University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

The two faces of digital diplomacy: dialogic public diplomacy and space for user motives

(USC Thesis Other)

The two faces of digital diplomacy: dialogic public diplomacy and space for user motives

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

1

The Two Faces of Digital Diplomacy:
Dialogic Public Diplomacy and Space for User Motives

B. Theo Mazumdar

University of Southern California Graduate School

In Fulfillment of the Doctor of Philosophy in Communication

Degree Conferral Date: May 2019

Author Note

B. Theo Mazumdar, Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism,
University of Southern California.
Correspondence concerning this doctoral dissertation should be addressed to B. Theo
Mazumdar, Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, University of Southern
California, 3502 Watt Way, Los Angeles CA 90089-0281. Phone: 551-998-4813
Email: bmazumda@usc.edu.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

2
Table of Contents

Page

I. Introduction --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
II. The “First Face” of Digital Diplomacy: Dialogic Public Diplomacy --------------------------- 9
III. The “Second Face” of Digital Diplomacy: Space for User Motives ---------------------------47
IV. Research Questions and Hypotheses ---------------------------------------------------------------81
V. Research Design and Method -----------------------------------------------------------------------86
VI. Results ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 100
VII. Discussion -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 138
VIII. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 184
IX. References ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 199
X. Appendices ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 231

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

3

I. Introduction

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

4
The networked sociality engendered by digital media has emerged into the mainstream of
society. Well over half of the world’s population is now connected to the Internet, while more
than four in ten individuals are active on at least one social medium or platform.
1
The
widespread adoption of socially oriented digital media like social network sites (SNSs) holds
much promise for practitioners of public diplomacy, who are tasked with engaging and
influencing foreign citizens on behalf of a nation-state or other international actor. Social
network sites like Facebook and Twitter enable public diplomats to communicate directly with
global publics at a scale, speed and minimal cost that were never possible in the previous, mass
media era.
The use of digital media like SNSs by practitioners of public diplomacy has burgeoned
accordingly in recent years (Kampf, Manor, & Segev, 2015; Kurbalija, 2016; Fletcher, 2016;
Lüfkens, 2017). “Digital public diplomacy” or “digital diplomacy”, as these activities have
come to be known, is an under-theorized phenomenon that lacks a developed or unifying
theoretical framework. Scholarly perspectives often focus on the construct of dialogue, viewing
the use of SNSs as an unmatched opportunity for nation-states to engage in symmetrical dialogue
with publics in order to advance shared goals. The use of social digital media like SNSs has also
been associated with the ability to achieve influence in the international system, as the dialogic
affordances of SNSs present opportunities for international actors to establish deliberative
legitimacy through dialogue (e.g. Van Ham, 2010). Yet, empirical investigations of the presence
and nature of dialogue in digital diplomacy have been limited. These have focused on a single

1
The “Digital in 2018: Global Overview” (Kemp, 2018) report from We Are Social and Hootsuite finds a 53%
global Internet penetration rate. This same report finds 3.20 billion global active social media users in 2017, or 42%
penetration. This latter percentage is based on the number of monthly active users reported by the most active social
media site/platform in each country. The sources for these data are Facebook; Tencent; Vkontakte; Kakao; Naver;
Ding; Techrasa; Similarweb; Kepios Analysis; Gsma Intelligence; Google; Ericsson; and Kepios Analysis. The
most widely used site or platform is Facebook, which was founded in 2004.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

5
ministry of foreign affairs (Manor, 2017) or on ostensibly co-equal ministries of foreign affairs
(MFAs) (Kampf et al., 2015), embassies (Cha, Yeo, & Kim, 2014) and other international actors
(Bjola & Jiang, 2015), when a disparate range of public diplomacy actors has established a
presence on SNSs. In fact, foreign relations bureaucracies exhibit varied organizational stances
with regard to new technologies, participatory digital culture and the embrace of technological
risk. Other digital diplomacy actors are guided by unique, explicit or implicit missions relating
to dialogue; several are tasked with facilitating dialogue or conversation with online publics
above and beyond the capacity or willingness of MFAs or embassies to do so. The presence of
and commitment to dialogue in digital diplomacy may therefore vary due to factors like
institutional stances on participatory digital culture and strategy, as well as guiding
organizational missions that establish the emphasis placed on engaging in dialogue with publics,
that have not been previously considered in the literature.
In addition, the operationalization of dialogic communication as it is manifest in digital
diplomacy has not been updated to reflect contemporary socio-technical culture. Studies of
dialogue in digital diplomacy have yet to incorporate quotidian but socially significant practices
such as hyperlinking, retweeting, and hashtagging, while sufficient emphasis has not been placed
on the use of multimedia. For instance, the use of hyperlinks to direct users in digital spaces may
not only have social functions like self-expression and the establishment of credibility (Freelon,
2014), but also a dialogic function in the provision of additional information that can help form
the basis for dialogue. Retweeting, or the posting of another user’s tweet to one’s own Twitter
followers, may serve the dialogic function of starting conversations and signaling that one is
listening (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013, citing boyd, Golder, & Lotan, 2010; both cited in
Freelon, 2014). Moreover, hashtags, designated by the symbol “#”, are used to organize related
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

6
content and may serve an amplification function as hashtags enable content to be read by any
individual who clicks on that hashtag. Finally, multimedia like photos, images and videos may
serve a dialogic function in digital diplomacy by providing users with background information
and examples that can be utilized in dialogue with practitioners or with other users.
Scholars have furthermore neglected to devote sustained attention to digital diplomacy
from the perspective of the publics who participate in the online communication. From one
viewpoint, this is an unsurprising and pragmatic approach; public and digital diplomacy are
construed as goal-oriented endeavors in which the facilitating international actor’s priorities,
strategies and disseminated texts are the centers of investigation. Indeed, neither scholars nor the
press has made the participating publics or the digital diplomacy “audience” the object of their
focus. However, from another perspective which foregrounds the evolution of the
communication system and the corresponding changes in socio-technical dynamics, the dearth of
attention paid to digital publics represents an inadequate response to the transformational shifts
that have occurred in the communication landscape over the last several decades. Contemporary,
digitally networked citizens are empowered, to an unprecedented degree, to express their
individual or group agendas, especially through the use of participatory SNSs. Viewed through
this lens, a facilitative theoretical framework for digital diplomacy must also incorporate the
norms, agendas and behaviors that constitute and characterize publics’ uses of the corresponding
digital communicative spaces. This perspective foregrounds the crucial question of the motives
that undergird the active participation of publics in digital diplomacy, as individual needs—the
essential components of agendas—are viewed as reflected in the motives of users for engaging in
digitally mediated communication (Ponder & Haridakis, 2015; Hanson et al., 2010). Indeed, the
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

7
failure to consider the motives of empowered, digitally networked publics may result in a
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of digital diplomacy.
This dissertation advances the study of digital diplomacy firstly by conceptualizing the
phenomenon as dialogic public diplomacy. It begins by investigating the content in digital
diplomacy as an amplification or extension of public diplomacy. The study then seeks to
differentiate the type of digital diplomacy actors whose dialogic communication is subject to
analysis. Finally, the dissertation updates the operationalization of dialogue to reflect the
socially significant behaviors of hyperlinking, retweeting, hashtagging, and the use of
multimedia. The dissertation furthermore proposes an additional conceptualization—digital
diplomacy as space for user motives—that foregrounds and investigates the motives of
empowered publics for participating in the communication. In doing so, the dissertation brings a
media studies perspective to the field and argues that such an approach is indispensable given the
dynamics of the contemporary communication environment.
The study proceeds by using thematic content analysis to identify the type of activities
contained in the Facebook and Twitter digital diplomacy of six properties of three disparate
international actors—the United States, Sweden and India—according to Cull’s (2008a)
taxonomy of public diplomacy activities. These nations are selected because their foreign
relations bureaucracies are expected to evince different organizational attitudes and stances
toward participatory digital culture and the embracing of technological risk. Next, content
analysis and a comparative approach are used to identify the presence of dialogic communication
in the same Facebook and Twitter digital diplomacy. In this section, the output of the three
nations’ MFAs is compared against that of three separate digital properties—ShareAmerica,
Sweden.se and Indian Diplomacy—established by the same nations but with the explicit or
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

8
implicit guiding mission to establish dialogue or conversation with publics. Third, the
operationalization of dialogic communication is updated to accommodate the common but
socially significant practices of re-tweeting, hyperlinking, hashtagging, and the growing use and
prominence of multimedia. The latter two objectives are accomplished by placing these digital
practices within the framework of Kent and Taylor’s (1998) principles for Internet-based
dialogic communication in public relations.
The dissertation then utilizes an exploratory, publics-centered approach and qualitative
content analysis to investigate the motives behind the commenting of publics in response to
digital diplomacy that elicits particularly strong response: the tweet or Facebook post most
responded to in the time period considered, published by the same accounts of the nations
examined in the first two sections of the study.
The final section of the dissertation uses 10 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with
willing participants in the Twitter digital diplomacy of the above actors in order to triangulate the
data and analyses in parts two and three of the study. Specifically, in-depth interviews are
conducted to assess the feasibility of a dialogic theoretical framework for digital diplomacy, the
nature of publics’ uses of the communicative spaces, and the motives behind the active
participation of publics in the Twitter digital diplomacy.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

9

II. The “First Face” of Digital Diplomacy: Dialogic Public Diplomacy

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

10
Defining Digital Diplomacy
Digital diplomacy as a term can be confusing because it is employed by scholars and
practitioners to signify different concepts and activities. Scholarly conceptualizations often vary
according to disciplinary perspective, parties and scope of the initiatives considered, and focus
on the mechanisms and tools through which the diplomatic and communication processes are
conducted. Early definitions referenced digital diplomacy as a novel development in the conduct
of international relations. Dizard (2001), for example, conceptualized digital diplomacy as a
“distinctly different type of relations between nations” that is a necessary and inevitable result of
the evolution of electronic communication technologies like radio, telephone, television,
facsimile and the Internet (pp. 1–2). In contrast, digital diplomacy can be construed narrowly,
such as the Internet-based provision of consular services like assistance to nationals abroad
(Melissen & Caesar-Gordon, 2016). Other definitions foreground the instrumental nature of the
phenomenon. Manor and Segev (2015), for example, define digital diplomacy as “the growing
use of social media platforms by a country in order to achieve its foreign policy goals and
proactively manage its image and reputation” (p. 94). Bjola (2015) employs a cross-disciplinary
international and diplomatic studies approach and defines digital diplomacy broadly as the “use
of social media for diplomatic purposes” (p. i). This perspective incorporates several discrete
aspects of diplomacy: the presence and evolution of professional norms, diplomatic decision-
making processes and public diplomacy activities and strategies. The latter two definitions also
situate digital diplomacy in a specific category of Internet-based communication technologies,
“social media”. The conjoining of digital diplomacy with social media like SNSs is a trend in
the literature and shall be discussed in a subsequent section. Related terms like “e-diplomacy”
(Rajasalu, 2011), “net diplomacy” (Murray, 2015) and “twenty-first century statecraft”
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

11
(Fitzpatrick, 2013) may further confound the concept of digital diplomacy. The U.S. Department
of State (U.S. DOS), for instance, began using “e-diplomacy” in 2002 to reference its Internet-
based public diplomacy initiatives and seven other distinct programs (Hanson, 2012, cited in
Gilboa, 2016).
2

“Digital diplomacy” as used in this dissertation and a growing body of literature (e.g.
Pamment, 2016; Kampf et al., 2015; Strauß, Kruikemeier, Van der Meulen, & Van Noort, 2015;
Sandre, 2015; Sotiriu, 2015) most closely resembles the concept of digital public diplomacy.
Digital diplomacy can therefore be defined as the use of Internet-based media by international
actors to engage or communicate with foreign publics in order to advance policy-related goals.
This conceptualization is also synonymous with “public diplomacy 2.0” (e.g. Cull, 2011, 2013;
Khatib, Dutton, & Thelwall, 2012; Newsom & Lengel, 2012; Dodd & Collins, 2017) and some
designations of “cyber-diplomacy” (e.g. Cooper, 2002; Mazumdar, 2012). All of these relate
directly to public diplomacy, which holds appeal because public diplomacy is an established and
growing academic field (Gregory, 2008) whose contributions feature diverse theoretical and
methodological perspectives.
Theorizing Digital Diplomacy
Digital diplomacy is furthermore an under-theorized phenomenon that lacks a developed
or unifying theoretical framework, as the definitional ambiguity noted above suggests. Bjola
(2015) and others (e.g. Holmes, 2015) writing in a volume dedicated to digital diplomacy
acknowledge this lack of theoretical rigor. These authors conceptualize digital diplomacy
broadly as a type of “change management” in international politics, in which “social media”
challenge the two dimensions of policy innovation and institutional adaptation (Bjola, 2015, p.

2
The seven other programs are information management, knowledge management, consular communication and
response, Internet freedom, disaster response, policy planning, and external resources (Hanson, 2012, cited in
Gilboa, 2016).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

12
5). From this perspective, digital diplomacy is explored at the policy level because social media
enable, constrain or disrupt diplomatic functions like communication, relationship management
and representation. Digital diplomacy is investigated at the institutional level because foreign
ministries hold varying levels of interest in, and ability to adapt to, the current, social media-
driven communication environment (Bjola, 2015). This expansive framework permits
investigation of a wide range of diplomatic processes, strategies and institutional concerns;
contributors explore matters like the influence of digitization on diplomatic routines and the
resultant organizational attitudes (Murray, 2015; Corrie, 2015; Pelling, 2015), the use of social
media in nation branding (Manor & Segev, 2015), and the efforts of embassies and other actors
to utilize social media in public diplomacy (Bjola & Jian, 2015; Corrie, 2015). However, the
breadth of the “change management” framework also directs the theoretical lens away from the
specific communicative processes through which engagement and persuasion potentially occur.
Moreover, this framework positions “social media” as indispensable to the phenomenon, yet the
behaviors afforded by these media and the strategies enacted through them receive little
systematic investigation.
3

Digital diplomacy may also be situated directly (e.g. Sotiriu, 2015) or obliquely (e.g.
Pelling, 2015) within the framework of soft power, Joseph Nye’s (2004) well known concept for
the ability to gain influence in the international system through attraction to one’s policies, ideas,
values, beliefs and culture. This perspective views public diplomacy, in all its formats, as a
primary mechanism through which a nation can accrue or wield soft power (Nye, 2008). Digital
diplomacy is therefore construed as a “novel and practical extension” of public diplomacy vis-à-

3
Bjola and Jiang (2015) do explore the nature of embassy-level influence processes through the concepts of digital
agenda-setting, digital presence-expansion, and digital conversation-generating. Manor and Segev (2015)
investigate influence by identifying the themes contained in the nation-branding of the U.S. DOS through “selfie
diplomacy” (p. 89).

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

13
vis the strategic deployment or accrual of soft power resources (Sotiriu, 2015, p. 35). In this
view, a nation’s soft power potential is contingent upon the manner in which its culture and
values are represented by officials and projected in the public sphere. According to Pelling
(2015), digital diplomacy has the potential to increase a nation’s relative soft power because
socially oriented online media can be used to communicate soft power resources in a more
inclusive and therefore more credible manner than traditional media. The fundamental advantage
of the soft power framework is that it foregrounds the crucial matter of achieving influence in the
international system. Communication perspectives on public and digital diplomacy processes,
by contrast, are often lacking in this respect; many neglect the core imperative of influence that
undergirds the initiatives in the service of explicating the communicative processes involved in
the phenomenon. However, the soft power concept has been criticized by Roselle, Miskimmon,
and O’Loughlin (2014) and others for its inability to enumerate the specific constructs and
account for the specific mechanisms through which such influence in the international system is
actually achieved. Other scholars have brought attention to the ethical concerns associated with
communication initiatives launched by international actors under the explicit objective to gain or
wield power (e.g. Fitzpatrick, 2007, 2013; Fisher, 2008, 2011; Zaharna, 2010). Digital
diplomacy conceived and enacted under the soft power framework may furthermore lack
credibility if it is perceived as overtly seeking influence, if it appears incongruous with the
conversations already occurring in digital spaces, or if publics do not deem its texts as worthy of
“spreading” through their own digital networks (e.g. Jenkins, Ford, & Green, 2013).
Digital Diplomacy as an Amplification or Extension of Public Diplomacy
The concept of digital diplomacy in this and other studies is closely aligned with the
practice of public diplomacy, as noted above. Therefore, digital diplomacy can also be theorized
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

14
usefully—and in simplest terms—as the use of Internet-based media to conduct public
diplomacy. Public diplomacy was introduced as a designation in 1965 (Cull, 2008a); it signifies
both an academic field (Gregory, 2008) that has garnered increasing attention since the end of
the Cold War (Cull, 2008a) and an area of practice whose activities emerged centuries ago. The
education of other kings’ progeny by the Romans and the establishment of the Library of
Alexandria in ancient Egypt, for example, are early initiatives that are interpretable as public
diplomacy (Cull, 2010).
The academic field of public diplomacy is multidisciplinary, with foundational
contributions from the distinct perspectives of history (e.g. Cull, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2012;
Nelson, 1997), international relations (e.g. Nye, 2004, 2008; Gilboa, 2006, 2008; Mor, 2006;
Roselle et al., 2014), communication (e.g. Fisher, 2008; Zaharna, 2010; Zaharna, Fisher, &
Arsenault, 2013) and public relations (e.g. Signitzer & Coombs, 1992; Fitzpatrick, 2007). Such
varied foci have made consensus on a definition and guiding theoretical framework difficult to
achieve (Gilboa, 2008). Nevertheless, it is useful to provide the definition that appeared in a
landmark issue of The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
published under the theme “Public Diplomacy in a Changing Word.” There, Cowan and Cull
(2008) define public diplomacy as “an international actor’s attempt to advance the ends of policy
by engaging with foreign publics” (p. 6). This definition highlights four crucial aspects of the
phenomenon. First, the attempts at engagement are usually initiated by a representative entity
like an embassy, foreign ministry or diplomat acting on behalf of an international actor like a
nation-state. Second, the initiatives involve engaging with publics, instead of with other
institutionally representative international actors in private settings. This engagement may be
attempted through direct communication with publics; it may also be pursued through indirect
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

15
means like media relations in order to influence news agendas and shape public opinion in a
direction favorable to the international actor. Third, the intended engagement of publics is
international in scope, rather than directed toward publics who are considered domestic; that is,
the communication is usually focused toward publics who are not located primarily among the
same geographic population that is represented by the international actor. Finally, the goals of
the attempted engagement are policy-related and/or intended to be of strategic benefit to the
international actor. Thus, public diplomacy, like all formats of strategic communication,
involves the purposeful enacting of communication programs in the service of distinct and
identifiable organizational goals (Riley & Hollihan, 2012; Hallahan, Holtzhausen, Van Ruler,
Verčič, & Sriramesh, 2007; Holtzhausen & Zerfass, 2015).
Cull (2008a) provides a taxonomy of five interrelated public diplomacy activities, which
can also serve as a conceptual framework that can be operationalized for empirical research.
Listening refers to an international actor’s efforts to use the data, opinions or other feedback of
global publics to shape the international environment or redirect policy. Advocacy is the
undertaking of a communication activity by an international actor to promote a particular idea,
policy or other interest. Cultural diplomacy signifies the transmission or promotion of an
international actor’s cultural achievements or resources in order to shape the international
environment. Exchange diplomacy is the reciprocal exchange of citizens through education or
acculturation in order to shape the international environment. Finally, international
broadcasting refers to the deployment of state-funded communication technologies to engage
foreign publics in order to shape the international environment (pp. 32–34).
The use of digital media like SNSs in public diplomacy is not inherently beneficial to the
facilitating international actor or to its public interlocutors. As Hayden (2012) observes, “In
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

16
simple terms—social media expands the number of contacts with people. It is a ‘force amplifier’
for public diplomacy” (p. 11). However, the potential benefits of using Internet-based
communication technologies in public diplomacy are readily apparent. The widespread, global
diffusion of digital media and low barriers to entry offer public diplomats the capacity to
facilitate inexpensively every manner of public outreach, and do so at an unprecedented scale.
To illustrate this point, the Internet and SNSs in particular can be used to enact, amplify or
enhance every type of initiative in Cull’s (2008a) taxonomy of public diplomacy activities.
Perhaps most consequentially, the interactivity inherent to SNSs in particular (Avery et al., 2010)
presents unparalleled opportunity for international actors to engage directly foreign publics and
solicit, gauge and “listen to” the feedback of global citizens, the first activity in the taxonomy.
Listening opportunities engendered by digital media like SNSs include the dissemination of web-
based surveys and the promotion and conducting of time-bound, participatory events like
interactive panel discussions, Google Hangouts, dedicated Question and Answer (Q&A)
sessions, and contests that invite the digital submission of user generated content (UGC).
Listening opportunities may also include the solicitation of responses from publics through
posing direct questions to them. Second, digital media can be employed to circulate rapidly
policy positions and other forms of advocacy in attempt to influence traditional media news
frames and agendas. Indeed, international actors are no longer dependent at all upon
professional journalists to influence public opinion; instead, nations can use digital media to
frame directly an unfolding event or policy position, bypassing altogether traditional media
outlets if time constraints or other circumstances necessitate a response. The Israel Defense
Forces, for example, has received scholarly attention for its attempts to utilize a dedicated
YouTube channel to control the narrative in the immediate aftermath of international crisis
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

17
situations (e.g. Allan & Brown, 2010; Mazumdar, 2012). Advocacy may also be utilized in the
posting of routine and even mundane social media content or updates, in addition to discreet,
time-bound campaigns like those employed by the Israel Defense Forces on YouTube in crisis
situations; a simple hashtag appended to a post or tweet—#refugeeswelcome, for example, in the
case of the U.S. DOS content analyzed in this study—may transform a simple update into an
advocacy message. Third, SNSs can be used to promote or publicize exchange programs or
participants, while images and videos attached to posts or tweets may themselves promote a
nation’s array of cultural, natural or tourist attractions. Moreover, virtual exchanges and other
digital cultural programs employ popular technologies like SNSs, voice over Internet protocol
services such as Skype and mobile phone applications to offer viable, discreet alternatives to
expensive physical exchange programs or in-person cultural initiatives (Jones, 2014; Wilhelm,
2014; Exchange 2.0, 2012). For example, in 2016 the non-profit World Learning Inc. launched
the Digital Young Leaders Exchange Program to build on a successful partnership with the U.S.
DOS called the Iraqi Young Leaders Exchange Program , in which Iraqi students travel to the
U.S. to learn about American culture and build leadership skills. Through webinars, videos,
discussion forums and group calls, the program enabled some 300 Iraqi teens to connect for free
with American high school students and structure all activities around their own schedules
(Digital Young Leaders Exchange Program, n.d.). Virtual exchange programs may furthermore
provide participants with specific social psychological benefits. A research collaboration
between the Virtual Exchange Coalition and the Saxelab Social Cognitive Neuroscience
Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has found that these virtual programs
offer participants the developmentally important experience of being heard and respected,
increase the willingness of participants to engage constructively with peers who hold different
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

18
views and have diverse backgrounds, and increase participants’ empathy for other perspectives
and cultures (The Impact of Virtual Exchange, n.d.). Finally, through webcasting, podcasting
and streaming, digital media offer state-funded international broadcasters—like the United
Kingdom’s BBC World Service, Germany’s Deutsche Welle or the United States’ Voice of
America—the ability to better compete in a crowded media marketplace by making them more
accessible, flexible, innovative and personalized (O’Keeffe & Oliver, 2010; Limbourg, 2014).
The SNS accounts of international actors may themselves function as international
“broadcasters” because they are state-controlled and obviate the need to utilize traditional
international media formats like radio and television to disseminate information and updates. In
sum, digital media not only provide numerous and multifarious opportunities to enact every type
of public diplomacy activity in Cull’s (2008a) taxonomy, they may also represent the ability to
reconstitute public diplomacy in formats that are cheaper, further reaching, more efficient and
potentially more impactful than those that comprise offline public diplomacy programs.
Very few other studies have operationalized Cull’s (2008a) taxonomy of public
diplomacy activities for empirical research of digital diplomacy. Dodd and Collins (2017)
content analyze Twitter accounts belonging to embassies of the United States, the United
Kingdom and Canada and located in 13 central and eastern European countries. These authors
also investigate the Twitter accounts of the embassies of the same 13 central and eastern
European countries located in the U.S., the U.K. and Canada.
4
The study’s operationalization of
each type of public diplomacy activity is not clearly stated. Nevertheless, findings indicate that
the most common type of activity in the Twitter digital diplomacy was advocacy (36.5% of the

4
The 13 central and eastern European nations are Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

19
sample), followed by cultural diplomacy (32.4% of the sample), international exchange
diplomacy (15.6% of the sample and their adaptation of exchange diplomacy, which is explained
ambiguously as “international experience of mutual benefit”), and news (7.7% of the sample and
their adaptation of international broadcasting). Interestingly, listening (2.5% of the sample) was
the activity least frequently identified among all the Twitter accounts considered, despite its
foundational role in public diplomacy and importance relative to all other activities (Cull,
2008a). With regard to differences between the Western and Central and Eastern European
embassies, the activity most frequently utilized by Western embassies was advocacy (24.1%)
followed by cultural diplomacy (18.5%), while the Central and Eastern European embassies most
frequently utilized cultural diplomacy (13.9%), slightly more often than advocacy (12.4%). The
prevalence of informational public diplomacy, particularly advocacy, was therefore consistent
with prior scholarship that has established the dominance of advocacy in public diplomacy
conducted by many nations throughout the world (Cull, 2008a, 2013; Dodd & Collins, 2017).
The Centrality of Dialogue to Digital Diplomacy
However, the theoretical construct that most distinguishes digital diplomacy as a
phenomenon is dialogue. Dialogue in the context of public diplomacy can be defined as “myriad
situations in which ideas and information are exchanged and communication is reciprocal and
multidirectional” (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 18, emphasis in original). Dialogue is reciprocal
because each party involved in the communication serves as both message source and destination
or has the capacity to do so; it is multidirectional because such dialogue can be exchanged on
multiple levels and by all parties involved in the communicative process (Cowan & Arsenault,
2008).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

20
Benefits of dialogic engagement with stakeholders. An instructive perspective on the
appeal of digital diplomacy for international actors encompasses the concepts of and relationship
between stakeholders and dialogic engagement with organizations. Lewis (2001) defines a
stakeholder as “any person or group that is able to make a claim on an organization’s attention,
resources or output or who may be affected by the organization” (p. 202). The support of
stakeholders is central to the long-term success of any organization (Buchanan-Oliver &
Fitzgerald, 2016); therefore, foreign—and increasingly, domestic—publics as stakeholders are
crucial concerns for the foreign affairs bureaucracies of nation-states.
There is an important distinction to be made between the stakeholders of nonprofit or
public sector organizations and their for-profit counterparts. Private sector organizations have
clearly identifiable customers or potential customers, along with shareholder owners, managers
and other “principals,” in addition to “agents” who are engaged by the principal to carry out a
service on her or his behalf (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, & Jegers, 2012, p. 432). In
contrast, nonprofits and public sector organizations usually have no owners yet incorporate an
array of internal and external stakeholders who have a stake in the organization and whose
prospects or utilities are impacted by the organization’s activities (Jegers, 2008, cited in Van
Puyvelde et al., 2012; Van Puyvelde et al., 2012).
As Balser and McClusky (2005) remind, one should neither assume nor expect that all
non-profit organizational stakeholders have the same objective. It thus behooves non-profit
organizations like governments and foreign affairs bureaucracies to incorporate into their
governance or discussions of accountability the insights gained through dialogic engagement
with public stakeholders as principals whose objectives can be expected to differ (Steinberg,
2010). Out of these dynamics arises a continuum of organization–external stakeholder
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

21
approaches characterized at one end by “controlling” (Bernoff & Li, 2008) or “push”
communication frameworks, which have traditionally been the status quo in consumer-centric
industries like marketing (Buchanan-Oliver & Fitzgerald, 2016). This is contrasted at the other
end of the spectrum by what has been called the “total stakeholder approach” to dialogic
communication (Buchanan-Oliver & Fitzgerald, 2016, p. 437), which seeks to coordinate an
organization’s approach to engaging a broad range of stakeholders to most effectively gain their
support (Åberg, 1990; Christensen & Cornelissen, 2011; Mulhern, 2009; all cited in Buchanan-
Oliver & Fitzgerald, 2016).
Bernoff and Li (2008) argue furthermore that organizations will successfully transition
beyond the controlling communication status quo when they embrace socially oriented digital
media as a mechanism through which to foster dialogic engagement in new ways. However,
transitioning beyond the controlled approach requires substantial and organization-wide
commitment to dialogic communication with publics and to the total stakeholder approach to
social media (Morrison & Milliken, 2000; Smith, 2012; both cited in Buchanan-Oliver &
Fitzgerald, 2016).
The potential of digital and social media as hosts to dialogic communication. Digital
media have the potential to serve as the primary conduit for dialogue in public diplomacy
because of the worldwide and rapidly growing adoption of socially oriented digital media and,
crucially, because of the nature of digital media themselves. With regard to diffusion, data
indicate that social media adoption rates are currently growing worldwide at about 13% each
year (Kemp, 2018).
5
In relation to SNSs specifically—on which foreign ministries, embassies
and other representatives of nations can easily establish a presence without prior acceptance into

5
These data include both SNSs and messaging apps like WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger; all data are measured
by active accounts on the most popular social medium in each country.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

22
an individual’s digital network—the growth in adoption rates is as robust or more so. For
example, the number of global Facebook users grew 15% from January 2017 to January 2018,
for a total of 2.17 billion active users, most among SNSs (Kemp, 2018). YouTube follows with
1.5 billion active users, then Instagram (800 million active users), Tumblr (794 million active
users), China’s QZone (568 million active users), China’s Sina Weibo (376 million active users),
and Twitter (330 million active users) (Kemp, 2018). Socially oriented digital media also offer
public diplomats increasingly fertile ground in the developing world. One 2014 Pew Research
Center report found that a majority of Internet users utilize SNSs, most frequently Facebook and
Twitter, in 21 of 24 developing nations (Emerging Nations Embrace, 2014).
6
Recent data show
that seven of the 10 nations with the highest growth in number of social media users from 2017
to 2018 are developing countries (Kemp, 2018).
7

In addition to the rapid diffusion and widespread global adoption of socially oriented
digital media, the nature of digital media properties themselves and the resultant behaviors they
afford are central to the potential for dialogue in digital diplomacy. According to Sundar and
Limperos (2013), digital media feature four classes of technological affordances that differentiate
them from traditional media with respect to their psychological and behavioral consequences.
Multiple modality refers to the possibility for multiple methods of presenting media content—
pictures, text, video and audio—which appeal to different elements of the human perceptual
system like seeing and hearing. The agency affordance in digital media allows all users to be the
agents or sources of communication. For example, UGC like blog entries, videos posted to

6
These developing nations are Egypt, Russia, Philippines, Tunisia, Indonesia, Jordan, Venezuela, Nigeria, Turkey,
Ghana, Mexico, Chile, Malaysia, Kenya, Argentina, El Salvador, Senegal, Brazil, Lebanon, Bolivia and South
Africa.
7
The counties with the highest growth in number of social media users, in order, are: China (84.63 million new
users), India (59 million new users), Indonesia (24 million new users), Iran (23 million new users), the U.S. (16
million new users), Vietnam (9 million new users), Russia (8.83 million new users), Brazil (8 million new users),
Japan (7 million new users) and Mexico (7 million new users).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

23
YouTube, and comments in response to social posts, is a product of the agency affordance. The
interactivity affordance permits users to make real-time changes to content and therefore interact
with and through the medium; interactivity results, for instance, in user expectations of greater
control over content and activity. Finally, navigability allows users to move throughout the
medium as a traversable space; users may therefore make ritualistic as well as utilitarian use of
digital media, for example in seeking out opportunities for browsing and play. Together, these
four classes of affordances engender numerous opportunities for—and corresponding
expectations of—the multifarious exchange of information, opinions, ideas and other content that
are both unique to digital media and unmatched in scale. The use of socially oriented digital
media like SNSs, whose functionality both depends on and promotes these core affordances,
therefore presents singular opportunity for international actors to engage in dialogic, reciprocal
communication with global publics, ultimately in the service of strategic goals. In this respect,
the potential for dialogue in digital diplomacy is the most crucial theoretical underpinning of the
phenomenon. Indeed, the dialogic opportunities presented by social digital media may even
have the power to transform public diplomacy by multiplying exponentially the number of
participants in the communication and by involving publics in conversations to which they have
never previously been privy.
Scholarly accounts of dialogue in digital diplomacy. Scholarly accounts of dialogue in
digital diplomacy—from a range of disciplinary perspectives—are thus frequently optimistic,
normative and prescriptive. Several scholars conceptualize the presence of dialogue in digital
diplomacy in a manner that resembles the theorizing of “two-way symmetrical communication,”
Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) classic model for advanced public relations as part of the Excellence
theoretical tradition. Two-way symmetrical communication occurs when the roles of the
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

24
message source and destination can be interchanged, the organization and its public stakeholders
are seen to interact symbiotically and on equal footing, and mutual benefit and understanding
between organization and publics are achieved (Zöllner, 2006). Newsom and Lengel (2012)
argue, for example, that digital diplomacy provides ample opportunity for inexpensive
symmetrical communication, as the phenomenon “promises increased interactivity, cost-effective
reach, and opportunities for more equitable information flow” (p. 1). For Arsenault (2009),
digital diplomacy serves two important functions: it promotes a horizontal platform for dialogue
between citizens and furthermore employs the use of participatory technologies like SNSs as a
potent instrument for public diplomacy actors to listen and respond accordingly to actionable
public sentiment. From this perspective, digital diplomacy is therefore a “conduit for feedback”
and a “mechanism for listening to and incorporating viable opinions and critical information both
through expressed opinions and through end-user behaviors” (Arsenault, 2009, p. 149). Fisher
(2008) argues that equivalency between all the parties involved should comprise the core of
digital diplomacy. In this view, digital diplomacy mirrors the production of “open-source”
software; publics and international actors like nation-states are conceived as digital peers, with
both parties “heading in the same direction” and publics viewed as “co-developers” instead of
target audiences (pp. 145, 149). Other scholars comment on the quality and duration of the
dialogue between international actors and publics and the beneficial outcomes of sustained
interaction in digital diplomacy. For example, Kampf et al. (2015) assert that digital diplomacy
can uniquely serve as a mechanism through which to establish enduring rather than ephemeral
relations between international actors and publics. For these authors, digital diplomacy has the
potential to foster “long-lasting relationships” precisely because they are based on dialogic
interactions between institutional actors like MFAs and publics (p. 332). This is echoed by Bjola
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

25
and Jiang (2015), who observe the potential for “sustained dialogue” or “quasi-continuous
dialogue” between diplomats and foreign publics and the possibility of diplomats carrying on
“enlightening conversations with a broad segment of the population in the country in which they
operate” (p. 71, 75). In sum, these conceptualizations characterize dialogue as the defining
feature of digital diplomacy; dialogic digital diplomacy thus represents an exceptional and
watershed opportunity to engender long-lasting interaction and even equivalency between
publics and international actors, which may in turn result in mutual understanding and shared
benefit.
Benefits of dialogue specific to public and digital diplomacy. Instantiations of
symmetrical and, more commonly, asymmetrical dialogue have always been integral components
of nation-backed communication initiatives that are now classified as public diplomacy. Indeed,
the potential for mutual understanding through sustained dialogue is one of the hallmarks of
educational and cultural exchanges, which are often regarded as some of the most successful
types of public diplomacy despite their long-term time frames and indirect capacity to garner
influence (Scott-Smith, 2009). However, scholars of public diplomacy have placed increasing
emphasis on the importance of establishing dialogic practices, particularly over the last two
decades as democratization in world geopolitics and advances in communication technologies
have laid bare the reality that foreign policy successes are inextricably linked to a nation’s
reputation and its relations with foreign publics—the dynamics that animate what scholars often
identify as the “new” public diplomacy (e.g. Melissen, 2005; Fitzpatrick, 2007; Pamment, 2012;
Vickers, 2004; Potter, 2003).
Practitioners have also recognized explicitly the importance of dialogue in contemporary
public diplomacy. In 1994 the Voice of America announced an operational shift from
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

26
“monologue to dialogue,” believing that their own messages would resonate more strongly when
foreign publics felt their views were being listened to and heard (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008).
The Voice of America thus began airing call-in radio and television programs in more than a
dozen languages (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008). Similarly, earlier this century Deutsche Welle
incorporated dialogic strategies into its radio, television and Internet content directed to
audiences in the Arab world. These included a weekly radio program called “Dialogue of
Cultures” that featured thought-leaders discussing topical events and issues (Zöllner, 2006, cited
in Cowan & Arsenault, 2008). Interestingly, Zöllner (2006) does not find these and the other
post-9/11 public diplomacy outputs of Deutsche Welle to be accurately classified as dialogue;
instead, Zöllner identifies the desire of Germany to further its nation-branding through a “quest
for dialogue as a projection of the country’s national values, policies, self-image and underlying
myth” (p. 160).
Cowan and Arsenault (2008) observe that many of the benefits of dialogue in public
diplomacy are similar to those in other communication phenomena that have received much
more empirical attention from scholars. For instance, reciprocal communication and listening
have been documented as qualities of enduring friendships and of highly regarded and effective
leaders (April, 1999, cited in Cowan & Arsenault, 2008). Scholars also find that people react
more favorably to requests or impositions if the interaction is preceded by conversation
(Dolinski, Nawrat, & Rudak, 2001, cited in Cowan & Arsenault, 2008). In addition, the presence
of dialogue under the right conditions can play a vital role in creating or improving goodwill and
bridging social barriers (e.g. Christakis & Brahms, 2003; Bathany, 2000, both cited in Cowan &
Arsenault, 2008). For Cowan and Arsenault (2008), dialogue in public diplomacy thus presents
the opportunity to facilitate conflict-solving and the establishment of common ground; dialogue
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

27
in public diplomacy is therefore “critical both as a symbolic gesture that emphasizes that
reasonable people can find reasonable ways to disagree and as a mechanism for overcoming
stereotypes and forging relationships across social boundaries” (p. 20).
Dialogue and deliberative legitimacy. Dialogue in public diplomacy conducted in the
current international environment also assumes another unique and crucial role: it may be the
primary non-coercive mechanism through which an international actor achieves the capacity to
influence. Peter van Ham (2010) argues that dialogue is indispensable in current international
politics as it is through dialogue that public diplomacy actors and the communication they
initiate will achieve perceived legitimacy, a precondition for the ability of an international actor
to gain influence. Legitimacy in international relations has received considerable attention from
scholars and a multitude of definitions (Van Ham, 2010). Daniel C. Esty (2006) has focused on
democratic legitimacy, arguing that its presence will depend on the existence of social trust and a
view that the decision-maker is acting on behalf of the community. The common theme in
scholarly formulations of democratic legitimacy is that legitimacy is subjective and rooted in
shared norms, values and a mutual sense of trust; moreover, the presence of these qualities may
even result in the belief in a common destiny (Van Ham, 2010). International democratic
political legitimacy typically derives from one of three processes. Legitimacy may arise from
the Rousseauian notion of democratic credentials, like the election of the president of the United
States or the majority vote of the British public to leave the European Union. International
political legitimacy may also be rooted in the Weberian notion of decision-making based on
expertise and legal structures, such as the policies decided upon and enacted by the World Trade
Organization, the International Monetary Fund or the United Nations. In public diplomacy,
which has communication at its core, deliberative legitimacy will derive from a third source: an
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

28
approximation of a Habermasian (1990) notion of dialogue as the taking into account of different
perspectives, all of which are perceived as having a stake in the final policy course of action or
decision outcome (Van Ham, 2010).
The dialogue ascribed to public diplomacy that is granted deliberative legitimacy thus
moves beyond the most basic definition of dialogue as a conversation between two people
(Arsenault, 2009)—and even beyond the notion of dialogue as the reciprocal and
multidirectional exchange of ideas (e.g. Cowan & Arsenault, 2008)—to an idealized notion akin
to Martin Buber’s (1970, 1985) concept of true dialogue. True dialogue occurs when all the
participants in the communication enter the interaction with respect, a willingness to listen to the
other parties involved and, crucially, a view of the interaction itself as the goal and not a means
to an end (Friedman, 1960, cited in Arsenault, 2009; Kent & Taylor, 1998, 2002). Here there is a
striking discrepancy that this dissertation helps to problematize: a contradiction between this
promise of deliberative legitimacy facilitated by digital media and manifested in dialogue as the
goal of the interaction in and of itself, and the view of public diplomacy as international strategic
communication, in which influence is the overarching goal of any and all initiatives (e.g. Paul,
2011).
Several scholars allow that strategic communication such as public diplomacy can be
accurately characterized as open, dialectic, collaborative or inclusive even when it originates
from an organization seeking influence or advantage (Hallahan et al., 2007, cited in Holtzhausen
& Zerfass, 2015; Holtzhausen, 2010). Furthermore, Hayden (2011) observes in public
diplomacy “the possibility that an ethical stance towards engagement and communication qua
communication may itself be influential” (p. 797, emphasis in original). Other scholars have
criticized the concepts of engagement, dialogue and attraction through the deployment of
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

29
strategic communication formats like public diplomacy. Bially Mattern (2005), for example,
argues that these formats can never align with the Habermasian (1990) notion of argument based
on a reasoned exchange of evidence-based perspectives by willing participants who seek truth,
because strategic communication practices are in fact little concerned with truth or the
willingness of the audience to participate. Comor and Bean (2012) object to digital diplomacy
specifically, as the dialogue through engagement generated in digital spaces is contrived instead
of genuine and free-flowing. For these authors, digital diplomacy can therefore be viewed as an
unethical and even “delusional” form of international communication.
Van Ham’s (2010) argument about the importance of deliberative legitimacy derived
through dialogue is also consistent with theorizing that relational or collaborative approaches to
public diplomacy may no longer be accurately described as mere options for the pursuit of more
ethical state–public interaction, but rather as a core twenty-first century imperative (e.g. Zaharna,
Fisher, & Arsenault, 2013).
8
These scholars view current society as distinguished primarily by
the presence of globally interconnected networks, multidirectional information flows and
multifarious sources of influence: the “network society” that Castells (2011, 2013) notably
identified and documented. The pressing concerns of the network society—terrorism, climate
change and resource scarcity, for example—are transnational in nature and in scope (Copeland,
2013); they are unconfined to national borders and therefore cannot be adequately addressed by
the policies of any one nation-state actor. From this perspective, successful public diplomacy
will require as standard practice values and activities that are rooted in dialogue—collaboration
with empowered global citizens and “genuine cooperation”, for example—and therefore
constitute a sea change that Zaharna, Fisher, and Arsenault (2013) have called a “connective

8
A body of literature has advocated conceptualizing public diplomacy, broadly defined, as a relationship and
therefore a more ethical alternative to power-based models, especially public diplomacy as a tool of soft power.
See, for example, Fitzpatrick (2007, 2013); Fisher (2008, 2011); Zaharna, (2010).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

30
mindshift” (p.1). In this respect, a dialogic, relational conceptualization of public and digital
diplomacy is a logical corollary to the growing scholarly consensus that the concomitant
processes of technological advancement and globalization present in the rise of networked, non-
state actors a significant challenge to national authority (e.g. Castells, 2008, 2013; Nye, 2011;
Van Ham, 2010; Copeland, 2013; Cooper, 2007; Slaughter, 2004).
The key point in this discussion is two-fold. First, the nature of the current, globally-
networked international system may require successful public diplomats to anchor their practices
in dialogic, relational and collaborative strategies, primarily enacted through digital media.
Second, the capacity of practitioners to achieve influence in this international system may hinge
on publics’ perception of deliberative legitimacy that can only be incubated through an
approximation of Buber’s (1970, 1985) notion of true dialogue.
The primacy of social network sites in digital diplomacy. In digital diplomacy, it is
the affordances and inherently participatory nature of SNSs in particular (Avery et al., 2010) that
facilitate beyond any other media the potential for deliberative legitimacy through dialogue.
Communication technology scholars Nicole B. Ellison and danah boyd (2013) define a SNS as:
A networked communication platform in which participants 1) have uniquely identifiable
profiles that consist of user-supplied content, content provided by other users, and/or
system-level data; 2) can publicly articulate connections that can be viewed and traversed
by others; and 3) can consume, produce, and/or interact with streams of user-generated
content provided by their connections on the site (p. 158, emphasis in original).
All four affordance classifications that engender the distinct psychological and behavioral
consequences (Sundar & Limperos, 2013) previously discussed are therefore prevalent in and
integral to SNSs. Social network sites provide numerous and diverse opportunities to view,
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

31
upload, share and send multi-modal content. These media are furthermore defined in part by
their hosting of UGC and enabling of users to manipulate UGC, a result of the agency
affordance. The functionality and popularity of SNSs are dependent on the interactivity
affordance, and SNSs are strong vehicles for the navigability affordance, as they are also defined
in part by the ability to traverse the contact or connection lists of others. Specific behaviors
afforded by SNSs like Facebook or Twitter include the ability to comment on or reply to text-
based content and multimedia like images, graphics, videos or photographs. Users can also
forward such content along a given network, for example by “sharing” or “retweeting”, and can
react to the content of others by selecting icons that convey emotions such as approval or
“liking”, and in the case of Facebook, also love, humor, wonder, sadness or anger. Social
network sites also permit users to hyperlink to other pages and engage in both asynchronous
communication at a time of one’s choosing and synchronous interaction such as “chatting”.
Furthermore, these essentially cost-free opportunities for dialogue are available to a wide array
of people, be they ambassador, embassy officer, adult citizen or adolescent. Any person who has
access to a given SNS and to the Internet—especially broadband, which accommodates the
sharing of data and downloading/uploading—and possesses a basic level of technological
aptitude may participate on theoretically even terms with any other person. Ellison and boyd
(2013) observe the social and dialogic potential of these media: “SNSs have become a genre of
social media that lowers barriers to communication, facilitates the display of identity formation,
and enables like-minded individuals to easily discern their common ground, thus helping users
cultivate socially relevant interactions” (p. 160, citing Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2011). For
Arsenault (2009), “social media platforms” are themselves interpretable as “hybridized” forms of
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

32
dialogue, as they invite people to share opinions about themselves and the society and world
around them (pp. 147–148).
Indeed, digital diplomacy is increasingly associated with, and even delimited by, the
deployment of SNSs specifically by international actors in effort to establish dialogue with and
between citizens. Kampf et al. (2015) define digital diplomacy as “the use of SNSs in order to
foster dialogue with online publics” (p. 332)—an explicit divorcement from the multitude of
other digital media like video games, traditional blogs and mobile phone applications that have
often been associated with public diplomacy and from instrumental or monologic models of
public diplomacy that are typically characterized by asymmetrical communication flows.
9

The concept of digital diplomacy or “public diplomacy 2.0” thus increasingly implies a
definitive “conceptual shift in the practice of diplomacy” (Kampf et al., 2015, p. 337): a
rebooting and replacement of an old public diplomacy that was often characterized by one-way
communication and an “informational,” sometimes propagandistic, approach (Zaharna, 2010),
with a “new form” of public diplomacy engendered specifically by the use of SNSs and
distinguished by the establishment of mutuality and relationships through dialogue (Kampf et al.,
2015, p. 337). From this perspective, then, the use of SNSs in digital diplomacy holds singular
significance for the contemporary conduct of foreign relations. It is the most promising non-
coercive method for international actors to achieve influence, as digital diplomacy facilitates at
scale the potential for symmetrical dialogue and the resultant bestowment of democratic
legitimacy by global citizens.
Investigating dialogue in digital diplomacy. Scholars working in the discipline of
public relations have provided the most facilitative conceptual framework for the analysis of

9
For examples of video games and mobile phone applications as public diplomacy, see Fisher (2008) and Milam
and Avery (2012), respectively.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

33
dialogue in organization–public communication. Twenty years ago, Kent and Taylor (1998) put
forward five principles to guide “the successful integration of dialogic public relations and the
World Wide Web” (p. 6). The first principle, “dialogic loop,” is crucial, as it permits publics to
question organizations and allows organizational representatives to respond to problems,
concerns and questions. The second principle, “usefulness of information,” relates to the
provision of useful and easily accessible information or explanations by the organization, which
allows publics to interact with the organization as an “informed partner” (p. 8). At its core, this
principle advocates the provision of information that facilitates dialogue. The “generation of
return visits” principle champions content like special forums, Q&A sessions and other updates
that encourage users to return to the organization’s site and thus sets the conditions for dialogic
communication. The fourth principle, “intuitiveness/ease of the interface,” relates to the
usability of the site; this concern has been ameliorated by the standardization and intuitive
interfaces that characterize SNSs. Finally, “the rule of conservation of visitors” places value on
site visits and warns against the inclusion of unnecessary hyperlinks that “can lead visitors
astray” (p. 10). Kent and Taylor’s (1998) principles for the use of dialogic Internet-based
communication in public relations pre-date the shift to participatory Internet use commonly
referred to as “Web 2.0”. However, as Kampf et al. (2015) point out, Kent and Taylor’s
principles remain a useful framework given their ongoing use in public relations studies (e.g.
McAllister-Spooner, 2009; Rybalko & Seltzer, 2010), their frequent use in content analyses like
that conducted by Kampf et al. (2015) and the present study, and their recent use in
investigations of dialogue in public diplomacy (e.g. Kampf et al., 2015).
The few prior empirical studies to focus on dialogue in digital diplomacy have not
substantiated the optimism for the establishment of mutuality through dialogue that characterizes
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

34
theoretic treatments of the phenomenon. Kampf et al. (2015) apply Kent and Taylor’s (1998)
principles for dialogic communication described above. These authors content analyze six-
weeks of Facebook and Twitter postings by the MFAs of eleven countries: Ethiopia, India,
Israel, Japan, Kenya, Poland, Rwanda, Somalia, South Korea, the United States and the United
Kingdom. Their most notable findings are in relation to “dialogic loop”: results indicate that the
dialogic engagement of publics—operationalized as direct interaction with publics in the form of
answering questions, supplying requested information and responding to criticism—was
extremely rare among all ministries considered. Kampf et al. (2015) conclude that the dialogic
potential of digital diplomacy was not being realized and that the one-way broadcast model of
public diplomacy dominated their Facebook and Twitter sample. These findings align with those
of Manor (2017), who utilizes thematic analysis to study the adherence of the U.S. DOS’s
January 2016 Facebook posts to Taylor and Kent’s (2014) four components of dialogic
engagement in public relations. Manor (2017) finds that the U.S. DOS provided no opportunities
for dialogic engagement with Facebook followers; that is, the digital diplomacy did not create
opportunities for collaborative action and did not respond to followers’ comments, concerns and
queries. Furthermore, the U.S. DOS did not query its Facebook followers and provided only one
invitation to followers to engage in conversation: a Twitter Q&A session focused on U.S. foreign
policy following President Obama’s State of the Union address. For Manor (2017), this isolated
Q&A invitation is a not a true dialogic opportunity; rather, the invitation represents a
“quarantined form of engagement” because the conversation is limited in both duration and
subject matter (p. 318, citing Kampf et al., 2015). Consistent with these findings are the results
of studies by Bjola and Jiang (2015) and Cha, Yeo, and Kim (2014). In the former, the authors
investigate the February–March 2013 Weibo digital diplomacy strategies of the U.S. embassy,
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

35
the European Union delegation and the Japanese embassy in China. These authors pay particular
attention to the conditions under which the Weibo accounts perform “digital conversation
generating” or two-way dialogue between the digital diplomacy actors and publics (p. 72). Bjola
and Jiang (2015) find that none of the official accounts commented on or reposted public feeds
that tagged them; they furthermore identify no evidence that any of the three digital diplomacy
accounts responded to publics’ queries. In addition, analysis of the reposting practices of the
three accounts indicated no reposts of others’ content by the Japanese embassy, while the main
function of the EU and U.S. reposts appeared to be information dissemination and the
clarification of policies rather than engaging in two-way conversation. Cha et al. (2014) conduct
a cursory investigation of the homepages and blogs of the South Korean embassies of the United
States, Canada and Australia. The methodology provided is opaque, but these authors conclude
that the embassies generally did not utilize the dialogic potential of new media and their online
communication with publics can be characterized as “passive” (p. 177). Therefore, findings in
past studies indicate that the features of social and digital media are not being utilized to
establish dialogue or two-way interaction between digital diplomats and publics; instead, the
digital diplomacy investigated appeared to resemble closely the information dissemination or
one-way model of public diplomacy.
Moreover, the results of these investigations are consistent with those of studies that have
employed Kent and Taylor’s (1998) dialogic principles to the Internet-based public
communication initiatives of other types of organizations. McAllister-Spooner (2009) conducts
a ten-year meta-analysis of studies that employ Kent and Taylor’s principles, finding that
organizations generally have not heeded the recommendations of public relations scholars to
utilize the dialogic potential of the Internet. This author’s literature review finds that
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

36
organizations frequently presented publics with digital properties that were easy to navigate and
presented useful information, but failed to utilize the interpersonal interactivity afforded by
digital media. McAllister-Spooner concludes that organizations “do not do the dialogic
functions very well” (p. 321); that is, the dialogic potential of the Internet has not been realized
with regard to organization–public communication.
Other recent studies have applied Kent and Taylor’s (1998) dialogic principles to public
relations conducted specifically via SNSs. Several investigations have concentrated on the use
of Facebook, for example by environmental advocacy groups (Bortree & Seltzer, 2009),
nonprofit organizations (Waters, Burnett, Lamm, & Lucas, 2009), political candidates (Sweetser
& Lariscy, 2008) and university health centers (Waters, Canfield, Foster, & Hardy, 2011).
Twitter has also been the focus in studies of dialogic communication in Fortune 500 companies
(Rybalko & Seltzer, 2010), non-profits (Lovejoy, Waters, & Saxton, 2012) and higher education
institutions (Linvill, McGee, & Hicks, 2012). In all these studies of Facebook- and Twitter-
based public relations, the researchers document an underutilization of the dialogic capabilities
afforded by SNSs (Watkins, 2017). The participatory social media of Web 2.0 do not appear to
be spurring a significant shift in the manner in which organizations utilize dialogue in their
communication with publics.
Aligning dialogic practices of digital diplomacy with current socio-technical culture.
Kent and Taylor’s (1998) principles for Internet-based public relations have thus served as the
primary conceptual framework for studies of digitally mediated organization–public dialogue for
two decades. They retain their value as an analytical framework; however, they will benefit
from greater consideration of the shifting digital practices that reflect the evolution of socio-
technical culture as participatory SNSs have become ubiquitous. Rybalko and Seltzer (2010)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

37
argue, for instance, that an organization’s multi-platform repertoire of SNS properties constitute
one greater and extended SNS presence; the deployment of hyperlinks between organizational
SNSs thus can be interpreted under the “rule of conservation of visitors” principle. Indeed, the
use of hyperlinks—“connective devices that allow users to direct each other in digital spaces
while also demonstrating their own interests in specific types of content” (Holton, Baek,
Coddington, & Yaschur, 2014, p. 33)—is one of the central distinguishing features of online
communication (Gulbrandsen & Just, 2011). Deen Freelon (2014) conducts a meta-analysis of
studies incorporating digital trace data and finds a consensus among communication scholars that
hyperlinking has social functions, the most commonly cited of which are self-expression, the
establishment of credibility and the provision of additional information. One cannot ascribe to
digital diplomacy actors a priori a desire for self-expression or the attempt to build credibility.
However, it seems logical that the inclusion of hyperlinks—to pages outside a given SNS
especially—is an attempt to provide publics with further or background information. It is
therefore argued here that such extra-SNS hyperlinking practices fit under the “usefulness of
information” principle.
Retweeting, or the posting of another user’s tweet to one’s own Twitter followers, is
another quotidian but socially significant digital practice. Freelon (2014) finds little agreement
among communication scholars with regard to motives for retweeting, outside the main function
of spreading content to audiences. However, several scholars note that re-tweets signal an
importance or authority placed upon the re-tweeted account (Larsson & Moe, 2012; Ausserhofer
& Maireder, 2013; both cited in Freelon, 2014). Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) observe that in
addition to the amplification of others’ voices, retweets can start conversations and may signal
that one is listening (citing boyd, Golder, & Lotan, 2010; both cited in Freelon, 2014). These are
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

38
dialogic qualities; it therefore argued that the retweeting of an unaffiliated individual Twitter
user by a digital diplomacy actor fits under the principle of “dialogic loop.”
Hashtags, designated by the symbol “#”, are keywords that users assign to content in
posts or tweets that describe the content and aide in searching (Small, 2011). Hashtags are not
native to any platform or SNS, but a convention that grew out of the digital communication
surrounding the forest fires that occurred in San Diego, California in 2007 (Small, 2011).
Hashtagging also serves to organize users’ discussions around specific events or topics (Fitton et
al., 2009, cited in Small, 2011). Moreover, hashtags are visible to any and all users, as
hashtagged posts or tweets can be viewed by a larger audience than one’s own followers (Small,
2011). Hashtags are also searchable through SNSs like Twitter, search engines like Google and
trending sites like hashtag.org (Small, 2011). The use of hashtags therefore serves not only an
organizing function, but also an amplification function as they enable content to be read by
audiences not restricted to a given account’s followers. Hashtags used in digital diplomacy
could be interpretable under the “generation of return visits” principle if the hashtags
disseminated are unique to the public diplomacy actor or to that actor’s sponsoring government.
However, some hashtags included in digital diplomacy are not originated by that actor and are
used by other types of organizations or entities unaffiliated with the public diplomacy actor. It is
therefore argued that the use of hashtags in digital diplomacy fits under the “usefulness of
information” principle, as the organizing function of hashtags promotes publics’ access to other
related and potentially informative content.
Multimedia like photos, images (charts, graphs, graphics, etc.) and videos that are
included in digital diplomacy have also not received sufficient consideration for their dialogic
qualities. Scholars often focus on the role that visuals play in framing processes, as they serve to
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

39
make certain aspects of an issue salient to the viewer (e.g. Borah, 2009; Seo & Ebrahim, 2016).
However, in digital diplomacy, the inclusion of multimedia often serves an informational
function: they provide background information on policies, initiatives or state visits and help
explain accomplishments, policy changes and shifting strategic priorities. Kampf et al. (2015)
place the dissemination of multimedia in digital diplomacy under the principle of “generating
return visits.” However, it is argued here that the inclusion of multimedia by public diplomacy
actors fits under the “usefulness of information” principle, due to the rich background
information frequently provided in explanatory and justificatory videos, photos and images.
Differentiating digital diplomacy actors. Most comparative studies of digital diplomacy
do not distinguish between types of international actors prior to analysis (e.g. Kampf et al., 2015;
Cha et al., 2014; Strauß et al., 2015; Hayden, Waisanen, & Osipova, 2013; Dodd & Collins,
2017; Collins & Bekenova, 2018).
10
This is notably the case with regard to both the actors’
organizational stances on digital strategy and their guiding missions in establishing practices like
dialogue. For example, Kampf et al. (2015) identify and compare the dialogic communication in
the digital output of eleven MFAs (listed above). These MFAs represent a wide range of nations
from the developed and developing world; however, little attention is paid to the manner in
which differences in mission statements or in institutional attitudes toward digital media might
influence the output disseminated. Similarly, Cha et al. (2014) and Bjola and Jiang (2015)
examine the dialogic content in the digital diplomacy of embassies and other entities, all
presented as aggregated instances of the same type of international actor. These studies all
utilize valuable research designs; however, it is useful to establish the perspective that a wide and

10
Dodd and Collins (2017) do distinguish between the Twitter accounts of Western embassies and those of central
and eastern European countries. They find that the Western embassies disseminated more policy or position
advocacy via Twitter, while the central and eastern European countries disseminated more cultural diplomacy;
however, the differences are discussed post-hoc.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

40
disparate range of digital diplomacy actors, with varying attitudes toward new technologies and
various perspectives on embracing participatory digital culture, has established a presence on
SNSs.
Differentiating organizations by attitudes toward participatory digital culture and
embrace of technological risk. In fact, foreign relations and public diplomacy bureaucracies
exhibit widely varied attitudes toward digital communication and culture, digital strategy, and
the willingness to embrace technological risk. Cull (2013) has shown, for example, that public
diplomacy in the U.S. has historically and consistently been vertical or hierarchical in nature
rather than horizontal through the encouragement of two-way practices such as listening or
dialogue. Indeed, advocacy, or the pushing out of messages in a hierarchical communication
format, has always been the default setting for U.S. public diplomacy (Cull, 2013). In addition,
U.S. technology-based public diplomacy has been risk averse, notably since the United States
Information Agency (USIA), the sole government agency dedicated to public diplomacy, was
merged into the DOS in 1999. While the USIA was receptive to innovation and valued the
maintenance and expansion of communication networks, the DOS has shown a stubborn
preference for hierarchical communication initiatives like broadcasting and advocacy, despite the
emergence of participatory technologies that facilitate listening, dialogue and other aspects of
mutuality (Cull, 213). For Cull, the “long road to public diplomacy 2.0” in the U.S. thus stems
more from “the priorities and prejudices of the bureaucracy” than from the dynamics that inhere
in digital media or the cultures that develop around them (p. 126). As a result, the U.S. has
lagged behind other nations both in the adoption of new technologies and the entrenchment of a
corresponding shift in bureaucratic culture and stance with regard to digital media (Cull, 2013).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

41
There is an important distinction to be made between a foreign affairs bureaucracy that
implements numerous digital media tools or widespread digitization in public diplomacy and a
bureaucracy that embraces participatory digital culture and installs a corresponding digital
diplomacy strategy. Murray (2015) argues that the U.S. is a prominent example of a digital
“have” state and even a digital hegemon because of its ability to exploit the digital revolution for
use in international relations and because information gathering and dissemination is the “base
currency” of U.S. public diplomacy (p. 129–130). For Murray, the U.S. as a digital “have” state
demonstrates the argument that digital media “change how states do diplomacy, but not what it is
or why they do it” (p. 141, emphasis in original). In this view, the U.S. successfully employs
Internet-based media in public diplomacy because these media are utilized to respond in a
proactive, public and dynamic manner; they create new opportunities for untraditional diplomats
like the Virtual Student Foreign Service; they enhance knowledge management and interagency
cooperation; they reduce the cost of diplomacy while increasing its speed; and because digital
media amplify the messages disseminated by public diplomats and other international actors
(Murray, 2015). These qualities, while likely beneficial to strategic goals, are consistent with a
hierarchical approach to public and digital diplomacy; such an approach is likely to be
characterized by close control of initiatives and may result in one-way communication in which
dialogue with publics is not prioritized, despite the increasing presence of information and
digitization in the bureaucracy.
In contrast, there are international actors whose initiatives do display a willingness to
reassess what public diplomacy in a digital context is or should be and why it should be done, in
addition to how public diplomacy is conducted. These are the actors that can be expected to
adopt a digital communication strategy—for example, engaging in frequent and fulsome
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

42
dialogue with publics—that displays fluency with digital culture and a willingness to embrace
risk. Sweden, whose public diplomacy can be characterized by innovative uses of digital media
that are embedded in established conventions and institutional priorities, may be one such
international actor. Pamment (2012) observes that a watershed moment in the evolution of
Swedish public diplomacy came in 2007, when the Ministry for Foreign Affairs announced a
significant repositioning of Sweden’s brand identity following a two-year consultation with key
stakeholders. The nationally televised announcement of “Brand Sweden” highlighted the values
associated with four words: innovation, caring, authentic and open. These concepts furthermore
came to comprise the ideological foundation on which Sweden’s various contemporary
promotional activities are built (Pamment, 2012). For Pamment (2012), these values are
consistent with the tenets of the “new” public diplomacy; they also align with theorizing on
participatory online culture and the qualities that strategic communicators will need to display if
they are to establish credibility in digital spaces (e.g. Jenkins et al., 2013). “Brand Sweden” and
other institutional efforts to become more responsive and adaptive to change, in addition to the
Swedish public’s expectations of digital acumen and innovativeness in the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, have made Sweden a trailblazer in digital diplomacy and leader among nations in
understanding digital culture (Pelling, 2015). Perhaps most important, the ministry views itself
not as the sole sender or source of information in public diplomacy, but as one part of a larger
digital network in which an informal and collaborative approach may often be needed (Pelling,
2015). As Jon Pelling (2015), currently Special Advisor for Strategic Communications at the
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Swedish MFA), observes about the nation’s digital
diplomacy: “Rather than being a top down sender, the ministry can act as a node or an
overlapping network, taking part in a process together with others” (p. 175). Sweden’s foreign
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

43
relations and public diplomacy bureaucracy can therefore be interpreted as an exemplar of an
organization that embraces participatory digital culture and effects digital initiatives that reflect
such understanding. For example, in 2007 Sweden was the first nation to open a virtual embassy
in the game world of Second Life (“Sweden First to Open,” 2007). This “Second House of
Sweden” was modeled after the House of Sweden, located in Washington, DC, and remained
open until 2012 (Peterson, 2013). Swedish digital diplomacy has also drawn attention for its
nearly seven-year-long “Curators of Sweden” initiative, wherein the Swedish Institute
transferred one of its official Twitter accounts to a different Swede each week and allowed that
person to tweet freely on behalf of the nation (Curators of Sweden, n.d.). One more example is
the 2014 Stockholm Initiative for Digital Diplomacy, the first international meeting dedicated to
digital diplomacy, which was intended to disrupt as much as reflect the field and was specifically
tasked with understanding diplomacy through the lens of a spreading culture of digital
participation (Pelling, 2015).
Other countries, particularly in the developing world, exhibit an enthusiastic but recent
embrace of digital diplomacy. In such nations, the organizational attitudes and norms that guide
the foreign relations and public diplomacy bureaucracies in the use of digital media are unclear.
India, for example, is a fast-progressing nation that has rapidly expanded its digital outreach
despite a modest budget for public diplomacy relative to those of developed nations (Chaudhury,
2016). In 2016, the audience of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (Indian MEA) across
SNSs exceeded four million followers: its two Twitter accounts garnered more than 1.2 million
followers, while the ministry’s Facebook followers alone numbered 1.2 million, second only to
those of the U.S. DOS in terms of MFAs (Chaudhury, 2016). Yet India’s digital diplomacy has
only recently expanded, and its philosophical underpinnings with regard to digital strategy and
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

44
the undertaking of technological risk have rarely, if ever, been systematically investigated.
Natarajan (2014) concentrates his analysis on the strategic narratives conveyed through India’s
digital diplomacy but nevertheless observes an online communication style similar to a “news
wire of sorts”, despite a goal of facilitating more interaction between India’s foreign relations
apparatus and its audiences (p. 96). In addition, India has lagged behind many Asian countries in
social media and SNS adoption. Recent data show that as of January 2018, only 19% of Indians
actively use the most popular social medium in the nation. This is compared, for example, to
65% of Chinese or 49% of Indonesians who actively use their nations’ most popular social sites
(Kemp, 2018). On the one hand, these penetration data could signal a relative and widespread
lack of Indian fluency with digital culture and with innovative digital strategy, as well as a
rudimentary knowledge of the expectations and credibility assessments of online audiences. On
the other hand, the concerted Indian effort to make inroads in digital diplomacy may engender
digital strategies that reflect a nuanced understanding and enthusiastic embrace of participatory
digital culture. India, then, can be considered an exemplar of a fast-developing nation whose
organizational attitudes toward participatory digital culture and the embracing of technological
risk in public and digital diplomacy are unclear.
In sum, the cases of the U.S. DOS (a technologically risk averse actor which may be
reluctant to embrace participatory digital culture), the Swedish MFA (a technologically risk
welcoming actor which embraces participatory digital culture), and the Indian MEA (a rising
digital diplomacy actor whose organizational stances toward technological risk and participatory
digital culture are unknown) support the assertion that digital strategies like the inclusion or
exclusion of dialogic communication with publics may evince unique and entrenched
institutional norms rather than impromptu or ad hoc content choices.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

45
Differentiating organizations by guiding mission with regard to dialogue. The current
range of digital diplomacy actors also includes government organizations specifically tasked
with establishing conversation or dialogue with publics, in addition to entities like MFAs,
embassies and diplomats. This is a consideration that has not been previously explored in the
literature. For example, this study identifies and investigates three state-funded organizations
whose explicit or implicit missions are to engage and establish conversation with publics; that is,
their missions are distinct from those of the MFAs of the same nation and are ostensibly rooted
in the desire to facilitate conversation with publics. For instance, at the time of writing the U.S.-
funded ShareAmerica digital property, which includes a website (https://share.america.gov/),
Twitter account (https://twitter.com/shareamerica) and Facebook page
(https://www.facebook.com/ShareAmerica/), describes itself on Twitter thusly: “a global
conversation about U.S. policy and culture, and is moderated by the U.S. DOS. Share your
voice!” (ShareAmerica, n.d.).
11
The government-funded Indian Diplomacy property, which
includes a Twitter page (https://twitter.com/IndianDiplomacy) and YouTube channel
(https://www.youtube.com/user/Indiandiplomacy), describes its mission on Twitter as
“Engagement through #digitaldiplomacy” (Indian Diplomacy, n.d.). This mission and
description appears to align with Kampf et al.’s (2015) definition of digital diplomacy and the
foregrounding of conversation previously discussed.
12
Similarly, the Sweden.se property, which
includes a Twitter account (https://twitter.com/swedense), website (https://sweden.se/), Facebook
page (https://www.facebook.com/swedense/), YouTube channel
(https://www.youtube.com/user/Sweden) and the “Curators of Sweden” initiative

11
The U.S. DOS, by contrast, introduces its Twitter page (https://twitter.com/StateDept) with only the following:
“Welcome to the official U.S. DOS Twitter account!” (Department of State, n.d.).
12
In comparison, at the time of writing the description on the Twitter page of Indian MEA
(https://twitter.com/MEAIndia), on whose behalf the official spokesperson Vikas Swarup tweets, states only:
“Official Spokesperson, Ministry of External Affairs, India” (Vikas Swarup, n.d.).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

46
(https://twitter.com/sweden), provides the following description on Twitter: “Hej! Welcome to
Sweden's official account on Twitter. | Managed by the sweden.se team and a moose at
@Sweinstitute” (Sweden.se, n.d.). This description does not mention explicitly a mission to
engage in conversation; however, the description is clearly presented in a conversational and
humorous style.
13
These three properties—ShareAmerica, Indian Diplomacy and Sweden.se—
are also interpretable as cultural diplomacy organizations whose encouragement of dialogue is
often centered on these nations’ cultural resources and initiatives.
This study therefore has three main goals in conceptualizing digital diplomacy’s “first
face” as dialogic public diplomacy. The first is to classify the digital diplomacy considered
according to type of public diplomacy, using Cull’s (2008a) taxonomy of activities. The second
is to build on the concept of dialogic communication as manifest in digital diplomacy by
updating its operationalization to reflect contemporary socio-technical culture. This is
accomplished by incorporating the quotidian but socially significant practices of hyperlinking,
retweeting, hashtagging, and the use of multimedia. Finally, this study aims to differentiate the
international actors whose digital diplomacy and dialogic communication are subject to
empirical investigation. This is undertaken by investigating international actors whose
institutional views, norms and practices relating to participatory digital culture and the embrace
of technological risk are expected to differ. The differentiation of international actors is also
accomplished through the consideration of disparate digital diplomacy organizations that are
guided by varied missions with regard to engaging in dialogue or conversation with publics.

13
The Swedish MFA, by contrast, previews its Twitter account (https://twitter.com/SweMFA) as follows: “MFA
Communications Department, Stockholm. Developing #DigitalDiplomacy,” followed by a list of high-level
ministers (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, n.d.).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

47

III. The “Second Face” of Digital Diplomacy: Space for User Motives

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

48
Digital Diplomacy From the Perspective of Participating Publics

Scholars have rarely placed the participating publics at the center of their investigations
of digital diplomacy. Most studies, such as those highlighted in the previous chapter (Kampf et
al., 2015; Manor, 2017; Bjola & Jiang, 2015; Cha et al., 2014), foreground the strategies
implemented and the content disseminated by the representatives of the nation-state as
international actor. From one perspective, this is an unsurprising and pragmatic approach. The
academic field of public diplomacy is inextricably tied to the practice of public diplomacy; in the
absence of initiatives, whether digital or offline, that are funded and enacted by international
actors like nation-states, there would be no lines of inquiry for scholars to pursue. An abiding
concern over practice and professional relevance thus pervades the scholarship of public
diplomacy, potentially engendering both beneficial and intellectually deleterious outcomes. For
instance, public diplomacy researchers may derive utility from their work finding audiences
beyond academe and potentially influencing the views or actions of practitioners and strategists.
However, the countenancing of practitioner agendas and priorities may also delimit the
boundaries of intellectual debate; this might, for example, bear responsibility for a paucity of
critical inquiry into public diplomacy theories, processes and practices (see Comor & Bean,
2012; Bially Mattern, 2005; and Dutta-Bergman, 2006 for more on critical approaches). A
second reason for scholars’ preoccupation with the perspective of the facilitating international
actor is rooted in the very essence of strategic communication, both as theory and as practice.
All strategic communication phenomena at their core involve deliberate activities that help a
given organization achieve its mission (Hallahan et al., 2007). As Pamment (2016) and others
(e.g. Gilboa, 2008; Brown, 2013) remind, in the final analysis public diplomacy is an objective-
driven endeavor. The investigation and assessment of an organization’s purposeful activities, in
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

49
pursuit of new knowledge and the shaping of more effective practice, are thus logical scholarly
foci in relation to all strategic communication formats, public and digital diplomacy included.
When the participating publics are considered, it is therefore predominantly in the context
of the manner in which international actors engage them—the actions and reactions that are
theorized to produce strategic advantage for the digital diplomacy actor. A growing corpus of
empirical literature on digital diplomacy thus features practitioner-focused studies guided by
theoretical frameworks like crisis communication and narrative (Mazumdar, 2012); strategic
narrative in the international system (Natarajan, 2014); computer-mediated communication
theories of effective messaging strategy (Strauß et al., 2015); agenda-building and national self-
presentations (Collins & Bekenova, 2018; Kretschmer, 2017); and public relations frameworks
like messaging strategy (Dodd & Collins, 2017), dialogic theory (Kampf et al., 2015; Manor,
2017) and relationship cultivation (Manor, 2017; Metzgar & Lu, 2015).
The Transformation of the Communication Landscape and Empowerment of Publics
The nature of publics’ participation in the communicative spaces facilitated by digital
diplomacy has therefore been largely neglected in the literature. From another perspective that
foregrounds the evolution of the communication system and the corresponding changes in socio-
technical dynamics, this is a conspicuous and troubling lacuna that represents an inadequate
response to the fundamental shifts that have occurred in the communication landscape over the
last several decades.
According to Castells (2013), four key transformations mark and distinguish the Internet
Age, together constituting what some regard as a “communication revolution” (Mansell, 2002;
McChesney, 2007; both cited in Castells, 2013). The first is a technological transformation in
which digitization and advancements in computing and software have given rise to the presence
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

50
of ubiquitous, increasingly Internet-based communication networks. Networks are sets of
interconnected nodes whose relative importance is derived from their ability to contribute to the
overall effectiveness of the network in achieving its goals, as defined by the interests and values
programmed into the network (Castells, 2013). The second transformation is an organizational
and structural shift that was precipitated by economic liberalization, deregulation and
privatization. This has resulted in the growth of global multimedia business networks—the
largest of which are currently Comcast (which includes NBCUniversal), Disney, News
Corporation, Warner Media (formerly Time Warner and now owned by AT&T), CBS (now
merged with Viacom) and Bertelsmann—whose subsidiaries, partnerships and interests are
closely intertwined with the largest diversified computer and Internet companies, Microsoft,
Google, Apple and Yahoo! (Castells, 2013). These global multimedia business networks
furthermore remain viable by prioritizing the cultural identifications of their audiences and by
segmenting, customizing and diversifying their media markets. The third transformation is
cultural and lies at the intersection of two parallel trends: the rise of various group identities in
the face of the growth and spread of a discernable global culture. Regional, ethnic, national and
religious dimensions are frequent drivers of the formation or maintenance of specific group
identities. In contrast, a global culture is derived from factors like cosmopolitanism, or the belief
in a shared destiny by individuals who envision themselves as citizens of the world (Castells,
2013, citing Beck, 2005). This emergent global culture also originates from the hybridization
and remixing of cultural artifacts such as music genres, and from a global culture of
consumerism through omnipresent commodification that results in the presence of shared market
values. The fourth transformation is a product of the first three: the expression of particular
social and ultimately power relationships that undergird the evolution of the contemporary
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

51
communication system. Business interests, for example, have swelled as a result of the structural
and organization transformation of the communication system, supplying multimedia business
networks with relative power and the increasing ability to commodify digital output like user
data. Another shifting power relationship is evident in the attempts of governments to restrict
citizens’ access to communication networks, utilize these networks to surveil their citizens or
otherwise enact policies that inhibit or influence the ability of various entities to utilize the
communication system (for example, see Morozov, 2011).
Embedded within these societal transformations, two crucial developments in particular
have amplified the communication capacity of ordinary citizens. First, participatory capabilities
resulting from “Web 2.0” technological developments—advancements in computer graphics and
interface, greater broadband capacity and accessible open-source software, for example—enable
global citizens to create and publish content themselves, as well as share, repurpose and
republish the content of others (Castells, 2013; Jenkins et al., 2013). This “mass self-
communication” capacity of publics (Castells, 2013, p. 65) is most notably realized by SNSs and
by hybrid social–video-sharing sites like YouTube, the second most visited site in the world
according to data from 2017 (Gray, 2017). This is due in part to SNSs’ singular incorporation of
the multiple modality, agency, interactivity and navigability affordances that distinguish digital
media (Sundar & Limperos, 2013), as described in the previous chapter. Social network sites
also facilitate the mass self-communication capability of publics through their user-friendly
interfaces, functionality across types of Internet-connected devices, free distribution model and
widespread global availability. The second and related development is the surge in interpersonal
connectivity that is also afforded by the growth of Web 2.0 applications, devices and
technologies and the digital social spaces they engender (Castells, 2013; Ellison & boyd, 2013;
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

52
Dindar & Yaman, 2018). Networked digital sociality was once limited to specialized, interest-
based communities like listservs and newsgroups (Ellison & boyd, 2013); however, the tools of
the contemporary media environment give publics the ability to engage in theoretically unlimited
digitally mediated interpersonal communication that is unrestricted by time or by space (Baym,
2015).
An additional and unprecedented, publics-centered shift in power relations thus also
undergirds the evolution of the contemporary information system: global citizens are empowered
to use Internet-based media like SNSs proactively and to express their individual or group
agendas. As Castells (2013) observes, “social actors and individual citizens around the world are
using the new capacity of communication networking to advance their projects, to defend their
interests, and to assert their values” (p. 57, citing Downing, 2000; Juris, 2008).
Power, agency and networked individuals. Castells (2013) conceptualizes power in
contemporary society as originating from two sources. The first is “switching” power, or the
capacity to generate exchange value in a network or networks (p. 52). Money and bartering in
the form of the exchange of network-based services, for example, are common forms of
exchange value. The second source of power is “programming” capacity, or the “ability to
generate, diffuse and affect the discourses that frame human action” (p. 53). Crucially,
programming capacity—and therefore power—is effected through the communication that takes
place in increasingly digital networks, which are not the sole domain of the state or of global
multimedia business networks. Individuals also possess the capability of exerting power through
their ability to program or contribute to the programming of ubiquitous digital communication
networks. A similar logic applies to Benkler’s (2011) concept of network power, in which
power is construed as the ability of one node to influence another node in its configuration,
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

53
behavior or outcomes, and freedom in a network is the capacity of an individual or entity to
affect its own behavior. The widely available digital tools of the current communication
environment give publics the ability to influence the behavior of other nodes and potentially
shape outcomes, in addition to determine—at least in part—their own behavior. Publics thus
join other entities in the possession of varying degrees of Internet-based network power and
network freedom.
Peter van Ham (2010) employs the concept of “social power” to analyze the evolution of
power in the context of international politics. Social power is “the ability to set standards, and
create norms and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable, without resorting to coercion
or payment” (p. 8). Social power is similar to soft power in that it foregrounds influence in the
international system that is derived from ideas, opinions, values and the discursive practices
through which they are communicated, instead of from coercive means. However, this concept
can be viewed as surpassing soft power because in specifying framing processes and the
uploading of norms, social power attempts to provide the communicative mechanisms through
which influence and persuasion are potentially achieved (Van Ham, 2010). It follows that the
concept of social power allows consideration of a broader range of actors who can possess power
in the international system than does soft power; non-state actors like non-governmental
organizations, media sources, celebrities, and individuals also have the capacity to shape the
framing of political issues and events and to upload norms that are propagated especially in
digital spaces. Social power was on display, for example, in the June 2018 worldwide response
to the widely aired and circulated footage of caged migrant children who were separated from
their families at the Texas border with Mexico, part of U.S. president Donald Trump’s “zero
tolerance” policy of prosecuting all persons entering illegally the United States. On June 20,
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

54
about three weeks after the images and footage were made public, President Trump signed an
executive order intended to end the separation of families by detaining together whole families at
the border. The rapid policy reversal was caused in substantial part by media coverage and the
resultant public outcry and political pressure; as President Trump said upon signing the order, “I
didn’t like the sight or the feeling of families being separated” (Shear, Goodnough, & Haberman,
2018). The efforts of activists and celebrities, as well as social media advocacy organized
through hashtags like #Familiesbelongtogether, may have also played a significant role (Shear et
al., 2018; #Familiesbelongtogether, 2018). The #Familiesbelongtogether hashtag and other
similar trace data not only helped to organize and mobilize protest, but also served the additional
function of framing the migrant issue as a human rights priority. Indeed, Van Ham views digital
media as particularly potent sites for social power, as their use uniquely builds confidence and
ultimately trust and authority among participants. This makes digital diplomacy a central vehicle
for the accrual or exertion of social power, both because public diplomacy is dependent upon and
rooted in communicative processes such as framing, and because the use of digital media
uniquely increases public trust and confidence. Ultimately, the rise of social power
simultaneously disrupts and provides novel opportunities in international politics, as digitally-
connected citizens join state actors and other entities in possessing the ability to influence
political processes and outcomes.
Communication technology scholars often conceptualize the empowerment of users as
individual-level agency and focus their analyses on specific communication technologies (e.g.
Berg, 2012). Individual-level agency is manifest in SNSs through matters like the various kinds
of actions and interactions in which users engage, the benefits they might experience through this
activity, and the manner in which the performance of a range of activities is mediated by SNSs
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

55
(Berg, 2012). For example, communication technology scholars widely agree that in the vast
majority of cases people use SNSs to maintain relationships, particularly those with personal
friends, instead of to form new ones (Baym, 2015; Ellison, Vitak, Gray, & Lampe, 2014;
Madden et al., 2013). Most people never interact at all with the vast majority of their contacts;
these weak-tie relationships endure precisely because they exist offline prior to their digital
instantiation (Baym, 2015). On a macro level, public diplomacy can be construed as a kind of
relationship maintenance between countries (Brown, 2013). However, individual publics will
very seldom have formed offline relationships with international actors prior to the digital
interaction. Therefore, viewing digital diplomacy through the lens of individual-level agency
raises pressing questions about the feasibility of a relational framework for digital diplomacy.
The individual-level agency approach to digital medial usage has been criticized by a minority of
scholars who concentrate on system-level agency and emphasize back-end mechanisms like
algorithms and interfaces, whose designs and uses are rooted in the profit motives and economic
forces associated with privatized communication technologies like SNSs (Fuchs, 2008, 2010;
Gehl, 2011; Berg, 2012). These are important critical perspectives; however, Castells (2013)
makes a keen observation: social sites like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube may be for-profit
enterprises or subsidiaries, yet the services they are selling and popularizing are sociality that is
self-determined and the ability to express oneself freely.
The central point in considering these perspectives on contemporary manifestations of
power and agency is that the transformation of the communication environment in the Internet
Age has resulted in the ability of networked citizens to join other entities in accruing, displaying
and utilizing power. This capacity may be manifest in everyday, relational uses of social online
media like SNSs; it may also be manifest in international political discourses or in the
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

56
communicative spaces engendered by digital diplomacy. Indeed, Cull (2011) has recognized this
capability of citizens specifically in the historical context of public diplomacy, observing that
digital media have made publics “inherently more powerful than they have been at any time in
history, more especially when they connect across networks” (p. 6).
Previous Studies That Foreground the Participating Publics
A few digital diplomacy scholars have recognized explicitly or implicitly these socio-
technical transformations and conduct empirical investigations that do foreground the
perspective of participating publics. Hayden et al. (2013) utilize an inductive, rhetorical
approach to examine the manner in which users responded to U.S. embassy Facebook posts
relating to the 2012 reelection of Barack Obama and published in the three days during and
immediately after the election. These authors characterize the publics’ comments in response to
the Cairo, Dhaka and Islamabad embassy Facebook posts as judgments and claims often lacking
the provision of evidence. The comments, most of which exhibited supported for the U.S., more
closely resembled the epideictic genre of argumentation rather than the deliberative or forensic
genres. Epideictic is ceremonial and usually associated with memorialization and celebration.
Deliberative argumentation considers the future and typifies the debate in policy and legislative
fora, while forensic argumentation presents and analyzes past occurrences and is often found in
settings like courtrooms (Aristotle, 2007, cited in Hayden et al., 2013). Hayden et al. link the
nature of the public Facebook comments to the affordances of the medium itself; they speculate
that the performative aspect of the comments may be rooted in and inseparable from the
performative nature of Facebook as a SNS—a crucial emphasis on the norms and practices that
inhere in digital media and receive little attention in the digital diplomacy literature.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

57
Seo (2013) investigates the relational perceptions of members of the Café USA online
community, an initiative launched in 2004 by the U.S. Embassy in Seoul to “forge interactive
communication between the U.S. government and South Koreans” (p. 163). The Korean- and
English-language forum featured chat groups, was hosted on South Korean servers and at the
time of the author’s writing had roughly 11,000 online members. Seo’s interviews with some 60
public participants yielded three broad relationship perspectives. The first and most prominent
was “sincerity based” and emphasized trust, fairness, sincerity and mutual understanding over
the provision of opportunities or success. The second relationship perspective was “outcome
based” and focused on the supplying of opportunities by the United States. The third was
“access based” and stressed information sharing, for example with regard to U.S. policies and
governance (p. 164). For Seo, the most important finding was that the “sincerity based” group—
the largest in the study—placed more emphasis on U.S. commitment to building relationships
with South Koreans than did the other groups. The implication for digital diplomats is that they
may need to communicate clearly their sincere commitment to relationship building in digital
spaces if they are to find success there (Seo, 2013). A second notable finding was that country-
and culture-specific factors may also influence significantly the manner in which publics view
digital diplomacy.
Storie (2015) concentrates on the “lost publics in public diplomacy,” employing the
antecedent stage of organization–public relationship management theory as reasons for publics to
enter into relationships with foreign governments, instead of the usual approach that investigates
the reasons of the organization for entering into relationships with citizens. This author conducts
four focus groups and two in-depth interviews with Emirati young women to investigate their
views on engaging with foreign governments via digital and social media. Results indicate three
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

58
main antecedents among the Emirati women. First, collective perceptions of the image of a
country were paramount: participants seemed uninterested or unwilling to engage with
governments they believed held negative images of their own societies. Second, perceived
cultural similarities and norms were important factors. For example, participants welcomed
linguistic and cultural proximity in the form of communicating in Arabic, even though they also
spoke English. Finally, political online security affected the willingness of respondents to
engage: participants were hesitant to communicate online with governments because they feared
reprisal and surveillance. This fear likely stemmed from a restrictive digital regulatory climate
in the United Arab Emirates (Storie, 2015). Storie concludes that digital diplomacy actors need
to incorporate culturally congruent messaging and cultural values into their communication,
including interacting in the publics’ native languages.
Pamment (2016) does not investigate digital diplomacy strictly from the perspective of
the public interlocutors, but endeavors to place participatory culture at the forefront of public
diplomacy analysis. This is accomplished through an original theoretical marrying of transmedia
storytelling, participatory digital culture, surveillance concepts and diplomatic studies to analyze
the British public diplomacy initiative Campaign to End Sexual Violence in Conflict. This was a
multi-modal advocacy campaign that was led by former foreign secretary William Hague and
featured an array of stakeholders, including government representatives, NGOs, faith leaders,
key citizens, and thought-leaders like celebrity advocate Angelina Jolie. The initiative ran from
2012 to 2014 and “sought to establish new international norms regarding how both perpetrators
and victims of sexual violence in fragile states are treated” (p. 2047). Transmedia storytelling is
the use of multiple content types across multiple media formats (Jenkins, 2006). According to
Pamment, this framework can be applied to the campaign as it utilized multilateral diplomacy,
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

59
off-line events like summits and cultural events, as well as SNSs Instagram, Tumblr, Twitter and
YouTube. Three emergent themes resulted from the case study. First, there was the presence of
digitization and convergence, characterized by the re-utilization of campaign content across
SNSs and the presence of multiple narratives instead of one original campaign narrative.
Second, the multifaceted digital campaign led to a culture of monitoring in which all
stakeholders enforced shared norms upon one another. Finally, the multi-modal campaign was
characterized by co-creation among the relevant stakeholders. In addition to the government and
NGO representatives, these stakeholder co-authors included members of the public who were
victims of or had personal connections to sexual violence. For Pamment, diplomacy thus faces
the same pressures of digital convergence that do other media industries: participatory digital
culture and the shifting practices, norms, perceptions and expectations that accompany it.
Pamment employs the case study to argue further that while participation in the campaign
reflects empowerment, it also contributes to “complicit surveillance and self discipline” in the
form of ongoing, real-time monitoring of publics and other stakeholders (p. 2050, citing
Andrejevic, 2004; Christensen & Jansson, 2014; Goldberg, 2011). This occurred because the
digital diplomacy campaign was an ostensibly transparent process whose assets were shared and
in turn provided the necessary mechanisms for monitoring the co-producers. The key point in
this respect is that the campaign did not follow the traditional template of an individual actor
gauging the environment and then advocating a policy or preference; instead, the initiative was
“designed to be internalized as values and norms, and the co-creators and co-monitors of the
campaign utilize their collective intelligence to keep each other in check” (p. 2058). Pamment
concludes that this campaign marks a shift from listening to publics and thought-leaders to co-
creation and surveillance; it thus embodies a new public diplomacy model whose core is an
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

60
approach that is rooted in media and communication resource integration. This study is
significant because of its contributions to theory-building, most notably in the application of
participatory digital culture and transmedia storytelling to public diplomacy. The Campaign to
End Sexual Violence in Conflict is also shown to instantiate, at least in part, the theorized
potential of digital diplomacy to advance mutually beneficially agendas and goals that are shared
by both practitioners and publics (e.g. Fisher, 2008).
Two observations and a useful conclusion can be drawn from these early and important
publics-centered studies of digital diplomacy. First, several discernable norms and routines were
observed in the digital social spaces considered. Some reflected the affordances and constraints
of the media and the cultural dynamics that are routinized in—and perhaps intrinsic to—
particular SNSs; others were created or internalized and enforced by specific communities that
participated in or co-authored the particular campaign. Second, many of the publics considered
appeared to expect or demand authenticity from, and cultural congruence with, those entities that
would engage them in digital spaces. These observations imply that credibility and therefore
success in digital diplomacy may be contingent upon achieving perceived fluency with the norms
and practices that guide a given digital community, in addition to publics’ judgments of the
unambiguous presence of authenticity, sincerity and sufficient cultural nuance.
Theorizing Publics as Empowered Participants in Digital Diplomacy

The conclusion drawn from these publics-centered studies thus supports the position
suggested above: a facilitative theoretical framework for digital diplomacy must also incorporate
the empowerment of digital publics and their resultant agendas, norms and behaviors as manifest
in digital networks. This position is consistent with Singh’s (2015) argument that the most
useful conceptualization of digital diplomacy may be that which understands power as embedded
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

61
in and resulting from social processes that constitute the interests and identities of actors,
including publics. Singh (2015) observes:
Literally in a fast changing world of digital diplomacy and communication networks,
taking the underlying context to be unchanged is myopic, to say the least. With such
lenses, we do not see that actors other than nation states might be practicing diplomacy or
that the issue means something quite different to them than what it does to state actors (p.
189, emphasis in original).
Indeed, the recognition that empowered Internet-connected global citizens possess individual-
level agency due to the transformation and current configuration of the communication system
begs a fundamental question that, somewhat surprisingly, has not been heretofore addressed:
what motives do publics have for self-selecting into and participating in the communicative
spaces facilitated by digital diplomacy?
Extant theorizing of public and digital diplomacy often centers on the accrual or use of
soft power or, when dialogic engagement or participation is considered, variations of the
Excellence theoretical tradition in public relations, as described in the previous chapter. Such a
shift in conceptual viewpoint to the participating publics therefore represents nothing short of a
radical departure from the current theorizing of public and digital diplomacy. The argument here
is not for abandoning a necessarily evolving practitioner-centered framework—this has been
conceptualized as dialogic public diplomacy in the second chapter of this dissertation—but for
supplementing the commonplace practitioner focus with a conceptualization that places needed
emphasis on the reasons citizens utilize digital media like SNSs to engage with digital diplomacy
actors or initiatives, in addition to the related question of how they make use of these
communicative spaces. The theoretical lens is thus bifurcated so that public users, as well as the
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

62
facilitating international actors and their digital diplomacy texts, are the focus of investigation.
At its essence, such a perspective does not take as given the desire of participating publics to
engage or collaborate with digital diplomacy actors, as most theoretic accounts do (e.g. Fisher,
2008; Cowan & Arsenault, 2008); instead, the motives that drive the participation of publics in
digital diplomacy are viewed as unknown and hence must be discovered through empirical
investigation. Singh (2015) advocates a similar approach, wherein digital diplomats do not
consider relevant cultural practices as “a study of exotic others who must be made legible and
translated through a known set of codes but as emergent phenomena whose codes are not yet
known” (p. 192).
One example of the type of insights that such an approach could yield relates to an image
of former U.S. first lady Michelle Obama, posted to Twitter and U.S. DOS SNSs on May 8,
2014. The image featured Michelle Obama displaying a sign with the hashtag
#Bringbackourgirls, a reference to the 276 Nigerian girls kidnapped by militant group Boko
Haram in April 2014. The posts generated immediate and significant response from public
followers of the social sites (Manor & Segev, 2015). A traditional approach to digital diplomacy
evaluation would assume support for the message, then seek to aggregate and measure the public
engagement through quantifying “likes”, shares and comments. In this instance, however, much
of the immediate response to the posts depicting Michelle Obama evinced a separate agenda:
numerous individuals had taken digital self portraits or “selfies” of themselves holding signs
with the hashtag #Bringbackyourdrones (Manor & Segev, 2015), a reference to the controversial
U.S. policy of sending unmanned drones into sovereign countries to kill suspected terrorists,
intensified under President Barack Obama. Analysis will only capture such insights—in this
case the use of a parodic meme that appropriated the social content of a government figure in
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

63
order to mobilize support for a distinct political agenda—if the digital diplomacy is
conceptualized not just as strategic communication in support of policy-related goals, but also as
communicative spaces in which empowered digital publics express their own, related or
unrelated, agendas that are reflected in motives for participating.
The Motives of Participating Publics: Digital Diplomacy From a Media Studies Perspective
This theoretical shift brings a media studies perspective to public and digital diplomacy
that has seldom been applied to the field (Pamment, 2016). Media studies and effects scholars
have long considered the motives that guide people’s uses of different media. Scholars began
exploring mass media uses and motivations around the same time as functional media effects
research was becoming popularized in the mid twentieth century (Rubin, 2009). These early
perspectives were spurred by the notion that a disproportionate amount of time and effort was
being devoted to whether a specific media effect occurs; a guiding principle for these researchers
was therefore that media objects are best defined not by their effects, but instead by their uses
(Rubin, 2009, citing Klapper, 1963). The key point in this theoretical positioning is that media
use or consumption represents active and deliberate behavior, in which audiences seek content as
guided by their internal motivations, instead of the passive reception of media texts over which
audiences have little control (Daugherty, Eastin, & Bright, 2008, citing Eastin & Daugherty,
2005).
As the communication system has shifted toward the participatory empowerment of
publics through Web 2.0 technologies and as manifest in the growth of UGC, media scholars are
directed toward placing even greater emphasis on understanding why and how people use media,
instead of the traditional focus on theoretical media effects and conceptualizations of the
audience (Daugherty et al., 2008, citing Severin & Tankard, 1992). Sundar and Limperos (2013)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

64
observe that the very concept of media usage “implies volitional action, not simply passive
reception” (p. 505). Indeed, the evolution in rhetoric employed to signify media consumption or
engagement—from “audience” to “active audience” to “user”—demonstrates powerfully this
point (Sundar & Limperos, 2013, p. 505).
Investigating Motives for the Use of Digital Media: Uses and Gratifications Theory
Uses and gratifications theory (UGT), though frequently criticized, is the dominant
framework within media studies that is employed to guide the investigation of motives for using
digital media. The uses and gratifications paradigm originated with research of radio
communication during the mass media era and has been one of the most commonly applied and
influential audience-centered perspectives for more than forty years (Gan, 2018; Hanson,
Haridakis, Cunningham, Sharma, & Ponder, 2010). Uses and gratifications theory was a
watershed conceptualization because it marked a theoretical shift in focus from what media do to
people to what people do with media, specifically with regard to their selection and use of
various mediated communication formats (Klapper, 1963, cited in Hanson et al., 2010; Rubin,
2009). Uses and gratifications theory emphasizes individuals’ active—that is, their motivated,
purposive and goal-directed—selection and use of media and the psychological and social factors
that filter, guide or mediate such behaviors (Rubin, 2009). Psychological and social factors that
influence people’s expectations about media or media content include interpersonal interactions,
the environment and certain predispositions (Rubin, 2009). The basic premise of UGT is that
individuals actively select or adopt specific media to satisfy certain needs, wants or interests;
furthermore, since individuals derive gratifications from engaging with or consuming media,
persistent media use is dependent upon the fulfillment of these sought gratifications (Rubin,
2009; Dindar & Yaman, 2018, citing Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1974; Rubin, 1994). Needs or
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

65
desired gratifications in turn are viewed as reflected in people’s motives for using various media
(Ponder & Haridakis, 2015; Hanson et al., 2010). As such, individual motives for using specific
media have been a fulcrum of uses and gratifications research (Hanson et al., 2010). The
majority of these UGT studies utilize survey methodology and a quantitative approach that
centers on the predictive capacity of various motives or gratifications in relation to the frequency
(e.g. Gan, 2018; Smock, Ellison, Lampe, & Wohn, 2011; Hoffman, Suphan, & Meckel, 2016) or
intensity (e.g. Gan, 2018; Alhabash & Ma, 2017) of media use.
Uses and gratifications research is also considered part of the media effects tradition.
This is because the convergence of social and psychological characteristics and circumstances
like interactive potential, channel availability, personality and social category and relationships,
along with the role of motives for selecting and using media and the choice of particular media
and specific content, is said to produce consequences or effects (Hanson et al., 2010; Rubin,
2009). Such “effects” UGT studies may focus, for example, on matters like the influence of
motives for media use on political behaviors like dogmatism, tolerance and discussion (e.g.
Rathnayake & Winter, 2017; Ponder & Haridakis, 2015). Uses and gratifications theory thus
guides researchers working in either or both of the parallel tracks of uses and effects within the
field of media studies (Rubin, 2009). In addition, some research concentrates solely on the
identification of motives for media use, particularly uses which center on newer media and the
practices associated with them (e.g. Greuling & Kilian, 2014; Mosemghvdlishvili & Jansz, 2013;
Stavros, Meng, Westberg, & Farrelly, 2014).
No studies known to this author apply UGT to public or digital diplomacy. However,
those investigations which apply UGT to SNSs and to citizens’ use of digital media in a political
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

66
context offer relevant insight about the motives that may drive and sustain the active
participation of publics in digital diplomacy.
Uses and gratifications, motives and social network sites. A robust body of literature
has utilized UGT to explore motives for using social media and SNSs in particular. These
studies have concentrated on the SNS MySpace (e.g. Ancu & Cozma, 2009); the professionally-
focused networking site LinkedIn (e.g. Hanson et al., 2010); the friend networking site and social
media platform Facebook (e.g. Alhabash & Ma, 2017; Smock et al., 2011); the hybrid micro-
blog and SNS Twitter (e.g. Liu, Cheng, & Lee, 2010; Dindar & Yaman, 2018); the photo- and
video-sharing SNS Instagram (e.g. Sheldon & Bryant, 2016); the multimedia messaging
application Snapchat (e.g. Utz, Muscanell, & Khalid, 2015); the hybrid video-hosting site and
SNS YouTube (e.g. Khan, 2017; Mosemghvdlishvili & Jansz, 2013); China’s micro-blog Sina
Weibo (e.g. Gan, 2018); and China’s multi-purpose messaging, social media and mobile
payment application WeChat (e.g. Gan, 2018). In addition, several investigations utilize a
comparative approach to identify similarities and differences in the motives or gratifications that
predict usage of various SNSs (e.g. Alhabash & Ma, 2017; Karapanos et al., 2016; Hanson et al.,
2010), while other studies conceptualize social media as a comprehensive media format and do
not differentiate between SNSs (e.g. Whiting & Williams, 2013).
According to Alhabash and Ma (2017), three conclusions can be drawn from past
research of SNSs from the audience- or user-centered perspective of UGT. First, these studies
suggest that there may be certain common and complementary motivations for usage across
SNSs or platforms. For example, Whiting and Williams (2013) conduct 25 in-depth interviews
with individuals of various ages who used “social media” (specific sites or platforms were
undistinguished from one another). These authors utilize prior UGT frameworks (Palmgreen &
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

67
Rayburn, 1979; Korgaonkar & Wolin, 1999; Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000; Ko, Cho, & Roberts,
2005) to identify the following ten uses and gratifications themes, presented in order by
percentage of respondents who provided each motive. Social interaction involved connecting
and keeping in touch with friends and family, chatting with old acquaintances and interacting
with people not regularly seen. Information seeking, which referenced a broad range of topics,
was next, followed by pass the time, especially when bored at work or school. The
entertainment motive involved viewing videos, playing games, listening to music and
experiencing humor and comic relief, including through observing other users. Relaxation
involved the ability to take one’s mind off of things, escape real-world stress and escape from
reality. Expression of thoughts and opinions referenced reacting to others’ content, as well as
criticizing others and “venting”, sometimes anonymously. Communicatory utility involved
giving oneself topics or content to discuss with others, convenience utility as a motive referred to
the convenience of social media use without location or time restraints and information sharing
referenced sharing information about oneself with others. Finally, surveillance or the capacity to
gain knowledge about others was “watching people or things and watching what others are
doing” (p. 367). In a more recent study, Alhabash and Ma (2017) find that college students
utilize equally Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Snapchat to share information. However, the
two highest rated motivations across platforms were convenience and entertainment, and the
entertainment motive was also the strongest predictor of use intensity across all four platforms.
Thus, the use of SNSs because they facilitate sociality, are convenient, provide entertainment and
constitute the preferred tools with which to share information about oneself, appear to be
particularly common motivations across types of SNSs.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

68
A second conclusion from past research is that the features and affordances of particular
SNSs also engender unique sets of motivations and sought gratifications, despite the existence of
certain prevailing or complementary motivations across SNSs or platforms (Alhabash & Ma,
2017). For instance, early studies of Facebook users’ motives revolved around the social
interactivity afforded by the site. These investigations identified motives such as connecting and
staying in touch with family, friends and acquaintances; staying in contact with old friends; and
maintaining social ties (Quan-Haase & Young, 2010; Raacke & Bonds-Raacke, 2008).
Similarly, Joinson (2008) finds seven predominantly social motive-driven uses of Facebook by
college students: shared identities, social connection, content, photographs specifically, social
network surfing, social investigations and status updates. Stanley’s (2015) findings are
consistent with those of earlier studies, as this author identified networking as an expressed
motivation for the use of Facebook by college students. However, motivations for using Twitter
are distinct from those of other SNSs due to Twitter’s micro-blog functionality and strict
character limit (Alhabash & Ma, 2017). In contrast to the sociality motive most prominently
associated with Facebook use, information sharing has been shown to motivate both frequency
and intensity of Twitter use (Johnson & Yang, 2009), along with the expressed intention to
continue use (Liu et al., 2010). However, the motive of social interaction was also found to
predict expressed intentions to continue Twitter use (Liu et al., 2010), perhaps signaling
recognition of Twitter’s dual social networking and blogging affordances. Instagram users, by
contrast, have been found to place less importance on connecting with other people and greater
emphasis on self-promotion and personal identity, in addition to surveillance and the gathering
of knowledge about others, the documentation of life events, and general coolness
(operationalized as displaying creativity and self-promotion) (Sheldon & Bryant, 2016, cited in
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

69
Alhabash & Ma, 2017). Snapchat use, in comparison to that of Facebook, is motivated more by
procrastination or distraction rather than by maintaining social connections (Utz et al., 2015,
cited in Alhabash & Ma, 2017). Research has also documented content appeal and peer
pressure as motives for the use of Snapchat (Stanley, 2015).
Finally, research suggests that uses and motivations may shift or evolve alongside or in
response to changes or updates in the functionality and design of a given site or platform
(Alhabash & Ma, 2017). For example, as Facebook has evolved from a tool primarily used for
social networking to a full-fledged, multifunctional media platform, motivations for usage have
also evolved. Self-documentation, medium appeal and entertainment, for example, now join
socially related gratifications as prominent factors that motivate Facebook use (Alhabash & Ma,
2017; Alhabash, Chiang, & Huang, 2014; Alhabash, Park, Kononova, Chiang, & Wise, 2012;
Karlis, 2013). Moreover, findings indicating Facebook and Twitter garner greater time
engagement and intensity of use than Snapchat and Instagram may also be a product of this
evolution of the former into multifunctional platforms (Alhabash & Ma, 2017). Alhabash and
Ma (2017) speculate further that the cross-platform rise of “passive use” motivations like
convenience and entertainment in lieu of social interaction may be attributable to burgeoning
friend or contact lists that make it more difficult to socialize and otherwise connect
interpersonally (p. 8).
Uses and gratifications, motives and digital media in a political context. The use of
digital media by citizens to fulfill political needs also offers guidance in the consideration of
motives that drive publics’ participation in digital diplomacy. Kay and Johnson (2002, 2004)
conducted foundational UGT studies on the use of the Internet and the World Wide Web for
political purposes. First, these authors surveyed politically interested Web users in the two
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

70
weeks surrounding the 1996 U.S. presidential election. Four motivations for connecting to
online sources of political information were identified: guidance, or learning about issues,
candidate positions, and other information that may contribute to voting decisions; information-
seeking/surveillance, which is the purposeful seeking of specific political information and the
monitoring of the political landscape; entertainment, or utilizing the Web for amusement and
relaxation; and social utility, which involved using the Web to support decisions and provide
information that could be used in discussions with others. A further finding was that guidance
and information-seeking/surveillance were stronger motivations than entertainment. The authors
infer that the use of the Web for political information is likely goal-oriented and instrumental
rather than simply about seeking entertainment from the Internet. Kay and Johnson (2004)
extended their work on users’ motives for accessing the Internet for political information by
differentiating between components: chat rooms, bulletin boards/mailing lists and the Web,
broadly defined. The authors again surveyed politically interested Web users in the two weeks
surrounding a U.S. presidential election, this time the 2000 contest. Overall, four motivations
were identified: guidance, information seeking, and entertainment/social utility, all as defined in
their previous study, in addition to convenience, which was the seeking of online political
information because it is easier to find and more convenient than information from traditional
sources. Guidance was again a primary motive for politics-related use of the Web, broadly
conceived, and of chat rooms (along with information-seeking, in the case of chat rooms), but
not for the use of bulletin boards/mailing lists. Kay and Johnson speculate that anonymity and
especially the lack of interpersonal connections in the latter may undermine trustworthiness and
credibility perceptions; thus, bulletin boards or mailing lists may be utilized less for political
guidance than the other components. This conclusion is potentially significant because the
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

71
connection between sociality and credibility might make SNSs, with their unique provision of
numerous opportunities for interpersonal interaction, potent sources for political guidance.
Recent studies have focused on citizens’ motives for political uses of SNSs specifically.
Postelnicu and Cozma (2007) analyze comments to the MySpace profiles of the 2006 mid-term
U.S. congressional candidates. These authors found that the comments addressed to both
candidates and other voters seemed motivated more by social interaction than by information-
seeking. Moreover, comments addressed to the candidates were often personal in nature, which
signaled parasocial relationships between voters and candidates, while the comments addressed
to other voters frequently addressed political issues. Sweetser and Weaver-Lariscy (2007)
conducted a similar investigation of comments posted to the SNSs of 2006 U.S. congressional
candidates, this time on Facebook. Only nine percent of the comments discussed policy-related,
substantive issues and the users often addressed candidates by their first name. This indicated
that such politics-related commenting on Facebook is also motivated by social interaction more
than information-seeking (cited in Ancu & Cozma, 2009). Ancu and Cozma’s (2009) study of
visitors to the MySpace profiles of the 2008 U.S. presidential primary candidates confirmed the
prominence of the social interaction motive in politics-related SNS use by publics; moreover,
users were drawn more to interact socially with likeminded peers and discover their views on the
candidates than to interact with the candidates themselves. The authors conclude that the high
level of social interaction in the use of SNSs may drive—uniquely in terms of online media—the
transformation of publics from passive receivers to engaged or active users in a political context.
Finally, Hanson and Haridakis (2008) survey college students about their motivations for
watching and sharing traditional and comedy/satirical news videos on YouTube. Political news
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

72
was not specified but was intuitively prominent in the operationalization of the news sources.
14

Information-seeking was the only motive that significantly predicted the watching of traditional
news, while leisure/entertainment was the sole motivation that predicted watching
comedy/satirical news. With regard to the sharing of traditional news videos, the interpersonal
expression motivation was a significant predictor, while leisure/entertainment and interpersonal
expression were significant predictors of the sharing of comedy/satirical news. Notably, the
presence of the interpersonal expression motive for sharing both types of news suggested that
viewers may be guided by one set of motives for viewing YouTube news clips, but have a
different set of motives for sharing them.
Researchers have also employed UGT more comprehensively to consider the personal or
background characteristics, motives, choices of media and types of uses that predict effects
related to political uses of SNSs. For example, Hanson et al. (2010) utilized the UGT framework
to investigate college students’ political cynicism surrounding the 2008 U.S. presidential
campaign—the “first to play out in the world of YouTube, Facebook, MySpace, and political
blogging” (p. 585). With regard to the motives portion of the study, these authors identified six
motives for seeking political information. In order of strength, these were convenient
information seeking; political evaluation (of candidates, issues, and candidates’ stands on the
issues) to reach a voting decision; pass time; entertaining arousal, as social media are “exciting,
thrilling, amusing, and peps one up”; self expression; and gainful companionship, because social
media allow for interpersonal connections that decrease loneliness or “get them to do something”
(p. 594). Gainful companionship—the weakest and only socially-oriented motive—was the sole
motive that significantly predicted political cynicism (lower levels of cynicism). The authors

14
Traditional news videos were operationalized as “segments of CNN, ABC, local newscasts or videos of actual
events,” while comedy/satirical news was operationalized as “comedy-related or satirical news videos such as The
Daily Show, The Colbert Report, or monologues by Jay Leno or David Letterman.”
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

73
speculate cautiously that this may be because interpersonal connecting via SNSs leads to more
trust placed in these media than in traditional media. Interestingly, the choice to use SNSs also
predicted lower levels of cynicism, which was contrary to early research on the use of SNSs in
comparison to other media formats (Hanson et al., 2010). Ponder and Haridakis (2015) employ
an online, nationwide survey to investigate the influence of several variables, including the
motives for using 18 media formats, on users’ discussions with political in- and out-group
members.
15
Political in-groups refer to people from the same political party; political out-groups
refer to individuals from a different political party. Three media use motives were identified:
political utility, which was similar to information-seeking; political in-group achievement, which
referenced increased positive feelings associated with membership in the respondent’s political
party; and idiomatic-use, which reflected the use of mediated political information for personal
utility. With regard to political discussion with in-group members, none of these motives
remained significant predictors when added to the other covariates.
16
With regard to political
discussion with out-group members, again none of the motives remained significant predictors
when added to the other variables. Interestingly, the use of political blogs and microblogs did
not predict in-group political discussion; instead, such use negatively predicted out-group
discussion. This backed the assertion that blog users are strong partisans who seek congruent
perspectives and avoid information that contradicts their own political opinions, ultimately
ensconcing themselves in echo chambers (Ponder & Haridakis, 2015, citing Kim & Johnson,
2012; Saleton, 2012; Brundidge & Rice, 2009).

15
The nationwide survey sample was designed to approximate the demographic composition of U.S. voters; the
media formats included traditional media and online sources, including “Social networking sites (e.g., MySpace,
Facebook)” and “Blogs/Microblogs (e.g., Drudge Report, The Republican Guru, Fidler’s Politics, Daily Kos,
Twitter)” (p. 292).
16
These covariates were demographic and personal political characteristics, media use and political elaboration.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

74
This UGT literature on the use of online sources and SNSs in a political context provides
three useful insights. First, citizens can be expected to use most politically-related online media
other than SNSs—that is, websites, blogs, chatrooms, etc.—instrumentally because their needs
tend be to cognitive. This is demonstrated by the prevalence and strength of the political
guidance and information-seeking motives across studies (though researchers also consistently
identified the presence of the entertainment and social utility motives). Second, users may be
motivated to turn more to interactive online sources for political guidance than to less interactive
sources, because interactive sources may be viewed as more trustworthy and credible. Finally
and perhaps most importantly, there is a distinction to be made between SNSs and other digital
media. Citizens’ use of SNSs in a political context appears to be driven by social motives like
interaction with peers as much as—and perhaps more than—by cognitive needs like information-
seeking or political utility. The sought gratification of sociality may therefore most starkly
distinguish users of politically relevant SNSs from audiences or users of other politically-
oriented media, including traditional formats and less social online sources.
Relevant criticisms of uses and gratifications theory. In addition to being one of the
most frequently applied audience- or user-centered perspectives, uses and gratifications is one of
the most frequently criticized theoretical frameworks (Alhabash & Ma, 2017). Two such
criticisms are particularly relevant to the consideration of publics’ motives for participating in
digital diplomacy and to the methodological choices made in this dissertation. First, media “use”
is an imprecise and overly broad concept (Dindar & Yaman, 2018, citing Stanford, 1983;
Ruggiero, 2000). Past research of traditional media formats has revealed the need to adopt a
more refined approach to media usage, in which it is recognized that individuals use particular
technological features and consume or engage with specific types of content within a broader
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

75
media framework (Smock et al., 2011). Research has shown, for example, that particular
motives for watching television predict the selection of specific types of programming content,
such as comedy (Ferguson & Perse, 2000, cited in Smock et al., 2011). However, the ambiguity
in the usage concept is perhaps most evident with regard to interactive digital media like SNSs.
Social network sites are distinguished by a multiplicity of uses, some of which are considered
“active” while others are categorized as “passive”. For example, active uses like the posting of
UGC in the form of comments may spur discussion and interaction, as well as give the
appearance that the space is active and accessible, thus bolstering credibility perceptions (Kraut
& Resnick, 2011, cited in Khan, 2017). At the opposite end of the spectrum of SNS usage,
“lurkers” view and monitor content but do not contribute comments, images, videos or other
content. Lurking is therefore considered a passive use of SNSs, even though lurking behaviors
may serve important functions like setting the stage for subsequent active participation (Jenkins
et al., 2013). Moreover, as noted above, some SNSs like Facebook and Twitter have evolved
into multifunctional platforms that afford a range of behaviors: self-expression through posting,
social interaction including private chat, news consumption, entertainment and information-
seeking (Khan, 2017).
Several uses and gratification scholars have thus attempted to refine the concept of SNS
use (e.g. Khan, 2017; Karapanos et al., 2016; Smock et al., 2011). Most relevant to this
discussion, Smock et al. (2011) “disassemble” Facebook usage to investigate the motives that
predict the use of specific features of the site (p. 2324). These authors find that the relaxing
entertainment, companionship and social interaction motives predicted the use of comments; the
expressive information sharing motive predicted the posting of status updates; the habitual pass
time, professional advancement, and social interaction motives predicted writing on the “walls”
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

76
of friends; the professional advancement and social interaction motives predicted the use of the
private messages feature; social interaction was the only motive that predicted Facebook chat;
and the expressive information sharing and social interaction motives predicted the use of
Facebook Groups (social interaction negatively predicted use of Groups). Furthermore, Smock
et al. (2011) contrasted these results against a model utilizing a more traditional, unidimensional
measure of Facebook use. This provided evidence of the differences in motives that predict uses
of the above-mentioned specific Facebook features and those that predict the generalized
conception of Facebook “use”. Khan (2017) distinguishes between “participation” (liking,
disliking, commenting, sharing and uploading) and “consumption” (viewing videos and reading
comments) in a study of motives for engaging with YouTube content. With regard to
participation, the motive of social interaction strongly predicted commenting and uploading,
while the relaxing entertainment motive was the strongest predictor of liking and disliking
videos, and the information-giving motive strongly predicted the sharing of content. With regard
to consumption, the relaxing entertainment motive most strongly predicted video viewing, while
the information-seeking motive predicted reading comments. In sum, both studies demonstrate
the utility of employing a more granular approach to the concept of SNS use. Additionally, they
confirm the prominence of the social interaction motive for the use of SNSs, especially as it
relates to Facebook and to commenting on Facebook and YouTube content. These findings
relating to social motives for commenting are particularly relevant to the consideration of digital
diplomacy, as commenting is perhaps the clearest representation of active participation by
publics in the Internet-based communicative spaces established by international actors.
A second relevant criticism of the uses and gratifications framework concerns the
methodologies most commonly employed by researchers to collect data. Media gratifications,
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

77
which are reflected in motives, are usually obtained through survey approaches. Survey designs
provide obvious advantages in facilitating quantitative analyses of specific, established motives
that predict media usage and related media effects. However, surveys can lack depth and detail,
which may be crucial to the investigation of motives for media use (Dindar & Yaman, 2018).
Indeed, the imprecision in the concept of media usage in UGT may be exacerbated by survey
questions that restrict the reporting of motives to closed-ended and predetermined response
choices. Moreover, survey designs can be afflicted by response bias, wherein respondents may
provide socially desirable or distorted responses (Bryman, 2008, cited in Dindar & Yaman,
2018). Response bias could be of particular concern with regard to UGT studies of newer media,
whose samples are frequently younger adults who may believe it desirable to provide socially
accepted and uncontroversial motives for their uses of emerging media. Several UGT studies
also employ in-depth interviews to determine motives, sought gratifications and types of media
use (Dindar & Yaman, 2018, citing Dunne, Lawlor, & Rowley, 2010; Xiong, 2014). Interview
methodologies provide ample opportunity for detailed and nuanced descriptions of the motives
that drive media use; they may also elicit the discovery of novel or shifting motives for media
use. However, interview studies can be expensive, time consuming, reliant upon small sample
sizes, and dependent on the skills of the interviewer (Newton, 2010, cited in Dindar & Yaman,
2018). In addition, response bias may also be present in respondents’ answers to the questions
posed by interviewers. As Greuling and Kilian (2014) point out, it is therefore beneficial to
utilize mixed method approaches to investigate under-researched phenomena, such as the
motives of publics for participating in digital diplomacy.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

78
Content Analytic Approaches to Investigating Motives for the Use of Digital Media
At least three studies have employed content analytic approaches to investigate the
motives that undergird the active use of digital media (Dindar & Yaman, 2018; Greuling &
Kilian, 2014; Stavros et al., 2014), including in response to the above concerns associated with
the survey and interview designs that are common in UGT research (e.g. Dindar & Yaman,
2018). Content analytic methods have the distinct advantage of incorporating naturally
occurring data; they therefore have the potential to contribute valuable insights about digital
media use and motivations that are unrestricted by closed-ended survey answer choices and
unencumbered by response bias (Dindar & Yaman; 2018). According to Krippendorff (2013),
phenomena such as intentions and cognitive processes are ultimately manifested in the verbal
attributes of behavior, which are constituted in language or in texts. Linguistically constituted
phenomena—of which motives are an example—are therefore natural opportunities for
facilitative content analysis (Krippendorff, 2013). Greuling and Kilian (2014) affirm that
motives for participating in digital spaces can be inferred from digital texts, including the
conversations that occur in online political debate fora like blogs.
Dindar and Yaman (2018) utilize a content analytic approach within a UGT framework to
investigate motives for Twitter use. These authors content analyze tweets sent over a two-day
period and that included the Turkish hashtag #IUseTwitterBecause, as this hashtag uniquely
served as a kind of directive for the volunteering of Turkish users’ motives for tweeting.
Findings indicate that the sought gratifications, as expressed in the tweets, were mostly process
gratifications (68% of the sample). Process gratifications included the entertainment, pass time,
habit, self-expression and campaign (using Twitter to “support a certain political view, or to gain
public attention on an issue”) motives (p. 263). Also notable were the relative lack of content
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

79
gratifications (the information sharing, information seeking and self-documentation motives) and
social gratifications (the social interaction and status seeking motives) that were coded.
17
This
study therefore provides evidence that investigating naturally occurring data through content
analysis may yield significantly different findings with regard to motives for media use than
those studies that employ survey or interview approaches.
Greuling and Kilian (2014) utilize qualitative content analysis to identify the motives of
active users for commenting in response to the posts of eight German political blogs. These
authors observe that a qualitative content analytic approach not only allows for the “explorative”
investigation of understudied, naturally occurring phenomena, it furthermore incorporates an
“openness” that permits the discovery of user motivations to emerge from the data (p. 225).
Uses and gratifications theory and past studies thus serve as a point of departure and comparison;
however, the identification and analysis of user motives are beneficially untethered to the UGT
framework. Greuling and Kilian find that the comments responding to the political blog posts
evince mostly social motives for engaging. Commenters appeared motivated to interact socially
with other blog users much more than with the blog post authors (more than eight times as
frequently). The exchanging of information motive was also prominent and the expressing an
opinion motive, particularly in disagreement with others, was also present in the comments.
These results were largely consistent with prior research of user motives for actively engaging
with politically-oriented online media (Greuling & Kilian, 2014, citing Papacharissi, 2003;
Johnson & Kaye, 2003; Sobkowicz & Sobkowicz, 2012; Trammell, 2006). One key departure
from prior research (e.g. Ancu & Cozma, 2009; Johnson & Kaye, 2003) was that the authors did
not code many instances of the entertainment and information-seeking motives. This could

17
Content gratifications and social gratifications comprised only 8% and 13% of the sample, respectively.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

80
reflect medium differences; however, it could also be a ramification of using content analysis
instead of asking respondents to provide motives for use. Nevertheless, with regard to
information-seeking, the rhetorical nature of questions posed in the comments may be
conceptually significant as it could indicate that users were more interested in sharing and
discussing previously formed opinions than in seeking information from others (Greuling &
Kilian, 2014, citing Sobkowicz & Sobkowicz, 2012).
Together, these studies demonstrate the feasibility and utility of employing content
analysis to investigate the motives of publics who participate in online fora, including digital
diplomacy. Chief among the benefits of a content analytic approach is that researchers gain
insights from naturally occurring data. Moreover, qualitative content analysis allows user
motives—unrestricted by existing and limited UGT classifications—to emerge from the data.
Therefore, while UGT and findings serve as a point of reference and contrast for the exploratory
analysis employed, this study follows Greuling and Kilian (2014) and utilizes qualitative content
analysis to infer the motives of publics who engage in Facebook and Twitter digital diplomacy.
This study therefore has two main goals in conceptualizing digital diplomacy’s “second
face” as space for user motives. The first is to foreground the empowerment of publics that has
resulted from the transformation of the communication landscape in the Internet Age and the
widespread adoption of SNSs. An additional theoretical framework for digital diplomacy is thus
proposed: one that approaches the phenomenon from a media studies perspective and does not
take as given the desire of digital publics to engage or collaborate with international actors, but
rather subjects the motives behind users’ active participation in digital diplomacy to empirical
investigation. The second goal is methodological and calls for exploratory qualitative content
analysis to infer the motives of active users for commenting in response to digital diplomacy.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

81

IV. Research Questions and Hypotheses

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

82
Chapter two defined digital diplomacy as the use of Internet-based media by international
actors to engage or communicate with foreign publics in order to advance policy-related goals.
Digital diplomacy is an under-theorized phenomenon that lacks a developed or unifying
theoretical framework. However, digital diplomacy can be usefully theorized as an extension or
amplification of public diplomacy. Moreover, the most consequential and widely analyzed
theoretical underpinning of digital diplomacy is dialogue. Digital diplomacy is therefore
distinguished by its potential for international actors to utilize social media like SNSs to engage
in symmetrical dialogue with stakeholder publics. Digital diplomacy may also be a primary
mechanism through which international actors can achieve deliberative legitimacy through
dialogue, thus gaining the capacity to exert influence in the current international system.
Empirical research of dialogue in digital diplomacy has not, however, substantiated the optimism
for the establishment of mutuality through dialogue that characterizes theoretic treatments.
There is furthermore a need to extend the consideration of dialogue in digital diplomacy in two
main ways. First, the operationalization of dialogue in digital diplomacy needs updating to
reflect contemporary socio-technical culture, for example in practices like hyperlinking,
retweeting, hashtagging, and the use of multimedia. Second, while past research does not
distinguish between international actors prior to analysis, it is necessary to account for a range of
digital diplomacy actors: some, for example, exhibit varied institutional stances with regard to
digital strategy and the embracing of participatory digital culture, while others have disparate
guiding missions with regard to engaging in dialogue or conversation with publics. Crucially,
these characteristics may influence the output of digital diplomacy actors, such as dialogic
content. In identifying the “first face” of digital diplomacy as dialogic public diplomacy, the
following research questions and hypotheses are therefore identified:
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

83
RQ1: What types of public diplomacy activities are evident in the digital diplomacy
considered, according to Cull’s (2008a) taxonomy?
RQ1a: Will the public diplomacy activities identified differ by nation (which exhibit
varied stances toward participatory digital culture and technological risk)?
RQ1b: Will the public diplomacy activities identified differ by type of organization
(MFAs versus the other organizations, which are funded by the same governments
but whose guiding missions appear to prioritize dialogic communication)?
RQ1c: Will the public diplomacy activities identified differ by platform (Facebook or
Twitter)?
RQ1d: Will novel activities be present in the digital diplomacy that do not align closely
with established public diplomacy classifications (according to Cull’s (2008a)
taxonomy of activities)?
RQ2: What dialogic practices will be present in the digital diplomacy considered,
according to Kent and Taylor’s (1998) principles for Internet-based dialogic
communication in public relations?
RQ2a: Will the dialogic practices identified differ by platform (Facebook or Twitter)?
RQ2b: As part of the “usefulness of information” dialogic principle (Kent & Taylor,
1998), what “updates” to the consideration of sociotechnical practices—
specifically, the use of hyperlinks, retweets, hashtags, and multimedia—will be
present in the digital diplomacy considered?
Chapter two also notes that past studies have found the dialogic potential of digital
diplomacy is not being met, particularly in the case of MFAs, the most common focus of
investigation (e.g. Manor, 2017; Kampf et al., 2015; Cha et al., 2014; Bjola & Jiang, 2015).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

84
These results are consistent with those of the broad corpus of public relations literature, which
finds that the dialogic potential of the Internet has not been realized with regard to organization–
public communication (McAllister-Spooner, 2009). In addition, chapter two identifies the U.S.
DOS (and subsidiaries) as an exemplar of a technologically risk averse actor which may be
reluctant to embrace participatory digital culture. It also identifies the Swedish MFA (and
subsidiaries) as an exemplar of a technologically risk welcoming actor which does embrace
participatory digital culture, and the Indian MEA (and subsidiaries) as an exemplar of a rising
digital diplomacy actor whose organizational stances toward technological risk and participatory
digital culture are unknown. Chapter two furthermore identifies the ShareAmerica, Indian
Diplomacy and Sweden.se digital properties as guided by missions to engage in dialogue or
conversation with publics; that is, their missions are distinct from those of the MFAs of the same
nation with regard to their relative emphasis on engaging in dialogue with publics. Finally,
ShareAmerica, Indian Diplomacy and Sweden.se can also be considered cultural diplomacy
organizations, due to their relative emphases on promoting cultural assets. Therefore, the
following hypotheses are identified:
H1: The digital diplomacy of the actors that can be considered cultural diplomacy
organizations (ShareAmerica, Indian Diplomacy and Sweden.se) will contain more
cultural diplomacy activities than will the digital diplomacy of these actors’
corresponding MFAs (the U.S. DOS, the Indian MEA and the Swedish MFA).
H2: The digital diplomacy of the risk-welcoming international actors that embrace
participatory digital culture (the Swedish MFA and Sweden.se) will exhibit more
dialogic practices than will the digital diplomacy of the other actors (the U.S. DOS,
ShareAmerica, the Indian MEA, and Indian Diplomacy).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

85
H3: The digital diplomacy of the actors guided by missions to engage in dialogue or
conversation with publics (ShareAmerica, Indian Diplomacy and Sweden.se) will
exhibit more dialogic practices than will the digital diplomacy of these actors’
corresponding MFAs (the U.S. DOS, the Indian MEA and the Swedish MFA).
Chapter three began by noting that digital diplomacy has rarely been theorized or studied
from the perspective of the participating publics. Yet, the transformation of the communication
landscape and system has empowered, to an unprecedented degree, global citizens to use online
media like SNSs to express their individual or group agendas. It was argued that a facilitative
conceptualization of digital diplomacy must therefore incorporate the norms, agendas and
behaviors of publics as manifest in digital networks. This viewpoint foregrounds the crucial
question of what motives publics have and display for participating in the communicative spaces
facilitated by digital diplomacy. Such an added and novel conceptualization—digital diplomacy
as space for user motives—brings a media studies perspective to the field. In addition, relevant
investigations that utilize content analytic approaches to infer motives serve to inform this
dissertation. The following research question is therefore identified:
RQ3: What motives do publics display (in posted comments and interview responses) for
participating in the digital diplomacy of the U.S., Sweden and India (the three
nations considered throughout this study)?

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

86

V. Research Design and Method

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

87
Digital Diplomacy Actors Selected for Analysis
Six digital diplomacy actors representing three countries are selected for analysis.
Following Kampf et al. (2015) and other studies, the digital content of MFAs is a focus of the
sample (half of the sample, in the case of the present study). The countries are selected on the
basis of their foreign relations apparatus’ perceived attitude toward technological risk and likely
fluency with and embrace of participatory digital culture. As chapter two describes, the U.S.
DOS and its subsidiaries serve as an exemplar of a technologically risk averse actor which may
be reluctant to embrace participatory digital culture; thus, U.S. digital diplomacy (the U.S. DOS
and ShareAmerica) is selected for analysis. In stark contrast and also noted in chapter two, the
Swedish MFA and subsidiaries serve as an exemplar of a technologically risk welcoming actor
which does embrace participatory digital culture; thus, Swedish digital diplomacy (the Swedish
MFA and Sweden.se) is selected for analysis. Chapter two furthermore notes that some nations,
especially those in the developing world, exhibit an enthusiastic but recent embrace of digital
diplomacy and their guiding organizational attitudes and norms are unclear. India is such an
example: its digital diplomacy (the Indian MEA and Indian Diplomacy) is selected for analysis
as an example of an actor whose willingness to embrace participatory digital
culture/technological risk is unknown.
In addition, chapter two argues that not all digital diplomacy actors operate under the
same guiding mission; rather, some foreign relations bureaucracies have established digital
properties that are uniquely and explicitly or implicitly tasked with establishing and maintaining
dialogue or conversation with publics. The ShareAmerica, Sweden.se, and Indian Diplomacy
properties are three such examples, as previously discussed, and are thus included in the study.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

88
Therefore, the six digital diplomacy actors included in the study are: the U.S. DOS;
ShareAmerica; the Swedish MFA; Sweden.se; the Indian MEA; and Indian Diplomacy.
Social Network Sites Selected for Analysis
Two SNSs, as hosts to the digital diplomacy of the above actors, are selected for analysis:
the “friend”-networking platform Facebook and the hybrid micro-blog and SNS Twitter. These
are selected because they are the two most widely utilized SNSs in digital diplomacy. The 2017
“Twiplomacy” report locates 856 Twitter accounts belonging to government foreign ministries
and heads of state in 178 countries—92% of all UN member states—with 356 million combined
followers (Lüfkens, 2017). Facebook ranked second among heads of state and among
government and foreign ministers, with 169 countries and 88% of all UN member states
represented on the site. Facebook and Twitter are therefore arguably the nexuses for emerging
trends in digital diplomacy practices. Investigation of Facebook and Twitter also allows for
consistency with and comparison to prior studies of dialogue in digital diplomacy (e.g. Kampf et
al., 2015; Manor, 2017).
Time Period Selected for Analysis
The time period utilized in the study was April 15, 2016 through July 15, 2016 (three
months or 91 days). Three months worth of Facebook posts and tweets from each of the
international actors was considered more than sufficient to gather robust data that were not
connected to any singular theme or international event. The April 15, 2016 start date was simply
the earliest possible date, in terms of historical Facebook and Twitter data retrieval, after study
approval was received from the University of Southern California Institutional Review Board
(approval received on May 31, 2016).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

89
Part One
Part one used thematic content analysis to investigate the types of public diplomacy
activities that are evident in the Facebook and Twitter digital diplomacy of the above actors. In
total, six Twitter properties and five Facebook properties (Indian Diplomacy does not maintain a
Facebook account) were included in the analysis, for a total of 11 digital diplomacy accounts.
Tweets were imported into DiscoverText (http://discovertext.com), a web-based data
analysis tool, on a rolling basis, about one month after they were published. The total numbers
of tweets imported from the three-month time period were: U.S. DOS (1,908); ShareAmerica
(1,198); Swedish MFA (961); Sweden.se (663); the Indian MEA (1,000); and Indian Diplomacy
(1,901). Facebook posts were imported into DiscoverText on January 5, 2017, an arbitrary date.
The total numbers of Facebook posts imported from the three-month time period were: U.S.
DOS (535); ShareAmerica (275); Swedish MFA (60); Sweden.se (60); and the Indian MEA
(721).
Systematic random sampling was utilized to produce a total sample of approximately 300
tweets and 300 Facebook posts for each account (100 tweets/posts per month), unless the
account tweeted or posted fewer than 100 times in a month, in which case all such tweets or
Facebook posts were included in the sample.
18
The exact numbers of tweets in the final sample
were as follows: U.S. DOS (N=302); ShareAmerica (N=303); Swedish MFA (N=301);
Sweden.se (N=250); the Indian MEA (N=272); and Indian Diplomacy (N=302). The total

18
Probability sampling was used as each Facebook post and tweet was equally informative with regard to the
research questions and all posts and tweets from the three-month period were known (Krippendorff, 2013).
Systematic random sampling ensured that all time increments from the three-month time period were represented
(Krippendorff, 2013). Given the anticipation that tweets/posts displaying “listening” and in part two, “dialogic
loop”, are rare, statistical sampling theory was used to determine the tweet and post sample sizes. A cautious
estimate was that 1 in 100 posts/tweets from each account would display “listening” or “dialogic loop”. According
to the table in Krippendorff (2013), to achieve 95% certainty that at least 1 in 100 posts/tweets would contain
“listening” or “dialogic loop,” a sample of 299 for each account was needed (p. 123).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

90
number of tweets analyzed was therefore N=1,730. The exact numbers of Facebook posts in the
final sample were as follows: U.S. DOS (N=302); ShareAmerica (N=275); Swedish MFA
(N=60); Sweden.se (N=60); and the Indian MEA (N=301). The total number of Facebook posts
analyzed was therefore N=998.
Thematic content analysis “uses qualitative material and the analysis of themes and
emphases (not merely specific words or phrases), but applies objective and scientifically rigorous
methods in the process of deriving quantitative data” (Suedfeld, Cross, & Brcic, 2011, p. 1009).
Therefore, the tweets and posts were analyzed by type or theme of public diplomacy activity,
according to Cull’s (2008a) taxonomy of public diplomacy activities. The tweet or Facebook
post was the unit of analysis. All tweets and posts were coded in DiscoverText. Each tweet and
post was attached to the following pre-set categories: 1) Tweet/Retweet/Directed
Tweet/Post/Shared Post; 2) Advocacy; 3) Cultural Diplomacy; 4) Exchange Diplomacy; 5)
International Broadcasting; 6) Listening; 7) Other (Not Covered by Previous Themes). A
randomly selected 150-item subset of the entire sample was first utilized to establish a working
codebook. Open coding was then used to establish subcategories within each type of public
diplomacy activity for greater specificity. A tweet or post could contain more than one type of
public diplomacy activity; however, only one subcategory within each main type of public
diplomacy was coded for each unit. Thus, each type of public diplomacy activity could only be
selected once for each unit, in order to facilitate comparison across types of activities. When two
subcategories within one type of public diplomacy were present, the most prominent was
selected. When the post or tweet introduced a video or linked to a separate website or PDF, only
the accompanying posted text that introduced the video or linked document was coded; this is
because the accompanying posted text is the first impression given to viewers. When the unit
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

91
was a shared post, the “new,” accompanying text was coded instead of the shared content. In
attachment previews or in thumbnails, only the headlines and titles were considered for coding.
Questions contained in attached multimedia images were also coded. When there were two or
more separate visuals contained in a post or tweet, each was coded separately. This resulted in a
scheme of categories and subcategories that was attached to each tweet and post. This scheme
was then utilized as the basis to code all units. The final coding scheme was comprised of
categories and subcategories that are reliable and mutually exclusive. The operationalization of
the public diplomacy categories and sub-categories was as follows:
Measures
Listening. Listening refers to opportunities to use the data, opinions or other feedback of
global publics to shape the international environment or redirect policy (Cull, 2008a). This was
operationalized as opportunities for listening, whether realized or not, by the following 5 sub-
categories: 1) any question found in any of the digital diplomacy actors’ tweets, retweets,
Facebook posts or shared Facebook posts, as the posing of a question signifies a potential
willingness to listen to publics (in previews or thumbnails, only questions contained in the
headline or title were coded; questions contained in embedded multimedia images were also
coded); 2) any polling-related content; 3) any request for UGC; 4) any other chance for public
input (linking to other SNSs was included in this sub-category because this gives publics the
ability to comment); and 5) other.
Advocacy. Advocacy is the undertaking of a communication activity to promote a
particular idea, policy or other interest (Cull, 2008a). This was operationalized by the active
promotion of a specific policy or set of policies, idea(s) or strategic interest(s). Advocacy was
also coded when the post or tweet contained relevant opinions, directives, value judgments and
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

92
normative statements (in contrast to the reporting of objective or neutral facts or updates). Open
coding, reported in the Results chapter, determined the subcategories in the Advocacy theme.
Cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is the transmission or promotion of cultural
achievements or resources in order to shape the international environment (Cull, 2008a). Open
coding, reported in the Results chapter, determined the subcategories in the Cultural Diplomacy
theme.
Exchange diplomacy. Exchange diplomacy is the reciprocal exchange of citizens
through education or acculturation in order to shape the international environment (Cull, 2008a).
This was operationalized by the following sub-categories: Any Human (any reference to a
human exchange program); Other.
International Broadcasting. International broadcasting refers to the deployment of
state-funded communication technologies to engage foreign publics in order to shape the
international environment (Cull, 2008a). International broadcasting has often been associated
with the dissemination of news (Cull, 2008a; Dodd & Collins, 2017); therefore international
broadcasting was operationalized as 1) news, updates, or statements that were neutral or
objective in tone (in contrast to advocacy) and 2) any mention of traditional international
broadcasting efforts (e.g. state-funded radio or television channels). Open coding, reported in
the Results chapter, determined the subcategories within the international broadcasting theme.
Other (Not Covered by Previous Themes). This was operationalized as any type of
activity that did not fit under one or more of the above types or themes derived from Cull’s
(2008a) taxonomy of public diplomacy activities.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

93
Part Two
Part two utilized content analysis to investigate the dialogic practices of the digital
diplomacy disseminated by the six international actors investigated throughout this study. As in
part one, six Twitter properties and five Facebook properties (Indian Diplomacy does not
maintain a Facebook account) were included in the analysis, for a total of 11 digital diplomacy
accounts. The same final tweet and Facebook post samples were utilized in part two that were
employed in part one. The tweets and posts were analyzed for dialogic practices according to
Kent and Taylor’s (1998) principles for dialogic Internet-based public relations. The tweet or
Facebook post was the unit of analysis, and all tweets and posts were again coded in
DiscoverText. Each tweet was attached to the following pre-set category: Original
Tweet/Retweet/Directed Tweet (Reply)/Directed Tweet (Other). Each Facebook post was
attached to the following pre-set category: Original Post/Share (Same Govt. Post)/Share (Other).
A randomly selected 150-item subset of the entire sample was first utilized to establish a
working codebook. A tweet or post could contain more than dialogic property. When the unit
was a shared post, the “new,” accompanying text was coded instead of the shared content. In
attachment previews or in thumbnails, only the headlines and titles were considered for coding;
attached multimedia images were also coded for dialogic principles. This resulted in a coding
scheme that was attached to each tweet/post. This scheme was then utilized as the basis to code
all units. The final coding scheme was comprised of categories that are reliable and mutually
exclusive. The operationalization of the dialogic principles in the digital diplomacy was as
follows:
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

94
Measures
Dialogic loop. This principle was operationalized in three ways: 1) Any instance of one
or more replies by a digital diplomacy actor to any public comment posted in response to the
relevant post or tweet (all digital diplomacy actors’ Facebook posts were considered, but only
their original tweets, not their retweets, were considered). This included but was not limited to
responding to criticism, supplying requested information and answering questions. All replies to
all publics’ comments (all comment threads) were comprehensively scrolled through to
determine the presence of any reply from a digital diplomacy actor; 2) Any unit that is a retweet
of a public’s tweet (the tweet originates from a public, not from another representative of the
same nation); and 3) Any unit that is a shared Facebook post of a public (the post originates from
a public, not from another representative of the same nation).
Usefulness of information. This principle was operationalized in three ways: 1) the
inclusion of “external” hyperlinks (links outside of Twitter when considering tweets, outside of
Facebook when considering Facebook posts) to a separate, unaffiliated organization (linking to
an independent media site; linking to an unaffiliated social media site; or linking to “other”); 2)
the use of hashtags, due to their organizing function that facilitates publics’ access to related and
potentially informative content; and 3) the inclusion of multimedia, coded as photographs;
videos; or images (charts, graphs, graphics, etc.). A Facebook post or tweet could include both
photos and images, but if a photo was supplemented by any design elements, it was considered
an image. Multimedia were only coded if they were embedded in the Facebook post or tweet
(thumbnail links to pages with multimedia were not coded as containing multimedia).
Generation of return visits. This principle was operationalized as the inclusion of any
mention of or invitation to contests, special forums, Q&A sessions, panel discussions and other
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

95
specific participatory time-bound events that encourage return visits and thus set the conditions
for dialogic communication.
Rule of conservation of visitors. Following Rybalko and Seltzer (2010), this principle
was operationalized as the inclusion of hyperlinks to websites and other SNSs maintained by the
same government, as this can be interpreted as one broad digital presence.
Intuitiveness/ease of the interface. This principle was not employed due to the
standardization of Twitter and Facebook interfaces, following other studies of dialogic practices
in digital communication (e.g. Rybalko & Seltzer, 2010; Kampf et al., 2015).
Part Three
Part three utilized qualitative content analysis to infer the motives of publics for
participating in the relevant digital diplomacy. The six digital diplomacy actors, two SNSs
(Facebook and Twitter) and the time period considered were the same as in parts one and two of
the study; therefore, 11 digital diplomacy accounts were included in this section.
Qualitative content analysis is an interpretive approach that involves making systematic,
valid and reliable inferences from texts (Krippendorff, 2013; Greuling & Kilian, 2014). The
advantage of qualitative content analysis is that it allows meanings and categories to emerge
from the data. This method was utilized because 1) past research (e.g. Dindar & Yaman, 2018;
Greuling & Kilian, 2014) indicates that content analysis of motives for online media usage is
feasible and beneficial because it incorporates naturally occurring data; 2) qualitative content
analysis is unrestricted by limiting established motive classifications, for example those of UGT;
and 3) no prior studies of publics’ motives for participating in digital diplomacy were available
to build upon.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

96
The motives of the participating publics were inferred by content analyzing all comments
posted in response to the one Facebook post and tweet that garnered the most comments in the
three-month time period. There was one exception in the Facebook posts of the Swedish MFA:
the comments in response to the third most commented post were content analyzed, as the two
most commented posts and their engagement data were unable to be displayed in Facebook at the
time of analysis. The most heavily commented post and tweet represent the richest sources for
investigating publics’ active uses of these SNSs, which is key to the focus on user motives in
media studies. Relevant comments were pasted into a spreadsheet, and usernames and account
names were deleted. The data were then imported into DiscoverText, which was used to
facilitate coding and subsequent analysis.
The comment was the unit of analysis. A randomly selected 150-item subset of the entire
sample was first utilized to establish a working codebook. Each comment was attached to the
following pre-set categories: 1) Is the comment an “original comment” or a reply to another
commenter?; and 2) Does the comment address the topic in the post or tweet? (yes/no/cannot
determine). Open coding was then used to classify the motive or motives as inferred from each
comment in the subset. A comment could contain more than one motive. Comments in foreign
languages were coded if they could be automatically translated by the Facebook and Twitter
interfaces. If they could not be automatically translated, they were not coded. Comments that
were solely emoticons (graphical depictions of tone or emotion typed using the keyboard
(Khalid, 2016)), emojis (images or depictions encoded in the Unicode Standard character coding
system (Khalid, 2016)), multimedia images or GIF (Graphic Interchange Format) files were not
coded for inferred motives. However, if a comment included text with an emoticon, emoji,
multimedia image or GIF file, coding for a motive or motives was attempted. This resulted in a
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

97
scheme of categories that was attached to each comment. This scheme was then utilized as the
basis to code all units; that is, the same coding categories were initially utilized for each set of
comments, but motive categories were added if and when needed as they emerged from the data.
The final coding schemes were comprised of categories that are reliable and mutually exclusive;
these are reported in Appendix 6.
Part Four
Part four utilized in-depth, semi-structured interviews to triangulate the data obtained and
analyzed in parts two and three of the study. Ten interviews were conducted with willing, active
participants in the Twitter digital diplomacy considered in the other parts of the study. Active
participants were users who commented at least twice in response to the tweets published by any
of the six digital diplomacy actors. Only participants in the Twitter digital diplomacy were
invited for interview.
19

Batches of active participants (users who commented at least twice in response to the
Twitter digital diplomacy of the six actors) were contacted on a rolling basis, roughly every three
months from June 2017 until July 2018. Commenters were contacted on a rolling basis so that
interview answers reflected recent participation in digital diplomacy and so that respondents who
agreed to be interviewed did not do so because of a single international event or political
development. Batches of invitees were compiled every three months by combining all comments
in response to the tweets published by the digital diplomacy actors in the week prior to the
sending of the invitations. If this process yielded fewer than 100 comments associated with any

19
This is because commenters could be contacted directly on Twitter by “tweeting at” individual users; by contrast,
messages (for example, containing interview invitations) sent to Facebook commenters who were not preexisting
contacts or “friends” were delivered to folders that function as receptacles for spam. As an alternative, two of the
digital diplomacy actors were contacted and asked if interview invitations could be posted in the comments section
of their Facebook pages. Both declined to give permission, so the decision was made to invite only Twitter
participants for interview.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

98
digital diplomacy account, all comments in response to the 50 tweets published by that account
prior to the invitation date were compiled. Once the comments were compiled, they were sorted
by username. Users who commented at least twice according to the compiled data—considered
more active than those who commented only once—comprised the batches of users who were
invited for interview. In total, 511 users were contacted for interview. Ten in-depth interviews
were conducted, for a response rate of 2%. Due to the international sample, an Internet-based
interview process was considered the most efficacious strategy (Mosemghvdlishvili & Jansz,
2013). Synchronous interviews were conducted using Twitter’s text-based direct messaging
feature. Messaging-based interview processes are beneficial because they feature both an
interactive nature (Crichton & Kinash, 2003, cited in Mosemghvdlishvili & Jansz, 2013) and
partial privacy, which allows participants “contextual naturalness” (Mann & Stewart, 2002, cited
in Mosemghvdlishvili & Jansz, 2013, p. 493). Interviews lasted about one hour and fifteen
minutes on average. Interviewees were compensated $40 USD for their time, paid by Amazon
electronic gift card or PayPal.
Interview questions centered on two main topics, derived from the research questions
listed above: 1) participants’ impressions of the nature of their Twitter-based communication
with the facilitating international actors, which addressed whether a dialogic theoretical
framework is feasible for and appropriate to the phenomenon of digital diplomacy; and 2) the
motives of respondents for participating in the Twitter digital diplomacy.
Braun and Clarke’s (2016) method of thematic analysis was utilized to analyze the
interview responses due to these authors’ explicit and rigorous guidelines provided. Thematic
analysis is “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data”
(Braun & Clarke, 2016, p. 79). Thematic analysis was selected because it offers flexibility in
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

99
terms of epistemological and theoretical approaches (Braun & Clarke, 2016), which is well-
suited to exploratory investigation like that undertaken in this section of the current study.
Thematic analysis also allows the research questions to guide the identification of patterned
responses or meaning in the data (Braun & Clarke, 2016), and has been utilized in prior
interview-based studies focused on reasons for the use of socially oriented digital media (e.g.
Nilsen, Hafstad, Staksrud, & Dyb, 2018).
A theoretical, rather than inductive, approach to the thematic analysis was undertaken as
the investigation was guided by established research questions. The data were furthermore
analyzed semantically. This is because respondents’ stated views about, and motives for
participating in, the digital diplomacy were the focus of the research, instead of the
corresponding latent meanings.
The approach set out by Braun and Clarke (2016) and followed involves a six-phase
process, moving from familiarizing oneself with the obtained data, to producing initial codes, to
discovering themes, to reviewing themes, to defining and naming themes, and finally to
producing the research report (p. 87). All coding was performed manually.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

100

VI. Results

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

101
Appendix 1 displays the type of tweet or post published by the digital diplomacy actors,
both in volume and percentage of the actor’s overall tweets or posts. The Swedish MFA
published the highest percentage of retweets (80%), followed by the U.S. DOS (60%), Indian
Diplomacy (12%), the Indian MEA (11%) and Sweden.se (2%). ShareAmerica did not publish a
single retweet in the time period considered. In terms of directed tweets (sometimes referred to
as “tweeting at” another account), only Sweden.se published this kind of tweets (3%). Two
actors published tweets that were replies to other tweeters: Sweden.se (55%) and the Indian
MEA (1%).
With regard to Facebook, the Indian MEA published the highest percentage of shared
posts, photos or videos (40%), followed by the Swedish MFA (25%) and the U.S. DOS (13%).
ShareAmerica and Sweden.se did not publish a single shared Facebook post, photo or video.
Indian Diplomacy does not maintain a Facebook account.
Part One
RQ1 addressed what kinds of public diplomacy activities would be present in the digital
diplomacy considered, according to Cull’s (2008a) taxonomy. Table 1 displays the results by
nation and property, with the public diplomacy activities presented in alphabetical order.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

102

Table 1
Type of Public Diplomacy Activity by Nation and Property
Digital Diplomacy
Property

Advocacy
Cultural
Diplomacy
Exchange
Diplomacy
International
Broadcasting
Listening
Opportunity

Other
U.S. DOS
Twitter (N=302) 158 (52%) 18 (6%) 5 (2%) 277 (92%) 29 (10%) 2 (1%)
Facebook (N=302) 170 (56%) 23 (8%) 6 (2%) 301 (100%) 32 (11%) 1 (0%)
TOTAL (N=604) 328 (54%) 41 (7%) 11 (2%) 578 (96%) 61 (10%) 3 (0%)
ShareAmerica
Twitter (N=303) 213 (70%) 82 (27%) 5 (2%) 213 (70%) 88 (29%) 0 (0%)
Facebook (N=275) 131 (48%) 71 (26%) 3 (1%) 227 (83%) 216 (79%) 0 (0%)
TOTAL (N=578) 344 (60%) 153 (26%) 8 (1%) 440 (76%) 304 (53%) 0 (0%)
Swedish MFA
Twitter (N=301) 179 (59%) 21 (7%) 5 (2%) 234 (78%) 25 (8%) 7 (2%)
Facebook (N=60) 42 (70%) 8 (13%) 0 (0%) 46 (77%) 9 (15%) 0 (0%)
TOTAL (N=361) 221 (61%) 29 (8%) 5 (1%) 280 (78%) 34 (9%) 7 (2%)
Sweden.se
Twitter (N=250) 7 (3%) 177 (71%) 0 (0%) 22 (9%) 26 (10%) 1 (0%)
Facebook (N=60) 7 (12%) 34 (57%) 0 (0%) 24 (40%) 7 (12%) 2 (3%)
TOTAL (N=310) 14 (5%) 211 (68%) 0 (0%) 46 (15%) 33 (11%) 3 (1%)
Indian MEA
Twitter (N=272) 124 (46%) 27 (10%) 1 (0%) 245 (90%) 7 (3%) 0 (0%)
Facebook (N=301) 82 (27%) 43 (14%) 3 (1%) 219 (73%) 13 (4%)
46
(15%)
TOTAL (N=573) 206 (36%) 70 (12%) 4 (1%) 464 (81%) 20 (3%)
46
(8%)
Indian Diplomacy
Twitter (N=302) 147 (49%) 104 (34%) 1 (0%) 218 (72%) 35 (12%) 0 (0%)
TOTAL (N=302) 147 (49%) 104 (34%) 1 (0%) 218 (72%) 35 (12%) 0 (0%)

Across the properties, international broadcasting was the public diplomacy activity most
frequently identified, accounting for 74% of the total sample. Advocacy was the activity next
most frequently identified, accounting for 46% of the entire sample. These were followed by
cultural diplomacy (22% of the total sample), listening opportunities (18% of the total sample)
and exchange diplomacy (1% of the total sample).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

103
RQ1a inquired whether the public diplomacy activities would differ by nation. The data
shown in Table 1 reveal that the two U.S. properties featured the highest proportion of advocacy
messages (56.85%), followed by the two Indian properties (40.34%) and then the Swedish
properties (35.02%). The two Swedish properties featured the highest proportion of cultural
diplomacy messages (35.77%), followed by the two Indian properties (19.89%) and then the two
U.S. properties (16.41%). The U.S. properties featured the most exchange diplomacy (1.61%),
followed by the Swedish properties (.75%) and the Indian digital diplomacy actors (.57%). With
regard to international broadcasting, the U.S. properties featured this activity in 86.13% of
published messages, followed by the Indian properties (77.94%) and the Swedish actors
(48.58%). Finally, the U.S. also led in percentage of published messages that featured listening
opportunities (30.88%), followed by the Swedish actors (9.99%) and the Indian properties
(6.29%).
RQ1b sought to examine differences in public diplomacy activities by type of
organization (the MFAs versus the other organizations, which are funded by the same
governments but whose guiding missions appear to prioritize dialogic communication with
publics). Appendices 2, 3 and 4 display public diplomacy activity by type of organization,
focusing on the U.S. properties, the Swedish actors and the Indian properties, respectively.
These tables provide further detail by listing the topic area or focus of the tweets and posts
within each public diplomacy activity.
Examining the two U.S. properties, 60% of the ShareAmerica digital diplomacy was
comprised of advocacy, while 54% of the DOS content was advocacy; however, there was no
association found between type of U.S. digital diplomacy actor and the presence of advocacy (X
2
(1) = 3.27, p = 0.078). In both U.S. cases, the most frequently coded subject of the advocacy
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

104
messaging was the environment/clean energy. Twenty-six percent of the ShareAmerica
messaging was comprised of cultural diplomacy, while seven percent of the DOS content was
cultural diplomacy, and there was an association between type of U.S. digital diplomacy property
and the presence of cultural diplomacy (X
2
(1) = 83.40, p < .001). ShareAmerica most frequently
published cultural diplomacy related to language; the U.S. DOS most often published messages
that were holiday greetings. ShareAmerica furthermore published a greater percentage of
listening opportunities (53%) than did the U.S. DOS (10%), and there was an association
between type of U.S. digital diplomacy property and the presence of listening opportunities (X
2
(1) = 249.90, p < .001). With regard to listening opportunities, “any question asked” was most
frequently identified in the ShareAmerica digital diplomacy, while “any other chance for input”
was most frequently identified in the U.S. DOS tweets and posts.
Two percent of the U.S. DOS digital diplomacy was exchange diplomacy, while one
percent of the ShareAmerica digital diplomacy was exchange diplomacy, but there was no
association found between type of U.S. digital diplomacy actor and the presence of exchange
diplomacy (X
2
(1) = .36, p = 0.646). The U.S. DOS published a greater percentage of
international broadcasting messaging than did ShareAmerica (96% to 76%), and there was an
association between type of U.S. digital diplomacy property and the presence of international
broadcasting (X
2
(1) = 94.67, p < .001). The U.S. DOS most frequently published international
broadcasting that featured a statement from a government official, while ShareAmerica most
often published tweets and posts that centered on providing international updates (updates on
international events, topics, situations, etc.)
Appendix 3 provides the Swedish public diplomacy activities by type of organization.
The Swedish MFA published a greater percentage of advocacy messaging than did Sweden.se
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

105
(61% to 5%), and there was an association found between type of Swedish digital diplomacy
property and the presence of advocacy (X
2
(1) = 235.64, p < .001). The most frequently coded
subject of the Swedish MFA advocacy messaging was peace, while the most frequent subject of
the Sweden.se advocacy was social policy. One percent of the Swedish MFA digital diplomacy
was exchange diplomacy, while no Sweden.se message was related to exchange diplomacy.
There was no association found between type of Swedish property and the presence of exchange
diplomacy (X
2
(1) = 4.33, p = 0.065). The Swedish MFA published a greater percentage of
international broadcasting (78%) than did Sweden.se (15%), and there was an association
between type of Swedish property and the presence of international broadcasting (X
2
(1) =
262.67, p < .001). The Swedish MFA international broadcasting most frequently provided
international updates (updates on international events, topics, situations, etc.), while the
Sweden.se international broadcasting most frequently centered on domestic updates (matters
within Sweden).
Sweden.se published a higher percentage of cultural diplomacy than did the Swedish
MFA (68% to 8%), and there was an association between type of Swedish property and the
presence of cultural diplomacy (X
2
(1) = 261.61, p < .001). The most frequent subject of the
Sweden.se cultural diplomacy was nature/travel/tourism, while the most frequent subject of the
Swedish MFA cultural diplomacy was the arts. Eleven percent of Sweden.se digital diplomacy
were listening opportunities, while 9% of Swedish MFA digital diplomacy were listening
opportunities; however, there was no association found between type of Swedish property and
the presence of listening opportunities (X
2
(1) = .28, p = 0.608). The Sweden.se listening
opportunities most frequently centered on any question asked, while the Swedish MFA listening
opportunities most often provided any other chance for input.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

106
Appendix 4 displays the Indian public diplomacy activities by type of organization.
Forty-nine percent of Indian Diplomacy tweets (the actor does not maintain a Facebook
property) were advocacy, while 36% of the Indian MEA Facebook posts and tweets were
advocacy, and there was an association between type of Indian property and the presence of
advocacy (49% to 36%; X
2
(1) = 13.30, p < .001). The most frequently coded subject of both the
Indian Diplomacy and Indian MEA advocacy was financial/trade/economy. Indian Diplomacy
also published more cultural diplomacy than did the Indian MEA (34% to 12%), and there was
an association found between type of Indian property and the presence of cultural diplomacy (X
2
(1) = 61.29, p < .001). Both Indian Diplomacy and the Indian MEA most frequently published
cultural diplomacy tweets and posts that were related to sports. These overwhelmingly featured
a worldwide Indian government campaign celebrating International Yoga Day on June 21, 2016:
a kind of hybrid sports, lifestyle and spiritual cultural diplomacy that drew crowds to practice
yoga at the sites of Indian embassies and other Indian government properties throughout the
world. Twelve percent of Indian Diplomacy tweets were listening opportunities, while three
percent of Indian MEA posts and tweets were listening opportunities, and there was an
association between type of Indian property and the presence of listening opportunities (X
2
(1) =
22.02, p < .001). Both Indian Diplomacy and the Indian MEA most frequently published
listening opportunities that centered on providing any other chance for input.
In contrast, .70% of the Indian MEA digital diplomacy was comprised of exchange
diplomacy, while .30% of Indian Diplomacy messaging was comprised of exchange diplomacy;
however, there was no association found between type of Indian property and the presence of
exchange diplomacy (X
2
(1) = .47, p = 0.665). Finally, the Indian MEA published a greater
percentage of international broadcasting messaging than did Indian Diplomacy (81% to 72%),
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

107
and there was an association between type of Indian property and the presence of international
broadcasting (X
2
(1) = 8.89, p < .01). The Indian MEA most frequently published international
broadcasting that was centered on an appearance of a government official, while Indian
Diplomacy most often published tweets and posts that were centered on domestic updates
(matters within India).
RQ1c investigated differences in public diplomacy activities by platform (Facebook or
Twitter). Data from Table 1 reveal that across all actors, the tweets contained a higher
percentage of advocacy messages than did the Facebook posts (48% to 43%), and there was a
significant association between type of platform used and the presence of advocacy (X
2
(1) =
5.33, p < .05). Across all actors the tweets also contained a higher percentage of cultural
diplomacy messages than did the Facebook posts (25% to 18%), and there was a significant
association between type of platform used and the presence of cultural diplomacy (X
2
(1) =
17.21, p < .001).
In contrast, across all actors the Facebook posts contained a higher average percentage of
exchange diplomacy than did the tweets (1.2% to 1%), but there was no association found
between type of platform used and the presence of exchange diplomacy (X
2
(1) = .29, p = 0.699).
Across all actors the Facebook posts also contained a higher percentage of international
broadcasting than did the tweets (82% to 70%), and there was a significant association between
type of platform used and the presence of international broadcasting (X
2
(1) = 47.52, p < .001).
Finally, across all actors the Facebook posts contained a higher percentage of listening
opportunities than did the tweets (28% to 12%), and there was a significant association between
type of platform used and the presence of listening opportunities (X
2
(1) = 105.25, p < .001).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

108
RQ1d addressed whether the content analysis would document activities in the digital
diplomacy that do not align closely with established public diplomacy classifications according
to Cull’s (2008a) taxonomy of activities. Table 1 shows that one percent of U.S. DOS tweets
could not be well classified according to this taxonomy; two percent of the Swedish MFA tweets
could not be classified according to the taxonomy; three percent of the Sweden.se Facebook
posts could not be classified according to the taxonomy; and 15% of the Indian MEA Facebook
posts could not be well categorized according to Cull’s (2008a) taxonomy of activities. The
tweets and posts coded as “other” are analyzed in the Discussion chapter.
Finally, H1 predicted that the cultural diplomacy properties (considered as such because
of their stated or apparent relative emphasis on promoting their nations’ cultural resources)—
ShareAmerica, Sweden.se and Indian Diplomacy—would contain more cultural diplomacy
activities than would the digital diplomacy of these actors’ corresponding MFAs (The U.S. DOS,
the Swedish MFA and the Indian MEA). Table 1 shows that 26% of the ShareAmerica
messaging was comprised of cultural diplomacy, while seven percent of U.S. DOS messaging
was cultural diplomacy, and there was a significant association between type of U.S. digital
diplomacy actor and the presence of cultural diplomacy (X
2
(1) = 83.4, p < .001). Sixty-eight
percent of Sweden.se messaging was made up of cultural diplomacy, while 8% of Swedish MFA
messaging was cultural diplomacy, and there was a significant association between type of
Swedish digital diplomacy actor and the presence of cultural diplomacy (X
2
(1) = 261.61, p <
.001). Thirty-four percent of Indian Diplomacy messaging was comprised of cultural diplomacy,
while 12% of Indian MEA messaging was cultural diplomacy, and there was a significant
association between type of Indian digital diplomacy actor and the presence of cultural
diplomacy messages (X
2
(1) = 61.3, p < .001). H1 was thus confirmed.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

109
Part Two
Part two of the study examined the dialogic practices found in the digital diplomacy
disseminated by the 11 international actors investigated throughout this study. RQ2 asked what
dialogic practices would be present in the digital diplomacy considered, according to Kent and
Taylor’s (1998) principles for the use of dialogic Internet-based communication in public
relations. Table 2 provides the volumes and percentages of the dialogic practices contained in
the digital diplomacy considered.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

110
Table 2
Dialogic Principle by Property and Platform
Digital Diplomacy
Property
Dialogic Loop Usefulness of
Information
Generation of
Return Visits
Rule of
Conservation
of Visitors
One or More
Replies to a Public
Comment
1

Retweet of a
Public Tweet/
Shared Public Post

U.S. DOS
Twitter (N=302) 0 (0%) (N=111) 0 (0%) 402 17 (6%) 153 (51%)
Facebook (N=302) 0 (0%) (N=301) 0 (0%) 482 25 (8%) 202 (67%)
TOTAL (N=604) 0 (0%) (N=412) 0 (0%) 884 42 (7%) 355 (59%)
ShareAmerica
Twitter (N=303) 0 (0%) (N=30) 0 (0%) 453 28 (9%) 292 (96%)
Facebook (N=275) 0 (0%) (N=80) 0 (0%) 360 32 (12%) 267 (97%)
TOTAL (N=578) 0 (0%) (N=110) 0 (0%) 813 60 (10%) 559 (97%)
Swedish MFA
Twitter (N=301) 0 (0%) (N=29) 0 (0%) 519 7 (2%) 40 (13%)
Facebook (N=60) 1 (5%) (N=21) 0 (0%) 114 4 (7%) 21 (35%)
TOTAL (N=361) 1 (2%) (N=50) 0 (0%) 633 11 (3%) 61 (17%)
Sweden.se
Twitter (N=250) 46 (28%) (N=164) 0 (0%) 215 1 (0%) 17 (7%)
Facebook (N=60) 13 (22%) (N=60) 0 (0%) 70 0 (0%) 16 (27%)
TOTAL (N=310) 59 (26%) (N=224) 0 (0%) 285 1 (0%) 33 (11%)
Indian MEA
Twitter (N=272) 1 (1%) (N=175) 0 (0%) 254 0 (0%) 16 (6%)
Facebook (N=301) 0 (0%) (N=241) 0 (0%) 470 12 (4%) 20 (7%)
TOTAL (N=573) 1 (0%) (N=416) 0 (0%) 724 12 (2%) 36 (6%)
Indian Diplomacy
Twitter (N=302) 0 (0%) (N=105) 0 (0%) 571 12 (4%) 41 (14%)
TOTAL (N=302) 0 (0%) (N=105) 0 (0%) 571 12 (4%) 41 (14%)

1
The percentages shown in the “One or More Replies to a Public Comment” column reflect the number of those instances in
relation to the tweets/posts that elicited a comment or comments, rather than in relation to all tweets/posts.

RQ2a investigated whether the dialogic practices identified would differ by platform
(Facebook or Twitter). Data from Table 2 reveal that across all actors the tweets contained a
higher percentage of practices classified under the principle of Dialogic Loop than did the
Facebook posts (2.7% to 1.4%), and there was a significant association between type of platform
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

111
used and the presence of practices classified under Dialogic Loop (X2 (1) = 4.99, p < .05). In
contrast, across all actors the Facebook posts contained about 1.50 examples of the Usefulness of
Information principle per post, while the tweets contained about 1.40 examples of the Usefulness
of Information per tweet. In addition, across all actors the Facebook posts contained a higher
percentage of practices classified under the principle of Generation of Return Visits than did the
tweets (7.3% to 3.8%), and there was a significant association between type of platform used and
the presence of practices classified under Generation of Return Visits (X
2
(1) = 16.68, p < .001).
Finally, across all the actors the Facebook posts contained a higher percentage of practices
classified under the Rule of Conservation of Visitors principle than did the tweets (52.7% to
32.3%), and there was a significant association between type of platform used and the presence
of practices classified under Rule of Conservation of Visitors (X
2
(1) = 109.88, p < .001).
RQ2b examined what “updates” to the consideration of sociotechnical practices—
specifically, the use of hyperlinks, retweets, hashtags, and multimedia—would be present in the
digital diplomacy considered, also according to Kent and Taylor’s (1998) principles for dialogic
Internet-based communication. Appendix 5 displays these updates to sociotechnical practices,
which were classed under the “Usefulness of Information” dialogic principle. Hyperlinks to
websites and other SNSs maintained by the same nation were not considered under the
“Usefulness of Information” principle, but under the “Rule of Conservation of Visitors” principle
(they are not included in Appendix 5). Indian Diplomacy most frequently included hyperlinks to
independent press or media sites (22% of tweets), while the Swedish MFA most frequently
included hyperlinks to independent social media sites (1% of posts and tweets) and to other sites
(23% of posts and tweets). The Swedish MFA also most often used hashtags (69% of posts and
tweets). ShareAmerica most frequently included photographs in its digital diplomacy (76% of
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

112
posts and tweets), while the U.S. DOS most often included videos (24% of posts and tweets), and
India Diplomacy most frequently utilized images, charts or graphs (43% of tweets).
H2 predicted that the digital diplomacy of Sweden, which was argued to welcome
technological risk and embrace participatory digital culture, would exhibit more dialogic
practices than would the digital diplomacy of the U.S., a technologically risk-averse actor, and
that of India, whose stance toward embracing new technology and participatory digital culture is
unknown. Focusing solely on the measure of one or more replies to a public comment, Table 2
shows that 21.90% of the four Swedish properties’ messages contained instances of Dialogic
Loop, while 0% of the four U.S. properties’ messages contained instances of Dialogic Loop, and
there was a significant association between nation-state (Sweden or the U.S.) and instances of
Dialogic Loop (X
2
(1) = 123.63, p < .001). Moreover, 0.19% of the three Indian properties’
messages contained examples of Dialogic Loop, and there was a significant association between
nation-state (Sweden or India) and examples of Dialogic Loop (X
2
(1) = 119.42, p < .001).
However, the Swedish accounts featured marginally fewer instances of the Usefulness of
Information principle (1.37 instances per tweet and post, taken together) than did both the U.S.
accounts (1.44 instances per tweet and post) and the Indian accounts (1.48 instances per tweet
and post). In addition, 1.8% of the four Swedish properties’ messages contained instances of the
Generation of Return Visits principle, while 8.6% of the four U.S. properties’ messages
contained instances of the Generation of Return Visits principle, and there was a significant
association between nation-state (Sweden or the U.S.) and instances of the Generation of Return
Visits principle (X
2
(1) = 34.69, p < .001). In addition, 2.7% of the three Indian accounts’
messages contained instances of the Generation of Return Visits principle, though there was no
association found between nation-state (Sweden or India) and examples of the Generation of
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

113
Return Visits principle (X
2
(1) = 1.52, p = 0.238). Furthermore, 14.0% of all Swedish digital
diplomacy contained instances of the Rule of Conservation of Visitors principle, while 77.3% of
all U.S. digital diplomacy contained instances of the Rule of Conservation of Visitors principle,
and there was a significant association between nation-state (Sweden or the U.S.) and the
occurrence of instances of the Rule of Conservation of Visitors principle (X
2
(1) = 691.75, p <
.001). However, 8.8% of all Indian digital diplomacy contained instances of the Rule of
Conservation of Visitors principle, and there was a significant association between nation-state
(Sweden or India) and instances of the Rule of Conservation of Visitors principle (X
2
(1) = 10.48,
p < .010). Therefore, taking into account all of the dialogic principles, H2 was substantially
rejected.
Finally, H3 predicted that the digital diplomacy of the actors guided by explicit or
implicit missions to engage in dialogue or conversation with publics (ShareAmerica, Indian
Diplomacy and Sweden.se) would exhibit more dialogic practices than would the digital
diplomacy of these actors’ corresponding MFAs (The U.S. DOS, The Indian MEA and the
Swedish MFA). Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 display the results for each dialogic principle by type of
property, showing Dialogic Loop, Usefulness of Information, Generation of Return Visits, and
Rule of Conservation of Visitors, respectively. Figure 1 displays the results with respect to
Dialogic Loop.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

114

Sweden.se did feature a higher percentage of instances (26%) than its corresponding
MFA (2%), and there was a significant association between type of Swedish property and
instances of the principle of Dialogic Loop (X
2
(1) = 14.16, p < .001). The only other actor that
featured an instance of Dialogic Loop was the Indian MEA Twitter account (1 instance, less than
1% of Indian tweets and posts).
(Figure 2) displays the results with respect to Usefulness of Information.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

115

Only the Indian Diplomacy property (1.89 instances per tweet and post, taken together)
featured a higher percentage of instances than its corresponding MFA (1.26 instances per tweet
and post, taken together).
Figure 3 depicts the results related to Generation of Return Visits.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

116

The ShareAmerica (10.4%) and Indian Diplomacy (4.0%) properties featured higher
percentages of instances of the principle than their corresponding MFAs (7.0% and 2.1%,
respectively). There was a significant association between type of U.S. property and instances of
the Generation of Return Visits principle (X
2
(1) = 4.40, p < .05). However, there was no
association found between type of Indian property and instances of the Generation of Return
Visits principle (X
2
(1) = 2.62, p = 0.127).
Finally, Figure 4 displays the results with respect to the Rule of Conservation of Visitors
principle.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

117

The ShareAmerica (96.7%) and Indian Diplomacy (13.6%) properties both featured
greater percentages of instances of this principle than did their corresponding MFAs (58.8% and
6.3%, respectively). There was a significant association between type of U.S. property and
instances of the Rule of Conservation of Visitors principle (X
2
(1) = 242.47, p < .001). There
was also a significant association between type of Indian property and instances of the principle
of Rule of Conservation of Visitors (X
2
(1) = 13.11, p < .001).
Therefore, taking into account the results associated with all four dialogic principles, H3
was partially substantiated.
Part Three
Part three of the study addressed RQ3 and used qualitative content analysis to infer the
motives behind the posting of comments in response to the relevant digital diplomacy. In the
case of each property (except the Swedish MFA Facebook account, as discussed), comments or
replies attached to the most heavily commented Facebook post and tweet in the time period
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

118
considered were content analyzed. With regard to the U.S. DOS, Figure 5 displays the most
heavily commented tweet in the three-month time period of the study.

Figure 5. Most Heavily Commented Tweet Published by the U.S. Department
of State (4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016)

This U.S. DOS international broadcasting and advocacy tweet referenced the July 15,
2016 failed military coup in Turkey that took the lives of 290 people and injured more than 1,400
others (Tuysuz & McLaughlin, 2016). The Obama administration may have supported Turkish
president Recep Tayyip Erdogan because Turkey has been considered a partner and ally in the
U.S. fight against the Islamic State militant group (Yeginsu & Victor, 2016). The situation may
have been further complicated by Erdogan’s blaming of Fethullah Gulen, a Muslim cleric and
political rival, for the attempted coup; Mr. Gulen lives in self-exile in Pennsylvania, USA, and
Erdogan called on the Obama administration to arrest or extradite Gulen (Yeginsu & Victor,
2016).
Of the 93 total comments available to code, 10 were replies to other users’ comments.
Eighty of the total comments were deemed to address the topic or theme of the tweet, four did
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

119
not address the topic or theme of the tweet, and in the case of nine comments it could not be
determined whether they addressed the topic or theme of the tweet. Two comments were in a
foreign language and could not be translated automatically and one comment was an emoticon
only. Appendix 6 displays the motives coded for the remaining comments (N=90). Of those
comments for which a motive could be inferred, the highest percentage evidenced a motive that
was opposing the agenda, opinion or position stated in the tweet (67.78%), followed by giving a
political opinion related to the topic of the tweet (51.11%) and flaming or trolling (42.22%).
Figure 6 displays the most heavily commented U.S. DOS Facebook post in the three-
month time period of the study.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

120
Figure 6. Most Heavily Commented Facebook Post Published by the U.S. Department
of State (4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016)

This U.S. DOS Facebook international broadcasting and advocacy post was a 6:55 video
of a June 17, 2016, Department of State Daily Press Briefing, in which Assistant Secretary
William Brownfield, Bureau of International Narcotics & Law Enforcement, discussed resource
allocation and strategy for combatting the narcotics trade in Central America. Facebook would
display only 363 out of the 964 comments submitted in response to that post.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

121
Of the 363 total comments available to code, three were replies to other users’ comments.
One of the available comments addressed the topic or theme of the post, 357 did not address the
topic or theme of the post, and five comments could not be determined to address the topic or
theme of the post or not. Two comments were in a foreign language and could not be translated
automatically. Appendix 6 displays the motives coded for the remaining comments (N=361). Of
those comments for which there could be inferred a motive, the highest percentage evidenced a
motive that was to address an unrelated political cause (98.34%).
With regard to the ShareAmerica property, Figure 7 displays the most heavily
commented tweet in the three-month time period of the study.

Figure 7. Most Heavily Commented Tweet Published by ShareAmerica
(4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016)

This ShareAmerica international broadcasting tweet previewed and linked to an article
about the mosquito-borne Zika virus and the efforts that teenage students are making to combat
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

122
the disease through their research (Buchanan, 2016). The Zika virus and infection had been
associated with thousands of babies being born with underdeveloped brains (“Zika Outbreak,”
2016). In February 2016, the World Health Organization declared the Zika virus a global public
health emergency (“Zika Outbreak,” 2016).
At the time of data extraction, 11 comments were available to code and three of these
were replies to other users’ comments. Nine of the comments addressed the topic or theme of
the tweet, while two comments could not be determined to address the topic or theme of the
tweet or not. Appendix 6 displays the motives coded for the comments (N=11). Of those
comments for which a motive could be inferred, the highest percentage evidenced a motive that
was supplying unrequested information or insight (45.45%), followed by expressing an opinion
not related to the tweet, politics or policy (27.27%).
Figure 8 displays the most heavily commented ShareAmerica Facebook post in the three-
month time period of the study.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

123

Figure 8. Most Heavily Commented Facebook Post Published by
ShareAmerica (4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016)

This ShareAmerica Facebook post featuring celebrity Angelina Jolie Pitt was an
advocacy message seeking to bring attention to, and gain support for, the plight of refugees.
Jolie Pitt served as Special Envoy for the United Nations’ High Commissioner on Refugees
(Quinn, 2016). This advocacy message was timed to coincide with World Refugee Day on June
20, 2016; Jolie also made an appearance at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C. on
that day (Quinn, 2016).
Of the four total comments available to code, none was a reply to another user’s
comment. Three of the comments addressed the topic or theme of the post, while in one case it
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

124
could not be determined whether the comment addressed the topic or theme of the post.
Appendix 6 displays the motives coded for the comments (N=4). Of those comments for which a
motive could be inferred, one opposed the agenda, opinion or position stated in the post; one
supported or complimented a U.S. official other than the president or secretary of state; and one
supported the agenda, opinion or position stated in the post.
With regard to the Swedish MFA digital diplomacy, Figure 9 displays the most heavily
commented tweet in the three-month time period featured throughout the study.

Figure 9. Most Heavily Commented Tweet Published by the Swedish Ministry
for Foreign Affairs (4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016)

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

125
This Swedish MFA international broadcasting tweet announced that Sweden had been
voted in to fill a two-year non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, joining
Ethiopia, Kazakhstan and Bolivia as newly elected non-permanent members (Italy and the
Netherlands divided a term, as neither could secure the required two-thirds majority vote
(“General Assembly Elects,” 2016)). Sweden built its campaign for the non-permanent seat on a
commitment to human rights, disarmament, international law and development (“UN Has ‘Great
Interest in Sweden’,” 2015). Another priority for Sweden was tackling conflicts like those in
Ukraine or Syria (“UN Has ‘Great Interest in Sweden’,” 2015); thus, the inclusion of the hashtag
#PushForPeace also makes this tweet an advocacy message.
Of the 46 total comments available to code, 3 were replies to other users’ comments.
Forty-one of the comments addressed the topic or theme of the tweet, none did not address the
topic or theme of the tweet, and five comments could not be determined to address the topic or
theme of the tweet or not. One comment was in a foreign language and could not be translated
automatically, and one comment consisted solely of a GIF file. Appendix 6 displays the motives
coded for the remaining comments (N=44). Of those comments for which a motive could be
inferred, the highest percentage evidenced a motive that was supporting the agenda, opinion or
position stated in the tweet (61.36%), followed by offering congratulations (54.55%) and giving
a political opinion related to the topic of the tweet (29.55%).
Figure 10 displays the most heavily commented available Swedish MFA Facebook post
in the three-month time period of the study.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

126
Figure 10. Most Heavily Commented Available Facebook Post
Published by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
(4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016)

This Swedish MFA cultural diplomacy post commemorated King Carl XVI Gustaf’s 70
th

birthday by featuring a montage of video clips from Swedish Foreign Service staff all over the
world sending their good wishes to the Swedish monarch. The king of 43 years faced declining
levels of popularity at the time, as newspapers reported he had visited strip clubs; one poll taken
before the birthday celebration indicated that many Swedes believed the king should abdicate the
throne to his daughter, Crown Princess Victoria (“Sweden Celebrates,” 2016). There were also
fears of a terrorist attack, as Iraqi authorities had informed Swedish security about the possible
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

127
presence of Islamic State militants who may have been planning an attack in Stockholm
(“Sweden Celebrates,” 2016).
Of the 25 comments available to code, none was a reply to another user’s comment.
Fifteen of the comments addressed the topic or theme of the post, one did not address the topic or
theme of the post, and in nine cases it could not be determined whether the comment addressed
the topic or theme of the post. Two comments were emojis only. Appendix 6 displays the
motives coded for the remaining comments (N=23). The highest percentage evidenced a motive
that was supporting the agenda, opinion or position stated in the post (43.48%), followed by
adding other people/contacts to the conversation thread (17.39%) and supporting or
complimenting an official (of the nation represented by the digital diplomacy actor) who is not
the prime minister or foreign secretary (13.04%).
With regard to the Sweden.se digital diplomacy, Figure 11 displays the most heavily
commented tweet in the three-month time period.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

128
Figure 11. Most Heavily Commented Tweet Published by Sweden.se
(4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016)

This Sweden.se tweet was both cultural diplomacy and a listening opportunity. Of the
161 total comments available to code, two were replies to other users’ comments. One hundred
forty-seven comments addressed the topic or theme of the tweet, one did not address the topic or
theme of the tweet, and 13 comments could not be determined to address the topic or theme of
the tweet or not. Five comments were in a foreign language and could not be translated
automatically, and one comment consisted solely of an emoji. Appendix 6 displays the motives
coded for the remaining comments (N=155). Of those comments for which a motive could be
inferred, the highest percentage evidenced a motive that was supplying an answer or requested
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

129
information (94.84%), followed by flaming or trolling (20.00%) and giving a political opinion
related to the topic of the tweet (7.10%).
Figure 12 displays the most heavily commented Sweden.se Facebook post in the three-
month time period.

Figure 12. Most Heavily Commented Facebook Post Published by
Sweden.se (4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016)

This Sweden.se Facebook post was an international broadcasting message providing tips
for foreigners on finding employment in Sweden. In 2015 there were record levels of
immigration in Sweden (“Eight Out of Ten,” 2017), due in part to a concerted effort to welcome
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

130
foreigners, including refugees. Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt gave a famous speech in 2014
asking Swedes to “open their hearts” to refugees; by 2015, 165,000 asylum seekers had gained
entry to Sweden, more per capita than in any other European nation (Cerrotti, 2017). However,
this unprecedented influx of people has placed a strain on the Swedish economy and contributed
to political instability and controversy (Cerrotti, 2017). Figures from the first quarter of 2017
revealed that the unemployment rate for native-born Swedes was just under five percent, while it
was 16 percent for those born outside of Sweden; moreover, by 2017, eight out of 10 new jobs
were going to immigrants (“Eight Out of Ten,” 2017). This raised the possibility of backlash
among native-born Swedes over Swedish immigration policy.
There were 183 comments available to code at the time of data extraction. Of these, 35
were replies to other users’ comments. Ninety-five comments addressed the topic or theme of
the post, 13 did not address the topic or theme of the post, and in 75 cases it could not be
determined whether the comment addressed the topic or theme of the post. Three comments
were emojis only. Appendix 6 displays the motives coded for the remaining comments (N=180).
Of those comments for which a motive could be inferred, the highest percentage evidenced a
motive that was adding another person or contact to the conversation thread (32.78%), followed
by supporting the agenda, opinion or position stated in the post (27.78%) and seeking additional
related information (16.67%).
With regard to the Indian MEA digital diplomacy, Figure 13 displays the most heavily
commented tweet in the three-month time period considered.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

131
Figure 13. Most Heavily Commented Tweet Published by the Indian
Ministry of External Affairs (4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016)

This Indian MEA tweet was an international broadcasting message that publicized India’s
efforts to provide relief to Sri Lankans after flashfloods and landslides in May 2016 killed at
least 37 people and displaced hundred of thousands more (Bastians, 2016). The tweet can also
be interpreted as advocacy due to the inclusion of the words “helping hands”. India has made a
concerted effort to become a benevolent regional actor under Prime Minister Modi; it has
provided money, civilian and military disaster relief workers, and materials to Nepal, Yemen, the
Philippines, Tonga, Myanmar, Fiji, the Maldives and Sri Lanka (Chaulia, 2018). As a result,
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

132
India has shifted from net recipient to net giver with respect to aid; in the year 2015 to 2016
alone, India contributed $1.16 billion in aid to others while receiving just $322 million from
multilateral banks and foreign governments (Chaulia, 2018). The promotion of this foreign aid
may be key to India’s relevant digital diplomacy, as Modi has given “unprecedented publicity to
Indian aid, to boost his nationalist credentials and buttress the point that India is now an aid
provider” (Chaulia, 2018). India’s relationship with Sri Lanka had been up and down; it had
been strengthened by high-level meetings and the signing of agreements, but tested by issues like
fishermen poaching in each other’s territorial waters and especially by China’s influence in Sri
Lanka, including the acquisition of the strategic port of Hambantota (PTI, 2017). The latter
China question could be a reason for consternation among Indian publics and diaspora who
engage with Indian digital diplomacy.
Of the 136 total comments available to code, 12 were replies to other users’ comments.
Ninety-two comments addressed the topic or theme of the tweet, 11 did not address the topic or
theme of the tweet, and 33 comments could not be determined to address the topic or theme of
the tweet or not. Thirteen comments were in a foreign language and could not be translated
automatically, and four comments consisted solely of an emoji. Appendix 6 displays the motives
coded for the remaining comments (N=119). Of those comments for which a motive could be
inferred, the highest percentage evidenced a motive that was supporting the agenda, opinion or
position stated in tweet (54.62%), followed by giving a political opinion related to the topic of
the tweet (30.25%) and expressing national pride (10.92%).
Figure 14 displays the most heavily commented India MEA Facebook post in the three-
month time period.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

133
Figure 14. Most Heavily Commented Facebook Post Published by the Indian Ministry of
External Affairs (4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016)

This Indian MEA international broadcasting message was a Facebook Live video of
Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj giving her annual press conference in New Delhi on
June 19, 2016 (black rectangular text box added to Figure 14 to obscure commenters’ names and
Facebook accounts). In the hour-long press conference, delivered mostly in Hindi, Minister
Swaraj touted the accomplishments of the Modi government over the past year, spoke at length
about India’s bid to join the multilateral nuclear export control regime Nuclear Suppliers Group,
and focused on India’s foreign relations in its immediate neighborhood (“7 Things,” 2016).
There were 544 comments available to code, of which ten were replies to other users’
comments. Two hundred and twenty-two of the comments addressed the topic or theme of the
post, 46 did not address the topic or theme of the post, and in 276 cases it could not be
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

134
determined whether the comment addressed the topic or theme of the post. Nine comments were
in a foreign language and could not be translated automatically, and 37 comments consisted
solely of an emoji. Appendix 6 displays the motives coded for the remaining comments
(N=498). Of those comments for which a motive could be inferred, the highest percentage
evidenced a motive that was supporting the agenda, opinion or position stated in the post
(40.76%), followed by supporting or complimenting the foreign secretary of the nation
represented by the digital diplomacy actor (16.27%) and expressing national pride (8.23%).
Finally, with regard to Indian Diplomacy, Figure 15 displays the most heavily
commented tweet in the three-month time period utilized throughout the study.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

135
Figure 15. Most Heavily Commented Tweet Published by Indian
Diplomacy (4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016)

This Indian Diplomacy tweet was an international broadcasting message that highlighted
Prime Minister Modi’s June 2016 visit to the U.S. and hyperlinked to a joint statement issued by
the two nations. The visit was Modi’s fourth as prime minister, and the occasion marked the
seventh time he had met U.S. president Barack Obama (Agrawal, 2016). The June 2016
appearance also included an address to a Joint Meeting of Congress in the House Chamber,
Modi’s first and an honor given to only a few world leaders each year (Agrawal, 2016). Indian
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

136
digital diplomats would likely showcase Modi’s close relationship with Washington as a way to
trumpet India’s economic growth and increased investment opportunities; according to Tanvi
Madan of the Brookings Institution, India-U.S. trade nearly doubled from $60 billion in 2009 to
$107 billion in 2015, while sales of U.S. defense equipment to India were up to $14 billion in
2016, a 50-fold rise from 2006 (cited in Agrawal, 2016). Modi has thus taken every opportunity
to maximize and publicize his close connections to the U.S.; for instance, he drew 20,000
supporters to a speech during his first visit to New York, and has appeared with Facebook
founder Mark Zuckerberg and SpaceX founder Elon Musk (Agrawal, 2016). These and other
appearances and policy priorities drew widespread coverage from the Indian media, which
focused particularly on what it termed a “bromance” between Prime Minister Modi and President
Obama (Agrawal, 2016).
Of 113 total comments available to code, eight were replies to other users’ comments.
Seventy-eight comments addressed the topic or theme of the tweet, three did not address the
topic or theme of the tweet, and 32 comments could not be determined to address the topic or
theme of the tweet or not. Eighteen comments were in a foreign language and could not be
translated automatically, two comments consisted solely of an emoji, and one consisted solely of
a GIF file. Appendix 6 displays the motives coded for the remaining comments (N=92). Of
those comments for which a motive could be inferred, the highest percentage evidenced a motive
that was supporting the agenda, opinion or position stated in the tweet (77.17%), followed by
supporting or complimenting the president/prime minister of the nation represented by the digital
diplomacy actor (34.78%) and giving a political opinion related to the topic of the tweet
(20.65%).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

137
Part Four
The final part of the study used in-depth interviews with willing participants in the
Twitter digital diplomacy of the actors considered throughout this research, in order to
triangulate the data obtained from the preceding content analyses. Ten synchronous interviews
were conducted using Twitter’s direct messaging function. Four interviewees had commented at
least twice in response to the U.S. Department of State tweets; two interviewees had commented
at least twice in response to the Swedish MFA tweets; two interviewees had commented at least
twice in response to the India MEA tweets; one interviewee had commented at least twice in
response to the Indian Diplomacy tweets; and one interviewee had commented at least twice in
response to the Sweden.se tweets. Five of the ten interviewees considered their countries of
origin to be those represented by the digital diplomacy actor whose tweets they commented on.
Six of the interviewees lived in the country represented by the digital diplomacy actor whose
tweets they commented on; four of the interviewees were “foreign publics” in the context of
digital diplomacy—that is, they did not live in the country represented by the actor whose tweets
they commented in response to. The mean age of the interviewees was 40.6 years with one
respondent choosing not to provide an age.
Interview responses are analyzed thematically in the following, Discussion chapter of this
dissertation.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

138

VII. Discussion

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

139
Beginning with type of tweet or Facebook post (Appendix 1), it is notable that the U.S.
DOS posted more retweets of others’ tweets (60% of total tweets) than “original” tweets (40% of
total tweets), as did the Swedish MFA (80% of total tweets compared to 20% of total tweets).
The Indian MEA also published a substantial percentage of shared Facebook posts (40%)
compared with “original” Facebook posts (60%). This indicates a potential willingness among
these actors to relinquish a degree of control over message. However, as Table 2 reveals, none
of the digital diplomacy actors published a single retweet of a tweet or repost of a Facebook post
that originated with a public. As described above, several scholars hold that retweets convey
importance or authority placed upon the re-tweeted account (Larsson & Moe, 2012; Ausserhofer
& Maireder, 2013), while others argue that retweets may signal one is listening (citing boyd,
Golder, & Lotan, 2010; both cited in Freelon, 2014). Therefore, these digital diplomacy actors
do not appear willing to demonstrate publicly through retweeting or reposting either a
recognition that stakeholder publics have agency or that they are willing to listen. Moreover, the
ShareAmerica account did not publish a single retweet or shared Facebook post, which indicates
a refusal to be perceived as endorsing any socially mediated message that is not directly
affiliated with the ShareAmerica property, including those of other U.S. government officials or
entities.
With regard to the Twitter-specific action of publishing a directed tweet (distinct from a
reply and sometimes referred to as “tweeting at” someone), only Sweden.se made use of this
feature and affordance. This is noteworthy because a directed tweet invites a reaction or reply,
which cannot be controlled by the digital diplomacy actor. In addition, Sweden.se was the only
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

140
actor to publish a substantial percentage of tweets that were replies (55% of the sample).
20
The
importance of tweeted replies is discussed below in the section on dialogic communication.
Part One
RQ1 centered on what kind of public diplomacy activities were evident in the digital
diplomacy, according to Cull’s (2008a) taxonomy. This research provides clear evidence that
the actors considered, in the aggregate, are treating Facebook and Twitter as a digital vehicle for
international broadcasting and advocacy messaging strategies; that is, their most common uses of
Facebook and Twitter appear to be as additions to their international broadcasting and advocacy
toolkits. Seventy-four percent of the total sample was coded as international broadcasting
(though messages were often coded as more than one type of public diplomacy activity), which
is most closely associated with the dissemination of news or updates. Indeed, 96% of the U.S.
DOS’s digital diplomacy was considered international broadcasting. Eighty-one percent of the
Indian MEA messages were classed as international broadcasting, as was 72% of Indian
Diplomacy messaging, which is consistent with Natarajan’s (2014) observation that India’s
digital diplomacy resembles the content of a news wire.
In addition, just under half of the entire sample was coded as advocacy, which aligns with
scholarly observation of the preponderance of advocacy messaging across public diplomacy
actors (e.g. Cull, 2008a, 2013), including digital diplomacy entities (e.g. Dodd & Collins, 2017).
Together, the prevalence of the international broadcasting and advocacy activities furthermore
suggests that these digital diplomacy actors favor top-down or hierarchical messaging strategies,
in which the messages are formulated and disseminated in a manner consistent with a desire to
maintain control over the communication. This point is emphasized by the findings from two of

20
The Indian Diplomacy account published two total tweets that were replies.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

141
the actors that were identified in this study as cultural diplomacy accounts displaying an
ostensible objective of engaging in dialogue with publics: ShareAmerica and Indian Diplomacy.
In the case of the former, only 26% of the posts and tweets were coded as cultural diplomacy,
while 60% were coded as advocacy and 76% were coded as international broadcasting. In the
case of Indian Diplomacy (Twitter only), 34% of the messages were considered cultural
diplomacy, while 49% were considered advocacy and 72% were coded as international
broadcasting. A notable exception was the third actor that was considered a cultural diplomacy
organization, Sweden.se, which published a majority of cultural diplomacy (68%) messages
compared to advocacy (5%) and international broadcasting (15%). Thus, two of the three
cultural diplomacy organizations actually utilized more broadcasting and advocacy than cultural
diplomacy in their digital diplomacy.
This point about the prevalence of hierarchical communication and potential control-
based strategies is further emphasized when one considers the paucity of listening opportunities
across all the accounts, save for ShareAmerica; listening opportunities like asking for UGC or
other forms of public input signal openness to employing a more horizontal communication
model. The other five actors published listening opportunities in just 8.5% of posts and tweets,
more than only exchange diplomacy. This is consistent with the findings from Dodd and
Collins’ (2017) study of Twitter digital diplomacy, in which listening was the least frequent
public diplomacy activity identified across accounts. The exception in the current study was
ShareAmerica, which evidenced listening opportunities in more that half of its digital diplomacy.
However, Appendix 2 reveals that 87% of these ShareAmerica listening opportunities consisted
of simply posing any question in the post or tweet, rather than the listening strategies that
indicate a deeper commitment to or consideration of the audience such as offering poll-related
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

142
content, requests for UGC and other concrete chances for specific input. Also clear from the
data is that none of these actors are highlighting exchange diplomacy on Twitter and Facebook:
just 1.06% of all posts and tweets mentioned or featured exchanges. One can assume that other
digital properties like dedicated websites and unaffiliated social media accounts are being
utilized to promote or conduct exchange diplomacy, rather than the social media accounts of
MFAs and related digital diplomacy accounts.
RQ1a inquired about differences in type of public diplomacy activity by nation. This
study’s documented U.S. emphasis on advocacy—56.85% of all posts and tweets compared to
38.03% of all other nations’ posts and tweets, and an association found between nation (U.S.
compared to the others) and the presence of advocacy (X
2
(1) = 95.45, p < .001)—aligns with
Cull’s (2008a) invoking of the U.S. as an exemplar of an actor that makes singular and
comparatively frequent use of advocacy in its public diplomacy. Moreover, these results suggest
that the U.S. concentration on advocacy extends into the realm of digital diplomacy and the
SNSs through which it is enacted. The U.S. also featured more international broadcasting
messages (86.13%) than did the other nations (65.20% of all other nations’ posts and tweets),
and there was an association found between nation (U.S. compared to the others) and the
presence of international broadcasting (X
2
(1) = 153.47, p < .001). Taken together, these results
thus also support Cull’s (2013) account of a stubborn and ongoing U.S. preference for pushing
out advocacy and international broadcasting messages in a hierarchical communication format,
despite the emergence of ubiquitous participatory communication technologies.
Indian digital diplomacy followed behind that of the U.S. in terms of both percentage of
advocacy (40.34% of posts and tweets) and international broadcasting (77.94% of posts and
tweets) messages. Sweden’s digital diplomacy exhibited a lower percentage of advocacy
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

143
(35.02%) and international broadcasting activities (48.58%) than that of both the U.S. and India.
By contrast, Sweden published more cultural diplomacy messaging (35.77%) than India
(19.89%) and the U.S. (16.41%). The U.S. digital diplomacy did clearly feature the highest
percentage of listening opportunities (30.88%), but as stated above, much of this was due to the
frequency of ShareAmerica’s posing of questions in its tweets and Facebook posts. The U.S.
DOS, by contrast, featured listening opportunities in just 10% of its posts and tweets, compared
to 10% in the Swedish posts and tweets and 6.29% in the Indian posts and tweets. Thus, with
regard to type of public diplomacy utilized and considering all the activity types, the Indian
model of digital diplomacy appears to resemble the U.S. hierarchical model, which features
activities like the dissemination of information and is likely characterized by one-way
communication flows.
RQ1b centered on differences in public diplomacy activity by type of organization. The
extent of the U.S. focus on advocacy is further demonstrated by the fact that ShareAmerica—
which describes itself as “a global conversation” (ShareAmerica, n.d.)—published no fewer
advocacy posts and tweets than did the DOS (in fact, it published more (60% to 54%), though
statistically there was no association found between type of U.S. digital diplomacy actor and the
presence of advocacy (X
2
(1) = 3.27, p = 0.078)). The highest percentage of U.S. advocacy
messages documented in this study focused on the environment and clean/alternative energy
sources (9% in the case of the U.S. DOS and 12% in the case of ShareAmerica), and specifically
on building support for the Paris Climate Agreement, signed by U.S. Secretary of State John
Kerry on April 22, 2016. This finding aligns with those of Manor and Segev’s (2015) study of
U.S. DOS digital diplomacy disseminated in December 2013, also during the presidency of
Barack Obama; these authors find that the DOS Facebook posts and tweets evinced an effort to
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

144
brand the U.S. as part of the global community instead of in opposition to it, in part through its
stated efforts to combat climate change. The current study’s finding of the environment or clean
energy as the dominant advocacy topic also aligns with Manor’s (2017) findings in a follow-up
study of U.S. DOS digital diplomacy during the Obama administration, this time investigating
DOS Facebook posts from January 2016. Those results found that of the relatively few
Facebook posts centered on the economy (6.4% of the sample), those that did depicted a U.S.-led
global economy as climate conscious.
With regard to international broadcasting, the DOS most frequently published posts and
tweets that included statements from U.S. leaders like Secretary Kerry and President Obama.
This indicates that U.S. practitioners recognize the importance of engaging with a domestic
digital diplomacy audience, in addition to an international one. In contrast, the ShareAmerica
international broadcasting tweets and posts most frequently provided international updates, or
news about international events and topics, likely indicating a focus on an international rather
than domestic audience. This difference with respect to audience recognition is also likely
evident in the foci of U.S. cultural diplomacy: ShareAmerica most frequently published cultural
diplomacy messages related to the English language and its use in America, while the DOS most
often published cultural diplomacy messages that were holiday greetings, relevant to
international and domestic audiences alike.
The Swedish digital diplomacy exhibited large discrepancies between the Swedish MFA
and Sweden.se in percentages of international broadcasting messages and advocacy, which
suggests a clear delineation in the messaging strategy undertaken by each Swedish property. The
same observation can be made in relation to Swedish cultural diplomacy, as the Sweden.se
properties were used eight times more often for cultural diplomacy than were those of the
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

145
Swedish MFA. The most frequent focus of the Sweden.se cultural diplomacy was the promotion
of Sweden’s natural beauty, architectural landmarks and other tourist attractions (22% of all
tweets and posts). Almost 99% of the Sweden.se cultural diplomacy coded as “other” occurred
on Twitter; examples of these tweets are analyzed below in the discussion of findings related to
RQ1d. Finally, it is noteworthy that the Sweden.se digital diplomacy did not contain statistically
supported higher percentages of listening opportunities than did the Swedish MFA or the other
digital diplomacy accounts in the aggregate. The other actors’ listening opportunities comprised
18.78% of their total posts and tweets; when one excludes ShareAmerica, whose tweets and
posts featured listening opportunities in 53% of total cases, the other actors included listening
opportunities in 8.15% of their digital diplomacy. There was no association found between type
of actor (Sweden.se or the other actors, excluding ShareAmerica) and the presence of listening
opportunities (X
2
(1) = 2.12, p = 0.153). Thus, the Sweden.se digital diplomacy actor is not
distinguishing itself from its peers through presenting listening opportunities that may be
associated with a horizontal, participatory communication model.
With regard to the Indian digital diplomacy, the Indian Diplomacy account (Twitter only)
featured more listening opportunities than did the MEA, as well as more cultural diplomacy than
did the MEA, both backed statistically through associations found between type of Indian
property and the presence of these activities. Indian Diplomacy also published a lower
percentage of international broadcasting messages than did the MEA, also backed by an
association found between type of Indian property and the presence of international
broadcasting. On one hand, these differences suggest a conscious attempt to utilize a less
informational and hierarchical messaging strategy for the Indian Diplomacy account, which
states publicly a mission of “Engagement through #digitaldiplomacy” (Indian Diplomacy, n.d.),
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

146
than for the MEA. On the other hand, Indian Diplomacy notably published a higher percentage
of advocacy (49%) than did the Indian MEA (36%), supported statistically by an association
found between type of Indian property and the presence of advocacy. This advocacy (23% in the
case of Indian Diplomacy and 8% in the case of the MEA) was most frequently centered on
promoting India’s economic strength and related matters, suggesting that inculcating a strategic
narrative highlighting India’s rise on the world stage is a top priority, even for the Indian
Diplomacy account, which is ostensibly tasked with establishing engagement with publics rather
than projecting power. This assertion is strengthened by the high percentage of Indian
Diplomacy international broadcasting messages coded as providing domestic updates (30%), for
example in highlighting progress made like the development of Indian infrastructure. The
argument is further bolstered by the high percentage of Indian MEA messages that featured an
appearance of a government official (33%) or statement from a government official (23%). Of
particular note are those highlighting Prime Minister Modi, who is often identified as the shrewd
steward of India’s economic rise (e.g. Broadman, 2017).
RQ1c dealt with differences in public diplomacy activities by platform (Facebook and
Twitter). Across all actors, the tweets contained a statistically supported higher percentage of
advocacy messages than did the Facebook posts (48% to 43%), and a statistically supported
higher percentage of cultural diplomacy messages than did the Facebook posts (25% to 18%). In
contrast, the Facebook posts contained statistically supported higher percentages of international
broadcasting than did the tweets (82% to 70%) and listening opportunities than did the tweets
(28% to 12%). As discussed in Chapter 3, research has established that the social interactivity
motive is a comparatively strong predictor of Facebook use (Quan-Haase & Young, 2010;
Raacke & Bonds-Raacke, 2008; Joinson, 2008; Stanley, 2015). Listening opportunities, which
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

147
include the asking of questions that publics may associate with social interactions, therefore
appear to be astutely employed more by these actors on Facebook than on Twitter. Conversely,
Twitter’s micro-blog functionality and strict character limit make the information-sharing motive
a comparatively strong predictor of Twitter use (Alhabash & Ma, 2017; Johnson & Yang, 2009).
Thus, to the extent that information sharing is linked to information seeking, these digital
diplomacy actors may be mistaken in selecting more frequently Facebook over Twitter for the
dissemination of information through international broadcasting. In addition, the use of Twitter
more by these actors than Facebook for cultural diplomacy may also be misguided. Twitter’s
character limit (now 280 characters, formerly 140) and research documenting the recent rise of
“passive use” motives like entertainment for Facebook use (Alhabash & Ma, 2017; Alhabash,
Chiang, & Huang, 2014; Alhabash, Park, Kononova, Chiang, & Wise, 2012; Karlis, 2013)
suggest that Facebook may be the more effective choice as host for cultural diplomacy,
especially those cultural diplomacy messages which have the potential to entertain users.
RQ1d addressed whether the digital diplomacy considered would contain activities that
could not be well placed within Cull’s (2008a) taxonomy of public diplomacy activities. The
Indian MEA Facebook posts contained the highest percentage of messages that were not placed
into the taxonomy (15%). Ninety-six percent of these posts were efforts to promote other
government-affiliated Facebook accounts, like those of Indian embassies, and increase
engagement data, particularly through gaining “likes”. Figure 16 displays an example of such a
post, an activity that can be referenced as engagement–promotion.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

148
Figure 16. Example of Indian MEA Engagement–Promotion Facebook Post

There are three important observations to be made about the type of activity referenced
here as engagement–promotion. First, this activity is not well classified as a listening
opportunity, as the unambiguous action requested to “like a page” leaves little room for publics
to express their own agendas and thus display agency through active participation. Second, this
activity represents a clear effort to boost the production of engagement data that can be
aggregated and used in (favorable) analytics reports or to bolster the perceived credibility of the
page that is hyperlinked. Third, this engagement–promotion activity is only possible online, as it
is dependent upon the interactivity and navigability affordances that distinguish digital media
from traditional media with respect to their psychological and behavioral consequences (Sundar
& Limperos, 2013). In other words, this specific type of activity is unique to digital diplomacy
and will not be utilized in offline public diplomacy.
Two Sweden.se Facebook posts were coded as unable to be classified according to Cull’s
(2008a) taxonomy. These can also be considered a novel activity: routine lifestyle diplomacy.
Figure 17 displays two examples of such messages.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

149

Figure 17. Examples of Sweden.se Routine Lifestyle Diplomacy Facebook Posts

The first example in Figure 17 was considered cultural diplomacy (sports) and the second
was coded as advocacy (social policy), but these two posts are also unique in their depiction of
routine activities (playing ping pong, a Friday lunch) and mundane weekend greetings. These
are facilitated by the ubiquitous nature of communication technologies, as the technologies make
feasible a public diplomacy message with which audiences can engage at home, at work, in
transit, in a social setting, in isolation, and when multi-tasking. The first post in Figure 17 also
clearly utilizes a personal tone (through its inclusion of “you”), which is appropriate to the focus
on the daily routines that comprise the lives of ordinary citizens and capitalizes on the
personalization that often characterizes socially mediated communication, for example between
friends (Baym, 2015; Ellison, Vitak, Gray, & Lampe, 2014; Madden et al., 2013). The personal
tone is also consistent with the social interaction motive that has been shown to underpin the use
of SNSs (Whiting & Williams, 2013), especially that of Facebook (Quan-Haase & Young, 2010;
Raacke & Bonds-Raacke, 2008; Joinson, 2008; Stanley, 2015).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

150
A second novel public diplomacy activity that utilizes the personalization found in
digitally mediated communication and in SNSs specifically, along with the ubiquitous nature of
communication technologies and digital platforms, can be classified as personal
reaction/reflection diplomacy. This type of activity disseminates the personal opinions and
reflections of digital diplomats on topics that arise quickly or on stimuli that are part of a pre-
planned activity. Importantly, these opinions or reflections are not developed sufficiently for
publication or airing as stand-alone pieces of content; yet, they reference topics and priorities
that are relevant to the strategic priorities of the international actor. Digital media enable the
public sharing of these reactions and reflections, while SNSs facilitate their personal and
potentially engaging tone. Figure 18 displays two examples of personal reaction/reflection
diplomacy. The first is a Swedish MFA retweet of a Swedish government official’s tweet that
was a reflection on the thirtieth anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. This must be
viewed in the context of Sweden’s official statement that it “strives for further progress on the
issue of nuclear disarmament” and a “continuous strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) through a wide and balanced implementation of the treaty” (“Representation,” n.d.). The
second is a U.S. DOS retweet of a personal reaction shared on Twitter by President Barack
Obama upon the passing of Holocaust survivor, author and professor Elie Wiesel, notably posted
on the day of Wiesel’s death. This message must be viewed in relation to both the steadfast U.S.
partnership with Israel, the Jewish state, and to the U.S. government commitment to and strategic
priority of “improving its ability to respond to potential mass atrocities” (“Atrocities
Prevention,” n.d.).

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

151
Figure 18. Examples of Swedish MFA and U.S. DOS Personal Reaction/Reflection Diplomacy
Tweets

Two other examples of digital diplomacy that were coded “other” warrant discussion.
These were tweets and posts that were classified as other kinds of cultural diplomacy. The first
relates to the Sweden.se property and to its Twitter account specifically. Twenty-two percent of
the total Sweden.se tweets and posts were coded as evidencing an “other” type of cultural
diplomacy, and 79% percent of these featured GIF files, both integrated into tweets containing
text and as standalone content. These GIF-file tweets (all were published on Twitter), some of
which were inserted into “original” tweets and some of which were used to reply to other users,
invoked references to movies, popular music, consequential events and other manifestations of
popular culture. The concept and definition of a meme have been the focus of much scholarly
debate (Shifman, 2014). Dawkins (1976), who originated the term, conceptualized a meme
simply as a unit of imitation or cultural transmission (Shifman, 2014). An Internet meme can be
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

152
defined as “the propagation of items such as jokes, rumors, videos, and websites from person to
person via the Internet” (Shifman, 2014, p. 2). According to Shifman (2014), there are two
central attributes of Internet memes. The first is their spurring of user-created additions to the
original digital content in the form of parodies, mash-ups or remixes. The second is
intertextuality, which refers to the creative, complex and surprising ways that memes relate to
one another. The Sweden.se GIF-based tweets are therefore interpretable as a specific type of
what can be termed Internet meme diplomacy. Figure 19 shows two examples of Internet meme
diplomacy published by Sweden.se (black boxes added to obscure user names and Twitter
handles).

Figure 19. Examples of Sweden.se Internet Meme Diplomacy Tweets

The first depicts an excerpt from the 2004 film Mean Girls, in which the user-created
additions not only center the GIF file on a piece of dialogue, “You know Swedish?,” but also
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

153
superimpose that text onto the file. In this case, Sweden.se utilizes Internet meme diplomacy as
a retort to tweeted criticism of the Swedish language, which is a prominent Swedish cultural
resource. In the second example, the Internet meme diplomacy takes the form of a GIF file that
depicts an astronaut hovering in space while carrying a six-pack of beer branded with the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) logo. The user-created additions are
both the origination of the GIF file itself and the addition to the image of the branded six-pack of
beer. This example also displays intertextuality, as the hovering astronaut meme is related to the
geographically unbound leisure activity of drinking beer, itself a meme; it is furthermore related
to the NASA brand, which is also interpretable as a meme due to the agency’s cultural
significance. In this example, Sweden.se utilizes Internet meme diplomacy again as a retort, this
time to establish that Sweden’s landmass is twice that of Great Britain, and thus rebut criticism
of a claim made by Sweden.se about the nation’s geography. Indeed, the potential strategic
advantage gained by employing a meme—to leverage digital culture and mitigate criticism of
previously disseminated cultural diplomacy messaging, in both of the above examples—is key to
the consideration of Internet meme diplomacy. The ease with which SNSs can be used to spread
such GIF-file memes through digital networks and to include them in conversational interactions
also suggests that Internet meme diplomacy will be most effectively, if not exclusively, enacted
through SNSs.
Sweden.se was notably the only actor to utilize Internet meme diplomacy in the posts and
tweets considered in this study. Such utilization of a digital cultural artifact displays a fluency
with and in-depth understanding of contemporary socio-technical culture, along with a
willingness to embrace technological risk. This finding is thus consistent with previous accounts
of Sweden as a trailblazer in digital diplomacy (e.g. Pelling, 2015) whose guiding strategic
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

154
objectives reflect careful consideration of the shifting norms and values that characterize and
distinguish the contemporary communication environment (e.g. Pamment, 2012).
Finally, H1, which predicted that the cultural diplomacy organizations ShareAmerica,
Sweden.se and Indian Diplomacy would contain more cultural diplomacy activities than would
these actors’ corresponding MFAs, was confirmed. Sweden.se displayed the clearest evidence of
a realized cultural diplomacy mission, as this account featured cultural diplomacy more than
eight times more frequently than did the Swedish MFA. ShareAmerica followed, as it featured
cultural diplomacy nearly four times more frequently than did the U.S. DOS. Indian Diplomacy
featured cultural diplomacy nearly three times more often than did the Indian MEA. These
comparative results provide further evidence that the emergent Indian model of digital diplomacy
more closely resembles that of the U.S. than that of Sweden.
Part Two
Part two advanced the study of the crucial construct of dialogue in digital diplomacy in
two ways: by differentiating the type of actors whose messaging is subject to empirical
investigation and by updating the operationalization of dialogic communication in digital
diplomacy to better reflect the practices of contemporary socio-technical culture. Both
objectives were undertaken through the application of Kent and Taylor’s (1998) principles for
the use of dialogic Internet-based communication in public relations.
On one hand, the results displayed in Table 2, in the aggregate, constitute findings that
align with past research of dialogue in both digital diplomacy and in other formats of
organization–public communication. These actors’ messages featured practices classified under
the Usefulness of Information dialogic principle—hyperlinks to external sources, hashtags and
multimedia—in almost 1.5 instances per tweet or post (1.43 instances, to be precise). Moreover,
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

155
all the actors featured the practice classified under the Rule of Conservation of Visitors
principle—the inclusion of hyperlinks to websites and other SNSs maintained by the same
government—in 39.77% of posts and tweets. The digital diplomacy actors are thus effectively
setting the stage for dialogic communication, particularly through providing publics with
information that is preferred by the organization and that is easily accessible and potentially
useful, which equips publics to interact with the organization as an “informed partner” (Kent &
Taylor, 1998).
However, the actors very rarely employed the crucial principle of Dialogic Loop, which
entails the organizational representative responding to the questions, concerns and problems
communicated by public stakeholders. All actors replied once or more to the comments of users
in just 4.63% of those posts and tweets that elicited comments. Indeed, removing the Sweden.se
Twitter account—the outlier in terms of Dialogic Loop—the other properties replied once or
more to the comments of users in just .18% percent of those posts and tweets that garnered
comments. Moreover, all the actors utilized practices under the principle of Generation of
Return Visits—events like Q&A sessions and other participatory, time-bound fora—in just
5.06% of their posts and tweets. This is an instructive finding, as instances categorized under the
Generation of Return Visits principle present the clearest opportunities for realized dialogic
interaction, next to the practices classified under Dialogic Loop.
Therefore, taken together, these results are consistent with findings of past research
related to dialogic communication in digital diplomacy, particularly with respect to the scarcity
of activities classified under the principle of Dialogic Loop (Kampf et al., 2015), and with results
of studies employing similar operationalizations of dialogic engagement (Manor, 2017; Bjola &
Jiang, 2015; Cha et al., 2014). The findings in the present study are also consistent with the
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

156
larger corpus of empirical research which utilizes Kent and Taylor’s (1998) dialogic principles to
investigation organization–public communication; that body of research finds that the dialogic
potential of Internet-based communication is not being met, despite the presence of
organizational properties that provide publics with useful information that is easy to navigate
(McAllister-Spooner, 2009). These results also align with past studies of organizations’ external
uses of SNSs specifically, which find an underutilization of the dialogic capabilities afforded by
SNSs (Watkins, 2017).
On the other hand, this research documents—perhaps for the first time in digital
diplomacy studies—an actor that does appear to be realizing the dialogic potential of Internet-
based media and of SNSs specifically. The Sweden.se accounts replied at least once to
comments in more than a quarter of instances in which the tweets and posts elicited comments;
indeed, with respect to the Sweden.se Twitter property, this was the case in nearly one in three
(28%) of the commented tweets.
It is therefore noteworthy that H2 was still substantially rejected: the digital diplomacy of
Sweden, a technological risk-welcoming nation that embraces participatory digital culture, did
not exhibit more instances of the dialogic principles in the aggregate than did that of the U.S., a
technological risk-averse actor, or that of India, a rising digital diplomacy actor whose stances
toward new communication technologies and participatory digital culture are unknown.
Particularly interesting is that the Swedish digital diplomacy featured statistically supported
fewer practices classified under the Generation of Return Visits principle than did the U.S.
accounts, and it featured no more instances of the Generation of Return Visits principle than did
the Indian properties (in fact, marginally fewer). The Generation of Return Visits principle is
interpretable as presenting clear opportunities for realized dialogic interaction because publics
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

157
are given concrete and specific opportunities to makes their voices heard. Yet, Manor (2017)
interprets these time-bound participatory fora not as true opportunities for dialogue, but rather as
a “quarantined form of engagement” because the conversation is constrained in both subject
matter and duration (p. 318, citing Kampf et al., 2015). Sweden.se’s eschewal of these
constrained but participatory formats of public engagement is thus potentially instructive.
RQ2b called for in-depth analysis of contemporary social-technical cultural practices,
specifically hyperlinking, hashtagging and the use of multimedia, all operationalized under the
Usefulness of Information principle (except hyperlinks to websites and other SNSs maintained
by the same nation, which were operationalized under the Rule of Conservation of Visitors
principle). Sweden.se—the outlier in relation to Dialogic Loop—exhibited no more frequent use
of these “updates” to sociotechnical practices than did the other actors; in fact, in many cases
Sweden.se exhibited fewer instances (results shown in Appendix 5). Also of note was the
finding that Indian Diplomacy most frequently included hyperlinks to independent press or
media sites (22% of tweets), indicating a willingness to highlight journalist perspectives not
belonging to government officials, even if the articles selected were likely framed in a manner
that is favorable to the government of India. Hashtagging was used in nearly half of all actors’
posts and tweets (48.57%), which also indicates a willingness to provide information and
perspectives from an array of sources; however, the actors’ preferred perspectives can be
assumed to generally align with the framing invoked by the hashtag. Photos were the most
frequently employed type of multimedia across actors (51.10% of all tweets and posts), followed
by images/charts/graphs (21.66%) and videos (9.49%). These actors therefore displayed a clear
preference for utilizing photographs over the other formats of multimedia, perhaps because of the
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

