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The interplay between the state and civil society: a case study of honor killings in Turkey

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THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: A CASE

STUDY OF HONOR KILLINGS IN TURKEY

by

Nur Banu Kavaklı Birdal

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(SOCIOLOGY)

May 2010

Copyright 2010 Nur Banu Kavaklı Birdal

ii
DEDICATION

To Zeynep

iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my gratitude to all who made it possible for me to
complete this dissertation. First, I would like to thank my advisor, Pierrette
Hondagneu-Sotelo, for her guidance, patience and encouragement. Her continuous
support has been the driving force behind this dissertation. My committee members,
Gül Özye ğin, Macarena Gomez-Barris and J. Ann Tickner, have provided invaluable
comments that significantly improved and enriched this work.
My sincere thanks go to the University of Southern California for providing
me with a Wallis Annenberg Final Year Dissertation Fellowship that allowed me to
complete this dissertation.
My parents Aynur Gökçen and Sabri Kavaklı have never stopped believing in
me, even when I doubted myself. Their endless love and support kept me going
throughout this process. İnci, İlker and Sinan Birdal have been by my side until the
end.
I would like to thank Nüket Sirman for easing the fieldwork by sharing her
networks with me. I owe special thanks to my informants, who made this work
possible by sharing their knowledge and experience.
I want to express my gratitude to David Annetts and İnci Birdal for reading
and editing the manuscript in such a short time. A special thank you goes to Stachelle
Overland and Lisa Rayburn for saving me from the strain of bureaucracy.

iv
I was fortunate to make lifelong friends during my graduate study. My friends
Zeynep Türkyılmaz, Rah şan and Mehmet Akbulut, Şelale Tüzel and Murat Bayız
provided me with the warmth and comfort of home whenever I needed one.
My daughter Zeynep has been a source of joy and inspiration. She has
patiently waited for my work to be finished while providing me with the energy to
keep going. I most want to thank my husband Murat, who stood by me through the
good times and bad.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION..........................................................................................................................................II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................................................... III
ABSTRACT ..........................................................................................................................................VII
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1
CHAPTER 2. GENDER AND THE STATE......................................................................................... 37
Women as Symbols of Modernity................................................................................................... 55
Women’s Movement in the Late Ottoman Period.......................................................................... 59
State Feminism in the Early Republican Period............................................................................ 61
Post-1980 Military Coup Period ................................................................................................... 63
Islamist Feminism: Feminists with Faith....................................................................................... 69
Kurdish Feminism: Gender vs. Ethnicity Dilemma ....................................................................... 71
CHAPTER 3. WOMEN AND THE NATION....................................................................................... 77
The Justice and Development Party ............................................................................................ 105
Democratic Society Party (DSP) ................................................................................................. 107
The Republican People’s Party (RPP) ........................................................................................ 111

Framing Honor Killings............................................................................................................................ 2
Honor and Custom Killings in Numbers .................................................................................................. 7
‘The Tradition Effect’............................................................................................................................. 12
Ethnicity in the Turkish Context............................................................................................................. 16
Turkey and the European Union............................................................................................................. 20
Honor Crimes in International Documents............................................................................................. 23
A Note on Methodology and Research Design ...................................................................................... 31
Intersectionality of Gender and Ethnicity............................................................................................... 46
Violence of Language, Language of Violence ....................................................................................... 48
State, Violence and the Family............................................................................................................... 51
The Turkish Modernization Project........................................................................................................ 53
Feminism and Women’s Movement in Turkey...................................................................................... 58
The Significance of Gender-Based Violence for Turkish Women’s Movement ................................... 65
Multiple Feminisms in the Turkish Context........................................................................................... 67
Women as Mothers: Reproducers of the Nation.....................................................................................77
Women: Carriers of Culture ................................................................................................................... 81
Family, Violence and the State............................................................................................................... 84
Institutionalization of Gender Policy: The Directorate General on the Status of Women (KSGM)...... 91
Diyanet: Modernity, Religion and Gender ............................................................................................. 99
Current Political Scene in Turkey......................................................................................................... 104

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CHAPTER 4. LAW AND GENDER ................................................................................................... 113
Circular 2006/17 of the Office of Prime Ministry ....................................................................... 149
Circular of the Ministry of Interior.............................................................................................. 155
Gender-Responsive Budgeting..................................................................................................... 159
CHAPTER 5. STATE, HONOR AND VIRGINITY ........................................................................... 163
CHAPTER 6. THE INVOLVEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GENDER-
BASED VIOLENCE ............................................................................................................................ 186
KAMER Diyarbakır (Women’s Center)....................................................................................... 198
Selis Women’s Solidarity Foundation.......................................................................................... 208
DIKASUM Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality Center for Investigation and Application of
Women’s Issues............................................................................................................................ 212
Diyarbakır Bar Association Center for Women’s Rights ............................................................ 216
WWHR-New Ways (Women for Women’s Human Rights) .......................................................... 218
Purple Roof Women’s Foundation............................................................................................... 221
Kadıköy Municipality Coordination Center for Women’s Issues................................................ 224
Istanbul Bar Association Center for Women’s Rights ................................................................. 225
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Coordination Center for Women’s Issues .......................... 227
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 239
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................................. 248
APPENDIX: INTERVIEW GUIDE..................................................................................................... 265
State and the Law.................................................................................................................................. 113
Women and the Law............................................................................................................................. 116
Legal Reform Revisited: Alterations of the Turkish Civil Code and Penal Code................................ 123
Honor Crimes and Other forms of Gender-Based Violence in Legal Texts......................................... 130
Law and Protection of the Family ........................................................................................................ 133
Jurists’ Evaluation of Application of Law to Gender-Based Violence ................................................ 134
The Sources of Gender-Based Violence............................................................................................... 139
Responsibilities of the State.................................................................................................................. 141
Gender politics in State-Produced Documents..................................................................................... 149
Honor and Virginity as Sources of Oppression .................................................................................... 163
The Power of Virginity......................................................................................................................... 168
Virginity as a Social Control Mechanism............................................................................................. 171
Virginity in Legal Texts........................................................................................................................ 178
Civil Societal Organizations’ Impact on Domestic Politics ................................................................. 187
A Note on Selection Criteria of Civil Societal Organizations.............................................................. 194
Women’s NGOs in Turkey: How Do They Fight Honor Crimes?....................................................... 196
Women’s NGOs and the State: Expectations and Grievances ............................................................. 230
NGO’s Criticism of State Practices ...................................................................................................... 231

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ABSTRACT

Honor killings in Turkey provide a crucial case for studying the interplay
between gender, law, the state and civil society. The characteristics of the Turkish
modernization made legal reform an important source of social change. I build on
legal studies in order to provide a sociological analysis of the reproduction of the
gender order through the law. For this purpose, I focus on civil societal actors that
advocate for legal reform and law enforcement. I conceptualize law not only as an
instrument of state policies but also as an opportunity and advocacy cause for civil
societal actors. I suggest that the limits of legal reform cannot be explained solely by a
legal analysis without understanding the gendered nature of the relationship between
the civil society and the state. The predominant norms reflect the gender order that
subjugates women through discourses on honor and shame. These discourses also
constrain the expression of subaltern norms advocated by civil societal actors in the
public sphere. In this regard, these actors pursue legal reform not only to press for
concrete policy changes, but also as a means to enhance their political capacity. I
argue that the activities of civil societal organizations, the methods they employ and
primary areas of operation are determined according to their relation to the state.
Claims of independence generally relate to issues of funding, where the sources of
funds are thought to manipulate the outcome of projects. The effectiveness and
outreach of an NGO are related to its relation to the state and its collaboration with
state institutions. The situatedness of each civil societal organization reflects its

viii
ideological discourse and determines its strategy and methods. This is a framework
where the interplay between the civil societal actors and the state shape the space for
politics. State-induced legal reforms do not suffice to provide gender equality unless
the social organization of the society and mechanisms of regulation are altered in
ways that have repercussions in all state related institutions, such as the law, family,
and education system. Civil societal actors, in this case, women’s NGOs, monitor the
implementation of and enforce the law in collaboration with state agencies, and
through international and transnational networks. They thus gain public visibility and
political power to challenge the gender order.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Honor killings are the tip of the iceberg. Several other issues lie beneath the
most important being the inequality between women and men. (Pınar
Ilkkaracan, Chair, WWHR)

An honor crime is the practice of killing or corporally punishing a female
member of a family when she is considered to bring ‘dishonor’ on the family, often
through unsanctioned social and sexual activity. Unsanctioned activities arise from
transgressing the limits of appropriate sexual and social conduct as imposed by
tradition. These range from engaging in pre- or extra-marital sexual relationships to
having a boyfriend, going out to the movie theater, being seen talking to a man, even
requesting a song on the local radio channel. Moreover, the suspicion of dishonorable
behavior is often considered sufficient to punish a woman. Another important
characteristic of honor crime is public punishment, designed to remind the
community’s girls and women of the consequences of breaking the male dominated
code of conduct.
Today, the Turkish society is well aware of honor killings. They hear about it
in the news, read about it in the newspapers, and watch TV series that narrate the
painful but also exotic stories of women of the southeast. It is no longer a regional or
domestic problem. The international society and organizations that Turkey strives to
be a part of have stepped in. The European Union clearly stated that Turkey cannot be

2
a member unless this human rights violation issue is resolved. The state is now
involved in the process to combat this brutal practice, this smear.
Feminist organizations have long been pressing the state to take the necessary
measures to eradicate honor killings and all forms of gender-based violence. The
bitter struggle of women’s civil societal organizations coupled with the pressure of
international bodies of governance have persuaded the Turkish State to embark on a
comprehensive legal reform that became effective as of January 2005. It has been
almost five years since the new Penal Code was introduced, but newspapers
continually report stories of women murdered by their families in the name of honor.
So, what has gone wrong? Is not the law the apparatus with which the State changes
the society? What is problematic about the relation between written law and reality
that the 2005 Penal Code has not had an impact on women’s everyday lives?

Framing Honor Killings
The interest in honor killings in Turkey started with a 1997 report by the
International Women’s Rights Action Watch. In response to Turkey’s second periodic
report to CEDAW, the report noted the pervasiveness of violence against women, the
prevalence of forced virginity exams and an increase in honor killings as major concerns.
Academic studies mainly focus on the patriarchal structure, which sees women as men’s
property, and the culture of honor that is based on sexual purity of women as factors
legitimizing honor violence (Kardam 2005; Kuraner 2002; Sev’er and Yurdakul 2001;

3
Tezcan 1999; Yurdakul 2000). Parla (2001), Ko ğacıoğlu (2004) and Sirman (2004)
problematized the Turkish modernization project in terms of its instrumentalization of
women as symbols of modernity, while at the same time reproducing traditional
mechanisms of control over women’s bodies and behavior. Another major issue of
examination concerns the legal system in Turkey, namely, the pre-legal reform Civil and
Penal Codes. These works criticize the legislation for blaming the victim (women who
deserved to be punished for bringing dishonor to the family) and the systematic impunity
granted to men who committed honor crimes (Arın 2001; Pervizat 2001, 2002; Sahin
1999; Sarıhan 1999; Soyaslan 1999; Yirmibe şoğlu 2002). Based on analyses of the legal
system, these works call on the state for legal reforms to combat violation of women’s
human rights and eradication of honor violence. Recognizing the role of the state in
designing the law that reproduces the notion of honor as a value that should be protected
at the expense of women, recent works have started to emphasize the potential of civil
societal actors in pressing the state for realization of women’s human rights (Arat 2003;
Pervizat 2003).
The phenomenon of honor killings is not confined to Turkey. The Middle East, a
region where honor killings are observed frequently and consistently, attracts more
attention than others. A major part of this literature consists of descriptive and
prescriptive legal studies that focus on the inadequate protection of women against honor
crimes. This inadequate protection stems both from discriminatory laws and law
enforcement practices against women in countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine and
Pakistan (CEWLA 2005, Hoyek, Sidawi and Mrad 2005; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2005;

4
Warraich 2005). Although these studies provide great insight and detailed contextual
information about the extent and the consequences of legal discrimination against
women, they do not analyze the phenomenon from a sociological perspective. Legal
studies reveal the gendered nature of the law, however they do not conceptualize the
relationship between gender, the law and the state. In this research, I build on these legal
studies in order to provide a sociological analysis of the reproduction of the gender order
through the law. For this purpose, I focus on civil societal actors that advocate for legal
reform and law enforcement. Thus, I conceptualize law not only as an instrument of state
policies but also as an opportunity and advocacy cause for civil societal actors.
As the legal study by Abu Hassan and Welchman (2005) underlines, moral norms
can be more influential on women’s lives than legal norms. Sen (2005) raises the question
whether it is possible to change Muslim moral norms without colonizing them. This
question is closely related to the limits of legal reform. How much and in what ways
should the state intervene in the prevention of honor crimes? How much should
international law, international organizations and transnational advocacy networks get
involved in enforcing women’s human rights? Or should they respect particular moral
norms in order to avoid a colonizing attitude even when they are detrimental to women’s
lives and discriminatory against women?
Such a formulation begs another question: whose norms should we, researchers,
accept as the representation of a society’s moral norms? My dissertation empirically
demonstrates that a variety of civil societal actors advocate a variety of moral norms that
challenge the predominant moral norms. These actors seek legal recognition of the norms

5
that they advocate. My sociological analysis suggests that the limits of legal reform
cannot be explained solely by a legal analysis without understanding the gendered nature
of the relationship between the civil society and the state. The predominant norms reflect
the gender order that subjugates women through discourses on honor and shame. These
discourses also constrain the expression of subaltern norms advocated by civil societal
actors in the public sphere. In this regard, these actors pursue legal reform not only to
press for concrete policy changes, but also as a means to enhance their political capacity.
Through monitoring the implementation of laws and even at times enforcing the law in
collaboration with state agencies, and finally through international and transnational
networks these actors gain public visibility and political power to challenge the gender
order.
This sociological perspective allows us to understand similar cases of honor
violence in regions other than the Middle East. Similar to legal studies in the Middle East,
Bettiga-Boukerbout (2005), in her historical study of the Italian Penal Code demonstrates
that the mechanism of punishment reduction discriminated against victims of honor
crimes. She reveals that civil societal actors played a major role in promoting legal
change in the late 1990s. The legal study by Pimental, Pandjiarjian and Belloque (2005)
shows that the law and law enforcement lead to discrimination against women through
punishment reduction across Latin America and the Caribbean. My dissertation
contributes to the analysis of honor crimes in other regions by bringing in the perspective
of civil societal actors.

6
The question of limits of legislation in intervening in moral norms becomes
extremely important when honor crimes among minorities and immigrant communities
are concerned. The legal system faces a dilemma of protecting the cultural values of
immigrant communities, while not allowing the justice system being influenced by these
values (Edwards and Welstead 1999). Here, once again, civil societal actors play a major
role in negotiating the enforcement of legal norms in the context of intersectionality of
gender and racial/ethnic discrimination (Volpp 1994). In the United Kingdom, for
instance, the Southall Black Sisters demand honor crimes to be located in the mainstream
of law and policy on gender violence and human rights (Siddiqui 2005). The studies on
immigrant communities are also important in understanding gender-based violence in the
host society. When immigrant or minority cultures are framed as the culturally inferior
‘other’, then the oppressiveness of that ‘other’ culture conceals gender norms of the host
society that produce violence (Elden 1998; Kurkiala 2003).
Honor killings in Turkey provide a crucial case for studying the interplay between
gender, law, the state and civil society. The characteristics of the Turkish modernization
made legal reform an important source of social change. In its quest for ‘reaching the
level of civilized nations’, the Turkish state thoroughly secularized the legal and political
system and granted basic civil and political rights to women. The Islamic legal system
was replaced by the Civil Code. As a predominantly Muslim country, Turkey granted
women the right to vote and be elected in 1934, way before major European countries
such as France and Italy. Behind these legal reforms was the modernizing ethos of
Turkish nation-building ideology. Due to this ideology, Turkish legislation, judiciary and

7
law enforcement have to seek compatibility with international human rights norms, such
as CEDAW, and the European Union norms. The state still has a significant role in social
change. This state-led modernization model continues to guide state-centric legal studies.
Therefore, they focus exclusively on the legal system without considering the dynamics
behind the formation of political will. However, the relationship between state and
society has dramatically changed since the early twentieth century as democratization set
forth in Turkey. Today’s lawmakers negotiate with a much larger segment of the society
than did the early Republican modernizers. The civil societal actors are now involved in
the process of law making as well as monitoring its enforcement. Hence, I argue that the
role of civil societal actors in bringing social change is crucial for conceptualizing the
changing dynamics of gender, law and the state.

Honor and Custom Killings in Numbers
It is not very easy to get the exact number of honor and custom killings in Turkey.
It requires the Minister of Interior’s command to be sent to every governor, who then
request the numbers from each and every police department within the borders of their
governorship. According to a KSGM (Directorate General on the Status of Women)
report dated 2006, 1091 honor and custom killings took place between 2000 and 2005.
The report provides the distribution of the murders with respect to regions. Accordingly,
31 percent were realized in eastern and southeastern regions. When the numbers are
revised according to place of birth and registration, 45 percent of the murders are found to

8
be committed by perpetrators originating from eastern and southeastern regions. The
report concludes that honor and custom killings mainly originate from eastern and
southeastern Turkey and are carried to urban centers through massive waves of migration
(KSGM 2006: 115-116). In 2008, the President of the Human Rights Division of the
Office of the Prime Ministry issued a press release, which stated that the decreasing trend
in the number of honor and custom crimes in 2004 and 2005 was reversed in 2007 to
reach the high levels of 2001 and 2002 (exact numbers are not provided). It should be
noted that these numbers do not include forced suicides and accidental deaths, which
women’s organizations suspect are methods to conceal honor and custom killings.
According to another report produced by the Governorship of Istanbul, 164 honor and
custom killings occurred in Istanbul between 2000 and 2006 (Istanbul Valiligi 2007).
In Turkey, especially in discourses produced by the state, honor killings are
referred to as ‘custom and honor killings’, always emphasizing that the problem is
confined to a particular region where backward tradition prevails. The region in question
is eastern and southeastern Turkey that is highly populated by Kurds, the largest ethnic
minority group in Turkey. In one of the earliest works on honor and custom killings in
Urfa, a southeastern city, Mehmet Faraç (2006[2002]) defined the practice as a regional
problem arising from the custom and claimed that custom travelled with people. In the
process of rural to urban migration, he stated, people do not only pack their local
clothing, accents, mattresses and comforters, but they also pack ‘their most valuable
belonging, their custom, which resists modernization’ (2006: 184). While framing
tradition as the cause of honor crimes, Faraç explains the prevalence of tradition in terms

9
of the feudal structure, the tribal system and religious fundamentalism that dominate
southeastern Turkey. He differentiates between bad tradition and good tradition. While
good tradition, such as ending feuds as a requirement of tradition or organizing mass
circumcision ceremonies for the poor, are expected to prevail for the betterment of the
society, bad tradition (honor killings) will fade away as regional education rates increase
for both men and women, and economic problems are resolved (Faraç 2006: 185-86).
Hence, he assumes tradition to have a paradoxical nature which is both unchanging (so
that good ones will survive despite changing social and economic conditions) and open to
change (so that the bad ones will wither away by the intrusion of the correct institutions).
In her rich and detailed examination of honor and custom crime cases, Vildan
Yirmibe şo ğlu (2007) displays the discriminatory nature of the law against women.
However, her analysis of the sources and causes of honor crimes is limited to the
southeast, implying that it is a problem contained in that particular region, arising from its
problematic traditions.
Evaluated against the backdrop of these explanations, revising the numbers with
respect to place of birth and registration indicates an attempt to frame honor killings in a
particular way. It is a fact that honor killings are more concentrated in eastern and
southeastern regions and this fact should motivate social scientists to investigating the
structural factors that yield such an outcome, yet without bashing a particular ethnic
group or culture. Even if one accepts that every person born and registered in eastern and
southeastern Turkey is Kurdish, still official figures indicate that more than half of (55

10
percent) honor and custom killings are perpetrated by members of the majority group.
This single factor should suffice to make it a nationwide problem, not a regional one.
In one of the few doctoral dissertations on honor killings in Turkey, Leyla
Pervizat (2005) analyzes the practice as a form of extrajudicial execution. Through an
analysis of court cases in four different southeastern Turkish cities (Adana, Gaziantep,
Sanliurfa and Diyarbakır) between 1996 and 1999, Pervizat concludes that courts
legitimate honor killings by reproducing the code of honor and secondary status of
women in society (2005: 258-259). The rich legal analysis is valuable in terms of
explaining the role of the legal institution in the reproduction of the code of honor that
leads to the perpetuation of honor crimes. However, I find approaching the practice as
extrajudicial executions (which, Pervizat states, is the language in certain international
documents without specifying which ones) extremely problematic and regressive. I
believe such an analysis will have damaging effects both on the efforts to eradicate honor
killings and on the status of women in the society.
My objection to examining honor killings as acts of extrajudicial executions is
two-fold, one relates to the role and boundaries of the family and the other to the
reproduction of the gender order that suppresses women through the control of their
bodies and behavior. First, by definition of an extrajudicial act, this approach accuses the
family (or the family council) of executing the women before and without a trial
assuming that the family has the right to try female family members for their behavior. It
implies that an execution after trial can be accepted, as if the family or the perpetrator of
the crime has such an authority but refrains from hearing a case. It also presumes that it

11
would have been legitimate to punish the women had a proper trial had been held. It thus
grants families a right they have never possessed. The family is not a judicial institution
and it should never have such a power over women. The rule of law requires that
individuals be tried according to established laws, once they are proven to have acted
illegally or breached the law. Not only that the family is not entitled to such an authority,
but also the reference point according to which an individual’s behavior is evaluated is
not the tradition or social norms but legal texts, namely the constitution and civil and
penal codes.
Second, and more importantly, this approach assumes that women’s practices
need to be monitored to the level that they should be tried if these acts are seen as breach
of social norms. The concern of the international community and international bodies of
governance with regard to honor killings and all forms of gender-based violence is not
developing alternative ways of controlling and punishing women but eradicating violence
and mechanisms of control that suppress women. When women go out, choose their
spouse, get a divorce or experience their sexuality they exercise their human rights and
rights over their bodies. These rights are not to be violated under any circumstance, leave
aside judging, trying and executing women for what they have done. The judicial aspect
enters the picture once women’s right to life is violated, to ensure that perpetrators are
tried and penalized accordingly. The idea of examining honor killings as extrajudicial
executions neglects the point that before the woman is murdered there is not a practice to
be tried. Women’s acts are not illegal even if they transcend social norms or boundaries.

12
Below I review what I believe to be one of the best formulations to analyze honor crimes
in Turkey and propose how it can be expanded to examine the role of the civil society.

‘The Tradition Effect’
In her seminal work on honor crimes in the Turkish context, Dicle Ko ğacıoğlu
draws attention to the illusion created by framing honor crimes as [backward and bad]
tradition (2004: 119). Instead, she proposes to consider the structures of power and
inequality at play as well as the complexity of institutions that are directly or indirectly
involved in the perpetuation of the practice. Thus, Ko ğacıoğlu suggests, an examination
of honor crimes ‘should shift from a focus on ‘tradition’ to an examination of the effects
of various institutional structures’ (2004: 119). This does not mean that certain
institutions intentionally engage in the repression of women and then blame it on
tradition. Rather, it is done through the discursive construction and the practices of those
same institutions. Once institutions, especially in the Turkish context those associated
with the state structure, are constructed as ‘modern’, then they are thought to work
against tradition even if their ideological structures are unfavorable to women’s rights or
emancipation. Accordingly, when honor crimes are seen as ‘traditions getting out of
hand’, the involvement of the institutions is ignored because, by definition, they are in
opposition to traditions. In this setting, traditions that stand still against the waves of
modernization are thought to be static cultural features, especially if they belong to the
‘other’. In this framing where tradition is the root cause of honor crimes, an institution’s

13
role in the reproduction of this tradition is ignored. This is what Ko ğacıoğlu calls the
tradition effect, ‘with utterance of tradition, questions of violence against women and of
the violation of their most basic rights fade away without being seriously addressed’
(2004: 121). The tradition effect, however, does not play out in a single way in every
institutional setting, rather it varies according to the political struggles and the discursive
context involved in the operation of different institutions. In this setting, Ko ğacıoğlu
argues, the tradition effect works within the state and the legal system in the following
way: Honor crimes are traditions in the process of fading away thanks to the
modernization project of the nation-state (2004: 122). Hence, once the desired level of
modernity is achieved by all segments of the society, honor crimes will cease to exist.
The issue of honor crimes in Turkey involves multiple actors, where each engages
in the definition, causes and means of eradicating the practice. In this dissertation, I build
and expand on Ko ğacıoğlu’s tradition effect concept and examine the ways in which it
surfaces in the interplay between the state and the civil society, namely, women’s NGOs
that fight violence against women. My focus on civil societal actors that advocate for
legal reform and law enforcement conceptualizes law not only as an instrument of state
policies but also as an opportunity and advocacy cause for civil societal actors. In this
process, I question how state institutions and different women’s NGOs frame honor
crimes, and analyze the effect of such variation on feminist policy development and state-
civil society relations.

14
Saba Mahmood conceptualizes tradition as a discursive formation in the sense
Foucault defines a discursive formation as practices whose structure of possibility is not
the individual or a collective, but the relation between the past and present based on a
rule system that determines what is doable and recognizable as a comprehensible event
(Mahmood 2005: 114-115). Tradition then is referring to a collectivity’s past to constitute
their subjectivities, sensibilities and capacities. In this analysis, Mahmood’s conception
of tradition as an analytical tool is particularly useful where she utilizes it to comprehend
‘subject formation as a means of understanding how a particular discourse establishes its
authority and truth within a historical moment’ (2005: 116). Whereas Mahmood used the
concept to understand the subject formation of women active in an Islamist movement, I
use it to expand on Ko ğacıoğlu’s tradition effect and examine how the state employed
tradition as a discursive formation to create a category of the ‘other’ (the Kurdish
population), which is both different from and external to it.
The practice of seeing honor crimes as a problem caused by a certain tradition or
culture is not particular to the Turkish State. Ko ğacıoğlu notes that the international
media, international bodies of governance, various activists, and especially state
institutions in countries with significant immigrant and minority communities tend to
perceive the issue as arising from ‘problematic non-Western practices’ be it culture or
religion (2004: 119). In the Turkish context, the responsible party for problematic non-
modern practices is defined as the Kurdish minority. The discourses produced by the state
institutions and the national media frame honor crimes as ‘backward tradition of the
southeast’, ‘the tribal system of the southeast’ or ‘the feudal structure’ resisting the

15
requirements of the modern world. Thus, honor crimes are ethnicized, implying that the
rest of the country is immune to honor/custom crimes. This approach does not only
prevent developing effective mechanisms to curtail honor crimes that will target both
structural and context-specific components of violence, but it also blinds the eye to other
forms of gender-based violence prevalent throughout Turkey.
In almost all multi-ethnic and multi-religious states, the culture, religion or the
tradition of the minority groups are held responsible for undesired practices. One recent
example is the stigmatization of Islam in the aftermath of September 11 or the immigrant
communities in Western European countries. Israel is one of those states where
intersectionalities of gender, race/ethnicity and religion determine individuals’ social
relations and relations with the state. Based on her research on the Israeli State’s
treatment of honor crimes, Nahlo Abdo notes that the official discourse frames the
practice as caused by the Islamic religious or Arab cultural origins of the Palestinian
population, while honor killings against Israeli Jewish women constitute an equally
serious problem (2004: 65-67).
An analysis of honor killings that avoids the tradition effect is a report produced
for the DSP run Ba ğlar Municipality in Diyarbakır by Nüket Sirman (Diyarbakır Ba ğlar
Belediyesi 2007). Instead of approaching gender-based violence as a cultural problem,
this report identifies it as a structural problem prevalent in all societies, traditional or
modern. Based on in-depth interviews conducted in Diyarbakır, the report concludes that
honor, determined by the relations of production, power and kinship, came to be

16
identified with women and became a means of violence against women. Accordingly,
within the hierarchical relations of power, each group of power-holders frames those
below them as resorting to violence to hide the mechanisms of domination. In such a
setting, the report claims, Europeans blame Islam akin to the Turkish state blaming the
Kurds for honor crimes (Diyarbakır Ba ğlar Belediyesi 2007).
An all-encompassing analysis of the Kurdish issue is beyond the scope of this
project. The following section outlines the historical, social and political specificity of the
ethnic minority issue in Turkey to delineate how honor crimes came to be defined as an
ethnicized problem of the Kurdish population.

Ethnicity in the Turkish Context
Kurds are the largest ethnic minority group in Turkey.
1
The Kurdish question has
been a troublesome issue for the Turkish State even before the establishment of the
Republic in 1923. Since the formation of the Turkish nation-state from the remnants of
the Ottoman Empire, the state has dealt with the Kurdish issue, at times in the form of
armed conflict between the Turkish military and Kurdish guerilla forces. Although it has

1
There are several and often conflicting accounts of the actual size of their population because the census
of the Turkish Republic does not include questions of ethnic origin. In the absence of official figures,
surveys conducted by national and international research organizations provide approximate numbers.
According to 2006 and 2008 surveys by KONDA, an independent research company, Kurds comprise
15.64 percent of the population (Milliyet March 22, 2007; Milliyet December 22, 2008). The 2008 CIA
World Factbook estimates the figure as 18 percent.

17
occupied a central place in Turkish politics and evolved with the changing context, the
Turkish state has not recognized the Kurdish question as an ethnic/nationalist problem
(Ye ğen 2007).
Starting from the modernization project of the late Ottoman period, the Kurdish
population opposed state attempts of centralization, which they saw as aiming to dissolve
the socio-political space they occupied.
2
The reforms undertaken by the state
disseminated state power to formerly remote areas of the empire, abolishing landlordship
and introducing taxes (Ye ğen 2007). For the Ottoman and Turkish nationalists, the tribal
organization of the Kurds denied them the status of a nation with the right to self-
determination (Mojab 2004). Hence, the first discourse produced with respect to the
initial Kurdish unrest defined it as a resistance to the ‘dissemination of modern political
and administrative power into the Kurdish regions’ (Ye ğen 2007: 123).
World War I and the subsequent Turkish War of Independence brought about the
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and consolidation of the Turkish Republic on a much
smaller territory. In contrast to the multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition of the
Ottoman Empire, the Republic was defined as a nation-state of Turks, which required
cultural homogenization. Imposition of a western nation-state model based on the
bureaucratic and military apparatus inherited from the Ottoman modernization brought
about an oppositional model of state-society relations (Aslan 2008). Cultural
homogenization coupled with the modernization project went beyond disseminating a

2
See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the Turkish modernization project.

18
common language or creating a national history to become what Aslan calls an extreme
makeover of the society. This makeover involved making citizens conform to the state’s
definition of Turkishness even through intrusion in the private sphere. In the eyes of the
state, the tribal and religious solidarities of the Kurdish population were indicators of
backwardness, religious fundamentalism, underdevelopment and opposition to the state.
The state embarked on an extensive Turkification of the Kurds to solve these problems,
where compulsory mass education and obligatory military service were the fundamentals
of this project (Aslan 2008; Ye ğen 2007).
3
It also involved a coersive linguistic policy
that prohibited the use of Kurdish. The language issue has occupied a central place in the
Kurdish movement since then, as the most important determinant of national
historiography and ethnic identity (Aslan 2009). The outcome of the state policies was
sixteen revolts breaking up in Kurdish regions only during the first two decades of the
Republic.
4

In addition to framing the Kurdish issue as arising from economic
underdevelopment, tribal structure, regional backwardness and religious fundamentalism
the Turkish State also attributed the Kurdish unrest to outside incitement. The outside
incitement changed according to the state’s current notion of threat ranging from western
imperialists and communists to the European States, which for the last two decades have
been a land for the Kurdish diaspora (Ye ğen 2007: 13). The discourses framing the

3
See Chapter 3 for a discussion of how the state employed Turkish women to Turkify Kurdish women
through education.
4
Many of these revolts could not be settled without the involvement of the military. The 1937 Dersim
Revolt is particularly infamous for the use of aerial bombing.

19
Kurdish issue have evolved in relation to the social and political environment but the
Turkish State has constantly refrained from recognizing the Kurdish population as an
ethnic minority, instead it has seen them as prospective-Turks (Ye ğen 2009).
The emphasis of the Turkish nation-state building project on Turkish ethnicity
and language has been a significant factor in the development of the Kurdish nationalist
movement as a reaction to state policies. In the late 1970s, the Kurdish nationalist
movement organized around PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which in the aftermath of
the 1980 military coup transformed into a paramilitary organization and started armed
conflict with the Turkish military. PKK is recognized as a terrorist organization by the
U.S.A and the Council of the European Union. With the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the
leader of PKK, in 1999, the organization declared a unilateral ceasefire. Following the
ceasefire, the discourse of the Kurdish movement shifted from a separatist armed struggle
to recognition of ethnic identity, human rights and democracy to attract European and
international support (Romano 2006). The capture and the ceasefire coupled with the
European Council’s 1999 decision to declare Turkey a candidate to the EU, which
subsequently led to a transformation in Turkey’s Kurdish policy. With the prospect of
becoming a full member of the EU, Turkey embarked on a series of legal reforms to
address human and minority rights, which lifted the ban on the use of Kurdish (Aslan
2009). The requirements of Turkey’s continuing EU candidacy with respect to cultural
rights of the Kurdish population, however, created discontent among the Turkish public,
whose perception of the EU has started to deteriorate since 2004 (Eurobarometer 67).

20
Turkey and the European Union
The Turkish Republic has always had an orientation towards Europe from the
onset. The modernization project has defined Europe as the tager for desired level of
civilization and modernity. For a long time, for the Turkish public considered the EU
membership as a guaranteed way to cure economic problems and bring about
democratization and the rule of law. In such a setting, the EU would mean achieving the
ultimate level of modernity. However, growing list of requirements, the never-ending
negotiations, overtly expressed resistance towards Turkey’s accession, and the fading
possibility of becoming a full member have caused a serious deterioration in the
popularity of the EU membership for the Turkish public. Besides, certain segments of the
society perceive the legal reforms and increasing human and cultural rights as a threat to
Turkey’s unity. Public opinion polls about the European Union display that in 2009 only
48 percent of the Turkish public agreed that membership would be a good thing for
Turkey, which is slightly larger than the 2008 figure of 42 percent. Likewise, the overall
image of the EU is positive for 46 percent of the public. Turkish public has constantly
cited unemployment and economic problems as Turkey’s most important problems along
with terrorism Eurobarometer 67; 71).
Turkey has been a candidate for admission into the EU since 1999. The official
negotiation process has been in effect since then, but the EU has explicitly stated that
admission is conditional upon meeting economic, social and political criteria. The most
important concerns for the EU regarding Turkey is establishing that the latter has an

21
institutional structure that allows for democracy, rule of law, human and minority rights.
Even though Turkey has embarked on a series of reforms to fulfill these requirements, the
EU considered its progress to be significant yet insufficient.
Honor crimes and other forms of gender-based violence are addressed by the EU
under the section on Human Rights and the Protection of Minority Rights. Due to such
placement, honor crimes are among the issues that Turkey is expected to attend to in the
mid-range but not sooner (Ko ğacıoğlu 2004). The requirements of the EU have forced
Turkey to initiate a legal reform that would alter several laws at once. Feminists in
Turkey have long been trying to pressure the state to have gender discriminatory clauses
removed from the Turkish Civil Code and alter the Penal Code so that it would no longer
be a means of reproducing violence against women. The negotiation process, thus,
created a leverage for the women’s movement to be involved in the legal reform process
and generating awareness about honor violence.
5
The EU appears sensitive about
eradication of honor crimes and other forms of gender-based violence, but certain recent
events create the impression that the Union’s approach is rather formal than substantial.
During the reformation of the Penal Code, for instance, the women’s movement insisted
that the clause on honor killings should explicitly refer to ‘honor’ but not to ‘custom’
crimes. However, because the EU was convinced that the state has addressed custom
crimes, it was not bothered that the law did not address honor per se. While the women’s
movement tried to remove both clauses that grant penalty reductions due to provocation,

5
See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the reformation of the Civil and Penal Codes and the role of the
women’s movement in this process.

22
the EU was satisfied with the removal of only one that referred to custom killings,
leaving the one with a wider range of application unaltered. The feminist activists
interviewed for this project even told that, due to lack of knowledge, at a certain point
they felt like the EU was working against them.
The approach of the EU to the issue seems to be more informed by a general bias
about the problematic traditions of an Islamic country. The EU, too, suffers from the
tradition effect in its relations with Turkey, in a manner that resembles Turkey’s relations
with the Kurdish minority. Another recent incident may help clarify the point. In May
2009, Robert Kilroy-Silk, a member of the European Parliament, filed a motion for the
investigation of female genital mutilation cases in Turkey, a practice that is literally
nonexistent in Turkey. This move can be regarded more as an attempt to use the women
issue as an excuse to prevent Turkey’s accession to the EU than as a concern with gender
equality and the status of women in Turkey. Still, the importance of the EU for the
institutional restructuring and generating awareness in Turkey is undeniable.
The decrees of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
6
have also been
very effective in the advancement of women’s human rights. In June 2009, the ECHR has
sentenced Turkey to pay compensation to Nahide Opuz for failing to protect her from the
violence of her ex-husband, which is a first in the history of the EHCR. The decree is far

6
The ECHR is an international judicial body established under the European Convention on Human
Rights, a convention adopted by the Council of Europe. The ECHR is not an institution of the EU but the
two are closely related. All the member states of the EU are also members of the Council of Europe and
signatories to the Convention.

23
from being an individual case because it set a precedent obliging Turkey to protect all
women from violence as well as prevent it.
7

Honor Crimes in International Documents
It was not until the First World Conference on Women in 1975 that non-
discrimination of women entered the United Nations (UN) agenda. Then, during the
following Decade for the Advancement of Women, the General Assembly of the UN
adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW). Interestingly, the first version of CEDAW did not address violence
against women as a separate issue (Ertürk 2004). Finally, the 1985 Nairobi Conference
addressed violence against women and urged participatory states to take necessary
measures to prevent it. Then in 1992, the CEDAW Committee linked violence against
women to the framework of discrimination, thus obliging states to report and take action
against gender-based violence. The 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights
further reinforced the relation between gender inequality and vilence against women, and
described women’s rights as human rights. The following year, the General Assembly of
the UN adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, while
also introducing the Special Rapporteur position to prepare individual country reports on
the causes and consequences of gender-based violence. The importance of these final

7
Following the issuance of the decree, Selma Kavaf, the incumbent Minister of the State Responsible from
the Women and the Family, and Güldal Ak şit, President of the Parliamentary Commission on Opportunity
Equality, criticized the court for unfair judgment of Turkey based on an individual case.

24
developments was their potential to enable the engagement of civil societal actors in
efforts to eradicate violence at both national and international levels (Ertürk 2004). The
Declaration is the first international document to provide an official definition of violence
against women.
8
Moreover, it particularly calls upon the states ‘to condemn violence
against women and not permit custom, tradition or religion to justify violent acts, and to
exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish acts of violence against women’
(Ertürk 2004: 169).
Honor crime was listed as a harmful tradition, but it did not generate as much
attention as female genital mutilation until the CEDAW Committee’s 1997 concluding
comments on several countries including Turkey. In the 2000 special session of the UN,
the first resolution on honor crimes was circulated, but it was in 2002 that the General
Assembly adopted the resolution titled Working Towards the Elimination of Crimes
Against Women Committed in the Name of Honor (Resolution 57/179). The resolution
did not only urge the states to investigate such crimes and punish perpetrators, it also
called for action on the parts of the states to take measures in order to ‘raise awareness of
the need to prevent and eliminate crimes against women committed in the name of honor,
with the aim of changing the attitudes and behavior that allow such crimes to be
committed’ (Ertürk 2004: 171).

8
The official definition of violence against women is ‘any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is
likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life’.

25
The international documents provide a sufficient framework for addressing crimes
of honor and other forms of gender-based violence. The application of the international
law in individual countries, however, is dependent upon each state’s efforts to comply
with the law by means of amending domestic legal system and institutional arrangements.
More importantly, it requires political commitment to the protection of women’s human
rights and establishing gender equality.
The state structure in Turkey is reproducing the unequal gender order, which
is the root cause of gender-based violence. The elimination of honor crimes requires a
solemn intervention in the status quo. The gender order is first and foremost
reproduced by the state that has repercussions in related institutions (law, family,
education, religion) and social formations (language, culture). Social relations of
power are intricately related to each other even though there are analytical differences
between types of power. The individual is formed in between these articulated
networks of power both as the oppressor and the oppressed. The state is the political
institutionalization of the immanence of power, an institutional structure that has
different hierarchies and domination relations placed at its center. Emerging as the
integration of public and social authority, the state defines the societal structure
(Selek 2007). Power, however, is diffused and is not exclusively generated by the
state. Foucault’s (1983) concept of governmentality reminds us that the state is not
impenetrable. The state gets priority in studies of social change but we also need an
analysis of civil societal actors in relation to the state for a thorough examination.
Certain historical moments, such as the modernization project in Turkey or Turkey’s

26
candidacy to the European Union, create opportunities for civil societal actors, in this
case women’s NGOs that fight gender-based violence, to be involved in state
processes. These opportunities enable the formation of different relations between the
state and society, which in turn change the nature of the state and the way political
will is formed.
I relate to two phenomena when I refer to the ‘gendered nature of the state’. One
is the fact that gender is a major feature of the state, in the sense that the pattern of gender
relations and the way the state is constituted are fundamentally related. And the other
points to the fact that the state relates to its citizens in gendered ways, meaning that the
distance of the state to its citizens and the nature of the relation between them are not
neutral to gender differences. In other words, being a man or a woman causes a
difference in one’s relationship to the state. Within this context, I argue that neither honor
killings nor any other form of gender-based violence can be eradicated through legal
reform only. Reformed and improved penal and civil codes, equality based constitutions,
and even laws that promote gender equality and penalize gender discrimination will not
prove effective as long as the gender order of the society is not altered. The legal system,
along with other state institutions, is built upon the gender order of the society (that
should not mean that other sources of difference, such as class, race/ethnicity, sexuality,
religion do not have an effect). As an institution, the law is structured for the maintenance
of the state system, not to change it. It thus works to legitimize and reproduce the
structure of the society, of which gender is one of the central organizational components.

27
Hence, I claim that unless the state embarks on normative policy changes that target the
gender order, societal change through legislation will not be achieved.
In order to disentangle the gendered nature of the state in Turkey, in Chapter 2, I
provide an analysis of the state from a feminist perspective. Based on Foucault’s notion
of governmentality, and that the state is not the only (though the most important)
mechanism of social regulation, I argue that domestic and international civil societal
actors are important components of governmental practices. Within this framework, I
analyze the Turkish modernization project in terms of its impact on the relationship
between women and the state, and the intersectionality of gender and ethnicity within this
process. Against the backdrop of gender politics influenced by the modernity project, I
follow the trajectory of the interplay between feminism and the state in Turkey. In this
process, I show that while the state instrumentalized women as symbols of modernity to
display how civilized and democratic the nation was, it also created opportunities for
women to become visible in the public sphere and recognize their citizenship rights. The
interplay between women, the state and the intersecting effects of gender and ethnicity, I
add, has determined the form of feminism and led to formation of multiple feminisms in
the Turkish context.
In Chapter 3, I focus my attention to another area, where the relation between the
state and women is both strongest and the most problematic: the process of nation-
building. Here, following the footsteps of Yuval-Davis, I discuss women’s role as
biological reproducers of the nation and cultural bearers of the collectivity’s identity and

28
honor. By a comparative analysis of Kurdish and Turkish women’s articulation to the
nation-state, I show how the nation-building process promotes certain identities while
excluding and suppressing others. In this chapter, I investigate the relationship between
family, state and violence against the backdrop of modernity. The modernization project
basically defined a move from the traditional to the modern. Although it is presented as a
totalistic state-led transformation of society, it was a selective process where certain
institutions were left to survive. The family is the most important of those institutions.
The Turkish society has always been a kinship-based society where modernity did not
attack the family. Although smaller family units replaced extended families, the state
addressed the family as the basic unit of the society, not the individual. In this setting,
men became accountable for their families as the head of the household. Women only
have a relation to the state through the male head of household, fathers or husbands. In
such a setting where families are left to the jurisdiction of customary rules, women’s
citizenship rights are breached at the expense of family honor and the family becomes the
source of violence. I then examine two state institutions, the Directorate General on the
status of Women and the Presidency of Religious Affairs, to show how the interplay
between the customary and the modern is enacted when the state’s gender politics is
institutionalized. The idea of modernity is cited again in determining the state’s relation
to international bodies of governance, where the European Union symbolizes the ultimate
level of modernity for Turkey and provides leverage for legal reform. After a broad
analysis of the state in historical moments and with respect to its institutions, I explain the
current composition of the Turkish Parliament that is in charge of legislative and

29
executive functions of the state. The ideologies of these political parties are important
both to understand what guides them in their policy decisions and see how they relate to
the civil society through the organizations associated with them.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to an analysis of the law that demonstrates that the law is
not neutral in regulating gender (and class and ethnicity) conflicts. That is because the
state and the legal structure reproduce social relations embedded in patriarchal norms. I
claim that women’s relationship to law has implications on their citizenship rights. Not
only women lack information about and access to legal measures, the law is non-applied
to women despite the constitutional establishment of equality before the law. I then
examine the recent legal reformation that involves the Civil and Penal Codes, and
question if they have a significant impact on women’s everyday lives. Through utilization
of interview material with state and legal officials, I show the ineffectiveness of
apparently very promising legal reforms on paper, when they are tested in reallife
situations. In this chapter, I also make a feminist reading of state-produced texts designed
to eradicate gender-based violence and question their potential to generate significant
societal changes with respect to strength of the documents and presence or lack of
gender-responsive budgeting.
Chapter 5 analyzes the notions of honor and virginity in terms of the roles they
play in the social regulation of the society and reproduction of the gender order. It then
shows how the state’s involvement in the protection and reproduction of these regulatory
mechanisms lead to extreme cases of gender-based violence. It also displays the

30
paradoxical situation, where the state is not only the protector of women’s virginity, but
also uses its loss as a threat against rebellious women to enforce compliance with state
rules.
Chapter 6 takes on the relationship between the state and women from the
perspective of the civil societal actors that fight against gender-based violence. Based on
fieldwork with feminist activists, I arrive at the conclusion that this form of NGO
activism is shaped by their conflict with the state. The state is central to the way NGOs
deal with gender-based violence. Either in the form of a critique of the state or the
demand and need for collaboration (often both), determine the NGOs activities in the
field. Their presence is in relation to the state, because they perceive the state as the
single most important institution responsible for eradicating gender-based violence and
improving women’s status in society, foremost, because the state plays a significant role
in the reproduction of both violence and an unequal gender order. The NGOs’
expectations from the state, how they employ state-generated opportunities and their
methods of action are all determined with respect to their situatedness. NGOs list their
basic grievances in their relation to the state as non-application of the law, weakness of
state-produced texts that provide them with leverage for action, the gender insensitive
attitudes of state and legal officials and law enforcement personnel.
State-induced legal reforms do not suffice to provide gender equality unless the
social organization of the society and mechanisms of regulation are altered in ways that
have repercussions in all state related institutions, such as the law, family, and education

31
system. Women’s NGOs monitor the implementation of and enforce the law in
collaboration with state agencies, often acting through international and transnational
networks. They thus gain public visibility and political power to challenge the gender
order. This research, bringing together an examination of law (as reproducing the gender
order and mechanisms of control) and the civil societal actors (namely feminist NGOs
that work to combat honor killings) fills a void in the literature.

A Note on Methodology and Research Design
The data for this project draws upon multiple resources. The main source is the
fieldwork I have done in Istanbul and Diyarbakır.
9
Istanbul is the economic and cultural
center of Turkey and the largest city with a population of over 12 million. It is also the
most cosmopolitan city receiving waves of internal migration continuously. Diyarbakır ,
a southeastern city , is the economic center of the region. It has an influx of migrant
communities due to internal displacement of rural populations uprooted by the political
unrest and military operations. Moreover, both cities have the highest occurrences of
honor killings despite the administrations of both having developed measures to deal with
the issue. In a similar fashion, women’s organizations that target gender-based violence
are significant and visibly active in these two cities. Between January 2008 and May
2009, I have conducted thirty-one in-depth interviews with selected individuals, who

9
Twice, I had to postpone and reschedule my field trip to Diyarbakır due to the warnings of my
connections in Diyarbakır. The political tension and the following intensive military operation in the region
did not generate an environment suitable for fieldwork for months.

32
occupy key positions either in state institutions or within the feminist movement and
NGO activism.
The in-depth interviews aim to collect information on two main axes; framing of
honor crimes and responses to crimes committed under the guise of honor. Through the
interviews, I traced the impact of the tradition effect in the ways state and legal officials
and NGO activists framed honor crimes. My focus on civil societal actors that advocate
for legal reform and law enforcement conceptualizes law not only as an instrument of
state policies but also as an opportunity and advocacy cause for civil societal actors. In
this process, I question how state institutions and different women’s NGOs frame honor
crimes, and analyze the effect of such variation on feminist policy development and state-
civil society relations.
The informants were asked a series of open-ended questions regarding the basic
concepts and were allowed to dwell upon with follow up questions based on the context
of the interview (depending on whether the informant was a state/legal official or an
NGO activist).
10
Questions such as, ‘How do you define honor? What are the appropriate
codes of behavior for women and men? What, according to you, are the roles of customs
and tradition in the social structure of this region?’ aim to grasp the gender regime of the
institution and how they relate to the gender order in the Turkish society. A second set of
questions particularly target their take on crimes of honor with questions reading as,
‘How do you define crimes of honor? What, according to you, is the root cause of these

10
See Appendix: Interview Guide

33
crimes? Do you find it possible to eradicate honor crimes? What do you do to fight honor
crimes?’ Another set of questions is dedicated to the law and the state. These questions
aim at finding out how state officials and NGO activists relate to the state and its
institutions. Their perception of the efficiency and applicability of the law and
responsibilities of the state institutions in eradicating honor violence are targeted in this
section of the interview. Questions regarding the field of their activities and use of the
law aim at deciphering the relation between the state and the civil society.
The Turkish public administration system is composed of a central government
and local administrations. The central government is elected through nation-wide
elections. Local administrations, on the other hand, are run by officials such as governors,
district governors, public prosecutors, judges, police chiefs appointed by the central
government, unlike the governors and district attorneys in the U.S. system who are
elected. Within the local administration system, only municipalities are autonomous from
the central government and are run by elected officials, i.e. mayors. In order to analyze
state discourses and practices I utilized several sources of information. First are the in-
depth interviews with state and legal officials in Istanbul and Diyarbakır. I interviewed a
former Governor of Diyarbakır, the Head of Human Rights and Women’s Status Division
of the Governorship of Istanbul, public prosecutors and judges (both high-criminal court
and family court). To substantiate the analysis of legal texts, I have also sought opinions
of lawyers from Istanbul and Diyarbakır. Another major data come from state documents,
such as the proceedings of the debates and resolutions of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly, circulars, directories and reports of various state institutions including

34
ministries, governorships and directorate generals among others. I refer to the public
speeches, press releases and statements of state officials that appear on national media as
reflective of state discourse and exemplary of state praxis. Legal texts, mainly the
Constitution of the Turkish Republic, the Civil Code, the Penal Code, and the rulings of
the Court of Cassation (Yargıtay) and the Council of State (Danı ştay) are also examined
from a gender perspective and with respect to gender-based violence.
The analysis of NGO activism to combat gender-based violence rests heavily on
in-depth interviews with prominent figures in the advocacy movement. I chose my
informants according to the visibility and influence of their activities within society, their
target groups and their relations with the state. In addition to women’s organizations that
specifically work to combat gender-based violence and improve women’s status in
society; I conducted interviews with representatives of the bar associations in Istanbul
and Diyarbakır, and officials from the municipalities of Istanbul, Kadıköy and
Diyarbakır.
11
During my fieldwork in Diyarbakır, I visited the municipal laundries and
bakeries and had informal focus groups with the local women using the facilities about
the impact of these facilities on their daily lives. The significance of the Democratic
Society Party is visible in Diyarbakır. Thus, I interviewed a Member of the Parliament

11
Interestingly, each municipality is run by a different political party. The municipality of Istanbul is run
by JDP, the governing political Islamist party since 1994. Kadıköy is run by the Republican People’s Party
(RPP), which is the political party associated with the secular ideology of the republic and Kemalist
reforms. The municipality of Diyarbakır, on the other hand, is run by Democratic Society Party (DSP),
which is the legal party of the Kurdish movement that also has representation in the parliament. Both RPP
and DSP are opposition parties in the Grand National Assembly.

35
from DSP to grasp the party’s relation to the Kurdish independence movement and the
Kurdish women’s movement.
I have made extensive use of printed material distributed by various state
institutions and non-governmental organizations. This allowed me to analyze the ways in
which the state and the NGOs introduce certain issues to the public and explain their
perceptions of and methods to deal with them.Throughout the course of this research, I
meticulously followed public debates in the national media regarding women’s issues,
feminism, women’s human rights and violence against women. I subscribed to a feminist
list-serve (kadın kurultayı) that has the highest number of participants including scholars,
activists, journalists, politicians and lawyers; basically every feminist and related
organization in the country. That gave me the opportunity to keep up with the women’s
movement responses to the agenda on a day-to-day basis.
As a participant observer, I joined state and NGO organized activities, such as
workshops or training programs that aimed at promoting gender equity, protecting
women’s human rights or combating violence against women.
A final source of data comes from the relating survey I conducted with 41
women, who as victims of domestic violence, applied to state authorities and then were
placed in the shelter run by the Purple Roof Women’s Foundation. The survey allowed
me to asses the state’s relationship with its female citizens who were victims of gender-
based violence on two different levels. Based on their experiences in the police stations
and courthouses, I first evaluated the attitude of the police forces, the most important

36
signifier of state power in everyday life, toward abused women. And second, I examined
the legal process and if the application of laws relating to domestic violence cases were
applied in a timely, unbiased and just manner by the public prosecutors and judges.

37
CHAPTER 2. GENDER AND THE STATE
There is no political will in Turkey to eradicate honor killings; on the contrary,
there is a strong political will to protect the construction of honor. How come the
construction of honor is that much important? To this day, I have difficulty
perceiving that. Why such a resistance? What’s in ‘honor’? (Pınar Illkaracan,
Chair, Women for Women’s Human Rights)

Murdering women in the name of honor is a prevalent problem in the 21
st
century
Turkey. The Turkish Republic, founded in 1923, has strived to become a ‘modern’ nation
state but has failed to protect its female citizens from being killed at the hands of their
families. Why? What, really, is in honor that men kill for it and the state, surprisingly,
condones? Or, is it actually unsurprising that the Turkish State has allowed this brutal
practice survive for over eighty-five years? Is this act even peculiar to the Turkish State?
To answer these and several similar questions, we need to understand the relation
between the state and women. Based on my research examining the state’s discourse and
practices in engaging with gender-based violence, I assert that the resistance to the
indisputable idea that women should not be killed by men in the name of honor is
engraved in the gender order of the society produced and reproduced by the state. Thus, I
argue that we have to disentangle the gendered nature of the state.
The state has been the focus of social sciences since their birth. Questions of
gender and sexuality, however, have been excluded from an analysis of the state for a
long time. Classic definitions of the state, Marxist, liberal or conservative, have either
limited the boundaries of the state to the public sphere or constructed relationships

38
between the state and abstracted individuals, which were sexless, classes and raceless
(Franzway, Court and Connell 1989). When Catherine MacKinnon claimed in 1983 that
‘feminism has no theory of the state’, she was pointing out a much-needed examination
of gender politics and the state. The need for an analysis of the state from a gendered
perspective became even more vital when we consider that women’s movement around
the world has developed in relation to the state. As a consequence, several feminist
scholars undertook gendered analyses of the state focusing on various issues ranging
from but not limited to citizenship and nation-building (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989;
Ong 1999; Yuval-Davis 1997); war and militarization (Altinay 2004; Enloe 1989; 2000);
world politics and security issues (Tickner 1992; 2001); modernity and the family
(Kandiyoti 1997; Sirman 2004).
The state is the absolute sovereign and possessor of power. We thus need to
understand how the state rationalizes the exercise of power by defining its discursive
fields. This is what Foucault (1983) calls governmentality, referring not only to political
structures or to management of the state, but the state’s ability to direct the conduct of
individuals or groups. In other words, governing is structuring the possible field of action
of others. Foucault presumes relations of power between individuals and the state.
Systems of differentiation, types of objectives and forms of institutionalization determine
the relations. Still, analyses of power relations cannot be reduced to examinations of state
related institutions, because, according to Foucault, ‘power relations are rooted in the
system of social networks’ (1983: 224). Thus, if the state is in at one end of the relation,
the social actors are at the other. The state is not only the most important exerciser of

39
power, but also all forms of power relations refer to it because the modern state controls
more and more power relations through its institutions. In the History of Sexuality (1980),
Foucault applies the concept of governmentality to areas of sexuality and social life, and
displays how the state works as an apparatus of social control and regulation. Here, the
state is not a monolithic or preconstituted entity, and the relation between the state and
private life demonstrates the multiple, intersecting and sometimes conflicting state
apparatuses at work. Foucault’s analysis of the state, especially at certain historical
moments when it starts regulating the family and sexuality, is the perfect departure point
for deciphering the gendered nature of the state. Nonetheless, we still have to ask ‘why’.
Why would the state be interested in regulating family and sexual life? What are the
dynamics of the state’s attempts to manage private life?
Foucault defines the state as a ‘transactional reality’, that is a dynamic assortment
of relations that simultaneously produces the institutional structure of the state. In this
setting, institutions are not the starting point of the analysis but direct us towards
examining the technologies that are materialized and stabilized in institutional settings
(Lemke 2007). Especially when the state’s relation to women is concerned, I claim, two
other factors that should be taken into consideration for a thorough analysis. First is the
effect of developments external to the state, such as the significance of international and
transnational organizations like the United Nations or the European Union. Second is the
role of civil societal actors, particularly nongovernmental organizations that have links to
transnational advocacy networks and international organizations.

40
Within the framework outlined above, to understand the state’s role in the
prevalence of honor killings and other forms of gender-based violence, I suggest that we
should answer the following questions: What forms of identities are accepted and
promoted (male, educated, contemporary, Turkish,) or on the contrary hindered and
suppressed (female, illeterate, traditional, Kurdish) by the state? This in turn forces us to
question the gender regime coupled with the existing forms of statehood. In a related
manner, what apparatus of sexuality and form of family are proliferated or repressed? In
this dissertation, I will seek answers to these questions through examining the
mechanisms employed by different state institutions (the law being the central one of
these) that reproduce the state as a gendered entity subjugating women (among other
identities). However, I do not claim that the state is the only mechanism of social
regulation, though it is the most important one. As I mentioned earlier, governance is a
relational process and international organizations and domestic civil societal actors are
involved in the exercise of power through their associations to the state. In this regard,
women’s NGOs in Turkey are important components of governmental practices. Their
interaction with the state is both determined by and in effect constitutes the gender
regime of the state.
Now let me elaborate on what I mean by the ‘gendered nature of the state’. To
begin with, I refer to two points by that concept. First is the fact that gender is a major
feature of the state, in the sense that the pattern of gender relations and the way the state
is constituted as an institution are fundamentally related (Franzway et al. 1989). Second, I
point to the fact that the state relates to its citizens in gendered ways, meaning that the

41
distance of the state from its citizens and the nature of the relation between the two are
not impartial to gender differences (other sources of difference such as race, class,
religion, sexuality and language are equally important determinants). Simply stated,
based on being a man or a woman, a person’s relation to the state (your rights as a citizen,
how the law applies to you, how well law enforcement protects you, what you can
demand from the state, how the state responds to your demands) changes.
The distinction between public and private spheres has been one of the main areas
in analyzing the relation between women and the state. The state is constituted within the
public realm and women are accorded the private sphere. The public vs. private
dichotomy is no longer as strong an argument in explaining women’s subordination but
still it has explanatory power when we consider the general tendency to exclude domestic
work and childcare from economic statistics. Feminist economists have taken important
steps toward recognition of domestic work as a value generating activity, but recent
developments in Turkey show that the state bases its medium-term plans on a sexual
division of labor and instead of institutionalizing child and elderly care to facilitate
women’s participation in the labor force (and public sphere). It defines these as home-
based activities that will be partially sponsored by the state (2008-2010 Orta Vadeli
Program). This single policy decision indicates an attempt to masculinize the public
realm. Sexual division of labor is visible in top levels of the state and throughout the
economy. Out of 550 seats in the Turkish Parliament, women occupy only 50 seats.
12


12
Eight of the fifty women MPs are from the Democratic Society Party (DSP), which applies a 40 percent
gender quota.

42
There are 27 ministries in the current cabinet with only two women ministers, who
occupy the seats for State Ministry Responsible for Women and The Family and the
Ministry of Education. The gendered distribution of positions continues in the
universities and big corporations. Whereas men hold significant positions at all levels,
women are accorded secondary positions or are accumulated in particular sectors such as
teaching, social welfare or health services. Here, it is not about the state personnel
comprising only men, but that there is a systematic gender patterning in the distribution
of positions that favors men over women.
Several strands of thought have taken up different aspects of the state to tackle the
gendered nature of the state. Liberal feminism, for example, builds its arguments on the
notion of citizenship. Whereas liberalism presupposes that the state is a neutral arbiter,
liberal feminism acknowledges that the state is not partial.However, sexism and
patriarchy are not treated as inherent features of the state but as consequences of
imperfect citizenship that requires redress (Franzway et al. 1989). Equal access and anti-
discrimination machineries are important achievements based on the notion of equal
citizenship. Nonetheless, neglecting the gendered mechanisms of the state in which
power relations are embedded in the way state works, set the limits of this approach.
Another school of thought explains women’s subordination by the state with
respect to its capitalistic nature. Accordingly, in order to fulfill the requirements of
capitalism, women are repressed to guarantee reproduction of the workforce, to subsidize
the economy through unpaid domestic work, and to serve as a cheap reserve labor force.

43
The division of labor within the family is the basis of social division of labor and reflects
the unequal and unjust stratification of the society within the capitalist system (Engels
1972; McIntosh 1978). The association between capitalism and the nature of the state is
indisputable, so are the worsening effects of neoliberal policies on women. However, a
gendered analysis of the state requires more than reducing the sources of oppression
solely to a mode of production.
At this point, I think it will prove useful to introduce ‘patriarchy’ as a concept to
explain gendered social arrangements and gender-based violence. Patriarchy, denoting
systems of male domination and female subordination, was severely criticized for being
undertheorized (Kandiyoti 1988), and was replaced by terms such as ‘a male-dominated
system’ and ‘gender inequality’. Earlier attempts at theorizing the patriarchal state either
saw it as an agent acting on behalf of men (Barret 1980), or the state itself was the
patriarch that was against women (Eisenstein 1982). The problem with this formulation
of patriarchy is that it attributed a feature to the state and defined it in rigid terms. Such
an analysis makes it impossible to either explain why women address demands to a state
dedicated to the interest of men or understand those state structures that run schemes
designated for the advancement of the women’s status. A good example for such a case is
the Turkish State and the modernization project it had embarked on with the
establishment of the Republic. As much as it was problematic, as I will argue in detail in
the next chapter, the modernization project carried out by the state made a huge
difference in women’s lives: granting emancipation, facilitating women’s participation in
the labor force and the public sphere, and promoting education for women. That does not

44
mean that the state is neither patriarchal nor a gendered entity, but it would be incorrect
to assume that it is a patriarchy always embodying a unitary male interest (Franzway et
al. 1989). Instead, we need to understand the mechanisms within the state that
institutionalize unequal access to power. Women are unevenly distributed within the
hierarchy of the state with a declining number, despite their obvious talents and
qualifications, reaching senior positions. In addition, parliament enacted institutions
designed to articulate women’s interests are peripheral in the organization of the state. In
the Turkish state structure, for instance, the power and significance of the Directorate
General on the Status of Women cannot be compared with the policy-making units, such
as the State Planning Organization, which is by and large dominated by men.
The state cannot be analyzed in abstraction from history and the social struggles
that shape it. The form of the state depends on who was mobilized in the social struggle,
what strategies were deployed, and what they yielded. The state, as an institutionalization
of power, is dynamic; and so is gender politics. As an actor in social struggle, feminism
places several demands on the state. The state, in return constitutes women as social
actors in gender politics. Here, the state itself is both an actor in social struggle and what
is at stake in it. It is an interplay in which the structure of the state shapes the feminist
movement and vice versa (Franzway et al. 1989). The state is actively involved in
constituting gender categories (the breadwinner husband, the wife and mother, the virgin
and honorable, or the soiled and disowned prostitute) and regulating their relationships.
Simultaneously, the state reproduces gender relations and it creates opportunities to
transform these. The modernization project of the Turkish State was one of those

45
historical moments that gave rise to possibilities for women. The state, however, wiped
out the possibilities, by resorting to institutional violence without legitimate justification.
The state’s use of violence without legitimate justification for such violence, thereby, the
state loses its credibility and power. The necessity to maintain legitimacy is a tool with
which the feminist movement could place demands on the state that cannot be refuted
without risking legitimacy. The state provides leverage for feminism to reform the gender
order through claims of citizenship and legitimacy. Nonetheless, reform through the state
might also mean developing politics organized around and limited to representation and
equal opportunity. Alternatively, dealing with the women’s movement is inevitable for
the state; after all, it is a recognized social actor in politics. Especially when the feminist
front is well organized and strong, the state has to negotiate with it. The gender order is
socially constructed and far from static. The interplay between the state and feminism
does not only have a significant effect on the form of each entity, but it also has the
potential to destabilize the gender order.
Understanding the relation between state and feminism is important for
intervening in the gender order on behalf of women. However, gender is not the only
source of division and inequality in the Turkish society. Besides, the way the gender
order is projected on every individual woman’s life varies significantly based on the
ethnic and class composition.

46
Intersectionality of Gender and Ethnicity
Divisions based on gender and ethnicity are considered to be natural sources of
difference and inequality. Gender and ethnic divisions reproduce practices of exclusion
and distribution in the favor of dominant ethnic or gender group (Anthias and Yuval-
Davis 1992). The naturalness of gender division arises from biological differences,
whereas ethnic division is based on boundaries of collectivities and culture. Anthias and
Yuval-Davis (1992: 112-113) note that gender relations differ according to ethnicity,
resulting in the dominant ethnic group’s gender divisions affecting ethnic minority
women in ways that are different from women of the majority. In a similar vein, they
claim, gender attributes are significant in delineating ethnic identity with reference to
sexuality, marriage and the family. According to Anthias and Yuval-Davis, women are
socially constructed markers of collective boundaries in five distinct ways: ‘As biological
reproducers of collectivities’ members; as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic or
national groups; as participating in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and
transmitters of its culture; as signifiers of ethnic and national difference, as symbol in
ideological discourses used in construction and reproduction of ethnic and national
categories; and as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles’
(1992: 115). It is important to understand how exclusions and subordination of subjects
are related to the intersections of gender and ethnicity (as well as class) divisions and
processes within the state.

47
The intersectionality of gender and ethnicity is an equally important phenomenon
within feminism. It is no longer assumed that women comprise a homogenous and
monolithic category but rather that every feminist struggle has a particular ethnic (and
class) context (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1983: 62). Recognition of double (race/ethnicity
and gender) or triple (race/ethnicity, class and gender) oppression of certain groups does
not mean that each source of difference and oppression should be added on top of each
other with their distinct and separate effects. Instead, for a thorough sociological (as well
as political) analysis, we need to realize the specific effects created by the
intersectionality of these divisions. The experiences and positioning of black women laid
the groundwork for conceptualizing intersectionality. Early accounts of intersectionality
distinguished between its structural and political forms. Whereas structural
intersectionality denoted the impact of intersecting inequalities in individuals’ lives,
political intersectionality focused on their impact on political strategies (Crenshaw 1989).
Recently, intersectionality does not need to point to multiplicity of oppression but is
employed as an analytical tool for understanding the multiple dimensions and patterns of
subject formation and social relations. It allows seeing the differences both between and
within the groups and thus avoids essentializing differences (Jordan-Zachery 2007). One
of the best models of theorizing intersectionalities is the matrix of domination by Patricia
Hill Collins. This concept refers to the whole ‘social organization within which
intersecting oppressions originate, develop and are contained’ (2000: 227-28). In this
framework, any matrix of domination takes a unique form resulting from historically
specific organization of power and intersecting inequalities. Hence, in a particular

48
historical moment and location several matrices of domination might determine the
conditions of existence for different social groups. These are equally important in
determining one social group’s relation with the state because state practices
exclude/include and distribute political power to groups based on their class, gender and
ethnic groupings (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1983). Accordingly, the experience of an
educated middle-class Turkish woman with law enforcement and the legal institution in
case of domestic violence will differ significantly from that of an illiterate Kurdish
woman who moved to an urban center through forced migration. Likewise, her
experience will also diverge from that of a Turkish working-class or unemployed woman
of rural origin.

Violence of Language, Language of Violence
In the context of honor killings and violence against women in Turkey, the
intersectionality of gender and ethnicity enables us to see that although gender-based
violence is a problem for all women, its impact on subject formation patterns and
everyday lives of Turkish and Kurdish women changes. Even the forms of violence they
experience vary significantly. Whereas the gender dimension differentiates the relation of
women and men to the state, intersectionality of gender and ethnicity (and class) creates
further divisions within women. The majority of Kurdish women, for instance, does not
have access to or cannot utilize services provided by state institutions because of
language barrier. The language barrier is an important factor affecting the quality of their

49
everyday lives. It also is a reflection of the class dimension because rural origins and
limited access to education are interrelated with poverty. Women cannot express
themselves in their mother tongue when they go to a hospital, apply to the police (file a
claim of domestic violence or demand protection from an honor crime), the court (file a
divorce or demand their inheritance rights) or any other state institution. This forces them
to be dependent on their husbands or other men of their family, who have at least basic
training in Turkish obtained during the military service that is obligatory for every man.
This is an important diference between Turkish and Kurdish women, which affects the
way they define and develop mechanisms to deal with forms of violence. Kurdish
feminists define language as another form of violence used against women especially by
the state. They also demand Turkish feminists to recognize it and collaborate with them
to fight against it.
The issue of language and its impact on women’s lives is one of the areas where
we can see the intersection of gender and ethnicity at play. Unequal gender relations and
their reproduction by the institutional structure are problems that unite women to struggle
against a common threat. However, within women’s activism, different groups’ struggle
for survival and institutional transformation diverge because of intersecting effects of
gender, ethnicity (and class). Women and men differently relate to the state, but that is
only one part of the puzzle. The relationships get more complicated with multiplying
effects of other sources of division and inequality. While one division (gender) brings
women together and constitutes them in opposition to their other, others (ethnicity and
class) simultaneously draw them apart and facilitate formation of other groups, which

50
might include components (men) that are thought to be their ‘other’. The intersectionality
of inequalities disables creating static categories of the ‘other’. The other shifts according
to intersecting divisions. Whereas a campaign to reform the penal code unites all
women’s and LGBT NGOs regardless of class, ethnicity and sexuality against the sexist
legal system, Kurdish women’s demands for education in Kurdish or criticism of military
operations in the southeast redefine them as the other of Turkish women.
I want to elaborate on this final point by use of a recent incident from the feminist
movement in Turkey. Women’s NGOs all around Turkey have been meeting regularly
for the Convention on Shelters and Solidarity Centers (Sı ğınaklar ve Dayanı şma
Merkezleri Kurultayı). The Convention has been an important platform for civil societal
actors that work to eradicate violence against women by enabling the development of
common politics, sharing experiences and raising awareness. One of the founding
principles of the Convention is to serve as a platform that allows for the coexistence of
differences to enable better-informed politics for change and action. However, the 12
th

Convention that was held in December 2009 has witnessed events, which proved the
importance of recognizing intersecting differences. Kurdish feminists interviewed for this
project have expressed their resentment toward Turkish feminists, especially referring to
cases when they gather in nationwide meetings. This work, however, carefully avoids
stigmatizing Turkish feminists as a monolithic group that ignores intersecting dimensions
of oppression (especially in this context, ethnicity). It rather points out an ongoing
tension that continues to divide the movement. While many women’s NGOs view the
Convention as the plane to question and struggle against ethnic discrimination, it might

51
unfortunately turn into one where these are reproduced. The following information is
posted by the Purple Roof Women’s Foundation to the Women’s Convention listserve.
13

Accordingly, when the news arrived that the pro-Kurdish political party DSP was banned
from politics and closed, Kurdish NGOs (Selis and DIKASUM) left the Convention to go
back.
14
Following their departure, some of the remaining NGOs wanted to make a
statement expressing their solidarity with Kurdish feminists, which was met with a wave
of protest that Purple Roof perceived as a ‘form of violence and discrimination’. This
particular incident reminds the importance of realizing and struggling against intersecting
forms of inequality and oppression to develop feminist politics that has transformative
capacity.

State, Violence and the Family
Nothing reveals the dilemma feminist activism faces in its relation to the state as
vividly as the struggle to end gender-based violence. I now want to discuss the uses of a
refined notion of patriarchy in explaining gender-based violence. Feminist theorizing is
based on the idea that gender is one of the primary mechanisms of social organization
and that violence is patterned along gender lines. Examining violence from a gendered
perspective demonstrates how violence is embedded in the gender order and how it
interacts with other institutions, social conditions and processes. We need a theory of

13
See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the NGOs mentioned here.
14
See Chapter 3 for a discussion of DSP and the chronicle of its closure.

52
gender-based violence, because empirical evidence indicates that women are victims of
violence in the hands of their intimate partners or other male members of their family in
patterned ways that are distinct from any other demographic group (Hunnicutt 2009).
This designates women as targets because they are women.
A central feature of the state is its capacity to exercise power. Actually, the state
claims monopoly of physical power for legitimate ends, such as protecting its citizens and
or its territory. However, the state does not have monopoly over violence. In those
instances, the state acts as the agency of regulation to maintain a particular configuration
of power relationships among its citizens and institutions (Franzway et al. 1989). The
state uses the law (here I mean judiciary and law enforcement as well as legislation) to
sustain social order. In his Critique of Violence (1996) Benjamin asserts that the state
sees violence in the hands of individuals as a threat to the legal system. Violence outside
the law poses a danger to the existence of the law. Taking the validity of Benjamin’s
claim forces one to ask: How about violence against women or honor killings, the most
extreme form of gender-based violence? The answer to that question, unfortunately, is
disturbing. Violence against women evidently poses no threat to the state.
From the perspective of the gendered state, gender-based violence is distinct from
other forms of violence. The distinction arises from the understanding that the relations
between women and men are private and familial, an area in which the state prefers to
‘regulate’ rather than intervene, despite specific legislation to the contrary. This is not an
issue that lacks methods of preventive intervention but rather the manner in which it is

53
carried out and the subsequent consequences. I will examine the relationship between
law, gender and violence in detail in Chapter 4. Here, I want to focus on the state’s role
as the reproducer of patriarchal familial relations. In a sense, the family mediates the
state’s relation to women. Men, as husbands and fathers, dominate the private sphere; the
family. The biased selectivity of intervention by the state in cases of gender-based
violence is an affirmation of men’s status within the family.
As stated earlier, feminism and the state determine one another. The state’s
monopoly over the control of force obliges feminists to deal with the state in relation to
gender-based violence. When the state is reluctant to intervene in the family on the
ground that it is private and personal, feminism responds ‘personal is political’, until
violence is recognized as a problem requiring the state’s involvement. In the next section,
I will examine the history of feminism and women’s movement in Turkey as a series of
struggles and confrontation with the Turkish State against the backdrop of major
historical, political and economic turns. The history of women’s movement in Turkey is
at the same time the history of the Turkish modernization project.

The Turkish Modernization Project
Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, the Turkish
people fought the War of Independence guided by the modernist cadres of the Ottoman
military and bureaucrats. Subsequently, the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 as a

54
secular nation-state. Immediately afterwards, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder and the
president of the republic, and the ruling elite embarked on a universally defined
modernization project. It was not a totally new project but rather the continuation of the
institutional reforms in the late Ottoman period. The inspiration for this elite-driven
institution-building process was exclusively the West. The wholesale adaptation of
Western norms, styles and institutions, especially in education, law and social life was
celebrated as an indicator of the viability of the modernity project in a predominantly
Muslim country (Lerner 1958; Lewis 1961). However, the critiques of Turkish
modernization project were soon to appear (Mardin 1997). The Kemalist doctrine that
launched the project was criticized for being ‘a patriarchal and anti-democratic
imposition from above that negated the historical and cultural experience of the people of
Turkey’ (Bozdogan and Kasaba 1997:4). Nonetheless, one fact about modernization
project remains to be true. Even if Turkey has not taken a holistic civilizational leap from
traditional Islam to modern West, institutional and symbolic manifestations of modernity
have become significant components of the Turkish society and continue to steer state
policies. Regardless of the approach to modernization project, either as a historical
condition with a liberating potential or an instrument for political domination, one thing
is for sure that the structure of the Turkish society has changed drastically since its
inception.

55

Women as Symbols of Modernity
If one were to choose a single social category, where the effect of the
modernization project is the most significant and visible, that would have to be the
stratum of women. Women are the symbols of modernity. The new liberal, democratic
and secular image of Turkey was concretized in women’s bodies. The Turkish nationalist
myth that upheld equality between women and men, democratic participation of women
in the new polity, and a secular ethos were the fundamentals of the project all of which
were realized through women. Recent feminist critiques of modernization project point
to instrumentalization of women, and state that the reforms of the period were not
undertaken for the betterment of women, but the state used women to facilitate a bigger
and more important transformation of the state system (Arat 1997).
The state-led modernization project defined itself as a Western-oriented series of
reforms against the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire signified by traditions and
Islamic fundamentalism. To mark the break with tradition, a nationalist myth was created
that referred to a golden age, a pre-Islamic Turkic past in Central Asia based on the
equality and collaboration of women and men. The adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in
1926 to replace the Shari’a law was a blow to the Islamic opposition. As the initiator of
reforms, the state knew the best interests of its polity. Democracy was the number one
priority and democracy required recognition of women’s rights. Then it followed
naturally that for the good of the nation, women would be integrated into the democratic
society. It was simply an instrumental and functionalist use of a distinct social group for

56
the larger project. There were, however, several downsides to the project. The women
called on to partake in public life comprised a small elite group, while the majority of
‘other’ women were expected to perform different tasks to contribute to modernization.
The most important one of those tasks involved being westernized housewives and
mothers and raising the next generations of the Republic (Arat 1997).
The project of modernity was holistic and included reforms at all walks of social,
cultural, economic and political life. In order to achieve a wholesale civilizational shift,
the institute of caliphate (religious leader of the entire Muslim community) was
abolished, a secular education system and a language reform were introduced, the
Western calendar and metric system was adopted, and even dress codes were altered.
These reforms had visible outcomes in urban centers and among classes associated with
the Republic, but it would be hard to say the same for the rest of society. I already
mentioned the instrumentalization of women as a state policy. Here, I want to add that
the state’s gender policy should not be examined independent of its class policy and
other determinants of social hierarchy.The modernization project, indeed, created
opportunities for a group of elite women to get an education and enter the ranks of
republican cadres and professions. Considering the atmospere of a rapidly expanding
republic and the growing necessity of cadres, the recruitment of upper and middle class
women was at the same time a means of hindering the chances of upward social mobility
for men of manual-labor and peasant origins. Although class-biased, this initial policy
choice resulted in consolidating the legitimacy of women in the public sphere (Öncü
1981).

57
We have to keep in mind that every nation-building process needs to define its
‘other(s)’ in order to survive. This idea resonates with what Foucault (1983) called ‘state
racism’, a system to distinguish the superior from the inferior. Racism, in this sense, does
not necessarily refer to dividing society along racial lines, but defining undeserving
social categories that can be legitimately excluded from state practices (or, if necessary,
eliminated). The ‘other’ of the modernist project was local customs associated with an
ancient regime described by social immobility, tradition and backwardness, which
crystallised in the image of the brutalized rural woman (Kandiyoti 1997). While what the
rural women represented was antithetical to modernity, the women themselves were the
subjects of the project. The local customs denounced for keeping women ignorant were
then employed to define other social categories, particularly ethnic minorities, which
were excluded from the modernist project. Among these, the Kurdish population has a
particular significance that I will explain in detail below. Suffice it to say that the
modernization project did not embrace the rural masses, except for increased schooling,
health service and infrastructural improvements (Kandiyoti 1997). Mobilization of rural
areas, which had far reaching consequences for the overall social landscape, had to wait
until transition to a multiparty democracy after World War II.
I will now return to an analysis of Turkish women’s movement in relation to the
modernization project and the state’s gender and sexuality politics. The intersectionality
of gender and ethnicity has repercussions for the (in)articulation of the Kurdish women
to the Turkish modernization project. As mentioned before, the modernization project
aimed at creating an ethnically, linguistically and culturally homogeneous nation-state. I

58
have already noted that women were selectively incorporated into the project favoring
elite, urban and educated Turkish women. This process led to the marginalization and
estrangement of Kurdish women, who suffered because of both their ethnic identity and
class position. This marginalization was further exacerbated, Yüksel (2006) claims, due
to the ignorance and lack of attention of Turkish feminism to the issues of Kurdish
women.

Feminism and Women’s Movement in Turkey
The women’s movement in Turkey is not a monolithic entity. The feminist
activists that I interviewed for this research come from different places along the
spectrum of the women’s movement in Turkey. Some of these organizations work in
close relation to state authorities, while others are highly critical of the state and
emphasize their autonomy . Likewise, the ideological standpoint of each organization
varies depending on its geographical location, the grassroots movement feeding it and
also its sources of funding. Even though fighting against gender-based violence and
promoting women’s human rights are common activities and goals, the women’s
organizations each have unique ways of dealing with women’s issues. Factors that
determine their relation to the state includes their individual attitudes towards the
Kurdish independence movement, the ideals of the modernist republic, or religious
values prioritizing the family.

59
Three distinct historical moments define feminism in Turkey, these are the late
Ottoman Empire period, the early decades of the Turkish Republic, and post-1980
military coup d'état period (Sirman 1989; Tekeli 1986, 1990, 1992, 1995; Arat 1994,
2000). The interlocution of Turkish nationalism and the women’s movement in Turkey is
crucial in constructing multiple Turkish feminisms.

Women’s Movement in the Late Ottoman Period
In the process of institutionalizing its power and structuring the gender order, the
state generates possibilities for civil societal actors that allow them to achieve
concessions from the state. The establishment of the Second Constitution of the Ottoman
Empire in 1908 is one of those state generated possibilities that led to the birth of
feminist ideas in the Turkish context. Starting from the mid-19
th
century, the Young Turk
movement initiated the modernization (Westernization) project of the Ottoman Empire.
In order to prevent the decline of the empire, the bureaucratic elite employed a set of
reforms in the fields of administration, legislation and education (Sirman 1989; Tekeli
1995). The administrative cadres were influenced by the ideas emanating from the
French Revolution, such as freedom, equality and citizenship. They were in favor of
abandoning the Islamic way of life, while the popular classes sought refuge in Islam and
traditions. The modernization project was executed by reformist men of the period. The
place of women was central in those debates, as they were seen as the ‘cradles of
civilization’ (Sirman 1989:5). While the proponents of modernization saw emancipation

60
of women as a prerequisite for westernization, conservative segments of the society
argued for women’s position to be determined by the Quran (Sirman, 1989; Tekeli, 1986,
1990, 1992, 1995; Arat, 1994, 2000).
Women established journals and organizations to promote new western ideas,
while indigenous efforts attempted to reform the position of women within Islamic
parameters. A prominent example of this moderate perspective was Fatma Aliye, who
argued that customs such as polygamy were not necessarily Islamic, but of Arabic origin
(Sirman 1989:6). Education of women was critical not solely for women’s good, but for
the good of the society. Some women expressed their dissatisfaction with the
developments, claiming that the male reformers ignored the women issue and limited
freedom to men alone. Thus, they developed the idea that women’s liberation should be
in the hands of women and that they needed to fight to win their rights (Sirman 1989;
Tekeli 1990, 1995; Arat 1994, 2000).
During this period, women were incorporated into public life according to their
social status. The women who raised their voices were educated middle-class women.
Educational reforms of the period also shaped a female working class that was created
simultaneously through Islamic schools and apprenticeship systems. Yet both the state
and the women’s organizations agreed that a woman’s primary role was to be a good
wife, mother and adapt to society’s needs in compliance with Islamic terms (Sirman,
1989; Tekeli, 1992, 1995; Arat, 1994, 2000). I have to note that the women’s movement
of the late Ottoman period was not monolithic, either. Several minority women’s
organizations flourished during the period, and the activities of Armenian women were

61
especially significant (Bilal and Ekmekçio ğlu 2006). However, under the auspices of an
empire defined by the rule of Islam, it is not surprising that the dominant feminist
movement conformed to Islam.

State Feminism in the Early Republican Period
After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the modern Turkish
State embarked on the women issue. Whereas in the previous period women were
situated within the society primarily as wives and mothers, who should be educated, in
this period women were constituted as patriotic citizens. This new role did not exclude
women’s role as wives and mothers, yet assigned another mission to the women of the
republic: educating the nation (Sirman 1989). Women’s role in society were indicators of
the state’s success in achieving democracy in addition to civilization. Moreover, rather
than incorporating Islam into the republican vision, religion was totally disregarded. The
founding fathers of the republic invoked the pre-Islamic Turkish past as an alternative to
Islamic way of life in constructing a Turkish identity as opposed to the Ottoman one. The
pre-Islamic past was reconstructed retrospectively as an egalitarian and democratic era,
which was based on the image of equal and powerful woman (Sirman 1989; Tekeli 1986,
1990, 1992, 1995; Arat 1994, 2000). Reforms such as adapting the Swiss Civil Code
(1926) and abolishment of the Caliphate (1924) undermined the Islamic way of life.
Once again, the battle between Islam and modernization was fought over women’s
bodies, where women’s bodies became instruments for the symbolic presentation of
political ideology.

62
In the 1930s, professional women were the symbol of the young Turkish republic.
Republican women were supposed be part of the public life as educated women. In this
period, Turkish women were emancipated but unliberated (Kandiyoti, 1987; Toprak,
1990). Gender equality was the discursive norm in the public sphere, yet patriarchy
prevailed in the private sphere. Women’s primary role was still defined in relation to the
family, being good wives and mothers, yet they were also expected to serve their country
by participating in public life. The condition of that participation, however, was a strict
denial of sexuality. Stripped off the veil, which served as a sign of chastity and modesty
in the public sphere, the modern women had to construct new codes to convey the
message of sexual unavailability. The civil servant woman with her suit and uncovered
face became the new female image of the Republic. Women were constituted as ‘the
comrade-women, and asexual sister-in-arms’, who preserved their honor and chastity
within their active struggle to improve their nation (Sirman 1989:12; Tekeli 1990, 1995;
Arat 2000).
Turkish women were granted suffrage in 1934, not as a result of women’s
struggle for citizenship rights, but by the state as a means of proving the democratic
nature of the Turkish Republic (Sirman 1989; Tekeli 1986, 1990; Arat 1994, 2000).
Given women’s presence in the public sphere, it was only natural that women wanted to
become actors in the political scene as well. However, the interplay between the state and
women was not conduciveto feminist politics yet. The state closely monitored and
ultimately restricted every feminist organizing attempt. It created its own version of
feminism, ‘state feminism’ where women’s organizations that advocated the republic,

63
education, and motherhood could survive but organizations autonomous from the state
were not allowed. A striking example is the Turkish Women’s Federation, which
organized an international Congress of Feminism in 1935 and issued a declaration
against the rising Nazi threat. The modernist state that was keeping a low profile on the
international scene was displeased. Subsequently, the federation declared itself a charity
organization, based on the explanation that an independent women’s movement was
redundant when all its demands were already met by the Kemalist state
15
(Arat 1997).

Post-1980 Military Coup Period
The third historical moment of feminism is the period of politicization. Feminists
of this era aimed at changing the social order through participation and recognition in the
political domain (Sirman 1989; Tekeli 1995; Arat 2000). This period is marked by
feminism and the state actively engaging in social struggles over issues defined by
women.
Student and left wing movements, similar to those in Western Europe and the US,
dominated the political scene of the sixties and seventies. Women found space for social
and political activism within anti-state ideologies and fought against class-domination
alongside men, which meant subordinating women’s issues to the main goal. Thus,
women within the New Left movement in the United States experienced a situation
similar to that of the feminists (Echols 1989). The 1980 military coup eliminated both

15
The name comes from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic.

64
left and right wing movements from the political scene and inadvertently created a
political space for women (Sirman 1989; Tekeli 1986, 1990, 1992, 1995; Arat 1994,
2000).
Throughout the 1980s, educated middle class women came together around
various publications and activities to raise the issue of women’s oppression as the central
site of struggle in contemporary Turkish society. Contrary to the feminist experience in
Western Europe and the U.S., Turkish feminists did not organize around issues of
suffrage or citizenship rights, but around violence against women. The campaign against
domestic violence in 1987 and the petition a year earlier demanding the implementation
of the United Nations Declaration of Women’s Rights (to which Turkey was a signatory)
served as focal points around which different women’s organizations collaborated (Arat
2000; Sirman 1989; Tekeli 1995). The campaign against domestic violence was
especially important in bringing together women from different backgrounds by
revealing the fact that women from all class, education and occupational backgrounds
suffered from domestic violence. Western feminism had a significant influence on these
movements in terms of organization and orientation. Non-hierarchical and independent
forms of organization very similar to theirWestern counterparts defined the
organizational structure of feminist groups in Turkey.

65
The Significance of Gender-Based Violence for Turkish Women’s Movement
The defining feature of post-1980 feminism is its critical stance toward
institutions and mechanisms that reproduce patriarchy and gender inequality. The
underlining point is questioning the modernization meta-narrative, with the idea that the
Turkish modernization project did not substantially deconstruct patriarchal gender
relations but actually reconstructed them (Uçan Çubukçu 2004). It would not be wrong to
state that the development of a feminist consciousness corresponds to this period.
In 1985, Turkey signed CEDAW, though with several reservations. The women’s
movement, for the first time, addressed the state and pressed for the removal of
reservations on CEDAW and its integration into domestic law. Women were aware that
imposing CEDAW on the state would require it to work towards the prevention of the
systematic violation of women’s human rights. While acknowledging the shortcomings
of legal and institutional regulations to acquire the desired level of societal change,
women still found it important that the state use the deterrent force of the law to prevent
gender discrimination (Uçan Çubukçu 2004). The awareness created around CEDAW
was limited to a small number of organizations. As any women’s movement at the early
stages of organization and participation in democratic process, the Turkish women’s
movement gathered around individual problems and campaigns, and dissolved until a
new issue came up. The problem of maintaining dissemination and continuity among the
women’s movement was resolved by the campaign against ‘violence against women’.

66
The ‘Solidarity March against Domestic Violence’ of May 1987 was a historical
moment for the women’s movement. It not only raised the veil off of women’s issues,
but also drew hundreds of women from different backgrounds to the streets to partake in
a campaign that the women organized by themselves and for themselves (Savran 2005).
Following the march, the first book compiling women’s experiences and feminist
analyses of violence, Scream, Let Everyone Hear! was published in 1988 (Daya ğa Kar şı
Dayanı şma Kampanyası). Summarizing their demands in the slogan ‘Our bodies are ours
– Say no to sexual harassment’, women collectively rebelled against all forms of violent
and constraining mechanisms targeting women’s bodies and selves. Hence, they
delineated gender-based violence as the core mechanism of the gender regime.
Another important contribution of this first mass-movement was the women
finally claiming the streets. The public sphere was, from then on, the site for women’s
struggle, which was a significant step towards the politicization of the civil society.
Women were eager to decipher all forms of violence, physical, psychological, economic
and state-led, and brought it to the public agenda. I have to note that the Campaign
against Domestic Violence was also a response, or more of retaliation, to certain state
practices. A simple divorce case heard in a central Anatolian town in 1987 created
outrage when it became public that the judge dismissed the case of a pregnant woman
with three kids, who was subjected to violence by her husband. When the judge ruled for
the continuation of the marriage union on the grounds that ‘No woman should be without
a child in her womb and a stick on her back!’ (Uçan Çubukçu 2004: 25), he did not only

67
spark a fire for the women’s movement but also summarized the state’s perception of
women and their place in the society.
The following years witnessed the birth of numerous women’s organizations
throughout Turkey. In 1989, the first nationwide feminist meeting was arranged. The
Feminist Weekend brought together women’s groups from across Turkey and enabled
them to share their experiences, discuss their methods, organizational scheme, theoretical
and political orientations in solidarity (Timisi and A ğduk Gevrek 2002). The meeting
resulted in the issuance of the Declaration on Women’s Liberation, which stated that
women, organized in a decentralized and nonhierarchical manner, need continuous and
well-designed coordination and a means of communication for effective feminist politics
(Berktay 1989). Thus, in less than a decade, the women’s movement in Turkey evolved
from a collection of individual uncoordinated groups to a collective movement dedicated
to changing the definition and methods of politics.

Multiple Feminisms in the Turkish Context
The role of women in society has been the fundamental aspect in reproducing
each value system, be it Islamist, modernist or nationalist (Tekeli, 1995). Feminism
explains women’s oppression with respect to patriarchy that is prevalent in all institutions
of the society, starting with the state and the family. Recent scholarly work on feminist
groups in Turkey categorizes them according to the political ideology of each group (Arat
2000). While many feminists do not need to label their ideology, on the ground that

68
feminism is already an ideology, others accentuate the difference in their approach to the
state and its institutions, primary issues for women, and proposed methods to tackle them.
Within the aforementioned framework, it is possible to define three distinct
groups of feminists. Kemalist feminism, Islamist feminism and Kurdish feminism.
Kemalist/Secular feminists comprise women who primarily identify with the Republic
and Kemalist ideology. They see Islam as the main threat to women’s rights, and
organize around state-supported associations to promote secular and modernist ideals
(Arat 2000; Sirman 1989). They do not provide a radical critique of the existing social
order, but try to amend the Civil Code to be more egalitarian.The Islamist women, who
first started organizing around Islamist political Welfare Party, developed a totally
different feminist ideology. Islamist feminists’ main concern was to maintain a high
public profile with their religious identity (Acar 1995; Arat 2000; Ilyaso ğlu 1995).
Kurdish feminists, as the members of the largest ethnic minority in Turkey, express their
discontent with the policies of the state and mainstream Turkish feminists (Arat 2000).
Turkey is a country that can be defined as part of the Third World, using the
concept not as a homogenizing category but an umbrella concept loosely defining a
certain level of economic development and a history significantly different from that of
the Western World. Feminism in Turkey has much in common with what Mohanty
(2003: 52) called Third World feminism, in the sense that it is as an ideology based on
the simultaneity of oppressions fundamental to the experience of social and political
marginality, grounded in the politics of racism and imperialism, where a hegemonic state

69
plays a central role in circumscribing daily lives and survival struggles with complex
interrelationships between feminist, anti-racist and nationalist struggles and political
liberation movements.
Turkish feminism transcended the indigenousness/authenticity concern that was
based on the East-West dichotomy with reference to universality (Ahmed 1982).
Mainstream feminism (here I refer to both Kemalist and no-label feminists) is still highly
influenced by modernization project and the republican ideology. Even though it was
self-identified as anti-statist in post-1980 era, mainstream feminist women were never
considered a threat to the state the way Kurdish or Islamist women were. In addition,
mainstream feminism is still dominated by the elite classes (educated, middle-class
women) consolidated by the republic (Ça ğatay and Nuho ğlu-Soysal 1995).

Islamist Feminism: Feminists with Faith
In the post-1980 period, Turkey experienced a growing Islamic radicalism, a
process contrary to the de-islamization in the early decades of the republic (Tekeli 1995).
Islamism’s strongest attack is on secularism and modernity. In this process, it raises the
issue of women’s rights and emancipation, yet from a completely different perspective.
The visible presence of women at the forefront is one of the defining features of Islamist
movements in the recent period (Acar 1995). Women’s incorporation into the Islamist
movement started with women’s journals. The second half of 1980s witnessed the
burgeoning of Islamist literature and publications directed at women.. The main message

70
was always a call back to religion by refuting the Western and non-Islamic ways of life.
They promised to save women from exploitation and oppression in this world, and bring
salvation in the next (Acar 1995).
The Islamist movement spared a significant space for the woman issue for two
basic reasons. First, they built on the notion that Islam, as a religion, has always been
very sensitive to women’s rights and roles in society. Second, women’s bodies have been
the most important sites of the struggle between the modernists and Islamists from the
very beginning (Acar 1995; Arat 1995). The Islamist reaction to state-led modernization
is represented in the form a nativist response in cultural and political terms. In this
reaction, not only does it criticize the modernist project, but also offers a new gendered
and politicized identity. Veiled women appearing in the public sphere and participating in
social movements is an important part of this new identity politics (Ilyaso ğlu 1998).
Islamist feminists explain the current faults of the Turkish society, such as moral
decay, increased symptoms of consumerism among women, and pornography as results
of Westernization. They promote a new identity by modifying the existing image of the
‘traditional woman’, and elevate her status by putting emphasis on education and
activism, in addition to the religious framework of womanhood (Acar 1995; Ilyaso ğlu
1998). Islamist feminism has two ways of dealing with the arguments regarding Islam’s
relation to women’s oppression. It either argues that Islam is not oppressive or that
oppressive practices are not Islamic (Kandiyoti 1996). Gender relations and division of
labor between sexes is a good example in that sense. In Islam, the relation between sexes

71
is not based on equality but on complementarity. Feminism in Islam adheres to the
ultimate notion of womanhood, which is motherhood. Within the anti-western and anti-
consumerism ideology, cultural authenticity is based on East-West dichotomy and
identified with Islam (Ahmed 1982). Islamist feminism has an embedded critique of the
patriarchal society in the argument that there can be no power over women other than that
of God. However, such a rebellious stance is not realized in praxis (Arat 1995, 2000).
Islamist feminism criticizes mainstream feminism for monopolizing the struggle
for women’s liberation and limiting it to the framework of Western feminism. They also
criticize the single, exclusive, secular Western feminist identity delineated by
mainstream/modernist feminism that ignores religious identity and prioritizes gender
oppression instead of focusing on the multiplicity of oppressions (Arat 2000). Islamist
feminism considers the historical relation of oppression between the East and the West,
which was defined by the colonization of the former by the latter, as a legitimate reason
to be loyal to and valorize the local culture and religion (Abu-Lughod 1998; Ahmed
1982).

Kurdish Feminism: Gender vs. Ethnicity Dilemma
Starting from the early 1990s, the ethnic conflict in Turkey regarding the Kurdish
population became the most significant issue in the Turkish political agenda. It was in
this period that Kurdish women voiced their discontent with the Turkish state and
Turkish mainstream feminism. Kurdish women developed an alternative language of

72
autonomy and feminist ideology while distancing themselves from the nationalist project.
Kurdish feminists felt the need to organize separately from Turkish feminists, who, they
claimed, did not feel the need to question the dominance of their national identity. In
response, Kurdish feminists formed separate groups claiming that the dilemma of
Kurdish women cannot be resolved through Turkish feminist organizations (Arat 2000).
Initially, Kurdish women were politicized under Kurdish nationalism, through
their ethnic identity. Similar to other feminist groups, Kurdish feminists organized around
women’s journals. However, the particular positioning of Kurdish women was much
more problematic than both Turkish and Islamist feminists. Their dual oppression due to
gender and ethnicity forced them to prioritize their struggles. Like the socialist feminists
of the 1970s, who had difficulty raising the issue of women within the leftist movement,
Kurdish women had to suppress the women question in favor of national independence.
In a vein similar to all nationalist projects, Kurdish men used Kurdish women as the
symbols of their culture and ethnic identity. They were first ‘mothers’ of the nation, then,
due to the active military participation of the women, they became ‘comrades’, the
warriors of the nation (Ça ğlayan 2007). The instrumentalization of women in the
nationalist movement by Kurdish men gave way to the emergence of Kurdish feminist
organizations. When they emerged as an autonomous entity, the Kurdish feminist
movement had to define itself as a distinctly separate entity from the Kurdish nationalist
movement, men (Turkish and Kurdish), and also from Turkish women (Yüksel 2006).

73
Kurdish feminists are critical of the Turkish Republic’s policies in the regions
where Kurds are the majority, and have an anti-state ideology. Their attitude towards
state initiated Multi Purpose Social Centers (ÇATOM) is informative. ÇATOMs are state
formed educational centers in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey that offer
programs to Kurdish women in literacy, nutrition, child care, hygiene, home economics
and craftsmanship. Kurdish feminists resisted the activities of ÇATOMs arguing that
those were centers of assimilation that encouraged Kurdish women to forget their mother
tongue and use Turkish, while at the same time training them to become cheap labor
force (Arat, 2000). The attitude Turkish feminists had towards the same centers revealed
the tensions between these two feminist ideologies. Although Turkish feminists did not
have a unified strategy to deal with ÇATOMs, a significant wing supported them, on the
grounds that they provided Kurdish women with options while some criticized the
assimilation intent. As a result, Kurdish feminists strengthened their stance against
mainstream Turkish feminism arguing that the latter claims to know their interests better
and does not let them voice their own issues (Arat 2000).
Some of the Kurdish feminist groups could not handle the pressure from the
nationalist movement from which they originated, especially during the time when armed
struggle reached its peak. Due to the accusations of Kurdish men that Kurdish women
subordinated the independence movement to the gender issue, feminist journals ceased
circulating. Kurdish feminists incorporated themselves to the nationalist independence
movement rather than rising as an independent women’s movement (Arat 2000).
Nonetheless, when I was in Diyarbakır as part of my fieldwork, I observed that although

74
they are deeply embedded in the struggle for recognition of the Kurdish population as
distinct from the Turkish majority and the demand for citizenship rights, Kurdish
women’s organizations do not surrender the women issue to the Kurdish issue. I will
discuss this in the following sections.
Pinar Ilkkaracan, chair of Women for Women’s Human Rights, an NGO that
organized important nationwide campaigns with the participation of all major women’s
groups and LGBT NGOs in Turkey, strongly criticized academic formulations of Turkish
feminism for creating artificial categorizations, such as secular (Kemalist) feminism,
radical feminism, Kurdish or Islamist feminism. ‘There is a single women’s movement. If
Islamist women are feminist, then they are part of that movement. Either you have a
feminist ideology or not; it doesn’t matter if you’re Islamist or communist. If some
women are not part of it then it’s not women’s movement but another movement’, is how
she explained it. However, my research proves that wrong. To begin with, I saw that
there are various feminist ideologies employed by different women’s organizations. The
way an organization defines feminism determines its place within the movement vis-à-vis
other organizations, as well as its relation to the state. That does not prevent these
organizations from coming together around common causes, such as the Women’s
Platform for the Reformation of the Turkish Penal Code or the preparation of a CEDAW
shadow report to be submitted to the UN. Although women’s human rights and the
struggle against patriarchy and gender-based violence are the common goals uniting these
organizations, they are not unified. Kurdish feminists, for instance, emphasize the
centrality of feminism for their struggle but then spell out their differences from what

75
they call the ‘Turkish feminist movement’. It is not an artificial category but an ‘us vs.
them’ divide based on ethnicity/nationality lines that have resonances in the way they
formulate their feminist politics. Likewise, Islamist women, self-identified as feminists,
fight against women’s oppression. However, their definition of oppression, their priorities
in the struggle and demands on the state are significantly different from other
organizations. The heated dispute between Kemalist (secular) feminist and Islamist
women’s organizations on whether or not women should be allowed to wear the
headscarf in public spaces is one of the vivid examples of such a divide. NGOs’
definition of freedom, agency and ideology determine their position with respect to the
state as well as other civil societal actors.
In this chapter, I suggested a framework to examine the role of the Turkish State
in the prevalence of gender-based violence. Based on an understanding that the state is
the most important mechanism of social regulation, I argued that the state operates in
gendered ways. What I call the gendered nature of the state implies that the pattern of
gender relations and the way the state is constituted and that the nature of the relation
between the state and its citizens are not neutral to gender differences. Similarly, I
employed Foucault’s concept of governance as a relational process between the state and
societal actors that determine the form of each. I then analyzed the modernization project
of the Turkish State as an historical moment that changed the form of the relationship
between women and the state. Against the backdrop of gender politics influenced by the
modernity project, I followed the trajectory of the interplay between feminism and the
state in Turkey. In the next chapter, I will analyze another dimension of the relation

76
between the state and women. Through an analysis of the nation-building process, I will
delineate how the Turkish State promotes particular identities while suppressing others.

77
CHAPTER 3. WOMEN AND THE NATION
In the course of Turkish history, women’s integration into the nationalist project
has been closely related to the modernization project. As a totalistic project, nationalism
promises to benefit women, purely through the extension of citizenship rights to them. In
addition, the nationalistic project particularly targets women, because the transformation
of women from subjects to citizens is predicated upon the renovation of the institutions
and traditions that have been keeping them constrained by the customs and norms of their
communities (Kandiyoti 1991). However, the nationalist project has another side to it.
Rather than serving the interest of its female citizens, the state mobilizes women
according to the requirements of its agenda. One thing is certain that women’s integration
into the nationalist project is significantly different from that of men. Women reproduce
nations biologically, culturally and symbolically. The control of women and their
sexuality is central to national and ethnic processes (Anthias and Yuval Davis 1992).

Women as Mothers: Reproducers of the Nation
Women’s ability to bear children relates them to the nation-state not as
individuals or citizens, but as members of particular national collectivities. According to
the requirements of the nationalist project and under varying historical circumstances, the
state mobilizes reproductive power in different ways. If the state is concerned with the
size of the nation, national interest may require maintaining and enlarging the population

78
based on the idea that ‘people are power’. Or, on the contrary, it might require reducing
the size due to scarce resources. Depending on the circumstances, the state either
encourages women to have more children, or prohibits or limits reproduction; both for the
sake of national interest. However, if the concern is the quality of the nation, then the
state decides who is qualified to reproduce and restricts the rest from doing so (Yuval-
Davis 1997). Through its population policies, the state controls women’s bodies,
sexuality and reproductive rights. The state’s policies regarding who should be
encouraged to reproduce and who needs to be restricted are important indicators of its
exclusionary practices.
I want to explain this with a recent example from Turkey. On March 8, 2008,
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Prime Minister of Turkey, gave his Women’s Day speech in
U şak, a conservative Muslim Turkish city. He first condemned violence against women
as a disgrace to the Turkish nation and associated it with the lack of education. After
stating that his government has taken and will continue to take all necessary legal
measures to facilitate women’s participation in social life, the Prime Minister called on to
the Turkish women to have at least three children. ‘My dear sisters, I am not addressing
you as your prime minister but as a concerned brother. Our nation needs younger
generations. We cannot let what happened to the West happen to Turkey. If we don’t
want a reduction in our population, each family should have three kids. The choice is
yours, but you should know that children are a blessing’, said the Prime Minister (Bianet
March 10, 2008). This statement created an outrage among feminists and several protests
followed demanding that the state took its hands off women’s bodies. Approximately a

79
month later, Mr. Erdogan visited Trabzon, another conservative city. He reiterated his
advice, though this time as the Prime Minister of his country, ‘some people are bothered,
but anyone who wants a strong Turkish nation would not oppose this. I repeat, at least
three children. I demand this as the Prime Minister. I have a responsibility that I should
fulfill’ (Bianet April 6, 2008). Leaving aside questions regarding the Prime Minister’s
rights over women bodies and issues of reproductive rights, let me analyze Mr. Erdogan’s
words with respect to the state’s gender and ethnic politics. This statement could have
been regarded as a simple example of the ‘people as power’ discourse had it been a call
to every woman in Turkey. However, this call excludes Kurdish women. Not only
rhetorically, but also practically through carefully planned interventions.
My interview with the former governor of Diyarbakır, Cemil Serhatlioglu,
revealed another side of the state’s population policy that did not make it to the news. He
told me that since the late 1990s, the state has been applying birth control methods and
sterilization in eastern and southeastern regions. ‘Semra Ozal (incumbent First Lady)
initiated a campaign to install IUDs, but they said it was a tracking device, it became an
urban legend. We couldn’t convince the women. Then, during my office, I launched a
sterilization center. We sent doctors to remote villages to find women who had more than
five kids. We would talk to women and their husbands, take them to the center in
Diyarbakır and perform the procedure. Then came the anti-propaganda that we were
committing genocide. We could not convince them that our concern was the women’s
health and the future of children’. Thus, the state has a different population policy and
politics of sexuality for Turkish and Kurdish women. While Turkish women are

80
encouraged to have at least three children, Kurdish women are sterilized. This differential
treatment of women based on ethnicity is not specific to the Turkish State. Anthias and
Yuval-Davis (1983: 70) state that in order to subordinate minority groups, particularly
blacks, immigrants and the poor, through the control of reproduction, Britain almost
exclusively gave contraceptive injections to black and very poor women, while Israel
distributed higher child allowances to Jewish families than Arab ones.
I think it would not be wrong to argue that motherhood is the most respectable
position accorded to women by the state. In every context and historical circumstance,
the ‘mothers of the nation’ have been the primary role of women in the eyes of the state.
However, I argue that when assessed in terms of women’s relation to the state ,
motherhood is not only gendered but also racialized. The mid 1990s was a period when
political tension reached its peak in eastern and southeastern Turkey as well as the urban
centers of the western Turkey. Recovering from the brutal military intervention of 1980,
left-wing organizations gained ground along with the Kurdish movement. The resurgence
of civil societal movements was coupled with state-led violence to repress these. It was in
this period the Turkish public first learned of the ‘disappearance’ of individuals who were
engaged in anti-state activities by the state forces through the ‘Saturday Mothers’.
Following the example set by the ‘Madres de Plaza de Mayo’, predominantly Kurdish
mothers of the Disappeared started regular vigils on Saturday mornings in Istiklal Street
(which ironically means freedom) asking the whereabouts of their children. Week after
week the number of the mothers increased, as did the level of police brutality despite the
presence of the media, television crews that broadcasted the police harassing and

81
detaining elderly mothers.
16
The experience of the Saturday Mothers made it clear that
even motherhood was not immune to violence when it clashed with the state’s ideology.
The Kurdish population is the largest ethnic minority in Turkey. Since the early
1980s, Kurdish guerilla forces organized around PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) have
been in an armed struggle with the Turkish military, claiming recognition and
independence. Although the Turkish army was not involved until 1984, the Turkish
State’s differential policies divided along gender and ethnic lines have been in effect
since the dawn of the Republic.

Women: Carriers of Culture
Gender relations are central to the cultural construction of collective identities and
are as equally important in cultural conflicts. In addition to being biological reproducers
of the nation, women are also cultural reproducers. They carry the ‘burden of
representation’, since they are seen as the symbolic bearers of collectivity’s identity and
honor (Yuval-Davis 1997: 45). The burden of representation is not easy to carry; first and
foremost because it makes women the primary target of the state’s civilizing missions. I
now want to illustrate the state’s differential relation to women in the process of nation-

16
Several months after the birth of Saturday Mothers, a new group of mothers, who called themselves
‘Friday Mothers’, emerged. These were the mothers of young men who died in combat with the Kurdish
guerilla forces while serving in the military, which is mandatory for every Turkish man once he turns 18.
The state pampered Friday Mothers and used them against Saturday Mothers to brand the latter as
sympathizers of terrorism. Friday Mothers, however, never attracted the attention of the media or the public
the way Saturday Mothers did.

82
building and display how gender and ethnicity, among other sources of difference, are
directed and employed through state projects.
A decade after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the dissatisfaction of
the Kurdish population with the new state was apparent. Revolts erupted in several cities
of the east and southeast, resulting in severe military action to suppress the insurrections.
Yet, the state’s action plan was not limited to military operations. Bearing on the role of
women as the bearer of the collectivity’s identity, the state embarked on a civilizing
mission, which targeted the Kurdish women that would be carried out by the Turkish
women. The plan was to educate the Kurdish girls in boarding schools and raise them as
modern Turkish women as part of the reform movement. Girls were particularly chosen
due to their potential roles as mothers. Kurdish men already had access to the outside
world and could speak Turkish. Yet, women were isolated from the rest of the society,
they could not acquire the Turkish language, and more importantly they could not pass it
on to the children they might raise, which perpetuated their alienation from Turkishness
(Türkyılmaz 2010). The state, thus, determined that Kurdish women should teach
Turkishness to the younger Kurdish generations. However, convincing the Kurdish
families to send their daughters to boarding schools was a tough call. This time the
burden fell on the dedicated Turkish women of the republic, who went to the remotest
villages to convince families escorted by the police or gendarme. These women, who also
worked as teachers and administrators of the institutions, are ‘maternal colonizers’, who
provided the girls with a new home and bright future (Jacobs 2005). Women who did not
partake in military conquest claim their exclusive colonial space around mothering,

83
backed by the idea that structural transformation of the masculine terrain needs to be
supported by radical transformation in the homes and based on the women’s assumed
natural capacity to nurture, educate and show compassion. The state’s gendered policy of
nation-building made strategic use of both Kurdish and Turkish women, though in
contrasting terrains.
Differential access of different collectivities to the state dictates the nature of the
hegemonic ethos in the society. All women possess ethnic, class and other definitive
particularities that define their femaleness, at the same time, their femaleness mark the
way they experience their particularities. Hence, being a Kurdish woman in Turkey has
far different consequences than being a Turkish woman. The differing histories of their
relations with the state and integration into nationalism determine the way they shape
their feminist politics today.
Gender hierarchy is one of the central organizing features of patriarchal societies.
Still, that does not rule out that class, race and ethnicity, sexuality, religion, language, age
and even location mediate gender statuses, assigning women and men differing levels of
power, privilege and value. In Turkish society the top stratum is reserved for the Turkish,
Sunni Muslim, college graduate, married men with a stable income. The lowest stratum is
occupied by illiterate, unemployed Kurdish women who cannot speak Turkish.

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Family, Violence and the State
I have been arguing that the form of the state is neither static nor independent of
the interplay between the state, its subjects and national and international civil society.
The state’s gender politics coupled with its ethnic politics determines the way it engages
with gender-based violence. The state’s approach to honor killings is a fertile area to
examine the interconnections between these factors. From the onset, the Turkish State
refused to recognize honor killings as a systemic form of gender-based violence. Instead
of looking for the root cause in the gender order reproduced by the state, it resorted to
basic premises of modernization theory and explained it as a temporary problem arising
from the resistance of backward traditions in regions that failed to successfully integrate
to modernity. The state assumed that the problematic traditions were destined to fade
away with appropriate articulation of modernity but never problematized its own role in
the perpetuation and reproduction of those very traditions (Ko ğacıoğlu 2004). This line
of argumentation produced leverage for the Turkish State against international
institutional structures, such as the European Union, which symbolizes the ultimate level
of modernity for Turkey.
The modernization project legitimized equality of women and men without
recognizing the differences between the two, which was actually the basis of the state’s
gender politics. The differences between women and men were denied in the public
sphere and left in the privacy of the home and family, where it led to formation of
hierarchies between women and men (Arat 1997). The power and stability of the family

85
is a significant characteristic of Turkish society (Tekeli 1995). The formal equality on the
agenda that ensured women’s presence in the public sphere was not coupled with a
transformation of the private domain or codes of morality and sexuality.This led to the
inevitable situation where women were still perceived as the primary components of the
family but not as independent individuals. The dominance of the family as the
fundamental institution of the society resulted in a situation where families were
protected at the expense of women. In such a context, the association between women’s
honor and the honor of the family is not broken. It then follows naturally that men, who
are in charge of the family, are equally in charge of the women of their family, to the
level of taking extreme measures when family honor is at stake.
What are the sources of violence in the Turkish society? Turkish feminists have
been critical of the family, on the ground that the family is the central institution that
suppresses women. However, they have failed to analyze the links between the family
and the larger societal system that enabled such domination. Feminist have tried to show
that modernization did not guarantee immunization from violence against women by
providing examples from different segments of the society and western societies as well.
The growing importance of human’s rights issues and widespread condemnation of
domestic violence are all seen as inevitable improvements brought about by
modernization along with globalization, yet the content of these concepts were not really
examined (Sirman 2007). In order to eradicate violence against women, we need to be
able to uncover the power relations embedded in traditions. However, that does not mean
falling pray to discourses such as modernization that bases its analyses on the inferiority

86
of certain societal categories. The distinction between custom crime and honor crime is a
good example of that. The modernist outcry against custom crimes is grounded on
traditional (read backward)/modern duality that canalized the negative feelings towards a
particular ethnic group, the Kurds, and thus concealed honor based violence.
The modernization project of the Turkish State presumes that through the
progress of law and education, the two most important institutions of the modern
republic, all societal perils including gender-based violence and gender inequality will
disappear (if tradition avails). Within this discourse, the problems of women do not
deserve particular attention but will wither away gradually in the course of
modernization. The issue is the development of the nation and when the desired level of
development is achieved, the status of its citizens will improve automatically. The
promised modernization and development are yet to appear after 85 years of the
republican modern state and its fight against tradition. The persistence of tradition is too
simplistic an explanation as the root cause of women’s problems and status in the modern
nation-state, unless the republic itself is reproducing the tradition or nourishing it through
its institutions. Ko ğacıoğlu (2005) defines this condition as ‘state patriarchy’, where the
state delegates the realm of the family to the jurisdiction of customary rules. State
institutions, thus, do not intervene into everyday lives of women. In such a setting,
women’s citizenship rights are breached at the expense of the family and related ideas.
Reinforcing family as the ideal institution, the state reduces women’s primary role to
those related to the family, the most important being the motherhood.

87
Eren Keskin (2008), coordinator of the project to end sexual harassment and rape
under custody, notes that women who are raped or harassed under custody are generally
politically active women of leftist ideology and often Kurdish. Even these well-educated
and strong women who endured torture and state-led sexual violence tend not to report
the sexual aspect, namely rape, so as not to hurt the men of their family, especially their
fathers. Keskin relates that to the dominance of feudal values that even the most political
and active of women have internalized and dare not break.
According to the social contract between the state and its citizens, citizens transfer
their certain rights to the state, in exchange of which the state is responsible for protecting
the lives and properties of its citizens. When state-led sexual violence against women is
concerned, we need to consider the exploitation of rights and abuse of the mission. That
abuse brings out the ‘masculine face’ of the state (Keskin 2008). There are numerous
NGOs working to end violence against women through nationwide campaigns, which are
financed by the EU and certain branches of the state. In theory, everyone is against
violence. However, when it comes to state-led sexual violence, many of these actors keep
silent. Thus, violence against women is reduced to domestic violence.
According to the official discourse, in Kurdish society, honor is the single most
important cultural obstacle to women’s integration to the society, while the Kurds are
depicted as a violent and conservative ethnic group ready to kill for honor. This view
portrays honor as the essence of society, thus as static. It is claimed that issues of honor
can be solved through non-violent means in successfully modernized societies, thus

88
assuming the possibility of change. Recent studies of the Kurdish society (Ça ğlayan,
2007) reveal that the concept of honor is dynamic and that not only the violence attached
to it but its content is subject to change. Far from being the essence of a particular
culture, honor is a cultural category constructed not only socially but also politically.
The modernist discourse of the republican project defines kinship-based societal
organization as a feature of tribal societies, thus limits it to certain ethnic groups, in this
case, the Kurds. Separating honor crimes from custom crimes is another way of
distancing the state from such crimes and blaming the Kurdish traditions for still keeping
such outdated customs. However, kinship rules are equally prevalent in non-tribal
societies, which explains the centrality of the notion of honor in defining social status.
Honor defines a person’s identity, her social position and behavioral codes appropriate to
her standing. All kinship-based systems place an extremely high value on honor, thus
assuring voluntary acceptance of societal norms (Abu-Lughod, 1986). In a sense, honor is
the legislative violence of kinship-based societies. The discourse of the modernization
project claims that the Turkish Republic is no longer a kinship-based society. The
traditional extended family is replaced by the modern nuclear family and all social
relations are organized accordingly. It was accepted by all strata of the society that there
would be no violence against women in a modern society. However, the 1926 Civil Code
established a modern version of patriarchy by defining the husband as the ‘head of the
house’ and thus providing him with the means to control the women and the family’s
honor (Sirman 2007). Even in modern Turkish society all social relations, except for

89
those bound by legal codes, are construed as being based on kinship codes. Age and
gender based hierarchies still organize norms of everyday life as well as politics.
At this point, it is worth noting that the state officials I have interviewed, a chief
prosecutor and a former governor of Diyarbakır, shared a very modernist discourse. They
emphasized the importance and significance of a ‘modern’ education to alleviate all
problems ranging from honor violence , poverty , feudal system , migration to
unsuccessful urbanization. However much I tried to draw their attention to other issues,
such as gender inequality, the land structure, role of the state, tribal system etc., they kept
going back to the importance and necessity of education, especially that of young girls
and women. Both of these high-level bureaucrats self-identified as ‘modern’ individuals
with a ‘contemporary’ outlook, stated that violence against women would not be a
problem if everyone (meaning every ethnic group) understood and shared the ideals of
the modern republic.
Although the organization of the society in terms of families works well for the
state, it also enables gender-based violence to perpetuate. Disseminating a narrative of
modernity that promises a fully egalitarian future for women, while at the same time not
realizing but on the contrary reproducing the gender order has been the state policy for a
majority of the republican history. Although the state has already named ‘backward
traditions prevalent in the southeast’ as being the responsible party for honor crimes and
distanced itself from the issue, by the late 1990s, the civil society, namely feminist

90
women, and the European Union have started to express discontent and called on the
state for action.
Following rigorous activism of women’s human rights organizations around the
world, the international human’s right community recognized honor crimes as a form of
violence against women. Even the UN issued documents holding all state parties
responsible for taking measures including ‘national legislation and other protective and
preventive measures aimed at elimination of crimes committed in the name of honor
(Paragraph 96(a) of the Outcome Document of the 23
rd
Special Session of the United
Nations General Assembly Beijing+5, June 2000). International bodies of governance
such as the UN and the EU were significant actors supporting the women’s movement in
Turkey and pressuring the Turkish state to take action.
When Turkey applied for membership to the EU, it was made clear that
membership was conditional on taking steps toward establishing democracy, human
rights, rule of law and respect for minorities as well as eradicating gender-based violence.
As I mentioned earlier, EU membership is the ultimate state of modernity for Turkey.
Thus, for Turkey, aspiration for EU membership has been the incentive for reform. The
legislative changes that I will explain in Chapter 4 are Turkey’s response to the EU’s
expectations for reform as well as to those of the feminist movement. Before proceeding
with an analysis of the legislation, I want to focus on two state institutions that are
important in understanding the gender policy of the state.

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Institutionalization of Gender Policy: The Directorate General on the Status
of Women (KSGM)
Acknowledging women’s human rights on paper does not suffice. What matters
is the establishment of institutions that will transform the words on paper into important
items of state policies and applications that affect everyday life. In this section, I want to
show that the state’s attitude towards women’s issues does not generally address women
as individuals and citizens but rather places them centrally within the family and
proceeds from here.
Local and global mechanisms that mobilize women’s issues are based on the
premise that gender inequality is a serious societal, political and economic problem. At
the same time, the sole existence of such mechanisms point to the possibility of change
and note that gender inequality is not inevitable. In other words, the systemic subjugation
of women can be overcome by systemic means and struggle. Within this process, the
institutional profile of a particular country is the intermediary mechanism to guarantee
that women’s human rights are realized as policies. This leads to a paradoxical situation,
where the very state institutions established to improve the status of women end up
working against the state that is loaded with patriarchal norms (Acuner 2002).
In Turkey, state attempts to institutionalize equality between women and men
started in 1987 with the establishment of the Advisory Board on Women-Related
Policies (Kadına Yönelik Politikalar Danı şma Kurulu) under the State Planning
Organization. This move enabled the state to report to the UN that, as a signatory to the

92
1985 Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies, it has fulfilled the requirement of founding an
official mechanism related to women’s issues (Aykor 1994). The responsibility of the
Advisory Board was to ensure that the State Planning Organization included women-
related issues in its five-year programs. It is worth noting that this first step of
institutionalization was not realized through pressure from women’s organizations but as
a result of fulfilling international requirements. Thus, rather than being an attempt to
improve the status of its female citizens, this move should be evaluated as another
reflection of the modernization ideology, which presents the West with the impression
that women’s issues are actually addressed in Turkey.
In 1990, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security established the Presidency of
Women’s Status and Problems. Six months later, the presidency was converted into the
Directorate General. During the previous year, the State Planning Organization, the first
state institution to host a women-related branch, that is the above-mentioned Advisory
Board, issued the sixth five-year development plan, which had particular sections on the
family. Dedicated to the protection of the family, the report stated that the major reason
for the diminution of the Turkish family was women’s employment outside the home. It
acknowledged that many women had to join the labor force due to financial hardships,
but warned against unforeseen social and psychological problems this might cause in the
family, most importantly the changing role of the mother and the father. Accordingly, the
report says, ‘the father is the head of the family, his role in the family is almost sacred,
similar to the role of the mother in the Muslim Turkish tradition’ (Acuner 2002: 129,
emphasis added). Evidently, women were required to fulfill their maternal role within the

93
family for the betterment of the society.
17
At its initiation, the KSGM was assigned a
very small cadre comprising twenty personnel, out of which only four were trained in
women-related policies, indicating that the directorate was more symbolic than
functional.
For years, women’s advocacy groups have repeatedly spelled out the state’s
responsibility in establishing gender equity. That does not mean that the women’s
movement will cease to exist or approve every policy of the state. Civil societal attempts
try to draw the state’s attention to this issue, demand legislation change, or protest
against the existing order, but it is the liability of the state to ensure gender equity
already embedded within the state mechanism as an ideology. It is the state’s
responsibility towards its citizens to eradicate discrimination based on race, ethnicity,
class or religion . Similar to women’s movements around the world, the Turkish
women’s movement is not a homogeneous and unitary entity and its relationship with the
state is not linear. A significant portion of the feminist movement perceives the state as
the utmost patriarchal entity that reproduces the unequal gender regime, and thus
distances itself from the state. Although the state’s role in the reproduction of inequality
is incontestable, total rejection of the state as a monolithic entity hindering the
advancement of women and other oppressed groups would not prove to be productive.

17
In spite of this call to return home, the economy, especially the public sector, needed the women’s
participation in the labor force. The second half of 1980s marked liberalization in the Turkish economy
with many men shifting from public sector jobs to the newly flourishing and better paying private sector.
Women were thus vital for the public economy. However, the state did not provide any services, such as
intensive childcare, to facilitate women’s participation in the labor force and workload was added to their
existing domestic responsibilities.

94
Instead, the state needs to be questioned and reinstated from the perspective of the
oppressed so that it realizes its responsibility and becomes the democratic and egalitarian
body capable of transforming its problematic institutions.
In the midst of such discussion at the civil societal level, a state institution that
targeted women’s status was in the process of being formed. I think the story of how the
KSGM came into being will prove useful in terms of clarifying the attitude of the state,
which I have been criticizing thus far. As stated earlier, the state’s perception of women
was mainly determined by their role within the family. This particular perception was
shared by all members of Parliament except for Ms. Imren Aykut, who was the Minister
of Labor and Social Security of the conservative Motherland Party.
18
Ms. Aykut,
contrary to statements made by other state officials, was emphasizing women as
individual members of the society, not solely of the family. She had a specific agenda
and that was to establish the KSGM.
19
The parliament (both the governing and opposing
parties) was definitely not receptive of such a structure, as it was made clear by the
policies that tied women to the family. Even the institution of a single body within the
state that would particularly address women’s issues was met with such opposition. It
was not a legal reform or granting of particular rights to women. It was merely an

18
The Motherland Party was a centre-right nationalist party which supported restrictions on the role that
government can play in the economy, which favored private capital and enterprise, and allowed for some
public expressions of religion. It was founded after the 1980 military coup, won the general elections in
1983 and ruled as the governing party for consecutive terms until 1993.
19
I have to note that Imren Aykut was not a prominent member of the Turkish women’s movement, she did
not even have any contacts with the women’s movement before she submitted the proposal to found the
KSGM. What I want to stress is that, the efforts of a single individual person with access to power might
initiate change, however problematic it may be.

95
establishment that would undertake research and produce reports on women’s issues,
which would ideally guide policy planning towards gender equity. Even this was
apparently too much to ask.
The discussions within the women’s movement following the submittal of the
proposal to institute the KSGM were varied. While some groups refuted the idea of the
state being involved in women’s issues, others spelled out the need for multiple
nationwide mechanisms to generate gender sensitivity at various state levels; however, it
should still respect the presence of an independent women’s movement and not try to
eradicate it. Still others were concerned that, because of the state’s lack of experience, it
refrained from collaborating with the women’s movement and excluded them from the
process of establishing a body for women’s issues (Acuner 2002).
The details of the proposal revealed the attempt to mobilize the institution to
disseminate the state’s ideology, but not necessarily as an opportunity to initiate societal
change. The decree law stated that the activities of the women’s organizations in Turkey
would be oriented towards fulfilling the state’s national vision (422 Sayili KHK, Madde
9(e), emphasis added).
20
This statement implied not only that the general directorate

20
The national vision denotes more than the official approach of the state. It is a concept developed during
the late 1970s and has very strong Islamic connotations. It is loaded with conservative and traditional
values regarding all aspects of social, economic and political life. While it promotes industrialization for
the sake of development, it advices against modernization or westernization, which, it claims, erodes the
values of Turkish Muslim society. It is also known as an ideology against the secular republican project.
The protest of women’s movement with explicit reference to the national vision should be evaluated with
the conservative connotations in mind, especially with regard to the proper place of women, within the
private sphere of the family. The women’s movement, especially segments of it that embraced ‘state
feminism’, considered it a major step back from the Kemalist revolutions of the’ modernist’ republic. Later,
when the decree law was reinstated as law, the notion of national vision was replaced by ‘national values’,
to free it from the loaded meaning described above.

96
would not be autonomous, but also that the state would use it to monitor the activities of
independent women’s organizations. Another problematic article defined the mission as
‘developing policies and programs to solve women’s problems and maintaining the status
of women in society’ (422 Sayili KHK, Madde 4). The definition created an outrage,
because, obviously, women ‘enjoyed’ no positive status and were in dire need of
recognition. The establishment of the general directorate was another state attempt to
create ‘state-designed women’ as opposed to what women wanted for themselves
(Cumhuriyet 1990).
Even though its area of operation was limited and state controlled, the presence of
a body within the state to address explicitly women’s issues is an intervention to the
status-quo. Many members of both the governing and opposition parties were not content
with the idea of questioning the status of women and dealing with their problems. One
particular speech by Mahmut Ozturk, an MP of the True Path Party (the conservative
right-wing opposition party) is worth noting because it is illustrative of the patriarchal
mentality, which assumes that women are in need of protection (especially when their
honor is concerned) and their bodies and behavior should be strictly controlled.
According to this mentality, ‘the protection of Turkish women’s rights by a state
institution is a major drawback for Turkish women, because the rights of Turkish women
are guaranteed by the Quran and societal norms and traditions’. Ozturk is also concerned
that ‘some feminist women’s organizations come to the forefront so as to represent the
Turkish women by suppressing the voices of the rest of the women. TheTurkish woman
is capable of protecting her honor’ (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 1990: p.179). Evidently, for

97
the bearers of such mentality, the most important problem of the women in Turkey is not
access to education, employment, or not even domestic violence but solely protecting
their honor.
Amidst vocal opposition from sections of the public and the state apparatus, the
General Directorate on the Status and Problems of Women was established in 1990. The
ensuing years saw a series of structural changes that prevented the general directorate
from achieving institutional stability. It was not until 2004 that the law governing the
operation of the General Directorate was passed, guaranteeing its legal standing and the
provision of its own budget. Although consecutive governments pledged support for this
law to be ratified, they all refrained from putting legislation in place. In spite of financial
and personnel shortages, the KSGM managed to generate a gender-based database,
collaborate with universities to establish women studies centers and produce policy
suggestions.
Policy planning and application is a process determined by societal hierarchies
based on gender, class, race, religion and ideology. Once such hierarchical organizational
structures are set, it is difficult to question leave aside change these (Diamond and
Hartsock 1981). The public administration has a rigid mentality in terms of gender
equity. With women’s issues regarded as secondary, getting them embedded within the
state mechanism is even a harder task. Besides, recognition of problems is only the first
step in making them an integral part of state policies. Such an endeavor requires
targeting the socio-historical structures of women’s subjugation and aim structural

98
transformations. The women’s movement in Turkey contributed to the process of
establishing an institutionalized response to women’s issues by making it a part of
political agenda.
The Turkish modernization project has a significant impact on every societal
process that Turkish society has witnessed. State-led attempts to institutionalize the
women issue is no exception. Modernization has a Janus-faced approach towards
women. While it reproduces the patriarchal ideology that traps women in systems of
subjugation, it also grants women certain citizenship rights, though not in response to
their demands but in keeping with the West to some extent.. The foundation of the
KSGM is just another state-granted favor to women with a notable name and mission
statement, however with limited applicability. The constitution and proposals to reform
the constitution are illustrative of this approach. In early 2000, women’s organizations
collaborated with the KSGM to have an article added to the reform package. Conveying
the demands of the civil society to the state, the KSGM proposed that Article 10 of the
Turkish Constitution be rewritten as ‘Women and men possess equal rights. The state
takes all necessary measures, including affirmative action, to ensure equality of the
sexes’ (Acuner 2002: 156-7). However, the proposal was dropped during the drafting for
debate in Parliament, an indicator that women’s issues and gender equality are still far
from becoming state policy.
Today, the KSGM states its mission as: ‘To make policies, develop strategies,
cooperate with all stakeholders and coordinate in order to achieve equality between

99
women and men, to strengthen position of women in all fields of social life and to
eliminate all forms of discrimination against women in our country’ and continues to
define its vision as ‘to become an effective and successful institution in achieving gender
equality and ensuring its sustainability with the policies it made and strategies it
developed’ (KSGM website). For the last decade, the KSGM has worked extensively to
run projects to combat domestic violence and develop policy suggestions for the national
action plan to promote gender equality. Despite the discouraging developments that the
institution went through, the KSGM’s recent connections with the women’s movement,
its research activities regarding violence against women and its attempts to question
patriarchal values and structures in favor of gender equality are promising, although they
do not seem to yield an outcome in the short-run.

Diyanet: Modernity, Religion and Gender
The Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) is a state institution occupying a
paradoxical position, since it is a state-led religious institution in a secular state system.
On paper, the function of the Diyanet is to carry out religious affairs in society pertaining
to faith, worship and moral principles, to inform society about religion and administer
places of worship. During the Ottoman Empire, the institution of the Şeyhülislam had a
similar but much more encompassing function in all matters related to Islam. The
Ottoman Empire, however, was a religious state and the Sultan was also the head of
religious administration, the Şeyhülislam was a high-level state official conducting

100
religious affairs on behalf of the Sultan. The Diyanet refutes being a continuation of the
office of Şeyhülislam and claims to comply with secular structure of the Turkish
Republic. Moreover, it claims to represent the Turkish modernism in the religious arena
(Karaman 2008). Defining itself as a civilian and democratic institution, the Diyanet
legitimates its presence by the fact that the Turkish population (who are predominantly
Muslim) should have the ability to fulfill their religious needs freely (Bardakoglu 2004a).
I have to note that, although the Diyanet identifies itself as an institution that is concerned
with issues of faith and religion in general, it does not cater to non-Muslim citizens of
Turkey or to Muslims, who are not from the Hanefite Sunni school of thought. It,
however, extends its services to Sunni Muslims living abroad.
The Diyanet is affiliated with the Prime Ministry, thus, its perception of religion
and the information distributed are reflective of the state’s ideology. The Diyanet is well
aware of the influence of religion when it regards religion as a sociological phenomenon
that reflects daily life and as something that people live and experience that serves a
common interest. The Diyanet thus finds itself responsible for enlightening the public
(Bardakoglu 2004a). Having a monopoly over the religious message conveyed to the
public, I examine the Diyanet’s discourse in terms of the rights and place of women in
society, gender roles and its perception of honor. The discourse of the Diyanet is
particularly important, because it has control over the Friday public sermons delivered
nationwide. Considering that only men are required to attend the Friday prayers, the
messages distributed through the mosques directly reach men all around Turkey, even if
they do not have access to other sources of information. This particular power of the

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Diyanet is acknowledged by all state and non-governmental organizations working to
combat gender-based violence so much so that every document produced and every
project proposal lists the Diyanet as one of the primary institutions to collaborate with.
On March 8, 2004, Ali Bardakoglu, the President of the Diyanet, issued a press
release regarding World Women’s Day, when he emphasized the importance of
women’s human rights and warned against gender-based violence within an Islamic
framework (Bardakoglu 2004b). He defined violation of women’s basic human rights as
a negative behavior in the society and invited everyone to take advantage of basic
teachings of Islam to prevent it. Moreover, he particularly referred to honor killings as a
problem faced by women in our country, noting that the problem did not arise from
Islam but was caused by social, cultural, and economic reasons, in addition to historical
or ones.
21
The president also recognizes the role of patriarchy that prioritizes the rights
and property of men and sees women inferiority as an explanation for honor killings.
But he distances the patriarchal attitude from Islam, which condemns it and recognizes
women and men as separate but equal individuals. According to the president, the
education of girls and women is a responsibility of the society. Islam and the state are
well aware of such responsibilities, he claims, but the problem is ‘the negative concepts
created by a section of society where a patriarchal attitude rules, concepts such as
‘honor’ killings of wives and daughters. To see this concept as only referring to women

21
I want to draw attention to the systemic reference to geographical factors whenever a state institutions
mentions honor or custom killings. By limiting the practice to a particular geography (though it is not
explicitly spelled out we know that it is the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey populated by
Kurds), it no longer becomes a nationwide problem and excludes it from state practices.

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feeds another misconception that has been created by the mentality and traditions of
society. To develop motifs that condemn the violence carried out in the name of honor,
tradition and local culture is of utmost importance’ (Bardakoglu 2004b, emphasis
added). According to the Diyanet, honor killings and suicide among young women (the
text refers to them as young girls, to denote they are virgins because they are not
married) are outcomes of illiteracy and perverse traditions and customs (Karaman
2008). The Diyanet recognized its own and the state’s responsibility to combat violence
against women, while emphasizing the necessity for the state to cooperate with
women’s groups to resolve the problem and to make the struggle against violence a
government policy.
The enthusiasm generated by this document was not long-lived. A very long and
detailed document posted on the Diyanet website on March 2008 about the rights and
place of women in society caused fury ( İnsan Hakları). In this document on human
rights, the Diyanet legitimates Islamic law, which is discriminatory against women in
terms of inheritance and social rights, and blames feminism for eroding the societal
structure for the sake of women’s liberty by disrupting values that are central to the
family.
The Diyanet has been applying a new policy of recruiting female preachers and
Quran school instructors to reach out to women (Karaman 2008). A research project
examining the sources and forms of violence sought the opinion of the Diyanet’s female

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workers, a preacher and a theologist.
22
Since 2002, the Diyanet has been reaching out to
women and families through Family Centers for Counseling and Religious Orientation.
These centers direct women to specialized institutions if need arises but in principle,
they protect the unity of the family as much as possible. Their basic aim is to increase
the number of women attending mosques and provide a sound religious education.
When social problems are concerned, the Diyanet offers solutions that are
geared towards strengthening faith and increasing religious participation. In 2000,
Turkey was struck with news of young women committing suicide in Batman, a
southeastern city. The frequency of suicides mobilized several state institutions to
investigate the matter. One of the first explanations came from the Mufti of Batman.
Accordingly, it was a combined outcome of tough life conditions, strict custom and
traditions, family pressure and an incorrect interpretation of religious rules. More
importantly, claimed the Mufti, a spiritual void was behind these suicides, since a
person with a strong faith would never commit suicide (Halis 2002: 145). Following
this explanation, the Diyanet sent a research team to the region to investigate and cure
the problem. The report of the investigation identified the problem as arising from a
combination of political, economic, social and psychological factors. The major factors
that contributed to this unfortunate result were listed as the failed utopia created by the
PKK, unemployment and financial hardship, lack of education, rapid social change,
domestic violence, insufficiency of social institutions, depression, and religious

22
Unpublished report written by Nüket Sirman, cited with the consent of the author.

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misinformation. The solution of the Diyanet to such diverse problems, a major part of
which are structural, was a call to religion through preaches specifically prepared for
women and religious education. These programs would target women and the family
and aim to change the ‘cultural codes of the region that influence individual behavior’
(Halis 2002: 150). Ironically, in this scheme, the negative effect of regional tradition
would be overcome by a ‘religious’ modernization project. This particular approach is a
reflection of the state’s attempt to situate women within the family and deal with every
issue related to women from this perspective. It denies women the right to exist as
independent individuals but recognizes them only as mothers and wives, who are the
backbones of a well functioning family and nation.

Current Political Scene in Turkey
I want to introduce the political parties that compose the current Parliament. The
parliament is the central institution of the state structure in terms of both law-making and
governance. The political parties represented in parliament have access to varying
degrees of state power and the means to convey their ideology to the public. The impact
of political parties is not limited to Parliament. Some of the NGOs that I studied have
organic ties to political parties and some share common ideologies. The gender policy

105
and ideological background of the political parties are important to understanding what
guides their policy choices.
23

The Justice and Development Party
The Justice and Development Party (JDP) that has been governing Turkey since
the 2002 general elections. As the governing party, the JDP’s party program is reflective
of and defines the ideology orienting state policies. The JDP pays particular attention to
women’s concerns. To begin with, it promises to apply the United Nations’ Convention
on Elimination of All Forms Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) principles. It also
has a section on honor crimes that reads as ‘in places where women’s suicides, murders
of tradition and honor are seen in abundance, the party will organize preventive and
educational programs targeting women and their families’. However, this approach
condenses crimes of honor to women’s suicides and an accepted code of honor ; the civil
war in the region or socio-economic background are ignored. Also, depicting the location
as ‘places where crimes are in abundance’ points to targeting a particular ethnic group,
the Kurdish population, which generates the illusion that other ethnic groups and regions
of the country are immune to this problem.

23
In addition to the three political parties analyzed here, a fourth political party Nationalist Movement
Party (NMP) also has representation in the Parliament as the second largest opposition party. It is a right-
wing conservative party that builds its ideology around the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’. I do not provide a
detailed analysis of NMP, because there are no women’s organizations associated with it that fight gender-
based violence or gender inequality.

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The way the JDP conceptualizes ‘women’ is illustrative in terms of the party’s
gender politics. Women are deemed important because they are the ones ‘primarily
responsible for rearing healthy generations’. Thus, women are defined in relation to their
roles as wives and mothers, the building blocks of the family, which is the foundational
institution of the society according to the JDP. Hence, the JDP signed its name to some
social reform packages implemented with an orientation towards the EU; the party’s
ideology is defined by a commitment to the protection of the family at the expense of
women. Separating the public and private spheres enables the party to maintain this
delicate balance. The public sphere, where reforms are implemented, belongs to men,
whereas the private sphere belongs to women as the keepers of the essence of he Turkish,
Muslim identity.. The two spheres are designed to complement one another so that
modernity can be achieved without hurting the fundamentals of the nation. Public sphere
– private sphere separation allows for the protection of central mannerisms of Turkish
and Islamic culture (women and family) by containing them in the private sphere whereas
certain traits of western democracies, such as human rights and secular institutions, are
embraced by males in the public sphere.
To summarize, the JDP, the current governing party in Turkey, tries to contain
honor crimes to a particular region and ethnic group when they generate an outcry in the
national and international public opinion. Yet when crimes are more easily
accommodated within existing social norms and traditions, the family ideology may be
manipulated to disguise the criminal act itself.

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Democratic Society Party (DSP)
The DSP is a Kurdish nationalist political party, established in 2005.
24
Since its
inception, the leaders and members of the party faced allegations by the Turkish State
regarding its relations to Kurdish separatist movement and the PKK. Senior DSP leaders
have maintained through their speeches and publications that they support a unified
Turkey within a democratic framework. Nonetheless, in November 2007, the
Constitutional Court filed a case to ban DSP from political activity. In defense of the
party, co-chair Ahmet Turk reiterated that the party was not affiliated with the PKK and
suggested that the national identity be redefined based on the concept of a shared
territory, rather than on ethnicity. He also noted that any impediment to using the Kurdish
language was a violation of human rights (Durukan 2008).

24
The Turkish Constitution allows the Constitutional Court to ban political parties proven that their
activities cause a threat to the unity of the state with its nation, national sovereignty, republic, national
security, public order, general peace, morals and health, and public good. In accordance with the
constitution, several political parties were banned from politics within the history of the Turkish Republic.
On November, 16 2007, the Constitutional Court of Turkey filed a case against DSP to ban the party from
politics on the ground that it had connections to the terrorist organization, PKK. On December 11, 2009,
the court unanimously decided to ban the party from politics and ruled to rescind parliamentary
membership of Ahmet Turk, the chairman of the party, and Aysel Tugluk, former co-chair. Following the
decision, the EU expressed its concern, noting that banning the party is a violation of minority rights. DSP
is not the first pro-Kurdish party to be banned by the Constitutional Court. Kurdish political parties
appeared on the Turkish political scene with HEP (People’s Labor Party). Following its closure, DEP
(Democracy and Equality Party) was established and eventually banned. Then followed OZDEP (Freedom
and Democracy Party), HADEP (People’s Democracy Party), DEHAP (Democratic People’s Party), and
DSP (Democratic Society Party). Following the closure of DSP, the deputies of the party continue to serve
under BDP (Peace and Democracy Party), which was established after the closure case was launched to
replace DSP in case of a shut down.

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I had an interview with Sebahat Tuncel,
25
Istanbul MP of the DSP, to understand
the party’s attitude towards women issues and its regional policies. Accordingly, the DSP
considers itself a left-wing mass party, which defends individual rights and liberties and
the free self-expression of all communities and cultures in Turkey. She stated that they
attribute primary importance to the liberation of women in Turkish and Kurdish society,
and that they defend gender equality. The party program defines the Kurdish question,
together with the gender equality question, as the most important topics in the action they
take. It is also important that an ecological balance is observed, since they believe the
domination of man over man is generated by the domination of man over nature. Thus,
the women issue is one of the three central pillars of their political ideology. Tuncel noted
that while other political parties approach the issue as a matter of the ‘family’, they had
women and particularly unequal gender relations as their major concern.
The DSP does not have a policy against honor crimes, per se, but it has a gender
policy. Tuncel told me that they established policies to challenge and change the ongoing
traditional feudal structure of the region. A very striking example of that is the party’s
attitude towards gender equality. They set a 40% quota for women at all levels of
administrative cadres. They adopted a co-system with equal powers, where the leadership
is shared with a man, Ahmet Türk, and a woman, Emine Ayna. Another policy that I find

25
Sebahat Tuncel is a women’s right advocate and has worked with international organizations such as the
UNDP and Amnesty International. She went on trial for membership of the PKK in 2006 and was
subsequently imprisoned. She ran for the parliamentary elections from prison and was released from
custody after being elected in July 2007.

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especially significant in terms of transforming the existing gender order is their ‘no
tolerance ‘approach to domestic violence and polygamous marriages. The DSP run the
Van Municipality (another eastern city) and the Sur Municipality in Diyarbakır have to
employ new policies to prevent violence against women. Accordingly, half of an
employee’s paycheck will be paid to his wife if he is proven to be abusing his wife and
children. In addition, the pension and other compensations of a municipality worker will
be paid to his legally wedded wife if he has a polygamous marriage (Bianet July 3, 2009).
Tuncel cited a recent case, where the party dismissed the mayor of a district in Mu ş
because he had a polygamous marriage.
26

I was surprised to learn about these progressive developments and questioned
Tuncel about men’s attitude towards the application of these policies. She told me that
men are obviously not content with these strictly enforced policies but whenever they
express their discontent, they have to face the women of the party, who are ready to fight
for their achievements. It is important to note that the relatively powerful status of
women in the DSP derives from their active participation in the ethnic freedom
movement as guerillas. Hence, it did not come naturally because the DSP is a left-wing
party that respects human rights. On the contrary, the Kurdish independence movement
used women exactly the same way that any society in the process of building a nation
would. After all, women are biological reproducers of the nation and symbolic bearers of

26
Polygamous marriages are not recognized by the state and are illegal. However, especially in eastern and
southeastern regions of Turkey, such marriages are common and are socially acceptable. Although a civil
marriage can only be carried out with a single woman, a religious ceremony is conducted with the other
women.In many cases the first wife may also be religiously married.with no legality following.

110
the collectivity’s identity and honor (Yuval-Davis 1997). Kurdish women served that
function within the Kurdish independence movement for several years. First, they were
constructed as the ‘mothers’ of the nation that was respected and honorable but at the
same time passive. With active involvement of the Kurdish women in guerilla warfare,
their position within the movement transformed to ‘comrades’ and they became a part of
the social contract. However, either as recognized political figures or as ‘free citizens of a
free nation’, women’s position in the society is determined with respect to the cause,
i.e.the independence movement (Ça ğlayan 2007).
Tuncel admits that there was a time when women were accused of betraying the
national cause when they wanted to deal with gender-based violence and inequality.
However, she claims, the party cadres have now realized that the women issue is so
urgent that it cannot be postponed until after the revolution. Still, party dynamics do not
reflect everyday life. Societal change is slow to follow the new party policies and
regulations, not disregarding that such changes are extremely important. Sebahat Tuncel
and women of the DSP are aware that discourse and practice are still to be synchronized.
‘Men do not oppose, but we, the women, want them to be convinced, not just stay silent.
We have to see the change in real life. While working in the party men are different, but
when they go home to their families, they also go back to their traditional roles’, Tuncel
noted.

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The Republican People’s Party (RPP)
The Republican People’s Party is the oldest political party in Turkey, founded in
1923 by the founder of the Republic Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. It ruled as a single party
until 1950 and it has always been associated with the values and ideals of the
Republic.The RPP is regarded as being social-democratic (it is a member of the Socialist
International), state nationalistic and secular/laicist. The party's logo consists of the Six
Arrows, which represent the foundational principles of the Kemalist ideology:
republicanism, nationalism, statism, populism, secularism and revolutionism.
Currently, the RPP is a center left party with traditional ties to middle and upper-
middle classes. The RPP is the major opposition party in the parliament. Because of its
recognition as the ‘political party of the Republic’, The RPP has emotional ties and a
vested interest in maintaining its image as the ‘guardian of republican values and
ideology’. The modernization project and the idea of modernity, which are central to the
republican nation-building process, maintain their significance in the ideology and policy
making of RPP. As I have explained before, the status of women in the society is central
to the idea of modernity, which takes it as an indicator of a country’s development level.
In this context, religion and tradition are seen as the most dangerous obstacles to
modernization and development. This is of utmost importance, as it is a major tenet in the
RPP manifesto, defined by a fervent protection of secularism and opposition to political
Islam, identified by the governing party the JDP.

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Although women are central to RPP’s definition of a modern society, the women
issue is only discussed under the section on equality in the RPP party program. It does
not particularly refer to gender equality but aims at institutionalizing opportunity
equality. It recognizes, however that the current situation in Turkey is far from satisfying
the equality between women and men. The RPP defines as its target a ‘new Turkey’,
which protects women’s rights in all circumstances of social life in addition to law and
economics and family. Accordingly, all obstacles hindering women’s participation in
economy, politics and governance should be removed. Nevertheless, the program does
not specify how. The program dated 2002, does not make any specific reference to
violence against women or propose a method to deal with it. Nonetheless, the influence
of modernization theory can be identified in all RPP led projects.

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CHAPTER 4. LAW AND GENDER
State and the Law
In analyzing state practices, I admit that the state is not a homogeneous entity.
Yet, it is not immune from criticism, especially when the right to live of its citizens is
under jeopardy. I argue that when gender-based violence, and especially honor murders,
are concerned, the neutrality of the state in regulating gender, class and racial/ethnic
conflicts needs to be questioned. That is because the state and the legal structure
surrounding it reproduce social and economic relations that are embedded in patriarchal
norms.
An analysis of the state from the perspective of gender-based violence and gender
inequality needs to avoid crude generalizations. When examining the state, we need to
concretize it. Although talking about the ‘State’ and how it reproduces the existing
gender regime may sound too elusive, I believe it is possible to conduct a thorough
analysis of the state by examining the distinct yet interrelated components that comprise
it. For that, an investigation of the institutional structure is vital. The most important
component of the state institutional structure is the law. Citizens’ relationship to the
judicial process is central to the reproduction or elimination of societal inequalities. Thus,
an examination of the law and legal system in terms of how laws are made, altered and
applied will prove useful for understanding the state’s position on gender inequality and
gender-based violence. Another institution that requires careful consideration is the
governing political party. Its policies and practices as well as the party program and

114
ideology are key to understanding the government’s position on women’s issues. One
other fruitful source is the documents produced by the state, which reflect its discourse.
What the state does to act in accordance with nationally binding international documents,
such as CEDAW or other UN treaties, and documents of varying power that target
specific issues are illustrative of how state policies are made and executed. A final source
that I utilize for the proposed analysis is the role played by state officials. Ministers,
governors, public prosecutors, judges, police chiefs are all appointed by the state and
have access to varying degrees of state power, thereby representing the state through their
actions. Education is another significant institution for the spread and maintenance of
state ideology. However, within the limits of this dissertation, I do not conduct an
analysis of the national education system with respect to its use in the reproduction of
unequal gender regime that feeds violence.
The ideological structure or daily operations of an institution might bear elements
that are detrimental to women’s rights. Even if that is not the case, an institution’s
workings may just not be improving the status of women in Turkey. However, they are
still framed as modern and against the tradition. Once traditions are defined as the only
cause of honor crimes, the involvement of institutions in the bigger picture that leads to
honor crimes is being ignored. Even if not intentionally, the discourse, practices, and
gender regime of an institution, if remain unexamined, might be contributing to the
perpetuation of violence committed under the guise of honor by sustaining traditions.

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The intention here is not to save tradition from being criticized, since it is
apparent that a particular tradition is behind the crimes of honor. What I want to
emphasize is, as the central institution, the state perpetuates ‘traditions’ when it has the
capacity and sources to eradicate certain practices sanctioned by it. While the state has
the power to generate some structural changes, it prefers to use its capacity to alter the
superstructure, i.e. the legal system, either being forced by the European Union (EU) or
as a result of feminists’ decades long struggle. The outcome of such an effort is not
targeting the source of the problem, but facing it after it becomes a problem, i.e. a
criminal act to be penalized. The question here is why the state refrains from treating this
as a structural problem emanating from the gender order that it reproduces but rather
chooses to tackle it as an individual criminal problem.
What are the limitations and the possibilities of the state as an actor in the
construction of citizenship rights? Literature on gender based violence displays that states
are responsible for the persistence of violence due to their indifference to the plight of
women and their role in legitimating the cultural codes of female chastity and control
(Abu Odeh 1996; Al-Fanar 1995; Arın 2001; Asamoah 1999/2000; Giovannini 1987;
Hamzeh-Muhaise 1997; WWHR 2006). It is important to examine the judiciary to
understand the relationship between the state and society. The features (who they are,
where they come from, how their interests and identities are constructed) of judges,
prosecutors, police officers and other legal officials are important to understanding and
then changing the discursive practices of legal officials (both outside and within the state)
for the advancement of women’s human rights.

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Women and the Law
Women’s relationship with the law has implications in terms their citizenship.
Institutional mechanisms are effective in the everyday reproduction of gender
inequalities. Gender inequality is also present in the law as signified in legal texts, non-
application of laws and women’s lack of knowledge of and access to legal measures
(Ko ğacıoğlu 2005). Citizenship is central in creating more egalitarian institutional
structures, since; it is at the intersection of structures of social inequality, such as gender,
race, and class. Modern citizenship implies equidistance, where every individual’s
distance from state institutions is the same regardless of sex, age, race, class, ethnicity
and each is recognized as a citizen. Presumably, with the advent of citizenship, kinship
and other forms of loyalty cease to be significant relative to citizens’ loyalty to the state.
State institutions penetrate into the everyday life of its citizens. Everyone is supposed go
through the same process to become and remain a citizen. This is guaranteed through the
law, which assures that state institutions operate according to formal and neutral
procedures. The legal institution should maintain equal distance from all citizens, as well
as be formal and neutral itself (Ko ğacıoğlu 2005). Since 1934, Turkish women have had
the right to political participation, which is significant in terms of the state’s recognition
of women as citizens. Other indicators of such recognition are equal rights to inheritance,
divorce, marriage and bearing witness in a court. Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution
establishes equality of the sexes before the law. However, women are not as equal in
every legal situation. Even when women are legally protected, they usually have neither
the means nor the ability to gain access to the law.

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Such non-application is unfortunately a routine and structured phenomenon
experienced by many women. A 1997 survey conducted among women in Turkey
(Ilkkaracan and Ilkkaracan 1998) shows that women’s basic rights, which are supposed to
be protected by the law, are breached in a regular fashion with no intervention at the state
level. 41 percent of women in eastern and southeastern Turkey, state that they need the
permission of a male relative to leave the house during daytime; when nighttime outings
are concerned, this figure rise to 96.2 percent. This is a clear violation of women’s right
to travel. Only 26 percent of women receive their rightful share of inheritance as recorded
in the Civil Code. This means that more than 70 percent of women are denied their lawful
right to inheritance. Furthermore, more than 50 percent of married women require their
husband’s permission to work outside the home, and over 30 percent of women confirm
that their husbands decide the ‘color’ of their vote (Ilkkaracan and Ilkkaracan 1998).
These numbers indicate that male family members are usurping women’s constitutional
rights, even though Articles 23 and 24 of the constitution clearly states that citizenship
rights are individual, non-transferrable and cannot be limited or renounced (Ko ğacıoğlu
2005). Evidently, laws are not upheld in everyday life. Because women cannot enjoy the
rights of their citizenship, they are distanced from the state institutions in a way unknown
to men. The denial of legal rights to women is a major issue, which is frequently ignored
by the state. When it is brought to public attention through the efforts of women activists
or the media, it is perceived as an individual and exceptional issue, not as a systemic
problem. Tradition once again appears as the scapegoat that limits women’s access to
law. The cure , as the official discourse unsurprisingly claims, is modernization and its

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corollary, development. As with any problem that can be solved with further
modernization, education is the key to success. Presumably, going through a state-led
education will teach women their rights, and how to use and protect them. However, in
the absence of institutional measures to back up women’s citizenship rights, knowledge
by itself will not suffice.
Up until 2004, the Turkish Penal Code included articles that granted a reduction
in the sentence due to the ‘cultural values and attitudes’ of the region, yet, it lacked an
article on honor crimes. Thanks to the activities of women’s and human rights
organizations, and the European Union requirements, the legislation was reintroduced to
include life sentence for those involved in honor killings. Severe provocation and values
of the region no longer qualify for a reduced sentence, and rapists who used to escape
punishment by marrying their victims are no longer excused (Arat 2005; Jaffer 2004).
However, there has also been a downside to this legal reform: with the increase in the
punishment of honor killings there has been a significant increase in the number of
suicides among women in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. Women’s organizations
suspect that families force women to commit suicide because of the harsher sentences
awaiting honor murderers (Radikal, 12 April 2006).
The problem with the legal system is not limited to a few problematic codes. The
issue is the way law works as a form of state power is gendered. MacKinnon (1989) has a
radical explanation to this issue. She argues that the state uses law to legitimate men’s
dominance over women. Accordingly, the law treats women the way men treats women

119
in the society within the established unequal gender order. The law, she claims, is based
on a societal organization that is unequal to begin with. Then the law, even those that
guarantee equality, is designed for non-interference with the status quo. As long as the
gender order that is engraved in all social and institutional mechanisms is not altered, a
legal reform will not produce social equality.
Both legal texts and legal practice work at the expense of women by placing
extreme value on family honor. Thus, a juridical convention that interprets and applies
laws with reference to social norms is constructed.
27
Previous research conducted among
civil court judges indicates that these legal professionals see honor crimes resulting
mainly from ‘traditions getting out of hand’ (Ko ğacıoğlu 2004: 124). However, even
though they were against victimization of women, they tended to approve their
colleagues who granted sentence reductions to honor crime perpetrators in line with
social norms.
28
In addition, due to lack of evidence, during case preparation organized

27
There are several examples of judges assessing the character/credibility of women based on their honor
performances. Especially in custody cases, judges evaluate the character of the woman according to honor
criteria assessed in terms of women’s outfit and behavior in court and sexual conduct based on information
gathered from the accounts of the woman’s opponents, generally her ex-husband and his family
(Ko ğacıoğlu 2004).
28
It is worth noting the institutional response to another infamous tradition, blood feud, to see the centrality
of gender. Blood feud is the hostility between two tribes or families where each family kills male members
of the other in turn. Feuds tend to begin because one party, correctly or incorrectly, perceives itself as to
have been attacked or insulted by the other. Similar to crimes of honor, what is at stake here is family honor
and the public image of the family. Yet, in the case of blood feuds, in addition to perpetrators, victims are
almost always men. The striking difference in terms of institutional attitude is that during the application of
the judicial process, no reductions in punishment are granted due to acknowledgement of tradition. On the
contrary, the penalty is even increased if the crime is proven to be resulting from a blood feud. In the case
of blood feud, interpretation of tradition is much different from that of honor crimes. Ironically, when the
masculine order is threatened by traditional practices, legal institutions employ the ultimate sanction to
eradicate the practice. Yet when women are victimized, legal institutions are inept to counter them.

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crime codes are not applied to crimes committed with the orientation of the family
council.
Another issue that complicates the issue is the relationship between the state and
the tribal system. The state uses and works with the tribal structure for the maintenance of
stability in the region, and to guarantee block votes during times of election. The state
cooperates with tribal leaders of the region in its fight against the Kurdish movement and
guerilla warfare (Ilkkaracan 2001). Since 1984, the Turkish nation-state has employed
tribal leaders as a form of rural police force and providing them with a salary and
weapons to stabilize and regulate the region. Hence, the Turkish state benefits from the
tribal leaders’ unofficial authority in that area. In return, it does not interfere with the
private matters of the tribe, which is mainly the way they handle familial relations and
norms of gender and sexuality.Therefore the state tacitly supports the tribal structure and
gives way to the perpetuation of crimes of honor arising as a central feature of the tribal
structure. However, a state that cannot protect its citizens and fails to punish the
perpetrators is equally responsible for the crime.
The existing gender order and social norms are so internalized by the standards of
even the most ‘modern’ of institutions, that it requires tremendous effort to comprehend
the degree of intransigence within these structures. The following incident is a good
indicator of this intricate nature. Article 462 of the Turkish Penal Code granted sentence
reduction on the grounds of extreme provocation. Before it was revoked, in line with the
EU reform requirements, women’s organizations in Turkey applied to the Constitutional

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Court for its cancellation. Then the Head of the Constitutional Court, and former
president of the Turkish Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer voted against the cancellation of
the article on the basis that the society needed this law. Considering that Mr. Sezer is
known for his commitment to the rule of law and ideology of the republic, the severity of
the situation becomes apparent.
The anecdote below is worth noting to demonstrate the state’s perception of
honor/custom (töre) crimes, as well as the media’s involvement in the process. Lately, it
is very fashionable among TV channels in Turkey to have a series dealing with crimes of
honor. Almost every major channel has a prime-time series shot in eastern or
southeastern regions of Turkey built around honor crimes. One of these series is shot in
Urfa, a southeastern city known with its conservative structure, centrality of the tribal
system, and the highest number of honor crimes in Turkey. After the first couple of
episodes were shot and broadcasted, the Head of Culture and Tourism under the
Governorhip of Urfa sent an official letter to the production company. The letter not only
warned them because of the misrepresentation of the city, its culture and traditions, but
also explained the proper application of honor/custom crime, thus legitimating the
process. According to the Governor’s Office of Culture and Tourism, ‘a custom/honor
crime is committed when a girl runs away with her lover or a woman cheats on her
husband. Innocent and victimized women are not to be killed’. Based on this document, it
is apparent that this state institution recognizes the prevalence of honor crimes, and more
importantly, legitimizes the use of violence against women whenever certain honor codes
are broken. The issue is not women’s human rights but the degree of violence to be used

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and under which conditions. The rest of the document continues to define proper
behavior codes for women and men by giving examples such as ‘in our city, especially in
rural areas, women do not even enter the room where male guests are being hosted, leave
aside serving meals’. This document shows that the Governor’s office is not only
defending the existing unequal gender structure, but also trying to maintain it by
eliminating alternative depictions of gender relations
29
(Aktüel 5-11 April 2007).
Appropriate codes of behavior for women and men and constructions of femininity and
masculinity in the Turkish context are also reflected in the institutional response to
crimes of honor by the legal system and state institutions.
An incident that requires particular attention due to its significance in outlining
the institutional response to honor violence comes from another southeastern city. After
the murder of a young unmarried woman by her relatives for falling pregnant out of
wedlock, the governor of the city demands an investigation and calls the head official of
the district. When the governor asks for the details of the case, the head official tells him
not to further the investigation for the girl had deserved it (Yirmibe şo ğlu 2007: 236).
Such an approach does not only reconstruct unequal gender relations by expecting total
compliance of women to existing norms, but also legitimizes the use of violence against
women who fail to do so.

29
In addition to this institutional response, locals of the city attacked the production crew and some
members of the crew were beaten and even shot. Because of this outrageous response, the set was moved to
another city, not known for frequent occurrence of honor crimes.

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Legal Reform Revisited: Alterations of the Turkish Civil Code and Penal
Code
The legislative framework of the Turkish Republic, be it the civil or the penal
codes, was built on an overarching patriarchal subtext until the late 1990s. The
constitutional principle of gender equality and several legally binding international
treaties that Turkey was signatory to, strengthened the advocacy efforts of the women’s
movement for the advancement of the status of women before the law. The former Civil
and Penal Codes granted men supremacy in marriage and restricted women’s decision-
making power within the family. They also treated women’s bodies and their sexuality as
belonging to men, their family and the society, thus depriving them of their human rights
and legitimizing the violation of these rights (WWHR 2006). In 2001, the Turkish Civil
Code was revised, followed by the reform of the Penal Code in 2004. The change,
however, was not easy. It was met with conservative resistance from the overwhelmingly
male Turkish Parliament and government officials within the civil service. Facilitated by
Turkey’s efforts for accession to the European Union (EU), the women’s movement
resorted to wide ranging advocacy efforts to publicize their demands of gender equality
and intervene in the law making process.
The Parliament approved the new Turkish Civil Code in November 2001, which
came into effect at the beginning of the calendar year in 2002. Prior to the new Civil
Code, in October 2001, another very significant change took place. Article 41 of the
Turkish Constitution regarding the definition of the family was amended. The modified

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article retains the family ‘as the foundation of Turkish society’, but now an added clause
defining it as an ‘entity based on equality between spouses’. The same article of the
Constitution deems the state responsible for takingall the necessary measures to protect
and sustain the peace and well-being of the family, especially that of the mother and the
children. It is worth noting that another constitutional obligation of the state is to ensure
that family planning methods are taught and applied.
The former Turkish Civil Code of 1926 was adapted from the Swiss Civil Code
and contained several articles that assumed a subordinate position for women, especially
in matters related to marriage and family. The first attempt to improve the status of
women in the Civil Code came in 1951, however; it did not yield any positive outcome.
Several attempts followed since then, either by commissions formed by the Ministry of
Justice or by NGOs, but none led to a comprehensive alteration of the code until 2001
(WWHR 2006).
The 1980s witnessed the rise of a new feminist movement in Turkey. Although a
total reform of the Civil Code was not achieved until 2001, the strengthening voice of the
women’s movement was noteworthy in the annulment of Article 159 of the Civil Code in
1990, which ruled that a woman needed her husband’s consent to work outside the home.
In 1994, the Ministry of Justice formed a commission to work on the reform of the Civil
Code. By the same token, women’s NGOs started their campaign to take an active part in
the reform process. Turkey’s commitment to CEDAW and support of international NGOs

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provided the women’s movement with more support in pushing for their demands.
Associate membership of the EU proved significant in accelerating the reform process.
A draft law for the Civil Code was prepared in late 1998. However, due to the
general elections held in 1999, it had to wait for another two years to be discussed in the
Justice Commission of the National Assembly. The discussions that started in April 2000
and lasted until June 2001 were held in the shadow of strong resistance from religious
conservative and nationalist groups in the Parliament. The basic premise of the resistance
was that equality between women and men would ‘threaten the foundations of the
Turkish nation by creating anarchy and chaos in the family’ (WWHR 2006). Faced with
such a resistance, in 2001, 126 women’s groups throughout Turkey came together to
advocate the reform of the Code.
Throughout the discussions, the most controversial issue was the article regulating
the equal division of matrimonial property. Whereas the draft law proposed equal sharing
of the property acquired during marriage, the 1926 Civil Code adapted a separate
property regime. Reflecting their intention to maintain the subordinate position of
women, the conservative front resisted the equal property proposal, because equal
property rights between spouses would violate Turkish traditions, change the family from
a matrimonial union to a corporation, destroy love and affection in the family, increase
the divorce rate and subsequently ruin the Turkish society (WWHR 2006). The campaign
initiated by the women’s platform proved successful and equal property reform made it to
the new Code. However, the opposition parties managed to make a last minute maneuver

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through which the new clause would not be applied retrospectively to property acquired
before January 1, 2002.
The most important change to the Civil Code was the alteration in the overall
approach to the status of women in marriage and the family. The previous legal
understanding acknowledged women as being subordinate to her husband with her rights
and duties defined by him. With the new Code, this unequal approach is replaced with
one that defines family as a union of equal partners, who are no longer defined as ‘the
husband’ and ‘the wife’, but as ‘the spouses’. According to the new Civil Code, the
husband is not the head of the family; the spouses are equal partners in the matrimonial
union with equal decision-making powers. Other important changes that improve the
status of women within the family are that the spouses have equal rights over the family
abode and over property acquired during marriage as well as having equal representative
powers.
30

The reformed Civil Code is a big step towards gender equality. However, there
are still many articles that discriminate against women and violate women’s human
rights. One such article is Article 132, which obligates divorced women to wait for three
hundred days before remarrying to ensure that they are not ‘with child’ from the previous
marriage. Women who do want to remarry without waiting for that period need to prove

30
The new Civil Code removed a clause in the former one stating that in the event of disagreement over
matters related to children, fathers would have the final say. Women now have an equal say in decisions
concerning children. Another deleted article refers to determining a legal domicile. In the new Code, a
wife’s place of residence is no longer necessarily that of her husband, and she is free to change her place of
residence. The former Civil Code obliged women to return to the place of their family’s abode in order to
claim alimony. An added clause in the new Code obliges the court to file for alimony , thereby freeing
women from their former, statutory obligations.

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through a medical report that they are not pregnant. The rule also applies to widows,
starting from the date of the ex-husband’s death. This article disregards women’s bodily
rights and limits women’s freedom with the sole aim of establishing fatherhood, which
can easily be detected by the use of advanced medical techniques.
The Civil Code did not alter the 1990 repeal of the article requiring women to
obtain their husband’s permission to work. However, the new Civil Code introduced an
additional clause stating that whereby the spouses do not need to seek each other’s
permission regarding their choice of work or profession, ‘the harmony and welfare of the
marriage union’ should be borne in mind when making the decision. Women’s groups in
Turkey are concerned that reference to the harmony and welfare of marriage might
legitimize violating women’s right to work outside the home.
The successful campaign that led to the alteration of the Civil Code motivated the
women’s movement to initiate another campaign for the reform of the Penal Code. In
2002, the women’s movement raised its demand for a gender sensitive alteration of the
Turkish Penal Code. Civil codes are generally deemed more significant when it comes to
the regulation of women’s human rights in national contexts, assigning a secondary role
to penal codes. In actuality, penal law is vital to the realization of women’s human rights
and gender equality in terms of regulating violence against women, and ensuring legal
protection of women’s sexual, bodily and reproductive rights.
The Turkish Penal Code of 1926, adapted from the Italian Penal Code, was
amended. Several changes have been made since then, but more than 50 percent

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remained intact. Not surprisingly, none of the changes made since the early years of the
republic advanced women’s rights or created gender equality. Before examining the
reform process and the new Penal Code, I have to mention the cancellation of a particular
article. Although it concerns women, the cancellation of Article 438 cannot be considered
an improvement, but only an elimination of disgrace to humanity. The infamous article
ruled that the punishment of a rapist would be reduced by one third if the victim was a
sex worker. Thanks to intensive efforts of the women’s movement and extensive civil
societal protest, the article was removed from the Penal Code in 1990. A draft Penal
Code was prepared by 2000, but it was not until 2002 that a holistic reform of it was
adopted as government policy that was in accordance with the EU requirements for
accession. Immediately after the establishment of the Penal Code Draft Law Sub-Judicial
Commission by the Turkish Parliament, the women’s movement, including NGOs, bar
associations and academicians, launched a campaign for the reform of the Penal Code. A
Working Group was established to examine the proposed reforms from a gender
perspective. As they stood, the laws were interpreted to consider women’s bodies and
sexuality as belonging to men, family and society, and thus should be protected (read as
suppressed) and controlled by the state.
The 2002 general elections resulted in the victory of the political Islamist Justice
and Development Party (JDP) and a drastic change occurred in the composition of the
parliament. The Working Group was in close contact with the members of the parliament
prior to the elections. The new parliament also meant that they would have to start the
negotiation process from the beginning. Meanwhile, the conservative JDP government

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made it clear that it had not the slightest intention to permit interference in the reform
process from the women’s movement. One of the new government’s first actions was to
ignore the draft of the law prepared prior to the election and form their own commission
to produce their own proposals. Not surprisingly, the draft law proposed by the new
government took verbatim from the existing Turkish Penal Code all articles related to
women and foresaw changes in the rest of the articles.
31
Thus, women were both
physically and legislatively excluded from the reform of the Penal Code.
Realizing that the new government was refraining from including the Working
Group in the reform process, the women’s movement launched a public campaign in May
2003, which resulted in the transformation of the Working Group into a nationwide
platform of more than thirty NGOs, including human rights and LGBT organizations.
Despite these major achievements, the sub-commission resisted the inclusion of some
very important issues in the draft law, such as honor crimes and virginity testing. The
JDP’s draft was to suffer further backlashes; first, the Minister of Justice intervened to
remove an article criminalizing discrimination based on sexual orientation. Second, a
new article on obscenity was formulated, which would most likely be used to limit
freedom of expression and legitimize discrimination based on sexual orientation (WWHR
2006). Immediately before the voting of the draft law in the Parliament in September
2004, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo ğan proposed to recriminalize adultery.
Although this last minute maneuver was later withdrawn as a result of pressure from the

31
The only exception was the article concerning the period of legal abortion. The new draft law tried to
extend the legal period for abortion from 10 to 12 weeks but was later revoked in the Justice Sub-
Commission.

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public and the EU, it cast a shadow over the rising advocacy efforts of the women’s
movement to have their remaining demands included in the draft law. Still, the draft law
was finally accepted in the Parliament in the September 2004 voting.
The new Turkish Penal Code explicitly criminalizes marital rape and sexual abuse
in the family. Marital rape carries a maximum sentence of twelve years of imprisonment.
The new law has a section named ‘Crimes against Sexual Inviolability’, regarding sexual
crimes as crimes against individuals, a sharp break with the former patriarchal
understanding that defined such crimes as ‘Felonies against Public Decency and Public
Order’ under ‘Crimes against Society’.

Honor Crimes and Other forms of Gender-Based Violence in Legal Texts
The judicial system in Turkey contributes in several ways to the perpetuation of
honor crimes by granting significant reductions in the sentence of perpetrators. The
Turkish Penal Code has recently been modified in line with the requirements of the
European Union. With the new penal code, not only the perpetrators but everyone
involved in the planning of the crime are to be punished. However, this amendment does
not always work in a way that prevents judges from taking social norms regarding
‘family honor’ into consideration and grant reduced sentences (Ko ğacıoğlu, 2004). In
addition, the new law (non-application of reduction) applies only to ‘custom (töre)
killings’ and do not include crimes of honor. The term ‘custom killings’ is associated
with primarily local practices in the Eastern Regions of Turkey; generally, it entails the

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so-called extended family assembly issuing a death warrant against a female member of
the family alleged to have dishonored the family through some inappropriate conduct.
Honor killings, however, is a more inclusive term that embraces , besides ‘custom
killings’, individual acts of murdering women who were perceived to have broken
individual man’s, personal codes of conduct and therefore committed, in their eyes at
least, the capital crime of besmiching their honor.. Therefore the legal definition of the
term ‘custom killings’ leaves the door open for a sympathetic judiciary to mitigate
murders committed by a man on the grounds of his personal understanding of
‘honor’allowing the crime to be classified as other than a killing motivated by customary
practice. The Penal Code has been reformed with a subtlety deliberate or otherwise that
may persuade an outsider that the Turkish government has worded the code to suit local
conditions when it is, in reality, circumventing international legal terminology and UN
rulings that define honor killings as ‘acts of murder in the name of honor’ (WWHR-New
Ways 2006).
An additional injustice is that the victim has no one to speak for her in cases of
‘honor killings’. Many feminist jurists believe that the perpetrator and his witnesses are
able to distort if not lie about every aspect of the victims character and behavior. Based
solely on the testimony of the murderer, almost in all honor killings cases, we are asked
to believe that a young woman, who has been subject to severe physical and
psychological violence, and subsequently fled to escape the violence and pressure, would
find the courage to turn on her male relatives and publicly humiliate them; a far from
convincing scenario.

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In most of the honor killing cases, the perpetrator of the crime and victim’s family
are in collusion, leaving no party to represent the victim’s rights. Currently, the legal
system in Turkey requires that interested parties should seek the permission of victim’s
family in order to attend the case on behalf of the victim. However, as stated above, when
the perpetrator is already the family itself, women’s advocacy groups cannot be involved
in the legal process. As a result, women’s groups have been campaigning for a change in
legislation that will allow interested parties to represent the rights of the victims of honor
crimes (CIMEL/Interights 2001).
The new Penal Code also addresses other forms of violence against women. Two
important improvements in terms of criminalizing gender violence are the recognition of
marital rape and sexual abuse in the family. Marital rape now carries a maximum
sentence of twelve years of imprisonment and sexual abuse in the family with five to
twenty years in prison.
The former Penal Code included an article (Article 453) on infanticide, which
documented that in the eyes of the state family honor is much more valuable than human
life. Accordingly, if a mother kills her newborn child for the sake of protecting her honor
(meaning that the child is born out of wedlock), she will be sentenced with four to eight
years in prison as compared to twentyfour to thirty years in cases of manslaughter.
Differentiating ‘infanticide for the sake of honor’ from manslaughter, the law partially
legitimizes the crime. The case was the same with child abandonment. Article 475 of the
former Penal Code stated that should a family abandon an illegitimate child (again,

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meaning born out of wedlock, which is a stain on family honor), the punishment would
be lower than abandoning a child born within marriage. These two articles showed that
the state differentiated between its citizens depending on the marital status of their
parents and it could disown those not born to married parents at the expense of family
honor. Fortunately, these two articles no longer exist in the new Penal Code.
The new Penal Code does not specifically regulate domestic violence.
Nevertheless, two articles in the new law address the issue. Article 96 stipulates that
anyone causing torment to their spouse or family members will be sentenced with three to
eight years of prison. And Article 232 requires imprisonment of up to one year for
maltreatment of anyone sharing the same domicile.

Law and Protection of the Family
Several years before the reformation of the Penal Code, on January 14, 1998, the
Turkish Parliament ratified a law named Law No. 4320 On the Protection of the Family.
Two decades of activism and lobbying by the women’s movement was effective in the
approval of this law against domestic violence. Under the law, any member of the family
(generally the woman) subject to domestic violence can file a court case to demand
protection from the perpetrator of violence. Accordingly, if a spouse or child or any other
member of the family is abused, upon notification by the victim or the Public Prosecutor,
one or more of the following measures can be taken. The accused spouse can be ordered
not to use violence; to leave the family home and not to approach the victim’s workplace;

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not to damage the property; not to cause distress through any means of communication;
not to approach the family household under the influence of alcohol; and, to surrender
any weapons.
These measures can be taken for up to six months. Failure to abide by the rules
can result in the imprisonment of the perpetrator. Family Court judges are required to
take into consideration the wellbeing of the victim and decide for financial support
accordingly. Some very important rules about this law are that application should be free
of charge for the victim, and that the case should be taken before the court immediately.
Once, and if the protection order is issued, the Public Prosecutor is to monitor its
application through the police. The police are equally responsible for ensuring that the
protection order is not violated.

Jurists’ Evaluation of Application of Law to Gender-Based Violence
The two judges and three public prosecutors that I have interviewed mentioned
their satisfaction with the existing state of the legal framework. They all think that the
laws, especially following the reform of the Civil and Penal Codes, could not have been
better. The only problem with the laws, according to them, is the way they are applied.
Especially, when it comes to the discussion of honor vs. custom crimes, and the women’s
NGOs discontent about the final version of the Penal Code, the judicial officials stated
their firm belief in the excellence of the law. Honor crimes, they all said (including the
family court judge, who is a woman), is a relatively minor problem compared to custom

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crimes. Celil Demircio ğlu, a chief prosecutor who disagrees with the application of unjust
acts rule to custom crimes and critical of the construction of honor in the Turkish society,
excluded honor crimes as individual cases of jealousy. He, however, mentioned a dire
need for a distinct trial of custom crime cases, which are particular to a region and
represent a primitive tradition that should be eradicated.
Honor and custom killings are separate incidents. The society’s perception of the
two is also different. In custom crimes, the family’s responsibility is much higher.
In honor killings, on the contrary, it is between the spouses, due to sudden
provocation or maybe committed later after planning. But both are illegal and
should be punished. One person’s deeds should be evaluated according to laws,
family should not have such power. (Celil Demircio ğlu, Former Chief Public
Prosecutor, Bakırköy Court).
Honor and custom killings are different. Custom is more encompassing than
honor. In custom murders, a tribe or a family is involved in the decision-making.
Honor murders, however, are individual impulsive acts. Not every honor murder
is a custom murder, though the majority of custom murders are honor murders.
Custom murders are a regional problem. (Ayhan Gödekmerdan, Chief Public
Prosecutor, Bakırköy Court)
The problem is that, honor killings may be different from custom killings in the
sense that the perpetrators are single individuals, almost in all cases current or former
spouse, and that a family council is not involved. However, the objection of the feminist
women is not to the way crimes are defined. The objection is to the exclusion of honor
killings from aggravating cases. Not classifying honor as an aggravating cause implies
the law accepting the mentality that feeds it, meaning men have a right over women and
their bodies to the extent that they can take their lives. Moreover, contrary to the public
prosecutor’s account, all custom crimes are honor crimes. However you name it, they all

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originate from the idea that women should live in accordance with the rules and norms
set by men and that breach of those rules mean death, whether from the hands of intimate
partner or a member of her family.
Another issue that deserves attention is the attempt to distance the state from
gender-based violence by giving it a distinct name, custom crime, and assigning it to a
particular region and culture, read as Kurdish. According to these statements, killing of
women by their family is not a Turkish problem. Although it occurs in Turkey, it is a
Kurdish issue concentrated in regions largely populated by the Kurds and carried to urban
centers through internal migration.
The concept of honor changes according to where people are raised, according to
their traditions and norms. Internal migration breaks down the social fabric. Those
who migrate to big cities are more likely to be involved in such murders. (Judge
1, High Criminal Court)

When it comes to evaluating the reformed Penal Code, all state jurists agree that it
is a well-planned and thought out alteration, which meets Turkey’s needs in combating
gender-based violence and the disadvantageous position of women. Then again, they
cannot help but emphasize that although the laws are perfect on paper, there are serious
problems with the application.
I think that the current legislation has no problems. It is sufficient to prevent
violence against women. But claiming rights requires a tough process. Although
the new Penal Code is in favor of victims of gender-based violence, you cannot
expect each member of the police force to be sensitive and knowledgeable. (Judge
1)

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The New Penal Code has a system to eradicate all kinds of discrimination against
women. The most important one is categorizing custom crimes as an aggravated
case. Also, there is Law 4320 on the Protection of Family. With respect to the
legal system, the statute is sufficient, but there are problems with application of
the law. (Ayhan Gödekmerdan)

Judge 1, a High Criminal Court judge that I interviewed , complained about the
media’s and women’s organizations perception of the application of penalty reductions
based on unjust acts. He was referring to the media’s presentation of a recent case, in
which a man killed his wife for coming home late and not preparing his meal on time.
The man got a reduced sentence due to unjust provocation, because his wife yelled at him
when he asked why she was late and if she was prostituting. ‘You cannot question me
about what I do!’ she answered him back and swore at her husband, according to his
testimony. Judge 1 stated that this was a misrepresentation of the case by the media. The
man did not get a penalty reduction because his wife answered back at him, but because
she slapped and cursed at him. These are unjust acts, Judge 1 believed, that required a
reduction in penalty.
The woman comes home after her husband. But we did not grant unjust
provocation reduction because she came home late. There is a claim that later,
when they had a fight about dinner she cursed at and slapped her husband. Then
the man stabbed her to death. So we ruled that her coming home late and not
preparing the meal on time were not, but slapping her husband was an unjust
provocation… You need to understand, it’s not about women. These would be
considered unjust acts even if done by a stranger. (Judge 1, Bakırköy District
High Criminal Court, emphasis added)
One point needs extra attention here. The rule of unjust acts applies only if the
victim is the first one to initiate an unjust act. In this case, however, it should have been

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the man, who provoked his wife to slap and yell at him for asking her if she was out
prostituting. Unfortunately, both the judge in question and the rest of Turkish society tend
to find women responsible for transgressing the boundaries of appropriate social conduct,
even when they are subjected to violence.Therefore they deserve to die if they get angry
and yell at their husband for calling them a prostitute. Judge 1 also clarified the
application of the law to customary crimes, however he excluded honor, still leaving
room for penalty reductions in cases where honor of the man was in jeopardy.
We do not accept ‘custom’ as a legitimate incentive for unjust provocation. A
grown up woman is free to choose her husband, her family cannot intervene or
kill her. Likewise, a grown up woman has the right over her body. We tell the
family ‘it is none of your businesses. But it wouldn’t be correct to argue that a
married woman cheating on her husband in their own home does not create a
legal basis for unjust provocation, would it? (Judge 1, emphasis added)

One point that struck me is the attitude of the jurists towards what they
differentiate as honor crimes. Even though they have such a strict stand against custom
crimes, they tend to understand the psyche of a husband, who would kill a cheating wife.
Unfortunately, this particular attitude is shared by members of the Parliament.
During the discussions about the reform of the Penal Code, many MPs resisted the
change on the ground that honor was too sensitive an issue. I remember one MP
saying ‘So, what this means is we won’t even be able to slap our wives even if we
catch them cheating on us!’ (Ayten A ğırdemir, Criminal Lawyer)
Women jurists, however, have a completely different take on the issue of unjust
provocation.

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A man killed his wife, claiming that he offered sex and she refused kicking him
off the bed. I was provoked and killed her, he said. According to the Court of
Cassation, not the refusal of sex, but kicking husband off the bed is unjust
provocation. Meaning, you deserve death if you throw your husband out of the
bed. However, what the Court of Cassation does not want to see is what happened
until he was kicked of the bed. It doesn’t take a jurist to realize that he attempted
rape. You cannot expect the man to explicitly state that he forced her, but that is
apparent. She resisted and she was murdered. Unjust provocation does not apply
to that case. But in 2008, the Court of Cassation ruled for a penalty reduction due
to provocation. Such rules and interpretation truly hurt us. (Meral Danı ş Be şta ş,
Former Head of Women’s Rights Commission Diyarbakır Bar Association)

The Sources of Gender-Based Violence
Once they have established that the statute was perfectly designed to deal with
violence against women and gender-based discrimination, I asked the state legal officials
why these problems prevailed in Turkey and what the sources of gender-based violence
were. Not surprisingly, their responses converged to emphasize the secondary status of
women in society, which meant failure to fully incorporate them into the republican
project of modernity.
Violence against women signals a problem of modernization. A modern man
would not beat his child’s mother. Our religion, Islam, has a role in it as well.
Islam defines a male-dominated society and family. In rural Turkey people live in
accord with religion. Although violence against women is a worldwide problem, I
wouldn’t assume any modern person would resort to it. (Celil Demircio ğlu,
emphasis added)
Those state bureaucrats who preach women’s rights should not go home and beat
their own wives. Women wouldn’t be subjected to violence if they were socially
equal to men. They should be aware of their rights, then go and claim them. It just

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won’t work if men change the laws and tell women ‘look what we’ve done for
you’. (Imdat Kaçan)

What Mr. Kaçan refers to as a problematic way of improving women’s status in
society is actually the top-down reform mentality of the modernization project, through
which women were granted certain citizenship rights, such as suffrage, years in advance
of women in many European countries. However, as he correctly points out, that is not
the best way to have rights converted into actualities of women’s public and private lives.
If you cannot make the public perceive women’s rightful place in society what
you’ll find in courthouses will be a reflection of that crooked perception. In
Turkey, women are weak, they don’t have economic freedom, they can’t even file
a complaint. (Ayhan Gödekmerdan)

If it is not a failure in articulating the ‘project of modernity’ through the
republican institutions then it is the culture of a particular locale that is responsible for
prevalence of honor killings.
Such events occur mostly in eastern and southeastern regions. And then carried to
urban centers through migration. Unfortunately, the feudal system prevails. (Özen
Yakar, Family Court Judge)

Although there is a truth to their statements, what I noticed is the state officials’
attempt to keep things separate. They did not question the role of the state in the
prevalence of feudal system in certain regions, for example.

141
Responsibilities of the State
Once they have established that the statute was perfectly designed to deal with
violence against women and gender-based discrimination, I asked the state legal officials
why these problems prevailed in Turkey and what the sources of gender-based violence
were. Not surprisingly, their responses converged to emphasize the secondary status of
women in society, which meant failure to fully incorporate them into the republican
project of modernity.
Violence against women signals a problem of modernization. A modern man
would not beat his child’s mother. Our religion, Islam, has a role in it as well.
Islam defines a male-dominated society and family. In rural Turkey people live in
accord with religion. Although violence against women is a worldwide problem, I
wouldn’t assume any modern person would resort to it. (Celil Demircio ğlu,
emphasis added)
Those state bureaucrats who preach women’s rights should not go home and beat
their own wives. Women wouldn’t be subjected to violence if they were socially
equal to men. They should be aware of their rights, then go and claim them. It just
won’t work if men change the laws and tell women ‘look what we’ve done for
you’. (Imdat Kaçan)

What Mr. Kaçan refers to as a problematic way of improving women’s status in
society is actually the top-down reform mentality of the modernization project, through
which women were granted certain citizenship rights, such as suffrage, years in advance
of women in many European countries. However, as he correctly points out, that is not
the best way to have rights converted into actualities of women’s public and private lives.

142
If you cannot make the public perceive women’s rightful place in society what
you’ll find in courthouses will be a reflection of that crooked perception. In
Turkey, women are weak, they don’t have economic freedom, they can’t even file
a complaint. (Ayhan Gödekmerdan)

If it is not a failure in articulating the ‘project of modernity’ through the
republican institutions then it is the culture of a particular locale that is responsible for
prevalence of honor killings.
Such events occur mostly in eastern and southeastern regions. And then carried to
urban centers through migration. Unfortunately, the feudal system prevails. (Özen
Yakar, Family Court Judge)

Although there is a truth to their statements, what I noticed is the state officials’
attempt to keep things separate. They did not question the role of the state in the
prevalence of feudal system in certain regions, for example.
When I asked them to reiterate the responsibilities of the state, all but one
expressed the state’s lack of commitment to the issue. It was quite surprising to perceive
that the paradox did not bother them. Whereas they praised the legal reform as the perfect
way to resolve honor killings, they criticized the very state that realized the reform of the
statute for not being committed to the cause. The answer lies in a combination of
modernization discourse and a criticism of the current JDP government, which according
to these state officials is antithetical to modernity.
There was too much media attention to the issue. Once the media takes up the
issue jurisdiction cannot stay indifferent. The European Union also has a huge

143
impact. The state wanted to impress the EU by saying that it was very sensitive
about the issue (custom killings) and wouldn’t let such a primitive tradition
survive. By including custom killings into the new code, the state secured itself
and noted that such primitive tradition is external to the state. (Celil Demircio ğlu)
I don’t think that the state has the will to resolve this problem for good. Maybe
because they enjoy the system for it is the male system. Add to that their
worldview and religious views…but I don’t want to delve into politics. We need
to question why the matriarchal Turkish society transformed into this patriarchal
system. In none of the developed countries the status of women is lower than that
of men. Women being equal to men in all fronts is an indicator of development.
Violence springs from inequality, women are not second class citizens. But the
composition of Turkey has changed. We are going back in terms of women’s
rights. I don’t foresee change in Turkey’s near future unless you can change the
existing dynamics. (Ayhan Gödekmerdan)

The influence of the modernity project in the accounts of these state officials is
impressive. Development and education are still seen as the cure-all to all problems
including gender-based violence, without feeling the need to question the state structure.
Whenever they are critical of the state, they refer to the current JDP government, which
is demonized as anti-thetical to modernity with its political Islamist background. When it
comes to spelling out solid tasks for the state, all legal officials prioritized education,
though not necessarily specifying the details of such education or any reforms needed in
the national education system. It could not be higher education that they refer to, because
recent studies suggest that domestic violence among recipients of higher education is
continuing to be a problem. Besides, if education does not bring with it equal access to
power and equal participation in social, economic and political life, there is no guarantee

144
that women will be safe from violence just because they have a high school or college
degree.
The state has two functions, first prevention and if that does not work creating
mechanisms of punishment. Preventative measures require a wholesale education
of the society, both through the school system and the media. Aversive
punishment mechanisms come second. But that requires a process, takes at least a
generation to change. But it is difficult to educate someone who grew up learning
these traditions. At that point, the state should protect the victims, first by
providing shelters then lifelong financial and psychological support (Judge 1).
The most important issue is education, of men and women. We, women, also
demand affirmative action, but that wouldn’t be necessary if women were equal
citizens and had their human rights respected. But that is not the case, so we need
a quota for women, especially in the Parliament. What has been done until now is
far from being sufficient (Özen Yakar).

An examination of the process based solely on an analysis of legal documents
suggest that, even if it is slow and was steered by vigorous civil societal activism and
external pressure of international bodies of governance, the Turkish State responded to
these demands and engaged in sincere acts for the advancement of women’s human rights
and establishment of gender equality. However, such an approach would mean closing
our eyes to the rest of the picture. The state, unfortunately, possesses a certain patriarchal
mentality that resists change. Listening to the above-stated story of the transformation of
the Penal Code from Pınar İlkkaracan, co-founder and chair of Women for Women’s
Human Rights and a prominent figure in the Turkish women’s movement, reveals the
other side of the story. The side that was hidden from the public eye, the side that exposes
that particular ‘mentality’.

145
The old Penal Code included two articles 463 and 51. Article 463 explicitly refers
to crimes of honor, whereas 51 is the article for unjust provocation, with no
particular reference to honor crimes. However, in most of the honor crime cases
the judges apply 51 rather than 463. In accordance with the 6
th
Adjustment
Package to the European Union, Turkey promised to remove article 463 of the
Penal Code. The EU enthusiastically congratulated them [the government]. I was
shocked! So they [the EU] never heard of article 51. The article 463 was removed
but 51 remained intact, meaning the courts continued to apply penalty reductions
in honor crime cases. The EU made a big deal out of the removal of 463,
congratulating the Turkish state for finally resolving the honor crime issue.
Incredible! Yes, they resolved it, they actually deceived the EU. We [women’s
movement] kept pressing for the removal of 51 and one of the bureaucrats said to
me ‘Even the EU is happy, what more do you want!’ That is the attitude of the
state. (Pınar İlkkaracan, WWHR-New Ways)
This response illustrates the whole system, the intricate relations between the
state, modernization, the status of women and patriarchy. This one sentence implies that
the state does not intend to improve the status of its female citizens. It shows that the
legal reform and other improvements initiated by the state are the outcomes of either the
women’s movements struggle or requirements that should be fulfilled for accession to the
European Union. It also is a reflection of the modernization ideology, which sets the
West as its target and evaluates itself relative to the West. In such a setting, a
development ideal is set and the condition of women is just another variable in measuring
the level of modernization and development. As such, the ‘women issue’ is no more or
less important, say than the problem of illiteracy or infant mortality or even
unemployment. The basic problem is that the state does not find itself responsible to its
citizen but to the EU.

146
Alterations and reforms in the legal system are important steps towards
preventing gender discrimination and elimination of women’s human rights violations.
These are, however, not adequate in achieving full gender equality nor in eliminating
violence against women. It is no surprise that in contemporary Turkey, women’s lives are
still regulated by various customary and religious practices that contradictthe secular law.
Honor crimes, forced child marriages and polygamous marriages, restrictions on
women’s education, lack of employment and mobility are issues at the top of the list. In
order to end violations of women’s human rights, the state’s intervention is vital. There
has to be a political will to eradicate violence and establish gender equality.
32
This
requires launching state-led programs and providing social services for women. Even
though there is a growing pressure from the women’s movement in Turkey and
considerable demand from international bodies of governance, the Turkish state is not
only reluctant but also resistant to the establishment of a holistic plan and securing funds.
Changes at the discursive level are not reflected in the state’s practices. Legal
applications, especially after the alterations of the Civil and Penal Codes, are very
illustrative of that discrepancy. Women’s human rights and gender equality
improvements that look very promising and transformative on paper are not reflected in
the everyday lives of women. A statement by İmdat Kaçan, a public prosecutor,
epitomizes the situation. Referring to the government’s parliamentary members, he said,

32
Two prominent members of women’s movement in Turkey recently voiced the Turkish state’s lack of
political will to establish gender equality and eradicating violence against women and resistance to
allocating resources to fund programs that serve that end. Prof. Yakın Ertürk, an academician and UN
rapporteur, and Canan Arın, a lawyer working for the advancement of women’s human rights, raised their
concerns about state practices in a recent TV program aired on Al-Jazeera English hosted by Riz Khan on
April 22, 2009.

147
‘Those who change the laws and preach for women’s human rights at the pulpit should
not beat their wives when they go home! That’s when change really happens’. The
discrepancy between official public discourse of the state and state practices becomes
apparent when the mentality of the high-level bureaucrats is considered. Vildan
Yirmibe şo ğlu, Head of Human’s Rights and Women’s Status Section in the Governorship
of Istanbul, told the following anecdote, based on her personal interactions with state
officials. Behind closed doors, she says, the state officials divert from the need to
establish women’s human rights and keep mentioning the inviolability of the family.
‘You insist on opening new shelters, prostitutes go to those shelters, are we to dissolve
the family?’ are the exact words of a high-level state official.
Recent events show that the legal reform did not suffice to change the mentality
of the judiciary and that it takes more than alteration of the laws to generate fundamental
and sustainable changes that will have an impact in the everyday lives of women. The
members of the Court of Cassation 5
th
Chamber voiced outrageous demands before a
Commission of the Ministry of Justice discussing potential alterations of the Penal
Code.
33
Based on the so called ‘victimization of the citizens’, the judges of the Court of
Cassation asked that the minimum age of marriage be reduced to fourteen instead of
seventeen, penalty for marital rape be significantly reduced, rapists who marry their

33
The Court of Cassation (Yargıtay) is the last instance for reviewing rulings and judgments rendered by
justice courts, criminal courts, the examination courts and renders verdicts upon appeal. The opinions
rendered by the Court of Cassation are taken as precedents for legal rulings in the first instance courts
throughout the country, so that uniform application may be achieved.

148
victims be exempt from punishment, and the age for consensual sexual intercourse with
minors be changed from fifteen to fourteen years old.
34
The judges of the Court of
Cassation tried to substantiate these hard to believe demands, which mean a major
drawback from the improvements of the previous legal reform that were not totally
satisfying to begin with, on various grounds that put men and family before women.
They, for example, argue that in cases of marital rape, imprisoning the husband (who
they refer to as the ‘head of the household’, a notion removed from the new Civil Code)
will lead to dissolution of the family, to the detriment of women and children involved.
Alternatively, they state, especially in towns, raped women would be isolated by the
society (meaning no one would marry a raped woman), thus they had better marry their
rapist in expectation of life long rape and abuse. It does not take an expert in law to
realize that such demands would encourage and legitimate gender-based violence. Instead
of falling prey to societal pressure and forsake its female citizens at the expense of
maintaining the gender order and sustaining the problematic ‘mentality’ that feeds it, the
legal system must protect women.
A ruling of the 2
nd
Chamber of the Court of Cassation is worth mentioning
although it is quite dated. However, Court of Cassation rulings set the precedence for all
similar cases that may happen in the future. A precedent made in 1976 is important both
for illustrating the endemic mentality that I find problematic and for indicating the

34
Feminist activists noted that the final demand intended to save Hüseyin Uzmez, a seventy year-old
columnist in a radical Islamist newspaper accused of sexually assaulting a 14 year-old girl, from sentence
but they would not allow that to happen. See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the Uzmez case and its
relevance in terms of differential application of justice in Turkey.

149
failures of an unsubstantiated legal reform. Recent proposals for alterations to the Penal
Code, such as those previously discussed, are built on the foundation of similar
precedences. Simply, the Court of Cassation rules that a raped wife is legitimate grounds
for divorce. It states that ‘a raped’ wife makes life unbearable for the husband. The
Turkish society does not expect a man to accept a raped wife. On the contrary, it causes
him to be ridiculed and looked down upon. Even though the wife has no fault in the act of
rape, just the condition of being raped creates disgust in the husband for his wife. Under
such circumstances, it would be unfair to force the husband to continue their marriage,
which has crumbled down to its foundations.
A comparison of the Court of Cassation rulings thirty years apart defy the
discourse on the effectiveness and importance of legal reform for improving the status of
women in society and eradicating gender-based violence. Admitting the significance of
mechanisms of jurisprudence, one cannot help but notice that more than legal reform is
required for those mechanisms to actually work and make a change in women’s lives.

Gender politics in State-Produced Documents
Circular 2006/17 of the Office of Prime Ministry
When we look at the state documents such as the human’s rights commission
report or the July 2006 Circular, we see that state practices are discrepant at the

150
discursive and application levels. Whereas the documents present an ideal picture, we do
not see these realized in the practices of state institutions.
In 2005, the Turkish Parliament (TBMM) formed a commission to investigate the
causes of custom and honor crimes and violence against women and children in order to
determine resolutions to eradicate the problems. Fatma Şahin, a Justice and Development
Party MP of Gaziantep and Head of TBMM Investigation Committee (Namus ve Töre
Cinayetlerini Ara ştırma Komisyonu), mentions three points in a report prepared for the
prevention of custom and honor crimes. The commission’s resolutions are as follows:
Educating the girls, integrating them into the society through work and social relations,
and overcoming the ‘macho’ culture that enables boys to control their sisters. In light of
the commission’s report, the prime ministry issued a circular in July 2006 titled Circular
2006/17 ‘Measures to be Taken to Prevent Violence against Children and Women and
Customary and Honor Killings’.
The circular defines customary killings of women as the most brutal version of
violence against women. Since violence against women and children is an ongoing
problem of our country, the circular says, we are in need of new and urgent measures.
The document is important because it is the first to define the elimination of all kinds of
violence against women as a state policy. Nonetheless, the prime ministry stays within
the modernization discourse. Like other perils, gender-based violence is transferred to the
mighty powers of ‘development and education’ to be taken care of. Accordingly, violence
against women is ‘one of the problems that will disappear as the level of education and

151
culture is elevated in parallel with economic progress and development’ (July 2006,
Resmi Gazete, Genelge 2006/17 No. 26218). It calls for the participation of citizens and
NGOs in addition to state institutions and organizations. In matters related to violence
against children, the General Directorate of Social Services and Child Protection (Sosyal
Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu Genel Müdürlü ğü) will coordinate the activities
and the issues related to violence against women and custom/honor crimes will be
coordinated by the Directorate General of the Status of Women (Kadının Statüsü Genel
Müdürlü ğü).
The circular comprises three sections dedicated to violence against children,
violence against women and customary/honor crimes. Each section explains the state’s
advice on protective and preventative measures, institutions of service, education, health
and law, and defines institutions and organizations that are expected to work in
collaboration. The listed institutions and organizations are various, ranging from public
institutions, such as the ministries, governorships, local administrations, municipalities,
presidency of religious affairs and police force to private ones, such as financial
institutions, NGOs, universities and research institutes, hospitals, bar associations and the
media. Even a quick reading of the text shows that it does not only intend to prevent
violence against women but also aims a transformation of the gender order in favor of
women. This ideal text urges one to question the discrepancies between state discourse
and praxis. Before delving into a detailed analysis of this ‘milestone document’, I would
like to note two criteria that are vital for such a document to be realized. First, a
significant budget should be planned and distributed for the cause. Second, the

152
determination of the state should be conveyed through a more powerful document, i.e. a
law or ruling, not a circular that has no enforcing power and is merely an explanation of
policy approaches.
The first of the preventative and protective measures of the circular deems the
state responsible for eradicating the economic inequality between men and women. It
goes on to say that gender equality should be maintained in workplaces, if necessary by
application of affirmative action. In line with this suggestion and in support of it, the first
article under the section’ Institutions of Service’ calls for establishing a Parliamentary
commission to investigate gender equality. At this point, a brief explanation is necessary.
In February 2009, almost three years after the issuance of the circular, the Turkish
Parliament started discussions for the establishment of a Commission for Gender
Equality. However, due to a last minute maneuver by Nimet Çubukçu of the JDP, the
Minister of Women and the Family, the name of the commission was changed to
Commission for Opportunity Equality, disregarding the gender element. There is no need
to indicate that opportunity equality and gender equality are not the same. Whereas
gender equality requires a holistic intervention at all aspects of social, economic and
political life, opportunity equality is limited and does not offer a structural reformation.
Moreover, replacing gender equality with opportunity equality is a breach of CEDAW, to
which Turkey is signatory. Considering that the JDP could not tolerate a commission for
gender equality, application of affirmative action seems highly unrealistic. Moreover, it
also points that the statements in the circular were far from sincere.

153
The measures listed in the circular encompass most of the policies voiced by the
women’s movement and the final summaries from Women’s Conventions (Kadın
Kurultayları). It is therefore important in terms of being responsive to the two decades of
bitter struggle of the women’s movement against violence. Under preventative and
protective measures, it included as detailed suggestions as ‘better lighting on streets and
parks’ and ‘increasing the number of public phones’. Moreover, it also involves the
Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), and calls for the preparation of sermons and
preaches that educate the society against violence.
Just a quick glance at this circular is sufficient to have high hopes for eradication
of violence against women and be optimistic for achieving gender equality. The office of
Prime Ministry states that women’s NGOs and women studies departments of
universities and research institutes should be involved in lawmaking process in issues
directly related to women.
35
The Prime Ministry even suggests that a budget should be
allocated to protect women against violence which is a state policy. It goes on to add that
all future budgets should be gender-sensitive.
36
Moreover, it aims to integrate gender-
sensitive policies to all state plans and programs. These are very important steps towards
generating a state-led structural transformation of the patriarchal order in favor of
women. The question that is waiting to be answered is to what extent they will be
realized and make a difference in female citizens’ everyday lives.

35
One cannot help but ask, ‘What are the issues that are directly related to women?’ Considering the JDP
government’s efforts to exclude the women’s movement from the reformation process of the Civil Code
and the Penal Code, it looks like the civil and penal codes are not among issues of direct concern to
women.
36
See below for a discussion of gender budgeting.

154
When it comes to preventing customary/honor crimes, the circular repeats
suggestions developed in the previous sections, yet with a nuanced emphasis on changing
existing customs, traditions, norms, ideas and mentality by pointing out the perils of a
male-dominated society and traditional gender roles. The so-called mentality is discussed
as having invaded our language, textbooks, visual and printed media, movies, academic
works and sermons.
37
It keeps repeating the need to alter the existing notions of custom
and honor, without necessarily explaining how.
I was very impressed when I read the text and sought the opinion of NGO
activists. Everyone I interviewed found it an important step, yet also criticized the
ineffectiveness of the text. They cited several examples of the futility when they were
working in the field and trying to get things done. However, even the sole presence of
such a document yielded some room for action for the NGOs. It is worth noting that the
circular was not prepared for the sole aim of eradicating violence against women and
children. Such an aim would call for more serious measures and issuing documents with
higher enforcement levels. According to prominent members of women’s movement in
Turkey, the document was the final step of a series of negotiations between the state and

37
A 2009 analysis of primary and secondary education textbooks by Egitim-Sen, the trade-union of public
education workers including university professors, revealed that they are filled with overtly gender
insensitive images and messages that portray men and women in traditional gender roles. Women are
figured mostly as mothers and wives or as teachers and nurses if they are working, men, on the contrary,
are powerful and in charge (Birgün 10/09/2009).

155
women’s NGOs, following the appointment of Nimet Çubukçu as the Minister of Women
and the Family.
38

Circular of the Ministry of Interior
Almost six months after the Circular 2006/17 of the Office of Prime Ministry, the
Ministry of Interior issued another circular to the same effect. Dated January 9, 2007, the
incumbent Minister of Interior, Abdülkadir Aksu’s circular was entitled ‘Circular on the
Coordination of Measures against Customary and Honor Killings’. The circular, sent to
the governorship of all eighty-one cities of the Turkish Republic, is a call to action to the
governors to sustain the circular of the prime ministry. The Ministry of Interior defines
violence against women and children as a social problem that continues to exist in spite
of all national and international attempts of eradicating it. Following the footsteps of the
first circular, it attributes special importance to customary and honor killings as the most
extreme form of violence against women. Noting that Turkey is listed among the
countries where such murders prevail, it goes on to explain the consequences of such
identification in terms of Turkey’s standing in international platforms. ‘It causes our
nation to be criticized, to be evaluated on equal grounds with countries that are at much
lower levels of development and to be called to action to take measures to prevent
customary and honor crimes. Prevention of such murders and protection of fundamental

38
Nimet Çubukçu was known as the ‘female minister fighting the women’, because of her negative attitude
towards the women’s movement right after she was appointed. One of her first actions as the minister was
filing lawsuits against women’s NGOs for signing a petition for the transformation of the Penal Code.

156
rights and freedoms are thus necessary for our country to maintain the respect it deserves
in the contemporary world’, states the Ministry of Interior ( İçi şleri Bakanlı ğı Genelge No.
2007/6). The remainder is a summary of the circular of the Prime Ministry. It calls the
governors to take required measures and hold the necessary educational and training
programs to ensure that police forces and legal officials treat victims of gender-based
violence with care and according to the reformed legal system; and engage in activities
that will alter the society’s biased and traditional perception of custom and honor.
The most important part of this document is where it explains the reason, the
motive for the state to prevent customary and honor crimes. Evidently, it is not a national
matter. The state is not concerned with the wellbeing of its citizens or its responsibility
for the protection of basic human right, the right to life, or eradicating gender-based
violence and moving towards a more gender-equal society. The main concern is for the
image of the Turkish Republic in the eyes of the international society, the contemporary
world (read as the West). No self-reflexive criticism is made about the criteria of the
intensely desired development. The fact that women are being murdered in the name of
honor does not annoy the state. It is not even considered problematic or as an obstacle to
development. The only concern is not failing the project of modernization. Women can
be sacrificed, but development cannot.
A third document regarding customary and honor crimes and strategies for action
is produced by the Governorship of Istanbul in 2007 (Istanbul Valili ği 2007). The tone of
this document is different from the first two. To begin with, a state institution that is at a

157
lower level in the hierarchy ladder issues it. The budget of the Governorship of Istanbul is
smaller than that of either the Prime Ministry or the Ministry of Interior. Even though the
directive of the governorship is limited in scope and is more like a response to the first
two circulars, it relates more directly to violence against women and customary/honor
crimes. That is because Istanbul has the highest occurrence of customary and honor
crimes in Turkey. According to the ‘2007 Honor Killings Report’ prepared by the Prime
Ministry Human Rights Presidency (2008), 53 murders took place only in 2007 and the
number is 167 for the five-year period between 2002 and 2007. With such high numbers,
the Governorship of Istanbul has to deal with the crisis. However, similar to the official
state discourse on the matter, the first impulse of the governorship is to externalize the
problem. The document states that an examination of birthplaces reveals that a significant
number of perpetrators were born in eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey.
Therefore the governorship does not regard customary and honor killings as an issue
intrinsic to the city, but as a problem of migration from the east and southeast Turkey into
Istanbul. In coordination with Social Services and the police force, the Governorship of
Istanbul provides several services to victims of domestic and customary/honor violence.
Among these services, providing shelter, legal and psychological counselling, health
services are of primary importance. In addition to the above services, coordinated through
the Human Rights and Women’s Status Division, the governorship organizes gender-
equality and gender-based violence training programs for the police force, gendarmerie,
administrative personnel of schools, personnel of health institutions, local administrators,
and religious leaders. Governorship of Istanbul has also initiated the establishment of a

158
committee to end gender-based violence comprising representatives of the police force,
gendarmerie, municipality of Istanbul, universities, the office of mufti,
39
NGOs, and the
media. Although these improvements are very promising, there is concern that they might
not be long lived.
Vildan Yirmibe şo ğlu, head of Human Rights and Women’s Status Division at the
governor’s office, stated that the struggle against gender-based violence is still not a state
policy.
40

It depends on the personal attitude of each governor. The incumbent governor,
Muammer Güler, is very sensitive about women’s issues, he supports the cause
and the rest of the office follows. However, it has not always been that way. The
other two governors that I worked with had very different perceptions. One of
them said that his wife was involved in charity work, thus he was knowledgeable.
He considered most of the services we provided as unnecessary. And the other
governor sarcastically suggested that the office needed a division for men’s rights
to counter that of women’s rights. (Vildan Yirmibe şo ğlu)

A similar concern regarding the lack of political will and determination supported
by strong policies is also voiced by Nebahat Akkoç, president of KA-MER in Diyarbakır.
The governor of Diyarbakır was Efkan Ala then. Thus, in Diyarbakır we did not
have problems. But like I told the Human Rights Commission of the Parliament, it
all depends on the governor’s will. He also backed me up on that. ‘If I was to
argue with my wife one morning and did not feel like helping women that day,
there is no state policy to enforce me. The circular has no power over me’, he
said. (Nebahat Akkoç)

39
The official who is in charge of Islamic affairs for a province or district.
40
In Turkey, governors are not elected, but appointed by the state. Muammer Güler has been the Governor
of Istanbul since February 2003.

159
The personal standpoint of state bureaucrats on the status of women is important
and may turn out to be promising when those in power decide to promote gender-equality
and work to end violence against women. However, it is far from being satisfactory. Such
a vital task cannot be left to the initiative of individuals who may or may not proceed
with it. What we need is a state committed to improving the status of its female citizens
and fighting against gender-based violence through plans that result in policy outcomes
and supported by sensible budgets.

Gender-Responsive Budgeting
Budgeting is an important tool in assessing the economic, political and social
priorities and choices of any state. Both the macroeconomic policies designed and public
services provided according to a particular budget have consequences that affect the
gender order of that society (Günlük- Şenesen 2008). Gender-responsive budgeting is the
analysis of actual government expenditure and revenue on women and girls as compared
to men and boys. It does not mean that there will be separate budgets for women and men
or that the expenditure on women-specific programs will be increased. Acknowledging
that women are disadvantaged compared to men, the aim of gender-budgeting is to aid
states in deciding how policies should be adjusted and resources allocated. It, thus, is an
indicator of the state’s commitment to improving the status of women and promoting
gender equality in all aspects of life starting with education, health care and employment.
In order to be useful, gender-budgeting should be more than just a discourse but needs to

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be integrated into actual budget process so that it will have tangible policy outcomes
(Sharp 2003).
International bodies of governance, such as the United Nations and the European
Union, are strong supporters of gender budgeting. A 2003 resolution of the European
Parliament gender outcomes of public policy applications should be carefully examined
and gender equality needs to be the primary concern in public revenue and expenditure
allocations (European Parliament Resolution P5_TA(2003) 0323). Evidently, gender
budgeting is the first and most important step towards a gender egalitarian policymaking.
To be effective, however, such gender perspective ought to be embraced by all levels of
decision-making process.
In the light of the information summarized above, lets review Turkey’s position in
the course of gender budgeting. According to the 2005 review report of the Council of
Europe, Turkey’s application of gender budgeting was very limited. By 2005, state
institutions were not aware of the concept and the only example was a conditional cash
transfer for increasing school enrollment of children. Under the project funded by the
World Bank, disadvantaged families were paid some money on the condition that they
sent their children to school. Because enrollment rate for girls was much lower than that
of boys, the payment for girls was relatively higher than for boys. The report shows that
the rate of girls continuing their education after primary school was twice the general
average in the supported families (Council of Europe 2005). This single example
illustrates the positive impact of gender budgeting in achieving gender equality and

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improving the status of women. Nonetheless, the funds for the above-stated project came
from the World Bank. Now let me examine how the Turkish State fared with allocating
its own resources through a gender perspective. I will do so through an analysis of the
State Planning Organization’s medium-term programs.
The 2007-2009 medium-term program has one article that concerns women;
which states that women’s active integration into economic and social life will be
facilitated and measures will be taken to improve the disadvantaged status of women. In
addition, the number of activities that educate and generate sensitivity about violence
against women will be increased (2007-2009 Orta Vadeli Program). In the 2008-2010
program, the article was changed as ‘in order to facilitate women’s participation in social
and economic life, vocational training opportunities will be improved. Measures will be
taken to prevent violence against women’ and stayed the same in the 2009-2011 program
(2008-2010 Orta Vadeli Program, 2009-2011 Orta Vadeli Program). The programs thus
acknowledge women’s disadvantaged position, especially in terms of access to education
and employment, and admit violence against women as a problem, but fail to propose
well-designed and substantial programs to deal with these.
The importance, but lack of sensible budgeting to finance gender-responsive
projects is a serious concern for both NGO activists and feminist women, who occupy
positions at state institutions.
In accordance with the European Union requirements, there have been positive
improvements in laws. The police, gendarmerie, social services and municipalities
are warned. However, if the state is serious and committed in achieving this, a

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budget needs to be allocated in addition to what has been done. (Vildan
Yirmibe şo ğlu, Head of Human Rights and women status division, Governorship
of Istanbul)
Applications do not match targets. If you consider the statute, it looks as if we
have a large field of action. But the field is proportionate to the budget. We have
problems arising from unallocated budgets. We are at the bottom of the
hierarchical structure of Diyarbakır Municipality, and its budget is accordingly,
even smaller than that for parks. But the Municipality doesn’t invest in women
although they comprise 55 percent of the city’s population. (Handan Co şkun,
DIKASUM Diyarbakır Municipality Women’s Problems and Application Center)
Erdo ğan (Turkish Prime Minister) had meetings with Zapatero (President of
Spain) to promote gender equality. But this budget is flawed to begin with,
because it is not gender-sensitive. In the Zapatero cabinet, 8 out of 15 ministers
are women; they have a ministry for gender equality. Here, let alone a ministry,
we can’t even get the JDP to consider our proposal for a commission on gender
equality. This is the state’s perception. In order to overcome violence against
women you have start from here. Even international documents such as CEDAW
do not suffice. The state has to be against violence. (Sebahat Tuncel, Democratic
Society Party, Member of the Parliament)

An examination of the documents produced by the current government and the
practices of state institutions guided by these reveals that eradicating gender-based
violence and improving the status of women in society are not yet state policies.
Although the state has developed a discourse to that effect, the reflections of that
discourse cannot be observed in state praxis.

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CHAPTER 5. STATE, HONOR AND VIRGINITY
Honor and Virginity as Sources of Oppression
In the previous chapter, I analyzed the application of law to women, in general,
and to gender-based violence, in particular. I argued that the law’s structure is designed to
reproduce the unequal gender order, which is an integral component of the state’s power.
In this chapter, I will analyze the social norms and values, notion of honor and virginity,
which are fundamental to the subjugation of women. These norms determine the
dynamics of power relations between both women and men, and women and the state.
Within this framework, I will basically deal with two questions: How the Turkish state
has worked to control women’s sexuality through the enforcement of compulsory
premarital virginity and how this assists the state in its complicity with honor crimes?
In order to understand any set of institutions, one needs to explain these
institutions by the ideas of the society, relations between different segments of the
society, and the history of such institutions. Once established, laws and the state
apparatus act as feedback mechanisms to reinforce the status quo. Changes in legal
institutions are determined by changes in ideas, forms of relations, and societal forces
(Sherman, 1995). Every institution has a pattern of gender arrangements called the gender
regime. These can change, though change is often resisted. Gender regimes are parts of
wider patterns that endure over time; these wider patterns are the gender order of the
society (Connell, 1987). Patriarchy is dependent on support from its environment. One of
my central arguments in this work is that the state is the primary institution that helps

164
maintain the patriarchal order of society by engaging in ideological activity to diffuse its
gender regime and thus reinforce the existing gender order. The state intervenes in the
gender order in various ways since it regulates workplaces, schools and even families,
and it is implicated in the social relations of gender (Connell, 1987). Through an
examination of its discourses and practices in the case of Turkey, I put to test the
argument that ‘the state is constructed as a patriarchal entity….that both institutionalizes
hegemonic masculinity and expends great energy in controlling it’ (Connell, 1987: 128).
The power of the state is central since it is with power that it constitutes, regulates and re-
produces social patterns. It also produces social categories of the gender order such as
husbands, wives or mothers with certain characteristics attached to them. Honor is one of
the most important features that individuals and families are expected to possess and the
definition of honor and expectations based on it radically differs from women to men. An
analysis of how these categories are constructed and reconstructed historically is vital to
the understanding of how interests are defined as arising from inequality and oppression.
The construction of honor is closely related to notions of virginity and sexual purity, and
enforced virginity is a source of violence.
Veena Das (2007) states that violence is not an exception but a constructive
element of all societies. In every society, bodies are marked and molded for the
socialization of those same bodies. Violence is not distributed equally among members of
modern societies. On the contrary, asymmetrical power relations define those who apply
violence and those who experience it. Das analyzes this inequality in terms of a debtor-
creditor relationship. Certain segments of the society (women) fail to fulfill their social

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responsibilities (transcend social norms) and thus incur a debt by harming the social
order. They then have to experience violence to compensate for their debt. Thus, violence
is legitimized. Moreover, the memory of violence and pain teaches them and others to
conform to social norms. In the patriarchal societies of the Middle East and the
Mediterranean, honor is the central organizing code of everyday life. In these societies,
women, who are suspected of dishonorable conduct are indebted to the society and can
only settle their debt by destroying their bodies, the physical evidence of their debt, by
committing suicide. The absence of their bodies and the memory of their destruction help
reproduce social order.
Turkish society is a unique case with an unsteady balance between an Islamic
value system and a modernist secular system, dominating private and public spheres,
respectively. Turkey can easily be defined as a country belonging to the ‘belt of classic
patriarchy’, in the sense defined by Kandiyoti (1988), where domination of women is the
essence of the gender system. An analysis of honor crimes requires a basic knowledge of
Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, which is ‘semi-feudal, traditional and agricultural’
( İlkkaracan, 2001). The majority of the population lives in rural areas with very low
literacy rates. The land structure is still feudal where tribal systems (aşiret) determine
land ownership. The tribal leader is also the landlord and tribe members work in his land.
In such a system, endogamic marriages are the norm to assure the sustenance of the
economic system. Moghadam (1993) argues that the practice of marriage within the
lineage set the ground for the oppression of women long before Islam. It is the male

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control over women’s lives experienced in terms of unequal inheritance rights and
polygamy that maintains and reproduces these communities.
The control over women’s lives is practiced especially by the control over their
bodies and sexuality that is embodied in the codes of honor and shame of this society.
Honor is basically concerned with a man’s ability to protect his belongings (Delaney,
1987). In patriarchal societies women are considered to be both the property of and
protected by their male kin; the honor of the man is defined through the honorability of
his women (wife, daughter, mother, sisters, and nieces). For women to be honorable, they
need to be chaste, which is equated with sexually purity: A man’s honor is defined
through the sexual conduct of ‘his’ women. The conceptualization of honor is illustrative
of the unequal gender relations prevalent in the Turkish context. In Turkish society,
honor emerges both as the identity of a person against the rest of the society and the sense
of worth that a person has. Subsequently, even though honor is related to sexual behavior,
it goes beyond to determine the social standing of any individual (Sirman 2004). Honor is
used to assess the social standing of both women and men. However, the connotations for
women and men are totally different, which is a reflection of the gender order. While a
man’s honor is measured by his trustworthiness and ‘decency’, women are judged on
their being sexually pure. However, it is important to note that no man can claim honor if
any of the women he is responsible for is suspected of being dishonorable. An honorable
man is not supposed to be a virgin or stay away from women. But the women that he is
responsible for are supposed to be virgins (until they get married) and refrain from overt
sexual behavior. Simply stated, it does not matter what her character traits are, an

167
honorable woman is a virgin and an honorable man is someone whose wife, daughters,
sisters, nieces etc. are virgins.
The constant control and monitoring of women’s bodies and sexuality through
basic institutions such as family, education, law, medicine, religion and language
have been the essence of patriarchal systems. The state is the central institution
manipulating, openly and covertly, women’s productive and reproductive capacities
with the aim of maintaining the patriarchal system. All patriarchal societies compel
women to abide by several bodily and sexual norms as ways of keeping them under
constant control. Honor, expressed through women’s bodies and particularly
sexuality, is the strongest of the control mechanisms. The glorification of female
virginity is an integral part of the same control mechanism.Honor by itself cannot
explain the prevalence of violence in the society. In kinship-based societies, such as
Turkish society, the fight against gender violence cannot succeed for as long as
women are in a direct confrontation with their husbands and relatives. The
dependence of women on these kinship and communal ties for the construction of
their identities and social standing keeps them from questioning and challenging the
mechanism, in which violence is embedded. The subjectivity and consciousness of
women are constructed along with the community they live in. The stance against
gender violence can only be created through a holistic articulation of society to
policies against violence, and most importantly through the state’s active participation
to transform the gender order.

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The Power of Virginity
Reports of international organizations, such as the Human Rights Watch (1994)
and Amnesty International (2003), show that state-led gender-based discrimination
perpetuates violence against women. The UN Economic and Social Council (1990)
recognizes that gender-based violence derives from the women’s unequal status in
society. States have a duty, under international law, to prevent violence against women.
When state actors display discriminatory attitudes, it is not only breach of women’s
human rights but also contributes to violence against women and societal ignorance
towards that violence.
In medical usage, hymen is the membrane that partially covers the entrance of the
vagina of a virgin. However, in daily use hymen is seldom used to express virginity.
Rather, the literal translation of the Turkish concept is ‘girlhood membrane’, implying
that an unmarried young woman is supposed to be a virgin. In Turkish, only a married
woman can be called a ‘woman’. An unmarried young woman should be called a ‘girl’,
because calling her a woman would be no different from an insult since it would imply
that she had lost her girlhood, i.e. virginity.
In her comprehensive research on the history of virginity, Hanne Blank (2008)
shows that with the medical discovery of the hymen and increasing power of medicine in
the society, virginity as a patriarchal control mechanism was transformed as doctors
became authorities on women’s bodies and sexuality. Like Mary Daly (1978), who
claims that virginity is a myth created by patriarchy, Blank’s main argument -and what

169
she proves through an historical analysis- is that virginity is an abstract concept
constructed by patriarchal cultures without a concrete base. Even the hymen, which is
closest to being a physical proof of virginity,
41
is not directly related to virginity but the
relation is a medical invention. Had the hymen not been discovered and named, neither
the membrane itself nor virginity would have existed. Hence, just like the dire need to
question and deconstruct the concept of honor, the same should be done for virginity, the
most important determinant of honor.
Mernissi takes the discussion of the relationship between patriarchy and virginity
a step further and defines virginity ‘as a matter between men’ (2000: 203). She sees
virginity as identical to honor, in the sense that it works to generate self-confidence for
men in a context of inequality, scarcity and deprivation. By locating the prestige of men
between the women’s legs, men’s status is secured. Controlling the bodies and
movements of women who are related to them by blood or by marriage is so convenient
that it frees men from the need to accomplish much harder tasks to regain power, such as
being a provider in a fierce capitalist economy or overcome class and ethnic inequalities
that subjugate them. What Nawal el Saadawi (1980) observed in Arab societies is equally
valid in the Turkish context. According to her, a problematic conceptualization of honor
prevails in the Arab societies. A man’s honor is secure as long as the hymens of his
family’s women are intact. Thus, the honor of a man does not depend on his own

41
In Turkey, newly married couples are expected to display the blooded sheet following the first night of
their marriage. The sheet stained with the bride’s blood is not only a ‘proof of the bride’s virginity and the
groom’s virility’, but also of the two families’ honor (Cindoglu 2000: 215; Sev’er and Yurdakul 2001).
One should not forget that failure to prove virginity would be a legitimate reason to send the bride back to
her family’s house, which would then probably result in her murder to clean the family’s ‘stained’ honor.

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behavior, but on the behavior of the women for whom he is responsible. Moreover, an
intact hymen is not sufficient to keep women from being named dishonorable. However,
this should not mean that the concern about virginity and the assumed relationship
between virginity and family honor are confined to Middle Eastern or Islamic societies.
Gloria Gonzalez-Lopez (2005) details the importance of pre-marital virginity in the
Mexican society and among Mexican immigrants in the U.S. Accordingly, virginity is
not only a feminine capital that increases a woman’s personal quality, but it is also an
important signifier of family honor.
Turkey is among the many countries where the purity of women reflects on the
honor and status of their families. This parallelization is enforced through systematic
control of women’s bodies, mobility, behavior and especially sexuality. Previous
research on women’s submission and inequality between the sexes have referred to
the‘power holders’ (read as men) claim over property to explain the idea of women’s
purity and its relation to the social honor of a group (Engels 1972; Schneider 1971;
Sherman 1995; Tillion 1983). Ortner (1978), however, adds another dimension to the
discussion and argues that the concern with female purity is related, structurally and
functionally, to the emergence of state-like structures. She goes on to assert that in none
of the pre-state societies there exists an ideology of protecting female purity. Even
though gender inequality remains, women are bartered or excluded; no systematic
mechanism is geared towards controlling women’s behavior (Ortner 1978: 24). With the
rise of the state and the patriarchal family structure, women are put under the systematic
control of first their fathers, then their husbands and all male members of the kinship

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group. Idealized as the mother and the virgin, women now need the protection of men
and the state. The family, for which the men are economically, legally and socially
responsible, is the base unit of the state.
The troublesome relationship between honor and virginity and its repressive
impact on women is adversely affected by state’s involvement. A glance over the last
twenty years would suffice to reveal the Turkish state’s obsession with virginity and its
relentless effort to use virginity testing as a method to monitor its female citizens, even at
a level that deprives them of their citizenship and human rights.

Virginity as a Social Control Mechanism
Towards the end of 1980s, the issue of virginity testing or examination
42
was
brought to public attention by the media. It started with news about the Turkish military
requiring virginity reports from single female applicants. A magazine carried the report
as its front cover story, reminding readers that this had been state policy since 1980
(Ergun 2008). The same period also marked the rise of the women’s movement in
Turkey. The first major campaign against virginity testing was called ‘Our bodies belong
to us, stop sexual harassment!’ took place in Ankara in 1989. Throughout the 1980s
feminists, academicians and journalists organized various activities that questioned the

42
A virginity test or examination is a gynecological examination of the hymen to determine whether it is
broken as a result of sexual intercourse. Several gynecologists do not consider an examination of the hymen
as sufficient evidence of lost virginity (Blank 2008; HRW 1994).

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state’s power over women’s bodies, the patriarchal system and virginity testing.
However, it was not until 1992 that the issue became a serious public matter.
Two separate incidents took place in 1992, when two female high school students
committed suicide to avoid virginity examination. One of them was among four girls
seen picnicking with boys in the woods. The school authorities lost no time and
demanded a virginity test. The other was the fifteen-year old Güzide. The principal of the
high school called her father and informed him that she had a low attendance rate and
there were rumors that she was seen with boys. ‘She may not be a virgin’, said the
principal, ‘you should have her examined’. Overhearing the conversation, Güzide fled. A
week later, she was found dead at the bottom of a cliff. Her father went ahead and had
the virginity exam performed on her dead body. She was a virgin. Even death did not
save her from virginity testing (Altınay 2000; Altınay 2007; Parla 2001). The incident
was tragic in itself and generated outrage among the women’s movement. A press
conference was held in Ankara condemning the practice. Türkan Akyol, the incumbent
Minister of Women’s Affairs, was among those who were against virginity testing. The
minister was even reported saying that she found involuntary examinations ‘abominable
and very humiliating’ and that she would do everything to avoid repetitions of such
incidents and have all the officials involved punished. Unfortunately, in spite of Minister
Akyol’s commitment, the Turkish government neither adequately prohibited the use of
enforced virginity examination nor punished the state agencies involved. The principal of
Güzide’s school was suspended, yet only to be reinstated to his post three months later,

173
right before the start of the school year (HRW 1994). What followed was even worse and
displayed the state’s distorted notion of honor and the measures it could take to protect it.
Despite severe criticism voiced by feminists and the media, The Ministry of
Education’s Statute for Awards and Discipline in High Schools came into effect on
January 31, 1995. It is an example displaying the justification of virginity testing. It
states that ‘unchaste behavior’ is a legitimate reason for expulsion from school. The
proof of unchaste behavior is gathered by enforcing female students to virginity tests. It
is obvious that ‘rules of chastity’ apply to female students alone and chaste means virgin.
A group of lawyers from Izmir Bar Association filed a lawsuit against the Ministry of
Education claiming that some articles of the statute were breaching the law. However,
they lost the case on the grounds that the statute was not unlawful; on the contrary, it was
a protective measure for the Turkish youth. Although the court concurred that
administrators were given explicit instructions not to request virginity reports as proof of
chastity or otherwise, several cases that followed proved that the authority was misused.
Moreover, the statute itself and the following lawsuit reveal the state’s approach to its
female citizens and the problematic construction of honor and chastity in the official
discourse. It is hard to understand how the threat of virginity testing could be a protective
measure, especially as several young women chose to end their lives rather than submit
to this demeaning procedure. Ironically, most of these girls were declared virgins
subsequent to post-mortem virginity examinations demanded by their families (Seral
2000). The infamous statute thus remained in effect. The women’s movement vocally
expressed its concerns about the practice. Finally, in March 2002, the Ministry of

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Education revised the statute, removing direct reference to unchastity. However, the
Ministry’s concern for monitoring the behavior of students and maintaining the gender
order was not removed. The reason for expulsion is now stated as ‘behavior that
contradicts the commonly accepted social values and influences the educational
atmosphere in a negative way’. However, the problem remains, who has the authority to
determine what constitutes acceptable public conduct? Moreover, who can guarantee that
such determination will not lead to violation of fundamental human rights?
The statute is just one among many state practices that reproduce the unequal
gender system and deny women their fundamental human rights. At the heart of the
problem lies the presupposition that female virginity is a legitimate concern for the
family, society, and state. A gynecological examination might be necessary in order to
collect evidence relating to a sexual assault charge. Even then, consent of the woman
should be sought and the primary aim should be collecting evidence and the woman’s
wellbeing. Virginity, in itself, is irrelevant in such a case. Besides, had virginity been the
most important determinant of such examinations, non-virgins would not be able to press
charges of rape. The bottom line is, state enforced virginity examination is unjustified
and the emphasis on female virginity is discriminatory. The involvement of Turkish
authorities in compulsory virginity exams and the failure of the state to denounce the
practice are violations of Turkey’s obligation to guarantee equal protection before the
law and a breach of bodily integrity and privacy (HRW 1994).

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In 1998, virginity testing entered the public agenda once again by the statements
of I şılay Saygın, the Minister of Women’s Affairs and a member of the center-right
Motherland (ANAP) Party. She defended the state’s right to enforce virginity testing as a
vital means of maintaining ‘our practices, customs and traditions’. The minister
legitimated virginity testing as a proper and effective measure for ensuring good manners
in girls. She was quoted as saying, ‘Virginity testing is a serious preventative matter. If a
young girl kills herself because of a virginity test, she kills herself. It's not that important,
it's only a few [girls]. Don't let them get into such a dialogue with men’. Women’s
organizations organized a protest campign immediately following the minister’s
comments. The campaign was based on the slogan ‘Our bodies belong to us. The state
should take its hands off the women’s bodies!’ (Amnesty International 2003).
Just one week after I şılay Saygın’s fury generating statements, the same reporter
had an interview with her counsellor Selma Acuner (Düzel 1998). She declared virginity
examinations as backward and outdated practices. She argued that the state should not
intervene in women’s bodies, which according to her is a violation of human rights and a
form of violence. Moreover, Acuner noted that the state should be involved in activities
such as eliminating gender discrimination, democratizing the family and securing
women’s citizenship rights rather than being concerned with women’s virginity,
sexuality and honor. She then defined Turkey as a ‘very traditional’ society and deemed
this the biggest societal problem that also led to underdevelopment. Selma Acuner
occupied an important seat in the Ministry of Women and the Family. Her progressive
standpoint and critical stance against discriminatory state practices could have been

176
promising in the advancement of women’s status in Turkey. However, right after the
difference of opinion between the minister and her counsellor on virginity examinations
was publicised through consecutive interviews, Ms. Acuner was suspended from her
office. By supporting Minister Saygın, the state categorically confirmed its approval of
her attitude in matters concerning women and the family.
The relationship between the state and women’s virginity is just another
manifestation of the modernization project based on the modern vs. traditional
dichotomy. Virginity examinations are tolerated and encouraged by the state – as seen in
the above-quoted statements of a minister – for protecting traditional values such as
honor and chastity, or they are condemned as scandalous practices hindering the
attainment of desired level of modernity. These examinations represent the preoccupation
with women’s honor, previously enforced through ‘kinship’, now implemented through
oversight and the mechanisms available to the state (Parla 2001). They are thus no less
than institutionalized forms of violence through which the state discriminates against
women by maintaining its right to intrude into their private lives and bodies in the name
of the state with such vehemence that it violates both domestic and international laws.
The protests of women’s organizations yielded some success by 1999 when the
Ministry of Justice issued a statute to distinguish virginity testing from legally required
vaginal and anal examinations, eliminating the former. Accordingly, in cases of alleged
rape, sex with minors and intermediating for prostitution, the judge may order a genital
examination without the consent of the woman, when no other evidence of a crime exists

177
or if the passing of time may interfere with evidence gathering. For the examination to be
undertaken, the judicial decree should be accompanied by the written authorization of the
public prosecutor. Furthermore, the statute instructs that genital examination should not
be used as a means for disciplinary punishment against the woman’s consent or as an
excuse to maltreat, hurt or humiliate contrary to the terms of her consent.
Despite changing the legal structure and growing public response, the state
authorities have, in practice, managed to turn virginity testing into an unresolved issue.
In 2001, the incumbent Minister of Health, Osman Durmu ş, amended the existing
Awards and Discipline Statute of healthcare vocational schools. Accordingly, all female
students were required to go through virginity examinations to determine if they were
involved in prostitution or ever had sex. Those who were found to have had sex would be
expelled from the high school. This time, with increased media attention and heightened
public sensitivity, the attempt was met with both national and international protest. In
addition to severe protests organized by domestic and international women’s
organizations, the Dutch representative of the European Parliament sent a letter to the
Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, demanding that the amendment be retracted on
the grounds that it was violation of women’s bodily security and human rights (Ergün
2008). Faced with such protest, the Minister issued a circular clarifying that virginity
examinations would only be required by legal authorities and not left to the decisions of
school administrations. Istanbul Bar Assosiation filed a lawsuit against the statute on the
grounds that it violated the constitution of the Turkish Republic. However, the Eighth
Division of the Council of State rejected the case on the basis that the statute was

178
intended to keep the students out of harms way and that it was indeed lawful.
43
It was not
until 2005 that the Council of State decided that the statute was a ‘violation of the
secrecy of private life’ (Sabah 26 October 2005).

Virginity in Legal Texts
Virginity examination is clearly a violation of a woman’s bodily integrity and
constitutes violation of women’s human rights. Despite intensive protests of women’s
movement, authorities still find it an acceptable and feasible practice. Not to forget that it
is also a breach of Article 17 of the Turkish Constitution, which asserts that, with the
exception of medical requirements and circumstances delineated in legislation, no one’s
bodily integrity may be violated.
The former Penal Code defined crimes of sexual assault as ‘felonies against
public decency and family order’, and not as felonies against the person. In addition, the
code also stated that the punishment would be increased by one-half if such offenses
caused ‘the passing of a disease to the victim, a serious impairment of the victim’s health
or physical disability or defect’. Here, what is actually mentioned was loss of virginity
through sexual assault, because a ruptured hymen is considered an irreversible ‘physical
defect’ (Frank, Bauer, Arıcan, Korur Fincancı and Iacopino 1999: 486).
44
The state’s

43
The Turkish Council of State is the highest administrative court in Turkey, which is equivalent to a
federal supreme administrative court.
44
A ruptured hymen is no longer an irreversible physical defect. Recently, women have started to utilize
medicine to repair their virginity through virginity restoration surgeries. As told by practitioners who

179
obsession with virginity becomes apparent in the way the legal system punishes crimes
of sexual assault. The sentence for raping a virgin is one half times higher than the
sentence for raping a non-virgin. Thus, according to the state, it is not the shock, the pain
or the trauma that the rape victim woman went through that determines the severity of
the crime but what matters most is whether or not she is ‘qualified’ as a virgin, as if
previous sexual intercourse has a lessening effect on rape. An interview I had with Ayten
A ğırdemir, a penal lawyer, reveals the troublesome approach to virginity and how it is
evaluated as something separate from the woman’s life, something more like an asset
that is lost or maintained. Ms. A ğırdemir cited a case where her rapist impregnated the
rape victim. Showing us one more time that the hymen is not a reliable indicator of
sexual assault, her hymen was intact. The court decided to wait until the birth of her child
before passing sentence. If she were to have a vaginal birth, her hymen would be
ruptured and she would lose her virginity, meaning that the sentence of the perpetrator
would be increased. If, on the other hand, she were to give birth through a c-section, her
hymen would remain intact, meaning a lower punishment for her rapist. To put it bluntly,

perform it, these operations are usually demanded by women who can afford this quite costly operation in
cases of premarital sexual relationships (Cindo ğlu 2000). The medically reconstructed artificial virginity
does not only repair the hymen, but helps restore the honor of the woman and her family. Both the
physicians and the public have conflicting views regarding virginity surgeries. While some surgeons find
this medically unnecessary operation unethical and refuse to operate others think it is beneficial to women
who have breached the boundaries of socially acceptable sexual behavior and now want to reconstruct their
virginity before getting married. Thus, they argue, it saves women’s lives in a conservative society.
Whether or not surgeons approve of the procedure, it is an intervention of medicine in the values system of
the society. Through reconstructive virginity surgeries, medicine is not only reinstating its power over
women’s bodies and sexuality. Thus, as an institution, it is also reproducing the patriarchal system. One
final note about the practice, legally virginity restoration surgeries are neither outlawed nor approved.
There is not a law that refers to the procedure. However, its application is strictly controlled in state
hospitals. Accordingly, the surgery is only applied to women who have not had sexual intercourse and lost
her virginity as a result of rape or an accident, and only through an order by a judge or public prosecutor
(Ergun 2008). This is a clear indication that the state both admits and reiterates a virginity-centered notion
of honor.

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the virginity of a rape victim who got pregnant is the issue here. Paradoxical in itself,
what is most troubling is the state’s concern for a membrane, which is considered more
valuable than the wellbeing of a rape victim.
The new Penal Code removed any references to virginity (or to its loss) in
determining the punishment of rape. High criminal court judges are supposed to treat
every rape victim with equal care regardless of her sexual history. However, my
interview with a high criminal court judge revealed that, despite the law requiring equal
punishment for equal crime, judges still tend to determine sentence based on women’s
sexuality, meaning her virginity.
The law requires eight to twelve years of imprisonment in rape cases, regardless
of virginity. However, the judge has a right to use his discretion. Raping a virgin
is not the same as raping a woman who had sex before. So if the victim is a
virgin, the judge will decide on the highest possible sentence, but if she had sex
before then it will be lower. (Judge 1)
The above quote is a clear example that changing legal structure will not generate
significant outcomes unless a change of mentality is achieved. The state should make
sure that the new laws are understood and applied equally and without bias.
The new Penal Code does not refer to virginity testing but includes an article on
‘genital examination’. The article states that anyone who performs or enforces a genital
examination without proper authorization from a judge or a prosecutor can be sentenced
to three months to one years imprisonment. However, the second part of the article goes
on to determine that the above rule will not be applied for examinations required for

181
protection of public health.
45
In spite of criticisms raised by the women’s platform, the
Justice Commission of Parliament explicitly rejected criminalizing virginity
examinations. Besides, it accentuates the rights of judges and public prosecutors over
women’s bodies. Although it criminalizes unauthorized genital examination, the article
fails to explicitly target and outlaw virginity testing as a practice separate from a medical
examination. Moreover, it does not require the woman’s consent for genital examination,
thereby leaving space for enforced examinations.
The report of international organizations document that law enforcement officials
forcibly use virginity examinations and more severe forms of sexual violence as a threat
against female political detainees, especially in regions largely populated by Kurds. The
state uses honor as an excuse for non-intervention and as a means of controlling dissent
when state agents sexually assault women and, through them demean their families,
groups and communities. A survey carried out among female prisoners in five
southeastern cities showed that almost all of the women were forced to go through
virginity examination and experienced some form of sexual violence while under custody
(NTV 2002). Amnesty International (2003) reports that state forces also used virginity
exams on women whose husbands were suspected of being PKK
46
members. Proof of

45
The second part of the article particularly refers to the state’s control of illegal prostitution. State officials
still have the right to demand virginity examinations on women who are suspected of being involved in
illegal prostitution because the Turkish state requires sex workers to be registered with the state and go
through regular health checks. The problem however lies with the refusal of the police to understand that a
woman might choose to live a sexually active life without being married or for pecuniary advantage.
46
Kurdistan Workers Party, PKK, is an ethnic separatist group that has been in armed conflict with Turkish
security forces since 1984.

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recent sexual intercourse was then utilized to establishe the men’s whereabouts. Thus,
the state was trying to get to the men by abusing the physical integrity of women.
The legal procedure that reduces the trauma experienced because of sexual
assault to the condition of the hymen is not only too simple and incorrect; it also ignores
the psychological trauma caused to the victim by the examination itself (Frank et al.
1999). Physicians conduct virginity examinations at the request of state officials in cases
of alleged sexual assault or prostitution for gathering forensic evidence, or at the request
of individuals for social reasons. The physicians’ role in virginity examinations and their
attitude towards the practice are very important in determining the legitimacy of virginity
testing and the limits of its applicability. A study conducted among forensic physicians
(Frank et al. 1999) reveals that a majority of physicians defined virginity as having an
intact hymen or no penile penetration of the vagina. However, a significant portion,
nearly a quarter, equated virginity with ‘innocence’. Based on their experiences, more
than half of forensic physicians noted that majority of the patients undergo virginity
examinations against their will. However, forensic physicians rarely refuse to perform
the test, especially when it is requested by legal authorities, even if the woman’s consent
is not sought. In a 1992 statement, the Turkish Medical Association condemned the
practice and defined virginity examination as a form of gender-based violence that lacks
a legal basis and is unethical (Frank et al. 1999: 488). Despite the TMA’s condemnation,
physicians continue to perform virginity examinations, not only for legal reasons, but
also for social reasons and without the patient’s consent. Physicians, who are involved in

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virginity examinations, are key figures in the control of women’s sexualities by
perpetuating the societal norms on virginity, albeit without a legal or ethical basis.
The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Justice Council of Forensic Medicine is
another medical state institution that has significant power over women’s lives and
bodies. Recently, the Council of Forensic Medicine has been severely criticized by the
public and the media for the scandalous reports in cases of sexual assault that favored the
perpetrator rather than the victim. The Council then went through a restructuring process,
which was far from satisfactory as the newly appointed experts resigned after a short
while due to the biased attitude of the Council. One recent example is worth noting. Dr.
Ayten Erdogan, a pediatric psychiatrist, resigned following a high-profile case, where
Hüseyin Uzmez, a columnist in the radical Islamist Vakit newspaper is being tried for
sexually assaulting a fourteen-year-old girl. The victim was examined twice by the
Council of Forensic Medicine, and the Council decided that the bodily and psychological
wellbeing of the fourteen-year-old girl was not harmed as a result of the assault by an
elderly man. Dr. Erdogan said that she resigned when she realized that the Council was
planning to reproduce the former report even after a third examination. This and several
other incidents made the Council of Forensic Medicine infamous for blaming the female
victims in cases of sexual crimes and thus reproducing the patriarchal structures, societal
norms and the unequal gender order.
The concern with female sexual purity is not unique to Turkey. A woman’s
virginity is taken as the indicator of her family’s reputation. Compromising that

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reputation comes with such a high price that women conform to the societal standards of
acceptable behavior. Although forbidden by law, any woman who breaches those
standards might be subjected to a virginity examination. Forcible virginity examinations
continue to follow women through their lives. The state conducts or tolerates the
practice, and families subject their daughters to virginity examinations. The concept of
honor sanctioned by the state and the strict control of women’s sexuality create an
environment in which women’s rights and integrity come after the community’s desire to
preserve honor. Even the recent legal amendments defining unauthorized virginity
examinations as a crime and the right of women to refuse an examination anytime is not
generally exercised as, to do so, is treated as tacit acknowledgement of one having lost
their ‘honor’. Although the presence or absence of an intact hymen is irrelevant to a
sexual assault claim, forensic physicians admit that they undertake virginity
examinations on the premise that a woman’s sexual history directly relates to her
reputation and subsequent credibility as a witness in court (HRW 1994). The state, thus,
discriminates against women and reproduces the unequal status of women and gender
order in the society by compelling women to conform to societal standards of appropriate
behavior, that radically differ for women and men.
Virginity not only applies to women’s bodies, it determines a set of preconceived
behavioural patterns that the state then regulates to enforce conformity. It, at the same
time, by signifying honor (of our women, our families and our nation), legitimates the
military’s and the state’s right to control women (and men) in order to protect them and
their honor. Virginity should be protected by all means possible even if use of force is

185
required. Otherwise, the enemies of the nation could take our lands and our women. This
mentality is visually demonstrated along the borders, especially in the eastern and
southeastern regions, where it is customary for the military to write, in giant letters on the
hillsides overlooking the borders ‘Border is honor’ (hudut namustur). The equalization of
women with the nation implies that transgression of physical and mental, societal borders
would have detrimental consequences. The idea of virginity thus serves a dual function:
it is protected by the state through depriving women of their basic human rights just for
the sake of ensuring intact hymens, at the same time; it legitimates the state by
establishing an almost sacred asset that needs to be guarded taking the most extreme
measures if necessary. Once such legitimation is achieved, no one can contest the state’s
use of force.

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CHAPTER 6. THE INVOLVEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE
Gender-based violence, particularly murdering women in the name of honor, is a
prevalent problem in contemporary Turkish society. In previous chapters, I have shown
that state efforts to combat gender-based violence and guarantee protection of women’s
human rights unfortunately remain on paper and have not been realized as sensible policy
and normative changes. In this setting in which the state, the central institution of the
society, pretends to fulfill or ignores its responsibilities towards its female citizens, civil
societal actors flourish to fill the void. Honor killing is a crime that no one wants to be
associated with. It is detrimental to the image of a nation, community, religion or country.
Thus, when the crime cannot be denied, the second best strategy is to turn it into an
isolated event and present it as the perpetrator’s problem alone. Unfortunately, the honor
of the community or nation weighs heavier than women’s rights. In many cases, the non-
government organizations offer services, which the public authorities do not have the will
or the ability to provide. Society will only benefit from the expertise and experience of
the NGOs if their ideas and programs are disseminated throughout the society. I claim
that women’s non-governmental organizations in Turkey, especially in regions where
violence against women is severe and frequent, work as intermediary institutions that
fulfill functions neglected by the state. I argue that, through their practices in the field,
they not only protect actual and potential victims of gender-based violence, but also
generate normative and structural change by their activities geared towards altering the
gender order.

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My analysis of NGOs is shaped by their situatedness vis-à-vis the state.
47
The
state is central to the way NGOs deal with gender-based violence. Either in the form of a
critique of the state or the demand and need for collaboration with it (often both),
determine the NGOs activities in the field. Their presence thus is related to the state,
because they perceive the state as the single most important institution able to eradicate
gender-based violence and improve women’s status in society, foremost, because the
state plays a significant role in the reproduction of both violence and an unequal gender
order. They are not part of government or controlled by a state body. They are elements
from civil society operating in an arena between households and the state, which affords
possibilities of concerted action and social self-organization.

Civil Societal Organizations’ Impact on Domestic Politics
The civil society comprises non-state actors that interact with one another, with
states and international organizations. Nongovernmental organizations
48
(NGOs) that
work to combat gender-based violence and improve women’s position in society are key
actors in these concerns. They build links among actors in civil societies, states and

47
I use situatedness to express the fact that no agent is an isolated entity but exists in an environment.
Situatedness is socially constructed and the interplay between agent, situation and context can help explain
the many perspectives of the context in which the research material (in this case gender-based violence,
reproduction of the gender order, attempts to eradicate violence, legal reform and so forth) occur. Hence, I
try to refrain from approaching the state and NGOs as static entities and show that there is not one kind of
interaction between the two.
48
Throughout the text, I use the terms nongovernmental organizations and civil societal actors
interchangeably.

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international organizations and make resources available to actors in domestic political
and social struggles (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Today, there is no dispute that NGOs
affect the delivery of services, policies and the legislative agendas of governments as well
as intergovernmental organizations. Moreover, they have an impact on initiatives that
used to be monopolized by states. Indeed, NGOs are recognized to be more adept than
states in effectively responding tothe challenges of today’s world (Hamad 2005).
Violation of women’s human rights is one of the areas where states fail dismally and
NGOs step in to fill the gap.
49
The fact that this is still a common problem, however,
indicates that NGOs do not have easy answers to difficult problems.
NGOs contribute to national and international discourse on issues of global
proportions, such as the promotion of gender equality and sustainability of development
and human rights. The driving force behind an advocacy group is values rather than
material concerns. Although policy change is an important part of most of advocacy
groups’ efforts, some of them even aim at reaching beyond policy change to alter the
institutional basis of social action. Thus, in addition to influencing policy outcomes,
NGO activism attempts to transform the terms of the debate in issue areas. Even though
they might not always succeed, they are nonetheless recognized players on the field
(Keck and Sikkink 1998).
NGOs have a pivotal role in both establishing and expanding the international
human rights system. The most visible outcomes of their influence are mechanisms such

49
In addition to human rights violations, civil wars and persistent poverty are the two other areas where
NGO activities prove more useful compared to states or corporations.

189
as UN responses to human right abuses and examination of these through special
rapporteurs and expert commissions. International forces and international bodies of
governance affect States and their spaces for political action (both domestic and global).
Van Tujil (1999) argues that if NGOs aspire to a more institutionalized position within
the human rights system, they need to improve the quality of their networks to become
sources of democracy, human rights and justice. That is indeed true. NGOs link to a
transnational advocacy network is central for them to promote norm implementation
through pressuring their states to adopt new policies and monitoring compliance with
requirements of international bodies of governance. Networks are communicative
structures, as well as political spaces, in which differentially situated actors negotiate not
only to participate in but shape politics (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
Keck and Sikkink (1998: 12-13) explain the importance for NGOs of strong links
to transnational advocacy networks by the ‘boomerang pattern’. Accordingly, states, who
are the primary guarantors of human rights, are also the primary violators of the very
same rights. When rights are denied or violated by state agencies, local NGOs may fall
short of reversing the situation through domestic, political, or judicial processes. At such
a point, when the channels between a state and domestic actors are broken, the domestic
NGOs bypass their state and reach out to transnational advocacy networks to pressure
their states from outside. It should be noted that, especially in Third World countries,
justifying external intervention in domestic affairs is a much harder task. Yet, we need to
acknowledge that, however severe and important they may be, injustice and oppression
do not automatically lead to social organizations or advocacy movements. It is the

190
activists, who are sufficiently committed to a particular issue to the extent of incurring
costs that they act to achieve their goals. In what follows, I will analyze the practices of
women’s NGOs in Turkey, which holds the line that protects women from human right
violations, gender-based violence or discrimination and maintains their gender equality. It
is not an easy task and each organization has its own ideological positioning and
methodology when approaching these issues, with varying degrees of success.

Civil Societal Organizations that Fight ‘Violence against Women’
Women’s organizations have been referring to human rights discourse as leverage
for action since international bodies of governance (The EU and the UN) have started
connecting human rights issues to terms of negotiations with states and fund
considerations.
The postcolonial framework is influential in interpreting the contemporary human
rights system. Sally Merry (2008) argues that the concepts of culture and tradition are not
so much different from colonial versions of savagery, and likewise, the human rights
reform movement is a revised application of the ‘civilizing process’. However, we need
to accept that the concept of human rights as applied by the West on the non-West would
ignore the complexity of the actors involved in the process. It would also disregard the
agency of local (non-western) civil societal actors, who work in collaboration with and
also comprise the transnational advocacy networks, to ensure the application of human
rights in their particular localities. I argue thus that women’s NGOs, which fight against

191
gender-based violence through the human rights discourse, and more often than not with
projects funded by international organizations, should not be treated as tools of an
external pressure group. Each has its own agenda and methodology, and differing levels
of exposure to and support from transnational networks. The ultimate goal is, regardless
of differences between NGOs, to improve the status of women in both the family and
society. It is equally important to realize that women are not subordinated solely because
of living in a traditional patriarchal society. Power operates in various ways most of
which are concealed by other practices. In the case of Turkey, for example, the severe
violence especially in southeastern regions stems from the ongoing political tension and
the armed conflict between Turkish military forces and Kurdish guerillas resulting in
forced migration and subsequent poverty.
Some of the NGOs are in dialogue with the state to facilitate advancement in its
position on the issue of women. An important point to consider is that states might
change discursive positions not necessarily with the intention of a policy change, but as a
diversionary tactic (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In such cases, NGOs can expose
discrepancies between state discourse and practices to the domestic and global society,
and use it to pressure the state to close the discrepancy. The most difficult task of civil
societal actors is to generate normative change. Especially in societies like Turkey, where
norms are taken as laws of nature and accorded a special place (and when state agencies
reproduce the norms), normative change requires the actors to question the repeated
practice of norms and consider alternative practices.

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When I criticize the modernization project of the Turkish Republic for sacrificing
women for the sake of development, I do not mean that Turkey is the only country that
has relied on a development paradigm to deal with poverty, inequality and the wholesale
improvement of their society. Women’s salvation was related to development around the
globe and in international organizations, such as the UN. The ‘women and development
paradigm’ was popular in the 1970s with a vast institutional support backing it. It mainly
targeted facilitating women’s incorporation into the labor force, in industry, agriculture,
and self-owned small businesses. However, by the mid-1980s, it was apparent that
economic participation was not the cure to women’s problems. Moreover, a new
understanding grew based on the idea that even women’s economic position could not
improve without addressing the root cause of women’s subordinate status as well as
global inequalities (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Whereas the issue of violence against
women opened up a clearly demarcated space for activism, the ‘women and
development’ paradigm never attracted the international civil society’s attention to be
transformed into a transnational advocacy network.
50

Gender-based violence has been an issue for transnational advocacy networks
since the late 1980s and entered the agenda of the UN around the same time. It also
marked a move away from the discrimination discourse that was institutionalized by

50
The attractiveness of the ‘violence against women’ concept comes from its wide applicability. Unlike
female genital mutilation, dowry death or honor killings, which are seen as issues particular to a certain
region and culture that require white women’s attention to save the women of those regions, violence
against women encompasses all women, in the North and South, East and West. Since it includes domestic
violence, which is as severe in the West as it is elsewhere, in addition to more particular forms of violence,
the ‘violence against women’ creates the common ground for women from around the world to work
together on equal terms.

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CEDAW towards a human rights framework. By the mid-1990s it probably was the most
significant international women’s issue, and in the second half of the 1990s, it was a
common advocacy position for both the women’s and human rights movements.
Networking between associations at national and grassroots levels ensures that
activists can disseminate information and rally multiple groups to help promote new
legislation or initiatives that help women. State-initiated actions tend to put issues that are
related to women’s economic welfare on the agenda. Women’s nongovernmental
organizations, on the other hand, put body politics on the agenda and initiate public
debate. Body politics is a tricky area because of the public-private divide within human
rights discourse. Women’s organizations claim that violence carried out in the household
are still violations of human rights, and for that, states should be held responsible (Keck
and Sikkink 1998). This particular demand is very pressing for the Turkish State, because
it means intervening in the family, which is defined as the central institution of the
society and left to rule autonomously within its boundaries. Prior to their being reformed,
both the Civil and Penal Codes were designed to protect the social and the familial order
rather than individual rights.
Within the framework of human rights methodology, the aim of NGOs has been
to promote change by reporting facts and holding states responsible for abuses. In order
to achieve this aim, NGOs are expected to document abuse cases, demonstrate state
accountability through international law, and to develop mechanisms to expose abuses
both nationally and internationally (Keck and Sikkink 1998). We should note, however,

194
that there are downsides to the human rights framework. Although state-led violence and
violations of women’s human rights are prevalent in Turkey and in many parts of the
world, certain types of systemic oppression, such as women’s subordination in patriarchal
societies and structural inequalities among classes, are not easy to deal with within the
framework of rights. Sally Merry (2001) draws attention to the class dimension of state’s
involvement in gender-based violence and the importance of civil societal actors. She
notes that states are reluctant to invest in protection of poor women from their batterers
and that it is only through the consistent political pressure of women’s advocates that
state are pressured to develop and extend such mechanisms.

A Note on Selection Criteria of Civil Societal Organizations
Before proceeding with the analysis of NGO practices, I need to clarify my
classification of the organizations that I have studied as nongovernmental organizations.
Cohen (1998) defines civil society as a sphere of social interaction separate from the state
and economy and he posits the need to differentiate civil society from political society
and economic society, which he rightly claims to have different orientations and
motivations. Whereas the political society comprises political parties and organizations,
the economic society comprises corporations, unions, councils and the like. The
economic society is not included in this research, yet the political society is, through
studying organizations related to three distinct political parties, all of which have

195
representation in the Turkish Parliament.
51
I do not treat women’s organizations
connected to political parties as separate from NGOs for two reasons. The first arises
from the role of the political society as the mediator between civil society and the state,
and the second has to do with the fact that political society is rooted in civil society
(Cohen 1998). I should note once again that in this analysis the civil society is not set
against the state but in relation to it. In this sense, the nature of the relationship the NGOs
have with state institutions and actors of the political society is an important component
of the study. Examinations of the practices of the NGOs are based on my in-depth
interviews with their presidents or members, participant observation in meetings and
workshops organized by the NGOs, as well as material published by these organizations.
In addition to the NGOs listed below, I conducted interviews with lawyers, academicians,
members of political parties (member of the parliament or vice mayor), administered a
survey among women staying in the shelter run by one of the NGOs (Purple Roof), and
conducted informal focus groups with women utilizing different NGOs services. I chose
the NGOs according to their visibility in public debates, proximity to the state or the
Kurdish nationalist movement, their reach and effectiveness in their locale, and their role
in the Turkish women’s movement.
The NGOs included in this work are as follows. In Diyarbakır: KAMER
(Women’s Center), Selis Women’s Solidarity Foundation, DIKASUM (Diyarbakır
Metropolitan Municipality Center for Investigation and Application of Women’s Issues),

51
The political parties in question are the governing Justice and Development Party, and two opposition
parties, the Kemalist and secular Republican People’s Party and the representative of the Kurdish
population Democratic Society Party.

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Bar Association of Diyarbakır Center for Women’s Rights.
52
In Istanbul: Women for
Women’s Human Rights – New Ways, Purple Roof Women’s Foundation, Bar
Association of Istanbul Center for Women’s Rights, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality
Coordination Center for Women, Kadıköy Municipality Coordination Center for
Women’s Issues.

Women’s NGOs in Turkey: How Do They Fight Honor Crimes?
I have noted in the previous chapters that the well-organized women’s movement
and the nation-wide Women’s Platform for the Reformation of the Penal and Civil Codes
were one of the most significant forces behind the legal achievements that Turkish
women obtained in the last decade. In today’s Turkey, women are organized around
independent women’s organizations or centers founded and funded by municipalities
(Altınay and Arat 2007). Funding is a very important concern for NGOs, especially for
those providing services to victims of gender-based violence. There is a close connection
between the autonomy of an organization and its sources of funding. Autonomy or
independence is a major concern for many of the NGOs, which deliberately add
‘independent’ in front of their names. Independence, however, is a relative concept.
Whereas it might mean financial independence for some NGOs, it means ideological

52
I had interviews scheduled with two other DSP municipality run organizations, Baglar Municipality
Women’s Cooperation (Kardelen) and Yenisehir Municipality Center for Psychological Support
(EPIDEM). During my fieldwork, two significant public figures and members of the DSP were killed in a
car accident. My remaining two interviews were thus canceled either for the preparation of the funerals or
due to the period of mourning. Fortunately, I obtained printed materials produced by these two NGOs.

197
independence for many others. Not forgetting that the two are not mutually
exclusive.The relatively stronger and larger NGOs in Turkey fund their activities by
resources provided by international organizations such as the European Union, the United
Nations, embassies and consulates of (predominantly northern) European countries,
foundations in the U.S or Europe, or nationally through the state or municipalities. Such
funds are provided on a project basis and new grant proposals should be written at the
end of each project. Project-based activities have been a source of dispute among the
feminist movement in Turkey. Whereas certain groups look down upon organizations that
base their activities on projects funded by external sources and call it ‘project feminism’
to denote that the political content of the movement is sacrificed (Bora and Günal 2002),
several others emphasize the vitality of such projects that reaches women in remote areas
and provide much needed services for them (Kümbetoglu 2002). The opposition group
fears that the NGOs will lose their independent voice and surrender to the discourse and
ideology of the fund-raising institutions, which, they claim, serve the ideals of neoliberal
capitalism. They are also worried that the competition for limited funds will hinder
cooperation between different NGOs and turn them into rivals (Yalcin 2006). Regardless
of their position on sources of funding, all women’s organizations agree that projects
carried out by women’s NGOs should not become a permanent substitute for the state’s
obligation: which is protecting the rights of its citizens. In other words, NGOs should not
be responsible for generating funds, to open and run shelters for victims of violence, or
create employment opportunities for women. These are the responsibilities of the state.

198
NGOs, on the other hand, should generate funds to open up political space for them to
pressure the state into fulfilling its responsibilities.
I want to provide the histories and missions of the organizations that I studied for
this research, to situate them within the women’s movement, and then move on to a
detailed analysis of their activities in the field and their relation to and critique of the
state.

KAMER Diyarbakır (Women’s Center)
I start with KAMER because of its widespread influence in the region and both
national and international recognition. It also occupies a controversial place among the
women’s NGOs for reasons I will explain below. I have to note that the space devoted to
KAMER is a reflection of its institutionalization and well-organized structure. It has a
website that defines its mission and principles, spreads information about KAMER, its
aims and functions, as well as providing an emergency hotline. It has centers all over the
eastern and southeastern Turkey. Its president Nebahat Akkoç is a well-known figure
who is a familiar face on nationwide media. Due to the availability of funds and
distribution of information about its activities nationwide, KAMER is the NGO that
comes to mind when honor killings and gender-based violence in the region is concerned.
KAMER was founded in 1997 in Diyarbakır as an organization to fight violence
against women and provide support to victims of violence. Nebahat Akkoç, president and
founder of KAMER, states that, as residents of a problematic region, the women first

199
became aware of state violence under custody or through harassment on the streets.
53

Then, she adds, they realized the link between different forms of violence and more
importantly recognized that it all begins in the family. Violence is normalized in the
household. Currently, KAMER has centers in 23 provinces in eastern and southeastern
Turkey and aim at expanding even more. In its website, KAMER defines feminism as
‘indispensable for a world that is free of patriarchy, discrimination, and violence’
(KAMER Website). It does not consider ‘a single feminism’ but defines itself as all
embracing with the objective of creating a better world for women.
Ms. Akkoç is a very strong and influential figure, and I got the impression that,
especially during the first years of the center, her character, determination and
networking skills were the driving force behind the expansion and success of the
organization. KAMER’s growth emanates from the loyalty and committment of those
women who originally came looking for a resolution to their individual crisis through a
process that led to self-awareness and empowerment and decided to share their
experience with newcomers. Thus, the majority of members and volunteers of KAMER
are former applicants, who managed to take control of their own lives. They call it a
learning process in which they became aware of the violence, sexism and oppression, and
find strength through mutual support.

53
Nebahat Akkoç is a former primary school teacher. Her husband, a member of the Kurdish independence
movement, was killed by unknown assassins in 1993. Following her husband’s murder, Ms. Akkoç was
arrested and tortured by the Turkish police.

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Among the women’s movement in Diyarbakır, KAMER is known to be the
recipient of the largest funds through the state, international organizations, embassies,
consulates and the like. Frankly, just comparing the offices of KAMER with those of the
otherNGOs, is sufficient to realize the extent of the funding and its ability to manage the
upkeep of 23 centers throughout the region. KAMER has also managed to generate its
own sources of income. Starting with a little kitchen and workshop, KAMER now owns a
café in one of the tourist centers in Diyarbakır and a small hotel in Tunceli.
One of the reasons why other NGOs in Diyarbakır distance themselves from
KAMER is its close links with the state both in terms of collaboration and funding. This
situation creates a paradoxical twist. Whereas other women’s NGOs blame KAMER for
not being independent from the state and its discourse (which should be read in the case
of Diyarbakır as being distant to the Kurdish independence movement), KAMER is the
one NGO that strongly emphasizes its independent stance, yet in this case its detachment
from the Kurdish movement. Claiming that they do not want to surrender women’s issues
to nationalist struggles, KAMER criticizes NGOs that are close to the DSP or are
founded by DSP run municipalities. KAMER’s independence is explained as keeping an
equal distance between every institution, movement or organization, which actually
means the state, the Kurdish movement and the DSP. However, they still embrace the
Kurdish identity yet not prioritizing it. The following statement from their self-definition
is informative in that sense, ‘although a majority of the women we work with and support
identify as Kurdish, we do not want to be the Kurdish Women’s Center. We do not want
to be limited to a single identity. Believing that each woman is equally important, we

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want to make sure that KAMER will be center for non-Kurdish women as well’
(KAMER Website).
KAMER is also unique in its integration to the discourse of the transnational
women’s rights movement. The discourse employed by KAMER is well informed by the
literature on transnational advocacy networks and operations of international
organizations. The definition of concepts, methods and practices they use is, I think,
another reflection of its connection to trans-border networks. Several members of
KAMER and the mission statement on their website express that during the first years
their aim was to generate awareness about the invisible types of violence against women,
meaning violence in the family, and providing emergency support to victims of violence.
After 2000, however, KAMER revised its mission statement based on the experiences
and demands of the women they work with as determining cultural practices that are
harmful to women and children, developing alternative practices that are in line with
human rights, and developing methods to ensure that alternative practices are applicable.
Activists indicate that they felt the need to reframe their mission because some of the
women they worked with were afraid that the protection of women’s human rights
required a total renunciation of the culture they grew up in. This bias generated a
resistance against their activities. They thus, reconstructed their methodology and
concepts based on the experience from the field. The concern about culture was also
raised by transnational advocacy networks. Participants of the first Women’s Leadership
Institute on Women Violence and Human Rights worked to develop international
standards that could be applied across cultures. In order to avoid culture bashing or

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accepting all customs without questioning, they came up with the phrase ‘practices that
are physically harmful to women and girls’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 195-6).
KAMER has been working to end violence against women since 1997 and did not
address honor killing until 2003 when their helpline received a call from a girl saying that
her family were going to kill her.A couple of days later, they received a second call from
the same woman, she mentioned the name of her village this time. Several other calls
followed saying that nothing could be done, her family was determined to kill her, but
said nothing more. About a month later, they read in a local newspaper that a woman was
murdered in that same village ‘in the name of honor’. That was when KAMER realized
that it had failed to associate honor with violence all that time. ‘We were very careful and
sensitive about domestic violence. But despite our orientation, even we failed to realize
honor, because we had normalized and internalized it so much that we didn’t question,
until that phone call’, explained Nebahat Akkoç. In 2003, KAMER launched the first
project on honor killings with financial support from Sweden. They targeted reaching and
rescuing three women within a year. They received 23 applications and saved their lives.
KAMER records indicate that, as of August 2009, more than 400 women were saved
from possible honor murders (Kaya 2009).
KAMER employs different methods to deal with possible honor killings and
domestic violence. To begin with, it emphasizes that they are not organized to end honor
killings or domestic violence; that, they say, is beyond their power and responsibility.
‘We pointed out the problem and what the state should do to deal with these. The

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circulars of the Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Interior are important steps. Now
we’re working for the documents to be realized’ (Nebahat Akkoç). When a woman, a
friend or family member of the woman, contacts KAMER about a possible honor murder,
KAMER starts the rescue process immediately. Its experience in the field taught
KAMER that even for the simplest of cases it should seek the support of state institutions,
which are, according to the circular, supposed to be involved in the process. The first step
is picking up the woman escorted by the police or gendarme. The next step is hiring an
attorney for the woman and filing the case at the public prosecutor’s office. Then they
change the woman’s physical appearance (to avoid her being recognized by relatives and
others looking for her) and relocate her to a safer place, sometimes even if the decision
contradicts with the woman’s wishes, yet only when a serious life threat is concerned. If
the woman in danger states that her family will never change its mind and is determined
to kill her, and demands to be taken away, she is then placed in a shelter in a remote place
or with friends or relatives proven to be safe. If, on the other hand, the woman thinks that
an influential person in the Kurdish movement, the municipality, the DSP, or a religious
figure (a sheikh or the mufti) might convince the family to reconsider the decision, then
KAMER contacts the family through the nominated third party.
The procedure is totally different for domestic violence cases. First of all,
KAMER does not intervene in domestic violence issues. The woman needs to apply the
center in person, which they think indicates her determination to change her life. The
starting point is making sure that the woman regains the self-esteem and confidence that
she lost due to all sorts of violence she experienced. Then the applicant is incorporated in

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group studies and self-awareness meetings that teach her about legal procedures, her
constitutional, civil and human rights, feminism and organizing, communication,
violence and gender roles, and possible ways to break the cycle. The aim is to help her
realize how the norms, traditions and institutions that affect her status in the society and
family surround her. They want the women to start questioning these mechanisms
themselves and develop informed methods of resistance. KAMER also organizes field
trips, where they visit various but especially disadvantaged neighborhoods to inform
women about KAMER, women’s rights and available mechanisms of support. In
addition, they hold town hall meetings, which are interactive meetings designed to
involve all related (and interested) parties, women and men as well as local state
institutions and NGOs, in a discussion on gender inequality and problems it causes.
In order for the international movement to be effective, human rights ideas need to
be interpreted by the local actors and be situated in the local context (Merry, 2006).
NGOs are the local actors that serve as the intermediaries between international texts and
local practices. KAMER is very careful in adapting international standards to regional
practices. They define it as ‘thinking globally and acting locally’. It is a framework based
on tailoring their methods according to the particular features of the region they work in.
‘We have to work with women who are knowledgeable about local features’, said Vildan
Ayçiçek, an activist in KAMER. She told me that the methods used in the cities differ
from those in rural areas. In certain towns where women are not allowed to leave their
homes, KAMER organizes literacy or home economics courses that all women in the
town can attend. They then explain the services the local center provides. The women

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learn that there is a center they can apply if need arises. Alternatively, in cases of a
possible honor killing, KAMER might try to communicate with the woman’s family and
convince them to spare her life. However, Akkoç explains that they cannot refer to
human rights or a woman’s right over her body. That would just break the relations and
result in the condemnation of the speaker of those words. In order to be respected and
taken seriously, they have to obey local norms, be careful about what they say, how they
sit and even what they wear (Akkoç 2004).
Another point that separates KAMER from other NGOs is its programs that target
the gender order and aim at generating societal changes in the perception of gender roles.
Akkoç claims that because of their activities in the region, they have managed to reach
more than forty thousand women in 23 different cities. Change is happening; very slow
and very slight, but still things have started to change. ‘This is a vast geography and
we’re talking about people from very different backgrounds and life styles. The women
that we reached are very sensitive about gender roles when raising their own children,
they place equal importance on the education of girls, and they have even started
celebrating a girl’s first period. Women are more visible now’. In order to generate a
societal change, KAMER believes, it has to start at an early stage, before individuals are
already socialized into existing norms and codes. That is one reason why they have
established daycare and pre-school facilities in every city they are organized. The daycare
centers serve two purposes: First, raising gender conscious individuals. Nilufer Yilmaz,
another KAMER activist, explains as follows ‘It is hard to change the mentality and ideas
that people have had for thirty or forty years. Even men respond to training programs, but

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it is a slow and difficult process. That’s the importance of pre-school activities. The State
should implement a similar curriculum starting from elementary school, one that is
gender neutral’. The second is using them as places to organize women, who are not
allowed to go to the women’s centers but can take their kids to pre-school activities.
There is one other point that I find significant about KAMER’s approach to
women’s relation to societal norms and constraints. Saba Mahmood (2005) introduces the
concept of individual autonomy as central to notions of both negative and positive
freedom.
54
She states that in order to be free, an individual’s actions must be the
consequence of her own will rather than custom, tradition or social coercion. In this
context, the following statement by Nebahat Akkoç gains a new meaning, ‘We do not call
women murdered in the name of honor as ‘victims’, they were resisters and they died.
Actually, every woman knows the consequences of her action when she chooses
disobedience, but still she goes ahead and does it’. Thus, while condemning the practice
and struggling to eradicate it, KAMER does not reduce women in this society to victims
who just made a mistake and paid it with their lives. It recognizes their agency in
accordance with what Mahmood (referring to Foucault) called ‘the paradox of
subjectivation, where the very processes and conditions that secure a subject’s
subordination are also the means by which she becomes a self-conscious identity and
agent’ (Mahmood 2005:17).

54
Negative freedom denotes the absence of external obstacles to self-guided choice and action, regardless
of the imposing party. Positive freedom is the capacity to realize autonomous will in accord with universal
reason (Mahmood 2005: 10-11).

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KAMER, like all the other NGOs in Diyarbakır, has a problem with the way
honor is conceptualized in Turkish society, though they, too, admit that particularities of
the region, such as the war that lasted for more than a decade, forced migration, state
violence and poverty, make it even harder for women. ‘What we strive for is to transform
the way honor is perceived. We also try to explain that dishonorable acts mean something
totally different. But however hard we try, honor is defined through women’s bodies, not
only bodies but their life spaces, behavior, social relations. All the rules and norms
around womanhood comprise honor. Depending on where they live, their education level,
economic, social and cultural standing, all women are surrounded by constraints. Any act
of transgression turns into a reason for murder’, summarizes Nebahat Akkoç. A final
point that requires attention concerns the perception of honor murders by the national
public opinion. KAMER, and all other NGOs in Diyarbakır, is disturbed by honor
killings to be identified with regions populated by the Kurds. They emphasize that,
unfortunately, gender-based violence is a global issue. There is not a single country in the
world that is immune to violence against women. The same is true for Turkey; the
conceptualization of honor through women’s bodies and violence against women is
equally prevalent in western regions as well as eastern and southeastern. To begin with,
KAMER is against the state approach that identifies such murders as custom murders,
indicating that it is an issue particular to the Kurds, thus a minor problem. KAMER
rejects the idea that honor murder is a Kurdish problem. The core of the problem is the
sexist system, KAMER claims, and criticizes the state for using it as an excuse for ethnic
discrimination. Vildan explains it in simple words ‘When it happens in western regions,

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they say it’s a passion crime or the man had a mental breakdown. But here it’s always a
custom or honor crime!’

Selis Women’s Solidarity Foundation
Selis Women’s Solidarity Foundation was founded in 2002 on a basis of need to
provide psychological counseling to women who have unduly suffered because of the
fighting between Kurdish guerilla forces and the Turkish military. Selis, which means
‘luminous’ in Sumerian and ‘guide’ in Persian, is one of the NGOs that defines itself as
independent. Selis explains independence as the principle of not accepting funds from
any institution, be it the state or any other. They think that external funding is sure to
result in interference with their activities. They, thus, explicitly criticize KAMER and
other NGOs that heavily rely on outside resources. ‘Our motto is ‘for women, with
women’. Regardless of language, religion or ethnicity, we work with and provide support
for everyone. We work in close relation with DIKASUM and Kardelen, but not KAMER.
Not that we didn’t try, but KAMER did not want to join the Diyarbakır Women’s
Platform’, Berivan Kaya stated. When I asked them to elaborate, it became apparent that
it is not only a matter of funding. Selis criticized KAMER for being manipulated by the
state and said that their women policies are totally different. According to Selis, although
KAMER ran successful campaigns to raise the issues of the region nationwide, it does
not agree with its local policies. Thus, for women who do not see women’s issues as
separate from ethnic issues (particularly oppression of the Kurdish people by the Turkish

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State), any collaboration with state institutions, even if for the sake of women, will not
yield positive outcome in the long-run as long as the state refuses to change its Kurdish
policy. However, this does not mean that they postpone the women’s issue until after the
resolution of the Kurdish problem. They realize that resolution of the Kurdish issue will
not automatically eradicate violence against women, like the proponents of
modernization project, who assume that development would cure all problems.
Nonetheless, they emphasize that in addition to structural factors that reproduce women’s
oppression all around Turkey, the region in which they live and work presents the most
severe problems because of the fighting: rape, sexual abuse under custody, forced
migration, language barriers and poverty take the lead.
Sudan Güven, one of the oldest members and volunteers of Selis, defines women
and children as those most hard hit by war. ‘Masculine mentality starts the war but
women suffer the most. One of the negative effects of war on people is psychological.
We wanted women to organize, join and become involved with the struggle provide
psychological support. We also wanted to organize women, we wanted them to become
members and partake in organized struggle’. Selis provides counseling in legal,
psychological and health related issues. Sudan Güven also mentions the difficulties of
being an NGO in the region, stating that there is an immense state pressure and control
over NGO activities. Selis defines its most important area of activity as state violence.
War and language violence are central components of state violence according to Selis.
‘The struggle for women is a tough venture in this region. We are subject to various sorts
of violence during our work because of language; I cannot express myself in my native

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tongue [Kurdish]. I have to speak Turkish or else I will not be heard at all. It also subjects
us to intellectual violence’, said Sudan Guven. Selis’ conceptualization of violence
against women is relatively different from other NGOs in the region and that difference
comes from the centrality of war. Their activities are geared towards eliminating the
trauma caused by war especially on women and children. Admitting that the feudal
structure, patriarchy and sexism in the society are the causes of women’s oppression and
gender-based violence, Selis emphasizes that the actual situation in the region is a direct
result of the ongoing war between the Kurdish people and the Turkish state for more then
three decades. It claims that violence against women cannot be eradicated unless the war
is over. Several times during the interview, our conversation was interrupted by the voice
of planes taking off from the military base in Diyarbakır to bomb PKK camps in northern
Iraq.
55
I could see the frustration in the eyes of the three Selis activists whenever they
heard the planes. ‘We are trying to work for women in the shadow of war. Can you
imagine the psyche of women who should live with this? We don’t even know if we will
make it to the office tomorrow. Our hopes and our future are stolen from us’, is how
Güven explained it.
Selis applies multiple methodologies to reach women who need their help. Their
doors are open for walk-ins, who have heard about Selis through a friend or their field
works. But it is almost impossible for women living in the rural areas to go to the city

55
The summer of 2008 was one of the periods of intense cross-border military operations that targeted
PKK guerilla camps in northern Iraq. Although the fighting and bombing took place outside of the borders
of the Turkish Republic, the Kurdish population was intensely affected by the operations because the
guerillas located in northern Iraq were the Kurds of Turkey and friends, family members and relatives of
people of Diyarbakır, including my informants.

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center to get help. Berivan Kaya told me that a woman could be killed for just visiting
Selis. Thus, Selis organizes field trips, picnics, programs in pilot regions. There they
inform women about their rights, health (especially reproductive health) issues and
psychological counseling. Lawyers, health personnel and teachers voluntarily organize
education seminars during these events or separately at the Selis office. There have been
instances where women came out about their traumatic experiences on these socializing
events. During one of those picnics, for instance, one woman shared with Berivan that
she was raped by two soldiers. In addition to these services, Selis runs a daycare center
for the children of their applicants. They are very sensitive in making sure that Selis
workers and volunteers are bilingual. This is how Berivan explains the importance of
language, ‘When women come to us and hear us speaking Kurdish, they trust us. It would
be an additional violence if we answered the applicant in Turkish when she spoke
Kurdish’.
Selis focuses on war related trauma but also provides services for victims of
domestic violence or honor crimes. If the life of a woman is at stake due to an honor
murder, Selis first attempts to reach the woman. Then, based on her needs, she receives
counseling, and either a lawyer is found for her or she goes into a shelter. In certain
instances, when life threat is severe, Selis organizes for the woman’s escape to another
city or if required to another country. Selis admits that the way the society conceptualizes
honor as an attribute of women is harmful to women. ‘Women get killed for wanting to
either marry the people of their choice or to get divorced. These cannot be considered
reasons to kill someone but it is a prevalent problem for us. Violence against women is

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everywhere but the difficulties of our region make it worse’, says Berivan. Still, Selis is
against the idea that honor murder is a problem limited to an ethnicity and region. They
think that the way this particular type of gender-based violence is presented by the state
and the media is a reflection of the state’s policy on the Kurdish issue. In this respect,
Selis is critical of the Turkish women’s movement attitude to the issue. They mention
that they are ready to collaborate with ‘Turkish women’ for the resolution of the problem.
However, they note, when they gather in nationwide meetings or conventions, even if
Turkish women’s organization admit that honor killings are not a regional problem and
that the ethnic conlict and military operations are of utmost importance for eradication of
violence, they fail to develop a unified policy against these.

DIKASUM Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality Center for Investigation and
Application of Women’s Issues
DIKASUM was established in 2001 by Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality
under its Social Services Division in accordance with the municipality’s policy on
women’s issues. Since 1999, Diyarbakır Municipality is run by a political party that
represents the Kurdish population.
56
Currently, the metropolitan municipality is governed

56
The Turkish Constitution allows the Constitutional Court to ban political parties proven that their
activities cause a threat to the unity of the state with its nation, national sovereignty, republic, national
security, public order, general peace, morals and health, and public good. In accordance with the
constitution, several political parties were banned from politics within the history of the Turkish Republic.
Pro-Kurdish political parties appeared on the Turkish political scene with HEP (People’s Labor Party).
Following its closure, DEP (Democracy and Equality Party) was established and eventually banned. Then
followed OZDEP (Freedom and Democracy Party), HADEP (People’s Democracy Party), DEHAP
(Democratic People’s Party), and DSP (Democratic Society Party). DSP which is banned from politics and
closed on December 11, 2009. The party continues to operate under a new name, BDP (Peace and
Democracy Party), since the closure.

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by the DSP. In addition to DIKASUM, the metropolitan municipality opened three
laundry houses in different neighborhoods in 2004 and a shelter in 2008.
DIKASUM is designed to reach women from different socio-economic
backgrounds, provide legal and psychological counseling and other necessary social
services to improve the status of women. It works to bring forth the women’s problems,
create gender awareness, eradicate violence against women and organize women through
solidarity networks. For a center with such a wide array of operation areas, DIKASUM
has a small personnel group to handle all the activities.
The laundry houses are important places for organizing activities for women,
determining and solving their problems, targeting particularly women who migrated to
the city from rural areas. In addition to providing free of charge laundry service, the
metropolitan municipality organizes literacy courses, provides legal counseling,
information about health (especially reproductive health) issues, offers courses and
daycare facilities for the children. In all the activities organized by the municipality,
creating gender awareness, informing women about their rights, eradicating violence
against women are mentioned as fundamental. They try to generate change in women’s
everyday lives starting from easing their lives through provision of appliances to
intervention into the household in cases of domestic violence. Laundry houses have a
wider outreach than any other organization. In 2006, 767 women, who were
predominantly victims of forced migration, applied to DIKASUM to get help from the
center regarding various issues ranging from possible honor killings to domestic violence,

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employment enquires, economic problems, health problems and education related issues.
In the same period, 1,760 women applied to laundry houses to get help with the same
criteria (DIKASUM 2006 Activity Report). During one of my visits to a laundry house
to talk with the women gathered there, I learned that the women were most interested in
courses that had offered them personal enrichment. Whereas reading and writing courses
are the most popular among women with a hundred percent completion rate, sewing
courses are discontinued due to lack of interest.
It is a tough job to provide such services with appointed personnel. One of the
determining features of NGO work is the significance of volunteers, who partake in
action with the belief that their involvement will assist in the realization of an ideal.
Municipalities face the problem of employing a limited number of people to fill multiple
roles for relatively low pay. Municipality-run NGOs look perfect on paper but require
dedication and sacrifice to put into practise. During my fieldwork in Diyarbakır, I met
several women working at different levels in various DSP run municipalities, who had
changed the face and meaning of civil society in the city. Their determination and
dedication to work for women has brought about positive changes that saved many
women’s lives. However, there were also others for whom civil societal activities were
just a part of their job description. Handan Co şkun, who was recently relocated to another
branch within the social services section of the metropolitan municipality after serving as
the director of DIKASUM for seven years, told me the difficulties of working with
women who are in dire need of help. She thinks that once you are involved in their lives
you cannot just leave when the project is over. Accordingly, this is a relatively new arena

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for DSP municipalities. Although the definition of aims and work areas are very wide, the
personnel and budget are not proportional. Coskun also noted that it was about time the
municipalities started to do something for the women,since more than half of the city’s
population comprises women and given the particularities of the region, the local
governments are responsible for catering to the women’s needs beyond attracting them as
potential voters.
Handan Co şkun told me that she had received numerous honor killing applications
over seven years. She had to host 74 women in her own house because the municipality
did not have a shelter until 2008. She criticizes the NGOs that have access to large funds
for not making effective use of the funds. She is also worried that many NGOs attend to
an honor killing case when it makes news or at the woman’s funeral and suggests a
better-organized field work to reach more women. DIKASUM’s stance on the
regionalization of honor killings echoes other NGOs in Diyarbakır. They do not agree
that honor violence is particular to Kurds or to southeastern Turkey. Violence against
women is a universal issue and limiting the problem and possible methods of solving it to
one particular region does nothing more than serving nationalism. One further point that I
should mention about DIKASUM and other DSP-run municipality organizations is that in
addition to providing solutions to the immediate problems of women, their activities
target altering the unequal gender order by creating a bottom up change through gender
awareness activities. Both the metropolitan municipality and several smaller
municipalities in Diyarbakır mention this as one of their priorities.

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Diyarbakır Bar Association Center for Women’s Rights
The Center for Women’s Rights was established in 1999 after working as a
commission for several years. The Center has fifty members all of whom went through a
vocational training program. The potential for honor murders is one of the Center’s main
priorities due to the direct threat to women’s lives and the frequency of the threat
becoming reality, in this region. Meral Danı ş Be şta ş, the former president of the Center,
said that generally ‘women at risk’ visit the Center to give first hand accounts of their
circumstances. Based on the known facts, the Center assesses the threat to life and then
directs her to a shelter prior to taking legal action. Unfortunately, in many cases, the
Center receives an application after the woman is murdered. The problem with honor
murders that concerns lawyers the most is that both the perpetrators and the victim are
from the same family. Thus, for the Center lawyers to be involved in the case someone
who is a first degree relative to the victim should personally apply to the Center and
request their involvement. Another point that requires consideration is that when a family
member (generally the mother of the victim) approaches the Center, the family threatens
her own life.
Based on the idea that legal reforms will not be effective in everyday life unless
state and legal officials embrace and understand the need for change, the Center
organizes gender awareness and women’s human rights courses for state officials at
certain levels. They are however, the first to admit that it would be unreasonable to
accept a four-hour course to work miracles. Transforming the patriarchal mentality that is

217
deeply engraved in judges and public prosecutors requires long-term planning and
investment.
The Bar Association of Diyarbakır issued a statement criticizing the exclusion of
honor killings from the new Penal Code and limiting aggravated attacks to only custom
crimes. The statement targeted the nationalist approach that tries to associate murder of
women with the Kurdish culture. It also had a legal point of view claiming that honor
murders should be applied as an aggravated case to all cases all around Turkey to provide
protection to more women. Besides, it would not mean excluding custom crimes, because
the Bar Association claimed, honor crimes cover custom crimes as well. Ferda Miran, a
volunteer lawyer for the Center, states that they are well aware that violence against
women cannot be thought independent from the socio-structural characteristics of the
region. Nonetheless, it should not turn into an exclusion and othering of the region. ‘We
(Kurds) do not have tails like the state wants the rest of Turkey to believe’, adds Meral
Danı ş cynically.
The Center for Women’s Rights collaborates with all the NGOs in Diyarbakır to
protect women from possible honor killings and provide legal support in cases brought to
them by other organizations. It also organizes training and education sessions to create
gender awareness, not only among women but also among state and legal officials, who
are in contact with women on a day-to-day basis..
All NGO activists from Diyarbakır wanted to draw attention to the fact that the
patriarchal system is prevalent all over Turkey, affecting the lives of every woman

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regardless of class, education, ethnicity and location of residence. They are aware that the
cultural setting of the region is particular and makes life harder especially for women.
That is why these NGOs operate in the region in the first place. Several factors intensify
the degree of violence that women face here. However, instead of blaming ‘culture’ as
the sole reason for the prevailing conditions, we need to look deeper and take into
consideration the structural factors that make the region what it is. Among these, the
dominating power of the feudal land structure deserves a particular place. The rural life,
forced migration, ongoing political tension and armed conflict, lack of education,
language and communication problems, and poverty follow as important factors that
deserve attention to solve the problem.

WWHR-New Ways (Women for Women’s Human Rights)
Women for Women’s Human Rights (WWHR) is an Istanbul based NGO founded
in 1993. Its mission statement is to facilitate the empowerment of women and women’s
right organizations by documenting laws and practices that promote or constrain
women’s rights. At the same time, it works to generate public awareness regarding the
violation of such rights. Increasing legal literacy, improving information gathering and
exchange; the solidarity between groups through networking and outreach programs are
their primary methods of influencing the state in the area of policy and legal change, at
both national and international levels. WWHR is a collaborator in several international
networks, such as UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women), IWRAW

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(participation of local NGOs in the CEDAW process), the Center for Women’s Global
Leadership and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Seral 2000).
WWHR aims at ending discrimination against women through empowerment programs
that are linked to action research. It informs grassroots women’s organizations about
methods for confronting structures of inequality. A second area of operation is organizing
training in women’s human rights and violence against women.
WWHR is involved in lobbying activities at the national and international levels.
It has been one of the most prominent organizations within the women’s movement in
Turkey and it took the lead in organizing women’s organizations nationwide in several
campaigns to make their voice heard in matters directly affecting their lives. The
campaigns for the improvements of the Turkish Civil and Penal Codes have marked a
turning point for the women’s movement. WWHR is equally active in the international
level in terms of advocacy. Here, I want to focus on WWHR’s use of its link to
transnational advocacy networks and international bodies of governance to show how the
boomerang pattern (Keck and Sikkink 1998) is employed by local NGOs to influence the
state.
In 1997 and 2005, WWHR prepared the shadow NGO reports on Turkey’s
periodic report to the CEDAW Committee. In addition to WWHR, the shadow report was
endorsed by 26 women’s organizations nationwide that comprise the Women’s Platform
on the Turkish Penal Code (hereon the Platform).
57
Starting from the reformation of the

57
All of the women’s organizations (except for municipality-related centers) and bar associations that I
studied took part in the preparation of the shadow report except for KAMER. Neither KAMER nor other

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Civil and Penal Codes, WWHR and the Platform have been in close contact with the
Turkish state to ensure that women’s voice and a gender perspective were incorporated
into the legal reform process. Despite the overall success of the campaigns, a number of
critical issues remained unresolved or unanswered by the state. Unable to have the state
address these critical issues and revise the legislative reform, the Platform bypassed the
state and carried the matter to the United Nations through the shadow report. The 2005
shadow report focuses on six areas and questions Turkey’s fourth and fifth combined
periodic reports to the CEDAW committee with respect to certain legal and public
administrative on the agenda of the Turkish Parliament (WWHR 2005). With reference to
CEDAW requirements that the Turkish state is liable of fulfilling, the Platform asked the
CEDAW Committee to pressure the state to take action in accordance with the NGOs
demands.
The exclusion of honor killings from the new Turkish Penal Code, ineffective
criminalization of virginity testing, and the quantitative lack and low quality of shelters,
lack of affirmative action, and rejection of the amendment to introduce a gender quota for
political parties were listed among the problem areas that indicated Turkey’s
unwillingness to eliminate gender discrimination and violence against women.
Examining the Turkish State’s periodic report and the NGO shadow report, the
Committee’s concluding report stated that although Turkey’s constitutional and
legislative provisions on equality were important steps, the Committee was concerned

NGOs commented on this so I presume having a close relation with the state precluded KAMER from
collaborating with other organizations to complain about the state in the international arena, but this point
needs further investigation.

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that Turkey’s legislation does not contain a definition of discrimination against women in
accordance with CEDAW. It thus recommended its inclusion in the Constitution and
appropriate laws. The Committee then explicitly mentioned the use of ‘custom killings’
instead of ‘honor killings’ in the new Penal Code and the continued application of
virginity testing were provisions that continue to discriminate against women. It then
called upon the state to revise the law on virginity testing, ensure that honor killings are
penalized as aggravated homicide, monitor the effectiveness of the Law on the protection
of the Family, and take measures to increase the representation of women in politics
among other recommendations (CEDAW 2005). Thus, each and every item in the NGO
shadow report that the Platform has been trying to impose on the state were indirectly
enforced through the use of an international organization.

Purple Roof Women’s Foundation
Purple Roof is one of the oldest NGOs in the women’s movement. It was founded
in 1990 following the marches and protests against domestic violence that marked the
launching of a new phase of the women’s movement in Turkey. Purple Roof is the
culmination of a series of events. When women realized that they needed more than
solidarity to be protected from and eradicate violence, the idea of a women’s foundation
was born. Purple Roof opened as the first independent shelter in 1995. After three years
of operation and more than six-hundred women and children served, the shelter was shut
down due to financial problems. In 2005, Purple Roof signed an agreement with the

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District Governorship of Beyoglu to jointly run the shelter. While the governorship
financially supported the shelter, Purple Roof operated it in accordance with international
feminist principles. The project, however, was terminated by the governorship in 2008
and Purple Roof volunteers were asked to leave the shelter, despite the outrage and
protests of the women’s movement. Since 2009, Purple Roof has been operating as an
independent shelter from new premises with the financial support of the women’s
movement.
Purple Roof focuses exclusively on violence against women. They do not organize
training programs or courses for women’s education or awareness raising.
58
Yet, the
counselors at Purple Roof define the shelter and the solidarity center as an arena of
political struggle, where women who suffered from violence and Purple Roof volunteers
jointly question and deconstruct gender violence and inequality. Fatma Mefküre Budak
and Gülsün Kunat Dinç, both volunteers in Purple Roof, define the process as enriching
and strengthening for both parties. Solidarity is the key concept in defining their feminist
ideology. They reject hierarchical organizational scheme and silencing of others. Instead
they promote a horizontal organization where everyone is encouraged to share their
experiences and thoughts in producing a common discourse for women by women.
The shelter plays a vital role in rescuing women whose lives are in danger. Purple
Roof also facilitates women’s interaction with state institutions by assisting them if they

58
Purple Roof offers seminars on violence against women. These, however, are not designed for their
applicants but for institutions that want to have their employees, members, students, inmates etc. educated
about the issue.

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need issuance of ID cards, health insurance and the like. Purple Roof’s approach is based
on enabling women to make their own decisions about their life. The shelter experience
in Purple Roof is dramatically different from state-run shelters. To begin with, they do
not treat women like inmates. Gülsün told me that state-run shelters confiscate women’s
mobile phones when they are admitted to the shelter, they must seek permission to leave
the shelter- even to look for a job, and are questioned about their movements when they
get back. Fatma adds that they reduce women to miserable creatures who cannot decide
what is best for her, hence needs the state’s protection. That protection however, comes
with a price. Because what the state protects is not the wellbeing of women but their
honor. Women are not allowed to leave the shelter with the fear that they might meet
men, when they are not monitored by the state, explains Gülsün. If the woman’s life is
under threat, such as a possible honor killing, then the woman is placed in a safe shelter
in or outside Istanbul. They also provide legal counseling and inform women of their
citizenship rights in addition to mobilizing all available and appropriate state sources to
the woman’s service. Purple Roof believes that the creation of a feminist political space
is vital for women’s liberation and gender equality. They do not aim at replacing the state
but rather transforming the state structure through the knowledge they obtain in the field
working with women in solidarity and through feminist politics. Purple Roof is one of the
NGOs that make a thorough use of funds provided by the European Union and other
international organizations.

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Kadıköy Municipality Coordination Center for Women’s Issues
Kadıköy Municipality is one of the remaining few municipalities in Istanbul
known as the ‘Castle’ of the Republican People’s Party. The RPP and the same mayor
have run it for four consecutive terms since 1994. Within this time, the RPP has
established its legacy in Kadıköy. The activities of the Kadıköy Municipality, thus, are
inexorably bound to the RPP ideology. The RPP is also significant in the operations of
the Istanbul Bar Association Center for Women’s Rights, because the current
administration of the Center is known to be RPP supporters.
İnci Be şpınar, vice mayor of Kadıköy in the 2004-2009 period, states that when
they launched the project to solve women’s issues in 1994 in collaboration with NGOs
and academic institutions, it signified a new approach to social projects. Although such
multi-actor projects are now standard within the European Union, she adds, at that time it
was novel and was met with skepticism and suspicion. ‘It would not be a modern
approach to exclude the universities and NGOs from governance. Local governments
should share their power with the residents of their locale and incorporate them into
decision-making process’, Be şpınar says. The Coordination Center for Women’s Issues
runs one of the two municipality-run shelters in the Istanbul area. Due to the inadequate
number of shelters in Turkey, it hosts women from all around Turkey. In addition to
collaborating with academic institutions and civil society for long-term projects that aim
to provide health, education and vocational training services to the public, the Center also
utilizes European Union funds for such projects. The Center organizes women’s human
rights and gender awareness seminars for the police force working within the

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municipality. The Center provides counseling services for victims of domestic violence
and focuses its activities in neighborhoods where there is an influx of rural migrants to
urban
Similar to other Kemalists, vice-mayor Be şpınar was critical of the state as long as
she referred to the policies of the JDP government. Regarding the recent reformation of
the Civil and Penal Codes, for instance, she gave more credit to the European Union, ‘the
proposal for legal reform has been waiting for years. But they (JDP government) do not
have the awareness that this was required to become a real modern nation. The EU
pushed for it and they had to sign it thinking this is what European countries do. I think
we have to reach that level of modernity through scientific education and making use of
our country’s human potential’. Once again, it is the modernization discourse setting a
certain level of modernity to be reached where neither gender-based violence not gender
inequality continues to be a problem.

Istanbul Bar Association Center for Women’s Rights
The Center for Women’s Rights within the Bar Association of Istanbul was
actually formed in 1995by feminist lawyers, who established the center to provide free
legal counseling for the protection of women’s human rights and promotion of gender
equality in the law. However, the administration was taken over by the modernist secular
wing of the bar association and feminists were excluded. According to the incumbent
administration, they were a group of feminists who identified feminism as ‘male-hatred’

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and decided to leave the center when their ideology was not share by others. Currently,
the Center identifies the most important threat to women as the rise of political Islam and
Islamic lifestyles that repress women and try to take them back to pre-modern times. Its
criticism of state practices is informed by this particular stance, which does not question
the state structure as much as blaming JDP for its policies.
When I asked Aydeniz Alisbah Tuskan, president of the Center for Women’s
Rights, about gender-based violence she showed me a newspaper cutting with fury and
said ‘This is incredible, people go to the imam (prayer leader of a mosque) to get advice
on their relationships. My wife cheated on me with her boss, what should I do? Imam
answers, women who work outside the house are inclined to cheat on their husbands,
thus, only single and divorced women can work. That’s not a question an imam can
answer! You take your wife either to a divorce court or to couple’s therapy. That is our
problem; religion should not rule our lives’. I then realized the Ataturk rosette on her
collar. And all the pieces of the puzzle came together when she said that secularism is
fundamental for women’s rights along with rule of law. She added, ‘This is not a
religious state. Patriarchal mentality dominates women as it wishes in Islamic states, that
is what we (Turkish women) are against’. Ms. Tuskan was highly critical of the JDP
governments’s gender and sexuality politics. However, for her the problem does not arise
from the state itself as an institution. There have been times (Kemalist regime), when the
state functioned perfectly. It is the political Islamist government that tries to shape the
society and change the legislation according to its conservative religious agenda. To
eradicate gender-based violence, the Center organizes education seminars for both

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women and men, because Ms. Tuskan claims, only through education and consciousness
raising can the society realize the pressure of religion and traditions.
Ms. Tuskan is against divisions within the women’s movement. Reciting a recent
incident when the representatives of the Diyarbakır Bar Association left a nationwide
meeting following a dispute on ethnic issues. Her approach closely resembles the
modernist outlook of the state based on homogeneity and unity of the nation’.They
keeping talking about the Kurdish women’s movement. There’s no such thing as a
Kurdish women’s movement! It is the women’s movement and every single woman has
equal rights in it. Every woman has the same and equal rights in the Turkish Republic.
Some women cannot freely use their rights in certain regions, but that is because of the
societal pressure and lack of education. The state has to step in to protect its citizens’
rights’, she concluded.

Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Coordination Center for Women’s Issues
The coordination center has been in effect since Welfare Party (the predecessor of
JDP barred from politics by the Constitutional Court) took over the municipality in 1994.
Its services are not particularly targeted at women. Their unit of concern is the family.
Within the Islamic codes of modesty, the municipality reaches out to families through in
need the mothers via its female social workers, who are dressed in accordance with
Islamic dress codes. The organizing mentality reflects that of the government since the
municipality is run by JDP. Although the Women’s Services Coordination Center stresses

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that they define woman as the head of the family and that they have a woman-centered
approach (at one point the social service worker even stated that they were a ‘feminist’
municipality), they refrain from emancipating women or being engaged in consciousness
raising and awareness programs, with the fear of ‘jeopardizing the integrity of the
family’. The emphasis that families should better be kept together with an authoritative
father figure is based on the assumption that women have neither the power nor the
confidence to run their families on their own.
Of all the NGOs that I studied, the Metropolitan Municipality Coordination Center
stood out with a completely different ideology and methodology, which I believe is
reminiscent of the JDP ideology. To begin with, the Center does not intend to decompose
the family unit even if violence is prevalent. Fatma Çebi, who does the field work and is
in constant touch with the women, told that the realities of the society were different than
what we want to believe, ‘we assume that a single mother can raise her kids just as fine.
But that’s not the case. There should be a father figure, especially with Kurdish families’.
When I asked why it was worse with Kurdish families, she explained it with respect to
lack of education of the Kurdish women. The Center works with many Kurdish families
due to immigration waves. However, although language barrier hinders effective catering
to Kurdish women, she admits that they do not have a translator working in the Center.
The Center also provides information on reproductive health and birth planning
services, ‘but I am not knowledgeable about those services’, says Ms. Çebi and adds,
‘because I am not married’. Although a personal statement, Ms. Çebi’s words can be

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thought to reflect the prevalent codes of appropriate behavior and honor in the society,
which presume that women should stay virgins until marriage.
The Center does not question violence as a structural problem but treats it as an
individual issue, mainly due to the stress of economic hardships. Ms. Çebi complained
about the women internalizing and normalizing and even legitimizing violence. Still, if
traits of domestic violence are visible and the woman files a complaint, they place her in
a shelter, though not the one operated by the Municipality of Kadıköy, due to ideological
differences. One significant policy that the Center has is issuing coupons with monetary
value. The coupons are issued only to name and only women can use them. This policy,
the Center states, is to break women’s economic dependence to their husbands. When
women have the means to provide for her family, Ms. Çebi states, families are in peace
and violence is less of a problem.
Instead of empowering women, the Center provides them with alimony to release
the economic stress on the families, thus ease domestic violence caused by financial
hardship and incapacity of the husband. This approach seriously limits the activities of
IBB when improving the status of women is concerned. The Center does not have an
issue with the state or the gender order. It is basically a center to provide financial help
rather than target societal change.

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Women’s NGOs and the State: Expectations and Grievances
How can civil society actors shape discursive practices of state agents? To show
that discursive change has occurred, state actors should refer regularly to the rules not
only in defining their behavior but also in evaluating the behavior of others. Statements
by state officials such as, ‘You educate these women about their rights, now they’ll go
home and revolt’ by a director in the Governorship of Istanbul; or ‘Virginity is a feature
that women should posses before marriage’ by the Court of Cassation; or ‘Women’s
organizations keep asking for shelters, but only women turn prostitutes there’ by a Social
Services director simply prove otherwise.
Feminists note that internationally produced documents that are binding for the
states as well as state-produced texts provide them with leverage when they deal with the
state for policy changes or the improvement of existing ones. The problematic issue is
holding the state accountable for the content of those texts. The best strategy is to fight
for women’s rights both from outside and inside the state. Limiting the fight to within the
state might lead to neutralization of women’s movement. Women’s activism that
politicizes women’s issues across class and ethnicity (and sexuality) lines is necessary to
both democratize the civil society and pressure the state toward change while it tries to
retreat from its social responsibility. On the other hand, locating women’s activism only
in the civil society has its perils as well when it comes to altering discursive practices of
state agents. The State is central to maintaining and changing the status quo, feminists,
thus, should invade the state. If it fails to carry down its discourse to the practice of local

231
state agents, transnational women’s activism remains only as a symbolic tool that has no
solid effects on the everyday lives of women. Another question for feminists is how to
tackle the battle of interpretation (Fraser 1991), which is equally important as invading
the state. In order to construct women’s rights, the content of the discourse on violence
against women is of utmost importance. The trick is to balance the universal discourse
based on human rights with the local one based on categories of class, race/ethnicity,
gender and sexuality in order to find ways to translate women’s collective interests into
rights recognized by both the state and civil society.

NGO’s Criticism of State Practices
Regarding their interaction with state institutions and officials, NGOs define three
problematic areas. The first is the non-application of the law. That refers to both the
reformed Penal Code and the Law on Protection of the Family. The second issue area is
the attitude of law enforcement and judiciary officials to victims of gender-based
violence. The judges are particularly important because they interpret the law. And the
final one is the weakness of the state-produced textsdesigned to eradicate gender-based
violence and promote gender equality. These documents have no enforcing power and are
not substantiated with sensible budgets.
The state is responsible for developing approaches to produce security and
prevent crimes rather than punishing them after the incident has already taken place.
Merry (2001: 17) defines this method as ‘spatial governmentality’, where the offender is

232
prohibited access to the victim’s home or workplace through the issuance of temporary
restraining orders. Law No.4320 On Protection of the Family (hereon Family Law),
which was launched in 1998 as a result of feminist campaigning, serves this particular
aim. The Family Law rules that in domestic violence cases, incarceration should be used
as a protection measure during or until the case is tried. However, the applicability of the
law is limited. The law requires participation of the police, public prosecutors and family
court judges to be effective. Besides, additional state support is a must for the women to
be self-sufficient when the offenders (most likely intimate partners) are excluded from
their life spaces.
According to a survey I conducted with forty-one women who have stayed in the
Purple Roof shelter between February 2006 and June 2008, the Family Law is not
effectively applied. To begin with, women are not informed about the law although it has
been in effect for more than a decade. Only 8 percent of the violence-victim women knew
about the law before they applied to the police. The police are required to inform women
about the law, but none of the applicants received that information in the police station.
One of the important conditions of the Family Law is prompt application starting from
the police station until the case is heard in the family court. However, 90 percent of the
women did not get a hearing day following their application. Once the case is heard, for
69 percent of the women, it took more than a month for the restraining order to be issued.
Thus, while the law was supposed to protect women, the way it is applied contradicts
with the intention of the law. NGO activists are also discontent with how the Family Law

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is not applied, though they pleasingly note that among police officers who took the
gender awareness training there have been significant improvements.
Punishment, Foucault (1979) argues, is designed to deter future offenses with the
fear of punishment without reforming the offender. It is merely an expression of the will
of the sovereign. In the Turkish case, however, the way punishment is applied signals not
the will of the sovereign to deter the crime, but rather to legitimate it by empathizing with
the offender. The Turkish state is not unique in this sense. Women’s organizations around
the world have been struggling for years to alter the rape laws where rapists leave the
courtrooms with insignificant penalties while women are blamed for the incident (Das
1996). Feminism allows women to see everyday life as political and reflect it on their
relations with the state. They, thus, require the ruling apparatus to pay attention to the
local, the individual, and the familial (Cockburn 2007: 209). The knowledge of activist
women comes from below and is better equipped in transforming asymmetrical relations
of power. Women’s organizations pressed for a legal reform that would enable greater
use of punishment in gender-violence cases and no-drop prosecution so that everyone
involved in the process, from police officers to public prosecutors and even the media
reporting the case, will realize that violence against women is a serious crime and is not
tolerated. The idea behind the activism was to show the relation between violence and
patriarchy and that men were not entitled to control women’s lives and resort to violence
to back up their authoritarian position.

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Activist women from Diyarbakır note that state-led violence against women is not
limited to torture or forced virginity examinations under custody. There is another,
almost holistic state policy, they claim, that aims to ‘make the Kurdish society break
apart by causing women to fall (dü şürmek)’. The state employs means to drag Kurdish
women into sex traffic and young Kurds into drug-traffic, DIKASUM and SELIS
activists claim.
59
All of the NGO activists working in Diyarbakır, regardless of their
political and ideological outlook, stressed that neither violence against women nor honor
crimes are peculiar to a particular region or ethnic group. In contrast to the official
discourse, which tries to externalize the issue as a problem occurring in areas heavily
populated by Kurdish citizens, the activist women emphasize that it is a problem
affecting a much larger geography and not limited to a certain ethnic group. In their
words, what comes to be identified as ‘passion or love crime’ in the western regions of
Turkey turns out to be honor or custom crime in the east and southeast. They are
bothered by the state’s attempt to externalize the problem as non-Turkish (read as

59
Handan Co şkun from DIKASUM explained that in 2003 she conducted a research about sex traffic in
Diyarbakır, which included interviews with sex workers. Based on the information, she said, she contacted
the Vice Governor to propose a comprehensive project with the collaboration of the local NGOs. ‘They
tried to prove me wrong and asked for evidence, which I had. Eventually, the Vice Squad of the Police
Department was recalled and the police chief was replaced. It was right before the local elections. The JDP
members distorted my statements and accused me of staining the honor of Diyarbakır’. Co şkun noted that
even KAMER released a statement supporting the police department questioning the validity of her
research. Co şkun added that a year later KAMER contacted her to apologize and request her participation
in a research funded by the International Organization for Migration. Accordingly, she refused when she
learned that the project entailed contacting only 10 sex workers with no plans for follow up. Selis also
produced a similar report on prostitution in 2002. In Berivan Kaya’s words, prostitution was ‘a systemic
attempt to demean Kurdish women through use of honor. It involved several high-level bureaucrats and
military officials. But we were threatened and could not release the report’.

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Kurdish), and as something that will be cured when these sectors of the society manage a
successful integration to the modern republic and get rid off their backward tradition.
The discourse disseminated by state institutions and the way Kurdish women’s
NGOs perceive state practices determine the relation between this segment of the civil
society and the state. A particular skepticism towards and distance to state institutions
affect the way these NGOs establish their course of action. Whereas Turkish women’s
NGOs and KAMER try to incorporate state officials and law enforcement into the
struggle for saving women from honor crimes and eradicating gender inequalities,
Kurdish feminists are critical of the same officials. They, for one, do not trust them. This
attitude of not trusting state officials, and especially law enforcement, is common among
Kurdish women. Handan Co şkun, DIKASUM, stated that when women are forced to
choose between their husbands or families, who subject them to violence, and police or
gendarme, they choose the ones they know. This also has to do with recollections of
memories and stories of rape, torture and village burnings by law enforcement forces.
Coşkun added that, especially in domestic violence cases, women perceive applying to
the police or the gendarme not as a means of escaping violence, but as turning in their
husbands to the state forces. In order to explain the tense relation between them and the
state, Berivan Kaya from Selis noted that not only that they do not receive support, but
there have been times when their activities have been hindered by state forces. Kaya
recited a case where they received information about an honor crime threat in a remote
village. However, they could not reach the woman because the gendarme did not let them
through. They could enter the village only after the woman’s funeral. Nevertheless, this

236
differential perception of the state should not indicate that they ceased laying demands on
the state and its institutions for change and action. It just corresponds to a different
relation with the state, which is still a significant component of the interplay between the
state and civil society.
Patriarchy is not a male attitude that is wrong, uneducated, biased and violent,
neither is it an individual problem. Patriarchy is a social and historical institution (Mojab
and Abdo 2004). It is the gender regime that represents the most extreme form of gender
inequality and male domination over women. The unequal, hierarchical and conflictual
gender relations are maintained by the exercise of power. Thus, power is central to the
sustenance of patriarchy to manage the resistance of the subjugated, i.e. women. No
institution can survive in isolation. Institutionalized male hegemony works in
collaboration with class and ethnic inequalities, and each is reproduced through
institutions and apparatuses such as education, law, family, language, religion and the
media (Mojab and Abdo 2004).
I keep referring to a particular mentality and how it is being reproduced at various
levels of the state and throughout the society. My research shows that the patriarchal
mentality that normalizes subjugation of women is unfortunately inherent in state
officials, who occupy very important seats and legal officials whose job is to guarantee
objective and equal application of law to all citizens. However, women of the society are
not immune to the mentality that I keep mentioning. A recent survey conducted
nationwide among more than 10,000 married women reveals that 25 percent of married

237
women agree with their husbands’ reasons to beat them. Top two ‘legitimate’ causes of
domestic violence according to these women are too much and unnecessary spending,
and not taking good enough care of their children. Moreover, 70 percent of women in this
survey disagree with the statement that ‘women should not require their husbands’
permission to go out’ (Radikal October 26, 2009). Hence, the problem facing us is not
limited to men or powerful men thereof. Normalization of gender inequality and
legitimization of violence against women are societal problems that require holistic
societal solutions.
In the last decade, the state undertook legal and policy reforms, either to respond
to the requirements of international bodies of governance, such as the European Union
and the United Nation, or to the civil society. These reforms provided women’s
organizations with an opportunity to call on the state for further reforms toward gender
equality as well as demands for proper application and enforcement of the law. How each
NGO realized the opportunity, its strategic choices and methods employed are
determined by its situatedness vis-à-vis the state.
The activities of civil societal organizations, the methods they employ and
primary areas of operation are determined according to their relation to the state. Claims
of independence generally relate to issues of funding, where the sources of funds are
thought to manipulate the outcome of projects. The effectiveness and outreach of an
NGO is also related to its relation to the state and its collaboration with state institutions.
The situatedness of each civil societal organization reflects its ideological discourse

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(feminism, nationalism, secularism or Islam) and determines its strategy (reference to
citizenship, human rights or moral values), and methods (domestic or international law,
demands on the state or international organizations). This is a framework where the
interplay between the civil societal actors and the state shape the space for politics.

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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
Thomas Kuhn (1962) wisely stated that political revolutions aim to change
political institutions in ways that those institutions themselves prohibit. In this
dissertation, I showed how the state, with its particular gendered nature, is the single
most important obstacle to changing the societal organization to a more gender
egalitarian one. When change does not come from within the state, feminist politics
and activism steps in for the reconstruction of society in a new institutional
framework. Although legislative reform does not suffice in itself, every reform
provides opportunity for feminist politics to place demands on the state for more
encompassing and significant reforms.
The struggle of feminist NGOs with the state to eradicate gender-based
violence and transform the social organization of gender shows that it is the interplay
between the civil society and the state, and their situatedness vis-à-vis each other that
determined the course of change. Governmentality is the way the state rationalizes the
exercise of power by defining its discursive fields (Foucault 1983). It does not only
refer to political structures or management of the state, but to its ability to direct the
conduct of individuals or groups. In other words, governing is structuring the possible
field of action of others. According to the ‘state in society’ approach (Migdal 2001),
the state does not have a monolithic nature. On the contrary, evolving forms of
governmentality shape human life in unforeseen ways and generate diversified and
dispersed practices and sites of governance filled with inconsistensies and

240
contradictions (Hansen and Stepputat 2002). These emerging sites of contradiction
generate space and opportunity for feminist politics. While the Turkish state reforms
the legal system to achieve gender equality, it also continues sexist applications of the
law that are detrimental to women’s human rights. Such diversity in state practices
has to do with the different contexts in which the state institutions operate. In order to
understand how the state responds to issues we need to move beyond techniques of
policy making to an analysis of how state institutions and civil societal actors
perceive and produce policies at different levels. In other words, the state does not
respond to an issue in a single way. The creation and execution of state policies are
outcomes of ‘a series of different actions based on the particular calculus of pressures
that each engaged component of the state faces in its particular environment. The
outcome can just as likely be a sum of ill-fitting responses that stem from the
different components of the state as they respond to their various arenas of
domination and opposition’ (Migdal 2001: 116-117). Accordingly, in one context, the
Parliament responds to the EU requirements and addresses the demands of the
women’s NGOs by embarking on the legal reform. In another context, the courts
continue to reproduce relations of power and domination through the interpretation of
the law in their decisions, making the legal reform practically inapplicable. The civil
society steps in again, women’s NGOs attend honor killing trials to ensure rule of
law. In 2009, women’s NGOs pressured the court to sentence the perpetrator with the
highest punishment in three cases they have been attending from the beginning.

241
The form of the state is neither static nor is it independent of the interplay
between the state, its subjects and national and international civil society. The state’s
gender politics coupled with its ethnic politics determines the way it engages with
gender-based violence. The state’s approach to honor killings is a fertile area to examine
the interconnections between these factors. From the onset, the Turkish State refused to
recognize honor killings as a systemic form of gender-based violence. Instead of looking
for the root cause in the gender order reproduced by the state, it resorted to basic
premises of modernization theory and explained it as a temporary problem arising from
the resistance of backward traditions in regions that failed to successfully integrate to
modernity. The state assumed that the problematic traditions were destined to fade away
with appropriate articulation of modernity but never problematized its own role in the
perpetuation and reproduction of those very traditions.
This dissertation empirically demonstrates that different civil societal actors
advocate a variety of moral norms that challenge the predominant ones. These actors seek
legal recognition of the norms they advocate. My analysis suggests that the limits of legal
reform cannot be explained solely by a legal analysis without understanding the gendered
and ethnicized nature of the relationship between the civil society and the state. The
predominant norms reflect the gender order that subjugates women through discourses on
honor and shame. These discourses also constrain the expression of subaltern norms
advocated by civil societal actors in the public sphere. In this regard, these actors pursue
legal reform not only to press for concrete policy changes, but also as a means to enhance
their political capacity. Through monitoring the implementation of laws and even at times

242
enforcing the law in collaboration with state agencies, and finally through international
and transnational networks these actors gain public visibility and political power to
challenge the gender order. This sociological perspective allows us to understand similar
cases of honor violence in regions other than the Muslim countries of the Middle East.
My dissertation contributes to the analysis of honor crimes in other regions by bringing in
the perspective of civil societal actors.
Honor killings in Turkey provide a crucial case for studying the interplay between
gender, law, the state and civil society. The characteristics of Turkish modernization
made legal reform an important source of social change. In its quest for ‘reaching the
level of civilized nations’, the Turkish state thoroughly secularized the legal and political
system and granted basic civil and political rights to women. The Islamic legal system
was replaced by the Civil Code. As a predominantly Muslim country, Turkey granted
women the right to vote and be elected in 1934, years before major European countries
such as France and Italy. Behind these legal reforms was the modernizing ethos of
Turkish nation-building ideology. Due to this ideology, Turkish legislation, judiciary and
law enforcement seek compatibility with international human rights norms, such as
CEDAW, and the European Union norms. The state still has a significant role in social
change. This state-led modernization model continues to guide state-centric legal studies.
Therefore, they focus exclusively on the legal system without considering the dynamics
behind the formation of political will. However, the relationship between state and
society has dramatically changed since the early twentieth century, as democratization set
forth in Turkey. Today’s lawmakers negotiate with a much larger segment of the society

243
than did the early Republican modernizers. The civil societal actors are now involved in
the process of law making as well as monitoring its enforcement. Hence, I argue that the
role of civil societal actors in bringing social change is crucial for conceptualizing the
changing dynamics of gender, law and the state.
Once state institutions are constructed as ‘modern’, then they are thought to work
against tradition even if their ideological structures are unfavorable to women’s rights or
emancipation. Accordingly, when honor crimes are seen as ‘traditions getting out of
hand’, the involvement of the institutions is ignored because, by definition, they are in
opposition to traditions. In this setting, where tradition is the root cause of honor crimes,
an institution’s role in the reproduction of this tradition is ignored, leading to the tradition
effect (Ko ğacıoğlu 2004). The issue of honor crimes in Turkey involves multiple actors,
where each engages in the definition, causes and means of eradicating the practice. I built
and expanded on Ko ğacıoğlu’s tradition effect concept and examine the ways in which it
surfaced in the interplay between the state and women’s NGOs.
The discourses produced by the state institutions and the national media frame
honor crimes as ‘backward tradition of the southeast’, ‘the tribal system of the southeast’
or ‘the feudal structure’ resisting the requirements of the modern world. Thus, honor
crimes are ethnicized, implying that the rest of the country is immune to honor/custom
crimes. This approach does not only prevent developing effective mechanism to curtail
honor crimes that will target both structural and context-specific components of violence,
but it also blinds the eye to other forms of gender-based violence prevalent throughout
Turkey.

244
Certain historical moments, such as the modernization project in Turkey or
Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union, create opportunities for civil societal
actors.These opportunities enable the formation of different relations between the
state and society and in turn change the way political will is formed. I claim that the
presence of women’s NGOs as recognized social actors will pressure the state
towards generating the desired normative changes by making use of the opportunities
created by the very state itself.
In order to disentangle the gendered nature of the state in Turkey I provided an
analysis of the state from a feminist perspective. Based on Foucault’s notion of
governmentality, I argued that domestic and international civil societal actors are
important components of governmental practices. Within this framework, the Turkish
modernization project is analyzed in terms of its impact on the relationship between
women and the state, and the intersectionality of gender and ethnicity within this process.
Against the backdrop of gender politics influenced by the modernity project, I followed
the trajectory of the interplay between feminism and the state in Turkey to show that
while the state instrumentalized women as symbols of modernity to display how civilized
and democratic the nation was, it also created opportunities for women to become visible
in the public sphere and recognize their citizenship rights. The interplay between women
and the state and the intersecting effects of gender and ethnicity, I add, has determined
the form of feminism and led to formation of multiple feminisms in the Turkish context.

245
The process of nation-building is the area where the relation between the state and
women is both strongest and the most problematic. I discussed women’s role as
biological reproducers of the nation and cultural bearers of the collectivity’s identity and
honor. By a comparative analysis of Kurdish and Turkish women’s articulation to the
nation-state, I showed how the nation-building process promoted certain identities while
excluding and suppressing others. I then provided an analysis of the law to show that the
law is not neutral in regulating intersecting conflicts of gender and ethnicity. That is
because the state and the legal structure reproduce social relations that are embedded in
patriarchal norms. I claimed that women’s relationship to law has implications on their
citizenship rights. Not only women lack information about and access to legal measures,
the law is non-applied to women despite the constitutional establishment of equality
before the law.
Finally, based on my empirical research on women’s NGOs, I claimed that the
form of NGO activism is shaped by their situatedness vis-à-vis the state. The state is
central to the way NGOs deal with gender-based violence. Either a critique of the state or
the demand and need for collaboration with it (often both), determines the NGOs
activities in the field. Their presence is in relation to the state, because they perceive the
state as the single most important institution liable for eradicating gender-based violence
and improving women’s status in society, foremost, because the state plays a significant
role in the reproduction of both violence and an unequal gender order. The NGOs’
expectations from the state, how they employ state-generated opportunities and their
methods of action are all determined with respect to their situatedness. NGOs list their

246
basic grievances in their relation to the state as non-application of the law, weakness of
state-produced texts that are supposed to provide them with leverage for action, and the
gender insensitive attitudes of state and legal officials and law enforcement personnel.
I found out that the activities of civil societal organizations, the methods they
employ and primary areas of operation are determined according to their relation to the
state. Claims of independence generally relate to issues of funding, where the sources of
funds are thought to manipulate the outcome of projects. The effectiveness and outreach
of an NGO is also related to its relation to the state and its collaboration with state
institutions. The situatedness of each civil societal organization reflects its ideological
discourse (feminism, nationalism, secularism or Islam) and determines its strategy
(reference to citizenship, human rights or moral values), and methods (domestic or
international law, demands on the state or international organizations). This is a
framework where the interplay between the civil societal actors and the state shape the
space for politics. State-induced legal reforms do not suffice to provide gender equality
unless the social organization of the society and mechanisms of regulation are altered in
ways that have repercussions in all state related institutions, such as the law, family, and
education system. Civil societal actors, in this case, women’s NGOs, monitor the
implementation of and enforce the law in collaboration with state agencies, and through
international and transnational networks. They thus gain public visibility and political
power to challenge the gender order.

247
The presence of a strong women’s movement does not imply a monolithic impact
on women’s empowerment. The intersectionality of gender and ethnicity (as well as class
and sexuality) is at play in determining the relations within women akin to their relation
with the state. The modernization ideology is still dominant, especially among middle-
class Turkish feminists, who believe it is their responsibility and mission to educate the
backward women of the southeast through regional campaigns, such as ‘Girls to the
School’ or ‘Father, Send me to School’. Whereas the modernization ethos guides the
activities of some of the NGOs, which does not want to recognize the presence of a
separate Kurdish or Islamist feminism, others embrace the differences within and
collaborate with the ‘other’ for the advancement of the women in Turkey. The Purple
Roof Women’s Foundation, for instance, boycotted the most recent Women’s Convention
because of its ignorance towards the Kurdish issue. It is possible to find more examples
for each stance. What we need to consider for feminist politics to be a viable alternative
to the status quo is the importance of realizing and struggling against intersecting forms
of inequality and oppression to develop feminist politics that has transformative capacity
for the betterment of all.

248
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265
APPENDIX: INTERVIEW GUIDE
• What are the root causes of honor crimes? What causes and perpetuates gender-
based violence?
• How do you define “honor”?
• (If tradition is brought up) What is your understanding of “tradition”?
• (If tradition is brought up) What, according to you, is the role of tradition/customs
in the social structure of the region?
• Do you find it possible to eliminate or reduce the occurrence of honor crimes?
• What can/should be done to eradicate honor crimes?
• What do you/your institution do to fight honor crimes and other forms of gender-
based violence?
• Do you (What do you do to) fight customs/tradition?
• What do you do (Do you do anything) to improve the condition of women?
• What are the state’s responsibilities to eradicate honor crimes and gender-based
violence?
• Is the legal system sufficient to eradicate honor crimes and eliminate gender
discrimination? Shortcomings, need for improvement, application
• How do you utilize the law in your activities?

Abstract (if available)

Abstract Honor killings in Turkey provide a crucial case for studying the interplay between gender, law, the state and civil society. The characteristics of the Turkish modernization made legal reform an important source of social change. I build on legal studies in order to provide a sociological analysis of the reproduction of the gender order through the law. For this purpose, I focus on civil societal actors that advocate for legal reform and law enforcement. I conceptualize law not only as an instrument of state policies but also as an opportunity and advocacy cause for civil societal actors. I suggest that the limits of legal reform cannot be explained solely by a legal analysis without understanding the gendered nature of the relationship between the civil society and the state. The predominant norms reflect the gender order that subjugates women through discourses on honor and shame. These discourses also constrain the expression of subaltern norms advocated by civil societal actors in the public sphere. In this regard, these actors pursue legal reform not only to press for concrete policy changes, but also as a means to enhance their political capacity. I argue that the activities of civil societal organizations, the methods they employ and primary areas of operation are determined according to their relation to the state. Claims of independence generally relate to issues of funding, where the sources of funds are thought to manipulate the outcome of projects. The effectiveness and outreach of an NGO are related to its relation to the state and its collaboration with state institutions. The situatedness of each civil societal organization reflects its ideological discourse and determines its strategy and methods. This is a framework where the interplay between the civil societal actors and the state shape the space for politics.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Kavaklı Birdal, Nur Banu (author)

Core Title The interplay between the state and civil society: a case study of honor killings in Turkey

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Juris Doctor / Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Sociology

Publication Date 02/03/2010

Defense Date 12/09/2009

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag civil society,honor killings,NGOs,OAI-PMH Harvest,state,Turkey

Place Name Turkey (countries)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierrette (committee chair), Gomez-Barris, Macarena (committee member), Özyeğin, Gül (committee member), Tickner, J. Ann (committee member)

Creator Email banubirdal@gmail.com,nbirdal@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m2831

Unique identifier UC1446641

Identifier etd-Birdal-3401 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-296731 (legacy record id),usctheses-m2831 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Birdal-3401.pdf

Dmrecord 296731

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Kavaklı Birdal, Nur Banu

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu