University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Mandate and manipulate: constructing political legitimacy during the Yuan-Ming transition, 1351-1370

(USC Thesis Other)

Mandate and manipulate: constructing political legitimacy during the Yuan-Ming transition, 1351-1370

PDF

Download

Open document

Flip pages

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content

MANDATE AND MANIPULATE:
CONSTRUCTING POLITICAL LEGITIMACY DURING THE YUAN-MING TRANSITION,
1351-1370

By

Haiwei Liu

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(EAST ASIAN LANGUAGES AND CULTURES)

August 2019

ii

Abstract
Mandate and Manipulate: Constructing Political Legitimacy during the Yuan-Ming Transition,
1351-1370
Haiwei Liu
This thesis revolves around the question of how anti-Yuan rebels and the Ming founder
established and defended their claims to political legitimacy in the Yuan and early Ming periods.
This research complicates the currently prevailing narrative about constructing political
legitimacy in Chinese history and reconsiders some important topics concerning the history of
the Yuan-Ming transition. This thesis examines some previously unexplored factors, such as
people’s fear of the ethnic “other,” anticipation of deity reincarnation, popular beliefs in
apocalyptic destruction, and some widely-spread prophecies, and demonstrates how rebel leaders
and warlords manipulated and utilized these factors in their efforts to construct and defend their
respective claims to political legitimacy. Rebel leaders also reinterpreted some key terms in
Confucianism and carried out state-building projects to defend their claims to political
legitimacy. This research argues that the dynastic name “Ming” was derived primarily from these
Confucian concepts rather than from the White Lotus or Manichean traditions. These factors
played a vital role in legitimatizing political authority during the Yuan-Ming transition and
helped various contenders, including the Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang, assert their claims to
have received the Mandate of Heaven.
This thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter I examines how anti-Mongol rebels utilized
both Confucian ideas and popular religious beliefs to construct their political legitimacy. This
chapter challenges the idea that the anti-Mongol rebellion was a simple messianic revolt, and it
offers a new interpretation for the origins of the dynastic name “Ming.” Chapter II discusses how
iii

the rebels built their states and organized their governments. Existing scholarship has largely
ignored this topic because of the tendency to identify this rebellion as a simple messianic revolt.
This chapter shows that the rebels utilized both traditional Chinese institutions and Mongol
institutions in their state-building. Chapter III explores how prophecies functioned to strengthen
different claims to legitimacy. It argues that warlords manipulated prophecies by using puns and
plays-on-words in order to portray themselves as legitimate rulers mandated by Heaven. Chapter
IV analyzes the relationship between ethnicity and political legitimacy. It argues that the Chinese
rebels selectively used Confucian rhetoric concerning ethnicity to undermine the legitimacy of
the Mongol-Yuan, and it holds that ideas of ethnic distinction played an important role in the
Yuan-Ming transition.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ii
Table of Contents iv
List of Illustrations vi
Abbreviations vii
Introduction 1

I. Confucian Elements in a Messianic Rebellion 8
1. A Brief Introduction to the Yuan-Ming Transition 8
2. Confucian Elements in the Red Turban Rebellion 14
3. Reconsidering the Meaning of the Mingwang 47
4. The Mingwang and the Dynastic Name “Ming” 66
Conclusion 76

II. State-building of Red Turban Regimes 78
1. Governmental Institutions of the Red Turban Song State 78
2. Tianwan or Song? The Name of Xu Shouhui’s Regime 92
3. Confucian Tradition and the Xia State 99
Conclusion 110

III. Prophecies as a Way of Constructing Political Legitimacy 111
1. The Bingwu and Dingwei Apocalyptic Belief 113
2. Two “Fulfilled” Prophecies 121
3. Zhu Yuanzhang, Han Lin’er, and the Bingwu Horse Year 135
4. Zhu Yuanzhang, Zhang Shicheng, and the Dingwei Sheep Year 142
5. New Narrative of Prophecies 148
Conclusion 153
v

IV. Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy 156
1. Ethnicity or Not? Debates among Chinese Scholars over the Yuan-Ming Transition 156
2. Beiren as an Ethnic Term in Late Yuan and Early Ming texts 163
3. Ethnic Rhetoric Used by the Rebels 173
4. Constructing Ethnic Tensions in the Late Yuan 195
Conclusion 200

V. Dissertation Conclusion 202
Bibliography 205

vi

List of Illustrations
Figure 1: The Seal of Military General-Director Office of the Song state (1359) 82
Figure 2: The Seal of Jinning County with the Mark of the “Branch Secretariat of Yidu and Other
Places” and the Longfeng Reign Title (1358) 84
Figure 3: Front Face of the Seal of the Marshall Office (1356) 85
Figure 4: Back Face of the Seal of the Marshall Office (1356) 86
Figure 5: Front Face of the Seal of the Military General-Director Office (1358) 86
Figure 6: Back Face of the Seal of the Military General-Director Office (1358) 87
Figure 7: Front Face of the Seal of the Military Myriarchy (1356) 87
Figure 8: The Back Face of the Seal of the Military Myriarchy (1356) 88
Figure 9: The Longfeng tongbao coin issued by the Song state 90
Figure 10: A Fragment of the Red Contract of the Fifth Year of the Longfeng Era (1359) 90
Figure 11: White Contract of the Tenth Year of the Longfeng Era (1364) 91

vii

Abbreviations
CSJC Congshu jicheng 叢書集成
SBCK Sibu congkan 四部叢刊
SKCM Siku quanshu cunmu congshu 四庫全書存目叢書
SKQS Yingyin wenyuange siku quanshu 景印文淵閣四庫全書
XXSK Xuxiu siku quanshu 續修四庫全書

1

Introduction
This dissertation revolves around the question of how different regimes and rebel leaders
established and defended their claims to political legitimacy in Chinese history. In pursuing
answers to this question, this dissertation examines the Yuan and early Ming periods, a time that
witnessed the conquest of China by the Mongols and the subsequent restoration of Han-Chinese
rule under the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). Whereas existing scholarship associates political
legitimacy with rulers’ military successes and seeming embrace of Confucian political ethics, I
draw attention to less explored factors such as ethnic tensions, fear of the “other,” popular
religion, apocalyptic beliefs, and prophecies, and I argue that manipulation of these social and
cultural factors played a vital role in the construction of political legitimacy during this period.
By examining official histories, judicial case records, personal writings by literati, local
gazetteers, prophecies recorded in various sources, and newly excavated stone inscriptions, my
dissertation discusses how warlords manipulated people’s perceptions of ethnicity, reincarnation
of deities, sage rulership, and fear caused by prophecies to gain followers. This dissertation sheds
new light on the many ways that political legitimacy was constructed and defended in late
imperial China. My work offers an Asian perspective on the construction of political legitimacy
around the world, both in historical times and today.

Problematizing the Yuan-Ming Transition
The term “Yuan-Ming transition” is used frequently in this dissertation, and here in the
introduction, I would like to problematize this popularly accepted term. The Yuan-Ming
2

transition is often used in reference to the mid-fourteenth century, during which time Mongol
rule over China collapsed and the Chinese Ming dynasty was established. This term is
appropriate in the narrative of the general history of China on the basis of traditional
periodization by dynasties. In this dissertation, however, this term fails to reflect the complex
context of events taking place during this period, and it could lead one to an oversimplification
of the complicated relationships between the Yuan, the rebels, and Zhu Yuanzhang’s regime.
We can better understand why the term Yuan-Ming transition is problematic if we juxtapose
it with another widely-accepted term, the “Song-Yuan transition.” The Song-Yuan transition is a
precise term because it conveys enough information for understanding major events during that
time. If we analyze the two sides, the Yuan/ Mongols and the Song, we can get a full picture of
the history of that period. But the Yuan-Ming transition is different. If we examine the two sides,
the Yuan and Zhu Yuanzhang’s Ming regime, we cannot draw a comprehensive picture of China
in the mid-fourteenth century. In the seventeen years between 1352 and 1367 during which time
Zhu Yuanzhang rose from an ordinary soldier to the emperor of the Ming, he spent most of his
time fighting against two other Han Chinese warlords, Chen Youliang and Zhang Shicheng. The
major battles between Zhu’s troops and Yuan forces took place in the two years of 1367 and
1368. At that time, the Yuan had been exhausted by the Red Turbans. Thus, Zhu’s troops did not
meet much resistance when they conquered the Yuan capital of Dadu in late 1368. The term
Yuan-Ming transition might mislead readers to conceive of the historical process as a long-time
confrontation between Zhu’s regime and the Yuan government, which finally lead to the Ming
conquest of the Yuan. But the historical process was different. It was only in a short period of
two years that the Yuan and Zhu confronted each other face to face. During most of this period,
the Yuan’s major rivals were the Song state established by Liu Futong and other rebel states
3

established by the Southern Red Turbans. The term Yuan-Ming transition overlooks the role
played by Red Turban rebels in that period. This dissertation problematizes the term Yuan-Ming
transition by reassessing the impact of the Red Turbans on late Yuan and early Ming China.

Chapter Outline
This dissertation consists of four chapters, each addressing an aspect of constructing political
legitimacy during the Yuan-Ming transition. Chapter I, titled “Confucian Elements in a
Messianic Rebellion,” talks about how the Red Turban rebels, who toppled Mongol rule and laid
the foundation for the establishment of the Ming dynasty, constructed their political legitimacy.
In 1351, a large-scale rebellion against Mongol rule broke out in central China. Because rebel
soldiers all worn red turbans, the rebellion is called the Red Turban rebellion in contemporary
and later sources. During the rebellion, the rebels circulated a prophecy that “the Buddha
Maitreya is descending to the world and the Mingwang 明王 (literally translated as the Prince of
Light) is coming to the world.” The Chinese scholar Wu Han (1909-1969) identifies the
Mingwang in the prophecy with a god in Manichaeism and argues that the rebels utilized the
perception of the reincarnation of the Buddha Maitreya and the Manichean god to legitimize
their rebellion against the Yuan. Wu Han’s argument has become the prevailing narrative of the
nature of the Red Turban rebellion, and many scholars, based on Wu’s argument, treat the Red
Turban rebellion as a Messianic/millenarian/sectarian revolt.
Chapter I complicates this discussion. This chapter shows that the Red Turban rebellion was
strongly influenced by Confucian thought. Many leaders of the revolt were educated elites who
can be categorized as Confucian literati. The rebels established states and set up institutions
4

modelled on the idealized state system recorded in the Confucian classic the Zhouli ( 周禮 Rituals
of the Zhou). The Red Turbans used the Confucian rhetoric of Huayi ( 華夷 China and
barbarians) in their proclamations. The rebels also utilized the Confucian rhetoric of the Mandate
of Heaven to legitimize their rebellion. The Red Turbans held keju ( 科舉 civil service
examinations) and set up a specific institution named the binxing yuan ( 賓興院 the Bureau of
Raising Guests) to take charge of administering civil service examinations. Based on these
discoveries, I argue that the Red Turban rebellion was not a simple Messianic/ millenarian/
sectarian revolt, but a social movement strongly influenced by the Confucian tradition.
This finding offers a new perspective for interpreting the term Mingwang in the Red Turban
prophecy. In Confucian classics, the term Mingwang designates the idealized ruler, the
Enlightened King. I argue that the Mingwang in the Red Turban prophecy should be understood
in the Confucian context and that it reflects the goals of the Red Turbans to overthrow the
Mongols and to establish states of a traditional Confucian sort. The Red Turbans manipulated
both popular religion and Confucian thought to achieve these goals. This finding also sheds light
on the origins of the dynastic name of the Ming dynasty. Most scholars trace the origins of “Da
Ming,” the dynastic name of the Ming, to the term “Mingwang” in the Red Turban prophecy and
identify it as a popular deity like the Manichean god or the Buddha Amitabha. Based on my
interpretation of the Mingwang in a Confucian context, I argue that this dynastic name indicates
that Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming dynasty, presented an image of himself as the
Enlightened King in the Confucian tradition and made a political gesture to embrace Confucian
ethics.
5

The chapter II, titled “State-building of Red Turban Regimes,” talks about the two states
founded by the Red Turbans. Because of the prevailing narrative that associates the Red Turbans
with a Messianic rebellion, the nature and structure of these two states have not received
sufficient academic attention. Based on remnants of material culture left by the Red Turbans,
such as coins minted by the rebel states, official seals issued by the Red Turban government, and
land contracts marked with rebel reign titles, as well as surviving written sources, this chapter
examines the composition of the two rebel states. This chapter shows that one of the Red Turban
states had a government system influenced by both Chinese and Mongol elements. Some of its
institutions were established on the basis of records in the Confucian classics, such as the Zhouli,
and some institutions were borrowed from the Yuan government. In contrast, the other state was
built completely on the government system recorded in the Zhouli. By examining a recently
excavated epitaph of a Red Turban general, this chapter shows that the name of a rebel state
established by the Southern Red Turbans was Song 宋 rather than Tianwan 天完 as recorded in
the Yuanshi ( 元史 Official history of the Yuan). The state name Song is a symbol of the Red
Turbans’ goal to restore the Song dynasty. This chapter reinforces the argument made in Chapter
I that the Red Turban states were strongly influenced by the Confucian tradition and meanwhile
made use of popular religion and even Mongol institutions.
The Chapter III, titled “Prophecies as a Way of Constructing Political Legitimacy,” explores
how prophecies functioned in the Yuan-Ming transition. Although previous scholarship has
pointed out that prophecies were often used to mobilize revolts in Chinese history, it is still not
clear how prophecies functioned to convince people that the Mandate of Heaven was changing to
the rebel side. This chapter addresses this question. This chapter examines two prophecies that
circulated in the late Yuan period, which were interpreted by Ming scholars as predictions of Zhu
6

Yuanzhang receiving the Mandate of Heaven. I associate these two prophecies with the popular
Bingwu Dingwei 丙午丁未 Apocalyptic Belief, which predicted that disasters would take place
during bingwu and dingwei years. I argue that originally these two prophecies did not point to the
rise of Zhu Yuanzhang but predicted that disasters would happen during the bingwu and dingwei
years. Later Zhu Yuanzhang used puns to change one prophecy into a symbol of his receiving
the Mandate of Heaven. Because of the puns, later scholars think of this prophecy as an accurate
prediction of the rise of Zhu Yuanzhang. This chapter also discusses the reason that Zhu
Yuanzhang after his ascension to the throne concealed the connection he had made previously
between his political legitimacy and this prophecy. I argue that Zhu Yuanzhang after the
founding of the Ming outlawed the circulation of prophecies to avoid having them manipulated
as he had done and thereby destabilize his rule over China. Zhu successfully utilized prophecies
to cultivate his image as a ruler mandated by Heaven.
The Chapter IV, titled “Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy,” addresses the relationship
between legitimacy and ethnicity. There has been a heated debate among Chinese scholars over
whether ethnic tensions were a factor in the wars between the Mongols and rebels in the late
Yuan. Today, the prevailing narrative among Chinese scholars is that the Yuan-Ming transition
was a “normal” dynastic transition, in which no ethnic factors were involved. This chapter
challenges this narrative. It demonstrates that during this period both the Mongols and Chinese
rebels reinterpreted certain Confucian concepts relating to ethnicity to defend their respective
claims to legitimacy. During the late Yuan, both sides manipulated people’s sense of ethnicity by
creating an ethnic “other.” Some Mongols tried to construct the Han Chinese as a group of ethnic
“other” who were naturally disloyal to the Yuan and inclined to rebel. The Chinese rebels also
constructed the Mongols as ethnic “others” who were planning to erase the Han people. By
7

manipulating the fear of the ethnic “other,” both sides sought to mobilize their supporters to
strengthen their legitimacy.
In summary, my dissertation argues that manipulation of fears of the ethnic “other,” beliefs
in deity reincarnation, anxieties caused by apocalyptic ideas, as well as selective uses of the
Confucian tradition, all played a significant role in constructing and defending political
legitimacy during the Yuan-Ming transition.

8

Chapter I: Confucian Elements in a Messianic Rebellion
This chapter examines an aspect of the Red Turban rebellion that has been largely ignored by
previous scholarship, namely the Confucian influence on the rebellion. The prevailing narrative
of the Yuan-Ming transition treats this rebellion simply as a messianic/ millenarian/ sectarian
revolt. Based on this narrative, hypotheses have been posited about the history of the Yuan-Ming
transition. This chapter complicates these discussions. I argue that the Red Turban revolt was
heavily influenced by Confucian thought and that many topics concerning the Yuan-Ming
transition should be approached from this perspective. I argue that the Red Turban rebels
manipulated both popular religious ideas like the reincarnation of the Buddha Maitreya and the
Confucian tradition to legitimize their rebellion against the Yuan. In this chapter, I will first
briefly introduce major events of the Red Turban rebellion and the prevailing narrative of the
rebellion in later historiography. Then, I examine some Confucian elements in this rebellion and
show how deeply this revolt was influenced by the Confucian tradition. From the Confucian
perspective, I will reexamine the meaning of the term “Mingwang” and its possible link with the
dynastic name Ming.

A Brief Review of the Yuan-Ming Transition
Before examining Confucian influences on the Red Turbans, I will first present a brief review of
major events occurring in the late Yuan including the rise of Zhu Yuanzhang.
1
In early 1351,

1
For more detailed introductions to the history of the Yuan-Ming transition, see Frederick. W. Mote and Denis Twitchett, eds.,
The Cambridge History of China, vol. 7, The Ming Dynasty, Part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 1-57; F.
W. Mote, Imperial China 900-1800 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 517-582; Edward L. Dreyer, Early Ming
China, A Political History, 1355-1435 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), Chapter 2; John W. Dardess, “The
9

Han Shantong 韓山童 and Liu Futong 劉福通, two leaders of the White Lotus society, an anti-
Yuan clandestine Buddhist order, conspired to launch a rebellion against the Yuan in Yingzhou
潁州, which today is known as the city of Fuyang 阜陽 in Anhui province.
2
Upon receiving
information of the conspiracy, local Yuan authorities took preemptive action, arresting Han
Shantong and having him executed. Shortly after Han Shantong’s execution, Liu Futong and his
colleagues launched the revolt and quickly occupied Yingzhou city. The rebel soldiers were
called the Red Turbans for their signature emblem, a red headscarf. During the rebellion, the Red
Turbans were also spreading a prophecy, claiming that “the Buddha Maitreya is descending into
the world and the ‘Mingwang’ is coming into the world (milefo xiasheng mingwang chushi 彌勒
佛下生明王出世).”
3

Liu Futong’s rebellion triggered revolts throughout the Yuan Empire. Later in the same
year, two sectarian leaders Xu Shouhui 徐壽輝 and Zou Pusheng 鄒普勝 led a large-scale revolt
against the Yuan in central China. Their troops also wore red turbans, and thus were also called
the Red Turbans. To distinguish them from the troops led by Liu Futong, scholars tend to refer to
Xu Shouhui’s army as the Southern Red Turbans, and Liu Futong’s army as the Northern Red
Turbans. The Southern Red Turbans quickly occupied a large part of southern China. In the next
year, Xu Shouhui claimed himself emperor and founded a state. According to the Yuanshi 元史

Transformation of Messianic Rebellion and the Founding of the Ming Dynasty,” JAS 29.3 (1970): 539-58; Edward L. Farmer,
Zhu Yuanzhang and Early Ming Legislation: The Reordering of Chinese Society Following the Era of Mongol Rule (Leiden:
Brill, 1995), Chapter 2, pp. 18-32; Hok-Lam Chan, “The Song Dynasty Legacy: Symbolism and Legitimation from Han Lin’er to
Zhu Yuanzhang of the Ming Dynasty,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 68:1 (2008): 91-133.
2
There are debates over whether Han Shantong belonged to the White Lotus society. I will talk about this topic later in this
chapter.
3
Gao Dai, Hongyou lu, Sikuquanshu cunmu congsu edition, shi 19, j.2, p. 21. The term “Mingwang” will be closely examined in
subsequent sections.
10

(Official history of the Yuan), this state was called Tianwan 天完, a mysterious dynastic name
that seemed to make no sense in the context of the Chinese language.
4

Some rebel groups that did not belong to the Red Turban movement also emerged in the
wake of Liu Futong’s rebellion. Zhang Shicheng 張士誠 (1321-1367), a salt smuggler, occupied
a large portion of the lower Yangtze River region and declared himself the King of Zhou. Fang
Guozhen 方國珍 (1319-1374), a pirate leader, put under his control some areas in today’s
Zhejiang province.
While the Southern Red Turbans, as well as other rebels in southern China, were making
great progress in their fight against local Yuan forces, the Northern Red Turbans also gained
momentum in their movement. The Northern Red Turbans rapidly swept central and northern
China, subduing the modern provinces of Anhui, Shangdong, and Henan. In 1355, Liu Futong
installed Han Lin’er 韓林兒, the son of Han Shantong, as emperor and announced the
establishment of the Song state. Liu Futong claimed that Han Lin’er was the ninth generation
descendent of the Huizong emperor (r. 1100-1126) of the Song dynasty (960-1279), which had
been conquered by the Mongols in the 1270s. As emperor of the Song state, Han Lin’er bore the
honorific title, Xiao Mingwang 小明王 (literally “Little Prince of Light”), which was likely
derived from the Red Turbans’ prophecy that “the Mingwang is coming into the world.” And his
reign title was set as Longfeng 龍鳳 (dragon and phoenix).
5

A year after Han Lin’er’s enthronement, Liu Futong set about implementing his ambitious
and rather bold military plans. The northern Red Turbans, divided into three expeditionary

4
Chapter II will offer explanations for this mysterious state name.
5
Song Lian et al., eds., Yuanshi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976), p. 922.
11

forces, simultaneously marched toward Dadu 大都, the capital of the Yuan, from three
directions. This strategy turned out to be unsuccessful. None of the three expeditionary forces
could achieve their strategic aims. The western troops were defeated in Shaanxi 陝西; the middle
troops, blocked by Yuan armies in Hebei, had to give up the plan to attack Dadu, detouring to
Mongolia; the eastern troops initially reached the suburb of Dadu, but finally were thwarted by
Yuan forces.
6

The setbacks of the Red Turbans were followed by a series of counter-offenses by Yuan
forces and warlords loyal to the Yuan. In the next few years the Song state gradually lost its
conquered territory. In 1362 Han Lin’er, escorted by Liu Futong, the de facto ruler of the Song
state, retreated to Anfeng on the Hui River, the last stronghold of the Song state in central China.
There Liu Futong faced a serious threat from warlord Zhang Shicheng. In 1364 Liu Futong
urgently asked for help from Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 (1328-1398), the last powerful Song
general, who was then busy building his power base in the lower Yangtze River area.
Zhu Yuanzhang, who later became the founding emperor of the Ming dynasty, had a long
and complex relationship with Han Lin’er (Xiao Mingwang) and his Song state. In 1352, the
second year after the outbreak of the Red Turban rebellions, Zhu Yuanzhang, aged 24, joined a
branch army affiliated with Liu Futong’s Red Turban armies. In 1355 the newly founded Song
state entitled Zhu Yuanzhang as Left Deputy Metropolitan General (zuo fudu yuanshuai 左副都
元帥) and dispatched him to conquer southern China. In the next few years, Zhu Yuanzhang, in
the name of the Song state, rapidly expanded his domain in the lower Yangtze River region. By

6
Chen Gaohua 陳高華, “Shuo Yuanmo hongjinjun de sanlu beifa” 說元末紅巾軍的三路北伐, Lishi jiaoxue 歷史教學, 1980:5,
pp. 21-25.
12

1364, he had controlled most of the middle and lower Yangtze River region with a strong power
base in Jiankang (the city of Nanjing today).
In 1364, Zhu Yuanzhang successfully rescued Han Lin’er from the besieged Anfeng city.
But Liu Futong had been killed by the rival warlord Zhang Shicheng shortly before the siege was
raised.
7
Although Han Lin’er escaped from the threat of Zhang Shicheng, he faced new
challenges. Zhu Yuanzhang on the one hand honored him as the titular emperor of the Song
state, on the other hand, he held Han under house arrest and manipulated him as a puppet ruler.
In the next two and a half years, Zhu continued to fight in the name of the Song state and Han
Lin’er. During this period, Zhu vanquished his most powerful rival, Chen Youliang 陳友諒, who
had assassinated Xu Shouhui and taken over most of the Southern Red Turbans forces in 1360.
The equivocal relationship between Zhu and Han Lin’er continued until late 1366 when Han died
in a mysterious boat accident. In early 1367 Zhu abandoned the Song state and Han Lin’er’s
reign title, Longfeng. Zhu founded a state named “Wu,” and he also designated the reign title as
Wu.
8
In the same year, Zhu Yuanzhang defeated Zhang Shicheng, his longtime rival in the lower
Yangtze River region. Immediately after Zhang Shicheng’s defeat, Zhu dispatched his forces to
march north to fight the remnants of Yuan forces in Northern China. In early 1368, Zhu again
changed the name of the state, from Wu to Da Ming, and formally declared the establishment of
the Ming dynasty. In the eighth month of the same year (1368), Zhu’s troops conquered Dadu,
the capital of the Yuan, and the last emperor of the Yuan retreated from Dadu to Mongolia. The
conquest of Dadu by Ming forces marked the end of the Yuan dynasty.
9

7
Historical accounts vary on this issue. Some mention that Liu Futong was killed by Zhang Shicheng’s troops in Anfeng in 1364.
Some record that Liu Futong was also rescued by Zhu Yuanzhang from this siege. For the debate over these accounts, see Yang
Ne, “Zhu Yuanzhang yu Liu Futong Han Lin’er”, Yuanshi lunji (Beijing: Guojia tushuguan chubanshe, 2001), pp. 176-184.
8
Reasons for these changes will be examined in detail in Chapter III.
9
For a detailed introduction of the rise of Zhu Yuanzhang, see Edward Dreyer, Early Ming China: A Political History 1355-1435
13

After the establishment of his Wu state in 1367, Zhu Yuanzhang began to intentionally
conceal his past subservience to Han Lin’er and the Song state. As the late Ming scholar Qian
Qianyi 錢謙益 and modern scholar Wu Han 吳晗 have pointed out, after his enthronement, Zhu
Yuanzhang regarded his past in the Red Turban army as a taboo subject.
10
He ordered the
destruction of any source marked with Han Lin’er’s reign title Longfeng. The Yuanshi (Official
history of the Yuan), the writing of which was greatly influenced by Zhu Yuanzhang, makes no
mention of Zhu’s service in the Red Turban movement. Furthermore, the Yuanshi denigrates
Xiao Mingwang as the “pseudo ruler” (weizhu 偽主) and the Song state as the “pseudo Song
state” 偽宋.
11
Similarly, the Ming Taizu shilu 明太祖實錄（Veritable records of Zhu
Yuanzhang) compiled by Zhu Yuanzhang’s successors, conceals Zhu’s service to the Red Turban
Song state. The Ming Taizu shilu makes no mention of many major events in regard to the Red
Turbans, including Zhu’s relationship with the Song state and the death of Han Lin’er.
Ever since the early Ming, sources like the Yuanshi had begun to construct the narrative that
the Red Turbans were sectarians and their Song state was a pseudo state. Most late
historiography follows this narrative. Existing scholarship in both English and Chinese languages
focuses on the religious, messianic aspect of this rebel movement. The Cambridge History of
China describes the religious activities of these Red Turban leaders as “sectarian movements”
12

and the Red Turban Rebellion as “a populist sectarian revolt.”
13
Frederic Mote in Imperial China
900-1800 also describes the Red Turban rebellion as a “sectarian” revolt.
14
Barend ter Haar

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 12-65.
10
Qian Qianyi, Guochu Qunxiong shilue 國初群雄事略, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1982, p. 38; Wu Han, “Mingjiao yu
damingdiguo 明教與大明帝國,” Dushi zhaji 讀史劄記, Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1961, p. 236.
11
Yuanshi, j.141, p.3387; j.142, p. 3397.
12
Frederick W. Mote, “The Rise of the Ming, 1330-1367,” in Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett, eds., The Cambridge
History of China, vol.7, The Ming Dynasty, Part 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 37.
13
Mote, “The Rise of the Ming, 1330-1367,” p. 48.
14
Frederick W. Mote, Imperial China 900-1800, Harvard University press, 2003, p. 526, 527, 528.
14

portrays the doctrine preached by Han Shantong as part of a “messianic movement.”
15
Ter Haar
argues that Han Shantong’s revolt was “violent action inspired by millenarianism.”
16
Taiwanese
Scholar Xiao Qiqing [Hsiao Ch’i-Ch’ing] describes the Red Turban rebellion as “millenarian.”
17

Although mainland Chinese scholars often praise the Red Turban rebellion as a peasant uprising
caused by class struggle and ethnic conflicts, they also highlight association of the rebellion with
popular beliefs like the White Lotus teaching, the belief in the Buddha Maitreya, and
Manichaeism.
It is noteworthy that some scholarship mentions that this messianic (millenarian, sectarian)
revolt eventually transformed into a few local states that sought to restore traditional Chinese
rule, like Zhu Yuanzhang’s regime and Chen Youliang’s Han state in the middle 1360s. As John
Dardess points out, in the 1360s, the large-scale anti-Yuan rebellion transformed into a
Confucian restoration movement.
18
David Robinson also argues that the Red Turbans used
Confucian rhetoric to attract support when they invaded Korea in 1359.
19

Confucian Elements in the Red Turban Rebellion
This section follows Dardess’s argument about the transformation from a Messianic rebellion to
a Confucian restoration movement and elaborates on why this transformation could take place.
Although to some extant I agree with the existing scholarship that identifies the Red Turban
rebellion with a Messianic revolt, I argue that this identification simplifies this complex rebel

15
Barend ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History, Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1992 [hereafter
The White Lotus Teachings], p. 115.
16
ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings, P. 126.
17
Xiao Qiqing [Hsiao Chi-ching], “Zhonghua fudi guyue huanjia mengyuan xingwang yu chenwei 中華福地古月還家：蒙元興
亡與讖緯,” Yuanchaoshi xinlun 元朝史新論, Taibei: Yunchen wenhua shiye, 1999, p. 94.
18
Dardess, “The Transformations of Messianic Revolt and the Founding of the Ming Dynasty,” p. 540.
19
David Robinson, Empire’s Twilight: Northeast Asia under the Mongols, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 148.
15

movement. I argue that from its beginning this rebel movement contained many Confucian
elements, and from this perspective many important issues can be reconsidered. By “Confucian
elements,” I mean characteristics of people, institutions, or perceptions of the Red Turbans
relating to the Confucian tradition. Confucianism is a complex system and has many different
sub-schools. But my concern here is to demonstrate a relationship between elements of the Red
Turbans and aspects of the Confucian tradition considered broadly.

1. The Identity of Han Shantong’s Grandfather
The connection between the Red Turban rebellion and the Confucian tradition can be traced back
to Han Shantong’s grandfather, who preached the White Lotus teaching two generations before
the 1351 revolt. The Yuanshi records that “before, Han Shantong’s grandfather, a local
Luancheng person, deluded the multitude by organizing the White Lotus gathering and burning
incense. He was banished to Yongnian county in Guangping [Route] 初，欒城人韓山童祖父以
白蓮會燒香惑眾，謫徙廣平永年縣.”
20
A contemporary source, the Unofficial History of the
Gengshen Emperor (Gengshen waishi 庚申外史), reveals the identity of Han Shantong’s
grandfather.
In the fifth Month [of 1351], the Red Army arose in Yingchuan and Yingshang.
They were also called the Incense Army. They gained the names because of
burning incense and worshiping the Buddha Maitreya. [This movement] originated
from the family of Han Xuejiu in Luancheng county of the Zhaozhou area.
21

20
Yuanshi, j. 42, p. 891.
21
Quan Heng, Gengshen weishi jianzheng, Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 1991, pp. 58-59.
16

五月，潁川、潁上紅軍起，號為香軍，蓋以燒香禮彌勒佛得此名也。其
始出趙州灤城縣韓學究家。
From these two sources, we can conclude that Han Shantong’s grandfather, Han Xuejiu, was
organizing the White Lotus society in Luancheng county. His followers burned incense and
worshiped the Buddha Maitreya. Because of this practice, the Yuan government banished Han
Xuejiu from Luancheng county to Yongnian county.
The title Xuejiu 學究 of Han Shantong’s grandfather indicates his links with the Confucian
tradition. Xuejiu was not the name of Han Shantong’s grandfather, but his title, which was
derived from the Confucian Imperial Civil Service Examination system (科舉 keju). During the
Tang dynasty, xuejiu was a category of the Classics Examination ( 明經 mingjing) in the civil
service examinations.
22
During the Song, the title xuejiu was often used in reference to those
who won ranks in the imperial civil service examinations.
23
After the Song, the title xuejiu
gradually transformed into a generic title in reference to intellectuals with profound knowledge.
The novel Outlaws of the Marsh, which is considered to be written in the late Yuan or early
Ming, contains information about how the title xuejiu was used during that period. The Outlaws
of the Marsh is set in the late Northern Song dynasty (907-1127) and tells of a group of outlaws
who first rebel against the Song, but later submitted to the Song and helped it suppress other
outlaws. The mastermind of this group of outlaws, named Wu Yong 吳用, was a principal of a
local Confucian school. In this novel, he was respectfully called Wu Xuejiu by his outlaw
cohorts. In the English translation of the novel, Wu Yong’s title xuejiu is directly translated as

22
Ouyang Xiu, Xintangshu, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975, j. 44, p. 1159; 1162.
23
Toghto, Songshi, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977, j. 155, pp. 3604-3608.
17

“scholar.”
24
From the case of Wu Yong in the novel, we might hypothesize the situation of Han
Xuejiu in the mid-Yuan. He might be a low-level Confucian intellectual, who exerted influence
among his local populace. The record in the Gengshen waishi is the only surviving source
concerning the identity of Han Shantong’s grandfather. And from this source we at least can
conclude that the White Lotus society that mobilized the large-scale rebellion in 1351 was at its
beginning organized by a Confucian scholar rather than a religious professional.
25

This record concerning Han Shantong’s grandfather and the White Lotus gathering is
controversial among scholars of the history of Chinese Buddhism. Many scholars, based on this
record, argue that the White Lotus gathering was the backbone of the 1351 Red Turban rebellion
and it marked a significant change in the White Lotus tradition from an orthodox Buddhist
school to a millenarian heterodoxy.
26
This long-established narrative, however, has been strongly
challenged by Barend ter Haar, who seeks to offer a new overall narrative for the history of the
White Lotus tradition from the Southern Song dynasty to the Qing period. Ter Haar argues that
the White Lotus tradition was a non-military devotionalist Buddhist movement until the mid-
Ming period (mid sixteenth century). Within this period, the term “White Lotus” was used as a
descriptor for this peaceful movement. But after the mid sixteenth century, “White Lotus”
gradually became a label used to stigmatize all kinds of heterodox groups, some of which did not
call themselves White Lotus adherents. Ter Haar insists that later Ming and Qing scholars tended
to use the White Lotus teaching retrospectively as an epithet for millenarian groups, including

24
Shi Nai’an and Luo Guanzong, Outlaws of the Marsh, translated by Sidney Shapiro, Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1981, p. 215.
25
This is consistent with the popular lay Buddhist movement in the Song-Yuan period. For the lay Buddhism movement, see
Daniel Overmyer, Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late Traditional China, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1976, esp. pp. 73-109.
26
Overmyer, Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late Traditional China, pp. 73-109. For Chinese literature, see Yang
Ne, “Yuandai de bailianjiao 元代的白蓮教,” Yuanshi lunji 元史論集, Beijing: Guojia tushuguan chubanshe, 2012, pp. 230-274.
18

the 1351 revolt organized by Han Shantong. Indeed, “Han Shantong’s religious message
therefore fits into an old indigenous Maitreyist tradition, by no means linked to Manichaean
religion or to the White Lotus tradition.”
27
An increasing number of scholars have begun to
accept ter Haar’s new narrative.
28

The record concerning Han Shantong’s grandfather and the White Lotus Gathering poses a
serious problem for ter Haar’s overall narrative. This record is included in the Basic Annals
(Benji 本紀) section of the Yuanshi, the compilation of which was finished in 1370. Thus, it is
hard to attribute this record to the later retrospective construction of the White Lotus history. Ter
Haar, however, challenges the reliability of this record. Ter Haar argues that this record of Han
Shantong’s grandfather and the White Lotus Gathering is the single reference to the connection
between the White Lotus tradition and the Red Turban rebellion, which cannot be verified by
other sources.
29
He also claims that “the term White Lotus Gathering is never used in any source
to refer to the old style White Lotus movement.”
30
Thus, ter Haar concludes that “the reference
to his grandfather’s membership in the White Lotus Gathering is very obscure, besides being
transmitted in only three sources that go back to the same original text. It certainly did not mean
a fundamental change in the nature of the old style White Lotus movement.”
31
Ter Haar decided
to exclude this obscure record from his examination and develops his overall narrative of the
history of the White Lotus without analyzing it.

27
ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings, p. 123.
28
Robert Hymes, “Reviewed Work(s): The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History by B.J. ter Haar,” Journal of
Song, Yuan, and Conquest Dynasty Studies, No. 26 (1996), pp. 251-263; Valerie Hansen, “Reviewed Work(s): The White Lotus
Teachings in Chinese Religious History by Barend J. ter Haar,” T’oung Pao, vol. 79, 4/5 (1993), pp. 367-374; Mark Meulenbeld,
Demonic Warfare: Daoism, Territorial Networks, and the History of a Ming Novel, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2015,
p. 128.
29
ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings, p. 118.
30
ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings, p. 118-119.
31
ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings, p. 123.
19

This record of Han Shantong’s grandfather, however, is not the sole contemporary textual
reference to the connection between the White Lotus tradition and Han Shantong’s messianic
revolt. The biography of Zhang Zhen 張楨, a Confucian official serving in the Yuan court during
the late Yuan, in the Yuanshi contains an imperial memorial he submitted to the Yuan emperor
after the outbreak of the Red Turban rebellion, illustrating the origins of the revolt and his
suggestions for solving the problem:
The bandits of Yingshang originally organized the White Lotus (Gathering),
deluding the masses with the law of Buddha. Finally (they) pretended to be
authorative and powerful, and resisted (the government) with military
troops. I observe its direction, which is fearsome. It will not stop until
destroying our national altars and burning down our country.
32

潁上之寇，始結白蓮，以佛法誘眾。終飾威權，以兵抗拒，視其所
向，駸駸可畏，其勢不至於亡吾社稷、燼吾國家不已也。
This record is the most direct contemporary textual reference to the connection of Han
Shantong’s revolt to the White Lotus tradition. It is certain that this account and the record about
Han Shantong’s grandfather are not based on the same source. Since two contemporary sources
associate the White Lotus with Han Shantong’s preaching and revolt, we can hardly ignore them
in our examination. Thus, in this sense ter Haar’s new narrative is incomplete.
The role of the White Lotus tradition in the messianic movement can be more clearly seen
in the campaign of the Southern Red Turbans. As mentioned above, after Liu Futong launched

32
Yuanshi, j. 186, p. 4267; Yang Ne first brought this record into academic attention in his 1983 paper “Yuandai de bailianjiao.”
20

the rebellion in Yingshang in early 1351, Xu Shouhui 徐壽輝 and Zou Pusheng 鄒普勝 rebelled
in the middle Yangtze River area late the same year. Their troops are called Southern Red
Turbans in modern historiography. Sources show that Xu and Zou spread the messianic message
that “the Buddha Maitreya will descend to reincarnate and will be the lord of the world” 彌勒佛
下生，當為世主.
33
Although this account does not directly mention the association of the
Southern Red Turbans with the White Lotus tradition, some related sources and later research
reveal the possible connection between the Southern Red Turbans and the White Lotus tradition.
For example, three years before the outbreak of the southern Red Turban rebellion, Zou Pusheng
had worked with a White Lotus monk to organize a small-scale anti-Yuan rebellion.
34
From the
name of Zou Pusheng, we can, with some certainty, conclude that he was a White Lotus
practitioner. The founder of the White Lotus school of Buddhism, Mao Ziyuan (d. 1166), set a
rule for naming later generations of White Lotus monks. Their names should include one of the
four Chines characters, Pu 普, Jue 覺, Miao 妙, and Dao 道.
35
The name of Zou Pusheng
conforms to this rule. According to the Chinese scholar Yang Ne’s research, there were more
than ten major generals in the Southern Red Turban army whose names had the character Pu.
One of the generals, Ou Puxiang 歐普祥, is also called Ou Daoren 歐道人 (“a person of the Way
surnamed Ou).
36
Here, Ou Puxiang’s title Daoren is an apparent abbreviation of the term bailian
daoren 白蓮道人 (person of the Way of the White Lotus). This shows that the White Lotus
tradition was deeply involved in the Southern Red Turban rebellion mobilized by Xu Shouhui

33
Chen Gaohua and Yang Ne ed., Yuandai nongmi zhanzheng shiliao huibian 元代農民戰爭史料彙編, vol.2, Zhong, Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju, 1985, p. 111.
34
Chen and Yang, Yuandai nongmi zhanzheng shiliao huibian vol.2 zhong, p. 110.
35
This rule was not strictly followed by later White Lotus monks. See Yang Ne, Yuandai bailianjiao yanjiu 元代白蓮教研究,
Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2004, pp. 165-166.
36
Mingtaizu shilu, j.15, p. 0197.
21

and Zou Pusheng. From these accounts, it is impossible to deny the involvement of the White
Lotus tradition in the late Yuan messianic movements.
An assumption in ter Haar’s narrative largely leads to the incompleteness of his overall
framework of the history of the White Lotus. Ter Haar assumes that throughout the Southern
Song up to the mid-Ming there was an unchanging and homogeneous “old style White Lotus
tradition” that used the White Lotus as its autonym. Ter Haar defines the old style White Lotus
movement as “a devotional passive movement with the autonym White Lotus Society.”
37

Because “No characteristics of the old style White Lotus movement are mentioned in the case of
Han Shantong’s grandfather,”
38
ter Haar argues, “It certainly did not mean a fundamental change
in the nature of the old style White Lotus movement.”
39
It is questionable to regard the history of
the White Lotus movement before Han Shantong as a homogeneous and unchanging religious
tradition. Sources show that as early as the mid-Yuan, the White Lotus tradition had become
highly diverse within itself, and various groups self-ascribed themselves as the White Lotus. Pu
Du 普度 (1255-1330) was a key figure in the Yuan White Lotus tradition. He successfully
persuaded the Yuan government to lift its ban on the White Lotus Society in 1312. In his 1304
book, Pu Du lamented the disunity among different branches of the White Lotus tradition:
The orthodox way of the White Lotus takes true nature and Buddha Amitabha
as its body, and takes reciting Buddha and believing wishes as its principle… In
recent times, followers [of the White Lotus] have lost their principles; they are
obsessed with things and manifestations. They do not follow classics of the
teaching; towards others they misbehave; their minds and eyes are not clear;

37
ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings, p. 114.
38
ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings, P. 119.
39
ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings, P. 123
22

they compete for the titles of master. It is really a corrupt practice of our
teaching. Some people search for ghosts and spirits like wizards; some even
claim the descending and reincarnation of Buddha Maitreya; some claim
possession by Heaven… [They] mislead themselves and others. It is
deplorable.
40

夫白蓮正法，以本性彌陀為體，念佛信願為宗 …… 比來學者迷失宗旨，貪
著事相，不遵教典，向外妄為，心眼不明，竟稱師長，實法門中一弊事
也。或搜鬼竅有若師巫，或稱彌勒下生，或言諸天附體 …… 誤人自誤，堪
可悲哉！
Here Pu Du is chastising the practices he thinks of as not following the classics of the teaching,
but he definitely regards them as within the White Lotus tradition. He blames some people
within the White Lotus tradition of claiming the descending and reincarnation of the Buddha
Maitreya. This shows that before 1304 some people within the White Lotus tradition had
preached the doctrine of the reincarnation of the Buddha Maitreya. This record is consistent with
Han Shantong and Zou Pusheng’s messianic messages. Thus, it is inappropriate to regard the
preaching of the reincarnation of the Buddha Maitreya as not belonging to the White Lotus
tradition. Furthermore, in another part of this book Pu Du addresses the disunity among different
White Lotus groups:

40
Pu Du, Lushan lianzong baojian 廬山蓮宗寶鑒, j. 10, in Chen Gaohua and Yang Ne ed., Yuandai bailianjiao ziliao huibian 元
代白蓮教資料彙編, Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 1989, p. 145.
23

I belong to the school taught by Mentor Zhang. He is a disciple of Master Li. You belong
to the branch of Pu; he belongs to the branch of Jue. They do not think about where we
originated. Infighting among different branches is not good.
41

我是張導師傳宗，他是李師長徒弟，彼是普字型大小，伊是覺字宗。不思根本自何
來，各競枝條無是處。
This record shows that different branches and schools within the White Lotus contended among
one another in terms of their master, generation, and school. Since Pu Du treated them as within
the White Lotus, it is reasonable to infer that these branches all used the White Lotus as the
autonym. In the early 1300s, the White Lotus tradition was by no mean a homogeneous old-style
devotional tradition, but a composition of various groups, who all described themselves as the
White Lotus.
From the above analysis, I would like to supplement ter Haar’s overall narrative of the
White Lotus history. I agree with his argument that Han Shantong’s revolt did not mark a
substantial change in the White Lotus tradition, but I disagree with him on his argument that Han
Shantong and his grandfather did not belong to the White Lotus tradition. I argue that the White
Lotus tradition was highly diverse in the early 1300s, and there was no homogeneous old-style
traditional White Lotus. Both Han Shantong and Zou Pusheng, who spread the messianic
messages of the reincarnation of the Buddha Maitreya, belonged to the White Lotus tradition. As
for this branch led by Han Shantong’s family, it seems to be a lay Buddhist movement greatly
influenced by Confucian thought, as evidenced by the cultural background of Han Xuejiu.

41
Lushan lianzong baojian, j.6; Chen Gaohua and Yang Ne ed., Yuandai bailianjiao ziliao huibian, p. 109.
24

2. The Role of Du Zundao in the Red Turban Rebellion
The connection of the Red Turban rebellion to the Confucian tradition can also be seen in the
role played by Du Zundao in this rebellion. Du Zundao was the major leader of the northern Red
Turban rebellion in 1351 and the Song state founded by the Red Turbans in 1355. His role was
even more important than that of Liu Futong in the early stage of the rebellion. While
mentioning the outbreak of the Red Turban rebellion, two contemporary sources specify that Du
Zundao was the major leader of the rebellion. “Du Zundao from Shandong installed the son of Li
(sic, it should be Han Shantong) as the lord and rebelled in the Runing area.”
42
“[The rebels in]
Yingshang acclaimed Du Zundao as their leader. They sacked Zhugao, seized grain storage, and
attracted hundreds of thousands of followers. They occupied Runing, Guang, Xi, and Xinyang.”
43
When the Song state was founded in 1355, Du Zundao became the Chief Councilor
(chengxiang 丞相) of the state:
On the jiwei day of the second month [of 1355], Liu Futong and others received Han
Lin’er from Jiahe of Dangshan and installed him as the emperor. He was also called
Xiao Mingwang [literally: Little Prince of Light]. The capital was set in Bozhou, the
state name was Song, and the reign title Longfeng (Dragon Phoenix) was adopted.
His mother, Mrs. Yang, was installed as the Empress Dowager. Du Zundao and
Sheng Wenyu were appointed Chief Councilors, Luo Wensu and Liu Futong were
appointed as Vice-Chief Councilors, and Liu Liu was appointed as the head of the
Military Affair Bureau… Du Zundao was favored [by Han Lin’er] and controlled

42
Quan Heng, Gengshen waishi jianzheng, p. 38.
43
Quan Heng, Gengshen waishi jianzheng, p. 59.
25

power. Liu Futong envied him and ordered soldiers to beat Du Zundao to death. Liu
Futong then became the Prime Minister and later he claimed himself to be the Grand
Guardian.
44

二月己未，劉福通等自碭山夾河迎韓林兒至，立為皇帝，又號小明王，建都
亳州，國號宋，改元龍鳳。以其母楊氏為皇太后，杜遵道、盛文郁為丞相，
羅文素、劉福通為平章，劉六知樞密院事…遵道得寵專權，劉福通疾之，命
甲士撾殺遵道，福通遂為丞相，後稱太保。
The information contained in these sources diverges from today’s popular understanding that Liu
Futong was the de facto leader of the Red Turban rebellion from its beginning. These records
show that Du Zundao played a much more important role in the early stage of the rebellion than
we usually think. Only after Du was assassinated did Liu Futong completely control the Song
state.
Although Du Zundao dominated the early period of the rebellion, he was not a White Lotus
follower but a Confucian scholar official. The Gengshen weishi records that Du Zundao was a
Confucian (shusheng 書生) and for a period served as a staff member in the Department of
Military Affairs in the Yuan Central Government in Dadu.
Du Zundao, a staff member of the Department of Military Affairs, resigned from his post.
When he arrived at Yingchuan, he became the leader of the bandits. Previously when
Bayan was the prime minister and Maza’ertai was the head of the department of Military
Affairs, Du Zundao, who then was a Confucian intellectual, submitted a memorial,

44
Yuanshi, j. 44, p. 922.
26

suggesting that [the court] hold martial imperial examinations (wuju 武舉) in order to
collect wise, brave warriors. Maza’ertai hired him as a staff member (yuanshi 掾史).
Knowing that his suggestions would not be adopted, [Du Zundao] left. Later, he became
the leader of the bandits.
45

樞密院掾史杜遵道，棄官不仕，適潁川，遂為紅軍舉首。先是，伯顏為丞相，馬紮
兒台為知院，遵道為書生，上言請開武舉，以收天下智謀勇力之士。馬紮兒台遂補
為掾史。既而知不能行其業，遂棄去，後為賊中舉首。
Du Zundao’s career was interesting. He was a Confucian and he proposed suggestions for the
Yuan empire. When he found that his suggestions could not be adopted by the Yuan government,
he chose to leave. When he arrived at Yingzhou, the Red Turban rebellion broke out. Du became
the leader of this rebellion. The Gengshen waishi does not mention why and how Du Zundao, a
person who was not a member of the White Lotus Gathering, became the major leader of the
rebellion. A reasonable hypothesis is that the rebels sought to exploit Du Zundao’s Confucian
status and his expertise in political affairs, which he had gained during his service in the Yuan
central government.
Du’s foresight in political affairs can be seen in two events. The first is the above-
mentioned memorial he submitted to the Yuan court, suggesting holding martial examinations.
Du’s aim was to incorporate local militia into the Yuan army to strengthen the declining Yuan
official military forces. Later historical developments show that Du’s observation of the
weakness of the Yuan military was correct. During the Red Turban rebellion, Yuan official
troops performed poorly in fighting the rebels. After many defeats, the Yuan court had to rely on

45
Quan Heng, Gengshen waishi jianzheng, pp. 38-39.
27

local militia to fight the Red Turbans. This policy led to the rise of military strongmen like
Chaghan Temur and Li Siqi. Although the Red Turbans were finally defeated by the local
militia, these local military strongmen had developed into semi-independent warlords. They
fought against one another and contended for the control of the Yuan court. This internecine
strife, which sapped the last strength of the Yuan, led to great turmoil in Northern China.
Scholars attribute this internecine strife as a major reason for the Yuan’s fall. The Yuan’s later
dilemma had been predicted by Du’s memorial.
The Gengshen weishi records a second, similar anecdote. When fighting the Red Turbans
in Henan, Yuan official troops were extremely incompetent. An official suggested recruiting
laborers in salt mines for military use. Commenting on this suggestion, Quan Heng, the author of
the Gengshen waishi, argues that “it was only [Du] Zhundao who could foresee this crisis as
much as more than ten years earlier.”
46

Du’s foresight is also demonstrated in his incorporation of Zhu Yuanzhang’s fledgling
troops into the Song state. In 1352, Zhu Yuanzhang, aged 24, joined a rebel army loosely
affiliated with the Red Turbans in Haozhou 濠州 (today’s Fengyang). This Red Turban army
was headed by a certain Guo Zixing 郭子興, a local White Lotus leader. Zhu’s talent in political
calculation and military planning soon attracted Guo’s attention. Guo not only promoted Zhu
from an ordinary soldier to a squadron leader, but also married Zhu to his adopted daughter, who
later became the empress of the Ming dynasty. But in early 1355, Guo Zixing suddenly died of
sickness and his army was left in the hands of Guo’s two sons and Zhu Yuanzhang. At that time,

46
Quan Heng, Gengshenwaishi jianzheng, p. 39.
28

this army was in a critical condition. Its leader having just passed away, it had no strategy and its
morale was low. The whole army faced the danger of total disintegration.
An edict from Du Zundao, the Chief Councilor of the newly founded Song state, changed
the situation. One of Guo’s sons returned from Bozhou, the capital of the Song state, with an
edict from the Song court issued by Du Zundao. In this edict, Du and the Song court conferred
upon Guo Zixing’s two sons and Zhu Yuanzhang respectively the titles of the Marshall, the
Right Deputy Marshall, and the Left Deputy Marshall, and commissioned them to conquer
southern China on the behalf of the Song state.
47

Records of Zhu Yuanzhang’s response to this conferment vary, and the differences further
show the unreliability of Ming official sources. According to the Mingtaizu shilu, when receiving
this conferment, Zhu Yuanzhang angrily said: “How can a true hero be subject to others?” He
immediately refused the conferment.
48
But the private writing Jishilu ( 紀事錄 Record of Events),
has a different story. The Jishilu records that Zhu accepted the title. Furthermore, the Jishilu also
records that in the following decade Zhu Yuanzhang served as a major general of the Song state,
conquering many places in the name of the Song state.
49
Many contemporary sources verify the
record in the Jishilu.
50
For example, as late as the mid-Ming period in the 16
th
century, imperial
edicts that were issued by Zhu Yuanzhang in the name of the Red Turban Song ruler Han Lin’er
could still be found in Ming society.
51
Texts of these edicts were recorded in different personal
writings. All these edicts began with the sentence “By the august power of the Emperor [Han

47
Huangming benji, Siku quanshu cunmu congshu edition, shi vol. 06, p. 126.
48
Mingtaizu shilu, vol. 3. p.30.
49
Yu Ben 俞本, Jishilu jianzheng 紀事錄箋證, annotated by Li Xinfeng, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2015, p. 31.
50
See Guochu shiji 國初事蹟, Guochu qunxiong shilue 國初群雄事略, Yanshantang bieji 弇山堂別集, Yeji 野記.
51
Zhu Yunming 祝允明, Yeji, vol.1, Siku quanshu cunmu congshu edition, zi vol. 240, p. 7.
29

Lin’er] and the order of the Prince of Wu [Zhu Yuanzhang].”
52
Thus, it is certain that Zhu
Yuanzhang accepted the Song state’s entitlement and became a general of the Song. In contrast,
the record in the Mingtaizu shilu is a narrative designed to conceal Zhu Yuanzhang’s service to
the Red Turban Song state.
Du Zundao’s edict changed the fate of Zhu’s army by providing it political legitimacy and
strategic direction. After then, Zhu and his colleagues moved southward, quickly crossed the
Yangtze River, and occupied Jiqing 集慶, today’s Nanjing. In the battle of Jiqing, Guo Zixing’s
two sons died, and hence Zhu Yuan became the sole commander of this army.
53
Based at Jiqing,
Zhu gradually increased his forces and expanded his domain. All this was undertaken in the
name of the Song State. For example, in early 1359, Zhu Yuanzhang occupied Wuzhou in
Zhejiang province. After the conquest, in front of his administration building Zhu erected two
huge flags, each with a large attached banner. On the flags was written: “The mountains and
rivers cover the land of China, the sun and moon restore the universe of the Great Song 山河奄
有中華地日月重開大宋天.” The banners bore this couplet: “In highest Heaven, the sun and
moon mark the imperial way; In the Song state, the rivers and mountains retrace the treasure
chart 九天日月開皇道宋國江山複寶圖.”
54
Zhu used these couplets and banners to demonstrate
his loyalty to the Song state. Indeed, many contemporary sources confirm that Zhu remained
subordinate, at least nominally, to the Song state until Han Lin’er died in early 1367.
55

52
Yeji, j. 1, p. 7; Yanshantang bieji, j. 85.
53
There have arisen suspicions that Zhu Yuanzhang might have murdered these two generals. But no existing source can verify
this suspicion.
54
Yu Ben, annotated by Li Xinfeng, Jishilu jianzheng, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2016, p. 101. Hok-Lam Chan, “The ‘Song’
Dynasty Legacy: Symbolism and Legitimation from Han Liner to Zhu Yuanzhang of the Ming Dynasty,” p. 112;
55
Yu Ben, Jishilu jianzheng, j. 1, pp. 198-199; Qian Qianyi, Guochu qunxiong shilue, j. 1, p. 39; Gao Dai, Hongyou lu, j. 2, p. 22.
30

These above-mentioned records indicate the importance of Du Zundao, who was not a White
Lotus believer but a Confucian, in leading the Red Turban rebellion and building the Song state.
Furthermore, Du Zundao incorporated Zhu Yuanzhang’s fledgling forces into the Song state and
granted Zhu the political legitimacy to fight against the Yuan and other warlords. The case of Du
Zundao provides a deeper understanding of the role of Confucians in the Red Turban rebellion.

3. The Identity of Master Guan
The association of the Red Turban rebellion with Confucians can also be seen in the life and
career of Master Guan (Guan Xiansheng 關先生), an important general of the Red Turban
troops. Master Guan was the commander of the Middle Expedition troops sent by Liu Futong to
attack Dadu in 1357. Master Guan and his troops were blocked by Yuan armies in central Hebei
and had to circumvent the Yuan’s strongholds there. They set out for Shanxi and then occupied
the strategic pass of Datong. From Datong, Master Guan’s troops entered into Mongolia. This
branch of Red Turbans sacked Shangdu (Xanadu), the summer capital of the Yuan Empire.
Because Shangdu was burned down by Master Guan, the Yuan Emperor had to abandon the
tradition of annual peripatetic trips between Shangdu and Dadu. Moreover, Master Guan’s
attacks continued after the conquest of Shangdu. These Red Turbans quickly occupied
Manchuria. Using Manchuria as a springboard, Master Guan and his Red Turban soldiers
invaded Korea, a vassal state of the Yuan dynasty. They conquered Kaijing, the capital of Korea
in 1362. But their victory was short-lived. Master Guan and his soldiers were trapped in Kaijing
31

by Korean militias, resulting in a disaster for the Red Turbans. Master Guan and most of his
soldiers were killed in the battles.
56

The invasion of the Korean peninsula by Master Guan’s Red Turban troops
fundamentally changed the political landscape of Northeast Asia in the mid-fourteenth century.
One of the results of Master Guan’s invasion was the establishment of the Chosŏn dynasty
(1392-1897). Under attack from the Red Turbans, the ruling Koryŏ dynasty of Korea collapsed.
In the process of fighting against the Red Turbans, a Korean general named Yi Seonggye quickly
rose. In the following decades he continued to consolidate his power among the Koreans by
driving off Mongol remnants and Japanese pirates from the Korean peninsula. In 1392, Yi finally
abolished the Koryŏ Dynasty and founded his Chosŏn Dynasty.
57

Although Master Guan’s campaign had a decisive impact on the political situation of East
Asia, records of him in surviving sources are disproportionately scarce. The Yuanshi only has a
few brief accounts about his campaign, all describing Master Guan and his soldiers as bandits
who kept moving, looting, and destroying. The following account in the Yuanshi is typical of
records about Master Guan’s campaign. “[In the Twelfth Lunar Month of 1358) Master Guan,
Broken-head Pan, and others sacked Shangdu, burned down palaces, and stayed there for seven
days; then they turned to attack Liaoyang and later Koryŏ. 關先生、破頭潘等陷上都，焚宮
闕。留七日，轉略往遼陽，遂至高麗.”
58
This account gives a very sketchy description of
Master Guan’s campaign in Mongolia, Manchuria, and the Korean Peninsula, but offers little
information about Master Guan’s background. Master Guan is apparently a nickname, but the

56
About the invasion of the Red Turbans on the Korean peninsula, see David Robinson, Empire’s Twilight: Northeast Asia Under
the Mongols (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 130-160.
57
Robinson, Empire’s Twilight, pp. 199-252.
58
Yuanshi, j. 45, p. 945.
32

Yuanshi does not give any reference to the true name of Master Guan or Broken-head Pan. The
Koryŏsa, the official history of the Koryŏ dynasty compiled by the Chosŏn dynasty government,
has relatively more detailed accounts about Master Guan’s invasion of the Korean Peninsula, but
similar to the Yuanshi, the records in the Koryŏsa convey little information about the Red Turban
generals. The Koryŏsa refers the Red Turbans as the “Red Bandits 紅賊” and describes them as
bandits who kept looting and sacking cities.
59
In general, the official histories in China and
Korea tend to describe these Red Turbans troops led by Master Guan as bandits but meanwhile
convey little information about their background.
This tendency to describe Master Guan and his soldiers as bandits in official narratives can
be best seen in an imperial edict sent by Zhu Yuanzhang to the Koryŏ dynasty. In 1373, Zhu
Yuanzhang, who was worried about the possible alliance between the Koryŏ dynasty and the
Mongols in Mongolia, issued an edict to the Koryŏ dynasty, warning the Koryŏ court of serious
consequences that would result from disloyalty to the Ming. In this edict, Zhu mentions several
invasions of Korea by Chinese in history, including Master Guan’s invasion. “Before, the
Taizong emperor of the Tang (r. 629-649) failed in conquering you. They were not skilled at
conquering. Later, the Gaozong emperor of the Tang (r. 649-683) did eliminate your state. And
later, Master Guan and his men and women refused to acknowledge law and rules. They only
sought avarice and licentiousness. Because of this, they also failed. 在先，唐太宗征您不得，
他每不會征。後高宗都滅了您國來。在後，關先生那波男女，不理法度，只要貪淫，以此
上他也壞了。”
60
Here Zhu Yuanzhang clearly describes Master Guan and his troops as bandits
who only wanted avarice and licentiousness.

59
Koryŏsa, j. 39; Chen Gaohua and Yang Ne, Yuandai nongmin zhanzheng shiliao huibian, p. 62.
60
Hok-lam Chan, Mingdai renwu yu shiliao 明代人物與史料, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2001, p. 90.
33

A surviving private writing compiled during the mid-Ming provides information different
from the records in Chinese and Korean official histories. This private writing Heshang zhetan
( 河上楮談 Free Talks on Rivers) has a brief introduction of Master Guan.
Guan Duo, from Chongren county, was bold, martial, and had heroic spirit. He once
travelled to the North and wrote the poem that “The west wind wakes me up from
[my] heroic dream; [I realize that] it is not Xianyang 鹹陽 but Luoyang 洛陽.”
Later he assisted and masterminded Liu Futong and got the name Master Guan.
(He) together with Broken-head Pan, and Sha Liu’er, sacked Ze, Lu, and other
prefectures of the Yuan, looted north of the Great Wall, burned down Shangdu, and
turned to destroy Liao Yang.
61

關鐸，崇仁人，豪俠負氣，嘗北遊，詩有“西風吹醒英雄夢，不是鹹陽是洛
陽“。後以策幹劉福通，號關先生。與破頭潘、沙劉二等破元澤、潞等州，
掠塞外，焚上都，轉破遼陽。
Master Guan’ real name was Guan Duo 關鐸 and he came from Chongren county in today’s
Jiangxi province. Apparently, Guan Duo was an educated elite, adept in composing poems. This
image of Master Guan is totally different from the images of him in the Yuanshi and Koryŏsa. In
these two official histories, Master Guan is portrayed as a brutal bandit leader who has nothing to
do with civilization or education.
It is interesting to compare Master Guan’s poem recorded in the Heshang zhetan with a
similar poem composed by Zhu Yuanzhang. Master Guan’s poem states that “The west wind

61
Zhu Mengzhen, Heshang zhetian, Sikuquanshu cunmu congshu edition, zi v. 104, j. 1, p. 592.
34

wakes me up from [my] heroic dream; [I realize that] it is not Xianyang 鹹陽 but Luoyang 洛
陽.”
62
Here in the poem, the two places of Xianyang and Luoyang are used in reference to the
two sides of the war between Xiang Yu 項羽, the hegemonic warlord during the chaotic late Qin
period, and Liu Bang 劉邦, the founder of the Han dynasty. Both Xiang Yu and Liu Bang were
leaders of rebel troops against the Qin. After the Qin collapsed, Xiang Yu dominated the
situation. He entered Xianyang, the capital of the Qin, and burned it down. At the time, Liu
Bang, a nominal inferior to Xiang Yu, was stationed in Luo Yang. Although Liu Bang was weak
in military power compared with Xiang Yu, he had the ambition of defeating Xiang. After three
years of bloody war, Liu Bang killed Xiang Yu and founded the Han Dynasty, arguably the most
long-lived dynasty in Chinese history. Possibly in this poem Master Guan used the story of these
two places to express his ambition to overcome rivals in spite of the enormous difficulties he
might face. Today this piece of Master Guan’s poetry is largely unknown to the public and
scholars, but a similar poem composed by Zhu Yuanzhang is widely circulating. This poem is
not only collected into Zhu’s personal writings, but is also praised as proof of Zhu’s talent in
composing poems.
63
Zhu’s poem reads “Horses have crossed the river and alfalfa smells
fragrant; [I] reached Xiaoxiang with light clouds and rain; the east wind wakes me up from my
heroic dream; [I realize that] it is not Xianyang, but Luoyang 馬渡江頭苜蓿香，片雲片雨渡瀟
湘。東風吹醒英雄夢，不是鹹陽是洛陽.”
64
The last two sentences of this poem are exactly the
same as that of Master Guan’s work, except for replacing west wind with east wind. According
to Ming sources, this poem was composed in 1364 when Zhu fought against Chen Youliang.
65

62
Zhu Mengzhen, Heshang zhetian, j.1, p. 592.
63
Jiang Yikui 蔣一揆, Yaoshantang waiji 堯山堂外紀, Sikuquanshu cunmu congshu edition, zi 148, j. 78, p. 294.
64
Jiang Yikui, Yaoshantang waiji, p. 294.
65
Jiang Yikui, Yaoshantang waiji, p. 294.
35

Two years earlier Master Guan had died in Korea in 1362. Thus, it is quite certain that Zhu
Yuanzhang plagiarized Master Guan’s work rather than the other way around.
Zhu Yuanzhang’s plagiarism of Master Guan’s work provides a clue to the possible links
between Zhu and Master Guan. As mentioned above, the Yuanshi describes Master Guan and his
troops as merely looters and bandits, making no mention of his name and cultural background. In
his edict to the Koryŏ dynasty, Zhu declared that Master Guan and his troops “refused to
acknowledge law and rules, but sought avarice and licentiousness,” clearly expressing his
aversion to Master Guan and his Red Turbans soldiers. In no case did Zhu Yuanzhang ever
mention that he personally knew Master Guan. But from the evidence that Zhu plagiarized
Guan’s work, it is almost certain that Zhu knew Master Guan’s poem, name, and identity as an
educated elite.
66
It is reasonable to infer that the exclusion of Guan’s name and background in
the Yuanshi, the writing of which was controlled by Zhu, is not a careless error, but an
intentional act in efforts to construct Master Guan and other Red Turbans as bandits and vandals.
The links between the Red Turbans and the Confucian tradition can also be seen in the
proclamation Master Guan issued to the Koryŏ government in 1359 when the Red Turbans were
about to invade the Korean peninsula. This proclamation declares:
Aggrieved that the people have long fallen under the Mongols (Hu 胡), we have
taken up the righteous cause and raised troops in order to recover the Central
Plains. To the east, we have moved beyond the Shandong region; to the west we
have gone beyond Chang’an; to the south, we have passed beyond Fujian and

66
There is a possibility that Master Guan’s poem circulated widely at the time and Zhu Yuanzhang copied his poem indirectly
from other sources. But in the 1350s, both Guan and Zhu were important generals of the Song state. It is quite certain that they
heard of each other and it is highly likely that they even met each other. Thus, it is more probable that Zhu copied Guan’s poem
because he knew him.
36

Guangdong; to the north, we have reached the Capital Region. All have joined
us in good faith, like the starving who receive meat and grain or the ill who
happen upon medicine. We have now ordered our generals to strictly prohibit
their soldiers from disturbing the people. We will succor those people who join
us; we will chastise those who resist in battle.
67

慨念生民，久陷於胡。倡義舉兵，恢復中原。東逾齊魯，西出函秦，南過閩
廣，北抵幽燕，悉皆款。如饑者之得膏梁，病者之遇藥石。今令諸將戒嚴士卒
毋得擾民。民之歸化者撫之，執迷旅據者罪之。
This proclamation is a direct reference to the Confucian ideology of the Red Turbans. As John
Dardess has pointed out, this proclamation is the only surviving document left by the Red
Turbans themselves.
68
David Robinson argues that in this proclamation the Red Turbans “also
adopt the long-standing Chinese imperial rhetoric of succor for those who accept legitimate
authority and punishment for those who stubbornly cling to their misguided ways.”
69
Robinson
also claims that in this proclamation, the Red Turbans did not distinguish the Chinese from
Korean and “this rhetoric was a logical extension of Confucian political philosophy.”
70

The Confucian rhetoric in this proclamation is apparently seen in its use of the confrontation
pattern of the Hu (Barbarians) and the Central Plains (zhongyuan 中原). In the Confucian
tradition, the Chinese are living in the Central Plains and the Hu people are living in marginal
areas. The continuous confrontation between the Chinese and the Hu people is a conflict between
the civilized and barbarians. Here the Red Turbans adopted the long-standing Confucian rhetoric

67
The translation is adopted from David Robinson, p. 147.
68
Dardess, “The Transformations of Messianic Revolt and the Founding of the Ming Dynasty,” p. 543.
69
Robinson, Empire’s Twilight, p. 147.
70
Robinson, Empire’s Twilight, p. 148.
37

of the confrontation between the civilized and barbarians to legitimize their rebellion against the
Mongols. It is noteworthy that in the proclamation the Red Turbans did not mention the
messianic belief in the reincarnation of the Buddha Maitreya, but based their legitimacy on the
Confucian tradition. From this proclamation, we can see that the Red Turbans and Master Guan
placed greater stress on Confucian ideology rather than the Buddhist messianic belief during
their campaign in Korea.

4. Mao Gui and Local administration of the Song State
An account about the local administration of the Song government in Shandong also sheds
light on the Confucian influence on the Red Turbans. This account is about the local government
of Shandong where the Song general Mao Gui (- 1358) and his son ruled for seven years. Mao
Gui was the commander of the Eastern Route Army of the three expeditionary troops dispatched
to attack Dadu by Liu Futong in 1356. Mao’s troops quickly occupied Shandong, and then
approached Dadu. In the suburb of Dadu, Mao’s attack was thwarted, and he had to retreat to
Shandong, where he was striving to build his base.
71
Later, Mao Gui was assassinated, and his
son succeeded him as the ruler of Shandong for the following several years. In 1362, the local
government established by the Red Turbans was conquered by Koke Temur (-1375), a warlord
nominally loyal to the Yuan. The Yuanshi has a brief record of Mao Gui’s rule over Shandong:
On the guiyou day [of the second lunar month of 1358], Mao Gui sacked Jinan
Route. The defending general Aidi was killed. Mao Gui established the House of
Guest-raising (Binxing Yuan 賓興院) and appointed officials. He assigned Ji

71
Yuanshi, j. 188, p. 4307.
38

Zongzou and other officials to defend different places. In Laizhou 萊州, he
established 360 farm colonies, with an equal distance of thirty li 裡 between
every two colonies. [Mao Gui] also made one hundred carts to carry grain. He
taxed twenty percent for both the public and private lands. During winter they
used land to transport grain, in the summer they used rivers and canals.
72

癸酉，毛貴陷濟南路，守將有的戰死。毛貴立賓興院，選用故官，以姬
宗周等分守諸路；又於萊州立三百六十屯田，每屯相去三十裡，造大車
百輛，以挽運糧儲，官民田十止收二分，冬則陸運，夏則水運。

Mao Gui’s rule over Shandong was characterized by Confucian features. The establishment of
the House of Raising Guests (Binxing Yuan) is a clear symbol of Confucian influence on the Red
Turban regime. The phrase binxing comes from the Confucian classic Zhouli 周禮 (the Rites of
the Zhou Dynasty), a work elaborating on the idealized government system in the Confucian
tradition. According to the original text and its various commentaries, the character Bin means
to treat somebody as a guest. And the character Xing means recommendation and promotion.
73

Thus, the meaning of binxing was to select talented persons and recommend them to rulers.
According to the Zhouli, the binxing institution is the best way to select talents because it makes
rulers treat talents as guests rather than servants.
During the Song dynasty (960 -1279), the term binxing also referred to the Imperial Civil
Service Examination System (keju 科舉). The reason for this change is quite apparent. During

72
Yuanshi, j. 45, p. 941.
73
Zheng Xuan 鄭玄, Jia Gongyan 賈公彥, Zhouli zhushu 周禮注疏, ed., by Zhao Boxiong. (Beijing, Beijing daxue chubanshe,
2000), pp. 314-315.
39

Song times, the Imperial Civil Service Examination was the main way to select ordinary people
to enter the bureaucratic system. Numerous examples can be found in Song texts. In an imperial
edict issued by the Gaozong emperor (r 1127-1162) of the Southern Song dynasty, the emperor
asked the Song government to adjust policies to meet the requirements of the three-year binxing
system.
74
Here the three-year binxing system refers to the Imperial Examination system which
took place every three years during the Song dynasty. A Song gazetteer of Yanzhou in present
Jiangxi province records that more than seven thousand local students attended the Binxing
examination, but only eighteen passed this examination.
75
Here it is clear that the binxing
examination is in reference to the Imperial Civil Service Examination system. During the Yuan,
the term binxing continued to be used in reference specifically to the Imperial Civil Service
Examination system or generally to the way of selecting talents.
In the case of Mao Gui’s rule over Shandong, the institution of Binxing Yuan (House of
Guest-raising) refers to the idealized system of recommendation associated with the well-field
system of antiquity. In the context of Yuan China, this was a political act with considerable
implications and enormously appealing to Confucian elites. As John Dardess puts it, during the
Yuan when Confucianism was as a profession, “the ideal marketing system for professional
services was that known as pin-hsing (binxing) or “guest-raising,” an institution associated with
the well-field society of antiquity.”
76
According to John Dardess, the binxing system faded out
together with the breakup of the ancient well-field system. During the Yuan time, many
Confucian intellectuals rejected the Imperial Civil Service Examination system in favor of the

74
Ma Duanlin 馬端臨, Wenxian tongkao 文獻通考, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), j. 32, p. 692.
75
Jingding yanzhou xuzhi 景定嚴州續志, Songyuan fangzhi congkan edition, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989 reprint), v. 3, p.
4372.
76
John Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy: Professional Elites in the Founding of the Ming dynasty (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1983), p. 57.
40

binxing system.
77
Mao Gui’s House of Guest Raising addressed the big concern of Confucian
literati, and it reflects the Red Turbans’ efforts to attract support from Confucians.
Mao Gui’s establishment of farm colonies also seems to be related to the efforts to
reconstruct the idealized system of selecting talents. According to Dardess’s research, the
binxing system was associated with the well-field society, and the binxing system disappeared as
a result of the breakup of the well-field system. The following accounts about Mao Gui’s farm
colonies seem to indicate Mao’s effort to reconstruct the Confucian ideal of farming institution.
The Yuanshi relates that in Laizhou Mao Gui set up 360 farm colonies with a fixed distance of
thirty li between every two colonies. This record has aroused doubts. Chinese scholar Yang Ne
questions the reliability of this record by asking why these colonies were laid out so regularly
and how the place of Laizhou could contain such a great number of colonies.
78
Yang’s questions
should be answered from a perspective of institutional ideal rather than real feasibility. Although
we admit that Yang’s questions are logical, we cannot immediately deny the reliability of this
record. Indeed, the description of Mao Gui’s farm colonies is consistent with the ideal
agricultural institution recorded in Confucian classics. From the above-quoted account, we know
that there were public and private lands under Mao Gui’s rule. The 360 farm colonies were
public lands, and the fixed distance of thirty li between every two colonies should have been
occupied by private lands. That private lands with the fixed size of thirty li were laid out
regularly amid public lands seems to point to an agricultural institution recorded in the
Confucian classic, the Shijing (Book of Songs). In the poem of yixi 噫嘻, King Cheng of the
Zhou issued an edict, encouraging people to cultivate their 30-li private lands in addition to

77
Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy, pp. 57-58.
78
Yang Ne, “Youguan yuanmo nongmin qiyide jixiang shishi 有關元末農民起義的幾項史實,” Yuanshilunji (Beijing: Guojia
tushuguan chubanshe, 2014), p. 43.
41

fulfilling their obligation of farming public lands. According to commentaries, the 30-li private
lands were an institution of the Zhou time.
79
Based on this poem Yixi, here I offer answers to
Yang Ne’s questions. Although the record about Mao Gui’s farm colonies looks unfeasible, it fits
the ideal Confucian institution recorded in Confucian classics. The Yuanshi record may be
describing Mao’s blueprint, drawn on ancient institutions of private and public lands, for
systematic reconstruction of ancient Confucian institutions, including the binxing system of
selecting talents and the well-field system that could economically support the binxing system.
At any rate, the Shandong local regime established by the Red Turban general Mao Gui was
strongly influenced by Confucian thought.

5. Sha Liu’er and His Dialogue with Bayan Zongdao
The Confucian elements in the Red Turban rebellions can also be found in a dialogue
between a Red Turban general Sha Liu’er 沙劉二 and the prestigious Confucian scholar Bayan
Zongdao 伯顏宗道, recorded in a local gazetteer. Sha Liu’er, also recorded as Sha Liu 沙劉 in
Yuan sources, was a major general of the Middle Route Expedition Forces sent by Liu Futong to
attack Dadu in 1356. Later Sha Liu’er assisted Master Guan in his campaigns in Mongolia,
Manchuria, and the Korean Peninsula. Sha Liu, together with Master Guan, died on the
battlefield in Korea in 1362.
In 1358, Sha Liu’er, commanding a force of Red Turbans, conquered Daming 大名 city in
Hebei. There he captured the noted Confucian scholar Bayan Zongdao. Bayan, whose lineage

79
Mao Heng 毛亨, Zheng Xuan 鄭玄, Kong Yingda 孔潁達, Maoshi Zhengyi 毛詩正義, ed., Gong Kangyun, (Beijing: Beijing
daxue chubanshe, 2000), vol. 19, pp. 1549-1550.
42

traced back to the Halaru tribe in Central Asia, was a renowned Confucian scholar. As his
biography shows, “his fame spread throughout the north of the Yellow River. Even farmers and
ordinary city dwellers heard his fame. 溢於河朔，雖田夫市人亦能知之” After the outbreak of
the Red Turban rebellion in 1351, Bayan gathered members of his genealogy and students to
form a stronghold in the Hebei area. In 1358, the stronghold was conquered by Sha Liu’er’s Red
Turban soldiers. Bayan was captured by the rebels. The rebels tried to force Bayan to join the
rebel camp, but failed. Finally, the rebels executed Bayan and his family members. Before the
execution, an interesting dialogue occurred between Bayan and Sha Liu’er.
In the Wuxu year (1358), the bandit Sha Liu’er of Dongchang led soldiers to attack.
First they claimed that “Master Yan is a renowned Confucian scholar in Hebei.
(Soldiers should be) careful to protect him from being hurt.” After two days of
attacking, the stronghold was broken. (Bayan with his) wife and sons were all
captured. Liu’er loosened his (Bayan’s) bounds himself and talked to him softly.
“You, Master, acknowledge the past and understand the present. We have captured
more than half of all under Heaven. If you can submit, we can share riches and
honor.” The Marquis (Bayan)
80
said: “You were good people, but you are
misleading the people with deluding words. If you repent and change, I will report
to the court to grant you official positions in the name of the emperor. Isn’t it better
than you are following pseudo orders?” Liu’er smiled and said: “You, pedant
Confucian, do not clearly understand issues. You can be said not to be
acknowledging the Mandate of Heaven.”
81

80
Here the Marquis refers to Boyan Zongdao, who was posthumously granted the title of the Marquis of the Fanyang Prefecture
(Fanyang Junhou 范陽郡侯).
81
Chen Gaohua, “Du boyan zongdao zhuan” 讀《伯顏宗道傳》, Yuanshi yanjiu lungao 元史研究論稿, (Beijing: Zhonghua
43

戊戌，東昌賊沙劉二者帥眾來攻，先宣言曰：“顏先生河北名儒，慎勿傷
也。”攻二日，壘破，妻子皆被執。劉二親解其縛，溫言語之曰：“先生知
古通今，天下十分我有太半，爾能屈從，可與共富貴。” 侯曰：“爾本良
民，乃以妖言惑亂黔首。爾能改悔，我當上言朝廷，使汝為王官，不猶愈於
受偽命乎！”劉二笑曰：“迂儒不達事宜，可謂不知天命矣。”
The rebel leader Sha Liu’er was using the Confucian rhetoric to debate with the renowned
Confucian scholar Bayan Zongdao. Bayan accused Sha Liu’er of misleading the people with
deluding words, which might point to the Red Turbans spreading the prophecy that “the Buddha
Maitreya is descending to the world.” Sha Liu’er did not address the messianic prophecy but
refuted Bayan by claiming that “we have more than a half of all under heaven.” This expression
in the Confucian context implied that the Mandate of Heaven had changed. When talking about
the Mandate of Heaven changing from the Shang dynasty to the Zhou, Confucius stressed that
Zhou had two thirds of all under Heaven and thought of that as a symbol of Zhou’s Mandate
from Heaven.
82
Here Sha Liu’er likened the Red Turban state to the Zhou dynasty. Furthermore,
Sha Liu’er directly pointed out that Bayan Zongdao, a leading Confucian scholar, did not
acknowledge the Mandate of Heaven. In this debate, Sha Liu’er completely used the Confucian
rhetoric to legitimize his rebellion. Although sources have no mention of Sha Liu’er’s cultural
identity, it is clear that he was very familiar with Confucian rhetoric of political legitimacy.
The talk between Bayan and Sha Liu’er offers a clue to considering how the Red Turbans
thought of themselves. In response to Bayan’s accusation of spreading deluding words, Sha
Liu’er did not directly address the accusation, but emphasized that the Red Turban state had

shuju, 1991), pp. 450-453.
82
Confucius, The Analects, 8:20.
44

received the Mandate of Heaven. It indicates that the Red Turbans did not highlight their
religious identity in their conquest. They would rather regard themselves and the Yuan as two
equal contenders for the Mandate of Heaven. This case casts doubt on the prevailing narrative
that treats the rebellion as a simple messianic revolt.
The case of Bayan Zongdao also prompts us to reconsider the attitude of the Red Turban
state towards Confucians. After the establishment of the Ming dynasty in 1368, Zhu Yuanzhang
tried to construct his Ming dynasty as the orthodox dynasty that succeeded the Yuan. In the Ming
narrative of the Yuan-Ming Transition, Zhu Yuanzhang denied the legitimacy of the Red Turban
states and blamed them for many atrocities. One of the major accusations was “slaughtering
Confucian intellectuals 殺戮士夫.”
83
The Yuanshi lists a few intellectuals who were killed by the
rebels. Zhu Yuanzhang’s major Confucian advisors like Liu Ji relentlessly chastised the Red
Turbans in their personal writings. The narrative constructed during the Ming keeps reinforcing
the impression that the Red Turbans were strongly anti-Confucian and tended to slaughter
Confucian literati. But the biography of Bayan Zongdao problematizes this prevailing narrative.
Although finally Bayan Zongdao was killed by the Red Turbans, at first the rebels tried to
protect him and invited him to join the rebellion. The Red Turban killed him because he refused
to join. Indeed, all the Confucians who were killed by the Red Turbans and recorded in the
Yuanshi were in the same situation. These cases show that the Red Turbans’ policy toward
Confucian literati was close to “the long-standing Chinese imperial rhetoric of succor for those
who accept legitimate authority and punishment for those who stubbornly cling to their

83
Zhu Yuanzhang, “Ping weizhou bang 平偽周榜”, in Yanshantang biejie 弇山堂別集, comp. by Wang Shizhen 王世貞, j. 85,
p. 1615.
45

misguided ways.”
84
This is no different from the policy toward Confucian intellectuals carried
out by the so-called “orthodox dynasties.”
From the record concerning Bayan Zongdao, we can see that the rebels were not anti-
Confucian, but tried to force Confucian literati to join in the rebellion. Sha Liu’er, the rebel
leader who was depicted as a bandit in the Yuanshi was familiar with Confucian rhetoric of
political legitimacy and sought to legitimize the rebellion by using the idea of the Mandate of
Heaven. The rebels did not emphasize their religious belief in the conquest, but stressed the Red
Turban state as an “orthodox state” that would replace the Yuan.

6. Information from the Epitaph of Saichi Dahu
As seen in the biography of Bayan Zongdao, the rebels did not regard themselves as
religion-oriented messianic groups, but thought of themselves as an equal contender for the
Mandate of Heaven. It is interesting to know what the Yuan side thought of the Red Turban
state. This question is hard to answer on the basis of existing written sources, which are sparse
and largely altered. In 1990, the epitaph of Saichi Dahu 賽因赤答忽 (-1363) was discovered in
Luoyang 洛陽, and this epitaph contains some information about the Red Turban rebellion.
Saichi Dahu was a general on the Yuan side against the Red Turbans during the late Yuan. His
ancestry traced back to the Boyetai tribe of the Mongols. His family had settled in Henan since
the Khubilai Khan period. After the outbreak of the Red Turban rebellion in 1351, Saichi Dahu
joined the local militia organized by the Mongol general Chaghan Temur in the fight against the
Red Turbans. Because of his merit in battlefield, he was promoted to the Associate Director of

84
Robinson, Empire’s Twilight, p. 147.
46

the Bureau of Military Affairs (tongzhi shumiyuanshi 同知樞密院事). In 1363, he died of
illness.
85
Saichi Dahu had a close relationship with Chaghan Temur. Saichi Dahu’s first son
Koke Temur was adopted by Chaghan Temur at a young age. Koke Temur, also known as Wang
Baobao 王保保 in sources, succeeded Chaghan Temur in 1362 as the commander of Chaghan’s
army. In 1368, Koke Temur, along with the Shundi emperor of the Yuan, retreated from Dadu to
Mongolia. Koke Temur thwarted a major attack by the Ming in 1372, saving the Yuan court in
Mongolia. Koke died in 1376.
86
Saichi Dahu was a participant of the war between the Yuan and
the Red Turbans and his epitaph provides reliable first-hand information about the war. As for
Han Lin’er, the leader of the Red Turbans, Saichi Dahu’s epitaph contains an item of
information.
The Bianliang city was conquered by the pseudo Little Prince of Light, Han Lin’er. [Han
Lin’er] established one hundred officials and stationed troops for defense, intending to
conquer the Central Plains. [Han Lin’er] was defeated by the Loyal and Magnificent
(Chaghan Temur).
87

汴梁陷於偽小明王韓林兒，建置百官，駐兵自固，有規取中原之意，為忠襄所破。
Saichi Dahu’s epitaph mentions nothing about the religious belief of Han Lin’er and his state, but
stresses that the Red Turban state had a complete bureaucratic system, strong military forces, and
intention to conquer the Central Plains.
88
It suggests that Yuan generals like Saichi Dahu also did
not emphasize the religious aspect of the Red Turban state. They treated it more as a contender

85
Zhao Zhenhua, “Yuan Saiyinchi dahu muzhi kao” 元《賽因赤答忽墓誌》考, Neimenggu shehui kexue 內蒙古社會科學,
1994 (2), 64-67.
86
For the life of Koke Temur, see “The Biograph of Koke Temur” 擴廓帖木兒傳, in the Mingshi, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,
1975), j. 124, pp. 3709-3713.
87
Zhao Zhenhua, “Yuan Saiyinchi dahu muzhi kao,” p. 65.
88
“One hundred officials” is a common phrase in reference to a complete bureaucratic system. Chapter II will talk about the
government institutions of the Red Turban Song state.
47

with the Yuan than a messianic revolt. Saichi Dahu’s epitaph, to some extent, represents the
Yuan’s understanding of the Red Turban state.
In summary, Confucian elements can be found in many aspects of the Red Turban
movement. Han Shantong’s grandfather, who disseminated the White Lotus teaching in the early
fourteenth century, was a Confucian literatus with the title Xuejiu. Many Confucians, like Du
Zundao, Master Guan, Sha Liu’er, and perhaps Mao Gui, joined and led the rebel movement. Du
Zundao dominated the early stage of the rebellion and played a vital role in incorporating Zhu
Yuanzhang’s forces into the Song state. Master Guan was an educated elite and adopted the
Confucian rhetoric in his proclamation to the Koryŏ government. Sha Liu’er was familiar with
the Confucian rhetoric of the Mandate of Heaven and used it to legitimize the rebellion. Mao Gui
adopted the binxing institution recorded in Confucian classics to select talent, and his agricultural
institution was similar to the ancient ideal farming system. During the war, the Red Turbans did
not highlight their messianic religious belief, but thought of themselves as a contender with the
Yuan for the Mandate of Heaven. Correspondingly, the Yuan did not emphasize the Red
Turbans’ religious aspect, but regarded them as a rival. This section shows that the prevailing
narrative that treats the rebellion as a simple messianic revolt is incomplete.

Reconsidering the Meaning of the Mingwang
The Confucian influence on the Red Turban rebellion provides a new perspective for examining
the meaning of the Mingwang in the Red Turban prophecy. Scholars have offered various
interpretations of the Mingwang in the past decades. The most popular one associates the
Mingwang with Manichaeism. All of the previous scholarship, however, interprets the meaning
48

of the Mingwang in the context of popular religion, ignoring the Confucian elements in this
rebellion movement. I argue that the Mingwang in the Red Turban prophecy refers to the
Enlightened King recorded in Confucian classics. The rebels used this Confucian term to
demonstrate their aim to build a dynasty of a traditional Chinese sort. The rebels manipulated
both popular religion (reincarnation of the Buddha Maitreya) and Confucian ideas (the
Enlightened King) to strengthen their claims to political legitimacy.

Previous Scholarship on Interpreting the term Mingwang
Many works have been done on the meaning of the Mingwang in the Red Turban prophecy. The
drive for interpreting the meaning of the Mingwang is that scholars believe that the dynastic
name of the Ming originated from the Mingwang.
89
Scholars like Wu Han, Yang Ne, and Barend
ter Haar all have offered different interpretations.
The Chinese Scholar Wu Han 吳晗(1909-1969) sought to associate the term Mingwang
with Manichaeism. In his famous 1941 paper “Manichaeism and the Great Ming Empire”
(Mingjiao yü Da Ming diguo 明教與大明帝國), Wu proposed a bold argument, suggesting that
the Ming dynasty derived its name from Manichaeism, a Persian religion that was call Ming Jiao
明教 (the religion of light) in medieval China.
90
Wu claimed that Zhu Yuanzhang’s former
overlord Han Lin’er, as well as most of the leaders of the Red Turban rebellion, were indeed
Manicheans. Wu argues that the Mingwang in the Red Turban prophecy refers to the supreme
god of Manichaeism and Han Lin’er’s title Xiao Mingwang ( 小明王 Little Prince of Light)

89
The relationship between the Mingwang and the dynastic name Ming will be discussed below.
90
Wu Han, “Mingjiao yu Da Ming diguo,” Qinghua xuebao 13.1 (January 1941): 49-50, reprinted in his Dushi Zhaji (Beijing:
Sanlian shudian, 1956), pp. 235-237; Huweiyong dangankao (Beijing: Shangwu chubanshe, 2010), pp. 77-122.
49

symbolizes his Manichean belief. Wu claims that Zhu Yuanzhang chose the Ming as the name of
his dynasty in order to appeal to remnants of the Red Turban movement, who made up of a large
part of Zhu’s troop when the Ming was founded.
To develop this argument, Wu had to overcome difficulties caused by sources. No extant
sources mention the role of Manichaeism in the uprisings in the late Yuan. The Yuanshi and
other contemporary sources do record Han Lin’er’s title as Xiao Mingwang, but none of them
refers to the meaning of the title, let alone any Manichean background of the title.
91
The Yuanshi,
however, clearly records that Han Shantong, as well as Han Shantong’s grandfather, belonged to
the White Lotus tradition. Furthermore, during the uprisings, Han Lin’er and his Red Turban
followers also spread a prophecy that “the Buddha Maitreya is descending into the world and the
Mingwang is coming to the world” （Milefo xiasheng mingwang chushi 彌勒佛下生明王出
世）. This prophecy shows that Han Lin’er and his colleagues worshiped the Buddha
Maitreya.
92
To develop his argument that the name Ming was originated from Manichaeism, Wu
had to first elaborate on the relationships between Manichaeism, the White-Lotus society, and
the Buddha Maitreya worship.
The first step of Wu’s argumentation process was to establish links between the three
beliefs. Wu points out that in many Song official documents and orthodox Buddhist texts, the
three above-mentioned beliefs were often listed together and labelled as the sects of “eating
vegetables and worshipping demons” (shicai shimo 食菜事魔). Thus, Wu asserts that during the
Song, Manichaeism had already intermingled with certain sects of Buddhism, such as the White

91
Yuanshi, j. 44, p. 922.
92
According to Buddhist sutras, members of the White Lotus society primarily worship the Buddha Amitabha, instead of the
Buddha Maitreya.
50

Lotus sect and the Maitreya sect. Wu also argues that the Mingwang in the Red Turban prophecy
referred to the supreme God in Manichaeism, who, according to Manichean sutras, will descend
to save the world one day. Since the three beliefs had intermingled, Wu asserts that Buddha
Maitreya and the Mingwang in the Red Turban prophecy were indeed two names of the same
deity, the Manichean supreme God, in the intermingled Buddho-Manichean society. Although no
surviving source points to the connection between Manichaeism and the Red Turban rebellion,
Wu Han concludes that the rebellion was indeed organized by Manicheans.
The second step of Wu’s argumentation process is to associate Han Lin’er’s title with
Manichean sutras. According to orthodox Buddhist writings, Manicheans often recited a sutra
named the Sutra of the Senior and Junior Mingwang coming to the world (Daxiao Mingwang
chushijing 大小明王出世經), which is not surviving now.
93
Wu Han inferred that, since Han
Lin’er had the title of Xiao Mingwang, his father Han Shantong must have had the title of Da
Mingwang when he was alive. The titles of Han Lin’er and his father Han Shantong just matched
the title of the sutra and Red Turbans’ prophecy that “the Mingwang is coming to the world”. In
this way, Wu reinforced his argument that the Red Turban movement was led by Manicheans.
The third step of the argumentation process is to explain the reason why Zhu Yuanzhang
adopted Ming as the dynastic name.
94
Wu argues that the primary aim of the adoption was to
appeal to former Red Turban soldiers who composed a large number of Zhu Yuanzhang’s forces.
Wu holds that by using the dynastic name Ming, Zhu Yuanzhang intended to convince Red
Turban soldiers that he was the god of Mingwang predicted in the prophecy. Zhu wished to

93
Zhi Pan 志磐, Fozu tongji 佛祖統紀, in Taishō shinshū daizōkyō (Taishō issaikyō kankōkai, 1924-32), no. 2035, 39:370a.
94
The full title of the dynasty is Da Ming. The character Da was a common prefix character used in titles of regimes to show the
greatness of them. Examples can be seen in the titles of other contemporary warlord regimes, such as Da Xia, Da Zhou and Da
Han during the Yuan-Ming transition. For the custom of adding Da as a prefix to dynastic names, see Timothy Brook, “Great
States,” Journal of Asian Studies 75, no. 4 (2016): 957-972.
51

legitimize his authority over these soldiers by seemingly fulfilling the prophecy. Wu points out
that the adoption of the name Ming also had a second aim. In addition to Red Turban soldiers,
there were also many Confucians serving in Zhu’s regime. The dynastic name Ming also made
sense to them. Confucians worship the Sun and the Moon; the two Chinese characters, sun ( 日)
and moon ( 月), combine to form the character Ming( 明). Thus the dynastic title, in the mind of
Confucians, could represent the Confucian rituals of sacrificing to the Sun and the Moon.
95
The
adoption of the title Ming could appeal to both the two groups of Zhu’s followers.
Wu Han’s argument was widely accepted by Chinese and foreign scholars. Chinese
textbooks accepted it as a standard narrative for the history of the Yuan-Ming transition.
96
Many
influential works in western languages, such as the Cambridge History of China volume 6, edited
by Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett and Imperial China by Frederick Mote also adopt Wu’s
argument. Many scholars conducted research on the basis of Wu’s argument. In some English
scholarship published in relatively recent period, Wu Han’s argument is also adopted. In his
work on the political legitimacy of the Ming and the basis of Ming law, Edward Farmer claims
that the dynastic name Ming was “a reference to the Manichaean notion of light or radiance.”
97

Farmer argues that during the late Yuan, a state with the Maitreya-Manichaean belief as its
ideology was also an option for China after the Yuan.
98
In his essay addressing the relationship
between sectarian groups and violence in Chinese history, Richard Shek holds that Han
Shantong, Han Lin’er’s father, for the first time incorporated Maitreya and Manichaean ideas
into the White-Lotus teaching.
99
But insofar as I have read, there is no existing evidence that can

95
Wu Han, “Mingjiao yü Da Ming diguo”, in Huweiyong dangankao (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2015), p. 111.
96
See Bai Shouyi, Chen Dezhi, et al., Zhongguo tongshi (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin chubanshe, 1997), vol. 13, pp. 506-535.
97
Farmer, Zhu Yuanzhang and Early Ming Legislation, p. 5.
98
Farmer, Zhu Yuanzhang and Early Ming Legislation, pp. 5-6.
99
Richard Shek, “Sectarian eschatology and violence”, in Jonathan Lipman and Stevan Harrell, ed,. Violence in China: Essays in
Culture and Counterculture (New York: SUNY Press, 1990), pp. 87-114, particulary p. 96.
52

support Shek’s bold argument. In his famous research about the 700 year history of the city of
Macheng 麻城 in central China, William Rowe begins with the Red Turban insurgency in the
city in the late Yuan. By comparing the different interpretations of the Mingwang, Rowe
supports Wu’s argument that the Red Turbans were Manicheans.
100
To date, Wu’s interpretation
of the Mingwang has been the dominant narrative on this topic in Chinese and Western literature.
But Wu’s argument and methodology have met serious challenges in China since the 1980s.
In 1983, Chinese scholar Chen Gaohua 陳高華 published a paper examining the so-called sects
of “eating vegetables and worshipping demons” recorded in Song-Yuan sources.
101
Chen admits
that during the Song dynasty, Manichaeism and some heterodox sects of Buddhism, such as the
White Lotus society, the Maitreya order, the White Cloud sect among others, were all labelled as
the sects of “eating vegetables and worshipping demons.” But Chen, quoting an imperial
memorial submitted to the court by a Song Jiangxi 江西 local official, points out that Song
officials clearly acknowledged boundaries among the different heterodox sects. In this memorial,
the author Wang Zhi (1127-1189) listed four kinds of heterodox sects and summarized the
different characteristics of individual ones. Wang Zhi also notes that the different heterodox sects
indeed recited different heterodox sutras. Chen Gaohua argues that “eating vegetables and
worshipping demons” was an umbrella term used to refer to many kinds of heterodoxies, but it
does not necessarily mean that all these heterodox sects intermingled with each other. Chen
Gaohua also cites two lists of banned books issued by the Song government, one for heterodox

100
William Rowe, Crimson Rain: Seven Centuries of Violence in a Chinese County (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2007),
p. 58.
101
Chen Gaohua, “Monijiao yu chicaishimo—cong wangzhi lunzhendaoshu shuoqi” 摩尼教與吃菜事魔—從王質《論鎮盜
疏》說起, in Chen Gaogua wenji (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2005), pp. 536-542.
53

Buddhist sects and one for Manichaeism, which reveal that the Sutra of the Coming of the Senior
and Junior Mingwang belonged to a heterodox sect of Pure Land Buddhism, not Manichaeism.
Chen’s research has seriously shaken the foundation of Wu Han’s argument. Since the
different heterodox sects did not intermingle during the Song, Wu’s argument that the Red
Turban leaders followed a belief intermingled with popular Buddhism and Manichaeism
becomes unconvincing. Furthermore, because the Sutra of the Coming of the Senior and Junior
Mingwang was not a Manichean book, Wu’s association of Xiao Mingwang, Han Lin’er’s title,
with the Manichean god, becomes very weak.
Besides Chen Gaohua’s works, a study by Chinese scholar Yang Ne 楊訥 also poses a big
challenge to Wu Han’s overall argument. Yang’s study examines the history of the White Lotus
teaching in the Song and Yuan dynasties. His work shows that during the Song and Yuan
dynasties, some heterodox sects of the White Lotus teaching also worshipped the Maitreya
Buddha, but there is no evidence that Manichaeism ever infiltrated into the White Lotus-
Maitreya society.
102
This finding reinforces Chen Gaohua’s argument.
Although Yang Ne disagrees with Wu Han on the infiltration of Manichaeism into
Buddhism, he accepts the argument that the Buddha Maitreya and the Mingwang in the prophecy
were indeed two titles of the same deity worshiped by the White Lotus-Maitreya Buddhist
society. He also concurs in the opinion that the name of the Ming dynasty originated from Han
Lin’er’s title, Xiao Mingwang. The differences between Wu and Yang lie in two questions,
namely the meaning of “Mingwang” and the reasons why Zhu Yuanzhang chose the Ming as the
dynastic name.

102
Yang Ne, “Yuandaide bailianjiao,” Yuanshi lunji (Beijing: Guojiatushuguan chubanshe, 2012), pp. 230-273.
54

Yang Ne interprets the meaning of the Mingwang in the context of the White Lotus
tradition. Since The Sutra of the Coming of the Senior and Junior Mingwang did not belong to
Manichaeism, Wu’s approach to associate the title Xiao Mingwang with Manichaeism is highly
questionable. Yang asserts that the right approach to explore the meaning of “Mingwang” should
be to examine the sutras and texts of the White-Lotus Maitreya society. In the sutra Da Amituo
jing 大阿彌陀經（The sutra of the great Buddha Amitabha ）, presumably favored by the
White-Lotus teaching, Yang has found a few lines that he believes contain information about the
origin of the Mingwang. These lines read: “The Buddha said, Amitabha Buddha’s brightness is
elegant and resplendent, unique and boundless, many times superior to the brightness of the sun
and moon. He becomes the king of the Radiant Buddhas (guangming zhi wang 光明之王)….
Wherever his brightness reaches, all the innumerable hidden and dark places in the world turn
out to be always in ‘Great Radiance’ (da ming 大明).”
103

Yang insists that the Amitabha Buddha described in this sutra was the deity of Mingwang in
the Red Turban prophecy. The Amitabha Buddha is an important Buddha in the White-Lotus
tradition. The above-mentioned sutra refers to the Amitabha Buddha as the King of the Radiant
Buddhas (guangming zhiwang 光明之王) , which, Yang Ne believes, can be abbreviated as
Mingwang in oral Chinese. Yang suggests that the title of Xiao Mingwang indicated that Han
Lin’er was an incarnation of both the Maitreya Buddha and the Amitabha Buddha. Zhu
Yuanzhang, a Buddhist monk in his young age, must have known of the brightness and power of
the Amitabha Buddha. He chose Da Ming as the name of his dynasty to show that he was the
true incarnation of the Mingwang (Amitabha Buddha).
104
Yang also suggests that probably Zhu

103
Yang Ne, “Yuandaide bailianjiao,” pp. 270. This translation is cited from Hok-lam Chan, “the Song Dynasty Legacy,” p. 122.
104
Yang Ne, “Yuandaide bailianjiao,” pp. 270-71.
55

deliberately identified his dynastic name with the Mingwang (Amitahba Buddha) in memory of
his life as a Buddhist monk in the past.
Chen Gaohua and Yang Ne’s challenges to Wu Han’s interpretation of the dynastic name,
Da Ming, have been given strong support by Hok-Lam Chan, one of the world’s leading scholars
on Yuan-Ming history in the West. Chan has published several articles in both English and
Chinese, addressing many aspects of the Yuan-Ming transition.
105
As for the origins of the
dynastic name Ming, Chan concurred with the argument held by both Wu Han and Yang Ne that
it was derived from the term “Mingwang” in the Red Turban prophecy and Han Lin’er’s title. In
terms of the interpretation of the dynastic name Ming, Chan completely agrees with Yang Ne’s
identification of the Mingwang with the Amitabha Buddha. “Yang makes a convincing case for
the Buddhist origin of Da Ming, which I believe should settle the question of Wu Han’s
provocative but ill-founded hypothesis.”
106
Chan highly praises the ingenuity of the naming of
the Ming.
The choice of Da Ming was ingenious. It simultaneously dislodged his political linkage
to the Han-Song regime and paid homage to the Mingwang messianic legacy of the
White Lotus-Maitreya sect on the one hand, and the Confucian state worship to the sun
and moon to seek Heaven’s blessings on the other. In this new society, the descent of the
Buddha Amitabha brightens up the world and brings salvation, whereas the advent of the
enlightened ruler portends restoration of the Confucian imperial institution and mores.
For Zhu Yuanzhang, a former Buddhist novice turned rebel leader, “Great Ming” was a
religious as well as political and cultural symbol that anointed (or affirmed) the
legitimacy of the new emperor and his dynasty.
107

105
See Hok-lam Chan, “The Song Dynasty Legacy: Symbolism and Legitimation from Han Liner to Zhu Yuanzhang of the Ming
Dynasty”; Chen Xuelin 陳學霖, “Mingchao guohao de yuanqi yu huode wenti” 明朝國號的緣起與火德問題, Mingchude renwu
shishi yuchuanshuo 明初的人物史事與傳說 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanse, 2010), pp. 1-35.
106
Hok-lam Chan, “The Song Dynasty Legacy: Symbolism and Legitimation from Han Liner to Zhu Yuanzhang of the Ming
Dynasty”, p. 122.
107
Hok-lam Chan, “The Song Dynasty Legacy,” p. 122.
56

Hok-Lam Chan accepts Yang Ne’s argument that Mingwang referred to the Amitabha Buddha,
and Zhu named his dynasty Da Ming in order to construct himself as the incarnation of the
Amitabha Buddha. Meanwhile Chan also adopted Wu Han’s argument that the objective of the
naming was twofold. On the one hand Zhu Yuanzhang attempted to appeal to the remnant of the
Red Turban movement. On the other hand, Zhu tried to make the dynastic name meaningful to
his Confucian subjects in the Confucian context. Although Chan does not make any new
interpretation of the dynastic name, he makes a great contribution to this topic by giving
thorough reviews of previous scholarship in both Chinese and English on this subject.
In English literature, Barend ter Haar offers his interpretation of the term Mingwang. As
mentioned above, ter Haar argues that Han Shantong’s messianic belief did not belong to the old-
style White Lotus tradition, but “Han Shantong’s religious message therefore fits into an old
indigenous Maitreyist tradition.”
108
Ter Haar insists that the meaning of the Mingwang should
be found in the Chinese indigenous Maitreyist tradition. Ter Haar notes that some sixth and
seventh century apocalyptic texts preserved in Dunhuang contain prophecies about the advent of
a certain Prince Moonlight and suggests that this Prince Moonlight was the Mingwang in the Red
Turban prophecy.
109
But ter Haar does not provide information about how this sixth and seventh
century apocalyptic idea disseminated to the fourteenth century Chinese rebels.

Unsolved Problems in Previous Scholarship
Although Hok-Lam Chan believes that Yang Ne’s interpretation has successfully settled the
controversial issue about the origins of the dynastic name Da Ming, some questions, I argue,

108
ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings, p. 123.
109
ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings, p. 121.
57

remain unsolved. First, Zhu Yuanzhang’s attitude toward the Maitreya prophecy puts into
question Yang and Wu’s belief that the Maitreya Buddha and the Mingwang were indeed the
same deity. In the fifth month of 1366, roughly one and a half years before the founding of the
Ming, Zhu Yuanzhang launched a military campaign to conquer his long-time rival Zhang
Shicheng 張士誠. Before the military campaign, Zhu issued a proclamation, in which Zhu
declared Zhang Shicheng’s guilt and expressed his own opinions about the situation of that time.
Talking about the Maitreya Buddha belief, Zhu has it:
Those fatuous people, who were deceived by the deluding words, were unable to
understand the incredibility of the words. [They] excessively believed in the existence of
the Maitreya Buddha, hoping it to rule the world and alleviate their pains. They gathered
together and organized the Gathering of Incense Burning. They took root in the Ru and
Ying areas, and spread to the Luo and the Yellow River areas. Since the deluding words
were accepted, conspiracies were carried out. Cities were burned down, and literati were
slaughtered. The multitude were massacred and [there were] thousands of horrible
conditions.
110

不幸小民，誤中妖術，不解其言之妄誕，酷信彌勒之真有，冀其治世，以蘇困苦。
聚為燒得之黨，根蟠汝潁，蔓延河洛。妖言既行，凶謀遂逞，夢蕩城郭，殺戮士
夫，荼毒生靈，無端萬狀。
This proclamation shows that Zhu Yuanzhang despised the Maitreya Buddha belief. He
derogatorily described the Maitreya belief as “deluding words” and its believers as “fatuous
people.” Also, he blamed the wrong belief in Maitreya Buddha for the destruction caused by the
wars in the late Yuan.
Zhu Yuanzhang’s attitude toward the Maitreya belief raises questions about the
understanding that the Maitreya Buddha and the Mingwang were the same deity. As mentioned
before, Wu Han and Yang Ne’s arguments are founded on two shared premises. First, though
Wu and Yang disagree on which deity the Mingwang should be identified with, they agree that

110
Zhu Yuanzhang, “Pingweizhou bang,” in Wang Shizhen, Yanshantang bieji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 1985), j. 85, p. 1615.
58

Maitreya Buddha and the Mingwang were the same deity. Second, Zhu Yuangzhang chose
“Ming” as the dynastic name in the hope of constructing himself as the incarnation of the
Mingwang. Considering the above quoted announcement by Zhu Yuanzhang, these two premises
have contradictory points. If Zhu aimed at constructing himself as the incarnation of the
Mingwang, he would not have denounced the Maitreya belief, in which the Mingwang and the
Maitreya Buddha were the same deity.
A similar discrepancy can be found between Zhu Yuanzhang’s religious policy and Wu and
Yang’s theories. Wu Han suggests that naming the dynasty “Ming” was Zhu Yuanzhang’s effort
to appeal to the remnants of Manicheans, who made up of the majority of the Red Turbans. Yang
argues that Zhu named the dynasty “Ming” to show that he was the incarnation of the Amitabha
Buddha, an attempt to draw support of the White Lotus believers. But the historical events do not
support their hypotheses. Shortly after his accession, Zhu Yuanzhang issued an edict, completely
outlawing the practice of the White Lotus belief, Manichaeism, and other heresies.
111
Sources
show that Zhu made the decision at the suggestion of then Prime Minister Li Shanchang 李善長
(1314-1390). In his imperial memorial to Zhu, Li labelled the White Lotus and Manichaeism,
along with the White Cloud sect of Buddhism and other popular beliefs, as evil witchcrafts
(xieshu 邪術) that must be completely banned. Zhu Yuanzhang issued the ban in the first year of
the Hongwu era (1368), the same year when the dynastic name was determined. Thus, the
naming was aimed at attracting support neither of the Manicheans nor of the White Lotus
believers. It was impossible that Zhu on the one hand outlawed these two beliefs and on the other
hand tried to attract the support of their believers with the name of his dynasty.

111
Liu Weiqian 劉惟謙 comp., Daming ülu 大明律, Sikuquanshu cunmu congshu edition, shi vol.276, j. 1, p. 8; Wang Shizhen,
Mingqing jiji 名卿紀績, Mingdai zhuanjiziliao edition, j. 42, p. 18.
59

The hypothesis that Zhu Yuanzhang constructed himself as the incarnation of the deity
Mingwang is also in conflict with historical accounts. Various sources show that Zhu Yuanzhang
tended to emphasize his identity as a real person, who had risen from a poor peasant boy to an
emperor. Insofar as I have read, Zhu never claimed himself the incarnation of any deity. In the
above-mentioned proclamation against Zhang Shicheng, Zhu claimed that “I was an ordinary
person in the Haoliang area. At the beginning I was recruited as a soldier. Gradually I became a
general.”
112
In another statement he issued to the people in the Central Plain in 1367, he stated “I
was a plain person (buyi 布衣) living on the right bank of the Hui river. Because of the chaos in
the world, I, trusted by the multitude, led them to cross the Yangtze river. Seventeen years have
passed since then.”
113
Decades after his accession, Zhu still proudly admitted his background as a
plain person. In a dialogue with his ministers, Zhu told them of his youth time. “I was a peasant
and happy with living under Yuan rule.”
114
If Zhu had sought to forge himself as a god, he would
have highlighted his magic and supernatural power attributed to gods, instead of emphasizing his
identity as a plain person.

The Mingwang in the Confucian Context
The above-mentioned contradictions between previous interpretations of the Mingwang and
existing materials prompt us to rethink the meaning of the term Mingwang and the origins of the
dynastic name Ming. One thing in common among previous interpretations is that all identify
this term with a deity, no matter the Manichean god, the Buddha Amitahba or the Prince of

112
Wang Shizhen, Yanshantang bieji, p. 1615.
113
Mingtaizhu shilu, j. 26, pp. 401-02.
114
Mingtaizhu shilu, j. 53, p. 1044.
60

Moonlight. From the perspective of Confucian influence on the Red Turban movement, we may
offer a new hypothesis beyond the limits of popular religion.
The word Mingwang was a popularly used term in the Confucian tradition, referring to the
idealized Enlightened King recorded in the Confucian classics. The use of the Mingwang in a
political context can be traced back to the Confucian classics The Book of Documents (Shangshu
尚書). The passage “Lü Ao” 旅獒 in the Shangshu, allegedly an imperial memorial to King Wu
of the Zhou, gives an idealized portrait of what an Enlightened King (Mingwang) would be:
After the conquest of Shang, the way being open to the nine tribes of the I 夷
and the eight of the Man 蠻, the western tribe of Lü sent as tribute some of its
hounds, on which the Grand-Guardian made “the Hounds of Lü,” by way of
instruction to the king. He said, “Oh, the intelligent kings [Mingwang]
115

paid careful attention to their virtue, and the wild tribes on every side
acknowledged subjection to them. 明王慎德，四夷鹹賓 The nearer and the
more remote all presented the productions of their countries, in robes, food,
and vessels for use. The kings then displayed the things thus drawn forth by
their virtue, (distributing them) to the (princes of the) states of different
surnames from their own, (to encourage them) not to neglect their duties. The
(more) precious things and pieces of jade they distributed among their uncles
in charge of states, thereby increasing their attachment (to the throne). The
recipients did not despise the things, but saw in them the power of virtue.
Complete virtue allows no contemptuous familiarity. When (a ruler) treats
superior men with such familiarity, he cannot get them to give him all their
hearts; when he so treats inferior men, he cannot get them to put forth for him
all their strength. Let him keep from being in bondage to his ears and eyes, and
strive to be correct in all his measures. By trifling intercourse with men, he
ruins his virtue; by finding his amusement in things (of mere pleasure), he
ruins his aims. 玩人喪德玩物喪志 His aims should repose in what is right;
he should listen to words (also) in their relation to what is right. When he does
not do what is unprofitable to the injury of what is profitable, his merit
can be completed. 不作無益害有益，功乃成 When he does not value
strange things to the contemning things that are useful, his people will be able
to supply (all that he needs). (Even) dogs and horses that are not native to his
country he will not keep. Fine birds and strange animals be will not nourish in
his state. When he does not look on foreign things as precious, foreigners will
come to him; when it is real worth that is precious to him, (his own) people

115
Here Legge translated the Mingwang as Intelligent King. But I prefer the Enlightened King as a better translation.
61

near at hand will be in a state of repose. Oh, early and late never be but earnest.
If you do not attend jealously to your small actions, the result will be to affect
your virtue in great matters; in raising a mound of nine fathoms, the work may
be unfinished for want of one basket (of earth). If you really pursue this course
(which I indicate), the people will preserve their possessions, and the throne
will descend from generation to generation.”
116

This passage is the most important textual reference to the concept of Mingwang in the
Confucian classics, and it provides the crucial clue to understanding the important role of the
Enlightened King in Chinese political ideology. This passage Lü Ao tells of King Wu (r. mid-
eleventh century BCE) of the Zhou dynasty, who overindulged in a pet hound paid to him as a
tribute by wild tribes, after the Zhou conquest of the Shang dynasty in the middle of the eleventh
century BCE. The Duke of Zhao (Zhaogong 召公), the Grand Guardian (Taibao 太保) of King
Wu, admonished King Wu by submitting an imperial memorial and instructing King Wu how to
act as an Enlightened King. According to the Duke of Zhao, an Enlightened King should meet
two qualifications. First, he paid great attention to virtue; second he could subjugate barbarians
(wild tribes). In the imperial memorial, the Duke of Zhao alerted King Wu to the dangers of
ruining virtue by trifling intercourse with men (wanren sangde 玩人喪德) and of ruining aims by
finding amusement of things for mere pleasure (wanwu sangzhi 玩物喪志). He also suggested
that King Wu not do what is unprofitable to the injury of what is profitable (buzuo wuyi hai youyi
不作無益害有益). The reference to the Enlightened King can be easily found in other passages
of the Shangshu and other Confucian classics.
Because the Enlightened King was the idealized ruler in Confucian tradition, the way of the
Enlightened King ( 明王之道) became the ideal way of governance, and in premodern China
many Confucian scholars discussed how to realize the way of the Enlightened King. For

116
James Legge trans., Shu ching: Book of history. A modernized edition (Chicago, H. Regnery Co.1971), p. 150.
62

example, the Family Proverbs of Confucius (Kongzi jiayu 孔子家語), a work allegedly by
Confucius and his disciples,
117
has a dialogue between Confucius and his favorite student
Zengshen 曾參 on the way of the Enlightened King. Confucius explains to Zengshen the way of
the Enlightened King. Confucius divides the way of the Enlightened King into two categories,
the defensive and the offensive. According to Confucius, an Enlightened King is able to practice
“seven cultivations” (qijiao 七教) in the defensive aspect, and reach “three ends” (sanzhi 三至)
in the offensive aspects.
118
The “seven cultivations” and “three ends” are about Confucian
doctrines of cultivating oneself and conquering the world. Thus, the way of the Enlightened King
in the Family Proverbs of Confucius resonates with the traditional Confucian value of “inside
sage and outside king (neisheng waiwang 內聖外王).”
The discussion of the way of the Enlightened King or rule under the Enlightened King is not
limited to Confucian scholars. Daoists, from a Daoist perspective, also pay great attention to this
topic. The Zhuangzi 莊子, one of the most fundamental Daoist classics, records a talk between
Yangjuzhi 陽居子 and Laozi 老子, concerning rule under the Enlightened King. Laozi says:
During the rule under the Enlightened King, the glorious achievements seem not to have
been done by (the Enlightened King) himself; (The Enlightened King) is nurturing all the
things but people cannot recognize; people might feel the existence of (the Enlightened
King), but cannot name him; (the Enlightened King) makes all things feel happy out of
themselves; (the Enlightened King) stands there, but cannot be spotted; he is wandering
between existence and non-existence.
119

明王之治，功蓋天下而似不自己，化貸萬物而民弗恃，有莫舉名，使物自喜，立
乎不測，而遊於無有者也

117
It is popularly accepted that the Kongzi jiayu was a forgery by Wang Su of the Jin dynasty (265-316). Although it by no means
reflects the actual words and thoughts of Confucius and his direct disciples, the Kongzi jiayu contains a lot of information about
Confucian thought in the third and fourth centuries.
118
Kongzi jiayu, annotated by Wang Su, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 2012), p. 102.
119
Chen Guying, Zhuangzi jinzhu jinyi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), p. 217.
63

The image of the Enlightened King in this Daoist classic is based on the fundamental Daoist
concept, wuwei (literally, “non-action”). Here according to Laozi, the rule under the Enlightened
King is like the Way that creates and nurtures everything but whose existence can hardly be
recognized.
Not only does the term Mingwang (Enlightened King) frequently appear in Confucian and
Daoist classics, the phrase “Mingwang chushi (the Enlightened King is coming to the world)”
can also be found in ancient texts. The Records of Picking up Leftovers ( 拾遺記 Shiyiji), a
collection of magic things and supernatural anecdotes from ancient times to the Jin dynasty (265-
316), records a kind of big turtle whose appearance represents the advent of a good and
prosperous era. The book says that “when the Enlightened King is coming to the world, (the
turtle) will rise to the surface of the sea.”
120

In imperial court culture, the title Mingwang (Enlightened King) was usually used by
ministers in their imperial memorials in reference to ideal sage rulers and also to eulogize their
emperors. Numerous examples can be found in all kinds of sources. For example, in the Tang
dynasty (618-907), a minister named Li Daliang (586-644) sent an imperial memorial to the
Taizong Emperor (r 626-649), one of the most meritorious emperors in Chinese history, talking
about Tang policy toward the “barbarian” peoples:
People of China are the root of the world. People of the four Yi are like branches and
leaves. It is impossible to make it [the tree) luxuriant by favoring the branches and leaves
at the expanse of the root. From ancient times Enlightened Kings (Mingwang) cultivate
China with trust and control the Yi and Di with statecraft.
121

120
Wang Jia, Shiyiji, SKQS edition, vo.1042, p. 359.
121
Liu Xu ed., Jiu Tangshu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975), p. 2388.
64

Here Li Daliang argues that the Enlightened King could control the barbarian peoples and protect
China. He also likened the Taizong emperor to the Enlightened King.
Li Daliang’s likening his emperor to the Enlightened King is echoed by Zhao Pu 趙普 (922-
992), one of the most prominent prime ministers of the Northern Song dynasty. In a report to the
Taizong Emperor (r 976-997) of the Northern Song dynasty, Zhao claims: “previous Sage
Emperors and Enlightened Kings ( 聖帝明王) all kept (the peoples of Yi and Di) outside
cultivation, leaving them chasing water and grass and controlling them with force and virtue.”
122

In summary, the Enlightened King is a model ruler in the Confucian rhetoric. In premodern
China, ministers often used this term to admonish or eulogize emperors.
During the Song, the title Mingwang was more frequently used because the Song regarded
themselves as the continuation of the ideal society under the rule of the Enlightened Kings
recorded in ancient classics. Chinese culture and economy reached their heights during the Song
dynasty, although strong military pressure from the North existed throughout the whole Northern
Song and Southern Song periods (960-1279). Scholars of the Song often boasted of the
prosperity and political stability of the Song and tended to perceive the Song as a restoration of
the ideal society of the Three Dynasties. An example can be seen in the following lines by Zhu
Xi 朱熹(1130-1200), the most important Confucian scholar of the Song dynasty. “In the early
period of our state, people began to respect rites, righteousness and classics, and tried to restore
the Two Emperors (Yao and Shun) and the Three Dynasties. At that moment, [people of our

122
Yang Shiqi ed., Lidai mingchen zouyi, SKQS edition, vol. 439, j. 1, p. 4.
65

state] were better than those of the Tang, but no one elaborated on this; it was not until the Cheng
brother that this theory was clearly explained.”
123

Zhu Xi argues that the Song was better than the Tang (618-907), the most glorious dynasty
in Chinese history, in terms of observing Confucian doctrines, and thus the Song was closer to
the Three Dynasties. This argument was supported by many other Song scholars. For example,
Shi Hao 史浩 (1106-1194), a Song minister in the late twelfth century, argues that the Han
dynasty (202 BCE – 220 CE), one of the most powerful dynasties of China, cannot be regarded
as a restoration of the Three Dynasties because it failed to treat its subjects benevolently. Shi
claimed that the Song was closest to the Three Dynasties because of its benevolence and
righteousness. “The rule of our dynasty is identical to that of the Three Dynasties. This is the
tradition of our forefathers.”
124

Because Song scholars regarded their dynasty as the continuation of the Three Dynasties,
they tended to call their emperors the Mingwang, a title in reference to the Enlightened King in
the Three Dynasties. Furthermore, the Song emperors were pleased to accept the title Mingwang
and preferred to be regarded as the Enlightened Kings. An article written by the Emperor
Renzong (r1021-1063) himself indicates this preference. This article was a preface to a Buddhist
book, written to show the support of the Song royal house for Buddhism. In this article, the
Renzong Emperor refers to his grandfather, his father, and himself as Sage Emperors and
Enlightened Kings (shengdi mingwang 聖帝明王).
125
It shows that emperors of the Song were
often referred to as Enlightened Kings.

123
Zhu Xi, Zhuzi yulei (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), j. 129, p. 3085.
124
Li Xinchuan, Jianyan yilai chaoye zaji, Congshu jicheng chubian edition, j. 839, p. 380-81.
125
Nian Chang 念常, Fozu lidai tongzai 佛祖歷代通載, Bejing tushuguan gujizhenben congkan edition, vol. 77, p. 345.
66

The above investigations of the meaning of the title Mingwang in the Confucian context and
its usage in the Song dynasty serve to elaborate on our discussion of the prophecy “The
Mingwang is coming to the world.” Indeed, the Mingwang here does not refer to any deity, but
represents the Enlightened King in the Chinese tradition. As we know, the political aim of the
Red Turban movement was to restore the Song dynasty, and also the Song emperors were often
honorably referred to as Enlightened Kings. The Mingwang prophecy means that the
Enlightened King of the Song is appearing. Indeed, the two parts of the 1351 Red Turban
prophecy should be treated separately. The first part, milefo xiasheng (Buddha Maitreya is
descending to reincarnate), was the religious objective of the Red Turbans. And the second part,
Mingwang chushi (the Enlightened King is coming to the word), was the political aim of the Red
Turbans. The whole prophecy predicted that Buddha Maitreya was to descend to the world and
become the Enlightened King to rule the world. The prophecy conveys the message that Han
Lin’er was the reincarnation of the Buddha Maitreya and he would become an Enlightened King
to restore the Song dynasty. In this sense, the Red Turban movement was a combination of the
Maitreya messianic ideal and the Confucian ideal of the Enlightened King. The Mingwang
represents a Confucian concept that did not previously belong to popular religion.

The Mingwang and the Dynastic Name “Ming”
This section analyzes the relationship between the title Mingwang and the dynastic name Ming.
As mentioned above, scholars like Wu Han, Yang Ne, and Dreyer all associate this dynastic
name with the title Mingwang. This section first reviews why the question about the dynastic
name Ming arose and previous interpretations of this name. Then, it offers a new interpretation
67

on the basis of the above analysis that the Mingwang represents the Confucian Enlightened King.
Last, it talks about Zhu Yuanzhang’s understanding of the Confucian Enlightened King.

The Dynastic Name Ming: A Question
The name of a state (guohao 國號) was one of the most important political symbols in
premodern China.
126
The top priority of founding a dynasty was to determine the name of the
dynasty, which could show the origin and nature of the royal family. As the famous Yuan scholar
Wang Yun 王惲 (1227-1304) said: “since ancient times, lords who had the world must first
choose the name of the state to manifest its foundation.”
127
The Qing historian Zhao Yi 趙翼
(1727-1814) argues that all the Chinese dynasties before the Yuan derived their names from the
titles of their founders. For example the Tang 唐 dynasty derived its name from its founder Li
Yuan, who had been entitled the Duke of Tang before he became the emperor of his own
dynasty. The same was true of other dynasties.
128

Zhao points out that the Yuan was the first dynasty whose name was derived from a
meaningful word. In the Enthronement Proclamation, Khubilai Khan, the founder of the Yuan
Dynasty, gives the reason why the dynasty was called the Yuan:
The Grand Progenitor Holy Martial Emperor rose from the north with the symbol of Qian
in his hands. He established the empire due to his miracle and valor. His Heavenly power
shocked the four directions, and he hugely expanded the territory. The expansion of the
empire is so huge that history has never seen before. Later, old scholars and ministers
submitted memorials to the court, suggesting that the name of the state be determined

126
For the importance of guohao for the dynasties, see Hok-Lam Chan, “The Song Dynasty Legacy: Symbolism and
Legitimation from Han Liner to Zhu Yuanzhang of the Ming Dynasty”, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 68:1 (June., 2008),
91-133.
127
Wang Yun, Qiujianxiansheng daquanwenji, Sibucongkan edition, j. 86, p.9.
128
Zhao Yi, Nianershi zhaji, SBCK, j.1, p.22.
68

since the great cause had been achieved. This, of course, is the old tradition, and I have
had my choice. The name of the state can be called Da Yuan (the Great Yuan) because it
is from the meaning of Qianyuan in the Book of Changes.
129

The Book of Changes is the oldest Chinese classic, which was originally used for divination and
later used to interpret Confucian cosmology. According to the Book of Changes the cosmos is
made of eight basic elements, each presented by a trigram. These eight trigrams and their
combinations result in all things and their transformations in the universe. The Qian 乾 trigram,
the first of the eight trigrams, represents the element of Heaven, and Yuan 元 is the attribute of
the Qian trigram, which means “vastness” and “hugeness.” Here Khubilai chose Da Yuan (Great
Yuan) in the Confucian classical text as the name of his dynasty in praise of the unprecedented
vastness of the Mongol empire.
Indeed, before the dynastic name was officially set as Da Yuan, the Mongol state had borne
another name in Chinese, Da Chao 大朝 (the Great Dynasty). Scholars believe that Da Chao was
a direct translation of the Mongolian name of the empire, yeke Mongol ulus (the great Mongol
state). According to Xiao Qiqing 簫啟慶, Da Yuan and Da Chao had the same meaning in the
Chinese context, and Da Yuan was simply a more literal and classical expression of Da Chao.
The change of the name from Da Chao to Da Yuan indicates the evolution of the Mongol state
from a nomadic regime to a Chinese dynasty.
130

Different from Khubilai Khan, who straightforwardly announced the origin of his dynastic
name, Zhu Yuanzhang made no reference to the origin of the name, Da Ming, in either his
Accession Proclamation or other imperial edicts. On January 23, 1368, Zhu Yuanzhang held a

129
Yuanshi, j. 7, pp. 138-139.
130
Xiao Qiqing, “Shuo Dachao: Yuanchao jianhao qian Menggude Hanwen guohao”, Neibeiguo erwaizhongguo (Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju, 2007), p. 77.
69

grand enthronement ceremony and proclaimed himself emperor of China. His Accession
Proclamation reads as follow:
I am the ruler of the people of the Middle Kingdom. When the dynastic fortune of the
Song had ended, the Lord commanded the “holy man” (zhenren 真人; i.e., Qubilai Qaghan,
r. 1260-1294) in the desert to enter the Middle Kingdom and become the ruler of the
empire. This was passed from son to grandson for more than a hundred years; but now
their dynastic fortune also has ended. Martial and powerful magnates (haojie 豪傑) vied for
the land. I stem from common stock on the right bank on the Huai but, blessed by Heaven
above and by the spirits of the ancestors, I availed myself of “the autumn of chasing the
deer” [that is, a time when many contended for the empire] to obtain the help of worthies
around me [as helpers in my tasks]. As for the bandits and raiders [from across the
land]…, I repeatedly commanded my military officers to make a rigorous show of our
might. They were all surpassed and pacified, and the people have come to rest secure in
their fields and villages. Today the civil and military officials and their subordinates, and
the masses join hands in urging me to ascend the throne, revering me as Emperor to make
me the lord of the “black-haired” people (qianli 黔黎). Reluctantly acceding to the pleas of
the multitude, I offered sacrifices to Heaven and Earth on the south side of Zhong
Mountain and ascended to the throne at the southern suburban altar on the fourth day of
the first moon of the second year of Wu. The title of the empire has been set as Da Ming.
The present year has been made the first year of Hongwu.
131

In the enthronement ceremony, Zhu Yuanzhang, like the founders of previous dynasties, offered
sacrifices to Heaven and Earth as well as his ancestors. He did everything a new emperor should
do except for one key thing, namely providing an explanation of the title of the dynasty.
Apparently, this was not a careless mistake, but an intentional political act. Why did Zhu
Yuanzhang avoid explaining the origin of the dynastic name? What did Da Ming mean in the
context of the Yuan-Ming transition?
Zhu Yuanzhang’s attitude made the meaning of the dynastic name, Ming, a puzzling
question. But in the early Ming, Zhu Yuanzhang and the Ming government had a tight control
over society, and the situation was so intimidating that scholars did not dare to talk about this

131
Fu Fengxiang ed., Huangming zhaoling, Xuxiu sikuquanshu edition, shi vol. 58, p. 16. This translation is cited from Hok-lam
Chan “The Song Dynasty Legacy,” p. 118.
70

controversial issue. It was not until the middle of the Ming dynasty that scholars began to
address the topic, offering various versions of explanations.
132

One version traces the origin of the name, Da Ming, to Daoism. In his Records of the
Foundations of the Unification (Yitong zhaojilu 一統肇基錄), Xia Yuanji 夏元吉 (1366-1430)
tells a story about the relationship between the Ming dynasty and Daoism. According to Xia,
before accession to the throne Zhu Yuanzhang planned to eradicate Daoism. One day a Daoist
priest reported to Zhu that he saw an auspicious couplet on a gate, reading “Mountains and rivers
revere the Hongwu, and the Sun and the Moon bathe the great Ming 山川尊洪武日月照大明.”
The content of the couplet met Zhu’s wish. So Zhu determined the name of the dynasty as Da
Ming. Consequently, he abandoned the plan to eradicate Daoism.
133

This account is dubious. According to the story, the Daoist priest saved Daoism by
foretelling the name of the new dynasty. But in surviving primary sources about the late Yuan
and early Ming, we cannot find any trace of evidence indicating that Zhu Yuanzhang ever
planned to eradicate Daoism. Furthermore, the story shows that the content of the couplet met
the wish of Zhu Yuanzhang. Thus, Zhu Yuanzhang must have determined the dynastic name
before the Daoist priest reported to him the couplet. Therefore, this story still cannot explain why
Zhu Yuanzhang chose the dynastic name.
Another version indicates that the name Da Ming was determined at the suggestion of Liu Ji
劉基, Zhu Yuanzhang’s chief advisor. According to the story, Liu Ji, before he met Zhu
Yuanzhang, had served under Xiao Mingwang as his advisor. But Liu realized that Xiao

132
The following summary is based on the study of Hok-lam Chan. For detailed research on this topic, see Chen Xuelin [Hok-
lam Chan], “Mingchao guohaode yuanqi ji huodewenti”, pp. 1-35.
133
Sun You’an ed., Beicheng (Sibu congkan edition), j. 1, 1a.
71

Mingwang would not achieve great things. So he abandoned Xiao Mingwang and turned to Zhu
Yuanzhang. When Zhu asked Liu whether they needed to kill Xiao Mingwang, Liu suggested
using a dynastic name that could overwhelm Xiao Mingwang’s title and cause him to die
naturally. So Zhu chose Da Ming (the big Ming) to suppress Xiao Mingwang (the prince of little
Ming). As a result, Xiao Mingwang died naturally as predicted by Liu Ji.
134

This story contradicts all other existing sources. Liu Ji, whose life is clearly recorded in
various sources, never served under Xiao Mingwang. Furthermore, Zhu Yuanzhang established
the Ming dynasty one year after the death of Xiao Mingwang, rather than before his death. Hok-
lam Chan argues that this story might have been constructed with the intention of manifesting
Liu Ji’s magic power.
135

Another version of the origin of the Ming was offered by Sun Yi 孫宜(1507-1556), a mid-
Ming scholar. Sun was, as far as I have read, the first scholar who argued that the name Ming
was derived from Xiao Mingwang, the title of Han Lin’er.
136
However Sun did not give any
evidence to support this argument.
In the late Ming, Tian Yiheng 田藝蘅 (1524- ?), a Hangzhou local scholar, gave a literal
interpretation of the dynastic name Ming. He points out that the Chinese character Ming 明
consists of two characters, namely the Sun ( 日) and the Moon ( 月). And the character Da 大
means “greatness.” Thus the title Da Ming demonstrates the Ming dynasty was as great as the
Sun and the Moon.
137

134
Zhu Yunming, Yeji, Sikuquanshu cunmu congshu edition, zi 240, p. 3.
135
Chen Xuelin, “Mingchao guohaode yuanqi ji huodewenti”, pp. 14-15.
136
Sun Yi, Dongtingji, Xuanlantang congshu edition, j. 4, p. 260.
137
Shen Jiefu ed., Jilu huibian, j. 188, p. 1.
72

Late Ming scholar Yuan Wenxin 袁文新 in his New Book of Fengyang ( 鳳陽新書
Fengyang xinshu) presented another interpretation of the name Ming, associating it with Zhu
Yuanzhang’s surname. Yuan claims that the character Ming 明 in Chinese literally means light
and has the connotation of fire. And the character Zhu 朱, the surname of Zhu Yuanzhang, also
has the meaning of fire. Yuan suggests that the dynastic name, Da Ming, was adopted to show
that the dynasty should only belong to the Zhu family.
138

Yuan’s interpretation tries to associate the two Chinese characters Zhu and Ming, but he
does not provide any substantial evidence to support this argument. Furthermore, if Zhu had
determined the name Da Ming based on this reason, he would have announced the reason
publicly in his Accession Proclamation. His silence on this subject alluded to the possibility that
the origins of the name Ming might lie in something more complex.
Scholars in the Ming dynasty proposed a few hypotheses about the origins of the dynastic
name Da Ming, but none provided strong sources to support these arguments. During the Qing,
scholars scarcely discussed this topic, presumably because of Qing’s taboo on studying Ming
history. Not until the Republican period did scholars resume the discussion of this subject.
After the Qing, scholars sought to use modern historical methodology to examine this
question. Wu Han first pointed out that the origins of the dynastic name Ming were related to the
title Mingwang, which Zhu Yuanzhang’s former overlord Han Lin’er adopted. Wu Han identifies
the Mingwang with the Manichean god. Wu Han’s hypothesis generated heated discussions over
the meaning of Mingwang in the following decades, and many renowned scholars in China and
the West participated in the discussions, as shown in the next sub-section of this chapter.

138
Yuan Wenxin, Fengyang xishu, 1261 printed edition, j. 1, p. 4.
73

Links between the Term Mingwang and the Dynastic Name Ming
The theories of Wu Han and other modern scholars are based on the assumption that the dynastic
name originated from the title Mingwang, but none elaborates on the connection. Indeed, since
Zhu Yuanzhang did not explain the origin of the dynastic name, it is impossible for modern
scholar to offer a definitive explanation for the name. But some information alludes to the
connection between the title Mingwang and the dynastic name.
Although Zhu Yuanzhang did not give any interpretation of his dynastic name, his
ambiguous attitude itself indicates that most likely the dynastic name was related to the title
Mingwang. As a rule, a dynasty founder usually made the world and his subjects know the
meaning of the dynastic name so as to build political legitimacy of the ruling house. In most
cases, the name was self-evident, as that of the Han, the Tang and the Song. Sometimes the
founder would clearly interpret the meaning of the name. For example, Khubilai explicitly gave
the origin of the dynastic name “Yuan” in his accession decree.
The fact that Zhu Yuanzhang did not offer an explanation was not negligence but a
deliberate political act that reflects the complex relationship between himself and Han Lin’er, the
Xiao Mingwang. In 1364 Zhu Yangzhang rescued Han Lin’er from a siege. After that, Zhu on
the one hand still treated Han as his titular overlord; on the other hand he actively prepared to
establish his own dynasty. The relationship between the two persons became complex and
nuanced. Zhu Yuanzhang had the power and was the de facto ruler of the Han-Song state. But
Han Lin’er was the titular emperor of the regime. It was not until Han Lin’er’s sudden death in a
mysterious boat accident in late 1366 did Zhu Yuanzhang have the opportunity to establish his
74

own regime, the Wu, and set up his own reign title. Naturally the suspicion existed that Han
Lin’er was murdered by Zhu Yuanzhang, who apparently was the biggest beneficiary of Han’s
death. Thus as Wu Han said, “since the twelfth year of the Longfeng era (1366), talking about
things during the Longfeng era became a taboo to Zhu Yuanzhang.”
139
Zhu Yuanzhang avoided
talking about the Longfeng era and prevented the public from pondering the suspicious death of
Han Lin’er, his former overlord.
An account in the early Ming source, the Stories of the Early Ming ( 國初事蹟 Guochu
shiji), can serve to elaborate the mindset of Zhu Yuanzhang at that time. In 1356, Zhang
Shicheng, Zhu’s long-time rival, launched an attack against Zhu Yuanzhang’s fledgling forces.
The two armies fought in Zhen Jiang city, a neighboring area to Zhu’s center in Nanjing. The
fight ended with Zhu’s victory. After the fight, local people erected a stele with an inscription to
extol Zhu’s merits. The inscription mentioned Xiao Mingwang’s reign title, Longfeng. When
Zhu ascended to the throne, he ordered to have the stele dismantled because it bore the mark of
the Longfeng reign title.
140
To conceal the fact that he had served under Xiao Mingwang, Zhu
even dismantled the stele extoling his own merits. This example can show to what extent Zhu
Yuanzhang tried to cover up his past of being a subordinate to Xiao Mingwang.
Based on the above analysis of the term Mingwang and its roots in the Confucian tradition,
I here offer a new theory of the origins of the dynastic name Ming. I argue that the dynastic name
“Ming” was closely related to the title Mingwang in the Confucian tradition. This dynastic name
shows Zhu’s political gesture to restore Confucian order in China.

139
Wu Han, “Mingjiao yu Da Ming diguo,” p. 117.
140
Liu Chen, Guochu shiji, Sikuquanshu cunmu congshu, shi 46, p. 26.
75

This new theory is supported by sources and previous research on Zhu Yuanzhang.
According to Zhu Honglin’s research, throughout his life Zhu Yuanzhang had a keen interest in
the Shangshu and frequently quoted sentences from it in his dialogues with ministers.
141
Zhu
Honglin particularly mentions Zhu Yuanzhang’ quotation of the sentence from the passage Lü
Ao that “ he does not do what is unprofitable to the injury of what is profitable” and thinks of
this sentence as the demonstration of Zhu Yuanzhang’s wish to follow ancient sage rulers.
142

This sentence from Lü Ao is exactly the doctrine that an Enlightened King should follow. It
shows that Zhu Yuanzhang knew well of the idea of Mingwang in the Confucian tradition and he
boasted of himself as the Enlightened King. Since he would cultivate his image as the
Enlightened King, he very likely used his dynastic name to strengthen the image.
The dynastic name Ming, derived from the Confucian Enlightened King, was acceptable to
the two groups of Zhu Yuanzhang’s supporters. As Wu Han argues, Zhu’s supporters consisted
of two groups, the former Red Turban rebels and Confucian scholars from the Zhexi area. Zhu’s
adoption of the dynastic name Ming could be appealing to the former Red Turban soldiers, as the
name can be interpreted as Zhu inheriting some Red Turban political ideology. Also, this
dynastic name with its Confucian connotation was appealing to Confucian literati, although they
did not like the Red Turban rebellion.
This new theory provides new perspectives to explain the paradox in previous scholarship.
As I mentioned before, if the Mingwang and the Buddha Maitreya were the same deity in the
White Lotus belief, it would be paradoxical that Zhu denounced the Maitreya belief, but
meanwhile claimed himself as the Mingwang. My new interpretation can solve this problem.

141
Zhu Honglin, “Mingtaizu dui Shujing de zhengyin jiqizhengzhi lixiang he zhiguo linian,” in Mingtaizhu de zhiguolinian jiqi
shijian 明太祖的治國理念及其實踐, (Hongkong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2010), pp. 19-63.
142
Zhu Honglin, “Mingtaizu dui i de zhengyin jiqizhengzhi lixiang he zhiguo linian,” p. 53.
76

Because the Mingwang refers to the Enlightened King, a Confucian concept unrelated to popular
religion, Zhu Yuanzhang could on the one hand identify himself as the Mingwang, on the other
hand denounce the Maitreya belief. Similarly, this theory also can explain why Zhu Yuanzhang,
claiming himself as the Mingwang, totally outlawed the White-Lotus society.

Conclusion
In summary, the Confucian tradition greatly influenced the Red Turban rebellion. Many
Confucian literati participated in this revolt. Han Shantong’s grandfather, a Confucian scholar,
organized the White Lotus Gathering, which later became the backbone of the rebellion. During
the rebellion, the Red Turbans used Confucian rhetoric to legitimize their movement. The Red
Turbans established administrative institutions modelled on the idealized institutions recorded in
Confucian classics. During the war, the Red Turbans highlighted their Confucian aspects and
tried to cultivate their image as an equal contender with the Yuan for the Mandate of Heaven.
The Red Turbans manipulated both popular religion and the Confucian tradition to strengthen
their claims to political legitimacy.
From this perspective, I offer a new interpretation of the title Mingwang in the Red Turban
prophecy. I argue that this Mingwang refers to the Confucian Enlightened King, and this
prophecy indicates the Red Turbans’ political aim to restore traditional China. The dynastic
name Ming is related to the title Mingwang. By adopting the dynastic name Ming, Zhu
Yuanzhang utilized the Confucian idea of the Mingwang to present himself as an Enlightened
King mandated by Heaven.

77

78

Chapter II: State-building of Red Turban Regimes
This chapter examines three states established by the Red Turbans. Because of the sparse
existing texts about them, the nature and structure of these Red Turban states have not been fully
explored. Thanks to some visual evidence like coins and official seals that have been discovered
in the past few decades, now we might offer a preliminary picture of institutions and workings of
these states. In this chapter, I first analyze the government system of the Red Turban Song state
established by Liu Futong and Han Lin’er. I will examine both written sources and material
culture to illustrate the Song state’s institutions and their possible links to the existing Yuan
administrative system. Then I will examine the regime established by Xu Shouhui and the
Southern Red Turbans, in particular its name and why that has been unclear. Finally, I will
analyze a state established by a general of the Southern Red Turbans, explaining how deeply this
state was influenced by the Confucian tradition. This chapter reinforces the argument in Chapter
I that the Red Turban movement was not a simple messianic insurgency but also built up state
structures; and it adds the argument that the rebels utilized not only Confucian elements, but also
Mongol institutions when they founded their own states.

The Governmental Institutions of the Red Turban Song State
Sources show that the Song state had a large and well-staffed government system and
bureaucratic system. As mentioned in Chapter I, Saichi Dahu’s epitaph relates that the Song state
“established one hundred officials” 設置百官 in its capital Bianliang.
1
The phrase “one hundred

1
Zhao Zhenhua, “Yuan Saiyinchi dahu muzhi kao,” p. 65.
79

officials” is an often-used figure of speech, suggesting a complex bureaucratic system.
2
Other
sources show that the number of officials in the Song court was very large. When the pro-Yuan
general Chaghan Temur reconquered Bianliang in 1359, he is said to have captured “five
thousand pseudo-officials 獲偽官五千.”
3
These “five thousand pseudo-officials” were officials
serving in the central government of the Song state and only accounted for part of the Song
bureaucratic system. Besides the central government in Bianliang, there were local governments,
like the Branch Secretariat in Shandong led by Mao Gui. The exact number of officials in the
Song state must have been much greater than five thousand.
On the Central Government level, the Song state had three major organs, the Central
Secretariat, the Bureau of Military Affairs, and the Censorate, a system very similar to the Song
dynasty government and Yuan dynasty government. The Yuanshi records that the Red Turban
Song state established these organs as soon as the state was formally founded.
On the jiwei day of the second month [January 15, 1355], Liu Futong and others
received Han Lin’er from Jiahe of Dangshan and installed him as the emperor. He
was also called Xiao Mingwang [Little Prince of Light]. The capital was established
in Bozhou, the state name was Song, and the reign title Longfeng [Dragon Phoenix]
was adopted. His mother, Madam Yang, was installed as the Empress Dowager. Du
Zundao and Sheng Wenyu were appointed Chief Councilors, and Luo Wensu and Liu
Futong were appointed as Privy Councilors, and Liu Liu was appointed as the head of

2
In the Mathews’ Chinese – English Dictionary, the phrase “wenwu baiguan” 文武百官 is explained as “all the various civil and
military officials.” See Mathews’ Chinese – English Dictionary, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 1059.
3
Yuanshi, j. 141, p. 3387. The compilers of the Yuanshi use this derogatory term “pseudo-officials” to describe officials of the
Red Turban Song state. We do not have any evidence that these officials ever committed any wrongdoings except for serving in
the anti-Yuan rebel state. The authors of the Yuanshi describe them as “pseudo” because this rebel state they were serving was not
recognized by either the Yuan or the Ming.
80

the Bureau of Military Affairs… Du Zundao was favored [by Han Lin’er] and
controlled power. Liu Futong envied him and ordered soldiers to beat Du Zundao to
death. Liu Futong then became the Chief Councilor and later he entitled himself as
the Grand Guardian.
4

二月己未，劉福通等自碭山夾河迎韓林兒至，立為皇帝，又號小明
王，建都亳州，國號宋，改元龍鳳。以其母楊氏為皇太后，杜遵
道、盛文郁為丞相，羅文素、劉福通為平章，劉六知樞密院事……
遵道得寵專權，劉福通疾之，命甲士撻殺遵道，福通遂為丞相，後
稱太保。
In the Yuan government at the time the Chief Councilors (chengxiang 丞相) were the highest
ranking officials of the Central Secretariat. From this passage, we can surmise that the Song
central government had a Central Secretariat ( 中書省 Zhongshusheng). Again apparently
following the model of the Yuan government, below the Chief Councilor there were several
Privy Councilors ( 平章 pingzhang). According to the Yuanshi, when the Song state was founded
in 1355, Du Zundao 杜遵道 and Sheng Wenyu 盛文鬱 took the positions of the Chief
Councilors, and Liu Futong and Luo Wenshu 羅文素 assumed the positions of the Privy
Councilors.
5

4
Yuanshi, j. 44, p. 922.
5
Yuanshi, j. 44, p. 922.
81

The Song state also had a Bureau of Military Affairs, for the Yuanshi reports that when the
Song state was founded in 1355, a certain Liu Liu 劉六 -- about whom we know nothing else --
took the position of the Overseer of the Bureau of Military Affairs.
6
According to a private
history produced in the early Ming, the Song state appointed Zhu Yuanzhang Deputy Assistant
of the Bureau of Military Affairs in 1356.
7
During the same time, a person named Ma Jian also
served as the Deputy Assistant of the Bureau of Military Affairs.
8
The three appointments are all
the evidence we have that he Bureau existed.
Although this account from the Yuanshi does not mention whether the Song state had the
Censorate organ, contemporary sources show that the Red Turban Song state also established a
Censorate, one of the three pillars of the Song, Yuan, and Ming governments. According to the
Mingshi, a Ming general named Ding Yu 丁玉（-1380 ） once served under Han Lin’er as
Censor 禦使.
9
This Ding Yu served in Han Lin’er’s court until 1364 when Zhu Yuanzhang
rescued Han Lin’er from Anfeng. After 1364, Ding Yu served under Zhu Yuanzhang. After the
establishment of the Ming, Ding served as Right Censor-in-Chief 右禦使大夫 and Left Censor-
in-Chief 左禦使大夫.
10
Ding Yu’s career shows that the Censorate existed in the Song. These
records of the appointment of particular men, in late-Yuan and early-Ming texts, show that the
Red Turban Song state had a Central Secretariat, Bureau of Military Affairs, and Censorate
modelled on those of the Yuan.

6
Yuanshi, j. 44, p. 922.
7
Yu Ben, Jishilu jianzheng, j. 1, p. 48.
8
Qiu Shusen, “Yuanmo hongjinjunde zhengquan jianshe”, pp. 96-97.
9
Mingshi, j. 134, p. 3909. Also see Qiu Shusen, “Yuanmo hongjinjunde zhengquan jianshe,” p. 96.
10
Mingshi, j. 134, p. 3909. According to the Mingshi, in 1380 Zhu Yuanzhang accused Ding Yu of participation in a conspiracy
and had him executed.
82

In the Yuan government, the Central Secretariat housed the six functional ministries.
According to archaeological findings, the Central Secretariat of the Red Turban Song state had at
least the Ministry of Rites ( 禮部 Libu). In the twentieth century, archaeologists discovered some
official seals belonging to the Song state. All these seals are marked with the sentence “made by
the Ministry of Rites of the Central Secretariat ( 中書禮部造 zhongshu libuzao).” See Figure 1.
These seals provide evidence that the Ministry of Rites of the Song state did exist. Although we
have not found textual and material evidence of the existence of other Ministries, it is reasonable
to infer that the Song government might have had all of the Six Ministries: Personnel, Revenue,
Rites, War, Punishments, and Public Works.

管軍總管府中書禮部造龍鳳五年正月日
Figure 1: The Seal of Military Directorate-General of the Song State (1359)
11

11
Qiu Shusen, “Yuanmo nongminzhengquan jifangtongyinde chubuyanjiu,” Wenwu 1975 (9): 77.
83

In addition to these central government offices, the Song state also established a number of
Branch Secretariats. As in the Yuan system, where the Branch Secretariat was the highest level
of local government, the Song state established several local administrative areas, each with its
own Branch Central Secretariat which took overall charge of civil and military affairs within its
domain. According to research by Qiu Shusen, the Song state had at least five Branch
Secretariats, namely the Jiangnan Branch Secretariat 江南行省, the Yidu Branch Secretariat 益
都行省, the Huai’an Branch Secretariat 淮安行省, the Liaoyang Branch Secretariat 遼陽行省,
and the Caozhou Branch Secretariat 曹州行省.
12
In 1359, Han Lin’er and the Song state
appointed Zhu Yuanzhang Privy Councilor of the Jiangnan Branch Secretariat 江南行省平章.
Although the Yuanshi and the Mingtaizu shilu do not describe this event, many contemporary
private writings record this event.
13
From these private writings, we know that Zhu Yuanzhang
not only accepted the position of the Privy Councilor of the Jiangnan Branch Secretariat of the
Song state, but also set up a vacant throne representing Han Lin’er in the Branch Secretariat
government, to which Zhu and his generals bowed daily.
14

The above five Branch Secretariats are only those names that are recorded in existing
sources, and they do not mean that the Song state only established the five Branch Secretariats.
As mentioned before, most sources about the Song state were lost or were destroyed by Zhu
Yuanzhang. Some sources have survived simply because Zhu Yuanzhang was unable to
eradicate them all. Recent archaeological findings have provided more information about the

12
Qian Qianyi, Guochu qunxiong shilue, j. 1, p. 14; Yu Ben, Jishilu jianzheng, j. 1, p. 48; Koryŏsa, j. 39. Qiu Shusen, “Yuanmo
hongjinjunde zhengquan jianshe”, Yuanshi luncong, (1982:1), 96-100.
13
See Yu Ben, Jishilu jianzheng, j.1, p.37; Qian Qianyi, Guochu qunxiong shilue, j.1, p.12. Although Qian Qianyi was more than
two hundred years later from the Yuan-Ming transition, the book Guochu qunxiong shilue by Qian Qianyi was a collection of
sources produced in the late Yuan and early Ming. Some books, whose passages were cited in the Guochu qunxiong shilue, are
lost today. Thus, I regard this book as a contemporary source for the history of the Yuan-Ming transition.
14
Huang Bosheng, “Chengyibo liugong xingzhuang 誠意伯劉公行狀”, Liuwenchenggong wenji 劉文誠公文集, Sibu congkan
edition, v. 1516, pp. 137-138.
84

Branch Secretariat system of the Song state. According to the Yuanshi, the Song state occupied
the area of today’s Shandong and established a Branch Secretariat there. But the Yuanshi does
not give the name of the Branch Secretariat. A seal preserved in the Shanghai Museum offers
information to solve this question. This seal is the seal of the Jinning county government (in
today’s Shandong province) issued by the Song state. On the back of the seal there is an
inscription that reads “Produced by the Branch Secretariat of Yidu and Other Places 益都等處行
中書省 in the fourth year of the Longfeng era 龍鳳四年.” Longfeng was the reign title of Han
Lin’er. This seal shows that the Branch Secretariat in the Shandong area was called the Branch
Secretariat of Yidu and Other Places, using the same terminology as the Yuan dynasty.

津寧縣印益都等處行中書省上龍鳳四年月日造
Figure 2: The Seal of Jinning County with the Mark of the “Branch Secretariat of Yidu and
Other Places” and the Longfeng Reign Title

(1358)
15

15
Qiu Shusen, “Yuanmo nongminzhengquan jifangtongyinde chubuyanjiu,” Wenwu 1975 (9): 78.

85

As for the local units of the military organ, the Song state established Branch Bureaus of
Military Affairs 行樞密院. The Yuanshi and Jishilu show that there were at least two Branch
Bureaus of Military Affairs once established by the Song state, namely the Caozhou Branch
Bureau of Military Affairs and the Jiangnan Branch Bureau of Military Affairs.
16
As the Privy
Councilor of the Jiangnan Branch Central Secretariat, Zhu Yuanzhang also held the concurrent
position of the Overseer of the Jiangnan Branch Bureau of Military Affairs of the Song state.
Below the Branch Bureau level, there also existed institutions such as the Marshall Office 元
帥府 (see Figure 3 and 4), the Military Director-General Office 管軍總管府 and the Military
Myriarchy 管軍萬戶府.
17
Following are some seals of these military institutions of the Song
state.

Figure 3: Front Face of the Seal of the Marshall Office 元帥之印 (1356)
18

16
Qiu Shusen, “Yuanmo nongminzhengquan jifangtongyinde chubuyanjiu,” Wenwu 1975 (9): 98.
17
Qiu Shusen, “Yuanmo nongminzhengquan jifangtongyinde chubuyanjiu,” Wenwu 1975 (9): 98-99.
18
Qiu Shusen, “Yuanmo nongminzhengquan jifangtongyinde chubuyanjiu,” Wenwu 1975 (9): 77.

86

元帥之印上中書禮部龍鳳六年十一月日
Figure 4: Back Face of the Seal of the Marshall Office (1356)
19

管軍總管府印
Figure 5: Front Face of the Seal of the Military General-Director Office (1358)
20

19
Qiu Shusen, “Yuanmo nongminzhengquan jifangtongyinde chubuyanjiu,” Wenwu 1975 (9): 77.
20
Lu Maochun, “Jieshao Hanliner songzhengquande yizu wenwu,” Wenwu, 1982(9): 92.
87

Figure 6: Back Face of the Seal of the Military General-Director Office (1358)
21

管軍萬戶府印
Figure 7: Front Face of the Seal of the Military Myriarchy (1356)
22

21
Lu Maochun, “jieshao Hanliner songzhengquande yizu wenwu,” Wenwu, 1982(9): 92.
22
Qiu Shusen, “Yuanmo nongminzhengquan jifangtongyinde chubuyanjiu,” Wenwu 1975 (9): 78.
88

管軍萬戶府印龍鳳二年正月日造
Figure 8: The Back Face of the Seal of the Military Myriarchy (1356)
23

The Song government system was strongly influenced by the Yuan government system.
24

All these local military institutions like the Military Myriarchy, the Military General-Director
Office, the Marshall Office, and the Branch Bureau of Military Affairs were specific Yuan
institutions that the previous Chinese dynasties had not had. Furthermore, the Branch Central
Secretariat was a new local administrative institution first established by the Mongol-Yuan state.
The Red Turban Song state largely adopted Yuan institutions in its government. This shows a
paradoxical aspect of the Song state. Although it claimed to be the restoration of the national
Song dynasty, the Song state modelled itself on Yuan institutions rather than Song dynasty
institutions.

23
Qiu Shusen, “Yuanmo nongminzhengquan jifangtongyinde chubuyanjiu,” Wenwu 1975 (9): 78.
24
For Yuan military institutions, see David Farquhar, The Government of China under Mongolian Rule: A Reference Guide, pp.
245-283; Ch’i-Ch’ing Hsiao, The Military Establishment of the Yuan, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 3-
32.
89

On the other hand, the Song state apparently never adopted some special Mongol institutions
like the Keshig 怯薛 military units (imperial body guards)
25
and the Darugachi 達魯花赤
(overseers). No surviving textual sources or material evidence ever mentions the existence of
Keshig or Darugachi in the Song state. It is safe to infer that the Song state never adopted these
Mongol institutions. All these records indicate that the administrative and military institutions of
the Red Turban Song state were greatly influenced by Yuan institutions. But the Red Turbans did
not completely adopt the Yuan system. They forsook some institutions with clear Mongol
elements like the Keshig and Darugachi. It seems the rebels selectively adopted institutions from
the Yuan in their state-building.
Material sources also offer information about other aspects of the Song state. For example,
the Song state issued coins marked with Han Lin’er’s reign title, Longfeng. In the past decades,
many such coins have been found in China. The Museum of Bengbu 蚌埠 in Anhui province has
a collection of Song state coins. The coins, marked with the Chinese characters Long Feng Tong
Bao 龍鳳通寶 (Circulating Currency of the Longfeng era), have three sizes and values. These
coins, made of copper, are well minted (see figure 9).

25
Ch’i-Ch’ing Hsiao, The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty, pp. 33-51.
90

龍鳳通寶
Figure 9: the Longfeng tongbao coin issued by the Song state
26

Further, two land transaction contracts with the Longfeng reign title give a rare glimpse of the
economic management of the Song state. These two land contracts were found in a trash recycle
station in Huangshan city in Anhui province in 1956.
27
One of them is a so-called “red contract,”
and the other is a “white contract.” The “red contract” was a type of contract form that derived
its name from the red seal of local government imprinted on it, showing that the government
validated and recognized the content. Normally a red contract contains signatures of all sides of
the transaction, including signatures of referees as well as a red seal imprint of local government.
A white contract – with no such government seal – was usually used in more casual occasions.
28

Figure 10: The Fragment of the Red Contract of the Fifth Year of the Longfeng Era (1359)
29

26
Zhang Wei, “Bengbushi buwuguancang Yuanmo nongminqiyijunqian pinxi,” Jianding yu jianshang 2016 (7): 86.
27
Lu Maocun, “Jieshao jijian songzhengquan de wenwu,” p. 91.
28
For the study of the White Contract and the Red Contract, see Wang Yuquan, “Mingchao tiandichiqi yufuyihuangce”,
Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu, 1991 (1):127-134.
29
Lu Maochun, “jieshao Hanliner songzhengquande yizu wenwu,” Wenwu, 1982(9): 91.
91

Figure 11: The White Contract of the Tenth Year of the Longfeng Era (1364)
30

These two contracts offer details of how land transactions were made under Song state rule.
The Red Contract is about a man named Xie Zhigao 謝志高 who was selling four pieces of his
hill land to a person surnamed Kang 康. Xie guaranteed that he had not sold the land to other
persons before this transaction. To ensure the validity of the contract, Xie invited a person named
Wang Zifu as the witness of the transaction. After the two sides signed the transaction they also
went to the local government to have the contract imprinted with the seal of the Song
government.
31

The White Contract tells of a person named Xie Gongliang who was returning a piece of land
to a person named Xie Shiyun. The contract shows that Xie Shiyun had mortgaged this piece of
land to Xie Gongliang in exchange for some cash. This contract was signed because Xie
Gongliang, troubled with insufficient cash, wanted to return the land to get his cash back.
Although this contract does not have a seal imprint of the Song local government, the contract is

30
Lu Maochun, “jieshao Hanliner songzhengquande yizu wenwu,” Wenwu, 1982(9): 91.
31
Lu Maocun, “jieshao Hanliner songzhengquande yizu wenwu,” p. 92.
92

marked with Han Lin’er’s reign title Longfeng, a fact indicating that in 1364 commercial
transactions in southern Anhui were carried out in the name of the Song state.
32

Material sources, private writings, and the Yuan dynastic history, taken together, show that
the Red Turbans used many elements in the process of rebellion and state-building. Chapter I
showed that on the religious side, the Red Turbans made use of the perception of the
reincarnation of the Buddha Maitreya. For the political ideology, the Red Turbans utilized the
idea of the Enlightened King in the Confucian tradition. In their local rule, the Song state
adopted the Confucian ideas of binxing, as seen in the Branch Secretariat of Yidu and Other
Places in Shandong led by Mao Gui. This chapter has shown that in their government
institutions, the Song state was strongly influenced by Mongol institutions, but selectively
adopted them.
This study of Song state institutions reinforces my argument in Chapter I that the Red
Turban rebellion was more than a simple messianic revolt. In fact, the Song state set up formal
bureaucratic systems and held stable control over a vast expanse of territory. It issued coins, and
commercial transactions were carried out in the name of the Song state. Local governments of
the Song state supervised land transactions by issuing Red Contracts. This shows that the Song
state was a fully-fledged regime of traditional Chinese sort, and not a mere band of rebels
expecting the end of the world.

Tianwan or Song? The Name of Xu Shouhui’s Regime

32
Lu Maocun, “jieshao Hanliner songzhengquande yizu wenwu,” p. 92.
93

This section examines the name of a state established by the Southern Red Turbans. The name of
this state recorded in the Yuanshi has raised questions. Recent archaeological discoveries and
new research show that the name recorded in the official histories was altered. By examining the
name of this state, this section seeks to show the nature of this state and how we should approach
Ming official histories concerning the Red Turban rebellion.
In the wake of Liu Futong’s rebellion in Yingzhou in early 1351, Xu Shouhui and Zou
Pusheng launched a revolt against the Yuan in central China. These rebel soldiers also wore red
turbans on their head and were also called the Red Turbans in contemporary sources. To
distinguish this group of rebels from the Red Turbans led by Liu Futong, modern historions often
identify this group led by Xu Shouhui as the Southern Red Turbans. No evidence indicates that
these two groups had political or religious connections. The Southern Red Turbans quickly
occupied a large expanse of territory in central China along the Yangtse River. In late 1351, Xu
Shouhui declared himself emperor and established a state. The Yuanshi records:
In the tenth month (of 1351), Xu Shouhui occupied Qishui and established it as the capital.
The name of the state was Tianwan (literally “Heaven Finished”). [Xu Shouhui] proclaimed
himself to be the emperor and changed the reign title into Zhiping. [He entitled] Zuo
Pusheng as the Grand Preceptor.
33

十月，徐壽輝據蘄水為都，國號天完，僭稱皇帝，改元治平，以鄒普勝為太師。

33
Yuanshi, j. 42, p. 893.
94

This record was followed by both the Mingshi (Official history of the Ming dynasty) and private
writings like the Guochu qunxiong shilu.
34
But no Ming and Qing sources explained the meaning
of the state name.
In the late twentieth century, modern scholars began to address this question. In a 1972
paper, Chinese scholar Shi Shuqing 史樹青 (1922-2007) suggests that the state name of Xu
Shouhui’s regime should be “Song” rather than “Tianwan.” Shi uses as evidence an epitaph, the
text of which is recorded in the collection of Song Lian’s writings. Shi brings attention to a
record in this epitaph that reads as follows:
At that time (late Yuan), the politics of the Yuan fell into chaos. All under Heaven was
disturbed by wars. Areas east and west of the [Yangtse] River became the territory of
bandits. Xu Shouhui from Fenning established the pseudo state named “Song.” He
established Jiujiang as the capital.
35

會元政大亂，天下兵動，江東西化為盜區。分甯徐壽輝建偽號宋，都九江。
Shi argues that this record is reliable and the record in the Yuanshi must be wrong.
36
Shi notes
that Song Lian was the chief compiler of the Yuanshi and he must have known the state name of
Xu Shouhui’s regime. It is paradoxical that the discrepancy exists between his personal writing
and the official history he was in charge of compiling. Shi argues that the private writing might
reflect the truth. Shi’s new argument, however, was not accepted by other scholars in the 1970s.
Chinese scholars continue to seek answers for why the state was named “Tianwan.”

34
Mingshi, j. 123, p.3687; Qian Qianyi, Guochu qunxiong shilue, j. 3,p. 64.
35
Song Lian, Songxueshi wenji, Sibu congkan edition, j. 3, p. 12.
36
Shi Shuqing, “Yuanmo Xu Shouhui nongmin zhengquande tongyin,” Wenwu 1972 (6): 12, footnote 3.
95

In the late 1970s, the Chinese Scholar Yang Ne offered a new argument over this topic by
analyzing the shape of the two Chinese characters Tian 天 and Wan 完. He suggested that the
character tian 天 is a character with a stoke over the Chinese character da 大, and the Chinese
character wan 完 looks like the Chinese character yuan 元 with a hat over it. Da Yuan was the
state name of the Yuan dynasty. Yang Ne suggested that the state name “Tianwan” can be
interpreted as “determinedly suppress Da Yuan ( 誓壓大元 shiya dayuan).”
37
Yang holds that the
state name “Tianwan” indicated the Red Turbans’ determination to overthrow the Yuan.
Although Yang’s argument is interesting and thought provoking, there was no evidence found
either to support or to reject the argument until the early 1980s.
In 1983, an archaeological finding offered new information concerning the state name
Tianwan. Local archaeologists in Chongqing excavated an old tomb, inside which they
discovered the epitaph of Ming Yuzhen 明玉珍 (1329-1366), a major general of Xu Shouhui’s
regime. Ming Yuzhen was a community leader in Suizhou (in present-day Hubei province).
After the rebellion broke out in 1351, Ming organized a militia for self-protection. In 1352, Ming
and his local militia joined Xu Shouhui’s Southern Red Turban army. In 1357 Xu Shouhui
commissioned Ming Yuzhen to fight Yuan forces in Sichuan. Ming Yuzhen’s military operation
went well and he quickly conquered the whole Sichuan area. In 1360 when he heard the news
that his overlord Xu Shouhui had been assassinated by the Red Turban general Chen Youliang,
he proclaimed himself emperor and founded a state named “Da Xia” 大夏 in the Sichuan area.
Ming Yuzhen’s tomb inscription shows that the state name of Xu Shouhui’s regime was “Song”
宋. The epitaph reads:

37
Yang Ne, “Shi Tianwan”, Lishi yanjiu, 1978 (1) :67.
96

In the gengchen year (1351), people along the Huai River acclaimed lord Xu as the emperor
in Qiyang. [Xu Shouhui] enacted the Calendar of Ten Thousand Years of Longevity. [He]
established the reign title as Zhiping and the state name as “Song.”
38

歲庚辰，淮人立徐主稱皇帝于蘄陽，頒萬壽曆，建元治平，國號宋。
Furthermore, throughout the epitaph Xu Shouhui is referred to as the Lord of Song ( 宋主
songzhu) whenever he is mentioned in this epitaph.
39
This epitaph further calls into question the
record in the Yuanshi that Xu Shouhui’s state was named Tianwan.
The latest research by Yang Ne offers new support for the idea that Xu Shouhui’s regime
was named “Song.” Yang’s new evidence is in the collected writings of a scholar named Liu
Shangbin 劉尚賓, a high-level civil official in Xu Shouhui’s regime. In an imperial memorial to
Xu in 1358, Liu Shangbin described the wars between Xu’s state and the Yuan as “promoting the
orthodox status of our August Song and sweeping away the barbarian imposters” 倡皇宋之正統
掃夷狄之閏位.
40
Liu also analyzes the conflict between the Red Turbans and some pro-Mongol
local militias who wore white clothes to distinguish themselves from the Red Turbans. Liu thinks
of both these groups as subjects of Xu’s state and calls for them to unite. “Those who favor red
are subjects of our Song; those who favor white are also subjects of our Song; how could Song
subjects kill other Song subjects? ”
41
尚紅者，吾宋之民也；尚白者，亦吾宋之民也；豈有宋
民還殺宋民？ Liu Shangbin’s memorial clearly shows that the state name of Xu Shouhui’s
regime was “Song,” just like the name of the Northern Red Turban Song state.

38
Ming Yuzhen jiqi muzhang yanjiu, 1982, pp. 11-13.
39
Ming Yuzhen jiqi muzhang yanjiu, 1982, p. 12.
40
Liu Shangbin, “Wuxu wuyue shang Liu Jinzhao canyi shu,” in Liushangbin wenji xuji, XXSKQS, vol. 1326, p. 136.
41
Liu Shangbin, “Wuxu wuyue shang Liu Jinzhao canyi shu,” p. 136.
97

Because neither Ming Yuzhen’s epitaph nor Liu Shangbin’s memorial mentions that the
state ever changed its name, scholars have begun to accept the argument that Xu Shouhui’s state
was named “Song,” and the record of the state name “Tianwan” in the Yuanshi was a distorted
account.
42

Then the question arises: Why would the compilers of the Yuanshi alter Xu’s state name in
this official history? Hok-lam Chan has presented a proposal, suggesting that Zhu Yuanzhang
changed the name of Xu Shouhui’s state in order to maintain the orthodox position of Han
Lin’er’s Song state. Chan holds that when Zhu Yuanzhang served in Han Lin’er’s court, both
Han Lin’er’s and Xu Shouhui’s rebel states were named the Song. Because Zhu Yuanzhang
belonged to Han Lin’er’s Song state, he deliberately altered Xu Shouhui’s state name in the
Yuanshi so that only the one he served was recorded as the legitimate state.
43

Chan’s argument is not convincing because Zhu Yuanzhang made no effort to maintain the
legitimate status of Han Lin’er’s Song state in the Yuanshi. As mentioned-above, after his
ascension to the throne in 1368, Zhu Yuanzhang immediately outlawed the White Lotus Society
and Maitreya teachings. The Yuanshi always referred to Han Lin’er as the “pseudo Song ruler”
偽宋主.
44
Thus, it is highly unlikely that in the same book Zhu Yuanzhang on the one hand
derogatively called Han Lin’er’s Song state the “pseudo Song,” on the other hand made efforts to
maintain the legitimacy of this state.
The motive for Zhu Yuanzhang to change Xu Shouhui’s state name should be understood
from the perspective that Zhu Yuanzhang sought to construct himself as the only legitimate ruler

42
Hok-lam Chan, “The Song Dynasty Legacy,” p. 128.
43
Hok-lam Chan, “The Song Dynasty Legacy,” pp. 128-129.
44
Yuanshi, j. 142, p. 3397.
98

among all warlords. As I have argued in Chapter I, one goal of the Red Turban states, both the
Northern and the Southern Red Turbans, aimed to fulfill Confucian ideals and restore the Song
dynasty. But Zhu Yuanzhang claimed that he was the only savior of China. Changing the name
of Xu Shouhui’s Song state was a way to abase the southern Red Turban state. The state name
“Song” represents the Red Turbans’ aim to restore traditional China, the Song dynasty. This
objective seems incompatible with the image of bandits and vandals Zhu Yuanzhang tried to
impose on the Red Turbans. On the contrary, the name “Tianwan,” a mysterious but meaningless
name, is fit for this image. In Chinese history many bandit rebels adopted mysterious names for
themselves and their regimes. I argue that the mysterious state name “Tianwan” was fashioned to
construct the Red Turbans as uneducated bandits.
This discussion about the name of Xu Shouhui’s state further reinforces my argument in
Chapter I that the Red Turbans aimed to restore traditional China rather than establish sectarian
states. Here we see more similarities between the Northern Red Turbans and Southern Red
Turbans. They both belonged to the White Lotus tradition. They both circulated prophecies that
the Buddha Maitreya was descending to the world. They both established states with the state
name “Song.” But the Southern Red Turban did not mention the Mingwang in their prophecy.
They only claimed that “the Buddha Maitreya is descending to the world and will be the Lord of
the World” 彌勒佛下生, 當為世主.
45
From a Confucian perspective, the Enlightened King
(Mingwang) and the Lord of the World (Shizhu) have the similar meaning of an ideal ruler.
Thus, both these two groups of Red Turbans sought to constructed themselves as Confucian sage

45
Mingtaizu shilu, j. 8, p. 0100. Chen Gaohua and Yang Ne, Yuandai nongmin qiyi shiliao huibian, p. 101.
99

rulers. This argument further challenges the narrative that treats the Red Turbans as millenarian
rebels.

Confucian Tradition and the Xia State
This section examines the connection between the Xia state -- a local regime established by a
branch of the Southern Red Turbans -- and Confucian thought. Sources about this state are richer
and more complete than those that survive for Han Lin’er’s Red Turban Song state. Among these
sources, the Mingshi shilu 明氏實錄 (Veritable Records of the Ming Family) is of special value.
This book has detailed records of the rise and fall of the Ming family and their dynasty, the Xia
state, in the Sichuan area.
The Xia state was a branch state of the Xu-Song state established by Xu Shouhui in 1352.
46

Xu Shouhui and his colleague Zou Pusheng were leaders of the White Lotus society in the area
along the middle reaches of the Yangtze River. Getting the news of Liu Futong’s rebellion in
Yingzhou in 1351, Xu, Zou and their White Lotus followers immediately organized an uprising
against local Yuan authorities, also calling themselves the Red Turbans. In 1352, Xu Shouhui
proclaimed himself emperor and founded his Song state [hereafter Xu-Song].
47
The Xu-Song
state swept away local Yuan forces, encompassing large areas along the upper and middle
reaches of the Yangtze River under its control. But in 1359, internal strife led to a major division
among these Southern Red Turbans. Chen Youliang 陳友諒 (1320-1363), an ambitious Xu-Song

46
To differentiate this Song state founded by Xu Shouhui in 1352 from the Song state founded by Liu Futong and Han Lin’er in
1355, this dissertation refers to Han Lin’er’s Song state as the Song state and Xu Shouhui’s state as the Xu-Song state.
47
According to Ming Yuzhen’s epitaph, the Xu-Song state was founded in 1350. This record is highly unreliable. It is almost
impossible that a rebel regime had existed in southern China before the outbreak of the Red Turban rebellion in 1351. Thus, here
I accept the record in the Yuanshi that the Xu-Song state was founded in 1352. But for the name of the state, I accept the name
“Song” recorded in Ming Yuzhen’s epitaph.
100

general, assassinated Xu Shouhui and changed the Xu-Song state into his own dynasty, the Da
Han state. Chen’s usurpation excited the animosity of other Xu-Song generals. As mentioned
above, Ming Yuzhen, a Xu-Song general who was then stationed in Sichuan, refused to
recognize Chen’s self-enthronement. Instead, Ming declared independence of his domain from
Chen’s Han state. In 1363, Ming proclaimed himself emperor of the Da Xia state. He still kept
his respect for the deceased Xu Shouhui, in whose memorial temple Ming Yuzhen frequently
offered sacrifices. In 1366, Ming Yuzhen died, and his son Ming Sheng 明昇 succeeded to the
throne. In 1370, the Xia state was conquered by the Ming dynasty.
Ming Yuzhen’s Da Xia state was structured according to Confucian ideology. In the political
realm, the Da Xia state was modelled on the administrative institutions described in the
Confucian classic, the Zhouli. After the enthronement, Ming Yuzhen “implemented the Zhou
system, divided the state into eight Routes, and established six Offices” 行周制，分天下為八
道，設六卿.
48
The “Zhou system” here refers to an ideal Confucian government structured in
the Zhouli. According to the Zhouli, the ideal government system consists of six offices, each
represented by a Chinese character, namely Tian (Heaven 天), Di (Earth 地), Chun (spring 春),
Xia (summer 夏), Qiu (autumn 秋), and Dong (winner 冬). These six offices respectively took
charge of administrative, educational, ritual, military, punitive, and agricultural affairs.
49
Heads
of the different offices in the Da Xia state were also titled according to the Zhouli.
50
Although
this six-office system described in the Zhouli was popularly regarded as the ideal government
system in Chinese history, before Ming Yuzhen’s Xia state, this system had actually been put

48
Yang Xueke, Mingshi shilu, p. 7.
49
Zhouli zhushu, pp. 1-13; Shangshu Zhengyi, vol. 18, pp. 569-570.
50
Mingshi shilu, p. 8.
101

into effect only for a short period in the Northern Zhou state (557-581) during the Southern and
Northern Dynasties period. This second attempt demonstrates that the Red Turban Xia state
desired to restore China to an idealized Confucian system of the distant past.
Another manifestation of Confucian influence on the Xia state was its examination system.
The Da Xia state implemented the Civil Service Examinations at both central and local
government levels. In the first year of Ming Yuzhen’s enthronement (1363), the Da Xia state
carried out the imperial examinations at the local level. The whole state territory was divided into
eight examination areas, and students attended the examinations in their respective areas. In the
next year, the examination at the central government level was held in the royal court. The head
of the Spring Office served as the chief examiner of the court examination. The students who
passed this level examination were granted the status of jidi 及第 and chushen 出身.
51

The tax policy of the Xia state was also based on the Confucian classics. As the Veritable
Records of the Ming Family states, “[The Xia state] started to set up tax policy. One-tenth [of
income] was taxed. The court did not impose labor service.”
52
The one-tenth tax （十一而稅
shiyi ershui ） was seen as the perfect taxation in the Confucian tradition. The sage Mencius
suggests that if a ruler only taxes his people one-tenth of their income, his state will become an
ideal society. This record does not show whether this tax policy was strictly carried out in the
Xia state, but the policy itself shows that the Xia state had a desire to realize Confucian ideology.
Turning from governance to religious policy, the records about the Da Xia – mainly the
Mingtaizu shilu and Mingshi shilu – contradict one another. According to the Mingtaizu shilu,

51
Mingshi shilu, p. 8.
52
Mingshi shilu, p. 8.
102

after the establishment of the Da Xia state, Ming Yuzhen “outlawed Buddhism and Daosim, but
exclusively revered the Maitreya Buddha teaching 去釋老二教，專奉彌勒法.”
53
But the
Mingshi shilu records that Ming Yuzhen “abolished Buddhism and Daoism, including the
Maitreya Buddha teaching 去釋老二教，並彌勒法.”
54
How do we assess the reliability of these
two completely opposite records? Which one is more reasonable in the contemporary context?
Why did these two opposite records about the Da Xia state exist? These are the questions I now
will turn to.
Currently most existing scholarship on the Yuan-Ming transition accepts the record in the
Mingtaizu shilu that the Da Xia state set the belief in Maitreya Buddha as its official religion.
55

Furthermore, Wu Han argues that belief in Maitreya Buddha and Manichaeism had mixed
together before the Yuan, and based on this, some modern works associate the Da Xia state with
Manichaeism. For example, Frederic Mote opines that “he [Ming Yuzhen] banned the Buddhist
and Daoist establishments and made a state religion of the Maitreya worship, ordering shrines
built in all countries.”
56
Adopting Wu Han’s assertion of the fusion of Manichaeism and the
belief in Buddha Maitreya, Mote suspects that Ming Yuzhen might have changed his surname to
Ming to demonstrate his Manichean/ Maitreya identity.
57
Hok-Lam Chan argues that Ming
Yuzhen was a staunch Manichean believer.
58
Edward Farmer claims that the Da Xia state, with
both Confucianism and heterodox Buddhism as its official ideologies, was a state model that
might offer an alternative option to Zhu Yuanzhang’s Ming dynasty for China during the warring

53
Mingtaizu shilu, j. 19, p. 268.
54
Mingshi shilu, p. 8.
55
See Edward Farmer, Early Ming Legislation, pp. 18-32; Also see Max Jakob Folster, Max “Legitimation of A ‘Marginal
Dynasty’: The Great Xia in Sichuan, 1362-1371—A Case Study,” Ming-Qing Studies 2013, pp. 98-99.
56
Mote, Imperial China, p. 540.
57
Mote, Imperial China, p. 540.
58
Hok-lam Chan, “The Song legacy,” p. 95.
103

time of the late Yuan.
59
Max Jacob Folster, taking note of the apparently opposite views of the
Mingtaizu shilu and the Mingshi shilu, prefers the former, arguing that Ming Yuzhen’s rule over
Sichuan brought about a surge of millenarian fervor in this area.
60

A commentary on the Mingshi shilu made by Fang Xiaoru 方孝儒 (1357-1402), a
prominent Confucian scholar in the early Ming, offers information to reconsider this topic.
According to Yang Ne’s research, Fang was familiar with the author of the Mingshi shilu.
61

Fang’s comments can be seen as a reliable primary source for the Xia state. There are two
versions of the Mingshi shilu existing today.
62
Although these two versions differ in some
characters and wordings, both contain a sentence of eulogy to Ming Yuzhen written in the
commentary by Fang Xiaoru. This eulogy sentence reads:
The Lord of the Xia [Ming Yuzhen] had a modest personality and lived a frugal life; he
improved civilization and education and banned heresies; he stopped aggression and
reduced tax burden; the whole area fortunately enjoyed the Small Tranquility 小康 under his
protection.
63

夏主幸致躬，行檢約，興文教，辟異端，禁侵略，薄稅斂，一方咸賴小
康焉。
Fang Xiaoru’s commentaries make it more likely that Ming Yuzhen totally banned Buddhism,
Daoism, and the Maitreya belief. Fang Xiaoru was well-known in contemporary and later times

59
Farmer, Early Ming Legislation, pp. 21-22.
60
Max Folster, “Legitimation of A ‘Marginal Dynasty’: The Great Xia in Sichuan, 1362-1371—A Case Study,” Ming-Qing
Studies 2013, pp. 98-99.
61
Yang Ne, “Mingshi shilu jiexi 《明氏實錄》解析,” Yuanshi lunji, p. 453.
62
One version is included in the Sikuquanshu cunmu congshu, and the other is in the Xuxiu Sikuquanshu.
63
Mingshi shilu, p.9.
104

for his orthodox Confucian stance. He labeled any beliefs other than Confucianism as heresies.
In Fang’s works, there are a number of passages, promoting Confucianism and berating
Buddhism and Daoism. For example, he strongly criticized those who equally respected
Confucius and the Buddha.
64
He publicly proposed to inhibit the development of Buddhism,
which he always thought of as a heresy.
65

Furthermore, even in the eyes of Confucian scholars, who were not as radical as Fang
Xiaoru, the White Lotus and Maitreya Buddha belief were still unacceptable. Yelu Chucai 耶律
楚才 (1190-1244), the famous Khitan Confucian of the early 1200s, once condemned popular
orders of Buddhism, including the White Lotus order, as heresies.
66
Yelu’s attitude is a reflection
of a Confucian view toward the White Lotus and Maitreya beliefs.
Considering Fang Xiaoru’s conservative attitude toward Buddhism and the popular view
about the Maitreya Buddha belief, it is highly unlikely that Fang would have praised Ming
Yuzhen if Ming had revered the Buddha Maitreya. The contested sentence probably originally
said that Ming Yuzhen banned Buddhism, Daoism, and the Maitreya belief.
In addition to political structure and religious policy, further associations between Ming
Yuzhen and the Confucian tradition appear in Ming Yuzhen’s tomb inscription and objects
discovered from Ming Yuzhen’s tomb in Chongqing. In the 1980s, archaeologists excavated
from Ming’s tomb many artifacts, including a stone inscription of Ming Yuzhen’s epitaph and
many other objects. The epitaph offers a detailed portrait of Ming’s life, but makes no mention of
either Manichaeism or the worship of the Buddha Maitreya. In contrast, it contains much content

64
Fang Xiaoru, Xunzhizhai ji, (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanse 2000), j. 14, p. 486.
65
Fang Xiaoru, Xunzhizhai ji, p. 486.
66
Yelu Chucai, Xiyoulu, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), p. 1.
105

concerning the Confucian tradition. For example, the epitaph records that Ming Yuzhen died on
the sixth day of the second month of the bingwu year (1366) and his funeral ceremony was held
on the sixth day of the ninth month of the same year.
67
There was a time gap of seven months
between his death and the funeral. This seemingly strange phenomenon was consistent with
ritual requirements for an emperor’s funeral in the Confucian tradition. According to the Liji, an
encyclopedia book about Confucian rituals, the body of a deceased emperor should be placed in
a coffin for seven days and the coffin would be buried seven months later ( 天子七日而殯，七月
而葬).
68
This account shows that Ming Yuzhen’s funeral was held in accordance with records in
the Confucian classics.
Another artifact found in Ming Yuzhen’s tomb also demonstrates the connection between
Ming Yuzhen and Confucian thought. This excavated artifact is a piece of textile embroidered
with images of the sun, the moon, and stars. Influenced by Wu Han’s argument, archaeologists
sought to associate this picture with Manichaeism. They suspected that the picture of the sun, the
moon, and stars might refer to the worship of light practiced by Manicheans.
69
But the theme of
the sun, the moon, and stars is a common figure of speech used in Confucian rhetoric about the
unity of man and universe: the sun represents the emperor, the moon ministers, and stars the
masses. Just as the sun was the center of the sky, so the emperor is the center of the earth. For
example, an imperial memorial to Zhu Yuanzhang submitted by a Confucian scholar Ye Boju (?-
1376) in the ninth year of Zhu’s reign says. “The sun is the image of the ruler; the moon is the
image of ministers; the five stars are the images of shi and ordinary people”
70
日者，君之象

67
Ming Yuzhen muzang yanjiu, p. 57.
68
Lijizhengyi, j. 12, p. 444.
69
“Sichuan Chongqing Ming Yuzhenmu”, Kaogu, 1983 (9), p. 830.
70
Ye Boju, “Yingqiu zhiyanzhao shangshu”, in Mingchen zouyi, Congsu jicheng edition, v. 913, j. 1, p. 1.
106

也。月者，臣之相也。五星者，卿士庶人之象也. Since Yang Ne’s work has wiped
out the Manichaen explanation, the textile found in Ming Yuzhen’s tomb can be understood as
the Confucian political ideal society, where ministers and the masses revolve around the
emperor.
Although textual analysis and archaeological findings support the argument that Ming
Yuzhen banned the Maitreya belief and exclusively practiced Confucianism, a crucial question
remains. Ming Yuzhen’s policy apparently contradicted an aforementioned central theme of the
Red Turban movement, namely the reincarnation of the Buddha Maitreya. Why did Ming ban the
Maitreya Buddha worship in his Da Xia state? I argue that Ming’s policy reflects the major
transformation of the Red Turban movement from a combination of a Messianic religious ideal
and a Confucian social ideal to a reconstruction of Confucian society. At the beginning, the Red
Turban rebellions were organized by the White Lotus-Maitreya believers, including Han
Shantong, Liu Futong, and Xu Shouhui. The messianic belief of the immediate incarnation of the
Maitreya Buddha contributed greatly to boosting morale of the Red Turban soldiers. A historical
account shows how the Maitreya Buddha belief mobilized rebel soldiers. In 1338, a White Lotus
leader named Zhou Zhiwang (-1338) launched a rebellion against the Yuan in Jiangxi. According
to the Gengshen waishi, all the rebel soldiers wore jackets with the Chinese character fo ( 佛
Buddha) on both the front and back sides of their jackets. The rebels claimed that the magic
power of the Character “fo” would protect them from be injured by knifes and spears.
71
More
than 5,000 persons joined the rebellion.
72
This account is evidence that the Maitreya Buddha
belief highly enhanced the fighting spirit of these White Lotus rebels.

71
Quan Heng, Gengshen waishi jianzheng, p. 23.
72
Quan Heng, Gengshen waishi jianzheng, p. 23.
107

But with the spread of the rebellions, great chaos broke out. Because of the role of the
Maitreya belief in stimulating fighters, many people, especially intellectual elites, blamed the
Maitreya Buddha belief for causing chaos. A poem by Li Fu 李黼 (1298-1352), a Confucian
intellectual in the late Yuan, demonstrates this attitude.
73
This poem reads:
What kind of god is this Maitreya, who has sown so many seeds of misfortune?
The flying squirrels shake the earth, and stir up huge dust storms.
Smoldering smoke blankets the land, and people’s livelihoods have been made unbearable.
Blood stains all the rivers, while the ghosts and spirits wail bitterly.
Only once in a hundred years will people encounter such disasters.
As of when have the punishing weapons of Heaven, which stretch for thousands of miles,
announced their arrival?
Even in a barren field [wicked world] there may be hidden precious jade [good people].
But alas! They all perish into a heap of ashes!
74

Once people came to associate the Maitreya Buddha belief with chaos and misfortune, this
worship hindered rulers who sought to stabilize society and attract support of the elites. Severing
themselves from the Maitreya Buddha was a means by which some warlords, including Ming
Yuzhen and Zhu Yuanzhang, sought to legitimize their rule.
It was not hard for Ming Yuzhen to make the decision to forsake the Maitreya Buddha belief.
As mentioned before, Ming Yuzhen was a leader of a small militia in Hubei when the Red
Turban rebellions broke out. The rebellion leader Xu Shouhui forced Ming to join his movement
under the banner of “expelling the Yuan barbarians and pacifying China 驅元虜以靖中夏.”
75

Ming had not been a believer of the Maitreya Buddha teaching before he joined the Red Turbans.

73
Li was the Municipal Director of Jiangzhou when the Red Turban rebellions broke out. When the Red Turbans sacked
Jiangzhou, Li Fu and his nephew were killed. See Yuanshi, j. 194, pp. 4392-4394.
74
Ye Ziqi, Caomuzi, p. 79. This translation is cited from Richard Shek, “Sectarian eschatology and violence,” p. 96.
75
Mingshi shilu, pp.7-8.
108

Furthermore, by 1363, when Ming Yuzhen proclaimed himself emperor, many early leaders of
the Red Turban movement who had been members of the White Lotus-Maitreya Buddhist order
had already perished in battle. The surviving warlords, like Ming Yuzhen, Zhu Yuanzhang, and
Chen Youliang, had few connections with the White Lotus - Maitreya order. Hence, it was easy
for Ming to abolish the Maitreya Buddha belief when this belief became a barrier on his way to
power.
Similarly, Zhu Yuanzhang also demonstrated a great change in his attitudes toward the
Maitreya Buddha belief. In his first decade in the Red Turban camp, he exploited the Maitreya
Buddha belief by nominally honoring Han Lin’er in order to accumulate his own power. After he
rescued Han Lin’er in 1363, he began to show his disrespect for the Maitreya Buddha belief
although he was still using Han Lin’er as his puppet leader.
76
After his ascension in 1368, Zhu
Yuanzhang immediately outlawed the White Lotus society and worship of the Buddha Maitreya.
Like Ming Yuzhen, Zhu Yuanzhang banned these “heretical” teachings in order to construct
himself as the legitimate ruler of China in a Confucian context.
The ways Zhu Yuanzhang constructed political legitimacy offer clues to understanding the
reliability of the Yuanshi and the Mingtaizhu shilu. After the establishment of the Ming dynasty,
Zhu strongly emphasized his uniqueness among all the warlords. The key to Zhu Yuanzhang’s
success was, according to Zhu’s chief advisor Liu Ji, that Zhu responded to Heaven, followed the
people, was magnificent in power but did not slaughter ( 應天順人神武不殺).
77
Zhu
dramatically stressed that he was the only ruler who could rescue China and its people from

76
See the previous chapter.
77
Mingtaizu shilu, j. 53. p. 1046.
109

water and fire 救民於水火.
78
Consequently, Zhu Yuanzhang characterized other warlords as
aimless bandits who sought slaughtering and vandalization.
Zhu’s attitude helps to understand the reason for the inaccurate record concerning Ming
Yuzhen in the Mingtaizu shilu. Indeed, Zhu Yuanzhang was not unique in the late Yuan. As
shown earlier in Chapter I and this chapter, Mao Gui and Ming Yuzhen also tried to fulfill
Confucian ideals. If Ming Yuzhen’s policies in the Da Xia state, including severing ties with the
Maitreya belief, had become widely known, it would have jeopardized Zhu Yuanzhang’s status
as the only Enlightened King, an image Zhu Yuanzhang strove to cultivate after his ascension.
Probably he or his historical team fabricated the record about Ming Yuzhen revering the
Maitreya belief.
Ming Yuzhen’s abolition of Buddha Maitreya worship in his Xia state marked the second
stage of the Red Turban movement. In this stage, warlords like Ming Yuzhen and Zhu
Yuanzhang began to eliminate the messianic element in the rebel movement, transforming the
movement from a mixture of Buddha Maitreya belief and Confucian ideology into a pure
Confucian reconstruction movement. Thus my argument here can rectify some points in the
prevailing narrative of the Yuan-Ming transition. Currently it is popularly believed that the Red
Turban movement was essentially a messianic rebel movement, but Zhu Yuanzhang, along with
Confucian elites, later transformed this rebel movement into a reconstruction of traditional
China.
79
Apparently this narrative is strongly influenced by the Yuanshi and the Mingtaizu shilu
which deliberately portray the Red Turbans as mobs. My analyses of Mao Gui’s and Ming
Yuezhen’s regimes in the first two chapters show that the Red Turbans also embraced the

78
Mingtaizu shilu, j. 53. p. 1046.
79
Dardess, “Confucian and Autocracy,” pp. 539-58.
110

Confucian tradition, and proceeded Zhu Yuanzhang in striving to reconstruct a Confucian China.
Probably, in order to promote the story that he was the only ruler mandated by Heaven in the
Confucian sense, Zhu altered the records about the Red Turbans, leading to today’s distorted
narrative of the religious belief of Ming Yuzhen’s Xia state, as well as the name of Xu Shouhui’s
state.

Conclusion
This chapter talks about institutions, state services, state names, and the political ideology of the
three rebel states. First, I have shown that the Northern Red Turban Song state mainly modelled
itself on the Yuan government to establish its governmental system, using both Mongol and
Confucian elements in its state building. Second, the name of Xu Shouhui’s state was “Song,”
reflecting its attempts to restore the Song dynasty. Third, Ming Yuzhen’s Xia state was built on
the basis of the Confucian classic Zhouli, a further example of the Red Turban’s aim to restore
China. But Ming official histories like the Yuanshi and Mingtaizu shilu altered the name of Xu’s
state and the religious ideology of Ming Yuzhen’s Xia state. Most likely Zhu Yuanzhang
changed these records to construct himself as the sole Enlighted King, the only one who tried to
restore Confucian rule. This chapter reinforces the argument in Chapter I that the Red Turban
movement was by no means a simple messianic revolt.

111

Chapter III: Prophecies as a Way of Constructing Political Legitimacy

On the fourth day of the first lunar month of a wushen 戊申 year (January 23, 1368) in the
southern suburb of Jiankang 建康 (present-day Nanjing), Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 held a grand
enthronement ceremony, proclaiming himself to be the emperor of China and announcing the
establishment of the Ming dynasty.
1
Zhu’s inauguration was an event of wide-reaching
significance. It marked the replacement of the Mongol-Yuan by the Chinese Ming dynasty and
the end of the Mongol era in China. In the sixteen years preceding his enthronement, Zhu rose
from an ordinary soldier in an anti-Yuan rebel army to be a founder of a dynasty.
In the enthronement announcement, Zhu Yuanzhang claimed that the Mongol-Yuan dynasty
(1276-1368) had lost the Mandate of Heaven, and his rule was being favored by Heaven.
2

Scholars have studied Zhu Yuanzhang’s efforts to construct political legitimacy from different
perspectives. Edward Farmer argues that Zhu established the Ming law code on the basis of
Confucian doctrines, legitimizing his authority by embracing Confucianism.
3
John Dardess
points out that Zhu’s cooperation with Confucian elites from the Zhedong area in the 1360s set
the foundation of the Ming dynasty.
4
Hok-Lam Chan convincingly shows that Zhu Yuanzhang
also adopted many political symbols from his former overlord Han Lin’er and Han’s Song

1
Mingtaizu shilu 明太祖實錄 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2016 reprint ) [hereafter MTZSL], juan 29, pp. 478-
79.
2
“Dengjizhao” 登極詔 (The Edict of Enthronement), in Huangming zhaoling 皇明詔令, 21 juan, ed. Fu
Fengxiang 傅鳳翔, Siku quanshu cunmu congshu edition (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996) [hereafter, referred to as
“SKCM edition”], shi v. 58, j.1, pp. 4a-5a.
3
Edward L. Farmer, Zhu Yuanzhang and Early Ming Legislation: The Reordering of Chinese Society
Following the Era of Mongol Rule (Leiden: Brill, 1995), pp. 18-32.
4
John Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy: Professional Elites in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty,
(Berkeley: University of California press, 1983), pp. 185-224.
112

regime, a political act appealing to the Red Turban rebel soldiers.
5
Chan also demonstrates that
Zhu Yuanzhang, after his enthronement, deliberately fabricated many fictions in order to make
his enthronement seemingly predetermined by Heaven.
6

Existing scholarship, however, largely has ignored an important factor that substantially
determined political legitimacy during the Yuan-Ming transition, that is prophecies. In 1351 the
leaders of a large scale anti-Yuan rebellion mobilized soldiers by disseminating a prophecy about
a single-eyed stone figure.
7
During the uprisings, the rebels also spread a prophecy that “the
Buddha Maitreya is descending to the world, and the Mingwang 明王 (Prince of Light) is
coming to the world.”
8
When the rebels established their Song state in 1355, their leader Han
Lin’er assumed the title “Xiao Mingwang” 小明王 (Little Prince of Light). Some scholars
associate the origin of the dynastic name “Ming” with the title Xiao Mingwang in this prophecy.
9

In addition to the prophecy of the emergence of a “Prince of Light,” two other prophecies,
which were later interpreted as omens of Zhu Yuanzhang’s rise, also exerted great influence
during the Yuan and Ming periods. First, this chapter introduces a folk belief widely followed in
the Song and Yuan periods, from which these two prophecies were created. Then it examines

5
Chan Hok-Lam, “The Song Dynasty Legacy: Symbolism and Legitimation from Han Liner to Zhu
Yuanzhang of the Ming Dynasty,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 68.1 (2008): 91-133. [Hereafter “The
Song Dynasty Legacy.”]
6
Chan Hok-Lam, “The Rise of Ming T’ai-tsu (1368-98): Facts and Fictions in Early Ming Official
Historiography,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 95.4 (1975): 679-715.
7
Song Lian 宋濂 et al., eds., Yuanshi 元史 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1978) [hereafter YS], j.51, p.1107; Ye
Ziqi 葉子奇, Caomuzi 草木子 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), j. 3, p. 50.
8
Gao Dai 高岱, Hongyoulu 鴻猷錄 16 juan, Siku quanshu cunmu congshu edition, shi v. 19, j. 2, p. 16; He
Qiaoyuan 何喬遠, Mingshanzang 明山藏 109 juan, Xuxiu Siku quanshu edition (Shanghai: Shanghai guji
chubanshe, 2002), v. 426, j. 43, p. 7a.
9
Wu Han 吳晗, “Mingjiao yu daming diguo 明教與大明帝國,” Wuhan shixue lunzhu xuanji (Beijing: Renmin
chubanshe, 1986), v.2, pp. 382-418; Yang Ne 楊訥, “Yuandai de Bailianjiao 元代的白蓮教,” Yuanshi lunji
(Beijing: Guojia tushuguan chubanshe, 2012), pp. 230-73; John W. Dardess, “The Transformation of Messianic
Rebellion and the Founding of the Ming Dynasty,” Journal of Asian Studies, 29.3 (1970): 539-40; Chan Hok-
Lam, “The Song Dynasty Legacy,” pp. 91-133.
113

these two seemingly fulfilled prophecies that often have been cited as evidence in later writings
that Zhu Yuanzhang received the Mandate of Heaven. I will show how these prophecies
emerged, changed, and were reinterpreted in different circumstances. Next, I will move to
examine some major events of the Yuan-Ming transition. From the perspective of the folk beliefs
and the prophecies, I offer new explanations for such important topics as the relationship
between Zhu Yuanzhang and his former overlord Han Lin’er, and the competition between Zhu
Yuanzhang and his rival Zhang Shicheng. Last, I will examine Zhu Yuanzhang’s attitude toward
prophecies after his enthronement. I will show how Zhu Yuanzhang concealed his utilization and
manipulation of prophecies and folk beliefs after his ascension. I argue that in various stages of
Zhu’s career, he took different attitudes towards prophecies and folk beliefs and made use of
them in different ways. His embrace of and subsequent departure from manipulating prophecies
demonstrates a shift in his legitimation strategy. This paper reveals the significant role of folk
beliefs and the two prophecies and sheds more comprehensive light on the process of
constructing political legitimacy during the Yuan and early Ming periods.

The Bingwu and Dingwei Apocalyptic Belief
Before officially adopting the Gregorian calendar in the early 20th century, China used its
traditional stem-branch calendar to organize time.
10
This traditional calendar consists of two
parts, the ten Heavenly Stems and the twelve Earthly Branches. The ten Heavenly Stems are jia
甲, yi 乙, bing 丙, ding 丁, wu 戊, ji 己, geng 庚, xin 辛, ren 壬, and gui 癸, and the twelve

10
For a detailed introduction of the Chinese calendar, see Endymion Wilkinson, Chinese History a New
Manual, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2018), pp. 545-57.
114

Earthly Branches are zi 子, chou 醜, yi 寅, mao 卯, chen 辰, si 巳, wu 午, wei 未, shen 申, you 酉,
xu 戌, and hai 亥. A Heavenly Stem and an Earthly Branch combine to form a stem-branch to
mark a certain year. Both changed at the same time, so there are a total of 60 stem-branch pairs
in a fixed order, starting from jiazi 甲子 and ending at guihai 癸亥. After a sixty-year cycle, the
calendar would restart a new round of counting from jiazi.
Each of the twelve Earthly Branches is associated with an animal sign. These twelve animals
are the Rat, Ox, Tiger, Rabbit, Dragon, Snake, Horse, Sheep, Monkey, Rooster, Dog, and Pig.
Thus one can identify the animal sign of a certain year from its Earthly Branch. For example, the
jiazi year is a year of the Rat because the Earthly Branch zi specifically refers to the Rat; the
guihai year is a year of the Pig because the Earthly Branch hai stands for the Pig.
Furthermore, the ten Heavenly Stems, twelve Earthly Branches, and their corresponding
animal signs also are linked to the Five Elements and Five Colors. The Five Elements—Metal,
Wood, Water, Fire, and Earth—with their corresponding colors—White, Green, Black, Red, and
Yellow—are connected to each of the 60 years to reveal the nature and characters of each year.
Thus every year has at least three attributes: the animal sign, the element, and the color. In the
following parts, I will talk about two consecutive years, the bingwu and dingwei years. The
bingwu year is a year of the Horse and the dingwei year is a year of the Sheep. Both years have
the Red attribute in the Five Colors and the Fire attribute in the Five Elements.
The traditional Chinese calendar was not only a system of organizing time, but also a way
of thinking. Premodern scholars often sought to discern overall patterns of history from the
calendar. During the Southern Song dynasty (1127—1279 CE), scholar Hong Mai 洪邁 (1123—
1202 CE) used the Chinese calendar to articulate an apocalyptic belief. He suggested that the two
115

consecutive years of bingwu 丙午 (a year of the Horse) and dingwei 丁未 (a year of the Sheep)
would most likely witness chaos and catastrophes, especially the death of emperors. In a section
titled “Bingwu dingwei” in his publication, The Informal Writings of Rongzhai (Rongzai suibi 容
齋隨筆), Hong Mai writes: “China always has disasters when it meets the years of bingwu and
dingwei. [The disasters] either occur domestically or are caused by invasions from foreign
barbarians.”
11
Hong goes on to list many disastrous events that occurred in bingwu and dingwei
years. For example, Emperor Gaozu (256—195 BCE), the founder of the Han dynasty (206
BCE—220 CE), died in a year of bingwu (195 BCE). In the Tang dynasty, Emperor Jingzong 敬
宗 was assassinated in a year of bingwu (826 CE). In the Five Dynasties Period (907—960CE),
Khitan troops sacked the capital of the Later Jin dynasty (936-947) and captured its emperor in a
year of bingwu (January 946—January 947 CE). Most seriously, during the years of bingwu and
dingwei in the Jingkang 靖康 period (1126-1127 CE), Jurchen troops sacked the Northern Song
(960-1127) capital Bianliang and captured the emperor and retired emperor of the Song, forcing
the surviving Song court to move to southern China. In later historical books this disastrous
event was called the Jingkang Incident.
12

These events did indeed occur in the bingwu and dingwei years. But to show the accuracy of
the belief, Hong also makes many far-fetched connections between historical events and bingwu

11
Hong Mai 洪邁, Rongzhai wubi 容齋五筆, in Rongzhai suibi 容齋隨筆 74 juan in 2 vols. （Shanghai:
Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1978 ）, v. 2, j. 10, pp. 928-29.
12
As far as I have read, Song scholar Chen Liang (1143-1194) for the first time articulated the link between the
Jingkang Incident and the bingwu and dingwei years. In an imperial memorial submitted to the Xiaozong
Emperor of the Song around the 1170s, Chen Liang pointed out that the Jingkang Incident occurred in bingwu
and dingwei years and alerted the emperor to the danger of the two years, but Chen did not provide many
examples to further support this argument. See Chen Liang, “Shang Xiaozong huangdi diyishu 上孝宗皇帝第
一書,” Chen Liang ji, 30 juan in 2 vols, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), j. 1, p. 8. For Chen Liang and his
philosophy, see Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch’en Liang’s Challenge to Chu His,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.
116

and dingwei years. For example, although Emperor Taizong 太宗 of the Tang dynasty (r. 627-
650) reigned over a period that covered the two years of bingwu and dingwei (646-647),
Taizong’s rule was marked by a long period of prosperity and peace. But Hong claims that these
two years led to Empress Wu’s usurpation of the Tang because during the two years the future
Empress Wu was already in the royal palace.
13
Hong writes “generally the disasters of the
dingwei (the Year of the Sheep) are more severe than those of the bingwu (the Year of the
Horse). This is the way of Heaven, which the power of human beings is unable to influence.”
14

After Hong Mai, another Song scholar named Chai Wang 柴望 (1212—1280) greatly
contributed to the development of the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic theory. Chai was a
student at the Imperial College and also served as a staff member in the Central Secretariat. In
1246, a year of bingwu, Chai submitted to the Southern Song imperial court a book that he had
written over a number of years. This book was titled the Bingding Guijian 丙丁龜鑒 (The Turtle
and Mirror of Bing and Ding). This book, modeled on the influential historical work Zizhi
tongjia 資治通鑒 (Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government) by Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019-
1086), was written to offer advice to the Southern Song royal court. In his book, Chai warned the
Song court of the two years of bingwu and dingwei, saying they would very likely bring
disasters. Chai investigated in detail the disasters occurring in the bingwu and dingwei years over
a long time span, ranging from the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770—221 BCE) to the Five Dynasties
period (907—960 CE). He argues: “from the period of Qin and Han to the Five Dynasties period,
there were twenty-one periods of bingwu and dingwei and the time covered 1,260 years. [During
these periods of bingwu and dingwei], disasters, calamities, and unfortunate incidents were

13
Hong Mai, Rongzhai suibi, p. 928.
14
Hong Mai, Rongzhai suibi, p. 929.
117

numerous” 自秦漢而下數之，至於五代，為丙午丁未者幾二十有一，上下通一千二百六十
載，炎異變故不可枚舉.
15
Although Chai Wang claimed that the periods of bingwu and dingwei
would most likely witness disasters and chaos, he suggests that, if the Song emperor observed
Confucian virtues and rituals, it would be possible to prevent the disasters from happening.
16

Chai Wang ended the book at the Five Dynasties period, omitting the events of the Northern
Song dynasty.
Chai’s book and his systematic narrative of the apocalyptic theory quickly attracted
attention from his contemporaries. In his book Kunxue jiwen 困學紀聞 (Observations Culled
from Arduous Study), the Southern Song encyclopedist Wang Yinglin 王應麟 (1223-1296)
recorded Chai Wang’s submission of the Bingding guijian to the Southern Song court. Although
Wang made no mention of the content of this book, Wang agreed with Chai’s argument that sage
rulers should be aware of previous disastrous events and prevent them from reoccurring.
17

During the Yuan dynasty, the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic theory continued to circulate
among scholars. In their articles and poems, some scholars used the bingwu and dingwei years in
reference specifically to the Jingkang Incident or generally to disasters taking place in the two
years. In a poem made in memory of the renowned Daoist Zhang Jixian 張繼先 (1092-1127),
whose story will be discussed in the following section, the Yuan historian and poet Yuan Jue 袁
桷 (1266-1327) refers to the Jingkang Incident as the Apocalypse of Red Horse and Red Sheep.
18

15
Chai Wang, “Bingding Guijian Xu”, Qiutangji 秋堂集 2 juan, in vol. 1187 of Wenyuange Siku quanshu
edition, v. 1187, j. 2, p. 3.
16
Chai Wang, Qiutangji, j. 2, p. 3.
17
Wang Yinglin, Kunxue jiwen, 20 juan (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2015), j. 20, p. 556.
18
紅羊赤馬悲滄海，白虎蒼龍儼大庭. Yuan Jue, “Zhang Xujing huan’anbianyueguihe ciyun 張虛靖圜庵扁
曰歸鶴次韻,” Qingrong jushi ji 清容居士集 50 juan, Sibu congkan edition, j.10, p.6a. Because both bingwu
and dingwei years belong to the Red in the Five Color system and the Fire in the Five Element system, this
118

In talking about the establishment of the Southern Song dynasty, another scholar, Zhang Zhu 張
翥 (1287-1368), uses the Red Sheep Apocalypse in reference to the Jingkang Incident.
19
The
Yuan politician Song Ben 宋本(1281-1334) attributes a serious plague breaking out in 1306 (a
bingwu year) and 1307 (a dingwei year) to the bingwu and dingwei years.
20
In other Yuan private
writings, there are also references to the principle that disasters take place during bingwu and
dingwei years.
21

During the Yuan dynasty, some Daoist hagiographies used the trope of the bingwu and
dingwei disasters as evidence of the supernatural power of Daoist priests. One example is Zhang
Jixian (1092—1127), a renowned Daoist priest of the Celestial Master branch of Daoism in the
Northern Song dynasty. Zhang figured prominently in later literature as an immortal, an
astrologist, as well as a fortune teller.
22
According to one of his hagiographies compiled during
the mid-Yuan period, Zhang Jixian had warned the Song court of the Apocalypse of the Red
Horse and Red Sheep 赤馬紅羊之厄 before the Jingkang Incident took place.
23
It is doubtful that
Zhang could have foretold the Jingkang disaster. This story shows, however, that during the
Yuan the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic theory was circulating among Daoist believers.
Sources reveal that during the Yuan this apocalyptic theory was also circulating among the

apocalyptic belief is often referred to as the Apocalypse of Red Horse and Red Sheep, or simply the Red Sheep
Apocalypse.
19
豈知白馬興王后，又到紅羊換劫年. Zhang Zhu 張翥, “Zhou Han zhanggongzhufu linangucheng ertu 周漢
長公主府臨安故城二圖” Duian shiji 蛻庵詩集 4 juan, Sibu congkan edition, j. 3, p. 21a.
20
Song Ben 宋本, “Jixixianyin zhanggong jiuzhengji 績溪縣尹張公舊政記”, Guochao wenlei 國朝文類 70
juan, Su Tianjue 蘇天爵 ed., Sibucongkan edition, j. 39, p. 4b
21
See Wu Shidao 吳師道, Jingxiang lu 敬鄉錄 14 juan, SKQS edition, v. 0451, j. 8, pp. 14a-14b.
22
About Zhang Jixian’s images as an immortal, see Shi Nai’an and Luo Guanzhong, Outlaws of the Marsh,
translated by Sidney Shapiro, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 1981, pp. 1-15.
23
Zhang Yu 張雨, Xuanpinlu 玄品錄, Daozang 道藏 36 vols. (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1988), v. 18, j. 5,
p. 139.
119

masses. Chai Wang’s book ended at the Five Dynasties period, making no mention of the Song
dynasty. During the Yuan dynasty, anonymous authors began to supplement Chai Wang’s
Bingding guijian by adding a new volume, which covered the events taking place in the bingwu
and dingwei years within the Song dynasty.
24
This continuation suggests that this apocalyptic
belief was getting mixed with some fortune-telling theories popular among the masses in the
Yuan dynasty. For example, in the supplemental volume, the anonymous Yuan author used
fortune-telling concepts, such as rensha 刃煞 and lu 祿 to illustrate the bingwu and dingwei
apocalyptic theory.
25
Rensha is jargon used by fortune tellers in reference to bad luck. Lu is a
concept in Chinese fortune telling in reference to a special attribute of each of the Heavenly
Stems and Earthly Branches. These fortune-telling theories and concepts were popularly
accepted among the masses, but were opposed by Confucian elites. As Qing Confucian scholars
argue, the supplemental parts of the Bingding guijian are written “in a complete language of
fortune telling that does not belong to the [Confucian] classics.”
26

In the Qing period, the compliers of the great collectanaea, Siku quanshu 四庫全書, did not
fully preserve the work Bingding guijian, but they claim that to honor Chai Wang’s loyalty to the
Song his book was categorized into the cunmu 存目 part, that is works not included in the Siku,
except for title and brief abstract in the catalogue. In the abstract of the book, the compilers give
reasons that the Bingding guijian did not qualify for formal preservation:

24
During the Ming, another new volume by anonymous authors was added to the book, covering some events
taking place in bingwu and dingwei years within the Yuan dynasty. See Chai Wang, Baoyantang dingzheng
bingding guijian 寶顏堂訂正丙丁龜鑒, 4 juan plus 2 suppls. Siku quanshu edition, zi 67, j. 6, p. 2a.
25
Rensha is jargon used by fortune tellers in reference to bad luck. Lu is a concept in the Chinese fortune-
telling theory in reference to a special attribute to each of the Heavenly Stems and Earthly Branches.
26
Ji Yun 紀昀 et al., Qingding Siku quanshu zongmu 欽定四庫全書總目, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997
reprint), j. 111, p. 1473.
120

[Chai] Wang found that the Jingkang Incident happened in these two years and
tried to impress his audience by imaginative language. Indeed, events listed in the
book are rather far-fetched, and his arguments are not reasonable. Furthermore,
the book concerns prophecies and omens, and tends to delude the multitude.
27

The trope is even popular in modern times. The most recent bingwu and dingwei years were
1966 and 1967, a period when the Cultural Revolution broke out and reached its most violent
stage. The brutal violence of the Cultural Revolution deeply traumatized Chinese intellectuals
and commoners. After this political movement, many intellectuals wrote books recording their
misery during this period. The Chinese writer and translator Yang Jiang 楊絳 (1911-2016) wrote
a book titled The Records of the Bingwu Dingwei Years 丙午丁未年紀事, detailing the
sufferings her family experienced during the Cultural Revolution.
28
The title of the book shows
that Yang knew of the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic belief. Because the Cultural Revolution
is still a censored topic in China, there are relatively few published books about the Cultural
Revolution. On the internet, however, it is easy to find articles that refer to the Cultural
Revolution as the bingwu and dingwei apocalypse or the Red Sheep apocalypse.
29

27
Ji Yun 紀昀 et al.,Qinding Sikuquanshu zongmu, p. 1473.
28
Yang Jiang 楊絳, “Bingwu dingweinian jishi 丙午丁未年紀事”, Yangjiang wenji sanwenjuan 2 vols,
(Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2009), v.1, pp. 55-83.
29
One interesting topic among Chinese netizens is whether it was a coincidence that the Cultural Revolution
occurred in the bingwu and dingwei years. Some believe that this demonstrated the reliability of the
apocalyptic theory. The Cultural Revolution, they argue, was a disaster that the Chinese people could not
avoid. Other netizens disagree with this argument and suspect that Mao Zhedong manipulated the timing to
launch the political movement because the timing matched the mindset of Chinese people. Mao wanted to give
the public the impression that the Cultural Revolution was destined and unchallengeable. Some even take as
evidence the fact that Mao often read Hong Mai’s the Informal Writings of Rongzhai throughout his life. They
believe that Mao read this work with the aim of studying the bingwu and dingwei Apocalyptic belief so as to
choose the right time to launch the Cultural Revolution. If we search “ 丙午丁未 ” and “ 文化大革命 ” on
Google, we can find a lot of related messages.
121

In sum, the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic belief emerged during the Southern Song
dynasty. Scholars like Chen Liang, Hong Mai, and Chai Wang all addressed the association
between disastrous events and these two years. In the Yuan dynasty, this trope became more
widely circulating and filtered down into popular culture. Although in the Qing dynasty,
Confucian elites like the compilers of the Siku quanshu called it far-fetched and deluding, the
influence of the belief has existed even to the present day.

Two “Fulfilled” Prophecies
Yuan and early Ming sources contain many records concerning prophecies circulating in Yuan
society.
30
This section examines two influential ones, which I name the Horse Year Prophecy
and the Sheep Year Prophecy. These two prophecies were important in history and
historiography not only because they circulated widely during the Yuan period, but also because
later scholars regarded them as portents of the shifting Mandate of Heaven from the Yuan to Zhu
Yuanzhang. I argue that originally these two prophecies did not point to the rise of Zhu
Yuanzhang but reflected the idea circulating in Yuan society that the Yuan would fall into chaos
during bingwu and dingwei years. This section also shows how later scholars made far-fetched
connections between these two prophecies and Zhu Yuanzhang’s political legitimacy.
The Horse Year Prophecy is recorded in Tao Zongyi’s 陶宗儀 (1329-1412) Nancun
Chuogeng lu (Nancun’s Notes Recorded during Respites from the Plow), the earliest version of
which was printed in 1366. According to Tao, this prophecy first appeared as a poem given by

30
See relative chapters in the Yuanshi 元史, j. 51-52, pp.1 049-1117; Genshen waishi janzhen, j. 1, p. 63, p. 69;
Caomuzi 草木子, j. 3, p. 50; Nancun chuogenglu 南村輟耕錄, j. 26, p. 328; Zhizheng zhiji 至正直記, j. 3, p. 105.
122

the god Zhenwu 真武 around the Wudangshan 武當山 area (today’s Hubei province) as soon as
the Mongols conquered the capital of the Southern Song dynasty in 1276. Tao relates:
In the thirteenth year of the Zhiyuan period (1276) when Jiangnan was just
incorporated, it widely spread among the populace that the god Zhenwu in the
Wudang Mountain left a poem named the Moon of the West River. [Someone]
carved it into a woodblock, printed it out on pieces of yellow paper, and pasted them
on walls. The poem reads as follows:
至元十三年，江南初內附。民間盛傳武當山真武降筆長短句曰西江月者，鋟刻
於梓，黃紙模印，貼壁間。其詞雲：

The nine by nine of Heaven and Earth has been fixed.
九九乾坤已定
Flowers blossom after the festival of Qingming.
清明節候開花
The world of “rice” and “land” will be a mess like flax.
米田天下亂如麻
[The world] is waiting for the horse that follows the dragon and snake.
直待龍蛇繼馬
As of old, China (Zhonghua) will be the land of fortune and blessings.
依舊中華福地
The “old” and “moon” together will return home.
古月一陣還家
Initially [he] planned to make a career,
當初指望作生涯
but will die under the moon of the west river.
死在西江月下
31

31
Tao Zongyi 陶宗儀, Nancun Chuogenglu 南村輟耕錄 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), j. 26, p. 328.
123

Later scholars tended to interpret this prophecy on the basis of plays-on-words. The Ming
scholar Lang Ying 朗瑛 (1487-1566?) argues that the Chinese character of “rice” 米 (mi) and of
“land” 田 (tian) combine to form a new character 番（fan ）, which means “barbarians.” The
same thing happens with the two characters of “old” (gu 古) and “moon”(yue 月). They combine
to form a new character 胡 (hu), which also refers to “barbarians.”
32
Thus, the meaning of this
prophecy lies in the interpretation of these plays-on-words.
Lang Ying, based on this reading, regarded this prophecy as an accurate prediction of the
rise of Zhu Yuanzhang. He writes that the first sentence, reading “the nine by nine of the
universe has been fixed,” meant that Yuan rule would last for 81 years, which is the result of
nine multiplied by nine. Because the Qingming festival is in the third month of the Chinese
calendar, Lang argues, the line of “flowers blossom after the Qingming festival” referred to the
fact that Zhu Yuanzhang joined a rebel army against the Yuan in the third month. The sentence
of “the world of ‘rice’ and ‘land’ will be a mess like flax” meant that Mongol rule would fall into
chaos. “Waiting for the horse that follows the dragon and snake” meant that Zhu Yuanzhang
would assume the throne in a year of the Dragon, launch an expedition against the Mongols in a
year of the Snake, and the Yuan would end in a year of the Horse. The two sentences—“as of
old, China will be the land of fortune and blessings” and “the ‘old’ and ‘moon’ together will
return home”—tell that Chinese rule would be restored and the Mongols would retreat to the
Mongol steppes. The last sentence that “initially [he] planned to make a career, but will die under
the moon of the west river” foretells the fate of the last emperor of the Yuan. According to

32
Lang Ying 朗瑛, Qixiu leigao 七修類稿, （Shanghai, Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2001 ）, j. 27, p. 283.
124

Lang’s narrative, the last Yuan emperor died suddenly with his coffin unprepared; his soldiers
hastily made his coffin out of a beam from a Buddhist temple named the West River Temple.
33

Modern scholar Xiao Qiqing [Hsiao Ch’i-Ch’ing] 蕭啟慶 (1937-2012), a leading expert on
Yuan history, accepts Lang’s association of this prophecy with the rise of Zhu Yuanzhang. Xiao
argues that the course of history generally matched the prophecy’s predictions with only minor
differences. Xiao credits this prophecy as being “the most accurate prophecy” 最為靈驗的讖語
if “it was not antedated by early Ming authors.”
34
Xiao argues that prophecies could be read as
symbols of public opinion, and modern scholars might not be able to uncover their authors and
the exact time of their emergence.
35

The “minor differences” between the prophecy’s predictions and historical events
mentioned in Xiao’s paper refer to the following disparities. Zhu Yuanzhang launched the
expedition against the Yuan in a year of the Sheep (1367), which was two years later than Lang’s
interpretation indicates. He assumed the throne and established the Ming dynasty in the
following year (1368), a year of the Monkey.
36
The Yuan ended in the eighth lunar month of the
same Monkey year,
37
which was also two years later than the Dragon year in Lang’s
explanation. The sudden death of the last emperor of the Yuan and the story of his coffin appear
only in Lang’s text and cannot be verified by other sources.
I argue that Lang’s interpretation of the prophecy cannot lead to Xiao’s conclusion that the
prophecy was an accurate prediction of Zhu Yuanzhang’s rise. Whether a prophecy is accurate,

33
Lang Ying, Qixiu leigao, j. 27, p. 283.
34
Xiao Qiqing 蕭啟慶, “Zhonghua fudi guyue huanjia mengyuan xingwang yu chenwei 中華福地古月還家：蒙元興亡與讖
緯,” Yuanchaoshi xinlun 元朝史新論, (Taibei: Yunchen wenhua, 1999), p. 97.
35
Xiao Qiqing 蕭啟慶, “Zhonghua fudi guyue huanjia mengyuan xingwang yu chenwei,” p. 97.
36
Mingtaizu shilu, j. 28, p.0477.
37
Mingtaizu shilu, j. 34, p.0600.

125

in many cases, depends on the interpretation of it. Lang Ying identifies the dragon, snake, and
horse mentioned in the prophecy with the Dragon, Snake, and Horse years, and he associates
these years with Zhu Yuanzhang’s career. Zhu Yuanzhang participated in many important events
throughout his life. It is easy for Lang to select three important events to fit in the three years.
Thus, the alleged accuracy of the prophecy is up to Lang’s selection of events. Furthermore, as
shown above, there are two-year differences between Lang’s interpretation of the prophecy and
historical events. Here Lang uses the animal sign years, a cycle of which consists of twelve years
rather than sixty years. Thus, within a twelve-year cycle, a two-year difference between the
prediction and historical events makes a huge difference. Even if one accepts Lang’s
interpretation of the prophecy, the prophecy can hardly be regarded as the “most accurate
prophecy” in Chinese history.
I read this prophecy as not related to Zhu Yuanzhang, but a prediction that the Yuan would
fall into chaos in a bingwu apocalyptic year. The text of this prophecy makes no direct mention
of Zhu Yuanzhang or his career, only Lang’s interpretation mentions these. I argue that key
information in this prophecy lies in the two sentences of “the world of ‘rice’ and ‘land’ will be a
mess like flax” and “[the world] is waiting for the horse that follows the dragon and snake.”
These two sentences predicted that Mongol rule would fall into chaos in a certain Horse year.
Although the prophecy does not point to which Horse year this would be, one can infer, based on
the bingwu and dingwei belief, that it probably means the bingwu Horse year, during which time
chaos was believed likely to break out. The prophecy tells that after the chaotic time, the
Mongols would retreat from China and Chinese rule would be restored.
This prophecy demonstrates new developments of the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic
belief after China was conquered by the Mongols. During the Song, Chen Liang, Hong Mai, and
126

Chai Wang all warned that these two years would bring dangers to China 中國, which they
naturally identified with the Song dynasty.
38
But things became complex during the Yuan, a
period when China was under Mongol rule. While this Horse Year Prophecy still stresses the
outbreak of chaos during bingwu Horse years, ironically, it suggests that such chaos would not
be detrimental but beneficial to China. As predicted by the prophecy, the chaos would lead to the
retreat of the Mongols and the restoration of China as “the land of fortune and blessings.” It
shows an idea circulating around Yuan society that the Yuan state could not be automatically
identified with China. Indeed, this prophecy promotes the idea that these two sides had totally
opposite interests.
In sum, according to Tao Zongyi’s record, the Horse Year Prophecy emerged in the early
Yuan period. The Ming scholar Lang Ying associates this prophecy with the rise of Zhu
Yuanzhang, a narrative accepted by modern scholar Xiao Qiqing. I argue that this prophecy
initially did not point to Zhu’s rise, but it predicted that the Yuan would fall into chaos in a
bingwu Horse year, based on the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic theory. This prophecy shows
that under Mongol rule, the idea about the bingwu and dingwei apocalypse underwent changes.
While Song scholars all regarded these apocalyptic periods as threats to China, this prophecy
conveys the message that the chaos expected to break out in the apocalyptic years would
overthrow Mongol rule and facilitate Chinese restoration.
The Sheep Year Prophecy is recorded in both the Yuanshi ( 元史 Official History of the
Yuan), which was finished in 1370, and the private history Gengshen waishi ( 庚申外史

38
Chen Liang,Chen Liang Ji, j.1, p.8; Hong Mai, Rongzhai suibi, pp. 928-29; Chai Wang, Qiutangji, j.2, p.3.

127

Unofficial History of [the Emperor Born in] the Gengshen Year), which was finished between
1368 and 1370.
39
In the Yuanshi, this prophecy is included in the Treatise of the Five Elements
五行志, a part that talks about the relationship between abnormal natural phenomena and
political malfunction. According to the Yuanshi, this prophecy first emerged as a Children’s song
in 1345 in the Huai River area (today’s northern Anhui and Jiangsu provinces).
Children’s songs included in official histories are those that spread popularly and were
thought of as predicting major events of their times. For example, one children’s song also
included in the Treatise of the Five Elements of the Yuanshi is associated with the fate of two
prime ministers in the late Yuan. This children’s song relates that “the white wild goose (baiyan
白雁) flies to the South and Mazha jumps to the north” 白雁望南飛馬劄望北跳.
40
According to
Xiao Qiqing’s interpretation, this children’s song predicts the fate of two influential figures of
the Yuan. The white wild goose (baiyan) is a synonym for Bayan/Baiyan 伯顏 (1280-1340), the
powerful prime minster of the Yuan in the 1330s. He was ousted in a coup and then banished to
South China in 1340.
41
The fall of Bayan marked a significant turning point in late Yuan politics.
And Mazha refers to Mazhaertai/Majardei 馬劄兒台 (1285-1347), another prime minister of
Yuan in the late 1340s. He was banished to Ganshu province in north China.
42
Another
children’s song in the Yuanshi is the famous one-eyed stone figurine prophecy, which was
regarded as a prediction of the outbreak of the Red Turban rebellion in 1351. This children’s

39
The Gengshen waishi was a major source for the chronology of the last emperor of the Yuan in the Yuanshi. See Wang
Shenrong, Yuanshi tanyuan, (Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1991), pp. 40-50.
40
Yuanshi, j. 51, p. 1107.
41
Yuanshi, j. 40, p. 854; Gengshen weishi, j. 1, p. 32.
42
Yuanshi, j. 41, p. 878.
128

song was so popular that it was not only included in the Yuanshi but also in the private history
the Caomuzi.
43

The Yuanshi records that the Sheep Year Prophecy first appeared in 1345 in the Huai river
area. It says:
The rich should not build mansions.
富漢莫起樓
The poor should not build huts.
窮漢莫起屋
But when we see the year of the Sheep,
但看羊兒年
Then it will be the Wu family state.
便是吳家國
44

The content of the prophecy seems relatively straight forward. The first two sentences urge
people, no matter rich or poor, not to spend resources building homes, that is houses or huts. The
last two sentences predict that in a year of the Sheep, a state named Wu will rise [and replace
Mongol rule]. It does not elaborate why people should not build houses or huts during the state
change.
Ming scholars like Quan Heng 權衡 (active in 1370s) and Qian Qianyi 錢謙益(1582-1664)
associate this prophecy with Zhu Yuanzhang’s rise and think of it as an omen that Zhu

43
Yuanshi, j. 51, p. 1107; Caomuzi, j. 3, p. 50. For the stone figurine of a one-eyed man, also see John Dardess, “The
Transformations of Messianic Revolt and the Founding of the Ming Dynasty,” p. 545.
44
Yuanshi, j. 51, p. 1107.
129

Yuanzhang received the Mandate of Heaven. Quan Heng, the author of the Gengshen waishi,
claims:
Our dynasty (the Ming) set its capital in Jiankang and built altars in the southern
gate of Jiankang city to offer sacrifices to Heaven and receive its mandate. [Our
dynasty] changed [the reign year of] the twenty-seventh year of the Zhizheng period
(1367) into the first year of Wu. It was exactly the year of the dingwei (a year of the
Sheep). It has been confirmed. The Mandate of Heaven has been set. How could
human beings change it?
45

Quan Heng linked this prophecy with an important event in Zhu Yuanzhang’s life.
According to the Veritable Records of the Progenitor of the Ming ( 明太祖實錄 Mingtaizu shilu),
on the first day of the first lunar month of the dingwei year (1367) Zhu Yuanzhang established a
regime named Wu 吳 and meanwhile proclaimed the use of his reign title Wu.
46
Quan argues
that Zhu Yuanzhang’s Wu regime was the fulfillment of the Wu family state mentioned in this
Sheep Year Prophecy. Thus, Quan Heng claims that this prophecy was an omen that Zhu
Yuanzhang’s rise had been predetermined by Heaven decades before Zhu ascended to the throne.
The late Ming scholar Qian Qianyi accepts Quan Heng’s interpretation of the prophecy and
repeated the omen of the rise of Zhu in his own work.
47

45
Quan Heng, Gengshen weishi jianzheng, j. 1, p. 63. Quan Heng was a renowned scholar of the late Yuan and early Ming.
During the warring period of the late Yuan, he lived a reclusive life in north Henan province. He collected a rich body of
sources and finished a private history of the late Yuan named the Gengshen waishi between 1368 and 1370. This book covers
many major events occurring during the late Yuan. Although Quan was not a participant in these events, his book records
narratives of these events circulating in Yuan society. After the establishment of the Ming, Zhu Yuanzhang ordered the
compilation of the Official History of the Yuan. But compilers found that most archives about the last emperor of the Yuan
were lost. Zhu commissioned scholars to collect private histories to make up the loss of archives. The Gengshen waishi is
among those collected for compiling the Yuanshi. In some sense, the Gengshen waishi is a more primary source of Yuan
history than the Yuanshi because many parts of Yuanshi derived from the Gengshen waishi.
46
Mingtaizu shilu, j. 21, p. 9.
47
Qian Qianyi 錢謙益, “Taizu shilu bianzheng yi 太祖實錄辯證一” Chuxueji 初學集 3 vols 110 juan, (Shanghai: Shanghaiguji
chubanshe, 1985), v. 3, j. 101, p. 2098.
130

This Sheep Year Prophecy attracted the attention of the modern scholar Wu Han 吳晗
(1909-1969), whose understanding of the relationship between Zhu’s Wu state and this Sheep
Year Prophecy underwent changes. In a 1940 paper, Wu Han challenged the reliability of the
record that Zhu established a Wu state and set his reign title as Wu in early 1367. Wu Han listed
two points to doubt this record that he considered unusual. Wu Han holds that first Zhu’s rival
Zhang Shicheng 張士誠 (1321-1367) had already founded a state named Wu a few years earlier.
Zhu would not establish a state with the same name as that of his rival’s state. Second, it is quite
unusual that Zhu chose a single Chinese character Wu as his reign title, because traditionally all
reign titles contained at least two Chinese characters. Wu Han speculated that Zhu did not found
the Wu state and this record was fabricated later.
48
But in his 1965 version of the Biography of
Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋傳, Wu Han changed his narrative of Zhu’s Wu state. Wu Han argues
that Zhu Yuanzhang, understanding the great influence of the Sheep Year Prophecy,
intentionally set his state name and reign title as Wu in order to satisfy the prophecy.
49

Wu Han’s latter argument that associates the founding of the Wu state with the Sheep Year
Prophecy is more meaningful, but he did not flesh out this argument. Zhu’s establishment of the
Wu state was unusual, and Wu Han’s questions about the unusualness are reasonable. To
elaborate reasons for Zhu’s founding of the Wu state, we need to address important questions
such as 1) why did the prophecy predict that a state named Wu would rise? 2) why did the
prophecy specify a year of the Sheep? 3) why was the prophecy so influential that Zhu
Yuanzhang sought to follow it?

48
Wu Han, “Mingjiao yu damingdiguo”, p. 236.
49
Wu Han, Zhu Yuanzhang zhuan 朱元璋傳 (Tianjin: Beihua wenyi chubanshe, 1965. Reprinted 2000), p. 131.
131

Consideration of the original medium of the prophecy can lead to a different reading of this
prophecy and sheds light on the question of why the prophecy specified a “Wu family state.” The
prophecy was first circulated in the form of a children’s song (tongyao 童謠). Thus, it originally
was an oral lyric without a written text. In Chinese, the pronunciation of wu has many matching
characters, including the surname Wu 吳, and the character wu 無 which means “no” or “none.”
Thus, the original meaning of wu in the children’s song was not limited to the surname Wu. In
the case of the prophecy, the character wu 無, meaning “no,” can be seen as a likely reading of
the prophecy. The phrase of wujiaguo ( 無家國 no family or state) means that people or rulers
would lose their families and states.
50

Here the phrase of “wujiaguo” ( 無家國 no family or state) suggests that the loss of families
and states would occur during a chaotic time. The meaning of “wujiaguo” ( 無家國 no family or
state) can be better understood in the context of the narrative of “having families and states” in
Chinese literature. Confucius had a very famous saying in regard to “having families and states.”
The Analects states:
Qiu (Confucius) has heard that the rulers of states and the heads of families ( 有家有國
youjia youguo) “worry not that the population is sparse but that it is unevenly
distributed; worry not that the people are poor but that they are not at peace.” For when
there is even distribution, there will be no poverty; when there is harmony, there will
be no sparseness of population; when there is peace, there will be no upheaval.
51

50
The phrase wujiaguo in this Children’s song was a colloquial expression. More formal literature such as official histories has a
similar expression of jiaguo juwang 家國俱亡, meaning both families and the states are lost. See Jinshu 晋书 The Official
History of the Jin Dynasty, j. 59, p. 1590; Chosŏn wangjo sillok 朝鮮王朝實錄 The Veritable Records of the Chosen Dynasty, j.
3, p. 50a; j. 10, p. 3b; j. 16, p. 31a; j. 43, p. 10b.
51
Confucius, The Analects 16:1, in Sources of Chinese Tradition Second Edition Volume 1 From Earliest Time to 1600, ed. by
132

邱也聞有家有國者，不患寡而患不均，不患貧而患不安。蓋均無貧，和無寡，
安無傾。
Confucius suggests that rulers who have states and families should make society stable by
keeping wealth evenly distributed, people in harmony, and society in peace. Therefore, “having
families and states” refers to harmony, peace, and even distribution of wealth. On the contrary,
“no family or state” refers to the situation that wealth is unevenly distributed, people are in
turmoil, and society is in chaos. Accordingly, the prophecy can be interpreted in the following
way. No matter rich or poor, people should not spend resources building houses and huts. In the
year of the Sheep, chaos will break out and people will lose their families and states. Above, I
raise a question about why the prophecy dissuaded people from building houses and huts when
the Wu state rose. This explanation can answer this question. Because the original meaning of
this prophecy suggested that families were destined to be lost in the chaotic time of “no family or
state,” people should not build houses or huts.
Two other prophecies recorded in the Yuanshi reinforce my above explanation of the
meaning of wujiaguo. During the late Yuan period, the expression “no families” (wujia 無家)
was used in prophecies in reference to the prediction that people would lose their families in
chaotic times. According to the Yuanshi, in 1356 a blackthorn tree (lishu 李樹) in the Zhangde
area bore a fruit that was said to be as big as a cucumber. Thus, a prophecy arose that “a
blackthorn bears a cucumber and all people will have no families 李生黃瓜, 民皆無家.”
52
Also
in the Yuanshi, in 1355 a popular prophecy circulated in the Dadu (present-day Beijing) area. “A
blast of yellow wind and a blast of sand; there are no people or families for a thousand and ten

William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 61.
52
Yuanshi, j. 51, p. 1104.
133

thousand li 一陣黃風一陣沙,千里萬裡無人家.”
53
The phrases of “no families (wujia),” “no
people or families (wurenjia),” and “no families or states (wujiaguo)” have similar meanings in
reference to the situation that people would lose everything in chaotic times. These records of
wujia and wurenjia in the Yuanshi support the identification of “no families and states” as the
original meaning of wujiaguo.
Examining this prophecy in the context of the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic belief
suggests an answer to the question of why the prophecy specified the Sheep year. I argue that the
Sheep year mentioned in the prophecy refers to the dingwei Sheep year, during which time chaos
was believed to break out. This prophecy can be interpreted as a prediction that in a dingwei
Sheep year chaos will break out in Yuan society, and people, no matter rich or poor, will lose
their families and states.
Confucius’ narrative of “having families and states” provides a clue to understanding why
this prophecy could circulate popularly in late Yuan society. Confucius emphasizes that “having
families and states” requires even distribution of wealth. Indeed, the disparity between the rich
and poor was a serious problems for the Yuan.
54
When the large-scale anti-Yuan rebellion broke
out in 1351, the rebel leader Liu Futong 劉福通 harshly criticized the Yuan on the grounds that
“while poverty is extreme in Kiangnan (Jiangnan) 貧極江南, wealth is boasted in Sai-pei
(Saibei) 富誇塞北.”
55
According to contemporary accounts, the poor people “gladly joined the

53
Yuanshi, j. 51, p. 1107. This prophecy is cited by modern scholars working on Chinese environmental history. Based on this
prophecy, they argue that sand storms existed in the Beijing area as early as the Yuan period. See Wang Weiti, “Lishishangde
shachen tianqi” 歷史上的沙塵天氣, Zhonghua wenshi luncong 72, 2003, p. 44.
54
See Wu Han, Zhuyuanzhang zhuan, pp.28-31; Meng Siming, Yuandai shehui jieji zhidu, (Shanghai: Shanghai shiji chubanshe,
2006), pp. 174-181; Han Rulin 韓儒林, Yuanchaoshi 元朝史, (Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 1986), pp. 38-53.
55
Ye Ziqi, Caomuzi, j. 3, p. 51. This translation is adapted from John Dardess, “The Transformations of Messianic Revolt and the
Founding of the Ming Dynasty,” Journal of Asian Studies, 29.3 (1970): 545.
134

rebellion,” and they “joined the rebellions like coming home 從亂如歸” because of the
“disparity between the rich and poor 貧富不均.”
56
Xiao Qiqing also associates the first two
sentences of this prophecy with the disparity of wealth in the Yuan. He argues that this prophecy
reflects a mindset that people, no matter rich or poor, should “stop working and wait for changes
脫產待變” among Yuan society.
57
Thus this prophecy suggesting a complete loss of everyone’s
wealth could resonate with poor people, and this might be considered as one of the reasons for
the popularly spreading of the prophecy.
58

To summarize, this Sheep Year Prophecy popularly circulated in the late Yuan. It was
identified by the Ming scholar Quan Heng and Qian Qianyi as a prediction of the rise of Zhu
Yuanzhang’s Wu state. Wu Han attributed this prophecy to the reason why Zhu Yuanzhang
adopted the reign title Wu. I argue that the meaning of the written text of the prophecy has been
changed from the original meaning in its lyrical form. The original children’s song did not point
to the rise of a Wu state, but predicted that chaos would break out in a dingwei Sheep year, and
people would lose their families and states. The fact that this prophecy popularly circulated
among people might be related to the serious disparity of wealth in Yuan society. I speculate that
the current text of “Wu family state” in the prophecy might have been a result of manipulation.
The next two sections will examine how Zhu Yuanzhang utilized the bingwu and dingwei
apocalyptic belief and the Sheep Year Prophecy to strengthen his claim to political legitimacy.

56
Ye Ziqi, Caomuzi, j. 3, p. 51.
57
Xiao Qiqing, “Zhonghua fudi guyue huanjia mengyuan xingwang yu chenwei, ” p. 97.
58
The anti-Yuan Red Turban rebels had a slogan of “destroy the rich and benefit the poor 摧富益貧.” This slogan can be seen as
an echo of the Sheep year prophecy. See Chen Gaohua, “Yuandai qiyi nongmin de kouhao,” Yuanshi yanjiu lungao, (Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju, 1991), pp. 260-265.
135

Zhu Yuanzhang, Han Lin’er, and the Bingwu Horse Year
The shared belief that chaos would break out in bingwu and dingwei years, as shown in the two
prophecies, offered great chances for opportunists to manipulate this social mindset. From the
perspective of the apocalyptic belief, connections can be made between some major events of the
Yuan-Ming transition, which otherwise seem unrelated to one another. In this section, I will
analyze the demise of Zhu Yuanzhang’s former overlord Han Lin’er and the possible links
between his death and the apocalyptic theory.
In 1351, Liu Futong 劉福通 (?-1363) and Han Lin’er 韓林兒 (?-1367) launched a rebellion
against the Yuan in Central China. Liu, Han and many other organizers of the rebellion were
believers in the White Lotus society of popular Buddhism.
59
The rebel soldiers wore red turbans,
and for that reason they were also called the Red Turban Armies. In the wake of Liu and Han’s
rebellion, the Yuan empire fell apart. Many warlords arose throughout China. Some warlords
fought against the Yuan in the name of Chinese restoration, but some warlords fought for the
Yuan.
60

In the late 1350s, Liu Futong and Han Lin’er were the most powerful among all the
warlords. In 1355, Liu established a regime named “Song” and installed Han Lin’er as the
emperor. Liu Futong claimed Han Lin’er to be the tenth-generation descendant of the Huizong
emperor (r. 1100-1126) of the Northern Song dynasty.
61
Han Lin’er and Liu Futong claimed their
Song regime to be a restoration of the Song dynasty that was conquered by the Mongols in the
1270s. Han granted himself the title of the Little Prince of Light (xiao mingwang 小明王) and

59
Yuanshi, j. 42, p. 891; j. 186, p. 4267;
60
For details of the rebellion, see John W. Dardess, “The Transformation of Messianic Rebellion and the Founding of the Ming
Dynasty,” Journal of Asian Studies, 29.3 (1970): 539-41.
61
Caomuzi, j. 3, p. 51.
136

adopted the reign title of Dragon and Phoenix (Longfeng 龍鳳).
62
Within the Song regime, Han
Lin’er was the titular leader, but Liu Futong controlled the regime de facto. In its heyday, the
Song state took control of most of central and east China, including the areas of modern Anhui,
Henan, Shandong, Shanxi, and Hebei provinces. Its northern expedition troops once reached the
suburb of Dadu 大都, the capital of the Yuan.
63

In 1352, Zhu Yuanzhang, the future founder of the Ming dynasty, joined a branch of
rebellion troops affiliated with the Red Turban rebels. He soon was promoted from an ordinary
soldier to a major general due to his good performance on the battlefield. In 1355, the Song state
assigned him to conquer southern China. Under the protection of the Song state, which was
resisting the brunt of the Yuan’s counterattack in the north, Zhu quickly wiped out local forces in
the lower Yangtze River area and established solid control over vast areas centered in Jiankang
(present day Nanjing). Although he still maintained nominal subjugation to Han Lin’er and the
Song state, by the early 1360s, Zhu had grown into a powerful regional leader.
64

During this time, the situation in the north had changed dramatically. Under consistent
attacks from the Yuan army and other warlords, Han Lin’er’s Song state lost most of its territory
and fell into turmoil. In 1359, the Song capital Kaifeng was conquered by Yuan troops; Liu
Futong and Han Lin’er had to retreat to An Feng 安豐, a small city along the Huai River.
65
In

62
Yuanshi, j. 44, p. 922.
63
For the military campaigns waged by the Red Turbans, see Chen Gaohua, “Shuo yuanmo hongjinjun de sanlu beifa 說元末紅
巾軍的三路北伐, ” Lishi jiaoxue 歷史教學 5 (1981): 21-25. For more English literature about the Red Turban Movement, see
Frederic W. Mote, “The Rise of the Ming Dynasty, 1330-1367” in The Cambridge History of China Volume 7 The Ming Dynasty,
1368-1644, part I, ed. Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 12-44;
Edward L. Dreyer, Early Ming China: A Political History 1355-1435, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 12-65;
David M. Robinson, Empire’s Twilight: Northeast Asia Under the Mongols, pp. 130-60.
64
Yu Ben, Jishilu jianzheng, j.1, p.31, p.101; Chan Hok-Lam, “The Song Dynasty Legacy”, p. 110.
65
Qian Qianyi, Guochu qunxiong shilu, j. 1, p. 37.
137

1363, besieged by the warlord Zhang Shicheng 張士誠 (1321-1367), Han Lin’er and Liu Futong
had to ask Zhu Yuanzhang for help.
66

Opinions of Zhu Yuanzhang’s advisers and generals varied over whether or not to go to
rescue Han Lin’er. Although Han Lin’er’s power had been weakened seriously, he retained his
titular overlordship over Zhu Yuanzhang and still enjoyed legitimacy for his rule among the Red
Turban armies. To Zhu Yuanzhang, a rising military strongman, it might have seemed a good
option not to rescue Han. Some Zhu’s advisers supported the policy not to rescue Han. For
example, Zhu’s chief advisor Liu Ji 劉基 (1311—1375), worrying about the aftermath of
rescuing Han Lin’er, asked: “If we succeed in rescuing him (Han Lin’er), how will we dispose of
him?”
67
Liu’s worry was not groundless. Getting along with Han Lin’er would be a thorny
problem for Zhu Yuanzhang if they managed to rescue him.
Then again, Zhu Yuanzhang would also face dangers if he decided not to rescue Han Lin’er.
As a vassal of Han Lin’er, Zhu had the obligation to save his overlord. In China where the
Confucian value of loyalty to one’s lord prevailed, abandoning one’s overlord would definitely
damage one’s reputation. Furthermore, if Han Lin’er was captured by Zhu’s rival warlords, Zhu
Yuanzhang would face a dilemma. His rivals would make use of Han Lin’er to challenge Zhu’s
position and jeopardize his cause.
After careful calculation, Zhu finally decided to rescue Han Lin’er. By the time Zhu and his
troops broke the siege, Liu Futong, the de facto ruler of the Song state, had been killed by Zhang
Shicheng’s troops.
68
Zhu brought Han Lin’er into the area under his control, and put him in the

66
Qian Qianyi, Guochu qunxiong shilu, j. 1, p. 38; Yu Ben, Jishilu jianzheng, p. 198.
67
Liu Chen 劉辰, Guochu shiji 國初事蹟, SKCM edition, shi.46, p. 26.
68
Sources about Liu Futong’s final fate vary. Some records indicate that Liu died in the battle of Anfeng in 1363. Other accounts
show that Liu was rescued by Zhu and later died with Han Lin’er in a boat accident. Here I accept records in the MTZSL that Liu
138

palace under close surveillance. Han Lin’er was now a puppet leader manipulated by Zhu
Yuanzhang. Although Zhu had Han under his control, he still kept his nominal allegiance to Han.
For the next three and a half years, Zhu continued holding Han up as the nominal leader of the
Song state and using Han’s reign title, Longfeng. Whenever Zhu issued an edict, it would begin
with the phraset Huangdi shengzhi Wuwang lingzhi 皇帝聖旨吳王令旨（At the august
command of the Emperor [Han Lin’er] and at the order of the Prince Wu [Zhu Yuanzhang] ）,
placing Han Lin’er’s title ahead of his own.
69

After three and a half years of peaceful life under house arrest, Han suddenly drowned in a
mysterious boat accident in the twelfth month of a bingwu year (January 1367).
70
According to
contemporary accounts, Zhu dispatched a general named Liao Yongzhong 廖永忠 (1323-1375)
to accompany Han Lin’er from Chuzhou to Yingtian, the center of Zhu’s realm. When the boat
that carried Han reached Guabu, a port north of the Yangtze river, the boat mysteriously
capsized. Han Lin’er drowned in this accident.
71
Although the most obvious beneficiary of the
sudden death of Han was Zhu Yuanzhang, existing sources do not offer any solid evidence that
Zhu murdered Han Lin’er.
The reason for Han Lin’er’s death has become a topic for debate among scholars. Two
Ming scholars, Gao Dai 高岱 (1508-1567) and Qian Qianyi 錢謙益 (1582-1664), assert that Zhu
Yuanzhang had no need to murder Han Lin’er, who at the time was only a nominal leader with
no real power. Gao Dai holds that Han’s death was an accident and Zhu was always loyal to Han.
Zhu’s loyalty, Gao argues, was evidenced by the fact that he rescued Han when Han was

Futong was killed by Zhang Shicheng’s troops in Anfeng; See Mingtaizu shilu, j. 12, p. 149. Also see Guochu shiji, p. 20.
69
Zhu Yunming 祝允明, Yeji 野記, SKCM edition, zi v. 240, j. 1, p. 7.
70
Lu Shen 陸深, Pinghulu 平胡錄, Congshu jicheng edition, p. 14.
71
Quan Heng, Gengshen waishi jianzheng, j. 2, p. 136.
139

besieged in 1363, and he issued edicts with Han’s title above his own title.
72
Qian Qianyi agrees
with Gao Dai’s conclusion that Zhu was loyal to Han, but he did not rule out the possibility that
Liao Yongzhong, the general Zhu Yuanzhang sent to travel with Han Lin’er, murdered Han
without Zhu’s authorization.
73
It is understandable that these two Ming scholars supported a
stance in favor of Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the dynasty to which they belonged.
Modern scholars, who have no obligation to absolve Zhu Yuanzhang, tend to attribute
Han’s death to a conspiracy of Zhu. For example, Wu Han asserts that Zhu murdered Han Lin’er
in order to get rid of the biggest obstacle to his enthronement.
74
Another Chinese scholar, Yang
Ne, believes that the murder was organized by Zhu and carried out by general Liao
Yongzhong.
75
Neither Wu nor Yang provides substantial evidence to confirm this theory. Neither
of these opposite opinions has addressed some specific concerns. If there was suspicion of Zhu
murdering Han, how did Zhu respond to the suspicion? If Zhu murdered Han, why did he choose
that specific time to carry out his plan?
Zhu Yuanzhang faced a dilemma after he rescued Han. As the most powerful warlord
during that time, Zhu Yuanzhang clearly had the ambition to establish a dynasty of his own.
Meanwhile he had to very carefully handle his relationship with Han Lin’er, since Han was still
his overlord in name. If Zhu hastily killed Han, he would risk the suspicion of murdering his
overlord. In China where the Confucian virtue of loyalty was regarded highly, such an accusation
could damage Zhu’s cause. A record of a purported discussion between Zhu Yuanzhang and Liu
Ji about their enemy Chen Youliang 陳友諒(1320-1363) , a powerful warlord in the middle

72
Gao Dai, Hongyoulu, j. 2, p. 23a-23b.
73
Qian Qianyi, “Taizu shilu bianzheng san,” Chuxueji, v. 3, j. 103, pp. 2123-24.
74
Wu Han, Zhuyuanzhang zhuan, pp. 125-126.
75
Yang Ne 楊訥, “Zhu Yuanzhang yu Liu Futong Han Lin’er 朱元璋與劉福通韓林兒,” Yuanshi lunji 元史論集, (Beijing: Guojia
tushuguan chubanshe, 2012), p. 183.
140

Yangtze River area, suggests Zhu’s awareness of the potential harm caused by an accusation of
disloyalty. Liu Ji asserted that Chen Youliang was doomed to fail because he “is manipulating
his lord and intimidating his subordinates, and his reputation is not righteous.”
76
Liu Ji’s
accusation of Chen refers to the fact that Chen Youliang incarcerated and executed his overlord
Xu Shouhui.
77
Liu Ji thought that the infamous reputation caused by Chen’s betrayal of his
overlord would lead to Chen’s failure. According to this source, Zhu Yuanzhang agreed with Liu
Ji’s judgement, and the conversation raised Zhu’s confidence in defeating Chen Youliang. Thus,
Zhu was aware of the risk he might face if the suspicion of killing Han fell on him.
Extant sources show that Zhu was later very sensitive about records depicting his
relationship with Han Lin’er. After he assumed the throne in 1368, he intentionally deleted the
sources about Han’s regime and his subservience to Han.
78
Today, historians, faced with scarce
sources, have to rely on only a few scattered records to infer what happened between Zhu and
Han.
If we look at Han Lin’er’s death from the perspective of the bingwu and dingwei
apocalyptic belief, we can see that the belief offered Zhu a way to avoid blame for Han’s death
and bolster his own legitimacy. Han Lin’er drowned suddenly in the twelfth month of the bingwu
year in the Chinese calendar (January 1367). As the apocalyptic belief suggests, disasters such as
wars and the demise of emperors would happen in that year. Thus, according to the belief, Han
Lin’er, who then still maintained the nominal title of “Emperor” of the Song state, faced danger
of sudden death during this apocalyptic period. Existing sources mention neither suspicion of

76
Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 et al, ed.. Mingshi 明史, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju), 1974, j. 128, p. 3778.
77
Yuanshi, j. 45, p. 950.
78
Although Zhu Yuanzhang destroyed most of the sources about his subservience to Han Lin’er, many contemporary private
writings have preserved records about it. For primary sources recording this, see Liu Chen, Guochu shiji; Qian Qianyi, Guochu
qunxiong shilue, j.1; Yu Ben, Jishilu jianzheng, j.1; Gao Dai, Hongyoulu, j.2; Zhu Yunming, Yeji, j. 1. For secondary sources, see
Zhu Yuanzhang zhuan, pp. 125-126.
141

Zhu Yuanzhang concerning Han’s death nor any official explanation for Han’s death offered by
Zhu. From the perspective of the apocalyptic belief, however, it is not difficult to infer Zhu’s
response to Han’s death. Zhu Yuanzhang might have publicly announced that Han died of the
boat accident. This explanation was acceptable to many people who adhered to the bingwu and
dingwei apocalyptic belief.
Furthermore, Han’s death put an end to the legitimacy of the Song ruling house and cleared
the way for Zhu to legitimize his power. Han Lin’er’s Song regime claimed itself to be the
restoration of the Song dynasty.
79
Han Lin’er proclaimed himself to be the ninth-generation
descendant of the Huizong emperor of the Song Dynasty.
80
Coincidentally the Huizong Emperor
was captured by the Jurchens in the Jingkang Incident, another bingwu and dingwei period 240
years earlier. As mentioned above, the apocalyptic belief came to circulate among Song and
Yuan society partly because of the miserable memory of the Jingkang Incident. The bingwu and
dingwei apocalypse was regarded like a curse on the Song royal family. The timing of Han
Lin’er’s demise served to reinforce the idea that the Song would be doomed to end in the bingwu
and dingwei period. After Han’s death Zhu Yuanzhang could naturally stop using the state name
“Song” and the reign title of Dragon and Pheonix adopted by Han Lin’er. Zhu Yuanzhang did
not need to face censure that he had usurped Han Lin’er’s state. Han Lin’er’s death opened up an
opportunity for Zhu Yuanzhang to establish his own dynasty.
Thirdly, Han Lin’er died a few days before the arrival of the dingwei Sheep year, during
which time the Sheep Year Prophecy predicted that a Wu family state would emerge and replace
the Yuan. As predicted, Zhu Yuanzhang established his Wu state on the first day of the first

79
Yuanshi, j. 44, p. 922.
80
Caomuzi, j. 3, p. 51.
142

month of the dingwei year, just a few days after Han Lin’er’s death. If Han Lin’er had died a
month later, Zhu Yuanzhang would have had difficulty in fulfilling the Wu family state prophecy
perfectly. Therefore, the timing of Han’s death just maximized Zhu Yuanzhang’s opportunities
to reduce suspicion and establish a new state.
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that Han’s death was likely a carefully planned
murder aimed at paving the way for Zhu Yuanzhang’s accession. Since Zhu Yuanzhang chose
that particular time to send Liao Yongzhong to travel with Han Lin’er in the late bingwu year,
the timing of Han’s death was likely decided not by Liao Yongzhong but by Zhu Yuanzhang.
Thus, the possibility that Liao Yongzhong, without Zhu’s permission, murdered Han for the sake
of Zhu is highly unlikely. The reasonable conclusion is that Zhu Yuanzhang organized the plan
to murder Han Lin’er late in the particular bingwu year, and Liao Yongzhong carried out the
plan.
81
Zhu managed to make use of the well-known bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic belief to
remove an obstacle to his political ambition.

Zhu Yuanzhang, Zhang Shicheng, and the Dingwei Sheep Year
On the first day of the dingwei Sheep year, which was only a few days after Han Lin’er’s death,
Zhu announced his new reign title Wu.
82
This indicates that he had changed from the de facto

81
General Liao Yongzhong’s fate is storied. He was not immediately punished by Zhu Yuanzhang for Han Lin’er’s death. On the
contrary, three years later, he was promoted by Zhu to the rank of Marquis in 1370. But in 1375 Zhu had him executed, accusing
him of transcending his rank. In a 1396 book, one of Zhu Yuanzhang’s sons, Zhu Quan, made a comment on Liao’ fate, arguing
that Zhu Yuanzhang executed Liao because he murdered Han Lin’er without Zhu Yuanzhang’s permission. This narrative is not
convincing because Zhu Yuanzhang did not punish Liao immediately after Han’s death. Only eight years later did Zhu execute
Liao for “transcending his rank,” making no mention of Han’s death. Later scholars like Qian Qianyi followed Zhu Quan’s
narrative. See Zhu Quan, Tongjian bolun 通鑒博論, SKCM shi vol. 281, p. 180. See Qian Qianyi, “Taizu shilu bianzheng,” Chu
Xueji 初學集, (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1995), pp. 2123-2124.
82
Mingtaizu shilu, j. 21, p. 311.
143

leader of the Song state to an independent ruler of his own Wu state.
83
The choice of the reign
title Wu was unusual. As pointed out by Wu Han, the reign title only had one Chinese character.
In all cases in Chinese history, the reign title of a ruler consisted of at least two characters.
84

Indeed we can also find the “unusualness” of the Wu reign title in other ways. For example, this
reign title Wu was the same as Zhu’s title the Prince of Wu, which had never happened before.
Furthermore, the reign title of Wu was used only for one year, a very short period. Suddenly a
year later, Zhu changed his reign title to Hongwu and formally established the Ming dynasty.
Moreover, Zhu’s long-time rival Zhang Shicheng had proclaimed himself to be the Prince of Wu
and established his Wu state four years earlier. It is unusual that Zhu still kept his title of the
Prince of Wu granted by Han Lin’er, when he had the opportunity to establish his own state in
early 1367.
These unusual and unprecedented steps can be explained if we understand them as part of a
plan for Zhu Yuanzhang to legitimize his rule by fulfilling the Sheep Year Prophecy. The
Yuanshi shows that since 1345 the prophecy had been circulating that a Wu family state would
rise in a Sheep year. As I analyze above, this prophecy most likely originally predicted that great
chaos would break out in the dingwei Sheep year, and people would lose their families and states
during the chaotic time. Because in Chinese the words “no” and the surname of “Wu” had the
same pronunciation, this prophecy could later transform into a prediction that a Wu family state
would rise during a sheep year.

83
Zhu had been the Prince of Wu ever since 1364. But during 1364 -1367, Zhu was under the nominal emperor Han Lin’er. In the
early 1367 when the Song state ceased to exist, and Zhu used his own reign title Wu, Zhu could for the first time be seen as a real
independent ruler.
84
Wu Han, “Ming Jiao yu daming diguo,” p. 236.
144

Although no direct source shows how this transformation took place, I speculate that it was
a result of manipulation by Zhu Yuanzhang. First, the fact that Zhu was the ruler of Wu for over
a decade offered him an opportunity to manipulate this prophecy. In 1356 the Song state
enfeoffed Zhu as the Duke of Wu for his merit in conquering Nanjing.
85
In 1364, Han Lin’er
further promoted Zhu to be the Prince of Wu for his rescue of Han Lin’er from the siege.
86
When
he formally established his own Wu state in early 1367, Zhu had been called the Prince of Wu
for four years. Second, Zhu’s early life in the Huai area suggests that Zhu knew of the
importance and popularity of this prophecy. According to the Yuanshi, this prophecy first
appeared in the Huai River area in 1345. Zhu Yuanzhang was born (in 1328) and raised in the
Huai River area.
87
Before he joined the Red Turbans in 1352, Zhu had traveled throughout the
Huai River area, including Yingzhou where the Red Turban rebellion first broke out in 1351.
88

Zhu possibly heard of this Sheep Year Prophecy in his youth. And most likely after he was given
the title Duke of Wu in 1356, he noticed that it was possible to manipulate the prophecy by
playing with his title Wu and the prophecy. After having rescued Han Lin’er in 1364, Han Lin’er
promoted him to be the Prince of Wu, further strengthening his status as the ruler of Wu.
89
In the
next three years Zhu conquered many rivals under both the name of the Song state and his title of
the Prince of Wu. In the end of the bingwu horse year (January 1367), Han suddenly died, paving
the way for Zhu to fulfill the Sheep Year Prophecy.

85
Mingtaizu shilu, j. 4, p. 45. It is noteworthy that the Veritable Records only records that his generals honorably acclaimed Zhu
to be Duke of Wu, making no mention of the fact that the title was granted by Han Lin’er and the Song state. Indeed, before
1367, all Zhu’s titles were granted, at least nominally, by the Song state. See Yu Ben, Jishilu jianzheng, j.1, p. 31, p. 136; Qian
Qianyi, Guochu qunxiong shilue, j. 1, p. 12, p. 38.
86
Mingtaizu shilu, j. 14, p. 175.
87
Mingtaizu shilu, j. 1, pp. 1-4.
88
Mingtaizu shilu, j. 1, p. 4.
89
Qian Qianyi, Guochu qunxiong shilue, j. 1, pp. 38-39.
145

Zhu was not the only warlord who tried to make use of the prophecy. His formidable rival,
Zhang Shicheng, also realized the power of the prophecy and sought to take advantage of it.
Zhang, originally a salt smuggler, organized a strong army during the late Yuan period.
90
His
loyalty often fluctuated between the Yuan court and anti-Yuan rebels. Zhang and his army
controlled a vast area centered on Suzhou in the lower Yangzi River area. Zhang’s regime
neighbored on Zhu Yuanzhang’s territory, and battles between the two sides continued for more
than a decade. In the middle of 1363, a year before Zhu Yuanzhang was promoted to be the
Prince of Wu by Han Lin’er, Zhang Shicheng changed the name of his regime from “Da Zhou 大
周” to “Wu 吳” and proclaimed himself to be the Prince of Wu.
91
When Zhu Yuanzhang was
also promoted to be Prince of Wu in the next year, there were two regimes with the name of the
same Chinese character Wu 吳.
92
To distinguish the two, contemporaries referred to Zhu’s
regime as Western Wu 西吳 (xiwu) and that of Zhang’s as Eastern Wu 東吳 (dongwu).
93

Both Zhang and Zhu had reasons to proclaim themselves the Prince of Wu. Suzhou, the
center of Zhang’s territory, was the capital of an ancient Wu state, which can be traced back to
the Spring and Autumn period (770-476BCE). The area surrounding Suzhou had been called the
“place of Wu” (wudi 吳地) ever since then. Zhu also had his reasons. Nanjing, his power base,
had been for a time the capital of a Wu Kingdom during the Three Kingdoms period (220-280).
Strictly speaking, Suzhou had a longer history of being called Wu than Nanjing had.

90
Guochu qunxiong shilue, j. 6, j. 7, pp. 167-210.
91
Guochu qunxiong shilue, j. 7, p. 181; Mingtaizu shilu, j. 13, p. 172.
92
Although during 1363-1367 Zhu Yuanzhang was nominally subservient to the Song state and its emperor Han Lin’er, Zhu was
generally seen as an independent ruler by his contemporaries because of the fact that he completely controlled the Song court and
Han Lin’er.
93
Guochu qunxiong shilue, j. 7, pp. 181-182.
146

The legitimacy of Zhang’s claim, however, was not of much help in his battles against Zhu
Yuanzhang. After a decade of seesaw battles, Zhu began to gain the upper hand. In the middle of
1366, a half year before Zhu set his reign title as “Wu,” Zhu launched a large-scale conquest
campaign against Zhang Shicheng. After almost a year of fierce fighting, Zhu finally conquered
the capital of Eastern Wu, and captured Zhang Shicheng in the seventh month of the Sheep year
(August 1367). The fall of Suzhou marked the end of Zhang Shicheng’s Eastern Wu state.
Therefore, Zhu Yuanzhang in the middle of the Sheep year (1367) became the only Prince of
Wu, who, as predicted by the prophecy, would rule China under the name of the Wu family and
state.
The importance of the state name Wu offers a new perspective on a puzzling question
concerning the special layout of Zhu Yuanzhang’s mausoleum, the Filial Piety Mausoleum of the
Ming (Ming Xiaoling 明孝陵). Whereas the Sacred Way (shendao 神道) of great mausoleums in
Beijing and Xian follow a straight line with stone statues standing along two sides, Zhu’s
mausoleum has a totally different look. The Sacred Way of Zhu’s mausoleum is U shaped. It
detours at the tomb of Sun Quan, the founder of the Wu kingdom during the Three Kingdoms
period. According to Ming sources, during the construction of the mausoleum officials suggested
to Zhu that Sun Quan’s tomb be removed because it blocked the Sacred Way. But Zhu
Yuanzhang refused and ordered that the Sacred Way detour around Sun’s tomb, such that Sun’s
tomb was preserved. Zhu gave the reason that “Sun was a hero; let his tomb be the guard of my
mausoleum.”
94

94
Zhang Dai 張岱, Tao’an mengyi 陶庵夢憶, (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1982), j. 1, p. 1.
147

Sun’s tomb was an exception. During the construction of Zhu’s Mausoleum, many historic
relics like the pagoda of Baozi and the Linggu temple were removed or destroyed.
95
Only Sun’s
tomb was left intact. It is confusing why Zhu Yuanzhang admired Sun Quan so much that he
even allowed the Sacred Way to detour in order to protect Sun’ tomb. This question can be
addressed in the context of Zhu’s utilization of the state name Wu. Sun Quan had once
established a Wu kingdom in this area, and so Zhu’s Wu state recalled this historical
background. It is possible that Zhu preserved Sun’s tomb to show his appreciation for Sun,
whose early Wu kingdom had made a necessary contribution to Zhu’s success.
The change of the Wu state to the Ming dynasty can also be seen as an effort to fulfill the
Sheep Year Prophecy. After conquering Zhang Shicheng in the middle of 1367, Zhu became the
only ruler of the Wu family state. His Mandate from Heaven had been demonstrated by his
fulfillment of the rise of his Wu family state. The prophecy, however, predicted that only in the
Sheep year would rise the Wu family state. Thus, when the Sheep year ended, the state name Wu
needed to change. In the first month of the next year (January 1368), Zhu formally announced
the establishment of the Ming dynasty and changed his reign title from Wu to Hongwu
(Abundantly Martial 洪武).
96
According to the Chinese cyclical thinking, revival and prosperity
will emerge after chaos. Zhu’s establishment of his new dynasty after the chaotic dingwei Sheep
year suggested that the chaos was over, and peace had come again.
In summary, in its circulation the Sheep Year Prophecy transformed from a prediction of
chaos breaking out in a dingwei Sheep year into a prediction of the rise of a Wu family state. I
argue that this transformation was probably manipulated by Zhu Yuanzhang or Zhang Shicheng.

95
Ge Yinliang 葛寅亮, Jinling fancha zhi, j. 3, p. 85. SKCM edition.
96
Mingtaizu shilu, j. 29, p. 0483.
148

In early 1367 Zhu Yuanzhang changed the Song state into the Wu state and adopted his reign
title Wu to fulfill the Wu family and state prophecy. His rival Zhang Shicheng had already
assumed the title Prince of Wu. In 1367, the two Wu states fought fiercely, and Zhu’s Wu state
finally conquered Zhang’s Wu state. In the middle of 1367, Zhu became the only ruler of Wu. By
manipulating the Sheep Year Prophecy and conquering Zhang Shicheng, Zhu constructed
himself as a ruler who had received the Mandate of Heaven.

New Narratives of Prophecies
It was a traditional practice in China that a new dynasty compiled an official history for the
previous one. The history would explain the reasons for the fall of the earlier regime and
justifications for the rise of the new. In early 1369, a year after the establishment of the Ming
dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang commissioned a group of scholars, with the prestigious Confucian
scholar Song Lian 宋濂 as the general director, to compile the official history of the Yuan
dynasty, the Yuanshi. After eight months of compilation, the project was suspended due to lack
of sources. Then Zhu dispatched several groups of scholars to different places throughout the
Ming empire to collect sources. In the second lunar month of 1370, the compilation project
resumed. In the seventh month of 1370, the compilation was finished.
97
The two phases of
compilation together lasted about one and a half years, the shortest time for any official history.
We can surmise Zhu Yuanzhang’s aim in ordering the hasty compilation of the Yuanshi. By
writing the official history of the Yuan, Zhu Yuanzhang demonstrated that the Mandate of the

97
For the compilation of the Yuanshi, see Chen Gaohua, “Yuanshi zuanxiu kao,” Chen Gaohua wenji, (Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu
chubanshe, 2005), pp. 469-491; Wang Shenrong, Yuanshi tanyuan, pp. 1-29; Chen Dezhi, Yuanshi yanjiu daolun, (Nanjing:
Nanjing daxue chubanshe, 2012), pp. 3-13.
149

Yuan had ended, and his newly founded Ming dynasty was an orthodox regime in the course of
Chinese history.
Although Song Lian nominally took charge of the task of compiling the history, Zhu
Yuanzhang dominated the whole process. Zhu determined every aspect of the book, including
the selection of materials, the organization of the book, and even the writing style of each
biography. Scholars concur that the content and narratives of the Yuanshi reflect Zhu
Yuanzhang’s purposes.
98
As the famous historian Chen Gaohua argues, “Indeed, Zhu Yuanzhang
was the real general director of the compilation group.”
99

Examples of Zhu’s influence on this book are manifold. Although many contemporary
private writings record Zhu’s participation in the Red Turban rebellion, the Yuanshi makes no
mention of it at all. On the contrary, the Yuanshi derogatively describes Han Lin’er’s Song state
as the “pseudo Song (weisong 偽宋)” and Han Lin’er as “the pseudo ruler (weizhu 偽主) .”
100

Also it denigrates Liu Futong, the de facto ruler of the Song state, as a sectarian (yaoren 妖人).
101

Furthermore, the Yuanshi anachronistically calls Zhu Yuanzhang’s bloc prior to the
establishment of the Ming dynasty in 1368 as “our Great Ming” so as to set it apart from the
Song state.
102

The record of the Sheep Year Prophecy in the Yuanshi signifies that Zhu Yuanzhang’s
attitude toward this prophecy changed. The Treatise of the Five Elements (Wuxing zhi 五行志)
in the Yuanshi includes the Sheep Year Prophecy. Unlike the private writing of the Gengshen

98
Chen Gaohua, “Yuanshi zuanxiukao,” Chen Gaohua wenji, p.4 69-490.
99
Chen Gaohua, “Yuanshi zuanxiukao,” Chen Gaohua wenji, p. 478.
100
Yuanshi, j. 141, p. 3387, p. 3397.
101
Yuanshi, j. 42, p. 891.
102
See Yuanshi, j. 46, p. 958, p. 966, p. 967; j. 47, p. 977.
150

waishi, which associates the Sheep Year Prophecy with Zhu’s Wu state and treats it as a
predictor of Zhu Yuanzhang receiving the Mandate of Heaven, the Yuanshi downplays its
importance. The Yuanshi simply states the time and content of the prophecy, without any
reference to its connections with Zhu Yuanzhang. After the prophecy, the authors of the Yuanshi
make a comment on it that “these prophecies are all poetic spirits (shiyao 詩妖).”
103

The “poetic spirit” is a specific term used in Chinese official histories in reference to
prophecies. This phrase is a neutral term without either positive or negative connotation.
104

According to Ban Gu (32-92), the author of the Hanshu, prophecies were indirect expressions of
the dissatisfaction of the multitude. “The lord is factious and tyrannical, and ministers shut their
mouths in fear of punishment. Then resentment will be expressed in the form of songs. Thus, the
poetic spirit emerges.”
105
The authors of the Yuanshi only regarded the Sheep Year Prophecy as
an expression of people’s resentment, but pointedly failed to highlight it as a symbol of Zhu
Yuanzhang’s Mandate from Heaven.
It is interesting to make a comparison between the comments on the Sheep Year Prophecy
in the Yuanshi and the comments made by Quan Heng in his Gengshen waishi. In these two
books, the texts of the prophecy are the same, but the comments are totally different. The
Yuanshi authors label the prophecy as a piece of the poetic spirit. But Quan Heng hails the
prophecy as a portent that Zhu Yuanzhang would receive the Mandate of Heaven.
106
Quan’s
interpretation seems to be more conducive to Zhu Yuanzhang’s image as the Heavenly mandated

103
Yuanshi, j. 51, p. 1107.
104
For details, see Sun Rongrong, “Chenyao yu shixue 讖謠與詩學,” Wenxue pinglun, 2011 (6): 164-171.
105
Ban Gu 班固, Hanshu 漢書, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962), j. 27, p. 1377.
106
Gengshen waishi, j. 1, p. 63.
151

ruler. Then, why did Zhu Yuanzhang choose to downplay the importance of this prophecy
considering that he had previously used it to defend his claims to legitimacy?
Zhu Yuanzhang’s choice can be seen as supporting the change in his role from a rebel
leader to the emperor of all China. As a rebel leader, Zhu could take advantage of the chaos of
Yuan society for his own sake. The bingwu and dingwei apocalyptical belief, as well as the
Sheep Year Prophecy, were useful tools to create chaos. As shown above, Zhu Yuanzhang and
Zhang Shicheng both sought to exploit the Sheep Year Prophecy to defend their respective
claims to legitimacy. But Zhu faced a different situation after his accession. His main task was to
bring stability to the multitude under his rule. Thus, the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptical belief
and the prophecies became dangerous to Zhu’s rule. According to the cyclical Chinese calendar,
chaos and turmoil would occur in every bingwu and dingwei period within each sixty-year cycle.
There was a possibility that some ambitious opportunists might use this apocalyptic belief to
overthrow his Ming dynasty 60 years later. Zhu could not allow such things to happen. As
discussed above, the Sheep Year Prophecy, based on the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic belief,
originally predicted that society would fall into chaos in a dingwei year. An emphasis on the
importance of the Sheep Year Prophecy in the Yuanshi would inevitably remind people of this
apocalyptic belief, which had become a subversive idea to Zhu’s rule. This might be the reason
that Zhu Yuanzhang covered up his manipulation of this Sheep Year Prophecy. This cover-up
can be seen as part of Zhu Yuanzhang’s greater campaign against prophecies. In 1372, Zhu
issued an edict that completely banned circulating any prophecy. Penalty for violating the ban
was severe. Anyone who created or circulated prophecies would be executed.
107

107
Daminglv, J. 8, p. 3.
152

Zhu’s change in his attitude toward prophecies was consistence with his policies toward
popular religion. During the war time of the late Yuan, Zhu served in the Red Turban army and
took advantage of Han Lin’er’s Song state to strengthen his own claims to legitimacy. Because
Han and other Red Turban leaders belonged to the White Lotus society and worshipped the
Buddha Maitreya, Zhu took a very friendly attitude toward these popular religions. But a few
months after his accession, Zhu issued an edict outlawing many popular religions, including the
White Lotus society, the Buddha Maitreya worship, Manichaeism, and others.
108
The reason
given by the Ming government for the ban was that these popular religions could delude the
masses. Similar to these messianic beliefs, the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptical belief also
posted a threat to Ming rule. By concealing his utilization of the apocalyptic belief and
manipulation of the Sheep Year Prophecy, Zhu could downplay its importance in the future.
The doctored text of the Yuanshi can also be associated with Zhu’s attempt to conceal his
subservience to Han Lin’er and his participation in the Red Turban rebellion. Zhu “placed a
taboo on talking about events during the Longfeng period 諱言龍鳳事.”
109
After his
enthronement, Zhu’s priority was to cultivate his image as a creator of a dynasty and a
lawgiver.
110
Talking about his manipulation of the Sheep Year Prophecy would inevitably reveal
his past in the Red Turban rebellion, and his subordinate role in the rebellion troop would
jeopardize his image-cultivation efforts. This might be a reason why Zhu chose to conceal his
manipulation of the Sheep Year Prophecy.

108
Wang Shizhen 王世貞, Mingqing jiji 名卿紀績, Mingdai zhuanji congkan edition, v. 42, j. 3, p. 2b.
109
Guochao qunxiong shilue, j. 1, p. 38; Wu Han, “Mingjiao yu damingdiguo”, Huweiyong dangankao, (Beijing: Shangwu
yinshugua, 2015), p. 117.
110
For Zhu’s efforts to construct himself as a law giver, see Edward Farmer, Zhu Yuanzhang and Early Ming Legislation, pp. 18-
32.
153

Zhu Yuanzhang’s efforts, however, did not conceal completely his connection with the
Sheep Year Prophecy. Both the mid-Ming scholar Huang Yu 黃瑜 (1426-1497) and the late
Ming scholar Qian Qianyi cited the Sheep Year Prophecy in their works, arguing that this
prophecy symbolized that Zhu Yuanzhang would receive the Mandate of Heaven.
111
It indicates
that Quan Heng’s interpretation of the prophecy continued to exert influence in later literature,
and Zhu’s efforts to conceal his connection with the prophecy was in vain.

Conclusion
During the Southern Song dynasty, an apocalyptic belief emerged, suggesting that chaos and
disasters would take place in bingwu and dingwei years. Although connections between these
two years and actual disasters and chaos taking place was far-fetched, prominent Song scholars
like Chen Liang, Hong Mai, and Chai Wang all held this belief and introduced it in their personal
works. This trope persisted into later periods. During the Yuan, scholars used these two years in
reference in particular to the Jingkang Incident and in general to various chaos and disasters in
their writings. Also, during the Yuan anonymous writers supplemented Chai Wang’s Bingding
guijian, a book designed to elaborate on the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic belief. During the
Qing period, elite Confucian scholars, like compilers of the Siku quanshu, criticized this belief as
deluding, but this belief has still exerted its influence among the masses to the present day.
From the perspective of this apocalyptic belief, two widely-reported prophecies that
emerged during the Yuan can be reexamined. These two prophecies were later cited by Ming
scholars like Lang Ying, Quan Heng, and Qian Qianyi as evidence that Zhu Yuanzhang was

111
Huang Yu, Shuanghuai suichao, j. 1, p. 1. Congsu jicheng edition; Qian Qianyi, “Taizu shilu bianzheng,” Chuxueji, p. 2098.
154

destined to receive the Mandate of Heaven. This chapter shows that initially these two
prophecies did not point to the rise of Zhu Yuanzhang but predicted that the Yuan would fall into
chaos during the bingwu Horse year and the dingwei Sheep year. In the case of the Horse Year
Prophecy, Ming scholar Lang Ying reinterpreted it, connecting it with the rise of Zhu
Yuanzhang. No evidence shows that Zhu Yuanzhang ever made use of it during his career. In the
case of the Sheep Year Prophecy, its meaning was transformed through puns from predicting that
Yuan society would fall into chaos during the dingwei Sheep year to the prediction of the rise of
a state named Wu in that year.
The bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic belief provides clues to linking some big events of the
Yuan-Ming transition, which otherwise seem unrelated to one another. Han Lin’er, Zhu
Yuanzhang’s former overlord who was under house arrest by Zhu in the mid-1360s, died
mysteriously in a boat accident in the end of the bingwu Horse year. This timing was helpful in
allaying the suspicion that Zhu might have murdered Han. Zhu established his State of Wu on
the first day of the dingwei Sheep year. This political act fulfilled what the Sheep Year Prophecy
had foretold and further cultivated Zhu’s image as a ruler mandated by Heaven. These events and
Zhu’s timing facilitated Zhu’s efforts to construct his political legitimacy.
Zhu Yuanzhang, however, concealed his use of these apocalyptic beliefs and prophecies
after his accession to the throne. While private writings record the Sheep Year Prophecy as a
good omen for Zhu Yuanzhang’s Mandate from Heaven, the Yuanshi, the editing of which was
dominated by Zhu, makes no mention of the connection between Zhu’s rise and prophecies. This
reflects a change in his legitimation strategy. After becoming the emperor of the Ming dynasty,
Zhu Yuanzhang sought to eliminate any potential threat to his rule. He not only concealed his
use of prophecies, but also banned circulating any form of prophecies on pain of death. He also
155

outlawed the practice of popular religions associated with the White Lotus sect and belief in the
Maitreya Buddha, which he thought of as dangerous to his rule.
This research demonstrates that manipulation of factors such as ethnic tensions, popular
religion, apocalyptic beliefs, and prophecies played a vital role in the construction of political
legitimacy during the Yuan-Ming transition. It also suggests that we have to consider a wide
range of similar factors when analyzing the construction of political legitimacy by imperial
regimes and rebel leaders in pre-modern China and elsewhere.

156

Chapter IV: Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy
This chapter, containing four sections, examines the relationship between ethnicity and political
legitimacy in Yuan and early Ming China. In the first section, I will review a debate among
Chinese scholars in the past century over the role of ethnicity in the Yuan-Ming transition. It
shows that the prevailing and official narrative in mainland China is that ethnicity was not a
factor affecting the course of the Yuan-Ming transition. I, however, will problematize this
narrative in the following sections. In the second section, I will move to a textual analysis of the
term beiren ( 北人 lit. “northerner”). I argue that in late Yuan and early Ming literature, the term
beiren, in some cases, specifically refers to the Mongol people, and sometimes it generally refers
to northerners. This helps to better understand contents concerning ethnicity in some Yuan and
Ming texts. In the third section, I will discuss how the Chinese rebels selectively utilized
Confucian ideas relating to ethnicity to challenge the political legitimacy of the Mongol-Yuan. In
the last section, I will analyze some stories about ethnic tensions circulating in the late Yuan, and
look at how these stories fueled fear of the Mongols among Han Chinese. This chapter argues
that ethnicity was an important factor during the Yuan-Ming transition.

Ethnicity or Not? Debates among Chinese Scholars over the Yuan-Ming Transition
In the twentieth century, the history of the Yuan-Ming transition became a hot topic of debate
among Chinese historians with studies focusing on the nature of the Yuan-Ming transition. These
scholars used terminologies and concepts different from those used in current western academic
circles. First, they used the word geming 革命 (revolution) to describe the Yuan-Ming dynastic
157

change. Second, the debate revolved around the question of whether the Yuan-Ming Revolution
元明革命 was a national revolution (minzu geming 民族革命) or a class revolution (jieji geming
階級革命). Although the Chinese word minzu (民族 nationality) cannot be equivalent to the
word ethnicity in the western academic context, a review of this debate sheds some light on
Chinese understandings of the relationship between the Yuan-Ming transition, ethnicity, and
class struggle.
The first president of the Republic of China, Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), was representative
of the opinion that the Yuan-Ming transition was a national revolution. In a speech he gave in
1906, Sun claimed that “Ming Taizu expelled the Mongols and restored China. [He]
accomplished the national revolution” 明太祖驅除蒙古，恢復中國. 民族革命已經做成了.
1
In
another speech, Sun praised Zhu as “the big great man of the Chinese national revolution.”
2

After he was sworn in as president of the Republic of China in 1911, Sun led his cabinet
members to Zhu Yuanzhang’s mausoleum, the Xiaoling Mausoleum, to offer sacrifices,
regarding himself as a successor of Zhu Yuanzhang in the cause of restoring China.
Not only politicians, but also scholars held this opinion. The renowned scholar specializing
in Qing history, Jin Yufu 金毓黼 (1887-1962), describes the establishment of the Ming dynasty
as “the national restoration movement of the Han people” 漢族的複國運動.
3
He argues that
“Ming Taizu overthrew Mongol rule and restored the Han nation. He was also a national hero of

1
Sun Zhongshan, “Zaidongjing minbao chuangkanzhounian qingzhudahuide yuanshuo” 在東京《民報》創刊周年慶祝大會的
演說, Sun Zhongshan quanji, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981, p. 325. Some of following summaries are based on Liu Pujiang,
“Yuan Ming geming de minzu zhuyi xiangxiang,” Zhongguoshi yanjiu, 2014:3, pp. 79-82.
2
Minbao 民报, June 26, 1906.
3
Jin Yufu, Zhongguo shi, Chongqing: Zhengzhong shuju, 1942, p. 77; p. 79.
158

us.”
4
Another famous scholar Lü Simian 呂思勉（1884-1957） had the same understanding. In
his influential book The General History of China ( 中國通史 Zhongguo tongshi), Lü entitled the
chapter about the Yuan-Ming transition as “the cause of Han national restoration.”
5

There was, however, another opinion concerning the “nature” of the Yuan-Ming transition.
In his 1936 paper on the fall of the Yuan empire, historian Wu Han 吳晗 challenges the national
revolution narrative. “The motive [of the rebellions against the Yuan] was that people could not
bear the economic and political oppression and demanded a change of state. They finally used
the slogan of the national revolution.”
6
Wu Han argues that the wars between the Yuan and the
rebels were in essence a class struggle between peasants and landlords.
7
Wu’s argument was
supported by Meng Siming 蒙思明 (1908-1974), who systematically examined Yuan society
from a class struggle perspective. By analyzing the causes and goals of the rebels and also the
background of the rebel leaders, Meng holds that the “Yuan-Ming Revolution” was a social
revolution instigated by class struggle.
8

Historian Qian Mu’s 錢穆 (1895-1990) shifting view on this topic is worth mentioning. In
his 1939 book An Outline of National History 國史大綱, Qian analyzed the Yuan-Ming
transition from a Han nationalist perspective, arguing that the importance of the Yuan-Ming
transition was “sweeping out the barbarian dust and restoring the old land 掃除胡塵光復故土.”
9

4
Jin Yufu, Zhongguo shi, p. 79.
5
Lü Simian, Zhongguo tongshi, V ol.2, (Chongqing: Kaiming shudian, 1944), pp. 500-503.
6
Wu Han, “Yuandiguozhi pengkui yumingzhi jianguo” 元帝國之崩潰與明之建國, in Wuhan shixue lunwenji, vol.2, (Beijing:
Renmin chubanshe, 1986), pp. 81-138.
7
Wu Han, “Yuandiguozhi pengkui yumingzhi jianguo,” pp. 81-138.
8
Meng Siming, Yuandai shehui jieji zhidu, (Beijing, Zhonghuashuju, 1980), p. 226; p. 233.
9
Qian Mu, Guoshi dagang, (Beijing: Shangwu chubanshe, 1996), p. 12.
159

But in his 1964 book, Qian showed an understanding of the Yuan-Ming transition completely
different from his previous one. He relates:
It was a dramatic change in Chinese history that the barbarian Yuan came to rule. The
Yuan fought and conquered brutally, and their institutions and governance changed
fundamentally. It was unprecedented that the whole territory of China fell under the rule of
aliens. Within a hundred years, rebels arose in all four directions. Ming Taizu was the only
one after Gaozu of the Han who rose from an ordinary person to the Son of Heaven.
History readers can not help praising expelling the barbarians and restoring China. And
during that period, how joyful the mood must have been both at court and in society. But
after examining facts of that time, [I find that] what was in the minds of intellectual
gentlemen and the ministers who followed Zhu Yuanzhang was largely different from that
which later history readers expect.
胡元入主，最為中國史上驚心動魄一大變，元人用兵得國之殘暴，其立制行政之多
劇變，而中國全境淪於異族統治之下，亦為前史所未遇。未及百年，亂者四起，明
祖以平民崛起為天子，為漢高以下所僅有，讀史者豈不曰驅除胡虜，重不中華，其
在當時，上下歡欣鼓舞之情當如何？而夷考其實，當時群士大夫之心情，乃及一時
從龍佐命諸臣，其內心所蘊，乃有大不如後人讀史者之所想像。
10

Qian Mu was frustrated after reading personal writings by Liu Ji, Song Lian, Hu Han, and other
learned officials of the early Ming, who supported Zhu Yuanzhang’s cause during the rebellion
and later served in the Ming court as important officials. Qian had expected to find in his reading

10
Qian Mu, “Du Mingchu kaiguo zhuchen shiwenji” 讀明初開國諸臣詩文集, Zhongguo xueshu sixiangshi luncong, vol.6,
(Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2009), p. 86.
160

evidence of the elated mood these intellectuals exhibited after the Mongols were expelled and
Chinese rule was restored. To his disappointment, however, he did not find any trace of evidence
that such an elated mood existed. On the contrary, Qian noted that many of these officials
serving in the new dynasty shared a strong sense of nostalgia for the Yuan. Qian pointed out that
these intellectual officials’ nostalgic feelings towards the Yuan was in conflict with Confucian
principles.
11

Qian’s conclusion was made on the basis of textual analysis and thus his arguments sound
stronger than those of other scholars. Other contemporary works, no matter whether they support
the national revolution or the class struggle arguments, were greatly influenced by the political
background of the authors. Jin Yufu and Lü Simian were both Chinese nationalists, and it is no
wonder they thought of the Yuan-Ming transition as a national revolution.
12
Wu Han and Meng
Siming were experts in Marxist theory, and thus they examined this topic through a Marxist
lens.
13
But both sides failed to provide strong evidence to support their argument.
Qian’s finding is so influential that some Chinese scholars, based on this argument, have
recently developed a new narrative of the Yuan-Ming transition, arguing that no ethnic
confrontation was involved in the Yuan-Ming transition. Chinese scholars Liu Pujiang 劉浦江
and Yao Dali 姚大力 are representatives of this new narrative. They claim that the Yuan-Ming
transition was a normal dynastic change that was no different from other dynastic shifts like the
Qin-Han or Sui-Tang transitions. Yao argues that nationalism did not exist in premodern China.
Most Han Chinese were culturists who believed that if alien rulers could accept Han culture, the
Han people would not oppose their rule. Yao also argues that the war between the Mongols and

11
Qian Mu, “Du mingchu kaiguo zhuchen shiwenji,” p. 197.
12
See Jin Yufu, Zhongguo shi, p. 97; Lü Simian, Zhongguo tongshi, p. 500.
13
See Wu Han, “Yuandiguozhi bengkui yumingzhi jianguo,” pp. 81-138; Meng Siming, Yuandai shehui jieji zhidu, p. 226.
161

the Southern Song dynasty was perceived by contemporary people as fighting between different
interest groups under the same Heaven. Yao holds that the Yuan-Ming transition was only a
normal dynastic change.
14

Liu Pujiang seeks to examine why and how the modern view that regards the Yuan-Ming
transition as a national revolution developed historically. He attributes this notion to two reasons.
First, Liu argues that the Mongol threat during the late Ming augmented the tensions between the
Han and the Mongols. During that time, the memory of the conquest of the Mongols by Zhu
Yuanzhang was revived among Ming intellectuals. They projected mid-Ming ethnic tensions
between the Han and the Mongols back into the Yuan-Ming transition and reinterpreted this
transition as an ethnic confrontation (national revolution) which had led to the Han conquest of
the Mongols.
15
Liu also argues that the anti-Manchu movement in the 19
th
century also
contributed to the formation of the understanding that the Yuan-Ming transition was a national
revolution. According to Liu, Sun Yat-sen and his colleagues took the establishment of the Ming
as a successful predecessor of the anti-Manchu movement to boost people’s confidence in
fighting the Qing. Thus, they deliberately labeled the Yuan-Ming transition as a national
revolution during which time the Han people successfully overthrew their alien Mongol rulers.
16

Yao and Liu’s seemingly new arguments are consistent with the change of Chinese official
narratives of premodern Chinese history. In an analysis of the different versions of history
textbooks published in China between the 1950s and the early 21
st
century, Nimrod Baranovitch
argues that “Chinese history textbooks in China display a clear evolution from an exclusive

14
Yao Dali, “Zhongguo lishi shangde minzu guanxi heguojia rentong” 中國歷史上的民族關係和國家認同, in Yao Dali ed.,
Beifang minzushi shilun, Nanning: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2007, p. 265.
15
Liu Pujiang, “Yuan Ming gemingde minzu zhuyi xiangxiang,” Zhongguoshi yanjiu, 2014:3, pp. 82-85.
16
Liu Pujiang, “Yuan Ming gemingde minzu zhuyi xiangxiang,” pp. 85-87.
162

historiography, in which the non-Han peoples constitute non-Chinese others, to an inclusive,
multi-ethnic historiography, in which these people are fully incorporated into the Chinese self.”
17

One example Baranovitch gives is Yue Fei 岳飛 (1103-1142), the Southern Song Han general
who fought against the Jurchens. Baranovitch notes that in recently complied history textbooks,
Yue Fei has been downgraded from his previous status as a Chinese national hero 民族英雄.
According to these textbooks, both the Han and the Jurchens were two subgroups within the
Chinese nation as a whole, and their fight had nothing to do with the Chinese national interest.
Consequently, Yue Fei is disqualified from the status of “national hero.”
18

Yao and Liu’s papers came out in a context where the Chinese official narrative places all
minorities, including the Mongols, as subgroups of the Chinese nation. Accordingly, the Yuan
and the rebels only represented different interest groups within the same Chinese nation, and the
fall of the Yuan and the establishment of the Ming was a change of ruling groups, a normal
dynastic change.
In sum, the Chinese scholarship about the Yuan-Ming transition has been, to a large extent,
politically oriented. Qian Mu was the exceptional historian who read primary sources and
reported on something that surprised and disappointed him; but his findings were reincorporated
into the historiography by politically-motivated scholars. The major concern of most historians
was to examine whether the Yuan-Ming transition was a national revolution or a class
revolution. Most recently the prevailing argument has changed to justify the idea of a normal
dynastic shift. As mentioned above, the research and arguments have been quite in line with the

17
Nimrod Baranovitch, “Others No More: The Changing Representation of Non-Han Peoples in Chinese History Textbooks,
1951-2003,” Journal of Asian Studies, 69(1), p. 89.
18
Nimrod Baranovitch, “Others No More,” pp. 105-109.
163

change in the overall narrative of Chinese history produced by the Chinese government. In the
following sections of this chapter, however, I will discuss the significant ethnic roots of the anti-
Yuan rebellions.

Beiren as an Ethnic Term in Late Yuan and Early Ming Texts
The different meanings of the term beiren 北人 (literally “northerners”) in various contexts
matter in the understanding of Yuan-Ming texts. In some Yuan-Ming texts, the term beiren
specifically refers to the Mongols. With this understanding, I argue that some documents
concerning the Yuan-Ming transition have strong ethnic connotations.
In Chinese historical documents, it is not unusual that geographical concepts are used to
convey ethnic meanings. This tradition can be traced back to the Spring and Autumn period and
earlier, during which time Han 漢 or Hua-Xia 華夏 people used geographic terms such as Dong
Yi ( 東夷 Eastern Yi people) and Bei Di ( 北狄 Northern Yi people) to refer to non-Han groups
living around China.
19
These geographic and ethnic terms in Chinese documents sometimes
contain both geographic and ethnic meanings in reference to groups of people, but sometimes
they refer specifically to certain ethnic groups. The term beiren in Yuan and Ming texts is an
example.
In some Yuan texts, the term beiren is used as a general term in reference to various peoples
who lived in the north or came from the north. These people might include the Mongols, the
Semu people, and sometimes the Han people who lived in the north. For example, the early Yuan

19
See the “Wangzhi” passage of the Liji; the “Yaolue” passage in the Huainanzi; For English literature about it, see Nicola Di
Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, esp. pp. 1-5, 93-104.
164

scholar Fang Hui 方回 (1227-1307) used fruits produced in the North and South to demonstrate
the wrong ideas held by northerners and southerners about one another. Fang pointed out that
only raisins were available to the southerners (nanren), not fresh grapes, and only preserved, not
fresh, lychee was available to the northerners (beiren). But these people took the taste of these
preserved fruits as their true taste.
20
In this text Fang Hui used nanren and beiren in reference to
Southerners and Northerners in general.
Yuan legal documents also contain similar expressions in contexts of appointing personnel,
punishing criminals, and registering households. The early Yuan government often chose
officials born in south China to serve in north China and chose officials born in the north to serve
in the south. According to the southern official Cheng Jufu 程钜夫 (1249-1318), the reason for
this practice was that southern officials were unfamiliar with the regulations and procedures of
the Yuan government. Southern officials could learn to become familiar with the workings of the
government by serving in the north.
21
But some northern officials were not willing to go to south
China and often refused to assume positions in the south. Thus, in an imperial memorial Cheng
Jufu suggested that “northerners (beiren) who were ordered to fill the vacant positions in the
south but failed to take up the positions should be severely punished 其北人注南缺而不赴者，
重與罪過.”
22
Here these northerners included the Mongols, the Semu people, and Han officials.
In the judicial system the Yuan government also adopted the practice of moving criminals
from their homelands. The mid-Yuan scholar Su Tianjue 蘇天爵 (1294-1352) records:

20
“ 南人于涼之蒲萄，北人於閩之荔枝，咀其枯臘以為美在是矣” Fang Hui, Tongjiangji, yuandaizhenben wenji huikan 元代
珍本文集彙刊 edition, j. 1, p. 42.
21
Cheng Jufu, Xuelou ji, Yuandai Zhenben wenji huikan edition, j. 10, p. 390.
22
Cheng Jufu, Xuelou ji, j. 10, p. 390.
165

Previously, people who committed crimes would be moved out of their native areas.
Northerners would be moved to Guanghai [Guangdong and Hainan]; southerners would be
moved to Liaodong. These places were ten thousand li away from their homes. They had to
experience miasma, coldness, and bitterness. Some of them died on the way.
23

先時有罪移鄉者，北人則居廣海，南人則居遼東。去家萬裡，涉瘴鬁寒苦，往往僨
于道路。
In this text, the meaning of “northerners” mainly is that of Han people who had committed
crimes. It is hard to say whether in this passage “northerners” included the Mongols. But it is
certain that beiren here does not specifically refer to the Mongols.
In texts about household registration, the term beiren mainly refers to those families that
had moved from the north to the south. These beiren households included Semu as well as Han
households. Within the Semu households, people were classified into subgroup households such
as the Mongol household, the Uighur household, the Khitan household, the Huihui household,
and the Hexi [Tangut] household.
24
The term beiren hu 北人戶 in these household registration
texts reflects the general understanding of the term beiren as various northern peoples. It
includes all the Mongols, the Semu, and the Han people who came from the north.
But in some other Yuan and Ming texts the word beiren specifically means the Mongols. Ye
Ziqi (1327-1390) used the term beiren in this way in his book Caomuzi:

23
Su Tianjue, Zixi wengao, punctuated by Chen Gaohua & Meng Fanqing, Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, j. 23, p. 386.
24
See Funada Yoshiyuki 船田善之, “Semuren yu Yuandai zhidu shehui zhongxin tantao menggu semu hanren nanren huafen de
weizhi,” Mengguxue xinxi, 2003:2, p. 8.
166

Generally speaking, the beiren were unspoiled and tended to whole-heartedly listen to
people. Thus, when Shizu [Khubilai] conquered all under heaven, [he] relied on the
enlightening and nurturing power of Master Yao Shu, Master Xu Heng and other worthies
in carrying out governance of the empire. Their humanity was deep; their benefits were
heavy and endless. Unfortunately, the emperor was following the Way, but [Wang]
Wentong mixed the Way with the way of clerks and used clerks to contain them [Yao and
Xu]. Although this action was able to prevent the beiren from abusing power, the
effectiveness of true Confucians was blocked and not fulfilled.
大抵北人性簡直，類能傾心以聽於人。故世祖既得天下，卒賴姚樞牧菴先生、許衡
魯齋先生諸賢啟沃之力。及施治於天下，深仁累澤，浹於元元。惜乎王以道，文統
行吏道以雜之，以文案牽制。雖足以防北人之恣肆之奸，而真儒之效，遂有所窒而
不暢矣.
25

In this text, Ye Zhiqi talks about the role of Confucians in the early Yuan court under Khubilai’s
reign. Ye argues that Khubilai trusted Confucians like Yao Shu (1203-1280) and Xu Heng
(1209-1281), and as a result the governance went well. However, the powerful minister Wang
Wentong (1190-1262) used clerks to contain the influence of these Confucians, keeping them
from fulfilling their true function. In this text, beiren is used twice in reference only to Mongols.
The Caomuzi also contains other passages that use beiren to refer to Mongols. These
passages are as follows:

25
Caomuzi, p. 47.
167

For the luxurious dresses of the beiren, the cap is topped with gold, and the waist is
encircled with [golden] threads, and the shoes are decorated with gems like goose [eggs].
26

北人華靡之服，帽則金其頂，襖則線其腰，靴則鵝其頂.
Here the beiren dress refers to the traditional dress of the Mongol people. Another example
reads:
Beiren are not able to recognize characters. When they are invested as chief officials or
when chief officials are not available, [they need to] sign documents, judgements, and to
write dates. They wrote the character 七 by turning the hook to the left rather than to the
right. People who saw this all burst into laughter.
27

北人不識字。使之為長官或缺正官，要題判署事及寫日子。七字鉤不從右七而從左
轉，見者為笑.
Here Ye Ziqi ridicules those Mongol officials who could not read and write Chinese characters.
Even when writing the simple character 七, they would make a ridiculous mistake. The beiren in
this text refers to those illiterate Mongol officials.
When the beiren slaughter calves, they open up a hole on the back and take out bones and
meat from within. The skin is still whole. After being softened, the skin can be used to
contain milk and milk wine. This is called huntuo.
28

26
Caomuzi, p. 61.
27
Caomuzi, p. 83.
28
Caomuzi, p. 85.
168

北人殺小牛，自脊上開一孔，逐旋取去內頭骨肉，外皮皆完。揉軟用以盛乳酪酒
湩，謂之渾脫。
Here Ye Ziqi describes the Mongols’ way of slaughtering animals. This way of slaughtering
calves and sheep was only practiced by the Mongol people, as evidenced by Khubilai Khan’s
1276 edict outlawing slitting sheep as practiced by Muslims and instead ordering Muslims to
follow this Mongol way of slaughtering.
29
It is certain that the beiren here refers only to
Mongols.
There were other Yuan authors who also used beiren to refer to the Mongols. The late Yuan
scholar Kong Qi (active 1360s) recorded a poem composed by renowned poet Jie Xisi 揭溪斯
(1274-1344), which satirized the Mongols and Semu people.
Jie Manshuo, a member of the Imperial Academy (hanlin 翰林) once wrote a poem titled The
Colophon to the Wild Geese Painting. It reads: “Feeling cold, they go to Jiangnan to get
warm; feeling hungry, they go to Jiangnan to get fed. Everything comes from Jiangnan, but
they do not appreciate Jiangnan.” This poem satirizes these Semu people and beiren who
came to Jiangnan. There the poor became rich, and the penniless became wealthy, but they
constantly disparaged the South. Conceiving themselves as nobles, they regarded the
southerners as slaves. But southerners also despised these beiren even more deeply. Thus,
this kind of derision frequently appeared.
30

29
Yuan dianzhang, j.57, p.1894; Also see Francis Woodman Cleaves, “Rescript of Qubilai Prohibiting the Slaughtering of
Animals by Slitting the Throat”, Journal of Turkish Studies, 1992 (16): 67-89.
30
Kong Qi, Zhizheng zhiji, (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1987), j. 3, p. 111.
169

豫章揭翰林曼碩《題雁圖》雲，‘寒向江南暖，饑向江南飽。物物是江南，不道江南
好。’蓋譏色目、北人來江南者，貧可富，無可有，而猶毀辱駡南方不絕，自以為右
族身貴，視南方如奴隸。然南人亦視北人加輕一等，所以往往有此誚.
In this text, Jie Xisi ridiculed those nobles who came to Jiangnan to get benefits by likening them
to wild geese. It is noteworthy that the Semu people were set apart from beiren. As we know, the
privileged people in the Yuan included the Mongols and the Semu people. Since here the Semu
people do not belong to beiren, here beiren can only mean Mongols.
This meaning of the term beiren as the Mongols facilitates the understanding of ethnic
connotations in some Yuan Ming texts. Although some texts make no mention of ethnic issues,
the information they provide makes it possible to appreciate the existence of ethnic markers. For
example, Ye Ziqi made a comment on the reasons for the fall of the Yuan:
The only way to rule the land under Heaven is to be ultimately impartial. With impartiality,
the Hu and Yue people can become a family. With partiality, the Chu and Yue will be
[separated] like the liver and the gallbladder. This is why ancient sages conceived the whole
land under Heaven as a family, and conceived all the central states ( 中國 zhongguo) as a
person. After unification, the Yuan tended to favor the northern country and disfavor the
central state, and to favor northerners and disfavor southerners. It resulted in deep isolation
and strict exclusion. By inappropriate precaution, they thought they had understood the way
of favoring and disfavoring. Thus the benevolence of the emperor could hardly reach to the
south; a triple measure of kindness was given to the north. Consequently, Jiangnan became
extremely poor, and saibei (north of the forts) became excessively rich, as can be seen in the
170

statements of the false imperial proclamation. Now the will of Heaven has completely
shifted to the south. The reasons for the change can be seen here.
31

治天下之道，至公而已爾。公則胡越一家，私則肝膽楚越。此古聖人所以視天下為一
家，中國為一人也。元朝自混一以來，大抵皆內北國而外中國，內北人而外南人。以
至深閉固拒，曲為防護，自以為得親疏之道。是以王澤之施，少及于南；滲漉之恩，
悉歸於北。故貧極江南，富稱塞北，見於偽詔之所雲也。迄今天祿之遷，盡歸於南，
於此可以見乘除勝複之理也.
Ye attributes the fall of the Yuan to its different treatment of its different subjects. Instead of
using ethnic terms like the Mongols and the Han, Ye only uses some geographic terms like the
northern country 北國, the central state 中國, the northerners 北人, southerners 南人, Jiangnan
江南 and saibei 塞北. However, these geographic terms also contain ethnic meanings. The
sentence “to favor northerners and disfavor southerners” does not mean that the Yuan favored
all people living in the north. As we know, many Han people in the north lived under bad
conditions. As discussed above, northerners (beiren) should be understood as the Mongols in
many Yuan texts. Accordingly, here the southerners (nanren) also should be understood broadly
as Han people. The true meaning of this sentence is that the Yuan government favored the
Mongols but meanwhile discriminated against the Han people. And, the two words “Jiangnan”
and “saibei” cannot be literally understood in the sense of their geographical meanings. After
Khubilai’s accession to the throne, the Mongol-Yuan empire moved its focus from the steppe to
north China, with Dadu as its power center. The sentence that “Jiangnan became extremely poor
and saibei became excessively rich” does not mean that the steppe area was becoming

31
Caomuzi, p.55.
171

excessively rich. This sentence is an allegory that means the Han people in the Jiangnan area
were becoming poor and the Mongols in the north were becoming rich. Thus Ye’s argument in
this passage is that the Yuan failed because it favored the Mongols and disfavored the Han
people.
The meaning of beiren as the Mongols helps to understand a prophecy that circulated in the
1360s. According to the Yuanshi, in the sixth lunar month of 1368 when the Ming army was
approaching Dadu, a pagoda in the Tianning Temple in Zhende 真德 Circuit (Modern-day
Anyang, Henan) changed its color of black to red. The pagoda looked like a bar of iron that was
just taken from a melting pot. The top of the pagoda seemed to be burning with flames. This
strange event reminded people of a children’s song that circulated in the area north of the Yellow
River earlier. The prophecy stated: “The pagoda is black, the northerners are the hosts and the
southerners are the guests; the pagoda is red, the people in vermilion dress will be the hosts.”
32

塔兒黑，北人作主南人客；塔兒紅，朱衣人作主人公.
In this text the host and the guest respectively refer to those people who ruled China and
those who were governed. The prophecy predicted that when the pagoda was black, the
northerners would rule China and the southerners would become the governed subjects. Here it is
clear that the northerners refer to the Mongols because only the Mongols were the ruling group
of the Yuan. And the meaning of southerners here is not limited to the nanren category that was
used in reference to the Han Chinese in the Jiangnan area in the early Yuan. The usage of nanren
here is the same as in the above-mentioned passage of Ye Ziqi. It refers to all the Han Chinese
because the Han people in the north were also the subjects of the Yuan empire. Thus, the

32
Yuanshi, j. 51, p. 1103.
172

meaning of the prophecy is that when the pagoda was black, the Mongols would rule China and
the Han Chinese would become subjects; when the pagoda was red, people in vermilion dress
would rule China. In this context, the people in vermilion dress could refer to the Red Turbans in
general or Zhu Yuanzhang in particular. The Red Turbans were known to wear red coats and red
turbans. Zhu Yuanzhang was subservient to the Red Turban Song state for twelve years.
Furthermore, his surname Zhu in the Chinese context has a meaning of the vermilion color. This
prophecy is a prediction that the Yuan would fall, and Han rebels in vermillion dress would
restore Chinese rule.
Currently some scholarship in English still treats the word beiren as a general term in
reference to all peoples in the north, leading to misreading of texts. In his research about the
evolution of the concept Hanren, Mark Elliott argues:
We can say, I think, that for the Mongols, Han was synonymous with Beiren, “Northerner.”
It was a supra-ethnic rubric, reminiscent of the encompassing category Hua introduced by
the Northern Wei, except that, unlike Hua, it did not include everyone in the empire; there
were limits, and former Southern Song subjects were outside those limits (as were, of
course, Mongols and Semu, too). In sum, then, in the Yuan, Nanren meant “Chinese” and
Hanren meant “Northerner.”
33

Mark Elliott’s argument reflects the general understanding of beiren as northerner. Elliott is right
in the point that during the early Yuan Hanren or Han’er ren was a general term referring to all
the peoples living in the former Jin territory. But his understanding is incomplete. As shown

33
Mark Elliott, “Hu Shuo: The Northern Other and the Naming of the Han Chinese,” in Thomas Mullaney et al, ed., Critical Han
Studies: The History, Representation, and Identity of China’s Majority, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), pp. 187-
188.
173

above, beiren specifically refers to the Mongols in some Yuan and Ming texts. Also, in some
cases, nanren refers to the Han Chinese as a whole. In this paper, Elliott misunderstands the
meaning of beiren and nanren in the late Yuan and early Ming texts.
34

In sum, the meaning of beiren varies in different Yuan and Ming texts, referring sometimes
to all northerners and sometimes only to the Mongols. This helps us better understand ethnic
connotations of some of these texts. The meaning and connotation of beiren, as well as nanren,
should be examined in particular contexts, as I will do in the next section.

Ethnic Rhetoric Used by the Rebels
During the Red Turban rebellions (1351-1367), the rebels often used ethnic rhetoric to help
instigate the rebellion. They often called the Mongols Hu 胡, Yi 夷, and Man 蠻, which all
suggest the idea of “barbarians,” and they called themselves Hua 華 or Xia 夏.
35
These rebels
claimed that China could only be ruled by Chinese and the ethnic identity of the Mongols
disqualified them from ruling China. By emphasizing the Mongol’s ethnic difference from that
of Han Chinese, the rebels sought to undermine the political legitimacy of the Yuan. Not only
did the Northern and Southern Red Turbans use this ethnic rhetoric, but their two branch
regimes, the Zhu Yuanzhang and Ming Yuzhen regimes, also utilized this rhetoric.
Despite the sparsity of the existing sources about the Northern Red Turbans, a piece of
evidence preserved in Korean sources sheds some light on how they used ethnic rhetoric to
attract support. In 1359 the Red Turban army led by Master Guan conquered Manchuria, and

34
E.g. Mark Elliott, “Hu Shuo: The Northern Other and the Naming of the Han Chinese,” p. 188.
35
For the changing ideas about Yi-Di and Hua-Xia prior to the Yuan, see Shao-Yun Yang, Reinventing the Barbarian: Rhetorical
and Philosophical Uses of the Yi-Di in Mid-Imperial China, 600–1300. Ph.D. dissertation, UC Berkeley, 2014.
174

prepared to invade Korea. Before their invasion, the Red Turbans issued a proclamation,
explaining why they rebelled against the Yuan and urging the Korea government to surrender.
This proclamation states:
Aggrieved that the people have long fallen under the Hu (Mongols), we have taken up the
righteous cause and raised troops in order to recover the Central Plain. To the east, we have
moved beyond the Shandong region; to the west we have gone beyond Chang’an; to the
south, we have passed beyond Fujian and Guangdong; to the north we have reached the
Capital Region. All have joined us in good faith, like the starving who receive meat and
grain or the ill who happen upon medicine. We have now ordered our generals to strictly
prohibit their solders from disturbing the people. We will succor those people who join us;
we will chastise those who resist in battle.
36

慨念生民，久陷於胡。倡義舉兵，恢復中原。東逾齊魯，西出函秦，南過閩廣，北抵
幽燕，悉皆款附。如饑者之得膏粱，如病者之遇藥石。
Here, the Red Turbans justified their rebellions by calling the Mongols Hu 胡, a disparaging term
for the northern nomads, and by describing their actions as restoring China (Zhongyuan). This
proclamation sends a strong message of ethnic tensions. The Red Turbans did not accuse the
Yuan of any wrongdoing, but declared that Mongol rule was unacceptable. The rationale behind
the proclamation was that the Han Chinese could not be ruled by the Mongols. It is noteworthy
that the target of this proclamation was the Korean court, members of which were not ethnically
Chinese. It shows that in the eyes of the Red Turbans, the Mongols also had no legitimacy to rule
Korea. As David Robinson argues, “This inclusive rhetoric was a logical extension of Confucian

36
Koryŏsa, j. 38; Also see Robinson, Empire’s Twilight, p. 147.
175

political philosophy.”
37
Robinson’s point echoes my argument in Chapter I and II that the Red
Turban movement contained many Confucian elements. It is also worth mentioning that the Red
Turbans described their domain as including the territory of both the Northern Red Turbans and
the Southern Red Turbans. It seems that the Red Turbans regarded their movement as an integral
one although the Northern and Southern Red Turbans did not belong to one regime.
Like the Northern Red Turbans, the Southern Red Turbans also used the Hua-Yi （華夷
Chinese-Barbarian ）ethnic rhetoric to help mobilize followers of the rebellion. Xu Shouhui, the
leader of the Southern Red Turbans was a cloth trader before the rebellion. Shortly after Liu
Futong launched the rebellion in early 1351, Xu and his colleagues launched an uprising in the
Qichun area (today’s Hubei province) along the Huai and Yangtze river areas. In order to
augment his forces, Xu sought to incorporate local militia into the Red Turbans. He sent envoys
to militia troops to explain his motives for the rebellion and asked them to join his troops. An
account of Ming Yuzhen, then a leader of a local militia who later became the emperor of the
Xia state in Sichuan, shows how Xu Shouhui used the Hua-Yi rhetoric to coerce Ming Yuzhen to
join his cause. The Mingshi shilu relates:
In the renchen year (1352), Xu Shouhui launched an uprising in the Qi and Yue areas. In the
eleventh month of the winter of the guisi year (1353), Xu established his reign title and
established his capital in Hanyang. He sent an envoy to summon Ming Yuzhen. Xu said, “I
launched the righteous rebellion with the expectation of expelling the Yuan caitiffs and
pacifying China. If you come, we can work together for this great cause. It will be very
appropriate. If you do not come, my military campaign will first target you.
38

37
Robinson, Empire’s Twilight, p. 148.
38
Yang Xueke, Mingshi shilu, Siku quanshu cunmu congshu edition, shi 159, pp. 7-8.
176

會壬辰，徐壽輝兵起於蘄越。癸巳，冬十一月，稱號，建都漢陽。遣使招玉珍曰：
‘予起兵舉義，期逐元虜，以靖中夏，若歸，共圖大事，甚善。不來，且先加兵。
Two similarities exist between Xu Shouhui’s statement and the proclamation issued by the
Northern Red Turbans to the Korean court. First both justified their cause by using the Hua-Yi
rhetoric. Xu clearly elaborated the motive of his rebellion as “expelling the Yuan barbarians and
pacifying China.” Both Xu and the Northern Red Turbans used the rhetoric of ethnic
confrontation and declared the priority of their cause was to restore China. They denied Yuan’s
political legitimacy on the grounds of its ethnic background. Second, they both, in Robinson’s
words, “adopt the long-standing Chinese imperial rhetoric of succor for those who accept
legitimate authority and punishment for those who stubbornly cling to their misguided ways.”
39

Sources show that Xu Shouhui’s strategy went well. After serious consideration, Ming Yuzhen
joined Xu’s troops and later became an important general under Xu.
Xu’s cause developed rapidly in the 1350s. As early as 1351 when Xu Shouhui launched the
rebellion, he established a state and chose the reign title as Zhiping 治平. According to the
Yuanshi, the name of his state was Tianwan, a mysterious name whose origin could not be
explained.
40
But the recently excavated epitaph of Ming Yuzhen, along with other sources,
shows that the state name was Song 宋.
41
Xu’s Song state swept out local Yuan forces and
quickly incorporated vast territories along the middle Yangtze river area into its domain. In 1357,
Xu Shouhui commissioned Ming Yuzhen to conquer Sichuan. Ming entered the Sichuan area
through the Three Gorges Straits and occupied the whole region.
42

39
Robinson, Empire’s Twilight, p. 147.
40
Yuanshi, j. 42, p. 893.
41
See Chapter II of this dissertation.
42
Mingshi shilu, p. 7.
177

Xu Shouhui’s Song state sought to base its political legitimacy on its ethnic resistance against
the Mongols. As an imperial memorial to Xu Shouhui by a Song minister shows, this official
used the Hua-Yi rhetoric to emphasize the ethnic differences between the Han Chinese and the
Mongols.
From antiquity, Yi-Di (barbarians) rulers have never had good fortune lasting for a century.
Now we see in the empire that the country is empty of people; the land is vast but poorly
administered. The omens are apparent that Heaven will abandon them. The ruler and
ministers of our dynasty clearly notice it, so we champion the orthodoxy of the royal Song
and sweep away the imposter position of Yi-Di. We blame them for retaining villains in the
court while gentlemen are banished; we blame them for central and local governments rife
with corrupt officials; we blame them for contaminating the Central Land 中土; we blame
them for ruining our hats and crowns.
43

自古夷狄之君無百年之運，觀於天下，國虛無人，地大不治，天心廢之，其徵見矣。我
朝君臣灼知其然，遂倡皇宋之正統，掃夷狄之閏位，數之以君子在野小人在朝，數
之以貪官汙吏佈滿中外，數之以膻腥中土，數之以毀裂冠冕。
Liu Xia’s imperial memorial contains important information, reflecting the rationale and logic of
these anti-Yuan rebels. First, the rebels assumed that “barbarians” could not enjoy the luck of
ruling over 100 years. They claimed that the omens for Heaven’s abandonment of these
“barbarians” were clear, thus they chose to rebel. Second, they believed that the restoration of the
orthodoxy of the Song dynasty was the right way to sweep away the barbarian imposters. Third,
As Liu Xia argued, all the accusations made to attack the Mongols, including the Hua-Yi

43
Liu Xia, Liu Shangbin wenji xuji, xuxiu Sikuquanshu edition, vol.1326, p. 136.
178

rhetoric, were just necessary ways to fulfill the changing will of Heaven. Thus, the ethnic
differences stressed by the rebels were, to some extent, just tools used to undermine the Yuan’s
political authority and to legitimatize Han Chinese authority.
While the Song state was expanding, danger of internal strife arose in its court. General
Chen Youliang (1320-1363) gradually took control of the political and military power of the
Song court. Chen incarcerated Xu Shouhui, ruling the Song state in Xu’s name for a few years.
In 1360, Chen murdered Xu and extinguished the Song state. Chen announced the establishment
of his Da Han 大漢 state and proclaimed himself to be the emperor.
44

When the message about Xu’s death and Chen’s accession to the throne reached Ming
Yuzhen in Sichuan, he was infuriated by Chen’s betrayal of Xu Shouhui. He decided not to
accept Chen’s political authority and determined to sever his relations with Chen’s Han state.
Ming blocked the roads linking Sichuan to Chen’s regime.
45
In the third lunar month of 1363,
Ming Yuzhen announced the establishment of his Da Xia state and assumed the throne. He chose
Chongqing as the capital and used the reign title Tiantong ( 天統 Heavenly Unity). Ming built a
temple for Xu Shouhui and constantly offered sacrifices to him.
46
Ming Yuzhen constructed the
political legitimacy of his new Xia state on the grounds of ethnic differences between the Han
and the Mongols. His enthronement proclamation says:
Heaven, having given birth to the people, had to set up authorities to shepherd them.
It can be traced far back to the changing fortune of the Xia, Shang and Zhou and the
successions of the orthodoxy of the Han, Tang, and Song. When the Yuan, as

44
Yuanshi, j. 45, p. 950.
45
Mingshi shilu, p. 7.
46
Mingshi shilu, p. 7.
179

northerners (beiren), defiled our China ( 中夏 Zhongxia) and destroyed our people, all
admit it was the will of Heaven. Who dared to say it was also a result of human’s
effort? Now it has reached a moment when their descendants have lost the Way and
their good fortune is weakening. Heaven has given its order and showed omens of
abandoning them. Strongmen have risen by taking this opportunity and are
collaborating on ways to expel them…I follow the Mandate of Heaven and follow the
heart of the people. On the first day of the third month of the renchen year, I am
sacrificing to Heaven, Earth, my ancestors, and emperors of previous dynasties. I am
assuming the position of emperor. The name of the state is Da Xia. This year is the
first year of the Tiantong reign. Hah, I will carry out Heaven’s punishment by
eradicating the filth and humiliation of folding robes to the left; I will fulfill the grand
enterprise of our civilization to manifest our great achievement.
47

天生斯民，必立司牧。夏商周之迭運，漢唐宋之繼統，其來遠矣。元以北人汙
我中夏，倫理以之晦冥，人物為之銷滅。鹹雲天數，敢謂人謀？邇者子孫失
道，運祚衰微；上天有命，示厭棄之機；豪傑乘時，興驅逐之策… 上承天命，
下順民心。謹以壬寅年三月初一日祭告天地祖宗及歷代帝王，即皇帝位，國號
曰大夏，其以今年為天統元年。嗚呼！恭行天罰，革彼左衽之卑污；昭顯茂
功，成我文明之大治。
Ming Yuzhen uses the rhetoric of ethnicity to strengthen his claim to political legitimacy. Here
he refers to the Mongols as northerners (beiren). Ming makes the accusation that Mongol rule
has contaminated China and ruined the Chinese. Although Ming admits that Yuan rule was

47
Mingshi shilu, p. 12.
180

mandated by Heaven, he claimed that Heaven had changed its will and decided to shift its
mandate to someone else. Thus, he justifies his rebellion against the Yuan as following the will
of Heaven to eradicate the contamination inflicted on China by the Mongols. Ming Yuzhen
makes no mention of whether Mongol rule is beneficial or detrimental to the Han Chinese. In his
eyes, Mongol rule in itself is not acceptable. The Mongols’ ethnicity disqualifies the Mongols as
legitimate rulers.
Ming Yuzhen pointed to many cultural differences between the Mongols and the Han people,
including the way of dressing robes. Folding robes to the left was a common trope used in
traditional China in reference to cultural practices of ethnic foreigners. Ancient Chinese believed
that Chinese people (Hua Xia) folded their dressings to the right, and ethnic foreigners practiced
the contrary. This belief can be traced back to at least Confucius’s time. Commenting on the
merits of Guan Zhong 管仲 (725-645 BCE), a politician in the Spring and Autumn period who
united the Hua Xia people and succeeded in defeating foreigners (Yi-Di), Confucius says “had it
not been for Guan Zhong we would be wearing our hair unbound and folding our robes to the left
微管仲，吾其彼發佐衽矣.”
48
Confucius describes wearing hair unbound and folding robes to
the left as the ethnic characteristics of foreigners. He credits Guan Zhong with protecting the Hua
Xia people from being forced to follow foreign cultural habits. Thus, folding robes to the left is a
typical ethnic manifestation of foreigners. Ming Yuzhen uses this trope of folding robes to the
left to highlight the ethnic differences between and the Han Chinese and the Mongols and to
justify his coronation.

48
Analects, 14:17.
181

The state name, Da Xia (Great Xia), of Ming Yuzhen’s new state also contains an ethnic
connotation. Xia, as the name of the first traditional Chinese dynasty, had long become an ethnic
symbol of Chinese. Hua Xia 華夏 had been a common self-ascribed title used by Chinese in
reference to Chinese identity. As mentioned above, when Xu Shouhui launched his rebellion
against the Yuan, he proclaimed that “I launched the righteous rebellion with the expectation of
expelling the Yuan barbarians and pacifying the Central Xia ( 中夏 China).” The dynastic name
Xia conveys the message that Ming Yuzhen’s new dynasty was a Chinese dynasty. This dynastic
name is consistent with Ming’s proclamation of “eradicating the filth and humiliation of folding
robes to the left.”
49

But the name of Ming Yuzhen’s Xia state did not conform to the common practice of
choosing a state name. In Chinese history a new state often chose its state name in connection
with the history of the realm it ruled, as evidenced by Zhu Yuanzhang’s state name Wu and
Zhang Shicheng’s state name Wu during the late Yuan. Nanjing, Zhu Yuanzhang’s power base,
was the capital of the Wu kingdom during the Three Kingdoms Period. And Suzhou, the capital
of Zhang Shicheng’s regime, was the capital of the Wu state in the Spring and Autumn period.
50

The state name Xia does not conform to this tradition. The ancient Xia dynasty occupied Central
Henan province, which is thousands of kilometers away from Sichuan. And there had been no
state named Xia established in Sichuan before Ming Yuzhen. I argue that most likely Ming
Yuzhen’s uncommon way to choose the state name was an effort to emphasize the Chinese
identity of his new state.

49
Mingshi shilu, p. 12.
50
See Chapter III of this dissertation.
182

The dynastic name Xia offered an opportunity for Ming Yuzhen to win the upper hand in
his confrontation against Chen Youliang. According to contemporary sources, Ming Yuzhen
assumed the throne in response to Chen Youliang’s establishment of his Da Han state.
51
The
state name Han was important in three aspects. First it conforms to the common practice of
choosing a state name according to the history of its realm. Chen Youlaing’s realm mainly
covered the Han River 漢江 area, and the capital city of Chen’s state was Wuhan 武漢. The state
name reflected the location of Chen’s regime. Second, Hanren was the most common title for
ethnic Chinese. This state name indicated the ethnic nature of the state. In the context of the anti-
Yuan rebellion, this state name was appealing to Han Chinese rebels. Third, Han was also the
dynastic name of the Han dynasty (202 BCE- 220 CE), one of the most glorious periods in
Chinese history. The dynastic name Han also implied that Chen’s Han state would subdue the
Mongols and restore the glory of China to the level of the Han dynasty. By choosing the dynastic
name Han, Chen Youliang constructed himself as a representative of ethnic Chinese and a
restorer of Chinese glory. But Ming Yuzhen outmaneuvered Chen by choosing the state name
Xia. Xia also represented ethnic Chinese; furthermore, the Xia dynasty, as the earliest dynasty in
Chinese history, belonged to the Three Dynasties period, a time Confucian scholars thought of as
a golden age. By choosing this state name, Ming Yuzhen claimed a link between his state and
antiquity, during which time the idealized sagehood society allegedly existed. Thus the state
name Xia, in the Confucian sense, represents a more antique and more idealized period than the
state name Han does.
While Ming Yuzhen was busy building his Xia state in the upper reaches of the Yangtze
river area after 1363, Zhu Yuanzhang, centered in the lower reaches of the Yangtze river area,

51
Yuanshi, j. 45, p. 950.
183

continued to expand his influence by fighting his two neighboring warlords, Chen Youliang and
Zhang Shicheng. In 1365, Zhu Yuanzhang completely conquered Chen Youliang’s Han state,
which made Zhu Yuanzhang’s territory adjacent to Ming Yuzhen’s Xia state. While fighting in
the east front against another rival Zhang Shicheng, Zhu wrote a letter to Ming Yuzhen,
suggesting an alliance. This letter states:
The Prince of Wu’s letter to the emperor of the Xia state: …. In the xinmou year (1351),
rebellions broke out in the Cai and Ying area (today’s northern Anhui province). There was
Chen Youliang who exploited his vast territory and strong soldiers and arms. When he
attacked my realm, I had to respond. Within three years, [I] completely eliminated him.
Originally, the Yuan people lived in the deserts. Now they occupy the Central Plain ( 中原
zhongyuan), and it is like the reverse placement of the hat and shoes. You responded to
circumstances, and your state occupies the upriver area. I have the natural defense of the
Changjiang river. We, like lips and teeth, should cooperate full-heartedly to restore the
Central Plain (zhongyuan). When this is settled, we will respectively defend our own
territories. Here I am sending an emissary to establish friendly relations. I hope you will
consider this.
52

吳王奉書夏國皇帝…. 辛卯歲，兵起蔡、潁，有陳友諒恃其土地之廣，甲兵之強，一旦
區區之境，不得已而應之，三年遂滅。元人本處沙塞，今反居中原，是冠履倒置。足
下應時而起，居國上流。區區有長江之險，相為辱齒，協心同力，並複中原。事定之
日，各守疆宇。特遣使通好，惟足下圖之。

52
Mingshi shilu, p. 9.
184

At this point, Zhu Yuanzhang was still the Prince of Wu under the nominal emperor Han Lin’er
of the Song state, so Zhu Yuanzhang used that title. Zhu Yuanzhang invoked the cause of
Chinese restoration as their common goal in order to establish an alliance with Ming Yuzhen.
Here Zhu Yuanzhang adopted a rhetoric that linked ethnicity to geography and political
legitimacy. According to Zhu, the Mongols (Yuanren 元人) lived in the steppe, and therefore
they had no right to live in China (Zhongyuan 中原). Consequently, they had no standing to rule
China at all. This is a substantial change of rhetoric about ethnicity and political legitimacy in
Chinese history. I will examine this new rhetoric below. I will show that Zhu Yuanzhang
repeatedly used this rhetoric of ethnicity to undermine the Mongols.
Based on this so-called common ethnic interest, Zhu proposed a joint military campaign
against the Yuan in the north. According to Zhu’s proposal, after their conquest of the Yuan, Zhu
and Ming would get along with one another peacefully by respectively guarding their own
territories.
After receiving Zhu’s letter, Ming Yuzhen replied to Zhu with a letter also rife with ethnic
rhetoric. The letter relates:
The letter from the emperor of the Xia state to the Prince of Wu: The fortune of these
Mongols has been declining, and the qi of China (Zhongyuan) is growing stronger. Heaven
must have assigned a strongman who will expel the Yuan barbarians and become the lord of
the living people (shengmin). This is the will of Heaven. But only a few figures in China
(Zhongyuan) can understand this. Many are still being used by these Mongols. This is
extraordinarily abhorrent. You rise in accordance with this fortune. Seeing how your infants
are suffering, I think you, too, cannot bear it. I have two hundred thousand of soldiers and
185

horses. [I will] enter the Hanzhong area in the north and the Jingchu area in the east with the
goal of annihilating the remaining caitiffs and pacifying the people. Now I am sending
emissaries to establish good relations. I dare not make a commitment to the future. Your
wise pardon is requested.
53

夏國皇帝奉書吳王足下。邇者元人運衰，中原氣盛，天必降生豪傑，驅逐元虜以為生
民主，是乃天意之有在也。第以中原人物解此者少，尚為彼用，殊為可惡。足下應運
而興，目視赤子之塗炭，想亦不忍也。區區人馬二十萬，北出漢中，東下荊楚，期靖
殘虜，以安黎庶。特遣使奉複通好。不敢後約，唯高明諒之。
Here Ming Yuzhen used the denigrating ethnic slur lu 虜 (caitiff) to characterize the Mongols.
He promised to send his two hundred thousand soldiers to annihilate the remaining troops of the
Yuan. Ming emphasized that some Chinese figures (中原人物 zhongyuan renwu) who were
working for the Yuan were even more vicious than the Yuan “caitiffs.” (lu 虜)
Ming Yuzhen’s letter reflects his ambivalent attitude toward Zhu Yuanzhang. On the one
hand, he echoed Zhu’s ethnic rhetoric about the imminent fall of the Mongols and the rise of the
Han Chinese and promised to maintain good relations with Zhu. On the other hand, Ming refused
to form a military alliance with Zhu. In Zhu’s letter to Ming, Zhu suggested a joint military
campaign against the Yuan in the north. In Ming’s reply letter, he promised to send his troops to
annihilate the remaining Yuan troops in the north, but refused to cooperate with Zhu. This
attitude is consistent with the strategy of keeping power balanced. Ming Yuzhen’s Xia state,
mainly in Sichuan, was smaller and weaker than Zhu Yuanzhang, who had just conquered Chen

53
Mingshi shilu, p. 9.
186

Youliang’s Han state. If the Yuan in the north was totally defeated by the joint forces of the Xia
and Wu, Zhu Yuanzhang would be able to focus his attention on Ming’s Xia state. It was a good
policy for the Xia to maintain good relations with Zhu Yuanzhang, but not provide substantial
help.
The most well-known textual reference to this ethnic rhetoric used by the Chinese against the
Yuan is seen in the declaration made by Zhu Yuanzhang before he launched the northern
expedition campaign in the tenth lunar month of 1367. In the eighth month of 1367, Zhu
Yuanzhang conquered Zhang Shicheng’s Wu state, taking full control of the middle and lower
reaches of the Yangtze river. At that time, Zhu’s realm occupied a vast territory, incorporating
Hubei, Anhui, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang provinces. Shortly after his defeat of Zhang Shicheng, Zhu
again rallied his army to launch an expedition against the Yuan in northern China. Before the
departure of the expedition forces, Zhu issued a declaration, in which he explained his theory
about ethnicity and political legitimacy.
Ever since our rulers in antiquity assumed governance over the realm, China occupying the
center has extended its control over the Yi-Di [barbarians], while the Yi-Di have resided on
the outside and acknowledged China. Never has it been heard that the Yi-Di resided in
China and governed the realm from there. When, however, the right to rule shifted away
from the Song, the Yuan Dynasty as Northern Di [barbarians] entered and has ruled over
China. Within the four seas and beyond there are none who have not submitted to it. How
could this be the consequence of human powers? It was in truth bestowed by Heaven. At
that time their rule was enlightened and their officials good, quite capable of the realm. Yet
even so, knowledgeable men and scholars of firm purpose still sighed that “caps and
sandals had traded places” [higher and lower had traded places]. Thereafter, the Yuan
187

officials failed to observe their rulers’ “Ancestral Instructions”; they abandoned and
destroyed the norms of conduct… and [their rulers] shockingly despoiled the principles of
father and son, ruler and servitor, husband and wife, senior and junior. For the ruler of men
must set the standard for his people; the court is the basis of the realm; Rites and Principles
form the great defense [of civilization] in governing the world. Committing deeds like that
[as described in incidents from Yuan imperial behavior, omitted here], how could they
maintain the standards for later generations?... And so, the people’s hearts turned against
them. Warfare broke out throughout the realm, causing the despoiled bodies of our Chinese
dead to be strewn across the land and the living to be unable to keep safe their own flesh
and blood. And although that was brought about by the misdeeds of men, in fact the time
had come when Heaven despised them and no longer sustained their right to rule. The
ancient saying: “The Hu [barbarians] caitiffs’ fortunes can never last out a hundred years”
is today again proved true, assuredly and beyond any doubt.
54

自古帝王臨禦天下，中國居內以制夷狄，夷狄居外以奉中國。未聞以夷狄居中國治
天下者也。自宋祚傾移，元以北狄入主中國。四海內外，惘惘不臣服，此豈人力，
實乃天授。彼時君明臣良，足以綱維天下。然達人志士，尚有冠屨倒置之歎。自是
以後，元之臣子不遵祖訓，廢壞綱常…其于父子、君臣、夫婦、長幼之倫瀆亂甚矣。
夫人君者，斯民之宗主；朝廷者，天下之本根；禮義者，禦世之大防。其所為如
彼，豈可為訓於天下後世哉？於是人心離叛，天下兵起。使我中國之民死者肝腦塗

54
Zhu Yuanzhang, “Yu Zhongyuanxi,” Mingtaizu shilu, j. 26, pp. 401-402. This translation is adopted from Frederic Mote,
Imperial China 900-1800, pp. 559-560.
188

地，生者骨肉不相保。人事所致，實天厭其德而棄之之時也。古雲“胡虜無百年之
運。”驗之今日，信乎不謬。
At this time, the Heavenly fortune is cycling and the qi of China (Zhongyuan) is getting
stronger. Among the thousands of millions of people must appear a sage. [He will] expel
the barbarian slaves [da lu], restore China [Zhonghua], establish rites and principles, and
rescue the people. Now looking at the world, there is no one to rescue the world and
pacify the people. You people are in a state of anxiety. You are in a situation like being
ruled by the Qin state in the morning but by the Chu state in the afternoon. It really
deserves sympathy. Now in the Henan and Shanxi areas [He Luo Guan Shan], there are a
few strongmen. They have forgotten the family names of their Chinese ancestors, but bear
the names of barbarian caitiffs [hu lu] and animals, and accept them as good names. [One
of them] is using the Yuan’s name for his own sake and threatens the emperor by
commanding massive armies. [He] is domineering and bullying and controls the [Yuan]
court from afar. This is the person who controls the Yellow River and Luo Yang areas.
Another one, who only has a small number of soldiers and military power, is holding a
strategic place to defend against attacks. [He] gains titles and ranks by bribery and has the
plan of accumulating strength and waiting for opportunities. This is the person who is
occupying the Shaanxi area.
55

當此之時，天運迴圈，中原氣盛。億兆之中，當降生聖人。驅逐胡虜，恢復中華，
立綱陳紀，拯救斯民。今一紀於茲，未聞有濟世安民者。徒使爾等戰戰兢兢，處於
朝秦暮楚之地，誠可矜憫。方今河洛關陝，是有數雄。忘中國祖宗之姓，反就胡虜

55
Zhu Yuanzhang, “Yu Zhongyuanxi,” Mingtaizu shilu, j. 26, pp. 401-402.
189

禽獸之名，以為美稱。假元號以濟私，恃有眾以要君。憑陵跋扈，遙制朝權，此河
洛之徒也。或眾少力微，阻兵據險，賄誘名爵，志在養力以俟憂隙，此關陝之人
也。
These two persons originally grasped military power in the name of suppressing the
sectarian people [yaoren] (the Red Turbans). After the sectarian people were eliminated,
they have commanded military power and become domineering. They do not show the
wish to respect the lord and rescue the people. They fight against each other and have
become big threats to the people. Neither of them can be the lord of China [Hua Xia]. I
was an ordinary person living in the area west of the Huai River. Because the land under
Heaven fell into chaos, I was acclaimed by the masses to lead them to cross the
Changjiang River. I occupied the strategic place of Jinling and held the natural moat of the
Changjiang River. It has been thirteen years. [Now my territory] reaches Sichuan in the
west, the sea in the east, and the Min and Yue areas in the south. The Hu, Xiang, Han, and
Mian areas, north and south of the Huai River, and Xu and Pi areas have all been included
in my territory. Even further south also belongs to me.
二者其始，皆以捕妖人為名，乃得兵權。及妖人既滅，兵權已得，志驕氣盈，無複
尊主庇民之意。互相吞噬，反為生民之巨害。皆非華夏之主也。予本淮右布衣，因
天下大亂，為眾所推，率師渡江，居金陵形勢之地，得長江天塹之險，今十有三
年。西抵巴蜀，東連滄海，南控閩越。湖湘、漢沔、兩淮、徐邳，皆入版圖。奄乃
南方，盡為我有。
The people are better pacified; food supplies are becoming adequate; armies are becoming
strong. We are holding bowstrings and arrows. I see that the people in the Central Plain
190

have had no lord for a long time. I feel regret. I, bearing the Mandate from Heaven, dare
not to enjoy stability alone. I plan to send troops to expel the barbarians to the north,
rescue the people from sufferings, and restore the prestige of Han officials. I worry that
the people who do not understand might become my enemies. If they flee to the north with
their whole families, they will suffer more deeply. Thus I am making this announcement
in advance.
民稍安，食稍足，兵稍精，控弦執矢，目視我中原之民，久無所主，深用疚心。予
恭天成命，罔敢自安。方欲遣兵北逐群虜，拯救生民於塗炭，複漢官之威儀。慮民
人未知，反為我仇。挈家北走，陷溺尤深，故先諭告。
When my troops arrive, people do not need to flee. I have strict discipline, and [my troops]
will offend you in no way. Those who submit to me will forever enjoy peace in China.
Those who do not follow my order will flee to the steppe. [Heaven] must mandate a
Chinese to pacify the Chinese people. How can barbarians rule [China]? I worry that the
Central Plain has been contaminated by the stinking smell [of barbarians] for too long a
time and its people are in anxiety. Therefore, I am leading heroes to strive to pacify. Our
ambition is to expel the barbarians (hulu 胡虜) and eliminate violence, and make all
people attain what they desire. [We will] remove the stain of humiliation from China. You
people should know. Although the Mongols and the Semu people do not belong to our
Chinese [Hua Xia], they are also living between Heaven and Earth. If they can understand
rites and righteousness and are willing to be my subjects, I will take care of them in the
same way as I nurture Chinese people. I am making this proclamation and want you to
know.
191

兵至民人勿避。予號令嚴肅，秋毫無犯。歸我者永安於中華，背我者自竄於塞外。
蓋我中國之民，必命中國之人以安之，夷狄何得而治哉。予恐中土，久於膻腥，生
民擾擾。故率群雄奮力廓清，志在逐胡虜、除暴亂，使民皆得其所。雪中國之恥，
爾民其體之。如蒙古、色目，雖非華夏族類，然同生於天地之間，有能知禮義，願
為臣民者，與中夏之人撫養無異，故茲告諭，想宜知悉。
56

This declaration gives a clear portrait of Zhu Yuanzhang’s narrative of the relationship between
ethnicity and political legitimacy. In this declaration Zhu associates ethnicity with geography and
links geography with legitimate rule over China. According to Zhu, Chinese were destined to
live in the central land, and barbarians were destined to live in peripheral areas. Because the
geographic positions of Chinese and “barbarians” were fixed, the political legitimacy of ruling
China was also fixed. Only Chinese had the right to rule China. Foreign reign over China, no
matter whether the governance was good or bad, was inappropriate like the “traded places of hats
and shoes.”
This narrative strongly challenges the narrative of some pro-Mongol Confucians who
supported the rule by civilized “barbarians.” For example, in his letter to a Song officer the pro-
Yuan Confucian Hao Jing 郝經 (1223-1275) argued that “today those who can utilize
Confucians and carry out the Chinese Way are eligible to the lord of China 今日能用士，能行中
國法，便為中國主.”
57
Hao’s argument makes Chinese culture the most important qualification
for political legitimacy. He implied that if foreigners accepted Chinese culture and respected
Confucians, they would be qualified to rule China. Hao’s argument is consistent with some

56
Zhu Yuanzhang, “Yu Zhongyuanxi,” Mingtaizu shilu, j. 26, pp. 401-402.
57
Hao Jing, “Yu songguo lianghuai zhizhishishu 與宋國兩淮制置使書,” Lingchuan ji 陵川集, Beijing tushuguan gujizhenben
congkan edition, vol. 91, j. 37, p. 819.
192

traditional Confucian narratives of political legitimacy. As the prominent Tang Confucian Han
Yu 韓愈 (768-824) argues, “when Confucius wrote the Spring and Autumn, he described those
vassals who adopted barbarian rites as barbarians and those “barbarians” who adopted Chinese
[rites] as Chinese 孔子之作《春秋》也，諸侯用夷禮則夷之，夷而進於中國，則中國之.”
58

According to Han Yu, Confucius also adopted the cultural standard rather than the ethnic
standard to distinguish “Chinese” from “barbarians.” But Zhu’s new narrative totally denied the
rule over China by “barbarians” by associating political legitimacy with ethnicity and geographic
position.
A discrepancy exists in Zhu’s declaration. On the one hand, Zhu denied the right of
“barbarians” to rule China. On the other hand, he attributed Yuan rule over China to the will of
Heaven. Zhu claimed that early Yuan politics were acceptable, but the behaviors of later
emperors and ministers egregiously violated Confucian ethical rule, which lead to the shift of
Heaven’s Mandate away from the Yuan. Zhu’s attitude toward Yuan rule was consistent with
other anti-Yuan warlords. As discussed above, during the rebellions, rebels like Liu Xia and
Ming Yuzhen claimed that the fortune of the Yuan was to end, and the Mandate of Heaven
would shift back to Chinese.
59
The way that these rebel leaders associated ethnicity with political
legitimacy was that they argued “barbarians could not have a fortune of a hundred years.” It
suggests that they to some extent recognized Yuan rule over China as a transitory phenomenon,
but they believed that Heaven would not favor the “barbarians” for long time.
While Zhu Yuanzhang, to some extent, recognized the legitimacy of the Mongol rulers, he
harshly denigrated those Chinese who were fighting for the Yuan. In the declaration, he used

58
Han Yu, “Yuandao 原道,” Hanchangli wenji 韓昌黎文集, (Shanghai, Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1981), p. 12.
59
Liu Shangbin wenji xuji, p. 136; Mingshi shilu, p. 9.
193

extremely negative words like “animals” to describe the two Han warlords who were fighting
against him on behalf of the Yuan. The two Han warlords were Koke Temur (1315-1375) and Li
Siqi (1323-1374). They rose to prominence in the Yuan military campaigns against the Red
Turbans. Koke Temur’s Chinese name was Wang Baobao. He adopted this Mongol-style name
because he was raised by his uncle Chaghan Temur (?-1362), a general of Uighur origin. Zhu
Yuanzhang blamed Koke Temur for adopting “the barbarian animal-like name” and accused both
Koke and Li Siqi of completely forgetting their Chinese ancestors. It suggests that in Zhu’s mind
those Han Chinese who betrayed their ethnicity were even more evil than the barbarians
themselves.
This declaration also shows that Zhu Yuanzhang held different attitudes toward those Han
Chinese living in north China from those in the south. As the declaration shows, the audience for
this declaration was people in Jin 晉 (Shanxi), Ji 冀 (Hebei), Lu 魯 (Shandong) and Qin 秦
(Shaanxi) areas, most of whom were previously ruled by the Jurchen Jin and the Khitan Liao
dynasties. Many parts of these areas had been under alien rule for over three hundred years. Zhu
Yuanzhang stressed his worry that “the Central Plain has been contaminated by the stinking
smell [of barbarians] for too long time.” It demonstrates his suspicion of the political identity of
these Han Chinese in northern China. Here Zhu Yuanzhang set two choices for the northern
Chinese. They could only choose to either stay in China as subjects of his new dynasty, or flee to
the steppes with the Mongols. It is consistent with his association of ethnicity with geography. In
Zhu Yuanzhang’s view, those who did not submit to his new dynasty were equivalent to these
barbarians, who only deserved living in the steppes.
Zhu’s attitude toward ordinary foreigners shown in this declaration is also noteworthy.
Although Zhu denied “barbarian” legitimacy to rule China, he did not deny their right to live in
194

China. As the declaration shows, Zhu promised to treat the Mongols and Semu people equally as
the Chinese as long as they accepted Chinese rites and acknowledged “righteousness.” Zhu
implied that if the barbarians accepted Chinese culture, they would become culturally, if not
ethnically, Chinese. In this part of the declaration, we can see that Zhu Yuanzhang downgraded
the importance of ethnic differences between the Han people and the foreigners. Compared to the
first part of the declaration, this shift in emphasis is more apparent. In the first part, Zhu argued
that the Yi-Di people were based in peripheral areas and had no right to rule China. In the second
part, Zhu argued that the Yi-Di could live in China and be treated the same as Chinese if they
accepted Chinese culture. Similar inconsistencies can be found in many of Zhu’s speeches and
edicts. This reinforces Edward Dreyer’s argument that many of Zhu’s institutions and policies
were expedients designed to solve temporary problems.
60

This declaration exerted great influence in later history. The earliest version of this declaration
is recorded in the Veritable Records of Zhu Yuanzhang, which was finished in the early 1400s.
After the 1450s, this declaration circulated widely among Ming intellectuals. For example,
scholar Cheng Minzheng 程敏政 (1445-1499) put the declaration as the first passage of his
highly selective collection of Ming literature, Huangming wenheng 皇明文衡. It was also copied
in many other popular collections of works.
61
Some modern scholars associate the increasing
popularity of this declaration among Ming society with the political situation of the mid-Ming,
during which time the Mongols in the north again became a major threat to the Ming dynasty.
62

In the late Qing, Chinese nationalists utilized this declaration to motivate the Chinese national

60
Edward Dreyer, Early Ming China: A Political History 1355-1435, p. 237.
61
See Cheng Minzheng ed., Huangming wenheng, j. 1; Gao Dai, Hongyou lu, j. 5; Wang Shizhen, Yanshantang bieji, j. 85.
62
Liu Pujiang, “Yuan Ming geming de minzu zhuyi xiangxiang,” pp. 91-94.
195

sentiment. Dr Sun Yatsen’s slogan of “expelling the barbarians and restoring China” was nearly
a carbon copy of sentences from this declaration.
In sum, Chinese rebels often used ethnic rhetoric in their anti-Yuan campaigns. By
emphasizing ethnic differences between Han Chinese and the Mongols, the rebels attempted to
deny the political legitimacy of the Mongols. As shown in the correspondence between Ming
Yuzhen and Zhu Yuanzhang, rebel leaders also tried to form alliances on the grounds of their
shared ethnic identity.

Constructing Ethnic Tensions in the Late Yuan
This section examines how ethnic tension was created and how it functioned during the Yuan-
Ming transition. The previous sections of this chapter have dealt with how the rebels used ethnic
rhetoric to weaken the legitimacy of Mongol rule. This rhetoric was used by rebel leaders in their
propaganda, and the preceding section focused on rebel leaders like Zhu Yuanzhang and Ming
Yuzhen. This section examines how authors writings about the masses, particularly Han Chinese,
understood events and stories relating to ethnic tensions and their reactions to these events. This
section focuses on primary sources like the Yuanshi and Gengshen waishi 庚申外史 (Unofficial
History of the Emperor Who was Born in the Gengshen Year). It shows that many stories
preserved in these books were reflections of people’s concern about ethnic relations rather than
accurate records of events taking place in that period. I argue that these widely-circulating stories
lead to growing ethnic tensions and stimulated the growth of the rebellion.
Existing sources about the Yuan court during the period of Shundi (r.1333 -1370), the last
emperor of the Yuan, are special in their authorship and content. When the Ming dynasty started
196

compiling the Yuanshi in 1368, compilers found that government archives about Shundi’s reign
were completely lost. Zhu Yuanzhang dispatched groups of scholars around the Ming empire to
collect materials, including texts and oral records, for writing the Shundi part of the Yuanshi.
63

The Gengshen waishi was one of the few books available to compilers to write the Basic Annals
of the Shundi reign ( 順帝本紀) of the Yuanshi.
64
This book covers the last three decades of the
Yuan dynasty under the rule of Emperor Shundi. Because Emperor Shundi was born in a year of
gengshen (1333), he is also referred to as the Gengshen Emperor in many texts. This book
contains many accounts about the Yuan court, especially the factional infighting among Mongol
nobles. Ironically, Quan Heng (active 1360s ）, the author of Genshen waishi, never participated
in the politics of the Yuan court. According to Quan Heng’s biography, he came from Jiangxi
province in Southern China. During the past thirty years of the Yuan, Quan lived in seclusion on
a mountain in Henan province. According to modern scholar Ren Congyue’s research, Quan
Heng wrote Gengshen waishi mainly on the basis of hearsay accessible to him.
65
Similarly the
Shundi part of the Yuanshi was mainly based on stories these compilers collected in their field
search. It is hard to tell whether these events concerning the Yuan court preserved in the Yuanshi
and the Gengshen waishi ever took place. But they are narratives reflecting Han people’s
understanding and imagination of Yuan court politics. I argue that events relating to ethnicity
recorded in the Yuanshi and the Gengshen waishi reflect Han people’s attitudes toward ethnic
relations between the Han and the Mongols.
The Yuanshi and the Gengshen waishi contain many stories that can be seen as symbols of
the deteriorating relations between the Mongols and Han Chinese. For example, the Yuanshi

63
See Chen Gaohua, “Yuanshi zuanxiu kao,” Lishi yanjiu, 1990 (04) :115-129.
64
Gengshen waishi jianzheng, p. 3.
65
Gengshen waishi jianzheng, p. 3.
197

notes: “(in 1343), Bayan proposed to slaughter Han people with the surnames of Zhang, Wang,
Liu, Li, and Zhao. The emperor did not accept. 伯顏請殺張、王、劉、李、趙五姓漢人，帝不
從.”
66
Bayan was then the Right Chief Councilor of the Central Secretariat of the Yuan court, the
highest official of the Yuan government. Bayan was very powerful in the early period of
Shundi’s reign. He controlled the central government and the emperor. In contemporary sources,
Bayan was recorded as a Mongol conservative. The five surnames were the most populous
families of Han Chinese, and to slaughter the five surnames meant a general massacre of almost
all Han people. This record is doubtful. There is no other existing source which can verify this
record. Furthermore, this proposal was not carried out. If it ever existed, it must have only been a
proposal in imperial memorials. Since all Yuan archives were lost, we cannot know what source
this record originated from. Thus, it is questionable that Bayan ever made this proposal. But the
existence of this record demonstrates that this story was circulating among Han Chinese. And the
circulation of this story among Han people would inevitably arouse Han people’s hatred toward
the Mongols.
A similar story recorded in the Gengshen waishi offers more clear information about how
such stories fed the deterioration of ethnic relations and fueled Han people’s resentment against
the Yuan. The Gengshen waishi relates:
(When the Red Turban rebellion was) reported to the court, a clerk carried a report titled
“The Issue of Rebellion.” When Toghto read the report, he changed the title of the report to
“The Issue of Rebellion of the Han People in Henan.” People with sense would know that

66
Yuanshi, j. 39, p. 843.
198

the Yuan dynasty would not be able to have all under Heaven. How would it be possible to
annihilate the Han people of Henan?
67

事聞朝廷，有吏抱牘曰謀反事，至脫脫前觀其牘，改題曰河南漢人謀所事。識者知元
朝不能有天下矣。河南漢人可盡誅乎？
This account tells a story about the Mongol noble Toghto’s response to the Red Turban
rebellion. Toghto was the Right Chief Councilor of the Central Secretariat when the Rebellion
broke out in 1351. He was a very competent Mongol official.
68
In this account, Toghto sought to
transform the portrayal of the Red Turban rebellion into an overall ethnic confrontation between
the Mongols and the Han people. He changed the title of the report from “The Issue about
Rebellion” to “The Issue about Han People’s Rebellion in Henan.” This makes all the Han
people in Henan the target of the Yuan’s suppression campaign.
It is hard to know whether this story was real. As we know, Quan Heng wrote the Gengshen
waishi based on stories circulating among Han people. Quan Heng himself never participated in
Yuan politics. The circulation of this story no doubt strengthened the force of the rebels. When
the war was a confrontation between the Han and the Mongols, many Han people had to choose
to side with the rebels. Although we do not know whether this event took place, the circulation
of this story in Yuan society would have heightened ethnic tensions between the Han and the
Mongols.
Another account in the Gengshen waishi also shows that stories about deteriorating ethnic
relations forced Han people to side with the rebels.

67
Gengshen waishi jianzheng, p. 62.
68
For Toghto’s life, see Yuanshi, j. 138, pp. 3341-3349.
199

Whenever Toghto discussed military affairs, he would shun hanren and nanren. One day
when he was going to the court to report to the emperor, he saw that staff of the Central
Secretariat Han Bogao and Han Daya were following behind him. He ordered the door
keepers to deny their entry. Toghto reported as follows. “Now Han people in Henan are
launching rebellions. We should announce to the land under Heaven that these rebels are to
be suppressed and arrested. Those Mongols and Semu people who have been banished for
misconduct should be recalled back to the capital. It should not be delayed.” When this
announcement was made, even people in the north of the Yellow River changed to join the
Red Army.
69

脫脫議軍事，每回避漢人、南人。時方入內奏事，回頭中書韓伯高、韓大雅隨後
來。遽令門者勿納。奏曰：“方令河南漢人反，宜榜示天下，令一概剿捕。諸蒙古、
色目因遷謫在外者，皆召還京師，勿令詿誤。”於是，榜出，河北之民亦有變而從紅
軍者矣。
According to this story, Toghto did not trust hanren and nanren officials in the Yuan
government. He identified the rebels with the ethnic Han people in Henan and planned to totally
annihilate them. He suggested to recall all Mongols and Semu people back to the capital to
strengthen their power. Again, the authenticity of this story cannot be verified. The impact of this
story, however, is clear. The Han people in the north of the Yellow River, who were a strong
power base of the Yuan, began to join the Red Turbans.
While ethnic tensions arose in Yuan society, as shown in the above-mentioned stories,
within the Yuan court ethnic tensions intensified court politics and sometimes led to internal

69
Gengshen waishi jianzheng, p. 69.
200

strife and violence. In 1357, the Shundi Emperor promoted Taiping 太平 (1301-1363), a minister
with ethnic Han background, to be the Chief Councilor of the Central Secretariat.
70
This
promotion provoked the resentment of a Mongol general named Taibuhua 太不花 (?-1358).
Taibuhua claimed that “I do not betray the state, but the state is betraying me. Taiping is a Han
person and now he is in charge of the affairs in the court and enjoying leisure and pleasure. I am
suffering hardship and fatigue outside. 我不負國家，國家負我矣。太平漢人，今乃複居中用
事，安受逸樂，我反在外勤苦邪”
71
Taibuhua’s resentment was caused by the fact that Taiping
was a Han person rather than a Mongol. He could not accept having the Yuan central
government headed by a Han person. This resentment caused by ethnic difference led to court
infighting. Taiping organized a conspiracy and killed Taibuhua in 1358.
72

The above-mentioned stories and events show that ethnic tensions between the Mongols and
the Han people significantly influenced the political and military situation of the Yuan. While
ethnic tensions helped strengthen the force of the rebels, the internal strife in the Yuan court
caused by ethnic tensions greatly weakened the Yuan. It can be said that ethnic tensions were an
important factor influencing the course of the Yuan-Ming transition.
Conclusion
Based on the discussion of a few topics relating to ethnicity during the Yuan-Ming transition,
this chapter concludes that ethnicity played a significant role in the wars between the Yuan and
the rebels during this period. In the last century, among Chinese scholars there were debates
over whether the Yuan-Ming transition was a class revolution or a national revolution. The

70
For Taiping’s life, see Yuanshi, j. 140, pp. 3367-3372.
71
Yuanshi, j. 141, p. 3383.
72
Yuanshi, j. 141, p. 3383.
201

newest narrative is that the Yuan-Ming transition was a normal dynastic shift in which no ethnic
elements were involved. My research in this chapter, however, challenges this newest Chinese
narrative. Textual analysis of the term beiren in Yuan and early Ming texts shows that this term
sometimes specifically refers to the Mongols and sometimes generally refers to northerners
(people residing in north China). With this understanding, many Yuan and Ming texts can be
seen to contain ethnically charged statements. During the late Yuan, rebel leaders used ethnic
rhetoric to challenge the political legitimacy of the Mongol-Yuan government. These rebels
undermined claims of legitimacy of the Mongols by associating legitimacy with ethnicity. Also,
during the late Yuan, stories circulated among Han people about how the Mongols discriminated
against the Han and even how the Mongols planned to annihilate the Han people. The source of
these stories recorded in primary sources cannot be verified, but their circulation provided Han
rebels and warlords a resource to intensify ethnic tensions and stir up fears of the “other” in their
confrontation with the Mongol-Yuan regime. Zhu Yuanzhang manipulated fears of the ethnic
other to legitimate his rise to power.

202

Chapter V: Dissertation Conclusion
To construct political legitimacy is a priority for any new dynasty. For the Ming, it was even
more urgent, because Zhu Yuanzhang with his humble origins lacked social standing and
traditional resources that he could exploit, unlike previous dynastic founders who came from
among the elite. Zhu’s success was helped by his exploitation of a number of unconventional
resources that enabled Zhu to strengthen his claims to legitimacy and assert that he had received
the Mandate of Heaven to rule all of China.
One resource available to Zhu was the political system of the Red Turban Song state,
which he served for over a decade. This dissertation shows that early on Zhu derived political
legitimacy from the Red Turban Song. Although Zhu later concealed his close connections to the
Red Turban movement, he adopted political symbols of the Song state to bolster his legitimacy.
While existing scholarship focuses on the religious aspect of the Red Turban movement and
treats it as a simple messianic revolt, this dissertation demonstrates that this movement contained
many Confucian elements. Confucian intellectuals joined the rebellion and served as leaders. The
political system of the Song state was influenced by Confucian ideas of model institutions. Most
importantly, key political symbols of the Song state were borrowed from the Confucian tradition.
For example, the title Mingwang of the Red Turban leader Han Lin’er can be understood as the
Enlightened King found in the Confucian classics. This political symbol could thus speak to
Confucian intellectuals in the movement and promote the Red Turbans’ claims to political
legitimacy among these elites. Accordingly, the dynastic name “Ming,” from the term
Mingwang, was not derived from White Lotus or Manichean traditions but evoked the Confucian
concept of an enlightened sage ruler who would receive the great Mandate of Heaven.
203

State-building was an important aspect of political legitimacy. Some artifacts of the Red
Turban Song state discovered by archaeologists make it possible to examine the composition and
workings of the Song state. These artifacts, along with textual sources, show that the Song state
had a complex bureaucratic system. The state was made up of different levels of government,
ranging from the county to the central bureaucracy. Zhu Yuanzhang served as the governor of
the Jiangnan Branch Secretariat of the Song state. Likely, the Ming branch-secretariat
(provincial) system was influenced by this Song institution, rather than by the Yuan directly.
Sources also show that a local state established by the Southern Red Turbans based its political
institutions on the ideal political system recorded in the Confucian classic Zhouli. This research
shows that the two Red Turban states were not just tearing down the old but were also building
up something new. The Red Turban regimes built new political institutions that bolstered their
legitimacy and served as a resource for Zhu in his own state building of the Ming.
Prophecies were an important resource that Zhu Yuanzhang was familiar with and sought to
exploit. In Chinese history, it was common for opportunists to utilize prophecies to their
advantage, but due to sparse surviving sources, in most cases researchers today cannot clearly
understand how prophecies functioned to benefit these opportunists. Research in this dissertation
provides a case study that clearly demonstrates how a prophecy, which we can conjecture
originally predicted the outbreak of chaos during a certain dingwei Sheep year, later became a
prediction of Zhu Yuanzhang’s rise, using puns and plays-on-words. Zhu Yuanzhang skillfully
manipulated this prophecy to construct himself as a ruler mandated by Heaven. Zhu’s s seeming
fulfilment of the prophecy strengthened his claim to legitimacy, but later Zhu intentionally
concealed the connection of his authority with the prophecy. Prophecies helped reinforce Zhu’s
204

political legitimacy, but the relationship between prophecies and legitimacy was not
straightforward.
During the Yuan-Ming transition, legitimacy was also related to narratives of ethnicity.
Chinese rebels used Confucian rhetoric of a Hua-Yi (Chinese-barbarian) binary to undermine the
legitimacy of the Mongols. Stories circulated in Yuan society that reinforced this binary. These
stories established a narrative that suggested the Mongols planned to annihilate the Han people.
Such ideas intensified ethnic tensions and sowed fear among the populace, which was later
exploited by Zhu Yuanzhang and other rebel leaders. Concepts of the ethnic “other,” played a
significant role in the course of the Yuan-Ming transition.
This dissertation sheds new light on the many ways that political legitimacy was
constructed and defended in late imperial China. Factors such as ethnic tensions, popular
religion, apocalyptic beliefs, and prophecies became important resources that Zhu and other
rebels used to assert their claims to legitimacy. Rebels, in addition, reinterpreted the Confucian
term Mingwang and carried out state building projects to strengthen their legitimation claims.
Manipulation of these social and cultural factors played a vital role in the construction of
political legitimacy during this period and supported the claims of Zhu Yuanzhang and other
rebel leaders to have received the Mandate of Heaven. These conclusions suggest more broadly
that we have to consider a wide range of similar circumstances when analyzing the construction
of political legitimacy by imperial regimes and rebel leaders in pre-modern China.

205

Bibliography
Primary sources are listed by their title, as cited in the footnotes, followed by author and
publication information. Secondary sources are listed by author.

Primary Sources
Beiqingjiang ji 貝清江集. Bei Qiong 貝瓊 (1314-1379). SBCK chubian edition.
Caomuzi 草木子. Ye Ziqi 葉子奇 (1327-1390). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959.
Chen wengang xiansheng wenji 陳文崗先生文集. Chen Fei 陳棐 (?-1550). SKCM ji vol.103.
Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996.
Chunqiu gongyangzhuan zhushu 春秋公羊傳注疏. Annotated by He Xiu 何休 (129-182) and Xu
Yan 徐彥 (active early ninth century). Beijng: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2000.
Chuxueji 初學集. Qian Qianyi 錢謙益 (1582-1664). Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1995.
Daming lu 大明律. Compiled by Liu Weiqian 劉惟謙 (active late 1300s). SKCM shi vol.276.
Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996.
Diangu jiwen 典故紀聞. Yu Jideng 餘紀登 (?). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981.
Dianzaiji 滇載記. Yang Shen 楊慎 (1488-1559). CSJC chubian edition vol.3142.
Dongshan cungao 東山存稿. Zhao Fang 趙汸 (1319-1369). SKQS vol.1221. Taibei: Taiwan
shangwu yinshuguan, 1983.
Dongtingji 洞庭集. Sun Yi 孫宜 (?). Xuanlantang congshu xuji vol.4.
Dongweizi wenji 東維子文集. Yang Weizhen 楊維楨 (1296-1370). SBCK chubian edition.
Dugongbu ji 杜工部集. Du Fu 杜甫 (712-770). Compiled by Qian Qianyi 錢謙益 (1582-1664).
Shanghai: Shijie shuju, 1936.
Fanshihu ji 范石湖集. Fan Chengda 范成大 (1126-1193). Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe,
1981.
Fangzhengxue ji 方正學集. Fang Xiaoru 方孝孺 (1357-1402). SKCM shi 85. Jinan: Qilu shushe,
1996.
Fengyang xishu 鳳陽新書. Yuan Wenxin 袁文新. Ming Tianqi printed version (1621).
Fozu lidai tongzai 佛祖歷代通載. Nian Chang 念常 (active late thirteenth and early fourteenth
centuries). Beijing tushuguan guji zhenben congkan vol.77. Beijing: Beijing tushuguan
chubanshe, 2000.
206

Gaotaishi daquanji 高太史大全集. Gao Qi 高啟 (1336-1373). SBCK chubian edition.
Gengshen waishi jianzhu 庚申外史箋注. Quan Heng 權衡 (active mid-fourteenth century).
Annotated by Ren Chongyue 任崇嶽. Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 1991.
Gengshen waishi 庚申外史. Quan Heng 權衡 (active mid-fourteenth century). XXSK shi.
vol.423. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002.
Koryŏsa 高麗史 [Goyeosa]. Compiled by Zheng Linzhi 鄭麟趾 (1396-1478). SKCM shi vol.
159-162. Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996.
Guochao diangu 國朝典故. Compiled by Deng Shilong 鄧士龍. Beijing: Beijing daxue
chubanshe, 1993.
Guochao wenlei 國朝文類. Compiled by Su Tianjue 蘇天爵 (1294-1352). SBCK chubian
edition.
Guochu qunxiong shilue 國初群雄事略. Qian Qianyi 錢謙益 (1582-1664). Beijing: Zhonghua
shuju, 1982.
Guochu shiji 國初事蹟. Liu Chen 劉辰 (1334-1412). SKCM shi vol.46. Jinan: Qilu shushe,
1996.
Han Changli wenji jiaozhu 韓昌黎文集校注. Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824). Annotated by Ma
Qichang 馬其昶. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1986.
Hanshan laoren mengyou ji 憨山老人夢游集. Hanshan deqing 憨山德清 (1546-1623). Beijing:
Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2004.
Hanshu 漢書. Ban Gu 班固 (32-92). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962.
Helin yulu 鶴林玉露. Luo Dajing 羅大經 (1196-1252). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983.
Heshang zhetan 河上楮談. Zhu Mengzhen 朱孟震 (?). SKCM zi vol.104. Jinan: Qilu shushe,
1996.
Hongyoulu 鴻猷錄. Gao Dai 高岱 (1508-1567). SKCM shi vol.19. Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996.
Huangming benji 皇明本紀. SKCM shi vol.6. Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996.
Huangming zhaoling 皇明詔令. Compiled by Fu Fengxiang 傅鳳翔 (late 1400s). SKCM shi
vol.58. Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996.
Huzhongzi ji 胡仲子集. Hu Han 胡翰 (1307-1381). SKQS vol.1229. Taibei: Taiwan shangwu
chubanshe, 1983.
Jiajing Shaowu fuzhi 嘉靖邵武府志. In Tianyigecang mingdai fangzi xuankan. Shanghai:
Shanghai shudian, 1964.
207

Jiansheng yiwen 翦勝野聞. Xu Zhenqing 徐貞卿 (active in early sixteenth century). SKCM zi
vol.240. Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996.
Jianyan lilai chaoyie zaji 建炎以來朝野雜記. Li Xinchuan 李心傳 (1167-1244). CSJC chubain
ben.
Jilu huibian 紀錄彙編. Compiled by Shen Jiefu 沈節甫, Ming Wanli print version.
Jingding Yanzhou xuzhi 景定嚴州續志. Compiled by Qian Keze 錢可則 et al. in Songyuan
fangzi congkan. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989.
Jishilu jianzheng 紀事錄箋證. Yu Ben 俞本 (?-1402). Annotated by Li Xinfeng 李新峰. Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju, 2015.
Jiu Tangshu 舊唐書. Liu Xu 劉昫 (887-946). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975.
Jiulingshanfang ji 九良山房集. Dai Liang 戴良 (1317-1383). SBCK chubian edition.
Kongzi jiayu 孔子家語. Wang Su 王肅 (195-256). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2012.
Kunxue jiwen 困學紀聞. Wang Yinglin 王應麟 (1123-1296). Shanghai: Shanghai guji chbanshe,
2008.
Liji Zhengyi 禮記正義. Annotated by Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127-200) and Kong Yingda 孔穎達
(574-648). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanse, 2000.
Lingchuan ji 臨川集. Hao Jing 郝經 (1223-1275). Beijing tushuguan gujizhenben congkan
vol.91. Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2000.
Liushangbin wenji xuji 劉尚賓文續集. Liu Xia 劉夏. XXSK vol.1326. Shanghai: Shanghai guji
chubanshe, 2002.
Liuwenchenggong ji 劉文成公集. Liu Ji 劉基 (1311-1375). SBCK chubian edition.
Longfei jilue 龍飛紀略. Wu Pu 吳樸 (1500-1570). SKCM shi vol.9. Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996.
Lu Jiuyuan ji 陸九淵集. Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139-1193). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980.
Lushan lianzong baojian 廬山蓮宗寶鑒. Pu Du 普度. Xuxiu daozang edition.
Maoshi Zhengyi 毛詩正義. Annotated by Mao Heng 毛亨 (active mid-third century BCE) and
Zheng Xuan 鄭玄(127-200). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanse, 2000.
Mingchen zouyi 明臣奏議. CSJC chubain edition.
Minghuidian 明會典. Compiled by Shen Shixing 申時行 (1535-1614) et al. XXSK vol.790.
Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002.
208

Mingqing jiji 名卿績紀. Wang Shizhen 王世貞 (1526-1590). Mingdai zhuanji congkan vol. 42.
Taiwan: Mingwen shuju, 1991.
Mingshan zang 明山藏. He Qiaoyuan 何喬遠 (1558-1632). XXSK vol.426. Shanghai: Shanghai
guji chubanshe, 2002.
Mingshi shilu 明氏實錄. Yang Xueke 楊學可 (active mid-fourteenth century). SKCM shi
vol.159. Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996.
Mingshi shilu 明氏實錄. Yang Xueke 楊學可 (active mid-fourteenth century). XXSK vol. 350.
Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002.
Mingshi 明史. Compiled by Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 (1672-1755) et al. Beijing: Zhonghua
shuju,1974.
Mingtaizu ji 明太祖集. Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 (1328-1398). Annotated by Hu Shi’e 胡士萼.
Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 1991.
Mingtaizu shilu 明太祖實錄. Facsimile reproduction of Guoli Beiping tushuguan cang hongge
chaoben. 133 vols. Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1962.
Mingyuzhen jiqi muzang yanjiu 明玉珍墓誌研究. Compiled by Chongqing Municipal Museum,
printed version, 1982.
Mishu jianzhi 秘書監志. Shang Qiweng 商啟翁 and Wang Shidian 王士點. Annotated by Gao
Rongsheng. Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 1992.
Nancun chuogenglu 南村輟耕錄. Tao Zongyi 陶宗儀 (1329-1410). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,
1959.
Nianershi zhaji 廿二史劄記. Zhao Yi 趙翼 (1727-1814). SBCK.
Pinghulu 平胡錄. Lu Shen 陸深 (1477-1544). CSJC chubian.
Pingwulu 平吳錄. Wu Kuan 吳寬 (1435-1504). SKCM shi vol.46. Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996.
Qingding siku quanshu zongmu 欽定四庫全書總目 [Catalogue of the complete literary of the
four treasures]. Yong Rong 永瑢 (1744-1790) et al. Orig. 1782. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,
1987.
Qingrong jushi ji 清容居士集. Yuan Jue 袁桷 (1266-1327). SBCK chubian edition.
Qiujian xiansheng daquan wenji 秋澗先生大全文集. Wang Yun 王惲 (1227-1304). SBCK
edition.
Qiutang ji 秋堂集. Chai Wang 柴望 (1212-1280). SKQS vol.1187. Taibei: Taiwan Shangwu
chubanshe, 1983.
209

Qixiu leigao 七修類稿. Lang Ying 朗瑛 (1487-1566). Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe,
2001.
Rongzhai suibi 容齋隨筆. Hong Mai 洪邁 (1123-1202). Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe,
1978.
Shangshu Zhengyi 尚書正義. Anataed by Kong Anguo 孔安國 (156-74 BCE) and Kong Yingda
孔穎達 (574-648). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2000.
Shiyi ji 拾遺記. Wang Jia 王嘉 (mid fourth century), SKQS vol.1042. Taibei: Taiwan shangwu
yinshuguan, 1983.
Shuanghuai suichao 雙槐歲抄. Huang Yu 黃瑜 (1426-1497). SKCM zi vol.239. Jinan: Qilu
shushe, 1996.
Shuiyuncun gao 水雲村稿. Liu Xun 劉壎 (1240-1319). SKQS vol. 1195. Taibei: Taiwan
shangwu chubanshe, 1983.
Song yiminlu 宋遺民錄. Cheng Minzheng 程敏政 (1445-1499). SKCM shi vol.88. Jinan: Qilu
shushe, 1996.
Songxueshi wenji 宋學士文集. Song Lian 宋濂 (1310-1381). SBCK chubian edition.
Supingzhong ji 蘇平仲集. Su Boheng 蘇伯衡 ( active 1360s). SBCK chubian edition.
Taoan mengyi 陶庵夢憶. Zhang Dai 張岱 (1597-1684). Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe,
1982.
Tieya guyuefu 鐵崖古樂府. Yang Weizhen 楊維楨 (1296-1370). Compiled by Wu Fu 吳複.
SKQS edition vol.1222. Taibei: Taiwan shangwu chubanshe, 1983.
Tongjian bolun 通鑒博論. Zhu Quan 朱權 (1378-1448). SKCM shi vol.281. Jinan: Qilu shushe,
1996.
Tongjiang ji 桐江集. Fang Hui 方回 (1227-1307). Yuandai zhenben wenji huikan edition. Taibei:
Guoli zhongyang tushuguan, 1973.
Tongzhi tiaoge jiaozhu 通志條格校注. Punctuated and annotated by Fang Linggui 方齡貴.
Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001.
Wenxian tongkao 文獻通考. Ma Duanlin 馬端臨 (1254-1323). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986.
Xin Wudaishi 新五代史. Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 (1007-1072). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974.
Xiyou lu 西遊錄. Yelu Chucai 耶律楚材 (1190-1244). punctuated and annotated by Xiang Da 向
達 (1900-1966). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981.
210

Xuanpinlu 玄品錄. Zhang Yu 張雨 (1277-1348). Daozang edition vol.18. Beijing: Wenwu
chubanshe, 1988.
Xuelou ji 雪樓集. Cheng Jufu 程钜夫 (1249-1318), Yuandai zhenben wenji huikan edition.
Taibei: Guoli zhongyang tushuguan, 1973.
Xunzhizhai ji 遜志齋集. Fang Xiaoru 方孝孺 (1357-1402). Punctuated by Xu Daguang 徐大光.
Ningbo: Ningbo chubanshe, 2000.
Yanshantang bieji 弇山堂別集. Wang Shizhen 王世貞 (1526-1590). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju
1985.
Yaoshantang waiji 堯山堂外紀. Jiang Yikui 蔣一揆. SKCM zi vol.148. Jinan: Qilu shushe,
1996.
Yeji 野記. Zhu Yunming 祝允明 (1460-1526). SKCM zi vol.240. Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996.
Yongchuang xiaopin 湧幢小品. Zhu Guozhen 朱國楨 (1557-1632). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,
1959.
Yuandai bailianjiao ziliao huibian 元代白蓮教資料彙編. Compiled by Yang Ne 楊訥. Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju, 1989.
Yuandai nongmin zhanzheng shiliao huibian 元代農民起義史料彙編. Compiled by Yang Ne 楊
訥 and Chen Gaohua 陳高華. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985.
Yuandianzhang 元典章. Punctuated by Chen Gaohua 陳高華 et al. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,
2011.
Yuanmingqing sandai jinhui xiaoshuo xiqu shiliao 元明清三代禁毀小說戲曲史料. Compiled
by Wang Liqi 王利器. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1981.
Yuanqu xuan 元曲選. Compiled by Zang Jinshu 臧晉叔 (1550-1620). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,
1958.
Yuanqu xuan weibian 元曲選外編. Compiled by Sui Shusen 隋樹森 (1906-1989). Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju, 1959.
Yuanshi 元史. Song Lian 宋濂 (1310-1381) et al. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976.
Zhizheng zhiji 至正直記. Kong Qi 孔齊 (active mid fourteenth century). Shanghai: Shanghai
guji chubanshe, 1987.
Zhouli zhushu 周禮注疏. Annotated by Zheng Xuan 鄭玄(127-200) and Jia Gongyan 賈公彥
(active early eighth century). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanse, 2000.
Zhuangzi jinzhu jinyi 莊子今注今譯. Annotated and translated by Chen Guying 陳鼓應. Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju, 2008.
211

Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類. Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200). Annotated by Wang Xingxian 王星賢. Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju, 1986.
Zixi wengao 滋溪文稿. Su Tianjue 蘇天爵 (1294-1352). Annotated by Chen Gaohua 陳高華 and
Meng Fanqing 孟繁清. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997.
Zizhi Tongjian 資治通鑒. Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019-1086). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1956.

212

Secondary Sources
Bai Shouyi 白壽彝 and Chen Dezhi 陳得芝. 1989. Zhongguo tongshi: Di ba juan 中國通史第
八卷. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe.
Benite, Ben-Dor Zvi. 2008. “The Marrano Emperor: The Mysterious, Intimate Bond between
Zhu Yuanzhang and His Muslims.” In Long Live the Emperor! Uses of the Ming Founder
across Six Centuries of East Asian History, edited by Sarah Schneewind, 275-308.
Minneapolis: Society for Ming Studies.
Birge, Bettine. 1995. “Levirate Marriage and the Revival of Widow Chastity in Yuan China.”
Asia Major 3
rd
series vol.8 part 2: 107-146.
Birge, Bettine. 2002. Women, Property, and Confucian Reaction in Sung and Yuan China.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Birge, Bettine. 2017. Marriage and the Law in the Age of Khubilai Khan: Case from the Yuan
dianzhang. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Burbank, Jane, and Frederick Cooper. Empires in world history: Power and the politics of
difference. Princeton University Press, 2010.

Cai Meibiao 蔡美彪. 2009. “Badu pingyang fendi chutan” 拔都平陽分地初探. Zhongguoshi
yanjiu1:115-122.

Cai Meibiao 蔡美彪. 2009. “Yuanchao mishi yu shiji Zhong de zhaoguan” 元朝秘史與史集中
的趙官. Zhongguoshi yanjiu 4: 101-104.
Chan, Hok-lam. [Chen Xuelin 陳學霖]. 1968. “Liu Chi (1311-75) and his Models: The Image-
Building of a Chinese Imperial Adviser.” Oriens Extremus 15(1): 34-55.
Chan, Hok-lam. [Chen Xuelin 陳學霖]. 1973. “The Prophecy of Chang Chung: The
Transmission of the Legend of an Early Ming Taoist.” Orients Extremus 20 (1): 65-102.
Chan, Hok-lam. [Chen Xuelin 陳學霖]. 1981. “Chinese Official Historiography at the Yuan
Court: The Composition of the Liao, Chin, and Sung Histories.” In China under Mongol Rule,
edited by John D. Langlois, 56-106. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chan, Hok-lam. [Chen Xuelin 陳學霖]. 1986 (2001). “Yuben jishilu yu yuanmo mingchu
shiliao” 俞本紀事錄與元末明初史料, In Mingdai renwu yu shiliao 明代人物與史料, 1-21.
Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
Chan, Hok-lam. [Chen Xuelin 陳學霖]. 1988. “The Chien-wen, Yung-lo, Hung-his, and Huan-te
reigns, 1399-1435.” In Cambridge History of China vol.7 The Ming dynasty, 1368-1644, part
I, edited by Frederick Mote and Denis Twitchett, 182-304. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
213

Chan, Hok-lam. [Chen Xuelin 陳學霖]. 1990. “A Legend of the Building of Ming Peking.” Asia
Major, 3
rd
ser., 3, part 2: 63-93.
Chan, Hok-lam. [Chen Xuelin 陳學霖]. 1995. “Ming shilu yu Mingchu shishi yanjiu” 明實錄與
明初史事研究. In Hanxue yanjiu zhi huigu yu qianzhan 漢學研究之回顧與前瞻, vol.2, 114-
124. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.
Chan, Hok-lam. [Chen Xuelin 陳學霖]. 1995. “Ming T’ai-tsu’s Manipulation of Letters: Myth
and Reality of Literary Persecution.” Journal of Asian History 29 (1): 1-59.
Chan, Hok-lam. [Chen Xuelin 陳學霖]. 2001. “Hongwu chao chaoxian ji huanguan shiliao
kaoshi—gaolishi lichao taizu shilu zhechao” 洪武朝朝鮮籍宦官史料考釋—高麗史李朝太祖
實錄摘抄. In Mingdai renwu yu shiliao, 77-124. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
Chan, Hok-lam. [Chen Xuelin 陳學霖]. 2001. “Ming Taizu longfei guanshi suxiang zhi fenxi---
Taizu shilu shiliao tanyuan juyu” 明太祖龍飛官史塑像之分析--- 太祖實錄史料探源舉隅. In
Mingdai renwu yu shiliao 明代人物與史料, 21-75. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
Chan, Hok-lam. [Chen Xuelin 陳學霖]. 2006. “Legitimation Usurpation: Historical Revisions
under the Ming Yongle Emperor (r. 1402-1424).” In The Legitimation of New Orders: Case
Studies in World History, edited by Philip Y.S. Leung, 75-158. Hong Kong: Chinese
University Press.
Chan, Hok-lam. [Chen Xuelin 陳學霖]. 2008. “The ‘Song’ Dyansty Legacy: Symbolism and
Legitimation from Han Liner to Zhu Yuanzhang of the Ming Dynasty,” Harvard Journal of
Asiatic Studies 68.1: 91-133.
Chan, Hok-lam. [Chen Xuelin 陳學霖]. 2009 (2010). “Mingchao guohao de yuanqi yu huode
wenti” 明朝國號的緣起及火德問題. In Mingchu de renwu shishi yu chuanshuo 明初的人物、
史事與傳說，1-35. Beijing: Beijingdaxue chubanshe.
Chan Hok-Lam and Dennis, Laurie. 2008. “Frenzied Fictions: Popular Beliefs and Political
Propaganda in the Written History of Ming Taizu.” In Long Live the Emperor! Uses of the
Ming Founder across Six Centuries of East Asian History, edited by Sarah Schneewind, 15-
36. Minneapolis: Society for Ming Studies.
Chen Dezhi 陳得芝. 2013. “Yuandai duoyuanwenhua shehui de yuyan wenzhi erti” 元代多元文
化社會的語言文字二題. In Mengyuanshi yu zhonghua duoyuan wenhua lunji 蒙元史與中
華多元文化論集, 183-193. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe.

Chen Gaohua 陳高華. 1991. “Yuanmo qiyi nongmin de kouhao” 元末起義農民的口號. In
Yuanshi yanjiu lungao, 257-267. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.
Chen Gaohua 陳高華. 2005. “Yuanshi zuanxiu kao” 元史纂修考. In Chen Gaohua wenji, 469-
490. Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe.
214

Chen Gaohua 陳高華. 1965. “Yuanmo nongminzhanzheng de sixiang wuqi” 元末農民戰爭的思
想武器. Guangming ribao, December first.
Chen Gaohua 陳高華. 1980 (1991). “Lun Zhu Yuanzhang yu yuanchaode guanxi” 論朱元璋與
元朝的關係. In Yuanshi yanjiu lungao 元史研究論稿, 316-327. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.
Chen Gaohua 陳高華. 1981. “Shuo yuanmo hongjinjun de sanlu beifa” 說元末紅巾軍的三路北
伐. Lishi jiaoxue 5: 21-25.

Chen Gaohua 陳高華. 2005. “Monijiao yu chicai shimo: Cong wangzhi lun zhendao shu shuoqi”
摩尼教與吃菜事魔—從王質論鎮盜疏說起. In Chen Gaohua wenji, 536-542. Shanghai:
Shanghai cishu chubanshe.

Chen Shisong 陳世松. 2006. “Yuanmo qingjinjun rushukao jianzhi chongqing xuangong zhibei”
元末青巾軍入蜀考兼釋重慶玄宮之碑. Sichuan wenwu 4:90-96.

Chongqingshi bowuguan 重慶市博物館. 1986. “Sichuan Chongqing mingyuzhen mu” 四川重
慶明玉珍墓. Kaogu 9:827-833.
Crossley, Pamela. A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology,
University of California Press, 2000.
Dang Baohia 黨寶海. 2015. “Waijiao shijie shuoshude zaoqi mengjin zhanzheng” 外交使節所
述的早期蒙金戰爭. In Qinghua Yuanshi III 清華元史第三輯，159-187. Beijing: Shangwu
yinshuguan.

Dardess, John W. 1970. “The transformations of messianic revolt and the founding of the Ming
dynasty.” Journal of Asian Studies 29.03: 539-558.
Dardess, John W. 1973. Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yuan
China (Studies in Oriental Culture). Columbia University Press.
Dardess, John W. 1983. Confucianism and autocracy: Professional elites in the founding of the
Ming Dynasty. Univ of California Press, 1983.
Dardess, John. 1994. “Shun-ti and the End of Yuan Rule in China.” In Cambridge History of
China, vol.6, Alien Regimes and Border States, edited by Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett,
561-586. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dreyer, Edward. 1982. Early Ming China: A Political History, 1355-1435. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Dreyer, Edward. 1988. “Military Origins of Ming China.” In Cambridge History of China vol.7
The Ming dynasty, 1368-1644, part I, edited by Frederick Mote and Denis Twitchett, 58-106.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Du Hongtao 杜洪濤. 2014. “Mingdai de guohao chudian yu zhengtong yihan” 明代的國號出典
215

與正統意涵. Shilin 2:52-57.

Elliott, Mark. 2001. The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial
China. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Elliott, Mark. 2012. “Hushuo: The Northern Other and the Naming of the Han Chinese.” In
Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation, and Identity of China’s Majority, edited by
Thomas Mullaney, 173-190. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Elverskog, Johan. 2008. “The Story of Zhu and the Mongol of the Seventeenth Century.” In
Long Live the Emperor! Uses of the Ming Founder across Six Centuries of East Asian
History, edited by Sarah Schneewind, 211-245. Minneapolis: Society for Ming Studies.
Endicott-West, Elizabeth. “The Yuan Government and Society.” In Cambridge History of China,
vol.6, Alien Regimes and Border States, edited by Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, 587-
615. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Farmer, Edward L. 1976. Early Ming Government: The Evolution of Dual Capitals. Cambridge:
East Asia Research Center, Harvard University.
Farmer, Edward L. 1995. Zhu Yuanzhang and Early Ming Legislation: The Recording of Chinese
Society Following the Era of Mongol Rule. Leiden: Brill.
Farquhar, David M. 1981. “Structure and Function in the Yuan Imperial Government.” In China
Under Mongol Rule, edited by John D. Langlois, 25-55. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Farquhar, David M. 1990. The Government of China under Mongol Rule: A Reference Guide.
Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
Fletcher, Joseph F. 1995. Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia. Variorum.

Franke, Herbert. 1978 (1994). “From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Ruler and God.” Munich:
Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 3-85.
Funada Yoshiyuki 船田善之. 2003. “Semuren yu yuandai zhidu shehui congxin tantao menggu
semu hanren nanren huafen de weizhi” 色目人與元代制度、社會—重新探討蒙古、色目、
漢人、南人劃分的位置. Menguxue xinxi 2:7-16.

Goodrich, L. Carrington and Fang Chaoying, eds. 1976. Dictionary of Ming Biography. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Han Rulin 韓儒林. 1986. Yuanchaoshi 元朝史. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.
Han Zhiyuan 韓志遠. 1983. “Yongan xiaokao” 永安小考. Yuanshi luncong 2: 110.

Hong Jingyuan 洪靜淵. 1984. “Yuanmo hongjinjun shouling Han Lin’er chengdi de shiji yu
wenwu” 元末紅巾軍首領韓林兒稱帝的事蹟與文物. Neimenggu shehuikexue 4: 118-119.
216

Hu Zhaoxi 胡昭曦. 1982. “Mingyuzhen xuangong zhibei chutan” 明玉珍玄宮之碑初析.
Sichuan daxue xuebao 3: 58-63.
Huang Yunmei 黃雲眉. 1979. Mingshi kaozheng 明史考證. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.
Hucker, Charles O. 1985. A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China. Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press.
Idema, Wilt L. 1990. “The Founding of the Han Dynasty in Early Drama: The Autocratic
Suppression of Popular Debunking”, in W.L. Idema and E. Zurcher eds., Thought and Law in
Qin and Han China: Studies Presented to Anthony Hubewé on the Occasion of his 80th
Birthday ，Leiden ：E.J. Brill, 1990.
Jin Yufu 金毓黼. 1942. Zhongguo shi 中國史. Chongqing: Zhengzhong shuju.
Langlois, John D. Jr. 1988. “The Hung-wu Reign, 1368-1398.” In Cambridge History of China
vol.7 The Ming dynasty, 1368-1644, part I, edited by Frederick Mote and Denis Twitchett,
107-181. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Legge, James, trans. (1895) 1960. The Shoo King vol.3 of The Chinese Classics with a
Translation, Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes. Reprint,
Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
Li Xuexun 李學訓. 1995. “Shandong changdong faxian longfeng liunian tongquan” 山東昌東發
現龍鳳六年銅權. Kaogu 1: 49.

Liu Hehui 劉和慧 and Zhang Aiqin 張愛琴. 1983. “Mingdai Huizhou tianqi yanjiu” 明代徽州
田契研究. Lishi yuanjiu 5: 125-139.

Liu Kongfu 劉孔伏. 1987. “Yuangong zhibei shiwuzi duanju guankui” 玄宮之碑十五字斷句管
窺. Chengdu daxue xuebao 3: 72-73.

Liu Kongfu 劉孔伏 and Xue Xinli 薛新力 1984. “Tan yuanmo xu shouhui nongmin zhengquan
de nianhao he guohao fulu xuangong zhibei beiwen” 談元末徐壽輝農民政權的年號和國號
—附錄玄宮之碑碑文. Xueshu yuekan 5: 47-50.

Liu Pujiang 劉浦江. 2014. “Yuan Ming gemingde minzu zhuyi xiangxiang” 元明革命的民族主
義想像. Zhongguoshi yanjiu 3: 79-100.

Lu Maocun 盧茂村. 1982. “Jieshao Han Lin’er zhengquan de yizu wenwu” 介紹韓林兒宋政權
的一組文物. Wenwu 9: 91-92.
Lu Nanqian 盧南喬. 1954. “Yuanmo hongjin qiyi jiqi jingong goali de lishi yiyi” 元末紅巾起義
及其進攻高麗的歷史意義. Wenshizhe 6:32-38; 7: 45-49.

Lv Simian 呂思勉. 1944. Zhongguo tongshi 中國通史. Chongqing: Kaiming shudian.
217

Meng Siming 蒙思明. 2006. Yuandai shehui jieji zhidu 元代社會階級制度. Shanghai: Shangai
renmin chubanshe.
Meulenbeld, Mark R.E. 2015. Demonic Warfare: Daoism, Territorial Networks, and the History
of a Ming Novel. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Mote, Frederick W. 1988. “The Rise of the Ming Dynasty, 1330-1367.” In Cambridge History of
China vol.7 The Ming dynasty, 1368-1644, part I, edited by Frederick Mote and Denis
Twitchett, 11-57. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mote, Frederick. 1994a. “Chinese Society under Mongol Rule, 1215-1368.” In Cambridge
History of China, vol.6, Alien Regimes and Border States, edited by Herbert Franke and Denis
Twitchett, 616-664. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mote, Frederick. 1994b. “Bibliographic Essays: A Note on Traditional Sources for Yuan
History.” In Cambridge History of China, vol.6, Alien Regimes and Border States, edited by
Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, 689-699. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mote, Frederick. 1999. Imperial China 900-1800. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Overmyer, Daniel. 1976. Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late Traditional China,
Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Perdue, Peter C. 2005. China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. Cambridge
Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Qian Mu 錢穆. 1964. Du Mingchu kaiguo zhuchen shiwenji 讀明初開國諸臣詩文集. Xinya
xuebao vol.6 issue 2. In Zhongguo xueshu shixiang shi luncong vol.6 2009. Beijing:
Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian shudian.

Qian Mu 錢穆. 1996. Guoshi dagang 國史大綱. Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan.

Qiu Shusen 邱樹森. 1975. “Yuanmo nongmin zhengquan jifang tongyin de chubu yanjiu” 元末
農民政權幾方銅印的初步研究. Wenwu 9: 76-86.
Qiu Shusen 邱樹森. 1980. “Han Shantong Liu Futong shouyi yingzhoukao” 韓山童、劉福通首
義潁州考. Lishi yanjiu 6: 150-152.

Qiu Shusen 邱樹森. 1980. “Maogui shiji kaolue” 毛貴事蹟考略. Wenshizhe 3: 5-7.

Qiu Shusen 邱樹森. 1982. “Yuanmo hongjinjun de zhengquan jianshe” 元末紅巾軍的政權建
設. Yuanshi luncong 1: 91-108.
Qu Wenjun 屈文軍. 2003. “Yuandianzhang de shiliaojiazhi he tongdu yaoling” 元典章的史料價
值和通讀要領. Neimenggu shehuikexue 6: 10-13.

218

Robinson, David M. 1999. “Politics, Force, and Ethnicity in Ming China: Mongols and the
Abortive Coup of 1461.” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 59 (1): 79-123.
Robinson, David M. 2009. Empire’s Twilight: Northeast Asia under the Mongols. Harvard-
Yenching Institute Monograph Series 68. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Robinson, David M. 2013. Martial Spectacles of the Ming Court. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
Robinson, David M., ed. 2008. Culture, Courtiers, and Competition: The Ming Court (1368-
1644). Harvard University Asia Center.
Rossabi, Morris. 1981. “The Muslim in Early Yuan Dynasty.” In China under Mongol Rule,
edited by John D. Langlois, 257-95. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rossabi, Morris. 1988. Kubilai Khan: His Life and Times. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Schneewind, Sarah. 2012. “Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence and King Wu’s
First Great Pronouncement,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 19.1: 75-91.
Schneewind, Sarah. 2018. Shrines to Living Men in the Ming Political Cosmos, Cambridge
Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Schneewind, Sarah ed. 2008. Long Live the Emperor! Uses of the Ming Founder across Six
Centuries of East Asian History. Minneapolis: Society for Ming Studies.
Shek, Richard. 1990. “Sectarian eschatology and violence.” In Violence in China: Essays in
Culture and Counterculture edited by Jonathan Lipman and Stevan Harrell, 87-114. New
York: State University of New York Press.

Shi Nai’an and Luo Guanzong. Translated by Sidney Shapiro. 1981. Outlaws of the Marsh.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Shi Shuqing 史樹青. 1972. “Yuanmo Xu Shouhui nongmin zhengquan de tongyin” 元末徐壽輝
農民政權的銅印. Wenwu 6: 12-13.

Smith, Paul Jakov and von Glahn, Richard. 2003. Song-Yuan-Ming transition in Chinese history,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Sun Rongrong 孫蓉蓉. 2011. “Chenyao yu shixue” 謠讖與詩學. Wenxue pinglun 6: 164-171.

ter Haar, Barend J. 1992. The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History. Leiden ：E.J.
Brill.
Wang Chongwu 王崇武. 1954. “Lun yuanmo nongmin qiyi de fazhan tuibian jiqi zai lishishang
de jinbu zuoyong 論元末農民起義的發展蛻變及其在歷史上所起的進步作用. Lishi Yanjiu
4: 87-114.
219

Wang Chongwu 王崇武. 1998. “Mingchu zhi tunken zhengci yu jingtianshuo” 明初之屯墾政策
與井田說. In Beijingdaxue bainian guoxue wencui shixue juan 北京大學百年國學文粹史學
卷, 300-303. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe.
Wang Shenrong 王慎榮. 1991. Yuanshi tanyuan 元史探源. Changchun: Jinlin wenshi
chubanshe.
Wang Weidi 王维堤. 2003. “Lishi shangde shachen tianqi” 历史上的沙尘天气. Zhonghua
wenshiluncong 72: 30-49.
Wang Yuquan 王毓銓. 1991. “Mingchao tiandi chiqi yu fuyi huangce” 明朝田地赤契與賦役黃
冊. Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu 1: 127-134.
Wei Songshan 魏嵩山. 1994. “Yuanmo Liu Futong deng qiyi jingguo yu zuichu qiyi zhidi
kaoshi” 元末劉福通等起義經過與最初起義之地考實. Zhongguoshi yanjiu 1: ?

Wu Chengxue 吳承學. 1996. “Lun yaochen yu shichen” 論謠讖與詩讖. Wenxue pinglun 2: 103-
110.
Wu Han 吳晗. 1936 (1986). “Yuandiguo zhi bengkui yu mingzhi jianli” 元帝國之崩潰與明之
建國. Qinghua xuebao vol.11 issue 2. In Wuhan shixue lunzhu xuanji vol.2, 81-138. Beijing:
Renmin chubanse.
Wu Han 吳晗. 1941 (1986). “Mingjiao yu daming diguo” 明教與大明帝國. Qinghua xuebao
vol. 13 issue 1. In Wuhan shixue lunzhu xuanji vol.2, 382-418. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.

Wu Han 吳晗. 1961. Dushi zhaji 讀史劄記. Beijing: Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian shudian.
Wu Han 吳晗. 1965. Zhu Yuanzhang zhuan 朱元璋傳. Beijing: Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian
shudian.
Wu Han 吳晗. 2015. Hu Weiyong dangan kao 胡惟庸黨案考. Beijing: Shangwu yinshu guan.
Xiao Qiqing [Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing] 蕭啟慶. 1994. “Mid-Yuan Politics.” In Cambridge History of
China, vol.6, Alien Regimes and Border States, edited by Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett,
490-560. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Xiao Qiqing [Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing] 蕭啟慶. (1994)1999. “Zhonghua fudi guyue huanjia mengyuan
xingwang yu chenwei” 中華福地，古月還家：蒙元興亡與讖緯. In Yuanchao shi xinlun 元
朝史新論, 83-98. Taibei: Yunchen wenhua shiye.
Xiao Qiqing [Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing] 蕭啟慶. 1994 (2007). “Yuanchao de tongyi yu tonghe yi handi
Jiangnan wei zhongxin” 元朝的統一與統合：以漢地、江南為中心. In Neibeiguo er wai
zhongguo mengyuanshi yanjiu 內北國而外中國—蒙元史研究, 17-38. Beijing: Zhonghua
shuju.

220

Xiao Qiqing [Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing] 蕭啟慶. 2007. “Shuo dachao yuanchao jianhao qian menggu de
hanwen guohao” 說大朝：元朝建號前蒙古的漢文國號. In Neibeiguo er wai zhongguo
mengyuanshi yanjiu 內北國而外中國—蒙元史研究, 62-78. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.

Xiao Qiqing [Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing] 蕭啟慶. 2007. “Zhongguo jinshi qianqi nanbei fazhande qiyi yu
tonghe yi nansong jin yuan shiqi de jingji shehui wenhua wei zhongxin” 中國近世前期南北
發展的歧異與統合—— 以南宋金元時期的經濟社會文化為中心. In Qinghua lishi jiangtang
chubian. Beijing: Sanlian shudian.
Xu Wenju 許文巨. 1987. “Zhejiang yiwu chutu longfeng qinian tongquan” 浙江義烏出土龍鳳
七年銅權. Wenwu 9:93.
Yang Ne 楊訥. 1965. “Yuandai nongcun shezhi yanjiu” 元代農村社制研究. Lishi yanjiu 4: 117-
134.
Yang Ne 楊訥. 1978 (2012). “Shi tianwan” 釋天完. Lishi yanjiu 1:66. In Yuanshi lunji 元史論
集, 99-100. Beijing: Guojia tushuguan chubanshe.
Yang Ne 楊訥. 1978. “Tianwan hongjinjun yu bailianjiao guanxi yizheng” 天完紅巾軍與白蓮
教關係一證. Wenshizhe 4: 77-78.
Yang Ne 楊訥. 1982. Tianwan dahan hongjinjun shi shulue 天完大漢紅巾軍史述論. Yuanshi
luncong 1: 109-136.

Yang Ne 楊訥. 1983 (2012). “Yuandai de bailianjiao” 元代的白蓮教. Yuanshi luncong 2. In
Yuanshi lunji, 230-273. Beijing: Guojia tushuguan chubanshe.

Yang Ne 楊訥. 1985 (2012). “Longfeng nianjian de Zhu Yuanzhang 龍鳳年間的朱元璋.
Yuanshi luncong 4. In Yuanshi lunji, 122-175.

Yang Ne 楊訥. 2004. Yuandai bailianjiao yanjiu 元代白蓮教研究. Shanghai: Shanghai guji
chubanshe.

Yang Ne 楊訥. 2008. “Xu Shouhui Chen Youliang deng shiji fafu Liu Shangbin wenji duhou” 徐
壽輝、陳友諒等事蹟發覆---- 劉尚賓文集讀後. Zhonghua wenshi luncong 2: 71-94.

Yang Ne 楊訥. 2012. “Mingshi shilu jiexi” 明氏實錄解析. In Yuanshi lunji, 451-460.

Yang Ne 楊訥. 2012. “Zhu Yuanzhang yu Liu Futong Han Lin’er” 朱元璋與劉福通、韓林兒.
In Yuanshi lunji, 176-184.

Yang Shao-Yun. 2014. Reinventing the Barbarian: Rhetorical and Philosophical Uses of the Yi-
Di in Mid-Imperial China, 600–1300. Ph.D. dissertation, UC Berkeley.

Yao Dali 姚大力. 2002 (2007). “Zhongguo lishi shang de minzu guanxi he guojia renting” 中國
221

歷史上的民族關係和國家認同. Zhongguo xueshu 2. In Beifang minzu shi shi lun, 258-279.
Nanning: Guoxi shifandaxue chubanse.

Yu Yingshi 余英時. 2004. Zhu Xi de lishi shijie 朱熹的歷史世界. Beijing: Shenghuo dushu
xinzhi sanlian shudian.

Zhang Fan 張帆. 1997. “Yuanchao de texing mengyuanshi ruogan wenti de sidao” 元朝的特性--
-- 蒙元史若干問題的思考. Xueshu sixiang pinglun 1: 457-480.

Zhang Fan 張帆. 1997. Yuandai zaixiang zhidu yanjiu 元代宰相制度研究. Beijing: Beijing
daxue chubanshe.

Zhang Wei 張偉. 2016. “Bengbushi buwuguancang yuanmo nongminqiyijunqian pinxi” 蚌埠市
博物館藏元末農民起義軍錢品析. Jianding yu jianshang 7: 86-87.

Zhao Xianhai 趙現海. 2010. “Mingchu fenfeng zhidu yuanyuan xintan” 明初分封制度淵源新
探. Zhongguoshi yanjiu 2: 141-160.

Zhao Zhenhua 趙振華. 1994. “Yuan saiyinchi dahu muzhi kao” 元賽因赤答忽墓誌考.
Neimenggu shehui kexue 2: 64-70.

Zhou Lianxiao 周良霄. 1996. “Zhaji erzhe” 劄記二則. Yuanshi luncong 6: 212-220.
Zhu Honglin 朱鴻林. 2010. “Mingtaizu dui shujing de zhengyin jiqi zhengzhi lixiang he zhiguo
linian” 明太祖對書經的徵引及其政治理想和治國理念. In Mingtaizu de zhiguo linian jiqi
shijian 明太祖的治國理念及其實踐, 19-62. Hong Kong: Zhongwen daxue chubanshe.
Zhu Honglin 朱鴻林, comp. 2010. Mingtaizu de zhiguo linian jiqi shijian 明太祖的治國理念及
其實踐. Hong Kong: Zhongwen daxue chubanshe.
Zhu Huo 朱活. 1962. “Luelun yuanmo hongjinjun zai Shandong” 略論元末紅巾軍在山東.
Wenshizhe 6: 37-43.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract This thesis revolves around the question of how anti-Yuan rebels and the Ming founder established and defended their claims to political legitimacy in the Yuan and early Ming periods. This research complicates the currently prevailing narrative about constructing political legitimacy in Chinese history and reconsiders some important topics concerning the history of the Yuan-Ming transition. This thesis examines some previously unexplored factors, such as people’s fear of the ethnic “other,” anticipation of deity reincarnation, popular beliefs in apocalyptic destruction, and some widely-spread prophecies, and demonstrates how rebel leaders and warlords manipulated and utilized these factors in their efforts to construct and defend their respective claims to political legitimacy. Rebel leaders also reinterpreted some key terms in Confucianism and carried out state-building projects to defend their claims to political legitimacy. This research argues that the dynastic name “Ming” was derived primarily from these Confucian concepts rather than from the White Lotus or Manichean traditions. These factors played a vital role in legitimatizing political authority during the Yuan-Ming transition and helped various contenders, including the Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang, assert their claims to have received the Mandate of Heaven. ❧ This thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter I examines how anti-Mongol rebels utilized both Confucian ideas and popular religious beliefs to construct their political legitimacy. This chapter challenges the idea that the anti-Mongol rebellion was a simple messianic revolt, and it offers a new interpretation for the origins of the dynastic name “Ming.” Chapter II discusses how the rebels built their states and organized their governments. Existing scholarship has largely ignored this topic because of the tendency to identify this rebellion as a simple messianic revolt. This chapter shows that the rebels utilized both traditional Chinese institutions and Mongol institutions in their state-building. Chapter III explores how prophecies functioned to strengthen different claims to legitimacy. It argues that warlords manipulated prophecies by using puns and plays-on-words in order to portray themselves as legitimate rulers mandated by Heaven. Chapter IV analyzes the relationship between ethnicity and political legitimacy. It argues that the Chinese rebels selectively used Confucian rhetoric concerning ethnicity to undermine the legitimacy of the Mongol-Yuan, and it holds that ideas of ethnic distinction played an important role in the Yuan-Ming transition.

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

Food, hygiene, and modernity of Hangzhou (1927-1937)

PDF

An exploration of the debate on “nancy boys” in modern China

PDF

"East is red": a musical rarometer for cultural revolution politics and culture

PDF

Explaining the variation in the extent of China's hegemony, 1279-1840 — multiple sources of ideational power beyond Confucianism

PDF

Third World activists and the Communist University of the Toilers of the East

PDF

Ideas of Hua and Yi in the works of Ma Zhiyuan and Bai Pu --- Two northern playwrights in the early Yuan

PDF

Going offshore: studies of the maritime zone in East Asia from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries

PDF

The end of Augustan literature: Ovid's Epistulae ex Ponto IV

PDF

Prophecy and the politics of authority in seventeenth-century revolutionary Britain

PDF

Networks of space and identity: origin narratives and manifestations of the Itsukushima deity

PDF

Jin Yong's chivalry: gender and ethnicity in wuxia fiction, film, and television

PDF

Three essays on the evaluation of long-term care insurance policies

PDF

Political coming-of-age in the era of WeChat: understanding the ethnic media ecosystem and group politics of first-generation Chinese Americans

PDF

Status seeking in hierarchy: Korea and Vietnam under Chinese hegemony in early modern Asia

PDF

Rationality and the primacy of the occurrent

PDF

Remember us this time tomorrow: a testimonial history of the foreign community during the Kwangju Uprising

PDF

Public justification beyond legitimacy

PDF

Economic policy-making in a changing environment: the politics of success in Peru vis-à-vis China

PDF

Window Seat: examining public space, politics, and social identity through urban public transportation

PDF

The magic mirror: representations of monsters in Chinese classical tales

Asset Metadata

Creator Liu, Haiwei (author)

Core Title Mandate and manipulate: constructing political legitimacy during the Yuan-Ming transition, 1351-1370

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program East Asian Languages and Cultures

Publication Date 01/29/2021

Defense Date 05/03/2019

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Ethnicity,OAI-PMH Harvest,political legitimacy,Prophecy,Religion

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Advisor Birge, Bettine (committee chair), Goldstein, Joshua (committee member), Rorlich, Azade-Ayse (committee member), Schneewind, Sarah (committee member)

Creator Email haiweili@usc.edu,haiweiliu@hotmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c89-200441

Unique identifier UC11663151

Identifier etd-LiuHaiwei-7682.pdf (filename),usctheses-c89-200441 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-LiuHaiwei-7682.pdf

Dmrecord 200441

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Liu, Haiwei

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA