University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Making transborder Los Angeles: Japanese and Mexican immigration, agriculture, and labor relations, 1924-1942

(USC Thesis Other)

Making transborder Los Angeles: Japanese and Mexican immigration, agriculture, and labor relations, 1924-1942

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content

MAKING TRANSBORDER LOS ANGELES:
JAPANESE AND MEXICAN IMMIGRATION, AGRICULTURE, AND
LABOR RELATIONS, 1924-1942

by

Yu Tokunaga

A Dissertation presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(HISTORY)

AUGUST 2018
i

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iii
List of Illustrations ...........................................................................................................................v
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. vi

Introduction ...................................................................................................................................1

1. Los Angeles before 1924: A Global Meeting Place on the Pacific Rim ..............................30

2. The 1924 Immigration Act and the Transborder Ethnic Japanese Community ..............46
“Mexico is Waiting for You” in the Time of Japanese Exclusion .............................................48
An Unintended Consequence: The Development of the Ethnic Japanese Community in Baja
California ...................................................................................................................................77

3. Here Come the Mexicans: Mexican Labor within Triracial Los Angeles Agriculture .....97
White Agribusiness Racism against Mexicans ........................................................................100
Suspicious “Meki” and Uncivilized “Dojin”: The Japanese Racial View on Mexicans..........110
The Birth of the Ethnic Mexican Press and Labor Unions in the 1920s Los Angeles .............120

4. Transpacific Borderlands: Japanese Farmers and Mexican Workers in the 1933 El Monte
Berry Strike ................................................................................................................................136
An International Problem Generated in Los Angeles Berry Farms .........................................140
Anti-Japanese Sentiment in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands ......................................................155
Victory for Whom?: Unsolved Problems in Triracial Los Angeles Agriculture .....................170

5. Ethnic Solidarity or Interethnic Accommodation: The 1936 Venice Celery Strike ........181
Union Recognition as a Hope or a Threat: Entering a New Phase of the Japanese-Mexican
Conflict .....................................................................................................................................184
Inter-Japanese Divide and Growing Support for Mexicans .....................................................202
Immigrant Nationalism and Interethnic Accommodation .......................................................218

ii

6. There Go the Japanese: Japanese Removal and Mexican Workers during the Pacific War
......................................................................................................................................................232
Japanese Internment as an Agricultural Labor Crisis in California .........................................235
Enduring Interethnic Trust in Rancho San Pedro .....................................................................265

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................291
Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................297

iii

Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my adviser Professor Lon Kurashige for his
support and encouragement over the entire period of my doctoral years at the history department
of the University of Southern California starting from 2012. Without his guidance, I could not have
written this dissertation. I am also deeply grateful to Professor George Sánchez, Professor William
Deverell, and Professor Jody Agius Vallejo for giving me insightful and encouraging comments
on my research work as members of my dissertation committee. I learned a lot from taking classes
or working as a teaching assistant with my committee members as well as with other faculty
members, especially Professor Kyung Moon Hwang, Professor Steve Ross, Professor Philip
Ethington, and Professor Clinton Godart (now at Tohoku University). During my doctoral years,
I have benefited from the friendship of my colleagues Angelica Stoddard, Christina Copland,
David Neumann, Young Sun Park, David-James Gonzales, and Carlos Parra. In particular, I am
grateful to Carlos for helping me edit my dissertation draft and make it more readable and
meaningful. I would like to extend my thanks to Lori Rogers and Melissa Calderon of the history
department office for their support that continued even after I began to work in Japan two years
ago.
During my archival research in Japan, Mexico, and the United States, I had the pleasure to
meet with helpful archivists. Particularly, I would like to thank Mr. Thomas Philo, archivist in
California State University, Dominguez Hills’ University Library, for his hospitability and
generosity. My graduate school experience could not have been this fruitful without the financial
support I received from the University of Southern California and the Japan-U.S. Educational
Commission (Fulbright Japan). I am also indebted to Professor Brian Hayashi, Professor Reiko
Maekawa, and Professor Yasuko Takezawa, with whom I studied at the graduate school at Kyoto
iv

University, for encouraging me to study abroad in the United States. And my former fellow
students at Kyoto University, Daniel Milne and Hironori Watari, have been such great friends on
and off campus.
Finally, my wife, Sakiko, my son, Sotaro, my mother, Kayo, and my late father Muneo are
always the source of my energy and happiness. This dissertation is dedicated to them.

v

List of Illustrations

MAPS
1. Japanese farms in Los Angeles County 45
2. Rancho San Pedro as of 1937 266
3. Horita and Haijima’s farms in Rancho San Pedro 273
4. Buildings owned by former Japanese tenant Henry Chiyozō Takeuchi 288

FIGURES
1. Advertisement of the Hara Company on La Opinión 127
2. Advertisement of Dr. Ichioka’s clinic on La Opinión 127
3. Pro-labor statement of Japanese immigrants in Mexicali 166
4. Statement of Japanese immigrants in Ensenada 176
5. Japanese giyūdan workers helping harvest celery in Venice 191
6. Japanese and Mexican representatives signing a provisional agreement at the office of the
Nōkai Renmei in Downtown Los Angeles 216

vi

List of Tables

1. List of Japanese tenants in Rancho San Pedro, February 10, 1942 282
2. List of non-Japanese tenants in Rancho San Pedro, 1943 282

1

Introduction

During World War I, Japanese writer and future Lower House member Kōji Higashi travelled
across the United States to observe the impact of anti-Japanese legislations such as the California
Alien Land Law of 1920. Higashi believed that U.S.-Japan relations would be the most crucial
factor for Japanese diplomacy after World War I. Next in importance was Europe, where he
planned to visit after leaving the United States. His plans changed, however, when he came to see
that Mexico was more important than Europe to understand U.S.-Japan relations. In Beiboku Jūō
[Traveling down and across the United States and Mexico], a book published in Japan in 1921,
Higashi explained that the United States had been aspiring to rule Mexico since its independence
in 1821, as seen in the subsequent U.S. annexation of Texas and its acquisition of California and
other Southwestern regions. He viewed the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) as “the explicit
revelation of the U.S. invasionism.” He believed that the United States was currently targeting
Baja California when he learned that U.S. Senator Henry Ashurst of Arizona had proposed the
annexation of this region. Located next to California, Ashurst considered Baja California as an
important region for the U.S. national security.
1

Although Japan also was expanding its influence over China, Higashi found the U.S. attitude
towards Mexico “much more daring and astute” than Japan’s own attitude towards China. At the
same time, he saw parallels in both powers’ imperial relationship to its weaker neighbors. “It is
true,” he wrote, “that U.S.-Mexico relations significantly resemble Japan-China relations in terms

1
Kōji Higashi, Beiboku Jūō [Traveling down and across the United States and Mexico] (Tokyo, 1921), preface
by Hisayoshi Shimazu, preface by the author, 274-302. As for the reaction of Mexican officials and immigrants
against Henry Ashurst, see F. Arturo Rosales, ¡Pobre Raza!: Violence, Justice, and Mobilization among México
Lindo Immigrants, 1900-1936 (Austin, 1999), 23.
2

of political, diplomatic, social, economic concerns, and so forth. I strongly believe that there are
many things that we must take into consideration regarding U.S.-Mexico, U.S.-China, Japan-
Mexico, and Japan-China relations if we want to solve Japan-U.S. problems in the future.” The
key to resolving U.S.-Japan tension, Higashi suggested, was Japan’s relationship to Mexico
because Americans were irrationally fearful that Japan would purchase lands and establish a
military base in Baja California. Learning about the historical importance of Mexico in U.S.
expansionism, Higashi emphasized that Japan should develop its diplomatic strategies related to
the United States and Mexico based on the fact that Americans were very sensitive to Japan-
Mexico relations.
2

Higashi’s conception of U.S.-Japan relations as triangulated by Mexico is important for
understanding immigration as well as diplomatic history. Mexico and its immigrants north of the
border played a salient, though often unacknowledged, role in the experience of Japanese
immigrants and Japanese Americans in Southern California, the largest settlement of its kind in
the continental United States. Shortly after the U.S. government prohibited Japanese immigration
in 1924, Japanese people on both sides of the Pacific Ocean began to call out, “[Japanese]
migration to Mexico is hopeful” and “Send emigrants to Mexico!”
3
In addition to small-scale
secondary migrations to Mexico, Japanese farmers in Southern California confronted labor and
racial conflicts with Mexican immigrants that blew up into international crises that concerned
government representatives from Japan, Mexico, and the United States.

2
Higashi, Beiboku Jūō, preface by the author, 301.
3
“Imin wo Mekishiko e Okure [Send emigrants to Mexico],” Yomiuri Shimbun, June 1, 1924; “Yūbō na
Bokukoku Ijū [Migration to Mexico is hopeful],” Rafu Shimpo, September 9, 1924.
3

Japanese-Mexican Relations in Los Angeles and the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands
This dissertation explores the social history of interethnic relations between Japanese and
Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles County from 1924 to 1942 by paying careful attention to
international relations between Japan, Mexico, and the United States. In this period, Japanese,
Mexicans, and white Americans in Los Angeles developed a triracial hierarchy, which was not
always rigid and dominated by domestic racial and economic factors but was rather fluid and
situational due to the immigrants’ agency and ability to negotiate interethnic relations and
international factors around the Pacific Ocean and across the U.S.-Mexico border. Although this
triracial hierarchy functioned to strengthen racial and class divisions and conflicts among Japanese,
Mexicans, and white Americans, their regular interactions resulted in interethnic accommodation
and mutual understanding in unexpected ways even during turbulent periods of Japanese-Mexican
labor conflicts during the 1930s and strong anti-Japanese sentiment during the Pacific War. By
looking at the Japanese-Mexican interactions within this hierarchy and correlations of their
experiences as racialized minorities in this turbulent period before the Pacific War, we can see the
Japanese immigrant experience, such as the ban on Japanese immigration and the wartime
Japanese relocation and internment, and the Mexican immigrant experience, such as agricultural
strikes in the 1930s and the Bracero Program, not in isolation but in a single narrative of
transpacific history.
4

The site of close Japanese-Mexican interactions highlighted in this study is Los Angeles
farmland. The Japanese and Mexicans played a significant role in developing local agriculture,

4
Lon Kurashige, Madeline Y. Hsu, and Yujin Yaguchi argue that the emerging field of transpacific history sees
people’s struggles within and around the Pacific Ocean “as not simply national problems, but as articulations of
transpacific processes and circumstances that have produced new relationships and modes of explanation.” Lon
Kurashige, Madeline Y. Hsu, and Yujin Yaguchi, “Introduction: Conversations on Transpacific History,” Pacific
Historical Review 83, no.2 (May, 2014): 187-188.
4

one of the major industries of Los Angeles County before World War II. This history of Japanese-
Mexican relations in Los Angeles agriculture begins with the Immigration Act of 1924 and ends
with the World War II Japanese relocation and internment starting in 1942. This eighteen-year
period witnessed the development and sudden disappearance of close Japanese-Mexican relations
in Los Angeles County. Furthermore, in this period, Japanese-Mexican relations in Los Angeles
farmland became fully incorporated as an integral part of local agriculture along with two
socioeconomic and geopolitical relationships developing particularly after the implementation of
the Immigration Act of 1924. The first relationship is the development of a unique triracial
hierarchy in which Japanese tenant farmers leased lands from white landowners and hired Mexican
farmworkers, which was the consequence of the upward mobility of Japanese immigrants into land
tenancy and the increase of Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles County particularly after the
1920s. The other is the development of a transborder ethnic Japanese community in the U.S.-
Mexico borderlands in which the experience of Japanese immigrants in Mexico affected that of
their co-ethnics and their relations with Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles County. By taking
these two important factors into consideration, this dissertation describes the development and
sudden demise of Japanese-Mexican relations in Los Angeles farmland from 1924 to 1942,
providing a better understanding of why and how interethnic relations and international relations
develop racial and economic inequalities as well as interethnic mutual trust in multiethnic Los
Angeles, a global meeting place located at the historical intersection of Asia, Latin America, and
the United States.
In the first three decades of the twentieth century, the ethnic Japanese and Mexican
populations in Los Angeles County increased dramatically (This dissertation uses “ethnic Japanese”
to mean people of Japanese origin and likewise “ethnic Mexicans” people of Mexican origin,
5

including both immigrants and their U.S.-born descendants).
5
In Los Angeles County, the number
of ethnic Japanese residents rose from 204 in 1900 to 35,390 in 1930 and the Mexican counterpart
from 1,618 (as a foreign-born population) in 1900 to 167,024 (as a racial group) in 1930, together
constituting 9 percent of the total population and 78 percent of the whole non-white population in
Los Angeles County in 1930. Japanese and Mexican minorities made up the majority of non-white
Los Angeles before World War II.
6

In the early twentieth century Los Angeles, the Japanese and Mexicans were major racialized
minorities. With the development of scientific racism such as eugenics, American racial
nationalism reinforced the idea of Anglo-Saxon superiority and materialized in the Immigration
Act of 1924.
7
This new immigration policy prohibited Japanese immigration altogether. The law

5
I employ terms “ethnic Japanese” and “ethnic Mexican” based on David Gutierrez’s definition of “ethnic
Mexicans,” which means “the total Mexican-origin population of the United States, citizen and alien alike.” See
David G. Gutiérrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity
(Berkeley, 1995), 218.
6
In 1930, the total population of Los Angeles County was 2,208,492 and its non-white population was 258,610.
U.S. Census Office, Twelfth Census of the United States: 1900, Population (Washington D.C., 1901), Table 34,
“Foreign Born Population, Distributed According to Country of Birth, by Counties,” 738-739; U.S. Census
Bureau, Fifteenth Census of the United States:1930, Population (Washington, D.C., 1932), Table 13, “The
Composition of the Population, by Counties: 1930” and Table 17, “Indians, Chinese, and Japanese, 1910 to 1930,
and Mexicans, 1930, for Counties and for Cities of 25,000 or More,” 252, 260, 266. In the city of Los Angeles
in 1930, the ethnic Japanese population was 21,081 and the ethnic Mexican population was 97,116, covering 71
percent of the whole non-white population in the city. As for a more detailed explanation of Japanese and
Mexican immigration histories before 1924, see Chapter 1.
7
John Higham has explored the history of American nativism and characterized the 1924 Act as Nordic victory
over non-Anglo-Saxon populations. Higham points out that the development of scientific racism such as
eugenics led to the rise of the comprehensive understanding of the Anglo-Saxon as a superior race in the 1910s.
Gary Gerstle contends that racial nationalism was central in the 1920s as the restrictive legislation reinforced
key principals such as an insistence on the racial superiority of “American” people, an intolerance of political
radicalism, and an opposition to cultural pluralism. See John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of
American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick, 1955; 1988); Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and
Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 2001), 80-83. The Immigration Act of 1924 has been studied in the
context of anti-Japanese movement in California. See Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-
Japanese Movement in California (New York, 1968). Some scholars regard the 1924 Immigration Act as an
underlying factor of the Pacific War. Toshihiro Minohara argues that the 1924 Act became “a factor in the multi-
dimensional and multi-layered mechanism that caused the outbreak of the war [between Japan and the United
States] in the sense that it left an incurable and deep wound in Japan-U.S. relations.” Masako Iino also writes
that “the enactment of the 1924 Immigration Act seems to have triggered the ‘vicious cycle of mutual distrust
and mutual stimulation to take hardline attitudes’ which would lead to the outbreak of the Japan-U.S. war in
1941.” See Toshihiro Minohara, Hainichi Imin Hō to Nichi-Bei Kankei [The Japanese Exclusion Act and Japan-
6

banned the entry of immigrants who were ineligible for naturalization. The ineligibility of Japanese
immigrants to become U.S. citizens was the legal basis for California Alien Land Laws of 1913
and 1920 that prohibited the Japanese from purchasing and leasing land. And the Ozawa v. United
States case in 1922 firmly established the non-white racial status of the Japanese as ineligible for
naturalization by rejecting an appeal filed by a Japanese immigrant Takao Ozawa who applied for
naturalization. The 1924 Immigration Act reaffirmed the racial status of the Japanese as
undesirable and ineligible to become part of the American nation. On the other hand, Mexicans
were legally regarded as white based on the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo of 1848 and exempted
from the numerical restriction institutionalized by the 1924 Act largely due to growing demands
for Mexican labor in the Southwest. However, new entry requirements imposed by the 1924 Act
and the establishment of the U.S. Border Patrol in the same year functioned to racialize Mexicans
increasingly as non-white and illegal immigrants.
8

Although the U.S. state power and its racial nationalism considerably affected the lives of
Japanese and Mexican immigrants, these immigrants were also under the influence of the new
international regime of the post-World War I period and the development of racial ideology in
their respective home countries, Japan and Mexico. Looking at the international context of the

U.S. relations] (Tokyo, 2002), 4; Masako Iino, Mō Hitotsu no Nichi-Bei Kankeishi: Hunsō to Kyōchō no Naka
no Nikkei Amerika Jin [Another history of Japan-U.S. relations: Japanese Americans in conflicts and
cooperation] (Tokyo, 2000), 68. Lon Kurashige stresses that “anti-Asian racism was debated, rather than simply
imposed” by highlighting, for example, the role of pro-Japanese egalitarians who opposed the implementation
of Japanese exclusion in 1924. See Lon Kurashige, Two Faces of Exclusion: The Untold History of Anti-Asian
Racism in the United States (Chapel Hill, 2016), 6.
8
Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, 2004), 1-9.
As for the history of the U.S. Border Patrol, see Kelly L. Hernández, Migra!: A History of the U.S. Border Patrol
(Berkeley, 2010). John McKiernan-González demonstrates that in El Paso from the 1910s to the 1930s, public
health officers regarded the body of Mexican migrants and children as a source of disease and Mexicans as non-
modern and non-citizen who could not handle epidemics. González sees this as the process of creating the
medical border that took the body of migrants as a division between citizens and aliens in the early twentieth
century. See John Mckiernan-González, Fevered Measures: Public Health and Race at the Texas-Mexico Border,
1848-1942 (Durham, 2012), 198-235.
7

1920s, Japan emerged as a new leading power and competed with the United States in the world
following the devastation of Europe.
9
During this decade, Japanese nationalism took the Pan-
Asianist framework in justification of its imperial expansion in East Asia, positioning the Japanese
as a leading minzoku (race or ethnicity) in Asia as competition with the West.
10
In Los Angeles
located on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, Japanese nationalism provided an emotional support
to Japanese immigrants who needed to survive the anti-Japanese environment.
11
The 1920s was
also an important period for Mexico to modernize the nation. After the Mexican Revolution, the
Mexican government sought to modernize and unify the diverse Mexican population. In the 1920s
Mexican cultural nationalist movement, post-revolutionary Mexican nationalism envisioned

9
With a renewed awareness about the importance of international cooperation and armament reduction, the
Washington Naval Treaty concluded of 1921 and 1922 assigned five powers including the United States and
Japan to limit the numbers of their battleships. Three years later, the Institute of Pacific Relations was established
as a non-government organization mainly by American and Japanese intellectuals in order to promote peace in
the Pacific region by deepening mutual understanding. The 1920s is generally remembered as the time of
international cooperation and relatively stable relations between the United States and Japan. See Ryuji Hattori
and Toshihiro Minohara, “Washinton Taisei 1920 Nendai [The Washington regime in the 1920s]” in Nichi-Bei
Kankeishi [The history of Japan-U.S. history], ed. Kaoru Iokibe (Tokyo, 2008), 83-109.
10
As for Japanese nationalism after World War I, Prasenjit Duara contends that Japanese nationalism became
radical and developed with “the ideology of pan-Asianism, which claimed to protect an authentic Asia and thus
justified the expansion [in Asia] as a holy war against the West.” See Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and
Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lanham, 2003), 34. According to Eiji Oguma, in the mid-
1920s, the Japanese discourse on the kokutai polity, which placed the emperor at the center of the Japanese
sovereignty, came to embrace the idea that the Japanese nation has historically been successful in assimilating
other ethnic groups, which ideologically justified Japanese colonization in East Asia. Oguma also explains that
the Immigration Act of 1924 generated two reactions among Japanese intellectuals that emphasized the
superiority of the Japanese nation over the United States. Some argued that the Japan was superior because the
Japanese nation was ethnically pure, while others contented that Japan was superior because it has been
assimilating other non-Japanese ethnic groups without discrimination in contrast to the racist United States. In
1924, for example, a Japanese writer named Tetsu Nakayama emphasized, “Japan will be the leader of Asia and
bring Asia back from the white race to us, the Asian minzoku,” while criticizing Japanese people’s own racial
discrimination against Koreans. See Eiji Oguma, Tan’itsu Minzoku Shinwa no Kigen: “Nihonjin” no Jigazō no
Keifu [The origin of the myth of ethnic homogeneity: The genealogy of “Japanese” self-images] (Tokyo, 1995),
148-150, 167-169.
11
As for Japanese immigrant nationalism, Yuji Ichioka wrote, “Victims of racial oppression can repudiate their
oppressors in different ways. Patriotic identification with Japan was a way by which the Issei psychologically
turned away from the America that had rejected them.” See Yuji Ichioka, Before Internment: Essays in Prewar
Japanese American History (Stanford, 2006), 199.
8

mestizaje (racial mixing) as the basis of the greatness of the Mexican nation.
12
Again in Los
Angeles, located on the other side of the U.S.-Mexico border, Mexican nationalism and the
government intervention occasionally empowered Mexican immigrants who identified themselves
as mexicanos or raza (race or people) and transformed local labor conflicts in Los Angeles into
international issues that affected both sides of the Pacific Ocean.
13

It is very important to understand that Japanese and Mexican immigrants were not simply
passive victims of American racialization but also the positive agents who could utilize their racial
and national identities to survive the Los Angeles society dominated by white Americans. And in
order to understand the political and emotional connections between Japanese and Mexicans with
their respective home governments, this study pays special attention to the role played by the
Japanese and Mexican consulates in Los Angeles, established in 1915 and 1885 respectively.
Particularly in times of Japanese-Mexican interethnic conflicts, the Japanese and Mexican
consulates played a significant role as the proxy of the respective immigrant community as well
as of their government, although the consulates did not always work for the sake of immigrants
per se and the immigrants did not always follow the instruction given by the consulates. By using
primary sources preserved in Japan, Mexico, and the United States, this dissertation illustrates the
transpacific dimension of local Japanese-Mexican relations in Los Angeles agriculture.
Los Angeles farmland developed in the early twentieth century as an important place where
Asians, Latin Americans, and white Americans worked closely. In the process of growing fruits

12
As for the historical development of mestizaje and the Mexican cultural nationalist movement, see Kelly R.
Swarthout, “Assimilating the Primitive”: Parallel Dialogue on Racial Miscegenation in Revolutionary Mexico
(New York, 2004).
13
Neil Foley explains, “Regardless of how the census classified them, Anglo Americans rarely regarded
Mexicans as belonging to the white race. Neither did most Mexicans—they identified themselves simply as
mexicanos.” Neil Foley, Mexicans in the Making of America (Cambridge, 2014), 50.
9

and vegetables, the Japanese, Mexicans, and white Americans together formed interethnic
relations beyond racial and class boundaries in the both local and transnational contexts. In other
words, this dissertation is about making transborder Los Angeles. By paying close attention to this
situational and fluid nature of race and class relations, we can see Los Angeles farmland as a
formative site of transborder Los Angeles.
Today we can find many workplaces where Asian and Latin American immigrants interact
with each other largely due to the implementation of the Immigration Act of 1965 that abolished
the exclusionist quota system. We can better observe their lives not simply in a domestic context
but also in a larger global context in which local and international factors around the Pacific Ocean
influence with each other to make up their immigrant experiences. The Asian-Latino-white
relations shape and are shaped by migration flows, the development of sending and receiving
countries or places, and the shrinking world of transpacific international relations. This social
history of Japanese-Mexican relations tells the contemporary importance of understanding
increasingly complicated multiracial relations in the international context around the Pacific Ocean
and grasping their workplace not simply as the site of conflict and exploitation but also as the site
of interethnic accommodation and mutual understanding through their actual interactions and
beyond existing racial and class boundaries.

Literature on Interethnic Relations
An increasing number of scholars have explored interethnic relations in California,
particularly in Los Angeles, to understand the history of immigration and racial dynamics. Natalia
Molina contends that “there are limits to examining racialized groups in isolation” because the
10

experience of one non-white group affected the other.
14
Yet, not much work has been done on the
relations between Asians and Mexicans, although Los Angeles and the U.S.-Mexico borderlands
areas have been a historically important site of Asian-Mexican interactions since the mid-
nineteenth century. This relative shortage of studies on Asian-Mexican relations seems to be the
result of historiographical gap between Asian American studies and Mexican American studies.
First, this gap seems to come from different historical experiences between Asian and Mexican
immigrants. Asian immigrants who came from the eastern hemisphere and were treated as a racial
threat, legally excluded from immigration and naturalization. Mexican immigrants were originally
from the western hemisphere and were largely marginalized and exploited, or internally colonized,
under U.S. imperialism. Second, this gap exists because the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s
encouraged and supported the development of ethnic studies by Asian American and Mexican
American scholars rather separately except for a few scholars such as Ronald Takaki and Tomás
Almaguer.
15
I hope this dissertation will fill this gap, by weaving the experiences of Japanese
immigrants with those of Mexican immigrants into a coherent local history of multiethnic and
multiracial Los Angeles.
16

Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of studies on interethnic relations in existing
scholarship: comparative studies and relational studies. Comparative studies look at several

14
Natalia Molina mentions that the monographs of Tomás Almaguer and Neil Foley “stood out as moving away
from a focus on one particular group to better understand how race is made,” as the former examines the racially
diverse history of California and the latter looks at the experience of Mexicans in relation to poor whites and
blacks. Natalia Molina, How Race Is Made in America: Immigration, Citizenship, and the Historical Power of
Racial Scripts (Berkeley, 2014), 3-5.
15
See Ronald Takaki, A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America (New York, 1993); Tomás
Almaguer, Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California (Berkeley, 1994).
16
Camilla Fojas and Rudy P. Guevarra Jr. emphasize the importance of creating a new field of study that
compares Asian Pacific American and Latin American studies. See Camilla Fojas and Rudy P. Guevarra Jr., eds.,
Transnational Crossroads: Remapping the Americas and the Pacific (Lincoln, 2012). As for the studies that link
Asian American studies with Native American studies, see Karen J. Leong and Myla Vicenti Carpio, eds.,
“Carceral States,” Amerasia Journal 42, no.1 (2016).
11

ethnoracial groups separately, compare them with each other, and obtain a relational understanding
on these groups. In this way, they reveal a larger picture of immigration and racial dynamics in a
city like Los Angeles or in a larger area such as the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, but they are not
much concerned with actual interactions between ethnoracial groups in the area. On the other hand,
relational studies shed light on actual interactions between ethnoracial groups, rather than
comparing their experiences independently. While my categorization of comparative and relational
studies may conflict with the definitions given by other scholars, I classify the previous studies on
interethnic relations by considering to what extent they examine the presence and extent of actual
interactions between Asians and Mexicans.
Mae Ngai’s Impossible Subjects is an important work that takes a comparative approach to
the experiences of Mexicans and Asians. Ngai shows the nature of U.S. immigration policy by
narrating the experiences of different ethnoracial groups respectively. Her study demonstrates the
similarity of ethnic Mexican and Asian experiences, both of whom were racialized by immigration
policy as illegal, criminal, and ineligible for naturalization.
17
Natalia Molina’s work on public
health policy examines the process in which public health policy constructed racial categories in
multiracial Los Angeles influencing Mexicans and Asians. Molina made another important

17
Mae Ngai argues, “Immigration policy is constitutive of Americans’ understanding of national membership
and citizenship, drawing lines of inclusion and exclusion that articulate a desired composition—imagined if not
necessarily realized—of the nation.” See Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 1-9. As for the historical development of
immigration control policy, Adam M. McKeown explains that the modern technology of immigration control
was first created to control Asians “by white settler nations around the Pacific that saw themselves as the
forefront of the liberal freedoms of the nineteenth century.” See Adam M. McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian
Migration and the Globalization of Borders (New York, 2008), 7. It is true that the United States began to
implement qualitative restrictions on immigration in the late nineteenth century and quantitative ones in the early
twentieth century, but governmental concerns and practices to control foreigners had already existed since soon
after the independence of the United States, as seen in the early republic’s naturalization acts. See James H.
Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 (Chapel Hill, 1978). Douglas Bradburn analyzed
the debates between Federalists and Jeffersonians over the Naturalization Act in the early Republic as the conflict
over national character of the new Republic. See Douglas Bradburn, “The Problem of Citizenship in the
American Revolution,” History Compass 8, no.9 (Sept., 2010).
12

contribution in her study on how the racialization of Asians influenced the racialization of
Mexicans under what she calls the “immigration regime” of 1924. Molina contends that her works
take a relational treatment that “recognizes that race is a mutually constitutive process and thus
attends to how, where, and to what extent groups intersect” by focusing particularly on how “the
racialization of one group affected the other.”
18
While I respect her definition of “relational” and
her great contribution in linking the Mexican experience with the Asian experience, I still regard
her works as part of comparative studies because they do not focus on actual interactions of
different racialized groups and different nation-states. Nevertheless, comparative studies are
important and effective in revealing the dominant institutional power structures that situate
ethnoracial minorities in disadvantaged positions in the United States. However, they do not give
us a good account of how different minorities constructed a multiethnic reality of their
neighborhoods and of the larger U.S.-Mexico borderlands in the face of restrictive immigration
policy and precarious international relations.
While government policy receives more attention in the above studies, authors of other
comparative studies have put more emphasis on dominant class and race relations in which
ethnoracial minorities in California occupy a marginalized position. As early as the 1930s, Carey
McWilliams showed, in Factories in the Field, how large land ownership of California helped
create a highly exploitative economic structure of California, particularly in the case of agricultural
industry. As a contemporary of the Popular Front movement of the 1930s, McWilliams paid
careful and empathetic attention to almost all major ethnoracial minorities which had contributed

18
Natalia Molina, Fit to Be Citizens?: Public Health and Race in Los Angles, 1879-1939 (Berkeley, 2006);
“Examining Chicana/o History through a Relational Lens,” Pacific Historical Review 82, no.4 (Nov., 2013):
521-522; How Race Is Made in America, 5. As another example of comparative studies, see Erika Lee and Judy
Yung, Angel Island: Immigrant Gateway to America (New York, 2010).
13

to the development of California agriculture to one of its own major industries. McWilliams’s
approach to California as part of the “Pacific Rim” deserves special attention, although he mainly
looks at the Pacific Ocean from the North American continent, and not much from its opposite
side. He spent several pages on Japanese-Mexican conflicts in the 1930s Los Angeles, framing his
approach along comparative lines.
19
More than a half-century after the publication of
McWilliams’s Factories in the Field, in the 1990s, Tomás Almaguer presented a new picture of
the California’s history by clearly recognizing race and racialization process as “the central
organizing principle of group life” in California. Like other comparative studies, actual interethnic
interactions are not his main subject, but he spends one chapter detailing the close interaction
between Mexican and Japanese immigrant farmworkers who organized a bi-national labor union
in Oxnard, Ventura County, in 1903.
20
As we see in the works of McWilliams and Almaguer, we
should remember that comparative studies can have relational analyses as well. However, most
comparative studies seem to put emphasis more on larger structural power that explains
marginalized positions of Mexicans and Asians in the United States, rather than on the social
history of Mexicans and Asians and the cultural and material forces drawn from their countries of
origin with which immigrants survived in the United States.
Meanwhile, an increasing number of scholars study interethnic relations in a relational
perspective. I further classify relational studies into three subcategories: intimate relations,
neighborhood relations, and labor and political relations. My three subcategories of relational
studies may overlap with each other, but these are useful and convenient to understand complicated
interethnic relations, treated in recent studies, which range from relations between individuals to

19
Carey McWilliams, Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California (Berkeley, 1939;
2000), 246-248; Southern California: An Island on the Land (Salt Lake City, 1946; 1973), 374.
20
Tomás Almaguer, Racial Fault Lines, ix, 7, 183-213.
14

those between immigrant groups. As an example of intimate relations, Karen Isaksen Leonard has
explored the history of Punjabi men from India, Mexican women, and their Punjabi Mexican
children in the Imperial Valley in the twentieth century. California antimiscegenation laws
“prohibited marriages between people of different races, and Punjabis were generally classified as
nonwhite” but local Anglo Americans did not problematize the relationship between Punjabi men
and Mexican women.
21
Another example of Asian-Mexican intermarriage is Rudy Guevarra’s
work on the history of Mexican-Filipino relations and the development of the Mexipino
community in San Diego. The local histories of Punjabi-Mexicans and Mexipinos help us
understand the development of their distinct identities and much larger historical connections and
migrations across the Pacific Ocean as well as the U.S.-Mexico border.
22

As for the studies on multiracial neighborhoods, George J. Sánchez has highlighted Boyle
Heights, Los Angeles, where Jews, Mexicans, Japanese, and other ethnoracial groups such as
Italians, Armenians, African Americans, and Russian Molokans created a multicultural

21
Isaksen maintains that Punjabi Mexicans “view their ethnic identity as a resource that they employed flexibly
over the life cycle,” interpreting their identity not as “marginal” or “borderland” but as central in their experience
in changing domestic and international contexts. As was often the case with other male dominant immigrant
groups, Punjabi men, who settled in California in the 1910s, could neither find Punjabi women nor bring their
wives from India. Thus, they built their new families with their local Mexican wives, who immigrated to the
United States after the Mexican Revolution. Karen Isaksen Leonard, Making Ethnic Choices: California’s
Punjabi Mexican Americans (Philadelphia, 1992), 63, 216-217. Grace Peña Delgado, focusing on the Chinese
in the Arizona-Sonora borderlands, argues that Arizona’s anti-miscegenation laws prohibited marriage between
Chinese men and Mexican women in the late nineteenth century. See Grace Peña Delgado, Making the Chinese
Mexican: Global Migration, Localism, and Exclusion in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (Stanford, 2012), 45. The
California’s antimiscegenation law was declared unconstitutional in a landmark 1948 lawsuit known as the Perez
v. Sharp case. Dara Orenstein argues that “the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo [had been used] as precedent in
cases involving Mexicans, sidestepping questions of Mexican racial pedigree” and that “unlike ‘Negroes’ or
‘Mongolians,’ Mexicans were defined legally by an absence of definition.” Regarding the finding of Leonard,
Orenstein argues that “when a marriage seemed unlikely to make headlines, county clerks tended to defer to
local custom.” See Dara Orenstein, “Void for Vagueness: Mexicans and the Collapse of Miscegenation Law in
California,” Pacific Historical Review 74, no.3 (Aug., 2005): 369-370, 387.
22
What made the Mexipino community significant is that both Filipino and Mexican immigrants shared the
legacy of Spanish colonialism as both groups practice Catholicism and speak or learn Spanish, and confronted
racism together in the white dominant U.S. society. See Rudy P. Guevarra, Jr., Becoming Mexipino: Multiethnic
Identities and Communities in San Diego (New Brunswick, 2012).
15

neighborhood before 1940 and became a model for interracial harmony in the 1950s, when the
division between the city’s whites and non-white population was growing through racial and class
stratification.
23
Unlike the studies exploring racially segregated ghettos, an increasing number of
studies focus on multiracial residential areas as “sites of interaction which taught everyone the
meaning of American identity,” as Sánchez points out.
24
Residential areas are not simply the space
for multiracial interaction. As Elizabeth R. Escobedo demonstrates, World War II gave Mexican
American women in Los Angeles a chance to interact with other ethnoracial minorities such as
Chinese, Filipino, black, and Euro-American women in their wartime workplace, while their work
experience generally “provided Mexican women with opportunities to embrace an ‘almost white’
social status.”
25
These studies on multiracial neighborhoods as well as workplaces help us
understand bottom-up multiculturalism, which is different from the top-down cosmopolitanism
oftentimes developed by elite intellectuals.

23
George J. Sánchez, “‘What’s Good for Boyle Heights is Good for the Jews’: Creating Multiculturalism on the
Eastside during the 1950s.” American Quarterly 56, no.3 (Sept., 2004). As for the relations between Japanese
and African Americans, see Scott Kurashige, The Shifting Grounds of Race: Black and Japanese Americans in
the Making of Multiethnic Los Angeles, (Princeton, 2010). Describing the history of Los Angeles before World
War II, Allison Varzally contends that minorities living in multiethnic neighborhoods like Boyle Heights “linked
their lives in ways that more often expanded than constricted ethnoracial categories.” See Allison Varzally,
Making a Non-White America: Californians Coloring outside Ethic Lines, 1925-1955 (Berkeley, 2008), 46-79.
24
George J. Sánchez, “Working at the Crossroads: American Studies for the 21st Century: Presidential Address
to the American Studies Association, November 9, 2001,” American Quarterly 54, no.1 (Mar., 2002): 3-4.
25
Elizabeth R. Escobedo, From Coveralls to Zoot Suits: The Lives of Mexican American Women on the World
War II Home Front (Chapel Hill, 2013), 99-100. The same thing can be said about Davis and Pérez, the couple
mentioned earlier as a case of intermarriage, who met each other at the common workplace during the war. For
Davis, it was not only their workplace but also his Catholic congregation where he had acquainted himself with
blacks, Mexicans, and whites, as he remembered “Everything was mixed.” Orenstein, “Void for Vagueness:
Mexicans and the Collapse of Miscegenation Law in California,” 372. On the other hand, these studies tend to
describe wartime workplaces as a nice place for multiracial and multicultural understanding, overlooking the
relentless reality that workers were mobilized to produce weapons in order to kill soldiers and civilians outside
the United States. It remains for us to contextualize these rich social histories of interactions between different
ethnoracial groups in relation to other countries, especially the sending countries of immigrants living in such
multiracial neighborhoods.
16

Labor and political relations are the third subcategory of relational studies. In labor and
political movements, different ethnoracial minorities not only achieved interethnic cooperation but
also developed interethnic conflicts with each other. Many historians regard the 1930s to be the
formative period of interethnic cooperation generated by the New Deal, the Communist Party, and
the Popular Front movement. Focusing on class-based interethnic interactions such as street
meetings and demonstrations, Mark Wild contends that from the 1880s to World War II, working-
class populations of different ethnoracial backgrounds in Los Angeles “entered a new kind of
cosmopolitan social space conditioned by the exigencies of modern urban life” and “transgressed
ethnic and racial boundaries.” As an example, he details the activities of a Japanese American
communist, Karl Yoneda, and describes him as “a fervent believer in multiracial coalition with
Mexicans and African Americans.”
26
Likewise, Shana Bernstein has analyzed the success of the
Community Service Organization that became active in the 1930s and concluded that “[s]uch
intercommunity networks hint at a substantial continuity between earlier activism [of the 1930s]
and its postwar incarnation.”
27
However, both studies do not pay much attention to the immigrant
generation of ethnoracial minorities who played a major role, for example, in Japanese-Mexican
conflicts in the 1930s.
28
Wild and Bernstein challenge the black-and-white binary approach and
the white-centered national history of the United States by offering important accounts of

26
Mark Wild, Street Meeting: Multiethnic Neighborhoods in Early Twentieth-Century Los Angeles (Berkeley,
2008), 5, 191. Like many other works, James R. Barrett sheds light on the role the Communist Party played in
building interethnic coalitions, arguing that “[e]specially by the early twentieth century, American working-class
formation was of necessity interethnic, emerging from the mixture of people from diverse backgrounds and
depending on contact across ethnic boundaries.” See James R. Barrett, “Americanization from the Bottom Up:
Immigration and the Remaking of the Working Class in the United States, 1880-1930,” Journal of American
History 79, no.3 (Dec., 1992): 1000.
27
Shana Bernstein, Bridges of Reform: Interracial Civil Rights Activism in Twentieth-Century Los Angeles (New
York, 2011), 138-184.
28
For example, Bernstein mentions that “[i]n 1933 at least thirty-seven agricultural strikes swept across
California, some in the Los Angeles” without explaining that some of the large strikes happened between
Japanese farmers and Mexican farmworkers. Ibid., 37.
17

interethnic solidarity. Other works such as the one done by Scott Kurashige have made a similar
important contribution. But they do not challenge the national history itself, for they pay little
attention to the social history of the immigrant generation and international relations, which would
tell us more of the historical connection between multiethnic Los Angeles and their countries of
origin.
29

This dissertation takes a relational approach to examine Japanese-Mexican relations, paying
special attention to their labor and political interactions in Los Angeles farmland from 1924 to
1942. There is no comprehensive study on Japanese-Mexican relations, since previous works have
focused on one ethnic group, either Japanese or Mexican, or examined both groups in comparison.
Thus, this dissertation will provide a clear picture of Japanese-Mexican interactions in Los Angeles.
Furthermore, it will situate Japanese-Mexican relations in the intersection of the Pacific Ocean and
the U.S.-Mexico borderlands and weaves the local history of Japanese-Mexican relations with the
history of international relations involving Japan, Mexico, and the United States. Immigration
history is almost inevitably transnational history.
30
This dissertation examines the transnational

29
Although it is not about California, Neil Foley has made a great contribution to our understanding of racial
relations beyond the black-and-white binary paradigm. Foley has analyzed the nature of whiteness as well as the
intermediate racial status of Mexicans in the early twentieth century Texas by looking at racial and class relations
between Mexicans, blacks, and poor whites. He argues that the white middle class began to regard white tenant
farmers as the white scourge, criticizing their inability to become independent landowners. White bankers and
landowners increasingly looked down on such white tenants and characterized them as inefficient and thriftless
just like they characterized blacks and Mexicans. In this process, Foley argues, white tenants lost their racial
status as whites despite their skin color. In his analysis on interracial labor unionism, Foley also touches upon
the global context related to the ideas about land distribution and ownership. See Neil Foley, The White Scourge:
Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture (Berkeley, 1997).
30
Transnationalism, which is used widely by scholars in different ways, can be ambiguous in meaning. We can,
however, more or less agree that the term “the transnational” basically refers to the sociohistorical flows of
people, capital, goods, information, and ideas that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state. As sociohistorical
phenomena, transnational practices can include not only global and imperial dominion by capital and the nation-
state “from above” but also resistance and accommodation by marginalized individuals such as migrant workers
“from below” in the increasingly interconnected world. Madeline Y. Hsu’s study on transpacific Chinese
migrants is a good example to show the transnational identity and practice “from below.” Hsu demonstrates that
after the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Chinese immigrants in the United States and their families in South
China created a single transnational community, embracing their practice of migration as a central part of their
18

processes in which the triangular relationship between peoples and governments of the three
Pacific Rim countries generated racial and economic inequalities as well as mutual understanding
during the turbulent period from 1924 to 1942. In this regard, Grace Peña Delgado’s study on
ethnic Chinese residents in the Arizona-Sonora borderlands provides an important insight into the
question on the historical intersection between the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands and the Pacific Ocean.
Her work has contributed to make a transnational turn in the historiography of multiethnic relations.
She examines the borderlands as a space where local and transnational factors of China, Mexico,
and the United States operated simultaneously and helped create U.S. and Mexican immigration
policies at around the turn of the twentieth century. By illustrating a local history of Chinese
residents who made efforts to build socioeconomic and legal relationships with Mexican neighbors
or officers, she illuminates the U.S.-Mexico borderlands as “trans-Pacific borderlands.”
31

identity and creating a social system to keep separate families bound together. Likewise, the U.S.-Mexico
borderlands has been a space where transnational identities can develop. Alicia Shmidt Camacho has analyzed
the subjectivity of trans-border migrants by examining oral, literary, and visual texts related to Mexican
immigration. She argues that “[r]esponding to conditions of voluntary or coerced departure, migrants create new
imaginative worlds… Migrant imaginaries, as articulated by subaltern groups, rarely break into the closed
domain of national sovereignty.” See Luis Eduardo Guarnizo and Michael Peter Smith, “The Locations of
Transnationalism” in Guarnizo and Smith eds., Transnationalism from Below (Piscataway, 1998); Madeline Y.
Hsu, Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration between the United States and
South China, 1882-1943 (Stanford, 2000); Alicia Schmidt Camacho, Migrant Imaginaries: Latino Cultural
Politics in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (New York, 2008). As for more scholarly discussions on
transnationalism, see Shelley Fisher Fishkin, “The Transnational Turn in American Studies: Presidential Address
to the American Studies Association, November 12, 2004,” American Quarterly 57, no.1 (Mar., 2005); C. A.
Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol and Patricia Seed, “AHR Conversation:
On Transnational History,” American Historical Review 111, no.5 (Dec., 2006).
31
Peña Delgado, Making the Chinese Mexican. Robert Chao Romero also argues that from the late nineteenth
century “the Chinese created a transnational commercial orbit in resistance and adaption” to the Chinese
Exclusion Act and that their activities involved “a multinational socioeconomic network spanning China, Latin
America, and the United States.” See Robert Chao Romero, The Chinese in Mexico, 1882-1940 (Tucson, 2010).
As for the U.S.-Canada borderlands, Kornel S. Chang demonstrates that the U.S.-Canada border was “a product
of intercolonial cooperation and exchange, as Anglophone empires supported each other’s prerogative to
imperial rule in Asia and the Pacific.” See Kornel S. Chang, Pacific Connections: The Making of the U.S.-
Canadian Borderlands (Berkeley, 2012). In contrast to previous studies that highlight interethnic collaboration,
this article focuses more on interethnic and international tensions as important factors in the formation of
transpacific borderlands in the early 1930s.
19

This dissertation adopts Peña Delgado’s conceptualization but focuses more specifically on
Los Angeles farmland that functioned as a central site of the transpacific borderlands. Los Angeles
is a very important place whose history has attracted the attention of many historians who explore
multiethnic relations in the American West where Asians and Latin Americans began to interact
with each other as minority groups from the late nineteenth century. In other words, the
historiography of this region tells us how scholars have understood multiethnic relations over time.
This dissertation shows that Los Angeles saw the triracial negotiations between the Japanese,
Mexicans, and white Americans for the first time in a meaningful way and in a large scale,
providing a new understanding of multiethnic relations in Los Angeles and the American West.
The history of the American West and U.S.-Mexico borderlands cannot be fully understood by
looking only at biracial relations between one non-white minority and the white majority because
many communities in this region were multiethnic. We have yet to fully explore these ethnoracially
diverse communities in the international context around the Pacific Ocean.
Like Peña Delgado, Eiichiro Azuma has contributed to make the transnational turn in the
multiracial historiography of the American West. Azuma has examined the triracial interactions
between the Japanese, Filipinos, and white Americans in the 1930s Stockton in Northern California
and provided a historical perspective indispensable for us to understand the Japanese immigrant
experience. In his book Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese
America, Azuma adequately describes the dual status and transnationalism of Japanese immigrants
as citizen-subjects of imperial Japan and resident members of white America simultaneously. With
this understanding, Azuma examines the world view of Japanese tenant farmers who “envisioned
a simple, three-tiered, overlapping race and class hierarchy, where white elites, Japanese
entrepreneurs, and Filipino union laborers formed the pyramid in descending order.” He argues
20

that Japanese tenant farmers “appropriated the ruling ideology of white supremacy as their own
and endeavored to turn perceived social relations into real ones.” Therefore, being a proper
Japanese national was compatible with becoming a good American resident who would understand
the dominant white racial ideology. In the serious conflict with Filipino workers, Japanese farmers
were determined to confront them to “protect the ‘natural’ order of existing power relations” in
their “class unconsciousness.”
32
Azuma applies a similar perspective to the Japanese immigrant
experience in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. In understanding the Japanese immigrant world view
in relation to Mexicans, Azuma emphasizes California Japanese as settler colonialists who thought
it “easy to dominate” Mexicans and become a “master” race in Mexico when they faced the anti-
Japanese movement in the 1890s San Francisco. And Azuma interprets the increase of Japanese
immigrants in the 1920s Mexico in terms of settler colonialism and argues that large numbers of
California Japanese resettled in Baja California, which was not the case simply because they
mostly stayed in California thinking it difficult to resettle in Mexico as the second chapter of this
dissertation explains.
33

32
Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America (New
York, 2005), 187-207. According to Azuma, Japanese farmers in the 1930s Stockton regarded Mexicans as
docile and attempted to hire them to reduce their reliance on Filipino farmworkers. As for Japanese-Filipino
relations, see also, Chris Friday, Organizing Asian American Labor: The Pacific Coast Canned-Salmon Industry,
1870-1942 (Philadelphia, 1994).
33
Azuma argues that the increase of Japanese immigrants in Baja California in the 1920s strengthened white
Americans’ racial fear of the hemispheric “Yellow Peril,” which was eventually relieved by the relocation of
ethnic Japanese residents from Baja California during World War II. However, Azuma does not elaborate on
why Japanese immigrants could considerably increase in the 1920s Baja California despite white Americans’
racial fear of the hemispheric “Yellow Peril” and to what extent the hemispheric “Yellow Peril” influenced the
Mexican government’s decision to relocate the Japanese from Baja California during World War II. I would
argue that the “Yellow Peril” fear was not influential at least in the 1920s in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands given
the relatively amicable relations between Japan and Mexico as detailed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. As for
Azuma’s argument on Japanese settler colonialism in Mexico, see Azuma, “Japanese Immigrant Settler
Colonialism in the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands and the U.S. Racial-Imperialist Politics of the Hemispheric
‘Yellow Peril’,” Pacific Historical Review 83, no.2 (2014).
21

Azuma’s work has made a significant contribution to our understanding of multiracial
relations in California, particularly showing the compatibility of Japanese imperial nationalism
with white supremacy in multiracial California. However, his work describes the triracial hierarchy
of the Japanese, Filipinos, and white Americans as a stable and rigid social structure divided along
existing racial and class boundaries under the influence of white supremacy. It downplays,
however, the social dimension that was not totally dominated by white supremacy and overlooks
the agency of minority residents and white people who did not always fit in the dominant triracial
hierarchy. In contrast, by looking at the triangular relations between the Japanese, Mexicans, and
white Americans in Los Angeles farmland, this dissertation demonstrates their triracial hierarchy
as an unstable and fluid relationship, not simply dominated by existing racial and class factors. I
would argue that the social factor of working together in Los Angeles farmland over a long time
despite their racial and class differences played an important role in changing the dominant racial
and class structure. This change was substantiated by the efforts of some Japanese, Mexicans, and
white Americans who cooperated with each other even in periods of serious Japanese-Mexican
labor conflicts in the 1930s and very strong anti-Japanese sentiment following the Pearl Harbor
attack in the 1940s. To understand the nature of triracial interactions, we need to look conceptually
beyond white supremacy and geographically beyond the Pacific Ocean and the U.S.-Mexico
border. For this purpose, this study draws on primary sources in three languages to reveal a fuller
picture of triangular interactions between the Japanese, Mexicans, and white Americans in pre-
war Los Angeles agriculture.
I regard Los Angeles farmland as a transpacific workplace that not only generated local labor
and racial conflicts but functioned as contested site in which their local relations operated within
the context of increasingly precarious international relations around the Pacific Ocean from 1924
22

to 1942. The transpacific workplace concept helps us to identify specific sites where Asian and
Latin American immigrants interact with one another as racialized minorities in the white
dominant U.S. society and where their interactions were partly as a product of international
relations between their home countries and the United States. As shown in this dissertation, in the
1920s, Los Angeles farmland transformed into a transpacific workplace in a full scale along with
the rapid economic development of Los Angeles as a major American city. And the relations built
by the Japanese, Mexicans, and white Americans were neither rigid nor fixed but rather fluid and
situational so that it had a potential to develop mutual trust beyond racial and class differences.
34

As for terminology, this dissertation considers Japanese and Mexican immigrants basically
as ethnoracial minorities since the ethnic and racial categories cannot completely be separated in
theory and reality. Nevertheless, it mainly uses the terms “ethnic” and “interethnic” to describe the
Japanese and Mexicans as a group of immigrants and their mutual relations, putting importance
on the agency of immigrants and their cultural and national ties with their home countries. On the
other hand, when situating these immigrant groups in relation to the white majority, it mainly uses
the terms “racial” and “triracial” to emphasize the aspect that they were minorities racialized by
the dominant white society in the domestic context.
35

34
Although the Chinese were the precursor of Asian immigrants in this region, the ethnic Chinese population in
Los Angeles County was quite small (5,330 in 1940) compared to the ethnic Japanese (36,866 in 1940) before
the Pacific War largely as the consequence of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. They did not make up the
highly populated and institutionalized triracial hierarchy like the one developed by Japanese, Mexicans, and
whites in Los Angeles farmland. U.S. Census Bureau, Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population
(Washington, D.C., 1943), Table 25, “Indians, Chinese, and Japanese by Sex, for Counties, and for Cities of
10,000 to 100,000,” 567.
35
As for the definitions of race and ethnicity, for example, see Michael James, “Race,” Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, online at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/race/#RacVerEth, accessed January 8, 2018.
23

Primary Sources
This dissertation draws on primary sources related to the ethnic communities of Japanese and
Mexican immigrants, diplomatic relations between Japan, Mexico, and the United States, and local
agriculture in California, particularly Los Angeles County. To collect and analyze these documents,
I have conducted archival research in three countries, Japan, Mexico, and the United States,
visiting cities such as Los Angeles, Carson, Claremont, Irvine, Riverside, Berkeley, Washington
D.C., Tokyo, Yokohama, Mexico City, and Mexicali. Immigrant newspapers such as the Rafu
Shimpo and La Opinión, first published in 1903 and 1926 respectively, are crucial to understand
the experiences and perspectives of the ethnic Japanese and Mexican communities, as Sally M.
Miller contends that “the press is the best primary source for an understanding of the world of non-
English-speaking groups in the United States.”
36
Although the Rafu Shimpo began to publish the
English edition in 1926 for the second-generation readers, this dissertation mostly uses the original
Japanese edition because it focuses primarily on the immigrant-generation. It makes clear in
footnotes when citing the English edition.
37
As for diplomatic documents, this dissertation uses
Japanese diplomatic documents and, to a lesser extent, Mexican diplomatic documents, simply
because the former contains more information about Japanese-Mexican relations. The Japanese

36
Sally M. Miller, The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook (Westport, 1987),
xii. In his analysis on the contribution of La Opinión, Raul D. Tovares summarizes four unique functions of the
ethnic media that have been discussed by a variety of scholars. First, ethnic media provide information about the
homeland. Second, they promote ethnic pride. Third, they teach recent immigrants how to settle in the new
country. And finally, ethnic media express the group’s changing values and identity. See Raul Tovares, “La
Opinión and its contribution to the Mexican community’s adaptation to life in the US,” Latino Studies 7, no.4
(Dec., 2009): 482. All the La Opinión articles cited in this dissertation are available at Google news. See Google
news, La Opinión, online at https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=A8NefVh_EAoC, accessed February 8,
2018.
37
Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi Kankō Iinkai [Publishing committee of Japanese in Southern
California: A history of 70 years], ed., Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi [Japanese in Southern California:
A History of 70 Years] (Los Angeles, 1960), 264, 267. The English edition of the Rafu Shimpo is cited only in
Chapter 6. And this dissertation uses Rafu Shimpo as the newspaper name as it appears on the paper, although it
is more accurate to write Rafu Shimpō in terms of pronunciation.
24

and Mexican consulates in Los Angeles oversaw and recorded the situations of Japanese and
Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles County and its vicinity. These diplomatic documents give us
a clear picture of how the Japanese and Mexican governments related to their respective
countrymen and women and how they negotiated with one another regarding Japanese-Mexican
interethnic relations in Los Angeles County.
38

As far as Los Angeles agribusiness is concerned, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce records
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture records are important documents that tell us about the
importance of Japanese and Mexican labor in Los Angeles agriculture as well as the racist view
presented by white business leaders towards these two major non-white minorities. In terms of the
agricultural labor crisis during the Pacific War, documents written by California Governor Culbert
Olson help us connect Japanese Internment with the Bracero Program from the agricultural
perspective. In addition, numerous land lease contracts preserved by real estate companies of the
South Bay area in Los Angeles County prove and detail the triracial hierarchy and interactions in
Los Angeles farmland during and after the mass removal of ethnic Japanese residents.

Organization of This Dissertation
This dissertation consists of six chapters that narrate the history of Japanese-Mexican
relations in Los Angeles agriculture from its development to its sudden demise. Chapter 1 briefly

38
Japanese and Mexican diplomatic documents help us understand the Japanese and Mexican immigrant
experiences in the international context. Yuji Ichioka contends, “It is vital to examine the relationship between
the homeland government and the immigrant nation in any interpretation of Japanese immigrants and their
descendants.” See Ichioka, Before Internment, 278. Lon Kurashige also argues that it is important to examine
diplomatic and trade relations between the United States and Asian countries in order to analyze the era of anti-
Asian politics. See Kurashige, Two Faces of Exclusion, 6-7.

25

explains the local history of Los Angeles before 1924 from the global perspective as the
background for what would happen in Japanese-Mexican relations in Los Angeles farmland after
1924. Chapter 2 explores the impact of the Immigration Act of 1924 on Japanese immigrants in
Los Angeles County and the subsequent development of a transborder ethnic Japanese community
in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. Japanese exclusion made Los Angeles Japanese seriously
concerned about their future in the anti-Japanese U.S. society and increasingly interested in
migrating southward to Mexico. At just about the same time, people in Japan felt the same way
and suddenly began to talk about Mexico as a hopeful destination for future Japanese emigrants.
In fact, many Japanese headed to Mexico from Japan. Above all, Japanese immigrants in Baja
California substantially increased. The Baja California Japanese community became firmly
incorporated into a southern part of a transborder ethnic Japanese community in the U.S.-Mexico
borderlands. Chapter 2 explains how Los Angeles Japanese conducted a campaign to do research
on Mexican society and culture in line with the similar efforts simultaneously made by their co-
ethnics in Tokyo in hopes of building new Japanese settlements in Mexico. It also details why and
how the Immigration Act of 1924 resulted in the increase of Japanese immigrants in Mexico by
focusing on an understudied fact that the 1924 Act nullified the Gentlemen’s Agreement that had
long prevented the Japanese government from issuing passports to Japanese emigrants to go to
Mexico. The development of the transborder ethnic Japanese community, an unintended
consequence of the 1924 Act, provided an important historical setting that made local Japanese-
Mexican interactions in Los Angeles farmland generate international repercussion in the 1930s.
Chapter 3 observes the increase of Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles County after Japanese
exclusion as an indispensable factor of the development of a triracial hierarchy in Los Angeles
agriculture in the 1920s. More specifically speaking, it analyzes how the development of the ethnic
26

Mexican community and the increasing demand for Mexican workers were explained by white
agribusiness leaders, perceived by Japanese immigrants who increasingly interacted with
Mexicans, and substantiated and strengthened by Mexican immigrants themselves. After Japanese
exclusion that totally stopped the supply of newly coming Japanese immigrants, Japanese tenant
farmers continued to lease lands from white landowners and increasingly relied on Mexican
workers, stabilizing the triracial hierarchy in Los Angeles agriculture. Facing the increase of
Mexican workers, white nativists quickly replaced the “Japanese problem” with the “Mexican
problem” (and the “Filipino problem”) as their major target. On the other hand, to calm down anti-
Mexican sentiment, white agribusiness leaders racialized Mexican immigrants as inferior but also
as a very safe source of labor coming specifically from Mexican “Indian” tribes by comparing
them with other groups of people such as urban dwellers in Mexico and Japanese immigrants.
Japanese immigrants in Los Angeles often portrayed Mexicans as criminals and inferior to the
Japanese but also deepened their relations in urban and nonurban areas to the extent that they
invested in the emerging ethnic Mexican business. Meanwhile, Mexican immigrants in Los
Angeles achieved two major developments that would empower their ethnic community: the
publication of an ethnic Mexican newspaper La Opinión in 1926 and the creation of a large-scale
labor union La Confederación de Uniones Obreras Mexicanas (CUOM) in 1928. This chapter
explains the formative period of the La Opinión and the CUOM in relation to Japanese immigrants,
since the ethnic press and the union would later play indispensable roles in supporting Mexican
strikers and criticizing Japanese farmers in the 1930s.
Chapter 4 and 5 examine interethnic conflicts between Japanese and Mexican immigrants in
Los Angeles farmland during Great Depression years by focusing on two large-scale agricultural
strikes launched by Mexican workers against Japanese tenant farmers. Chapter 4 observes the El
27

Monte Berry strike of 1933 and its international repercussions across the Pacific Ocean as well as
the U.S.-Mexico border. The El Monte strike became one of California’s largest labor conflicts in
1933. The strike evolved from a local interethnic conflict into an international problem in which
anti-Japanese sentiment travelled across the U.S.-Mexico border, merged with Mexican
nationalism, and forced Japanese residents in Mexicali, Baja California to issue an unexpected
pro-labor and pro-Mexican statement against their co-ethnics in Los Angeles. The Japanese and
Mexican consulates helped this local interethnic problem transform into an international problem
by intervening in or mediating the conflict. By focusing on the transpacific character of the
Japanese-Mexican interethnic relations in Los Angeles agriculture, this chapter details the process
in which Mexican nationalism trumped ethnic solidarity among Japanese immigrants in their
transborder community and the exacerbating situation in Mexico, rather than in California, played
a decisive role in the settlement of the strike. The pro-Mexican action taken by the Mexicali
Japanese destabilized the existing racial and class boundaries in Los Angeles farmland, forcing the
Los Angeles Japanese to make a compromise with Mexican strikers.
Chapter 5 continues to examine the Japanese-Mexican conflict by looking at another large-
scale agricultural strike, namely the Venice Celery strike of 1936, and explores the growth of
interethnic alliances in Los Angeles farmland. Unable to see the improvement of their working
and living conditions after the El Monte strike, Mexican farmworkers went on the Venice strike
against Japanese farmers in 1936. Compared to the previous strike, the Venice strike developed
within the Los Angeles local context. However, it caused a serious internal divide within the Los
Angeles Japanese community. Largely influenced by the enactment of the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, Mexican strikers began to demand union recognition and some Japanese
began to express sympathy toward Mexicans and their demand. While most Japanese farmers
28

vehemently opposed union recognition and sought to maintain the rigid racial and class boundaries,
more than fifty Japanese farmers signed a contract with Mexican strikers challenging the existing
norm of the triracial hierarchy. By exploring the Venice strike in the context of the New Deal pro-
labor political atmosphere, Chapter 5 illustrates how the Japanese-Mexican interethnic conflict
made Japanese immigrants to reconsider their position as a non-white minority in the highly
multiethnic Los Angeles society and how Japanese immigrant nationalism responded to the
growing need for interethnic accommodation in the mid-1930s Los Angeles.
Chapter 6 will focus on the sudden demise of Japanese-Mexican relations as well as of the
transborder ethnic Japanese community by analyzing Japanese relocation and internment as an
agricultural labor crisis in California, particularly Los Angeles farmland. In contrast to previous
studies that focus on the experience of ethnic Japanese community, this chapter examines the
impact of Japanese relocation and internment on the wartime agricultural industry and on the
ethnic Mexican community in Los Angeles County. For local farming communities in California,
the mass removal of ethnic Japanese meant the loss of reliable resident farmers and thereby an
agricultural labor crisis. Even after the Pearl Harbor attack, Japanese removal did not make much
sense to local officials of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and California Governor
Culbert Olson who regarded Japanese farmers as indispensable for the state’s agricultural
production. Some white landowners were also upset and concerned about how to find new tenant
farmers to maintain their Japanese farms operational without the Japanese. It is generally explained
that the ethnic Japanese in Hawaii were not interned because of their economic importance in the
islands. Yet, this chapter reminds the reader of the fact that their co-ethnics in California were also
economically very important. Their removal needed to accompany with a drastic solution for the
agricultural labor crisis, which was soon materialized by the importation of Mexican workers, the
29

so-called Bracero Program. On the other hand, Japanese relocation and internment brought an
economic opportunity for Mexican farmworkers to take over the former Japanese lands and
become tenant farmers themselves. The last chapter will demonstrate unknown aspects of
internment history that Japanese farmers were perceived as trustworthy people despite wartime
hysteria. The mutual understanding between Japanese tenant farmers and white landowners and
government officials, and even between some Japanese and Mexicans, unsettled the hardening
racial and political boundaries in wartime Los Angeles, even though it could hardly stop the
implementation of Japanese removal.
The outbreak of the Pacific War resulted in the sudden demise of Japanese-Mexican relations
in Los Angeles agriculture and the transborder ethnic Japanese community. Again, Kōji Higashi,
the Japanese writer who realized in the 1920s the importance of Mexico in U.S.-Japan relations,
was right. It was the ethnic Japanese population in Baja California, who were first removed from
the region by the Mexican government under the American diplomatic and military pressure. Soon
later, this was followed by the removal of the ethnic Japanese from California. As the result, Los
Angeles farmland ceased to exist as the transpacific workplace of Japanese and Mexican
immigrants. However, as the final chapter demonstrates, the war could not completely get rid of
the interethnic mutual trust between Japanese farmers, white landowners, and Mexican workers
that had developed in some parts of Los Angeles farmland.

30

Chapter 1
Los Angeles before 1924: A Global Meeting Place on the Pacific Rim

Los Angeles is a long-standing global meeting place. Peoples of diverse backgrounds coming
across land and sea have interacted, conflicted, and understood each other for centuries. The region
was first inhabited by Native Americans before it came to be ruled by Spain and named Los
Angeles in the late eighteenth century. The nineteenth century saw two regime changes from Spain
to Mexico and then to the United States. Before the Spanish Empire claimed its rule over the region,
five to ten thousand Native Americans, today known as the Gabrieliño-Tongva, lived there. They
interacted with other Native Americans including those living near the Colorado River and Arizona
and had a valuable source of knowledge of trade routes beyond the region. Meanwhile, California
came to be seen increasingly as an important area for the Spanish Empire to maintain its trade with
Asia across the Pacific Ocean. The Spanish Empire considered it necessary to prevent any other
European power, particularly Russia, from entering California, dreaming that California could
guide them to the mythical sea passage from Europe to Asia called the “Strait of Anián.”
The future U.S. state of California was established as a colonial crossroads in the Pacific Rim
beginning in 1769, when the Spanish Empire sent missionaries, soldiers, and settlers to the region.
Two years later, the San Gabriel Mission was founded about eight miles east of Downtown Los
Angeles and became one of the richest and most important of the missions established in the region.
Yet, as a way to limit the power of the Catholic Church over the Gabrieliño-Tongva and other
Native Americans, California’s Governor Felipe de Neve founded a civilian agricultural settlement
called Nuestra Señora La Reina de Los Angeles with forty-two settlers in 1781. In this civilian
31

settlement, Native Americans grew crops such as corn, beans, and melons for Spanish-Mexican
settlers. In return, the settlers did not demand that the former should convert to Christianity and
gave them one-third to one-half of the harvest or manufactured goods such as cotton cloth, glass
beads, and knives. Although the Spaniards imposed their cultural norms including the Spanish
language on Native Americans, they socialized with one another on an everyday basis. Some
settlers formally married with Indian women and others spoke the Indian languages fluently. By
the turn of the nineteenth century, the Los Angeles region had already been an important place for
its transpacific connection to Asia, agricultural activities, and interethnic interactions.
39

The Independence of the Republic of Mexico from the Spanish Empire in 1821 had a
significant impact on the migration flows in and out of the Los Angeles region. With the new
republic’s secularization policy, most Native Americans left their missions for the interior valleys.
The Native American population of the larger Los Angeles region marked 28,643 in 1820 but
plummeted down to 2,553 after secularization. In the Los Angeles civilian settlement, however,
their population increased from 200 in 1820 to 553 in 1836, and 650 in 1844, since former
neophytes (mission residents) chose to settle in the town where they could work as servants for
wealthy ranchero families.
40

39
Louise Pubols summarizes the history of Los Angeles from the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century.
Drawing on a wide range of important secondary sources, Pubols demonstrates the historical importance of Los
Angeles as a city that “was born a global city” connected to “the global reach of empires, political ferment in the
age of revolution, the world of Pacific trade, the ongoing negotiation of race and labor in the Americas, and Latin
American notions of gender and patriarchy.” See Louise Pubols, “Born Global: From Pueblo to Statehood,” in
A Companion to Los Angeles, eds. William Deverell and Greg Hise (Malden, 2010), 21-25. Kevin Starr touches
upon the Spanish expedition in his synthesis of California history. See Kevin Starr, California: A History (New
York, 2005), 24, 32. As for the involvement of the Gabrieliño-Tongva people in pre-Hispanic interactions
between California and other places in the American Southwest, see Erin M. Smith and Mikael Fauvelle,
“Regional Interactions between California and the Southwest: The Western Edge of the North American
Continental System,” American Anthropologist 117, no. 4 (Dec., 2015).
40
Pubols, “Born Global: From Pueblo to Statehood,” 31; Albert Camarillo, Chicanos in California: A History
of Mexican Americans in California (Sparks, 1984: 1990), 5-7.
32

At the same time, the Los Angeles settlement attracted new migrants from Mexico,
particularly from Sonora and Sinaloa, as well as other European American immigrants from New
Mexico and the Mississippi Valley. Although the Los Angeles population increased only slightly
from 1,088 in 1820 to 1,250 in 1844, the Mexican period saw the expansion of ranchos for the
growing hide and tallow trade thanks to the liberalized land policy. By the 1830s, the trade lines
had been firmly established between California rancheros and New England traders. These
maritime traders brought to California manufactured goods from New England such as shoes,
while they took sea otter pelts to China. On their return voyages the New Englanders brought
Chinese goods to California before taking hides and tallow from the region back to New England.
In what is now Southern California, Manuel Domínguez, a prominent ranchero who inherited one
of the original Spanish land grants and owned more than 25,000 acres of land in the area including
the entire Los Angeles harbor, worked closely with American traders. Since he was politically
active and spoke English fluently, Manuel Domínguez became mayor of Los Angeles in 1832.
41

Mexican California also saw the reification of the Manifest Destiny theory that justified the
American rule of the northern Mexican territory. In 1848, the United State acquired California,
New Mexico, and other northern Mexican territories through the stipulations of the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo after defeating its southern neighbor in the Mexican-American War.
Nevertheless, Los Angeles remained culturally as a Mexican town, as the half of its population
still consisted of Mexicans in 1860, while the region was increasingly connected to the
transcontinental and transpacific markets.
42
As detailed in Chapter 6, Manuel Domínguez’s

41
Pubols, “Born Global: From Pueblo to Statehood,” 30-33; David Hombeck, “Land tenure and rancho
expansion in Alta California, 1784-1846,” Journal of Historical Geography 4, no. 4 (1978), 376-379; Starr,
California, 58; Dominguez Rancho Adobe Museum, “History,” online at http://dominguezrancho.org/history,
accessed February 8, 2018.
42
Starr, California, 64, 73; Pubols, “Born Global: From Pueblo to Statehood,” 35.
33

descendants would play an important role in supporting ethnic Japanese farmers during World War
II, merging the Spanish colonial history with the Mexican, American, and Japanese histories into
a global history.
Not long afterwards, the United State went through the devastating Civil War. The triumph
of the North, supported by abolitionists, Whigs, and free-soilers, prevented the westward
expansion of slavery but accelerated the westward development of the railroad network. During
the Civil War, northern Republican Party legislators enacted a variety of laws for the United States
to develop economically through government promotion and large-scale enterprise. One such law
was the transcontinental railroad bill that authorized public land grants for the westward railroad
construction. As the result, in 1869, the first transcontinental railroad was completed between the
Missouri River and Sacramento, California. Chinese immigrants, who had arrived in California
during the Gold Rush, constructed the western half of the transcontinental railroad, while Irish
immigrants did the eastern half. As historian Walter Licht phrases, “American industry was
immigrant industry” since the industrialization of the late nineteenth century was not necessarily
caused by the Civil War itself but rather by the “ample supplies of resources and inventive talent
guaranteed industrial success” and the population growth thanks to newly coming immigrants. By
1890, the entire mainland United States had been connected by 167,000 miles of railroad tracks,
serving as the extensive bloodstream of the growing U.S. economy.
43
In this period, Los Angeles
came to be firmly incorporated into the transcontinental railroad network as the Southern Pacific

43
Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: An Interpretive History (Boston, 1991), 30-31; Walter Licht, Industrializing
America: The Nineteenth Century (Baltimore, 1995), 82, 97-98, 126-128. As for the congressional debates over
the transcontinental railroad bill, see John Lauritz Larson, Internal Improvement: National Public Works and
the Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States (Chapel Hill, 2001), 240-255. As for the
ideological driving force of the Civil War, see Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the
Republican Party before the Civil War (New York, 1970; 1995); Michael A. Morrison, Slavery and the American
West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War (Chapel Hill, 1999).
34

Railroad reached the city via San Francisco in 1876 and the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
Railroad did in 1887, which resulted in the transformation of the city’s demography and local
economy with the influx of migration from other areas of the United States. The passenger rate of
the Santa Fe line dramatically dropped from $125 to one dollar within a year because of the heated
competition with its rival Southern Pacific Railroad. In 1887, the San Fe line brought three and
four passenger trains a day to Los Angeles, while the Southern Pacific transported 120,000 people
to the city.
44

The influx of these American newcomers had a considerable impact on the racial and cultural
representation of Los Angeles, since they consisted mainly of middle-class white protestant
migrants dissatisfied with their lives in the Midwest. Their arrival resulted in the significant
expansion of the city’s population from about 11,000 in 1880 to 102,000 in 1900, making Los
Angeles increasingly a white protestant city. In 1900, nearly 78 percent of the city’s population
was American-born white, while the percentage of foreign-born white population in the city was
18 percent and that of the nonwhite population 4.3 percent. The city’s boosters knew that the
population growth was crucial for the development of the Los Angeles region. They declared, “No
happier paradise for the farmer can be found than Los Angeles County,” in order to attract white
American migrants from the interior. Yet, the boosters were also aware that these prospective
newcomers did not intend to engage in large-scale farming. Therefore, they did not emphasize
their economic prosperity in agriculture but rather portrayed the city as a comfortable place where
“nature seems to work with man and not against him” liberating them from “the restless rush and

44
Starr, California, 146; Carey McWilliams, Southern California: An Island on the Land (Salt Lake City, 1946;
1973), 118-125. As for the rapid expansion of the railroad network and public antagonism against it in the late
nineteenth century California, see William Deverell, Railroad Crossing: Californians and the Railroad, 1850-
1910 (Berkeley, 1996).
35

haste of our usual life.” The development of the highway network made it much easier for the
newcomers to live in the neighboring areas around the city such as the San Fernando Valley, San
Gabriel Valley, Long Beach, and Santa Monica. As the result, Los Angeles County’s population
increased from 504,131 in 1910 to 936,455 in 1920, 92 percent of which were native and foreign
born white population except Mexican-born residents. With the presence of the overwhelming
white majority, white reformers and municipal officials drew the diving line between white
suburbs and non-white “slums” not only in their imagination but also in the actual city landscape
through measures such as zoning ordinances and public health policy among other policies.
45

In the early twentieth century, European immigrants such as Italians, Russians, and Poles
supplemented the white population of Los Angeles County, thanks to the improved transportation
facilities such as the new transportation route connecting the Southern Pacific Railroad with the
steamship service between New Orleans and Naples, Italy. In 1920, the foreign-born white
population in Los Angeles County numbered 166,579, about 88 percent increase from 1910.
African Americans also arrived at Los Angeles escaping the discriminatory socioeconomic
situation in the South and their number doubled from 9,424 to 18,738 in Los Angeles County in
the same period. Historian Douglass Flamming explains that middle-class African Americans were
“bound and determined to keep Jim Crow out of their new home [in Los Angeles, and] believed
in the transformative power of the West.”
46
Los Angeles history, however, cannot be understood

45
Robert M. Fogelson, The Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles, 1850-1930 (Cambridge, 1967), 21, 63, 72, 75,
78-82, 95; U.S. Census Bureau, Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920, Population (Washington, D.C.,
1922), Table 9, “Composition and Characteristics of the Population, for Counties,” and Table 12, “Country of
Birth of the Foreign-Born White, For Counties and For Cities of 10,000 or more,” 114, 124; Stephanie
Lewthwaite, “Race, Place, Ethnicity in the Progressive Era,” in A Companion to Los Angeles, eds. William
Deverell and Greg Hise (Malden, 2010), 48-51.
46
Mark Wild, Street Meeting: Multiethnic Neighborhoods in Early Twentieth-Century Los Angeles (Berkeley,
2005), 18; Fogelson, The Fragmented Metropolis, 75-76; U.S. Census Bureau, Fourteenth Census of the United
States: 1920, Population (Washington, D.C., 1922), Table 9, “Composition and Characteristics of the Population,
36

within the black-and-white racial paradigm because the region’s demography was becoming
increasingly multiracial and multicultural due to the influx of farmers and laborers particularly
from two Pacific Rim countries: Mexico and Japan. These countries experienced rapid
modernization and development around the turn of the twentieth century as Los Angeles did. The
downside of rapid modernization in Mexico and Japan was the impoverishment of many of their
respective citizens, who suffered from drastic reforms and became potential emigrants to Los
Angeles located in the intersection of Latin America and Asia. Mexican and Japanese immigrants
would play an indispensable role in developing agriculture in the remaining rural area of rapidly
growing Los Angeles County. While the urban history of Los Angeles is well-known, this
dissertation highlights this multiethnic non-urban history of Los Angeles from the 1920s to the
1940s by focusing on the Japanese and Mexicans as its protagonists.
As the Los Angeles region was once ruled by Mexico, old Mexican barrios still existed in the
late nineteenth century California. But their presence would be overwhelmed by the large-scale
migration of newly arriving Mexicans in the first three decades of the twentieth century. The
increase of Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles had a lot to do with the modernization of Mexico
that started with the presidency of Porfirio Díaz in 1876. The land reform and railroad construction
were the two major reforms implemented by Díaz that largely influenced the Mexican migration
north to the United States. Believing that large-scale agriculture was indispensable for the
economic development of Mexico, the Díaz administration rapidly built up the land system ruled
by powerful landowners and companies by depriving small farmers of their traditional communal
lands whose ownership was not clear from the government’s perspective. As a result, in 1910, only

for Counties,” 114. Douglass Flamming, Bound for Freedom: Black Los Angeles in Jim Crow America (Berkeley,
2005), 14.
37

one percent of the Mexican population owned 90 percent of the entire national territory, leaving
95 percent of the ten million farmers landless. Many of these landless people had no choice but to
become migratory workers. At the same time, the Díaz administration eagerly received foreign
investment particularly for the development of mines and the expansion of railroad tracks. In
Mexico, the track mileage increased from 663 kilometers in 1876 to 19,748 kilometers in 1910,
which shrunk the temporal distance between the city and the countryside and developed the
country’s market economy. Thus, many landless Mexicans took a ride on the train heading north
to the United States particularly in times of political and economic disturbances during and after
the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920). On the other side of the border, the expansion of agriculture
and implantation of restrictions on Asian labor in California enlarged the demand for agricultural
labor provided by these Mexican immigrants. By 1920, in California, ethnic Mexicans comprised
of about 75 percent of the state’s agricultural labor force (and nearly 17 percent of its unskilled
construction labor force).
47

Although the number of Mexican-born residents in California was merely 8,086 in 1900, it
jumped more than tenfold to 85,610 in 1920. Los Angeles County counted by far the largest
concentration in California where 33,644 Mexican-born residents lived (3.6 percent of the total
county population). Most Mexican immigrants first settled in the downtown Plaza area before
World War I. With the urban development and the increase of native-born white Americans who

47
George J. Sánchez argues that most Mexican immigrants to the United States not only originated from the
area near the Mexican railway system but also brought the culture that was “both modern and Mexican” due to
the rapid socioeconomic changes with the increased geographic mobility and economic dislocation during the
Porfirian period. See George J. Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in
Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (New York, 1993), 17-37; Aito Shinohara, “Kyōwakoku no Ayumi:
Mekishiko,” in Raten Amerika Sekai, eds. Yoshio Masuda, Yoshiro Yamada, and Hidefuji Someda (Kyoto,
1984), 104-105; Camarillo, Chicanos in California, 33; David G. Gutiérrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican
Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity (Berkeley, 1995), 40-45.
38

settled in the western parts of the city, many Mexican immigrants concentrated in the eastern side
of the Los Angeles River such as Boyle Heights as well.
48

When we analyze the immigrant experience in an international context, we need to look at
the activities of the consulate of their home country in the United States since the consulate served
as the official agency that protected its overseas nationals and negotiated with the local and federal
governments of the United States regarding immigration issues. The Mexican consulate had been
established in Los Angeles much before the increase of the Mexican population in the early
twentieth century. For decades after the Mexican-American War, the Mexican government did not
pay much attention to its nationals in Los Angeles. But in 1885 when Los Angeles was about to
be fully connected to the transnational railroad network, the Mexican government established its
consulate in Los Angeles, understanding the necessity to protect Mexican residents and foreseeing
the economic potential of the city. With the rapid increase of the Mexican population in the Los
Angeles region, the Mexican consulate would play a more proactive role in the protection and
control of their nationals particularly in the 1930s as detailed in Chapter 4 and 5.
49

Japanese immigrants were another major non-white minority in Los Angeles, although the
Chinese was the preceding Asian immigrant group.
50
The Japanese became visible and

48
U.S. Census Office, Twelfth Census of the United States: 1900, Population (Washington D.C., 1901), Table
33, “Foreign Born Population, Distributed According to Country of Birth, by States and Territories,” 734; U.S.
Census Bureau, Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920, Population (Washington, D.C., 1922), Table 12,
“Country of Birth of the Foreign-Born White, For Counties and For Cities of 10,000 or more,” 124; Sánchez,
Becoming Mexican American, 19, 72-73.
49
Francisco E. Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza: The Los Angeles Mexican Consulate and the Mexican
Community, 1929 to 1936 (Tucson, 1982), 3-4.
50
In 1900 in Los Angeles County, the Japanese population was only 209 while the Chinese population was 2,951.
After the completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869, Chinese immigrants began to engage mainly in
agriculture while others cast nets to catch fish all along the West Coast from Oregon to Baja California, Mexico.
In this time period, some Chinese began to settle in cities including Los Angeles. Despite their contribution to
the local economy, Los Angeles became a site of deadly anti-Chinese violence in 1871, known as the Chinese
Massacre. After a mob attacked the Chinese in Downtown Los Angeles, the sheriff found fifteen Chinese hanged,
four shot, and two wounded. Eight men were convicted for the murder but released only a year later. As for the
39

incorporated into the multiethnic economy in Los Angeles especially in the early twentieth century.
As was the case of Mexican immigrants, the political reform of Japan affected the overseas
Japanese migration across the Pacific Ocean. In 1868, fifteen years after U.S. Commodore
Matthew Perry’s first visit to Japan that brought an end to Japan’s seclusion policy and only eight
years before the beginning of the Díaz administration in Mexico, the Meiji Restoration took place
and drastically modernized the Japanese society and economy. The equivalent of the Porfirian land
reform was the tax reform called chisokaisei implemented in 1873. The new Meiji government
began to impose tax on the land instead of crops, mainly rice, to assure the stable tax revenue that
would not be influenced by crop failures or successes. Furthermore, in the 1880s, the Japanese
government took a drastic deflation policy in order to solve the serious inflation caused by the
military expenses on suppressing the uprisings of former samurais deprived of their privileges by
the regime change. The rapid decline of the rice price hurt the livelihood of rural farming families.
As the consequence of the combination of the tax reform and deflation policy, both of which were
necessary for the new government to continue the path of modernization with a stable fiscal base,
many Japanese farmers became landless and then migratory workers.
51
Meanwhile, the maritime
routes connected Japan with Seattle and San Francisco in the late 1890s making their transpacific
transportation more feasible. In the hope of having a better life, many Japanese laborers
particularly from the southwestern prefectures of Japan such as Hiroshima, Yamaguchi,

history of Chinese immigrants, see Chan, Asian Americans; Iris Chang, The Chinese in America: Narrative
History (New York, 2003). U.S. Census Office, Twelfth Census of the United States: 1900, Population
(Washington D.C., 1901), Table 34, “Foreign Born Population, Distributed According to Country of Birth, by
Counties,” 739.
51
Yuji Ichioka, The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885-1924 (New York, 198),
42-43. Masaaki Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu (Hiroshima, 1992), 11-18; Marius B. Jansen, The
Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge, 2000), 372-377.
40

Kumamoto, and Fukuoka took on the transpacific journey first to Hawaii and then to the mainland
United States particularly from the 1890s.
While the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 certainly increased demands for
substitute immigrant labor, the financial inflation after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and 1895
directed impoverished Japanese workers and jobless war veterans to the United States. In addition,
in 1894, the Japanese government set up regulations on the protection of emigrants that put private
Japanese emigrant companies in charge of sending Japanese laborers abroad, while those
companies actively recruited would-be emigrants making profits from their brokerage business.
As the result, the Japanese population in the United States increased from about 4,500 in 1892 to
35,000 in 1897 and many of them used the Hawaiian Islands as a stepping-stone to the mainland
United States.
52

Natural disasters also affected the destiny of Japanese immigrants in the United States.
Although San Francisco was the first Japanese settlement in California starting from the 1870s,
the Great Earthquake of 1906 destroyed the city and turned Los Angeles into the main destination
for Japanese immigrants. While the Japanese had existed in Los Angeles County since as early as

52
According to Masaaki Kodama, there are five major periods in the history of Japanese overseas migration
before World War II. The first period was between 1885 and 1900 when most Japanese went to Hawaii with the
support of the government or private emigration companies. They were mostly workers, while students and
merchants consisted of the majority of Japanese immigrants before 1880. The second was between 1900 and
1908 when their major destination shifted from Hawaii to the mainland United States. The third was between
1908 and 1924 when the Japanese increasingly faced immigration restrictions such as the Gentlemen’s
Agreement and the Immigration Act of 1924. The fourth was between 1924 and 1935 when Brazil became the
major destination for Japanese emigrants. And the last period was between 1935 and 1945 when many Japanese
chose to migrate to the northeastern part of China or Manchuria as the Japanese government tightened its imperial
control over the region. See Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu, ii, 26, 518-521; Ichioka, The Issei, 52;
Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi Kankō Iinkai [Publishing committee of Japanese in Southern California:
A history of 70 years], ed., Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi [Japanese in Southern California: A History
of 70 Years] (Los Angeles, 1960), 7-8 (hereafter as Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi). As for the lives of
early Japanese immigrants in Hawaii and California at the turn of the twentieth century, see Ichioka, The Issei;
Ronaldo Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (New York, 1989; 1998).
41

the 1880s, their population in the county dramatically increased from 204 in 1900 to 19,911 in
1920 (2.1 percent of the total county population, which was equivalent to the African American
population).
53
Japanese immigrants worked in a variety of industries such as construction,
canneries, fishing, and domestic service, but one of the most important industries was agriculture.
First generation Japanese, known as Issei, most of who had farming experiences in Japan, had
skills to grow fruits and vegetables effectively. Landowners were willing to employ the Japanese,
not only because of their skills suitable to intensive agriculture, but also because of the rapid
growth of agricultural industry in California and the lack of other low wage foreign workers such
as the Chinese whose entry was banned in 1882.
54

The defining characteristic of Japanese agriculture in Southern California was its large
percentage of tenant farmers. In Los Angeles County in 1940, about 90 percent of Japanese farmers
were tenant farmers, while about less than half were tenant farmers in other places such as Fresno,
Merced, Placer, and Sacramento Counties. Masakazu Iwata observes that there were two main
reasons for the high percentage of Japanese tenancy in Southern California even before the
enactment of the California Alien Land Law that prohibited Japanese nationals from purchasing
and leasing lands. Firstly, most lands in Southern California were being held for speculative

53
In 1873, the Japanese government set up a new consulate in San Francisco. In the same year, the Japanese
consulate in San Francisco did a survey on Japanese residents and reported that there were sixty-eight Japanese
men, eight women, and four kids in California. Many immigrants resided in San Francisco as a “school boy”
who lived with a white American family as a domestic worker while attending school. In 1884, twenty-four
Japanese immigrants lived in Los Angeles as domestic workers, restaurant employees, and so forth. Minami
Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi, 5-6, 661; Ichioka, The Issei, 24-27; U.S. Census Office, Twelfth Census of the
United States: 1900, Population (Washington D.C., 1901), Table 34, “Foreign Born Population, Distributed
According to Country of Birth, by Counties,” 739; .S. Census Bureau, Fourteenth Census of the United States:
1920, Population (Washington, D.C., 1922), Table 9, “Composition and Characteristics of the Population, for
Counties,” 114, and “Supplemental tables for Indian, Chinese, and Japanese Population,” 132.
54
Masakazu Iwata, Planted in Good Soil: A History of the Issei in United States Agriculture, 2 vols (New
York, 1992), 1: 111, 153-154, 298.
42

purposes, not for sale. Secondly, Japanese immigrant farmers considered that leasing would be
more profitable for them than purchasing lands.
55

After the enactment of Alien Land Law in 1913 and 1920, Japanese farmers began to lease
lands under the names of their children who were U.S. citizens eligible for leasing and purchasing
lands. Although the Alien Land laws were certainly a serious obstacle faced by Japanese farmers,
the productivity of Japanese farmers did not change in Southern California, as they came to
dominate the production of a variety of crops. In 1941, Japanese farmers grew more than 90 percent
of the production of at least seventeen fruits and vegetables including strawberries and celery, two
major crops whose fields became the very sites of Japanese-Mexican conflicts in the 1930s Los
Angeles County. Although they operated only 4.8 percent of all 596,522 acres of Los Angeles
County farmland in 1940, the importance of Japanese farmers in perishable crop agriculture was
undeniable in Los Angeles by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.
56
Yet, it meant also the
importance of Mexican farmworkers who provided indispensable labor for Japanese tenant farmers
in Los Angeles County. The Gentlemen’s Agreement signed by both Japan and the United States
in 1907 and 1908 restricted the entry of Japanese laborers to the United States, so that by the early
1910s it had already been impossible for Los Angeles Japanese farmers to grow crops without the
help of non-Japanese laborers such as Mexicans, Filipinos, and even white workers.
57
In Los
Angeles County, the Japanese farmers’ dependency on Mexican workers became even larger after
the implementation of the Immigration Act of 1924 that stopped the entry of Japanese immigrants.

55
Ibid., 292, 400.
56
Noritaka Yagasaki, Imin Nōgyō: Kariforunia no Nihonjin Imin Shakai [Immigrant Agriculture: The Japanese
Immigrant Society in California] (Tokyo, 1993), 51-53; Leonard Broom and Ruth Riemer, Removal and Return:
The Socio-Economic Effects of the War of Japanese Americans (Berkeley, 1949), 74, 85.
57
Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi, 53.
43

The expansion of Japanese farmland meant the expansion of Japanese-Mexican interactions
in Los Angeles County. The first Japanese agricultural settlement in Los Angeles County was
established by two Japanese immigrants who began to farm in Tropico, about six miles north of
Downtown Los Angeles in 1901. Then Japanese farmers began to work in areas such as the
Gardena and San Gabriel Valleys. Japanese farms in the Gardena Valley first succeeded in the
strawberry industry in the Gardena and Moneta area, about ten miles south of Downtown. In 1910,
531 Japanese farming families lived in Los Angeles County and the Gardena and Moneta area was
the largest concentration of Japanese immigrants back then. From the mid-1910s, they began to
grow vegetables and expanded to its northwestern and southeastern areas such as Torrance,
Hawthorne, Inglewood, and Compton. The southward expansion of Japanese agriculture reached
the former Spanish land grant of Rancho San Pedro, which overlaps mainly with the South Bay
cities such as Torrance and Carson as well as the Wilmington area of Los Angeles. In the San
Gabriel Valley, Japanese farmers appeared in the early 1900s and expanded widely in the valley.
They had been a major producer of celery until around 1920 and then cauliflower and berries
particularly in the El Monte area, about twelve miles west of Downtown. Meanwhile, in the mid-
1910s, Japanese immigrants also established agricultural settlements in the Venice area, about ten
miles west of Downtown, where they became major celery producers on a national level.
58

This dissertation highlights these agricultural areas before World War II. Throughout the
period from 1920 to 1940, about 40 percent of the total ethnic Japanese population in Los Angeles
County lived mostly in non-urban agricultural areas outside Los Angeles City, while Downtown

58
Ochi Dōjun, ed., Minami Kashū Nihonjinshi Kō-hen (Los Angeles, 1957), 61; Iwata, Planted in Good Soil, 1:
397-400; Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi, 80-84, 88.
44

Los Angeles served as their economic, cultural, and political center.
59
The expansion of Japanese
agriculture helped develop Little Tokyo as a visible and vibrant Japan town in multiethnic Los
Angeles since the early 1900s. It also resulted in the openings of two major agricultural wholesale
markets, the Ninth Street and Seventh Street Markets, established respectively in 1909 and in 1918
in Downtown, which played crucial roles in shipping and selling Japanese crops within and beyond
Los Angeles County. In 1915, the Japanese government established its consulate in Los Angeles
in Downtown, responding to the decade-long request from Japanese residents. Like the Mexican
counterpart, the Japanese consulate became seriously concerned and involved in the Japanese-
Mexican conflicts in the 1930s Los Angeles farmland.
60

Before World War II, Japanese farmers grew vegetables and fruits all over Los Angeles
County, meaning that they interacted with Mexican farmworkers there. Here is a map made by
Los Angeles County authorities and edited by the Los Angeles Times in March 1942 (see Map 1)
that shows in black the locations of Japanese agricultural settlements in order to sound the alarm
on the alleged Japanese military threat after the Pearl Harbor attack with the headline “Network of
Japanese Farms Covers Vital Southland Defense Areas.” This map, ironically, helps us visualize
where Japanese immigrants engaged in agriculture before the war. It is worth noting that the map
gives an exaggerated impression that Japanese were densely populated in the Palos Verdes
Peninsula, the militarily important southwestern coastal area of Los Angeles County although in
reality only about fifty Japanese families lived there at the time.
61
Keeping the image of this map

59
The ethnic Japanese population of Los Angeles County increased from 19,111 in 1920 to 36,866 in 1940 and
that of Los Angeles City increased from 11,618 in 1920 to 23,321 in 1940. Broom and Piemer, Removal and
Return, 8.
60
While the Ninth and Seventh Markets dealt with vegetables and fruits, there was a Japanese flower market on
the Los Angeles Street established in 1913 and later moved to the Wall Street in 1941. Minami Kashū Nihonjin
Shichijūnenshi, 66-68, 115-117, 377-378, 662.
61
The map’s caption said, “Depicting how Japanese landholdings are spaced throughout the Los Angeles County
area in a manner to permit disastrous assaults on every military objective.” See “Network of Japanese Farms
45

in mind, this dissertation will explore the history of Japanese-Mexican conflicts and
accommodations in Los Angeles agriculture from 1924 to 1942.

Covers Vital Southland Defense Areas,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 1942. In 1929, about forty-five Japanese
farming families lived in the Palos Verdes Peninsula area. Their population in 1940 was likely to be very similar
to that of 1929 because the ethnic Japanese population did not significantly increase from 1930 to 1940 largely
due to the Immigration Act of 1924. Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi, 59. U.C. Census Bureau, Sixteenth
Census of the United States: 1940, Population (Washington, D.C., 1943), “Table 4: Race by Nativity and Sex
for the State: 1850 to 1940,” 516.
Map 1 Japanese farms in Los Angeles County
Source: Los Angeles Times, March 4, 1942.
46

Chapter 2
The 1924 Immigration Act and the Transborder Ethnic Japanese Community

In the first three decades of the twentieth century, Los Angeles developed dramatically
outpacing every other American metropolis. Los Angeles County’s population doubled from
936,455 in 1920 to 2,208,492 in 1930, which counted for nearly 40 percent of the total population
of California. One of the major driving forces of the region’s rapid development was its oil industry.
In the 1920s, the Los Angeles Basin produced 230 million barrels of crude oil and 300 billion
cubic feet of natural gas, which fueled trains, ships, and other industrial machines. During the
1920s, the Los Angeles harbor came to handle a large amount of cargoes including oil and overtook
the trade volume of any other ports except that in New York. Regarding the transpacific trade
between the United States and Japan, at the end of the decade, the Los Angeles harbor dealt with
the largest amount of export to Japan among U.S. ports on the Pacific Coast. On the other hand,
agriculture remained one of the major industries of Los Angeles County, utilizing water coming
from the Los Angeles River and the Owens Valley. As far as the agricultural labor in Los Angeles
was concerned, Japanese and Mexican immigrants continued to play an important role as farmers
and workers, while their respective ethnic communities developed along with the rapid growth of
the metropolitan region.
62
However, relations between these two groups faced new challenges.

62
U.S. Census Bureau, Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920, Population (Washington, 1922), Table 9,
“Composition and Characteristics of the Population, for Counties,” 114; Fifteenth Census of the United
States:1930, Population (Washington, D.C. 1932), Table 2, “Color, Nativity, and Sex, for the State, Urban and
Rural,” and Table 13, “Composition of the Population, by Counties,” 233, 252; Kevin Starr, California: A
History (New York, 2007), 178-180; Carey McWilliams, Southern California: An Island on the Land (Salt Lake
City, 1946: 1973), 183-194; Ricardo Romo, East Los Angeles: History of a Barrio (Austin, 1983), 6; Yoshiaki
Katada, “1930 Nendai ni Itaru Nichi-Bei Kankei no Gaiyō: Beikoku Taiheiyō Gan Shuyōkō Toriatsukai
Kamotsu to Bōeki Kōro no Kōsatsu wo Tōshite [An exploration of the United States-Japanese trade relationships
47

The Immigration Act of 1924 affected Japanese and Mexicans differently, since the law
prohibited Japanese immigration and thus increased demands for Mexican agricultural labor. The
impact of this demographic change is clear in census records. In Los Angeles County, while the
number of ethnic Japanese residents increased from 19,111 in 1920 to 35,300 in 1930 thanks to a
growing second-generation, the number of ethnic Mexican residents jumped from 33,644 (as a
foreign born white population) in 1920 to 167,024 in 1930 due to both the influx of newcomers as
well as its own growing second-generation.
63
In other words, although the number of ethnic
Mexicans was less than twice as large as that of Japanese in 1920, the former grew almost five
times larger than the latter in 1930.
But it was not only the demographic character of Los Angeles ethnoracial minorities that the
1924 Act changed. While Japanese exclusion promoted the migration of Mexicans to the United
States, in part to replace Japanese labor, it pushed a small number of disgruntled Los Angeles
Japanese to resettle in Mexico. And more importantly, it also resulted in the substantial migration
of people from Japan to Mexico. The increasing size of the ethnic Mexican community in Southern
California and the development of the ethnic Japanese community south of the border in Baja
California in the 1920s laid the foundation for serious interethnic and international conflicts
between Japanese farmers and Mexican farmworkers in both the United States and Mexico in the
following decade.

during the period approaching the 1930s: An examination of the changes of exports and imports in major ports
along the US Pacific Coast and shipping routes between the US and Japan],” NUCB Journal of Economics and
Information Science 58, no.2 (Mar., 2014): 101; George J. Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity,
Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (New York, 1993), 69. As for the Owens Valley,
Morrow Mayo, “The Rape of Owens Valley,” and Remi Nadeau, “There It Is-Take It,” in Los Angeles:
Biography of A City, eds. John and LaRee Caughey (Berkeley, 1977), 222-235.
63
U.S. Census Bureau, Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920, Population (Washington, D.C., 1922),
Table 12, “Country of Birth of the Foreign-Born White, for Counties and for Cities of 10,000 or More,” 124:
Fifteenth Census of the United States:1930, Population (Washington, D.C., 1932), Table 13, “Composition of
the Population, by Counties: 1930,” 252.
48

This second chapter explores the impact of the 1924 Immigration Act on Japanese immigrants
in Los Angeles County and the subsequent development of a transborder ethnic Japanese
community in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. First, it will focus on the growing interests among the
Los Angeles Japanese in migrating to Mexico and their campaign to do research on Mexican
society and culture in line with similar efforts made by their co-ethnics in Tokyo. Second, it will
observe the 1924 Act in terms of the nullification of the Gentlemen’s Agreement and explain its
unintended consequence on the development of the ethnic Japanese community particularly in the
Mexican border city of Mexicali. Because of the 1924 Act, this Mexicali Japanese community
would fully develop as a southern part of the transborder ethnic Japanese community in the U.S.-
Mexico borderlands that would exist until the outbreak of the Pacific War.
64

“Mexico is Waiting for You” in the Time of Japanese Exclusion
The goal of the Immigration Act of 1924 was to maintain the United States as a country
dominated by White Anglo-Saxon Americans by introducing the national origins quota system
that largely restricted Eastern and Southern European immigrants and prohibited Japanese
immigrants from entering the United States altogether. The 1924 Act symbolized the triumph of
Anglo-Saxon racial nationalism over civic virtues such as liberty and equality and thus brought an
end to the era when immigrants envisioned the United States as a promised land. In this year, a
Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce official Clarence Matson wrote in their business periodical,

64
Eiichiro Azuma describes that “[b]efore the Pacific War, the Japanese of southern California and the northern
Baja peninsula constituted what can be termed a ‘transborder’ community,” although he does not discuss the
impact of the 1924 Act on the transborder ethnic Japanese community. See Eiichiro Azuma, “Community
Formation across the National Border: The Japanese of the U.S.-Mexican Californias.” Review: Literature and
Arts of the Americas 39, no.1 (2006): 30-44.
49

“Anglo Saxon civilization must climax in the generations to come… The Los Angeles of
Tomorrow will be the center of this climax.”
65

Regarding Japanese immigrants, restrictionists and nativists succeeded in excluding them by
inciting demographic, economic, racial, moral, and ideological fears among the white majority
regarding the Japanese. Lon Kurashige argues that these five fears related to Asian immigration,
such as human flood, labor competition, mongrelization, racial disruption of social order, and
ideologically driven actions, together produced the “perfect storm of exclusion” as materialized in
the 1924 Immigration Act. And in this process, despite the presence of pro-Japanese white
Americans who were often in close interactions with ethnic Japanese residents, California’s
“Progressive Era” politicians succeeded in incorporating the Japanese exclusion clause in the 1924
Act.
66

In contrast, Mexicans did not face the numerical restriction of the quota system because of
the low-wage labor demands for expanding U.S. industry and agriculture. This policy was also
justified as an expression of Pan-Americanism and Good Neighbor policies of the U.S. State
Department that wanted to keep amicable relations with its neighboring countries in the Western
Hemisphere. The 1924 Act institutionalized an immigration control policy that aimed to maintain
the Anglo-Saxon Americans as the “original [Nordic] stock” of the country, while allowing
Mexican workers to enter the United States in the way in which it responded to the expectations
of capitalists. As Aristide R. Zolberg summarizes, the 1924 Act institutionalized the “distinction

65
As for nativism and racial nationalism behind the 1924 Act, see John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns
of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick, 1955; 1988); Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and
Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 2001). As for the Matson’s article, William Deverell, Whitewashed
Adobe: The Rise of Los Angeles and the Remaking of its Mexican Past (Berkeley, 2004), 172, 199.
66
Lon Kurashige, Two Faces of Exclusion: The Untold History of Anti-Asian Racism in the United States
(Chapel Hill, 2016), 8-13, 111-138. As for the Japanese exclusion clause in the 1924 Act, see Toshihiro Minohara,
Hainichi Imin Hō to Nichi-Bei Kankei [The Japanese Exclusion Act and Japan-U.S. relations] (Tokyo, 2002).
50

between a main gate tightly regulated in keeping with the ‘national interest,’ as determined by the
guardians of the country’s ‘Nordic’ character, and an informally managed ‘back door’ where
agricultural employers ruled supreme,” which became a long-lasting feature of the U.S.
immigration policy. Yet, no matter whether Mexicans came legally or illegally, they came to be
seen increasingly as “illegal” due to other legal provisions and enforcement newly implemented
by the 1924 Act. This act had a serious cultural consequence racializing Asian and Mexican
Americans as “alien citizens” who were illegal, criminal, and foreign and unassimilable regardless
of their actual citizenship.
67

Being targeted for exclusion, an immediate response of the Los Angeles Japanese community
was anger, as they denounced the law as the Japanese Exclusion Act or hainichi imin hō in
Japanese. An editorial of the Rafu Shimpo showed their concern that the 1924 Act would result in
a future race war between whites and non-whites but also called on the Japanese to their nation’s
discriminatory attitude towards the Chinese in Japan, saying, “Is there any difference between anti-
Japanese discrimination of the United States and anti-Chinese discrimination in Japan?” In the
early 1920s, the Japanese government was strengthening its control over Chinese workers in Japan
and issued deportation orders on the prejudiced assumption that most Chinese were engaged in
industries such as construction and transportation in which the Chinese were not allowed to engage.
In 1922, a Chinese student in Japan, named Zhaocheng Wang, wrote up to the Asahi Shimbun, a
major newspaper company, and criticized that the Japanese government’s deportation order
against Chinese workers was inappropriate. He stressed, “Such an action of the Japanese

67
Aristide R. Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America (Cambridge, 2006),
245. Mae Ngai also argues that the Immigration Act of 1924 opened the era of undocumented immigrants, whom
Ngai calls “impossible subjects” whose “inclusion within the nation was a social reality and a legal impossibility.
See Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, 2004), 4-
5, 1-9, 254.
51

government is starkly inconsistent with its own proposal for the anti-racial discrimination clause
at the Paris Peace conference,” and “Look at the anti-Japanese movement in the United States.
You should know what the problem is.”
68
Nevertheless, these voices did not influence the Japanese
public in general.
The Japanese on both sides of the Pacific Ocean called and remembered the day of its
enactment May 26, 1924 as kokujokubi (The day of infamy). In Tokyo, one Japanese man felt
infuriated and protested the United States by disembowelment, or hara-kiri, which many Los
Angeles Japanese thought was a respectable patriotic act.
69
On the other hand, Japanese
immigrants had to think about the future of their ethnic community in the United States, since U.S.
immigration policy officially deemed them undesirable. They were concerned particularly about
the future of their U.S.-born children. In order to prevent anti-Japanese sentiment from growing
further, Japanese immigrant parents began to regard and educate their children as a bridge
(kakehashi) of understanding between the United States and Japan.
70

68
“Beikoku wa Berabō daga Nihon mo Tai Shina Taido wo Hansei Seyo [The United States is outrageous, but
Japan should reflect on its attitude towards China],” Rafu Shimpo, June 4, 1924; Zhaocheng Wang, “Ichi Shinajin
kara [From a Chinese],” Asahi Shimbun, September 28, 1922. As for the situation of Chinese immigrant workers
in the 1920s Japan, see Yasuhisa Abe, “1920 Nendai no Tōkyō-fu ni okeru Chūgokujin Rōdōsha no Shūgyō
Kōzō to Kyojū Bunka [The occupational structure and residential differentiation of Chinese workers in Tokyo
Prefecture during the 1920s],” Jinbun Chiri 51, no.1 (1999): 40-41.
69
“Kokujokubi [Day of infamy],” Rafu Shimpo, May 28, 1924; “Beitaishikan no Yakeato de Niihonjin Fungai
Seppuku [An infuriated Japanese cut his abdomen in front of the U.S. Embassy],” Rafu Shimpo, June 1, 1924;
“Kanashimubeki Giseisha [A victim we should lament over],” Rafu Shimpo, June 4, 1924. The term “infamy”
was later used in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s war address following the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. See Wynell
Burroughs Schamel and Jean West. “‘A Date Which Will Live in Infamy’: The First Typed Draft of Franklin D.
Roosevelt's War Address.” Social Education 55, no.7 (Nov., 1991): 467-470.
70
Yuji Ichioka, Before Internment: Essays in Prewar Japanese American History (Stanford, 2006), 53.
Mitsuhiro Sakaguchi contends that particularly since the 1920s, Japanese immigrants were determined to survive
in the United States as parents of U.S.-born children, pledging loyalty to Japan as their country of origin and
allegiance to the United States as their country of permanent residence. See Mitsuhiro Sakaguchi, Nihonjin
Amerika Iminshi [History of Japanese immigrants in the United States] (Tokyo, 2001), 23-31, 321.
52

The U.S-born children of Japanese ancestry had the dual citizenship due to the jus sanguinis
principle of Japan and the jus soli principle of the United States. Japanese Issei regarded the dual
citizenship as an obstacle for the future of their U.S.-born children or Nisei (the second generation)
because anti-Japanese nativists criticized their dual citizenship and doubted their loyalty to the
United States. The Issei’s concern about dual citizenship had existed since the 1910s. Responding
to their concern, in 1916, the Japanese government amended the Nationality Act to make it possible
for the Nisei under the age of seventeen, who were not eligible for military service, to renounce
their Japanese citizenship. Thanks to this 1916 amendment, about 550 Japanese Americans under
the age of seventeen in the United States renounced their Japanese citizenship in May and June of
1924. But the law did not solve the situation of the Nisei who were seventeen years old and over.
As the 1924 Act seriously deepened the Issei’s concern, in July 1924, the Japanese government
again amended the Nationality Act. With this second amendment, ethnic Japanese babies born
after December 1, 1924 could lose their Japanese citizenship unless their immigrant parents
indicated the intention to make their children retain dual citizenship. And even if they were born
before December 1, 1924, the amended Nationality Act allowed Nisei to renounce their Japanese
citizenship by filing their application to the Interior Minister of Japan regardless of their age. From
December 1924 to November 1925, out of 5,993 children of Japanese ancestry born in San
Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, Portland, and New York, 4,245 or 70.8 percent renounced the
Japanese citizenship, while 1,748 retained dual citizenship. And the amendment of the Nationality
Act was also for the sake of the Issei who believed that Nisei’s U.S. citizenship was “a faint
glimmer [of hope]” for their survival in the United States.
71
Although renouncing citizenship might

71
“Kokuseki Ridatsusha no Gekizō [A dramatic increase of those who renounce citizenship],” Osaka Mainichi
Shimbun, July 11, 1924; “Kokuseki Hō Chū Kaisei [Amendment of the Nationality Act],” Rafu Shimpo, July 18,
1924. As for the transnational campaign of Japanese immigrants for the amendment of the Japanese Nationality
Act related to the renunciation of the Japanese citizenship, see Sakaguchi, Nihonjin Amerika Iminshi, 273-300.
53

have sounded unpatriotic to Japanese nationalists, the Japanese government recognized the need
to provide a better legal environment for the ethnic Japanese community during the peak of anti-
Japanese sentiment in the 1920s United States.
The 1924 Act prohibited the entry of Japanese immigrants altogether and thus redirected them
to settle in South American countries such as Brazil and Peru expanding the range of the Japanese
diaspora. The peak of Japanese immigration to Brazil was between 1928 and 1934, when about
108,000 Japanese entered Brazil.
72
Although emigration from Japan was reorienting itself towards
these South American countries, even some Japanese immigrants already living in the United
States at the time of the passage of the 1924 Act developed interest in migrating to other less-
hostile destinations.
73
In fact, many Japanese immigrants in Los Angeles advocated for their
migration from California to Mexico as a new land of opportunities free of anti-Japanese
restrictions. While many Japanese families had established a settled way of life in Los Angeles by
the early 1920s, the 1924 Act ignited the desire of Japanese immigrants for migrating to
neighboring Mexico, a desire that had existed since the enactments of previous anti-Japanese
legislations such as the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 and 1908 and California Alien Land Law
controversies in 1913 and 1920.
74
Before World War II, the most influential ethnic Japanese
organization in Southern California was the Central Japanese Association of Southern California

72
Tomoko Makabe, “Ethnic hegemony: the Japanese Brazilians in agriculture, 1908-1968,” Ethnic and Racial
Studies 22, no.4 (Jan., 1999): 704. Masaaki Kodama characterizes the period from 1924 to 1935 as the era of
Japanese immigration mainly to Brazil. See Masaaki Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu [Introduction to
Japanese immigration history] (Hiroshima, 1992), ii, 459,
73
The Japanese government encouraged Japanese emigration to South America by providing travel subsidy in
hopes of reducing the number of unemployed in Japan. See Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Josetsu, i-ii. Makabe,
“Ethnic hegemony: the Japanese Brazilians in agriculture, 1908-1968,” 718; Mitsuhiro Sakaguchi, “Shutsu Imin
no Kioku [Memory of emigration],” in Japanese Association for Migration Studies ed. Imin Kenkyū to Tabunka
Kyōsei [Immigration studies and multicultural coexistence] (Tokyo, 2011), 86-87.
74
Nichi-Boku Kōryūshi Henshū Iinkai [Editorial committee of history of Japan-Mexico interaction], ed. Nichi-
Boku Kōryūshi [History of Japan-Mexico interaction] (Tokyo, 1990), 422 (hereafter as Nichi-Boku Kōryūshi).
54

(Nanka Chūō Nihonjin Kai). Tsuneji Chino, who was the chairman of the Central Japanese
Association in 1920 and 1921, recalled later in the 1950s, “Feeling the necessity to find new places
for the Japanese to prosper after the enactment of the malignant land law, we advocated and
organized a study group to learn about Mexico.”
75
Regarding the legal status granted to the
Japanese, Mexico appeared much more attractive than California, since the Mexican government
allowed the Japanese to immigrate, purchase lands, and get naturalized, although the Mexican
government did not recruit or receive many Japanese immigrants until 1924 because of the
Gentlemen’s Agreement and the political instability caused by the Mexican Revolution.
Migration to Mexico quickly became a major agenda in the ethnic Japanese community in
Los Angeles. Japanese ethnic organizations and newspapers led the discussion and portrayed
Mexico as a new promised land with vast lands free from anti-Japanese sentiment and with plenty
of chances for Japanese farmers and investors. In February of 1924, three months before the
enactment of the Immigration Act of 1924, the Central Japanese Association held a regular meeting,
which was attended by forty-one immigrant leaders from Los Angeles and from other places in
Southern California such as Santa Barbara and San Diego. At the meeting, they discussed the
possibility of finding new lands outside California for the Japanese.
76
In April, the association held
a board meeting in which ten board members decided to set up a team to conduct research in
Mexico. They put importance on exploring Mexico as a measure to save Japanese farmers who
faced growing anti-Japanese hostility in Southern California. At the same time, the members

75
Tsuneji Chino to Shirō Fujioka, February 5, 1958, Box 59, Folder 2, Japanese American Research Project
Collection, Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California (hereafter as
JARP).
76
Central Japanese Association of Southern California, meeting minutes, February 7, 1924, Box 229, Japanese
American Research Project Collection, National Diet Library, Tokyo, Japan (hereafter as JARP-NDL). From
2002 to 2004, the National Diet Library of Japan purchased microfilms of some materials from the Japanese
American Research Project Collection preserved in the Special Collections, Charles E. Young Library of the
University of California, Los Angeles.
55

brought up the idea of petitioning the Japanese government to set up a branch consular office in
Mexico separate from the Japanese Legation in Mexico City, since Japanese immigrants depended
on the government’s protection to avoid anti-Japanese attacks in the western hemisphere.
77

In May, responding to “the voices calling for the development of the Japanese outside
California,” Japanese immigrant leaders quickly made a start in field research in Mexico in order
to determine whether Mexican lands were suitable for Japanese immigrants. The secretary general
of the association Masuo Hiratsuka emphasized Mexico as the right destination for the Japanese,
arguing, “even outside of the state [of California], if we remain in the United States, we will face
anti-Japanese legislations.”
78
By 1924, other states such as Washington, Oregon, and Arizona had
passed their alien land laws against the Japanese. Texas also passed its Alien Land Law which
prohibited newly arriving immigrants from owning land in the Lone Star State after its enactment,
although the law conceded that Japanese immigrants were still able to lease land.
79
Given the
increase of anti-Japanese legislation in various states across the United States, Mexico appeared
as an intriguing option in the anxious hearts of Los Angeles Japanese. In July, the Rafu Shimpo
reported that a Japanese government official visited Los Angeles after conducting a research on
the availability of Mexican lands and encouraged Japanese farmers to go south to Mexico. He also
emphasized the absence of anti-Japanese legislation against Japanese farmers, saying, “The vast
untouched land in Mexico is waiting for you under especially favorable conditions. In Mexico, the

77
Central Japanese Association of Southern California, meeting minutes, April 3, 1924, Box 229, JARP-NDL.
78
“Chūō Nihonjin Kai de, Chikaku Bokukoku Chōsa ka [Central Japanese Association will conduct research of
Mexico soon],” Rafu Shimpo, May 3, 1924; Central Japanese Association of Southern California, meeting
minutes, March 1, 1924, Box 229, JARP-NDL.
79
Dudley O. McGovney, “The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and the Other States,” California Law
Review 35, no.1 (Mar., 1947). In 1924, Japanese immigrants in San Francisco conducted research about Japanese
migration to Georgia and Florida and concluded that the Japanese would need more than $2,000 to begin
agriculture in those states. Japanese Association of the United States, report on states outside California,
November 1924, Box 263, JARP-NDL. As for the Texas land law, see Masakazu Iwata, Planted in Good Soil:
A History of the Issei in United States Agriculture, 2 vols (New York, 1992), 2: 733-734.
56

Japanese can purchase lands . . . Those already engaged in agriculture in California can use their
experiences as a capital and work hard without restraint in their new lands in Mexico.”
80

Right after the enactment of the 1924 Act, the Japanese Association of Los Angeles (Rafu
Nihonjin Kai), another important ethnic organization, began to gather information about Mexico
in hope of finding a place for Japanese settlements. The association asked a Japanese resident in
Mexico, Fusao Kasai, who worked as a doctor in the state of Chihuahua, about whether Los
Angeles Japanese could migrate to Mexico. In mid-May 1924, Kasai sent the association a reply
and recommended Mexico as a great place for the future prosperity of fellow Japanese immigrants.
Kasai stressed that Mexican newspapers reported that there was no reason for Japanese immigrants
to stay in anti-Japanese California. His white friend, probably American, who owned large ranches
and mines in the state of Jalisco, was asking him to find Japanese people interested in purchasing
properties in Mexico. He even contrasted Mexico with Canada, which “is already infected by
American anti-Japanese sentiment.” His reply appeared in the Rafu Shimpo with the title “Mexico
is waiting for you.”
81
As seen in Kasai’s comments, Japanese immigrants in Mexico perceived
anti-Japanese sentiment as a disease spreading from the United States. As Kasai feared, the
Canadian government decided to limit the number of Japanese immigrants under 150, responding
to anti-Japanese pressure in the 1920s. Anti-Japanese sentiment was strong especially in
Vancouver where Japanese workers were denied membership in the mainstream unions. However,
in Canada, the Japanese were still able to purchase lands and even gain Canadian citizenship
(without the right to vote).
82
While overlooking these facts, Kasai understood that Canada was

80
“Bokukoku Nōen Shihaisha ni Kashū ni okeru Nihonjin [Japanese in California to control farms in Mexico],”
Rafu Shimpo, July 10, 1924.
81
“Bokukoku wa Shokun wo Matsu [Mexico is waiting for you],” Rafu Shimpo, May 17, 1924.
82
Andrey Kobayashi and Midge Ayukawa, “A Brief History of Japanese Canadians,” in Encyclopedia of
Japanese History of the Descendants in the Americas: An Illustrated History of the Nikkei, ed. Akemi Kikumura-
Yano (Walnut Creek, 2002), 155-156; Masumi Izumi, “Tetsujōmō Naki Kyōsei Shūyōjo: Dai Niji Taisen Ka no
57

“infected” because it was a country dominated by anti-Japanese whites just like the United States.
What is interesting is that his rhetoric that linked race with disease was similar to the American
yellow peril discourse in the early decades of the twentieth century which used the metaphor of
disease to criticize the increase of Japanese population in the United States.
83
Probably the disease
that Kasai considered “infected” Canada was a disease of white hysteria over the yellow peril.
At the very moment in which the U.S. government declared the Japanese undesirable and
restricted their immigration, the presumed absence of anti-Japanese legislations and anti-Japanese
sentiment in Mexico appealed to the Los Angeles Japanese. Yet, they needed more information
regarding both merits and demerits of migrating to Mexico. To give them a more accurate picture
of Mexico, the Rafu Shimpo published serial articles about Mexico written by a Japanese resident
in Mexico, Torimatsu Ozono, who immigrated to Mexico from the United States before 1924 and
was farming bananas in the state of Sinaloa. Based on his experiences in both the United States
and Mexico, he could provide a comparative view about the two countries and discuss the
possibility of Japanese migration to Mexico.
84
In contrast to growing expectation of Japanese
immigrants in Los Angeles, however, Ozono did not encourage them to migrate south of the border.
He contended that Japanese Issei in California were too old to begin agriculture from scratch in
Mexico because it would take at least five years to harvest enough crops. Instead, he argued that a
new Japanese immigrant community in Mexico should be built by Japanese investors living in
Japan and by newly arriving immigrant workers from Japan who were supposedly younger and
stronger than Japanese immigrants in Los Angeles. So what role could Los Angeles Japanese play

Nikkei Kanadajin [Concentration camps without barbed wire: Japanese Canadians during World War II],”
Ritsumeikan Gengo Bunka Kenkyū [Ritsumeikan studies in language and culture] 25, no.1 (2013): 122-123.
83
Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for
Japanese Exclusion (New York, 1968), 32, 73.
84
Torimatsu Ozono, “Bokukoku Jijō [The situation of Mexico] (4),” Rafu Shimpo, July 20, 1924.
58

in Mexico? Ozono argued that the Japanese in the United States should take part in building a new
Japanese community in Mexico by providing the newly coming Japanese with knowledge to
cultivate their lands and information to sell their produce in the U.S. market.
85

In addition to his concern over difficulty in initiating land cultivation from scratch, Ozono
also pointed out the lack of adequate education for Japanese children in Mexico as another reason
why Los Angeles Japanese should not migrate to Mexico. He argued, “I am not impressed by
Mexican ways of education. It seems that ordinary Mexicans are satisfied with their hand-to-mouth
life as they lack an ambition for savings. And liquors, philandering with women, dancing, and
gambling were common.” Ozono warned that “they (Japanese children) would become
mexicanized unless a large group of Japanese immigrants build a colony in the same place and
have a project to build an orderly Japanese colony modelled after the U.S. or Japanese society in
every aspect.” Instead, Ozono encouraged Japanese American youth to use their “knowledge and
skills that they earned from the best education and civilization [in the United States]” to help
Japanese immigrants in Mexico.
86
He envisioned a transpacific Japanese network which would
link labor in Mexico, capital in Japan, and knowledge in the United States. But his suggestion was
based on the idea that Mexico was culturally and economically inferior to both Japan and the
United States.

85
Torimatsu Ozono, “Bokukoku Jijō (1),” Rafu Shimpo, July 17, 1924; “Bokukoku Jijō (2),” Rafu Shimpo, July
18, 1924.
86
“Bokukoku Jijō (1),” Rafu Shimpo, July 17, 1924. La Opinión had the same understanding that Mexicans
lacked the ambition for savings. Raul D. Tovares explains that an “editorial (of La Opinión) states that the
Mexican community lacks the willingness to maintain savings accounts.” Yet, it may be fair to say that many
Mexican immigrants’ wages were so low that it was difficult for them to save enough money. See Raul D.
Tovares, “La Opinión and its contribution to the Mexican community’s adaptation to life in the US,” Latino
Studies 7, no.4 (Dec., 2009): 490.
59

Despite the appeal of Mexican prospects, Japanese immigrants were not free from anti-
Japanese sentiment in Mexico, either. In 1924, Itarō Ishii, a Japanese diplomat stationed in Mexico
City, conducted a field research in the Mexican border city of Mexicali. In his report on the Rafu
Shimpo published in early May, he warned that anti-Japanese sentiment in California could
influence how ordinary Mexicans would treat Japanese immigrants in Mexico. In Mexicali, he had
discussion with local Mexicans on Japanese immigration to Mexico. It was their unanimous
opinion that “they would welcome the Japanese simply because they were sorry to learn about
Japanese exclusion in California.” On the other hand, he was “concerned that anti-Japanese
sentiment in California could sway Mexicans in the border region and make them treat us in a
condescending manner,” although “the wind of pro-Japanese sentiment might blow” in the inland
region of Mexico.
87
As Ishii recognized the regional difference regarding Mexicans’ sentiment
toward the Japanese, the border region had larger Asian populations and a record of anti-Asian
violence, particularly against the Chinese.
During the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), in Mexican northern states, Mexican
nationalism merged with anti-Chinese sentiment and caused physical and economic damage on
Chinese residents. In 1911, a Mexican revolutionary mob killed 303 Chinese in Torreón in the
state of Coahuila. In this city, Chinese immigrants had strong economic power. They owned a
large Chinese bank and dominated local agriculture, which drew strong resentment from local
Mexicans. The Japanese government immediately investigated the Torreón massacre since they
heard the rumor that the mob killed some Japanese, too. Eventually, the Japanese government
found that there was no Japanese killed in the massacre but warned that Japanese immigrants could
face the same tragedy if they amassed significant wealth and incurred resentment from local

87
“Futatabi Bokukoku Ijūsha e [Another message to those who move to Mexico],” Rafu Shimpo, May 4, 1924.
60

Mexican residents.
88
In 1917, the anti-Chinese campaign in the state of Sonora became intensified.
Mexican nationalists regarded Chinese immigrants as supporters of the deposed President Porfirio
Díaz as well as contaminators of the Mexican race. In response, Governor Plutarco Elías Calles
implemented several anti-Chinese regulations including a special taxation of Chinese farmers and
merchants and the denial of reentry of Chinese residents who had left Mexico.
89
The anti-Chinese
campaign was still active in 1924. In early June, the Rafu Shimpo reported rumors of an anti-
Chinese campaign in the northern border region of Mexico, which led the Mexican government to
immediately repudiated the story.
90
In September, however, the anti-Chinese campaign developed
force in several Mexican states, especially in the northern state of Sonora. Anti-Chinese Mexican
nativists sent petitions asking the Mexican government to solve the “Chinese Problem” and
criticizing the Chinese for lowering wages, posing a threat to public health, and creating disorder
in society. In reporting this, the Rafu Shimpo mentioned that the Mexican government was
considering various anti-Chinese regulations that would make the Chinese ineligible for
immigration, intermarriage, land lease, and naturalization.
91
It was important for the Los Angeles
Japanese to be aware of the situation of Chinese immigrants in Mexico because they could face a
similar situation if they migrated to Mexico.
92

88
Kumaichi Horiguchi, acting deputy minister of the Japanese Legation in Mexico, to Jutarō Komura, Japanese
Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 26, 1911, 5-3-2-0-154, Bokukoku Nairan Kankei Teikoku Shinmin no Songai
Baishō Ikken [Report on the compensation for damages that imperial subjects suffered during the insurgency in
Mexico], vol.1, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (DAMFAJ), Minato-ku, Tokyo,
Japan. The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR), a Japanese government’s online digital archives,
makes publicly available a large number of historical documents of the Japanese government including those
preserved in the DAMFAJ and the National Archives of Japan (NAJ).
89
Grace Peña Delgado, Making the Chinese Mexican: Global Migration, Localism, and Exclusion in the U.S.-
Mexico Borderlands (Stanford, 2012), 104-105, 106-110, 113.
90
“Shinajin Haiseki [Anti-Chinese exclusion],” Rafu Shimpo, June 4, 1924.
91
“Bokukoku Seibu Shoshū nite Shinajin Mondai [Chinese Problem in western states of Mexico],” Rafu Shimpo,
September 7, 1924.
92
A Rafu Shimpo article reported on the disappearance of a Chinatown in Orange County and wrote,
“Discriminated again and again, the Japanese could face the similar destiny (like the Chinese did).” See “Kemuri
61

In Mexico, the Japanese had occasionally been the victims of xenophobic violence, although
their small population did not pose a significant economic threat to ordinary Mexicans. According
to a Japanese government investigation, at least fifty-one Japanese suffered physical and economic
damage during the Mexican Revolution. Most cases were robbery, but some Japanese lost their
lives. For example, in October of 1913 in the Nayarit area, revolutionary soldiers robbed the
grocery store of Kenjirō Sakaguchi and set his store on fire destroying his entire fortune valued at
5,000 pesos. In March of 1918 in the same area, soldiers robbed a grocery store and killed a
Japanese shopkeeper Ryūsaku Kikuchi.
93
If the Japanese population increased in Mexico, sporadic
attacks against the Japanese could turn into a concerted anti-Japanese campaign. While some
Japanese in Los Angeles had an optimistic view that they could live in Mexico because of the
absence of anti-Japanese sentiment, their migration and concentration could be a source of anti-
Japanese attitudes in Mexico. In 1924, Los Angeles Japanese were gathering information and
considering very carefully whether they should or could go to Mexico.
The Central Japanese Association appointed Wataru Dobashi, vice president of the
association, and Ryōsaku Matsuoka, agricultural engineer, to lead the expedition. Dobashi and
Matsuoka spent two months in Mexico and came back to Los Angeles in early September of 1924.
On September 6, they gave a talk on their expedition at a meeting of the Central Japanese
Association and invited leaders of local Japanese farming communities and other Japanese
interested in migrating to Mexico.
94
Soon later the Rafu Shimpo reported the details of their talk in

no You ni Kiesatta Orenji no Shina Machi [Orange County Chinatown vanished like a puff of smoke],” Rafu
Shimpo, June 18, 1924.
93
Keiichi Itō, acting deputy minister of the Japanese Legation in Mexico, to Yasuya Uchida, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Japan, June 1, 1922, 5-3-2-0-154, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
94
“Chūō Nihonjin Kai de, Chikaku Bokukoku Chōsa ka,” Rafu Shimpo, May 3, 1924; “Bokukoku Shisatsu
Hōkokukai [A debrief session about the research in Mexico],” Rafu Shimpo, September 5, 1924; “Shisatsu Go
no Tai Bokusaku [A plan regarding Mexico after the research],” Rafu Shimpo, September 6, 1924. Dobashi and
62

serial articles to share the information with the larger Japanese community in Los Angeles and
beyond.
In their talk, Dobashi and Matsuoka encouraged their audience to migrate and build new
Japanese colonies in Mexico, because of relatively favorable public feeling toward the Japanese,
the low price of lands in Mexico, and the successes of other non-Japanese immigrants such as
Italians and Canadians in building their colonies. They also emphasized that “Mexico cannot help
but depend on foreign agricultural immigrants” to develop unattended lands. They explained that
200,000 square-miles of farmlands were farmed by three million workers and 600,000 landlords
in Mexico but still 300,000 square-miles were waiting to be cultivated. But the availability of lands
would not guarantee the success of Japanese immigrants in agriculture in Mexico. There were
already about 2,600 Japanese residents in Mexico and most of them were engaged in commerce in
cities, not in agriculture. In fact, many Japanese had tried but failed in agriculture in Mexico
because they neither selected the right types of crops and sales outlets nor had enough capital and
transportation network. Thus, Dobashi and Matsuoka recommended that the Japanese should
migrate in a large group, not as individuals, and work together to overcome difficulties, particularly
the lack of capital. As a possible destination, they suggested the western states of Nayarit and
Colima, located along the Pacific Ocean, where immigrants could use enough water from rivers
for farmlands.
95

Matsuoka gave another talk to Japanese farmers in Orange County, see “Anahaimu: Bokukoku Shisatsu Dan
[Anaheim: A talk on the research in Mexico],” Rafu Shimpo, September 12, 1924.
95
“Yūbō na Bokukoku Ijū [Migration to Mexico is hopeful], Rafu Shimpo, September 9, 1924; “Bokukoku
Shisatsu Dan Shōhō [Detailed reports of the research in Mexico] (3),” Rafu Shimpo, September 12, 1924;
“Bokukoku Shisatsu Dan Shōhō (4),” Rafu Shimpo, September 13, 1924; “Bokukoku Shisatsu Dan Shōhō (5),”
Rafu Shimpo, September 14, 1924.
63

What is interesting about Dobashi and Matsuoka’s explanation is that it gives us an idea of
how Japanese immigrants in Los Angeles mapped the world and found locations for future
Japanese settlements in the 1920s. Dobashi and Matsuoka described Mexico as a safe place for the
Japanese by comparing Mexico with the northeastern Chinese region of Manchuria. The
association’s investigators contended, “Mexico is not quite dangerous compared to places like
Manchuria. In Manchuria, bandits might kill you and rob you of your money, but in Mexico, they
tell you ‘hold up’ and take money from you if you have any.” They also mentioned the
geographical advantage of Mexico, which “is significantly important from the global perspective”
because Mexico faced the United States, Europe, and Asia.
96
Since the Russo-Japanese War in
1904 and 1905, the Japanese government regarded Manchuria as an important frontier and as a
“life line” of the Japanese Empire in terms of economic interests and national security. Before the
Manchuria Incident in 1931, the Japanese government infiltrated into Manchuria in the name of
protecting Korean immigrants, who were treated as Japanese subjects after the Japanese
annexation of Korea in 1910. But the Japanese army leadership held the idea that the increase of
Japanese immigrants was indispensable to gain full control of Manchuria.
97
In fact, the number of
Japanese immigrants in Manchuria increased in the 1920s, although it was not until Japan founded
its puppet state Manchukuo in 1932 that the Japanese population expanded in Manchuria in full
scale. In 1923, Sakio Tsurumi, the director of the commerce department of the Ministry of
Agriculture and Commerce of Japan, gave a talk at the conference on Japanese overseas migration
in Tokyo and reported that “an increasing number of Japanese went to the Manchuria region
recently,” leading to more sales of Japanese products such as sake, miso, soy sauce, clothes, and

96
“Bokukoku Shisatsu Dan Shōhō (1),” Rafu Shimpo, September 10, 1924.
97
Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge, 2000), 578; Hyun Ok Park, Two Dreams in One
Bed: Empire, Social Life, And the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria (Durham, 2005), 49,
51.
64

even geta (traditional Japanese wooden clogs) not only among the Japanese but also among the
Chinese in the region.
98

Although Dobashi and Matsuoka described Manchuria as an awful place for immigration,
their explanation tells us that Manchuria was, if not desirable, one of the possible destinations for
Japanese immigrants in the 1920s. Compared to Manchuria, Mexico was located right next to
California so that Los Angeles Japanese could migrate with less expense and still benefit from the
growing market of the United States. In addition, Mexico was still connected to the larger Japanese
diaspora via the Pacific Ocean. Thus, Mexico appeared a better option for Los Angeles Japanese
not simply from a borderlands perspective but from a transpacific perspective as well. Their
expedition report also had an orientalist view toward Mexican women, which made Mexico look
even more attractive than Manchuria, although there was an irony in the orientalist perspective
used by East Asians from Japan on supposed “westerners” in Mexico. According to a Rafu Shimpo
article about their expedition titled “Mr. Wataru Dobashi and a Mexican princess,” “Dobashi looks
better than Mexican men, so that a Mexican woman fell in love with Dobashi.” Although Dobashi
did not interact with the woman, this episode implies that Los Angeles Japanese found themselves
both attracted to Mexico and superior to Mexicans.
99

Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, Mexico’s proximity to the United States raised concern
about anti-Japanese sentiment in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. Dobashi and Matsuoka echoed the
same concerns voiced by the diplomat Itarō Ishii who recently warned that anti-Japanese sentiment

98
Ryoichi Imai, “Manshū Nōgyō Imin ni okeru Jinushika to Sono Ronri [Becoming landowners and its logics
in the agricultural immigration to Manchuria],” in Nihon Teikoku wo Meguru Jinkō Idō no Kokusai Shakai Gaku
[Migration and repatriation: The rise and fall of the Japanese empire], ed. Sinzo Araragi (Tokyo, 2008), 219;
Sakio Tsurumi, “Imin to Bōeki [Immigration and trade],” in Kaigai Ijū [Overseas migration], ed. Nihon Imin
Kyokai [Migration Association of Japan] (Tokyo, 1923), 72-73.
99
“Dobashi Wataru Kun ga Meki Hime ni [Mr. Wataru Dobashi and a Mexican princess],” Rafu Shimpo,
September 7, 1924.
65

in California could affect how Mexicans would treat the Japanese. They said, “It is true that
Mexicans welcome the Japanese and treat the Chinese like beasts. But we witnessed Americans
promoting the idea that the Japanese and the Chinese are the same group of people. American
newspapers belonging to the [anti-Japanese] Hearst Press were widely read in major Mexican
cities.” They were also “appalled to learn that Americans built an American school in the middle
of Mexico to promote American nationalism in Mexico.” At the same time, they alerted the
audience to the influence of American money in Mexico, explaining that many American
capitalists were trying to purchase Mexican lands at low prices and would not sell their lands to
the Japanese at reasonable prices.
100
Although Los Angeles Japanese wanted to find a place free
from anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States, their expedition made them realize that Japanese
immigrants could hardly escape from the American sphere of influence even if they migrated south
to Mexico.
Dobashi and Matsuoka were not the only Japanese who studied the prospects for Japanese
immigrants in Mexico. Based on reporting in the Rafu Shimpo, at least three more groups of
Japanese immigrants in Los Angeles County took a research trip to Mexico within four months
after the enactment of the 1924 Immigration Act. One of them, Genpei Nakamura, lost his life
during his trip to Mexico. Nakamura owned farmlands in Lancaster in the northern part of Los
Angeles County, where Japanese immigrants farmed from as early as 1910, but decided to sell his
lands and move to Mexico. In September, Nakamura left Los Angeles on his expedition by car
with other four Japanese men to explore Ensenada, a Mexican coastal city in the Baja California
Peninsula, 180 miles distant from Los Angeles. On their way, their car ran off the road near
Oceanside in San Diego County and rolled down when they attempted to overtake the car in front

100
“Bokukoku Shisatsu Dan Shōhō (6),” Rafu Shimpo, September 16, 1924.
66

of them, killing Nakamura and severely injuring the other passengers.
101
The death of Nakamura
was an unexpected consequence of the Immigration Act of 1924, but it did little to stop other
Japanese in Los Angeles from thinking about the possibility to migrate to Mexico. The Rafu
Shimpo reported both the death of Nakamura and the talk of Dobashi and Matsuoka on September
16, which happened to be the Independence Day of Mexico. Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles
held an event to celebrate the day in Lincoln Park and invited the Japanese consul in Los Angeles
Kaname Wakasugi.
102
We do not know what he said to the Mexican audience at the event, but he
was increasingly interested in Japanese migration to Mexico. When the 1924 Act was enacted,
Wakasugi questioned the attitude of Americans and candidly said, “How could the Japanese
assimilate when they are socially excluded?”
103

The desire of Japanese immigrants to leave the United States was inextricably linked with
their nationalism and national pride. Shirō Fujioka, editor-in-chief of the Rafu Shimpo, thought a
great deal of the idea of migrating to Mexico rather than waiting for a softening in U.S. public
opinion or going back to Japan.
104
Fujioka was born in 1879 in Aomori, the northernmost
prefecture of the Honshū island of Japan. After studying at Waseda University in Tokyo, he arrived
at the United States in 1897. Since then, he began to work as a journalist for ethnic Japanese papers
in New York and Seattle. When the state of California implemented its first Alien Land Law in
1913, he moved to California to investigate the case on behalf of Japanese farmers. In 1914, he

101
“Tasū Nōka Bokukoku Shisatsu [Many farmers visiting Mexico],” Rafu Shimpo, July 4, 1924; “Nakamura
Mankichi Kun Ikkō, Bokukoku Shisatsu [A group led by Mr. Mankichi Nakamura, research in Mexico], Rafu
Shimpo, August 10, 1924; “Bokukoku Shisatsu no Tochū, Jidōsha Tempuku Shite Nakamura Genpei Shibō [On
the way to visit Mexico, Mr. Genpei Nakamura died due to a car accident],” Rafu Shimpo, September 16, 1924.
As for Japanese farmers in Lancaster, the Rafu Nenkan [Rafu yearbook and director] 1910 recorded seventeen
Japanese landowners in Lancaster in 1910. See also Iwata, Planted in Good Soil, 1: 440.
102
“Bokukoku Kinensai, Wakasugi Ryōji Enzetsu [Consul Wakasugi gave a speech at the Mexican festival],”
Rafu Shimpo, September 16, 1924.
103
“Wakasugi Ryōji no Keikoku [Warning from Consul Wakasugi],” Rafu Shimpo, June 3, 1924.
104
Kaori Hayashi, A History of The Rafu Shimpo (Osaka, 1997), 65.
67

settled in Los Angeles as the secretary general of the Japanese Association of Southern California.
Since then, he had worked for several Japanese organizations and contributed many articles for the
Rafu Shimpo as the editor-in-chief. By the 1920s, he had become a well-known intellectual and
political leader of the Japanese community in Southern California.
105
When the U.S. government
implemented Japanese exclusion in 1924, Fujioka denounced the law as the revelation of white
Americans’ racial prejudice and wrote, “The white race has the strongest sense of superiority by
birth . . . We must break down White Americans’ sense of superiority by making full efforts to
build up our strength.”
106

Although Rafu Shimpo’s editorials were anonymous, Fujioka was most likely the person
responsible for many articles advocating for Japanese migration to Mexico in 1924, as independent
scholar Kaori Hayashi argues based on her extensive research about the history of the ethnic
paper.
107
When a Japanese man committed suicide in Japan as his protest against the United States
in June of 1924, the editorial wrote, “I cannot help but respect his sincere efforts to care and love
the nation . . . If it is impossible [to repeal the law], we will need to search for places outside the
United States such as South America or Mexico for the development [of the Japanese nation].”
When Dobashi and Matsuoka reported back to Los Angeles in September, another editorial
emphasized Mexico as “the most ideal place to prosper not only for the Japanese in the United
States but also for the Japanese as a nation.”
108
The 1924 Act made Fujioka determined to advocate
for the development of Japanese overseas communities in order to eventually stand equally with
white Americans. While many Japanese immigrants hoped that their U.S.-born children could

105
Kaori Hayashi, Nikkei Jānaristo Monogatari [Nikkei journalist stories] (Tokyo, 1997), 135-141.
106
Sirō Fujioka, “Hainichi Jōkō wo Fukumu Beikoku Shin Iminhō [The new U.S. immigration act that has the
Japanese exclusion clause] (4),” Rafu Shimpo, June 1, 1924.
107
Hayashi, Nikkei Jānarisuto Monogatari, 145
108
“Shisatsu Go no Tai Bokusaku,” Rafu Shimpo, September 6, 1924.
68

build better relations between the Japanese and whites, many others found a chance in Mexico to
make a contribution to the development of the Japanese imperial state and its people strong enough
to confront white American racism in the future. In the 1950s, Fujioka looked back on the 1920s
and wrote, “Those with guts searched for a new life in another state or another country in the hope
of escaping the bond of humiliation and infringement on freedom [in the United States], which I
see was the natural course of events. Thus, it is understandable that the Japanese in the United
States advocated for migrating to Mexico.”
109

Around the time when the Japanese Exclusion Act was enacted, Japanese government
officials and intellectuals began to discuss more seriously on new destinations for the development
of overseas Japanese population. For example, in 1925, scholar Satarō Yamada published a book
on the overseas Japanese migration titled Gojin no Kaitaku Subeki Kaigai Yūbō no Fugen [My
thoughts regarding promising overseas sources of wealth for our development]. In the preface, he
wrote, “the problem of our overseas migration became a major discussion topic among the general
public after the enactment of the Japanese Exclusion Act effective from July 1, 1924 in the United
States” and “nothing would be more pleasing than doing research to find a solution and establish
a solid emigration policy.” He believed that sending Japanese people from agricultural areas to
other countries would solve two major problems in Japan: the battered economy in rural areas and
overpopulation. Yamada picked up eight overseas regions as possible destinations for future
Japanese emigrants: Manchuria, Siberia, Southeast Asia, South Africa, Mexico, Cuba, Brazil, and
other South American countries. Regarding Mexico, Yamada explained that Mexicans “are not
comfortable with the autocratic United States because their country has always been interfered by

109
Shirō Fujioka, Ayumi no Ato: Hokubei Tairiku Nihonjin Kaitaku Monogatari [Traces of a journey: A story of
Japanese pioneers in the North American continent] (Los Angeles, 1957), 74.
69

the United States and have a strong will to develop businesses with the Japanese. Thus, it is
imperative that we establish the basis for the development of our fellow countrymen [in Mexico]
by acquiring interests in the fertile land, forests, mines, and so forth.”
110

Meanwhile, the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles was busy checking the passports of
Japanese immigrants planning to travel to Mexico. While understanding enthusiasm among those
Japanese, the Japanese consulate was concerned that they might bring back inaccurate information
on Mexico, which could be beneficial only for themselves and misleading for many others. The
consulate also wanted Japanese immigrants to share their findings about Mexico with the Japanese
government, since the government was also planning on conducting research on Latin America.
In late September, Tetsuo Umimoto, the Japanese vice-consul in Los Angeles, proposed the
creation of a study group on Mexico. He claimed, “In Southern California, there is no other place
like Los Angeles convenient to learn about Mexico directly and indirectly . . . I hope that our study
group takes a national perspective and finds out where the Japanese government should send
Japanese emigrants in the future.”
111
Aligned with the argument of Umimoto, an editorial of Rafu
Shimpo, also most likely written by Fujioka, agreed with the vice-consul’s idea of creating a study
group in Los Angeles and sharing their information on Mexico with fellow Japanese in the United
States and Japan. The editorial asserted, “We must understand that this is our responsibility to our
home country.”
112

On October 8, 1924, Umimoto and twenty-eight Japanese immigrant leaders in Los Angeles
gathered and celebrated the foundation of a study group on Mexico, called the Mexico Study

110
Satarō Yamada, Gojin no Kaitaku Subeki Kaigai Yūbō no Fugen [My thoughts regarding promising overseas
sources of wealth for our development] (Tokyo, 1925), 1-9, 233.
111
“Imin Seisaku Shishin toshite Bokukoku Kenkyū Kai Setsuritsu [Foundation of the Mexico Study Society
for emigration policy],” Rafu Shimpo, September 26, 1924.
112
“Bokukoku Kenkyū Kai [The Mexico Study Society],” Rafu Shimpo, October 3, 1924.
70

Society (Bokukoku Kenkyū Kai). They adopted a resolution that their organization should work
closely with the Japanese government and contribute to the development of the Japanese nation in
Mexico. The Japanese consulate, the Rafu Shimpo, and immigrant leaders in Los Angeles
emphasized that the Japanese in Los Angeles were privileged and even responsible for studying
on Mexico and opening up new possibilities of Japanese migration in cooperation with the
Japanese in their home country.
113
At the same time, their nationalistic argument reflected the fact
that some Japanese in Los Angeles did not follow such a concerted effort and attempted to explore
Mexico in their own way. No matter whether Japanese immigrants and the consulate worked
together, many Japanese were so enthusiastic about Mexico that some wanted to learn more about
the country including its language. In July of 1924, the Rafu Shimpo advertised the Mexican
Almanac, published by the Los Angeles Times and distributed to the Japanese through the Rafu
Shimpo. One copy of the almanac cost seven dollars and fifty cents (approximately $108 in 2017),
which was neither too cheap nor too expensive (The hourly wage in Japanese berry farms was
thirty-five cents in 1924). The paper emphasized, “Since this book has sufficient and detailed
information about Mexico, it will be the only guide and repository for those who want to move to
Mexico.”
114
In the following month, a Spanish language school placed an advertisement on the
Rafu Shimpo. A man named A. E. Demoulín, who claimed himself as a former university professor,
wrote, “I will teach you Spanish with kindness.”
115

113
“Katsuro Kaihatsu Subeki [We should find new opportunities],” Rafu Shimpo, October 10, 1924. While the
group was generally called the Mexico Study Society, its official name was the Bokukoku Hatten Kyōkai
[Mexico Development Society].
114
“Bokukoku Nenkan [The Mexican almanac],” Rafu Shimpo, July 11, 1924. “Ichigo Kōsakusha no Kyūjō
[Plight of berry growers],” Rafu Shimpo, June 29, 1924. Another advertisement of the Mexican Almanac said,
“In the time when we hear a lot of voices on the development of Mexico, this is a treasure for the Japanese in
the United States.” “Bokukoku Nenkan,” Rafu Shimpo, September 27, 1924. I have used MeasuringWorth.com
to convert the monetary value of the pre-World War II period into that of 2016. See MeasuringWorth.com, online
at http://www.measuringworth.com, accessed January 17, 2018.
115
“Seito Boshū [Recruiting new students],” Rafu Shimpo, August 10, 1924.
71

Around the same time, Japanese enthusiasm for Mexico grew on the other side of the Pacific
Ocean. In Tokyo, Japanese business, political, and military elites, who had personal connections
with Mexico, felt the same necessity to learn more about Mexico. In October 17, 1924, they
established an organization named the Japan-Mexico Society (Nichi-Boku Kyōkai) to promote
amity between the peoples of Japan and Mexico. Since 1913, a group of people who had some
relationship with Mexico had held nine meetings to discuss Japan-Mexico relations, but Japanese
exclusion in 1924 persuaded them to make a more formal and well-organized group. At their first
meeting on that day, thirty-seven Japanese elites celebrated the foundation of the organization and
appointed Keizaburō Moriyama, Lieutenant General of the Japanese Navy, as the first president.
Other founding members included Masaji Inoue who was a businessman and a Lower House
member, Ichijirō Itani who was a prominent fisheries scientist, and Jūtoku Saigō who was an army
general and a nephew of well-known Meiji revolutionary Takamori Saigō. The list of members
proves that the Japan-Mexico Society was not a civilian amity society, but a quasi-governmental
organization with serious political weight behind it designed to pursue national interests in
response to the adversarial immigration law of the United States.
116

At their first meeting, Moriyama appreciated the welcoming and sympathetic attitude of
Mexicans toward the Japanese, drawing on the historical facts that a Japanese samurai named
Tsunenaga Hasekura visited Nueva España (Mexico) in the early seventeenth century and that
Mexico was the first country that made an equal treaty with Japan in the late nineteenth century.
In his speech, Mexico appeared as the complete opposite of the United States that forced Japan to
sign an unequal treaty in the late nineteenth century and recently prohibited Japanese immigration

116
Nichi-Boku Kyōkai [The Japan-Mexico Society], Nichi-Boku Kyōkai Hō [Japan-Mexico Society bulletin],
vol.1, April 30, 1926, Box 271, JARP, 190-192; Nichi-Boku Kōryūshi, 429.
72

because of white supremacist racism. Moriyama proceeded to explain that the main goal of the
Japan-Mexico Society was to “contribute to mutual prosperity and cooperation between the
peoples of Japan and Mexico by deepening understanding of the situation and real intent of both
countries.” For that purpose, the Japan-Mexico Society aimed to conduct investigations in Mexico
and provide the Japanese people with their findings, so that it could help people who would migrate
from Japan to Mexico.
117
As the news about the foundation of the Japan-Mexico Society arrived
at Los Angeles, the Rafu Shimpo cheerfully reported it as a timely event that would brighten up
the hearts of Japanese immigrants who had created their own study group about Mexico, the
Mexico Study Society.
118

In contrast to the Los Angeles study group, the Tokyo study group consisted of elites and had
better and quick access to Mexican government officials stationed in Tokyo. Right after the closing
of their first meeting on October 17, they held a welcome party for Mexican Minister
Plenipotentiary of the Mexican Legation in Japan, Eduardo F. Hay, who was active during the
Mexican Revolution and would later become the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs in the mid-
1930s. In his speech, Hay appreciated the foundation of the Japan-Mexico Society and provided
his idea that commerce was the most effective way to deepen relationship between the peoples of
Japan and Mexico. He did not touch upon Japanese immigration to Mexico.
119
But Hay was well
aware of growing expectations among the Japanese for the Mexican government to accept
Japanese immigrants. In June 2, 1924, Hay sent correspondence from Tokyo to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Mexico in Mexico City and reported possible consequences of the Immigration

117
Nichi-Boku Kyōkai, Nichi-Boku Kyōkai Hō, vol.1, April 30, 1926, Box 271, JARP, 190-192.
118
“Bokukoku Kenkyū Kai no Umareta Toki [When the Mexico Study Society was created],” Rafu Shimpo,
October 22, 1924.
119
Nichi-Boku Kyōkai, Nichi-Boku Kyōkai Hō, vol.1, April 30, 1926, Box 271, JARP, 195-196.
73

Act of 1924 on Mexico. He explained, “Japan will direct immigration to other countries [from the
United States]. I need you to let me know the position of the Mexican government regarding the
acceptance of immigrants and indicate an approximate number of immigrants admissible annually.
The Japanese were indignant to the United States.”
120

Although Japanese immigrants increased after 1924 as detailed later, the Mexican federal and
local governments did not openly advocate for the acceptance of Japanese immigrants on a large
scale. In April of 1924, the Asahi Shimbun, a major newspaper in Japan, reported excitedly, with
the title “Mexico, a new destination for Japanese immigrants,” that Mexican President Álvaro
Obregón had told the press that Mexico would welcome a large number of Japanese immigrants.
Not long afterwards, Obregón denied what the media had reported, although he said that he was
open to discuss the possibility of accepting the Japanese after researching its impact on the
Mexican society.
121
In the same month, a group of Japanese in California visited the state of
Sinaloa and asked local Mexican officials about whether the Japanese could move and find a place
to live in Mexico. According to the report of the Yomiuri Shimbun, another major Japanese
newspaper, the Mexican officials responded negatively, saying, “We would not encourage the
immigration of Asians and other nationals because it could cause conflicts with the United
States.”
122
Probably they needed to consider how the U.S. government would react to Japanese

120
Eduardo F. Hay, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Mexican Legation in Japan, to the Ministry of Foreign
Relations of Mexico, June 2, 1924, Box 5, Collection Gaveta 21, Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada [Genaro
Estrada Historical Archive], Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Mexico City,
Mexico (hereafter as AHGE).
121
“Mekishiko Daitōryō Nihon Imin Kangei wo Seimei [The Mexican president welcomes Japanese
immigrants],” Asahi Shimbun, April 18, 1924; “Hōjin Shokumin to Bokukoku Shoshimbun [Japanese
settlements and Mexican newspapers],” Rafu Shimpo, April 25, 1924.
122
“Mekishiko mo Kotowaru [Mexico rejects, too],” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 25, 1924.
74

immigration to Mexico, because Japanese immigrants in Mexico could be a source of illegal
Japanese immigrants into the United States.
Likewise, the Japanese government worried that sending a large number of immigrants to
Mexico could worsen the already deteriorated U.S.-Japan relations. In the 1950s, Shirō Fujioka
revealed an episode about how the Japanese government considered the impact of Japanese
immigration to Mexico on U.S.-Japan relations. According to Fujioka, the Minister Plenipotentiary
of the Japanese Legation in Mexico, Shigetsuna Furuya, told the Japanese Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Kijūrō Shidehara, that the Mexican government was interested in accepting Japanese
immigrants and providing them with necessary farming implements and housings after the U.S.
government prohibited Japanese immigration. Shidehara, known for his policy for international
cooperation, reproached and told Furuya that such a move between Japan and Mexico could hurt
U.S.-Japan relations that were more important for the Japan’s position in the international
society.
123
The 1920s was indeed the period of international cooperation between the United States
and Japan that came to the forefront as great powers after Europe became devastated during World
War I. Since Japan aroused mistrust from the United States by pressuring China with the notorious
Twenty-One Demands in 1915, Shidehara considered it necessary to regain trust from the United
States and achieved historic international agreements such as the Washington Naval Treaty.
124

In May 25, 1925, the Japan-Mexico Society held a meeting and invited as a guest speaker
Eiichi Kimura, a Japanese diplomat who had come back from his field research in Mexico. Above
all else, Kimura emphasized the abundance of petroleum in Mexico and the influence of American
capital in the Mexican oil industry. Then, regarding how Japan should build good relations with

123
Fujioka, Ayumi no Ato, 75.
124
Minohara, Hainichi Imin Hō to Nichi-Bei Kankei, 218.
75

Mexico, he argued that Japanese immigrant farmers could develop Japan-Mexico economic
relations and turn the Pacific Ocean into an international site of trade and investment between the
two countries. “If Japanese immigrants prosper in the Pacific Coast of Mexico, a region with
various types of terrains such as plains, highlands, and tropical and temperate zones, we can easily
gain resources our country needs in this region . . . The United States has already dominated the
oil, gold, and silver industries, and retained control over railroads. Thus, it is only agriculture that
our people can find room to invest.” In addition, Kimura explained that native Mexicans believed
that their ancestors were Asians and had a good feeling especially toward the Japanese, and said,
“it is very interesting to see some similarities between them and us in terms of manners, customs,
looks, and other things.”
125

In December of the same year, the Japan-Mexico Society held another meeting and Mexican
Minister Hay attended to share his idea about organizing an exposition of Japanese products in
Mexico. This time he touched upon the possibility of Japanese migration to Mexico. While
emphasizing the importance of economic relations between Japan and Mexico, he discouraged the
audience about Japanese immigration to Mexico. Hay said that “right after anti-Japanese voices
rose in the United States, many Japanese shifted their focus to Mexico, which urged both Japan
and Mexico to cooperate closely.” Yet, large-scale immigration was not the solution from the
perspective of the Mexican government. He explained that if the Japanese government wanted to
send a large number of immigrants to Mexico, there needed to be three conditions: (1) the
socioeconomic situation of Mexico should be better than that of Japan, (2) Japanese immigrants

125
Nichi-Boku Kyōkai, Nichi-Boku Kyōkai Hō, vol.1, April 30, 1926, Box 271, JARP, 4-15. In August 1924,
the Asahi Shimbun reported the rumor that Kimura had departed to Mexico to explore the possibility of sending
Japanese immigrants to the Pacific Coast area of Mexico. To the press, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
denied the rumor probably because the ministry did not want to arouse attention from the U.S. government. See
“Kimura Jimukan no Nyūboku ni Tomonau Uwasa [A rumor about secretary Kimura’s visit to Mexico],” Asahi
Shimbun, August 22, 1924.
76

should contribute to national interests of Mexico, and (3) the immigrants should not take jobs from
Mexican workers. “However, if we look at the current situation of Mexico, it is one level lower
than that of Japan. Mexican workers are crying over difficulties in their lives” because of the
downturn of the world economy and consequences of the Mexican Revolution. He continued,
“You may say that Mexico will benefit from Japanese immigrants if they arrive at Mexico and
exert their skills to develop lands and resources, but at present Mexico does not have enough
capital to respond to such expectations. And even if we had it, Japanese immigration would
decrease job opportunities for Mexicans. It is my sincere thought that this is not the right time to
send Japanese immigrants to Mexico.”
126

Despite the reluctant response of Hay, Japanese enthusiasm about going to Mexico,
developing in both Los Angeles and in Tokyo, did not fade away, maintaining Mexico’s character
as a strong candidate for Japanese emigration in the 1920s. While the Japanese immigrant press
Rafu Shimpo advocated for the development of Japanese settlements in Mexico, the Yomiuri
Shimbun ran an editorial that called for sending the Japanese to Mexico as “the policy that Japan
should take after being extremely insulted [by the United States].”
127
These voices resonated with
each other to make a transpacific campaign for Japanese migration to Mexico and resulted in the
creation of study groups such as the Mexico Study Society in Los Angeles and the Japan-Mexico
Society in Tokyo. Soon later, the number of Japanese immigrants increased in Mexico, which
would contribute to the formation of a transborder ethnic Japanese community that would connect
the Japanese in Southern California with their co-ethnics in Baja California.

126
Nichi-Boku Kyōkai, Nichi-Boku Kyōkai Hō, vol.1, April 30, 1926, Box 271, JARP, 197-201.
127
“Imin wo Mekishiko e Okure [Send emigrants to Mexico],” Yomiuri Shimbun, June 1, 1924. The Rafu Shimpo
reported about the Yomiuri’s editorial. See “Bokukoku e Tatsu Imin wo Okure [Send many emigrants to Mexico],”
Rafu Shimpo, June 3, 1924.
77

An Unintended Consequence: The Development of the Ethnic Japanese Community in Baja
California
The Immigration Act of 1924 embodied Anglo-American ethnocentrism and anti-Japanese
sentiment in the 1920s United States and infuriated many Japanese in the United States and Japan.
However, it had an unintended consequence of forming a relatively large Japanese population in
Baja California, Mexico. The key point was the Gentlemen’s Agreement signed by the U.S. and
Japanese governments in 1907 and 1908. The history of Japanese immigration to Mexico began in
1897 with a group of thirty-five Japanese settlers sent by former Japanese Minister of Foreign
Affairs Enomoto Takeaki, who advocated for sending Japanese people abroad as a “great and
urgent need [for the development of Japan] for domestic and international reasons.” Although
Enomoto’s settlement project failed because the settlers lacked funding and farming skills
necessary in Mexican coffee farms, Japanese immigrants continued to land on Mexico through
Japanese emigration companies, particularly from 1901, and worked at mines in the northern
region, coffee and sugar cane fields in the southern region, and railroad construction sites in the
central region. By 1907, 8,697 Japanese immigrated to Mexico through emigration companies.
128

However, most Japanese in Mexico clandestinely entered the United States, prompting the U.S.
government to restrict the influx of Japanese from Mexico by negotiating with the Japanese
government. In this context, the Gentlemen’s Agreement required the Japanese government to
refrain from sending its subjects to Mexico in order to prevent illegal immigration into the United

128
“Iminka Setchi ni Kansuru Gaimu Daijin no Iken [An opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding
setting up the immigration division],” Chōya Shimbun, August 5, 1891; Nichi-Boku Kōryūshi, 140-169; Koichiro
Yanaginuma, “Kindai Mekishiko no Sangyō Kaihatsu ni okeru Nihonjin Imin: ‘Imin Gaisha’ no Hensen to
Nihonjin Mekishiko ‘Keiyaku Imin’ wo Chūshin ni [Japanese immigrants and the development of modern
Mexican industries—the history of ‘emigration companies’ and Japanese ‘contract immigrants’ in Mexico],”
Kanda Gaigo Daigaku Kiyō 12 (Mar., 2000): 212-215.
78

States. As a result, the number of Japanese immigrants to Mexico dropped from about 9,000 in
1906 and 1907 down to zero in 1908.
129

The 1924 Immigration Act nullified this Gentlemen’s Agreement. Consequently, the
nullification of the agreement made it easier for the Japanese government to issue passports to
those who desired to go to Mexico. Speaking before the Japanese Diet in 1926, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan explained, “After the demise of the so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement,
the government had nothing to worry about Japanese immigrants in Mexico, but it is still difficult
for ordinary workers to build a stable life [in Mexico].” Thus, the Japanese government allowed
the emigration of only “yobiyose (relatives of Japanese residents in Mexico), immigrants who aim
to reenter, and those who have enough capital to be self-reliant in agriculture or commerce.”
130
As
a result, most Japanese who arrived at Mexico after 1924 were yobiyose. Historian Maria Elena
Ota Mishima demonstrates that 2,950 Japanese immigrated to Mexico from 1921 to 1941 and 74
percent of them did so from 1925 to 1932 mostly as yobiyose. And in 1930, the total Japanese
population in Mexico numbered 5,967.
131
In fact, Los Angeles Japanese, who paid close attention
to U.S. immigration policy, were aware that the 1924 Act would nullify the restriction on Japanese
immigration to Mexico and the Japanese government would not deny passport applications of

129
Iyo Kunimoto, “Kindai Nichi-Boku Kankei no Keisei to Beikoku 1888-1910 [The formation of modern
Japan-Mexico relations and the United States, 1888-1910],” Raten Amerika Ronshū 11-12 (1978): 90-94; Nichi-
Boku Kōryūshi, 338; María Elena Ota Mishima, “Características Sociales y Económicas de Los Migrantes
Japoneses en México,” in Destino México: Un estudio de las migraciones asiáticas a México, siglo XIX y XX,
ed. María Elena Ota Mishima (Mexico City, 1997), 56; Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice, 44.
130
Fujioka, Ayumi no Ato, 72-74; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Issues related to Mexico,” 1926, Gikai-
TS-11, Dai 52 Gikai Setsumei Sankō Shiryō [Report prepared for the 52
nd
Diet], DAMFAJ.
131
María Elena Ota Mishima, Siete Migraciones Japonesas en México, 1890-1978 (Mexico City, 1985), 67;
Jerry García, Looking Like the Enemy: Japanese Mexicans, the Mexican State, and US Hegemony, 1897-1945
(Tucson, 2014), 79. Jerry García mistakenly explains that this 1924 Treaty established the system of yobiyose
immigration. The yobiyose immigration had existed before 1924 and the nullification of the Gentlemen’s
Agreement played a major role in the increase of yobiyose immigrants in Mexico as demonstrated in this
dissertation. Ota Mishima also touches upon the treaty to explain the immigration of Japanese fishermen. See
García, Looking Like the Enemy, 80-81; Ota Mishima, Siete Migraciones Japonesas en México, 1890-1978, 88-
92.
79

those planning to go to Mexico.
132
The increase of yobiyose Japanese in Mexico was an unintended,
if predictable, consequence of the 1924 Act, which largely affected the Japanese migration in the
U.S.-Mexico borderlands.
133
As will be seen, however, most yobiyose Japanese in Mexico were not
from Los Angeles.
It was the Mexican border city of Mexicali that received a largest number of Japanese
yobiyose immigrants after 1924. Mexicali is located about 300 miles southeast of Los Angeles and
just across the border from California’s Imperial County. In the beginning of the twentieth century,
Mexicali was a small town with a scarce population of less than 1,000 people because of its poor
communications and transportation conditions as well as its harsh desert climate. However, by
1930, Mexicali evolved into a center of cotton cultivation in Mexico with about 30,000 people.
134

The process of this transformation involved the water from the Colorado River, a huge amount of
money coming from Los Angeles, and immigrant workers, first the Chinese and later the Japanese.
In 1908, the Colorado River Land Company, an American company owned by powerful and
wealthy Americans such as Los Angeles Times owner Harrison G. Otis, invested twelve million
dollars to construct canals, dikes, roads, and other improvements in order to utilize lands of
Mexicali. The company monopolized the land for agricultural use and hired a large number of

132
“Bokukoku Imin Gekizō ka [A dramatic increase of immigrants in Mexico?], Rafu Shimpo, May 22, 1924.
133
Jerry García mistakenly explains that this 1924 Treaty established the system of yobiyose immigration. The
yobiyose immigration had existed before 1924 and the nullification of the Gentlemen’s Agreement played a
major role in the increase of yobiyose immigrants in Mexico as demonstrated in this dissertation. Ota Mishima
also touches upon the treaty to explain the immigration of Japanese fishermen. See García, Looking Like the
Enemy, 80-81; Ota Mishima, Siete Migraciones Japonesas en México, 1890-1978, 88-92
134
Secretaría de la Economía Nacional de México, Dirección General de Estadística, Fifth Census of Population,
Baja California Distrito Norte (Mexico City, 1935), 11, Box 72, Folder 1, Collection Gobierno del Estado,
Archivo Histórico del Estado de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (hereafter as AHEBC); Yolanda Sánchez
Ogás, Asalto a Las Tierras 75 Aniversario, 1937-2012 (Mexicali, 2012), 30.
80

Chinese immigrants as tenant farmers and farmworkers, who entered Mexicali legally or illegally
and played an indispensable role in the early development of Mexicali cotton agriculture.
135

When World War I boosted the Mexicali economy, the Japanese came on the scene as they
found an economic opportunity in speculative cotton industry. There were two groups of Japanese
immigrants, one coming from the United States and the other wanting to enter the United States.
The first group came from California with capital enough to become cotton farmers in the lands
free from anti-Japanese sentiment and regulations in the United States such as California Alien
Land Laws. The second group came there from other parts of Mexico or Peru in the hope of
entering the United States clandestinely. A Japanese man Sankichi Tsutsumi recalled that when he
arrived at Mexicali in 1919, there were 600 or 700 Japanese waiting for their chance to slip into
the United States.
136
But many decided to settle in Mexicali and work for the Japanese cotton
farmers, not only because the local cotton economy was booming but also because it was not
difficult to enter the United States as temporary visitors if they lived in Mexicali. The Japanese
workers stepped up to become foremen and later tenant farmers as they got used to their new life
in Mexicali. Like the Chinese, they leased lands from the Colorado River Land Company and hired
Japanese and paid the company about 10 percent of their harvest income. Japanese farmers also
hired local Mexican workers to reclaim land, plant seeds, eradicate weeds, and harvest crops.
Meanwhile, they called over their relatives from Japan as yobiyose and thus Mexicali became a
small ethnic enclave with Japanese shops and restaurants by 1924. Mexicali developed as an ethnic
Japanese community in a unique way in which the southward migration of Japanese from

135
Catalina Velázquez Morales, Los Inmigrantes Chinos en Baja California, 1920-1937 (Mexicali, 2001), 49-
50, 59.
136
Ota Mishima, Siete Migraciones Japonesas en México, 1890-1978, 63.
81

California met with the northward migration of Japanese from other parts of Mexico.
137
According
to the Mexican census of 1930, the number of Japanese immigrants in the northern region of Baja
California increased from 393 in 1921 to 958 in 1930. As the Japanese Association of Mexicali
claimed that the ethnic Japanese population was nearly 1,000 in 1931, Mexicali became one of the
largest concentrations of ethnic Japanese residents in Mexico.
138

One of the Japanese people who gave up his plan to enter the United States but built a stable
life in Mexicali was Gensaku Nakaoka. In April 1919, he landed the port of Salina Cruz in southern
Mexico after staying temporarily in Peru and Chile and joined more than 200 Japanese with the
same intention to enter the United States. After arriving in the port of Guaymas in the state of
Sonora, he began to walk in the blazing heat with about twenty Japanese toward Mexicali, some
of whom died during their journey in a foreign land. In Mexicali, he found a high-paying job of
cutting down trees and leveling the lands and then decided to settle in Mexicali to become a cotton
farmer.
139
An immigrant story like Nakaoka’s has been narrated in the context of Japanese Mexican
history. But if he successfully entered the United States and stayed there, his life would have been
part of Japanese American history. In the mind of transpacific immigrants like Nakaoka, the
distinction between Japanese American history and Japanese Mexican history did not matter. The

137
Nichi-Boku Kōryūshi, 423-424; Nihon Mekishiko Ijūshi Hensan Iinkai [Editorial committee of history of
Japanese migration to Mexico], ed., Nihon Mekishiko Ijūshi (1971), 200-206.
138
Secretaría de la Economía Nacional de México, Dirección General de Estadística, Fifth Census of Population,
Baja California Distrito Norte (Mexico City, 1935), 31, 35, Box 72, Folder 1, Collection Gobierno del Estado,
AHEBC; Japanese Association of Mexicali to Ken Yanagisawa, acting deputy minister of the Japanese Legation
in Mexico, June 13, 1931, M-1-3-0-1_1, Zai “Mekishikari” Ryōjikan Setchi Kankei [Regarding the
establishment of the consulate in Mexicali], vol.1, DAMFAJ. A report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan recorded that the number of Japanese residents in Mexicali was about 780 in 1931. See Ken Yanagisawa
to Kijūrō Shidehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 29, 1931, M-2-2-0-1_3_2, Honshō Narabini Zaigai
Kōkan’in Shutchō Kankei Zakken/Honshōin Oyobi Zaigai Kōkan’in Kaigai Shutchō no Bu (Soshakuchi, Inin
Tōchi Chiiki wo Fukumu)/Zaibei Kakukan [Miscellaneous reports on overseas diplomatic offices/overseas
assignments of ministry officials and diplomatic office staff members (including leased and mandated
territories)/offices in the United States], vol.2, DAMFAJ.
139
Yasutarō Taki, Mekishiko Kokujō Taikan: Shokumin Shichijūnenshi [Mexico, great friend of Japan: a seventy-
year history of Japanese settlement] (Mexico City, 1968), 255-258.
82

experiences of immigrants who passed or stayed in Mexicali were part of a lager Japanese
immigration history of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands.
However, with the implementation of the 1924 Immigration Act that automatically nullified
the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 and 1908, Japanese immigrants who had already lived in
Mexicali began to call over their relatives from Japan and developed the border city as one of the
most important sites of Japanese Mexican history. After 1924, the ethnic Japanese population
increased and played a larger role in the local cotton agriculture in Mexicali. According to the
History of Japanese-Mexican Interactions, edited by first-generation Japanese in Mexico and
published in 1990 by the Japanese-Mexican Association (Asociación México Japonesa), there
were probably around 500 Japanese in Mexicali in 1925. By that time, cotton cultivation in
Mexicali expanded to about 20,000 hectares of which the Japanese cultivated 70 percent, while
the Chinese and Americans cultivated the rest.
140
A contemporary report issued by the Japanese
consul in Los Angeles Chūichi Ōhashi tells us a slightly different number, saying that in 1927 the
ethnic Japanese population numbered about 400, out of which 100 were engaged in cotton
agriculture and other 300 were running restaurants, barber shops, bars, hotels, pool halls, and so
forth. Ōhashi added that the ethnic Chinese population was 3,500 and that “one half of them are
day laborers at cotton farms, but the other half takes hold on city’s commerce.”
141
Anti-Chinese
xenophobia growing from the early 1920s forced many Chinese to leave cotton farms and move
to the Downtown area, leaving more chances for the Japanese to engage in cotton farming in the
countryside of the Mexicali region.
142

140
Nichi-Boku Kōryūshi, 440.
141
Nichi Boku Kyōkai, Nichi-Boku Kyōkai Hō, vol.2, March 30, 1927, Box 271, JARP, 316-324.
142
Catalina Velázquez Morales, ed., Baja California: Un Presente con Historia (Mexicali, 2002), 104.
83

The personal stories of newly-arriving Japanese immigrants in the border town of Mexicali
reveal much about their yobiyose background. Kieya Hayasaka was one of the yobiyose Japanese
in Mexicali. In 1924, he began to live in Mexicali at the age of 22, when his brother, who had
already lived in that arid border town, called him over from Japan. Later in 1929, he became a
naturalized Mexican citizen, because he did not think of “returning to his country and by virtue of
having the majority of his family members in Mexico and his interests,” as written in his
naturalization application. In his application, he wrote the names of two Mexican friends and his
savings of $727 (approximately $10,400 in 2017), which demonstrated his stable social and
economic basis.
143
The United States did not allow the Japanese to become naturalized as an
American citizen based on the Naturalization Act of 1790 and the Ozawa v. The United States case
of 1922 that deemed the Japanese ineligible for naturalization because they were neither African
nor white who were people “of what is popularly known as the Caucasian race.”
144
In contrast, the
Mexican government allowed the Japanese to become a Mexican citizen. In fact, the Mexican
Census of 1930 recorded that forty-one people of Japanese origin had become Mexican citizens
by 1930 in Baja California where about 1,000 Japanese nationals lived in that time.
145
One of
economic reasons for naturalization was that foreigners were not allowed to purchase land or water
rights in the range of 100 kilometers from the national borders and 50 kilometers from the coasts.
146

The number of Japanese immigrants who got the Mexican citizenship was relatively small most

143
Information of Japanese Kiyoya Hayasaka, November 25, 1929, Box 40, Folder 90, Collection Dirección
General de Gobierno, Archivo General de la Nación (National Archives of Mexico), Secretaría General de
Gobernación, Mexico City, Mexico (hereafter as AGN); Taki, Mekishiko Kokujō Taikan, 274.
144
See Ozawa v. United States. 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
145
Secretaría de la Economía Nacional de México, Dirección General de Estadística, Fifth Census of Population,
Baja California Distrito Norte (Mexico City, 1935), 31, 35, Box 72, Folder 1, Collection Gobierno del Estado,
AHEBC.
146
Secretaría de Gobernacion, “Pide se le informe si los extranjeros naturalizados pueden adquirir dominio en
tierras y aguas,” December 1929, Box 3, Folder 32, Collection Dirección General de Gobierno, AGN.
84

likely because they could lease and purchase lands without Mexican citizenship and did not need
to purchase properties in the above mentioned region near the borders and coasts.
Kiyoshi Nakazawa was another yobiyose who arrived at Mexicali in 1924. In the beginning,
his plan was to enter the United States from Mexicali and stayed there for a couple of years. But
he thought twice and decided to settle in Mexicali because of the reinforcement of U.S. border
control. After working at grocery stores, he began to farm cotton with his fellow Japanese in
Mexicali in 1931.
147
Naoki Hata was a good example of transpacific Japanese migration. In 1917,
he crossed the Pacific Ocean and arrived at the Peruvian capital city of Lima where he lived as a
barber for five years. In Lima, it was very common for Japanese to work at barber shops, since
they could start out the business with relatively little capital and skills. By the mid-1910s, eighty
out of 110 barber shops in Lima were operated by Japanese immigrants. Then in 1923, Hata
travelled to Mexico in search for a better life and began working at a cotton farm in Mexicali. In
1925, he entered the United States illegally, but only six months later, he returned to Mexicali to
open his barber shop based on his experience in Peru. In 1930, he called over his wife Sueko from
Japan and later raised four girls in Mexicali. There were many women like Sueko who arrived in
Mexicali as yobiyose wives, too. As these examples illustrate, Japanese immigrants who arrived at
Mexicali in the early 1920s started their lives as “Japanese of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands” not
knowing whether they were going to stay in Mexico or in the United States.
148

And in Mexico, it was common for Japanese men to marry Mexican women, since
intermarriage was legal unlike the United States. But due to the development of cotton agriculture
and the yobiyose immigration, many Japanese men in Mexicali married to Japanese wives and had

147
Taki, Mekishiko Kokujō Taikan, 244.
148
Ibid., 85, 298.
85

Mexican-born children, forming an ethnic community similar to that of their co-ethnics in Los
Angeles.
149
The growth of the Japanese community in Mexicali after 1924 resulted in creations of
several important ethnic organizations. Mexicali Japanese founded the Japanese School of
Mexicali in 1925, the Japanese Agricultural Association of Mexicali in 1928, and the Women’s
Association of Mexicali in 1929. These new organizations helped the Mexicali Japanese to
maintain ethnic solidarity to survive the Mexican-dominant society and defend their economic
rights to own their farmlands.
150

Another Mexican city in Baja California that attracted Japanese was Ensenada, a city facing
the Pacific Ocean and located fifty miles south of the U.S.-Mexico border. Many Japanese
fishermen settled in Ensenada and worked for Japanese fishery companies based in Southern
California. The Japanese in both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border developed their ethnic fishery
business together. Since the 1910s, Japanese fishery companies based in Southern California were
recruiting Japanese fishermen who immigrated to Mexico, since they could not enter the United
States after the implementation of the Gentlemen’s Agreement in 1907 and 1908. After the
nullification of the agreement by the 1924 Act, it became easier for Japanese fishermen to bring
their relatives to Mexico as yobiyose.
151
For example, a Japanese fishery company MK Fisheries

149
Except for Baja California, the majority of Japanese immigrant men in Mexico married Mexican women in
the 1930s. See García, Looking Like the Enemy, 85.
150
Nichi-Boku Kōryūshi, 517-518.
151
Ota Mishima, Siete Migraciones Japonesas en México, 1890-1978, 89-93. Ota Mishima regards the period
from 1921 to 1940 as one of the three periods when the Japanese increased in Mexico. As for the Japanese
fishery in the Baja California region, Shigeru Sugiyama explores its history in terms of the trinational
relationship between Japan, Mexico, and the United States and Yuko Konno focuses on it in relation to the anti-
Japanese movement in California. See Shigeru Sugiyama, “1930 Nendai Mekishiko ni okeru Nihon Ebi Torōru
Gyogyō to Nichi-Boku-Bei Sangoku Kankei ni Kansuru Kenkyū [The Japanese Prawn Trawl Fishery and the
Trinational Relationship between Japan, Mexico, and the United States in the 1930s Mexico],” Research report
of project funded by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
(Apr., 2008); Yuko Konno, “Senzen no Kariforunia Shū ni okeru Hannichi Gyogyō Hōan wo Meguru Tatakai
[The struggle over anti-Japanse fishing bills in pre-World War II],” Imin Kenkyū Nenpō [Annual Review of
Migration Studies] 22 (Mar., 2016).
86

based in San Diego was hiring Japanese immigrants in Mexico since 1913. The company’s
president Masaharu Kondō used an immigration recruitment company, recommended by his friend
scientist Ichijirō Itani, who later became a founding member of the Japan-Mexico Society. Then
Kondō brought thirteen Japanese from several prefectures in Japan. By 1926, the company had
brought about 100 yobiyose to Baja California.
152
The Periódico Oficial, the official organ of the
government of the northern district of Baja California, recorded the activity of the MK Fisheries
in 1924. Kondō applied for a permit to operate his fishing ships at nineteen places along the coast
of Baja California that covered San José del Cabo, the southern edge of the peninsula, with the
purpose of catching and exporting lobsters, abalones, and seaweeds.
153
According to a report
submitted by the Japanese consul in Los Angeles Ōhashi, in 1927, about 200 Japanese were
registered as residents in the Ensenada area but only sixty were actual residents, because the rest
were out of town working on the voyage for California-based Japanese fishery companies.
154

Hajime Tomita, a former Japanese fisherman, recalled that Japanese fishermen had a strong sense
that they had immigrated to the United States although they were in Mexico on paper, since they
worked on the ocean and got on shore mostly at San Diego.
155
These Japanese fishermen were also
the “Japanese of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands” just like Mexicali Japanese residents.
Japanese fishing activities in Baja California developed partly thanks to the renewal of the
Japan-Mexico Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation in October of 1924. The original treaty
between Japan and Mexico was first signed in 1888, which was the first equal international treaty
for Japan after the Meiji Restoration. Although the treaty did not strengthen economic ties much

152
Nichi-Boku Kōryūshi, 429, 431.
153
Gobierno del Distrito Norte de la Baja California, Periódico Oficial, July 10, 1924.
154
Nichi Boku Kyōkai, Nichi-Boku Kyōkai Hō, vol.2, March 30, 1927, Box 271, JARP, 321.
155
Nichi-Boku Kōryūshi, 44
87

between Japan and Mexico, it certainly opened the door for Japanese to immigrate to Mexico.
156

However, the 1888 Treaty was unable to correspond to changing international relations in the early
twentieth century, when Mexico underwent its years-long revolution and Japan evolved into an
empire. While Japan became a country that received immigrants from its colonies such as Korea
and Taiwan, the country was still searching for places abroad to send emigrants and decrease the
unemployed within the Japanese archipelago. The new Japan-Mexico Treaty of 1924 continued to
allow Japanese nationals to enter and travel in Mexico. It also permitted them to engage in
economic activities in Mexico by giving them the same status with Mexicans or a most-favored-
nation status. Yet, the treaty exempted fishery activities from its application. Although it did not
mean that the treaty prohibited Japanese fishery activities, it indicates that the Mexican
government wanted to develop the Mexican fishery industry by Mexicans themselves by limiting
the influence of Japanese fishermen and fishery companies to a certain extent. In addition, the
renewal of the Japan-Mexico Treaty in 1924 was not exactly the Japanese government’s
countermeasure against the U.S. exclusionist law, since the negotiation between the two countries
had begun in 1916.
157
It was, however, significant and symbolic for the Japanese government to
be able to manifest its amicable relations with Mexico, an important neighbor country of the United
States. Although Eiichiro Azuma emphasizes that American diplomats were deeply concerned
about the Japanese presence in Mexico and argues that Baja California held “a symbolic site of a

156
Kunimoto, “Kindai Nichi-Boku Kankei no Keisei to Beikoku 1888-1910,” 83-84, 87.
157
Council meeting minutes, “Nihon Koku Mekishiko Koku Kan Tsūshō Kōkai Jōyaku no Hijun no Ken
[Regarding the ratification of the treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and Mexico],” March 18,
1925, Sūmitsuin Kaigi Hikki [Council meeting minutes] (Sū-D00562100), NAJ. Jerry García provides a
misleading explanation that “[t]he 1924 treaty allowed Japanese immigrants to bring their parents, children, and
a wide spectrum of relatives.” The yobiyose immigration had existed before 1924 and the nullification of the
Gentlemen’s Agreement played a major role in the increase of yobiyose immigrants in Mexico as demonstrated
in this dissertation. Ota Mishima also touches upon the treaty to explain the immigration of Japanese fishermen.
See García, Looking Like the Enemy, 80-81; Ota Mishima, Siete Migraciones Japonesas en México, 1890-1978,
88-92.
88

hemispheric race war and inter-imperial contestation,” I argue that Baja California was also a
symbolic site for Japan-Mexico transpacific amity in the 1920s as seen in the increase of Japanese
population in the region as already explained.
158
At a time when the U.S. government declared that
the Japanese were undesirable aliens, the Mexican government made clear that the Japanese were
still desirable or at least acceptable immigrants.
The Japanese community in Baja California developed their relations with the co-ethnics in
Southern California. Japanese diplomats knew that the Japanese Mexican community would grow
after 1924 with yobiyose from Japan as well as the Japanese coming from the United States. In
May 1924, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Japanese Legation in Mexico Shigetsuna Furuya sent a
telegram to Minister of Foreign Affairs Keishirō Matsui, writing that Japan should build a new
consulate in Mazatlán, a harbor town at the Pacific Coast in the state of Sinaloa, to protect Japanese
immigrants in the region and take a preventive measure against anti-Japanese propaganda of the
United States. But it was not just about Japanese immigrants but also about the power relationship
with European countries sending immigrants to Baja California. Furuya reported that nine
countries including England, the United States, Germany, Italia, and Spain had their respective
consulates in Mazatlán to monitor the region, which implied the geopolitical importance of
Mazatlán from a global perspective. He called for the creation of a consulate because otherwise
Japan “would regret greatly sometime later in terms of competition with other countries.”
159

What is important is that the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles, not the Japanese Legation
in Mexico City, was in charge of protecting and monitoring the Japanese in Baja California,

158
Eiichiro Azuma, “Japanese Immigrant Settler Colonialism in the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands and the U.S.
Racial-Imperialist Politics of the Hemispheric ‘Yellow Peril’,” Pacific Historical Review 83, no.2 (2014): 274.
159
Shigetsuna Furuya, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Japanese Legation in Mexico, to Keishirō Matsui, Minister
of Foreign Affairs, May 30, 1924, 6-1-2-72, Zaigai Teikoku Kōkan Setchi Zakken [Miscellaneous reports on the
establishment of overseas imperial diplomatic offices], vol.1, DAMFAJ.
89

because Baja California was a part of the larger Southern California metropolitan economy.
Additionally, the Japanese consul in Los Angeles Kaname Wakasugi also felt the necessity to
create a new consulate in Mazatlán. In June 1924, he sent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo
a telegram and gave four reasons why Japan needed to set up a new consulate in Mazatlán. First,
“Japanese farmers in the Los Angeles area were increasingly interested in migrating to Mexico as
a countermeasure against the oppression of anti-Japanese land laws and immigration laws.” And
Japanese fishermen based in California but working along the Pacific Coast of Mexico could move
their base to Mexico if American laws became more exclusionist against them. Second, the
Japanese government should send emigrants to Mexico directly from Japan just like emigrants to
South America, given the “unilateral action taken by the United States” that nullified the
Gentlemen’s Agreement. With the increase of the Japanese population, the new consulate in
Mazatlán could develop the commercial market of Japanese in Mexico. Third, the Japanese
government should create a consulate in advance to give guidance to newly arriving Japanese
immigrants so that they could prevent the development of anti-Japanese sentiment in this region.
Finally, Wakasugi added that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should enhance the capability of
overseas agencies by setting up a consulate in Mazatlán.
160
Soon later in the summer of 1924, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan took the diplomats’ suggestions seriously and started consular
activities in Mazatlán (The Japanese consulate of Mazatlán formally opened in 1927 after securing
a sufficient budget).
161
In October 1924, when a new vice consul Masaki Yodogawa visited Los
Angeles on his way to Mazatlán, the Mexico Study Society held a welcome party for him at a

160
Kaname Wakasugi, Japanese consul in Los Angeles, to Matsui, June 4, 1924, 6-1-2-72, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
161
Kijūrō Shidehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Wakasugi, Masanao Hanihara, Japanese ambassador in the
United States, and Ujirō Oyama, Japanese consul general in San Francisco, July 23, 1924, 6-1-2-72, vol.1,
DAMFAJ; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, November 1, 1927, M-2-1-0-10_33, Kakkoku Chūzai Teikoku
Ryōji Ninmen Kankei Zakken [Miscellaneous reports on appointment and dismissal of imperial consulate
officials in foreign countries], DAMFAJ.
90

Japanese restaurant in Los Angeles. Twenty-four members of the study group attended the party
and showed him their enthusiasm and explained why Los Angeles Japanese created a group to do
research on Mexico.
162
The new consulate in Mazatlán at the Pacific Coast near Baja California
was another consequence of the Immigration Act of 1924 that reflected worries and expectations
among the Japanese immigrants and government officials regarding Japanese migration in the
U.S.-Mexico borderlands and international competition between Japan and western countries.
Here remains one question: how many Japanese migrated from Los Angeles to Mexico after
1924? Despite several expeditions and high expectations Los Angeles Japanese had, only a small
number of Japanese actually moved from Los Angeles to Mexico after 1924. In Mexico, there
were still many places politically too unstable for the Japanese to build a new ethnic community.
The risks of ongoing instability likely convinced many to remain in Los Angeles. In fact, by
December of this year, the Rafu Shimpo had begun to show negative prospects of leaving
California. An editorial wrote, although written not in terms of the 1924 Act, “You need to be well
knowledgeable and well prepared [to engage in agriculture in other places outside California or
the United States], so I think you cannot expect much.”
163

Even in the border city of Mexicali, most Japanese immigrants were not from the United
States. In 1926, Japanese consul in Los Angeles Chūichi Ōhashi, who was appointed in 1925,
reported the situation of Mexicali Japanese in the Overseas Business Bulletin, a daily report
published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. His report was based on the investigation
conducted by Mokichi Fukushima, a Japanese diplomat stationed at an outpost of the Ministry of

162
“Mekishiko Kenkyū Kai, Yodogawa Ryōji Kangei Kai [The Mexico Study Society, welcome party for consul
Yodogawa],” Rafu Shimpo, October 17, 1924.
163
Hayashi, Nikkei Jānarisuto Monogatari, 147; “Kyūchi ni Tateru Nōgyōka,” Rafu Rhimpo, December 17,
1924.
91

Foreign Affairs in Baja California. According to the report, the majority of Japanese immigrants
there came from other places in Mexico or Peru and decided to stay and work in Mexicali since
they became short of money at the time they arrived at Mexicali. “Recently some Japanese in Los
Angeles,” explained Ōhashi, “came to this region to purchase several thousand acres of lands from
American landowners in order to sell the lands in lots, but . . . it is quite hard to make profits in
agriculture in this region,” since they were not able to find lands with good irrigation. From his
report, it is clear that only a few Los Angeles Japanese moved to Mexicali.
164
Historian María
Elena Ota Mishima has analyzed the alien registration cards (tarjetas del Registro Nacional de
Extranjeros) recorded by the Mexican government between 1890 and 1949 and found that only
fifteen Japanese immigrants, out of 3,626 Japanese immigrated to Mexico from 1890 and 1949,
came from the United States, arguing that “Japanese immigrants sporadically came from other
countries” but mostly from Japan.
165

Despite the initial enthusiasm in most of 1924, Los Angeles Japanese did not carry out a
large-scale migration to Mexico.
166
Dobashi and Matsuoka, representing the Central Japanese
Association of Southern California, did not mention Mexicali as a possible destination for Japanese

164
Nichi Boku Kyōkai, Nichi-Boku Kyōkai Hō, vol.2, March 30, 1927, Box 271, JARP, 321.
165
María Elena Ota Mishima, Destino México: Un estudio de las migraciones asiáticas a México, siglo XIX y
XX (Mexico City, 1997), 60-63, 104-110.
166
Eiichiro Azuma writes that “the latter half of the 1920s saw a rise in the number of Issei resettlers to
northwestern Mexico” and “[b]etween 1924 and 1931, 275 and 274 Issei households went through Tijuana and
Mexicali, respectively, resettling elsewhere in Baja California.” Azuma asserts this mistakenly drawing on a
statistic compiled by historian María Elena Ota Mishima and assuming that those Japanese crossing Mexican
border cities such as Tijuana and Mexicali were former Japanese residents in the United States who wanted to
“resettle” in Mexico. However, Ota Mishima’s statistic is neither about “Issei resettlers” from the United States
nor about their households but simply about from where Japanese immigrants entered Mexico. In fact, many
Japanese immigrants first landed at San Francisco, moved through the U.S. territory, and finally entered Mexico
via Mexicali and Tijuana. For example, a Japanese yobiyose immigrant Kieya Hayasaka landed at San Francisco
on 16 October 1924 and a week later entered Mexicali by train via Los Angeles. See Azuma, “Japanese
Immigrant Settler Colonialism in the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands and the U.S. Racial-Imperialist Politics of the
Hemispheric ‘Yellow Peril’,” 270-271; Ota Mishima, Destino México, 60-63, 104-110; Taki, Mekishiko Kokujō
Taikan, 274-275.
92

migration but recommended Mexican northwestern states such as Nayarit and Colima, since these
places had lands with enough water for farming. But their suggestion did not result in any
organized project that could successfully transfer Japanese people from Los Angele to those
coastal destinations in Mexico. In 1927, Teizō Egashira, a Japanese diplomat in Mexico,
contributed a report to the Japan-Mexico Society’s newsletter on the Mexican coastal states of
Nayarit, Sonora, and Sinaloa facing the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of California. His report
mentioned that about 350 Japanese lived in these three states and those who had come from the
United States tended to be successful in agriculture. But the number of Japanese immigrants in
Mexico was still small even after the United States prohibited all the Japanese entry, as it required
serious efforts for newcomers to reclaim uncultivated lands in Mexico with fewer resources than
they had in California. To quell optimism, Egashira touched upon a Japanese who came from the
United States in the hope of succeeding in agriculture in this region but decided to give up his plan
immediately after looking at underdeveloped lands in Mexico. He added, “those who assume that
they could use things like a car and a telephone from the beginning have no right to talk about
starting business in this country” and “[if you want to succeed] you need to have the same
willingness of fellow Japanese immigrants who could reclaim wilderness of the United States in
the past.”
167

High expectations for Mexico expressed by the Los Angeles Japanese in 1924 were the
reflection of their anger against the American exclusionist law and strong desire to find somewhere
better than the United States. Such expectations, however, did not materialize because it was still
economically and culturally better for Japanese immigrants to live in Los Angeles than in Mexico
despite anti-Japanese regulations in the United States. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the

167
Ibid., 78.
93

Japanese communities in Los Angeles and in Mexico existed separately. Despite its location within
the northern fringes of the Mexican polity, Baja California vividly belonged to the larger economic
sphere of Southern California with Los Angeles as its nucleus. At the time, Mexican border cities
like Mexicali were not able to survive without goods and information emanating from Southern
California. In the early 1930s, Mokichi Fukushima, a Japanese diplomat stationed in Baja
California, reported, “almost all materials including consumer staples, building materials, and so
forth, are imported from the United States” in Mexicali, Ensenada, and Tijuana. The U.S. dollar
was widely circulated there. In addition, Baja Japanese immigrants were reading the Los Angeles-
based ethnic press such as the Rafu Shimpo, while serving as local correspondents for those
papers.
168
In addition, the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles, not the Japanese Legation in Mexico
City, was in charge of protecting and monitoring Japanese subjects in Baja California until 1931
when even the Japanese consulate in Mazatlán took over that role.
169
Japanese residents of Baja
California survived in the periphery of both the United States and Mexico by keeping economic,
cultural, and political ties with the Los Angeles Japanese. The Immigration Act of 1924 did not
dramatically increase the number of Japanese moving from the United States to Mexico but
certainly brought more yobiyose from Japan to Mexico, especially Mexicali, developing a
transborder ethnic Japanese community in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands.
Nevertheless, deepening relations between Los Angeles and Mexicali Japanese were not
always good for Mexicali Japanese. After 1924, the Japanese Association of Mexicali came to play

168
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 1932, Tsū-San_97, “Bokukoku “Ensenada” Hōmen ni okeru
Honpōjin no Hatten Jōkyō [The situation of Japanese people’s development in the Ensenada area in Mexico],
DAMFAJ; Nihonjin Mekishiko Ijūshi Hensan Iinkai [Editorial committee of history of Japanese migration to
Mexico], ed. Nihonjin Mekishiko Ijūshi [History of Japanese migration to Mexico] (1971), 205-206 (hereafter
as Nihonjin Mekishiko Ijūshi); Eiichiro Azuma, “Community Formation across the National Border: The
Japanese of the U.S.-Mexican Californias.” Review: Literature and Arts of the Americas 39, no.1 (2006): 40-41.
169
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1935, M-1-3-0-1_3, Zaigai Teikoku Kōkan Kankei Zakken
[Miscellaneous reports on overseas imperial diplomatic offices], vol.2, DAMFAJ.
94

an increasingly important role in strengthening ethnic solidarity and economy in the Mexican
dominant society. The association was first founded in 1917 and served as an outpost agency for
the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles taking care of immigration paperwork. On 9 December
1926, this association unexpectedly turned into a crime scene, when the association secretary
Saburō Masuko was found dead and buried under the patio of the association building that was
also burned down. Masuko immigrated to Mexico in 1907 to work at a coal mine in the northern
state of Coahuila and served as a supervisor of immigrants. He could speak Spanish since he had
studied the language at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. He was a well-respected
immigrant leader in the Japanese community in Mexico, who worked hard to support other
Japanese workers facing difficult working conditions. When eight Japanese miners died from an
explosion at a mine in the state of Veracruz in 1908, Masuko brought their bodies back from the
mine and held a funeral for them. Then in 1925, he moved to Mexicali to work as the secretary of
the Japanese Association, which unfortunately resulted in his death a year later.
170

After his body was found, the Mexican local authority arrested two Japanese men, Shin’ichi
Morishita and Kiyoji Shōda, for the murder of Masuko. Why was Masuko killed by fellow
Japanese? History of Japan-Mexico Interactions, a comprehensive history of Japanese immigrants
in Mexico edited by first generation Japanese, explains the cause of this homicide. At the time,
there were Japanese women who migrated to Mexicali as yobiyose immigrants but worked as
prostitutes in Mexicali or in the north of the border. A Japanese mafia organization called the
Tokyo Club, based in Los Angeles, was behind the entry of such women in Mexico. When Masuko
was killed, Mexicali Japanese thought that the Tokyo Club used its influence to remove Masuko,
who attempted to repatriate five Japanese women who he thought would become prostitutes.

170
Nichi-Boku Kōryūshi, 472-476.
95

According to History of Japan-Mexico Interactions, Shōda was a member of the Tokyo Club,
while Morishita was an owner of a pool hall and bar in Mexicali. Mitsu Ichikawa, a Japanese
female resident who began to live in Mexicali in 1924, remembered the incident, saying, “My
eldest son was born in December 7 [of 1926]. Back then, the Japanese Association was like a city
hall [for the Japanese]. So, I was going to visit the association building to report the birth of my
son within three or four days later. But, Mr. Masuko was not there when I visited the building. It
was the night of that day when the association building was burned down.”
171

The Rafu Shimpo reported the murder of Masuko as a tragedy for both Mexicali and Los
Angeles Japanese. Although the paper did not mention the involvement of the Tokyo Club, it
recorded that Shōda was arrested in Calexico, an American border city directly across from
Mexicali, and that Japanese consular officials and immigrants in Los Angeles visited Mexicali to
investigate the situation as well as to encourage their co-ethnics amid that horrible experience.
172

In 2016, I visited Mexicali and met with Ichikawa’s son Iwao Ichikawa. When I asked him what
he knew about the influence of Los Angeles Japanese in Mexicali, he immediately told me about
the death of Masuko. His death is still remembered by descendants of Mexicali Japanese.
173

Masuko’s death proved how deeply the Japanese communities in Los Angeles and Mexicali were
connected with each other and how they formed a transborder ethnic Japanese community before
World War II. As will be explained in detail in Chapter 4, this transborder community would serve

171
Ibid; Nihonjin Mekishiko Ijūshi, 182.
172
For example, an editorial of the Rafu Shimpo criticized the murderer who killed Masuko as “the enemy of the
whole Japanese community.” See “Masuko-kun [Mr. Masuko],” Rafu Shimpo, December 23, 1926; “Mexicali
Nikkai ni Hōka [Japanese Association of Mexicali set on fire],” Rafu Shimpo, December 18, 1926; “Chūnichikai
yori Ryō Kanji, Mexicali Shutchō [Two secretaries of the Central Japanese Association visit Mexicali],” Rafu
Shimpo, December 23, 1926; “Shōda Taiheiyō no Ue nimo Giwaku no Ten Koshi [Very suspicious Taiheiyo
Shōda],” Rafu Shimpo, December 25, 1926.
173
Interview by the author, Iwao Ichikawa, January 28, 2016, in Mexicali.
96

as a significant background that complicated interethnic relations between Japanese farmers and
Mexican workers in Los Angeles farmland in the 1930s.

97

Chapter 3
Here Come the Mexicans: Mexican Labor within Triracial Los Angeles Agriculture

While the 1924 Immigration Act forced many Los Angeles Japanese to think about their
future in Mexico as detailed in the previous chapter, the law also made white business leaders and
nativists focus more on Mexicans in the United States. The number of both legal and
undocumented Mexicans increased in Southern California, as the growing agribusiness needed
more Mexican workers. Mexicans became the major source of farmworkers for Japanese tenant
farmers gradually from the 1910s and particularly after the exclusion of Japanese immigrants in
1924. In fact, by this time, there were almost no Japanese farms that operated only with Japanese
labor. In 1929, the number of Japanese residents engaged in agriculture increased to 8,882 and
their children to 12,355. As Japanese farmers increasingly employed Mexican farmworkers, they
came to develop interethnic relations that were mutually dependent though charged with labor and
racial tension.
174

As a result, a triracial hierarchy developed in Los Angeles agriculture as Japanese tenants
leased lands from white landowners and hired Mexican farmworkers.
175
Major ideological and

174
Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi Kankō Iinkai [Publishing committee of Japanese in Southern
California: A history of 70 years], ed., Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi [Japanese in Southern California:
A history of 70 years] (Los Angeles, 1960), 53, 57 (hereafter as Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi); Carey
McWilliams, Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California (Berkeley, 1939; 2000),
243-249.
175
The triracial hierarchy in Southern California was unique in the sense that it consisted of Japanese, Mexicans,
and white Americans. Different types of triracial hierarchy also developed in other areas. For example, before
World War II, in Northern California, Japanese farmers leased lands from white landowners and hired Filipino
workers. By the early decades of the twentieth century in Hawaii, some Portuguese had begun to work as field
supervisors on sugar plantations and found themselves in an intermediate position between Anglo-Saxon
plantation owners and Asian laborers such as Japanese and Filipinos. See Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two
Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America (New York, 2005); Moon-kie Jung,
Reworking Race: The Making of Hawaii’s Interracial Labor Movement (New York, 2006), Ch.3.
98

economic forces that created this hierarchy were white supremacy and agricultural
industrialization, as it placed white landowners and business leaders on the top and marginalized
Japanese tenants in the middle and Mexican workers on the bottom. This divide-and-rule structure
certainly helped strengthen the character of what Carey McWilliams called factories in the field in
Los Angeles agriculture, although this characterization itself was a historical product of the 1930s
as David Vaught contends.
176
In this situation, the Japanese played a role of the middleman-
minority who built ethnic solidarity and economy to survive the anti-Japanese society, while
buffering the direct criticism from Mexican labor against white American capital.
177
While white
landowners and Japanese tenant farmers in Los Angeles became increasingly dependent on
Mexican farmworkers, Mexican immigrants were not inclined to own or lease farmland in the

176
David Vaught argues that from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, agricultural labor
relations particularly in California orchards and vineyards were shaped mainly by the “everyday interplay”
between growers and other actors such as their workers, communities, marketing cooperatives, other growers,
and the state and federal governments. During this period, California growers identified themselves as the
guardians of their harvest and saw their work as a way of life rather than just a business. When the state and
federal governments came to ensure a sufficient labor supply from Mexico after World War I, however,
California growers became part of so-called “industrialized agriculture” as characterized by Paul S. Taylor in
the 1930s. See David Vaught, Cultivating California: Growers, Specialty Crops, and Labor 1875-1920
(Baltimore, 1999).
177
Middleman-minorities are immigrant groups who occupy an intermediate position between the elite and
masses, face societal hostility, and succeed in occupations that can be easily liquidated. Their social status as
sojourners or strangers strengthens their ethnic solidarity and economy and thus aggravates the hostility in the
host society. Edna Bonacich and John Modell apply the middleman-minority theory to Japanese immigrants and
their descendants and demonstrate that middleman-minorities tend to dissolve when they cease to exist as
economic-interest groups. As for the conflicts that Japanese immigrants faced, however, Bonacich and Modell
do not analyze the interethnic and international dimensions of the Japanese immigrants’ position in relation to
ethnic Mexicans. See Edna Bonacich and John Modell, Economic Basis for Ethnic Solidarity: Small Business in
the Japanese American Community (Berkeley, 1980); Bonacich, “A Theory of Middleman Minorities,”
American Sociological Review 38, no.5 (Oct., 1973). Recent studies examine different versions of the
middleman-minority such as the Asian Indian “modern middleman-minority” and the Latino “coethnic
middleman-minority.” They provide important insights into ethnic entrepreneurship in the United States since
the late twentieth century. See Jennifer Parker, “Ethnic Social Structures and Mainstream Capital: The Ethnic
Anchoring of “American” Franchise Growth,” Journal of Asian American Studies 16, no.1 (2013); Jody Agius
Vallejo and Stephanie L. Canizales, “Latino/a professionals as entrepreneurs: how race, class, and gender shape
entrepreneurial incorporation,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 39, no.9 (July, 2016). As for Japanese immigrants in
Brazil and Peru as middleman-minorities, see Tomoko Makabe, “Ethnic hegemony: the Japanese Brazilians in
agriculture, 1908-1968,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no.4 (Jan., 1999); Ayumi Takenaka, “The Japanese in
Peru: History of Immigration, Settlement, and Racialization,” Latin American Perspectives 31, no.3 (May, 2004).
99

United States except certain areas of Texas, as reported by the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States in 1930.
178
Many Mexicans did not become tenants most likely because farm prices
were falling in the early 1920s and because the relationships between white landowners and Asian
tenants had already been established not leaving much room for Mexican newcomers, which was
the case for Filipinos and Japanese late comers in the same period.
179

In order to better understand the triracial hierarchy in Los Angeles agriculture, this chapter
observes the increase of Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles after Japanese exclusion. First, it
analyzes how white agribusiness leaders explained the importance of Mexican agricultural workers
in response to anti-Mexican exclusionists. Agribusiness leaders countered the exclusionists’ racist
argument by employing an equally racist discourse and fabricating a false categorization of
different types of Mexicans. They explained that Mexicans could be categorized into three types,
the ruling class, the “greaser” class, and the “Mexican peon,” and racialized those who would come
to the United States specifically as the “Mexican peon” and a safe group of people. Second, this
chapter explains how Japanese immigrants perceived the growing presence of Mexican residents
and interacted with them in Los Angeles County. Finally, it explores how Mexicans themselves
developed their ethnic community by focusing on the foundation of the ethnic Mexican press La
Opinión and a pioneer Mexican labor union, the Confederación de Uniones Obreras Mexicanas,
in the 1920s. La Opinión and the Mexican labor union members would play a significant role in

178
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, “A Factual Report reviewing Mexican Immigration to the United
States from the Viewpoint of its Economic, Social, Political and International Implications, with less extended
treatment of Immigration from other Western Hemisphere countries,” July 1930, Box 80, George Pigeon
Clements Papers, Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California.
179
Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: An Interpretive History (Boston, 1991), 39. According to Nobuya Tsuchida,
Japanese immigrants who arrived at the United States after the 1910s tended to become farmworkers or
sharecroppers for established Japanese farmers. In hope of having more stable jobs, many of these late comers
became gardeners in the urban area. See Nobuya Tsuchida, “Japanese Gardeners in Southern California, 1900-
1941,” in Lucie Chang and Edna Bonacich ed., Labor Immigration Under Capitalism: Asian Workers in the
United States before World War II (Berkeley, 1984), 1900-1941,” 444.
100

Japanese-Mexican conflicts in Los Angeles County in the 1930s as the former strongly supported
the movement through its coverage of the conflicts and the latter organized Mexican farmworkers
who demanded better wages from Japanese tenant farmers.

White Agribusiness Racism against Mexicans
The exclusion of Japanese immigrants and the increase of Mexican immigrants
simultaneously propelled the transition from the “Japanese Problem” to the “Mexican Problem”
as the major target of nativism in California, which decreased nativist pressure on Japanese farmers
who survived in Los Angeles. In fact, despite the immigration ban and land use restrictions
imposed by the California Alien Land Laws, Japanese farmers of Los Angeles County would enter
the period of the “rise and prosperity” within the stable framework of the triracial agricultural
system even during the Great Depression years. Although the Great Depression damaged the
ethnic Japanese economy as in the case of Little Tokyo merchants, Japanese agriculture endured
the recession and even developed in the 1930s. Historian Masakazu Iwata contends, based on his
own experience, that Japanese immigrants overcame economic difficulties of the depression
“because of the general steadfastness and tenacity of the Issei inured to hardships coupled with
their cohesiveness as a group.” Edna Bonacich and John Modell also argue that as a middleman-
minority, Japanese immigrants in the United States “were not only able to survive but could
actually thrive within capitalist society.”
180

180
Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi edited by the first-generation Japanese immigrants regards the 1930s
as the period of kōryūki (rise and prosperity) for Japanese agriculture because their agribusiness expanded.
Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi, 58. Also see Lon Kurashige, Japanese American Celebration and
Conflict, 23-24; Masakazu Iwata, Planted in Good Soil, 1:290-291; Edna Bonacich and John Modell, Economic
Basis for Ethnic Solidarity: Small Business in the Japanese American Community (Berkeley, 1980), 253.
101

Although Mexicans did not face restrictions based on the quota system, they had to go through
a variety of entry requirements institutionalized by the 1924 Act, compelling many to avoid formal
admission and inspection. In fact, after the implementation of new entry requirements including a
$10 fee to secure a visa, legal immigration dropped from 90,000 to 32,378 in 1924. At the same
time, among legal Mexican immigrants, many entered the United States as “temporary visitors”
who would work as farmworkers but did not have to submit passport or visa. Such instability of
immigration control met the labor demand of local agribusiness, but immigration officials
perceived it as opportunities for illegal immigration. Historian Mae Ngai observes that “it was
ironic that Mexicans became so associated with illegal immigration because, unlike Europeans,
they were not subject to numerical quotas and, unlike Asiatics, they were not excluded as racially
ineligible to citizenship.”
181

The new entry requirements on Mexicans coincided with the reinforcement of border control
enforcement, namely the establishment of the U.S. Border Patrol in 1924. As the Border Patrol
intensified the significance of the political border among Mexicans in the Southwest, the term
“alien” began to be used towards Mexicans in the Southwest. As George J. Sánchez observes, they
came to be perceived as “interlopers on familiar land, even as their labor became increasingly
crucial to its economic development.”
182
Until the 1920s, the Chinese and Japanese had long been
considered as major “illegal aliens.” In fact, the predecessors of the Border Patrol officers were
the Mounted Chinese Inspectors of the Chinese Division of the Immigration Service, who were
assigned to enforce the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1904. As Kelly L. Hernández has demonstrated,

181
Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, 2004), 64-
75. George J. Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles,
1900-1945 (New York, 1993), 57. Rudy P. Guevarra, Jr., Becoming Mexipino: Multiethnic Identities and
Communities in San Diego (New Brunswick, 2012), 102. Ricardo Romo, East Los Angeles: History of a Barrio
(Austin, 1983), Ch.5.
182
Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 61-62.
102

24 percent of the original 104 Border Patrol officers hired by July 1, 1924 were former Mounted
Chinese Inspectors.
183
Even after Japanese exclusion, the U.S. government continued to worry
about continued undocumented immigration from Japan and other Asian countries by way of
Mexico. The establishment of the Border Patrol, however, symbolized the geographical divide
between the United States and Mexico, racializing Mexicans as “illegal aliens” whose presence
became increasingly visible particularly in the farmlands of the Southwest.
184

Anti-Mexican restrictionists raised several concerns about the increase of Mexicans in
California. In the mid-1920s, many Americans came to reaffirm their belief that Mexicans were
unassimilable and thus a racial and economic threat to white America. One of the prominent
restrictionists was Texas representative John C. Box. In 1928, Box advocated for the ban on
immigration from Mexico in order to protect “American racial stock from further degradation,”
because he believed that the “Mexican peon” was “a mixture of Mediterranean-blooded Spanish
peasants with low-grade Indians who did not fight to extinction but submitted and multiplied as
serfs.” The restrictionist discourse resembled that against Asians in the past decades and resonated
with the development of eugenics in the 1920s. The American Eugenics Society claimed, “The
Mexican birth rate is high, and every Mexican child born on American soil is an American citizen,
who, on attaining his or her majority, will have a vote. This is not a question of pocketbook or the
‘need of labor’ or of economic [necessity]. It is a question of the character of future races. It is
eugenics, not economics.” Yet, the “Mexican problem” was a both racial and economic problem

183
Kelly L. Hernández, Migra!: A History of the U.S. Border Patrol (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 2010), 36-37
184
The intensification of border control was not exclusively operated by the U.S. government. As Hernández
has demonstrated, the Mexican government also wanted to prevent unsanctioned border crossing and played an
important role in the development of the binational border enforcement. For Mexican officials, “the
transformation of mass labor migration into mass illegal immigration converted the profits of labor emigration
into the problems of illegal immigration” in the 1920s. Ibid., 85, 89-90.
103

for many other anti-Mexican restrictionists who insisted that Mexican workers were displacing
American workers. For example, the Saturday Evening Post concluded that Mexican exclusion
would be the “only salvation” for American workers.
185

However, for agribusiness leaders in Southern California, Mexican exclusion meant the
devastation of agriculture and thus Mexican inclusion was the only salvation for agriculture.
Likewise, Filipino labor was the salvation for agriculture in Northern and Central California. A
report of the California state government on Mexican farm workers published in 1930
demonstrated that Mexicans consisted of 84 percent of farm labor in Southern California, while
they were 56 percent and 32 percent respectively in the San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys. The
use of Filipino farm labor covered 17 percent, 18 percent, and 6 percent respectively in the San
Joaquin Valley, in the Sacramento Valley, and in Southern California. The percentage of Japanese
farm workers remained relatively large in San Joaquin Valley and Sacrament Valley as it was 17
percent and 29 percent respectively because many Japanese farmers used the labor provided by
their family members. Yet, the percentage of Japanese farm labor was only 5 percent in Southern
California, showing the heavier dependency on Mexican labor among farmers including both white
and Japanese operators in Southern California.
186

During the first half of the twentieth century, California agriculture was rapidly growing and
transforming into highly industrialized agriculture, which promoted the concentration of farms for
large scale production and labor exploitation for large profits. The number of farms in California
rose from 29,473 in 1910, 117,670 in 1920, to 150,360 in 1935. The number of large scale farms

185
David G. Gutiérrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of
Ethnicity (Berkeley, 1995), 53-54.
186
Governor C.C. Young’s Mexican Fact-Finding Committee, “Mexicans in California,” October 1930, Box 62,
George Pigeon Clements Papers, Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles,
California (hereafter as “Mexicans in California,” October 1930, Box 62, Clements Papers), 159.
104

of a thousand acres or more increased from 4,906 in 1920 to 5,939 in 1945.
187
In 1926, the
agricultural production of California reached $453,267,000. Mexican labor was an indispensable
element for the California industrialized agriculture, particularly for the cultivation of perishable
crops such as fruits and vegetables. In Los Angeles, agriculture attracted many Mexican workers
who came to their work sites using the highly developed railroad network.
188
In order to maintain
this agricultural labor, agribusiness leaders of Southern California readily countered anti-Mexican
restrictionist arguments.
In 1928, the California Development Association, an organization devoted to the economic
growth of California and supported by prominent business leaders of Los Angeles and other areas
in Southern California, conducted a survey named the “Survey on the Mexican Labor Problem in
California.” The purpose of this survey was to counter anti-Mexican arguments by portraying
Mexicans as indispensable and harmless labor in California agriculture. The survey explained that
California agriculture needed more farm labor since “each successive bar was dropped against
existing adequate labor—first Chinese and, more recently, Japanese” and “[f]luid casual labor is
this farmer’s only salvation. It is the prime necessity of his success. Restrictive immigration has
shut out Europe and Asia from the California farmer. He has only the Mexican to turn to,” which
clearly linked their pro-Mexican labor argument with the recent enactment of the Immigration Act
of 1924. Comparing with East Coast agriculture “accustomed to intensive harvest labor only in the
autumn months,” the report emphasized that “the land works 365 days” in California because of a
series of peaks of crops in different places throughout a year and Mexican workers accommodated

187
Lawrence J. Jelinek, Harvest Empire: A History of California Agriculture (San Francisco, 1979; 1982), 62-
63.
188
California Development Association, “Survey of the Mexican Labor Problem in California,” 1928, Box 63,
Clements Papers, 1; Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 69-70; Kevin Starr, California: A History (New
York, 2007), 178, 182.
105

themselves “by nature much more readily than the white farm labor” to the circulatory working
style drifting from one crop peak to another. Since farmers depended on Mexicans for works that
could not be done by machines, the report repeated that Mexican labor was necessary “until
Thomas Edison or Henry Ford develop machinery which will take the drudgery out of the harvest,
or until the idealist becomes amenable to developing callouses on his hands”
189

While arguing against restrictionists who used racist explanations, the “Survey on Mexican
Labor Problem” provided equally racist views on Mexicans. To portray Mexicans as docile and
better labor compared to other foreign labor, the report wrote, “[The Mexican] is not acquisitive
and, therefore, is not concerned in laying up for a rainy day. He has no sense of time, nor idea of
values. He still adheres to many of the principles and precepts of tribal life. He is generous,
sympathetic, kind, artistic and has his own ideas in regard to perfection. He possesses great
capacity for happiness.” This racist and ambiguous characterization of Mexicans was followed by
the explanation of George P. Clements, who worked as the manager of the Agricultural
Department of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce from 1918 to 1936 and would play an
important role in the Japanese-Mexican conflicts in the 1930s. Clements was in the forefront of
defending Southern California agribusiness. In order to refute the anti-Mexican exclusionist
argument that Mexican immigrants were non-white Indians who would pose a racial and economic
threat to the U.S. society, Clements employed a unique and racist discourse in support of California
agribusiness. According to Clements, there were three types of Mexicans: the ruling class, the
“greaser” class, and the “Mexican peon.” First, he emphasized that the “greaser” class of Mexicans
were “are the riff-raff of the Mexican race, found along the railroads and in the larger centers of

189
California Development Association, “Survey of the Mexican Labor Problem in California,” 1928, Box 63,
Clements Papers, 2, 8, 10, 15. The California Development Association was founded in 1921. See Stephanie S.
Pincetl, Transforming California: A Political History of Land Use and Development (Baltimore, 1999), 76-77.
106

population [in Mexico]. They are the criminal Mexicans; worthless in labor and always a social
problem; chronic beggars and sizzling with disease.” For these reasons, “this class should never
pass the immigration officer on the Border, even though he did happen to be a healthy specimen.”
Following this, Clements provided a much positive picture of “Mexican peon.” According to
Clements, Mexicans who came to the United States were the peon class Mexicans, “made up of
hundreds of distinct Indian tribes as primitive as our own Indians were when the first colonists
arrived in America” and “They are clean and healthy and are still strongly tribal in their recognition
of responsibility—a characteristic which may appear soviet or communistic to those not
understanding it.”
190
In short, Clements racialized Mexican immigrant workers as safe Indians,
simultaneously attempting to avoid anti-communist criticism, and thus easy to handle, while
highlighting Mexican city dwellers as dangerous “greasers” who assumed all characteristics
deemed as problematic by exclusionists.
Clements’s argument that Mexicans could be categorized into three types was not true in
both reality and theory, simply because it was too difficult to racially categorize the Mexican
population. The majority of the Mexican population consisted of indigenous people and mestizos
who were racially mixed people as the result of Spanish colonization of Mexico since the sixteenth
century. And the mestizo class meant the Mexican middle class that included indigenous groups
of people acculturated to Western ways, accounting for half of the entire Mexican population. In
addition, during the 1920s, even Mexican intellectuals such as Manuel Gamio and José
Vasconcelos were still in the middle of developing their theories to explain the modern Mexican

190
Ibid., 11-12.
107

nation.
191
On the other hand, Mexican immigrants in the United States, as Neil Foley summarizes,
identified themselves “simply as mexicanos, a national identity that embraced the concept of
mestizaje, or racial mixture.” However, Clements, known as a man who “made himself thoroughly
acquainted with Mexican character,” ignored the demographic reality of Mexico and Mexican
immigrants’ perspective. Clements described Mexican immigrants as primitive and thereby
nonthreatening to the U.S. society. In other words, the pro-Mexican argument of white
agribusiness leaders represented by Clements was based on what can be called redirecting racism
that attempted to turn away the attention of exclusionists from Mexican immigrants to a more
“dangerous” type of Mexicans who inhabited in Mexican urban centers.
192
In addition, the report
said that Mexicans “may be deported” unlike other non-white alternative workers such as African
Americans from the South, Filipinos, and Puerto Ricans, suggesting that Mexicans were the only
deportable foreigners.
193

Clements’ racial categorization deemed Mexican immigrants pre-modern Indian and urban
Mexican “greasers” unable to be live a modern life. In either way, Mexican were not modern and
thus inferior to white Americans. And his categorization was different from the racial assumption
that Chamber leaders had in the fall of 1924, when plague was found in Los Angeles and the
California Board of Health implemented the quarantine and demolition of Mexican neighborhoods.
At that time, Chamber leaders cooperated with the Board of Health and regarded “typical Mexicans”
as a vector of the disease, as William Deverell has detailed.
194
Four years later, when they needed

191
Regarding the history of racial mixing and the Mexican cultural nationalist movement in the 1920s, see Kelley
R. Swarthout, “Assimilating the Primitive”: Parallel Dialogues on Racial Miscegenation in Revolutionary
Mexico (New York, 2004).
192
Neil Foley, Mexicans in the Making of America (Cambridge, 2014), 50.
193
California Development Association, “Survey of the Mexican Labor Problem in California,” Box 63,
Clements Papers, 17.
194
William Deverell, Whitewashed Adobe: The Rise of Los Angeles and the Remaking of its Mexican Past
(Berkeley, 2004), Ch.5.
108

to keep Mexican labor for California agriculture, they deemed only those Mexicans who lived in
Mexican urban centers susceptible to disease, while explaining that Mexican immigrants in
California were “clean and healthy.” Their changing racial discourse shows us the arbitrary and
opportunistic nature of capitalist racism.
Nevertheless, the acknowledgement that Mexicans could be deported would not be persuasive
to exclusionists who wanted both Mexicans and Filipinos deported from the United States. A year
before the “Survey on Mexican Labor Problem” was published, the California State Federation of
Labor adopted a resolution demanding the exclusion of Filipinos who “threaten American
standards of wages and living conditions” and “the communities in which they have congregated
because of their immoral conduct.” After Japanese Exclusion, Filipinos were facing a similar
restrictionist pressure, which materialized during depression years as the Tydings-McDuffie Act
of 1934 that would change the legal status of Filipinos from “national” to “alien” subject to a
restrictive immigration quota and as the Filipino Repatriation Act of 1935 that would encourage
Filipinos to return to the Philippines during depression years (yet, once they returned, it was
impossible for them to return to the United States because they were regarded as “alien” under the
provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act).
195
Furthermore, the California Development
Association’s report ludicrously asserted that “there is no distinctly Mexican town or land-owning
Mexican colony in the State” because Mexicans would return to Mexico after the heavy peaks of
harvest. The report downplayed or intentionally did not talk about the development of Mexican
barrios and the increasing visibility of Mexican immigrants in the 1920s Southern California. By

195
Casiano Pagdilao Coloma, “A Study of the Filipino Repatriation Movement,” Master’s thesis, University of
Southern California, 1939; Guevarra, Jr., Becoming Mexipino, 35-36.
109

1930, Los Angeles housed the largest concentration of Mexican immigrants in the United States
and many Mexican immigrants began to see themselves more rooted in the U.S. society.
196

Despite the development of culturally rich and economically active ethnic Mexican
communities in the 1920s Los Angeles, the “Survey of the Mexican Labor Problem” attempted to
forge the image of Mexican immigrants as “primitive” and deportable. And their ultimate purpose
was to prove Mexicans nonthreatening to the white dominant society, as it concluded that “the
Mexican farm laborer does not in any sense constitute a menace to the so-called Anglo-Saxon
blood strain.”
197
In fact, their argument partly reflected the contemporary common sense among
whites regarding the number of Mexicans, as Ricardo Romo argues that “because Mexicans, at
least the vast majority, had arrived in the 1900-1930 migration wave at a time when the West was
still economically and politically marginal to the eastern seaboard region, census takers,
government officials, and scholars assumed that they were relatively few in number and therefore
insignificant.”
198
Although it is not clear to what extent the California Development Association’s
“pro-Mexican” argument was persuasive to restrictionists, it is clear that both white American
opponents and advocates for Mexican labor used racist rhetoric to explain that Mexicans were
inherently threatening or nonthreatening.

196
California Development Association, “Survey of the Mexican Labor Problem in California,” Box 63,
Clements Papers, 12; Albert Camarillo, Chicanos in California: A History of Mexican Americans in California
(San Francisco, 1984; 1990), 43; Romo, East Los Angeles, Ch.4; Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, Ch.9.
197
California Development Association, “Survey of the Mexican Labor Problem in California,” 1928, Box 63,
Clements Papers, 17.
198
Romo, East Los Angeles, 8.
110

Suspicious “Meki” and Uncivilized “Dojin”: The Japanese Racial View on Mexicans
When it comes to the multiethnic Los Angeles society, racial prejudice against Mexicans was
developed not exclusively by white Americans but also by the Japanese who increasingly
interacted with Mexicans in the 1920s Los Angeles. The “Survey of the Mexican Labor Problem”
mentioned the end of Japanese immigration as a major reason why agribusiness needed Mexican
labor. Yet, it did not mention the role of Japanese tenant farmers in Southern California probably
because the very existence of such Japanese farmers proved a loophole in anti-Japanese
legislations and the economic alliance between white landowners and business leaders and
Japanese farmers who leased lands under the name of their U.S.-born children. Most Japanese
involved in Los Angeles agriculture were small tenant farmers, who cultivated relatively small
plots of lands. For example, as of 1924, eleven Japanese farmers in Santa Monica leased about 350
acres, meaning that their average acreage per farmer was about thirty-two acres.
199
In the 1920s
when California agriculture became highly industrialized and large-scale farms over 1,000 acres
increased, small-scale farms under fifty acres also increased including those plots operate by both
Japanese and non-Japanese farmers. Between 1920 and 1945, the number of farmers under fifty
acres increased by 25,169, while the number of farmers between fifty and 999 acres decreased by
12,201. As Lawrence J. Jelinek has pointed out, “California’s industrialized agriculture meant not
only increasing land concentration, or horizontal integration, but increasing polarization between
very small and very large farms.”
200
As small farm operators, Japanese farmers maintained their
niche in California agriculture dominated by large-scale business farms.

199
“Santa Monica no Nōka 11 Ken Tachinoki [11 farmers evicted from Santa Monica],” Rafu Shimpo, February
2, 1924.
200
Jelinek, Harvest Empire, 63.
111

The California Development Association’s “Survey of the Mexican Labor Problem”
implicitly explained why Mexican casual labor mattered to Japanese tenant farmers, who usually
relied on the unpaid labor of family members but needed Mexican labor for the harvest seasons.
The report wrote, “For the small farmer particularly, success depends solely upon his handling his
crop so as to keep production costs at the lowest possible figure . . . but at harvest time, particularly
if he has a perishable crop, the small famer needs casual [Mexican] labor—ten, twenty or fifty—
and he needs that labor quickly to get his crop off and into market.”
201
This was the case for most
Japanese tenant farmers in Los Angeles. As early as the 1910s, it was “virtually impossible” for
the Japanese to operate their farms without non-Japanese workers such as Mexicans and Filipinos.
Their dependency on Mexican labor became larger as they worked more farmlands. The total
acreage of land cultivated by ethnic Japanese farmers in California increased from 134,058 acres
in 1908 to 328,350 in 1929, although it reached a peak in 1920 and soon later decreased by 30
percent in the 1920s because of the California Alien Land Law of 1920. In 1929, Japanese farmers
in Los Angeles County cultivated 33,730 acres, 98 percent of which were lands leased by tenant
farmers.
202

A conversation between a Japanese farmer and a white landowner in 1924 shows us a clear
picture of the triracial hierarchy in which Japanese farmers leased lands from white landowners
and hired Mexican farmworkers. The Del Amo Estate Company that inherited part of Rancho San
Pedro, one of the original Spanish land grants in the South Bay region of Los Angeles County,
sent a letter to a Japanese American tenant named Ken’ichi Kodama, asking about Japanese
immigrant workers the company found in Kodama’s farmland. Those Japanese used to be the

201
California Development Association, “Survey of the Mexican Labor Problem in California,” 1928, Box 63,
Clements Papers. 1, 8.
202
Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi, 18-19, 53.
112

company’s tenants but needed to leave the land after the enactment of the California Alien Land
Law of 1920 unless they were employed by Kodama. The company wrote to Kodama, “you are
hereby directed to order them to vacate immediately [if they are not your employee].” Kodama
responded, “I have seven formans [sic] working for me stardy [sic] and some extra work men when
ever they are nesecely [sic], I am paying monthely [sic] wages for my formans [sic] and by the
hours for the extra men. My employees are mostly Japanese and a few Mexicans but, I have right
to hiaring [sic] any nationality as I desir [sic], as you know, so you need no worry about this lease
as long as I am operating your Domingue[z] Hill ranch.”
203
While Mexicans provided
indispensable labor for the harvest time, this conversation tells us that Japanese tenant farmers
needed Mexicans on a regular basis as well. In the 1920s, the restrictionist shift in U.S. immigration
policy and the development of Southern California agribusiness strengthened the triracial
hierarchy
The 1924 Immigration Act helped generate more interactions between the Japanese and
Mexicans in both agricultural and non-agricultural areas in Los Angeles. Their interactions were
not always amicable and sometimes reinforced the racial prejudice that the Japanese had towards
Mexicans in Los Angeles. We can observe such prejudice in Rafu Shimpo articles that used
derogatory terms towards Mexicans. When the Japanese ethnic paper reported about crimes

203
Ken’ichi Kodama was born in Hawaii in 1893. Like Kodana, many Hawaiian-born Nisei moved to California
and worked as farmers. Territory of Hawaii, Office of the Secretary, birth certificate of Ken’ichi Kodama, June
1910; Del Amo Estate Company to Kodama, March 22, 1924; Kodama to the Del Amo Estate Company, 1924,
Box 87, Folder 6, Del Amo Estate Company Collection, Archives and Special Collections, University Library,
California State University, Dominguez Hills, Carson, California (hereafter as Del Amo Estate Company
Collection). As for another example of Japanese tenants who hired Mexicans in the 1920s, see Kōichi Ono to
Gregorio del Amo, February 7, 1925, Box 96, Folder 2, Del Amo Estate Company Collection. As for the
California Alien Land Law ballot of 1920, Lon Kurashige points out that “it was not insignificant that more than
200,000 Californians opposed the measure,” which shows us the complicated dimension of anti-Asian politics
in the 1920s. See Lon Kurashige, Two Faces of Exclusion: The Untold History of Anti-Asian Racism in the
United States (Chapel Hill, 2016), 124.
113

committed by Mexicans against the Japanese, writers used the Japanese term meki to refer to
Mexican criminals. Like “Jap” used by white Americans against the Japanese, meki was used
against Mexicans as a derogatory abbreviation of the formal term used to refer to a Mexican person
in the Japanese language, mekishikojin.
204
For example, in June 1924, the Rafu Shimpo run an
article titled “Mekidoro ga Shinnyū (A Mexican robber broke in).” The term doro is also an
abbreviation of dorobō (robber), such that mekidoro functioned as a derogatory way of referring
to a Mexican robber. A day before, a young Mexican man broke in a Japanese jewelry shop, the
Yamamoto Jewelry, in Downtown Los Angeles early afternoon and stole golden clocks and a
precious jar. In this incident, the robber was arrested soon after he stole the goods, to the extent
that the jewelry shop ultimately suffered no loss. But the article added, “it is said that this mekidoro
was the same man who broke in the Tomio Store (another Japanese store) the other day.”
205
The
next day, in another article titled “Chihō Nōka wo Arasu Sagikan to Mekidoro (Bandits and
Mexican robbers looting rural farmers),” the Rafu Shimpo reported that a sheriff officer visited the
Japanese Association of Los Angeles and warned about crimes committed by bandits and
Mexicans in the rural farm area of Los Angeles. The sheriff told the Japanese Association members
that three Mexicans had visited a Japanese farmer and one of them began to talk with the farmer
while other two Mexicans robbed his house.
206
The Rafu Shimpo reinforced a negative image of
Mexicans as dangerous and suspicious by using the derogatory term meki.
207
Yet, these mekidoro

204
Fuminori Minamikawa suggests that Japanese immigrants used the term meki because they “internalized the
basic racial worldview in the United States through their daily lives in Los Angeles.” See Fuminori Minamikawa,
“Vernacular Representations of Race and the Making of a Japanese Ethnoracial Community in Los Angeles” in
Trans-Pacific Japanese American Studies: Conversations on Race and Racializations, eds. Yasuko Takezawa
and Gary Y. Okihiro (Honolulu, 2016), 115-116.
205
“Mekidoro ga Shinnyū [Infiltration of a Mexican robber],” Rafu Shimpo, June 25, 1924.
206
“Chihō Nōka wo Arasu Sagikan to Mekidoro [Bandits and Mexican robbers looting rural farmers],” Rafu
Shimpo, June 26, 1924.
207
As for other Rafu Shimpo articles that used the term meki in 1924, see “Meki Dorobō Nimei [Two Mexican
robbors],” July 21; “Asamadaki Mekidoro ga Oitsumerarete Taiho [Early morning, a Mexican robber was chased
and arrested]”, August 27; “Daisen na Meki [A bold move of Mexicans], September 5; “Jukusuichū ni Mekidoro
114

stories did not stop Los Angeles Japanese from thinking about their southward migration to
Mexico, probably because they also knew many non-criminal ordinary Mexican residents who
would not appear on newspaper articles.
The Japanese racial prejudice toward Mexicans seems to have affected how the Japanese
regarded mixed-race children of Japanese-Mexican couples in Los Angeles as well. In 1924, a
Japanese-Mexican child named Tony Kishi, thirteen years old, whose father was a Japanese bike
rental shop owner and whose mother was a Mexican, was arrested for several robbery cases in Los
Angeles and sent to the Whittier State School, a reformatory that still exists today as the Fred C.
Nelles Youth Correctional Facility. Although Kishi was a son of a Japanese immigrant, the Rafu
Shimpo described him rather as a non-Japanese foreigner. The article wrote, “Konketsuji (mixed-
blood child) Tony has been known as a delinquent kid who could be handled neither by his father
nor by the general public.”
208
The Japanese term konketsu literally means “mixed-blood,” but it
implies that mixed-blood children are not “pure-blood” Japanese. Scholar Hyoue Okamura
explains that the term konketsu inherited the racist ideology of nineteenth century Europe as it first
appeared in written form in Japanese in 1903 when Ōgai Mori, one of the greatest Japanese
novelists, translated the term konketsu from Comte de Gobineau’s An Essay on the Inequality of

ga Ichimai Kanban wo Shikkei[A Mexican robber stole a sign while the owner was sleeping],” September 27;
“Meki no Jidōsha Dorobō Taiho su [Mexican who stole a car was arrested],” September 28; “Hoteru no Iriguchi
de Machifuseta Meki [A Mexican ambush near the hotel entrance],” October 17. The Shin Sekai, an ethnic
Japanese paper based in San Francisco, also reported at least five incidents related to Mexicans using the term
“mekidoro” from 1917 to 1931. All the incidents reported by the Shin Sekai happened in the Fresno or Los
Angeles areas according to the search result of the Hoji Shinbun Digital Collection administered by the Hoover
Institution at Stanford University. For example, see “Futari no Mekidoro Dōhō Nimei wo Osoi [Two Mexican
robbers attacked two Japanese countrymen],” Shin Sekai, November 5, 1929. The Hoji Shinbun Digital
Collection, online at https://hojishinbun.hoover.org, accessed December 20, 2017.
208
“Konketsuji Tonii [Mixed-race child Tony],” Rafu Shimpo, September 5, 1924. As for the history of the
Whittier School in relation to minority youths, see Miroslava Chaves-Garcia, States of Delinquency: Race and
Science in the Making of California's Juvenile Justice System (Berkeley, 2012).
115

the Human Races.
209
The article emphasized Kishi as not “pure Japanese” and contrasted him with
his father and the general Japanese community. In other words, it implicitly portrayed Kishi as a
foreign person outside the “pure Japanese” community. Kishi was a minority within the Japanese
community in Los Angeles, because it was not common for Japanese immigrant men to intermarry
non-Japanese women in California and have mixed-race children.
California law, with its prohibition on intermarriage between “Mongolian” and white women,
discouraged mixed marriages between Japanese and other racial/ethnic groups at the time, while
the long-established picture bride system (fostering unions between Japanese men and women)
continued until 1920. Aside from the picture bride system and California’s anti-miscegenation
laws, the social pressure within the ethnic Japanese community discouraged intermarriage, as
suggested by historian Paul Spickard.
210
From 1924 to 1933 in Los Angeles County, the total
number of Japanese who married was 1,163. Only twenty-seven or 2.3 percent of them married
non-Japanese such as Chinese, African Americans, Filipinos, and “white Americans” who could
be ethnic Mexicans. Constantine Panunzio, who examined the marriage licenses in this period,
suggested that the country clerk might not have been informed of the antimiscegenation law or
regarded such “white Americans” as outside the prohibition if they came from foreign countries.

209
Hyoue Okamura, “‘Hāfu’ wo Meguru Gensetsu [Discourses of hafu (mixed-race)],” in Jinshu Shinwa wo
Kaitai Suru, vol.3, Hybridity:”Chi” no Seijigaku wo Koete [Dismantling the race myth, vol.3, hybridity: Beyond
the politics of “blood”], eds. Kohei Kawashima and Yasuko Takezawa (Tokyo, 2016), 42. In the late nineteenth
century Japan, there was a discourse that placed importance on intermarriage between the Japanese and whites.
For example, a business leader Yoshio Takahashi argued in 1884 that the ethnic Japanese could improve its
racial character through the intermarriage with whites on the assumption that the Japanese were inferior to whites.
See Minami Hiroshi, Nihonjin Ron [Theories of the Japanese specificity] (Tokyo, 1994), 26-28.
210
Leti Volpp, “American Mestizo: Filipinos and Antimiscegenation Laws in California,” UC Davis Law Review
33, no.4 (1999): 803; Paul Spickard, Japanese Americans: The Formation and Transformations of an Ethnic
Group, revised edition (New Brunswick, 2009), 35, 66. Although most Japanese immigrants opposed
intermarriage, some thought intermarriage was necessary for the future ethnic Japanese community. In 1924, a
Seattle Japanese banker S. Minami wrote, “Until we intermarry [especially between Japanese and whites] real
friendship and social and economic harmony and cooperation is very hard and we cannot be free from prejudice.”
See Paul Spickard, Mixed Blood: Intermarriage and Ethnic Identity in Twentieth-Century America (Madison,
1989), 61-62.
116

On the other hand, only forty-five or 0.4 percent of 11,016 ethnic Mexicans who married in the
same period had Asian spouses. In 1942, among Japanese Americans removed to internment
camps, there were only 192 Japanese Americans of mixed white and Japanese ancestry and 183
whose ancestry was Japanese and another non-white minority including Mexicans.
211
For these
reasons, mixed-race children of Japanese-Mexican couples suffered social pressure and racial
prejudice not only within the larger white dominant society but also within the ethnic Japanese
community.
The Japanese racial prejudice toward ordinary Mexicans did not come only from their
encounters with Mexican robbers but also from their understanding that Mexicans were indigenous
people rooted in the western hemisphere. The Japanese rarely called Mexicans in the United States
“immigrants (imin)”, while sometimes calling Europeans “immigrants.”
212
Such a view appeared
in both the Rafu Shimpo and in Japanese government’s documents, since they used the Japanese
term dojin to refer to ordinary Mexicans living in Mexico. The term dojin literally meant “a person
of land” or “a native person” so that the term was used to describe not only Mexicans in Mexico
but other native populations such as Filipinos in the Philippines.
213
But it actually implied
“uncivilized person.” As early as 1869, a year after the Meiji Restoration, Yukichi Fukuzawa, one
of the most influential intellectuals for the modernization of Japan whose portrait appears on the

211
Constantine Panunzio, “Intermarriage in Los Angeles, 1924-1933,” American Journal of Sociology 47, no.5
(Mar., 1942): 691-694; Greg Robinson, “The Early History of Mixed-Race Japanese Americans,” in Hapa
Japan: History (Vol. 1), ed. Duncan Ryuken Williams (New York, 2017), 226.
212
For example, a Rafu Shimpo article about the decline of Chinatowns in California wrote, “Mexicans and
Southern European immigrants prosper in [former] Chinatowns.” See Rafu Shimpo, “Kemuri no You ni Kiesatta
Orenji no Shinamachi [Orange County Chinatown vanished like a puff of smoke],” June 18, 1924.
213
The Hoji Shinbun Digital Collection created by the Hoover Institution of Stanford University hits 182 Rafu
Shimpo Japanese articles with the search word “dojin,” which was used to describe not only Mexicans in Mexico
but also other native populations such as Filipinos in the Philippines. For example, see “Hitō Dojin Seifu wo
Ikaku [Native Filipinos threaten the government],” Rafu Shimpo, August 29, 1924. Since the Hoji Shinbun
Collection does not always show all the articles with search terms, it is difficult to say how often the term “dojin”
was used to describe Mexicans in Mexico.
117

current ten-thousand yen bill, used the term dojin in his work on world geography to explain “the
lowest people” in the uncivilized region in the world as opposed to the people in the civilized
region.
214

The term dojin appeared clearly in the Japanese colonization policy of the northern island of
Hokkaido and the following marginalization of the island’s native Ainu people. In 1869, the new
Japanese government established the Hokkaido Development Commissioner (kaitakushi) and
further promoted the political inclusion of its native people as imperial subjects of Japan, while
denying their history and traditional ways of life as a distinct ethnic group. Although the Japanese
government claimed that the Ainu people were equal to the ethnic Japanese, the government
registered the Ainu as kyū-dojin (former natives), which meant that they were originally uncivilized
people.
215
Additionally Japanese newspapers continued to use the term dojin even without kyu
(former) to call the Ainu people.
216
A Japanese-language dictionary Daigenkai published in 1934
continued to explain that dojin meant a native person born in that territory or “a native race who
lived a primitive life.”
217

Although Mexican land seemed very promising to the Japanese of Los Angeles worried by
rising discrimination in the United States, consideration of Mexican people in Mexico was

214
Yukichi Fukuzawa, Sekai Kuni Zukushi [All the countries of the world], vol. 6 (Tokyo, 1869), 30. A large
number of Fukuzawa’s works can be read digitally in Digital Collections of Keio University Libraries. See
Dejitaru de Yomu Fukuzawa Yukichi, online at http://dcollections.lib.keio.ac.jp/en/fukuzawa, accessed January
25, 2018.
215
Masato Kuwabara and Masao Gabe, eds., Ezochi to Ryūkyū [Ezochi and Ryukyu] (Tokyo, 2001), 126-128.
The Japanese government promoted the assimilation of the Ainu modeling after the U.S. assimilation policy
toward Native Americans. See Eiji Oguma, Tan-itsu Minzoku Shinwa no Kigen [The myth of the homogeneous
nation] (Tokyo, 1995), 81.
216
Tomohide Sakanishi, “Kindai Nihon no Jinshu Sutereo Taipu no Keisei Katei to Mainoritii ni Taisuru
Gendaiteki Henken no Kenkyū [Studies on the formation processes of ethnic stereotypes and the prejudice
toward minorities in modern age of Japan],” a research report of project funded by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific
Research (C) (2) of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Mar., 2002), 58-59.
217
According to the Daigenkai dictionary, the third meaning of dojin was “a doll made from clay.” See Fumihiko
Ōtsuki, “Dojin,” Daigenkai (Tokyo, 1934), 552.
118

repeatedly articulated through the dojin term. Torimatsu Ozono, a Japanese resident who lived in
Mexico and sent his reports to the Rafu Shimpo in 1924, explained that Japanese immigrants could
save half of their salary in Mexico if they spent money on food like dojin did and that dojin boys
earned fifty cents or one dollar a day while Japanese workers could earn one dollar and twenty-
two cents to one dollar and seventy-five cents a day.
218
In 1926, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan also used the dojin term when it issued a report on Mexican agriculture, probably responding
to growing interests among the Japanese in migrating to Mexico. Saichirō Koshida, a Japanese
diplomat in Mexico and the author of the report, wrote, “The production of minerals, petroleum,
and a considerable amount of agricultural products for trade depend on foreigners from the United
States, Spain, and Germany” but “the village industry depends on dojin.”
219

These documents tell us about a transpacific prejudice that the Japanese on both sides of the
Pacific Ocean had toward ordinary Mexicans regarding them as uncivilized or less civilized
compared to the Japanese. This notion of Japanese superiority over other non-white racial groups
developed along with the growth of imperial Japan especially after the victory over Russia in 1905.
Los Angeles Japanese, living within the imagined Japanese community around the Pacific Ocean
and getting latest news about Japan and the world in the Japanese language media, shared such
notion. For example, editor-in-chief of the Rafu Shimpo Shirō Fujioka, although he was very
critical about those Japanese who discriminated other racial groups, still asserted in 1924, “[I]t is

218
“Bokukoku Jijō [The situation of Mexico] (2),” Rafu Shimpo, July 18, 1924.
219
Saichirō Koshida, acting deputy minister of the Japanese Legation in Mexico, to Kijūro Shidehara, Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 4, 1926, B-3-5-2-224, Kakkoku ni okeru Nōgyō Kankei Zakken
[Miscellaneous reports on agriculture in other countries], vol.2, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan (DAMFAJ), Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan.
119

clear that our country Japan became a first-rate country in the world and thus should not be
considered equal to countries of other colored races.”
220

Los Angeles Japanese used derogatory terms towards ordinary Mexicans such as meki and
dojin, but it did not mean that they never appreciated their interactions with Mexicans. For example,
in October 1918, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce of Southern California organized a carnival
at an empty lot in front of the Japanese-operated Pacific Hotel on San Pedro Street in Downtown
Los Angeles. The main event in their carnival was a Mexican dance show. The Japanese Chamber
spent $600 (approximately $9,770 in 2017) on the carnival. Within this budget, they leased the lot,
set up a stage for dancers and a music band, distributed fifty fliers in the ethnic Mexican
neighborhood. Before the carnival, they were planning an excursion to Mexico, which was later
cancelled. After the carnival, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce of Southern California held a
meeting with the Mexican consul in Los Angeles. Although their meeting minutes do not explain
why they planned the carnival, it is most likely that Japanese chamber members wanted to
strengthen economic relations with the Mexican government officials and business leaders.
221
It
seems that Los Angeles Japanese regarded Los Angeles Mexican “modernized” because they lived
in the United States, while calling ordinary Mexicans in Mexico not modern dojin despite the fact
that they were the same Mexicans. The country where Mexican lived or the physical proximity to
Los Angeles Japanese affected their racial view on Mexicans. In other words, meki and dojin were

220
Shirō Fujioka, “Hainichi Jōkō wo Fukumu Beikoku Shin Iminhō [The new U.S. immigration act that has the
Japanese exclusion clause] (4),” Rafu Shimpo, June 1, 1924. The victory of Japan over Russia was a factor that
strengthened anti-Japanese racism. See Jung, Reworking Race, 79, 81; Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice:
The Anti-Japanese Movement in California (New York, 1968), 27.
221
Japanese Chamber of Commerce of Southern California, meeting minutes, 1918, Box 272, Japanese
American Research Project Collection, National Diet Library, Tokyo, Japan (hereafter as JARP-NDL).
120

localized racial terms employed by Japanese immigrants in Southern California towards ethnic
Mexicans.
The Japanese-Mexican trusting relationship also developed through the interactions between
the two groups in schools and multiethnic neighborhoods such as Boyle Heights.
222
Above all, the
Japanese had to interact with Mexicans because they needed to work with them in their farms,
which would require a certain level of trust and decency for fellow Mexican immigrants.
Nevertheless, the racial prejudice as well as understanding that the Japanese had toward Mexicans
added an underlying factor which would complicate Japanese-Mexican interethnic relations in the
1930s as will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Birth of the Ethnic Mexican Press and Labor Unions in the 1920s Los Angeles
While Japanese immigrants advocated for migrating to Mexico and white business leaders
discussed the importance of Mexican agricultural labor, Los Angeles became the largest ethnic
Mexican community in the United States in the 1920s due to the city’s rapid industrialization and
urbanization.
223
Although Mexicans were legally considered as white and thus eligible for
naturalization unlike Asians, the dominant white society looked down on them as non-white and
set up a variety of racist legal barriers such as discriminatory housing covenants and school
segregation and city zoning laws, which forced Mexicans to live in Mexican barrios particularly

222
One example is Ralph Lazo, a Mexican-Irish American who was born in 1924 and grew up in Los Angeles.
Lazo is well known for registering as Japanese and going to an internment camp along with his Japanese
American friends during World War II. See Allison Varzally, Making a Non-White America: Californians
Coloring Outside Ethic Lines, 1925-1955 (Berkeley, 2008), 139. As for the multiracial neighborhood of Boyle
Heights, see George J. Sánchez, “‘What’s Good for Boyle Heights is Good for the Jews’: Creating
Multiculturalism on the Eastside during the 1950s.” American Quarterly 56, no.3 (Sept., 2004).
223
Romo, East Los Angeles, 3-6
121

in East Los Angeles. However, thanks to the proximity to their home country and the increase of
their population, Mexicans also developed a culturally rich and economically vibrant ethnic
community. They operated Mexican restaurants, patronized ethnic businesses, organized
community organizations, attended Catholic churches, and enjoyed Spanish language radio
programs.
224
As historian Albert Camarillo observes, “barrioization in the early part of the century
reflected positive elements (cultural, ethnic, and linguistic reinforcement) as well as negative
forces (impoverishment, physical deterioration of neighborhoods, and lack of adequate municipal
services).”
225

Discriminated as cheap labor in the white dominant society, many Mexican immigrants
maintained strong attachment to Mexico. Regarding the naturalization rates among Mexicans, only
5.5 percent of Mexican residents in Los Angeles were naturalized in 1930.
226
Before World War
II, a long-time Mexican resident in Hicks Camp, a Mexican barrio in El Monte, Los Angeles,
responded to a California government researcher and said, “I’m not interested in being a citizen
because first of all it would mean nothing to anyone—I would be a citizen in name only—with no
privileges or considerations. I would still be a ‘dirty Mexican’.”
227
Mexican immigrants’ low rates
of naturalization also reflected the fact that they needed to keep their Mexican citizenship in order
to rely on the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles for protection and assistance. In the 1920s, the
Mexican consulate became increasingly involved in the public life of its expatriates, while many

224
Ibid., 80-88; Camarillo, Chicanos in California, Ch.4; Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, Ch.9. As for
the history of class and race segregation in Los Angeles, see Laura Redford, “The Intertwined History of Class
and Race Segregation in Los Angeles,” Journal of Planning History 16, no.4 (Nov., 2017).
225
Camarillo, Chicanos in California, 38
226
The naturalization rates of Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles were as low as 10.7 percent in 1910, 3.3
percent in 1920, and 13.8 percent in 1940. See Francisco E. Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza: The Los Angeles
Mexican Consulate and the Mexican Community, 1929 to 1936 (Tucson, 1982), 8.
227
Gutiérrez, Walls and Mirrors, 89.
122

Mexicans began to see themselves increasingly rooted in Los Angeles.
228
In 1930, sociologist
Emory S. Bogardus observed, “By remaining a citizen of Mexico and by calling on the Mexican
consul for assistance the Mexican immigrant often can secure justice, whereas if he becomes an
American citizen, he feels helpless. He does not understand our courts and is not able to secure as
adequate a hearing as if he remains a Mexican citizen.”
229

Likewise, the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles also had a close connection with ethnic
Japanese residents. During the period when the Gentlemen’s Agreement was effective, the
Japanese government had the direct organizational authority over local immigrant organizations.
The Japanese government delegated to the local Japanese associations, through its consulates, part
of its bureaucratic functions of creating the immigrant registry needed for the Gentlemen’s
Agreement. This registry was considered the only valid document for Japanese laborers, who had
already settled in the United States, to continue to reside in the United States. After the enactment
of the Immigration Act of 1924, this type of registry became no longer necessary, bringing an end
to the direct organizational relationship between the Japanese consulates and immigrant
associations in 1926.
230
Nevertheless, Japanese immigrants, ineligible for naturalization,
continued to depend on the Japanese consulates for their protection. When Toshito Satō became
the Japanese consul in Los Angeles in 1929 after working at the Japanese Embassy in Washington
D.C. for three years and a half, he explained that his position was like the sonchō (village mayor)

228
Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 109.
229
Emory S. Bogardus, “The Mexican Immigrant and Segregation,” American Journal of Sociology 36, no.1
(Jul, 1930), 78.
230
As for the relationship between the Japanese government and local Japanese associations in California, see
Yuji Ichioka, “Japanese Associations and the Japanese Government: A Special Relationship, 1909-1926,”
Pacific Historical Review 46, no.3 (Aug., 1977).
123

of the Los Angeles Japanese community and the Rafu Shimpo reported his remark with the
headline highlighting the term sonchō.
231

Mexican immigrants were not silent about the socioeconomic difficulties and discriminations
that they faced in Los Angeles. In the 1920s, the increase of Mexican immigrants expanded the
possibility and generated the need to strengthen their ethnic solidarity. Some of the most important
developments in the Mexican community in the 1920s Los Angeles were the publication of an
ethnic Mexican newspaper La Opinión in 1926 and the creation of a large-scale labor union La
Confederación de Uniones Obreras Mexicanas (Confederation of Mexican Labor Unions, CUOM)
in 1928. Both La Opinión and the CUOM played an important role in Japanese-Mexican relations
in Los Angeles because in the 1930s La Opinión and some members of the CUOM supported
Mexican workers in conflict with Japanese farmers.
Ignacio Lozano, the founder of La Opinión, was one of many Mexican immigrants who
moved and found a chance to start a business in Los Angeles, an emerging metropolis on the
Pacific Coast. The development of the Mexican community meant an expansion of markets for
goods that Mexican consumers wanted to purchase. In 1913, Lozano founded a Mexican
newspaper titled La Prensa in San Antonio, Texas, which at the time had the largest concentration
of Mexican immigrants in the United States, after leaving his home town in northern Mexico
during the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution. Lozano succeeded in making La Prensa the largest
Mexican paper in San Antonio. By distributing papers by train, he expanded the sales network to
other big cities such as Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles. Impressed by the growth of the
Mexican population and the market in Los Angeles, in 1926, Lozano founded La Opinión in Los

231
“Sato Shin Ryōji niwa Hajimete Taiken no Sonchō [The first experience for the new consul Sato to be a
village mayor],” Rafu Shimpo, November 7, 1929.
124

Angeles. In the same period, several other Spanish-language newspapers including his own La
Prensa were published in Los Angeles, showing an increasing demand for the Spanish-language
media that would provide Mexican residents with useful information. Lozano regarded La Opinión
as “a Mexican newspaper whose purpose was to pay close attention to what was happening in
Mexico, to call to task the politicians for what they were doing, and to continue to watch and ensure
that there was progress in Mexico,” as his granddaughter Monica Lozano later recalled in an
interview. The Mexican government of the 1920s and 1930s saw as problematic his political
writings that pursued to be journalistically objective and did not pertain to any particular political
party and did not allow him to go back to Mexico. Thus, Ignacio Lozano needed to stay in the
United States and write what should be discussed about his country without censorship and
repression by the Mexican government.
232
From the beginning, he had the intention of sending his
paper to readers in Mexico, as the newspaper announced that subscription cost 90 cents per month
in Los Angeles, $2 in the rest of the United States, and $3 outside of the United States. The price
was almost same with the Rafu Shimpo that cost one dollar per month in the same year.
233

The editorial page of the first issue published on 16 September 1926, the Independence Day
of Mexico, proclaimed Los Angeles as an “importantísima región (very important region)” and

232
Monica Lozano, interview by Shirley Biagi, Washington Press Club Foundation, December 13, 1993,
http://beta.wpcf.org/oralhistory/loz.html, accessed November 27, 2017. In the 1920s Los Angeles, there were
several Spanish-Language newspapers: The Los Angeles Record (1927-unknown), Gráfico (1928-1933), El
Malcriado (1923-1930), El Mundial (1927-unknown), La Pantilla (1926-1927), Tribuna (1928-unknown),
México (1925-1929, El Eco de México (1924-unknown), El Pueblo (1924-unknown), La Alianza (1926-
unknown). See Nicolás Kanellos and Helvetia Martell, Hispanic Periodicals in the United States, Origins to
1960: A Brief History and Comprehensive Biography (Houston, 2000). San Antonio had been the largest
Mexican concentration until Los Angeles overtook the lead in the 1920s. See Romo, East Los Angeles, 80. As
for the transition of journalistic contents of La Opinión in the late twentieth century, see Carlos Parra, “Changing
Opinions at La Opinión: The Transformation of California’s Spanish-Language Paper of Record, 1975-1990,”
research paper submitted in a seminar course of the history department at the University of Southern California,
2014.
233
“Precios de Suscripción,” La Opinión, September 16, 1926; “Subscription Rate,” Rafu Shimpo, September
21, 1926.
125

demonstrated that La Opinión would be a serious and useful newspaper for readers based on the
publishers’ experience of publishing La Prensa in San Antonio for the last fourteen years. Mexican
intellectuals such as Teodoro Torres, Jr, a well-known journalist, and José Vasconcelos, a former
Secretary of Public Education, contributed columns to the editorial page. Writing from Mexico,
Torres discussed the responsibility of journalists in relation to Mexican politics. Sending a message
from France, Vasconcelos wrote passionately about the importance of spiritual activities for the
development of the Spanish speaking people.
234
According to Raul D. Tovares who has analyzed
La Opinión’s editorials during its early years, Lozano considered that “the Mexican nation was
seen and evaluated through the image Mexicans in the United States were projecting in public.”
With Lozano’s goal to succeed in his business and with the loyalty of the Mexican community, La
Opinión made efforts to provide Mexican immigrant readers with enough information about
Mexico, which would not be available in Los Angeles without La Opinión.
235

Although its editorials reflected an assumption that Mexicans would return to Mexico once
Mexican politics stabilized, La Opinión provided practical advices for Mexicans to adapt to a new
environment in Los Angeles. One of such tip was the encouragement to learn English. An editorial
on 11 October 1926, wrote, “If those Mexicans, instead of feeling faint, would preoccupy
themselves with learning a little bit of English every day and something about the method of
working the American way, they would soon see that they are not as inept for the struggle to
succeed as they think they are.”
236
Even before this editorial, advertisements on La Opinión had
already encouraged readers to learn English. An advertisement printed on the very first issue,

234
“Dos Palabras”; Teodoro Torres, Jr., “El Secreto Profesional en el Peridodismo”; José Vasconcelos, “El
Soplo,” La Opinión, September 16, 1926.
235
Raul D. Tovares, “La Opinión and its contribution to the Mexican community’s adaptation to life in the US,”
Latino Studies 7, no.4 (Dec., 2009): 487-488.
236
Ibid., 487-493.
126

which was likely placed by a textbook company, said “English in a few weeks,” “We guarantee a
successful exit to each disciple,” and “Give us your name and address to send you interesting
information.” Another advertisement also promoted an English textbook, saying, “the edition we
offer now, which has been considerably revised, contains a DICTIONARY OF FIVE
THOUSAND WORDS.” Lozano himself might have been the person selling this textbook, since
the name of the company that placed this advertisement was Librería Lozano (Lozano
bookstore).
237
While Los Angeles Japanese felt the need to learn English as well as Spanish as
they might have to go to Mexico, Los Angeles Mexicans were encouraged to learn more English.
238

There were also Japanese immigrants who studied Spanish or hired somebody fluent in
Spanish to interact with Mexicans in Los Angeles. Just like Lozano found an economic chance in
the growing Mexican community, Japanese merchants and doctors wanted Mexican residents to
patronize their businesses. On 3 October 1926, only seventeen days after Lozano launched La
Opinión, a Japanese company named the Hara Company placed an advertisement on the paper.
This company sold clothes and shoes on North Main Street near the Plaza in Downtown Los
Angeles where many Japanese run businesses. One of the company’s advertisements had pictures
of two young girls. One girl appeared a white girl, while the other appeared to be a Japanese girl
with black straight short hair, a hairstyle common among Japanese girls (see Figure 1).
239
The Hara
Company became one of the major advertisers for La Opinión in the early years after the paper’s
founding. Mexican customers patronized the Hara Company with affection, as they called the
owner “Japonesito,” the mixture of “Japonés (Japanese)” and “-ito (a Spanish diminutive suffix to

237
“Inglés en Pocas Semanas,” La Opinión, September 16, 1926; “El Inglés sin Maestro,” La Opinión,
November 2, 1926.
238
As for the advertisement of a Spanish language class on the Rafu Shimpo, see Chapter 2.
239
“The Hara Co.,” La Opinión, October 3 and 17, 1926.
127

call something with affection).” In January 1927, the Hara Company placed an advertisement in
the paper celebrating, “El Japonesito’s store, as our friends call us, wishes a Happy New Year to
its friends, its fellow merchants, and the Mexican, American, and Japanese communities.”
240

Japanese doctors provided medical care to Mexican residents in Los Angeles, too. In
December 1928, two Japanese clinics, treating patients near the corner of Main Street and First

240
“The Hara Co.,” La Opinión, January 2, 1927. The Hara Company continued to place its advertisement on
the New Year’s Day of 1928. See “The Hara Co.,” La Opinión, January 1, 1928. In the Plaza area where
Mexicans enjoyed recreational and cultural activities, they patronized Japanese pool halls, too. Romo, East Los
Angeles, 83.
Figure 1 Advertisement of the Hara Company
on La Opinión
Source: La Opinión, October 17, 1926.
Figure 2 Advertisement of Dr. Ichioka’s clinic
on La Opinión
Source: La Opinión, December 1, 1928.
128

Street in Downtown Los Angeles, placed their respective advertisements on La Opinión. Both
surgeon Dr. T. Ichioka and ophthalmologist Dr. M. Shinohara emphasized, “Se Habla Español
(We speak Spanish)” in order to make their clinics look accessible to Mexican immigrants (see
Figure 2). Japanese doctors including Ichioka and Shinohara continued to place their
advertisements on La Opinión into the 1930s, which proves the long-lasting relationship between
Mexican patients and Japanese doctors in Downtown Los Angeles.
241
In the 1920s Los Angeles,
Japanese businesses offered part of the income source for La Opinión from the very beginning and
formed a multiracial cityscape of Los Angeles for newly coming Mexican immigrants. While
Mexicans interacted increasingly with the Japanese in the urban Downtown area, they also faced
the Japanese in the non-urban agricultural area around Los Angeles. In the next decade when
Japanese-Mexican relations deteriorated due to the labor conflict between Japanese farmers and
Mexican farmworkers, La Opinión would play an important role as a vehicle for Mexican leaders
to fight for Mexicans and promote Mexican nationalism mixed with anti-Japanese sentiment.
While Mexicans increased and became indispensable labor in Los Angeles, they also came
to be aware of the necessity to make a larger effort to organize themselves and fight against
exploitation. On 10 November 1927, a committee of the Confederación de Sociedades Mexicanas
(Federation of Mexican Societies), an umbrella organization of ethnic Mexican mutual and
beneficent societies in Los Angeles, adopted a resolution that recited the “deplorable condition of
abandonment and isolation” in which Mexicans lived in the United States, “deprived of food,
cooperation and mutual help.”
242
Alfonso Pesqueira, Mexican consul in Los Angeles, approved

241
Dr. T. Ichioka”; “Doctor M. Shinohara,” La Opinión, December 1, 1928; Dr. T. Ichioka”; “Doctor M.
Shinohara,” La Opinión, January 1, 1931. There were other Japanese doctors as well as Chinese doctors who
provided medical care to Mexican residents in Los Angeles. Chinese doctors were specialized in the Chinese
herbal remedy. For example, see “Está Ud. Enfermo?,” La Opinión, January 1, 1929.
242
California state government, “Mexicans in California,” 1930, Box 62, Clements Papers, 123. As for the
foundation of the CUOM, see also Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 231-232.
129

their effort by telling them that he considered their efforts “extremely favorable for all the Mexican
community of workers who live in the West [of the United States].”
243
Soon after this resolution,
local Mexican unions merged into the Confederación de Uniones Obreras Mexicanas (CUOM).
On March 23, 1928, the Committee on Laws of the CUOM formulated a constitution, modelled
after the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), the largest Mexican union in Mexico
founded in 1918. The CUOM adopted the constitution that declaring:

1. That the exploited class, the greater part of which is made up of manual labor, is right in
establishing a class struggle in order to effect an economic and moral betterment of its
conditions, and at last its complete freedom from capitalistic tyranny.
2. That in order to be able to oppose the organization, each day more complete and intelligent,
of the exploiters, the exploited class must organize as such, the base of its organization
being the union of resistance, in accord with the rights which the laws of this country
concede to native and foreign workers.
3. That the corporations, possessors of the natural and social wealth, being integral parts of
the international association of industry, commerce and banking, the disinherited class
must also integrate by means of its federations and confederation into a single union of all
the labor of the world.
244

243
“El Cónsul Sr. Pesqueira es Sindicalista,” La Opinión, November 6, 1927
244
“Mexicans in California,” 1930, Box 62, Clements Papers, 123-124. Devra Anne Weber, “The Organizing of
Mexicano Agricultural Workers: Imperial Valley, and Los Angeles 1928-34, An Oral History Approach,” Aztlán
3, no.2 (1972): 329.
130

Their constitution shows us both national and transnational characteristics of the CUOM since they
modelled after the largest union in their home country but put emphasis on the rights guaranteed
by their host country.
The CUOM also issued their manifesto to make clear that Mexican workers needed to be
united for the “prosperity of the laboring classes, promoting their defense, stimulating
remunerative salaries and the constant betterment of the proletarian” and that “this movement’s
aim is not to agitate, nor to spread or instigate dissolvent ideas. All that is desired is to equalize
Mexican labor to American labor and to obtain for them what the Law justly allows them.” What
is more important is that in order to improve the working conditions of Mexicans in the United
States, the CUOM advocated for “solid relations with the organized Labor of Mexico
(Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana) and to try to stop the immigration of unorganized
Labor into the U.S. which is harmful to the working men of both Countries.”
245
Prior to the 1930s,
the American Federation of Labor did not make efforts to organize unskilled workers of any
nationality, especially migratory farm workers regarding them unorganizable.
246
The CUOM
showed their restrictive stance toward newly coming immigrant workers in order to lessen the
tension between them and American workers.
The CUOM also intended to improve the living conditions of Mexican families as a Mexican
mutual-aid organization, as they demonstrated that they would “promote a strong cultural
campaign giving preference to the education of our children, for which we shall build schools and
libraries as is possible,” “raise a benevolent fund towards helping our indigent countrymen and to
build up or help other Mexican Societies for the establishment of exclusive Mexican hospitals,

245
“Mexicans in California,” 1930, Box 62, Clements Papers, 125.
246
Camarillo, Chicanos in California, 42. According to Rudy P. Guevarra, Jr., contemporary sociologist Emory
S. Bogardus did not think Mexicans were able to organize, either. See Guevarra, Becoming Mexipino, 101
131

orphan asylums, alm houses [sic],” and set up “Constitute Committees of defense which will have
competent lawyers paid by the Mexican colonies themselves so that these with the help of the
[Mexican] consulate can effectively defend Mexican[s] who are put in jail, in many cases by mere
ignorance of the law.”
247
These efforts seemed to mean what they meant by “moral betterment” in
their constitution. While working closely with the Mexican consulate, the CUOM assumed the role
of mutualistas, Mexican mutual-aid societies that had existed since the late nineteenth century and
increased in the early twentieth century in ethnic Mexican neighborhoods in the Southwest.
248

In contrast to La Opinión’s early assumption that Mexicans would return to Mexico, the
CUOM positioned Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles as exploited laborers who would stay in
the United States and thus fight against exploitation and discrimination working with both
Mexicans and non-Mexicans. On the other hand, a major Japanese mutual-aid association in the
1920s Los Angeles was the Central Japanese Association of Southern California (Nanka Chūō
Nihonjin Kai), which was established in 1915 and originally founded as the Federation of Japanese
Associations in Southern California (Minami Kashū Rengō Nihonjin Kai) in 1910. From the
beginning, one of the major goals of the Central Japanese Association was to develop Japanese
agriculture in Southern California. In the 1920s when anti-Japanese sentiment became strong, the
association adopted a resolution to encourage Americanization of the ethnic Japanese population,
which tells us that many Japanese immigrants had been determined to settle in the United States
despite Japanese exclusion, like Mexican immigrants of the CUOM who showed their willingness
to stay in the United States.
249

247
“Mexicans in California,” 1930, Box 62, Clements Papers, 125-126.
248
Gutiérrez, Walls and Mirrors, 34; Camarillo, Chicanos in California, 37.
249
Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi, 382-384.
132

The CUOM was born just at the moment in which American restrictionists were engaged in
heated discussions on the so-called “Mexican Problem.” Only five days after the foundation of the
CUOM, California Governor C.C. Young appointed the Mexican Fact-Finding Committee and
ordered the committee to prepare a report which “would contain only facts relating to the industrial,
social and agricultural aspects of the problem of Mexican immigration into California.” The core
members of the committee were Will J. French, Director of the Department of Industrial Relations,
Anna L. Saylor, Director of the Department of Agriculture, and George H. Hecke, Director of the
Department of Agriculture. In their report, published in September 1930, touched upon the CUOM
as part of their analysis on Mexican labor unions. In contrast to the image of Mexicans forged by
business leaders such as Clements, the report pointed out that “the fact that Mexican laborers are
beginning to organize into unions is significant from the standpoint of those employers who look
upon Mexican laborers as tractable and docile persons.” But it provided a rather optimistic view
about the CUOM because “Mexicans themselves consider that there is already an oversupply of
Mexican workers in California, as evidenced by the fact that they have incorporated in their
constitution articles pertaining to the limiting of further Mexican immigration into the United
States.”
250

The restrictionist stance of organized Mexican workers in the United States was not
influential enough to limit the actual influx of immigrants given the huge demand for Mexican
labor in the ever-growing Southern California agricultural industry. However, once the economic
growth halted and unemployment rose due to the Great Depression in the 1930s, Mexicans came
to be seen as a burden on U.S. taxpayers, compelling the Los Angeles County government to
repatriate a large number of Mexicans and their U.S. born children. From Los Angeles County,

250
“Mexicans in California,” 1930, Box 62, Clements Papers, 14, 129.
133

13,332 ethnic Mexicans returned to Mexico from 1931 to 1934.
251
The Great Depression also
helped La Opinión evolve from a Mexican newspaper to a Mexican American one, if subtly.
Witnessing that Mexicans were scapegoated despite their economic contribution, La Opinión
raised voices of protest against the forced repatriation of Mexicans.
252
In the 1930s, about one-
third of the ethnic Mexican population in Los Angeles, particularly single men and young families,
returned to Mexico, which made the immigrant-generation numerically smaller than the second-
generation. George J. Sánchez argues that “[t]he major outcome of repatriation was to silence the
Mexican immigrant generation in Los Angeles and make them less visible.” Increased residential
segregation, decreasing interethnic contact, the efforts of local officials to remove the Mexican
population, for example, as seen in the construction of the Union Train Terminal, forced ethnic
Mexicans further into specific areas such as the Downtown area or into East Los Angeles.
253

Los Angeles business leaders were concerned that repatriating too many Mexicans would
negatively affect local industries that had been using cheap Mexican labor and that the repatriation
campaign would worsen the image of Los Angeles.
254
In July 1931, J.A.H. Kerr, the Chamber’s
president, posted a letter titled as “To Our Mexican Friends” on the Chamber’s bulletin, saying
“this community [of Los Angeles] has been privileged to be designated as the largest city in
Mexican population outside of the Republic” and “they should in no wise be influenced in leaving
this section because of idle rumors that the people of Los Angeles do not entertain for them the
most cordial friendship or that the government of the United States is embarked upon any

251
As for Mexican Repatriation, see Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza, 20-25.
252
Monica Lozano, interview by Shirley Biagi, Washington Press Club Foundation, December 13, 1993,
http://beta.wpcf.org/oralhistory/loz.html, accessed November 27, 2017.
253
Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 225. William Deverell has explored how the pavement construction
of the Los Angeles River in the 1930s created the dividing line between Anglo American and Mexican American
residents in Los Angeles. See Deverell, Whitewashed Adobe, Ch.3.
254
Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza, 22-23.
134

wholesale deportation plan aimed principally at our Mexican people.”
255
On the other hand, the
Mexican consul in Los Angeles Rafael de la Colina, who worked closely with Mexican nationals
in Los Angeles, did not take such a statement of Kerr as sincere enough and thought that local
business leaders viewed the “Mexican laborer as a docile beast of burden, hard-working,
economical, and cheap.”
256

Colina’s view grasped accurately the racial understanding of business leaders. As discussed
earlier in this chapter, George P. Clements, the manager of the Chamber’s Agricultural Department,
countered the exclusionist argument in 1928 by confidently explaining that Mexican immigrants
should be allowed to stay and work in Los Angeles because they consisted of a type of Mexicans
who were “clean and healthy” and had their sense of “responsibility” unlike the dangerous “greaser”
type of Mexicans. After the Great Depression took place, Clements still maintained his racist view
on Mexican immigrants as safe and docile. In June 1931, Clements wrote a letter to his superior
W.G. Arnoll, the Chamber’s secretary and general manager, about the feasibility of keeping non-
white agricultural labor in California even during the economic depression. He contended,
“unemployment has nothing whatsoever to do with certain types of agricultural labor” because “a
Mexican, Chinaman or Jap at the present wages could make a good living and give service for
wage to his employer.” In the same letter, Clements also said, “I think that I thoroughly understand
the Mexican people, and particularly the type of Mexican whom for years we have solicited from
Mexico. We have been very careful to demand a sandalled Mexican. These men are drawn from
tribes all over Mexico, and the majority of them have no real knowledge of their own government

255
J.A.H. Kerr, “To Our Mexican Friends,” Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce Bulletin, May 1931, Box 80,
Clements Papers.
256
Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza, 16, 23-24.
135

or their governmental workings. In fact, it might be correct to say that the majority of them do not
know that such a thing as a Mexican consul exists.”
257

As the depression worsened the living and working conditions of remaining Mexican workers
and their families, they felt an even larger need to organize and fight against labor exploitation.
Japanese tenant farmers in Los Angeles were part of the economically exploitative structure in
Southern California agriculture, holding a middleman-minority position between white
landowners and Mexican workers. In 1933, Armando Flores, one of the founding members of the
CUOM, became a leader who worked closely with the Mexican consulate and La Opinión and
mobilized Mexican farmworkers against Japanese tenant farmers in El Monte, at the time one of
Los Angeles’s neighboring agricultural communities.
258
The El Monte strike became one of the
largest strikes in 1933. It started as a local interethnic conflict in Los Angeles but evolved in an
international conflict between Japan, Mexico, and the United States, which unexpectedly affected
the lives of Japanese immigrants across the border in Mexicali. The 1920s saw the development
of the transborder ethnic Japanese community as well as the triracial hierarchy in Los Angeles
farmland, which laid a foundation of transpacific Japanese-Mexican conflicts in the 1930s.

257
George P. Clements to W.G. Arnoll, June 11, 1931, Box 80, Clements Papers.
258
The list of founding members of the CUOM including Flores appeared in the report “Mexicans in California.”
See “Mexicans in California,” 1930, Box 62, Clements Papers, 126.
136

Chapter 4
Transpacific Borderlands:
Japanese Farmers and Mexican Workers in the 1933 El Monte Berry Strike

The Immigration Act of 1924 resulted in the increase of Japanese immigrants in Baja
California, Mexico, and Mexican immigrants in Southern California. Japanese tenant farmers of
Los Angeles County increasingly depended on Mexican workers, further institutionalizing the
labor-management relationship between these two immigrant groups within the triracial hierarchy
of the local agriculture. The post-1924 development of the triracial hierarchy increased the
possibility of Japanese-Mexican interethnic conflicts and resulted in a large-scale agricultural
strike by Mexican workers against the Japanese in the early 1930s.
In June 1933, Mexican farmworkers went on strike against Japanese tenant farmers in the
small community of El Monte in Los Angeles County. Quickly spreading to other areas of
Southern California, involving more than 5,000 strikers, and lasting more than a month, the El
Monte Berry Strike became one of the state’s largest labor conflicts in a Great Depression year
that witnessed at least thirty-seven agricultural strikes.
259
Yet more than just a labor and interethnic
issue, the El Monte strike was an international problem involving the peoples and governments of
Japan, Mexico, and the United States. This process strengthened the racial and class boundaries in
the local context of Los Angeles agriculture but unsettled the racial and class boundaries in the
transnational context of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. The strike’s transnational dimension was

259
Ronald W. López, “The El Monte Berry Strike of 1933,” Aztlán 1, no.1 (Apr., 1970): 101-102, 105-106. As
explained in the first section of this article, most Japanese farmers in Los Angeles County were tenants. Thus,
in this article, “Japanese farmers” means “Japanese tenant farmers.”
137

evident in a letter to the editor of La Opinión. What is intriguing about the letter is that it was
written by Japanese immigrants living across the border in Mexicali, Baja California, who
condemned the labor exploitation by the Japanese in Los Angeles as “inhumane and contrary to
friendly and cooperative relations that must exist between the employer and the worker.”
260
As
detailed in this chapter, this unexpected action taken by Mexicali Japanese eventually affected the
way in which Los Angeles Japanese made a compromise in their negotiation with Mexican strikers,
turning the racial and class boundaries temporarily fluid and leading to the settlement of the strike.
Historians have studied the El Monte strike not simply as a local conflict but also in terms of
U.S.-Mexico relations. Abraham Hoffman argues that the El Monte strike “claimed the distinction
of direct involvement by the government of Mexico, in the form of diplomatic pressure, monetary
assistance, and consular intervention” through his analysis of diplomatic correspondence between
Mexican and U.S. officials and politicians. Francisco E. Balderrama has examined an international
dimension of the Mexican American community by assessing consular-colonia relations in Los
Angeles. He argues that the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles took “an active role in formulating
policy and organizing a new colonia society to help care for the poor and unemployed Mexicans
and Mexican Americans who remained in southern California.” Gilbert G. González has analyzed
the close communication exchanged between the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles and the
Mexican government during the El Monte strike. He interprets the nature of the Mexican

260
“Los Japoneses de Baja California Apoyan a Los Huelguistas,” La Opinión, June 30, 1933. The original
Spanish messages are “La Asociación Japonesa de la Baja California . . . ha averiguado que el proceder de estos
súbditos japoneses en California es inhumano y atentatorio a las relaciones de amistad y cooperación que deben
existir entre el patrón y el trabajador.”
138

government’s involvement in the strike as conservative Mexican nationalism that would neither
help Mexican farmworkers in a radical way nor harm U.S. capitalism.
261

In the 1970s, several scholars including Hoffman studied the Japanese-Mexican conflicts in
the 1930s, presumably inspired by the labor conflicts that occurred between the United Farm
Workers and the Nisei Farmers League in the 1970s to explore the earlier cases of Japanese-
Mexican relations. Ronald W. López provided a detailed overview of the El Monte Berry Strike,
revealing the Mexican government’s involvement in the strike. Devra Weber explored the
ideological relationship between the El Monte strike and the Mexican Revolution. Charles
Wollenberg paid careful attention to the interethnic aspect of the strike, describing the historical
process in which the Japanese and Mexicans came into conflicts in the agricultural industry in
1930s Los Angeles.
262

Yet no one has examined the strike from the perspective of the Japanese government and
Japanese immigrants in both the United States and Mexico.
263
This chapter does so by focusing

261
Abraham Hoffman, “The El Monte Berry Pickers’ Strike, 1933: International Involvement in a Local Labor
Dispute,” Journal of the West 12, no.1 (1973); Francisco E. Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza: The Los Angeles
Mexican Consulate and the Mexican Community, 1929 to 1936 (Tucson, 1982); Gilbert G. González, Mexican
Consuls and Labor Organizing: Imperial Politics in the American Southwest (Austin, 1999); “The 1933 Los
Angeles County Farm Workers Strike,” New Political Science 20, no.4 (Dec., 1998). A contemporary scholar
Charles B. Spaulding, who made the first observation of the strike, explained that the strike increased the social
distance between the Japanese and Mexicans while strengthening ties between the Japanese and whites. See
Charles B. Spaulding, “The Mexican Strike at El Monte, California,” Sociology and Social Research, 18 (July-
Aug., 1934).
262
López, “The El Monte Berry Strike of 1933”; Devra Anne Weber, “The Organizing of Mexicano Agricultural
Workers: Imperial Valley, and Los Angeles 1928-34, An Oral History Approach,” Aztlán 3, no.2 (1972); Charles
Wollenberg, “Race and Class in Rural California: The El Monte Berry Strike of 1933,” California Historical
Quarterly 51, no.2 (July, 1972). As for the viewpoint of communist organizers in the strike, see Cletus E. Daniel,
Bitter Harvest: A History of California Farmworkers, 1870-1941 (Berkeley, 1981). Vicky Ruiz recorded the
memories of a Mexican American resident in El Monte who witnessed the strike. See Vicki Ruiz, From Out of
the Shadows: Mexican Women in Twentieth-Century America (New York, 1998; 2008). George J. Sánchez refers
to the Mexican government’s involvement in the strike. See George J. Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American:
Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (New York, 1993), 235-238.
263
Noritaka Yagasaki, Imin Nōgyō: Kariforunia no Nihonjin Imin Shakai [Immigrant agriculture: the Japanese
immigrant society in California] (Tokyo, 1993), 79-80. Eiichiro Azuma also touches upon the El Monte strike
in an endnote of his book. See Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in
139

largely on Japanese and Mexican diplomatic documents and the ethnic newspaper Rafu Shimpo.
These sources reveal that the El Monte strike generated anti-Japanese sentiment in Southern
California that spread across the border to Mexico and eventually pressured Japanese immigrants
in Los Angeles to soften their uncompromising stance on the strike and accept a settlement. In this
way, conflict between Japanese farmers and Mexican workers in Los Angeles County contributed
to the further reification of “transpacific borderlands” framed by intersecting local and diplomatic
concerns of Japan, Mexico, and the United States.
264
A key dimension of the history of U.S.-
Mexico borderlands was interactions between the Japanese in Los Angeles and their co-ethnics in
Mexicali, which developed the transborder ethnic Japanese community after 1924 as detailed in
Chapter 2. Although Japanese immigrants on both sides developed cultural and economic ties with
each other across the border, the El Monte strike exposed the limits of this transborder ethnic
solidarity as the Japanese in Mexicali supported the strikers in Los Angeles and thus fell in line
with Mexican nationalism. In the end, Mexican nationalism trumped ethnic solidarity among
Japanese immigrants in the context of the transpacific borderlands.

Japanese America (New York, 2005), 270. Yuko Matsumoto touches upon the El Monte strike in her article on
the Venice Celery strike of 1936 and mentions that the Japanese immigrant newspaper Kashu Mainichi described
the El Monte strike as a conflict with an aspect of “race war.” See Yuko Matsumoto, “1936 Nen Rosanjerusu
Serori Sutoraiki to Nikkei Nōgyō Komyunitī [The Los Angeles Celery Strike of 1936 and the Japanese
agricultural community],” Shirin 75, no.4 (July, 1992): 53. A group of researchers have worked to preserve the
local history of El Monte in collaboration with the local historical society La Historia Society of El Monte and
publishing short online articles. Melqui Fernandez offers a summary of the El Monte strike based on secondary
sources. Andre Kobayashi Deckrow sheds light on the lives of ethnic Japanese in El Monte by using the Los
Angeles Times and Densho Digital Archive. See Melqui Fernandez, “The El Monte Berry Strike of 1933,”
Tropics of Meta (Mar., 2015), online at https://tropicsofmeta.wordpress.com/2015/03/30/the-el-monte-berry-
strike-of-1933, accessed March 5, 2016; Andre Kobayashi Deckrow, “A Community Erased: Japanese
Americans in El Monte and the San Gabriel Valley,” Tropics of Meta (Sept., 2014), online at
https://tropicsofmeta.wordpress.com/2014/09/18/a-community-erased-japanese-americans-in-el-monte-and-
the-san-gabriel-valley, accessed March 5, 2016.
264
I utilize Grace Peña Delgado’s conceptualization of “trans-Pacific-borderlands” in her study on ethnic
Chinese residents in the Arizona-Sonora borderlands. See Grace Peña Delgado, Making the Chinese Mexican:
Global Migration, Localism, and Exclusion in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (Stanford, 2012).
140

In this chapter, the analysis of Japanese experience during the El Monte strike unfolds in three
chronologically arranged sections. The first focuses on the early stage of the strike by detailing
how Japanese farmers and diplomats in Los Angeles responded to the demands of Mexican strikers.
Given the triracial hierarchy of Los Angeles agriculture, Japanese farmers were fully backed by
white agribusiness leaders represented by the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. The second
analyzes the impact of the strike on Japanese-Mexican relations in Los Angeles and the Mexican
border city of Mexicali by focusing on growing transborder anti-Japanese sentiment and on the
experience of Japanese immigrants in Mexicali. The final section explores how anti-Japanese
sentiment in Mexico forced Japanese diplomats and farmers in Los Angeles to reach an agreement
with the Mexican strikers and how they interpreted the unexpected repercussions of the strike in
Mexicali. The transpacific perspective helps us understand that this exacerbating situation in
Mexico, rather than in the United States, played a decisive role in the settlement of the El Monte
strike and that Los Angeles farmland proved to be as a transpacific workplace where local and
international concerns of peoples and governments of the three Pacific-Rim nations intersected
with each other.

An International Problem Generated in Los Angeles Berry Farms
In 1930, Japanese and Mexicans constituted about 78 percent of the non-white population in
Los Angeles County.
265
By the 1930s, a triracial hierarchy had developed in Los Angeles
agriculture where Japanese tenant farmers a role of the middleman-minority while leasing lands

265
U.S. Census Bureau, Fifteenth Census of the United States:1930, Population (Washington, D.C., 1932), Table
13, “The Composition of the Population, by Counties,” and Table 17, “Indians, Chinese, and Japanese, 1910 to
1930, and Mexicans, 1930, for Counties and for Cities of 25,000 or More,” 252, 266.
141

from white landowners and hiring Mexican workers.

El Monte was one of many communities in
Southern California where Mexicans worked for Japanese farmers. A small community in the San
Gabriel Valley, El Monte was about thirteen miles east of Downtown Los Angeles, with a
population of 16,000. Approximately 20 percent of the community’s population were ethnic
Mexicans, while about 5 percent were ethnic Japanese, with the rest white American. Throughout
the broader San Gabriel Valley, Japanese farmers leased land from white landowners and hired
Mexican farmworkers to cultivate approximately 80 percent of 600 to 700 acres of berries. A
Mexican American woman Jesusita Torres remembered, “They (Japanese farmers) would work in
the field but you knew they were the boss.” In El Monte, both ethnic Japanese and Mexican
residents faced racial segregation that excluded non-whites from more affluent white areas. For
example, Japanese and Mexican children went to the same segregated school where no white
children attended.
266
Yet, a cultural divide existed between Japanese and Mexican children, as a
Mexican American resident Patty Holguin recalled, “I thought it was so weird to see the food they
(the Japanese) ate, just as they probably thought we were weird with our tacos.”
267

The Great Depression hit this triracial community of El Monte, particularly afflicting
Mexican residents. Since May of 1933, Mexican farmworkers in El Monte had been demanding a
pay increase from fifteen cents (approximately $2.84 in 2017) to thirty-five cents an hour due to
that season’s abundant harvest. Japanese farmers, however, rejected the farmworkers’ demand
arguing that they could not afford to increase wages because the price of their crop had declined
due to the depression.
268
Carey McWilliams demonstrated how difficult it was for Japanese

266
López, “The El Monte Berry Strike of 1933,” 103; Spaulding, “The Mexican Strike at El Monte California,”
571-572; Ruiz, From Out of the Shadows, 75-76
267
“Sweet, Sad Latino Life of Yesterday,” Los Angeles Times, September 27, 1992.
268
Mokichi Fukushima, secretary official in Tijuana, to Yasuya Uchida, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan,
July 11, 1933; Toshito Satō, Consul in Los Angeles, to Uchida, June 17, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, Gaikoku ni okeru Rōdō
Sōgi no Kankei Zakken (Higyō Taigyō wo Fukumu) [Miscellaneous reports on the labor conflicts in foreign
142

farmers to raise wages for Mexican workers in the 1930s based on a Los Angeles County’s survey
conducted in 1935. According to the survey, the average annual gross return for 157 farms, 94.3
percent of whom were Japanese, was $6,415. The average annual expense for paid workers was
33.3 percent of the gross return, while overhead expenses such as rent, water charges, and
fertilization reached 50.1 percent. It is most likely that an average annual income of a Japanese
farm was less than $1,065 (approximately $19,000 in 2017) in the-mid 1930s.
269

On June 1, communist organizers of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers’ Industrial Union
(CAWIU), whose strike committee included several Mexican, Japanese, and Filipino members,
successfully mobilized about 800 Mexican farmworkers at a barrio called Hicks Camp in El Monte.
The CAWIU began organizing migrant farmworkers in 1930 in the Imperial Valley and then
became the major force in thirty-seven strikes in California in 1933.
270
Following its initial
outbreak, the El Monte strike rapidly spread to other parts of the San Gabriel Valley and farther
areas in Los Angeles County such as Venice because communist organizers of the CAWIU held
local meetings and distributed leaflets to farmworkers right after the strike was set in motion.
Women and children actively took part in picketing and distributing leaflets printed in Spanish,
Japanese, and English. Learning from their failure in mobilizing farmworkers during a pea strike

countries (including strikes and sabotages)], vol. 1, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan (hereafter as DAMFAJ). Although berries were picked on a crate basis like
other crops, the payment for berry pickers was arranged on an hourly basis since they picked various types of
berries such as raspberries, youngberries, and blackberries which had different crate values. See Ross H. Gast to
George Pigeon Clements, June 27, 1933, Box 64, George Pigeon Clements Papers, Special Collections,
University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California (hereafter as Clements Papers).
269
Carey McWilliams, Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California (Berkeley,
1939; 2000), 247-249.
270
“800 Pizcadores más Van a la Huelga,” La Opinión, June 6, 1933; López, “The El Monte Berry Strike of
1933,” 102-104; Spaulding, “The Mexican Strike at El Monte California,” 573.
143

in Alameda and Santa Clara Counties in April, the organizers placed importance on the publication
of leaflets for “ideological control” over farmworkers to lead a militant and successful strike.
271

On June 6, La Opinión ran the first detailed account of the El Monte strike and reported that
Japanese farmers had refused to improve labor conditions for the “numerous Mexicans [who] had
three and four children to support.” Although CAWIU organizers first launched the strike, another
Mexican workers’ organization played an active role from the early stages of the strike. Calling
itself la Unión de Campesinos y Obreros Mexicanos (UCOM) by the end of the strike in early July,
this union originated from La Confederación de Uniones Obreros Mexicanos (CUOM), which was
founded in 1928 as a mutual aid society for Mexican workers in California as explained in Chapter
3. It emphasized patriotic principles rather than the international solidarity of workers. Armando
Flores, a print shop owner and an original signer of the CUOM and the general secretary of the
UCOM in 1933, was especially active in leading the strikers. With the support of Flores, by June
6, the leaders of the ethnic Mexican community formed a pro-strike committee. They held a
meeting at Flores’ printing shop and decided that the committee should not only support picketing
by strikers but should also provide the government and workers in their home country with
information of the strike. They also agreed to express their gratitude to La Opinión for “their
dedicated and spontaneous support for the movement,” which was not surprising since the
newspaper catered to Mexican immigrant readers in Los Angeles.
272
While most strike leaders

271
“Kai! Shirane Shizuko Jō [Good Job! Ms. Shizuko Shirane],” Nichibei Shimbun, June 9, 1933; López, “The
El Monte Berry Strike of 1933,” 104; Daniel, Bitter Harvest, 143-146.
272
“800 Pizcadores más Van a la Huelga,” La Opinión, June 6, 1933; “Arrestos Al Cundir La Huelga de Los
Pizcadores Mexicanos!,” La Opinión, June 7, 1933; Weber, “The Organizing of Mexicano Agricultural Workers,”
326-328. González, “The 1933 Los Angeles County Farm Workers Strike,” 446. The Unión de Campesinos y
Obreros Mexicanos (UCOM) and the Confederación de Uniones de Campesinos y Obreros Mexicanos
(CUCOM) were not the same organization, since the latter was formally established on July 15, 1933, after the
end of the El Monte strike. See Spaulding, “The Mexican Strike at El Monte California,” 575; Weber, “The
Organizing of Mexicano Agricultural Workers,” 329; González, Mexican Consuls and Labor Organizing, 111.
Moreover, in primary sources produced during the strike, the union led by Flores appears as the UCOM. See
144

were men like Flores, Mexican women were also actively supporting the strikers behind the scenes,
cooking food and taking it to the strikers.
273

Following a request from Japanese farmers, more than ten local sheriffs began to protect their
farms from the activities of labor organizers. The Central Japanese Association of Southern
California (Nanka Chūō Nihonjin Kai), the ethnic organization that sent an expedition team to
Mexico in 1924 as explained in Chapter 2, quickly responded to the strike under the leadership of
the association’s president Katsuma Mukaeda. Mukaeda was a respected community leader in the
ethnic Japanese community because of his educational background and bilingual abilities. He was
born in Kumamoto Prefecture in 1890 and immigrated to California in 1908. After working on his
uncle’s strawberry farms in Arcadia near El Monte, he attended the University of Southern
California and the Southwestern University School of Law, which enabled him to serve as a court
interpreter for the ethnic Japanese community.
274
Takashi Fukami, the general secretary of the
association, was assigned to negotiate with the Mexican side. Given the absence of the Mexican
farmworkers, Japanese farmers tried to find more permanent replacement workers while using
their children to harvest the crop. By June 10, they had advertised in local newspapers and
distributed twenty fliers to recruit new farmworkers. The Rafu Shimpo reported that many white
Americans, responding to the call for work, “flooded to the Japanese Association in El Monte and
some brought their housewives, students, and children” and that they were not skilled workers but
“the most powerful weapon against the strike.” The ethnic newspaper covered the strike in a

“Concluye La Huelga al Rendirse Los Japoneses,” La Opinión, July 7, 1933; A copy of the final agreement
contract, July 6, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
273
“Sweet, Sad Latino Life of Yesterday,” Los Angeles Times, September 27, 1992.
274
Katsuma Mukaeda and Masatoshi Nakamura, Zaibei no Higojin [Kumamoto people in the United States]
(Los Angeles, 1931), 637-638, Katsuma Mukaeda Papers, Japanese American National Museum, Los Angeles,
California; Alexandra Giffen, Finding aid for the Katsuma Mukaeda Papers, online at Online Archives of
California, http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c8fx7fx0/entire_text/, accessed October 27, 2017.
145

nationalistic tone with aggressive words such as “weapon,” “risk his life (to save fellow Japanese),”
and “flames (of the strike).” In an interview article, an anonymous Japanese farmer explained his
experience, saying, “It was like a war” when both strikers and sheriffs came to his farm.
Antagonism against Mexicans was evident in the Japanese side.
275

Meanwhile, two young Japanese American representatives of the recently established San
Gabriel Valley Japanese American Citizens League, Shizuko Shirane and David Shiratake, got the
principal of El Monte Union High School to grant a special permission to sixty-five Japanese
students to work on the farms; the high school postponed the students’ exams until after the harvest.
A Rafu Shimpo headline declared, “Good job! Miss Shizuko Shirane,” and noted “all the fellow
farmers were moved by the beautiful action of the Nisei.” By emphasizing the “beautiful” role of
young Japanese Americans, the article romanticized their action to strengthen their ethnic
solidarity.
276
It was not until the late 1930s that the second-generation began to take a larger role
in the Japanese farming community. Yet, in the El Monte strike, the U.S.-born children of Japanese
farmers played an important but secondary role. For Japanese farmers, their U.S.-born children
enabled them to lease land and provided them with useful temporary labor during an emergency.
277

The support from the El Monte Union High School was consistent with that of El Monte’s
white landowners association, headed by Tom Lambert, which backed the Japanese farmers, who,

275
“Fukami Kanji, Shi wo Toshite [Secretary Fukami, risking his life], Rafu Shimpo, June 10, 1933; “Boshū ni
Ōjite, Beikokujin ga Sattō [Americans flooded into the office upon recruitment],” Rafu Shimpo, June 10, 1933;
“Bokukokujin Higyō Taisaku de [A measure against the Mexican strike],” Rafu Shimpo, June 10, 1933; “Ichigo
no Debana wo Orare, Tetteiteki no Dageki desu [They spoiled the harvest of berries, devastating damage], Rafu
Shimpo, June 11, 1933.
276
“Kai! Shirane Shizuko jō,” Nichibei Shimbun, June 9, 1933. As for the experiences of Nisei, see Lon
Kurashige, Japanese American Celebration and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and Festival in Los
Angeles, 1934-1990 (Berkeley, 2002); Yuji Ichioka, Before Internment; John Modell, “Class or Ethnic
Solidarity: The Japanese American Company Union,” Pacific Historical Review 38, no.2 (1969).
277
Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi Kankō Iinkai [Publishing committee of Japanese in Southern
California: A history of 70 years], ed., Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi [Japanese in Southern California:
A History of 70 Years] (Los Angeles, 1960), 58, 667 (hereafter as Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi).
146

after all, were their tenants. Lambert was concerned that the strike “would unquestionably be
reflected directly back on the land owner” who knowingly let the Japanese lease lands under their
children’s names, which was a legal loophole of the Alien Land Laws. He was “very much
concerned about the suit brought by the Mexican strikers against Japanese vegetable growers by
Flores,” which would question the legality of Japanese tenant agriculture. Although the strike
caused serious concerns among white landowners, posing the possibility of breaking down the
triracial hierarchy in local agriculture, they continued to support Japanese farmers to protect their
economic interests over the welfare of Mexican farmworkers.
278

The strike spread quickly to other major Japanese agricultural communities in Los Angeles
County such as Venice and Gardena, since Mexican farmworkers were working throughout the
county. In 1933, the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles estimated that there were 21,500 ethnic
Mexican families in Los Angeles County and reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico,
“Even when there is a shortage of jobs in all branches, Mexicans always find jobs two or three
days a week in harvesting fruits or vegetables.”
279
In Venice, about 125 Mexican farmworkers
went on strike on the same day when the strike was voted for in El Monte. About sixty Japanese
tenant farmers, most of whom grew celery, held a convention on the first evening of the strike.
Mexican strikers demanded thirty-five cents an hour instead of the fifteen or twenty cents they had
been receiving, but Japanese tenant farmers dismissed their demand as “futō yōkyū (inadequate
claim).” In the Gardena Valley, most Mexican farmworkers quickly joined the strike, while eight

278
Gast to Clements, June 28, 1933; Clements to W.G. Arnoll, July 26, 1933, Box 64, Clements Papers;
Wollenberg, “Race and Class in Rural California,” 161-163.
279
According to the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles, the number of Mexican families was 8,750 in Orange
County, 3,750 in Ventura County, and 1,250 in San Luis Obispo County in 1933. Luis Lupián G, “Informe de
la Visita Practicada al Cosulado de México en Los Angeles, California, durante Los Días del 27 de Abril al 31
de Mayo de 1933,” June 6, 1933, Box 29, Folder 266, Collection Gaveta 30, Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada
[Genaro Estrada Historical Archive], Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Mexico
City, Mexico (hereafter as AHGE)
147

or nine Mexicans remained in the field since they had been working with Japanese tenant farmers
for years. According to the Rafu Shimpo, a “threat group” organized mainly by communists came
to the field by three cars and “threatened” those remaining Mexican workers to leave the field, so
that no Mexican remained by mid-June. Consequently, the El Monte strike became serious enough
to involve both the Japanese and Mexican consulates in Los Angeles as well as the state
government and the business community of Southern California.
280

In El Monte and other areas of Los Angeles County, strikers asked the Mexican consulate for
support, and on June 6, a vice consul Ricardo Hill visited the areas surrounding Venice to take
necessary steps to settle the problem under the auspices of the Department of Protection of the
Mexican consulate.
281
Hill, one of three vice consuls working at the Mexican consulate in Los
Angeles, was the chief of its Department of Protection. This department dealt with issues related
to the protection of Mexican residents as well as to Comisiones Honoríficas Mexicanas (Mexican
Honorary Commission), locally established organizations of Mexican residents that functioned to
facilitate the communication between Mexican immigrants and the Mexican consulate in
Downtown Los Angeles.
282
The relationship between Comisiones Honoríficas and the Mexican
consulate was not the same but similar to that between local Japanese associations (Nihonjin Kai)

280
“Huelga de 125 Mexicanos Aquí,” La Opinión, June 4, 1933; “Bokukokujin Sutoraiki de Benisu Nōka no
Taikai [Farmers in Venice hold a convention as to the strike of Mexicans],” Rafu Shimpo, June 3, 1933; “Bōryoku
sae Mochiite Higyō Sanka wo Kyōyō Suru, Gādena Heigen ni Bokujin Nashi [Even with violence, they force
people to join the strike, Mexicans are now absent in the Gardena Valley],” Rafu Shimpo, June 19, 1933. In
Dominguez Hills, a group of ten Mexicans came to stop other Mexicans from working at Japanese farms, so that
Japanese farmers immediately asked local sheriffs to protect them. See “Dominguez wo Osotta Ittai [A group
that attacked the Dominguez area],” Rafu Shimpo, June 11.
281
“Huelga de 125 Mexicanos Aquí,” La Opinión, June 4, 1933; “Actua El Vice-Consul Ricardo Hill,” La
Opinión, June 6, 1933.
282
Luis Lupián G, “Informe de la Visita Practicada al Cosulado de México en Los Angeles, California, durante
Los Días del 27 de Abril al 31 de Mayo de 1933,” June 6, 1933, Box 29, Folder 266, Collection Gaveta 30,
AHGE; Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza, 9-10.
148

and the Japanese consulate in the sense that immigrant organizations mediated the communication
between immigrants and their home government.
The Mexican consulate also supervised the flow of relief supplies for Mexican strikers. After
launching the strike, the Mexican pro-strike committee assigned its member named Vicente Pinto
to collect provisions, funds, and any other assistance from people who wanted to help Mexican
strikers in El Monte. Accordingly, an owner of a Mexican grocery store M. Pacheco was asked to
provide strikers with “30 sacks of wheat, 8 sacks of beans, 200 pounds of salt, 500 pounds of sugar,
10 boxes of condensed milk, and 10 cans of butter that were worth 171.95 dollars.” The pro-strike
committee estimated that these supplies could prolong the strike until almost the end of June and
decided that these should be handed to strikers only through the order issued by the Mexican
consulate. The Mexican consulate provided assistance to the strikers from the beginning because
the El Monte strike appeared a chance to unite Mexican nationals in Los Angeles, some of whom
were “forgetting the sentiment of solidarity, brotherhood, and patriotism that every Mexican
should cherish for its fellow [Mexican] citizens,” as recorded in the consular monthly report.
283

On June 7, an official of the California Department of Industrial Relations met with Japanese
consul Toshito Satō and told him that the wage of farmworkers was too low. Later that day, Hill
visited Satō to ask him to “interpose their valuable influence before the group of Japanese farmers.”
Hill had worked at the Mexican Legation in Tokyo from October 1923 to June 1924, which he
might have told Satō at some point or another.
284
But Satō answered there is little either consulate
could do to settle the problem, since Japanese farmers had already determined not to

283
The Mexican consulate in Los Angeles, “Informe de protección. Junio de 1933,” June 1933, Box 626, Folder
2, Collection Departamento Consular (IV), AHGE.
284
Ibid; “Benisu Higyō ni Kanshite, Hiru Ryōji wa Kataru [Consul Hill talks about the Venice strike],” Rafu
Shimpo, May 7, 1936.
149

compromise.
285
The Japanese consulate kept their hands off the conflict in its early stage, standing
by the side of farmers. In Japanese diplomatic correspondence, Satō later explained to Tokyo that
he had refrained from intervening in the strike “because of the character of the conflict.” Although
Satō did not specify the meaning of its “character,” he considered that the consulate “should not
deal with it directly but support them (Japanese farmers) indirectly,” probably because he thought
that the consulate’s intervention in the early stage could promote the internationalization of this
local interethnic conflict.
286

Satō became the consul in 1929 after working in the Japanese Embassy in Washington for
more than three years and Japanese immigrants later remembered him as one of the consuls who
worked most closely with their ethnic community in Los Angeles before World War II. Satō had
to handle the U.S.-Japan relations carefully due to the international tension heightened by Japan’s
invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and due to the dependence of Japanese on U.S. exports such as oil
and cotton, many of them produced in or near the Los Angeles area.
287
Japanese immigrants in Los
Angeles fervently supported Japan’s foreign policy in Manchuria, while attempting to build
amicable relationships between the Japanese and Americans.
288
Even though the peak of pre-war
anti-Japanese sentiment came with U.S. exclusion of Japanese immigration in 1924, Japanese
communities continued to face nativist harassment and local conflicts always had the potential of

285
“Nōen Sutoraiki de Nichi-Boku Ryōjikan no Sesshō [Negotiation between the Japanese and Mexican
consulates regarding the agricultural strike],” Rafu Shimpo, June 8, 1933.
286
Satō to Uchida, July 18, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
287
“Satō Ryōji no Raichaku [The arrival of Consul Satō],” Rafu Shimpo, November 5, 1929; Minami Kashū
Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi, 378-379; Yoshiaki Katada, “An Exploration of the United States-Japanese Trade
Relationships during the period approaching the 1930s: An Examination of the Changes of Exports and Imports
in Major Ports along the US Pacific Coast and Shipping Routes between the US and Japan,” NUCB Journal of
Economics and Information Science 58, no.2 (Mar., 2014): 107-108.
288
Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi, 668. As for the impact of the Manchuria Incident on the ethnic
Japanese community, see Ichioka, Before Internment; Mitsuhiro Sakaguchi, Nihonjin Amerika Iminshi [History
of Japanese immigrants in the United States] (Tokyo, 2001).
150

hurting U.S.-Japan relations. When Satō was assigned to the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles,
he gave a speech at a welcome party for himself. In his speech, he acknowledged Los Angeles as
a growing industrial center and emphasized the importance of U.S.-Japan relationship. To maintain
stable diplomatic and trade relations between Japan and the United States, Satō directed Japanese
immigrants to abide by U.S. laws and settle in U.S. society without causing any problems, knowing
“a considerable number [of Japanese residents] faced legal punishment for offences against laws
such as the traffic and prohibition laws.”
289

In contrast, the Mexican consulate actively stepped into the El Monte strike from its beginning.
Despite the initial success of CAWIU organizers in mobilizing strikers, their presence ironically
gave a good reason for the Mexican consulate to take over the leadership in the strike by using
anti-communist rhetoric and fueling Mexican nationalism. When mass picket lines set up by the
CAWIU organizers resulted in a confrontation with sheriffs in El Monte, the Mexican consul
Alejandro Martínez came to El Monte and denounced the CAWIU organizers as “reds” who did
not represent the rights of farmworkers. Actually, it was the strike leader, Flores, who requested
Martínez’s visit. On June 10, when the local authority finally arrested and failed eight of the
CAWIU organizers involved in the El Monte strike, Martínez appeared in public and denounced
the CAWIU leadership again. After this incident, strikers began to fight against Japanese farmers
along nationalistic lines.
290
It was not difficult for them to switch their leadership from communists
to the Mexican consulate, since few strikers were actual members of the CAWIU and non-

289
“Nichi-Bei Kyōkai Shusai no Satō Ryōji Kangeikai [The welcome party for Consul Satō held by the Japan-
American Society],” Rafu Shimpo, November 27, 1929; “Seikatsu Kaizen to Hōritsu Sonchō wo [Improvement
of life and respect for laws],” Rafu Shimpo, January 1, 1931.
290
López, “The El Monte Berry Strike of 1933,” 105.
151

communist leaders like Flores gained confidence in directing the course of the strike, as historian
Cletus E. Daniel argues.
291

Predictably, the Japanese farmers welcomed the arrest of communist organizers due to the
threat they posed to their business. When the local authority arrested a Japanese communist named
Hiroshi Tōi and a few other Mexicans on June 7, the ethnic Japanese newspaper Nichibei Shimbun
praised the action.
292
Although prominent Japanese American communists such as Karl Yoneda
played an important role in building a multiracial and multiethnic coalition, Japanese immigrant
farmers and the Rafu Shimpo regarded communism as a threat to their ethnic solidarity and farmers’
profits.
293
One Japanese farmer maintained that “the strike spread widely because of the agitation
of leftists and lazy unemployed people” and that farmers could solve the conflict “by separating
professional agitators from workers and negotiating directly with workers.”
294
The Japanese
consul Satō also emphasized, “if individuals such as communists are disturbing Japanese farmers,
it is my thought that we should take an appropriate action in cooperation with authorities.”
295
In
the El Monte strike, both Japanese and Mexican leaders regarded communist organizers as harmful
to their respective economic and political solidarity.
Meanwhile, Flores was active in making the Japanese-Mexican conflict an international
problem. He asked for support from U.S. and Mexican politicians such as President Franklin D.

291
Daniel, Bitter Harvest, 147.
292
“Kai! Shirane Shizuko Jō,” Nichibei Shimbun, June 9, 1933.
293
Mark Wild details the activities of Karl Yoneda and describes him as “a fervent believer in coalition building
and organized among Mexicans and African Americans in addition to ethnic Asians.” See Mark Wild, Street
Meeting: Multiethnic Neighborhoods in Early Twentieth-Century Los Angeles (Berkeley, 2005), 191. On the
other hand, the Rafu Shimpo consistently shows us that Japanese tenant farmers, who were mostly immigrants
and not U.S. born, had antipathy against communists.
294
“Shitsugyōsha to Sakei Bunshi, Higyō Kakudai no Gen’in [The unemployed and leftists, the reason behind
the expansion of the strike],” Rafu Shimpo, June 11, 1933.
295
“Kanken to Teikeishi Sakei Bunshi wa Issō Suru Hōshin [In cooperation with authorities, leftists should be
removed],” Rafu Shimpo, June 10, 1933.
152

Roosevelt and the former president of Mexico Plutarco Elías Calles. Calles, known as the “Jefe
Máximo (supreme leader),” maintained strong political power in Mexico. By June 23, Calles had
donated $750 (approximately $14,200 in 2017) through the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles,
while Mexican President Abelardo Rodríguez, loyal to Calles, donated $1,000 for strikers.
296

Given the reality of the transborder migration of Mexican farmworkers in the early twentieth
century, Calles found in the El Monte strike an opportunity to forge a positive image of himself
among the Mexican working class beyond the U.S.-Mexico border. Historian Ronald W. López
contends that “[t]his would be an opportunity for Calles to get good publicity and simultaneously
Flores would be getting support for the strike” since “labor groups in Mexico were disenchanted
with Calles and his puppet president, Abelardo Rodríguez.” As Mexico’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs José M. Puig Casaraunc later mentioned that Calles’s interest was due chiefly to “his
geographical propinquity,” Gilbert G. González argues that “Calles had no deep interest in the
strike other than his own driving political ambition.”
297
At the same time, problems were beginning
to mount not only for Japanese immigrants but also for their country’s diplomats in Japan, Mexico,
and the United States.
The expansion of the strike along with the active intervention of the Mexican consulate and
political leaders persuaded Satō to change his hands-off approach and intervene in the conflict in
order to prevent the souring of relations between Japan, the United States, and Mexico. On June
23, Satō sent a telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yasuya Uchida, in Tokyo, writing that
the strike was “considerably organized” and that he had been working hard to solve the conflict

296
Satō to Uchida, June 23, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ; “Calles Envía Dinero a Los Huelguistas,” La
Opinión, June 21, 1933; López, “The El Monte Berry Strike of 1933,” 106; Ricardo Pozas, “El Maximato: El
Partido del Hombre Fuerte, 1929-1934,” Estudios de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea de México 9 (1983);
The Mexican consulate in Los Angeles, “Informe de protección. Junio de 1933,” June 1933, Box 626, Folder 2,
Collection Departamento Consular (IV), AHGE.
297
López, “The El Monte Berry Strike of 1933,” 106; González, Mexican Consuls and Labor Organizing, 113.
153

with Japanese farmers and local business leaders of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. Satō
explained that the U.S. economy depended on Mexican farmworkers because of the “historical
relationship between the United States and Mexico” after the U.S. government banned Japanese
immigration in 1924. Satō reported to Tokyo that the number of Mexican strikers in the San
Gabriel Valley had increased to 2,000 and strike leaders were working with the Mexican
government and planning for a boycott against Japanese merchants.
298

Since both Japanese farmers and Mexican farmworkers were an integral part of the unique
triracial hierarchy of Los Angeles agriculture, their interethnic conflict became a serious problem
for white landowners and agribusiness leaders. While the strike involved Mexican farmworkers,
Japanese farmers, and their respective consulates, white agribusiness leaders in the Los Angeles
Chamber of Commerce, who attempted to keep Mexican labor in Los Angeles during the period
of the Mexican repatriation as mentioned in Chapter 3, also got involved and sought to convince
Japanese farmers and Mexican farmworkers to resolve the strike through a compromise. They too
were concerned that the strike by farmworkers would reinforce anti-immigration sentiment and
rekindle the argument for Mexican immigration restriction that could lead to a labor shortage.
When the Los Angeles County government repatriated a large number of Mexicans in 1931 due to
the Great Depression, some chamber members expressed their concerns that the repatriation
program could severely damage local industries. In May of that year, Chamber President J. A. H.
Kerr stated, “[W]e regret that a considerable number of our Mexican people are returning to their
home land” and “[legal immigrants] not only are permitted to stay here but are welcome.” To

298
Satō to Uchida, June 23, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ. Hoffman reveals that the U.S. Ambassador to
Mexico Josephus Daniels had a cordial relationship with the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs José M. Puig
Casaraunc, showing a supportive stance toward Mexican farmworkers during the strike as part of the Good
Neighbor Policy. See Hoffman, “The El Monte Berry Pickers’ Strike, 1933,” 75.
154

prevent a labor shortage, on 26 June 1933, the Chamber of Commerce leaders proposed a
compromise and called on the U.S. Labor Department to mediate a settlement of the El Monte
strike. The proposal demanded that the Japanese farmers pay eighteen cents an hour to berry
pickers. Japanese tenant farmers agreed to the deal, but Mexican farmworkers declined it,
demanding an arrangement that covered all vegetables and fruits as well as berries.
299
Ross H. Gast
was the Chamber’s official who arranged the first round of negotiations and had increasing
concerns about the precarious situation of the strike. One day after the first negotiation ended in
failure, Gast sent a letter to his superior George Pigeon Clements, the manager of the Chamber’s
Agricultural Department who once racialized Mexican immigrants as “peons” easy to handle in
the 1920s, writing, “[M]y opinion is that unless something is done, this local situation is dangerous
in that it will spread throughout the state as a whole. In my opinion this is the most serious break
of the Mexican workers here.”
300
Reflecting his concern, by this time, the total number of strikers
had reached over 5,000 in Los Angeles and Orange Counties.
301

Gast correctly grasped the potential of the strike to spread far beyond the Los Angeles area,
drawing the larger involvement of the California state government. Furthermore, the failure to
reach an agreement exacerbated the situation not only in Los Angeles but also in Mexicali, the
largest concentration of ethnic Japanese residents in Mexico. Anti-Japanese sentiment in Los
Angeles travelled across the U.S.-Mexico border and began to disturb ethnic Japanese residents in

299
Satō to Uchida, July 1 and 18, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ; “To Our Mexican Friends,” Los Angeles
Chamber of Commerce Bulletin, May 1931, Box 80, Clements Papers. While López and González explain that
Japanese tenant farmers agreed to pay twenty cents an hour on June 26, a Japanese diplomatic document says
that they agreed to pay eighteen cents an hour. The Japanese side most likely took into consideration both skilled
and less-skilled workers and calculated average hourly wages of piecework and overtime work. See López, “The
El Monte Berry Strike of 1933,” 107-108; González, “The 1933 Los Angeles County Farm Workers Strike,”
452; Gast to Clements, June 27, 1933, Box 64, Clements Papers. As for Mexican Repatriation, see Balderrama,
In Defense of La Raza, 22-23.
300
Gast to Clements, June 27, 1933, Box 64, Clements Papers.
301
López, “The El Monte Berry Strike of 1933,” 107-108.
155

Mexicali who played an important role in the local cotton agriculture as explained in Chapter 2.
Consequently, Japanese diplomats in Mexico became increasingly concerned about the impact of
the El Monte Strike on Japan-Mexico relations.

Anti-Japanese Sentiment in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands
After the failure to reach a compromise on June 26, the Japanese consul Satō became
increasingly concerned over the strike’s negative impact on international relations involving Japan,
Mexico, and the United States and discarded his early uncritical stance toward Japanese farmers.
By monitoring La Opinión, he was already aware of the exacerbating situation in Mexico as the
most influential Mexican leaders such as Calles and Rodríguez were supporting the strikers. In
addition, two days before the failed negotiation, the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Japanese
Legation in Mexico, Yoshiatsu Hori, warned Satō of the possibility that the strike would bother
the Mexican government by driving a large number of unemployed immigrants in Los Angeles
back to Mexico. Hori added, “I hope that you take our region’s situation into consideration,
although I understand that you are working hard to solve the problem in an amicable way.”
302

On June 27, Satō summoned thirty-five leaders of Japanese farm communities in Los Angeles
and Orange County to his consulate building and recommended that they reach a compromise with
Mexican farmworkers. By this time, he came to consider that without his intervention, the strike
“could complicate the relations of Japan, the United States, and Mexico.” At the meeting, Satō
stated to Japanese farmers, “it would be wise for the Japanese side to make a concession at

302
Satō to Uchida, June 23, 1933; Yoshiatsu Hori, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Japanese Legation in Mexico,
to Satō, June 24, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
156

necessary costs,” and attempted to persuade them to pay twenty cents an hour since the strike had
become “increasingly important locally as well as internationally.” The El Monte strike could stir
up anti-Japanese sentiment, which had troubled U.S.-Japan relations since the early twentieth
century, as seen in the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 and 1908, the first California Alien Land
Law of 1913, the second California Alien Land Law of 1920, and the Immigration Act of 1924.
Satō was concerned that mounting anti-Japanese sentiment caused by the strike would lead to
further legal restrictions against Japanese land use, which would go beyond the restrictions laid
out in the 1920 Alien Land Law.
303

Nevertheless, Japanese farmers rejected the consul’s recommendation, explaining that it was
hardly possible for them to raise wages due to the continuing economic recession and that some
farmers had difficulty paying their land rent and water bills. They concluded, “Even with the
current wages, fifteen cents per hour, Japanese farmers get into the red. So it is impossible for us
to raise wages until the economy gets well.”
304
Although Japanese agriculture in Los Angeles
County had continued to develop by overcoming legal restrictions on land use, their average
income was much below that of all residents in California and many Japanese women and children
were supporting family farming through unpaid labor.
305
In addition, Japanese farmers were
reluctant to make a concession because 60 to 70 percent of the struggling Mexican strikers had
already returned to work by the beginning of July. The strike did not seem to be working.
306

Despite the ongoing internationalization of the strike, the fact that Japanese tenant farmers had

303
Satō to Uchida, July 1 and 18, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
304
Ibid. “Kore Ijō no Chingin Neage wa Nihonjin Nōka no Jimetsu [Raising wages will lead the self-destruction
of Japanese farmers],” Rafu Shimpo, June 28, 1933.
305
Yagasaki, Imin Nōgyō, 51-58. In 1941, the per capita income for all Japanese Americans was $671, while the
per capita income for all California civilians was $982. See Leonard Broom and Ruth Riemer, Removal and
Return: The Socio-Economic Effects of the War of Japanese Americans (Berkeley, 1949), 13, 20-22.
306
Satō to Uchida, July 1, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ
157

sufficient political autonomy to reject the consul’s recommendation further complicated the
situation. What was clear was that the Japanese consulate began to work closely with farmers as
the Mexican counterpart had been doing with strikers, making clear the national boundary between
Japanese and Mexican sides which intersected with their racial and class boundaries.
In attempting to resolve the strike, two Rafu Shimpo reporters visited the Mexican consulate
in Los Angeles and interviewed the consul Martínez, vice consul Hill, the strike leader Flores, and
their lawyer David Marcus about the ongoing Japanese-Mexican conflict. On June 29, their
conversation appeared in the Rafu Shimpo. Martínez simply reaffirmed their basic stance in the
strike saying, “It is my viewpoint that the Mexicans are entitled to better wages. It is also my hope
that the Japanese producers may find a way to cooperate in our efforts to help the Mexican families
of California as I consider that both factors have been a great force for the development of the
State of California.” In this meeting, the Japanese reporters were particularly eager to interview
Flores, regarding him as “the most influential person among Mexicans.” Flores told the reporters,
“What we want the Japanese farmers to understand is that we are not making an inadequate claim.”
He added, “It is my sincere hope that we concede each other to reach a peaceful solution. Otherwise,
we need to take a different measure.” When the reporters asked what he meant by a “different
measure,” Flores answered, “I can’t tell you clearly since it depends on the situation.” Although
Flores did not seem to have a definite idea of a different measure, this interview proved that the
situation was quite uncertain.
307

307
“Jitai wo Akka Seru Higyō to Bokujin Gawa Shunōbu no Iken [The strike that exacerbates the situation and
the opinions of Mexican leaders],” “Local Mexican leaders voice opinions to the Rafu Shimpo; Consul Martínez
issues statement pleading for amity,” Rafu Shimpo, June 29, 1933. While Japanese reporters interviewed
Mexican representatives from the standpoint of Japanese farmers, they also showed sympathy toward Mexican
strikers by acknowledging their difficult living conditions.
158

The situation soon worsened for those on both sides of the conflict. La Opinión sensationally
reported that two Mexican children died allegedly from hunger caused by the strike, although
infant mortality rates were high among Mexican farmworkers in Los Angeles County even before
the strike.
308
Three days after the failed negotiation, Japanese berry farmers in El Monte and nearby
Arcadia opened their fields and let the public pick berries at one cent per box, five to six cents
below the retail price. The move was a huge financial loss for the farmers, but they decided to do
so in a desperate attempt to salvage part of the money invested in their crop. After newspapers and
local radio stations announced this emergent pick-your-own day, “Hundreds of men, women, and
children, carrying baskets, buckets and various other containers, invaded the berry fields.”
309
This
event hurt the strikers’ efforts. Later the same day, at least 2,000 strikers began to gather around
the Hicks Camp and about 1,000 of them entered the berry fields to urge those harvesting the
berries to quit. Nearly a hundred local police officers quickly responded to the intrusion. The Los
Angeles Times reported that on the next morning, some strikers beat a Japanese farmer and his
wife near Arcadia. The Rafu Shimpo took up the alleged incident seriously and investigated only
to find that the stories of the violence on the Japanese were fabricated by English language
newspapers and radio stations. This kind of exaggeration about strikers’ violence in the Los
Angeles Times explains the newspaper’s long reputation of being anti-labor.
310
Satō knew that the
Los Angeles Times reported as little as possible about the strike, so that many residents in Los
Angeles did not know that several thousands of Mexican farmworkers were fighting against

308
“Mueren de Hambre 2 Niños en La Huelga de Pizcadores,” La Opinión, June 30, 1933. According to Natalia
Molina, among Mexicans living in Los Angeles County, their infant mortality rates were as many as 100 deaths
per 1,000 live births in 1927, which was more than twice as high as among whites and Japanese residents. Natalia
Molina, Fit to Be Citizens?: Public Health and Race in Los Angles, 1879-1939 (Berkeley, 2006), 93-94.
309
“Los Nipones Abren al Público Sus Plantaciones,” La Opinión, June 30, 1933; “Officers Watch Picketing
Army,” Los Angeles Times, June 30, 1933.
310
Ibid.; “Higyōdan demo [Strikers’ demonstration],” Rafu Shimpo, June 30, 1933; Lisa McGirr, Suburban
Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton, 2001), 37. The Japanese consulate did not mention
any injury to Japanese subjects regarding the incident. See Sato to Uchida, July 1, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1 DAMFAJ.
159

Japanese farmers.
311
Regardless of injuries, local interethnic relations between Japanese and
Mexicans were getting worse.
The Mexican consulate responded to this worsening situation. On June 30, Mexican consul
Martínez exchanged telegrams with Governor of California James Rolph Jr. asking him to
intervene in the dispute. In their communication, Martínez forwarded a telegram sent by former
president Calles describing Mexicans’ working conditions as “intolerable” and their wages as
“inhumanly low.” Rolph ordered the Director of the Department of Industrial Relations and the
chief of the Division of Labor Statistics and Law Enforcement to “amicably adjust the dispute.”
The next day, Rolph’s decision headlined La Opinión’s front page, which generally buried local
news in other sections.
312
According to the monthly consular report of June 1933 to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, the Mexican consulate called Rolph’s attention to “the illegal
intervention of the police authorities of Arcadia and San Gabriel and other parts affected by the
strike” because “it is known based on a reliable source that Japanese farmers have paid police
officers in the already mentioned areas.”
313
The strike leader Flores played an important behind-
the-scenes role. Following the failed negotiation, Flores left Los Angeles for Baja California to
meet Calles, who had been supporting the strikers. On his way to El Sauzal in Baja California
where he would meet Calles, Flores told La Opinión, “Our principal objective is to personally
show gratitude to Mr. General Calles for his moral and material support” and to relay the details
of the fight against the Japanese. On June 29, just a day after Flores met Calles, Calles sent a
message to Governor Rolph, explaining, “the Japanese employers . . . lack all humanitarian

311
Satō to Uchida, July 18, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1 DAMFAJ.
312
“Action to End Strike Begun,” Los Angeles Times, July 1, 1933; “El Gobernador de California Intervino Ya
en La Huelga,” La Opinión, July 1, 1933.
313
The Mexican consulate in Los Angeles, “Informe de protección. Junio de 1933,” June 1933, Box 626, Folder
2, Collection Departamento Consular (IV), AHGE.
160

sentiment and deny workers the rights they have in the modern world.” This message appeared in
La Opinión the next day.
314
Both Martínez and Flores needed the political power of the former
Mexican president to support the strikers.
On the other hand, Japanese consul Satō was paying careful attention to the actions of the
Mexican consulate. Satō reported to Tokyo, “the Mexican consul openly supports the strikers as
he kept the funds for the strike and distributed fliers to encourage the strike while asking the U.S.
Labor Department and the Governor of California to intervene.”
315
Actually, Satō speculated that
Flores was Calles’s right-hand man and that Flores was manipulating the Mexican consulate as his
tesaki (puppet) by using the power of Calles.
316
Satō developed a sense of distrust toward Mexican
strikers and their consulate, leaving no room to problematize the dominant structure of Los
Angeles agriculture that marginalized both the Japanese and Mexicans. Instead, the Japanese
consul functioned to affirm the status quo by cooperating with the Los Angeles Chamber of
Commerce that represented the interests of white landowners.
317

The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce proved far more sympathetic to the Japanese. Ross
H. Gast believed the strike leaders were exploiting the workers by preventing them from working.
He regarded Flores as “a pretty smart operator” who “was able to point out that if the Mexican
government and particularly Calles and Rodríguez would show sympathy” to Mexican
farmworkers in Southern California, they would gain the labor support in Mexico. In addition,

314
“Dan Nuevo Impulso al Movimiento,” La Opinión, June 28; “El Movimiento está Tomando Proporciones
Serias, Dijo el Cónsul Martínez,” La Opinión, June 30, 1933. Flores and Vice Consul Hill blamed the Japanese
as an inferior ethnic group who caused the strike, instead of blaming the social structure where growers in general
and white landowners had control over farmworkers. See González, Mexican Consuls and Labor Organizing,
106-107.
315
Satō to Uchida, July 1, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ
316
Satō to Uchida, July 18, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
317
Satō to Uchida, June 23, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ
161

Gast thought that it is necessary to take a “humanitarian standpoint” to solve the strike because
“workers want to go back to the fields” liberated from strike leaders who “are exploiting workers.”
He clearly lacked a humanitarian viewpoint to understand the farmworkers’ plight, although he
was partly right in the sense that the Mexican government had a political stake in the strike. First,
it was understandable why the strike leaders rejected the compromise offered by Japanese farmers.
The proposal covered only the berry industry despite the fact that Mexican farmworkers worked a
variety of fruit and vegetable crops on a number of farms throughout Los Angeles, just like those
harvesting celery in Venice. Second, and more importantly, the wages of farmworkers were
extremely low, compared to the state’s minimum wages for industrial workers, thirty-three cents
an hour, which did not apply to farmworkers. According to a survey conducted by the Los Angeles
County government and the Works Progress Administration in the 1930s, a farmworker’s
household income was approximately $491 and their average expenditure for food was about $412.
There was little money left for farmworkers to use for housing, medical care, clothing and other
necessities. About 98 percent of those interviewed lived in “frame houses,” which could best be
described as “wooden shacks.”
318

By this time, the El Monte strike had taken a transnational twist when anti-Japanese sentiment
spread beyond the small town of El Monte and unexpectedly developed in Mexico. In mid-June,
anti-Japanese activities in Mexico prompted a call for a boycott against Japanese merchants to
protest the actions of Japanese farmers in Los Angeles. Anti-Japanese sentiment grew stronger in
Mexico after Calles took an unfavorable attitude toward Japanese farmers and provided financial

318
Gast to Clements, June 27, 1933, Box 64, Clements Papers; McWilliams, Factories in the Field, 246-247;
The State of California, Department of Industrial Relations, “History of California Minimum Wage,” online at
http://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/minimumwagehistory.htm, accessed March 15, 2016.
162

support for Mexican strikers in Los Angeles.
319
Calles helped transform the strike into an
international problem by providing support from Mexico and mobilizing the Mexican public. He
also sent messages to Governor of California Rolph, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the
chairman of the leading Mexican political party, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National
Revolutionary Party) to urge their support. The Japanese Minister Plenipotentiary in Mexico, Hori,
sent a telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uchida, in Tokyo on June 29, warning that since
local Mexican newspapers widely reported the action taken by Calles, the situation of the Japanese
side was “seriously deteriorating” in Mexico, so much so that it might have a negative effect on
Japan-Mexico relations.
320

Even before the strike began, Hori was aware of growing anti-Japanese sentiment in Mexico,
especially in its northern states including Baja California, due to the territorial expansion of the
Japanese empire in Manchuria. In May 1933, Mexican newspaper Excélsior ran an anti-Japanese
article warning of a possible Japanese invasion of Mexico with the large headline “A grave danger
to Baja California,” which Hori countered. Frustrated with the prolonged strike in Los Angeles
and the worsening situation in Mexico, Hori sent another telegram to Uchida in Tokyo the next
day. He insisted, “I had been dealing with this problem as a local problem of California that had
nothing to do with us, but I would need to explain the position of Japanese tenant farmers [of Los
Angeles] depending on the future situation. Thus, I beg you to send us a telegram immediately
about the points of contention over wages claimed by both sides of the conflict, the number of

319
Hori to Uchida, June 15, 1933; Fukushima to Uchida, July 11, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
320
Hori to Uchida, June 29, 1933. I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ; “El Movimiento está Tomando Proporciones
Serias, Dijo el Cónsul Martínez,” La Opinión, June 30, 1933.
163

Mexican workers who are returning to work, and the latest situation of the conflict [Italics
added].”
321

Japanese diplomats in Mexico also needed to prevent anti-Japanese sentiment from spreading
and turning into some organized campaign against Japanese immigrants. Although their small
population did not pose a significant economic threat to ordinary Mexicans, the Japanese had
occasionally been the victims of xenophobic violence in Mexico. During the Mexican Revolution,
they did not experience racial animosity in the way the Chinese did. However, according to the
Japanese government’s investigation, at least fifty-one Japanese suffered physical and economic
damage during the revolution. Most cases were robbery, but some Japanese lost their lives, as
already mentioned in Chapter 2.
322
In the 1930s, the Great Depression made the Japanese in
Mexico increasingly concerned about anti-Japanese sentiment, as it created a large number of
frustrated, unemployed Mexicans. In September of 1932 in Veracruz, for instance, a group of
unemployed Mexicans demanded seventeen Japanese shop owners to hire Mexicans. After the
Japanese rejected their request, they forced the closure of two Japanese shops denouncing the
Japanese as foreigners exploiting Mexicans.
323

In this historical context of anti-Japanese violence, the El Monte strike took place and became
another source that fueled anti-Japanese sentiment in Mexico. The strike’s impact was serious
among Japanese residents in Mexico, especially in the Mexican border city of Mexicali, Baja

321
“Un Grave Peligro para la Baja California,” Excélsior, May 9, 1933; Hori to Uchida, June 30, 1933. I-4-4-0-
2, vol.1, DAMFAJ; Jerry García, Looking Like the Enemy: Japanese Mexicans, the Mexican State, and US
Hegemony, 1897 - 1945 (Tucson, 2014), 93.
322
Keiichi Itō, acting deputy minister of the Japanese Legation in Mexico, to Uchida, June 1, 1922, 5-3-2-0-154,
Bokukoku Nairan Kankei Teikoku Shinmin no Songai Baishō Ikken [Report on the compensation for damages
that imperial subjects suffered during the insurgency in Mexico], vol.1, DAMFAJ.
323
Nichi-Boku Kōryūshi Henshū Iinkai [Editorial committee of history of Japan-Mexico interaction], ed., Nichi-
Boku Kōryūshi [History of Japan-Mexico interaction] (Tokyo, 1990), 478-481.
164

California, By the 1930s Mexicali became the largest concentration of ethnic Japanese residents
in Mexico with nearly 1,000 people and was incorporated into the southern region of the
transborder ethnic Japanese community.
324
Despite their economic, cultural, and political ties with
Japanese immigrants in Los Angeles, the Japanese in Mexicali initially did not take sides in El
Monte strike. Nevertheless, they were facing anti-Japanese sentiment that developed in El Monte
and spread beyond the U.S.-Mexico border.
325

Mokichi Fukushima, a Japanese diplomat stationed at a consular outpost in Tijuana, reported
the situation of Mexicali Japanese to Tokyo. The consular outpost in Tijuana began to operate in
1931 by the decision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan given the growing population of
ethnic Japanese residents as well as the development of Japanese fishermen’s activities along the
coast of Baja California.
326
Fukushima wrote, “Mexicans here [in Mexicali] who had been
relatively cool began to launch the activity to collect donations as well as the boycott against
Japanese merchants as an act of revenge,” because Calles intervened in the conflict. The Mexicali
Japanese became increasingly concerned about Calles and the impact of anti-Japanese sentiment
on their cotton farming. Japanese cotton farmers employed Mexican farmworkers on favorable
terms granted by the local government of Baja California. They, however, became fearful that
mounting anti-Japanese sentiment in Mexicali could motivate the Governor of Baja California
Agustín Olachea to end that accommodation for Japanese cotton farmers.
327
On the day after the

324
See Chapter 2.
325
Even before the El Monte strike, anti-Japanese sentiment was increasing in the northern regions of Mexico
such as Baja California due to Japanese expansion in Asia. See García, Looking Like the Enemy, 93.
326
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Bokukoku Teikashū ni Haken suru Ryōjikan’in ni Kansuru Ken
[Regarding the consular staff member to be sent to Baja California],” 1931, M-2-2-0-1_3_2, Honshō Narabini
Zaigai Kōkan’in Shucchō Kankei Zakken/Honshōin Oyobi Zaigai Kōkan’in Kaigai Shucchō no Bu (Soshakuchi,
Inin Tōchi Chiiki wo Fukumu)/Zaibei Kakukan [Miscellaneous reports on overseas diplomatic offices/overseas
assignments of ministry officials and diplomatic office staff members (including leased and mandated
territories)/offices in the United States], vol.2, DAMFAJ.
327
Fukushima to Uchida, July 11, 1933 I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
165

failed negotiation in Los Angeles, the Mexicali Japanese finally decided to publicly express their
support for Mexican strikers, rather than for fellow Japanese immigrants in Los Angeles, as an
attempt to deflect any anti-Japanese sentiment. This was an especially difficult decision because
the Mexicali Japanese had received financial support from the Los Angeles Japanese when they
suffered a poor cotton harvest in the previous year. In their public statement, they noted the bonds
between Japanese on both sides of the border, but clearly sided with the Mexican strikers: “[T]he
members of the Japanese Association of [Mexicali], Mexico, putting aside the spiritual and racial
bonds that unite us with such Japanese residents in California, U.S.A, for humanitarian reasons,
for moral reasons, and for the directions of conscience and of rights, we unite for very righteous
protests of Mexicans against the unfair conduct of those subjects of the Japanese Empire” (see
Figure 3).
328
Transborder anti-Japanese sentiment seemed to have resulted in the cooperation of
Mexicali Japanese, if only temporarily, for the Mexican nationalist pro-labor campaign.
The Mexicali Japanese sent their pro-labor statement to Calles, Olachea, and the media on
June 27. Three days later, La Opinión published it in Los Angeles. The Mexicali Japanese even
donated $500 (approximately $9,460 in 2017) for strikers to quell anti-Japanese sentiment in
Mexico more effectively. Fukushima later reported to Tokyo that Japanese residents published the
pro-labor statement and made donations under the pressure from a local Mexican lawyer called

328
“Mensajes de Los Japoneses de Baja California, Apoyando La Huelga de Los Pizcadores,” La Opinión, June
30, 1933. The statement was published in Spanish: “los miembros de esta Asociación Japonesa de la Baja
California, México, haciendo a un lado los lazos espirituales y de raza que nos ligan con dichos japoneses
residentes en California, E.U.A., por humanidad, por moral y por los dictados de la conciencia y del derecho,
nos aunamos a las muy justas protestas de los mexicanos en contra del inicuo proceder de aquellos súbditos del
imperio japonés.” Although La Opinión called the Japanese organization the Asociación Japonesa de la Baja
California, it was actually the Japanese Association of Mexicali. See Fukushima to Uchida, July 11, 1933, -4-4-
0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
166

Guajardo. After Calles demonstrated his support for Mexican strikers in Los Angeles, Edmundo
Guajardo organized an anti-Japanese donation committee calling local Mexicali leaders for support

Figure 3 Pro-labor statement of Japanese immigrants in Mexicali
Source: La Opinión, June 30, 1933.
167

in fundraising and a boycott in Mexicali. According to Fukushima, on June 27, a Mexican
merchant suspended his business with Japanese merchants in concert with the anti-Japanese
campaign in Mexicali.
329
Throughout the strike in Los Angeles and its unexpected repercussion in
Mexicali, Fukushima stayed well informed by Japanese immigrants in Mexicali and maintained a
sympathetic attitude toward them. This was partly because Japanese immigrants in Mexico were
loyal to the Japanese government that provided protection, knowing that Chinese immigrants had
suffered harsh discrimination because they lacked the Chinese government’s protection in
Mexico.
330

On the other hand, some Mexicans criticized the anti-Japanese campaigns. Before the
publication of the pro-labor statement, a newspaper circulated in Tijuana, El Hispano-Americano,
ran an editorial questioning the anti-Japanese boycott in Mexico. It wrote, “What responsibility
corresponds to the Japanese rooted in Mexico, who had nothing in common with the Japanese
farmers of California other than their nationality and had not intervened in the conflict between
Mexican pickers and patrones amarillos (yellow employers) in the said state?” Anti-Japanese
sentiment was not strong in Tijuana presumably because it lacked much of a Japanese population,
so this editorial did little to decrease the anti-Japanese pressure in Mexicali, ninety miles east of
Tijuana.
331

Mexicali Japanese cotton farmers were also a middleman-minority in Mexicali who leased
lands from an American company and sometimes hired Mexican workers. What is significant
about their actions during the El Monte strike is that they revealed the inability of their middleman-

329
Fukushima to Uchida, June 28 and 29, and July 11, 1933. I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ. In late July of 1933,
Guajardo acknowledged the fact that the Mexicali Japanese made the donation when he was interviewed by a
local Mexicali newspaper Mercurio. See “Mandaron Dinero Los Japoneses?,” Mercurio, July 29, 1933.
330
García, Looking Like the Enemy, 89.
331
“El Boycot Contra Los Nipones,” El Hispano-Americano, June 25, 1933.
168

minority position in Mexicali to maintain transborder ethnic solidarity, when their economic
interests contradicted those of their co-ethnics in the north. As an Asian minority among the
Mexican majority, the Mexicali Japanese faced growing anti-Japanese sentiment backed by rising
Mexican nationalism and antipathy toward Japanese expansion in Asia during the 1930s. Anti-
Japanese Mexican nationalism fueled by the El Monte strike made the socioeconomic position of
the Japanese in Mexicali even more precarious and urged them to break their ethnic solidarity with
the compatriots in Los Angeles, if only briefly. In such an unexpected way, Mexicali Japanese
played a role in heightening the interethnic tension in Los Angeles by taking an extremely pro-
Mexican stance despite their commonalities in race, class, and nationality.
Los Angeles Japanese did not publicly discuss the pro-labor actions by the Mexicali Japanese.
During the strike, in contrast with La Opinión, the Rafu Shimpo did not discuss the pro-labor
statement and donations made by Japanese immigrants in Mexicali. Instead, the Rafu Shimpo’s
correspondent in Mexicali emphasized the difficulty that fellow Japanese immigrants were facing
in Mexicali. It reported that Japanese immigrant leaders in Mexicali visited the local chamber of
commerce to declare that they had nothing to do with the El Monte strike and to ask for help to
stop the anti-Japanese campaign.
332
However, ordinary Japanese immigrants in Los Angeles were
unlikely to know the details of anti-Japanese actions such as boycott and fundraising campaigns
in Mexicali since the Rafu Shimpo, their major information source, did not report them, although
immigrant leaders might have known them through their connections with the Japanese consulate
in Los Angeles and immigrants in Mexicali. Nor did Japanese diplomatic correspondence report
any case of the anti-Japanese actions in Mexicali being publicly discussed and problematized in

332
“Mekishikari Hōmen ni Hainichi no Kisei Ugoku [Growing anti-Japanese sentiment in the Mexicali area],”
Rafu Shimpo, June 28, 1933.
169

the ethnic Japanese community in Los Angeles. The absence of public discussion about the
controversial actions by Mexicali Japanese implies that such actions were too disturbing for the
Los Angeles Japanese community when the strike was an ongoing problem. Meanwhile, Japanese
farmers in Los Angeles maintained their uncompromising stance, which could only exacerbate the
situation of Mexicali Japanese. In short, each ethnic Japanese community in the borderlands
attempted to secure their respective socioeconomic position as a middleman-minority even at the
cost of transborder ethnic solidarity.
By the end of June 1933, anti-Japanese sentiment, first generated in El Monte, traveled across
the U.S.-Mexico border and resulted in the interethnic tension between Japanese and Mexican
residents in Mexicali. We could understand anti-Japanese sentiment found in both Southern
California and Mexico as an important aspect of hemispheric Asian American history, a
framework that historian Erika Lee applies to anti-Chinese sentiment in the western hemisphere.
333

Yet, we can better understand the expansion of anti-Japanese sentiment generated by the El Monte
strike as an episode of transpacific history because anti-Japanese sentiment in the U.S.-Mexico
borderlands forced the Japanese government to handle the volatile situation through its transpacific
diplomatic network. As demonstrated in their frequent diplomatic exchanges, Japanese
government officials in Japan, Mexico, and the United States could no longer ignore anti-Japanese
sentiment circulating in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, since it could result in further restriction on
the land use by Japanese farmers and in larger criticism against Japanese expansion in Asia.

333
Erika Lee, “Orientalisms in the Americas: A Hemispheric Approach to Asian American History,” Journal of
Asian American Studies 8, no.3 (Oct., 2005).
170

Victory for Whom?: Unsolved Problems in Triracial Los Angeles Agriculture
While Japanese diplomats were increasingly concerned about the impact of anti-Japanese
sentiment spreading in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, the situation remained precarious. On July 2,
Hori, the Minister Plenipotentiary stationed in Mexico City, reported to both Uchida in Tokyo and
Satō in Los Angeles that there was a rumor that Chinese residents in California were providing
financial support for Mexican strikers and making contact with local newspapers in Mexico to turn
anti-Chinese sentiment into anti-Japanese sentiment.
334
Although both Hori and Japanese
merchants in Mexico believed the rumor to be false, Japanese diplomats in the U.S.-Mexico
borderlands still paid careful attention to the situation, since ethnic Chinese in the United States
were protesting strongly against Japan’s aggression in China.
335
Japanese farmers had not wavered
in their stance toward Mexican strikers, but without an agreement, the strikes could continue in
Los Angeles year after year, which neither party wanted. The remaining question was whether Los
Angeles Japanese would understand the nature of the strike as a problem that would hurt not only
local Japanese-Mexican relations but also international relations involving Japan, Mexico, and the
United States. This trinational situation was something that urged Los Angeles Japanese farmers
to find a way to defy, if only slightly, the existing racial and class boundaries in order to solve the
strike.
After the failure of the first round of negotiations in late June, Thomas Barker, the chief of
the Division of Labor Statistics and Law Enforcement of the California state government, was in
charge of mediating a settlement by the order of Governor Rolph. On July 3, with the assistance
of Barker, the Japanese and Mexican consuls held a meeting to discuss a solution with the

334
Hori to Uchida, July 2, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
335
Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: An Interpretive History (Boston, 1991), 111; Ronaldo Takaki, Strangers
from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (New York, 1989; 1998), 268-269.
171

representatives of both Japanese farmers and Mexican farmworkers. Willing to settle the strike,
the farmworkers’ representatives made a compromise and demanded twenty-five cents an hour,
ten cents lower than the initial demand. Japanese farmers maintained that they could not pay more
than seventeen cents an hour due to the decline in crop prices. Attempting to broker concessions
from both sides, Barker proposed twenty cents an hour until August 15. Although the Mexican
side finally agreed to Barker’s proposal, the Japanese refused the compromise.
336

Two days later, Satō, feeling a responsibility to persuade Japanese farmers to reconsider,
summoned the leaders of farm communities to the consulate building. At this meeting, Satō
explained to them that the strike had become an international problem, generating serious anti-
Japanese sentiment in the northern part of Mexico, increasing the possibility of a boycott against
Japanese merchants in Mexico City, and giving Chinese residents in Mexico a chance to direct
anti-Chinese sentiment against the Japanese. Then he urged Japanese farmers to make an
agreement or else they would need to bear responsibility for the ongoing international conflicts.
Responding to Satō, the farmers decided to end the strife for the moment, by agreeing to increase
wages to 17.5 cents, a mere half-cent higher than their previous deal. While not totally convinced
about the settlement and still concerned about their difficult economic situation, the Los Angeles
Japanese finally came to understand the nature of the El Monte strike as a serious international
problem that went beyond a local conflict and that could affect diplomatic relations involving three
Pacific Rim nations.
337

The next day, July 6, the Japanese side again met with their Mexican counterparts. Like the
previous meeting, state government officials such as Barker attended in order to mediate the

336
Satō to Uchida, July 5, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
337
Satō to Uchida, July 6, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ; “Daihyōsha Namida wo Nonde Shūgawa Chōteian
wo Shōnin [Japanese representatives accept the proposal, holding back tears],” Rafu Shimpo, July 6, 1933.
172

negotiation. After several hours of deliberation, both sides finally reached a deal that consisted of
three agreements. First, Mexicans working a minimum of six nine-hour days per week would be
compensated $1.50 a day and twenty cents an hour for overtime. Second, temporary farmworkers
working less than six days a week would receive a flat rate of twenty cents an hour. Third, the
Japanese had to re-employ the strikers without discrimination. The deal, effective immediately,
was applicable until August 15 when both sides would discuss an extension if it was deemed
necessary. The agreement did not specify names of crops so that it seemed to apply to all
farmworkers working under Japanese farmers. It was signed by the representatives of Japanese
farmers such as Fukami and Katsuma Mukaeda (respectively general secretary and president of
the Central Japanese Association of Southern California) and those of Mexican farmworkers such
as Flores (general secretary of the UCOM) and Manuel González (representative of San Gabriel
Valley Mexican workers), and witnessed by Japanese consul Satō, Mexican consul Martínez, and
approved by chief Barker.
338

After this final agreement, Barker commented to the Los Angeles Times, “neither workers nor
growers are satisfied with the agreement made . . . [I]f the conditions of the workers and growers
in this important industry are to be improved materially, there must be a decided increase in
commodity prices [so that producers would gain more and pay more to farmworkers].” He gave a
relatively fair observation of the settlement, although he did not touch upon the responsibility of
white landowners for the interethnic conflict and the fact that the Japanese buffered between
landowners and strikers. His comment appeared at the bottom of page seventeen, where few would

338
A copy of contract between the Central Japanese Association of Southern California and la Unión de
Campesinos y Obreros Mexicanos, July 6, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
173

read it. Once again, this shows Los Angeles Times’ anti-union stance and provides a strong contrast
to the significant and substantial article on the settlement that appeared in La Opinión.
339

Interestingly, although strikers gained far less than their initial demand of thirty-five cents an
hour, La Opinión celebrated the agreement as a victory for Mexican farmworkers, devoting three
pages, including the front page, to the labor agreement. It emphasized the contribution of the
Mexican government and particularly Calles to their alleged victory, obscuring the fact that
farmworkers actually gained little. The newspaper claimed that farmworkers succeeded in making
Japanese farmers accept the major part of their demands. Although the deal was not a complete
victory for the Mexican side in terms of wages, it was significant that the Japanese farmers had to
make their compromise as part of a tri-national negotiation, not as a mere local agreement they
could easily ignore. Furthermore, in his comments to La Opinión, Flores emphasized that one of
the largest triumphs of the agreement was that the Japanese would not employ Mexicans who had
served as strikebreakers, which the official document of the agreement did not clearly mention.
340

In fact, Japanese farmers did not need many Mexicans after the harvest season and continued to
employ their compatriots and other non-Mexican workers who helped them during the strike.
341

339
“Strikers Make Pay Pact,” Los Angeles Times, July 7, 1933.
340
“Concluye La Huelga al Rendirse Los Japoneses,” La Opinión, July 7, 1933; A copy of contract, July 6, 1933,
I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ. The Mexican government praised themselves for their role in the strike, as we can
see in their words that “the favorable circumstances . . . together with that of General Calles, probably saved the
Mexican workmen of California from the most serious situation that has ever confronted them.” See Hoffman,
“The El Monte Berry Pickers’ Strike, 1933,” 80. Meanwhile, a number of strike organizers, who had a close
relationship with the Communist Party, strongly criticized the deal arguing that Mexican representatives sold
out to the Japanese side. After the negotiation, Guillermo Veralde, the under-secretary of the Mexican union
who attended the final meetings alongside Flores, accused the Mexican consulate and Flores of making too many
concessions to Japanese tenant farmers. See Weber, “The Organizing of Mexicano Agricultural Workers,” 331.
341
“Chōin wa Nattaga Bokukokujin no Kisan Sukunashi [Despite the agreement, few Mexicans returned],” Rafu
Shimpo, July 7, 1933; “Nihonjin ga Yatowanu to Bokukokujin Rōdōsha Himei [Mexican workers cry that
Japanese are not employing them],” Rafu Shimpo, July 12. Charles B. Spaulding observed that some Mexican
farmworkers had a strong impression that the Japanese discriminated against the former strikers after the
agreement was signed. See Spaulding, “The Mexican Strike at El Monte California,” 577.
174

From the viewpoint of the Japanese side, the agreement was actually quite similar to the
proposal offered by the Japanese farmers, since $1.50 a day for nine-hours of work was equivalent
to 16.6 cents an hour. Even if farmworkers worked overtime, their average wages would be about
seventeen cents an hour. On July 18, Satō reported to Tokyo, writing that the agreement had
“almost no impact” upon Japanese farmers and that they were satisfied with the result because it
did not amount to much of a change.
342
In addition, the strike strengthened solidarity among the
Japanese farmers and helped them understand the importance of ethnic associations.
343
However,
their ethnic community also faced the problem of how to understand the anti-Japanese actions
taken by Japanese residents in Mexicali, which seemed to divide the bonds of the overseas
Japanese population in the U.S-Mexico borderlands. One week after the final agreement, two
leaders of the Japanese Association of Mexicali came over to Los Angeles to explain their struggle
during the strike. Visiting the Japanese consulate, the Central Japanese Association of Southern
California, and the Rafu Shimpo’s head office, they described their “delicate position” in Mexicali:

We did not want to take any action that would hurt your feelings since we owe a lot to the
fellow Japanese in Southern California. However, we could not help but take that attitude,
being stuck in a difficult situation and facing the dilemma [between our relationship with
the Japanese in Los Angeles and anti-Japanese sentiment in Mexico].
344

342
Satō to Uchida, July 18, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ. The Rafu Shimpo also emphasized that Japanese
farmers had to pay 16.6 cents an hour by the final agreement. “Jisshitsuteki niwa 16 sen 6 rin [Actually it is 16.6
cents],” Rafu Shimpo, July 6, 1933.
343
Yagasaki, Imin Nōgyō, 58-59, 79-80.
344
“Yoshida, Yoshizaki Ryōshi, Kukyō wo Shakumei [Mr. Yoshida and Mr. Yoshizaki explained their difficult
situation],” Rafu Shimpo, July 14.
175

The apology of Mexicali Japanese tells us that their cooperation in the Mexican nationalist
campaign during the strike was not sincere but rather strategic, but this does not mean that Los
Angeles Japanese were able to discuss openly what was happening in Mexicali during the strike.
Even after the Mexicali Japanese came to apologize, the Rafu Shimpo only vaguely reported, “the
fellow Japanese in Mexicali took an action that somewhat hurt the feelings of the Japanese in
Southern California” without clearly explaining their pro-labor statement or their donation for
Mexican strikers.
345
In short, the chasm between Los Angeles Japanese and Mexicali Japanese
during the strike was temporary but serious.
The Japanese consul Satō, in his summary report about the strike submitted to Tokyo in mid-
July, blamed the local Mexican labor union for “threatening and coercing” Japanese residents in
Mexicali to support the strikers. While criticizing the Mexican side, he paid little attention to the
fact that poor working conditions of Mexican farmworkers in Japanese farms in Los Angeles
caused anti-Japanese sentiment in Mexicali in the first place. Probably, Satō’s one-sided judgment
about the actions of Mexicali Japanese came from his nationalism as well as skepticism about the
triangular relationship between the strike leader Flores, the Mexican consul Martínez, and the
former president Calles. In other words, Satō’s report left the impression that Japanese subjects in
the United States and Mexico maintained their transborder ethnic solidarity.
346

The borderlands situation was, however, not that simple. Two days after the final agreement,
Japanese immigrants in Ensenada, Baja California, posted a statement on a local newspaper El
Faro, showing their lament over the Japanese-Mexican conflict in Los Angeles. And they wrote,
“we sincerely desire that this [final agreement] will be confirmed and thus the said [labor]

345
Ibid.
346
Satō to Uchida, July 18, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
176

movement will conclude soon and satisfactorily, so that the frank and faithful friendship that has
existed since time immemorial between Mexicans and Japanese will not deteriorate.” At the same
time, although the El Monte strike did not affect the Ensenada Japanese directly, their statement
shows that they were also under the pressure of Mexican nationalism growing in Baja California,
since they described Los Angeles Japanese farmers as “Japanese agricultural capitalists” in tune
with Mexican strikers’ perspective (see Figure 4).
347

347
“La Sociedad Japonesa de Ensenada, lamenta el conflicto existente enre trabajadores mexicanos y japoneses
en Los Angeles, Cal,” El Faro, July 8, 1933.
Figure 4 Statement of Japanese immigrants in Ensenada
Source: El Faro, July 8, 1933.
177

Meanwhile, Fukushima, the Japanese diplomat stationed in Tijuana, had an uneasy feeling
about what happened to the Mexicali Japanese since he had been observing their situation closely.
Fukushima also sent a ten-page summary report to Tokyo and explained:

I think that the stringent situation in Mexicali forced the Japanese residents to take such
difficult actions. But it is not desirable for Japan’s overseas subjects to get extremely upset
and overlook negative consequences of their myopic and desperate behavior [in supporting
Mexican workers]. If they do, it will be difficult [for them] to make sound progress and
development as a daikokumin (member of the great nation), which I would deeply deplore.
Thus, I gave cautions to the leaders of the Japanese Association [of Mexicali].
348

The report shows Fukushima’s sympathy to Japanese residents in Mexicali who found
themselves torn between the politics of Southern California and Baja California. However, this
ended up with an emotional and nationalistic conclusion that Japanese should act as a daikokumin,
while the same time ignoring the structural causes of the strike rooted in the triracial hierarchy in
Los Angeles agriculture. When Mexican nationalism divided Japanese ethnic solidarity in the
borderlands, Fukushima could only appeal to Japanese nationalism to prevent such an unexpected
situation from happening again in the future.
After all, the economic structure of Los Angeles agriculture did not change, preserving the
middleman-minority position of Japanese between white landowners and Mexican farmworkers.

348
Fukushima to Uchida, July 11, 1933, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ. Although Fukushima did not report the
Ensenada Japanese’ statement to Tokyo, it is most likely that he knew it given the close relationship between
him and Japanese residents in Baja California.
178

Over the course of the El Monte strike, the Japanese and Mexican governments played a direct
role in the interethnic conflict for the sake of themselves, drawing a clear line between the Japanese
and Mexican sides. Although Japanese farmers faced anti-Japanese laws and had economic
difficulties during the depression, they thrived in the 1930s in collaboration with white
landowners.
349
Life was not easy for the Japanese farmers, too, who like Mexicans were under
residential and occupational discrimination, but their economic position was an integral
component of the white agribusiness of Los Angeles supported by landowners, business leaders,
and government officials. Four years later, Clements, the manager of the Chamber’s Agricultural
Department, commented that the Chamber had “done a good deal of work for the Japanese in order
to save ourselves.”
350

Nevertheless, Clements’ comments did not fully represent the attitude of the Chamber of
Commerce regarding the Japanese-Mexican conflict in 1933. A month after the final agreement of
the strike, the assistant secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, F.L.S. Harman, sent a letter to
Clements writing, “I realize that much of the work to be done in this section (agriculture) can best
be done by Mexican and Japanese labor, but if we are going to be continually hounded by these
foreigners and held up by strikes, it is about time we threw them all out of the county.”
351
Harman’s
comment reveals the vulnerable position of both Japanese and Mexican residents, whom the
dominant white society perceived and treated as dispensable foreigners despite the fact that they
were indispensable to the Los Angeles agriculture. This proves Satō’s concern that the strike,

349
Minami Kashū Nihonjinshi Kō-hen [History of Japanese in Southern California, second volume], another
comprehensive history of Japanese immigrants, writes that in 1936, the total acreage of Japanese farms in
Southern California reached 150,000 acres and the annual production value $80 million. Ochi Dōjun, ed. Minami
Kashū Nihonjinshi Kō-hen (Los Angeles, 1957), 62.
350
Clements to W. G. Arnoll, November 23, 1937, Box 64, Clements Papers.
351
F.L.S. Harman to Clements, August 23, 1933, Box 62, Clements Papers.
179

although launched at the local level, could generate a larger problem that would affect international
relations and the entire Japanese communities in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands.

The El Monte strike of 1933 evolved from a local Japanese-Mexican conflict into an
international problem in which anti-Japanese sentiment travelled across the U.S.-Mexico border,
merged with Mexican nationalism, and forced Japanese residents in Mexicali to issue an
unexpected pro-labor and pro-strike statement against the fellow Japanese in Los Angeles. This
drew the closer attention and involvement of both Japanese and Mexican governments through
their consulate networks in Japan, Mexico, and the United States, strengthening the character of
the U.S.-Mexico borderlands as transpacific borderlands in which the triracial hierarchy of Los
Angeles agriculture intersected with international relations of three Pacific Rim countries. In this
context, the transborder anti-Japanese sentiment trumped Japanese ethnic solidarity across the
border and thereby made Japanese diplomats and farmers in Los Angeles understand the
international dimension of their local conflict and the necessity for the settlement. Japanese
immigrants in Mexico faced pressures of Mexican nationalism in the guise of anti-Japanese
sentiment and thus chose to identify publicly with Mexican nationalists rather than co-ethnics in
the north despite their commonalities in race, class, and nationality. In other words, while the racial,
class, and national boundaries were intensified by the El Monte strike in the local context of Los
Angeles agriculture, these boundaries proved to be quite fluid and unstable in the transnational
context of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands as shown in the pro-Mexican support of Mexicali Japanese
and its influence on the settlement of the strike.
After the settlement of the El Monte strike, the problems of poor labor conditions among
Mexican farmworkers existed untouched. At the same time, anti-Japanese sentiment remained in
180

the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, as imperial Japan continued its expansionist policy in East Asia. Los
Angeles was on the path to another large-scale strike by Mexican farmworkers in 1936 against the
Japanese: the Venice Celery strike of 1936. The next chapter will examine the Venice strike by
focusing more on internal divides within the respective Japanese and Mexican communities in Los
Angeles County and Japanese-Mexican interethnic alliances born out of such internal divides. This
is another story of the transpacific workplace and its possibility of nurturing mutual understanding
beyond racial and class differences.

181

Chapter 5
Ethnic Solidarity or Interethnic Accommodation: The 1936 Venice Celery Strike

The El Monte Berry strike of 1933 did not improve the working and living conditions of
Mexicans hired by Japanese tenant farmers, although it generated local and international
repercussions in the transpacific U.S.-Mexico borderlands. Its international repercussions
functioned to fuel nationalism in the respective ethnic communities, which ironically set aside the
plight of Mexican farmworkers. The economic depression continued well into the mid-1930s
keeping the lives of ethnic Mexicans difficult and giving them reasons to claim their rights as
workers. In April of 1936, Mexican workers decided to go on another large-scale strike against
Japanese farmers in Venice in Los Angeles County, which would be later remembered as the
Venice Celery strike.
The Venice strike was very different from the El Monte strike. In contrast to the El Monte
strike that evolved into an international conflict in which Japanese farmers relied on the Japanese
consulate to advance their anti-Mexican position, the Venice strike basically developed as a local
problem. Japanese farmers created a new organization to fight sternly against Mexican strikers and
the Japanese consulate let them handle the strike without actively taking part in it. The Venice
strike, however, became a significant stage in which some Issei leaders came to accept a new
regime of American business and labor norms of the New Deal period that was more sensitive to
interethnic harmony. In 1935, a year before the Venice strike took place, the U.S. government
enacted the National Labor Relations Act or Wagner Act that recognized workers’ rights to
organize into trade unions and engage in collective bargaining. Although this New Deal law did
182

not deal with agricultural workers, it empowered the whole labor movement since the mid-1930s
and farmworkers began to increasingly demand labor recognition.
Historian Yuko Matsumoto has explored the Venice Celery strike from the perspective of the
ethnic Japanese farming community, by analyzing mainly two ethnic Japanese newspapers, the
Rafu Shimpo and the Kashu Mainichi. She points out that the class hierarchy and tension within
the ethnic Japanese community surfaced during the Venice strike but that the strike did not result
in the formation of class consciousness beyond ethnic differences between the Japanese and
Mexicans in Los Angeles.
352
But a further analysis on the strike based on diplomatic and Spanish-
language sources in addition to ethnic Japanese newspapers shows us that the Japanese-Mexican
relationships during the strike were much more complicated because the strike was not simply an
episode about the failure in forming interethnic class consciousness but rather about the
development of interethnic understanding beyond both racial and class differences, which this
chapter will highlight.
The dramatic change of the American political atmosphere symbolized by the Wagner Act
affected how the Venice strike developed, resulting in internal divides among Japanese tenant
farmers and complicated the triracial hierarchy of Los Angeles agriculture. In the El Monte strike
of 1933, the division in the ethnic Japanese community appeared at the international level between
Los Angeles Japanese and Mexicali Japanese who faced Mexican nationalism merged with anti-
Japanese sentiment fueled by Mexican politicians such as Calles. In the Venice strike of 1936, a
different division appeared at the local level within Los Angeles County. Anti-labor farmers,
representing the mainstream Japanese community, vehemently opposed union recognition and

352
Yuko Matsumoto, “1936 Nen Rosanjerusu Serori Sutoraiki to Nikkei Nōgyō Komyunitī [The Los Angeles
Celery Strike of 1936 and the Japanese agricultural community],” Shirin 75, no.4 (July, 1992).
183

stressed the importance of the ethnic Japanese solidarity within the framework of the triracial
hierarchy. On the other hand, pro-labor Japanese farmers came on stage and understood the
importance of union recognition and the need for interethnic cooperation with ethnic Mexican
residents, a move that challenged the existing power structure of the triracial hierarchy in Los
Angeles agriculture.
By exploring the understudied Venice Celery strike, this chapter examines how the Japanese-
Mexican interethnic conflict in Los Angeles farmland forced Japanese immigrants to reconsider
their position in the multiethnic society and created unexpected Japanese-Mexican alliances in the
both pro-labor and anti-labor camps. Although Japanese farmers could eventually get through the
strike without recognizing the Mexican labor union, the Venice Celery strike of 1936 demonstrates
an aspect of the transpacific workplace that generated a tension between ethnic solidarity and
interethnic accommodation and could nurture mutual understanding by unsettling the racial and
class boundaries. More importantly, the Venice strike shows us that Japanese immigrant
nationalism served as a basis of their understanding of interethnic accommodation with both white
Americans and Mexicans, rather than simply incorporating the white supremacist view on other
non-white groups such as ethnic Mexicans.
353

353
Francisco E. Balderrama briefly mentions that the Venice strike ended up without union recognition for
Mexican workers. See Francisco E. Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza: The Los Angeles Mexican Consulate
and the Mexican Community, 1929 to 1936 (Tucson, 1982), 102; Stuart Jamieson touches upon the important
fact that 385 Japanese farmers had signed an agreement with Mexican strikers by July 1936. Although he writes
that the strike was settled “on the basis of 60-percent union preference in employment and a minimum wage of
30 cents per hour for field labor,” this was not the case since the Venice strike did not end with a formal
settlement in 1936 as described in this chapter. See Stuart Jamieson, Labor Unionism in American Agriculture
(Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1945), 124-125; David J. O’Brien and
Stephen S. Fugita explain that both the El Monte and Venice strikes are classic examples of the support of the
larger ethnic Japanese community for Japanese farmers. Their explanation overlooks the internal divides during
these strikes within their ethnic community in Los Angeles as well as in the larger U.S.-Mexico borderlands. See
David J. O'Brien and Stephen S. Fugita, The Japanese American Experience (Bloomington, 1991), 30-32.
184

Union Recognition as a Hope or a Threat: Entering a New Phase of the Japanese-Mexican
Conflict
In the mid-1910s, a few Japanese farmers moved into the Venice area, a Pacific Coast region
of Los Angeles Count, and began to grown sugar beets and celery. They developed a productive
way to grow celery in a glasshouse and transplant them to the field. This made it possible for
Japanese farmers to harvest celery earlier than usual and become major celery producers in the
United States. By the 1920s, an ethnic Japanese farming community had fully developed in the
Venice area, selling their produce in Los Angeles and also shipping them to the East Coast. In the
mid-1930s, about 146 ethnic Japanese families, or 5 percent of all 2,895 Japanese farming families
in Southern California, were growing celery in Venice.
354
The Venice area was also a transpacific
workplace where Japanese farmers relied on Mexican workers for harvesting crops.
As early as in July 1935, Mexican farmworkers in Los Angeles County began to demand
from Japanese farmers an increase of wages and other improvements in their working conditions.
But Japanese farmers were not willing to agree with Mexican workers arguing that the economic
situation had not been improved due to the depression. As the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles
reported to the Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexican workers wanted to have “talks with
the Japanese in the presence of the ‘Regional Labor Board’ to try to sign a more favorable
agreement.” Although the Wagner Act was not designed to protect the labor rights of agricultural
workers, the enactment of the Wagner Act and the presence of the Regional Labor Board as its

354
Noritaka Yagasaki, Imin Nōgyō: Kariforunia no Nihonjin Imin Shakai [Immigrant agriculture: the Japanese
immigrant society in California] (Tokyo, 1993), 43-46, 57, 69; Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi Kankō
Iinkai [Publishing committee of Japanese in Southern California: A history of 70 years], ed., Minami Kashū
Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi [Japanese in Southern California: A History of 70 Years] (Los Angeles, 1960), 59, 88
(hereafter as Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi).
185

local office encouraged the Mexican labor movement vis-a-vis Japanese farmers.
355
Since the
Japanese continued to refuse negotiations with the Mexican counterpart, on 17 April 1936, 300
Mexican celery workers went on a strike against Japanese farmers in the Venice area. Mexican
strikers demanded that Japanese farmers should accept three conditions: 1) Workers in Japanese
farms should be composed of 90 percent members of labor unions; 2) Japanese farmers should
increase wages form twenty-five cents to thirty-five cents an hour for relatively easy works and
forty cents an hour for more demanding works such as picking celery (50 percent increased wages
for overtime work); 3) Japanese farmers should pay male and female workers equally. Japanese
farmers immediately rejected their demands and showed a strong opposition against union
recognition and the idea of setting up a percentage of union workers in their farms. They believed
that union recognition could devastate Japanese agriculture and thus the Venice strike was a
“scheme of red elements” to take control of Japanese agricultural business.
356

A Mexican labor union, the Confederación de Uniones Campesinos Obreros Mexicanos
(CUCOM), took charge of organizing Mexican strikers in the Venice strike. The CUCOM was
established right after the El Monte strike of 1933 in order to continue the Mexican labor
movement in Los Angeles and other areas in Southern California. The leader was Guillermo
(William) Veralde, who served as the under-secretary of the Mexican union, the Unión de

355
Mexican consulate in Los Angeles, “Informe de protección correspondiente al mes de julio de1935,” July 31,
1935, Box 5, Folder 101(I), Collection Gaveta 8, Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada [Genaro Estrada Historical
Archive], Mexico City, Mexico (hereafter as AHGE). The Los Angeles Regional Labor Board first functioned
under the National Labor Board, an agency authorized by the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 but later
the Regional Labor Board and its personnel were transferred to the newly established National Labor Relations
Board under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. See Louis B. Perry and Richard S. Perry, A History of
the Los Angeles Labor Movement, 1911-1941 (Berkeley, 1963), 311, 315.
356
“Estalló la Huelga de Pizcadores,” La Opinión, April 19; “3 Mil Pizcadores en Huelga,” La Opinión, April
20, 1936; The Federated Farmers Association of Southern California (Nanka Nōkai Renmei, hearafter Nōkai
Renmei), anti-strike measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, Gaikoku ni okeru Rōdō Sōgi no Kankei Zakken (Higyō
Taigyō wo Fukumu) [Miscellaneous reports on the labor conflicts in foreign countries (including strikes and
sabotages)], vol. 1, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan
(hereafter as DAMFAJ).
186

Campesinos y Obreros Mexicanos (UCOM) that organized Mexican workers during the El Monte
Strike. When the El Monte strike ended without substantial gains for Mexican workers, Veralde
remained frustrated about a compromising stance of the Mexican consulate and the union secretary
Armando Flores. Three years after the El Monte strike, the Venice strike gave an opportunity for
Veralde to become a strike leader and seek revenge against the Los Angeles agribusiness
establishment in which white landowners and Japanese farmers were allied. Veralde organized the
Venice strike not simply as a Mexican campaign but as a multiethnic one; from the beginning, the
strike included support from Japanese, Filipino, and white American labor activists. One of non-
Mexican activists was Lilian Monroe, a well-known labor organizer and former communist, whose
presence particularly alarmed Japanese farmers.
357

The Venice strike rapidly expanded to other areas of Los Angeles County such as San Pedro,
Wilmington, Dominguez Hills, Artesia, El Monte, Belvedere, and the San Fernando Valley. On
April 19, a delegation of strike leaders, mostly Mexicans, visited the office of La Opinión and
criticized that Japanese celery farmers had “the least desire to improve our situation.” The
delegation consisted of multiethnic members including Velarde as the Mexican leader and also a
Japanese leader named Kōken Ishida, who was in charge of negotiating with Japanese farmers on
behalf of Mexican workers. On the other hand, they strongly denied their cooperation with Monroe,
despite her actual involvement in the strike. As was the case in the El Monte strike, strike leaders

357
“Kyō Higyō Kanbu to Kisha no Ichimon Ittō [The strike leader interviewed today]” Rafu Shimpo, May 6,
1936. The leader of the CUCOM, Guillermo Veralde, wrote that the Venice strike was supported by the unions
such as the Agricultural Industrial Workers Union of America (AIWUA), Filipino Labor Union (FLU), and
Japanese Farm Workers Union of California (JFWU). Guillermo Veralde to Shin’ichi Katō, manager of the
Nōkai Renmei, April 6, 1936, Box 64, George Pigeon Clements Papers, Special Collections, University of
California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California (hereafter as Clements Papers); “Estalló la Huelga de
Pizcadores,” La Opinión, April 19. As for Mexican labor activists and their relations with Lilliam Monroe, see
Gilbert G. González, Labor and Community: Mexican Citrus Worker Villages in a Southern California County,
1900-1950 (Urbana and Chicago, 1994).
187

wanted to avoid anti-communist criticism from both Japanese and Mexican communities,
explaining, “We want to deny the version of movement led by Lilian Monroe as it indicates a
policy based on communist ideas.”
358

Japanese farmers had been on alert against Mexican strikes since unionizing efforts became
increasingly active in California in the mid-1930s because of the enactment of the Wagner Act.
To prevent strikes against Japanese farmers, they founded the Federated Farmers Association of
Southern California (Nanka Nōkai Renmei, hereafter as Nōkai Renmei) as a member of the
Associated Farmers of Los Angeles County, an anti-labor organization of farmers established in
late March of 1936. The Nōkai Renmei set up their office on San Pedro Street in Little Tokyo,
Downtown Los Angeles, and about 1,600 Japanese farmers joined the organization. The Nōkai
Renmei leadership started up with ten Japanese immigrant leaders and one Nisei and they chose
Shin’ichi Katō as the manager of the Nōkai Renmei in charge of leading Japanese farmers and
negotiating with Mexican strikers.
359
The establishment of the Nōkai Renmei was a sign of strong
ties between Japanese and whites in local agriculture, since their parent organization, the
Associated Farmers of Los Angeles, consisted mostly of white farmers and business officials
including George Pigeon Clements, the manager of the Agricultural Department of the Los
Angeles Chamber of Commerce.
360
When the CUCOM first demanded that Japanese farmers
should hire union members in late March of 1936, the Nōkai Renmei held a meeting and reaffirmed

358
“3 Mil Pizcadores en Huelga,” La Opinión, April 20, 1936; “Sutoraiki Iinkai no Ichiin, Ishida Kōken-shi
Raisha Dan [A strike committee member, Mr. Kōken Ishida visits the Rafu Shimpo],” Rafu Shimpo, May 2, 1936.
359
Nōkai Renmei, anti-strike measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ; George Clements, manager
of the Agricultural Department of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, to A. E. Hanson, March 17, 1936,
Box 64, Clements Papers; “1500 Pizcadores Rompen La Huelga; Abandonan la CUCOM,” La Opinión, June 8,
1936; “Gādena no Ichibu Nōka, Mekishikan to Keiyaku Musubi [A group of Gardena farmers signed a contract
with Mexicans],” Rafu Shimpo, June 18, 1936.
360
Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, “Offices and Directors of Associated Farmers of Los Angeles,” ca.
1936, Box 64, Clements Papers.
188

their uncompromising stance against labor unions. They considered that the Venice strike was
particularly dangerous because this strike gave the highest priority to union recognition unlike
previous strikes that simply demanded pay increase. Nōkai Renmei leaders understood that
“unions serve as a castle wall to defend workers from the abuse of capitalists” but they stressed
that Japanese farmers were not capitalists because “only 20 or 30 percent of the entire Japanese
farming population might belong to the capitalist class but the remaining 70 or 80 percent must be
regarded as workers” who could make ends meet only by making their family members work in
the field. They feared that unionizing efforts could take power from Japanese farmers in controlling
wages and eventually result in the “demise of our business.” Since losing their agricultural business
seemed nearly identical to losing their ethnic community itself, the Japanese-Mexican conflict in
1936 appeared to Japanese farmers almost as an existential emergency.
361

The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce paid close attention to the development of the strike.
As in the El Monte strike, the Chamber of Commerce was firmly supportive toward Japanese
farmers, an integral part of white agribusiness in Southern California. As early as in March 1936,
the Nōkai Renmei appealed to the Chamber of Commerce that the CUCOM was preventing
farmworkers from picking celery in Japanese farms and working with other unions such as the
Japanese Farm Workers Union of California (JFWUC), the Agricultural Industrial Workers Union
of America (AIWUA), and the Filipino Labor Union (FLU). The Nōkai Renmei also reported the
names of individuals leading these unions such as Veralde and Juan C. Avila of the CUCOM,
Masato Deguchi of the JFWUC, Lilian Monroe of the AIWUA, and C.D. Monsalves of the FLU.
362

361
Nōkai Renmei, anti-strike measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
362
Clements to W.G. Arnoll, secretary of Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, May 18, 1936, Box 64, Clements
Papers.
189

Within a week after the outbreak of the strike, a violent incident took place in Venice. On
April 24, strikers, mostly Mexican, came to prevent other Mexicans and Filipinos from working
in the celery farm owned by a Japanese farmer Kazuo Nishi. The Rafu Shimpo reported that strikers
threatened workers with knives so that the local police authority quickly arrived at the scene and
used tear gas bombs against strikers.
363
While the Rafu Shimpo emphasized the violence
committed by strikers, La Opinión reported the incident with sympathy toward Mexicans. With
the front-page headline that read “8 Mexican Strikers of Venice, Injured in a Clash,” La Opinión
described that the local police authority “attacked workers provoking a havoc that was about to
culminate into a tragedy.” According to the official statement of the Los Angeles Police
Department, 300 Mexicans participated in the incident and various strikers were armed with iron
tubes, stones, and sticks. Some strikers even tried to set fire on some houses. The police explained
that this was why they had to use tear gas bombs to calm down the situation and added that strikers
were working together with communist activists. Strikers denied the story told by the police when
interviewed by La Opinión. They claimed that police officers provoked this collision by attacking
strikers on behalf of Japanese farmers. And again, the CUCOM strongly denied the involvement
of communists, criticizing “what the police said was to devaluate the labor movement by calling
us communist.” Another CUCOM member Blas Piñon also told La Opinión, “some pickers
(strikers) became victims by the attack of vigilantes as they urged their coworkers to abandon their
work.”
364

On the same day, the Nōkai Renmei held a meeting where thirty-five Japanese leaders
attended and exchanged opinions with white Americans involved in Los Angeles agriculture. At

363
“Pikettā no Bōkō ni Kanken ga Sairuidan [The authority threw tear gas bombs against violent picketers],”
Rafu Shimpo, April 25, 1936.
364
“8 Mexicanos Huelguistas de Venice, Heridos en Un Motín,” La Opinión, April 25, 1936.
190

the meeting, Japanese leaders demonstrated their concern that some strike organizers were
Japanese, saying, “we can’t help but deplore that there are some [Japanese] radicals who make
their compatriot farmers suffer.”
365
They also made clear the importance of defending Venice
celery farmers, because otherwise the strike could develop and expand all over the county.
Therefore, they called for support from other major Japanese organizations such as the Central
Japanese Association of Southern California (Nanka Chūō Nihonjin Kai), which played a major
role in defending the Japanese in the El Monte strike. Responding to the Nōkai Renmei’s call for
support, Japanese farmers in Los Angeles County and Orange County began to send groups of
temporary workers to pick celery in Venice. These groups were called giyūdan (volunteer corps)
and organized mainly by young Nisei in several Japanese farming communities such as San
Fernando, Burbank, San Gabriel, Montebello, Norwalk, Downy, Compton, Dominguez Hills,
Hawthorne, Gardena, and so forth.
366
In the El Monte strike, Nisei students helped harvest crops
for their parents. And three years later in 1936, the Nisei were more organized probably because
the strikers’ demand for union recognition posed a larger threat to the Japanese farming community
and because Nisei turned three years older and became more responsible for their family farms.
The busiest season for Venice celery farmers was from late April to late May when they
needed about 150 workers to harvest and export their crops to the East Coast, although the harvest
itself would continue until August. The strike took place in this peak period for harvest, so that the
giyūdan workforce played a critical role for the Venice farmers to keep their operation.
367
Another
likely reason why the giyūdan was organized during the Venice strike but not during the El Monte

365
“Ryōsha Gankyō ni Aitaiji Shi [Both parties face off],” Rafu Shimpo, April 25, 1936.
366
Nōkai Renmei, anti-strike measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
367
Ibid.
191

strike is because the former faced more serious labor shortage.
368
On April 28, more than sixty
giyūdan workers arrived in Venice from other areas, and on later days, the giyūdan continued to
provide labor to Japanese celery farms in emergency (see Figure 5). What helped giyūdan workers
enter and work at Japanese farms was the protection provided by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department.
369
On May 1, the Associated Farmers of Los Angeles sent a letter to the Los Angeles
Sheriff Eugene Biscailuz and appreciated the department for “the splendid work done by officers
of your department in maintaining peace in the Venice celery area.”
370
Just as seen in the El Monte
strike, Mexican strikers were fighting against the whole structure of Los Angeles agribusiness
operated by Japanese farmers, controlled by white agribusiness leaders, and protected by the local
police authority.

368
Matsumoto, “1936 Nen Rosanjerusu Serori Sutoraiki to Nikkei Nōgyō Komyunitī,” 69.
369
“Sōgo Fujo no Seishin kara Giyūdan Tatsu [The spirit of mutual aid in the giyūdan],” Rafu Shimpo, April 28,
1936.
370
Arthur Clark, executive secretary of the Associated Farmers of Los Angeles, to Eugene Biscailuz, Los
Angeles Sheriff, May 1, 1936, Box 64, Clements Papers.
Figure 5 Japanese giyūdan workers helping harvest celery in Venice
Source: Rafu Shimpo, April 28, 1936.
192

Around the same period, Japanese celery farmers in Venice faced a serious trouble. A white
landowner named Mesmer, who had been rather sympathetic to Mexican workers, suddenly signed
a contract with the CUCOM to pay thirty cents an hour and recognize the union, so that fourteen
Japanese farmers who grew celery in Mesmer’s land followed the landowner to comply with the
contract. For Japanese farmers squaring off with strikers, the action taken by the fourteen farmers
was “a big shock” and “a betrayal.” Soon later, the CUCOM began to send workers to the Mesmer
ranch, while major Japanese organizations such as the Central Japanese Association of Southern
California, the Los Angeles Japanese Association (Rafu Nihonjin Kai), and the Central Industrial
Association of Southern California (Nanka Shōkō Kaigisho) stepped in to make the fourteen
Japanese farmers revoke the contract with the CUCOM. Due to the intervention by the three major
Japanese immigrant organizations, the fourteen farmers in the Mesmer ranch came to reach a
reconciliation that would remove the influence of the CUCOM.
371

Although giyūdan workers played an important role in maintaining the operation of celery
farms, Venice Japanese farmers knew that they could not depend on giyūdan’s help forever
because other Japanese farming communities needed labor for the harvest of their own crops.
Venice farmers needed to create a new strategy to maintain a certain number of Mexican labor in
their fields. What they invented was a card registration system that would require Mexican pickers,
who would not participate in the strike, to hold a member card issued by the Japanese Farmers’
Association of Venice. With this card, farmers could distinguish reliable Mexican workers from

371
Nōkai Renmei, anti-strike measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ; “Reconocimiento de la
Unión,” La Opinión, April 29, 1936; “Jinushi Mesumā-shi Nōka wo Shiji [Mr. Mesmer supports the farmers],”
Rafu Shimpo, April 21, 1936; “Seimeisho Benisu Sangyō Kumiai [Announcement by the Venice Industrial
Association],” June 2, 1936; Central strike committee, open letter on the Venice strike, May 2, 1936, Box 1,
Folder 3, Karl G. Yoneda Papers, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library of
Japan, Tokyo (hereafter as Yoneda Papers). The original documents of the Yoneda Papers are preserved in the
Special Collections, Charles E. Young Library of the University of California, Los Angeles.
193

others who might be CUCOM members. It was also useful for Mexican workers since they could
get a job more easily than others who did not have the card. In fact, this system functioned even
better than Japanese farmers expected. By May 9, thanks to the card registration system, Venice
farmers could keep enough Mexican workers to harvest the rest of celery and thereby giyūdan
workers returned to their respective communities. The effectiveness of the system even reached
outside the Venice area, since Japanese and white farmers in other areas began to accept the same
card when they hired Mexican workers.
372
In a sense, Japanese farmers forged an effective
immigrant-made immigration policy to control the type of foreign workers entering their farms in
Los Angeles County.
Mexican strike leader Blas Piñon claimed that by April 24, 5,000 workers, including Japanese
and Filipino workers, had joined the strike throughout Los Angeles County. However, he probably
exaggerated the number, since the Nōkai Renmei calculated that Japanese farmers usually hired
from 3,000 to 4,000 workers in total.
373
Nevertheless, it is clear that the strike was affecting the
whole Japanese farming population in Los Angeles County. One of such places was El Monte, the
very region that saw the outbreak of Japanese-Mexican conflict three years earlier. Japanese
immigrants in El Monte took the Venice strike very seriously because of their “bitter experience
in the large strike” in the recent past. On 2 May 1936, when the berry harvest was at its peak, a
group of twenty-four Japanese youth in El Monte founded a Japanese vigilante group named
Seinen Seigidan (Youth League for Justice) to protect Japanese farms from Mexican strikers. The
Seinen Seigidan elected vigilante leaders to protect eight sections in the El Monte area and

372
“Benisu de Rōdōsha Kādo Saiyō [Introduction of the worker’s card in Venice],” Rafu Shimpo, May 9, 1936;
“Ragun Nōen Sutoraiki, Dai Yon Shū ni Hairu [The Los Angeles County strike now in the fourth week],” Rafu
Shimpo, May 11, 1936.
373
“2 Vigilantes Resultaron Lesionados,” La Opinión, April 25, 1933; “Gādena no Ichibu Nōka, Mekishikan to
Keiyaku Musubi,” Rafu Shimpo, June 18, 1936.
194

consulted with the Sheriff’s Department about their activities. By May 8, Japanese farmers in El
Monte had distributed fliers that read “No Trespassing” in English and Spanish to display at their
berry farms. An editor of the Rafu Shimpo Yoneo Sakai also mentioned the El Monte strike to
describe the Venice strike as a more serious conflict because the CUCOM demanded union
recognition.
374

On May 2, Mexican consul Ricardo Hill and Edward H. Fitzgerald, an official of the U.S.
Labor Department, visited the Nōkai Renmei and discussed with Katō and other Japanese leaders.
But the Japanese side was determined to reject any condition that would make them recognize
unions. In fact, Hill’s presence made Japanese farmers reluctant to negotiate with the Mexican side
because they knew well that Hill was active in supporting Mexican strikers in the El Monte strike
as the vice-consul back then. To make clear Hill’s intention in the Venice strike, on May 7, Rafu
Shimpo reporters interviewed Hill about the ongoing interethnic problem. In the interview, Hill
encouraged Japanese farmers to have more constructive conversation with Mexican strikers and
denied the participation of radical agitators in the CUCOM. Hill said, “First of all, I want to tell
you that I worked at the Mexican Legation in Tokyo from October 1923 to June 1924, which made
me favor Japan even more. I have held deep respect for Japan and its people since I was young.”
And he continued, “I deplore this strike in terms of Japan-Mexico friendship and strongly hope

374
“Nōen Sōgi no Kaiketsu no Michi [A solution for the agricultural strike],” Rafu Shimpo, May 1, 1936;
“Sutoraiki Taisaku toshite Seinen Seigidan Soshiki [The establishment of the Youth League for Justice],” Rafu
Shimpo, May 4, 1936; “San Gēburu Heigen Rōdōsha Fukki [The return of workers in the San Gabriel Valley],”
Rafu Shimpo, May 5, 1936; “San Gēburu mo Higyō Boppatsu ni Sonau [The San Gabriel farmers prepare for
the outbreak of strikes],” Rafu Shimpo, May 8, 1936.
195

that the strike will be solved as soon as possible. But that goal will not be achieved if the
representatives of Japanese farmers do not meet with the representatives of Mexican workers.”
375

Although Hill publicly supported Mexican strikers at the local level, the Mexican government
in Mexico City did not play a significant role in the Venice strike. In 1934, Lázaro Cárdenas
assumed presidency in Mexico by removing the political influence of his former patron Plutarco
Elías Calles.
376
In the El Monte strike, Calles openly criticized the Japanese and funded Mexicans
to gain public support for the Mexican government under his influence. Unlike Calles, Cárdenas
did not need to take advantage of the situation of Mexican workers in Los Angeles to garner public
support in Mexico, mostly likely because he had already had strong support from the Mexican
working class. As a result, this time, the CUCOM lacked donations from Mexico and thus needed
to hold fundraising events in Los Angeles. On May 1, the CUCOM held an event celebrating May
Day at Placita in Downtown Los Angeles. While criticizing Japanese farmers, they called for
donation from which the CUCOM would provide material supports for the families of Mexican
strikers. La Opinión also explained the lack of financial sources for Mexican strikers. The
immigrant press wrote that “[d]uring the past movement [in the El Monte strike] General Plutarco
Elías Calles who then lived in El Sauzal, Baja California, contributed a large sum that reached
several thousands of dollars” to support Mexican strikers but the CUCOM “is in a grave situation
in the sense that economic resources are exhausted” due to the lack of donations.
377

375
“Yunion Mitomenu to Ganbari [Working hard not to recognize unions],” Rafu Shimpo, May 2, 1936; “Benisu
Higyō ni Kanshite, Hiru Ryōji wa Kataru [Consul Hill talks about the Venice strike],” Rafu Shimpo, May 7,
1936.
376
Aito Shinohara, “Kyowakoku no Ayumi: Mekishiko [History of the Republic: Mexico],” in Raten Amerika
Sekai [Latin American World], eds. Yoshio Masuda, Yoshiro Yamada, and Hidefuji Someda (Kyoto, 1984),
107-108.
377
“2 Vigilantes Resultaron Lesionados,” La Opinión, April 25, 1936; “Los Nipones No Aceptan Un Arreglo,”
La Opinión, May 2, 1936.
196

Since the Mexican government in Mexico City did not intend to make the Venice strike an
international problem, the Japanese consulate opted to remain silent and wait for the conflict to
end with time. However, the lack of the Japanese government’s involvement did not mean that the
Venice strike was less complicated and easier to solve than was the El Monte strike. It was in fact
more difficult to resolve because the social climate for the labor movement in the United States
was very different before and after 1935. The Venice strike took place after 1935, the year when
the U.S. government enacted the Wagner Act. As mentioned earlier, the law excluded agricultural
workers from its protection. In fact, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) commented on
the Venice strike in their internal report, writing “We are taking no part in this controversy.”
378

Yet, the changing social mood for the labor movement surely helped agricultural workers to put
priority on making their employers to recognize unions. In fact, some Japanese farmers in Southern
California had already succumbed to the pressure of Mexican union workers before the Venice
strike took place. For example, in August of 1935, Japanese farmers in the San Diego area signed
a contract with a Mexican union called the Union of Laborers and Field Workers. They agreed that
“at least 60 percent of all fields workers employed and working at any one time shall be members
of the Union of Laborers and Field Workers” and that Japanese farmers preserved the right to fire
unsatisfactory union workers but “any vacancy created by such discharge shall be filled only by
members of the Union Laborers and Field workers.” This agreement was made by Japanese leaders
I. Kawashima and Eyno Kawamura and Mexican leaders Martín Omendaiz [sic], J.C. Espinoza,
Miguel Delgado, Juan D. Gonzále[z], and Antonio Del Buono.
379
In addition, when the Wagner

378
The 21
st
district office of the National Labor Relations Board, “Strike of Mexican Field Workers,” April 17,
1936, Box 1, RG25, Records of the National Labor Relations Board, National Archives at Riverside, Riverside,
California (hereafter as RG25, NAR).
379
The 15
th
district office of the National Labor Relations Board, “Agreement San Diego Field Workers,” August
22, 1935, Box 1, RG25, NAR.
197

Act was enacted, the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles reported about it in relation to the conflicts
between Mexican farmworkers and Japanese farmers in Southern California. They wrote “the
project of the Wagner Act was finally approved . . . This law, as it has already been informed,
regulate the relations between workers and industry people” and “[Mexican] farmworkers in Los
Angeles County [were] demanding an increase of wages and other improvements in working
conditions.”
380
Given that Mexican strikers had successfully negotiated with Japanese farmers in
San Diego, it is understandable that Venice strikers hoped and insisted that Japanese operators
should hire union Mexican workers.
Meanwhile, in Los Angeles County, Japanese labor activists, who did not play a major role
in the El Monte strike, demonstrated their support for Mexicans in the Venice strike. In early May
of 1936, they distributed fliers written in Japanese to criticize Japanese farmers in Venice and urge
the ethnic Japanese community to support Mexican workers. They denounced Katō as a haori goro
(well-dressed bully) who “intends to deteriorate the labor-management relationship and works
hard to leave celery to rot in the Venice area” and asserted that if ethnic Japanese residents did not
cooperate with strikers, “it will darken the future of the whole Japanese community living abroad
[outside Japan].”
381
On May 2, Kōken Ishida, the chairman of the Japanese Farm Workers Union
of California, visited the Rafu Shimpo headquarters to explain why he was supporting Mexican
strikers as a labor activist. He said, “First of all, Japanese farmers wrongly believe that Japanese
communists are playing a central role in this strike and radicals were involved. But there are only
three Japanese who work at the strikers’ headquarters, me and other two secretaries of the JFWUC,

380
Mexican consulate in Los Angeles, “Informe de protección correspondiente al mes de julio de1935,” July 31,
1935, Box 5, Folder 101(I), Collection Gaveta 8, AHGE.
381
Central strike committee, an open letter on the Venice strike, May 2, 1936, Box 1, Yoneda Papers.
198

Deguchi and Ōi. We are neither reds nor radicals.”
382
Ishida had lived in the United States for
seventeen years and worked mostly in agriculture. Interestingly, Ishida himself was a farm operator
in Orange County who cultivated tomatoes in a land of 120 acres and hired Mexican farmworkers.
Based on his experience as a laborer and a farmer, he tried to persuade Japanese farmers in Los
Angeles that an immediate settlement of the strike was beneficial for both Mexican workers and
Japanese farmers:

Some (Japanese) people seriously fear that recognizing unions would result in the demise
of their business, but that is a huge misunderstanding since workers need farmers to make
their living and they know it very well . . . Despite the fact that strikers hope to meet and
discuss with the leaders of Japanese farmers to clear misunderstandings and solve the
problem, Japanese farmers stubbornly reject their proposal and try to repress the strike. I
am deeply sorry for this situation because Japanese farmers need Japanese, Mexican,
Filipino workers. Workers are human beings . . . Until now, Mexican workers had felt
greater respect for the Japanese than they did for whites and spent most of their income at
Japanese-operated shops. But how would they feel now?
383

In Orange County, in 1935, Mexican farmworkers demanded that Japanese farmers should
provide better working conditions and succeeded in reaching an agreement with the Japanese. That
a Japanese farmer in Orange County was organizing the strike in Los Angeles was a disturbing

382
“Sutoraiki Iinkai no Ichiin, Ishida Kōken-shi Raisha Dan,” Rafu Shimpo, May 2, 1936. The Rafu Shimpo
called Ishida’s organization “Kashū Nihonjin Nōen Rōdōsha Kumiai Nanka Rengō (Southern California
Federation of the Japanese Farm Workers Union of California.”
383
Ibid.
199

fact for Los Angeles Japanese farmers. Yet, what disturbed them even more was the fact that many
Japanese farmers in Los Angeles County had begun to show sympathy toward Mexican union
members during the Venice strike, which was not the case in the El Monte strike. Nōkai Renmei
leaders became increasingly concerned about the growing division within the Los Angeles
Japanese farming population regarding how to confront and solve the interethnic labor conflict.
And as they felt pressure to explain more carefully about their uncompromising stance toward
strikers, from May 4 to 6, Katō wrote a series of articles to the Rafu Shimpo and asserted:

The Japanese-Mexican wage agreement in Orange County was made against the will . . . I
want to make clear one important fact. It is not that only a small group of [anti-labor]
Japanese farmers are trying to push through their cause . . . Making a compromise is to
weaken our solidarity, which makes it impossible to win the fight that we should be able
to win.
384

The Nōkai Renmei represented the majority of Japanese farmers in Los Angeles and the Japanese
consulate regarded them as the leading ethnic organization in the Venice strike. However, Katō’s
explanation ironically reaffirmed that many other Japanese suspected that only a small number of
leaders like Katō were leading the Japanese community toward a wrong direction in the time when
unionization and collective bargaining became a legitimate right protected by the U.S. government.
In the El Monte strike, the division within the ethnic Japanese community appeared between Los
Angeles Japanese and Mexicali Japanese who faced Mexican nationalism merged with anti-

384
Shin’ichi Katō, “Nōka Gawa no Tachiba [The Position of Farmers] 2,” Rafu Shimpo, May 5, 1936.
200

Japanese sentiment fueled by Mexican politicians such as Calles.
385
In the Venice strike, a different
division appeared within Los Angeles County and separated anti-labor farmers who stressed the
importance of the ethnic Japanese solidarity from pro-labor farmers who understood the need for
interethnic harmony with ethnic Mexican residents. Los Angeles farmland as a transpacific
workplace forced the Japanese to consider which was more important for the future of the Japanese
community, ethnic solidarity or interethnic harmony.
To prove the existence of a growing number of pro-labor Japanese farmers, on May 13, La
Opinión cheerfully reported that Mexican strikers in the Gardena area “reached an agreement”
with Japanese farmers and “accomplished a partial triumph yesterday.” The Gardena area was one
of the major concentrations of ethnic Japanese residents in Los Angeles County. Veralde told the
paper that a group of Gardena Japanese farmers had agreed to increase wages of about fifty workers
from 22.5 cents to 35 cents an hour. Since there were still about 2,000 workers engaged in the
strike, Veralde told, “The movement will continue with all intensity and fieldworkers are actually
backed by the moral and financial supports from fifty-two organizations including the American
Federation of Labor . . . [I]n a short time, we will reach a definitive solution.”
386
Indeed, it was a
partial victory since Veralde’s goal was to make Japanese farmers recognize his union. The Rafu
Shimpo did not report this agreement probably because they needed some time to confirm it or
simply wanted to downplay the fact, but anti-labor Japanese farmers knew that the strike was
spreading far outside the Venice area by this time.
387
And later in May, these pro-labor Japanese
farmers of the Gardena area would take another significant step to settle the strike: union

385
See Chapter 4.
386
“Huelguistas y Cosecheros en Un Arreglo,” La Opinión, May 13, 1936.
387
“Nōen Sutoraiki, Zenji Ta Chiiki ni Kakudai ka [The strike gradually seems to be spreading to other areas],”
Rafu Shimpo, May 13, 1936.
201

recognition. Since anti-labor farmers represented by the Nōkai Renmei feared union recognition
as a stepping stone toward the demise of the whole Japanese agriculture, this Gardena agreement
posed a serious threat and blow to their ethnic solidarity.
The Japanese-Mexican conflict in 1936 had created a division that made both anti-labor and
pro-labor Japanese farmers consider what role they should play as a minority in the multiethnic
and multiracial Los Angeles society. Ishida urged anti-labor Japanese farmers to make an
agreement with strikers, saying, “Since I am a Japanese who share the same blood [with you all],
it is my personal desire that Japanese farmers should solve the problem to avoid a considerable
loss.” On the other hand, Katō denounced pro-labor Japanese farmers, “If you have a good faith
as fellow Japanese, you should neither collaborate with non-Japanese radicals nor engage in
unpatriotic activities that agitate Mexicans and Filipinos and make only Japanese farmers suffer.
You should back out of this conflict and show a good faith.”
388
Both Ishida and Katō stressed the
importance of their blood tie and patriotism, concepts deeply connected to their sense of immigrant
nationalism and ethnic solidarity. However, they had different understanding about the path
Japanese immigrants should take in Los Angeles. For most Japanese determined to confront
Mexican strikers, what it meant to be Japanese was to put priority on the ethnic Japanese solidarity
over interethnic accommodation and regard agriculture as the core of their solidarity and future
prosperity. On the other hand, for those Japanese considering a possibility of hiring Mexican union
workers, what it meant to be Japanese was to see the importance of co-existing with other
ethnoracial minorities and thus to regard agriculture more as a multiethnic project in Los Angeles.

388
“Sutoraiki Iinkai no Ichiin, Ishida Kōken-shi Raisha Dan,” Rafu Shimpo, May 2, 1936; Katō, “Nōka Gawa
no Tachiba 3,” Rafu Shimpo, May 6, 1936.
202

The division within the ethnic Japanese community made fluid and unstable the racial and class
boundaries in the triracial hierarchy of Los Angeles agriculture.
In the mid-1930s, the farmland of Los Angeles, a site of transpacific intersection of Japanese
and Mexican immigrants, triggered a serious interethnic conflict that challenged the existing
concept of “solidarity” in the Japanese immigrant community and saw a gradual development of
their understanding for interethnic accommodation with Mexican workers.

Inter-Japanese Divide and Growing Support for Mexicans
By mid-May of 1936, strike organizers had moved their new headquarters from Venice to
Harbor City, about twenty miles south of Downtown Los Angeles. In Venice, the card registration
system introduced by Japanese farmers proved quite effective to keep Mexican picketers away and
workers in their celery farms.
389
The strike itself, however, was expanding and targeting the South
Bay area of Los Angeles such as Lomita, San Pedro, and Dominguez Hills, where many Japanese
farmers and their families lived. In Lomita, more than 100 picketers appeared in Japanese farms.
In San Pedro, more than 100 picketers came to Japanese farms by about forty cars and trucks in
total and interrupted the operation of Mexican workers including women and children. Sheriff
officers rushed to the scene and arrested a Filipino leader and forty-seven protestors. The strike
affected the urban area of Los Angeles as well. Strike organizers marched and distributed fliers in
Downtown Los Angeles to criticize Japanese farmers, as a Japanese hotel owner Noboru
Murakami recorded one of the strikers’ marches in his diary. Some fliers were written in Japanese

389
Clements sent letters to the sheriff and police chiefs of Los Angeles to thank their support for Japanese farmers.
See Clements to James E. Davis, Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, May 15, 1936, Box 64, Clements
Papers; Clements to Eugene Biscaliuz, Sheriff of Los Angeles County, May 15, 1936, Box 64, Clements Papers.
203

to call for a wider support among Japanese residents. One of the fliers denounced Japanese farmers,
“Why can you raise our wages when you provide police officers with money [to protect Japanese
farms]? Why can you recognize our union when we recognize farmers’ associations?”
390

Meanwhile, feeling the need to settle the conflict, Nōkai Renmei leaders and strike organizers
had begun to set meetings to discuss working conditions in Japanese farms. On May 14, they held
the first meeting. While Katō, Naonori Mibu, Seijirō Kai, and Kengorō Nakamura represented
anti-labor farmers, those who represented strikers were not only Mexicans such as Veralde but
also Japanese activists such as Ishida and Deguchi. Filipino and white members also attended the
meetings to support strikers.
391
Although Japanese consul Hori did not take part in the conflict as
mentioned earlier, a week before the meeting, he recommended Katō to meet with Veralde to
discuss the solution for the conflict.
392
Hori’s recommendation would not be the major reason why
Katō decided to discuss with the Mexican side. Rather, Katō would want to use this opportunity
to demonstrate their uncompromising stance toward the strikers.
In four consecutive meetings from May 14 to 22, the strike leaders softened their demands
but told that 60 percent of workers in Japanese farms should be union members and paid thirty
cents an hour, while the Nōkai Renmei provided a counter proposal that they would pay 22.5 cents
an hour for relatively easy harvest and thirty cents at most for more complicated work like
harvesting celery. Although the strike leaders conceded regarding wages and told that they could

390
“Victoria de los Pizcadores,” La Opinión, May 29, 1936; “Nōen Sutoraiki, Zenji Ta Chiiki ni Kakudai ka,”
Rafu Shimpo, May 13, 1936; “Lomita de Shii [Demonstration in Lomita],” Rafu Shimpo, May 13, 1936; “Tairitsu
Sen’eika [Conflict aggravated],” Rafu Shimpo, May 14, 1936; “Higyōdan Shii ni Nōka Fungai [Farmers
infuriated about the strikers’ demonstration],” Rafu Shimpo, May 15, 1936; “Higyōdan Taikyo Sattō [Strikers
arrive in large number],” Rafu Shimpo, May 18, 1936. Noboru Murakami, diary, May 15, 1936, Box 130, Noboru
Murakami Papers, Japanese American Research Project Collection, Special Collections, University of California,
Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California.
391
Nōkai Renmei, anti-strike measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
392
“Katō Shihainin Higyō Kanbu to Kaiken [Manager Katō met with strike leaders],” Rafu Shimpo, May 8, 1936.
204

agree if farmers paid 27.5 cents an hour for harvesting crops except celery, they did not take back
their demand for union recognition. Union recognition was the last thing that anti-labor farmers
could agree.
393
On May 22, after their negotiations broke down, Veralde visited the Rafu Shimpo
headquarters with other twenty strike organizers, who were Mexican, Filipino, and Japanese
members including Ishida and Deguchi. Frustrated by the failure of their negotiations, Veralde told
the Rafu Shimpo, “I’m a member of the Democratic Party in the 67
th
district and got support from
the American Federation of Labor that is critical of the leftists. For this reason, I think you
understand that I am not a communist. I’ve told them (the Nōkai Renmei) that I want them to sign
an agreement with us to see if unions are such a horrible thing as they think. Since Mexican
workers know well about the difficult situation faced by Japanese farmers, they won’t make an
outrageous demand.”
394
From the perspective of most Japanese farmers in Los Angeles, union
recognition was an outrageous demand. So why did Veralde adhere to union recognition, which
made it almost impossible to draw concessions from the Nōkai Renmei? The Nōkai Renmei
leaders speculated that it was because some Japanese farmers in the Gardena area, a major Japanese
farming region in Los Angeles County, had begun to show sympathy toward strikers and the idea
of union recognition. Given this gradual change in the attitude of some Japanese farmers, there
seemed to be a chance for strikers to win the conflict.
395

In addition, unlike the El Monte strike, the California state government offered only limited
assistance for both the Japanese and Mexican sides. Again, the reason was again because strike
organizers demanded union recognition. At one of their negotiation meetings, strike leaders
proposed that they would ask Thomas Barker, the state government mediator who played an

393
Nōkai Renmei, anti-strike measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
394
“Nōren Iin to Higyōdan Kanbu [Nōkai Renmei members and strike leaders],” Rafu Shimpo, May 23, 1936.
395
Nōkai Renmei, anti-strike measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
205

important role in the agreement at the end of the El Monte strike, to mediate the Venice conflict.
Nōkai Renmei leaders agreed on this idea. However, Barker answered them that it was not him
but parties in interest who should discuss union recognition, while he could offer some help
regarding only wages.
396
Barker also thought that Japanese and Mexican immigrants could solve
the Venice strike through a contract agreement just like they did in the El Monte strike. On May
22, Barker told the Rafu Shimpo, “I should maintain a fair stance and an objective position for both
parties. This strike reminds me of the berry strike that happened three years earlier. At that time,
Mr. Mukaeda, the former president of the Central Japanese Association of Southern California,
mediated the conflict to reach an agreement that I think was a quite fair and appropriate document.”
He also added his opinion that reaching an agreement with union leaders would not necessarily
mean that Japanese farmers had to hire union workers, although anti-labor Japanese farmers could
not accept such an idea. On the same day, Barker was invited to the forth meeting between farmers
and strikers. But he declined the invitation as he thought that he could do nothing, given the
uncompromising stance of Japanese farmers against union recognition.
397

The Rafu Shimpo was basically supportive for the Nōkai Renmei but also provided its readers
with various opinions sympathetic toward Mexican strikers. On May 22 when the Japanese-
Mexican negotiation ended in failure, a prominent Japanese immigrant Shōji Nagumo, the founder
of the Southern California Gardener Unions’ Federation, contributed his opinion regarding the
strike. On the Rafu Shimpo article, he wrote, “By observing the actual living conditions [of
Mexicans], they are very impoverished. Since they suffer difficult lives more than fellow Japanese

396
Ibid.; “Nōen Sutoraiki Jiken, Tsuini Chōteikan no Te e [The agricultural strike problem will be handled by
the mediator],” Rafu Shimpo, May 20, 1936.
397
“Bākā Chōteikan Kisha ni Kataru [Mediator Barker talks to us],” Rafu Shimpo, May 22, 1936; “Nōren Iin to
Higyōdan Kanbu,” Rafu Shimpo, May 23, 1936.
206

farmers do, they are in the situation in which they cannot lower the level of their lives anymore.”
398

Nagumo was well educated and also able to speak Spanish because he had hired Mexican workers
since the 1920s, which seems to have helped him understand better the situation of ethnic Mexican
neighborhoods. Represented by Nagumo, Japanese gardeners were supportive of Mexican strikers
during the Venice strike, although such a pro-labor stance was not dominant in the whole ethnic
Japanese community. By shedding light on the prewar history of Japanese gardeners in Southern
California, Nobuya Tsuchida argues that the Japanese gardeners could take a pro-Mexican stance
during the Venice strike because they depended almost exclusively on white customers, not
serving Japanese patrons. And more importantly, “the ambiguous class position of gardeners,
between labor and the petite bourgeoisie, seems in this instance to have led to their identification
with, and support of, the workers.”
399
While Nōkai Renmei leaders sometimes claimed that
“farmworkers earn more income than farmers do,” Nagumo’s observation was an important
evidence that Japanese immigrants were not that naïve to believe an awkward claim made by the
Nōkai Renmei.
400

Without making any progress in negotiating with the Mexican side, an increasing number of
Japanese farmers began to criticize that the Nōkai Renmei did not quite represent them. On May
20, this forced Katō convey his intention to step down as the manager of the Nōkai Renmei at their

398
Sōji Nagumo, “Kisho Sutoraiki Sokumenkan [Letter about the strike from a different perspective] 1,” Rafu
Shimpo, May 23, 1936. Nagumo created a beautiful Japanese garden in the internment camp at Manzanar during
World War II. As for the history of the Southern California Gardener Unions’ Federation, see “Nanka Teien
Gyōsha Renmei Sōritsu 60 Shūnen [60
th
anniversary of the the Southern California Gardener Unions’
Federation],” Rafu Shimpo, February 19, 2015.
399
As Tsuchida explains, most Japanese gardeners were latecomers who migrated to the United States after the
implementation of the Alien Land Laws and could not establish a strong base in agriculture. This prevented them
from becoming established farmers but forced them to work as farmworkers. In this situation, they came to see
gardening a more stable and rewarding job. See Nobuya Tsuchida, “Japanese Gardeners in Southern California,
1900-1941,” in Labor Immigration Under Capitalism: Asian Workers in the United States before World War II,
eds., Lucie Chang and Edna Bonacich (Berkeley, 1984), 443-446, 459-460.
400
Nōkai Renmei, anti-strike measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
207

meeting. About sixty representatives of Japanese agricultural associations in Los Angeles County
attended the meeting and persuaded Katō to stay in his position, since they were in line with Katō
unanimously and firmly against union recognition. To make clear their solidarity, they even issued
a resolution to acknowledge that “the contribution [made by Katō] had been huge.”
401
But the
criticism against the Nōkai Renmei did not stop. Another ethnic Japanese newspaper Kashu
Mainichi, whose editor-in-chief was Sei Fujii, represented small-scale tenant farmers who were
increasingly frustrated about the leadership of the Nōkai Renmei and wanted to handle the strike
independently in each farming community without the authoritative instruction of the Nōkai
Renmei. Compared to the Kashu Mainichi, the Rafu Shimpo represented the main stream position
of Japanese farmers who supported the Nōkai Renmei.
402

Observing the deadlock between strikers and farmers, Mexican consul Hill began to think
that Mexican strikers should stay away from non-Mexican labor activists and negotiate
independently with Japanese farmers to make more rapid progress for settlement. Since Japanese
farmers and Mexican strikers signed an agreement a year earlier in Orange County, Hill considered
that he could model after the Orange County’s Japanese-Mexican agreement to solve the problem
in Los Angeles. Then he asked Lucas Lucio, the consulate’s representative in Orange County, and
Masami Sasaki, a prominent Japanese immigrant in Huntington Beach in Orange County, to set
up meetings between Hill and the Nōkai Renmei starting from May 22. Since Hill wanted to apply
the Orange County agreement, the Nōkai Renmei agreed to appoint Sasaki as a negotiator on behalf
of Japanese farmers. This day happened to be the day of the failed meeting between the CUCOM
and the Nōkai Renmei, meaning that Hill was working separately from Veralde during the Venice

401
“Katō Shihainin no Kōseki Mitome [Aknowledging the contribution of manger Katō],” Rafu Shimpo, May
21, 1936.
402
Matsumoto, “1936 Nen Rosanjerusu Serori Sutoraiki to Nikkei Nōgyō Komyunitī,” 69.
208

strike.
403
On the other hand, Lucio was a publisher of a weekly Mexican immigrant paper El Nuevo
Mundo that put emphasis on the importance of the Mexican consulate and reiterated the danger of
radicalism. While Veralde represented the hardline of radical labor movement, Lucio attempted to
settle the labor conflict through the mediation of government agencies.
404
The Nōkai Renmei
thought it worth meeting independently with Hill and hoped to reach a Japanese-Mexican
agreement without union recognition.
While the negotiation continued now between the Mexican consul and Japanese farmers, the
strike itself was expanding and became increasingly violent. Since strike organizers moved their
headquarters, Japanese farmers in Dominguez Hills, only about five miles from the CUCOM
headquarters in Harbor City, were on high alert and mobilized their family members to get their
harvest done. Otokichi Kuwahara, the leader of Japanese farmers in Dominguez Hills who
immigrated to California from the Kumamoto Prefecture in 1902, told Japanese American children
who attended a local kendo (Japanese fencing) club, “Now we Issei have been struggling to break
through this strike without enough sleep at night. So we want you all Nisei to get up at five a.m.
and help us for a couple of hours before going to school. And you do so after coming back from
school as you usually do.”
405

The expansion of the strike in Dominguez Hills resulted in a bloody encounter between
Mexican strikers and strikebreakers took place in Japanese farms in Dominguez Hills in the
morning of May 25. La Opinión reported this incident as a front-page news based on their

403
Nōkai Renmei, anti-strike measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ. Lucio was the presentative
of the Comision Honorífica de Santa Ana, an ethnic Mexican organization affiliated to the Mexican consulate.
See “El Cónsul Hill Se Defiende,” La Opinión, June 13, 1936.
404
González, Labor and Community, 146
405
“Zenson Ikka no Daikentō [The whole village united as one family to fight],” Rafu Shimpo, May 20, 1936;
Kō Murai, Zaibei Nihonjin Sangyō Sōran (Los Angeles, 1940), 651, Murai Family Papers, Japanese American
National Museum, Los Angeles, California.
209

interview to the police as well as the CUCOM. According to the police report, more than twenty
people got injured because the encounter involved the use of rifles and bladed weapons. In the
afternoon, the police authority arrested about forty strikers, most of whom were Mexican, for the
incident in the morning. Three Mexican strikers named Mike Pulido, Joe Delgado, and Bernardo
Lucero were arrested by the police but also brought to the hospital to receive treatment such as
removing pellets from their body. Two Mexican farmworkers named Pedro Cabrera and Ernesto
Villapondo were also sent to the hospital as they were attacked by strikers. The police report did
not mention who opened fire on Mexicans but gave an impression that Mexican picketers and
workers caused a bloody incident anyway.
406
The Rafu Shimpo also reported the incident in
Dominguez Hills while mentioning other violent encounters in the nearby Compton area and other
areas in the San Gabriel Valley. In Dominguez Hills, the police also arrested Lillian Monroe who
had been involved in the Venice strike from the beginning. Although Monroe was released shortly
after her arrest, the Japanese immigrant press described her as the “Red queen who masterminds
the agricultural strike.” A Japanese labor activist Deguchi was also arrested and held on $2,500
bond. Right after this violent incident, about 150 Japanese residents in Dominguez Hills held an
emergency meeting and approved resolutions: 1) that they would support the Nōkai Renmei as
much as possible, 2) that they would ask the Japanese consulate for protection, 3) that they would
request the police authority to raise the level of vigilance, and 4) that they would gather donation
for the safety in their farms. The incident resulted in hardening the attitude of Japanese farmers in
Dominguez Hills.
407

406
“24 Heridos y 40 Arrestados en la Huelga de Pizcadores,” La Opinión, May 26, 1936.
407
“Nōen Higyō wo Kage de Ayatsuru, Aka no Joō, Monrō Joshi [Ms. Monroe, the queen of reds, who
masterminds the strike],” Rafu Shimpo, May 26, 1936.
210

On La Opinión, the CUCOM provided their version of what happened in Dominguez Hills
on May 25 and criticized police officers and Japanese farmers armed with rifles for attacking
Mexican strikers. Japanese farmers probably did not use fire arms against Mexicans. It would have
caused a serious international problem that both Japanese and Mexican consulates had to deal with,
if some Japanese national injured Mexican nationals with a deadly weapon. In fact, neither the
Japanese nor Mexican consulates took prompt action on this incident, indicating that no Japanese
opened fire against Mexicans. For this reason, it is most likely police officers who did so. No
matter who actually injured Mexican strikers, the CUCOM criticized Japanese farmers and said
that “workers have decided to stay strong, despite accidents and injustices in which they became
victims, while suffering and risking their lives to improve their conditions. Unfortunately, we don’t
know if [Japanese farmers] hear us when we ask for a piece of bread for our children and avoid
misery in which we live.”
408

Interestingly, this CUCOM’s message revealed a weakness of their campaign as well, since
they claimed, “Through this pro-labor general committee, we make a call for all workers in El
Monte, San Gabriel, and surrounding neighborhoods and ask them not to hinder this movement of
their own brothers of raza.”
409
In other words, there were Mexicans who did not follow the order
of the CUCOM. Being aware of this problem, the CUCOM worked hard to strengthen the
solidarity of Mexican workers by holding daily meetings from May 26 to 31. In Hicks Camp, the
Mexican barrio in El Monte, the CUCOM screened a movie about the El Monte strike of 1933 to
raise a sprit to fight against the Japanese.
410
Although the El Monte strike did not much improve
working and living conditions of Mexican farmworkers, it had already been an important part of

408
“24 Heridos y 40 Arrestados en la Huelga de Pizcadores,” La Opinión, May 26, 1936.
409
Ibid.
410
“El Comité Pro-Huelga Lanza Una Excitativa,” La Opinión, May 31, 1936.
211

local Mexican American history that the CUCOM could use to strengthen ethnic Mexican
solidarity. Yet, the solidarity of raza was not guaranteed because many Mexican workers could
not keep up with the prolonged strike. Ironically, the Venice strike was not successful in the El
Monte area. As mentioned earlier, ethnic Japanese residents, particularly youth, took proactive
actions to protect their farms. They thought they could play an important role in protecting
Japanese agriculture and thus contributing to the “development of the ethnic sprit.” In addition,
many Mexican workers including women continued to work for the Japanese, while local sheriff
officers prevented Mexican picketers from influencing those workers. For example, on May 19,
about 110 strikers tried to force Mexican workers to leave Japanese berry farms in the El Monte
area, so that sheriff officers quickly responded to remove picketers from Japanese farms. Another
case took place on May 28 when sixteen Mexican picketers arrived at berry farms and Katō
happened to confront them. At that time, sheriff officers arrested thirteen picketers, while other
three escaped the scene.
411
A week later in the county court, seven arrested Mexicans were
sentenced to 180 days in prison for interrupting harvest and trying to kidnap workers. Although
picketers continued to appear after this guilty verdict, with the support of the Sheriff’s Department,
El Monte Japanese farmers could maintain a necessary number of Mexican workers.
412

Then again, in late May, the Nōkai Renmei heard unwelcome news. On May 28, a group of
more than fifty Japanese farmers in the Gardena area, led by a Nisei named Bob Ueda, met with
Veralde and signed a contract to raise wages to 27.5 cents an hour and recognize the CUCOM.
What was more important was that this contract required that 60 percent of their workers should

411
“Pikettā Sattō [Picketers flood into the area],” Rafu Shimpo, May 20, 1936; “Nōen Shinnyū no Higyōdan
[Strikers encroaching in the farms],” Rafu Shimpo, May 28, 1936; “Heigen Nai Seinendan no Kessoku
[Solidarity of the youth league in the Valley],” Rafu Shimpo, May 29;
412
“Bōkō Pikettā, Yūzai no Senkoku [Guilty verdict on violent picketers],” Rafu Shimpo, June 4, 1936; “San
Gēburu Keikai [Vigilance needed in San Gabriel],” Rafu Shimpo, June 5, 1936.
212

be members of the CUCOM. La Opinión celebrated the deal with the headlines “Victories of
Pickers” and “The Japanese Surrender to the CUCOM.” Their contract would benefit nearly 300
Mexican workers in areas such as Walteria, Harbor City, Lomita, and Torrance, although Veralde
claimed that other 2,000 workers were still in the strike in Los Angeles County. After signing the
contract with Ueda, Veralde told Mexican workers to come to the CUCOM’s headquarters in
Harbor City to obtain identification cards for union members, which happened to resemble what
Venice Japanese farmers did to hire non-union Mexican workers.
413

The Rafu Shimpo, on May 29, touched upon this shocking contract by quoting a local
newspaper Los Angeles Daily News that reported about fifty Japanese farmers signed a contract
and recognized the CUCOM. But the Rafu Shimpo described it as a rumor based on an unreliable
explanation given only by the CUCOM.
414
In the morning of the next day, Katō visited the Gardena
Valley area including Harbor City, Torrance, and Lomita, with other two Nōkai Renmei leaders to
ask Katsuichi Inoue, who represented the local Japanese association, about the contract made by
Ueda. Inoue told them that he had no idea about the contract. In the afternoon, Inoue held a meeting
with about thirty Japanese leaders of the area and reaffirmed their support for the Nōkai Renmei.
While the Nōkai Renmei negotiator Sasaki confirmed that four farmers including Ueda signed the

413
“Se Someten a la CUCOM los Nipones,” La Opinión, May 29, 1936. The records of the local land company
the Dominguez Estate Company, which owned lands in the South Bay area, shows that a person called Robert
Shigeru Ueda, born in Hawaii in 1894 and sometimes called Bob, leased at least twenty-two acres of land in the
Lomita area from 1935 to 1937. During the Venice strike, the landowner of the Dominguez Hills area stated that
they would not lease lands to tenant farmers who had signed a contract with any labor union. Because Shigeru
Ueda continued to lease lands many years after the strike, probably he was not the Bob Ueda who led the pro-
labor campaign. See Dominguez Estate Company, lease contract of Shigeru Ueda, January 1, 1935; Dominguez
Estate Company to Bob Ueda, May 7, 1937; Territory of Hawaii, Office of the Secretary, birth certificate of
Shigeru Ueda, January 1910, Box 194, Folder 2565, Rancho San Pedro Collection, Archives and Special
Collections, University Library, California State University, Dominguez Hills, Carson, California.
414
“Shinkō Chū Datta Kaiketsu Kōshō [Negotiation for solution was in progress],” Rafu Shimpo, May 29, 1936.
213

contract with the CUCOM, the Nōkai Renmei and the Rafu Shimpo basically dismissed it as a
trivial matter at least publicly and did not even mention the name of Bob Ueda.
415

Nōkai Renmei leaders hastily made a visit to the Gardena Valley area to investigate the
influence of strikers. The leaders speculated that those Japanese led by Ueda did not suffer labor
shortage since most were small tenant farmers who would not depend much on Mexican workers.
Based on this assumption, they concluded that these Gardena farmers signed the contract as they
were influenced by pro-labor sentiment not by their desperate need for Mexican labor, without
understanding that Nōkai Renmei’s rather insensitive attitude towards small-scale farmers was a
major reason why some other farmers wanted to act independently. Around the same time,
Mexican consul Hill suddenly became reluctant to discuss with the Nōkai Renmei and abandoned
his own settlement plan. Hill’s turn-over made Nōkai Renmei leaders suspect that there must be
considerable relations between Ueda and Hill, as they argued that “now Hill discusses that we do
not have to model after the agreement in Orange County clearly because a group of Japanese
farmers in Gardena began to sign for union recognition.”
416

Meanwhile, it was becoming increasingly difficult for Mexican strikers to live without work,
as almost forty days had passed since the outbreak of the Venice strike. In early June, a Mexican
American strong man David Benítez organized as many as 900 Mexican workers, who once
belonged to the CUCOM, to seek for a different solution. Benítez, who was originally from
Arizona, was working to support Mexican workers in the El Monte area as part of the CUCOM’s

415
“Gādena Hōmen no Yunion Shōnin wa Tonda Dema [A bad false rumor about Gardena farmers recognizing
unions],” Rafu Shimpo, June 1, 1936. Another article said that Ueda was the only person who signed the contract
with the union. See “Yunion Shōmei wa Nisei Rīsu Meiginin [Who signed the contract with the union was a
Nisei lessee], Rafu Shimpo, June 8, 1936.
416
Nōkai Renmei, anti-labor measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ; Matsumoto, “1936 Nen
Rosanjerusu Serori Sutoraiki to Nikkei Nōgyō Komyunitī,” 69.
214

campaign. But he came to consider that it would be better to make an independent negotiation with
the Nōkai Renmei without other non-Mexican unions. Benítez visited the Nōkai Renmei office in
Downtown Los Angeles and demanded that Japanese farmers would pay twenty-five cents or more
for ordinary work and thirty cents for more expensive crops such as celery, that Japanese farmers
should hire workers regardless of their union membership, and that the contract would be valid in
one year. In short, Benítez did not demand union recognition itself, as he did not set the percentage
of union workers to be hired by Japanese farmers. He also submitted signatures of 900 Mexican
workers and told that the number would soon reach 1,500. Facing an emergency in the Gardena
area, the Nōkai Renmei welcomed the proposal of Benítez.
417
Although Nōkai Renmei leaders
were concerned of the possibility that the campaign led by Bob Ueda would spread to other areas,
most Mexican workers had already returned to Japanese farms. The Nōkai Renmei expected that
the contract with Benítez could help prevent the increase of pro-labor and pro-union farmers.
On June 7, the Nōkai Renmei and Benítez made a provisional agreement, which on the next
day La Opinión reported as a front-page news saying, “1,500 Pickers Destroy the Strike; They
Abandon the CUCOM.” Mexican workers led by Benítez could not continue their struggle as
members of the CUCOM because “their families find themselves in an urgent situation.” Benítez
signed a contract with Japanese leaders such as Katō, Masajirō Kai, and Yemon Minami to end
“one of the gravest labor conflicts in the history of Mexican organizations in the United States”
(see Figure 6). The signers announced, “Last night the strike of workers in vegetable fields ended
peacefully and all Mexican farmworkers who want to work can get all the information at the office

417
Nōkai Renmei, anti-labor measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ; “Yunion wo Hanareta
Mekishikojin 1500 Chingin Kyōtei wo Musubu [1500 Mexicans who had left the union signed the wage
agreement],” “Kaiketsu ni Honsō Shita Ryō Iin [Both committee members worked hard for solution],” Rafu
Shimpo, June 8, 1936; “Sutoraiki Kaishō Sezu to [The strike not solved],” June 6, Rafu Shimpo, June 9, 1936;
“1500 Pizcadores Rompen la Huelga; Abandonan la CUCOM,” La Opinión, June 8, 1936.
215

of the Federated Farmers Association of Southern California (Nōkai Renmei).” Sasaki looked at
the La Opinión article and appreciated “the most influential newspaper among Mexicans” for
encouraging Mexican workers to visit the Nōkai Renmei office to work. As reported by La Opinión,
the separation of 1,500 Mexican workers must have been “a harsh attack” for Veralde and the
CUCOM that had been leading Mexican strikers by that time. Mexican consul Hill gave no
comments on the action taken by Benítez when the La Opinión interviewed him.
418
Probably Hill
was not behind Benítez, since Lucas Lucio, the Mexican consulate representative in Orange
County who worked closely with Hill, visited the Rafu Shimpo headquarters to criticize Benítez
immediately after the signing.
419
Yet, white agribusiness leaders and Japanese farmers in the El
Monte area might have put some pressure on Benítez, who was an ethnic Mexican well trusted by
white Americans according to the Nōkai Renmei.
420
Although it is not clear what kind of power
was behind Benítez, a division within Mexican workers was evident just like that within Japanese
farmers. While the CUCOM led by Veralde put priority on union recognition, many Mexican
workers led by Benítez cared their wages and employment more than union recognition. Both
groups of Mexican workers wanted to live in Los Angeles permanently securing their job and
sustaining their families. Again, Los Angeles farmland as a transpacific workplace made them
think which was more important to survive in Los Angeles, union recognition in multiethnic
cooperation or more stable employment, if only temporarily, in a bilateral Japanese-Mexican
negotiation.

418
Ibid.; “Bokukokujin Rōdōsha Yunion wo Hōki [Mexican workers abandoned the union],” Rafu Shimpo, June
8, 1936.
419
“Sutoraiki Kaishō Sezu to,” Rafu Shimpo, June 9, 1936;
420
“Kaiketsu ni Honsō Shita Ryō Iin,” Rafu Shimpo, June 8, 1936.
216

Although losing most union members, Veralde did not stop organizing workers, since he had
succeeded at least in part of the Gardena area. Likewise, Ueda continued to be active in persuading
Japanese farmers to recognize the CUCOM. Nōkai Renmei leaders were concerned that the pro-
labor campaign by some Gardena Japanese could give a negative impression to white farmers who
were resisting the labor movement in Southern California and “damage a good situation in recent
years in which amicable relations [between Japanese and white farmers] are being made in this
industry.” The anger of anti-labor Japanese was not only triggered by their class interests but also
by their racial understanding about the Japanese and Mexicans. When they criticized Japanese
labor activists who took part in organizing the Venice strike, they asserted that “it is outrageous
Figure 6 Japanese and Mexican representatives signing a provisional agreement at the office
of the Nōkai Renmei in Downtown Los Angeles. Shin’ichi Katō (left) is watching David
Benítez (second left) putting his signature.
Source: Rafu Shimpo, June 9, 1936.
217

that they lead ignorant Mexican workers to take violent actions and afflict Japanese farmers who
share the same blood and ethnicity.” For anti-labor Japanese leaders, Mexican strikers were wrong
because they were “ignorant” and pro-labor Japanese were bad because they betrayed the racial
and ethnic solidarity.
421

From the perspective of pro-labor farmers like Ueda, Mexican workers were not ignorant at
all and Japanese farmers should think beyond racial and ethnic backgrounds. Thus, it was
important for pro-labor Japanese to build amicable relationships between Japanese farmers and
Mexican workers. As seen in the Venice strike, multiethnic Los Angeles saw class and race
intersect each other generating multiple relations between the Japanese and Mexicans. Anti-labor
Japanese and white farmers worked together based on their common class interests. Their
Japanese-white alliance helped maintain the white dominant agriculture of Los Angeles in which
non-union Mexican workers would fit as an indispensable element. On the other hand, pro-labor
Japanese farmers and Mexican strikers helped each other, envisioning an interethnic and interracial
harmony beyond their racial and class status.
Agriculture had been the most important industry for Japanese immigrants to build their
ethnic solidarity and survive the hostile Los Angeles society, which was true until the Pearl Harbor
attack. But a close look at the Venice strike gives us a new understanding. In the mid-1930s, due
to the heavy dependency of Japanese agriculture on ethnic Mexican workers, the growing labor
movement particularly after 1935 in the United States, and the lack of the Japanese government’s
involvement, the Venice strike forced ethnic Japanese residents to question the premise of the
ethnic Japanese solidarity within the triracial hierarchy in Los Angeles agriculture and some

421
Nōkai Renmei, anti-strike measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
218

Japanese like Gardena farmers began to envision a possibility of interethnic harmony in the
transpacific borderlands where Japanese and Mexican immigrants had come to settle and work
together.

Immigrant Nationalism and Interethnic Accommodation
The split within Japanese farmers alarmed white agribusiness leaders who had been working
closely with the Nōkai Renmei and the police authority to suppress the labor movement more
severely, while they knew that the strike had been basically unsuccessful in Los Angeles County.
On June 11, 1936, the executive secretary of the Associated Farmers of Los Angeles, Arthur Clark,
wrote a report on the Venice strike to the Board of Direction of the Associated Farmers, which
was shared by Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. Clark believed that radicalization of the
Mexican labor movement resulted in the division of anti-labor and pro-labor Japanese farmers:

A very critical situation has developed in agricultural labor during the past few weeks . . .
The spear head of the attempt [of strikers to make growers to recognize unions] was in the
celery and vegetable harvests locally where old line Mexican unions of no particular size
or strength in past years were taken over by militant, radical organizers of the San Joaquin
Valley apparently with the full support of Ricardo Hill, local Mexican consul. This strike,
as far as delaying or interfering with the harvests was concerned, was a complete failure,
but because it was directed against Japanese growers who find themselves divided, some
219

progress has been made toward accomplishing the real purpose of the walkout, i.e.
establishment of complete union recognition and the closed shop [Italics added].
422

This report described that “some 100 Japanese have signed up with the union on what is referred
to as a 60 per cent closed shop” but that “[t]here are between 1500 and 2000 Japanese growers in
this County and so the progress cannot be regarded as very favorable to the ‘strikers,’ but with
salient support and approval of the Local A.F. of L. the organizers are [bearing] away in their
efforts to make further inroads into the Japanese growers.” Since the Nōkai Renmei affiliated with
the Associated Farmers of Los Angeles, they must have known that nearly 100 Japanese farmers
signed up with the CUCOM. It would be no surprise that the Nōkai Renmei did not reveal this
information to the ethnic Japanese community. While strike organizers were still active in Los
Angeles County, they were also active in Orange County in order to accomplish “complete
unionization on closed shop principles of all farm labor here and throughout California.” Thus,
Clark’s report warned, “United action by all farm labor employers, whether Japanese or Americans,
is vitally necessary if this battle is to be won.”
423

To prevent further strikes by Mexicans, the secretary of the Los Angeles Chamber of
Commerce W.G. Arnoll discussed the need to set up a “permanent board of strategy” against
Mexican strikers in his letter to Clements sent on June 20. Arnoll’s suggestion was to create
“Mexican villages out in the agricultural districts where the mean labor supply can be housed and

422
Arthur Clark, executive secretary of the Associated Farmers of Los Angeles, to the Board of Direction of the
Associated Farmers of Los Angeles, June 11, 1936, Box 64, Clements Papers. It seems that Clark thought that a
group of labor activists in the San Joaquin Valley was involved in the Venice strike, although other Spanish and
Japanese primary sources analyzed in this dissertation do not indicate their direct involvement.
423
Ibid.
220

taken care of.” Since many Mexican workers lived in the urban area of Los Angeles and commuted
to agricultural areas, Arnoll thought that it would be easier to control Mexican workers if they
were scattered and lived near different agricultural areas.
424
His idea reflected their typical
understanding toward Mexicans as foreigners who should and could be tamed through government
or business policy. This type of understanding would be shared with many other Chamber of
Commerce officials who regarded Mexicans as foreign labor to be controlled rather than people
who deserved better wages and labor conditions.
At the same time, Chamber of Commerce officials were aware of the division within Mexican
workers, as documented in Clark’s report. They observed that “only a handful of Mexicans actually
at work want to belong to the union (CUCOM),” because many continued to harvest crop despite
“the known desire of Consul Hill that they stop work.” Chamber of Commerce officials took the
role of Mexican consul Hill seriously, while being aware that not only Mexican organizers but also
non-Mexican leaders such as Monroe and Deguchi were involved in the expansion of the strike.
However, the Chamber of Commerce also knew that the role of Mexican government officials was
limited in the Venice strike because of “a split between the followers of the present Mexican
government [led by Cárdenas] and Calles [which] has developed to further complicate the
situation.”
425
In other words, Hill could not receive a similar support from the Mexican
government in the Venice strike due to the absence of Calles. This lack of coherent support from
the Mexican government helped the Japanese government stay away from the Venice strike in
order to avoid transforming it into an international problem that might harm U.S.-Japan relations,
although the respective consulates were never able to give up their role in protecting and

424
Arnoll to Clements, June 20, 1936, Box 64, Clements Papers.
425
Clark to the Board of Direction of the Associated Farmers of Los Angeles, June 11, 1936, Box 64, Clements
Papers.
221

monitoring their citizens in Los Angeles. This absence of the consulates’ direct involvement was
also an international factor that defined the Japanese-Mexican relations during the Venice strike.
By early June of 1936, the Venice strike was on the decline as a contract was made between
anti-labor farmers led by the Nōkai Renmei and non-union Mexican workers organized by Benítez.
However, anti-labor Japanese farmers were not feeling easy until the strike would completely fade
away. And around this time, the labor movement in Orange County became increasingly active,
which could unsettle the situation in Los Angeles.
426
Katsuma Mukaeda, the former president of
the Central Japanese Association of Southern California who represented Japanese farmers during
the El Monte strike and succeeded in signing a contract with Mexican strikers back then, was
worried about the unsettled situation between Japanese farmers and Mexican workers. Although
Mukaeda continued to work for the association as the vice-president, he was absent in Los Angeles
when the Venice strike broke out, as he was visiting Japan and its overseas territories such as Korea
and Manchuria. In mid-June, Mukaeda returned to Los Angeles and, as an advisor for the Nōkai
Renmei, immediately took action to settle the trouble especially with Veralde and Hill. Mukaeda
knew Veralde and Hill well since he negotiated with them to settle the El Monte strike. Then
Mukaeda personally set up meetings with Veralde and Hill and reached an idea of how to solve
the strike with the CUCOM.
427

In the Venice strike, Mukaeda made serious efforts to make compromise with the Mexican
counterpart. However, it did not mean that he was a cosmopolitan. He was a Japanese nationalist
like many other Japanese immigrants were. He praised imperial Japan for its military and economic
colonization of East Asia when he visited Korea and Manchuria. In his travel report the Rafu

426
Ibid.
427
Nōkai Renmei, anti-labor measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ; Katsuma Mukaeda, “Sen-
Man no Tabi kara [From my trip in Korea and Manchuria],” Rafu Shimpo, June 4 to 6, 1936.
222

Shimpo published in June 1936, Mukaeda wrote, “I became filled with a feeling of superiority as
Japanese when I arrived at Busan (a major port city in Korea). All Koreans were carrying heavy
baggage by hand. People in the United States would use a truck to carry them. Now our train was
heading to Keijō (Seoul). I could see the hardships and fruits of our rule through the train window
[Italics added].” Inspired by Japanese compatriots building the empire in Korea and Manchuria,
Mukaeda reaffirmed his mission to “work hard for amicable U.S.-Japan relations.”
428
With this
hope and determination in his mind, Mukaeda began to solve the Japanese-Mexican conflict during
the Venice strike. Mukaeda’s view on interethnic conflicts demonstrates that Japanese immigrant
nationalism could take a multiethnic and accommodationist position to make compromise with
Mexicans rather than simply incorporating the white supremacist view to look down on Mexicans
and reinforce the racial and class boundaries of the triracial hierarchy in Los Angeles. Japanese
immigrant nationalism and ethnic solidarity were compatible with labor multiculturalism in the
1930s when their economic interests were challenged. It is also significant that Mukaeda, a widely
respected community leader, showed such a nationalist-cum-multiethnic view given the changing
understanding of labor rights in the mid-1930s Los Angeles.
On July 6, Mukaeda submitted his proposal to the Nōkai Renmei. The proposal said that
Japanese farmers should negotiate only with the CUCOM, that the CUCOM should be regarded
as a negotiation agent, that the contract would be valid for one year, that wages should be from 25
to thirty cents an hour, that a mediation committee should be set up when it was necessary, that
the CUCOM should nullify any previous contracts, and that Japanese farmers should hire
Mexicans regardless of their membership in the union. In terms of wages, this was similar with the
contract signed between the Nōkai Renmei and Benítez. Yet, Mukaeda’s proposal would prevent

428
Ibid.
223

the CUCOM from setting up the percentage of union workers at Japanese farms and nullify the
contract signed between the CUCOM and the group of Gardena farmers organized by Ueda. Soon
later, however, the CUCOM disagreed with Mukaeda’s idea and insisted that Japanese farmers
should sign a contract not only with the CUCOM but also with other non-Mexican unions and that
the contract should be valid for nine months. In addition, the CUCOM removed the provision that
would nullify previous contracts, as they wanted to keep the deal with Gardena Japanese farmers,
while adding another provision that allowed union representatives to check the fulfilment of the
contract.
429

Figuring out a middle ground for compromise, Mukaeda revised his original proposal based
on the CUCOM’s demands. On July 8 when Mukaeda visited Veralde, they agreed on the revised
proposal, and on the next day, the state government mediator Thomas Barker and Hill agreed on
their provisional agreement. The provisional agreement was a product of trusting Japanese-
Mexican relationship between Mukaeda and Veralde.
430
Since the provisional agreement did
neither use the term “closed shop” nor mention the percentage of union workers to be hired,
Mukaeda gained support from the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce that regarded it as “the best
contract for both labor and management.” When he explained the importance of this provisional
agreement, he appreciated Veralde for “understanding the position of Japanese farmers and
persuading hard-liners in his union from opposing.”
431
As one of the most prominent immigrant
leaders in the Los Angeles Japanese community, Mukaeda knew the importance of their ethnic
solidarity and economy. At the same time, he also came to understand the importance of building

429
Nōkai Renmei, anti-strike measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
430
“Nōen Sutoraiki San Kagetsu [The agricultural strike has continued for three months],” Rafu Shimpo, July 9,
1936; “Un Motín de Huelguistas fue Disuelto Ayer a Garrotazos,” La Opinión, July 11, 1936.
431
“Mukaeda-shi Kataru [Mr. Mukaeda talks],” Rafu Shimpo, July 9, 1936.
224

trusting relations with ethnic Mexican workers, without whom Japanese agriculture in Los Angeles
could neither survive nor strive. In the three years since the El Monte strike, Japanese-Mexican
labor relations did not improve much. But there was certainly a growing understanding among
Japanese immigrants for cooperating with Mexicans as well as white Americans.
On July 11, the Nōkai Renmei held a meeting to discuss Mukaeda’s revised proposal but
politely disapproved it by showing gratitude to his efforts. The Nōkai Renmei disapproved his
proposal because a nine-month contact would be invalid before the next year’s harvest and because
letting union representatives in Japanese farms could result in an increase of union workers even
though the contract did not set the percentage of union workers. At the same time, white
landowners had demonstrated a stern attitude towards labor unions and made it even more difficult
for Japanese farmers to negotiate with the CUCOM. White landowners in San Pedro and
Dominguez Hills made a statement that they would not lease lands to Japanese farmers who had
signed a contract with any labor union.
432
On July 13, the Nōkai Renmei and the CUCOM were
supposed to sign a contract based on Mukaeda’s revised proposal. But without the approval from
Nōkai Renmei leaders, the Japanese and Mexican sides could not reach the agreement. CUCOM
leaders denounced Japanese farmers for “trying to deceive workers” and called Mexican workers
not to fall in “traps” set up by the Japanese.
433

432
Nōkai Renmei, anti-strike measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ. Regarding the Dominguez
Hills white landowners’ statement, Matsumoto regards it as “an attempt of pressure and control over ethnic
Japanese farmers.” Her argument seems to be based on the assumption that the decision of white landowners
one-sidedly controlled or influenced the situation of Japanese farmers. By taking a closer look at the local context,
however, I argue that most Japanese farmers and landowners in the Dominguez Hills area were determined to
fight together against strikers largely because of their genuine mutual trust, which will be explained in Chapter
6. See Matsumoto, “1936 Nen Rosanjerusu Serori Sutoraiki to Nikkei Nōgyō Komyunitī,” 65-66.
433
“Fracasaron Los Arreglos en la Huelga,” La Opinión, July 14, 1936.
225

Meanwhile, since early June, the CUCOM was gradually shifting their focus from Los
Angeles to Orange County where Mexican strikers were fighting against white citrus farmers. Just
like anti-labor Japanese farmers in Los Angeles County, white citrus farmers maintained an
uncompromising stance and the local police authority treated Mexican strikers harshly.
434
White
farmers were skeptical that Mexican consul Hill was promoting the strike in Orange County. They
sent a petition to the U.S. Labor Department for investigating the role of Hill in the Orange County
strike. Hill immediately refuted their allegation and explained his position by saying, “It has
always been an honor for me to comply with my obligation, as the representative of my
government and of ordinary Mexican citizens, to actively intervene in controversies” involving
Mexican citizens.
435
On July 14, one day after the disapproval of Mukaeda’s revised proposal, the
Orange County Sheriff’s Department arrested Veralde, another Mexican strike leader J. Espinoza,
and Fred West, a local representative of the American Federation of Labor on charge of “vagrancy.”
Veralde, Espinoza, and West were held on $1,000 bond (approximately $17,700 in 2017)
respectively. La Opinión reported that Logan Jackson, the Orange County Sheriff, had given a
“shoot to kill” order regarding strikers, while Edward H. Fitzgerald, a U.S. Labor Department
official who had been involved in mediating the El Monte strike, criticized Jackson saying that
such an order would provoke a “very serious” international conflict.
436

On July 17, Veralde was released but could not regain the leadership in the labor movement
in Orange County, because other Mexican leaders such as Hill and Lucas Lucio came to play a
larger role in negotiating with white citrus farmers.
437
In contrast to Veralde who believed in the

434
“Mekishikan Sutoraiki Orenji Gun ni Tobihi [The Mexican strike has spread to Orange County],” Rafu
Shimpo, June 10, 1936.
435
“Enshu Gawa to Bokukoku Ryōji [Farmers’ side and the Mexican consul],” Rafu Shimpo, June 13, 1936; “El
Cónsul Hill Se Defiende,” La Opinión, June 13, 1936.
436
“El Lider de la CUCOM, Preso!,” La Opinión, July 15, 1936.
437
“Está Ya en Libertad el Sr. Velarde,” La Opinión, July 17, 1936.
226

importance of union recognition and cooperation with non-Mexican workers, Hill and Lucio
focused more on wages and non-discriminatory treatment for Mexicans without insisting on union
recognition. On July 24, Orange County citrus farmers and Mexican workers reached an agreement
thanks to the support of the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles. While citrus farmers in Orange
County used to pay six cents per box without hourly wages, the new agreement required them to
pay twenty cents an hour as well as three cents per a box. However, union recognition was not
included in the agreement.
438
In short, the CUCOM and Veralde lost in both Los Angeles and
Orange Counties.
Back in Los Angeles, the strike had been gone by that time. On August 18, Japanese consul
Hori sent a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in Tokyo and explained, “the strike
faded away on its own.” He attached a detailed report about the Venice strike written by the Nōkai
Renmei.
439
During the strike, Hori stayed away and even travelled to the East Coast.
440
He must
have been happy about the fact that the strike ended in Los Angeles without his involvement. The
U.S. government was not involved in the Venice strike, either. The NLRB simply did not deal with
agricultural workers but hoped that there would not be serious labor disputes. Particularly their
regional branch office in Los Angeles was looking forward to the end of the Venice strike. On July
10, a weekly report of the regional office celebrated the agreement between Japanese and Mexican
representatives. Although this agreement was still an unofficial one between Mukaeda and the
CUCOM, the NLRB regional office mistook it for the final contract signed between the Nōkai
Renmei and the CUCOM. The report wrote, “We are pleased to report that the Los Angele County
Vegetable Workers strike ended today with a signed agreement between the Mexican union and

438
“Regresan al Trabajo los Pizcadores,” La Opinión, July 26, 1936.
439
Nōkai Renmei, anti-strike measure report, July 1936, I-4-4-0-2, vol.1, DAMFAJ.
440
“Hori Ryōji Tōbu Shisatsu [Consul Hori travels in the East Coast],” Rafu Shimpo, June 13, 1936.
227

the Japanese Associations. This agreement is to continue for a period of nine months and grants
the workers a slight increase in wages, a few concessions in regard to hours but does not recognize
a closed shop.”
441

In addition to the fact that their observation was wrong, Towne Nylander, the director of the
Los Angeles Regional Labor Board, a local branch of the NLRB in Los Angeles, did not take the
Japanese-Mexican conflict seriously. One year after the Venice strike, Nylander wrote about
Mukaeda and the Japanese-Mexican conflict in a letter to his colleague. Nylander said, “Makaidam
(Mukaeda) who is a graduate of the University of Southern California, General Manager of the
Central Japan Association, and understands English just as well as you and I do, but when forced
into a corner resorts to that most irritating trait of the Japanese-pretending not to understand.
Makaidam will play ball, however, if a strike actually threatens but he will bluff right down to the
very last minute and in several cases in the past the Mexicans have moved too fast for him and
have actually struck before he could make the concession that he was prepared to make from the
very beginning. If you have plenty of time I think you will enjoy this Mexican-Japanese
problem.”
442

On the contrary, Mexican consul Hill was working hard for the sake of Mexican workers.
Although he did not adhere to union recognition and intended to exclude radicals from the labor
movement, white farmers and agribusiness leaders were frustrated by “subversive activities” of
Hill and wanted him out of Los Angeles. Arthur Clark, the executive secretary of the Associated
Farmers of Los Angeles, misunderstood the role of Hill and believed that he purposefully teamed

441
The 21st district office of the National Labor Relations Board, weekly report, July 10, 1936, Box 1, RG25,
NAR.
442
Towne Nylander, regional director of the National Labor Relations Board, to Ralph T. Seward, Regional
Attorney, March 12, 1937, Box 1, RG25, NAR.
228

up with Veralde and Monroe to organize workers for “interfering with a purely domestic problem.”
Likewise, the Associated Farmers of Orange County was dissatisfied with Hill regarding him as a
pro-union leftist. By October, Hill had left the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles to work as a
deputy in the Federal Chamber of Deputies in Mexico.
443
Clements welcomed Hill’s resignation
and believed that the Mexican government removed him in order to avoid international conflicts.
In November, when new consul Renato Cantú Lara arrived at Los Angeles, Clark and Clements
contacted with his vice consul and made sure that Lara should “adhere strictly to his consular work”
and work closely with local agribusiness leaders and farmers.
444

Resisting the strike of Mexican workers, Japanese farmers built stronger relations with white
landowners and agribusiness leaders, as they believed that “Japanese and Americans are firmly
tied together not merely through words but through agriculture.”
445
Most Japanese farmers and
white landowners demonstrated an uncompromising stance against union recognition. However,
the question that the Venice strike forced Japanese farmers to consider was not simply about union
recognition but also about how to survive as a minority in white dominant and multiethnic Los
Angeles. The Venice strike helps us understand how Japanese farmers negotiated the Los Angeles
society divided by race and class and how they could make Japanese agriculture sustainable for
years to come. While anti-labor Japanese farmers drew a clear line between them and ethnic
Mexicans in order to maintain ethnic Japanese solidarity, pro-labor farmers regarded the Japanese-
Mexican relationship as a mutually dependent and indispensable component in Japanese

443
Clements to Arnoll, August 8, 1936, Box 64, Clements Papers. As for the relationship between Hill and
radical labor organizers, see González, Labor and Community, 118-121.
444
Clements to Arnoll, October 12, 1936, Box 64, Clements Papers; Clements to Arnoll, November 27, 1936,
Box 64, Clements Papers.
445
“Nōgyō wo Tōshite Shinzen [Deepening our relationship through agriculture],” Rafu Shimpo, February 24,
1936.
229

agriculture that would necessitate some kind of interethnic accommodation such as hiring a
definite number of union members.
Mukaeda’s position was in between these two groups. By employing his personal network
with Mexican and white American key persons, he urged Japanese farmers to recognize the
CUCOM while preventing the Mexican side from setting up the percentage of union workers to
be hired. Although his efforts did not materialize, it is important that by the mid-1930s Issei leaders
like Mukaeda had come to recognize the importance of inter-minority cooperation in white
dominant and multiethnic Los Angeles. In other words, Los Angeles, a transpacific workplace
located in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, provided such space for Japanese immigrants to
understand the importance of both ethnic solidarity and interethnic accommodation. In fact, as the
vice-president of the Central Japanese Association of Southern California, Mukaeda continued to
work for the final settlement of the Venice strike and finally succeeded in reaching an agreement
between the Nōkai Renmei and the CUCOM in April 1937.
446
The both Japanese and Mexican
sides signed a contract with the important provisions such as the recognition of the CUCOM and
other unions as agents for collective bargaining and the payment of minimum wage of thirty-five
cents per hour for all farmworkers. The agreement was made between representatives of Japanese
farmers, the Mexican consul, and the California State Labor Commissioner’s office, and then
ratified by the unions such as the CUCOM, the Filipino Labor Federation, and the Japanese Farm
Workers Union.
447

446
Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi, 388.
447
Jamieson, Labor Unionism in American Agriculture, 127-128. Further research is necessary to examine how
the international situation of 1937 affected the Japanese-Mexican negotiation for this agreement, although the
Second Shino-Japanese War began after the agreement.
230

As a leader of the ethnic Japanese community, Mukaeda had his own view about how to
survive the white dominant and multiethnic Los Angeles society and made efforts to create the
mutual trust with both white Americans and Mexicans. At the night of December 7, 1941 when
Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, however, Mukaeda was arrested by the U.S. authority because he
was a community leader no matter what he had been doing in his beloved city of Los Angeles. But
“whenever troubles, came, or maybe when troubles were coming up, I always settled them or
stopped them,” as he recalled later in the 1970s. During the war, Mukaeda served for his
community as the spokesman of his internment camp and worked to make comfortable the living
conditions of ethnic Japanese internees within the camp.
448

What was significant about the Venice strike is that some Japanese farmers came to
understand the importance of union recognition during the New Deal period and the need for
interethnic harmony with ethnic Mexican residents, thus challenging the existing norm of the
triracial hierarchy. However, the majority of Los Angeles farmers, who were vehemently anti-
labor, could go through the strike without recognizing the Mexican labor union. One of the places
that demonstrated the strongest alliance between Japanese farmers and white landowners was
Dominguez Hills. However, this does not mean that they were simply pro-business and anti-
Mexican. In Chapter 6, we will examine the impact of Japanese relocation and internment on Los
Angele agriculture and Japanese-Mexican relations. Japanese removal wiped away Japanese-
Mexican relations in the triracial hierarchy as well as the transborder ethnic Japanese community.

448
Katsuma Mukaeda, interview by Dave Biniasz, November 28, 1973, California State University, Fullerton
Oral History Program Japanese American Project Oral History Collection, Special Collections, University of
California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California.
231

Yet, by focusing on the Dominguez Hills area, we can see that the events of World War II could
not completely remove mutual trust between Japanese tenant farmers, white landowners, and
Mexican workers.

232

Chapter 6
There Go the Japanese: Japanese Removal and Mexican Workers during the Pacific War

In the morning of 7 December 1941, Kumezō Hachimonji, a Japanese immigrant and owner
of a seed and fertilizer shop in El Monte, woke up as usual and tended his field in shirt sleeves.
The sun was shining brightly. At about 2 o’clock in the afternoon, Jim, his trusted employee came
to his shop. He came by the back gate and did not look well. In his diary, Hachimonji wrote, “he
(Jim) came this time with a kind of smile on his face—as if he had [a] mask on.” When Hachimonji
said “Hi,” Jim calmly told him, “You know [that the] Japanese [are] bombing Hawaii, now.”
Hachimonji responded, “What? No. What do you mean? It can’t be true. Maybe [some] American
aviator dropped bombs on Honolulu by mistake or something.” Jim said, “Well… Go in and listen
[to the] radio.” Hachimonji listened to the radio and realized that it was true. For him, it was “a
peal of thunder out of a clean sky.” Two days later, Hachimonji wrote in his diary that he wanted
to transfer his properties to his U.S.-born children in the case that he was arrested as an enemy
alien. He hoped that his diary would serve as a legal document, although he was not sure whether
he was legally able to transfer his properties to his children in the first place. Yet, Hachimonji
anticipated that “the government would tolerate it (property transfer) so that my U.S.-born children
could operate [my shop] to make their living.”
449
His diary shows that he had no idea that the
government would mercilessly remove the entire ethnic Japanese population, both Japanese
immigrants and their U.S.-born children, altogether from the Pacific Coast.
Japanese Internment inflicted a grave injustice on Japanese immigrants and Japanese
American citizens and marked a key moment in U.S. racial history. The decision-making processes

449
Kumezō Hachimonji, diary, December 7 and 9, 1941, Box 61, Folder 2, Japanese American Research Project
Collection, Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California.
233

that led to Internment have been well studied by scholars in the contexts of anti-Japanese racism,
wartime hysteria, and political tension among different governmental agencies.
450
Yet, from the
agricultural perspective, Internment also resulted in the sudden loss of Japanese farmers, triggering
a serious labor shortage in California where vegetable production was an integral part of the
wartime food security. As detailed in previous chapters, Los Angeles farmland developed as a
transpacific workplace with the unique triracial hierarchy in which Japanese farmers, Mexican
workers, and white landowners interacted with one another. The disappearance of Japanese
farmers brought an end to this triracial relationship in Los Angeles agriculture and thus produced
a serious problem of how to keep Japanese farms operational without the Japanese.
451
This chapter
will examine Japanese Internment as an agricultural labor crisis by analyzing the impact of
Japanese removal on the federal and California state governments, white landowners, and Mexican
farmworkers in California, particularly in Los Angeles County. As was the case in the 1930s,
interethnic and international relations involving Japan, Mexico, and the United States influenced
each other and influenced the governmental and local responses to the mass evacuation of Japanese
farmers.

450
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied (Washington, D.C.,
1982; 1997), Summary, 18. As for the decision-making process of Japanese Internment, see Morton Grodzins,
Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation (Chicago, 1949; 1974); Jacobus tenBroek, Edward
N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, Prejudice, War and the Constitution: Causes and Consequences of the
Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in World War II (1954; repr., Berkeley, 1970); Roger Daniels, The
Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans (Philadelphia, 1975); Greg Robinson, By Order of the President:
FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans (Cambridge, 2001); Brian Masaru Hayashi, Democratizing the
Enemy: The Japanese American Internment (Princeton, 2004); Alice Yang Murray, Historical Memories of the
Japanese American Internment and the Struggle for Redress (Stanford, 2008); Lon Kurashige, Two Faces of
Exclusion: The Untold History of Anti-Asian Racism in the United States (Chapel Hill, 2016).
451
As for the impact of Japanese Internment on non-Japanese minorities, see Scott Kurashige, The Shifting
Grounds of Race: Black and Japanese Americans in the Making of Multiethnic Los Angeles (Princeton, 2008),
161-169; R.J. Smith, The Great Black Way: L.A. in the 1940s and the Lost African-American Renaissance (New
York, 2006), 139-153. Greg Robinson, After Camp: Portraits in Midcentury Japanese American Life and
Politics (Berkeley, 2012), 105-122; Allison Varzally, Making a Non-White America: Californians Coloring
outside Ethnic Lines, 1925-1955 (Berkeley, 2008), 122-123; George J. Sánchez, “Disposable People,
Expendable Neighborhoods,” in A Companion to Los Angeles, eds. William Deverell and Greg Hise (Malden,
2010), 129-146.
234

This chapter consists of two parts. The first section looks at the reactions of local officials of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and California Governor Culbert Olson to the mass
removal of ethnic Japanese residents. While attempting to keep them within the border of the state
of California, USDA officials and Olson portrayed the Japanese not only as important contributors
of labor for the U.S. war effort but also as trustworthy people despite the racial hysteria of the
opening months of World War II. Even after the federal government decided to implement the
mass removal, federal officials remained concerned about the problems the loss of Japanese
farmers could raise. While Japanese Internment was regarded as the solution for military concerns,
it was also the cause of economic problems as far as agriculture was concerned. In this context,
the importation of Mexican workers through the so-called Bracero Program emerged as a potential
solution for the economic concerns Governor Olson identified with the sudden loss of Japanese
agricultural labor. The Bracero Program materialized as a result of the newfound wartime U.S.-
Mexico collaboration in hemispheric defense of their shared borderlands where large number of
Japanese immigrants and their children lived at the time.
The second section of this chapter examines in detail how Japanese farms were taken over by
Mexican farmers during the Pacific War by paying close attention to the South Bay area in Los
Angeles County, the region once called Rancho San Pedro. Many white landowners in Los
Angeles County did not expect that the Bracero Program would solve their urgent situation because
the program would bring only temporary immigrant workers, not resident tenant farmers. A
collection of land lease contracts and other business documents preserved by landowners of
Rancho San Pedro give us a detailed picture of what happened there after the Pearl Harbor attack.
In Rancho San Pedro, Japanese Internment reaffirmed the trusting relationship between Japanese
farmers and white landowners who cordially supported the Japanese, while providing economic
235

opportunities for ethnic Mexicans to acquire their own farms in Los Angeles County during the
turbulent period of the Pacific War. In short, Japanese Internment was not just an experience
restricted solely to the ethnic Japanese population but rather a multiethnic wartime experience for
Los Angeles within the larger transpacific U.S.-Mexico borderlands created by rapidly changing
international relations between Japan, Mexico, and the United States. The transborder ethnic
Japanese community, which was developed in Baja California, particularly Mexicali, as an
unintended consequence of the 1924 Immigration Act, ceased to exist as a result of the unique
transnational pressures of the Pacific War in 1942.
After the Pearl Harbor attack, the racial and class boundaries that existed in the triracial
hierarchy in Los Angeles agriculture took on a character of wartime political boundaries that
separated the Japanese from Mexicans and white Americans just like the line drawn between the
Axis and the Allies. The wartime political boundaries, however, were not rigid for many Japanese,
Mexicans, and white Americans of Los Angeles County who had already built a certain level of
mutual trust and thus understood each other beyond the dominant racial and class boundaries. The
mutual understanding between Japanese tenant farmers and white landowners and government
officials, and even between some Japanese and Mexicans, unsettled the hardening racial and
political boundaries in wartime Los Angeles, even though it could hardly stop the implementation
of Japanese removal.

Japanese Internment as an Agricultural Labor Crisis in California
Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 prompted the United States to
declare war on Japan and turned Japanese immigrants into the position of enemy aliens. After ten
weeks, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 that would soon serve
236

as a legal basis for the mass removal of Japanese immigrants and Americans of Japanese ancestry
from the Pacific Coast of the mainland United States. The aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack
created two contradictory wartime tasks for U.S. agriculture officials: keeping Japanese farms
operational for the Food-for-Freedom program while also removing the Japanese from their farms.
An eventual compromise of the War Department and USDA was reached keeping Japanese farms
functioning yet without the Japanese. Yet before putting this compromise into action, local USDA
officials in California had to handle a messy situation caused by the Treasury Department’s
freezing of Japanese assets immediately following the Pearl Harbor attack.
452
Japanese farmers
produced from 35 to 50 percent of the vegetables grown in California in December 1941;
furthermore, California’s vegetable harvest constituted between one to two thirds of the country’s
vegetable production. About 5,000 ethnic Japanese farms operated 175,000 acres of the California
farmland in 1941.
453
In Los Angeles County, the number of Japanese-operated farms increased
from 531 in 1910 to 1,523 in 1940 operating 28,670 acres.
454
Los Angeles County was the largest
concentration of ethnic Japanese residents in the mainland United States with a population of
36,866, which represented 39 percent of the Japanese population in California. Perhaps more
significantly for our purposes, the Los Angeles County Japanese population represented 29 percent

452
“Assets ‘frozen’,” Rafu Shimpo (English edition), December 9, 1942.
453
Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., Regional Director of the Farm Security Administration, to District Officers and Field
Agents of the Wartime Farm Adjustment Program of the Farm Security Administration, March 15, 1942, Carton
2, W.R. Ralston Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California (hereafter as
Ralston Papers); U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Select Committee Investigating National Defense
Migration, National Defense Migration: Hearings before the Select Committee investigating National Defense
Migration, 77th Cong., 2nd session, March 6, 7, and 12, 1942 (hereafter as Tolan Committee), 11659, online at
https://archive.org/details/nationaldefensem31unit, accessed July 3, 2017; Minami Kashū Nihonjin
Shichijūnenshi Kankō Iinkai [Publishing committee of Japanese in Southern California: A history of 70 years],
ed., Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi [Japanese in Southern California: A history of 70 years] (Los
Angeles, 1960), 58 (hereafter as Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi).
454
Masakazu Iwata, Planted in Good Soil: A History of the Issei in United States Agriculture, 2 vols (New York,
1992), 1:294; Leonard Broom and Ruth Piemer, Removal and Return: The Socio-Economic Effects of the War
on Japanese Americans (Berkeley, 1949), 74.
237

of the entire Japanese population in the mainland United States. In Los Angeles County about 28
percent of the total 17,005 employed ethnic Japanese were involved in agriculture and about 90
percent of Japanese farmers were tenants. Japanese farmers dominated the county’s production of
at least seventeen crops such as celery, peas, spinach, beets, broccoli, radishes, peppers, snap beans,
strawberries, cauliflower, lettuce, and so forth.
455

The Treasury Department’s action stopped the distribution of Japanese-grown vegetables and
forced three major produce markets on Seventh, Eights, and Ninth Streets in Downtown Los
Angeles to suspend their operation. On December 8, about two hundred people, Japanese, Chinese,
and white Americans, working at these markets held a joint meeting about the wartime emergency
and affirmed the necessity of resuming their market operation in order to distribute Japanese grown
vegetables in Los Angeles County and other neighboring counties. Japanese merchants needed to
prevent the vegetables kept in their storehouse from going rotten and thus decided to hand the
stored vegetables to the companies run by white American or Japanese American merchants.
456

Two days later, the Rafu Shimpo, reported on the troubling situation in Downtown Los Angeles.
Many Japanese immigrants “rushed into” a bank to withdraw money only to find out that the bank
allowed only Nisei with birth certificates to withdraw money. Like the produce markets, most
Japanese operated shops in Little Tokyo were closed because “baking transactions by Issei were
prohibited.” Although the immigrant press expected the U.S. government to remove the restriction
on behalf of “bona fide Issei,” the immediate reaction of the Treasury Department to the Pearl

455
U.S. Census Bureau, Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population (Washington, D.C., 1943),
Table 4, “ Race, by Nativity and Sex for the United States: 1850 to 1940” and Table 25, “Indians, Chinese, and
Japanese by Sex, for Counties, and for Cities of 10,000 to 100,000,” 19, 516, 567; Broom and Piemer, Removal
and Return, 13, 74, 85.; Noritaka Yagasaki, Imin Nōgyō: Kariforunia no Nihonjin Imin Shakai [Immigrant
agriculture: The Japanese immigrant society in California] (Tokyo, 1993), 51-53.
456
“Nōsan Shijō no Nichi-Bei-Shi Jin ga Taisaku Kyōgi [Japanese, Americans, Chinese of the produce markets
hold a meeting to discuss measures],” Rafu Shimpo, December 10, 1941.
238

Harbor attack certainly created a financial crisis in the daily lives of ethnic Japanese residents in
Los Angeles County.
457

During the war, the U.S. Department of Agriculture promoted the Food-for-Freedom program
that sought to increase food production as a home front war effort against the Axis Powers. In a
program pamphlet published in November 1942, Secretary of Agriculture Claude R. Wickard
explained, “Our farm recourses must be used toward but one end—Victory” and “Not only must
we keep our own soldiers strong physically by producing the food they need, but we must back
them up in another way by keeping workers in our war factories fell fed.”
458
Local officials of the
USDA took the suspension on Japanese agriculture seriously because it could impede their
wartime efforts under the Food-for-Freedom policy. On December 10, Dave Davidson, Chairman
of the California USDA Defense Board, warned representatives of County Defense Boards, “All
resources of alien Japanese are frozen. This is creating a serious problem in the Food-for-Freedom
program in areas where alien Japanese are employed.” The State and County Defense Boards were
established by the USDA in July 1941 and later changed to War Boards in January 1942. Their
goal was to “help farmers produce commodities needed in the war” in cooperation with other war
agencies in the field. Davidson worried that if Japanese tenant farmers could not pay for land lease,
it was possible that white landowners would terminate contracts with them and hire non-Japanese
workers as their new tenants. He also had information that the Treasury Department was about to
modify their anti-Japanese measure regarding Japanese assets. Thus, Davidson asked the county
representatives to make sure that “[e]mployers should be advised verbally not to hire other labor
to replace alien Japanese.” In his correspondence, Davidson showed no prejudice or antipathy

457
“Senjika no Shō Tōkyō, Hotondo Zenten Heiten [Little Tokyo in the wartime, almost all closed, banking
transactions by Issei were prohibited],” Rafu Shimpo, December 10, 1941.
458
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food for Freedom: Information handbook 1943, November 1942, 3, online
at https://archive.org/details/foodforfreedomin14unit, accessed July 2, 2017.
239

against the Japanese but instead stressed that “Japanese should not be disturbed as to their
safety.”
459
In Davidson’s understanding, freezing Japanese assets generated concerns not only
about the Food-for-Freedom program but also about the socioeconomic safety of ethnic Japanese
residents.
On the next day, the Treasury Department decided to partially unfreeze Japanese assets,
allowing Japanese farmers to resume shipping their vegetables, as they realized the importance of
Japanese agriculture in the West Coast economy. Under this modified stance, the Treasury
Department allowed Japanese farmers to withdraw up to $100 (approximately $1,660 in 2017)
monthly if they brought their notarized affidavit to designated banks.
460
Yet, this measure did not
restore the normal operation of Japanese agriculture because Japanese farmers were prohibited
from receiving the payment for their produce directly from merchants at wholesale markets. The
Central Industrial Association of Southern California (Nanka Shōkō Kaigisho), an ethnic Japanese
organization consisting of both producers and merchants to adjust shipping and control market
prices of their produce, claimed, “Due to the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States,
Japanese Issei are not able to receive payment for their produce so that they could not make their
living . . . This is a serious problem in terms of national defense. In time of war, the shortage of
food, particularly fresh vegetables for soldiers in the war front and affect the spirit of people in the
home front.”
461
Before the Pearl Harbor attack, Japanese immigrants often expressed their national
and racial pride for Japan directly or indirectly supporting Japanese imperialism. In contrast, after

459
Dave Davidson, Chairman of the California USDA Defense Board, to Chairmen of USDA County Defense
Boards, December 10, 1942, Carton 2, Ralston Papers; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food for Freedom:
Information handbook 1943, November 1942, 36, online at https://archive.org/details/foodforfreedomin14unit,
accessed July 2, 2017.
460
“Nihonjin wa Yokin wo Hyaku Doru made Hikidaseru [Japanese allowed to withdraw up to $100],” Rafu
Shimpo, December 12, 1941.
461
“Nihonjin wa Shukka Seyo [The Japanese need to ship],” Rafu Shimpo, December 12, 1941.
240

the outbreak of the Pacific War, they needed to explain that Japanese agriculture was an important
part of war efforts for the United States to counter Japanese imperialism.
462
The immigrants’
rhetoric changed as a means of survival within the sudden transformation of the political
environment with the outbreak of war and the U.S. public’s anti-Japanese hysteria.
Not long afterwards, the Treasury Department understood the necessity of letting money flow
between Japanese farmers and wholesale markets in Downtown Los Angeles. The department
ordered both Japanese and non-Japanese merchants to pay designated banks for Japanese-grown
vegetables and Japanese farmers to receive payment from those banks. When farmers received the
payment at the bank, they needed to bring bills to prove their expenses for growing their vegetables.
On December 13, Japanese farmers resumed shipping operations for their vegetables. Since some
farmers complained that they could not receive the payment directly from merchants and thus
refrained from shipping their vegetables, the Rafu Shimpo warned that reluctance in shipping
vegetables could be seen as an act of sabotage and thus encouraged farmers to ship as many as
possible “in line with the national defense policy.” As Japanese assets were partially unfrozen,
Japanese shops in Little Tokyo such as grocery stores, restaurants, and barber shops began to
reopen advertising the end-of-year sales.
463

Nevertheless, the USDA was still concerned about whether unfreezing the Japanese assets
really restored the living and working conditions of Japanese farmers. In late December, P.A.
Minges, a specialist on truck crops at the California Extension Service of the USDA, conducted a

462
Yuji Ichioka, Before Internment: Essays in Prewar Japanese American History (Stanford, 2006), Ch.8. When
Japanese farmers faced a large-scale strike organized by Mexican farmers in 1936, they stressed their cooperation
with white Americans in agriculture. See “Nōsangyō wo Tōshite no Nichi-Bei Shinzen wo Kōchō [Calling for
better Japan-U.S. relations through agriculture],” Rafu Shimpo, February 24, 1936.
463
“Nihonjin wa Shukka Seyo,” Rafu Shimpo, December 12, 1941; “Sā Yasai ga Kita [Vegetables have come]”,
Rafu Shimpo, December 13, 1941; “Mise mo Hiraite Shō Tōkyō Kakkizuku [Shops open, Little Tokyo
revitalized],” Rafu Shimpo, December 13, 1941.
241

survey on ethnic Japanese farmers between December 19 and 24. Minges gathered information
from eleven counties such as Yolo, Fresno, Tulare, Kern, Los Angeles, Riverside, Imperial,
Orange, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, and Monterey Counties by conducting interviews to
people who knew well about Japanese farmers and, in some cases, Japanese farmers in person.
According to his survey, Japanese farmers desired to continue farming in California. Some farmers
had already signed contracts for larger acreages in 1942. Minges observed that “the Japanese
realize they are on the spot and their optimistic outlook may not be entirely sincere,” based on his
analysis that Japanese farmers had signed new contracts to prevent landowners from replacing
them with American farmers who “are anxious to get control of the land now operated by
Japanese.”
464

Although Minges appreciated that unfreezing Japanese assets “greatly benefited the truck
crop growers,” he pointed out four problems that might be faced by Japanese farmers. First,
Japanese-operated banks were still closed, preventing money saved in those banks from being used
for Japanese agriculture, while American banks would likely stop making loans to Japanese
farmers due to growing public antagonism toward them. Second, non-Japanese farmworkers began
to refuse to work for the Japanese. Minges noticed particularly that “Filipinos have definitely quit
the Japanese.” For instance, in Stockton during the 1930s, Filipinos launched a boycott and strike
against Japanese immigrants who allegedly discriminated against Filipinos. In 1940, Japanese
farmers in Stockton even established a Japanese labor union to exclude the influence of Filipino
labor which was probably one of the reasons why Filipinos strongly refused to work for Japanese
farms. Third, white landowners might remove Japanese farmers who used the names of their U.S.-
born children to lease lands, despite the fact that it had been practiced by Japanese farmers and

464
P.A. Minges, “Report on the Effects of the Japanese War on the Japanese Alien and Native-born Vegetable
Growers of California,” December 29, 1941, Carton 2, Ralston Papers.
242

tacitly approved by white landowners, agribusiness leaders, and local governments. War hysteria
could turn such a practice into an act that would prove the dishonesty of Japanese farmers. In his
survey, Minges maintained, “there is nothing to prevent landowners to refuse to lease land to
American-born Japanese . . . Since 90 to 95 per cent of the land operated by Japanese is leased,
the refusal of landowners to renew leases could be serious.” He suggested that this situation could
be solved if Americans took over the land and then hired former Japanese tenant farmers as
farmworkers.
465
Even if landowners cancelled lease contracts with Japanese tenants, Minges felt
that the employment of Japanese immigrants should be guaranteed. Similar to how Dave Davidson
stressed the need for their economic security, Minges was also concerned with how to maintain
the economic safety of Japanese farmers in the tense racial climate of the weeks following the
Pearl Harbor bombing.
Finally, Minges pointed out that the fundamental problem was anti-Japanese sentiment, which
was strong particularly in the areas where Japanese farmers dominated the production and
distribution of vegetables. Minges also mentioned that some informants expressed the opinion that
the Japanese may commit sabotage to their crops to support Japan’s war efforts. Yet, he easily
countered such a claim arguing, “Such an occurrence [of sabotage] is to be doubted on the grounds
that most Japanese are interested in self-preservation and money, and are not likely to jeopardize
their own well-being or their pocketbook.”
466
Japanese immigrants had been legally regarded as
aliens and now politically created as enemies of the United States because the outbreak of war.
Nevertheless, they were also important participants in Californian society due to their economic
impact as resident farmers. Minges did not overlook this socioeconomic aspect of Japanese farmers.

465
Ibid. As for Japanese-Filipino relations in Stockton, see Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race,
History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America (New York, 2005), 187-207.
466
P.A. Minges, “Report on the Effects of the Japanese War on the Japanese Alien and Native-born Vegetable
Growers of California,” December 29, 1941, Carton 2, Ralston Papers.
243

His survey demonstrated a hands-on understanding of Japanese farmers as a group of permanent
residents who had long been working hard to make their living in California. From this perspective,
sabotage was the last thing they would do because they did not want to jeopardize their
“pocketbook,” let alone the national security of the United States.
In fact, Minges was right. Japanese immigrants were well aware that any suspicious activities
would do great harm to the whole ethnic Japanese community. On December 8, the day after the
Pearl Harbor attack, the Rafu Shimpo issued two breaking news extras but voluntarily refrained
from publishing the daily issue, since they considered it necessary to discuss with the U.S.
government about how to continue their publication before continuing their daily operation. The
next day, the immigrant press issued only the English edition and demonstrated their loyalty to the
United States with a large headline on the bottom of the front page “We Are 100 Percent for the
United States.” After consulting with the federal government, on December 10, the Rafu Shimpo
resumed its main Japanese edition and posted a “warning to fellow Japanese in the United States.”
The message stressed that Japanese immigrants should understand their position as “permanent
residents who have moved and settled in the United States and benefit from living under the U.S.
Constitution” exhorting them to have “one hundred percent” cooperation with the U.S. government.
On December 11, another message from the Rafu Shimpo, in a both careful but emotional tone,
alarmed that “even if only one individual makes a rash action, that will throw all Japanese residents
in the United States into the jaws of death and bring indescribably serious troubles to the whole
Japanese immigrant society.”
467
When the U.S. government prohibited Japanese immigration in
1924, the Rafu Shimpo indirectly but openly criticized the United State on the front page by quoting

467
“We are 100 Percent for the United States,” Rafu Shimpo (English Edition), December 9, 1941; “Keikoku
[Warning],” Rafu Shimpo, December 10, 1941; “Minasama eno Gochūi [Warning to all],” Rafu Shimpo,
December 11, 1941; “Minasama eno Onegai [Request to all],” Rafu Shimpo, December 13, 1941.
244

Japanese newspapers that said, for example, “Americans are stupid people” or “We have learned
the barbarity of the United States.”
468
However, in 1941, there was no room for the ethnic Japanese
community to exercise such freedom of speech. Japanese immigrants knew that sabotage or any
suspicious activity could seriously jeopardize not only their financial survival but also their very
existence in California.

While the U.S. government arrested more than 900 Japanese leaders in the mainland United
States in three days right after the Pearl Harbor attack, political pressure against Japanese farmers
became increasingly heavy. Just as Minges anticipated, on January 17, the California Senate
unanimously adopted a resolution to “investigate any and all possible evasions of the Alien Land
Laws and to prosecute to the utmost . . . any violations,” clearly targeting Japanese immigrant
farmers. Congressman Leland Ford of Los Angeles saw the whole ethnic Japanese community as
a group of enemies and demanded an even more aggressive measure against them. On January 16,
in his letter to the Secretaries of War and Navy as well as the FBI Director, he claimed that “all
Japanese, whether citizens or not, be placed in inland concentration camps.”
469
However, such a
mass evacuation of ethnic Japanese residents could mean the sudden disappearance of Japanese
farmers who had been an integral and indispensable part of California agriculture.
It is in this context that the actions of California Governor Culbert Olson during the height of
the anti-Japanese hysteria become a significant point of analysis in problematizing the political
and economic dialogue that led to the removal of Japanese farmers into internment camps. Olson’s
complicated positions, which neither strongly protested nor enthusiastically supported the policy
of mass evacuation, are very important to consider since they demonstrated that in the midst of
intense anti-Japanese public sentiment, many Californian political and agricultural officials were

468
“Nihon Kankei Denpō [Telegrams related to Japan],” Rafu Shimpo, June 25, 1924.
469
Personal Justice Denied, 54-55, 70; tenBroek, et al, Prejudice, War, and the Constitution, 76-77.
245

concerned with the intrinsic well-being of the ethnic Japanese community in California because of
the economic and social consequences evacuation would entail. Analysis of Olson’s comments
and actions in that time reveal his concern with the negative impact Japanese removal would wreak
on the California economy. Five days after the Pearl Harbor attack, Olson sent a message to
Japanese American citizens urging them to support the U.S. government and continue working
hard in any kind of production.
470
Many Nisei were engaged in agriculture. For instance, in Los
Angeles County, 1,895 Nisei, 26 percent of the total employed Nisei in the region were farmers,
farm managers, and farmworkers.
471
Regarding Issei and other enemy aliens, on January 28, Olson
issued a proclamation pursuant to the proclamation issued by President Roosevelt, which required
all Japanese, Germans, and Italian aliens fourteen years of age or over to secure identification
certificates and register for identification, so that the state government could keep them under
surveillance.
472

Meanwhile, knowing the importance of Japanese agricultural labor in California, Olson
developed the so-called California plan. The governor’s plan was to relocate but still keep Japanese
agricultural labor within the borders of the state of California, which Olson believed could solve
both military and economic problems related to the ethnic Japanese population.
473
On February 2,
Olson met with General John DeWitt of the Western Defense Command, Assistant Attorney
General Thomas B. Clark, USDA official J. M. Thompson, and Adjutant General J. O. Donovan
of the California State Guard to discuss and develop “plans for protection against any menace to
defense and civilian safety from the large population of Japanese within our borders.” Two days

470
“Oruson Shū Chiji Nikkei Shimin ni Yōbō [Governor Olson’s demand for Japanese American citizens],”
Rafu Shimpo, December 13, 1941.
471
Broom and Piemer, Removal and Return, 13.
472
Culbert Olson, “Defense,” January 28, 1942, Carton 5, Culbert L. Olson Papers, Bancroft Library, University
of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California (hereafter as Olson Papers).
473
As for the California plan, see Daniels, The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans, 36-39.
246

later, Olson gave a radio speech and talked about the California plan discussed in the meeting. To
the people of California, he explained that that “general plans were agreed upon for the movement
and placement of the entire adult Japanese population in California at productive and useful
employment, within the borders of our State, and under such surveillance and protection for
themselves.” While touching upon “the possibility of sabotage and organized fifth column
Japanese activities,” Olson made clear that “[t]o lose the benefit of this Japanese labor in
agricultural production would be a serious loss to our war economy.”
474
In cooperation with the
USDA, Olson was making plans to increase “the products of our agricultural resources to supply
our military forces as well as the civilian population.”
475
While the Japanese Empire was a threat
to California located on the Pacific Coast, local ethnic Japanese residents had already been an
integral part of California’s war efforts against Japan because of the immigrants’ role in the food
security at the home front.
Olson’s radio speech was received favorably by Japanese immigrants because he publicly
acknowledged the importance of Japanese agriculture and did not push the idea of relocating them
to unfamiliar inland areas. On February 5 and 6, the Rafu Shimpo covered Olson’s radio speech in
an article entitled “Governor Olson opposes the evacuation of Japanese to inland areas,
considerable influence on the food problem” and translated his words into Japanese explaining
that the loss of Japanese farmers meant “a serious loss to our war economy.”
476
On February 6,
Olson invited Nisei representatives of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) and the
ethnic Japanese media and spent two hours on explaining to them how the state government would

474
Culbert Olson, “National Defense,” before the 17
th
District American Legion, Los Angeles, February 20,
1942, Carton 5, Olson Papers.
475
Culbert Olson, speech before the Pacific Traffic Association, San Francisco, January 27, 1942, Olson Papers.
476
“Kashū Nihonjin no Torishimari ni [Regarding the control of the Japanese in California],” Rafu Shimpo,
February 5, 1942; “Okuchi eno Nihonjin Tachinoki, Oruson Chiji Hantai [Governor Olson opposes the removal
of the Japanese to inland areas],” Rafu Shimpo, February 6, 1942.
247

handle the situation of ethnic Japanese residents. In the meeting, there were three writers of the
Rafu Shimpo including Akira Komai, the eldest son of Toyosaku Komai who was the president of
the Rafu Shimpo and had been arrested by the FBI after the Pearl Harbor attack. Olson told them
that it was difficult to distinguish the loyal from the disloyal among Japanese immigrants, which
“makes it embarrassing for loyal American Japanese, and it might have more tragedy if there is
indiscriminate treatment of all persons of the Japanese race.” He added that he had learned of the
presence of Japanese engaged in sabotage or fifth column activities through his communication
with DeWitt and other federal government officials. While acknowledging that the ethnic Japanese
were “law abiding” and “industrious,” Olson demanded that both Issei and Nisei support U.S. war
efforts by leaving the combat zone designated by the War Department.
477

However, Olson explained the state’s middle position to the Nisei leaders in a careful manner.
According to the Rafu Shimpo’s report in its English edition on their meeting with Olson, he gave
a more nuanced explanation that ethnic Japanese must leave the combat zone, “Even though you
and I might be sure that there wouldn’t be one Japanese in that area who would be disloyal. There
would still be suspicion in the minds of the people in that area.” Regarding where Japanese
evacuees would go, Olson told them “There will definitely be the movement to places where the
Japanese can be employed in producing goods and engaging in other activities outside the combat
areas.”
478
Although the Rafu Shimpo’s description of what Olson said might not completely be the
same with what he actually said, it did not change the significant fact that Olson took time to meet
with the Nisei leaders in person to discuss the wartime situation. How the Rafu Shimpo described
the meeting reveals that the ethnic Japanese community received Olson’s explanation rather

477
“State attitude outlined by Olson at confab,” Rafu Shimpo (English edition), February 7, 1942.
478
Ibid. As for Akira Komai, see Chris Komai, “Revival: Rafu Shimpo,” Discover Nikkei, March 7, 2014, online
at http://www.discovernikkei.org/en/journal/2014/3/7/revival-rafu-shimpo, accessed July 3, 2017.
248

favorably with an impression that Olson did not treat all the Japanese as a faceless group of enemy
race and also suggested a possibility of employment “outside the combat areas,” which actually
meant “somewhere in California outside the combat areas” in line with Olson’s California plan.
The USDA was a proponent for the California plan.
479
On the same day Olson discussed the
California plan with General DeWitt, the California Agricultural (Land Use) Planning Committee
of the USDA Bureau of Agricultural Economics sent a letter about “the possibilities of using
enemy alien evacuees” to its local representatives of the County Farm Labor Subcommittees in
twenty-five counties such as Butte, Colusa, El Dorado, Fresno, Glen, Imperial, Kern, Kings, Lake,
Madera, Mariposa, Merced, Placer, Riverside, Sacramento, San Benito, San Bernardino, San
Joaquin, Solano, Stanislaus, Sutter, Tehama, Tulare, Yolo, and Yuba. The USDA’s letter asked its
local representatives four questions: 1) “Which of the three nationalities (Japanese, Italians, and
Germans) are now members of your communities in sufficient numbers so that immigration of
evacuees would not cause serious problems?”, 2) “Are there any possibilities of housing these
individuals with people now resident in the community?”, 3) “Can you really public support for
an evacuation of enemy aliens into certain areas in your county?”, and 4) “What is your estimate
of the number of people that could be handled by the various communities in your county?” While
the USDA bureau did not ask about U.S.-born children of enemy aliens in the letter, they described
the use of enemy alien labor as a war effort that agricultural communities could make. They
explained that “an opportunity is provided for certain areas to build up a local reservoir of labor
required to harvest the agricultural crops so vitally needed for defense” and that they had to
recognize “the need for increased food production and the utilization of all available sources of

479
Daniels, The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans, 37. The Associated Farmers, a farmers’
organization with which Japanese farmers cooperated in order to break the Venice Celery strike in 1936, was
also a proponent of the California plan. See Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, 33-34.
249

labor in that production.” In addition, they gave an impression that the California plan had already
been in progress with support from other government agencies, as they wrote, “It is important, also,
to emphasize that the FBI will have investigated the aliens and that they will be under
observation.”
480

By 7 February 1942, the local California committee of the USDA bureau had hastily collected
the answers from the county representatives. The USDA officials created a report based on the
survey and, on February 11, sent it to the California USDA War Board. According to the report,
the country representatives in general showed a willingness to cooperate with the federal
government in any evacuation plans. Regarding Japanese immigrants, the report explained that
“the anti-Japanese sentiment was stronger than the anti-Italian and anti-German sentiment” and
“[i]n a few counties there was very strong anti-Japanese feeling.” For example, counties in
Southern California such as San Bernardino, Riverside, and Imperial wanted no enemy alien labor
or did not reply by the deadline. On the other hand, some counties preferred “Orientals because of
their ability to do certain kinds of labor,” as Japanese immigrants had been known as skilled
farmers for decades. In fact, counties in Northern or Central California such as Glenn, Sutter,
Colusa, Solano, San Joaquin, and Tulare Counties regarded the Japanese acceptable for their
respective communities, leading the USDA bureau to conclude, “Willingness to use approximately
10,000 Japanese was expressed.”
481
As made clear in this USDA report, California was not
unanimously anti-Japanese after the Pearl Harbor attack and some counties even needed Japanese
immigrants for the harvest of their agricultural crops. At the time, the California plan was feasible

480
Roscoe E. Bell, Secretary of the California Agricultural (Land Use) Planning Committee of the USDA Bureau
of Agricultural Economics, to Chairmen of County Farm Labor subcommittees, February 2, 1942, Carton 2,
Ralston Papers.
481
Roscoe E. Bell to the California USDA War Board, February 11, 1942, Carton 2, Ralston Papers.
250

and the fear of the yellow peril was not strong in California, because both Japanese immigrants
and agricultural communities in California could agree on the plan.
It is generally explained that the ethnic Japanese in Hawaii were neither relocated nor interned
during the war because they had been an indispensable part of the local society and economy.
482

Yet, the documents shown in this chapter remind us that the ethnic Japanese population in
California was equally very important in terms of the local economy and thus their removal was
equally problematic during the war. Furthermore, these documents help us understand that the
USDA officials and Olson challenged the wartime formation of the racial boundary between the
ethnic Japanese and the white majority, which was intensified by growing anti-Japanese sentiment.
Even in the turbulent period after the Pearl Harbor attack, the racial boundary was not completely
rigid but rather fluid and unstable as the USDA officials and Olson demonstrated their awareness
about the importance of Japanese agriculture in California and their understanding of the ethnic
Japanese as resident farmers who cared about their livelihood in the first place. It is an important
historical lesson that this kind of awareness and understanding about immigrants and their
descendants as an integral part of the local society and economy played a crucial role in questioning
the racist policy of mass evacuation that deemed them as a faceless group of undesirable and
removable people.
Meanwhile, Army officials such as Provost Marshall General Allen W. Gullion and his
assistant Karl R. Bendetsen were pressing the War Department to implement the mass evacuation
of ethnic Japanese residents, both aliens and citizens. Gullion believed that the United States “shall
very possibly lose the war” unless the U.S. government took a stern measure regarding ethnic
Japanese residents. Their stance was backed by anti-Japanese politicians and newspapers and

482
For example, see Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: An Interpretive History (Boston, 1991), 127.
251

based on the prejudice that ethnic Japanese residents would commit the fifth column activities. On
February 10, a joint delegation of Congressmen from Western states approved a resolution
recommending the evacuation of enemy aliens and citizens from the coastal area. The resolution
targeted Japanese aliens and Japanese American citizens, although it did not mention the Japanese
by name.
483
Behind the scene, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce was actively involved in
crafting the evacuation policy in cooperation with anti-Japanese congressmen. The Chamber even
sent a message to a leading proponent of Japanese removal Leland Ford: “Japanese Daily News,”
presumably the Rafu Shimpo, “still publishing according to their own admission. Thought you
might be interested in this for use on radio or press release.”
484
In addition, Howard B. Miller,
Manager of the Chamber’s Agricultural Department, seemed to regard Mexican workers as a
substitute labor for Japanese evacuees, based on his understanding that “the Japanese are rather
large employers of Mexican labor” and that the operation of Japanese farms are conducted “in a
considerable degree by employment of Mexican and other labor, too.” As detailed in Chapters 3
and 4, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce was a business partner for Japanese farmers in the
1930s in order to suppress the labor movement of Mexican farmworkers. However, the Chamber
quickly altered their attitude in the wartime when the city of Los Angeles could expect to enjoy
the rapid growth of defense industries and the land was “in a transition period” from agriculture to
other industries.
485

483
Daniels, The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans, 39; tenBroek, et al, Prejudice, War, and the
Constitution, 86; Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, 76
484
Ibid., 67-76
485
Tolan Committee, 11691. At the Tolan Committee, W.S. Rosecrans, Agricultural Coordinator of the Los
Angeles County Defense Council and former President of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, testified that
the lands of Los Angeles County “are not purely agricultural lands” and “are, in themselves, in a transition period”
for industrial purposes or settlement. See Tolan Committee, 11685.
252

The public opinion was increasingly in favor for mass evacuation largely influenced by the
media coverage on Japanese military activities in Asia and Japanese residents in the United States.
On February 12, Walter Lippmann, one of the most influential newspaper columnists at the time,
wrote about his concern regarding a possible Japanese raid on the U.S. mainland and sabotage,
claiming that “the Pacific Coast is in imminent danger of a combined attack from within and from
without . . . The peculiar danger of the Pacific Coast is in a Japanese raid accompanied by enemy
action inside American territory.” In this column, Lippmann seemingly called for the mass removal
of ethnic Japanese. Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not take the lead, he certainly
lacked compassion for the Japanese. On February 19, he issued the Executive Order 9066 to enable
the Army to execute the mass removal of the ethnic Japanese population. Although the Justice
Department had resisted the idea of evacuating Japanese American citizens on the constitutional
grounds, by mid-February, their resistance ceased. The ethnic Japanese community of Los Angeles
had no choice but to follow the executive order, but some expressed their frustration. For instance,
in Little Tokyo, Japanese immigrants showed their anger by casting contemptuous eyes, spit on
the street, and even drew graffiti on patrolling cars—moves which were strongly criticized by the
Rafu Shimpo.
486

However, this did not mean that Olson gave up his California plan and continued to promote
the plan even before anti-Japanese organizations. On February 20, Olson visited Los Angeles, the
largest concentration of ethnic Japanese residents, and gave a speech on the state’s position on
national defense before local members of the American Legion. The American Legion was an
organization of veterans who fought in the World War I and was one of the anti-Japanese

486
Walter Lippmann, “The Fifth Column on the Coast,” Washington Post, February 12, 1942; Personal Justice
Denied, 80; Robinson, By Order of the President, 123; Daniels, The Decision to Relocate the Japanese
Americans, 49; “Kanken ni Furachi na Soburi wo Suru Minohodo wo Shiranu Chikan Ari [There are some rogues
who behave rudely to the authority],” Rafu Shimpo, February 24, 1942.
253

organizations that promoted the nativist movement for the enactment of Japanese Exclusion in
1924. In January 1942, the American Legion’s national commissions on war efforts unanimously
adopted a resolution calling for the mass evacuation of all enemy aliens from the Pacific Coast.
487

At the meeting in Los Angeles, Olson praised the American Legion as “perhaps the only group of
citizens” who possessed a realistic understanding of the problem faced by Californians in the war
and discussed the importance of the California State Guard newly organized in 1941. Then, Olson
moved on to rearticulate the effectiveness of the California plan by quoting his own radio speech
made on February 4, 1942. He repeated that to lose Japanese agricultural labor would mean “a
serious loss to our war economy” and stressed that the Army, the Department of Justice, the
Department of Agriculture, and the State of California will “determine upon specific plans for
comprehensively locating and regulating the activities of our adult Japanese population for the
duration of the war” outside the combat zone along the West Coast but “within the borders of our
State.”
488
Even after the executive order let the Army take control of the Japanese issue, Olson was
still confident enough to clarify his policy before the patriotic and anti-Japanese organization and
hoped the California plan could be implemented in cooperation with the Army and the USDA.
In the context of the wartime emergency, however, the governor of California could do only
so much to resist the decision of the federal government, particularly the Army. Two days after
the issuance of Executive Order 9066, the House Select Committee Investigating National Defense
Migration, the so-called Tolan Committee, began hearings to discuss the possibility of the mass
removal of ethnic Japanese residents from the West Coast. On March 6, Olson gave his testimony
and agreed with the racist idea that the Japanese should be examined as a group, while Germans

487
As for the American Legion, see tenBroek, et al, Prejudice, War, and the Constitution, 43-46; Grodzins,
Americans Betrayed, 38.
488
Culbert Olson, “National Defense,” before the 17
th
District American Legion, Los Angeles, February 20,
1942, Carton 5, Olson Papers.
254

and Italians should be examined as individuals. He eventually supported mass evacuation. There
were three reasons why Olson agreed with the mass evacuation of the Japanese at the Tolan
Committee. First, as he had already told Nisei leaders, it was difficult to distinguish the loyal from
the disloyal among the Japanese. Second, Japanese American representatives (presumably JACL
representatives) were determined to cooperate with the federal government. Finally, local
communities refused to accept Japanese evacuees as of March 1942. As mentioned earlier, in
December 1941 the USDA conducted a survey regarding where Japanese agricultural labor could
be relocated within California and several counties showed a willingness to accommodate
Japanese evacuees. Yet, later in February, Olson asked the USDA to conduct another survey and
its result turned out to be quite different from the previous survey. The February survey could find
no place that would accept large numbers of Japanese evacuees, reflecting the rapidly growing
anti-Japanese sentiment in California in the few months since the Pearl Harbor attack as the
Japanese military expanded its control in East Asia defeating the U.S. military in the Philippines
and the British military in the Malay Peninsula. As one example of this significant change, in
December 1941 Tulare County had once showed a willingness to accept Japanese evacuees but by
February they switched its position and rejected the relocation of the Japanese there. Even the
county hospital ordered a Japanese doctor fired only because of his national origin.
489

Olson’s testimony indicates that he recognized the situation that ethnic Japanese residents in
California confronted in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack. Olson stressed the importance
of understating the feelings of ethnic Japanese residents who faced an extremely difficult situation

489
Tolan Committee, 11629-11642; “Tsurare Gun demo Nihonjin Okotowari [Japanese rejected in Tulare
County, too],” Rafu Shimpo, February 22, 1942. The aggression of the Japanese military in Asia in the initial
period of the war strengthened war hysteria in the United States. See, for example, Personal Justice Denied, 28;
Page Smith, Democracy on Trial: The Japanese American Evacuation and Relocation in World War II (New
York, 1995), 116.
255

in which their country of ancestry attacked their country of permanent residence. Olson was
“hoping that it will be your recommendation [of the Tolan Committee] that States . . . cooperate
so as to help the movement of these evacuees in a way to maintain, as near as possible, their normal
lives; to have them made self-sustaining and avoid any injustices and the consequences of
prejudices against them.” While Olson “would yield largely to the judgement of the Department
of Justice and the F.B.I. and the military” with respect to the removal of Japanese enemy aliens,
he mentioned that Japanese Internment “presents a problem . . . [since] there are a great many
whom we shouldn’t treat as alien enemies, although so classified, because of their lack of
citizenship” and “the trouble about that is, as I say, too many people will conclude that every
Japanese is a fifth columnist, no matter what may be in his heart.” He even confessed that if Japan
attacked California, “I would feel sorry for any Japanese loyalist inside because I am just afraid
that he would suffer even if he were innocent.”
490
In other words, yielding to the judgement of the
federal government agencies did not mean that Olson reconciled himself with the idea of mass
removal. He did not change his mind. He continued to express his concern about the situation of
ethnic Japanese residents during the war.
The Rafu Shimpo did not translate Olson’s sympathetic words for the Japanese much and thus
reported his testimony with the impression that he was not particularly anti-Japanese but still
pushing for mass evacuation. The immigrant press did not report on Olson’s sympathetic
comments probably because all Rafu Shimpo articles were censored by the Anti-Axis Committee,
which was formed by the JACL right after the Pearl Harbor attack. Since the JACL considered it
necessary to cooperate for any measure taken by the federal government including mass evacuation
to prove their loyalty, the Anti-Axis Committee might have wanted the Rafu Shimpo not to stress

490
Tolan Committee, 11629-11642.
256

Olson‘s sympathy in hopes that it would not sound as though the ethnic Japanese community was
resisting the idea of mass evacuation.
491
In line with the federal government’s plan for mass
evacuation, the Rafu Shimpo reported that Olson urged other states to accept Japanese evacuees
because “ethnic Japanese residents are children of the United States,” which was the translation of
Olson’s actual words, “It is our baby, all of us—the United States of America.”
492

In contrast, the Rafu Shimpo was critical of Los Angeles Mayor Fletcher Bowron who fueled
anti-Japanese sentiment, although he demonstrated a rather friendly attitude toward the ethnic
Japanese population before mid-January of 1942. Bowron became increasingly concerned about
the large Japanese population in Los Angeles, particularly in Terminal Island, an economically
and militarily important site located in Los Angeles Harbor. On February 5, Bowron made his first
public statement in favor of mass removal, and a week later, gave a Lincoln Day address in which
he stated, “If Lincoln were alive today, what would he do[?] . . . Lincoln, the mild-mannered man
whose memory we regard with almost saint-like reverence, would make short work of rounding
up the Japanese and putting then where they could do no harm.” The Rafu Shimpo reported it with
the headline that said “Mayor Bowron dwells on relocation” along with another article about the
evacuation order to ethnic Japanese residents in Terminal Island.
493

491
“Anti-Axis Committee formed by J.A.C.L,” Rafu Shimpo, December 9, 1942. “Minasama eno Onegai,” Rafu
Shimpo, December 13, 1941. On March 10, in San Francisco, representatives of JACL chapters held a meeting
to discuss their position regarding mass evacuation and adopted a solution that they would willingly cooperate
with mass evacuation. See “Ikanaru Gisei mo Amanjite Shinoban [We will endure any sacrifice],” Rafu Shimpo,
March 11, 1942.
492
“Kain Iinkai ni okeru Chiji, Shichō no Shōgen [Testimonies of the governor and the mayor at the Lower
House committee],” Rafu Shimpo, March 7, 1942. Olson said, “It is our baby, all of us—the United States of
America. It seems to me when the Federal Government decides as to the most feasible places to go, and the
Federal Government pays for that, that that is the program we all ought to follow and those who stand in the way
ought to get out of it.” See Tolan Committee, 11642.
493
Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, 100-101; Page Smith, Democracy on Trial, 119-120; “Rinkan Yo ni Araba
Kanarazuya Yokuryū Sen, Bōron Shichō [If Lincoln were alive, he would have interned them, says Mayor
Bowron],” Rafu Shimpo, February 13, 1942; “Tāminaru Tō Kyojūsha, Sanjūnichi Inai Tachinoki Meirei ka
[Residents of Terminal Island, evacuation to be ordered within thirty days?],” Rafu Shimpo, February 13, 1942.
257

At the Tolan Committee, Bowron gave his testimony and stressed the city’s full cooperation
for the Army with respect to the evacuation of the Japanese. He dared to say, “I first want to make
it clear that my position relative to the Japanese population here in our midst is not by reason of
any racial or other prejudice . . . The Japanese have caused very little trouble. They are law abiding
and industrious and cooperative,” but continued, “As I look back on some events after the 7th of
December, I am quite convinced that there was a large number of the Japanese population here
locally who knew what was coming.” Although the aggression of the Japanese military in Asia
and the increasingly hostile public opinion could have influenced the attitude of Bowron, his racial
prejudice was clear. In addition, Bowron seemed to downplay the economic impact of Japanese
removal on the city’s food supply and distribution, as he answered, “There are others who could
describe that much better than I . . . Necessarily, it will quite seriously affect the fresh vegetable
supply for this large population area. However, I think our people will be glad to adjust themselves
to wartime conditions.” The ethnic Japanese residents were not regarded as “our people” in
Bowron’s mind.
494
His hypocritical stance aroused Nisei to anger. After his testimony at the Tolan
Committee, Togo Tanaka, a Nisei editor of the Rafu Shimpo’s English edition wrote an open letter
to Bowron and criticized him for working as “the spearhead of press publicity for uprooting us
from the only home we know.”
495
For the ethnic Japanese community of Los Angeles, Olson was
clearly different from Bowron, although both eventually agreed on mass evacuation.

494
Tolan Committee, 11647. In February 1942, Bowron wrote in his letter to Congressman John Costello, “I
would hate to see the three million people in the Los Angeles metropolitan area greatly inconvenienced, business
activity slowed up, traffic congested, and the people given unnecessary cause for fear, merely because of the
presence here of 40,000 Japanese, only a limited portion of whom might be expected to do something dangerous.”
This demonstrates Bowron’s perspective that the civil and human rights of the ethnic Japanese population should
be sacrificed for the greater good of the non-Japanese majority in Los Angeles. See Grodzins, Americans
Betrayed, 104.
495
“Kain Iinkai ni okeru Chiji, Shichō no Shōgen,” Rafu Shimpo, March 7, 1942; Togo Tanaka, “An open letter,”
Rafu Shimpo (English Edition), March 8, 1942.
258

Even after the Tolan Committee, the loss of Japanese agricultural labor continued to be a
serious problem with no clear solution. At the Tolan Committee, Olson maintained that Japanese
removal “will eliminate the possibility of having the benefit in agricultural production of the labor
of the Japanese during this war period. We are going to have some labor problems, I believe, in
agriculture.” Olson gave the committee a stereotypical explanation that “the Japanese are
peculiarly fitted” to pick vegetables in a sitting posture, but it was also the reality that they played
an indispensable role as agricultural labor in California along with Mexicans and Filipinos who
provided them with additional labor in harvesting crops. Although Olson believed that Japanese
farms should be worked by new tenants, he thought it doubtful that “there will be sufficient
manpower in certain classes of agricultural work.” For example, in Salinas, landowners were
worried about the lettuce harvest because they could not find enough Filipino workers. Many
Filipinos had been enlisted into the Army or were leaving to do more profitable work in the rapidly
growing defense industries.
496
Japanese Internment, justified by the U.S. government as a military
necessity, created an agricultural labor crisis for the state of California.
In April 1942, the Los Angeles Times reported on the Japanese evacuation from the local
harbor area, defined by the Pacific Ocean on the west, by the Pacific and San Pedro Bay on the
south, by Ford Boulevard and Alameda Street on the east, and by the city limits of Redondo Beach
to Torrance Boulevard on the north. While the article warned of sabotage and espionage by the
Japanese in those “vulnerable areas,” it mentioned the wartime treatment of Japanese farms as well.
By that time, out of the more than 25,000 acres of Los Angeles County farmland operated by the
Japanese, one third had been put under the control of the U.S. government to transfer the lands to
“American owners going into production.” By 18 August 1942, the U.S. government expelled all

496
Tolan Committee, 11629-11642.
259

the ethnic Japanese residents, both aliens and citizens, from California except for those relocated
to the Tule Lake and Manzanar camps and others supervised in hospitals and prisons. However,
many of the Japanese farms were abandoned, without being managed by new operators. One
example was a 200-acre tomato farm in Palos Verdes Estates in Los Angeles County. The Los
Angeles Times reported later in September that the farm’s tomatoes “may never reach the United
States Army, contract canneries or city markets unless there is some vital change in the labor
outlook,” to the extent that the situation “became a do-or-die campaign among civic leaders today.”
Local students were mobilized to pick the tomatoes, but it still lacked the manpower for the peak
of the crop season. To make matters worse, motorists picked the apparently abandoned tomatoes.
As for this situation, non-Japanese growers also announced that the problem was “virtually out of
control.”
497
Around the same time in September, in Gardena, a similar situation took place in
former Japanese farms and made “Spanish-American (Mexican American) students round out
garden project by using farms evacuated by Japs” as reported by the Los Angeles Times.
498

Although these students were not farmworkers per se, this article shows an aspect of wartime
Japanese-Mexican relations in which ethnic Mexicans provided agricultural labor in absence of
Japanese labor in Los Angeles farmland.
While many Japanese farms were destined to remain unattended, Olson came to have a more
optimistic view on how to maintain agricultural labor in California. Rapidly changing dynamics
of international relations in the transpacific borderlands created a possibility of importing a large
number of Mexican agricultural workers. The Pacific War between the United States and Japan
resulted in the close hemispheric cooperation between the United States and Mexico. In May of

497
“Army Will Move 5000 Japs by End of Week,” Los Angeles Times, April 1, 1942; Personal Justice Denied,
112; “Tomato Harvest Action Pledged, Palos Verdes, Facing Loss of Crop, Will Place Matter Before Council,”
Los Angeles Times, September 22, 1942.
498
“Students Do Their Bit on Nation’s Home Front,” Los Angeles Times, September 27, 1942.
260

1942, the U.S. and Mexican governments began to discuss the importation of Mexican agricultural
workers into the United States. This binational measure, known as the Bracero Program, would
bring Mexican workers to the United States starting from August of 1942 and would have awarded
4.5 million work contracts by 1964 when the program was terminated. With this wartime
collaboration, the U.S. government intended to solve the wartime labor shortage in agriculture and
the Mexican government sought to regulate the northward migration of their citizens.
499

Olson hoped that the Bracero Program could replace his California plan. On July 2, 1942,
Olson made another radio speech entitled “Mexican Labor” and argued that the importation of
Mexican workers might solve the agricultural labor crisis created by Japanese Internment. Olson
touched upon negotiations “conducted between the secretary of state of the United States and the
Mexican government to ascertain whether Mexico will approve a plan for bringing Mexican
laborers into this country to be employed on the farms for the duration of the war. Representatives
of growers have been urging such a program in Washington” and said that he demanded in his
telegram to the War Manpower Commission that the federal government should take the
responsibility for recruitment and transportation of Mexican workers. Yet, even at this stage, Olson
looked back on his California plan and explained why it was difficult to implement it. He said, “It
was then [re]cognized that if the Japanese could [be] employed in the performance of [ag]ricultural
work, under appropriate [re]gulations and control of their movements, [tha]t would serve the
economy of the [nat]ion, avoid the appropriations of [hun]dreds of millions of dollars for [the]ir
maintenance in Assembly Centers, [and] solve the agricultural labor problem [in] California. But
the natural antipathy [of] having Japanese in the presence of [any] community under any condition

499
As for the Bracero Program, see Deborah Cohen, Braceros: Migrant Citizens and Transnational Subjects in
the Postwar United States and Mexico (Chapel Hill, 2011); Ana Elizabeth Rosas, Abrazando el Espíritu: Bracero
Families Confront the Mexico Border (Berkeley, 2014).
261

was manifest.” Then Olson pointed out that despite the economic importance of Japanese
agricultural labor, rapidly growing anti-Japanese sentiment in California made it very difficult to
implement his California plan, saying, “an entire change of [dis]position and sentiment on the part
[of] the farmers and employers of farm labor in California would be needed for the employment
of Japanese.”
500

Then, Olson argued that Japanese evacuees could have stayed and worked in California farms
under continuous surveillance that made it impossible for Japanese evacuees from participating in
sabotage or fifth column activities and closed his radio speech by touching upon the importation
of Mexican workers.

Such an effort to [util]ize this vast reservoir of manpower [would] undoubtedly be aided
and assisted [by] that proportion of the Japanese people themselves, who undoubtedly have
an [undi]vided loyalty to our country . . . [as] thousands of Japanese now serving in the
United States Army and fighting against the Japanese power. If the farm labor shortage
could be [supp]lied without the importation of foreign labor, we would avoid all of the
problems, [dela]ys, difficulties and expenses which [such] importation would entail. But
with the uncertainty that any other solution [may] be found, efforts will continue to [make]
available such Mexican labor as shall be found needed to save the crops of California. I
thank you and bid you good night.
501

Olson’s radio speech was not only about his hope for the Bracero Program. It was also about
his belief that the California plan was feasible because of the loyalty of ethnic Japanese residents

500
Culbert Olson, “Mexican Labor,” July 20, 1942, Carton 5, Olson Papers.
501
Ibid.
262

as well as his implicit criticism on uncompromising anti-Japanese sentiment that made it
impossible to keep Japanese farmers in California. In this context, in August 1942, Olson sent a
telegram to President Roosevelt and urged him to implement the importation of Mexican workers
as quickly as possible. Olson explained the serious situation of California agriculture in which
crops were “wasting and spoiling” given the lack of agricultural labor. Olson begged of President
Roosevelt “to immediately put an end to the current academic debates in Washington on this
subject,” “[s]end recruiting teams into Mexico and send someone to California with full authority
[to] handle this matter now in a direct practical fashion.” And he added, “Matter has been delayed
to the point of negligence and will have serious effect upon our entire war effort.”
502

It is easy for us to regard Olson as one of many racist leaders in the sense that he agreed on
the mass removal of Japanese immigrants and Japanese American citizens. However, as discussed
in this chapter, Olson shared local USDA officials’ idea of relocating the Japanese within
California and also publicly expressed his sympathy toward the ethnic Japanese community even
after mass evacuation was implemented. By looking at Japanese Internment as an agricultural labor
crisis in California, we can understand that those who recognized the Japanese as an important
component of agricultural labor understood Japanese residents as people. They can be contrasted
with other government officials who demonstrated their prejudiced suspicion towards ethnic
Japanese residents and treated them as a faceless group of enemies. At the same time, this was a
historical moment when the Japanese American experience intersected with the Mexican
American experience, as the importation of Mexican braceros, rather than military necessity,
relieved Olson’s concern caused by Japanese Internment.

502
Culbert Olson to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 19, 1942, Box 7, Folder Migratory-120-A Thru-G,
RG96, Records of the Farmers Home Administration, 1918-1975, National Archives at College Park, College
Park, Maryland.
263

The Bracero Program was one of the wartime policies born out of the U.S.-Mexico wartime
collaboration. Mexicans did not only work in farmlands in the United States but also served as
soldiers in the U.S. Army. The number of Mexican citizens serving in the U.S. Army reached
nearly 15,000 during the Pacific War. This remarkable collaboration that incorporated Mexican
manpower into U.S. war efforts was promoted by Mexican President Manuel Ávila Camacho. In
October 1942, Ávila Camacho announced that Mexican residents in the United States were
allowed to enlist in the U.S. Army because “Mexico is a member of the Allied Nations and we are
obligated to contribute decisively to the triumph of allies over Germany, Italy and Japan.”
503
Ávila
Camacho became president in 1940 and contrasted with the former president Lázaro Cárdenas who
nationalized the oil industry that had been largely controlled by American, British, and Dutch
owners. Ávila Camacho’s predecessor galvanized the Mexican people in his nationalist policies
but also exacerbated already tense diplomatic relations with the United States. In contrast, even
before the Pearl Harbor attack, Camacho welcomed foreign investment and strengthened its
alliance with the United States partly because he needed to gather recourses to suppress anti-
Camacho protests in Mexico. In his inauguration speech, Camacho emphasized, “Nothing divides
us in this America of ours. Any differences that may exist between our peoples are overcome by a
lofty desire to secure the permanence of a continental life of friendliness based on mutual respect
and the victory of reason over brute force, of peaceful cooperation over mechanized
destruction.”
504

The U.S.-Mexico wartime collaboration even made Japanese Internment a transnational
project that took place in the larger U.S.-Mexico borderlands. After the Pearl Harbor attack, Ávila

503
Neil Foley, Mexicans in the Making of America (Cambridge, 2014), 97, 101
504
Selfa A. Chew, Uprooting Community: Japanese Mexicans, World War II, and the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands
(Tucson, 2015), 53-55.
264

Camacho promptly responded to the request of the U.S. government regarding ethnic Japanese
residents in Mexico. In fact, in early January 1942, more than a full month before the issuance of
the Executive Order 9066, the Mexican government ordered the relocation of the ethnic Japanese
population in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, which numbered about 2,700, to inland cities such as
Mexico City and Guadalajara.
505
When Japanese immigrants in Baja California heard the
relocation order, they held emergency meetings and gathered about 10,000 pesos and, with that
money, attempted to persuade the local government of Baja California of letting them stay in the
region. They failed and learned that the U.S. government was behind Mexican government’s
relocation order. Japanese immigrants in Baja California had no choice but leave the region except
for their Mexican wives and their children who were allowed to stay. On January 2, 1942, the first
group of twelve ethnic Japanese residents and a Japanese diplomat named Miyazawa left Mexicali
for Guadalajara. One of them, Mitsu Ichikawa, later recalled her experience of Japanese removal
form Mexicali. She immigrated to Mexicali in 1924 as a yobiyose to live with her husband Yonezō
Ichikawa, owner of a soda water factory and a board member of the local Japanese association.
Before leaving Mexicali, the Ichikawa family and others in the same group asked Miyazawa why
they were the first to leave. According to Mitsu Ichikawa, Miyazawa answered, “If you don’t leave,
the United States would invade Mexico. To order other Japanese to leave, I want leaders of the
Japanese community to leave first.”
506

The experience of the ethnic Japanese in Baja California had already been at the mercy of
international relations between the United States and Japan. As detailed in Chapter 2, the
Immigration Act of 1924 nullified the Gentlemen’s Agreement and helped compel the

505
Ibid., 47.
506
Nichi-Boku Kōryūshi Henshū Iinkai [Editorial committee of history of Japan-Mexico interaction], ed., Nichi-
Boku Kōryūshi [History of Japan-Mexico interaction] (Tokyo, 1990), 563-566.
265

development of the ethnic Japanese community in Baja California as well as the development of
the transborder ethnic Japanese community in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. Eighteen years later,
the Pacific-War brought an end to this community’s existence due to the transnational
implementation of Japanese removal from both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border. The large space
vacated by the ethnic Japanese population in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands was soon to be filled
again with Mexican residents and Mexican cross-border migrants such as braceros. The history of
the transborder ethnic Japanese community seems to have disappeared from public memory.

Enduring Interethnic Trust in Rancho San Pedro
The Bracero Program gave hope for people like Governor Olson, who were concerned about
the agricultural labor shortage in California after Japanese Internment. Nonetheless, the program
was designed to provide temporary foreign workers, not tenant farmers. Many white landowners
in Los Angeles County needed tenant farmers who could take diligent care of their farmlands.
Since they had built stable and trusting relationships with Japanese tenants for the past decades, it
was not an easy job for landowners to find tenants like Japanese farmers. To support such
landowners and maintain former Japanese farms operational without the Japanese, as early as in
March 1942, the USDA assigned the Farm Security Administration (FSA) to find non-Japanese
tenant farmers and provide them with loan finance.
507
Landowners in the region including the
Dominguez Hills area and other neighboring areas in Los Angeles County, known as Rancho San
Pedro, were no exception and remained concerned about the replacement of tenant farmers. As
explained in Chapter 5, during the Venice Celery Strike of 1936, Japanese farmers and white

507
Chan, Asian Americans, 126; Varzally, Making a Non-White America, 122; Laurence I. Hewes, Jr. to District
Officers and Field Agents of the Wartime Farm Adjustment Program of the Farm Security Administration,
March 15, 1942, Carton 2, Ralston Papers.
266

landowners in Dominguez Hills banded together in a demonstration of a strict and
uncompromising stance against Mexican strikers. This situation was dramatically altered by the
Pacific War, turning Mexican workers into hopeful replacement candidates for land tenancy in the
area. Wartime experiences of the ethnic Japanese, ethnic Mexicans, and white landowners in
Rancho San Pedro detail the impact of Japanese Internment on a local agricultural community and
tell us an untold story of the triracial interethnic relations that continued even after Japanese
removal from Los Angeles County.

Map 2 Rancho San Pedro as of 1937
Source: Map Case 3, Drawer 2, Folder 1, Special Collections, Archives and Special
Collections, University Library, California State University, Dominguez Hills.
267

Rancho San Pedro was a site of the original Spanish land grant located in the southern part of
Los Angeles County overlapping mainly with today’s Torrance, Carson, and the Wilmington area
of Los Angeles (see Map 2). In Rancho San Pedro, Japanese immigrant farmers began to increase
in the mid-1910s.
508
One example of this early Japanese tenant farming economy is the story of a
Japanese immigrant named Masakichi Kuwahara. Kuwahara came to the United State in 1919 and
settled in Rancho San Pedro despite the restrictions imposed under the Gentlemen’s Agreement of
1907-1908. He could enter the United States legally as a yobiyose son of a Japanese farmer
working in Rancho San Pedro.
509
Later Japanese farmers began to grow other crops such as
cauliflower, cabbage, celery, and beans. Those Japanese farmers leased their farmlands from four
local real estate companies in Rancho San Pedro: the Dominguez Estate Company, the Carson
Estate Company, the Watson Land Company, and the Del Amo Estate Company. These four
companies were connected as family companies, since Rancho San Pedro had been owned by the
descendants of Manuel Domínguez who was a Los Angeles mayor in the nineteenth century. In
1784, a veteran Spanish soldier Juan José Domínguez was granted the land by the Spanish
government. The land ownership was taken over by Dominguez’s nephew Cristobal Domínguez
and later Cristobal’s son Manuel. When Manuel died in 1882, more than 24,000 acres of Rancho
San Pedro were divided by his six children, all daughters, and eventually came to be managed by
the above estate companies. It is noteworthy that the Dominguez descendants were socially
considered as whites and—proud of their roots in the original Spanish colonization of California—

508
The Map of Rancho San Pedro, Map case 3, Drawer 2, Folder 1, Archives and Special Collections, University
Library, California State University, Dominguez Hills. Iwata, Planted in Good Soil, 1: 397-400; Minami Kashū
Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi, 79-88.
509
Eileen R.N. Sugiyama (Yoshimura), “Inventory and Analysis of Materials on the Arrival and Settlement of
Japanese and Japanese Americans in the Dominguez Family Papers,” revised draft #5, July 1, 1981, 14. Eileen
Reiko Yoshimura has conducted a detailed research of the documents on ethnic Japanese residents, using the
records of the real estate companies in Rancho San Pedro, as an undergraduate student of California State
University, Dominguez Hills. Her research is significant in helping us to understand the daily lives and war
experience of the Japanese population in Rancho San Pedro.
268

as a result maintained their land property into the twentieth century despite the turbulent transitions
of power from Spain to Mexico, and then from Mexico to the United States.
510
Rancho San Pedro
was where the histories of settlers and immigrants from Spain, Mexico, the United States, and
Japan merged together and turned the region into a site of global history and profitable farmland
in Southern California.
These real estate companies preserved a large amount of legal and business documents
including land lease contracts of Japanese tenant farmers and donated them to California State
University, Dominguez Hills, in the 1970s. According to various records related to ethnic Japanese
tenants, there were more than sixty Japanese family farmers in Rancho San Pedro by the time of
Japanese internment. Before Japanese tenants were gone, the Dominguez Estate Company and the
Del Amo Estate Company respectively created a list of forty-two and twelve Japanese tenant
farmers who worked in lands leased until February 10, 1942. The Carson Estate Company also
had the records of land lease contracts with at least fourteen Japanese tenant farmers who worked
until the time of their evacuation. The majority of ethnic Japanese farmers in Rancho San Pedro
leased small plots ranging from three to thirty acres, but some had larger lands of more than 100
acres.
511

Land lease contracts give us a detailed picture of how Japanese farmers leased lands under
the name of their U.S.-born children in order to circumvent the California Alien Land Law of 1920
and how the landowners provided them with assistance in that process. In February 1941, a

510
Judson Grenier, Reminiscences of the Dominguez Rancho and the Carson Family: An Oral History by John
Victor Carson, second edition (Carson: California State University, Dominguez Hills, 1981), introduction i-iii.
511
Dominguez Estate Company, list of Japanese tenants, February 10, 1942, Box 194; Carson Estate Company,
land lease contracts, Box 117 and 118, Rancho San Pedro Collection, Archives and Special Collections,
University Library, California State University, Dominguez Hills, Carson, California (hereafter as Rancho San
Pedro Collection); Del Amo Estate Company, list of Japanese tenants, February 10, 1942, Box 62, Del Amo
Estate Company Collection, Archives and Special Collections, University Library, California State University,
Dominguez Hills, Carson, California (hereafter as Del Amo Estate Company Collection).
269

Japanese family made a lease contract for two small lots under the name of Chieno Amate,
probably the family’s daughter, with the Carson Estate Company. In April, however, the company
cancelled this lease because her birth certificate was not submitted. A little bit later, the Amate
family tried to lease the same lots under the name of their son, Shigeru Amate, who was twenty-
one years old at that time. The company official in charge of processing the lease cooperatively
worked for the change of the tenant name, but Shigeru’s birth certificate was not found in the
designated file either. Then the official sent a letter to his manager A.G. Hemming and asked him
about the missing birth certificate, writing “I am enclosing lease C, to Shigeru Amate . . . I have
looked all through the lease files, and I can’t find a birth certificate for Chieno Amate. I have the
file on him (Shigeru) but no certificate is with the other papers. Are you sure he gave it to you and
you sent it in? It just isn’t here. I’ve looked several days for it. Will you please check with him to
be sure you got it?” Later the company confirmed Shigeru’s birth certificate, proving his birth in
Los Angeles on March 11, 1920 as a son of Japanese parents, Sōtarō and Yoshino Amate.
512
As
demonstrated in these records, Japanese farmers and the companies made collaborative efforts for
legal compliance under the restriction of the California Alien Land Law until the time when the
U.S.-Japan war began.
The Amate family’s lease contract also illustrates another important fact, which was observed
by the USDA specialist P. A. Minges in December 1941. Their lease covered one year from
January 1 to December 31 of 1941. Before the lease would expire, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on
December 7. Yet, even after the outbreak of the war, the Amate family and the Carson Estate

512
Carson Estate Company, lease contract of Chieno Amate, February 25, 1941; memorandum, April 18, 1941;
lease contract of Shigeru Amate, January 1, 1941; California State Board of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics,
birth certificate of Shigeru Amate, March 16, 1920, Box 117, Rancho San Pedro Collection. The issue dates of
these documents indicate that the Carson Estate Company made some contracts retrospectively and let the Amate
family use the land before they confirmed Shigeru’s birth certificate.
270

Company renewed the lease for another annual term from January 1 to December 31 of 1942. A
company memorandum shows that the Amate family paid one half of their yearly amount of $75
(approximately $1,130 in 2017) for the lease on January 27, 1942, not knowing that they would be
removed from their farms shortly after the payment. Finally, their lease was cancelled on March
11 of that year due to the mass evacuation of ethnic Japanese people. Other Japanese farmers in
Rancho San Pedro also renewed their leases after the Pearl Harbor attack.
513
Since the Japanese
farmers and the real estate companies in Rancho San Pedro had trusting relationships to maintain
the profitable use of lands for both parties, Japanese Internment was a problem not only for the
Japanese but also for real estate companies and landowners.
Being aware of this difficult situation, in March 1942, the FSA created the Wartime Farm
Adjustment Program. At the same time, Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., Regional Director of the FSA in
charge of the states of California, Nevada, Utah, and Arizona, sent letters to all district officials
and field agents of the Wartime Farm Adjustment Program and announced that the FSA had been
assigned “the vital emergency job of seeing that agricultural production continues on the lands of
Japanese aliens and citizens.” The primary purpose of the Wartime Farm Adjustment Program was
“to supervise the fair disposition of alien agricultural lands and to assure continued production on
those lands aiding qualified farmers to take over the vacated land and obtain credit to operate.”
Hewes, Jr. emphasized that “increased production under the Food For Freedom program is of vital
importance to our military effort—affecting not only supplies for our Army but supplies being sent
to Britain and Russia—keeping the Japanese lands in production is a basic war measure.”
514
It

513
Carson Estate Company, lease contract of Shigeru Amate, January 1, 1942; memorandum, February 13, 1942,
Box 117, Rancho San Pedro Collection; Dominguez Estate Company, lease contract of Yoshio Amemiya,
January 14, 1942, Box 192, Rancho San Pedro Collection.
514
Laurence I. Hewes, Jr. to District Officers and Field Agents of the Wartime Farm Adjustment Program of the
Farm Security Administration, March 15, 1942, Carton 2, Ralston Papers. As for his position, see Tolan
Committee Tolan, 11653.
271

revealed the pragmatic but contradictory nature of the US war policy toward the ethnic Japanese
population, which regarded as military necessity both the removal of Japanese residents and the
maintenance of Japanese farms. The U.S. government that violated the human and civil rights of
the ethnic Japanese population still needed the fertile farmland cultivated by Japanese farmers.
Earlier in March 1942, Howes, Jr. gave his statement and testimony at the Tolan Committee.
Although he agreed that the agricultural problem caused by the Japanese removal would not raise
questions about whether or not there should be an evacuation, he put importance on maintaining
the Japanese farmlands “in order that vital food supplies needed for war purposes be maintained.”
And he disagreed that mass evacuation should be a permanent relocation of the ethnic Japanese
because “It is to be assumed, I think, that most of them will desire to return to their former homes
if possible or at least to the community in which they have formerly lived and worked and which
they know.” His remark, in fact, echoed the sentiment of Japanese farmers, implying that Howes,
Jr. was in favor of the return of the Japanese to California. The idea that the Japanese should be
allowed to return was a reason why the FSA would work to “arrange for their operation (of former
Japanese lands) under lease to nearby farmers,” rather than finding new owners of the lands.
515

After all, what the U.S. government as a whole wanted was the food grown at Japanese farmlands,
not the ethnic Japanese residents themselves. Although the prevailing national sentiment was
opposed to ethnic Japanese residents along the Pacific Coast, the FSA representatives, however
discreetly, advocated for the return of ethnic Japanese farmers to California before the Tolan
Committee.
The Rancho San Pedro real estate companies faced the same problem of finding new tenants.
John Victor Carson, a member of the Dominguez family and great grandson of Manuel Domínguez

515
Ibid., 11653-11660.
272

who inherited Rancho San Pedro in the 1820s, was in charge of the management of family business,
including farm operations. In 1972, Judson Grenier, professor of history at California State
University, Dominguez Hills, interviewed Carson about his experience during World War II.
Regarding the Japanese tenant farmers in the prewar period, Carson recalled, “We had a lot of
Japanese gardeners (farmers), all scattered around,” and “all of our land, being under irrigation,
went into truck gardening, vegetable gardening. The Japanese were the only ones who would do
it. So our farming operations went on pretty much as usual.” However, “the second World War
was different because the Japanese gardeners all got hauled out of here.”
516

Then the FSA began to find new tenants who would replace the Japanese. We can observe in
land lease contracts how Japanese farms were taken over by non-Japanese farmers through the
FSA. For example, a Japanese American tenant Toru Horita leased a fifteen-acre land known as
“lease #3” (see Map 3) of the Carson Estate Company to use it for the period from July 1, 1941 to
June 30, 1943. Horita was born in Compton in 1919 as a son of a Japanese farmer family. However,
the Horita family was sent to an internment camp in 1942. On March 27, 1942, new tenants
Kenneth Bruce Jones and his father J. D. Jones took over the “lease #3” through the FSA. On June
5, the FSA sent a letter to the Carson Estate Company informing it that the Horita family “gave
Mr. Jones a Bill of Sale on all crops, machinery, pipe, and buildings [such as a five-room house, a
barn, and a work shed] on the place for a consideration.”
517

516
Grenier, Reminiscences of the Dominguez Rancho and the Carson Family, credits, introduction, 2, 43-44.
Carson managed the land owned by the Dominguez Estate Company and Carson Estate Company, while the Del
Amo family handled the farm operation of the Del Amo Estate Company. A large portion of the original land
grant is still held and operated by the descendants of Manuel Domínguez, who inherited the land from Juan José
Domínguez, a former soldier in the first Spanish expedition to California. Dominguez Rancho Adobe Museum,
“History,” online at http://dominguezrancho.org/history, accessed February 8, 2018.
517
Carson Estate Company, map of Horita’s farm, ca. 1939; lease contract of Toru Horita, July 1, 1941; lease
contract of K. B. Jones and J. D. Jones, March 27, 1942; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Security
Administration to the Carson Estate Company, June 25, 1942; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Security
Administration, severance agreement, July 6, 1942, Box 117, Rancho San Pedro Collection.
273

Carson had to handle the replacements by the government but found it quite difficult to hire
farmers who could work as diligently as the Japanese did, particularly because the FSA did not
carefully check applicants’ farming experience. Later he remembered that experience, saying “they
(FSA) took anybody who made application. They (applicants) were the lousiest—oh, we had more
trouble around here . . . I had a bad time.” Carson was frustrated with both FSA agents and new
tenants, as he recalled:

Map 3 Horita and Haijima’s farms in
Rancho San Pedro. The Horita family
farmed the land titled “lease #3” and
the Haijima family Lease the land
titled “lease #2.” This area at the
southeastern corner of Victoria Street
and Avalon Boulevard is now a
parking lot at northwestern corner of
the California State University,
Dominguez Hills.
Source: Box 117, Rancho San Pedro
Collection, Archives and Special
Collections, University Library,
California State University,
Dominguez Hills.

274

One day this government fellow (a FSA agent) came down to me and said, “I’ve got a man
for this piece up here on Dominguez Hill, this ten-acre piece. He wants to take it.” . . . He
gave me the name, and it was a guy I threw out the day before [h]e’d gone right around
and in the other door. So I said, “Don’t bring him down here. I don’t want him. I just threw
him out.” . . . Do you know what they were doing? They were working in the shipyards . . .
They went to work in the shipyards, and then they’d come back, work for a couple of hours,
and go home. Then the next day, they’d do the same thing. The crops were dying and
everything else.
518

Even though new tenants began to lease former Japanese farms through the FSA, the tenants
worked for only a couple of hours a day because they were primarily working in the shipyards.
Consequently, the farms were devastated as Carson lamented that “they (the crops) all died. We
lost plenty.”
519
What happened in the farm of the Amate family, mentioned earlier, tells such a
trouble that Carson had with the replacements. After the Amate family was removed from Rancho
San Pedro, the FSA sent a new tenant named William J. Cammack, providing him with a loan of
$42.4 as the payment to the Carson Estate Company. However, Cammack did not complete the
lease contract so that the FSA was “trying to get someone to take the lease over.”
520
Although there
is no evidence that Cammack was also working in the shipyards, it is reasonable to consider that
the replacements through the FSA were not a smooth process given the fact that the war created
many other employment opportunities in Los Angeles County.
521

518
Grenier, Reminiscences of the Dominguez Rancho and the Carson Family, 44-45.
519
Ibid., 45.
520
Carson Estate Company, memorandum, May 21, 1942; memorandum, June 24, 1942, Box 117, Rancho San
Pedro Collection.
521
According to the Los Angeles City Directory of 1939, a person named William J. Commack was an engineer
at the Los Angeles Fire Department and lived in Van Nuys. Los Angeles Directory Co., Los Angeles City
275

While the new tenants such as Jones and Cammack were presumably white, there were Asian
Americans who tried to replace the Japanese farmers in Rancho San Pedro. A Chinese American
named John J. Wong tried to lease a 6.5-acre plot of land that was formerly cultivated by the
Japanese family of Haruko Kurashige. The Carson Estate Company began the replacement process
for Wong on May 19, 1942, but Wong did not sign the lease since he “does not want it.” A company
memorandum written on June 24 says, “this Chinaman has not taken land, nor signed lease. Unable
to locate him. Will lease it to someone else.”
522
Regardless of the ethnicity, it was not easy for the
local real estate companies to find the tenants who would stay and take care of the farms seriously
after the removal of the Japanese. However, there was one group of people who eventually
revitalized the Rancho San Pedro farmland: ethnic Mexicans, who had been farmworkers for
decades in the region. Carson recalled that “they (Japanese) were replaced mostly by Mexicans.”
523

World War II had a great socioeconomic impact on the ethnic Mexican community in Los
Angeles County, which was the largest concentration of ethnic Mexicans in the United States. In
1940 in Los Angeles County, Mexican residents, as foreign-born whites, numbered 59,260 and the
whole ethnic Mexican population approximately 315,000.
524
The war triggered the rapid growth
of defense industries and created job opportunities for residents and newly arriving domestic
migrants to Los Angeles. In the hope of getting well-paying jobs, tens of thousands of ethnic
Mexicans went westward to California from Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, Arizona, while ethnic
Japanese were forcibly relocated eastward to some of those same states. In around 1943 when

Directory 1939 (Los Angeles, 1939), 383, online at http://rescarta.lapl.org/ResCarta-Web/jsp/RcWebBrowse.jsp,
accessed July 20, 2017.
522
Carson Estate Company, lease contract of Haruko Kurashige, May 21, 1941; memorandum, n.d., Box 118,
Rancho San Pedro Collection; Varzally, Making a Non-White America, 122.
523
Grenier, Reminiscences of the Dominguez Rancho and the Carson Family, 34, 45.
524
U.S. Census Bureau, Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population (Washington, D.C., 1943),
Table 24, “Foreign-Born White, by Country of Birth, by Counties, and for Cities of 10,000 to 100,000,” 564;
Zaragoza Vargas, Labor Rights are Civil Rights: Mexican American Workers in Twentieth Century America
(Princeton, 2005), 224.
276

defense production peaked, many Mexican residents were hired in the booming aircraft and
shipbuilding industries. For example, about 12 percent of all Lockheed aircraft employees were
Mexican Americans, 80 percent of whom were women working in assembly lines and riveting
process. However, racial discrimination was still deeply rooted in the U.S. society despite the war
against the Axis. When the war economy began to slow down, ethnic Mexican workers were the
first to be dismissed.
525
Japanese Internment somewhat moderated anti-Japanese fear but then
positioned ethnic Mexicans as a new target of racial hatred by the white majority, as most clearly
demonstrated in the Sleepy Lagoon murder case in 1942 and the Zoot Suit Riots in 1943. The
Pacific War heightened the racial tension between whites and Mexican Americans in Los Angeles
by transforming the city’s demography with the disappearance of the ethnic Japanese as well as
the increase of domestic migrant workers including Mexicans.
526
In the history of prewar Los
Angeles, racial discrimination against the Japanese and Mexicans were mutually constitutive and
created in the context of local as well as international relations.
As far as Japanese-Mexican interethnic relations were concerned, the question is how the
ethnic Mexican community in Los Angeles reacted to Japanese Internment. Since the ethnic

525
Ibid., 224, 233-234. As for the wartime experiences of Mexican American female workers, see Elizabeth R.
Escobedo, From Coveralls to Zoot Suits: The Lives of Mexican American Women on the World War II Home
Front (Chapel Hill, 2013), 99-100.
526
In August of 1942, the very month when Japanese removal was completed in the West Coast, seventeen
Mexican American youth were arrested and convicted for murdering José Díaz near a swimming hole called
Sleepy Lagoon in Los Angeles County. The Sleepy Lagoon trial demonstrated strong racism against ethnic
Asians and Mexicans, although the charges were later dismissed thanks to the Sleepy Lagoon Defense
Committee chaired by Carey McWilliams. Such racism was most clearly expressed at the trial by Lieutenant
Edward Duran Ayres of the sheriff’s department who said Mexicans were Indians who show “many of the
oriental characteristics, especially so in his utter disregard for the value of life.” The so-called Zoot Suit Riots re
was another incident in which ethnic Mexicans were racialized as criminals after the Japanese were removed
from Los Angeles. In June of 1943, white sailors and soldiers stationed in Los Angeles attacked groups of
Mexican American youth in the zoot suit style. However, the city’s media reported the confrontation as the
violence mainly committed by Mexican Americans against white soldiers and civilians, since “the ideal of
American youth was encapsulated in the serviceman . . . The zoot-suiter was the antithesis of the servicemen”
as explained by Mauricio Mazon. See Mauricio Mazon, The Zoot-Suit Riots: The Psychology of Symbolic
Annihilation (Austin, 1984;1995), 6, 22-24; Vargas, Labor Rights are Civil Rights, 228.
277

Japanese and Mexicans interacted one another in the urban and agricultural areas of Los Angele
County, Japanese removal could not go without influencing the ethnic Mexican community.
527
An
Issei physician Toshio Ichioka had been serving the ethnic Mexican community in Downtown Los
Angeles and placing his clinic’s advertisements on La Opinión since 1928 (a popular trend we
looked at previously in Chapter 3). His wife Tsutayo, who was a Nisei, earned her medical doctor
degree from the University of Southern California in the late 1938 and opened her own clinic in
Downtown Los Angeles in January 1942. While it was unfortunate for her to begin her business
after Japan attacked the United States, the Rafu Shimpo ran an article and an advertisement about
her clinic. At the same time, La Opinión wrote a larger article about her clinic with a picture of her
face and introduced her as the “wife of doctor Toshio Ichioka, well known in our colonia.”
528

Predictably Tsutayo’s new clinic was soon shut down due to mass evacuation just like other
Japanese shops in Downtown Los Angeles. On April 19, La Opinión reported on close interactions
between Mexicans and Japanese in Los Angeles County. It reminded the reader of the bitter
experiences of Mexican strikers in the past, writing, “As for the relations between Mexicans and
Japanese in this country, where our workers are concerned there is enough material for a large
book.” On the other hand, regarding the Japanese evacuees, the article showed sympathy toward
the Japanese: “The traditional ‘mom-and-pop’ store . . . will pass for a long time into history,
leaving behind a void in the soul of our people, since many of them speak Spanish, especially the

527
Ralph Lazo, a Mexican-Irish teen, registered as a Japanese and went to internment along with his Japanese
American friends. Guy Gabaldon, another Mexican American who was raised by a Japanese family in Boyle
Heights, later saved more than 1,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians by persuading them to surrender in Saipan
during the war. See Varzally, Making a Non-White America, 139; “Guy Gabaldon, 80; WWII Hero Captured
1,000 Japanese on Saipan,” Los Angeles Times, September 6, 2006.
528
“Ichioka Tsutayo Dokutoru Shin Iin Kaigyō [Dr. Tsutayo Ichioka opens her new clinic],” Rafu Shimpo,
January 30, 1942; “Nueva Oficina de la Dra. Ichioka,” La Opinión, February 3, 1942. Toshio Ichioka’s mailing
address is identical to his clinic’s address. See Los Angeles Directory Co., Los Angeles City Directory 1939 (Los
Angeles, 1939), 1017.
278

children. And this may surprise you, the reader, but reciprocity obliges us to note that many
Mexicans, especially in the border regions, speak Japanese.”
529

Nonetheless, La Opinión approved the government decision to relocate the Japanese as a
military necessity and expressed their expectation for its positive impact on Mexican farmworkers:
farmlands abandoned by Japanese evacuees.
530
On April 27, an editorial explained the work of the
FSA and stressed “great opportunities” available for Mexicans with farming experience to become
tenant farmers in former Japanese farms. On the other hand, it was not easy for Mexicans to do all
the paperwork for land leases, because “the majority of us are, due to the lack of the perfect fluency
of the English language, are averse to all the management that involves legal procedures.” In El
Monte, the very site of the large-scale Japanese-Mexican conflict in 1933 detailed in Chapter 4, an
ethnic organization named the Mexican Agricultural Society provided Mexican residents with
necessary information for the ownership and lease of farm lands. Mexican residents could own
and lease lands since they were legally regarded as white and eligible for citizenship. Mexican
farmworkers were aware of the importance of owning or leasing farms instead of working as
farmworkers through their bitter experiences in anti-Japanese strikes in the 1930s. La Opinión’s
editorial concluded, “We hope that this opportunity today presented for the improvement of
Mexicans can be utilized properly, since it means a flattering rise in their form of life, and a
possibility for economic independence.”
531
The Pearl Harbor attack and the subsequent removal
of the Japanese brought an end to the triracial hierarchy in Los Angeles agriculture but created rare

529
José Ruiz Velis, “El ‘Pequeño Tokio’ ha muerto,” La Opinión, April 19, 1942, cited and translated by Greg
Robinson, After Camp, 122.
530
Greg Robinson conducted a careful analysis of La Opinión’s coverage on Japanese Internment. Robinson
argues that while La Opinión’s editors sometimes expressed sympathy for the Japanese, “the nature of La
Opinión’s coverage . . . suggests that its editors were motivated not only by (dual) patriotism or fear of the
Japanese military but also by greed and land hunger, mixed with a wish to settle old scores with Japanese
Americans.” See Robinson, After Camp, Ch.6.
531
“Una Gran Oportunidad,” La Opinión, April 27, 1942.
279

chances for Mexican farmworkers to fill in the socioeconomic spot formerly occupied by the
Japanese.
In this context, the Rancho San Pedro companies began to lease lands to Mexican farmers.
Mexican farmers grew crops which could be harvested within a short time period, from forty-five
to sixty days. In Carson’s recollection, some Mexican farmers grew flowers such as geraniums
because many of them had worked as farmworkers under a European immigrant geranium farmer.
They recovered the productivity of the farms in six months and “did pretty well” in growing
geraniums.
532

While Carson’s recollection is a significant testimony about what happened after Japanese
removal in relation to ethnic Mexicans, the business records of the Rancho San Pedro companies
reveal even more about the transition from Japanese to Mexican farmers. In fact, the transition was
not always smooth. In 1940, a Japanese family farmer leased a seventeen-acre parcel of land named
“lease #2” for the period from July 1, 1940 to June 30, 1943, under the name of Ichirō Haijima
who was born in 1916 in Los Angeles. Their lease contract was cancelled on May 1, 1942 due to
their removal. About a month later, new tenants Vaughn Guzelain and William Beisel replaced the
Haijima family with the lease contract which would expire on June 30, 1945. Guzelain and Beisel
began to grow flowers but did not stay long. In January 1943, Guzelain and Beisel transferred the
lease to the Jones family who had moved into the former Japanese farm as mentioned earlier. The
Jones family, however, also did not stay in the farm for too long. After these white tenants left the
former Haijima farm, a tenant farmer Angelo Ornelas leased it on November 1, 1943. Although
his lease contract does not say the nationality or ethnicity, Ornelas was most likely an ethnic
Mexican because of his name and the small size of the land he leased in addition to Carson’s

532
Grenier, Reminiscences of the Dominguez Rancho and the Carson Family, 45.
280

recollection that Japanese farms were taken over mostly by Mexicans. The 1942 Los Angeles City
Directory lists a man named Angelo Ornelas who was a grocer in Boyle Heights; it is possible that
this was the same Ornelas who, having enough capital and knowledge, took over the former
Haijima family land. As described in a handwritten map (see Map 3) owned by the Carson Estate
Company, the piece of land where the complicated transition from Japanese Haijima to Mexican
Ornelas occurred is now a parking lot at northwestern corner of the California State University at
Dominguez Hills.
533
Another example of the Japanese-Mexican transition of farmland was the
fourteen-acre land formerly leased by a Japanese family under the name of Haruo Imaizumi. The
Imaizumi family’s farm was first taken over by a tenant named Hanko Franco, whose ethnicity is
not clear, in May 1942. Franco was expected to lease the land until April 1945 but, for unknown
reasons, left from there by the end of 1942. Then, in January 1943, a Mexican farmer Manuel
Torres took over six acres of the land formerly leased by the Imaizumi family (Torres continued
to lease his six-acre land at least until 1950). The series of transitions from the Japanese to whites,
and then to Mexicans, as recorded in these land lease contracts, illustrate the rapid demographic
changes in the rural areas of Los Angeles County during the 1940s.
534

There is further additional evidence of the transition from Japanese to Mexican tenancy in
Rancho San Pedro. A list of new tenants made by the Dominguez Estate Company in 1943
recorded eighteen non-Japanese tenants, all of whom had Spanish-surnames except one. The
tenants’ names were R. Lopez, P. Hurtado, P. Cruz, F, Garcia, M. De Luna, Angel Acosta,

533
Carson Estate Company, lease contract of Ichirō Haijima, July 1, 1940; lease contract of Vaughn Guzelain
and William Beisel, June 12, 1942; lease contract of Angelo Ornelos, November 1, 1943; Carson Estate
Company, map, n.d.; State of California, Department of Public Health, Vital Statistics, birth certificate of Ichirō
Haijima, August 5, 1916; Southern California Floral Industry, transfer of lease, January 8, 1943, Box 117,
Rancho San Pedro Collection; Los Angeles Directory Co., Los Angeles City Directory 1942 (Los Angeles, 1942),
2765.
534
Carson Estate Company, lease contract of Haruo Imaizumi, July 1, 1940, Box 118, Rancho San Pedro
Collection; Carson Estate Company, lease contract of Manuel Torres, December 15, 1942; lease contract of
Hanko Franco, May 1, 1942, Box 118, Rancho San Pedro Collection.
281

Sebastian Venegas, and so forth. These new tenants were most likely ethnic Mexicans based on
Carson’s recollection that Japanese farms were taken over mostly by Mexicans and the fact that
most foreign-born residents with Spanish surnames were Mexicans in Los Angeles County at the
time. The list also recorded their rural route addresses telling us the exact places where these
Mexican tenants lived during their tenancy and, more importantly, that many of their addresses
were similar with those of former Japanese tenants. If we compare the list of forty-two Japanese
tenants in 1942 and the list of seventeen Mexican tenants in 1943, we can observe that twelve
Mexican tenants lived in the area where fourteen Japanese family farmers had lived before mass
evacuation, along the rural routes from the post office in Compton (see Table 1 and 2). These
Japanese tenants grew vegetables in farms in the northeastern part of Rancho San Pedro, which
was mostly an unincorporated area just south of the city limit of Compton. In one case, an ethnic
Mexican tenant Joe Uribe and a former Japanese tenant M. Nakashima had the identical address
of “Route 2, Box 830, Compton.” This proves that Uribe moved into the former Nakashima home
after Japanese Internment began.
535

Uribe acquired only a small part of the former Nakashima land, as Uribe farmed only 3.6
acres of the thirty-five acres Nakashima once farmed. On November 24, 1943, the Dominguez
Estate Company wrote a letter to Uribe saying “according to our recent measurement of your land,
we find you are farming 3.6 acres. Therefore, we are charging you for the current year beginning
May 1, 1943 on the adjusted acreage.” Including this letter, the company sent at least sixteen letters
to new tenants, mostly ethnic Mexicans recorded on the above list, informing about the exact size

535
Dominguez Estate Company, list of Japanese tenants, February 10, 1942; list of non-Japanese tenants, 1943,
Box 194, Rancho San Pedro Collection. According to U.S. Census of 1940, non-Mexican Latin Americans and
Spaniards in Los Angeles County numbered only 4,468, while Mexicans numbered 59,260 as foreign-born
whites. See U.S. Census Bureau, Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population (Washington, D.C.,
1943), Table 24, “Foreign-Born White, by Country of Birth, by Counties, and for Cities of 10,000 to 100,000,”
564.
282

Table 1 List of Japanese tenants in Rancho San Pedro, February 10, 1942.
Source: Box 194, Rancho San Pedro Collection, Archives and Special Collections, University
Library, California State University, Dominguez Hills.
Table 2 List of non-Japanese tenants in Rancho San Pedro, 1943
Source: Box 194, Rancho San Pedro Collection, Archives and Special Collections, University
Library, California State University, Dominguez Hills.
283

of their farms. Their farm sizes ranged from 3.6 to 14.5 acres, slightly smaller than the former
Japanese farms in the same area (Tables 1 and 2). Usually tenants made lease contracts after the
size of land was determined. However, in the hurried and chaotic situation caused by the sudden
disappearance of Japanese farmers, the company allowed new tenants to work the lands even
before the sizes of their farms were precisely measured.
536

Land lease contracts tell us not only about the transition from Japanese to Mexican farmers
but also about the cordial support provided by the Rancho San Pedro companies to former Japanese
tenants. They kept their Japanese tenants until the very moment when the U.S. government
removed them. Not all white landowners were supportive to Japanese tenant farmers after the Pearl
Harbor attack. For example, landowners in Stockton in Northern California cancelled the lease
contracts with Japanese farmers right after the Pearl Harbor attack.
537
However, it is important for
us to recognize that ethnic Japanese farmers in Southern California’s Rancho San Pedro lost their
lands because of Japanese Internment, not because of the Pearl Harbor attack. As demonstrated by
the red-ink handwritten memos on the Rancho San Pedro companies’ lease contracts, for example,
“Cancelled 4-6-42. Tenants Evacuated by U.S. Gov’t” or “Tenant evacuated by the United States,
May 1942,” Internment triggered a major management challenge for the Rancho San Pedro real
estate companies.
538
John Victor Carson was so supportive of his Japanese tenants that many were
very grateful to Carson during this difficult period. In April 1942, a former Japanese tenant Makoto
Miyakawa sent a postcard to Carson from the Tulare Assembly Center showing his gratitude:

536
Dominguez Real Estate Company to Joe Uribe, November 24, 1943, Box194, Rancho San Pedro Collection.
Similar letters from the company to new tenants are preserved in the Rancho San Pedro Collection.
537
Azuma, Between Two Empires, 207.
538
For example, see Carson Estate Company, lease contract of Momoo Mochizuki, July 1, 1940 (cancelled on
April 6, 1942) and of Ichirō Hayima (Haijima), July 1, 1940 (cancelled on May 1, 1942), Box 117, Rancho San
Pedro Collection.
284

We reached here about 6:30 in the evening on Thursday. The trip was long and its weather
was so hot that practically all the passengers have gone to sleep but the beautiful scenery
of the mountains and the desert were the only thing that kept us awake. We are now staying
in the barrack no E-3 which is very cool and a nice place. So far everything is better than
what we had expected. We thank you ever so much [f]or everything you've done to us and
we’ll write to you again. Truly yours.
539

Carson’s support continued even after Japanese tenants were evacuated to internment camps.
Carson never hesitated to provide affidavits for those Japanese who were under investigation or
others who wanted to gain permission to leave internment camps to work outside. On September
19, 1942, Misao Miyakawa, a Nisei daughter of Makoto Miyakawa, sent a letter to Carson from
the Gila River Relocation Center and asked him to write an affidavit for her farther who was under
investigation at the time. She wrote:

Dear Mr. Carson. How are you? We are now in the Gila Relocation Center and all of us
are just fine. The desert heat is very severe and the sand storm is the only thing that that
causes us trouble . . . Mr. Carson, I may cause you great deal of trouble but would you
kindly make me out an affidavit of my father? This affidavit may forward him for another
hearing. I’ll appreciate very much if you can do so by proving his honesty, his residence
of nearly sixteen years in Dominguez Hill, tilling the soil and has done anything wrong
during these years. If you can, would you please send it as early as possible.
540

539
Makoto Miyakawa to J.V. Carson, May 11, 1942, Box 194, Rancho San Pedro Collection.
540
Misao Miyakawa to J.V. Carson, September 19, 1942, Box 194, Rancho San Pedro Collection.
285

Within a week, Carson sent Misao his affidavit that said, “Makoto Miyakawa has been a tenant of
Dominguez Estate Company for several years, during which time, to the best of my knowledge,
he has been an honest, industrious and law abiding member of his community and has reached and
educated a family in this country. I have no knowledge that he has been associated with or has
contributed to any foreign society or organization.”
541
Right after receiving it, on September 27,
Misao wrote back to Carson and appreciated his prompt support for the Miyakawa family, saying
“we’ll never forget your kindness.”
542
Since the Miyakawa Family leased the land from the Del
Amo Estate Company in Rancho San Pedro as well, Misao sent the same request to the company.
Eugenio Cabrero, the company’s secretary, quickly responded to Misao’s request and sent his
affidavit back. It is mostly likely that these two Rancho San Pedro companies cooperated in
supporting former Japanese tenants since their affidavits were identical.
543

A former Nisei farmer Henry Chiyozō Takeuchi also benefited from his trusting relationship
with Carson, when he needed an affidavit for himself to get permission to leave the relocation
center for outside employment or education. On 7 May, 1943, Dillon Myer, Director of the War
Relocation Center, sent a letter to Carson requesting his affidavit about Takeuchi. A week later,
Carson sent his affidavit emphasizing Takeuchi’s good character, writing “he and his family were
agricultural tenants of this company for many years prior to the evacuation of the Japanese from
the Pacific Coast in May 1942. It is my belief that Mr. Takeuchi was born here and educated in
the public schools of this community. His reputation in the community is very good and as a
vegetable farmer he is considerably above average.”
544
These exchanges of letters and affidavits

541
J.V. Carson, affidavit about Makoto Miyakawa, September 1942, Box 194, Rancho San Pedro Collection.
542
Misao Miyakawa to J.V. Carson, September 27, 1942, Box 194, Rancho San Pedro Collection.
543
Misao Miyakawa to the Del Amo Estate Company, September 19, 1942 and October 2, 1942; Eugenio
Cabrero, affidavit about Makoto Miyakawa, September 30, 1942, Box 93, Del Amo Estate Company Collection.
544
D.S. Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, to J.V. Carson, May 7, 1943; Dominguez Estate
Company to War Relocation Authority, May 14, 1943, Box 194, Rancho San Pedro Collection.
286

demonstrate the depth of the mutual trust between landowners and Japanese farmers in Rancho
San Pedro, which should be remembered as one of important facts in the history of Japanese
Internment.
Back in the 1930s, the trusting relationship between landowners and Japanese farmers in
Rancho San Pedro was behind their collaboration in fighting against Mexican strikers. Nonetheless,
Carson and Japanese tenants were not anti-Mexican. They were anti-union. Carson’s grandmother
Victoria Dominguez was one of the six daughters of Manuel Domínguez who successfully kept
the family’s land ownership during the turbulent period of the transition from the Mexican to
American rule. Victoria married to an Anglo American George Henry Carson in 1857 but
continued to speak almost only Spanish at home because she wanted her children to be able to
speak Spanish. Although her grandson John Victor Carson did not learn to speak Spanish, his
American wife Alice was fluent in Spanish since she was born and raised in Mexico. Carson had
stayed in Mexico with Alice for “many, many months down in Mexico.” Although Carson was a
rich person whose life was very different form working class Mexicans, he was familiar with
Mexican culture and people.
545

More important is the fact that Japanese farmers in Rancho San Pedro had close relationships
with some Mexican workers as well. After being relocated to an internment camp in Arkansas,
Henry Chiyozō Takeuchi received a letter from Carson inquiring about the property of Takeuchi
left in Rancho San Pedro. Takeuchi wrote back that his family had sold their wooden flumes and
pipe but kept the buildings to store their personal properties. However, as his properties were
removed, he wanted to rent them during his absence. In addition, Takeuchi mentioned a Mexican
who rented one of his buildings, writing “[s]ince our personal property has been moved away, I

545
Grenier, Reminiscences of the Dominguez Rancho and the Carson Family, i-ii, 36.
287

would like to rent the buildings . . . [except] the one building Julian Rodriguez is occupying if he
is still living there.” Takeuchi was not sure if Rodriguez could stay at his house when Takeuchi
entrusted Carson’s company in handling how to rent his buildings. Thus, Takeuchi asked Carson
to “tell Julian that I’ll refund it when I return to California” in the case that he Rodriguez had to
leave his house. It seems that Takeuchi was willing to pay Rodriguez for leaving his house to lease
a more expensive building or lease the same building whose rent was set higher by Carson’s
company. As Takeuchi cared about the financial situation of Rodriguez, we can infer that the
Takeuchi family and Rodriguez had a good relationship. In his letter, Takeuchi also sketched the
size and location of his family’s buildings (see Map 4) such as “living quarters, “boy room,”
“tractor garage,” “small garage,” and “Julian’s Rodriguez House.” Most Mexican farmworkers
came to Japanese farms only when they found jobs, but Rodriguez lived together with the Takeuchi
family as his house was only about forty feet away from the Takeuchi family’s house.
546

The basic socioeconomic structure that ruled Japanese agriculture in Los Angeles County was
the triracial hierarchy in which Japanese farmers leased lands from whites and hired ethnic
Mexicans. Because of this hierarchy, Los Angeles agriculture maintained a multiethnic
environment and created a site of interethnic labor conflicts between the Japanese and Mexicans.
Letters exchanged between Carson and Japanese evacuees during the war, however, demonstrate
another side of the triracial relations in which Japanese, Mexicans, and white landowners
developed mutual trust and cooperated to maintain the Los Angeles farmland profitable. Japanese
Internment eliminated the presence of Japanese farmers from Los Angeles County but could not
completely obliterate the mutual trust developed in their triracial relationship. In the history of

546
Henry Chiyozō Takeuchi to J.V. Carson, February 16, 1943; Henry Chiyozō Takeuchi, Bill of Sale, February
16, 1943, Box 194, Rancho San Pedro Collection. In his letter to Carson, Takeuchi added, “The rent for the
building, I will have it up to you and your staff to work out the best plans.”
288

immigrants, the workplace is oftentimes a site of economic inequality. Yet, the workplace can also
be the site of close contact enabling mutual understanding and making fluid and unstable the racial
and class boundaries.

Map 4 Buildings owned by former Japanese tenant Henry Chiyozō Takeuchi in Rancho San
Pedro. It shows that Takeuchi lived with a Mexican farmworker Julian Rodriguez before
Japanese removal.
Source: Box 194, Rancho San Pedro Collection, Archives and Special Collections, University
Library, California State University, Dominguez Hills.

289

Los Angeles farmland was the transpacific workplace where Japanese and Mexicans who
came over across the Pacific Ocean and the U.S.-Mexico border interacted with each other weaving
their respective experiences into a history of immigrant Los Angeles that developed both
interethnic conflicts and mutual understanding. For a better understanding of interethnic relations,
we should focus not only on what the wartime hysteria creates but also on what forms the situation
that cannot easily be changed by the wartime hysteria. By looking at the latter aspect, we can see
the nature of race and class relations in the immigrant society as more fluid and situational even in
the time of economic and military crises.
Japanese Internment marked the end of this history of Japanese-Mexican relations in Los
Angeles agriculture. It brought the end to the triracial hierarchy in Los Angeles agriculture as well
as the transborder ethnic Japanese community in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. Local USDA
officials and California Governor Culbert Olson thought that the mass evacuation of ethnic
Japanese residents would cause an agricultural labor crisis and wanted to keep them within the
state of California. What is more significant historically is that they regarded the Japanese as an
important source of labor but also as trustworthy people who should be allowed to stay in
California under surveillance. Their serious concern about the agricultural labor shortage was
finally relieved by the importation of Mexican workers, the so-called Bracero Program, which
started in August 1942 right after the completion of Japanese removal. In other words, the Pearl
Harbor attack and Japanese Interment together generated the necessity for the Bracero Program in
California.
Meanwhile, the local real estate companies in Rancho San Pedro, under the management of
John Victor Carson, had serious trouble finding new tenants who would replace the Japanese, and
the government aid for the replacement did not help them enough. Again, it was mainly ethnic
290

Mexicans who acquired and revitalized the former Japanese lands in Rancho San Pedro. Even after
Japanese removal, Carson provided genuine support for his former Japanese tenants based on his
experiences of working with them for many years. Japanese Internment was not just a Japanese
American experience. It was rather a larger multiethnic Los Angeles wartime experience created
by rapidly changing international relations between Japan, Mexico, and the United States. From
this perspective, we can see better the social dimension of the Los Angeles immigrant society in
which different groups of people interacted with one another on an everyday life level, challenging
the racial and class boundaries in multiethnic Los Angeles even during the wartime emergency.
547

547
Further research should be done to demonstrate that what happened in Rancho San Pedro during the war
happened in other rural areas of Los Angeles Country.
291

Conclusion

The eighteen-year period between the Immigration Act of 1924 and the mass removal of the
ethnic Japanese population in 1942 is traumatic and consequential in the local history of
multiethnic Los Angeles as well as being significant in the international history of the triangular
relationship between Japan, Mexico, and the United States. As detailed in this dissertation, this
period witnessed the development and sudden demise of two distinct ethnoracial relationships
involving the Japanese and Mexicans in Los Angeles County. One of these relationships was the
transborder ethnic Japanese community in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands and the other was the
triracial hierarchy in Los Angeles agriculture in which Japanese farmers leased land from white
landowners and hired Mexican workers. These local and transnational relationships together
formed the socioeconomic and geopolitical dynamics of the Pacific Coast of the U.S.-Mexico
borderlands, intersecting with each other the concerns held by the peoples and governments of
Japan, Mexico, and the United States. As mentioned in the introduction, Kōji Higashi asserted in
1921 that U.S-Japan international relations could not be understood without considering Mexico.
His assertion seems even more convincing when we look back at the history of Japanese and
Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles County.
A simple but important fact is that Los Angeles farmland made Japanese, Mexicans, and
white Americans interact with one another on an everyday or regular basis. Their interactions
generated serious interethnic conflicts but also nurtured mutual understanding that helped them
accommodate each other beyond the dominant racial and class boundaries of this period. Although
these groups were different in terms of race and class, they shared the same immigrant workplace.
Based on their everyday life interplay, the Japanese could be seen more as resident farmers rather
292

than enemy aliens even in times of intense Japanese-Mexican labor conflicts and wartime
emergency in Los Angeles County in the 1930s and 1940s.
By looking at both local and international factors, this dissertation has highlighted how the
unique social dimensions of this triracial interaction challenged existing racial and class
boundaries in the region, revealing the level of fluidity and contingency in racial and class relations
that shaped the negotiations and accommodations reached by these different Pacific borderlands
groups. The El Monte Berry strike of 1933 intensified the racial, class, and national boundaries
between the Japanese and Mexicans in the local context of Los Angeles agriculture. These
boundaries, however, proved to be fluid and unstable in the transnational context of the U.S.-
Mexico borderlands as demonstrated by the Mexicali Japanese who supported Los Angeles
Mexicans despite their ethnic ties with Los Angeles Japanese farmers. Three years later, the Venice
Celery strike created two sets of Japanese-Mexican alliances: anti-labor and pro-labor. The
creation of these alliances between the Japanese and Mexicans whose race and class were different
proves the situational nature of Japanese-Mexican relations in Los Angeles farmland that were
influenced but not determined by their racial and class differences. In such a situation, Japanese
immigrant nationalism was rather compatible with a multiethnic understanding that Japanese
immigrants should make efforts to build better relations with both white Americans and ethnic
Mexicans. And by the time of the Pacific War, this long-standing interethnic interplay in Los
Angeles farmland had created a strong basis for Mexicans and white Americans to be able to regard
their Japanese neighbors as farmers and residents without completely succumbing to the prevailing
anti-Japanese hysteria in Los Angeles County. In such interactions, I believe, we can trace to the
history of transborder Los Angeles.
293

After World War II, many ethnic Japanese internees returned to Los Angeles County. Their
population reached 36,761 in 1950, which was almost the same number recorded in 1940.
548
But
they could not reestablish the ethnic agricultural community they had developed in prewar years.
World War II brought a dramatic change in the demography and industry of California by
multiplying the manufacturing economy during war years and by attracting about 1.6 million
Americans from other states. People continued to migrate to California even after the war. Between
July 1945 and July 1947, more than one million people moved to California, which caused rapid
urbanization and created a housing shortage. Los Angeles County, one of the primary industrial
regions of the U.S. West, experienced this remarkable change like few other places.
549
When
former ethnic Japanese farmers returned to Los Angeles County, many were not able to lease or
buy lands because of rapid industrialization and urbanization, even in the places that used to be
major Japanese agricultural areas such as the coastal regions or the Gardena, San Gabriel, or San
Fernando Valleys. These areas included the places analyzed in this dissertation such as El Monte,
Venice, Gardena, and Dominguez Hills. For example, before the war, the Gardena Valley had from
800 to 1,000 Japanese farming families. But after the war, only 70 to 80 Japanese families resumed
their agricultural work. Those Japanese who had an ambition to resume agriculture at the large-
scale moved from Los Angeles County to other places in neighboring Ventura and Orange
Counties. By 1959, only 2,500 acres of land were cultivated by 150 or 200 Japanese families in
Los Angeles County, an almost 90 percent decrease from the prewar level. On the other hand, the
gardening and nursery industries replaced perishable crop agriculture as the major ethnic Japanese
industry in postwar Los Angeles. Japanese immigrants had been known to be good at these

548
U.S. Census Bureau, Seventeenth Census of the United States: 1950, Population (Washington D.C., 1952),
Table 47, “Indians, Japanese, and Chinese, by Sex, for Selected Counties and Cities,” 179.
549
Kevin Starr, California: A History (New York, 2007), 235-239.
294

businesses since before the war and these businesses could make larger profits from
urbanization.
550
After all, in Los Angeles County, the postwar socioeconomic situation did not see
the return of the highly institutionalized triracial hierarchy that had existed in prewar Japanese
agriculture.
In the postwar period, remaining Japanese farms in California have been cultivated first by
the Nisei and later by the Sansei (the third-generation), Mexican immigrant and Mexican American
farmworkers became increasingly important in California agriculture largely because of the
Bracero Program implemented from 1942 to 1964. In the 1970s, Japanese Nisei farmers came to
conflict with Mexican American workers organized by the United Farm Workers (UFW) under
the leadership of César Chávez. In 1976, the UFW placed Proposition 14 that would secure the
enough funding for the newly established Agricultural Labor Relations Board and guarantee the
right of UFW organizers to enter the fields. At that time, the Nisei Farmers League led by Harry
Kubo, a Japanese American farmer in Fresno County, responded fiercely to challenge Proposition
14. Kubo emphasized the importance of Japanese farmers’ property rights that were once violated
by Japanese Internment in the past, emotionally affirming, “It will never be repeated.”
551
Thus, the
ethnic Japanese wartime experience affected Japanese-Mexican relations even in the 1970s. Even
today, no matter whether they conflict with Mexicans or not, Japanese American farmers still
depend on Mexican immigrant farmworkers. However, the postwar Japanese-Mexican relations

550
Japanese agriculture in the Imperial Valley, which was one of prominent sites of Japanese agriculture before
the Pacific War, declined after the war, since white and other non-white tenants replaced the Japanese during the
war and continued to farm lands after the war. Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi Kankō Iinkai [Publishing
committee of Japanese in Southern California: A history of 70 years], ed., Minami Kashū Nihonjin
Shichijūnenshi [Japanese in Southern California: A history of 70 years] (Los Angeles, 1960), 78-79, 100-101,
133-134; Leonard Broom and Ruth Piemer, Removal and Return: The Socio-Economic Effects of the War on
Japanese Americans (Berkeley, 1949), 74.
551
Matt Garcia, From the Jaws of Victory: The Triumph and Tragedy of Cesar Chavez and the Farm Worker
Movement (Berkeley, 2012), 163-174; “Harry Kubo 84; farm leader was defender of private property rights,”
Los Angeles Times, December 16, 2006.
295

are different from what existed in prewar Los Angeles County in terms of the proportion of the
immigrant-generation tenant farmers, the involvement of the Japanese and Mexican governments,
and its transnational connection between the Japanese-Mexican relations in Los Angeles and those
in Baja California, Mexico.
The demise of Japanese-Mexican relations in Los Angeles agriculture, however, does not
suggest that Los Angeles ceased being a meeting place between Americans and Asian and Latin
American immigrants. Today’s Koreatown is a good example that demonstrates the different social
layers of close Asian-Latin American interactions. Even outside Los Angeles, an increasing
number of communities have come to develop immigrant workplaces where Asians and Latin
Americans interact with one another. This dissertation can give us a historical lesson to understand
today’s Asian-Latin American relations in the United States. It has analyzed interethnic conflicts
and accommodations in prewar Los Angeles farmland, as what can be called a transpacific
workplace, from the local and international perspectives, shedding light on the less visible social
dimension in which Japanese tenant farmers, Mexican farmworkers, and white Americans
regularly interacted with each other in person. They engaged themselves in interethnic negotiations,
nurturing a certain level of mutual understanding beyond differences of their racial and class
statuses and making the racial and class boundaries fluid and situational, even amid the serious
economic and military conflicts that defined the Pacific borderlands of the 1930s and 1940s.
Although the immigrant workplace often operates along the racial and class lines, it should
not be regarded only as the site that produces racial and class boundaries and inequalities. As
shown in this dissertation, the immigrant workplace should be conceptualized as the social space
that can nurture mutual understanding between different groups of people, no matter whether they
are Americans or immigrants, to challenge the existing dominant racial and class boundaries of a
296

particular place in time. This conclusion—formed as it is by using a transnational, transpacific
lens—helps us understand the immigrant experience within the inevitable and continuing
processes of interethnic negotiations in their everyday life interplay, not within the fixed racial and
class categories in our thought and analysis. What is more important is to observe, understand, and
direct such historical processes of interethnic negotiations toward a better understanding of how
to generate more trusting interethnic relations in immigrant workplaces not only in the United
States but also in any country whose society and economy depends largely on immigrants and their
descendants of diverse backgrounds.

297

Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES
Manuscript Materials
The United States
Archives and Special Collections, University Library, California State University, Dominguez
Hills, Carson
Rancho San Pedro Collection
Del Amo Estate Company Collection

Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley
Culbert L. Olson Papers
W.R. Ralston Papers

Japanese American National Museum, Los Angeles
Katsuma Mukaeda Papers
Murai Family Papers

La Historia Society Museum, El Monte

Special Collections and Archives, University of California, Irvine
Miscellaneous Newspaper Collection, 1704-1970

Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles
California State University, Fullerton Oral History Program Japanese American Project Oral
History Collection
George Pigeon Clements Papers
Japanese American Research Project, University of California, Los Angeles
Pre-War Japanese Socio-Cultural Organizations
298

Noboru Murakami Papers
Shiro Fujioka Papers
Kumezo Hachimonji Papers

U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park
RG96, Records of the Farmers Home Administration, 1918-1975

U.S. National Archives at Riverside, Riverside
RG25, Records of the National Labor Relations Board

Japan
Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Tokyo (DAMFAJ)
Bokukoku “Ensenada” Hōmen ni okeru Honpōjin no Hatten Jōkyō (Tsū-San_97)
Bokukoku Nairan Kankei Teikoku Shinmin no Songai Baishō Ikken (5-3-2-0-154)
Dai 52 Gikai Setsumei Sankō Shiryō (Gikai-TS-11)
Gaikoku ni okeru Rōdō Sōgi no Kankei Zakken (Higyō Taigyō wo Fukumu) (I-4-4-0-2)
Honshō Narabini Zaigai Kōkan’in Shutchō Kankei Zakken (M-2-2-0-1_3_2)
Kakkoku Chūzai Teikoku Ryōji Ninmen Kankei Zakken (M-2-1-0-10_33)
Kakkoku ni okeru Nōgyō Kankei Zakken (B-3-5-2-224)
Zaigai Teikoku Kōkan Kankei Zakken (M-1-3-0-1_3)
Zaigai Teikoku Kōkan Setchi Zakken (6-1-2-72)
Zai “Mekishikari” Ryōjikan Setchi Kankei (M-1-3-0-1_1)

National Archives of Japan, Tokyo (NAJ)
Sūmitsuin Kaigi Hikki (Sū-D00562100)

Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library, Tokyo
Karl Yoneda Papers (Original documents are preserved in the JARP, UCLA)
299

Nanka Chūō Nihonjin Kai Gijiroku (Original documents are preserved in the JARP, UCLA)

Reference Room, Japanese Overseas Migration Museum, Yokohama

Shūgakukan Research Library, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto

Mexico
Genaro Estrada Historical Archive (Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada), Mexico City (AHGE)
Collection Departamento Consular IV
Collection Gaveta 8
Collection Gaveta 21
Collection Gaveta 30

Historical Archive of the State of Baja California (Archivo Histórico del Estado de Baja
California), Mexicali (AHEBC)
Collection Gobierno del Estado

Mexicali Central Library (Biblioteca Central Mexicali), Universidad Autónoma de Baja
California, Mexicali
Periódico Oficial del Estado de Baja California (1924)

Mexico-Japan Association (Asociación México-Japonesa), Mexico City

National Archives of Mexico (Archivo General de la Nación), Mexico City (AGN)
Collection Dirección General de Gobierno

Newspapers and Periodicals
Asahi Shimbun. 1924 (Tokyo)
Chōya Shimbun. 1891 (Tokyo)
300

El Hispano-Americano. 1933 (Tijuana)
Excélsior. 1933 (Mexico City)
El Faro. 1933 (Ensenada)
La Opinión. 1924, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1942 (Los Angeles)
Los Angeles Times. 1933, 1942, 1992, 2006 (Los Angeles)
Mercurio. 1933 (Mexicali)
Osaka Mainichi Shimbun. 1924 (Osaka)
Rafu Shimpo. 1924, 1926, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1941, 1942, 2015 (Los Angeles)
Rafu Shimpo (English Edition). 1941, 1942 (Los Angeles)
Yomiuri Shimbun. 1924 (Tokyo)

Government Publications
California. Governor C. C. Young’s Mexican Fact-Finding Committee, “Mexicans in California.”
Sacramento: California State Printing Office, 1930.
U.S. Census Office. Twelfth Census of the United States: 1900. Population. Washington D.C.:
GPO, 1901.
U.S. Census Bureau. Thirteenth Census of the United States:1910, Population. Washington D.C.:
GPO, 1913.
———. Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920, Population. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1923.
———. Fifteenth Census of the United States:1930, Population. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1933.
———. Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1943.
———. Seventeenth Census of the United States: 1950, Population. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1952.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Select Committee Investigating National Defense
Migration. Hearings on National Defense Migration. 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Washington D.C.:
GPO, 1942.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food for Freedom: Information Handbook 1943, Washington
D.C.: GPO, 1942.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Unionism in American Agriculture.
By Stuart Jamieson. Bulletin No. 836. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1945.

301

Dissertations, Theses, and Unpublished Papers
Pagdilao Coloma, Casiano. “A Study of the Filipino Repatriation Movement.” Master’s thesis,
University of Southern California, 1939.
Sugiyama, Eileen R.N. “Inventory and Analysis of Materials on the Arrival and Settlement of
Japanese and Japanese Americans in the Dominguez Family Papers,” revised draft #5. Research
paper, History Department, California State University, Dominguez Hills, 1981.

Published Books and Articles
Bogardus, Emory S. “The Mexican Immigrant and Segregation,” American Journal of Sociology
36, no.1 (1930): 74-80.
Ochi, Dōjun, ed. Minami Kashū Nihonjinshi Kō-hen. Los Angeles: Nanka Nikkeijin Shōgyō
Kaigisho, 1957.
Fukuzawa, Yukichi. Sekai Kuni Zukushi, vol. 6. Tokyo: Keiō Gijuku Zōhan, 1869.
Fujioka, Shirō. Ayumi no Ato: Hokubei Tairiku Nihonjin Kaitaku Monogatari. Los Angeles:
Ayumi no Ato Kankō Kōenkai, 1957.
Higashi, Kōji. Beiboku Jūō. Tokyo: Seikyōsha, 1921.
Los Angeles Directory Co.. Los Angeles City Directory 1939. Los Angeles: Los Angeles Directory
Co. Publishers, 1939.
———. Los Angeles City Directory 1942. Los Angeles: Los Angeles Directory Co. Publishers,
1942.
Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi Kankō Iinkai, ed. Minami Kashū Nihonjin Shichijūnenshi.
Los Angeles: Nanka Nikkeijin Shōgyo Kaigisho, 1960.
Mukaeda, Katsuma, and Masatoshi Nakamura. Zaibei no Higojin. Los Angeles: Nanka Kumamoto
Kaigai Kyōkai, 1931.
Murai, Kō. Zaibei Nihonjin Sangyō Sōran. Los Angeles: Beikoku Sangyō Nippōsha, 1940.
Nichi-Boku Kōryūshi Henshū Iinkai, ed. Nichi-Boku Kōryūshi. Tokyo: PMC Shuppan, 1990.
Nihon Mekishiko Ijūshi Hensan Iinkai, ed. Nihon Mekishiko Ijūshi. n.p: Nihon Mekishiko Ijūshi
Hensan Iinkai, 1971.
Ōtsuki, Fumihiko. Daigenkai. Tokyo: Fuzanbō, 1934.
Spaulding, Charles B. “The Mexican Strike at El Monte, California,” Sociology and Social
Research 18 (1934): 571-580.
Taki, Yasutarō. Mekishiko Kokujō Taikan: Shokumin Shichijūnenshi. Mexico City: Mehiko
Shimpōsha, 1968.
302

Tsurumi, Sakio. “Imin to Bōeki.” In Kaigai Ijū, edited by Nihon Imin Kyōkai, 65-75. Tokyo:
Nihon Imin Kyōkai, 1923.
Yamada, Satarō. Gojin no Kaitaku Subeki Kaigai Yūbō no Fugen. Tokyo: Keibunsha, 1925.

SECONDARY SOURCES
Abe, Yasuhisa. “1920 Nendai no Tōkyō-fu ni okeru Chūgokujin Rōdōsha no Shūgyō Kōzō to
Kyojū Bunka,” Jinbun Chiri 51, no.1 (1999): 23-48.
Almaguer, Tomás. Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California.
1994. Reprint, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.
Azuma, Eiichiro. Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese
America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
———. “Community Formation across the National Border: The Japanese of the U.S.-Mexican
Californias.” Review: Literature and Arts of the Americas 39, no.1 (2006): 30-44.
———. “Japanese Immigrant Settler Colonialism in the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands and the U.S.
Racial-Imperialist Politics of the Hemispheric ‘Yellow Peril’.” Pacific Historical Review 83, no.2
(2014): 255-276.
Balderrama, Francisco E. In Defense of La Raza: The Los Angeles Mexican Consulate and the
Mexican Community, 1929 to 1936. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982.
Barrett, James R. “Americanization from the Bottom Up: Immigration and the Remaking of the
Working Class in the United States, 1880-1930.” Journal of American History 79, no.3 (Dec.,
1992): 996-1020.
Bayly, C. A., Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol, and Patricia Seed,
“AHR Conversation: On Transnational History.” American Historical Review 111, no.5 (Dec.,
2006): 1441-1464.
Bernstein, Shana. Bridges of Reform: Interracial Civil Rights Activism in Twentieth-Century Los
Angeles. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011,
Bonacich, Edna. “A Theory of Middleman Minorities.” American Sociological Review 38, no.5
(Oct., 1973): 583-594.
——— and John Modell. Economic Basis for Ethnic Solidarity: Small Business in the Japanese
American Community. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
Bradburn, Douglas. “The Problem of Citizenship in the American Revolution.” History Compass
8, no.9 (Sept., 2010): 1093-1113.
Broom, Leonard, and Ruth Piemer. Removal and Return: The Socio-Economic Effects of the War
on Japanese Americans. Berkeley: University of California, Press, 1949,
303

Camarillo, Albert. Chicanos in California: A History of Mexican Americans in California. 1984.
Reprint, Sparks: Materials for Today’s Learning, 1990.
Chan, Sucheng. Asian Americans: An Interpretive History. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991.
Chang, Iris. The Chinese in America: Narrative History. New York: Penguin Books, 2003.
Chang, Kornel S. Pacific Connections: The Making of the U.S.-Canadian Borderlands. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2012.
Chao Romero, Robert. The Chinese in Mexico, 1882-1940. Tucson: University of Arizona Press,
2010.
Chaves-Garcia, Miroslava. States of Delinquency: Race and Science in the Making of California's
Juvenile Justice System. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.
Chew, Selfa A. Uprooting Community: Japanese Mexicans, World War II, and the U.S.-Mexico
Borderlands. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2015.
Cohen, Deborah. Braceros: Migrant Citizens and Transnational Subjects in the Postwar United
States and Mexico. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011.
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied. 1982.
Reprint, Washington, D.C.: Civil Liberties Education Fund, 1997.
Daniel, Cletus E. Bitter Harvest: A History of California Farmworkers, 1870-1941. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1981.
Daniels, Roger. The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975.
———. The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California. New York:
Atheneum, 1968.
Deckrow, Andre Kobayashi. “A Community Erased: Japanese Americans in El Monte and the San
Gabriel Valley.” Tropics of Meta (2014). Accessed March 5, 2016.
https://tropicsofmeta.wordpress.com/2014/09/18/a-community-erased-japanese-americans-in-el-
monte-and-the-san-gabriel-valley.
Deverell, William. Railroad Crossing: Californians and the Railroad, 1850-1910. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1996.
———. Whitewashed Adobe: The Rise of Los Angeles and the Remaking of its Mexican Past.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.
Duara, Prasenjit. Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern. Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003.
Escobedo, Elizabeth R. From Coveralls to Zoot Suits: The Lives of Mexican American Women on
the World War II Home Front. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013.
304

Fernandez, Melqui. “The El Monte Berry Strike of 1933.” Tropics of Meta (2015). Accessed
March 5, 2016. https://tropicsofmeta.wordpress.com/2015/03/30/the-el-monte-berry-strike-of-
1933.
Fisher Fishkin, Shelley. “Crossroads of Cultures: The Transnational Turn in American Studies:
Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, November 12, 2004.” American
Quarterly 57, no.1 (Mar., 2005): 17-57.
Flamming, Douglass. Bound for Freedom: Black Los Angeles in Jim Crow America. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2005.
Fogelson, Robert M. The Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles, 1850-1930. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1967.
Fojas, Camilla, and Rudy P. Guevarra Jr., eds. Transnational Crossroads: Remapping the
Americas and the Pacific. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012.
Foley, Neil. Mexicans in the Making of America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014.
———. The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Foner, Eric. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the
Civil War. 1970. Reprint, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Friday, Chris. Organizing Asian American Labor: The Pacific Coast Canned-Salmon Industry,
1870-1942. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994.
García, Jerry. Looking Like the Enemy: Japanese Mexicans, the Mexican State, and US Hegemony,
1897-1945. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2014.
Garcia, Matt. From the Jaws of Victory: The Triumph and Tragedy of Cesar Chavez and the Farm
Worker Movement. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.
Gerstle, Gary. American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2001.
González, Gilbert G. Labor and Community: Mexican Citrus Worker Villages in a Southern
California County, 1900-1950. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994.
———. Mexican Consuls and Labor Organizing: Imperial Politics in the American Southwest.
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999.
———. “The 1933 Los Angeles County Farm Workers Strike.” New Political Science 20, no.4
(Dec., 1998): 441-458.
Grenier, Judson. Reminiscences of the Dominguez Rancho and the Carson Family: An Oral
History by John Victor Carson, 2nd edition. Carson: California State University, Dominguez Hills,
1981.
305

Grodzins, Morton. Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation. 1949. Reprint,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.
Guarnizo, Luis Eduardo, and Michael Peter Smith, eds. Transnationalism from Below. Piscataway:
Transaction Publishers, 1998.
Guevarra, Jr., Rudy P. Becoming Mexipino: Multiethnic Identities and Communities in San Diego.
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2012.
Gutiérrez, David G. Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the
Politics of Ethnicity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
Hattori, Ryuji, and Toshihiro Minohara, “Washington Taisei 1920 Nendai.” In Nichi-Bei
Kankeishi, edited by Kaoru Iokibe, 83-109. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2008.
Hayashi, Brian Masaru. Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004.
Hayashi, Kaori. A History of The Rafu Shimpo: Japanese and Their Newspaper in Los Angeles.
Osaka: Union Press, 1997.
———. Nikkei Jānarisuto Monogatari. Tokyo: Shinzansha Shuppan, 1997.
Hernández, Kelly L. Migra!: A History of the U.S. Border Patrol. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2010.
Higham, John. Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925. 1955. Reprint,
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988.
Hoffman, Abraham. “The El Monte Berry Pickers’ Strike, 1933: International Involvement in a
Local Labor Dispute.” Journal of the West 12, no.1 (1973): 71-84.
Hombeck, David. “Land tenure and rancho expansion in Alta California, 1784-1846.” Journal of
Historical Geography 4, no. 4 (1978): 371-390.
Hsu, Madeline Y. Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration
between the United States and South China, 1882-1943. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.
Ichioka, Yuji. Before Internment: Essays in Prewar Japanese American History. Edited by Gordon
H. Chang and Eiichiro Azuma. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.
———. “Japanese Associations and the Japanese Government: A Special Relationship, 1909-
1926.” Pacific Historical Review 46, no.3 (Aug., 1977): 409-437.
———. The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885-1924. New
York: Free Press, 1988.
Iino, Masako. Mō Hitotsu no Nichi-Bei Kankeishi: Hunsō to Kyōchō no Naka no Nikkei Amerika
Jin. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2000.
306

Imai, Ryoichi. “Manshu Nōgyō Imin ni okeru Jinushika to Sono Ronri.” In Nihon Teikoku wo
Meguru Jinkō Idō no Kokusai Shakai Gaku, edited by Sinzo Araragi, 217-254. Tokyo: Fuji
Shuppan, 2008.
Isaksen Leonard, Karen. Making Ethnic Choices: California’s Punjabi Mexican Americans.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992.
Iwata, Masakazu. Planted in Good Soil: A History of the Issei in United States Agriculture, 2 vols.
New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 1992.
Izumi, Masumi. “Tetsujōmō Naki Kyōsei Shūyōjo: Dai Niji Taisen Ka no Nikkei Kanadajin.”
Ritsumeikan Gengo Bunka Kenkyū 25, no.1 (2013): 119-135.
Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.
Jelinek, Lawrence J. Harvest Empire: A History of California Agriculture. 1979. Reprint, San
Francisco: Boyd & Fraser, 1982.
Jung, Moon-kie. Reworking Race: The Making of Hawaii’s Interracial Labor Movement. New
York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
Kanellos, Nicolás, and Helvetia Martell. Hispanic Periodicals in the United States, Origins to
1960: A Brief History and Comprehensive Biography. Houston: Arte Público Press, 2000.
Katada, Yoshiaki. “1930 Nendai ni Itaru Nichi-Bei Kankei no Gaiyō: Beikoku Taiheiyō Gan
Shuyōkō Toriatsukai Kamotsu to Bōeki Kōro no Kōsatsu wo Tōshite.” NUCB Journal of
Economics and Information Science 58, no.2 (Mar., 2014): 87-111.
Kettner, James H. The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1978.
Kobayashi, Andrey and Midge Ayukawa, “A Brief History of Japanese Canadians.” In
Encyclopedia of Japanese History of the Descendants in the Americas: An Illustrated History of
the Nikkei, edited by Akemi Kikumura-Yano, 150-161. Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2002.
Kodama, Masaaki. Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu. Hiroshima: Keisuisha, 1992.
Komai, Chris. “Revival: Rafu Shimpo,” Discover Nikkei, March 7, 2014. Accessed July 3, 2017.
http://www.discovernikkei.org/en/journal/2014/3/7/revival-rafu-shimpo.
Konno, Yuko. “Senzen no Kariforunia Shū ni okeru Hannichi Gyogyō Hōan wo Meguru Tatakai.”
Imin Kenkyū Nenpō 22 (Mar., 2016): 63-77.
Kunimoto, Iyo. “Kindai Nichi-Boku Kankei no Keisei to Beikoku 1888-1910.” Raten Amerika
Ronshū 11-12 (1978): 83-102.
Kurashige, Lon. Two Faces of Exclusion: The Untold History of Anti-Asian Racism in the United
States. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016.
307

———. Japanese American Celebration and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and Festival
in Los Angeles, 1934-1990. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
———, Madeline Y. Hsu, and Yujin Yaguchi, “Introduction: Conversations on Transpacific
History.” Pacific Historical Review 83, no.2 (May, 2014): 183-188.
Kurashige, Scott. The Shifting Grounds of Race: Black and Japanese Americans in the Making of
Multiethnic Los Angeles. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Kuwabara, Masato, and Masao Gabe, eds. Ezochi to Ryūkyū. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2001.
Larson, John Lauritz. Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular
Government in the Early United States. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
Lee, Erika. “Orientalisms in the Americas: A Hemispheric Approach to Asian American History.”
Journal of Asian American Studies 8, no.3 (Oct., 2005): 235-256.
———, and Judy Yung, Angel Island: Immigrant Gateway to America. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010.
Lewthwaite, Stephanie. “Race, Place, Ethnicity in the Progressive Era.” In A Companion to Los
Angeles, edited by William Deverell and Greg Hise, 40-55. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
López, Ronald W. “The El Monte Berry Strike of 1933.” Aztlán 1, no.1 (Apr., 1970): 101-114.
Licht, Walter. Industrializing America: The Nineteenth Century. Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1995.
Lozano, Monica. Interview by Shirley Biagi. Washington Press Club Foundation. December 13,
1993. Accessed January 25, 2018. http://beta.wpcf.org/oralhistory/loz.html.
Makabe, Tomoko. “Ethnic hegemony: the Japanese Brazilians in agriculture, 1908-1968.” Ethnic
and Racial Studies 22, no.4 (Jan., 1999): 702-723.
Matsumoto, Yuko. “1936 Nen Rosanjerusu Serori Sutoraiki to Nikkei Nōgyō Komyunitī.” Shirin
75, no.4 (July, 1992): 484-513.
Mayo, Morrow. “The Rape of Owens Valley.” In Los Angeles: Biography of A City, edited by
John and LaRee Caughey, 222-231. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
Mazon, Mauricio. The Zoot-Suit Riots: The Psychology of Symbolic Annihilation. 1984. Reprint,
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995.
McGovney, Dudley O. “The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and the Other States.”
California Law Review 35, no.1 (Mar., 1947): 7-60.
McKeown, Adam M. Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders. New
York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
Mckiernan-González, John. Fevered Measures: Public Health and Race at the Texas-Mexico
Border, 1848-1942. Durham: Duke University Press, 2012.
308

McWilliams, Carey. Southern California: An Island on the Land. 1946. Reprint, Salt Lake City:
Peregrine Smith Books, 1973.
———. Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California. 1939. Reprint,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
Miller, Sally M. The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook.
Westport: Greenwood, 1987.
Minami, Hiroshi. Nihonjin Ron. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1994.
Fuminori Minamikawa. “Vernacular Representations of Race and the Making of a Japanese
Ethnoracial Community in Los Angeles.” In Trans-Pacific Japanese American Studies:
Conversations on Race and Racializations, edited by Yasuko Takezawa and Gary Y. Okihiro, 107-
132. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2016.
Minohara, Toshihiro. Hainichi Imin Hō to Nichi-Bei Kankei. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002.
Modell, John. “Class or Ethnic Solidarity: The Japanese American Company Union.” Pacific
Historical Review 38, no.2 (May., 1969): 193-206.
Molina, Natalia. “Examining Chicana/o History through a Relational Lens.” Pacific Historical
Review 82, no.4 (Nov., 2013): 520-541.
———. Fit to Be Citizens?: Public Health and Race in Los Angles, 1879-1939. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2006.
———. How Race Is Made in America: Immigration, Citizenship, and the Historical Power of
Racial Scripts. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014.
Morrison, Michael A. Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the
Coming of the Civil War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999.
Nadeau, Remi. “There It Is-Take It.” In Los Angeles: Biography of A City, edited by John and
LaRee Caughey, 2310-235. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
Ngai, Mae M. Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004.
O’Brien, David J., and Stephen S. Fugita. The Japanese American Experience. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1991.
Oguma, Eiji. Tan’itsu Minzoku Shinwa no Kigen: “Nihonjin” no Jigazō no Keifu. Tokyo:
Shinyosha, 1995.
Okamura, Hyoue. “‘Hāfu’ wo Meguru Gensetsu.” In Jinshu Shinwa wo Kaitai Suru, vol.3,
Hybridity: “Chi” no Seijigaku wo Koete, edited by Kohei Kawashima and Yasuko Takezawa, 37-
67. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2016.
Orenstein, Dara. “Void for Vagueness: Mexicans and the Collapse of Miscegenation Law in
California.” Pacific Historical Review 74, no.3 (Aug., 2005): 367-408.
309

María Elena Ota Mishima, Destino México: Un estudio de las migraciones asiáticas a México,
siglo XIX y XX. Mexico City: Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios de Asia y Africa, 1997.
———. Siete Migraciones Japonesas en México, 1890-1978. Mexico City: Colegio de México,
Centro de Estudios de Asia y Africa, 1985.
Panunzio, Constantine. “Intermarriage in Los Angeles, 1924-1933.” American Journal of
Sociology 47, no.5 (Mar., 1942): 690-701.
Park, Hyun Ok. Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, And the Origins of the North Korean
Revolution in Manchuria. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005.
Parker, Jennifer. “Ethnic Social Structures and Mainstream Capital: The Ethnic Anchoring of
“American” Franchise Growth.” Journal of Asian American Studies 16, no.1 (2013): 25-56.
Parra, Carlos. “Changing Opinions at La Opinión: The Transformation of California’s Spanish-
Language Paper of Record, 1975-1990.” Research paper, History Department, University of
Southern California, 2014.
Peña Delgado, Grace. Making the Chinese Mexican: Global Migration, Localism, and Exclusion
in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012.
Pincetl, Stephanie S. Transforming California: A Political History of Land Use and Development.
Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1999.
Pozas, Ricardo. “El Maximato: El Partido del Hombre Fuerte, 1929-1934.” Estudios de Historia
Moderna y Contemporánea de México 9 (1983): 283-298.
Pubols, Louise. “Born Global: From Pueblo to Statehood.” In A Companion to Los Angeles edited
by William Deverell and Greg Hise, 20-39. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
Redford, Laura. “The Intertwined History of Class and Race Segregation in Los Angeles.” Journal
of Planning History 16, no.4 (Nov., 2017): 305-322.
Robinson, Greg. After Camp: Portraits in Midcentury Japanese American Life and Politics.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.
———. By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2001.
———. “The Early History of Mixed-Race Japanese Americans.” In Hapa Japan: History
(Volume 1), edited by Duncan Ryuken Williams, 225-250. New York: Kaya Press, 2017.
Romo, Ricardo. East Los Angeles: History of a Barrio. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983.
Rosales, F. Arturo. ¡Pobre Raza!: Violence, Justice, and Mobilization among México Lindo
Immigrants, 1900-1936. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999.
Rosas, Ana Elizabeth. Abrazando el Espíritu: Bracero Families Confront the Mexico Border.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014.
310

Ruiz, Vicki. From Out of the Shadows: Mexican Women in Twentieth-Century America. 1998.
Reprint, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Sakaguchi, Mitsuhiro. Nihonjin Amerika Iminshi. Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 2001.
———. “Shutsu Imin no Kioku.” In Imin Kenkyū to Tabunka Kyōsei, edited by Japanese
Association for Migration Studies, 80-103. Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 2011.
Sakanishi, Tomohide. “Kindai Nihon no Jinshu Sutereo Taipu no Keisei Katei to Mainoriti ni
taisuru Gendaiteki Henken no Kenkyū.” Research report of project funded by Grant-in-Aid for
Scientific Research (C) (2) of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Mar., 2002).
Sánchez, George J. Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los
Angeles, 1900-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
———. “‘What’s Good for Boyle Heights is Good for the Jews’: Creating Multiculturalism on
the Eastside during the 1950s.” American Quarterly 56, no.3 (Sept., 2004): 633-661.
———. “Disposable People, Expendable Neighborhoods.” In A Companion to Los Angeles, edited
by William Deverell and Greg Hise, 129-146. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
———. “Working at the Crossroads: American Studies for the 21st Century: Presidential Address
to the American Studies Association, November 9, 2001.” American Quarterly 54, no.1 (Mar.,
2002): 1-23.
Sánchez Ogás, Yolanda. Asalto a Las Tierras 75 Aniversario, 1937-2012. Mexicali: AM
Impresiones, 2012.
Schamel, Wynell Burroughs, and Jean West. “‘A Date Which Will Live in Infamy’: The First
Typed Draft of Franklin D. Roosevelt's War Address.” Social Education 55, no. 7 (Nov., 1991):
467-470.
Schmidt Camacho, Alicia. Migrant Imaginaries: Latino Cultural Politics in the U.S.-Mexico
Borderlands. New York: New York University Press, 2008.
Shinohara, Aito. “Kyowakoku no Ayumi: Mekishiko.” In Raten Amerika Sekai, edited by Yoshio
Masuda, Yoshiro Yamada, and Hidefuji Someda, 100-109. Kyoto: Sekaishisosha, 1984.
Smith, Erin M., and Mikael Fauvelle. “Regional Interactions between California and the
Southwest: The Western Edge of the North American Continental System.” American
Anthropologist 117, no. 4 (Dec., 2015): 710-721.
Smith, Page. Democracy on Trial: The Japanese American Evacuation and Relocation in World
War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.
Smith, R.J. The Great Black Way: L.A. in the 1940s and the Lost African-American Renaissance.
New York: Public Affairs, 2006.
Spickard, Paul. Mixed Blood: Intermarriage and Ethnic Identity in Twentieth-Century America.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.
311

———. Japanese Americans: The Formation and Transformations of an Ethnic Group. 1996.
Reprint, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2009.
Starr, Kevin. California: A History. New York: Modern Library, 2007.
Sugiyama, Shigeru. “1930 Nendai Mekishiko ni okeru Nihon Ebi Torōru Gyogyō to Nichi-Boku-
Bei Sangoku Kankei ni Kansuru Kenkyū,” Research report of project funded by Grant-in-Aid for
Scientific Research (C) of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Apr., 2008).
Swarthout, Kelley R. “Assimilating the Primitive”: Parallel Dialogues on Racial Miscegenation
in Revolutionary Mexico. New York: Peter Lang, 2004.
Takaki, Ronald. A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America. New York: Little, Brown
and Company, 1993.
———. Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans. 1989. Reprint, New
York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1998.
Takenaka, Ayumi. “The Japanese in Peru: History of Immigration, Settlement, and Racialization.”
Latin American Perspectives 31, no.3 (May, 2004): 77-98.
tenBroek, Jacobus, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson. Prejudice, War and the
Constitution: Causes and Consequences of the Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in World
War II. 1954. Reprint, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970.
Tovares, Raul D. “La Opinión and its contribution to the Mexican community’s adaptation to life
in the US.” Latino Studies 7, no.4 (Dec., 2009): 480-498.
Tsuchida, Nobuya. “Japanese Gardeners in Southern California, 1900-1941.” In Labor
Immigration Under Capitalism: Asian Workers in the United States before World War II, edited
by Lucie Chang and Edna Bonacich, 435-467. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
Vallejo, Jody A., and Stephanie L. Canizales. “Latino/a professionals as entrepreneurs: how race,
class, and gender shape entrepreneurial incorporation.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 39, no.9 (July,
2016): 1637-1656.
Vargas, Zaragoza. Labor Rights are Civil Rights: Mexican American Workers in Twentieth
Century America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
Varzally, Allison. Making a Non-White America: Californians Coloring Outside Ethic Lines,
1925-1955. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.
Vaught, David. Cultivating California, David Vaught, Cultivating California: Growers, Specialty
Crops, and Labor 1875-1920. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999.
Velázquez Morales, Catalina, ed. Baja California Un Presente con Historia. Mexicali:
Universidad Autónoma de Baja California, 2002.
———. Los Inmigrantes Chinos en Baja California, 1920-1937. Mexicali: Universidad
Autónoma de Baja California, 2001.
312

Volpp, Leti. “American Mestizo: Filipinos and Antimiscegenation Laws in California.” UC Davis
Law Review 33, no.4 (1999): 795-835.
Weber, Devra Anne. “The Organizing of Mexicano Agricultural Workers: Imperial Valley, and
Los Angeles 1928-34, An Oral History Approach,” Aztlán 3, no.2 (1972): 307-350.
Wild, Mark. Street Meeting: Multiethnic Neighborhoods in Early Twentieth-Century Los Angeles.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
Wollenberg, Charles. “Race and Class in Rural California: The El Monte Berry Strike of 1933,”
California Historical Quarterly 51, no.2 (July, 1972): 155-164.
Yagasaki, Noritaka. Imin Nōgyō: Kariforunia no Nihonjin Imin Shakai. Tokyo: Kokonshoin, 1993.
Yanaginuma, Koichiro. “Kindai Mekishiko no Sangyō Kaihatsu ni Okeru Nihonjin Imin: ‘Imin
Gaisha’ no Hensen to Nihonjin Mekishiko ‘Keiyaku Imin’ wo Chūshin ni.” Kanda Gaigo Daigaku
Kiyō 12 (Mar., 2000): 203-228.
Yang Murray, Alice. Historical Memories of the Japanese American Internment and the Struggle
for Redress. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.
Zolberg, Aristide R. A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America.
Cambridge: Harvard University, 2006.

Abstract (if available)

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

Between two visions of empires: Japanese immigrants’ theatergoing and aesthetics of landscape on the West Coast from 1907 to 1942

PDF

Radical crossings: from peasant rebellions to internationalist multiracial labor organizing among Japanese immigrant communities in Hawaii and California, 1885–1935

PDF

Seeking difference: Latino-White relations in a Los Angeles bilingual school

PDF

Working with la familia: a study of family work relations among Latina/o children and adolescents who work with their parents as street vendors in Los Angeles

PDF

Navigating DACA precarity: the lived experiences of Latina(o) DACA recipients in Los Angeles before and during the Trump era

Asset Metadata

Creator Tokunaga, Yu (author)

Core Title Making transborder Los Angeles: Japanese and Mexican immigration, agriculture, and labor relations, 1924-1942

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program History

Publication Date 07/28/2020

Defense Date 05/22/2018

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Agriculture,anti-Japanese sentiment,Baja California,El Monte Berry Strike,immigrant nationalism,Immigration Act of 1924,Interethnic relations,Japanese American incarceration,Japanese consulate,Japanese immigrants,Los Angeles,Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce,Mexican consulate,Mexican immigrants,OAI-PMH Harvest,Rancho San Pedro,transpacific history,U.S.-Mexico borderlands,Venice Celery Strike,World War II

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Kurashige, Lon (committee chair), Agius Vallejo, Jody (committee member), Deverell, William (committee member), Sanchez, George (committee member)

Creator Email ytokunag@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c89-39009

Unique identifier UC11668676

Identifier etd-TokunagaYu-6554.pdf (filename),usctheses-c89-39009 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-TokunagaYu-6554.pdf

Dmrecord 39009

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Tokunaga, Yu

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA