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“What difficulty means for me”: predictors and consequences of difficulty mindsets

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“What difficulty means for me”: predictors and consequences of difficulty mindsets

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“What Difficulty Means for Me”: Predictors and Consequences of Difficulty Mindsets

Oliver Fisher

A dissertation presented to the Faculty of the USC Graduate School at
University of Southern California
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy
(Social Psychology)
August 15, 2019

1
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………….2
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….3
Chapter I: When The Going Gets Tough, Social Class Matters……………………...…….12
Transition…………………………………………………………………………….……..52
Chapter II: Difficulty Mindsets Influence Time-as-Resource Metaphor ………….……....53
General Discussion…………..…………………………………..…………………………72
References………………………………………………………………………………….74
Appendix A: Chapter 1 Table and Figures………………………………………….……..95
Appendix B: Chapter 2 Table and Figures………….……………………………………101
2
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank first and foremost my advisor, Daphna Oyserman. Her guidance and
mentorship has been invaluable for me and this work would absolutely not have been possible
without her and I am deeply grateful to her. I would also like to thank Kate Johnson-Grey for all
of her support (professional and otherwise) when I first started this PhD and teaching me how to
be a graduate student. And of course, I want to thank Norbert Schwarz, Nathanael Fast, and
Morteza Dehghani for serving on my dissertation committee and providing helpful feedback and
novel insights into my research.
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Introduction
Throughout the course of one’s life we are likely to encounter experiences of both ease
and difficulty. While we don’t have to make sense of these experiences we often do (Schwarz,
2015). These metacognitive experiences refer to malleable and subjective feelings that arise from
monitoring one’s own cognitive processes which have downstream implications for how we
think and act (Schwarz, 2010). Metacognitive experiences of ease and difficulty are often used to
imply something about who one is and what one is capable of. For example, in one study, adults
rated themselves as more invested in politics after being given easy-to-answer rather than
difficult-to-answer political knowledge questions (Schwarz & Schuman, 1997). Generally,
experiences of ease seem to be linked to greater motivation to engage with a task and work
toward one’s goals whereas the more difficult something is the less likely one is to engage and
persist (Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013; Schwarz, 2015). However, some research indicates
the opposite. Experiences of difficulty may lead to increased effort and involvement (Brehm &
Self, 1989) while ease could sometimes lead to decreased effort (Kanevsky & Keighley, 2003).
Along these lines, experiences of difficulty may actually lead to higher levels of motivation and
arousal when the task at hand feels difficult rather than easy (for a review, see Richter, Gendolla,
& Wright, 2016). Whether an experience of ease or difficulty is going to bolster or undermine
motivation depends critically on the lay theory or mindset one draws on when making sense of
that experience (Oyserman, Lewis, Yan, Fisher, O’Donnell, & Horowitz, 2017).
The mindsets that people hold about what ease and difficulty imply, whether chronically
accessible or brought to mind in the moment, influence how metacognitive experiences are
interpreted (Oppenheimer, 2008; Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz,
1998; Rhodes, 2006; Schwarz, 2015). IBM theory predicts that what a particular experience of
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ease or difficulty implies for who one is now and for who one might become in the future is not
certain (Oyserman et al., 2017). An experience of ease might signify that succeeding at a task is
likely and possible, a “me” thing to do, or that though possible, it is trivial and hence “not worth
my time, not for me.” Similarly, an experience of difficulty may signal that the odds of success
are quite low and may actually be impossible for me “just not worth my time”, or that despite the
low odds, the task is important and valuable, “no pain, no gain” and hence a me thing to do
(Fisher & Oyserman, 2017). To make sense of when these different mindsets are likely to be
used and the downstream consequences these mindsets have for motivation and the self I turn to
identity-based motivation theory.
Identity-based Motivation
Identity-based motivation theory (IBM) is a situated social psychological theory of
human motivation and self-regulation (Oyserman, 2007). IBM predicts that people’s attributions
about what experienced ease and difficulty imply are a function of which identities come to mind
and what these identities seem to imply in context for action and meaning-making (Oyserman,
2007, 2009). Identities have value and people are motivated to act and make sense of the world
in identity-congruent ways, the ways consistent with how ‘I’ or ‘people like me’ think and act.
While people generally perceive one’s self and their identities as stable (Quoidbach, Gilbert, &
Wilson, 2013), IBM predicts and shows that which identities come to mind and the content of
these identities is dynamically constructed in the moment (Elmore & Oyserman, 2012; Raj, Fast,
& Fisher, 2017). That is, what is stable is not the identities themselves but rather the motivation
to use identities to guide action and meaning-making (Oyserman et al., 2017).
Therefore, what is crucially important is not that people can change how they view
themselves with conscious effort, but that subtle elements of the context that one may not even
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be aware of can have large effects for how people view themselves (dynamic construction). This
influences how they act (action-readiness), and how they interpret their experiences (procedural
readiness). These three elements of IBM are part of an associative knowledge network and
operate in tandem with one another (Oyserman et al., 2017), therefore activating one element
will likely have implications for the other two. The identity-to-action link is bidirectional and
thus the affordances and constraints of one’s context should influence how people view
themselves and how they make sense of their experiences, in particular for this dissertation their
experiences of ease and difficulty.
Ease and Difficulty Mindsets
What a particular experience of ease or difficulty implies for who one is now and for who
one could become in the future is not always certain. IBM predicts that one’s identities provide a
lens through which one can interpret these experiences (Oyserman, 2007). Task-related
motivation could be bolstered or undermined as a consequence of either ease or difficulty
depending on what that experience is interpreted to mean in the moment in light of the identities
that are on the mind (Oyserman et al., 2017). If an accessible identity feels congruent with the
task at hand (it is a “me” thing to do) then people are likely to adopt a motivation bolstering
mindset (i.e. ease-as-possibility, difficulty-as-importance). When the task at hand feels identity-
incongruent then people are likely to adopt a motivation undermining mindset (i.e. ease-as-
triviality, difficulty-as-impossibility; Fisher & Oyserman, 2017).
An experience of ease may imply something about one’s high odds of success, an ease-
as-possibility mindset: “I know this (or can know it), I am (or can become) good at this”, thereby
bolstering motivation. Indeed, much of the learning literature suggest that when people
experience ease with their learning they translate this experience into feelings of mastery and that
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they have learned something (Hertzog, Dunlosky, Robinson, & Kidder, 2003; Koriat, 2008)
despite this not always linking with actual learning (for a review, see Bjork et al., 2013). Similar
findings have been found with research on fluency (for a review, see Schwarz, 2015). Consistent
with this, when asked to self-report their endorsement of this mindset, people tend to agree that
ease is a signal that success is possible (Fisher & Oyserman, 2017). However, experienced ease
may imply something about the value of the task, an ease-as-triviality mindset: “I should not
waste my time on this stuff, it is beneath me”, undermining motivation on the task at hand. This
interpretation seems to be less common as people tend to disagree that ease is a signal of
triviality (Fisher & Oyserman, 2017), but people do seem to adopt this mindset in some contexts.
For example, gifted students are at risk of disengaging and underperforming if they interpret
their experienced ease as boredom (Kanevsky & Keighley, 2003).
Similarly, an experience of difficulty can be either motivating or demotivating depending
on the mindset drawn on in the moment. Experienced difficulty can imply that one’s odds of
success are low, a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset: “I don’t know this (or cannot learn it), this
is not for me”, thereby undermining motivation. This lay theory seems common. For example,
people are not motivated to use learning strategies they experience as difficult (Karpicke, Butler,
& Roediger, 2009; Kornell & Bjork, 2008) even when told that these difficult learning strategies
are more effective (Yan, Bjork, & Bjork, 2016). Indeed, implicitly people readily link difficulty
to impossibility (O’Donnell & Oyserman, in prep) but when asked explicitly people tend to
disagree that difficulty signals impossibility (Fisher & Oyserman, 2017). Alternatively,
experienced difficulty can imply the value of the task at hand, a difficulty-as-importance
mindset: “I really care about this, ‘no pain, no gain,’ this is for me.” This mindset is less
common. An analysis of word usage in the English-language found little relationship between
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difficulty and importance compared to difficulty and impossibility (Yan & Oyserman, in prep).
However, when explicitly asked people tend to agree that difficulty is a sign of importance
(Fisher & Oyserman, 2017).
These mindsets represent four distinct ways of interpreting experiences of ease and
difficulty. A mini meta-analysis across five studies and over 900 participants revealed these
mindsets are associated with one another at a small to moderate level (Fisher & Oyserman,
2017). The ease mindsets are weakly negatively correlated at about ! = -.21, while the difficulty
mindsets were weakly negatively correlated at about ! = -.12. Ease-as-possibility is weakly
negatively associated with difficulty-as-impossibility at ! = -.15 and weakly positively
associated with difficulty-as-importance at ! = .21. Ease-as-triviality is moderately positively
associated with difficulty-as-impossibility at ! = .45 and weakly positively associated with
difficulty-as-importance at ! = .24. These small to moderate correlations suggest that people
separately experience ease as implying possibility and as implying triviality; they separately
experience difficulty as implying importance and as implying impossibility. The implication is
that both ease and difficulty have the potential to bolster motivation depending on the mindset
used in the moment.
Additionally, these mindsets are largely distinct from other existing measures of
motivation, showing both convergent and discriminant validity (for a detailed description, see
Fisher & Oyserman, 2017). The motivation bolstering mindsets (i.e. ease-as-possibility,
difficulty-as-importance) have low-level positive correlations with other measures of motivation,
including growth mindset (Dweck, 2000), grit (Duckworth & Quinn, 2009), self-efficacy
(Bandura, 2006), locus of control (Rotter, 1966), and others (Fisher & Oyserman, 2017). The
motivation undermining mindsets (i.e. ease-as-triviality, difficulty-as-impossibility) show
8
negative associations with these measures. The correlations between these other measures of
motivation and the ease and difficulty mindsets are no higher, and are often lower, than the
correlations among measures of motivation generally (Fisher & Oyserman, 2017). The
implication is that these mindsets yield four distinct factors, both from one another as well as
other theories of motivation, suggesting that people have each available as an interpretive
framework when making sense of their experiences, distinct from existing constructs.
Aside from this correlational evidence, experimental research has demonstrated that these
mindsets are readily available and are indeed determined by features of the immediate context,
including which identities are on the mind (Oyserman, Destin, & Novin, 2015). An accessible
mindset has implications for identity and self-regulation (Aelenei, Lewis, & Oyserman, 2017;
Smith & Oyserman, 2015). As previously discussed, much of the work coming out of the
metacognition literature has shown that inducing an experience of ease or difficulty on an
unrelated task carries with it meaning about identity and ability (e.g. Bjork et al., 2013; Richter et
al., 2016; Schwarz & Schuman, 1997). While these studies imply that accessible mindsets linked
task to identity, these studies failed to directly assess or manipulate which mindset was being
used in the moment.
Another line of work has looked at the impact of these mindsets more directly, by
activating one mindset in the moment and examining the consequences this salient mindset has
for identity and motivation. (e.g., Elmore et al., 2016; Lewis & Earl, 2018; Smith & Oyserman,
2015). For example, Smith and Oyserman (2015) employed a scale manipulation such that half
the participants answered questions focusing only on difficulty-as-impossibility while the other
half answered questions focusing only on difficulty-as-importance. This subtle prime instantiated
the mindset and students guided to use a difficulty-as-importance mindset viewed academics as
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more central to their identity and performed better on a test compared to those guided to use a
difficulty-as-impossibility mindset (Smith & Oyserman, 2015). A set of studies using the same
manipulation found that those with a salient difficulty-as-importance mindset had more school
focused possible selves and strategies that those with a salient difficulty-as-impossibility mindset
(Oyserman, Elmore, Novin, Fisher, & Smith, 2018). Similarly, Lewis and Earl (2018) showed
that dieters guided to use a difficulty-as-importance mindset felt significantly less tempted to
continue snacking compared with dieters guided to use a lay theory that difficulty implies
impossibility.
Overview of Dissertation
Research so far has focused on activating difficulty mindsets in context and examining
the causal processes by randomly assigning people to either difficulty-as-importance or
difficulty-as-impossibility and examining the downstream consequences (Lewis & Earl, 2018;
Oyserman et al., 2018; Smith & Oyserman, 2015). However, the immediate context is not
necessarily always experienced as changing. Rather, the immediate context may be experienced
as psychologically isomorphic to the one before it and the one after it. If so, then IBM predicts
the same interpretations of experienced ease and difficulty are likely to come to mind repeatedly
given one’s stable context (Oyserman et al., 2017). Repeated interpretation of ease-as-possibility
and of difficulty-as-importance should bolster self-regulation. In contrast, repeated interpretation
of ease-as-triviality and of difficulty-as-impossibility should undermine self-regulation. That is
to say, that just as immediate context influences difficulty mindsets, so should chronic contexts.
Little research has directly examined this specific prediction. Empirically, adults with low
incomes are more likely to endorse a difficulty-as-impossibility perspective than adults with
higher incomes (Fisher & Oyserman, 2017); effects of education (Aelenei et al., 2017) and
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income on difficulty-as-importance are less consistent (Fisher & Oyserman, 2017). While these
studies provide initial evidence for the role of chronic context shaping the difficulty mindsets
that are likely to come to mind they do not examine the specific process by which social class
influences these difficulty mindsets. In the first part of this dissertation I aim to examine and
understand the relationship between social class and difficulty mindsets. Specifically, I examine
how being lower in social class limits people’s experience of having power and control over their
lives and thus the difficulty mindsets they are likely to adopt.
Another open question concerning difficulty mindsets is the process by which difficulty
mindsets are able to bolster motivation. That is, while the benefits of a difficulty-as-importance
mindset are clear (Lewis & Earl, 2018; Oyserman et al., 2018; Smith & Oyserman, 2015), the
process itself is not. Some work has found that an active difficulty-as-importance mindset leads
to greater engagement in terms of time spent on a test lead to better performance (Smith &
Oyserman, 2015) while another study found that this boost in performance was driven by
efficiency with which students completed the task (Oyserman et al., 2018). Much of the work on
difficulty mindsets has implied that difficulty-as-importance is the ‘good’ mindset to adopt, and
indeed fits with the American cultural ideal of ‘pulling yourself up from the bootstraps’ (Fisher,
O’Donnell, & Oyserman, 2017). However, both mindsets should be useful depending on the
situation. Sometimes it is useful to persist, while in other contexts it is better to quit (Chen &
Miller, 2012; Wrosch, 2010). Both mindsets are necessary from an evolutionary perspective
(Charnov, 1974; Nesse, 2009), but research to date has yet to show this directly. Therefore, in the
second part of this dissertation I aim to examine one potential process by which difficulty
mindsets should influence motivation. Specifically examining how difficulty mindsets influence
the time-as-resource metaphor people are likely to adopt and therefore what people believe they
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are capable of accomplishing given the time they have.
12
Chapter I: When The Going Gets Tough, Social Class Matters
Fisher, O., & Oyserman, D. (in prep). When the going gets tough, social class matters: Social
class predicts difficulty mindsets.

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“[J]ob imperatives are such that the work of those in higher status positions is characterized by a
high level of occupational self-direction—an opportunity to make one's own decisions, to
exercise independent judgment, to be exempt from close supervision—in large part because of
the substantive complexity of the work” (Rosenberg & Pearlin, 1978, p 58, describing the work
of Kohn, 1969)

As our opening quote implies, in their work lives, people with higher social class are
more likely to experience control and less likely to experience being controlled in how to
proceed on difficult tasks. Just as is the case at work, in daily life, tasks can feel difficult to do or
accomplish and goals can feel difficult to attain or even imagine doing. People do not have to
make inferences from their experiences of difficulty but they often do (Schwarz, 2015). When
they do, what experienced difficulty implies for who they are and could become and hence for
their likely course of action depends in large part on the meaning-making lens that people apply
in the moment (Oyserman, 2015). That is, the lay theory or difficulty mindset they draw on in the
moment.
Experiencing difficulty might imply that a task is difficult for oneself or for people like
oneself to succeed at, discouraging task engagement. Such a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset
implies that difficulty is a sign that the odds of success are low, encouraging one to shift
attention to something else (“if you cannot stand the heat, get out of the kitchen”). In contrast,
experiencing difficulty might imply that a task is important for oneself. Such a difficulty-as-
importance mindset implies that difficulty is a sign of high value, encouraging task engagement
(“no pain, no gain”). Both interpretations are plausible. From an evolutionary perspective, both
exploring (shifting one’s attention in the face of difficulty) and exploiting (doubling down
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attention) can be effective (Charnov, 1974; Nesse, 2009). Depending on circumstances, failing to
interpret difficulty as impossibility and to shift to something else can be fatal – since persisting
entails opportunity costs. Indeed, persisting on unattainable goals can impair self-regulation and
negatively impact well-being (Wrosch, 2010). At the same time, failing to interpret difficulty as
importance can undermine learning and goal pursuit (Oyserman, 2007, 2009). In the current
paper, we use identity-based motivation theory to test the novel prediction that low social class
may set people up to be more inclined to endorse a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset and less
inclined to endorse a difficulty-as-importance mindset because low social class entails repeated
exposure to situations in which power and control is lacking.
Identity-based Motivation (IBM) Theory
Our organizing framework, identity-based motivation (IBM) theory, is a social
psychological theory of motivation and goal pursuit (self-regulation) drawing on situated social
cognition perspectives (Oyserman, Lewis, Yan, Fisher, O’Donnell, & Horowitz, 2017). IBM
theory posits that people prefer to act and make sense of their experiences in identity-congruent
ways, ways that fit the person they are in the present and might be in the future. To infer who
they are, people draw on associative knowledge networks in memory; however, which identities
come to mind and what on-the-mind identities seem to mean are also sensitively attuned to
context, a process termed dynamic construction of identity.
Once on the mind, an identity activates a readiness to make sense of experience in
identity-congruent ways, and the reverse -- not only do identities activate difficulty mindsets, but
activated mindsets shape identities. Thus, if a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset is activated,
people should feel less certain that on-the-mind identities are important and less certain that
taking action matters. In contrast, if a difficulty-as-importance mindset is activated, people
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should feel that taking such action towards on-the-mind identities is important, no matter the
odds. Evidence for these predictions come from a number of experiments that manipulated
mindset accessibility. For example, in one experiment, students guided to use a difficulty-as-
impossibility mindset rated academics as less central to who they are than students guided to use
a difficulty-as-importance mindset (Smith & Oyserman, 2015). In another experiment, students
guided to use a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset were less certain that they could attain
positive academic identities in the future than students guided to use a difficulty-as-importance
mindset (Aelenei, Lewis, & Oyserman, 2017).
It is important to note that these difficulty mindsets are distinct from each other (i.e.
weakly correlated at ! = -.12) as well as other measures of motivation, showing both convergent
and discriminant validity (for a detailed description, see Fisher & Oyserman, 2017). Difficulty-
as-importance mindset score tends to show modest, positive correlations with self-efficacy
(Bandura, 2006), locus of control (Rotter, 1996) growth mindset (Dweck, 2000), grit (Duckworth
& Quinn, 2009) and others (Fisher & Oyserman, 2017). Difficulty-as-impossibility mindset score
tends to show more moderate negative correlations with these measures of motivation.
Importantly, these correlations are generally less or as correlated with these measures of
motivation as the measures of motivation are correlated with each other, suggesting that these
mindsets represent distinct constructs and that people have each available as a mindset to
interpret experiences of difficulty.
While these studies document that difficulty mindsets can be activated and are distinct
from each other and other existing measures of motivation, they do not address the question of
whether these mindsets are influenced by chronic context, specifically a person’s social class. A
person’s chronic context should systematically shape the difficulty mindsets that come to mind
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as the same mindset is likely to be repeatedly instantiated. These repeated experiences should
make that mindset more accessible in memory and thus more likely to be used spontaneously
when making sense of experience (Bargh, 1996; Higgins, 1996). In this paper, we examine this
question in the context of how a person’s social class may shape the mindset people are likely to
use when making sense of difficulty. Presented graphically in our theoretical process model
(Figure 1), we predict that being low in social class should matter because it limits individual
access to power and control in their daily lives. Due to this decreased sense of power and control,
one is more likely to adopt a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset and less likely to adopt a
difficulty-as-importance mindset. Given this process model there are two competing predictions
for how social class impacts difficulty mindsets. The first prediction is that social class will have
a direct effect on difficulty mindsets. This prediction is typically implied by other research who
propose a direct effect of social class on motivation (Browman, Destin, Carswell, & Svoboda,
2017; Laurin, Engstrom, & Alic, 2019). The second prediction is that social class will only have
an indirect effect on difficulty mindsets through experienced power and control. This prediction
has not yet been fully considered in the literature, though there are some exceptions (Gecas &
Seff, 1989; Wiederkehr, Darnon, Chazal, Guidmond, & Martinot, 2015). We aim to test both of
these predictions to determine exactly how social class influences the mindsets people are likely
to adopt in the face of difficulty.
Social Class
What is social class? Social class is a shorthand term for denoting place or location in
social hierarchy. It is some combination of resources (power, wealth, income), rank
(occupational prestige, subjective social standing, preferences, and tastes), and education (years
of schooling, attaining accreditations such as high school graduate or college graduate, Davis,
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1948; Kohn, 1969; Kohn & Schooler, 1969; Ossowski, 1963; Oyserman, Smith & Elmore, 2014;
Rivera & Tilcsik, 2016; Warner, 1936). Lower social class is not necessarily associated with
having lower educational aspirations (Alexander, Entwisle, & Bedinger, 1994; Destin &
Oyserman, 2009), but it does matter for important life outcomes. For example, people lower in
social class on average have worse mental and physical health and shorter lifespans (Case &
Deaton, 2015; Lee et al., 2015; Muntaner, Ng, Vanroelen, Christ, & Eaton, 2013; Oyserman et
al., 2014; Williams, Priest, & Anderson, 2016). Those starting at lower social class levels tend to
accumulate less wealth over time (Killewald, Pfeffer, & Schachner, 2017). Their occupational
(Murray, Zaninotto, Stafford, Shelton, & Head, 2016; Rivera & Tilcsik, 2016) and educational
(Pokropek, Borgonovi, Jakubowski, 2015; Quinn & Cooc, 2015) attainments also tend to be
lower.
One construct, or three indicators? Is social class a single entity? The answer is
complex. Consider a person who works at the Indiana-based Carrier Heating and Cooling
factory. Does that person’s social class change as the factory cuts wages? Did his social class
drop when his earnings dropped from above the median in the U.S. to below it? Does that
person’s social class change as the factory prepares to move operations to Mexico? Did his social
class drop when he lost job stability? What about the social class of a college-educated single
mother who is living in a homeless shelter? Is her social class higher because of her college
degree or lower because she earns no income?
While accepting the general conceptualization of social class as denoting place or
location in the social hierarchy, studies and disciplines differ in how social class is
operationalized (see for example Duncan & Magnuson, 2003). Income is a commonly used
indicator of social class in social science (e.g., policy, sociology, and economics)–though less
18
often used by psychologists (with noted exceptions, Browman & Destin, 2016; Cohen, Shin, &
Liu, 2018; Johnson & Krueger, 2005, 2006; Keister & Moller, 2000; Oyserman, 2013). Wealth,
though also less assessed, is central to the idea that social class entails experienced power and
control (e.g. Killewald et al., 2017; Sherraden & Gilbert, 2016).
Psychologists and sociologists used to operationalize social class via objective measures
of occupational prestige and education, with each measure used separately or together (e.g.,
Gecas & Seff, 1989; Oyserman, Johnson, & James, 2011; Rosenberg & Perlin, 1978). But the
standard measure for occupational prestige, the Hollingshead, was criticized in part because it is
not clear how one could characterize occupations objectively, rather than via subjective
perception of raters with incomplete knowledge (e.g., Hauser & Warren, 1997). With no better
objective measure available, psychologists shifted away from objective indicators of
occupational prestige to subjective social status indicators--asking participants to indicate their
place on a social “ladder” (e.g. Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000; Cantril, 1965; Kraus,
Tan, & Tannenbaum, 2013). Though education continues to be understood as a component of
what social class is, which aspect of education matters is open to question--is more education an
indicator of higher social class, or is the way that education relates to social class best understood
as a contrast between having or not having a college education? Indeed, psychologists often
assess education as a binary contrast between those with a college education (or a college-
educated parent) and those without (e.g. Stephens, Hamedani, & Destin, 2014). Some
psychologists operationalize social class as the mean of income, education, and subjective social
status (e.g., Kraus, Park, & Tan, 2017; Varnum, Blais, Hampton, & Brewer, 2015). Other
psychologists analyze the effects of each separately (Duncan & Magnuson, 2003; Kristenson,
Eriksen, Sluiter, Starke, & Ursin, 2004; Operario, Adler, & Williams, 2004).
19
While the three social class indicators (income, education, and subjective social status) are
significantly correlated, the size of the correlations is such that the indicators are not redundant
(Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009; Kraus & Keltner, 2013). For example, raw correlations range from
.37 to .43 in a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults, implying shared variance in the
range of 14 to 18 percent (Operario et al., 2004). Indeed, while there is a link between education
and income, this effect is much smaller than previously expected (Taborini, Kim, & Sakamoto,
2015). This non-redundancy has two implications. First, it implies that focusing on a single
indicator to operationalize social class is problematic as it may fail to fully account for unique
variance explained by other indicators of social class (e.g., Conger & Donnellan, 2007; Duncan
& Magnuson, 2003; Shavers, 2007). Second, it implies that interpreting results as being due to
social class may hide which indicators actually matter. That is, the implication of finding that
social class matters is a useful shorthand but an unclear policy statement. It does not tell
policymakers where to put resources or what the target of intervention should be. Depending on
which indicator is the active ingredient, the appropriate policy solution might focus on increasing
wages, or on reducing social inequality, or on increasing access to higher education. It is unlikely
that a single rule of thumb as to how to assess social class applies across all situations. When
considering how to operationalize social class it is important to consider the process by which
social class is likely to matter.
What does social class imply for experienced power and control? Whether and how
social class matters differs depending on whether it is accessible (on-the-mind) and what it seems
to imply in that particular moment. Though people may know how many years of education they
have or their income, they often have no direct way of knowing if their education, income, and
social status is higher or lower than others (Arsenio, 2018; Kraus & Keltner, 2013) or in what
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ways this shapes their day to day experiences. In particular the way social class shapes people’s
everyday experiences of power and control. For example, children growing up in low social class
families have less stability in their everyday experiences and often have more chaotic and
unpredictable home environments (Evans, 2004; Evans, Gonnella, Marcynyszyn, Gentile, &
Salpekar, 2005) undermining their sense of control (Mittal & Griskevicius, 2014). These
differences in perceived control persist into adulthood (Lascano, Galambos, Krahm, & Lachman,
2015) which have been linked to worse self-rated health and higher mortality rates (Turiano,
Chapman, Agrigoroaei, Infurna, & Lachman, 2014).
Adults lower in social class often experience lower control as well –such as in their work
as described in our opening quote. People who are lower in social class are more likely to
experience highly supervised work lives with little control over what they do and when they do it
(a nationwide study of working men, Kohn, 1969; Kohn & Schooler, 1969). Moreover, people
lower in social class are more likely to be shift workers, less likely to have control over their
work schedules, and less likely to have stable work hours--undermining childcare and stressing
work-family balance (Fenwick & Tausig, 2001; for reviews of implications for IBM, see
Oyserman et al., 2014; Oyserman & Fisher, 2017; Oyserman & Lewis, 2017). This fails to
consider the financial uncertainty those low in social class face, which is often stressful and
threatening (De Witte, Pienaar, & De Cuyper, 2016). This daily chronic instability not only
reduces people’s ability to control their earnings, to budget, and to plan and schedule their time
and effort, but it also undermines their sense of power (Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, & Keltner,
2012; Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2015) and control (Lachman & Weaver, 1998; Lascano et
al., 2015; Laurin et al., 2019; Mittal & Griskevicius, 2014) over their lives. If one believes that
they have power and control over these aspects of daily life then their efforts in the face of
21
difficulty are likely to be consequential. If what one does and how it is done is outside one’s
control, then one should be attuned to the odds of success, and switch whenever possible to tasks
in which the odds of success look better.
This leads us to consider two competing predictions for how social class matters for how
difficulty mindsets and thus subsequent motivation. First, social class may have a direct effect on
motivation. Prior theorizing and research tends to be in line with the idea that social class would
have a direct effect on motivation. For example, Laurin, Engstrom and Alic (2019) have recently
suggested that it is the affordances and constraints of being lower in social class which shape a
person’s expectations of success and thus their motivation (Laurin et al., 2019). Expectations of
success consist of people’s belief in their own ability (i.e. efficacy expectations) and belief that
their own effort is consequential (i.e. outcome expectations). Those lower in social class have
lower efficacy expectations compared to those higher in social class (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner,
2009; Lachman & Weaver, 1998) even when they are high performing (MacPhee, Farro, &
Canetto, 2013). Being lower in social class is associated with lower belief that effort is
consequential, they believe that the world is a less just place (Brandt, 2013) and that
socioeconomic mobility is less likely (Kraus & Tan, 2015). This influences people’s difficulty-
as-impossibility mindset. When one believes that mobility is unlikely (i.e. low expectancy
judgment) they are also likely to endorse the idea that difficulties are a signal of impossibility
(Browman, Destin, Carswell, & Svoboda, 2017). Additionally, guiding low income students to
believe that mobility is possible decreased difficulty-as-impossibility endorsement compared to
low income students guided to weak mobility beliefs or a neutral control group (Browman et al.,
2017). However, this study does not examine how these mobility beliefs matter for people’s
22
difficulty-as-importance mindset. Ultimately this work suggests that social class should have a
direct effect on how people make sense of difficulty and therefore subsequent motivation.
However, another possibility is that social class influences one’s sense of having power
and control over their lives, which then shapes how people respond to difficulty. Therefore,
social class may actually only matter for motivation indirectly through people’s sense of power
and control over their lives and not otherwise. That is, it is not one’s social class per se that
matters; instead, one’s social class matters to the extent that it affects one’s everyday experience
that one’s focused effort is consequential. As noted previously, higher social class is associated
with a stronger sense of power and control. Rosenberg and Pearlin (1978) propose that the
markers of socioeconomic status only have meaning when one’s standing is comparably higher
or lower than others and when that standing implies something about oneself. This means that
even seeming direct effects of social class are actually due to effects of social class on whether
one has power and control. Indeed, Gecas and Seff (1989) found an indirect rather than a direct
effect of education and occupational prestige on self-esteem in their large sample of men. Those
with higher educational and occupational prestige were more likely to experience control and
autonomy in the workplace and these experiences of power and control over one’s choices
predicted more self-esteem. Other researchers also show that effects of social class are indirect
and point to effects of social class on one’s baseline sense that one has power over and can
control everyday experience (Wiederkehr, Darnon, Chazal, Guidmond, & Martinot, 2015). The
implication is that social class may actually only matter insofar as it influences people’s
everyday experience of having power and control over their lives.
Predictions. We propose that one’s chronic social class context should shape the
difficulty mindsets that are likely to come to mind as these contexts are likely to repeatedly
23
instantiate these mindsets (Bargh, 1996; Higgins, 1996). However, it is not yet clear how one’s
chronic context would influence the difficulty mindsets that are likely to come to mind.
Presented graphically in Figure 1, we suggest that the process by which social class shapes the
difficulty mindsets that are likely to come to mind in the moment is through differential exposure
to power and control that people have in their daily lives. Specifically, being lower in social class
limits a person’s actual experience of having power and control (e.g. Evans, 2004; Kohn &
Schooler, 1969) thereby undermining their overall sense of power and control (e.g. Dubois et al.,
2015; Lascano et al., 2015). As a result of this decreased power and control, those lower in social
class are unlikely to believe that their efforts are consequential and thus are more likely to
believe that difficulties are a signal of impossibility and that more likely to believe that
difficulties are a signal of importance. However, it is not yet clear whether this would produce a
direct effect of social class on difficulty mindsets or only an indirect effect through power and
control (this ambiguity is represented by the dashed line in Figure 1). In this series of studies, we
aim to test each of these predictions to determine exactly how social class influences difficulty
mindsets.
Current Studies
In the current studies, we tested two competing predictions. H1: People’s social class (i.e.
income, education, and subjective social status) will have a direct effect on people’s difficulty
mindsets. Specifically, people higher in social class will endorse a difficulty-as-impossibility
mindset less and a difficulty-as-importance mindset more than people lower in social class. We
test H1 in Study 1 using a correlational design and in Studies 2a-2c using experimental designs.
We then test the second prediction. H2: People’s social class will only have an indirect effect on
difficulty mindsets through experienced power and control. Specifically, people higher in social
24
class will have a higher sense of power and control in their daily lives, therefore leading them to
endorse a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset less and a difficulty-as-importance mindset more.
We test H2 in Study 3 using a correlational design and in Studies 4a and 4b using experimental
designs.
Separately, we initially included newly developed measures of ease mindsets (ease-as-
possibility, ease-as-triviality, Fisher & Oyserman, 2017) in some of these studies (Studies 1, 2b,
2c, & 3). Our goal was to begin to develop initial knowledge about the extent that these mindsets
are independent of difficulty mindsets. We had no specific predictions with regard to social class.
Indeed, difficulty and ease mindsets functioned independently so we explored how social class
relates to ease mindsets. We detail these measures and analyses in our Supplemental Materials.
Study 1. In Study 1 we test H1, that social class has a direct effect on difficulty mindsets.
Specifically, in this study, we examine the association between a person’s social class (i.e.
income, education, and subjective social status) and their endorsement of difficulty mindsets.
Sample. We recruited 1630 adult volunteers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk using the
TurkPrime platform (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). Specific demographic information
is detailed in Table 1. To obtain a stable estimate of the association between social class and
difficulty mindsets we use a merged data set consisting of three different rounds of data
collection. The only difference between the rounds of data collection is the presentation of the
difficulty mindsets, as detailed below. Analyses include all participants, including 28 participants
who skipped some items. This means that sample size varied across analyses. Our Supplemental
Materials provides analyses including only participants with complete data and documents the
same pattern of results.
25
Method. Participants read and responded to two blocks of questions; difficulty and ease
mindset questions as well as demographic questions which included our measures of social class.
Because data came from multiple datasets, participants completed our measures in 3 different
orders. For 411 participants, the difficulty and ease mindset questions were randomized into
three blocks; ease-as-possibility and difficulty-as-impossibility items, ease-as-triviality and
difficulty-as-importance items, and filler items followed by demographic questions. For 828
participants, the difficulty and ease mindset questions were randomized together without any
filler items followed by demographic questions. For 391 participants, they first completed the
demographic questions and then the difficulty and ease mindset questions which were
randomized together without any filler items. We ran analyses comparing mean differences
between the three orders as well as comparing the confidence intervals of the correlation
coefficients, finding no significant differences. Therefore, we use the combined merged dataset
in all subsequent analyses, but present results separated by order in our Supplemental Materials.
Difficulty Mindsets.
Difficulty-as-impossibility. We used Fisher and Oyserman’s (2017) 4-item, 6-point
response (1=strongly disagree, 6=strongly agree) measure (e.g., “If a task feels difficult, my gut
says that it may be impossible for me.”). The scale is reliable (α = 0.87) and therefore we
averaged responses into a composite score (M = 2.62, SD = 1.08).
Difficulty-as-importance. We used Fisher and Oyserman’s (2017) 4-item, 6-point
response (1=strongly disagree, 6=strongly agree) measure (e.g., “If a task feels difficult, my gut
says that it really matters for me.”). The scale is reliable (α = 0.89) and therefore we averaged
responses into a composite score (M = 4.14, SD = 0.99).

26
Social Class.
Income. We assessed annual income using Lewis and Oyserman’s (2015) 11 categories:
(1) < $10,000, (2) $10,000-$19,999, (3) $20,000-$29,999, (4) $30,000-$39,999, (5) $40,000-
$49,999, (6) $50,000-$59,999, (7) $60,000-$69,999, (8) $70,000-$79,999, (9) $80,000-$89,999,
(10) $90,000-$99,999, and (11) > $100,000. In this study, the most common (modal) income
categories was $20,000-$29,000 while mean income was higher (M = 4.69, SD = 2.73).
Education. We assessed education using Lewis and Oyserman’s (2015) 9 categories: (1)
less than high school, (2) high school diploma, (3) some college, no degree, (4)
vocational/technical degree, (5) associate’s degree, (6) bachelor’s degree, (7) master’s degree,
(8) professional degree (M.D., D.D.S., J.D., etc.), and (9) doctoral degree. In this study, the most
common (modal) level of education was a bachelor’s degree and the average level of education
was lower, a vocational/technical degree (M = 4.83, SD = 1.76).
Subjective Social Status. We assessed subjective social status using the MacArthur 10-
rung ladder scale of subjective socioeconomic status (Adler et al., 2000; Kraus et al., 2009).
Participants are presented with a ten-rung ladder and told that the top ladder rung (i.e. rung 10)
represents the best off people in terms of having the most money, the most education, and the
most respected jobs and the bottom ladder rung (i.e. rung 1) represents the worst off people in
terms of having the least money, the least education, and the least respected jobs. Respondents
are asked to choose which rung on the ladder they fit. In this study, the most common (modal)
subjective social status choice was 5, which is just below the midpoint of the scale while the
mean response was a bit lower (M = 4.73, SD = 1.65).
Preliminary Analyses. We wanted to first confirm the structure of the difficulty mindsets
as two distinct constructs as previously found (Fisher & Oyserman, 2017) and conducted two
27
analyses. First, we examined a small negative correlation between difficulty-as-impossibility and
difficulty-as-importance (r(1604)=-0.21, p < 0.001, 95% CI [-0.256, -0.163]) consistent with
Fisher and Oyserman (2017) and suggesting that people are able to hold both mindsets
simultaneously. Second, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to document that
the two-mindset model (Figure 2) fits the data better than a single mindset model in which
difficulty-as-impossibility is reverse coded and loaded onto a single factor with difficulty-as-
importance questions. The two-mindsets model treats difficulty-as-impossibility questions as
indicators of a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset and difficulty-as-importance questions as
indicators of a distinct difficulty-as-importance mindset. For this analysis, we used the lavaan
package (Rosseel, 2012) in R and the recommended indices of fit --root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA, good fit is a value < 0.08), the comparative fit index (CFI good fit is a
value > 0.95), and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI good fit is a value > 0.95; Browne & Cudeck,
1993; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Jackson, Gillaspy, & Purc-Stephenson, 2009). The two difficulty-
mindset model showed a much better fit to the data (RMSEA = 0.064, CFI = 0.981, TLI = 0.973)
than the single difficulty-mindset model (RMSEA = 0.302, CFI = 0.575, TLI = 0.404).
Therefore, we move forward by treating difficulty mindsets as two distinct constructs; difficulty-
as-impossibility and difficulty-as-importance.
We took a similar two-step approach for determining whether social class should be
treated as a latent variable comprised of income, education and subjective social status (SSS) or
allowing the three indicators to be separate but correlated variables. First, we examined
correlations. As can be seen, we found a large association between income and SSS
(r(1602)=0.55, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.515, 0.583]) and moderate associations between income
and education (r(1604)=0.30, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.255, 0.343]) and between SSS and education
28
(r(1603)=0.28, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.235, 0.324]). The strong correlation between income and
SSS is consistent with the results from a nationally representative sample documenting an
increasing association of income and subjective social status (Cohen, Shin, Liu, Ondish, &
Kraus, 2017). Then we tested structure of social class measures as they relate to difficulty-as-
importance and difficulty-as-impossibility mindsets using structural equation modeling (SEM).
We compared the model fit of two models, the single latent construct model depicted in Figure 3
and a three-correlated indicator model. In these analyses, we used the same fit indices detailed
above when testing for model fit. Both the single latent construct model (RMSEA = 0.046, CFI =
0.982, TLI = 0.976) and the three-correlated indicator (RMSEA = 0.044, CFI = 0.984, TLI =
0.977) models showed acceptable model fit, implying that either model was a plausible one.
Therefore, we used the single latent construct model given that both models are acceptable and
the single construct model is more parsimonious. Therefore, we created a social class variable by
taking the average of standardized versions of income, education, and SSS. However, since
researchers often use a single indicator, we present analyses separated by individual indicator in
our Supplemental Materials (Table S1).
Results. We tested H1; that social class directly influences people’s difficulty mindsets.
Specifically, in this study, that a person’s social class and their endorsement of difficulty-as-
impossibility are negatively associated and that their social class and endorsement of difficulty-
as-importance are positively associated. Supporting this prediction, people lower in social class
were more likely to agree that difficulties are a signal of impossibility (r(1604)=-0.10, p < 0.001,
95% CI [-0.148, -0.052]). However, people’s social class was not associated with their
endorsement of difficulty-as-importance (r(1604)=0.02, p = 0.555, 95% CI [-0.028, 0.068]),
29
inconsistent with H1. Our results replicate Fisher and Oyserman (2017) but not Aelenei, Lewis,
and Oyserman (2017).
Studies 2a. In Study 1 we found some evidence for H1 in the negative relationship
between individual’s social class and their endorsement that difficulty signaled impossibility.
However, we found no relationship between an individual’ social class and their endorsement
that difficulty signaled importance. Therefore, in experiments 2a-2c we turned to causally testing
whether social class impacts difficulty mindsets. We did this in three separate studies with three
different manipulations of social class. In Study 2a we used a relative income manipulation to
test the direct effect of social class on difficulty mindsets.
Sample. We recruited 305 adult volunteers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and
restricted volunteers to a single study in our sequence (Litman et al., 2016). Specific
demographic information is detailed in Table 1. Analyses included all participants, including 6
participants who skipped some items. This means that sample size varied across analyses. Our
Supplemental Materials provides analyses including only participants with complete data and
documents the same pattern of results.
Method. In this study, we manipulated relative income as our manipulation of social class
by using an adapted version of the method described by Schwarz, Bless, Bohner, Harlacher, and
Kellenbenz, (1991, see also Rothman, Haddock, & Schwarz, 2001). Specifically, we randomized
participants to either a low relative income condition (N = 149) or a high relative income
condition (N = 156) using a scale manipulation. Participants in the low relative income condition
reported their income on an 11-point scale which started at ‘less than $50,000’ and went up to
‘greater than $500,000’. This wide range of incomes above their own likely income was
designed so that participants would experience their own income as relatively low (see Figure 4,
30
left panel). Participants in the high relative income condition reported their income on an 11-
point scale which started at ‘less than $5,000’ and went up to ‘greater than $50,000’. This narrow
range of incomes below their own likely income was designed so that participants would
experience their own income as relatively high (see Figure 2, right panel). The manipulation
check revealed that participants randomly assigned to the low-income condition did indeed
report their income as being lower on the scale (M = 1.52, SD = 0.71) compared to participants
randomly assigned to the high-income condition (M = 7.54, SD = 3.39; t(168.113)=21.614, p <
.001). Participants then completed the ease and difficulty mindset questions randomized together
followed by demographic questions where we asked income again using the same measure as in
Study 1.
Difficulty Mindsets. We used the Fisher and Oyserman (2017) measure of difficulty-as-
impossibility (α = 0.91, M = 2.66, SD = 1.06) and difficulty-as-importance (α = 0.92, M = 4.18,
SD = 1.05) as in prior studies.
Social Class. We used the same measures of social class used in prior studies except SSS,
which was not included due to experimenter error (income Mode = $50,000-$59,000; M = 4.85,
SD = 2.65 & education Mode = bachelor’s degree; M = 4.75, SD = 1.69).
Results. We tested H1; that social class directly influences people’s difficulty mindsets.
Specifically, in this study, making a person feel relatively low in their social class through their
income should lead them to endorse a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset more and a difficulty-
as-importance mindset less compared to those guided to feel relatively high in their social class.
Those guided to consider their income as relatively low were no different in their difficulty-as-
impossibility endorsement (M = 2.59, SD =1.03) than those guided to consider their income as
relatively high (M = 2.72, SD =1.09; t(301)=1.101, p = 0.272). Additionally, those guided to
31
consider their income as relatively low were no different in their difficulty-as-importance
endorsement (M = 4.18, SD =1.03) than those guided to consider their income as relatively high
(M = 4.19, SD =1.07; t(300)=0.074, p = 0.941). Therefore, we did not find evidence for H1 in
this study.
Studies 2b. Having found no evidence for a causal link between social class and
difficulty mindsets in Study 2a, we then wanted to try again using a different manipulation of
social class. Specifically, we used a subjective social status manipulation to test the direct effect
of social class on difficulty mindsets.
Sample. We recruited 300 adult volunteers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and
restricted volunteers to only one study in our sequence (Litman et al., 2016). Specific
demographic information is detailed in Table 1. Analyses included all participants, including 2
participants who skipped some items. This means that sample size varied across analyses. Our
Supplemental Materials provides analyses including only participants with complete data and
documents the same pattern of results.
Method. In this study, we manipulated subjective social status as our manipulation of
social class by using a relative social status ladder manipulation that has been previously used to
manipulate social status (Kraus, Cote, & Keltner, 2013). We randomized participants to either a
low relative status condition (N=162) or a high relative status condition (N=138). Participants in
the low relative status condition received instructions to focus on people with higher social
status, implying that their own status was relatively low. Participants randomly assigned to this
condition read the following prompt: “Below is a ladder representing where people stand in the
United States. Now, please compare yourself to the people at the very top of the ladder. These
are the people who are the best off – those who have the most money, most education, and the
32
most respected jobs. In particular, we’d like you to think about how you are different from those
in people in terms of your own income, educational history, and job status. Think about an
interaction with the person from the top of the class hierarchy. How is this interaction likely to
play out? How are the differences between you likely to shape the way the interaction goes?”
Participants randomly assigned to the high relative status condition read the same instructions
except that instead of comparing themselves to people at the very top, they were instructed to
compare themselves to people at the very bottom, implying that their own status was relatively
high. Though people’s response to the manipulation were in the expected direction, the
manipulation check showed no significant condition effect on where people placed themselves
on the scale (high status manipulation M = 4.86, SD = 1.64, low status manipulation M = 4.61,
SD = 1.76; t(297)=-1.214, p = 0.226). Participants then completed the ease and difficulty mindset
questions randomized together followed by demographic questions which included income and
education.
Difficulty Mindsets. We used the Fisher and Oyserman (2017) measure of difficulty-as-
impossibility (α = 0.92, M = 2.71, SD = 1.04) and difficulty-as-importance (α = 0.90, M = 4.30,
SD = .98) as in prior studies.
Social Class. We used the same measures of social class used in prior studies except SSS
as it was embedded in the manipulation (income Mode = $20,000-$29,000; M = 4.94, SD = 2.78
& education Mode = bachelor’s degree; M = 4.79, SD = 1.73).
Results. We tested H1; that social class directly influences people’s difficulty mindsets.
Specifically, in this study, that making a person feel relatively low in their social class through
their subjective status would lead them to endorse a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset more and
a difficulty-as-importance mindset less than those made to feel high in their social class. Those
33
guided to consider their subjective status as relatively low were no different in their difficulty-as-
impossibility endorsement (M = 2.79, SD = 1.09) than those guided to consider their subjective
status as relatively high (M = 2.61, SD = 0.96; t(298)= 1.523, p = 0.129). Additionally, those
guided to consider their subjective status as relatively low were no different in their difficulty-as-
importance endorsement (M = 4.32, SD = 0.92) than those guided to consider their subjective
status as relatively high (M = 4.29, SD = 1.05; t(298)= 0.382, p = 0.703). Once again, we did not
find evidence for H1 in this study.
Study 2c. Once again, we found no evidence for a causal link between social class and
difficulty mindsets in both Study 2a and 2b. However, these studies employed methods that have
recently failed to replicate (Klein et al., 2018), making it unclear whether the null results are due
to the method or actual lack of a null effect. Therefore, we wanted to do one more test of H1 to
confirm there was no direct relationship between social class and difficulty mindsets. In Study 2c
we used a financial standing manipulation to test the direct effect of social class on difficulty
mindsets.
Sample. We recruited 325 college student volunteers from the University of Southern
California subject pool. Specific demographic information is detailed in Table 1.
Method. In this study, we manipulated financial standing as our manipulation of social
class by using a manipulation that has been previously used in college student samples to
manipulate participants subjective status (e.g. Devoe & Pfeffer, 2010; Nelson & Morrison,
2004). Specifically, we randomized participants to either a low financial standing condition
(N=162) or a high financial standing condition (N=163) using a scale manipulation. Participants
in the low financial standing condition reported how much money they personally had in their
bank account on an 11-point scale which started at ‘$0-$5,000’ and went up to ‘over $400,000’.
34
This wide range of amounts above their own likely amount was designed so that participants
would experience their own financial standing as relatively low. Participants in the high financial
standing condition reported how much money they personally had in their bank account on an
11-point scale which started at ‘$0-$50’ and went up to ‘over $500’. This narrow range of
amounts below their own likely amount was designed so that participants would experience their
own financial standing as relatively high. The manipulation check revealed that participants
randomly assigned to the low financial standing condition did indeed report the amount of
money in the bank as being lower on the scale (M = 2.02, SD = 1.14) than participants randomly
assigned to the high financial standing condition (M = 7.93, SD = 3.89; t(189.769)=-18.612, p <
0.001). We also included an additional manipulation check question at the end of the study prior
to the demographic questions. We asked participants how satisfied they are with their personal
finances on a 9-point response scale (1=Not at all satisfied to 9=Very satisfied). Those in the low
standing condition were less satisfied (M = 3.88, SD = 2.20) than those in the high standing
condition (M = 4.55, SD = 2.42; t(323)=-2.606, p = 0.010). After the manipulation participants
completed the ease and difficulty mindset questions randomized together followed by
demographic questions.
Difficulty Mindsets. We used the Fisher and Oyserman (2017) measure of difficulty-as-
impossibility (α = 0.89, M = 2.34, SD = 0.91) and difficulty-as-importance (α = 0.89, M = 4.18,
SD = 0.95) as in prior studies.
Social Class. Because this was a college student sample we only collected SSS (Mode =
7; M = 6.06, SD = 1.95).
Results. We tested H1; that social class directly influences people’s difficulty mindsets.
Specifically, in this study, that making a person feel relatively low in their social class through
35
their financial standing would lead them to endorse a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset more
and a difficulty-as-importance mindset less. Those guided to consider their financial standing as
relatively low were no different in their difficulty-as-impossibility endorsement (M = 2.36, SD =
0.96) than those guided to consider their financial standing as relatively high (M = 2.31, SD =
0.87; t(323)=0.477, p = 0.634). Additionally, those guided to consider their financial standing as
relatively low were no different in their difficulty-as-importance endorsement (M = 4.26, SD =
0.90) than those guided to consider their financial standing as relatively high (M = 4.10, SD =
1.00; t(323)=1.498, p = 0.135). Across three studies and three different manipulation we failed to
find evidence for a direct effect of social class on difficulty mindsets.
Study 3. Having found little evidence for the link between social class and difficulty
mindsets in four studies, we next turn to H2. We examine whether social class has an indirect
effect on people’s difficulty mindset through their sense of power and control. Specifically, in
this study, we examine whether being higher in social class is associated with having a higher
sense of power and control in one’s daily life, thereby making one less likely to interpret
difficulties as impossibility and more likely to interpret difficulty as importance. As secondary
questions, we also examined potential moderating variables (e.g. income inequality,
intergenerational mobility, and need for cognition) which we detail in our Supplemental
Materials.
Sample. We recruited 403 adult volunteers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and
restricted volunteers to a single study in our sequence (Litman et al., 2016). Specific
demographic information is detailed in Table 1. Analyses included all participants, including 6
participants who skipped some items. This means that sample size varied across analyses. Our
36
Supplemental Materials provides analyses including only participants with complete data and
documents the same pattern of results.
Method. Participants completed the survey in the following order: Block 1: mindset
scales (all items presented in randomized order), Block 2: Sense of Power (Anderson, John, &
Keltner, 2012) and Sense of Control (Lachman & Weaver, 1998) scales (randomized order of
scale, within scale items randomized), Block 3: Need for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao,
1984) scale (randomized order), Block 4: demographics, concluding with zip code (used to
obtain measures of zip code level income inequality and intergenerational mobility).
Difficulty Mindsets. We used the Fisher and Oyserman (2017) measure of difficulty-as-
impossibility (α = 0.86, M = 2.70, SD = 1.08) and difficulty-as-importance (α = 0.83, M = 4.02,
SD = 0.95) as in prior studies.
Social Class. We used the same measures of social class used in prior studies (income
Mode = $20,000-$29,000; M = 4.66, SD = 2.68; education Mode = bachelor’s degree; M = 4.80,
SD = 1.78, and SSS; Mode = 5; M = 4.82, SD = 1.70).
Sense of Power Scale. We used Anderson, John and Keltner’s (2012) 8-item, 7-point
sense of power (1=disagree strongly, 7=agree strongly) measure (e.g. “In my relationship with
others, I can get people to listen to what I say,” “My ideas and opinions are often ignored”
[reverse-coded]). The scale is reliable (α = 0.89) and therefore we averaged responses into a
composite score (M = 4.78, SD = 1.03).
Sense of Control Scale. We used Lachman and Weaver’s (1998) 12-item scale, 7-point
sense of control (1=disagree strongly, 7=agree strongly) measure (e.g., “I can do just about
anything that I really set my mind to,” “Other people determine most of what I can and cannot
37
do” [reverse-coded]). The scale is reliable (α = 0.92) and therefore we averaged responses into a
composite score (M = 4.69, SD = 1.11).
Need for Cognition Scale. We used Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao’s (1984) 19-item scale, 5-
point need for cognition (1=extremely uncharacteristic of me, 5=extremely characteristic of me)
measure (e.g., “I prefer complex to simple problems,” “I prefer to think about small, daily
projects to long term ones” [reverse-coded]). The scale is reliable (α = 0.91) and therefore we
averaged responses into a composite score (M = 3.35, SD = 0.66).
Income Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility. We asked participants to report their
current zip code and their zip code when they were growing up. We planned to use both zip
codes to obtain Census tract by cross walking (Wilson & Din, 2018). However, though
participants provided both, historic information was not always available at the state and county
levels or included large amounts of missing values so we limited our analyses to current zip
codes. We used the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey Census tract level
estimates of income inequality to obtain local and state GINI levels
(https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml) and to calculate Piketty and
Saez’s (2003) ratio of income for the top 1% and the bottom 99% of the population at both state
and local level (https://www.epi.org/publication/the-new-gilded-age-income-inequality-in-the-u-
s-by-state-metropolitan-area-and-county/). We obtained estimates of intergenerational mobility
using Opportunity Insights Census tract level estimates of local and state level intergenerational
mobility (https://opportunityinsights.org).
Results. We first wanted to test H1 once more; that social class directly influences
people’s difficulty mindsets. Specifically, that a person’s social class and their endorsement of
difficulty-as-impossibility are negatively associated and that their social class and endorsement
38
of difficulty-as-importance are positively associated. Supporting the prediction, we once again
found that people lower in social class were more likely to endorse the idea that difficulties are a
signal of impossibility (r(400)=-0.15, p = 0.003, 95% CI [-0.244, -0.053]). However, once again
people’s social class was not associated with their endorsement of difficulty-as-importance
(r(400)=0.07, p = 0.166, 95% CI [-0.028, 0.166]), replicating the pattern found in Study 1.
We then tested H2; that social class impacts difficulty mindsets indirectly through
person’s sense of power and sense of control. We did this by entering both sense of power and
control in parallel mediation models using Hayes (2013) Process Model 4 with 5,000
bootstrapped samples. Figure 5 depicts these analyses graphically using our social class latent
construct. We found a significant total effect of a person’s social class on their difficulty-as-
impossibility endorsement (b = -0.2139, SE = 0.0703, 95% CI [-0.3522, -0.0756]). One’s social
class had a significant indirect effect (b = -0.2078, SE = 0.0463, 95% CI [-0.3019, -0.1202]) on
their difficulty-as-impossibility endorsement through their sense of power and control. The
individual indirect effects via individual’s sense of power (b = -0.0429, SE = 0.0183, 95% CI [-
0.0827, -0.0117]) and sense of control (b = -0.1649, SE = 0.0391, 95% CI [-0.2485, -0.0947])
were both significant. When we included a person’s sense of power and sense of control as
mediators, social class no longer had an effect on whether people endorsed a difficulty-as-
impossibility mindset (b = -0.0061, SE = 0.0578, 95% CI [-0.1197, 0.1074]).
With regard to difficulty-as-importance mindset, we did not find a significant total effect
of a person’s social class on the extent to which they endorsed a difficulty-as-importance mindset
(b = 0.0863, SE = 0.0622, 95% CI [-0.0359, 0.2085]). However, one’s social class did have a
significant indirect effect (b = 0.0931, SE = 0.0291, 95% CI [0.0424, 0.1558]) on their likelihood
of endorsing a difficulty-as-importance mindset through their sense of power and sense of
39
control. The individual indirect effects via one’s sense of power (b = 0.0432, SE = 0.0191, 95%
CI [0.0121, 0.0860]) and sense of control (b = 0.0499, SE = 0.0255, 95% CI [0.0067, 0.1077])
were both significant
1
. When we included a person’s sense of power and sense of control as
mediators, the relation between one’s social class and their difficulty-as-importance endorsement
remained non-significant (b = -0.0068, SE = 0.0602, 95% CI [-0.1251, 0.1115]).
In our Supplemental Materials we present additional analyses for interested readers,
which address questions separate from the overall purpose of this paper. First, we present
mediation models using each of the individual indicators of social class (i.e. income, education,
and SSS) as the independent variable. Second, we present the set of exploratory moderation
analyses. We found that Need for Cognition did moderate the relationship between social class
and difficulty-as-impossibility, but not difficulty-as-importance. Also, we found that income
inequality and intergenerational mobility did not significantly moderate the relationship between
social class and difficulty mindsets (Table S2).
Study 4a. After finding promising correlational evidence for H2 in Study 3, we next
wanted to test this path experimentally. Research to date is clear on the first path of the indirect
effect; that being higher in social class is linked to higher levels of experienced power and
control (Anderson et al., 2012; Dubois et al., 2015; Lachman & Weaver, 1998; Lascano et al.,
2015; Mittal & Griskevicius, 2014). Therefore, in Studies 4a and b we turn our attention to
understanding whether experienced power and control causally influence people’s difficulty
mindsets. In Study 4a we examine the effect of having either low or high power on difficulty
mindset endorsement.

1
We test indirect effects following Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty (2011) who demonstrate
that these effects can occur in the absence of direct effects.
40
Sample. We recruited 223 college student volunteers from the University of Southern
California subject pool. Specific demographic information is detailed in Table 1.
Method. In this study, we manipulated sense of power using forced agreement scales.
Participants were randomized to either a low-power (N = 113) or a high-power condition (N =
110). Following prior studies using and validating forced agreement scale manipulations
(Petrocelli, Martin, & Li, 2010; Salancik & Conway, 1975), all participants rated their agreement
on a 6-point agreement scale (1=slightly agree to 6=strongly agree). Participants in the low
power condition rated their agreement with questions such as “When it comes down to it, I have
little power and sway over some aspects of my life.” Participants in the high-power condition
rated their agreement with questions such as “When it comes down to it, I have quite a bit of
power and sway over some aspects of my life.” By forcing participants to agree with a statement
they should search their memory for instances supporting their agreement and this information
would then be salient for subsequent judgments (Petrocelli et al., 2010). Full items used in the
manipulation are presented in Supplemental Materials. After the manipulation participants then
completed the difficulty-as-importance scale, followed by the difficulty-as-impossibility scale,
and finished with demographics.
Difficulty Mindsets. We used the Fisher and Oyserman (2017) measure of difficulty-as-
importance (α = 0.88, M = 4.15, SD = 0.94) and difficulty-as-impossibility (α = 0.90, M = 2.30,
SD = 0.98) used in prior studies.
Results. We tested H2; that social class indirectly influenced people’s difficulty mindsets
through power and control. Specifically, in this study testing whether being guided to think you
have low-power would lead people to endorse a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset more and a
difficulty-as-importance mindset less than being guided to think you have high-power. Those in
41
the low-power condition were no different in their difficulty-as-impossibility endorsement (M =
2.38, SD = 0.96) than those in the high-power condition (M = 2.40, SD = 0.99; t(221)=-0.132, p
= 0.896). However, we did find an effect for difficulty-as-importance. Those in the low-power
condition were less likely to endorse a difficulty-as-importance mindset (M = 4.02, SD = 0.92)
than those in the high-power condition (M = 4.29, SD = 0.99; t(221)=-2.143, p = 0.033). These
results provide some evidence for H2. One potential reason for the null finding with difficulty-
as-impossibility could be that these items came after difficulty-as-importance, therefore the
subtle power manipulation may not have persisted to the difficulty-as-impossibility items.
Therefore, it is unclear whether or not power influences difficulty-as-impossibility from this
study.
Study 4b. Having found evidence for the effect of power on difficulty-as-importance, we
next ran the same study but with control as our main independent variable in Study 4b.
Sample. We recruited 226 college student volunteers from the University of Southern
California subject pool. Specific demographic information is detailed in Table 1. Analyses
included all participants, including 1 participant who skipped some items. This means that
sample size varied across analyses. Our Supplemental Materials provides analyses including only
participants with complete data and documents the same pattern of results.
Method. In this study, we manipulated sense of control using forced agreement scales.
Participants were randomized to either a low-control (N = 113) or a high-control condition (N =
113). Following prior studies using the same forced agreement scale manipulations (Petrocelli et
al., 2010, Salancik & Conway, 1975), all participants rated their agreement on a 6-point scale
(1=slightly agree to 6=strongly agree). Participants in the low-control condition rated their
agreement with questions such as “When it comes down to it, I have little choice or control over
42
some aspects of my life.” Participants in the high-control condition rated their agreement with
questions such as “When it comes down to it, I have quite a lot of choice or control over some
aspects of my life.” Full items used in the manipulation are presented in Supplemental Materials.
After the manipulation participants then completed the difficulty-as-importance scale, followed
by the difficulty-as-impossibility scale, and finished with demographics.
Difficulty Mindsets. We used the Fisher and Oyserman (2017) measure of difficulty-as-
importance (α = 0.91, M = 4.12, SD = 0.96) and difficulty-as-impossibility (α = 0.92, M = 2.32,
SD = 0.97) as in prior studies.
Results. We tested H2; that social class indirectly influenced people’s difficulty mindsets
through power and control. Specifically, in this study testing whether being guided to think you
have low-control would lead people to endorse a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset more and a
difficulty-as-importance mindset less than being guided to think you have high-control. Those in
the low-control condition were marginally less likely to disagree that difficulty is a signal of
impossibility (M = 2.21, SD = 0.88) than those in the high-control condition (M = 2.43, SD =
1.04; t(223)=-1.693, p = 0.092). This effect is in the opposite direction of what we predicted.
However, we did find a marginally significant effect for difficulty-as-importance in the predicted
direction. Those in the low-control condition were less likely to endorse a difficulty-as-
importance mindset (M = 4.01, SD = 0.98) than those in the high-control condition (M = 4.24,
SD = 0.93; t(224)=-1.812, p = 0.071). These results provide some additional evidence for H2. As
in Study 4a, the difficulty-as-importance questions came before the difficulty-as-impossibility
items. Therefore, it is unclear whether the marginal effect of condition on difficulty-as-
impossibility score is stable or not as the effect of the manipulation may have faded by the time
participants answered those questions.
43
Discussion
Difficulties are obstacles that hinder achievement of a goal, whether at work or in daily
life. Since many of life’s meaningful goals are not easy to attain, it is likely the case that people
experience at least some difficulty whenever they strive for such life goals. Indeed, experiencing
difficulty is often interpreted as implying something about whether the goal itself is worthwhile
for oneself or whether the odds are such that one may as well quit (Oyserman, 2007; Oyserman
et al., 2017). That is, experiencing difficulty can signal that goal achievement is impossible and
efforts are better spent elsewhere (i.e. a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset). In contrast,
experiencing difficulty can also signal that the goal itself is valuable and important for oneself
(i.e. a difficulty-as-importance mindset). People spend less time (Smith & Oyserman, 2015),
engage less and perform worse on difficult tasks (Oyserman et al., 2018) when a difficulty-as-
impossibility mindset rather than a difficulty-as-importance mindset is on the mind. People with
lower social class have less say over their work schedule, less stable incomes, and less stable
work hours (Fenwick & Tausig, 2001; Kohn, 1969; Kohn & Schooler, 1969). We predicted that
these features of daily life could also differentially shape the chronic difficulty mindsets of
people with higher and lower social class by undermining people’s sense of power and control.
In examining the relationship between a person’s social class and their beliefs that
difficulty signals impossibility or importance we tested two competing predictions. The first
prediction is that social class will have a direct effect on people’s difficulty mindsets. The second
prediction is that social class will only have an indirect effect on difficulty mindsets through
people’s sense of power and control over their lives. Across seven studies we find little evidence
for the first prediction and more evidence supporting the second. In Study 1 we found that
Americans from lower social class backgrounds (operationalized as a single latent construct
44
composed of income, education, and subjective social status) endorsed the idea that difficulty
implies impossibility more than Americans from higher social class backgrounds, supporting the
first prediction. However, we did not find evidence that Americans from lower class
backgrounds endorsed a “no pain, no gain” idea that difficulty implies importance and value less
than Americans from higher social class backgrounds. Additionally, we found no experimental
evidence for the direct effect on social class. In Studies 2a-2c we tested this experimentally using
three different methods of manipulating people’s subjective social class; relative income in Study
2a, subjective status in Study 2b, and financial standing in Study 2c. Across all three studies we
find no evidence that social class directly influences how people make sense of their experiences
of difficulty.
However, we do find evidence for the indirect effect of social class on difficulty mindsets
through power and control. In Study 3 we find that Americans from lower social class
backgrounds were less likely to report power and control in their everyday lives and it was this
lack of power and control that affected both their difficulty-as-impossibility and difficulty-as-
importance mindset endorsement (as revealed in mediation analyses), supporting the second
prediction. Because the link between social class and power and control is well-established
(Anderson et al., 2012; Dubois et al., 2015; Lachman & Weaver, 1998; Lascano et al., 2015;
Mittal & Griskevicius, 2014) we then examined the causal relationship between power and
control and difficulty mindsets. In Study 4a we find that thinking one has high power lead to
more agreement that difficulty signals importance and no differences on difficulty-as-
impossibility endorsement. In Study 4b we find that thinking one has high control lead to
marginally more agreement that difficulty signals importance and surprisingly more agreement
that difficulty signals impossibility. These results provide early evidence that power and control
45
influence the extent to which difficulties are a signal of importance. The null and reverse
findings with difficulty-as-impossibility mindset score are surprising, but may be due to these
questions coming after the difficulty-as-importance items. The forced agreement scale effect is a
subtle manipulation and therefore it is unclear whether the power and control manipulations
impacted people’s difficulty-as-impossibility mindsets the same way the manipulation impacted
people’s difficulty-as-importance mindset. Across these studies we find evidence rejecting the
direct effect of social class on difficulty mindsets, and instead find early evidence for an indirect
effect through experienced power and control.
Advancing social class research. As we reviewed in our introduction, social class is
associated with worse life outcomes whether assessed by health (Case & Deaton, 2015; Herd,
Goesling, & House, 2007; Lee et al., 2015; Muntaner et al., 2013; Oyserman et al., 2014;
Williams et al., 2016), accumulation of wealth (Killewald et al., 2017), or occupational (Murray
et al., 2016; Rivera & Tilcsik, 2016) or educational (Pokropek et al., 2015; Quinn & Cooc, 2015)
attainments. In part, these effects are due to the lack of resources and stigma associated with low
place in the social structure (Fisher et al., 2017; Oyserman & Fisher, 2017). The implication is
that it is the “hard knock” lives of those working in low status jobs and experiencing social
interactions in which they are low in social status that carries the conclusion that if things are not
working, one should shift to something else. In the current paper, our goal was to advance
understanding of how social class matters by beginning to address the recursive effects of social
class on difficulty mindsets, specifically through differential access to experiences of power and
control over one’s daily life. Our results provide some insight into how social class influence
one’s sense of power and control which then shapes motivation and engagement when difficulty
is experienced.
46
Our research presents an explanation for how differential access to resources can shape
people’s interpretations of their experiences of difficulty and hence their likely engagement and
motivation. Being lower in social class undermines power and control which is likely to lead
people away from interpreting difficulties when working towards their goals as implying
impossibility, thereby undermining motivation to work towards their important goals, ultimately
leading to worse outcomes. These outcomes can circle back to influence how people make sense
of themselves and their experienced difficulties, leading to a recursive process that is likely to
exacerbate existing disparities (Fisher et al., 2017; Oyserman & Fisher, 2017). Prior research has
shown that people’s sense of their own social status is sensitive to small contextual cues such as
whether they are oriented to consider others with higher or with lower status (Kraus et al., 2013).
Orienting people to consider others with higher social status is associated with less optimism
about class mobility (Kraus & Tan, 2015), less belief that one has power over others (Dubois,
Rucker, & Galinsky, 2015), and even more eating (Cheon & Hong, 2016). However, our studies
suggest that these manipulations may not always be effective in shaping motivation because they
ignore the crucial role of experienced power and control.
A core insight from our results is that people do not get to fully choose the difficulty
mindsets they endorse; their life circumstances choose these for them. That is, difficulty
mindsets are constructed as a result of repeated everyday exposure to a certain kind of context
and cultural environment that shape how people make sense of their chances of success and the
value associated with their goals (Laurin et al., 2019). People do not construct their difficulty
mindsets outside of these contexts and environments, their everyday and repeated experiences of
power and control expose them to a particular set of associations. Hence, difficulty can mean
importance--if one is born rich and has the resources, power, and control to tackle difficulty. But
47
difficulty can mean impossibility--if one is born poor and does not have the resources, power,
and control to tackle difficulty rather than simply getting out of the way. Of course, current
contexts can reinforce or shape these acquired mindsets; psychologically unsafe working
environments that foster uncertainty and lack of control should further increase difficulty-as-
impossibility mindsets regarding solving work problems. At the same time, psychologically safe
and welcoming working environments with leadership that encourages initiative-taking and
employee voice should foster certainty and a sense of power and control which should foster
difficulty-as-importance mindsets regarding solving work problems. Moreover, psychologically
safe and positive working environments may be more successful than stressful ones in instilling a
common sense of difficulty-as-importance in their employees, providing a sense that “this is who
we are, and this is the way we do it.”
Psychologists are divided in how to consider social class. One possibility is that social
class is a latent construct composed of various indicators of social class (e.g. Kraus et al., 2017).
Alternatively, social class may be best understood through looking at each individual indicator
separately (e.g. Duncan & Magnusson, 2003). Our results suggest that the effect of social class
on difficulty mindsets are best understood through a single latent construct composed of income,
education, and subjective social status. However, supplemental analyses suggested that assessing
social class with a single indicator, especially education (at least among adults) will not
necessarily yield the same effects as using an array of indicators. The implication is that which
indicator one uses and how one operationalizes social class is likely to lead to different patterns
of results (for a discussion in the health domain, see Shavers, 2007). Pragmatically, the indicators
used should reflect the theoretical process model of influence. In our case, we predicted that the
effect of social class on difficulty mindsets and motivation is operating through sense of power
48
and control (e.g., Anderson et al, 2012; Dubois et al., 2015; Lachman & Weaver, 1998; Lascano
et al., 2015; Laurin et al., 2019; Mittal & Griskevicius, 2014). Our results support this prediction.
If education leads to income but income itself is the proximal link to resources, power, and
control, then focusing on income and subjective social status rather than education should yield
more consistent effects.
Advancing identity-based motivation research. In addition to social class, our results
are theoretically important for motivation research because they document that place in social
class has a chronic, small effect on adult Americans endorsement that difficulty is a signal of
impossibility. However, our results suggest that the core process is what social class implies for
one’s sense of power and control over their lives. Because prior studies did not include a diverse
sample and did not include direct indicators of social class, an association with place in social
structure was posited but never demonstrated (Fisher et al., 2017; Oyserman, 2007, 2009). An
increasing body of research suggests that low income (Browman & Destin, 2016), and first-
generation college (Stephens et al., 2014) students feel less efficacious in college but that
intervention to change their construal of the college setting can improve their outcomes (for a
review, see Dittmann & Stephens, 2017). These studies do not test whether effects are due to
change in students’ difficulty mindsets, but our results imply that they may be. The implication is
that changing difficulty mindsets is a common denominator across interventions aimed to
improve academic outcomes of students from low social class backgrounds. Emerging research
documents that teachers delivering an identity-based motivation intervention can change their
students’ difficulty-as-importance and difficulty-as-impossibility mindsets (O’Donnell &
Oyserman, 2018).
49
Limitations. We show that social class has an indirect effect on people’s difficulty
mindsets through people’s sense of power and control in a series of studies. However, like any
set of studies, our studies have a number of limitations that should be taken into account. First,
our participants were recruited through MTurk and a university subject pool. Our MTurk sample
allows us to have a more heterogeneous and representative group to study social class then the
commonly studied college student population (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012). However, our
sample is less representative of the U.S. population at large than would be obtained by
probability samples (Weinberg, Freese, & McElhattan, 2014). Moreover, while median
education in our MTurk sample is an undergraduate degree, median income is below family
median income and we adequately represent neither the wealthy nor the very poor.
Second, we use three indicators of social class (income, education, subjective social
status) that are currently common among psychologists. However, future research is needed to
consider other plausible indicators that may have important consequences for experience of
power and control including wealth in assets separate from income in shaping motivation
(Sherraden & Gilbert, 2016).
Third, our sample and indicators are plausible for the U.S.; however, we do not have any
samples from social contexts outside the U.S. It is likely that the relationship among our three
measures of social class may differ across cultural contexts (Gregorio & Lee, 2002) as well as
across time in the U.S. (e.g., Cohen et al., 2017; Cohen et al., 2018).
Finally, while we confirmed that social class does not have a direct effect on people’s
difficulty mindsets, the indirect effect is not entirely clear. The link between social class and
power and control is well-established (e.g. Anderson et al, 2012; Dubois et al., 2015; Lachman &
Weaver, 1998; Lascano et al., 2015; Laurin et al., 2019; Mittal & Griskevicius, 2014) but the link
50
between power and control on difficulty mindsets has not been fully tested. We show
correlational evidence for this link in Study 3, and causal evidence for this link on difficulty-as-
importance score in Studies 4a and 4b. These studies however fail to adequately test the causal
relationship between power and control and difficulty-as-impossibility endorsement. The
implication is that further research should be done directly testing this last element of the indirect
effect of social class on difficulty mindsets through power and control.
Implications for policy and intervention. Low wages and less job stability are the new
reality for most Americans (Lambert, 1999). Given that our samples were composed mostly of
adults with some college students, we draw a number of conclusions and practical implications
from these findings for workplace and other settings. First, being lower in social class is likely to
have undermining effects in workplace contexts in which employees are likely to experience
difficulties. Workplaces that provide better wages and a social structure in which workers
experience more power and control are also likely to gain in worker productivity and creativity
in part by changing their difficulty mindsets.
Second, given that we were not able to change this pattern of effects with standard
priming tools (Studies 2a-2c), it is unlikely that token changes to income or status will matter
unless they substantively change employee’s sense of power and control in their work lives.
Examples of such interventions include increasing employee ability to control the number and
timing of their work shifts and breaks or increasing employee voice in work conditions such as
uniforms or who they work with (e.g. Lambert & Haley-Lock, 2004). These interventions should
improve morale (Lambert, 2000) and bolster employee’s sense of power and control, thereby
shifting difficulty mindsets and increasing productivity.
51
In addition to changing elements of the work context to shift experienced power and
control in the workplace, employers may consider intervening directly to change difficulty
mindsets. Prior work documenting that difficulty mindsets can be shifted momentarily using
priming techniques and documenting that interventions can yield lasting change all focuses on
school-aged and college students (e.g., Oyserman et al., 2015; Oyserman et al., 2018; Smith &
Oyserman, 2015). However, it is likely that effects would be found for adults. Hence changing
subtle features of one’s context should shift difficulty mindsets among employees. For example,
consider the common management mantra “go with your strengths.” While this saying suggests
that one should focus on what they are good at, it also implies that one should avoid things that
are not immediately easy, a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset. As a result, this mentality may
bolster motivation on easy tasks, but undermine motivation once things start to feel difficult. It is
better to focus on directly instantiating a difficulty-as-importance mindset into an organization,
advocating “no pain, no gain” instead. Such workplace-based intervention, especially if timed to
coincide with the beginning of a new, unclear, or difficult project, holds promise of improving
employee motivation by directly shifting difficulty mindsets, rather than working to change
employee’s social class.

52
Transition
These studies have shown that social class has an indirect effect on how people make
sense of their experiences of difficulty through people’s sense of power and control. The next
chapter begins to examine how both difficulty mindsets may lead to positive outcomes. While
both difficulty-as-importance and difficulty-as-impossibility are theorized to be useful mindsets,
research to date has only shown that difficulty-as-importance bolsters motivation. Additionally,
the exact process by which difficulty mindsets influence motivation is not clearly understood.
Therefore, the following studies examine both of these questions by testing the relationship
between difficulty mindsets and the time-as-resource metaphor people are likely to adopt.

53
Chapter II: Difficulty Mindsets Influence Time-as-Resource Metaphor

Fisher, O., & Oyserman, D. (in preparation). Difficulty mindsets influence perceptions of
whether time is available.

54
While we do not have to use our experiences of difficulty to make sense of the world
around us, we often do (Schwarz, 2015). How these experiences are used and what they imply
for who one is and for action in the moment are a function of the lay theories people use
(Oyserman, Lewis, Yan, Fisher, O’Donnell, & Horowitz, 2017). Difficulties can signal
importance - that succeeding is actually quite important regardless of the odds of success.
Alternatively, difficulties may signal impossibility, that success is unlikely and hence probably
not worth the time and effort (Fisher & Oyserman, 2017). These difficulty mindsets have been
shown to influence how people understand themselves as well as their motivation and academic
performance (Oyserman, Elmore, Novin, Fisher, & Smith, 2018; Smith & Oyserman, 2015). The
implication is that these mindsets can shape how we perceive and interact with the world around
us, and therefore we argue that these mindsets impact whether or not we see time as being either
a plentiful or a scarce resource. This would then have implications for what one believes they are
capable of accomplishing within a set amount of time.
Difficulty Mindsets
Whether and how an experience of difficulty is likely to matter for cognition and
behavior depends on the lay theory or mindset people draw on in the moment to make sense of
the difficulty (Schwarz, 2015). That is, these mindsets imply something about who one is and
what one is capable of accomplishing (Oyserman et al., 2017). One way to interpret an
experience of difficulty is through a difficulty-as-importance mindset (Fisher & Oyserman,
2017). This mindset emphasizes the value of the task at hand and tends to bolster motivation: “I
really care about this, ‘no pain, no gain,’ this is for me.” While people tend to explicitly endorse
this mindset (Fisher & Oyserman, 2017) other research suggests this mindset is less common in
how people actually respond to and talk about difficulty (Smith & Oyserman, 2015; Yan &
55
Oyserman, in prep). Another way of interpreting difficulty is through a difficulty-as-impossibility
mindset. This mindset highlights the opportunity costs of the task at hand (e.g. low likelihood of
success) and tends to undermine motivation: “I don’t know this (or cannot learn it), this is not for
me.” Despite people generally disagreeing with this mindset explicitly (Fisher & Oyserman,
2017) people implicitly associate difficulty with impossibility (O’Donnell & Oyserman, in prep)
and seem to commonly respond to difficulties as signaling impossibility (e.g. Kornell & Bjork,
2008; Yan, Bjork, & Bjork, 2016), with some exceptions (e.g. Richter, Gendolla, & Wright,
2016).
These difficulty mindsets are dynamically constructed in the moment. That is, which
mindset one is likely to draw on is a function of the affordance and constraints of the situation
and what information is on the mind in the moment (Oyserman et al., 2017). This makes sense as
sometimes people need to see the value of the task in order to persist and other times need to quit
and shift attention elsewhere when things may actually be impossible (Chen & Miller, 2012;
Wrosch, 2010). This would suggest that difficulty-as-importance and difficulty-as-impossibility
mindsets should be distinct from one another, as both represent plausible ways of making sense
of difficulty. Indeed, this is what is commonly seen. The two difficulty mindsets are consistently
found to be weakly negatively correlated with one another at ! = -.12 (Fisher & Oyserman,
2017; see also Fisher & Oyserman, in prep), suggesting that these mindsets represent distinct
constructs and that people have each available as a mindset to interpret experiences of difficulty.
Difficulty mindsets are also distinct from other measures of motivation, showing both
convergent and discriminant validity (Fisher & Oyserman, 2017). Those who endorse a
difficulty-as-importance mindset score tends to be higher in self-efficacy (Bandura, 2006), locus
of control (Rotter, 1996) growth mindset (Dweck, 2000), grit (Duckworth & Quinn, 2009) and
56
others (for a detailed description, see Fisher & Oyserman, 2017). Endorsing a difficulty-as-
impossibility mindset score tends to show moderate negative associations with these measures of
motivation. Importantly, these correlations are generally less or as correlated with these measures
of motivation as the measures of motivation are with each other. The implication is that difficulty
mindsets are not redundant with other existing measures of motivation.
Because these mindsets are dynamically constructed in the moment (Oyserman et al.,
2017), researchers have examined the downstream consequences of instantiating one mindset
over the other for judgment and motivation. For example, Smith and Oyserman (2015)
randomized participants to either a difficulty-as-importance or difficulty-as-impossibility
mindset using a biased scale prime. Students answered questions about only the notion that
experienced difficulty implies importance or only the notion that experienced difficulty implies
impossibility. Those guided to use a difficulty-as-importance mindset performed better on a test
and viewed academics as central to their identity compared to those guided to use a difficulty-as-
impossibility mindset (Smith & Oyserman, 2015). A set of studies using the same manipulation
found that those with a salient difficulty-as-importance mindset had more school focused
possible selves and strategies and performed better on a task than those with a salient difficulty-
as-impossibility mindset (Oyserman et al., 2018). Similarly, Lewis and Earl (2018) found that
dieters guided to use a difficulty-as-importance mindset felt significantly less tempted to
continue snacking compared with dieters guided to use a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset.
While these studies show the utility of adopting a difficulty-as-importance mindset in
terms of bolstering motivation and improving task performance, they ultimately suggest that a
difficulty-as-importance mindset is the ‘good’ mindset to adopt. However, sometimes difficulties
are actually a signal of impossibility and therefore a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset may
57
actually be more useful as it frees you to focus on other goals (Wrosch, 2010). There is some
indirect evidence for this. Knowing when to accept a stressor and shift attention elsewhere rather
than persisting has been effective in buffering various health disparities among those lower in
social class (for a review, see Chen & Miller, 2012). Similarly, research on unattainable goals
has shown that learning to disengage with a goal when it is impossible is associated with better
physical and mental well-being than persisting towards that goal (for a review, see Wrosch,
2010). While in line with our theorizing on the utility of difficulty mindsets, neither body of
work directly examines the role of difficulty mindsets. Empirically, it has not yet been shown
how and in which contexts a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset is likely to lead to positive
outcomes. In this paper, we suggest that one way that these mindsets are likely to be effective is
through their influence on whether one perceives time as being plentiful or scarce, thereby
influencing what one thinks they are capable of accomplishing.
Time as a Resource
People use metaphors to make sense of abstract concepts like time. Conceptual metaphor
theory predicts that metaphors are not just figures of speech but necessary tools people use to
concretize abstract concepts (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). This is useful as it allows people to
reason about abstract concepts because they apply what they know about the concrete concept to
make sense of the abstract ones (Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010). For example, the abstract
concept of time can be concretized as distance or as a resource (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).
2

People should then understand characteristics of resources as being relevant to time (Landau,
2017). There are two ways to make sense of resources, a resource can be bountiful, like air, or it

2
One common metaphor for time is time as space (e.g. Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008). People
often tend to use words and concepts commonly used when referring to space when referring to
time, such as “looking forward” (e.g. Boroditsky, 2000; Clark, 1973; for a review, see Bender &
Beller, 2014).
58
can be scare, like gold, yielding two metaphors for time: time-as-plentiful and time-as-scarce.
Time can be a bountiful resource yielding the notion that “there is plenty of time left” or that one
can “make time” to accomplish goals. Alternatively, time may be a scarce resource such that you
feel “there is hardly any time left” or that you are “running out of time” to accomplish your
goals.
While not always studied in these terms, viewing time as a resource seems to be common
among psychologists (e.g. Carstensen, 1991; Perlow, 1999; Teuchmann, 1999; Moon & Chen,
2015). For example, socioemotional selectivity theory is a life-span theory of motivation which
posits that as one gets older time is more likely to be seen as constrained and limited (i.e. time-
as-scarce) rather than as expansive and open-ended (i.e. time-as-plentiful; Carstensen, 1991).
Cognitive appraisal of time as plentiful or scarce is useful for balancing short-term and long-term
goals, such that viewing time as expansive is associated with knowledge-related goals while
viewing time as limited is associated with emotional goals (for reviews, Carstensen, Isaacowitz,
& Charles, 1999; Mohammad & Drolet, 2019) with some exceptions (e.g. Barber, Opitz,
Martins, Sakaki, & Mather, 2016; Fung, Carstensen, & Lutz, 1999). In this paper we are
interested in how difficulty mindsets shape which time-as-resource metaphor people are likely to
draw on. Which metaphor people use should then have consequences for what people believe
they are capable of accomplishing. Just as difficulty mindsets shape how people understand
themselves and thus their subsequent motivation and task performance (Oyserman et al., 2018;
Smith & Oyserman, 2015), these mindsets should also influence how people understand the
world around them, in particular time. We suggest that a difficulty-as-importance mindset should
lead one to adopt a time-as-plentiful metaphor when making sense of time, while a difficulty-as-
impossibility mindset should lead one to adopt a time-as-scarce metaphor.
59
A difficulty-as-importance mindset highlights the value of the task or goal at hand and
that regardless of the difficulty or lack of resources one should persist as the difficult things are
the most important and thus worthy of increased effort. A salient difficulty-as-importance
mindset implies that you should invest time and effort into your valued goals, therefore time
should be perceived as something that is plentiful or something you can make more of in order to
complete your goals and tasks when this mindset is activated. Perceiving time as plentiful
matters, it is associated with less impatience (less temporal discounting, Zauberman, Kim,
Malkoc, & Bettman, 2009), more compassion (more time helping others, Rudd, Vohs, & Aaker,
2012), and higher subjective well-being (Kasser & Sheldon, 2009). However, when time is too
plentiful (e.g. when people feel idle) people report being less happy (Hsee, Yang, & Wang, 2010;
Robinson, 2013; Robinson & Martin, 2008). Perceiving time as a plentiful resource is context
sensitive. Imagining that you’ll live a long life (Barber et al., 2016; Fung et al., 1999) or feeling
powerful in the moment (Moon & Chen, 2015) both lead one to view time as being more
plentiful. Therefore, we propose that believing difficulties are a signal of importance will be
associated with viewing time as a plentiful resource, which should then lead one to believe that
they are capable of accomplishing imminent but not yet started tasks.
On the other hand, a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset should lead to the perception that
time is a scarce resource. A difficulty-as-impossibility mindset highlights the opportunity costs
of the current situation and should therefore focus attention on whether the resources you have
are best spent on the tasks at hand or whether attention is better focused elsewhere. As a result, a
salient difficulty-as-impossibility mindset should emphasize that time is actually a scarce and
valuable resource. You should therefore be focused on making the most of your limited time to
complete the goals and tasks set before you when a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset is on the
60
mind. Viewing time as scarce or constrained is associated with better cognition (e.g. working
memory, episodic memory Festini, McDonough, & Park, 2016), viewing situations more
positively (e.g. positivity effect Barber et al., 2016; Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003), and
believing that one is using their time effectively (Wilcox, Laran, Stephen, & Zubcsek, 2016).
Additionally, in some contexts perceiving time as scarce is associated with greater motivation
(e.g. after missing a deadline Wilcox et al., 2016). However, time scarcity has also been linked to
worse physical health behaviors (Celnik, Gillespie, & Lean, 2012; Venn & Strazdins, 2016) and
outcomes (Strazdins et al., 2011), worse mental health (Garling, Gamble, Ford, & Hjerm, 2016;
Roxburgh, 2004), as well as other a number of other consequences (for a review, see Rudd,
2019). Perceiving time as scarce is also context sensitive. Reflecting on a shortened life
expectancy (Barber et al., 2016) and being reminded about the fragility of life (Fung &
Carstensen, 2006) both can lead one to view time as being scarcer. Therefore, we propose that
believing difficulties are a signal of impossibility will be associated with viewing time as a
scarce resource, which should then lead one to believe that they may not be capable of
accomplishing imminent but not yet started tasks.
Current Studies
In the current studies, we tested our two main hypotheses. H1: People who endorse a
difficulty-as-importance mindset will view time as a plentiful resource. H2: People who endorse
a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset will view time as a scarce resource. We test these
hypotheses in Study 1 and pre-register it in Study 2 (http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=nw3f4r).
We also examine two secondary questions. First, is there a relationship between endorsing a
difficulty-as-importance mindset and time-as-scarce resource metaphor as well as a relationship
between endorsing a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset and time-as-plentiful resource
61
metaphor? Second, does endorsement of the time-as-resource metaphors mediate the relationship
between difficulty mindsets and the belief that one has enough time to prepare for imminent but
not yet started tasks?
Study 1. We ran a first test of our hypotheses and secondary question.
Pilot. We developed measures to assess the extent to which people perceive time as a
plentiful or a scarce resource and a measure of one’s sense that they have time to prepare for an
imminent task. We piloted items for these measures with 101 participants on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk. We started with the Future Time Perspective Scale (Carstensen & Lang, 1996)
and the Perceived Time Availability Index (Rudd et al., 2012) and developed a face valid four-
item ‘time-as-plentiful’ scale (e.g. “I have the time to do what needs to get done.”) and a face
valid four-time ‘time-as-scarce’ scale (e.g. “I often have the sense that time is running out.”),
asking participants how much they agreed or disagreed (1=strongly disagree, 6=strongly agree).
An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) suggested that the two sets of items represent two
separate factors. Indeed, time-as-plentiful score (α = 0.84) was moderately correlated with time-
as-scarce score (α = 0.88), r(101)=-0.382, p < 0.001, 95% CI [-0.537, -0.202]. To confirm that a
two-factor model was superior to a single factor model (in which the time-as-scarce items are
reversed scored), we ran confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) to compare a single factor model to
a two-correlated factor model. We find that indeed the two-correlated factor model was a
superior fit (Chi-Square Difference = 128.26, p < .001). We present full items in our
Supplemental Materials.
We also piloted eight items designed to assess one’s belief that they have time to
accomplish imminent but not yet started tasks (i.e. ‘time-to-prepare’). We developed a set of
eight items asking participants how likely they are to have enough time to complete an imminent
62
but not yet started task on a 6-point Likert scale (e.g. “You have a presentation for work in two
days and haven’t started preparing. How likely is it that you’ll have enough time to prepare for it
well?” 1=Not at all likely, 6-Very likely). An EFA suggested a single factor. Indeed, the scale
was reliable (α = 0.84). We present full items in our Supplemental Materials. Having developed
clear and reliable measures of time-as-plentiful, time-as-scarce, and time-to-prepare we then
moved to test our hypotheses.
Sample. We recruited 100 adult volunteers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk using the
TurkPrime platform (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). Specific demographic information
is detailed in Table 1.
Method. Participants read and responded to two blocks of questions (difficulty mindset
questions and time-as-resource questions) followed by time-to-prepare questions and concluding
with demographic questions. The order of these first two blocks were counterbalanced, such that
half the participants completed the difficulty mindset questions followed by the time-as-resource
questions while the other half completed them in the reverse order.
Difficulty Mindsets.
Difficulty-as-importance. We used Fisher and Oyserman’s (2017) 4-item, 6-point
response (1=strongly disagree, 6=strongly agree) measure (e.g., “If a task feels difficult, my gut
says that it really matters for me.”). The scale is reliable (α = 0.84) and therefore we averaged
responses into a composite score (M = 4.25, SD = 0.99).
Difficulty-as-impossibility. We used Fisher and Oyserman’s (2017) 4-item, 6-point
response (1=strongly disagree, 6=strongly agree) measure (e.g., “If a task feels difficult, my gut
says that it may be impossible for me.”). The scale is reliable (α = 0.90) and therefore we
averaged responses into a composite score (M = 3.05, SD = 1.29).
63
Time-as-Resource.
Time-as-Plentiful. We used the 4-item measure we developed in our pilot test. Once
again, we found that the scale is reliable (α = 0.83) and therefore averaged responses into a
composite score (M = 4.44, SD = 0.86).
Time-as-Scarce. We used the 4-item measure we developed in our pilot test. Once again,
we found that the scale is reliable (α = 0.87) and therefore averaged responses into a composite
score (M = 3.66, SD = 1.26).
Time-to-Prepare. We used the 8-item measure we developed in our pilot test. Once
again, we found that the scale is reliable (α = 0.80) and therefore averaged responses into a
composite score (M = 4.01, SD = 0.90).
Results. As can be seen in Table 2 (top half) results support H1 and H2. People who
view difficulties as a signal of importance were more likely to also view time as a plentiful
resource (r(100)=0.323, p = 0.001, 95% CI [0.136, 0.488]). People who view difficulties as a
signal of impossibility were more likely to view time as a scarce resource (r(100)=0.463, p <
0.001, 95% CI [0.294, 0.604]). Next, we examined our first secondary question; what is the
relationship between difficulty-as-importance endorsement and time-as-scarce score as well as
difficulty-as-impossibility endorsement and time-as-plentiful score? Difficulty-as-importance
endorsement was unrelated to time-as-scarce score (r(100)=0.053, p = 0.602, 95% CI [-0.144,
0.246]) and difficulty-as-impossibility endorsement was unrelated to time-as-plentiful score
(r(100)=0.121, p = 0.232, 95% CI [-0.077, 0.310]).
We then examined our next secondary question; whether time-as-resource mediates the
relationship between difficulty mindsets and time-to-prepare. As shown in Figure 1, believing
that time was a plentiful resource mediated the relationship between difficulty-as-importance
64
score and belief that one had time to prepare for an imminent task (b = 0.065, SE = 0.032, 95%
CI [0.037, 0.134]). However, we found no support for the mediating role of believing that time
was a scarce resource between difficulty-as-impossibility score and belief that one had time to
prepare for an imminent task (b = -0.026, SE = 0.040, 95% CI [-0.112, 0.046]).
Study 2. Having found evidence for H1 and H2, we then replicated this study with a
larger sample in pre-registered Study 2 (http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=nw3f4r).
Sample. We recruited 251 adult volunteers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and
restricted volunteers to a single study in our sequence by using the TurkPrime platform (Litman
et al., 2016). Specific demographic information is detailed in Table 1. We based our sample size
on recent work suggesting that correlations stabilize at N=250 (Schonbrodt & Perugini, 2013).
Method. Study 2 followed the same design as Study 1.
Difficulty Mindsets. We used the Fisher and Oyserman (2017) measure of difficulty-as-
importance (α = 0.86, M = 4.29, SD = 1.00) and difficulty-as-impossibility (α = 0.92, M = 2.79,
SD = 1.31) as in Study 1.
Time-as-Resource. We used the same measure of time-as-plentiful (α = 0.87, M = 4.49,
SD = 0.97) and time-as-scarce (α = 0.90, M = 3.63, SD = 1.36) as in the pilot and Study 1.
Time-to-Prepare. We used the same measure of time-to-prepare (α = 0.84, M = 4.15, SD
= 0.97) as in the pilot and Study 1.
Results. As can be seen in Table 2 (bottom half) results support H1 and H2, consistent
with Study 1 and our pre-registered predictions. People who endorse view difficulties as a signal
of importance were more likely to also view time as a plentiful resource (r(251)=0.315, p <
0.001, 95% CI [0.199, 0.422]). People view difficulties as a signal of impossibility were more
likely to endorse a time-as-scarce resource metaphor (r(251)=0.552, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.460,
65
0.632]). Next, we examined our first secondary question; what is the relationship between
difficulty-as-importance endorsement and time-as-scarce score as well as difficulty-as-
impossibility endorsement and time-as-plentiful score? Once again we find that difficulty-as-
importance endorsement was unrelated to time-as-scarce score (r(251)=-0.025, p = 0.699, 95%
CI [-0.148, 0.099]) and difficulty-as-impossibility endorsement was unrelated to time-as-
plentiful score (r(251)=-0.102, p = 0.107, 95% CI [-0.223, 0.022]).
We then examined our next secondary question; whether time-as-resource metaphor
mediates the relationship between difficulty mindsets and time-to-prepare. As shown in Figure 2,
believing that time was a plentiful resource mediated the relationship between difficulty-as-
importance score and belief that one had time to prepare for an imminent task (b = 0.139, SE =
0.037, 95% CI [0.072, 0.215]), consistent with Study 1. In this study we found that believing
time was a scarce resource mediated the relationship between difficulty-as-impossibility score
and belief that one had time to prepare for an imminent task (b = -0.142, SE = 0.035, 95% CI [-
0.214, -0.079]).
Discussion
In these studies we predicted that difficulty mindsets shape the time-as-resource
metaphor that is likely to come to mind, which would then impact individuals’ beliefs that they
are able to accomplish imminent but not yet started tasks. We found support for our predictions.
People who endorsed a difficulty-as-importance mindset were more likely to endorse that time is
a plentiful resource, but showed no differences in believing that time is a scarce resource.
Additionally, those who endorsed a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset were more likely to view
time as being a scarce and limited resource and no differences with perceiving time as being
plentiful. We also found evidence for the mediating role of time-as-resource metaphor on the
66
relationship between difficulty mindsets and belief that one will be able to complete imminent
but not yet started tasks. In Studies 1 and 2 we found that believing that time is plentiful
mediated the relationship between difficulty-as-importance endorsement and belief that one
would be able to prepare for an imminent but not yet started task. The pattern was less consistent
for time-as-scarce score mediating the relationship between difficulty-as-impossibility
endorsement and believing you have enough time to prepare for an imminent task. In Study 1 we
did not find significant mediation, but in Study 2 with a larger sample we did find the effect,
suggesting this effect may be less stable.
Advancing research on time perception and motivation. Time is an abstract concept,
to make sense of time people use a concretizing metaphor, conceptualizing time as a resource
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Time can be viewed as something that is plentiful or that you can
make more of (i.e. time-as-plentiful) or as something that is scarce and limited (i.e. time-as-
scarce). While not always studied in these terms (e.g. Carstensen, 1991; Perlow, 1999;
Teuchmann, 1999; Moon & Chen, 2015), our studies show that the time-as-resource metaphor
that people are likely to adopt is important for people’s beliefs about what they are capable of
accomplishing in a given amount of time. As we reviewed in our introduction, the amount of
time one has and whether time is perceived as plentiful or scarce has implications for goal
pursuit (Fung et al., 1999; Mohammad & Drolet, 2019; Etkin, 2019), health (Strazdins et al.,
2011; Venn & Strazdins, 2016), and well-being (Kasser & Sheldon, 2009; Mogilner, 2019).
Our work also highlights that difficulty mindsets play a critical role in whether time is
perceived as a plentiful or as a scarce resource. These mindsets and their influence on time
mattered as they influenced people’s beliefs that they were able to prepare for imminent but not
yet started tasks. Much of the work on time perception has focused on the consequences of
67
having or not having time (e.g. Festini et al., 2016; Hamermesh & Lee, 2007; Kasser & Sheldon,
2009; Roxburgh, 2004; Rudd, 2019; Venn & Strazdins, 2016) while less work has examined the
predictors of time perception, with some notable exceptions (e.g. age Mohammad & Drolet,
2019; being notified of a terminal illness Carstensen & Fredrickson, 1998; power Moon & Chen,
2015). We show that the mindsets people draw on to make sense of difficulty influence whether
people perceive time as being either a plentiful or a scarce resource. The implication is that more
attention should be paid to experiences of difficulty and the difficulty mindsets people use when
evaluating the amount of time they have to complete their important goals and thus their
subsequent motivation.
This work also provides an early example of how difficulty mindsets may play a role in
time perception and motivation more broadly. For example, numerous researchers have shown
that making the future feel closer (e.g. through a fine-grained time metric Lewis & Oyserman,
2015; being exposed to a vivid image of one’s future self Hershfield et al., 2011) motivates
people to engage in long-term decision making (for a review, see Hershfield, 2019). One reason
why these interventions may be effective is that they make the interests of one’s future self feel
salient. Another may be that these interventions are also making time feel like a scarce resource.
Therefore, these interventions may benefit from incorporating a difficulty-as-impossibility
mindset to highlight the opportunity costs of the goals and tasks at hand in order to determine the
best use of one’s limited time. Additionally, consider the body of work on temporal landmarks
(for a review, see Dai & Li, 2019). Anticipating an upcoming temporal landmark leads people to
plan (Dai, Milkman, & Riis, 2015) and act in line with their important goals (e.g. exercising
more as you approach your 30
th
birthday, Alter & Hershfield, 2011; Peetz & Wilson, 2013). One
reason for these effects may be that the landmark is quickly approaching and therefore time is
68
starting to feel scarcer. When time feels scarce and limited, interventions should focus on making
the most of what time is left and focus on which goals may not be attainable with the remaining
time (i.e. a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset). Alternatively, after experiencing a temporal
landmark people are more motivated to engage in goal-related activities (e.g. going to the gym at
the start of a New Year; Dai, Milkman, & Riis, 2014), potentially because time is now perceived
as a plentiful resource following a landmark. In this case, adopting a difficulty-as-importance
mindset is useful as it would highlight which goals are actually valuable and focus attention and
effort to those specific goals. Knowing which mindset to leverage is a function of how time is
perceived in the moment.
Advancing identity-based motivation research. In addition to research on time, our
results are theoretically important for motivation research because they document one process by
which difficulty mindsets are likely to impact motivation. Prior work has theorized that both
difficulty-as-importance and difficulty-as-impossibility mindsets are useful and necessary
mindsets (Oyserman et al., 2017), but research to date has only provided evidence for the former
(Oyserman et al., 2018; Smith & Oyserman, 2015). One reason is because the specific process
has not been well understood. Our results suggest that one way that difficulty mindsets are
motivating is through the time-as-resource metaphor people are likely to draw on in the moment.
Which time-as-resource metaphor one draws on has different implications for judgment and
behavior and each metaphor can be beneficial or harmful depending on the situation and the
variables of interest (for reviews, see Mohammad & Drolet, 2019; Rudd, 2019; Yang & Hsee,
2019). Likewise, each difficulty mindset should be useful in some contexts and harmful in others
(for a review, see Oyserman et al., 2017). For example, believing time is a scarce resource is
associated with better cognition (Festini et al., 2016) and motivation in some contexts (e.g. after
69
missing a deadline, Wilcox et al., 2016). However, it can also lead to higher levels of stress
(Roxburgh, 2004) and unhealthy behaviors (Venn & Strazdins, 2017). Is it the case that adopting
a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset may lead to similar outcomes due to adopting a time-as-
scarce metaphor? This research provides a starting point to examine when and how both a
difficulty-as-importance and a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset may be helpful and harmful for
self-regulation.
Additionally, this research provides some early evidence that difficulty mindsets shape
how one sees the world. Previous work has shown that difficulty mindsets shape how people
view themselves and the downstream consequences this has for motivation and performance
(Smith & Oyserman, 2015; Oyserman et al., 2018). Additionally, while it has been theorized that
how an experience of difficulty is going to matter for judgment and behavior is a function of the
mindset brought to mind in the moment (e.g. Schwarz, 2015), this had not yet been tested. Our
results provide empirical evidence that difficulty mindsets shape how people perceive time and
their subsequent belief in their ability to complete an imminent but not yet started task. This
suggests that difficulty mindsets may have much farther-reaching effects through how time is
perceived (e.g. health Venn & Strazdins, 2016, well-being Kasser & Sheldon, 2009). While these
links have been previously theorized (Oyserman & Fisher, 2017), they have yet to be empirically
tested and are a promising avenue for future research.
Limitations. We show stable relationships between endorsing a difficulty-as-importance
mindset and viewing time as a plentiful resource as well as between endorsing a difficulty-as-
impossibility mindset and viewing time as a scarce resource. Additionally, these time-as-
resource metaphors mediated the relationship between people’s endorsement of difficulty
mindsets and their belief in their ability to prepare for an imminent task. However, like any set of
70
studies, our studies have a number of limitations that should be taken into account. First, our
participants were recruited through MTurk, which is certainly a more heterogeneous and
representative group than the commonly studied college student population (Berinsky, Huber, &
Lenz, 2012) it is less representative than those collected through probability sampling
(Weinberg, Freese, & McElhattan, 2014). However, as is generally true of people who take paid
surveys, this sample tends to report lower incomes than Americans in general (Shapiro,
Chandler, & Mueller, 2013), which is a concern as being higher in income is linked to perceiving
time as being a scarcer resource (Sullivan, 2008). This is particularly true in the U.S.
(Hamermesh & Lee, 2006). Given that social class has been shown to have an indirect effect on
people’s difficulty mindsets through experienced power and control (Fisher & Oyserman, in
prep), it is unclear what unique role social class may have in the relationship between difficulty
mindsets and time-as-resource metaphor. Future research should replicate our findings across
different groups and cultures to ensure these results are not specific to our sample.
Another limitation is that our results are all correlational. This has has two implications
for future research. First, it is unclear whether difficulty mindsets directly cause one to adopt one
time-as-resource metaphor over another in the moment. Metacognitive experiences of difficulty
and difficulty mindsets have shaped how people understand themselves and the world, as
demonstrated in past research (Oyserman et al., 2018; Schwarz, 2015; Smith & Oyserman,
2015). Time-as-resource metaphors have previously been shown to be context sensitive,
changing in response to reminders of mortality (Fung & Carstensen, 2006), feeling powerful
(Moon & Chen, 2015), and thinking about how long (short) one’s life is (Barber et al., 2016;
Fung et al., 1999). Taken with our correlational evidence, it seems likely that difficulty mindsets
71
would causally shape whether people adopt a time-as-plentiful or time-as-scarce metaphor, but
we did not directly test this in these studies.
Second, while we posit that difficulty mindsets influence the time metaphor people are
likely to use, this relationship may also be bidirectional. Just as the material resources one has
available in terms of their social class shapes the difficulty mindsets likely to come to mind
(Fisher & Oyserman, in prep), so should the time resources one has available. That is, when time
is actually plentiful one should be free to adopt a difficulty-as-importance mindset and determine
which goals are the most valuable and therefore which should be pursued. When time is scarce
then one needs to consider whether there is actually enough time and adopt a difficulty-as-
impossibility mindset. There is some evidence for this. When time is constrained, people are
likely to engage in ‘priority planning’ which requires you to focus your time on the most
important and plausible goals (Fernbach, Kan, & Lynch, 2012). This priority planning ultimately
leads to better outcomes compared to spreading your attention to thin. This fits nicely with a
difficulty-as-impossibility mindset which highlights the opportunity costs of the task at hand and
therefore making the most of the limited resources one has. Future research should focus on
understanding this possible bidirectional relationship between whether time is actually plentiful
or scarce and the consequences this has for the difficulty mindsets people are likely to adopt in
the moment.

72
General Discussion
In this dissertation, I examine both a predictor and an outcome of difficulty mindsets.
First, I examine and show that social class shapes people’s difficulty mindsets indirectly through
sense of power and control. Being lower in social class limits people’s sense of power and
control in their everyday lives, which increased the likelihood of adopting a difficulty-as-
impossibility mindset and decreased the likelihood of adopting a difficulty-as-importance
mindset. Second, I examine the relationship between difficulty mindsets and the time-as-resource
metaphor people are likely to draw on. Endorsing a difficulty-as-importance mindset is linked to
viewing time as a plentiful resource, while endorsing a difficulty-as-impossibility mindset is
linked to viewing time as a scarce resource. These time-as-resource metaphors mediate the
relationship between difficulty mindsets and individual’s beliefs that they could accomplish an
imminent but not yet started task.
While these studies provide initial evidence for these relationships, there is still much
work to be done as discussed in the individual chapters. Regarding the indirect effect of social
class on difficulty mindsets, I have shown that power and control have a causal effect on
difficulty-as-importance but have not yet adequately whether power and control have a similar
effect on difficulty-as-impossibility mindset. While not presented here, I have been working on
developing effective manipulations of power and control and replicating the effects found in
Studies 4a & 4b. Regarding the difficulty mindsets and time-as-resource studies, the results
presented here have all been correlational so far. I have run numerous rounds of initial tests to
develop potential manipulations of difficulty-as-importance and difficulty-as-impossibility to
experimentally test the predictions made in this paper. While these studies present promising first
73
steps there is still much to be done in examining the predictors and consequences of difficulty
mindsets.

74
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Appendix A: Chapter I Tables and Figures
Table 1. Simplified Sample Demographic Information

Variable Study 1 Study 2a Study 2b Study 2c Study 3 Study 4a Study 4b
N
1630 305 300 325 403 222 222
M(SD) Age 37.42 (12.24) 37.65 (12.03) 36.26 (11.81) 20.13 (1.53) 36.91 (12.08) 20.07 (1.62) 20.19 (1.59)
% Female (n)
53.10 (n=851) 53.60 (n=164) 53.00 (n=159) 57.70 (n=188) 50.90 (n=205) 60.50 (n=135) 64.60 (n=146)
% European
American (n)
76.70 (n=1230) 75.20 (n=230) 79.00 (n=237) 39.60 (n=129) 70.50 (n=284) 34.50 (n=77) 36.70 (n=83)
Modal Education
Bachelor's
Degree
Bachelor's
Degree
Bachelor's
Degree
-- Bachelor's Degree -- --
Modal Income
$20,000-$29,999 $50,000-$59,999 $20,000-$29,999 -- $20,000-$29,999 -- --
Modal Subjective
Social Status
5 -- -- 7 5 -- --

Note: Education includes nine categories from less than high school to graduate or professional degree. Income includes eleven categories from less
than $10,000 to greater than $100,000. Subjective Social Status includes ten categories from 1=bottom of the ladder to 10-top of the ladder. In Study
2a, 2b, 4a, and 4b SSS was not collected. In Study 2b, 4a, and 4b the sample were college students; therefore, we did not collect education and
income. Full distributions can be found in Table S1 of supplemental materials.

Figure 1. Theoretical Process Model: How Social Class Affects Difficulty Mindsets

Note: We represent the direct path between social class and difficulty mindsets as a dashed line
to note the two competing predictions for how social class may impact difficulty mindsets. One
possibility is that social class will have a direct effect on difficulty mindsets. Alternatively, social
class may only have an indirect effect on difficulty mindsets through individual’s sense of power
and control.

1
Figure 2. Study 1: Factor Loadings of Difficulty-as-Impossibility Mindset and Difficulty-as-
Importance Mindset

Note: Impss1 to Impss4, and Imprt1 to Imprt4 are abbreviations for each of the difficulty mindset
statements. The full text of each of the statements is located in our Supplemental materials

2
Figure 3. Study 1: Social Class Affects Difficulty Mindsets

Note: Numbers represent factor loadings for social class and regression weights for predicting
Difficulty-as-Impossibility and Difficulty-as-Importance Mindsets (the latent constructs are
presented in Figure 2).

Figure 4. Study 2a: Participants were randomly assigned to see either the left (low relative income) or the right (high relative income)
scale

Note: In Study 5, participants were randomly assigned to either see the response scale on the left or the response scale on the right.
Both scales allow researchers to know if income was below $50,000 or greater than $50,000. However, by placing most of the
responses in a wide range above $50,000, the response scale on the left has the effect on most people of finding oneself at the bottom
of the income range. In contrast, by placing most of the responses in a (narrower) range below $50,000, the response scale on the right
has the effect on most people of finding oneself towards the top of the income range. If people’s difficulty mindset responses were
sensitive to their immediate experience of being relatively better or worse off than others, the response scales would matter. If the
effect of income on difficulty mindset was due to an accumulation of experience of lack of power and control then response scale
would not matter.
Figure 5. Study 2: Social Class Affects Difficulty Mindsets By Affecting Everyday Experience of Power and Control

Note: *p < .05, **p <.01, *** p<.001. Numbers reflect regression weights. Numbers in parentheses are effects prior to addition of
experienced power and control.

Appendix B: Chapter II Tables and Figures
Table 1. Sample Demographic Information
Variable Study 1 Study 2
N 100 251
M(SD) Age 33.74 (9.83) 36.45 (11.12)
% Female (n) 33.00 (n=33) 39.40 (n=99)
% European American (n) 66.00 (n=66) 70.50 (n=174)
Modal Education Bachelor's Degree Bachelor's Degree
Modal Income $30,000-$49,000 $40,000-$49,999
Modal Subjective Social Status 4 4
Note: Education includes nine categories from less than high school to graduate or
professional degree. Income includes eleven categories from less than $10,000 to greater than
$100,000. Subjective Social Status includes ten categories from 1=bottom of the ladder to 10-
top of the ladder. For income, in Study 1, two categories had the exact same frequency so the
range contains the two modal categories.

Table 2. Correlations Between Difficulty Mindset, Time-as-Resource Metaphor, and Time-to-Prepare

Difficulty-as-
Importance
Difficulty-as-
Impossibility
Time-as-
Plentiful
Time-as-
Scarce
Time-to-
Prepare
Difficulty-as-Importance -- 0.017 0.323** 0.053 0.453**
Difficulty-as-Impossibility -0.033 -- 0.121 0.463** 0.027
Time-as-Plentiful 0.315** -0.102 -- -0.330** 0.345**
Time-as-Scarce -0.025 0.552** -0.509** -- -0.05
Time-to-Prepare 0.340** 0.019 0.518** -0.231** --
Note: *p < .05, **p <.001. Correlations above the diagonal are from Study 1 (N=100), correlations below the diagonal are from Study
2 (N=251).

Figure 1. Study 1: Difficulty Mindsets Affects Time-to-Prepare By Affecting Time-as-Resource
Metaphor

Note: *p < .05, **p <.01, *** p<.001. Numbers reflect regression weights. Numbers in
parentheses are effects prior to addition of time-as-resource metaphor. We emphasize the indirect
effects as the main point of interest in these analyses following Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, &
Petty (2011) recommendation.

1
Figure 2. Study 1: Difficulty Mindsets Affects Time-to-Prepare By Affecting Time-as-Resource
Metaphor

Note: *p < .05, **p <.001, *** p<.001. Numbers reflect regression weights. Numbers in
parentheses are effects prior to addition of time-as-resource metaphor. We emphasize the indirect
effects as the main point of interest in these analyses following Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, &
Petty (2011) recommendation.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract In daily life, things can feel easy or difficult to do

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Creator Fisher, Oliver (author)

Core Title “What difficulty means for me”: predictors and consequences of difficulty mindsets

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Psychology

Publication Date 07/24/2019

Defense Date 06/05/2019

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag difficulty mindsets,identity,Motivation,OAI-PMH Harvest,Social class,Time

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Advisor Oyserman, Daphna (committee chair), Dehghani, Morteza (committee member), Fast, Nathanael (committee member), Schwarz, Norbert (committee member)

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