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Running for office? Three different models in U.S. political campaigns & elections
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Content
Running for Office?
Three Different Models in U.S. Political Campaigns & Elections
by
Fabian Naranjo Gonzalez
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
May 2021
Copyright 2021 Fabian Naranjo Gonzalez
ii
Dedication
The road to the Ph.D. has been a long journey. The most important person who has
supported me on this path has been my mother. She has been my biggest supporter and without
her constant guidance and encouragement I would not have made it this far. This dissertation and
degree are a culmination and reflection of her work as a mother.
I started this academic odyssey as an 18-year-old and I now conclude it as a 32-year-old.
I am not the same person that I once was. Through each chapter I found a little part of myself,
getting ever closer to my true self. I had to go away to university in order to truly find myself –
and I am thankful that I did. I found great people and made them my friends at UC Davis,
I found my truth while living in San Francisco and attending USF, and I found the courage to
live my truth when I moved back home to southern California and attended USC.
My advice to the youth of today and tomorrow: Dare to dream that you can make a
difference in the world. Believe in yourself. Be brave and be bold. And most importantly, try to
do good in the world. No day is guaranteed, and every day is an opportunity to get closer towards
discovering your purpose in life.
I thank God for the blessings I have been gifted with. May I be granted the strength to
leave this world a better place through my actions and deeds, than when I entered it.
iii
Table of Contents
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................................................... iv
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................................... v
Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 1
Research Focus ......................................................................................................................................................... 3
Preview of Chapters .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Chapter 2: Review Of The Literature ........................................................................................................................ 7
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................... 7
The Voter-Driven Model ......................................................................................................................................... 11
Shared Ideologies ............................................................................................................................................. 11
Shared Identity ................................................................................................................................................. 13
Self-Interest ...................................................................................................................................................... 15
Intergroup Politics ........................................................................................................................................... 16
The Candidate-Driven Model .................................................................................................................................. 19
Candidate Supply & Recruitment ..................................................................................................................... 20
Competition & Resources ................................................................................................................................. 22
Policy Preferences ............................................................................................................................................ 23
Political Parties ................................................................................................................................................ 25
Campaign Strategies ........................................................................................................................................ 28
The Deracialized Campaign Strategy Model ........................................................................................... 28
The Racialized Campaign Strategy Model ................................................................................................ 34
The Hybridized Campaign Strategy Model ............................................................................................... 39
Chapter 3: Content Analysis ..................................................................................................................................... 48
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................. 48
Research Design & Methodology............................................................................................................................ 52
Hypotheses............................................................................................................................................................... 62
The Dependent Variable and IV’s ........................................................................................................................... 66
Findings ................................................................................................................................................................... 67
Discussion ............................................................................................................................................................... 73
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................... 77
Appendices............................................................................................................................................................... 79
Chapter 4: Field Experiment .................................................................................................................................... 88
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................. 88
Research Focus & Questions .................................................................................................................................. 91
Design ...................................................................................................................................................................... 92
Methodology ............................................................................................................................................................ 93
Hypotheses............................................................................................................................................................... 96
Findings ................................................................................................................................................................... 99
Discussion ............................................................................................................................................................. 103
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................. 105
Appendices............................................................................................................................................................. 107
Chapter 5: Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 112
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................... 112
Overview ................................................................................................................................................................ 115
In Conclusion & Looking Forward ....................................................................................................................... 117
Epilogue ..................................................................................................................................................................... 118
References ................................................................................................................................................................. 126
iv
List of Tables
2.1 Voter-Driven vs. Candidate-Driven Model Attributes .......................................................................... 10
2.2 Components of Deracialized Model ..................................................................................................... 32
2.3 Components of Racialized Model ........................................................................................................ 37
2.4 Three Models of U.S. Campaigns and Elections .................................................................................. 44
2.5 Components of Hybridized Model (variation 1) ................................................................................... 44
2.6 Components of Hybrdized Model (variation 2) .................................................................................... 46
3.1 Racialization of Immigration: Directionality & Intensity ..................................................................... 55
3.2 Hybridization vs. Racialization ............................................................................................................ 59
3.3 Coding of Variables ............................................................................................................................ 66
3.4 Hybridization:Deracialization Output .................................................................................................. 69
3.5 Racialization:Deracialization Output ................................................................................................... 71
3.6 Hypotheses Overview ......................................................................................................................... 72
3.7 Immigration Policy Stance .................................................................................................................. 76
3.8 Jobs & Economy Policy Stance ........................................................................................................... 76
4.1 Coding of DV & Covariates ................................................................................................................ 95
4.2 Candidate Racialized or Hybridized Responses ................................................................................. 100
4.3 Candidate Deracialized Responses .................................................................................................... 101
4.4 Post-Hoc Analysis: Candidate Responses .......................................................................................... 102
4.5 Hypotheses Overview ....................................................................................................................... 103
5.1 Hybridization (variation 1) ................................................................................................................ 114
5.2 Hybridization (variation 2) ................................................................................................................ 115
v
Abstract
The focus of this dissertation is on candidate campaign strategies within the U.S. political
context. As a starting point and for general reference, this research considers the two existing
documented campaign strategies available to candidates running for office: racialization or
deracialization. Through original theoretical contributions, the work presented in this dissertation
seeks to expand beyond the current limited binary by offering a third alternative in campaign
strategy which I deem to be a hybridized model. It is important to note that this third option, the
hybridized model, is theorized to take shape in one of at least two possible manifestations. In one
variation, this hybridized model consists of both traditionally racialized and deracialized
elements, whereas the second variation of the hybridized model is theorized to comprise of both
“anti-“ and “pro-“ racialized stances. A mixed-methods approach is used to test for these two
different variations of hybridity. In the first study, I conduct a content analysis of 585 campaign
websites from candidates running for state legislative office from six states (California, Texas,
Florida, Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico) during the 2018 general election cycle. In the
second study, I rely on a field experiment of 766 candidates running for state legislative office
across six states (California, Texas, Florida, Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico) during the 2018
general election cycle.
As the nation continues to diversify along racial and ethnic lines, it is imperative to
research, analyze, and document how such population shifts impact the electoral process
(campaigns) and candidate (elite) behavior. The work presented in the ensuing dissertation is
rooted within the political science literature corresponding to U.S. campaigns and elections, race
& ethnic politics, and elite behavior.
1
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In the aftermath of the U.S. civil rights movement, and in the midst of movements
sweeping through college campuses and around the nation with a focus on ethnic rights,
women’s rights, and gay rights, political scientist Charles Hamilton introduced the concept of
candidate deracialization as a strategy of electoral success for Black candidates. In response to
the GOP’s increasing reliance on its racialized, albeit coded, southern strategy (Lopez 2014),
Hamilton encouraged black candidates to run their campaigns by speaking to the interests of all,
not simply to those of the black community (Gillespie 2013). Under this deracialized campaign
model, candidates are expected to de-emphasize their own racial identity and ethnic ties to a
particular community, and instead speak to issues that have greater commonality with the larger
population of a given electoral district; this deracialized campaign model also captures the tone
of recent electoral politics. However, as McCormick and Jones (1993), Gillespie (2010) and
Johnson (2014) have identified, the first wave of Black elected officials consisted of candidates
appealing to voters in majority minority districts (MMDs), whereas the second and third waves
of electoral politics are understood as relying on a deracialized approach whereby candidates run
their campaigns beyond the scope of majority-minority politics.
1
At the other end of the
spectrum, campaigns may also follow another model wherein candidates speak to and advocate
public policy stances that speak to a specific racial and ethnic community: these campaigns are
perceived to follow a racialized model.
1
Johnson (2014) defines the first wave of Black elected officials as taking place from “the late 1960s [to the] early
1970s;” the second wave of Black elected officials took place throughout the 1980s; lastly, we are currently in the
third wave of Black elected officials, which is defined by Black elected officials’ “ambition for higher offices in a
‘postracial’ era.”
2
The literature has already accurately observed the two polar opposite models as it relates
to the intersection of race and ethnicity and public policy within U.S. political campaigns and
elections: Deracialization and Racialization. However, I posit that the discipline has not yet
captured a third hybrid model which encompasses elements of both deracialization and
racialization in a strategic fashion. I name this third manifestation as a hybridized approach, of
which Hanna Pitkin’s work on Representation proved to be critical for the development of what I
present as my own original theoretical contribution to the field. As the country continues to
become more diverse and candidates of color start to run for office beyond MMDs, I suggest that
the Hybrid model will provide insight into how these candidates succeed in largely unfamiliar
terrain. Only by expanding beyond the Deracialized v. Racialized binary will we ever develop a
more rich and accurate understanding of how race and ethnicity is influencing the behavior of
elites (candidates running for office) and their corresponding public policy platforms in relation
to U.S. political campaigns and elections.
The main intent of the research conducted and presented in this dissertation is to bridge
the gap between (some of) the theoretical underpinnings of political science, and the practical
side of politics. The author’s reviewed and their respective scholarly contributions––mostly
within the realm of U.S. Campaigns & Elections, Elite Behavior, and Race & Ethnic politics––
have sought to bridge this existing gap themselves, and were it not for their own work, the
theoretical contributions submitted in this study would not have developed. The work and
research presented in this study lives in the intersection of race and ethnicity with public policy
within U.S. political campaigns. More specifically, this study is intrigued by how elite behavior
(candidates running for office) is shaped and influenced. For the purposes of this research, elite
3
behavior refers to the stance a candidate takes on a public policy issue; or as Pitkin (1967) refers
to it, Substantive Representation.
Research Focus
In order to empirically test my theory, I analyze candidates running for the state
legislature during the 2018 General Election in six states: California, Texas, Florida, Nevada,
Arizona, and New Mexico. To ascertain how candidates position themselves on public policy
issues, I find that candidate positionality can be classified as: 1. Deracialized, 2. Hybridized, or
3. Racialized. Political Science scholarship has commented on the existence and manifestation of
deracialized and racialized candidates and campaigns. Generally speaking, a deracialized
candidate is one that campaigns on public policy issues that have transethnic or universal appeal
(Hamilton 1977; Wilson 1980; Goldstein 1981; McCormick and Jones 1993; Barrett 1995;
Geron and Lai 2002), whereas a racialized candidate is one that campaigns on public policy
issues that appeal to a specific or particular racial and ethnic demographic (Hancock 2003;
Meyerson 2006; McIlwain and Caliendo 2011; Tesler 2012; Brown 2013; Major, Blodhorn, and
Blascovich 2018). However, I posit that the literature has not yet captured a third approach
which I deem to be a hybridized strategy.
According to Hanna Pitkin (1967), there are four distinct manifestations of representation
within elite behavior as it pertains to elected officials: 1. Formal Representation, 2. Descriptive
Representation, 3. Symbolic Representation, and 4. Substantive Representation. Formal
Representation is the degree to which an elected official acts within the contours of the
4
institution’s powers to fulfill their duties. Descriptive Representation refers to the extent to which
an elected official mirrors the characteristics (race, ethnicity, gender) of their constituents,
whereas Symbolic Representation makes reference to the extent to which the constituents in the
district perceive the elected official “as being from the community” (Geron and Lai 2002).
Lastly, Substantive Representation refers to the “policy responsiveness” of an elected official
towards their constituents—meaning, the degree to which an elected official’s policy priorities
and stances reflect those of the constituents (Geron and Lai 2002). Using Pitkin’s contribution to
the scholarship with regard to representation as a source of theoretical inspiration, I theorize that
hybridization can manifest in one of at least two ways. In the first instance, hybridization
consists of an incorporation of two diametrically opposed racialized public policy stances (or
substantive representation) ––for example, as highlighted in the content analysis chapter,
hybridization comprised of both pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant policy stances. In the second
manifestation, hybridization is comprised of racialized Symbolic Representation and deracialized
Substantive Representation.
Preview of Chapters
Chapter 2: A Review of the Literature
This chapter lays the literary and theoretical groundwork by reviewing relevant scholarly
findings within the subfield of U.S. Campaigns & Elections, including Voter Relevant Factors,
Candidate Supply, Competition, Resources, Policy Preferences and Political Parties, and Racial
5
& Ethnic coalitions. I also introduce the two existing frameworks relating to the intersection of
race and ethnicity and public policy in U.S. political campaigns: Deracialization and
Racialization. Using those two theoretical metrics, I then introduce my own original theory on
Hybridization. The components of all three models are presented as a means to concisely
visualize the traits and characteristics.
Chapter 3: A Content Analysis of the 2018 General Election for State Legislature in Six States
The content analysis chapter is comprised of 585 analyses of candidate campaign
websites, from which two public policy issues are considered: 1. immigration and 2. jobs & the
economy. A candidate’s immigration policy stance functions as the dependent variable, whereas
the analysis on candidate positionality on jobs & the economy functions as a metric from which
to compare how a traditionally racialized policy issue (like immigration) is treated by candidates,
compared to a traditionally deracialized policy issue (like jobs & the economy). In this chapter,
hybridization is theorized to consist of both pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant racialized policy
stances.
Chapter 4: A Field Experiment on the 2018 General Election for State Legislature in Six States
The field experiment analysis consists of 766 email responses from candidates running
for office in California, Texas, Florida, Nevada, New Mexico, and Arizona during the 2018
General Election. A total of six purported voter aliases (2 Latino, 2 Black, and 2 White) ––
equally divided between treatment and control––are employed in an effort to prompt candidate
6
responses on a traditionally deracialized public policy issue: obesity. Consequently, candidate
responses on obesity function as the dependent variable of interest. Hybridization in this chapter
is theorized to manifest as racialized Symbolic Representation, and deracialized Substantive
Representation.
Chapter 5: In Conclusion & Looking Forward
In the final chapter, I present a condensed review of the topic, research focus, and
findings reported in the preceding chapters. This chapter will consider the weight of the evidence
of this study’s claim that a third campaign model exists, in light of the limitations. I conclude
with a few remarks, and with a call for the continual pursuance of similar research within the
discipline.
7
CHAPTER 2: Review Of The Literature
Introduction
The current state of racial and political polarization within the U.S. body politic is a
manifestation that is historically traced back to three major episodic moments in which the
American electorate further realigned itself along the two existing main political parties (Bobo
2017; Abramowitz and McCoy 2018). The first instance of party realignment occurred in the
1930s at the height of the Great Depression; Black Americans viewed the efforts of Franklin
Roosevelt and the Democratic Party as more sympathetic towards their economic dire straits as
evidenced by the Administration’s creation of various social safety net and economic recovery
packages under his New Deal proposal, like Social Security and the Works Progress
Administration (Bobo 2017). Because of this view, many Black Americans subsequently left the
(Republican) party of Lincoln and instead realigned themselves with the (Democrat) party of
Roosevelt. The second instance in which party realignment further cemented the trend set in
motion during the Roosevelt presidency came in the 1960s, specifically after the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. Many Black Americans and communities of color perceived Lyndon Johnson’s
commitment towards passing the landmark legislation as indicative of the Democrats
commitment to the overall well-being of historically underrepresented and disenfranchised racial
and ethnic communities; ergo, larger swaths of Black Americans re-registered as Democrats. Of
course, the inverse of this trend is that many White Americans, often recognized as “working-
class” or “blue-collar” workers, began to leave the Democratic Party in lieu of the Republican
Party. According to Bobo (2017), the 1970s and 1980s continued to witness party realignment
during which “White evangelicals and other religious conservatives” eventually found
8
themselves in the Republican Party and with a new eventual leader in Ronald Reagan, and this is
representative of the third instance of party realignment. The author goes on further to note that
party polarization [increased] in the 1990s and 2000s as Americans sorted into
more ideologically homogenous political parties, perceived the parties growing
further apart on policies, and their representatives in Congress voted in more
lock-step party unity roll-call votes (138).
Within the past couple of decades, the birth of a new concept known as “negative partisanship”
or “affective polarization” has taken shape. Defined as “sympathy to the in-party and antipathy
toward the out-party” (Abramowitz and McCoy 2018) affective polarization is noted to have
accelerated after Barack Obama was elected in 2008 as the first African American
biracial president, giving voice to an underrepresented minority with a long history
of discrimination (Abramowitz and McCoy, 138).
By the time Donald Trump entered the political fray in 2016 for the presidential election,
the racial animosity among White Americans towards other Americans from communities of
color had long been seeping and finally erupted in the form of their support for Trump’s
campaign. As the racial and ethnic demographics of the county have continued to transition from
majority White to plural, White Americans have adopted a zero-sum mentality (Norton and
Sommers 2011; Wilkins and Kaiser 2014; Bobo 2017) in which they believe their own socio-
political and economic standing, influence, and power, will diminish as the same increases for
other communities. Because they perceive themselves as members of the racial and ethnic “out-
group,” White Americans tolerated the “explicit hostility” (Schaffner, Macwilliams, and Nteta
2018) and “racial appeals” (Abramowitz and McCoy 2018) of then-Republican presidential
candidate Donald Trump. Trump’s campaign slogan to “Make American Great Again”
was a none-too-subtle dog whistle signaling an effort to return to an America
where the material well-being and privileged position of white citizens would
be protected and made something that could be again taken comfortably for
granted (Bobo 2017, 100).
9
As Smith and Hanley (2018) observe, “White, male, older, and less educated
voters…[voted for Trump] not despite his prejudices but because of them” (207). According to
Schaffner, Macwilliams and Nteta (2018), there is reason to believe that similar racialized
explicit appeals might become the norm among subsequent political candidates. But as the nation
and the electorate continue to diversify along racial and ethnic lines, it is now more important
than ever to remain committed to the findings presented within the scholarship—past, present,
and future.
The scope of this study, as it pertains to U.S. campaigns and elections, is in developing a
greater understanding of the campaign strategy or approach that candidates (elite behavior)
employ when running for office. As it stands, the literature has presented two diametrically
opposed campaign strategies that candidates may employ in their campaigns: a racialized
campaign strategy, or a deracialized campaign strategy. However, I posit that a candidate’s
campaign strategy may not necessarily be reduced—nor best understood—as a choice between a
simple binary; consequently, the literature has not yet captured a third campaign strategy, which
I deem the hybrid model.
The literature reviewed in this chapter falls under the Campaigns and Elections subfield
within American Politics. With respect to the layout of the ensuing literature, I organize it in the
following manner: first I start with the attributes of the voter-driven model; secondly, I discuss
the characteristics of the candidate-driven model. The voter-driven model is comprised of
elements which are understood to be relevant to voters; from this perspective, campaigns and
elections are analyzed and understood from a bottom-up approach. Under this framework, voter-
10
relevant attributes like shared ideologies, shared identity, self-interest, co-ethnicity, and
intergroup politics are reviewed and discussed. Conversely, the candidate-driven model offers an
analysis and understanding of campaigns and elections from the perspective of candidates
(elites), otherwise classified as a top-down approach. Using this candidate-centered lens to
campaigns and elections, characteristics such as candidate supply and recruitment, competition
and resources, policy preferences, political parties, and campaign strategy are reviewed and
discussed. The research in this dissertation is squarely interested in the campaign strategy
component of the candidate-driven model. As it stands, the scholarship has acknowledged the
existence of two campaign strategy models: Racialization and Deracialization. However, I argue
that the discipline has not yet capture a third campaign strategy model which I submit is
Hybridization.
U.S. Campaigns & Elections:
Table 2.1: The “Voter-Driven Model” versus The “Candidate-Driven Model”
Attributes of
The Voter-Driven Model
Attributes of
The Candidate-Driven Model
Shared Ideologies Candidate Supply & Recruitment
Shared Identity & Co-Ethnicity Competition & Resources
Self-Interest Policy Preferences
Intergroup Politics Political Preferences
Campaign Strategy
11
The Voter-Driven Model
The voter-driven model attempts to explain where and why candidates run in relation to
the voters within an electoral district. From this approach, campaigns and elections are
explicated and understood from the perspective of voters (Juenke and Shah 2015). This analysis
rests on those attributes which are relevant to voters; in other words, this model relies upon the
characteristics that help influence a voters’ choice on Election Day.
There are five attributes that I identify as voter relevant and are both important and useful
for understanding how campaigns and elections are influenced by voters: 1. Shared ideologies, 2.
Shared Identities, 3. Self-Interest, 4. Co-Ethnicity, and 5. Intergroup politics.
Shared Ideologies
Shared ideologies can be analyzed vis-à-vis the policy preferences of voters with respect
to the policy preferences of candidates. One of the earliest findings in campaigns and elections
informs us of the relationship between voters and candidates, specifically finding that voters are
able to process campaign information and consequently cast their ballots in favor of the
candidate that best appeals to their interests and concerns (Dewey 1954).
2
This theory assumes
voters have clear positions on public policy issues, which in turn they utilize towards evaluating
2
This implies voters have the ability to process information and also have stated policy preferences. Connecting it to
ideology, this means that voters’ policy interests and concerns precedes partisan considerations; the understanding
here is that voters have stated policy interests and concerns, and then vote for whichever candidate (or political
party) that fits within their expressed interests. This theory differs from the theory of partisan voting which assumes
that conservatives are likely to vote for conservative candidates, and liberals are likely to vote for liberal candidates
(Bartels 2000), or as Converse et al. (1960) came to identify it as: a partisan lens, wherein political identification
precedes and inform policy interests and concerns.
12
competing candidates. This cost-benefit analysis (Downs 1957) differs significantly from the
partisan lens approach (Converse et al. 1960). In accordance to the former theory, voters cast
their ballot for the candidate that will best represent their policy interests. In other words, the
Dewey theory tells of the following: voters policy preferences candidate (or party) choice.
However, according to the latter theoretical approach, voters employ heuristics as a means of
casting their ballot; most notably through the use of their partisan identification, which results in
the diminishing importance of issue preferences (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954;
Converse et al. 1960). Under this theory, voters perceive interests based upon a partisan lens, and
consequently cast their ballot in favor of their partisan identification. In short, the Converse et al.
theory tells us that: voters partisan lens candidate (or party) choice.
Not being able to differentiate the policy stances of opposing candidates, known as policy
ambiguity, may not be an optimal condition for voters. Bartels (1988) informs of the disapproval
among voters of not having clarity with respect to a candidate’s policy stance. This leads us to
believe that voters seek and rely on clear policy positions among candidates. And yet, only sixty
percent of voters could correctly associate one of the issues discussed by candidates during the
1988 elections for the U.S. Senate (Dalager 1996). Of course, this underscores another aspect as
it relates to voters, and that is the degree to which voters are informed. There are three
possibilities pertaining to voters and information: informed voters, uninformed voters, and
misinformed voters (Kuklinski et al. 2000). Specifically,
To be informed requires, first, that people have factual beliefs, and
second, that the beliefs be accurate. If people do not hold factual
beliefs at all, they are merely uninformed. But if they firmly hold
beliefs that happen to be wrong, [then] they are misinformed—not
just in the dark, but wrongheaded (Kuklinski et al. 2000, 792-793).
13
Tom Bradley’s initial electoral victories for Los Angeles City Council in the 1960s were
largely driven by a sense of shared ideology, predominately among the city’s Black and White
communities (Sonenshein 1993a; Austin, Wright and Middleton 2004). By appealing to White
liberals’ ideologies, Tom Bradley was able to successfully construct a biracial winning coalition
that would eventually expand and catapult him to the Mayor’s Office in 1973.
Based on this review of the literature on shared ideologies, this dissertation uses the
following operational definition: shared ideology is a concept that attempts to establish a
relationship between the policy preferences of voters with the policy positions of candidates.
Shared Identity
During his 2012 re-election campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives,
Congressman Charlie Rangel made an important announcement with regards to his racial and
ethnic identity: he would no longer solely identity as a Black man; instead, he opted for
embracing his Latino heritage and consequently declared himself a bi-racial Black and Latino
man As it turned out, Black voters were more receptive than Latino voters to the congressman’s
newly declared biracial identity as a Black and Latino man (Adida, Davenport and McClendon
2016). While this may be partially explained by the general sense of mistrust between Black and
Latino voters (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1984), it is worth noting that this finding does not
hold across the board for all Latino voters. Dominicans and Puerto Ricans report greater levels of
commonality with Black voters, while Mexican and Salvadorian voters claim a lower degree of
commonality with Black voters (Kaufmann 2003, 208). These different perceptions of
14
commonality vary accordingly with one’s experiences and perceptions of discrimination (Dovido
et al. 2001; Purdie-Vaughns et al. 2008; Adida, Davenport and McClendon 2016).
The concept of co-ethnicity, i.e. when a voter and a candidate share the same ethnic
background (otherwise referred to as a sense of “shared ethnicity”), is something that is
discussed by both DeSipio (1996) and Barreto (2007). According to the former, Latino voters are
not influenced or motivated to turnout by ethnic considerations but rather by socioeconomic
factors (DeSipio 1996). However, this is refuted in finding that co-ethnicity not only influences
vote choice for Latinos, but it also causes Latinos to turnout in greater numbers and cast their
ballots when they are presented with a co-ethnic candidate (Barreto 2007). The author goes on
further to posit five reasons for why “shared ethnicity” merits validity. It is argued that
(1) Latinos share a Latin American heritage and culture including the
prevalence of Spanish; (2) they draw on a shared immigrant experience;
(3) continued discrimination against Latinos highlights their common-
ality (Masuoka 2008; Sanchez 2006); (4) ethnic candidates typically
focus on co-ethnics as their base, reinforcing the bond (Leighley 2001;
Tate 1991); and (5) Spanish surname candidate on the ballot cues known
traits in typically low-information environments (Jacobsen 1987;
Wolfinger 1965) (Barreto 2007, 426).
While Latino voters appear to cast their ballots in favor of their co-ethnic candidates
(when presented with the opportunity to do so), White voters show indications of resistance to
Latino candidates by funneling their vote choice through the prism of an American national
identity (McConnaughy et al. 2010). Under this thinking, White voters perceive Latinos and
Latino candidates as being something other than “American” (Hayes-Bautista 2004). By viewing
Latino as a separate identity from American, White voters are able to employ nativist
considerations as a means for voting against Latino candidates, while voting for those candidates
15
that they perceive are most representative of an American identity. White voters are more
responsive to narratives of “overcoming disadvantages” from minority candidates, as was
witnessed by Mel Martinez during his 2004 campaign for the U.S. Senate (McIlwain and
Caliendo 2011, 174), and by Barack Obama during his 2008 campaign for President (McIlwain
and Caliendo 2011, 189).
Based on this review of the literature on shared identity or shared ethnicity, this
dissertation uses the following operational definition: shared identity is a concept that addresses
the relationship between the racial and ethnic identity of voters and the racial and ethnic identity
of a candidate.
Self-Interest
Self-interest is a concept that suggests voters perceive a particular candidate as more
likely or better positioned to advance their own racial and ethnic community’s legislative
interests (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Austin, Wright and Middleton 2004), which differs
from the concept of shared ideologies wherein voters are assumed to cast their ballot for the
candidate that they perceive as sharing similar ideological points of view (Dewey 1954;
Sonenshein 1993a; Austin, Wright and Middleton 2004). Black voters exhibited traces of two
concepts during the 2001 Los Angeles Mayoral election: “common self-interest,” and “shared
ideologies” (Austin, Wright and Middleton 2004).
In the 2001 Los Angeles Mayoral election, the Black community perceived that the
White candidate, James Hahn, was more likely to represent their self-interests than the Latino
16
candidate, Antonio Villaraigosa. Despite the notion that the Black community may have had
shared ideologies with the Latino candidate, the historical relationship between the Black
community and the White candidate’s father led many in the Black community to believe that
James Hahn was best positioned to represent the self-interests of their community. In this
scenario, “common self-interest” considerations outweigh “shared ideologies” ––at least within
the context of the 2001 Mayoral election in Los Angeles and the Black community. Perhaps
some of the public policy priorities which Black voters might deem as representative of their
“common self-interest” comes in the finding that Black voters show greater support (over White
voters) for
A governmental guarantee of jobs, a government-sponsored anti-
discrimination legislation, of programs targeting racial and ethnic
minorities for economic initiatives, and of increased spending
for social welfare and public education programs (Gurin, Hatchet,
and Jackson 1989; Barrett 1995, 224).
Based on this review of the literature on self-interest, this dissertation uses the following
operational definition: self-interest is the act when voters cast their ballot in favor of the
candidate they perceive as best positioned to advocate and legislatively pursue their policy
interests.
Intergroup Politics
Upon reviewing Leighley and Vedlitz’s “Five Models of Political Participation
3
,” I posit
that therein lies the fifth voter relevant factor. The author’s work on group conflict seeks to
3
Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) review five models of minority political participation as a means of explaining the
political behavior of people of color: 1. Socioeconomic Status, 2. Psychological Resources, 3. Social Connectedness,
4. Group Identity (or Consciousness), and 5. Group Conflict. According to the Socioeconomic Status model,
17
account for political participation based upon “intergroup interactions” relating to a “division of
scarce resources, the application of political power, or fundamental cultural values like religion”
(Sherif 1953; 1961; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999, 1096). Essentially, the Group Conflict model
functions on the perception of an out-group in relation to the dominant in-group. As the
perceived out-group starts to gain influence and notoriety, most likely through an increase in
population numbers, the in-group’s political calculations are affected as they attempt to “protect
their interests” (Blalock 1967; Giles and Evans 1985; 1986; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). Both
V.O. Key (1949) and Matthews and Prothro (1966) captured White Americans’ sentiment
towards Black Americans in the south using the Group Conflict model: as Black Americans’
increased in population numbers, so too did White Americans’ fear and resentment towards
Black Americans often manifesting in anti-Black American political agendas (think: Jim Crow
laws like Poll Taxes and Literacy Tests).
The election of Donald Trump is linked with the preservation of White ethnic identity
based on several theories: Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), Group Status Threat
individuals with greater socioeconomic means, like income and education, not only “adopt psychological
orientations that motivate their participation in the political system” (Verba and Nie 1972; Leighley and Vedlitz
1999, 1094), but they also tend to be more politically engaged than those with lower socioeconomic means.
However, others (like Brody 1978) have emphasized placing less of a premium on the socioeconomic, and more of
an emphasis on psychological orientations, like civic duty or political interest for example, as a means of explaining
the political participation (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Aldrich 1993; Conway 1991; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993;
Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). Proponents of the Social Connectedness model posit that political participation has
diminished over the past several decades due to a breakdown among citizens and the “larger political and social
community” (Putnam 1995; Teixeira 1992; Uslaner 1995; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). Faith-based and voluntary-
based institutions and organizations have now taken the place and filled the void left by the previous political and
social community, and consequently political participation can now be explained and accredited to these informal
associations. The Group Identity (or Consciousness) model attempts to explain political behavior from the
positionality of communities of color, in relation to others in general and White voters in particular. Group
consciousness for certain historically marginalized communities (like Blacks, Women, and the Poor) has been found
to be correlated with greater political participation (Miller at al. 1981; Wilcox and Gomez 1990; Leighley and
Vedlitz 1999). It is further hypothesized by Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) that there are two dimensions of Group
Consciousness: 1. Group Closeness, or the extent to which an individual identifies with their racial and ethnic
community; and 2. Out-Group Distance, or an individual’s feelings or perceptions towards other racial or ethnic
communities. The Group Conflict model is reviewed above.
18
(Branscombe and Wann 1994), Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan and Stephan 2000), and
Social Cognition Theory (Jost et al. 2003). Whereas Social Identity Theory informs us that, in an
effort to preserve their social identity status, individuals compare their status with the status of
others (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Major, Blodhorn and Blascovich 2018) , Group Status Threat
expects a rise in “discrimination against outgroups” based upon the perceived status of the
ingroup (Branscombe and Wann 1994; Major, Blodhorn and Blascovich 2018). Integrated Threat
Theory reinforces these expectations by positing that an increase in
Diversity poses a threat to White Americans, as an increase in
minorities represents a real threat to White Americans’ resources,
as well as a symbolic threat to White American values (Stephan and
Stephan 2000; Major, Blodhorn and Blascovich 2018, 932).
Lastly, according to Social Cognition Theory, White Americans become both frightened
and confused in the face of rising diversity within the country’s changing demographics;
consequently leading to a feeling of “uncertainty and fear” within White Americans (Jost et al.
2003; Major, Blodhorn and Blascovich 2018) and thereby explaining their support of
“conservative political policies” (Bonanno and Jost 2006; Major, Blodhorn and Blascovich
2018).
The 2016 Presidential election cycle has provided a plethora of theories as to why Donald
Trump won, but also as to why White voters supported his candidacy by a large margin. One
possible explanation for why White voters showed such strong support for Trump rests on
“economic discontent among working-class White Americans” (Major, Blodhorn and Blascovich
2018), while another possible explanation posits of a rejection towards the political
establishment (De Jonge 2016). However, the theory that has been gaining much more attention
19
and credibility stems from the “changing racial demographics” in the United States, and how
White voters perceive this as a threat to their status (Major, Blodhorn, and Blascovich 2018;
Chokshi 2018). According to Wilkins and Kaiser (2014), White Americans have a “zero-sum”
perspective on race relations within the United States; meaning that as racial and ethnic
communities of color gains status, White Americans loses status. Norton and Sommers (2011)
also inform us that White Americans believe that they will experience greater bias, as bias
against communities of color diminishes. From this perspective, as one group gains, another
group loses—the pie, so-to-speak, gets smaller for White Americans.
Based on this review of the literature on intergroup politics, this dissertation uses the
following operational definition: intergroup politics is a concept that seeks to explain the
electoral motivations of voters (with regard to which candidate specific voter’s support), based
upon the racial and ethnic tensions, perceptions, and relations among different racial and ethnic
communities.
The Candidate-Driven Model
The candidate-driven model seeks to explain where, why and how (which is the focus of
this dissertation) candidates run for office. From this lens, campaigns and elections are
explicated and understood from the perspective of the candidates themselves (Juenke and Shah
2015). This analysis uses those characteristics which are pertinent to a candidates’ decision to
20
run for office; these are the factors that influence, shape, and explain candidate (elite) behavior in
electoral politics.
As it pertains to the candidate-driven model, there are five attributes that I argue are
candidate relevant and are both important and useful for understanding how campaigns and
elections are shaped by candidates themselves: Candidate Supply and Recruitment, Competition
and Resources, Policy Preferences, Political Parties, and Campaign Strategy.
Candidate Supply and Recruitment
Carroll (1991) considers the occupational backgrounds of candidates who are eventually
elected into office. The author finds that male legislators more often than not tend to come from
an agricultural or business background—however, the most common professional background
for men is within the legal field: lawyers. For women legislators, a professional background in
social work or nursing is found to be a common source of talent—however, the one field that
stands-out against all other for women is in education: teachers represent the professional
background of the bulk of the women who are elected to the legislatures.
Latino candidates and Latino representatives have certainly come a long way from 1949
when Edward Roybal became the first Latino elected to the Los Angeles City Council since 1881
(Guerra 1990). And according to Guerra (1991) electoral gains within the Latino community can
be attributed to five factors: candidate recruitment networks, the role of reapportionment,
vacancies, prior public service, and the strength of incumbency. Considering other sources of
21
explanatory variables of electoral success among Latinos running for office, Wallace (2014)
finds that support for Latino candidates is more likely to manifest among Latinos who have a
high degree of linked fate, as well as amongst those who have a strong attachment to the Spanish
language. These same findings indicate that support for Latino candidates—albeit to a lesser
degree of significance than linked fate and an attachment to Spanish—is also influenced by the
perception that Latinos face discrimination in the aggregate or in having personally experienced
discrimination, something that varies within the Latino community (Dovido et al. 2001; Stokes-
Brown 2006; Purdie-Vaughns et al. 2008; Adida, Davenport and McClendon 2016)
However, if we truly want to get at the heart of why candidates of color run in some
electoral districts and not in others, then it is imperative to ask the question from a different
angle. The “minority candidate supply” issue as addressed by Juenke and Shah (2015) has more
often than not been analyzed from a voter-driven model: that is, the analysis almost always
derives from where the voters reside, and correspondingly, in which electoral districts minority
candidates have the best odds of winning. For the author’s, the voter-driven model represents a
demand aspect, whereas a candidate-driven model represents a supply aspect. While the voter-
driven model centers on those who are expected to support a candidate and where they reside,
the candidate-driven model shifts some of the focus back on the candidate by focusing on
concepts like competition or resources, for example, in attempting to address why some
candidates choose to run for office, and others do not. If the interest lies in understanding elite
behavior more holistically, then I posit that the analysis ought to re-shift back to the candidate’s
themselves as suggested by the candidate-driven model. The behavior of elites is best understood
22
and explained from a model that focuses on them, whereas a voter-driven model provides insight
into the behavior of elites from the perspective of voters, not elites (or candidate’s) themselves.
Competition and Resources
Conventional wisdom informs us that the greater resources a candidate has at their
disposal, the more competitive they are and by extension the more competitive the race will be.
Shah (2013) defines an advantage in resources as relating to a candidate’s “education and/or
employment.” Juenke and Shah (2015) go on further to expand the definition of resources as a
reflection of a candidate’s relationship with incumbency, experience, skills, political networks,
and money. The understanding here being that a candidate with greater experience, skills,
political networks and money is perceived to have more resources at their disposal; resources
which may effectively deem a candidate as competitive by giving them an advantage that other
candidate’s may not have.
Considering an aspect of self-interest among candidates (not to be confused with self-
interest among voters as discussed previously) within the Black community, White, Laird and
Allen (2014) find that the degree of political solidarity that Black candidates feel with their own
ethnic community can be unraveled through self-interest appeals vis-à-vis clear and small
monetary gains. From this we are led to believe that Black candidates may favor their own self-
interest over the perceived group interest. Linked fate in this case is somewhat akin to turning-on
or turning-off at the behest of personal incentives. Although the authors inquire about how to
keep wealthy Black candidates from pursuing their own self-interest over those of the group
23
interest, another question to ask might be how do we keep lower income Black candidates from
exchanging the group interest in favor of their own self-interest—which may arguably seem
more alluring for lower income candidates to pursue, than wealthier candidates. Black candidates
are also found to be strategic in deciding where to run for office—specifically, Black candidates
choose not to run for office in districts with high racial competition (Keele, Shah and White
2013; Juenke and Shah 2013; Shah 2013; Shah 2013). In other words, Black candidates consider
the likelihood of winning with respect to the racial makeup of the electorate. A district with high
racial competition is perceived by Black candidates as a low likelihood chance of electoral
success.
Policy Preferences
There are at least two strategies that candidates can employ when crafting their campaign
agenda: an “issue ownership” strategy, or a “riding the wave” approach (Ansolabehere and
Iyengar 1994). Under the “issue ownership” approach, candidates shape their campaigns and
accompanying policy preferences in accordance with their party’s platform. This means that
candidates will strictly adhere to their party’s issue positions when campaigning. On the other
hand, under a “riding the wave” approach, candidates craft their policy positions in accordance
with whichever issues are deemed as important given their coverage by the press. Policy
ambiguity may also function as a deliberate strategy by candidates, as such ambiguity on where
candidates stand on issues may result in an increased favorability among voters (Shepsle 1972).
The intentional pursuit of policy ambiguity among candidates enables candidates to make
24
appeals beyond a specific segment of voters in favor of a broader base of support by
campaigning on general subjects and topics (Ripley and Franklin 1991).
In terms of candidates seeking re-election, Barrett (1995) raises the “self-interest
perspective,” which essentially states that is in the self-interest of candidates to assume the
policy positions of their supporters (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1977; Mayhew 1974; Barrett 1995).
This self-interest perspective, or approach, somewhat resembles the advice given to Black
candidates: adopt transethnic policy positions that speak to the larger electorate, not only to a
specific segment of the population (Ardrey and Nelson 1990; Kilson 1989; West 1986; Barrett
1995). Under this thought, it’s to the best interest of Black candidates in particular—and
candidates of color in general—to not focus on the policy concerns of a specific racial and ethnic
community. This frame of thought fits squarely within a deracialized approach (Hamilton 1977;
Wilson 1980; Goldstein 1981; McCormick and Jones 1993), which will be covered in the next
section. However, quite opposite to transethnic policy preferences, Grose (2005) finds that Black
legislators are in actuality more likely to advocate for Black interests (even after controlling for
the demographics of a district). What this means is that Black legislators, are more often than
not, ignoring transethnic policies in favor of community-specific policies, irrespective of whether
or not they represent an MMD. The interaction of race and gender informs us that Black women
legislators in comparison to Black men legislators, are more liberal (Leader 1977), and more
interested in feminist issues (Mezey 1978). The latter finding is also shared by Bratton, Haynie,
and Reingold (2006), except that they find Black women legislators are more likely to be
concerned with Black interests and women’s issues. And yet, the literature furthermore informs
that Black women legislators indicate policy priorities relating to “reforming education and the
25
healthcare system, stimulating the economic development, and reducing unemployment” (Barrett
1995, 242).
Political Parties
Becker (1958) comments on the motivations of political parties. Namely, the author
indicates that the “immediate aim of the political party is to be chosen by the electorate” (106).
Becker goes on further to elaborate on party motivations by citing
The desire to help one’s country (altruism), or the desire for prestige
and income; the one most frequently used is the desire for power,
which can be defined as the ability to influence the behavior of others
(Becker 1958, 106).
In terms of the relationship between parties and policy or issue preferences, there appears
to be an ensuing presence of policy divergence among parties when there is a focus on the issues
that most appeal to the party base (Schattschneider 1942; Ranney 1954). In other words, policy
divergence occurs when parties focus and campaign on the most polarizing issues. Of course,
appealing to the issue preferences of the party faithful may not be the only strategy, as the
literature too informs us that candidates make an effort at appealing to the median voter by
campaigning on less polarizing issues (Downs 1957; Black et al. 1958; Davis, Hinich, and
Ordeschook 1970; Calvert 1985).
According to Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994), the “issue ownership” strategy is the
only approach that is found to be successful for a candidate to win in an election. Perhaps this
finding is not at all that particularly surprising when considering that voters associate certain
policy positions with either Democrats or Republicans (Petrocik 1996). For example, while
26
Republicans are perceived as more willing to be tough on crime, Democrats are perceived as
having better bonafides for addressing education (Abbe, Goodliffe, Herrnson, and Patterson
2003: 420). If a candidate is seeking to turnout out voters in response to certain policy issues,
then it behooves of a candidate to campaign on the issues that are most clearly associated with
the party (Abbe et al. 2003). This means that candidates must campaign on those issues which
are already defined along partisan lines. Abbe et al. (2003) define this relationship between
candidates and voters as policy convergence, or issue agreement. Party and partisanship are
important variables for consideration, and as Spiliotes and Vavreck (2002) find, candidates shape
their campaigns within the context of their party, particularly when it pertains to the policy
issues. As the authors observe, during the 1998 congressional midterm elections, both Democrats
and Republicans campaigned within the policy contours predetermined by their party: Democrats
campaigned on education and juvenile justice, while Republicans campaigned on the economy
and taxes.
However, it may not always be the case the candidates will run their campaigns in
accordance with the issue ownership of their party. Indeed, a candidate may choose to campaign
on the issues that the opposing party is perceived to have ownership over (Sides 2006). This
ability for a candidate to “trespass” over into the opposing party’s policy terrain is understood to
represent a tactic by which a candidate attempts to frame an issue in a fashion that is most
favorable to the target constituency. Sides (2006) refers to this strategy of crossing party lines
with the intention of campaigning on the other party’s issues as heresthetics: an attempt by a
candidate to manipulate the weights and priorities (but not preferences) that a voter designates
27
towards policy issues. Heresthetics is a different approach that candidates may take, compared to
what both Downs (1957) and Riker (1983) present
4
.
In terms of a party identification among Black candidates for Congress and the degree to
which that influences voter turnout, it is found that Black Democratic candidates are correlated
with an increased Black voter turnout (Fairdosi and Rogowski 2015). Black Republican
candidates are not found to be associated with voter turnout within the black community. As the
authors point out, these findings inform us that efforts by the Republican Party to bolster Black
turnout by recruiting Black candidates may not yield results.
Just as party identification is the biggest determinant for how a voter casts their ballot
according to Converse et al. (1960), so too is the party identification of an elected official just as
important—specifically, the political party of an elected official is observed to represent “a
strong predictor of policy preferences” of representatives (Bullock and Brady 1983; Kingdon
1981; MacRae 1958; Barrett 1995). The connection between the political party of an elected
representative and a voter also exists within the concept of partisan representation (Harley
1989). Partisan representation is a derivation of Substantive Representation wherein a partisan
elected official within an institution has the potential to represent the policy interests of a (similar
partisan) voter in any given electoral district (Harley 1989; Hero and Tolbert 1995). The thought
4
Whereas the theory of convergence informs us that candidates will essentially campaign for office in response to
the positions of the median voter (Downs 1957), the theory of rhetoric (or persuasion) informs us that candidates
will in actuality seek to persuade the median voter towards supporting their stances (Riker 1983). For Sides (2006)
and the heresthetics camp, candidates seek to manipulate the issue priorities of voters but not their preferences; for
Downs (1957) and the convergence camp, it is the median voter who will inform a candidate of where to position
themselves on the issues; for Riker (1983) and the school of rhetoric, candidates have the power of persuasion over
voters when it comes to the issues.
28
here lies in that if a voter is not substantively represented by their immediate elected official
because of incongruent party identification, then another elected member within the same
institution who mirrors the party identification of that voter will be able to fulfill the role of
Substantive Representation. Under this supposition, Substantive Representation does occur:
either by a constituent’s own elected representative, or by another elected representative within
the same institution.
Campaign Strategies
The Deracialized Campaign Strategy Model
At the 2004 Democratic National Convention, a little known then-Illinois State Senator
stepped onto the national stage and delivered a speech that catapulted him to the national
political stage, just four years later he would clench his party’s nomination for President and go
on to win the White House as the 44
th
President of the United States. This pivotal speech, along
with his 2008 campaign for President, has been largely perceived as deracialized (Rho’Dess
2011).
