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How perceived moral congruence shapes propensities to engage in pro-group behaviors
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How perceived moral congruence shapes propensities to engage in pro-group behaviors
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Running head: MORAL CONGRUENCE 1
How perceived moral congruence shapes propensities to engage in pro-group behaviors
Drew Kogon
Department of Psychology
University of Southern California
Master of Art: Psychology
August 2019
MORAL CONGRUENCE
2
Abstract
The intersection of highly moralized beliefs and the perceptions that the social environment, notably echo chambers,
reflect one’s moral concerns serve as one possible explanation for why people engage in extreme pro-group
behaviors that bring no benefit to their personal selves or their families. We define this interaction as moral
congruence, one's perceptions or beliefs that their social environment echoes their own moral convictions and
concerns. In this project, we conducted five studies to explore how moral congruence in a social media environment
influences the propensity for one to engage in activism and radicalism. Our results indicate that moral congruence is
related to intentions to engage in activism and radicalism (Study 1) and is partially mediated by identity fusion,
familial-like closeness to a social group (Study 2 & 3). Furthermore, moral congruence is stronger and more
predictive than other life value congruence (Study 4) or moralized domains such as political ideology (Study 5).
Finally, moral congruence has no greater impact in-person than over the web (Study 5). These results indicate that
moral congruence has far reaching consequences for extreme pro-group behavior and can be considered part of a
greater model for understanding motivations for pro-group action. More importantly, our results illustrate how moral
congruence, unlike other forms of congruence, is intimately related to fusion to a social identity.
Keywords: morality, extremism, pro-group behavior, identity fusion, congruence
MORAL CONGRUENCE
3
Table of Contents
General Method…………………………………………………………………………………...8
Overview………………………………………………………………………………….8
Procedure………………………….……………………………………………………....9
Data Analysis and Sample Size Justification……………………………………………...9
Study 1: Moral congruence predicts propensity to engage in activism and radicalism....……….10
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………10
Hypotheses……………………………………………………………………………….10
Method.…………………………………………………………………………………..10
Results……………………………………………………………………………………11
Discussion..………………………………………………………………………………13
Study 2: Identity fusion mediates the relationship between moral congruence and extreme...….14
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………14
Hypotheses……………………………………………………………………………….14
Method.…………………………………………………………………………………..14
Results……………………………………………………………………………………15
Discussion..………………………………………………………………………………18
Study 3: The relationship of agency and invulnerability to moral congruence ……...………….18
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………18
Hypotheses……………………………………………………………………………….19
Method.………………………………………………………………………………......19
Results……………………………………………………………………………………20
Discussion..………………………………………………………………………………24
MORAL CONGRUENCE
4
Study 4: Moral congruence is unique and unlike other shared value congruence ...…………….24
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………24
Hypotheses……………………………………………………………………………….24
Method.…………………………………………………………………………………..24
Results……………………………………………………………………………………26
Discussion..………………………………………………………………………………28
Study 5: Moral congruence is a stronger predictor than other moralized domain
congruence……………...………………………………………………………………….…….29
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………29
Hypotheses……………………………………………………………………………….29
Method.…………………………………………………………………………………..30
Results……………………………………………………………………………………31
Discussion..………………………………………………………………………………34
General Discussion...…………………………………………………………………………….34
Bibliography….…....…………………………………………………………………………….37
Appendix A: Mediation Results for Study 4……....……….………………………………….....40
Appendix B: Mediation Results for Study 5……....………..…………………………………....41
Appendix C: Scales....…………………………………………………………………………....42
MORAL CONGRUENCE
5
How perceived moral congruence shapes propensities to engage in pro-group behaviors
“HIAS
1
likes to bring invaders in that kill our people. I can’t sit by and watch my people get
slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going in.”
-Robert Bowers, perpetrator of the Tree of Life Synagogue Shooting
On October 27, 2018, Robert Bowers opened fire on the Tree of Life synagogue, killing eleven
people. Bowers did not have any known accomplices, but he did have a network of ideologically
congruent individuals to validate his concerns and strengthen his identity as a White American. Bowers, a
prolific anti-Semite, frequently engaged with those that shared his views of Jewish people on the alt-right
social media network, Gab.ai. Without the need to travel or seek out those with ideological similarities,
Bowers was able to find a community that confirmed his ill beliefs from the comfort of his living room.
In this ideologically-congruent context, his moral concerns of Jewish conspiracy were met with
choral praise and bonds with a community. Moreover, Bowers’ network validated his conspiratorial
beliefs that Jews were harming his people by bringing in refugees, destroying his white heritage. What
motivates Robert Bowers to go beyond hatred and commit atrocities against innocent people? The
purpose of this paper is to understand this intersection of the moralization of beliefs, perceived attitude
congruence, and one’s intimate ties to their social groups, notably in an online setting.
Human beings hold highly moralized beliefs that “produce fast, automatic, gut-reactions of like
and dislike when certain patterns are perceived in the social world, which in turn guide judgments of right
and wrong” (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012, p. 2). These values help guide us through trials
and tribulations––deciphering what is wrong from right. Through several lines of work, moral values have
demonstrated their unparalleled, distinguishing role in belief-formation and resistance to change. Skitka
1
HIAS is a Jewish American nonprofit organization that provides humanitarian aid and assistance to refugees.
HIAS was established in 1881 to aid Jewish refugees (“History,” 2019)
MORAL CONGRUENCE
6
and Mullen (2002) proposed moral mandates––attitudes rooted in moral concerns––suggesting that
attitudes held on moral grounds can be differentiated from equally strong, non-moral attitudes as
experienced “facts about the world” (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005, p. 896).
Koleva et al. (2012) argue that many attitudes toward modern culture wars in the United States
can be explained by Moral Foundations theory, five proposed psychological intuitions from which
members of society construct their moral values (see Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Graham, 2007). In
comparison to demographic information, moral foundations provided better predictors for one’s position
on culture wars. From his posts, we can infer that Bowers held highly moralized beliefs surrounding his
country or more specifically, his people and their purity. In one of Bower’s reposts, the user @__ribbit
writes: “Jews are waging a propaganda war against Western civilization and it is so effective that we are
headed towards certain extinction within the next 200 years...the internet has given us a small window of
opportunity to snap our people out of their brainwash.” Users like @__ribbit provide not only validation
of beliefs and conspiracies, but also a community to fuse to.
With the surge in populism in the United States and elsewhere in the developed world (Connor &
Krogstad, 2018) and polarization abound (Jones, 2019; Laloggia, 2019), many researchers are interested
in the role that social media platforms play in promoting violence against outgroup members (e.g. hate
crimes) or pro-group mobilization (e.g. activism, radicalism). Unlike other platforms for interaction,
social media environments are distinctively easy to tailor to be congruent with one's own beliefs or moral
convictions. These platforms give users the ease of eliminating contact with outgroup members that may
already be sparse in the real world and ferment echo chambers, or environments that can “facilitate social
extremism and political polarization” (Barbera et al., 2015, p. 18531). Furthermore, with the ease of
tailoring one’s social media environment to fit moral concerns and morality’s binding ability, fusion to a
group should be not only easier, but also far more widespread.
The communities that we belong to shape our social norms (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1958;
Cialdini & Trost, 1998) and our group boundaries (Opotow, 1990). Even when groups are formed on
trivial characteristics, humans are quick to develop stereotypes and prejudices toward out-group members
MORAL CONGRUENCE
7
and follow through with discriminatory actions. These effects are evident in both laboratory studies
(Tajfel, 1981) and case studies (see Paluck & Green, 2008; Jane Elliot Blue Eyes/Brown Eyes
Experiment). However, beyond prejudice or in-group love, mere identification with one’s group alone
does not predict propensity to engage in extreme pro-group behavior (Swann & Buhrmester, 2015). For
extremism, an intimate identification with a group, coined identity fusion, describing "a sense of oneness
with a group" (Swann & Buhrmester, 2015, p. 52) offers one potential pathway.
According to identity fusion scholars, highly identifying group members view other in-group
members as “categorically undifferentiated and interchangeable” (Gomez et al. 2011, p. 919) whereas
fused group members exemplify group characteristics, but also experience close familial-like ties with
other group members––maintaining a sense of agency or purpose on behalf of their group. That is, group
members may “display their solidarity with the collective...[but] not necessarily its members,” producing
lower propensity to sacrifice for the well-being of the group (Gomez et al. 2011, p. 919).
In a thorough set of studies, Gomez et al. (2011) were able to differentiate group identification
empirically from identity fusion and determine its two key components: invulnerability and agency.
Invulnerability in this context refers to the unlikelihood that outside forces could threaten and harm the
group or self. By agency, the authors refer to one’s beliefs that one has control and responsibility over
their group’s actions. Put another way, a strong collective identity does not “compel [one] to rush to the
assistance of individual members,” whereas fused participants “equate threats to the group with threats to
the self” and readily turn themselves over under the belief that they will live on through the group
(Gomez et al. 2011, p. 919; see Swann et al., 2009, Swann & Talaifar, 2018).
Past research on identity fusion has been largely correlational, measuring fusion as it exists in the
environment and its relationship to pro-group decision making. Research involving moral decision
making has demonstrated that fused participants are significantly more likely to make the right moral
decision (e.g. sacrificing their lives for the benefit of others in their group) compared to non-fused
participants (Swann et al. 2010). However, little work has examined what shared values contribute to
MORAL CONGRUENCE
8
fusion. As an exception, Carnes and Lickel (2018) identified the mediating effect of identity fusion on
moral convictions and self-sacrifice, suggesting that moral convictions serve to bind individuals together.
The aim of our studies put forth below is to test the relationship between deeply held moral
beliefs and pro-group behavior––particularly by understanding the relationship between moral
congruence and identity fusion (Swann, Gómez, Dovidio, Hart, & Jetten, 2010), or one’s intimate
connection to a social identity. We define moral congruence as one's beliefs that their social context
largely echoes their own moral convictions and concerns. In this series of five studies, we first test
whether perceived moral congruence is related to intentions to engage in radicalism and activism (Study
1). Following this, we test the mediating effect of identity fusion (Study 2) for engaging in pro-group
behavior. We introduce agency and invulnerability in Study 3, drawing from work by Gomez et al. (2011)
to explore their roles in the relationship between moral congruence, identity fusion, and pro-group
behavior. In Study 4, we compare the binding role of moral congruence with other domain congruence to
demonstrate a differentiation between moral concern congruence and generic domain congruence as well
as examine the intersection of identity fusion within each value domain. Finally, Study 5 seeks to
strengthen the claim that moral concerns are unique in their behavioral influence to other moralized
domains such as politics and examines whether offline and online social contexts moderate willingness to
engage in pro-group behavior.
General Method
Overview
In the following experiments, we told participants to imagine that their social media network
shared or did not share their moral concerns or other beliefs in other life domains. Participants were
assigned to high or low congruence (shared values between themselves and their group) and asked how
willingly they would engage in certain pro-group behaviors, violent and non-violent. In each scenario, we
tested how participants’ willingness to engage in pro-group behavior is influenced when the majority of
the members of their social group share or do not share the same values (e.g. moral values, appreciation
for music, political ideologies) as their own. To operationalize pro-group behavior, we use the Activism
MORAL CONGRUENCE
9
and Radicalism Intentions Scale (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009; ARIS). The scale captures two forms
of pro-group behavior, legal (activism) and illegal (radicalism). Since the original ARIS measures one’s
propensity to engage in legal and illegal progroup behavior related to political objectives, we modified the
questions to instead address moral beliefs. For example, we modified “I would join/belong to an
organization that fights for my group’s political and legal rights” to become “I would join/belong to an
organization that fights for this group’s moral beliefs” (see Appendix C for full scales). Both modified
activism (α=.91) and radicalism (α=.82) scales yielded consistent inter-item reliability, on par with the
original version of the ARIS.
Procedure
Broadly, participants identified a moral value that was important to them, from simply selecting a
domain (e.g. “concerns regarding care and protecting individuals from harm” for moral congruence) to
also writing about why their domain choice is important to them. Following value selection and
identification, participants received their condition assignment, high or low congruence for moral values
as well as any other domains of interest, which varied across studies. Participants answered one-item
manipulation checks (Select the figure below that best describes your [insert] values in relation to those
around you in this scenario), using a modified version of the Inclusion of Self in Other Scale (Aron,
Aron, & Smollan, 1992). Participants were excluded from analysis if they failed to indicate whether those
around them in majority (high congruence condition) or minority (low congruence condition) shared their
values. Following manipulation checks, participants completed the ARIS as well as several scales serving
as covariates or mediators, discussed in greater detail within each study.
Data Analysis and Sample Size Justification
Not surprisingly, past research indicates that individuals display much lower intentions to engage
in radicalism compared to activism (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). We sought to identify a medium
effect size of .25 from our moral congruence manipulation. To do so, we used G*Power (Faul, Buchner,
& Lang, 2009) to achieve a medium effect size of .25 for radicalism, which generated a suggested sample
size between four-hundred and five-hundred participants.
MORAL CONGRUENCE
10
Study 1: Moral congruence predicts propensity to engage in activism and radicalism
Introduction
Our primary interest in this preliminary study is to test moral congruence and its relationship to
activism and radicalism intentions. Primarily, we are interested in whether participants exhibit heightened
propensities to engage in pro-group behavior offline on behalf of a social media group that the user
belongs to. Since past literature suggests that one’s social networks may be echo-chambers (Barbera et al.
2015), we are interested in testing whether there is variability in any observed effects of pro-group
intentions when manipulating the boundaries of the social media environment. Simply put, we investigate
if a more abstract (user’s entire social media network) or concrete (a group the user belongs to within the
network) social media environment produces any differences in pro-group behavior.
Hypotheses
Our hypotheses are two-fold. We predict that participants in the morally congruent condition
report higher propensity to engage in both activism and radicalism on behalf of their prescribed groups.
We also predict that there will be a significant interaction between the framing (abstract/concrete) and
moral congruence, predicting that participants in the concrete condition, a more intimate group within the
network, will report a significantly higher propensity to engage in activism and radicalism.
Method
Four-hundred (N=400) Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers participated in a short survey
on their social media environments (IRB: UP-17-00375). Participants were assigned to one of two
conditions for manipulated moral congruence: a morally congruent or incongruent social media
environment (congruent vs. incongruent with one’s moral concerns) and one of two conditions for
abstract/concrete framing of social network (those around oneself on Facebook vs. joining a group on
Facebook) totaling four possible cells (see Table A). After assignment, participants answered questions
regarding their propensities to engage in legal and illegal pro-group behavior on behalf of their morally
MORAL CONGRUENCE
11
congruent or incongruent group as measured by the ARIS. Finally, participants completed a set of
demographic questionnaires.
Abstract Concrete
Congruent Regardless of what your social
media friends are actually like,
we would like you to imagine
that your social media friends
share very similar moral beliefs
to your own. Keep this in mind
as you answer the following
questions.
Imagine that you are invited to a
group on Facebook by your
colleagues. When you join, you
realize that nearly everyone
around you shares very similar
moral beliefs to your own. Keep
this in mind as you answer the
following questions.
Incongruent Regardless of what your social
media friends are actually like,
we would like you to imagine
that your social media friends
do not share similar moral
beliefs to your own. Keep this
in mind as you answer the
following questions.
Imagine that you are invited to a
group on Facebook by your
colleagues. When you join, you
realize that nearly all of them
share very different moral
beliefs to your own. Keep this
in mind as you answer the
following questions.
Table A: Study 1 Framing
Results
Participants were removed from analysis if they 1) failed to answer attention checks correctly or
2) finished outside ± 2 SD away from the median completion time. After attention-checks, 360 (N=360)
participants remained for analysis. A 2x2 ANOVA revealed a main effect of moral congruence for
activism, F(1,356)=126.26, p<.001, η2= .26, and no main effect for framing, p=.67. We did not find an
interaction between moral congruence and framing, p=.58, when predicting activism intentions (see
Figure 1). When collapsing cells across framing, participants in the morally congruent condition reported
significantly higher intentions to engage in activism on behalf of their social media group (M= 3.30,
SD=1.03) compared to participants in the morally incongruent condition (M=2.08, SD=1.02), t(354)=
11.25, p<.001, d= 1.19.
MORAL CONGRUENCE
12
Figure 1: Activism Intentions Group Means
Consistent with our results for activism, there was an observed main effect for moral congruence,
F(1,356)=9.98, p<.01, η2= .027, and no main effect of framing, F(1,356)=.012, p=.96, when predicting
radicalism. There was no significant interaction of framing and congruence F(3,356)=.04, p= .82 (see
Figure 2). Collapsing across the framing cells, participants in the morally congruent condition reported
significantly higher intentions to engage in radicalism on behalf of their social media group (M= 2.01,
MORAL CONGRUENCE
13
SD=.91) compared to participants in the morally incongruent condition (M=1.72, SD=.86), t(350)= 3.16,
p<.01, d= .33.
Figure 2: Radicalism Intentions Group Means
Discussion
This study investigated how perceived moral congruence with one’s group members influences
an individual’s propensity to engage in activism and radicalism on behalf of their social media group. We
identified a significant main effect for moral congruence on both pro-group activism and radicalism, but
no interaction for the boundaries of the social media group. Our results indicate that moral congruence
has an impact on pro-group intentions no matter what the framing. Given past findings on the relationship
between self-sacrifice and identity fusion, we were interested in how perceived moral congruence and
identity fusion intersect. As reported by Carnes and Lickel (2018), shared moral values may bind
individuals to a group. Thus, we sought to test whether this binding would be apparent when moral
congruence is manipulated and further, when the social group is online.
MORAL CONGRUENCE
14
Study 2: Identity fusion mediates the relationship between moral congruence and extreme
behavior
Introduction
The purpose of Study 2 is to test what role, if any, identity fusion plays in the relationship
between moral congruence and propensities to engage in pro-group behavior. Prior findings on identity
fusion illustrate that fused participants report a higher willingness to self-sacrifice for group members in a
moral dilemma task (Swann et al., 2010). If moral congruence influences pro-group intentions, we expect
that identity fusion could mediate the relationship between moral congruence and pro-group intentions,
particularly in more radical behavior that offer higher personal risk than participating in non-violent pro-
group behavior.
Hypotheses
Our hypotheses are two-fold. First, we seek to replicate our previous results: higher moral
congruence is positively associated with higher intentions for activism and radicalism. Second, we
hypothesize that the high congruence condition will positively influence reported identity fusion with a
participant’s group.
Method
Four-hundred (N=400) Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers participated in the study (IRB: UP-17-
00375). Following a simplified format from Study 1, participants were assigned to one of two conditions
for manipulated moral congruence: a morally congruent or incongruent social media environment. All
participants received the concrete framing of the environment (invitation to join Facebook group) due to
prior null findings and to further reduce the number of groups for analysis. Our experiment was pre-
registered on Open Science Framework before data collection
(https://osf.io/k8hjx/register/5730e99a9ad5a102c5745a8a).
MORAL CONGRUENCE
15
Prior work by Carnes and Lickel (2018) reported discrepancies between different moral
foundations in their binding capacity. As part of an exploratory analysis, we had subjects “choose a
domain of moral values that reflects your most important moral concerns” (purity, fairness, loyalty,
authority, harm; see Haidt & Joseph, 2004). After assignment, participants completed the one-item
manipulation check, (Select the figure below that best describes your [insert] values in relation to those
around you in this scenario), using a modified version of the Inclusion of Self in Other Scale (Aron et al.,
1992) and the Verbal Identity Fusion Scale (α=.90, Gomez et al. 2011) before completing the modified
ARIS.
Results
Following attention-checks and manipulation check, we were left with 267 (N=267, Low: 166,
High: 101) participants for analysis. Our results replicated Study 1’s findings: participants in the high
moral congruence condition (M=3.81, SD=.70) reported greater propensity for engaging in activism
compared to low congruence participants (M=1.89, SD=.92), t(308.91)= 18.97, p<.001, d=2.31. We
found a similar trend when comparing high moral congruence participants (M=2.13, SD=1.05) with low
moral congruence participants (M=1.60, SD= .69) on their propensity to engage in radicalism on behalf of
their group, t(153.39)= 4.53, p<.001, d=.63 (see Figure 3).
MORAL CONGRUENCE
16
Figure 3: Group means for activism (left) and radicalism (center) and identity fusion (right) by condition assignment
A 2x5 ANOVA revealed no main effect for domain of moral foundations that participants chose (p=.125)
and no interaction for high/low congruence with domain selection (p=.338) when predicting activism
intentions. Similar results occurred for radicalism, there was no main effect for domain of moral
foundations that participants chose (p=.229) and no interaction for high/low congruence with domain
selection (p=.657) when predicting radicalism.
Turning to our second hypothesis, participants in the high moral congruence condition (M=4.89,
SD= .93) reported significantly higher fusion with their group compared to low moral congruence
participants (M=2.65, SD=1.03), t(224.07)= 18.51, p<.001, d= 2.29. A 2x5 ANOVA revealed no main
effect for domain of moral foundations that participants chose (p=.485) and no interaction for high/low
congruence with domain selection (p=.962) when predicting identity fusion.
We performed exploratory mediation analysis to test whether identity fusion mediates the
relationship between moral congruence and pro-group behaviors. We used the R package, mediation(v.
4.4.7) (Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, & Imai, 2014). Results revealed that identity fusion was a significant
mediator for both activism and radicalism. The regression coefficient between congruence and identity
MORAL CONGRUENCE
17
fusion was significant, b=2.25, SE=.12, p<.001, and identity fusion had a significant effect on activism,
b=.63, SE=.04, p<.001. We employed bootstrapping methods to obtain 1000 simulated samples of the
data and test for the indirect effect. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect of identity fusion
(b=.80, 95 % CI: .58, 1.03, p<.001) accounted for 41% of the total effect (b=1.93, p<.001) of a moral
congruence framing on willingness to engage in activism on behalf of the group (direct effect; b=1.14,
p<.001).
Figure 4: Activism-Fusion Mediation Model
Results for radicalism were similar to activism, but more pronounced. Identity fusion had a
significant effect on radicalism, b=.19, SE=.04, p<.001, and the bootstrapped unstandardized indirect
effect of identity fusion (b=.33, 95 % CI: .10, .57, p<.01) accounted for 63% of the total effect (b=.53,
p<.001) of a moral congruence framing on willingness to engage in radicalism on behalf of the group
(direct effect; b=.20, ns). Moral congruence no longer remained a significant predictor of radicalism
intentions after controlling for the mediator, identity fusion, indicating that identity fusion serves as a full
mediator for intentions to engage in radicalism on behalf of the group.
MORAL CONGRUENCE
18
Figure 5: Radicalism-Fusion Mediation model
Discussion
This study investigated how perceived moral congruence with group members interacts with
identity fusion, one’s feelings of closeness and familial-like ties to other group members. We first
successfully replicated results from Study 1, and then identified a mediating effect of identity fusion on
the relationship between moral congruence and pro-group behavior. Our results indicate that identity
fusion functions as a partial mediator for activism intentions and as a full mediator for radicalism
intentions on behalf of one’s social media group. Contrary to Carnes and Lickel (2018) we did not find
any differences among the moral foundations on their ability to bind group members, indicating that
moral congruence more generally may contribute to fusion and feelings of closeness to the group. Given
our results for radicalism intentions, we were interested in more rigorously investigating the mediators for
identity fusion identified by Gomez et al. (2011): feelings of agency and invulnerability. Specifically, we
were interested in how feelings of invulnerability and agency interact in the relationship between moral
congruence and identity fusion.
Study 3: The relationship of agency and invulnerability to moral congruence
Introduction
The purpose of Study 3 is to explore mediators known to be related to identity fusion, feelings of
agency and invulnerability with regards to the group (Gomez et al., 2011). Given our findings for identity
fusion in Study 2, we expect that moral congruence will also influence reported feelings of agency and
MORAL CONGRUENCE
19
invulnerability with regards to a participant’s social media group. Particularly, we predict that when
individuals feel that those around them share the same moral concerns as their own, they will report
heightened feelings of invulnerability to outside threats. For agency, our rationale is drawn from the
literature previously discussed on moral convictions and theory that social media environments provide
users with a voice and thus, greater agency in their online social contexts.
Hypotheses
We have four main hypotheses, the majority of which are replications of our prior studies. First,
we seek to replicate our previous results––higher moral congruence influences intentions for activism and
radicalism. Second, participants with high congruence in their social media environment will report
higher identity fusion with their group. Third, identity fusion will mediate the relationship between moral
congruence and activism/radicalism intentions on behalf of the group, as identified in Study 2. Finally, we
predict that manipulating the perception that one’s group shares similar moral convictions, or a shared
belief about right versus wrong, will contribute to feelings of invulnerability and feelings of agency. We
predict that this relationship will be reflected in a mediation between the relationship of moral congruence
and identity fusion.
Method
Four-hundred (N=400) Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers participated in the study (IRB: UP-17-
00375). Study 3 builds on Studies 1 & 2, but we include the two new scales known to be associated with
identity fusion and extreme pro-group behavior. Drawing from work conducted by Gomez et al. (2011),
we employed their five-item scales for Invulnerability (α=.72) and feelings of Agency (α=.83) based on
prior work by Haggard and Tsakiri (2009). Following design from Studies 1 & 2, participants were
assigned to one of two conditions: 1) high moral congruence in their social media group or 2) low moral
congruence in their social media group. After completing the one-item manipulation check for moral
congruence based on the Inclusion of Self in Other Scale (Aron et al. 1992), participants answered
questions on each of the five scales of interest, counterbalanced for potential ordering effects. We
MORAL CONGRUENCE
20
preregistered our experiment on Open Science Framework prior to data collection
(https://osf.io/hb28u/register/5730e99a9ad5a102c5745a8a).
Results
After removing participants that failed attention checks and our manipulation check, 307
participants remained (Low Condition= 138, High Condition=169). Our results replicated our prior
findings: participants in the high moral congruence condition (M=3.34, SD=.95) reported greater
propensity for engaging in activism compared to low congruence participants (M=2.06, SD=1.02),
t(282.8)= 11.30, p<.001, d=2.32. We found a similar trend when comparing high congruence participants
(M=1.95, SD=.88) with low congruence participants (M=1.49, SD= .63) on their propensity to engage in
radicalism on behalf of their group, t(300.34)= 5.26, p<.001, d=.63.
Figure 6: Group means for activism (left) and radicalism (center) and identity fusion (right) by condition assignment
A 2x5 ANOVA revealed no main effect for domain of moral foundations that participants chose
(p=.509) and no interaction for high/low congruence with domain selection (p=.591) when predicting
activism intentions. In line with Study 2, there was no main effect for domain of moral foundations that
participants chose (p=.413) and no interaction for high/low congruence with domain selection (p=.174)
MORAL CONGRUENCE
21
when predicting radicalism. Turning to our second hypothesis, participants in the high moral congruence
condition (M=4.025, SD= 1.17) reported significantly higher fusion with their group compared to low
moral congruence participants (M=2.69, SD=1.07), t(301.31)= 10.40, p<.001, d= 2.29. We found no
evidence of differences in moral domains when predicting fusion to a group (p=.382) or interaction with
high/low moral congruence (p=.382).
Using the R package, mediation(v. 4.4.7) (Tingley et al., 2014), the relationship between moral
congruence and propensity to engage in activism on behalf of the group was mediated by reported identity
fusion. The regression coefficient between congruence and identity fusion was significant, b=1.33,
SE=.13, p<.001, and identity fusion had a significant effect on activism, b=.62, SE=.04, p<.001. We
employed bootstrapping methods to obtain 1000 simulated samples of the data and test for the indirect
effect. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect of identity fusion (b=.62, 95 % CI: .51, .82,
p<.001) accounted for 52% of the total effect (b=1.28, p<.001) of a moral congruence framing on
willingness to engage in activism on behalf of the group (direct effect; b=.62, 95 % CI: .38, .87, p<.001).
Figure 7: Activism-Fusion Mediation Model
Our results for radicalism replicated our findings from Study 2. A 2x5 ANOVA revealed no main
effect for domain of moral foundations that participants chose (p=.509) and no interaction for high/low
congruence with domain selection (p=.657) when predicting activism intentions. Identity fusion had a
significant effect on radicalism, b=.27, SE=.03, p<.001. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect
of identity fusion (b=.32, 95 % CI: .21, .45, p<.001) accounted for 70% of the total effect (b=.45) of a
MORAL CONGRUENCE
22
moral congruence framing on willingness to engage in radicalism on behalf of the group (direct effect; b=
.14, ns). Moral congruence no longer remained a significant predictor of radicalism intentions after
controlling for the mediator, identity fusion, indicating that identity fusion serves as a full mediator for
intentions to engage in radicalism on behalf of the group.
Figure 8: Radicalism-Fusion Mediation Model
Finally, our predictions for invulnerability and agency were also successful. Participants in the
high moral congruence condition (M=3.78, SD=.91) reported higher group invulnerability compared to
low congruence participants (M=3.03, SD=.82), t(299.82)= -7.41, p<.001, d=.84, as well as higher
feelings of agency (High: M=3.39, SD=1.21; Low: M=2.96, SD=1.16; t(296.37)= -3.14, p< .01, d=.36).
MORAL CONGRUENCE
23
Figure 9: Group means for invulnerability (left) and agency (right) by condition assignment
For mediation analyses, the regression coefficient between congruence and invulnerability was
significant (b= .75, SE=.10, p<.001) and invulnerability had a significant effect on identity fusion (b=.78,
SE=.06, p<.001). The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect of invulnerability (b=.81, 95 % CI: .60,
1.03, p<.001) accounted for 48% of the total effect (b=1.68) of a moral congruence framing on identity
fusion to the group (direct effect; b= .87, p<.001).
Figure 10: Fusion-Invulnerability Mediation Model
The regression coefficient between congruence and agency was significant (b= .43, SE=.13, p<.001) and
agency had a significant effect on identity fusion (b=.48, SE=.06, p<.001). The bootstrapped
unstandardized indirect effect of agency (b=.53, 95 % CI: .38, .70, p<.001) accounted for 31% of the total
effect (b=1.69) of a moral congruence framing on identity fusion to the group (direct effect; b= 1.16,
p<.001).
Figure 11: Fusion-Agency Mediation Model
MORAL CONGRUENCE
24
Discussion
Study 3 replicated results from Studies 1 & 2 and tested mediation models for our exploratory
predictors of interest––invulnerability and agency. Our results indicate that both feelings of agency and
invulnerability function as partial mediators for the relationship of moral congruence and identity fusion.
One explanation for our consistent replication across the studies so far discussed could be that participants
are reporting differences based on mere similarity to the members in their group. In other words, one’s
propensity to engage in pro-group behavior could be a function of how similar one perceives the group
members to be from oneself––not the actual highly moralized domain of congruence. Study 4 sought to
test whether moral values are unique in predicting one’s propensity to engage in pro-group behavior and
not simply a dimension of shared values.
Study 4: Moral congruence is unique and unlike other shared value congruence
Introduction
The purpose of Study 4 is to test whether other forms of congruence, not necessarily moralized
content congruence, predicts intentions to engage in pro-group behavior. Since our prior studies validated
the role of moral congruence as well as its relationship to other predictors in the pathway to pro-group
behavior, we seek to show that moral congruence is unique in its abilities to prompt pro-group behaviors.
Hypotheses
We predict that compared to forms of non-moralized (generic) congruence, moral congruence
will be a stronger predictor of both intentions for activism and radicalism. Additionally, if moral values
are unique in their importance compared to other forms of congruence, moral congruence will be a
stronger predictor for fusion to a social group. Finally, unlike generic forms of congruence, identity fusion
will mediate the relationship of moral congruence and activism/radicalism intentions on behalf of the
group.
Method
Five-hundred (N=500) Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers, participated in the 2x2 designed study
(IRB: UP-17-00375). Participants were assigned to one of four conditions for manipulated congruence: a
MORAL CONGRUENCE
25
morally congruent or incongruent social media environment (high/low moral congruence) and generic
congruence on one of three domains: music, food, or technology (high/low congruence with one’s
preferences and appreciation for a chosen domain). Our rationale for choosing these domains was exactly
their relevance to the human experience. Each domain can have significant interpersonal implications, but
is unlikely to be highly moralized. As a result, we expect that when placed on a hierarchy of values worth
fighting and dying for, moral values will be prioritized ahead of these unmoralized domains.
To provide insight into how individuals perceive moral and generic values in the experiment,
participants wrote briefly about why they chose particular moral and generic domains before receiving
their condition assignment.
Generic High Generic Low
Moral High Imagine that you are invited to a group on
Facebook by your colleagues. When you
join, you realize that your [moral concern]
AND the value you place on [food, music,
or technology] are very similar to nearly
everyone around you.
In other words, the majority of people in
this group share your particular moral
values and your appreciation of on [food,
music, or technology] in life. Keep this in
mind as you answer the following
questions.
Imagine that you are invited to a group on
Facebook by your colleagues. When you join, you
realize that your [moral concern] but NOT the
value you place on [food, music, or technology],
are very similar to nearly everyone around you.
In other words, the majority of people in this
group share your particular moral values, but NOT
your appreciation of [food, music, or technology]
in life. Keep this in mind as you answer the
following questions.
Moral Low Imagine that you are invited to a group on
Facebook by your colleagues. When you
join, you realize that the value you place
on [food, music, or technology], but NOT
your [moral concern] are very similar to
nearly everyone around you.
In other words, the majority of people in
this group share your appreciation of
[food, music, or technology] in life, but
NOT your moral values. Keep this in mind
as you answer the following questions.
Imagine that you are invited to a group on
Facebook by your colleagues. When you join, you
realize that your [moral concern] AND the value
you place on [food, music, or technology] are very
different from nearly everyone around you.
In other words, few people in this group share
your particular moral values or appreciation of
[food, music, or technology] in life. Keep this in
mind as you answer the following questions.
Table B: Study 4 Framing
After completing the one-item manipulation check for each domain based on the Inclusion of Self
in Other Scale (Aron et al., 1992), participants answered questions on each of the five scales of interest,
counterbalanced for potential ordering effects. Following the manipulation checks, participants answered
MORAL CONGRUENCE
26
questions regarding their propensities to engage in activism (α=.89) and radicalism (α=.76) on behalf of
their group. In order to avoid potential effects related to moral values, we broadened the ARIS to reflect
all beliefs rather than just moral beliefs (e.g. “I would continue to support an organization that fights for
this group’s beliefs even if the organization sometimes resorts to violence”). Consistent with past
experiments, we standardized the social media context (Facebook) and pre-registered our experiment on
Open Science Framework prior to data collection
(https://osf.io/hb28u/register/5730e99a9ad5a102c5745a8a).
Results
Participants were removed from analysis if they 1) failed to answer attention and manipulation
checks correctly or 2) finished outside +/- 2 SD away from the median completion time. After checks, we
were left with 291 (N=291) participants for analysis. A 2x3 ANOVA revealed no main effect for domain
of life value domain (music, technology, food) that participants chose (p=.781) and no interaction for
high/low congruence with domain selection (p=.295) when predicting activism intentions. There was no
main effect for non-moral domains that participants chose (p=.916) and no interaction for high/low
congruence with domain selection (p=.555) when predicting radicalism. Turning to our hypotheses, a 2x2
ANOVA revealed a main effect of moral congruence for activism intentions, F(1, 287)=65.04, p<.001,
η2= .19, and no significant main effect of generic congruence (p=.567). As expected, there was no
interaction between moral congruence and generic congruence, when predicting activism intentions
(p=.875). Collapsing generic congruence, participants in the high moral congruence condition reported
significantly higher intentions to engage in activism on behalf of their social media group (M= 3.24,
SD=.97) compared to participants in the low moral congruence condition (M=2.25, SD=1.12), t(267.65)=
8.01, p<.001, d=.95.
MORAL CONGRUENCE
27
Figure 12: Activism and Radicalism Group Means
For radicalism, there was an observed main effect of moral congruence, F(1,335)= 8.88, p<.05,
η2= .02, but not for generic congruence, p=.810. Consistent with activism intentions, there was no
significant interaction of generic congruence and moral congruence, p=.903. Collapsing across generic
framing, participants in the high moral congruence condition reported significantly higher intentions to
engage in radicalism on behalf of their social media group (M= 1.86, SD=.82) compared to participants in
the low moral congruence condition (M=1.64, SD=.75), t(288.04)=2.44, p<.05, d=.29. Consistent with
Study 2, we found no evidence of a main effect for moral foundation choice (Activism: p= .858,
Radicalism: p=.853) or interaction with high/low congruence (Activism: p=.559, Radicalism: p=.704).
For identity fusion, we found no evidence for a main effect of between the generic domain
choices (p=.624) nor an interaction with high/low value congruence (p=.570) on fusion to a group. We
found similar results for moral foundation domains. There was no main effect of foundation choice
(p=.617) or an interaction with high/low moral congruence (p=.492). Turning to our hypothesis, a 2x2
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of moral congruence on identity fusion, F(1, 287)=72.74,
p<.001, η2= .18. In line with our findings for activism and radicalism, participants in the high moral
MORAL CONGRUENCE
28
congruence condition reported significantly higher fusion to their social media group (M= 4.12,
SD=1.17) compared to participants in the morally incongruent condition (M=3.01, SD=1.08). There was
also a significant main effect of generic congruence framing on identity fusion, albeit, a much smaller
effect, F(1,287)=10.37, p<.01, η2= .03. Participants in the high generic congruence condition reported
significantly higher fusion to their social media group (M= 3.35, SD=1.18) compared to participants in
the low generic incongruence condition (M=3.88, SD=1.28). The 2x2 ANOVA did not report a
significant interaction between the moral and generic framing factors, p=.34.
With regards to our final hypothesis, the relationship between moral congruence and propensity
to engage in activism on behalf of the group was mediated by reported identity fusion, a replication of
findings from Studies 2 and 3 (see Appendix A for full results).
Discussion
This study investigated how perceived moral congruence, unlike other forms of congruence,
influences one’s propensity to engage in activism and radicalism on behalf of their group. Our results
indicate that moral congruence serves as a unique binding force that shapes one’s propensity to engage in
pro-group behavior unlike other shared, non-moralized values. Replicating Studies 2 and 3, identity
fusion mediated the relationship between moral congruence and pro-group behavior.
In line with our prediction, moral framing emerged as the stronger predictor between the two
factors across activism, radicalism, and identity fusion. However, generic values did provide a significant
binding effect to the group as measured through identity fusion, but as a far weaker predictor, with the
effect size of moral congruence exceeding generic congruence by nearly nine times. In our final study, we
sought to differentiate moral values from political congruence to add further evidence to the notion that
morality, unlike other shared values, is unique in its mobilizing and binding capability.
MORAL CONGRUENCE
29
Study 5: Moral congruence is a stronger predictor than other moralized domain
congruence
Introduction
Our primary interest in this study is to test moral congruence in comparison to political
congruence. If moralization drives action on issues, then separating the moral component from the
political domain should reduce its effect on pro-group behavior. One could argue that politics and
political ideology is one main pathway by which individuals operationalize their moral concerns to make
changes in society congruent with their moral beliefs. Furthermore, we are interested in expanding the
scope beyond online environments, testing whether our prior effects would differ in an offline
environment (e.g. community program) versus an online environment (e.g. Facebook group).
Hypotheses
We predict that moral congruence will be a stronger predictor of pro-group behavior compared to
political congruence. We have no predictions of an interaction between moral and political congruence
seeing as politics in the United States are deeply moralized, such that one would almost expect political
and moral congruence to go hand in hand. However, when participants are told to choose between their
political ideologies and their moral beliefs, we expect that they will significantly indicate the latter to be
more worthy of fighting for.
Secondly, Study 4 indicated that other domains can act as binding forces for identity fusion to a
group, but on a much smaller scale than moral values. Keeping this in mind, we predict that moral
congruence will emerge as a stronger predictor for identity fusion compared to political congruence, not
ruling out a potential binding effect of political congruence. As an exploration of context, we predict that
social media environments, as agency-driving contexts, produce higher propensity to engage in pro-
group behavior. Finally, we predict that identity fusion will mediate the relationship of moral congruence
and pro-group behaviors, consistent with prior studies.
MORAL CONGRUENCE
30
Method
Four-hundred (N=400) Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers, participated in the 2x2x2 designed
study. Participants were assigned either high or low congruence for the two factors, moral congruence and
political ideology congruence. Participants were also assigned to a context: a community program
(offline) or a Facebook group (online). In total, there were eight possible conditions (See Table C below).
Online Environment Online
Environment
Offline
Environment
Offline
Environment
Low Political High Political Low Political High Political
High Moral Imagine that you are
invited to a group on
Facebook by your
friends. When you join,
you realize that your
[moral concern], but
NOT your political
ideology, are very
similar to nearly
everyone around you.
In other words, the
majority of people in this
group share your
particular moral values,
but NOT your political
ideology in life. Keep
this in mind as you
answer the following
questions.
Imagine that you are
invited to a group on
Facebook by your
friends. When you
join, you realize that
your [moral values]
AND your political
ideology are very
similar to nearly
everyone around
you.
In other words, the
majority of people in
this group share your
particular moral
values and your
political ideology.
Keep this in mind as
you answer the
following questions.
Imagine that you are
invited to a
community program
by your friends.
When you join, you
realize that your
[moral concern], but
NOT your political
ideology, are very
similar to nearly
everyone around
you.
In other words, the
majority of people
in this group share
your particular
moral values, but
NOT your political
ideology. Keep this
in mind as you
answer the
following questions.
Imagine that you are
invited to a
community program
by your friends. When
you join, you realize
that your [moral
concern] AND your
political ideology are
very similar to nearly
everyone around you.
In other words, the
majority of people in
this group share your
particular moral
values and your
political ideology.
Keep this in mind as
you answer the
following questions.
Low Moral Imagine that you are
invited to a group on
Facebook by your
friends. When you join,
you realize that your
[moral concerns] AND
your political ideology
are very different from
nearly everyone around
you.
Imagine that you are
invited to a group on
Facebook by your
friends. When you
join, you realize that
your political
ideology is very
similar to nearly
everyone around you,
but NOT your [moral
concerns].
Imagine that you are
invited to a
community program
by your friends.
When you join, you
realize that your
[moral values] AND
your political
ideology are very
different from nearly
everyone around
Imagine that you are
invited to a
community program
by your friends. When
you join, you realize
that your political
ideology is very
similar to nearly
everyone around you,
but NOT your [moral
values].
MORAL CONGRUENCE
31
In other words, few
people in this group
share your particular
moral values or your
political ideology. Keep
this in mind as you
answer the following
questions.
In other words, the
majority of people in
this group share your
political ideology, but
NOT your moral
values. Keep this in
mind as you answer
the following
questions.
you.
In other words, few
people in this group
share your particular
moral values or your
political ideology.
Keep this in mind as
you answer the
following questions.
In other words, the
majority of people in
this group share your
political ideology, but
NOT your moral
values. Keep this in
mind as you answer
the following
questions.
Table C: Condition assignments for Study 5
In line with Studies 3 and 4, participants wrote briefly about why they chose a particular moral
concern and also wrote about their political ideology (Liberal/Democrat, Conservative/Republican,
Libertarian, or Moderate) before receiving their condition assignment. In addition to completing a one-
item manipulation check for the moral and political factors based on the Inclusion of Self in Other Scale
(Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992), participants also completed a one-item manipulation for context in which
they were asked, “What percentage of those around you have a Facebook account?” After completing
checks, participants answered questions on each of the five original scales of interest, counterbalanced for
potential ordering effects. We pre-registered our experiment on Open Science Framework prior to data
collection (https://osf.io/m4uct/register/5730e99a9ad5a102c5745a8a).
Results
Participants were removed from analysis if they 1) failed to answer attention and manipulation
checks correctly or 2) finished outside +/- 2 SD away from the median completion time. After checks, we
were left with 266 (N=266) participants for analysis. A three-way ANOVA between moral congruence,
political congruence, and context, revealed no three-way interaction or main effects of context for either
activism intentions (ps>.70) or radicalism intentions (ps>.50). All further analyses and reported effect
sizes collapse across the context manipulation, online/offline.
A two-way ANOVA between moral and political congruence revealed a main effect of moral
congruence for activism intentions, F(1,258)=21.11, p<.001, η2= .033, as well as a main effect for
political congruence F(1,258)=17.16, p<.001, η2= .049. Participants in the high moral congruence and
MORAL CONGRUENCE
32
political conditions reported significantly higher intentions to engage in activism on behalf of their group
regardless of context (M= 3.32, SD=1.02; M= 3.31, SD= .98) compared to participants in the low moral
and political congruence conditions (M=2.74, SD=1.13; M=2.68, SD= 1.18). Analyses also revealed a
marginal interaction between moral congruence and political congruence, when predicting activism
intentions, F(3,258)=4.35, p=.0451, η2= .012.
Figure 13: Activism and Radicalism Intentions Group Means
For radicalism, there was an observed main effect of moral congruence, F(1,258)= 5.09, p<.05,
η2= .010, and no main effect of political congruence, F(1,258)= 1.64, p=.201. Participants in the high
moral congruence reported significantly higher intentions to engage in radicalism on behalf of their group
regardless of context (M= 2.19, SD=.97) compared to participants in the low moral congruence condition
(M=1.92, SD=.94). We found no evidence for a significant interaction of political and moral congruence
on radicalism intentions (p=.912).
The 2x2x2 ANOVA between moral congruence, political congruence, and context also revealed a
significant main effect of political congruence on identity fusion, F(1,253)=12.73, p<.001, η2= .04.
Participants in the high moral congruence and political conditions reported significantly higher intentions
MORAL CONGRUENCE
33
to become fused to the group (M= 4.34, SD=1.17; M=4.16, SD=1.14) compared to participants in the low
moral and political congruence conditions (M=3.55, SD=1.15; M= 3.68, SD=1.28). In line with our
predictions, moral framing emerged as the stronger predictor between the two factors. The ANOVA did
not show a significant interaction between the moral and political congruence factors, p=.40, but there
was a significant interaction for moral congruence and community context, F(2,258)= 4.95, p<.05, η2=
.013.
With regards to our third hypothesis, the relationship between moral congruence and propensity
to engage in activism and radicalism on behalf of the group was mediated by reported identity fusion, a
replication of findings from Studies 2-4 (see Appendix B for full results). The relationship between
political congruence and propensity to engage in activism on behalf of the group was also mediated by
reported identity fusion. The regression coefficient between political congruence and identity fusion was
significant, b=.48, SE=.15, p<.01, and identity fusion had a significant effect on activism, b=.51, SE=.05,
p<.001. We employed bootstrapping methods to obtain 1000 simulated samples of the data and test for
the indirect effect. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect of identity fusion (b=.23, 95 % CI:
.09, .38, p<.01) accounted for 36% of the total effect (b=.63) of a political congruence framing on
willingness to engage in activism on behalf of the group (direct effect; b=.40, 95 % CI: .19, .62, p<.001).
Figure 14: Activism-Fusion Mediation Model
Identity fusion had a significant effect on radicalism intentions, b=.25, SE=.05, p<.001. The
bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect of identity fusion (b=.12, 95 % CI: .04, .21, p<.01) accounted
for 61% of the total effect (b=.20) of a political congruence framing on willingness to engage in
MORAL CONGRUENCE
34
radicalism on behalf of the group (direct effect; b= .08, ns). Political congruence no longer remained a
significant predictor of radicalism intentions after controlling for the mediator, identity fusion, indicating
that identity fusion serves as a full mediator for intentions to engage in radicalism on behalf of the group.
Figure 15: Radicalism-Fusion Mediation Model
Discussion
This study investigated how perceived moral congruence, unlike other forms of congruence,
influences one’s propensity to engage in activism and radicalism on behalf of their group. Our results
indicate that moral congruence serves as the strongest binding force that shapes one’s propensity to
engage in pro-group behavior unlike other shared values. Identity fusion mediated the relationship
between moral congruence and pro-group behavior, replicating prior findings from Studies 2-4.
Interestingly, political congruence also provided a significant binding effect to the group as measured
through identity fusion. However, when comparing the effect sizes of moral congruence and generic
congruence on identity fusion, moral congruence exceeds political congruence. Like moral congruence,
the relationship between political congruence and pro-group intentions was mediated by identity fusion,
suggesting that the role of identity fusion is just as important in the domain of political congruence.
General Discussion
Thus far, we have demonstrated that moral values serve as an important binding value for identity
fusion and propensity to engage in pro-group behavior, both non-violent and extreme. In Study 1, we
established that moral congruence, one's perceptions or beliefs that their social environment echoes their
own moral convictions and concerns, influences one’s propensity to engage in non-violent and violent
MORAL CONGRUENCE
35
behavior on behalf of their group. Study 2 expanded on this finding, exploring the relationship of moral
congruence and identity fusion, a close familial-like bond to one’s group. High moral congruence
contributed to reported identity fusion which functioned as a mediator between congruence and pro-group
behaviors. Study 3 identified that feelings of invulnerability and agency, two components of identity
fusion, are influenced by moral congruence and mediate the relationship between moral congruence and
reported fusion. Study 4 revealed that moral congruence is unique and unlike other domains of
congruence, when predicting activism and radicalism intentions, but not identity fusion. Finally, Study 5
demonstrated that moral congruence continued to be the strongest predictor for pro-group behavior, even
when paired with political congruence which we would argue is the domain by which moral concerns are
translated into pro-group action. Investigating the environment in which congruence occurs, Study 5
revealed that online and offline environments were no different in influencing one’s propensity to
participate in non-violent and violent pro-group behavior, suggesting that the ease of tailoring one’s social
environment online potentially presents real concerns for offline non-violent and violent pro-group
behavior.
Access to smartphones has nearly doubled from 2014 to 2017 in developing countries and social
media usage continues to rise, in synchrony (Poushter, Bishop, & Chwe, 2018). With these trends,
communities or regions that suffer high intergroup friction will also experience higher violence in years to
come. Hate-motivated mass shootings like Robert Bower’s actions at the Tree of Life synagogue are not
going away. During the conception of this paper, another hate-motivated mass shooting occurred in
Christchurch, New Zealand, killing 50 people, fueled by similar motivations, stemming from an online
environment. Just as with Bowers, the shooter found his ideological community through fringe social
media groups that praised hate and ethnocentrism (Kirkpatrick, 2019).
These communities confirm often ill-willed moral concerns and the conspiracies that drive them.
To combat and prevent further intergroup violence, researchers and policymakers need to understand the
importance of moral values and social media environments in their contributions to extreme behavior. We
would argue that self-proclaimed members of the Islamic State were driven to commit terrorist attacks in
MORAL CONGRUENCE
36
their host countries by a similar process. Marginalized members of society find confirmation of their
beliefs through online forums that idealize extreme actions, fuse them to their community, and create a
sense of urgency to act on behalf of the group.
Much work remains to be done, particularly in exploring context manipulation and perceptions of
closeness to examine the relationship of a social media context to heightened feelings of agency. Study 5
provided interesting insights into a rather surprising lack of effect between offline and online
environments, which we would argue is the most valuable and significant future direction for this line of
research. Ongoing work seeks to replicate our findings outside of MTurk to establish robustness of our
effects and cross-validate our manipulations. We hope that our work can contribute to the growing body
of literature on hate crimes and radicalism––particularly how moral binding contributes to the tolerance of
hate-based rhetoric toward out-group members or system justification of marginalized communities.
Finally, we hope that our work can pave the way for understanding mechanisms that influence one’s
propensity to engage in pro-group behavior both legal and extreme, particularly when beginning in a
social media context.
MORAL CONGRUENCE
37
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Appendix A: Mediation Results for Study 4
In Study 4, we replicated prior findings that identity fusion mediates the relationship between moral
congruence and propensity to engage in pro-group behaviors. The regression coefficient between moral congruence
and identity fusion was significant, b=1.11, SE=.13, p<.001, and identity fusion had a significant effect on activism,
b=.50, SE=.05, p<.001. We employed bootstrapping methods to obtain 1000 simulated samples of the data and test
for the indirect effect. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect of identity fusion (b=.45, 95 % CI: .32, .60,
p<.001) accounted for 45% of the total effect (b=.99) of a moral congruence framing on willingness to engage in
activism on behalf of the group (direct effect; b=.54, 95 % CI: .29, .79, p<.001).
Figure 1: Activism-Fusion Mediation Model
Results for radicalism also replicated from Studies 2 and 3. Identity fusion had a significant effect on
radicalism intentions, b=.17, SE=.04, p<.01. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect of identity fusion
(b=.18, 95 % CI: .10, .29, p<.001) accounted for 81% of the total effect (b=.23) of a moral congruence framing on
willingness to engage in radicalism on behalf of the group (direct effect; b= .04, ns). Moral congruence no longer
remained a significant predictor of radicalism intentions after controlling for the mediator, identity fusion, indicating
that identity fusion serves as a full mediator for intentions to engage in radicalism on behalf of the group.
MORAL CONGRUENCE
41
Figure 2: Radicalism-Fusion Mediation Model
Appendix B: Mediation Results for Study 5
In Study 5, we replicated prior findings that identity fusion mediates the relationship between moral
congruence and propensity to engage in pro-group behaviors. The regression coefficient between moral congruence
and identity fusion was significant, b=.79, SE=.14, p<.001, and identity fusion had a significant effect on activism,
b=.51, SE=.05, p<.001. We employed bootstrapping methods to obtain 1000 simulated samples of the data and test
for the indirect effect. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect of identity fusion (b=.38, 95 % CI: .24, .55,
p<.001) accounted for 65% of the total effect (b=.72) of a moral congruence framing on willingness to engage in
activism on behalf of the group (direct effect; b=.20, 95 % CI: -.02, .44, p=.07).
Figure 1: Activism-Fusion Mediation Model
Our results for radicalism replicated our findings from Studies 2-4 as well. Identity fusion had a significant
effect on radicalism intentions, b=.25, SE=.05, p<.001. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect of identity
fusion (b=.20, 95 % CI: .11, .30, p<.001) accounted for 71% of the total effect (b=.29) of a moral congruence
framing on willingness to engage in radicalism on behalf of the group (direct effect; b= .08, ns). Moral congruence
MORAL CONGRUENCE
42
no longer remained a significant predictor of radicalism intentions after controlling for the mediator, identity fusion,
indicating that identity fusion serves as a full mediator for intentions to engage in radicalism on behalf of the group.
Figure 2: Radicalism-Fusion Mediation Model
Appendix C: Scales
Activism Intentions (adapted from Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009)
1=Strongly Disagree 5=Strongly Agree
1) AI_A1 I would join/belong to an organization that fights for this group’s moral beliefs.
2) AI_A2 I would donate money to an organization that fights for this group’s moral beliefs.
3) AI_A3 I would volunteer my time working (i.e. write petitions, distribute flyers, recruit people,
etc.) for an organization that fights for this group’s moral beliefs.
4) AI_A4 I would travel for one hour to join in a public rally, protest, or demonstration in support of
this group.
Radicalism Intentions (adapted from Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009)
1=Strongly Disagree 5=Strongly Agree
MORAL CONGRUENCE
43
1) AI_Rad1 I would continue to support an organization that fights for this group’s moral beliefs
even if the organization sometimes breaks the law.
2) AI_Rad2 I would continue to support an organization that fights for this group’s moral beliefs
even if the organization sometimes resorts to violence.
3) AI_Rad3 I would participate in a public protest against oppression of this group even if I thought
the protest might turn violent.
4) AI_Rad4 I would attack police or security forces if I saw them beating members of this group.
Facebook Usage
1) How often do you use Facebook?
Never All the time
0 1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
1
0
0
1
Verbal Identity Fusion Scale (Gomez et al. 2011)
1= Strongly Disagree 7=Strongly Agree
1) IDF_1 My group is me.
2) IDF_2 I am one with my group.
3) IDF_3 I feel immersed in my group.
4) IDF_4 I have a deep emotional bond with my group.
5) IDF_5 I am strong because of my group.
6) IDF_6 I'll do for my group more than any other group members would do.
7) IDF_7 I make my group strong.
Agency Scale (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009)
1= Totally Disagree 7=Totally Agree
1) I am able to control what my group does.
2) I am able to control what my group does in the same way that I control what I do.
3) I usually feel responsible for what my group does.
4) I am responsible for my groups actions.
5) I feel as responsible for what my group does as for what I do.
Invulnerability Scale (Gomez et al. 2011)
1= Totally Disagree 7=Totally Agree
MORAL CONGRUENCE
44
1) In the face of danger, I am convinced that my group and I will survive.
2) Nothing bad can happen to me or my group.
3) Anything could damage me or my group. (reverse coded)
4) My group is less vulnerable than most other groups.
5) My group will be able to cope with any sort of threat.
Moral Congruence Manipulation Check (adapted from Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992)
Select the figure below that best describes your moral values in relation to those around you in this
Facebook group.
My Moral Values vs. Those around me
Political Congruence Manipulation Check (adapted from Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992)
Select the figure below that best describes your political values in relation to those around you in this
Facebook group.
My Political Ideology vs. Those around me
Abstract (if available)
Abstract
The intersection of highly moralized beliefs and the perceptions that the social environment, notably echo chambers, reflect one’s moral concerns serve as one possible explanation for why people engage in extreme pro-group behaviors that bring no benefit to their personal selves or their families. We define this interaction as moral congruence, one's perceptions or beliefs that their social environment echoes their own moral convictions and concerns. In this project, we conducted five studies to explore how moral congruence in a social media environment influences the propensity for one to engage in activism and radicalism. Our results indicate that moral congruence is related to intentions to engage in activism and radicalism (Study 1) and is partially mediated by identity fusion, familial-like closeness to a social group (Study 2 & 3). Furthermore, moral congruence is stronger and more predictive than other life value congruence (Study 4) or moralized domains such as political ideology (Study 5). Finally, moral congruence has no greater impact in-person than over the web (Study 5). These results indicate that moral congruence has far reaching consequences for extreme pro-group behavior and can be considered part of a greater model for understanding motivations for pro-group action. More importantly, our results illustrate how moral congruence, unlike other forms of congruence, is intimately related to fusion to a social identity.
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Kogon, Drew
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How perceived moral congruence shapes propensities to engage in pro-group behaviors
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Psychology
Publication Date
07/03/2019
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