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Gangs beyond borders: California and the fight against transnational crime - have recommendations become reality?

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Gangs beyond borders: California and the fight against transnational crime - have recommendations become reality?

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Gangs Beyond Borders: California and the Fight Against Transnational Crime
Have Recommendations Become Reality?

by

Patrick Isidoro Butler

Submitted to the Faculty of
University of Southern California Sol Price School of Public Policy
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Policy, Planning, and Development

University of Southern California
December 2018

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Table of Contents
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ v
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study ................................................................................... 1
U.S.-Mexico’s Complicated Relationship and Border Control ..................................... 2
Transnational Criminal Activities Across the Californian Border ................................ 4
2014 California State Attorney Report and Recommendations .................................... 6
Statement of Problem and Need for Study .................................................................... 8
Research Questions ..................................................................................................... 10
Advance in Practice and Significance of the Project ................................................... 11
Outline of Research Project ......................................................................................... 13
Chapter 2: The 2014 Gang Beyond Borders Report ......................................................... 14
The Case for the 2014 Gangs Beyond Borders Report ............................................... 15
Major Objectives and Findings from the 2014 Gangs Beyond Borders Report .......... 16
Major Recommendations from the 2014 Gangs Beyond Borders Report ................... 19
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 27
Chapter 3: Literature Review ............................................................................................ 29
Historical Relationship Between the United States and Mexico ................................. 30
Human Trafficking ...................................................................................................... 33
Drug Trafficking .......................................................................................................... 41
Money Laundering ...................................................................................................... 45
Cybercrimes ................................................................................................................. 50
Border Enforcement Challenges .................................................................................. 55

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Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 60
Chapter 4: Research Methods ............................................................................................ 62
The Need for a Policy Analysis ................................................................................... 63
The Importance of Policy Analysis ............................................................................. 64
Methods for Analyzing Policy Recommendations ...................................................... 66
Barriers in Combating Transnational Crimes .............................................................. 68
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 73
Chapter 5: Findings ........................................................................................................... 75
Recommendation 1: The Legislature Should Amend California Law to Target
the Leaders of Transnational Criminal Organizations Operating in
California. .............................................................................................................. 75
Recommendation 2: Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Should Use
California’s State Threat Assessment System as a Central Hub for Sharing
Information About Transnational Crime. .............................................................. 82
Recommendation 3: Federal, State, and Local Authorities Should Establish a
Unified Maritime Task Force and Associated Radar Network to Counter
Maritime Smuggling Operations Along California’s Coastline. ........................... 86
Recommendation 4: The Legislature and Governor Should Fund Five
Additional Special Operations Units Across California. ....................................... 93
Recommendation 5: The Federal Government Should Continue Providing
Critical Funding to Support State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies in
Investigating and Dismantling Trafficking Organizations. ................................... 96

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Recommendation 6: Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Agencies
Should Increase Operational Coordination in Combating Transnational
Criminal Organizations. ...................................................................................... 101
Recommendation 7: State and Local Authorities Should Develop Public-
Private Partnerships to Leverage Technology Against Transnational
Organized Crime. ................................................................................................ 107
Recommendation 8: Businesses Should Adopt Industry’s Best Practices
Designed to Protect Against Cybercrime. ........................................................... 111
Recommendation 9: The Legislature Should Amend California Law to Enable
Prosecutors to Temporarily Freeze the Assets of Transnational Criminal
Organizations and Their Gang Associates Before the Filing of an
Indictment. ........................................................................................................... 114
Recommendation 10: The Legislature Should Strengthen California’s
Prohibition Against Financial Transaction Structuring. ...................................... 117
Recommendation 11: California Prosecutors Need Advanced Training to
Combat Sophisticated Transnational Money Laundering Schemes. ................... 120
Recommendation 12: State Authorities Should Partner With Their Mexican
Counterparts to Share Intelligence and Disrupt Illicit Flow of Money
Across the Border. ............................................................................................... 126

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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations .............................................................. 130
Major Themes from the 2014 California Attorney General’s Report ....................... 130
Major Recommendations from the Report ................................................................ 132
Major Implications from the Report .......................................................................... 139
Recommendations for Future Research and Policy Implications .............................. 147
Concluding Comments .............................................................................................. 148
References ....................................................................................................................... 150

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Abstract
The United States government spends more than $18 billion a year to secure its 2,000-
mile border with Mexico, which is more money spent than all other federal law
enforcement agencies combined. Despite the monetary investment, only 44% of the
border is considered operationally secured, and transnational criminal organizations have
taken advantage of this to develop a sophisticated network of illegal drugs smuggling,
human trafficking, money laundering, guns importation, and other nefarious activities. To
mitigate the impact of transnational criminal activities, the Office of California Attorney
General issued a report entitled Beyond Borders: California and the Fight Against
Transnational Organized Crime to address the growing threat of transnational criminal
organizations. This research focuses on the three sectors recognized in the report: money
laundering, trafficking, and cybercrime. Substantial evidence and cases are documented
throughout the analysis to clarify the degree to which recommendations from the report
were implemented within California. The analysis includes key research questions and a
gap analysis to show which recommendations have been implemented and which have
not. The study concludes with the author’s recommendations to address these gaps.
Keywords: Money Laundering; Human Trafficking; Drug Trafficking; Gun Trafficking;
Guns; Cybercrime; Gangs; Cartels; Kidnapping; Extortion; Attorney General; Kamala
Harris; Mexico; California; Homeland Security; National Security; Border Security;
DEA; FBI; DOJ; DHS; Transnational Crime; Crime
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
On a typical day, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (2017) confiscates over
7,910 pounds of drugs, seizes over $289,609 in undeclared or illicit currency, prevents
877 individuals with suspected national security concerns from entering the United
States, handles over $6.3 billion worth of imported products, and processes over
1,000,000 passengers and pedestrians. Despite the CBP’s effort to secure the nation’s
border, transnational criminal organizations have developed elaborate means for
smuggling illegal drugs, human trafficking, money laundering, gun running, and other
nefarious activities (California Office of the Attorney General [OAG], 2014a).
To counter the negative effect of transnational crimes, California Attorney
General Kamala Harris issued a report in 2014 entitled Gangs Beyond Borders:
California and the Fight Against Transnational Organized Crime. The report addressed
the growing threat imposed by transnational criminal organizations, and it provided key
findings and recommendations to combat the growing epidemic. The report provided 12
recommendations for state, local, nonprofit, and business organizations to combat these
organizations.
To date, no studies have analyzed the recommendations from the Gangs Beyond
Border report to determine whether they were successfully implemented. Furthermore, no
studies have analyzed the social, political, and criminal implications of the
recommendations or assessed the current situation. This dissertation aimed to address the
aforementioned issues by reviewing the policy in greater detail, determining whether the
recommendations were successfully implemented, and ascertaining whether the changes
had a positive impact in curtailing transnational criminal activities in California.
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This chapter provides an overview of the historical context for transnational
criminal activities, the current problems law enforcement faces with border patrol, the
2014 Gangs Beyond Borders report, the statement of the problem, the need for this study,
the research questions, the advance in practice and significance of this study, and, finally,
an outline of this dissertation research.
U.S.-Mexico’s Complicated Relationship and Border Control
The issue of human trafficking, drug smuggling, and various organized crimes
transpiring across the U.S.-Mexico border is not a recent phenomenon; it is, rather, the
continuation of the complex and tumultuous relationship between the two nations
stemming from their inception. Even though Mexico won independence from Spain in
1821, the combination of political instability, conflict, and foreign aggressions between
1821 and 1860 marked these as the lost decades for Mexico (Moreno-Brid & Ros, 2009).
The newly formed government experienced a series of mishaps as political elites battled
for control of the government. At the same time, Mexico lost a series of military battles to
the United States, which resulted in Mexico ceding over half of its territory in the process
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).
In 1862, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom invaded Mexico in an attempt to
collect taxes, which further weakened the fragile state. In a twist of fate, the United States
intervened and persuaded the foreign aggressors to leave, fearing that the occupation
would impact American interests in Mexico. Porfirio Díaz became the first president and
remained in power for the next 40 years. Díaz embraced foreign capital, particularly from
the U.S. government and corporations, to invest in his country’s infrastructure, and he
was quick to torture and arrest those who opposed him: organized unions, peasants, poor
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Indians, and those who were disenfranchised by his policy. His unpopularity ultimately
led to the Mexican Revolution in 1910.
The late 19th and early 20th centuries were marked by a large influx of Mexicans
into the United States, which ultimately led to conflict over the U.S.-Mexico border.
Labor shortage on railroad construction during the 1880s resulted in large-scale hiring of
Mexican workers. Mexicans fled the country to avoid the Mexican Revolution in 1910.
By 1917, the relationship with Mexico also began to cool when the U.S. government
intercepted a secret telegram from Germany. In the telegram, Germany offered to restore
Mexico’s lost land if Mexico agreed to attack the United States. The Great Depression
also had the unintended impact of repatriation of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans to
Mexico. Many Midwestern farmers migrated to California in search for work and viewed
the Mexican workers with hostility. By 1942, a shortage of laborers in agriculture and
railroad industries due to World War II resulted in the Bracero Program, which allowed
Mexicans to travel to the United States for temporary work. While U.S. businesses
exploited Mexican laborers, the act resulted in an increase of unauthorized immigration
to the United States.
Though immigration was always a thorny issue for the United States, it was not
until 1986 when Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) that
the issue of illegal immigration and border control became officially recognized with
attempts to contain it. The IRCA made the hiring of unauthorized workers illegal for the
first time in U.S. history, strengthened border enforcement, and provided steps for
citizenship.
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The IRCA is considered a failed policy for multiple reasons (Chishti & Kamasaki,
2014). First, it was unable to sanction employers for hiring undocumented workers
because the government did not have a valid means for distinguishing documented from
undocumented workers. The government did not fully enforce border control until the
mid-1990s. At that time, Mexico and Central America were experiencing instability,
which resulted in increased migration to the United States. Finally, the United States
experienced unprecedented economic growth during the 1990s, which made it an
attractive destination. By the mid-2000s, it was estimated that over 12 million
undocumented immigrants resided in the United States. Although America is Mexico’s
largest trading partner, both nations have an uneasy relationship with regard to enforcing
the border given the fact the last border dispute resulted in Mexico ceding half of its
territory to the United States.
Transnational Criminal Activities Across the Californian Border
The United States government spends more than $18 billion a year to secure the
2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border, which is more money spent than all other federal law
enforcement agencies combined: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service,
Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Marshal Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. The issue of transnational organized crime is a major
problem for California law officials.
According to the OAG (2014a), transnational criminal activities across the
California-Mexico border are on the rise, which is mostly due to the influx of Mexico-
based transnational criminal organizations. The Mexico-based criminal organizations
have adopted sophisticated means for transporting drugs, money, firearms, and people
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across the border. For instance, Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations like the
Sinaloa Federation, La Familia Michoacana, The Knights Templar, and others have
partnered with California prisons and street gangs to protect, secure, and eliminate threats
to their drug cartel operations. One of the byproducts of the Mexico-based drug
trafficking is the increase in gang membership and violence. For instance, gang
membership increased by 40% between 2009 and 2011. California also has reported an
increase in violent crimes such as extortion, homicide, intimidation, assault, shootings,
human trafficking, illegal weapons, and money laundering.
A major concern is the infusion of illegal drugs crossing the California border.
Mexican-based drug trafficking organizations such as the Sinaloa Federation have been
largely responsible for trafficking a vast majority of the marijuana, heroin,
methamphetamine, and cocaine through California. The California OAG (2014b)
estimates that Mexico drug cartels are responsible for over 70% of the methamphetamine
that is transited through the San Diego port, making California the primary distribution
center for the nation. In fact, the Gangs Beyond Borders report found that, in 2012, law
enforcement confiscated over 79,572 pounds of processed marijuana, 1,797 pounds of
cocaine, 133 gallons of meth solution, 3,146 pounds of methamphetamine, and 387
pounds of heroin. The border patrol also confiscated 20,885 handguns, 5,995 rifles, 3,939
shotguns, and 52 machine guns. Over 1,300 trafficked people were rescued. In addition,
law enforcement officials estimate that between $30 billion and $40 billion are laundered
in California each year.
California authorities face many challenges with regard to protecting citizens
from transnational criminals. Despite the prevalence of drug trafficking, human
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trafficking, and violence associated with transnational criminal activities, the number of
state-led task forces responsible for protecting Californians decreased from 55 in 2011 to
17 in 2013 (OAG, 2014a). Transnational criminal organizations have managed to subvert
the legal system to avoid prosecution. Federal, state, and local agencies have operated in
silos, further reducing their efficacy in combating these crimes. Finally, the budget for
training, staff development, and resources allocated to combating transnational crimes
has been severely reduced in recent years, making it harder for law enforcement agencies
to do their job.
2014 California State Attorney Report and Recommendations
In 2014, California Attorney General Kamala Harris issued a report entitled
Gangs Beyond Borders: California and the Fight Against Transnational Organized
Crime. The report addressed the growing threat posed by transnational criminal
organizations. While international crime groups have always had a presence in
California, the modern transnational crime organizations are more adaptive in evading
law enforcement officials, more fluid in incorporating modern infrastructure and
technologies to perpetuate their illegal dealings, and more likely to diversify their
criminal enterprises when compared to their larger, hierarchically organized
predecessors. Part of the complexity, the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) argued,
was due to the fact that these organizations have taken advantage of the technological
revolution of the last two decades, as well as advancements in trade, transport, and global
money transfers, to substantially increase the scale and profitability of their criminal
activities in California. (p. vii)
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Transnational organized crimes generally fall into three types: trafficking crimes,
financial crimes, and high-tech crimes. Trafficking crimes primarily involve importing
narcotics, humans, and firearms. Financial crimes include money laundering and bulk
cash smuggling. High-tech crimes involve identity theft, fraud, and hacking private
servers. The Mexico-based drug cartels decentralized by relying on the street gangs and
prisoners to distribute their goods.
There are four key types of transnational criminal organizations. First, the
Mexico-based cartels came to power as a result of a power vacuum left behind when the
Colombian government dismantled the Medellín and Cali drug cartels in the 1980s and
1990s. The second type of transnational criminal groups are Asian and Eastern European;
these groups leverage their respective immigrant communities to engage in transnational
crimes. These organizations are tied by shared ethnicities and are linked to identity theft,
credit card crimes, cybercrime, auto theft, narcotics distribution, human trafficking,
illegal gambling, domestic marijuana cultivation, and wildlife trafficking. Recently, street
gangs that share the same ethnic and nationality ties have also started operating both in
the United States and abroad. The third type of organization is the transnational gang.
Transnational gangs adhere to a hub and spoke model, which is “a hierarchical central
point directing regional ‘clique’ or ‘clica’ leadership” (p. 6). As part of their tactics to
circumvent the law, transnational gangs have teamed up with California street and prison
gangs and other transnational criminal organizations to coordinate money laundering,
extortion, human trafficking, intellectual property fraud, and contract killing. The fourth
type of criminal structure consists of online criminals from places as diverse as West
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Africa and China who are involved with transnational hacking, high-tech crimes, and
pirating.
To counter the rising tide of transnational criminal activity, the Gangs Beyond
Borders report provided 12 recommendations: legislation specifically targeting leaders of
transnational criminal organizations; leveraging California’s State Threat Assessment
System to combat transnational crime; establishing a unified maritime task force;
providing additional funding for special operations units; providing funding to support
state and local law enforcement agencies; increasing operational coordination;
developing public-private partnerships to leverage technology against transnational
organized crimes; adopting industry best practices to protect against cybercrime; giving
prosecutors the ability to freeze the assets of transnational criminal organizations;
strengthening prohibition against financial transaction structuring; advancing training to
combat sophisticated transnational money laundering; and partnering with Mexican
counterparts to share intelligence and disrupt the illicit flow of money flowing across the
border.
Statement of Problem and Need for Study
It is estimated that over $171 billion have been spent enforcing the border since
1986 when Congress officially passed the IRCA (Chishti & Kamasaki, 2011). Despite the
monetary investment, the border is still not secure; in fact, the Government
Accountability Office (2011) estimates that only 44% of the border is under operational
control. While the exact figures of those who successfully passed the border undetected
are unknown, experts predict that, for every illegal immigrant who is caught and
apprehended, three have successfully passed the border undetected (Plumer, 2013). This
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led U.S. Representative Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) to conclude, “You can’t ever seal the
border. You can never stop anything 100 percent. As long as there’s a market, as long as
there’s a profit, there will always be someone taking a chance on getting that product
through” (Mendoza, 2011 p. 3). The California-Mexico border in particular is the most
vulnerable to transnational criminal activities from Mexico.
Transnational criminal organizations threaten the safety and security of
communities across California. By joining forces with violent street gangs, drug cartels,
and prison inmates, transnational criminal organizations have become even more
sophisticated as they are able to circumvent the law and detection. Transnational criminal
organizations have also been able to diversify their criminal endeavors, from the
traditional crimes such as drug trafficking, weapons, and human trafficking to specialized
cybercrimes, sex trafficking, and money laundering. One of the unintended consequences
of transnational criminal activities is the increase in gang membership, which resulted in
higher levels of violent crimes and criminal activities related to drug and human
trafficking.
Based on the aforementioned issues, the California OAG issued the Gangs
Beyond Borders report, which examined the social and economic costs of transnational
criminal activities. The report also provided recommendations that involved providing
resources for trained officials combating the transnational criminal organizations, passing
laws that would pressure the criminal organizations and enable state officials to best
mobilize their resources, and providing strategic partnerships among law enforcement
agencies and local municipals. While the report was thorough and provided detailed
recommendations to combat transnational criminal organizations, the California OAG has
10

yet to conduct a comprehensive analysis to determine if these recommendations have
been successfully implemented throughout the state or if any such actions were
successful in reducing the levels of transnational criminal activities. This analysis is
critical since the United States spends over $18 billion to protect its border from illegal
drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, cyber warfare, and other nefarious
criminal activities. To assess their effectiveness, one needs to analyze the various
recommendations to see if such recommendations were implemented and if there were
barriers to implementation.
The report overlooked key factors that may hamper implementation of its
recommendations. For example, the Gangs Beyond Borders report suggested increasing
personnel to combat the violence. However, municipalities may be busy with other non-
transnational crimes and may be limited in terms of manpower and resources. Moreover,
local communities may be unable to train their officers due to the lack of funding. Laws
that allow prosecutors to expedite the legal process may have unintended ramifications on
other members of the community, such as transgressing on the civil liberties of other
citizens. Thus, the following dissertation may identify additional recommendations that
the original report overlooked.
Research Questions
To determine the extent to which the Gangs Beyond Borders report has been
successfully implemented or if it had an effect in mitigating the activities of transnational
criminal organizations, this dissertation attempts to answer the following research
questions:
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• Have the 12 recommendations in the Attorney General’s report been
implemented?
• What are the barriers to implementation?
• Are there additional policy recommendations that could improve
implementation?
The purpose of the first research question is to determine if the 12
recommendations have been implemented. Some recommendations require additional
resources, legal approval, or complex coordination between various agencies. As a result,
some recommendations may be harder to implement than others. The purpose of the
second research question is to identify barriers to implementation. Some of the
recommendations require an overhaul of the current methods for securing the border, and,
as such, they may require additional manpower, resources, and support from key
stakeholders. The purpose of the third research question is to determine if additional
policy recommendations could be provided to improve implementation.
Advance in Practice and Significance of the Project
Transnational criminal organizations pose a menace to society because these
organizations are chiefly responsible for bringing illegal drugs, people, guns, illegal
currency, cybercrimes, and other nefarious activities into the United States. Even though
the U.S. government spends billions of dollars to protect its border, transnational criminal
organizations persist due to the profitability of human and drug trafficking. In fact,
experts estimate that illegal drug trafficking is worth over $320 billion while human
trafficking is worth over $150 billion annually (Organization of American States, 2013).
12

The issue of transnational organized crime is a particular challenge for California.
The sophisticated network between transnational organizations, prison inmates, and street
gangs, coupled with a reduction in resources for combating transnational crimes and
advances in technology, have made it virtually impossible for Californian law
enforcement agencies to completely protect the border.
To mitigate the growing threat, the OAG issued a report providing 12
recommendations to combat the transnational criminal epidemic, but there are many
barriers to implementing this policy. First, policymakers often issue reports with
recommendations but seldom provide follow-up on their recommendations. Second,
policy recommendations may appear easy on paper but may be hard to implement in
practice due to the complexity of the issue. Finally, policy implementation may
negatively impact the desired outcome, lead to failure, or require new policy to carry
forth the recommendations (Office of Federal Register, n.d.). This is the case because the
recommendations may be complex.
To mitigate the complexity of implementing the 12 recommendations, this
dissertation consists of a policy analysis to determine if these were implemented, identify
barriers to success, and provide additional recommendations. This project advances
practice because it informs policymakers and the public on the status of implementation
of the recommendations presented in the OAG’s report and to improve the practice of
reducing transnational crime through effective policy. It is anticipated that this project
will generate interest among public safety agencies and homeland security professionals,
and it may influence how subsequent reports on transitional crime are issued and
13

evaluated. Furthermore, this project will provide recommendations on the next steps that
can be taken to address transnational crime in California.
Outline of Research Project
The remainder of this research project is divided into five chapters. Chapter Two
examines the 2014 Gangs Beyond Borders report in greater detail by outlining its
rationale and background, major goals and objectives, major findings, and, finally, the 12
resulting recommendations. Chapter Three provides a literature review of the
transnational criminal organizations and their impact in California. Chapter Four
summarizes the methods and clarifies the need for a policy analysis. Chapter Five
summarizes the results of the policy analysis by determining whether the 12
recommendations were implemented, clarifying barriers impacting the implementation of
the recommendations, and providing additional recommendations. Chapter Six provides a
discussion of the dissertation, suggestions to improve the implementation process, and
final thoughts on the impact of transnational criminal organizations.
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Chapter 2: The 2014 Gang Beyond Borders Report
In 2014, California Attorney General Kamala Harris issued a report titled Gangs
Beyond Borders. Considered one of the first comprehensive reports of its kind, Gangs
Beyond Borders addressed the growing threat from transnational criminal organizations
relating to drug trafficking, money laundering, high-tech crimes, and the smuggling of
humans and weapons.
The report was the result of a collaboration among local municipalities, state law
enforcement agencies, academic researchers, and activists from nonprofit organizations
with expertise in combating transnational criminal organizations. One of the underlying
themes was that the threat of transnational criminal activity cannot be handled solely by
California given the fact that the state’s geography and size make it a perfect target for
transnational crime. Since 2008, Mexican drug cartels have increased their influence in
California from the Mexican border all the way to Northern California. The report also
found that 70% of all methamphetamine sold in the United States comes through
California. Local law enforcement agencies have had to change their strategies in
addressing this emerging threat. However, the strategies employed by law enforcement
are lagging the advances that criminal enterprises are making in California.
The report leaned on California lawmakers to return over $70 million in funding
to local law enforcement agencies so that they can implement programs and expend
resources to combat this growing threat. The report also found that transnational criminal
organizations are using new technology and social media to further their criminal
activity, aid in recruitment, and incite fear, intimidation, and harassment on California’s
15

citizens. The spillover violence from these criminal organizations might be as close as
our backyards based on findings within the report.
The Case for the 2014 Gangs Beyond Borders Report
If California were considered a country, it would be the sixth largest economy in
the world with an annual economic output of $2.44 trillion, surpassing that of France,
India, Italy, and Brazil (Footprint to Africa, 2016). While a leader in international
commerce, California has also attracted more narcotics, weapons, and human tracking
than any other state in America (California OAG, 2014a). This is the case because
transnational criminal organizations are keen to establish a presence in the Golden State
to take advantage of the financial institutions, local infrastructure, businesses, and local
communities. Aside from engaging in illegal drug smuggling, human trafficking, and
other nefarious activities, transnational criminal organizations have also been actively
engaging in cybercrimes to fund their ventures.
While the issues of transnational criminal activities have plagued California since
the 1980s, it was not until the 2012 report entitled The State of Human Trafficking in
California that the California OAG started to investigate the impact of transnational
crimes. The report provided various prosecutorial strategies for targeting human
traffickers. Though instructive, the 2012 report only focused on one facet of these
activities rather than examining human trafficking from a holistic perspective.
By 2014, the California OAG published another report entitled Gangs Beyond
Borders: California and the Fight Against Transnational Organized Crime. The
comprehensive report was novel in many regards. First, it examined transnational
criminal activities in terms of three emerging pillars: the trafficking of drugs, money
16

laundering, and high-tech crimes. Previous reports only examined transnational criminal
activities from a single vantage point. Second, the report was a collaborative effort
involving experts from public policy institutions, academia, law enforcement agencies,
local governments, and the private sector. By involving other key stakeholders, the
Gangs Beyond Borders report addressed a wide range of issues from a cross-sectoral
perspective.
Major Objectives and Findings from the 2014 Gangs Beyond Borders Report
The major objective of the Gangs Beyond Borders report was to inform the public
regarding the impact of transnational criminal activities. Another goal of the report was to
convene a working group of academic researchers, public policy experts, national
security experts, nonprofit activists, and various law enforcement agencies to tackle the
problem and provide recommendations.
Through intense collaboration, the California OAG found that, while transnational
organized crime poses a significant threat to society, the problem is not insurmountable.
To overcome the problem, the report found three emerging trends. The first was the
emergence of drug trafficking from Mexico. The second was the impact of money
laundering across the border. The third was the rise of high-tech crimes. These trends
have emerged at a time when California was experiencing unprecedented economic
prosperity.
Pillar 1: Drug trafficking. According to Gangs Beyond Borders, there are over
305 drug-related transnational cartels operating in California, and their combined illegal
drug trafficking efforts have generated billions of dollars in profit. While law
enforcement agencies have experienced success in intercepting the flow of illegal drugs,
17

they cannot completely protect California’s border given the fact that only 44% of the
U.S.-Mexico border is under operational control (United States Congress Committee on
Homeland Security, 2011). It is virtually impossible for law enforcement agencies to
monitor every motorist at any given time. A majority of the drugs are trafficked through
the Tijuana border. Then, it is transported into San Diego, then Los Angeles, and, finally,
into the San Francisco and Sacramento areas. These major cities serve as distribution
centers where the drugs are then transported into other parts of the United States and
Canada.
The recent development of trafficking across the California border did not occur
overnight. By the 1980s and 1990s, the Colombian government successfully dismantled
the Medellín and Cali drug cartels; these cartels controlled a highly profitable cocaine
drug route into the United States. The removal of the Colombian drug cartels enabled the
Mexican drug cartels to take over the power vacuum, and these cartels were mainly led
by the Arellano Félix Organization and the Carrillo Fuentes Family cartels. In 2000, a
joint U.S.-Mexico government effort successfully dismantled the majority of Mexican
cartels.
While considered a success, the dismantling of the Mexican-based cartels resulted
in a power vacuum that was eventually filled by the Sinaloa Federation that had its roots
in the breakup of the Guadalajara cartel in the 1980s. The Sinaloa Federation now
operates in California. Experts have identified the Sinaloa Federation as the primary
group responsible for the trafficking of humans, weapons, and drugs across the U.S.-
Mexico border.
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Pillar 2: Money laundering. According to Gangs Beyond Borders, money
laundering is defined as “a process designed to mislead law enforcement and
mischaracterize the source and origin of the financial proceeds resulting from criminal
activities, or ‘dirty money’” (OAG, 2014a, p. 21). The El Paso Intelligence Center, which
is a federal agency responsible for data analysis on currency and narcotics seizures, found
that California is among the top two states where “narco-dollars are seized and to which
seized narco-dollars are destined” (OAG, 2014a, p. 21). While the scope of money
laundering in California is unknown, law officials estimate that approximately $30 to $40
billion are laundered. Illegal cash proceeds are estimated to be between $18 and $39
million. Cash smuggling is also known as bulk cash, and California law enforcement
agencies seized over $130 million in bulk cash in 2012.
Due to the clandestine nature of money laundering and the complicated legal
process associated with this activity, law officials find it difficult to expose and prosecute
those engaging in money laundering. First, California’s law requires that “state
prosecutors prove a money launderer intentionally structured a financial transaction to
disguise that the proceeds were derived from a criminal activity or, alternatively, were
structured to promote or further criminal activity” (OAG p.24). The special burden
hampers prosecutors from targeting those engaging in money laundering. Second, federal
and state law has indirectly enabled criminals to launder money legally. For instance,
those who bring in $10,000 or more into the United States must declare it through
customs and treasury officials. Once legally declared, these individuals directly deposit
the money into the nearest financial institutions or ATM kiosks, thereby undermining the
legal system and gaining legal protection. These individuals funnel the money into
19

transnational criminal organizations who use it to finance their operations. Finally,
California, New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas have formed a loose alliance to combat
money laundering, but law officials have not leveraged this partnership to its fullest.
Pillar 3: High-tech crimes. The role of high-tech crimes has increased over time
with the number of breaches in the United States increasing by 280% between 2009 and
2012. The costs associated with cybercrimes and data breaches are estimated to increase
to $2 trillion by 2019 (Morgan, 2016). In the past, skilled hackers who were motivated to
boost their reputation within the hacker community spearheaded much of cybercrime.
Now, a majority of data breaches and high-tech crimes are run by transnational criminal
enterprises. In fact, in a global survey, Verizon (2013) found that external actors
constituted over 55% of the unauthorized breaches of government or government entities.
High-tech crimes are not as high-risk as drug and human trafficking, but high-tech
crimes are hard to detect and to prosecute since most of the transnational crimes are
committed in Eastern Europe. Second, international jurisdiction prevents law
enforcement agencies from successfully prosecuting transnational criminal organizations.
Third, the advent of technologies and high-speed Internet has reduced “transaction costs,”
allowing criminals to exploit the United States and Western Europe from afar. Finally,
criminal organizations have outsourced the dirty work using clandestine websites in the
dark market.
Major Recommendations from the 2014 Gangs Beyond Borders Report
The California OAG provided 12 recommendations based on its findings relating
to the impact of drug and human trafficking, money laundering, and high-tech crimes.
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Recommendation 1: The legislature should amend California law to target
the leaders of transnational criminal organizations operating in California.
California does not have a statutory authority that specifically targets or prosecutes those
who lead operations on behalf of transnational criminal organizations. For example, high-
level street gang members who supervise, organize, manage, or finance the supply chain
are treated as co-conspirators or aiders and abettors similar to their underlings or foot
soldiers. That is, high-level prison or street gang members who are in charge of logistics
and operations are not punished accordingly.
California should broaden existing laws to increase penalties against those who
organize, supervise, finance or manage these criminal enterprises. By incorporating the
Criminal Enterprise Act provision, law enforcement agencies may be able to increase
potential sentencing and fines for those who manage, organize, and finance the criminal
enterprise. This law would increase the penalties of incarceration and the immediate
seizure and forfeiture of any illegal funds or property, which would deprive the criminal
organization of its working capital. Other states have passed similar laws that increased
the criminal liability of large-scale narcotic operators beyond that of their employees or
their underlings who are generally the first to be caught in law enforcement dragnets.
Recommendation 2: Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies
should use California’s State Threat Assessment System as a central hub for sharing
information about transnational crime. There are over 500 law enforcement agencies
operating within California, but California does not have a unified system for collecting,
analyzing, and disseminating information relating to transnational organized crime.
California’s State Threat Assessment System (CSTAS, California Governor's Office of
21

Emergency Services, 2017) is a single point access center located in Sacramento and is
uniquely positioned to serve as a central hub for transnational criminal information.
Unfortunately, not leveraged among law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement
agencies should leverage the statewide system as a platform to share information about
presidential criminal organizations across the state of California.
Currently, California does not have a single system that integrates databases of
criminal activity into a central system for easy access. This recommendation encourages
and directs law enforcement agencies to share pertinent information and establish a
common operating platform across California. This recommendation will expedite
prosecutorial process and will also benefit agencies with limited funding who participate
in the system.
Recommendation 3: Federal, state, and local authorities should establish a
unified maritime task force and associated radar network to counter maritime
smuggling operations along California’s coastline. Maritime task forces in California
are often established on an as-needed basis and are specific to geographic areas along
California’s coast near major cities such as Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco.
This has made the task of enforcing the 600 miles of coastline difficult and ineffective.
Limited resource is another barrier, with some jurisdictions being better equipped than
others. For instance, larger jurisdictions like Los Angeles and Long Beach have the
resources to partner with regional security and federal agencies while others are not so
effective.
The report recommends that various local, state, and federal law enforcement
agencies establish a new multiple-jurisdictional maritime task force to leverage the local,
22

state, and federal levels to combat the threats along the coastline. By integrating the
various coastal radar systems and other technologies, law enforcement agencies can
develop a common operating protocol along the entire coastline and manage security
breaches.
Recommendation 4: The legislature and governor should fund five additional
special operations units across California. Transnational criminal organizations have
become increasingly sophisticated in their methods and operations. Research by the
California Department of Justice Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement found that special
task forces such as the special operations units (SOU) were highly effective in
dismantling transnational criminal organizations. However, severe budget cutbacks
resulted in the reduction of state special task forces from 55 in 2011 to 17 in 2013, which
constituted a 70% reduction in operational capacity.
Currently, there is only one SOU division located in Fresno, California. While the
only remaining unit since the 2011 budget cuts, the Fresno unit has proven to be highly
successful in combating transnational criminal activities. For instance, the unit has netted
over $6.6 million in U.S. currency from its counterintelligence operations. The report
recommends that California open more SOU offices in Sacramento, San Francisco,
Riverside, Los Angeles, and San Diego. The operating budget for these five additional
units would be approximately $7.5 million and would greatly enhance the state’s ability
to build cases against transnational criminal organizations.
Recommendation 5: The federal government should continue providing
critical funding to support state and local law enforcement agencies for investigating
and dismantling trafficking organizations. One source of revenue came from grants.
23

One such grant was the Bryne Justice Assistance Grant (Bryne JAG), which enabled the
Department of Justice to fund state task forces such as the SOUs. Unfortunately, much of
the grant funds that enabled law enforcement agencies to combat transnational criminal
activities were severely reduced. As a result, criminal activities increased significantly.
For instance, there has been a significant increase in methamphetamine trafficking from
both foreign and domestic drug cartels following 2011.
The report recommends continuing or increasing critical funding to support both
state and local law enforcement agencies that investigate and dismantle trafficking
organizations. Congressional funding should also be maintained or increased for
California’s law enforcement agencies in charge of combating transnational criminal
organizations.
Recommendation 6: Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies
should increase operational coordination in combating transnational criminal
organizations. Operational coordination allows law enforcement agencies to better
utilize their resources and other prosecutorial authorities to combat transnational crime.
Due to the fact that transnational criminal organizations operate through international
networks, it is imperative that local, state, and federal enforcement work together to
improve intelligence exchange, develop stronger partnerships between state and federal
agencies, and coordinate efforts with state and federal health and correction agencies to
reduce the demand for drugs.
To enhance operational coordination, the report recommends the following: (1)
improve intelligence sharing among federal, state and local agencies; (2) partner with
local agencies and the U.S. Forest Service and National Park Service to eradicate the
24

cultivation of marijuana on public lands; and (3) coordinate between public health
agencies to reduce the demand for drugs trafficked by transnational criminal
organizations.
Recommendation 7: State and local authorities should develop public-private
partnerships to leverage technology against transnational organized crime. Eighty-
five percent of our nation’s critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private
sector. By forming a partnership between the private and public sectors, state and local
authorities can better leverage the private sector’s strength in utilizing the latest
technological capabilities to counter the ever-changing threats and tactics imposed by
transnational criminal organizations.
Law enforcement agencies should capitalize on the relationship within the private
sector. Due to the nature of bureaucracies, laws, and protocols, public agencies cannot
keep up with new and emerging technologies. This is particularly relevant because
transnational criminal entities are using advanced technologies to avoid detection and
prosecution. Developing these partnerships would enable public agencies to maintain
access to advancements in technology.
Recommendation 8: Businesses should adopt industry’s best practices
designed to protect against cybercrime. California experiences a barrage of cyber-
attacks in both the public and private sectors. Lax attitudes toward cyber security and
lack of protection resulted in computer and network breaches that have cost California
billions of dollars in economic losses. To mitigate the impact of the cyber-attacks, the
California Department of Justice (2014) released a report offering practical guidance on
how to minimize cyber vulnerabilities. To help businesses protect against cybercrime, the
25

report recommends they adopt best practices such as maintaining constant vigilance,
conducting a comprehensive review of the organization’s data, encrypting the data, and
ensuring that bank information is secured and protected.
Recommendation 9: The legislature should amend California law to enable
prosecutors to temporarily freeze the assets of transnational criminal organizations
and their gang associates before the filing of an indictment. Current laws do not allow
prosecutors to temporarily freeze assets during seizures. This loophole enabled
transnational criminal organizations to transfer assets from the targeted bank account into
another account and, therefore, avoid prosecutorial authority. The funds are funneled to
other shell organizations. These loopholes must be eliminated so that law enforcement
can have the power to temporarily freeze illegal proceeds or property prior to a formal
prosecution.
Transnational criminals are adept at avoiding asset forfeiture by moving assets
and other profits out of the state. Similar to federal laws that authorize prosecutors to
freeze assets and property without prior notice, California prosecutors should be allowed
the same equal authority as their counterparts to disrupt the funding mechanisms. The
report recommends that California amend laws to enable prosecutors to temporarily
freeze the assets of transnational criminal organizations and their gang associates before
the filing of an indictment. Doing so will close the existing legal loophole.
Recommendation 10: The legislature should strengthen California’s
prohibition against financial transaction structuring. Federal regulation requires that
institutions report all financial transactions involving amounts greater than $10,000 or
multiple currency transactions over $10,000 in one day. While federal laws make it a
26

federal crime to break up, or structure, financial transactions, the law does not require
prosecutors to prove that the structuring is intended to facilitate criminal activities. Under
current California law, prosecutors must prove intent to structure the money for criminal
purposes via breaking up the money into smaller amounts and laundering it into shell
corporations. In other words, California prosecutors must demonstrate that the laundered
money is intentionally disguised and the proceeds are the byproduct of illegal criminal
activity. This requirement hampers the prosecutor’s abilities to disrupt money laundering
schemes because it provides an additional barrier that prosecutors must overcome before
being able to properly prosecute. The report recommends that California simplify its anti-
structuring laws and make it illegal for any person to break up larger transactions into
smaller amounts for the purpose of avoiding law authorities.
Recommendation 11: California prosecutors need advanced training to
combat sophisticated transnational money laundering schemes. Transnational
criminal organizations have adopted sophisticated means for laundering money, and this
is occurring during a time when statewide budgets relating to investigatory and
prosecutorial capabilities are being reduced. Providing law enforcement the training and
technical assistance to investigate and prosecute complex money laundering schemes is
critical in combating the illegal funding that supports transnational criminal
organizations.
The report recommends that the Department of Justice leverage existing resources
and partnerships to increase training for California prosecutors. Doing so will expand the
pool of trained experts who can then go on to equip prosecutors with knowledge of the
latest money laundering schemes.
27

Recommendation 12: State authorities should partner with their Mexican
counterparts to share intelligence and disrupt illicit flow of money across the
border. Transnational criminal organizations have leveraged the global economy to
launder money and transfer illicit funds into the legitimate financial system.
Transnational criminal organizations set up shell corporations in the United States and
Mexico, and they send people to cross the border to deposit the money via legitimate
institutions.
The report recommends that California state agencies partner with their Mexican
counterparts to collaborate and eliminate the illicit flow of money across the border. The
recommendation encourages California financial and banking regulators to work with
Mexico’s Banking and Securities Commission.
Conclusion
The Gangs Beyond Borders report provides an overview of the growing threat
from transnational criminal organizations relating to money laundering, drug trafficking,
high-tech crimes, and other illegal activities. The report found that California’s vibrant
economy has made it the ideal marketplace for narcotics, illegal weapon smuggling, and
human trafficking. Gangs Beyond Borders was unique in that it examined transnational
criminal activities from three emerging pillars: the trafficking of drugs, money
laundering, and high-tech crimes. Also, the report was the result of collaboration among
law enforcement agencies, the academic community, nonprofit organizations, and public
businesses across California.
Each year, thousands of pounds of drugs are illegally transported into California.
International drug cartels have high success rates in transporting drugs into California
28

because they have established a complex network of drug centers in Los Angeles, San
Diego, Sacramento, and San Francisco which serve as distribution hubs for other parts of
the United States and Canada. Law experts estimate that approximately $30 to $40 billion
are laundered each year. The clandestine nature of money laundering has made it
complicated for legal experts to expose and to prosecute these crimes. The prevalence of
high-tech crimes has increased significantly over recent years, and a majority of the high-
tech crimes are now masterminded by transnational criminal enterprises. High-tech
crimes pose minimal risks with maximal gains since the crimes are hard to identify and
prosecute. Also, high-tech crimes occur in Eastern Europe where legal prosecution is
difficult.
To combat the influence of transnational criminal organizations, the California
OAG provided 12 recommendations focused on targeting drug and human trafficking,
money laundering, and high-tech crimes. These recommendations varied from amending
existing laws to make prosecution easier, to leveraging existing resources to share
information across various agencies, to establishing a public-private partnership to
respond to the growing technological threat, and, finally, to increasing the training,
manpower, and resources related to combating transnational criminal organizations.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review
The following section is divided into three main parts: the historical and complex
relationship between the United States and Mexico; the modern challenges relating to
human trafficking, drug smuggling, and high-tech crimes; and the present-day issue of
immigration, trade, and border control. To understand how transnational criminal
organizations have infected California, it is necessary to examine the historical
relationship between the United States and Mexico during the 19th, 20th, and 21st
centuries. Human trafficking, drug smuggling, and other nefarious activities transpiring
across the U.S.-Mexico border are not the byproduct of the modern era, but, rather, the
continuation of the complex and complicated dynamics between the two nations present
since their inception. Throughout history, both nations dealt with conflicts over land
disputes, trade, and securing national sovereignty, particularly in the aftermath of
September 11.
Second, this chapter examines the prevalence of transnational crimes such as
human trafficking, drug smuggling, money laundering, and high-tech crimes. Human
trafficking is a lucrative enterprise for transnational criminal organizations that is
estimated to be worth $150 billion a year (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
2017). To put it simply, transnational criminal organizations traffic humans because they
can reap financial gains. Transnational criminal organizations have been utilizing the
drug trade as one of their main sources of income throughout California since the 1800s
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2014). California is a major leader in technology and
30

innovation, and the state is an attractive target for cybercriminals due to the sheer size of
its economy.
Finally, this chapter also discusses the issue of immigration, highlighting the fact
that Mexican immigrants are essential to the U.S. economy despite public perception. It
also examines the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). While NAFTA
enables both nations to experience an unprecedented level of commerce, the equitable
trade rules have also enabled criminal groups to transport illegal exports easily between
the two countries. The issue of border security is also examined relative to the statistics
on drug, human trafficking, and undocumented immigrants entering the United States.
Historical Relationship Between the United States and Mexico
The issues of human trafficking, drug smuggling, and various organized crimes
transpiring across the U.S.-Mexico border are not a new phenomenon, but, rather, a
continuation of a complex and tumultuous relationship between the two nations since
their inception. Mexico exports 80% of its product to the United States and enjoys an
unprecedented level of trade, tourism, and other joint partnerships with its northern ally
(OAG, 2014a). Mexico is nevertheless weary of its northern neighbor, given the fact that
the last border dispute resulted in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 wherein
Mexico ceded over 525,000 square miles of land to the United States (The Library of
Congress, 2017). Since then, any military assistance from the United States is often
viewed with skepticism.
U.S.-Mexican Relations During the 19th Century. Mexico gained
independence from Spain in 1821. Not long after independence, Mexico and the United
States faced a conflict over Americans settling in Texas, as Mexico wanted to prevent
31

English-speakers from flooding the territory. When Mexico tried to enforce laws
regarding slavery, a rebellion by Americans occurred. Texas became a U.S. state in 1845,
which led to Mexico severing diplomatic ties with the United States. Shortly thereafter,
the Mexican-American War began, facilitated by the Manifest Destiny argument that the
United States had a moral obligation to expand west. The war ended in 1848, with
Mexico ceding Arizona, New Mexico, and California to the United States, but minor
skirmishes continued for most of the century (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).
U.S.-Mexico Relations During the 20th Century. Around the start of WWI,
civil war broke out in Mexico. In 1916, Francisco “Pancho” Villa led an attack on New
Mexico, leading to the deaths of 17 Americans. In response, President Wilson sent
10,000 troops to Mexico to capture Villa. A year later, he withdrew the troops due to
their failure to capture Villa, but the prolonged presence of U.S. troops caused further
damage to already fragile U.S.-Mexico relations. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his
Good Neighbor Policy, announced a major policy change regarding Mexico, opposing
armed intervention in Latin America and reassuring the region that the United States
would not pursue interventionist policies (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).
The Council on Foreign Relations (2017) rightly points out that immigration is
not a new concern: although the U.S. had allowed Mexicans to cross the border unabated
during WWII to help with the worker shortage, President Eisenhower’s Operation
Wetback forcibly repatriated around a million Mexicans across the border. However, in
the 1960s, economic ties with Mexico were restored via the maquiladoras, or assembly
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plants, built along the U.S.-Mexico border. The maquiladoras were a major source of
income for Mexico.
Still, U.S.-Mexico relations suffered a heavy blow when President Nixon’s war on
drugs led to agents being placed along the border to search all cars and persons entering
the United States. Because this was done without consulting the Mexican government,
the Mexicans understandably reacted with anger. Though some joint task force operations
were carried out, the United States does not see the Mexican government as dedicated to
the war on drugs and often acts unilaterally (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).
U.S.-Mexico Relations During the 21st century. Following the 9/11 attacks, the
Department of Homeland Security was created, and the number of border agents doubled.
This led to Mexican migrant workers staying illegally in the United States rather than
crossing the border seasonally (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017). The relationship
between the United States and Mexico strengthened when Felipe Calderon was elected
President of Mexico in 2006. Calderon sent thousands of federal troops to fight the drug
cartels, and the United States provided Mexico with $400 million a year in assistance
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).
Unfortunately, the relationship between the two nations suffered a heavy blow in
2010 when Arizona passed SB 1070, a law that required, in part, that police officers
check a person’s immigration status while enforcing other laws (Council on Foreign
Relations, 2017). Ultimately, this section of SB 1070 was blocked by a federal judge, a
decision welcomed by Mexico, who argued that the joint border is best protected via all-
inclusive immigration reform (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017). It is too soon to tell
33

what impact President Trump’s proposed border wall will have on U.S.-Mexico relations,
although it is safe to say that the relationship is strained.
Human Trafficking
Free trade and illegal smuggling. The globalization of free trade and advances
in technology increased interdependencies between neighboring states, which have also
resulted in increased illicit flows (Naim, 2006). Mexico is an important part of U.S.
foreign policy because of a shared geographical land border, economic markets, and
national security, and we must work together to solve this emerging threat. One
successful method of working together is by using fusion centers (Department of
Homeland Security, 2015).
The North American Free Trade Agreement fostered an economic relationship by
virtue of the agreement’s comprehensive, market-opening rules. U.S. goods and services
trade with Mexico totaled $500 billion in 2011 while exports from the United States to
Mexico totaled $224 billion and imports totaled $277 billion. The U.S. goods and
services trade deficit with Mexico was $53 billion in 2011 (Office of the United States
Trade Representative, 2018). NAFTA has also created a more equitable set of trade rules
as trade barriers in Mexico are reduced and eliminated. However, these open trade rules
and reduced barriers also created opportunities for criminal groups to benefit from the
loosening of trade and free movement of goods between countries.
By leveraging these pro-trade rules, criminals in Mexico and the United States are
able to move illegal goods and services across the border in both directions. Drugs and
human trafficking move into the U.S. while guns and money flow south into Mexico.
Transnational criminal organizations have also taken advantage of NAFTA policy by
34

laundering money into shell corporations to increase their profits in the movement of
goods, services and money from illicit activities (Faux, 2012).
Smuggling may be one of the world’s oldest professions; for as long as political
authorities and governments have sought to control borders and ports of entry, criminal
enterprises have tried to circumvent them, evading customs duties and trafficking in illicit
goods. Mexico is no different (Patrick, 2013). For instance, the cocaine that flows from
Mexico into the United States alone makes for a $40 billion industry; the United States is
the biggest consumer worldwide. Since 2001, over $90 billion has been spent on
protecting our borders, but measuring effectiveness is still a challenge. Matching the cost
of enforcement to the profits made in the illegal drug industry is not the solution, but
targeting spending in the right areas could lead to a better outcome. According to former
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano (2013), “It is safe to say
that there has been more money, manpower, infrastructure, [and] technology, invested in
the border-protection mission in the last three years than ever before” (Robbins, 2012,
para. 8). One question to consider is whether spending on border security and
immigration provide a benefit in halting drug flows into the United States.
Human trafficking as a criminal enterprise. The Department of Homeland
Security (2015) defines human trafficking as a “modern-day slavery [that] involves the
use of force, fraud, or coercion to obtain some type of labor or commercial sex act” (para.
1). In California, sex trafficking is increasing yearly (Ali, 2017). Human trafficking is
happening every day in communities of California, specifically in suburban communities.
Contrary to popular belief, human trafficking occurs in affluent areas and not just the
impoverished or economically depressed areas. Traffickers are targeting these areas as
35

destinations for trafficking, as they can charge more money: “Whatever the price in Los
Angeles County, whatever the price in San Diego County, it’s going to be twice the price
in Orange County and it’s going to be worth the trip for them” (Walker, 2016). Thus,
human trafficking is on the rise in California, specifically in the most elite geographic
locations. Next, it will be essential to identify how transnational criminal organizations
are operating in the state.
Human trafficking is an emerging illegal enterprise for transnational criminal
organizations. According to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2017) data,
human trafficking now generates an estimated $150 billion a year. Human trafficking is
relatively easy because the victims are provided a false narrative and led to believe that
they are coming to the United States for a better life and good jobs. Because of this ruse,
they willingly comply with their smugglers and can hide in plain sight as willing
participants, giving no indication that they are being trafficked.
Transnational criminal organizations traffic humans because they can reap
financial gains, over and over, in contrast to drugs. In addition, human trafficking is less
likely to be discovered because the law is currently aimed at the victims of trafficking by
labeling them “prostitutes” rather than victims. According to the Department of
Homeland Security (2017),
Every year, millions of men, women, and children are trafficked in countries
around the world, including the United States. It is estimated that human
trafficking generates many billions of dollars of profit per year, second only to
drug trafficking as the most profitable form of transnational crime. (para. 2).
36

Victims typically become so manipulated and mind-controlled that they rarely inform law
enforcement about their situation. Therefore, victims often will be arrested and charged
with prostitution. However, the pimp
1
is rarely caught, which is one reason transnational
criminal organizations are enticed by human trafficking. The criminal organizations have
mastered a variety of different ways to reach their victims as well.
Mexican cartels are well known for the exploitation and trafficking of their own
citizens into California. Proximity to the Mexican border is one reason sex trafficking is
on the rise in California in comparison to other states: “Mexican cartels build and operate
underground cross-border tunnels for the trafficking of guns, drugs, and human beings.
This is deeply concerning because it is estimated that 800,000 adults and 20,000 children
are annual victims of human trafficking in Mexico” (United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, 2010).
Challenges in combating sex trafficking. According to the state of California
Department of Justice (2012), most of the trafficked victims are citizens of the United
States. Transnational criminal organizations seek vulnerable victims whom they can
easily exploit:
They look for people who are susceptible for a variety of reasons, including
psychological or emotional vulnerability, economic hardship, lack of a social
safety net, natural disaster, or political instability. The trauma caused by
traffickers can be so great that many may not identify themselves as victims or
ask for help, even in highly public settings. (State of California Department of
Justice, 2012, para. 3)

1
A man who controls prostitutes and arranges clients for them, taking part of their earnings in return.
37

Therefore, California law enforcement officials struggle with identifying a victim
versus a willing sex worker. Transnational criminal organizations reap financial gains in
the billions, with little risk of being arrested. In addition, transnational criminal
organizations are highly attracted to California for a variety of reasons: “California’s
extensive internal border, airports and harbors, large native and immigrant populations
and strong economy make it a prime location for human traffickers” (United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010, p. 4). Transnational criminals leverage technology and
the Internet as a recruitment tool. The criminals will pose as model agencies looking to
hire women and pay for their plane ticket.
These criminals target naïve, and oftentimes underage, vulnerable young women
and men with the allure of fame and money. According to the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (2010), “Traffickers are reaching more victims and customers through
recruiting and advertising online” (p. 3). Traffickers have mastered different
psychological and manipulative techniques to control their victims. They promise high-
paying jobs, social support, and other benefits that attract these naïve and vulnerable
individuals.
Transnational criminal organizations have become so skilled in their techniques
that victims will not speak out to law enforcement agents due to fear and intimidation.
The Polaris Project (2016) points out that “Traffickers employ a variety of control tactics,
including physical and emotional abuse, sexual assault, confiscation of identification and
money, isolation from friends and family, and even renaming victims. Often, traffickers
identify and leverage their victims’ vulnerabilities to create dependency” (n.p.).
38

Consequently, targeting and finding the traffickers has been shown to be very challenging
for law enforcement in California.
Laws on human trafficking. Human trafficking laws in California generally do
not target the leaders of transnational criminal organizations who operate human
trafficking rings (OAG, 2014a). They are mostly aimed at the low-level criminals who
act as the foot soldiers for these large sophisticated criminal networks or the victims who
have been forced into prostitution. The state legislature has taken steps to de-criminalize
minor prostitution but has done little to target the leaders of these rings. This change in
the law is highly beneficial for victims of sex trafficking because they will no longer be
treated as criminals when they are typically the victim of the situation. According to Ortiz
(2016),
[Republican Assemblyman] Allen acknowledged that Democrats are “sincere in
their belief that decriminalizing underage prostitution is a good public policy that
will help victims of sex trafficking.” But he said SB 1322 is “misguided” because
it would theoretically allow pimps to exploit children. SB 1322, he added, bars
law enforcement from arresting sex workers who are under the age of 18 for
soliciting or engaging in prostitution, or loitering with the intent to do so (n.p.).
Thus, it is clear this law is the first step to protecting the victims of sex trafficking;
however, there is still an abundance of changes that need to be made to reduce
trafficking.
The lack of legislation aimed at stopping human trafficking has given rise to
many activists and human rights groups. One such group is California Against Slavery
(CAS), which has been pushing an initiative to changes laws and regulations against
39

human trafficking in California. One of the main concerns CAS holds is the lack of
awareness associated with human trafficking in the United States, specifically in
California:
Make human trafficking a mainstream topic. The initiative will raise awareness
among Californians and allow over seventeen million voters the opportunity to
speak out right against this evil crime. Until the American public embraces human
trafficking as our issue, the effort against human trafficking will see little victory
globally and domestically. (CAS, 2016, para. 4)
Moreover, the organization wants to set new human trafficking laws that are
relevant to the different techniques traffickers use in modern-day America. The laws need
to be renovated and improved to reduce the amount of human trafficking in California.
CAS (2016) argues that the state should “Set a new standard for human trafficking laws.
Other states look to California before they enact new laws. We can set the standard for
the rest of the country. We can lead the way and set the bar high” (n.p.). As one of the
more innovative states, California needs to take the first major step in improving laws
and increasing penalties associated with human trafficking crimes.
The CAS ballot initiative includes seven recommendations to reduce human
trafficking. The first two recommendations focus on prison terms and fines associated
with human traffickers: “Increase prison terms for human traffickers, up to 15-years-to-
life for sex trafficking of a minor. Increase fines for human traffickers, up to $1.5M to
fund victim services” (CAS, 2016). These serious consequences could deter transnational
criminal organizations from committing this crime at the rate they have been. The next
five recommendations focus on the victim and improving laws to arrest traffickers, such
40

as removing the need to prove force to prosecute sex trafficking of a minor, mandating
that human trafficking be illegal, making sex traffickers register as sex offenders,
requiring all sex offenders to disclose Internet accounts, and prohibiting the use of sexual
history to impeach or prove criminal liability of victims (CAS, 2016).
Anti-human trafficking initiatives. Metropolitan cities in California have made
reducing human trafficking one of their main initiatives and have had success in tracking
and arresting criminals who use on-line platforms for sex trafficking. In October 2016,
law enforcement agencies initiated a criminal investigation of the CEO of Backpage.com,
a website for prostitution services: “The top executive of the online classified portal
Backpage, and two of the company’s controlling shareholders were charged…with felony
pimping charges…as authorities alleged the website operators were effectively running
an ‘online brothel’” (Madhani, 2016). While this is a step in the right direction, there
have been far more leaders of organizations such as Backpage that have not been
properly targeted.
Backpage was similar to other sales websites like Craigslist; however, the website
focused on sex services. Human rights groups brought awareness to the website and
engaged law enforcement to assist in bringing down this site. The CEO of the company is
being investigated for his role in connecting perpetrators with sex victims.
The website generated millions of dollars annually, which is why state
representatives aggressively pursued the CEO for his criminal actions and profiting from
this type of human slavery: “They also alleged that Ferrer and shareholders Michael
Lacey and James Larkin made millions of dollars from illegal sex trade” (Madhani,
2016). Thus, it is clear that efforts are put forth to reduce human trafficking in the state;
41

however, sex trafficking still leaves citizens vulnerable and fearful for their children’s
safety. One key recommendation is to implement the Safe Harbor Law, which has been
extremely successful for New York. The Safe Harbor Law has been instrumental in
reducing sex trafficking in New York; therefore, implementation of the same law needs
to occur in California. New York enacted the law to protect young victims of human
trafficking and sexual abuse from being re-victimized by the criminal justice system
when caught being prostituted. This allows police officers and state workers to allow
these children to be forcibly taken off the streets and from their pimps (Change.org, Inc.,
2015).
California law enforcement officials do not have the same authorities that New
York law enforcement officials do in terms of pulling victims out of trafficking. New
York has seen great progress in reducing trafficking due to the new law. The law has
proven to be successful by putting individuals in safe homes so that they can recover
without the fear of jail. Without the additional resources, children are less likely to leave
their pimp due to the psychological tendency to love and identify with their abuser
(Change.org, 2016).
Drug Trafficking
Seizure of illegal drugs. According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(2011), border guards seized a record 254,000 pounds of cocaine, 3.6 million pounds of
marijuana, and 4,200 pounds of heroin in 2011. In response to this seizure and disruption
in flow, Mexican drug trafficking organizations simply sent more: trainloads and
truckloads of marijuana, cocaine hidden in fenders and dashboards, and heroin packed
into immigrants’ clothes. An estimated 660,000 pounds of cocaine, 44,000 pounds of
42

heroin, and 220,000 pounds of methamphetamine are on American streets in a given year.
A fraction of that amount is seized at the border. There is growing suspicion that the
recent inundation of unaccompanied minors at the border is part of a strategic move by
the cartels to distract border patrol officers while they move drugs (Dickson, 2017). The
most recent statistics from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration indicate that drug
seizures fell across the entire border with Mexico in 2014, with the most significant drop
in Texas (Partlow & Miroff, 2014). While drug seizures have fallen at the border, drug
shipments and consumption continue to increase. It appears that the problem is shifting to
other parts of the country and ports of entry.
As Valenzuela (2014) explains, “Mexico-based transnational criminal
organizations are suspected of bringing in 70 percent of the United States’
methamphetamine supply through San Diego, which makes the state the primary source
for the drug nationwide” (para. 9). Transnational criminal organizations have been
utilizing the drug trade as one of their main sources of income; consequently, drug
trafficking has proliferated throughout California since the 1800s (Lee & Renwick,
2014). Transnational criminal organizations have recently focused on methamphetamine
as their drug of choice for trafficking in California. In the OAG’s report, one of the main
recommendations pertained to reducing the trafficking of methamphetamine: “Congress
should maintain and increase funding levels for methamphetamine law enforcement
grants through the U.S. Department of Justice’s Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) office” (OAG, 2014b). In 2016, the COPS office raised over six million dollars
to combat methamphetamine manufacturing and distribution; however, only $1.4 million
was awarded to the California Department of Justice.
43

Drug supply chain from Mexico. One of the largest transnational criminal
organizations, Mexican cartels, is linked with most drug trafficking in California.
According to Hoffman (2015), “Mexican cartels have stepped up mass production and
trafficking of methamphetamine, inundating Southern California with the potent drug for
shipment across the United States. Seizures of meth at the U.S.-Mexico border reached a
record high in 2014” (n.p.). Drug trafficking has been on the rise in Northern California,
which is worrisome for law enforcement agencies involved in drug trafficking seizures.
According to Family First Intervention (2016), it is easier for drug traffickers to blend in
with the already overcrowded highway system in large cities than to transport the drugs
in rural areas.
From this location in Northern California, drug moving organizations can access
major foreign markets, including Asia, Europe, and Canada. Domestically, traffickers can
use the region to move drugs between major urban hubs in Hawaii, the Pacific Northwest,
and on the East Coast. Thus, California is still one of the most attractive and lucrative
locations for transnational criminal organizations. Drug trafficking in California has also
been shown to have a direct correlation with violence and crime within the state as drug
trafficking leads to increased violence in our communities. Furthermore, researchers have
noted that the increased use of these drugs is in direct correlation with the amount of drug
trafficking occurring between Mexican and California gangs. According to Cawley
(2014), “The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) noted increased heroin and
methamphetamine consumption in the U.S., thought to be driven by Mexican suppliers,
and the presence of Mexican heroin in the eastern coast and Midwest market” (para. 16).
44

Transnational criminal organizations and illegal enterprises in Mexico control the
illegal drug supply chain, coordinating and taking control of drug shipments after they
leave South and Central America. Once these shipments are in Mexico, the organizations
oversee their transportation to market and distribution throughout the United States.
According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (2009), it is estimated that
approximately 90% of the cocaine that is destined for U.S. markets transits the
Mexico/Central America corridor. Mexico has become the primary foreign source of
marijuana and methamphetamine destined for U.S. markets and is also a source and
major transit route for heroin. Transnational criminal organizations based in Mexico
dominate not only the U.S. drug trade in border areas, but also throughout much of the
nation. These organizations also control the southbound flow of drug-related bulk
currency and illegal weapons. Drugs flow north from Mexico to the U.S. and guns and
money flow south to Mexico.
The southwest border of the United States has served as the principal arrival zone
for most of the illicit drugs smuggled into the United States as well as one of the largest
staging areas for the drugs’ subsequent distribution throughout the country (Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 2010). During prohibition era, Mexico supplied alcohol to the
United States,

and the onset of the illegal drug trade with the U.S. began when prohibition
was ultimately repealed in 1933.

Toward the end of the 1960s, Mexican narcotic
smugglers started to smuggle drugs on a major scale (Woody, 2013). The establishment
of these routes, or plazas as they are called in Mexico, provides an easy pathway for
cartels to move their inventory freely as well as routes to bring money and guns to
Mexico. Cartels have leveraged the highway system to move goods and services.
45

Recently, human smuggling has allowed terrorist organizations to co-opt Mexican cartels
and use these same plazas to smuggle potential terrorists into the United States (Bruer,
2010).
Money Laundering
Money laundering in California. California is the world’s eighth largest
economy, and, as such, is a lucrative target for money laundering. Money laundering is
by far one of the most common crimes committed by transnational criminal organizations
because it is the method they utilize to hide how they make an abundance of money.
According to the International Compliance Association (2015),
Money laundering is the generic term used to describe the process by which
criminals disguise the original ownership and control of the proceeds of criminal
conduct by making such proceeds appear to have derived from a legitimate
source. (para. 1)
Transnational criminal groups generate a substantial portion of their money
through cybercrime, sex trafficking, and drug trafficking, and they use money laundering
techniques to hide their criminal activity. There are many different types of money
laundering schemes; however, one widely used technique is referred to as bulk cash
smuggling. According to Woody (2016), “Currently, bulk cash smuggling is still the most
widely-reported method used by [transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs] to move
illicit proceeds, the Drug Enforcement Administration reported in its 2015 National Drug
Threat Assessment” (para. 10).
Efforts in combating money laundering. There have been many large-scale
operations to counter money laundering in California over recent years. In September
46

2014, one of the largest money laundering arrests occurred in Los Angeles, California.
Los Angeles businesses were assisting Mexican drug cartels launder money through their
retail storefronts:
About 1,000 federal agents and local cops swarmed Los Angeles’ Fashion District
on Wednesday and seized at least $65 million in cash in a massive crackdown on
money laundering connected to Mexican drug cartels, authorities said. Nine
suspects were busted – and the cash was seized from LA businesses as well as
bank accounts from around the world. (Chandler, 2014, para. 1)
In August 2016, San Diego Border Patrol made one of their largest money
smuggling seizures to date. The total cash seizure was over three million dollars. For the
agency that deals with border security, it was a major intercept of smuggled cash. The
border patrol noted most of its past seizures have been in smaller amounts: $300,000,
$51,000, and $43,000. “This is one of our larger cash seizures,” said Ralph DeSio
(Visser, 2016, para. 3).
This type of law enforcement action is highly effective in reducing the activity
and prevalence of transnational criminal organizations, specifically in Southern
California. Los Angeles and San Diego County are both epicenters for money laundering
operations conducted by Mexican cartels. Thus, increased arrests and interdictions made
by border and law enforcement agents in Southern California will help deter transnational
criminal organizations from viewing this area as a prime spot for illicit operations: “If the
sophisticated gangs can’t get their tens of millions of dollars in cash home each year, the
U.S. market wouldn’t be nearly as attractive. And California is central to those type of
activities” (Visser, 2016, para. 5). Consequently, Southern California is the prime
47

location for transnational criminal organization to implement money laundering and
smuggling schemes.
Current laws on money laundering. While there have been highly effective
operations in combating money laundering, current California laws make it difficult for
law enforcement agencies to freeze assets, as “Under current law, transnational criminal
organizations are often given the equivalent of warning that their criminal proceeds and
assets are about to be seized by law enforcement. That is because of a legal void that
prevents the seizure of any assets until the filing of a formal criminal indictment” (OAG,
2014a). This loophole allows the opportunity to transfer assets in a quick manner to hide
them from law enforcement.
Recently, Assembly Bill 433 passed out of the Assembly Public Safety
Committee with unanimous bipartisan support. It will allow a prosecuting agency to file a
petition to forfeiture prior to the commencement of a criminal proceeding in cases of
criminal profiteering (California Office of Legislative Counsel, 2015). This bill will soon
be heard in the State Assembly Appropriations Committee to assess the fiscal aspects of
the new initiative and perhaps will have a significant impact if passed.
Financial transaction structuring has been an ongoing loophole that allows illicit
cash flows to go unnoticed and unreported. The technique of structuring serves to evade
bank institutions from reporting their transactions. The definition of structuring states,
A person structures a transaction if that person, acting alone, or in conjunction
with, or on behalf of, other persons, conducts or attempts to conduct one or more
transactions in currency in any amount, at one or more financial institutions, on
48

one or more days, in any manner, for the purpose of evading the [CTR filing
requirements]. (Dalton, 2015, para. 3)
California law is currently not designed to assist law enforcement with identifying
individuals who are involved in money laundering. Potentially, if the laws were changed,
law enforcement would be in a better position to track fraudulent and odd deposits within
financial institutions.
How transnational criminal organizations evade detection. Transnational
criminal organizations evade law enforcement by structuring their cash transactions in a
manner that reduces their likelihood of getting caught. As Dunn (2014) notes,
Regulations require each financial institution to file a report of each deposit,
withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment or transfer, by, through, or to
such financial institution which involves a transaction in currency of $10,000 or
more, except as otherwise provided by the regulations. (p. 1)
However, many different money-structuring techniques serve to avoid deposits being
reported. In addition, California law has made it difficult for prosecutors to use money-
structuring against criminals. In California, prosecutors must demonstrate that the
laundered money is intentionally disguised and the proceeds are the byproduct of illegal
criminal activity.
Lack of cooperation between U.S. and Mexico. Disrupting cross-border money
laundering schemes will require a great deal of collaboration with Mexico. The OAG’s
(2014a) report highlights that “State authorities should partner with their Mexican
counterparts to share intelligence and disrupt the illicit flow of money across the border.
The ease with which large sums of money can be whisked physically across borders has
49

never been greater” (para. 12). Thus, collaboration between investigators and officials on
both sides of the border is important to reducing border money laundering schemes.
Unfortunately, the relationship between California and Mexican officials has
weakened since the OAG report of 2014. Upon analysis, it is clear that Peña Nieto’s
presidency has played a key role in the reduction of money laundering collaboration.
During the first full two years of Peña Nieto’s presidency (2013–2014), the amount of
laundered money seized dropped in comparison with the same period under Calderon
(2007–2008), falling from a total of just over $90 million to around $13 million
(Lohmuller, 2015). Thus, it is hard to collaborate effectively with a government that is
not dealing with their own money laundering schemes in an efficient manner. As a result,
connection and collaboration between California and Mexico officials has weakened
since the report, whereas collaboration between California and Mexico gang members
has strengthened.
For California to combat money laundering schemes, there needs to be
improvement in terms of the relationship between California and Mexican law
enforcement officials. Specifically, it should be one of the main objectives due to the
increase of California and Mexican gangs collaborating to commit more advanced cross-
border crimes. As Cawley (2014) points out,
this relationship allows the Mexican organizations to conduct operations without
entering US territory, thus reducing their risks, and to expand their distribution
networks. US gang members offer the added benefits of being able to cross the
border with less risk of detection and having an in-depth knowledge of the areas
where they operate (para. 4).
50

Cybercrimes
Rise of cybercrimes. California is a major leader in technology and innovation;
consequently, cybercrime is on the rise in the state. The state is an attractive target for
cybercriminals due to the size of its economy. In comparison to other states, California is
the main target for cyber-criminals, as “California has seen a sharp rise in breaches the
last four years, according to the Breach Report. According to the report, every industry is
affected: schools, hospitals, restaurants, retailers, banks, hotels, government agencies, and
more” (SecureAuth Corporation, para. 2). Cybercrime attacks are detrimental for
businesses, ranging from loss of money to damaging company reputations. Protecting
consumer’s personal information and privacy is one of the most important factors for
business in any industry. Businesses in California are much more likely to be targeted in
contrast to those in other states due to the vast population and the number of businesses
located in the state. According to Myhre-Nunes (2014), “For example, the Privacy Right
Clearinghouse recorded at least 331 breaches in 2012. Of that total, 16 percent (around 53
breaches) occurred in California and put a total of 2.5 million Californians at the risk of
identity theft” (para. 2). Californians are highly susceptible to cybercrime attacks, more
so than civilians living in another state. Identifying and stopping cyber-criminal groups
has become one of the emerging priorities in California for law enforcement agencies, but
limited budgets and lack of resources make it difficult to adequately address this issue.
Transnational criminal organizations pivot in cybercrimes. Transnational
criminal organizations are shifting from typical criminal activities to cybercrimes for a
variety of reasons. Cybercrimes allow for reaching victims across the globe with the click
of a button. ATKearney (2014) states that “Transnational criminal organizations are
51

relying increasingly on cybercrime as a source of funds — which means they are
frequently targeting, and illicitly using, the digital tools and content developed in our
state” (para. 3). Therefore, transnational criminal organizations are extremely attracted to
cybercrimes due to the newness and vulnerability of businesses in California.
Leaders of criminal organizations can carry out their crimes without even crossing
the United States border via foot soldiers and subordinates, which is extremely
challenging for the safety and economy of California: “Many groups are organized along
ethnic lines, with ringleaders often outside the United States and foot soldiers and victims
in immigrant communities in the country” (Kearney, 2014, para. 5). In addition,
California is home to an abundance of criminal groups with ties to international gangs.
Thus, criminal organizations steal money from the state’s economy through illegal
activities such as narcotics, financial fraud, piracy, identity theft, cybercrime, illegal
gambling, and send it back to their home countries. Consequently, this activity has a
negative impact on Californian’s safety and economy:
Criminal groups with ties to the former Soviet Union and Central Europe run
gangs throughout California, including the Armenian Power gang, which has links
to cybercrime, financial fraud, piracy, identity theft, illegal gambling, narcotics,
and human trafficking, the report said (Kearney, 2014, para. 7).
Transnational groups have targeted California and will continue to do so for as long as
businesses leave their information vulnerable.
Targets of cyber-attacks. California businesses were involved in the majority of
cyber-attacks of 2016; specifically, highly reputable companies such as Twitter were
involved in cyber-attacks. This is of significant concern because these companies are
52

operated and protected by some of the best intelligence information technology
professionals in the world. According to CBS News (2016),
Withering cyberattacks on server farms of a key Internet firm repeatedly disrupted
access to major websites and online services including, Twitter, Netflix, and
PayPal across the United States on Friday. The White House called the disruption
malicious and a hacker group claimed responsibility, though its assertion couldn’t
be verified. (para. 1).
All three of these companies are headquartered in or near Silicon Valley, California, a
clear indication that California businesses are still being targeted and infiltrated
regardless of the safety recommendations the companies put into place.
Healthcare systems are also being targeted, which is highly disturbing for the
privacy and safety of patients. The healthcare industry has become tech-reliant for
patients’ health history, private information, and other confidential information. Thus,
criminals are attacking their systems with the intent to receive money before returning
facilities’ access to their own systems.
In 2016, Senator Barbara Boxer sent FBI Director James Comey a letter where
she stated her concerns regarding the “recent ransomware attacks on the hospitals in
California and across the United States.” In her letter she highlights the ransomware
attack on Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Los Angeles, California, which in
February 2016, paid a ransom of 40 bitcoins – about $17,000 – to re-obtain access to its
computer systems after malware blocked access to the hospital’s electronic medical files
regarding the patients it was treating (Radick, 2016).
53

The healthcare industry is not the only industry feeling the impact of transnational
cyber-criminals; the state’s education system has been attacked as well. Transnational
criminal organizations are tied to stealing UC Berkeley students’ personal information
including social security numbers and bank account numbers through cyber-attacks:
UC Berkley officials are sending alert notices to approximately 80,000 current
students and former faculty, staff and students and vendors following a criminal
cyberattack on a system storing their social security or bank account numbers.
These criminals gained entry though a security flaw that UC Berkeley was in the
process of patching. (Gilmore, 2016, para. 1)
Cyber-criminals constantly try to infiltrate industries throughout the state,
potentially accessing the identities of millions of people. According to Gilmore (2016),
“In today’s cyber security landscape, large, high-profile organizations such as leading
universities are under near-constant attack” (para. 9). California is one of the most
technologically sophisticated states in the country, but it cannot protect systems from
cyber-attacks. With a booming economy, the state finds itself in a fight against cyber-
criminals on all fronts.
Cyber-criminals operate indiscriminately and target large businesses as well as
seek out highly vulnerable small businesses because their information technology
systems are much easier to access in comparison to big businesses: “Large banks,
retailers, and federal agencies make the headlines when they are hacked – but all
businesses are at risk. Per Microsoft, twenty-percent of small to mid-size businesses have
been the cybercrime targets” (Morgan, 2016, p. 14). Thus, small business owners are
54

extremely vulnerable, and could lose everything if cyber-criminals target them. The
Associated Press (2016) rightly points out that:
Their impact is tremendous, in the hundreds of millions of dollars from small
business, mom and pop operations, who lose their very existence to a financial
crime, to a scheme that’s being originated out of Romania, out of Egypt, out of
Israel, out of parts well off of our shores. (para. 8)
California businesses are more than familiar with the realities of cyber-attacks.
Therefore, many businesses are implementing systems and regulations to reduce the
likelihood of cyber-attacks. Government cannot be the only agency responsible for
protecting against this emerging threat; the private sector has a personal stake in
protecting itself as well:
Cyber-attacks by nation states are a serious threat to U.S. business, and companies
should not rely on the government to protect them from attacks, said Mike
Rogers, a former chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. (Souter, 2016,
para. 1)
California businesses are aware of the true realities associated with cyber-crime;
however, at the federal level, government has done little to help business combat these
types of crimes (Kelly, 2012). According to Limbago (2016),
Despite these numerous cyberbreaches, the U.S. government does not have a
cohesive policy for how companies can legally respond to such attacks. While
policymakers have advanced several cyber policy directives and strategies in the
past years, these are mostly reactive documents and do little to proactively
address the cyberthreats facing American companies (para. 4).
55

The lack of government involvement allows cyber-criminals to operate with
limited interference. Businesses are, therefore, left to fend for themselves, making their
systems even more vulnerable to attacks:
Given the lack of real government action and the financial and reputational risk,
the private sector is understandably dissatisfied with its limited ability to respond
to these growing threats. The private companies wanting tools to fight back
against attackers is not only reasonable; it’s logical. (Limbago, 2016, para. 5).
In 2016, the OAG created the California Cyber Crime Center, also known as C4.
This center has been a positive step in fulfilling the need for more government support in
combating cyber-crime. The C4 is designed to collaborate with the private sector and
ensure businesses have a clearinghouse for cyberattack issues. Nonetheless, the state
legislature needs to issue stronger policies and implement cyber task forces to assist
businesses in the cyber-crime era of California.
Border Enforcement Challenges
According to the Migration Policy Institute (2016), the United States spends more
than $18 billion a year for border enforcement and security for the 2,000-mile southern
border. Nonetheless, a factor in cross-border crime is smugglers’ use of lands across
Indian Reservations. Ten percent of the marijuana illegally shipped into the United States
comes through the Tohono O’odham Reservation in southwest Arizona. The Tohono
O’odham Reservation is only 4% of the total border but has a significant proportion of
illegal drug crossings (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). Targeting enforcement to that
area may serve as an effective strategy, but it would require enforcement from both sides
of the border. According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office audit issued in
56

2013, the number of drug and contraband seizures along the southwest border increased
by 83% to 18,898 over the past five fiscal years, but drug smuggling is “not used as a
performance measure for overall border security” because other federal agencies such as
the DEA have the primary responsibility (Boak & Pianan, 2013, para. 17).
U.S. Customs and Border Protection estimates that only 44% of the U.S.-Mexico
border is under operational control (The Economist, 2014). Having less than half of the
U.S. border under operational control and only being 25% effective in the apprehension
rate could signify that three out of four immigrants who illegally cross the southern
border present an opportunity for increased drug smuggling. Many undocumented
immigrants have committed more crimes than just crossing our border. There are many
cases of illegal aliens who travel to the United States who are involved with human
trafficking, drug smuggling, and other illicit activities(Brown: Would immigration reform
stop drug trafficking - iowa state daily: Opinion.).
Migration routes into California. Mexican drug cartels are using advanced and
emergent technologies and secure networks to expand control of their operations and
supporting infrastructure (The Soufan Group, 2012). Drug trafficking organizations are
employing the same tactics to cut costs, better control distribution, and develop new
sources of revenue just as companies like Wal-Mart and Amazon do to move their
products (Morris, 2013).
Logistics and “just in time”
2
business models are now becoming a main source of
cost cutting for drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), and illegal drugs and other illicit

2
A production strategy that strives to improve a business by reducing in-process
inventory and associated carrying costs.
57

activities are some of the products they offer. As the DTOs’ revenue streams become
diversified due to enforcement pressure on both sides of the border, the illegal drug trade
will become less important. In fact, the prospect of the DTOs selling their services to
terrorists, by transporting weapons of mass destruction across the U.S.-Mexico border, or
assisting with assassination attempts of diplomats, is a shifting threat to national security
(Judicial Watch, 2016). Given this level of business sophistication, it becomes harder to
interdict and disrupt these criminal enterprises.
The increase in border security has led to a funnel effect, pushing these routes into
concentrated areas in the punishing deserts where migrants are either preyed on by
criminals or die from the heat. The U.S. Border Patrol admits that some changes in illegal
immigration patterns and routes are due to increased enforcement along the border, as
well as the expansion of the border fence that pushes illegal immigrants toward less
populated and more dangerous areas (Walser & Zuckerman, 2011).
Migrant routes and drug routes into the United States from Mexico follow closely
along the same land-based routes. One difference is that, once the drugs reach the border,
the DTOs have been forced to innovate and find methods to go over, around or under the
border. The similar routes create an opportunity for cartels to co-opt smugglers and their
immigrants to “mule”
3
drugs into the country (Graham, 2012). As stated above, cartels
have the possibility that three out of every four immigrants will get through the border
and enter safe houses where the drugs can be distributed into the supply chain.
Mexican immigration. Mexican immigration has been central in the U.S. legal
system and in public opinion. Mexican immigrants are an important aspect of the U.S.

3
A mule is someone who smuggles something across a border.
58

economy and serve as a convenient workforce for agriculture and other labor-intensive
industries. Immigration laws during the last century shifted back and forth, at times
welcoming Mexican immigrants as part of the workforce and, at other times, slamming
the door shut on them. The history of seasonal use of immigrant workers was not
intended to build either loyalty or a pathway to citizenship but was designed to provide a
necessary commodity. The U.S. reception of this immigrant group has also been hard to
predict; Mexican immigrants have been able to make a place for themselves in
communities across the United States, but quite frequently have had to endure and battle
hostile elements in those same communities to survive. In many ways, this push-and-pull
dynamic continues today (Yankelevich, 2012).
Mexican immigrants are vital to the U.S. economy and the workforce (Costa,
Copper, & Shierholz, 2014); however, the porous nature of our borders has allowed what
was established as a pathway for a seasonal workforce to become a pathway of
criminality. These immigration routes and plazas have turned into corridors for criminals
to access the United States.
On paper, it may appear that immigration enforcement is effective given the
decrease in border arrests

(Department of Homeland Security, 2015). However,
apprehension numbers may not be a good indicator for border security, yet there is
evidence that today’s borders are more secure due to the 21,000 border agents assigned to
the southwestern border. According to a thesis written by Navy Lt. Bettina Cory (2014),
Fortifying the border has created diminishing returns. In addition, it has created
negative side effects and unintended consequences that undermine the very nature
and reason for installing border fences. Immigrants have been forced into the
59

hands of criminal organizations and are more vulnerable now than in the past. (p.
61)
Border fortification has created a niche market for border smugglers known as coyotes.
Immigrants used to cross the border on their own; now, they use these coyotes and,
perhaps, more are making it into the United States without being apprehended. According
to various estimates, between 80% and 95% of illegal immigrants hire smugglers to assist
in crossing the border. While these smugglers often ease the means of travel, there are
also significant risks in employing these networks (Walser & Zuckerman, 2011).
Consequences of immigration enforcement. According to U.S. Border Patrol
data the number of Mexican migrants apprehended at U.S. borders in fiscal 2015 dropped
to the lowest levels in nearly 50 years (Gonzalez-Barrera & Krogstad, 2016). Cost-benefit
calculations and the analysis of risk taken by immigrants may show that enforcement and
deportations have changed their decisions to illegally migrate. While there may be other
outside forces that play into this change, like the downturn in the U.S. economy and
increased opportunities with a growing economy in Mexico and the impacts of
globalization, it is apparent that funding for immigration enforcement has had an impact
on illegal immigration, but little evidence supports that it has affected drug flows.
The potential downside to immigration enforcement and border security is the
balloon and cockroach effect
4
it has on the global trade for illegal drugs and the
fragmentation of cartels. The data leads to a theory that, when pressure is applied to our

4
The name draws an analogy between efforts to eradicate the production of illegal drugs in Latin American
countries and the phenomenon when a latex balloon is squeezed: The air is moved, but does not disappear,
instead moving into another area of less resistance, or the cockroach effect. You can chase the pests out of
one corner of your house, but they have an irritating habit of popping up somewhere else.
60

borders through direct enforcement or interdiction, the problem simply shifts to areas that
have less resistance and often ungoverned spaces. Borders have thus far proven
impossible to seal completely, and traffickers have shown to be highly adept and
innovative at creating new transport routes and methods to respond to both opportunities
and risks.
Conclusion
This chapter discussed the current conditions of transnational criminal activities
and their impact on the state of California. It first examined the historical relationship
between the United States and Mexico, noting that the current challenge is a continuation
of a complex and complicated past relating to land, border disputes, and trade. Then, it
explored how both nations are wrestling with major challenges in combating human
trafficking, drug smuggling, money laundering, and cybercrimes.
Ironically, NAFTA paved the way for comprehensive free market trade between
the U.S. and Mexico, ushering in billions of dollars’ worth of trade. These trade rules
have reduced barriers for criminal organizations to freely move goods between the two
countries. Human trafficking is a $150 billion industry annually. Human traffickers have
successfully used the legal system to profit from this venture and, in the process, silence
their victims. Drug trafficking has also been a big issue facing law enforcement agencies.
Mexican drug cartels have been able to freely import drugs into California where they are
then able to export it to major foreign markets such as Asia, Europe, and Canada. Money
laundering is by far the most common crime committed by transnational criminal
organizations. These groups generate a substantial portion of their money through such
means as cybercrime, sex trafficking, and drug trafficking, and they use money
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laundering techniques with the intent to hide their criminal activity. The sheer size of
California’s economy has, unfortunately, made it the ideal target for cybercrimes and one
which transnational criminal organizations have leveraged as another source of revenue.
Unlike the other crimes, cybercrimes are the easiest to execute with minimal cost or risk
of detection. Most of these crimes are committed outside of the United States, making it
hard for law officials to prosecute.
There are many challenges that impact the effectiveness of combating
transnational criminal organizations. First, the 2,000-mile southern border makes it
impossible for law enforcement agencies to prevent illegal immigration, drug smuggling,
and other nefarious activities. Furthermore, the weakened Mexican government and its
inability to effectively contain violent crimes have made it possible for criminal
organizations to cross into the United States. There is also a lack of information and
intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies, which is viewed as critical in
combating criminal insurgents and terrorists alike. Finally, Mexico and the U.S. do not
have a formal method for sharing information, which is partly due to distrust between the
two nations.
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Chapter 4: Research Methods
In 2014, the OAG issued a report entitled Gangs Beyond Borders: California and
the Fight Against Transnational Organized Crimes to combat the growing threat of
transnational criminal activities. The report was considered the first of its kind for several
reasons. First, it was a joint collaboration among academic researchers, policy experts,
national security experts, nonprofit activists, and various state and local agencies.
Second, the report examined the issues of transnational criminal organization from a
holistic perspective: the proliferation of human and drug trafficking, the economic impact
of money laundering, and the emergence of high-tech crimes. As such, the report
provided a multi-pronged approach to mitigate these organizations’ influence in
California for state, local, nonprofits, and business organizations to combat transnational
crime. These recommendations ranged from targeting the leaders of the transnational
organizations, to increasing funding for state and local agencies, to providing additional
training, and to developing a public-private collaboration.
While the recommendations were instructive in providing detailed
recommendations to combat transnational criminal organizations, the California Office of
the General Attorney has yet to conduct a comprehensive analysis of its
recommendations. Furthermore, no studies have analyzed the recommendations or
determined whether they were successfully implemented.
To ensure that the recommendations were effective, one needs to analyze them to
see if they have been implemented, if there were barriers to implementation, and to what
extent the recommendations were successful. The current study consists of a policy
analysis to examine the aftermath of the 12 recommendations. By employing a policy
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analysis, the dissertation aims to determine if the 12 recommendations were
implemented, if the implementation was applied at the local municipal level, if there are
barriers to implementation, if there are other recommendations the author proposes to
improve implementation, and, finally, if there are other recommendations or strategies
that can be implemented to address transnational crime in California.
The Need for a Policy Analysis
The goal of implementing a policy, according to the National Collaborating
Centre for Healthy Policy (2012), is to apply “the strategic actions led by a public
authority to limit, reduce, or increase the presence of a certain phenomenon within the
population” (p. 1). The Gangs Beyond Borders report provided key policy
recommendations, but one needs to analyze them to see if they were implemented, if
there were barriers to implementation, and to what extent the recommendations were
successful.
Consequently, acting upon a policy recommendation depends on the suggested
course of actions (Fischer, Gerald, & Sidney, 2007). Lowi and Ginsburg (1996)
articulated this dynamic best when they considered a public policy as “an officially
expressed intention backed by a sanction, which can be a reward or a punishment” (p.
607). Regarding recommendations from the Gangs Beyond Borders report,
implementation may be hampered by external factors, and it is often difficult to
determine whether the policy has the intended effect of reducing, limiting, or increasing
the social problem. For instance, lawmakers may issue reports with recommendations,
but they seldom provide follow-up on their recommendations. The recommendations
rarely address how to implement the policy or the means for measuring success. Policy
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recommendations may appear easy on paper, but they may be hard to implement in
practice due to the complexity of the issue. Finally, the policy implementation may result
in negative impact on the desired outcome or even lead to failure of the policy altogether
(Office of Federal Register, n.d.).
The Importance of Policy Analysis
According to Dunn (1981), policy analysis is defined as “an applied social science
discipline which uses multiple methods of inquiry and arguments to produce and
transform policy-relevant information that may be utilized in political settings to resolve
policy problems” (p. 35). Applying policy analysis against the recommendations in the
Attorney General’s report requires researching and conducting analysis using different
methods, which is akin to a policy review in some situations. In other cases, a policy
review does not follow a simple linear model, but it may require cross-referencing
multiple sources to verify and validate the information. An example of this is budget
augmenting. In these instances, a review of the last five years of state budgets did not
offer any conclusive evidence that these recommendations had been fully implemented.
However, one must interview the various stakeholders, cross-reference the reports, and
determine if these recommendations were incorporated via different means.
Through policy analysis and review, this project stands to address the current
status of the recommendations from the Gangs Beyond Borders report and to identify the
missing gaps. To do that, I will apply the rational comprehensive model, which posits
that:
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“Goal setting and values of the society can often take the form of a concept of
"general interest", which then helps to determine the importance and urgency of
the problems to be solved” (Mercier, 2008 p.26).
“The basis for this rational model, are rationalist theories and those are being
rooted in the illuminist rationalism and positivism, current which promoted ways
of neutral and objective knowledge on human society. At the basis of these
problems lies the idea that human society can and should be resolved in a rational
and scientific manner, by gathering all of the information that can be found in the
problem, followed by processing them, and obtaining, by applying the most
efficient answer, from the cost point of view” (Leoveanu, 2013, p. 43)
For a policy analysis to be effective, one must analyze the policy thoroughly.
According to Mercier (2008), there are seven distinct and sequential stages in conducting
a policy analysis:
• Identifying the values and objectives to be achieved;
• Analyzing all possible alternatives for achieving the objectives;
• Researching and selecting information relevant to the efficiency or
effectiveness of various alternatives;
• Making a comparison between alternatives and their consequences;
• Choosing the alternative that maximizes the values and objectives;
• Implementing the recommendations; and
• Analyzing the feedback after the implementation to determine success or
opportunities for change.
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Policy issues rarely turn into real-world policy reforms without addressing the
barriers to implementation, which are oftentimes either structural in nature or related to
the political feasibility of a policy recommendation. Having worked for the past 27 years
in a large metropolitan fire department, I have personally seen important policy proposals
being scrapped because the policy did not meet the feasibility criterion. On the other
hand, I have seen tough policy issues turned into real-world solutions because of political
feasibility and support. Unfortunately, few policies get past the hurdles of the political
process, but they tend to take hold and serve their purpose once they do pass the hurdles.
Through policy review, I analyzed the 12 recommendations to determine to what
extent these recommendations were implemented by examining the recommendation
itself, its implementation and scale as well as barriers to its implementation. As such, the
policy analysis will focus on the following:
• To what extent have the 12 recommendations in the Attorney General’s report
been implemented?
• To what scale have they been implemented at the local municipal level?
• What are the barriers to implementation?
• What policy recommendations can the author propose to improve
implementation?
• Are there other recommendations or strategies that can be made to address
transnational crime in California?
Methods for Analyzing Policy Recommendations
I applied a four-part framework to evaluate the 12 recommendations from the
Gangs Beyond Borders report. First, I described the key provisions for the respective
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recommendation and the critical requirements needed for success. Second, I examined
the status of the actions implemented. Third, I determined if the recommendations were
successful in mitigating the impact of transnational criminal activities. Fourth, I provided
further analysis and insights of the recommendation by providing additional ideas and
recommendations for the furtherance of the policy.
First step: Key provisions and critical requirements. The first step was to
review the recommendations to determine key provisions and expected outcomes. Much
of this initial information was referenced in the report, but, in some cases, further analysis
was required. Essentially, I accessed journals or OAG reports from prior years.
Second step: Status of the recommendations. The second step was to conduct a
policy review to determine the status of the 12 recommendations. This was accomplished
by accessing a myriad of data and peer-reviewed journals, government archives, and
articles located in various online research libraries. Through this process, the
recommendation was evaluated in light of existing data to determine the extent to which
recommendations or provisions were implemented. In certain cases, determining
implementation status required review of congressional reports or legislation.
Step three: Measuring success of the recommendations. There are various
resources to measure the success of the 12 recommendations. Half of the
recommendations from the Gangs Beyond Borders report involved sanctions to counter
increasing transnational criminal activities, which can be examined by reviewing public
data and current Californian laws relating to these activities. Additionally, a large portion
of the recommendations entailed providing budgets for state and local agencies, though
accessing data related to budget allocation is no easy task. For example, funding
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additional special operations units (SOUs) could not be determined because of the vague
and voluminous data located in 200 pages of state budgets.
Another way to benchmark the impact of the 12 recommendations on trafficking,
money laundering, and cybercrime entails analyzing state and federal crime databases
such as the National Institute of Justice. One limitation of using crime data statistics is
that correlation to the recommendations does not always infer causation. In other words,
an increase or decrease in crime in a certain area related to the report does not necessarily
the recommended action was effective. However, crime data provides a baseline for trend
analysis.
Step four: Additional recommendations and insights. The final step of the
analysis was to provide additional recommendations and insights for the furtherance of
the report. Much has happened since the release of the Gangs Beyond Borders report, and
the benefit of hindsight and the author’s decades of experience within law enforcement
could be useful in providing substantive insights that the original report may have
overlooked. As such, the final section aims to provide additional recommendations and
insights to increase the effectiveness of combating transnational criminal organizations.
Barriers in Combating Transnational Crimes
Combating transnational crimes in Mexico. The approach to addressing the
criminal insurgency in Mexico has been ineffective for the past decade. In 2006,
President Felipe Calderon initiated an all-out attack on drug trafficking organizations, but
this use of kinetic force has not only been ineffective but has also damaged Mexico
(Jimenez, 2017) by killing thousands of innocent people. The leadership has failed to see
how different problems are interrelated and refused to recognize how these solutions will
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affect future generations. In many ways, the cure is worse than the disease. A new
worldview of combating criminal insurgents is necessary, and looking at issues in a
fundamentally different manner will be necessary for Mexico to prevail. The new
worldview to address this problem entails shifting to a new paradigm and developing
collaborative government networks to combat the network manner of how DTOs operate
as a group or system of interconnected people.
Transnational criminal activity continuously occurs in almost every major urban
area in California. The structure of the various transnational criminal organizations has
adapted over time to evolve in nearly every small city and in all regions across the state.
California has experienced an increase in drug trafficking operations over the past two
decades

(Valenzuela, 2014). Mexican drug trafficking organizations, such as the Tijuana
cartel, have expanded their roots and become more complicated to control. Although
there have been many attempted crackdowns, the majority of these operations have been
ineffective and oftentimes an embarrassment for the Mexican government. One example
of Mexico’s embarrassment is the multiple prison escapes by Mexican drug lord Joaquin
Guzman Loera, aka “El Chapo.” Guzman, who is viewed by many as a folk hero, heads
up an alliance of powerful drug traffickers known as the Sinaloa Cartel. During his
criminal career, he has been able to simultaneously co-opt and bribe public officials and
prison wardens, attack his enemies’ strongholds, and find creative ways to get his drugs
to market, making him a legend in the underworld

(InSight Crime, n.d.)). Guzman’s reign
ended abruptly in January 2016 when Mexican Marines captured him. He is now held in
New York under an extradition agreement with Mexico. However, many still believe that
he continues to control much of his expansive criminal organization.
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Since 2006, Mexico has rapidly climbed the list of potential trouble spots for U.S.
policymakers. According to an annual survey conducted by the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (2016), Mexico had more violent war zones than Afghanistan and
Yemen, and it was surpassed only by the conflicts in Syria. Public security in Mexico has
deteriorated dramatically of late. Drug-fueled violence has caused thousands of deaths,
taken a severe psychological toll on the nation, and, in the estimation of some observers,
brought Mexico to the edge of the failed-state precipice (Schaefer, Bahney, & Riley,
2009).
In January of 2009, Michael Hayden, the departing CIA chief, claimed that
Mexico could become “more problematic than Iraq,” and Michael Chertoff, the departing
Secretary of Homeland Security, announced that the Department of Homeland Security
has a “contingency plan for border violence, so if we did get a significant spillover, we
have a surge - if I may use that word - capability” (Stratfor Enterprises, 2008, p. 13).
Since 9/11, there has been speculation that Al-Qaeda has an interest in using
Mexico as a gateway entry into the U.S. or as a staging location for an attack. A recent
RAND report views this as an extremely controversial point of view because there have
been no reports of known or suspected terrorists arrested along the U.S.-Mexico border
region. However, there have been instances of terrorism within Mexico: in July of 2007,
the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), a Marxist guerilla group, blew up natural gas
pipelines, cutting off service across Central Mexico.
Lack of information-sharing among agencies. Information and intelligence
sharing between law enforcement and other key stakeholders has been viewed as a weak
link in combating criminal insurgents and terrorists alike. The attacks on the World Trade
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Center and the Pentagon in 2001 have become one of the signature failures in
government in combating terrorists. Since that time, local, state, tribal and federal
agencies have engaged in unprecedented collaboration, and, today, trust and collaboration
have led to successful interdiction of many criminal networks (Department of Homeland
Security, 2015). However, much still needs to be accomplished to root out these deep-
seated criminal enterprises that impact both the U.S. and Mexico.
In the present era, intelligence sharing among countries with different technical
capabilities and local knowledge is particularly valuable for countering terrorism,
transnational organized crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
States participating in intelligence sharing arrangements must balance the benefits of
more and better intelligence against the possibility that their partners will withhold or
distort the information they share or will pass along the information they receive to
others.
According to German and Stanley (2007), intelligence gathering and sharing at all
levels of government can face potential challenges in the newly rising institutions such as
the fusion centers. Potential issues include the ambiguous lines of authority, excessive
secrecy, troubling private sector and military participation, and an apparent bent toward a
lack of information collection and data mining. The Wall Street Journal and the Los
Angeles Times reported on a Los Angeles Police Department order (Kolsy, 2012) that
would require officers to begin reporting suspicious behaviors in addition to their other
normal duties, potentially creating a stream of intelligence about a host of everyday
activities that would be fed to the local fusion centers. Oftentimes, these information and
intelligence gathering policies list very innocuous and clearly subjective First
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Amendment-protected activities, such as members of the public using binoculars, taking
pictures or video footage that have no apparent aesthetic value, taking notes and other
daily routine activities.
The ACLU points out that fusion centers essentially turn local police officers into
national domestic intelligence agents. In 2008, the Washington Post reported that fusion
centers increased access to Americans’ private information through multiple databases.
Fusion centers have also led to a new niche industry of private data brokers that collect
personal and private information and frequently sell this information to law enforcement
agencies (Barnosky, 2016).
There are also examples where fusion centers collected sensitive information from
military installations, without the military’s awareness, to enhance surveillance. One
example happened in Los Angeles where the local fusion center surreptitiously accessed
military surveillance reports that revealed a federal surveillance program targeting
Muslim groups in the United States. This security breach was discovered only after an
investigation into stolen equipment in Iraq revealed that a fusion center in Los Angeles
was accessing confidential data from a military base. In certain states, such as Virginia,
fusion centers are exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. The federal government
pressured Virginia into passing this law with the threat of withholding classified
information if it did not. It was referenced that fusion centers will become a one-way
mirror in that citizens are subject to ever greater scrutiny by the authorities even while
the authorities are increasingly protected from scrutiny by the public.
Lack of trust between U.S. and Mexico. Mexico and the United States do not
have a formalized method to share tips and leads, and, in order to do so, cross-border
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information-sharing is going to require a high level of trust. Traditionally, our countries
have not trusted each other with information. One example is the death of DEA Agent
Enrique Camarena: he was kidnapped by drug cartels, tortured, and executed. Experts
familiar with the case claim that Mexican officials leaked Camarena’s identity to the
cartels.
The importance of information-sharing cannot be overstated; one of the problems
with information is that it is often misclassified and/or overclassified and not
disseminated appropriately. The 9/11 Commission and others have observed that the
overclassification of security information interferes with accurate, actionable, and timely
security information-sharing, increases the cost of information security, and needlessly
limits public access to information. According to Bill Leonard, a former director of the
Information Security Oversight Office at the National Archives, one in four documents
are misclassified. Overclassification should not be a barrier to keeping local officials
informed about threats, but this is often the bureaucratic impulse.
Conclusion
This dissertation consists of a comprehensive analysis of the 12 recommendations
provided by the Gangs Beyond Borders report to determine if they were implemented, the
barriers to implementation, and the extent to which the recommendations were
successful. In many cases, implementing a public policy may be hampered for multiple
reasons, such as a lack of strategy, complexity of the issues, and unintended
consequences. As such, successful implementation requires a relevant governmental
agency that has the power to enact the policy, clear communication between the
stakeholders, and adequate resources to implement the policy.
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A policy analysis enables analysts to define the problem and the goals, examine
the arguments, and determine the extent to which the recommendations were successful.
This dissertation applied policy analysis and review to address the current status of the 12
recommendations from the Gangs Beyond Borders report. To do that, I first reviewed the
key provisions and requirements from the report. Next, I accessed public data to
determine the status of the 12 recommendations, which was accomplished by accessing
peer-reviewed journals, government data, or articles located in various online research
libraries. The third stage was to measure the success of the recommendations by
benchmarking the goals of the recommendations with the current situations in California
(e.g., murder rates, crime rates, and drug arrests). The final step of the analysis was to
provide additional recommendations and insights to make substantive ideas and
recommendations for the furtherance of the report.

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Chapter 5: Findings
Through policy analysis and policy review, the author applied a consistent four-
part framework to evaluate the extent to which the 12 recommendations have been
implemented. While the framework has its limitations, such as available data, reference
material, and budget provisions, it allows the recommendations to be assessed through
qualitative research. That framework consists of the following.
1. Key provisions of the recommendation: Summarizing the key provisions of
the recommendation provides a basic understanding of what exactly the
recommendation sought to accomplish.
2. Actions implemented since the recommendation: Determining current actions
and implementation status provides the baseline for exactly where this
recommendation currently stands.
3. Success of the implementation: Determining if the implementation was
successful has several variables and, in some cases, is hard to substantially
measure; however, by looking at the available data, one can make a
reasonable assumption of its impact or success.
4. Further analysis of and insights about the recommendation: Providing further
analysis and insights of the recommendation applies the author’s critical
thinking and understanding of the policy to make substantive insights and
recommendations for the furtherance of the report.

The following table provides a brief overview of the 12 recommendations including the
implementation status.
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Recommendation Implementation
Recommendation 1: The Legislature Should Amend California Law to Target the
Leaders of Transnational Criminal Organizations Operating in California.

No
Recommendation 2: Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Should Use
California’s State Threat Assessment System as a Central Hub for Sharing
Information About Transnational Crime.

Yes
Recommendation 3: Federal, State, and Local Authorities Should Establish a
Unified Maritime Task Force and Associated Radar Network to Counter Maritime
Smuggling Operations Along California’s Coastline.

Yes
Recommendation 4: The Legislature and Governor Should Fund Five Additional
Special Operations Units Across California.

No
Recommendation 5: The Federal Government Should Continue Providing Critical
Funding to Support State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies in Investigating and
Dismantling Trafficking Organizations.

Yes
Recommendation 6: Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Should
Increase Operational Coordination in Combating Transnational Criminal
Organizations.

Yes
Recommendation 7: State and Local Authorities Should Develop Public-Private
Partnerships to Leverage Technology Against Transnational Organized Crime.

Yes
Recommendation 8: Businesses Should Adopt Industry’s Best Practices Designed to
Protect Against Cybercrime.

Yes
Recommendation 9: The Legislature Should Amend California Law to Enable
Prosecutors to Temporarily Freeze the Assets of Transnational Criminal
Organizations and Their Gang Associates Before the Filing of an Indictment.

No
Recommendation 10: The Legislature Should Strengthen California’s Prohibition
Against Financial Transaction Structuring.

No
Recommendation 11: California Prosecutors Need Advanced Training to Combat
Sophisticated Transnational Money Laundering Schemes.

Yes
Recommendation 12: State Authorities Should Partner With Their Mexican
Counterparts to Share Intelligence and Disrupt Illicit Flow of Money Across the
Border.

Yes

Recommendation 1: The Legislature Should Amend California Law to Target the
Leaders of Transnational Criminal Organizations Operating in California.
California does not have a statutory authority that specifically targets or
prosecutes leaders of transnational criminal organizations. For example, high-level
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prisoners and street gang members who supervise, organize, manage, or finance the
supply chain are treated as co-conspirators or aiders and abettors similar to their
underlings or foot soldiers. That is, high-level prison or street gang members who are in
charge of the logistics and operations are not punished accordingly.
Key provisions of the recommendation. California should broaden existing laws
to increase penalties against those who organize, supervise, finance or manage these
criminal enterprises. By incorporating the recommendations from the Criminal Enterprise
Act, law enforcement agencies may be able to increase sentencing and fines for those
who manage, organize, and finance criminal enterprise. This law would immediately
increase the penalties of incarceration and immediate seizure and forfeiture of any illegal
funds or property, which would deprive criminal organizations of working capital.
Currently, forfeiture occurs only when such acts are taken in concert with five or more
other persons. Other states have passed laws that increased the criminal liability of large-
scale narcotic operators beyond that of their employees or their underlings who are
generally the first to be caught in law enforcement dragnets. California should look to
broaden the law so that it can be easier to apply to when fewer than five are captured or
indicted.
Actions implemented since the recommendation. Since the issuance of the
report, California has not taken substantive steps to broaden existing laws to increase
penalties against those who organize, supervise, finance or manage these criminal
enterprises. The state legislature has introduced seven relevant bills to target the leaders
of criminal enterprises, but the only bill that was passed and chaptered as part of the
Penal Code (California Department of Justice, 2016) does little to target the assets of
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these leaders. California Senate Bill 443 was one of only seven bills to pass and requires
a criminal conviction before the accumulated criminal assets of a transnational criminal
operation can be taken away. Under SB 443, a drug dealer can transfer assets to another
enterprise prior to conviction. The passage of this bill places the burden of proof on the
state from preponderance of the evidence to a beyond reasonable doubt. The adoption of
this bill has made it more difficult for law enforcement agencies to seize assets and target
the leaders of criminal enterprises.
Other state bills have been introduced and failed. For example, in 2015
Assemblyman Luis Alejo (D-Salinas) introduced Assembly Bill 443. The bill would
amend an existing law to require prosecutors to file a petition of forfeiture in conjunction
with the criminal proceeding for the underlying offense. This would allow the
prosecuting agency to file for forfeiture prior to a criminal proceeding. Removing assets
from criminal gangs prior to proceedings is an effective method to cripple or impede the
criminal enterprises from expanding their network. Going after the money and assets of
transnational criminal enterprises as well as the leaders of those organizations is a good
strategy; however, the cartels quickly adapt and break off into splinter groups and create
more issues by the time law enforcement agencies get through the legal bureaucracy of a
mandate that does not come with a corresponding budget. AB 443 died in committee.
Another bill that never made it into law was Senate Bill 298: Enforcement of
Money Judgments (2015). It was introduced to include money laundering as one of the
offenses that can be used to intercept electronic communications involving criminal
enterprises. Current law authorizes the court to issue an order authorizing interception of
those communications if the judge finds, among other things, that there is probable cause
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to believe that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit one of
several offenses. These offenses include, among others, possession for sale of certain
controlled substances, murder, and certain felonies involving destructive devices.
Unfortunately, money laundering is not one of the crimes included, and SB 298 would
add money laundering to that list. Unfortunately, this bill also failed and died in
committee.
Needless to say, very little has been done to target leaders through the legislative
process. Both the ACLU and the federal government have opposed the legislation that
has been developed in the state senate and state assembly. Interestingly, the federal
government opposes the state asset seizure legislation because it impacts the federal
government’s ability to seize it first. The ACLU sees the legislation as far too broad
because it has the potential to prematurely seize the assets of innocent victims or punish
those who do not have the financial means to legally defend themselves in court from
such seizures. Having both the ACLU and federal government oppose such state
legislation makes it very difficult to craft state asset seizure laws that would serve local
agencies.
On the other side of the border, Mexico has also attempted to implement
strategies aimed at drug cartel leaders. In 2012, Mexican President Felipe Calderon also
attempted to pass a regulation that would undermine the leadership of criminal
organizations. Unfortunately, his attempt failed, but there have been several successes.
For example, the Mexican government captured Heriberto Lazcanom, who is the leader
of Zetas. In the process, law officials were able to undermine the Zetas operations and
criminal dealings (PBS News Hour, 2012). According to a 2011 Stratfor report, there are
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three basic dimensions of violence in Mexico: cartel vs. cartel, cartel vs. government, and
cartel vs. civilians. The Stratfor analysis revealed that the Mexican government has
focused its efforts, including military assets, on defeating cartel groups considered the
most violent, targeting, in particular, those that are the most violent toward civilians
(Williams, 2017).
The decapitation strategy has been successful in removing 22 of the top 37
trafficking figures (Beckhusen, 2012). This strategy has worked for Mexico. However,
U.S. military officials argue that such tactics could lead to power vacuums, resulting in
other criminal groups taking over the drug and criminal operations. The rule of law must
be put in place to eliminate this power vacuum. Essentially, law officials need to replace
the criminal structure with a strong law enforcement presence and rule of law.
Eliminating the power vacuum requires an overhaul of existing law enforcement and
judicial institutions such as implementing a faster response time, providing more
resources, and enabling law officials to intercept the proceeds of criminal enterprise:
laundered money.
Success of the implementation. To date, there has been little progress toward
comprehensive legislation that targets leaders of criminal enterprises. Part of the reason
many of the laws targeting criminal enterprises fail is competing interests by federal
agencies. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice warned California law
enforcement agencies that, if Senate Bill 443 were to be enacted into law, state and local
agencies would be ineligible to participate in the Department of Justice’s equitable
sharing programs. Losing out on tens of millions of dollars from the federal government
would be a severe economic loss and would lead to the disbandment of state, local, and
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federal taskforces responsible for much of the work against transnational crime. If Senate
Bill 443 were to pass, transnational criminal operations could operate more freely in
California because the federal government would not be involved in providing additional
funds. Competing interests between state and federal governments may, in fact,
strengthen criminal operations because, ultimately, funding for local agencies would be
cut off.
Another impediment to success is that law enforcement agencies cannot use
money seized from illegal operations. Critics of the law charge that allowing law
enforcement to reap financial rewards from such seizures creates “perverse incentives,
encouraging the pursuit of property over the impartial administration of justice” (Sforza,
2016, para. 4). Reformers have described the practice with pejoratives like “policing for
profit” and “theft by cop.”
Further analysis and insights about the recommendation. Rather than focusing
legislation on criminal leaders, a better approach would be to change laws that would
decriminalize certain drugs and reduce the criminal activities of transnational criminal
organizations. California has the most cartel-run illegal marijuana gardens of any state in
the nation. It is known as the Emerald Triangle due to it being the largest cannabis-
producing region in the United States. These illegal farms appear to be expanding and
now can be found in 20 other states and 67 national forests. Sixty percent of our nation’s
population resides in states with some form of legalized marijuana (Dinenberg, 2017).
Making certain drugs legal will close the market for criminal enterprises by forcing them
out of the market (Swan, 2017).
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Another byproduct of decriminalization is that prison populations can be managed
to ensure that only the most violent offenders are incarcerated. For instance, 27.6% of
drug offenders arrested in the United States are sentenced to prison for crimes related to
marijuana. Police arrest more people for marijuana use than for all violent crimes
combined. The latest 2016 data from the U.S. Border Patrol shows that, last
year, marijuana seizures along the southwest border were the lowest in at least a decade.
Agents seized roughly 1.5 million pounds of marijuana at the border, down from a peak
of nearly 4 million pounds in 2009. Mexican criminal growers are having difficulty
competing with U.S. domestic production, which is cutting into their profits (Ingraham,
2016). While this model of legislation is contrary to the recommendation in the OAG
report, it is this type of innovative thinking that could impact criminal leaders.
Recommendation 2: Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Should Use
California’s State Threat Assessment System as a Central Hub for Sharing
Information About Transnational Crime.
Fusion centers, as described by the Department of Homeland Security (2007),
operate as state and major urban area central points for the receipt, aggregation, analysis,
and sharing of threat-related information among federal, state, local, tribal, territorial and
private sector partners. There are over 500 law enforcement agencies operating within
California, but the state does not have a unified system for collecting, analyzing, and
disseminating information relating to transnational organized crime. Currently, there is
not a single central system that integrates the databases for easy access. CSTAS is
positioned to serve as a central hub for transnational criminal information. Law
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enforcement agencies should leverage the system as a platform to share information
about transnational criminal organizations across the state.
This recommendation encourages and directs law enforcement to share pertinent
information by establishing a common operating platform across the state. Implementing
this recommendation will expedite the prosecutorial process and will also benefit
agencies with limited funding through their participation in the system.
Key provisions of the recommendation. The report recommends that the state
implement a unified system for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information
relating to transnational organized crime. After 9/11, there was a call by the government
for greater collaboration and intelligence sharing among federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies to help prevent future terrorist attacks against this nation (National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). The underlying theme
was collaboration and sharing of information, but the establishment of a unified system
for the collection of information and intelligence related to transnational organized crime
did not receive much attention. The OAG report establishes an important point in that
aggregating information from the various already existing statewide fusion centers
provides access to key information in a single comprehensive database. Currently, there
are over 17 databases that law enforcement agencies access to gather information and
intelligence on transnational criminal enterprises (California Department of Justice,
2006). Given the complexity of these various databases and access points, the CSTAS
should develop a single system to achieve a seamless data port that aggregates and
integrates these systems.
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Actions implemented since the recommendation. Since the release of the OAG
report, the CSTAS has continued to evolve into both a distributed and centralized system.
The distributed model allows the other centers and agencies to control and maintain their
own data and protect it from being commingled or housed in a central data warehouse. A
distributed system is better at scalability because it is a network of systems that can grow
or shrink as needed.
The centralized system places all information in one location. Maintaining
accurate and updated data is difficult because the information is only as good as how
often it is entered into the system and validated. The change of pace of information-
sharing due to globalization makes it difficult for one system to scale up or down when
information changes rapidly.
The capacity of the statewide center as a central hub for information-sharing can
be leveraged as both a distributed and central system to better share information. It can
aggregate data from several sources and quickly share it with consumers. Prior to the
Attorney General’s report, the CSTAS was not viewed by the other fusion centers as the
central hub of the system. Each agency that operated its own fusion center focused
primarily on its own region. This had to do with regional funding provided to each center
to allow them to focus on local issues. After the Attorney General’s report was issued,
fusion centers adopted the CSTAS system to further strengthen collaboration among
state, local, and counties agencies. CSTAS became the central hub for data sharing and
distribution.
Success of the implementation. The six statewide fusion centers have had
success in combating transnational crime. Part of their success is due to increased mutual
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agreements, leading to mutual sharing of information. For example, the CSTAS was
instrumental in the arrest of 38 individuals suspected of being involved with a
transnational drug network. Law enforcement agencies seized over 200 pounds of
synthetic drugs, half a million dollars in cash, bank accounts, and 19 guns (Department of
Homeland Security, 2015). These successful examples were attributed to increased
information sharing between the various agencies. In fact, the Department of Homeland
Security publishes examples of success stories on its website.
Further analysis and insights about the recommendation. While the five other
centers do interact with the CSTAS for information-sharing, the five lack the legislative
authority or a governance structure to direct the other fusion centers. Only the CSTAS
has the legislative authority. The current model can best be described as a voluntary
relationship in which the five fusion centers agreed to work together as part of a
statewide system. This system is horizontal in leadership, like peer-to-peer, versus a top-
down hierarchy. While this model can serve well for collaboration, it lacks the ability to
enforce information and intelligence sharing policies or legal authority for others to
comply with a single standard of information and intelligence sharing. As long as it
remains a voluntary system versus statutorily mandated, there will be communication
barriers to fully implementing a single central hub for sharing among the partner fusion
centers.
The goal of this recommendation is to eliminate barriers to communication and
intelligence development by establishing a single point of sharing at the state fusion
center. Communication barriers are not always about behavior; they also involve
technology, such as incompatible or disparate computer system, lack of interoperability,
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lack of a common terminology, and lack of funding. Centers should establish formal
peer-to-peer protocols and standards to enhance communications as well as create
effective and efficient vehicles for exchanging information. Post 9/11, the United States
Attorney General issued a directive to establish secure means of working with state and
local officials to improve their information-sharing and collaboration efforts. The USA
Patriot Act (Pub. L. 107–56) was issued after 9/11 and greatly improved the Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s ability to exchange data with the intelligence community and
across law enforcement agencies. Adopting the same type of legislative mandates in
California would direct the six fusion centers to work with each other rather than rely on
voluntary collaboration.
Recommendation 3: Federal, State, and Local Authorities Should Establish a
Unified Maritime Task Force and Associated Radar Network to Counter Maritime
Smuggling Operations Along California’s Coastline.
Maritime task forces in California are often established on an as-needed basis and
are specific to the geographic areas along California’s coast. This has made the task of
enforcing the 600 miles of coastline difficult and ineffective. Another barrier is limited
resources, with some jurisdictions better equipped than others. For instance, larger
jurisdictions like Los Angeles and Long Beach have the resources to partner with
regional security and federal agencies while others do not.
According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (2015), transnational criminal
organizations are currently smuggling drugs and contraband along the West Coast to
delivery points in California with little disruption from law enforcement agencies. These
criminals use small high-speed boats and watercraft, operating primarily at night,
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conducting approximately 4 to 6 deliveries a week. The speed, short travel distance, and
low radar signature of these vessels is a challenge for interdiction forces.
The report recommends that local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies
establish a new multiple-jurisdictional maritime task force that leverages the local, state,
and federal levels to combat threats along California’s coastline. By integrating the
various coastal radar systems and other technologies, law enforcement agencies can
develop a common operating protocol along the coastline and manage security breaches.
Key provisions of the recommendation. Before September 11, 2001, maritime
and port security did not have the profile and requisite resources to adequately protect our
nation’s ports; it was a relatively low priority in U.S. ports of entry. In 2002, Congress
enacted the Maritime Transportation Security Act establishing committees at all ports to
coordinate the operations and activities of all port stakeholders, including other federal,
local and state agencies, industry and the boating public. These multiagency groups,
called Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC), were developed to serve as a
clearinghouse for information and intelligence related to port security as well for law
enforcement agencies to leverage the support and legal authority of the Coast Guard
when conducting offshore patrols or interdictions. In Los Angeles, the AMSC has been
successful at increasing collaboration with agencies that protect and operate within the
Port of Los Angeles. This has been accomplished through routine training, stakeholder
meetings and federal grants.
The key provision of this recommendation is the establishment of an effective
multi-jurisdictional maritime task force. The task force should develop more effective
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sonar buoys, radar stations and other technologies, which may be utilized along the
coastline.
Actions implemented since the recommendation. To counter smuggling
operations, the United States Coast Guard developed Operation Border Shield as an
initiative to shield the coastal borders of Southern California from maritime drug
smuggling. The two areas of primary concern are the northern Baja California Peninsula
(offshore component) where the Coast Guard patrols the air and surface area. Another
area of concern is the U.S.-Mexico border area (inshore component) in which the Coast
Guard coordinates real-time interdiction with local, state and federal agencies. The
Border Shield program was launched in April 1997, and it focuses on stemming the
illegal flow of marijuana into Southern California. It relies heavily on inter-agency
cooperation with the maritime task force in San Diego. The Attorney General included
the expansion of Border Shield to include task forces along the entire coastline rather
than just Southern California. This federal program is now integrated with all local and
state agencies that protect the California coastline.
Border Shield provides additional resources and support to ensure that the coast of
California has adequate ground, surface and air surveillance, which includes monitoring,
detection, intelligence reporting, and interdiction by interagency participants, including
the U.S. Customs Service, the Joint Interagency Task Force-West, the DEA, the Border
Patrol, Joint Task Force Six, the National Guard, the Information Analysis Center, and
California law enforcement agencies.
In 2016, Congress introduced HR3586, which is known as the Border and
Maritime Coordination Improvement Act. While portions of this bill were incorporated
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into other bills, the full Senate has not passed it in its entirety. Fortunately, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 continues to provide support and funding to ensure that marine
operations are continued with a risk-based assessment that considers mission needs,
validated requirements, performance results, threats, costs and any other relevant factors
identified by the United States Customs and Border Protection.
Maritime smuggling and drug trafficking operations along the coast of California
include the use of panga boats. Pangas are cheap, open-hulled boats that can be loaded
with drugs, humans, or other contraband and were originally intended for short-range
hauling of up to 100 miles, but they are now being supplemented with large 55-gallon
tanks of fuel and are known to travel up to 300 miles. As law enforcement agencies
increase pressure on coastal drug trafficking, smugglers adapt to changing conditions and
have now reached upper portions of the state. Enforcement programs like Border Shield
have been effective in controlling these panga operations, but smugglers can quickly
adapt by locating other routes further offshore.
Success of the implementation. Maritime task forces have proved to be
successful in Southern California. In 2016, law enforcement agencies captured a panga
boat off of the Ventura County coastline. Law enforcement agencies now pool their
resources and work together to catch the smugglers. This is one of many examples that
demonstrate the successful use of maritime task forces. Federal funding has continued to
support critical resources such as through the Port Security Grant out of the Port of Los
Angeles. Locally, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department has been successful in
interdicting smuggling operations off the coast. The acquisition of new fast boats
improved local law enforcement’s ability to track and capture these operations. The Ports
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of San Diego, Long Beach, Los Angeles, and Hueneme have benefited from the security
and enforcement provided by these maritime taskforces. The investment from federal port
security grants in local maritime taskforces has proved to be money well spent with the
ever-increasing use of offshore drug smuggling and human trafficking.
It is important to note that the United States’ maritime domain is not only limited
to the nation’s shoreline but also encompasses the ports, coastal waters, and our territorial
sea, contiguous zone, and the 200 nautical miles from shore. The United States Coast
Guard is a key component of the Department of Homeland Security and maritime
security. However, due to the expanded role of the Coast Guard as an armed force, a
federal law enforcement agency, a humanitarian service, a regulatory agency and a key
member of the intelligence community, the Coast Guard is stretched thin when it comes
to local coastline protection. The Coast Guard confronts maritime threats through a
layered approach. This layered approach places a portion of the burden on local law
enforcement agencies that have the capacity to patrol the coastline. Through this
collaboration, local law enforcement agencies have been successful in combating
transnational crime by participating in joint federal task forces.
Another successful model for safeguarding California’s coast is Operation Triton.
In 2015 the California National Guard Counter Drug Task Force designated 65 soldiers to
help detect drug smugglers along the coast. This new task force essentially doubled the
resources directed at protecting California’s coastline from drug smuggling. According to
Captain Richard Long, a counterdrug task force officer,
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This is one of the biggest threats to our civilian law enforcement partners; it’s one
of the things they are trying to counter right now. So, since that’s their effort, we
decided to make it our effort too.
Major Jeffrey More, the counterdrug task force operations officer, argues,
By increasing support to the Department of Homeland Security, Border Patrol,
and the Coast Guard, we hope to further deter and disrupt the smuggling of illegal
drugs into our state. Since the issuance of the AG report, Operation Triton has
continued to focus efforts on safeguarding California’s coast.
Another model of task force interdictions is the California Border Alliance Group
(CBAG), which was designated in 1990. While this partnership was formed almost 30
years ago, the AG report emphasized stakeholder involvement. One in five partnerships
of the Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) has received
additional funding as the result of the AG report. The HIDTA covers the areas from the
U.S.-Mexico border to Orange County and Riverside County and from the Pacific Ocean
to the Arizona border. While this area has approximately a 140-mile border with Mexico
and is only 7% of the entire national border, it is accessed by 60% of the entire southwest
border population. This area also has five of the busiest land ports of entry as well as
international airports, seaports, and large mountainous and desert areas. Throughout this
area, transnational criminal organizations operate their illicit activities. Due to this high
percentage concentration of border land crossings, it is a strategic location to place law
enforcement officers.
The mission of the CBAG is to measurably reduce drug trafficking, thereby
reducing the impact of illicit drugs in this region and other areas of the country. The
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CBAG assists with the coordination of joint initiatives to deter, disrupt, and dismantle the
most significant drug trafficking organizations and their supporting transportation and
money laundering organizations. The CBAG also emphasizes efforts against
methamphetamine manufacturing, precursor supply, and abuse.
Successful models of maritime surveillance like Operation Triton and the
California Border Alliance Group have supported local law enforcement with enhanced
equipment, personnel and logistics. The recommendation in the OAG report has led to
increased use and support of these groups and task forces, which could benefit from
additional funding to ensure that resources are continually provided and supported.
Further analysis and insights about the recommendation. One aspect of
coastal security that should be considered is the inclusion of private and commercial
vessels as part of the network. At any given time, there are thousands of boats off the
California coast. A query of the Marine Traffic website, an interactive map with live
vessel tracking, shows a vast network of vessels that law enforcement can leverage to
gather information and reporting on suspicious vessels (CRUISIN, 2018). Expanding the
current model of U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary to include patrolling the California coastline
can serve as force multiplier against criminal groups. The United States Coast Guard
Auxiliary serves as a civilian force to assist the United States Coast Guard in a multitude
of missions. There are over 32,000 volunteers each year who help to save approximately
500 lives, assist 15,000 distressed boaters, conduct over 150,000 safety examinations of
recreational vessels, and provide boater safety instruction to over 500,000 students. In
total, the Coast Guard Auxiliary saves taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars each
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year. The existing model can serve to enhance coastal security (Department of Homeland
Security, 2015).
Recommendation 4: The Legislature and Governor Should Fund Five Additional
Special Operations Units Across California.
Special Operations Units (SOUs) were established by the California Department
of Justice to provide statewide enforcement against organized crime. The SOUs also
support local law enforcement agencies and combine their resources to combat crime.
Funding cuts eliminated five of the six SOUs. The AG report recommends that more
SOUs should be created to combat the growing threat of transnational crime. The
California Department of Justice Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement found that special
task forces such as SOUs are highly effective in dismantling transnational criminal
organizations. These multi-agency statewide enforcement teams are used to combat
violent career criminals, gangs, and organized crime groups, along with intrastate drug
trafficking. However, severe budget cutbacks in 2011 eliminated five SOUs.
In 2011, Governor Jerry Brown defunded much of the SOU budget. The approved
cuts were known as reallocating funding that cut in half the enforcement work of the
California OAG. About 200 of the 400 investigators assigned to these units were
removed from their positions. The general fund reduction proposal reduced the budget of
the division of law enforcement by $71 million, impacting many of the 55 statewide
taskforces which coordinate responses to transnational criminal organizations. Attorney
General Kamala D. Harris released a statement:
The proposed 70-million-dollar cut will cripple California’s statewide anti-gang
and drug trafficking operations. Our division of law enforcement leads 50 task
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forces across the state that target criminal gangs and drug trafficking
organizations. Earlier this month one of these task forces took down 101 leaders
and members of two transnational gangs terrorizing California’s Central Valley.
Last month we announced the seizure of over hundred pounds of
methamphetamine and arrested more than 30 gang members in the Bay Area;
these cuts will eliminate many, if not all, of these taskforces and jeopardize many
ongoing investigations. (California OAG, 2011, para. 2)
This statement was issued to convince lawmakers to maintain funding for these units by
providing an example of their impact on the war on drugs and criminals in California.
The California Department of Justice provides statewide enforcement for
combating violent career criminals, gangs and transnational organized crime groups.
Much of the work of the SOUs involves evaluating and validating information and
intelligence and conducting field surveillance to identify methods of interdiction. The
personnel assigned to these units conduct undercover operations to gather evidence
leading to the arrest and prosecution of the criminals involved. These units emphasize
target selection to ensure their works are directed at criminal organizations. Another
benefit of these units is that they provide appropriate support to local agencies when
major drug problems, transnational criminals, and gangs exceed the capabilities of local
law enforcement agencies. The SOUs work under the California Bureau of Narcotic
Enforcement.
Key provisions of the recommendation. The key provision of this
recommendation is specifically aimed at providing funding and budget allocations to
SOUs. Since the 2011 state budget cuts to these specialized units, there has been very
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little funding allocated to restore them. Because the Attorney General has little authority
over state budgets, this initiative needs to be driven by the legislature.
Actions implemented since the recommendation. Due to limited available
information on the status of the five additional SOUs, it is difficult to determine the status
of this recommendation. An analysis of the past five years of California’s budget found
only one reference to restoring funding for the SOUs as a line item to restore $9.4 million
to the California Department of Justice. The California Department of Justice’s website
indicates that the SOUs remain in existence and describes their capabilities and statewide
objectives. However, it does not list how many exist statewide and whether any of them
have been reassembled since the $70 million budget cut of 2011.
Success of the implementation. Currently, there is only one SOU division
located in Fresno, California. While it is the only remaining unit since the 2011 budget
cuts eliminated five SOUs, the Fresno unit has proven to be highly successful in
combating transnational criminal activities. For instance, the unit has netted over $6.6
million in U.S. currency from its counterintelligence operations. The report recommends
that California open more SOU offices in Sacramento, San Francisco, Riverside, Los
Angeles, and San Diego. The operating budget for these five additional units would be
approximately $7.5 million total and as recommended in the AG report would greatly
enhance the state’s ability to build cases against transnational criminal organizations.
Data from 2015 indicates the Fresno SOU has been successful in the arrest of
hundreds of criminals, confiscation of 196 firearms, and seizure of over a quarter million
dollars’ worth of drugs, including 146 pounds of methamphetamine, 20 pounds of heroin,
12 pounds of cocaine, and 31 pounds of marijuana.
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Further analysis and insights about the recommendation. The SOUs have
been successful in the coastal interdiction of smugglers and transnational criminals.
These efforts are similar to the type of U.S. warfare that is taking place in the Middle
East and Africa. The United States Special Operations Command has deployed small
adaptable fighting forces that can target insurgents without causing collateral damage
normally associated with conventional warfare. After the rescue of Captain Richard
Phillips from Somali pirates and Operation Neptune Spear, the Naval Special Warfare
Development Group, colloquially known as DEVGRU or SEAL Team 6, became well
known throughout the world (Beekman, 2015). Military research shows that deploying
small-scale adaptable forces is the most effective way to combat threats and apply force.
This is very similar to the approach taken by the SOUs.
Recommendation 5: The Federal Government Should Continue Providing Critical
Funding to Support State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies in Investigating
and Dismantling Trafficking Organizations.
In 2011, many of the federal grants that enabled law enforcement agencies to
combat transnational criminal activities had been severely reduced. Unfortunately, since
then, many multi-agency task forces have been underfunded or eliminated. One such
grant was the Bryne Justice Assistance Grant (“Bryne JAG”), which enabled the
Californian DOJ to fund and organize task forces across the state. As a result, criminal
activities increased significantly. For instance, according to the DEA’s drug seizure data,
there has been a dramatic increase in methamphetamine trafficking from both foreign and
domestic drug cartels following 2011 (DEA, 2015).
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Key provisions of the recommendation. The report recommends continuing or
increasing critical federal funding to support both state and local law enforcement
agencies that investigate and dismantle trafficking organizations. Congressional funding
should also be maintained or increased for California’s law enforcement agencies in
charge of combating transnational criminal organizations. In 2016, the federal
government provided over $50 million in funding to support local law enforcement
agencies. Funding these agencies will provide the necessary resources, equipment, and
personnel to enable them to investigate and dismantle transnational criminal
organizations.
Actions implemented since the recommendation. There have been several
action steps taken since the release of the OAG report. For example, in January of 2014,
Congress approved $7.5 million to state law enforcement to target the production and
trafficking of methamphetamine. In 2016, the Federal Appropriations Committee
approved $55.7 billion in funding for federal grants for nationwide law enforcement
agencies, a 10% increase in the budget from 2015. This bill provides grant funding
through the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The funding also allows the Department of
Justice to provide grants and assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies that
help put police officers on the street, equip them with body armor, test backlogged
scientific evidence, protect schools and college campuses, and assist victims of violent
crime and sexual assault.
The U.S Department of Justice (California OAG, 2016) allocated funding in 2016
to address five key areas: gun violence, the heroin crisis, violence against women, drug
control policy, and state and local programs. The grants are a key resource in combating
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crime and developing drug policy in the United States. The following identify the key
funding areas for each one:
• $73 million for all states to improve the quality of criminal and mental health
records so interstate background checks are more effective. It is unknown at
this time how much of the $73 million will be allocated to California.
• $15 million to train local police how to respond to active shooter situations so
police and bystanders can get safely out of the way when the unthinkable
happens.
• $75 million for comprehensive school safety, which will allow communities
to conduct school safety assessments and fill gaps in school safety plans.
• $7 million to fund anti-heroin task forces within the COPS program.
Competitive grants will be awarded for drug enforcement, including
investigations and activities related to stopping the distribution of heroin or
unlawful diversion and distribution of prescription opioids. The bill also
provides funding for Justice Department grant programs available to state and
local governments for residential drug treatment ($12 million), prescription
drug monitoring ($13 million) and drug courts ($42 million).
• $480 million, the highest funding level ever, for grants provided by the Office
on Violence Against Women. Funding is provided for multiple competitive
and formula grant programs that support training for police officers and
prosecutors, state domestic violence and sexual assault coalitions, rape
prevention programs, lethality assessment and homicide reduction initiatives,
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domestic violence hotlines, and women’s shelters and transitional housing
support services.
• $45 million to address the sexual assault kit backlog at law enforcement
agencies.
• $380 million, $5 million (one percent) more than the fiscal year 2015 enacted
level. For the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program, the
agreement provides $250 million, a $5 million increase from fiscal year 2015,
and $95 million for Drug-Free Communities, a $1.5 million increase from the
fiscal year 2015 enacted level. This funding will help reduce drug trafficking
and drug use.
• $2.5 billion for various state and local grant programs, which is $174 million
above the fiscal year 2015 enacted level.
• $476 million for Byrne Justice Assistance Grants.
• $210 million for the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program.
• $72 million for missing and exploited children programs.
• $70 million for programs to improve police-community relations, including
the purchase of body-worn cameras for police.
Federal funding is an important resource for state and local governments. Because
these issues cross state lines, it is important that these programs are implemented
nationwide. Recent policy decisions from the White House to defund federal grants to so-
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called “Sanctuary Cities”
5
will only create more systemic crime problems nationwide
(Lucas, 2017).
Success of the implementation. The Office of Justice Programs Grant
Performance Measurement and Progress Reporting Information Portal is the performance
monitoring system for agencies that receive federal grant funds. A quantitative and
qualitative system for assessing grant performance is an invaluable tool for agencies to
monitor performance. The public can see where their federal tax dollars are being spent
and whether efforts prove effective on crime. The data in the system is consistently
updated. Federal funding has continued to support law enforcement agencies in several
areas. One of the most influential funding streams is the Urban Areas Security Initiative
(UASI). This program assists high-threat, high-density urban areas in California in an
effort to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to deter, prevent and respond to acts
of terrorism. The UASI program has been very successful because it covers everything
from equipment to staffing; it uses the whole community approach. Equally important to
ensuring the funds are properly distributed, is oversight and governance, which include
regional partners. California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services administers the
funds. This agency is responsible for managing the financial and reporting aspects of the
grant program in accordance with federal guidelines. In 2016, more than $120 million
were allocated to the state of California.
Further analysis and insights about the recommendation. Relying on outside
federal funding makes it hard to plan accordingly. Additionally, some grants require

5
A city that limits its cooperation with the national government effort to enforce
immigration law.
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matching funds from the state or local agency, putting an additional strain on the local
budget. One idea that has been successful in Los Angeles is public-private partnerships.
The Los Angeles Police Foundation provides funding for special projects, equipment and
staffing.
The Los Angeles Police Foundation is an independent, not-for-profit organization
that raises private money and provides critical resources and vital support to the
Los Angeles Police Department. From essential equipment and state-of-the-art
technology to specialized training and innovative programs that would otherwise
be unfunded, the funding we provide directly improves public safety, impacts
officer readiness, and enhances our quality of life. (Los Angeles Police
Department, 2017, para. 1)
A public-private partnership with the community enhances both the capabilities of the
department and builds trust and collaboration with the community. Accessing both
federal and private funds can build resiliency into the funding system.
Recommendation 6: Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Should
Increase Operational Coordination in Combating Transnational Criminal
Organizations.
Operational coordination allows law enforcement agencies to better utilize their
resources and other prosecutorial authorities to combat transnational crime. Because
transnational criminal organizations operate through international networks, it is
imperative that local, state, and federal enforcement work together to improve
intelligence exchange, develop stronger partnerships, and coordinate efforts with state
and federal health and correction agencies to reduce the demand for drugs.
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Key provisions of the recommendation. To enhance the operational
coordination, the report recommends the following: improve intelligence sharing between
federal, state and local agencies; partner with local agencies and the U.S. Forest Service
and National Park Service to eradicate the cultivation of marijuana on public lands; and
coordinate between public health agencies to reduce the demand for drugs trafficked by
transnational criminal organizations.
Actions implemented since the recommendation. Several programs were
implemented to increase operational coordination in combating transnational crime in
California. Those include the statewide fusion centers, maritime and drug task forces and
local partnerships between the California Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. For example, in Los Angeles, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms
and Explosives works closely with both Los Angeles Police Department and the Los
Angeles Fire Department to investigate and deter crime. The Los Angeles Fire
Department, Los Angeles Police Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives formed the House of Worship
Task Force (Eastern Group Publications, 2017). Since that time, several arson and
explosive-related crimes have been solved as well as prevented.
Success of the implementation. The California Department of Justice has
several statewide programs that enhance collaboration among local, state, and federal
agencies. One successful example is the Division of Law Enforcement’s Bureau of
Investigation, which is comprised of local, state and federal special agents that perform a
broad spectrum of law enforcement and investigative duties. Agents are experts in
conducting complex criminal investigations ranging from identity theft to trans-national
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criminal enterprises. These agents are assigned to regional offices and task force offices
throughout the state and work closely with their counterparts.
The mission of the Bureau of Investigation is to provide statewide expert
investigative services combating multi-jurisdictional and transnational criminal
organizations. The Bureau of Investigation applies its resources to enhance public safety
by focusing their efforts on organized crime, consumer fraud protection, money
laundering, trafficking, cyber-crimes, and any crime or civil action of statewide
importance to the Attorney General. The following 18 programs are part of the Bureau of
Investigation’s key initiatives to increase operational coordination in combating
transnational criminal organizations. These 18 programs have been successful in
combating transnational crime in California by providing resources, equipment,
personnel, and a centralized system that improves collaboration.
Anti-Terrorism Program. This program works with federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies for the purpose of detecting, investigating, prosecuting,
dismantling, preventing and responding to domestic and international terrorist activities
in a unified and coordinated manner.
California Anti-Money Laundering Alliance (CAMLA). The California
Department of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement, has established CAMLA, a
specialized, statewide multi-agency team of financial forensic investigators from local,
state and federal agencies who provide technical and logistical support to combat
transnational criminal organizations’ financial crimes along the California/Mexico
border.
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Campaign Against Marijuana Planting (CAMP). This program, along with
local, state, and federal partner agencies, eradicates large-scale illegal marijuana
cultivations from public and private lands that cause deforestation, damage wildlife
habitats, pose dangers to the public, and generate hazardous chemical pollution.
Clandestine Laboratory Coordination Program (Clan Labs). This program is
part of a national strategy, intelligence sharing and training initiative addressing
methamphetamine and pharmaceutical drug crimes in the United States.
Controlled Chemical Substance Program (CCSP). This program includes state
law enforcement agencies that monitor the use of meth-making products such as reagents,
solvents, laboratory glass flasks and precursor chemicals that are needed for clan lab
operations.
eCrime Program. This program consists of the eCrime Teams tasked with
investigating and prosecuting large-scale identity theft and technology crimes with actual
losses in excess of $50,000. The teams also provide investigative assistance on
technology related crimes to the Attorney General’s Criminal Law Division.
Foreign Prosecutions and Law Enforcement Unit (FPLEU). This program
provides assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies in the location and
prosecution of suspects who are Mexican nationals accused of committing violent crimes
in California and who flee to Mexico to avoid arrest and prosecution.
Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU). This program provides leadership
and promotes professionalism in the criminal intelligence community to protect public
safety and constitutional rights.
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Los Angeles Clearing House (LA CLEAR). This program provides strategic
investigative research and analysis, tactical case and special operations support as well as
real-time officer-safety-related operational intelligence. LA CLEAR provides these
services to 205 law enforcement agencies statewide. This core capability has made LA
CLEAR a global model to combat transnational crime. As of 2016, LA CLEAR has
continued to expand its capabilities in support of local law enforcement agencies.
Recycle Fraud Program (Recycle Fraud). This program’s primary objective is to
detect and stop existing fraud by organized criminal groups against the Beverage
Container Recycling Fund (Recycling Fund) and to deter future fraud through the
successful prosecution of criminal activity.
San Diego Human Trafficking Task Force (HTTF). This task force disrupts and
dismantles human trafficking and child exploitation organizations through a
comprehensive, collaborative and regional law enforcement and prosecution response to
identify and rescue victims and hold their offenders accountable along with promoting
community awareness, expanding the exchange of information, and enhancing law
enforcement resources and training.
San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC). This program
coordinates law enforcement agencies along the border and provides detailed information
about current transnational criminal investigations via the National Drug Pointer Index
system, which is designed to enhance officer safety and strengthen cases by putting
officers working on the same target in touch with each other.
Southwest Border Anti-Money Laundering Alliance (Alliance). This program
works to enhance and better coordinate investigations and prosecutions of money
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laundering in the southwest border area, which includes the area within 200 miles of the
United States/Mexico border on either side of the border and all of Arizona.
Special Investigations Team (SIT) Program. This program consists of the SIT
Teams, which provide investigative assistance to the Attorney General’s Criminal Law
Division, Division of Public Rights and Division of Criminal Law units.
Special Operations Unit (SOU). This program provides statewide enforcement
for combating intrastate drug trafficking and violent career criminals and gangs.
Task Force Program. This program allows the Bureau of Investigation to
maintain partnerships with federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to
coordinate and concentrate efforts against drug trafficking, the underground economy and
human trafficking.
Tax Recovery and Criminal Enforcement (TRaCE) Task Force. The Tax
Recovery and Criminal Enforcement Task Force is a pilot program facilitated by
California Assembly Bill 576, Revenue Recovery and Collaborative Enforcement Team
Act. TRaCE joins existing state and federal resources to collaboratively combat illegal
business activities that rob California of public funds and its citizens of public services.
The task force is comprised of investigators and special agents from multiple agencies
working together to investigate, prosecute and recover revenue lost to the underground
economy.
Western States Information Network (WSIN). This program is one of six
Regional Information-Sharing System projects funded by Congress through the U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. It has been very effective in
California. In 2017, the Richmond Police Department used the equipment provided by
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WSIN to investigate a drug trafficking case. Officers arrested several suspects and seized
11 ounces of marijuana valued at $5,000; 1 kilo and 13 ounces of cocaine valued at
$43,000; 4 ounces of methamphetamine valued at $16,000; three Ecstasy pills valued at
$30; and $900 in U.S. currency.
Operational coordination, under programs like WSIN and others, allows law
enforcement agencies to better utilize their resources and other prosecutorial authorities
to combat transnational crime. Through these various networks and programs, the state
has built a strong and resilient system that does not rely on simply one model. The
research shows that the state and federal government are well integrated to improve
operational coordination.
Further analysis and insights about the recommendation. One enhancement to
this recommendation is to designate the state fusion centers as the single clearinghouse
for all data and information that is aggregated under these programs. A central location
where statewide agencies can access and analyze big data sets ensures that the
information is accurate and consistent, improves public safety through the use of accurate
criminal intelligence, and saves money by eliminating other processes.
Recommendation 7: State and Local Authorities Should Develop Public-Private
Partnerships to Leverage Technology Against Transnational Organized Crime.
Eighty-five percent of our nation’s critical infrastructure is owned and operated
by the private sector. By forming partnerships between the private and public sectors,
state and local authorities can better leverage the private sector’s strength to counter the
ever-changing threats and tactics imposed by transnational criminal organizations. The
world has experienced significant growth and development as a result of technological
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innovations and globalization. Advancements in technology have facilitated and
improved efficiency of numerous aspects of our lives. As quickly as globalization and
technology have advanced in the world, transnational criminal organizations have taken
advantage of this progress. The recent proliferation of cybercrime on businesses shows
no signs of abating, and cybercrime, money laundering, and counterfeiting of goods and
services is a major concern for all business leaders.
International criminal markets have become major centers of economic power.
The Council of Foreign Relations issued a report in 2010 that highlights the impact of
transnational criminals on the private sector at all levels. These criminals disrupt the
market and profit off of private sector initiatives. Due to technology and globalization,
transnational criminal organizations have internationalized faster than law enforcement
and world governance. When states fail to deliver public services and security, criminals
will fill the vacuum by providing services and security. Thus, partnering with the private
sector is central to combating these criminal organizations.
Key provisions of the recommendation. Law enforcement agencies should
capitalize on existing resources within the private sector. Due to the nature of
bureaucracies, laws, and protocols, public agencies cannot keep up with new and
emerging technologies. This is particularly relevant because transnational criminal
entities use advanced technologies to avoid detection and prosecution. Developing these
partnerships would enable public agencies to maintain access to advancements in
technology.
Speaking at the symposium of the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
(2017) Executive Director Yury Fedotov stated,
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The private sector is subject to legal and regulatory measures to protect the public
and foster competitive markets. But in the fight against transnational organized
crime, the private sector also needs commercial self-regulation to help distinguish
between licit and illicit commercial flows, and to prevent the criminal exploitation
of private-sector activities. For example, efforts to prevent human trafficking and
keep forced labour exploitation out of supply chains help stop this modern-day
slavery. Preventing transnational organized crime is good for business, but the
most important beneficiaries are ordinary people. Your efforts can help to foster
development and create stronger economies and safer communities, giving people
new opportunities and hopes for the future. By working together, you can make a
real difference in the lives of people all over the world. (p. 9)
Developing public-private partnerships to leverage technology against
transnational organized crime can improve government’s access to new and emerging
technologies. Thomas Friedman, an American journalist and author writes, in his new
book Thank You for Being Late, that it takes 10 years for government to adapt to new
technologies. This inability to adapt makes it even more important to partner with the
private sector. The private sector can develop an idea, and have it spread worldwide and
become ubiquitous in less than 7 years.
Actions implemented since the recommendation. The California Cybersecurity
Task Force is a statewide partnership comprised of key stakeholders, subject matter
experts, and cybersecurity professionals from California’s public sector, private industry,
academia, and law enforcement. The main goal of this task force is to improve cyber
security through education, information and intelligence sharing, workforce training, and
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economic growth. In addition to the task force, there are two federal programs that
support the implementation of this recommendation: The Homeland Security Presidential
Directive – 7 (HSPD7) and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).
After the attacks of September 11, the federal government issued presidential
directives aimed at improving homeland security. HSPD7 establishes a national policy
for federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure and
key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks. HSPD7 emphasizes critical
infrastructure as it relates to cybercrime. Through these directives, including the OAG
report, state, local, and federal government resources are directed to collaborate and
support the private sectors’ key databases and protect them from cybercrime.
The NIPP provides access and distribution of data used to establish national
priorities, goals, and requirements for critical infrastructure and key resource protection.
The NIPP ensures that federal funding and resources are applied in the most effective
manner to reduce vulnerability to turf threats and minimize the consequences of attacks
and other incidents. Both federal and statewide initiatives to integrate the private sector
into the law enforcement community have been implemented throughout the state and
continue to support the OAG report.
Success of the implementation. One successful example of this recommendation
being implemented is the partnership that local governments developed with the private
sector. One of these companies is Palantir Technologies, a data mining and analysis
company. Palantir is a private American software and services company that specializes
in big data analysis. The Los Angeles Police Department has leveraged the computational
power of this system to track transnational crime. Palantir was used to track and locate
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the drug cartels that murdered two U.S. agents in Mexico City in 2011 (Woody, 2016).
This and other technologies have continued to aid law enforcement in the tracking and
locating of criminals through the use of big data and social network analysis.
Further analysis and insights about the recommendation. The OAG report
addresses public-private partnerships as a key underpinning to combat transnational
crime. To be successful in this endeavor, the public and private sectors should share more
criminal intelligence information related to cyber threats, vulnerability and consequences.
Equally important is that these sectors should work to create new platforms or strengthen
existing platforms to increase information-sharing and improve investigations and
prosecutions. In California the fusion centers include the private sector as a valuable
partner and, as such, law enforcement has been able to collaborate with private industry
to investigate, mitigate and eradicate transnational crime in private enterprise.
Recommendation 8: Businesses Should Adopt Industry’s Best Practices Designed to
Protect Against Cybercrime.
California experiences a barrage of cyber-attacks on both public and private
sector entities. The lax attitudes toward cyber security and lack of protection resulted in
computer and network breaches that have cost billions of dollars in economic losses. To
mitigate the impact of the cyber-attacks, the California Department of Justice recently
released a report that offered practical guidance on how to minimize cyber
vulnerabilities. To help businesses protect against cybercrime, the report recommends
that businesses adopt the best practices.
Key provisions of the recommendation. Businesses should adopt industry best
practices designed to protect against cybercrime. Lax cybersecurity practices, or the lack
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of protections altogether, allow far too many breaches of computer networks and
databases to happen in California. All entities, public and private, doing business in
California should assume that they are a target and defend themselves accordingly by
adopting industry best practices identified in the Department of Justice’s report.
Actions implemented since the recommendation. One successful model created
in 2015 by the Attorney General is the California Cyber Crime Center, also known as C4.
Criminals often leave a digital footprint of their illegal activities, whether it is a
photograph on a cell phone or metadata found on a laptop or phone device. Many local
law enforcement agencies do not have the tools, experience or trained staff to do that type
of forensic research:
The mission of C4 is to combat and prevent crime by harnessing the Department’s
expertise in cybercrime, cyber security, and digital evidence by offering technical
assistance, training, and case-specific services, including: Digital forensics
analysis support (e.g. cell phones, social media, etc.), investigation and
prosecution of cyber crimes, technical assistance for cyber crime investigation
and prosecution, technical assistance for network security, high quality
cybercrime and security training on digital evidence, legal services, and
investigations, research and development of advanced forensic tools, techniques,
best practices, and policy recommendations regarding cyber crime. (California
Cyber Crime Center, 2015, p. 1)
This center has been a positive step in fulfilling the need for more government
support in combating cybercrime. C4 is designed to collaborate with the private sector
and ensure that businesses have a clearinghouse for cyber-attack issues. C4 is a step in
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the right direction, but the state legislature needs to issue stronger policies and implement
cyber task forces to assist businesses.
Another successful model is the California Cyber Exploitation Task Force. Cyber
exploitation is the criminal act of posting intimate photos or videos online without the
consent of the individual photographed or recorded. With over 50 major technology
companies involved, state lawmakers and law enforcement agencies are fighting to stop
cyber exploitation through tracking software and sharing cyber threat information. One
successful activity of this task force is a resource hub that provides helpful tools for
victims, the technology industry, and law enforcement agencies. The site includes
detailed steps individuals can take if they are victims of cyber exploitation. In 2015, the
Department of Justice obtained the first successful prosecution of a cyber exploitation
operator. In this case, Kevin Bollaert was sentenced to eight years in prison followed by
10 years of supervised release for his operation of a cyber exploitation website. Since
then, there have been several other successful arrests and prosecutions.
Success of the implementation. Due to ongoing cyber-attacks on our country,
like the on-going Russian hacking investigations on our electoral system, most companies
have an advanced understanding of the need to reduce their vulnerability to cybercrime.
Cybercrime breaches are generally caused by human error: trusting instructions sent
electronically or being a victim of complex scams in which criminals pose as clients,
vendors, employees, executives, or other professionals to gain access to financial assets.
Given the national coverage on cyber security, this recommendation has been widely
publicized in government and is well integrated within the private sector. Some
improvements would include developing additional legislation to allow the private sector
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to share critical private information with law enforcement agencies when there is
evidence of criminal activity.
Further analysis and insights about the recommendation. One aspect that
should be of increasing concern is the use of personal or unauthorized devices by
corporate or government employees while at work or when conducting business. There
are many businesses that support “bring your own device” as a method to cut costs and
allow their workforce to be mobile on their own devices. Personal devices such as tablets,
smart phones and portable computers can be more vulnerable to cyber-attacks because
most users do not have strict security settings on their devices. While this has become
common practice in many industries, the result is an increased vulnerability of the
company’s systems. The sharing of cyber security best practices has become a
requirement rather than an option. Given recent data breaches of Uber, Equifax and other
large consumer databases, this type of crime is now at the forefront of public discussion
(Frankel, 2017).
Recommendation 9: The Legislature Should Amend California Law to Enable
Prosecutors to Temporarily Freeze the Assets of Transnational Criminal
Organizations and Their Gang Associates Before the Filing of an Indictment.
The current laws do not allow prosecutors to temporarily freeze the assets during
seizures. This loophole has enabled transnational criminal organizations to transfer their
assets to Mexico and therefore avoid prosecutorial authority. These loopholes must be
eliminated so that law enforcement can have the power to temporarily freeze the illegal
proceeds or property prior to a formal prosecution.
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Key provisions of the recommendation. Transnational criminals are adept at
avoiding asset forfeiture by moving assets and other profits out of the state. Similar to
federal laws that authorize prosecutors to seize assets and property without prior notice,
California prosecutors should be allowed the same authority to disrupt transnational
criminal enterprises’ funding mechanisms. This recommendation is aimed at changing
existing laws. Recently, transnational criminal organizations have become so adept at
profiting from their activities that, if they were listed on global stock exchanges, they
would almost be prime attractions for investors. With this type of influence, California
needs to have the laws changed to disrupt these transnational criminals. Criminal
enterprises share many characteristics with high performing businesses. These groups are
focused on profit goals, effective at implementation, highly adaptive to changing
environments and conditions, resilient when faced with setbacks and understand their
competitors from other criminal enterprises. By allowing California law enforcement
officials to have legislative tools, such as freezing criminal assets, they can cut off
funding to their illicit activities (Williams, 2017).
Actions implemented since the recommendation. Criminal forfeiture is an
action against a criminal defendant’s property. The property is considered tainted because
it constitutes the proceeds of criminal conduct, property traceable to criminal proceeds, or
property used to facilitate (or which is otherwise involved in) a criminal offense.
Criminal prosecution determines only the interest of the criminal defendant in the
property. Whether the interests of other owners in the forfeited property are exempt from
forfeiture is determined in a post-forfeiture ancillary hearing (Schmeltz, 2011).
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The Supreme Court recently ruled on asset forfeiture in March 2016. In the case
Luis v. United States, the court ruled that a defendant has a right to use his/her own
“innocent property to pay a reasonable fee for the assistance of counsel.” Prior to this
ruling, the lower courts held that asset forfeitures and frozen bank accounts could not be
used for legal counsel if the money was tainted.
Similarly, California Assembly Bill 443 would permit prosecutors in a criminal
profiteering matter to file a petition of forfeiture of assets and property of individuals
associated with transnational criminal organizations up to 60 days prior to the filing of
criminal charges. This bill died in committee, and there have been no other attempts to
revive this bill. There are arguments for and against pretrial asset forfeiture. In one set of
circumstances, those who oppose these laws believe that criminal defendants have a right
to due process and pretrial actions on their assets can impact their ability to have a fair
trial. On the other side of the argument, existing federal laws provide for asset forfeitures
for federal law enforcement agencies.
Success of the implementation. This recommendation in the Attorney General’s
report has not gained traction and faces opposition from both federal prosecutors, who
want the money to remain within the federal government, and criminal defense attorneys,
who want their clients to have liquidity to pay their defense fees. There are several
barriers to implementing this recommendation, and political feasibility is a major
roadblock. Pretrial asset forfeiture and freezing of financial accounts does not have the
needed support from various state, federal and local government entities, including civil
rights groups. The use of existing federal laws and current practices under 18 U.S. Code
981 (Civil Forfeiture) is probably the most successful path forward until there is enough
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political interest and policy research to determine if pretrial actions against criminal
defendants are a viable option.
Further analysis and insights about the recommendation. While this
recommendation sounds like a common-sense solution, it faces many challenges in terms
of constitutional law, competing interests in government and vague policies that identify
illegal assets. As referenced in prior recommendations, legislation is a difficult method to
address these types of issues. One way to curtail criminals from acquiring illegal assets is
to regulate the cash purchase of high-value assets such as homes, cars and other items.
Since most criminals use cash for these transactions, these purchases should require a
report to the federal government. This would make it difficult for criminals to amass
high-value assets and would deter their ability to launder money.
Recommendation 10: The Legislature Should Strengthen California’s Prohibition
Against Financial Transaction Structuring.
Federal regulation requires that institutions report all currency transactions greater
than $10,000 or multiple currency transactions adding up to over $10,000 in one day.
Breaking up the $10,000 into smaller amounts is considered a federal crime. Under the
current California loophole, prosecutors must prove intent to structure the money for
criminal purposes. In other words, prosecutors must demonstrate that the money is
intentionally disguised and that the proceeds are the byproduct of illegal criminal activity.
This loophole hampers the prosecutor’s ability to disrupt money laundering schemes
because it provides an additional barrier to prosecution. The report recommends that
California’s anti-structuring laws be amended so that breaking up larger transactions into
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smaller amounts for the purpose of avoiding reporting requirements becomes a criminal
act in itself.
Key provisions of the recommendation. Financial structuring, in general, is the
act of structuring or dividing of financial transactions to evade the amount that triggers
notification to the federal government of any deposit, withdrawal, or transfer under the
Bank Secrecy Act. The Internal Revenue Service monitors financial transactions. One
requirement is that all businesses or individuals who make a cash transaction of $10,000
or greater are required to file Form 8300. Another model of financial structuring is called
“Smurfing.” In this model, criminals purchase small quantities of controlled substances
such as pseudoephedrine with the intent of using some of the base ingredients to produce
methamphetamine. The term “Smurf” comes from the cartoon characters that were little
gatherers. In both models, the intent is to conduct small transactions that cannot be traced
by law enforcement.
Because there are existing federal laws against setting up financial structuring
processes, the only other way that law enforcement can make a difference is to
collaborate with banking institutions so that specific trends can be analyzed and financial
structuring can be spotted by these financial institutions.
Under U.S. Code Title 31, federal laws already restrict the structuring of
transactions to evade reporting requirements. However, under California law, prosecutors
must demonstrate that the laundered money is intentionally disguised and that the
proceeds are the byproduct of illegal criminal activity. Until these laws are changed,
prosecutors can leverage the federal code for prosecution. Financial structuring requires
constant monitoring from both the banks and government agencies. Another legislative
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tool is to apply the 1978 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
Under this law, it is not necessary to prove the suspect personally committed any illegal
activity. Instead, prosecutors must prove the defendant owns and/or manages an
organization, and the organization regularly performs one or more specific illegal
activities. Using the IRS rules, Title 31 and RICO are effective enforcement and
prosecutorial tools for state agencies to go after illegal financial structuring schemes.
Actions implemented since the recommendation. There are limited data on the
status of this recommendation. Due to existing laws, such as the federal statutes, the term
“strengthen” is subjective. The U.S. government has reinforced its counter-financing of
narcotics efforts by strengthening intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. Since
the issuance of the OAG report, California has not been able to implement laws against
criminal financial structuring.
Success of the implementation. Acting Drug Enforcement Administration Chief
Chuck Rosenberg and other DEA officials consider Mexican cartels a growing threat
because of their financing and organizational complexity (Beittel, 2017). To date, there is
limited information on whether this recommendation has been successfully implemented.
The data concludes that little has been done to undermine criminal financial structuring
since the issuance of the OAG report. In the future, there may be additional data that can
be captured and analyzed to measure effectiveness against these crimes.
Further analysis and insights about the recommendation. Under the current
transactions loophole, foreign currency can be broken up into small amounts for
depositing into U.S. banks. One method that has been used successfully in overseas
counterterrorism operations is to identify individuals and organizations known or
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suspected to be involved in the Mexican drug trade. Those could include Mexican
officials with business in the U.S. who moved large sums of money. Offering incentives
to the local community to identify cartel members is another effective means at
compiling such a list. Closing loopholes and using a targeted approach and reinforcing
existing financial structuring laws can limit their ability to launder money.
Recommendation 11: California Prosecutors Need Advanced Training to Combat
Sophisticated Transnational Money Laundering Schemes.
Transnational criminal organizations have also adopted sophisticated means to
launder money, and this is occurring during a time when statewide budgets relating to
investigatory and prosecutorial capabilities are being reduced. Financial transaction
structuring has been an ongoing loophole that allows illicit cash flows to go unnoticed
and unreported. Transnational criminal organizations utilize the technique of structuring,
to evade bank institutions from reporting their transactions.
Key provisions of the recommendation. The report recommends that the
Department of Justice leverage existing resources and partnerships to increase training
for California prosecutors. Doing so will equip prosecutors with knowledge about the
latest money laundering schemes. Providing law enforcement training on financial crimes
and technical assistance to investigate and prosecute complex money laundering schemes
is critical in combating the illegal funding that supports transnational criminal
organizations.
Actions implemented since the recommendation. One effective improvement
that has aided law enforcement agencies is access to the Money Laundering and Asset
Forfeiture Training Program provided by California. This program has been useful for
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law enforcement, prosecutors, and investigators. “The Money Laundering and Asset
Forfeiture Training Program…is designed for law enforcement professionals seeking a
foundation and understanding of how to investigate money laundering and the issues
involved with asset forfeiture” (FLETC, n.d.) The program is open to all law enforcement
agencies throughout the state and offers training on topics ranging from money
laundering schemes to investigative applications that will help track down the individuals
committing the crimes. Another program available is the CAMLA (OAG, 2018). The
CAMLA as put into place to assist law enforcement agencies in their efforts against
cross-border money laundering schemes. This team of experts has been useful for
prosecutors, investigators, and law enforcement officials seeking assistance and guidance
in relation to money laundering cases. Through CAMLA, law enforcement agencies
access a large statewide network of experts in financial crimes and forensics auditors to
assist in tracking and investigating money laundering.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2016) provides computer-based
training aimed at improving the law enforcement community’s ability to understand,
detect and investigate money laundering and the financing of terrorism and transnational
criminals. The course consists of 13 modules in 10 languages (OAG, 2018). The Los
Angeles Fire Department Arson-Counter Terrorism Section has used the UNODC
training courses for investigating arson and fraud cases. One important benefit of the
office is access to global partnerships. The Global Program against Money Laundering
(GPML) works closely with dozens of global financial institutions and is active in the
Financial Action Task Force. The task force is an inter-governmental body established in
1989 by the Ministers and executives of its members’ jurisdictions. The objectives of the
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task force are to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory
and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other
threats to the integrity of the international financial system. “The FATF is therefore a
‘policy-making body’ which works to generate the necessary political will to bring about
national legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas” (Financial Action Task Force,
2018, para. 3).
The OAG report identified a key recommendation in training prosecutors and law
enforcement agencies in money laundering schemes. Since that time, statewide training
has been offered to these agencies and the California Commission of Peace Officer
Standards and Training has made anti-money laundering required training to maintain
currency in their law enforcement jobs. Peace Officers in California are required to
complete 644 hours of training in the academy before they graduate. This training
includes a module on financial crimes, which provides investigators with the skills and
knowledge needed to investigate cases of fraud, forgery, and other financial crimes.
Another successful program is the Southwest Border Anti-Money Laundering
Alliance (2011) developed to create a network of people, agencies, task forces, and
programs actively engaged in anti-money laundering enforcement in the southwest border
area. The alliance plans to build an internal network of analysts, including analysts in
each border state and federal analysts; task its staff investigators in each state with
forming a network of money laundering, financial investigation, and asset forfeiture
experts and making them available to southwest border area investigators and prosecutors
to assist in their money laundering cases; develop people and resources to train
investigators and prosecutors; and bring these networks together in periodic conferences
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to continually improve the effectiveness of collaborative enforcement efforts. This
program has enhanced coordination between investigators and prosecutors of money
laundering in the southwest border area (OAG, 2018). Through training partnerships with
other law enforcement stakeholders, the information is disseminated over larger areas and
ensures that those involved in investigating and prosecuting money laundering are up to
date with the latest trends and training.
Success of the implementation. The available data on anti-money laundering
training is limited. However, the California Budget for 2015–2016 shows a 35% shortfall
in funding for statewide training. The state budget shortfall is so dire that the governor
proposed changes in traffic citations fees that allow violators to pay 50% of their fines to
ensure that the state training budget receives direct funding. This amnesty program, as
referenced in the budget (California Legislative Analysts’ Office, 2015), is designed to
provide a boost in revenue by allowing violators to pay only half of their fine as full
payment. An analysis by the Legislative Analyst’s Office shows this program is unlikely
to raise the revenue required to address the shortfalls in training budgets and might
negatively affect future collections. Since 2009, there has been a 33% decline in revenues
from the State Penalty Fund that supports training programs. This trend could have a
lasting negative impact because the rate of government spending is increasing as
revenues are decreasing. Overall, the state budget allocated to criminal justice had a 2.1%
increase since the release of the OAG but no proportional increase in training funds.
In 2012 the U.S. Attorney General distributed over $40M to local jurisdictions for
training on anti-money-laundering strategies (United States Attorney’s Office, 2012).
Given the statewide reductions in the training budget, there are examples of increased
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training through other funds, such as CAMLA, GPML, and POST. However, this
research project did not find that the recommendation in the OAG report was directly the
cause of increased training. Nationally, there has been an increase in training and funding
for anti-money laundering activities. For example, the Department of Homeland Security
offers federally funded training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
specifically tailored for financial crimes and money laundering.
Since the passing of the Patriot Act, empirical results indicate that anti-money
laundering compliance costs have fallen disproportionately on smaller financial
institutions, suggesting that the Patriot Act has produced an intra-industry redistribution
of wealth (Dolar & Shughart, 2012). However, this example is an indication that the
private sector has taken responsibility for some of the costs and training associated with
compliance. While not directly related to the OAG report, it provides an example of how
the private sector engaged to increase training within the financial system.
In keeping with this trend, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Steven Mnuchin,
recently identified combating financial crime and terrorism financing as core missions of
the Treasury in a statement supporting President Trump’s discretionary budget proposal.
That proposal spares the Treasury’s financial crime units from reduced funding. In
addition, other regulators at all levels continue to signal a sustained commitment to
strengthening and policing the financial system’s protections against financial crime
(Wilmer Hale, 2017). In the era of competing budget priorities in government, the
indication that anti-money laundering training and resources will not be cut from the
federal budget indicates this training is a high priority.
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Given the available data, the research did not provide enough evidence to
conclude whether the recommendation was successful. One problem is that funding is not
directly tied to any performance management standards to evaluate the efficacy of the
actions taken.
Further analysis and insights about the recommendation. One area that needs
additional focus is training local police officers on identifying potential money
laundering schemes. Criminals are using more elaborate methods to launder money. One
example is trade-based money laundering where wholesale clothing is made in China,
paid for with laundered money and shipped to the United States where drug money is
used to purchase large shipments that are exported to Mexico for sale and distribution. By
providing advanced training to every sector involved with the import and export of
clothing or goods, law enforcement agencies can be more effective in disrupting the flow
of trade-based money laundering.
Another area of focus is to ensure that funding allocated for training is evaluated
through performance management tools. For example, in the Los Angeles Police
Department, the use of CompStat
6
is applied to evaluate all aspects of the organization
and determine if agency priorities are being measured against performance metrics.
Through this system of checks and balances, the agency can determine if its priorities are
being achieved. Without having some form of compliance tool, it is difficult to measure
the impact or efficacy of money laundering training in law enforcement.

6
Compstat is a performance management system that is used to reduce crime and achieve other
police department goals. Compstat emphasizes information-sharing, responsibility and account-
ability, and improving effectiveness.
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Recommendation 12: State Authorities Should Partner With Their Mexican
Counterparts to Share Intelligence and Disrupt Illicit Flow of Money Across the
Border.
Key provisions of the recommendation. Transnational criminal organizations
have leveraged the global economy to launder money and transfer illicit funds into the
legitimate financial system. These organizations bypass legal authorities by setting up
shell corporations along the California-Mexico border where they deposit illegal funds
via legitimate institutions.
The report recommends that state agencies partner with their Mexican
counterparts to eliminate the illicit flow of money across the border. The
recommendation encourages California financial and banking regulators to work with
Mexico’s Banking and Securities Commission.
Actions implemented since the recommendation. Since the report was written,
Mexico and California have continued to share information on banking and money
laundering and collectively combat transnational crimes. The California OAG is an active
member of the Conference of Western Attorneys General (CWAG). CWAG is comprised
of Attorneys General of 15 western states, three Pacific territories and 13 associate
member states. The CWAG’s primary function is to provide a forum for cultivating
knowledge and cooperation on subjects of mutual concern.
Mexico also has a similar consortium known as the National Conference of
Attorneys General (NCAG) and Mexico State Attorneys General. These groups help
establish and nurture cross-jurisdictional cooperation on many law enforcement issues,
including human trafficking, money laundering, transnational criminal organizations, and
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training and capacity building. Both CWAG and NCAG have working relationships and
collaborate on mutual topics.
Success of the implementation. The available research on intelligence sharing
and disrupting money laundering shows that, through memoranda of understanding
between the border states and Mexico, both countries developed compatible strategies in
prevention, information and intelligence sharing, education and awareness, and law
enforcement efforts through mentoring and cross-border working groups (OAG, 2018).
Successful cases like the disruption of trade-based money laundering in the Los Angeles
garment district are examples of cooperation between Mexico and California’s law
enforcement agencies in addressing illegal criminal funding.
Further analysis and insights about the recommendation. There are three
areas where U.S. and Mexico law enforcement and intelligence agencies can enhance
their cooperation on intelligence sharing: leadership and personal relationships,
standardized procedures, and institutional agreements.
The first recommendation. The leadership of U.S. and Mexico’s law enforcement
agencies should develop trust so that bilateral cooperation becomes institutionalized.
With the change in the political tenor in United States, personal relationships have
become strained and other political issues such as immigration or building a border wall
have caused relationships to cool.
The second recommendation. Having standardized procedures that establish the
framework for information and intelligence sharing can eliminate ambiguity or
misinterpretation of what can and cannot be shared. By agreeing to joint standardized
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procedures, U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies can operate off a single unified
plan.
The third recommendation. The last time the United States and Mexico signed a
bilateral agreement to combat drugs and transnational crimes was 1998. Institutional
agreements should be reviewed and updated to ensure that changes in technology and
globalization are considered.
One model that can be used as the standard for information and intelligence
sharing is the El Paso Intelligence Center. The center is a successful model of a cross-
border fusion center. Partnerships among federal, state, local, and international agencies
in the intelligence community have led to the successful disruption, apprehension and
prosecution of transnational criminal organizations. Using the El Paso model, California
can enhance statewide fusion centers by including partners from the Mexican intelligence
community.
As spillover violence from Mexico continues to impact California, it is essential
to establish information intelligence sharing itself as a central role when dealing with
criminal entities. Through statewide fusion centers and partnering with other law
enforcement task forces, the more information and intelligence we can share with each
other the more likely we are able to disrupt and halt the rising tide of transnational crime
and money laundering.
Summary
This chapter explored the 12 recommendations. For each of these, the first section
focused on the key provisions by providing a basic understanding of what the
recommendations are meant to accomplish. The second section focused on actions taken
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since the recommendations were proposed. The third component assessed if
implementation was successful, which has several variables and, in some cases, is
difficult to substantially measure. However, looking at the available data, one can
reasonably assume the impact or success of implementation. The fourth section focused
on further analysis and insights.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations
Even though the US government spends billions of dollars to maintain border
safety, transnational crimes are on the rise, particularly in California. The proliferation of
transnational criminal activities and the resulting import of illegal drugs, human
trafficking, and high-tech crimes led the California OAG to commission a report in 2014
entitled Gangs Beyond Borders. The Attorney General found transnational corporations
leveraged modern infrastructures and technologies to perpetuate their illegal dealings.
Furthermore, the organizations diversified to include cyberattacks and sophisticated
methods of money laundering.
To combat the growing threat, the Gangs Beyond Borders report listed 12 key
recommendations for state, local, nonprofit, and business organizations. While insightful,
no studies have assessed the implementation or impact of the recommendations. No
studies have analyzed the social, political, and criminal implications or assessed the
current situation after the publication of the report or examined the practicality of
implementing such recommendations.
Major Themes from the 2014 California Attorney General’s Report
The 2014 Gangs Beyond Borders report was notable in many regards. First, the
authors examined transnational criminal activities from three emerging and
interconnected pillars: drug trafficking, money laundering, and high-tech crimes. The
report was also unique in that it resulted from a collaboration among local, state,
academic, and nonprofit activist organizations with expertise in combating transnational
criminal organizations. These stakeholders played a critical role in the analysis and in
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providing recommendations to combat the growing threat since they were directly
involved in or affected by transnational criminal organizations.
Among its findings, the OAG report argued that the threat of criminal enterprises
across transnational borders could not be handled solely by California due it being a vast
territory with a strong economy, and, thus, is a prime location for transnational crimes.
The report listed three emerging trends. The first was the emergence of drug trafficking
from Mexico. The second was the impact of money laundering across the border. The
third was the rise of high-tech crimes. These trends emerged at a time when California
experienced unprecedented economic prosperity.
Trafficking. Per the report, there are more than 300 drug-related transnational
cartels operating in the state with combined illegal drug trafficking efforts generating
billions of dollars in profit. While law enforcement agencies experienced success in
intercepting the flow of illegal drugs, they cannot completely protect California’s border
given the fact that a majority of the US-Mexico border is not under operational control.
Furthermore, drug cartels leveraged California’s modern interstate highway system to
successfully evade capture. Drug cartels have also been successful with leveraging San
Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco as major distribution centers from where drugs
are transported into other parts of the United States and Canada. Experts identified the
Sinaloa Federation as the primary group responsible for the trafficking of humans,
weapons, and drugs across the US-Mexico border.
Money laundering. Currently, drug cartels can send individuals across the
border, who declare the cash they bring with them and deposit the money at a local kiosk
or financial institution into shell corporations. The laundered money is then used to
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finance other criminal activities. Currently, law officials do not have the authority to
prosecute these individuals who directly launder money across the border. Furthermore,
law enforcement agencies are powerless in prosecuting these crimes due to the
complicated legal process and the clandestine nature of money laundering. As a result,
experts predict that approximately $30 to $40 billion are laundered annually.
High-tech crimes. High-tech crimes have increased over recent years, and the
costs associated with cybercrimes and data breaches are estimated to be over $21 billion.
Transnational criminal enterprises are primarily leading the data breaches and high-tech
crimes as another way of financing their illegal operations. High-tech crimes are
profitable because they pose a relatively low risk when compared to drug and human
trafficking. High-tech crimes are also harder to detect and to prosecute.
Major Recommendations from the Report
Four main themes emerged from the 12 recommendations: amending existing
laws to prosecute transnational criminal organizations; leveraging existing resources to
share information across various agencies; leveraging public and private partnerships to
respond to the growing technological threat; and increasing training, manpower, and
resources to prevent and mitigate the impact of criminal activities that are transpiring
across the California border.
Ironically, the existing legal system provides leniency, rather than penalizes,
transnational organizations for engaging in criminal activities. For instance, high-level
members who are responsible for the logistics and operations are treated as co-
conspirators or aiders and abettors rather than prosecuted with a harsher sentence.
Another restriction is the temporary freezing of assets. A current loophole prevents
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prosecutors from temporarily freezing assets of transnational criminal organization,
which enables the quick transfer of funds prior to confiscation. The OAG report
recommended loosening these constraints to prevent criminal organizations from taking
advantage of the legal system.
Despite the fact that federal, state, and local agencies face the same challenges
and hurdles with regard to transnational criminal organizations, these agencies tend to
operate in silos. The consequences of such an approach include loss of time, manpower,
resources, and efficacy in combating the criminal organizations. The OAG recommended
sharing information or establishing a more effective means for sharing the information
among the various law enforcement agencies.
Transnational criminal organizations are turning to modern technologies to escape
detection and criminal prosecution and have hired skilled hackers to breach private data
and steal valuable information. Businesses are most vulnerable to these attacks since
private businesses own and operate over 85% of the country’s critical infrastructure.
Thus, one of the recommendations in Gangs Beyond Borders was collaboration between
the public and private sectors. This would be critical to combating high-tech crimes by
enabling law officials to leverage existing resources, and private businesses would gain
extra security protection from high-tech crimes.
Even though transnational criminal activities are on the rise, the budget for
training, staff development, and resources allocated to combating them has been severely
reduced over recent years. Furthermore, law enforcement agencies work with antiquated
technologies and lack the necessary knowledge to counter advanced criminal activities.
The OAG report recommended providing additional resources, training, and budget
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allocation to assist law enforcement agencies in combating the growing threat. The major
recommendations of this research can be summarized into three categories: successes,
challenges, and opportunities.
Successes. Overall, this research showed much success. Eight of the
recommendations were successfully implemented. Broadly speaking, the report
spotlighted the threat posed to the state by transnational criminals by focusing on
trafficking, money laundering, and high-tech crimes. Past OAG reports focused on one
specific area without considering other concurrent threats. Including all three types of
threats provides government agencies a clearer picture of the broad range of criminal
activity in the state and, therefore, addresses the issue in a holistic manner.
Over one hundred participants from the public, private and non-profit sectors
provided input for Gangs Beyond Borders. The fact that this report helped to convene a
large and diverse group of stakeholders is an accomplishment itself. Complex issues like
those found in the report can be better solved when stakeholders work together and build
relationships. While transnational criminals have become more adaptive to their
environment, the increase in collaboration among various government agencies as well as
the sharing of information and resources has successfully countered these criminals.
California has been successful in developing regional partnerships to address
criminal maritime operations. One example is that maritime federal task forces are more
inclusive of local agencies to combat smuggling operations along the state's coastline.
One reason these task forces have been successful is that federal dollars are allocated to
protect California’s ports of entry. The state’s ocean economy generates over $300 billion
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in imports alone, and having a secure coastline ensures legal commerce is protected and
that drug smugglers and other criminal enterprises are targeted to keep our coastline safe.
Challenges. A major challenge for government is that transnational criminals
amplified their impact in the state by diversifying their illicit activities. Adapting and
branching out to other types of crimes makes it difficult for less nimble law enforcement
agencies to pursue these criminals. When law enforcement agencies begin to disrupt the
street drug sales by deploying regional task forces, the criminals quickly shift to human
trafficking until the pressure subsides, and they then go back to drug sales. This balloon
effect, where pushing down on drug production in one region causes criminal activity to
bulge somewhere else, is like a game of whack-a-mole
7
.
Of the 12 recommendations, four have not been fully implemented. The first is for
the legislature to amend the law to target the leaders of transnational criminal
organizations operating in California. The second is for the legislature and governor to
provide funding for five additional SOUs across the state. The third is for the legislature
to amend state law to enable prosecutors to temporarily freeze the assets of transnational
criminal organizations and their gang associates before the filing of an indictment. The
fourth is for the legislature to strengthen the state’s prohibition against financial
transaction structuring.
The research indicates that these recommendations are mostly hindered because
they involve enacting laws or legislative policy, which is a long and sometimes arduous
process. Legislation is influenced by many factors, including political feasibility and

7
A term colloquially used to denote a repetitious and futile task: each time an adversary
is "whacked", it only pops up again somewhere else.
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budgetary constraints. Roughly six percent of bills introduced through the legislature ever
become laws. With so few making it through the process, the odds are not in favor of
getting legislation passed. In addition, California does not currently have any statutes that
specifically target or punish supervisors, managers, or financers operating on behalf of
transnational criminal organizations. To date, none of the four recommendations
regarding legislation has been enacted. Compounding the problem, under current law,
transnational criminal organizations are often alerted, due to mandatory filings of
criminal indictments, that their proceeds and assets are about to be seized by law
enforcement. Sealed indictments require approval from a magistrate judge and are only
approved in certain instances. There are several loopholes in current laws that prevent
the seizure of assets until the filing of a formal criminal indictment. Because changing
laws requires significant legislative support, implementation has been unsuccessful.
Another challenge is the inability of federal, state and local agencies to
collaborate and share information through the fusion centers. The state presently lacks a
unified system for aggregating, analyzing, and sharing information regarding
transnational organized crime. While the CSTAS was designed as a central hub for
California’s transnational crime information-sharing needs, it has limitations. One
limitation is that the personnel who work within this CSTAS rarely physically interact
with each other. The system needs to focus more on human interaction and encourage
more personal engagement to develop trust. Information-sharing and building trust
happen through interpersonal behavior and are not something a system or technology can
solve.
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One significant gap affecting many of the recommendations is the budgetary
impact of the state’s 2009 economic downturn. As the state budget improves, lawmakers
need to restore the services that were cut prior to 2014. One significant program that has
shown success in the past is California’s SOUs. Restoring funding to these units,
specifically in Sacramento, San Francisco, Riverside, Los Angeles, and San Diego, is
critical in the fight against transnational organized crime.
One of the emerging pillars in the report is cybercrime. The state has been lax in
cybersecurity practices and, in some cases, offers no protections whatsoever. These
critical gaps allow cyber-criminals to breach computer networks and databases in both
the public and private sectors. Because 85% of the nation's critical infrastructure is
owned by the private sector, they are at the frontline in defending against numerous high-
tech threats. Government networks are at risk and lack the nimbleness and sophistication
of those in the private sector. Since the report was issued, there have been significant
changes in cybersecurity best practices, including public-private partnerships with state
and local authorities. This collaborative approach aims to leverage the private sector’s
comparative strengths to combat the ever-changing threats and tactics of transnational
criminal organizations.
Opportunities. There are many opportunities that government agencies can
capitalize on to contain and eradicate transnational criminals. Three areas that can
provide successes are increased use of technology, community education and
engagement, and cross-border partnerships.
Globalization and advances in technology are force multipliers for both good and
evil. It was technology and globalization that allowed a terrorist living in a cave in
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Afghanistan to bring down the World Trade Center buildings. However, it is those same
technologies that made the battlefield less dangerous for our troops due to drones and live
satellite imagery. Using technology like remote surveillance, data mining and financial
transaction monitoring systems to contain and eradicate these criminals can be an
effective method to address the threat. There are also other opportunities that can improve
cybersecurity such as innovations like blockchain technology, which uses distributed
databases and not a single system to secure information. This emerging technology uses
cryptography and develops immutable records that make it extremely difficult to hack.
Community policing begins with a commitment to building trust and mutual
respect between law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve. It is critical
to public safety that all stakeholders work together to address California’s crime
challenges. When police and communities collaborate, they more effectively address
underlying issues, disrupt patterns and behaviors, and allocate resources. Community
engagement is a key component to gathering information and intelligence on criminals as
well as in building resiliency within the community. Community oriented policing has
proven to be an effective method to reducing crime and building trust within the
community. However, public education is often the most overlooked force multiplier. An
informed and educated citizenry is the frontline defense against these criminals. Investing
in public service announcements and statewide education efforts has been successful in
other programs. By accessing this untapped opportunity, government agencies can
inform, educate and include the public as a partner. There needs to be more focus on this
aspect of governance, yet the report did not address the value of community engagement
and education.
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Cross-border partnerships should be strengthened and considered an opportunity
for building trust. The recent rhetoric on immigration and border wall security makes
long-term trust more difficult, but, politics aside, having strong and trusting neighbors is
always best for both nations’ security. The DEA’s 2015 National Drug Threat
Assessment found that Mexican transnational criminal organizations are the single
greatest criminal drug threat to the United States. The El Paso Intelligence Center is a
cross-border fusion center that serves the southwest border with Ciudad Juarez. It has
been very effective in disrupting transnational criminal organizations because of the
partnership with Mexico.
Major Implications from the Report
The OAG report found that, while transnational organized crime is a significant
problem, it is not insurmountable. In California, law enforcement agencies at all levels of
government have made significant strides against these criminal groups, even in the face
of declining resources. The report describes the strategies that work in combating these
criminals and those that need additional efforts to become successful. A common theme
in the report is how the downturn in the economy affected law enforcement funding,
which negatively affected collaboration among federal, state, and local governments.
Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations are suspected of trafficking
70% of the U.S. supply of methamphetamine through the San Diego port of entry alone,
making California the primary source for methamphetamine nationwide. In 2013, border
authorities seized over 6,200 kilograms of methamphetamine entering California, a three-
fold increase since 2009. The public safety threat posed by Mexico-based drug trafficking
organizations has been amplified as cartels formed alliances with California prison and
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street gangs to control trafficking routes, distribute drugs, kidnap, extort, and kill as
necessary to protect their criminal activities. With gang membership up 40% nationally
between 2009 and 2011, California has seen higher levels of violent crime (particularly
assault, extortion, home invasion robberies, homicide, intimidation, and shootings) as
well as an increase in arrests for human trafficking offenses and significant seizures of
drugs, weapons, and cash.
Further amplification of the threat lies in the fact that transnational criminal
organizations are taking advantage of new communications technologies and social
media to facilitate illegal activity, recruit new members, and intimidate or harass their
rivals—even from inside prison walls. In 2011, for example, over 15,000 cell phones
were seized from inmates in California prisons. Also, recent increases in the use of panga
boats to smuggle drugs and people into California exemplify the constant tactical
adaptation by transnational criminal organizations. Vessels capable of carrying 12 tons of
marijuana have landed as far north as Santa Cruz County, with a steady increase in panga
sightings and landings throughout the Central Coast. Between 2009 and 2012, the number
of intentional breaches of computer networks and databases in the United States jumped
by 280%, with California leading the nation.
In the 2012–2013 fiscal year, California state drug task forces disrupted or
dismantled 140 drug, money laundering, and gang organizations, arrested nearly 3,000
individuals, rescued 41 drug-endangered children, confiscated 1,000 weapons, and seized
roughly $28.5 million in U.S. currency in anti-narcotic law enforcement actions
statewide. Federally-sponsored HIDTA program task forces also identified 305 drug-
related transnational criminal organizations operating in California and 18 street and
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prison gangs with ties to these groups. At the same time, however, state-led task forces
charged with protecting California from transnational criminal organizations have
suffered severe budget reductions, with the number of operating task forces dropping
from 55 in 2011 to just 17 in 2013 (OAG, 2014a).
The Gangs Beyond Borders report was successful in that it addressed broad issues
of transnational crime and provided 12 recommendations as a roadmap to address this
emerging crime. However, public policy recommendations without an implementation
plan can quickly become rhetoric. Creation of public policy recommendations is only the
beginning. It is the implementation process that determines whether the goals of the
public policy could be actualized. A policy without a cogent implementation plan is
rarely executed. The implementation of policy refers to enacting the proposed legislation
or solutions. According to McLaughlin (1987), a policy recommendation may appear
good on paper, but it may not necessarily be the best policy in practice, and this is mostly
due to the failure to implement it effectively. McLaughlin argues,
Effective implementation requires a strategic balance of pressure and support;
policy-directed change ultimately is a problem of the smallest unit. These lessons
frame the conceptual and instrumental challenge for a third generation of
implementation analysts—integrating the macro world of policymakers with the
micro world of individual implementers. (p. 171)
The formulation of these laws is only part of the process; the other part is ensuring that
the legal framework is properly implemented. Legislators often adopt and enact the legal
framework as the final solution with the assumption that the laws will be administered
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and services delivered. This false sense of security leads legislative solutions to fail in
practice because the incentives and framework for implementation are misaligned.
Policy implementation can further be complicated when policies are issued to
agencies without specific direction; such can be the case with the OAG report. Policy
formulation often involves compromise and political influence. Therefore, the
implementation creates both discretion and confusion in agencies that administer policies.
After conducting a comprehensive review, the findings and insights drawn from
this research show that eight of the twelve recommendations were successfully
implemented. The shortcomings and gaps to those recommendations that were not fully
implemented were hindered due to a lack of funding, political will, and an
implementation plan.
The author’s critical analysis surmised that the gaps could be addressed by
bridging the gap between recommendations and implementation. The recommended
model to address these gaps consists of performance management, budget allocation, and
periodic reviews.
Performance management. It is difficult to know if a public policy agency is
effective and how public managers use measures of public agencies’ achievements to
produce even greater results. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 was
designed to ensure that government agencies expend resources based on strategic
objectives and systems for measuring results, and to ensure they issue performance
reports. Performance metrics will improve the confidence of the American people in the
capability of our local, state, and federal government to implement policy. Performance
metrics also improve legislative decision-making. An effective implementation plan
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should clearly define the mission and the desired outcomes, involve stakeholders,
consider the environment, and align the activities, core processes, and resources to the
desired outcome.
The Governmental Accounting and Standards Board suggests that performance
measures are "needed for setting goals and objectives, planning program activities to
accomplish these goals, allocating resources to these programs, monitoring and
evaluating the results to determine if they are making progress in achieving the
established goals and objectives, and modifying program plans to enhance performance"
(Behn, 2003, p. 587).
With the advent of big data and the easy access to information and metrics,
taxpayers are becoming more interested in how government spends money. Part of this
interest is also to determine if the programs that the government implements are effective
and the reasons they may not be. Policies need to be transparent to gain traction and
credibility with communities.
Performance Management Plan. Each of the 12 recommendations was geared
toward a desired outcome or goal, yet they had no corresponding performance
measurement to ensure compliance. A performance management plan (PMP) is a tool
designed to assist in setting up and managing the process of monitoring, analyzing,
evaluating, and reporting progress toward achieving desired outcomes. The PMP is
intended to be a living document that is developed, applied, and updated. PMPs enable
governing bodies to collect comparable data over time to make better-informed decisions.
By developing a PMP, each recommendation can be tied to an outcome and provide real-
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time updates so that policymakers and the public can determine if the policy
recommendations were met.
A comprehensive and balanced set of performance measures should compare
current performance with expected outcomes. A recommended process for developing
performance measures from Gangs Beyond Borders is to, first, define the desired
performance measures based on the recommendations’ goals and objectives. Second, it is
important to assess each performance measure to ensure data will be accurate and
reliable, cost-effective to collect, and can be compared over time. Next is the selection of
key performance measures that reflect success of the objectives and achievement of
expected results. The fourth step is to determine information needs by identifying what
data should be accumulated, whether it readily available, and how often it should be
collected. The fifth step is to clearly define each performance measure so that all users
can understand the source of the data, the methods used to calculate measurements, and
the time frame from which the measurement is reported. Last is establishment of
performance targets that analyze past performance and forecast expected future results.
One way to reinforce transparency in government performance is to allow the
public access to the performance data. Developing a public website with an easily
accessible dashboard that allows citizens to check on progress is one method to ensure
transparency and accountability because tax payers will see how their money is spent and
whether goals are met. Many cities adopted performance measurement as the standard
practice to ensure that budgets reflect priorities and the priorities are measured against
outcomes with accessible data to the public. As Light (1997) mentioned,
The only way to alter the gravity of reform is to introduce much greater
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knowledge about what succeeds and what does not in actually making
government work. And the best route to that knowledge is through better
measures of the performance of government, a greater commitment to
experimentation to reform, and clean settings in which to conduct the needed
tests. The measures provide essential baseline against which to measure reform,
the commitment supplies the needed will to declare a given reform a failure, and
the settings provided a place to generate valid data. (p. 232)
Budget allocation. A properly defined and allocated budget is central to
implementing policy recommendations. In public policy, the budget serves as a contract
between citizens and state by showing how resources are allocated, how a project is
funded, and how it is delivered in the public sector. Budget allocations should be based
on priorities to ensure that money is spent in the right place. According to the California
Budget and Policy Center (Hoene & Graves, 2016), as of the 2014–2015 fiscal year,
California’s state and county governments spent $20.7 billion on incarceration and
responding to crime. Specifically, $15.1 billion was spent on incarceration of adults and
juveniles at the state and county levels: $10.8 billion at the state level and $4.3 at the
county level. In addition, 27% of this spending was for activities associated with
responding to crime: $1.4 billion at the state level and $4.3 billion at the county level.
Thus, significantly reducing state and county spending on incarceration can free up
money to combat transnational criminals. Special programs referenced in the report can
once again receive the necessary funding if the state were to address the rising, and
sometimes unnecessary, cost of incarceration.
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In 2017, California voters approved Proposition 64 to legalize marijuana for
recreational purposes and reduce criminal penalties for various marijuana-related
offenses for adults and juveniles. It also authorized a new process for individuals in the
state to get previous marijuana-related convictions retroactively reduced, reclassified as
lesser offenses or dismissed altogether. While there is not enough data to make long-term
projections on the impact of the state’s incarceration rates and other related issues, the
impacts of Proposition 64 may free up money to combat transnational criminals.
Budget allocation plan for Gangs Beyond Borders. Budget choices should
reflect our collective values, priorities, and ideals, and this depends on fact-based
budgets. The OAG’s recommendations were supported by data but lacked a
corresponding budget. Future public policy recommendations should have a
corresponding budget strategy that is directly tied to performance measurements. Policy
recommendations without resources are not implemented.
Periodic review. Developing frequent public policy reviews is essential to ensure
that budgets, policies, and priorities are aligned and that their outcomes support
overarching goals. The United States Department of Defense (DOD) has an effective
periodic model called the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR analyzes the
strategic objectives against military threats. The QDR is a legislatively mandated review
of DOD strategy and priorities. The QDR is designed to set a long-term course for DOD
as it assesses the threats and challenges that the nation faces, and re-balances DOD's
strategies, capabilities, and resources to address today's conflicts and tomorrow's threats.
Periodic Review for Gangs Beyond Borders policy. Using the same type of
approach as the QDR with recommendations outlined in Gangs Beyond Borders, a
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legislatively mandated review of public safety policies and recommendations will ensure
that the intended outcomes are frequently reviewed.
The state of California can enact a review process that would direct the OAG or
other executive offices to undertake a wide-ranging review of current programs,
legislation and resources to ensure that they meet the expectations and outcomes designed
in policy and adopted by the public. The review process would evaluate the broad
strategies established in the report by applying the management plan to trafficking,
money laundering, and high-tech crimes. Similar to the QDR, a public report should be
issued to identify successes, challenges and opportunities that can be used as a roadmap
for the next set of recommendations.
Recommendations for Future Research
Progress has been made towards the OAG’s recommendations, but important
research questions and technical support needs remain. A framework is suggested above
to bridge the gap between report recommendations and subsequent implementation.
Based on this framework and the review of the recommendation efforts already under
way, two important research gaps are identified and discussed briefly below: risk analysis
and collaborative governance
The first recommendation is to apply risk analysis to the issue of transnational
crime. Risk analysis is a systematic process of defining and analyzing the dangers to
individuals, businesses and government agencies posed by potential natural and human-
caused adverse events. The risk posed by transnational organized crime is a central
concern to California. Determining the risk of transnational organized crime requires
specific local community assessments rather than statewide judgments. To say that
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organized crime is a widespread problem in California, for example, is too broad a
statement to be useful because it overlooks variations within the state. Future research on
transnational crime should focus use of risk analysis to determine local impacts and target
recommendations to a known area or type of crime.
The traditional focus of risk assessment has been to gather information and
intelligence on offenders and use this data to locate and interdict high-risk individuals
and groups involved in organized crime. The long-term goal of the prosecution of these
individuals is to have an impact on the illicit activities involved. An alternative approach
is to conduct an analysis of risk in specific products and markets, knowing that these
activities will attract transnational criminals and the offenders that law enforcement
seeks. Future research in this area will target resources to where they are most needed.
The second recommendation is to pursue collaborative governance as a strategy to
eradicate transnational crime. Collaborative governance involves the government, non-
government organizations, community and private sector actors communicating with
each other and working together to achieve more than any one sector could achieve on its
own. Future research on these two gaps should also produce tools with a reasonable
likelihood of implementation wherever feasible.
Concluding Comments
California leads the world on immigration policy, commerce, and innovation, as
top tech firms such as Facebook, Google, Yelp, and Apple started in this state. It is not
surprising that the world looks to California for direction on matters of world policy.
While the state remains the global hub for economic progress, it is also susceptible to
transnational criminal organizations. The size and strength of California's economy make
149

it an ideal target for transnational criminal organizations that generate billions of dollars
annually from the illegal drug smuggling, human trafficking, and high-tech crimes.
To counter the effects of transnational crimes, the OAG published the Gangs
Beyond Borders report, which offered major policy recommendation and was first of its
kind in many regards. First, it was the result of a collaboration among various
stakeholders who are directly and indirectly connected to the issues of transnational
criminal activities. Second, the recommendations took into consideration the various
stakeholders’ experiences. Finally, the recommendations were holistic and focused on
policy changes, encouraged public-private collaborations, and requested additional
resource allocation, training, and manpower.
While the original intent of these policy recommendations was to eradicate
organized crime in California, the policies lacked proper funding and implementation.
This is indicative of policy making. Most often, top-down directives fall on
administrators to carry out. Not surprisingly, these implementations fail due to a lack of
the conditions necessary for successful implementation, resources, and periodic review.
This was evident in that four of the recommendations presented were not implemented.
Policy implementation from theory to practice is one of the most overlooked
aspects of policy making. In more than a quarter-century in public service, I have seen
many well-intentioned policies never make it into practice. Based on my experience, I
found that an implementation plan combined with performance management, budget
allocation, and periodic review is the most feasible way to actualize policy. Using a
simple process also builds transparency so that the public, along with government
agencies, can work to build trust and ensure that policy becomes practice.
150

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Abstract (if available)

Abstract The United States government spends more than $18 billion a year to secure its 2,000-mile border with Mexico, which is more money spent than all other federal law enforcement agencies combined. Despite the monetary investment, only 44% of the border is considered operationally secured, and transnational criminal organizations have taken advantage of this to develop a sophisticated network of illegal drugs smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, guns importation, and other nefarious activities. To mitigate the impact of transnational criminal activities, the Office of California Attorney General issued a report entitled Beyond Borders: California and the Fight Against Transnational Organized Crime to address the growing threat of transnational criminal organizations. This research focuses on the three sectors recognized in the report: money laundering, trafficking, and cybercrime. Substantial evidence and cases are documented throughout the analysis to clarify the degree to which recommendations from the report were implemented within California. The analysis includes key research questions and a gap analysis to show which recommendations have been implemented and which have not. The study concludes with the author’s recommendations to address these gaps.

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Creator Butler, Patrick Isidoro (author)

Core Title Gangs beyond borders: California and the fight against transnational crime - have recommendations become reality?

School School of Policy, Planning and Development

Degree Doctor of Policy, Planning & Development

Degree Program Policy, Planning, and Development

Publication Date 10/08/2018

Defense Date 06/15/2017

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag attorney general,Border security,California,cartels,Crime,cybercrime,DEA,DHS,DOJ,drug trafficking,extortion,FBI,Gangs,gun trafficking,Guns,homeland security,human trafficking,Kamala Harris,Kidnapping,Mexico,money laundering,national security,OAI-PMH Harvest,transnational crime

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Language English

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Advisor Robertson, Peter J. (committee chair), Poirier, Alfred (committee member), Southers, Erroll G. (committee member)

Creator Email lafdbutler@gmail.com,pibutler@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c89-75209

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