For candidates – particularly candidates of color like Barack Obama – the decision of
which campaign strategy to employ constitutes a double-edged sword. Upon analyzing Barack
Obama’s deracialized electoral approach, Rho’Dess (2011) posits that such an approach is more
reliant on building a broader multi-ethnic coalition
5
, compared to a racialized approach in which
5
Sonenshein (1990) also credits Tom Bradley’s victories for City Council and Mayor in Los Angeles to his ability
to coalesce a multi-ethnic base. This will be discussed in greater detail.
29
a candidate appeals to a specific ethnic community. Again, a deracialized campaign focuses on
meta issues which affect the general population of a given district irrespective of ethnic
considerations, whereas a racialized campaign strategy embraces those issues that are most
pertinent to a particular segment of the population. The biggest criticism of deracialized
campaign strategies is that they champion issues relevant to the general population at the expense
of issues that most matter to a specific community; conversely, the most common criticism
lobbied against racialized approaches is that they speak to a specific community, at the expense
of the general population (McCormick and Jones 1993).
A platform that targets the needs of a specific ethnic community i.e. a racialized
approach, ignores the issues of the greater population. However, a message that speaks to the
greater population, i.e. a deracialized approach, can drown out issues held dear by an ethnic
community. McCormick and Jones (1993) define deracialization as a tactic for
Conducting a campaign in a stylistic fashion that defuses the polarizing
effects of race by avoiding explicit reference to race-specific issues,
while at the same time emphasizing those issues that are perceived as
racially transcendent, thus mobilizing a broad segment of the electorate
for purposes of capturing or maintaining public office
(McCormick and Jones 1993, 76).
Demographics of Electoral Support
It is further understood that a deracialized candidate is one that garners electoral support
from white voters by presenting a “nonthreatening image” (Wilson 1980; Goldstein 1981;
McCormick and Jones 1993). Juenke and Sampaio (2010) analyze Ken and John Salazar’s 2004
30
race for the United States Senate and for the United States House, respectively, and find that the
brothers pursued a deracialized strategy in their campaigns for office. In both races, the authors
find that the candidates received white, Republican crossover votes because of the nature in
which they ran their respective campaigns. Both chose a neutral, deracialized platform that
focused on jobs, health care, the environment, agriculture, and rural development, in lieu of
racialized issues as one would expect given their ethnic background.
6
However, while the
candidates targeted independents and Republicans via race-neutral messaging, 527’s and
independent expenditures made specific overtures towards the Latino community through race-
specific issues. Of course, there is a possibility that even if the Salazar brothers had made race-
specific appeals to the Latino community, they may not have worked. For example, we know
that Black voters reject race-specific appeals by Black candidates in Black only contests
(McIlwain and Caliendo 2011). In other words, McIlwain and Caliendo (2011) suggest that
candidates may be pursuing deracialized electoral strategies because of their finding that the very
same ethnic communities that are supposed to be embracing such strategies are in actuality
rejecting them—thus, deracialization is occurring because of (in this instance) Black voters and
not because of White voters (Hamilton 1977). These findings are consistent with both a voter-
driven model and a candidate-driven model.
6
Juenke and Sampaio (2010) identify race-neutral issues as those focusing on transportation, agriculture, water,
whereas race-specific issues are those that focus on immigration, bilingual education, and in-state tuition for
undocumented children.
31
Racial & Ethnic Coalitions
Two key aspects of a deracialized campaign consist of: 1. Bi or multi-racial and ethnic
coalitions (Fong 1998; Saito 2001; Sonenshein 1990; Kim and Lee 2001; Lien 2014), and 2.
Transethnic or universal public policy issues (Hamilton 1977; Wilson 1980; Goldstein 1981;
McCormick and Jones 1993; Barrett 1995; Geron and Lai 2002).
The possibility for bi or multi-racial and ethnic coalitions exists—as Kim and Lee (2001)
observe, there does appear to be policy congruence between Blacks and Whites on immigration
on one side (both hold tougher stances on immigration), and Latinos and Asians on the other end
(both hold favorable stances on immigration). In terms of Affirmative Action, Kim and Lee also
find that Whites and Asians tend to hold less favorable views on the policy, whereas Latinos and
Blacks tend to share more favorable positions. Accordingly, the most promising circumstances
under which racial and ethnic coalitions are expected to occur are if
(1) Racial/Ethnic groups set aside short-term, group-specific consid-
erations to address fundamental issues related to social change;
(2) They resist narrow race-based politics while at the same time
Recognizing the importance of race in American society; (3) individuals
and organizations build and sustain relationships across group boundaries
over time as a basis for promoting collaborative efforts; (4) each group
contains organizations that serve as vehicles for community mobilization,
leadership training, resource building, etc. (Saito and Park 2000; Kim
and Lee 2001, 632).
Oliver and Grant (1995) go on further to posit that such racial and ethnic coalitions are
contingent on specific public policy issues, are temporary in nature as opposed to long-lasting,
and are more than likely only doable at a local level as opposed to statewide or federal
campaigns (Kim and Lee 2001). Lien (2014) goes on further to suggest that electoral success for
candidates of color is contingent on their ability
32
To be agile and adopt a different coalitional strategy for a different
level/type of office and different political space. Depending on the
ethnoracial composition in jurisdictions and political-institutional
context, women of color are expected to construct a nonwhite or
rainbow coalition or an ethnic-bloc vote that is in competition
or in solidarity with men of color in the same electoral arena
(Lien 2014, 257).
Policy Platform
As it relates to transethnic or universal public policy stances, Geron and Lai (2002) find
that candidates are better off relying on “mainstream” or “universal” issues when running in non-
MMDs. The authors deem this a “cross-over” strategy and go on to suggest that this is
representative of what Antonio Villaraigosa did during his first unsuccessful mayoral run in Los
Angeles in 2001, a finding that is also echoed by Austin, Wright and Middleton (2004).
However, perhaps the candidate of color who most successfully exemplified the successful
implementation of a coalitional strategy in recent memory within Los Angeles is former council
member and twenty-year Mayor Tom Bradley (Sonenshein 1990)—he remains to hold the record
for longest tenure as the city’s chief executive.
Table 2.2: Components of a Deracialized Campaign Strategy Model
Policy Platform (Substantive Representation) Color-blind, Universal, or Transethnic
Symbolic Representation Color-blind, Universal, or Transethnic
Racial/Ethnic Coalitions Bi-racial or Multi-ethnic
How a Candidate Identifies Panethnic Identity (i.e. American)
Demographics of Electoral District Plural
33
A deracialized campaign strategy is theorized to consist of a universal or transethnic
policy platform, as well as universal or transethnic symbolic representation. This means that a
deracialized policy platform will be comprised of public policy stances that refrain from making
references to racial or ethnic disparities, or racial and ethnic appeals in general. Similarly,
candidates employing a deracialized campaign strategy are expected to rely on transethnic
symbolic representation, meaning that candidates will refrain from making racial or ethnic
appeals in their policy speeches or policy statements. Racial and ethnic coalitions under a
deracialized strategy are expected to be either bi-racial or multi-ethnic in nature, given the
transethnic appeal of a candidate’s public policy platform and public policy statements (symbolic
representation). Under a deracialized approach, candidates are interested in appealing to different
racial and ethnic communities for the purposes of building an electorally successful coalition.
Candidates employing a deracialized approach are expected to identify or portray themselves to
the electorate along panethnic terms. In order to connect with a broad base of voters and
supporters, candidates are theorized to rely on identities that transcend particular racial and
ethnic communities so that a large swath of the population can identify with them––the most
obvious of these identities is American. In terms of electoral districts, a deracialized campaign
strategy is expected to work best in districts where no one racial and ethnic community holds the
majority; in other words, in a plural district. The expectation here is that plural districts are
optimal for candidates to build bi-racial or multi-ethnic coalitions, given that an electoral victory
in plural districts is contingent on receiving votes from at least two (if not more) different racial
and ethnic communities.
34
The Racialized Campaign Strategy Model
If the Salazar brothers from Colorado, Barack Obama during his 2008 presidential
campaign, and Tom Bradley’s successful efforts for City Council and Mayor in Los Angeles are
all representatives of how a deracialized campaign looks like then arguably, Pete Wilson’s 1994
re-election campaign for California State Governor is representative of a racialized campaign. In
1994, a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment swept through California, ultimately manifesting itself
on the state ballot as Proposition 187—an initiative that sought to bar the access of public
services to undocumented immigrants
7
. Governor Wilson aligned himself with this initiative
during his re-election campaign by emphasizing the necessity of its passage by voters (Meyerson
2006; Brown 2013). Wilson’s anti-immigrant, racialized re-election for Governor of California
did help him win another term in office.
Policy Platform
The racialization and association of public policy issues with specific demographics of
the American public is a concept that has been discussed in length (Hancock 2003; Tesler 2012;
Brown 2013). The discussion of welfare benefits and recipients in the 1980s gave birth to the
imagery of the “welfare queen” invoked by President Reagan. In his characterization of the
welfare queen, images of Black single mothers living on the government dime in high fashion
were evoked into the mainstream psyche of Americans (Hancock 2003). This highly racialized
7
It’s important to note that pro-immigrant candidates, campaigns, and policy stances are also considered to be
racialized, not only anti-immigrant candidates, campaigns, and policy stances. Racialization encompasses everything
and anything that uses race and ethnicity to advance a specific public policy objective.
35
identity of Black single mothers represents the implementation of racially divisive appeals,
RDA’s (Brown 2013) or dog whistle politics (Lopez 2014). As Brown (2013) asserts, racially
divisive appeals
Mobilize images of minorities as criminals, terrorists, or as populations
engaged in voter or welfare fraud…[it is] a rhetorical strategy wherein
the speaker denigrates a particular minority, frames that group as a threat
to the target audience, advocates for special restrictions against them, or
reassures the audience of their rightfully privileged position vis-à-vis
the problematized group (315).
Furthermore, racialized advertisements and appeals are understood to consist of racial
stereotypes and racially coded language, in addition to public policy platforms that are heavily
race-based (McIlwain and Caliendo 2011). McIlwain and Caliendo further enhance our
understanding of racialized electoral strategies by adding that states with a large Anglo
demographic were home to the “most racialized campaigns.”
Individuals are able to connect the dots, so to speak, between subtle coded appeals and
the intended target audience through the creation of public identities (Hancock 2003). From this,
individuals are able to effectively merge preexisting “stereotypes and moral judgments of various
group identities” (Hancock, 33) with certain public policy issues. This is how Pete Wilson was
able to effectively present the issue of immigration as a Latino/Mexican problem in 1994
(Meyerson 2006; Brown 2013), how backers of proposition 227 were similarly able to market
bilingual education as a learning impediment among Latinos, how the welfare queen became
synonymous for Black single mothers (Hancock 2003), how gangs, drugs, and trafficking are
36
associated with Latinos (Brown 2013), and how the healthcare debate became highly racialized
during Barack Obama’s presidency (Tesler 2012)
8
.
The election of Donald Trump to the presidency has prompted scholars to research the
motivations of those who cast their ballots for him on Election Day. Possible explanations have
ranged from a rejection of the status quo and the political establishment (De Jonge 2016), to
dissatisfaction with the state of the economy (Major, Blodhorn, and Blascovich 2018). However,
the one potential explanation that has been gaining quite a bit of traction attributes support for
Trump due to the everchanging racial composition of the country and the resentment and fear
faced among White Americans in particular (Major, Blodhorn, and Blascovich 2018; Chokshi
2018). What Major, Blodhorn and Blascovish (2018) find is that high White ethnic identity is
correlated with support for Trump as well as with holding and endorsing anti-immigrant policy
stances, and lastly it’s also linked with “increased opposition to political correctness norms.” The
authors go on further to note that
Of all the candidates, Trump has been the most vocal in his opposition
to ‘outsiders’ such as Muslims and illegal immigrants from Latin
America…As White Americans’ numerical majority shrinks and they
increasingly feel that their group’s status is threatened, White identity
will become increasingly salient and central to White Americans…it is
likely to guide White Americans’ political preferences in the future,
especially on policies and issues closely related to immigration and
tolerance of diversity (Major, Blodhorn, and Blascovich 2018, 938).
8
Tesler (2012) argues that the health care debate during Obama’s term became racialized as this was the President’s
signature piece of legislation and consequently became highly associated with the nation’s first Black president.
This racial divide became apparent in noting that African Americans overwhelmingly endorsed the president’s
health care proposals over white Americans. Consequently, support and opposition to the health care reform debate
came to be heavily predicated on an individual’s preconceived notions on Black Americans—if a person had
favorable attitudes on Black Americans, then they were more likely to support the President’s efforts; conversely, if
a person had negative attitudes on Black Americans, then they were more likely to oppose the President’s health
care reform.
37
Intra-Racialization
While racialization may take shape in the form of inter-racialization
9
, Gillespie (2012)
sheds light on the possibility of intra-racialization, and more specifically discusses how and why
it’s likely to manifest as a strategy among candidates. Gillespie's theory of elite displacement
operates under the conventional wisdom that candidates of color are more likely to: 1. Run in
majority minority districts (MMDs), and 2. Run deracialized campaigns in districts that are not
majority minority (i.e., majority white and plurality districts). However, Gillespie finds that a
new generation of Black political entrepreneurs are choosing to run deracialized campaigns in
majority minority districts (MMDs), against (oftentimes) racialized incumbents with deep ties to,
and support from, racial and ethnic community leaders. In order to compete against the storied
tenure of a racialized incumbent, these deracialized candidates are placing greater emphasis on
their credentials and the extent to which they have socially assimilated (11). This form of intra-
racialization, wherein a Black deracialized candidate runs against a Black racialized incumbent,
appears to be on the rise and as such it remains to be seen how useful and successful a strategy
this might be over the coming years and decades.
Table 2.3: Components of a Racialized Campaign Strategy Model
Policy Platform (Substantive Representation) Race or Ethnic-specific
Symbolic Representation Race or Ethnic-specific
Racial/Ethnic Coalitions Monolithic
How a Candidate Identifies Race or Ethnic-specific
Demographics of Electoral District Majority-White or Majority-Minority
9
Inter-racialization is a strategy that occurs between different racial and ethnic communities.
Intra-racialization is a strategy that occurs within the same racial and ethnic community.
38
A racialized campaign strategy is expected to be comprised of a policy platform (policy
stances or policy proposals) that appeal to specific racial and ethnic communities. Candidates
employing a racialized campaign strategy are interested in promoting policy proposals that will
benefit (or cost, depending on positionality) a particular racial and ethnic community
10
.
Similarly, the language found in a candidate’s policy speeches or statements (symbolic
representation) is also expected to be race or ethnic-specific. For candidates employing
racialization, the language corresponding with public policy statements and stances is expected
to be targeted towards appealing to a particular racial and ethnic community. Given this same
nature of racialization in appealing to specific racial and ethnic communities, the expectation is
that candidates electoral coalitions will be monolithic. By appealing and advancing policies that
resonate with specific members of the electorate, candidates are essentially isolating themselves
from receiving the support from a wide array of racial and ethnic communities. By doing so,
candidates are not expected to receive support from a diverse body politic. As it relates to
identity, candidates relying on racialization are theorized to portray themselves along race or
ethnic-specific terms. This may include identities that resonate with specific members of society
and less so with others, such as Latino, Mexican American, African American, Irish American,
Asian American, et cetera. Understanding that a racialized campaign strategy is employed and
targeted with the intention of appealing to a specific racial and ethnic community, it then
becomes clear as to why I theorize that such an approach is optimal for an electoral district with
a clear racial and ethnic majority, such as a MWD or a MMD. In both of these types of electoral
districts, there is a clear racial and ethnic majority, ergo the expectation is that a racialized
10
For example, a racialized pro-immigrant policy stance from a candidate will advocate for a proposal that may
benefit immigrants, say a pathway to citizenship. However, a racialized anti-immigrant policy stance from a
candidate will more than likely advocate for a proposal that may cost immigrants, perhaps that cost may be the
opportunity to become citizens by denying amnesty.
39
campaign strategy is more likely to occur in such districts than in plural districts where there is
no clear racial and ethnic majority.
The Hybridized Campaign Strategy Model
To recap, there are currently two approaches in campaigning as it relates to the
intersection of race and ethnicity with public policy: 1. Deracialization, or 2. Racialization. In the
former, campaigns are largely based on public policy issues that speak to the larger, broader
population without any racial or ethnic undertones. In the latter, campaigns tend to be based on
public policy issues that speak to a specific racial and ethnic population. While these two
approaches have been well-documented within the literature, I posit that the existing binary is
not sufficient enough to capture the nuances within the theoretical framework and practical
application of Campaigns and Elections. As the nation continues to diversity along racial and
ethnic lines, the existing duality of racialization or deracialization may no longer apply as neatly
or accurately as it once did. With that being stated, I maintain the argument that the scholarship
has failed to capture a third approach pertaining to campaign strategy, which I present in this
dissertation as the hybrid campaign strategy model.
Policy Platform
Using Hannah Pitkin’s (1967) scholarly contribution on representation as a source of
inspiration, I theorize that a candidate’s policy platform may assume a hybridized campaign
strategy in one of at least two possible forms: 1. A symbolically racialized, but substantively
40
deracialized position; or 2. A substantively racialized position that consists of both pro- and anti-
stances of a specific policy issue.
In the first supposition, candidates are theorized to hold policy positions that
acknowledge or make reference to a racialized public policy disparity, but in actuality propose a
deracialized public policy proposal. For example, under this first hybridized approach a
candidate—in addressing existing health disparities—may acknowledge that Black and Brown
communities are disproportionately affected by obesity when compared to their White
counterparts in discussing their policy platform; however, in their policy proposal to this health
epidemic, candidates are expected to put forth a proposal that all racial and ethnic communities
can positively benefit from, not solely those whom are most negatively and disproportionately
affected by obesity. Therefore, a candidate’s public policy position would be a form of racialized
symbolic representation, with deracialized substantive representation.
The second theorized outcome for a candidate’s hybridized public policy platform
consists of both pro- and anti- stances with regard to a specific issue. Hybridization under this
outcome rests on the ability of a candidate to position their policy stance as consisting of two
diametrically opposed views. For example, under this form of hybridization, a candidate may
formulate their public policy stance on immigration based upon the views which one might
categorize as pro-immigrant, as well as those views which one may identify as anti-immigrant.
Granting amnesty (or a legal pathway to citizenship) is an immigration policy stance that may be
identified as resting in the pro-immigrant corner. Conversely, calling for a border fence or wall
in conjunction with increased security protocols at the border is an immigration policy stance
41
that may be classified as representative of an anti-immigrant stance. The first stance is perceived
to be beneficial to the (uncommented) immigrant community ergo pro-immigrant, whereas the
second stance is perceived to be harmful or less welcoming of the (undocumented) immigrant
community ergo anti-immigrant. And yet, it may be plausible for a candidate to assume these
diametrically opposed stances by incorporating them into their immigration policy position. In
which case, I posit is representative of a candidate’s hybridized policy platform.
Using Tom Bradley’s 1982 campaign for Governor
11
as a reference point, Sonenshein
(1990) posits of the best conditions for Black candidates to be elected statewide: liberal racial
attitudes, positive political situation, and a flexible campaign strategy.
12
Continuing on the
analysis of strategies for Black candidates who run for statewide office, Pettigrew and Alston
(1988) present five necessary dimensions of a middle-ground strategy (otherwise known as a
hybrid approach) for successful electoral prospects: 1. Follow the accepted political wisdom of
first making sure of one’s base; this refers to the necessity of shoring up supporters first before
expanding the scope and appealing to voters who may not be proactively supporting the
candidate. 2 Appeal to the broader range of White voters/Issues that intersect for Whites and
Communities of Color; the thinking here is to think beyond the scope of racialized and
deracialized appeals, instead opting for a hybrid approach that speaks to the issues that resonate
11
One of the contributors for Tom Bradley’s defeat was due to his preference for taking the high road and staying
above the fray when he was attacked through implicit messages—however, staying above the fray may only work
when the racial attacks are explicit rather than implicit (Sonenshein 1990). In fact, it might be better for candidates
to condemn racial attacks by exposing them for what they are, which consequently may lessen the intended impact
that such implicit attacks have on the targeted audience of White voters (Mendelberg 2001).
12
Liberal racial attitudes refer to the extent to which racial deference exists. Positive political situation speaks to the
extent to which the party at the state-level is able to support and embrace a Black candidate; also, positive political
situation touches on the preference for Black candidates to have previous statewide experience as a means of uniting
the party and further building on the issues confronting the state. Flexible campaign strategy refers to a crossover
strategy wherein a candidate may be deracialized but not wholly divorced from the issues confronting the Black
community—in other words, this strategy calls for the coexistence of conservative with progressive issue stances.
42
with both communities of color as well as for Whites (and, presumably everyone else in
between). 3. Mention Race early, shape the discussion; 4. Deal candidly with the race issue; the
authors cite John F. Kennedy’s ability to discuss his Catholicism during the 1960 presidential
campaign as an example of how Black candidates can similarly embrace and define the
parameters of race in the campaign; and 5. Be prepared for the negative use of race in the
contest; the suggestion here is for candidates to be cognizant and prepared to address racial
attacks.
As discussed previously, according to Juenke and Sampaio (2010) the Salazar brother’s
campaigns for the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives is clearly reflective of a
deracialized strategy. Both campaigns focused on transethnic issues whereas the 527’s and
independent expenditures carried the heavy lifting in regard to race-specific or racialized
messaging targeted at the Latino community. With this in mind, could the Salazar brother’s races
truly be deemed to be deracialized? On the surface, yes; however, upon closer analysis and in
acknowledgment of the role the 527’s played in microtargeting, I would posit that these
campaigns represented a new form of hybridity. Of course, critics will say that the law prohibits
the coordination of campaign messaging and targeting between a candidate’s official campaign
and independent expenditures, thusly would question the validity of my assertion of hybridity.
The fact is that not all voters are able to differentiate the difference between a message received
from a candidate’s official campaign, from a message received from an independent expenditure.
Because of this reality, it is important to consider and analyze (when possible) the messaging
from independent expenditures in conjunction with the official messaging from a candidate’s
43
campaign in order to more accurately assess whether a campaign pursued a racialized,
deracialized, or hybridized approach.
Johnson (2017) discusses Barack Obama in great detail and finds that he is not indicative
of a deracialized candidate—rather, the author borrows the term “race conscious” from King and
Smith (2005; 2011; 2014) to define Obama as someone who is aware of the intricacies that race
has in the narrative of the American experience. Furthermore, the author makes an insightful
observation by seeking to distinguish between a racial campaign strategy, and one’s racial
philosophy––whereas the former may change from time to time and may be temporary, the latter
is understood as generally being more fixed (622). Obama’s ability to speak to different
audiences may be underscored in his classification as race conscious: while his racial campaign
strategy may have been to tailor his message to each audience in order to emphasize what each
wanted to hear, his underlying racial philosophy remained unchanged. Perhaps this hybridized
strategy rested on his ability to speak to Black audiences about the issues that have long
confronted the community (race-conscious), while simultaneously campaigning on the necessity
of overcoming racial and ethnic disparities (color-blind). In this regard, a hybridized strategy
might be one that relies on and employs aspects of both racialization and deracialization. While
Obama was not the first Black candidate to garner White electoral support and consequently be
deemed as deracialized or a hybridized candidate, he is the most recent and is also the only
candidate of color to have been elected to the highest office in the free world.
44
Below are the three different models within U.S. campaigns and elections, including my
original theoretical contribution, the hybridized model, which I believe the literature has not yet
captured:
Table 2.4: Three Models of U.S. Campaign Strategies
Deracialized
Model
Hybridized
Model
(Version 1)
Racialized
Model
Symbolic
Representation
“Acknowledge”
(policy speeches, policy
statements)
Deracialized
Racialized
Racialized
Substantive
Representation
“Address”
(policy proposals,
policy stances)
Deracialized
Deracialized
Racialized
Table 2.5: Components of a Hybridized Campaign Strategy Model (Variation 1)
Policy Platform (Substantive Representation) Color-blind, Universal, or Transethnic
Symbolic Representation Race or Ethnic-specific
Racial/Ethnic Coalitions Bi-racial or Multi-ethnic
How a Candidate Identifies Panethnic Identity (i.e. American)
Demographics of Electoral District Any (MWD, MMD, or Plural)
As mentioned, I have two theoretical models for a hybridized campaign strategy. Under
the first model (Table 2.5 above), a hybridized strategy is expected to be comprised of a
transethnic or universal public policy platform. Under such circumstances, candidates refrain
from making any racial or ethnic references or appeals pertaining to their public policy stances or
proposals. However, under version 1, candidates are expected to symbolically racialize their
public policy speeches or statements; this means that candidates are theorized to acknowledge
45
racial and ethnic disparities corresponding to public policy issues. This is the unique attribute of
version 1 of a hybridized campaign strategy: racialized policy speeches or statements from
candidates wherein they acknowledge diverging realities among different racial and ethnic
communities in regard to a specific policy issue, married with a deracialized policy platform
(stances and proposals) wherein a candidate advances policy positions from which everyone in
the general population – irrespective of racial or ethnic background – can benefit from.
Because of the universality of candidate’s public policy platform, the expectation is that
candidates will seek to build a bi-racial or multi-ethnic coalition of voters and supporters. By
tailoring their policy stances in universal, transethnic terms, candidates employing this version of
hybridization will be in an optimal position to build a large consensus amongst a diverse
population.
In keeping with this transethnic approach, candidates are also expected to identify
themselves in panethnic terms so that a larger swath of voters can relate to them; again, the most
obvious of these panethnic identities is American, but a panethnic identity may also manifest in a
regional or geographic capacity, such as “southern Californian,” or “proud Texan.” The point is
that these panethnic identities are meant to have a broad base appeal across different racial and
ethnic communities.
Lastly, I posit that this version of hybridization is likely to occur in any type of electoral
district, primarily because of the uniqueness in how candidates employ racialized symbolic
representation (policy speeches or statements) with deracialized substantive representation
46
(policy proposals or stances). Given this innovative approach, I theorize that candidates may
position themselves as being able to appeal to those who are being affected disproportionately
from a policy issue by acknowledging their experience while simultaneously seeking to build a
multi-ethnic coalition by advancing policy positions from which everyone in the community can
benefit from.
Table 2.6: Components of a Hybridized Campaign Strategy Model (Variation 2)
Policy Platform (Substantive Representation) Race or Ethnic-specific
Racial/Ethnic Coalitions Bi-racial or Multi-ethnic
How a Candidate Identifies Panethnic Identity (i.e. American)
Demographics of Electoral District Any (MWD, MMD, or Plural)
The second theoretical model of a hybridized campaign strategy (Table 2.6 above) is
expected to be comprised of a policy platform (a candidate’s policy stances and proposals) that is
racialized––but in a unique fashion. Under this version of hybridization, it is theorized that
candidates will employ a racialized public policy platform that consists of diametrically opposed
positions, meaning both “pro-” and “anti-” elements of a policy issue. Hybridity under this
version rests on the ability of a candidate to incorporate aspects of opposing sides of a policy
issue in order to appeal to a broader racial and ethnic bloc of voters; the understanding here
being that if a candidate were to assume a policy stance in either side of a policy issue (as “pro-”
or “anti-”) that their reach across the electorate would be much narrower. For example,
immigration policy is an issue that is racialized and clearly defined by a “pro-” side as well as an
“anti-” side. Hybridity, using the example of immigration policy, would be expected to consist of
47
candidates incorporating aspects of both the pro-immigrant positionality as well as the anti-
immigrant positionality, as opposed to focusing on one side of the policy issue in assuming either
“pro-” or “anti-” stances.
Because of the nature in which candidates position themselves in a policy stance by
incorporating diametrically opposed elements, the expectation is that candidates would be
appealing to a broader base of supporters and voters, ergo the belief is that they would be doing
so with the intention of building a bi-racial or multi-ethnic coalition.
Much like version 1 of the hybridized campaign strategy, candidates using this version of
hybridity are theorized to assume a panethnic identity with the intention of appealing to a racially
and ethnically broad base of voters within the body politic. In so doing, candidates are expected
to identify along transethnic lines, like American or geographic-specific identities like “central
Floridian” or “Arizonan.” It’s important to note that it is also theorized that candidates may opt
for identifying with their professional career, such as rancher, businessperson, teacher; I make
the argument that such professional identities ought to also be considered as panethnic identities
because they transcend race and ethnicity, and are also relatable to the larger electorate
irrespective of race and ethnicity.
The objective of a hybridized campaign strategy is to appeal beyond the traditional
racialized or deracialized binary construct. With that in mind, hybridity is theorized to be
employed in any type of electoral district (MWD, MMD, or plural).
48
CHAPTER 3: Content Analysis
Introduction
In the 2016 election, Latino candidates had diverging strategies in addressing
immigration policy. Consider each of these examples: Representative Luis Gutierrez’s statement
on halting the deportation of young DREAMers (see: Appendix 3A), compared to U.S. Senator
Ted Cruz’s remarks at the Republican debate during the 2016 Presidential campaign (see:
Appendix 3B). These two elected officials mobilized their ethnic identity differently in
association with their immigration positions. Whereas Gutierrez frames the issue in response to
children of illegal immigrants, Cruz frames the issue in regard to children of legal immigrants.
And because the narrative of illegal immigration has been more associated with Latinos than
legal immigration has (Meyerson 2006; Brown 2013), it then becomes clear that Gutierrez’s
ethnic identity is more closely aligned with being a Latino of Latino descent, whereas Cruz’s
ethnic identity is more akin to being an American of (partial) Latino descent.
In this chapter, I test for variation 2 of the hybridized campaign strategy model––that is,
the version in which a candidate’s policy platform is comprised of racialized “pro-” and “anti-”
positions. The methodological approach chosen for conducting this analysis is a content analysis,
during which candidate campaign websites are analyzed for public policy positionality. I zeroed
in on how a candidate positioned themselves on two public policy issues: immigration (as the
primary issue of interest), and on jobs and the economy (as the secondary issue for comparison
purposes). The illuminating factor of analyzing a traditionally racialized issue (such as
immigration) in juxtaposition with a traditionally deracialized issue (such as jobs and the
49
economy) comes in informing an outside observer, such as a researcher, as to whether or not a
candidate ran a consistent campaign; meaning, did a candidate racialize both their policy stance
on immigration as well as on jobs and the economy? Or rather, did a candidate opt for racializing
one public policy issue and not the other?
In order to develop a classification of campaign’s, I posit of four general factors that
influence a candidate’s behavior as it relates to whether a candidate’s policy platform is
deracialized, hybridized, or racialized: 1. Symbolic representation, 2. Racial and ethnic
coalitions, 3. How a candidate identifies, and 4. The racial and ethnic demographics of the
electoral district. However, variation 2 of my hybridized campaign strategy model (which I am
testing for in this chapter) consists of three factors that influence a candidate’s behavior:
1. Racial and ethnic coalitions, 2. How a candidate identifies, and 3. The racial and ethnic
demographics of the electoral district.
A candidate’s own racial and ethnic background (as well as the racial and ethnic
background of their competitor) may influence how they position themselves on the issues they
campaign on. A Latino candidate may be more likely to racialize their campaign in congruence
with the sentiment of the majority of the population from the same community (Adida,
Davenport, and McClendon 2016). For example, if the majority of the Latino population is pro-
immigrant, then a Latino candidate is more likely to assume similar issue stances––at least,
certainly more likely than a candidate from a differing racial and ethnic background would. The
ethnicity of a candidate’s competitor may also play a role in whether a candidate opts for
racializing, hybridizing, or deracializing their stance on immigration policy. Is a candidate more
50
or less likely to racialize their stance on immigration when facing a Latino competitor? Does
having a Latino competitor inherently influence a candidate’s stance? Does this expectation
change when a candidate is facing a White competitor? My expectation is that a candidate’s
positionality on immigration will be impacted by the racial and ethnic background of their
electoral competitor, however I do not hypothesize in any one particular direction. The manner in
which the racial and ethnic background of a competitor shapes a candidate’s immigration policy
stance is not of main concern with this content analysis, however it nevertheless remains a point
of interest for observational purposes and as such will be captured in this study.
There are three possible demographic compositions for a district as it relates to its ethnic
and racial make-up: 1. majority White (MWD), 2. majority minority (MMD), and 3. plurality.
13
I
theorize that the demographics of a district will best predict whether a candidate will choose to
racialize, hybridize, or deracialize. I believe candidates running for office in majority minority
districts (MMDs) will choose to racialize their campaigns. The theory here rests on the
assumption that a campaign that makes overtures to racialized issues will appeal favorably to a
minority demographic, in which they make-up the majority in majority minority districts (Orey
2006). Thus, in order to witness electoral success in majority minority districts, the belief and
expectation is that candidates will need to appeal to the majority of voters and a racialized
agenda may represent the best approach for achieving success.
13
Grose (2011) and Preuhs and Juenke (2011) define a majority minority district (MMD) as having greater than 50
percent of an ethnic population––I apply their definition to majority White districts (MWDs) and thereby define
such districts as having greater than a 50 percent White demographic. I define a plurality district as having no racial
or ethnic population in the majority; instead at least two or more racial or ethnic communities must co-reside in
double digit percentages.
51
In the case of majority White districts (MWDs), the natural assumption here is that
deracialized issue stances are more likely to resonate with White voters as opposed to racialized
issue stances given what the literature has already stated with relation to White voters (Hamilton
1977; Perry 1991; McCormick and Jones 1993). Following Charles Hamilton’s advice for Black
candidates in the 1970s to forgo racialization tactics in an effort to appeal to a broader ethnic
base beyond the Black community, namely to include White voters, deracialization was
prescribed as the method of choice. However, I disagree with the expectation that White voters
would otherwise prefer a deracialized position from candidate’s, perhaps most notably in relation
to a candidate’s immigration policy stance.
Recent findings inform us of the existence of White voter identity in response to an ever-
changing United States of America in terms of race and ethnicity (Major, Blodhorn, and
Blascovich 2018; Chokshi 2018). The understanding here is that White Americans perceive their
status as diminishing in the face of an increase of status among communities of color (Wilkins
and Kaiser 2014). This “zero-sum” mentality among White voters––of winners and losers––in
combination with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), Group Status Threat
(Branscombe and Wann 1994), Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan and Stephan 2000), and
Social Cognition Theory (Jost et al. 2003), is part and parcel for why I believe White voters in
MWDs may not necessarily favor a candidate with a deracialized immigration policy stance;
rather, I posit that voters in MWDs will favor a candidate with a racialized immigration policy
stance that champions their interests, and opposes the interests of communities of color, for
under their “zero-sum” mentality the perceived gains of one racial and ethnic community come
at the losses of another racial and ethnic community. Therefore, in contradiction with Charles
52
Hamilton’s expectation of White voters responding more favorably to deracialized issue stances,
I expect voters in MWDs to prefer racialized immigration policy stances. However, in plurality
districts, the expectation is that a hybrid campaign strategy (with a combination of both
racialized and deracialized elements) will lead to electoral success because victory hinges on the
necessity of appealing to a broad, multi-ethnic base of supporters––the direct opposite of a
racialized strategy which focuses on building support within a specific ethnic community.
Therefore, in order to be successful in plurality districts, the assumption is that candidates will
run hybridized campaigns.
Research Design and Methodology
In order to confirm the existence of a hybridized campaign strategy model, I designed a
mixed-methods study with four aims:
1. Observe and report the conditions under which hybridization occurs.
2. Observe and report how hybridization is occurring.
3. Observe and report the relationship between candidate campaign strategy and the
racial and ethnic background of candidates and their respective competitors.
4. Observe and report the prevalence in racialization of immigration policy with the
prevalence in racialization of policy on jobs and the economy.
To answer the questions raised by these aims, I conduct a content analysis of campaign
websites from candidates running for the state legislature across six different states (California,
Texas, Florida, Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico) during the 2018 general election cycle.
According to Krippendorff (1989), the usefulness of content analyses methods for their ability to
53
shed light on the kind of values expressed and attitudes held
on particular issues by candidates for political offices, and
how these change in response to particular circumstances
and with the kind of audiences addressed (Krippendorff 1989, 405)
How a candidate positions themselves on the issues will reveal their preferences on the
policy issue itself, while also providing insight into the “audience” being addressed: the voters
and supporters within a district. I expand on this utility of content analysis by suggesting it can
illuminate a spectrum of campaign strategy.
The six states that comprise the content analysis (California, Texas, Florida, Nevada,
Arizona, and New Mexico) were selected for their significant share of Latino population (by
percent of the population)
14
.Given that candidate positionality on immigration policy is the
dependent variable in this analysis, coupled with the realization that immigration has been
strongly linked with the Latino community for decades (Meyerson 2006; Brown 2013), I felt it
appropriate to select the top six states with the highest percentage of Latino population. Two
additional advantages of the selected sample population are the variation of partisanship and time
commitment of each legislature. In terms of partisanship, each state varies: California is heavily
blue
15
(or controlled by the democratic party), Texas is heavily red
16
(or controlled by the
republican party), Florida is heavily red
17
, Nevada is a purple state
18
(meaning party control in
the state fluctuates between democrats and republicans), Arizona is heavily red
19
, and New
Mexico is blue leaning
20
. With respect to the time commitment of each legislature, California is
14
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2016/09/08/4-ranking-the-latino-population-in-the-states/
15
https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_California_state_government
16
https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_Texas_state_government
17
https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_Florida_state_government
18
https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_Nevada_state_government
19
https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_Arizona_state_government
20
https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_New_Mexico_state_government
54
the only state in the sample population that is full-time; the remaining five states have a part-time
legislature. Variation in partisanship and time commitment among each state legislature ensures
that the sample population is not biased in any which way. Of course, it is equally important to
note the limitations of this study.
The first such limitation comes in recognizing that not all candidates running for office
use internet websites as a campaigning tool. Because of this, the expected sample population is
actually less than anticipated. The next limitation of this research comes in that not every seat of
the six state legislatures comprising the analysis were up for election or re-election. Every seat
from the lower chamber (state assembly or state house) is up for election or re-election every two
years; however, seats from the upper chamber (state senate) vary from state to state with regard
to when they are up for election or re-election, thus not every senate seat from each of the six
state legislatures were captured or accounted for in this study.
In total, 1,120 candidates ran for office across these six states in 2018. Approximately
half of those candidates, or 585, had campaign websites available for conducting a content
analysis. The two public policy issues selected for the analysis were 1.) immigration (which
served as the dependent variable of interest), and 2.) jobs and the economy (which served as a
public policy issue for comparison purposes). Immigration has been an issue that has largely
been racialized (Meyerson 2006; Brown 2013) and has most recently and repeatedly been
equated as a Mexican problem by then-candidate and now President Donald J. Trump.
21
Because
21
Gregory Korte and Alan Gomez (2018). Trump ramps up rhetoric on undocumented immigrants: 'These aren't
people. These are animals.' USA TODAY: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/05/16/trump-
immigrants-animals-mexico-democrats-sanctuary-cities/617252002/
55
of this long and storied narrative association between Mexicans and immigration, the expectation
is that immigration will remain a mostly racialized public policy issue for candidate’s
campaigning for office. Now, to be clear, a racialized public policy stance can take one of two
forms: the anti-immigrant position which has perhaps become all too familiar within the
narrative of the United States, from the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 to Proposition’s 187 and
227 in the 1990s; but a pro-immigrant position is also considered to be a racialized stance, such
as pro-immigrant legislation sponsored by Gilbert Cedillo in the California Legislature
pertaining to driver’s licenses for undocumented immigrants or the California Dream Act for
undocumented college students . In both anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant stances, the marriage
of race and public policy is intertwined.
To be clear, immigration policy can be deracialized, hybridized, or racialized (this will be
further elaborated on). But in terms of a candidate’s racialized (anti-immigrant or pro-immigrant)
stance, I propose the table below as a helpful guide for discerning the directionality and intensity
of such policy positions:
Table 3.1: Racialization of Immigration Policy Stance: Directionality & Intensity
(Directionality)
Pro-Immigrant Anti-Immigrant
Strong Immigrants are a benefit, provide
policy proposal
Immigrants are a cost,
provide policy proposal
Weak Immigrants are a benefit,
no policy solution
Immigrants are a cost,
no solution
(Intensity)
56
Pro-Immigrant = Benefit
Benefit to the state through their
economic contributions
Benefit to the economy by taking jobs
others do not want
Anti-Immigrant = Cost
Cost to the state by using services they
don’t pay for
Cost to the economy by taking away jobs
of Californians
Strong (Immigration policy stance) =
Policy Proposal Provided
Pro-Immigrant = benefit to state,
economy, and immigrants = pathway to
legal status
Anti-Immigrant = cost to state, economy
and immigrants = immediate deportation
Weak (Immigration policy stance) =
Reference to Issue, No Policy Proposal
Pro-Immigrant = immigration is a
benefit, no policy proposal
Anti-Immigrant = immigration is a cost,
no policy proposal
As mentioned, the analysis of the 585 campaigns that comprised this research relied on a
mixed-methods approach. In the first phase, I conducted a text analysis of candidate websites
with a particular interest in their immigration policy stance. I then coded their positions (the
dependent variable) as one of three possible outcomes: 0 (deracialized), 1 (hybridized), or 2
(racialized). Once I coded the dependent variable, I then conducted a multinomial logistic
regression, which are “typically used when the dependent variable has 3 to 5 unordered
categories,”
22
such as the dependent variable in this research.
22
Learn About Multinomial Logit Regression in R With Data From the General Social Survey (2016). SAGE
Publications https://methods.sagepub.com/base/download/DatasetStudentGuide/mlogit-in-gss-2016
57
A racialized immigration policy stance (Meyerson 2006; Brown 2013) is one that
typically attempts to establish the possibility of a link between a particular racial and ethnic
group, with a specific public policy issue (Hancock 2003; Tesler 2012; Brown 2013). As
mentioned earlier, racialization can take two forms: pro- (in favor of something), or anti- (against
something). Generally speaking, the positionality can be interpreted, perceived, and coded
differently by different people, but conventional wisdom tells us that to be pro-immigrant means
that one is in favor of welcoming non-citizens into the country with the hopes of them becoming
either permanent legal residents or naturalized citizens, but until they do, pro-immigrant
candidates are open to providing certain safeguards for immigrants, such as medical care,
driver’s licenses, and educational benefits for undocumented college students. On the contrary,
anti-immigrant candidates are opposed to such immediate measures targeted towards relieving
anxiety and uncertainty among undocumented immigrants; however, these same anti-immigrant
candidates will state that they do support the attainment of legal permanent residency status or
naturalized citizenship, just for legal immigrants.
The excerpt below is an example of a racialized, pro-immigrant policy stance from a
candidate (Black woman) running for the California State Assembly:
[The candidate] doesn’t believe that babies belong in cages, or that families should be
separated when they cross a line on a map. Asylum-seekers and migrant workers should
not be treated like criminals: they should be given the medical services they need, and
access to the legal assistance guaranteed by our Constitution. It is shameful how
migrants are being treated in our name, and we must treat everyone in this country with
the compassion all human beings deserve. Our nation was founded to provide a haven
from persecution and poverty, and everyone deserves that opportunity.
58
However, as mentioned, racialization in immigration policy can also take form in an anti-
immigrant stance as evidenced by the excerpt below which stems from a candidate (White man)
running for the Texas House of Representatives:
This session, [the candidate] was very proud to co-author the bill that officially banned
‘Sanctuary Cities’ like Austin that refused to turn over criminal illegal aliens and put our
families in danger. Additionally, [the candidate] voted to add 250 troopers and invest
$1.6 billion toward securing our border – while maintaining a balanced state budget. He
believes we must secure every inch of the border to protect our families from violent
criminals, drug cartels, and terrorists. [The candidate] is committed to eliminating all
threats to the safety of our Texas families.
A hybridized immigration policy stance is theorized to comprise of both anti-immigrant
and pro-immigrant elements. In other words, despite hybridity being observed to be composed
entirely of racialized components, the reason for why I classify this manifestation as hybridity is
because such positions seek to appeal to both sides of a racialized aisle, whereas a racialized
appeal is traditionally interested in appealing to one side of the aisle. A hybridized immigration
policy stance seeks to appeal to those who are against (undocumented) immigrants, as well as to
those who are in favor of (undocumented) immigration. Again, if you recall, I established that
the treatment towards undocumented individuals is what seems to truly divide those who are
anti-immigrant from those who are pro-immigrant, as both sides seem to favor legal
immigration. Consequently, a hybridized immigration stance incorporates aspects of both anti-
immigrant and pro-immigrant positions, such as the excerpt below made from a candidate (White
woman) running for the Texas House of Representatives:
I support comprehensive immigration reform that protects our borders, allows a path to
citizenship for all immigrants, and gives a priority to those standing in line.
59
From the statement above, one can observe that the candidate is making appeals to
rhetoric that “protects [the] border,” which can allude to anything from building a border wall, to
increasing the numbers of border patrol agents––positions both of which are reflective of a
traditionally anti-immigrant stance. However, the candidate also makes reference to pro-
immigrant rhetoric in calling for the availability of a pathway to citizenship “for all immigrants.”
Anti-immigrant positions advocate that only those who have arrived through legal avenues merit
a pathway to citizenship, whereas pro-immigrant advocates champion a pathway to citizenship
for all, including those who arrived through illegal means. Therefore, this candidate’s
immigration stance is reflective of a hybridized approach for the incorporation of both sides of
the policy aisle. It is neither anti-immigrant, nor is it pro-immigrant. It is hybridity.
Table 3.2: Hybridization versus Racialization
Symbolic Representation Substantive Representation
Deracialization Deracial Deracial
Hybridization
Deracial or Racial
Fusion of (racial)
policy positions
(i.e. pro-immigrant and
anti-immigrant stance)
Racialization
Racial
Racial
(i.e. pro-immigrant or
anti-immigrant stance)
Although the analysis on candidate positions on jobs and the economy was performed as
a means of comparison in relation to how candidates treated the main dependent variable of
immigration policy, I find it useful to similarly include my classification of the policy positions.
Perhaps the most obvious and most easily identifiable policy position is a deracialized one. The
excerpt below falls under that category; it comes from a candidate (White man) running for the
California State Senate:
60
[The candidate] is a leader in the effort to maintain and expand the Film and Television
Tax Credit that is responsible for keeping TV and movie productions, and the good jobs
associated with them, in the state. He recently held a hearing of the Joint committee on
the Arts to review the successes of the tax credit program and examine ways to
strengthen it.
A hybridized position on jobs and the economy is more than likely to reflect a platform
that is in sync with version 1 of hybridity as put forth by this author: symbolically racialized, but
substantively deracialized. However, as the excerpt below shows, hybridity rests on a sliding
scale and not in absolutist terms. In the statement below, it appears that the candidate makes
reference to a racialized substantive appeal in calling for a focus on “minorities” in bettering the
economy. However, it’s important to note that the statement is made alongside a largely
deracialized appeal wherein the candidate seems to be focused on a wholistic approach where
everyone benefits from. Nevertheless, because of that one reference to communities of color, I
find it necessary to interpret such a position as representative of hybridity. Even though a
racialized appeal was made, it was made within a larger deracialized statement; had those
deracialized appeals been omitted, then this statement would be considered racialized for its
appeal to “minorities.” However, because that racialized appeal was made alongside deracialized
appeals, I find that it is in actuality a hybrid position. Below is the hybrid position made by a
candidate (White woman) running for the Nevada State Assembly:
As our economy continues to recover, it is critical that we help working families get back
on their feet. I support the efforts on behalf of the legislature to bring thousands of new
jobs to our state. Diversification and expansion of the job base are how Nevada thrives in
the 21st century. We must also do all we can to help new and existing small businesses
thrive, including businesses owned by women and minorities. I believe we need to raise
Nevada’s minimum wage, and to reward hard work by ensuring equal pay for women
doing the same jobs as men.
61
Lastly, in relation to deracialization and the dependent variable: It's important to note that
I treated the omission of an immigration policy stance by a candidate as a deracialized position.
While I did not encounter any textually deracialized immigration policy positions during the
content analysis and as such cannot provide an example below of what a deracialized statement
looked like, I aim to be transparent as to how I conducted my analysis and subsequent findings.
The second public policy issue of interest pertaining to jobs and the economy is used to
better gauge whether candidates treat that issue as either racialized, hybridized, or perhaps as one
might arguably expect, more traditionally as deracialized (Juenke and Sampaio 2010). The intent
here is to compare the breakdown of how immigration policy is treated (as either racialized,
hybridized, or deracialized) and compared to how candidate positionality on policy pertaining to
jobs and the economy is treated (again, as either racialized, hybridized, or deracialized) for the
purposes of assessing whether candidates treat both of these public policy issues in the same
manner or differently. Having said that, the analysis of a candidate’s immigration policy stance
serves as the dependent variable of interest, whereas the analysis of a candidate’s stance on jobs
and the economy isn’t necessarily incorporated as an independent variable in the model, for I am
not making the argument that the racialization, hybridization, or deracialization of one public
policy stance is influenced by the racialization, hybridization, or deracialization of another public
policy stance. Rather, I am interested in observing the degree to which candidate’s racialize,
hybridize, or deracialize their position on immigration, independently of and in contrast to how
candidates racialize, hybridize, or deracialize their position on jobs and the economy. For that
reason, the analysis on jobs and the economy will serve as more of an insightful and comparative
purpose rather than a theoretical or methodological purpose.
62
Hypotheses
The main intent of this content analysis is to ascertain how the racialization,
hybridization, or deracialization of a candidate’s immigration policy stance is influenced by: 1.
The presence or absence of racial and ethnic coalitions; 2. How a candidate chooses to identify,
in terms of an ethnic-specific identity or a panethnic identity; and 3. The racial and ethnic
demographics of an electoral district. Also of interest to this analysis, but not directly integral to
my theoretical expectations on campaign strategy, are how a candidate’s immigration policy
stance is influenced by: 1. The racial and ethnic background of a candidate, and 2. The racial and
ethnic background of a candidate’s competitor.
Racial and ethnic coalitions are expected to impact or influence a candidate’s
immigration policy stance in different ways. Candidates that run a campaign with the support of
a bi-racial or multi-ethnic coalitions (Fong 1998; Saito 2001; Sonenshein 1990; Kim and Lee
2001; Lien 2015) are understood to have formed such a base by appealing to a broad set of
policy interests that are, more often than not, framed along transethnic or universal language
(Hamilton 1977; Wilson 1980; Goldstein 1981; McCormick and Jones 1993; Barrett 1995;
Geron and Lai 2002). Conversely, conventional wisdom informs us that candidates without a bi-
racial or multi-ethnic coalition—meaning, candidates running with monolithic support—have
less of an electoral incentive to run on transethnic or universal policy positions, instead opting
for policy positionality that might resonate most with a specific racial and ethnic group. To be
clear, the expectation as it pertains to racial and ethnic coalitions is that candidates with bi-racial
or multi-ethnic coalitions are likely to run on a deracialized immigration policy stance, whereas
candidates with monolithic support are likely to run on a (one-directional) racialized immigration
63
policy stance. However, candidates employing a hybridized approach are expected to rely on a
(two-directional) racialized immigration policy stance. The key distinction between candidates
with monolithic support and a one-directional (pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant) racialized
immigration policy stance, compared to candidates with bi-racial or multi-ethnic coalition
support running on a two-directional (pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant) hybridized
immigration policy stance is that a racialized campaign strategy appeals to those who are either
pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant, while a hybridized campaign strategy attempts to appeal to
those who are pro-immigrant as well as to those who are anti-immigrant.
How a candidate chooses to identify may also shed some light on their policy
positionality within the respective campaign. It is theorized that candidates who choose to
identity along specific racial or ethnic lines––like Latino, or Mexican American, African
American, Asian American, Irish American––are more likely to assume a racialized immigration
policy stance. The belief here is that candidates who opt for racializing themselves by identifying
with a specific racial or ethnic community, are also expected to racialize their immigration policy
stance as such a positionality also appeals to a specific racial or ethnic community. Conversely,
candidates who opt for identifying themselves along panethnic lines––the most obvious being
American, or by the state or region in which they live––might also be reasonably expected to
adopt such an approach to their immigration policy stance and adopt a transethnic or universal
stance. Now, I make the argument that candidates who choose to identify themselves or present
their narrative by referring to their professional career ought to also be considered a novel
approach in panethnic identity, as professional careers transcend race and ethnicity in the same
manner in which panethnic identities do.
64
In an electoral district where there is a numerical majority of any one given racial and
ethnic community, I posit that the likelihood of a candidate appealing to that large, majority
constituency is obviously high; it is not an unreasonable assumption to expect a candidate to
advocate for the policy needs and issues that interest the majority of the people if electoral
success is the end goal. In both a majority minority district (MMDs) and in a majority White
district (MWDs), there is a clear numerical racial and ethnic majority, whereas in a plural district
there is no such evident racial and ethnic majority. In both MMDs and MWDs, the possibility of
a candidate racializing their immigration policy stance is probably higher than in a plurality
district where electoral success is more contingent on a deracialized or hybridized strategy
wherein building bi-racial or multi-racial coalitions (Fong 1998; Saito 2001; Sonenshein 1990;
Kim and Lee 2001; Lien 2015) is essential for electoral victory. However, in both MMDs and
MWDs it is conceivable for racialization to occur.
For example, in a majority Latino district it is not out of the question to expect a
candidate to adopt a racialized policy stance on immigration, such as former California State
Assemblymember, state Senator, and current Los Angeles City Councilmember Gilbert Cedillo.
His pro-immigrant stances have become well-known and documented (Pla and Ayon 2018).
Conversely, it too is conceivable for a candidate in a majority White district to adopt a racialized
anti-immigrant policy position, such as California State Assemblymember Marie Waldron from
the 75
th
district.
23
Campaigning on immigration policy in a plural district, I posit, is more likely
23
In her 2012 campaign, Waldron promised to “lead the fight to stop illegal immigration by opposing benefits and
drivers [sic] licenses and authored a resolution to enforce immigration laws locally.”
https://patch.com/california/temecula/marie-waldron-candidate-for-state-assembly-75th-district
65
to reflect a hybridized approach wherein a candidate appeals to voters on both sides of the issue
aisle: those who are pro-immigrant, in addition to those who are anti-immigrant. Again, the
defining characteristic between a traditionally racialized immigration policy stance and a
hybridized immigration policy stance is in the following: while racialization seeks to appeal to
those who are either pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant, hybridization is employed and targeted in
a fashion so as to appeal to those who are pro-immigrant by including a policy aspect that
resonates with them, as well as appealing to those who are anti-immigrant by simultaneously
incorporating a policy aspect that appeals to that particular cohort.
H1: A candidate running with the support of a bi-racial or multi-ethnic coalition will campaign
on a deracialized or hybridized immigration policy stance.
H2: A candidate running with the support of a racial or ethnic monolith will campaign on a
racialized immigration policy stance.
H3: A candidate who identifies with a panethnic identity will campaign on a deracialized or
hybridized immigration policy stance.
H4: A candidate who identifies with a race-specific or ethnic-specific identity will campaign on
a racialized immigration policy stance.
H5: A candidate running in a majority minority district will campaign on a racialized
immigration policy stance.
H6: A candidate running in a majority White district will campaign on a racialized immigration
policy stance.
H7: A candidate running in a plural district will campaign on a hybridized immigration policy
stance.
66
Dependent Variable & IV’s
The main variable of interest for this content analysis pertains to the immigration policy
stance of candidates running for the state legislature during the 2018 general election across six
states: California, Texas, Florida, Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico. The immigration
dependent variable has been coded as: 0 (deracialized), 1 (hybridized), or 2 (racialized). Included
in the analysis were seven independent variables: the demographics of the electoral district
(coded as 0 for a majority White district, 1 for a plural district, and 2 for a majority minority
district); the ethnicity of a candidate, coded as 0 (White), 1 (Latino), 2 (Black), 3 (API), and 4
(American Indian/Native American); the ethnicity of a competitor, coded as 0 (White), 1
(Latino), 2 (Black), 3 (API), and 4 (American Indian/Native American; the gender of a
candidate, coded as 0 (male), and 1 (female); the electoral outcome of the race, coded as 0 (won),
and 1(lost); the political party of a candidate, coded as 0 (republican), and 1 (democrat); and the
incumbency status of a candidate, coded as 0 (incumbent), and 1 (non-incumbent).
Table 3.3: Coding Key of Variables
0 1 2 3 4
Immigration Policy (DV) Deracial Hybrid Racial
Racial/Ethnic Coalitions Bi-racial/
Multi-ethnic
Monolith Missing
Candidate Self-Identification Panethnic Racial
Electoral District Demographics Maj White Plurality Maj Min
Candidate Racial Background White Latino Black API AI
Competitor Racial Background White Latino Black API AI
Gender Male Female
Electoral Outcome Won Lost
Party Rep Dem
Incumbent Status Incumbent Non-Incumbent
Jobs/Economy Deracial Hybrid Racial
67
In an effort to test the consistency of coding, an Intercoder Reliability Test was
conducted. A random analysis of 10 percent of the sample population of this study yield results
(see: Appendix 3C) indicating of a strong agreement in coding between two separate coders
using the same key or guide (see: Appendix 3D). The lowest percentage reported of agreement in
the Intercoder Reliability Test is 81 percent and the highest is 100 percent. These results indicate
of a great amount of agreement between two coders, and also speaks to the high likelihood that a
replication of this analysis by future scholars should yield similar results as those reported and
presented in this study.
Findings
Analyzing Hybridity Against the Baseline (Deracialization)
In the first reported multinomial logit output (for hybridity) with deracialization as the
baseline, one can observe that candidates with monolithic coalitions are correlated with a
hybridized immigration policy stance. Candidates with bi-racial or multi-ethnic coalitions report
a correlation with both deracialized and hybridized immigration policy stances––this is precisely
what was hypothesized. Candidates without coalition data or information report a correlation
with a deracialized immigration policy stance. The variable corresponding to candidate self-
identification reports that candidates who self-identify with a racialized (race-specific) identifier
are correlated with a deracialized immigration policy stance, whereas candidates who self-
identify with a panethnic identifier are correlated with a hybridized immigration policy stance.
68
Both a plural electoral district and a majority minority district (MMD) are positively correlated
with a deracialized approach to immigration policy, whereas a majority white district (MWD) is
positively correlated with hybridized immigration policy stance. In terms of candidate ethnicity,
Table 3.4 also reports that both Latino, Black, and AI candidates are associated with a hybridized
immigration policy stance, whereas their White counterparts (in the baseline category) are
associated with a deracialized immigration policy stance. Interestingly enough however, White
candidates are observed to rely on hybridity when compared to their API (Asian Pacific Islander)
counterparts who are observed to be correlated with deracialization. The trend for the ethnic
background of a candidate’s competitor reports that candidates with Latino and Black
competitors are likely to employ a hybridized approach to immigration policy, whereas
candidates with API and AI competitors are likely to rely on a deracialized immigration policy
stance. Candidates with White competitors are observed to be correlated with both a hybridized
and a deracialized immigration policy stance.
In terms of gender, women candidates are observed to be correlated hybridity, whereas
men are associated with deracialization. The variable corresponding to the electoral outcome of a
race reports that hybridity is correlated with an electoral loss while deracialization is correlated
with a successful electoral outcome (significant at the .10 level). Looking at the party variable,
we observe that democratic candidates are correlated with deracialization and republican
candidates are correlated with hybridity. Lastly, the incumbency variable reports that non-
incumbency is associated with deracialization whereas incumbency is associated with hybridity.
69
Table 3.4: Hybridization compared to Baseline (Deracialization) Output
Candidate Immigration Stance
(0=deracial, 1=hybrid)
Monolithic Coalitions .029582 (1.24485)
Missing Coalition Info -.2313492 (.7028297)
Race/Ethnic-Specific Candidate Self-Identification -14.24831 (1967.661)
Plural Electoral District -1.411589 (1.340339)
Majority Minority District (MMD) -.8515077 (.8785416 )
Latino Candidate .3891088 (.9923787)
Black Candidate .5154858 (1.250485)
API Candidate -13.75968 (1833.476)
AI Candidate 2.701078 (9617.458)
Latino Competitor .9227239 (1.016907)
Black Competitor 1.351253 (.8980858)
API Competitor -14.1289 (2342.226)
AI Competitor -13.75514 (8024.942)
Female Candidate 1.008469 (.7068577)
Lost Electoral Race 1.384128 (.7838492)*
Democrat -.747604 (.7537741)
Non-Incumbency -.3712957 (.8216876)
Constant -3.990845 (.8702525)
N 585
* Statistical Significance at the .10 level
** Statistical Significance at the .05 level
*** Statistical Significance at the .01 level
Analyzing Racialization Against the Baseline (Deracialization)
Candidates with monolithic coalitions are observed to be correlated with a racialized
immigration policy stance. The findings (Table 3.5) pertaining to candidates with bi-racial or
multi-ethnic coalitions are mixed: these candidates are correlated with both a deracialized and a
racialized immigration policy stance. Candidates with missing coalition data or information are
correlated with a deracialized immigration policy stance. With regard to candidate self-
identification, candidates who self-identify with racialized (race-specific) identifiers are
70
correlated with a racialized immigration policy stance, whereas candidates who self-identify with
panethnic identifiers are correlated with a deracialized immigration policy stance.
The variable corresponding with the racial and ethnic demographics of an electoral
district reports that both plural and majority minority districts (MMDs) are correlated with a
deracialized immigration policy stance, while majority White districts (MWDs) are correlated
with a racialized immigration policy stance. In analyzing the output pertaining to a candidate’s
ethnic background, we observe that all candidates of color are correlated with a deracialized
immigration policy stance: Latino, Black, API, and AI. However, their White counterparts are
correlated with a racialized immigration policy stance. The output looks quite different in
relation to the ethnic background of competitors: candidate’s with Latino, Black, or API
competitors are observed to be associated with a racialized immigration policy stance.
Candidates with AI competitors are observed to be correlated with a deracialized immigration
policy stance. In comparison candidate’s with White competitors are correlated with both a
deracialized and racialized immigration policy stance.
The gender variable reports of a correlation between a deracialized immigration policy
stance and women candidates, while men appear to be correlated with a racialized immigration
policy stance. The variable pertaining to electoral outcome reports that candidates who won their
races are correlated with a racialized immigration policy stance, whereas candidates who lost
their races are correlated with a deracialized immigration policy stance (significant at the .05
level). The party variable reports that democrats are associated with a deracialized immigration
policy stance and republicans are associated with a racialized immigration policy stance
71
(significant at the .01 level). The final variable, relating to incumbency, reports that non-
incumbents are correlated with a racialized immigration policy stance, and those running as
incumbents are correlated with a deracialized immigration policy stance (significant at the .05
level).
Table 3.5: Racialization compared to Baseline (Deracialization) Output
Candidate Immigration Stance
(0=deracial, 1=racial)
Monolithic Coalitions .2966211 (.3632683)
Missing Coalition Info -.2739388 (.2637266)
Race/Ethnic-Specific Candidate Self-Identification .1294997 (.8145358)
Plural Electoral District -.7055228 (.486892)
Majority Minority District (MMD) -.3481566 (.3107957)
Latino Candidate -.6788292 (.4895504)
Black Candidate -.427205 (.6216316)
API Candidate -.9695709 (.7807315)
AI Candidate -13.94289 (2732.703)
Latino Competitor .5281764 (.3610679)
Black Competitor .1504621 (.4771862)
API Competitor .1815892 (.6176387)
AI Competitor -12.77245 (2396.583)
Female Candidate -.3594173 (.2680793)
Lost Electoral Race -.7246434 (.3233605)**
Democrat -1.059579 (.297546)***
Non-Incumbency .5670459 (.2511464)**
Constant -.5407124 (.2729491)
N 585
* Statistical Significance at the .10 level
** Statistical Significance at the .05 level
*** Statistical Significance at the .01 level
72
Table 3.6: Hypotheses Overview
Hypothesis Reject or Fail to Reject? Reason
H 1: A candidate running with
the support of a bi-racial or
multi-ethnic coalition will
campaign on a deracialized or
hybridized immigration policy
stance
Fail to Reject
Bi-racial and multi-ethnic
coalitions indicate of a
correlation with deracialized,
hybridized, and racialized
immigration policy stances;
mixed results; no statistical
significance
H 2: A candidate running with
the support of a racial or ethnic
monolith will campaign on a
racialized immigration policy
stance
Fail to Reject
Racial and ethnic monoliths
indicate of a correlation with
racialized and hybridized
immigration policy stances; no
statistical significance
H 3: A candidate who identifies
with a panethnic identity will
campaign on a deracialized or
hybridized immigration policy
stance
Fail to Reject
Panethnic identities do indicate
of a correlation with hybridized
and deracialized immigration
policy stances; however, no
statistical significance
H 4: A candidate who identifies
with a race-specific or ethnic-
specific identity will campaign
on a racialized immigration
policy stance
Fail to Reject
Race-specific or ethnic-specific
identities do indicate of a
correlation with racialized
immigration policy stances, as
well as deracialized positions;
however, no statistical
significance
H 5: A candidate running in a
majority minority district will
campaign on a racialized
immigration policy stance
Fail to Reject
MMDs indicate of a correlation
with deracialized immigration
policy stances; no statistical
significance
H 6: A candidate running in a
majority White district will
campaign on a racialized
immigration policy stance
Fail to Reject
MWDs indicate of a correlation
with racialized and hybridized
immigration policy stances; no
statistical significance
H 7: A candidate running in a
plural district will campaign on
a hybridized immigration policy
stance
Fail to Reject
Plural districts indicate of a
correlation with deracialized
immigration policy stances; no
statistical significance
73
Discussion
There is a correlation between MMDs and deracialization, between plural districts and
deracialization, and between MWDs and hybridization and racialization. This tells us that
candidates were less willing to adopt racialized appeals (either pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant
positions) in either majority minority districts, or in plural districts. Instead it appears as if
though candidates in MMDs and plural districts opted for an immigration policy stance that
omitted race and ethnicity from the issue. Quite oppositely, candidates running in MWDs ran on
either hybridized or racialized appeals; this suggests that candidates running in MWDs are
interested in making inroads with both pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant voters of the electorate
as indicated by their willingness to adopt and incorporate hybridized policy positions. However,
the findings also inform of the willingness of candidates running in MWDs to run on a racialized
immigration policy stance with the intent of appealing a particular side of the immigration
debate: those who are either pro-immigrant, or those who are anti-immigrant.
Only White candidates report a correlation with a racialized immigration policy stance,
whereas all candidates (Latino, Black, White, API and AI) report of a correlation with a
deracialized immigration policy position. Latino, Black, White, and AI candidates indicate of a
correlation with a hybridized immigration policy stance; API candidates are the only group that
do not show of a correlation with hybridization. With respect to the racial background of
candidate competitors, all competitor racial backgrounds (Latino, Black, White, and API)
showcase a correlation with racialization; this means that candidates running against Latino,
Black, White, and API competitors are likely to take a racialized immigration policy stance.
74
However, candidates running against AI competitors do not show this trend; instead, candidates
with AI competitors show of a correlation with a deracialized immigration policy stance. In
terms of hybridity, candidates with Latino, Black, and White competitors are correlated with
taking a hybridized immigration policy stance.
Democratic candidates are observed to be correlated with a deracialized immigration
policy stance, compared to republican candidates which are correlated with a racialized
immigration policy position (significant at the .01 level). This is an interesting observation in
reference to party politics on immigration policy during the 2018 General Election: it appears as
if though democrats––who have in more recent times shaped their party platform as pro-
immigrant––actually opted for a deracialized approach. Republicans have traditionally taken a
tougher (anti-immigrant) stance on immigration, so perhaps it is not too surprising that
republican candidates in the sample were in fact associated with a racialized immigration policy
stance. Republican candidates are also correlated with a hybridized immigration policy stance.
This informs us that republican candidates are not only likely to campaign on either a pro-
immigrant or an anti-immigrant policy stance as showcased by their correlation with
racialization, but republican candidates are also likely to campaign on a policy position that
encompasses both pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant positions as observed by their correlation
with hybridized immigration policy stances.
The gender variable on candidates presents the following observation: women are relied
on either a hybridized immigration policy stance or on a deracialized immigration policy
position, whereas men are observed to have relied on either a racialized immigration policy
75
stance or a deracialized immigration policy stance. This finding tells us that women a were more
likely to adopt immigration positions that speak to both pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant
individuals vis-à-vis a hybridized approach––perhaps in an effort to build a consensus and appeal
to a broader range of the electorate––or they will rely on a deracialized position that completely
omits race and ethnicity from the conversation. On the contrary, men were observed to be more
willing to adopt racialized appeals (either pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant positions), or
similarly to women they adopted deracialized stances. Because of this, it might be suspected that
men, writ large within the sample of this content analysis, were not interested in consolidating
the pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant electorate through a hybridized appeal; rather, men were
more interested in consolidating support from one side of the issue, either pro-immigrant folks or
anti-immigrant individuals.
For comparison purposes and as mentioned under the Research Design & Methodology
section of this chapter, I conducted a content analysis of a secondary policy issue relating to jobs
and the economy. As observed below, the main dependent variable pertaining to a candidate’s
immigration policy stance exhibited much more variability when compared to a candidate’s
positionality on jobs and the economy. On immigration, the vast majority of policy positions
corresponded with a deracialized stance (approximately 78 percent). The next largest subset of
candidate positions corresponds with a racialized immigration stance (20 percent). Only eleven
candidates were coded as having a deracialized immigration policy stance (just under 2 percent).
On jobs and the economy, almost all of the candidates were coded as having a deracialized
policy stance (99 percent). Only 1 candidate was coded as having a hybridized stance on jobs
76
and the economy. No candidates were found to have a racialized policy stance on jobs and the
economy.
This juxtaposition of candidate positionality on immigration policy and policy on jobs
and the economy indicates of an unequal treatment of public policy within U.S. campaigns and
elections. This study captures the perception among candidates that, arguably, each public policy
issue ought to be treated differently––meaning, the racialization of one issue may not necessarily
lead the racialization of another issue, for example. Candidates appear to position themselves
differently on public policy issues, at least based upon this analysis of two policy areas. It may
be surmised that candidates are strategic in how they position themselves on policy issues, and
perhaps even with respect to where they are running. As noted earlier, the six states that
comprise this study all have a significant percentage of Latino population; perhaps this may be
why candidates in this sample population treated a highly salient issue like immigration
differently than jobs and the economy, again, given the storied relationship and prevalence of
immigration (policy) within the Latino community. All this is to say that candidates are strategic
in how they position themselves on public policy issues, as showcased by their inequitable
treatment of policy stances pertaining to immigration compared to jobs and the economy.
Table 3.7: Immigration Policy Stance Table 3.8: Jobs & Economy Policy Stance
JOBS & ECONOMY POLICY
STANCE
FREQUENCY
DERACIALIZED 584
HYBRIDIZED 1
RACIALIZED 0
TOTAL 585
IMMIGRATION POLICY
STANCE
FREQUENCY
DERACIALIZED 455
HYBRIDIZED 11
RACIALIZED 119
TOTAL 585
77
Conclusion
Despite the inability to reject any of the null hypotheses from this study, it is worth
mentioning that the findings corresponding to four of the hypotheses do in fact showcase the
relationship as expected with the dependent variable: 1. Monolithic coalitions do in fact report a
correlation with racialized immigration policy stances; 2. Panethnic self-identification is
correlated with deracialized and hybridized immigration policy stances; 3. Race-specific or
ethnic-specific self-identification is correlated with racialized immigration policy stances; and 4.
MWDs do showcase a correlation with racialized immigration policy stances. Collectively, these
four hypotheses expected to find the relationship as reported from the analyses, but a lack of
statistical significance ultimately prevents the rejection of the null.
This chapter has presented a new theoretical concept within U.S. Campaigns & Elections,
with the intention of breaking the binary mold of campaign literature by suggesting that
candidate positionality on public policy issues ought not simply be perceived as deracialized or
racialized; rather, it is argued that a third path of hybridity is occurring. In this chapter, version 2
of hybridity is presented, discussed, and tested. To recap, version 2 of hybridity takes shape
when a candidate assumed a policy position that incorporates elements of two diametrically
opposed positions (such as in assuming an immigration policy stance that incorporates elements
of both pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant positionalities).
This content analysis of 585 state legislative campaigns across California, Texas, Florida,
Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico during the 2018 General Election reports insightful
78
observations pertaining to the deracialization, hybridization, and racialization of immigration
policy. This study’s focus on hybridity, and original contribution, is not fully captured within the
scope of this sample population. As the adage goes, the absence of evidence is not the evidence
of absence. The hope is that through a larger sample, more robust findings of a hybridized
relationship may be captured, thereby extending its possibility beyond the realm of the
theoretical and into the practical.
79
Appendices
3A: Statement from Rep. Luis Gutierrez on halting the deportation of DREAMers
“The Congressional Hispanic Caucus has been clear that deporting young people who have
lived in the U.S. for years and were brought here through no fault of their own as children
should not be the targets of deportation.”
3B: Remarks from Sen. Ted Cruz at a Republican debate during the 2016 Presidential
campaign
“I am the son of an immigrant who came legally from Cuba to seek the American dream. And, we
can embrace legal immigration while believing in the rule of law--and I would note, try going
illegally to another country. Try going to China, or Japan. Try going to Mexico. See what they
do. Every sovereign nation secures its borders, and it is not compassionate to say we’re not
going to enforce the laws. And we’re going to drive down the wages for millions of hardworking
men and women.”
3C: InterCode Reliability Test
kap immigration1 immigration2
Expected
Agreement Agreement Kappa Std. Err. Z Prob>Z
-----------------------------------------------------------------
91.53% 73.46% 0.6807 0.1141 5.97 0.0000
. kap coalitions1 coalitions2
Expected
Agreement Agreement Kappa Std. Err. Z Prob>Z
-----------------------------------------------------------------
81.36% 47.57% 0.6444 0.1112 5.79 0.0000
. kap canid1 canid2
Expected
Agreement Agreement Kappa Std. Err. Z Prob>Z
-----------------------------------------------------------------
100.00% 84.49% 1.0000 0.1302 7.68 0.0000
. kap districtdemo1 districtdemo2
Expected
Agreement Agreement Kappa Std. Err. Z Prob>Z
-----------------------------------------------------------------
100.00% 37.32% 1.0000 0.0942 10.62 0.0000
80
kap canethnicity1 canethnicity2
Expected
Agreement Agreement Kappa Std. Err. Z Prob>Z
-----------------------------------------------------------------
96.61% 44.64% 0.9388 0.0957 9.81 0.0000
. kap compethnicity1 compethnicity2
Expected
Agreement Agreement Kappa Std. Err. Z Prob>Z
-----------------------------------------------------------------
100.00% 42.66% 1.0000 0.0899 11.13 0.0000
. kap gender1 gender2
Expected
Agreement Agreement Kappa Std. Err. Z Prob>Z
-----------------------------------------------------------------
100.00% 51.74% 1.0000 0.1302 7.68 0.0000
. kap won1 won2
Expected
Agreement Agreement Kappa Std. Err. Z Prob>Z
-----------------------------------------------------------------
100.00% 74.15% 1.0000 0.1302 7.68 0.0000
. kap party1 party2
Expected
Agreement Agreement Kappa Std. Err. Z Prob>Z
-----------------------------------------------------------------
100.00% 51.74% 1.0000 0.1302 7.68 0.0000
. kap incumbent1 incumbent2
Expected
Agreement Agreement Kappa Std. Err. Z Prob>Z
-----------------------------------------------------------------
100.00% 54.15% 1.0000 0.1302
81
3D: Key for Content Analysis InterCode Test
Immigration Policy:
“0” No mention of race or ethnicity. A policy stance that conveys how a candidate stands on
immigration without making any references to racial or ethnic communities. This will
also include candidates that do not have a position on immigration listed on their
campaign website.
“1” Immigration policy stance that includes “anti-immigrant” AND “pro-immigrant”
elements. These positions consist of views that promote a benefit to immigrants (like
pathway to citizenship, amnesty, et cetera) AND views that promote a cost to current or
future immigrants (increased border security, tougher laws for undocumented individuals,
et cetera).
“2” An immigration policy stance that is either “pro-immigrant” OR “anti-immigrant.”
A stance may promote benefits to current or future immigrants (pathway to citizenship,
amnesty, et cetera) OR it may promote a cost to current or future immigrants (increased
border security, tougher laws for undocumented individuals, et cetera).
Racial/Ethnic Coalitions:
“0” Candidates with bi-racial or multi-ethnic coalitions of support. This will be found under
the “Endorsements” or “Supporters” heading/section. Use the following to gauge support:
1. Pictures of supporters/endorsers; 2. Names of supporters/endorsers.
“1” Candidates with monolithic support (one racial or ethnic community). This will be found
under the “Endorsements” or “Supporters” heading/section. Use the following to gauge
support: 1. Pictures of supporters/endorsers; 2. Names of supporters/endorsers.
“2” Candidates with missing supporters/endorsers information.
Candidate Self-Identification:
“0” Candidates that identify themselves as American, or with a specific region (southern
Californian, Native Texan, 4
th
Generation Floridian, et cetera). This also includes
Candidates who identify themselves with their professional career (Firefighter, Teacher,
Businessman, Farmer, et cetera).
“1” Candidates that identify themselves with a specific racial or ethnic community (Latino,
Mexican-American, African-American, Asian-American, Irish-American, et cetera).
82
Electoral Districts:
“0” A district with greater than 50 percent White population
“1” A district with no racial or ethnic population in the majority. Instead, at least two or more
racial or ethnic communities must co-reside in double digit percentages.
“2” A district with greater than 50 percent Latino, OR greater than 50 percent Black, OR
greater than 50 percent API population.
Candidate Racial Background:
“0” A candidate with a “White”: 1. Phenotypic complexion, and/or 2. Name/Surname.
“1” A candidate with a “Latino”: 1. Phenotypic complexion, and/or 2. Name/Surname.
“2” A candidate with a “Black”: 1. Phenotypic complexion, and/or 2. Name/Surname.
“3” A candidate with an “API”: 1. Phenotypic complexion, and/or 2. Name/Surname.
“4” A candidate with an “AI”: 1. Phenotypic complexion, and/or 2. Name/Surname.
Competitor Racial Background:
“0” A competitor with a “White”: 1. Phenotypic complexion, and/or 2. Name/Surname.
“1” A competitor with a “Latino”: 1. Phenotypic complexion, and/or 2. Name/Surname.
“2” A competitor with a “Black”: 1. Phenotypic complexion, and/or 2. Name/Surname.
“3” A competitor with an “API”: 1. Phenotypic complexion, and/or 2. Name/Surname.
“4” A competitor with an “AI”: 1. Phenotypic complexion, and/or 2. Name/Surname.
Gender:
“0” Male
“1” Female
Electoral Outcome:
“0” Won
“1” Lost
Political Party:
“0” Republican
83
“1” Democrat
Incumbent Status:
“0” Incumbent
“1” Non-Incumbent
Jobs/Economy Policy:
“0” No mention of race or ethnicity. A policy stance that conveys how a candidate stands on
jobs and the economy without making any references to racial or ethnic communities.
This will also include candidates that do not have a position on immigration listed on
their campaign website.
“1” A policy stance that acknowledges a racial or ethnic disparity in policy, but presents a
policy proposal that omits race and ethnicity from the solution.
“2” A policy stance that acknowledges a racial or ethnic disparity in policy, and also presents
a policy proposal that includes racial or ethnic considerations in the solution.
3E: Multinomial Logistic Regression
Multinomial logistic regression Number of obs = 585
LR chi2(34) = 92.97
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -301.07828 Pseudo R2 = 0.1337
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
immigration | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
--------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
0 | (base outcome)
--------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
1 |
coalitions |
1 | .029582 1.24485 0.02 0.981 -2.410279 2.469443
2 | -.2313492 .7028297 -0.33 0.742 -1.60887 1.146172
|
canid | -14.24831 1967.661 -0.01 0.994 -3870.794 3842.297
|
districtdemo |
1 | -1.411589 1.340339 -1.05 0.292 -4.038605 1.215428
2 | -.8515077 .8785416 -0.97 0.332 -2.573418 .8704021
|
canethnicity |
1 | .3891088 .9923787 0.39 0.695 -1.555918 2.334135
2 | .5154858 1.250485 0.41 0.680 -1.935419 2.96639
3 | -13.75968 1833.476 -0.01 0.994 -3607.306 3579.787
4 | 2.701078 9617.458 0.00 1.000 -18847.17 18852.57
|
compethnicity |
1 | .9227239 1.016907 0.91 0.364 -1.070377 2.915825
2 | 1.351253 .8980858 1.50 0.132 -.4089633 3.111469
3 | -14.1289 2342.226 -0.01 0.995 -4604.807 4576.55
4 | -13.75514 8024.942 -0.00 0.999 -15742.35 15714.84
|
gender | 1.008469 .7068577 1.43 0.154 -.3769463 2.393885
won | 1.384128 .7838492 1.77 0.077* -.1521884 2.920444
84
party | -.747604 .7537741 -0.99 0.321 -2.224974 .7297661
incumbent | -.3712957 .8216876 -0.45 0.651 -1.981774 1.239182
_cons | -3.990845 .8702525 -4.59 0.000 -5.696508 -2.285181
--------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
2 |
coalitions |
1 | .2966211 .3632683 0.82 0.414 -.4153717 1.008614
2 | -.2739388 .2637266 -1.04 0.299 -.7908335 .242956
|
canid | .1294997 .8145358 0.16 0.874 -1.466961 1.72596
|
districtdemo |
1 | -.7055228 .486892 -1.45 0.147 -1.659814 .248768
2 | -.3481566 .3107957 -1.12 0.263 -.957305 .2609918
|
canethnicity |
1 | -.6788292 .4895504 -1.39 0.166 -1.63833 .280672
2 | -.427205 .6216316 -0.69 0.492 -1.64558 .7911705
3 | -.9695709 .7807315 -1.24 0.214 -2.499777 .5606347
4 | -13.94289 2732.703 -0.01 0.996 -5369.942 5342.056
|
compethnicity |
1 | .5281764 .3610679 1.46 0.144 -.1795037 1.235857
2 | .1504621 .4771862 0.32 0.753 -.7848057 1.08573
3 | .1815892 .6176387 0.29 0.769 -1.02896 1.392139
4 | -12.77245 2396.583 -0.01 0.996 -4709.988 4684.443
|
gender | -.3594173 .2680793 -1.34 0.180 -.8848431 .1660086
won | -.7246434 .3233605 -2.24 0.025** -1.358418 -.0908685
party | -1.059579 .297546 -3.56 0.000*** -1.642758 -.4763991
incumbent | .5670459 .2511464 2.26 0.024** .074808 1.059284
_cons | -.5407124 .2729491 -1.98 0.048 -1.075683 -.005742
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Statistical Significance at the .10 level
** Statistical Significance at the .05 level
*** Statistical Significance at the .01 level
Summary Statistics of Sample
3F: Candidate Ethnicity by Electoral District
CANDIDATE
ETHNICITY
MWD PLURAL MMD TOTAL
WHITE 288 24 85 397
LATINO 16 89 15 120
BLACK 7 8 25 40
API 4 5 17 26
AI 0 2 0 2
TOTAL 315 128 142 585
85
3G: Competitor Ethnicity by Electoral District
COMPETITOR
ETHNICITY
MWD PLURAL MMD TOTAL
WHITE 276 40 92 408
LATINO 17 68 24 109
BLACK 16 9 17 42
API 6 8 9 23
AI 0 3 0 3
TOTAL 315 128 142 585
3H: Candidate Ethnicity by Competitor Ethnicity
CANDIDATE
ETHNICITY
WHITE LATINO BLACK API AI TOTAL
WHITE 329 35 21 12 0 397
LATINO 46 65 3 5 1 120
BLACK 13 5 16 5 1 40
API 19 4 2 1 0 26
AI 1 0 0 0 1 2
TOTAL 408 109 42 23 3 585
3I: Party Identification by Candidate Ethnicity
PARTY
IDENTIFICATION
WHITE LATINO BLACK API AI TOTAL
REPUBLICAN 247 19 4 8 0 278
DEMOCRAT 150 101 36 18 2 307
TOTAL 397 120 40 26 2 585
3J: Frequency of Electoral Districts
DISTRICT
DEMOGRAPHICS
FREQUENCY
MWD 315
PLURAL 128
MMD 142
TOTAL 585
86
3K: Party Identification by Electoral District
PARTY
IDENTIFICATION
MWD PLURAL MMD TOTAL
REPUBLICAN 204 25 49 278
DEMOCRAT 111 103 93 307
TOTAL 315 128 142 585
3L: Frequency of Candidate Immigration Policy Stance
IMMIGRATION
POLICY
STANCE
FREQUENCY
DERACIALIZED 455
HYBRIDIZED 11
RACIALIZED 119
TOTAL 585
3M: Candidate Immigration Policy Stance by Electoral District
IMMIGRATION
POLICY
STANCE
MWD PLURAL MMD TOTAL
DERACIALIZED 220 116 119 455
HYBRIDIZED 8 1 2 11
RACIALIZED 87 11 21 119
TOTAL 315 128 142 585
3N: Candidate Immigration Policy Stance by Party Identification
IMMIGRATION
POLICY STANCE
REPUBLICAN DEMOCRAT TOTAL
DERACIALIZED 182 273 455
HYBRIDIZED 6 5 11
RACIALIZED 90 29 119
TOTAL 278 307 585
87
3O: Candidate Immigration Policy Stance by Candidate Ethnicity
IMMIGRATION
POLICY
STANCE
WHITE LATINO BLACK API AI TOTAL
DERACIALIZED 286 108 35 24 2 455
HYBRIDIZED 8 2 1 0 0 11
RACIALIZED 103 10 4 2 0 119
TOTAL 397 120 40 26 2 585
3P: Frequency of Candidate Policy Stance on Jobs & Economy
JOBS &
ECONOMY
POLICY
STANCE
FREQUENCY
DERACIALIZED 584
HYBRIDIZED 1
RACIALIZED 0
TOTAL 585
88
CHAPTER 4: Field Experiment
Introduction
The 2018 election cycle lends itself to be an important and potentially insightful period
from which to research the deracialization, racialization, or hybridization construct of
campaigns in American Politics. The 2018 elections represent the most immediate electoral
contests to succeed the highly racialized 2016 election cycle.
24
If the 2008 election cycle
represented the best example of deracialization (Rho’Dess 2011), or at the very least the best
example on a large scale of how a candidate of color campaigned for and was subsequently
elected to the highest office in the nation without so much as a racialized public policy platform,
then the 2016 presidential election represents the polar opposite. In this vein, the 2018 elections
represent an ideal setting from which to observe how candidates for the state legislature fashion
their own campaigns: either in the mold of the 2008 cycle which is more akin to deracialization
or hybridity, or more in a racialized fashion as evidenced by the 2016 election.
Specifically, this field experiment is interested in observing a potential causal relationship
between the campaign strategy employed by a candidate as evidenced by their response to a
public policy inquiry with respect to: 1. the perceived racial and ethnic background of a voter,
and 2. the type of policy inquiry (treatment or control) received by a candidate. The intent herein
24
The 2016 Presidential Election has widely been recognized as having been highly racialized by then-Presidential
candidate Donald J. Trump. In his campaign kick-off, Trump set the tone for his campaign—and arguably the tone
of the entire campaign cycle—by equating Mexican immigrants with drugs, crime, and rape:
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/05/16/trump-immigrants-animals-mexico-democrats-sanctuary-
cities/617252002/
89
lies in analyzing whether or not a candidate’s statements are influenced by the racial and ethnic
background of the voter who initiated contact, as well as in analyzing how candidates react to
racialized or deracialized public policy inquiries. This field experiment presents a useful
approach towards testing for causality: First, by observing whether or not the racial and ethnic
background of a prospective voter plays a role in how a candidate crafts a response; and
secondly, by observing whether or not an initial contact by a prospective voter (as either
racialized or deracialized) is a factor in how a candidate fashions their response. In the first, by
randomly priming three different racial and ethnic considerations (Black, Latino, and White)
pertaining to a voter’s background, we are able to observe if there is a measurable difference in
how candidates respond to Black voters, compared to Latino voters, compared to White voters.
In the second, by including a treatment and a control message and randomly assigning one of the
two to candidates in the sample, the analysis will aid in helping to ascertain whether candidates
shape their response in relation to the type of policy inquiry they receive.
Candidates that employ a deracialized approach are more likely to campaign on policy
issues that refrain from making any specific references to a particular racial or ethnic
demographic (McCormick and Jones 1993), such as agriculture, water, or transportation (Juenke
and Sampaio 2010). For these candidates, avoiding to campaign on race-specific issues is done
so with the intent of presenting a “nonthreatening image” (Wilson 1980; Goldstein 1981;
McCormick and Jones 1993) towards all voters, but mainly towards White voters. On the other
hand, a racialized approach is one that more heavily relies on campaigning for office by
connecting policy issues with a particular racial or ethnic demographic. Whether that’s by
associating single Black mothers as “welfare queens” as President Ronald Reagan did in the
90
1980s (Hancock 2003); by casting immigration as an inherent Mexican problem as California
Governor Pete Wilson did during his 1994 re-election campaign vis-a-vis Proposition 187
(Meyerson 2006; Brown 2013); or whether that’s by raising opposition to the Affordable Care
Act by associating it with our nation’s first Black president, as was done by Tea Party
Republicans in their campaign against Obamacare (Tesler 2012).
However, while both a deracialized response and a racialized response have been well
documented and may perhaps come across as pretty evident, it’s the hybrid strategy that I
perceive to be as the most interesting, and quite possibly the most important as the literature has
not yet fully captured such a strategy in electoral politics. In accordance with my version 1
definition of a hybrid strategy, I posit that this type of a hybrid strategy incorporates elements of
both racialization and deracialization. I submit that this (variation 1) type of hybrid strategy
“acknowledges” the existence of a link or relationship between a public policy issue and a
particular racial or ethnic demographic––similar to what is witnessed under a racialized strategy
(Hancock 2003; McIlwain and Caliendo 2011; Tesler 2012; Brown 2013;).
In “addressing” or presenting their solutions to the public policy issue, I hypothesize that
candidates will put forth platforms that omit references to specific racial or ethnic
demographics––very much akin to what is witnessed under a deracialized strategy (Hamilton
1977; Wilson 1980; Goldstein 1981; McCormick and Jones 1993; Barrett 1995; Geron and Lai
2002); in this way, their policy platforms reflect a “one-size fits all” approach, wherein everyone
has the potential to benefit from. Connecting it to Pitkin’s work on representation, the hybrid
approach is theorized to “acknowledge” racial disparities within public policy as a form of
91
symbolic representation; however, in presenting their policy positions, candidates employing a
hybrid strategy will promote a color-blind view as a form of substantive representation.
As a measure of my own original theoretical contribution, I propose two steps for
assessing whether a candidate response is deracialized, racialized, or a hybridized:
1. Acknowledge, and 2. Address. “Acknowledge” refers to whether or not a candidate makes
some sort of a reference to the racialization of the policy inquiry, in the case of this study, the
public policy issue pertains to obesity. “Address” relates to whether or not a candidate opts for
presenting a solution to the policy inquiry by including racialization as part of their answer.
25
Research Focus & Questions
The intent of this research is to analyze how candidates craft their responses to campaign
messages (a proxy for how candidates shape their campaigns) when confronted with a racialized
or deracialized setting. Whereas a deracialized electoral setting is perceived to be one in which
race is absent in terms of its association with a particular public policy issue (Hamilton 1977;
McCormick and Jones 1993; Juenke and Sampaio 2010), a racialized electoral setting is one in
which race is closely woven with a singular or a set of public policy issues (Hancock 2003;
Meyerson 2006; McIlwain and Caliendo 2011; Tesler 2012; Brown 2013; Lopez 2014). While
the literature has appropriately relied on this useful dichotomy relating to a candidate’s campaign
strategy, I posit that the literature is missing a third approach to campaign strategy: one that is
defined by incorporating elements of both racialization and deracialization. I define this third
25
This will be further elaborated on in the Methodology section.
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approach to campaign strategy as a hybrid approach. In this field experiment, I seek to capture
what a hybrid strategy might look like, and if a candidate might employ such a strategy in
relation to how they respond to a racialized (treatment) or deracialized (control) policy inquiry.
However, the main intent of this experiment is to observe how candidates respond when
receiving either a treatment or a control policy inquiry. My research questions can be summed up
as the following: 1. Do candidates racialize, deracialize, or employ a hybrid approach when
responding to a deracialized (control) policy inquiry? 2. Do candidates racialize, deracialize, or
employ a hybrid model of both, when responding to a racialized (treatment) policy inquiry?
3. Is there a measurable difference in how candidates respond to voters of different racial and
ethnic backgrounds? 4. What are the components of a hybrid response to a policy inquiry?
Design
A letter inquiring about a candidate's position on the public policy issue of obesity was
emailed to every candidate (with an available email address)
26
running for the state legislature in
California, Texas, Florida, Nevada, New Mexico, and Arizona
27
in the 2018 general election
cycle. In this regard, the candidate’s themselves are unit of analysis for this experiment. The
26
There were a total of 1,134 candidates running for state legislature across our six state sample population.
However, 368 candidates were excluded from the field experiment for not having any publicly disclosed email
address. Our final universe consisted of 766 candidates, of which 146 (or 20%) responded to our policy inquiry.
27
Originally, this field experiment was only focusing on California, Texas, and Florida with the reasoning being
that the three resemble similar demographic characteristics, but different political leanings: California is blue, Texas
is red, and Florida is purple. However, when collecting the data for the experiment, Florida proved to be challenging
as the vast majority of email addresses for candidates were not made available or published. As fate would have it,
my attempts to reach Florida’s Secretary of State did not go through as Hurricane Michael forced a shutdown of
government agencies and evacuations of residents in the month prior to the 2018 General Election. In order to move
forward with the experiment, I kept the small sample size from Florida and added three additional states: Nevada,
Arizona, and New Mexico. These states (California, Texas, Florida, Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico) represent
the six states with the largest Latino population in the United States of America.
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policy inquiries were sent from six different email accounts: three email accounts pertained to
the treatment, and three email accounts pertained to the control. I created two email accounts for
a Latino voter (one for the treatment, and another for the control), two email accounts for a Black
voter (one for the treatment, and another for the control), and two email accounts for a White
voter (one for the treatment, and another for the control). First names were selected in
accordance with demographic information reporting the “most popular” names in the State of
Texas from 2014 (updated in 2016), and surnames were selected in accordance with
demographic information from the 2000 Census. The emails were all sent over the span of a few
back-to-back days in October of 2018, approximately a month before Election Day on Tuesday,
November 6, 2018. For the experiment, a total of 766 candidates were randomly assigned to
receive either the treatment or control message. I had an approximate response rate of 20%,
however, it’s important to note that non-responded were coded as “0” or deracialized. This was
done in order to avoid post-treatment bias, for not including non-responses would bias the
analysis toward those who did respond (Coppock 2019); ergo, the findings would not be driven
by a truly randomized experiment.
Methodology
As a true field experiment, it was important to randomly assign our subjects (in this case,
the candidates running for office) into one of two categories: treatment or control. I created a
total of six different aliases (2 Latino, 2 Black, and 2 White) for our letter writers and then
divided them into either treatment or control. This means that the treatment cohort consisted of 1
Latino, 1 Black, and 1 White letter writer; similarly, the control cohort consisted of 1 Latino, 1
Black, and 1 White letter writer. Again, this was done in an effort to determine who candidates
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respond to the racial and ethnic background of a perceived constituent, and in this case names
were designed to convey race and ethnicity. After I created the six aliases, I then randomly
assigned candidates into receiving either the control message or the treatment message.
Control Message
A deracialized message (see: Appendix 1A) served as the control. No specific references
to race or ethnicity were made. Rather, the message solely focused on the epidemic of obesity,
and inquired from a candidate of their position on the issue and any potential remedies for
combating this epidemic once they were elected to office in their respective race. The control
message was coded as “0.”
Treatment Message
A racialized message (see: Appendix 1B) served as the treatment. It contained the same
exact information as the control message, except for two additional sentences that cued racial
and ethnic considerations. Specifically, this message invoked racial disparities by framing
obesity along racial and ethnic lines by making the argument that Black and Latino Americans
are disproportionately affected by obesity when compared to their White counterparts. The
treatment message was coded as “1.”
To be clear, the dependent variable of interest in this study is in analyzing how a
candidate crafts their message or response to a policy inquiry from a perceived constituent letter
95
writer. I submit that there are three potential responses a candidate can issue: a deracialized
response (coded as 0”), a hybridized response (coded as “1”), or a racialized response (coded as
“2”). There were two key independent variables of interest in this study: the type of message of
candidates received (either treatment or control), and the racial and ethnic background of the
constituent letter writer. As a reminder, candidates were randomized to receive either a
deracialized message from a constituent (the control group, coded “0”); or randomized to receive
a racialized message from a constituent (the treatment group, coded “1”). This randomization
means that, in expectation, all other potential explanations for differences in responses from
candidates are “controlled for” because of randomization. One of the key tests in this chapter will
assess if the responses vary per constituent deracialized or racialized messages.
Table 4.1: Coding Key of DV & Covariates
0 1 2
Candidate Response (DV) Deracial Hybrid Racial
Policy Inquiry Deracial Racial
Constituent Letter Writer’s Race White Latino Black
District Demos MWD Plural MMD
The ethnicity of the constituent letter writer was coded as “0” for White, “1” for Latino,
and “2” for Black. The racial and ethnic demographics of the electoral district were coded as “0”
for Majority White, “1” for Plurality, and “2” for Majority Minority).
28
28
Setting aside the examples of campaigning for national or statewide office, there are three types of electoral
districts in which candidates can run in: Majority White Districts (MWDs), Majority Minority Districts (MMDs),
and Plurality Districts. Both Grose (2011) and Preuhs and Juenke (2011) define a Majority Minority District as
having greater than 50 percent of an ethnic population––I apply their definition to Majority White Districts and
thereby define such districts as having greater than a 50 percent White demographic. I define a plurality district as
having no racial or ethnic population in the majority; instead at least two or more racial or ethnic communities must
co-reside in double digit percentages.
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Hypotheses
H1: A candidate will issue a racialized or hybridized response to a policy inquiry from a Latino
letter writer.
H2: A candidate will issue a racialized or hybridized response to a policy inquiry from a Black
letter writer.
H3: A candidate will issue a deracialized response to a policy inquiry from a White letter writer.
Coding of Candidate Responses (The Dependent Variable)
A deracialized candidate response is one that refrained from making any reference to race
or ethnicity in addressing the obesity issue. In this case, a deracialized candidate response
refrains from making any acknowledgement of the statement that Blacks and Latinos suffer more
from obesity compared to their White counterparts, and it further refrains from presenting a
solution that is rooted in the belief that Blacks and Latinos suffer more from obesity than Whites.
Below is an example of a deracialized candidate response from the field experiment. It comes
from a candidate (White man) running for the State Assembly in Nevada:
“I appreciate your email and value your time as well as your voter concerns.
On balance, I favor small government and freedom of individual choice.
Sadly, sometimes individuals make choices that can be harmful. It is clear
to me that usually when government inserts itself in issues like this, one
of two things happen: Tax payer money is wasted or the problem is compouned [sic]
—or both. I am hesitant (even as one who is 1/2 Hispanic) to use
identity or group politics in my decision making and opinions. I am not
doubting your assertion about Latino and Blacks being disproportionately obese.
That can be objectively true. However, I am just not convinced that government
policies should be changed or enhanced to address the situation. That is not
to say that in the uture [sic], I could not come to a different conclusion.
I appreciate your time.”
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On the other end, a racialized response is one that acknowledges that Blacks and Latinos
do indeed suffer more from obesity than Whites, and also addresses its solution in a racialized
fashion, for example by positing to focus on remedying the issue in Black and Latino
neighborhoods and not really focusing on White neighborhoods. Included below is an excerpt of
a racialized response from a candidate (White woman) running for the State Assembly in
California:
“I taught 7th grade health previously and share your concerns regarding the
prevalence of obesity, particularly in minority communities. When elected,
I'd work to increase the opportunity for students to take additional health
course in public schools as well as push for a return of cooking courses with
a focus on preparation of healthy meals with fresh ingredients and thorough
evaluation of nutrition labels of pre-packaged foods.
I would also work to expand elementary physical education programs to
provide students with additional opportunities to engage in rigorous structured
exercise (preferably with a credentialed PE teacher) several times a week during
and after school.
Several members of our local community have discussed trying to find a location
for a local farmers market in our area, but we have been unsuccessful thus far in
making this dream a reality. I would like to see more availability of farmers markets
in minority communities and the encouragement of residents to establish small gardens
on their own properties whenever practical. Scheduling of community health fairs,
speaker meetings and opportunities for residents to meet with community members
that are successfully raising their own food will be high on my priority list.”
I define a hybridized response as one that incorporates elements of both a racialized and a
deracialized strategy. For a hybridized strategy, I noticed that candidates who employed this
approach “acknowledged” the racial and ethnic disparities as it relates to obesity between Blacks
and Latinos on one end, and Whites on the other end. This sense of acknowledgement (an
extension of what I perceive to be symbolic representation) would certainly be classified or
coded as a racialized strategy; however, what differentiated these candidates manifested in their
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“addressing” of the solution (an extension of what I perceive to be substantive representation).
When presenting potential solutions or remedies for obesity, the hybrid strategy most
interestingly omitted the racial and ethnic component, instead opting for addressing the solution
by making reference to the belief that obesity is something that affects all Americans, and as
such should consequently be done so accordingly. In this regard, while the hybrid strategy is
coded as racialized in the “acknowledgement” of racial and ethnic disparities in terms of obesity,
it too is coded as deracialized in “addressing” the issue by proposing that potential solutions to
the obesity issue ought to be targeted and tailored towards all Americans; not towards one or two
particular racial and ethnic communities, at the expense of the greater community (Note: see
Table 2.1 on page 11). Therefore, such a hybrid strategy incorporates elements of both
racialization and deracialization, effectively creating a third option in campaign strategy.
Attached below is an excerpt of a hybrid response, received from a candidate (White man)
running for the State Assembly in California:
“Thank you so much for writing me. You are absolutely correct that obesity is
an important issue that must be addressed.
With regards to how I would close the obesity gap between people of color
and the white community, I think we need a multi-pronged approach that focuses
on a few key areas, namely educating our youth about better eating practices,
curbing the use of high fructose corn syrup, and making sure everyone community
has access to fresh, quality food. I’ve listed a few ideas and policy positions with
regards to the key areas I mentioned above.
First, we should be making sure kids are getting healthy and nutrious [sic] meals at
school, and we should make sure that these meals are available to all students,
regardless of their ability to pay.
Second, I would like to see more State money invested in both community gardens,
but also in making sure that every school is the district has easy access to their
own garden (I know they have a program like this at Buena Vista Elementary).
It’s both a great education tool about earth sciences, and biology, but it also
99
provides the children an opportunity to bring there fresh bounty home with them
to make their own fresh and nutrious [sic] meals
Third, I would like to see what the State’s options are in terms of regulating high
fructose corn syrup and other high sugar sweetners [sic]. It has become increasingly
clear over the last decade and a half that we need better quality food made with
less sugar. Much of the rise in obesity, and the attending problems, such
as diabetes, can be directly traced to America’s shift in using high fructose
corn syrup and other high sugar additives in the production of our food.
Fourth, it is that it is important to ensure that high quality food products
reach everyone. I know in many lower-earning neighborhoods the choices
available to them are limited in such a way that eating healthy is, for
practical purposes, not an option. Many people are forced to buy groceries
out of conveninece [sic] stores that are one of the worst of offenders when it
comes to carrying products that contribute to the obesity crisis, and often
come at high costs. It is incumbent upon all of our leaders to put forth
the effort to close the obesity gap and make sure that all folks have access
to fresh, quality food.”
Findings
In testing the first hypothesis (H1: A candidate will issue a racialized or hybridized
response to a policy inquiry from a Latino constituent letter writer), the analysis (Table 4.2
below) finds that a Latino constituent letter writer is (positively) causally linked with receiving a
racialized or hybridized response from a candidate (significant at the .05 level). Receiving a
policy inquiry from a Latino constituent letter writer increases the likelihood of a candidate
issuing a racialized or hybridized response by 3 percentage points (relative to a White constituent
letter writer and pooling across both types of messages). The analysis for the second hypothesis
(H2: A candidate will issue a racialized or hybridized response to a policy inquiry from a Black
letter writer) indicates that a Black constituent letter writer is (positively) causally linked with
receiving a racialized or hybridized response from a candidate. Receiving a policy inquiry from a
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Black constituent letter writer increases the likelihood of a candidate issuing a racialized or
hybridized response by 0.3 percentage points (relative to a White constituent letter writer and
pooling across both types of messages). An analysis of the general relationship between a
constituent’s policy inquiry and a candidate’s response indicates that a treatment message is
(positively) causally linked with eliciting a racialized or hybridized response from a candidate
(significant at the .01 level). Receiving a treatment message increases the likelihood of a
candidate issuing a racialized or hybridized response by 7 percentage points (pooling across
senders from all racial groups).
Table 4.2: A Candidate’s Racialized or Hybridized Response
Candidate racialized response
(0=deracial; 1=racial or hybrid)
Racialized Constituent Inquiry .0708051 (.0139994)***
Latino Constituent Letter Writer .0351562 (.0171228)**
Black Constituent Letter Writer .003597 (.0171568)
Constant -.0077822(.0139581)
N 766
* Statistical Significance at the .10 level
** Statistical Significance at the .05 level
*** Statistical Significance at the .01 level
The analysis (Table 4.3 below) for the third hypothesis (H3: A candidate will issue a
deracialized response to a policy inquiry from a White letter writer) reports that a White
constituent letter writer is (positively) causally linked with receiving a deracialized response
from a candidate. Receiving a policy inquiry from a White constituent letter writer increases the
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likelihood of a candidate issuing a deracialized response by approximately 2 percentage points
(relative to a Latino and Black constituent letter writers and pooling across both types of
messages). A general analysis on the relationship between a constituent’s policy inquiry and a
candidate’s response indicates that a treatment message is (negatively) causally linked with
eliciting a deracialized response from a candidate (significant at the .01 level). Receiving a
treatment message decreases the likelihood of a candidate issuing a deracialized response by 7
percentage points (pooling across senders from all racial groups).
Table 4.3: A Candidate’s Deracialized Response
Candidate racialized response
(0=racial or hybrid; 1=deracial)
Racialized Constituent Inquiry -.0706403 (.0140209)***
White Constituent Letter Writer .0194391 (.0148617)
Constant .9882613 (.0110888)
N 766
* Statistical Significance at the .10 level
** Statistical Significance at the .05 level
*** Statistical Significance at the .01 level
I decided to conduct a post-hoc analysis (Table 4.4 below) to observe the relationship
between whether or not a candidate responds (using a dummy variable for candidate response
coded as yes or no), measured against the racial background of a constituent letter writer. The
prior analysis looked at how a candidate responds (deracialized, hybridized, or racialized),
however this analysis considers if candidates respond at all. The first finding reports that a
treatment message is (negatively) causally linked with eliciting a response from a candidate.
Receiving a treatment message decreases the likelihood of a candidate issuing a response by
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approximately 1 percentage point (pooling across senders from all racial groups). With regard to
the racial background of constituent letter writers, the findings indicate that a Latino constituent
letter writer is (positively) causally linked with receiving a response from a candidate. Receiving
a policy inquiry from a Latino letter writer increases the likelihood of a candidate issuing a
response by approximately 2 percentage points (relative to a White constituent letter writer and
pooling across both types of messages). Lastly, the analysis reports that a Black constituent letter
writer is (negatively) causally linked with receiving a response from a candidate. Receiving a
policy inquiry from a Black constituent letter writer decreases the likelihood of a candidate
issuing a response by 1 percentage point (relative to a White constituent letter writer and pooling
across both types of messages).
Table 4.4: Post-Hoc Analysis: Candidate Responses
Did candidate respond?
(0=no; 1=yes)
Racialized Constituent Inquiry -.0093094 (.0284422)
Latino Constituent Letter Writer .0195312 (.034788)
Black Constituent Letter Writer -.0102616 (.0348571)
Constant .1921183 (.0283583)
N 766
* Statistical Significance at the .10 level
** Statistical Significance at the .05 level
*** Statistical Significance at the .01 level
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Table 4.5: Hypotheses Overview
Hypothesis Reject or Fail to Reject? Reason
H 1: A candidate will issue a
racialized or hybridized
response to a policy inquiry
from a Latino letter writer.
Reject
A Latino letter writer is
(positively) causally linked with
receiving a racialized or
hybridized response from a
candidate (sig. at the .05 level)
H 2: A candidate will issue a
racialized or hybridized
response to a policy inquiry
from a Black letter writer.
Fail to Reject
A Black letter writer is
(positively) causally linked with
receiving a racialized or
hybridized response from a
candidate; however, no
statistical significance
H
3
: A candidate will issue a
deracialized response to a policy
inquiry from a White letter
writer.
Fail to Reject
A White letter writer is
(positively) causally linked with
receiving a deracialized
response from a candidate;
however, no statistical
significance
Discussion
This study indicates that a racialized policy inquiry from a constituent is likely to receive
a racialized or hybridized response from a candidate; similarly, such a racialized policy inquiry
from a constituent is not likely to receive a deracialized response from a candidate. Perhaps that
may seem to be conventional wisdom, but this study confirms such a causal relationship.
Candidates appear to be inclined to fashion their response to a constituent’s policy inquiry in line
with the framing of the policy inquiry they receive: a racialized inquiry receives a racialized or
hybridized response, and a deracialized policy inquiry received a deracialized response. In some
part, this finding informs us that candidates are indeed likely to be influenced by the tone or
framing of a policy inquiry they receive. This means that the racialization (or deracialization) of
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a constituent’s initial message affects or impacts how a candidate responds. It would not be
farfetched to state that the framing of a constituent’s inquiry sets the tone for how a candidate
chooses to respond, for that is exactly what the findings here appear to report. Among those
candidates who did respond to a constituent’s inquiry (compared to those who did not), a
racialized policy inquiry from a constituent reports a negative correlation with receiving a
response from a candidate. This indicates that candidates in general are less likely to respond to a
racialized policy inquiry from a constituent, and more likely to respond to a deracialized policy
inquiry from a constituent. One supposition may be that candidates avoid racialized contexts, and
when confronted with such a scenario, candidates choose to not engage or interact. An
interesting finding that begs for further exploration.
As it relates to the racial and ethnic background of a constituent letter writer, the findings
presented in this study suggest that candidates treat different racial and ethnic constituents
differently. Firstly, the findings indicate that candidates are more likely to respond to a policy
inquiry from a Latino constituent letter writer, and less likely to respond to a policy inquiry from
a Black constituent letter writer. This suggests that candidates do not respond to constituents
from different racial and ethnic backgrounds equally. However, among those who do respond,
the study reports that both a Latino constituent letter writer and a Black constituent letter writer
are causally related with receiving a racialized or hybridized response from a candidate. This
means that a candidate’s response to a Latino or Black constituent letter writer will have a
racialized element to it
29
. By comparison, White constituent letter writers are causally linked
29
Again, a racialized response is one that acknowledges a racial and ethnic disparity in public policy AND also
proposes to address this disparity by focusing on those who are disparately affected, at the expense of those who are
not affected. By comparison, a hybridized response is one that (also) acknowledges a racial and ethnic disparity in
105
with receiving a deracialized response from candidates. This last finding deserves further
exploration as to understanding why it is that candidates perceive White constituents as more
receptive to deracialized responses, particularly in light of the 2016 presidential election in which
the (White) Republican nominee ran on a highly racialized platform and managed to coalesce a
majority of White electoral support.
Conclusion
This field experiment sought to analyze the relationship between the responses of
candidates running for office with the type of policy inquiries candidates receive, as well as with
the racial and ethnic background of a constituent letter writer. Specifically, the aim of this
research was rooted in understanding how candidates craft a response, based on the message they
receive coupled with the racial and ethnic background of the messenger. The findings presented
here suggest that these two factors (1. the type of message and 2. the racial and ethnic
background of the messenger) do indeed influence the response candidate’s issue. A racialized
policy inquiry from a constituent is more likely to receive a racialized or hybridized response
from a candidate; a deracialized policy inquiry is more likely to receive a deracialized response
from a candidate. Lastly, Latino and Black constituent letter writers are reported to be more
likely to receive a racialized or hybridized response from candidates, whereas White constituent
letter writers are reported to be more likely to receive a deracialized response.
public policy BUT proposes to address this disparity in a deracialized manner by calling for a solution that everyone,
irrespective or racial or ethnic background, stands to benefit from.
106
Due to the small sample size of this study, not all of the null hypotheses were able to be rejected.
However, the hope is that a larger sample size will lead to statistical significance, as the trends
reported in this study do appear to hint at potential confirmable relationships between the
dependent variable and corresponding independent variables. May it be through additional
studies, and in the pursuit of knowledge, that the discipline gain greater understanding.
107
Appendices
4A: Control Message
Dear [--------],
I am writing to you as a concerned voter. One of the leading epidemics confronting our country
is the issue of obesity. The fact that Americans are facing this dire health crisis speaks to the
urgency of needing to address this public health issue.
I am interested in learning more about your position on this important public health epidemic,
and how you might be positioned to address this when in office. I look forward to your response,
and thank you in advance.
Sincerely,
[--------]
4B: Treatment Message
Dear [--------],
I am writing to you as a concerned voter. One of the leading epidemics confronting our country
is the issue of obesity. The fact that Americans are facing this dire health crisis speaks to the
urgency of needing to address this public health issue. Even more alarming is the fact that
Black and Latino Americans are more likely to suffer from obesity than White Americans.
I am interested in learning more about your position on this important public health epidemic,
and how you might be positioned to close the health gap between Latino, Black and White
Americans when in office. I look forward to your response, and thank you in advance.
Sincerely,
[--------]
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4C: Regression of Racial or Hybridized Candidate Response by Latino or Black
Constituent Letter Writer
* Statistical Significance at the .10 level
** Statistical Significance at the .05 level
*** Statistical Significance at the .01 level
4D: Regression of Deracialized Candidate Response by White Constituent Letter Writer
* Statistical Significance at the .10 level
** Statistical Significance at the .05 level
*** Statistical Significance at the .01 level
109
4E: Post-Hoc Analysis: Regression of Candidate Responses
* Statistical Significance at the .10 level
** Statistical Significance at the .05 level
*** Statistical Significance at the .01 level
Summary Statistics of Sample
4F: Frequency of District Demographics from Sample Population
District Demographics Frequency
Majority White District 367
Plural District 175
Majority Minority District 224
Total 766
4G: Frequency of Candidate Responses from Sample Population
Candidate Response Frequency
Deracialized 735
Hybridized 9
Racialized 22
Total 766
110
4H: Frequency of Message Group from Sample Population
Message Group Frequency
Control 384
Treatment 382
Total 766
4I: Frequency of Message Group
Message Group Frequency
Control 384
Treatment 382
Total 766
4J: Total Constituent Letter Writer’s by Racial Background
Total Constituent Letter Writer’s Frequency
Latino Constituent Letter Writer 256
Black Constituent Letter Writer 254
White Constituent Letter Writer 256
Total 766
4K: Frequency of Racial Message Group
Constituent Letter Writer by Message Frequency
CONTROL (Latino Constituent Letter Writer) 129
CONTROL (Black Constituent Letter Writer) 126
CONTROL (White Constituent Letter Writer) 129
TREATMENT (Latino Constituent Letter Writer) 127
TREATMENT (Black Constituent Letter Writer) 128
TREATMENT (White Constituent Letter Writer) 127
Total 766
4L: District Demographics by Candidate Responses
District Demographics Deracialized
Response
Hybridized
Response
Racialized
Response
Total
Majority White 346 6 15 367
Plural 169 1 5 175
Majority Minority 220 2 2 224
Total 735 9 22 766
4M: Message Group by Candidate Responses
Message Group Deracialized
Response
Hybridized
Response
Racialized
Response
Total
Control 382 0 2 384
Treatment 353 9 20 382
Total 735 9 22 766
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4N: Racial Message Group by Candidate Responses
Constituent Letter Writer by Message Deracialized
Response
Hybridized
Response
Racialized
Response
Total
CONTROL (Latino Constituent Letter Writer) 128 0 1 129
CONTROL (Black Constituent Letter Writer) 125 0 1 126
CONTROL (White Constituent Letter Writer) 129 0 0 129
TREATMENT (Latino Constituent Letter Writer) 112 7 8 127
TREATMENT (Black Constituent Letter Writer) 121 0 7 128
TREATMENT (White Constituent Letter Writer) 120 2 5 127
Total 735 9 22 766
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusion
Introduction
The research conducted and presented in this dissertation stems in part from the concept
of candidate deracialization, first authored by political scientist Charles Hamilton in the 1970s.
As posited by Hamilton, the theory of deracialization held that if Black candidates wanted to be
more competitive, they would have to start running for office outside of the majority Black
districts (which had become the stronghold) in exchange for starting to run in MWDs (Hamilton
1977). In order for this to happen, however, Black candidates would need to deracialize
themselves––their campaigns and their policy stances––as a means of appealing to a broader
base of voters for the purposes of achieving an electoral victory (Wilson 1980; Goldstein 1981;
McCormick and Jones 1993). This meant candidates would need to downplay their racial and
ethnic backgrounds as well as no longer running on issues that were perceived to be of sole
importance to, and resonance with, Black voters; rather, Black candidates would need to run on
transethnic and universal issues that affect everyone, with public policy stances and proposals
that the electorate writ large could identify with.
Of course, the opposite of a deracialized campaign is a racialized campaign––which in
effect is how Black candidates were running in majority Black districts. To run a racialized
campaign is to run on public policy issues that appeal to a specific racial and ethnic community
(McCormick and Jones 1993; Hancock 2003; Meyerson 2006; McIlwain and Caliendo 2011;
Tesler 2012; Brown 2013; Major, Blodhorn, and Blascovich 2018). Throughout this dissertation
I have used the example of immigration policy to best underscore the manifestation of how
113
racialization can take shape: as discussed, racialization can take the form of “pro-” or “anti-”. To
be pro-immigrant means something quite different, in terms of public policy, than to be anti-
immigrant. This verbiage may arguably be perceived to be a bit simplistic and may actually
perpetuate the zero-sum mentality perceived by White voters concerning race and ethnicity
(Norton and Sommers 2011; Wilkins and Kaiser 2014), but its conciseness does serve a purpose
in functioning as a delineation of candidate issue positionality. But inevitably, to campaign on a
racialized issue means that a candidate will be in favor of a public policy issue that will benefit
some more than others.
Through my own theoretical originations presented in this dissertation, I have sought to
contribute a third campaign approach not yet captured by the literature in the field. Using
Hamilton’s deracialization work as the general foundation and Hanna Pitkin’s seminal work on
representation (1967) as inspiration, I posited that a hybrid model can manifest in one of at least
two distinct ways: 1. Racialized Symbolic Representation alongside Deracialized Substantive
Representation; or 2. A fusion of (opposing) Racialized Substantive Representation.
In the first manifestation of hybridity (variation 1), Racialized Symbolic Representation
(see: Table 5.1 below) means that a candidate will acknowledge a racial or ethnic disparity as it
relates to a public policy issue––in effect, the acknowledgment of a racial disparity is in and of
itself and symbolic gesture that can be achieved in a speech, interview, or in the preface of a
candidate’s policy stance explanation. However, when it comes to the candidate’s true policy
stance – as in, how the candidate will advance the issues in terms of policy and potential
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sponsored legislation – hybrid candidates are theorized to be largely deracialized, ergo
Deracialized Substantive Representation.
Table 5.1: Hybridization (variation 1)
Symbolic Representation Substantive Representation
Deracialization Deracial Deracial
Hybridization Racial Deracial
Racialization Racial Racial
In another version of hybridity (variation 2), candidates are theorized to hold a fusion of
opposing racialized policy stances (see: Table 5.2 below). In the case of immigration policy,
candidates employing hybridity were observed to rely on a mix of both pro-immigrant and anti-
immigrant stances. I posit that this ought not be considered just another form of Racialized
Substantive Representation, for racialization is comprised (in the immigration example) of either
pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant policy stances; however, hybridity is observed to consist of
pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant policy stances. It may appear to be a simple nuance but it
makes a difference, particularly when one starts to understand a possible motivation for this
carefully curated incorporation of otherwise racialized policy stances. Perhaps the biggest and
most obvious explanation is in that candidates are seeking to appeal to a much broader base of
voters, certainly broader than a racialized (either pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant) position
would appeal to. In a racialized immigration platform, a candidate is appealing to a select group
of voters: either those who are pro-immigrant, or those who are anti-immigrant. However,
through a hybridized stance, candidates are seeking to appeal to both sides of the policy aisle by
incorporating elements of pro-immigration and anti-immigration.
115
Table 5.2: Hybridization (variation 2)
Symbolic Representation Substantive Representation
Deracialization Deracial Deracial
Hybridization
Deracial or Racial
Fusion of (racial)
policy positions
(i.e. pro-immigrant and
anti-immigrant stance)
Racialization
Racial
Racial
(i.e. pro-immigrant or
anti-immigrant stance)
Overview
The findings presented in the content analysis chapter do not report any statistical
significance; however, some of the findings do report of a trend in the hypothesized direction.
The finding on bi-racial and multi-ethnic coalitions present mixed results, but the finding on
monolithic coalitions report the trend as hypothesized, however it lacks sufficient statistical
power to reject the null. The findings on candidate self-identification also report the trend as
hypothesized but lack sufficient statistical power. Lastly, the results on the relationship between
candidate positionality on immigration policy and the demographics of an electoral district report
of a different trend than hypothesized. Perhaps the biggest takeaway from this chapter is that
candidates with monolithic coalitions do trend toward racialized immigration policy stances; that
candidates with panethnic identities do trend toward hybridized or deracialized immigration
policy stances; that candidates with race-specific or ethnic-specific identities do trend toward
racialized immigration policy stances; and that MWDs do trend toward racialized immigration
policy stances.
116
The field experiment chapter sought to capture the relationship between a candidate’s
policy response and a perceived constituent’s racial and ethnic background. The hypothesis
pertaining to a candidate’s response to a Latino constituent letter writer is found to be
statistically significant at the .05 level, thereby giving a bit of credence to the existence of
hybridity as theorized in that chapter: of racialized symbolic representation coupled with
deracialized substantive representation. This finding reports that a Latino constituent letter writer
is (positively) causally linked with receiving a racialized or hybridized response from a
candidate. This informs us that candidates are likely to issue a response to Latino constituents
with some hint of racialization: either through a full-blown racialized response, or through a
hybridized response that consists of racialized symbolism. The hypotheses corresponding to
Black and White constituent letter writer’s do not report statistical significance, but they do trend
toward the direction as hypothesized meaning that, perhaps with a larger sample, the
relationships may correspond with statistical significance and thereby reject the null.
This study has sought to establish a third classification or model for campaign strategy
referred to as a hybrid model. The content analysis chapter sought to establish one form of
hybridity (theorized as a fusion of diametrically opposed racialized policy stances) but without
any statistical significance, this model of hybridity cannot be established with certainty and
instead it remains as a theory. The field experiment chapter sough to establish another form of
hybridity (theorized as a mix of racialized symbolic representation coupled with deracialized
substantive representation) and one of the findings corresponding to Latino constituent letter
writers and racialized or hybridized candidate responses was found to be statistically significant
thereby establishing the existence of this version of hybridity as theorized. This study consisted
117
of a small sample size, and the expectation is that through a larger sample size and perhaps over
additional election cycles, a more robust understanding of hybridity will be established.
In Conclusion & Looking Forward
The results from this dissertation’s research are illuminating and exciting, albeit limited.
The constrains corresponding with completing a dissertation––most notably pertaining to time––
might be offset through a larger study comprised of a larger sample and with greater time
available. The small sample from the content analysis and field experiment do certainly shed
light on a theory that is nascent. Hybridization holds to be a promising theoretical lens from
which candidate behavior––as it relates to U.S. campaigns & elections, elite behavior, and race
& ethnic politics––is better analyzed, particularly as the country and electorate continue to
diversify with respect to racial and ethnic backgrounds, and MWDs and MMDs give way to an
increase in plural districts. Deracialization and Racialization have captured the historical
relationship between race and ethnicity and public policy within the field; yet, the 21
st
Century is
most certainly expected to undergo changes, and if the research from this dissertation is any
indication, it is both important and necessary that the scholarly literature too be updated to reflect
the existing nuances occurring within practical politics. For as the adage goes, it’s not simply
always Black or White; there are shades of gray. It is my hope that this research sheds light on
the subtleties in order to capture the grays––with the intention of adding nuance to the discipline,
and validity to the practice of politics.
118
EPILOGUE
In Merge Left: Fusing Race and Class, Winning Elections, and Saving America, author
Ian Haney Lopez (2019) presents his campaign framework for how “the left” ought to respond to
Donald Trump et al. racialized campaign tactics, with the intention of defeating such racially
divisive appeals (RDAs) at the ballot box. Perhaps it comes as no surprise that the book’s
contextual background is in the current 2020 presidential election, informed by and based upon
the lessons learned from the 2016 presidential election cycle.
Haney Lopez makes the claim that in both the 2016 and in the current 2020 presidential
election, Donald Trump (the republican candidate) has run a highly racialized campaign wherein
non-White Americans are constantly and consistently on the receiving-end of dog whistle
politicking. However, in directly responding to such racialized attacks on communities of color
and subsequently identifying such proponents as racists, Haney Lopez makes the argument that
democrats fall into the trap set by republicans. Firstly, by labeling Trump and fellow republicans
are racists, Haney Lopez argues that democrats effectively embolden republican voters and
supporters in allowing them to victimize themselves in the eyes of the larger populace and
electorate. Secondly, the author makes the case that in campaigning in colorblind
30
dog whistle
politics but simultaneously getting labeled as racists, republicans argue that it is the democrats
30
For democrats, Haney Lopez argues that to be colorblind means to advocate, advance, and champion public
policy issues that transcend racial and ethnic lines; meaning, policies that everyone can benefit from not policies that
a subsegment of the population stands to gain from. However, for republicans—it is argued—to be colorblind means
to campaign on implicit dog whistle positions that completely omit overt or specific references to race or ethnicity
and instead opt for and rely on messages that invoke stereotypical associations with certain communities when
discussing public policy.
119
who are solely discussing and invoking race into the conversation, ergo democrats walking into
the race trap. However therein lies the dilemma according to the author: if democrats confront
the tactics of republicans, then the former not only embolden the latter, but the entire narrative
then becomes fixated on race from henceforward thereby debilitating a candidate’s ability to
engage in deeper discourse. However, if democrats refrain from addressing the dog whistle
politics of republicans, then the former effectively allow the latter to propagate racist narratives.
The author does consider the merits of messaging comparable to that of Vermont senator
Bernie Sanders in focusing on income inequality and similar class narratives at the expense of
addressing racial inequality and inequity. To this, Haney Lopez remarks that
Democratic silence [from the economic Left] about race speaks loudly, though
timidly, about race. It does not successfully sidestep the Right’s [W]hite identity
politics, but instead responds with its own insecure version of the same thing (122).
Instead, Haney Lopez presents the race-class framework as the best possible fashion in
which to respond to the implicit dog whistle politics of republicans and Donald Trump.
According to the author, this new framework holds the potential for garnering support from a
wider base of the electorate while simultaneously exposing the divisive efforts stemming from
the Right.
The race-class framework presented by Haney Lopez advises candidates to reframe
disparities and inequities in public policy in a way that faults the wealthy and their special
interests for advancing an agenda that disadvantages both lower-income Americans as well as
communities of color. As the 2016 presidential election (and the current 2020 presidential
election) showcased, the republican candidate (and current president) Donald Trump has crafted
120
his campaign around a “White America versus everybody else” mentality effectively creating an
“in” group juxtaposed to an “out” group. In so doing, Donald Trump (and fellow republican
candidates) have sought to sow seeds of division by fabricating an illusion of a zero-sum
mentality among White Americans for social services, civil rights, and social standing,
particularly as the country continues to diversify and the population numbers of communities of
color increase and the population numbers of White Americans continue to decline. Yet, by
reframing the argument in a race-class narrative, the author posits that Americans from all racial
and ethnic backgrounds will band together – or at least are certainly more likely to – and create a
winning multiracial coalition for electoral victory. Although the author fails to make the case and
point the obvious, the reality is that by expanding a candidate’s message to include class in
conjunction to race, a candidate is essentially making an appeal to lower income and middle-
class White Americans.
While a class narrative is certainly going to appeal to all lower income and middle-class
Americans irrespective of racial and ethnic background, the truth is that a class narrative is what
will most resonate with White Americans from lower and middle-income brackets, while a race
narrative is more likely to resonate with communities of color. In other words, for Haney Lopez,
the magic of a race-class narrative is in the following: the race aspect of the message will turnout
communities of color, while the class narrative will turnout lower and middle-income
Americans, particularly White Americans. Haney Lopez makes the case that in order to build a
broad-based coalition with multiracial appeal, it is imperative to highlight the plights of those
who have been taken advantage of by the wealthy, and that comes in highlighting both race and
class.
121
My own hybridized model and Haney Lopez’s race-class framework are similar in that
they both call for candidate public policy proposal’s or stance’s to be deracialized in order to
appeal to a broad base of voters. Both models understand the importance of advancing policy
initiatives that all Americans stand to benefit from. My theory of hybridization is operationalized
to garner as much support from the electorate, and this is believed to be achievable through an
approach that deemphasizes race and ethnicity from the policy solutions put forth by candidates.
However, this does not mean that candidates refrain from making references to racial or ethnic
disparities. Hybridization works because it allows candidates to acknowledge racial and ethnic
disparities in public policy while simultaneously advancing policies and initiatives that benefit
everyone irrespective of racial and ethnic background. In this much, both the hybridization
model and the race-class framework are similar: both call on candidates to make references
acknowledging inequality and inequity with regard to the impact of particular public policies on
specific communities. And similarly, both models also call for candidates to position themselves
on policy issues in a way that includes (not excludes) all Americans as standing to benefit from
their stances; the betterment of all Americans is imperative in both models with respect to
candidate policy positionality.
There are, however, a few differences between my model on hybridity and the race-class
framework. The first and most obvious difference is in that the hybridized model is comprised of
a narrative around race, whereas Haney Lopez’s framework revolves around a race-class
narrative. For Haney Lopez, the race-class model attempts to lump the lived experiences of
people and communities of color with that of White Americans (namely, lower and middle-
income White Americans). The race-class model equates the injustices and experiences of
122
Americans due to race and class by crafting messages that make reference to both without really
acknowledging the historical context much more in depth. In so doing, the race-class narrative
grossly glosses over, and subsequently dilutes, the nuances of both racial inequities and class
inequality.
The reality is that racial inequities are different than class inequality: race is different than
class. For people and communities of color, race and class are often intertwined––more often
than not, to be a person of color in this country means to be poorer and lower-income, however
this is not the case for White Americans. This is not to say that there aren’t any poor or lower-
income White Americans; rather, the point is that race and poverty are correlated with each
other, and communities of color account for the highest rates of poverty compared to White
Americans.
31
While it is commendable that the race-class model attempt to create unity among
those who are victim of inequity and inequality, the fact is that race and class ought not be
treated the same and as such should not be weaved together in a tailor-made message simply to
appeal to those at the bottom of the socio-economic strata. Race is, arguably, more deeply rooted
in the American experience and perhaps even more prevalent than class (certainly true for people
and communities of color, although perhaps not so for White Americans.) The hybridization
model recognizes this truth which is why race is a central aspect of its functionality. Hybridity
works because it allows candidates to speak candidly about race by acknowledging past
transgressions without placing blame on any one particular racial or ethnic community.
31
In 2019, Black Americans had a poverty rate of 18.8 percent. Latino Americans accounted for 15.7 percent of
poverty. Both Asian and White Americans reported a 7.3 percent poverty rate.
(https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2020/09/poverty-rates-for-blacks-and-hispanics-reached-historic-lows-in-
2019.html)
123
Haney Lopez makes reference to how White Americans confuse feeling unsafe when
discussing race when in reality they are simply uncomfortable in such settings; however, the
hybrid model is anchored in the belief that White Americans are familiar with and recognize past
racial injustices and as such are capable of having frank (but respectful) conversations on race
relations in this country. Hybridity works because candidates are allowed to be frank in
acknowledging racial inequities and disparities without placing blame, while simultaneously
calling for policy proposals that advance the betterment of all irrespective of racial or ethnic
background. Of course classism is also deeply rooted in the founding of this country as it was
land-owning (wealthy) White men who wielded power at the onset; the problem is that the race-
class model attempts to address both race and class in a singular message that in actuality fails to
address either concretely whereas the hybridized model emphasizes race in a more nuanced
fashion. Quite concisely, this is a comparison between breadth versus depth.
Both model’s seek to construct a winning multiracial coalition, but they appear to have
very different (subtle) motivating factors. In discussing the drive towards building a multiracial
coalition vis-à-vis the race-class framework, Haney Lopez indicates that White focus group
participants responded favorably to a candidate’s message indicating of “white, Black, and
brown” commonality and unity (189). However, among people of color, the order of the message
makes a difference; for them, the message indicating of “Black, brown, and white” commonality
and unity received higher favorability. And yet, Haney Lopez suggests that a message ought to
maintain the order with Whites coming in first, giving the impression as if that specific
community is more precious or important over the others. Clearly the order seems to matter to
both White perceived voters as well as to voters of color––it is a minute and perhaps seemingly
124
irrelevant point within the larger context of multiracial coalitions, but this small detail in the
author choosing to list Whites first because the order resonates more with them hints at a
possible indication of what is perceived to be the default under a race-class model. Conversely,
the hybrid model emphasizes building a multiracial coalition without prioritizing any one racial
or ethnic group over others. Whereas the race-class model lists different racial and ethnic groups
in defining commonality and unity for a wholistic betterment, the hybrid model omits race and
ethnicity all together in its policy proposals instead opting for racially transcendent terms and
identifiers like “all Americans.” Thusly, whereas the race-class model seeks to construct a
multiracial coalition seemingly led by Whites, the hybrid model simply seeks to build a
multiracial coalition with Whites alongside other communities.
The race-class model and the hybrid model both have the same end, albeit slightly
different means. Both of these campaign frameworks ought to be considered on their own merit.
The way to think about the race-class model and the hybrid model is nothing more than
additional tools to choose from within the arsenal of campaigns and elections. The sole objective
of these models is to construct unity within the electorate, irrespective of racial or ethnic
background, for the sake of representation and democracy and against divisive political rhetoric.
The reason the United States of America has often been regarded as the leader of the free world
is not because we are the best manifestation of democracy, nor is it because we have not
committed atrocities; rather, the reason for why we are revered by other nations is because of our
proclaimed ideals, because of our stability and our respect for the rule of law, and because of our
respect for norms and traditions. And yet, all of these aspects which have given us prestige are in
danger when a divisive demagogue is elected and consistently undermines our norms, traditions,
125
and institutions without respite. To combat this, we must all assume a perspective of collective
action, an “all hands-on-deck” outlook; and this regard, the race-class and hybrid models ought
to be viewed as small contributions towards this effort.
The objective of scholarship (in political science) is to shed light on new theories and
new information, all for the purposes of gaining a greater understanding of the intricacies in the
relationship between humans with institutions, power, government, and of course with each
other. To that end, there is no “right” or “wrong” answer. Rather, there are simply different and
competing explanations for answering a singular question. It is up to each of us as researchers
and scholars to further the work already established by presenting new ideas with persistent
dedication and objective fidelity. The past informs the present; may this work inform the future.
126
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Abstract (if available)
Abstract
The focus of this dissertation is on candidate campaign strategies within the U.S. political context. As a starting point and for general reference, this research considers the two existing documented campaign strategies available to candidates running for office: racialization or deracialization. Through original theoretical contributions, the work presented in this dissertation seeks to expand beyond the current limited binary by offering a third alternative in campaign strategy which I deem to be a hybridized model. It is important to note that this third option, the hybridized model, is theorized to take shape in one of at least two possible manifestations. In one variation, this hybridized model consists of both traditionally racialized and deracialized elements, whereas the second variation of the hybridized model is theorized to comprise of both “anti-“ and “pro-“ racialized stances. A mixed-methods approach is used to test for these two different variations of hybridity. In the first study, I conduct a content analysis of 585 campaign websites from candidates running for state legislative office from six states (California, Texas, Florida, Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico) during the 2018 general election cycle. In the second study, I rely on a field experiment of 766 candidates running for state legislative office across six states (California, Texas, Florida, Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico) during the 2018 general election cycle. ❧ As the nation continues to diversify along racial and ethnic lines, it is imperative to research, analyze, and document how such population shifts impact the electoral process (campaigns) and candidate (elite) behavior. The work presented in the ensuing dissertation is rooted within the political science literature corresponding to U.S. campaigns and elections, race & ethnic politics, and elite behavior.
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"Hum so the devil doesn't hear you": rural Black Southern political existences as the otherwise
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Naranjo Gonzalez, Fabian
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Core Title
Running for office? Three different models in U.S. political campaigns & elections
School
College of Letters, Arts and Sciences
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Doctor of Philosophy
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Political Science and International Relations
Publication Date
02/26/2021
Defense Date
10/07/2020
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campaigns,Elections,elite behavior,OAI-PMH Harvest,race and ethnic politics
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Hancock Alfaro, Ange-Marie (
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elite behavior
race and ethnic politics