Visual reasoning: representations in global politics, economics, and society

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Content i

VISUAL REASONING:
REPRESENTATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIETY

by

Guilherme Arêas Maciel de Araujo Silva

________________________________________________________________________

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirement for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

May 2010

Copyright 2010 Guilherme Arêas Maciel de Araujo Silva
ii
Epigraph

Compared with other species, as far as we know, we have enormously complex facilities
for thinking. New thoughts are destabilizing, even dangerous. They generate frustration
with the way things are or suggest possibilities about how they might be different.
Imagination is surely not a uniquely human property, but it seems likely that human
imaginations are uniquely rich. Every event we imagine is a potential new future.

Felipe Fernández-Armesto
(Ideas That Changed the World, 2003, p.6)

iii
Dedication

In memory of Prof. Hayward R. Alker,
Without whom this research would not have been possible

iv
Acknowledgments

Looking back at the long journey leading up to the completion of my doctoral
studies at USC, I am very grateful to see so many people who in one way or another were
instrumental to my accomplishment. It starts with those who made me believe that I had
the potential in the first place to successfully apply to such a prestigious university in
equal footing with other well-qualified applicants. Among those, Luiz Gonzaga de
Carvalho gave me much inspiration to keep searching for and recognizing the beauty of
the endless quest for new knowledge. Williams Golçalves da Silva, my adviser in my
master studies in International Relations at UERJ, in Rio de Janeiro, was central in
helping me build the foundations of my knowledge and critical thinking in regards to the
field. All along, countless friends at home, in Brazil, believed in my potential and shared
with me the emotions that come with the territory of moving to a foreign country and
facing new and exciting challenges. In America, new friends were so important in
making this journey a blessing, among them, the Gialamas, the Spazafumo, the Poppe,
the Martiniano, and the Bastos families, among others. By kindly hosting (by then) a
stranger at his home (a friend of a friend) Mauro Jorand was the first to give me a warm
welcome in Los Angeles, for which I am forever thankful.
At USC, I had nothing but absolute support and encouragement from all. It started
with my first visit to campus and the warm welcome from Luda Spilewsky and Linda
Cole. It continued throughout the years as I found guidance and advising from the staff
and faculty of both the USC School of International Relations (SIR) and the USC Center
for International Studies (CIS). Either as a student, as a teaching or as a research
v
assistant, or simply as a member of the student body at USC, I was fortunate to be able to
learn from great scholars and educators such as Steven Lamy, Laurie Brand, John Odell,
Abraham Lowenthal, J. Ann Ticker, Manuel Castells, Geoffrey Wiseman, Jonathan
Aronson, Saori Katda, David Andrus, Douglas Becker, and Wayne Glass, among others.
I also own a special thanks to the Department of Spanish and Portuguese‟s
director, Gayle Fiedler-Vierma, for whom I worked as assistant lecturer for several
semesters. It was very inspiring to work for such a competent professional who truly
cares for the students and shows appreciation and trust for the graduate instructors,
always juggling teaching and research commitments.
Prof. Gerald Bender, the first faculty at SIR for whom I worked for as a teaching
assistant, became my first mentor at USC. I am incredibly honored to be able to have him
as a friend! Prof. Hayward R. Alker, a towering figure, challenged me from the start to be
bold and to be thorough. As my original chair, he was the sole responsible for the initial
and crucial steps of a research that is as unique as it may sound strange to some in
mainstream International Relations. I am forever grateful for the memories and lessons he
left behind. They will forever stay with me. Prof. Patrick James, who became my chair in
a moment of great sorrow with the untimely passing of Prof. Alker, was central in my
struggles to complete my research. Simply put, if it were not for his support and guidance
I would have not had the ability to complete my research as efficiently as I did. The other
two members of my committee, Prof. Daniel Lynch and Prof. Thomas G. Goodnight,
were equally generous in supporting me throughout my research and providing me with
invaluable feedback and suggestions.
vi
From the personal side, I cannot express enough how fortunate I feel for having a
large extended family of aunties, uncles, cousins, nieces, etc, cheering and celebrating in
good moments, and standing with and by me during challenging times. As for my
immediate family, my brother Leonardo, and my sister, Letícia, even if distant physically,
are always present. I am very proud of their unwavering belief in my potential. My dad,
Zenildo, has always been a source of reference, allowing me to take risks in life, always
within the boundaries of honesty and guided by the compass of high moral standards. My
mother-in-law, Sueli, believes in me even when I doubt myself! I am so happy for having
her in my life.
Finally, I would be nothing without the presence, influence, and support from the
two most important women in my life: my mom, Dina, and my wife, Sandra. As for my
mom, I remember once, when I was about five or six years old, thinking on how lucky I
was for having her as my mom, and not any other mother in this whole planet. I still feel
that way. I am who I am because of her!
Lastly, but not the least, my beloved Sandra is the reason I have the energy, the
belief, and the love I need to continue pursuing my goals in life. The accomplishment that
comes with the conclusion of this long process of becoming a Ph.D. is hers as it is mine.
For a while now we have worked, laughed, dreamed, and cried together, sharing each
step and milestones thrown at us by this beautiful journey and adventure we call life. I
wouldn‟t want it any other way!

vii
Table of Contents

Epigraph ii

Dedication iii

Acknowledgments iv

List of Diagrams x

List of Figures xv

Abstract xvi

Introduction 1
The “What” Question: Constitutive Identities in Research Concepts 7
Defining Constitutive Explanation 7
Identifying the Empirical Domain 10
The “How” Question: Knowledge Representations in Concept Systems 12
The “Why” Question: Intersubjective Understandings of the Global 19
The Research 25
Introduction 25
Chapter One: Knowledge Representations in Concept Systems 25
Chapter Two: Visual Cognitive Modeling 27
Chapter Three: Agency in Global Civil Society 28
Chapter Four: Representations of Religion by International Relations 29
Chapter Five: Paradigmatic Degrees of Aggregation Model 31
Chapter Six: Global Relations Paradigm 32
Conclusion 33

Part One: Visual Reasoning 34
Chapter One: Knowledge Representations in Concept Systems 34
Approaches in Conceptual Analysis 35
Sociological Concept Systems 41
Cognitive Representations in Concept Systems 51
Systems in Social Realities and Representations 62

viii

Chapter Two: Visual Cognitive Modeling 73
Axiomatic Foundations 75
Mental Models 76
Cognitive Universals 78
Nodes 78
Networks 92
Sequence Topology Networks 93
Intersection Networks 139
Set-Domains Networks 147
Linkages 165
Multilevel Network Structures 168
Referential Structures 174
Molecular Visualization 174
Lateral Mapping 175
Cognitive Instances 177
3D 178
Cognitive Equation 180
Dawn of VCM 182

Part Two: Visual Representations 188
Chapter Three: Agency in Global Civil Society 188
Why a Typology on Agency of Global Civil Society? 190
Global Civil Society & Sites of Agency 197
Gradation Network Typology of Social Agency in Global Civil Society 200
Main Sources of GCS Agency in the Gradation Network 202
Type I: Individuals 206
Individuals‟ Sites of Agency in GCS 207
Individuals-As-Personality 209
Individuals-As-Collectivity 212
Type II: Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 219
Types of Social Mobilization 222
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 224
International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) 231
Transnational Civil Society Organizations (TCSOs) 233
Type III: Transnational Collective Networks (TCNs) 236
Single-Mobilization Networks 238
Hybrid Networks 241
Cognitive Reasoning on Global Civil Society Agency 245

ix

Chapter Four: Representations of Religion By International Relations 253
Historic Representations of Religion: Rejection & Persistence 254
Banning Religion from Politics 255
The Insistence of Religion 260
IR Prescriptions on Dealing with Religion 266
Fractures and Inconsistencies in IR Dialogue on Religion 280
Reframing the Debate: The Cognitive Semantics of IR Interpretations on
Religion
292
Religion UNDER International Relations 293
Religion INSIDE International Relations 299
Religion WITHIN International Relations 305
Religion OVER International Relations 311
Religion AND International Relations 319
A Ring Network Analysis of Religion & IR Ontologies 324

Chapter Five: Paradigmatic Degrees of Aggregation Model 329
The Model 329

Chapter Six: Global Relations Paradigm 365
Global Relations: Going Beyond Globalization Processes 366
Global Concepts in International Studies Quarterly: 1997-2006 372
Global Relations Paradigm 375
Modeling Concept Systems in Global Relations 393

Conclusion 397
Visual Reasoning & Global Relations 397
Potential Contributions from VCM 406
The Next Steps 409

Bibliography 411

Appendices:
Appendix A: Acronyms Used in Chapter Three on Global Civil Society 442
Appendix B: Global Civil Society Yearbook Articles 443
Appendix C: ISQ Articles Used in Chapter Six: Global Relations Paradigm 448
Appendix D: Global Concepts From ISQ Readings Used in Chapter Six:
Global Relations Paradigm
457

x
List of Diagrams

Diagram I.1: Research Design 4
Diagram I.2: Connectionist Approach to Information Processing of the Brain:
Neural Nets

18
Diagram 1.1: Cognitive Representations 54
Diagram 2.1: Types of Mental Models 77
Diagram 2.2: Four Primary Types of Containers 79
Diagram 2.3: Units-Within-Environment Containers 81
Diagram 2.4: Ringed Containers 85
Diagram 2.5: Modes of Environment Containment 87
Diagram 2.6: Nodes in Visual Cognitive Modeling 91
Diagram 2.7: Martin Wight‟s Proximity of IR Traditions 97
Diagram 2.8: Robert Robertson‟s Representation of the Global Field 98
Diagram 2.9: Research Cycle According to DSI 103
Diagram 2.10: Definition for the Concept “Party” in Hyperpolitics 106
Diagram 2.11: Visual Thesaurus Radial Network for the Concept
“Sovereignty”

108
Diagram 2.12: Dirk Geeraerts‟ Conceptual Map of Cognitive Linguistics 110
Diagram 2.13: Complex Spider-Web Network Configuration 112
Diagram 2.14: Logical Quadrants Linking Concepts in Hyperpolitics 113
Diagram 2.15: Charles S. Pearson‟s Classification of Environmental Values 119
Diagram 2.16: James Rosenau‟s Classes of Concepts in Scientific Research 122
xi
Diagram 2.17: Andrey P. Tsygankov‟s Russia‟s Foreign Policy Discourses 124
Diagram 2.18: Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler‟s View of Religion in IR 127
Diagram 2.19: Alternative Representations to Fox and Shmuel‟s Model 128
Diagram 2.20: Alastair Iain Johnston's Interrelated Levels of Strategy 130
Diagram 2.21: Imre Lakatos‟ Components of SRPs 134
Diagram 2.22: Imre Lakato‟s Theories in Sequence – Ideal Type 136
Diagram 2.23: Imre Lakato‟s Theories in Sequence – Actual Developments? 137
Diagram 2.24: Edwards‟ Venn Diagram of Three Sets 144
Diagram 2.25: Torbjorn L. Knutsen‟s Historic Analysis of IR Theory 152
Diagram 2.26: Ring Network Multi-Level Structure 170
Diagram 2.27: Andrey P. Tsygankov‟s Russia‟s Foreign Policy Discourses and
Overlying Security Strategies Preferences

171
Diagram 2.28: Karl Erich Wolff‟s Line Diagram for Animals 172
Diagram 2.29: Referential Structure: Molecular Visualization 175
Diagram 2.30: Referential Structure: Lateral Mapping 176
Diagram 2.31: Referential Structure: Cognitive Instances 177
Diagram 2.32: Referential Structure: 3D 179
Diagram 2.33: Referential Structure: Cognitive Equation 180
Diagram 2.34: Visual Cognitive Modeling 183
Diagram 2.35: Cognitive Universals 185
Diagram 2.36: Relationships Between Ontological Components of VCM 186
Diagram 3.1: Gradation Network 200
Diagram 3.2: Gradation Network of Social Agency in Global Civil Society 202
xii
Diagram 3.3: Primary Types of GCS Agency 204
Diagram 3.4: Sub-Types of GCS Agency 205
Diagram 3.5: Type I of GCS Agency: Individuals 219
Diagram 3.6: Type II of GCS Agency: Civil Society Organizations 236
Diagram 3.7: Type III of GCS Agency: Transnational Collective Networks 245
Diagram 3.8: Complete Typology of Agency in Global Civil Society 247
Diagram 4.1: Line Network for the „Spectrum‟ of IR Prescriptions on Religion 266
Diagram 4.2: Religion as Threat 269
Diagram 4.3: Religion as Intervening Variable 270
Diagram 4.4: Inter-Faith Dialogue & Political Ethics 273
Diagram 4.5: IPT & Religion as Rules 276
Diagram 4.6: Embedded Religion 279
Diagram 4.7: Cognitive Instances for Line-Network Representations of
Religion by IR

281
Diagram 4.8: Hybrid Gradation-Lines Network 285
Diagram 4.9: Pendulum Network 286
Diagram 4.10: Blending Network 287
Diagram 4.11: Pendulum-Blending Intersection Network 289
Diagram 4.12: Cognitive Instances on IR Representations on Religion 291
Diagram 4.13: Religion UNDER International Relations 295
Diagram 4.14: Religion INSIDE International Relations 300
Diagram 4.15: Religion WITHIN International Relations 306
Diagram 4.16: Religion OVER International Relations 312
xiii
Diagram 4.17: Religion AND International Relations 320
Diagram 4.18: Ring Network on Representations of Ontologies of Religion
and International Relations

326
Diagram 5.1: Blending Network Giving Rise to the Paradigmatic Degrees of
Aggregation Model

332
Diagram 5.2: Conceptual Degrees of Aggregation‟s Scale Network 334
Diagram 5.3: Gary Goertz‟ Three-Level Concept for Societal Corporation 337
Diagram 5.4: Gary Goertz‟ Three-Level Concept as a Scale Network 341
Diagram 5.5: 3D Scale Network of Goertz‟s Three-Level Concept Structure 342
Diagram 5.6: 3D Scale Network of Goertz‟s Three-Level Concept Structure 344
Diagram 5.7: Conceptual Blending Network: Blending Spaces‟ Contents 345
Diagram 5.8: Conceptual Blending Network for the Paradigmatic Degrees of
Aggregation Model

349
Diagram 5.9: Paradigmatic Degrees of Aggregation Model 353
Diagram 5.10: Paradigmatic Degrees of Aggregation Model for Global
Relations

357
Diagram 5.11: Global Relations‟ Negative Pole 358
Diagram 5.12: Global Relations as a Paradigm Within International Relations 360
Diagram 5.13: Logical Functional Relations in Systemism 361
Diagram 5.14: Paradigmatic Degrees of Aggregation Final Model 363
Diagram 6.1: Hybrid Lateral Mapping-Cognitive Instances of Global Relations 376
Diagram 6.2: Multidimensional Global Relations 381
Diagram 6.3: Multidimensional Global Relations as Planetarization 383
Diagram 6.4: Multidimensional Global Relations: Conceptual Distribution 385
xiv
Diagram 6.5: Multidimensional Global Relations: General Dimensions 387
Diagram 6.6: Multidimensional Global Relations: General Dimensions,
Agency, and Respective Domains

390
Diagram 6.7: Multidimensional Global Relations: General Dimensions,
Agency, Respective Domains, and the Environment

392
Diagram C.1: Visual Integration of Global Civil Society, IR-Religion, and
Paradigmatic Degrees of Aggregation Models: 3D Referential
Structure

403
Diagram C.2: Visual Integration of Global Civil Society, IR-Religion, and
Paradigmatic Degrees of Aggregation Models: Molecular
Referential Structure (Bird‟s Eye View)

405
Diagram C.3: “Bullet-Points” Tree Structure and Its Equivalent in VCM 407

xv
List of Figures

Figure 2.1: Sequence Topology Networks 95
Figure 2.2: A Logical Proposition in Euler and Venn Diagrams 140
Figure 2.3: Intersection Networks 142
Figure 2.4: Set-Domains Networks for Time Sequence Configurations 150
Figure 2.5: Set-Domains Networks for Motion Configurations 158
Figure 2.6: Set-Domains Networks for Set-Structures 160
Figure 2.7: Linkages 166
Figure 6.1: Research Programs in Global Relations and Respective Domains 380

xvi
Abstract

Is it possible to objectively map collective, intersubjective, representations of social
realities? If so, what inferences may be drawn from them? I address these questions by
recognizing concept systems as analytical units for mapping knowledge representations.
They are groups of interrelated key terminologies, constituting specialized vocabularies
applied to areas of human interest. They help shaping our understandings about the
worlds we investigate and, consequently, the types of puzzles deemed as appropriate for
academic inquiry. In Part One of this research, I make the case for and develop a
methodology designed to display the structural features of conceptual systems, namely
system units, sub-systemic arrangements, and types of relationships between their
components. The methodology, to which I refer as Visual Cognitive Modeling (VCM),
stands out as a visual language for mapping systemic network structures embedded in
reasoning, argumentation, and organization of knowledge. In Part Two, I apply the
methodology to empirical and theoretical cases of global relevance in the field of
International Relations (IR): the various views on the nature of the relationship between
IR and Religion; a typology of agency in Global Civil Society; the conceptual
constitution of the idea of paradigms as a benchmark for evaluating quality of knowledge
production; and, finally, conceptual constructs found in IR literature on global
phenomena, together forming concept systems on global relations. The use of VCM in
each of these cases has shown to provide at least two major contributions. First, it allows
for the formal structuring of reasoning on complex issues in ways characterized by high
levels of logical consistency and accessibility. Second, the models generated allowed
xvii
indeed for inference making and even theory development, which reveals its high levels
of descriptive and explanatory powers. I conclude the research by pointing out the need
for further development of global relations as a structured research program aimed at
addressing global levels of socialization, while also pointing out potential applications of
Visual Cognitive Modeling, both as a formal methodology for academic and scientific
inquiry, and as a visual language for reasoning beyond the strict confines of knowledge
production.

1

Introduction

The fast and widespread global contamination of a deep economic downturn
within the last year reveals once again the power of global processes. Global warming
and its widely recognized consequences such as increases in deforestation, polar caps‟
melting, as well as the range and intensity of major storms affecting all areas of the globe
make it clear that global phenomena go well beyond the economic or political spheres.
And yet, as much as we recognize the relevance of matters of globalization, such as
global capitalism, global civil society, and global governance, for the most part these
phenomena are still largely addressed in isolation from each other. Policy-makers,
specialists, and academics continue to have fractured views, focusing on particular
instances of global phenomena despite its inherent multidisciplinary and
multidimensional character.
As a result, key questions in international studies are still unsatisfactorily
answered. For instance, what is the fundamental nature of the relationship between
international relations and religion? After all, religious beliefs informing social behavior
refuse to go away, making religion a global phenomenon as powerful as it has ever been
in history. If religion may inform culture and provides social meaning and purpose it also
fuels conflicts worldwide, as attested by transnational terrorism and ethnic religious
cleavages. Likewise, what is the nature of agency by the part of the emerging nonstate
actors that have become increasingly relevant both within global civil society and for
global governance? Finally, and even more broadly, what are the conceptual constructs
scholars in our field use to address global social phenomena in intelligible ways? It is a
2
relevant question to the extent that the conceptual apparatus chosen simultaneously
generate and reflect particular social understandings of the “global” in detriment to other
levels of socialization.
What do these questions have in common? First, they are all related to global
phenomena that have become increasingly prevalent in international studies in the post-
Cold War era. Second, they are all primarily “constitutive” questions, or questions
essentially concerned with the ontological make-ups of the conceptual tools used by
scholars when subsequently engaging in “empirical” research. They serve as the
background and the content of a research that focuses on the constitutive nature of
mutually related groups of concepts pertaining to particular levels of social interactions.
My goal is to engage in constitutive explanation of “global concepts” (the “what”
question). Rather than looking at causal processes taking place between empirical
entities, I am looking at the metaphysical and ontological make-ups that „constitute‟ the
very nature of such entities. But I do not look at concepts in isolation from each other.
Instead, I address groups of mutually interconnected concepts, or concept systems, in
order to expose their embedded knowledge representations (the “how” question). It is my
understanding that in doing so we may gain a clearer picture of the collective or
intersubjective understandings that we, scholars, bring to our research in regards to the
global level of analysis, commonly referred to as globalization (the “why” question).
But before going into the specifics of the “what”, the “how”, and the “why”
questions of my research, let me summarize the general background reasoning guiding
the identification of my research topic. First, there are general areas of academic
investigation to which I have always been interested. Placed at different levels of
3
generality, they are nevertheless analytically interconnected. Drawing on them, I identify
what I consider to be some interesting research puzzles, which, in turn, allows me to raise
some relevant IR-related research questions. The logical structure of the arguments in my
reasoning is visually represented in Diagram I.1
1
below. What follows is an explanation
of its content.
Constitutive concerns have been traditionally associated with what is generally
termed as philosophy of science. In broad terms, production, assessment, and
organization of knowledge are the three main sources of much debate and investigation.
Although we still have much to learn on virtually any subject, in each and every
academic as well scientific areas of investigation, it is safe to say that there is currently
no shortage of knowledge production. Since at very least the mid to the late twentieth
century, thanks to the wide spreading of new technologies as well as democratic regimes
worldwide, education, research, and the search for knowledge have been at the forefront
of virtually all of modern societies. The problem has been, to a large extent, to properly
assess the quality of the knowledge being produced (particularly within Social Sciences
and Humanities) as well as to efficiently access data, information, and knowledge that
have been accumulating at unprecedented speed and volume.

1
This visual representation of the arguments guiding my choice of research topic combines elements of
various types of network constructions. It employs the general template called cross-domains mapping
network, a sub-type of network structure introduced in Chapter Two. It is one among various types of set-
domains networks. Within each of the four domains in the model, there is further content, structured as line
networks, another type of network structure. Also introduced in Chapter Two, they are types of sequence
networks.

4

4
Diagram I.1: Research Design
V
Areas of
Interest
Sociology
of
Knowledge
V
Philosophy
of Science
Conceptual
Analysis
Globalization
Concepts
Λ
Globalization
Vocabulary?
Puzzles Research
Questions
Globalization
Representations?

Globalization
Concept
Systems?
Science
Unsystematic
Procedures
Concepts as
Heuristic
Devices
Unmapped
Globalization
Vocabulary
5
From these rather broader frames of reference, sociology of knowledge emerges
as a more specific realm in which the sociological nature of knowledge is debated. Here,
the assumption is that embedded in knowledge production, assessment, and classification,
there are social values and preferences, informed and eventually structured around
collective or intersubjective representations of society. Knowledge in this regard is
deemed as not being dissociated from matters of morality, interests, social structures, and
ultimately power.
Taking yet one step further into deeper levels of specificity, these “non-objective”
factors much guiding the pursuit of knowledge, particularly within Social Sciences, are
greatly institutionalized through the emergence and usage of key conceptual constructs.
They provide the very vocabulary through which members of the academic and the
scientific worlds – and the public in general – can communicate, let alone generate
meaningful deductive and inductive inferences in regard to the universes of knowledge
we investigate. Conceptual Analysis, therefore, is central to anyone interested on the
constitutive nature of the world of knowledge.
When taking into consideration the specifics of International Relations as an
academic discipline, globalization concepts appear to well-reflect an evolving process in
which key conceptual constructs are still emerging and subsequently shaping a yet very
contested realm of empirical and social relations.
Looking at all these issues in the aggregate allows for the identification of some
interesting puzzles. As for the general quests within philosophy of science, for instance, it
is commonly accepted that any scientific enterprise is guided by theory, which in turn
should emerge through formal reasoning. And formal reasoning should be the result of
6
widely accepted procedures able to capture the inner structures of formal logic. And yet,
Social Sciences still lack a reliable, generally accepted template, a systematic universal
method, aimed at properly mapping the soundness of logic reasoning justifying research
design toward knowledge production, assessment of knowledge, and specially
organization and retrieval of information; at least one that goes beyond the strict and non-
accessible confines (to the non-initiated) of symbolic logic used by philosophers and
logicians and formal modeling used by mathematicians. This is certainly true for Social
Sciences in general, and International Relations in particular, where fundamental sub-
divisions abound, preventing dialogue and inhibiting the full potential of
interdisciplinarity to manifest.
This is a shortcoming with clear implications to conceptual analysis. As already
mentioned, concepts are central to the success and reach of scientific enterprises. And
yet, they are generally considered as “mere” heuristic devices, introductory remarks to
contextualize subsequent – and, apparently, more relevant – steps of the scientific
inquiry. Few research focus primarily on the ontological nature of social concepts, and
even fewer on interconnected sets of key terminologies, so essential to shape the
semantic, cognitive, and sociological nature of specialized vocabularies.
Once again, it is a shortcoming that reverberates through even more specific
domains within the broader context of knowledge production. At the empirical level,
global phenomena have become central to international studies. And yet, there have been
very few attempts to analytically map the range of „global concepts‟ that have been used
in IR literature and virtually no analytical research has focused on the structure of the
7
specialized vocabularies of globalization (on how these concepts mutually relate to each
other as to form coherent conceptual network structures).
In summary, knowledge production is guided by formal logical procedures, but a
general logical template aimed at assessing the validity of its analytical foundations is
still missing. Concepts are central to research, but they are largely addressed as heuristic
devices. And globalization has become central to international studies, but to date no
analysis has focused on the systemic features of its specialized vocabulary.
Drawing on these considerations, what are the main scientific terminologies
adopted by scholars in the field of IR? What are the ontological systemic arrangements
structurally linking global concepts? What inferences may be drawn about the nature of
social representations reflected on scholarly research on global phenomena? These are
the basic original premises guiding my research.

The “What” Question: Constitutive Identities in Research Concepts

With this research I intend to engage in constitutive explanations of “global
concepts” adopted in international studies to address global issues and processes.

Defining Constitutive Explanation

Constitutive claims are not causal claims to be validated or not through empirical
testing of neutral data. Constitutive claims question the very foundation of the world the
researcher is looking at, from within. In traditional IR scholarship unparallel emphasis is
8
given to causal relations resulting from rationalist and economicist behavior. However,
constitutive concerns precede causal ones and should not be overlooked. Even when
looking at the original empirical concern in IR, namely interstate conflict, no
investigation can start but with a consideration of its determinants. Materialist realist
accounts find them in the notion of an anarchical system within which the timeless search
for power and survival explains violent behavior (Carr 1946; Waltz 1959; Jervis 1976;
Bull 1977; Gilpin 1981; Morgenthau 1985; Hobbes 2006). But constructivist accounts see
norms and identity, not material capabilities, as their explanatory cause (Onuf 1989;
Kratochwill 1991; Kubálková, Onuf et al. 1998; Wendt 1999). These two explanations
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as each is placed in different locations in our
explanatory efforts. First, there must be meaning. Only then behavior can be manifested.
Without meaning guiding behavior action is nothing more than irrationality. Therefore,
constitutive normative justification (or constitutive explanation) precedes causal relations
(causal explanation) in which a given (independent) variable leads to an outcome
(dependent variable). Not only constitutive and causal explanations are placed in different
locations within the scientific explanatory chain of social relations, but they also (by
definition) must answer different enquiries about the social world. Tal Dingott Alkopher
put it well (Alkopher 2005):

Whereas causal statements answer “why” questions and seek to explain an
event by its efficient causes, constitutive ones seek to answer “what” and
“how possible” questions, that is, to explain the conditions that constitute the
phenomenon in the first place (Wendt 1998, 1999; Kratochwil 2000: 78).
Thus, they can be seen as supplementary rather than alternative research
questions. (p.720)

9
The IR feminist literature provides a relevant example of investigations
privileging constitutive explanations. According to J. Ann Tickner (Tickner 2005) the IR
feminist literature challenges the state-centric and androcentric biases of the discipline,
constantly looking at questions relative to the behavior of states and interstate relations
(frequently taken as unitary actors). The prevalent social scientific method privileged to
address state-centric research questions favors the use of quantitative data from state-
generated indicators. To feminists, such indicators are gendered biased. They do not
reflect, according to Tickner, “the reality of women‟s lives and the unequal structures of
power within which they are situated” (p.6). Therefore, the issue is not so much about
basing one‟s research on initially specified hypotheses open to subsequent testing, but to
unveil unspoken or not-asked „realities‟ that are as real as the empirical observable
manifestations from state-centered relations that are at the core of Western IR
scholarship. That is why, says Tickner, feminists “rely on hermeneutic, historical,
narrative, and case study methodological orientations rather than on causal analysis of
unproblematically defined entities and social relations” (p.6).
Instead of looking at gendered biases that would justify my choosing of a
constitutive (rather than causal) research design, I am looking at the ontological biases
guiding the way IR scholarship analytically incorporates research on „global‟ issues
(whether we call these globalization, globality, globalism, or, as I call it, global
relations).

10
Identifying the Empirical Domain

What is the empirical domain in my research? To answer this deceivingly simple
question it must be acknowledged that the very understanding of what is regarded as
empirical in Social Sciences is greatly contested. A strictly empiricist understanding of
the scientific method would suggest that only material events and processes that can be
observed or experienced in the „real‟ world qualify as empirical data. But critical
approaches, such as constructivism and hermeneutics, recognize that the construction of
the human material world starts at the level of the ideational codified through language.
Both are treated as necessary previous steps that provide underlying meaning and
rationality to human action. I side with the latter and further argue that concepts are key
linguistic and ideational elements in the process of translating information reaching for
our senses through experience into knowledge. Without them no explanatory power
would ever emerge. Therefore, the empirical domain in my research is scientific
terminologies, or concepts, used by scholars in International Relations to address global
social phenomena.
In general terms a concept is an idea about something. More specifically, in the
form of a terminology, a concept is a term, a predicate whose function is to translate
intelligibly a sensation or raw information reaching our senses into understanding or
knowledge.
Research Concepts are terminologies used by the members of a given scholarly
community in their perspective areas of inquiry. They are the linguistic components
largely responsible to the ever-evolving establishment of intersubjective understandings
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about the nature and content of what is deemed as valid investigations. They indicate
what phenomena are the subjects of research; what are the central research questions;
what are the marginal ones; what is contested and what is largely settled. Ultimately, they
indicate to the members of the community what is real and what is not in their respective
worldviews, areas of investigation, research programs, and disciplines.
But social concepts are eluding creatures. Any area of human interest, activity, or
inquiry – be it sports, fashion, quantum physics, or global relations – has its own sets of
linguistic terms, without which even reasoning about them would be impossible. And yet,
social sciences concepts are particularly difficult to handle. They have very heavy
normative contents. Their definitions and usages are not merely a matter of description,
but also include evolving social interpretations and even power struggles that are never
fully settled. It would be a futile exercise to attempt to engage in final or universal
judgments or adjudications about their meanings, usages, or relevance. But these
challenges should not prevent us from looking closely and systematically into the ways
concepts shape our very interpretations of reality. On the contrary, it only makes this
need even more compelling.
The answer, in my opinion, is to recognize that while usages of social concepts
are always changing they also reflect historic and cultural intersubjective understandings.
They become relevant concepts because large enough of social groups and sub-groups
appropriate and re-interpret them in a given time and place. Thus it is possible and
desirable to produce historical and cultural snapshots that allow us (a) to recognize social
meanings of terminologies with influential social currency, (b) to monitor how these
meanings evolve with time, and (c) to map the extent to which the conceptual systems
12
formed by these terminologies actually provide us with comprehensive, fragmented,
distorted, or otherwise altogether misleading “pictures” of realities that in any case
influence, shape, and constrain the accepted boundaries of possibilities for individual and
collective action.

The “How” Question: Knowledge Representations in Concept Systems

There are several ways at looking at concepts. I am particularly interested in the
frame perspective that addresses concepts as components of idealized cognitive models
that portray a given worldview or interpretation of reality (Brady and Collier 2004).
Concepts are the key components of these models. But it is the existing relationships
observed among them that give functionality to the model as a whole and ultimately
generate and guide conceptual formation. The identification of which concepts form
which models is just the first step on how to look at concepts and their relevance to the
constructions of social worldviews. It is reasoning about interactions among concepts that
justify the frame perspective.
Groups of interrelated concepts, forming coherent concept systems, once
institutionalized, even if implicitly, as reflected in academic writing, publications, and
speeches, provide authority to the meanings primarily associated to them. They become
norms. As such, they constitute social agreements on matters of boundaries, of right and
wrong, of patterns of behavior, and of authority among social agents. It also identifies
what is perceived as social cleavages. Quoting Hall and Kratochwil, Alkopher makes the
point that „„norms are not important because they create harmony, but because they help
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to recognize cleavages and conflicts in a society (1993:501–502)” (Alkopher 2005,
p.718). In other words, norms are the end result of a process of disputes over meaning
and relevance of the entities (i.e., terminologies) that we choose to recognize and
legitimate as constitutive of a given reality. When norms become institutionalized they
become social rules that will dictate intersubjective understandings about social life.
An example of norms as sources of intersubjective explanation about reality, the
author cites John Ruggie‟s argument on the widespread prevalence of a particular
meaning for the concept of war that emphasizes matters of causality (Ruggie 1988). Says
Ruggie:

Nevertheless, the conclusion is not that meaning causes wars; rather, as
previously indicated, the explanation is constitutive. The constitutive
explanation logically precedes causal one; thus, wars depend ontologically on
the meaning given by ideational and conceptual factors (stories, myths,
explanatory theories). (Ruggie 1998, p. 24)

Constructivists point out that the prevalent conceptualization for war is one
“caused” by military conflict, leaving out the question as to what its polar opposite –
peace – means. Is peace only the absence of military conflict? Explains Alkopher:
“Constructivism, for its part, maintains that the existence of a conflictual reality depends
on internalized norms, rules, and conventions that give meanings to conflictual and
violent actions.” (Alkopher 2005, p.719). What these issues imply is that the prevalence
of a given understanding of reality, institutionalized through the unquestioned use of
conceptual interpretations no longer open to debate (thus becoming norms for
socialization) will guide collective behavior. In the case of the example of war, it will
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shape the nature of academic funding and research for the investigations of wars as an
empirical manifestation, as well as the types of policy making deemed as appropriate to
deal with them.
While interpretations are individual endeavors, rules imply a collective game of
action and reaction in which patterns governing social interactions emerge. Rules may be
more or less stable or institutionalized; they may evolve or eventually become reified and
socially construed “to represent an objective reality, independent of our meaning
structures” (Fierke 2002, p.338). Deviations or questionings will therefore be seen as
open confrontation to established knowledge and status quo.
In terms of scientific praxis, itself a social world, repetition and habit can be a
powerful force to make constitutive explanations deeply internalized up to the point of
normative institutionalization. Repetitive (and unquestioned) use of concepts has such
power, helping to define disciplinary limits and boundaries, shaping what is perceived as
valid research programs, while at the same time recognizing what are the cleavages in the
field (legitimate research problems) as well as giving meaning to action (scientific
praxis). For instance, is the emphasis on causal inferences over constitutive ones a
normative imposition (conventional scientific IR trumping critical normative discourses)
or simply the reflection of a widely perceived understanding about the right (over the
wrong) way of practicing science? By judging from the successful persistence of critical
approaches in our field, all too often subscribing to constitutive explanations, the answer
must rest with the former.
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The concept of Cold War is another example of a reified conceptual norm
incorporated as objective reality that in turn imposed a particular pattern of social
interactions guided by fixed rules of play.

The Cold War solidified into a set of shared practices that – while not relying
on identical meanings in East and West, or even America and various
Western European countries – provided established, if not fixed rules of play.
The fixity of any particular game is in part a function of the degree to which
actors assume the logic represents the world “as it is,” thus requiring their
conformity. Transition or movement toward a new set of rules often required
a challenge to the prevailing necessity and a willingness to act as if a new
logic were possible. (Fierke 2002, 338-339)

It is true that a single concept can be framed in a certain way and eventually
reified as to reshape social interpretation and understanding as objective and even
absolute reality. But a concept in isolation can only go so far in helping us portraying
complex social realities and our intersubjective (collective) understandings of it. Frame
semantics, developed by Charles J. Fillmore (Fillmore 1976), advocates that it is not
possible to understand the meaning of a single word (e.g., scientific terminology) without
reference to the corpus of knowledge to which that word refers. Concepts must be
addressed in conjunction to other related concepts as to provide a coherent „frame‟ of
social reality.
The implication from adopting the frame perspective to understand how concepts
generate worldviews, from recognizing their normative role for matters of socialization,
and from using the frame semantics‟ approach applied to concepts as to portray complex
social reality, is to look at related scientific terminologies as discrete, individual
components of overarching conceptual systems.
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By definition a conceptual system is a system comprised by linguistic
components, not physical ones. As a system it implies the notion that its individual non-
physical objects mutually relate, interdependently, forming a complex whole that in turn
represent interrelated sets of ideas, principles, organizational forms, classifications, and
categories. At the basic level, thus, conceptual systems reflect implicit or explicit
attempts to process perception and information into interpretation and understanding.
Dictionaries and Encyclopedias are the most obvious and basic examples of concept
systems. Other less evident refer to the variables chosen in a given research design, in
detriment to others, excluded by whatever reason. They form expert systems.
Expert systems are conceptual systems whose individual components, or
terminologies, are research concepts. They are the result of explicit attempts to produce
scientific knowledge, which is a decisive step beyond fashion, opinion, interpretation, or
mere description. Research concepts have a certain aura of authority, as they claim to be
fragments of reality itself as it is presented to all of us regardless of personal tastes. They
claim to be intersubjective knowledge. Expert systems then should be able to put together
the various discrete pictures of the jigsaw puzzle that we call reality.
But the question still remains: how to address conceptual systems in systematic
ways in order to have access to the realities they claim to represent? My strategy is to
engage in knowledge representation, a method to depict systems of knowledge however it
is understood and defined (e.g., description, explanation, and prescription of social
phenomena). It aims at portraying complex information in ways conductive to the
generation of knew knowledge (theory generation) and inference. Applied to expert
conceptual systems it must be able to identify the key components of the systems (e.g.,
17
concepts) as well as the existing links observed among them in ways that reduce the
complexity and sheer amount of information to manageable levels.
Cognitive modeling is the type of knowledge representation that I here favor for
its particular concern for the maximization of the human cognitive abilities to process
information into knowledge. It attempts to reproduce or emulate human cognitive
abilities such as connectionism (networks of interconnected units), paradigmatic
representations, and semantic relationships to convey processed information (knowledge)
in ways that help us to absorb the most possible amount of knowledge with the minimum
levels of input information.
Connectionism is an approach to computer modeling and human cognition based
on the idea of how the human brain works to process information. Connectionism claims
that information is processed as a result of networks of units working together. These are
“neural nets”, constituted by input units, hidden units, and output units. Paul M.
Churchland explains the process, as it is typically visually represented as shown in
Diagram I.2 below (Churchland 1992). Input units represent sensory neurons. After
information reaches these sensory units, they are transmitted to a second layer or
population of neuronlike units. In a real brain, a single input unit may generate thousands
or even hundred of thousands of connections to the “hidden units”. These are
intermediary units within the network that will react to the connections according to their
intensity, the size or “weight” of the synaptic connection, and its polarity. From the
hidden units, additional connections are made leading to the output units:

18
In this upper half of the network also, the global effect is that an activation
patterns across the hidden units produces a distinct activation pattern across the
output units. As before, exactly what pattern-to-pattern transformation takes place
is fixed by the configuration of synaptic weights meeting the output units.
(Churchland 1992, p. 345).

Key in the connectionist approach to human cognitive abilities is the
understanding that information operates through integrated networks, not through discrete
and isolated units operating autonomously, as tends to be the view with semantic-oriented
approaches. But critics of connectionism point out its general disregard for the human
ability to process information by manipulating symbols and representations (Pinker and
Mehler 1988; Fodor 1998). While the focus for the connectionist approach is to try to
replicate as much as possible the actual, physical architecture of the brain, semantic
Diagram I.2: Connectionist Approach to Information Processing of the Brain:
Neural Nets
Output Units
Hidden Units
Input Units
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oriented approaches are rather concerned with the contents of the information processing
abilities of reasoning.
Still, the two approaches do not have to be in mutual opposition by default. After
all, connectionism has shed light into the actual composition of the brain in terms of
transforming sensory information into understanding that in turn allows for rational
behavior to emerge. But semantic approaches have also provided important contribution
by showing that in this process of transforming sensory data into knowledge, the use and
manipulation of symbols and metaphorical references appear to be crucial.
To that end, I believe that a major intended contribution from my research is the
development of a particular methodology aimed at producing visual representations of
concept systems in more systematic ways. In other words, it combines insights from the
network approach adopted by connectionism to the use and manipulation of symbolic
representations from semantic approaches. I call it Visual Cognitive Modeling. As a
general template or platform, it provides a general language for reasoning, and allows for
the production of complex and yet simplified models of subjective, intersubjective and
objective representations of reality with the aid of diagrams, colors, lines, etc, as well as
texts, thus reducing informational complexity while at the same time providing a “bird‟s
eye” perspective of expert systems in their entirety.

The “Why” Question: Intersubjective Understandings of the Global

The cognitive models developed in this research are based on global concepts
used by scholars in International Relations in their respective investigations on global
20
issues. They greatly influence and eventually shape conversations within academia,
policy designs based on their recommendations, and the public appropriation of the
„global‟. There should be no doubt that the impact from cognitive models of
representation on global realities is palpable and significant. More than neutral depiction
of reality, scientific knowledge in general and global relations in particular is the result
of history and culture, of political power and interests, which begs the question: why
certain models comprised by certain concepts and not others?
To answer this question, I must first point out to what I see as a glaring and yet
largely neglected paradox within global studies: Western IR scholarship in general and
globalization in particular, either addressed as empirical manifestations or as multi-
disciplinary scholarships, are often (rightly) accused of engaging on explicit or
unintended forms of imperialism. In both cases, in the name of some sort of „universal‟
claims, they challenge in threatening ways the particular, the local, and the peripheral.
They impose on the disenfranchised (whether less-powerful states or any other social
agents) the will, the moral, the interests, and the values of the powerful. This is true when
the exercise of imperial power derives from the disproportional attention paid to the
preferred object of analysis in Western scholarship – the powerful states – or their
political, economic, and even intellectual constituents (such as inter-governmental
organizations, north-based multinational corporations, and epistemic communities).
Critics see claims to the universal in pejorative ways as they justify these unequal
relationships embedded not only in actual economic and political relations but also
through the academic production of „knowledge‟. But such criticism albeit relevant also
allows the „nationalistic methodology‟ so prevalent in IR to prevail unchallenged.
21
Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldo (Anheier, Glasius et al. 2001) use this term in reference to
the existing sources of statistical data for measuring domestic and international social
phenomena that also used to measure global manifestations, when the latter is not a linear
extension of the former.

The sequence contains an important qualitative difference that escapes
international statistical systems – a difference that becomes fundamental once
the nation state or the national economy is no longer the frame of reference
for what is to be measured. (p.18)

I expand the use of the term here to imply the prevalence of a broad
understanding at all levels of knowledge production that takes the global as a mere
extension of the international, without any qualitative differentiation. As a result, the
logical and the analytical foundations for the production of knowledge that gives IR its
state-centric and polycentric nature are not seriously debated. It allows the particular, the
individual – both the great powers and their home-based powerful political, economic,
and social forces – to be at center stage, to be the „sovereign‟ in their respective domains.
It fulfills realist claims about the prevalence of a scholarship addressing a world in which
the will of the strongest, the need for individual survival in a climate of permanent
competition and scarce resources dictate the search for knowledge. It also fulfills liberal
claims about the power of the individual freedom and enterprise as the only road to
success. The collective, in both accounts, can only take place within the unitary
boundaries of the state and society. Outside, conflict can only be mitigated, partially
negotiated. The very ontology of the state-centric duality of external-conflictual and
internal-ordered can never be altered, so the story goes. The obvious by-product of this
22
account is that there are no truly universals in social relations outside the state and
domestic society (thus the immutable state of conflict). This, of course, justifies the
incorporation of global studies by the traditional „nationalistic methodology‟ so prevalent
in IR scholarship.
The need to reclaim global discourses from its trapped definitions imposed by
standard or traditional views of globalization finds resonance in Steve Smith‟s arguments
about what he considers as the ten core assumptions or features of IR theory that have
prevailed and given the discipline its characteristics. One of the assumptions “concerns
the power of the notion of a common progression of humanity toward one end-state as
exemplified in most accounts of globalization” (Smith 2004, p.505). It implies a common
route for progress and regularities superseding subjectivity and difference that are seen as
temporally defined and historically contingent. Well, it is only natural that reactions to
such accounts negate universalities that should be at the very heart of global discourses.
After all, how to accept that all human social communities ought to have the same path?
How to accept that the so-called „advanced‟, „post-industrialized‟ societies should impose
their cultural, political, and economic practices and worldviews on all other „developing‟
societies? Of course, it is not possible.
Smith is right when saying that the underplayed importance conferred to matters
of identity in IR is reflected in most accounts of globalization. Indeed, those who
subscribe and practice, even if unwillingly, the conventional standards of empirical,
rationalist social science inquiry in IR, tend to accept global discourses as resulting from
a single rationality (that of the powerful), as the end-of-history progression toward a
single global-state type of political, economic, and social structures. But I would go
23
further and argue that those who deny globalization as an imperialist tool of the powerful
tend to deny not this particular self-centered, narrow global discourse, but the global
discourse as a whole, any global discourse. They see all global relations rather for what
this narrow global discourse is: the discourse of the powerful.
The question is not to accept that all societies have the same cultural values,
worldviews and institutional structures, but that we all have culture, worldviews, and
institutions. That is what is universal. The question is not to accept a common fate to all
humanity, but to investigate what is behind similar needs to produce knowledge, culture,
all sorts of human social practices, and how can we learn from the myriad of differences
emanating from varying social groups. How to learn from different contributions to
human socialization? The recognition of global universalities is not necessarily about
finding commonalities in the way human social behavior emerges, but exchanging
perspectives and differences so levels of communications, empathy, sympathy,
interpretation, and persuasion can increase and with them mutual understanding,
standards of living and a more harmonious relationship not only between human social
groups, but between us and the global environment to which we all belong.
My claim is that in negating any global discourse, critics of globalization end up
playing in the hands of those powerful forces benefiting from a world in which matters of
trans-border identity are denied. Most of what their criticism can do is to highlight here
and there incredible and heroic manifestations of the local in opposition to the global.
This is the case, for instance, of public manifestations against global capitalism before the
WTO Ministerial Meetings as well as claims in defense of local cultural manifestations
against American cultural imperialism. But the overall structure of a world primarily
24
devised as powerful, imperial forces, imposing their will on the weak, the local, cannot be
altered. But the local is not the weak. It is the very foundation that allows for the global to
manifest itself. It is the variety of cultures that allow us to recognize that human behavior
is not natural, but cultural. We have to reclaim the meaning of global discourses, exactly
to be able to bring-in matters of identity embedded in all sorts and types of human
production at the global scale.
The unfortunate irony in this paradox is that the very disenfranchised who are the
most disadvantageously affected by the clash between a prevailing imperial global
discourse and its full denouncing tend to support the latter as the only alternative to the
former. They play along in this game, understanding that international relations are solely
the realm of state-to-state relations primarily dictated by power politics. To learn the
goals, the reasoning, and the behavior of the great powers must be done by the non-
powerful if they want to „play the game‟. There are no universals, and grabs the valuable
the fittest or whoever gets there first. The disenfranchised plays the game all right, the
game of the powerful. A game they can never win. I contend that only with the
uncovering of the universal, we can all make claims to them and use them to the benefits
of us all. Only understanding the universal in human social relations will allow the
disenfranchised to uncover a different game to be played. After all, if it is not the game of
power relations that the least powerful can successfully play, what are the alternative
possibilities?

25
The Research

The research is structured as follows:

Introduction

In this chapter I explored in some detail the “what”, the “how”, and the “why”
questions that guide my research: What is the type of investigation that I propose with my
research? How to address a non-causal, constitutive type of investigation centered on key
research terminologies, largely shaping our representations of the realities we study in the
field of IR? Why looking at intersubjective understandings that constitutive our global
perspectives, its issues and processes? In the following chapters I will engage in each of
these questions, in turn.

Chapter One: Knowledge Representations in Concept Systems

In this chapter I expand the arguments on the “what” question, namely the object
of this research, by addressing in succession its key foundational elements. First, I
provide a brief summary of historical approaches to concepts in general. They inform the
main strategies for conceptual analysis and when mutually compared they reveal
similarities as well as some profound differences. These approaches while providing the
groundwork for more systematic investigations of concepts also reveal shortcomings,
26
ultimately restricting certain analytical possibilities, particularly those taking concepts as
components of cognitive frames and groups of mutually related concepts.
Second, I discuss in some detail the nature of concept systems as groups of
integrated terminologies. I distinguish and compare intersubjective or sociological
concept systems from subjective or physiological concept systems, and argue on the
power and roles of the former for the dynamic shaping and reshaping of collective
representations about social realities.
Next, I detail the cognitive content in social representations and how it has been
sporadically used in IR literature on various types of investigations. The variety of
cognitive approaches found reflects the interdisciplinary character of cognitive
investigations and, consequently, a broad range of cognitive frameworks, particularly
when considering alternative strategies for mapping and modeling cognitive
representations. I explain the main alternatives from the standpoint of levels of formality
implied in each framework used.
I conclude the chapter by discussing systemic features embedded in social
realities and how cognitive representations should be able to model them. On the one
hand, various usages of cognitive approaches found in IR literature in one way or another
reflect this interplay between systemic social realities and their corresponding
representations. On the other hand, the variety of approaches found has prevented so far
minimal levels of uniformity – and even communication – between them. Therefore, I
indicate what I see as some key logical requirements for building a general methodology
aimed at producing visual cognitive representations of concept systems. The actual
methodology is the subject of the following chapter.
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Chapter Two: Visual Cognitive Modeling

Here I finally introduce the essentials of a method aimed at visually mapping or
representing reasoning, argumentation, and organization of information. I call this
method Visual Cognitive Modeling (VCM). It follows the footsteps of a somewhat
disperse but nevertheless established literature on diagrammatic reasoning. The
difference is that other efforts have focused on principles of logic to validate their visual
structures, on network structures for computer design and expert systems, as well as
semantic networks and visual schema in linguistics. VCM tries to combine elements of
all these traditions, while also adding two important elements. First, it is based on the
fundamental principle of systemism, in which everything is considered to be either a
system or a component of one (Bunge 1996). As a result, particular attention is paid to
multi-level systemic structures, as opposed to isolated unidimensional constructions.
Second, while incorporating elements capable of providing logic and analytical internal
validity to the models built, the focus is to provide a language that is first and foremost a
cognitive one. In doing so, it provides simple general templates that allows for easy
understanding and access to content. As a result, it “democratizes” participation in
debates characterized by high levels of analytical reasoning, while also substantially
reducing complexity from visual models.
The chapter is primarily devoted to introduce the contents of what I call
“cognitive universals”. They are the basic elements universally used when individuals
and collectivities produce mental models, namely types of containers and containments
(nodes), classes of network structures, and linkages. As I address each of these essential
28
elements I provide examples of their actual or potential applications, mostly from IR
scholarship. I conclude the chapter by pointing out the multi-dimensional nature of the
models, characterized by the existence of network structures within network structures
within network structures. As a result, alternative modes of visualization may be
available, particularly the “molecular” mode as well as “cognitive instances”. The former
presents networks within networks. The latter presents successive cognitive steps in
reasoning.

Chapter Three: Agency in Global Civil Society

In chapter three I apply the „language‟ of VCM to a rather concrete task, namely
building a typology on agency in Global Civil Society (GCS). I use the articles and data
in the five volumes published between 2001 and 2006 by the Global Civil Society
Yearbook (GCSY) project, jointly produced by two units of the London School of
Economics and Political Science (LSE): the Centre for the Study of Global Governance
and the Centre for Civil Society.
First, I justify the need for the typology, focusing on agency rather than on agents
or actors. Since GCS is a very fluid environment in which its actors still experiment with
emerging organizational forms and strategies, it makes more sense to focus on types of
agency available to agents, capable of influencing the direction of global issues and
processes, rather than trying the inglorious task of mapping types of mutating actors
wearing multiple „hats‟. I also detail the sites of agency available for GCS. They refer to
29
spatial and analytical levels in which particular types of agency may be better apt to deal
with as opposed to others.
Next I build a typology model in two separate stages. First, I introduce the
gradation network model as the most appropriate to represent distinct and yet integrated
types of GCS agency. I spell out the main types of agency available (individuals,
institutions, and infrastructure, as variations of human and social resources in terms of
agency). Second, the bulk of the chapter is devoted to analyzing – with the use of
examples from empirical cases and data found in the GCSY literature – the specific types
of agents operating within each realm of agency. I conclude the chapter by reasoning on
both the rich picture found in regards to GCS agency and on the benefits of applying the
gradation network methodology as an alternative approach to understanding the nature
and reach of GCS.

Chapter Four: Representations of Religion by International Relations

In chapter four I apply cognitive representations to visually translate the logic of
the arguments behind the various approaches in IR on the relationships between the field
and Religion. It is an application of VCM to more abstract conceptual constructs. First, I
briefly describe the historical evolution of the relationship between politics and religion:
the banning of the latter from the public life with the establishment of the Westphalian
system of states, and then its persistence to continue to be a relevant force in international
relations.
30
Next I produce a literature review of IR prescriptions on how to deal with
religion. The common understanding is the existence of a „spectrum‟ of alternative ways
to address the intersection between IR and Religion. Therefore, I visually translate that
spectrum of possibilities as a line network. Each „node‟ in the model represents a singular
approach. However, a close analysis reveals a debate that is not characterized by a
continuum or linear spectrum of logical alternatives. What we have instead is a truncated
debate. Different approaches focus on different epistemological concerns, which in turn
leads to varying prescriptions that do not necessarily allows for productive analytical
engagements. The evidence for such analytical state of affairs is a fractured debate that
can be visually represented as two distinct network structures, united only by a single
(and weak) intersection. The specifics of each of these network structures are properly
explained throughout Chapter Four.
Finally, I propose the reshaping of the debate, by focusing exclusively on
metaphysical and ontological assumptions embedded in each approach found in the
literature. The result is the emergence of an alternative visual cognitive model, called
ring network. Contrary to the previous debate, by centering the arguments on
metaphysical and ontological claims produce openings for a debate in which the logical
arguments from one approach transfer to the next in the model in a looping, linear
fashion.
I conclude the chapter by calling for a more systematic analysis of those
metaphysical and ontological claims if the debates between Religion and IR are to be
truly fruitful. In particular, I suggest the systematic incorporation of the analytical
principles of scientific paradigms for the analysis of research programs, as expressed in
31
the philosophy of science‟s debate involving authors such as Thomas Khun, Imre
Lakatos, and Karl Popper, among others.

Chapter Five: Paradigmatic Degree of Aggregation Model

In chapter five I built a visual cognitive model able to incorporate groups of
interrelated concepts. It involves a rather ambitious task of trying to logically and
consistently link a large number of constructs used by scholars in a given area of interest,
research program, or field with paradigmatic identity. I call it paradigmatic degrees of
aggregation model. It first emerges as a blended space of a blending network model. It
combines features of two distinct conceptual constructions (the input spaces). The first is
Patrick James and James Rosenau‟ levels of aggregation model. It is a model that
differentiates between various levels of conceptual aggregation with the goal of
identifying the most appropriate ones for the assessment of whether a given research
enterprise is progressive or degenerative (Rosenau 1977; James 2002). The second is
Gary Goertz‟ three-level concept model. It is a model that according to this author better
reflects the inner structure of most, if not all, relevant social concepts (Goertz 2006).
The emerging multi-level model combines elements of the two afore-mentioned
input models, while introducing two important conceptual distinctions. First, I argue that
a comprehensive evaluation of the progressive nature of a given research enterprise
requires taking into consideration the extent to which all levels of aggregation are
populated by appropriate conceptual constructs. Second, I make the case that in fact the
inner structure of social concepts possesses not only three levels, but multiple ones, as
32
each of the three original primary levels presented by Goertz is, indeed,
multidimensional.
I then apply this model in the subsequent chapter to a specific paradigmatic
domain in IR scholarship.

Chapter Six: Global Relations Paradigm

In the final chapter I use the paradigmatic degrees of aggregation model
introduced in chapter five to globalization concepts. The goal is to logically and
consistently link a large number of constructs used by scholars in IR somehow working
with globalization. I ended up selecting a large set of “globalization concepts” from a
literature review of all articles published by the academic journal International Studies
Quarterly (ISQ) for a period of ten years. After a two-stages review, 108 articles were
selected out of a pool of 301 for an in-depth content analysis, which resulted in the
selection of about a thousand global concepts.
I engage in what may be defined as “qualitative/quantitative distribution” of those
global concepts in the model. However, here I only introduce the initial stages of this
effort. First, I engage in some theoretical considerations about the logical shortcomings of
globalization as a terminology commonly used to refer to global spheres of socialization,
suggesting instead the use of the more value-neutral global relations. Next, I identify the
components of global relations paradigms in the paradigmatic degrees of aggregation
model. Finally, I populate the model with the concepts found in the ISQ literature review.
33
I conclude the chapter with some tentative inferences on the state of knowledge in IR in
regards to the topic of globalization as a research enterprise with paradigmatic identity.

Conclusion

I conclude my work with some references to two distinct topics: the methodology
of Visual Cognitive Modeling introduced in Chapter Two and applied in all subsequent
chapters, and my research on global relations.
I address the potential applications of VCM as a visual methodology. I point out
its potential contributions to theoretical research, teaching and education, as well as
organization of knowledge. I indicate the next steps in my efforts to fully develop it as a
mature tool to be used by scholars, students, and the public at large as an efficient tool for
communication, characterized by high levels of analytical reasoning, and yet highly
accessible by non-experts in the languages of symbolic logic and formal modeling.
I conclude with some remarks on the next steps on my research on global relations.
34
Part One: Visual Reasoning

Chapter One:
Knowledge Representations in Concept Systems

In this chapter I explore the “what” question in my research, namely concepts.
More specifically, it is groups of interconnected concepts, or concept systems, which are
the focus of my investigations. As discussed throughout this chapter, I take concept
systems as sources for cognitive representations of social realities. By systematically
looking into the ways concepts interact within and form concept systems may provide us
with alternative understandings on the state of knowledge of social realities that are the
object of study of particular fields, domains, or areas of academic interest. Assuming that
collective representations should try to mirror the social realities to which they refer,
investigations of concept systems may also allow for inference making on the very
structure, content, and changes taking place inside actual realms of socialization.
The arguments in this chapter are structured around four main sections. First, I
give a brief summary of the historical approaches to conceptual analysis, followed by
some conjectures on their similarities and differences. Second, I engage in a more
detailed analytical description of conceptual systems as groups of interrelated concepts
endowed with sociological roles. Third, I analyze the “frame” perspective of concept
systems and their relationship with cognitive representations. I provide some basic
information as to the nature of cognitive representations, some of its applications in
35
international relations literature, and an overview of the various frameworks found for
mapping and modeling cognitive representations. I conclude the chapter by enumerating
the essential features required for a proper methodology to be applied to the types of
investigations and data used in this research. These features emanate from the
fundamental understanding that social realities have systemic features and their
representations should be able to reflect such systemic character.

Approaches in Conceptual Analysis

Concepts have historically played a central role in our efforts to produce both
knowledge and understanding of social practices in all areas of human interests, from
philosophy to science, from religion to sports. Understanding and explaining social
reality is possible largely due to the construction of conceptual categories that inform
theory and method. Conceptual analysis (CA) is a topic in theory building and plays an
important role for scientific production in general, and for social sciences in particular.
Although there is great a variety of approaches of conceptual analysis, three of
them stand out: the „classical‟ or philosophical approach to concepts, which focuses
primarily on matters of natural language (Bacon 1620; Leibniz 1684; Locke 1690; Kant
1781); the scientific or applied approach dealing with matters of scientific terminology of
social phenomena (rather than on concrete objects), (Whitehead and Russell 1910-13;
Smith and Kunne 1982; Smith and Mulligan 1983; Smith 1989; Smith 2003); and the
36
context-dependent approach dealing with the historic and social contexts of concepts
(Skinner 1969; Skinner 1978).
2

The classic approach to conceptual analysis draws from philosophy and
philosophy of language and focuses primarily on matters of natural language. It had
originally been concerned with the metaphysical nature of concepts (Socrates, Plato,
Aristotle). The problematisation of the meaning of concepts in natural language emerged
with the predecessors of modern analytic philosophy. They recognized the need of more
rigorous uses of concepts, which implied, among other things, the identification of its
logical boundaries, specific components as well as the nature of its propositions (Bacon
1620; Leibniz 1684; Locke 1690; Kant 1781).
Analytic Philosophy, closely related to logical empiricism and logical positivism,
emerged and claimed that the analysis of concepts or language is the central
methodological approach for the achievement of clarity required to any philosophical
inquiry (Moore 1922; Wittgenstein 1922; Carnap 1928; Russell 1940; Russell 1948; Ryle
1949; Moore 1959; Strawson 1959; Wittgenstein 1999). To the members of the American
movement known as Pragmatism – term coined by Charles S. Pierce – the relevance of
concepts, whether in the form or ideas or propositions, is their relation to empirical
observables and experimental investigations (James 1907; Quine 1986).
In linguistics, one of the most relevant sub-fields to CA is that of semantics – the
study of meaning of language – which is closely related to symbolic logic. However, the

2
The following summary of the three main streams of conceptual analysis was originally based on the
doctoral dissertation work of Lajos Ludovic Brons: Brons, L. L. (2005). Rethinking the Culture-Economy
Dialectic.

37
focus here tends to be on deeper structures of language, and not so much on particular
concepts (Quine 1960; Chomsky 1972; Searle 2001).
In hermeneutics, the focus is on the critical interpretation and understanding of
texts in their relation to culture and history. Originally restricted to biblical criticism, it
expanded to address the methodological requirements necessary for textual understanding
(Schleiermacher) and even aimed at providing a distinct methodology for human and
social sciences in general, seen as primarily hermeneutical in nature, different than
natural sciences (Dilthey 1860; Dilthey 1867-8; Dilthey 1900; Gadamer 1960; Heidegger
1962; Ricoeur 1981).
The scientific approach has furthered the efforts aimed at uncovering intrinsic
conceptual properties. It aims at building classification of terminologies for the sake of
scientific knowledge organization as something distinguished from the every-day uses of
concepts in natural language. Their uses should not derive from individual interpretation,
but from what we know about reality. Hence the emphasis of concept in social sciences
rather as expert knowledge as opposed to belief systems. The concern becomes matters of
conceptual rigor through systems of classification. The resulting concept systems that
emerged from these efforts tend to reflect the notion of concepts as „mirrors‟ of reality. It
means, usually, matters related to intrinsic conceptual properties, such as logical
boundaries, intension and extension
3
.

3
Intension refers to the various possible meanings associated with a particular concept. For instance, the
concept of “international relations” may be associated primarily with inter-state relations, with political
relations at the international level (international politics), or with any set of relationships, events, and
processes taking place beyond the jurisdiction of a nation-state, whether international, transnational, or
transsofereign in nature. Extension, in turn, refers to the sets of cases to which a particular meaning apply.
For instance, security studies may be considered as an instantiation of international relations defined as
international politics.

38
This approach has allowed the accumulation of taxonomies and classifications
that have been particularly relevant in nursing and medicine, social, political and
behavioral sciences, as well as computer and information sciences (Brons 2005). In
nursing and medicine the obvious focus is with diagnostics and their communication for
better treatment (Wilson 1970; Walker and Avant 1983; Morse 1995). In political and
social sciences the concern, particularly since the 1970s, has been the increasing
conceptual confusion resulting from the adoption of concepts from natural language and
natural sciences (Dahlberg 1978). For that reason, the goal has been on „conceptual
reconstruction‟ (Sartori 1984), with the development of projects on terminology,
classification, and knowledge organization. In 1970 Giovanni Sartori and Fred W. Riggs
founded the Committee on Conceptual and Terminological Analysis (COCTA). In 1977
Unesco started the Interconcept Project (Riggs 1981) and in 1981 Sartori edited one of
the most influential works on systematic analysis of concepts in social sciences, as a
follow up of the COCTA‟s project (Sartori 1984). The International Standards
Organization (ISO) has also worked on the development of concept systems with the
objective of establishing inter-lingual harmonization on terminologies, which led to the
publication of ISO 704, 1087, and 10241 (Effenberger 1995).
Conceptual analysis in the political and social sciences have been greatly
influenced by the idea of the „meaning triangle‟ of symbol, thought and referent
(Richards and Ogden 1923). Based on this idea Sartori argued that the key issues in
regards to concepts are (a) how meanings relate to words and (b) how meanings relate to
referents (real-world counterparts of the worlds in our minds). In the fields of artificial
intelligence and computer science the use of formal modeling for CA is prevalent,
39
particularly for conceptual modeling. Conceptual logic (first-order logic, set-theory and
formal ontology) is used for conceptual elucidation (Whitehead and Russell 1910-13;
Smith and Kunne 1982; Smith and Mulligan 1983; Smith 1989; Smith 2003). Conceptual
graphs are used for the edification of conceptual structures (Sowa 1984; Sowa 1992;
Sowa 2000) and description logic is used for knowledge representation (Sowa 2000;
Helbig 2006).
Finally, the context-dependent approach to concepts and conceptual analysis
emphasizes the historic and social contexts of concepts and is closely related to the
history of ideas
4
. More than arguing that concepts are related to contexts, the argument
here is that context is part of the concept. In fact, meanings and relevance of contexts
(specific problems and questions) change and die with changing social dynamics
(Skinner 1969; Skinner 1978). Therefore, an ultimate meaning to any given social
concept is not possible, only the development of a common language for the translation
of the various interpretations, allowing comparisons and communication. Furthermore, it
is necessary to first understand the use of language in any given context to (only then)
understand their respective ideas (or concepts) (Pocock 1969; Pocock 1975). Each of
those historic periods and their respective concepts reflect „discourses‟ that are
structurally constant in the form of „épistèmes‟, determining reality as well as how we
experience it and classify its objects, as we perceive them (Foucault 1969; Foucault
1969).

4
Although history of ideas can be related to intellectual history they differ from each other. The latter
focuses on the intellectuals responsible for the propagation of ideas or movements, such as the
Enlightenment, Romanticism, Existentialism, Structuralism, and so on. The former focuses on the evolution
of ideas (i.e., concepts) throughout history and cultural contexts.

40
Notwithstanding the differences, all approaches to concepts and the linguistic
systems formed by them inform about a common double quest, even if implicitly stated:
the building of expert knowledge and the expression of intersubjective belief systems.
Systematic investigations, philosophical or scientific, theoretical or empirical, require
rigorous uses of concepts, addressing matters of logical conceptual boundaries,
propositions and components. But as reality in the social world is social interactions, the
conceptual components chosen in any scientific endeavor help define the scope of what is
perceived as relevant in that particular world of knowledge and investigation, what is
deemed as valid research problems. Such problems, or “puzzles”, partly result from
social practices and interpretations that ultimately guide the search for knowledge and
understanding.
Still, even if the differences between the various approaches to concepts are
primarily a matter of emphasis, it is clear that the classical and the scientific approaches
to conceptual analysis give preference to matters of conceptual intrinsic attributes, while
the context-dependent interpretation understands concepts primarily as “frames”. For the
latter the main concern is not with concept attributes of “objects”, but with the world
representations that these concepts embody in cognitive models. The consideration of
concepts as being primarily semantic in nature implies looking at the implicit or explicit
values and preferences informing the uses (and misuses) of key scientific terminologies,
either individually or when related to other concepts. It is about addressing knowledge as
a perceived social reality hold together by a coherent interrelated set of values,
agreements and understandings that forms a belief system. Thus, ideology, social and
41
political interests as well as cognitive biases can explain different intersubjective
appropriations.

Sociological Concept Systems

Concept systems are largely considered as the epistemological structures that
represent either a given body of knowledge in an expert domain or the semantic
vocabulary of an individual or collective belief system. Simply put, they are knowledge
representations or representations of cognitive spaces. Members of scientific domain-
communities use concept systems formed by key terminologies as inter-related sets of
vocabulary-objects. Systems of concepts form the typology of variables that scholars use
to address the empirical realities (types of universals and their respective particulars, or
instances) of their respective investigations and research programs (Shaw and Gaines
1989). It is, so to speak, the supporting systems of any body of knowledge and
understanding.
But what are the main characteristics of concept systems within the domains of
social relations as understood in this research?
To answer this question it is important to differentiate sociological concept
systems from the purely cognitive activities of the brain responsible for the construction
of internal, mental representations of reality through the formation of abstract, subjective
concept systems. This research is fundamentally concerned with the former. Edward
Comor critically assesses the role of communication for the formation and the
development of global civil society (Comor 2001). He does so through the prism of
42
conceptual systems, which to him is an area of investigation that originally belongs to the
interdisciplinary field that we call “sociology of knowledge”. Its goal is to address the
ways in which information becomes knowledge. Conceptual systems to Comor are in no
way related to sets of terminologies, much less in the sense of scientific praxis. It relates
to the ways individuals become socialized. Concept systems to that author are converging
social values expressed through natural language that inform experiences and social
behavior. To Comor, the development of transnational identities needed to glue together
an emerging global civil society is much weaker than commonly proclaimed by its
defenders. The reason, says Comor, is that human cognition dictates that close references
(e.g., local) are more powerful than distant ones (e.g., global).
The concept of household in international studies reflects Comor‟s perspective.
According to Mary Ann Tétreault and Ronnie D. Lipschutz (Tétreault and Lipschutz
2005), the household, a realm of socialization that has not received much attention in IR
scholarship, is essential for the understanding of social practices reaching national and
international levels. The reason, contend these authors, is that individuals become
socialized first at the level of immediate relationships, as is the case of a household. Of
course, what matters is not necessarily the existence of a traditional nuclear family,
comprised by father, mother, and siblings. It can be any household, formed by any
possible configurations. What matters are the relationships carried out inside a household
transmitting social patterns: social reproduction and physical production. It is at the level
of the household that social values are reproduced. It includes, for instance, expectations
about the places that individuals (i.e., women) should take or not take in society. It also
includes, for instance, the reproduction of patterns of consumption, as well as general
43
patterns of political inequalities. Poverty, in this regard, becomes justified in the eyes of
those who have only experienced poverty as their normal life. Values and expectations
regarding poverty, oppression, and inequality, become the norm through the daily
household experiences. Following Comor‟s arguments, agents in global civil society do
not have the same ability to produce and reproduce patterns of socialization since they do
not have the same type of face-to-face, direct relationships between individuals within a
given social context, as happens in a household.
The problem with Comor analysis is the assumption that the socialization process
made possible by the development of conceptual systems operates primarily or even
solely through the individual. Comor argues that conceptual systems that are generated
(and transmitted) in different ways resonate with varying levels of intensity and efficacy
in individuals due to the ways human cognition operates: direct, unmediated family
relationships, particularly those taking place during childhood are more powerful,
resilient and profound in generating references, identities, and loyalties than indirect,
distant, mediated communicated relationships. The result is that global loyalties cannot
compete with local ones.
Comor conflates notions of basic individual human cognition aimed at
interpreting information and processing it into knowledge (a physiological process
organized by the human brain) with the ways collectivities make use of conceptual
systems (a sociological process aimed at transmitting and categorizing information as
well as processing it into intersubjective knowledge and understanding). Both make use
of conceptual systems as key to provide meaning to human action. But they are different
44
things. I call the former subjective or physiological concept systems and the latter
intersubjective or sociological concept systems.
Subjective or physiological concept systems are directly related to the human
basic physiological functions of the brain. They help humans “to cope with the
incalculable numbers of sights, sounds, odors, tastes, and textures” (Comor 2001, p. 394)
allowing individuals to become rational and coherent actors in the physical world, while
at the same time allowing for the incorporation of social values, norms and rules of
socialization. They are primarily an individual, subjective process.
The concept of cognitive operational code affecting the way decision-makers
reach policy decisions is an example in IR literature about the power of individual
cognitive abilities (George 1969; Vertzberger 1990). According to Vertzberger, decision-
makers contain sets of philosophical and instrumental core beliefs, grouped into clusters.
One cluster of beliefs, for example, helps the decision-maker to make sense of the very
nature of the political world (i.e., harmonious vs. conflictual), the essentials of politics,
and the nature of political conflicts. Its instrumental counterpart comprises beliefs about
the best strategies or approaches to select and reach political goals. Other philosophical
beliefs refer to what the decision-maker perceives as the fundamental character of allies
and opponents, while their instrumental counterparts inform the best ways to deal with
them (Vertzberger 1990, p.15).
The goal in Vertzberger‟s work is to point out that every decision-maker, as
individuals –and resulting from their role as deciders of political actions – contain the
same sets of cognitive structures, helping them to make sense of the rather complex and
45
chaotic world of politics. How these cognitive tools are “filled in”, or what will be the
specific content of a given decision-maker is a personal, subjective process.
Intersubjective or sociological concept systems on the other hand develop
primarily outside the human brain, in the world of real forms of communication and
technologically devised ways to process collective information into knowledge that
allows for the emergence of complex human socialization. Of course, members of any
community can only incorporate those if individual human physiological cognition
operates properly. But they are primarily social devices, not physiological cognitive ones.
They may be educational, cultural, legal, political, philosophical, professional, and
religious conceptual systems, to mention a few. They are primarily a collective,
intersubjective process.
An obvious example in international politics is the existence of various schools of
political thought also known as paradigms in International Relations. Political realism,
for instance, has a long line of historic and contemporary scholarly work that portrays
political relations between autonomous polities as primarily concerned with matters of
self-help, relative power and security in an anarchical environment (Carr 1946; Kaplan
1957; Waltz 1979; Keohane 1984; Morgenthau 1985; Lapid and Kratochwil 1996;
Patomäki and Wight 2000; James 2002; Elman 2004). It is obvious that those who
subscribe to realist views on international relations do so not as a result of any physical
cognitive interpretation of information inputs from the external world. After all, polities
are constructed, abstract entities, not empirical manifestations that can be experienced by
an individual in the same way as unmediated relationships between mother and son, a car
accident, or by drinking water. These intersubjective or collective representations of
46
reality result from the transmission of knowledge (i.e., writings), socializing members of
a giving community into the same set of values and perceptions about the social reality.
Contrary to Comor‟s reasoning, socialization processes are collective efforts and
those taking place beyond the family level (beyond the direct reach of the family) can be
as powerful as the ones more closely produced. Otherwise, how to explain, for instance,
the success of conceptual systems matured as ideologies and conscious nationalist efforts
that occurred where no national loyalties pre-existed? All social conceptual systems are
mediated and their efficacy will largely depend on two factors: the quality and reach of
the technological devices used to transmit information to all members of a given
community, and the ability of those members of the community championing those
systems through ideologies and discourses to efficiently and convincingly process that
information into social understanding and knowledge.
Comor is right though when pointing out that the formation and development of
conceptual systems have similar functions. First, they translate, mediate, transform, or
process information into knowledge or understanding. Unprocessed information is
nothing more than raw signals with no more than skin-deep meaning and coherence, if
much. It is the formation of conceptual systems, whether implicitly formed in the minds
of individuals and collectivities or as the result of conscious efforts to coherently
categorize, classify and compile information that generates intelligibility.
Second, concept systems create references and associations on which members of
a given community rely. In the case of sociological concept systems these references are
intersubjective or cultural in nature, guiding members of society to adjudicate what is
bad, rational, realistic, and so on. In the case of terminological conceptual systems they
47
help practitioners of a given field of human inquiry, whether it is scientific, religious,
philosophical or otherwise, to adjudicate what is included and excluded in their
respective realms of investigation; what is located at the center of their concerns, what is
marginal, what is relevant or irrelevant. In the end, conceptual systems of any type help
to form worldviews that ultimately inform individual (subjective) and collective
(intersubjective) understandings of what counts as reality.
A classic example in the field of IR of a intersubjective representation is that of
Waltz‟s billiard ball metaphor as a fundamental explanation as to how states mutually
interact within an anarchic system (Waltz 1979). John M. Hobson well summarizes the
metaphor (Hobson 2000):

Waltz effectively „black-boxes‟ the state – that is, unit-forces are held
constant. It is this manoeuvre that informs the „billiard-ball‟ metaphor. States
are like billiard balls, not simply because they constantly clash, but because
billiard balls are solid such that their internal properties do not vary, and
above all, do not affect their external behavior. (Hobson 2000, p. 23)

The billiard ball metaphor is an intersubjective representation of reality to the
extent that enough members within a given social group adopt it as legitimate, even
forcing those who do not subscribe to it to recognize its existence and even debate its
merits. At least in Western literature, any student of international relations has been
introduced to the realist metaphor of billiard balls and forced to reason on its merits and
shortcomings. Most importantly, the metaphor indicates the nature of what is central and
what is marginal in the realist account of international relations. States are central, as is
the anarchic nature of the system in which they necessarily operate. As explained by
48
Hobson, the internal constitution of states do not matter for the understanding of how the
system of states operate:

Herein lies the crux of Waltz‟s understanding of the state: that because states
are „like units‟ (due to the „socializing‟ effects of anarchy), their particular
attributes cannot enter into the definition of the international political
structure as an independent (i.e. determining) variable, precisely because
their internal attributes do not vary. Of course, they differ greatly in terms of
regime form, ideology, etc. but, as we have seen, these have purposefully
been ignored. (Hobson 2000, p. 23)

In the end, the billiard ball metaphor indicates a series of interconnected concepts
that should be taken into consideration when one “look” at reality under the prism of the
realist account: states, conflict, anarchy, power, self-interest, etc. Altogether these
elements form a conceptual system that is central for the realist understanding of the
external world to which they refer.
The third function of concept systems is to infuse malleable shades of coherence,
sense of purpose and possibilities for social evolutionary paths into complex collective
relationships that otherwise would eventually be dragged down by sheer chaos. That is
why at any given time there are competing conceptual systems at work at different levels
of development and with different power levels to influence (and even direct) the course
of collective references, identities, and ultimately action.
The concept of “globalization” may provide a good example. The topic of
globalization has become ubiquitous in academia, media outlets, and among the public at
large. And yet, it may still be a legitimate question to ask: What does globalization mean?
49
Jan Aart Scholte provides an account of the most current meanings associated with the
concept “globalization” (Scholte and Robertson 2007). According to him, it is most
commonly associated with ideas pertaining to internationalization, liberalization,
universalization, and planetarization. A more detailed account for each of these meanings
is presented in Chapter Five. For now, suffice to say that each one of them implies
different sets of empirical manifestations.
However, the recognition of which of these definitions is the one being applied
behind the concept “globalization” in a given text or discourse is often a matter of
interpretation. Seldom these distinctions are made explicit or even recognized. Still,
globalization has become such a central concept for interpretations and analyses of social
and empirical realities in the late twentieth, early twenty-first centuries that it has
contributed to the emergence of a growing corpus of novel concepts that are analytically
interconnected to the main idea of globalization (however it is defined). The literature
review of articles published by ISQ between 1997 and 2006 (shown in Chapter Five)
anyhow addressing global issues revealed over twelve hundred of such concepts! At the
same token, globalization has yet to become recognized as a coherent research program
in the field of IR.
The point here is that the concept of globalization, the fundamental ideas it imply,
as well as the emerging body of conceptual constructs associated with it (together
forming conceptual systems), have contributed to the generation of new understandings
about contemporary social realities. They provide the malleable shades of analytical
coherence that allow us to engage in reasoning on complex integrated sets of phenomena,
still in evolution, and generally termed as globalization.
50
It is true that members of expert communities only partially share the use and
content of terminologies and conceptual systems, which makes it problematic the
elicitation of knowledge. But when authoritative social groups incorporate or appropriate
certain meanings, then groups of mutually connected terminologies, or concept systems,
become a powerful intersubjective and contextual source for experiencing social reality.
Since it is a contextual source, the implication is that a dynamic process is at work. Social
meanings (as reflected in sociological concept systems) change, adapt, and may be
uniquely incorporated by different groups, at different places and historical times, as well
as by singular local contextual realities.
Such understanding about the inner functioning of sociological concept systems
resonates with Mustafa Emirbayer‟s „relational sociology‟ (Emirbayer 1997), Charles J.
Fillmore‟s „frame semantics‟ (Fillmore 1976), and with the notion of concept systems as
complex systems.
According to Mustafa Emirbayer the social world consists primarily of either
static substances or dynamic processes (unfolding relations). The substantialist
perspective considers substances such as things, beings, and essences as the fundamental
units of inquiry. These substances have intrinsic properties or fixed preferences. The
explanation of social reality (institutions and change) results from looking at the
interactions among the social substances, particularly causal interconnections. It is a
variable centered approach.
The relational or transactional perspective, in contrast, focuses on relationships
between social entities believed to have no intrinsic, inherent properties or fixed
preferences. The primary units of analysis are not social substances, but the changing
51
functional roles they play within social transactions, which gives these constituent
elements meaning, significance, and identity. Things are understood as not having
autonomous or independent existence prior to transactional relations. Furthermore, the
relations taking place between terms or units are dynamic in nature. They are unfolding,
ongoing processes, not “static ties among inert substances” (Emirbayer 1997, p.289).
Actors may enter relations with prior sets of properties, but they emerge from those
qualitatively different, as new entities displaying new characteristics, properties, or
interests.

Cognitive Representations in Concept Systems

The very acceptance of sociological concept system as responsible for the
generation of malleable intersubjective references and the adoption of a “frame”
perspective that complements such approach by privileging relational or transactional
features of concepts, indicate an implicit central concern with matters of cognitive
representation. Since entities do not have intrinsic attributes, but acquire them through
relationships, their meanings result from at least two essential features. First, conceptual
meanings emerge from relationships with other entities within a given systemic, coherent,
context that in principle should be amenable to mapping or modeling (i.e., cognitive
models). Second, these meanings reflect representations rather than absolute values.
Meanings are social perceptions.
Broadly speaking, cognition refers to the human mental processes of perception,
reasoning and intuition that allow us to interact with ourselves and with our surrounding
52
physical and social environments in intelligible ways. It applies to mental processes such
as problem solving, memory, attention, emotion and behavior, among others. This
cognitive process takes place through the construction of representations.
In general terms, some of the main contributions from cognitive models of
representation include elicitation, capturing, and creation of knowledge, comparison of
knowledge systems, reduction of informational and communication complexity, and the
enhancing of meta-cognition (thinking about thinking, or thinking about knowledge).
In the fields of political science, international relations and global studies,
cognitive modeling has been applied to decision-making processes of policy makers and
organizations. They have generated models on bounded rationality, cognitive consistency
and dissonance, conceptual metaphors, information-processing capacity and styles, and
coping with stress, and have been applied to non-routine situations, for long-range policy
planning, in circumstances of information overload and unanticipated events, among
others (Allison 1969; George 1969; Holsti 1976; Jervis 1976; Vertzberger 1990; Khong
1992; Rosati 1995). Interesting enough, cognitive mapping have been used even for the
development of models of causality. In this regard, and according to Robert Axelrod,
cognitive maps can be used specifically in foreign policy for addressing problems of
decision-making, forecast, explanation and strategy behavior of political elites and
organizations (Axelrod 1976).
Increased concerns with aspects of human cognition have also led to the
development of more complex constructions and models of human intentionality and
interaction in international studies as reflected in texts and discourses. This is the case of
discourse analysis, for instance, in which through text interpretation and linguistic-
53
oriented models investigations range from political discourse analysis (analysis of official
documents, speeches, hearings, etc), to analysis of speech acts, to the development of
contextual frame-based interpretive software applied to matters of practical relevance to
international order, such as international conflict management (Alker 1991; Alker 1996;
Searle 2001; Chilton and Schaaffner 2002; Chilton 2004).
Formal cognitive representations (e.g., formal concept maps) have served as the
logical basis for the development of software designs, particularly in the fields of
artificial intelligence, computational linguistics and computational modeling (Moor, Lex
et al. 2003; Dau, Mugnier et al. 2005). Examples with implications to International
Relations include Robert P. Abelson‟s work on the structure of belief systems (Abelson
1973), Andrew S. Gordon‟s work on representation of human strategies (Gordon 2004)
and Roger C. Schank and Abelson‟s work on structuring human knowledge (Schank and
Abelson 1977).
As this very brief look at examples from IR literature reveals, the interdisciplinary
character of cognitive modeling leads to a rich variety of approaches, methodologies, and
research programs. But it also allows for the existence of conceptual divergences and
misuses in regards to varying levels of formality in mapping and modeling
representations. Cognitive modeling, cognitive maps, concept maps, conceptual graphs
and similar expressions refer to various forms of cognitive representations. Each of these
reflects specific strategies, each embodying specific goals about particular types and
levels of representations.
Diagram 1.1 below summarizes the various conceptual frameworks for mapping
and for modeling cognitive representation.
54

The four columns indicate the varying levels of formality that different types of
schemata represent. From there one can easily visualize the extent to which they are
Diagram 1.1: Cognitive Representations
Cognitive Mapping / Modeling
Creative
Schema
Cognitive Representations
Spatial Representations
Knowledge Representations
Conceptual
Schema
Logical
Schema
Physical
Schema
Concepts
Relationships
Attributes
Design
Physical
Storage
Parameters
Classifications
Taxonomies
Topologies
Mental
Models
Mental Maps
Mind Maps
Sketch Maps
Spider Maps
Computational
Modeling
Computer
Programs

Expert
Systems

Software
Design

Semantic
Networks

Conceptual
Graphs
Concept Maps
(i.e. Cmap Tools)
55
appropriate to portray spatial representations and/or formal or knowledge representations.
Furthermore, a short list of types of cognitive modeling available is presented, organized
according to the particular level of formality they are meant to achieve.
Although the distinction between representations of cognitive spaces and
representations of knowledge is somewhat artificial, it rather indicates an overlapping
continuum in terms of levels of formality of the particular type of representation
intended. Spatial representations may be about creative, conceptual and logical schemas,
but they stop short of addressing physical schemas required for data base design. They
are commonly equated with belief systems. Formal or knowledge representations, in turn,
tend to reflect highly formalized schemas, which means logical schemas and physical
schemas for data base design. It is also equated with representation of intersubjective
knowledge, such as cumulative and revolutionary scientific and technical knowledge.
The diagram also reveals the four levels of schema for the construction of
cognitive representations. Schema theory is a theory about learning. The function of a
mental schema is to organize, structure, and cluster bodies of information in relational
ways, forming networks of information. Furthermore, schemas are mental constructs that
bring together pieces of information about the surrounding physical and social
environments with the function of helping us to make sense of them and their cacophony
of raw blocks of information. At the same time it is the basis from which individuals and
society organize new information.
As indicated in the diagram, there are creative schema, conceptual schema, logical
schema and physical schema. Creative schema aims at helping eliciting creative mental
flows that may or may not be about creativity per se. For instance, an individual
56
summarizing its own perceptions on a given subject would exemplify this type of creative
schema. Tony and Barry Buzan‟s mind maps for what they call „radiant thinking‟ is an
example of creative schema (Buzan and Buzan 1996).
Drawing on principles from learning and information sciences as well as
cognitive research of the brain, the Buzan brothers introduce the notion of „radiant
thinking‟ as a non-linear method to enhance the individual‟s ability to make cognitive
associations, linking ideas, arguments, and content through the design of creative
drawings or diagrams. The drawings start from a central point, represented as a concept
written in the middle of the paper, a drawing of it (i.e., the drawing of a house to
represent the concept home), or a combination of both, writing and drawing (i.e., the
drawing of a house with the concept „home‟ written inside it, or the word home written in
such a way as to resemble the shape of a house with a roof on the top of the word).
Then, in order to express all the concepts, ideas, associations, etc, related to the
central concept, the drawing expands, radiates, freely, through linkages drawn in a radial
shape. They combine writing information with colors, shapes, numbers, arrows, etc, in
brainstorming efforts meant to efficiently activate cognitive abilities and to produce
logical associations as well as to improve memory. Lively drawings result from the use of
this method, in which content is highly contextualized not only by linkages connecting
them, but also by their shapes and colors. According to the authors these brainstorming
„radial thinking‟ can be applied to summarize any type of information as well as to help
generate new ideas.
The fundamental limitation from creative schema derives from the impossibility
to use it as a general template to evaluate content. It displays no general structure or
57
patterns that could serve as focal points for the evaluation of knowledge. Other than
applying the radial network format and the general use of words, shapes, and colors, its
logic is rooted on free associations in an attempt to mimic the physical functioning of the
brain in individuals. Therefore, if several maps were produced, for instance, in the
classroom, to summarize the contents of a given lecture, there would be evident
benchmarks in the ways those maps could be mutually compared and evaluated in terms
of “appropriate” representations of content.
Conceptual schema, or conceptual data model, is one step ahead in terms of
formally mapping concepts and their relationships. Examples include sketch maps,
mental maps and models. Here emphasis is given to the more formal nature of semantic
relationships between the concepts forming the model. The graphic representations for
those relationships require the enactment of sets of universal notations for application
across cases and exemplars represented in that same conceptual schema format.
Therefore, different than creative schemas, conceptual schema generate expectations
about proper configurations of schema representations and their embedded meanings.
Traditional examples may include taxonomies, typologies, and classifications.
An example in IR literature is Gary Goertz‟s work on structures of social concepts
(Goertz 2006). According to the author, most if not all relevant social concepts,
particularly in political science, have a similar three-level structure. The basic level is the
“root” concept that gives it its name. The secondary level is the level of ontology,
comprising the conceptual elements that “constitute” the root concept. It provides the
linkage between the more abstract first level and the third level of concrete indicators.
The indicator level identifies the empirical elements that represent the actual
58
manifestation of the ontological components of the root concept. By looking at IR and
political science literatures, Goertz translates key arguments in seminal readings in these
fields. For example, the root concept of “societal corporatism” has “organizational
centralization” and “associational monopoly” as its ontological components. “Collective
bargaining powers”, “strike funds”, "membership dues”, and “large staff” are the
empirical indicators to the former. “National labor federalism”, “joint organization”, and
“no stable factions”, are the empirical indicators to the latter.
One may agree or disagree with Goertz‟s interpretation of the key components for
the concept of “societal corporatism”. But the important contribution from Goertz‟s work
in the context of the discussion on types of cognitive schema is his attempt to formalize a
visual representation of what he sees as the inherent three-level structure of social
concepts. He does so by employing some of the traditional tools of conceptual analysis,
namely the “box and arrows” strategy. However, Goertz adds to it by stipulating specific
notations as well as an overall visual structure (the three levels) that should guide
representations adopting this format. For instance, Goertz introduces different types of
linkages (i.e. solid, dotted, etc) to indicate different types of relationships between the
concepts within the structure (i.e., causal, ontological). This alone is a major contribution
to the “box and arrows” strategy for conceptual analysis, largely devoid from a fixed
structure as well as from more specific notations to indicate variations or types of
relationships between concepts.
Next in the classification scheme of varying levels for cognitive representations
introduced in Diagram 1.1 we have logical schemas. They require the consideration of
attributes next to the identification of concepts and their relationships in a given
59
computational format or language. Finally, data base design, or physical schema,
addresses, besides the enumeration of concepts and the establishment of their
relationships and attributes, the necessary design considerations for the building of
computer programs as well as their required physical storage parameters that makes it
possible. Computer programs, expert systems and semantic networks are examples of this
type of schema.
A final observation is warranted in regards to varying classifications found in
Diagram 1.1. Generally speaking the idea of cognitive mapping and modeling reflects a
gamut of schemas going from creative to logical ones. They tend to be applied to
schemas in which spatial representations are addressed in one way or another, even when
the focus is on knowledge representation. However, it is more or less widespread the
perception that models somehow are ahead of maps in terms either of relevance or detail
of information. Computational modeling tends to be a term rather used to the more
specific task of data base design, even when these draw on logical schemas underlying
cognitive spaces.
In his presidential address to the 1999 International Studies Association (ISA)
Annual Conference, Michael Brecher (Brecher 1999) explores what he sees as false
dichotomies in international studies, such as the apparent opposition between theory and
history. He then refers to the development of the International Crisis Project as a clear
example of a successful effort able to incorporate matters of theory and history, thus
integrating the two. In so doing, he explores the idea of a bottom-up strategy for theory
edification. The process included successive steps that began with conceptual
clarification. In the case of the ICP, they were “international crisis” and “foreign policy
60
crisis”, the two types of crises they were interested to explore. Next, the goal was to map
their formal structural arrangements with the edification of taxonomies: the proper
classification of relevant variables and their attributes. The next step was to identify the
logical relationships between the variables selected and classified in the form of a two-
level conceptual map. Brecher then concludes by pointing out the difference between a
model and theoretical propositions derived from hypotheses made possible thanks to the
model. Of relevance in our discussion here is the fact that by doing so Brecher
distinguishes between a „map‟ and a „model‟.

A model goes far beyond a taxonomy and a conceptual map in specifying
cause-effect linkages between independent and dependent variables, often
with intervening variables as well. Such postulates are the essence of
explanation. When tested with, and supported by, empirical data, these
postulates merit the designation theoretical propositions. Thus, in my view, a
rigorous model, such as the ICB‟s Unified Model of Crisis (UMC), qualifies
as contingent theory. (Brecher 1999, p.224)

I would contend that the distinction between a map and a model might appear
artificial to the extent that maps also include the conceptual entities and their mutual
relationships. However, a model may display indeed not only the relationships but also
the intrinsic or contextual properties of the entities in their relationships. More
importantly, as Brecher‟s explanation about the ICP project indicates, there is also the
perception that a model is better attuned to address theoretical concerns. While maps tend
to be highly descriptive models purposely make subjective choices (hypotheses) about
the ways the entities originally “mapped” actually interact. In any case, the distinction
61
between the two is not absolute and these terminologies end up being used
interchangeably.
With such a broad range of possibilities to engage in strategies for visual
(schema) representations, some decisions have to be made as to the strategy adopted for
the conceptual investigations in my research. First, I will be working with conceptual
schemas, since my goal is to address the ways individual components in concept systems
mutually relate and reflect social realities. It means taking into consideration both
cognitive spaces and knowledge resulting from those representations. It also means
producing models in the sense described by Brecher: models that allows for inference
making and theory. But most importantly, my goal is to produce schemas logically
consistent with the idea of systems.
With such a broad range of possibilities to engage in strategies for visual
(schema) representations, some decisions have to be made as to the strategy adopted for
the conceptual investigations in my research. First, I will be working with conceptual
schemas, since my goal is to address groups of interrelated concepts used as specialized
vocabularies helping us to reason about specific social realities. It means taking into
consideration both cognitive spaces and knowledge resulting from those representations.
It also means producing models in the sense described by Brecher: models that allow for
inference making and theory. But most importantly, my goal is to produce schemas
logically consistent with the idea of systems. If groups of interconnected concepts (i.e.,
specialized vocabulary) form concept systems, then by definition one should be able to
analytically and visually “map” those systemic relationships, thus forming systemic
representational models of the realities to which they refer. In the next and final section
62
of this chapter I explore in detail the systemic function of cognitive representations of
social realities.

Systems in Social Realities and Representations

If social manifestations are inherently systemic, the mental models we produce to
interpret and represent them should also encompass systemic features if they are to
display meaningful levels of correlation. Simply put, mental models must display the
same systemic features as the world they represent. Otherwise, emerging models will
necessarily be distorted, flawed, or outright incomplete or wrong. The first question, of
course, is whether social reality displays systemic features indeed.
Mario Bunge has developed a philosophical approach to general systems theory
called systemism. According to Bunge, “everything is a system or a component of one.
And it models every system as a triple (composition, environment, structure), or CES for
short, so it encompasses the valid features of its rivals” (Bunge 1996, p.264). Systemism
takes as flawed the dichotomy between units and system. After all, a system encompasses
both holistic structures as well as individual units that populate those structures. What is
more, systemism as an approach can be applied to any and every aspect of social life.
Realms of socialization are systemic structures, formed by mutually related empirical
manifestations.
Patrick James has applied systemism as the theoretical and logical basis to
evaluate the quality of structural realism (SR) scholarship (James 2002). James
investigates whether SR theories actually produce knowledge about the international
63
system in terms of its composition, environment, and structure – the key elements of a
system according to systemism. But as James shows, the very conceptual definition of a
system structure in the field is contentious. Some SR authors privilege investigations
addressing taxonomies of actors (Kaplan 1957), while some focus on linkages taking
place within the system (McClelland 1966). Others yet privilege the relationships
between actors, either in terms of regularity of interactions or in terms of their relative
ordering vis-à-vis each other, due to the actors‟ effective levels of relational powers
(Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981; Holsti 1988). Ultimately, James provides his own definition of
structure, which altogether comprise, in the language of systemism, the endostructure of
the system:

Structure consists of primary, secondary, tertiary, and higher-order elements
of the international system that are (a) expressed in terms of the distribution
of capabilities and (b) potentially able to affect the foreign policy decisions
and outcomes achieved by states under rational leadership. (James 2002,
p.47)

What James aims at capturing with such classification are the enduring features
within the overall system. They are the systemic elements through which the units of the
system operate and mutually interact. It also reflects a very specific application of the
concept of systemism to a social world, namely that of state relations in an anarchic
world in which the units seek relative power and security. But also, and even more
important here, is the fact that by identifying the systemic components of social relations
(i.e., state relations according to structural realism) necessarily James ends up providing
us with his own cognitive model of that social reality.
64
If in this case of applying systemism to structural realists‟ representations of
international reality the production of a cognitive model is, so to speak, a by-product of
the primary goal of addressing social reality as a system, others have tried to make
explicit the cognitive models that underlie the logic of human action. In those cases, it is
the systemic element that is somewhat hidden within the main research goal of producing
cognitive interpretations of social relationships.
Richard K. Herrmann, James F. Voos, Tonya Y. E. Schooler, and Joseph
Ciarrochi show the use of cognitive models to explain foreign policy decision-making in
international studies (Herrmann, Voss et al. 1997). In the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, the
scholarship led to the emergence of multiple concepts on belief systems. The 1980s was
characterized by the drive for parsimony, which led to an emphasis on fewer and larger
concepts and the types of existing relationships between them and their parts. The result
was the consolidation of the concept of schemata (or schema theory, or mental model) as
clusters of cognitive concepts. They indicate not only a subject‟s knowledge about a
given actor (i.e., states) or topic, but also their influence on actors‟ selection,
interpretation, and memory of information (Axelrod 1976; Holsti 1976; Sowa 1984),
including in computational terms (Sowa 1984; Sowa 2000).
Still according to Herrmann et al, towards and during the 1990s, research in
foreign policy analysis focused on types of schematic concepts that included metaphors,
analogies, heuristics, story lines, and scripts (Jervis 1986; Alker 1987; Vertzberger 1990).
Of particular relevance was the definition of the concept of image, comprised by basic
cognitive structures such as polar opposites of friendship vs. enmity, and strength vs.
65
weakness. As simple as these polar opposites may sound they are after all types of
systemic representations about relationships in the international arena.
Hyperpolitics project is another important example of a cognitive approach to
politics that expands even further this conceptual strategy of focusing on polar opposites
in systemic ways, this time forming even more complex conceptual structures (Calise and
Lowi 2000). In fact, its relevance partly derives from its conscious effort to combine an
explicit systemic approach to (important concepts in) politics while also formalizing it in
the shape and content of a cognitive model structure. It is an example of a conceptual
schema formally structured as a logical computational schema, portraying knowledge in
the form of a dynamic dictionary of concepts in politics. It takes advantage of new
technological possibilities, particularly the Internet, as a source for dynamic interaction of
conceptual constructs
5
.
The project is greatly inspired by Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan‟s
work on a logically closed system of concepts, or a system of thought
6
(Lasswell and
Kaplan 1950). The conceptual schema of hyperpolitics is structured around key concepts
most commonly found in political science dictionaries. It presents varying levels of
complexity for conceptual analysis.

5
Hyperpolitics‟ website address is http://hyperpolitics.net.
6
Lasswell and Kaplan were interested in finding a common ground between experience and abstraction. To
that end, they worked on a “configurative analysis” capable of properly explaining the political system
through conceptual analysis. The idea was to build a framework for analysis simultaneously allowing for
investigations of particular instances while never loosing sight of the whole. They worked originally with
eight central concepts that once tabulated in cross-references generated 64 property spaces or concepts with
their own “scope values”, all logically derived from the original eight concepts. As the end result, one may
“call this a “logically closed system” of concepts concerning power in society”, as well put by Mauro
Calise and Theodore J. Lowi (Calise and Lowi 2000, p.294).

66
First, it introduces a key concept, or “keyword” that comprises a “node” (although
the term is not used by its authors). Next to it, there is a definition for the concept. The
second level of complexity relates the central concept to other “keywords” by placing the
former at the axis of a “matrix of logically consistent relationships”. Four additional
“keywords” are then placed at the extremities of the two polar-opposite axes. The
definition to the central concept now expands in order to include arguments about the
logical relationships it has in regards to each of the four additional conceptual constructs.
Finally, a third level of complexity is introduced by expanding the axes schema into a
quadrant schema. Here additional four “keywords” are introduced to the previous five-
concepts set. Now the schema displays four interconnected “quadrants”, each with an
additional “keyword” at the center. In total, thirteen concepts form the quadrant schema.
The dynamics of the schema results from the possibility of choosing any concept either in
the axes schema or in the final quadrant schema that is not the original central concept or
“keyword” and “moving” it to the center of its own axes and quadrant schemata, each
comprised by different sets of conceptual constructs. A bird‟s eye view of the entire
system of concepts shows that all quadrants are interconnected. There is clearly an
attempt with hyperpolitics project to formalize a systemic structure logically
interconnecting all relevant concepts (key terminologies) in the field of Political Science
(and by extension, as informed by its authors, all social Sciences as well).
Other approaches have focused on semantic relationships as the analytical source
for modeling systemic representation. And semantics is at the center of several
conceptual approaches intersecting with cognitive principles found in areas of
investigations loosely aggregated under the general umbrella of Cognitive Linguistics
67
(CL), which is the interdisciplinary field within Social Sciences most closely working
with at the crossroads between cognition and language from the sociological perspective.
Vyvyan Evans defines CL as follows (Evans 2007, p.22):

A school of linguistics and cognitive science which emerged from the early
1980s onwards. Places central importance on the role of meaning, conceptual
processes and embodied experience in the study of language and the mind
and the way in which they intersect. Cognitive linguistics is an enterprise or
an approach to the study of language and the mind rather than a single
articulated theoretical framework. It is informed by two overarching
principles or commitments: the generalization commitment and the cognitive
commitment. The two best developed sub-branches of cognitive linguistics
are cognitive semantics and cognitive approaches to grammar. While
cognitive linguistics began to emerge in the 1980s as a broadly grounded
intellectual movement, it traces its roots to work that was taking place in the
1970s, particularly in the United States, which was reacting to formal
linguistics. Early pioneers in the 1970s who were instrumental in formulating
this new approach include Gilles Fauconnier, Charles Fillmore, George
Lakoff, Ronald Langacker and Leonard Talmy.

Evans‟ definition, while straightforward and concise, allows for the articulation
of some important analytical considerations. First, CL is not a unified field of
research, but rather a congregation of approaches with a short history, still evolving,
and sharing some common features or rather interests, such as the recognition of the
role of meaning and concepts in the study of language.
Dirk Geeraerts expands the dictionary-like definition provided by Evans and
asserts that Cognitive Linguistics, with capital letters, must be distinguished from other
general approaches to cognitive linguistics, such as Chomskyan‟s generative grammar
(Chomsky 1972) and others that focus on language as “a collection of formal, syntactic
structures and rules (or constraints on such structures and rules)” (Geeraerts 2006, p.3).
68
Drawing on Evans and Geeraerts, the main definitional character of CL that
separates it from other cognitive approaches to linguistics is, as stated by Geeraerts, the
understanding that language is primarily about meaning – and not formal linguistic rules.
It is about semantics, which may imply different things. It may center on the study of
meaning in language (the meaning intended by Evans and Geeraerts), but also on the
study or interpretation of words as they appear in natural language, particularly
morphology. It includes, for instance, close analysis of key elements in syntax, such as
prepositions, verbs, adverbs, whole sentences, and even slogans with the ability to frame
debate and (policy) action. Again, these have increasingly been used in international
studies, for instance, by constructivists, feminists, and postmodernists for analyses of
speech acts and discourse analysis (Allison 1969; Polanyi 1989; Halliday 1994; Wodak,
Cillia et al. 1999; Wodak and Meyer 2001; Chilton and Schaaffner 2002; Fierke 2002;
Chilton 2004; Chilton 2004; Torfing 2005; Waever 2005; Epstein 2008). Usually these
approaches have focused on uncovering hidden systemic social relationships of
inequality, power, and exploitation (i.e., gender hierarchies).
What these few examples of IR scholarship reveal is the existing interplay
between the understanding of social life as inherently systemic and the emergence of
mental or cognitive models aimed at interpreting or representing those systemic features.
But it is also apparent the lack of uniformity in these efforts to model representations of
social life. Different strategies have been employed and with them a variety of interests,
emphases, and analytical goals, which begs the question: Is it possible to design a general
methodology to address concept systems from the standpoint of cognitive modeling
based on visual representations? If so, how visual cognitive structures should work? How
69
should schematic structures operate through clusters of perceptions and ideas? Finally,
what would be the essential features for a visual mode of cognitive representation to
properly capture these essential functions? To properly answer these questions, some
issues have to be raised beforehand.
First, mental models are not directly related to empirical realities. They result
from thought processes that interpret reality into understanding. Johnson-Laird calls them
“structural analogs” of either imagined or real-life situations. They are fundamental
heuristic devices for human cognition, allowing for the understanding of the world as
well as inference making through the interplay of mental propositions, models, and
images (Johnson-Laird 1983; Giere 1992; Nersessian 1992). The conceptual constructs
forming cognitive models display images that function as templates, or ideal types.
Rather than being mere stereotypes or reification of reality they are conceptual
descriptors (Herrmann, Voss et al. 1997, p.410). Therefore, cognitive models must be
seen rather as templates, a language for communication, rather than as attempts to display
“correct” realities as opposed to “wrong” ones.
Second, the various components of images do not work independently. They
interact with each other and produce whole gestalts, schemata in the language of
cognitive psychology, or a system in the language of systemism. Cognitive schemata
bring together clusters of ideas and cognition about a particular topic. They form
cognitive patterns that are mutually related. Each cluster reflects strategic, logic, or
analytical judgments about the reality to which they refer.
Third, cognitive models are important heuristic devices to address conceptual
change (e.g., paradigmatic scientific revolutions). According to Ronald N. Giere, they are
70
integral components of the scientific method (heuristics), functioning as analogical
reasoning, imagistic reasoning, thought experiments and limiting case analysis. Contrary
to rational positivist empiricism, says Giere, cognitive science has shown through
cognitive-historical analysis that cognitive modeling, or mental models, as heuristic
devices, occupies a much central role in abstracting beyond existing representations in
the process of problem solving. Among the virtues of cognitive mental-modeling, these
heuristics are bridges between old, well-established representations and new ones, yet
under the initial stages of development and maturation. They allow for new ways to
address matters of incommensurability, for instance, a critical problematic in philosophy
of science, poorly dealt with by rational empiricist accounts of science (Giere 1992).
Therefore, a cognitive approach to mental models is relevance to a critical topic in
scientific production, namely conceptual change (Nersessian 1992).
In short, a methodology aiming at systematically producing cognitive or mental
models must be understood as a device, a template for communication, and a “language”
through which key features of social representations can be visually “translated”, without
altering the fundamentals in terms of logic and reasoning giving rise to these
representations in the first place. They must also display systemic features if they are
meant to properly represent social life. At the same time, being comprised by conceptual
constructs, they must be flexible enough to be able to represent conceptual changes that
ultimately reflect changes either in social life or in the ways we interpret them.
Going back to our set of key questions previously formulated, the answers start to
emerge. Of course, the belief here is that it should be possible to design a general
methodology to visually display systemic relationships between concepts. To that aim,
71
some basic principles should guide the effort. First, if social life is systemic and the
representations we have about them should also display such feature in the form and
shape of general templates, a natural way to start is to build visual models displaying
network structures. After all, network structures are probably the most widely adopted in
various fields, including computer modeling, to reflect and display systemic functions
that can be applied across domains.
Second, if the goal for the emerging schematic structures is to address clusters of
perceptions and ideas in particular areas of interest, and considering that mental models
function as conceptual descriptors or “structural analogs” of reality, then the units of
analysis for the two should be one and the same: the “atoms” of specialized vocabularies,
namely terminologies or key concepts. In the case of the empirical investigations carried
out with this research (addressed in Part Two), the goal is to map clusters of perceptions,
ideas, and collective representations espoused by members of the (IR) academic
communities. The understanding is that the key elements encapsulating those shared
representations are the specialized vocabularies, the scientific terminologies used in the
field, to represent the social worlds we investigate. Therefore, the central units for a
network analysis of cognitive representations are the linguistic constructions that we
generally refer to as concepts.
Finally, cognitive models should display the same systemic features as the social
realities they represent. At the same time, concepts, the analytical units within the system,
are not only „descriptors‟ of reality but also the very foundation for the collective
recognition of social change, shaping our subsequent representations in regards to these
changes. Therefore, the methodology must reflect that flexibility, allowing for the
72
representation of competing social realities (i.e., incommensurability), as well as
changing, metamorphosing modes of socialization. If the essential systemic feature for
representation is through networks, these same networks may be of different structures,
displaying different patterns, different inherent functions. Most important, they must
communicate. In other words, as a template, the methodology must present an array of
network possibilities through which its units – concepts – navigate, properly representing
different realms of socialization and changes in our existing collective representations.
In the next chapter, I formally introduce the terms of a general methodology that I
believe fulfills these basic requirements. It offers a template for visual communication on
the ways concepts interact and in doing so provide us with collective representations of
reality. I term this methodology Visual Cognitive Modeling
73
Chapter Two:
Visual Cognitive Modeling

Visual Cognitive Modeling (VCM) is a methodology that provides a template for
mapping and modeling, or visually representing, logically consistent cognitive structures
embedded in reasoning, organization of information, and mental models comprised by
groups of mutually related terminologies, or concept systems. The use of visual cognitive
representation of concept systems implies the combined use of linguistic components
(concepts) and visual structures. It explores the human cognitive abilities to process
information with the integration of written and visual elements by way of cognitive
modeling. VCM as an emerging methodology results from major inputs from discrete
fields such as Cognitive Linguistics (CL) and computational modeling, albeit by
incorporating elements from several of their sub-fields in autonomous ways. The result is
the production of visually logical narratives about the ways we interpret social relations,
through the construction of ontological and epistemological categories. At the same time
it provides grounds for explanatory power about the internal functioning of these
relations. It is this methodology that will be subsequently applied in the following
chapters to the investigation of empirical concept systems in topics related to
international relations.
In general terms, any visual type of representation must pay attention to some
general guidelines as far as design is concerned. Edward R. Tufte analyzes Charles
Joseph Minard‟s data-map that describes losses of men from the French army during the
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1812 invasion of Russia, and in so doing enumerates what he considers as the six
fundamental principles of analytical design for what he terms „figurative maps‟ (what I
would rather call here as visual cognitive maps or models) (Tufte 2006).
Although the author focuses on quantitative information, these principles are also
useful for guiding qualitative visual displays of information as a way to process it into
knowledge or understanding.
First, they must show comparisons, contrasts, and differences. Combining
graphics, images, color, and text does it. Second, they should reveal what we want to
understand: causality, mechanism, structure, or explanation. In the case of VCM it
should be able to display logical structures (i.e., causal, ontological) linking concepts
pertaining to a same conceptual system. Third, they should reflect multivariate
analysis. It means addressing three or more variables. In Minard‟s map, the variables
are the size of the army, their location (longitude and latitude), direction of the
army‟s movement, the temperature they faced throughout the campaign, and the key
dates of the campaign. The central variables within every model produced with the
methodology here introduced are the entities within a conceptual system, structures
formed by them, and specific types of relationships between entities and sub-
structures within the overall system. Fourth, the end goal from the integration of
evidence (e.g. words, number, images, and diagrams) must be the reasoning about
the substantive problem at hand, rather than the format chosen for the presentation of
information. With the production of visual cognitive models of concept systems their
respective emerging representations should be able to generate contributions to
knowledge and understanding as pointed out throughout this research (particularly
75
when applying the models of empirical cases in international relations). It includes
elicitation of knowledge that allows for inference-making, comparative analysis, and
dealing with complexity for better communication and analytical reasoning, among
others. Fifth, proper documentation of the information contained in the „maps‟ and
the sources for the data used is, of course, not only a pre-requisite of any serious
scientific research, but also a matter of taking responsibility for the arguments
implied in the construction of the evidence displays. Ultimately, it is a matter of
personal and academic moral standards and integrity.
In addition to the general guidelines above-enumerated, the specifics of VCM
must be addressed. To that aim, I first present the metaphysical or axiomatic claims that
provide the logical support for the construction of VCM. Then, I enumerate and provide
the specifics for each of the main ontological components that constitute the
methodology. Finally, by using examples from the literature in international studies I
show some of its actual applications for organizing knowledge, mapping argumentation,
and systemically representing interconnectedness among key terminologies within a
single concept system.

Axiomatic Foundations

There are four basic assumptions guiding the construction of VCM as a general
template for producing visual cognitive models. First, human reasoning in general and in
particular our attempts to engage in formal logic can only manifest due to our cognitive
abilities to produce mental models that interpret information (raw data) into
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understanding. Second, reality at all fundamental levels and realms is essentially systemic
in nature, reflecting organizational structures characterized by intricate patterns of
containments within containments. Therefore, if mental models are to reflect reality with
minimal levels of accuracy they should be able to properly represent such features. Third,
mental models are only mental representations of reality, not reality per se. Fourth, the
mental cognitive constructs of mental models to which I hereby refer as cognitive
universals, present in all and every reasoning, are entities, networks, and linkages.
Entities are types of containment, containers and contained units commonly referred by
as the nodes of cognitive models. Networks are structural arrangements between nodes.
Linkages are particular types of relationships between nodes within pre-arranged
networks as well as between sub-structures within a broader network.

Mental Models

There are three possible types of mental models: subjective, intersubjective, and
objective. The distinction between subjective and intersubjective models has already been
made in the previous chapter, when I discussed at length the distinction between
physiological concept systems (that generates subjective models) and sociological
concept systems, giving rise to intersubjective mental models. The former is essentially
the result of an individual cognitive process. It is subjective because it may or may not be
shared by others. Intersubjective models, however, are those representations shared by
various individuals within a social group up to a point when they become either largely
accepted or at least recognized as legitimate by large enough of a group within that
77
community. By and large, they represent shared representations of reality. Objective
mental models are those endowed with universal levels of acceptance by all members of a
given community. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the boundaries between
the three types of mental models are not absolute. They rather reflect fuzzy degrees in the
ways individuals and communities perceive them. It applies even to objective models.
Thus, we may visually represent the levels of interconnectedness between types of mental
models as a gradation network, as shown in Diagram 2.1 below.

Diagram 2.1: Types of Mental Models

Subjective
Models

Inter-
Subjective
Models

Objective
Models
Mental Models
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The blurred boundaries between subjective and intersubjective models should be
clear by now. But the lack of an absolute distinction between intersubjective and
objective models still deserves some additional remarks. An obvious example of an
objective type of cognitive representation is that of cartographic maps. They tend to be
regarded as mere reflection of an objective reality. But that may not be the case with
political maps, in which the nature or the shape of the established social boundaries may
be contested. The level of universal acceptance of a given model may be even blurrier in
the case of abstract social concepts. For instance, in the field of International Relations
the notion of levels of analysis is a cognitive model almost universally recognized as
valid. And yet, which exactly are the components of each level is hotly debated.

Cognitive Universals

There are three ontological components for building visual models with VCM.
They are nodes, networks, and linkages. They are here considered as the cognitive
universals necessarily employed to translate information (raw data) into knowledge or
understanding, through the generation of mental models. The next sub-sections will
address the empirical elements that provide shape and form to each.

Nodes

Nodes are the entities of the system. They may take distinct (and yet similar)
configurations in the form of containers, containments, or containing spaces. They should
79
not be equated with labels. Within a container there may be further levels of containment.
There are also series of logical possible combinations of various types of containers,
generating new signs for containments with their own differentiated meanings. Diagram
2.2 below shows the four primary types of containers, from which other forms emerge.

Starting at the bottom left we have the most essential type of container, called unit
container (a). It is the initial representation to any node. Its visual representation is one of
a sphere, which indicates two things. First, it has a spatial nature, which means it
encapsulates the possibilities of further content in its interior as well as possible
relationships with other entities manifested outside it. Second, its spatial nature also
should not imply rigidity. On the contrary, it may metamorphose into other spatial
shapes. In fact, this feature is transmitted to other types of containers as well, as
explained below.
Diagram 2.2: Four Primary Types of Containers

(a)
(d) (c)
(b)
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The node at the bottom right (b) is called environment container. Rather than
indicating a unit, it reflects the contained environment, or containment, within which
further content exists and is being visually expressed. Notice that all four types of
containers are themselves placed inside an environment container, which, in turn, has a
“metamorphosed” shape. From a sphere (the standard representation of a node) it became
one that rather resembles a square without edges or corners. Whatever is within an
environment container belongs to a same “world”, in conceptual terms. In the case of
Diagram 2.2 all four types of nodes form a particular group: the primary types of
containers.
The node at the top right (c) is termed in the language of VCM as label container.
As the name suggests it indicates a container that is at this level of representation either
devoid from content in its interior or that the content is not at this point relevant or the
focus of analysis. It basically has the same function of a box in the “box and arrows”
approach to conceptual analysis. It is just a label.
The last node at the top left is called ring container (d). It may simply demarcate
the boundaries between an endostructure (the interior, or contained environment) and an
exostructure (the exterior, or an open universe). In that sense it becomes an environment
container. But the ring itself may display meaning. In other words, the ring itself may be
the unit container, with the space in its interior and outside it being one and the same: an
exostructure. However, if a node or a network is placed in its interior, then the ring
becomes conceptually attached to that node. When harboring a network it becomes
simply an environment, establishing network or environment boundaries. When circling a
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node, then the ring becomes attached to it in some ontological way, as constitutive
element of it. This point will be further explained a little later in this section.
As already hinted, from these four essential types of nodes, combinations between
them generate other types of nodes, or containers. Diagram 2.3 below shows possible
logical types of units-within-environment containers by combining unit container (a) and
environment container (b).

Moving from left to right, we first have single unit container (e). It represents an
environment containment, or node, that is populated by a single element (additional
node). The end result is the visual symbol for a single unit container. In international
studies we could define certain actors in the so-called global civil society such as
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as being single unit containers. The realist
description of the state in the billiard ball metaphor also matches this representation of a
single unit container. Next, collective unit container (f) also indicates a single unit, but
Diagram 2.3: Units-Within-Environment Containers

(a) (b)

(e)
(h)
(g)
(f) ( i )
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one that is of a collective nature. The Climate Action Network, for instance, is a coherent,
structured network that promotes agency at the global level. Comprised by over 340
NGOs, and exposing a complex network design with multiple headquarters and a
decentralized federated structure, it is recognized as an INGO Network, or international
nongovernmental organization network (Katz and Anheier 2006), which, according to
VCM may be represented as a collective unit container. Approaches that focus on the
bureaucratic apparatus as the appropriate level to explain state‟s behavior (i.e., branches
of government), may also reflect the representation of a unit internally constituted by a
collective set of elements that altogether explains the node‟s very existence or behavior.
Next, we have a single cluster contained population (g). It indicates a general
population congregated as a cluster. An edited encyclopedia on a particular topic, such as
Scholte and Roberson‟s Encyclopedia of Globalization (Scholte and Robertson 2007), for
instance, may be considered one such single cluster contained population to the extent
that it congregates readings (or, in this case, entries) that do not necessarily share any
particular approach, analytical foundations, or particular worldviews. In fact, it is likely
that when mutually compared logical, analytical and theoretical inconsistencies will
appear. The only thing they have in common is the general orientation in regards to the
topics of the entries, loosely considered as pertaining to the broad interdisciplinary
domain we usually refer to as globalization. What is more, they are all entries written by
authors considered experts in the field, which makes them and their work a particular
cluster within the broader universe of writings on globalization.
Then, we have multi-cluster contained population (h) nodes. A handbook of
writings on a particular academic field, such as the Handbook of International Relations
83
edited by Carlsnaes, Risse, and Simmons (Carlsnaes, Risse et al. 2002), for instance, may
be considered at first as another example of a single cluster contained population. Very
much like an encyclopedia this type of publication also brings together readings that in
principle do not share much more than general orientations or guidelines in regards to
International Relations as a field of research within Social Sciences. However, if one look
closer at the contents of such handbook, it becomes clear that a further level of
conceptual concerns guided the ways those readings were selected and grouped together
in several clusters. In the case of Carlsnes et al, there are three clusters (or three main
sections in the book: historical, philosophical, and historical readings; concepts and
context in the field, and substantive issues. Therefore, as a container, the handbook is a
multi-cluster one.
The last container lined to the far right in Diagram 2.3 is population container (i).
It represents a particular (endostructure) universe as opposed to the outside world, and it
recognizes the existence of a population within it. Other than that, there is no further
information as to the composition(s) of the entities populating it. Any particular scientific
or academic discipline formally structured in our scholarly community is, at first, and
before any further evaluation, one such population container.
The examples given to these various types of nodes may instigate the reader to
question whether it is in fact appropriate to pin down any conceptual construct, as an
entity that belongs to either of these particular types of nodes in opposition to other
alternative types of containers. After all, is IR a single container, a population container,
or a unit collective container? The answer is simple: IR, as a field, may be any of these
types of containers. There is no a priori, intrinsic, value that best translates its
84
foundational nature. What matters is how it is “framed”. What matters, in fact, is the level
and type of the cognitive reasoning behind a contextual representation provided. In other
words, in a particular level of cognitive reasoning IR may be portrayed first and simply as
a unit container. The emphasis here is just to justify its existence in a complex world
comprised by things other than IR. Looking closer, the argument goes, allows us to
identify it, at first, as a fragmented universe comprised by all sorts of things (a general
contained population). At this level, the focus is still in reference to outside universes,
external to those comprising IR (let‟s say Sociology). References to internal elements
(seen broadly as a population of things) are meant to offer context to oppose the field to
other external conceptual universes. Once those justifications allows for proper
identification and allocation of membership (inclusion rather than mere differentiation)
we then may speak of the field as a single unit container.
Efforts toward formal classifications follow giving rise to categories and sets of
sub-memberships. At this level, arguments may refer to the field as varying types of
units-within-environment containers. It may be a collective unit container if the reasoning
revolves around the idea, for instance, that it is the totality of the existing sub-fields that
gives the discipline its identity. The perception of single cluster contained population
could emerge, for instance, from the general understanding that all those sub-fields are
located at the same analytical level. Therefore, the field has a single cluster of inter-
related sub-fields. However, it may equally be the case that to some, there are levels
within levels, or separate clusters at a single level, making the field rather a multi-cluster
contained population. Here the emphasis is on how particular sub-fields interact as
opposed to others, all equally located within the broader discipline.
85
This hypothetical reasoning scenario is just to make the point that cognitive
reasoning may vary according to issues such as levels of abstraction, emphasis of the
argument, etc. Each may give rise to the framing of an entity (node, container,
containment) in particular ways. What matters is the internal validity of the argument
(conceptual construct) and its respective visual representation (i.e., types of units-within-
environment containers).

Continuing the explanation on the nature of nodes as cognitive constructs, next
we have combinations between a ring container (d) and the other three primary types of
containers to form variations of ringed containers, as shown in the Diagram 2.4 above.
Diagram 2.4: Ringed Containers

(a)
(d) (c)
(b)
(k)

( l )

( j )

(m)
86
When combining a ring container (d) with an environment container (b), there are two
possibilities. First, one or more rings may circle the environment container to form an
externally ringed environment container (l). The second option is an environment
container with one or more rings in its interior to form an internally ringed environment
container (m). In both cases, the rings may server as additional information on the
contents of an environment container (b). With the former, other elements will populate
the environment of the node, while with the latter it is the rings that populate the
environment container. With externally ringed environment container, the rings may be,
for instance, qualifications about the contents showing within the environment or about
the environment container itself. They may be axiomatic claims on the nature of the
environment container, or scope conditions explaining the context in which further
networks appearing inside the environment container may operate. With the internally
ringed environment container the rings are the content appearing in the environment
container. Again, they may be claims, rather than entities.
When combined with a unit container (a), a ring container (d) forms a ringed unit
container (k). For instance, if the conceptual construct in question is, say, “chapter one”
of this research, the unit container component of the ring container would be its title
“Representations in Concept Systems”, while rings circling it could indicate, for example,
the number of sections in the chapter. In this hypothetical construction, there would be
six rings because the chapter contains six main sections. Each ring represents a section.
The cognitive idea with this representation is to convey the expectation of further content
in regards to the chapter. In other words, it indicates further reasoning in which the
specific content of the unit container would be disclosed. Otherwise, if the goal were
87
simply to inform the number of sections (say, in comparison to other chapters), as the
final level of information then a better representation would be to express such idea with
a ring label container (l), when the ring container (d) combines with the label container
(c). Once again, the label container is meant to just “label” something, with no
expectation of providing further levels of information or cognitive content.

Diagram 2.5: Modes of Environment Containment

(b)
(n) (o)
(s)
(r)
(q)
(p)
(x)
(w)
(v)
(t)
88
The environment container is the basis for yet another set of or rather modes of
containment, as shown in Diagram 2.5 above. These modes indicate first whether the
environment has single or multiple layers of containments. Single-layered containment
(n) indicates the existence of one single environment within the container. Multi-layered
containment (o) indicates rather the existence of various layers with differing
environments.
There are at least two possibilities for arrangements between layers within the
containment. Deepening Multi-Layered Containment (p) reveals a vertical pattern in
which each layer is placed on the top of one another. Drawing on an example from IR
literature, John Hobson discusses the various theoretical approaches to the field in
regards to the central issue of state international agential power. In such debate, we may
represent the concept of international state agency as our unit container (a). It is the main
conceptual construct under discussion. The next level of reasoning forces us to see the
concept as an environment container (b), with several layers within it. In the arguments
presented by Hobson, there are three distinct levels of agency, presented as a deepening
multi-layers containment (p). At the top, high international agential power implies the
state power to determine policy, shape the international realm free from structural
constraints and from the influence of other actors, and even eventually mitigating inter-
state competition as well as the logic of anarchy. At the middle, moderate international
agential power reflects the same features as the previous one, except for the inability to
buck or mitigate state-competition or the logic of anarchy. Finally, at the bottom, we have
the absence of international agential power, when states cannot perform any of the
actions previously enumerated (Hobson 2000). It is clear that the main focus of the
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reasoning is the absence or lack of state agency, which makes this representation a
deepening-up multi-layer containment (r), in which there is a clear hierarchy in terms of
relevance or content (in this case content as opposed to absence of some quality).
Whatever goes at the top is “more” than whatever is at the “bottom” (either in
quantitative or qualitative terms). In case of an inverted situation, with “more” at the
bottom and “less” at the bottom (i.e., food pyramid), then we would have a deepening-
down multi-layer containment (q).
The second possibility for a multi-layered containment reflects a horizontal
pattern for the arrangement of the layers, forming a centering multi-layer containment (t).
Here the focus of the cognitive reasoning is not hierarchy, but a movement towards the
center from the periphery. Martin Wight discusses what he sees as the evolution of
mankind in terms of growing levels of morality as reflected in three states of society and
law (Wight 1991). In his own words:

A picture begun to emerge of three concentric circles; the inner circle was the
state, with its municipal law, or „jus civile‟; the second circle was
international society, subject to a volitional, positive law of nations; and the
third, outer circle, surrounding the other two, was mankind, subject to natural
law. (p.73)

In fact, not only Wight adopts a language that is fully compliant with the notion of
cognitive representations here presented, but he does it visually too (see Wight 1991,
p.73, figure 2). Once again we may reason in terms of the emphasis of the reasoning as a
way to determine the direction of this particular mode of multi-layering. Wight is
concerned with the movement of thicker levels of order or law emanating from the
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various types of human socialization. That is why he places the state, or municipal law, at
the center of the multi-layered environment. Therefore, we have here a centering multi-
layer containment (w) as opposed to a de-centering multi-layer containment (v).
An alternative visual representation for deepening multi-layer containment (p) is
introduced as Diagram 2.5s. The same happens for the representation of de-centering
multi-layer containment, as shown as Diagram 2.5x. These are just that, alternative modes
of representation.
Their relevance will become apparent later as we discuss about cognitive
networks formed by nodes in closed systems. It is easier to infer however that if the goal
were, for instance, not only to uncover the general states that account for international
state agency in the previous example of Hobson‟s analysis, but also its individual
elements in details and how they form particular types of network at each level, then, the
visual representation of Diagram 2.5s would certainly be more appropriate. It would
allow for the visualization of those detailed constructions (sub-structures) taking place
within each layer of containment.
The array of logical possibilities for cognitive constructs of nodes as entities
discussed so far should not be seen as exhaustive. In fact, a third type of multi-layered
containment has been widely used to visually display quantitative distribution of data.
The well-known “pie chart” (Diagram 2.6z below) is a graphic representation used to
convey proportions of a particular set of content, usually to translate quantitative
information, such as percentage of ethnic populations within a given country. But, of
course, nothing prevents it to be a visual representation of qualitative content or a
combination of both, quantitative and qualitative.
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Diagram 2.6: Nodes in Visual Cognitive Modeling

(a
)
(d) (c
)
(b)
(k)

(l)

( j
)

(m
)

(n
)
(o
)
(s)
(r)
(q
)
(p
)
(x
)
(w)
(v
)
(t)

(e)
(h)
(g)
(f) ( i )
(z)

91
92
Diagram 2.6 summarizes all the visual representations discussed so far for nodes
in the methodology of VCM. Again, rather than attempting to be an exhaustive list they
just form a basic “menu”, meant to support the basic argument that by considering a node
as something more than a mere label, a whole universe of analytical possibilities emerges
to better match varying nuances in logic argumentation to their respective visual
notations. Nodes are entities in the full sense of the term. They are universes within
themselves. Notwithstanding, they are not real, empirical entities, but cognitive
representations. They are not attempts to reify objects in the world of empirical
manifestations, but attempts to formally translate cognitive “framing” as reflected in
argumentation and logical claims. Therefore, as tools for visual notation nodes have the
dynamic feature of mutating into one another, according to the levels of cognitive
reasoning, be it in terms of abstraction, types of emphasis intended, or any other logical
or analytical types of variation in the ways we interpret reality.
So far, I have argued about representing nodes in isolation, based on their own
analytical merits. But, of course, an approach that is meant to capture systemic
relationships between entities must offer a template to represent them. This is the topic
for the next section, dealing with networks.

Networks

Networks are closed sets of systemic relationships taking place between nodes.
There are various types of networks and listing a full array of visual representations for
all of them may be either a very long-term project or an outright impossibility to
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accomplish. The reason, of course, is the simple recognition that particular enterprises
may develop or rely on very specific types of complex systemic networks. What is more,
there may be unstructured networks that cannot be reducible to generable templates for
visual representation. Nevertheless, I would contend that there are at very least three very
important general types of structured networks, largely adopted across domains. They are
sequence topology networks, intersection networks, and set-domains networks. Next, I
address each in turn.

Sequence Topology Networks

Topology networks are types of networks comprised by nodes that focus on
transmission of information as well as qualitative qualities of spaces and their mutual
relationships. In mathematics, topological properties may be considered as a sub-field of
geometry concerned with spatial forms – or relationships between shapes – rather than
calculations of property spaces (i.e., lines, curves, etc). Topology is primarily concerned
with shapes, as well as relationships and positioning between them (Haarslev 1998). In
computer science, network topology has been used to display interconnections of circuit
components that determines the way information flows within a system. The essential
components are the nodes within the system, the links between them and the particular
shapes or structures generated by the network itself. Physical topology is concerned
primarily with the physical elements of the network that gives to it is topological identity
(i.e., a star network as opposed to a ring network). Logical topology is concerned with the
actual flows of information within the network, such as intensity, volume, etc.
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As far as VCM is concerned what matters most from the various well-established
applications of topology in mathematics or in computer science is the level of formality
implied in each network configuration. Far from being an ad hoc application of
“imagined” network configurations, topology networks bring with them embedded and
widely recognized attributes. If these attributes can be applied to both formal
mathematical calculations and actual physical transmission of computational data, then
they should also equally apply to conceptual constructs.
Furthermore, a second essential element from topology networks for VCM is the
embedded meaning in each formal network configuration. Each type of network implies
particular modes for transmission of information, as well as particular structural
arrangements between nodes that directly derive from different qualitative types of
interactions between them.
Figure 2.1 below shows a (non-exhaustive) list of sequence topology networks.
Each network displays the same basic elements: nodes, linkages between nodes, and a
particular structural configuration for the emerging network. They are all sequence
networks to the extent that information, relationship, and interconnection between nodes
move in sequence, from one to the next. Nodes do not intersect nor merge, nor converge.
Networks from “(a)” through “(d)” are called ringed networks. They reflect a
network characterized by looping effects, or circular transmission of systemic features
over on itself. Ring network (a) indicates that the nodes of the network directly relate to
the nodes immediately placed next to it. At the same time, the connectivity taking place
between nodes occur within a single cognitive level (i.e., level of generality, analytical
level, etc).
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Figure 2.1: Sequence Topology Networks

(h2)
(h1)
(h4)
(h3)
(h5)

(i1) (i2) (i4) (i3) (i5)
(g3)
(g1)
(g4)
(g2)

(e1)
(e2)

(e3)

(a) (b) (d) (c)

(f)
(m1) (m2) (m3)
(n)

( j )
(k)
( l )

96
Once again Martin Wight provides an example of systemic reasoning that can be
visually translated as a network representation. Wight discusses the main theoretical
approaches in international relations, all of which trying to answer the fundamental
question about the nature of the “international”, particularly its societal features. First, the
author identifies what he sees as the three main theoretical frameworks answering to this
fundamental question in differing ways, namely realism, rationalism, and revolutionism.
Next, the author analyzes each in some detail and uncovers some in-group variations
(Wight 1991). The result is a rather more complex range of varying positions, flowing
very much like a ring network.
Diagram 2.7 below is an almost identical reproduction of Wight‟s figure 1
appearing on page 47. The content is the same; only the design is slightly adapted to the
language of VCM by placing the terminologies within their own node. In fact, each
tradition in this case is a node in the network. The information flowing through the nodes
(the systemic feature) is their varying answer to the same question: the nature of
international relations. At the bottom (extreme realism) international relations become a
realm entirely dictated by natural law, self-help, and survival of the fittest, where the
„social contract‟ is fully dissolved. At the top, rationalism fully equates the logic that
rules societies to the international realm as the result of the abilities of human reasoning.
Natural law contains the seeds of sociability developed through the moral laws of nature.
The other two „nodes‟ to the left of the network present variations between these two
poles, either closer to the “top” or to the “bottom”. The nodes to the right of the network
move away from the question of society vs. nature altogether and see international
relations as the civitas maxima; international society as a future world-state, with the
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states as its citizens. Variations of this view result from differing views on the means to
achieve this end, either through violent or ideological revolutions.

Notice that in Wight‟s representation of the main IR traditions the nodes to the
right of the network do not directly connect to those placed at the left. The foundations
and substance of their theoretical, analytical, and logical reasoning are simply not related
to each other, preventing direct interaction.
A fully connected ring network (Figure 2.1b) is similar to the previous network
discussed with the exception that here all nodes in the network may directly relate to and
Diagram 2.7: Martin Wight‟s Proximity of IR Traditions

Rationalism

Realism

Extreme
Realism

Hard
Revolutionism

Moderate
Realism

Soft
Revolutionism
98
with any other node. An example of such model is provided by Roland Robertson‟s
interpretation of what the author sees as the key systemic components and flows of the
global field (Robertson 2004), shown in Diagram 2.8 below.

The model appears on page 95, and once again I replicate its content, only
adapting the design to the language of VCM. Concerned with the basic make-up of
globality and with the issue of the ways the world is ordered, Robertson introduces a
Diagram 2.8: Robert Robertson‟s Representation of the Global Field
Relativization of Citizenship

Humankind

National
Societies

World
System of
Societies

Selves
Relativization of Societal Reference
Realpolitik-
Humanity
Problematic
Relativization
of Self-
Identities
Individual-
Society
Problematic
Relativization
of Societies
99
model populated by national societies, individuals (or selves), relationships between
national societies (comprising the world system of societies), and humankind. The
relationships between the entities are all bi-directional and are meant to convey
problematic flows (relationships, reasoning, logic of action, etc) between each entity that
comprises the global field.
A side note may be in order, at this moment. Robertson‟s model exemplifies a
particular type of network but it also reinforces my previous argument about the
fundamental nature of models, which is simply to visually summarize or interpret our
representations of the world. It is not to offer or impose a reified explanation of reality, a
perception that unfortunately seems to be widespread. Robertson himself feels compelled
to explain the reason behind the construction of his model:

Whereas I am setting out this model of order in what may appear to be formal
terms, the intent which actually guides it is to inject flexibility into our
considerations of „totality‟. In so far as we think about the world as a whole,
we are inevitably involved in a certain kind of what is sometimes pejoratively
called totalistic analysis. But even though my scheme does involve a
„totalizing‟ tendency, it does so partly in order to comprehend different kinds
of orientation to the global circumstance (…) In that sense what my model
does is to facilitate interpretation and analysis of such variation. (…) To put it
yet another way, my model is conceived as an attempt to make analytical and
interpretive sense of how quotidian actors, collective or individual, go about
the business of conceiving of the world, including attempts to deny that the
world is one. (pp. 95-6)

Robertson appears to go to great lengths to justify building his model, which
should be simply viewed as a tool for analysis. And yet, when conceding that the model
has indeed a „totalizing‟ tendency, Robertson perpetuates the ill-conceived idea that
models are attempts to „explain‟ reality. The formal element of models should be
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evaluated in its own terms, namely the ability to encapsulate the logic behind reasoning.
It is internal validity of the model that has to be assessed. Its external validity is not the
world of empirical manifestations, but the soundness of its author‟s arguments and the
overall interpretation of them.
Next in Figure 2.1 we have the centered-ring network (c). It displays the general
features concerning transmission of information in a circle pattern between the nodes
placed on the “ring”. However, this time there is a node placed at the center, around
which all other nodes revolve in systemic fashion. In a rather abstract level, this network
configuration could be linked to the IR debate over paradigms (Kuhn 1962; Feyerabend
1970; Lakatos 1970; Smith, Booth et al. 1996; Waever 1996; James 2002; James 2004).
The nodes on the ring would be the various schools of thought, research enterprises or
research programs in the field (i.e., realism, liberalism, constructivism, etc). They are all
approaches co-existing within the disciplinary academic field we refer to as International
Relations. That is the systemic feature, the nature of the network. However, if one takes
seriously the inter-paradigm debate between Lakatos, Popper, and Khun, among others,
and the consequent need to identify metaphysical components giving theoretical and
analytical justifications for the very existence of our disciplinary world, then besides the
levels of mutual proximity or distance each paradigm may have in regards to each other
(replicating the argument visually represented in Diagram 2.8), every single paradigm
should also make explicit the metaphysical foundations it shares with the field‟s
axiomatic claims.
To be clear: if these paradigms are part and parcel of the same cluster of social
investigations (international relations), then they have to minimally share some basic
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metaphysical orientations. The node at the center of the ring network would be the
axiomatic, metaphysical, and ontological components of the field. Each node, to be part
of the (ring) network, should – theoretically speaking – share at very least one such
component with the field. Otherwise, it would be considered as external to the field.
Fully connected centered ring network (d) shows the same features as the fully
connected ring network (b). This time, however, the network has a center node to which
all nodes in the system may be connected as well. If we move one level down the degree
of abstraction for the previous example, the discrete empirical domains for a given
research program or enterprise should emerge. For instance, scholars working on
globalization studies often recognize global governance, global capitalism, and global
civil society as the three main empirical domains in the field (Castells 1996; Cutler 1999;
Appadurai 2001; Falk 2001; Keane 2001; Shaw 2003; Sending and Neumann 2006).
They would form the nodes in the ring network. They mutually connect, since it is a
widespread representation of the global world that it is a multidimensional arena in which
the domains mutually relate. Furthermore, it is no longer enough to share in abstract
terms some few features with the center node (the metaphysical and axiomatic principles
constituting the very idea of the global). This time, the empirical domains cannot
manifest themselves but through these fundamental conceptions of what constitutes the
global as opposed to the more traditional views of what constitutes the realm of inter-
state relations. It is in these terms that each domain has to be fully investigated,
interpreted, and understood.
Before moving to the next type of typology, an apparent obvious remark in
regards to the variations of ring networks here detailed may be appropriate. In both cases,
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for ring and centered-ring networks, differentiation was made about linkages restricted to
the nodes in the ring and full linkages, encompassing linkages between all nodes in the
network. Of course, in-between scenarios are not only a logical possibility, but also one
that is often employed. Because partially-fully connected ring networks are not fully
symmetric, one may fail to recognize their structural network constitution. David Collier,
Jason Seawright, and Gerardo L. Munck (Collier, Seawright et al. 2004), for instance,
present a visual representation of what they consider as standard steps in research as
presented by Gary King, Robert Koheane, and Sidney Verba in their well-known
publication “Designing Social Inquiry”, or DSI for short (King, Keohane et al. 1994).
Together those steps form a “research cycle”, here reproduced in Diagram 2.9 below.
The network configuration is simple enough. It shows necessary steps in the
process of producing meaningful research as addressed by King, Keohane, and Verba.
Collier, Seawright, and Muck make it clear that the “research cycle” is their own
summary of the arguments presented in DSI. They are also careful to point out the
flexible nature of the structure. First, at the level of further testing and reformulating the
theory there are two possible directions. Either there may be a need to re-specify the
theoretical terms of the research, or it may be necessary to reformulate the entire
research, starting with its very definition. Second, “although research routinely moves
through a series of ordered steps such as this, what is learned at each step certainly may
lead to revisiting prior steps or jumping forward to subsequent steps. Hence, one could in
fact place many more arrows in the diagram” (Collier, Seawright et al. 2004, p.36).

103

Even more important though, is the authors‟ careful explanation about the nature
of the model presented. Paraphrasing King, Keohane, and Verba, they explain that it is
not meant to impose any dogma, but rather “disciplined thought”:

Correspondingly, we do not want to give the impression that DSI‟s
framework consists of rigid rules. Rather, we seek to bring together
systematically the large number of specific recommendations offered by the
book, as a means of demonstrating both the scope of these recommendations,
and DSI‟s relative emphasis on different methodological issues. (p.37)

Diagram 2.9: Research Cycle According to DSI

B
Specifying the
Theory
A

Defining the
Research
Program
F
Further
Testing and
Reformulating
the Theory

Causal
Inference

E

Descriptive
Inference

D
Selecting
Cases and
Observations

C

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Once again, we may infer from the argument an implicit concern about presenting
a model not as reification of reality, or strict rules of interpretation. It should rather be
understood on its own analytical merit, which is to allow for systematic reasoning on
what otherwise would be disconnected arguments on proper ways to do research.
A final remark on the model presented refers to the possibility for further
detailing its content. Collier et al list the series of “rules” addressed by King, Keohane,
and Verba in DSI. They are listed as the contents for each of the six steps forming the
network in Diagram 2.9. For instance, in regards to the very first step, defining the
research problem, there are three basic rules listed: to address a problem that is important
in the real world, to contribute to a scholarly literature, and to modify or abandon a topic
that cannot be refined into a research project that permits valid inferences (pp. 37-38).
For the subsequent steps, even more detailed and complex elements are listed. For
instance, for the crucial step of selecting cases and observations there are seven main
“rules”, some of them with sub-topics to consider, which makes a total of at very least 12
actual rules to follow, reflecting varying levels of reasoning.
So, from the standpoint of the interests of cognition and visual modeling that are
central to my research, a basic question emerges: if a general model can be produced
indicating the main steps in the overall research enterprise, how they interconnect (in
sequence), and even the directions of their relationships, what prevents detailing the
model even further as to incorporate the subsequent levels of reasoning? The answer to
this rhetorical question is, of course, nothing. But it was not done. If it did, the model
could be even more relevant in helping generate inferences as to how appropriate those
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rules are. After all, they would be fully integrated by a complex logic reasoning captured
by a systemic representation.
Going back to the contents of Figure 2.1, next we have radial or star network (e1-3).
It represents a departure from the previous types of networks so far discussed in the sense
that the nodes do not communicate but with the center node (e1) or with nodes placed in
the previous radial level (e2-3). The project of hyperpolitics adopts a one level radial
configuration as the basic first level template to structure what otherwise would be
nothing more than “unstructured networks”. Unfortunately the authors mistakenly oppose
the concept of network to that of structure, as if the former precluded the latter. Say the
authors: “the model we present has axes rather than networks” (Calise and Lowi 2000,
p.297), failing to recognize that a model comprised by a center node (what they call
matrix) and two axes is, in itself, a network. It is just a structured network. In any case,
the main reason behind the construction of the model (besides providing a structured way
to systemically link conceptual constructs in political science) is to provide a general
template to expose the logic underlying the meaning for the main concept. To that end,
the axes in relation to the main concept provide antinomies-dichotomies dialectics as the
basis for the reasoning. The authors define the concept of political party, for instance, in
very simple terms: as actors of modern political regimes, defined “on the basis of very
different factors as ideology, organization, electoral mobilization, social representation,
elite composition”
7
. The axes forming the logical structure for interconnected additional

7
See definition at: http://www.hyperpolitics.net/hyperdictionary/index.php?entry=party, retrieved in
November 3
rd
, 2009

106
concepts are formed by two mainstream dichotomies found in the literature in regards to
political parties:

The first one refers to Duverger‟s distinction between parties originating in
the legislature and parties arising from cleavages in the civil society. The
second dichotomy reflects the difference in the organizational patterns,
contrasting the corporate party of the European continental tradition with the
individualistic machinery that has prevailed in the Unites States. (Calise and
Lowi 2000; p.299)

The resulting model is shown below in Diagram 2.10.

Diagram 2.10: Definition for the Concept “Party” in Hyperpolitics

Corporation

Individual

Legislature

Civil
Society

Party
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In fact, the model contains further components: “indirect” linkages to additional
concepts. But this “first analytical level” so to speak is the structural foundation to
hyperpolitics. Later in this research I will argue that the final model provided by
hyperpolitics is an example of juxtaposition of cognitive models, forming even more
complex – and yet fully structured and cognitively consistent – representations.
Once again, it is interesting to notice that authors of cognitive models feel compelled
to justify their creation or at least to make clear their primary role in scientific reasoning.
Calise and Lowi argue that anyone could, of course, question their model on substantive
grounds. Furthermore, the model per se may not directly lead to new theory. Instead:

What our model does offer, however, is a system for controlling the logical
consistency of conceptual links in the construction of a theoretical argument,
at the same time giving the possibility of comparing, criticizing, and possibly
modifying specific segments of such an argument. (Calise and Lowi 2000;
p.299)

This argument is in line with my previous assertions on one of the main
contributions from cognitive modeling, which is to allow for inference making. The
formality of the argumentation‟s logic, as reflected in the internal logical consistency and
validity of the model, provides the background for reasoning in ways conductive to
revisions and even new insights. Just like a real star a radial network may expand or
irradiate into further network levels. As it expands, the nodes from the subsequent levels
are connected to nodes placed at the radial level immediately prior to them. In a multi-
level radial configuration the nodes in the outside radial level may “irradiate” either from
a single node from the previous radial level (e2) or from multiple ones (e3).
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A dynamic computational application of a multi-level radial network structure in
which nodes irradiate from a single node in the previous radial level (e2) is Visual
Thesaurus
8
, a dynamic thesaurus dictionary powered by ThinkMap, a for-profit
corporation. Available in the Internet, when typing, for instance, the word “sovereignty”,
the concept is placed at the center of the network that displays, in this case, three main
nodes comprising a first radial level, and from each a second radial level of nodes.

8
The web-address to Visual Thesaurus is http://visualthesaurus.com.
Diagram 2.11: Visual Thesaurus Radial Network for the Concept “Sovereignty”

Sovereignty
State
Authority
Royal
Authority
Government
Autonomy
Reign
Authorisation Authority
Authorization
Dominance
Potency
Say-So
Self-
Determination
Self-
Government
Self-Rule
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Diagram 2.11 above reproduces the network as found on the web. It has two types
of linkages. The solid lines imply synonyms. The dotted ones indicate relationships
between meanings or between words. For the definition of sovereignty as government
autonomy there are three “types of” as indicated by the dotted line, namely self-
determination, self-government, and self-rule. Notice that the two nodes placed on the
second outer-ring do not comprise a concept, but rather either an explanation, or further
explanation, about the original concept to which they interconnect. In the case of
government autonomy the node provides further explanation about the definition. In the
case of state authority, the node provides further explanation as well as an example of a
sentence in which that meaning may appear. Finally, as the user “clicks” over any of the
concepts in the network, it moves to the center, and a new radial network appears, with
its own sets of linkages and nodes.
The relevance of Visual Thesaurus is twofold. First, all the examples given up to
this point have been quite abstract in nature, or rather about subjective or intersubjective
interpretations of the social realities scholars investigate. But here we have an example of
a very concrete application of network analysis applied to concepts, reshaping our
understanding about the types of information found in thesaurus and how they are
structured. It provides meaning to the way we navigate through information. It visually
structures the ways words interconnect according to the traditional approach to semantics
and grammar, focusing on formal syntactic structures. Second, it provides a very fair
level of cognitive information not only with the use of the radial network, but also with
the use of colors (i.e., nodes in one color may represent adjectives, while another color is
a noun) and specific notations for different types of linkages.
110
Next, we have an actual example of a star network in which nodes from the outer
radial level “irradiates” from multiples nodes placed at the previous level (e3). The
example refers to the „conceptual map‟ provided by Dirk Geeraerts, here translated into
the language of VCM, as shown in Diagram 2.12 below.

Diagram 2.12: Dirk Geeraerts‟ Conceptual Map of Cognitive Linguistics

Cognitive
Linguistics

Experiential Perspectival
Non-
Autonomous
Dynamic
Conceptual
Characterization
of Grammar
Lexicon-
Grammar
Relationship
Langue
-Parole
Relationship
Interactions
Between
Domains of
Experience
Categorial
Polysemy
Mechanisms
Categorial
Polysemy
Models
Cognitive
Grammar
Grammatical
Construal
Usage-Based
Model
Construction
Grammar
Frame
Semantics
Conceptual
Integration
Image
Schema
Conceptual
Metaphor
Metonymy
Schematic
Network
Prototype
Theory
Radial
Network
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Geeraerts defines Cognitive Linguistics (CG) as a particular area of academic
investigation within the broader area that congregates general approaches to cognitive
linguistics (uncapitalized letters) (Geeraerts 2006).
The area to which Geeraerts refers contains (four) basic understandings about the
relationship between cognition and language, more or less emphasized and shared by
(six) sub-fields of investigation. The author builds a map that introduces and visually
summarizes partially overlapping interconnections between those four fundamental
features of Cognitive Linguistics, its major fields of research, and a resulting set of
twelve central concepts that are key objects of investigation in these fields (see Geeraerts
2006, p. 19, Figure 1).
It is interesting to notice though that in an area of investigation that reflects
interests with matters such as radial network, schematic network, and image schema (all
concerned with visual representations), the original diagram presented by Geeraerts is
largely devoid of much, if any, cognitive value. The map is based on the all-too-common
strategy of “box and arrows”, which induces the perception that the resulting network is
devoid from structure (recognizable pattern). In order to expose the hidden structure in
Geeraerts‟ map, I reprint it here in the VCM format, which reveals a radial network.
Notice that the content is not altered at all. It shows the same linkages between the same
set of nodes, or entities, presented by the author. The only difference is that now the
structure of the network becomes apparent, whereas in the original format, it
misleadingly appeared to be unstructured (not amenable to generalization to other similar
cases).
112
The next sequence typology listed in Figure 2.1 is spider-web network (f). In a
spider web, and once again mimicking the metaphor that gives it its name, the nodes in
subsequent levels may link to various nodes in the previous level as well as in its own
level, forming a multi-level, multi-directional web of linkages. It is possible to argue that
this type of network is a hybrid one formed by the juxtaposition of two types of networks
previously mentioned: radial network and ring network. Also, spider-web networks may
end up acquiring very complex configurations, often making it very difficult if not
impossible to identify underlying patterns. Diagram 2.13 below visually exemplifies this
argument.

Once again, hyperpolitics may serve as an appropriate example to demonstrate the
complexity of the spider-web network and its basic topology constitution. The arguments
leading to the display of Diagram 2.10 explained that radial network is the basic template
Diagram 2.13: Complex Spider-Web Network Configuration

113
forming its „matrix‟, or set of primary links (Calise and Lowi 2000, p.298). As also
mentioned in the previous chapter, secondary links and eventually spatial concepts are
subsequently introduced to form four interconnected quadrants, as shown in Diagram
2.14 below.

The diagrams 2.14a1 through a3 reproduce the style of representation used in
Hyperpolitics. They are the three successive logical steps used to link concepts, as well as
the linkages between them. Diagrams 2.14b1 through b3 re-interpret those same steps,
but this time according to the visual style and notations from VCM. At first sight, the
style of representation used in Hyperpolitics may look a little more elegant.
Unfortunately, not only beauty here may be in the eyes of the beholder, but also the
Diagram 2.14: Logical Quadrants Linking Concepts in Hyperpolitics

(b1)
(b2)
(b3)

(a1)

(a2)
(a3)
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representation of Hyperpolitics does not visually translate some essential features. First,
notice that in the first stage, solid lines form the two central axes linking the primary
concepts. In the second stage, the secondary concepts are linked by a dotted square. The
variation in the visual notation refers to that primary-secondary variation in the nature of
the linkage.
Indeed, there is a logical variation in the reasoning guiding the primary and
secondary levels of conceptual relationships. The logical principle at the secondary level
is one of complementarity, resulting from the previous antinomy-dichotomy relationship
linking primary concepts. For instance, the additional node placed at the top left of the
entire structure is “participation”, resulting from the conjunction of the two previous
primary concepts, “legislature” (at the top of the vertical axis) and “corporation” (at the
right of the horizontal axis). The authors justify their option as follows:

If we now move toward the second step of indirect links, the upper left
peripheral we chose is participation, as parties of the corporate type – like the
German Social Democratic Party in the pre-World II era, or the Communist
Party in post-World II Italy – conceive of their presence in the legislative
arena mainly as a way to maximize mass mobilization (Calise and Lowi
2000, p. 299).

In VCM notation style, the lines indicating primary and secondary links are both
solid, which indicates they share some fundamental quality. They are differentiated
however, by shape (straight vs. curved lines) and also by the thickness of the lines,
indicating some sort of variation, such as order of appearance, preference, relevance, or,
primary and secondary types of linkages. I would argue that the problem with the
notation adopted by Hyperpolitics, however, is that they carry the solid-dotted
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differentiation to the third and final level of analytical construction for the interconnected
quadrants.
The analytical justification for the third level in Hyperpolitics substantially and
fundamentally differs from the previous two. This time, the four nodes at the corner of
the square become independent variables. Not any independent variables, but the ones
logically identified in the previous steps. The spatial concept, the one placed at the center
of the quadrant is the dependent variable. Well, the final representation certainly does not
indicate logical commonality among the independent variables. If anything, it suggests
the existence of two different types of relationships among the nodes forming its
surrounding network (one represented by the solid line, and the other by the dotted line).
There are two other even more important considerations in regard to the
appropriateness of visual representation in this particular case. First, as the VCM
representation indicates, the final Hyperpolitics structure is actually a hybrid
construction. At the first level we have a radial network with a central concept and two
axes. At the second level we have just a line network (Figure 2.1 h1-5, yet to be
introduced later in this chapter) comprised by polar-opposites (four of them in total). At
the third level we have four interconnected centered-ring networks (Figure 2.1c). None of
these distinctions appears in Hyperpolitics‟ visual representation. But they are essential to
recognize the final constitution of the network generated by the project, as well as the
meanings of the relationships conveyed in different sub-structures of the overall system.
Second, Hyperpolitics takes even one step further by generating an entire
“matrix” congregating the entire population of concepts selected by its authors, with
concepts relating to other concepts in different ways. The central concept “party” that
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gives rise to the structure represented in Diagram 2.9 appears in a total of 16 different
sets of interconnected quadrants, with varying roles: either as primary, secondary, or
spatial concept. How could we visually represent the entire matrix of concepts and their
multi-dimensional linkages? Unless it is done by a computer-generated procedure, it is
very difficult if not impossible to do. Even then, it is most likely that the final spider-web
representation of the entire matrix would fail to display any discernible pattern. A brief
analysis of the 16 different interconnected quadrants where the concept “party” appears
reveals the concept as performing varying roles, in different numbers, in ways that at
least in principle do not display symmetry or reflect underlying patterns other than
juxtaposition of multidimensional quadrants. At that final level, the entire structural
symmetry that gave rise to the entire project appears to disappear.
Continuing in our analysis of the sequence typologies shown in Figure 2.1 we
have hierarchic typology network (g1), tree network (g2), and lateral typology networks
(g3 and g4). The first two are the most commonly used in knowledge representations,
with a tendency to reflect concrete classifications, such as organizational structures (g1)
and evolution in biology, the so-called „tree of life‟ (g2). But these can also be used to
address more abstract constructions, in order to reveal hierarchy of any kind (analytical
level, conceptual linkage, etc).
Charles S. Pearson, for example, summarizes the standard view in economics
reflecting abstract discussions of costs and benefits involved in considerations toward
environmental protection (Pearson 2000). Usually the discussion starts with the first level
distinction between use values of a particular good and its intrinsic value. When
considering use values, there are three alternative classifications, says Pearson. First, a
117
distinction is made between producer goods and consumer goods. The former refers to
environmental services that are inputs into production, while the latter refer to those
related to consumers or individuals‟ satisfaction (individuals‟ utility function). The
second approach distinguishes between direct and indirect use value. The author best
summarizes the distinction:

Direct use value includes products made possible by the environmental
(natural) resource, such as timber or fish. Indirect use value includes
ecosystem support functions, such as climate regulation, nutrient cycling and
soil formation, and maintaining hydrological systems and flood control, that
indirectly support economic activity. Indirect use values are clearly economic
values, but because they are not marketed and because they are indirect, their
monetary value must be inferred. (Pearson 2000, pp. 120-121)

Here the distinction is clearly related to the direct possibilities not only to assess
in absolute terms economic value from a particular environment resource, but also its
implication as to whether that good may have, in abstract terms, any economic value at
all that justifies its production in the first place. Finally, the third distinction opposes
actual use values and option values. The former refers to those environmental goods and
services whose relevance is self-evident, such as processing water for both industrial and
household usages (i.e., portable water). The latter implies subjective considerations, such
as evaluation of uncertainty about future expectations. In other words, these are goods
whose benefits are not immediate. They have a time-leg for recovering the investment
that must be calculated against its expected benefits. Resulting from this subjective
element, Pearson identifies three sub-types emanating from option value: expected value,
premium for risk aversion (the more people are averse to risk, the greater the option value
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since the contribution from these goods to prevent future negative uncertainties is greatly
appreciated), and quasi-option (the additional value people are willing to pay expecting a
future use of something with no immediate application in the present, such as new
technologies).
When taking into consideration intrinsic values of environmental goods and
services, pure economic evaluations become even more complicated. Basically, there are
two ways to assess particular concerns and attention people pay to certain groups of
environmental goods. In both cases, there is the critical element of social perception
suggesting that these goods possess their own intrinsic value, independent of any
eventual economic value they may also have. On the one hand, there are ecologic and
biologic treasures, such as species, ecosystems, etc. They are valuable simply because
they exist. The Amazon forest or the Great Canyons are obvious examples of these
natural wonders. On the other hand, these and other environmental treasures may invoke
feelings of attachment due to cultural, religious, and historic determinants, among others.
The final diagram appearing in Pearson‟s book (p.121) is fully reproduced below in
Diagram 2.15, with no changes whatsoever besides some minor layout designs.
Few features stand out from Pearson‟s classification. It reflects a good example of
the use of hierarchy typology network to address abstract conceptual constructs. But there
are some design features in the structure that raises some questions about its appropriate
use. Hierarchic typology as the name indicates presupposes hierarchic relationships
between the various levels of nodes in the system. Horizontal lines of nodes should imply
a common analytical level, while vertical differentiation implies variation in the features
guiding the classification scheme. Furthermore, the linkages indicate interconnectedness
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between nodes both within a particular level and between levels. However, two odd
visual elements in Pearson‟s model defy these basic expectations, putting into question
the value of the cognitive information expected from his hierarchic typology network.
First, the two nodes at the top are not connected. Do they form two distinct networks?
The answer would be no, judging by the author‟s argument. They should be connected to
a higher node, probably entitled “environmental values”. This is, after all, the very
justification for the classification presented.

Second, the first sub-structure to the left, starting with the node “use values”, is
subsequently divided into three branches. However, they are not placed at the same visual
Diagram 2.15: Charles S. Pearson‟s Classification of Environmental Values
Use
Values
Intrinsic
Values
Direct Indirect Types:
Geologic
Species
Motivations:
Bequest
Sympathy
Stewardship
Use in
Production
Functions
Directly
Entering
Utility
Functions
Actual Option
Premium
for Risk
Aversion
Expected
Value
Quasi-
Option
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(logical) level. The pair direct/indirect nodes are placed in a higher position. Below, at
the same level, we have the two pairs forming the contents for the other two branches.
Once again, why is that the case? Do the three primary branches reflect the same
analytical level (relevance, level of abstraction, etc), or for some reason the direct/indirect
pair has precedence over the other two branches? There is nothing in Pearson‟s text
giving any guidance to answer that question. In fact, the only reasonable explanation is
that the branches were placed in different positions just as a way to make the overall
structure fit the margins of the book for printing. If that is the case, here we have a
common problem with the use of visual models of representations in academia. They
have indeed been frequently used – as the various examples mentioned in this chapter
clearly attest – but all too common not in a formal way, revealing inconsistencies or
misusages in regards to their cognitive content. But if Pearson meant in fact to display the
typology‟s structure with varying levels, then a proper explanation as to the reason for
this variation should be given. It is hard to imply such a thing, particularly when dealing
with abstract conceptual constructs.
As for the lateral tree typology networks (g3 and g4), they have not been used
much as representation of knowledge production. Instead, they are most commonly
known as tournament brackets in sports. Still, they have their cognitive value in that they
imply narrowing of information as one moves along the network continuum. Different
than hierarchic typology, pairs of nodes, or nodes placed at the same vertical level, are
not sub-types of the same genre or quality. Furthermore, nodes placed at the same level in
lateral and tree typologies have opposite functions. With the latter, nodes placed in higher
levels are offsprings from previous levels. With the former, further levels emerge by
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eliminating previous elements in the network. It is important to recognize that these types
of networks (g1-4) have very distinct cognitive values resulting from their positioning
vis-à-vis each other. Said differently, they show that differing positioning of similar
visual configurations may have profound influence on meaning.
The next series of sequence topology structures include line networks (h1-5) and
scale networks (i1-5). These are network structures in straight sequence, as opposed to
closed structures in looping mode (i.e., ring networks). They imply transference of
information from one node to the next and their configurations vary as to whether they
are open-ended or closed sets of networks. Closed Line network (h5) and closed scale
network (i5) are networks in which the flow of information is finite, with a demarcated
beginning and an end. Open-Ended line network (h2) and Open-Ended Scale network
(i2), on the contrary, suggest open structures, with an implicit continuation of the
structure beyond of what is shown. There are combinations between these two opposites,
with line and scale networks having a closed structure in one end of the structure, and an
open one on the other end: left-open line network (h3), right-open line network (h4),
upwards-open scale network (i3), and downwards-open scale network (i4). Eventually,
these structures do not indicate whether they are open or closed, either because the
information is simply not there or because the object in the network (i.e., elements, topic,
etc) do not allow for a final judgment as to whether there is the possibility of expanding
the network even further (h1 and i1).
The major distinction between these two sets of networks derives from their
spatial positioning. Scale networks (h1-5) imply hierarchy between the nodes in the
system, which may or may not be related to qualitative levels of relevance. They may
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indicate, for instance, variation in analytical levels of abstraction, among other things.
Line networks (i1-5) do not imply variation in the qualitative nature of its nodes, but
rather variation within the same genre.

Diagram 2.16 above contains an example of a scale network that can be derived
from the typological classification presented by James Rosenau on different classes of
fundamental concepts scholars use in scientific research (Rosenau 1977). The conceptual
constructs forming the original line network typology discussed by Rosenau are
worldviews, ontologies, paradigms, theories, and hypothesis. They are lined up as a scale
Diagram 2.16: James Rosenau‟s Classes of Concepts in Scientific Research

Worldview

Ontology

Paradigm

Theory

Hypothesis
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network with the concept worldview being placed at the top, and hypothesis at the
bottom. Variation in the network refers to the degree of generality between concepts.
Worldview is simply the broadest or the most generic of all the concepts in the network.
According to Rosenau ontology is an all-encompassing or overarching concept,
usually possible to be summed up by few or even a single word. Ontologies take one step
further in terms of specificity, by encapsulating the most basic or fundamental
understanding about the nature of the world that gives rise to or results from a worldview.
Paradigms provide even more detailed information as to the sets of parameters or
boundaries shaping the ontological components of that broader universe (worldview).
Theories demand specific references about relationships between entities and how they
vary within a particular set of parameters. Patrick James, in evaluating Rosenau‟s
typology and the varying degrees of generality for each concept, adds another one, placed
below theories, namely hypotheses (James 2002). These are if-then statements with high
levels of specificity that can only be formulated by making explicit and detailed
references to entities, relationships, parameters, scope conditions, etc. The “v” sign at the
top of the network indicates the direction of the system‟s variation, going from the
broadest (at the top) to the most specific (at the bottom).
Next we have line networks. It is commonly used to indicate variation in time as
well as in a continuum of a given logical or analytical component. Andrey P. Tsygankov
investigates the political spectrum of Russia‟s Foreign Policy Discourse (Tsygankov
2004). By doing so, he builds a line network visually representing the various discourses
within Russian politics in the post-Cold war period and where they stand in regards to the
West. Diagram 2.17 below partially reproduces Tsygankov‟s model (appearing on p. 48).
124

The author investigates the major political schools of thought in post-Cold War
Russia and how their general ideological make-ups make them fit within Western-
oriented classification schemes of world-order projects, such as Fukuyama, Bull and
Watson, Huntington, and Cox‟s (Bull and Watson 1985; Fukuyama 1989; Cox 1995;
Huntington 1996). World projects formulated by Western scholarly tradition vary in
relation to two essential variables or as the author calls them, dimensions, namely
political power and culture. Those with emphasis on matters of power give rise to
worldviews with ethnocentric features, in which the global reality is a realm for struggle
and competition and world order the result of either unipolar (Fukuyama) or multipolar
(Huntington) hegemony. Those who recognize the power of culture to transcend local
realities see world order as the result of multicultural configurations, either under the
hegemony or moral leadership of a given civilization (Bull-Watson), or as truly inter-
civilizational (Cox) (Tsygankov 2004, pp.22-26).
The study of Russia‟s foreign policy discourses is an example of the way ideas
travel (in this case, perceptions of power and culture shaping views of world order),
Diagram 2.17: Andrey P. Tsygankov‟s Russia‟s Foreign Policy Discourses
Westernizers
National
Democrats
Statists
National
Communists

Eurasianists
West Anti-West
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meeting resistance along the way, and producing distinct (political) schools of thought
dialectically incorporating those ideas in different formats. These various formats give
rise to what the author sees as the major five intellectual currents in Russia.
In Tsygankov‟s model they can be lined up as a continuum in an axis that opposes
visions in support to world order projects structured on Western values and those
advocating alternative Eurasian configurations. The node placed to the far left to the
model in Diagram 2.17 represents the so-called “Westernizers”. They fully subscribe a
Western world order, seen Russia as citizens of that global world. Next to it, “National
Democrats” also advocate for a global world order, but one that is essentially
multicultural, with Russia‟s identity having its own place as legitimate citizen of the
world. At the middle of the model, “Statists” depart from that vision of a global order,
rather seeing world order as the result of a multipolar, sovereign-based one. Therefore,
Russia‟s identity depends on its standing as an independent state holding the status of a
great power. Next, “National Communists” go even further by not even recognizing a
world order shaped by matters of power in a multipolar configuration. Instead, they see a
bipolar struggle between socialist and Western worlds. The relevance of Russia then
becomes even greater, as the beacon of the socialist civilization. Finally, to the far right
of the model, “Eurasianists” support that vision but also see an underlying struggle or
competition for geopolitical empires in that bi-polar world between civilizations.
Tsygankov‟s model is a perfect example of a line network because it neatly
represents rather complex ideas into a coherent set of analytical reasoning. It is not a
scale network because the two opposites forming the axis do not evoke any variation in
quality or hierarchy. They are rather „alternatives‟. The model‟s axis is bi-directional and
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extends beyond the nodes placed at the extremes of the continuum. It implies two things.
First, it indicates possibilities for additional political configurations to emerge. In fact, the
author explicitly makes that remark, pointing out the difficulty is summing up into five
units what is rather a much more complex, dialectic, and chaotic set of political
configurations (see p.149, note 17). Second, it indicates the way the flow of information
travels in the model, analytically interconnecting all nodes in it. A particular political
school of thought are sided by other two variations, and they may also fluctuate their
positions in either direction when particular, specific policy debates are at stake.
The model has yet another important contribution that will be addressed later in
this chapter. Diagram 2.17 only shows one cognitive level of reasoning employed by the
author. But once the model is fully visualized (which will be done later) it becomes one
more example of a model that incorporates multiple cognitive modes of reasoning by
superimposing discrete sets of network structures. To form an even more comprehensive,
complex and yet logically consistent set of visual representation, models such as these
combine systemic networks from the basic menu of VCM cognitive structures.
The next two structures listed in Figure 2.1 are fishbone network (j) and bus
network (k). They present a structure in which the flow of information irradiates from a
central line, to which peripheral linkages and nodes may be attached. With the former, we
have several sub-structures, or line networks attaching to the main line. With the latter,
we have only nodes connecting to the main structure in succession. These are structures
amenable to evaluating causal linkages, although they are rarely, if ever, used as such,
other than implicitly. These structures can help elucidate and explicitly display causal
chains as well as interactions between independent, intervening, and dependent variables.
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Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler consider religion to be a major intervening
variable in the field of IR (Fox and Sandler 2004). The implication of this representation
and how it stands within a broader debate about the relationship between religion and
international relations is the central topic for chapter four. For now, suffice to say that the
model proposed by these authors is a very simple bus network, even if they have never
produced a visual representation of it or referred to it as such.

Diagram 2.18 above shows how Fox and Sandler‟s representation would look like
if visually displayed with VCM design. The thicker line constitutes the center structure
for the network. Information flows from the left to the right, starting with the independent
variable (IV) and ending with the dependent variable, in this case international relations
(IR). The thinner line connects the peripheral node to the main structure. The
mathematical signs (+/-) indicate the possible effects of that linkage on the outcome or
output of the system, either as positive or negative. Otherwise, the model is quite
Diagram 2.18: Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler‟s View of Religion in IR

IR

IV

R
+/-
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indeterminate as to the possible constitution of elements (i.e., nodes, entities, processes)
constituting the independent variable(s). For that reason it is portrayed as a single node.
However, it is not difficult to visualize alternative configurations portraying
multiple independent variables forming different linkages to the system that would result
in either a bus or a fishbone network, as indicated by the Diagram 2.19 below.

In fact, Margaret Tucker Wrightson, in her contribution to the well-known
volume edited by Robert Axelrod, entitled “Structure of Decision” (Axelrod 1976),
which applies cognitive mapping to political issues, addresses coding procedures to what
she refers as chain-of-events assertions (Wrightson 1976). In doing so, she points out –
Diagram 2.19: Alternative Representations to Fox and Shmuel‟s Model

IR
R
+/-

IV2

IV3

IV1

IR
R
+/-

IV3

IV2

IV1
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basically reiterating my argument above – that possibilities for configurations of these
chains – what I here refer to as particular types of networks (fishbone and bus) – may be
endless. However, she categorizes those into two groups: simple cause/multiple effect,
and multiple cause/simple effect chains (p.316). This view does not necessarily contradict
the network approach discussed here. But I would argue that it limits the possibilities for
configurations to causal relations. In principle, there is nothing precluding a fishbone
network with multiple secondary structures attaching to the main structure on either or
even both sides of the network.
The next series of sequence topology networks is what we may refer to as partite
networks (m1-3, in Figure 2.1). These are networks with two (bipartite), three (tripartite),
or more sets of nodes. Each set represents a class, type, or group of entities within a
common level or ontological realm. The nodes within levels may or may not mutually
interact. Instead, systemic interconnectedness occurs primarily between levels or groups
of nodes. Alastair Iain Johnston provides a very good example of such a network, when
addressing Chinese strategic thinking during the Ming period (Johnston 1995). Johnston
applies cognitive modeling and symbolic analysis to investigate whether it is possible to
refer to a historically consistent Chinese strategic culture. But to do so the author has to
tackle the analytical problem of, first, identifying a meaningful typology of grand
strategies from which decision-makers can choose.
Although the literature has provided some categorization efforts of matters such
as military doctrine and operational strategy (Mearsheimer 1983; Posen 1984; Snider
1984), for the most part that has not been the case with grand strategies, says Johnston.
Drawing on while also revising the terms of an incipient literature aiming at providing
130
some basic categories for grand strategies, the author proposes three essential grand
strategies, namely accommodationist, defensive, and offensive/expansionist. Of particular
relevance is the distinction between political ends and grand strategic means, often
collapsed within the same concept in the literature.
The author then develops a more detailed typology that distinguishes between
political goals, grand strategies, military doctrines, and specific strategies for action.
Johnston‟s “interrelated levels of strategy” (appearing on Johnston 1995, p. 115) is
reproduced below in Diagram 2.20.

Diagram 2.20: Alastair Iain Johnston's Interrelated Levels of Strategy
Political
Goals
Military
Doctrine
Grand
Strategy
Strategy
Accommodationist Defensive Expansionist
Defensive Deterrence Offensive
Attrition Limited Aims Blitzkrieg
Status Quo
Revisionist
a
a
b
c
d
e
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The distinction between political goals from grand strategy allows for a proper
delimitation of plausible relationships between them as well as between each subsequent
category, represented in the model by the directional arrows. Both types of states (status
quo and revisionist ones) may make use of any of the existing grand strategies, according
to the circumstances. Johnston also indicates in the model some very specific types of
relationships with lettered arrows: temporary strategies adopted for expediency (a),
conservative imperialism (b), punitive expeditions (c), strategy designed to capture
territory vital for strategic defense (d), and compellence designed to reinforce future
deterrence credibility (e).
The obvious main difference in this type of typology provided by Johnston and
the more traditional hierarchical one (Figure 2.1, g1) is that here the classes of nodes
aggregated into sub-structures have multiple possibilities for interaction. Relationships
are not ontologically bound, fixed, constrained by intrinsic properties. Partite networks
are systems with multiple paths of interconnectedness, all potential, none mandatory.
The next structure in Figure 2.1 is grid network (l). It is similar to spider network
(f) in the sense that it forms a net of interconnected nodes. They differ however by the
varying ways the networks in the net are arranged. With the latter, the structure irradiates
from a center node. With the former, there is no center node. The structure is uniform. An
interesting example of such network structure comes from Thad A. Brown‟s contribution
to the volume edited L. Douglas Kiel and Euel Elliott, which congregates various
applications of chaos theory to Social Sciences (Kiel and Elliott 1996). Brown is
interesting in non-linear, non-deterministic dynamics of systemic evolution, particularly
in the realm of political behavior (Brown 1995). According to the author, chaos results
132
from the impossibility to assess long-term predictions to systemic behavior, not because
of external noise or infinite number of degrees of freedom, but due to the system‟s
intrinsic non-linear feature, which quickly separates initial conditions from subsequent
close trajectories. However, problems of unpredictability of long-term behavior occurs
only at the individual level of the entities (i.e., actors, nodes), not at the systemic level
where statistical predictions averaged over long periods may identify patterns and allow
for predictions.
Brown puts his argument to the test by looking at political interactions, logically
(and visually) representing social dynamics as grid networks in the form of „square
lattice‟. The author starts from the assumption that “social and political behavior is by
definition holistic and synergetic” (Kiel and Elliott 196, p.123), and that “in political
dynamics there are likely to be spatial and temporal phase transitions” (p.124). With that
in mind, the „square lattice‟ construction (grid network) is the basic constitution of
cellular automata, a method for microstructure modeling largely used in fields such as
biology and physics, among others, to investigate behavior in dynamic systems with
discrete degrees of freedom. Interactions result from neighboring relationships within the
grid, governed by some specific deterministic or probabilistic, local, uniform, and time-
independent rules, such as love and hate, amity and enmity, etc. Applied to the world of
partisan politics, says the author:

Although individuals remain in fixed physical locations, their partisanship
may change as a result of interactions with other voters on the lattice. This is
a primordial political world, but well reflects many of the central ideals in
contextual models of politics. By using political rules on a lattice, enough
interactions between decision makers can replicate real political situations.
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Finding useful rules that map different forms of political behavior is the key
to making automata theory viable for the social sciences. (Kiel and Elliott
196, p. 125)

In this representation of political behavior as a grid network, few features stand
out. The nodes of the system are the individuals. But its systemic dynamics result from
modes of interaction between the entities in the aggregate, as a whole. Therefore, of
crucial importance in this type of network analysis is the nature of the linkages between
the nodes, which gives the system its holistic shape: the rules governing the relationships
between the units of the system. Furthermore, the physical arrangement of the network is
essential, since all calculations refer to neighboring relationships between nodes. It is a
central feature in this network structure. Nodes can only directly relate to other nodes
placed immediately next to them. Relationships with nodes placed at further levels away
can only take place indirectly, through sequence-chains of relationship. Also, this is an
example that shows the possibilities for more formal applications of cognitive modeling.
Although many of the examples in this chapter refer to subjective, abstract
configurations, one should not loose from sight that cognitive modeling is meant to
reflect high levels of formality. This is one of the main reasons for building such models;
to lock in and properly structure the logics behind whatever it is being modeled, be it an
argument or the fundamental terms of dynamic and systemic interactions. Thus, cognitive
models should be extremely amenable to computational and mathematical formalizations.
Finally, the last structure shown in Figure 2.1 is that of spiral network (n). This is
a structure that begins with a center, but evolves in sequence in such a way that each
subsequent node in the systems is placed a little bit farther away from that center. Imre
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Lakatos‟ MSRP, or Methodology of Scientific Research Programs, provides a very good
example of this type of network (Lakatos 1970; Lakatos, Worrall et al. 1980). In fact,
Lakato‟s model can be built into two distinct stages.
First, Lakato‟s model forms a set of concentric-rings network (or a centering
multi-layer containment, as shown in Diagram 2.5t. The author sees scientific disciplines
as formed by series of research programs, or SRPs. Each is comprised by four ontological
components, as visually represented in Diagram 2.21 below.

The hard core constitutes the circle at the center and is populated by axiomatic
claims. These are the fundamental metaphysical assumptions that guide the entire
Diagram 2.21: Imre Lakatos‟ Components of SRPs
Hard
Core
Negative Heuristics
Auxiliary Belt
Positive Heuristics
135
research program. They do not change and cannot be challenged by theories or
hypotheses. They are self-contained, which justifies their representation here as a unit
container. The next circle is the negative heuristics. It contains the rules that protect the
hard core from being challenged or directly tested. They provide the guidelines to avoid
forbidden theorizing in terms of methodological principles: (faulty) measurements,
(loose) research designs, contradicting axioms, and faulty reductionisms that compromise
the integrity of the axioms. The next circle in the structure is the belt of auxiliary
hypotheses, or auxiliary belt. They provide possibilities for adjustments, redefinitions of
conceptual apparatus, anything necessary to protect the hard core from direct challenges,
while also allowing for necessary changes conductive to progressive theorizing. Finally,
the outer ring is the positive heuristics. It is populated by sets or theories in sequence,
connected to the core. It directly interacts with the auxiliary belt, reshaping and
reformulating it.
The second stage in our visual representation of Lakato‟s model results from the
authors‟ understanding of theories not as isolated entities, but as constitutive of a
systemic aggregate, in which series of theories should be logically linked and ultimately
connected to the hard-core, through a direct relationship with the auxiliary belt. Theories
mutually connect in sequence. Each theoretical development is possible only due to
previous theoretical contributions to the field (what Thomas Khun refers to as normal
science). Diagram 2.22 below is a visual representation of Lakato‟s model of science. At
the center of the model, we have the hard core surrounded by the negative heuristics and
the auxiliary belt. They form the center from which the theories‟ spiral network
emanates, populating the positive heuristics.
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As new theories are brought into the network, the further away they are from the
specifics of the hard-core. In some cases, it may even lead to the formation of anomalies,
which can take two forms judging by the visual representation in Diagram 2.22. First, a
theory may partially contradict the terms of the hard-core and yet end up producing
relevant knowledge to the field, either on its own terms or by allowing the continuing of
the spiral network. This is the case with the node (theory) T5 in the diagram, partially
falling outside the positive heuristics, and yet allowing for the continuing advancement of
theoretical developments whose content are attuned with the entire system (T6-9).

Diagram 2.22: Imre Lakato‟s Theories in Sequence – Ideal Type

T1

T3

T2

T7

T8

T4

T6

T5

T9
5.1
5.3
5.2
5.4
5.5
137
Second, as is the case with any theory, theories partially contradicting the
paradigmatic terms of the research program may give rise to its own offspring of theories
in sequence (T5.1-5). Chances are that the contents of these sub-sets may be even further
detached from the hard-core, making it even easier to produce greater anomalies (i.e.,
newer cases not explained by the hard-core). Notice that in the diagram, the theoretical
anomalies are those entities falling outside the overall network (T5, T5.1, and T5.5).

This neat picture envisioned by Lakatos may be seen, of course, as an ideal type
in terms of the ways theoretical contents of a research program should evolve.
Particularly within Social Sciences the actual picture may be a little bit messier. Diagram
Diagram 2.23: Imre Lakato‟s Theories in Sequence – Actual Developments?

T1

T2

T4

T6

138
2.23 above displays some of the logical possibilities for theoretical development within
any given research program.
There may be some actual theories in sequence, but just as easily we may have
sub-sets of theories in sequence that may or may not be directly (or even indirectly linked
to the broader set of theories directly emanating from the hard-core. What is even more
probable is the existence of groups of theories co-existing within a research program that
may be clustered together (i.e., by topic) but with no clear distinction as to the types of
interconnectedness they mutually share. Sometimes it may be possible to recognize these
theories as comprising a somewhat unified sub-group (a single cluster contained
population; Diagrams 2.3g and 2.6g). Sometimes it is only possible to group them
together as a general cluster without being able to identify any significant defining
features (a general population container; Diagrams 2.3i and 2.6i). Anomalies may emerge
from any of these theoretical aggregations and the spiral network linking them may be
only subjectively implied (thus the dotted line connecting the theories to the hard-core).
What is more, those theoretical developments that are not placed within the spiral
network, meaning that they do not present novel predictions in relation to a theoretical
predecessor, constitute what Lakatos call degenerative problemshifts. They are ad hoc
theoretical constructions that do not contribute to the research program‟s overall
improvement. Being isolated from the spiral network these theoretical constructions do
not bring with them unified ideas, no continuity in regards to the entire program.
Be as it may, the arguments aforementioned show the extent to which Lakato‟s
model allows for very important inferences when „translated‟ into a visual mode of
representation. Furthermore, it is a very abstract and relevant application of a particular
139
type of structured systemic construction. Next, we turn to the analysis of another class of
systemic network structures, namely intersection networks.

Intersection Networks

The most well known visual sets of intersection networks are Venn diagrams.
They are primarily addressed from the standpoint of propositional logic, with direct
implications to graph theory, resulting from their particular geometric and mathematical
properties (Barker-Plummer, Beaver et al. 200; Anderson and Cleaver 1965; Gardner
1983; Hammer 1995; Chilakamarri, Hamburger et al. 1996). Their network
configurations result from varying numbers of “sets”, represented by ring containers
(introduced in Diagram 2.2d) partially intersecting with each other. John Venn created
Venn diagrams with the goal of visually representing complex logical propositions and
algebraic statements (Edwards 2004) . The idea was to visually represent propositions by
inclusive and exclusive circles. Euler diagrams – created by Leonhard Euler – also make
use of circles to express relationships between classes of things. They are symbolic
representations of logical propositions, such as “All B is A, some A is not B”, which is
traditionally represented as shown in Figure 2.2a, below. The inner circle is B, the greater
one is A, and the area outside is “neither A nor B”. The problem, however, is to apply
Euler diagrams to complex sets of logical problems or propositions. A.W. F. Edwards
summarizes its limitations: “For example, a logician faced with a series of propositions
might wish to ascertain whether they were mutually consistent, and Euler diagrams do
not provide a graphical “algorithm” for settling such a question” (Edwards 2004, p. 3).
140

John Venn tried a different strategy. Instead of trying to directly convey the
relationships between class terms, Venn rather focused on classes and the successive
duplication of sub-divisions forming sub-classes:

All the we have to do is to draw our figures, say circles, so that each
successive one which we introduce shall intersect once, and once only, all the
subdivisions already existing, and we then have what may be called a general
framework indicating every possible combination producible by the given
class terms.
(On the Diagrammatic and Mechanical Representation of Propositions and
Reasonings, 1880, quoted in A.W. F. Edwards 2004, p.4)

Figure 2.2b above is the Venn‟s alternative visual representation to the original
two-set propositional framework introduced by Euler. The circle to the left corresponds
to “A” and the one to the right, to “B”. The blacked out region of “B” is the notation that
indicates absence, or non-existence (“B but not A”). Of course, the two-set Venn diagram
has the advantage of also including the “B but not A” area in the representation, as
indicated in Figure 2.2c. Note that Euler diagram cannot convey that information.
Venn‟s discovery opened a whole new area of investigation in regards to the
possibilities for visual representations of propositional logic. However, as Venn soon
Figure 2.2: A Logical Proposition in Euler and Venn Diagrams
( b ) ( a ) ( c )
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realized it quickly becomes complicated to apply the elegant approach used to create the
iconic three-set diagram (Figure 2.3d below) to sets with four or more classes. And this
very problem became the center of attention to mathematicians and logicians interested in
Venn‟s diagrams. The result is the uncovering of relevant properties in these diagrams,
such as its relation to mathematics “gray-code”
9
and binary number
10
for simple
diagrams, even fractal properties
11
. But most of all, apparently, is the quest for symmetry
applied to Venn diagrams of any sets, as aptly captured by Edwards (2004, p. 45):

Towards the end of the 1980s the time was evidently ripe for solving the
century-old problem of drawing Venn diagrams for arbitrary numbers of sets
using only “symmetrical figures… to some extent elegant in themselves”.
Symmetry and elegance are not solely aesthetic virtues, however, for it is
they that provide the “aid to reasoning” that Venn sought.

The outcome is a proliferation of variations of Venn diagrams, each focusing on
varying types of mathematical properties. Edwards, in particular, has conquered the task
of producing fully symmetrical Venn diagrams, which culminated with the building of
the seven-set diagram “Adelaide”, in 1992 (Edwards 1994). However, as the emphasis
has been on mathematical and logical properties rather than on their visual cognitive

9
Grey Code is a combinatorial algorithm “which lists all the 2n ways of making a selection amongst n
different things (corresponding to the n sets) in an order which ensures that successive selections differ in
only one of the things” (Edwards 2004, p.50).
10
Binary numbers, or binary numeral system, uses a numerical combination of 0 to 2n – 1, in which the
numbers 0 and 1 correspond to a set (when applied to a Venn diagram) or a value. It allows for the
conversion of decimal numbers into binary codes comprised by 0s and 1s, with obvious implications for
mathematics and computer science.
11
Some variations of Venn Diagrams discussed by Edwards are related to Martin Gardner‟s diagrams
primarily associated to yin-yang shapes. From there, Edwards builds additional yin-yang style diagrams
based on C. A. B Smith‟s binary number approach, revealing diagrams increasingly shaped by levels-
within-levels of yin-yang structures, revealing a fractal pattern.

142
merits, the emerging Venn diagrams have become greatly detached from that direct
relationship between seeing and understanding in simple terms.

Figure 2.3: Intersection Networks
( k )
( b )
( c )
( e ) ( f )
( h )
( i )
( a )
( j )
( g )
( d )
143
Alternative modes for visual or diagrammatic representation, such as the one
involving Euler, Venn, and Edwards, among others, are not a trivial question. Logicians
and mathematicians have debated on the value of diagrams as pictorial equivalents of
symbolic logic as well as their values for proofs in logic (Barker-Plummer, Beaver et al.
200; Barwise and Etchemendy 1995; Hammer and Shin 1998; Sowa 2000; Shin 2002).
Philosophers have been interested in their ability to properly display mental
representations (Dennet 1992; Fodor 1998). Cognitive scientists have been working on
the functions of mental models and diagrammatic representations in regard to cognitive
activities, such as memory, perception, learning, inference, and problem solving (Larkin
and Simon 1987; Lindsay 1988). Researchers in artificial intelligence have focused on
heuristic and expressive powers of representations in domain-specific approaches (Shin
2002). Differing approaches reflect varying concerns and strategies. Resulting
diagrammatic solutions may not fit all requirements.
Thus, when considering the cognitive goal in VCM to display intuitive
information, I would argue that Venn‟s basic diagrams are still the most elegant and
appropriate, at least when considering sets with few classes. First, they directly and easily
show the classes that form a given set of classes and their interconnectedness. Hence, the
four basic representations to convey all possible interconnections between sets of two,
three, four, and five classes are listed in Figure 2.3a, d, g, and j. It is certainly the case
that further structures are available for greater sets of classes. For those, Edwards‟ fully
symmetric structures built on the necklace principle may be the most appropriate. They
144
do not include the exostructure in those representations, and their symmetry really helps
with reasoning in a context of greater complexity
12
.
Second, some of the alternative solutions proposed include the representation in
the diagrams of both the components comprising the endostructure as well as the
exostructure of the system. They include in the model a visual space to denote complete
absence of any proposition. For instance, for the three-set Venn model, the “non-area” is
found outside the three partially intersecting rings. But with Edwards‟ version we have
the construction shown in Diagram 2.24 below.

The rectangular area at the bottom left (000) represents the exostructure, which is
located at the outside of the three classes (100, 010, and 001) that altogether comprise our

12
One additional reason for using Edwards‟ Venn diagrams for sets with 6 or more classes derives from the
entire process used by that author to build the diagrams. First, Edwards drew the diagrams directly on a
sphere (spherical geometry) and only then placed the resulting lines on a one-dimensional plane thanks to
crystallography‟s stereographic projection technique (See Edwards 2004, pp. 36-42). Therefore, when
considering the possibility for future 3D computer-based VCM models (the next logical step in this
research), these models should be a perfect fit.

Diagram 2.24: Edwards‟ Venn Diagram of Three Sets
010
000
110
100
011 111
001 101
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endostructure universe. Edwards heralds the surprising property that his model displays
of drawing the planar graph of a Boolean cube, the so-called hypercube (Edwards 2004,
pp.77-83). But this representation becomes problematic to a methodology such as VCM
concerned with network structures within network structures in which systemic
components found within a given environment are all elements constitutive of the
endostructure. The cognitive features of diagrammatic representations in VCM suggest
that whatever is portrayed within a systemic environment is contrasted with everything
else placed outside of it. With diagrammatic representations focusing on matters of logic
and mathematics, these two environments may be collapsed, as is the case with Edwards‟
models.
In fact, all too often in diagrammatic solutions concerned with matters of logic,
the image is placed against an infinite, one-dimensional plane. But with VCM there is not
such a thing. VCM subscription to systemism states that everything is a system or part of
one. It means that there is not such a thing as a system of classes isolated or floating in a
vacuum. By definition, they are part of greater systemic structures and their relationships
therefore are bounded by their own finite context. Therefore, networks are placed within
contained environments. For that reason, contrary to their usual representation against an
infinite plane the Venn diagrams in Figure 2.4a, d, g, and j are all here placed within an
environment container (as introduced in Diagram 2.4b). Obviously, this also applies to
any of the other intersection networks actually employed in any given visual
representation.
A third observation refers to conventions that must be adopted to assure
consistency from representations. In this regard, what counts as an intersection?
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Intersection according to VCM results from nodes partially or totally “invading” other
nodes. According to VCM the diagram in Figure 2.2a is a full intersection in the form of
a containment-within-containment network. The other two structures in Figure 2.2 are
partial intersections. Partial intersection presupposes intersection within the same logical
level, while full intersection introduces multi-level reasoning.
Another important factor to consider is that not all intersections can be classified
as a Venn diagram, since they do not show all intersections logically possible within a
given set of classes. That is the case with the diagrams in Figure 2.4c, h, i, k. As Venn
diagrams these are incomplete geometric constructions. But they are relevant to VCM to
the extent that they may be the best representation to emphasize a particular set (and not
all) logical relationships within a sequence of cognitive reasoning. The obvious challenge
they may present is their apparent “unstructured” character. There may be as many
possible configurations of intersections in loose “chain” formats as authors with different
explanatory goals and logical reasoning. However, this should not pose a major problem
as long as the logic for building these configurations follow the basic principles stipulated
by the methodology that gives them the character of general templates for reasoning.
Anyone “reading” such configurations would similarly interpret them as environments
interconnecting in a particular fashion. Furthermore, at least in principle intersection
networks may take the same shape of many if not all sequence topology networks, which
may reveal their “hidden” structured configurations.
Another point of convergence between Venn diagrams and intersection diagrams
in VCM notation is the possibility for variation in the actual source of analysis conveyed
in the representation. The diagrams in Figure 2.4d, e, f are the most famous Venn
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diagrams, representing relationships between three sets of propositional classes. While
the first diagram to the far left (d) indicates a relationship between spaces, the other two
(“(e)” and “(f)”) are concerned with entities (nodes) interacting within those spaces.
Diagram (e) depicts a network resulting from relationships formed by entities located at
the borders between spaces, while diagram (f) conveys “distribution” of entities within
those spaces. These are all network variations also applicable to VCM.
An obvious example of an intersection network in international relations is the
widespread, if implicit, perception that globalization comprises a multidimensional
system whose main ontological components are the political, the economic, and the
socio-cultural dimensions. Together they form a global system, which justifies their
visual representation as a three-set Venn diagram. In fact, this presentation is a central
component of the topic addressed in chapter five, when it will be discussed in details.

Set-Domains Networks

I call set-domains networks the graphic constructions – diagrammatic
representations – used primarily by scholars in the field of Cognitive Linguistics. They
reflect the use of differing approaches and strategies, but they all aim at conveying
abstract cognitive properties and functions used in language and communication.
Domains here can be defined as vessels for representing meaning, constituted by
enclosed conceptual content as well as a particular (visual) way of portraying or
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“constructing” that content. Domains may represent space, time, sensation, experience,
containment, etc. Ronald W. Langacker
13
(Langacker 2008) states:

In and of themselves, basic domains are not concepts or conceptualizations.
They are better thought of as realms of experiential potential, within which
conceptualization can occur and specific concepts can emerge. (Langacker
2008, pp. 44-45)

Cognitive Linguistics‟ very broad range of interests and approaches is too large a
universe to be fully covered in here. Besides, I am primarily interested in those
approaches and authors making use of graphic representations. These include, among
others, temporal representations (Evans 2004; Evans 2007), framing and frame semantics
(Fillmore 1976; Fillmore 2006), blending and mental spaces theories (Fauconnier and
Sweetser 1996; Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Fauconnier and Turner 2006), radial
networks (Brugman and Lakoff 2006), image schemas (Johnson 1987), prototype theory
(Geeraerts 2006), and cognitive grammar (Mortelmans 2007; Langacker 2008). They
provide unique insights and contributions in terms of possibilities for visually
representing communication, while also incorporating the use of structures identified in

13
Langacker distinguishes between basic and non-basic domains. The former comprises irreducible
domains, which includes experiential domains such as time, and space. The author defines the latter in the
following terms: “Any kind of conceptualization counts as a nonbasic domain capable of being exploited
for semantic purposes. Conceptions fall under this rubric whether they are sensory or intellectual, static or
dynamic, fixed or novel, simple or complex. Included as nonbasic domains are instances of immediate
sensory, emotive, and motor/kinesthetic experience (e.g. the sensation of wetness, of being afraid, or of
blowing up a balloon), as well as the abstracted products of intellectual operations (e.g. concepts like
JUSTICE, VERTEBRATE, and BATTING AVERAGE)” (Langacker 2008, p. 45). According to
Langacker‟s definition all visual representations in Figure 2.5 are non-basic domains. I am not sure this
distinction is meaningful here. What matters most is (1) the fundamental fact that domains are
containments for specific conceptual constructs, whether basic or not, and (2) that the visual representations
devised to portray the relationships between domains within a set and their contents have cognitive value.

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this chapter as primarily pertaining to either sequence topology networks or to
intersection networks.
Central to the production of visual schema in Cognitive Linguistics is the attempt
to represent patterns of activity. Mark Johnson defines image schema as “a dynamic
pattern that functions somewhat like the abstract structure of an image, and thereby
connects up a vast range of different experiences that manifest this same recurring
structure” (Johnson 1987, p.2). Adds Langacker: “image schemas are seen as basic,
“preconceptual” structures that give rise to more elaborate and more abstract conceptions
(or at least provide their skeletal organization) through combination and metaphorical
projection” (Langacker 2008, p.32).
Langacker then enumerates all patterns of activity, or image schema, cited by
Johnson in his seminal work: container, blockage, enablement, path, cycle, part-whole,
full-empty, iteration, surface, balance, counterforce, attraction, link, near-far, merging,
matching, contact, object, compulsion, restraint removal, mass-count, center-periphery,
scale, splitting, superimposition, process, and collection. It is not possible in here to
address in detail each and every one of these image schemas as patterns of activity. For
one, they may not necessarily represent an exhaustive list. Furthermore, the ways these
schemas are visually represented by different authors are not necessarily compatible. But,
I would argue that by focusing on the notions of cognitive universals (comprised
essentially by various forms and shapes of nodes, networks, and linkages), VCM
provides a feasible template to incorporate many if not all of these visual patterns of
activity in a coherent and integrated manner. With this in mind, I shall address the
specifics of some set-domains, with emphasis to a few patters of activity that, in my view,
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may have a more direct resonance with the types of investigations carried out in IR. They
are time-sequence networks, motion networks, and set-structures networks.

Figure 2.4 above shows time-sequence configurations. However, they address
different temporal-linguistic cognitive aspects and are introduced by different authors. As
Figure 2.4: Set-Domains Networks for Time Sequence Configurations
( h )
( g ) ( f )
( e )
( d )
( a )
( b ) ( c )
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a result, there are variation and inconsistencies in the ways those models are visually
represented originally. Here, I reproduce those models, while introducing some
alterations to make them compatible, mutually, and in regard to VCM.
Figure 2.4a diagram is the temporal sequence network, an adaptation of Vyvyan
Evan‟s cognitive model for time (Evans 2004; Evans 2007). According to the author, it is
a model that conveys the notion of “later” and “earlier”, as the nodes in sequence indicate
succession in time. Basically, it is a line network (see Figure 2.1h) with few specific
notations to indicate time. First, the line is not solid, nor dotted (as used by Evans).
Instead, it is a dotted-traced line that in VCM should be exclusively used to indicate time
continuum.
Second, different than what happens with all the sequence networks presented in
Figure 2.1, h1-5, i1-5, the line does not cross the nodes at the center. Instead, it is placed
below the nodes. It is a convention borrowed here from scholars working in Cognitive
Linguistics, which seems appropriate. After all, it makes sense, cognitively speaking, to
portray time as a line on which events (nodes) occur or manifest. Figure 2.4a reproduces
Evan‟s unidirectional line indicating events going into the future. However, it could also
be a bi-directional line if the goal is rather to indicate succession of events extending
towards the past and the future. The node at the center is placed on a little vertical bar,
which is a simple notation that can be used to indicate the present. The nodes placed to
the left occurred in the past; those to the right are expected to take place into the future.
The same notation is used in Figure2.4h.

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Diagram 2.25 above is a partial representation of Torbjorn L. Knutsen‟s analysis
of the historical evolution of theoretical developments on international relations (Knutsen
1997), which is an obvious example of a temporal sequence network. He enumerates
political thinkers and their respective theoretical contributions to the field not merely as a
descriptive device. Rather, Knutsen makes the argument that running through these
authors and their works there are common themes, namely war, wealth, peace, and
power, altogether providing the field with its own theoretical tradition. For each century
the author addresses in detail a list of key thinkers and their works, as exemplified by the
time sequence network at the bottom, which enumerates eleven central publications on
politics that took place during the sixteenth century. Knutsen‟s entire three hundred and
plus pages book is devoted to address each of the “content-nodes” (works on political
theory) from this temporal network, spanning from the sixteenth to the twentieth
centuries.
Diagram 2.25: Torbjorn L. Knutsen‟s Historic Analysis of IR Theory

17th

Century

19th

Century

20th

Century

18th

Century

16th

Century
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Going back to Figure 2.4, Evans contrasts her model to Dedre Gentner‟s time-
moving and ego-moving models (Gentner 2001), represented by the diagram in Figure
2.4b and c, respectively. The idea with these models is to indicate movement of time in
relation to an observer, or, as put by Evans, “the location of temporal events relative to
the subjective experience of now” (Evans 2007, p.148). The observer is represented in the
model here with an environment container
14
(Diagram 2.2b). Since events in a time
continuum relate with an external observer, together the two form a network
environment. For this reason they are both encapsulated by an additional environment
container (one more example of a multi-level systemic representation of systems within
systems).
The same principle applies to the diagrams in Figure 2.4d, e, f, and g. With the
moving-time model (Figure 2.4b), the time-line points to the left, indicating a movement
towards the past, which is experienced by the observer, positioned in a fixed time-space
dimension. With the ego-moving model (Figure 2.4c), it is the observer (environment
container node with a linkage indicating movement to the left) that moves through spatial
time-events. The nodes placed to the left of the observer are events already experienced
(i.e., past conflicts), and those placed at the right of the observer are expected future

14
In the original model, the observer is represented by a drawing of an individual, with a node-like head
and a body with arms and legs. In the ego-moving model the head is turned towards the left, the past, while
in the moving time model the observer “looks” to the right, towards the future. It seems to be a tendency or
at very least a very widely accepted practice in Cognitive Linguistics to make use of drawings of actual
entities, such as individuals, animals, and inanimate things, in cognitive visual representations. With VCM,
however, the goal is to reduce variation of visual shapes to a minimum. In fact, as the entire methodology is
based on a network approach, with the assumption that cognitive universals are nodes, networks between
nodes, and linkages between nodes and structures, I adopt the principle of containment to indicate entities
(nodes) of any sort. As much as possible I use circles to represent containment. When not possible I use
“round” enclosed figures.

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events towards which the observer is heading (i.e., expected future conflicts)
15
. The
primary difference between the two models is the source of analytical reference. With the
ego-moving model it is the agent that is the center of attention. With the time-moving
model it is the event or events that take analytical precedent.
Adding one more level of analytical complexity to networks for time sequence
configurations, Leonard Talmy developed the Conceptual Structuring System theory,
formed by four distinct types of schematic systems, namely configurational, force-
dynamics, attention, and perspectival systems (Talmy 2000). The latter has location,
distance, mode, and direction as its schematic categories. The diagram in Figure 2.4d and
f indicate retrospective and prospective direction, respectively. They once again indicate
succession of time-events vis-à-vis a perspective point, or external agent. The succession
of events is the same. It is the order in which these events are „perceived‟, „emphasized‟,
„described‟, etc, by the external source of reference that changes. Obviously, it is possible
to think of multiple events in sequence been perceived by the source of reference, as
indicated in the diagrams Figure 2.4e and g.
An IR related example for a prospective movement model would be the assertion
that the Allied forces had won World War II, first, and subsequently were able to
establish the post-war financial arrangements known as Bretton Woods system. The
equivalent for a retrospective movement model would suggest an argument in which the

15
In Cognitive Linguistics, the examples for these two temporal cognitive constructions are obviously
related to language, which here I try as much as possible to provide examples to which an IR audience can
relate. Thus, a future event for the ego-moving model would be “we are moving towards Christmas”, while
the equivalent future event for the moving-time model would be “Christmas is getting closer”. It is clear
that what varies in these different cognitive constructions is the intended perspective. The former has the
observer as the focus of analysis, while the latter is the event in time. In social sciences similar distinctions
could be made, visually differentiating, for instance, between independent and independent variables, or
between agent and process.

155
Allied forces, before they could establish an international liberal system, had to defeat the
authoritarianism of the Axis Powers. Notice that the difference is not only semantic, as
primarily intended by Talmy. These deceivingly similar statements may have
fundamental implications to the ways scholars perceive international events, a central
topic in discourse analysis of politics, and even to analysis of causality.
One observation about Talmy‟s models is in order. The node outside the time
continuum network is represented as a unit container (Diagram 2.2a), instead of an
environment container (Diagram 2.2b), as is the case with the diagrams in Figure 2.4b
and c. With the latter, events were going “through” the agent that now becomes a
container within which further content (i.e. time events) take place. With Talmy‟s models
the agent is external to time events, and the focus is on the subjective relationship
between the source of reference events taking place in time. At this point there is no
reference to or analysis of further content on neither time events nor the external source
of agency.
Langacker‟s dynamic evolutionary model (Langacker 2008) is yet another time
sequence network (Figure 2.4h). Once again, we have the time continuum line, here
„populated‟ by two events in time. In addition to be a time sequence model, Langacker‟s
model combines the notion of a “structured world”, with Talmy‟s force-dynamics system.
The structured world comprises the known reality, shaping our knowledge, expectations,
notions of what is possible, what is unreal, etc. Mortelmans well-summarizes the concept:

The notion “structured world” recognizes the fact that we conceive of the
world as being structured in a particular way, that we do not feel surrounded
by mere chaos. It tries to capture the difference between (i) incidental vents
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(which simply occur, but cannot be predicted or anticipated) and (ii) those
events that are “direct manifestations of the world‟s structure” and as such
exhibit a degree of regularity and predictability (Langacker 1991a: 264).
(Mortelmans 2007, p. 878).

Notice that the “constructed world” concept essentially describes a systemic
world. Bounded by a systemic universe, agents may project reality into the future as
emanating from their past and present experiences, representations, and knowledge. The
force-dynamics component of the model derives from Talmy‟s observation about the
ways physical objects or entities, including agents, interact to matters of force, as well
resistance, blockage and removal of force-dynamics. Applied to Langacker‟s model,
expectations about the future are shaped and even constrained by the „force‟ exerted upon
us from our universe of experiences, shaping what is deemed or perceived as possible and
impossible, real and unreal.
Looking at the visual representation of such model (Figure 2.4h), the first node to
the left indicates present, or immediate reality. The cylinder-shaped area with a solid-line
boundary to the left of the immediate reality node indicates past time where events
actually occurred (placed on the half-dotted, half-lined linkage that represents time
continuum). The node to the right indicates a possible event that will or may take place in
the future as the result of either a projected reality or potential reality, respectively. The
dotted cylinder-shaped area placed between the two nodes represents the expected future
of what will happen, the projected reality. The dotted cone-shaped area represents
potential reality, those events that are not excluded as potentialities and therefore may
manifest indeed. Anything and everything placed outside any of these containment areas
are defined as unreality.
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It does not require much imagination to foresee how this model could be applied
to different accounts of international relations. Realism in any of its variants would
project a much longer area for projected reality, since it sees the past as confirming again
and again some fundamental – systemic and intrinsic – features shaping relations among
polities in timeless fashion. Therefore, it should not be hard to foresee those relations into
the future as a straight line, with narrow possibilities for potential realities.
Constructivism, by contrast, conceives a social world in constant mutation, even if
shaped by systemic features. Therefore, projections would be shorter, as it becomes
harder and harder to engage in long-term predictions of how social relations will evolve.
Furthermore, the area for potential reality would be much broader, as potentialities for
what may happen are constrained only by the limits of our imagination, creativity, and
learning potentials. Also, the model itself may be better drawn not as straight connecting
cylinders, but by a construction combining straight and curved sections, to better
represent the human capability for change and alterations of course as seen in history.
These models (Figure 2.4a-h) are relevant for several reasons. First, they
showcase how different approaches to visual representations within a given thematic area
or domain (or pattern of activity) can be incorporated by VCM or any other methodology
aiming to provide a cognitive language for interdisciplinary „visual‟ conversations.
Second, they combine elements from sequence topology networks and from intersection
networks, revealing a very specific realm of application of the containment-within-
containment characteristic of systemic representations. Finally, they show that semantic
uses of network principles are not necessarily detached from those that would be
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naturally attuned to and incorporated by IR scholarships, as they are fit to portray
linguistic as well as sociological relationships.
Figure 2.5 below lists few motion configuration networks. In fact, most of motion
notations are primarily related to linkages, as will be shown in the next section of this
chapter. But here we have some configurations applied to ways nodes may move as well.
Figure 2.5a (node entering containment network) appears in Langacker‟s work
(Langacker 2008, p. 33) to express the movement in space of an object (the node to the
right of the model) towards a contained unit (the environment container to the left).

Applied to the universe of concepts, for instance, it becomes possible to track the
approaching movement of a concept to a particular domain as it successfully gains usages
Figure 2.5: Set-Domains Networks for Motion Configurations
( a )
( b )
( c )
( d )
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and definitions ever closer to the systemic environment of a given domain-containment.
We could argue that the concept of “globalization”, for example, has gained usage and
gradually became central to IR investigations only in the last ten, fifteen years; thus
reflecting this motion configuration.
In Figure 2.5a the node to the left of the model is notated as a label container (see
Diagram 2.2), which indicates that it is the node itself that moves towards the
environment container. In Figure 2.5b (moving container network), the nodes on both
ends of the model are notated as unit containers, which indicates that they are different
entities, and the one to the left moves towards the one to the right. Different than what
happens in the previous model, it is not a concept that enters a domain, but it is concept
that gets closer to another. Finally, it is perfectly feasible to consider a moving
relationship between two environment containers (i.e., domains). In Figure 2.5c (moving
containments network) two domains are either getting closer to or further apart from each
other (the dotted arrow indicates an unspecified type of linkage). In Figure 2.5d (moving
containment network), similar to what happens with Figure 2.5a, it is one and the same
domain that moves to the right.
A concrete example related to IR literature on motion configurations can be found
in chapter four, when I discuss the various approaches found in IR literature concerning
the ways the field incorporates the topic of religion. As I provide visual representations
for the content of each approach I also indicate how they may relate to each other, which
includes motion configuration bringing some types of representations either closer to or
further away from each other.
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Next, set-structures are networks in which combined elements (containers,
containments) form coherent set networks. Figure 2.6 below lists a few of such networks.

Figure 2.6a is called open-ended overlapping domains network, according to
Langacker (2008, p.47-48). It indicates that the existing ring containers form as a whole
an open-ended set in regards to the node at the center. All the domains in the matrix relate
at different rates, levels, etc, to the node at the center, sometimes to the point of full
inclusion, sometimes only marginally. A conceptual example of such structure is the
Figure 2.6: Set-Domains Networks for Set-Structures

( e )
( d )
( g )
( f )
( c )

( b)
( a )
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notion of paradigms in IR. If one considers the center node as the paradigmatic hard-core
of the field, the outer rings are the various paradigms – or traditions of thought –
contemplated by research enterprises found within the field‟s various literatures. As the
hard-core congregates the axiomatic claims that gives coherence to the field as a
legitimate area of academic investigation within Social Sciences, its various traditions of
thought may or may not incorporate all or some of those axiomatic requirements as their
metaphysical foundations. As a result, different paradigms are placed in different
positions vis-à-vis the field‟s hard-core. This topic will be discussed in more detail in
chapter five, with the introduction of the paradigmatic degrees of aggregation model.
Figure 2.6b is the scope hierarchy network. It implies distinction between
maximal and immediate scope of a type of hierarchy that consists of successive whole-
part relations. Explains Langacker (2008, p. 64): “a striking feature of such hierarchies is
that each part functions as immediate scope for the next terms in the sequence. The
conception of an arm is thus the immediate scope for hand (…), a hand for finger, and a
finger for knuckle”. The model, therefore, is a layered construction of embedded scopes.
Figure 2.5c is called cross-domains mapping network. The model is associated
with the conceptual metaphor theory primarily developed by George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Here we have communications taking place between
content pertaining to distinct domains. The source domain, to the left, and the target
domain, to the right, are populated by concepts displaying interconnections, or
relationships. In linguistics, the concern is with metaphorical relationships, possible due
to associations between domains. For instance, as put by Evans, if we consider the source
domain as one of quantity and the target domain as related to verticality, a sentence such
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as “she got a really high mark in the test” becomes possible (Evans 2007, p.53). I would
argue that it is a model well suited for mapping argumentation as well. Arguments in
sequence may possess content that should be mutually linked to be logically valid or
consistent. In the introduction chapter (Diagram 1) I have summarized the key steps of
the research design leading to the development of this research, visually represented as a
formal cognitive model. In doing so, I have applied the cross-domains mapping network
to structure the key elements of reasoning guiding the analytical choices of my research
design.
Figure 2.5d and e are blending networks, originally developed by Gilles
Fauconnier and Mark Turner to explain the mental process responsible for the process of
conceptual integration (Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Fauconnier and Turner 2006).
Blending, as a manifestation of conceptual integration, is part of a broader literature on
cross-space mapping, which includes work on analogy and similarity (Gentner 1983;
Keane, Ledgeway et al. 1994), on metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and
Johnson 1980), and on cross-domain mapping in general (Fauconnier 1997). The point
emphasized by Fauconnier and Turner is that conceptual integration is central in all these
approaches since it is a basic cognitive feature for human reasoning and communication.
Conceptual blending, in particular, is a central cognitive feature to the way we think. It
explains the process of meaning construction that generates new conceptual constructs,
such as metaphors, counterfactuals, etc. It has been considered as central to human
thought and imagination, cutting across all relevant features of language and
communication.

163
Under the old view, there were word meanings, syntactic structures, sentence
meanings (typically truth-conditional), discourse and pragmatic principles,
and then, at a higher level, figures of speech like metaphor and metonymy,
scripts and scenarios, rhetoric, forms of inductive and deductive reasoning,
argumentation, narrative structure, etc. A recurrent finding in recent work has
been that key notions, principles, and instruments of analysis cut across all
these divisions and in fact operate in non-linguistic situations as well.
(Fauconnier and Turner 2006, p. 303)

A reasonable implication from this statement is that the process of blending is
central to our understanding on how social concepts emerge, evolve, and mutually relate.
This, alone, justifies its inclusion as a central model for VCM. In fact, a more detailed
example of a blending model will appear in chapter five, as it is the main cognitive model
responsible for the generation of the paradigmatic degrees of aggregation model (or
multi-level concept model) that I develop to apply to globalization concepts found in IR
literature. The model emerges as a blending process, borrowing and transforming ideas
and analytical components from blending spaces (in this case, from two distinct
literatures of relevance in Social Sciences in general, and IR, in particular: the concept of
paradigm and conceptual analysis). Chapter six then addresses a large body of
„globalization concepts‟ and their „qualitative‟ distribution as entities within domains,
which include concepts placed at „blended intersections‟ between domains that constitute
the paradigmatic degrees of aggregation model.
The process of conceptual integration resulting from cross-space mapping in
Figure 2.5d includes the two input domains side by side, and the blended space at the
bottom. In Figure 2.5e, in addition to these two categories we have the generic space at
the top. In this case, both input domains pertain to the same generic space. Applied to IR,
for instance, we could have a paradigmatic model in which the generic space is paradigm
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and the two input spaces are, for instance, realism and liberalism, and with the blended
space being defined as rationalism. The two input spaces clearly belong to the same
conceptual generic space, while the blended space clearly result from merging features
belonging to the two input spaces. The dotted lines in both models indicate the
conceptual connections from within each domain, structuring the overall process of
conceptual integration.
Figure 2.6f is the overlapping set-structure network (Geeraerts 2006;
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2007). It is a type of prototype network that focuses on
overlapping categories among concepts. Different than classic conceptual analysis with a
focus on extension and intension of fixed or inherent conceptual features, prototype
networks do not display clear boundaries between entities in the network nor they display
any classical fixed definitions in terms of necessary and sufficient attributes. Instead, they
map degrees of representativity as well as clusters of overlapping features between them.
Diagram 1.1 showed in Chapter One is an example of such network, applied to clusters or
modes of cognitive representations. As we saw, there are several approaches to visual
representations of visual spaces and knowledge. Together these approaches form a rather
complex set-structure by way of mutual interconnectedness characterized by non-
symmetric overlapping.
Finally, Figure 2.6g introduces the gradation network. It is basically an
intersection network combined with prototype features. A line network in which its
contents display partially overlapping features in a gradation mode populates the model.
The gradation feature indicates variation of degree, not gender. This network structure is
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the foundation for the construction of a model of agency in Global Civil Society, the
topic for chapter three.
The contents of these three classes of network structures addressed to exhaustion
in this chapter – sequence topology networks, intersection networks, and set-domain
networks – reveal an existing rich tradition in diagrammatic networks. They reflect very
distinct analytical foundations and yet are surprisingly fit for mutually integrated
constructions. Also, contrary to a disproportional emphasis in international studies with
matters of causality, these models show a much broader set of linkages between nodes
and networks, all essential for appropriate constitutive analysis of our social constructs.

Linkages

Linkages are the last of the three basic cognitive universals used for building
mental models. They indicate the specific types of relationships taking place between
nodes, nodes and network structures, as well as between network structures within
broader systemic constructions. Again, scholars working within Social Sciences in
general and International Relations in particular have given disproportional attention to
causal relations, which may lead to two misguided assumptions. First, that there are no
other types of linkages between entities (i.e., nodes, systems); at least not relevant ones
for scientific inquiry. Second, it implies that we fully understand and agree on the terms
of what are the basic, ontological elements of whatever we investigate. It also assumes an
a priori understanding about the constitutive relationships between these ontological
elements. In reality, the picture is much more complex than that.
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Figure 2.7: Linkages
Linkage, Implication
(Implies)
Linkage, Unspecified
Linkage, Directional
Linkage, Substitutability
Linkage, Causal Conjunction
Linkage, Ontological
Linkage, Symbol for
Linkage, Non-Causal Conjunction
Linkage, Equivalence
Linkage, Causal
Linkage, Pressure
Linkage, Medium
(Through/Throughout)
Linkage, Directional Movement
Linkage, Mutually Excluding
Directional Movement
Linkage, Time-Continuum
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Figure 2.7 above shows a sample of possible types of linkages. They are not
necessarily an exhaustive list. Rather, it portrays examples of types of linkages found in
various literatures within Social Sciences and International Relations. A quick look at
them suggest the existence of a variety of directional possibilities, movement between
linked entities, as well as qualitatively distinct types of relationships.
Variation in notation shown here for each type of linkage results at once from
eventual usages found in the literature as well as arbitrary judgment calls. For instance,
the notations for ontological linkage, substitutability linkage, causal conjunction and non-
causal conjunction linkages, are all found in Gary Goertz‟s work on concepts (Goertz
2006). Notations for mutually excluding directional movement and pressure movement,
on the other hand, are arbitrary notations since they are not found in the literature. Time-
continuum linkage aims at providing a unique notation for time-line and time linkage.
Although the idea of time as a particular type of linkage is commonly used, it still lacks a
particular notation universally adopted.
In any case, the main point of Figure 2.7 is to show the existence of a great
variety of possible types of linkages. Regardless, it is interesting to notice an almost
absolute absence in the literature of a more systematic attempt to map them while
providing each with specific notations for universal usage. To accomplish such a task
would be too great of an effort within the context of this research. But it is certainly a
challenge that shall be tackled in the future if a more systematically integrated,
comprehensive, “visual vocabulary” for reasoning and organization of knowledge is to be
achieved. Still, the simple visualization of the various types of linkages shown in Figure
2.7 should be enough to provide the reader with a glimpse of the inherent complexity that
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linkages between nodes and network entail. They are fundamental for a proper
understanding of the various ways nodes and network structures mutually relate.

Multilevel Network Structures

So far, most of the examples of the various types of network structures shown are
one dimensional in nature. They represent nodes placed at the same analytical level, all
interconnected, arranged within a particular network structure. But going back to Bunge‟s
definition of systemism, everything is a system or a component of one. But I would go so
far as to amend Bunge‟s definition and state that everything is a system AND a
component of one. In this regard, nodes (i.e., parts or objects of a system) have contents.
And these contents of individual nodes of any given network structure should, by
definition, form network structures within themselves as well. That is the case even if we
look at them as merely unstructured aggregates, in which case they would be forming a
general population network (a specific type of network itself shown in Diagram 2.3i).
Let us consider, for example, Martin Wight‟s ring network structure for IR
traditions, shown in Diagram 2.7. The nodes of the network are the various traditions
considered by Wight, such as realism, soft revolutionism, rationalism, etc. Well, for us to
be able to analytically differentiate one from the other we have to look closely at the
contents of each. It could be done in different ways. One way to do it would be to simply
enumerate the attributes in the interior of each node (the traditions), without any
consideration as to how the various attributes relate to each other. In that case, we would
have general population networks (Diagram 2.3i). But we could take a step further and
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directly link each attribute to what is deemed as the very essence (core) of the node
(tradition). As previously explained, radial or star network (Figure 2.1a) is a particular
type of structure in which peripheral nodes (attributes) directly communicate with a
center node (the node‟s essence or core). A different strategy, whenever possible, is to
mutually relate the attributes as constitutive of a particular hierarchic typology network
(Figure 2.1g1). Yet another route would be to recognize further network structures within
the node in such a way as to form intersecting environments (i.e., Venn diagrams). We
could continue with this “thought experiment” by applying alternative possibilities for as
many network structures as they are available. What this hypothetical exercise reveals is
that the contents of nodes within a given network form subsequent levels of network
structures. Diagram 2.26 below is the visual representation for this argument.
In principle, the individual nodes forming the original, broader ring network
structure, could be populated by any of the topology sequence networks, intersection
networks, and set-domains networks already introduced with this chapter. Their
respective containers and containment nodes, in turn, could also be populated by further
content, which can be analyzed or logically structured by further network configurations.
Just as the various examples drawn from IR literature brought with this chapter to
exemplify types of network structures reveal that they have already been used in
scholarly work, sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly, the understanding that
network structures exist within and combine with network structures in multiple levels
can also be found in academic and scientific reasoning.

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Tsygankov‟s analysis of Russia‟s foreign policy discourses represented in
Diagram 2.17 provides a specific example of superimposing network structures. As
explained in detail, the political spectrum of Rusia‟s foreign policy discourse in regards
to the West in the post-Cold war period forms a line network. But Tsygankov takes a step
further and shows how the various political positions form yet another structure, this time
related to preferred strategies for security. The result is a superimposed structure formed
by two line networks, as shown in Diagram 2.27 below. The final structure is simple as it
Diagram 2.26: Ring Network Multi-Level Structure

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is analytically powerful. In a glance the reader is immediately exposed to an array of
relevant and complex sets of information that together form an integrated and well-
structured logical totality.

The general point for consideration here is that for both, reasoning and
organization of information or knowledge, network structures emerge from within
network structures in a process that combine elements from hierarchical schema (Wolff
1994; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2007) and fractal geometry (Gleick 1987). They reveal
differing levels of aggregation in reasoning and structuring of information.
A classical analysis of concepts focuses on hierarchical relationships between
concepts, forming prototypical categories, which is to say sets of objects (extension)
characterized by sets of attributes (intention). Karl Erich Wolff, for instance, analyzes the
concept ANIMAL, for which we may have objects such as lion, finch, eagle, hare, bat,
Diagram 2.27: Andrey P. Tsygankov‟s Russia‟s Foreign Policy Discourses and
Overlying Security Strategies Preferences
Westernizers
National
Democrats
Statists
National
Communists

Eurasianists
West Anti-West
Nationalists Expansionists Globalists
Balance of
Power
Expansion Mutual Security
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bee, and ostrich (Wolff 1994). They share, in varying levels, intrinsic attributes such as
“preying”, “flying”, “bird”, and “mammal”. Wolff then builds a network structure called
line diagram of concept lattices (which is yet another type of sequence topology
network), as shown in the Diagram 2.28 below.

The relationship between sets of objects within the network and their respective
attributes are hierarchically structured as subconcept-superconcept relations. For
example, according to Wolff:

Diagram 2.28: Karl Erich Wolff‟s Line Diagram for Animals
mammal bird flying preying
BEE OSTRICH
HARE
FINCH
EAGLE BAT LION
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E.g. the preying flying birds describe a subconcept of the concept of the
flying birds. The extent of this subconcept consists only of the EAGLE, the
intent consists of the three attributes preying, flying and bird. The extent of
the given superconcept consists of FINCH and EAGLE, the intent only of
flying and bird. (Wolff 1994, p.3)

In a similar line of reasoning Lewandowska-Tomaszcvzyk points out to the fact
that such schematic networks refer to meanings or membership in a given category:
“Schematicity involves the relationship between a subordinate node and a superordinate
node in a taxonomical hierarchy” (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2007, p. 156).
In the case of VCM‟s networks within networks structure it is also possible to
refer to hierarchical levels of conceptual schemata. Of course, another entirely alternative
way to understand the networks-within-networks relationship is to think in terms of levels
of analysis, or better yet levels of aggregation. In that case, network structures placed at
different levels may reflect variation in terms of specificity, from broader, or generic, to
more specific ones. But still, that is not necessarily the case with all constructions. Very
often, it is about hierarchically arranged sets of conceptual structures, all integrated
through subordinate-superordinate relationships.
Furthermore, when considering the fairly limited types of network structures
actually available, it is entirely possible that networks within networks arrangements end
up producing a fractal like overall structure, with certain types or network structures (or
even a single one) being produced at multiple levels. But regardless whether particular
network constructions form hierarchical arrangements, or fractal ones, an essential
question is how to properly visualize them. This is an issue that becomes particularly
relevant for visual representations with more than three levels of structural arrangements.
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Depending on the complexity of the structure at hand as well as the types or emphasis of
information preferred for analysis alternative modes for visual displays should be
available. I refer to them as referential structures.

Referential Structures

There are at very least five different types of referential structures. Each provides
a particular mode of visualization for network structures. It is entirely possible that the
same structure be visualized in more than one mode, which may provide access to
differing types of information. It is also possible that a given structure may not be
properly displayed in a particular mode, given the nature or the complexity of the
embedded information. Therefore, the point in having a menu of types of visual displays
is to provide flexibility and access to modes that are better suited either to the model at
hand or to the particular types of information emphasized for analytical reasoning.

Molecular Visualization

Diagram 2.29 below represents the molecular visualization mode. It is a preferred
mode for quickly displaying networks within networks and how the varying structural
configurations relate between and intra levels. In the hypothetical example below there
are four structural levels. Its main limit is exactly the number of levels it can display in a
plane space such as the surface of a paper. However, in the world of computer digital
technologies, it is easy to foresee how this could endlessly be “zoomed” in and out at
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will. Molecular visualization may be well suited for both, for matters related to reasoning
as well as knowledge structures.

Lateral Mapping

Diagram 2.30 below represents the lateral mapping mode of visualization. This
mode of visualization is akin to what we commonly refer as “site map”, a lateral tree
topology network (see Figure 2.1g4) that „maps‟ the entire structure by emphasizing the
step-by-step levels of cognitive analytical development. It adds, however, to the
traditional tree network commonly used for organizing information by making explicit
the types of network arrangements formed by the individual components in the tree. Not
Diagram 2.29: Referential Structure: Molecular Visualization

176
only it clearly indicates the various analytical levels (or levels of cognitive reasoning),
but it also indicates the content-path for each container/containment within the network
structure.

The hypothetical structure represented in Diagram 2.30 shows how the original
ring network populated by three nodes, evolves, with each of the original nodes‟ paths
clearly depicted both in terms of direction as well as the shape (type) of their respective
network structures. This is a mode of reference particularly suited for the visualization of
knowledge structures.

Diagram 2.30: Referential Structure: Lateral Mapping

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Cognitive Instances

Diagram 2.31 below represents the cognitive instances mode of visualization. It is
meant to portray the step-by-step evolution of cognitive content in a given structure
aimed at portraying reasoning.

The structure in Diagram 2.31 indicates that what is originally portrayed simply
as a line diagram comprised by two nodes, becomes, in a subsequent level of reasoning,
very specific in terms of the structural contents for the two original nodes. Then, details
are added for each scale networks within the two original nodes. Finally, communication
occurs between the contents of the two original line network nodes. The emphasis here is
on how additional levels of information (i.e., content, structure, etc) are added, following
Diagram 2.31: Referential Structure: Cognitive Instances

178
the addition of further levels of cognitive reasoning. As if in perspective, the structures at
the top are smaller, with fewer levels of specificity or details. As we move to the bottom,
the elements become bigger and more detailed. The last line at the bottom is the final
structure, portraying all of the major elements embedded in the cognitive reasoning it
represents. It is important to notice, that it is not a given that content is necessarily added
from one node to the next in sequential order, or that each node are independent of each
other.
As the hypothetical structure in Diagram 2.31 shows, we may add content at
different stages for the nodes in the original structure, going back to them again and again
as required by the reasoning guiding the shaping of cognitive structures. This mode of
visualization aims exactly at portraying the step-by-step evolution of these cognitive
stages in reasoning. Diagram 4.12 to be presented in chapter four of this research well
exemplifies this argument and stands as an essential example of how the referential
structure cognitive instances operates.

3D

The 3D mode of visualization displays a tri-dimensional view of the entire
structure. One of its benefits is to allow for an immediate recognition of how nodes
become differentiated as to form varying types of containers and containment
environments. Diagram 2.32 below shows a three-level structure represented as a
deepening multi-layer containment (see Diagram 2.6r and s). In its interior we have
nodes, here shown as unit containers (see Diagram 2.2a). The visual structure shows
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where each node stands in regards to their respective analytical level, types and directions
of linkages, as well as the specific network structures formed by groups of nodes within
the overall system. In here, at the second and third analytical levels we have ring
networks (see Figure 2.1a).

It is not difficult to imagine the relevance of this mode of visualization for more
complex structures, particularly within the context of a digital, computational
environment where entire structures of knowledge could be assessed and evaluated,
simultaneously by its individual parts and as an integrated whole.

Diagram 2.32: Referential Structure: 3D

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Cognitive Equation

If VCM is able to capture logical cognitive constructions and relationships
between these constructions, then we should be able to express their formal constitution
through some form of mathematical formula or equation. Diagram 2.33 below shows
such a possibility for a simple three-level structure comprised by a two-node line network
at the secondary level.

The “equation” shown below the structure is simply an attempt to make the point
about the intrinsic formality embedded in cognitive models. Its relevance draws from the
possibility it entails to “translate” cognitive structures into widely accepted languages for
Diagram 2.33: Referential Structure: Cognitive Equation

181
formal reasoning, namely formal modeling and symbolic logic. Once again, this takes
into consideration future steps in this research aimed at providing computer-generated
venues for building, displaying, analyzing, and comparing visual cognitive models.
Simultaneous “translations” of models into the above-mentioned formal methods for the
evaluation of the models‟ levels of logical robustness could be a valuable tool for helping
assessing the quality of the models as well as the ways they could evolve, eventually
“breaking up” under their own weight.
To better understand this argument, imagine the following scenario. Web-based,
computer-generated models would be dynamic ones, resulting from collective efforts. In
other words, groups of individuals could collaborate on the construction of a single model
that would evolve and become ever more complex with time. As new conceptual
constructs and meanings emerge, so would the inner-structures of the model, up to a point
when it would eventually collapse due to emerging contradictions, or anomalies. This is
what happens, for instance, when new ideologies emerge from old ones, leading to
intellectual ruptures and the development of new schools of thought. Backed-up by
mathematical and logical formalities, these models could – in principle – become the
formal visualization of the endless process of how social concepts emerge, become
institutionalized, and eventually decay, giving space to new and ever evolving conceptual
representations. Simply put, we would have formal visual access, in real time, to
evolution taking place in the world of conceptual representations.

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Dawn of VCM

Despite this chapter having hundred and plus pages, the truth is that the research
on Visual Cognitive Modeling as a methodology and a visual language for
communication is it its very early stages. I believe I have only scratched the surface in
term of possibilities. As already hinted, its full potential lies with the eventual
development of web-based, computer-generated templates allowing for the creation of
dynamic, ever-evolving individually and collectively built models. Such templates should
encompass a more substantial, complete array of cognitive universals forming its menu of
visual tools. But these, of course, are planned stages for the future. For now, I believe I
have provided enough details and justified its relevance to exhaustion.
Still, at this point it may be appropriate to summarize all the elements presented in
this chapter. Diagram 2.34 below is the visual representation of all the constitutive
components of VCM. At the basic level it is a single unit container (first shown in
Diagram 2.3e, in which the rings around its center node represent the four axiomatic
claims that supports and justifies in metaphysical terms the construction of the
methodology.
The axiomatic foundations for VCM refer to the understanding that (1) human
reasoning employs the constant creation of mental models as the basic feature for
interpreting fragmented data reaching for our senses. By considering reality
fundamentally as intricate sets of interconnected multi-level and multi-domain systems,
(2) mental models should be able to properly represent these systemic features.
Furthermore, mental models are (3) not reality per se, but our interpretation of reality.
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Finally, the (4) basic components employed for the construction of mental models are
cognitive universals, namely nodes, networks, and linkages.

At the secondary level, the model in Diagram 2.34 forms a centered-ring network.
The four nodes that constitute the network are mental models, cognitive universals, signs
& symbols, and referential structures. Together they are the ontological components of
Diagram 2.34: Visual Cognitive Modeling

Subjective
Inter-
Subjective
Objective
Mental Models

Cognitive
Universals
Nodes
Linkages Networks

VCM

Signs & Symbols

Referential
Structures
Molecular
Cognitive
Instances
Cognitive
Equation
Lateral
Mapping
3D
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VCM. Mental models form a gradation network (Figure 2.6g), since there are no clear
boundaries differentiating what constitutes an objective, intersubjective and even
objective models. Cognitive universals constitute a ring network, since its three nodes
(nodes, networks, and linkages) mutually interact as the basic building blocks for the
generation of models.
Looking even closely to the contents of cognitive universals, we have the details
for each of its components, as shown in Diagram 2.35 below. Nodes mutually interact in
a fully connected ring network between four essential types of nodes. Clockwise, starting
from the top, they are: unit container (first introduced in Diagram 2.2a), environment
container (first introduced in Diagram 2.2b), label container (first introduced in Diagram
2.2c), and ring container (first introduced in Diagram 2.2e). Each has their own specific
inherent features, while also being able to mutually combine, which results in an array of
logically possible cognitive node-constructs, as shown in Diagram 2.6.
Diagram 2.35 also reveals the three possible classes of networks shown
throughout this chapter. The first class of networks structures discussed was sequence
topology networks. They reflect various possible arrangements between nodes, with an
emphasis in transmission of information throughout the system. Next, we have
intersection networks, which are sets of containments mutually intersecting. Intersected
areas become autonomous (or rather differentiated) in the sense of possessing individual
properties or functions within the overall system. At the same time, the overall system
emerges only with the sum of all its parts. Finally, we have set-domains, which are
network structures aimed at portraying meaning, language, and communication; often
through series of “themes”, such as time, movement, etc.
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The final type of cognitive universal presented in this chapter is that of linkages.
They are represented in Diagram 2.35 as a general population network, since I did not
discuss in details possible mutual arrangements between them. I only went so far as to list
several examples of conceptual linkages to make the point about the inherent complexity
in the ways nodes and structures mutually relate.

Going back to Diagram 2.34, we have signs and symbols. They are mathematical
and notations commonly used in symbolic logic that function as aids for bringing
additional information to the cognitive models generated by cognitive universals. Finally,
Diagram 2.35: Cognitive Universals

Cognitive
Universals

Nodes

Sequence
Topology
Networks
Intersection

Set-Domains

Linkages
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as just shown in the previous section, referential structures are some of the possible
alternative modes for visualizing cognitive models according to emphasis on certain
types of information over others, or alternative types of information conveyed (i.e.,
argumentation, structuring of information or knowledge). Moving one step further in the
level of specificity in regards to the ways these four ontological components mutually
interact, we have the representation in Diagram 2.36 below.

Diagram 2.36: Relationships Between Ontological Components of VCM

Molecular

Cognitive
Instances

Cognitive
Equation
Lateral
Mapping

3D
Referential Structures
+

Cognitive
Universals
Nodes
Linkages Networks

Subjective
Inter-
Subjective
Objective
Mental Models

Signs & Symbols
VCM
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The model should be self-explanatory. In any case what the model conveys is that
cognitive universals combine with signs and symbols to generate mental models, be they
subjective, intersubjective, or objective in nature. Each model may be visually
represented through a menu of visual expression, the referential structures. Finally, notice
that the axioms that provide metaphysical justification to the entire structure are
represented as ring containers placed around the main node that encompasses the overall
system. In Diagram 2.34 they were placed around the center node of the structure, since
the model there represented a single unit container (see Diagram 2.3e), while here the
model represents an environment within which relationships take place.
Now that the introduction of VCM is complete it becomes viable to take the next
step. In the next Section of this research I apply Visual Cognitive Modeling as a
methodology to the analysis of empirical and theoretical issues of relevance in the field of
International Relations. In doing so, I hope to provide actual examples on how VCM may
be a formal (and valid) way to reason on critical contemporary international issues.
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Part Two: Visual Representations

Chapter Three:
Agency in Global Civil Society

The research carried out in this chapter aims at contributing to a more precise
mapping of Global Civil Society, or GCS.
16
More specifically, the goal is to propose a
coherent typology of agency in GCS, built with the use of a specific cognitive
representation taken out of the general menu of cognitive universals presented in the
previous chapter. It exemplifies the possibilities of a very specific application of VCM as
a methodology in the very concrete realm of typology construction. By doing so, it
provides a distinct, alternative way to built typologies, rather based on cognitive models
of understanding social reality.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I present the arguments for a general
need of a typology of GCS and, more specifically, one based on agency rather than on
agents, or actors. Then, I spell out my own understanding and assumptions on the nature
and content of GCS affecting my efforts to build the typology. I also introduce the notion
of sites of agency on which GCS operates. Finally, I build the typology, by first
introducing the cognitive model that will serve as its logical template, and then by

16
The lists of acronyms and all articles used for the literature review in this chapter are in Appendix A and
B, respectively.

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focusing on each of its main types and corresponding sub-types of agency. I conclude the
chapter with some considerations on the value and limitations of the typology built.
The data used for the literature review used in this chapter are the yearbooks
published by the Global Civil Society Yearbook project (GCSY). The yearbooks have
been produced jointly since 2001 by two units of the London School of Economics and
Political Science (LSE): the Centre from the Study of Global Governance and the Centre
for Civil Society. Each yearbook is divided into two parts. First, it brings with it a
collection of articles written by different authors. In each volume the articles are bundled
together in three separate sections. They relate respectively to (a) concepts, (b) issues and
(c) infrastructure of GCS. Second, it puts together a vast array of empirical data
concerning the actual functioning of GCS. Besides relying heavily on the empirical data
accompanying the publication, the authors followed a similar analytical and conceptual
framework in writing their articles, while at the same time “agreeing on mutually
disagreeing”. In fact, they all agree with the perception that the very idea, definition and
components of GCS are all very contentious.
The benefits from this approach are twofold as far as this chapter is concerned.
On the one hand, the authors‟ coordinated approach provides a common ground upon
which one can think about GCS, which in turn allows me to have access to a common set
of shared terminologies. On the other hand, the autonomous ways the authors approach
their own sub-topics reflect a rich array of possible understandings of what comprises
agency in GCS, addressing sometimes the same agents in different ways, and sometimes,
different agents in similar ways; enriching the possibilities for analytical comparisons.

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Why a Typology on Agency of Global Civil Society?

According to Helmut Anheier and Nuno Themudo, the Union of International
Associations (UIA) recognizes the growing numbers and shapes of what is captured by
their classification systems as „organizations of special form‟ (Anheier and Themudo
2002):

They include foundations and funds, financial organizations, information
networks, certain types of educational and training organizations, exile and
diaspora organizations, and, significant for our purposes here, „discontinuous‟
bodies, and hybrids such as „informal quasi-organizations‟. A growing
number of organizations no longer fit standard classifications of INGO forms
– forms that are neither conventional membership organizations nor typical
NGOs but somewhere in between or altogether different. (Anheier and
Themudo 2002) (p.196).

The typology introduced with this chapter addresses, I would argue, some of these
forms that are waiting for better classification. Taking them away from this common
„residual bag‟ of more traditional ways of classifying agents of GCS will give them better
conceptual identity. It can open venues for better analysis of their nature, purposes, and
strategies. This in turn allows for better assessments of these categories‟ individual
characteristics and their mutual constitutive linkages.
Furthermore, GCS is a contending concept. Its definition is by no means
universally shared; much less its content or, most importantly, the nature and role of its
agents. Discussions on GCS tend to portray the nature, role and reach of its several actors
in different ways. For instance, some accounts of GCS appear to limit themselves to the
analysis of the so-called non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Others understand
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such form of social organization simply as one among several others (i.e. social
movements), each with different characteristics and goals, each mutually interacting. It
can be argued that besides the evident lack of clarity this analytical imprecision entails, it
can generate the advancement of a poor understanding of the very dynamics of GCS.
In any case, the so-called civil society organizations are commonly deemed as the
main agents within GCS. These organizations are classified by their major form
characteristics, according to the Union of International Associations (Anheier and
Themudo 2002, p.195, Table 8.1). Special attention is given to their different kinds of
membership (universal; intercontinental; regional; of special form), levels of dependency
(emanating from places, persons, bodies; subsidiary; religious or secular), international
orientation, autonomous conferences as a form of organizational substitutes, and bodies
that have been dead or inactive. But, as Anheier and Themudo rightly observe, if in the
past the dynamics of CSOs were basically restricted to membership or non-membership
organizations replicating the “Weberian model of bureaucracy” (p. 202), today a much
more fluid reality is emerging. Looking at a series of case studies, Anheier and Themudo
put forward four propositions about factors influencing and shaping the organizational
form of CSOs: first, the social environment for these organizations is an ever changing
one (funding sources; staff, members, and volunteers; diversity of missions; need to be
locally responsive, conform to national regulations, and be globally relevant; varying
costs of communication and organizing). As a result CSOs are encouraged to diversify
and innovate.
Second, this leads in turn to the evolution of „isomorphism‟ tendencies, in which
some forms of organizations are more apt than others to adapt to a changing globalized
192
environment. This has been observed with “a widespread adoption of the federation as an
organizational form” (p. 204). Third, globalization has varying impacts on organizational
forms, producing a kind of division of labor between organizations and their functioning
as well as an increase of complexity to the way CSOs organize themselves (i.e.
management). Finally, “form constraints encourage innovations and the creation of
hybrid and relational forms”. Anheier and Themudo cite Romaneli (Romanelli 1991), to
explain, “hybridization implies the combination of elements of two different
organizational forms to generate a third form” (Anheier and Themudo 2002, p. 208).
Anheier and Themudo‟s analysis suggests the inadequacy in looking at CSOs as
merely in terms of NGOs, since GCS has organized itself in different ways. Therefore,
the classificatory scheme below reflects an attempt to take the authors‟ findings into
consideration; but with the caveat that any such scheme will be limited and not absolute.
After all, the main characteristics of the current ways GCS organize itself in the age of
globalization are exactly instability, ever-changing environments and hybridism. Still,
these characteristics should not prevent attempts to make sense of the various
manifestations of CSOs. On the contrary, they should be incorporated by the
classification scheme.
What is important to retain from this argument is the possibility that social actors
can become different agents, in practice changing the sources of their agency. Even more,
in so doing they may have multiple roles as multiple sources of agency. In analyzing the
role played by GCS in pushing for the implementation of the International Criminal
Court, Marlies Glasius identifies „individuals with multiple hats‟, such as M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Andrew Clapham, Emma Bonino, Arthur Robinson and Theo Van Boven
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(Glasius 2002c, pp.144-145, Box 6.2). These are individuals that actively participate in
various sources of social agency, such as NGOs, professional expertise and even through
governmental collaboration and participation.
Therefore, instead of speaking of a typology of actors it may be more appropriate
to refer to a typology of agency as far as GCS is concerned. John Keane compares GCS
with a “dynamic biosphere” whose main characteristics include an expansionist nature
coupled with a polyarchic constitution (Keane 2001, p.23). That means, in other words,
that GCS is expanding and doing so in different ways, with different formats. Helmut
Anheier and Nuno Themudo appear to agree with such proposition. In analyzing
organizational forms of GCS and particularly the implications for a civil society
organization (CSO) to go global, they point out that “being global is more than an
increase in scale of national work. It is qualitatively different from being national”. For
instance, the authors identified a trend in which “mimetic isomorphism resulting from
increased competition for scarce funding may be encouraging global CSOs to be more
like transnational corporations”. To these authors, “because being global is new and
uncertain, global civil society must experiment with different forms and explore different
models of governance, accountability, decision-making, and resource generation and
distribution (Anheier and Themudo 2002, pp.212-213).
In fact, I would argue that an evident part of such exploratory process is the
increasing transnational collective networking, which takes place among several forms of
CSOs and individuals (whether acting individually or collectively through public
manifestations). The outcomes of individual groups pulling together human,
organizational and material resources are reflected in the growing number of identifiable
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networks, coalitions, partnerships and social movements, each reflecting their own
characteristics and behavior. The argument here is that these manifestations are
something more than the mere sum of their parts. They entail a unique ability to act in the
system and to generate outcomes (therefore to engage in agency) that may not be equally
available to their individual components (i.e., formal organizations). Therefore, a more
comprehensive typology of GCS should be primarily looking at the sources of agency
rather than limiting itself to consider only the more formal organizational structures of
GCS.
To be true, Anheier and Themudo make explicit that they “use the term
„organizational form‟ in a broad sense as „organized and structured action‟ rather than
applying it to formal, singular organizations only” (p.192). Their need to make this
remark is indicative to the importance that „action‟ or agency plays indeed for the
functioning of GCS. I am only taking a step forward in this chapter. Besides recognizing
their relevance I will try to classify those „actions‟ as agents in themselves. Said
differently, these collective networks are not solely a matter of strategies or goals adopted
by individual civil society organizations, but also the very manifestation of hybrid kinds
of social entities, with autonomous agency and particular abilities.
The logic here adopted does not differ much from the one that considers inter-
governmental organizations (IOs) as something qualitatively different than their
members, the nation-state. But the argument can also be made that once all the members
withdraw from a given IO, by definition the former could no longer exist. Even when few
members withdraw and others join in, the fact remains that the organizations they are
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members of have a life on their own, even if very too often their behavior is constrained
by the power exerted upon them by all or some of their individual members.
The difference is that social agency is more fluid than the rather formally
structured workings of IOs. This is true even when collective networks within GCS are
formally organized. It is possible to consider a given social movement fracturing
internally into different groups, each attacking each other and yet the overall movement
still having a role to play in pressuring governments or corporations to change their
policies and practices. There are rarely unified or even clear cut positions among GCS
mobilizations when compared to the workings of IOs. For instance, according to Diane
Osgood, members of the coalition Five Year Freeze Campaign, a coalition of 50 NGOs,
had members with different (and even conflicting) positions within the coalition in
regards to the need for a ban on genetically modified organisms (GMOs). And yet, the
coalition managed to coherently advocate a temporary ban on “all field testing, planting,
and importation of GMOs into Europe” (Osgood 2001, p.98).
Mario Pianta, when analyzing the growing phenomenon of parallel summits in the
last 20 years gives a similar example. Through surveys and systematic monitoring of
traditional and alternative media outlets, NGO publications and web sites, the author
selected 61 cases of parallel summits. The data shows that these summits have been more
and more frequent, particularly since the year 2000 (Pianta 2001, p.177, Figure 7.1), and
have been organized and attended by a plethora of social actors that include international
NGOs (INGOs), NGOs, trade unions, local groups and even local authorities. Each has
its own interests, which reflects in the different priority the participants give to the
several global issues. For instance, the data shows a predominance of parallel summits
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dealing with economic issues, followed by environmental and human rights concerns (p.
181, Figure 7.5).
More important to the point being here made is that there are different positions
within the organizers of these parallel summits. When looking at the relation of parallel
summits with official summits different approaches may emerge: strong conflict,
criticism of policies, active dialogue and even integration in the official summit (p. 184,
Figure 7.11). To Pianta, “what is interesting from these results is that widely differing
modes of interaction coexist in the same event” (p. 185). Even more interesting is the fact
that such internal differences do not hinder the efficacy of these summits to convey their
messages and to influence policy making. But their most important success appears to be
one of self-reference: a survey on the assessments of the results of parallel summits
shows that “the strongest impact of parallel summits is on global civil society itself” (p.
185). They have improved the ability of social actors to coordinate efforts through
networking, therefore improving „internal‟ build-up of GCS itself. This could not be done
solely by individual civil society organizations.
It should be clear by now that efforts concentrating on the existing types of actors
and the activities they perform may be a lost cause. An alternative approach would be to
rather concentrate on the realms or types of agency available for these actors. This is the
strategy taken in this research, based on the data made available by the Global Civil
Society Yearbook project (GCSY).

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Global Civil Society & Sites of Agency

Once the case for a typology of agency has been made, it becomes central to spell
out the assumptions that inform my own understanding of what GCS is, which results
from my own perception of what globalization is. According to Manuel Castells
globalization can be defined, in analytical terms, as the process by which political, social,
and economic systems become organized in a particular mode with the following
characteristics: the core functions of the systems have the capacity to work as a unity in
real time in a planetary scale. By capacity Castells means the technological, the
institutional and the organizational aspects necessary for the real time functioning of
these global systems.
17
Based on this definition, I see GCS as the core of social
globalization, which in turn is something distinct from political globalization (that has
global governance as its core) and economic globalization (that evolves around global
capitalism).
Assuming then that GCS is an autonomous realm that co-exists with political and
economic forces, all mutually relating within a multidimensional context, the descriptive
definition of GCS espoused by most of the authors in the GCSY and expressed by
Helmut Ahneier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor seems appropriate. Global Civil
Society may be defined as “the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organizations,
networks, and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market and

17
CASTELLS, Manuel, Lecture given at the University of Southern California Annenberg School for
Communication, in August 25, 2004.

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operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and economies” (Anheier,
Glasius et al. 2001b, p.17).
The above-definition implies the need to leave out of the typology here proposed
agents that are primarily political in nature (i.e., the state) or economic (business
corporations). That is not to say that these agents are not important to GCS. Much on the
contrary, to fully understanding the logic of GCS the components of the other global
dimensions (i.e. economic, political) must be addressed. Only then processes and
relations between agents belonging to different global dimensions can be fully uncovered
and the very characteristics of their behavior vis-à-vis these realities be identified. But
still, the understanding of global relations as comprised by three main autonomous
dimensions (even if relating to each other) implies the need to place GCS, global
capitalism and global governance (as well as their respective agents) in different
analytical categories.
In order to build any meaningful typology, four basic requirements must be
fulfilled. First, the typology has to be based on layers of categories ranging from the most
generic to the most specific. Second, the labeling of the components of the typology
should be, as much as possible, value-neutral. Third, the classification proposed should
be comprehensive, properly applying to the entire population analyzed. Finally, the
categories identified and labeled should be exhaustive, not living out any entity that
should otherwise be part of the classification proposed. These are generic requirements
for building any typology, including one focusing on agency. But a typology of agency is
rather about behavior than about objective, material entities. As such, it becomes relevant
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to explicit the empirical realms where agency takes place. My understanding is that GCS
agency manifests itself in very specific spatial sites.
Sites of agency are here defined as the social, the political (and ultimately) the
legal contexts under which civil society agents manifest. In that sense, I would point to
the existence of three fundamental sites: the glocal, the international and the
transnational. The concept of a glocal still deserves a more analytical definition.
Nevertheless, it is a term that has been frequently used to express processes, relations and
challenges whose constitution derives from combinations of local (city, province,
national) and global realities (international, transnational). They can be primarily about
(a) social realities first manifested at the local level but with enough power to achieve
global repercussions or (b) global realities strong enough to shape local structures. Since
the typology I intend to build is about agency in the specific realm of GCS, local forms of
agency are relevant only to the extent that they are somehow connected to global
relations. It appears to me that the concept of a „glocal site‟ well captures this context.
The next site of GCS agency is the international. This is the arena fully
legitimized by a global system that is legally and politically based on notions of state
sovereignty. The international system of states presupposes multiple legal jurisdictions
(by state) and demands full subordination of individuals, communities and organizations
within these jurisdictions. It has the states as the solely subject of international law, being
all other international actors (i.e., MNCs, individuals, etc) its objects. While subjects of
international law are expected to create law, objects are only entitled to rights and
responsibilities imposed upon them. In short, it presupposes a hierarchical relation in
which the state rests above all other actors in the global arena.
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The transnational site of GCS agency, on the other hand, may or may not allow
for the clear drawing of national jurisdictions to map or codify global processes, relations
and challenges. It also blurs the possibility for purely hierarchical relations to manifest
itself at the global arena. Rather, it implies a site in which multiple international actors
tend to act in concert or away for the state-centric instruments of control.
In principle agency is free to move within any of these three sites. But in practice
specific kinds of agency may be more suited to a given site and not to others.

Gradation Network Typology of Social Agency in Global Civil Society

The logic of a fluid directional path of social agency in GCS can be visually
translated as a particular type of cognitive representation, namely gradation network.

Diagram 3.1: Gradation Network

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Diagram 3.1 above is the visual representation for the general gradation network
structure. A line-network of nodes constitutes the gradation network, with each node
having differentiated functions, or ontological features, vis-à-vis each other, as expressed
along that line-continuum. Since that variation is not absolute, but rather a continuum, a
gradation, each node shares some features with a node next to it. The dotted oval circles
visually represent that. The line network itself has a meaning, as indicated by the half
solid, half dotted arrow below the network. It reveals a directional movement as well as
the meaning or content that varies along that movement. By applying the gradation
network as a cognitive model to the general domain of social agency, each cognitive
element of the model becomes conceptually populated, as shown in Diagram 3.2 below.
The nodes in the line network, from the left to the right, become individuals,
social institutions (which do not necessarily imply formalization or institutionalization),
and social infrastructures. Individuals and social institutions share a central common
feature, which is their very ontological constitution as human resources. It indicates that
they may express autonomy and volition as agents. Social institutions and infrastructures
share their ability to function as material resources through which agency can manifest.
Individuals and infrastructure in light of such features occupy the opposite poles.
Individuals are the pure manifestation of human autonomy, while social infrastructures
are the purest form of social/material capabilities.

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Main Sources of GCS Agency in the Gradation Network

A closer look at the data collected (and the arguments presented by the authors)
suggests the existence of three broad types of social agency within GCL, which fits the
general template of the gradation network.
Diagram 3.2: Gradation Network of Social Agency in Global Civil Society

Institutions

Individuals

Infra-
Structure
SOCIAL AGENCY
Human
Resources
Social/Material
Resources
Simplicity Complexity
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First, there is the role played by the individuals as the primary source of any kind
of agency as far as social sciences is concerned. But that is not enough. The question, of
course, is to evaluate if individuals –as individuals – actually produce changes in the
shape and functioning of GCS. The evidences collected by GCSY suggest they do. There
are a number of key individuals with enough legitimacy and/or ability to have varying
degrees of social influence, particularly when considering both, the ability to mobilize
agency within GCS itself and in terms of serving as interlocutors with government and
IOs‟ officials as well as business corporations. The next step then is to identify under
what conditions individuals actually play that role. Ultimately these positions will
comprise the sub-types of individual agency in the typology presented below.
Second, there is what several of the authors in the yearbooks referred to as civil
society organizations (CSOs). They are more or less formal ways in which society
mobilize itself in clearly identifiable ways. But while some authors include in this
category loose forms of coalitions and networks, for the reasons above-mentioned the
typology here presented will separate the former from the latter. Hence the second class
of social actors to be presented in details below comprises an array of minimally
structured organizations of GCS. They are, so to speak, „single-collectivities‟, here
deemed as social organizations.
The third class of social actors is comprised by what is here defined as
transnational collective networks (TCNs), whose constitutive parts draw from
combinations of the first two types of agency – individuals and CSOs. Their classification
as a source of agency – bringing together individuals and/or organizations through
different formats of mobilization – derives from the understanding that they possess their
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own logic, abilities and behavior in the global arena, ultimately functioning as types of
social infrastructures. They constitute material and social venues or outlets for the other
two types of agents to manifest in efficient ways. But, of course, as it happens with any
technology, the manifestation of the whole becomes qualitatively differentiated from the
mere sum of its parts. It is in this context that social infrastructures are also sources of
agency in their own right.
The model in Diagram 3.3 below, visually representing the first layer of agency in
GCS, is an instantiation of the general model introduced in Diagram 3.2. It is an exemplar
of agency, here applied to the universe of global civil society.

Diagram 3.3: Primary Types of GCS Agency

Civil Society
Organizations
- CSO -

Individuals

Transnational
Collective
Networks
- TCN -
Human
Resources
Social/Material
Resources
Simplicity Complexity
AGENCY IN GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY
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The next step is to uncover the contents of each main type of agency in GCS. The
Diagram 3.4 below visually represents the cognitive task at hand. The main types of
agency identified in our gradation network display horizontal differentiations. Now,
within each of those main nodes in the gradation network, lies a traditional hierarchy
network, commonly used to portray typologies. Although the sub-types may also display
horizontal analytical levels, they reveal sub-types within sub-types, thus displaying
vertical levels of differentiation.

Diagram 3.4: Sub-Types of GCS Agency

Human
Resources
Social/Material
Resources

Simplicity Complexity
AGENCY IN GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY
CSOs TCNs Individuals
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Type I: Individuals

The evidences collected by the GCSY project suggest two ways individuals can
play a role for the functioning of GCS. First, they do so as individuals acting as such. In
other words, key individuals, due to their personalities and to the circumstances
surrounding them are caught under the spotlights, which transform them into symbols of
social struggles. Their actions and their words tend to go beyond the confines of their
own immediate social realities and may end up igniting, shaping or influencing realities
within the social dimension of globalization and its interactions with other global
dimensions. Paola Grenier does an excellent investigation with the goal of identifying
some of these individuals. According to the author, these are people “who have helped to
shape, lead and even define different aspects and issues relating to civil society action.
These are the „pioneers‟ of global civil society, At the heart of this account are notions of
agency and action, of how people influence what can seen to be overwhelming forces,
particularly of globalization and its effects within their countries and communities”
(Grenier 2005, p.122).
These individuals, even if having a cosmopolitan outlook in life, acting
simultaneously at the local and at the global (the glocal site of action), are not necessarily
members of the upper class elites within their communities. On the contrary, all too often
they represent the struggles and the voices of those negatively affected by the adverse
aspects of global processes. Examples include figures such as José Bové, a French farmer
without his own organization but who became a symbol of the fight against plant
biotechnology (Osgood 2001).
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Second, individuals play a role under the conditions of collectives of individuals.
In other words, similar spontaneous behavior undertaken simultaneously by a large
number of individuals (whether consciously or not) can have social, political and
economic repercussions. They can help shaping the very nature of GCS. An example is
the existence of students studying abroad. Foreign students are “major transmitters of
knowledge and ideas, and interlocutors among cultures”. (Anheier, Glasius et al. 2001,
p.242, Table R4). Therefore, the numbers of students studying abroad and their
performances while doing so should be important indicators about the current and past
state of GCS. Unfortunately, as the data shows, the evidence of the actual global number
of foreign students is not accurate since the data has to be provided by their countries of
origin and some simply do not provide such information, such as Brazil and India.
Furthermore, the data appears not to be collected in systematic ways throughout time.
And that is essential. A growing number of foreign students would certainly be an
indicator of the “thickening” of GCS.

Individuals’ Sites of Agency in GCS

It appears that the primary sites of agency of individuals-as-personality in GCS
are the glocal and the transnational, and through these they have managed to influence
international policies. The reason for that is the resistance against individuals as agents by
the legal and political structures of the international system (and society) of states. Global
sites present more suitable structures inducing greater participation of individuals (i.e.,
local leaders and activists whose reputation surpass their local struggles and become
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symbols of GCS) and transnational sites (through their engagement in organizations
acting primarily in those realms). According to Grenier, there are individuals acting
directly at the global level, others exercising their power originally from a local setting
but with global potential, and others yet working exclusively at the local level but with
the extensive use of transnational human and material resources.
As for agency of individuals-as-collectivity, the same argument applies. But it is
easier to observe in here a more symmetric fit between the legal and political apparatus of
the state and the communitarian component of the nation. Public opinion, in particular,
seems to manifest itself through this identity-relation between the national and the
international. It is first captured nationally and eventually advances itself into the
international realm by pressuring the international community of states to act in a certain
way. The example of economic sanctions against Apartheid South Africa in the late
1980s is appropriate. According to Gregory Treverton and Pamela Varley only when
public opinion in the United States positioned itself strongly on the wrongdoings of
Apartheid South Africa (thanks to intensive media coverage), it put enough pressure on
the US Congress to push for economic sanctions against that country. This coupled with
threats of boycotts against Western (i.e., American) corporations doing business in South
Africa lead to a change of direction by the US diplomacy of “constructive engagement”
toward that country. Being the US the hegemonic power of the international system of
states, its position ignited a concerted international diplomatic pressure that culminated
on UN sanctions against South Africa (Treverton and Varley 1988).

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Individuals-As-Personality

The GCSY data shows at least two relevant types of individuals as personality to
GCS. First there is what could be called as social leaders. Second, there are social
activists or entrepreneurs. Social leaders are individuals not necessarily concerned or
conscious about GCS as a conceptual reality. Instead they act within the framework of
individuals defending their own communities or acting on their behalf. Their primary
concern is the betterment of local social, political and economic realities, or their
protection against what is perceived as external threats to their survival. Once their
plights manage to catch with the imagination of a bigger audience or when it fits well into
the analytical framework of what is considered by experts as being GCS, these
individuals become symbols of agency. They end up representing values, perceptions and
reactions against factors, agents and processes somehow seen to be threatening to their
local realities. In that sense, social leaders tend to come to light out of conditions of local
struggles.
An obvious example is that of the Sub-comandante Marcos of the Zapatistas,
someone who is not a political leader or an activist, but the leader of a movement that
was taking place in a global site. As Meghanad Desai and Yahia Said aptly put it, “one of
the secrets behind the Zapatistas‟ success is their ideas as formulated by the movement‟s
eloquent non-leader Sub-comandante Marcos. These ideas go far beyond the immediate
demands of the Mayan communities to articulate an alternative global vision” (Desai and
Said 2001, pp.70-71).
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Another example of a transnational social leader working from a local setting but
becoming a symbol for transnational values and ideals is Medha Patkar, from India. She
became one of the central figures in “the Narmada Bechao Andolan (NBA), a movement
of local villagers, farmers, tribal people and Dalits (untouchables), based on the Gandhian
principles of non-violence and civil disobedience” (Grenier 2005, p.132). The central
goal for the movement was to denounce the consequences of people‟s displacement
resulting from a series of development projects for building dams in the Narmada Valley
in the 1980s. Because of the movement‟s visibility in their efforts, the World Bank
commissioned an independent review in 1992, basically confirming the movement‟s
claims and as a result the World Commission on Dams was created in 1992 by the World
Bank to review dam developments throughout the world.
Social activists or entrepreneurs are individuals consciously acting beyond their
local realities in the name of a transnational social cause. They tend to be heads of
transnational movements, organizations, projects, or campaigns. Eventually their names
become associated with the campaign itself. That was the case with Jody Williams, who
ended up winning the Nobel Prize for the Landmine Ban campaign (Chandhoke 2002,
p.38). Contrary to social leaders, these individuals are rather social transnational
entrepreneurs, better known among militants and experts of GCS than by the general
public.
Acting preeminently at the global stage, M. Cherif Bassiouni, for instance, is an
Egyptian working in the field of human rights, publishing more than 60 books and 200
articles on the subject and in the process consciously becoming instrumental for keeping
alive the project for an international criminal court (Grenier 2005).
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Operating originally at the local level, but with the use of transnational human and
material resources, Paul Rice, born in America, but with a great love for the country of
Nicaragua, started working with cooperative initiatives in the 1990s, helping local poor
coffee producers to gain the international market through the fair-trade markets. To that
aim he managed to harness the support from Max Havelaar brand, precursor for the free-
trade initiative and Oxfam International, one of its main partners. Once back in the US,
Rice founded TransFair, thus expanding the global network for fair trade (Grenier 2005).
On the other hand, a distinct and potentially damaging feature in regards to
transnational social entrepreneurs is the fact that many of them are only known among
those working in their own field of expertise as well as within restricted circles of power,
be governmental or corporative ones. This, some might argue, threatens the required
levels of autonomy and transparency for their work to produce positive changes. Often
not known by the large public, and not being directly accountable by pressures from the
public opinion, some social entrepreneurs may engage in questionable activities and
strategies. Melanie Beth Oliviero and Adele Simmons caution, for instance, that many of
these entrepreneurs (and the organizations they represent) engage in close relationships
with institutional sources of funding (Oliviero and Simmons 2002). How is it possible –
one may ask – for a social entrepreneur to criticize the World Bank, for example, while at
the same time applying for funds from that same agency in order to promote social work?
Ultimately, the need for resources from sources that are the very object of attention of
social watchdog organizations makes these social entrepreneurs susceptible to corporate
influence, threatening the legitimacy of their actions.
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One example may be the name of George Soros listed by Paola Grenier as one of
key pioneers in global civil society (Grenier 2005). Grenier sees Soros as a great
philanthropist, with contributions in the order of “US$400 million annually to the Open
Society Institute and the network of national and regional Soros Foundations” alone
(Grenier 20045, p. 130). However, Soros has made his fortune in the corporative world of
global finance, deemed by many working in the realm of Global Civil Society as one of
the main obstacles for the emergence of a just, healthy global civil society. Global
finance is one of the pillars of global capitalism, whose functioning is commonly deemed
as the very source of the many of our global environmental and social problems. The
anti-globalization movement is the embodiment of such view (Hutton and Giddens 2001;
Mohanty 2004; McNally 2006; Held and McGrew 2007).

Individuals-As-Collectivity

There are three ways in which individuals can play a role in GCS in collective and
yet not coordinated ways. First, there is public opinion. Second, there are spontaneous
public manifestations. Third, there is population mobility.
The first type of individuals-as-collective type of individual agency is public
opinion. Assuming that civil society exists, we have to assume then that it has its own
personality, its own way of thinking. Social „thinking‟ is made up with the sum of the
individuals‟ beliefs and perceptions. But the outcome (public opinion, the opinion of the
mass) is not merely the sum of its parts. It has a life on its own and therefore social
agency. It can shape or influence social, political and economic processes and relations in
213
such a way that individuals acting alone cannot. In fact, public opinion has long been a
focal point for those trying to harness the power of society to at least constrain or
influence policy behavior from government officials as well as to induce corporate
decisions by exposing consumer preferences. Examples are abundant in which efforts
from global civil society are in fact aimed directly at public opinion, not policy-makers
per se. In fact, social activism makes extensive use of dramatic performances and actions
with the hope of getting much media attention. Only then, through knowledge of the
facts, individuals all over will express their views and exert pressure on both
governments and corporations. There are two interesting cases exemplifying the power of
public opinion‟s agency.
First, there is the Brent Spar case. The environmental group Greenpeace forced
the British government to bring the Brent Spar, an aging high-waters oil platform to
shore, instead of simply sinking it as Shell and the British government originally wanted.
Through dramatic actions in which activists protested on small inflatable boats on rough
seas, the media paid attention and the public became aware of the situation. Backed by its
internally produced reports on the environmental dangers posed by sinking the Brent
Spar, Greenpeace managed to engage the Europeans in a boycott against Shell, who
eventually conceded and brought the Brent Spar to shore. Ironic, nevertheless, is that
posterior independent environmental assessments came to the conclusion that bringing
the platform to shore was much more dangerous than sinking it on high seas. In fact, if
the latter had been done, it could actually be beneficial for the marine life as the debris of
the platform could serve as grounds for marine species to foster. Still, as Oliviero and
Simmons observed, Shell was “so demoralized and its reputation so badly tarnished that
214
the company was moved to revamp its strategic processes, regardless. Today, Shell is
considered by many to be a model of corporate citizenship” (Oliviero and Simmons 2002,
p.99).
The second case is the largely unfavorable view that the public throughout the
world tend to have in relation to genetically modified food. Even without any definite
scientific proof about eventual dangers to human consumption or to the environment
from GMOs, public opinion reacts to activism. GCS becomes highly skeptical of these
products and demand higher standards in terms of research, control and – specially –
information (Osgood 2001).
In both cases, it was not so much the merits of the case that allowed civil society
to exert pressure on governments and corporations, but the fear ingrained on them about
the reactions from society at large, as reflect by public opinion. Therefore, public opinion
is thus understood as the unified voice of the multitude of individuals that comprise
society in such a way as to make their position known as well as their readiness to act
upon the facts. Public opinion, however, is rather a passive agent, waiting for
measurements of their voices from outside interlocutors or sheer manipulation from those
within GCS, politics or economics hoping and able to make use of its power (i.e., media,
activists, polls). As such it is highly malleable and subject to manipulation. But as
information and communication becomes widespread public opinion tends to become
more independent and forceful on their positions vis-à-vis society, politics and
economics.
The second type of individual-as-collective type of individual agency is
spontaneous public manifestations. Once again, they are the result of great numbers of
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individuals spontaneously and simultaneously expressing themselves in the face of
economic, political, and social realities. But differently than public opinion – which is a
rhetoric form of social manifestation – spontaneous public manifestations are actions,
physical undertakings carried out in the real world of manifested relations. Hence, if the
first type of individuals-as-collectivity agency refers to ways of thinking, the second type
is about concrete actions. The new communication technologies, particularly wireless
devices and the Internet, appear to have greatly increased the reach and potential of these
manifestations.
The 2001 so-called “people power II” in the Philippines is one such example. For
four days thousands of Filipinos used their cell phones as part of a massive demonstration
against inaction of the country‟s Senate on charges of corruption against president Joseph
Estrada, leading to his impeachment. As put by Manuel Castells, Mireia Fernandez-
Ardevol, Jack Linchuan Qiu and Araba Sey, “this four-day event has become legendary
as the first occasion in human history when removing the head of the government of a
nation-state” (Castells, Fernandez-Ardevol et al. 2006, p.266).
The 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle is by now also largely considered a landmark
in the people‟s ability to generate mobilization thanks to the new electronic
communication technologies. These technologies allowed for disparate groups with
different agendas and interest to coordinate their efforts through the Internet, showing a
unified front against the WTO meeting. As put by John Nughton, the use of the Internet
allowed “participating groups to exchanged information, prepare position papers, lobby
local legislatures, and generally lay the groundwork for the more established forms of
political action” (Naughton 2001, p.156).
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The third type of individual-as-collective type of individual agency is grass-roots
communities. There are two kinds of grass-roots communities of interest to GCS. One
refers to indigenous communities, the other to diaspora communities.
Local, or indigenous, communities tend to be primarily concerned with their own
realities. Due to their common life experiences they tend to bond and form shared sets of
cultural values and social practices. These communities are sources of agency within
GCS to the extent that their local experiences somehow interact with global relations.
An example may be the social experiment in democracy that started in the city of
Porto Alegre, in Brazil. That experiment not only expanded to other cities in that country,
but became a model for similar experiments carried out in other countries as well. In the
words of Hilary Wainwright,

From the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the Brazilian Workers‟ Party (PT)
won electoral victories in significant cities like Porto Alegre, the capital of
the southern region of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazilian civic movements and
NGOs working closely with the PT pioneered participatory budgeting (PB), a
form of municipal government through which democratically organized civil
society strengthened popular control over local state institutions.
(Wainwright 2005, p.101)

Once in power, and realizing the city‟s broken budget, the newly elected officials
called for town meetings and with the help of grass-roots communities and community
groups, worked together on deciding how to spend its sparse resources in transparent and
efficient ways.
Another example of grass-roots communities as indigenous communities relates to
local populations fighting the threats of global warming. According to Peter Newell,
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indigenous populations and tribes are groups particularly vulnerable to global warming.
In the US, for instance, 80% of the indigenous people live in coastal regions. The Inuit
people of Canada and Alaska have decided to act upon the problem by choosing a
strategy of legal litigation against the US government‟s, claiming human rights violation
from environmental threats to their existence. Public accountability has generated popular
participation and once again evidencing the fluid nature of agency, organized groups (i.e.,
NGOs) eventually took the lead of litigation against the US government, claiming human
rights violations (Falk 2006).
Diaspora communities are the result of the fact that people move, as individuals,
for innumerous reasons: running from persecution, searching for a better life, simply to
study abroad, to experiment different social realities. Whatever the reasons, the fact is
that population mobility has social, political, economic and cultural implications. These
individuals moving abroad take with them their culture, their worldviews, and their
expectations. Their common background imposes on them – whether they are conscious
or not – a number of similar patterns in the way they think and act (behavior) and this can
produce agency within GCS.
Saskia Sassen has looked at the relation between global cities and diasporic
networks. She points out the relevance of diasporic communities in producing new
understandings of citizenship and therefore new social practices that influence the shape
of GCS. First, these communities induce changes in the ways national regulations (and
perceptions) are forced to deal with aliens, recognizing alternative meanings for
citizenship: “as legal status, as possession of rights, as political activity, as a form of
collective identity and sentiment”. Furthermore, these same aliens tend to have
218
alternative views of nationality themselves. Eventually critical to their countries of origin,
sometimes critical of their countries of immigration, these individuals reproduce
alternative views of what constitutes social practices and identity (Sassen 2002).
In referring to Sassen‟s work, Helmut Anheier and Hagai Katz point out that
particularly in recent decades, migrant communities have created non-contiguous units, in
geographical terms: “Columbians in New York, Armenians in Los Angeles, Irish in
Boston, Turks in Germany, Algerians in France, Pakistanis in England, Indians in South
Africa, Chinese in south-east Asia, and so on” (Anheier and Katz 2003 p.243). Diaspora
communities can be actively engaged in global practices. Mary Kaldor and Diego Muro
analyzed the phenomenon of religious and nationalistic militant groups (including those
involved with terrorist activities) and concluded that diaspora support is an increasing
source of funding for these groups. “The most important diasporic groups were those of
the Jews, the Armenians, and the Greeks” (Kaldor and Muro 2003c, p.178).
Although diaspora communities tend to the associated with ethnic groups, any
movements of people should classify in this category. This is the case, for instance, with
labor movement, a topic addressed by Meghnad Desai, Fiona Holland, and Mary Kaldor.
The authors point out the extent to which transnational labor movement involve questions
ranging from human rights (the rights of non-citizens), to economic issues (remittances,
local economic resources), to society and culture (diluting or reshaping local culture,
increases in levels of insecurity) (Desai, Holland et al. 2006).
Diagram 3.5 below summarizes the findings related to Type I agency in GCS.

219

Type II: Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

Formal organizations have legal status. Even those less formally constituted are
primarily subject to a given jurisdiction. The identification of legal (and as a consequence
Diagram 3.5: Type I of GCS Agency: Individuals
INDIVIDUALS‟ AGENCY IN GCS
Individuals
Indigenous
Communities

Diaspora
Communities
As
Collectivity
As
Personality
Social
Leaders
Social
Activists
Public
Opinion
Spontaneous
Public
Manifestation
Grassroots
Communities
220
geographical) location can help us understand the primary social contexts under which
these entities function. Therefore, I would suggest three basic sub-types of CSOs: NGOs,
INGOs, and transnational civil society organizations (TCSOs). Each primarily acts,
respectively, onto the glocal, the international and the transnational sites of agency.
NGOs are non-governmental organizations. International civil society
organizations are referred to as international non-governmental organizations, or INGOs.
According to Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor (Anheier, Marlies Glasius et al. 2001) both
NGOs and INGOs are autonomous organizations that are non-governmental. The
difference between them is the truly international nature of the latter. Thus, an INGO is
something qualitatively different than an NGO that has merely an international
orientation.
As noticed by the authors, the data shows that not only the sheer number of
INGOs have grown greatly since the 1990s (Anheier, Glasius et al. 2001) (see Table R19
– Number of INGOs and Organizational Density, pp.283-286) but also “during the 1990s,
INGOs became much more interconnected both to each other and to international
institutions” (Kaldor 2001) (see also Table R21 – Links Between International
Organizations, pp. 291-292). These qualities have directly contributed to a higher density
of international and transnational networks within GCS. Not only that, but INGOs have
evolved onto business-like entities in the sense of the way they organize themselves and
relate both to governments and corporations worldwide: “under pressure from
management gurus they increasingly adopt corporate strategies (…) encouraged by a
resource-poor international community eager to seek new forms of cooperation” (Kaldor,
Anheier et al. 2003b, p.9). “For example, Amnesty International underwent frequent
221
reorganization as it grew to a presence in over 100 countries in just over 40 years and
evolved from a small volunteer-run group to a transnational organization with a highly
complex governance structure” (Anheier and Themudo 2002, p.193). NGOs, on the other
hand, are entities more closely related to their local environment, as will be discussed in
details below.
The third sub-type of CSOs is transnational civil society organizations (TCSOs).
But here a clarification is needed. In analytical terms, both INGOs and TCSOs are
transnational entities. The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations defines INGOs
as “transnational, non-profit-making organizations”(Evans and Newnham 1998, p.267).
In that case a better nomenclature to INGOs should be TNGOs, or transnational non-
governmental organizations. But there are two aspects that may justify INGO as an
acceptable nomenclature. The reference to the „international‟ should be indicative of
closer relations between these non-governmental organizations and states as well as IOs.
And that, as above-mentioned, is exactly one of the current trends about INGOs. This is
expressed through greater levels of integration they have with both states and
international institutions. Another factor that says something about these INGOs is their
legal formality. They are complex legal entities, with very complex internal managerial
structures. As also mentioned, in order to continue to integrate with states and IOs (i.e.,
for funding, consultative status, etc) they must follow some principles of internal
structures that allows for legal accountability.
TCSOs, on the other hand, do not have such a strong normative content. They
may or may not be formal, they may be more or less internally complex, but they indicate
a rather stronger grass roots, identity based configuration. Or, being completely outside
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the governmental influence or integration, they tend to adopt internal managerial
structures that are more truly transnational in nature.

Types of Social Mobilization

An important characteristic of CSOs (as well as TCNs to be discussed later) is
that agency derives in all cases from active social mobilization. These organizations
reflect conscious attempts to intervene in all spheres of human relations, particularly
those that are primarily political and economic in nature. This very much follows the
definition of GCS given by the authors of the GCSY project, which I take as the basis for
constructing my typology. I also agree with the authors when they point out the difficulty
in classifying these organizations based on their primary areas of militancy (i.e.,
development, human rights, environment, etc). Many of the CSOs have multiple focus
and act on many areas. Furthermore, due to changing conditions on the political
environment – particularly when concerning funding – many of CSOs venture in new
areas where they had never been before. So, to try to base the classification scheme on
areas of concern seems too problematic.
On the other hand social organizations have only so many options in terms of the
nature of their operations. I have identified seven kinds of mobilization. Mobilization of
CSOs is apparently motivated by social identity, ideology, knowledge/expertise,
professional affiliation, and the primary goal of engaging in advocacy, service, and
watchdog operations.
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Mobilization based on social identity is one whose primary focus of activity is the
strengthening of the community. They are grass-roots forms of mobilization and deal
primarily with the well being of indigenous communities as well as diaspora communities
(i.e., The African Service Committee, (Anheier and Stares 2002b, p.229). Ideological
mobilization is one whose primary motivation is the expression of beliefs through active
militancy, be they political, such as nationalism, religious, economic, etc (i.e., US
Christian Coalition, (Kaldor and Muro 2003c, p.156). A special kind of ideological
mobilization is that of fundamentalist groups, in which the expression of beliefs became
an end in itself, preventing dialogue to take place. As pointed out by Caldor and Muro the
most fundamentalist are the ones prone to make use of violence to achieve their goals
(i.e. Gush Emunim is a militant settler group that aims to recreate Biblical Israel, and
make use of violence to achieve its goals, (Kaldor and Muro 2003c, p.153, p.156).
Knowledge/expertise based mobilizations bring together individuals, groups and
networks whose main characteristic is the possession of expertise and scientific
knowledge put to the service of dialogue and enterprises (i.e., International Law
Association, Union of Concerned Scientists).
Mobilization by professional affiliation, on the other hand, is based on class and
has the defense of any given professional class its main objective (i.e., labor unions).
Mobilization involving advocacy is primarily concerned on pushing a given agenda on all
kinds of topics of interests to civil society (i.e., Greenpeace, Coalition Against
Trafficking in Women – (Sen 2003, p.140). Service mobilization, on the other hand, aims
at providing services in substitution of or in partnership with government IOs (i.e.,
Community of San Egidio, a Vatican group dedicated to conflict-resolution, (Kaldor
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2001, p.113). Watchdog mobilizations are those primarily concerned with accountability
and their goal is to survey that practices carried out by not only political and economic
actors, but also civil society agents, are in conformity with social interests (i.e.,
International Consumers Association, (Kaldor 2001, p.97).
It is different combinations of these different kinds of social mobilization that
ended up forming agency in GCS.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

As already mentioned these organizations are those that are primarily of domestic
nature. They are organizations whose social and political realms of activity are
predominantly domestic in nature and manifestation. NGOs pertain to a single legal
jurisdiction as far as international relations are concerned. However, in order to logically
fit the typology of agency in GCS here proposed not all NGOs qualify, but only those
with corroborated potential to impact the functioning of GCS in particular and social
globalization in general. For that reason, once again the assumption is that as far as
NGOs go only those acting on glocal sites of agency are the ones to be considered here.
That being said, several kinds of NGOs of relevance for GCS can be identified by the
data and researches put together by the GCSY project.
A first type of NGO identified is grass-roots associations of any kind (i.e.,
coalitions). They are associations of voluntary membership and can deal with all kinds of
issues deemed as relevant to the community, such as culture, politics, economics,
education, religion, etc. Their primary concern is the well being of their local realities.
225
Just like grass-roots communities there are two main sub-types of grass-roots
associations: indigenous associations and diaspora groups.
In the first case, only the associations that become part of glocal sites of GCS
agency are to be considered. They do so to the extent that they are affected by global
relations or relate to it somehow, even if symbolically. Therefore it tends to be
reactionary in nature and always motivated by social identity, broadly speaking. They can
be advocacy in nature when claiming rights, protection, accountability, and so on. They
can also be about pulling together efforts and resources for the achievement of a given
goal of relevance for the community, such as the construction of schools or the
implementation of cooperatives.
Too often their main contribution to GCS is symbolic. They become models of
the way local communities are affected and react to all kinds of negative as well as
positive processes, relations and consequences from globalization. Local grass-roots
associations can – and they often do – mobilize GCS to join their plight. For instance,
they can simply advertise their struggle in order to gain public opinion sympathy
inducing them to pressure government officials and business leaders to alter their policies
and practices. Or, they can engage in transnational networks, benefiting from the
exchange of experiences in the way local communities worldwide deal with globalization
as well as from the power achieved by pulling together transnational resources.
An important example of a local grass-roots coalition that became quite symbolic
of the ability that local social society groups can have in relating and profiting from
global connections was the Free Burma Coalition, “a diverse mix of high school,
university, environmental, human rights, religious, and labor organizations, which soon
226
comprised of the world‟s largest single students movements” (Mure 2000: p.10). They
engaged in what Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink describe as the boomerang
pattern. Local groups go outside their local/national realities in search for transnational
support to their causes, hopping that in doing so international pressure will “return”
against their local sources of oppression. In the case of the Burma Coalition they did so –
to prevent the construction of an oil pipeline that was threatening local communities and
the environment.
In the second case, that of diaspora associations, their manifestation well
exemplifies the notion of fluid directional paths in GCS. As part of Type I of the
typology, diaspora communities was shown to be one of those instances in which a
spontaneous collective of individuals may have relevance for GCS even when not
consciously acting in concert. The example given in this regard is monetary remittances
sent by individuals that are members of diaspora communities to their countries of origin,
which generates consequences to global relations. It was said that this is the case of
Mexicans in the United States.
But diaspora communities can become consciously active as seen by the
formation of diaspora associations. As Sassen pointed out, “the presence of immigrant
communities produces specific transnational forms of engagement and (…) enables
immigrant groups to begin to think of themselves as global Diasporas, rather than
expatriates” (Sassen 2003, p.420).
In the case of Mexican diaspora, for instance, “more than 400 home-town clubs
and associations of Mexican immigrants have been counted in the US”. Even more,
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“according to the Mexican Consulate of Chicago, there are seven federations of home
towns organized according to the state of origin” (Sassen 2002, p.226).
A second type of NGO observed in the GCSY project refers to professional
associations. Once again they tend to be characterized by voluntary association. These
associations are primarily concerned with local realities affecting not necessarily the
community at large, but professional segments of it. For that reason, membership may be
rather an expected social – if not an outright formal – requirement to all members of the
professional class the association represents. The most evident example of professional
associations is labor associations, or unions. Their relevance to GCS derives from the
high levels of coordination and mobilization among its members that allows then to
forcefully fight for the defense of what they consider as their labor rights, particularly
vis-à-vis economic global forces. Again, being local, they become sources of agency
when acting though glocal sites. They do so in two ways. First, when their mobilizations
call the attention of the world in symbolic ways. Second, they also engage in larger labor
mobilizations and networks seen to fit well with their own interests. In order to maximize
their ability to exert influence in the international political arena they tend to be part of
transnational coalitions and collective networks.
Peter Waterman and Jill Timms explore the historic developments and changes of
trade unions, originally formed by local and national chapters, heading toward
international organization and mobilization (Waterman and Timms 2005) . Once again,
the fluid change in agency is at play, influencing not only strategy but also the very
content of its actors. Trade unions reveal a historic record of local and national struggles
(as NGOs), just to be replaced by a conscious “internationalist” vocation, transforming
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their primary site of agency and their very nature, now as well-established INGOs, or
international non-governmental organizations (as introduced in more detail in the next
sub-heading below).
Fundamentalist groups comprise a third type of NGO. These are groups primarily
motivated by ideological concerns, radical beliefs on issues such as the economy,
politics, culture, social identity, and religion. They are militant groups that frequently
make use of violence to achieve their ends. It is true that some authors would not include
violent fundamentalist entities such as Hamas as components of GCS. The basic
argument for that would be the fact that violence is antithetic to the very normative
principle that GCS should be exactly about minimizing violence in everyday relations.
But as Kaldor and Muro argue, GCS has been defined by the GCSY project as a realm
that includes ideas and values, besides individuals, institutions, organizations and
networks. They ask: “if we accept the normative content of global civil society, should
we not exclude anti-democratic groups?” They admit that this is a difficult question to
answer, but adds that “a Yearbook about global civil society has to describe and analyze
those groups that are at least on the margin of a normative definition of global civil
society”. Besides, they ponder “the destruction of the World Trade Towers on 11
September 2001 drew global attention to a new transnational terrorist phenomenon”
(Kaldor and Muro 2003c, p.151).
One can conclude from such argument that since they have influence, thus
agency, they are worth looking at as social agents. This, of course, fits well with the
argument I used to construct a typology of agency. An interesting characteristic about
fundamentalist groups is their rather active position vis-à-vis global forces. Rather than
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being purely reactive to globalization their militancy are in general pro-active. As a result
of that their participation in global sites of agency tends to be expansive. Fundamentalist
groups that “operate beyond borders or have transnational links (…) do appear to have
increased over the last decade” (p. 151). Interesting examples of fundamentalist groups
are the (now fading) Marxist-Leninist Red Terrorist groups that appeared autonomously
in different countries between the 1960s and the 1990s with the explicit goal of
overthrowing “the democratic regimes in their countries of origin” (p. 161, Box 7.1).
A fourth type of NGO that can be pointed out is local epistemic communities.
According to Peter Haas, epistemic communities are groups of specialists in a given field
of expertise, scientific knowledge and research. They are knowledge-based communities
(Haas 1992). They include think tanks, groups devoted to research in policy-making,
scientific communities and technical expertise, particularly among liberal professionals
(i.e., law). To many it is arguable whether they are in fact agents of GCS or if they are
just individuals working through the framework of their respective institutions of
education. In that sense they would be integral parts of a larger structural reality. To
some, however, these individuals possess some particular kind of credibility. And for that
reason many of these professionals opt to act independently from their original academic
centers in the name of advancing civil society. What is more, they have become
“significant purveyors of information and opinions” (Kaldor 2001, p.115).
In terms of NGOs, think tanks have a particular strong position as they
consciously try to influence political policy-making, which brings them close to the
sources of political power. This is seen as positive by some, since they possess a real
possibility to actually influence political processes with real-life implications to society.
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To others it is not so positive, as being so close to the circles of power can induce these
individuals to end up putting their expertise to the service of particular interests.
In any case, I tend to agree with Mary Kaldor when noting that “the growth
during the 1980s and 1990s of think tanks and commissions addressing global issues is
yet another sign of the emergence of global civil society”. In fact, they add, “older
established think tanks concerned with defense and foreign affairs, which exist in almost
every country, have joined the [global] debate” (p. 115). An example of a local think tank
with global orientation is the Center for Global Development
18
. It is located in the United
States and has as its priority to engage in policy-oriented research with a focus on the
policies of the United States as well as other industrial countries.
A fifth type of NGO is one generically called as watchdog groups. The Collins
Cobuild English Language Dictionary defines „watchdog‟ as “a person or committee
whose job is to make sure that companies do not act illegally or irresponsibly”. As the
definition indicates, the main function of watchdogs is to survey the behavior of other
social actors. With the advancement of GCS, more and more NGOs take to themselves a
role traditionally pertaining to public officials. Also because of facilities provided by
advances in communication and information technologies they can expand their reach of
activities in order to make sure that other social actors are in fact behaving truthfully. One
such example is the Center for Media & Democracy, whose mission is to counter
“propaganda by investigating and reporting on behind-the-scenes public relations
campaigns by corporations, industries, governments and other powerful institutions”
19
.

18
http://www.cgdev.org.
19
http://www.prwatch.org.

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International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs)

Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor rightly state that it is not correct to assume the
existence of a linear extension that goes from national to international to global. “The
sequence contains an important qualitative difference that escapes international statistical
systems” (Anheier, Glasius et al. 2001b, p.18). What is valid to statistical measurements
about GCS agents is, of course, valid to these agents themselves. This perception
coincides with the logic of a fluid directional path referred above. Both negate the
argument that a linear, progressive evolutional path is supposed to be followed by all
CSO in the same way. The notion of „fluid‟ directional paths presupposes that evolution
(and transformations) by different social agents will take place according to their own
characteristics. Therefore, certain kinds of NGOs may rather become integral parts of a
transnational collective network (TCN) without ever being part of a transnational civil
society organization (TCSO). Others may go from an INGO to become a TNO, through
internal changes.
This explanation is important to make the point that some INGOs may have
already been born that way, without even being a NGO before. The most common
definition of INGOs qualifies them as “autonomous organizations that are non-
governmental, that is, they are not instrumentalities of government; and non-profit, that is
not distributing revenue as income to owners, and formal, legal entities” (Anheier,
Glasius et al. 2001b, p.4).
Examples of INGOs are numerous, including Amnesty International, Greenpeace,
CARE, among others. International versions of NGOs within similar types of social
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mobilization, such as advocacy groups, service-driven organizations, and professional
associations are all part of what is broadly defined as INGO.
There are two-sub types of INGO reflecting high levels of participation from
states and IOs in the functioning of the INGO. Sponsored INGOs are INGOs that own
their existence to states-led initiatives. A prime example is the International Committee
of the Red Cross. Another example is the International Labor Association, an entity made
possible by the UN system. The second sub-type is Partnership INGOs. They reflect high
levels of cooperation with states or IOs. This can give them better access to the circles of
power but also generate questionings about their autonomy.
A good example of this sub-type is the International Federation of Agricultural
Producers (IFAP), founded after the Second World War. According to Marc Edelman,
their goal is to promote cooperation to prevent food shortages “and a recurrence of
agricultural depression like that of the 1930s” (Edelman 2003, p.186). Close cooperation
of IFAP with governments has generated visible outcomes. “IFAP leaders served in
government delegations to FAO conferences, sometimes exercising substantial influence
on FAO policies” (p. 188). Furthermore, “IFAP‟s close collaboration with governments
and multilateral agencies, as well as its big-producer orientation, gives it access to
resources and makes it a centrist or even conservative voice within the spectrum of global
agriculturalists‟ movements” (p. 212). This is an indicative that closeness with a non-civil
society actor – states and IOs – gives these organizations a particular outlook, integrating
them into the „international‟ logic of state relations. Otherwise, they would simply be
considered as transnational organizations.
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INGOs comprise the bulk of CSOs and are the ones most frequently taken into
account for statistical recordings and classification. They are the ones most frequently
taking part in the international system of states‟ decision-making process (i.e., UN
consulting status). For instance, the record shows that some of the biggest and well-
known INGOs in the world, such as the World Wide Fund for Nature, Greenpeace, and
Friends of the Earth have been among the main groups working on the issue of climate
change since the 1980s, pushing for international regulation.
Eventually, as shown by Peter Newell, these organizations opted for pooling
resources and expertise, better organizing their efforts through a different type of agency:
coalitions or networks (discussed in more details below), such as the Climate Action
Network (CAN) (Newell 2006).
Finally, a key distinction between INGOs and TCSOs is a rather hierarchical
internal structure of the former compared to a more horizontal structure of the latter.

Transnational Civil Society Organizations (TCSOs)

Transnational Civil Society Organizations are organizations that have a more
definite horizontal structure among its members. But different than transnational
collective networks (to be discussed below) they have formal internal structures (just like
INGOs). They also have no state or state-led institutions‟ participation in their creation.
These characteristics taken together (horizontal internal structure, non-state participation,
and internal formal structures) led me to consider them as a particular case of CSO. That
is why I believe it is justifiable to assign these organizations a category of their own. But
234
I am aware that they tend to be classified as INGOs by more traditional statistics
measurements.
A prime sub-type of TCSO is the so-called global federations. These are groups
that had become a global brand name or uniquely influential, thus attracting worldwide
membership. Their managerial structure allows for equal opportunity of its members in
terms of participation and internal governance. But membership is strict and applicants
have to fulfill specific qualifications. This does not prevent the full autonomy of the
members to act according to their own agendas and needs.
According to Anheier and Themudo, due to a changing global environment as
well as to greater civil society participation, organizations traditionally classified as
INGO have been adopting this format. A good example of a global federation is Friends
of the Earth International (FoE), “a federation of 61 groups with an international
secretariat and an executive committee to oversee the operations between biennial
General Assembly meetings. (…) Together the FoE federation of member organizations
combines about 5,000 local groups and 1 million members. (…) Biennially, a week-long
General Assembly of representatives of member organizations decides on the policies
and activities of the federation” (Anheier and Themudo 2002, p.203).
Another sub-type of TCSO involves partnership with business corporations or
sponsored TCSO. This is the case of foundations in which the endowment comes from
the corporation but in which the organization has autonomy to act. Bill Gates and
Melinda Gates Foundation is an example of such form of TCSO. The logic here is similar
of that of sponsored INGOs, in which a civil society organization owns its existence to
235
the act of a non-civil society actor. The difference is that in this case it is a private,
economic actor, and not a public one (i.e., state).
A third sub-type of TCSO is formal transnational coalitions of local grass-roots
organizations. They are transnational community associations. Here the idea of a fluid
directional path indicates that this type of organization derives from „deeper‟ global
engagement of otherwise local organizations coalescing efforts in order to improve their
agency at the global level. Yahia Said and Meghnad Desai give an interesting example.
“In 1989 the International Federation of Alternative Trade (IFAT) was established, of
which two-thirds are based in the Third World. The various local groups also coalesced
into national organizations, which in turn established the International Fairtrade Labeling
Organization (IFLO) in 1997. The IFLO is an umbrella organization which issues the
„Fairtrade‟ label to qualifying products based on a set of standards applied to both
producers and traders” (Said and Desai 2003, p.70).
Civil Society Organizations‟ agency in GCS is summarized in Diagram 3.6
below.

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Type III: Transnational Collective Networks (TCNs)

Transnational collective networks (TCNs) reflect perhaps some of the most
exciting experiments within the GCS community. They are coalitions of coalitions, so to
speak. They are also coalitions of individual organizations, influential individuals
Diagram 3.6: Type II of GCS Agency: Civil Society Organizations
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS‟ AGENCY IN GCS
CSOs
Grassroots
Associations
Professional
Associations
Fundamentalist
Groups
TCSOs NGOs
INGOs
Local
Epistemic
Communities
Watchdog
Groups
Sponsored
NGOs
Partnership
NGOs
Global
Federations
Sponsored
TCSOs
Transnational
Community
Associations
237
(individuals-as-personality) and even non-civil society actors, such as state officials or
business corporations. They tend to be loose aggregations, or networks, characterized by
horizontal forms of relationships, informality and varying degrees of mobilization (i.e.,
permanent, ad hoc). And yet, these forms of GCS agency appear to reflect efficient ways
through which GCS manages to advance its global agenda. They are certainly a growing
trend within GCS, as the evidences indicate.
20

I will follow here Keck and Sikkink‟s explanation for the meaning of networks
applied to civil society actors:

Networks are forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal,
and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange. The organizational
theorist Walter Powell calls them a third mode of economic organization,
distinctly different from markets and hierarchy (the firm). “Networks are
„lighter on their feet‟ than hierarchy” and are “particularly apt for
circumstances in which there is a need for efficient, reliable information,”
and “for the exchange of communities whose value is not easily measured.”
His insights about economic networks are extraordinarily suggestive for an
understanding of political networks, which also form around issues where
information plays a key role, and around issues where the value of the
“commodity” is not easily measured. (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p.8)

Keck and Sikkink apply the network concept to a specific form of TCN, the
transnational advocacy networks. This is one of the sub-types of TCNs to be presented
below. But I would suggest that the „network‟ component also applies to all forms of
GCS manifestations here classified as TCNs.
I consider as „network‟ all sorts of coalitions, partnerships, associations, etc, as
long as they bring with them the characteristics above-mentioned: democratic forms of

20
See for instance the growing numbers of parallel summits: GCSY02, Record 30, p.372.

238
horizontal relationships that tend to be loosely structured. By loose I do not mean
necessarily informal, although even more formal global civil society networks are
generally more inclusive than the traditional hierarchical ways of organizational
groupings. By loose I mean, as put by Anheier and Themudo, „discontinuous‟ bodies as
well as „quasi-organizations‟ (Anheier and Themudo 2002, p.196).
I shall divide TCNs into two main classes of networks: single-mobilization
networks and hybrid networks.

Single-Mobilization Networks

Single-mobilization Networks are based on specific types of social mobilization
commonly shared by all its members. They result from fluid directional paths traveled by
CSOs. Organizations primarily producing agency within their original sites of agency
(glocal, international, transnational) engage in single-mobilization networks in order
either to alter their primary site of agency (i.e., from local to transnational) or to produce
agency within multiples sites of agency. In either case, the primary concern is to overall
increase their ability to produce agency within GCS. Specific types of mobilization as
networks include transnational community networks, alternative network projects,
transnational advocacy networks, and transnational fundamentalist networks
Transnational Community Networks are transnational networks of diaspora
communities. In principle there could be three different kinds of such networks. First,
networks dealing with several diaspora communities co-existing within a single geo-
political space. Second, networks of a single diaspora community spread throughout a
239
single geo-political space. Third, networks of a single diaspora community spread
throughout several geo-political spaces. Sassen analyzed several cases, among them The
Platform of Filipino Migrant Organizations in Europe. It is a network that represents “75
organizations, national and Europe-wide networks from 14 countries in Europe”, whose
main goal is to work on “a Migrant Agenda which aims at equality of rights in Europe
and for participative development in the Philippines” (Sassen 2003, p.228).
Alternative Network Projects is about specific local projects operating within the
confines of glocal sites of agency. They are local projects that had gained visibility and
then expanded their project models beyond their own immediate social realities. Desai
and Said detail the case of the „Project LETS‟, with networks present in 36 countries
involving over 500 LETS schemes. What is interesting in this kind of TCN is that what is
networked is the „model‟ they advocate, not necessarily the actual operations of the social
groupings. “The average size of these [LETS] schemes is 50-60 participants although
larger ones can have thousands of participants” (Desai and Said 2001, p.72). Alternative
network projects tend to make extensive use of communication technologies, such as the
Internet. It is crucial since what they are networking is alternative forms of social
practices and self-organization. In the case of the Project LETS, they have an on-line
database of community currencies in which people can describe their local money
system, thus exchanging information about their community experiences as well as to
provide useful links for the advancement of the overall PROJECT LETS.
Keck and Sikkink define Transnational Advocacy Networks as “networks of
activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in
motivating their formation” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p.4). Their goal is to advocate and
240
instigate changes in the institutional and principled basis of international interactions” on
specific issues. They bring together actors who share values and a common discourse in
regards to these issues and make extensive and strategic use of information and services
“to help create new issues and categories and to persuade, pressure, and gain leverage
over much more powerful organizations and governments” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p.2).
Purna Sen looks at several examples of transnational women‟s advocacy networks. One
example is the Women Against Violence in Europe (WAVE) a regional (European)
network of non-governmental women‟s organizations whose main focus is violence
against women and children. Their advocacy includes the provision of feminist analysis,
the facilitation of common activities, to influence European and international policies,
among other things. “The network comprises of around 1,000 members, including shelter
providers, telephone help-line services, and training organizations” (Sen 2003, p.129).
Hagai Katz and Helmut Anheier look at the actual shape of transnational NGO
networks, providing empirical evidence to the extent of the reach of these advocacy
networks. The authors point out that these networks are formed by entities other than
simply NGOs. They include activists, representatives of civil society organizations, even
inter-organizational relationships involving coalitions among INGOs as well as links
between philanthropic institutions and recipient groups (Katz and Anheier 2006).
Transnational Fundamentalist Networks, very much like transnational advocacy
networks, are extensions of agency being previously exercised within glocal and
international sites for GCS agency. They maximize the potential to exercise global
influence that otherwise would be minimized when the individual components (members)
of these networks act alone. The logic of these networks is similar to that of advocacy
241
groups, with the difference that very often they employ „uncivil‟ strategies and methods.
Their networks tend to operate not within the confines of institutional venues for global
negotiation but at their margins. The obvious example is the Al Qaeda, “a cross-border
network involving hybrid forms of organization. (…) itself a coalition involving a
number of constituent organizations: the most well-known are the Egyptian groups
Islamic Jihad and Jamaa Islamia (Islamic Group of Egypt) and the Groupe Islamique
Armé (GIA) of Algeria, but there are also organizations from Pakistan, Chechnya, Sudan,
Somalia, and the Philippines among others” (Glasius and Kaldor 2002b, p.24).

Hybrid Networks

Hybrid networks reflect some of the most recent experiments of social
mobilization at the global scale. They are hybrid for two reasons: first, because of their
format. They manifest in ways that are qualitatively different from the more traditional
forms of social organizations as well as from single-mobilization networks. Second,
hybrid networks are hybrid in terms of the actors they bring together. Different than
single-mobilization networks that are primarily formed by civil society actors, hybrid
networks encompass a vast array of actors. Besides all GCS actors and agents they may
also include states, state officials, international institutions and corporate gurus. Specific
types of hybrid networks include transnational social movements, global campaigns,
social forums and parallel summits.
Transnational Social Movements is the outcome of local social moments being
played at the glocal sites of GCS agency. Kaldor defines social movement as “looser
242
organizations, often based on grass-roots groups and making use of volunteers. By and
large they are campaigning groups engaged in various, often innovative, forms of protest.
Because of their grass-roots nature, social movements tend to be locally based, although
they can and do make coalitions across borders” (Kaldor 2001, p.111). Their
transnationality results either from across borders coalitions and/or from their ability to
become global symbols of local struggles against perceived or actual negative
implications of globalization. In either case, their main source of leverage in terms of
agency is to generate the formation of global social movements for global justice
21
. An
example of a transnational social movement is one seeking to end violence against
women. Sen has analyzed this movement in detail. She has mapped the origins of the
movement, its main contours, as well as coalitions within the movement, members,
successes and challenges (Sen 2003).
Global Campaigns can be another kind of hybrid network. It is true that for the
most part they can merely be part of a broader process. It may be simply one of the
strategies used by broader social networks, such as social movements. But it can also
have an end in itself. It can be the entire process. That was the case with the campaign
initiated by the Greenpeace to bring Shell‟s oil platform Brent Spar to shore. Still, not
much evidence had been collected on this particular form of transnational social agency.
Social Forums is yet another hybrid network. It is a mix of infra-structure and a
source of agency in itself. It provides a venue for social mobilization and generates the
strengthening of GCS by promoting internal debate, giving global visibility to GCS and

21
CASTELLS, Manuel, Lecture given at the University of Southern California Annenberg School for
Communication, in September 29, 2004.

243
even providing new opportunities for engagements with non-state actors, such as
government officials. The data on social forums is clear. It shows that global social
forums are a growing tendency, particularly since the Second World Forum that took
place in Porto Alegre, Brazil.
22
Social forums can have varying institutional structures.
Some are, in fact, permanent organizations for the promotion of GCS issues, interests and
challenges. Others may only have regular events, named as „social forums‟. They are all
characterized by internal plurality. “Another feature of the social forums is that debates
are not a means to an end, but the end itself. Social forums discuss proposals and
strategies, but they do not produce unified „final statements‟” (Kaldor, Anheier et al.
2003b, p.25).
It is worth mentioning that the understanding of social networks such as social
forums rather as types of social infrastructures finds some parallel in the ways specialists
in the field have begun analyzing these sources of agency. Marlies Glasius and Jill
Timms flat out ask that question in the very title of their contribution to GCSY05: “
Social Forums: Radical Beacon or Strategic Infrastructure?” (Glasius and Timms 2006,
pp.190-239). The nature of the social infrastructure in these manifestations are related to
matters of organization, to new ways for approaching decision-making, and to the
development of “ horizontal” politics based on networking.
The final hybrid network is parallel summits. Pianta defines them as events whose
main characteristics are: 1) they are organized by agents of GCS; 2) they coincide with or
are related to official summits organized by states and IOs; 3) they address the same
issues as the official summits, 4) they make use of a mix of public information, political

22
See GCSY03: Box 1.4: List of world, regional, and thematic social forums as of May 2003.

244
mobilization, protest and policy proposals, and; 5) with or without formal contacts with
the official summits (Pianta 2001, p.171). The analysis of parallel summits since the late
1990s indicates few trends. It shows a clear growth on the number of such events, a
prevalence of development and economic issues as their main agenda, a prevalence of
conference-type format for the summits, and two main goals: the formulation of
alternative proposals and the engaging in public information and consciousness raising.
23

Finally, their main relation with official summits is one characterized by strong
criticism, in opposition to either active dialogue or strong conflict. Interestingly enough,
it seems that their main success has not been to produce major impacts on the official
summits they relate to, but on GCS itself
24
. Apparently in similar ways as happens with
social forums, parallel summits provides a social space in which GCS agents can engage
in stronger and wider transnational networks, particularly in terms of what has been here
defined as CSOs. It has also generated strong political alliances among organizations
25
.
Transnational Collective Networks‟ agency in Global Civil Society is summarized
in Diagram 3.7 below.

23
See GCSY01: Figures 7.1 to 7.11, pp. 177-184.
24
See GCSY01: Figure 7.12, p. 185.
25
See GCSY01: Figure 7.14, p. 186.

245

Cognitive Reasoning on Global Civil Society Agency

This chapter explored in some detail the possibilities for analytical constructions
resulting from primarily cognitive-oriented forms of reasoning. Even when applied to a
Diagram 3.7: Type III of GCS Agency:
Transnational Collective Networks
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE NETWORKS‟ AGENCY IN GCS
TCNs
Transnational
Community
Networks
Hybrid
Networks
Single
Mobilization
Networks
Alternative
Network
Projects
Transnational
Advocacy
Networks

Transnational
Fundamentalist
Networks
Transnational
Social
Movements
Global
Campaigns
Social
Forums
Parallel
Summits
246
very concrete-oriented investigation, as is the case of a typological construction,
cognitive modeling offers new venues for exploring the ways we conceptually interpret
empirical realities. The full typology of agency in global civil society (shown below in
Diagram 3.8) is the final visual cognitive representation of one such venue.
The typology here introduced brought to the fore certain sources of GCS agency that
have not yet received much attention by existing data collection. Anheier, Glasius and
Kaldor point to the fact that there are key variables not yet charted. They include NGOs
as relays of funding, international professional migrants from CSOs, MNCs and IOs, and
global connectedness of the components of GCS (Anheier, Glasius et al. 2001b).
In this regard, it is relevant to notice, for instance, that several authors, when
analyzing their own specific topics of research, have recorded the participation of
individuals. If there appears to be enough information available from individual case
studies to justify the consideration of individuals as a class of agency in GCS, more
systematic studies about individual agency, however, is still missing: issues such as the
actual role that individuals play within GCS, their strategies, circumstances favoring
individual agency, among other things, are necessary for the construction of a more
accurate profile about the nature and scope of individual agency in GCS.
The typology here proposed does not aim at capturing reality at its totality. It only
provides an ideal-type of the component parts of agency in GCS. As showed with the
analysis of the data collected by the GCSY project, the characteristics of GCS currently
involves a process of experimentation in which different forms of social organizations
with potential and actual global reach have been tried.

247

Diagram 3.8: Complete Typology of Agency in Global Civil Society

Individual
s
Indigenous
Communities

Diaspora
Communities
As
Collectivity
As
Personality
Social
Leaders
Social
Activists
Public
Opinion
Spontaneous
Public
Manifestations
Grassroots
Communities

CSOs
Grassroots
Association
s
Professional
Association
s
TCSOs NGOs
INGOs
Fundamentalist
Groups
Watchdog
Groups
Sponsored
NGOs
Partnership
NGOs
Global
Federations
Sponsored
TCSOs
Transnational
Community
Associations
Local Epistemic
Communities

TCNs
Transnational
Community
Networks
Hybrid
Networks
Single
Mobilization
Networks
Alternative
Network
Projects
Transnational
Advocacy
Networks
Transnational
Social
Movements
Global
Campaigns
Social
Forums
Parallel
Summits
Transnational
Fundamentalist
Networks

247
248
Therefore, the various shapes through which GCS can express itself are rather
fluid. They are not absolute, as one form of agency may mutate and become something
else as the circumstances change (i.e., due to evolving requirements for funding by states,
state-agencies as well as by business corporations). Still, the assumption is that even if
the current manifestations of GCS are plural, it is still feasible to build a helpful typology
of what are the current forms of experimentation and GCS agency. In fact, constructing a
typology of agency allows for some interesting analysis of the data and research put
together by the GCSY project.
For example, GCS has been referred to as „globalization from below‟. But it turns
out that GCS has its own internal divisions. The data clearly indicates that even
meaningful improvements on the status of GCS in the South can be observed due to its
higher integration into the global economy as well as to the spread of democracy. Still,
the fact remains that GCS has its own elitist aspect. It is certainly possible to talk about
„GCS from below‟ and „GCS from above‟. The analysis of the top 10 cities in terms of
their share of NGOs shows no presence whatsoever of any city or country from the South
among them ((Glasius, Kaldor et al. 2002, p.323, Record 16c). On the contrary, the list
includes only the richest cities in the world, going from Washington DC to Paris, from
London to Tokyo, from New York to Geneva. In fact, Brussels, London and Paris
together comprise 60% of that list alone.
This is clearly an indicative of a GCS from above. Decisions of what is socially
needed in the world and how GCS should act upon it are frequently made on sites where
social realities are in fact well resolved. In that sense, it is pertinent to refer to Hakan
Seckinelgin‟s analysis about the way GCS deals with the issue of HIV/AIDS globally
249
(Seckinelgin 2002). The South is rather treated as the patient, the victim, the subject of
priorities and decisions made in the North, rather than the partner. This reflects on a GCS
agenda based on sets of priorities and actions frequently disengaged from the most
pressing needs from the South. But the data also shows the „thickening‟ of GCS,
particularly in the last decade. And it is hopeful to see that some of the most interesting
social experiments in terms of GCS mobilization have been produced with active
participation from the South. The city of Porto Alegre, in Brazil, founder and host of
most of the World Social Forum editions to date, has apparently entered the mental map
of GCS for good.
At the same time, authors have pointed out that the recent successes of GCS in the
last decade could in effect hinder its long-term goals. The reason for that is twofold. First,
there is the danger of co-option. New, hybrid forms of GCS agency, has in effect counted
with the participation of „outsiders‟, such as state leaders who are either sympathetic to
their causes or because they want to take political advantage. As well put by Said and
Desai (in reference to what they call as anti-capitalist movement) it “may yet fall victim
to its own success. Its meteoric rise has attracted some nasty fellow-travelers in the guise
of nationalist leaders, Third World multinationals, and old left gurus. They are
threatening to hijack the movement and block out its most attractive features – openness,
cosmopolitanism, informality, and popular appeal” (Oliviero and Simmons 2002, p.82).
For that reason, the growing of GCS is not an accomplished project. New forms
of global social agents have their own qualifications, some more appropriate than others.
Some may be better apt than others to deal with the changing dynamics of the global
environment. For that reason better classifications are needed. This chapter is just an
250
introductory chapter in this direction. Furthermore, it certainly needs improvements.
More data has to be analyzed to better confirm (or not) the types and sub-types here
presented. Important though is to recognize the increasing levels of complexity in the
ways GCS expresses itself. To better understand the various shades and shapes of GCS is
to improve its ability to act. In so doing, the prognostics for further „thickening‟ of global
civil society can certainly improve.
Furthermore, the very insight of focusing on social agency as a particular type of
network – rather than focusing on actors or issues – introduce a whole new way to think
about, collect data end analyze GCS. Much is said about GCS as introducing a new
“horizontal” mode of political organization in the mist of international politics, centered
about network principles. Finally, some important empirical attempts to confirm or not
this all-too-common claim is being carried out. Katz and Anheier do so, revealing some
actual features of network structures formed by transnational NGO networks (Katz and
Anheier 2006). Their research appears to confirm the general expectation that GCS tends
to favor non-hierarchical structures and relationships. These same authors had previously
argued for the relevance of network analysis applied to uncover the configurations of
GCS (Anheier and Katz 2005b, pp.206-221). They supported their analytical choice by
first making reference to the general view shared by scholars and specialists in the field
that GCS is indeed a relational phenomenon, whose meaning, functions, and systemic
structures may be better captured by network analysis. Then, they introduced what key
see as key features embedded in network analysis: such as the ability to uncover
relational matters of cohesion, equivalence, and prominence between nodes within a
given network, the range or level of reach of a network and its nodes, and brokerage
251
performed by nodes in relation to other nodes or networks simultaneously (pp.208-210).
I would argue that the type of analysis and the subsequent typology here introduced
largely mirror these same general interests in regards to the value of network analysis. At
the same time it adds to the list of original features presented by those authors by adding
others, embedded in cognitive models of networking. In the case of the typology here
built, it reveals the existence of a „directional path‟ available to social agents in their
ways of actually producing agency – which is to say affecting – the shape, content, and
strategic directions of global civil society.
Finally, the presumption is that if cognitive reasoning is a valuable tool to address
more concrete, empirical conceptual realities (i.e., typology of social agency), then it
should be equally or even more relevant when used to more abstract conceptual
constructions. After all, the ability to deal with complex abstract systems of meanings
should be one of the central contributions from cognitive approaches to knowledge
construction and systematic organization. As a method it should allow for argumentation
to be centered on better-grounded logical principles and not ideological claims.
The next chapter puts this argument to the test. It addresses what I see as the
existing various cognitive approaches to Religion by International Relations in the IR
literature. The problem, however, is the lack of formalization or conceptual clarification
on these cognitive appropriations shaping our very understanding on how international
studies should take religion into consideration and what are the topics for discussion.
Different arguments or approaches touch on different axiomatic determinants, clearly
violating some essential requirements necessary for the emergence of meaningful
conversations between them. This fundamental problem is visually represented with the
252
construction of a cognitive model aimed at displaying the logic behind such truncated
debate. The basic claim is that each of those approaches entails varying metaphysical or
axiomatic foundations that should shape beforehand the types of empirical relationships
allowed for consideration by their respective scholarships. With that in mind, I then
propose the reshaping of the debate, this time to be centered on the approaches‟ often
hidden paradigmatic foundations. This allows for the emergence of an alternative
cognitive model of representation, revealing fluid possibilities for fruitful inter-approach
engagements.
253
Chapter Four:
Representations of Religion by International Relations

The end of the Cold War has been followed by the resurgence of religious-based
conflicts as well as violent manifestations of religious fundamentalism as exemplified by
large-scale terrorist attacks in places such as New York, Bali, Madrid, and London. The
peace and democratic dividends widely believed to characterize the „new world order‟
were quickly replaced by an international environment in which security issues – once
again – dominate the political agenda. The recurrence of international or global religious-
based terrorism has forced the discipline of International Relations
26
(IR) to re-look at
religion as a central component of international politics. Yet, there is a lack of agreement
on a conceptual, theoretical and analytical framework to address a topic that, after all, has
for so long been largely neglected by the practitioners in the field. Scholars and policy-
makers widely diverge in their respective prescriptions about the ways IR should
incorporate religion. With this chapter, I address the relationships between religion and
international relations and argue that different understandings about the interplay between
the two entail distinct ontological, epistemological and methodological possibilities. To
recognize the nature of these understandings and their conceptual implications is a
requirement for a productive dialogue to take place, both among practitioners in the field

26
Throughout this chapter, International Relations, with initial capital letters and thereafter referred by with
the acronym „IR‟, means the academic field or discipline that dedicates itself to the study of international
phenomena, or relations. When referring to the social or spatial reality or phenomena to which the
discipline of IR refers to, I will use the expression „international relations‟, with small letters.

254
of IR and between IR and religion. To understand what religion means and what its
contributions can be may help us to bring to the fore whatever religion has to offer for the
advancement of human development and world peace, while at the same time helping us
to efficiently face the conflictive and destructive powers of religion.
The chapter contains the following key sections. First, I provide a brief overview
of the historic representations on the relationships between international relations and
religion. The arguments are centered on attempts at banning religion from the public
sphere of politics and the insistence of religion in continuing to be a relevant force in that
realm of socialization. Second, I discuss in some detail the contemporary prescriptions
found in the IR literature on how to address these relationships, while „translating‟ to the
language of VCM their respective analytical contents in the format of simple self-
contained cognitive models for each prescription discussed. Third, I engage in inference
making about the fractures and inconsistencies found in the ways the prescriptions relate
to each other, truncating dialogue. Fourth, I re-interpret those representations, this time
focusing on their respective hidden metaphysical and ontological foundations. The result
is the emergence of a distinct cognitive model on the range of possible logical and
ontological relationships between international relations and religion.

Historic Representations of Religion: Rejection & Persistence

The first step for us to properly understand the role that religion plays in
international relations is to assess the historic relationship between religion and politics.
As many historians and practitioners in the field of IR appear to agree, the process
255
leading to the formation of the nation-state had generated a profound impart on ways the
formal exercise of political and institutional authority are played out, both domestically
and internationally, structurally and in terms of agency. Since at least the early
seventeenth century religion had been stripped from its role as bearer of coercive power,
particularly as far as relations among sovereign states are concerned. However, looking
through the perspective of Braudel‟s concept of longue durée (Braudel 1958), these last
few centuries have also shown a remarkable resilience of religion to continue to be an
element of great influence for social and political relations. This, in turn, has sparked
many interpretations as to how to address the observed encounters between politics and
religion.
In this section I address in some detail these three central features on the
relationship between politics and religion, namely, the exclusion of religion from the
public life, the persistence and resurgence of religion in international politics, and the
most commonly held scholarly prescriptions on how to better address the encounters
between these two social dimensions.

Banning Religion from Politics

Scholars in the field of IR tend to share similar understandings about the way the
discipline recognizes the nature and role of religion in international affairs, which – to
many – explains the apparent neglect the field has expressed towards religion. Basically,
there is the widely shared, intersubjective, understanding that religion has been ignored
by IR due to the very foundational principles upon which this discipline has been built. In
256
this regard, Scott M. Thomas summarizes what he sees as the four main reasons why
international relations have neglected religion in its analysis (Thomas 2005).
First, the history of international relations and the rise of the modern international
society reveal that the Westphalian presumption privatized, marginalized and
nationalized religion. As put by Hatzopoulos and Petito (Hatzopoulos and Petito 2003;
Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003) the end of the Wars of Religion with the Peace of
Westphalia is seen as a turning point, when “religion was privatized, and through the
principle of the cuius regio eius religio (the ruler determines the religion of his realm)
pluralism among states and noninterference were born and worshipped as the new sacred
principles of the emerging Westphalian order” (Thomas 2005, pp.1-2). For Scott M.
Thomas this process made religion out to be a threat to order, civility and security, raising
the consensus that religion had to be disciplined by the state. Furthermore, religion as the
main basis for the conduct of foreign policy was replaced by political realism and the
principle of raison d’etat as the cornerstones of statecraft. Now politics emphasizes (a)
the system of states, (b) the nonintervention principle that serves as the main starting
point for the regulation of their relations and mutual interactions, and (c) the narrow
concept of military security. As a consequence, as pointed out by Cecelia Lynch the
Enlightenment assumptions that followed the formation of the new Westphalian system
of states associate “religion with danger, dogma and rigid conceptions of otherness”
(Lynch 2003, p.56).
The second reason for the neglect of religion in IR relates to the impact of
modernization theory in the field that gives emphasis to the transition from “traditional
society” (where religion and culture are thought to be) and “modern society.” Political
257
and economic developments are seen as the key components towards modernity, which
downplays the relevance of social matters, such as culture and religion. Modernization
theory to Scott M. Thomas has three assumptions. First, modern society can be
distinguished from traditional society, particularly in terms of economic development.
Second, modernization is seen as linear, progressive conception of social change. Third,
the process of secularization is part of modernization. According to the modernization
theory, attendance at religious services should decline with modernization, it should
retreat from the public square, and in order to survive religion would have to conform to
modern norms (rationality, relativism, pluralism, the secular state, science, and
economics). Scott. M. Thomas points out that with the secularization of politics religion
became a set of privately held doctrines or beliefs in substitution to a social
understanding of it, based on the notion of a community of believers (Thomas 2003).
The third argument is that culture and religion as social forces were marginalized
by the main images, paradigms, perspectives, or traditions of thought of IR, namely
realism (and neorealism) pluralism, liberalism, or neoliberal institutionalism. To realism
and its tenets religion is simply „superstition‟, although classical realism of the 40s and
50s was rooted, at least partially, in religious perspectives, with its emphasis on sin, the
limits of human nature, and human knowledge. These are exemplified by the rediscovery
of St. Augustine, seen by realists as the first political realist. Also, the English School, to
some soft realists, gives emphasis to the historical sociology of different state-systems,
which reveals the relevance of religion and world history for the study of international
relations. Pluralism, in turn, gives emphasis to the prospects of morality, international
law, international institutions, and to the ways in which the changing nature of power –
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political, military, and economic – has expanded the agenda of international relations.
Therefore, the nature and role of religion is either diminished – becoming merely sets of
moral standards – or outright dismissed as irrelevant to those approaches that represent
the analysis of the material components of international relations.
The final point raised by Scott M. Thomas is the overwhelming emphasis of
positivism and materialism in IR. The second great debate of IR has led to the triumph of
positivism and behaviorism (the scientific study of IR) over diplomatic history,
jurisprudence, and political philosophy. Consequently, the Christian perspectives on
international relations waned. The resulting rationalist assumptions limited the idea of
what good theories are and the role to be played by ideational factors (ideas, ideals,
passions, aspirations, ideologies, belief systems, norms, and collective identities).
Positivism and the kind of rationality it entails became the epistemological basis for the
discipline. The scientific method, assuming the world as comprised by unconscious
particles in mechanistic interaction is contrasted with the interpretive approach of the
humanities and critical or postmodern approaches that recognizes the “conscious world of
human beings with emotions, thoughts, and intentions that are capable of representing the
world to each other in meaningful ways” (Thomas 2005, p.60). The positivist scientific
approach, as exemplified by the neorealist approach, sees the unitary method of scientific
investigation as reflecting the belief in a single logic of explanation, in the separation of
facts from values, on the fact that the real causes of social reality are observable
phenomena and on the existence of general laws, patterns or regularities to be
„discovered‟ about the social world. Thus, for instance, religious fundamentalism is seen
as a general type or class of event, international conflicts result from material causes (i.e.,
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economic inequalities) and culture and religion are part of the ephemeral realm of values,
beliefs, attitudes, and feelings. In any case, Vendulka Kubálková states that the prevalent
positivist, materialist, and state-centric approaches in IR tend to contrast religion from
reason, which prevents its theorization from happening within the discipline (Kubálková
2003).
These developments enumerated above gave rise to great a number of
reservations about placing religion within international politics. They range from the fear
of the „commingling of church and state‟ to concerns about the emergence of theocracies,
from militant fundamentalisms to crusades of wars of religion. These are the fears that
modern secular politics, beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were trying
to overcome.
But it seems important also not to forget that such fears were closely related to
specific historic events, namely religious strife and violence in Europe (Carlson and
Owens 2003). To Richard Falk, secularism, both as an intellectual and as an ideological
current, was rooted in the desire of promoting nonreligious foundations of scientific
rationality for the governance of society. It can thus be contrasted to medievalism,
“which above all entailed the fusing of political and religious institutions and authority on
the basis of faith in a shared transcendent and absolute truth” (Falk 2001, p.36). In its
original form, secularism aimed indeed at limiting the impact of religion on the public
order. And it was both a cause and a result of the process leading to the formation of the
nation-state, autonomous, sovereign. But it was also a reactionary process to violent and
oppressive events linked to the exercise of religious authority. Religious warfare in
Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth century in Europe eventually generated the
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political consensus that a universal order cannot be imposed upon society. Thus, with
secularism not only religion was seen as inimical to the rise of science and material
progress, but also to the advancement of more humane forms of governance (Falk 2003).
Secularism, as a reaction to religious superstitions and abuses, was seen as a step forward
in the path of human development.

The Insistence of Religion

Despite such „modern‟, Western, secular understanding of religion, which
eliminates any theoretical, conceptual and analytical legitimacy in IR, reality seems to
point to a disconcerting different direction. The growing relevance of religion has been
remarkable. The United States, for instance, arguably the most modern of the modern,
advanced, and industrial democracies, is one of the most religious countries in the world.
About ninety-percent of the American population professes a belief in God, while about
seventy-percent of Americans are members of a church or synagogue. Even if religious
freedom is assured, constitutional and political matters involving religious arguments of
morality for political choices (i.e., abortion, homosexuality) are both relevant and socially
polarizing (Perry 1997).
The impact of religion has been, in fact, stronger worldwide over at least the last
two decades and has become a key component either in causing international conflicts or
in exacerbating them (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003). Religion has been more visible,
both at the private level (as spirituality and religiosity of individuals) and at the public
level. At the public level religion manifests itself domestically and internationally.
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Domestically religion can be observed at the state level, at the political society level and
at the civil society level. In international relations religion can be observed through
transnational relations (i.e., religious organizations), through state and non-state religious
groups and interstate relations (diplomatic relations between and among secular and
religious states) (Kubálková 2003, p.31).
However, it is the negative impacts of religion in the international sphere that has
made it impossible for IR to continue to neglect its relevance. The terrorist attacks of 9/11
in the US are just the most dramatic example of what has been perceived as violent acts
based on or supported by religious justifications. Religion as a threat or as a source for
international conflicts has given visibility to religious issues among the public in general
but also in IR. International conflicts have increasingly been perceived as being related to
matters of culture and identity, which is the case of religious fundamentalism and
terrorism. Once again, the resurgence of religion as a relevant topic for analysis in
international studies challenges the discipline‟s focus on secularization, modernity, and
rationality based on its Westphalian founding principles (Laustsen and Weaver 2003).
The reasons behind the insistence of religion in continuing to be a force in
international relations are not self-evident though. Thomas uses the social theory of
Alasdair MacIntyre to point out the importance of the relationship between rationality
and social tradition, and criticizes the “Enlightenment project‟s separation of reason and
morality from practice and tradition” (Thomas 2003, p.31). The claim here is that there is
no rationality independent of tradition. Once religion was taken away from the public
sphere to the private realm of social practices it necessarily took away the element of
tradition from social relations. Thomas goes on to say that in most non-Western societies
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the transition from a social to a modern understanding of religion has still to be made.
This would explain the large number of weak states with strong religions, all struggling
to redefine “their boundaries between the sacred and the profane in the face of
globalization” (Thomas 2003, p.28).
I would argue, however, that at the public level religion might become rather a
tool to an end, justifying its use in support and at the service of ideological struggles.
Religious conflicts may arise with the use of religious discourses by elites as part of their
strategic choices to deal with social challenges (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003). The
politization of religion can take various forms, one of them as a struggle between
secularism and religion. In this case, some argue, “it is not religion as such that acts. The
movement is driven by strategic action in a political context by some leaders, and the
action program is formulated at the interface of politics and religion” (Laustsen and
Weaver 2003, p.162). Here, the securitization of religion becomes the very foundation
(and definition) of religious fundamentalism.
Whatever the reason for its persistence, the manifestation of religion in the
international arena can take various forms. First, religion can be a source of people‟s
worldviews. It influences behavior, informs beliefs that are at the base for the formation
of norms and gives substance for the way individuals and society construct each other.
Second, religion can be a source for identity. It gives meaning to what people
believe what they are, informing their feelings of affinity, loyalty and boundaries (social
and geographic) in relation to those who are perceived as „others‟. In informing what the
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social boundaries are, religion, as a source for identity is believed to take priority over
alternative lines of social division, such as ethnicity, class or gender
27
.
Third, religion can be a source of legitimacy. It can provide moral justification for
state and non-state international actions (i.e., humanitarian intervention). It can also
justify options and policies formulated and executed by policy-makers.
Fourth, religion can be the very foundation for the existence of formal institutions,
such as the Roman Catholic Church. These institutions can influence policy-making,
support or oppose regimes as well as generate public mobilization based on religious
beliefs and arguments (Fox and Sandler 2004).
Fifth, religion can be a source of ideology. It can inform ideas, core values, the
definition of what is good and what is bad and what is seen as universal truth. Very often
then these values and truths tend to be seen as absolute, resisting change and justifying
their uncompromising defense even at the cost of generating conflicts.
Sixth, religion can be a source of cultural manifestation, more specifically at the
level of civilizations. This is the view most clearly related to Samuel P. Huntington‟s idea
of clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996). Here there is symmetry between the world
religions (Confucianism, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, and Christianity) and the major
ancient civilizations. In substitution of the West-East and North-South divisions, the
assumption is that the major international schisms for the twentieth-first century will be
determined by cultural differences, shaped by the conflicting interests of different
civilizations (Thomas 2000).

27
Many would argue, not without merit, that this is a very questionable statement, particularly with respect
to ethnicity. What is important here is not that this is actually the case, but that it can be perceived that way,
even if not always or even most of the time.

264
Finally, religion can be a source of patriarchy. It informs the basic norms and
rules for the way society is organized on race and, more important, gender lines. Looking
at the most virulent forms of religious expressions represented by fundamentalists, right-
wing militias and terrorist religious groups they are all too commonly informed by hatred
against the “decadent West.” They are perceived by these groups as controlled by
feminists, environmentalists, blacks and Jews, etc. and are characterized as lacking public
morality and, especially, unregulated female behavior (Tickner 2005).
The locus or special sites of religious manifestations also varies. It can be placed
at the individual and societal level (i.e., church and principles of morality), at the state
(i.e., theocracies), international (e.g. international organizations) and transnational levels
(e.g. NGOs and transnational religious movements).
Furthermore, religion can be seen either as a source of threat to the international
order and security (i.e., religious fundamentalism) or as a source of soft-power (Nye
2002; Nye 2004). When considering religion as a threat, it is important to notice the fact
that its potentially destructive power emerges not only as a reaction to modernization,
secularization or globalization as reflected on the principles and norms governing the
functioning of the states. Religion as a threat also results from differences and conflicts
occurring between and within religious groups, organizations and movements (Almond,
Appleby et al. 2003). The emergence of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that
culminated with the capture of Kabul in 1996, for instance, is an example of a broader
phenomenon. Major disagreements within established religious-based groups have led to
ruptures, disputes for power and legitimacy and eventually the „return‟ to what is
considered by the dissenting group as the real „fundamentals‟ of their religion. Almond et
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al reveal the irony of the immediate correlation made in the West between
fundamentalism and Islam. In fact, the term „fundamentalism‟ emerged in a 1920 edition
of the Northern Baptist periodical in the US, “whose editor described himself and a group
of conservative evangelical Protestants as militants willing to do “battle royal” to
preserve the “fundamentals” of the Christian faith from the evolutionists and biblical
critics infecting mainline seminaries and colleges” (Almond, Appleby et al 2003, p. 2).
Religion as a source of soft power relates to the attraction religion may exercise
over individuals, groups and communities on grounds that differ from the traditional
ideas of „sticks‟ (coercion) or „carrots‟ (enticements). Nye defines soft power as “the
ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others” (Nye
2002, p.9). Soft power is more than simply the ability to exercise influence or persuasion
over others; it refers to the ability to co-opt others:

The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets
such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and
policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. (…) Simply put, in
behavioral terms soft power is attractive power. (Nye 2004, p. 6)

As far as religion is concerned soft power can be manifested through the actions
and examples given by charismatic religious leaders, through the moral validity of
religious arguments (i.e., justice and human rights protection) as well as through the
workings of religious institutions (e.g. Liberation Theology in Latin America).
What all these different religious manifestations reveal is the complexity of the topic.
Consequently, scholars and practitioners in IR offer different solutions and alternatives to
the way the discipline should incorporate religion in its analysis.
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IR Prescriptions on Dealing with Religion

Religion may both be a positive as well as a negative force in international
relations. But, for the most part, it is religion as a disruptive force that has made its
appearance in news and policy-making headlines. So, it is only natural that most of the
emerging prescriptions tend to focus on religion as a problem or as a threat. Ultimately,
more radical claims may favor a complete banning of religion from matters of politics.
Counterbalancing such a strict approach other prescriptions may go in the opposite
direction. Here religion is seen not only as essential for the understanding and explaining
of international phenomena but it is deemed as its very foundation, its very soul. The
radicalization of such approach may advocate that in the end everything is religion. In
between these two poles, a spectrum of possibilities can be prescribed. The Diagram 4.1
below shows a visual representation of the interpretive spectrum of possibilities.

The first and the last node in the network are the afore-mentioned radicalized
prescriptions, which are not really taken seriously in the scholarly world of academia.
Diagram 4.1: Line Network for the „Spectrum‟ of IR Prescriptions on Religion
No
Religion
All Is
Religion
267
The other five nodes in the network are the main five prescriptions found in the literature.
Next I address their content and build for each a self-contained network model of their
main analytical contents. What the emerging models reveal is that different prescriptions
suggest different conceptual alternatives to address the relationship between religion and
IR, a theme that will be further explored in the subsequent section of this chapter.
One alternative is to recognize the disruptive potential of religion and to deal with
it through the formulation of specific policy strategies; each strategy aiming to address
specific stages leading to the escalation of religious conflicts (Hasenclever and Rittberger
200, pp. 122-136). The first stage would be to face the underlying economic and social
crisis, or perceived inequality and injustice existing within and among nations.
Development and democratization are seen as the key strategies at this stage (strategy
one).
The main problem here is that it presupposes a viable state for this strategy to
succeed. Once the perceived levels of injustice and grievances reach a critical point,
political conflicts emerge and with them the invocation of the sacred by political
entrepreneurs. The strategy proposed in this regard is one of dialogue (strategy two) in
order to point out to the fact that the interpretation of the sacred as presented by militant
leaders is just one among many possible interpretations. Key initiatives are suggested:
established religious authorities can denounce the use of faith to sustain political conflicts
and stressing common set of moral values and norms within the various religious
doctrines. These same authorities can channel the willingness for sacrifices into peaceful
actions in order to redress grievances. They can focus on the moral common ground
between the great world religions in order to stop the dehumanization process that feeds
268
violence, and to give voice to the poor and the oppressed. Once the violence escalates
there is a possibility to put in place strategies of deterrence and repressive denial (strategy
three).
An example would be the establishment of homogeneous regions with secure
access to the outer world (safe havens). In this regard, Hasenclever and Rittberger
specifically suggest that the major powers should abstain from intervention into the
internal affairs of alien civilizations, as advocated by Huntington. In order for these
strategies to be successful, two issues must be previously addressed, according to the
authors. First, there is the dilemma situation between different religious communities,
when all should follow the adoption of peaceful measures. Second, there is the problem
of the admittance of guilt, which can ultimately undermine the credibility of the religious
leaders.
Diagram 4.2 below summarizes the first prescription found in IR literature on
religion. It reveals a relationship that starts with negative, threatening, empirical
consequences from religion (the node to the left) on international relations (the node to
the right). The first, thicker, solid arrow, or linkage, shows the specific directional path
from religious inputs, whose „negative‟ nature is represented by the mathematical signal
for subtraction. All international relations can do is to try to minimize those negative
inputs by influencing the conditions upon which religious threats may flourish. The
thinner solid linkage represents that.

269

A second alternative is simply to consider religion as having no direct bearing on
international relations, at least not having a direct causal role. But from this it does not
follow that religion is irrelevant. To Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler religion may be
perhaps the most important intervening variable informing agency in international
relations. The solution prescribed in this case would be to integrate the topic of religion
into the existing theoretical framework of the discipline, much in the same way as
happened with the incorporation of nationalism and ethnocentrism. Eventually the field
of IR recognized them as important (even if indirect) factors to explain international
outcomes (Fox and Sandler 2004). Implicitly, this approach avers that religion is not
among the key topics for international politics. It should be incorporated in empirical and
conceptual analyses within the field insofar as religion „intervenes‟ with more profound
and directly observable international phenomena.
This is certainly a clean approach to religion, one that may prove true for the way
the discipline will eventually incorporate religion in its studies. The problem is the
Diagram 4.2: Religion as Threat

R
-

IR
270
character of such approach, which, for the most part, is reactive. If religion interferes with
political processes then it will be considered. If not, then it is simply discarded. Even if
explanations are to be found about religious „interference‟ in political matters very little
will be said about the very nature of religion. This is also true for other variables like
ethnicity and race, which may be vital in certain cases but absent in others. It is curious
that here the empirical, positivist methods in search for causality will drive the
understanding of something that ultimately may not be amenable to such approach at all.
To many, the understanding of religion implies a whole different approach altogether.

Diagram 4.3 shows the visual representation of the interpretation of religion as
being of secondary relevance. The main node to the left (IV) represents independent
variables of relevance, capable of generating significant international outcomes, or effects
on international relations (IR), represented in the model by the thicker solid linkage.
Therefore, religion is taken into consideration to the extent that it „intervenes‟ on such
Diagram 4.3: Religion as Intervening Variable

IR

IV

R
+/-
271
outcomes along the way, as one among many other variables (thus the thinner solid
linkage). What is not discussed in this view is the nature of religious‟ influences on
international outcomes, which justifies its representation with the combination of the
mathematical symbols for addition and subtraction (positive or negative religious
influences).
A different alternative is to avoid that religion becomes a source of ideology
altogether, de-securitizing religion (Laustsen and Weaver 2003, p.169). But for that to
happen, discussions about religion must go beyond the analysis of its communities and
political functions toward a true discussion of ethics in IR. Ultimately better theories and
categories cannot fully solve a problem that, in the end, reflects political processes. But
still, this is an outlook that can allow for the emergence of analyses that go beyond the
view of religion merely as a source of conflict. It can reveal the possibilities for inter-
faith dialogue among different religious traditions (Lynch 2003, pp.62-71). Of course,
dialogue may range from no dialogue at all (exclusivism) to different forms of
conversations. Inclusivism accepts co-existence and the validity of other religious
systems. But it does so viewing competing religious traditions as incomplete or
unenlightened systems. Efforts to universalize one‟s own (superior) system of belief are
prevented by the reasons of impracticalities and ethics. Pluralism goes a step further and
acknowledges the multiplicity of truth and the similarity of purpose and functions of
different religious traditions. Its focus is rather on how religious beliefs inform different
cultural experiences.
But, the Western missionary activities that took place particularly in Asia and
Africa during the twentieth century – supported by this approach – have been criticized
272
for their cultural and religious imperialism. In opposition to pluralism the apologetics
focus on the defense of a doctrine when challenged from the outside. Positive apologetics
focus on reinforcing the consistency and superiority of one‟s own religion over others.
Finally, syncretism aims at finding legitimacy for pre-colonial practices and beliefs in the
context of world religions through notions of indigenization, enculturation and
syncretism. Syncretistic movements have challenged and even revised world religions
doctrines. More than being an ethical and a theological position they also reflect
anthropological and historical processes, influencing dynamics and processes in terms of
ethnicities, post-colonialism and even producing new transnational, cross-cultural cultural
innovations (Droogers and Greenfield 2001). It resonates with deconstructionist
philosophy, with aspects of the English School and with the constructivist ontology.
The inter-faith dialogue is a conceptual alternative that reveals the possibilities for
mutual understanding (and its limits) among the various religious traditions. It certainly
demystifies the essentialist argument that religion is hermetic to dialogue. It also reveals
an important aspect of the challenges that religion poses, which is the fact that all too
often religious-based domestic conflicts eventually emerge from unresolved disputes
existing among religious traditions. Said differently, many international political conflicts
with religious justifications are primarily about contentions for the souls of the faithful or
about struggles for religious authority within a given religious tradition or community.
Only secondarily they may be about secular, political interferences on religious matters.
However, the limits of this approach should be evident. It may address the religious side
of the equation, but not the international political one. How exactly should IR scholars
and practitioners be part of inter-faith dialogue? Should they be part of that al all? In the
273
meantime, international relations keep flowing, interacting with religious manifestations
of all sorts, in all manners. The complex realities of politics and inter-faith dialogue (and
conflicts) keep bumping on each other. The question is how to address them in ways that
are conductive to dialogue and peaceful solutions, thus minimizing the possibilities for
explosive, violent occurrences. To address inter-faith dialogue may not be enough. In
addition to that, inter-faith and inter-political interactions must be also considered.

Diagram 4.4 visually summarizes the perspective of religion influencing
international relations as a by-product of inter-faith dialogue, here represented by two
nodes on religion interacting with each other within a large (oval) node to the right. Inter-
faith dialogue (R1 and R2) takes place within the realm of religion (R) and only the
outcome of these interactions affect international relations (IR), here represented by the
thicker solid linkage. The assumption in this view is a likely positive effect on
international relations (thus the mathematical symbol), directly affecting the very nature
Diagram 4.4: Inter-Faith Dialogue & Political Ethics
+
R1
R2
R
IR
274
of IR, as long as it incorporates the notion of ethics in its conceptual fabric. In the
language of VCM the double-lined dotted notation indicates ontology. Another
assumption, although not properly explicated in this view, is that somehow IR affects the
inter-faith dialogue in return. The thinner dotted arrow represents this idea. It is dotted
because it implies the existence of such influence, but without specifying how.
A fourth alternative is to recognize the dynamic components of religion as
reflexive of a different reality altogether when compared to politics. In this regard,
Kubálková (Kubálková 2003) is explicit about the need to recognize religion on its own
terms and proposes a serious discussion about the ontology of religion. To that aim she
distinguishes between two ways to define and understand religion. Religion can be seen
as faith as well as institutions or communities. She also distinguishes between the
positivist and the religious understandings of the world. The former may be applied to
politics but the latter may not be amenable to the rationalist, positivist worldviews.
However, due to the relevance of religion in world affairs it is important to find proper
ways to address the relationship between religion and politics.
For that reason Kubálková advocates the development of what she calls
International Political Theology (IPT) as the proper way to address such ontological
issues. IPT should take theology and “theos to refer to the systematic study of discourses
and the relations among them concerning world affairs that search for – or claim to have
found – a response, transcendental or secular, to the human need for meaning”
(Kubálková 2003, p.80). If positivism, materialist, and state-centric accounts in IR
contrast religion to reason, and if „soft constructivism‟ has been hijacked by mainstream
IR, the author believes that Nicholas Onuf rule-oriented constructivist framework (Onuf
275
1989) is better suited to address religion on its own terms. If positivism looks for the
unlocking of external mechanisms, their functioning and regularities, a rule-oriented
constructivist approach seeks for the recognition and understanding of the unique human
linguistic construction that informs action through meaning. It is the „insider‟s
perspective‟ of human emotions and identity that provides for the meaning and logic that
make it possible for our social world to emerge.
Rule-oriented constructivism is “an anthropology of society, showing how rules
influence the nonlinguistic aspects of human existence”. It focuses on human universals,
such as the ability to use language and reason, “points to words, speech acts, and rules as
the key ontological elements of human interaction and of the human view of the world”
(Kubálková 2003, p.91). In this view, religion is seen as a manifestation of assertive rules
(meaning through conjecture and ceremony) all too often dismissed as non-modern,
primitive, and non-rational. Religion, in constructive terms, can be defined as (1) a
system of rules and related practices; (2) an explanation about the meaning of existence;
and (3) as motivator and guide for the behavior of believers based on faith. Religion as
rules is expressed through assertive speech acts and instruction rules. Religious sanctions
are derived from the divine authority, being faith the essence of religion, the core of
consciousness and culture. The reasoning for the acceptance of such rules is based on the
status of the agent performing the speech acts (i.e., priest, professor). This stands in
opposition to modernity‟s commitment rules based on the contractual model, built around
the individual and requiring standards of empirical proof (not possible in religion). Faith
thus is a non-linear form of reasoning, not based on utilitarian gratification. But religion‟s
276
assertive rules are compatible with similar systems, such as nationalism, and are thus
suitable for political exploitation.
Diagram 4.5 below summarizes the approach focusing on the ontology of
Religion (thus the double-lined dotted node “R”). The bi-directional dotted linkages
separating the two nodes (representing Religion and IR) indicate two distinct social
worlds, but possibly affecting or interacting (intersecting) with each other. Note that the
investigations in this view emphasize almost exclusively ontological make-ups of
religion, while very briefly touching on how it affects the political world or even the very
nature of the world of IR. Kubálková proposes the creation of International Political
Theology as an interdisciplinary field aimed at investigating religion on its own terms as
well as the ways religion affects world politics and vice-versa. But again, there is hardly
any information on the ontology of IR. The different notations for the two constituting
nodes in the model reflect that variation of emphasis in regards to ontological matters.

Diagram 4.5: IPT & Religion as Rules

IR

R
277
A final alternative is to look at religion and politics as being mutually embedded.
On the one hand, the primordialist, essentialist, accounts of religion – prevalent in IR –
focus on the immutable nature of religion and see religious identities, communities and
even its cultural components as being static, hermetic to change and, therefore, to
dialogues and compromises. The focus then is on what is perceived as rigid sets of
doctrines, beliefs, and religious practices. On the other hand, the modernist or
instrumental approach to religion reduces religion to issues of identities. As such religion
becomes merely one among other sources of identity. An alternative is to understand
religion as reflecting „interpretive communities‟, as suggested by Scot M. Thomas. In so
doing one may recognize the evolving nature of such communities and their religious
components. Here the argument is that religious interpretations cannot be separated from
politics. If the religious texts are fixed, the beliefs resulting from their interpretation are
not. An ongoing dialogue takes place between religion, their members and society
(Thomas 2000). The implicit assumption in this approach is that going beyond the view
of religion solely as a threat would require practitioners in IR to question the very
meaning of „religion‟ as a concept.
History shows that religious traditions, such as the Judeo-Christian tradition, were
never confined to narrow ethnic, regional, or national boundaries. In fact, “over the
centuries, the international dimension has been an integral feature of Western religion”
(Wuthnow 1992, p.153). Migrations, whether voluntary or not (i.e., refugees) carry with
them the seeds of religious beliefs and practices. Missionary and evangelization have also
been international in scope. They have taken to the international realm matters of
prejudice as well as compassion; thus shaping relations among groups, ethnicities and
278
nationalities. Hence religion is an integral part of dynamic social configurations at all
levels, including the international and the global ones. Therefore, to separate politics
from religion is artificial and not conductive to the understanding of the role played by
religion beyond national boundaries. It is not simply a matter of religion being relevant to
issues such as “war and peace, poverty, and prosperity, exploitation and social justice.”
Religion is embedded in social realities and an integral component of their
manifestations. What are needed then are more systematic theoretical perspectives aiming
at encompassing religion‟s roles in international relations (Wuthnow 1992, p. 156).
This is an approach that certainly challenges secularization and modernization
theories. Despite the development of the rationalist thinking linked to modernity, the
belief in science and knowledge as an antidote to ignorance and superstition, religious
beliefs, and practices, have not declined. In fact, religion has even borrowed from science
and from rational institutional procedures since the Middle Ages. The allegedly
separation between the state and religion may be only an indirect one as more and more
politicians are expected to fulfill and respect religious beliefs and principles of morality
in their official conduct. In short, the idea of secularization may not only be implausible
but also illegitimate. After all, as put by Peter L. Berger, religion provides the „sacred
canopy‟ under which society flourishes and finds meaning (Berger 1967). To Berger, the
most critical social component is nomination. It is to prevent the individual separation
from the social world, and thus assuring the existence of an ordered and meaningful life.
Separated from society, the individual is exposed to extinction, both psychologically as
well as physically. And it is religion that provides for nomination in bringing to society
the notion of the sacred under which not only order, but also meaning can manifest
279
themselves: “by sacred is meant here a quality of mysterious and awesome power, other
than man and yet related to him, which is believed to reside in certain objects of
experience” (Berger 1967, p.25). Religion then is the means through which humans
manage to produce a world-construction. According to Berger:

Religion implies the farthest reach of man‟s self-externalization, of his
infusion of reality with his own meanings. Religion implies that human
order is projected into the totality of being. Put differently, religion is the
audacious attempt to conceive [sic] of the entire universe as being humanly
significant. (pp.27-28)

The potential problem with this approach is that politics becomes religion. There
is no fundamental separation between the two. Besides, one of its corollaries is the
understanding that religion belongs to the public realm. Although some authors in IR may
agree with such view, this is a very contentious position.

Diagram 4.6: Embedded Religion

R ≈ IR
280
Diagram 4.6 above visually represents the approach that favors the view of
religion and politics as mutually embedded in ontological terms. The form a single
integrated social reality, here represented as a single node. Once again the dotted double-
line represents ontology in the language of VCM.
What this brief mapping of various representations of religion reveals is enormous
variations in the ways practitioners in the field of IR conceptualize religion. Obviously,
each conceptualization leads to different ways to address the topic. Different
prescriptions see differently the challenges (and possibilities) that religion poses to issues
that are at the core of IR concerns, be they issues of power, order and security,
development or identity. Obviously, different conceptions of religion lead to different
ways to deal with it, both theoretically and methodologically.
But what exactly are the logic fundamentals of these variations? What are the
main points of agreement and fractures implicit between these various approaches to
religion in international studies? To answer that question, the next step is to visually
integrate the various models displayed in Diagrams 4.2 to 4.6 into the original „spectrum‟
line model introduced in Diagram 4.1.

Fractures and Inconsistencies in RI Dialogue on Religion

The Diagram 4.7 below summarizes the „spectrum of possibilities‟ within the IR
literature for representations of the ways religion should be addressed in the field. The
diagram shows one of the alternative modes of visualization introduced in Chapter 2,
namely cognitive instances.
281

Diagram 4.7: Cognitive Instances for Line-Network Representations of Religion by IR

No
Religion
Inter-Faith
Dialogue &
Political
Ethics

Embedded
Religion

IPT
& Religion
as Rules

Religion as
Intervening
Variable

Religion as
Threat

Everything
As Religion

IR

IV
R
+/-
IR R
-
+
R
R
IR
R

R ≈ IR

IR
R

281
282
The three horizontal instances are the main levels of cognitive reasoning. The first
line is simply a line network. It indicates the „spectrum‟ of possibilities, seven in total. It
presupposes a coherent line in which the nodes of the network share some common
characteristics (justifying their systemic presence in the network). The line network also
presupposes variation between the nodes, such as some intrinsic characteristics,
movement, etc.
The second line of the cognitive instances within the model introduces the
conceptual content for each node. As previously stated the two extreme poles of the
network are either the complete exclusion of religion from academic investigations in
international studies (the node to the extreme left of the network) or the consideration that
in the end everything is religion (the node to the extreme right of the network). Obviously
neither is taken seriously in the literature. Therefore, they are both excluded from further
analysis, what justifies their absence in the third instance of the model, centering on the
alternative approaches actually addressed in the scholarly literature, as shown in the
previous section of this chapter.
The third cognitive instance within the model uncovers the basic analytical
content for each representation of religion, as previously discussed. If the second instance
treated each node as an autonomous container, this time they are treated as containments
within which lies further content, expressed by additional cognitive constructs and
network structures in their interior.
The fundamental question at this stage is: by analyzing the visual cognitive model
in Diagram 4.7, what can we infer on the state of knowledge, or intersubjective
283
representations, in the field of IR in regards to the relationships between religion and
international relations?
The first obvious inference from looking at the visual cognitive model is the
disparate epistemological takes from the various academic representations, vis-à-vis each
other. While the first two (from the left to the right) focus entirely on causal relations
between religion and politics, the last two engage in ontological considerations. Only the
third one (on interfaith-dialogue and ethic politics) somewhat addresses both empirical
causal manifestations and the ontological backgrounds providing them logical
justifications. But as previously discussed, much is said about the value of inter-faith
dialogues, with little reasoning on how it may indeed produce ontological changes in
politics (i.e., ethics). This flagrant difference in emphasis between the empirical and the
ontological should be enough to truncate any meaningful dialogue. After all, either the
metaphysical as well as the ontological elements of both Religion and International
Relations as fields for systematic investigations are dealt with, or we focus on empirical
ways in which the two interact. Sure, ultimately analyses of causal relations must
consider the metaphysical and the ontological make-ups of the variables involved in those
relations if they are to be meaningful at all. Likewise, ontological considerations must be
aware of the empirical realms in which those abstract entities manifest. Otherwise, what
is the utility of their investigations? But the shortcomings on the analyses seem clear. For
the most part a simultaneous double take on the empirical and on their ontological
foundations is absent. Some approaches focus on causal relationships, only implicitly
addressing their epistemological foundations (if much). Others center on metaphysical
284
justifications about religion and politics interactions, stopping short of looking into the
range of their empirical manifestations.
A second inference, drawing from the first, is the recognition that the line-
network that should reflect a linear spectrum of representations of religion is not in reality
a single network. There are no clear features fully uniting them in the network other than
the very broad understanding that they all refer to the relationship between religion and
international relations. But even here the assumptions are not at all clear or universally
shared. While the first two representations in the network clearly reduces the meaning of
international studies to the realm of political relations, the last three raises some questions
about the fundamentals of IR as a realm of socialization. Likewise, there are no clear
differing features being transferred from one node to the next in terms of gradation.
However, one can see an absolute emphasis on empirical manifestations at first, which
becomes intertwined with ontological considerations (even if faintly at first), when finally
matters of ontology take over the debates entirely. So, in reality, there are two line-
networks, connected by an intersection, as shown in Diagram 4.8 below.
The hybrid gradation-lines network is connected by one node, sharing features
with both line-networks. The third representation on religion, focusing on inter-faith
dialogue and ethic politics, has causal elements, drawing from conversations between
religious groups, which generates causal effects on (ethnic) politics. But it has also
ontological features to the extent that it questions the very nature of politics, a
requirement to engage in considerations on moral religious values.

285

By looking closely at each of the two line-networks, allows for a third inference:
that each line-network is, indeed, different types of networks altogether. The first line-
network, centered primarily on empirical considerations, indicates that the
representations in the model have a tendency to be one-sided, thus precluding a broader
and more systemic understanding of the ways religion interacts with politics. While the
understanding of religion as a security threat focus on its negative or destructive aspects,
the next approach sees religion as an intervening variable, primarily informing social
agency, with positive as well as negative consequences. To fully reclaim the validity of
religion in international studies, the third approach centers its analysis on the role of
religion for building an ethical political reality through inter-faith dialogue.

Diagram 4.8: Hybrid Gradation-Lines Network
Ontological Empirical

+/-

-

+

R ≈ IR

286

Together they form rather a „pendulum‟ type of conversation, as shown in
Diagram 4.9 above. The pendulum network suggests a movement between two opposing
poles (one negative and one positive), separated by a node with mixed values in between.
The pendulum also indicates that all the conversation does, really, is to move along that
pendulum, without ever engaging in actual inter-argumentation conversations.
The second line network, centered primarily on ontological claims, indicates the
existence of a blending network in regards to the main epistemological premises
displayed by the three representations on the relationships between religion and
Diagram 4.9: Pendulum Network
IR IV
R
IR R
-
+
R
R
IR
R
+/-
287
international relations. The Diagram 4.10 below is the graphic representation of such a
model. The node at the top is the „generic space‟, which is to be blended (ontology). The
two nodes side by side are the „inputs‟ from where the main elements forming the
blended space (the node at the bottom) originates. Finally, at the bottom, the blended
space congregates, in this particular case, ontological claims from both international
relations and religion. Certainly, the arguments from the „input‟ spaces are not the same
as those found in the blended space, the approach here termed as „embedded religion‟.

Diagram 4.10: Blending Network

IR

Ontology
+
R
R
IR

R ≈ IR
R
288
However, there are important commonalities in the epistemological ways in
which arguments are presented. For instance, the approach calling for inter-faith dialogue
claims the need for „inclusivism‟, a view that opposes the essentialist understanding of
religion. This call for integration and interpretation is not dissimilar to the call for the
understanding of religion as „interpretive communities‟. In both cases, there is the
fundamental underlying belief that religion is not hermetic and necessarily guided by
fundamentalist or intrinsic principles. Likewise, the understanding of „religion as rules‟
open for interpretation somewhat fits with the argument in the „embedded religion‟
interpretation that, after all, rules guiding religion have always displayed an international
outlook. International relations, in turn, brings with it the very set of rules guiding moral
judgments, compassion and empathy when dealing with “others”, even if when these
rules are unwritten.
Considering that the “inter-faith dialogue” is part of the two networks presented in
Diagrams 4.09 (pendulum network) and 4.10 (blending network), the logical conclusion
is that the two networks intersect, as shown in Diagram 4.11 below.
The pendulum-blending intersection network shows, visually, that the hidden
logic behind the debates in international studies on religion is that of two distinct
epistemological concerns, connected by a thin intersection between them. The pendulum
network displays matters of causality as the primary source for reasoning. The blending
network, in contrast, focus on matters of ontology. At the intersection point, there is one
approach somewhat addressing both elements, even if insufficiently, as already argued.

289

Diagram 4.11: Pendulum-Blending Intersection Network
Pendulum Network Blending Network

IR
IR IV
R
R
-
IR
+
R
R

Ontology
IR
+/-

R ≈ IR
R

289
290
What we originally addressed as being a linear „spectrum‟ of approaches is, in
reality, the combination of two distinct types of networks. Each has its own internal logic
as to how dialogue is carried out between IR and religion. The pendulum network, as the
name suggests, has as its defining character the oscillation between pros and cons
empirical effects of religion on international politics. Also within that oscillation feature
varies the weight of politics as the defining element in international relations. From left to
right in the pendulum‟s movement, it goes from almost absolute to just one of the field‟s
defining empirical domains for consideration. As for the blending network, the defining
character of the debate is the „generic‟ incorporation of ontological considerations on
arguments either on international relations (ethic politics), on religion (IPT), or both
(embedded religion).
In short, what was originally seen as a linear spectrum of possibilities for the
interaction between religion and international relations (Diagrams 4.1 and 4.7), becomes
first two intersected line networks (Diagram 4.8) and then, finally, after close evaluation,
two very distinct networks. Diagram 4.12 below exposes all the cognitive instances for
the logic supporting the reasoning here formulated.

291

Diagram 4.12: Cognitive Instances on IR Representations on Religion
Religion as
Threat
Embedded
Religion
Religion as
Intervening
Variable
Inter-Faith
Dialogue
Religion as
Rules

+/
-

-
+

R ≈ IR

+/-

-

+

R ≈ IR

-

+/-
+

Ontology

R ≈ IR

292
Reframing the Debate: The Cognitive Semantics of IR Interpretations
on Religion

As discussed in the previous section the various approaches in IR literature on
Religion for the most part focus either on matters of empirical causal relations or on
matters of ontology. But, as also hinted, they all do have ontological justifications, even if
implicitly stated. In this section I will address those from the standpoint of cognitive
semantics; in terms of the way one would grammatically link Religion to IR.
Cognitive semantics is a an area of study within the broader field of cognitive
linguistics primarily concerned with the relationships between knowledge representations
and conceptualizations, or meaning construction (Evans 2007). Here the focus is on
linguistic semantics as a fundamental way to define the way IR and Religion stands in
relation to each other. In other words, what would be the proper preposition that better
translates the terms in which the two intersect according to the various approaches
introduced in the previous section?
Once again, each representation (linguistically defined by the use of one
preposition as opposed to others) leads to a particular visual model. Each model points to
a different ontological scenario. Different scenarios reflect concerns with different
problématiques. The point here is not to propose the best scenario. A more productive
approach may result from the recognition of the interchangeable nature of the different
realities described by different conceptual scenarios. It can help us to better adjudicate in
favor of the scenario more attuned with any given historic and special circumstance
293
presented. It can also help us to look into the ways these scenarios mutually relate and
thus evolve into new social possibilities.

Religion UNDER International Relations

The understanding of religion UNDER international relations implies a relation of
hierarchy, in which religion is only regarded as relevant to the extent that it somehow
produces meaningful consequences to those areas of studies deemed as central to IR. This
is the case of religion as a security threat when religious fundamentalism or religious
conflicts „force‟ IR to take religion into consideration. The implication of such approach
is that the ontology of religion fundamentally opposes that of international politics. It
becomes merely a particular kind of violence or threat to security, among others, to which
IR imposes its own analytical tools to solve the problem in a top-down fashion.
The outlook of religion as a threat starts with the view that religion is a source of
conflicts due to an intrinsic exclusivist worldview hold as fundamental by each religious
groups, manifestations, and churches. The so-called primordialist view understands that
uncompromising religious beliefs are an integral part of the ontological make-up of world
religions. Furthermore and somewhat linked to the primordialist approach, the
instrumentalist view argues about the inevitable „politization‟ of religion. It results from
economic, social or state decay that opens political spaces for religious engagement.
Finally, the continuous interplay between true believers and those merely seeking
political mobilization of religious constituents may also lead to conflicts, as moderate
constructivists tend to believe (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003, pp.109-115).
294
Since the ontology of religion becomes equated with opposition, exclusivism and
ultimately violence, then it appears to be just another kind of violence in the world of
power and politics. Therefore, it is enough to apply (or to impose from the top) to the
analysis of religion the well-known positivist logic, so pervasive in mainstream IR.
Hasenclever and Rittberger (2003), for instance, apply a rational choice model, in order
to address what they see as the various phases of conflicts‟ escalations based on religious
justifications. They reduce the logic of religion to that of politics, when elites and leaders
simply manipulate the masses to foster their own interests. As in politics, the goal of
religion becomes maximization of utilities. As we can see, this approach does not require
any changes or even amendments to the analytical and conceptual tools available in IR.
More than reducing the logic of religion to one that should be subordinated to that
of politics (if order and peace are to be assured) the top-down IR approach to religion
reduces the scope of the former as well, now restricted to the very specific and limited
issues of security politics and politics of power. That is why religious fundamentalism so
often becomes a central religious issue for those interested in the role of religion UNDER
international relations. The implication is that not only the ontology of religion becomes
strict and reduced to a single set of one-sided (negative) claims, but the ontology of IR
becomes reduced as well. IR becomes equated with international or world politics, whose
central ontological tenets are matters of security. These include concerns over domestic
religious conflicts spilling over beyond national borders, and transnational religion as a
source of power strategy to contest modernization and secularization, thus feeding
fundamentalist movements (Fox and Sandler 2004). But then, issues such as political
religion (i.e., Political Islam), political influence from diaspora groups, the religious
295
contributions for the spreading of human rights and for debates about contentious issues
such as women‟s rights (i.e., contraception and abortion), among others, are only
indirectly addressed by this approach.
Diagram 4.13 displays a visual representation of the ontological make-ups of IR
and Religion in regards to each other in this top-down approach. The model also
represents the „reduced‟ metaphysical premises guiding the relationship between IR (at
the top) and Religion (at the bottom).

The main nodes inside this model have dotted double-lines for their borders. In
VCM notation they refer to matters of ontology. In this case, they refer to the fact that the
contents or arguments for each refer to their respective ontological constitution. The node
for IR has two layers of ontological borders. The outer-ring represents a full potential
range of ontological principles guiding its very nature. It would include views of
international relations as comprising not only politics, but also all sorts of issues (i.e.,

IR
R
T
hr
ea
t
Diagram 4.13: Religion UNDER International Relations
296
economics, global civil society), processes (i.e., international, but also transnational), as
well as agents (i.e., nonstate actors). The inner-ring reflects the strict view of the field in
this top-down approach as reduced to matters of security, power, and politics. The solid
linkage in between the two actually separates them and indicates hierarchy (top and
down) in the way they eventually relate to each other.
Since the primary view of religion is one linked to security in this representation,
the subsequent strategies for the integration of religion into IR theory are also reduced to
matters of security, and power politics
28
. Fox and Sandler suggest that realism should
reassess its tenets in order to account for religion. First, it should recognize the religious
origins of norms, particularly those about international laws on war (i.e., St. Augustine‟s
City of God and similar concepts reflected in Islamic law). Second, domestic factors are
not reflective of a „black box‟. They influence the international system. Religion is one
such example. Third, again, the international system may not be chaotic as realists
assume, but are reflexive of norms, such as religious ones. Liberalism, in its quest for
building international institutions and norms should look for shared norms, which can be
partially provided by religion. Fox and Sandler refer to R. Scott Appleby (Appleby 2000)
and Marc Gopin (Gopin 2000) to argue for the ability world religions (and their norms)
have to bridge cultural gaps to overcome international conflicts. It should be evident that
these suggestions do no call for major theoretical re-structuring. They may invite us to
„remember‟ some of the religious components hidden somewhere within the logical

28
Fox and Sandler eventually concede that religion should be seen as something more than “one of many
potential sources of power and influence” (p.169). It reflects peoples‟ worldviews influencing their actions.
However, in the context of the analysis performed it seems to be a brief remark done primarily with the
intention to point out that the influence religion has on politics is not necessarily a cynical one, at the
service of those using religious arguments to seek power. They do not call for any major reconstruction of
IR theories for the incorporation of religion, just amendments or adjustments.

297
constructions of mainstream IR theoretical traditions. But it is not clear how (or even
why) these reminisces should lead to any new ways to see or to address international
realities, other than reducing the scope of epistemological premises (i.e., constructivist
ones advocating for the reshaping of the most conflictual aspects of religion) guiding the
interpretation of the very nature of religion and its effects on politics.
Accounts of religion as a source of conflict may indeed point to specific ways to
bring it to international studies. That is certainly the case of incorporating religion
through security studies, a very specific approach to link religion under the well-
established theoretical accounts of international studies. However, this is not a small task.
Obviously the main topic in this approach is to look at violence from religion,
particularly religious fundamentalism (Marty and Appleby 1991; Antoun 2001; Almond,
Appleby et al. 2003; Juergensmeyer 2003; Stern 2003; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2004).
Even if to look at religion UNDER international relations is to have only a partial
outlook at the nature and role of religion in international affairs, this partial consideration
is nevertheless crucial. Not only religion can affect international security, but also it can
highjack politics altogether. This is the case, for instance, with the relation between
religious fundamentalism and historic manifestations of political extremism, such as
fascism. Religious components can be found underlying fascist arguments in defense of a
nation or race through sacrifice (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2004).
Furthermore, it is no less relevant to understand the logic behind violence in the
name or religion or God. They can uncover matters related to faith behind the willingness
for self-sacrifice. They can also help us to uncover social determinants and implications
298
of personal empowerment of otherwise disenfranchised or marginal individuals looming
behind ideals of martyrdom (Juergensmeyer 2003).
The problem with a more narrowed, strict view of religion is that to some IR
cannot simply incorporate religion in its well-established agenda imposing on it the
discipline‟s conceptual and analytical tools. After all, these tools may be external to the
very nature of religion as a social reality. In fact, I would argue that the view of religion
solely as a security issue continues to support the Westphalian conception of religion of
nothing more than a threat. It further reifies the „polycentric‟ self-reference of IR as a
field primarily if not entirely concerned with matters of politics (international „political‟
relations). As such religion becomes relevant to IR only as long as it has something to say
to issues of power, more specifically coercive and institutional power. Not for other
reasons the issue of „securitization of religion‟ and the various forms of religious
conflicts that result from it seem to be the preferred way to address religion for many IR
scholars. But what is the nature of religion? How does religion shape our social lives,
individually and collectively? Can religion offer alternatives for the betterment of human
international relations beyond realist accounts of selfish and self-help behavior? These
and other questions cannot be answered through this top-down approach. In fact, they
cannot even be properly formulated. That being said, it is also noteworthy to mention that
even a narrow, strict approach to religion can bring with it the seeds for more
encompassing approaches. It is particularly the case of Appleby and Gopin‟s argument
about the relationship between religion and culture as a way to overcome potential and
existing conflicts.

299
Religion INSIDE International Relations

The understanding of religion INSIDE international relations may go a little
further. Religion here is no longer an external component to IR, a temporary element of
annoyance, one more type of violence that has to be subdued by the analytical and policy
instruments at the disposal of polycentric IR (Religion under IR). It becomes one element
that whether practitioners in IR like it or not is here to stay and from now on will be part
of the polycentric reality of the field. The important thing is that INSIDE international
relations religion becomes a relevant variable to IR scholars. But it only becomes a
variable insofar as its cultural component is recognized and deemed as relevant in a world
in which politics are informed not only by interests, but also by identities that shape and
constrain those interests.
Religion finds its place within the overall analytical framework of IR once the
recognition of its cultural element puts it next to other cultural categories already being
part of international studies. Religion, together with ethnicity, race, and gender are all
components of the same sub-category of culture that provides international actors some
measurement of identity and that at least to some extent shape their behavior and
expectations (Lynch 2003, p.58).
Religion under the sub-heading of „culture‟ is a component (or variable) that may
or may not be taken into consideration by any given scholar or policy-maker. If
addressed, it will be so according to the specific circumstances at hand. In general, these
circumstances are still those affecting the all-encompassing issue so privileged by IR,
namely power. In short, here religion matters so long as the IR practitioner believes that
300
culture matters to explain the (power) behavior of international actors (i.e., states, global
elites, individual leaders). So, even here, it is possible to mainstream IR theoretical
constructions (i.e., realism and liberalism) to continue to ignore religion beyond their
more immediate concerns with the securitization of politics (as expressed by the top-
down approaches discussed earlier).

Diagram 4.14 above is the visual representation of Religion as a cultural variable
to the field of IR. As a variable it is represented as a solid container node. But since its
status as a variable defines its very ontological make-up, the node is circled by the dotted
double line notation for ontology in VCM. Once again, the node representing IR has two
ontological layers. The outer-layer represents the full potential ontological premises
guiding our understanding of the fundamentals of the world we investigate. The inner
layer represents the ones actually incorporating religion in this approach. It somewhat
expands the original strict self-reference of IR as the field in this approach permanently
Diagram 4.14: Religion INSIDE International Relations

IR

R
301
incorporate cultural factors to our understanding of the world. However, matters of
politics and power are the ones still fundamentally forming and shaping that world.
Bringing religion back into IR as a cultural element may or may not be conductive
to broader assessments about the nature of religion as central for international
phenomena. On the positive side, one claim for the relevance of religion as culture is to
consider the power of its symbolism (Wuthnow 1992). Anthropologists, ethnographers
and sociologists of religion have long studied the intricacies of religious symbolism and
mythology. In the past the focus had been on the subjective nature of religion versus the
functioning character of religious practices. Clifford Geertz‟s essays on religion as
reflective of a cultural system is the paradigmatic work of that period (Geertz 1966;
Geertz 1973). The substantive approach of religion as a cultural system implies that
culture is distinct from social structures. Culture was rather a system of intangible general
values, goals or value orientations informing individual and collective behavior. The
functional approach, on the other hand, emphasizes empirical studies. Religious culture
should then be approached through empirical analyses (i.e., survey methods) of concrete
and measurable religious views and manifestations. In the end, “Geertz basically settled
the issue by suggesting that symbols themselves might vary greatly in substance but
could be studied usefully in terms of their subjective functions, such as creating moods
and supplying meaning and motivation” (Wuthnow 1992, p.43).
More recently however, questions of discourse and practice have gained much
attention. The focus has shifted from grand theories towards more concrete, specific
sources of religious manifestations, such as texts (i.e., sermons), discourse, language, and
institutional manifestations. The symbols are seen as relevant in themselves, not only as
302
means to cultural production. As far as religion goes the question becomes the symbolism
of meaning, a powerful source of discourse that is distinguished from other kinds of
discourses. Even more important, the symbolism of religious „expressive behavior‟
allows for the understanding of how symbols interact with human discourse and action in
dynamic ways. It can help us to shed light into the ways institutions evolve and
institutionalization takes place. The idea that the symbolic character of religion is not
static has implications for international studies. Symbols evolve, as do the interpretations
of religious texts and discourse.
Therefore, social practices deriving from religious symbolism are seen as
malleable, and their resulting differences can be mediated. Once again, a more evident
application of this approach to international relations is to understand how (political)
interpretations of „sacred‟ writings and discourses by individual and groups provide
rationale and even legitimacy for more radical – and disruptive – behaviors directed
against the established order. This is the clear case with religious fundamentalism and
their support for terrorist acts. So, religion as culture can once again justify more
pessimistic polycentric assessments of the international reality. In IR the cultural
dimension of religion is largely influenced by the work of Samuel P. Huntington
29
.

2929
Samuel P. Huntington is a political scientist whose work entitled Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of the World Order, first published in 1996, has greatly influenced the debates in IR on matters
related to world order, peace and conflict, as well as political theory. Originally a response to Francis
Fukuyama‟s 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, the idea behind the Clash of Civilizations is
that the future fault lines in terms of international conflict is based on cultural, civilizational differences.
The definition and the numbers of civilizations may be open to debate, but they are primarily based on
geographic regions: Latin America, Western, African, Hindu, Islamic, Sinic, Orthodox, and Japanese. To
Huntington, with the end of the Cold War conflicts tend to occur between these civilizations, as
exemplified by the break up of Yugoslavia, the continuing conflict between India and Pakistan, and the
emergence of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism against the West. From this perspective, the international
struggle for power is no longer between isolated states. If the West is the power holder in our historical
period, the Sinic and Islamic civilizations are the challengers, as attested by what Huntington sees as major
shifts in economics, military power, and cultural assertion by non-Western civilizations.
303
His theory of culture as informative of civilizational fractures, the clash of
civilizations, is well known and need not be covered here. What is important to note is
that „elevating‟ the place, nature and role of religion as something more than an
aberration, as a ghostly manifestation of backwardness, does not warrant any positive,
inclusive analysis in search for ways international or global cooperation and human
development can develop based on religious culture. In this regard, Huntington clearly
takes a primordialist stance, looking at religion as the source of global divisions and
schisms that coalesce within the lines of a few world civilizations. Rather than being the
sources of possibilities, cultural diversity (as emanated from religion) is in fact a recipe
for conflict and struggle. Religion here becomes one among several cultural factors. And,
as such, what matters is that with an upsurge of worldwide religious interest,
fundamentalist (thus divisive) behavior emerges, reinforcing division and conflict. That
explains why, in Huntington‟s view, it is unlikely that religion will ever be a pillar for
any future, hypothetical universal civilization (Huntington 1996).
But the symbolic character of religion may also inform and contribute for the
evolving of international norms and cooperation. The case of successful (and not so
successful) attempts of mediation carried out by religious groups is a powerful
demonstration of how positive manipulation of religious symbolism can contribute for
the betterment of social relations. The Vatican took active part in mediating the century-
long dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel (Crocker, Hampson
et al. 1999). The well-known case of the Community of Sant‟Egidio, a Catholic NGO,
and its successful efforts to mediate peace in Mozambique in the early nineties is yet
another, and instructive, example (Crocker, Hampson et al. 1999). Without political
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power or authority, a small mediating team comprised of members of Sant‟Egidio
managed to manipulate interests and goals from antagonist actors towards peace.
Employing a synergistic method aiming at dialogue and personal relations, the mediators
gained the trust of the opposing parties (Bartoli 1999). Religious symbols of fraternity
and human compassion for all individuals were pillars behind such strategy. They
generated at once feelings of trust about their neutrality as well as the shared belief that
genuine interest for the fate of those engulfed by fifteen years of a bloody conflict was
their motivating factor. The mediating team was not moved by political goals. They were
moved by religious symbolisms that went beyond the strict notion of what count as
sacred in order to generate social cohesion and trust where there was none.
It is important to note that in this case religious symbolism, as an instrument for
the enactment of cultural values of respect for life, peace, and compassion, did not aim at
replacing politics. On the contrary, what gave legitimacy to Sant‟Egidio was its lack of
political agenda. So, religion INSIDE international relations allows for religion to be
seriously addressed by IR, as a key variable, without having religion claiming to be part
of the genetic make-up of politics. It does not claim a place in the public sphere –
commanding or informing the logic of politics. It only calls for its right place as a
relevant factor for social – thus political – relations
30
. In fact, once Sant‟Egidio managed
to bring the warring parties to the table it brought the United Nations into the equation,
which ultimately made the 1992 peace accords possible. Once the positive manipulation

30
This is a line of reasoning that may lead us to consider religion and politics as two distinct manifestations
of human social relations. They would be, so to speak, two distinct epistemologies (domains) or ontologies
(realities). This will be further discussed below, with the introduction of the notion of religion AND
international relations.

305
of religious symbolism proved effective, the UN brought with it what Sant‟Egidio
missed: the institutional and coercive political powers to oversee the implementation of
the peace agreement. In short, religion and politics worked hand-in-hand.

Religion WITHIN International Relations

The understanding of religion WITHIN international relations suggests an
interesting and rather challenging scenario to the traditional polycentric self-reference of
IR. It proposes a reconfiguration of the field‟s ontology in order to incorporate the
essential role that religion plays in all international areas of interest, including but not
limited to matters of order and security. In here, it is not simply a matter of deciding
whether culture matters but to recognize that culture (thus religion) is at the center of
international relations. Said differently, the same way the argument can be made that
gender is embedded in IR, so is religion. Both are examples of the social, the historic and
even the anthropologic components that comprise the framework of international
structures of (unequal) power relations. They cannot be artificially separated from politics
and put aside.
Diagram 4.15 shows the configuration of „embedded religion‟. Its cognitive
model indicates that religion, just a cultural factor or variable in the previous approach
(Religion INSIDE International Relations), now becomes the very ontological fabric of
the field. The two dotted double-lines forming a single node indicate such representation.

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To the English School (ES) and some of its members, such as Martin Wight,
Herbert Butterfield and Michael Donelan, religion and culture underpin international
society, giving it a necessary identity, essential to foment cooperation. Seen that way,
international conflicts and matters of war and peace tend to reflect disputes over
traditions. Therefore, there is no possible rationality (i.e., rational behavior, the
maximizing of utilities) without an underlying set of tradition giving meaning and
purpose to it. A pre-political moral order precedes and holds together the existence of any
international society. The contemporary Rationalist tradition, for instance, is, to Martin
Wight, informed by the modern Catholic social thought (Wight 1991; Thomas 2003).
Therefore, a mere „thin‟ conception of culture in which a “common intellectual culture”
is located at the level of diplomacy and global elites (Religion WITHIN IR) is not enough.
It does not explain the „thick‟ “larger narrative of the collective life of individuals,
communities, and states” (Thomas 2003, p.38). The underlying assumption here is that
religion and moral dimensions are embedded in international politics, which in turn

R ≈ IR
Diagram 4.15: Religion WITHIN International Relations
307
cannot be fully dealt with or understood if such dimensions are not taken seriously
(Carlson and Owens 2003). Religion then becomes the unseen source of principles and
values informing action. It is true for theory as it is for real life events and issues. Not to
consider such cultural factor – embedded political morality – has its implications.
The religious origins of secular social practices cannot be denied. The very
concept of natural law, the historic, anthropologic and moral basis for the development of
structured and reiterated relations among human groups, nations and civilizations, draws
its foundations from the notion that, as believed by Aquinas, the laws that God imposed
upon human nature – body and intellect – is one and the same as those that rule nature.
The religious component of law draws from the idea that all things earthly or not
are God‟s creation. As such, God‟s law is present in all natural manifestations, including
human‟s society (Aquinas 1273). Only obeying God‟s law, society can flourish and
redemption be assured. But natural law distinguishes itself from „human law‟, „written
law‟, „civil law‟, or „municipal law‟ to the extent that the former brings with it the
element of human freedom. It is up to men (and women) to obey or not God‟s law. It
requires human adjudication or, in Hegel‟s words, reflection (Hegel 1821).
What is important is that the exercise of such freedom must be done according to
principles of morality. There is a relation of hierarchy, according to Aquinas, between
natural law and natural law in man, or moral law. The latter derives from the former.
Even if moral law results from the free will exercised by human understanding and
actions, the exercise of freedom is not boundless. It ought to observe the relation between
good and evil, and not merely the political common good.
308
Consequently, to Aquinas, the „law of the nations‟
31
(ius gentium) is built
deductively from natural law. I would argue that in this regard guidance then comes from
the symbolic interpretation of religious beliefs, interpretations of sacred texts, or religious
norms as applied to or reflected by the community through moral standards. Eventually
these standards may or may not be codified by law. But even if they are not positively
codified the „law of the nations‟ is still informed by precepts derived from natural – or
God‟s – law as understood by individuals and communities in their social dealings.
For instance, the concepts of just war and humanitarian intervention can be seen
as rooted in religious principles of justice and morality (Elshtain 2003; Hehir 2003;
Kelsey 2003; McMarthy 2003; Cromartie 2005). The existence of such principles may
justify limits to state authority (as in the cases of humanitarian intervention and the use of
reciprocity for the proper conduction of war). They are also at the basis of state
legitimacy for the pursuit of such actions. Furthermore, one can argue that the very basis
of the political thinking of realism that informs state actions and rationale is rooted in
religious tradition. That is the case, for example, with the concept of just war tradition as
originally developed by St. Augustine (Elshtain 2003).
In fact an interesting argument can be made that the relation between political
sovereignty and the realm of the sacred reflects a millennial Christian tradition, as well
observed by Hehir. After all, Jesus himself had proclaimed: “Repay to Caesar what
belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God” (Matt. 22:21). Here the sacred

31
It is important to distinguish between the concept of „law of the nations‟ (ius gentium) as defined by
Aquinas and „international law‟ (ius inter gentes), as subsequently developed by authors such as Hugo
Grotius. The latter has a connotation of positive law, or law as codified and applied by principles of
legislation, justice, equity and constitutionality.

309
functions as a source of legitimacy as well as limitation for the exercise of sovereign
power; long before the formation of the nation-state: “individuals holding political power
sought support from, and had to contend with, traditions and institutions claiming higher
moral authority than the political order possessed” (Hehir 2003, p.41). Therefore, there is
a continuous interplay between religion, ethics and politics. To the claims of sovereign
power there are the imperatives of the sacred, as reflected, once again, in the notion of the
just war. Linda Zagzebski well summarizes the relation between morality and the sacred:

Western religions maintain that morality arises from God. Natural law
theory makes morality rest on God‟s will. The theory I call Divine
Motivation theory makes morality rest on the motives that are the primary
constituents of God‟s virtues. In each case, the theory may not be committed
to the idea that morality needs religion, as it is possible that even though
morality in fact derives from God, morality would exist even if there were
no God. Bu clearly, if morality derives from God, it depends on God in
actuality whether or not morality would have existed in some other possible
godless world. (Zagzebski 2005, p.356)

Notwithstanding, this interplay may not be as genuine as one would assume.
Besides, moral arguments may not be directly linked to religion. Morality, defined as
accordance with standards of right or good conduct, as a system of ideas for such forms
of conduct, or as virtuosity, may be primarily linked to social and legal rules primarily
concerned with common good (and not the observance of the relation between the good
and the evil). Religion then becomes secondary, or simply one among several sources of
morality. Classical realism considers morality as an integral part of the exercise of
political power and an important instrument of restraint on power (Morgenthau 1985).
Without moral standards the self-help system of international anarchy would fully
310
materialize and make human life impossible: “From the Bible to the ethics and
constitutional arrangements of modern democracy, the main function of these normative
systems has been to keep aspirations for power within socially tolerable bounds”
(Morgenthau 1985, p.243). However, it may be that the rhetoric of morality in politics is
at times (if not frequently) just a disguise for the real goal of seeking political power by
political actors. Notwithstanding, religion – despite modernity and secularization – still
has extraordinary political influence in public life. In too many countries, the exercise of
power by a given ruler is still supported by religion, determining loyalty and defining the
characteristics of contending communities. Therefore, not taking into consideration the
religious component of political life can lead to failure in policy-making formulation and
expectations (Rubin 1994).
To conclude this analysis of religion WITHIN IR we should keep in mind that it is
here where the argument about bringing religion back to the public domain becomes
evident. It points out to the failure of modernity and secularization to forever bury
religion within the confines of the private. It also argues for the impossibility to fully
separate religion from politics as religious experience and sentiments are pervasive of all
human action, including in its institutional forms (Giesen and Suber 2005). But as we will
discuss in the next section, bringing religion back to the public domain may not be a
solution. It may be indeed the recipe for bringing back the possibilities of abuses made in
the name of God. The discussion about religion OVER IR presented below will discuss
the arguments pro and against bringing religion back to the public realm.

311
Religion OVER International Relations

The view that religion is embedded in principles and practices of IR can easily
lead us to the understanding that everything else is ultimately religion. Nothing exists or
has legitimacy but through the traditions and values of religion. In this case the relation of
hierarchy between religion and IR would be reversed, with international politics being
subjected to the dictates of religious principles, values, and commands.
In religion WITHIN IR the argument is that religious cultural traditions have given
rise, underlie and justify political normative constructions. And this is an argument that
easily allows for the conclusion that it would be only natural that it is solely through
religion that politics can achieve its most noble ideals. More than simply constituting the
genetic make-up of politics religion then becomes the medium through which humanity
can genuinely express whatever is deemed as the most spiritually elevated aspects of
human existence. It is valid both at the level of the unseen, of the metaphysical guiding
components of humanity and at the level of manifested policies and social constructions
derived from it.
Diagram 4.16 below visually translates this perspective. A quick comparison to
the contents of Diagram 4.13 reveals it to be a reversal of the representation portrayed
with the notion of Religion UNDER International Relations. However, in here there are
no double ontological layers. Religion OVER International Relations is deemed as
fulfilling its ontological potential, as the source of all political matters. IR ontology, in
turn, is simply reduced to political dimensions, without ever specifying their nature (i.e.,
security).
312

Richard Falk best represents this view by arguing about the role of religion for the
sustained development of more humane forms of global governance. To Falk, the
European Enlightenment that followed the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 led to the
perception of religion as something inimical to science and material progress. Its
exclusion from political life was seen as essential for the establishment of humane
governance. This became apparent with the development of Hugo Grotius‟ ideas that
combined two key characteristics of modernity: the claim of moral superiority of the
“Christian world” and the deprecation of non-Christian societies as „barbarous races”;
which led to “the Eurocentric conceptions of world order and hierarchical relations
between Western and non-Western peoples” (Falk 2003, p.187).
Falk argues that even recent attempts to draw normative orientations toward more
humane governance on global levels failed to include the relevance of religion and
spiritual dimensions of human experience. This is the case with Hedley Bull‟s idea of
international society, Woodrow Wilson‟s experiments in world organization (League of

R
I
R
Diagram 4.16: Religion OVER International Relations
313
Nations and the UN), the ideas about world government or world federalism and WOMP
(the World Order Models Project). Consequently, the current efforts for the establishment
of world order are characterized, Falk argues, by “inhumane” social patterns. They reflect
variants of “global inhumane governance” (p.189) and generate a crisis of sovereign
rights. The most recent events reflecting such crisis are economic globalization,
worldwide backlashes against it, and against the “American project of planetary
domination”, (p.205).
The centerpiece of Falk‟s argument is that only the anti-globalization movements
that are supported by religious commitments and important segments of the organized
religious communities have the strength to be something more than a mere nuisance to
the existing state-centric world order. A religiously grounded transnational movement for
a just world is the only one capable of giving us hopes “that humane global governance
can become a reality” (p.190). Only such movement can transcend the constraints of
economic secularism and its blindness towards the social impacts of economic
globalization. To Falk, the emergence of „globalization from below‟ as an effort to build
a democratic global civil society is driven by religious and spiritual inspirations. Falk
then argues for religion as the basis for the emergence of an effective global civil society:

Without religion, prospects for global humane governance appear to lack a
credible social or political foundation and, more important, miss the spiritual
character that can mobilize and motivate people much more potently than
can “the market”, “secular reason”, or even “nationalism”. (p.193)

314
A first problem with the allegedly precedence of religion over secularist projects is
the very definition of religion given by Falk and its relation for viable projects of global
human governance. The author thus defines religion:

Religion is understood here as encompassing not only the teachings, beliefs,
and practices of organized religions but also all spiritual outlooks that
interpret the meaning of life by reference to faith and to the commitment to
that which cannot be explained by empirical science or sensory observation
and is usually associated with an acceptance of the reality of the divine, the
sacred, the holy, the transcendent, the mysterious, the ultimate. Religion is
also the source of limits, suggesting outer boundaries of acceptable behavior
for the human species, a guidance that has great current relevance with
respect to imposing limits on scientific inquiry and technological
innovation, as in the instance of human cloning. Religion, then, must be
understood as providing a rationale for the unconditional, for the refusal to
accept limits to the extent that the divine is being served. In these respects,
religion encompasses belief in God and gods, but does not depend on such
theistic convictions, or for that matter, theological dogma of any kind.
(Falk 2003, p. 194)

The definition above is conveniently – but problematically – broad. Looking
closely one will identify three alternative understandings of religion in it. First, religion
can be theological dogma as expressed by institutions, practices or religious traditions.
Second, it reflects spiritual commitments to the transcendent, to the sacred, not amenable
to empirical or sensory observation. Finally, it can also reflect morality or moral
standards of behavior that in principle should derive from either one of the previous two.
So, while the first is about religion collectively manifested through a congregation or a
faith-based community, the second is primarily an individual enterprise. Although the
third could be emanated from either one, standards of morality tend to result from
collective imperatives of religious traditions.
315
Well, in arguing for the prevalence of religion for the construction of humane
forms of governance it is through global civil society that, according to Falk, religion
should be manifested. And it is manifested in the form of „organized‟ religious
communities or movements; which is primarily a collective, a public, and not a private
enterprise. If it were about private, individual spirituality, humane global governance
could emerge not only from global civil society, but also from the action of more
conscious policy-makers, business leaders, global public opinion and anyone with a real
power stake within the various facets of global governance. The focus is on global civil
society because it is there where culture (collective identity) belongs. Therefore, the
entire analysis that follows refers indeed either to the first definition of religion (religious
traditions) or to religious morality derived from these traditions.
Implicit in the argument is the claim for the full return of religion to the public
realm, with a vengeance: only organized religion has legitimacy, power of mobilization
and sustainability for any political proposal or project aiming at building (humane) global
governance. And that is a claim that not everybody is willing to accept. Even if the
majority of the world‟s population professes a religion I would suspect that most of this
majority would also be wary of formal political authority being handled over to religious
groups, communities or institutional traditions. If history teaches us anything it is that we
should not forget the atrocities and all kinds of intolerance committed by faith-based
authorities in the name of God or religious morality.
A second problem comes from the two diverging tendencies that Falk admits as
being characteristic of religion. It is as much inclusivist as it can be exclusivist. His focus
is primarily about the former, without ever explaining though how it should or shall „win‟
316
the battle over the latter. And this is ultimately a struggle that is primarily to be solved by
religion and its practitioners, not by politics. Until this within-religion tension is resolved
– and there is no indication that it will be any soon – then to fully open the doors of the
political process to religion (not merely as a participant, or even as an integral ingredient,
but as the leading component) is to open the doors to all elements of religion, be they
inclusivist in nature, be they exclusivist ones. So, in the end politics guided by religion
will also fall pray to the same kinds of political battles, disputes, and struggles that the
secular exercise of politics has to face. What is worse, those struggles, contrary to Falk‟s
arguments, will likely be even more intractable, as primordialist claims would certainly
tend to dominate the debates.
A third problem with Falk‟s approach is the unexplained (or unconvincing)
arguments about religious historic legitimacy over all other secular projects for global
governance. The author enumerates the contributions religion has to offer as
distinguished from secular ones. Personally, in looking at each of those contributions I
see no reason why secular projects of governance could not champion them. First
religion, according to Falk, would have an appreciation of suffering that makes it a force
in the struggle against global poverty, social injustice, and the inequities of globalization.
Again, history shows that religion has been cowardly absent throughout critical moments
of human suffering. The silence of the Catholic Church before the holocaust is just one
example among too many. Second, religion would have civilizational resonance. Falk
refers to religious revolutionary language and utopian aspirations that are capable of
resonating as legitimate thus allowing for mobilizing potential. But no explanation is
offered about their content. Secular components of global civil society have long argued,
317
for instance, for the inclusion of the individual as the subject of international law (next to
the state). Besides, all too often religion has been used (and abused) as a key component
to explain cultural and civilizational divisions. Huntington‟s idea about the „clash‟
certainly fits this category. Third, religion would have an ethos of solidarity, a uniting
religious consciousness based on the idea of a single human family under the unity of all
creation. To Falk, this weakens the idea of the other, so relevant to nationalism and
patriotic fervor, as well as the statist character of world order. But it is hard to see how
this is the case. If anything, nationalism and religious fundamentalism feed on each other,
as in the case of the Palestinian Islamists, Militant Lebanese Shi‟ites, and Radical Sikhs
in which the crisis of national identity, national economic decay and ethno-nationalism
has given rise to religious fundamentalism (Sahiyeh 1991). The explosive mixture of
nationalism and religion is evident and fuels religious fundamentalism (Juergensmeyer
2001; Juergensmeyer 2003).
Forth, religion has normative horizons that bring with them a sense of the
sacredness of all human beings capable of giving primacy to fundamental needs of
humanity such as food, shelter, health, sustainable environment, peace and meaningful
life. However, even Falk recognizes that these are concerns that converge to secular
priorities of human rights culture. Fifth, religion believes in the transformative capacity
of ideas sustained by spiritual energy that leads to non-violent forms of struggle,
challenging to most secular views of human history, driven by warfare. The founding
narratives of the world religions are primarily concerned with liberation from oppression
and with faith as the path toward emancipation. Again, Falk admits, “institutionalization
of religions often suppresses their emancipatory potential” (p.199). Furthermore, secular
318
theoretical traditions such as constructivism (and even idealism) build their prescriptions
on the power of ideas and ideals.
The last three contributions presented by Falk seem rather too generic and even
speculative. They are not linked to concrete historic examples and can be contested on
innumerous grounds. First, religion would remind us of the human limits, bringing
humility in relation to human thought and action. It recognizes human fallibility and the
limited capacity of the human mind to fully grasp reality and to claim for absolute access
to the truth. It is conductive to dialogue, as religion alerts us about the fallacy of the
primacy of human autonomy. However, the agent/structure debate goes well beyond
religion and is an integral part of „secular‟ discussions within IR. Second, religion would
take the issue of identity to a new level, superseding the limited locus of the sovereign
state by replacing the concept of citizen for that of „citizen pilgrim‟: we are all in a
spiritual journey. Once again, up to this moment in human history the exclusivist
characteristics of religion in this regard seem to have the upper hand. Cultural identity
may reflect a different level of loyalty, but one that is certainly not universal. If it were
indeed the case, how could we explain so many religious based conflicts and divisions
worldwide? Finally, religion can lead a reconciliation process between science, reason
and spirituality, as exemplified by truth and reconciliation initiatives that took place in
Africa and Latin America. While one cannot deny the possibility that religion can be at
service of political reconciliation, it is only possible when expressing neutrality. Even
though it is hard to see its relation with the argument that religion is in a privileged
position to initiate a positive conversation with science. The contrary seems to be the
case. It is a historic fact that religion has resisted scientific claims about truth.
319
In conclusion, the claims about the prevalence of religion as the leading
component of political processes seem unwarranted. There is nothing specific in religion
that can give it special legitimacy for dealing and solving intractable political issues. It is
certainly a powerful tool to help individuals, groups and communities to address them on
grounds that can be conducive to dialogue, cooperation and charity. But it is certainly not
the only medium through which more humane projects for a global society can flourish.
It is not even the best one as history shows.

Religion AND International Relations

The understanding of religion AND international relations presents a radical
departure from the previous positions. It argues that the incorporation of religion (as in
Religion in as well within IR) ultimately distorts the very nature of Religion. Thus, the
focus here is about uncovering the ontological characteristics of religion and the ways it
intersects with politics, rather than trying to alter IR‟s ontology.
Kubálková makes this point very forcefully. The very proposition of the afore-
mentioned methodology that she calls International Political Theology (IPT) is
instructive. In her own words IPT mirrors IPE, or international political economy,
devoted to address economic factors in politics at the international level. The author
refers to Robert Gilpin to explain that IPE reflects the fact that “it was not possible to
separate the pursuit of power (as studied in the discipline of IR) and the pursuit of wealth
(left out of the IR discipline to the students of economics)” (Kubálková 2003, p.60). The
argument behind the IPT as a methodology is that the „social scientific‟ accounts of world
320
affairs can no longer neglect the „pursuit‟ of identities based on religious allegiances by
the international actors. But such recognition does not imply an incorporation of religion
by IR. It rather advocates the recognition of religion in its own right, from the standpoint
of its own metaphysical and ontological characteristics. Only from there it would be
possible to look at the way religion and politics intersect.

The Diagram 4.17 above visually translates this approach. The two solid nodes in
the model (Religion and International Relations) represent two separate ontological
entities. As such they are autonomous in relation to each other, but also free to approach
Diagram 4.17: Religion AND International Relations

International
Relations

Religion
321
and even intersect, as represented in the model by a series of dotted circles indicating
movement. The arrows linking the two nodes point to possible directions in the ways they
may relate to each other.
Both with IPE and with IPT, if the goal is to bring external elements (i.e.,
economic and religion) to the sphere of politics, the outcome is the recognition that these
realms are distinct dimensions, ontologically autonomous. That is why Kubálková gives
so much importance to explicit religion‟s ontology, which includes the understanding that
religion guides behavior based on faith. To Kubálková the reality of God is fixed by
social conventions, expressed in everyday language, and requires reflection,
interpretation, illumination, repetition, metaphor, and ritualization. It cannot be subjected
to scientific tests. Laustsen and Weaver also focus on the element of faith, pointing out
that it is coded through the distinction between the transcendent and the immanent.
Religious dogmas and religious behavior thus are ways to bridge the transcendental and
the earthly realms through principles of mediation (Laustsen and Weaver 2003, pp.152-
153).
An implication from the recognition of religion‟s ontology vis-à-vis IR is that if
the latter is about the struggle for power guided by the positivist logic of utility
maximization (at least as seen by mainstream IR) the former provides humans the link
between the material world and the larger cosmos, a transcendental reality that cannot be
put to test by modern, positivist, empirical tests of rational logic. Thus, Religion and IR
do have their own distinct existential logic and if the latter is to engage in a meaningful
conversation with the former it must do so through a sort of inter-logics dialogue.
322
Also, looking at religion and international politics as two ontologically distinct
entities can justify arguments that may be even disconcerting to analyses that privilege
the standpoint of international politics. For instance, a common theme expressed by
scholars and practitioners in the field of IR is the need to bring religion „back‟ to the
public sphere. Unfortunately, for the most part, these same authors do not define what
this means. Would be participation in the political process enough and, if so, at what
level? Or should partial or total formal political authority be handled back to religious
traditions and organizations? Whatever the answer to these questions, the assumption is
that religion should be brought back to the center of the political debates. However, the
case of the Sant‟Egidio shows that success was drawn exactly for its lack of participation
in any formal political process. This is what gave to it enough legitimacy to be an
efficient mediator for the warring parties in the Mozambique‟s conflict. What is more,
from the standpoint of religion to abstain from political action may be the proper way to
exercise religion while at the same time having a say and being actively involved in
social matters. It can even help assure the protection of freedom and liberty (Audi 2000).
So, the starting point is to properly define religion in its most fundamental
elements. There are, in general, three likely understandings for the meaning of religion as
exemplified by Falk‟s religion as tradition, religion as spirituality, and religion as
morality. One can argue that what gives unity to all three is the notion of the sacred
embedded in each: “the sacred refers to that which is holy, sublime, universal, or true – a
realm of ultimate reality, meaning, purpose, and significance that often is traced to the
very source and power of this realm” (Carlson and Owens 2003, p.7). The advantage of
looking at the ontology of religion as sacredness is to understand a unity in the
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motivation of the individual and of the collective whose understandings and behavior are
faith-based. It also helps us understand the source of authority from religious texts and
leaders. There is certainly the challenge of assigning a sacred veil to things and people
that, after all, may not be sacred. But what matters is the perception of religion and
religious manifestations as such. From there one can argue that the sacred cannot be
reducible to the life of nations, states and their citizens (Carlson and Owens 2003).
Unfortunately the discussion of religion and IR tend to be reduced to the problem
of secularization or „un-secularization‟, as if a return to pre-modern periods in which
religion was highly taken into account would help us to understand the phenomenon of
the sacred in our private and in our public lives. But a notion of caution in this regard
may be pertinent. The arguments about the misinterpretation of the wars of religion and
the role religion played in them suggest that the idea that the secular state as our savior is
untrue; that the arguments that the presence of religion in the political, public life can
lead to intolerance, devastation, political upheaval and even collapse of the international
order are unfounded. Just to play the devil‟s advocate, I would argue that even if the role
of religion in the European wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
(servings as the starting point to the secularization process) has been grossly overstated,
the fact remains that religion, then and now, still reflects practices of intolerance and
oppression. People being burned at the cross for various reasons ranging from advocating
alternative practices of worship to rational and scientific claims that contradicted current
interpretation of scriptures are not fantasies or imagination. To say so would be the same
as claiming that the holocaust never happened. They are historic facts, as are the
innumerous historic examples of oppressive faith-based political regimes. The issuing of
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Fatwa as the one issued against Salman Rushdie is unfortunately a very poignant social
reality. Thus, it begs the question: what are the exact contents from the political
mythology of liberalism? Is such a myth the account of the specific historic events that
surround the wars of religion and the subsequent peace of Westphalia? Or is it the general
theoretical argument that religion belongs indeed to the public political realm? These are
two distinct things. Even if the former is true – and a historic revisionism is long overdue
– it does not alter the basic arguments of the latter: that religion, when holding the
coercive, institutional reins of political power, tend not to be a positive thing, to say the
least, for those not in agreement with the „sacred truth‟ imposed upon them.
So, the answer may not be a return to pre-modern periods as if modernity and
secularization had indeed detached humanity from its spirituality. After all, humanity is
what we make of it. Besides, as Diagram 4.17 suggests, religion and politics may
intersect. They may have a common ontological area, premises or axiomatic claims in
which a clear separation between the two may not be possible. But each has its own logic,
its own ontology, primary concerns and social functions. Only if these are identified it
becomes possible to fully grasp to what extent and in which ways these two reams,
domains, or dimensions of human existence feed on each other.

A Ring Network Analysis of Religion & IR Ontologies

By reframing the debate on the relationships between Religion and International
Relations, and how they see their respective constitutive nature, allow us to reach for an
alternative understanding of fundamental paradigmatic cleavages in the literature. For
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one, it entirely shifts the focus of the debate, which, as it stands, tends to be truncated by
different epistemological concerns, as summarized in details in Diagram 4.12.
In fact, Diagram 4.18 displayed below reveals a complete different cognitive
network environment for a dialogue centered on metaphysical as well as axiomatic
claims. The nodes in the model and their respective contents are the various approaches
found in the literature. The interior of each node shows how each realm stands in relation
to each other based on paradigmatic references.
The ring network that structures the model clearly demonstrates how different
axiomatic views lead to varying scenarios for possible relationships between international
relations and religion as two ontologically distinct realms of socialization. This time,
however, there is a real „continuum‟ in the ways the arguments relate to each other. As
the ring network implies, there is transference of information from one node to the next,
in this case in either direction, and in a looping motion.
Moving anti-clockwise, and starting with the node at the top (AND), there is clear
demarcation between the two fields, characterized by a non-hierarchical relationship.
They may or may not intersect with each other, as they are autonomous realms of social
manifestations. The next node to the left (UNDER) reveals a movement in which IR goes
to the top and Religion to the bottom. It results from the perspective that IR is primarily
concerned with matters of security, power, and politics and religion relates to such
universe only to the extent that it poses threats to security in politics.

326
326
Diagram 4.18: Ring Network on Representations of Ontologies of Religion and International Relations

IR

R

IR

R
IR
R

R ≈ IR

R
IR
UNDER
AND
INSIDE WITHIN
ABOVE
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Once religion is taken into consideration in international studies as an eventual
variable, the next movement is it permanent incorporation. It is done, as shown in the
next node in the network (INSIDE), when religion becomes one more type of cultural
element affecting empirical manifestations deemed as objects for analyses in the field.
Then, the next logical ontological step following permanent incorporation by theoretical
and analytical IR frameworks is for religion to permeate the very paradigmatic fabric of
those frameworks. That is represented in the model with the node WITHIN. Here there is
no longer an epistemological demarcation, or paradigmatic separation, between IR and
Religion as the two may only exist through each other. It opens the path for religion to
finally take OVER. It becomes the very reason for the existence of social relations beyond
the domestic level.
This “neat”, linear story is just an ideal-type formulation of relationships made
logically possible by arguments centered on paradigmatic, metaphysical, or ontological
framings on the nature of both religion and international relations and how they stand in
regards to each other. For a more detailed, grounded analysis, more structured and
systematic analyses are needed on the specifics of those ontological constitutions. That is
what is missing as the current terms of the debate focus on different epistemological
concerns that do not necessarily lead to fruitful analytical engagements.
But to do so would require serious efforts to spell out the fundamentals of each of
these two realms of socialization in more pragmatic, objective, and scientific ways.
Doing so should not necessarily imply a rationalist or positivist mode of analysis
trumping others, more constructivist or hermeneutic in scope. Said differently, each node
in the ring-network model in Diagram 4.18 entails different contents for what Lakatos
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calls hardcore and negative heuristics (Popper 1959; Kuhn 1962; Feyerabend 1970;
Lakatos 1970). The conceptual elements populating the hardcore (axiomatic claims), and
its consequent negative heuristics (the range of theories and investigations prevented to
take place by assumptions stipulated by the hardcore) will necessarily shape the types of
possible analytical interactions. Premises guiding the use of specific sets of conceptual
constructs should be unequivocally spelled out beforehand. Only then a more productive
engagement with the terms of the positive heuristics (emerging theories) can serve as
empirical basis for more sustainable and systematic debates on the various relationships
between Religion and International Relations.
In fact, in the next chapter I will engage exactly in this type of intellectual
exercise, by introducing a cognitive model that I see as cognitively representing the
essential terms of what I call paradigmatic degrees of aggregation, applied to the IR
literature on globalization. This model emerges from my own interpretation of
intersubjective understandings in academia on the essential terms of the debate among
authors such as Imre Lakatos, Karl Popper, P. K. Feyerabend, and Thomas Khun (as well
as IR scholars such as Patrick James and James Rosenau), about the concept of scientific
paradigm and its application to assessments of scientific enterprises or research programs.
In chapter six I populate the model with „global concepts‟ found in IR literature. These
are concepts used by scholars in the field when addressing globalization issues and
processes.
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Chapter Five:
Paradigmatic Degrees of Aggregation Model

In this chapter I develop a rather complex cognitive model that I believe reflects a
widely held intersubjective representation of scientific praxis, commonly known as
scientific paradigm. I call this model paradigmatic degrees of aggregation. It is largely
based on the Kuhn-Popper-Feyerabend-Lakatos debate on paradigms and research
programs (Popper 1959; Kuhn 1962; Feyerabend 1970; Lakatos 1970). These two
concepts have experienced great influence in Social Sciences, broadly speaking, and,
more specifically, in the disciplinary field of International Relations, as attested, for
example, on its appropriation by scholars such as Patrick James and James Rosenau
(Rosenau 1997; James 2002).
The arguments that follow introduce, step-by-step, the cognitive reasoning (in the
language of VCM) leading to the construction of the model, structured as a multi-level
network configuration. In chapter six I apply this model to what I see as a particular
sociological paradigm, to which I refer as global relations.

The Model

The concept of scientific paradigm in IR is well known and widely used by
practitioners in the field (Popper 1959; Kuhn 1962; Feyerabend 1970; Lakatos 1970;
Hollis and Smith 1991; Smith, Booth et al. 1996; Waever 1996; Osiander 1998; Brecher
330
1999; Elman and Elman 2002; James 2004). Thomas Kuhn gave the concept its more
formal meaning with the publication of the very controversial and influential work “The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (Kuhn 1962). According to Kuhn, progress in
science does not reflect a process characterized by gradual accumulation of better
theories as defended by authors such as Karl Popper (Popper 1959). Instead, mature
sciences experiment the succession of dominant paradigms. These paradigms will
determine the nature of accepted puzzles and the methodological procedures to be used
by practitioners in the field. Kuhn breaks with the rationalist view of Popper, that science
is purely a rational endeavor. He points out the sociological elements embedded in
scientific praxis that influence generations of scholars to adopt similar worldviews and
subsequent sets of praxis.
Nevertheless, despite Kuhn‟s view that in mature (natural) sciences a single
paradigm should dominate, in IR the concept of paradigm has become central for the
recognition and acceptance that the field is inherently multi-paradigmatic. Realism, Neo-
Realism, Institutional Liberalism, Constructivism, just to mention a few, now may claim
to represent particular sets of views and procedures to understand the world of
international relations.
Notwithstanding the relevance of the debates centering their arguments on the
levels of rationality or socialization guiding scientific praxis, the question inevitably
becomes the need to recognize that the two elements are actually present in the way
science advances. Imre Lakatos has tried a middle ground, so to speak (Lakatos 1970).
He recognizes the need for rational methods of evaluation, while at the same time
relaxing the all too strict terms defined by Popper to properly falsify and eventually
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replace a theory. His take has allowed scholars to keep working with the notions of
scientific paradigms but in ways more attuned with rationalist views of science.
What follows is a “visual explanation” of the key cognitive elements leading to
the development of a logically coherent and self-contained model that I call paradigmatic
degrees of aggregation. It is a model that reflects my own interpretation of how the
notion of scientific paradigms may be visually represented and therefore properly
populated by conceptual constructs found in the literature. In the case of this research, the
concepts found with the ISQ literature review will populate the model. At the same time,
I believe the model largely reflects an intersubjective representation of the idea of
scientific paradigms as largely understood in academic circles. For that reason, it may be
a viable template applicable to any field dealing with large numbers of interconnected
abstract concepts that together comprise a given corpus of disciplinary knowledge.
Diagram 5.1 below represents the conceptual blending process responsible for
giving rise to the idea of paradigmatic degrees of aggregation in the first place.
Conceptual blending is a network structure first introduced in Figure 2.6d and e. The two
nodes on the top are the matrixes (blending spaces) for the constitution of the model,
which is the node at the bottom. The blending spaces provide elements that will form the
new node, the blended space. In this case, the essential blending features are the notion of
conceptual degrees of aggregation adopted by scholars such as James Rosenau and
Patrick James (Rosenau 1997; James 2002), and the idea of three-level concept as the
basic internal structure of social concepts developed by Gary Goertz (Goertz 2006). The
blended space, emerging with the combination of elements taken from the two blending
spaces, is what I call paradigmatic degrees of aggregation.
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The next step is to investigate the contents of each component of the model in
more detail, starting with the notion of conceptual degrees of aggregation.
Patrick James is an example of a scholar in the field of IR who adopts the general
points presented by Popper as a way to assess the quality of the content (progressive vs.
degenerative) of research enterprises; in his case that of structural realism (James 2002).
But to do so James refers to James Rosenau‟s classification of different classes of
concepts required for assessing the value of theories and the ways disciplines move
forward (Rosenau 1977). These authors advocate the need for a proper distinction of key
conceptual constructs commonly used in scholarship for the evaluation of quality
knowledge production, namely worldview, ontology, paradigms, theory, and hypothesis.
Diagram 5.1: Blending Network Giving Rise to the Paradigmatic Degrees of
Aggregation Model

Degrees of
Aggregation
Three-Level
Concept
Paradigmatic
Degrees of
Aggregation
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To them, these concepts are placed at different levels of analytical reasoning, forming a
“five-point continuum of aggregation” (as shown in Diagram 2.16), which ranges from
the highest to the lowest in terms of degree of generalization.
In cognitive terms what Rosenau and James propose as conceptual degrees of
aggregation is a scale network comprised by the five points in a linear continuum
structure characterized by varying levels of generality, or aggregation. Variation of
information in the network travels from the most generic (at the top) to the most specific,
in terms of the meaning and intended application of each conceptual construct. At the top,
we have the level of worldviews, comprised by metaphysical claims. Immediately below
it there is the ontological level, followed by the degree of paradigmlike creations (or
paradigms for short). Next, the level of theories is placed right before the level of
hypothesis, which is to be found at the very bottom of the network.
Diagram 5.2 below is the visual representation of the conceptual continuum of
aggregation as understood by Rosenau and James. James‟ goal is to assess the
(degenerative or progressive) nature of a particular research program, or research
enterprise, as he calls it. To that end he concentrates on the three intermediate levels,
comprised by ontologies, paradigmlike creations, and theories.
He is of the opinion that the degree of worldviews is too general for assessment of
quality of the scientific enterprise, while the level of ontologies is problematic, since no
one can fairly adjudicate what are the particular ontologies of a given worldview, leading
to much confusion as to the specific types of categories and their respective components.
It is much easier (and productive) to focus on the theoretical level, argues James. What
are the theories? How are they lined up vis-à-vis each other? What do they tell us as to
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the state of knowledge in the field? To answer these questions one needs an analytical
framework to organize the theoretical data gathered. That is when Lakato‟s model of
science enters the picture in James‟s construction.

Diagram 5.2: Conceptual Degrees of Aggregation‟s Scale Network

Theories

Paradigms

Hypothesis

Ontology

Worldview
V
335
James is explicit about organizing his arguments as well as addressing the data
through the prism of Lakato‟s integrated concepts of hardcore, negative heuristics,
positive heuristic, and the hard core‟s protective belt with auxiliary hypotheses. As
already shown in Diagram 2.21, in cognitive terms, these elements form a concentric
ring-network, a network comprised by layers going from the outskirts (positive
heuristics) to the center (hard-core). At the center we have the axiomatic claims, the
metaphysical assumptions informing the very nature of the research enterprise, program,
or paradigm. They are not open to questionings. Following from the hard-core‟s
axiomatic claims and forming a protective belt around it, the negative heuristics contains
sets of rules informing the types of theories that cannot be formulated as they violate the
non-negotiable principles of the hard-core. Only then, within the outer layer comprised
by the positive heuristics, theories are formulated and tested against empirical realities.
On an entirely different line of research, Gary Goertz (Goertz 2006) also engages
in a type of multi-level reasoning with cognitive implications that are surprisingly similar
to James‟s idea of degrees of aggregation, while at the same time revealing fundamental
differences. Goertz engages in conceptual analysis and proposes that most of the relevant
social concepts are actually multi-level. At the highest level (the basic level) one has the
concept itself, its nomenclature, or what he calls the root concept. At the intermediate
level (the secondary level), one has the ontological components that constitute the
concept. Finally, at the more specific level (the indicator level) one has the empirical
components, or the indicators of the ontological elements. Goertz calls this structure
Three-Level Concept. Explains Goertz:

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Usually the basic level is too abstract and complex to be directly converted
into the indicator/data level. The secondary level provides theoretical
linkages between the abstract basic-level concept and the concrete
indicator/data level. For example, the basic-level concept of “intelligence”
usually receives the secondary-level formulation “verbal ability”, “analytic
ability”, or “mathematical ability”, which then allows the actual creation of
test questions. (Goertz 206, p. 53)

Goertz develops a very ingenious, rather elegant menu of visual tools that makes
it possible to mutually integrate the three-levels in a coherent manner, while also being
able to apply his proposed visual structure to the two types of prototypical conceptual
structures most often recognized as valid in scholarship, namely family resemblance and
necessary and sufficient conditions. To that end, particular attention is given to variation
in types of linkages (represented by arrows with different notations) and some additional
signs/symbols, such as the use of the expressions OR and AND, as well as mathematical
signs, such as “+” and “*” to indicate, respectively (in both cases) family resemblance
and necessary and sufficient condition. According to Goertz one may use either OR and
AND structural relationships either at the secondary or at the indicator levels. In short,
what determines the type of prototype structure adopted is the choice of linkages within
and across the three constitutive levels of the overall conceptual scheme.
Diagram 5.3 below reproduces Goertz‟ three-level conceptual structure for
societal corporation (Goertz 2006, p. 52), which is the author‟s interpretation of the
analysis on the topic provided by Philippe C. Schmitter (Schmitter 1982). The column to
the left is the third-level, which is that of the empirical indicators. The column in the
middle is the secondary level, the ontological one, while the column to the right is the
337
basic level, the one that provides the name (identity or reference) to the overall
conceptual structure.

In the specific structure represented in the model, the indicator level is connected
to the level of ontology by substitutability linkages. What it means is that, contrary to
necessary and sufficient conditions prototype, which is a type of conceptual structure that
does not allow for “substitution” of a given component by another, here “the family
Diagram 5.3: Gary Goertz‟ Three-Level Concept for Societal Corporation
Indicator Level
Secondary Level
Basic Level
Legend:
+
OR
Ontological
Substitutability
Societal Corporation
Organizational
Centralization
Collective Bargaining
Powers
Strike Funds
Large Staff
Membership Dues
National Labor
Federation
Joint Organization
No Stable Factions
+
+
+
+
+
Associational
Monopoly
+
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resemblance approach is characterized by the fact that the absence of one characteristic
can be substituted for by the presence of others” (Goertz 2006, p. 12).
The basic level connects to the secondary level by linkages that indicate ontology
in Goertz‟s scheme. Both at the indicator and at the secondary level the mathematical
sign for addition indicates linkage between indicators, which is also a notation for family
resemblance.
Goertz sees his structure as one that departs from the traditional semantic
approach to concepts:

Sartori developed a semantic and definitional approach to concepts. In
contrast, my approach is ontological, realist, and causal. The core attributes
of a concept constitute a theory of the ontology of the phenomenon under
consideration. Concepts are about ontology. To develop a concept is more
than providing a definition: it is deciding what is important about an entity.
The arguments about why attribute X is important form part of the
ontological theory of the object. (Goertz 2006, p. 27, author‟s highlights)

As the quote clearly states, conceptual analysis is not about providing alternative
semantic definitions to phenomena or abstract ideas. It is about theorizing, manifested in
the very choosing of its ontological components. Notice here a fundamental depart from
Rosenau and James‟ view on the role of ontologies. To these authors to focus on
ontologies for assessment of knowledge production is too problematic. In their opinion
choices on ontology reflect arbitrary assumptions (and therefore open for contestation) on
what is to be observed, what are the units for analysis, their boundaries and the selection
of what are the main issues for consideration (James 2002, p. 69). After all, different
scholars may have differing views on those elements. But Goertz sees it as a key
339
component of theory itself. The very selection of ontological components reflects
theoretical choices. To Goertz, ontology is theory. This differing view on the role of
ontology has implications for the edification of the paradigmatic degrees of aggregation
model, as I shall discuss later.
Furthermore, Goertz‟s structure derives from the basic premise that the internal
constitution of concepts is multi-level. The very name of the structure refers to the notion
of “levels”, which in this case – similar as to what happens with Rosenau and James‟
notion of “continuum of aggregation” – goes from the most generic to the most specific.
The quote from Goertz above explicitly refers to this fact. Well, from the cognitive point
of view, the network structure that best reflects this cognitive representation is that of a
scale network. However, Goertz prefers to adopt a construction that is rather one of
“brackets to the right” lateral tree typology network (first introduced in Figure 2.1g3). It
somewhat results in a reversed lateral mapping (as shown in Diagram 2.30). In lateral
mapping the emphasis is on the evolving analytical levels as they evolve step-by-step,
going naturally from the first to the n-level as required by the overall structure. But with
Goertz‟ construction, one starts from the last level, the third one, which is that of the
indicators.
Considering that the choice of a given network structure is primarily a matter of
emphasis on certain features over others, it is not that Goertz is necessarily “wrong”. It
only means that he has other, more pressing concerns in mind. I can only speculate which
would they be. It could be, for instance, his concerns with matters of causality, as
expressed by the author in the quote above. Although the example in Diagram 5.3 depicts
a non-causal structure, the already mentioned disproportionate emphasis on causal
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relations within Social Sciences may have led the author to give preference to a visual
structure more attuned with the reasoning of the type “A causes B” or “A leads to B”,
commonly represented as line networks (introduced in Figure 2.1h1-h5), or as either
fishbone or bus networks, when there are either intervening variables or several
independent variables, as shown in Diagrams 2.18 and 2.19, respectively.
Whatever the reason, my main interest is in Goertz‟ reasoning in terms of multiple
analytical levels forming the internal constitution of social concepts. In this regard, the
model would be best represented as shown in Diagram 5.4 below.
Changing Goertz‟ choice of visual display for his three-level concept is more than
a mere exercise guided by any sort of „cognitive correctedness‟. Doing so allows me to
expose yet another major feature in the author‟s mode of visualization that, in my
opinion, prevents taking his conceptual reasoning to deeper levels of analytical content.
One possible influence in Goertz‟s choice in displaying his structure in a lateral way may
be the hidden and probably unconscious subscription to traditional methods of concept
mapping. This is the so-called “boxes-and-arrows” structure, in which nodes are
represented as labels (Cañas, Hill et al. 2004; Canãs and Novak 2006; Novak and Canãs
2006). However, the use of labels prevents the possibility of displaying further content
within any given label. Labels can only be linked to other labels. What happens, for
instance, if a given component within the overall “map” has layers within layers? How to
portray them? By opting for the boxes-and-arrows structure, it is simply not possible.

341

On the other hand, by representing the conceptual components of Goertz‟ model
as entities, rather than as mere labels allows for a complete mental reconfiguration of the
entire structure. Diagram 5.5 below is a referential structure in 3D format (first
Diagram 5.4: Gary Goertz‟ Three-Level Concept as a Scale Network
Indicator Level
Secondary Level
Basic Level
Legend:
+
OR
Ontological
Substitutability
So
cie
tal
Co
rp
ora
tio
n
Organ
izatio
nal
Centr
alizati
on
Colle
ctive
Barga
ining
Powe
rs
Str
ike
Fu
nd
s
La
rge
Sta
ff
M
em
ber
shi
p
Du
es
Natio
nal
Labo
r
Feder
ation
Joi
nt
Or
ga
niz
ati
on
No
Sta
ble
Fa
cti
on
s
+
+ +
+ +
Assoc
iation
al
Mono
poly
+
342
introduced in Diagram 2.32). It shows the same reconfigured three-level concept
structure displayed in Diagram 5.4 above.
Notice that this time the levels are not merely labels for the identification of
different classes of conceptual constructs within the model. They have become
environment containers within which the conceptual components of the model are placed
(the labels in Goertz‟s boxes-and-arrows arrangement, the nodes in VCM). This mode of
visualization can uphold the same level of information as in the original version (by
simply including specific notations to the lines between levels as well as to the rings
linking content within each level.

Diagram 5.5: 3D Scale Network of Goertz‟s Three-Level Concept Structure

Indicator Level
Secondary Level
Basic Level

Societal Corporation
Organizational
Centralization
Collective Bargaining
Powers
Strike Funds
Large Staff
Membership Dues
National Labor
Federation
Joint Organization
No Stable Factions
Associational
Monopoly
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What is more, besides being able to uphold the same level of information present
in the original (and in the reconfigured) structure presented by Goertz, this 3D scale
network structure allows for the expression of even more detailed content. Two of them
stand out. First, contrary to the original Goertz‟s three-level concept format, it is possible
to visualize and portray multiple levels of content within each of the three fundamental
analytical levels. Just for the sake of the argument, in the hypothetical example shown in
Diagram 5.6 below the basic level is formed not by a single root-concept, but by a two-
level content in which the root-concept is linked to a two-ring intersection network. Let
us imagine, for instance, that “realism” constitutes the root concept. At very least, one
may refer to neo-realism as well as to structural realism as two off-springs of the basic
general concept “realism”. Each has their specific sets of ontological components as well
as empirical indicators. They necessarily intersect since both of them share at very least
some key axiomatic claims on the nature of international relations, such as the notion of
an anarchic system shaping relationships among nation-states. Therefore, the proper way
to portray this multi-level conceptual arrangement would be to place the root-concept and
its two (or more) inner variations at the broadest possible analytical level; the basic level
in Goertz‟s three-level concept.
Second, it is possible to display varying types of network structures linking
entities (nodes) within a particular analytical level. In Diagram 5.6 a line network links
the components at the secondary level. At the indicator level, a ring network structures
the arrangements for the indicators to the left, while a radial network structures those to
the right. Goertz‟ three-level concept simply does not account for structural variation in
the ways contents within a given analytical level interact. In fact, it does not account to
344
any sort of structural arrangements within levels at all, besides indicating the nature of
the prototype displayed.

Now that the case has been made for the reconfiguration of Goertz‟s structure in
the general language of VCM, we can visualize in Diagram 5.7 below the contents from
the blending spaces previously shown in Diagram 5.1.
The next step of course is to see how these elements from the blending spaces will
contribute to the emergence of the paradigmatic degrees of aggregation model. But
before, let us summarize the arguments raised up to this point. The paradigmatic degrees
Diagram 5.6: 3D Scale Network of Goertz‟s Three-Level Concept Structure

Indicator Level
Secondary Level
Basic Level

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of aggregation model is a cognitive visual representation for the concepts of sociological
paradigms and research programs. It results, initially, from a “blending” process.

From one hand we have key conceptual constructs often serving as the basis for
systematic evaluation of knowledge: worldview, ontology, paradigmlike creations,
Diagram 5.7: Conceptual Blending Network: Blending Spaces‟ Contents
V
THEORY
PARADIGMS
HYPOTHESIS
ONTOLOGY
WORLDVIEW
Degrees of
Aggregation

Paradigmatic
Degrees of
Aggregation
Three-Level
Concept
V
ONTOLOGY
ROOT-
CONCEPT
INDICATORS
346
theory, and hypothesis. They are generically seen as pertaining to different levels of
generalization. If worldview is the broadest possible reference to a world comprised by
abstract configurations, hypothesis refer to the most specific, detailed elements of such
world, now seen through the prism of empirical manifestations, such as units, events, and
processes.
From the other hand, Goertz convincingly develops the argument that most
relevant abstract social concepts have multiple layers of content. These layers are
surprisingly similar to and integrate with those key conceptual constructs previously
mentioned in regards to levels of generalization. Therefore, I bring the two together as to
form a coherent cognitive representation, a model to which I refer as paradigmatic
degrees of aggregation. How and to what extent, in specific terms, those two “blending”
elements (degrees of aggregation and Goertz‟s three-level concept) combine is the
subject of the arguments that follow.
James and Goertz‟s models coincide in a central aspect. They both recognize the
existence of a more complex conceptual structure that is essentially multi-level in
character. But there are differences as well. James draws first on Rosenau in order to
justify opting to a particular level of aggregation that he sees as suitable to assess
knowledge production. He terms this as the paradigmatic degree of aggregation. Goertz
rather looks at the internal constitution of major social concepts and make the case that
they have three central analytical levels.
In the end, I combine insights from both Rosenau-James and Goertz. I agree with
Goertz that social concepts are constituted by at least three major analytical dimensions,
although as I explained above, I foresee the possibility for the existence of multiple levels
347
within those three essential dimensions. From James and Rosenau I borrow the essential
nomenclatures – and the insights – on the internal constitution of the three analytical
levels identified by Goertz. The result is what I believe constitutes a particular
intersubjective cognitive model.
The first and most essential transformation leading to the blended space is the
appropriation of the idea of paradigm, no longer as an individual concept among many
(as in Rosenau-James construction) but as a multi-level concept (rather similar to
Goertz‟s three-level concept). In the paradigmatic levels of aggregation model, paradigm
is not a particular level of aggregation, but the entire structure within with multiple levels
of aggregation exist. The justification for this appropriation is rather simple. If Goertz is
right about the fact that most – if not all – social concepts are multi-level in character,
with the multiple levels mutually linked by theoretical determinants, then two
implications follow. First, the very concept of paradigm may be represented in this
format, since it is a social concept. Second, the entire structure of a given paradigm (i.e.,
realism, constructivism) is paradigmatic, by definition: the metaphysical axioms
justifying its existence, the ontologies recognized as comprising it, as well as the
empirical manifestations listed as indicators.
Therefore, the multi-level model for paradigm has at least three cognitive domain-
levels. The broader one may be called as metaphysical paradigm. The intermediate level
I term paradigmatic ontologies, while the most specific, empirical level, I refer to as
paradigmatic indicators. Once again, within each of these levels there are subsequent
levels of conceptual structures. An additional level in the model congregates the elements
from the previous three domains in order to inform the structured contents of research
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enterprises as bodies of knowledge production. It is basically Lakatos‟ structure as
adapted by James for the evaluation of structural realism. Its presence in the blended
space is justified by the fact that paradigm is essentially a concept related to collective
and conscious efforts for the generation of knowledge. Thus, a model for paradigm would
be incomplete if it did not incorporate a mechanism to provide a logical basis for the
evaluation of the quality of its knowledge production.
Even more importantly, James emphasis on theories as the key contents of the
positive heuristics in Lakato‟s model is a critical piece of information not incorporated by
the previous three paradigmatic degrees of aggregation. Goertz‟s three-level structure
seems appropriate to uncover all the metaphysical, the ontological, and the empirical
components of a given conceptual universe. But how these elements combine as to form
theories and hypotheses that will guide scientific inquiry is not covered in that structure.
Lakato‟s structure does it. Since the elements that will populate Lakato‟s structure cannot
come from anywhere, but from an integrated analytical framework, it has to be explicitly
linked to the metaphysical, the ontological, and the empirical foundations of the research
enterprise.
These foundations provide substance as well as conceptual validity to the theories
and hypotheses generated within the research enterprise. If variables, relationships, etc,
contained in theories in succession or hypotheses cannot be properly located within the
various paradigmatic levels then either the theories have to be reformulated or the
foundations of the research enterprise better devised. Diagram 5.8 below shows how each
element from the blending spaces contributes to the internal arrangements of the
paradigmatic degrees of aggregation model.
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Diagram 5.8: Conceptual Blending Network for the Paradigmatic Degrees of
Aggregation Model
V
THEORY
PARADIGMS
HYPOTHESIS
ONTOLOGY
WORLDVIEW
Degrees of
Aggregation
V
EMPIRICAL
ONTOLOGY
RESEARCH
ENTERPRISE
METAPHYSICS
Paradigmatic
Degrees of
Aggregation
Three-Level
Concept
V
ONTOLOGY
ROOT-
CONCEPT
INDICATORS
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In Goertz‟ view this most generic level is not only a label for the concept under
consideration. It generally reflects either a positive or a negative pole in a continuum that
may or may not be dichotomous. (Goertz 2006, p. 30). Goertz emphasizes a sharp
distinction between the positive and the negative poles, in which “the negative pole is
often the negation of the positive: it has no independent theoretical existence” (p.32).
This of course, can be a contentious claim. In fact, as Goertz explains, in the case of
Schitter‟s concept of societal corporatism shown in Diagram 5.3, the negative pole is
often defined as pluralism, which, of course, is a concept theoretically autonomous.
Equally important for the designation of the concept‟s basic level, according to
Goertz, is the clear specification as to whether the relationship between the positive pole
(usually the concept in question) and the negative pole (its negation) is one characterized
by a dichotomous relationship (usually raising the problem of the “gray zone” between
the two) or one of continuous variation, allowing for the existence of additional cases
between the two poles (even if explicitly defined as “the” grey zone).
In short, the designation of the basic level in Goertz‟s structure is part and parcel
of a broader conceptual structure, mutually linking conceptual constructs in systemic
ways. In this regard, it is easy to see how interconnectedness between concepts at the
basic level (as put by Goertz) reflects line networks, in the language of VCM. What is
more, a conscious recognition about the existence of such continuum at the basic level
will greatly inform decisions about the components forming the analytical level of
ontologies.
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In a sharply distinct line of reasoning, Rosenau and James tend to agree with each
other on the notion of worldview as an overarching concept. By making reference to
Rosenau, James states:

To be more precise, worldview is an overarching concept that invariably can
be summed up in very few words or even just one, as in realism, liberalism,
or Rosenau‟s (1988, 1990, 1995) neologism fragmegration, which refers to
simultaneously unfolding processes of fragmentation and integration in the
international system. (James 2002, 49, author‟s emphasis)

Adds James:

A worldview, for example, is a concept that conveys an overall meaning,
inclines toward the normative end of the intellectual spectrum for that reason,
and, at least by intuition, is not assessed effectively by gathering data and
testing hypotheses. (James 2002, p. 50)

A first view of the quotes above may lead to the false impression that the idea of
worldview is nothing more than a generic label for a concept, with no further content.
However, that could not be farther from the truth. It rather indicates an overall
understanding of a given conceptualization that is primarily normative in nature. But
normative content is not necessarily something wide open to any sort of interpretation.
Rather, as put by James, the level of worldview is one characterized by Gestalt:

A worldview is understood by gestalt rather than through an explanation
based on some mixture of formal logic and evidence from observation. Thus
the concept represents something fundamentally normative in character; a
worldview shapes interpretation of reality from a perspective that is not
subject to any prior rational reconstruction. A worldview, moreover, may
even remain implicit and unnamed; a formal exegesis is not necessary to
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confirm it presence because self-identification occurs naturally through
adoption of arguments that can be traced back to a fundamental system of
beliefs. (James 2002, pp. 70-71)

The key point in this quote is the principle that worldviews reflect fundamental
systems of beliefs, which by definition are normative in character. They are beliefs that
may not be amenable to rational assessments. Either one believes on them or not.
However, it does not necessarily means that these beliefs cannot be formally expressed.
They are, through what Lakatos defines as axioms, or axiomatic claims (Lakatos 1970).
Although James does not explicitly or directly link worldviews to the concept of Lakatos‟
axioms, it can be easily inferred by his adoption of Lakatos‟ scheme to assess the quality
of knowledge production in structural realism as a distinct research enterprise.
By referring to Lakatos‟ model for scientific research programs that are
comprised by hard-core, negative heuristic, and positive heuristic, James states:

The term hard core refers to the axiomatic basis of the program. During its
lifetime, these assumptions are not questioned. Only if the program as a whole is
refuted by the emergence of a superior alternative (i.e., a program that still looks
better after a reasonable passage of time) is the hard core discarded. (James
2002, p. 91)

Although James is here referring to the hard core as the place where axioms are
found, the similarity in terms of how axioms are the basis for an entire system of beliefs
(therefore leading to scientific investigations) cannot be dismissed. Therefore, I would
argue that the original location of axioms in a multi-level concept structure is at the basic
level, the level of worldviews. But it is transmitted throughout the other levels, ultimately
forming the hard-core of Lakato‟s research program structure.
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Diagram 5.9 below is the next step in visualizing the internal structure of the
paradigmatic degrees of aggregation model, this time in the 3D referential structure
visualization mode. It shows the arguments about the axioms originating at the
metaphysical level but irradiating throughout the entire structure. It also shows how the
concept would be linked to external conceptual constructs based on Goertz‟s advise about
the need to make explicit the nature of the positive-negative axis.

Diagram 5.9: Paradigmatic Degrees of Aggregation Model

Paradigmatic Indicators
Paradigmatic Ontologies
Metaphysical Paradigm
Paradigmatic Knowledge Structure
Negative
Pole
Root-
Concept
Axioms
Hard-Core
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The next step is to discuss the contents of the level of ontology, here termed as
paradigmatic ontologies. According to Goertz‟s here is where the distinction between the
positive pole (root-concept) and the negative pole comes into play. The ontological
contents result from a combination of reasoning on axiomatic claims that should provide
a broad understanding of the nature of the world to which it refers as well as reasoning
about on what would be the contents of the negative pole, indirectly providing clues as to
what would be “positive” ontological elements of the root-concept (positive pole):

The secondary-level dimensions will almost always refer to the positive
concept; many of the same issues that arise at the basic level will reappear at
lower levels. For each secondary-level dimension, the question of the
negative pole will arise. In each case it is important that, in addition to the
positive dimension linking up with the positive basic-level concept, the
negative ends of the secondary-level dimensions make sense as well.
Nevertheless, I, and most scholars, focus attention on the positive end of the
basic level when constructing lower-level dimensions. (Goertz 2006, pp.36-
37)

Furthermore, it is at the level of ontology that decisions must be made about the
nature of the logic conceptual arrangements (necessary conditions vs. family
resemblance) that gives shape to the entire structure. The level of ontologies is not the
primary focus of attention in James‟ analysis. Still, the author provides some key insights
as to the nature of its contents:

Ontology focuses on the nature of existence and, as such, remains too general
and normatively focused to serve as a promising avenue for evaluation by a
community of scholars. The problem of incommensurability as related to
concept formation, which initially became associated with interparadigmatic
debate as defined by Kuhn (1962), seems germane to this point along the
continuum and, of course, to those that might reside even closer to
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worldview. The crucial condition to fulfill is clarity – an ontology must be
specified in a way that is intelligible and consistent, or research based upon it
cannot build toward a higher purpose. (James 2002, p. 74)

Both authors agree on the fact that at the level of ontology it is crucial that its
components reflect a recognizable degree of consistence, be it as the result of opposing
its terms to those from the negative pole (as Goertz suggests), be it as the result of paying
attention to matters of intelligibility and internal coherence, as observed by James.
I would argue that in terms of a paradigm it is at the level of ontology that the
terms of its respective research programs emerge. This is a view that fundamentally
departs from Rosenau and James‟ arguments on the nature of the five points continuum
of aggregation (Diagram 5.2). They see ontology and paradigmlike creations placed at
two distinct levels of aggregation. I see both placed at the same level. After all, the
designation of ontological components of any conceptualization of reality is the first
attempt to give shape, boundaries, and ultimately structure to what has originally been
expressed only in metaphysical terms. In fact, by making reference to Rosenau, James
states that “agreement on units, boundaries between them, and issues within interactions
is a precondition for identifying a set of paradigms within an ontology (Rosenau 1977)”
(James 2002, p. 76).
All these elements – units, units‟ boundaries, and issues– are primarily structured
within what we broadly refer to as research programs; which are structured ontologies.
Within a given paradigm are likely to subsist several research programs. Each has its own
set of units, domains, and issues, organized around one ore more research domains. Only
then, at the next level of aggregation, is where empirical indicators are identified. There
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are sets of indicators for each research domain that constitutes a given research program
within a disciplinary paradigm.
Let us summarize these arguments about ontological and empirical levels of
aggregation by way of exposing what they are in the case of global relations, if
considered as a single, unified paradigm within the general disciplinary field of
international relations. Judging by the broad literature on globalization, global relations
has three research programs, namely global economy, global civil society, and global
governance, as shown in Diagram 5.10 below. Global economy has three research
domains: economic production, trade, and financial market. Global civil society has
social movements and advocacy movements as its research domains. Global governance
has four research domains: global power, global development, global order, and global
justice. As the model in Diagram 5.10 shows, both research programs and their respective
research domains are located at the level of ontology. After all, these are abstract
representations about the constitutive elements forming the world of global relations,
providing specific information as to what are the conceptual units inhabiting that world
and the logical boundaries between them.
Furthermore, it is inside the ontological level of a research program that one may
locate the three central units endowed with agency, as shown in chapter three: agents,
institutions, and infra-structure. Therefore, all the contents shown in Diagram 3.8 are
located inside the node identified as “global civil society” in Diagram 5.10.
Finally, the label containers in the model shown in Diagram 5.10 (the black rings) are the
empirical indicators linked to each of the research domains. For that reason they are
located at the paradigmatic indicators‟ degree of aggregation.
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At this point an important observation is in order. If we treat global relations as
the root-concept placed at the metaphysical level of aggregation as shown in Diagram
5.10, then, what would be its negative pole, according to Goertz‟s advice? Surprisingly,
there are two distinct answers, both of them appropriate I would argue. The first option is
Diagram 5.10: Paradigmatic Degrees of Aggregation Model for Global Relations
Paradigmatic Indicators
Paradigmatic Ontologies
Metaphysical Paradigm
Paradigmatic Knowledge Structure
Global Relations
Global Governance
Global Civil Society
Global Economy
358
to follow Goertz‟s advice and recognize the existence of a continuum. But here this
continuum is comprised by several autonomous entities (and not merely a positive pole, a
negative one, and an undefined grey area in between). Rather, they would form a
sequence network well known in IR as levels of analysis (Waltz 1959; Singer 1961;
Hollis and Smith 1991; Brecher 1999; Locher and Prügl 2001). Which, specifically,
would be the elements in this network would vary from author to author. In my own
understanding of the idea of levels of analysis, they would be the global, the
international, the regional, the national, the domestic, the local, and the individual levels.
Diagram 5.11 below is the visualization of such representation. Of course, the
same way that “global relations” is formed by further content, the other nodes in that
positive-negative pole network should also contain their own sets of metaphysical,
ontological, and empirical elements.

Diagram 5.11: Global Relations‟ Negative Pole
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But another entirely distinct option is to consider global relations as one paradigm
among many others co-existing within the disciplinary field of International Relations. In
that case, it would be part of a network of paradigms located at the metaphysical level of
aggregation. The implications are twofold. First, it shows in practice the possibility for
multi-level content within a single main containment level in Goertz‟s three-level
conceptual structure. Second, more important than thinking in terms of a negative pole,
one would have to think – in this case – in terms of a network of paradigms co-existing in
the field, how they stand in regards to the main disciplinary conceptual foundations, and
how they stand vis-à-vis each other.
In this regard, these paradigms would be structured as a fully connected centered-
ring network (first introduced in Figure 2.1d) since all paradigms gravitate around the
core metaphysical foundations of the disciplinary world to which they are all part. All
paradigms must share at least some of their axiomatic foundations with the discipline.
Otherwise they would not be under the same disciplinary “umbrella”. Diagram 5.12
below is the visualization of such representation. Global relations (GR) and other
hypothetical paradigms (P1-4) form the ring network that has IR as its center node. By
definition the paradigms have to be placed at the metaphysical level. After all, they all
reflect normative worldviews about reality.
What these alternative possibilities show in terms of thinking beyond a concept in
isolation is that there are multiple ways to think of conceptual integration. For some
reason scholars tend to recognize the important of network analysis, but privileging one
particular structure over others. The notion that key concepts form bipolar, dichotomous
structures of polar opposites, for example, is a well-established idea among those
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engaged in conceptual analysis, particular the more traditional approach to concepts,
focusing on matters of intension and extension, and indicators (Sartori 1970; Riggs 1981;
Wolff 1994; Goertz 2006). Scholars in cognitive linguistics, in turn, recognize the
relevance of radial networks (Brugman and Lakoff 2006; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk
2007), but without integrating them with other types of constructions.

In chapter two I showed great a number of such constructions, which should at
very least put into question the tendency in scholarship to pick one over others as the
Diagram 5.12: Global Relations as a Paradigm Within International Relations
IR
GR
P2 P1
P4
P3
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network structure that best exemplifies the way reality manifests itself. The contents in
Diagrams 5.11 and 5.12 only reinforce the inherent limit in this very strict view of the
roles played by network structures for reasoning on concept systems.
A final element has to be included in the model to make it complete. Patrick
James makes reference to Mario Bunge‟s systemism to make the point about the
importance of including micro and macro variables for the edification of theories that
take into account all possible functional relations in a social system. Below is an
adaptation of the reproduction of Bunge‟s visual representation found in James (2002, p.
31). The two general population containers (first introduced in Diagram 2.3i) on the top
of the structure represent macro variables. The single unit containers (first introduced in
Diagram 2.3e) at the bottom represent micro variables. The linkages between these
elements indicate, “the logically possible connections are micro-micro, micro-macro,
macro-macro, and macro-micro” (James 2002, p. 31).

Diagram 5.13: Logical Functional Relations in Systemism

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Continues James: “The essence of systemism is to get away from holism,
individualism, and other mindsets that convey only part of the picture of a working
system. Furthermore, systemism recognizes that effects also can move across levels.”
(James 2002, p. 31). My interpretation of James‟ argument is that the variables used for
the edification of theories originate from both the ontological and from the empirical
levels of aggregation. For that reason, this conceptualization on the functional
relationships between elements in a system serving as the logical basis for the edification
of theories is cognitively placed in between the level of empirical indicators and that of
actual knowledge production.
The final model is shown in Diagram 5.14. It has two additional pieces of
information when compared with the previous diagrams. First, it now contains the logic
structure for functional relations between variables that should serve as the basis for
theory development. Second, notice that the first layer of nodes at the level of
paradigmatic ontologies are no longer mutually linked by a ring network. Instead, they
are now structured around an axis, forming a radial network (first introduced in Figure
2.1e1). The ring network structure was used in Diagrams 5.10, 11, and 12 because they
were taking global relations as a specific example of a paradigmatic research program. In
that case, in particular, it is generally accepted that the main domains in globalization –
political, economic, and socio-economic – mutually interact, forming a multidimensional
system. Basically, all textbooks on globalization are structured as to address these
domains. Therefore, the use of the ring network simply meant to indicate that the nodes
in that network structure mutually interact in some fundamental way. What exactly are
the specific terms of that interaction will be shown in more detail in the next section.
363

But Diagram 5.14 is meant to indicate the final internal constitution of
paradigmatic network structures in general. In this regard, logically speaking, there is no
formal requirement that research programs necessarily mutually interact, although I
would suspect it to be rather the norm than the exception. The components forming the
Diagram 5.14: Paradigmatic Degrees of Aggregation Final Model

Paradigmatic
Indicators
Paradigmatic
Ontologies
Metaphysical
Paradigm
Paradigmatic
Knowledge
Structure
364
second layer of ontological nodes, however, are expected to interact in some way, as they
are organic manifestations of the same general abstract construction. For instance, it is
clear from the evidences shown in chapter three that agency within global civil society
navigate freely between its two main research/empirical domains, namely social
movements and advocacy movement.
Now that the basic internal structure of the paradigmatic degrees of aggregation
model has been revealed, the next step is to apply it to what I see as a particular
sociological paradigm, recognized as such in IR scholarship, even if implicitly: global
relations paradigm. I do it in the next chapter by first identifying the use of “global
concepts” in articles published in International Studies Quarterly (ISQ), a mainstream,
prestigious academic journal in the field of IR, and also the official research journal of
the 7000-member International Studies Association (ISA), the biggest and most
representative such organization in International Relations in the world. Then, I
“populate” the paradigmatic degrees of aggregation model with these global concepts,
which allows for some arguments to be raised about the state of knowledge in the field in
regards to the paradigm of global relations.

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Chapter Six:
Global Relations Paradigm

In this chapter I apply the paradigmatic degrees of aggregation model introduced
in the previous chapter to map the conceptual relationships between “global concepts”, or
concepts found in the globalization literature in the field of IR.
First, I argue about the logical shortcomings of “globalization” as the defining
concept for the analysis of global spheres of socialization. I propose, instead, the use of
“global relations” as an alternative terminology for such.
Second, considering global relations as an umbrella terminology, or what we may
call as the root concept of a broader system of meanings, I investigate the nature of the
conceptual constructs found in IR scholarship that together should form a concept system
of global relations. I do so by engaging in a literature review of articles published by the
academic journal International Studies Quarterly (ISQ)
32
for a period of ten years,
anyhow addressing global issues.
Third, I populate the paradigm model above-mentioned with the “global
concepts” found in the articles published by ISQ. I then engage in inferential remarks
about the state of knowledge in the field in regard to global studies and possible future
directions for its further development.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the steps here taken to populate the
paradigmatic degrees of aggregation model with concepts on global relations paradigm

32
The lists of all articles used for the literature review in this chapter and all concepts found in those
articles and subsequently grouped by category are in Appendix C and D, respectively.

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is just the first step of a broader effort that cannot be finalized within the context of this
research. To fully interconnect the large number of concepts listed is a task that cannot be
here concluded due to time constraints and limited resources. Nevertheless, the initial
steps to which I focus in here should be enough to generate inferential reasoning and to
provide a glimpse of the type of research the entire project entails.

Global Relations: Going Beyond Globalization Processes

Globalization is the term most commonly used within and outside academia to
address and define global issues (Gill 1995; Hall 1997; Riggs 1998; Bairoch 2000;
Friedman 2000; Meyer 2000; Scholte 2000; Appadurai 2001; Beynon and Dunkerley
2001; Guillén 2001; Berger and Huntington 2002; Munck 2002; Rudra 2003; Kaldor,
Anheier et al. 2003b; Heslam 2004; Kudrle 2004; Lechner and Boli 2004; Robertson
2004; A.T.Kearney 2005; McMichael 2005; Ruether 2005).
It is as much a precarious as it is a tainted term, however. It is a precarious term
because it disproportionably focuses on global processes occurring within the
international system of states. It leaves out questions about the very nature and role of the
components of global systems, particularly agency, and conflicting discourses shaping
our understandings of global social relations. In fact, it tends to imply rather a mere
process occurring within the inter-state system at the global level. It stops short of
questioning whether and to what extent global social relations are qualitatively distinct
types of human socialization when opposed to international and domestic ones. In fact,
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global studies are often not even identified as a distinct research program in the
disciplinary field of International Relations (Elman and Elman 2002).
Jan Aart Scholte is one of the editors of the Encyclopedia of Globalization, the
only such work on the topic to date (Scholte and Robertson 2007). He is also the author
of the entry “globalization”, where he explains that the terminology has been historically
linked to terminologies such as globe, global, and globalism. However, its modern usage,
“with its connotations of a development, a process, a trend, and a change – is a relatively
new word, coming into use during the latter part of the 20th century” (Scholte 2007, p.
526). According to Scholte globalization implies the idea of “becoming global”, which,
of course, directly derives from the main view of it as a process.
This disproportionate emphasis on empirical processes embedded in the concept
of globalization becomes even clearer when adding into the picture the
conceptualizations of globality and globalism. Manfred B. Steger writes the entry
“globalism” in the same Encyclopedia of Globalization. Reading Steger‟s arguments, it
becomes clear that the concept is not directly about processes. Rather, globalism relates
to political ideologies supporting those processes. It refers to political ideological designs
purposely championed by certain agents to foster interests at the global scale. It is
commonly linked to the Anglo-American model of liberal capitalism advocating for
values and norms based on “individualism, consumerism, market liberalization,
deregulation of the economy, and unlimited accumulation of capital” (Steger 2007,
p.522). Furthermore, it is commonly associated to a particular political system required
for the success of such open, liberal, political world: democracy.
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But it need not be about this particular ideology, I would caution. A different
political ideology or one that is diametrically opposed to the Anglo-American globalism
should also be defined as such, as long as it has somewhat of a global reach or appeal.
The notion of global jihad, for instance, is an obvious example.
Finally, Roland Robertson writes the entry globality for the Encyclopedia of
Globalization, to which he is one of the editors, together with Scholte. Here Robertson
explicitly differentiates globality from globalization. The latter refers “to processes, to
changes over time, but the concept of globality refers to a condition” (Robertson 2007,
p.524). The author also differentiates between globality and globalism: “the latter has an
ideological flavor, one that is lacking in the former” (p. 524). So, neither a process nor an
ideology, globality can be defined as the various human discourses observed throughout
human history linking humanity to levels of totality: the cosmos, the universe, and the
globe. It frequently refers to notions of global consciousness and global cultural ecumene.
Robertson explains: “throughout most of human history there have been different
civilizational conceptions, features, and conditions of the world as a whole” (p. 524).
Since Robertson focuses on the contemporary usage of the term in Western
scholarship, he limits the examples to Western history: the Renaissance period, the
valorization of humanitas (following both Copernicus‟ demonstration that Earth is not the
center of the Universe and the great European Voyages of Discovery), the 18th century
Enlightenment, the 1969 landing on the Moon, and the growing environmental concerns
at the global scale in the 20th century – all of which reinforcing the Greek notions of
oikoumene and okeanos, or global ecumene.
369
In short, while globalization is primarily about processes, and globalism is
essentially about ideologies, globality is about a worldview of the planet itself: “this
means that human beings have become more and more conscious of, and have acquired
doctrines and views about, the future of the entire planet” (Robertson 2007, p. 525). The
concept has two essential components, one of consciousness and one of actual
(technological) means of connectivity, which allows for the transmission of that global
conscience.
But the disproportionate emphasis on empirical processes at the expenses of
metaphysical and ontological components is not the only shortcoming of globalization as
an umbrella terminology. Globalization is also a tainted term because it has been largely
equated – implicitly or explicitly – with the strict and narrower domains of either political
or economic globalization (Apodaca 2001; Helleiner 2002; Gartzke and Li 2003; Kudrle
2004). It is as if other global domains either do not exist or – if they do –they are
necessarily subordinated to economic matters and to political arrangements that
legitimate it.
Scholte identifies four general conceptions to the terminology in contemporary
parlance: globalization as internationalization, as liberalization, as universalization, and
as planetarization. The first two meanings are directly related to state relations,
characterized by interdependence (internationalization) and subsequent efforts towards
removing official state barriers for cross-border flows of people, products, and services
(liberalization). In turn, these allow for “objects and experiences” worldwide, whether
they are good or bad in nature. These, of course, become the foundations for
universalization, leading to the emergence of views about either cultural homogenization
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or clash of civilizations. Although this third meaning indicates, in Scholte‟s opinion, a
departure from the statecentric views of the former two, the author points out the lack of
novelty of an alternative terminology (globalization) aimed merely to indicate
universalization (an already existing concept in itself).
The fourth meaning attached to globalization – planetarization – is the one closely
related to the idea of global relations. Still in Scholte‟s words, “the idea of planetarization
regards globalization as a trend whereby social relations increasingly unfold on the scale
of the Earth as a whole” (Scholte 2007, p. 527). Direct connections between individuals
and communities due to new global technologies, such as the Internet, transportation, etc,
as well as global challenges perceived as such (i.e. global warming, decaying global
biodiversity, etc) allow for the emergence of global discourses. Adds Scholte:

In the aggregate, the growth of these and many other transplanetary linkages
between people generates a reconfiguration of social geography, so that
“society” comes to exist on a global plane as well as in regional arenas,
country realms, and local spheres. Thus, with globalization, the planet
becomes a social location in its own right, more than and distinct from
territorial spaces. (p. 527)

Again, Scholte recognizes “planetarization” as the only meaning attached to
globalization that really adds “insight for an understanding of society in the 21st century”
(p.528). And yet, I would argue, this is the meaning actually least adopted by scholars
working on global issues. Scholte himself appears to agree with such view by stating that
economists and political scientists favor globalization as internationalization or
liberalization. Even more, the idea of globalization as liberalism largely dominates
Western scholarship and policymaking.
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It is easy to see that the concept of globality is the one closest related to the idea
of globalization as planetarization. Not surprisingly, it is a concept seldom if ever used by
scholars in the field of IR. Instead, a very brief survey should be enough to clearly
indicate that when working with the concept of globalization, most scholars argue about
the “liberal” and “neo-liberal” ideological underpinnings of globalization processes,
implicitly and sometimes explicitly linking the concept of globalization as
internationalization and as liberalization to the concept of globalism, understood as the
“liberal” ideology behind the fostering of global processes.
Summing up the arguments up to here, the concept of globalization becomes
fundamentally tainted to anyone interesting in working with the idea of planetarization,
of a realm of human socialization at the global scale. It happens for two reasons. First, at
the very core of the concept of globalization there is nothing more than the idea of
processes, of becoming global. There is no debate as to the nature of its axiomatic
foundations, or to the constitution and functioning of its ontological components. Focus is
almost entirely on empirical manifestations, on processes. Although processes are but the
end line of a broader reality, they tend to be the centerpiece of scholarship on global
matters. Second, as explained in the previous paragraph, the concept of globalization has
been widely framed (not only in academia, but also by the media and the public at large)
in ways that link it to the more strict ideas of internationalization, liberalization, and
liberal globalism.
For all these reasons I hereby refer to global relations as an alternative
terminology better equipped to address the contours of a global realm of human
socialization. As a concept, it should be rather an “umbrella”, under which a corpus of
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conceptual constructs should exist and mutually relate as to provide the specifics of its
metaphysical, ontological, as well as empirical elements in coherent and comprehensive
fashion. Together these conceptual constructs should form the conceptual system of
global relations. The assumption is that scholars working on globalization have already
developed many such constructs, regardless of how broad or strict have been their usages
of the concept. Therefore, the next step is to try to identify that corpus of knowledge as it
appears in IR scholarship on globalization. I do so by exploring ten years of articles
published by International Studies Quarterly, a prestigious and mainstream academic
publication in the field of International Relations.

Global Concepts in International Studies Quarterly: 1997-2006

The International Studies Quarterly (ISQ) is widely considered as a prestigious
academic journal in IR, publishing articles addressing comparative and international
aspects or international studies. Although ISQ reflects “mainstream” approaches to IR,
with emphasis on topics related to high politics, security and foreign policy, it also
publishes articles representative of all the major currents of research in IR. In short, it is a
mainstream, authoritative journal in IR with a broad scope of topics covered.
The initial review comprised the reading of every title and abstract of all 301
articles published by ISQ from 1997 to 2006. The articles were classified according to the
likelihood that they contained global concepts as part of the central or ancillary
arguments raised in the paper. The classification was based on an initial five-point
nominal scale ranging from „no‟ to „yes‟. The „no‟ point in the scale meant that from the
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reading of the title and the abstract it was reasonable to infer that in no way the article
addresses global concepts or broad global approaches or issues, such as globalization,
globalism, or globality. The „yes‟ classification meant that it was reasonable to infer or to
suspect that the article somehow addresses global concepts, even if tangentially to the
main topics or arguments raised. The other options in the classification scheme were
highly unlikely, maybe, and highly likely. The articles originally classified under the
„no‟ category were discarded from further analysis. All others were subjected to full
reading, including readings that did not fit well with any of the points in the nominal
scale, such as the ones addressing methodological and theoretical topics. These were re-
classified under the rubric „indeterminate‟ and also subjected to full reading.
Global concepts were broadly defined. Included are predicates and compounded
terminologies formed by words that are the usual suspects, such as “global”, “world”,
“transnational”, and, of course, “globalization”. But it also included terminologies
comprised by words with no immediate relation to global matters. In those cases what
mattered the most was the context (e.g., topic, issue) in which they were used. When the
slightest sign of something going beyond or above the traditional state-centric approach
and topics was found, those terminologies were deemed as global concepts and the texts
chosen for subsequent full analysis.
All in all, 110 articles were chosen for full reading (36.54% of all publications
from the 10 year period selected for the research). The reading of the articles selected
gave origin to a database containing the global concepts found, quotes where these
concepts appeared in the text that can help us understand the author‟s use of the term, the
full bibliographic information (e.g., authorship, article‟s title, pages, publication, etc), as
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well as a brief summary of the arguments raised in the article and, in some cases, a short
„analysis‟ in which I engaged the arguments in the texts vis-à-vis either the content or the
use of the terminologies found in the text.
The reading/coding of all the articles was a time consuming process that requires
intellectual judgment and tedious procedures to properly insert all the information in the
database. Only two of the articles fully read did not make into the database, as their topics
proved to not be related to global issues whatsoever. The final tally then registers a total
of 108 articles that have made into the database, which gave origin to a list of 1550
quotes, and a final list of global concepts reaching the staggering number of 1283
terminologies! The listing of all the ISQ articles that entered the database, as well as the
final list of concepts derived from them are in Annexes A and B, respectively.
In many cases, the terminologies listed appeared in a single article or in articles
from the same author. This could give margin to questionings as to whether these
terminologies have indeed any currency among other members of the scholarly
community. But, it could also be argued that the very publication of the article in such a
prestigious academic journal gives validity to these terms. After all, the review process
that precedes the article‟s acceptance for publication is meant to assure that it meets the
expected high quality standards of methodology, analytical rigor, and relevance. At the
very least, the publication of the article warrants some indisputable level of legitimacy as
to what members of the expert community judge as a requirement to participate in the
field‟s conversations. In a very colloquial way, it means something like: “You are a
member of the club. We hear you. And we can and may have a conversation.”
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It certainly does not mean that these terminologies will eventually reach the status
of full currency used by large enough of a subgroup of members within that expert
community. And that is part of the reason for and the relevance of the research carried
out in this chapter. There are redundancy, lack of consistency, too much creativity in
generating novel terminologies, and ultimately a disturbing lack of precision on what are
the key terminologies that should indeed be part of concept systems on global relations.
The next step in the analysis of the data is the construction of a model, which the
terminologies found in the ISQ literature review will populate.

Global Relations Paradigm

Now it is finally time to populate the paradigmatic model of global relations with
the concepts found in ISQ literature. But the large number of concepts listed suggests the
need of a multi-step process for this “qualitative distribution”. What follows is just the
first of these steps. The entire process requires an effort and resources beyond the
confines of this research. Still, this first step provides a very good basis of an
understanding of the nature of the next steps and, most important, it allows already for
the generation of inference making on the state of knowledge in the field of IR in regards
to the globalization literature.
In order to explain the methodological details for this first phase of “qualitative
and quantitative distribution” of global concepts in the paradigmatic model of global
relations, we must revisit the internal network structure of the model (as shown in the
previous chapter) in order to expose of more critical piece of information.
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Diagram 6.1: Hybrid Lateral Mapping-Cognitive Instances of Global Relations

( a )
( b ) ( c )
( d ) ( e )
( m ) ( n )
( k )
( l )
( f )
( g )
( h )
( i )
( j )
PARADIGM
PARADIGMS
RESEARCH
PROGRAMS
RESEARCH
PROGRAMS
DOMAINS
INDICATORS
PROCESSES
KNOWLEDGE
PRODUCTION
AGENCY
Metaphysical
Ontological
Empirical
Knowledge
Production
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Diagram 6.1 above shows an alternative mode of visualization for the model
shown in Diagram 5.14 (and all the arguments providing its logical justifications). It
combines elements of lateral mapping and cognitive instances, two of the alternative
modes of visualization (referential structures) that were first introduced, respectively, in
Diagram 2.30 and Diagram 2.31.
For the most part Diagram 6.1 simply represents the model‟s structure previously
discussed up to this point. At the metaphysical level, the single unit container (6.1a, first
introduced in Diagram 2.3e) represents the unitary nature of the model: global relations
as a single paradigm. However, as explained, it may be primarily seen as one paradigm
among others, within the context of a broader framework of analysis, namely the
disciplinary field of IR, where other paradigms co-exist. In that case a secondary layer of
metaphysical logical structures are added. A fully connected centered ring network (6.1b,
first introduced in Figure 2.1d) represents a hypothetical array of paradigms mutually
connected as they are all part of the same broader “lens” through which a given
community of experts may look at reality: the lens of international relations. As these
various paradigms share some of their axiomatic foundations with the field‟s
metaphysical foundations, they necessarily intersect with each other, even if only
partially. It is represented in the open-ended overlapping domains networks (6.1c, first
introduced in Figure 2.6a).
Moving down to the level of ontology, once again there are two layers. The first
one indicates that from the metaphysical domains, several research programs may co-
exist, as represented in the radial network (6.1d, first introduced in Figure 2.1e1) with a
hypothetical number of nodes. In the particular case of global relations (thus moving one
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step further in the level of cognitive reasoning), we have three such programs: global
governance, global capitalism, and global civil society, structured around a centered ring
network (6.1e, first introduced in Figure 2.1c). It is a ring network because in the
particular case of global relations, the understanding is that its emerging system is the
result of a multidisciplinary environment in which its main components mutually interact.
Moving even further towards even more detailed levels of specificity (but still at the same
degree of aggregation) these three nodes actually intersect as to form a coherent system.
The specific nature of their relationship is represented with the three-nodes Venn
Diagram (6.1f, first introduced in Figure 2.3d).
Finally, as previously mentioned, it is at the level of research programs that one
may identify the units of the system endowed with agency (agents, institutions, infra-
structure). The conceptual distinction between these three system‟s units is not absolute.
It is rather a matter of subjective and contextual references. For that reason, a gradation
network (6.1g, first introduced in Figure 2.6g) best represents its structural composition.
The contents (domains) of the three research programs (6.1e) within the overall
paradigm of global relations are detailed (still at the ontological level), as shown in 6.1, h,
i, and j. The foundational relationship between the elements in a domain is represented as
a star network. At this point there is no a priori requirement that they necessarily
mutually relate (although they most likely do). Their primary linkage is with the program
to which they belong.
Moving down one more degree of aggregation the ring network (first introduced
in Figure 2.1a) is the best general representation for empirical indicators (6.1k) emanating
either from a given research program (6.1d) or from specific domains located in its
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interior (6.1, h, i, and j). The specific indicators were never introduced in the model,
which explains their representation simply as a general ring network structure. Moving
downwards, the indicators (as well as the ontological components preceding them) serve
as the sources for the selection of variables for the identification of empirical processes
(6.1l) and theoretical developments.
Finally, at the very bottom of the model, we have Lakato‟s structure for the
evaluation of knowledge production (6.1m and n). Both structures were properly
explained in chapter two and visually represented in Diagrams 2.21 and 2.22.
The only new information in this model refers to the intersection network
structure between the various research programs in globalization studies (6.1f) as well as
the explicit visualization of its contents in the form of a network on agency (6.1g). It is
this portion of the model that will serve as the starting point for the “qualitative
distribution” of globalization concepts from the ISQ readings mentioned earlier.
Individually then, each research program in a given paradigm has – at a first level
of specificity – two essential components: agency, which comprises agents, institutions,
and social and material infra-structures, as well as specific research/empirical domains,
which are realms where agency manifest in the world of empirical events and processes.
Figure 6.1 below shows the three main research programs in global relations: global
governance, global economy, and global civil society. They are shown in isolation from
each other just to reveal their ontological contents as well as the nature of the network
structure between sources of agency and domains. They each form a radial network with
sources of agency as the center node.

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Figure 6.1: Research Programs in Global Relations and Respective Domains

Global
Power
Global
Order
Global
Development
Global
Justice
Agency
Global
Governance

Trade
Financial
Market
Economic
Production
Agency
Global
Economy

Social
Movements
Social
Advocacy
Agency
Global Civil
Society

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The prevalence of this particular systemic structure results from the fact that
agency within a given research program may display unique features vis-à-vis agency
taking place in other research programs. But within a given research program, it is more
likely that the same sources of agency navigate freely within the various domains that
constitute it. In terms of global relations its various research programs mutually intersect,
forming a coherent and integrated single system.

Diagram 6.2: Multidimensional Global Relations

Global
Governance
Global
Economy
Global
Civil Society
Global Relations
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Diagram 6.2 above shows the multidimensional, systemic network structure of
global relations. Its intersecting conceptual dimensions, reflecting autonomous research
programs, partially overlap. Each brings to the network their respective unique sets of
research/empirical domains. Intersection takes place through agency. Label containers
(black dots) indicate emerging sub-domains and emerging sub-sites for agency, all
resulting from the interaction between the original sources of agency.
There is one final piece of information to complete the network structure. The
notion of global relations as “planetarization” implies a fundamental, axiomatic, linkage
between human socialization and the geographic space in which it takes place (the globe).
Therefore, the inclusion of the environment as a spatial and a conceptual element is
critical for the understanding on how global loyalties, cultural manifestations, and
expectations, emerge and interact with sources of human agency.
Simply put, the very containment where the entire multidimensional structure
rests is the environment. The physical environment necessarily surrounds the social
environment. The question here is how to visualize the possibilities for properly
representing the environment as it relates to the entire structure at once (multidimensional
environment), to unidimensional, or to bi-dimensional sections of it. The outer-ring in
Diagram 6.3 below represents the multidimensional aspect of the environment in the
model, as it relates to the entire structure. The dotted lines allows for the separation of bi-
dimensional spheres of environmental intersection with the social world (in between the
two parallel dotted lines) from unidimensional interactions taking place between the
environment and one of the three dimensions in global relations. They are represented in
the model as the spaces in between the parallel dotted lines.
383

Simply put, the very containment where the entire multidimensional structure
rests is the environment. The physical environment necessarily surrounds the social
environment. The question here is how to visualize the possibilities for properly
representing the environment as it relates to the entire structure at once (multidimensional
environment), to unidimensional, or to bi-dimensional sections of it. The outer-ring in
Diagram 6.3 above represents the multidimensional aspect of the environment in the
Diagram 6.3: Multidimensional Global Relations as Planetarization

Global
Economy
Global
Civil Society
Global
Governance
384
model, as it relates to the entire structure. The dotted lines allows for the separation of bi-
dimensional spheres of environmental intersection with the social world (in between the
two parallel dotted lines) from unidimensional interactions taking place between the
environment and one of the three dimensions in global relations. They are represented in
the model as the spaces in between the parallel dotted lines.
Now the model is complete and may be populated by the conceptual constructs
found in ISQ readings. Diagram 6.4 below shows the first phase of this exercise of
engaging in qualitative/quantitative initial distribution of the global concepts in the global
relations model. The initial distribution starts at the ontological level because it reflects
the highest level of articulation on the specific elements that comprise global elements,
beyond purely normative metaphysical claims.
At this point, however, the findings and the arguments about them should not be
taken as absolute facts on the state of knowledge in the field of IR on global relations.
Rather, the point here is only to press the case that this type of „ontological distribution‟
is possible and useful; that it contributes to enhance conceptual precision and inference
making. Furthermore, as already mentioned, subsequent phases in furthering the levels of
precision in terms of the qualitative distribution of the concepts within the overall
paradigmatic model and the subsequent refinement of its ontological, empirical, and
knowledge-production elements will not be dealt with in here, as it would require time
and resources beyond those available at this moment. Still, the initial distribution here
discussed should allow for some interesting arguments to be raised.

385

There are several possible readings for the distribution. First, we may take into
consideration only the concepts placed at the one, bi, and multidimensional spaces within
the three overarching research programs in global relations. What it means is that it
leaves out those concepts that specifically refer to sources of agency (agents, institutions,
and infra-structure, or social/material resources), research/empirical domains explicitly
listed as emanating from them at the one-dimensional level, as well as those concepts
making direct reference to environmental matters. The numbers resulting from this
Diagram 6.4: Multidimensional Global Relations: Conceptual Distribution

Global
Economy
Global
Civil Society
Global
Governance
123
82
137
13 18
63
2 0 2 18 0 5
7 0 2
11
5
7
4
10
43
20
12
6
211
94
31
94
2
56
30 1
2 8
8
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distribution may not be comprehensive, but they provide a general view of the broad,
general type of interest that these research programs generate in scholarship. This broad
interest is responsible for and the result of the articulation of novel conceptual constructs,
which ultimately answers for the future deepening of content and differentiation of the
research program. Thus, it is a count that provides a reading that may shed some light
into the future evolution of the research program as a whole.
Another reading is to add to the previous count the concepts specifically
pertaining to sources of agency and the empirical domains listed for each research
program previously identified in the model. With the previous count we had an overall
idea about where the research program is heading in terms of generating interest towards
academic production. Now we may reason on the state of knowledge in that particular
research program, judging by the current level of academic production, as it is expressed
by references to singular types of agency, the engine in any realm of human socialization.
Thus, it provides information about the present level of knowledge production in regards
to the research program.
Finally, we add to the previous count the conceptual constructs that make
reference to the environment, a key metaphysical component for the understanding of
global relations as a realm of socialization extending throughout the globe. It may help
reveal the extent to which the research programs make this factor a central feature in the
way they evolve. Diagram 6.5 below shows the numbers for the first reading of the
distribution.

387

By analyzing the distribution in Diagram 6.5, it is not entirely surprising, for
instance, to notice the high number of concepts within the socio-cultural global domain.
It has more concepts placed in its one-dimensional area (136) than the one-dimensional
political (123) and the economic domains (82). This is expected to the extent that the
emerging idea of a global level of socialization may be pressed the most by reasoning on
matters related to civil society, one may argue. In any case, these numbers may suggest
few things.
First, it may be that scholars in International Relations are still reluctant to
concede that global governance indeed reflects a global sphere of social relations going
beyond the state-centric international relations. At most, there appears to be an increased
recognition that global political and socio-cultural forces have been playing an increasing
role in international affairs. This would explain the equally great number of conceptual
constructs aimed at addressing linkages having global governance on one side and either
Diagram 6.5: Multidimensional Global Relations: General Dimensions

123
82
136
94
211
94
31

388
socio-cultural or economic domains on the other (the bi-dimensional intersection areas
from the standpoint of the global political domain).
Second, apparently there is an increasing recognition that even if state-centric
relations still dominate politics at the international and at the global sphere of analytical
reasoning as it is translated in academic scholarship in the field, there has been a growing
influence, pressure, or authoritative participation from the domain of global civil society
in matters of politics. It may be explained by both the overall high number of conceptual
constructs pertaining to the realm of socio-cultural dimension as well as the high number
of bi-dimensional constructs, linking global civil society to matters of global governance.
Third, those scholars implicitly or explicitly advocating for the growing relevance of
socio-cultural globalization have been quite prolific in searching for new conceptual
constructs capable of capturing the contours of this global domain as well as its
relationships with the prevailing world of global governance.
What is surprising, from the standpoint of this argument, is the significantly low
number of conceptual constructs linking global civil society to matters of global
economy. After all, common criticism among the anti-globalization advocates is that
economic concerns tend to shape (an unjust, unequal) global reality. One possible
explanation may be the anti-globalization advocates‟ recognition that economic factors
and forces are only the end result of ideological articulations structured from within
political domains. Said differently, only by changing politics the terms guiding global
economics will be altered. The manifestations against the Ministerial WTO meetings are
certainly a reflection of this posture.
389
In any case, by computing also the numbers located at the bi-dimensional
intersections the picture somewhat alters. Now, global governance has a higher number
of conceptual constructs (123 + 94 + 94 = 311) than socio-cultural (136 + 94 + 31 = 261)
as well as economic global relations (82 + 94 + 31 = 207). But again, this may be
explained by liberal arguments on globalization, in which global levels of socialization
result primarily from the central intersection between economic forces and political ones
that provides its legal and political sustainability. Furthermore, it should not be surprising
that greater attention has been paid to matters of global governance in the disciplinary
field of IR, historically centered around political matters. What is surprising is the equally
high number of conceptual constructs linking the political domains to both the socio-
cultural and the economic domains (both reaching 94). It may result, however, from
efforts by those engaged with global civil society scholarship to bridge linkages with the
global political world and the world of global civil society.
Furthermore, how can the somewhat lower number of conceptual constructs
aimed at dealing with global economy be explained? This is even more surprising when
considering that too often economic globalization is conflated to represent the entire
reality of global processes. It certainly does not mean any lack of economic analyses of
economic globalization. What it may indicate is a higher disregard from these analyses on
the multidimensional levels of globalization. All too often, when dealing with economic
globalization (again, often conflated as the totality of global processes) scholars may use
well-established conceptual constructs that properly represent that particular globalization
domain. They may not integrate in their analyses forces from the other two
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(globalization) domains that have their own ontological autonomy (which could require
the use or development of new conceptual constructs).
Finally, it is interesting to notice the high number of concepts placed at the
multidimensional space. This could be an indicative of the fact that regardless of more
systematic efforts to structure “globalization studies” leading to a coherent paradigmatic
research program or domain in the disciplinary world of International Relations may still
be lacking, the sheer number of research on globalization had led to its permanent
incorporation by the scholarly community. It may also indicate the broad perception that
global forces are inherently multidimensional, which may require the development and
use of conceptualizations capable of addressing this global feature.

Diagram 6.6 above has the numbers for the second reading of the distribution, this
time including conceptual constructs referring to sources of agency (actors, institutions,
Diagram 6.6: Multidimensional Global Relations:
General Dimensions, Agency, and Respective Domains

167
196
237
94
211
94
31

391
and social/material capabilities) and their respective research/empirical domains. The
numbers now profoundly differ when compared to those in Diagram 6.5. This time the
greatest number of “global concepts” refers to global civil society (237), followed by
those pertaining to the economic dimension (196), with the political dimension at the
lowest end (167). Again, if one looks at these as indicative of the current state of
knowledge on global topics, it may be appropriate to infer that if global relations is to
develop as a paradigmatic representation of social reality, attention has primarily to be on
socio-cultural matters.
First, it may be a combination of both logical and socializing factors, necessary
for the development of a research program that advocates as an empirical reality a
worldview essentially founded on sociological premises. In other words, it somewhat
confirms Scholte‟s assessment about the prevalence of an emphasis on political matters in
the disciplinary fields of Political Science and International Relations, and a specific
concern on economic matters by both Economics and Political Economy (Scholte 2000).
It is up to those working at the interdisciplinary boundaries of the discipline (i.e., global
civil society) to provide the core of the required conceptual constructs necessary for the
substantial development of global relations as a paradigmatic research program.
Second, quantity may not necessarily translate into quality. The greater number of
conceptual constructs to the analysis of global socio-cultural factors may be indicative of
a lacking body of well-established conceptual framework with intersubjective appeal. It
may be the current prevalence of a very impoverished conceptual architecture necessary
to properly translate all the features of a global realm of socialization that may lead
scholars to make use of ever more creative terminologies.
392
Finally, Diagram 6.7 below shows the final numbers, this time also including
terminologies aimed at addressing the environmental component of global relations.

By adding the environmental element, two factors stand out. First, overall, the
picture in the previous reading does not alter much, when considering that terminologies
on global civil society are still prevalent. It only confirms the engagement of those
working from the standpoint of the sociological aspects of global relations to its critical
axiomatic foundation, namely a level o socialization that encompasses the globe. The
biggest jump, however, from the previous reading (excluding environmental
conceptualization) to this one takes place within the realm of global governance. It may
imply, once again, the relevance of politics for the establishment of intersubjective
appropriations of global relations as a realm of socialization. If global loyalties and
experiences may first emanate from within civil society, it may be at the legal level that
Diagram 6.7: Multidimensional Global Relations:
General Dimensions, Agency, Respective Domains, and the Environment

207
201
255
94
211
94
31

393
moral, normative values, become formally recognized, which in turns, in a looping mode,
allows for the further strengthening of global socializations. Supporting this argument is
the fact that most of the novel concepts linking global governance to the environment are,
indeed, legal ones, or relating to the political and institutional processes necessary for the
emergence of environmental regimes. It seems that contrary to those who dismiss the
relevance of international law and institutions as lacking autonomy and ultimately
coercive power, these capabilities are still central in our ability to construct (both in
ideational and in material terms) global spheres of social relations. Furthermore, there are
few conceptualizations on the autonomous nature of the environment (8), which just
reinforces this perspective that its main relevance is ultimately ideational, sociological.

Modeling Concept Systems in Global Relations

I have explored in this chapter the possibility of mapping the way large concept
systems are structured within a coherent cognitive model. The paradigmatic degrees of
aggregation model fully introduced in the previous chapter and here applied to the
specific case to global relations paradigm may be a general template for
qualitative/quantitative distributions of terminologies forming a given specialized
vocabulary, while at the same time interconnecting with theoretical developments on
agency, events, and processes that constitute the core of knowledge production.
But Patrick James correctly warns about the potential dangers of assessments of
research enterprises‟ quality that start at the ontological level (James 2002, p. 85). After
all, specification of ontology is the result of a natural process of socialization. For that
394
reason James concentrates on the level of theoretical developments. The question then, as
far as mapping ontological constitutions is concerned, becomes how to be able to
properly display natural evolutionary development of ontological categories.
I have shown in this chapter that extensive literature reviews with the goal of
identifying large body of conceptual constructs pertaining to a given research program
may be a feasible initial step. However, no one single individual may be able, first, to
engage in such a large review. Second, even if for the sake of the argument it could be
accomplished, one individual‟s interpretation about the ontological nature of those
concepts is as good as any. There may be as many interpretations as individuals working
on concept systems. Not for other reason writing encyclopedias and even dictionaries is
usually the result of collective efforts.
Nevertheless, judging by the fact that the model here presented is rooted on
logical and theoretical intersubjective foundations, making use of general templates
(cognitive universals), there is no reason to think that it is not possible that better, more
refined versions of this model (or of any other model structure by that matter) cannot
emerge from collective efforts. After all, that is the very nature of science: the adoption
of replicable methodologies allowing for collective efforts towards knowledge
accumulation. In the context of conceptual concept systems, knowledge accumulation is
directly related to the ways the individual units of that system (conceptual constructs)
mutually relate.
Going back to James‟ work on assessing the quality of structural realism as a
research enterprise within the confines of the disciplinary field of IR, even when focusing
on theoretical developments in sequence (paradigmatic knowledge structure), one cannot
395
forget that the elements informing those theories originate at the metaphysical, the
ontological, and the empirical levels of concept formation. Therefore, if one may not start
at the ontological level, one should still be able to do the inverse path: to place the
elements of the theory in their respective original levels of aggregation. Even when not
explicitly informed, says James, the ontological foundations of theories can be inferred
from the arguments. By definition, if they can be inferred, then they can be explicitly
placed at their original metaphysical, ontological, and empirical places. The argument can
be made that global concepts mentioned by scholars when working on a restricted
number of variables informing theory development is the evidence about their ontological
foundations.
In any case, the main point of the model introduced in the previous chapter and
here applied to global relations paradigm is to offer a general template in which
individual components of concept systems can be mutually integrated. Furthermore, in
doing so I try to incorporate in the model logical and theoretical elements found in
scientific praxis that are endowed with relevant levels of intersubjective validity.
Finally, when considering the topic of global relations in particular I believe that I
have made the case for the need of a more systematic approach to global relations either
as a paradigm within the overall disciplinary field of IR, or, at very least, as one of the
field‟s integrated research program. Interestingly enough, neither is seriously considered
by scholars in the field, despite the generally agreed relevance of globalization. The sheer
number of conceptual constructs on global matters alone indicates the relevance of the
topic. But other paradigms or research programs usually incorporate global issues, which
means that the possibilities for an underlying theoretical and analytical architecture
396
mutually structuring and interacting all branches and different global investigations is
very limited, if not altogether impossible. Hopefully, the research here presented stands
as a contribution in the direction of properly and formally structuring knowledge on
global relations by indicating its relevance either as a paradigm or as a research program.

397
Conclusion

I would like to conclude this research by making some remarks on what has been
here accomplished as well as the new potential directions in store for its continuation. At
this time, it is appropriate to revisit the initial steps in the research design that provided
the justification for the development of VCM as a diagrammatic methodology applied to
groups of mutually related concepts, or concept systems. I summarize how the
methodology was used in this research to address empirical topics in international
relations and consider potential drawbacks and benefits from its use. Next, I raise some
arguments about what I see as potential areas of contributions from the use of VCM. I
conclude by drawing some brief remarks on what are the next steps for the continuing
development of both the methodology and the research on global relations.

Visual Reasoning & Global Relations

The first half of part one of the research (introduction and chapter one) started
with the investigation of conceptual analysis, particularly concept formation in regards to
groups of interrelated terminologies forming concept systems. These concept systems are
the specialized vocabularies in specific areas of human interest, whether technical,
scientific, or even artistic in nature. They help individuals and communities anyhow
engaged with those realms of socialization and representation of reality to make sense of
the worlds they are addressing, their units, events, and processes.
398
As a direct implication of this approach the argument was raised that if groups of
interrelated terminologies form a concept system, then by definition one should be able to
identify the units of that system (in this case, the conceptual constructs forming the
vocabulary), systemic sub-structures mutually relating groups of units within the overall
system, as well as the particular types of relationships between the units, units and sub-
structures, and between sub-structures within the system. If that is the case, as with any
other system, one should be able to visualize those systemic constructions.
The remainder of part one (chapter two) was devoted then to the development of a
methodology capable of performing these tasks and providing general templates for the
placement of concept systems within logically and analytically consistent frame
perspectives. Visual Cognitive Modeling is the result of that effort. It is a methodology
grounded on assumptions about our cognitive abilities to interpret into knowledge and
understanding through the construction of mental models what otherwise is merely
fragmented information reaching for our senses. Mental models, I argued, make use of
what I call cognitive universals, simple basic units that once combined allows for the
representation of reality in flexible and structured ways. Nodes, network structures, and
linkages are the three fundamental categories of cognitive universals, which perfectly fit,
respectively, with the ideas of units, systemic structures, and relationships; the building
blocks of concept systems.
Thus, Visual Cognitive Modeling, as a methodology, is here introduced as a visual
language for mapping representations of systemic network structures embedded in
reasoning, argumentation, and organization of knowledge. In fact, as demonstrated with
great a number of examples in IR scholarship, network representations are quite
399
ingrained already in the way scholars organize and visually present their theoretical
constructions.
In part two of the research I apply the methodology to empirical topics of
relevance in IR scholarship: agency in global civil society (chapter three), the various
approaches in the field of IR about its contested types of relationships with the topic of
Religion (chapter four), the development of a particular model with intersubjective
currency among scholars interested in matters of scientific praxis (chapter five) and,
finally, I apply the model developed in chapter five – aimed at addressing the theoretical
concepts of scientific paradigm and research programs – to frame within a coherent
cognitive systemic structure the large number of conceptual constructs used by IR
scholars when working on global phenomena (chapter six).
Furthermore, by working on the “global concepts” as they were found in articles
published by ISQ within a period of ten years (chapter six), I raise the theoretical
argument on the need to consider global relations as a paradigm on its own right,
integrating scholarly work on the topic, if the currently predominant concept of
“globalization” is meant indeed to refer to global realms of socialization, and not merely
specific processes related to inter-state or inter-nation relationships.
Approaches centered on the idea of internationalization, liberalization, and even
universalization tend to emphasize economic process between nation-states and
international political arrangements required to give the necessary legal support to those
process. This is particularly the case with topics such as global trade, global finance,
global production, and the structuring of international organizations serving as their legal-
political infrastructures (i.e., WTO, and World Bank). In all these instances, spheres of
400
global socialization and development of global loyalties among members of global civil
society are often left out. What is even more problematic, the prevalence of these
appropriations of the global tend to induce research on global civil society to be evaluated
in terms of how it contributes to either economic or political globalization; not on their
own merits in regards to matters of “planetarization”, or diffusion of global values, social
norms and practices.
Next, it is important to enumerate the potential drawbacks and benefits from
VCM, as a diagrammatic methodology. The argument may be raised that the
formalization of non-symbolic, heterogeneous systems of representation making use of
diagrams face a double challenge. First, it seems clear that they are powerful sources for
engaging in logical reasoning. Second, it is somewhat largely understood among
logicians and mathematicians that diagrams are not rigorous enough as to serve as
sources for logical proof. They should, therefore, say the critics, be used only as heuristic
aids.
However, as aptly observed by Sun-Joo Shin (Shin 2002), the apparent lack of
logical formality does not derive from diagrammatic systems of representations
themselves as if it were an inherent property that cannot be overcome. Instead, it is rather
the result of the ways they are usually read, from the standpoint of symbolic logic. As
Shin explains, the source for the criticism against diagrams is the natural possibility for
multiple readings from a graph. The question, therefore, is to “obtain a comprehensive
algorithm of multiple readings when we utilize more fine-grained visual features present
in graphs” (Shin 2002, p. 4). Shin provides a new methodology to read Charles Sanders
401
Peirce‟s existential graphs and in doing so points out the relevance from his research to
non-symbolic systems in general:

It urges heterogeneous-systems researches to ask whether they fully utilize
visual aspects of a non-symbolic system for a direct and natural reading
algorithm, for an efficient formulation of inference rules, and for an intuitive
interpretation of these rules. If we do not take advantage of visual distinctions
already present in a system, we can only expect a graphical system to be less
useful or less intuitive than the symbolic system whose criteria have been
used to interpret the graphical system. Unless we adopt independent methods
or criteria for a graphical system, we cannot challenge the long-standing
prejudice against non-symbolic systems, but only reinforce it. (pp. 44-5)

The argument is clear. What matters is that non-symbolic, diagrammatic, visual
systems of representation, have enough levels of formalization as to provide all the
required elements for a general reading of all the information they convey.
Throughout this research I have referred to the term “general template”. Here I
connect its meaning to this more specific context. Something can only play the role of a
template if it provides all the required tools for a homogeneous reading. Of course, the
units (the discrete tools) comprising general templates have to communicate to each other
in a systemic fashion in order to genuinely form a “language” for communication. Letters
are the general templates for the construction of words and sentences. Symbols are the
general templates for symbolic logic. Numbers and mathematical signs are the general
templates for mathematics.
Cognitive Universals and notation signs are the general templates for VCM.
Cognitive universals are the basic units for the construction of mental and cognitive
models. They are nodes, network structures, and linkages. Nodes are the various types of
402
containers and containments used in cognitive representations to display the way we
perceive basic constitution of entities and their systemic placement. Network structures
are systemic arrangements between units, each with their own inherent properties in
terms of arrangement and transfer of information within the system. Finally, linkages are
the specific types of relationships between nodes, nodes and network structures, and
between networks. They include, among others, relationships of causality, ontology, and
movement.
Furthermore, it may be argued that among two of the most relevant contributions
from VCM are its use as a tool for inference making as well as for structuring large
bodies of knowledge. As for the former, I have engaged in inferential reasoning when
addressing each of the three empirical chapters of this research (chapters three, four, and
five). As for the latter, it is interesting to realize that the use of VCM as a methodology
applied to all of those empirical chapters ended up (not by design!) generating pieces of
knowledge that may be mutually integrated, as shown in Diagram C.1 below, whose
elements should be self-explanatory.
The main 3D structure is the paradigmatic degrees of aggregation model applied
to the disciplinary field of International Relations. At the metaphysical level, one finds its
main paradigms, including global relations (GR), located at the center-front of the ring
network that mutually links the paradigms and them to the field‟s hard core. The field and
global relations‟ paradigmatic structures are shown, in overlapping ways, revealing all
four main containments, or logical environments within which further content may be
found, namely the metaphysical, the ontological, the empirical, and finally the theoretical
realm of knowledge production.
403
Diagram C.1: Visual Integration of Global Civil Society, IR-Religion, and Paradigmatic Degrees of Aggregation
Models: 3D Referential Structure

GCS Agency

P2 P1

P4
P3
GR
IR
Religion

403
404
A ring network links the field of IR to an undifferentiated node, entitled Religion,
while dotted rings placed in between them indicate motion (see motion configurations in
Figure 2.5). It simply indicates that the two nodes in the structure (IR and Religion) may
be related to each other in different ways as a result of ontological differentiation or
inclusion (as shown in Diagram 4.18). In other words, they can be closer or farther away
from each other, depending on how the various approaches found in the literature frame
the terms of their relationship.
Finally, the content of one of the nodes placed inside the ontological level of
aggregation in the global relations paradigm is zoomed in, represented by the two dotted
lines connecting to a node with a gradation network inside it. The content relates to
sources of agency in Global Civil Society, the topic for chapter three.
Diagram C.2 below is the exactly same structure presented in Diagram 5.21. The
only difference is that the former is a 3D referential structure, while the latter is a
molecular mode of visualization, viewed from above. Hopefully, Diagrams C.1 and C.2
help revealing the high levels of internal consistency in the way the various pieces of
knowledge were addressed in this research through cognitive modeling, and ultimately
mutually integrated in logic and organic manner.

405

Diagram C.2: Visual Integration of Global Civil Society, IR-Religion, and Paradigmatic Degrees of Aggregation
Models Molecular Referential Structure (Bird‟s Eye View)

GR
IR
GCS

405
406
Potential Contributions from VCM

The empirical examples in this research show that VCM could be of interest to IR
scholars, especially those working with concepts, concept systems, and paradigmatic
knowledge production. But it could also be a relevant tool to any scholar in need to
organize and present complex sets of ideas and content in a logically coherent fashion, in
ways intelligible and accessible to large audiences of non-specialists. The series of
examples from IR scholarship in chapter two is an indication that the perspective of
systemic network structures have already been used to that end, even if implicitly.
Furthermore, if theories and methodologies are judged by the extent to which they
can be applied beyond the strict confines of a given, narrow research topic, then VCM
should be regarded as a positive contribution to the world of scientific knowledge as well.
In fact, not only scholars working from the standpoint of IR and political science
could take advantage of the visual language VCM offers, but so would any disciplinary
field within Social Sciences, as well as any other investigative areas dealing with abstract
concepts that mutually relate in a systemic fashion.
What is more, VCM should be of interest to the general field of philosophy of
science as well as sociology of knowledge as it directly relates to the central issues of
production and assessment of bodies of knowledge, as well as organization of
information. A visual example should help make this point clear. Knowledge is
commonly structured in a tree format. In the digital world of computer we refer to it as
the folder/sub-folder organization of data. In the world of written words and ideas, we
call it the “bullet-points” structuring of information. In both cases, information is
407
organized as layers, or levels. A table of contents of any book publication, for instance, is
the introduction of its general contents in the format of “bullet-points”. However,
information organized in such a way does not tell us anything as to how the elements
within and across “layers”, or levels, mutually relate. At best this type of information is
inferred, at worse it has to be interpreted upon full intellectual digestion of the entire
material. VCM makes this type of information explicit right up front. It is important to
realize that the latter is not meant to replace the former, just to add to it as a cognitive tool
for conveying information in an efficient and more detailed fashion.

Diagram C.3: “Bullet-Points” Tree Structure and Its Equivalent in VCM

408
Diagram C.3 above is the visual representation of this argument. At the top of the
diagram the bars indicate the bullet-points (or folder/sub-folder tree structure). Bars
placed at the same analytical level have the same color. Bars placed at different levels
have different colors. The visual structure below the bars is their equivalent in the VCM
language, representing a hypothetical network structure. The varying colors for each node
in the structure match those in the bullet-points structure. Since there are three bars
representing a level one analysis in the bullet-points construction, there are also three
main nodes, with their colors matching. The same is true to all other bars, at the
subsequent analytical levels in the tree structure.
One can immediately recognize that the representation in VCM format can
convey the same type of multi-level information in the bullet-point tree format. But it
also displays additional information, such as how exactly each element within and across
levels relate to each other as to form a coherent systemic construction.
As demonstrated at length throughout this research, VCM can be applied both to
“objective” knowledge production (i.e., organization of bodies of knowledge as shown in
chapter six on global relations) as well as to mapping logic embedded in reasoning (see
Diagram I.1 explaining the logic of the research design as well as chapter four on
approaches to Religion in IR). What it implies is a large range of possible usages of the
methodology in areas ranging from learning and education, reasoning and argumentation,
research, and knowledge production. In the classroom, for instance, simulations and
exercises focusing on the students‟ abilities to reason and organize information with the
use of visual maps and visual tools is already a reality (Hyerle, Alper et al. 2004; Hyerle
2009). But it is still done in an ad hoc manner, with limited potential to integrate
409
individual (subjective) and collective (intersubjective) representations into broader
coherent and integrated constructions. The use of VCM could be an important
contribution in that direction.

The Next Steps

Now that the logical foundations of VCM have been properly expressed and the
methodology applied to empirical cases, the next main step is to complete its degrees of
formalization. It includes, among other things, detailing and structuring a more refined
pool of cognitive universals, particularly linkages. But the most obvious impediment for
this methodology to become widely accepted in scholarly circles is the labor-intensive
demands for producing complex models “by hand”, as was the case with all the models
and diagrams introduced in this research. It becomes imperative for one to be able to
generate those models in automated ways. Therefore, the main step for the future is to
develop this methodology as a computer application. One should be able to have much
simpler ways to produce visual representations – even automatically derived from written
text –, to have automatic “translations” between various modes of visualization
(referential structures) as well as between formal languages of logic reasoning (formal
modeling and symbolic logic), organization of “visual dictionaries” of network
structures, data attached to each component of the model, etc.
But probably the most exciting features from a web-run computer generated VCM
would be the possibilities it would entail for collective, cooperative work on cognitive
410
modeling by the part of groups and communities, of scholars, of students, and even by the
public at large.
Finally, it is only fitting to conclude this research with some words on my
continuing efforts to systematize knowledge production on global relations. From the
theoretical point of view I have already made my claim about the need to recognize
global relations as a paradigm if we are serious in our efforts to consider global realms of
socialization a reality. The large number of global concepts found in the ISQ literature
review indicates an already relevant body of knowledge on global relations, even if not
entirely mutually integrated. The “qualitative and quantitative distribution” that was the
focus of chapter six was simply the first stage in engaging in a much more detailed
placement of those concepts within the paradigmatic degrees of aggregation model. It
was also the beginning stage in fully digesting a massive body of information gathered
with the ISQ readings. A body of information that includes over twelve hundred
concepts, fifteen hundred quotes, and analysis for each of the readings making the
database.
Although it is a challenge to mutually integrate in a logically tight and organic
manner all those concepts in the model, I believe it can be achieved. My next steps in
regards to working on global relations paradigm is to continue the “qualitative
distribution” in all levels of the model, not only the ontological one. In doing so, my goal
is to uncover patterns in scholarly work on the subject, identifying areas over-researched,
as well as those in need of further academic investigations.

411
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442
Appendix A:
Acronyms Used in Chapter Three, on Global Civil Society

CSO Civil Society Organization
GCS Global Civil Society
GCSY Global Civil Society Yearbook
INGO International Non-Governmental Organization
IO International Organization
MNC Multinational Corporation
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
TCN Transnational Collective Network
TCSO Transnational Civil Society Organization

443
Appendix B:
Global Civil Society Yearbook Articles

The list below contains all articles that constitute the data used for the research
carried out in Chapter Three: Agency in Global Civil Society. They all appeared in the
Global Civil Society Yearbook project (GCSY), jointly produced since 2001 by two units
of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE): the Centre from the
Study of Global Governance and the Centre for Civil Society. The articles are first
grouped together by year of publication. Within each sub-list they are also listed in
chronological order, as they appear in each volume published.

Global Civil Society Yearbook 2001

Anheier, H., M. Glasius, et al. (2001b). Introducing Global Civil Society. Global Civil
Society 2001. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. Oxford, Oxford University Press:
3-22.

Keane, J. (2001). Global Civil Society? Global Civil Society 2001. H. Anheier, M.
Glasius and M. Kaldor. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 1: 23-47.

Desai, M. and Y. Said (2001). The new Anti-Capitalist Movement: Money and Global
Civil Society. Global Civil Society 2001. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. Oxford,
Oxford University Press: 51-76.

Osgood, D. (2001). Dig It Up: Global Civil Society's Responses to Plant Biotechnology.
Global Civil Society 2001. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. Oxford, Oxford
University Press: 79-107.

Kaldor, M. (2001). A Decade of Humanitarian Intervention: The Role of Global Civil
Society. Global Civil Society 2001. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. Oxford,
Oxford University Press: 109-143.
444

Naughton, J. (2001). Contested Space: The Internet and Global Civil Society. Global
Civil Society 2001. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. Oxford, Oxford University
Press: 147-168.

Pianta, M. (2001). Parallel Summits of Global Civil Society. Global Civil Society 2001.
H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. Oxford Oxford University Press: 169-194.

Pinter, F. (2001). Funding Global Civil Society Organizations. Global Civil Society
2001. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 195-217.

Anheier, H. (2001c). Measuring Global Civil Society. Global Civil Society 2001. H.
Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 1: 221-230.

Global Civil Society Yearbook 2002

Glasius, M. and M. Kaldor (2002b). The State of Global Civil Society: Before and After
September 11. Global Civil Society 2002. M. Glasius, M. Kaldor and H. Anheier.
Oxford, Oxford University Press: 3-33.

Chandhoke, N. (2002). The Limits of Global Civil Society. Global Civil Society 2002. M.
Glasius, M. Kaldor and H. Anheier. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 35-53.

An-Na'im, A. (2002). Religion and Global Civil Society: Inherent Incompatibility or
Synergy and Interdependence? Global Civil Society 2002. M. Glasius, M. Kaldor and H.
Anheier. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 55-73.

Oliviero, M. B. and A. Simmons (2002). Who's Minding the Store? Global Civil Society
and Corporate Responsibility. Global Civil Society 2002. M. Glasius, M. Kaldor and H.
Anheier. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 77-107.

Seckinelgin, H. (2002). Time to Stop and Think: HIV/AIDS, Global Civil Society, and
People's Politics. Global Civil Society 2002. M. Glasius, M. Kaldor and H. Anheier.
Oxford, Oxford University Press: 109-136.

Glasius, M. (2002c). Expertise in the Cause of Justice: Global Civil Society Influence on
the Statute for an International Criminal Court. Global Civil Society 2002. Oxford,
Oxford University Press: 137-168.

Deane, J., N. Mue, et al. (2002). The Other Information Revolution: Media and
Empowerment in Developing Countries. Global Civil Society 2002. M. Glasius, M.
Kaldor and H. Anheier. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 171-190.
445

Anheier, H. and N. Themudo (2002). Organizational Forms of Global Civil Society:
Implications of Going Global. Global Civil Society 2002. M. Glasius, M. Kaldor and H.
Anheier. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 191-216.

Sassen, S. (2002). Global Cities and Diaspora Networks: Microsites in Global Civil
Society Global Civil Society 2002. M. Glasius, M. Kaldor and H. Anheier. Oxford,
Oxford University Press: 217-238.

Global Civil Society Yearbook 2003

Kaldor, M., H. Anheier, et al. (2003b). Global Civil Society in an Era of Regressive
Globalization. Global Civil Society 2003. M. Kaldor, H. Anheier and M. Glasius. Oxford,
Oxford University Press. 3: 3-33.

Shaw, M. (2003). The Global Transformation of the Social Sciences. Global Civil Society
2003. M. Kaldor, H. Anheier and M. Glasius. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 35-44.

Beck, U. (2003). The Analysis of Global Inequality: from National to Cosmopolitan
Perspective. Global Civil Society 2003. M. Kaldor, H. Anheier and M. Glasius. Oxford,
Oxford University Press. 3: 45-55.

Said, Y. and M. Desai (2003). Trade and Global Civil Society: The Anti-Capitalist
Movement Revisited. Global Civil Society 2003. M. Kaldor, H. Anheier and M. Glasius.
Oxford, Oxford University Press: 59-85.

Feakes, D. (2003). Global Civil Society and Biological and Chemical Weapons. Global
Civil Society 2003. M. Kaldor, H. Anheier and M. Glasius. Oxford, Oxford University
Press: 87-117.

Sen, P. (2003). Successes and Challenges: Understanding the Global Movement to End
Violence Against Women. Global Civil Society 2002. M. Kaldor, H. Anheier and M.
Glasius. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 119-147.

Kaldor, M. and D. Muro (2003c). Religious and Nationalist Militant Groups. Global
Civil Society 2003. M. Kaldor, H. Anheier and M. Glasius. Oxford Oxford University
Press: 151-184.

Edelman, M. (2003). Transnational Peasant and Farmer Movements and Networks.
Global Civil Society 2003. M. Kaldor, H. Anheier and M. Glasius. Oxford, Oxford
University Press: 185-220.

446
Fries, R. (2003). The Legal Environment of Civil Society. Global Civil Society 2003. M.
Kaldor, H. Anheier and M. Glasius. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 221-238.

Anheier, H. and H. Katz (2003). Mapping Global Civil Society. Global Civil Society
2003. M. Kaldor, H. Anheier and M. Glasius. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 241-258.

Global Civil Society Yearbook 2004/5

Anderson, K. and D. Rieff (2005). 'Global Civil Society': A Sceptical View. Global Civil
Society. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. London, Sage Publications: 26-39.

Ezzat, H. R. (2005). Beyond Methodological Modernism: Towards a Multicultural
Paradigm Shift in the Social Sciences. Global Civil Society 2004/5. H. Anheier, M.
Glasius and M. Kaldor. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, SAGE Publications: 40-58.

Said, M. E.-S. (2005). Global Civil Society: an Arab Perspective. Global Civil Society
2004/5. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi,
SAGE Publications. : 60-73.

Said, Y. (2005). Global Civil Society: Oil ad Activism. Global Civil Society 2004/5. H.
Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, SAGE
Publications: 76-93.

Wainwright, H. (2005). Civil Society, Democracy and Power: Global Connections.
Global Civil Society 2004/5. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. London, Thousand
Oaks, New Delhi, SAGE Publications: 94-119.

Grenier, P. (2005). The New Pionners: The People Behind Global Civil Society. Global
Civil Society 2004/5. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. London, Thousand Oaks,
New Delhi, SAGE Publications: 122-157.

Anheier, H. and S. Daly (2005). Philanthropic Foundations: A New Global Force?
Global Civil Society 2004/5. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. London, Thousand
Oaks, New Delhi, SAGE Publications: 158-176.

Waterman, P. and J. Timms (2005). Trade Unon Internationalism and a Global Civil
Society in the Making. Global Civil Society 2004/5. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M.
Kaldor. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, SAGE Publications: 175-202.

Anheier, H. and H. Katz (2005b). Network Approaches to Global Civil Society. Global
Civil Society 2004/5. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. London, Sage Publications:
206-221.
447

Global Civil Society Yearbook 2005/6

Howell, J. (2006). Gender and Civil Society. Global Civil Society 2005/6. M. Glasius, M.
Kaldor and H. Anheier. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, SAGE Publications: 38-64.

Whitaker, C., B. d. S. Santos, et al. (2006). The World Social Forum: Where Do We
Stand and Where Are We Going? . Global Civil Society 2005/6. M. Glasius, M. Kaldor
and H. Anheier. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, SAGE Publications: 64-86.

Newell, P. (2006). Climate for Change? Civil Society and Politics of Global Warming.
Global Civil Society 2005/6. M. Glasius, M. Kaldor and H. Anheier. London, Thousand
Oaks, New Delhi, SAGE Publications: 90-119.

Desai, M., F. Holland, et al. (2006). The Movement of Labour and Global Civil Society.
Global Civil Society 2005/6. M. Glasius, M. Kaldor and H. Anheier. London, Thousand
Oaks, New Delhi, SAGE Publications: 120-148.

Falk, R. (2006). Reforming the United Nations: Global Civil Society Perspectives and
Initiatives. Global Civil Society 2005/6. M. Glasius, M. Kaldor and H. Anheier. London,
Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, SAGE Publications: 150-186.

Glasius, M. and J. Timms (2006). Social Forums: Radical Beacon or Strategic
Infrastructure? Global Civil Society 2005/6. M. Glasius, M. Kaldor and H. Anheier.
London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, SAGE Publications: 190-238.
Katz, H. and H. Anheier (2006). Global Connectedness: The Structure of Transnational
NGO Networks. Global Civil Society 2005/6. M. Glasius, M. Kaldor and H. Anheier.
London, Sage.

Castells, M., M. Fernandez-Ardevol, et al. (2006). Electronic Communication and Socio-
Political Mobilization: A New Form of Civil Society. Global Civil Society 2005/6. M.
Glasius, M. Kaldor and H. Anheier. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, SAGE
Publications: 266-285.

448
Appendix C:
ISQ Articles Used in Chapter Six, on Global Relations
Paradigm

The list below contains all articles that constitute the data used for the research
carried out in Chapter Six: Global Relations Paradigm. They were all published by the
academic journal International Studies Quarterly, between the years of 1997 and 2006.
The articles are listed in alphabetical order by the author‟s name.

Agathangelou, A. M. and L. H. M. Ling (2004). "Power, Borders, Security, Wealth:
Lessons of Violence and Desire from September 11." International Studies Quarterly
48(3): 517-538.

Alkopher, T. D. (2005). "The Social (and Religious) Meanings that Constitute War: The
Crusades as Realpolitik vs. Socialpolitik." International Studies Quarterly 49(4): 715-
737.

Andreas, P. (2005). "Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its
Legacy." International Studies Quarterly 49(2): 335-360.

Apodaca, C. (2001). "Global Economic Patterns and Personal Integrity Rights After the
Cold War." International Studies Quarterly 45(4): 587-602.

Arfi, B. (2000). ""Spontaneous" Interethnic Order: The Emergence of Collective, Path-
Dependent Cooperation." International Studies Quarterly 44(4): 563-590.

Atkinson, C. (2006). "Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military
Engagement and the Socialization of States, 1972-2000." International Studies Quarterly
50(3): 509-537.

Balch-Lindsay, D. and A. J. Enterline (2000). "Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil
War Duration, 1820-1992." International Studies Quarterly 44(4): 615-642.

449
Bartlett, D. and A. Seleny (1998). "The Political Enforcement of Liberalism: Bargaining,
Institutions, and Auto Multinationals in Hungary." International Studies Quarterly 42(2):
319-338.

Betsill, M. M. and H. Bulkeley (2004). "Transnational Networks and Global
Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program." International
Studies Quarterly 48(2): 471-493.

Bonham, G. M., V. M. Sergeev, et al. (1997). "The Limitd Test-Ban Agreement:
Emergence of New Knowledge Structures in International Negotiation." International
Studies Quarterly 41(2): 215-240.

Brecher, M. (1999). "International Studies in the Twentieth Century and Beyond: Flawed
Dichotomies, Synthesis, Cumulation." International Studies Quarterly 43(2): 213-264.

Carpenter, R. C. (2005). ""Women, Children and Other Vulnerable Groups": Gender,
Strategic Framing and the Protection of Civilians as a Transnational Issue." International
Studies Quarterly 49(2): 295-334.

Cioffi-Revilla, C. and T. Landman (1999). "Evolution of Maya Polities in the Ancient
Mesoamerican System." International Studies Quarterly 43(4): 559-598.

Coleman, W. D. and M. Gabler (2002). "Agricultural Biotechnology and Regime
Formation: A Constructivist Assessment of the Prospects." International Studies
Quarterly 46(4): 481-506.

Comor, E. (2001). "The Role of Communication in Global Civil Society: Forces,
Processes, Prospects." International Studies Quarterly 45(3): 389-408.

Conca, K., F. Wu, et al. (2006). "Global Regime Formation or Complex Institution
Building? The Principled Content of International River Agreements." International
Studies Quarterly 50(2): 263-285.

Corrales, J. and F. Westhoff (2006). "Information Technology Adoption and Political
Regimes." International Studies Quarterly 50(4): 911-933.

Crystal, J. (1998). "A New Kind of Competition: How American Producers Respond to
Incoming Foreign Direct Investment." International Studies Quarterly 42(3): 513-543.

Cutler, A. C. (1999). "Locating "Authority" in the Global Political Economy."
International Studies Quarterly 43(1): 59-81.

Davis, D. R. (1997). "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign
Policy Behavior." International Studies Quarterly 41(1): 171-184.

450
Dimitrov, R. S. (2003). "Knowledge, Power, and Interests in Environmental Regime
Formation." International Studies Quarterly 47(1): 123-150.

Elman, C. and M. F. Elman (2002). "How Not to Be Lakatos Intolerant: Appraising
Progress in IR Research." International Studies Quarterly 46(2): 231-262.

Enders, W. and T. Sandler (1999). "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era."
International Studies Quarterly 43(1): 145-167.

Enders, W. and T. Sandler (2002). "Patterns of Transnational Terrorism, 1970-1999:
Alternative Time-Series Estimates." International Studies Quarterly 46(2): 145-165.

Enders, W. and T. Sandler (2006). "Distribution of Transnational Terrorism Among
Countries by Income Class and Geography After 9/11." International Studies Quarterly
50(2): 367-393.

Fierke, K. M. (2002). "Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International
Relations." International Studies Quarterly 46(3): 331-354.

Fox, J. (2000). "Religious Causes of Discrimination Against Ethno-Religious
Minorities." International Studies Quarterly 44(3): 423-450.

Furia, P. A. and R. E. Lucas (2006). "Determinants of Arab Public Opinion on Foreign
Relations." International Studies Quarterly 50(3): 585-605.

Gartner, S. S. and J. Bercovitch (2006). "Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: The
Contribution of Mediation to Short-Lived Conflict Settlements." International Studies
Quarterly 50(4): 819-840.

Gartzke, E. and Q. Li (2003). "War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political
Externalities of Economic Globalization." International Studies Quarterly 47(4): 561-586.

Goff, P. M. (200). "Invisible Borders: Economic Liberalization and National Identity."
International Studies Quarterly 44(4): 533-562.

Goldstein, J. S., X. Huang, et al. (1997). "Energy in the World Economy, 1950-1992."
International Studies Quarterly 41(2): 241-266.

Grundig, F. (2006). "Patterns of International Cooperation and the Explanatory Power of
Relative Gains: An Analysis of Cooperation on Global Climate Change, Ozone
Depletion, and International Trade." International Studies Quarterly 50(4): 781-801.

Harlen, C. M. (1999). "A Reappraisal of Classical Economic Nationalism and Economic
Liberalism." International Studies Quarterly 43(4): 733-744.

451
Hawkins, D. (2004). "Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and
Enforceable Human Rights Norms." International Studies Quarterly 48(4): 779-804.

Hays, J. C., J. R. Freeman, et al. (2003). "Exchange Rate Volatility and Democratization
in Emerging Market Countries." International Studies Quarterly 47(2): 203-228.

Helleiner, E. (2002). "Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism?
Lessons from the 19th Century." International Studies Quarterly 46(3): 307-329.

Henderson, E. A. (1998). "The Democratic Peace Through the Lens of Culture, 1820-
1989." International Studies Quarterly 42(3): 461-484.

Henderson, E. A. and R. Tucker (2001). "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of
Civilizations and International Conflict." International Studies Quarterly 45(2): 317-338.

Hensel, P. R. (2001). "Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of
Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992." International Studies Quarterly 45(1):
81-109.

Hermann, M. G. (1998). "One Field, Many Perspectives: Building the Foundations for
Dialogue." International Studies Quarterly 42(4): 605-624.

Herrmann, R. K., J. F. Voss, et al. (1997). "Images in International Relations: An
Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata." International Studies Quarterly 41(3): 403-
433.

Hochstetler, K., A. M. Clark, et al. (2000). "Sovereignty in the Balance: Claims and
Bargains at th UN Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women."
International Studies Quarterly 44(4): 591-614.

Iqbal, Z. (2006). "Health and Human Security: The Public Health Impact of Violent
Conflict." International Studies Quarterly 50(3): 631-649.

James, P. (2006). "Democracy and Conflict Management: Territorial Claims in the
Western Hemisphere Revisited." International Studies Quarterly 50(4): 803-818.

Joachim, J. (2003). "Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and
Women's Rights." International Studies Quarterly 47(2): 247-274.

John M Owen, I. (2005). "When Do Ideologies Produce Alliances? The Holy Roman
Empire, 1517-1555." International Studies Quarterly 49(1): 73-99.

Johnston, A. I. (2001). "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments."
International Studies Quarterly 45(4): 487-515.

452
Katada, S. N. and T. J. McKeown (1998). "Aid Politics and Electoral Politics: Japan,
1970-1992." International Studies Quarterly 43(3): 591-600.

Keohane, R. O. (1998). "Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations Between International
Relations and Feminist Theory." International Studies Quarterly 42(1): 193-198.

Kinsella, D. (2002). "Rivalry, Reaction, and Weapons Proliferation: A Time-Series
Analysis of Global Arms Transfers." International Studies Quarterly 46(2): 209-230.

Koslowski, R. (2002). "Human Migration and the Conceptualization of Pre-Modern
World Politics." International Studies Quarterly 46(3): 375-399.

Lamborn, A. C. (1997). "Theory and the Politics in World Politics." International Studies
Quarterly 41(2): 187-214.

Leblang, D. (2003). "To Devaluate or to Defend? The Political Economy of Exchange
Rate Policy." International Studies Quarterly 47(4): 533-559.

Leblang, D. A. (1997). "Domestic and Systemic Determinants of Capital Controls in the
Developed and Developing World." International Studies Quarterly 41(3): 435-454.

Leblang, D. A. (2002). "The Political Economy of Speculative Attacks in the Developing
World." International Studies Quarterly 46(1): 69-91.

Lebovic, J. H. and E. Voeten (2006). "The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of
Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR." International Studies Quarterly 50(4):
861-888.

Leng, R. J. and P. M. Regan (2003). "Social and Political Cultural Effects on the
Outcomes of Mediation in Militarized Interstate Disputes." International Studies
Quarterly 47(3): 431-452.

Li, Q. and R. Reuveny (2006). "Democracy and Environmental Degradation."
International Studies Quarterly 50(4): 935-956.

Locher, B. and E. Prügl (2001). "Feminism and Constructivism: World Apart or Sharing
the Middle Ground?" International Studies Quarterly 45(1): 111-129.

Löwenheim, O. (2003). ""Do Ourselves Cridit and Render a Lasting Service to
Mankind": British Moral Prestige, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Barbary Pirates."
International Studies Quarterly 47(1): 23-48.

Lukauskas, A. and S. Minushkin (2000). "Explaining Styles of Financial Market Opening
in Chile, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey." International Studies Quarterly 44(4): 695-
723.
453

Luo, X. (2000). "The Rise of the Social Development Model: Institutional Construction
of International Technology Organizations, 1856-1993." International Studies Quarterly
44(1): 147-175.

Lynch, D. C. (2004). "International "Decentering" and Democratization: The Case of
Thailand." International Studies Quarterly 48(2): 339-362.

Majeski, S. J. (2004). "Asymmetric Power Among Agents and the Generation and
Maintenance of Cooperation in International Relations." International Studies Quarterly
48(2): 455-470.

Marchand, M. H. (1998). "Different Communities / Different Realities / Different
Encounters: A Reply to J. Ann Tickner." International Studies Quarterly 42(1): 199-204.

Mesquita, B. B. d. (2002). "Domestic Politics and International Relations." International
Studies Quarterly 46(1): 1-9.

Midlarsky, M. I. (1998). "Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict
and the Democratic Peace." International Studies Quarterly 42(3): 485-511.

Milner, H. V. and B. Judkins (2004). "Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is
There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy?" International Studies Quarterly 48(1): 95-
119.

Mitchell, R. B. (1998). "Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International
Regimes." International Studies Quarterly 42(1): 109-130.

Mousseau, M. (2003). "The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and
Democratic Peace: Interdisciplinary Theory and Evidence." International Studies
Quarterly 47(4): 483-510.

Murphy, C. N. (2001). "Political Consequences of the New Inequality." International
Studies Quarterly 45(3): 347-356.

Oneal, J. R., B. Russett, et al. (2003). "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence,
and International Organizations, 1885-1992." International Studies Quarterly 47(3): 371-
393.

Oneal, J. R. and B. M. Russett (1997). "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy,
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985." International Studies Quarterly 41(2): 267-
294.

Osiander, A. (1998). "Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory: Idealism
Revisited." International Studies Quarterly 42(3): 409-432.
454

Paris, R. (2003). "The Globalization of Taxation? Electronic Commerce and the
Transformation of the State." International Studies Quarterly 47(2): 153-182.

Parker, O. and J. Brassett (2005). "Contingent Borders, Ambiguous Ethics: Migrants in
(International) Political Theory." International Studies Quarterly 49(2): 233-253.

Patomäki, H. and C. Wight (2000). "After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical
Realism." International Studies Quarterly 44(2): 213-237.

Peng, D. (2002). "Invisible Linkages: A Regional Perspective of East Asian Political
Economy." International Studies Quarterly 46(3): 423-447.

Pollins, B. M. and K. P. Murrin (1999). "Where Hobbes Meets Hobson: Core Conflict
and Colonialism, 1495-1985." International Studies Quarterly 43(3): 427-454.

Prakash, A. (2003). "Biopolitics in the EU and the US: A Race to the Bottom or
Convergence to the Top?" International Studies Quarterly 47(4): 617-641.

Raustiala, K. (1997). "States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions."
International Studies Quarterly 41(4): 719-740.

Richards, D. L., R. D. Gelleny, et al. (2001). "Money With a Mean Streak? Foreign
Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing
Countries." International Studies Quarterly 45(2): 219-239.

Ron, J., H. Ramos, et al. (2005). "Transnational Information Politics: NGO Human
Rights Reporting, 1986-2000." International Studies Quarterly 49(3): 557-587.

Rosenau, J. N. and W. M. Fagen (1997). "A New Dynamism in World Politics:
Increasingly Skillful Individuals?" International Studies Quarterly 41(4): 611-632.

Rudra, N. (2004). "Openness, Welfare Spending, and Inequality in the Developing
World." International Studies Quarterly 48(3): 683-709.

Sandholtz, W. and W. Koetzle (2000). "Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure,
Democracy, and Trade." International Studies Quarterly 44(1): 31-50.

Sarkees, M. R., F. W. Wayman, et al. (2003). "Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State
Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816-1997." International
Studies Quarterly 47(1): 49-70.

Scanlan, S. J. and J. C. Jenkins (2001). "Military Power and Food Security: A Cross-
National Analysis of Less-Developed Countries, 1970-1990." International Studies
Quarterly 45(1): 159-187.
455

Sell, S. K. and A. Prakash (2004). "Using Ideas Strategically: The Constest Between
Business and NGO Networks in Intellecual Property Rights." International Studies
Quarterly 48(1): 143-175.

Sending, O. J. and I. B. Neumann (2006). "Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing
NGOs, States, and Power." International Studies Quarterly 50(3): 651-672.

Shadlen, K. C., A. Schrank, et al. (2005). "The Political Economy of Intellectual Proterty
Protection: The Case of Software." International Studies Quarterly 49(1): 45-71.

Shulman, S. (2000). "Nationalist Sources of International Economic Integration."
International Studies Quarterly 44(3): 365-390.

Simon, M. V. and H. Starr (2000). "Two-Level Security Management and the Prospects
for New Democracies: A Simulation Analysis." International Studies Quarterly 44(4):
391-422.

Sjoberg, L. (2006). "Gendered Realities of the Immunity Principle: Why Gender Analysis
Needs Feminism." International Studies Quarterly 50(4): 889-910.

Smith, T. W. (2002). "The New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructural
Violence." International Studies Quarterly 46(3): 355-374.

Smith., S. (2004). "Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and
September 11." International Studies Quarterly 48(3): 499-515.

Taagepera, R. (1997). "Expansion and Contraction Patterns of Large Polities: Context for
Russia." International Studies Quarterly 41(3): 475-504.

Thompson, W. R. (2003). "A Streetcar Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation
Chains, and Rivalry Structures." International Studies Quarterly 47(3): 453-474.

Tickner, J. A. (1997). "You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between
Feminist and IR Theorists." International Studies Quarterly 41(4): 611-632.

Tickner, J. A. (1998). "Continuing the Conversation..." International Studies Quarterly
42(1): 205-210.

True, J. and M. Mintrom (2001). "Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The
Case of Gender Mainstreaming." International Studies Quarterly 45(1): 27-57.

Wang, T. Y. (1999). "U.S. Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important
Issues." International Studies Quarterly 43(1): 199-210.

456
Wapner, P. (2002). "The Sovereignty of Nature? Environmental Protection in a
Postmodern Age." International Studies Quarterly 46(2): 167-187.

Weisband, E. (2000). "Discursive Multilateralism: Global Benchmarks, Shame, and
Learning in the ILO Labor Standards Monitoring Regime." International Studies
Quarterly 44(4): 643-666.

Williams, M. C. (2003). "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International
Politics." International Studies Quarterly 47(4): 511-531.

Woodwell, D. (2004). "Unwelcome Neighbors: Shared Ethnicity and International
Conflict During the Cold War." International Studies Quarterly 48(1): 197-223.

Zahariadis, N. (1997). "Research Notes: Why State Subsidies? Evidence from European
Community Countries, 1981-1986." International Studies Quarterly 41(2): 341-354.

457
Appendix D:
Global Concepts From ISQ Readings Used in Chapter Six, on
Global Relations Paradigm

The information below has two components. First, a list of conceptual categories
is presented in alphabetical order (Global Conceptual Categories), with each category
being preceded by a code, comprised by numbers and, eventually, letters. Second, all
global concepts found in the articles published in ISQ between 1997 and 2006 (listed in
Appendix C, above) are listed in alphabetical order (ISQ Global Concepts: 1997-2006).
Each concept is preceded by its respective code, which indicates the global conceptual
category to which it belongs.

Global Conceptual Categories

1 Global
2 Global Governance
2A Global Governance Agency
2A-1 Global Governance Actor
2A-2 Global Governance Institution
2A-3 Global Governance Infrastructure
2B Global Governance – Global Order
2C Global Governance – Global Power
2D Global Governance – Global Justice
2E Global Governance – Global Development
3 Global Economy
3A Global Economy Agency
3A-1 Global Economic Actor
3A-2 Global Economic Institution
3A-3 Global Economy Infrastructure
3B Global Economy – Global Trade
458
3C Global Economy – Global Finance
3D Global Economy – Global Production
4 Global Civil Society
4A Global Civil Society Agency
4A-1 Global Civil Society Actor
4A-2 Global Civil Society Institution
4A-3 Global Civil Society Infrastructure
4B Global Civil Society – Social Movement
4C Global Civil Society – Social Advocacy
5 Bi-Dimensional: Global Governance/Global Economy
6 Bi-Dimensional: Global Governance/Global Civil Society
7 Bi-Dimensional: Global Economy/Global Civil Society
8 Multidimensional Environment
9 Environment: Global Governance
10 Environment: Global Economy
11 Environment: Global Civil Society

ISQ Global Concepts: 1997-2006

4A-1 Activist, Environmental
4A-1 Activist, Global
4A-1 Activist, Transnational
2A-1 Actor, Authoritative Global
7 Actor, Boundary-Eclipsing
4A Actor, Coalition of Many
3A-1 Actor, Corporate
7 Actor, Extraterritorial
3
A
-1 Actor, Foreign Economic
1 Actor, Global
1 Actor, Globalizing
6 Actor, Government-NonGovernment
Hybrid
4A-1 Actor, Nongovernmental
7 Actor, Nonstate
2A-1 Actor, Supranational
7 Actor, Transnational
3A-1 Actor, Transnational Economic
7 Actor, Transnational Nonstate
4A-1 Actors, Global Civil Society
4A Advocacy Coalition Framework
4A Advocacy Community
4A Advocacy Groups
4A Advocacy Network
4A Advocacy Network, Principled
4A Advocate, Women's
4A Agent, Global Civil Society
2A Agents of Globalization
1 Border, Conceptual
3A-1 Business Firm
3C Capital Account Convertibility
3C Capital Account Liberalization
3C Capital Control
3C Capital Control Liberalization
3C Capital Flows
3C Capital Flows, Cross-Border
3C Capital Flows, Transnational
3C Capital Inflow
3C Capital Market
3C Capital Mobility
3C Capital Outflow
3C Capital, Cross-National Mobility of
3C Capital, Foreign
3C Capital, Foreign Economic
3C Capital, Global Flows of Investment
3C Capital, Mobile
1 City Culture
4A Civilian Protection Network
1 Civilization
1 Civilization Membership
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1 Civilization [of the Human Race]
1 Civilization, Human
5 Civilization, Market
6 Civilizational Conflict
6 Civilizational Difference
6 Civilizational Paradigm
6 Civilizational Realpolitik
6 Civilizations, Clash of
6 Civilizations, Noncontiguous
6 Civilizations, War of
5 Clandestine Trade Agreement
2 Cold War, Globalized
6 Complex Adaptive System
5 Convergence-to-the-Top
3A Corporation, Private
2 Cosmopolitan
6 Cosmopolitan Human Solidarity
6 Crimes Against Humanity
1 Cross-Border
5 Cross-Border Financial Transaction
6 Cross-Cultural Affinity
7 Cultural Community
6 Cultural Conflagration
6 Cultural Differences or Dissimilarities
1 Cultural Diffusion
7 Cultural Exception
4 Cultural Factor
4 Cultural Homogenization
4 Cultural Identity
6 Cultural Imperialism
7 Cultural Industry
6 Cultural Integration
6 Cultural Norm
6 Cultural Norm, World
6 Cultural Norm, Worldwide
6 Cultural Orientation, Shared
6 Cultural Realism
6 Cultural Relativism
6 Cultural Similarity
1 Culture Groups [=Civilizations]
7 Culture Industries
7 Culture, Consumerist
6 Culture, Global Diplomatic
6 Culture, Political
6 Culture, Social
3A-1 Currency Trader
1 Democracy, Multicultural
4 Diaspora
4 Diaspora Community
4 Diaspora, Minority
6 Diaspora, Rebellious
3D Digital Commerce
7 Digital Divide, Worldwide
3A-1 E-Commerce Firm
5 E-Commerce Taxation
3 E-Commerce, Global
14 Eco-Criticism
14 Eco-Criticism, Contemporary
14 Eco-Criticism, Postmodern
9 Ecological Protection
11 Ecologism
5 Economic Integration
1 Economic Integration, Informal
5 Economic Penetration, Foreign
5 Economic Regionalization
8 Ecosystems, Freshwater
2 Empire, Hegemonic
6 Empire, Polyethnic
11 Environmental Activist Group
9 Environmental Affairs
14 Environmental Cooperation,
International
8 Environmental Degradation
9 Environmental Dilemma
9 Environmental Diplomacy
9 Environmental Institution, International
14 Environmental Justice Movement
9 Environmental Organization
9 Environmental Organization,
International
8 Environmental Perspective
8 Environmental Principles
9 Environmental Regime
8 Environmental Relativism
9 Environmental Security
11 Environmentalism
11 Environmentalism, Conventional
11 Environmentalism, Post-Nature
13 Environmentalist
4A Epistemic Community
4A Epistemic Community of Scientists
4A Epistemic Community, Scientific
4A Epistemic Community, Transnational
6 Epistemic Conventions
4A Ethnic Alliance, Transnational
6 Ethnic Cleansing
460
4 Ethnic Conflict
4 Ethnic Demographics
4 Ethnic Diaspora
4 Ethnic Group
6 Ethnic Group, Trans-Border
4 Ethnic Hatreds
6 Ethnic Identity, Political
6 Ethnic Immigrant
6 Ethnic Peace
6 Ethnic War
4 Ethnicity
6 Ethno-Political Conflict
5 Financial Liberalization
3C Financial Markets
5 Financial Markets, Integration of
2 Foreign Aid
5 Foreign Bank
3C Foreign Capital
3C Foreign Capital Investment
3B Foreign Commerce
3A-1 Foreign Company
3 Foreign Competition
3 Foreign Competitive Advantage
3A Foreign Competitor
3A-1 Foreign Corporation
7 Foreign Cultural Product
3C Foreign Currency
3C Foreign Direct Investment
5 Foreign Direct Investment Policy
5 Foreign Direct Investment Regulation,
Incoming
5 Foreign Direct Investment, Incoming
5 Foreign Direct Investment, Outward
3 Foreign Economic Competition
5 Foreign Economic Integration
5 Foreign Economic Policy
5 Foreig