158
widespread availability of images on the Internet, a substantial portion of which are high-
resolution.
It is also notable that U.S. properties led in terms of percentage of posts and tweets that
featured two types of multimedia: photographs (ShareAmerica utilized these in 76% of posts and
tweets) and videos (the DOS employed these in 24% of posts and tweets). This is consistent
with the assertion that U.S. digital diplomacy is willing to provide publics with useful and high-
quality curated information and media content, but largely unwilling to engage in realized
dialogic interaction with publics.
Finally, India Diplomacy most frequently utilized images, charts or graphs (43% of
tweets). Many of these were incorporated into series of tweets disseminated under certain
themes that reflect Indian strategic priorities. For example, one such graphics-laden Twitter
series, published on May 31, 2016, advocated and extolled India’s progress in diplomacy and
was promoted the previous day with a tweet stating “Watch this space for our series on
@MEAIndia’s #pathbreakingdiplomacy that is #TransformingIndia.”
RQ2a investigated whether the dialogic practices identified would differ by platform
(Facebook or Twitter). With regard to Dialogic Loop, there was a significant association found
between type of platform used and the presence of practices classified under this principle.
Sweden, essentially the only nation adhering to Dialogic Loop, is hence exhibiting a clear
preference for using Twitter over Facebook to engage in dialogue with publics. Perhaps the most
important finding with regard to platform was that the activities captured under the other dialogic
principles across properties were all documented more often in the Facebook posts than in the
tweets. The largest discrepancy was in relation to the Generation of Return Visits principle:
Facebook was used nearly twice as frequently as Twitter (1.92 times more often) to feature time-
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

159
bound participatory fora like Q&A sessions and panel discussions. Facebook was also utilized
1.63 times more frequently than Twitter for the activity classed under the Rule of Conservation
of Visitors principle: hyperlinking to sites and other SNSs maintained by the same government.
Finally, across actors Facebook was also used marginally more often than Twitter for actions
under the Usefulness of Information principle (1.50 examples per Facebook post, compared to
1.40 instances per tweet). Dialogic communication may be associated with social interaction,
and the motive of social interaction has been shown to undergird the use of Facebook in
particular (Quan-Haase & Young, 2010; Raacke & Bonds-Raacke, 2008; Joinson, 2008; Stanley,
2015); therefore, considering all four principles, these actors appear to display some
understanding that Facebook is likely a more effective vehicle for dialogic communication with
publics than Twitter. The exception is Sweden.se, which appears to prefer Twitter to engage in
dialogue with publics.
Finally, in analyzing the findings related to H3 (Figures 1–4), which was only partially
substantiated, it is useful to isolate the principle of Dialogic Loop. Activities classified under
Dialogic Loop were found essentially only in Swedish digital diplomacy, and especially in that
of Sweden.se. Considering the other dialogic principles, it is noteworthy that Sweden.se
exhibited fewer instances that fit under the other three principles than did the Swedish MFA—
despite Sweden.se’s sustained commitment to replying to the comments of publics and thus
exhibiting the principle of Dialogic Loop. With regard to Usefulness of Information, Sweden.se
featured just less than one (.92) example of this principle per post and tweet; the Swedish MFA
featured 1.75 instances of this principle per post and tweet. With regard to Generation of Return
Visits, there was an association between type of Swedish property and instances of the
Generation of Return Visits principle (X
2
(1) = 7.05, p < .010). Moreover, with respect to the
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

160
Rule of Conservation of Visitors principle, there was also an association between type of
Swedish property and instances of the principle (X
2
(1) = 5.41, p < .05). This points to a
disconnect between Dialogic Loop and the other principles; moreover, through its focus on
Sweden.se, this research has established empirically the unique and critical role of the principle
of Dialogic Loop—and the manner in which its fulfillment might accompany the relative
eschewal of practices that fit under the other three dialogic principles.
Excluding Dialogic Loop, Indian Diplomacy did exhibit more practices that fit under
each of the other dialogic principles than did the Indian MEA, though not supported through
statistical association in the case of the Generation of Return Visits principle. This suggests a
concerted effort on behalf of the Indian foreign affairs bureaucracy to distinguish Indian
Diplomacy from the MEA as a digital diplomacy actor. This is accomplished especially through
including images, charts and graphs; hashtags; and hyperlinks to press sites and other Indian
government websites. A similar observation can be made with respect to the U.S.: with the
exception of activities classed under the Usefulness of Information principle (the U.S. DOS
exhibited marginally more of these examples per post and tweet than did ShareAmerica), the
U.S. appears to be positioning ShareAmerica as a property that places greater emphasis on
dialogic communication than does the DOS, especially through featuring time-bound
participatory fora like Q&A sessions and hyperlinking to other U.S. government sites. Crucially,
however, this is dialogic communication as it is invoked by the U.S. government: a model that
appears to encompass asking questions of publics, providing useful information though trace
data and multimedia, and hyperlinking especially to other U.S. government sites (as was the case
in 59% of DOS posts and tweets, and in fully 97% of ShareAmerica posts and tweets). As noted
above, this U.S. model does not appear to call for actual dialogic conversation or exchange with
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

161
publics, except potentially in restricted and “quarantined” settings like Q&A sessions (Manor,
2017, p. 318, citing Kampf et al., 2015).
Part Three
Part three of the dissertation utilized qualitative content analysis to infer the motives that
drove the commenting of publics in response to the most heavily commented tweet and post
published by the actors in the three-month time period employed throughout the study. This
section is rooted in the recognition that in the current, digitally networked media environment,
users are uniquely empowered to express their individual and group agendas. It was thus argued
that an additional theoretical framework for digital diplomacy is needed and, in fact,
indispensable: digital diplomacy as space for user motives. At the core of this approach is a
media studies perspective that does not take as given the desire of publics to collaborate or even
engage with digital diplomacy actors, but rather views the motives of the participating publics as
unknown and subject to empirical investigation.
A useful starting point for the analysis of this section’s results is to determine what
percentage of the total public comments that were analyzed addressed the topics or themes of the
posts and tweets to which they are attached. These data show that 46.63% of all comments did
address the topic or theme of the relevant tweet or post; 25.97% of the comments did not address
the topic or theme of the relevant tweet or post; and in the case of 27.40% of the comments, it
could not be determined if the comment addressed the topic or theme of the relevant tweet or
post. Thus, out of 1,679 total comments, more than half could not be affirmed to address the
topic or theme of the digital diplomacy disseminated by the actors; in addition, more than one
quarter of the posts and tweets were determined to not address the topic or theme of the relevant
post or tweet. As shall be discussed, the comments in response to the analyzed U.S. DOS
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

162
Facebook post were an outlier of sorts (98.35% of those comments did not address the topic of
the post). Removing those comments from this discussion, 59.42% of the remaining comments
did address the topic or theme of the relevant tweet or post; 6.00% of the comments did not
address the topic or theme of the relevant tweet or post; and in the case of 34.57% of the
comments, it could not be determined if the comment addressed the topic or theme of the
relevant tweet or post. Taken together, these data alone reveal the utility of this research
perspective and theoretical framework, as the most fundamental concern—whether the public
comments addressed the subject or topic highlighted in the relevant digital diplomacy—could not
be confirmed in a substantial proportion of instances.
It is also useful to analyze and compare the most frequently identified motive for each
comment set. Table 3 displays the most frequently coded motives for commenting by property.

Table 3
Most Frequently Coded Motives for User Commenting by Property (Attached to Most Heavily
Commented Tweet and Facebook Post, 4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016)

Digital Diplomacy Property Most Frequently Identified Comment Motive
Percentage
of Total
Coded
Motives

U.S. Department of State

Twitter Oppose Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post (67.78%)
Facebook Address Unrelated Political Cause (98.34%)
ShareAmerica
Twitter Supply Unrequested Information or Insight (45.45%)
Facebook
Oppose Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post (tied)
Support or Compliment Other Official of Nation Represented by
Digital Diplomacy Actor (tied)
Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post (tied)
(25.00%)
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Twitter Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post (61.36%)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

163

Table 3 reveals that of the 13 most frequently identified motives for commenting (the
ShareAmerica comments featured three motives that were tied in terms of frequency), seven of
these were distinct motives. Removing the leading motives for commenting on the
ShareAmerica Facebook post (there was only one occurrence of each), of the 10 remaining most
frequently identified comment motives, six were distinct. These results—that more than half of
the posts and tweets in this section revealed distinct leading motives for their associated user
comments—provide further evidence for the utility of the approach put forward in this study:
participants’ motives should be viewed as unknown but discoverable through empirical
investigation.
It is furthermore useful to devote attention to the findings with respect to the motives
inferred from the public commenting in response to the individual tweets and Facebook posts.
The comments in response to the U.S. DOS tweet conveying the positions of President Obama
and Secretary Kerry on the Turkish military coup (shown in Figure 5) evidenced a vehicle for the
voicing of opposition to the stated U.S. position on Turkish president Recep Erdoğan and his
administration: nearly 70% of the comments displayed this motive. However, it is interesting to
Facebook Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post (43.48%)
Sweden.se
Twitter Supply an Answer or Requested Information (94.84%)
Facebook Add Other Person/Contact to the Conversation Thread (32.78%)
Indian Ministry of External Affairs
Twitter Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post (54.62%)
Facebook Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post (40.76%)
Indian Diplomacy
Twitter Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post (77.17%)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

164
note that 51% of the comments also included a related political opinion, which is to say there
was frequently a display of relevant political knowledge that could potentially be leveraged for
dialogic engagement or for future strategic messaging. Of note is also the 42% of comments that
appeared to be motivated by a desire to flame or troll the DOS or related parties. There is
considerable and growing scholarly debate as to what behaviors and motivations constitute
trolling and flaming (Cook, Schaafsma, & Antheunis, 2018). Here, “flaming” is perhaps the best
fitting term, as it can be employed to signify a type of trolling and is defined as “presenting
emotionally fuelled or contrary statements with an instrumental purpose” (Cook et al., 2018, p.
3329). The purpose of such flaming in response to digital diplomacy is usually to insult or cast
judgment upon an actor, policy, politician or related phenomenon (as opposed to employ
reasoned criticism of that person, entity or policy).
With regard to the most heavily commented Facebook post published by the U.S.
Department of State (depicted in Figure 6), the overwhelming majority of comments (98%)
evinced a motive that addressed an unrelated political cause. The comment section attached to
this post functioned as a space of mobilization to demand action taken to combat the genocide
against the Yazidi people, perpetrated by the militant group ISIS in northwestern Iraq, starting in
2014 (Cetorelli, Sasson, Shabila, & Burnham, 2017). This digital mobilization effort notably had
no topical connection to its associated DOS Facebook post. Figure 20 provides two of the
replicated artifacts that were posted numerous times in the comment section of this DOS
Facebook post (black box added to obscure user account names).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

165

Figure 20. Example of Mobilization Artifacts From Comment
Section of Unrelated Facebook Post Published by
the U.S. Department of State (6/17/2016)

With regard to the most commented ShareAmerica tweet and Facebook post (shown in
Figures 7 and 8), the minimal engagement is striking: in the three-month time period considered,
this most commented tweet elicited only 11 comments, and the most commented Facebook post
garnered only 4 comments. In addition, it is worth noting the motive associated with the heaviest
commented tweet, a message about the Zika virus and student efforts to combat the disease
through research: supplying unrequested information or insight (45.45% of total coded motives).
The information and insight provided by users was related to the Zika virus, indicating some
potential for substantive, knowledge-based dialogue in the social spaces of the ShareAmerica
Twitter account.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

166
In the cases of both the heaviest commented Swedish MFA tweet (shown in Figure 9)
and Facebook post (Figure 10), the most frequently identified motive for commenting was to
support the agenda, opinion or position stated in the message. Specifically, in the case of the
tweet, the comments indicated support for the announcement that Sweden had been voted onto
the United Nations Security Council (61.36% of identified motives); in the case of the Facebook
post, the comments indicated support for a birthday greeting to the Swedish king (43.48% of
identified motives). The MFA tweet and Facebook post thus appear to be eliciting engagement
that aligns with the strategic objectives of that specific digital diplomacy. Also notable was the
third most commonly coded motive identified in the comments responding to the Swedish MFA
tweet: the supplying of a political opinion related to the topic of the tweet (29.55% of identified
motives). As noted above with respect to the comments in response to the U.S. DOS tweet
centered on the Turkish military coup, a substantial percentage of the comments in response to
the Swedish MFA tweet (here, nearly 30%) displayed political or policy knowledge that could be
utilized in the future to build engagement with publics.
In addition, it is potentially important to highlight the motives inferred from the user
comments in response to the most commented Sweden.se tweet and Facebook post. The
Sweden.se tweet (shown in Figure 11) was a hybrid listening opportunity and cultural diplomacy
message asking users what they would write about a picture depicting a Swedish countryside
field and what appears to be a wind turbine, accompanied by text that might have been a tongue-
in-cheek offer of an unspecified prize for the winner. Nearly 95% of comments displayed a
motive that was supplying the requested information, which was surely the motive for engaging
that Sweden.se as digital diplomacy actor desired. However, one in five of the comments also or
instead evidenced a motive of flaming the tweet, the Sweden.se account or Sweden as a nation—
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

167
a potential hazard for Sweden.se in relation to the reception of its digital diplomacy. The most
frequently identified motive for commenting in response to the heaviest commented Sweden.se
Facebook post (Figure 12) was adding another person or contact to the conversation thread
(32.78% of comments). Thus, the social interaction motive for SNS use that has been well
documented by scholars (Whiting & Williams, 2013; Quan-Haase & Young, 2010; Raacke &
Bonds-Raacke, 2008; Joinson, 2008; Stanley, 2015) is also present in digital diplomacy—not
with respect to interacting with the international actor but with other personal contacts.
Moreover, the above-mentioned two most common motives for commenting in response to the
Sweden.se digital diplomacy provide further evidence of the uniqueness of the Sweden.se digital
property: the social interaction and request-fulfilling motives were not prominent in the comment
threads of any of the other actors’ posts and tweets considered.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the most commonly identified motive associated with all
three heaviest commented Indian digital diplomacy messages was supporting the agenda, opinion
or position stated in the tweet or post (shown in Figures 13, 14 and 15). At least 40% of the
comments in each case exhibited a motive of showing such support. The Indian MEA Facebook
post featuring Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj and the Indian Diplomacy tweet
featuring Prime Minister Modi (along with President Obama) elicited particular support, both in
terms of supporting the agenda or position expressed in the message and in displaying support
for the Indian government officials portrayed. This speaks to the personal popularity of External
Affairs Minister Swaraj and Prime Minister Modi. The documented support for both the theme
or position in the above-mentioned messages and for the featured Indian government officials—
in addition to the expression of national pride motive identified (in 8.23% of comments attached
to the MEA Facebook post featuring Ms. Swaraj and in 15.22% of comments attached to the
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

168
Indian Diplomacy tweet featuring Mr. Modi)—thus have the potential to be prominent
contributors to the formulation of Indian digital diplomacy strategy. Indeed, the comments in
response to the most commented MEA tweet (shown in Figure 13) also evidenced the motives of
support for the theme or position in the message (54.62% of comments) and the expression of
national pride (10.92% of comments).
The comments in response to the Indian digital diplomacy furthermore exhibited another
unique dimension: many were addressed to a government official, specifically to Prime Minister
Modi or to External Affairs Minister Swaraj. Thus, in digital diplomacy the social interaction
motive has been identified in user interactions with both government officials and other users.
Moreover, the personal nature of these comments suggests parasocial interaction between users
and the Indian government figures, which is consist with the results of Postelnicu and Cozma’s
(2007) study of comments posted to the MySpace profiles of 2006 U.S. mid-term congressional
candidates. In the case of the Indian Diplomacy tweet, 13.27% of the comments were addressed
to Prime Minister Modi. One example is the following, which was posted on June 7 and
evidenced both the motives of expressing national pride and expressing support for the Prime
Minister: “Sir today we really started feeling PROUD of being Indian under your esteem
leadership.” In the case of the MEA Facebook post, nearly one in five (18.93%) associated
comments was addressed to Minister Swaraj. For example, the following comment expressed
support for the minister: “Good speech and one day hope that we Indians understand what you
have spoken is for our betterment.” Another comment, posted several times, made an unrelated
request, but did so in a manner that also suggested parasocial interaction: “Madam my in laws
blocked my Passport and arrested me in Airport, now Passport impounded and job lost due to
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

169
false 498a case, wat action u take for this, I can never get passport 1 year now, this is very bad in
India.”
The particularly high proportion of comments in response to the MEA Facebook post that
exhibited parasocial interaction is noteworthy—and potentially useful for India’s digital
diplomacy strategy—as that post was a Facebook Live video featuring Minister Swaraj
conducting in real-time an annual press conference. It should be emphasized that this insight, in
addition to the others discussed in this section, are made possible only through employing a
perspective such as the one proposed in this dissertation: digital diplomacy as space for user
motives, in which participating publics’ norms, codes, motives and behaviors must be discovered
rather than taken as given.
Part Four
The final part of this dissertation utilized semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 10
willing participants in the Twitter digital diplomacy of the actors investigated throughout this
study. Interview questions centered on two main topics, derived from the theoretical perspective
and research questions identified in the preceding parts of the study. Specifically, this part
addressed: 1) participants’ impressions of the nature of their Twitter-based communication with
the facilitating international actors, which addressed whether a dialogic theoretical framework is
feasible for and appropriate to the phenomenon of digital diplomacy; and 2) the motives of
respondents for participating in the Twitter digital diplomacy.
A theoretical and semantic thematic analysis approach was utilized to analyze the
interview responses, following the guidelines set out by Braun and Clarke (2016).
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

170
Thematic Analyses
Participants’ views of digital diplomacy. The first concern addressed through thematic
analysis was participants’ views of the nature of their Twitter-based communication with the
facilitating international actors. Two main themes were identified across the data set: skepticism
and optimism.
Skepticism. This theme evinced a pervasive doubt about the utility of engaging with the
officials who maintain the digital diplomacy accounts and suspicion about the intentions of the
government officials associated with the respective national sponsors. These interview responses
offered unambiguous opinions that the digital diplomats were not listening to commenters like
themselves, and that publics like themselves could not shape the foreign policy of the respective
nations that conducted the digital diplomacy. Two subthemes were identified: hostile skepticism
and reasoned skepticism.
Hostile skepticism. Several respondents voiced hostility about the personnel, intentions
and practices associated with the digital diplomacy actor, in addition to skepticism that their
voices would be heard. For example, in describing the rationale behind the view that the public
comments in response to the U.S. DOS tweets were not being listened to, one respondent pointed
toward the professional inadequacy of, and absence of decision-making capability in, the
personnel who actually administered the account: “Just that, someone, an intern. No one of much
use. There faxed sheet what to tweet out.” Another individual echoed these concerns about the
U.S.DOS representatives: “US Dept of State seems to be manned by parrots living in an echo
chamber who follow the same false narratives put out by some ?? Trilateral or CFR 'think tank'
or al CIAda ... I wonder if the employees even know where on world map are the countries they
make utterances and edicts on ....”
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

171
Much of the hostile skepticism was focused not just on personnel inadequacies, but also
on the perceived intentions of the digital diplomats, particularly those representing the U.S. As
one respondent said about the officials’ regard for commenters, “No pretty sure they don’t care at
all.” Another, reflecting on whether the U.S. DOS digital diplomats wanted the same things for
the U.S. in the future that the respondent wants, stated: “No. I don’t think they think about
anything but personal gratification.” One participant in the Indian Diplomacy Twitter
communication thought that it would take a major collective action like a strike to gain the
attention of the digital diplomats, stating, “Indian diplomacy doesn't listens opinions of people..if
Indians started to do the strike on Ramleela ground of delhi then only they listens … Especially
they dont listens on twitter.”
For one respondent, the hostile skepticism resulted in a near dismissal of the digital
diplomats from consideration in the communicative process, in so far as the participating publics
are concerned: “They are immaterial because, well honestly besides throwing out tweets, what
are they doing?”
Reasoned skepticism. A second type of skepticism also doubted the utility of engaging
with the digital diplomacy, but justified the skepticism through the voicing of logic-based,
reasoned arguments that were less rooted in emotion than those voiced by the hostile skeptics.
One participant in the Sweden.se digital diplomacy, for instance, did not think the policies of
Sweden could be influenced through commenting on the tweets, due to citizenship: “I dont think
so, since I am not Sweden citizen nor I currently live in Sweden. No, who am I though …
Possibly they would listen more to their citizen ….” Similarly, a participant in the Swedish
MFA digital diplomacy explained a limited ability to influence the policies of Sweden as the
result of the tone and properties of that participant’s individual contributions: “I write in English
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

172
because I have limited grammatical and spelling competence, and because almost all Swedes
read English. Also, I tend to be rougher than a Swede, who are usually overly polite. These
characteristics make it less likely that I will influence Swedish debates directly.”
One commenter on the Indian MEA tweets did not think the MEA would listen, but
justified the opinion based on the lack of dialogic evidence in the form of organizational replies
to publics: “I think no …Don't reply & comments.”
One participant in the U.S. DOS digital diplomacy was unambiguous that the
organizational representatives did not listen, but explained the lack of attention paid as part of a
wider disconnect between the political class and the citizenry, also personalizing the observation:
And why would they? There is a truth here, and forgive my soapbox, but there is a
massive canyon of space between the understanding of a congressman about the world
and the understanding of someone such as my self who honestly struggles on a daily
basis. I think that they have lost the concept that their duty and responsibility is both
birthed from and is intended for the people whom have put him or her into office.
This individual was therefore ambivalent, and again personalized the matter, when asked if the
people behind the U.S. DOS Twitter page wanted the same things in the future for the U.S. as
that individual:
I honestly would not be able to say i know one way or the other. They speak as if they are
co-concerned and they do deliver a compelling message of empathy, but often its the
language of their actions that we feel contradict these words. At a human and emotional
level, its fairly depressing to even try to determine one way or the other how they feel
when you see people that spend extravagant amounts of money of lavish things on tax
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

173
payer money, while me and my family are eating frozen veggies and hamburger because
it is all we can afford.
It is interesting to note that this commenter not only personalized the explanation, but also
appeared to be speaking broadly on behalf of citizen users by invoking the term “we” (though
this commenter could also have been speaking for her or his family only).
A separate individual who also participated in the U.S. DOS Twitter digital diplomacy
explained the skepticism in terms of the norms and routines that characterize the communication
that occurs on Twitter: “What i am saying is that i cannot expect them to allow twitter to have an
influence … and some are too busy using it for hating … if everyone used it in a constructive
way, it would be the ultimate townhall.”
Optimism. The second main theme, optimism, was in many respects the inverse of the
skepticism theme. However, hopefulness for or optimism about the utility of engaging in the
digital diplomacy was not always unambiguous. Two subthemes were identified: cautious
optimism and wistful optimism.
Cautious optimism. Several of the responses voiced optimism that the perspectives and
opinions of publics like themselves would be heard, but were measured in that optimism. One
participant in the Swedish MFA digital diplomacy based the expressed opinion on assumptions
about organizational practices with regard to administering the sites and the organization’s data
operation: “am sure they've assigned persons to monitor+interact on those twitter accounts=must
be passively listening &analytics etc.” On the matter of whether that individual’s voice was
being heard, this person was therefore “yes fairly confident=if i was running socialmedia for my
co/org/ministry or hired 'manager' then that's the least i'd expect.”
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

174
A couple of respondents attributed the capacity of their voices to be heard to quantity of
engagement, specifically in the amount of data that publics produced. For instance, one
participant in Sweden MFA digital diplomacy opined: “I'd say one tweet is enough to register
original opinion in sweden-mfa minds; if multiple tweets then more info/opinion=register more.”
In contrast, another respondent’s cautious optimism was due to the presence of data
indicating organizational engagement with publics. This participant in the Sweden.se digital
diplomacy remarked, “I am glad that they noticed my reply,” and in response to a question on
whether the individual felt that Sweden.se was listening, stated: “I do feel it, sometimes they also
would reply certain questions … If I am not mistaken they also replied my question about
University admissions.”
One commenter on the U.S. DOS Twitter digital diplomacy remarked on the amount of
data that would need to be filtered by the DOS, which affected whether this individual was
actually listened to: “again, i hope they do but i can imagine they have to filter through the pile
of comments they get. i cannot for sure say that they do so i can only leave it at -< "i hope they
do".” Therefore, this individual also expressed cautious, measured optimism that the policies of
the United States could be influenced by commenting on the tweets: “i hope they read comments
and i hope they take the genuine ones seriously and i hope they gain insight from them and i
hope that insight is used … but policies is not yet an open house perspective so we the followers
are missing too much of the stream to help direct the flow :-).”
Wistful optimism. Finally, several responses evinced optimism that their voices would be
heard by the digital diplomats and that they could shape, at least to some degree, the policy
priorities of the nation represented by the digital diplomacy actor. Interestingly, however, the
responses that comprised this sub-theme were not rooted in logical or measured assessments of
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

175
the process of digital diplomacy; instead, they displayed a leap of faith, a sense of optimism that
was not based on experience or observation, but rather on an idealistic notion of what could be
possible in these digital social spaces. In some instances, this took the form of observations that
do not appear to reflect reality. For example, in response to a question that addressed whether
the Indian MEA reads through the publics’ twitter comments, one participant in the MEA digital
diplomacy stated: “Yes.. you yourself can see the Twitter handle … They respond and try and
help everyone who come with genuine issues.” This response is noteworthy for two reasons.
First, this study, using a systematic random sample of three months worth of Indian MEA
Twitter digital diplomacy, found just one instance of the MEA responding to a public comment
out of 175 tweets that elicited public comments (see Table 6). Second, the respondent indicated
that certain public comments that voiced genuine—or subjectively legitimate—concerns would
be paid sufficient attention by the MEA.
Relatedly, the wistful optimism sometimes expressed contradictions or inconsistencies.
For instance, one participant in the U.S. DOS digital diplomacy observed: “No .. I don't think the
comments are read or taken seriously .. but hope that they may be 'scanned' through for "general
sentiment" - and that my objections are registered.” One participant, when asked if the Indian
Diplomacy organization listens to people like that individual, responded “Yes...definitely,” but
when asked to consider whether the corresponding organizational representatives read through
the Twitter comments and consider people’s opinions, stated “No...they dont reads all Twitter
comments and people opinions....” This could represent either a plain contradiction or the
presence of the third person effect, wherein the participant viewed that others’ voices would be
ignored by the digital diplomacy organization, but not his or her own perspective.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

176
In some cases, the wistful optimism about engaging in digital diplomacy and the
resonance of individual opinions was attached to the values associated with particular nations
and national narratives. For example, one participant in the Indian MEA digital diplomacy,
when asked if that individual could influence the policies of India by commenting in response to
the MEA tweets, replied: “Why not.. in democracy janta janardhan is the God … It's people's
democracy … If not 100% but 1% Sure … You never know??.” Another comment from a
participant in the Sweden.se digital diplomacy, on the matter of whether the people behind the
Sweden.se Twitter account want the same things in the future for Sweden (or the world) that the
individual wants, responded: “I do think so, since they are open minded people. And they have
advanced education also modern technology, they are one of one step ahead country to copy to.”
Finally, in some cases the wistfully optimistic perspective on digital diplomacy was
linked to the agency displayed by the individual as an active participant in the process. On the
matter of whether one individual could influence the policies of the U.S. by commenting on the
U.S. DOS tweets, that individual stated: “Not really, but I tell myself that one day I might. I care
enough to try even though I am cognitively aware of the minuscule if not negligible chance I
truly have.” In one more example, a participant in the Indian Diplomacy communication
expressed confidence in the ability to influence the policies of India through commenting on the
Twitter page, due to experiential knowledge: “I can influence the policies of India bcoz.. I have a
very good mind direction with plenty of good thoughts which I have collected them by reading,
visiting , feeling the real pain of rural Indian people...so My words have strong power to express
them....so I have told you I can Influence the policies of India.”
Motives for participating in digital diplomacy. The second concern addressed through
thematic analysis was participants’ motives for participating in the Twitter digital diplomacy.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

177
Three main themes were identified across the data set: instrumental motives, national
pride/admiration and platform-based motives.
Instrumental motives. This theme was characterized by the presence of clear aims and
goals, though the aims were often disparate in nature. Four subthemes were identified:
perspective sharing; issue-based; watchdog/guardian of values; and derisive public guidance.
Perspective sharing. Several respondents voiced a motive that was rooted in the desire to
share publicly their perspectives, which were not associated with any one issue or set of issues or
with any particular communication technology. For instance, one participant in the U.S. DOS
Twitter digital diplomacy clarified that the contributions were not fundamentally about agreeing
with or opposing the U.S. DOS tweets: “not really oppose but more share a perspective.
sometimes it aligns and sometimes it doesn’t.” This individual furthermore made clear that the
motivation to participate was only partially issue dependent: “because i am hoping someone
reads their mentions. if the topic they are discussing resonates, then i comment. lately i have
really been into the thought of the political landscape globally.” The same participant indicated
further that it was of little concern who was receiving this contributed perspective: “whoever is
involved in sharing the information that is shared is who i am aiming to share my comment back
to.”
Perspective sharing could also take the form of a hobby or pastime, as referenced by one
participant in the Swedish MFA digital diplomacy in the midst of a discussion about a particular
issue: “Twitter is a hobby. In this case, I took a minute to respond in a way that would provide
facts to anybody who was interested in the question, by citing a recent article on Canadian
immigration policy … I would comment on something that is a matter of public debate.”
However, for one participant in the U.S. DOS digital diplomacy, the perspective sharing was
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

178
specific both to an audience and to the platform of Twitter: “I find Google is getting more
censored by the day. So are US online publications getting harder to comment on. I realise US
State dept don't read the response tweets - but I feel need to TELL them what I think / object to
(within limit of 147 characters).”
Issue-based. In contrast to the lack of specificity that characterized the perspective
sharing motive, the issue-based motive evinced a desire to contribute an opinion about a specific
issue or set of issues, whether primarily domestic or international in scope. One participant
addressed the motivation for engaging with the Indian Diplomacy Twitter account by referencing
explicitly a specific international affairs matter: “I would like to tell them that, If Pakistani Army
officers supporting terrorists for doing terror attack in India..Like Mumbai Taj hotel attack..then
Change the geometry of pakistan country...I know that war is not good for human being but they
are not understanding the language of us.” Another commenter, this individual a participant in
the Swedish MFA digital diplomacy, referenced a motive for commenting that was rooted in a
desire to persuade in order to effect issue-based change: “I have mentioned MFA when I want to
change something, like put pressure on Margot Wallström after she blamed Israel for the attacks
in Paris.” For another participant in the Swedish MFA digital diplomacy, the motive to
participate was not based on agreement or disagreement, but rather on a set of issues that were
relevant to that individual’s career: “not agree/disagree w/ business-sweden tweets more
whatever professional info their tweets carry … right business sweden accounts i interact
reply/RT for energy- and india- singapore- related investment opportunities, general interest.”
Watchdog/guardian of values. Other respondents voiced a motive for participating
whose instrumental goal was the safeguarding of national values or serving as a vigilant
watchdog on a threatening actor. One participant in the U.S. DOS digital diplomacy was clear in
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

179
voicing this motive: “This administration has not put “the right people in the right job”; so
instead of trusting our government I have to watch them.” A separate participant in the U.S.
DOS digital diplomacy explained the rationale behind instrumental, issues-based engagement as
a desire to act as a patriotic watchdog safeguarding America’s future: “The root of my efforts is
based on a personal passion for our country. I served 10 years. I have two little boys and I
honestly have zero trust in our current system (more so the people in the system) or its ability to
recover from this slump in a way that promises prosperous life for my children.”
Another commenter on U.S. DOS tweets revealed that the core of a motive appearing to
be perspective sharing was actually a desire to act as a watchdog safeguarding the future. When
asked what type of content would warrant a reply, this individual responded: “Anything that they
are highlighting, normally issue with other countries and their caring loving feelings towards
them. When in fact immigrants are on the bottom of their care list … I don’t like games, lies,
when my grandchilds future is at stake … I guess we became the check and balances.”
Derisive public guidance. The final instrumental motive for participating in the digital
diplomacy centered on the desire to guide or educate other public commenters, but do so
derisively. For instance, one participant in the U.S. DOS digital diplomacy explained that
visiting the DOS Twitter page was not motivated by a desire to interact with other commenters,
but instead “Honestly, more heckling the dos … Can’t help they make it easy.” A separate
participant in the U.S. DOS digital diplomacy revealed a highly calculated strategy in engaging,
guiding and confronting other commenters:
I have spent a great deal of time thinking about this. I have a set of predetermined angles
of approach that are tailored to the individual that I respond to. For instance, if I percieve
that someone is of a strong opinion that is in oposition of my own, yet that person
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

180
displays a lack in understanding wrt the topic or the context of the discussion, then i tend
to be more abrasive and confrontational. Not as an apex behavior but to establish the
persons desire to confront me back … Everyone is ready to stand their ground on twitter
lol … so while at first it seems a fairly aggressive approach, once I can get the person to
mentally accept lack of information, i will then begin to try and be open and accepting
and will then engage them in conversation that more lets them see why I am in
disagreement .… But sometimes they become more closed and defensive, at that point it
is no longer a valuable expenditure of time. Depending on how they choose to stand, I
usually tend to leave on a gracious, yet condescending tone .… I also enjoy banter with
those who are merely present for the shock and attention. I often masquerade as such.
People are much more likely to comment back when they think that you are an empty
talking head. Im sure I sound like I am half a bubble off center for this much
consideration, but if you are going to seek to engage, inform, and stimulate thought, you
sometimes have to go about it smartly …. Some Trolls have a noble purpose in other
words.
Interestingly, this same individual was willing to concede that teaching and learning are bi-
directional: “And sometimes I discover that I am the one without understanding, at that point I
have no right choice but to accept and learn and carry on.”
One commenter on U.S. DOS tweets clarified that the voicing of an individual opinion
could be done through other media, but the desire to educate the masses was a prominent
motivating factor: “I have done the letters, just got one back from Portman. But then it’s only
me. Sorry, but we have a ton of less than intelligent people out there. If I can write it for them to
comprehend maybe they will get it.”
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

181
National pride/admiration. The second main theme derived in considering the motives
that undergird the active participation of publics in digital diplomacy was national pride or
admiration, often closely associated with identity. For example, one commenter on the Indian
MEA tweets voiced a desire to engage with tweets that framed India positively: “Anything
positive about my country I like and retweet also … Coz I see the tweets very positive and very
updated.” A separate participant in the Indian MEA digital diplomacy supplied a motive for
commenting that was connected to the progress made in India: “Because I m keen 2 follow all
development of India on world issues.”
In one instance, the national pride motive for participating was manifested in high regard
for an individual government official. For this participant in the Indian MEA digital diplomacy,
External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj appeared to embody India’s rise and the swelling pride
felt by her citizens; opinions on the MEA digital diplomacy thus became inseparable from the
strong personal approval for Minister Swaraj. When asked to clarify whether the participant
commented to show support for the minster as an individual, the participant replied:
I do. And will continue to support her. She's the best. I salute her for the dedication
towards our nation and her ministry. I support @SushmaSwaraj and I like and retweet
also her tweets. I follow and read all the tweets of @MEAIndia coz they are updated.
About India's foreign policy and diplomacy in brief. Anything positive about my country
I like and retweet also … Courtesy @SushmaSwaraj and @MEAIndia ... Today India's
passport has weight its just because of @SushmaSwaraj and PM @narendramodi ji.”
For one commenter on the Sweden.se digital diplomacy, the motive to participate was not pride
of country of origin or residence, but rather a nostalgic admiration for a visited country
(Sweden). Furthermore, national admiration was expressed in concert with a desire to be viewed
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

182
as an opinion-leader; these two confluent factors appeared to drive participation in the digital
diplomacy: “I did the retweet because not all my friends follow http://sweden.se twitter account,
it such a waste not to share it for my friends on Twitter .. I am just glad to show my friends that
have not been there that Sweden is one of cool country to visit. I have some friend that work at
Stockholm, few been travelling there, but not many … Sometimes I forget about midsummer
which my friend celebrated and http://sweden.dot.se tweet would pops up on my timeline to
remind me.”
Platform-based motives. The final main theme identified consisted of platform-based
motives. These reasons for participating were inseparable from Twitter as a SNS and platform,
its unique features and the behaviors they afford. For example, one participant in the U.S. DOS
digital diplomacy was enthusiastic about engaging on Twitter due to its uncomplicated
facilitation of the public sharing of opinions: “The site seems too official to be “friendly” with,
but fits the bill when you are frustrated with government and want to get something off your
chest.” A participant in the Sweden MFA digital diplomacy voiced an information-seeking
motive that dovetails with the information-sharing motive found in quantitative studies of
Twitter use, noted above: “so ofcourse by email &off those websites but twitter is an easier
medium to get current/most recent info may be posted to website slower.” Finally, one
commenter on U.S. DOS tweets alluded to the personalization often associated with SNSs,
previously discussed. This individual contrasted the personalization found in Twitter specifically
with the relative impersonality found in static websites: “There simply is (at least for me) a
disconnect between the human interaction of a twitter channel from someone you know is an
individual, and a Government site that is bereft of personality and often times "cold" feeling.”
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

183
The overall significance of these two thematic analyses to digital diplomacy is discussed
in the final chapter: the conclusion to this dissertation.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

184

VIII. Conclusion

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

185
This dissertation had three broad objectives that animated its focus on digital diplomacy,
defined here as the use of Internet-based media by international actors to engage or communicate
with foreign publics in order to advance policy-related goals. The first was to build upon the
study of dialogue in digital diplomacy and the type of public diplomacy activities undertaken by
digital diplomacy actors—and in so doing address the notably underdeveloped theoretical
framework that most commonly undergirds the phenomenon. The second objective was to
differentiate the actors whose digital diplomacy is subject to investigation. Past research has
focused on MFAs without distinguishing between them a priori, as previously discussed; this
study, by contrast, identified and investigated the output of three actors that are interpretable as
cultural diplomacy organizations whose ostensible goal is to engage in digitally mediated
dialogic communication with publics, in addition to the output of these actors’ corresponding
MFAs. The third broad objective was born of necessity: a dearth of sustained attention paid by
public and digital diplomacy scholars to empowered digital publics who have the unprecedented
ability to display agency and advance their individual or group agendas using networked
communication technologies. This dissertation thus addressed two parallel conceptual tracks: 1)
digital diplomacy as dialogic public diplomacy, a format of strategic communication often
distinguished by the construct of dialogue; and 2) digital diplomacy as space for user motives, a
novel, media studies perspective that was emphasized and introduced in part by this work.
Before presenting some thoughts on the theoretical and professionally relevant
implications of this dissertation, it is necessary to highlight some limitations of the study. First,
there were several challenges in procuring the data necessary for this sustained investigation of
digital diplomacy. The Facebook and Twitter data were imported into DiscoverText, the web-
based data analysis tool used throughout this study. The data importing function worked much
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

186
more effectively with the Twitter data than it did with the Facebook data, whose retrieval can
vary widely by Facebook account settings and by an opaque set of considerations that determine
what data Facebook will allow to be exported for analysis. This and related data matters are a
significant challenge for researchers; factors like restrictions set—but often not disclosed—by
the SNSs, the considerable expense of purchasing historical data, and the wide variation by SNS
in terms of data exportation quality are obstacles to undertaking comparative studies of SNS
output. However, in the case of this study, any Facebook posts that may have been lost in the
process of data importing had no relation to the research questions; therefore, this concern does
not bias the data set utilized in this dissertation.
A second limitation related to working with SNS users was the degree of difficulty in
attaining interviewees to take part in the study. As reported in Chapter 5, the response rate
among participants in the Twitter digital diplomacy was 2%. These users were invited for
interview by sending them directed tweets (“tweeting at” them), an affordance made possible—
perhaps uniquely among SNSs—by the features of Twitter. Such processes, which may vary by
individual SNS, are painstaking and make securing an adequate sample size a challenge in itself.
Yet, these processes are crucial for researchers to undertake in order to further the qualitative
investigation of users who self-select into the social spaces facilitated by organizations, including
those that enact digital diplomacy. Moreover, it appeared all but impossible to contact
participants in Facebook digital diplomacy and invite them for interview. Facebook messages
sent to users who are not prior contacts are treated essentially as spam, when they are delivered
at all. This is an unwelcome reality for researchers of the communication engaged in and shared
by public stakeholders on Facebook, particularly those who engage with organizations that do
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

187
not grant permission for researchers to recruit on their Facebook pages, as was the case in this
study.
A third matter may be less of a limitation than a finding: the difficulty of identifying and
distinguishing the public diplomacy activity of international broadcasting—interpreted as the
dissemination of news or updates—as it occurs in SNS messages or posts. International
broadcasting was coded in nearly three quarters of the total posts and tweets examined in this
study. This reveals two important and related developments that make challenging the
interpretation of digital diplomacy in the context of traditional public diplomacy. First, the
ubiquity of communication technologies, the personalization that characterizes the use of SNSs,
and the ease with which posts, messages or tweets can be shared suggest that value-laden,
normative or opinion-driven organizational SNS output will become increasingly commonplace,
whether intended as part of the organization’s strategic communication or not. Relatedly, the
norm and expectation of displaying a standard of objectivity may not be present with regard to
the SNS output of organizations; that is, the objectivity standard will almost certainly be less
robust than that which guides traditional media content, including the programing of several
highly regarded international broadcasting organizations like the United Kingdom’s BBC World
Service. The line of demarcation between advocacy and international broadcasting thus appears
particularly blurred in the spaces in which digital diplomacy is conducted. This is a theoretically
rich development for scholars to consider; however, it makes challenging the analysis of digital
diplomacy within traditional public diplomacy activity typologies, whose valuable frameworks
like Cull’s (2008a) taxonomy provide crucial context to the interpretation of digital diplomacy.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

188
Theoretical Insights
With regard to the building and refining of digital diplomacy’s theoretical framework, the
first matter at hand is whether this study’s findings bolster or diminish a dialogic theoretical
framework, as dialogue is the construct most commonly applied to the phenomenon. The
relevant implications of the dissertation are mixed. Thematic analysis of the interview responses
did yield public perspectives that are skeptical of digital diplomacy actors’ intent and their ability
or desire to listen to the views of publics. Other perspectives displayed hostility to the
government officials who venture into the social spaces of SNSs. However, the interview
responses also evinced a measured and reasoned, cautious optimism that the voices of publics
who engage via SNSs can and may be listened to by digital diplomats. Indeed, this was joined
by a perspective termed “wistful optimism,” which is hopeful—even fanciful—about the ability
of SNSs to act as a digital bridge between publics and organizational representatives.
One key question is whether digital diplomacy has the capacity to engender an
approximation of true dialogue (Buber, 1970, 1985), as true dialogue may be granted deliberative
legitimacy and thus enable the actor to exert influence in the international system (Van Ham,
2010). True dialogue occurs when the participants exhibit respect for the interaction, a
willingness to listen to the other parties involved, and a view of the interaction as the goal and
not merely a means to an end (Friedman, 1960, cited in Arsenault, 2009; Kent & Taylor, 1998,
2002). Thematic analysis did not reveal publics’ perceptions of an approximation of true
dialogue; yet, the “wistful optimism” and “national pride/admiration” themes, particularly, did
not foreclose its existence.
In addition, content analysis did provide clear evidence of an actor, Swedens.se, which is
consistently replying to the quips, queries, problems and concerns of public commenters—and
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

189
thus adhering to the elusive principle of Dialogic Loop, the most crucial but seldom realized
component of Kent and Taylor’s (1998) principles for Internet-based dialogic communication in
public relations.
However, the results relating to the other actors’ digital diplomacy largely aligned with
those of past studies of dialogue in digital diplomacy and in other formats of digitally mediated
organization–public communication, including that conducted via SNSs. Organizations are
setting the stage for dialogue through the provision of information and other practices. They
may also offer “quarantined” forms of engagement through opportunities like Q&A sessions that
constrain the nature and duration of the dialogue (Manor, 2017, p. 318, citing Kampf et al.,
2015), though less frequently than they employ practices that merely set the stage for dialogue.
Crucially, however, nine of the 11 digital diplomacy properties examined are failing to utilize
practices that fit under the principle of Dialogic Loop—realized and unconstrained dialogue—
even if they evidence practices that do fulfill the requirements of the other, less onerous dialogic
principles. In this sense, empirical investigation of dialogue in organization–public
communication appears at an impasse.
Perhaps most impactful, however, is the totality of the findings related to Sweden.se, the
extraordinary digital diplomacy actor examined in this study. The strategic priorities of
Sweden.se appear unconcerned with distinguishing the property through setting the stage for
dialogue; Sweden.se usage of practices classified under the Usefulness of Information principle,
including those that align with contemporary socio-technical culture like hyperlinking,
hashtagging and the use of multimedia, was no more frequent than that of the other actors
considered. In addition, Sweden.se did not appear to prioritize constrained public participation
formats like panel discussions and Q&A sessions, in comparison to the other actors investigated
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

190
throughout this study. Sweden.se furthermore did not emphasize hyperlinking to other sites
maintained by the same government, relative to the other actors. It is therefore not the
deployment of practices across the four dialogic principles that appears to distinguish Sweden.se
from the other actors.
Moreover, with regard to type of public diplomacy activity, the results of the study
indicate that the Sweden.se messaging did not generally contain higher percentages of listening
opportunities than did that of the Swedish MFA or the other actors, taken together. It was argued
in Chapter 7 that the findings in relation to the U.S. digital diplomacy support the established
account of a U.S. public diplomacy model that prioritizes advocacy and international
broadcasting, and hence can be characterized as informational and hierarchical. Thus, in so far
as the Sweden.se digital diplomacy is interpretable as a model that stands in stark relief to that of
the U.S., it is neither through employing in the aggregate practices classified under Kent and
Taylor’s (1998) principles nor through presenting listening opportunities that may be associated
with a horizontal, participatory communication model rather than a hierarchical one.
Instead, Sweden.se demonstrated a commitment to replying to the comments of publics, a
priority that was utterly unique among the actors considered.
21
Sweden.se thus appeared
singularly willing to cede partial control of its communication; by responding to comments, it
acknowledged the viewpoints, concerns and priorities of public users, including in settings that
were not closely controlled, “quarantined” (Manor, 2017, p. 318, citing Kampf et al., 2015), or
time-bound—despite an apparent lack of concern for applying the practices classified under the
other dialogic principles.

21
It is noteworthy, however, that Sweden.se, like the other actors, did not appear willing to endorse the perspectives
of others through retweeting or reposting publics’ tweets and comments, also operationalized under the principle of
Dialogic Loop.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

191
This suggests that Kent and Taylor’s (1998) principles for Internet-based dialogic
communication in public relations, as applied in digital diplomacy, should not be conceptualized
as co-equal theoretical components of dialogic communication. Rather, in digital diplomacy
these principles should be employed on a continuum that is based on the degree of control that
the organization wishes to exert over its communication with publics. Figure 21 displays a
representation of the continuum on which the dialogic principles would appear.

Figure 21. Kent and Taylor’s (1998) Dialogic Principles as Applied to Digital Diplomacy

Dialogic practices like the inclusion of multimedia (the Usefulness of Information
principle) would therefore appear close to the endpoint that is characterized by tight control. In
contrast, practices like replying or responding to public comments and retweeting or reposting
the comments of publics (the Dialogic Loop principle) would appear close to the opposite
endpoint of the continuum, which is characterized by minimal control exerted by the
organization over its interaction with publics.
Sweden.se was also notably unique in featuring novel types of activities in its digital
diplomacy. Chapter 7 identified and provided examples of four such novel activities:
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

192
engagement–promotion; routine lifestyle diplomacy; personal reaction/reflection diplomacy; and
Internet meme diplomacy. It is furthermore argued that these activities warrant consideration as
components of a standalone classification: social media diplomacy. Social media diplomacy—
not used synonymously with “digital diplomacy,” which refers to a type of public diplomacy
conducted via Internet-based media and references a corresponding academic subfield—can be
defined as the following: a type of digital diplomacy activity that is contingent upon and
maximizes the features and affordances of socially oriented digital media like SNSs to
communicate with users in order to advance policy-related goals. Any of the five public
diplomacy activities that comprise Cull’s (2008a) taxonomy may be present in digital diplomacy;
however, socially oriented digital media like SNSs uniquely enable and afford activities like
those proposed above—referenced here as social media diplomacy—which either cannot or will
not be utilized in offline formats or enacted through other, less social digital media.
Social media diplomacy can also be situated along the continuum depicted in Figure 21.
Its positioning, like that of the five public diplomacy activities in Cull’s (2008a) taxonomy, is
determined by the amount of control attempted or exerted over the opportunities presented to
publics for dialogue (and according to corresponding dialogic principle employed). Thus an
advocacy message featuring a policy preference and a photograph would be placed at the far left
of the continuum, exhibiting a desire to maintain tight control; an invitation to discuss the subject
of that advocacy during a restricted Q&A session would be placed toward the midpoint (the
Generation of Return Visits principle); and a response from the digital diplomacy actor that
addresses a public comment on the subject of the advocacy would be placed at the far right of the
continuum, exhibiting minimal control because neither the subject of the comment nor the
duration of the exchange is constrained. Internet meme diplomacy, as another example, may be
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

193
situated near the end of tight control, near the middle, or near the end of minimal control,
depending if it exists as a standalone post or tweet, if it includes an invitation to a restricted
Q&A session or panel, or if it is incorporated into dialogue or conversation with a public or
publics.
This dissertation has also helped begin the necessary work of elucidating the nature of
publics’ participation in digital diplomacy. An additional theoretical perspective was proposed:
digital diplomacy as space for user motives. As described in Chapter 7, the utility of this
exploratory approach was demonstrated by several findings: the fact that a substantial proportion
of the public comments did not address the topic of the digital diplomacy messaging; the
disparate range of most commonly inferred motives for public commenting across properties;
and the array of instrumental motives for participating discerned through thematic analysis of
interview responses, in addition to the national pride/admiration and platform-based motives that
were documented. It is of paramount importance that the qualitative methodologies of this user-
centered perspective be refined and reworked, so that scholars can better understand the motives,
norms, codes and behaviors that characterize and determine public uses of the social spaces
facilitated by digital diplomacy. A corresponding necessity will be that this user-centered
perspective and its qualitative methodologies evolve alongside digital culture and socio-technical
practices. For instance, scholars of digital diplomacy will need to adopt their studies and
methods to the current trend of users increasingly exhibiting a preference for messaging
platforms like Facebook Messenger and Snapchat over SNSs.
Practitioner Insights
Digital diplomacy is a format of strategic communication, which is to say that it is
fundamentally concerned with the purposeful undertaking of communication activities to
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

194
advance organizational goals. As such, it is imperative to consider how this dissertation’s
findings may aid practitioners in communicating with publics to advance the policy-related goals
of the nations that they represent. The first theoretical framework featured in this dissertation—
digital diplomacy as dialogic public diplomacy—addressed how digital diplomats are making use
of SNSs to communicate with and influence global publics, in addition to the theoretical
implications discussed above. The second and additional, novel framework—digital diplomacy
as space for user motives—offers considerable benefit to practitioners, despite its radical
departure from the customary organization-centered perspective in digital diplomacy, and indeed
in all formats of strategic communication. This is a crucial point; in the absence of perceived
benefits to practitioners, the user-centered perspective proposed in this dissertation has little
chance to take hold.
What useful insights might practitioners glean from these findings, first from the
qualitative content analyses? The U.S. DOS might monitor their digital social spaces for user
attempts to mobilize support for political causes that may be unrelated to DOS messaging. Such
monitoring may in turn present opportunity to address those mobilization efforts that align with
U.S. policy priorities, and perhaps increase the capacity to influence those persons who would
otherwise assume their voices and mobilization attempts were ignored. Swedish digital
diplomats may take heart in the knowledge that commenters may be reacting in accordance with
the goals of the strategic messaging; however, the prominence of flaming or trolling might
suggest the occasional respite from extolling the progressive policies and natural advantages of
the nation. These findings could also suggest an opportunity for Swedish digital diplomats to
engage the flamers, in typically irreverent Swedish fashion. Swedish digital diplomats could
furthermore utilize the knowledge that their SNSs may be used for social interactions between
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

195
members of users’ personal networks—and adjust their messaging so that users are prompted to
invite into the conversation their contacts. Finally, Indian digital diplomats might take heed of
the comments that appeared motivated by support for both the positions featured in their posts
and tweets and for Minister Swaraj and Prime Minister Modi as individuals. The parasocial
nature of many comments additionally suggests a high return on engagement in posts featuring
Ms. Swaraj and Mr. Modi addressing publics in a personally engaging manner, perhaps through
further use of Facebook Live or of Twitter Periscope.
With regard to the thematic analyses of the interview responses, there is reason for both
practitioner apprehension and optimism. There is a strand of hostility—perhaps particularly
associated with U.S. digital diplomacy—that seems to distrust, dislike and disrespect digital
diplomacy actors and their corresponding government officials. Indeed, participants who voice
such hostility may be engaging in digital diplomacy chiefly as a last resort. These individuals
will be difficult to engage; however, demonstrating that the digital diplomats are listening by
responding to their queries might be a powerful antidote to this antipathy.
Other public commenters were found to exhibit cautious or wistful optimism. These
publics appear to want to believe that their voices will be heard, for example through appeals to
their sense of logic (e.g. the provision of evidence such as comment replies or “likes” which
prove that a person behind the digital diplomacy curtain is paying attention). These results also
suggest that additional perspectives may be receptive to those digital diplomats who can fulfill
the publics’ optimism that their comments might not just be read, but contemplated, discussed
and even incorporated into the process of striving to meet a common goal.
In much the same way as the public optimism could be stoked, the skepticism discovered
in the thematic analysis of interview responses might be assuaged—if the digital diplomacy
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

196
actors are willing to put in the work of proactive engagement, instead of seeking and aggregating
data “engagement” measures like number of followers, likes, and so on.
Concluding Thoughts
This dissertation has built on a growing and increasingly robust body of literature on
digital diplomacy. However, it has merely helped to begin the process of understanding the
nature of digital diplomacy. There is much to be done. The matter of distinguishing type of
digital diplomacy actor requires further attention. One objective, for example, would be to
analyze the presence of dialogue in the messaging of individual diplomats like ambassadors or
heads of state in comparison to that of organizations. Further refinement of the construct of
dialogue as it occurs in digital diplomacy also warrants undertaking. One point of entry is to
analyze dialogic digital diplomacy in the theoretical context of organizational control, according
to the continuum depicted in Figure 21. Additional content analytic studies of digital diplomacy
activities are also called for. These will help document further instances of social media
diplomacy activities like engagement–promotion, routine lifestyle diplomacy, personal
reaction/reflection diplomacy, and Internet meme diplomacy—and may discover additional
digital diplomacy activities that can be fruitfully classified as social media diplomacy. Scholars
of rhetoric and of digital culture will also find fertile ground in analyzing the communication
artifacts of digital diplomacy.
Researchers must also begin to establish empirically the effects of various digital
diplomacy messaging strategies. For instance, studies should be undertaken to measure the
effects of practices classified under the dialogic principles on the credibility perceptions of
digital publics, compared to the effects of one-way, hierarchal messaging strategies. These
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

197
investigations will require experimental designs, a methodology that has been largely eschewed
by public diplomacy scholars but could become an important part of the methodological toolkit.
Most important, however, will be foregrounding the perspective of digital publics, both in
the academic field of public diplomacy and in practitioner circles. The default behavior in both
communities is to return to the communicating texts and strategies of the organization,
documenting what has been done and prescribing what could be done more effectively, more
efficiently, more strategically. This dissertation has argued that those concerns remain vital,
especially as communication technologies and communicative processes evolve, creating new
opportunities for processes like dialogic communication with publics. However, this dissertation
has also asserted that the empowerment of digitally networked publics makes indispensable an
additional, user-centered framework for digital diplomacy, presented here as space for user
motives. The key factor in this consideration is the recognition that digital publics around the
world have and display agency, which makes paramount the fundamental question of their
motives for participating in digital diplomacy. This observation and its implications alone make
for potentially fruitful scholarship. Yet, also needed will be research that puts into historical
context the motives of participants in digital diplomacy; “digital publics” may be best interpreted
not in isolation, but in relation to the public participants in traditional formats of public
diplomacy, who throughout history have evinced their own motives, agendas, codes, and
behaviors. Further elucidation of who constitutes the public participants in digital diplomacy is
also in order. Investigation of domestic publics, as well as of foreign publics, in addition to the
presence of flamers, trolls, and even bots, will shed needed light on the entities that self select
into the communicative spaces of digital diplomacy.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

198
In addition, an organizational imperative must act as a catalyst for the adoption of this
publics-centered perspective. Digital diplomacy actors should conceptualize digital publics as
empowered actors who possess and display agency—and crucially adapt their messaging
strategies accordingly. If they do not, they risk a crisis of credibility among digital citizens in an
era whose fundamental defining feature may be the very presence of global, Internet-based
communication networks (Castells, 2013).
There is an often-invoked axiom about the role of public diplomacy at the foreign policy
table. Originating with the venerable American broadcaster and director of the USIA Edward R.
Murrow, it holds that public diplomacy should be part of foreign policy “takeoffs,” or its
formulation, as well as the “crash landings,” or the mitigation of foreign policy failures (Kelley,
2009). In the year 2019, with the presence of ubiquitous communication technologies and
Internet-based communication that is unrestricted by time or by space, digital diplomats have the
capacity to engage, communicate with and potentially influence citizens all over the world—at
the time of policy takeoff, for the duration of its journey, and amid the crash landing, when and
should it occur. If only the digital diplomacy community will commit to discovering what the
citizen passengers are discussing and why, as these empowered global publics utilize the in-flight
Wi-Fi and scroll through a social network site on their smartphones.

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

199

IX. References

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

200
Åberg, L. E. G. (1990). Theoretical model and praxis of total communications. International
Public Relations Review 13, 2, 13–16.
Agrawal, R. (2016, June 7). Why India's prime minister is in Washington... again. CNN.com.
Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/07/asia/modi-us-visit/index.html
Alhabash, S., Chiang, Y. H., & Huang, K. (2014). MAM & U&G in Taiwan: Differences in the
uses and gratifications of Facebook as a function of motivational reactivity. Computers in
Human Behavior, 35, 423–430.
Alhabash, S., & Ma, M. (2017). A tale of four platforms: Motivations and uses of Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat among college students? Social Media + Society, 3, 1,
1–13.
Alhabash, S., Park, H., Kononova, A., Chiang, Y. H., & Wise, K. (2012). Exploring the
motivations of Facebook use in Taiwan. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social
Networking, 15, 304–311.
Allan, D., & Brown, C. (2010). The Mavi Marmara at the frontlines of Web 2.0. Journal of
Palestine Studies, 40, 1, 63–77.
Ancu, M., & Cozma, R. (2009). MySpace politics: Uses and gratifications of befriending
candidates. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 53, 4, 567–583.
Andrejevic, M. (2004). Reality TV: The work of being watched. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield.
April, K. A. (1999). Leading through communication, conversation and dialogue. Leadership &
Organization Development Journal, 20, 5, 231–241.
Aristotle. (2007). On rhetoric: A theory of civic discourse. New York: Oxford University Press.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

201
Arsenault, A. (2009). Public diplomacy 2.0. In P. M. Seib (Ed.), Toward a new public
diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. foreign policy (pp. 135–153). New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Atrocities Prevention. (n.d.). U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from
https://www.state.gov/j/atrocitiesprevention/
Ausserhofer, J., & Maireder, A. (2013). National politics on twitter: Structures and topics of a
networked public sphere. Information, Communication & Society, 16, 291–314.
doi:10.1080/1369118X.2012.756050
Avery, E., Lariscy, R., Amador, E., Ickowitz, T., Primm, C., & Taylor, A. (2010). Diffusion of
social media among public relations practitioners in health departments across various
community population size. Journal of Public Relations Research, 22, 336–358.
Balser, D., & McClusky, J. (2005). Managing stakeholder relationships and nonprofit
organization effectiveness. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 15, 295–315.
Bastians, D. (2016, May 18). Floods and Landslides in Sri Lanka Leave Dozens Dead. The New
York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/world/asia/sri-lanka-
landslides-flooding.html
Bathany, B. H. (2000). Guided evolution of society: A systems view. New York: Kluwer
Academic/Plenum.
Baym, N. K. (2015). Personal connections in the digital age (2nd ed.). Malden, MA: Polity
Press.
Beck, U. (2005). Power in the Global Age: A new political economy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Benkler, Y. (2011). Networks of power, degrees of freedom. International Journal of
Communication, 5, 1, 721–755.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

202
Berg, M. (2012). Social intermediaries and the location of agency: A conceptual reconfiguration
of social network sites. Contemporary Social Science, 7, 3, 321–333.
doi:10.1080/21582041.2012.683446
Bernoff, J., & Li, C. (2008). Harnessing the power of the oh-so-social web. MIT Sloan
Management Review 49, 3, 36–42.
Bially Mattern, J. (2005). Why ‘soft power’ isn't so soft: Representational force and the
sociolinguistic construction of attraction in world politics. Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, 33, 3, 583–612. doi:10.1177/03058298050330031601
Bjola, C. (2015). Introduction: Making sense of digital diplomacy. In C. Bjola & M. Holmes
(Eds.), Digital diplomacy: Theory and practice (pp. i–9). New York: Routledge.
Bjola, C., & Jiang, L. (2015). Social media and public diplomacy: A comparative analysis of the
digital diplomatic strategies of the EU, US and Japan in China. In C. Bjola & M. Holmes
(Eds.), Digital diplomacy: Theory and practice (pp. 71–88). New York: Routledge.
Borah, P. (2009). Comparing visual framing in newspapers: Hurricane Katrina versus Tsunami.
Newspaper Research Journal 30, 1, 50–57.
Bortree, D. S., & Seltzer, T. (2009). Dialogic strategies and outcomes: An analysis of
environmental advocacy groups’ Facebook profiles. Public Relations Review, 35, 317–
319.
boyd, D., Golder, S., & Lotan, G. (2010). Tweet, tweet, retweet: Conversational aspects of
retweeting on twitter. 43rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS)
(pp. 1–10).
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in
Psychology, 3, 2, 77–101. doi:10.1191/1478088706qp063oa
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

203
Brown, R. (2013). The politics of relational public diplomacy. In R. S. Zaharna, A. Fisher & A.
Arsenault (Eds.), Relational, networked, and collaborative approaches to public
diplomacy: The connective mindshift (pp. 44–55). New York and London: Routledge.
Broadman, H. G. (2017, June 30). Don’t underestimate India's cunning Narendra Modi.
Forbes.com. Retrieved from
https://www.forbes.com/sites/harrybroadman/2017/06/30/dont-underestimate-indias-
cunning-narendra-modi/#79e5b2e023b4
Brundidge, J., & Rice, R. E. (2009). Political engagement and exposure to heterogeneous
political discussion: Do the (information) rich get richer and the similar get more similar?
In A. Chadwick & P. N. Howard (Eds.), The handbook of internet politics (pp. 134–156).
New York, NY: Routledge.
Bryman, A. (2008). Social research methods (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buber, M. (1970). I and thou. (W. Kaufmann trans.). New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Buber, M. (1985). Between man and man. (R.G. Smith trans.). New York: Collier Books.
Buchanan-Oliver, M., & Fitzgerald, E. M. (2016). Industry and agency views of social media:
Issues implementing dialogic communication. Journal of Marketing Communications,
22, 4, 437–454. doi:10.1080/13527266.2014.975829
Carey, J. W. (1989). A cultural approach to communication. Communication as culture: Essays
on media and society (pp. 13–36). New York: Routledge.
Castells, M. (2008). The new public sphere: Global civil society, communication networks, and
global governance. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616,
78–93.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

204
Castells, M. (2011). A network theory of power. International Journal of Communication, 5,
773–787.
Castells, M. (2013). Communication power. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Cerrotti, R. (2017, September 11). Sweden was among the best countries for immigrants. That's
changing. PRI.org. Retrieved from https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-09-11/sweden-was-
among-best-countries-immigrants-thats-changing
Cetorelli, V., Sasson, I., Shabila, N., & Burnham, G. (2017, June 8). ISIS’ Yazidi genocide:
Demographic evidence of the killings and kidnappings. Foreign Affairs.com. Retrieved
from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-06-08/isis-yazidi-genocide
Cha, H., Yeo, S., & Kim, B. (2014). Social media’s dialogic communication of foreign
embassies in Korea and public diplomacy: Based on dialogic communication theory.
Advanced Science and Technology Letters, 63, 175–178.
Chaudhury, D. R. (2016, April 6). India on top 10 ranking of global digital diplomacy:
Diplomacy Live. The Economic Times. Retrieved from
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-on-top-10-ranking-of-
global-digital-diplomacy-diplomacy-live/articleshow/51715372.cms
Chaulia, S. (2018, August 29). India right to spurn foreign disaster relief. Nikkei Asian Review.
Retrieved from https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/India-right-to-spurn-foreign-disaster-
relief
Christakis, A. N., & Brahms, S. (2003), Boundary-spanning dialogue for the 21st-century agoras.
Systems research and Behavioral Science, 20, 371–382. doi:10.1002/sres.508
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

205
Christensen, L. T., & Cornelissen, J. (2011). Bridging corporate and organizational
communication: Review, development and a look to the future. Management
Communication Quarterly, 25, 3, 383–414.
Christensen, M., & Jansson, A. (2014). Complicit surveillance, interveillance, and the question
of cosmopolitanism: Toward a phenomenological understanding of mediatization. New
Media & Society 10, 3, 373–392.
Collins, N., & Bekenova, K. (2018). Digital diplomacy: Success at your fingertips. Place
Branding and Public Diplomacy, 1–11. doi:10.1057/s41254-017-0087-1
Comor, E., & Bean, H. (2012). America’s ‘engagement’ delusion: Critiquing a public diplomacy
consensus. International Communication Gazette, 74, 3, 203–220.
doi:10.1177/1748048511432603
Cook, C., Schaafsma, J., & Antheunis, M. (2018). Under the bridge: An in-depth examination of
online trolling in the gaming context. New Media & Society, 20, 9, 3323–3340.
doi:10.1177/1461444817748578
Cooper, A. F. (2002). Snapshots of an emergent cyber-diplomacy: The Greenpeace campaign
against French nuclear testing and the Spain-Canada “Fish War”. In E. H. Potter (Ed.),
Cyber-diplomacy: Managing foreign policy in the twenty–first century (pp. 128–150).
Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
Cooper, A. F. (2007). Celebrity diplomacy. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
Copeland, D. (2013). Taking diplomacy public: Science, technology, and foreign ministries in a
heteropolar world. In R. S. Zaharna, A. Fisher & A. Arsenault (Eds.), Relational, networked,
and collaborative approaches to public diplomacy: The connective mindshift (pp. 56–69).
New York and London: Routledge.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

206
Corrie, K. L. (2015). The International Criminal Court: Using technology in network diplomacy.
In C. Bjola & M. Holmes (Eds.), Digital diplomacy: Theory and practice (pp. 145–163).
New York: Routledge.
Cowan, G., & Arsenault, A. (2008). Moving from monologue to dialogue to collaboration: The
three layers of public diplomacy. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 616, 10–30.
Cowan, G., & Cull, N. J. (2008). Preface: Public diplomacy in a changing world. Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616, 6–8.
Crichton S., & Kinash, S. (2003). Virtual ethnography: Interactive interviewing online as
method. Canadian Journal of Learning and Technology 29, 2, 101–115.
Cull, N. J. (2008a). Public diplomacy: Taxonomies and histories. The ANNALS of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 616, 31–54. doi: 10.1177/0002716207311952
Cull, N. J. (2008b). The Cold War and the United States Information Agency. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Cull, N. J. (2010). Public diplomacy: Seven lessons for its future from its past. Place Branding
and Public Diplomacy, 6, 1, 11–17.
Cull, N. J. (2011). WikiLeaks, public diplomacy 2.0 and the state of digital public diplomacy.
Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 7, 1, 1–8. doi:10.1057/pb.2011.2
Cull, N. J. (2012). The decline and fall of the United States Information Agency: American
public diplomacy, 1989-2001. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cull, N. J. (2013). The long road to public diplomacy 2.0: The Internet in US public diplomacy.
International Studies Review, 15, 1, 123–139. doi:10.1111/misr.12026
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

207
Curators of Sweden. (n.d.). Curatorsofsweden.com. Retrieved from
http://curatorsofsweden.com/
Daugherty, T., Eastin, M., & Bright, L. (2008). Exploring consumer motivations for creating
user-generated content. Journal of Interactive Advertising, 8, 2, 16–25.
Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Department of State [StateDept]. (n.d.). Twitter page. Retrieved February 6, 2017, from
https://twitter.com/StateDept
Deruda, A. (2012). Digital diplomacy, foreign policy and social media. Self published.
Deruda, A. (2014). The digital diplomacy handbook: How to use social media to engage with
global audiences. Self published.
Digital Young Leaders Exchange Program. (n.d.). World Learning.org. Retrieved from
https://www.worldlearning.org/program/digital-young-leaders-exchange-program/
Dindar, M., & Yaman, N. D. (2018). #IUseTwitterBecause: Content analytic study of a trending
topic in Twitter. Information Technology & People, 31, 1, 256–277.
Dizard, W. P. (2001). Digital diplomacy: U.S. foreign policy in the Information Age. Westport,
CT: Praeger.
Dodd, M. D., & Collins, S. J. (2017). Public relations message strategies and public diplomacy
2.0: An empirical analysis using Central-Eastern European and Western Embassy Twitter
accounts. Public Relations Review, 43, 2, 417–425.
Dolinski, D., Nawrat, M., & Rudak, I. (2001). Dialogue involvement as a social influence
technique. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 11, 1395–1406.
doi:10.1177/01461672012711001
Downing, J. D. H. (2000). Radical media. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

208
Dunne, Á ., Lawlor, M. A., & Rowley, J. (2010). Young people’s use of online social networking
sites – a uses and gratifications perspective. Journal of Research in Interactive
Marketing, 4, 1, 46–58.
Dutta-Bergman, M. J. (2006). U.S. public diplomacy in the Middle East: A critical cultural
approach. Journal of Communication Inquiry, 30, 2, 102–124.
Eastin, M. S., & Daugherty, T. (2005). Past, current, and future trends in mass communication.
In A. Kimmel (Ed.), Marketing Communication: Emerging Trends and Developments.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Eder, M. K. (2011). Leading the narrative: The case for strategic communication. Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press.
Eight out of ten new jobs in Sweden go to immigrants (2017, 13 June). The Local. Retrieved
from https://www.thelocal.se/20170613/eight-out-of-ten-new-jobs-in-sweden-go-to-
immigrants
Ellison, N. B., & boyd, d. (2013). Sociality through social network sites. In W. H. Dutton (Ed.),
The Oxford Handbook of Internet Studies (pp. 151–164). Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Ellison, N. B., Steinfield, C., & Lampe, C. (2011). Connection strategies: Social capital
implications of Facebook–enabled communication practices. New Media & Society 13, 6,
873–92.
Ellison, N. B., Vitak, J., Gray, R., & Lampe, C. (2014). Cultivating social resources on social
network sites: Facebook relationship maintenance behaviors and their role in social capital.
Journal of Computer–Mediated Communication, 19, 4, 855–870.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

209
Emerging nations embrace internet, mobile technology. (2014, February 13). Pewglobal.org.
Retrieved from http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/02/13/emerging–nations–embrace–
internet–mobile–technology/
Esty, D. C. (2006). Good governance at the supranational scale: Globalization administration
law. The Yale Law Journal, 115, 7, p. 1504.
Exchange 2.0: The science of impact, the imperative of implementation. (2012). United States
Institute of Peace. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/publications/2012/10/exchange-
20-science-impact-imperative-implementation
#Familiesbelongtogether: Thousands protest over migrant separations. (2018, July 1). BBC
News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44667093
Ferguson, D. A., & Perse, E. M. (2000). The World Wide Web as a functional alternative to
television. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 44, 155–174.
doi:10.1207/s15506878jobem4402_1.
Fisher, A. (2008). Music for the jilted generation: Open-source public diplomacy. The Hague
Journal of Diplomacy, 3, 2, 129–129.
Fisher, A. (2011). Looking at the man in the mirror: Understanding of power and influence in
public diplomacy. In A. Fisher, and S. Lucas (Eds.), Trials of engagement: The future of US
Public Diplomacy. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Fitton, L., Gruen, M., & Poston, L. (2009). Twitter for dummies. Indianapolis, IN: Wiley
Fitzpatrick, A. (2013, March 12). The future of digital diplomacy: An interview with Alec Ross.
Mashable.com. Retrieved from https://mashable.com/2013/03/12/digital-diplomacy-alec-
ross/#bEq784soIPqh
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

210
Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2007). Advancing the new public diplomacy: A public relations perspective.
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 2, 3, 187–211.
Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2013). Public diplomacy and ethics: From soft power to social conscience. In
R. S. Zaharna, A. Fisher & A. Arsenault (Eds.), Relational, networked, and collaborative
approaches to public diplomacy: The connective mindshift (pp. 29–43). New York and
London: Routledge.
Fletcher, T. (2015). Preface: Naked diplomacy. In A. Sandre (Ed.), Digital diplomacy:
Conversations on innovation in foreign policy (pp. xi–xiii). Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Fletcher, T. (2016, May 31). Twiplomacy study 2016. Twiplomacy.com. Retrieved from
http://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2016/
Freelon, D. (2014). On the interpretation of digital trace data in communication and social
computing research. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 58, 1, 59–75.
doi:10.1080/08838151.2013.875018
Friedman, M. S. (1960). Martin Buber: The life of dialogue. New York: Harper.
Fuchs, C. (2008). Internet and society: social theory in the information age. London & New
York: Routledge.
Fuchs, C. (2010). Labor in informational capitalism and on the internet. Information Society, 26,
179–179.
Gan, C. (2018). Gratifications for using social media: A comparative analysis of Sina Weibo and
WeChat in China. Information Development, 34, 2, 139–147.
Gehl, R. W. (2011) The archive and the processor: The internal logic of Web 2.0. New Media &
Society, 13, 8, 1228–1244. doi:10.1177/1461444811401735
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

211
General Assembly elects 4 new non-permanent members to Security Council, as Western and
others group fails to fill final vacancy. United Nations.org. Retrieved from
https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/ga11796.doc.htm
Gilboa, E. (2006). Public diplomacy: The missing component in Israel's foreign policy. Israel
Affairs, 12, 4, 715–747.
Gilboa, E. (2008). Searching for a theory of public diplomacy. The American Annals of Political
Science, 616, 55–77.
Gilboa, E. (2016). Digital diplomacy. In C. M. Constantinou, P. Kerr, & P. Sharp (Eds.), The
SAGE handbook of diplomacy (pp. 540–551). London: Sage Publications.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781473957930.n45
Goldberg, G. (2011). Rethinking the public/virtual sphere: The problem with participation. New
Media & Society, 13, 5, 739–754.
Gray, A. (2017, April 10). These are the world's most popular websites. World Economic Forum.
Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/04/most-popular-websites-
google-youtube-baidu/
Gregory, B. (2008). Public diplomacy: Sunrise of an academic field. The American Annals of
Political Science, 616, 274–290.
Greuling, K., Kilian, T. (2014). Motives for active participation in political blogs. Social Science
Computer Review, 32, 2, 221–237.
Grunig, J. E., & Hunt, T. (1984). Managing public relations. New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

212
Gulbrandsen, I. T., & Just, S. N. (2011). The collaborative paradigm: Towards an invitational
and participatory concept of online communication. Media, Culture & Society, 33, 7, 1095-
1108.
Habermas, J. (1990). Moral consciousness and communicative action. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Hallahan, K., Holtzhausen, D., Van Ruler, B., Verčič, D., & Sriramesh, K. (2007). Defining
strategic communication. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 1, 1, 3–35.
Hanson, F. (2012). Baked in and wired: eDiplomacy@State. Washington, DC: Retrieved from
Brookings website:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/10/25%20ediplomacy/bak
ed%2 0in%20hansonf
Hanson, G., & Haridakis, P. (2008). YouTube users watching and sharing the news: A uses and
gratifications approach. Journal of Electronic Publishing, 11, 3.
Hanson, G., Haridakis, P. M., Cunningham, A. W., Sharma, R., & Ponder, J. D. (2010). The
2008 presidential campaign: Political cynicism in the age of Facebook, MySpace, and
YouTube. Mass Communication and Society, 13, 5, 584–607.
Hayden, C. (2011). Beyond the ''Obama Effect'': Refining the instruments of engagement
through U.S. public diplomacy. American Behavioral Scientist 55, 6, 784–802.
doi:10.1177/0002764211400571
Hayden, C. (2012). Social media at State: Power, practice, and conceptual limits for US public
diplomacy. Global Media Journal—American Edition, 11, 21, 1–15.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

213
Hayden, C., Waisanen, D., & Osipova, Y. (2013). Facilitating the conversation: The 2012 U.S.
presidential election and public diplomacy through social media. American Behavioral
Scientist, 57, 11, 1623–1642.
Heath, R. (2016, June 29). Sweden wins UN Security Council seat. Politico.eu. Retrieved from
https://www.politico.eu/article/sweden-wins-un-security-council-seat/
Hoffmann, C. P., Suphan, A., & Meckel, M. (2016). The impact of use motives on politicians’
social media adoption. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 13, 13, 239–256.
Holmes, M. (2015). Digital diplomacy and international change management. In C. Bjola & M.
Holmes (Eds.), Digital diplomacy: Theory and practice (pp. 13–32). New York:
Routledge.
Holton, A. E., Baek, K., Coddington, M., & Yaschur, C. (2014). Seeking and sharing:
Motivations for linking on twitter. Communication Research Reports, 31, 1, 33-40.
doi:10.1080/08824096.2013.843165
Holtzhausen, D. R. (2010). Editor’s introduction: Communication in the public sphere: The
political context of strategic communication. International Journal of Strategic
Communication, 4, 75–77.
Holtzhausen, D., & Zerfass, A. (2015). Strategic communication: Opportunities and challenges
of the research area. In D. Holtzhausen & A. Zerfass (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of
strategic communication (pp. 3–17). New York: Routledge.
Indian Diplomacy [IndianDiplomacy]. (n.d.). Twitter page. Retrieved February 6, 2017, from
https://twitter.com/IndianDiplomacy
Jegers, M. (2008). Managerial economics of non-profit organizations. London, UK: Routledge.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

214
Jenkins, H. (2006) Convergence culture: Where old and new media collide. New York; London:
New York University Press.
Jenkins, H., Ford, S., & Green, J. (2013). Spreadable media: Creating value and meaning in a
networked culture. New York; London: New York University Press.
Johnson, P. R., & Yang, S. (2009, August). Uses and gratifications of Twitter: An examination of
user motives and satisfaction of Twitter use. Paper presented at the meeting of the
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Boston, MA.
Johnson, T. J., & Kaye, B. K. (2003). Around the World Wide Web in 80 ways: How motives for
going online are linked to Internet activities among politically interested Internet users.
Social Science Computer Review, 21, 304–325.
Joinson, A. M. (2008). Looking at, looking up or keeping up with people?: Motives and use of
Facebook. Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in
Computing. Retrieved from http://digitalintelligencetoday.com/downloads/Joinson_Facebook.pdf
Jones, A. (2014, May 8). The Fulbright Program is the flagship of American cultural diplomacy.
So why are we cutting it? Motherjones.com. Retrieved from
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/05/fulbright–culture–exchange–diplomacy–state–
department–funding–cuts?page=1
Juris, J. S. (2008). Networking futures: The movements against corporate globalization. Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press.
Kampf, R., Manor, I., & Segev, E. (2015). Digital diplomacy 2.0? A cross–national comparison
of public engagement in Facebook and Twitter. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 10, 4,
331–362. doi:10.1163/1871191X–12341318
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

215
Karapanos, E., Teixeira, P., & Gouveia, R. (2016). Need fulfillment and experiences on social
media: A case on Facebook and WhatsApp. Computers in Human Behavior, 55, 888–
897.
Karlis, J. V. (2013). That’s news to me: An exploratory study of the uses and gratifications of
current events on social media of 18-24 year-olds. Scholar Commons. Retrieved from
http://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/2347/
Katz, E., Blumler, J. G., & Gurevitch, M. (1974). Utilization of mass communication by the
individual. In J. G. Blumler & E. Katz (Eds.), The uses of mass communications: Current
perspectives on gratifications research (pp. 19–32). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Kaye, B. K., & Johnson, T. J. (2002). Online and in the know: Uses and gratifications of the Web
for political information. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 46, 1, 54–71.
Kaye, B. K., & Johnson, T. J. (2004). A Web for all reasons: Uses and gratifications of Internet
components for political information. Telematics and Informatics, 21, 3, 197–223.
Kelley, J. R. (2009). Between “take-offs” and “crash landings”: Situational aspects of public
diplomacy. In N. Snow & P.M. Taylor (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of public
diplomacy. New York: Routledge.
Kemp, S. (2018). Digital in 2018: Global overview. Retrieved from
https://digitalreport.wearesocial.com/download
Kent, M. L., & Taylor, M. (1998). Building dialogic relationships through the World Wide Web.
Public Relations Review, 3, 24, 321–334.
Kent, M. L., & Taylor, M. (2002). Toward a dialogic theory of public relations. Public Relations
Review, 28, 21–37.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

216
Kerry, J. (2013, May 6). Digital diplomacy: Adapting our diplomatic engagement [Web log
post]. Retrieved 24/7/14. http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2013/05/06/digital-diplomacy-
adapting-our-diplomatic- engagement
Khalid, A. (2016, June 22). Emoji vs. emoticon: What’s the difference? The Daily Dot.
Retrieved from https://www.dailydot.com/debug/emoji-vs-emoticon-differences-
explained/
Khan, M. (2017). Social media engagement: What motivates user participation and consumption
on YouTube? Computers in Human Behavior, 66, 236–247.
Khatib, L., Dutton, W., & Thelwall, M. (2012). Public diplomacy 2.0: A case study of the US
digital outreach team. The Middle East Journal, 66, 3, 453–472. doi:10.3751/66.3.14
Kim, D., & Johnson, T. J. (2012). Political blog readers: Predictors of motivations for accessing
political blogs. Telematics and Informatics, 29, 1, 99–109. doi:10.1016/j.tele.2011.04.003
Klapper, J. T. (1963). Mass communication research: An old road resurveyed. Public Opinion
Quarterly, 27, 4, 515–527.
Ko, H., Cho, C. H., & Roberts, M. S. (2005). Internet uses and gratifications: A structural
equation model of interactive advertising. Journal of Advertising, 34, 2, 57–70.
Korgaonkar, P. K., & Wolin, L. D. (1999). A multivariate analysis of web uses. Journal of
Advertising Research, 39, 1, 53–68.
Kraut, R. E., & Resnick, P. (2011). Encouraging contribution to online communities. Building
successful online communities: Evidence-based social design, 21–76.
Kretschmer, L-M. (2017). Imagine there is war and it is tweeted live – An analysis of digital
diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Global Media Journal, German Edition, 7,
1, 1–23.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

217
Krippendorff, K. (2013). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology (3rd ed.).
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.
Kurbalija, J. (2016, November 7). 25 points for digital diplomacy. Huffingtonpost.com.
Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/25-points-for-digital-
diplomacy_us_581c78bae4b0334571e099ec
Larsson, A. O., & Moe, H. (2012). Studying political microblogging: Twitter users in the 2010
Swedish election campaign. New Media & Society, 14, 729–747.
doi:10.1177/1461444811422894
Ledingham, J. A., & Bruning, S. D. (Eds.). (2000). Public relations as relationship management:
A relational approach to the study and practice of public relations. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Lewis, D. (2001). The management of non-governmental development organizations: An
introduction. London, UK: Routledge.
Limbourg, P. (2014). Social media – chances and challenges for international broadcasting.
Connect-World.com. Retrieved from http://connect-world.com/2014/12/23/social-media-
chances-and-challenges-for-international-broadcasting/
Linvill, D. L., McGee, S. E., & Hicks, L. K. (2012). Colleges’ and universities’ use of Twitter: A
content analysis. Public Relations Review, 38, 636–638.
Liu, I. L. B., Cheung, C. M. K., & Lee, M. K. O. (2010). Understanding Twitter usage: What
drive people continue to tweet. PACIS 2010 Proceedings (pp. 928–939).
Lovejoy, K., Waters, R., & Saxton, G. D. (2012). Engaging stakeholders through Twitter: How
nonprofit organizations are getting more out of 140 characters or less. Public Relations
Review, 38, 313–318.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

218
Lüfkens, M. (2017, May 31). Twiplomacy study 2017. Retrieved from
http://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2017/
Madden, M., Lenhart, A., Cortesi, S., et al. (2013). Teens, social media, and privacy. Pew
Internet & American Life Project.
Malas, N. (2009, January 12). IDF recruits YouTube in Hamas fight. Variety. Retrieved from
http://variety.com/2009/digital/features/idf-recruits-youtube-in-hamas-fight-1117998426/
Mann, C., & Stewart, F. (2002). Internet interviewing. In J. F. Gubrium & J. A. Holstein (Eds.),
Handbook of interview research: Context and method (pp. 603–628). Thousand Oaks,
CA: SAGE.
Manor, I. (2017). America’s selfie – Three years later. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy,
13, 4, 308-324.
Manor, I., & Segev, E. (2015). America’s selfie: How the US portrays itself on its social media
accounts. In C. Bjola & M. Holmes (Eds.), Digital diplomacy: Theory and practice (pp.
89–108). New York: Routledge.
Mansell, R. (Ed.). (2002). Inside the communication revolution: Evolving patterns of social and
technical interaction. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Mazumdar, B. T. (2012). Shifting blame on the high seas ... and on YouTube: The narrative
failure of Israel’s flotilla cyber-diplomacy. Global Media Journal, American Edition, 11,
21, 1–21.
McAllister-Spooner, S. A. (2009). Fulfilling the dialogic promise: A ten-year reflective survey
on dialogic Internet principles. Public Relations Review, 35, 320–322.
McChesney, R. W. (2007). Communication revolution: Critical junctures and the future of
media. New York: New Press.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

219
McCluskey, M. (2014, January 28). Social media helps diplomats engage — online and off. The
Washington Diplomat. Retrieved from
http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&id=9963:social–media–
helps–diplomats–engage–online–and–off&Itemid=428
Melissen, J. (Ed.). (2005). The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Melissen, J., & Caesar-Gordon, M. (2016). “Digital diplomacy” and the securing of nationals in
a citizen-centric world. Global Affairs, 2,3, 321–330.
Meraz, S., & Papacharissi, Z. (2013). Networked gatekeeping and networked framing on #Egypt.
The International Journal of Press/Politics. doi: 10.1177/1940161212474472
Metzgar, E. T., & Lu, X. (2015). Tweeting the pivot? The United States and PD 2.0 in Northeast
Asia. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 11, 3, 204–215.
doi:http://dx.doi.org.libproxy2.usc.edu/10.1057/pb.2015.3
Mor, B. (2006). Public diplomacy in grand strategy. Foreign Policy Analysis, 2, 2, 157–176.
Morozov, E. (2011). The net delusion: The dark side of internet freedom. New York:
PublicAffairs.
Morrison, E. W., & Milliken, F. J. (2000). Organizational silence: A barrier to change and
development in a pluralistic world. Academy of Management Review 25, 4, 706 – 725.
Mosemghvdlishvili, L., & Jansz, J. (2013). Framing and praising Allah on YouTube: Exploring
user-created videos about Islam and the motivations for producing them. New Media &
Society, 15, 4, 482–500.
Mulhern, F. (2009). Integrated marketing communications: From media channels to digital
connectivity. Journal of Marketing Communications, 15, 2, 3, 85–101.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

220
Murray, S. (2015). Evolution, not revolution: the digital divide in American and Australian
contexts. In C. Bjola & M. Holmes (Eds.), Digital diplomacy: Theory and practice (pp.
127–144). New York: Routledge.
Natarajan, K. (2014). Digital public diplomacy and a strategic narrative for India. Strategic
Analysis, 38, 1, 91–106.
Nelson, M. (1997). War of the black heavens: The battles of Western broadcasting in the cold
war (1st ed.). Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
Newsom, V. A., & Lengel, L. (2012). Framing messages of democracy through social media:
Public diplomacy 2.0, gender, and the Middle East and North Africa. Global Media
Journal, 12, 21, 1–18.
Newton, N. (2010). The use of semi-structured interviews in qualitative research: Strengths and
weaknesses. Exploring Qualitative Methods, 1, 1, 1–11.
Nilsen, L. G., Hafstad, G. S., Staksrud, E., & Dyb, G. (2018). Five reasons for using social media
among young terror survivors: Results from the Utøya study. Computers in Human
Behavior, 84, 285–294. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2018.03.006
Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. New York: Public Affairs.
Nye, J. S. (2008). Public diplomacy and soft power. The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 616, 1, 94–109.
Nye, J. S. (2011). The future of power. New York: Public Affairs.
O’Keeffe, A., & Oliver, A. (2010). International broadcasting and its contribution to public
diplomacy (Working Paper). Retrieved from Lowy Institute website:
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/pubfiles/O%27Keeffe_and_Oliver_Inter
national_broadcasting_WP_full_1.pdf
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

221
Owen, T. (2016). The networked state and the end of 20th century diplomacy. Global Affairs, 2,
3, 301–307.
Palmgreen, P., & Rayburn, J. (1979). Uses and gratifications and exposure to public television.
Communication Research, 6, 2, 155–180.
Pamment, J. (2012). What became of the new public diplomacy? Recent developments in
British, US and Swedish public diplomacy policy and evaluation methods. The Hague
Journal of Diplomacy, 7, 3, 313–336. doi:10.1163/187119112X635177
Pamment, J. (2016). Digital diplomacy as transmedia engagement: Aligning theories of
participatory culture with international advocacy campaigns. New Media & Society, 18,
9, 2046–2062. doi:10.1177/1461444815577792
Papacharissi, Z. (2003, October). The blogger revolution: A uses and gratifications study. Paper
presented at the Association of Internet Researchers Annual Conference, Toronto, ON.
Papacharissi, Z., & Rubin, A. M. (2000). Predictors of internet use. Journal of Broadcasting &
Electronic Media, 44, 2, 175–196.
Paul, C. (2011). Strategic communication: Origins, concepts, and current debates. Westport, CT:
Praeger Security International.
Pelling, J. (2015). When doing becomes the message: The case of Swedish digital diplomacy. In
C. Bjola & M. Holmes (Eds.), Digital diplomacy: Theory and practice (pp. 164–180).
New York: Routledge.
Perse, E. M. (1992). Predicting attention to local television news: Need for cognition and
motives for viewing. Communication Reports 5, 1, 40–49.
Peterson, K. (2013, January 9). A farewell [Web log post]. Retrieved from
https://secondhouseofsweden.wordpress.com/
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

222

Ponder, J. D., & Haridakis, P. (2015). Selectively social politics: The differing roles of media use
on political discussion. Mass Communication and Society, 18, 281–302.
Postelnicu, M., & Cozma, R. (2007). Online political campaigning on MySpace during the 2006
U.S. mid-term elections. Paper presented at the meeting of the National Communication
Association, Chicago, IL.
Potter, E. H. (2003). Canada and the new public diplomacy. International Journal, 58, 2, 43–64.
PTI. (2017, December 21). India-Sri Lanka ties improved in 2017 despite port lease to China.
Financial Express. Retrieved from https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/india-
sri-lanka-ties-improved-in-2017-despite-port-lease-to-china/984365/
Quan-Haase, A., & Young, A. (2010). Uses and gratifications of social media: A comparison of
Facebook and instant messaging. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 30, 350–361
Quinn, D. (2016, June 21). Angelina Jolie Pitt pleads for ‘new approach’ to global refugee crisis,
slams ‘xenophobia’. People. Retrieved from https://people.com/celebrity/angelina-jolie-
pitt-gives-world-refugee-day-speech-at-department-of-state/
Quinn, J. B. (1978, Fall.). Strategic change: Logical incrementalism. Sloan Management Review,
20, 7–21.
Raacke, J., Bonds-Raacke, J. (2008). MySpace and Facebook: Applying the uses and
gratifications theory to exploring friend-networking sites. Cyberpsychology & Behavior,
11, 169–174.
Rajasalu, T. (2011). E–diplomats in action: Interview with Triinu Rajasalu, Estonia. Retrieved
from http://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/e–diplomats–action–interview–triinurajasalu–
estonia
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

223
Rathnayake, C., & Winter, J. S. (2017). Examining the link between social media uses and
gratifications, and political tolerance and dogmatism. Policy & Internet, 9, 4, 444–466.
Representation: Permanent Mission of Sweden, Geneva. (n.d.). Swedenabroad.se. Retrieved
from https://www.swedenabroad.se/es/embajada/un-geneva/about-us/disarmament-and-
non-proliferation/
Riley, P., & Hollihan, T. (2012). Strategic communication; how governments frame arguments in
the media. In F.H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Exploring argumentative contexts
(pp. 59–77). John Benjamins.
Riley, P., Thomas, G. F., Weintraub, R., Noyes, A., & Dixon, S. (2015). Good governance and
strategic communication: A communication capital approach. In D. Holtzhausen & A.
Zerfass (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of strategic communication (pp. 201–213). New
York: Routledge.
Roselle, L., Miskimmon, A., & O’Loughlin, B. (2014). Strategic narrative: A new means to
understand soft power. Media, War & Conflict, 7, 1, 70–84.
Rubin, A. M. (1994). Media uses and effects: a uses and gratifications perspective. In J. Bryant
& D. Zillmann (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research (pp. 417–436).
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Rubin, A. M. (2009). Uses and gratifications perspective on media effects. In J. Bryant & M. B.
Oliver (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research (3rd ed.) (pp. 165–184). New
York: Routledge.
Ruggiero, T. E. (2000). Uses and gratifications theory in the 21st century. Mass Communication
& Society, 3, 1, 3–37.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

224
Rybalko, S., & Seltzer, T. (2010). Dialogic communication in 140 characters or less: How
Fortune 500 companies engage stakeholders using Twitter. Public Relations Review, 36,
336-341.
Saletan, W. (2010, March 3). Bubble think: How to escape a partisan echo chamber. Slate.com.
Retrieved from: http://www.slate.com/id/2252685/
Sandre, A. (2013). Twitter for diplomats: A guide to the fastest growing digital diplomacy tool.
DiploFoundation.
Sandre, A. (2015). Digital diplomacy: Conversations on innovation in foreign policy. Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Scott-Smith, G. (2009). Exchange programs and public diplomacy. In N. Snow & P.M. Taylor
(Eds.), The Routledge handbook of public diplomacy (pp. 50–57). New York: Routledge.
Seo, H. (2013). The “virtual last three feet”: Understanding relationship perspectives in
networked-based public diplomacy. In R. S. Zaharna, A. Fisher & A. Arsenault (Eds.),
Relational, networked, and collaborative approaches to public diplomacy: The connective
mindshift (pp. 157–172). New York and London: Routledge.
Seo, H., & Ebrahim, H. (2016). Visual propaganda on Facebook: A comparative analysis of
Syrian conflicts. Media, War & Conflict, 9, 3, 227–251. doi:10.1177/1750635216661648
7 things Sushma Swaraj said in her annual press conference (2016, June 19). The Economic
Times. Retrieved from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/7-
things-sushma-swaraj-said-in-her-annual-press-conference/articleshow/52819652.cms
Severin, W. J., & Tankard Jr., J. W. (1992). Communication theories: Origins, methods, and
uses in the mass media (3rd ed.). White Plains, NY: Longman Publishing Group.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

225
Shannon, C. E., & Weaver, W. (1949). The mathematical theory of communication. Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press.
ShareAmerica [shareamerica]. (n.d.). Twitter page. Retrieved February 6, 2017, from
https://twitter.com/shareamerica
Shear, M. D., Goodnough, A., & Haberman, M. (2018, June 20). Trump retreats on separating
families, but thousands may remain apart. The New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/us/politics/trump-immigration-children-executive-
order.html
Sheldon, P., & Bryant, K. (2016). Instagram: Motives for its use and relationship to narcissism
and contextual age. Computers in Human Behavior, 58, 89–97.
Shifman, L. (2014). Memes in digital culture. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Signitzer, B. H., & Coombs, T. (1992). Public relations and public diplomacy: Conceptual
convergences. Public Relations Review, 18, 2, 137–147.
Singh, J. P. (2015). The power of diplomacy: New meanings, and the methods for understanding
digital diplomacy. In C. Bjola & M. Holmes (Eds.), Digital diplomacy: Theory and
practice (pp. 181–198). New York: Routledge.
Slaughter, A–M. (2004). A new world order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Small, T. A. (2011). WHAT THE HASHTAG?: A content analysis of Canadian politics on
Twitter. Information, Communication & Society, 14, 6, 872–895.
doi:10.1080/1369118X.2011.554572
Smith, B. G. (2012). Communication integration: An analysis of context and conditions. Public
Relations Review, 38, 600–608.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

226
Smock, A. D., Ellison, N. B., Lampe, C., & Wohn, D. Y. (2011). Facebook as a toolkit: A uses
and gratification approach to unbundling feature use. Computers in Human Behavior, 27, 6,
2322–2329.
Sobkowicz, P., & Sobkowicz, A. (2012). Two-year study of emotion and communication
patterns in a highly polarized political discussion forum. Social Science Computer Review,
30, 448–469.
Sotiriu, S. (2015). Digital diplomacy: Between promises and reality. In C. Bjola & M. Holmes
(Eds.), Digital diplomacy: Theory and practice (pp. 33–51). New York: Routledge.
Stanford, S. W. (1983). Comments on Palmgreen and Rayburn: Gratifications sought and media
exposure. Communication Research, 10, 2, 247–258.
Stanley, B. (2015). Uses and gratifications of temporary social media: A comparison of
Snapchat and Facebook (Master’s thesis). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses
database. (UMI No. 1526404)
Stavros, C., Meng, M. D., Westberg, K., & Farrelly, F. (2014). Understanding fan motivation for
interacting on social media. Sport Management Review, 17, 4, 455–469.
Steinberg, R. (2010). Principal–agent theory and nonprofit accountability. In K. J. Hopt & T.
Von Hippel (Eds.), Comparative corporate governance of non-profit organizations (pp. 73–
125). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Storie, L. K. (2015). Lost publics in public diplomacy: Antecedents for online relationship
management. Public Relations Review, 41, 2, 315–317. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2015.02.008
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

227
Strauß, N., Kruikemeier, S., Van der Meulen, H., & Van Noort, G. (2015). Digital diplomacy in
GCC countries: Strategic communication of Western embassies on Twitter. Government
Information Quarterly, 32, 369–379. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2015.08.001
Suedfeld, P., Cross, R. W., & Brcic, J. (2011). Two years of ups and downs: Barack Obama's
patterns of integrative complexity, motive imagery, and values. Political Psychology, 32, 6,
1007–1033.
Sundar, S. S. (2004). Theorizing interactivity's effects. The Information Society, 20, 5, 385–389.
Sundar, S. S., & Limperos, A. (2013). Uses and Grats 2.0: New Gratifications for New Media.
Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 57, 4, 504-525.
Sweden celebrates king's 70th birthday. (2016, April 30). Associated Press. Retrieved from
https://www.businessinsider.com/ap-sweden-celebrates-kings-70th-birthday-2016-4
Sweden.se [swedense]. (n.d.). Twitter page. Retrieved February 6, 2017, from
https://twitter.com/swedense
Swedish MFA [SweMFA]. (n.d.). Twitter page. Retrieved February 6, 2017, from
https://twitter.com/SweMFA
Sweetser, K. D., & Lariscy, R. W. (2008). Candidates make good friends: An analysis of
candidates’ uses of Facebook. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 2, 175–
198. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15531180802178687
Sweetser, K. D., & Weaver-Lariscy, R. (2007). Candidates make good friends: An analysis of
candidates' use of Facebook, Paper presented at the meeting of the National
Communication Association, Chicago, IL.
Taylor, M., & Kent, M. L. (2014). Dialogic engagement: Clarifying foundational concepts.
Journal of Public Relations Research, 26, 5, 384–398.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

228
The Impact of Virtual Exchange. (n.d.). Virtualexchangecoalition.org. Retrieved from
http://virtualexchangecoalition.org/
The Swedish Number. (n.d.). Theswedishnumber.com. Retrieved from
https://www.theswedishnumber.com/
Trammell, K. D. (2006). Blog offensive: An exploratory analysis of attacks published on
campaign blog posts from a political public relations perspective. Public Relations
Review, 32, 402–406.
Tuysuz, G., & McLaughlin, E. C. (2016, July 18). Failed coup in Turkey: What you need to
know. CNN.com. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/18/middleeast/turkey-
failed-coup-explainer/index.html
UN has ‘great interest in Sweden’ says PM (2015, March 31). The Local.se. Retrieved from
https://www.thelocal.se/20150331/un-has-great-interest-in-sweden-says-pm
Utz, S., Muscanell, N., Khalid, C. (2015). Snapchat elicits more jealousy than Facebook: A
comparison of Snapchat and Facebook use. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social
Networking, 18, 141–146.
Van Ham, P. (2010). Social power in international politics. New York: Routledge.
Van Ham, P. (2013). Social power in public diplomacy. In R. S. Zaharna, A. Fisher & A.
Arsenault (Eds.), Relational, networked, and collaborative approaches to public diplomacy:
The connective mindshift (pp. 17–28). New York and London: Routledge.
Van Puyvelde, S., Caers, R., Du Bois, C., & Jegers, M. (2012). The governance of nonprofit
organizations: Integrating agency theory with stakeholder and stewardship theories.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 41, 3, 431–451.
doi:10.1177/0899764011409757
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

229
Vickers, R. (2004). The new public diplomacy: Britain and Canada compared. The British
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6, 2, 182-194. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
856X.2004.00133.x
Vikas Swarup [MEAIndia]. (n.d.). Twitter page. Retrieved February 6, 2017, from
https://twitter.com/MEAIndia
Vk.com. (2017). Retrieved from https://vk.com/about
Waters, R. D., Burnett, E., Lamm, A., & Lucas, J. (2009). Engaging stakeholders through social
networking: How nonprofit organizations are using Facebook. Public Relations Review,
35, 102–106.
Waters, R. D., Canfield, R. R., Foster, J. M., & Hardy, E. E. (2011). Applying the dialogic theory
to social networking sites: Examining how university health centers convey health
messages on Facebook. Journal of Social Marketing, 1, 211–227.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/204267611111170713
Watkins, B. A. (2017). Experimenting with dialogue on Twitter: An examination of the influence
of the dialogic principles on engagement, interaction, and attitude. Public Relations
Review, 43, 163–171.
Whiting, A., & Williams, D. (2013). Why people use social media: A uses and gratifications
approach. Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal, 16, 362–369.
Wilhelm, I. (2014, July 27). U.S. moves to align student exchanges with policy goals. The New
York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/us/us-moves-to-align-
student-exchanges-with-policy-goals.html
Xiong, S. (2014). A comparative study of uses and gratifications between Weibo and News
Websites in China (Doctoral dissertation). Ohio University, Ohio.
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

230
Yarchi, M., Samuel-Azran, T., & Bar-David, L. (2017). Facebook users’ engagement with
Israel’s public diplomacy messages during the 2012 and 2014 military operations in
Gaza. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 13, 4, 360–375.
Yeginsu, C., & Victor, D. (2016, July 16). Erdogan calls on U.S. to arrest or extradite Fethullah
Gulen. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/live/turkey-coup-
erdogan/obama-and-kerry/
Zaharna, R. S. (2010). Battles to bridges: U.S. strategic communication and public diplomacy
after 9/11. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Zaharna, R. S., Fisher, A., & Arsenault, A. (2013). Introduction: The connective mindshift. In R.
S. Zaharna, A. Fisher & A. Arsenault (Eds.), Relational, networked, and collaborative
approaches to public diplomacy: The connective mindshift (pp. 1–16). New York and
London: Routledge.
Zika outbreak: What you need to know. (2016, August 31). BBC News. Retrieved from
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-35370848
Zöllner, O. (2006). A quest for dialogue in international broadcasting. Global Media and
Communication, 2, 2, 160–182. doi:10.1177/1742766506061817

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

231

X. Appendices

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

232
Appendix 1

Type of Tweet or Post by Nation and Property

Digital Diplomacy
Property
Tweet/
FB Post,
Photo or Video
Retweet/
Shared FB Post,
Photo or Video

Directed Tweet

Reply to Others
U.S. DOS
Twitter (N=302) 120 (40%) 182 (60%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Facebook (N=302) 263 (87%) 39 (13%) N/A N/A
ShareAmerica
Twitter (N=303) 303 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Facebook (N=275) 275 (100%) 0 (0%) N/A N/A
Swedish MFA
Twitter (N=301) 60 (20%) 241 (80%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Facebook (N=60) 45 (75%) 15 (25%) N/A N/A
Sweden.se
Twitter (N=250) 101 (40%) 4 (2%) 8 (3%) 137 (55%)
Facebook (N=60) 60 (100%) 0 (0%) N/A N/A
Indian MEA
Twitter (N=272) 240 (88%) 30 (11%) 0 (0%) 2 (1%)
Facebook (N=301) 182 (60%) 119 (40%) N/A N/A
Indian Diplomacy
Twitter (N=302) 265 (88%) 37 (12%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

233
Appendix 2

Detailed Public Diplomacy Activity by Type of U.S. Property

U.S. Department of State

ShareAmerica
Type of Activity
Twitter
(N=302)

Facebook
(N=302)
TOTAL
(N=604)

Twitter
(N=303)

Facebook
(N=275)
TOTAL
(N=578)
ADVOCACY

Crime 4 (1%)

4 (1%) 1%

9 (3%)

5 (2%) 2%
Democracy 5 (2%)

3 (1%) 1%

8 (3%)

6 (2%) 2%
Diplomacy 14 (5%)

10 (3%) 4%

0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%
Education 1 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%

0 (0%)

1 (0%) 0%
Environment/
Clean Energy
21 (7%)

31 (10%) 9%

38 (13%)

31 (11%) 12%
Financial/Trade/Economy 3 (1%)

4 (1%) 1%

1 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%
Foreign Aid 5 (2%)

8 (3%) 2%

1 (0%)

1 (0%) 0%
Health/Medical 4 (1%)

7 (2%) 2%

14 (5%)

10 (4%) 4%
History 0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%

1 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%
Human Rights 6 (2%)

8 (3%) 2%

7 (2%)

13 (5%) 3%
Human Trafficking 1 (0%)

2 (1%) 0%

1 (0%)

1 (0%) 0%
Immigration/Refugees 13 (4%)

9 (3%) 4%

17 (6%)

8 (3%) 4%
Military 8 (3%)

3 (1%) 2%

3 (1%)

0 (0%) 1%
Nuclear 3 (1%)

3 (1%) 1%

0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%
Other 26 (9%)

18 (6%) 7%

33 (11%)

19 (7%) 9%
Peace 4 (1%)

18 (6%) 4%

0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%
Press/Journalism 7 (2%)

9 (3%) 3%

21 (7%)

13 (5%) 6%
Science 2 (1%)

3 (1%) 1%

8 (3%)

1 (0%) 2%
Social Policy 12 (4%)

15 (5%) 4%

37 (12%)

19 (7%) 10%
Technology 2 (1%)

2 (1%) 1%

12 (4%)

2 (1%) 2%
Terrorism 17 (6%)

13 (4%) 5%

2 (1%)

1 (0%) 1%
TOTAL 158 (52%)

170 (56%) 54%

213 (70%)

131 (48%) 60%

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

234

Detailed Public Diplomacy Activity by Type of U.S. Property

U.S. Department of State

ShareAmerica
Type of Activity
Twitter
(N=302)

Facebook
(N=302)
TOTAL
(N=604)

Twitter
(N=303)

Facebook
(N=275)
TOTAL
(N=578)
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Arts 4 (1%)

4 (1%) 1%

11 (4%)

12 (4%) 4%
Holiday Greeting 6 (2%)

4 (1%) 2%

0 (0%)

2 (1%) 0%
Language 0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%

30 (10%)

29 (11%) 10%
Nature/Travel/Tourism 0 (0%)

3 (1%) 0%

10 (3%)

2 (1%) 2%
Other 2 (1%)

1 (0%) 0%

1 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%
Religion 3 (1%)

5 (2%) 1%

16 (5%v

17 (6%) 6%
Sports 3 (1%)

6 (2%) 1%

14 (5%v

9 (3%) 4%
TOTAL 18 (6%)

23 (8%) 7%

82 (27%)

71 (26%) 26%

EXCHANGES

Any Human 4 (1%)

5 (2%) 1%

5 (2%)

3 (1%) 1%
Other 1 (0%)

1 (0%) 0%

0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%
TOTAL 5 (2%)

6 (2%) 2%

5 (2%)

3 (1%) 1%

INTERNATIONAL
BROADCASTING

Consular Services 1 (0%)

2 (1%) 0%

1 (0%)

2 (1%) 1%
Cooperation With
Traditional International
Broadcasters
0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%

0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%
Crisis Communication 8 (3%)

0 (0%) 1%

0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%
Domestic Update 10 (3%)

10 (3%) 3%

55 (18%)

76 (28%) 23%
Foreign Policy Update 34 (11%)

38 (13%) 12%

11 (4%)

8 (3%) 3%
Appearance of
Government Official
22 (7%)

28 (9%) 8%

1 (0%)

1 (0%) 0%
Statement of
Government Official
112 (37%)

117 (39%) 38%

15 (5%)

6 (2%) 4%
Web Only Appearance of
Government Official
1 (0%)

1 (0%) 0%

0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%
History 1 (0%)

4 (1%) 1%

4 (1%)

4 (1%) 1%
International Update 40 (13%)

37 (12%) 13%

91 (30%)

89 (32%) 31%
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

235

Detailed Public Diplomacy Activity by Type of U.S. Property

U.S. Department of State

ShareAmerica
Type of Activity
Twitter
(N=302)

Facebook
(N=302)
TOTAL
(N=604)

Twitter
(N=303)

Facebook
(N=275)
TOTAL
(N=578)
Preview 4 (1%) 1 (0%) 1% 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 0%
Other 2 (1%)

2 (1%) 1%

8 (3%)

6 (2%) 3%
Scheduling Update 31 (10%)

56 (19%) 14%

25 (8%)

35 (13%) 10%
Travel Update 11 (4%)

5 (2%) 3%

0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%
TOTAL 277 (92%)

301 (100%) 96%

213 (70%)

226 (82%) 76%

LISTENING
OPPORTUNITY

Any Question Asked 7 (2%) 12 (4%) 3% 75 (25%) 188 (68%) 46%
Any Other Chance for
Input
16 (5%)

14 (5%) 5%

2 (1%)

1 (0%) 1%
Any Polling-related
Content
0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%

0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%
Any Request for UGC 6 (2%)

6 (2%) 2%

11 (4%)

27 (10%) 7%
Other 0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%

0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%
TOTAL 29 (10%)

32 (11%) 10%

88 (29%)

216 (79%) 53%

OTHER 2 (1%)

1 (0%) 0%

0 (0%)

0 (0%) 0%

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

236
Appendix 3

Detailed Public Diplomacy Activity by Type of Swedish Property

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Sweden.se
Type of Activity
Twitter
(N=301)

Facebook
(N=60)
TOTAL
(N=361)

Twitter
(N=250)

Facebook
(N=60)
TOTAL
(N=310)
ADVOCACY

Crime 1 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Democracy 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 1% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Diplomacy 8 (3%) 2 (3%) 3% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Education 1 (0%) 1 (2%) 1% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Environment/Clean
Energy
25 (8%) 6 (10%) 9% 2 (1%) 1 (2%) 1%
Financial/Trade/Economy 8 (3%) 1 (2%) 2% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Foreign Aid 14 (5%) 3 (5%) 5% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Health/Medical 5 (2%) 4 (7%) 2% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Human Rights 16 (5%) 2 (3%) 5% 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 0%
Immigration/Refugees 7 (2%) 0 (0%) 2% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Nuclear 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 0% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Other 29 (10%) 8 (13%) 10% 1 (0%) 1 (2%) 1%
Peace 28 (9%) 7 (12%) 10% 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 1%
Press/Journalism 4 (1%) 2 (3%) 2% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Social Policy 22 (7%) 5 (8%) 7% 2 (1%) 4 (7%) 2%
Technology 3 (1%) 0 (0%) 1% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Terrorism 6 (2%) 0 (0%) 2% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
TOTAL 179 (59%) 42 (70%) 61% 7 (3%) 7 (12%) 5%

CULTURAL
DIPLOMACY

Arts 7 (2%) 4 (7%) 3% 44 (18%) 2 (3%) 15%
Food 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 10 (4%) 7 (12%) 5%
Holiday Greeting 7 (2%) 2 (3%) 2% 1 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Language 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 3 (1%) 1 (2%) 1%
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

237

Detailed Public Diplomacy Activity by Type of Swedish Property

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Sweden.se
Type of Activity
Twitter
(N=301)

Facebook
(N=60)
TOTAL
(N=361)

Twitter
(N=250)

Facebook
(N=60)
TOTAL
(N=310)
Nature/Travel/Tourism 1 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 48 (19%) 20 (33%) 22%
Other 1 (0%) 1 (2%) 1% 67 (27%) 1 (2%) 22%
Religion 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 1% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Sports 3 (1%) 1 (2%) 1% 4 (2%) 3 (5%) 2%
TOTAL 21 (7%) 8 (13%) 8% 177 (71%) 34 (57%) 68%

EXCHANGES

Any Human 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 1% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Other 3 (1%) 0 (0%) 1% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
TOTAL 5 (2%) 0 (0%) 1% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%

INTERNATIONAL
BROADCASTING

Consular Services 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 1 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Domestic Update 7 (2%) 5 (8%) 3% 15 (6%) 20 (33%) 11%
Foreign Policy Update 29 (10%) 7 (12%) 10% 1 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Appearance of
Government Official
57 (19%) 1 (2%) 16% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Statement of Government
Official
49 (16%) 8 (13%) 16% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
History 3 (1%) 1 (2%) 1% 2 (1%) 3 (5%) 2%
International Update 62 (21%) 17 (28%) 22% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Other 6 (2%) 0 (0%) 2% 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 0%
Preview 1 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 3 (1%) 0 (0%) 1%
Scheduling Update 20 (7%) 7 (12%) 7% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
TOTAL 234 (78%) 46 (77%) 78% 22 (9%) 24 (40%) 15%

LISTENING
OPPORTUNITY

Any Question Asked 9 (3%) 5 (8%) 4% 23 (9%) 7 (12%) 10%
Any Other Chance for
Input
16 (5%) 4 (7%) 6% 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 1%
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

238

Detailed Public Diplomacy Activity by Type of Swedish Property

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Sweden.se
Type of Activity
Twitter
(N=301)

Facebook
(N=60)
TOTAL
(N=361)

Twitter
(N=250)

Facebook
(N=60)
TOTAL
(N=310)
Any Polling-related
Content
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Any Request for UGC 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 1 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
Other 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0%
TOTAL 25 (8%) 9 (15%) 9% 26 (10%) 7 (12%) 11%

OTHER 7 (2%) 0 (0%) 2% 1 (0%) 2 (3%) 1%

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

239
Appendix 4

Detailed Public Diplomacy Activity by Type of Indian Property

Indian Ministry of External Affairs

Indian Diplomacy
Type of Activity
Twitter
(N=272)

Facebook
(N=301)
TOTAL
(N=573)

Twitter
(N=302)
TOTAL
(N=302)
ADVOCACY

Crime 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 0% 1 (0%) 0%
Democracy 3 (1%) 2 (1%) 1% 2 (1%) 1%
Diaspora 15 (6%) 8 (3%) 4% 4 (1%) 1%
Diplomacy 9 (3%) 30 (10%) 7% 23 (8%) 8%
Education 1 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 1 (0%) 0%
Environment/Clean
Energy
2 (1%) 1 (0%) 1% 10 (3%) 3%
Financial/Trade/Economy 29 (11%) 17 (6%) 8% 68 (23%) 23%
Foreign Aid 3 (1%) 2 (1%) 1% 5 (2%) 2%
Health/Medical 2 (1%) 3 (1%) 1% 3 (1%) 1%
History 5 (2%) 0 (0%) 1% 0 (0%) 0%
Military 2 (1%) 5 (2%) 1% 2 (1%) 1%
Nuclear 0 (0%) 1 (0%) 0% 0 (0%) 0%
Other 34 (13%) 12 (4%) 8% 9 (3%) 3%
Peace 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 1 (0%) 0%
Science 4 (1%) 0 (0%) 1% 2 (1%) 1%
Social Policy 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 4 (1%) 1%
Technology 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 12 (4%) 4%
Terrorism 13 (5%) 1 (0%) 2% 0 (0%) 0%
TOTAL 124 (46%) 82 (27%) 36% 147 (49%) 49%

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Arts 4 (1%) 4 (1%) 1% 18 (6%) 6%
Food 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 4 (1%) 1%
Language 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 2 (1%) 1%
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

240

Detailed Public Diplomacy Activity by Type of Indian Property

Indian Ministry of External Affairs

Indian Diplomacy
Type of Activity
Twitter
(N=272)

Facebook
(N=301)
TOTAL
(N=573)

Twitter
(N=302)
TOTAL
(N=302)
Nature/Travel/Tourism 1 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 15 (5%) 5%
Other 1 (0%) 2 (1%) 1% 1 (0%) 0%
Religion 4 (1%) 1 (0%) 1% 2 (1%) 1%
Sports 17 (6%) 36 (12%) 9% 62 (21%) 21%
TOTAL 27 (10%) 43 (14%) 12% 104 (34%) 34%

EXCHANGES

Any Human 1 (0%) 3 (1%) 1% 1 (0%) 0%
Other 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 0 (0%) 0%
TOTAL 1 (0%) 3 (1%) 1% 1 (0%) 0%

INTERNATIONAL
BROADCASTING

Consular Services 0 (0%) 3 (1%) 1% 3 (1%) 1%
Cooperation With
Traditional International
Broadcasters
0 (0%) 1 (0%) 0% 0 (0%) 0%
Crisis Communication 4 (1%) 3 (1%) 1% 2 (1%) 1%
Domestic Update 9 (3%) 7 (2%) 3% 92 (30%) 30%
Foreign Policy Update 12 (4%) 12 (4%) 4% 36 (12%) 12%
Appearance of
Government Official
97 (36%) 93 (31%) 33% 10 (3%) 3%
Statement of Government
Official
96 (35%) 38 (13%) 23% 9 (3%) 3%
History 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 9 (3%) 3%
International Update 10 (4%) 38 (13%) 8% 29 (10%) 10%
Other 0 (0%) 3 (1%) 1% 0 (0%) 0%
Preview 1 (0%) 0 (1%) 0% 16 (5%) 5%
Scheduling Update 3 (1%) 10 (3%) 2% 9 (3%) 3%
Travel Update 13 (5%) 11 (4%) 4% 3 (1%) 1%
TOTAL 245 (90%) 218 (72%) 81% 218 (72%) 72%
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

241

Detailed Public Diplomacy Activity by Type of Indian Property

Indian Ministry of External Affairs

Indian Diplomacy
Type of Activity
Twitter
(N=272)

Facebook
(N=301)
TOTAL
(N=573)

Twitter
(N=302)
TOTAL
(N=302)

LISTENING
OPPORTUNITY

Any Question Asked 0 (0%) 1 (0%) 0% 14 (5%) 5%
Any Other Chance for
Input
7 (3%) 6 (2%) 2% 17 (6%) 6%
Any Polling-related
Content
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 0 (0%) 0%
Any Request for UGC 0 (0%) 6 (2%) 1% 4 (1%) 1%
Other 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0% 0 (0%) 0%
TOTAL 7 (3%) 13 (4%) 3% 35 (12%) 12%

OTHER 0 (0%) 46 (15%) 8% 16 (5%) 5%

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

242
Appendix 5

Usefulness of Information: “Updates” to Sociotechnical Practices
Hyperlinks Hashtags Multimedia
Digital Diplomacy
Property
Indep.
Press/Media
Site
Indep.
Social
Media Site
Links to
Other
Sites Photos Videos
Images/
Charts/
Graphs
U.S. DOS
Twitter (N=302) 4 (1%) 0 (0%) 38 (13%) 193 (64%) 65 (22%) 53 (18%) 49 (16%)
Facebook (N=302) 1 (0%) 2 (1%) 14 (5%) 206 (68%) 101 (33%) 94 (31%) 64 (21%)
TOTAL (N=604) 5 (1%) 2 (0%) 52 (9%) 399 (66%) 166 (27%) 147 (24%) 113 (19%)
ShareAmerica
Twitter (N=303) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 4 (1%) 162 (53%) 223 (74%) 0 (0%) 64 (21%)
Facebook (N=275) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (0%) 87 (32%) 216 (79%) 16 (6%) 40 (15%)
TOTAL (N=578) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 5 (1%) 249 (43%) 439 (76%) 16 (3%) 104 (18%)
Swedish MFA
Twitter (N=301) 21 (7%) 0 (0%) 75 (25%) 216 (72%) 136 (45%) 13 (4%) 58 (19%)
Facebook (N=60) 9 (15%) 4 (7%) 9 (15%) 34 (57%) 34 (57%) 14 (23%) 10 (17%)
TOTAL (N=361) 30 (8%) 4 (1%) 84 (23%) 250 (69%) 170 (47%) 27 (7%) 68 (19%)
Sweden.se
Twitter (N=250) 6 (2%) 0 (0%) 18 (7%) 47 (19%) 53 (21%) 14 (6%) 77 (31%)
Facebook (N=60) 2 (3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 9 (15%) 43 (72%) 10 (17%) 6 (10%)
TOTAL (N=310) 8 (3%) 0 (0%) 18 (6%) 56 (18%) 96 (31%) 24 (8%) 83 (27%)
Indian MEA
Twitter (N=272) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 8 (3%) 46 (17%) 168 (62%) 10 (4%) 22 (8%)
Facebook (N=301) 21 (7%) 0 (0%) 5 (2%) 155 (51%) 201 (67%) 17 (6%) 71 (24%)
TOTAL (N=573) 21 (4%) 0 (0%) 13 (2%) 201 (35%) 369 (64%) 27 (5%) 93 (16%)
Indian Diplomacy
Twitter (N=302) 66 (22%) 0 (0%) 33 (11%) 170 (56%) 154 (51%) 18 (6%) 130 (43%)
TOTAL (N=302) 66 (22%) 0 (0%) 33 (11%) 170 (56%) 154 (51%) 18 (6%) 130 (43%)

THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

243
Appendix 6

Motives Behind Comments in Response to Most Heavily Commented U.S. Department
of State Tweet, 4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016 (N=90)

Comment Motive

Oppose Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 61 (67.78%)
Give Political Opinion Related to Topic of Tweet/Post 46 (51.11%)
Flaming/Trolling 38 (42.22%)
Other/Cannot Determine 14 (15.56%)
Oppose or Criticize President/Prime Minister 13 (14.44%)
Oppose Government of Digital Diplomacy Actor 12 (13.33%)
Seek Additional Related Information 9 (10.00%)
Oppose or Criticize Sec. of State/Foreign Sec. 9 (10.00%)
Express Sarcasm 6 (6.67%)

Express Opinion About Other Policy of Nation Represented by Digital
Diplomacy Actor 2 (2.22%)
Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 2 (2.22%)
Make a Request That is Not Personal 1 (1.11%)
Supply an Answer or Requested Information 1 (1.11%)
Supply a Warning 1 (1.11%)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

244

Motives Behind Comments in Response to Most Heavily Commented U.S. Department
of State Facebook Post, 4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016 (N=361)

Comment Motive

Address Unrelated Political Cause 355 (98.34%)
Other/Cannot Determine 4 (1.11%)
Oppose Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 1 (0.28%)

Oppose or Criticize Other Official of Nation Represented by Digital
Diplomacy Actor 1 (0.28%)
Flaming/Trolling 1 (0.28%)
Solicit Unrelated Business 1 (0.28%)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

245
Motives Behind Comments in Response to Most Heavily Commented ShareAmerica Tweet,
4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016 (N=11)

Comment Motive

Supply Unrequested Information or Insight 5 (45.45%)
Express Opinion Not Related to the Tweet/Post, Politics or Policy 3 (27.27%)
Other/Cannot Determine 2 (18.18%)
Seek Additional Related Information 2 (18.18%)
Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 1 (9.09%)
Supply an Answer or Requested Information 1 (9.09%)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

246

Motives Behind Comments in Response to Most Heavily Commented ShareAmerica
Facebook Post, 4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016 (N=4)

Comment Motive

Other/Cannot Determine 2 (50.00%)
Oppose Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 1 (25.00%)
Support or Compliment Other Official of Nation Represented by Digital
Diplomacy Actor 1 (25.00%)
Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 1 (25.00%)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

247

Motives Behind Comments in Response to Most Heavily Commented Swedish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs Tweet, 4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016 (N=44)

Comment Motive

Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 27 (61.36%)
Offer Congratulations 24 (54.55%)
Give Political Opinion Related to Topic of Tweet/Post 13 (29.55%)
Oppose Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 7 (15.91%)
Flaming/Trolling 6 (13.64%)
Other/Cannot Determine 3 (6.82%)
Make a Request That is Not Personal 3 (6.82%)
Supply an Answer or Requested Information 2 (4.55%)
Seek Additional Related Information 1 (2.27%)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

248

Motives Behind Comments in Response to Most Heavily Commented Swedish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs Facebook Post, 4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016 (N=23)

Comment Motive

Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 10 (43.48%)
Other/Cannot Determine 6 (26.09%)
Add Other Person/Contact to the Conversation Thread 4 (17.39%)
Support or Compliment Other Official of Nation Represented by Digital
Diplomacy Actor 3 (13.04%)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

249

Motives Behind Comments in Response to Most Heavily Commented Sweden.se Tweet,
4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016 (N=155)

Comment Motive

Supply an Answer or Requested Information 147 (94.84%)
Flaming/Trolling 31 (20.00%)
Give Political Opinion Related to Topic of Tweet/Post 11 (7.10%)
Other/Cannot Determine 6 (3.87%)
Personal Reflection Related to Tweet/Post 2 (1.29%)
Supply Unrequested Information or Insight 1 (0.65%)
Express Opinion Not Related to Politics or Policy 1 (0.65%)
Make a Request That is Not Personal 1 (0.65%)
Express National Pride 1 (0.65%)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

250

Motives Behind Comments in Response to Most Heavily Commented Sweden.se Facebook Post,
4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016 (N=180)

Comment Motive

Add Other Person/Contact to the Conversation Thread 59 (32.78%)
Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 50 (27.78%)
Seek Additional Related Information 30 (16.67%)
Other/Cannot Determine 25 (13.89%)
Supply an Answer or Requested Information 22 (12.22%)
Personal Reflection Related to Tweet/Post 10 (5.56%)
Oppose Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 9 (5.00%)
Flaming/Trolling 3 (1.67%)
Express Sarcasm 2 (1.11%)
Supply a Warning 1 (0.56%)
Solicit Unrelated Business 1 (0.56%)
Address Unrelated Political Cause 1 (0.56%)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

251

Motives Behind Comments in Response to Most Heavily Commented Indian MEA Tweet,
4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016 (N=119)

Comment Motive

Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 65 (54.62%)
Give Political Opinion Related to Topic of Tweet/Post 36 (30.25%)
Other/Cannot Determine 16 (13.45%)
Express National Pride 13 (10.92%)
Express Gratitude 11 (9.24%)
Supply a Warning 8 (6.72%)
Oppose Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 7 (5.88%)
Make a Request That is Not Personal 7 (5.88%)
Give Political Opinion Related to Topic of Tweet/Post 6 (5.04%)

Support or Compliment the President/Prime Minister of Nation Represented
by Digital Diplomacy Actor 6 (5.04%)
Support or Compliment the Government of Digital Diplomacy Actor 5 (4.20%)
Supply Unrequested Information or Insight 4 (3.36%)
Address Unrelated Political Cause 4 (3.36%)
Oppose or Criticize President/Prime Minister 3 (2.52%)
Seek Additional Related Information 3 (2.52%)
Make a Personal Request 3 (2.52%)
Flaming/Trolling 3 (2.52%)
Support or Compliment Other Official of Nation Represented by Digital
Diplomacy Actor 1 (0.84%)
Express Opinion Not Related to Politics or Policy 1 (0.84%)
Oppose or Criticize Government of Digital Diplomacy Actor 1 (0.84%)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

252

Motives Behind Comments in Response to Most Heavily Commented Indian Ministry
of External Affairs Facebook Post, 4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016 (N=498)

Comment Motive

Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 203 (40.76%)

Support or Compliment the Foreign Secretary of Nation Represented by
Digital Diplomacy Actor 81 (16.27%)
Other/Cannot Determine 64 (12.85%)
Express National Pride 41 (8.23%)
Support or Compliment the Government of Digital Diplomacy Actor 26 (5.22%)
Seek Additional Related Information 22 (4.42%)

Give Opinion Related to a Different Policy of Nation Represented by Digital
Diplomacy Actor 20 (4.02%)
Make a Personal Request 19 (3.82%)
Offer a Greeting to an Undetermined Person 18 (3.61%)
Personal Reflection Related to Tweet/Post 17 3.41%)
Flaming/Trolling 17 (3.41%)
Make a Request That is Not Personal 15 (3.01%)
Address Unrelated Political Cause 9 (1.81%)
Oppose or Criticize Government of Digital Diplomacy Actor 6 (1.20%)

Oppose or Criticize a Different Policy of Nation Represented by Digital
Diplomacy Actor 6 (1.20%)
Supply an Answer or Requested Information 6 1.20%)

Support or Compliment a Different Policy of Nation Represented by Digital
Diplomacy Actor 5 1.00%)
Oppose Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 5 1.00%)
Solicit Unrelated Business 4 0.80%)
Add Other People/Contacts to the Conversation Thread 3 0.60%)

Oppose or Criticize Sec. of State/Foreign Sec. of Nation Represented by
Digital Diplomacy Actor 2 0.40%)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

253

Oppose or Criticize President/Prime Minister of Nation Represented by
Digital Diplomacy Actor 2 0.40%)

Support or Compliment President/Prime Minister of Nation Represented by
Digital Diplomacy Actor 2 0.40%)
Supply a Warning 1 0.20%)
THE TWO FACES OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

254

Motives Behind Comments in Response to Most Heavily Commented Indian
Diplomacy Tweet, 4/15/2016 – 7/15/2016 (N=92)

Comment Motive

Support Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 71 (77.17%)

Support or Compliment President/Prime Minister of Nation Represented by
Digital Diplomacy Actor 32 (34.78%)
Give Political Opinion Related to Topic of Tweet/Post 19 (20.65%)
Express National Pride 14 (15.22%)
Other/Cannot Determine 11 (11.96%)
Supply an Answer or Requested Information 4 (4.35%)
Make a Request That is Not Personal 3 (3.26%)
Supply Unrequested Information or Insight 2 (2.17%)
Flaming/Trolling 2 (2.17%)
Address Unrelated Political Cause 1 (1.09%)

Give Opinion Related to a Different Policy of Nation Represented by Digital
Diplomacy Actor 1 (1.09%)
Seek Additional Related Information 1 (1.09%)
Oppose Agenda, Opinion or Position Stated in Tweet/Post 1 (1.09%)
Express Gratitude 1 (1.09%)
Offer Congratulations 1 (1.09%)

Abstract (if available)

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

Staying ahead of the digital tsunami: strategy, innovation and change in public media organizations

PDF

E/Utopia in practice: the practice and politics of Ethiopian futurity

PDF

Developing and testing a heuristic-systematic model of health decision making: the role of affect, trust, confidence and media influence

Asset Metadata

Creator Mazumdar, Biswagit (Theo) (author)

Core Title The two faces of digital diplomacy: dialogic public diplomacy and space for user motives

School Annenberg School for Communication

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Communication

Publication Date 05/13/2019

Defense Date 01/18/2019

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag comment,dialogic theory,dialogue,digital diplomacy,facebook,interview,motives,OAI-PMH Harvest,public diplomacy,qualitative content analysis,social media,Twitter,user

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Riley, Patti (committee chair), Bar, Francois (committee member), Cull, Nick (committee member)

Creator Email bmazumda@usc.edu,theomaz1@yahoo.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c89-155163

Unique identifier UC11660422

Identifier etd-MazumdarBi-7444.pdf (filename),usctheses-c89-155163 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-MazumdarBi-7444.pdf

Dmrecord 155163

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Mazumdar, Biswagit (Theo)

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA