Zone of Nanking,
previous national distinctions between Danes, Americans, Germans, Brits, and Chinese were
washed away as civic connections to Nanking and the people needing protection became
paramount. Much like the members of the International Safety Zone committee during the
Margaret E. Keck and Katheryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
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Politics. (Cornell University Press, 1998:) chapter 1, pg. 12.
60
Rape of Nanking or the Righteous Among Nations during the Holocaust, many foreigners who
were present during the Kwangju Uprising experienced intense psychological scars as a result
of their experiences and faced challenges in returning to normalcy. Despite clear signs of how
psychologically damaging the events of these atrocities were to the individuals involved, they
never regretted their decision to stay and aid. Minnie Vautrin, the president of Ginling College
in Nanking who sheltered thousands of people during the Rape of Nanking, was deeply
traumatized by the events she witnessed, but never regretted her decision. She famously wrote
only a few days before her suicide in 1941 that “had I ten perfect lives I would dedicate them
all to this cause” of China. Likewise, Martha Huntley, who is still alive and remembers the
114
events vividly, recounts “Whatever was happening, we had to stay there with the other people
of Kwangju and do whatever we could to help” .
115
By exploring the psychological after-effects of rescuers are we able to fully understand
the primary motivation for aiding in the first place. It is clear from the relative silence and
humility of rescuers - whether in Kwangju, Nanking, or Warsaw - that these individuals did not
act out of a vainglorious sense of their own righteousness, and may even feel a sense of unease
about discussing what they did. The decision to help, while very clear, was an incredible
burden. These acts were most often selfless and motivated from a deep sense of connection to
the victims. The concept of the Absolute Community more broadly erases individual heroism
for the sake of collective identity, resulting in relative silence for many rescuers.
Guo Sheng-Ping. “The Living Goddess of Mercy at the Rape of Nanking: Minnie Vautrin and the Ginling
114
Refugee Camp in World War II (1937–1938) †.” Religions 7, no. 12 (December 1, 2016). https://doaj.org/article/
31884116b3b342c5ab8e0997f70e7838. P. 14.
Martha Huntley, interview. p. 6.
115
61
As someone who directly threw himself between protestors and soldiers, one would
expect Warnberg to be explicit about the event in his own writings, as several eyewitnesses
place Warnberg blocking soldiers from attacking protestors and civilians many times over the
course of the Uprising. Warnberg’s description of events in “An Insider’s View,” however,
seems to downplay this event:
We ran with the panicked crowd and I ended up in a small store along with about
fifteen other people, including one other PCV . A soldier came into the store and
proceeded to club everyone over the head with his truncheon until he came to the other
volunteer and me. He stopped, startled, hesitated a moment, and then ran out .
116
Later on the same day (May 18th), Warnberg went to take an orphan to Ch’ŏnju Hospital for
“ear surgery,” stating:
The soldiers were in riot gear and were walking through back alleys in residential areas,
selecting young men, many of them standing alone in front of their shops or houses,
and beating them on their heads and arms. We tried to stop them but were pushed
away .
117
As has been presented previously, Warnberg did a lot more than what he described back in
1987. While his silence on throwing himself between soldiers and students seems unusual at
first, follows a similar pattern of remembrance around rescuers. This is in part a result of the
rescuers’ own reticence to speak on their actions and of the many citizens within their home
countries being unaware or even uninterested of the full scope of the atrocities committed.
The cases of John Rabe and Chiune “Sempo” Sugihara, who respectively saved
countless lives during the Rape of Nanking and the Holocaust, is telling when considering how
histories of rescuers are remembered and written. John Rabe, although a member of the Nazi
Warnberg, p. 39.
116
ibid., p. 41.
117
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party, returned to Germany after the events of Nanking to petition the Nazi government against
its alliance with Japan, and he would eventually be censored by the Nazis for his efforts to
expose the atrocities committed by the Japanese. His actions in saving countless lives in
Nanking were obscured by the victorious powers after the fall of the Third Reich, and Rabe
was subsequently swept up in denazification and spent much of the immediate post-war years
in destitution. Sugihara was eventually captured by the Soviets and sent back to Japan, where
his perceived intransigence led to his expulsion from the Japanese diplomatic corp . Sugihara
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himself admitted that “after the war, I did my best to forget the past” . The decision to
119
continue aiding is both obvious and difficult, one that is apparent to rescuers yet in which
rescuers are completely aware of the immense psychological and psychical threat they put
themselves in by aiding.
The stories of Sugihara and Rabe remained largely unknown in their home countries,
but the memories were not forgotten by either the Jewish refugees Sugihara helped smuggle
out or the citizens of Nanking whom Rabe helped shelter. In 1969, Sugihara’s actions were
acknowledged by the Israeli government, and eventually Sugihara was inducted as a
“Righteous Gentile” by Yad Vashem, Israel’s official memorial to the victims of the Holocaust.
Likewise, when the citizens of Nanking found out about John Rabe’s destitution, they
organized a relief fund for the former leader of the Nanking Safety Zone, who was able to live
out the final years of his life in comfort thanks to the people he helped save. The decision to
begin recording what was observed was ultimately an incredibly personal one for many. By
Fogelman, p. 11.
118
Hillel Levine, In Search of Sugihara: the Elusive Japanese Diplomat Who Risked His Life to Rescue 10,000
119
Jews from the Holocaust (New York, N.Y: Free Press, 1996). P. 15
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recording their actions during mass atrocities, rescuers bring themselves ultimately back to the
trauma. The intense psychological burden with coming face-to-face again with the painful
memories takes a great deal of time to overcome. While sharing one’s experience may be
therapeutic, it is not necessarily easy. Eva Fogelman, in her research on the Righteous Among
Nations during the Holocaust, suggests that “by sharing, they overcame neuroses associated
with...guilt for not doing more themselves. By talking about what formerly could not be
revealed rescuers made their peace with the past” . In the weeks, months, and years after a
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mass tragedy, there is a much longer psychological process in which individuals come to terms
with their experiences.
This ultimately leads us back to the relative silence by those who lived there. Tim
Warnberg stated his intention back in 1987 was to “not take sides” and rather “present a picture
of the initial confrontation and subsequent events that eventually led to full-scale armed
revolt”. While Warnberg’s article represents the first published account from Americans, it was
certainly not the last. Arnold Peterson self-published his own memoirs in 1990 based on his
121
own journal writings and recordings from the Uprising and found the process of writing
“therapeutic”. Both former PCVs Dave Dolinger and Paul Courtright, who were with Warnberg
during the Uprising, have only recently been writing memoirs related to the Uprising several
decades afterwards, and it remains an intensely emotional part of their lives. Another PCV -
Carolyn Turyfill - was diagnosed with PTSD as a result of her experiences during and after the
Fogelman, p. 10.
120
Chŏng Dong-sŏp, the Korean translator of Arnold Peterson’s memoirs, points rather clearly to Peterson finally
121
coming to terms with his memory, writing in the introduction: “In 1990, Arnold Peterson finally returned to the
United States after working at the Baptist University of Taejŏn...It was only in 1990, 10 years after the events [of
Kwangju] occurred that could he document his experience” p. 12.
64
Uprising, and had not spoken about the Uprising until being contacted for this project. The
deep suffering and inhumanity witnessed by the foreigners lends to explanations of why their
experiences had been left out for so long; they were unintentionally and collectively not ready
to talk.
Warnberg did an excellent job in presenting his research in presenting the conflict’s
origins that led to revolt. Reading into his article, however, it is clear that Warnberg
experienced something deeply traumatic. Warnberg writes about a “half-burnt body of a
student we had talked to a few days earlier” and “pools of blood along the streets,” which is
122
a level of violence that few other accounts match. Much like Sugihara, the memories that
Warnberg faced could have been too immediate to bring to the fore back in 1987. It may have
been the case that this article was part of the initial sharing process that Fogelman discusses,
and Warnberg would eventually be able to write his narrative fully in the hope of making his
own peace with the past. That, however, would not be the case, as Tim Warnberg passed away
in 1993 due to complications related to HIV/AIDS . Our understanding of Warnberg and
123 124
his motivations for acting become a source of speculation, as his memory seems to have largely
faded away. His legacy in the histories of the Uprising is sadly most often relegated to the role
of the American who saw the first day, and his story has been omitted not by any malicious
intent, but by an early death.
Warnberg, p. 45.
122
“Timothy Jay Warnberg Obituary” from The Brainerd Dispatch, February 8th, 1993.
123
Courtright, Interview.
124
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III. Conclusion - “Into the forefront of history”
By expanding our understanding of the events of May 1980 to include the narratives
and testimonials of foreigners, we may understand the potential escalation of violence that
could have occurred had individuals not intervened and taken action. The actions of journalists
from around the world to report on the atrocities committed by the Chun Doo-hwan
government, for example, were critical. Jürgen Hinzpeter’s photographs, which represent the
first photographic evidence of the atrocities to the outside world, were processed in Pastor
Huntley’s dark room. Conversely, the presence of the Americans in the city may have affected
decisions by the ROKAF to not bomb the city and the USAF to enter the city, which may have
prevented a greater loss of life.
Such patterns of motivation, decision making, and reasoning are not unique to the
Righteous Among Nations or the rescuers in Kwangju. Whether in the Holocaust, the Rape of
Nanking, My Lai, or the Yazidi Genocide, amongst a long and sadly ever-growing list of
atrocities committed during the 20th and 21st centuries, we witness patterns of violence
perpetrated by a state that attempts to annihilate an “other”. Likewise, mass atrocities exhibit
well-documented examples of groups of people who, while privileged and exempt from state
violence, nevertheless risk that privilege for the sake of helping those targeted for annihilation.
While the Righteous Among Nations are among some of the most well-known examples of this
group, we see strikingly similar parallels in other atrocities, whether it is the International
Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone during the Rape of Nanking, Hugh Thompson Jr.
66
during the My Lai Massacre, or the Sinjar Crisis Management Team during the Yazidi
125
Genocide. By understanding the foreign community of Kwangju and their motivations,
reasoning, and actions, we can further contextualize the Uprising as part of a broader trend on
state violence, mass atrocities, and the means by which people risk their lives to save others
and resist mass state brutality.
The actions by foreigners in the city were little different from the acts by native-born
sons and daughters of Kwangju as their homes, and the lives of those they called friends,
family, and neighbors were threatened. Kwangju was not just a place where they lived, but a
deeply interconnected web of relations that both necessitated saving and motivated a
commitment to staying with those on the front lines of Kwangju. In remembering the
foreigners, we remember a more complete picture of the thousands of incredibly brave acts by
the people of Kwangju across class and creed who found themselves facing the brutality of
unspeakable state-sponsored violence all those years ago. ”It was a beautiful moment when, of
their own accord, the people threw their lives into the forefront of history,” commented Lee
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Jae-eui in his memoir of the event. South Korea’s eventual democratization would come in
1987, and in the following decades the country would engage in a long process of reconciling
with the past in order to achieve democratic rule that continues to the present. Of the
testimonials left behind by the foreigners, there is a great sense of pride for South Korea in
achieving democracy and an incredible sense of optimism for the future of South Korean
democracy. In 2017, ROK President Moon Jae-in pledged to reopen a probe on Chun’s actions
See: Jenny Krajeski “The Daring Plan to Save a Religious Minority from ISIS” in New Yorker, Feb. 19th 2018.
125
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/02/26/the-daring-plan-to-save-a-religious-minority-from-isis
Lewis, p. 17.
126
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during the Uprising. The testimonials left by the foreigners add another valuable page to
Korea’s history, and contribute to the long arch of Korea’s struggle for democratic rule.
While this thesis examines the roles of several foreigners over the course of the
Kwangju Uprising, there remains important avenues of research necessary to fully understand
the transnational nature of the Uprising. In particular, there are four topics that have not been
covered by this thesis and requires greater research. First, there was a vast array of journalists
present at Kwangju who became directly involved, such as Terry Anderson, Robin Moyer, and
most famously, Jürgen Hintzpeter. Their efforts in reporting on the Kwangju Uprising were
vital to spreading the truth of the Chun regime’s crimes against humanity, their decision to
become involved does not follow the same pattern of passive observer-active intervener that
the foreign community in Kwangju. Famed AP Reporter Terry Anderson, as he stated, spoke no
Korean and arrived in Kwangju by commandeering a bike in Mokpo and riding all the way to
Kwangja, bypassing and evading military blockades and transport along the way.
Understanding their decision to become involved as reporters is a necessary point of analysis in
comprehending the full scope of the Uprising.
Second, while there are a few cases mentioned of non-Americans and their impact on
the Uprising such as Marian Pope and Jon M. Nakajima, this study has primarily drawn on the
accounts and narratives of Americans. Based on details from both of these accounts, it seems
that although the Americans in the city were the largest group of foreigners, they were not the
only one. While the story of Jürgen Hintzpeter and other German reporters have received
praise and have been remembered, the role of the many Japanese reporters, who were also
among the first international reporters on the scene, have largely been forgotten about by both
68
the predominantly Western foreigners in the city as well as by American historians at large.
There were accounts of Irish Catholic priests who likewise intervened in similar ways as to
Tim Warnberg and David Dolinger, and there remains the question of how Jon M. Nakajima
was able to gain access to Paul Coutright’s journals, and the role that non-Americans in South
Korea played in aiding in the Kwangju Uprising.
Third, there remains questions as to decision making within the Chun regime itself. If
Martha Huntley’s testimonial is to be believed and that acting President Ch'oe Kyu-ha had sent
an informant to observe the full scale and scope of the Uprising, it is clear that the government
apparatus that permitted the atrocities to occur in the first place was tightly controlled by a
small cabal of Chun loyalists. The precise means of decision making, and the process by which
the events of May 18th-May 27th have not been fully disclosed at this time, and remains to be
investigated in order to develop a full understanding of the Uprising.
Lastly, there remains fundamental questions as to the failure of American foreign policy
leaders both before and during the Uprising to prevent the full bloodshed from happening.
While it is a popular opinion, particularly among leftist intellectuals in both South Korea and
the United States, to accuse the American response as unwilling to prevent this tragedy, the
picture may be more complicated and in some senses much more concerning. The Carter
Administration’s failing to properly understand the situation should be condemned, but what is
most striking about the failure of the Carter regime to respond adequately to condemning Chun
remains a curiosity if one were to contextualize it within US Policy during that time. While
President Carter was quite willing to withdraw Ambassador Glysteen after the removal of Kim
Young Sam from the National Assembly in 1979, and there had been increased concerns
69
regarding Chun after the 12/12 coup according to General Wickham. For reasons that remain a
mystery, the Carter Administration, which had made human rights a cornerstone of its foreign
policy objectives, and its insistence in condemning South Korea under the Park administration
for imprisoning democratic opposition to the regime, was unable to do so in May 1980. Based
on the actions just a year before, one would expect a much stronger or at least a more
congruent response by the Carter Administration, yet it did not. The American Government’s
own account of its failures in the “United States Government Statement on the Events in
Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980”, sometimes referred to as the “Kwangju
Statement” provides in excruciating detail how American policy and military leaders were
routinely misinformed by the Chun regime, and exposed the means by which Chun was able to
take advantage of the US-ROK alliance for his own personal and political gain in both the
12/12 Coup and the Kwangju Uprising. With such documentation, however, there continues to
be a necessary amount of analysis as to why the Carter Administration was unable to
adequately promote its own agenda of human rights in Northeast Asia, and the intelligence
failures to properly understand the full scope of the Uprising. The consequences of this failure,
and the lessons learned from that failure, may help prevent similar tragedies for foreign policy
makers in the future.
Epilogue
As of May 2020, the Kwangju Uprising will enter its 40th Anniversary and as the US
faces the consequences of both the Coronavirus pandemic, the protests that have erupted with
the murder of George Floyd, and the failure of leadership from the top to act decisively and
70
clearly, the lessons of Kwangju seem most poignant now to the country where so many of the
foreigners involved hailed from. While many who were there during those dark days in
Kwangju are still alive, several have passed away.
In 2017 Pastor Charles Betts Huntley - who along with wife Martha Huntley sheltered
22 people during the Uprising - received word that he was nominated for the “May Mothers’
Award” in Kwangju. Due to health complications, the award ceremony was delayed. A week
before his departure, Rev. Huntley phoned the committee and told them “I want to go to
Korea...I cannot go now. If I die, I can go”. On June 26th, 2017, a week after the phone call,
Rev. Charles Betts Huntley passed away . Martha Huntley is still alive today and currently
127
lives in North Carolina. The Huntley residence still stands in the Yangrim-dong section of
Kwangju and is managed by a Christian NGO called “THE1904”. Both Arnold Peterson’s and
Charles Betts Huntley’s ashes are buried in Kwangju. Martha Huntley currently lives in her
home state of North Carolina, and has been back to speak about the Uprising many times in
Kwangju since.
Arnold Peterson passed away on September 24th, 2015 in Dallas, Texas and is survived
by his wife Barbara Peterson who has returned often to Kwangju to commemorate the
Uprising.
Paul Courtright currently lives in San Diego, and after his service in the Peace Corp
became an opthamologist after his work on Hansen’s disease in South Korea. After returning to
the US, Courtright would work in ophthalmologist and public health across Africa, and served
Jeonghee Jeon, “Conscience & Faith Led Missionary Huntley to Tell the World About May 1980 Gwangju,”
127
The Kukmin Daily. June 25th, 2018. http://www.kukmindaily.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0012469534
71
as the director of the Kilimanjaro Centre For Community Ophthalmology in South Africa until
2019. His memoirs on the Uprising will be published in May, 2020.
David Dolinger too has entered the medical field and has been back to South Korea and
Kwangju several times since his expulsion from the Peace Corp. He has asked to have his
ashes be interred in Kwangju, and his request has been granted. Dolinger’s memoirs are slated
to be published in both Korean and English as of 2020 to coincide with the 40th Anniversary of
the Uprising.
Carolyn Turbyfill currently lives and works in Silicon Valley. Her husband, Steven
Clark Hunziker, who travelled to Sweden with multiple documents highlighting the full
bloodshed of the conflict, passed away in 2014.
In 2011, Dave Dolinger was in Kwangju for the annual Kwangju Uprising memorial. In
the main atrium of the May 18th Foundation hung a photo of Kwangju citizens carrying a
stretcher. One of the men in the photo was a lanky, blonde-hair man, most likely in his 20s and
clearly a foreigner, who was helping carry the stretcher away from the blood and violence. For
years, researchers were unable to identify the foreigner in the photo. At the memorial service,
several historians from the May 18th Foundation approached Dolinger about the photo.
“Was this you?” Dolinger recalled the researcher asking him.
“No,” Dolinger replied, “it was Tim Warnberg” .
128
Dolinger, interview.
128
72
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74
Appendix

Figure 1. As a member of the K-45 group of Peace Corps volunteers in South Korea, Tim
Warnberg (taking the Korean name “Wŏn Dŏk-ki”) arrived in South Korea in 1978. Warnberg
was heavily involved in helping the people of Kwangju, most dramatically by interposing
himself between students and soldiers. (source: K-45 Book, 1978).

Figure 2. David Dolinger’s photo of the relatively empty highway on the way to Kwangju. The
military convoy truck in the center of the photo would stop, and would harass Dolinger for
taking this photo. Dolinger’s photo would eventually be given to Carolyn Turbybill and Steven
Clark Hunziker and published in Covert Action. (Source: Covert Action, December 1980).
75

Figure 3. Pastor Charles Betts Huntley (taking the Korean name: Hŏ Ch’ŏl-sŏn) and eldest
daughter Mary (who was at boarding school at Taejŏn during the Uprising) with student and
family friend Rev. Cha Jong-sun in front of the Huntley home in the 1970s. Moving to
Yangnimdong in 1976, their new residence became a primary site for missionaries - amongst
many others - to coordinate aid to those who needed it and help spread information to the
outside world of the atrocities being committed. Reverend Cha has translated several books by
the Huntleys into Korean (source: The Kukmin Daily).
76

Figure 4. A map that Paul Courtright drew in his journal of the Kwangju Uprising. Courtright’s
experience and testimonial point to a larger scale conflict around the Uprising than is usually
understood, and helps showcase some of the other areas affected by the Uprising. (source:
Courtright, Paul. Unpublished Journal.)
Figure 5. Citizens in Kwangju carrying injured to the hospital. In the center of the photo is Tim
Warnberg. (Courtesy of: May 18th Foundation.)
77

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Asset Metadata

Creator Literati, Steve IV (author)

Core Title Remember us this time tomorrow: a testimonial history of the foreign community during the Kwangju Uprising

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publication Date 08/05/2020

Defense Date 08/04/2020

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Kwangju Uprising,Minjung,OAI-PMH Harvest,Peace Corp in South Korea,South Korea 1961-1987,Transnational Advocacy Network

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Kang, David (committee chair), Goldstein, Joshua (committee member), Sheehan, Brett (committee member)

Creator Email literati@usc.edu,steveliterati@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c89-360304

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