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Crisis preparation in technical organizations: A study using a multi-dimensional approach
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Crisis preparation in technical organizations: A study using a multi-dimensional approach
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CRISIS PREPARATION IN TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS: A STUDY USING A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH by Sarah Kovoor A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Public Administration) August 1991 Copyright 1991 Sarah Kovoor UMI Number: DP71326 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. in the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI Dissertation R jblishing UMI DP71326 Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code uesf ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CAUFORNIA 90089 This dissertation, written by S a ra h K o vo o r under the direction of h.QV. Dissertation Committee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Graduate School, in partial fulfillm ent of re quirements for the degree of D O C T O R O F P H ILO S O P H Y Dean of Graduate Studies Date August 2, 1991 DISSERTATION COMMITTEE Chairperson V 1 1 I I ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS As I write my acknowledgements I feel a mixture of : j relief, anticipation and sadness. The Ph.D process is i finally over! i Now for the next phase of my life. However, I also feel sadness. The Ph.D. process for me I was more than just fulfilling the Graduate School requirements. It was a time of learning, loving, living, fun, frustration, and tears. In short, it was four years of my life that I lived to the fullest. At this time I | would like to acknowledge the many relationships that made this goal possible for me. First, I would like to acknowledge my family. My parents Ann and Type and my siblings George, Abie, Lily and Mary. Even though we were separated by distances, each of you is so much a part of me, each of you has contributed to who I am today. Your continued love, ' support and interest was a solid base that helped me ! through this process. Thank you! and here's to many more journeys together. I To my uncle Sunny, aunt Shanti and cousins Switsy and , Shibu - thank you for believing in me and giving me the j opportunity to study in this country. Thank you for ^ opening your home to me and for your continued support. To the faculty and staff in the School of Public iii i Administration, University of Southern California; and the University of Nebraska at Omaha - thank you! Special | thanks to Dr. Ross Clayton, Dr. Cooper, Dr. Hinton, Dr. B.J. Reed, Dr. Willa Bruce, Dr. Chris Reed, and ! Dr. John Swain. I have learned much in the last six years. Thank you for being so much a part of it. | To my colleagues Chris Pearson and Judy Clair in the ! Center for Crisis Management, School of Business Administration, University of Southern California. I could not have enjoyed my work more or had nicer friends i I to work with. Thank you for happy memories. To my dear friends without whom the Ph.D process would have seemed long and tedious. Most of all to Manavendra Misra. Manav, I cannot begin to thank you both for fun times and for your daily support. Thank you for supporting me every step of the way through the dissertation. You more than any one else I know exemplifies what it means to give with an open heart. Thank you for listening during all those times I bored you with my passionate discussions on crisis management, for late nights at Kinko's and at School, and most of all thank you for being my loyal, supportive friend. I am sorry that you were forced to become an expert in crisis ‘ I management! ! . Much of the success for the timely completion of this dissertation I share with you. L. IV Mona, thank you for being my friend and for always being available. These last three years have been fun I because I had a kindred spirit to observe and to analyze i life with. Thank you for sharing my laughter and tears. | Carmen, thank you for your friendship, support, and our long talks. Also to my long-time friends Nina Cherian and Shanti Gopala Krishnan who have continually , supported me long distance. Thank you both for your > friendship. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the members of my dissertation committee. Dr. Warren Schmidt, Co-Chair who always showed warmth and interest in me as a human being, and provided continued support - thank you! Dr. Peter Robertson who dilligently read many rough drafts and made excellent suggestions, who advised me on jobs and was always available to help and advise at short notice. Thank you Peter. Dr. Alec McEachern who was available to help whenever I needed it. Most of all I would like to thank Dr. Ian Mitroff - dissertation committee, Co-Chair, boss, mentor and . I friend. Ian, thank you for giving me this wonderful opportunity to work with you. More than any other , teacher you have moulded the way I think1 You know that this statement means alot as I don't take to moulding very easily! Thank you for giving me this opportunity ------------------------- V I I for research. I loved every moment of it - as an | educational experience I could ask for no better. Thank you for being a role model as a human being. For teaching me the importance of being integrated and for encouraging passion in work. I look forward to many more I challenges together. In closing, I would like to acknowledge the worthwhile | experience these last four years have been for me. I end a phase of my life with satisfaction and am pleased with the results. I would also like to acknowledge that the subject of this dissertation is important to me as a , human being. I believe that we as individuals have to take responsibility for our actions and have progressed sufficiently as a species that we must be concerned for the common good. It is primitive as a society to be motivated purely by profit. Finally, as all doctoral students Ï hope this dissertation is used and does more than collect dust on a library shelf ! !. ! VI TABLE OP CONTENTS Page No Chapter I: Problem Statement ............... 1 Chapter II: Review of the Literature ......... 8 Chapter III: Overview of the S t u d y .............3 0 Definition of T e r m s .............. 3 2 Chapter IV: Phase O n e ......................... 3 4 Areas for S t u d y ...................3 4 Research Design & Methodology . .37 Findings & Discussion ........... 39 Chapter V: Phase T w o ......................... 53 Conceptual Framework ............. 53 Research Design & Methodology . .78 Chapter VI: Findings............................91 Chapter VII: A Multi-dimensional Approach for Crisis Preparation . . . .121 ----7 vii PageNo. Chapter VIII: Implications of the Study .... 152 Limitations of the Study & Future Research.......................157 Contributions of the Study .... 159 Conclusions.......................165 Bibliography: 169 Appendix #1:......................................174 Appendix #2: ..............................17 6 Appendix #3:......................................178 Appendix #4: ..................................183 Vlll LIST OF FIGURES FIGURES PAGE 1. Crisis Families.......................... 11 2. Types and Examples of Industrial Crises . . . 12 3. The Five Phases of Crisis Management .... 25 4. Capabilities for Crisis Preparedness .... 58 5. A Multi-dimensional Model .................... 59 6. Participants by Functional Areas............. 80 7. Crisis Preparation Score .................... 97 8. CM Teams in the Organization........... 99 9. Plans by Organizational Level ............... 102 10. Plans and Testing of Plans by Organizational Level ............... 103 11. Ranking of Mean Scores in Crisis Preparation and Technical Beliefs ................. 107 I 12. Ranking of Mean Scores in Crisis Preparation I and General Beliefs.....................109 13. Ranking of Percentage of Technical Education and Mean Scores of Technical Beliefs . 112 14. A Multi-Dimensional Model (Revised) ........ 128 15. Typology of Crises for Technical Organizations ............. * 130 16. Dimensions of a Crisis.......................133 17. The Crisis Preparation Process ............. 135 - 1 ix i LIST Of TABLES TABLES PAGE 1. Causes of Crises........................... 14 2. Impact of Crises........................... 19 3. Critical Capabilities for Crisis Preparation............ 60 4. Critical Capabilities for Crisis Preparation (Revised) 13 9 X 1 ABSTRACT Today we live in a world of dangerous technologies that have the potential to create catastrophic crises. However, despite recent incidents of catastrophic crises such as Bhopal, Chernobyl, and Challenger, this study finds that technical organizations are not adequately prepared to prevent and contain crises. Assessments of vulnerabilities are inadequate, crisis planning is fragmented, and the human and social aspects of crises are not understood. In short, the existing crisis management systems do not address the complexities of ■ technological systems and organizational crises. Considering the catastrophic consequences of technological disasters, such inadequacies in crisis preparation are disconcerting. Findings from this study have important implications for technical organizations, public administration, educational institutions, and research programs. The crisis preparation of nine technical organizations was comprehensively studied. One hundred I and eighty-five individual interviews from a range of functional areas and organizational levels were conducted. A rating scale and crisis plans and procedures were used to support interview data. A Multi XI dimensional Approach to Crisis Preparation was developed and suggested for effective crisis preparation. CHAPTER I PROBLEM STATEMENT In a decade of frequent and catastrophic organizational crises, crisis preparation is a critical management function. Three Mile Island, Tylenol, Bhopal, Challenger, Chernobyl, Exxon Valdez, and S & L Savings are drises that have occurred in recent times. Today, organizations must accept the reality of crises and be prepared. This dissertation studies the crisis preparation of technical organizations^. Such a study was conducted for a number of reasons: (a) Crisis preparation is oarticularlv critical for technical organizations. These organizations have the potential for catastrophic crises and are prone to errors and failures. The catastrophic nature of crises in technical organizations was painfully illustrated by recent crises. Bhopal, Challenger, Chernobyl, and Exxon Technical organizations are those whose core technology (Thompson, 1967) is based on knowledge from the physical sciences or its applications (engineering). They include organizations invloved in manufacturing, utilities, and transportation. 2 Valdez resulted in huge economic losses, disruption in operations, and negative publicity for the organizations. Also, the impact on society was disastrous. These crises resulted in deaths, injuries, psychological trauma, economic losses, and environmental damage. The consequences of these crises will also be experienced by succeeding generations. In addition, technical organizations are vulnerable to errors and failures. According to Perrow (1984) accidents in technological systems are an inherent characteristic of the system. So much so he refers to them as "normal accidents." These organizations are highly complex, with numerous interactions and interrelationships (managerial and technical) which increases the probability of error and failure. Also, the knowledge-based control svstems that manage modern technological svstems creates conditions for errors and failures. In the past, less complex systems were controlled by skill and rule-based systems. Clear procedures were used to manage the system. However, with increasing complexity it is impossible to identify rules for all situations necessitating knowledge-based control systems. These control systems depend on individuals to have and to 3 share knowledge. Such systems, though necessary to manage complexity depend on human judgement and coordination creating conditions for errors and failures (Rasmussen, 1983, cited in Meshkati, 1990). Finally, the containment of errors and failures once they occur in technological systems is difficult. The high levels of complexity make it difficult to determine the cause of a problem. To make sense of an unfamiliar situation, operators often have to act. However, acting in uncertainty may further exacerbate the problem and cause crises. Weick, (1988) refers to this phenomenon as "enacted sensemaking". Thus, not only do technical organizations have the potential for catastrophic crises but they are also vulnerable to errors and failures. In such a context, it is vital to know the nature and extent of their crisis preparation. This subject is particularly important for public administration. A number of technical organizations, such as utilities are public. Also, public agencies contract out to technical organizations, particularly in the defense industry. In addition, public agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) enforce legislation to prevent technological disasters. Other public 4 organizations such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and state and local governments are involved in the containment of disasters. Thus, crisis preparation in technical organizations is important to public administration both from the perspective of preparing one's own organizations and protecting society from catastrophic crises. Such a study is important for public administration. (b) However, despite the importance of crisis preparation in technical organizations, existing literature on the subject is limited. The causes of crises in these organizations have been extensively studied by organizational and human factors researchers. However, the literature does not address the extent and approach to crisis preparation in technical organizations. Considering the vulnerability of these organizations to catastrophic crises, this gap in the literature is significant. (c) Further, the literature on organizational crises is fragmented and does not provide sophisticated models to address the complexity of crises. It focuses primarily on particular aspects of crises such as causes, types, phases, impact, and crisis management activities. Few 5 integrated models exist that synthesize the different aspects of crises. Thus, one is faced with a complex problem and only limited tools for problem solving. More sophisticated models are required. (d) Finally, the methodologies used in the few studies of crisis preparation are not comprehensive. For example, studies such as Reilly (1989) though useful, are based on interviews with only a few individuals in each organization. In addition, only particular aspects of crisis readiness such as problem sensing, decision making, resource mobilization, and communication are studied. Methodologies that involve few individuals and limited aspects fail to capture the complexity of crisis preparation. Crises originate in and impact all dimensions of the organization. The organization as a whole must be prepared for crises. Few individuals in the organization do not have the necessary information to make an assessment of crisis preparation. More comprehensive studies of crisis preparation are required. Thus, a study of the crisis preparation of technical organizations is important, as the subject is significant for organizations and society at large. In addition, existing literatures, models, and 6 methodologies are limited. To address these concerns, this dissertation studied the crisis preparation of nine technical organizations. A comprehensive approach was used, and a Multi-dimensional Approach to Crisis Preparation is proposed. Subsequent chapters of this dissertation discuss the following: Chapter II: Chapter III: Chapter IV: Chapter V: Chapter VI: Chapter VII: Chapter VIII Review of the Literature Overview of the Study Definition of Terms Phase One Areas for Study Methodology Findings and Discussion Phase Two Conceptual Framework Research Design & Methodology Findings A Multi-dimensional Approach for Crisis Preparation Implications of the Study Limitations of the Study & Future Research Contributions of the Study Conclusions 8 CHAPTER II REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE The literature on organizational crises is reviewed to provide a theoretical background for the dissertation. In addition, limitations in the literature are discussed. An analysis of the literature reveals a focus on six major aspects of crises, namely: (a) the definition of crises, (b) types of crises, (c) causes of crises, (d) impact of crises, (e) phases of crises, and (f) crisis management. In addition, four major organizational dimensions are addressed namely, technical, human and social, administrative and external. The literature is discussed in terms of each of these features and the organizational dimensions where appropriate. (a) Definition of Crises In the literature a number of terms are used synonomously for crisis. Reilly (1989) summarizes them as threat, disaster, catastrophe, jolt, stress, turning point, opportunity, adversity, tragedy, environmental discontinuity, bad times, and decline. Different theorists define a crisis and describe particular characteristics. The following is a summary of the different characteristics of crises defined in the literature: (1) Time: Crises are urgent and sudden events (Reilly, 1989; Hermann, 1972). (2) Magnitude: This refers to the intensity of crises. Crises are events of high magnitude that affect large parts of the organization (Reilly, 1989; Perrow, 1984). (3) Unusual: Crises are events that are non-routine and "outside the organization's typical operating framework" (Reilly, 1989). (4) Threat: Crises are a threat to an organization's survival and goals (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984; Hermann, 1972) . (5) Impact: Crises have the potential to affect the physical, psychological, and existential aspects of individuals, organizations, and society (Pauchant, 1987). (6) Outcome: Some theorists discuss the positive and negative outcomes of crises (Fink, 1986; Milburn et 10 al., 1983; others focus purely on the harmful and disruptive outcomes (Reilly, 1989; Shrivastava, 1988) . (b) Types of Crises Mitroff et al. (1988) categorize crises based on two axes. (See Figure 1.) The horizontal axis is a severe to normal scale, and the vertical axis is the human/social to technical/economic scale. Crises were found to cluster in different quadrants. Organizations may experience crises from any quadrant, and the nature of crises would also vary by the nature of the organization. Shrivastava (1987) also proposes a typology of industrial crises. (See Figure 2). They are categorized based on their occurrence in the production or consumption side of industrial activities. 11 11 nil I I I IIiill i l l p I o a .5 -S E E & âffi S21S %liiill: &{lliili i S o O O UJ CA OC I a> sz +J i - Q) 4 - » c C 3 o i - tn 1 — c c 3 +J OI +J 3 > u O) q : 4 - 1 4 - > c c a> 0) E E a> o> c. C - . fO (O c c m « z: to c fO to o i - vn c GO o 00 t o 3 4- C o ( _ ) « « 4 - « 4 - O i - 4 - > O I u i_ 3 o on 12 CO CM O) & W a . a . O, Q b f i GO O. < 13 (c) Causes of Crises In the literature a number of authors discuss the causes of crises. Analysis of these causes reveal that they originate in four major dimensions of organizations, namely, technical, human and social, administrative and external. These causes are summarized in Table I. Causes of Crises 1. Technical Dimension * Interactive complexity * Tight coupling * Failures in design * Failures in equipment 2. Human and Social Dimension * Human error - mechanical, perceptual * Excessive defense mechanisms * Faulty assumptions, beliefs 3. Administrative Dimension * Policy failures * Inadequate resource allocations for safety * Cost reduction pressures * Inadequate plans * Failures in communication * Inadec[uate balance between flexibility, adaptability, and stability * Inappropriate levels of diversity and decentralization * Failure to comply with existing regulations 4. External * Organization/environment mismatch * Inadec[uate infrastructure in the community * Inadequate regulation * Inadequate community preparedness These causes interact across dimensions to cause crises. 15 A number of organizational and human factors researchers discuss the systemic nature of crises. They describe the causes of crises as being an interaction of factors across organizational dimensions. Perrow (1984) discusses the problem of "normal accidents" or crises in high risk technological systems. Normal accidents are seen as inevitable because of the inherent characteristics of the system such as interactive complexity and tight coupling. Interactive complexity is the unexpected interaction between different components due to the complexity of the system. These interactions may not be visible or easily comprehensible. Tight coupling is insufficient slack or buffer between two items. Loosely coupled systems are better able to withstand shock or changes; tightly coupled systems are more efficient but respond easily to change, sometimes with disastrous results. Thus, technical systems are vulnerable to crises, and causes of crises may be due to failures in design, equipment, procedures, operations, and the environment of the organization. Shrivastava et al. (1988) summarize the causes of industrial crises. According to them, industrial crises result from intraorganizational factors interacting with interorganizational failures. 16 Intraorganizational factors span the human, technological, and organizational dimensions. They include inadequate resource allocations for safety, strategic and cost pressures that compromise safety; and failures in policy, communication, the perception of the event, and plans of the organization. Interorganizational failures identified were inadequate infrastructure in the community, failures in regulation, and community preparedness. Mitroff et al. (1989) use an "onion" metaphor to describe crisis-prone organizations and causes of crises. Vulnerability to crises is attributed to problems in different levels or layers of the organization. These layers include the innermost core of the organization which is the deep-seated beliefs and defense mechanisms followed by organizational assumptions, structure and plans and behavior. Causes of crises within these layers include extensive use of defense mechanisms such as denial, repression, splitting, and projection within the organization; faulty organizational beliefs and rationalizations such as "employees who bring bad news deserve to be punished, crises are isolated, and it is sufficient to react to crisis than be proactive"; and 17 inadequate crisis management structures, plans, and behavior. Human factors researchers such as Meshkati (1991) also conclude that major crises such as Three Mile Island, Bhopal, and Chernobyl are "system accidents," "caused by the way the (system) parts-engineered and human-fit together and interact." This recognition of the systemic nature of crises is evidenced in the development of the field of macro ergonomics that studies people/technology interactions at the organizational level. Turner (1976) particularly stresses two major causes of crises as failures in foresight to predict crisis due to a mismatch of assumptions and reality, and the high cost of collecting all possible information, resulting in action with insufficient information. Other causes discussed by him include rigidities in perception and beliefs in the organization, the decoy problem where attention is paid to a well defined problem while the ill- structured problem is ignored, organizational exclusivity and disregard of members outside the organization who may foresee the crisis, information and communication difficulties, involvement of strangers such as members of the public who are unfamiliar with a precipitating 18 situation and could escalate a crisis, failure to comply with existing regulation, minimizing emergent danger because of fear of sounding the alarm, and the need to deny danger to preserve a perception of continued invulnerability. Milburn, Schuler and Watman (1983) also identify internal and external causes for crises. Internal causes are decision makers with a passive approach, low self-esteem, and high anxiety; organizations with poor balance between flexibility, adaptability, and stability; and inappropriate levels of diversity and decentralization. Causes in the external environment are organization/environment mismatch in addressing competitors, suppliers, customers, clients, regulators, and society in general (norms, values, political system, and technology). This review of the causes of crises reveals a range of causes that interact across organizational dimensions. d. Impact of Crises In the literature the different impacts of crises have been discussed. Crises seem to impact the technical, human and social, administrative and 19 external dimensions of organizations. These impacts are summarized in Table II. Table II Impact of Crises 1. Technical Dimension * Disrupts operations 2. Human and Social Dimension * Physical - injuries, deaths * Psychological - trauma * Psychosomatic - illnesses 3. Administrative Dimension * Reduces effectiveness of decision making * Reduces effectiveness of problem solving * Restricts information processing * Constricts control * Loss of resources 4. External Dimension * Physical - injuries, death, and destruction of property * Psychological - trauma * Social - dislocation * Political - disruptions * Inter-generational - consequences are experienced by succeeding generations. 20 The impact of crises on the different dimensions of the organization is discussed below. (1) Technical dimension Crises create disruption in the technical dimension of the organization. Accidents such as Three Mile Island, Challenger, and Bhopal disrupted operations until the problems were rectified. (2) Human and social dimension Crises can impact the human, and social dimensions of individuals and the organization. Doepel (1991) and Wilkinson (1983) discuss the psychological impact of disasters. Individuals involved in crises display a number of psychological symptoms such as anxiety, fears nervousness, nightmares, headaches, withdrawal, anger, depression, physical illness, and abuse of sedatives and alcohol. These effects were experienced immediately after crisis and for an extended period of time. Fauchant (1987) also discusses the social and psychological impact of crises on the subjective meanings that organizational members give to themselves and the organization. 21 (3) Administrative dimension Crises have a number of dysfunctional effects on administrative systems and processes in organizations. The effect of stress on decision making and the capability to deal with complex problems is discussed in the literature (Holsti, 1978). Perception of a threat also seems to restrict information processing and constricts control, resulting in a dominant level response. Such a response may be positive in a familiar situation but is inappropriate in an unfamiliar situation (Staw et.al, 1981). In addition, according to Dutton (1986), crises issues reduce financial and personnel resources. (4) External Dimension Organizational crises also affects the external environment of organizations. Shrivastava et al. (1988) discuss the disruptions to the social, political, and cultural arrangements of society. Perrow (1984) identifies the larger community and even the unborn offspring of members of the community as the victims of catastrophic crises. Members of the community also suffer from psychological affects of crises (Raphael, 1986; Wilkinson, 1983). 22 Thus, the impact of crises is experienced in the technical, human and social, administrative, and external dimensions of the organization. The nature of the impact, however, depends on the type of crisis. For example, a technical crisis (fires, explosions) may affect all dimensions depending on the severity. A human and social crisis like a kidnapping may not have any impact on the technical dimension unlike a sabotage which could severely affect it. Further, these impacts may be interactive. For example, a technical impact could result in economic losses, which in turn could have human and social consequences. (e) Phases of Crises A number of different models are proposed in the literature to describe the phases of crisis. Fink (1986) describes four stages of crisis: the prodomal crisis stage of early warning signals, the acute stage when the crisis is experienced, the chronic crisis stage or "clean-up", and finally the crisis resolution stage. Turner (1976) identifies a six-stage model of crises based on the development of a disaster. These stages include: 23 Stage I: Notionally normal starting point - where "culturally accepted beliefs about the world and its hazards" and precautionary measures to deal with them exist. Stage II: Incubation period - unnoticed sets of events occur which contradict accepted beliefs. Stage III: Precipitating event - events are noticed and change prior perceptions. Stage IV: Onset - the collapse of prior precautions and their consequences are apparent. Stage V: Rescue and salvage - first-stage adjustments when the collapse is recognized and ad hoc adjustments are made to begin rescue and salvage. Stage VI: Full cultural readjustment - an investigation is carried out and beliefs and precautions are adjusted to deal with the new understanding of the world. In summary, crises pass through a pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis phase. 24 (f) Crisis Management (CM) The terms crisis management, crisis preparation, and crisis readiness have varied usage in the literature. According to Fauchant (1987), crisis management is the "organizational efforts to prevent, react to, and learn from crises". Prevention is the proactive component concerned with reducing the likelihood of crisis. The reactive component is in containing and resolving the crisis, and learning from a crisis is an interactive component providing organizational members feedback for further prevention. Reilly (1989) uses the concept of crisis readiness which incorporates a crisis prevention and a crisis management component. The prevention component involves technology and people activities to reduce vulnerability to crisis, while the crisis management component involves responding to a crisis. Crisis management requires the capability for decision response, information flow both internal and external, and resource mobilization and implementation. Mitroff (1988) identifies five phases of CM as signal detection, prevention, preparation, resolution, and learning. See Figure 3. 25 CO 2 3 o> \L C 0) E 0) O) (0 c CO s CO CO Ü CO CD CO CO Jmm Û. CD > 0) CO CO o> CL. > 2 2 Q . Û . t n c -r4 4 J 4 J 3 u 4 - ) c I (0 c s to -H to -H U U CO CO crt 4 4 44 o M 4J -H S ir> 5 ( 1) -H > S 4 J C I D i ( t d r t C O -H to 0 44 d o 0 <D x: 4 - > 1 o > 4 x: E -I 26 Early detection and prior preparation could minimize or prevent crisis, while the lessons learned from the crisis experience contribute to further crisis preparation. In addition, Mitroff et al. (1989) make explicit the profile of a crisis prepared organization. Using an "onion" metaphor they describe crisis-prepared organizations as those having (a) healthy defense mechanisms and realistic assumptions; (b) well established structures for crisis management with representation from different functional areas and clear roles and responsibilities, share information and resources between groups, have the support of top management, and have early warning systems ; and c) integrated plans that address a range of crises. Crisis preparation activities are also discussed in the literature. Mitroff (1988) recommends that organizations develop crisis portfolios and take preventative actions to address a range of crises. Phelps (1986) recommends disaster recovery planning prior to a crisis. He prescribes that the planning process should include all stakeholders who will be affected by crisis, and all areas of the organization that could be disrupted both in the short and long term. 27 Kelly (1989) discusses industrial emergency preparedness and the methods to develop preparedness. These methods include evaluation of resources, development of plans, integration with community plans, training, education of the public, drills, exercises, and hazard reviews. Due to the impact of crises on decision making, a number of preparatory activities have been proposed. These actions include designing crisis decision-making units to prevent biases for stressful situations, increasing flexibility and sensitivity of operating units, and developing computational and processing capabilities to meet sudden increasing demands (Smart & Vertinsky, 1977). In conclusion, the literature on organizational crises focuses on the different aspects of a crisis, namely, its definition, causes, impacts, types, phases, and crisis management activities. Following is a discussion of the limitations in the literature. 28 Limitations of the Literature As discussed in the problem statement, the literature on organizational crises has a number of limitations; these are reiterated for emphasis. First, despite the seriousness of crises in technical organizations, both for organizations and society at large, the literature on crisis preparation in technical organizations is almost non- existent. Second, the literature on organizational crises itself does not reflect the complexities of crises. The literature so far has focused on specific aspects of crises and few models exist to synthesize the different elements. Such fragmentation is inadequate to address the systemic nature of crises. Third, prior studies on crisis preparation such as Reilly (1989) though useful, involve only a few individuals from each organization. Since preparation for crises spans all dimensions of the organization, such a methodology does not provide an accurate assessment of crisis preparation for the organization as a whole. Thus, the literature on organizational crises does not address crisis preparation in technical organizations, few models exist to address the 29 complexities of crises, and the methodologies used to study crisis preparation are limited. 30 CHAPTER III OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY This study was exploratory in nature and was a journey into unfamiliar terrain. The more one progressed, the more was unfolded and understood. In time, just as in a journey, patterns and themes in the landscape could be identified. The sense of discovery in being able to "see," organize, and build on previous findings all in the same study was truly exciting for the researcher. In hindsight, this study can be organized into two phases. Due to the sensitive nature of the subject opportunities for access strongly influenced the study. First, a public organization involved in aerospace requested a crisis audit. Three months later a public electrical utility also requested to be audited. These two organizations constituted the first phase of the study. The emphasis of the first phase was to investigate the nature of crisis preparation in technical organizations and to begin to develop a model for crisis preparation. In time seven other organizations involved in chemicals, metals, and aerospace joined together and requested a crisis audit. This comprised the second phase. The emphasis in the 31 second phase was to further investigate the nature of crisis preparation, confirm/reject findings from the first phase, and to further develop the model for crisis preparation. The study will be discussed in terms of these two phases. 32 DEFINITION OF TERMS The following are definitions of key terms used in this dissertation: (a) Technical Organizations Technical organizations are those whose core technology (Thompson, 1967) is based on knowledge from the physical sciences or its applications (such as engineering: mechanical, civil, chemical, aerospace, electrical). This category of organizations include manufacturing, utilities, and transportation. (b) Crisis The definition of crisis used in this dissertation is taken from Reilly (1989). It is an event that is sudden, unusual, and of high magnitude for the organization. It has the potential to threaten the survival and goals of the organization and is disruptive. The outcome of crises may be positive or negative depending on how it is handled. Webster's dictionary defines crisis as a "turning point." Fink (1986) perceives crises also as opportunities. However, due to the catastrophic nature of crises in technical 33 organizations a crisis in this dissertation is seen as a problem, not an opportunity. (c) Crisis Management (CM) The definition of CM used in this dissertation is based on the phases of CM described by Mitroff (1988). Thus, CM is the approach and activities involved in the prevention, preparation, containment, recovery, and learning from crises. (d) Crisis Preparation Crisis preparation is defined as the approach and activities necessary to develop organizational capabilities to prevent, contain, recover, and learn from crises. The crisis preparation activities occur prior to crises, though the crisis experience provides information that is used to help organizations be better prepared. The definition of crisis preparation is further discussed in Chapter V. 34 CHAPTER FOUR: PHASE ONE AREAS FOR STUDY The objective of this phase was to investigate the nature of crisis preparation in two technical organizations, and to begin to develop a model for crisis preparation. The analysis of the literature revealed six major features of crises, namely its definition, types, phases, causes, impact and crisis management activities. The crisis preparation of the organizations were studied in these areas. The following were the areas explored. (a) The definition of crises used How individuals in the organization define crises was studied. This was important to understand the various individuals* responses in context. (b) The types of crises experienced and addressed The significant types of crises experienced by the organization were investigated. This was important to understand the nature of present crisis preparation and the vulnerability of the organization to crises. In addition, the types of crises the organizations prepared for were studied. 35 (c) The phases of crises addressed The extent to which the organizations addressed the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis phases was studied. In addition, the extent to which the organizations prepared for crisis versus reacted to it once it occurred was explored. (d) The extent to which the causes and impact of crises were addressed across the organization. The extent to which the organizations understood and addressed the causes and impact of crises across the organization was studied. In addition, the extent to which the organizations addressed the interaction of factors across dimensions was studied, particularly in terms of the interaction of technical (design, operations, procedures, processes) and nontechnical (communication, culture, reward systems, public image) factors in CM. (e) The CM activities in the organization The crisis management activities investigated were the CM teams and plans; and the extent to which they were interdisciplinary, integrated and tested. 36 (f) Critical factors in CM In order to develop a model for crisis preparation, individuals were asked to identify what they thought were critical factors in crisis preparation, containment, and recovery. 37 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY (a) Sample Two public organizations, one involved in aerospace and the other an electrical utility, were studied. These organizations had requested a crisis audit of their organizations. (b) Data Collection Methods Approximately thirty individual inteirviews in each organization were conducted. The duration of each interview was approximately an hour. Open-ended questions were used. Due to the exploratory nature of the study, the interviewer used both prepared and spontaneous questions. The interview agenda can be found in Appendix 1. Each individual interviewee was assured confidentiality and was told that only patterns and themes across the organization would be reported. The interviewees were selected by the organization. The criteria for selection included representation from a range of functional areas and levels of the organization, and involvement with CM. The functional areas included, human resources, administration, operations, design, maintenance, security, safety, and public affairs. The levels 38 included upper, middle and lower management, field center managers, and operators. Crisis plans in the organization were also used as a source of information to supplement information obtained in the interviews. (c) Analysis: The interviews were summarized across the different variables to develop a comprehensive picture of the nature of crisis preparation. 39 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION Findings A significant finding was that both organizations shared a common approach to crisis preparation. The following are the findings across both organizations : (a) Definition of crises A "crisis" was defined by individuals in two ways: events and characteristics. Events such as earthquakes, fires, accidents, explosions, injuries, terrorist bomb threats, leaks, oil spills, loss of information, and loss of funds were used to define a crisis. (Examples of technical crises were most frequently used). The characteristics of a crisis identified were: having no control, risky, uncertain, unexpected, unprepared, catastrophic, having serious consequences or damage, involvement of media and government, interference with the ability to serve customers, out of routine, anxiety producing, and requiring higher management involvement. 40 (b) Actual incidents of crises experienced bv the organization The organizations experienced the following types of crises: * Technical: fires, explosions, oil embargo, hazardous spills * Natural disasters: earthquakes, wind storms, flooding * Human and Social: labor stoppage, deaths and injuries, bomb threats (c) Causes of crises addressed The organizations addressed the technical causes of crises, such as design flaws and equipment breakdowns. The nontechnical causes of crises, such as poor communication and pressures to produce and their role in causing technical crises were not as well understood. As a result, hazard and safety audits in the technical areas did not include human factors or other nontechnical factors. Culture audits were conducted in one organization, but the connection between problems in the culture and their impact on the technical areas was not clearly understood or addressed. 41 (d) Preparation for types of crises The organizations were prepared for containing technical crises such as fires and explosions. Extensive plans existed for technical crises, and these plans were emphasized and visible. Parts of the plans were often practiced due to frequent incidents of minor failures. However, they were less prepared to contain human and social crises such as sabotage and terrorism. These crises were not well-understood and as a result were ignored. This was particularly true of the utility where security at the field centers was minimal. In addition, the organization was unclear as to what it would do in the event of sabotage. (e) Integration of crisis preparation Crisis preparation was fragmented. Responsibility for crisis preparation was distributed among the different functional areas with limited coordination resulting in horizontal fragmentation. For example, the operational functions were responsible for technical crises, and the public affairs function for media crises. There was limited communication between the two functions in terms of crisis preparation. In the utility the public affairs personnel were totally unaware of the nature of crisis plans in the 42 operational areas and vice versa. In the aerospace organization the public affairs personnel felt that the operational areas viewed them as "outsiders" and with almost the same level of distrust as the external media. As a result, crisis plans were not integrated across the organization and there was no clarification of roles and expectations. In addition, few coordinating structures, such as CM teams existed, to bring together the different functional areas to address the common issues in crisis preparation. Vertical fragmentation also existed. Crisis preparation was largely delegated to the operational units or field centers These units had plans and procedures which had been tested. Top management was not aware of the nature of the plans and had not clarified their expected role in the event of a crisis. (f) Organizational culture Both organizations valued technical competence, and engineers held top management posts. In addition, commitment and pride in work was very evident. (g) Preparation for the psychological impacts of crises The psychological aspects of crises were well understood in the utility and ignored in the aerospace 43 organization. In the utility, extensive efforts were made through the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) to prepare supervisors and emergency responders for psychological trauma in the event of a crisis. The EAP personnel were kept on twenty-four hour call and immediately contacted in the event of a crisis. In the second organization emotion was considered a "weakness" and individuals felt it was unnecessary to get psychological help. Also, the organization did not see the importance of addressing the psychological effects of crises. (h) Critical factors in CM The critical factors in CM were identified in two ways. Individuals were asked to list (1) factors that made a difference in a crisis handled well versus not handled well, (2) factors considered critical for crisis preparation/prevention, containment, and recovery. (1) The following factors were listed as making a difference in a crisis handled well versus not handled well : * "Lack of experience and procedures" 44 * "Communication is a trouble source and makes a difference." * "Personality variables and emotional factors play a role." * "Don't bother with details." * "Define tasks and make it small." * "Have one point of contact at the site." * "Be appreciative." (2) The following is a list of factors identified as critical for crisis preparation, containment, and recovery. They are categorized by organizational dimensions, namely technical, human and social, administrative, and external. (i) Crisis preparation Technical dimension * Ensure good technical design. * Emphasize safety. * Conduct risk hazard studies. * Accumulate resources such as transportation, equipment, and communication technology, with adequate backups. * Provide redundancy in the system. 45 * Have an inventory of equipment. Human and social dimension * Address the emotional ability of key responders. * Develop plans to meet the needs of employees and families. Administrative dimension * Ensure cash flow during a crisis. * Develop a well-trained team. * Develop crisis plans - plan for a range of crises, practice and test plans, hypothesize for potential crises, define crises. * Clarify roles. * Ensure communication - flow of information. * Have top management support. * Train key personnel. * Identify a common place to report to. * Develop special procedures for purchasing during a crisis. External dimension * Deal with the media. * Identify the responsible PR person. 46 (il) Crisis containment Technical dimension * Knowledge of the technical design Human and social dimension * Confidence and knowledge * Account for people. * Employee Assistance Programs * Keep emotions low. * Deal with deaths. * Trust in key personnel. * Assurance that inadvertent mistakes will not lead to punishment. * Coordinate work with families. Administrative dimension * Communication and control centers * Emergency Response teams * Clear roles * Strong leadership * PR person in close proximity to the crisis * Good decision making * Know where the problem is * Damage assessments 47 * Prioritize tasks * Contact the command center and key personnel * Clear communication * Appropriate delegation External dimension * Coordinate and deal with the media. (iii) Recovery from crisis * Clean up. * Address feelings. * Review, investigate, and use findings in preparation. * Assure the customers and public. * Have strong leadership. An analysis of the critical factors indicate that they span all dimensions of the organization. This is an interesting finding considering the organizations fragmented approach to crisis preparation and emphasis on the technical aspects of crises. It seems that different individuals in the organization are aware of the different dimensions. That is knowledge exists in different "pockets" of the organization but is not 48 integrated. The critical factors were used to develop the Multi-dimensional Model in the second phase. 49 Discussion The crisis preparation of the organizations studied had an emphasis on the technical aspects and was fragmented. This is of concern, as such an approach is inadequate to address the complexities of crises. The findings and reasons for concern are discussed below: (a) Lack of attention to nontechnical causes of crises This is of concern as crises are caused by interactions among a number of different factors. For example, the cause of the crisis in Bhopal is attributed to an interaction between inadequate maintenance due to economic cutbacks, and lack of infrastructure in the local community to contain the crisis (Shrivastava, 1988). Similarly, the Challenger explosion was attributed to poor communication that impeded memoranda which identified weaknesses in the design of the "O" ring from reaching top management, a "can do" culture that did not accept limitations, and a weak safety and quality control department that did not monitor quality (Presidential Commission Report). Thus, a lack of attention to the nontechnical causes of 50 crises and their interactions with technical factors leaves the organization vulnerable in these areas. (b) Lack of preparation for human and social types of crises This finding is of concern as sabotage or terrorism related crises have the potential to be devastating for organizations. Sabotage could lead to technical crises, for example, if a saboteur were to detonate a bomb in an operational center. Therefore, it is important that organizations evaluate the threat of all kinds of crises. (c) Lack of attention to the psychological aspects of crises This was observed in only one of the organizations. Inattention to the psychological aspects of crises is an important omission, as crises have a number of psychological effects on individuals both in the short and long term. (d) Fragmentation of crisis preparation across functional areas Such fragmentation is of concern as crises can originate in any dimension of the organization and one 51 type of crisis can trigger another. For example, the oil spill from the Exxon Valdez was an environmental crisis that led to a public image crisis for Exxon. Thus, fragmenting crises and managing them separately does not address the interactive nature of crises. (e) Lack of involvement of top management in CM Top management largely delegated CM activities to the operational units and did not develop their capabilities for CM. Such an approach is of concern as during a significant crisis it is top management and the organization as a whole that is held accountable. For example. Union Carbide as a whole rather than the plant in India was held accountable for the catastrophe in Bhopal; similarly, Exxon as a whole, not just Exxon Shipping, was held responsible for the Exxon Valdez crises. Thus, even though a particular unit may be primarily responsible for containing the crisis, preparation has to be integrated at all levels to provide an effective response. Thus, findings of the first phase were disconcerting. Technical organizations, despite their vulnerability to crises, were inadequately prepared. Based on these findings, the second phase of the study sought to further investigate the nature of crisis 52 preparation, to confirm/reject findings from this phase, and to develop a model for crisis preparation. 53 CHAPTER FIVE: PHASE TWO CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK A Multi-dimensional approach was developed and used as the conceptual framework in the second phase. It provided a comprehensive approach to address and assess crisis preparation. The assumptions and critical capabilities that comprise this approach are discussed below: (A) Assumptions The approach is based on two major assumptions, namely- (1) Assumption #1 Organizations, because of the interaction of its components, namelv. people, technoloav. goals, and the environment, are comprised of a number of different dimensions. An analysis of the literature (Chapter II) revealed four major dimensions of organizations namely, technical, human and social, administrative, and external. Factors within these dimensions cause crises and are impacted by crises (see Tables I and II). Therefore, effective crisis preparation must address all the dimensions of organizations. 54 The organizational dimensions are found to a greater or lesser extent in all aspects of organizational life. They do not exist in isolation but interact and impact each other. Each of these dimensions is described below with particular reference to technical organizations : (i) The technical dimension. This dimension encompasses the core technology of technical organizations. It is based on knowledge from the physical sciences and its applications (engineering). It incorporates the equipment, materials, and procedures used for the design and production of the key products. Other forms of technology, such as those used in financial administration, human resource management, and marketing are included in the other dimensions. For purposes of this dissertation, the term technology is restricted to physical science based technology. (11) The human and social dimension. This dimension encompasses the human and social aspects of the organization. It includes the psychological and physical aspects of individuals in the organization. 55 their social interactions, and the organizational culture. (iii) The administrative dimension. This dimension encompasses the organizational structure, procedures, and policies which are used to manage the organization. (iv) The external dimension. This dimension encompasses the external environment of the organization. This dimension is important as factors within it affect organizations. Components of this dimension include among others stakeholders such as the media, government agencies, competitor organizations, communities; and environmental trends and forces such as regulations, societal norms, and economic, political, and social conditions. The external dimension is also comprised of technical, human and social, and administrative dimensions. However, in this phase of the dissertation the external dimension was addressed as a singular unit. Organizations often manage these dimensions through their functional areas. For example, the human resources function addresses some of the human and social needs, the public affairs and marketing function 56 the external dimension, the operational departments the technical dimensions, and the financial departments the administrative dimension. However, it is important to stress that these dimensions are not the sum of the functional areas; on the contrary, the functional areas are a means to address these dimensions. Thus, irrespective of the functional areas in organizations, these dimensions exist because of the nature of people, technology, the shared goals, and the environment. Understanding the nature of these dimensions is important for managing crises. Crises are caused by factors that interact across the different dimensions. Further, crises have an effect on all the different dimensions. Thus, crisis preparation activities must address all the dimensions of organizations. (2) Assumption # 2 According to Mitroff (1988), effective crisis management must address all phases of crises. He identifies the phases of crisis management as signal detection, prevention, recovery, and learning. (See Figure 3.) Therefore, the second assumption of the Multi-dimensional approach is that a crisis prepared organization must have the capabilitv to prevent and if necessarv contain, recover, and learn from crises. 57 These capabilities will be referred to as "critical capabilities" as they are critical for crisis preparation. Signal detection will be understood as part of the capability required for crisis prevention. In addition, learning will be seen as an ongoing process. Sources for learning include the process of developing the critical capabilities, "near miss situations," actual experience of crises, and the experiences of other organizations. The development of these capabilities do not occur in a linear process but can occur concurrently. This process is depicted in Figure 4. The Multi-dimensional Approach to crisis preparation integrates the above-mentioned assumptions. This approach prescribes that a crisis-prepared organization must have the capability for crisis prevention, containment, recovery, and learning in all of its different dimensions. In addition, it addresses the interactions across dimensions with mechanisms to integrate crisis preparation across the different dimensions. The different dimensions and their integration are presented in Figure 5. In addition. Table III lists the critical capabilities required for crisis preparation and their role in crisis prevention, containment, recovery, and learning. 58 S 3 D) C 0) 0) 0> c T3 0> k. (0 Q. Q) (/> (0 La. ü k. O (/> 0> n (0 Q. (0 ü O) c ( 0 0> g ( 0 1 § i r i :»ôi «JC o> ■il 2 III -El'S 2 Is ? W S .5 m = c û. 0 > < 5 g - 59 À to 2 3 o> iZ _J lU Q O S _j < z o c / ) z lU I - — I 3 (0 E < 0 ( 0 co c co ü Q- o c (0 c o o o c (0 k. o o c 2 5 o nil (0 % w i i l f 2 0 SS """ >iO)(0 -o ■ t = « c ë = : c Q ) o ^ C0£ O ( 0 e < u o O o (0 c o X LU O > (5 co - c il î l S q oS o H co c o co c o E Q o co co o o < co c o o co C D c 60 TABLE III CRITICAL CAPABILITIES FOR CRISIS PREPARATION Dimensions & Capabilities PR c R L 1. Technical Dimension a. Identify vulnerabilities P p S S b. Understand interactions P p P P c. Redundancy P p S d. Technical competence P p P P e. Safety & maintenance P s S f. Learning from failures P p P P 2. Human and Social Dimension a.Address psychological aspects S p P b. Understand mental disorders P p P c. Address assumptions. P p P P beliefs & defenses d. Value for all competence P p P P e. Assess worker overload P p P P 3. Administrative Dimension a.Effective communication P p P P b. Make changes P p P P c. Reward all competence P p P P d. Inventory of equipment p P e. Resources for crisis p P preparation 4. External Dimension a. Identify trends P p P b. Identify & work with P p P P stakeholders c. Infrastructure/community S p P 5. Integrative Mechanisms a. Systemic thinking b. Top management support c. Plans d. Teams Codes PR=Prevention C=Conta inment R=Recovery L=Learning P=Primary Role S=Secondary Role P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 61 (B) Critical Capabilities The organizational dimensions and the critical capabilities within each dimension are discussed below: 1. Technical Dimension This dimension is critical for crisis preparation, as factors within this dimension can cause crises such as, fires, explosions, leaks, and oil spills. Such crises can be catastrophic for the organization and society at large. The major technical causes of crises identified in the literature are interactive complexity, tight coupling, and failure in design and equipment (Perrow, 1984). The critical capabilities required to address this dimension are discussed below. They have been derived from the contributions of Perrow (1984), Shrivastava et al. (1988), and Mitroff (1988). (a) Identification of vulnerabilities in the technical system Vulnerabilities in the technical system can exist in design, process, equipment, and materials. The capability to identify vulnerabilities contributes to all phases of CM. Audits and interdisciplinary teams are important means for identifying vulnerabilities. 62 (b) Understanding the interactions between systems According to Perrow (1984), technical systems are complex, with numerous interactions which increase the probability of error and failure. In addition, this interactiveness also aggravates crisis containment and recovery. In designing systems the interactive complexity must be understood. Also, the personnel managing the system must understand the nature of these interactions. Understanding the interactive complexity of the system helps avoid crises, or if a crisis were to occur, understanding can help containment and recovery. (c) Redundancy in the system Appropriate redundancy in the system is important as it serves as a safeguard against failure. Systems that are tightly coupled have a greater chance of failure (Perrow, 1984). However, an excessive amount of redundancy is inefficient. Thus, an appropriate degree of redundancy in the system is important to prevent crises. This should be planned for when the system is being designed. 63 (d) Competence of technical personnel Technical personnel include all individuals who have a background in the physical sciences or its applications and are involved in the design and operations of the technical systems. They include the engineers, chemists, supervisors, operators, safety, environmental and manufacturing personnel. These individuals are responsible for the design and operations of the system; as a result, their competence is critical. Human error is a common cause of failure in the technical system (Perrow, 1984). Thus, lack of competence can cause crises. On the other hand, competence of personnel contributes to crisis prevention, recovery, and learning. (e) Attention to safety and maintenance Technical organizations often produce or process volatile materials which can be hazardous. In addition, failure in their products can be catastrophic. Thus, safety and maintenance of the system is critical. Lack of attention to safety and maintenance were contributing factors in the Challenger and Bhopal crises. 64 Capability in safety and maintenance primarily helps in crisis prevention. However, it also plays a secondary role in crisis containment and recovery. (f) Learning from technical failures Crises are preceded by early warning signals (Mitroff, 1988). Learning from past failures helps in the recognition of these signals. It is important that organizations learn from failures, implement lessons learned, and communicate this information to relevant individuals. This learning will help organizations prevent more catastrophic failures and contain and recover from crises. These critical capabilities can be developed by organizations in a number of ways. A number of organizations use Hazard Analysis Reviews to identify and monitor vulnerabilities in design and process. The competence of technical personnel can also be audited during this process. In addition, organizations can learn from technical failures by reporting "near misses" to a "central bank." This information can then be disseminated to other parts of the system. More in- depth investigations of larger failures is also a valuable source for learning. 65 However, as discussed previously, the technical dimension does not exist in isolation. Nontechnical factors also interact with factors in this dimension to cause crises. For example, a lack of openness to bad news within the culture will affect the extent to which individuals report technical failures. Thus, it is important that the interactions of these nontechnical factors also be audited to comprehensively address vulnerabilities in the technical system. 2. Human and Social Dimension This dimension is critical for crisis preparation, as human and social factors such as faulty beliefs, assumptions, and human error contribute to crises (Mitroff, et. al. 1989; Turner 1976). In addition, all crises have some physical or psychological consequences that must be addressed. The forms of crises that originate in this dimension include sabotage, employee violence, strikes and kidnapping. The critical capabilities required to address this dimension include: (a) Address the psychological aspects of crises Wilkinson (1983) describes some of the psychological effects of crises on individuals. 66 Organizations must acknowledge these affects crises on individuals. To do this necessitates that organizations have an openness to emotional and psychological issues even prior to crises. Organizations that are "machismo" and deny this dimension would find it difficult to respond to psychological pain during crises. Organizations can provide psychological preparation for crises to key individuals, such as top management and emergency responders to prepare them for some of the psychological impacts. Preparation will help them be better able to cope with crises. In addition, psychological counseling can be provided to affected employees after a crisis. This capability is important for crisis containment and recovery. (b) Understand individuals with mental disorders and psychopathic tendencies This capability is important to identify possible internal saboteurs or to protect the organization from external saboteurs and terrorists. It helps organizations identify individuals within the organization who could potentially be dangerous, such as arsonists and drug addicts. Such protection is particularly important in plants where volatile 67 processes are involved. In addition, such understanding also helps organizations prepare against external saboteurs, product tamperers, and kidnappers. This capability is important for crisis prevention, containment, and recovery. <c) Address organizational assumptions, beliefs, and defense mechanisms Mitroff et al. (1989) discuss the role of faulty assumptions and unhealthy defenses that inhibit crisis preparation. Organizations must have the capability to confront and challenge their assumptions and to develop healthy defense mechanisms. Organizations must be particularly open to bad news and to knowing about organizational limitations. Communication and denial have been found to play a critical role in making organizations crisis-prone. This capability helps organizations prevent crises, and if necessary, contain, recover, and learn from crises. 68 (d) Value for all kinds of competence (technical and nontechnical) in the culture of the organization As discussed previously, a major assumption of this approach is that organizations have a number of different dimensions. Thus, it is important that all dimensions be valued in the culture. The different kinds of competencies such as technical, public affairs, and human resource management are means of managing the dimensions and need to be valued. Rejection of certain kinds of competencies leaves the organization vulnerable to crisis in those areas. For example, undervaluing the public affairs competence can leave the organization vulnerable to public image kinds of crises. However, valuing the role of different competencies gives organizations the capability to prevent crises or, if necessary, to effectively contain, recover, and learn from crises in all dimensions. (e) Assess individual worker overload This capability is critical for reducing human error, as overloaded and stressed workers can make mistakes. Organizations must assess if employees are doing too much or are given tasks beyond their competence. This capability helps organizations not 69 only to prevent crises but also to effectively contain and recover from them. Organizations can develop these capabilities in a number of ways. Key individuals can be trained in the importance of this dimension. In addition, culture audits and assumption analysis techniques can create awareness of beliefs and assumptions within the organization. Psychological preparation for crisis prepares individuals for some of the psychological impacts of crises. 3. Administrative Dimension This dimension is critical for crisis preparation as problems in structure, policy, and procedures have been found to cause crises (Shrivastava et al., 1988). In addition, crises situations have been found to constrict the processing of information and increase control in organizations (Staw et al., 1981). Some specific crises that directly affect this dimension include hostile takeovers and loss of information. Critical capabilities within this dimension include: 70 (a) Effective communication of information (b) Capability to make organizational changes Communication of information both vertically and horizontally is a critical capability for crisis preparedness. One of the primary causes of the Challenger explosion, identified in the Presidential Commission Report, was poor communication. In addition, organizations also need to make changes to adapt to changing circumstances. Organizational structures and procedures must facilitate these processes. These two capabilities are important not only for crisis prevention but also for crisis containment, recovery, and learning. (c) Reward all kinds of competence (technical and nontechnical) This capability once again emphasizes the importance of all dimensions of the organization. For organizations to actively value all dimensions, it is important that they reward all kinds of competence to ensure that factors in all dimensions of the organization be given importance. This capability is important for crisis prevention, containment, recovery, and learning. 71 (d) Have essential resources for crisis preparation, such as * Communication technology for crises * Inventory of equipment to be used in a crisis * Control centers to coordinate crisis operations * Backup systems to operate during a crisis (computers, transportation, and communication) These are the different resources that organizations need to have for crisis containment and recovery. It is important that organizations not only have the above-mentioned administrative resources but also have the capability to use them. Organizations can use a number of different methods to develop these capabilities. Administrative audits can identify problems in communication and areas for change. The use of a suggestion box or numbers for anonymous callers is also useful. Evaluating the reward systems and performance appraisals can identify the kinds of competence that are actually valued in the organization. In addition, accumulating the necessary resources for crisis containment and conducting 'dry runs* can test their capability. 72 4• External Dimension This dimension is critical for crisis preparation as external factors interact with organizational factors to cause crises (Shrivastava et al., 1988; Milburn et al, 1983). The impact of crises on this dimension can be catastrophic as evidenced by the crises in Bhopal and Chernobyl. Affects of crises on this dimension include large-scale deaths or injuries, destruction of property or the environment, and negative publicity. Thus, critical capabilities to address this dimension include: (a) Identify and address trends in the environment (b) Identify and work with stakeholders such as families of affected employees, the media, and community groups (c) Identify and assess infrastructure in the community These capabilities enable the organization to manage the environment. The organization needs to be able to scan the environment and identify key stakeholders and changes in regulation and socio political conditions. This capability will enable the organization to adapt to environmental changes. In addition, in a crisis the organization must work with key stakeholders such as the families of affected 73 employees and provide them with economic and psychological support; with the media to obtain public support; and with community and government agencies to contain crises such as fires and leaks. Ensuring adequate infrastructure in the community such as hospitals and fire stations is also critical for containing crises. The above-mentioned capabilities are primarily important for crisis containment and recovery. However, they also play a secondary role in preventing further crises. These capabilities can be developed by organizations in a number of ways namely, by environmental scanning, stakeholder analysis, audits of available resources in the community and ensuring their capabilities, sharing crisis plans with community agencies, providing media training to key individuals in the organization, and educating the community as to what they can do in the event of a crisis. Thus, we see that within each of the dimensions factors exist that have the potential to cause crises. In addition, the dimensions are affected by crises. The above-mentioned critical capabilities therefore are necessary for crisis prevention, containment, recovery, and learning. 74 However, the literature on organizational crises also reveals that factors also interact across dimensions to cause crises. Further, it is important to be aware that even though a crisis may seem to be manifested in one dimension, it also impacts the other dimensions. For example, a technical crisis such as a chemical leak also impacts the human and social dimension by causing possible deaths and psychological trauma, the administrative dimension by causing economic losses, and the external dimension by affecting the image of the organization. As a result, it is not possible to manage these dimensions in isolation, and integrative mechanisms are required to address these interactions. The following are some integrative mechanisms that are critical for crisis preparation in organizations. 5. Integrative Mechanisms (a) Systemic thinking This is a key capability that is the basis for integration in organizations. Individuals involved in preparing for and managing crises have to understand the nature of the organizational system as a whole. Systemic thinking involves understanding the different 75 dimensions of the organizations and their interactions. More specifically, the causes and impact of crises and their interactions across the different dimensions must be understood. This understanding is the basis for the development of the other integrative mechanisms. (b) Top management support for crisis preparation Support for crisis preparation by top management is another integrating mechanism. This support is important as it provides direction and a common mandate for crisis preparation across the organization. (c) Comprehensive and integrated plans. This mechanism ensures integration across dimension and levels of the organization. A comprehensive plan is one that covers a range of crises. Mitroff (1988) suggests that organizations prepare for at least one type of crisis from the different crisis families. Integration of plans also implies that the plans of the different functional areas and levels of the organization be integrated. Thus, the plans of the public affairs department need to be integrated with the operations department, and so on. In addition, the plan at the corporate headquarters needs to be integrated with the divisions 76 and plants. Also, plants may integrate their plans with local governments and other agencies in the community, such as fire stations and hospitals. However, the mere existence of plans is not sufficient. For capability to exist, it is important that organizations practice and update their plans regularly. (d) Coordinating structures in the organization To integrate crisis preparation, coordinating structures are important. These additional structures need to integrate the levels and functional areas of organizations. These structures usually take the form of crisis management teams. Such teams may exist at plant sites with representatives from different functional areas. Divisions and corporate offices also need such teams to coordinate crisis activities. Despite the form these structures take, the important principles are that these structures must be integrated across the different organizational functions and levels; and they need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of individuals within these structures as well as the scope of each structure. 77 In this way, the Multi-dimensional Approach to crisis preparation incorporates the specific features of crises (causes, types, phases, impacts, and CM activities) and the different dimensions of organizations. In addition, it identifies critical capabilities within and across the organizational dimensions necessary for crisis prevention, containment, recovery, and learning. This approach is used to assess the crisis preparation of the organizations studied in the second phase. 78 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY The second phase of the study was conducted in seven technical organizations and had three major objectives, namely (A) to further investigate and assess crisis preparation and to confirm/reject the pattern found in the first phase, (B) to identify possible factors that affect the degree of crisis preparation, and (C) to further develop the Multi dimensional Approach for crisis preparation. (a) Sample The sample studied in this phase was seven technical organizations involved in chemicals, metals, and aerospace. These organizations had joined together and requested a crisis audit to enable them to learn from each other. The sample was limited by access into organizations and the comprehensive nature of the study. (b) Data Collection Methods and Sources of Data (1) General methods used: (i) Interviews - One hundred and twenty-five interviews were conducted across the seven organizations. The number of interviews in each 79 organization ranged from nine to twenty-three. Since crisis impacts all the different dimensions and levels of the organization, individuals representing different functional areas and levels of the organization participated in the study. Figure 6 presents the breakdown of participants in the study by functional areas. Each organization was asked to select individuals who played a key role in crisis management. Each interview lasted for approximately an hour. A sample of the interview questions is provided in Appendix 2. Each participant was assured confidentiality and was informed that only the general findings would be reported. 80 Figure 6 Participants By Functional Areas Functional Area Number Top management (*) 10 Plant managers 8 Safety/Environmental 25 Operations/Manufacturing 11 Other technical(**) 18 Human resources 11 Public affairs 15 Legal 7 Security 4 Other nontechnical(* * *) 16 Total 125 * Top Management - CEO, COO, heads of business groups and divisions ** Other Technical - engineering, MIS, R & D, distribution *** Other Nontechnical - Planning, finance, risk management, accounting (ii) Rating scale - The different "critical capabilities" identified in the Multi-dimensional Approach were scaled on a Likert scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is an "ineffective" level of capability and 7 an "effective" level of capability. At the end of the interview participants were asked to rate their organization's crisis preparedness. The scale was completed by one hundred and twenty one participants. The rating scale is presented in Appendix 3. 81 (ill) Crisis plans and procedures - Plans provided information as to the types of crises prepared for, the functional areas involved, the preventive actions taken, and dimensions of the organization that are addressed. The audit mechanisms used by the organization were also analyzed to identify the range of factors audited by the organizations. The plans and audits were used to control for bias in the interviews and rating scores. (2) Specific use of methods to achieve objectives (i) Objective A- To confirm/reject findings from the first phase and to assess the crisis preparedness of the organizations. This objective was achieved by stating the findings from the first phase as propositions for testing. The propositions and how they were studied are described below: 82 Proposition 1 Technical organizations do not address the causes of crises in the nontechnical dimensions, or their interaction on the technical dimensions. This proposition was tested by examining (i) what dimensions are audited for vulnerabilities in the organization, and (ii) the extent to which nontechnical factors and their interactions are audited in the technical audits (Hazard Analysis Reviews) of the organization. Proposition 2 Technical organizations prepare for technical crises and are inadequately prepared for the human and social types of crises. This proposition was tested by (i) asking interviewees the range of crises the organizations were prepared for and the nature of their preparation, and (ii) examining the crisis plans of the organization and identifying which crises were planned for. 83 Proposition 3 Technical organizations have limited preparation for the psychological impacts of crises. This proposition was tested by (i) reviewing the plans to identify programs for psychological preparation and post-crisis counseling, and (ii) asking interviewees to describe what is done in the actual event of a crisis to address the psychological effects. Proposition 4 Crisis preparation is fragmented across the different functional areas of the organization, and few coordinating mechanisms exist. This proposition was tested by (i) identifying who is responsible for the different types of crisis, (ii) verifying whether there is a crisis management team representing the different functional areas to coordinate crisis preparation, and (iii) determining if the plans ensure coordination across the different functional areas. 84 Proposition 5 Crisis preparation is fragmented across the different levels of the organization. The plans and procedures at the division and corporate levels are not integrated with the plants. This proposition was tested by (i) examining plans and the extent to which they were integrated at all levels of the organization, and (ii) identifying the extent to which the different levels of the organization were involved in the testing of the plans. In addition to exploring for the pattern in crisis preparation, the crisis preparedness of the seven organizations in the sample was assessed. The Multi dimensional Approach was used as a basis for this assessment. The extent to which the organizations had the "critical capabilities" was assessed. This assessment was done in two ways: * Participants in the study were asked to rate their organization's capability for crisis preparedness on the rating scale (described in the section on data collection methods). 85 I * The interviewer assessed the organization's I preparedness based on information from interviews and crisis plans. (ii) Objective B - To identify possible factors that affect crisis preparation Two factors were explored that could affect crisis preparation, namely, cultural beliefs and education. The relationship of cultural beliefs and crisis preparation was discussed by Mitroff et al. (1989). They identify inappropriate cultural beliefs as a factor that inhibits crisis preparation. Thus, it is proposed that strong inappropriate cultural beliefs in these organizations contributes to less crisis preparation. The cultural beliefs that were studied were categorized into general cultural beliefs and technical beliefs. This distinction was made as the first phase of the study showed a strong bias for the technical aspects of crises. It was therefore considered important to differentiate between these beliefs and examine their relationship to crisis preparation. These beliefs can be found in Appendix 3, page 182. Participants in the study were asked to rate 86 the intensity of these beliefs in the culture of their organizations. A Likert scale of 1 to 7 was used, where 1 was a "High" (a strong) belief, and 7 a "Low" (a weak) belief. Thus, it is proposed that: Proposition 6a: The greater the intensity of technical beliefs the less the crisis preparation. Proposition 6b: The greater the intensity of general beliefs the less the crisis preparation. The relationship between the educational background of individuals participating in the study and the organizational crisis preparation score was studied. Udwadia (1986), describes an engineering mind-set and discusses how engineering education creates a mind-set that is inappropriate for addressing problems such as crises. He describes the engineering mind-set as characterized by reductionistic thinking. Such thinking solves problems by breaking them down into their parts. This results in fragmentation. Therefore it is proposed that organizations that have more individuals with technical education (physical 87 sciences or its applications) than nontechnical will be less prepared for crises. Data on the educational background of the participants was collected. It was assumed that participants with technical education would have more of a tendency to treat crises as a technical problem than will participants with an interdisciplinary or social science background. Proposition 7: Organizations that have individuals involved in CM (participants in the study) with more technical education than nontechnical will have less of a crisis preparation score. 88 (111) Objective C- To further develop the Multi dimensional Approach The interviews and crisis plans provided additional information to further develop the Multi dimensional Approach. In addition, data were collected on participant’s tenure and position in the organization, and on past experience with crisis to see if these factors influence their perception of crisis preparation. <c) Analysis The data was analyzed in a number of ways- (1) Interviews were analyzed to identify- (i) Patterns and themes within each organization and across the seven organizations. (ii) Number of CM teams. (iii) Types of crises addressed (iv) Number of times plans were tested. (v) Extent to which plans were integrated across the organization. 89 (2) A crisis preparation score was computed for each organization. Each of the dimensions in the scale was given equal weight in computing the score. (3) An ANOVA test was done between the seven organizations crisis preparation scores to see if there was a significant difference between organizations. (4) To identify potential relationships between individual characteristics of participants and their perception of their organizations crisis preparedness, the responses on the rating scale were analyzed by the respondent’s position in the organization, functional area, tenure, and past experience with crises. A correlation was calculated between tenure and the crisis preparation scores across all organizations. The ANOVA statistic was used to analyze the effect of function, past experience with crises, and position on crisis preparation. (5) Rank order correlations were calculated between ranks for technical beliefs and crisis preparation. 90 (6) Rank order correlations were calculated between ranks for general beliefs and crisis preparation. (7) Rank order correlations were calculated between ranks for technical education and crisis preparation; and technical education and technical beliefs. (8) The plans in the organization were analyzed to identify: (i) Kinds of crises prepared for (ii) Functional areas involved (iii) Integration with other plans in the organization This information was used to interpret the assessment made by the participants on the rating scale, and to see if they support or reject the propositions described above. 91 CHAPTER SIX FINDINGS Due to the comprehensive nature of the study a range of findings emerged. The findings fall into four major categories, namely: a. The approach to crisis preparation b. Factors that affect crisis preparation c. Findings related to the Multi-dimensional Approach d. Findings related to the research process a. The Approach to Crisis Preparation Based on data from interviews, the rating scale, and plans a common approach to crisis preparation is evident across the seven organizations. The pattern in crisis preparation found in the first phase of the study was once again found in this phase. The approach to crisis preparation was characterized by (1) an emphasis on the technical aspects of CM, and a lack of attention to the human and social aspects; (2) fragmentation; and (3) plants were more proactive than corporate and division levels. Each of these characteristics are discussed below: 92 (1) An emphasis on the technical aspects and a lack of attention to the human and social aspects was an important characteristic of the approach to crisis preparation. This was evident in the following ways: (i) The organizations did not systematically address the nontechnical causes of crises or their interactions on the technical dimensions. (Proposition 1) The organizations conducted extensive Hazard Analysis Reviews and safety audits to address the technical causes of crises. However, nontechnical factors such as beliefs, communication, training and supervisory styles were not systematically audited in the organizations. Five organizations conducted periodic (once in two or three years) employee opinion surveys, but the relationship between problems identified in these surveys and crises was not well understood. A number of interviewees in the technical function felt that these periodic surveys itself were too many. In addition, the technical audits such as Hazard Analysis Reviews did not address the interaction of nontechnical factors on the technical dimension. Safety audits occasionally informally 93 explored for problems in communication, training, or supervision. One organization was considering including human factors in its audits but did not know how to go about it. However, none of the organizations fully understood the role of nontechnical factors in causing crises, nor did they audit these vulnerabilities systematically. (ii) The organizations prepared most for technical crises. Preparation for human and social crises was inadequate. (Proposition 2) Analyses of crisis plans and interview data indicated that the organizations extensively prepared to contain technical types of crises such as fires, explosions, and oil spills. In all seven organizations the plants had extensive emergency response plans to respond to technical crises. These plans were updated and tested at least twice a year. In addition, some organizations had plans for bomb threats, strikes, and the potential kidnap of a member of top management. These plans were infrequently reviewed or tested. The interview data indicated that the problem of sabotage at plants was not addressed. All participants agreed that a saboteur could do significant damage to a 94 plant. Despite this the issue of sabotage was not given much attention. Plants had strong security at front gates but often had inadequate fencing around the plant, making it possible for a saboteur to have easy access. In addition, only two organizations conducted pre-employment checks for criminal backgrounds of individuals working at plants, though background checks were conducted on individuals working on government contracts if mandated by the contract. Lack of security was perceived as a problem more by personnel at plants and the security function than by top management. Top management often felt that the threat of sabotage was not a significant problem as "this is the United States and sabotage is not a issue here," or "we can trust our employees." (iii) The organizations poorly addressed the psychological aspects of crises. (Proposition 3) None of the seven organizations provided any psychological preparation for crises. Neither did the organizations have plans to address the psychological impact of crises. However, some of the interviewees felt that in the event of a significant crisis counseling would be provided. 95 À number of interviewees who had been involved in , a significant crisis described some of the psychological effects. A Vice President for Manufacturing described the shame and guilt he felt after an explosion had occurred in one of his plants; also the fear that other organizational members might [ blame him. Similarly, a plant manager described the sense of guilt he felt, as he had perceived himself as the "Captain of a ship who had failed." He also described the psychological support he had to provide ; to his subordinates. In his experience, emotional stability during a crisis was critical. Interviewees who had experienced crises valued the need for psychological support more than those participants with 1 limited crisis experience. The latter felt that it was ! a low priority item. (iv) Participants perceived their organizations as strongest in the technical dimension and weakest in the human and social dimension. This emphasis on the technical aspects and lack of I attention to the human and social aspects of CM was acknowledged by interviewees. They rated their organizations as strongest in the technical dimension 96 and weakest in the human and social dimension. This ranking was consistent across all organizations. Figure 7 presents results from the rating scale. (A scale of 1 to 7 was used, where "1" was ineffective and "7" effective.". A breakdown of factors within each of the dimensions can be found in Appendix 4). The researcher however, based on data from interviews and crisis plans would give an even lower rating to all organizations in the human and social dimensions. This is because of findings 1 to 3 discussed above. Participants perceive their organizations as more prepared than the researcher because they do not value the human and social aspects and consider what is being done as sufficient, and also do not fully understand the importance of the human and social aspects of CM. Thus, the crisis preparation of the organizations studied had an emphasis on the technical aspects and showed a lack of attention to the human and social aspects of CM. 97 00 ^ CO o> in in ^ O) O) O u. CM Û. O) X *5 Ul < 98 <2) The second characteristic of the approach to crisis preparation was fragmentation. Fragmentation was found in structures, plans and programs. This was evidenced in the following ways: <i) Crisis preparation was fragmented across functional areas and few coordinating mechanisms existed (horizontal fragmentation)• (Proposition 4) The interviews and crisis plans indicated that crisis preparation was fragmented across functional areas. For example, the operational functions were responsible for technical crises, public affairs for media-related crises, and security for sabotage and terrorism. At the corporate and divisional levels few coordinating structures such as crisis management teams (CM) existed to address common issues and the interactive nature of crises. The few existing teams were organized either purely for technical crises or to address terrorism against a member of top management. However, at plant sites CM teams with representatives from different functional areas were organized. These teams practiced their roles. Figure 8 summarizes the number of crisis management (CM) teams across the 99 organizations. Only teams that were interdisciplinary and organized to address a range of crises are included. Figure 8 CM Teams in the Organization (Number of organizations =7) Level No. of CM Teams Across Organizations Corporate Divisional Plants Thus, the organizations did not understand the systemic and interactive nature of crises and as a result fragmented crises by functional areas. 100 (ii) Crisis preparation is fragmented across organizational levels (vertical fragmentation)• (Proposition 5) The organizations were primarily structured into corporate, divisions, and plants. The interview data indicates that there was limited communication in terms of crisis preparation activities across the different levels. As a result, plants or divisions particularly had limited knowledge of plans at Corporate headquarters. In addition, plans were formed and practiced in isolation. None of the organizations tested plans across all levels of the organization. (iii) Lack of integration of organizational programs The organizations did not have a comprehensive vision that incorporated all its programs. Neither did the organizations identify areas of overlap and differences between its major programs. The organizations had a number of comprehensive programs such as Issues Management, Total Quality Management, Strategic Planning and Safety that involved the organization as a "whole." However, the areas of 101 overlap and differences between these programs and CM were not identified. For example, the organizations had extensive safety programs. However, this program was limited to technical safety. The obvious connection between CM and safety was not made. The purpose of CM is to keep the organization "safe" in the economic, public image, human, legal and technical areas. However, CM and safety programs were run separately, once again indicating fragmentation. Thus, the organizations did not have an understanding of the systemic nature of their organizations and crises. Both fragmentation and integration are necessary for effective CM. However, the organizations lacked integration in their approach. (3) The plants were more proactive in their crisis preparation than division or corporate headquarters. The plants had organized CM teams (see Figure 8) more so than had divisions or corporate. In addition. Figure 9 and 10 identify the extent to which the different levels of the organization had plans and tested their plans. 102 Figure 9 Plans by Organizational Level (Total number of organizations = 7) Plans No of Plans/Level Corporate Divisions Plants Technical Communication Bomb threats Kidnap Strikes 103 Figure 10 Plans and Testing of Plans by Organizational Level (Total number of organizations = 7) Plans Level & No. of Organizations that Tested Plans Corporate Division Plant Technical 0 3 7 Communication 1 1 7 Bomb threat 0 0 4 Kidnap 0 0 0 Strikes 0 2 0 Thus, plant sites had plans and tested their plans more so than corporate and divisional levels. This finding is of concern as in a major crisis the organization as a whole will be involved. Thus, corporate and division levels also need to be prepared. In conclusion the approach to crisis preparation in the organizations studied was characterized by an emphasis on the technical aspects, lack of attention to the human and social aspects, fragmentation, and the plants were more proactive than corporate or division levels. 104 (b) Factors that Affect Crisis Preparation Six factors were found to affect the crisis preparation of the organizations studied namely, lack of understanding of the systemic nature of crises, lack of understanding and value for the human and social aspects, technical beliefs, general beliefs, recent experience with crises, and the environment. The educational background of participants did not affect crisis preparation. However, there was a weak relationship between technical education and technical beliefs. In addition, the relationship between individual characteristics (tenure in the organization, position and function) and perception of organizational preparedness was analyzed. These factors did not affect the perception of crisis preparedness. Below is a more detailed discussion of factors that affect crisis preparation. (1) A lack of understanding of the systemic nature of organizations and crises. The interview data indicated that the existing approach to crisis preparation was affected by a lack 105 of understanding of the systemic nature of organizations and crises. Most interviewees had no clear understanding of the "big picture", did not know enough about other functions, and did not understand how factors interact across the organization. As a result their preparation was fragmented. In addition, they did not understand the systemic nature of crises such as, how crises are caused by factors across the organization and how types of crises can interact. Thus, lack of systemic thinking affected the nature of crisis preparation in the organizations. (2) A lack of understanding of the human and social aspects of crises. The interview data also indicated that organizations did not seem to understand the human and social aspects of crises, and as a result addressed it inadequately. The role of human resources and security in terms of CM were least understood. In addition, there was a value that this dimension of crises was a low priority. r' I 106 (3) A relationship exists between technical beliefs in the organization and crisis preparation. (Proposition 6.a) Participants had rated their organizations across all dimensions. These scores were added and averaged to obtain a crisis preparation score for each organization. The organizations were ranked by their crisis preparation score (highest score rank of 1, lowest score rank of 7). In addition, participants had rated the intensity of a list of technical beliefs in their organizations. ( See Appendix 3, page 182 for a list of technical beliefs.) The average score for the rating on technical beliefs was computed for each organization. The technical belief score was ranked 1 for organizations that had the weakest technical beliefs and 7 for organizations that had the strongest technical beliefs. A rank order correlation was done between the two rankings. A correlation of .69 was obtained. It seems that organizations that had a high crisis preparation score had less technical beliefs in their cultures. (See Fig. 11.) 107 £ 3 O) i Z o oc < Q . LU OC Q.</) = — I OC 1 1 1 O m il s < U- O O < oc I I z 8 C £ O H 0) Q) m CO lO lO T— lO CO N c o (0 (0 ü c 3 ( 5 CL <D Q. CM CO i n lO m lO N. c o 8 C 03 O < m ü Q t u U - o O G) <D O I I ( 0 108 (4) A relationship exists between general beliefs in the organization and crisis preparation. (Proposition 6b) Organizations were also ranked by their crisis preparation score (highest score rank of 1, lowest score rank of 7) and the score obtained in general beliefs. (See Appendix 3, page 182 for a list of general beliefs.) The general belief score was ranked 1 for organizations that had the weakest general beliefs and 7 for organizations that had the strongest general beliefs. A rank order correlation was calculated between the two ranks. A correlation of .69 was again obtained. It seemed that organizations that had a high crisis preparation score had less inappropriate general beliefs in their cultures. (See Figure 12.) 109 CM £ 3 O) C o < DC < Q . LU OC Q . (0[2 (om oc-i ouJ ( 2 3 OC LU O Z qlu 0 ) 0 < 1 lu< o o z z < oc h- I I ( 0 42 0 ) c 0 ) a 0 ) 0 ) m CM CO (O M m m c o 0 > 0 > ü c 5 ( 5 a. 0 ) k - Q. CM CO m lO m i r i M c o 1 c ( 0 O) o < m ü o LU L i _ O o> (O o I I coi 110 I (5) The educational background of participants had I I j no relationship to crisis preparation. However, a weak relationship exists between technical | education and technical beliefs. I A rank order correlation was calculated between the percentage of participants in each organization that had a technical education and the rank received for crisis preparation. Organizations that had a lesser percentage of participants with a technical education received a rank of 1 and the organization with the highest a rank of 7. No relationship emerged. In addition, analysis was conducted to see if organizations that had a better balance of technical and nontechnical education were better prepared than those that did not. Individuals who had both technical and nontechnical education were not included. Still no significant relationship emerged. However, a lack of relationship may be because all the participants involved in the study may not be key decision-makers who determine the approach to crisis preparation. Subsequent research could study the educational background of top management and the nature of crisis preparation. Ill A rank order correlation was also conducted between the ranks for technical beliefs and the ranks for technical education. A weak relationship (0.57) emerged. It seems there is some relationship between the percentage of individuals involved in crisis preparation who have a technical education and the intensity of technical beliefs in the culture. See Figure 13. 112 CO T— g 3 O) i s S 3 Ii l-UJ o l : u j O ^ ( 0 <111 toc o ü c/> LU ü OC lU a.< LU o S o 9 z < oc M II O O) B c 8 u. q ! c o 8 C (0 O) — c .8 s c ( 0 “ I I J J m in C O lO C D M in o II (0 CD C O C M m m ü LU LU O 113 (6) Organizations that had experienced recent crises were more prepared. The organization that had the highest crisis preparation score had experienced three significant crises in the past two years. Interviewees stated that these crises had motivated it to improve its crisis preparation capabilities. Other organizations, when asked why they had not improved their capabilities, frequently said it was because "we haven't had a crisis lately." Thus, recent experience with crises affected the extent of crisis preparation. (7) The environment affected crisis preparation. Four key components of the environment seemed to have had an impact on crisis preparation, namely: (i) Legislation A number of significant laws have been passed to ensure that organizations can prevent and contain technical crises. This study finds that as a result of legislation the organizations have a number of capabilities such as identification of technical vulnerabilities, plans for technical crises at plants. 1 114 dissemination of information to the community, and integration of plans with local government services. Thus, legislation does work and ensures that organizations develop the necessary capabilities for crisis preparation. (ii) Role of professional organizations All participating organizations were active members of the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA). As part of the membership in this association organizations were expected to adopt the Responsible Care Program. This program emphasizes organizational responsibilities to communities. All organizations at plant sites made extensive efforts to develop community support and involve community representatives in their planning processes. Thus, the professional organization was able to influence the crisis preparation of the organizations studied. (ill) Role of the media The media has transformed the importance of organizational crises. The progress in communication technology has resulted in extensive coverage of crises. As a result the organizations were extremely concerned about their public image. Media training was 115 provided to all pertinent personnel in the organization. (iv) Experience of crises by other organizations in the industry Interviewees stated that actual incidents of crises in the industry, particularly Bhopal, provided a significant impetus in making their organizations more prepared for crises. Thus, the crisis preparation of the organizations studied were affected by a range of internal and external factors. (c) Findings Related to the Multi-dimensional Approach Emergence of the legal, economic, political and ethical dimensions in crisis preparation The Multi-dimensional Approach used in this dissertation focused on the administrative, human and social, technical and external dimensions of organizations. The interviews revealed that crisis preparation also needs to include the legal, economic, political, and ethical dimensions of organizations. 116 The legal dimension was found to be important for crisis preparation. The lawyers within the organizations worked closely with the safety, environmental, and human affairs personnel to ensure that existing laws were adhered to and legal liabilities are prevented. During a crisis the lawyers are one of the first functions to be involved to contain the crisis and reduce legal liabilities. The economic dimension was partially addressed in the administrative dimension of the Model. However, interviews indicated that the economic dimension plays an important role in crises and needs to be addressed separately. First, economic types of crises such as hostile takeovers and the loss of a major plant operation can occur. In addition, economic factors can interact with other factors to cause crises. For example, in the Bhopal crisis the poor economic performance of the plant fostered the crisis condition. Further, every crisis has an economic dimension that needs to be addressed. For example, in the event of a major explosion, emergency responders need to have economic resources to purchase equipment, and compensate the community to contain the crisis. Thus, the economic dimension should be specifically addressed in crisis preparation. 117 ] The political dimension of crisis preparation also emerged as significant. The political dimension refers to the power and influence processes and strategies used by individuals or the organization to attain goals. During the process of the study a number of political activities were observed. For example, some of the organizations agreed to participate in the study as it was felt that findings from a combined audit would be of greater interest to top management. As a result, it was hoped that top management might take a greater interest in CM. In other instances, the contact person for the study in the different organizations tried to obtain the "buy in" of key individuals for CM by including them in the interview process. I Finally, an ethical dimension also emerged as | i important for crisis preparation. During the interviews the ethical aspects of crises surfaced. For example, a number of individuals felt it was their responsibility to be a messenger of "bad news" irrespective of whether they were rewarded or punished. In other instances, top management seemed concerned that in the event of a crisis they "should do the right thing irrespective of cost." Finally, it was important to employees that they worked for an organization that 118 had integrity and would "do the right thing" in the event of a crisis. Employees also felt responsible for the communities that their plants were located in and felt they should protect the community from disasters. It seemed that the organizations were competing with each other to be perceived as ethical. Competitive advantage was understood not only in economic terms but also in being perceived as ethical. The economic advantage of an ethical image is obvious but it seemed that the motives were not purely economic. It seemed that once organizations had achieved a certain amount of economic security they were prompted by motives other than economic. These dimensions are included in Chapter VII to revise the Multi-dimensional Approach to Crisis Preparation. (d) Findings related to the research process The research process has political and therapeutic dimensions. In addition, the researcher needs to be "whole" to be sensitive to a range of issues. As described earlier, the research process was used by organizational members to achieve political 119 objectives. The researcher needs to be aware that the i research process is an intervention in the organization and cannot view it in isolation. The interventionistic ' aspects of the research process were illustrated when, after studying one organization, the researcher was told that some changes in crisis preparation had already been initiated in the organization. The | questions used by the researcher had stimulated | interest and change. | In addition, due to the sensitive nature of the | I subject, the researcher found that she needed to create i high levels of trust and respond to the emotional needs ! of the interviewees. Some participants experienced guilt if they criticized the organization and looked to the researcher for reassurance that they were not being disloyal. Other participants, in describing some of the traumatic aspects of crises, were vulnerable and the researcher had to be sensitive in responding to I their pain. Thus, a "disinterested observer" role is j inappropriate in researching subjects that have ; I emotional overtones. The researcher had to manage the research situation so that her intervention did not leave negative repercussions in the organizations. . In addition, the researcher felt that she herself was a research instrument. She had to use all ! 120 dimensions of herself (the mental, emotional, spiritual, and physical) to be sensitive to issues in the organization. Just as counselors or psychiatrists I have to have dealt with their own personal issues to be I responsive to their clients; the researcher found that to be sensitive to the different dimensions of individuals and the organization she herself had to be whole. For example, if the researcher herself had a lot of emotional pain, she would find it difficult to acknowledge or address the pain expressed by the interviewees. Also, since the researcher herself had reflected on ethical issues she was able to observe ethical issues in the organization. A healthy integrated researcher is important for exploratory studies and to study multi-dimensional problems. Thus, we see a number of significant findings have emerged from this study. Since only a small sample is involved one cannot make large generalizations. However, the problem is significant and a comprehensive study has been completed. The, findings are important and form a rich foundation for further research. 121 CHAPTER VII A Multi-dimensional Approach for Crisis Preparation Based on findings from this study the Multi- Dimensional Approach for Crisis Preparation is revised. This revised model differs from the earlier version in I the following ways: ! (a) It incorporates economic, legal, political, I and ethical dimensions. ! As described in Chapter VI, analysis of interviews and crisis plans indicated that these dimensions were important and as a result, are included in the Model. (b) It identifies additional capabilities in the technical, human and social, and administrative dimensions. The interview process and crisis plans indicated additional capabilities which are included. (c) It opens the organizational boundaries so that each dimension has both internal and external aspects. Factors previously identified in the external dimension are incorporated into each of the other dimensions. 122 The model is revised in this way as the interviews indicated that in reality environmental factors interact directly with each of the dimensions. Thus, having a separate external dimension was inappropriate. (d) A typology of crises for technical organizations is proposed. Based on interviews a typology of crises for technical organizations emerged. The typology for industrial crises developed by Shrivastava (1987) (Figure 2) focuses largely on the technical aspects of crises. The proposed typology identifies a broader range of crises. (e) The dimensions of crises are made explicit. The dimensions of crises were alluded to in the earlier model. However, a major finding of this study is that a number of dimensions of crises are not understood. Thus, the dimensions of crises are made explicit. 123 (f) The crisis preparation process is described. The interview data indicated that often plans were developed and not tested and vulnerabilities were not addressed in all dimensions. Thus, the crisis preparation process is briefly discussed. The revised model is similar to the earlier version in the following ways: (a) It incorporates assumptions 1 and 2 described earlier. (b) It incorporates the technical, administrative, human and social dimensions, and the integrative mechanisms. (c) It incorporates the critical capabilities within each of the dimensions. For purposes of clarity, the assumptions and dimensions used in the earlier model are presented again in summary form. Additions to the model are discussed in greater detail. 12 4 (A) Assumptions of the Model This model is based on four major assumptions, namely: (a) Organizations Have a Number of Dimensions. Technical organizations, because of the interaction of people, technology, goals, and the environment, are comprised of a number of dimensions. These dimensions include technical, human and social, administrative, legal, political, economic, and ethical. These dimensions are fluid and are found in all aspects of organizational life. Organizational researchers have acknowledged a number of these dimensions. Parsons (1960, cited in Thompson, 1967) describes three levels of responsibility and control in organizations as technical, administrative, and institutional. Tichy (1983) discusses the technical, political, and cultural aspects of change. In addition, fields such as strategic management, business and society, and organizational development also acknowledge a range of dimensions in the organization and its environment. This model synthesizes the different organizational dimensions to develop a comprehensive model for crisis preparation. 125 For purposes of this model the following is a definition of each of the dimensions: (1) The technical dimension. This dimension encompasses the core technology of technical organizations. It includes the manufacturing and operational components of technical organizations (knowledge, equipment, materials, procedures, processes, and products). This dimension is particularly characterized by the use and application of physical science knowledge and skills in the core technology. Other forms of technology, such as those used in financial administration, human resource management, and marketing, are included in the other dimensions. For purposes of this Model, the term technology is restricted to physical engineering technology. (2) The human and social dimension. This dimension encompasses the human elements of the organization. Included are both the psychological and physical aspects of individuals in the organization and their social interaction. 12 6 (3) The administrative dimension. This dimension encompasses the organizational structure, procedures, and policies which are used to manage the organization. (4) The legal dimension. This dimension encompasses societal laws and regulations that are relevant to organizations. (5) The political dimension. This dimension encompasses the power and influence strategies and processes used to gain support or to achieve goals. Both internal and external stakeholders are involved in this process, such as employees, top management, media, elected officials, and the community. (6) The economic dimension. This dimension encompasses the financial resources and procedures of the organization. | (7) The ethical dimension. This dimension I encompasses the integrity and moral values of | I individuals and the organization. ' 127 In addition, to address the interactions across dimensions and to coordinate activities, additional integrative mechanisms exist. As discussed in the review of the literature, crises can be caused by factors from any organizational dimension. In addition crises can impact all organizational dimensions. Thus, effective crisis preparation must address all organizational dimensions and their interactions. This approach constitutes the basis of the Multi-dimensional Model and is presented in Figure 14. (Q O 128 111 o o 2 3 .2> u . O CO z i l l s o I 5 3 ( / ) E ( 0 c <0 £ o O) o> c (0 O) O) LU (0 o o Q. o > (0 4- * (0 c (0 o> o 73 c sz o K (0 o o ( / ) o8 c (0 E 3 X ( 0 c o (0 c 0) E ( 0 c o ( 0 c O) E O) J= ( / ) ( / ) o o < ( 0 c o 4-4 o CO O) c 129 (b) Effective Crisis Preparation is Proactive. To be prepared for crises, organizations must be able to prevent, and if necessary contain, recover, and learn from crises. See Figure 4. For a more detailed discussion see Chapter V. (c) Organizations Must Prepare for a Range of Crises. Technical organizations are susceptible to a range of crises which affect all aspects of organizational life. A typology of crises is presented in Figure 15. This typology is based on the dimension of organizations that may be the triggering cause of the crises or the dimension of the organization that it may visibly impact. For purposes of the typology distinctions are made between different types, however, it is important to remember that crises may interact across types. Thus, organizations must prepare for a range of crises. Figure 15 Typology of Crises for Technical Organizations 130 TECHNICAL CRISES (Breakdown in the technical systems) Fires, explosions leaks, spills, transportation accidents POLITICAL CRISES (Reduces power & influence) Negative publicity, loss of support by elected officials ECONOMIC CRISES (Major loss of financial resources) Hostile takeovers Significant losses INFORMATIONAL CRISES (Loss of information) crises) Loss of confidential information Organization HUMAN & SOCIAL RISES (Caused by physical, psychological, cultural factors) Sabotage, terrorism, strikes LEGAL CRISES (Infringement of the law) Legal liability ETHICAL CRISES (Loss of confidence in integrity) Corruption scandal Unwillingness to take responsibility NATURAL DISASTERS (Weather related Floods, hurricanes, typhoons earthquakes 131 (d) Every Crisis Has a Number of Dimensions. Every crisis despite its type, has a number of dimensions that must be prepared for and managed. For example, a technical crisis such as the chemical leak in Bhopal had other dimensions that had to be managed such as: * The human and social - deaths, injuries * Legal liabilities * Political - negative image for the company Similarly, an economic crisis such as a hostile takeover has a number of dimensions other than the economic that must be managed such as : * Human and social - addressing the stress and concerns of employees * Legal implications * Political - negative publicity Thus, the metaphor of an "orange" can be used to describe a crisis. Each segment is a different dimensions. See Figure 16. Depending on the nature of the crises some of the dimensions will be manifested more than others. These dimensions are a product of the impact of the crisis on the organization and its environment. Lack of attention to any one dimension can affect the management of the crisis as a whole. 132 just as rot in any one segment of the orange will affect the taste of the orange as a whole. Thus, organizations must identify the dimensions of the crisis as it occurs and evolves and address them. Figure 16 DIMENSIONS OF A CRISIS 133 134 (e) The Crisis Preparation Process is Ongoing and Evolving. To develop and maintain capability the crisis preparation process must be ongoing and evolving. In addition, to address the complexity and uncertainty of crises, CM mechanisms also need to be knowledge-based. Simple, detailed rules cannot address the complexity and uncertainty of crisis situations. Instead, all key personnel in CM must internalize their roles, have the required information, and coordinate their efforts. For this to be possible the crisis preparation process must be ongoing and evolving. The crisis preparation process must address all dimensions of the organization. The steps in this process are interactive and includes identification of vulnerabilities, development of capabilities, testing of capabilities and continuous learning. See Figure 17. 135 £ 3 O) (/> (/> 0> o o c o ■ ■ H H—> c o c o o. 0> Q . (/> ■ ■ H (/> ■ ■ H ü 0> I_ _ 136 (f) Crisis Management is the Management of Paradox CM is not a linear process; instead, it often involves managing competing demands or needs. These include: (1) Safety and Efficiency Safe operations require redundancy in the technical systems, ongoing maintenance, background checks of critical employees and safety training. However, the organization also needs to be efficient and not fritter away unnecessary resources. Thus, organizations need to establish an effective balance between safety and efficiency. (2) Integration and differentiation of CM Efforts Both integration and differentiation are important in CM efforts. The organization needs to be addressed as a whole, and integration and coordination of CM efforts are necessary. On the other hand, differentiation of efforts is also required. Components of the organization such as specific functional areas (public affairs, operations, HR, legal) and levels of the organization (corporate headquarters, divisions, plants) need to develop their own plans. Thus, both integration and differentiation J 137 are required and organizations need to develop the appropriate balance. According to (Weick, 1987) the "real trick in high reliability organizations is to achieve simultaneous centralization and decentralization. (3) Address Present and Future Problems Organizations often are fully occupied addressing day-to-day concerns such as meeting deadlines, developing budgets, conducting performance appraisals, and running the business. On the other hand, it is also necessary for them to allocate time to address potential problems such as crises. This tension between the present and the future needs to be addressed. Thus, the organization for effective CM needs to effectively manage these paradoxes. The complexity of crises is such that there is no place for "either/or" thinking instead organizations must be able to manage ambiguities and contradictions. The Multi-dimensional Approach is based on the assumptions described above. Following is a discussion of the critical capabilities required to address individual dimensions and the integrative mechanisms 138 needed to coordinate crisis preparation. Capabilities described in Chapter V are listed and additional capabilities that are proposed are discussed. Table IV ' presents a comprehensive list of capabilities | prescribed by this approach. 139 TABLE IV CRITICAL CAPABILITIES FOR CRISIS PREPARATION Dimensions & Capabilities 1. Technical Dimension a. Identify vulnerabilities b. Understand interactions c. Redundancy d. Competence of personnel e. Safety & maintenance f. Learn from failures g.Understand tech. nontech./interact h. Clarify assump. i. Access to community resources j. Plan for technical crises 2. Human and Social Dimension a. Address psychological needs b. Understand mental disorders c. Confront assump.,beliefs d. Value for all competence e.Assess worker overload 3. Administrative Dimension a. Effective communication b. Initiate changes c. Reward all competence 4. Political Dimension a. Work with media b. Work with community groups c. Work with stakeholders 5. Legal Dimension a. Enforce laws b. Education on laws 6. Economic Dimension a. Ensure cash Flow b. Special procedures c. Compensation to community 7• Ethical Dimension a. Develop Core Values 8. Integrating Mechanisms a. Think systemically b. Top management support c. CM plans f.Address needs of families g.Communicate with employees h. Plan for sabotage & terrorism d. Ensure resources e. Reward CM efforts d. Plan for public image crises c. Clarify roles with public affairs d. Alternative supplies d. CM teams e. Vision for CM f. Envt. scanning I 140 I (B) Critical Capabilities L 1. Technical Dimension This dimension is important to CM as technical failures can cause crises such as fires, explosions, and spills, with devastating consequences for operations and human safety. CM efforts must focus on preventing such crises and, if necessary contain and recover from them. The following capabilities within the technical dimension were presented in Chapter V. (a) Identification of vulnerabilities in the technical system (b) Understanding interactions between systems (c) Redundancy (d) Competence of technical personnel (e) Safety and maintenance (f) Learning from technical failures In addition, the following are proposed: (g) Capability for technical managers to understand the interactions of technical and nontechnical factors Failures in technical systems occur due to interactions between technical and nontechnical factors such as human factors, organizational culture and 141 communication. Managers must be trained to understand these interactions. I (h) Clarify assumptions of designers, operators, ! maintenance, and safety personnel. Each group of individuals has implicit assumptions about equipment, processes, products, and human behavior. Failures occur due to ignorance or incorrect assumptions. It is important to share these assumptions. This needs to be done on an ongoing basis such as during initial design, modification, and operation. Sharing of assumptions can be done through the use of scenarios, question/answer and devils advocate techniques. (i) Capability for access to resources in the community Often it is not possible for organizations to have all the necessary technical equipment to contain fires, explosions or spills. Thus, the organization needs to have mutual aid agreements with other similar technical organizations. (j) Plan for responding to technical crises Organizations also need to have emergency procedures to respond to technical crises. These 142 I 1 procedures should integrate roles and responsibilities of individuals at the site, in the community, in divisions, and in corporate headquarters. These plans | should be tested across the organization. 2. Human and Social Dimension This dimension is critical for CM as physical, psychological, and social factors can interact with others to cause all types of crises. Specific human and social crises are sabotage, terrorism, and strikes In addition, all crises have a human and social aspect that has to be addressed. The following capabilities were discussed in Chapter V: (a) Address psychological aspects of crises. (b) Understand individuals with mental disorders. (c) Confront organizational assumptions, beliefs, and defenses. (d) Value all kinds of competence (technical and nontechnical) in the culture of the organization. (e) Assess individual worker overload. In addition the following are proposed: 143 (f) Address the needs of families of affected employees. Organizations also need to respond to the families of affected employees. Responsibilities must be assigned and addressed in the plans. (g) Internal communication during crisis During a crisis it is important that there be a system to provide employees with information on the status of the crisis. Mechanisms for providing this service must be considered prior to crises. (h) Plan for sabotage and terrorism Preventing and containing sabotage and terrorism are particularly important at plant sites. Saboteurs can be both internal and external, and organizations must prepare for both. The security at plant sites must be evaluated regularly, and drug testing and background checks of new employees are important. Plans to contain such crises must be developed and tested regularly. 144 3. Administrative Dimension This dimension is critical for CM as factors such as inadequate communication can contribute to crises. In addition, communication is critical for effective crisis containment and recovery. Reward systems are also important to support CM efforts. The following capabilities were described earlier: (a) Ensure effective communication. (b) Make organizational changes. (c) Reward all kinds of competence (technical and nontechnical). (d) Ensure resources for crisis preparation In addition, the following capabilities are proposed: <e) Reward CM efforts. To ensure continuity and success of CM, it needs to be supported by existing reward structures. Responsibilities for CM must be a part of job descriptions and must be evaluated regularly. In addition, organizations should provide incentives to support CM activities such as safety improvements, reporting of "bad news," and effective containment of a crisis. (4) Political Dimension This dimension is important as the political support of key internal and external stakeholders is critical for CM. Key stakeholders include top management, the media, community groups, and elected officials. CM plans must address all relevant stakeholders. Since the political processes affect CM it is included in the model. The following capabilities were described earlier under the external dimension but since they affect the organization's power and capability to influence they are included in this dimension. (a) Work with the media. (b) Work with community groups. In addition, the following are proposed: <c) Ensure the support of key organizational members. An effective CM program is not possible without the support of key organizational members, particularly top management. It is important that they be involved and committed to the approach. 146 (d) Develop support of elected officials. In the event of a major crisis, the elected officials in the community can play a critical role in the support or rejection of the organization. Good relationships with elected officials can be helpful. (e) Plan for public image crises. Due to the critical role of the media in today's society it is important to plan for negative publicity that could affect the image of the organization. Almost all crises have implications for the image of the organization. Procedures for the notification of public affairs personnel and the roles of plant, division, and corporate personnel should be clarified prior to a crisis. 5. Legal Dimension In today's litigious society almost all crises have a legal dimension. Legal liabilities have I political and economic ramifications. Thus, this, is a critical dimension for CM and is included in the model. 147 (a) Ensure that various laws are followed. A key aspect of crisis prevention is to ensure that day to day organizational actions are within the law. This capability prevents legal liabilities. (b) Educate organizational members about laws and liabilities. During and after a crisis organizations are often legally liable in terms of injury, loss of property, and effects on the environment. Some working knowledge as to these laws could help individuals avoid exacerbating the situation. (c) Clarify the legal and public affairs roles in crises. All roles must be clarified for effective CM. However, often the roles of legal and public affairs functions in particular conflict during a crisis. The legal role necessitates caution and the public affairs disclosure. The conflicts in roles must be clarified prior to crises. (6) Economic Dimension This dimension is important as economic crises such as hostile takeovers and significant financial 148 losses can occur. In addition, almost all crises have some economic implications that need to be addressed. Thus, this dimension is included in the model. (a) Ensure cash flow during a crisis. To contain a crisis, plants and divisions often need access to large amounts of resources. Organizations need to ensure that their financial systems have this flexibility and that the necessary procedures have been identified. (b) Develop special procedures for purchasing. Equipment and other materials may need to be bought during a crisis. Special procedures for purchasing are required to allow for a quick response. (c) Provide compensation to the affected community. Crises such as explosions cause damage to the neighboring community. Quick response by organizations to remedy this damage often results in greater community support and less legal liabilities. 149 (d) Identify critical products and plans for alternative supplies in the event of a crisis. Organizations need to identify their critical products and develop plans for alternative supplies in case production is disrupted. (7) Ethical Dimension CM efforts have a strong ethical dimension. Ethical decisions have to be made continuously. These may concern the extent to which organizations should strive to prevent catastrophic crises, how much responsibility the organization should take for a crisis, or how the organization should deal with affected employees and the community. The extent to which an organization is ethical will affect how it is perceived by internal and external stakeholders. Since this dimension is critical to CM it is included in the model. (a) Develop core values associated with CM. An ethical approach to CM and organizational stakeholders is critical in upholding the integrity of the organization. This can be done by developing core values for the organization to follow. 150 8. Integrative Mechanisms Integrative mechanisms are vital to effective CM since they not only address the needs of the organization as a whole but coordinate CM efforts across the organization. The following integrative mechanisms were discussed in Chapter V. (a) Systemic Thinking (b) Top management support for crisis preparation (c) Comprehensive and integrated plans (d) Coordinating structures in the organization In addition, the following are proposed: (e) Develop a vision for CM in the organization and integrate it with the existing strategic vision of the organization. It is important that organizations develop a comprehensive vision for the organization as a whole. This would entail identifying areas of overlap with other existing systemic approaches such as strategic planning, issues management, and TQM. A "master plan" for the organization is recommended. 151 (f) Scan the Enviremuent The organization is continuously bombarded by fluctuations and changes in its environment. It is critical that organizations monitor trends in the environment in all its dimensions. This will help organizations be more proactive. Instituting an Issues Management Committee to scan the environment can help organizations be proactive. In this way the Multi-dimensional Approach is comprehensive and systemic. Such an approach is critical to address the complexity of crises in technical organizations and to help organizations be proactive in their crisis preparation. 152 1 CHAPTER VIII Implications of the Study A comprehensive study of crisis preparation in nine technical organizations was conducted. Findings from this study addressed a range of issues discussed in Chapter VI. These findings have implications for (a) technical organizations, (b) the public sector, (c) educational institutions and (d) research programs. (a) Implications for Technical Organizations A significant finding of this study was that technical organizations are not adequately prepared to effectively prevent or contain crises. They do not address the nontechnical causes of crises, have limited capability to address the human and social impacts, and lack integrative mechanisms to coordinate crisis containment activities across the organization as a whole. This finding is disconcerting in the light of their potential for catastrophic crises. Thus, technical organizations must change their approach to CM. Thev must adopt a comprehensive, svstemic approach that addresses all dimensions of organizations and crises, and the interactions across dimensions. The Multi-dimensional Approach to crisis 153 preparation is suggested. Listed below are some specific capabilities that technical organizations need to strengthen. (A more detailed discussion on each of these capabilities was completed in Chapter VII). The following recommendations are made: (1) Develop a strategic vision for CM in the organization, and integrate CM with existing programs. (2) Change inappropriate beliefs as they affect crisis preparation. (3) Audit both technical and nontechnical factors and their interactions. (4) Train technical managers as to the role of nontechnical factors in causing crises. (5) Have plans that cover a range of crises. (6) Integrate and test plans across the organization. (7) Address the psychological impact of crises. (b) Implications for the Public Sector This study has two significant implications for the public sector. First, publicly run technical organizations need to adopt the recommendations made for technical organizations in general. Public administrators need to ensure that these organizations 154 are prepared for crises. Lack of preparation can result in enormous legal liabilities and destruction to the community. Second, public enforcement agencies such as EPA and OSHA can adopt some of the above-mentioned recommendations as standards. A finding of this study was that legislation does help organizations be prepared. Such standards will ensure that technical organizations incorporate these requirements in their daily practice. (c) Implications for Educational Institutions To address problems that are interdisciplinary, education that is purely discipline-based is inadequate. Engineering disciplines in particular must include as part of their curricula information on nontechnical factors such as communication, culture and beliefs. Presently, these aspects are seen as "soft" and are not valued. Such distinctions between hard and soft issues are no longer relevant for today's realities. To manage complex systems and interdisciplinary problems, more interdisciplinary training is required. Universities can offer seminar courses on interdisciplinary problems such as crises 1 155 that are taught by a team of faculty from a range of technical and nontechnical disciplines. The ability to think systemically, to be aware of issues that cut across disciplines, and to manage complexity is essential. Educational institutions must help individuals and organizations develop these capabilities. Specific implications have been discussed for organizations, the public sector and educational institutions. However, it is also suggested that these stakeholders join together and form a partnership to address crises. Catastrophic crises is a societal problem and it is in our best interest to be collaborative rather than adversarial to effectively prevent and contain crises. (d) Implications for Research Programs Problem centered research necessitates a comprehensive approach to understand the full nature of the problem. Fragmented research approaches that are limited to narrow aspects are inappropriate as they do not capture the interaction across all relevant dimensions. Such an approach is a weakness of 156 quantitative studies. Large samples are required, making comprehensive approaches difficult. Today, academia places a greater value on quantitative than the qualitative research methods. However, to comprehensively study problems it is important that qualitative research methods also be valued. Thus, in research programs qualitative research methods should not be treated as a step-child. In addition, to study sensitive problems the researcher needs a range of interpersonal skills. These aspects need to be incorporated into the research curriculum. Thus, we see that this study has a number of implications for technical organizations, the public sector, educational institutions, and research programs. 157 Limitations of the Study and Areas for Future Research The major limitation of this study was that the sample was limited to nine technical organizations. However, due to the sensitive nature of the subject matter and the comprehensive nature of the study, larger samples would not have been possible. Thus, findings from this study are limited to organizations involved in: electrical utilities, aerospace, and chemicals. The generalizability of these findings to other technical organizations in the nuclear and transportation industries is not known. This is an area of future research. In addition, future research can explore specific findings from this study in larger samples. The following findings can be tested in larger samples: (1) The extent to which the interactions between technical and nontechnical factors are addressed. (2) The extent to which the organization prepares for sabotage. (3) The nature of coordinating structures such as CM teams in the organization. (4) The extent to which the psychological effects of crises are addressed. I 158 (5) The presence of technical beliefs in the organizations. (6) The relationship between the educational background of top management and crisis preparation. Thus, this study is limited due to its small sample. However, it has identified a range of findings. Future research can build on this study and test these findings in larger samples. 159 Contributions of the Study This study is significant both for its contributions to theory and practice. Even more, it is unusual in that such a study was possible. The issue of crises is extremely sensitive for organizations. The active role of the media and the litigious environment make access into organizations difficult. Access into technical organizations in particularly is difficult, as recent crises such as Bhopal, Chernobyl, and Exxon Valdez have made them sensitive to outside scrutiny. Thus, obtaining access into the nine technical organizations itself was unusual. In addition, the fact that the organizations themselves were interested in a crisis audit made the comprehensive nature of this study possible. Each organization was willing to invest time and resources to allow the researcher to talk to individuals in a range of functional areas and levels. The organizations also provided the researcher with the necessary plans and procedures. Therefore, such an opportunity to study the crisis preparation of nine technical organizations was unique. The following are the contributions of the study to theory and practice. 160 (a) The study has surfaced a significant problem that is important both for organizations and society at large. One of the major contributions of this study is that it has surfaced a significant problem namely, that technical organizations are not prepared to effectively prevent and contain crises. Such a finding is significant as crises in these organizations can be catastrophic both for themselves and society at large. Thus, surfacing this problem provides an opportunity for it to be rectified to the benefit of both technical organizations and society at large. Technical organizations, the public sector and educational institutions can now work towards remedying the problem. The implications for each of the stakeholders has already been discussed. (b) Contributes to theorv-building This dissertation contributes to theory building in two significant ways: 161 (1) It contributes to the literature on organizational crises. Existing literature do not address the crisis preparation of technical organizations. This dissertation fills this gap in the literature. The existing approach to crisis preparation in technical organizations is described. Specific information on the nature of crisis plans, structures, audit mechanisms, types of crises addressed, and the role of top management is discussed. Further, factors that affect crisis preparation are also identified and discussed. Thus, this study contributes to knowledge of crisis preparation in technical organizations. In addition, unlike prior studies of crisis preparation, a comprehensive methodology was used to study the problem. One hundred and eighty-five individual interviews were conducted. Nine to twenty- three individuals from each organization, representing a range of functional areas and organizational levels, were interviewed. In addition, a rating scale and crisis plans were used to supplement interview data. Thus, a comprehensive approach was used to provide a more complete understanding of crisis preparation in technical organizations. 162 (2) It contributes to our understanding of the behavior of technical organizations. A number of findings from this dissertation, though not generalizable due to the small sample, shed light on the behavior of technical organizations. They include: (i) Technical organizations lack a systemic understanding of their organizations and crises. (ii) Technical organizations prepare to protect their core technology. (iii) Technical organizations value most the knowledge and skills associated with their core technology. Hence an emphasis on the technical aspects. (iv) Problems cut across traditional functional lines. Theorganizational structures and behaviors relevant for daily business is not appropriate to address interdisciplinary problems such as crises. Additional mechanisms are required. (v) Cultural beliefs affect preparation for crises. (vi) Environmental influences such as the media, professional organizations, and the experiences of other organizations affect crisis preparation. 163 (vii) Problems such as crises that are catastrophic unite previously competing organizations to collaborate to address a common "enemy." Thus, this study contributes to knowledge on the nature of crisis preparation in technical organizations and the behavior of technical organizations. (c) Contributes a Multi-dimensional Approach for Crisis Preparation The Multi-dimensional Approach developed in this study makes the following contributions: (1) A significant limitation of the existing literature on organizational crises was a lack of sophisticated models to address crises. The Multi-dimensional Approach synthesizes key features of crises, such as its dimensions, causes, types, phases, impacts and CM activities; and the dimensions of organizations. Such a model is an important contribution to the literature. (2) In addition, this approach can help organizations prevent and prepare for crises. Such a model helps 164 I I organizations address all the critical dimensions of | crises and develop the critical capabilities. In addition, organizations can use this model to audit their own capabilities. (3) Finally, this approach provides a framework to | address other systemic goals and problems such as organizational development, organizational change, and quality. The Multi-dimensional Approach synthesizes the critical dimensions of organizations. These | dimensions are critical to address all organization- I wide interventions and problems. The present model can be modified to incorporate other critical capabilities relevant for the particular issue. A Multi-dimensional approach to problem solving helps organizations address ! problems or issues comprehensively. In addition, it helps organizations understand the impact of interventions in one dimension on another. Today, problems and issues are complex and systemic. To be i effective, organizations must be able to address all facets of a problem. In conclusion, this dissertation has made a number I of significant contributions. It has surfaced a * I I significant problem for organizations and society. I 165 I contributes to knowledge on organizational crises and the behavior of technical organizations, and has developed a Model that contributes to theory and practice. 166 CONCLUSION Today we live in a world of dangerous technologies. Crises such as Bhopal, Chernobyl, and Exxon Valdez have illustrated some of the consequences of these technologies. It is vital that technical organizations be prepared to prevent and contain catastrophic crises. However, findings from this study are disconcerting. This dissertation exhaustively studied the crisis preparation of nine technical organizations. Findings indicate that technical organizations do not address the nontechnical causes of crises, inadequately address human and social crises, have fragmented CM systems, and do not address the psychological aspects of crises. In short, these organizations are not prepared to effectively prevent, contain, and recover from crises. These findings are truly worrisome, technical organizations both for the benefit of themselves and society at large have a responsibility to be better prepared. According to a Congressional Research Service (Weir, 1987,p 116, cited by Meshkati, 1991) 75 percent of the US population lives close to a chemical plant. However, according to an expert in the Environmental Policy Institute (USA Today, Aug.2, 1989, 167 cited in Meshkati, 1991), 17 accidents have occurred in the US where the Bhopal equivalent of toxic gases were released. However,"only because the wind was blowing in the right direction, Bhopal did not happen here." Organizations that operate dangerous technologies are responsible not only for their survival but also for the well-being of their surrounding communities. They need to be held to a higher standard. Technical organizations are concerned with the catastrophic nature of their crises. A finding of this study was that both employees and top management want "to do the right thing." The organizations support and emphasize safety and environmental programs, often far exceeding what is required by legislation. However, it seems that the organizations are unaware of their systemic properties and the role of nontechnical factors in causing crises. This attitude may be a product of specialized forms of education that make it difficult to see the "whole" picture. To protect society and the environment from catastrophes, this situation has to change. Organizations must understand and address all critical organizational dimensions. A multi-dimensional approach is recommended for more effective crisis preparation. 1 168 j This dissertation contributes to both theory and practice. 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Administrative Science Ouarterlv. 22. 640-657. Staw, B.M., Sandelands, L.E., & Dutton, J.E. (1981). Threat Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavior: A Multi-Level Analysis. Administrative Science Ouarterlv. 26, 501-524. Thompson, J.D. (1967). Organizations in Action. N.Y:McGraw-Hill Tichy, N.M. (1983). Managing Strategic Change. N.Y:John Wiley & Sons Parsons, T. (1960). Structure and Process in Modern Societies. N.Y: The Free Press of Glecoe Turner, B.A. (1976). The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters. Administrative Science Ouarterlv. 21. 378-397. Udwadia, F.E., (1986). Management Situations and the Engineering Mindset, Technological Forecasting and Social Change.. 29, 387-397 173 Weick, K.E. (1987). Organizational Culture as a Source of High Reliability. California Management Review. 25, (2), 11-126. Weick, K.E. (1988). Enacted Sensemaking in Crisis Situations. Journal of Management Studies. 25, (4), 305-317. Weir, D., (1987) The Bhooal Svndrome. Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, Ca I Wilkinson, C.B. (1983). Aftermath of a Disaster; The I Collapse of the Hyatt Regency Hotel Skywalk. I American Journal of Psvchiatrv. 140. 1134-1139 I Zales, M.R.. (1985)., Stress in Health and Disease. NY: I Brunner Mazel Publishers 174 Appendix # 1 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (Phase One) 1. How would you define a crisis? 2. What crises has this organization experienced? 3. What other crisis could the organization experience? 4. What crises do you think this organization is prepared to deal with/not prepared to deal with? j 5. What is the planning process/who is involved/are j the plans practiced/ what dimensions are included? ! 6. Describe a crisis the organization handled I well/did not? What made the difference? I 7. What do you think are the important critical ! factors the organization should consider in preparing for a crisis? 8. Who is responsible for CM in this organization? I ; 9. What training rewards do you have to ensure safety? ' 10. Who is involved with CM in the organization? I 11. How would you describe this organization as a ! place to work in? 12. What happens to the messenger of "bad news" ? I 13. What does it take to succeed in this organization/to fail? ! 14. Do people feel free to express their feelings? 175 15. Do you think individuals are able to see the interaction of managerial factors and technical factors? 16. What audits are conducted in the organization? What factors are assessed? 17. What is done to address the psychological impacts of crises? 18. What systems does the organization have in place to learn from crises? 176 Appendix # 2 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (Phase TWO) 1. How would you define a crisis? 1 2. What crises has this organization experienced? 3. What crises do you think this organization is prepared to deal with/not prepared to deal with? I 4. Who is responsible for CM in this organization? ' 5. Who are involved in CM in this organization? i I 6. Which are the functions that dominate? Should I there be any change? 7. What crises plans exist in the organization? Which I ones are you familiar with? I 8. Are these plans practiced/updated? 9. How would you describe this organization as a place to work in? 10. What happens to the messenger of "bad news" ? ^ 11. What does it take to succeed in this organization/to fail? 12. Do people feel free to express their feelings? I . 13. How are feelings perceived? I 14. What are the critical factors that can trigger or prevent a crisis? I I 15. Do you think managers are able to see the I I interaction of managerial factors and technical factors? I 16. Describe a crisis that the organization handled I well and did not handle well? What made the [ difference? ■ 17. What is done to ensure the organization is a safe place to work in? What more needs to be done? j 18. Are periodic hazard analysis, what if scenarios done? What critical factors are assessed? 19. If you could make a significant change what would it be? 178 Appendix # 3 RATING SCALE (Phase Two) YOUR RESPONSE WILL BE TREATED WITH TOTAL CONFIDENTIALITY. WE ARE INTERESTED IN MAKING A GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPANY NO INFORMATION IDENTIFYING AN INDIVIDUAL RESPONSE WILL BE RELEASED 1. Position: Management: Upper management Mid management Lower management Non- management: Engineering Technical Other 2. Functional area: Technical/engineering | Human Resources I Public Affairs I Legal | Other ! 3. Number of Years in the Company: | 4. Education: Technical Non-degree Undergraduate degree Master's degree Doctorate degree Nontechnical (Please specify) 5. Have you had any past experience with crises (please describe)? I 179 How would you rate your organizations capability in the following factors? DK Ineffective Effective 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1. Technical Factors Score a. Identifying vulnerabilities in the system b. Seeing the interactions between systems c. Providing redundancy in the system d. Collaborating with other technical disciplines e. Having competence of technical personnel f. Attending to safety g. Attending to maintenance h. Learning from technical failures i. Implementing lessons learned from technical failures j. Communicating information regarding technical failures to relevant individuals k. Having communication technology for crises 1. Having an inventory of equipment to be used in a crisis m. Having backup systems to operate during a crisis (computers, transport, communication) 2. Human, Social, and Cultural Factors Score a. Allowing for the expression of feelings b. Dealing with bad news c. Accepting limitations/weaknesses of the organization d. Providing psychological support in general e. Providing psychological support to employees for crisis f. Providing trauma response training for crisis g. Working with families of affected employees in a crisis h. Recognizing and valuing the nontechnical functions (HR, PR etc.) i. Assessing individual worker overload j. Clarifying assumptions that operators, engineers and managers behave on 180 How would you rate your organizations capeibility in dealing with the following factors? DK Ineffective Effective 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3. Administrative Factors Score a. Communicating information- top down b. Communicating information- bottom up c. Initiating organizational changes d. Rewarding technical competence e. Rewarding nontechnical competence (people skills) f. Having an inventory of equipment to be used in a crisis 4. External Dimension Score a. Identifying relevant stakeholders b. Dealing with the media in general c. Dealing with the media for crisis d. Developing community support e. Dealing with community groups/activist groups f. Coordinating with key services in the community (fire, police, health etc.) g. Providing necessary information to the community regarding hazardous materials 5. Integrating Mechanisms Score a. Integrating CM in daily operations b. Top management supporting crisis management c. Having plans covering a range of crises d. Coordinating plans across divisions and functional areas e. Practicing the plans f. Updating plans g. Having capability required by the plans h. Knowing the assumptions underlying the plans i. Having coordinating structures representing different functional areas j. Clarifying roles and responsibilities of key players in crisis mgt. k. To see the interaction of managerial factors on technical and vice-versa (e.g. poor communication on tech. failures) r How would you rate your organizations capability in I dealing with the following factors? I DK Ineffective Effective 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 1. Dealing with technical crises m. Dealing with non-technical crises (sabotage, bad press) n. Having control centers to coordinate crisis operations 182 ORGANIZATIONAL BELIEFS To What extent do the following beliefs exist in the organization Low High 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 General Beliefs Score 1. Our size will protect us 2. Another entity will come to our rescue or absorb our losses 3. Excellent/well managed companies do not have crises 4. Certain crises only happen to others 5. CM is someone else's responsibility 6. It is not possible to prepare for crises since they are unpredictable 7. CM is not warranted since it costs too much 8. It is enough to react to crises once they have happened Technical Beliefs I 1. Technical competence is sufficient to prevent crises 2. Technical competence is sufficient to contain crises once it occurs. 3. Being prepared for technical crises is sufficient 4. For a technical crises resolving the technical issues is sufficient A pp en d ix #4 183 ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES IN CRISIS PREPARATION SUMMARY ACROSS SEVEN CHEMICAL COMPANIES BY DIM ENSIONS O ne h u n d re d a n d tw enty-one resp o n d e n ts ra te d th e ir organizations' capabilities on th e following factors on a scale of 1 to 7. 1 re p re se n ts a score of "ineffective" an d 7 "effective". The following are th e m ean scores for th e resp o n ses acro ss th e seven organizations. "DK" refers to th e n u m b e r of people w ho resp o n d ed "don't know" to th e item . MEAN SCORES 1. TECHNICAL DIMENSION 5.4 2. HUMAN & SOCIAL DIMENSION 4.1 3. ADMINISTRATIVE DIMENSION 4.9 4. EXTERNAL DIMENSION 5.3 5. INTEGRATIVE MECHANISMS 4.4 TOTAL PREPARATION SCORE 4.8 IM PORTANT: T he n u m erical scores m u st be in terp reted w ith cau tio n . D ata from th e open-ended interview s reveal th a t the ac tu al situ a tio n is n o t as good as th e quantitative d a ta m ay indicate. P articularly in th e h u m a n and social, an d integrative areas. ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES IN CRISIS PREPARATION BREAK DOWN WITHIN DIMENSION (N =121) MEAN SCORES DK 1. TECHNICAL DIMENSION a. Identifying vulnerabilities in th e system 5.5 b. Seeing th e in teractio n s betw een sy stem s 5.1 11 c. Providing red u n d an c y in the system 5.0 2 d. C ollaborating w ith o th er tech n ical disciplines 5.2 e. H aving com petence of tech n ical p erso n n e l 6.0 f. A ttending to safety 6.2 g. A ttending to m a in ten an ce 5.2 2 h. L earning from technical failures 5.6 3 i. Im plem enting le sso n s learned from tech n ical failures 5.5 5 J. C om m unicating inform ation regarding tech n ical failures to relevant individuals 5.2 3 k. H aving com m unication technology for crises 5.1 6 1 . H aving b ack u p sy stem s to operate d u rin g a crisis (com puters, tran sp o rta tio n , com m unication) 5.0 16 TOTAL 5.4 185 MEAN SCORES DK 2 . HUMAN & SOCIAL DIMENSION a. Allowing for th e expression of em otion 4.1 2 b. D ealing w ith bad new s 4.5 c. O pen to lim itatio n s/ w eak n esses of th e organization 4.3 d. Providing psychological su p p o rt 4.1 5 e. Providing psychological su p p o rt to em ployees for crisis 4 .0 10 f. Providing tra u m a resp o n se train in g for crisis 3.7 21 g. W orking w ith fam ilies of affected em ployees in a crisis 4. 19 h. Recognizing an d valuing th e n o n tech n ical fun ctio n s 4 .4 i. A ssessing in d iv id u al/w o rk er overload 3.7 J. Clarifying assu m p tio n s betw een operators, engineers an d m an ag ers 4.3 8 TOTAL 4.1 3 . ADMINISTRATIVE DIMENSION a. C om m unicating inform ation - top dow n 4.8 b. C om m unicating inform ation - bottom u p 4.4 1 c. Initiating organizational ch an g es 4.8 3 d. R ew arding tech n ical com petence 5.3 I 186 i I MEAN SCORES DK !e. R ew arding n o n tech n ical com petence 4.6 2 I (people skills) i if. H aving p la n s for cash flow d u rin g a crisis 5.2 55 |g. H aving special procedures for p u rch a sin g 5.0 47 |h. H aving a n inventory of eq uipm ent to I be u se d in a crisis 5.2 11 I I i. H aving control cen ters to coordinate I crisis operations 5.2 12 TOTAL 4 .9 4 . EXTERNAL DIMENSION ! |a. Identifying relevant stak eh o ld ers 5.2 3 lb. D ealing w ith th e m edia in general 5.0 1 I Ic. D ealing w ith th e m edia for crisis 5.2 5 d. D eveloping com m unity su p p o rt 5.2 2 e. D ealing w ith com m unity g ro u p s/a c tiv ist groups 4.9 4 ! ! f. C oordinating w ith key services in th e com m unity 5.8 2 ! jg. Providing n ecessary inform ation to i th e com m unity regarding h az ard o u s m aterials 5.7 2 | I i TOTAL EXTERNAL DIMENSION 5 .3 187 MEAN SCORES DK 5 . INTEGRATIVE MECHANISMS a. Integrating CM in daily operation 4.1 7 b. Top m an ag em en t su p p o rtin g crisis m an ag em en t 5 .0 1 c. H aving p lan s covering a range of crises 4.2 7 d. C oordinating p lan s acro ss divisions an d functional areas 4 .0 9 e. P racticing th e p la n s 4.0 10: f. U pdating p la n s 4.0 1 6 1 i g. H aving capability required by th e p lan s 4.8 10 h. Knowing th e a ssu m p tio n s underlying th e p lan s 4 .5 9 i. H aving coordinating stru c tu re s rep resen tin g different functional a re a s 4.4 11 J. Clarifying roles an d responsibilities of key players in crisis m anagem ent 4.4 4 k. Recognizing th e in teractio n of n o n tech n ical & technical factors 4.2 8 TOTAL 4.4 Overall capability to deal w ith technical crises 5.6 3 Overall capability to deal w ith n o n tech n ical crises 4.0 12 ORGANIZATIONAL BELIEFS 188 R esp o n d en ts w ere asked to rate th e stre n g h t of th e following in th e cu ltu re of th eir organizations on a scale of 1 to 7 w here "low /w eak" belief an d 7 is a "high/strong" belief. GENERAL BELIEFS 1. O u r size will p ro tect u s t ; 2. A nother en tity will come to o u r rescu e j or ab so rb o u r losses 3. E xcellent/w ell m anaged com panies do n o t have crises 4. C ertain crises only h ap p en to o th ers MEAN SCORES 3.7 2.2 3 .6 3.4 3.2 beliefs 1 is a DK i ( ; 5. CM is som eone else's responsibility 6. It is n o t possible to prep are for crises since they are u n p red ictab le 2.9 ! 7. CM is n o t w arran ted since it costs too m u ch 2.5 8. It is enough to reac t to crises once th ey have h ap p en ed 2.8 TOTAL 3 .0 TECHNICAL BELIEFS 1. T echnical com petence is sufficient to p rev en t crises 3.7 2. T echnical com petence is sufficient to co n tain crises once th ey o ccu r 3.9 3. B eing p rep ared for technical crises is sufficient 3.7 4. For a tech n ical crisis resolving the tech n ical issu es is sufficient 3.5 TOTAL 3.7
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Crisis preparation in technical organizations: A study using a multi-dimensional approach
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