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Spaces of market-culturalism: the case of Chungking Mansions, Hong Kong
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Spaces of market-culturalism: the case of Chungking Mansions, Hong Kong
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SPACES OF MARKET-CULTURALISM: THE CASE OF CHUNGKING MANSIONS, HONG KONG by Surajit Chakravarty A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (POLICY, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT) August 2010 Copyright 2010 Surajit Chakravarty ii Dedication This dissertation is dedicated to my parents who had more faith in me than sometimes I did myself. I cannot thank them enough for their love, generosity and encouragement. Most of all I am grateful for their unending patience. iii Acknowledgements I am humbled by the help and assistance I have received from numerous people over the last six years. I am honored to have worked with and been supervised by Prof. Tridib Banerjee. His open-minded, tolerant, and process-oriented guidance allowed me to find my interests and my voice. Every PhD student should be so fortunate. I thank Prof. Eric Heikkila for providing the original spark of interest in Hong Kong, and for always taking the time to talk when I needed it. I am grateful to Prof. Laurie Brand for taking interest in my project, for being generous with her time, for always reading my chapters with careful attention, and not least, for her kindness in both commendation and critique. I was fortunate to have had the supervision and insightful guidance of Prof. Chan Kam-wah while conducting my fieldwork in Hong Kong. I thank him for sharing his time with me, both in discussion and on the badminton courts. I am grateful to Prof. Clara Irazabal for her unwavering support as a guide, co-author, fellow-explorer, and friend. I am richer for the experience. This dissertation was made possible through generous funding and institutional support from the Department of Applied Social Sciences, Hong Kong Polytechnic University. I thank the Head of the Department Prof. Angelina Yuen Tsang, and the faculty and staff for their support during my stay. I also thank sincerely Ms. Sharmila Gurung and the staff of Christian Action, for inviting me into the community and helping me make friends. iv I am grateful to Prof. Dowell Myers, Prof. Niraj Verma, Prof. Shui Yan Tang, Prof. Geoffrey Wiseman, Prof. Claudio Delang, Prof. Gordon Mathews, Prof. Margaret Crawford, and Prof. Ackbar Abbas, for offering me feedback on my work, opportunities to present the research, time to talk through theoretical issues, and sometimes, encouragement through a sympathetic ear. I am indebted to Prof. Joanna Yu, Prof. Joyce Mann, Prof. Melissa Lopez, Prof. Erlyana Sie and the International Public Policy and Management Program (IPPAM) at USC, for giving me the opportunity to teach at the IPPAM, and for including me in the family. I thank the offices of the School of Policy, Planning and Development for their generous support throughout the PhD program. Through the last 6 years I have known that I have SPPD on my team and that assurance has been invaluable. I sincerely appreciate the school’s support throughout the program. I would also like to thank the staff at SPPD for their prompt, accurate and dependable attention to all concerns. I thank Christine Wilson, Ann Abrahamyan and Julie Kim for their help on numerous occasions. I reserve a very special thank you for June Muranaka for letting me trouble her far too often, and for putting up with all the emails and questions. v I thank the staff and proprietors of the cafes Koffea and Ragazzi Room for their friendly service, refills of coffee and access to wireless internet. This dissertation was written in large part in these two locations. I am immensely grateful to my friends who have, each in their own way, contributed to my work, wisdom and well-being. In this brief list I would like to convey my appreciation to Dr. Ileana Apostol, Shilpa Bhatnagar, Ajay Chacko, Katherine Chu, Dr. Amna Imam, Hisako Kobayashi, Miwa Kawamura, Dr. Rohit Negi, Mimi Pedersen, Dr. Cristian Pliscoff and the Pliscoff-Flores family, Cintia Quiliconi, Dr. Ersin Sandal, Dr. Nukhet Sandal, Shubha Shrivastava, Shilpa Trisal, Sin Wai-fong, Dr. Yin Wang, Tammy Wong, Bill Yip, and Heidi Zeller. Last but not least, thank you Uncle Nik for having your home and heart always open. All responsibility for the quality of this work and for any possible errors rests entirely with me. vi Table of Contents Dedication .............................................................................................................. ii Acknowledgements ................................................................................................ iii List of Tables .......................................................................................................... ix List of Figures ......................................................................................................... x Abstract ............................................................................................................. xi Chapter 1 : Theoretical Framework, Research Questions and Methodology .. 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................ 6 (i) Privatization of public space .................................................................................. 9 (ii) Ghettoes versus ethnic enclaves .......................................................................... 11 (iii) Local citizenship through practice ..................................................................... 12 Research questions ...................................................................................................... 15 Incorporating structure and agency .......................................................................... 17 On the framework of structure and agency ............................................................... 19 Research Design ........................................................................................................... 26 Conceptual framework .............................................................................................. 26 The meaning of ‘space’.............................................................................................. 29 Case study: Chungking Mansions, Hong Kong ......................................................... 31 Methodology: getting from questions to analysis ..................................................... 35 Constant comparison and mixed methods ................................................................. 35 Research Methods...................................................................................................... 36 Data Analysis ............................................................................................................. 40 Significance of research .............................................................................................. 43 Caveats ......................................................................................................................... 44 Chapter 2 : Privatizations of the Urban Public Sphere .................................... 45 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 45 Nature of loss: Economic goods and commodification ............................................ 52 The economic meaning of excludability: free riders and opportunity cost ........... 55 Conflations within ‘public’ and ‘private’.................................................................. 56 vii I. Structure-side explanation ...................................................................................... 59 Fragmentation of users .............................................................................................. 60 Commodification of public space .............................................................................. 62 II. Agent-side privatization ......................................................................................... 66 Spatial identity clubs ................................................................................................. 66 Contextualizing Chungking Mansions ...................................................................... 75 Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 81 Chapter 3 : Beyond the Ghetto/ Enclave duality ............................................... 84 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 84 Literature review ......................................................................................................... 85 I. The Sociological Approach .................................................................................... 86 II. The Geographic Approach .................................................................................... 91 III. Urban Planning Approach .................................................................................. 93 Historical overview ...................................................................................................... 98 Before 1961................................................................................................................ 98 Since 1961................................................................................................................ 100 Extents of the Enclave ............................................................................................... 103 Internal differentiation in Chungking Mansions ................................................... 107 Chungking Mansions as a Ghetto ............................................................................ 120 Poor sanitary and structural conditions .................................................................. 122 Ruralism in an urban setting ................................................................................... 123 Ethnic (Enclave) Economy of Chungking Mansions ............................................. 133 Changes Inside Chungking Mansions ..................................................................... 135 Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 147 Chapter 4 : Citizenship Through Place-Based Practice ................................. 153 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 153 Literature Review ...................................................................................................... 157 The idea of ‘post-national’ citizenship .................................................................... 158 Locally practiced ‘insurgent citizenship’ ................................................................ 162 Cities and citizenship ............................................................................................... 166 Statist citizenship in Hong Kong – uncertainty and enterprise ............................ 170 British legacy and Chinese future ........................................................................... 171 The Ideal of the ‘enterprising’ citizen ..................................................................... 174 UNHCR and the offer of cosmopolitan citizenship ................................................ 177 Practiced citizenship ................................................................................................. 181 Focus on asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants ................................................... 182 viii Aspiring cosmopolitans: flocking together but not of feather ................................. 185 Innovative narratives of citizenship: “fresh start” as a human right ..................... 187 Stuck in limbo: vagaries of the asylum process ....................................................... 193 Claiming the right to work: innovative narratives, risky jobs ................................. 199 Locating basic necessities: aid from faith-based organizations ............................. 205 Negotiating identity: seeking new ways to belong ................................................... 212 Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 217 Chapter 5 : Imagining Chungking Mansions ................................................... 223 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 223 Survey findings: Dark but changing ....................................................................... 223 ‘Chungking Express’ (1994): Difference and Speed .............................................. 229 Matthews (2007): The colonial subject of globalization ........................................ 239 Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 247 Chapter 6 : Conclusions ..................................................................................... 250 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 250 The subject of Chungking Mansions ....................................................................... 250 (I) In-betweenness ..................................................................................................... 253 Ghetto / Enclave ...................................................................................................... 253 Space of place / Space of flows ................................................................................ 254 Legal / Illegal .......................................................................................................... 256 (II) Marginalization by consent ............................................................................... 257 (III) Market-culturalism ........................................................................................... 259 The context of market-culturalism ........................................................................... 259 Defining market-culturalism.................................................................................... 261 Contributions and direction for future research .................................................... 270 Bibliography ........................................................................................................ 275 Appendices ................................................................................................... 286 Appendix 1: Opinion Survey: Perceptions of Chungking Mansions ................... 286 Appendix 2: Interview guides .................................................................................. 291 Appendix 3: Survey Results ..................................................................................... 293 ix List of Tables Table 1-1: Summary of methodology and results ….……………………………………41 Table 2-1: Classic typology of economic goods…………………………………………54 Table 3-1: Immigrant social positions in Chungking Mansions ……………………….110 Table 3-2: Internal differentiation in Chungking Mansions society……………………119 x List of Figures Figure 1.1: Structure, Agency and Space in the work of Lefebvre, Bourdieu and Giddens .......... 24 Figure 1.2: Conceptual Framework ............................................................................................... 26 Figure 1.3: Chungking Mansions façade ....................................................................................... 33 Figure 1.4: Chungking Mansions Site Plan ................................................................................... 34 Figure 2.1: Privatizations of the Urban Public Sphere ................................................................... 51 Figure 2.2: Graffiti in Chungking Mansions .................................................................................. 76 Figure 3.1: Promotional materials from 1961 ................................................................................ 99 Figure 3.2: Schedule of Uses, Tsim Sha Tsui, 1965 .................................................................... 102 Figure 3.3: Chungking Mansions and vicinity, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong .............. 109 Figure 3.4: Ghetto-like conditions inside Chungking Mansions ................................................. 141 Figure 3.5: Ethnic Enclave Economy inside Chungking Mansions ............................................. 142 Figure 3.6: Ground Level Shopping Arcade Plan ........................................................................ 143 Figure 3.7: Physical changes inside Chungking Mansions .......................................................... 144 Figure 4.1: Growth of Asylum-seekers in Hong Kong, 1997-2006 ............................................. 179 Figure 4.2: Christian Action language class picture on South Chuna Morning Post website ...... 184 Figure 4.3: Christian Action office and promotional material ..................................................... 207 Figure 4.4: Kowloon Mosque (above) and St. Andrew’s Church (below) .................................. 208 Figure 4.5: Poster for the Quaid-i-Azam Trophy ......................................................................... 215 Figure 5.1: Stills from Chungking Express (1994) ...................................................................... 238 Figure 5.2: Gill Mohinderpaul Singh (aka Kiu Bo-Bo) endorses Christian Action ..................... 249 xi Abstract The policy framework of multiculturalism allows minorities to express and practice their identities without requiring them to assimilate into the mainstream majority. Spatially, this often translates to the proliferation of ethnic enclaves in economically integrated ‘global’ cities. Enclaves have existed since the 19 th century, however the advent of globalization and the related policy environment has altered the meanings of these places significantly. It is in this context that I have studied Chungking Mansions - an ethnic enclave of predominantly African and South Asian immigrants and asylum-seekers in Hong Kong. The following broad concerns guide this study. How does multiculturalism affect the public character of the city? How does ‘class’ interact with ‘ethnicity’ in the formation of enclaves? How does immigrant agency create meaning and belonging in such places? And finally, how are these enclaves quintessential products of globalization, and how might we conceptualize them as such? The main findings are as follows. (i) Enclaves often act like urban enclosures, and in a very specific sense contribute to the privatization of the public sphere. (ii) The case studied shows considerable internal differentiation (in terms of identity, interests, capabilities and practices), so that various constructs from existing theory are unable to capture the socio-spatial formation it represents. (iii) Through local practices of everyday life immigrants and asylum-seekers negotiate their expectations with institutions of state-based and cosmopolitan citizenship, but in the process, also become subjects of these institutions. Finally, (iv) findings from the case lead to the idea of “market-culturalism”, a socio-spatial condition (or entity) whereby identity is expressed through the market, legitimacy sought through xii consumption, and interaction between communities is marked by a spirit of competition, with tensions persisting under the façade of cooperation. 1 Chapter 1 : Theoretical Framework, Research Questions and Methodology Introduction In 1992 South Central Los Angeles, an area composed of various predominantly African American neighborhoods, erupted in civil disturbance. These neighborhoods had faced economic depression for years. When a member of the community (an individual named Rodney King), was recorded being subjected to police torture, and the policemen were acquitted by a state court, the anger of poverty and marginalization (which are correlated with race) boiled over. What started with protests over the judge’s verdict soon turned into mass civil disturbance. To further complicate matters, in another incident a Korean store attendant shot dead an African American girl for alleged petty shoplifting. The disturbance took a racial turn due to the proximity of Koreatown and soon Korean business owners were defending their shops with guns against the rioters. People from lower economic classes, including both Blacks and Latinos, engaged in looting abandoned stores. The principal cause of the problem was economic strife and powerlessness to create change. Since the rioting started in Black neighborhoods due to the beating of a Black person (and the following acquittal of the accused White policemen), and since one of the affected communities was an ethnic enclave (Koreatown), the events acquired a racial definition that persists until today. In the “race riots” of 1992 race relations were not the primary cause of the violence, but the strife over economic marginalization came to be divided on race lines. 2 Nearly two decades later, in the summer of 2009, Australia witnessed a spate of attacks on students of South Asian origin in various cities of the country. This was not the first instance of xenophobic hate crimes in Australia but there were significant differences this time. Not only were the attacks more numerous, but also the local police and other arms of government responded with official statements suggesting that the students were asking for it by displaying their electronic gadgets and by speaking their native language in public areas. The logic of this narrative failed to explain why similar attacks were not “occurring” against, say, European or Latin American students or tourists speaking their native languages in Australia. Nor was it the case that the attackers were always from the most economically depressed backgrounds. The issue was quite certainly race-based. The narrative of class was invented as a defense against an implicit allegation of rampant institutionalized racism, which potentially had far deeper consequences for Australian society, and for Australia as a destination for international labor and investment. These two examples illustrate the difficulty of reading cultural and racial conflicts in multicultural cities through either the lens of ‘class’ or ‘identity’ alone. Not only are the two often correlated making motives diffuse, but also multiple narratives skew our understanding. In the recent past similar events have unfolded in Paris (2005), Sydney (2005), Birmingham (2005) and Johannesburg (2008) among other cities. Further, there are numerous instances of attacks against a country’s own minorities (not “outsiders”) by the majority, such as Hindu-Muslim conflicts in India and the recent Han-Uighur standoff in China. Internal ethnic strife is not directly the focus of this study. I am most interested in the relatively recent trends in the phenomenon of large-scale international immigration 3 for economic and political reasons. Even so, any minority that lives in enclaves is subject to similar scholarly scrutiny, and some findings may be applicable to such communities, particularly to comparable urban contexts. Undoubtedly there are structural causes that create the conditions where violence appears to the “instigators” to be a valid and viable option. These may include poverty and hopelessness, an instance of overt repression that “necessitates” retribution, or political manipulation of communities (often with the assistance of mass media) through the construction of an “other” that is held responsible for social and economic problems. This raises some pertinent questions that have inspired this study. Who is the “other” in a world of transnational social relations and economic convergence? With regards to outsiders, are economic, or social imperatives, more important to the host society? How might these be revalorized with changing conditions? How can different groups be encouraged to build bonds across lines of identity. These questions are complex and only partially explained by structural accounts. This study aims to complement structural analyses of urban processes with an examination of the role of agency, in the context of ethnic places, and how these places mediate the conceptualization of multiculturalism. Again, the idea is to introduce the variables of culture and identity to complement (rather than reject or replace) a structural understanding of how and why certain places evolve as they do. Violence may become the final outcome in some cases, but underlying contentions are more common. These contentions emerge around expectations of the host society for 4 means of incorporation of immigrants, and expectations of immigrants with regards to distributive justice in terms of access to rights and resources. When either side does not meet the expectations of the other friction begins to be generated. Immigrants negotiate these expectations with the host society through their agency and efforts to create space for themselves in the legal, economic or cultural structures of the host society. Social and economic relations are embedded in spatial relations. Ethnic places are the outcomes of the struggles between the structures of the host society and immigrant agency, exercised cultural and economic practices of everyday life. Let me describe briefly what is meant here by the term ‘ethnic places’. The term refers to those places (neighborhoods, malls, plazas, streets etc.) that are characterized by a concentration of people or businesses of an immigrant (minority) community that has not been assimilated into the host society (where “assimilation” refers to the requirement for newcomers to fully adopt the culture, language and way of life of the host community). Even if the immigrant community has been assimilated, or otherwise incorporated into the host culture, ‘ethnic places’ exist as locations where the minority is able to practice its own identity and highlight its original differences. In this context immigrant agency acts in space (in the broadest sense, and more specifically in places) by both resisting and conforming to existing structures. These places exist in all situations where immigrants come into contact with host societies in large numbers and/ or over a long period of time. Relations are particularly strained where ethnicities build walls of difference, creating doubt and mistrust. The role of “place” is significant in cities facing such issues. 5 I am interested in the spaces produced by immigrants in contemporary urban contexts. Since the Jewish ghettos and Chinatowns of old, the context within which we might read ethnic enclaves has changed, though the places often appear to be the same. The policy environment has changed from ‘assimilation’ to ‘multiculturalism’. Economies of the world are more integrated. Information technology has programmed virtual worlds for both commerce and community. “Agencies of globalization” (Pizarro et. al, 2003) have created new networks and practices of citizenship, and also new political motivations and economic imperatives in contemporary enclaves. These changes make contemporary enclaves very different from those of earlier periods. In this context, places of ethnic concentration in the city are caught between being “invisible” (Sandercock, 1998) to institutions of governance that remain unaware of the needs of minorities and immigrants, and “disappearing” (Abbas, 1997) altogether by being understood in the “good old ways”. I am interested in studying the less explored changes in the roles, meanings and narratives associated with ethnic enclaves. Further, I aim to study how institutions of planning and local governance have responded to these changes, and in the process become stakeholders in the growth and development of these places. There is a tendency for ethnic enclaves to be interpreted in terms of indices of concentration, isolation etc. While these studies do capture the physical growth of enclaves, relatively less attention has gone towards examining the changes in the character of these places. In particular new issues such as inter-minority tensions, internal 6 differentiation within groups, new developments in civil society, and the state’s stake in ethnic enclaves deserve close examination. Politically, ethnic enclaves become hotbeds of local agency nurturing new practices and claims to the city. Further, it is increasingly becoming apparent that there are many issues that are shared by the enclave and other sections of the city’s population. As sites of these contests, enclaves assume a far greater significance for the city as a whole. Theoretical Framework Immigrant incorporation is a highly contested and politicized issue. The current policy approach of ‘multiculturalism’, and the consequent need to plan for difference, has received much attention within Planning theory. A large part of the literature on the theme has emanated from the North American (Wallace and Milroy, 1999; Qadeer, 1997) European (Amin, 2002; Gale, 2004) and Australian (Watson and McGillivray, 1995) experiences with immigration. Michael Burayidi’s (2000) edited volume traces the evolution of urban planning paradigms over the second half of the twentieth century in relation to the official national outlook toward immigration. One of the main concerns the author expresses is regarding the focus on procedure at the cost of substantive theoretical advances in the integration of multiculturalism in urban planning. Burayidi makes the point that the field of Urban Planning has tended to focus on the procedural rather than the substantive aspects of multiculturalism. The procedural aspects 7 are easy to identify and mostly involve making space for particular needs of immigrant communities in zoning regulations, lists of permitted uses and design guidelines. In addition there is a concern for engaging immigrant/ minority communities in civic dialog. It is less obvious what the substantive issues of planning for multiculturalism are. Susan Fainstein (2005), for example, asks whether we “should” and “can” plan for diversity. Fainstein’s construction of “diversity” encompasses various kinds of difference (including ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation etc.) It is not clear if difference in citizenship is included in her scheme of things. Even so, with the example of Amsterdam, Fainstein shows that postwar planning committed to the principles of “democracy, equity, diversity, growth, and sustainability” (p.15) can help create a model city. The proposed work seeks to contribute to substantive issues related to space and diversity. Further I hope to use empirical work to enhance our understanding of immigrant agency and the structures within which it works. The core interests driving this research are as follows. How are places produced under the conditions of multiculturalism? In other words, what do we know about these places, the process of production, and the character of multiculturalism? How does identity interact with economic processes, not only in the sense of consumption, but more subtly in the construction of meanings associated with places? How does ‘class’ influence these interactions? What are the respective roles of structure and agency in producing space? These questions direct the research, and point to the general issues in which I am interested. 8 The research interests outlined above will be studied within a theoretical framework comprising three related themes. These themes are developed fully in chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Each chapter includes its own literature review. Here I provide an overview of each theme. First we will deal with the debates around the privatizations of the city (or of the public sphere of the city). This body of work has its origin in the work of Jurgen Habermas (1991). Recently, prominent voices have explained how the process of transformation works, and presented arguments highlighting the currency of the issue (Harvey, 1985; Herzog, 2006; Kohn, 2004; Low and Smith, 2006; Mitchell, 2003; Purcell, 2003; Sorkin, 1999). The analysis situates ethnic enclaves within larger ongoing economic transformations. I attempt to show how multiculturalism leads to a loss of publicness in the same manner that privatization through ownership does. The second theme directly confronts the ghetto versus ethnic enclave dualism. I will engage literature from Sociology (Light, 1972; Light et al., 1995; Sanders and Nee, 1987; Portes and Jensen, 1989, 1992), Geography (Peach, 1996, 2001, 2002; Poulsen et al, 2002) and Urban Planning (Banerjee and Verma, 2005; Marcuse and van Kempen, 2000; Qadeer and Kumar, 2006). My focus here is on critiquing the ghetto-enclave dualism, and making a case for focussing on the internal differentiation within ethnic enclaves and the diversity of resultant choice sets. In particular I will examine the relationship between ‘class’ and the functions of the enclave. The third theme focuses on the rescaling of citizenship. I examine two traditions in literature – one that conceptualizes citizenship at supra-national levels and another that sees it as a local experience, claimed through practice (Bloemraad, 2004; Brettel, 2000; 9 Brubaker, 1996; Castles and Davidson, 2000; Kymlicka, 2003; Oldfield, 1998; Pocock, 1992; Soysal, 1999). (i) Privatization of public space The increasing pressure of privatization on public space has prompted concerns regarding “right to the city” (Banerjee, 2001; Herzog, 2006; Kohn, 2003; Mitchell, 2003; Sorkin, 1999; Purcell 2003, Low and Smith, 2006). The conflict between the rights of private property and the ideal of the public good has been discussed at great length in this literature. Margaret Crawford (1992) suggests that malls rejected public life just like the suburbs of which they were a part. People’s public time moved into the mall, but the mall was not the public space for dialogue, debate or demonstration. Michael Sorkin (1992) characterizes the contemporary neoliberal city as a “theme park”, where space is increasingly “departicularized” (p. xiii), that is losing its contextual uniqueness. This homogenization and sterilization of space is closely related to the decline of community life. Mike Davis (1992) discusses the loss of the Olmsteadian ideal of intermingling classes and ethnicities in public space (pp. 155-156), particularly with reference to Los Angeles. Margaret Kohn (2003) cites Benjamin Barber in arguing that shopping centers have become a sanitized alternative to public life (p. 79). Kohn also highlights the importance of public space as a means of creating bonds across social divisions and promoting tolerance and understanding. She argues that the privatization of public space, by entrepreneurs following a profit motive, leads to market segmentation. Mitchell (1995, 10 2003) has argued the “end of public space” based on a thorough analysis of relevant court cases and the US courts’ interpretation of the First Amendment. One of the important points made by the author is about the marginalization inherent in our understanding of the “public” and who is included in it. In questioning the “future of public space”, Tridib Banerjee points to aspects of conviviality and insurgent citizenship (2001, p.15) as emerging foci of planning efforts. The author also calls for the nurturing of “third places”, a sentiment echoed by Albert Herzog (2006). Specifically in the context of Los Angeles, Herzog also suggests a relationship between the commodification of public space and the “larger crisis of public life” (p.221). The connection between the notions of citizenship and public space become clearly defined in political analyses of space. This is also the point of departure for Mark Purcell (2003) in his analysis of Lefevbrian “rights to the city”. Purcell underlines the change in citizenship from once having strong territorial congruence, being scaled at the level of the nation state and oriented towards it, to now being redefined at the city scale by an increasingly diverse and international population. Sorkin sums it up succinctly: “the effort to reclaim the city is the struggle of democracy itself” (1992, p. xv). Privatization is not only an economic phenomenon. Social processes can also cause attrition of publicness in the city. This is related to the critique of multiculturalism that it keeps people in sanitized and distinct ethno-spatial ‘containers’. In the chapter on privatization of the public sphere I seek to contextualize enclaves as socially privatized spaces. From this discussion we can make a transition to literature regarding 11 multiculturalism and the influence of immigrants on the production of space. ‘Multiculturalism’ has attracted scholarship from a variety of traditions. Here multiculturalism means the policy of allowing all groups their respective rights with no obligation to become more like the majority host community. Here I will deal only with the specific literature on ethnic enclaves, enclave economies and the comparison of enclaves and ghettos. (ii) Ghettoes versus ethnic enclaves The literature on ethnic enclaves has focused on three aspects - Sociology, Geography and Urban Planning, each respectively focussing on defining the ethnic enclave in terms of wages and labor markets, studying spatial characteristics (clustering, segregation etc.) of demographic variables (race, nationality, religion etc.), and attempting to understand the enclave within the context of globalization. These studies have pointed out some tensions inherent in the social production of ethnic enclaves, for example, whether enclaves encourage or hinder immigrant incorporation, whether they are better understood as ghettos or enclaves, and whether they are sources of comfort or exploitation for newcomers. Light et al. (1995) compare the 'ethnic economy' with the 'ethnic enclave economy'. According to their thorough literature review the 'ethnic economy' is the primary field of inquiry. The conceptualization of the enclave was that of an economy running parallel to the 'main' economy. Light et al. also discuss the 'dual labor market' theory. Sanders and Nee (1987) argue against the ‘dual labor market’ theory, which suggests that workers in 12 the ethnic economy receive benefits not available to those working outside. They argue that there are no benefits to the workers in the ethnic economy, which is in fact more like a trap. Wilson and Portes (1980) are credited for the term 'enclave'. From the Geographical perspective Poulsen et al (2002) have designed a measure of residential concentration using 'density' and 'size' in conjunction with 'thresholds'. These and other measures are discussed more fully in the literature review of the chapter. Finally, whereas Peter Marcuse (2005) considers both ghettos and enclaves as different types of clustering, Banerjee and Verma (2005) caution against considering them merely market outcomes. A lot of the studies have tended to view the enclave as a monolith, and few have studied internal differentiation and how it affects the processes and politics. Further few of these studies have been in the Asian contexts. Studying the politics of the enclave gives us the opportunity to examine the differences in power and motivation among the actors in the enclave. It is also an opportunity to study how users of this space create meaning (in term of belonging and citizenship) through their spatial practices. (iii) Local citizenship through practice In light of the intensifying movement of labor and capital in the age of globalization, the idea of ‘citizenship’ has come under scrutiny, as needing to adapt to emergent forms and way of belonging. The term is highly contested, with one school of thought staunchly attached to the nation-state based understanding of the term, and various other arguments making cases for understanding it in different ways. Citizenship has been rescaled in 13 recent literature and two trends have emerged in this context. First, new forms of citizenship are being imagined at supra-national levels (e.g. the European Union). Second, citizenship is being rescaled to the local level, where the emphasis is on practices of citizenship at the local level. In their essay on the theoretical lenses through which immigration is studied, Caroline Brettell and James Hollifield (2000) capture the multidimensionality of the subject. John Pocock (1992) traces the historical origins of citizenship, emphasizing the bourg and polis as the original spatial unit of belonging in this regard. Adrian Oldfield (1998) makes the important connection between citizenship and community, asking the question of whether citizenship should be conceptualized as a status (bearing rights) or duties carried out in practice. This idea defines one of the objectives of this study - to gauge the extent to which new forms of citizenship are constructed through local agency, advocacy or activism. Presenting the European perspective, Will Kymlicka (1998) argues in favour of the notion of “differentiated citizenship” (p.167), which allows various groups different sets of rights. The author acknowledges that this model comes with a serious risk of deterioration of a common understanding and cooperation across groups, which is the very basis of citizenship. It is a separate question whether a differentiated citizenship is being created de facto, regardless of tacit or expressed official sanction or complicity. It is useful to refer to T.H. Marshall’s (1950) theory of citizenship, in which three kinds of rights were discussed – civil, political and social. These rights represent three institutions of society – the judiciary, the parliament, and the welfare system, which, in 14 Britain, developed in the 18 th , 19 th and 20 th centuries respectively (Turner, 1990). Marshall’s theory addresses class relations but obviously is not designed to address the multicultural character of the 21 st century citizenship debates. In other words, it is concerned with the substantive meaning of citizenship, but not so much the inclusion and exclusion of individuals (the other) from its benefits. The authors cited in the preceding paragraph demonstrate the “divergences” (p.18) in the questions asked, units of analysis and methods of inquiry, between various fields such as Sociology, Anthropology and Political Science (amongst others). This group of scholars support the call for more cross- disciplinary studies so that a thicker understanding may be achieved. Since the proposed study views immigration from a Planning perspective, an interdisciplinary approach is necessary and most useful. In this case, however, the dependent variable is 'space', or more specifically, the "production of space" (Lefebvre, 1991). Immigration is treated as an independent variable. Most of the literature cited above deals with the legal understanding of citizenship as a bundle of rights. However, Kymlicka’s idea of ‘differentiated citizenship’, Holston’s (1995) notion of ‘insurgent citizenship’, Castells’s idea of ‘exclusion of the excluders by the excluded’, de Certeau’s (1984) idea of ‘practices of everyday life’ point to the existence of a citizenship by praxis, which, although limited in legal protection compared to formal citizenship, allows residents of the city to assert identity and claim spaces as proxies (or alternatives) for legally granted rights. This idea is of particular interest to this chapter. 15 Friedman (2002) proposes a framework of “statist”, “cosmopolitan” and “practiced” citizenship. Using this framework I examine how the citizenship regimes in Hong Kong produce the space being studied, and also how the people have themselves created forms of citizenship and civic culture within the constraints of government policies. The point of this section of the inquiry is not so much to suggest alternatives to statist citizenship regimes, but rather, based on findings from the case, to highlight the ways in which people exercise their agency to produce a practiced citizenship and the roles that ethnic places play in this process. Thus the inquiry is targeted not towards the economic or political rationale for flexibility in citizenship, but rather towards the places where this flexibility is generated. By definition, then, this project addresses that component of citizenship which is practiced outside official guarantees, and sometimes (though not always) outside legal permissions. Research questions Research questions have been drawn from each of the three debates outlined above. These are presented below. The first debate I want to engage is that of the privatization of public space. I seek to interpret privatization as not only an economic but also a cultural and political phenomenon. The literature so far has lamented a loss of substantive ‘rights to the city’ and squarely blamed profit-oriented private sector expansion for the trend. Two research questions drive the inquiry. (i) What are the various expressions of privatization in the city? (ii) How are those parts of the urban public sphere, that are not privately-owned, privatized through social interactions? The analysis presented is twofold. Firstly, I offer a theoretical explanation of the impetus towards privatization of 16 the urban public sphere by agency as opposed to privatization through economic structures. Next, I support this theory with my own observations on site. The second debate is that of the distinction between ghettoes and enclaves. Existing theory has already moved beyond the distinction, citing choice (and constraint, i.e. lack of choice) as the pivotal factor in understanding clustering of co-ethnic residents and businesses. Again, I want to extend this line of inquiry by studying the role of cultural and political factors in people’s motivation to use the enclave. The research questions are as follows. (i) Is Chungking Mansions a ghetto or enclave? What can we learn about the dualism from this analysis? (ii) What are the internal social divisions in Chungking Mansions? How does this affect ‘choice’ as a defining variable? This approach takes the discussion on enclaves beyond an economic conceptualization and also beyond a duality, and towards a more complex and nuanced understanding of the ethnic clustering phenomenon. The third discussion is about the idea of ‘citizenship in practice’. Citizenship as a modern idea, with clearly defined in- and out-groups, closely tied to national boundaries, and guaranteed by the state, is being questioned, and alternatives are being offered through the notions of “flexible” and “insurgent” citizenship, where the excluded fulfill their expectations of citizenship through local action. I want to study how this process is played out in a particular place, and mediated by the local context. Two questions are asked. (i) How are scales of citizenship interrelated? (ii) Why does this community, unlike so many others in the literature on practiced and insurgent citizenship, not 17 organize or protest against the state, neoliberal institution or other factors perceived as causing its multiple marginalities? As an extension of the second question I examine how this form of practiced citizenship may be characterized in relation to Holston’s (1995) idea of insurgency. Incorporating structure and agency In his monograph Transnational Urbanism, Michael Peter Smith (2001) subjects David Harvey’s work to a stinging critique, for its lack of attention to human agency as a contingent force. According to Smith, Harvey’s scholarship reduces human beings to mere recipients of social change. This argument reflects the dialectical relationship between Harveyan historical-materialism and what Smith calls the “social- constructionist” view. Smith’s lengthy critique is based on one principal problem alone – the marginalization of ‘agency’ to privilege an invisible and loosely understood “logic of capital accumulation”. Although it is a valid (and serious) point that Smith makes about Harvey’s oversight of the role of agency, there is nothing in the critique that undermines Harvey’s actual examination of the characteristics and tendencies of the structures of capital and political economy. This is not without reason, as the relationship between, say, privatized urban renewal and gentrification is unmistakable. Although a construction company’s profit motive does not fully determine the outcomes of the lives of those living on a prospective renewal site, it does, to a large extent, determine the choices available to them. Indeed it is hard to ignore the argument that the structures of capital and political economy shape the choices available to individuals. Harvey’s account of the “out there” may be called incomplete but the critique must include a careful consideration 18 of the author’s research question and agenda. The relationship between the structure and agency need not be reduced to a confrontation between disciplines with different focuses. In this conversation, ‘space’ occupies a unique position as the product of both structure and agency, and a reflection (or microcosm) of the “out there”. The field of planning is therefore fertile ground for studying the interaction of structure and agency. As suggested by Smith (2001), it is opportune, in response to the critique of Harvey, to complete the picture with agency-oriented urban theory. My position on the structure-agency debate is thus aligned with Giddens’s theory of “structuration” (1986), which attempts to synthesize the duality into a model of coexisting and concerted activity. Critical analysis of structure must be considered in conjunction with a sensitive and detailed account of human agency to arrive at a more comprehensive picture of how space is produced. The proposed study will hope to bridge the divide through an examination of both structure and agency within a specific spatial context. Based on everything that has already been written on the structure-agency dialectic it is intuitive and somewhat simplistic to suggest merely the need to consider both structure and agency to understand any given space. If structure and agency are considered independent variables, then their explanatory power depends on how the dependent variable is conceptualized. In the same space (i.e. controlling for externalities) the explanatory power of ‘agency’ could be more in research of, say, social networks or social movements. On the other hand, structural aspects may explain more in density patterns or land use being studied. Further, even within these topics of study (dependent variables) the relative importance of structure and agency will vary in different contexts. 19 The challenge, therefore, is not to select between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ but rather to (a) consider them dialectically, and (b) to define the dependent variable in such as way that intent, assumptions and biases are stated as clearly as possible. For this study the dependent variable is the ‘socio-spatial unit’ (specifically the ethnic enclave). Both are constructed or experienced by combined influence of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’. ‘Structure’ and ‘agency’ is the methodological apparatus we use to examine the contribution of the two sets of variables in the production of space. This provides a thick understanding of all relevant stakeholders and issues. On the framework of structure and agency In this section I will examine the works of three theorists in the context of the relationship between structure and agency in their work and their attempts to resolve the tension. The three theorists are Henri Lefebvre, Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens. Figure 1.1 summarizes this discussion. Lefebvre Lefebvre’s idea of “the production of space” attempts to bring insights from Gramscian thought into the theorization of space. Gramsci, too, though deeply influenced by Marxist ideas, was dissatisfied with economic structuralism with respect to its application to questions of culture. Gramsci’s project was to conceptualize culture and cultural practices as expressions of class positions. Lefebvre (1991a) had a similar view on space. In The Production of Space, he outlines his theory of space as a social product, a transformation of nature effected by social practices. It is in Critique of Everyday Life (1991b), however, 20 that Lefebvre engages the idea of “structure” directly through the example of a seashell. The shell, secreted by its amorphous inhabitant, provides the structure within which the creature can live. Examining the shell by itself, however, gives us little idea of the physiology of the creature. Thus in Lefebvre’s dialectic, structure is an act of agency, and the agent a product of structure. Lefebvre sees space as a political product - the site and object of struggle. In this view, space is the product over which society struggles, and is simultaneously produced by the processes of this struggle. Lefebvre does not directly make these assertions about space, structure and agency, but there is an echo of it in his “triadic” schema of “conceived”, “perceived”, and “lived” spaces, which was ostensibly an attempt to move beyond the dichotomy of structure and agency. “Conceived” space, also called “representational” space is organized by experts, and thus is an expression of power. This notion can be roughly compared to the influence of “structure” in the production of space. “Perceived” space is the space of collective rhythms – the temporal aspects of spatiality. “Lived” space (or “endured” space) is the experience of everyday life at the micro level. The last two concepts both articulate the role of agency – at collective rhythms (time) and individual everyday life (practice). Again, it is important to bear in mind that Lefebvre’s project was not to resolve or even directly address the structure/ agency discourse. Instead, he sought to see space in an entirely different epistemological framework comprised of the political, the involuntary aggregate, and the personal psycho-behavioral spaces. 21 Bourdieu For Bourdieu, addressing structure and agency was a more direct concern, although his focus was not on space. Bourdieu attempted to capture a subliminal essence using the term ‘habitus’ with the ‘field’ as its context. ‘Habitus’, as Bourdieu (2002) describes it, is “a system of dispositions, that is of permanent manners of being, seeing, acting and thinking, or a system of long-lasting (rather than permanent) schemes of schemata or structures of perception, conceptions and action” (p.43, original emphasis). Bourdieu suggests that ‘habitus’ is acquired, and although it is long-lasting, it can and does evolve over time. “[I]n rapidly changing societies, habitus changes constantly, continuously, but within the limits inherent in its originary structure” (Bourdieu, 2002, p.47). Habitus is “a product of history [and]… of social relations” (p.45). It exists subliminally, but we can learn to become aware of it. Bourdieu insists that “habitus must not be considered in isolation”. In Bourdieu’s terms meaning of ‘habitus’ is completed only with reference to the ‘field’, which is constituted by a set of relations among agents and groups holding variable (field-specific) “capital”. In Bourdieu’s conceptualization individuals are the locus of the struggle between structure and agency. Through their habitus individuals inherit and internalize features of structure (power imbalance, economic relations etc.), and through their personal socialization (which includes their culture, values etc.) they turn those structural impulses into habitus. The habitus thus negotiates structural rules and personal inclinations, and is created, held and practiced by individuals. The idea of habitus has a close link with space in that space is part of the individuals’ socialization, and also the location where the habitus is practiced. Thus space may be a formative ingredient of habitus, and the medium of its reproduction. 22 Giddens Through the theory of structuration, Giddens directly confronts the dichotomy of structure and agency. According to Giddens neither structure nor agency can have primacy in the evolution of society. He has been critiqued from a variety of standpoints. In addition to these concerns I would like to point out that though Giddens is concerned with the city in some of his writings, he does not fully develop the position of space within the theory of structuration. In the chapter Time, Labour and the City (1985, pp.129-156) Giddens places the city at the “very core” (p.140) of social theory. The author expresses agreement with Lefebvre, Harvey and Castells insomuch that cities have their own power politics and represent more than just the evolution from feudalism to industrial production. Giddens’s focus, however, is on “city life” – or more accurately the social life of the city. Space itself is incidental in this scheme. It has no role beyond being the location of urban society. The bearer of ‘structuration’ is society as a whole. Giddens’s scholarly project begins with a critique of the Marxist system of Historical Materialism. In developing the theory of structuration Giddens claims to “elaborate a satisfactory account of the competent and knowledgeable human agent…. without relapsing into a subjectivist view, and without failing to grasp the structural components of the social institutions which outline us” (1985, p.15). Synthesis The methodological framework presented below is explicitly designed to assist the study of places (seen as socially produced spaces). It draws, in part, from the work of all three 23 theorists summarized above. The model is closest in orientation to Lefebvre’s fundamental outlook – that of space as a “product” of social relations. The model, however, does not share the “triadic” conceptualization of space. Instead it situates space (socio-spatial units) squarely as the locus of the interaction between structure and agency. This is in keeping with the ideas of both Bourdieu and Giddens insofar that Structure and Agency are understood as contributing elements to social outcomes (or in Levebvrian terms, “products”). This model shares more of a spatial outlook with Lefebvre, and thus focuses on socio- spatial units, rather than individuals (or society), as the object of investigation. This also reflects recent debates in the fields of Geography and Sociology, arguing for socio-spatial thinking, which are discussed at length later in this chapter. Agents, in this perspective are actors in and producers of space (as in Lefebvre), but they are also the bearers of influence of structural forces and produced subjects (as in Bourdieu and Giddens). Their agency is relevant to this model to the extent that it is put into action on and in space. Structure and Agency are dialectically related. So the ‘production’ of the agent herself must also involve the combined action of structure and agency. In that context Bourdieu and Giddens again come to the fore, and it is obvious why individual and group psychology is critical in understanding the agent. The transformation of the object of inquiry from ‘space’ to a ‘socio-spatial unit’ incorporates the production of both space and its social context, and the influence of both structure and agency. Figure 1.1: Structure, Agency and Space in the work of Lefebvre, Bourdieu and Giddens Conceptual tool (in this context) Representative argument Role of space Conceptualization of Structure/Agency Lefebvre 1901-1991 Social theory Production of space Analysis of space as thing (product) can reveal social relationships that produce it Social Product, and means of production Bourdieu 1930-2002 Sociology Habitus and Field Habitus (dispositions) within any field, is the result of structural impulses and agents’ socialization Not explicit, constituent of habitus through socialization of individuals Giddens 1938- Sociology Structuration Neither structure nor agency has primacy in explaining social change, Marx’s error was to overlook the role of humans as competent agents Location of urban, industrialized, class-divided society, in contrast to the countryside Socialization, values Rules, power Habitus Field Space Lived space (agency / practice) Perceived space (agency / time) Conceived space (structure) Structuration Agents (competent, reflexive actors) Structure (rules created through signification, domination and legitimation) 24 25 The central idea in the conceptual framework (Figure 1.2) is space itself – expressed as a “socio-spatial unit”. To reiterate, this structure-agency methodological framework helps in providing a fuller picture of the cultural, political and economic agency of immigrants. As conceived in this framework, this agency does not act directly on ‘structure’. I have conceptualized structure and agency as a dialectical pair, such that they both act on space, and neither on each other (as Giddens would have it), nor on individual bearers (as Bourdieu would prefer). As a clarification, in this model ‘Structure’ does act directly on ‘Agency’ (that is shape the broad constraints within which agency can work, via political and economic institutions and regulations) but Agency does not have the opportunity to act directly back on Structure. Instead Agency acts on space in response to structures, and influences structure in that way. The dashed line signifies this weaker force back on Structure. Structure, too, acts on agency through space, i.e. through the design and regulation of space. In this view, the socio-spatial unit (ethnic enclave) is ‘produced’ by the influence of both structure and agency. The affect of each can be read from the socio- spatial unit and each must necessarily be read to achieve a complete understanding of the meanings of the socio-spatial unit – what it is, why it exists, and how it works. By reading the affects of structure and agency from space we are able to avoid Bourdieu’s amorphous idea of habitus. At the same time we avoid Giddens’s and Bourdieu’s emphasis on the individual actor as the site of the struggle between structure and agency. The refocusing of the socio-spatial unit as the subject helps create a framework more suited and useful to those interested in space. Further, this model makes the idea of the “production of space” compatible with subject formation and body 26 QUADRANT I QUADRANT II Figure 1.2: Conceptual Framework Socio-spatial unit (Ethnic Enclave) Structure Institutions, Policies, Regulations, Law Agency Local organization, Grassroots action, (Organized/ spontaneous), Social capital Planning and economic variables (RQ1) Privatization (of urban public sphere) (RQ2) Segregation and exclusion (ghetto/enclave) Political variables (RQ3) Citizenship in practice (rescaling of citizenship) QUADRANT III QUADRANT IV politics (as understood in their own ways by Foucault and Bourdieu). The new framework allows us to engage Lefebvre’s idea of “production” explicitly in the context of socio-spatial analysis, with room to theorize the action of agents and the forces acting on them. Research Design Conceptual framework As explained above the methods used are arranged in a structure-agency framework. That is, while the study seeks to answer specific questions based on a review of literature, at 27 the same time it attempts to develop an understanding of the roles of structure and agency in the production of socio-spatial units (or entities). As a response to the structure-heavy explanations and understandings of urban phenomena, this study strives for a balanced discourse and a dialectical understanding of how structure and agency influence each other. The incorporation of structure and agency does not involve asking a new set of questions, but rather being aware of each side, and striving to synthesize findings from various sources, so that they tell a more complete story. Figure 1.2 also shows the methods used in this study. These methods are exactly the same as are reported later in Table 1-1 and explained in more details in the sections below. Figure 1.2 shows the arrangement of the methods as being part of the examination of structure and agency. This is not a second set of methods, only a meaningful organization of the same methods and data, and towards answering the same questions. This organization is included here in the discussion on methodology to emphasize that the structure-agency dialectic was integral to the research agenda and research design from the outset. Figure 1.2 can be viewed as four quadrants – one in each corner – formed by the intersection of two groups of variables with ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ respectively (2x2). These quadrants represent four aspects of the creation of space – that is, the structure and agency roles of our two main foci of inquiry. The two main foci of inquiry are (a) “planning/economic variables” (left), and (b) “cultural variables” (right). The “planning/economic” variables deal with the first and second themes of literature and 28 corresponding research questions described earlier in this chapter. These were “ghettoes/ enclaves” (noted as RQ1) and “privatization of public space” (noted as RQ2). The “cultural” variables deal with the third theme of literature and corresponding research questions, which was “citizenship through practice” (noted as RQ3). Thus this conceptual reiteration of the debates (from which the research questions are drawn), posits them as being determinants of space, and also as being determined by ‘structure’ and ‘agency’. We can now take a closer look at the four quadrants. The first quadrant (top left) – ‘structure’ aspects of Planning/Economic variables – includes Planning institutions, public policies related to immigration and labour, other government institutions such as the Hong Kong Police. The second quadrant (top right) – ‘structure’ aspects of Culture/Political variables – includes the religious leaders at the Kowloon Mosque and St. Andrew’s Church, and the management of Chungking Mansions. The third quadrant (bottom left) – ‘agency’ aspects of Planning/Economic variables – includes the residents’ and workers’ reactions to zoning regulations and other policies and controls. Finally the fourth quadrant (bottom right) – ‘agency’ aspects of Culture/Political variables – includes the residents’ and workers’ experience of the place, the narratives they use to give it meaning, and their actions of everyday life. This conceptual arrangement serves several purposes. First, it allows the explicit incorporation of ‘agency’ into socio-spatial analysis. Second, it illustrates how the study incorporates “cultural” variables to complement the analysis of “planning/economic” variables. Third, it makes the connection between the research questions initially posed 29 and the analysis of the roles of structure and agency. Fourth, it arranges the theoretical debates, research questions, and methods, into a single framework. Fifth, it also clarifies the study’s perspective on ‘space’ (understood here as a socio-spatial unit), complemented by further narrative explanation in the following section. In the last section of this chapter I will provide an explanation of the category “socio-spatial unit”, which is placed at the centre of this conceptual arrangement. The meaning of ‘space’ The central category of ‘socio-spatial unit’ in Figure 1.2 merits clarification. The critical point to be made for our purpose is that space can be understood to be socially constructed. In other words, space is lent meaning (i.e. created or produced) by the relations, actions and contingencies of society. This idea is the difference between the notions of ‘land’, ‘site’, or ‘area’ on one hand, and ‘property’, ‘plaza’, or ‘neighbourhood’ on the other. Whereas the former group of terms is inert to social relations, the latter group is clearly a product of these relations (and reflective of them). A discussion from the field of urban sociology is helpful. The trajectory of urban sociology as outlined by Flanagan (1993) had focused on the study of communities and social networks within the urban setting. The significance of the space was discovered through study of social relations. The communities that were the subject of sociological inquiry in urban areas were defined by propinquity (neighborhoods, towns, boroughs etc.), identity (race, gender, ethnicity etc.) or economic class (often closely correlated with other markers of social identity). This academic project evolved with the stages of 30 urbanization itself. Over the years, some of the main areas of inquiry have been suburbia, segregation, inner city decay, ethnic enclaves, gentrification, homelessness, and social movements, among others. Space and place have not been particularly significant as either a dependent or independent variables in this agenda. In recent times, however, the agenda of urban sociological inquiry has moved beyond an understanding of urban space as simply a backdrop to the subjects of social relations and networks. Space is now seen as socially constructed, and at the same time, as having a causal effect on social phenomena. Gans (2000, 2002) argues against what he perceives to be an erroneous spatial determinism evident in some contemporary urban theory. According to Gans space is constructed by the action of social agents (“users and uses”), and that the “direct effects of space on society are limited” (p.330). Gans does not discriminate between structure and agency. His model of “use-centered” space would easily incorporate effects of both structure and agency as social influence on natural space – an intrinsic part of the process of turning it into social space. In his reply, Gieryn (2002) suggests that space is not only a product of society but also a determinant of social relations. Gieryn, although in agreement regarding the risk of determinism, argues that the normative agenda of designing “good” spaces to create better societies should not altogether be abandoned. Gieryn’s comments pull the debate into a structure-agency framework, suggesting that Gans is missing the “agentic capacity of material realities” (p.342). Gieryn’s critique takes Gans’s functionalism for a structuralist argument. This assessment is slightly inaccurate and misses Gans’s main 31 point of avoiding spatial determinism. Gieryn, however, does correctly warn against replacing one kind of determinism with another. In another response to Gans’s essay, Zukin (2002) calls for sociologists to examine how cities “transmit power” (p.347), and to find the relationships between socially constructed urban spaces and pressing social issues. Thus in Zukin’s view space becomes both a reflection and determinant of the contest between structure and agency. The three scholars are fundamentally in agreement regarding the need to study the mutual influences and relationships between space and society. The disagreement stems from the degree to which one influences the other. The scholars are also set apart by their respective positions with regards to the role of structure and agency. Of particular interest to this study is how and why space is socially constructed. Who participates and to what degree? What is the role of those who inhabit and use the space? Case study: Chungking Mansions, Hong Kong Chungking Mansions is located on Nathan Road in the Tsim Sha Tsui district, near the southern tip of the Kowloon peninsula in Hong Kong.The study area is of particular interest with regard to studying Hong Kong culture and the immigrant experience. ‘Chungking Mansions’ is a 17-storey building, originally intended for residential use, but now home to high-density use including housing, motels, storage, retail (of real and imitation consumer goods) and even light manufacturing uses. The building, which is structurally one unit, consists of five 15-storey towers built on top of a single 2-storey ‘platform’, which acts as a common base for all five towers. Figure 1.3 shows the front 32 façade (Fig. 1.3a) and entrance (Fig. 1.3 b-c) of the building, and Figure 1.4 shows the site plan. This overcrowded, poorly lit, noisy and (in parts) foul-smelling building is also a center of concentration of immigrants and asylum-seekers from Africa and South Asia, and tourists from around the world. Across the road from the mansions, a little distance away, stands Kowloon mosque, the biggest in Hong Kong. Located in a busy section of Kowloon the area enjoys a near-continuous flow of pedestrians. Hundreds of neon lit signs dot every building façade in the area. It is a hub of entrepreneurship and a place carrying cultural and historical significance. This place thrives in a starkly different built environment than the glitzy malls across the bay, on Hong Kong Island. Chungking Mansions represents the city’s non-Chinese immigrant working class that lives in the shadows of a tall skyline, but is far removed from it, despite the spatial propinquity. In the context of third world slums Mike Davis (2004) asks if “clientelism, populist spectacle and appeals to ethnic unity” have become the tools for the management of proletarian “historical agency”. Although Chungking Mansions offers better living conditions than most slums, in the context of the metanarrative of globalization, these spaces warrant examination as the breeding ground of a unique form of agency. The essence of this social formation within the neoliberal “revanchist city” (MacLeod, 2002) cannot be understood in terms of class consciousness alone. The immigrant movements in other parts of Asia make Hong Kong (perhaps along with Singapore and Dubai) a likely candidate to be studied for its experience with immigration. Bangladeshi immigrants in India, Indians in the Middle East, and the 33 Figure 1.3: Chungking Mansions façade b c a 34 Figure 1.4: Chungking Mansions Site Plan Source: Hong Kong Planning Department 35 increasing number of foreigners in Japan, to cite just a few examples, are all likely to face similar urban experience in the host countries. The case of the Chungking Mansions provides a microcosm of the contradictions that have shaped Hong Kong, and an illustrative example of the challenges of incorporating Others in space and society. The study not only seeks to explore a key aspect of contemporary urbanism but also answers Caroline Brettell’s (2000) call for an interdisciplinary understanding of migration and the diasporic experience. Methodology: getting from questions to analysis Constant comparison and mixed methods This research follows a methodology based on Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Before discussing the details of methodology it needs to be mentioned that the research loosely followed the “constant comparison” method of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.101), and the research foci were modified and sharpened through the course of data collection, allowing for emergent themes to direct the research direction. The three theoretical debates outlined above, and reiterated throughout this chapter and further in the study, were among several others guiding the initial inquiry. They were selected for deeper analysis as research started showing related findings and themes. The progress from the “core interests” (described in this chapter), to the three themes, and then to the specific questions was a direct result of constant comparison. The process of constant comparison was repeated at various levels in the research process. For example there was constant comparison between accounts of different interviewees, between different sources of data, between different aspects of the 36 fieldwork and between received knowledge and fieldwork findings. Table 1-1 summarizes the research questions and the methods employed to respond to them. The table also lists the kinds of data that were collected and the analysis performed on those data. These methods are described below and in more detail. Research Methods The methods used to study the four quadrants (as conceptualized above) included participant observation, structured observation, based on the Rapid Ethnographic Assessment Procedure (REAP) of Taplin et al, 2002), policy analysis, semi-structured in- depth interviews, historical analysis, spatial analysis, and a survey. Interviewees were selected by a combination of ‘theoretical’, ‘snowball’ and ‘emergent’ sampling methods. Interviewees included the Imam of the Kowloon Mosque, community leaders at the St. Andrew’s Church in Kowloon, Ms Lam (President of the Incorporated Owners of Chungking Mansions), representatives of the Planning Department, the Race Relations Unit, the NGO ‘Christian Action’, and Hong Kong Police. Additionally, residents and users of the case study area and the various groups represented there were also interviewed. About 40 in-depth interviews have been recorded. Many more were conducted informally, or with written notes only. Interviewees were sometimes in legally sensitive situations, and thus unwilling to allow audio recording. They also had to option of having the recording turned off at any point during the interview. Further details of the fieldwork are provided below. The fieldwork was conducted in three stages: December 2006 – January 2007, August 2007- February 2008, and December 2008- January 2009. 37 Survey There was no clear statement available regarding the opinions of outsiders regarding Chungking Mansions could only be gauged indirectly from popular culture and newspaper reports. To make a more direct assessment I conducted an online survey to assess the current image of the place. The survey instrument is provided in Appendix 1. In-depth interviews Focused, semi-structured, in-depth interviews were carried out with South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Nepalese and Sri Lankan) immigrants living or working in Chungking Mansions or in its close proximity. Participants were selected so as to give representation to the following groups (I) residents and workers, and (II) business owners. In addition, interviews were carried out with representatives of the (III) NGOs, (IV) planning agencies and (V) local government. Thus five different interview guides were required. Each interview covered four or five themes and is expected to last one to two hours. The five interview guides are presented below. In a situation where an unexpected interviewee was found, a combination of these interview guides were used as found appropriate for the situation. The interview guides are provided in Appendix 2. Participant observation Structured observation was carried out at various times of the day at many locations on various floors of the Chungking Mansion, the streets around the building, and Kowloon Park. Written notes were taken to summarize observations. In addition, photographic records were maintained of all locations observed. In particular I looked for (i) 38 interactions between and within groups, (ii) intensity of activity, (iii) use and appropriation of space, (iv) shifting patterns at different times of the day and week, (v) influence of management and authorities in regulating use of space, (vi) delineation between public and private space, (vii) modification of form and function of space, (viii) expression of identity by practices or artifacts. I also lived in various guest houses in Chungking Mansions for 30- 40 nights during the several trips I made to Hong Kong in connection with this study. While staying at these guest houses I had the opportunity to speak to the various proprietors and employees working there, and also some of the other guests visiting Hong Kong. Staying on site also allowed late night observations inside the building. In addition, during my fieldwork I volunteered to teach English at Christian Action (a faith-based NGO). The teaching role helped to identify key informants among my students, and also observe them in a more intimate setting than on the streets. It also afforded an opportunity to have them tell me about how they spent their time in Hong Kong and in Chungking Mansions. To pursue the same goals I also joined Cantonese classes taught at Christian Action. One of the roles of Christian Action is to provide legal advice to asylum-seekers before they make their case at the United Nations. I helped with translations for several asylum-seekers at Christian Action’s legal advice center in Jordan, Hong Kong. This provided me with not only various stories of the asylum- seekers’ trajectory and route to Hong Kong, but also an insider’s look at the process of application for asylum. 39 Finally, I participated in the production of a documentary by students of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. The film included excerpts of one interview conducted by me on camera and also excerpts from my interview conducted by the director. Participating in the film project was beneficial by way of conducting common interviews and also by way of observing the filmmakers themselves as they interacted with the residents of Chungking Mansions. The film, called ‘Peeking through Chungking Mansions’ won the Best Director of Documentary award for director Bill Yip at the 2009 Asian Festival of First Films (AFFF) in Singapore. I am grateful to Bill Yip also for translating my interview with Ms. Lam. This multi-layered participation was instrumental in triangulating findings from interviews. It allowed me to learn from observing activities routines and behaviors from close quarters. In addition, I was able to learn from overheard conversations, and from closely observing the nature of interactions between individuals. I recognized these possibilities by spending time at Christian Action and also in the areas around Chungking Mansions, staying nights at the various guest houses, having tea and meals in the restaurants in Chungking Mansions, lining up for and riding elevators, getting haircuts, buying DVDs and groceries, using internet cafes etc. Review of Secondary sources Several secondary sources were consulted for this study. These include the Hong Kong Census, United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) data, archives of the South China Morning Post newspaper, plans and maps from the Hong Kong Planning 40 Department, Annual report of the 12 th committee of the Incorporated Owners of Chungking Mansions, informational materials gathered from offices of NGOs and Church-based groups. In addition, various accounts of the evolution of Chungking Mansions were drawn from other monographs. Data Analysis Various kinds of data were collected through the research. This included interview transcripts, quantitative survey results, responses to open-ended questions, newspaper articles and online reports about Chungking Mansions, other secondary data (described in the previous section), three films (Chungking Express, Peeking through Chungking Mansions, and a documentary on the work of Ms Lam), more than a thousand photographs, and field notes. Tools employed to analyze these data are described in this section. Details of the survey mentioned earlier are provided in Chapter 5 where I have discussed its design, analysis and findings in depth. Coding: The approach of this study is a modified form of grounded theory. The aim is to move towards the resolution of questions posed at the outset, by extracting meaning, relationships, narratives and explanations from the data. Qualitative data, including transcripts of interviews, pictures, documents, observations and other materials collected, were first coded using the open-coding method allowing for the emergence of themes. Axial coding was also used to bridge themes and make causal and explanatory Theme/ Debate Research Question Argument Methods Analysis Evidence Privatizations of public sphere What are the various expressions of privatization in the city? How are those parts of the urban public sphere, that are not privately-owned, privatized through social interactions? Loss of publicness may occur due to economic structures, and also due to agency creating identity clubs thus (further) privatizing space Participant observation, Interviews with users Theoretical analysis, Coding of transcripts and field notes, Photographic analysis Theoretical argument Highly fragmented society despite propinquity, solidarity aligned with ascriptive identity, tensions clearly visible under the surface of cooperation Ghetto/Enclave Is Chungking Mansions a ghetto or enclave? What are the internal social divisions in Chungking Mansions? Both, dualism fails to define this case Divided on lines of ethnicity, language, religion, political status, class and gender – this creates many different use values of the enclave Interviews with representatives of all user groups Interviews with Planning Dept, Analysis of plans and documents, Historical survey Coding of transcripts Coding, Spatial analysis, Historical analysis based on plans and other secondary sources Discovery of immensely diverse groups within enclave, with different trajectories, experiences and expectations. Historical reasons, zoning ordinance, ethnic succession, niche market, role as a common place of otherness Citizenship in practice How are scales of citizenship interrelated? Why does this community, unlike so many others, not organize or protest against the factors or forces perceived as causing its multiple marginalities? Subjects produced by statist laws, but also create their own belonging Inverted resistance – no incentive for protest since they actually want greater integration Interviews (govt. depts., CBOs), Policy review, Historical survey, Interviews especially with refugees and asylum seekers, Participant observation Coding of field notes, transcripts and other secondary sources, Policy analysis Accounts of suffering, needs and expectations of citizenship, particularly for asylum-seekers. Also accounts of deep appreciation for the HK government and faith in the larger system, and expressions and practices of belonging to HK 41 Table 1-1: Summary of Methodology and Results 42 connections between ideas. The resulting themes were organized to answer the questions posed earlier. This was done by sorting the codes into three groups related to the initial questions, and into subcategories as they emerged on analysis. Internal consistency was tested by the process of triangulation, using various sources of data. Policy Analysis: Immigration policies in Hong Kong were analyzed from the perspective of the way in which they influence the choices and actions of the people in Chungking Mansions. Most important in this discussion were the visa regulations that allow South Asians easy access to Hong Kong, the creation and work of the Race Relations Unit, the work of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and education policy with regards to children of ethnic minorities, and the newly-adopted employment anti-discrimination policy. These policies were considered part of the structural conditions that shape the place as explained in Figure 1.2. Historical Analysis: I have tried to piece together a picture of the historical evolution of the site through various primary and secondary sources. Further, I have tried to relate the trajectory of the building and community in Chungking Mansions to significant milestones in Hong Kong history. The analysis uncovered some key factors from the building’s early days that have contributed to its current configuration. These findings are reported in detail in Chapter 3. 43 Spatial / Behavioral Analysis: Spatial analysis has been integrated with the history of the building and its analysis as an ethnic enclave (Chapters 4). Spatial analysis includes a survey of the uses to which the spaces of the building are put (at different times), the evolution of physical configurations within the building, and constantly mutating character of the building. It also includes an analysis of the enclave’s physical context in terms of its relationship with urban features (streets, parks, stores, religious sites etc.) in close proximity. Significance of research The need and significance of this research is three-fold. The first is to contribute to the literature in the field of urban planning related to immigration and multiculturalism with empirical work, particularly substantive issues and theory development. Second, the literature, so far, has tended to concentrate on the experiences of Western Europe and North America. Immigration and the co-habitation of diverse cultures in relative proximity is not a phenomenon experienced only by countries in North America, Western Europe and Australia. This study creates space for understanding immigration in a different set of circumstances, with different results. The third significance is methodological. This study uses a mixed-methods approach based on the structure/agency dialectic, with particular emphasis on eliciting the role of agency, to complement structural analyses. This methodology allows us to conceptualize space as a socio-spatial phenomenon and derive a comprehensive picture of the processes involved in its production. The model is proposed as a way of reading space, particularly 44 smaller sites and integrating the analysis with theory. The study has explicitly utilized principles of Economics, Sociology, Anthropology, Political Science, and Geography to understand different aspects of the socio-spatial phenomenon that is Chungking Mansions. Caveats I have utilized qualitative methods to answer the questions posed. The ultimate goal was not so much to provide proof of any theory in the natural sciences mould but rather to investigate certain socio-spatial processes, and ask how and why they take place. Whereas quantitative theory-building through testing hypotheses is based on the idea of negating all alternative explanations, the theories developed here make only a modest claim of being one researcher’s interpretation of observed events. Further, this being a single-case study limits the generalizability of the theories. The case, however, is symptomatic of global processes that are part of the urban experience of most cities in developed countries, and also the burgeoning metropolises of many developing countries. It is a reasonable expectation that the theories developed here with respect to multiculturalism and urban places created by diasporas will be widely applicable. Further, the ideas presented in this study, I hope, will be tested in future studies in other contexts. 45 Chapter 2 : Privatizations of the Urban Public Sphere Introduction This study is interested in the ethnic places created in multicultural cities under conditions of free-market capitalism, particularly in the age of globalization and intensifying global capital and labor flows. In this chapter I argue that these “ethnic places” (we will discuss in the next chapter whether they are better characterized as ghettos or enclaves), can be contextualized usefully within other trends observed in cities integrated into the global economy. I expect that this analysis will allow us to see Chungking Mansions not just as an enclave among enclaves, but as a socio-spatial entity among other socio-spatial phenomena in the city. The benefit would be that we would be able to see the enclave not just as a place of otherness (culturally and economically) but as entrenched in the political economy of the city. I would like to begin the analysis with the “narrative of loss”, which describes the ongoing phenomenon of the loss of publicness in the city. Flight to the suburbs, gated communities, “bowling alone”, revanchist attitudes of the neoliberal city towards unwanted groups, and rise of “Entertainment Retail Centers” (Irazabal and Chakravarty, 2007) as the public space of choice have all been cited as symptoms of a fundamental revalorization of public life and attrition of community. The narrative of loss is directed towards ‘public space’ ostensibly because these spaces bear the expectation of being the preserves of publicness and public life. Here I will argue that ethnic places represent another kind of privatization that takes us farther away from the ideals of public space and shared time. Further, though these ethnic places provide opportunities for interacting 46 with Others through commerce, they also tend to fix culture to products and interaction to consumption. Approaching ethnic clubs from the perspective of privatization is instructive because they are two aspects of the same problem of the loss of publicness and ultimately arising from the same underlying causes. This helps us to see the problem in new light – not merely as a byproduct of maximization of land rent (directly or indirectly) but more generally as a problem emanating from economic and social relations. Further, it allows us to examine how the variable of ‘culture’ interacts in urban space with new and existing economic relations. The proliferation of these kinds of places points to a change in the meaning of ‘identity’ and the way it is practiced. It also points to the need for studying spatial dimensions of multiculturalism within to context of economic imperatives. Chungking Mansions is publicly accessible and used intensively as a commercial building in addition to its residential “mansions”. It does not resemble a typical park or plaza in terms of being an “open space”, however, it does resemble a typical public space in terms of the way it is used and the symbolism attached with these uses. This chapter is a theoretical examination of the nature of public space, and the public sphere in general, within contemporary urban processes, with insights drawn from case study. In particular the role of agency is theorized from the observations on site at Chungking Mansions. As I will attempt to show in this chapter, using the framework of economic goods helps to make the link between privatization as an economic process and privatization as a social phenomenon. This analytical chapter will set up the enclave as a product of another kind of privatization, where ‘privatization’ means a loss of publicness. This idea will be the 47 underlying theme of the next two chapters, where I will explore the idea of ‘ethnic enclaves’ and ‘practiced citizenship’. Those two chapters focus on writing a more complete story of the political and cultural roles of the enclave, its internal diversity, and its value to its various participants. The privatization of public space has been held responsible for social fragmentation and the loss of substantive democratic rights, particularly for those already at the margins of society. Several authors (Banerjee, 2001; Crawford, 1992, 1995; Goss, 1993; Jackson 1996; Kohn, 2004; Low and Smith, 2006; Mitchell, 2003; Sassen, 1999; Sorkin, 1992) have expressed concern regarding the conflict between public and private rights and interests arising due to privatization of public space. This literature, often evoking a nostalgic longing for a truly public, and therefore, inclusive and democratic space, has been referred to as the “narrative of loss” (Crawford, 1995; Banerjee, 2001). It may be argued that such a public space never existed to begin with. Margaret Crawford (1995), for example, argues that the Athenian agora was not open to women and slaves, and that the contemporary public sphere privileges “middle-class and masculine modes of public speech” (p.4). In any case the literature so far has focused on identifying and critiquing the various manifestations and repercussions of the loss of the public sphere, comparing it against, say, Athenian norms of space or Habermasian (1987) norms of communication. Relatively less attention has gone towards explaining precisely how social relations are transformed into spatial relations. Although arguments are made implicating capitalist planning and development institutions, the internal logic has been explored inadequately 48 beyond squarely blaming the profit motive of the free market. Here, I attempt to take that analysis forward by studying how the public sphere is influenced by the system of economic forces that shape a city. I will argue that the privatization of the spatial dimensions of the urban public sphere is associated with the internal economic logic of contemporary urbanization. David Harvey’s (1985) critique - “planning the ideology of planning”, and the conceptualization of the “revanchist” city (Smith, 1996; MacLeod, 2002), are instructive for understanding this internal logic. There are, however, two (related) drawbacks to these critical perspectives. First, the theories depend on fairly orthodox structural explanations with little room for theorizing the actions of agents with various motivations. Second, these explanations, though robust for explaining various aspects of the political economy of urbanization, are nevertheless somewhat indifferent to cultural factors. Further, in addition to privatization of urban space, diverse causes are cited for the attrition of the public sphere (or public realm) in general (see Banerjee, 2001, p.11). Public space (a special case within all kinds of urban space) requires special attention as it is the place where some of the ills or problems of the urban experience, can (and ought to) be countered, reversed, or at least questioned, rather than reiterated and reinforced. The travails of public space, however, are widely experienced in other parts of the city too, and the idea of ‘privatization’ is a useful lens to analyze this phenomenon. We are all aware of the loss of publicness through private ownership and outright exclusions of unwanted groups. In this chapter I argue that the spatial dimensions of the public realm is also subject to two other kinds of privatizations – (a) through the fragmentation of users, and (b) the creation of identity clubs. 49 I attempt to address two research questions. (i) What are the various expressions of privatization in the city? (ii) How are those parts of the urban public sphere, that are not privately-owned, privatized through social interactions? The narrative of loss echoes enduring concerns with “colonization of the lifeworld by the system” (Habermas, 1987), and the “opposition of the net and the self” (Castells, 1996) which are themselves genealogically closely related to the Marxian base/superstructure model, where an ideological superstructure is the tool for the control and justification of the base of economic forces and relations. This chapter offers an analysis of the ‘privatization of the public sphere’ through an analysis of economic imperatives. I have used a structure/agency framework to acknowledge and incorporate the “agentic” critique of Marxist theories. Understanding the process of privatization (loss of publicness) can give us a better understanding of the nature of the loss and contextualize ethnic places. In discussing the use value of land, Harvey (2006), following Marx, limits his conception to natural endowments such as minerals (p.335). For Harvey the key to understanding the idea of ‘value’ is to inquire where surplus or profit comes from. Responding to this query brings us directly to the conception of labor as commodity. This in turn leads to an understanding of the idea of the commodity itself, and to the disjunction between use and exchange values. Harvey’s insightful conclusion, that “the commensurability of commodities achieved through exchange renders the labour embodied in them equally commensurable.” (2006, p.14) is particularly relevant here. Harvey’s project is to study space as a means of production, and to reveal the relations of production hidden behind it, particularly in the urban context. His focus is on the role of urban space in creating 50 cycles of investment and accumulation of surplus value. This orthodox reading of Marx is aimed at discovering “the inner logic of capitalism” (2006, p.14). The analysis presented here follows a similar heuristic to study the taxonomy of goods that are often presented as the rationalization for the need for privatization. We begin with a short inquiry into the nature of the ‘loss’, that is the subject of the ‘narrative of loss’. The exploration of the economic meaning of the ‘loss’ in terms of ‘use values’ is a new contribution to existing literature. In the next section we begin exploring the reasons for this loss and divide our analysis into two parts: the structure- and agency- side explanations. (The framework of the argument is shown in Figure 2.1 below.) The structure-side privatization is based on that privatization of public space, which occurs because of, and through its coexistence with commerce. The discussion will focus on the fragmentation of users and the commodification of public space leading to the ‘loss’ in question. This is followed by the agent-side privatization. I will argue that in contemporary multicultural cities, the use of public space for the expression of identity, or the formation of ethnic enclaves, creates “identity clubs”. This creates an environment of exclusion, which also replicates the conditions of privatization. This is not to argue for reverting to an assimilationist paradigm, but rather by making the connection between decline of public life, and the critique of multiculturalism that it fragments society, I hope to move theory towards building trust and social capital through intercultural engagement and bridging interactions. 51 The ‘urban public sphere’ is a very broad and inclusive term, but here I am interested in the explicitly spatial dimensions of it. At the same time it would be wrong to equate it to only “public space”. Of all the spatial dimensions (aspects) of the urban public sphere, public spaces are certainly an important component. But my interest is in the entire city as a shared space, not in the sense of property rights, but in the sense of all residents together being responsible for engagement, civic life and social capital. Viewing public space as a public good enables us to recognize this situation, and thus critique and attempt to improve it. Some significant connections between cultural production (the exercise of cultural practices in urban space) and the neoliberal economy emerge from this discussion. Recently these connections have been obscured as class- or knowledge/power-based analyses have been eclipsed by identity-specific perspectives Segmentation of public space/ Fragmentation of users “Multicultural” identity clubs Private good Club good Loss of publicness Public Sphere Structure‐side privatization Agent‐side privatization politics of identity commodification Figure 2.1: Privatizations of the Urban Public Sphere 52 and agendas (e.g. studies on Latino new urbanism, Black ghettoes, or gay districts). My experiences in the cities of Hong Kong and Los Angeles have influenced this analysis, with the findings from Chungking Mansions underpinning the theory. I believe, however, that the findings are largely applicable in all ‘world-cities’. Nature of loss: Economic goods and commodification Existing literature has approached the phenomenon of ‘loss’ from various angles. These include law (Mitchell, 2003), anthropology/ cultural studies (Low, 2000), design (Banerjee, 2001; Herzog, 2006; Sorkin, 1999), and politics (Kohn, 2004; Low and Smith, 2006) among others. Not surprisingly, the work is closely related to Habermas’s (1987) idea of the “transformation of the public sphere”. Some arguments (e.g. Mitchell, 2003) make a case against violated rights or dubious ethics – pointing to specific case histories where a certain group of people were excluded from political participation or from the exercise of their full rights. In general, however, the narrative of loss seems to focus on the ills of private ownership of public spaces rather than on deciphering the meanings and the underlying logic that pushes public spaces towards privatization. The critique hinges on examining strife or problems witnessed in privatized public spaces, because these are considered the touchstone of public life, and quite rightly so. Those issues (for example, eviction of the homeless from a park’s premises, or exclusion of pamphleteers from a mall), however, are only symptoms of a more insidious problem, which widens the ruptures in the social fabric, and goes uninvestigated. 53 There are two related explanations for the observed phenomenon. It is helpful to organize these explanations as being ‘structure-side’ and ‘agency-side’, while looking at the entire picture holistically. It reveals that the privatization of public space is not just a business strategy, but an integral part and logical necessity of neoliberal urbanization. To appreciate the ‘structure-side’ and ‘agency-side’ explanations for the privatization of public space, we must first locate public space as an economic good. This will enable us to analyze the processes that convert public goods to private goods, and also the motives for doing so. The classic typology of economic goods (Table 2-1) is based on the two dimensions of excludability and subtractability (rivalness). Public goods are non-excludable and non- subtractable (lower right side). In other words, it is not possible to exclude anyone from using public goods and any individual's use of a public good does not limit or reduce another's access to it. Commonly cited examples of such goods include clean air, law enforcement and national defense. Although these goods are usually classified as “public”, it can be argued that none of them is a perfect case. The categorical ‘yes’ and ‘no’ classification behaves more like a range. This is because both rivalness and excludability could be achieved partially or in degrees. For example, some resources may be possible to replenish to a certain extent, and it might also be possible to exclude only some and not all users from some other resources. Based on the tradition of Greek agora and the Roman forum, public space, and more generally the public sphere, has been assumed to have the characteristics of non- 54 excludability and non-subtractability. As stated before, this may have been an inaccurate reading even for the times. Under the present system of flexible accumulation, however, public space is constantly under the pressure of changing character to resemble the category of a ‘club good’ or a ‘private good’. Table 2-1: Classic Typology of Economic Goods Excludability YES NO Rivalness YES Private goods Common pool resources NO Club goods Public goods Influences of both Structure (pertaining to economic logic) and Agency (of socio-cultural origin) contribute to this trend. This is not to suggest that the idea of ‘structure’ is completely and fully defined by ‘economic reasons’ or ‘agency’ by ‘socio-cultural reasons’. I am only suggesting that ‘economic reasons’ are an integral and important part of ‘structure’, and the particular ‘socio-cultural reasons’ that have been engaged in this paper contribute to ‘agency’. Unlike the casual usage of the term ‘privatization’, the public-private dichotomy is not based on ownership alone. A set of characteristics can shift a good towards a greater or lesser degree of ‘privateness’. Ownership is an important aspect of the character of public space, but does not completely define it as an economic good. I will refer to ‘privatization’ in terms of the classification of economic goods as presented in Table 2-1, that is, in terms of lack of publicness. In other words, for 55 our purpose, private ownership will be regarded as only a part of privatization and not its complete definition. Before considering the explanations for the loss of publicness in the public sphere, it is useful to take a closer look at ‘excludability’ as an economic concept and its relationship with privatization. The economic meaning of excludability: free riders and opportunity cost There are two concepts that are particularly useful for understanding efficiency and the dynamics of public space that we are interested in. The first is ‘excludability’ and the second ‘opportunity cost’. Exclusion, in theory, solves the “free rider” problem. Eliminating free riders means that only those persons who are able to support its highest market uses, are allowed the use of space. In other words space is allocated in such a manner as allows the maximum possible rent and revenue to be derived from it. The next question that arises is who the ‘free riders’ are. To fully answer this question we must engage the concept of ‘opportunity cost’. ‘Opportunity cost’ of an economic option (a choice, policy, investment decision etc.) is the “value of the best alternative that was foregone” (Hackett, 2001, p.7) to pursue that option. (As an example, the opportunity cost of depositing $100 in the bank, could be seen as the best return one might have reasonably expected by investing it in the stock market.) Put yet another way, the opportunity cost of a decision or option regarding a resource, is measured by what one chooses not to do with that resource – i.e. the opportunity one loses, in order to follow one’s preferred option. 56 Free riders also carry opportunity costs. A free rider in this regard is not merely someone enjoying a resource without paying for his or her share. A free rider is also anyone who could be replaced by someone willing to pay more for the use of the same resource. So this kind of “rider” is not riding free, but riding for less than what someone else is willing pay. Thus this rider may be seen, under tenets of economic logic, as creating an inefficiency. To put this more simply, there is a logical pressure to attract those users to any space, who can (and are willing to) pay the most for its use. Those who are paying less than maximum derivable value for the use of any space can be seen as wasting the space (i.e. causing an inefficiency). Further, the difference between what the ‘wasters’ are paying and the maximum derivable value is the opportunity cost lost due to the inefficiency. Therefore, according to the precepts of economic theory, to prevent waste and inefficiency, it is best to exclude those users from the use (consumption) of a resource who cannot pay the highest price (which someone else might be willing to offer.) The resource in this case is space. This is how the logic of exclusion is seen to lead to the most economically efficient option. In other words, exclusion satisfies the most people while “wasting” the fewest resources, thus minimizing inefficiency. Conflations within ‘public’ and ‘private’ Before proceeding it is necessary to discuss briefly the meaning of the categories of ‘public’ and ‘private’, particularly with regards to the status of the individual. ‘Private’ is often understood as the sphere of rights and activities that is preserved from state 57 influence. From the private sphere of an individual’s life, he or she has the right to exclude anyone (or everyone). This construction, usually taken for granted, requires clarifications regarding three issues. The first two issues are of conflating independent ideas, and the third issue is the implicit relationship created by the first two conflations. The first issue is that the aforementioned understanding of ‘public’ and ‘private’ conflates the idea of the ‘private’ with the idea of the ‘individual’. There is no reason to assume that the entire set of all things private represents, protects the interests of, or promotes the rights of all individuals. The second concern is that this model conflates everything that is not private, with the set of phenomena belonging to, associated with, or influenced by the state. Once again, there is no logical imperative that necessitates the conflation of the entire set of ‘non-private’ (or public) phenomena with the ‘state’. The two issues, when considered together, bring us to an implicit dichotomy which constitutes the third problem. The dichotomy, or the third problem, is that the construction described above, through the two conflations, implicitly (and inappropriately) portrays the state as antagonistic to the individual. A fear of the state as an overbearing, patriarchal behemoth is implicit in this conceptualization. To be sure those subscribing to this view can present good arguments explicating various practical and philosophical weaknesses with the very idea of the state. It is erroneous, however, to suggest that these weaknesses and problems necessitate a definitional arrangement that automatically estranges the state from the individual. The result is that the individual is unduly distanced from the state, which is actually the 58 representative of individuals’ interests and welfare, or at least is supposed to be. Of course this depends on the type of state and system of government – but this discussion is based in the context of commonly understood notions of “liberal democracies” and not monarchies or autocratic regimes. Indeed in any autocratic or dictatorial context neither the “private” nor the “public” realm could be counted on to act as a guarantor of individuals’ rights or welfare. As before, there is no clear evidence that all works and efforts of the state inherently undermine the rights and interests of individuals. This argument is intended to challenge the orthodox understanding of the “private equals individual” versus “public equals state” dichotomy. We are necessarily drawn into political philosophy here, in particular the understanding of rights (not least, of property), the state and the social contract. Discussing these in depth would require a significant departure from the subject of this chapter. I do want to reiterate that the idea of the ‘public sector’, which may be considered a derivative of the ‘social contract’, also serves to protect individual rights. Libertarian philosophy, which largely underpins neoliberal economics, makes a virtue of “liberty” without sufficient consideration for the need for constraints to protect the liberties of others. In this view the “free” market is the means (and ends) of achieving a free society. Thus neoliberalism seeks the minimum government possible. Further, it has no conception at all of the possibility of collective goals. This leads to the weakness that the ‘private’ (free realm) is assumed to represent the ‘individual’, and state power is seen as (i) an exact equivalent of the term ‘public’, and (ii) as antagonistic to the individual. This critique is not intended as an argument for large government but rather to recognize the 59 complexities within the categories of ‘public’ and ‘private’, particularly as they relate to the individual, the market and the state. The preceding digression briefly considered the character of the delineation of ‘public’ and ‘private’ as political categories and philosophical ideas. The point was to emphasize that when we talk about the privatization of public space we actually engage bundles of meanings within each category. This theoretical complexity raises many questions. For example, to whom does public space belong? To whom does the Public Sphere? Which rights are guaranteed in public space? What can be achieved in the public sphere beyond the rights guaranteed in public space? Can public space be used for private benefit? These doubts illustrate the need for investigating the relationship between “privateness” and the public sphere. In the following sections of the chapter I will discuss the two ways in which the urban public sphere acquires characteristics of privateness. I will begin with the privatization of public space, and the influence of economic structures on its public character. I. Structure-side explanation It is in the interest of many industries in the neoliberal city (including those of real estate, construction, retail and financial services among others) increasingly to bring space out of the public and into the private realm. Private capital can benefit from new business opportunities – markets, land holdings, construction, rent capturing etc. to continue cycles of accumulation. These business opportunities draw investment from 60 internationally networked corporations and consortia. It is in this context that we will discuss privatization of the public sphere in today’s “global” cities. Brian Field (1992) has also attempted to locate public space in the context of economic goods. He argues that “the private sector can be quite effective in supplying” (p.106) public space. This section will deal with refuting his claim and showing why private provision in this case changes the very character of the good being produced. I will argue that, being public, is itself essential to the value of public space, which is immediately lost when it is conceived and “provided” as a private good – not just because of the exclusion of “unwanted” people, but also because even the “wanted” people are fragmented. Fragmentation of users The integration of commerce with public space leads to “segmentation” of public space that follows the market-segmented goods and services on offer within it. The products being sold in the mall, “invented space” or “reinvented street” (Banerjee, 1996), are grouped (segmented) so that complementary (similarly priced or equally affordable) goods and services can be found in the same place, and can benefit from agglomeration and the presence of each other’s consumers. It follows that these goods and services, which are grouped according to price, are not equally accessible to all consumers. This creates a ladder of exclusivity for both the market and the place. 61 A short example can illustrate the meaning of the ‘ladder of exclusivity’. The division of the entire apparel market in, say, the US economy, into progressively expensive brands is instructive in this regard. The Gap Inc., for example, owns the apparel brands ‘Old Navy’, ‘Gap’ and ‘Banana Republic’, in increasing order of the pricing of products sold under each brand. Each price level is exclusive to those unable to shop there. This shows how a single company markets goods by “class” which translates to exclusivity. The phenomenon (of the ladder of exclusivity) applies to not just one, but all manufacturers of a particular good – and thus to the entire market of that good. It can be argued that the fashion industry is inherently one that assists in the creation of exclusive apparel that draw a large part of their value from the very fact that not many people can afford to buy them. This idea is similar to Bourdieu’s (1984) critique of fashion as a bourgeois construction of distinction and classification, based on tastes and codes that legitimize the class positions of those who create them. The correspondence which is… objectively established between the classes of products and the classes of consumers is realized in acts of consumption only through the mediation of that sense of the homology between goods and groups which defines tastes. Choosing according to one’s tastes is a matter of identifying goods that are objectively attuned to one’s position and which ‘go together’ because they are situated in roughly equivalent positions in their respective spaces, be they films or plays, cartoons or novels, clothes or furniture; this choice is assisted by institutions – shops, theatres (left- or right-bank), critics, 62 newspapers magazines – which are themselves defined by their position in a field and which are chosen on the same principles (Bourdieu, 1984, p.232) We can broaden the category of “institutions” in Bourdieu’s sense, which includes ‘shops’, to reflect contemporary sites of consumption, such as the privately produced public spaces being discussed here. When products of a certain price category are grouped together and sold together, the place where they are sold (mall, street, plaza etc.) also becomes part of the consumption process. That is, people tend to go to the malls where they can afford to shop, and are thus physically (bodily) divided up into the market segments to which they “belong”. The consumers of these segmented goods and services then find themselves (with intent as much as serendipity) in a place frequented by others like themselves in terms of not only taste but also socio-economic status, budget constraints, and indifference curves. Thus, people (the consumers of goods and services) get divided up spatially (and bodily) into groups along the same ladder of exclusivity that divides the spaces of consumption. I call this the ‘fragmentation’ of users, which in this case is based primarily on economic class (or buying power) but also on race or ethnicity, to the extent that these variables may be correlated with class. Commodification of public space The process of commodification is intrinsic to the privatization of public space. Commodification facilitates the extraction and accumulation of value. Once commodified, exchange values of space can be realized “efficiently”. The essential 63 processes involved in privatizing public space are those of creating exclusion and rivalness (as we have seen from the typology of economic goods). It is through commodification that these functions can be achieved. First, I must define what I mean by ‘commodification’. Commodification refers to the process by which “social relations are reduced to an exchange relation” (Goldman et al., 2003). In general, the term refers to the conversion of those aspects of life (cultures, ideas, emotions etc.) into commodities which would not normally be bought and sold. Marx’s own original conception of commodification begins with the “labor theory of value”. According to Marx the use value of labor of human beings is turned into exchange value through the production of commodities. In this way the “social character of men’s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour” (Marx, 1978, p.320). Social relations (of labor, in this case) thereby come to be represented by commodities. Other aspects of social life can be considered ‘commodified’ when their ‘use value’ is disjointed from their ‘exchange value’. Exchange value, though not the same as ‘price’ (a dollar amount), indicates a value of exchange, of the commodity. That is when something of use to an individual or society, assumes a value for exchange, it is said to have become a commodity, or to have been commodified. The essential transformation is the change from being viewed as being of use, to being for exchange, and therefore for ownership, accumulation and surplus generation. For the purpose of this paper, what we are interested in is the transformation of social relations to spatial relations, via the commodification of space. So we are interested in the transformation of ‘use’ and ‘exchange’ values of space. 64 To understand the “loss” in privatized public space, we can use this understanding of commodification. The transformation of public space into an “excludable” and “rival” economic good is exactly the process that converts its use value to exchange value. That is commodification privileges the liminal and tactile aspects of public space (i.e. rent and revenue), and of the public sphere in general (‘exchange’ value). The concomitant political and social characteristics of public space (representing ‘use’ value, such as inclusion, interaction and communication etc.) are lost to the quest for efficiency. To explain the point further let us focus on what specifically constitutes the use value of public space and the public sphere. ‘Use value’ of public space could be constructed theoretically in various ways. We could think of it, for example, as the character of space that allows “random encounters” (Jacobs, 1961) between people. In a related way ‘use value’ could be thought of as the value of space for its role in supporting of “bridging interactions” (Larsen et al, 2004) between social groups. The use value of public space is also derived from its role in becoming host to “extraordinary events” (Irazabal, 2008), which promotes freedom of speech, political activism and civic participation. Freedom of speech itself may be considered even more multidimensional than protest marches, public lectures or pamphleteering. The term may be thought to include expression of identities by those at the margins of society in the presence of the “mainstream”. The condition in the last part of the previous sentence implicitly assigns (use) value to inclusion. Free speech is meaningful only when it is heard, not if it is voiced in isolation. The substantive value of “being heard” or “being seen” (beyond simply speaking) is the use value of 65 public space. Even more demanding norms might suggest that the ‘use value’ of space is derived from its contribution to class consciousness and class struggle (where social class is emphasized as the defining identity). In a freedom-construction (in the manner expounded by Sen, 1999, exploring the meaning of development), the use value of public space could be conceptualized as the freedom of subjectivity. This construction is useful in developing Kohn’s (2004) analysis, for example, the “rationales for the provision of public good”, critiqued by Apostol and Banerjee (2006). The idea of freedom of subjectivity can be defended with support from the literature on the transformation of the built environment into the equivalent of theme parks. We can see the economic rationale that leads to segregation of people (as consumers) in space from the preceding discussion. In the context of access to commodified space, the most obvious basis for segregation is class. Class is often closely correlated with race. Segregation by race (with the help of formal or informal institutions) has been outlawed in the United States (as in most of the world). Segregation by economic class, though, is not considered an offense (or for that matter, offensive or objectionable) in any manner. From the structure-side explanation for the privatization of public space we can see that conditions of privatization lead to the commodification of public space and to consequent loss of publicness in the public sphere. In the next section I will present what I am calling the ‘agent-side explanation’, where I will discuss how politics of identity contributes to the replication of the conditions of privatization (or loss of publicness). 66 II. Agent-side privatization The ‘structural’ explanation accounts for those instances of privatization where public activity shifts to privately-owned space and thus comes to be reconstituted by the rules that govern the marketing of commodities. This phenomenon is labeled the ‘structure- side privatization’ because the results are largely functions of market logic. On the other hand, the agent-side privatization describes the process by which “the public” uses urban space (i.e. both public space and other spatial components of the urban public sphere) in ways such that publicness of the city is diminished. This is not to suggest that this is carried out by groups within the public with this intent in mind. The loss occurs at a scale that is invisible to the agents acting in space. The actions are spatial but the loss is social. These spatial practices lead to a larger loss for society when these practices become the norm. Spatial identity clubs The agent-side explanation is based on the appropriation of space for the expression of social identity, often ethnic, in multicultural cities (e.g. weekend soccer leagues in MacArthur Park, Los Angeles). Such spaces may be claimed by different groups at different times. This kind of use leads to the transformation of public spaces, from public goods to club goods (non-rival but exclusive), that is to publicness being compromised. That is, when certain groups exclude other groups, or use space in a way that only one group can participate, the result is that the potential for common use of space (through shared understanding) is lost. This exclusion might happen for the purpose of strengthening intra-group bonds, or for keeping out those perceived as being the initiators 67 of exclusion, termed by Castells (2004) as “exclusion of the excluders by the excluded”. The argument points towards social processes, such as assertion of identity, under conditions of late capitalist market multiculturalism (Zizek, 1997) as being part of the total reality of the neoliberal city, and having real implications for the production of space. The conditions of privatization can also be achieved under public ownership. “Private space becomes public when the public wants it; public space becomes private when the public that has it won’t give it up” (Acconci, 1990, p.904). This second kind of privatization, based on agent behavior with regards to expression of identity, occurs frequently on publicly-owned public space, and also more broadly, when we consider the city as a public sphere. By ‘city as a public sphere’ I do not mean to imply public ownership of property rights, but rather I mean the city as the space (sphere) where public attitudes are created, and public life practiced (even if individual properties are under private ownership). Private spaces, in contemporary times, usually have no special incentive to segregate people based on ethnicity. Segregation is primarily class-based. Identity groups based on race or ethnicity being excluded by way of having a close correlation with class divisions, is incidental to the logic. The literature on the privatization of public sphere does not address the processes transforming that part of the public sphere which is still publicly owned. Mitchell and Staeheli (2006) do engage the ideas of “pseudo-public” and “pseudo-private” spaces (p.53) – spaces that have transitioned from being purely private or public (respectively) to 68 some degree of use by (and therefore ceding of rights to) the “other side”. This negotiation over access and rights, between the public and private sectors, is neither balanced nor even two-way. Indeed the reality is that when private spaces cede rights to the public it is generally in the interest of revenue generation (either directly through people spending money in the space, or indirectly, through permission to build taller structures, or creating possibilities for increasing advertising revenues etc.) Regardless, the question of investigating the reasons behind privatization of public-owned public spaces still remains. Such public spaces, by virtue of their government ownership and management hold an image of being universally inclusive, not-for-profit and a refuge from the other ills of city. These public spaces do not exist in isolation – neither spatially nor in an institutional sense. Their full meaning is produced by the spatial and political-economic context within which they are embedded. The quest for efficiency must affect these spaces too. Firstly, there is the obvious relationship between a safe, sanitary and organized appearance in public space and the value of the private properties surrounding it (in terms of location attractiveness for businesses and the rents charged). Loiterers, homeless, teenage skateboarders, vendors, street musicians and others are perceived as a threat to the required levels of safety and tranquility. Control is exercised commonly by discouraging loiterers by avoiding comfortable seating, by having the police dump the homeless in “their” part of the city, by assigning skateboarders to skateboarding parks, and allowing vendors and musicians by license only. Safety, defined as the absence of individuals with certain personal characteristics, becomes a tool for profiling users of 69 space. In other words only that part of the public are considered legitimate users of space who do not adversely affect property and rent values for owners, and revenue potential for renting businesses. This is only a basic relationship which is very closely related to the first part of this chapter. In addition, publicly-owned spaces can acquire characteristics of private space without overt economic profit-related causes. The expression of identity in public space undeniably lends diversity and vitality to the park, plaza or sidewalk. At the same time, however, it also creates conditions of exclusion of the out-group. When all identities begin to express themselves separately, a situation is created where self preservation (or self-promotion) is the dominant motive rather than cross-cultural understanding or solidarity across lines of identity. Exclusion in this manner also dissolves publicness (of the sort discussed by Jane Jacobs in terms of “random interactions”) the same way as privatization through ownership does. The use values of the public sphere lost in the mall are not regained, but rather lost again, in the public space that privileges “bonding” over “bridging” interactions (Larsen et al, 2004). The formation of identity clubs is an inherent feature of contemporary multiculturalism, and the use of space both reflects and reinforces the trend. When spatial practices are organized and on the basis of the social-psychological constructs, these identities get inscribed in physical space. The creation of ‘Tieboutian’ clubs (Heikkila, 1996) provides further evidence of the fragmentation of society. Heikkila argues, municipalities in Los Angeles behave like clubs offering a well-defined basket of goods. Individuals choose the ‘basket’ that matches their requirements thereby joining the club. Thus those who share similar 70 preferences ‘elect’ to be grouped together in the Tieboutian clubs of their choosing. As modeled by the author, the “goods” in these “baskets” include (among other variables) ‘age’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘language’, ‘gender’ and ‘household finance’ (p.207). Stepping away from market parlance, these “goods” could easily be viewed as markers of social identity. Therefore Heikkila’s findings provide strong evidence of fragmentation of society along the lines of culture and identity. In this context, Tieboutian sorting may be seen as a process that allows ethnic identities to be spatialized and thus both fixed and consumed. It is noteworthy that this argument is predicated on a strong sense of agency of those “choosing” their preferred basket of goods. Again, it can be argued that for a large number of people, particularly those not well-off, the choice is neither broad nor particularly free. Further, it must be conceded that a lot of decisions are still in the hands of the agents and are made so as to maximize personal utility. Such “noble” ideals as building bridges across lines of identity are understandably overlooked in this process. Heikkila’s findings have wider application to the agents’ use of urban space, even though residential sorting is not directly comparable to all of urban space, public or private. Yet the general idea of spatial clubs is instructive, because in practice, other kinds of urban spaces are produced by the same processes of decision-making that creates residential Tieboutian clubs. This allows us to contextualize multicultural spaces in the city as ‘spatial clubs’. 71 Multiculturalism and the loss of publicness Leonie Sandercock (2003b) cites Richard Sennett in making the point that there is a “normative imperative in the multicultural city to engage in meaningful intercultural interaction” (p.87). Sennett (2000) himself emphasizes this idea with help of the work of Hannah Arendt and Jurgen Habermas. Sennett also draws on Rawls and suggests that the public sphere is one where a veil of ignorance is worn – that is, people are not judged based on their status or position. If we hold up public spaces to these standards we will find that identity politics in multicultural cities essentially moves public space towards exclusion and privatization. What I am calling privatization through identity politics has already been recognized by Nancy Fraser (1997, 2000) and Zizek (1997). For Fraser, “today’s struggles for recognition often assume the guise of identity politics…. [and] serve less to foster interaction across difference than to enforce separatism, conformism, and intolerance.” (p. 119). Fraser’s article concedes the possibility of truly emancipatory identity-based projects, but critiques their recent proliferation on counts of “displacement” (of struggles of redistribution with struggles of recognition) and “reification” (of separatist, intolerant and chauvinistic attitudes). Fraser’s own model, which intends to replace the need for recognition with a struggle against “status subordination”, follows from her grappling with the distinct but related ideas of economic and cultural injustice. [T]his distinction between economic injustice and cultural injustice is [only] analytical. In practice, the two are intertwined. Even the most material economic institutions have a constitutive, irreducible cultural 72 dimension; they are shot through with significations and norms. Conversely, even the most discursive cultural practices have a constitutive, irreducible political-economic dimension; they are underpinned by material supports. Thus, far from occupying two airtight separate spheres, economic injustice and cultural injustice are usually interimbricated so as to reinforce each other dialectically. Cultural norms that are unfairly biased against some are institutionalised in the state and the economy. meanwhile, economic disadvantage impedes equal participation in the making of culture, in public spheres and in everyday life. The result is often a vicious circle of cultural and economic subordination. (Fraser, 1997, p.15). The dialectical relationship requires closer inspection. Fraser’s argument creates the impression that the two (economic and cultural injustice) are equal forces mutually reinforcing each other. This is not entirely incorrect, but the argument begs the question whether one of the two has a “primary” role. In other words, can we say that one of these two analytical categories of injustice would exist even if the other did not? The idea of “status subordination” again places all kind of subordination on a level plane. While it is useful to recognize that injustices of all kinds are actually expressions of wider inequalities in power relations, Fraser does not adequately address the issue of how various different struggles can be reformulated (or reorganized) to work together. In other words, despite this very useful critique, Fraser still leaves the problem of fragmentation untouched. It is not the purpose of this study to delve into a lengthy critique of Fraser’s 73 work, especially as I am in agreement with a lot of what the author says. It is more important here to cite Fraser’s work as the basis for a liberal critique of multiculturalism. In similar vein Zizek (1997) has critiqued multiculturalism as the “cultural logic of multinational capitalism” (p. 28). According to Zizek multiculturalism is a disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism, a ‘racism with a distance’—it ‘respects’ the Other’s identity, conceiving the Other as a self-enclosed ‘authentic’ community towards which he, the multiculturalist, maintains a distance rendered possible by his privileged universal position (p.44). This is an insightful critique of the political-economy of multiculturalism. The author is bringing attention to a distanced “respect” guaranteed to all communities in the multicultural society, so that the universality of the majority, and more importantly the inevitability of the ideology that accords power, is not questioned. Zizek’s radical idea is that multiculturalism is a calculated concession, which allows the dominant classes to maintain their hegemonic status while extracting the most surplus possible from the labor and consumption of all sections of society. In other words, policies of multiculturalism minimize the transaction costs of having every individual minority member of society assimilate into the majority culture. For example, multiculturalism allows immigrants to become useful in the economy as labor and consumers, without the lags associated with cultural assimilation. In this view, multiculturalism is a Faustian bargain between economic growth and a fractured society. In this way multiculturalism becomes an administrative practice for the management of labor resources. 74 According to Appiah (2006) multiculturalism “often designates the disease it purports to cure” (p. xiii). The politics of multiculturalism is thus inherently defensive and divisive. There is certainly also a “positive” rationale – that is, the minorities require a space for expression of their identity so as not be coerced into losing cultural values and ways of life. There is also a “defensive” rationale. By “defensive” I mean that the need to express identity emerges from a perceived threat, or sense of exclusion. It is not the purpose here to distinguish these motives, as the difference is fuzzy and perhaps requires an in-depth psychological study to uncover. The point certainly needs to be made, however, that one may easily transform into, or appear to be, the other. The ostensible normative goal of multiculturalism is to ensure that language, culture and ways of life of minority communities are protected from the forced assimilation by a cultural majority. In other words, multiculturalism ensures the sustenance of marginal cultures that may otherwise be threatened by intolerance of the majority. Multiculturalism, does not, however, impose on the majority, a burden to adapt to the presence of minorities in society. It does not necessitate measures to amenably create new mixed societies. There is no normative goal within the idea of multiculturalism to find ways of easing tensions between various minority communities, and promoting understanding. Multiculturalism, in this context, fails to imagine and capture the synergies through the coexistence of diverse cultures within relatively proximity of each other. Certainly there are elements of interaction between communities (mostly through transactions, but also through employment of non co-ethnics, marriages, children 75 interacting in school etc.), but by and large ethnic groups tend to remain turned inwards, both culturally and certainly politically. Contextualizing Chungking Mansions The privatization critique (of the framgentation into ethnic clubs of the public sphere) developed in this chapter, provides support for the liberal crtique of multiculturalism outline above. This pattern can be seen also at Chungking Mansions. The place has always been a privately owned and used, except for the shopping arcade which resembles a typical privately-owned public space. This private character of the “mansions” within Chungking Mansions has changed over time (as we will see in greater depth in the next chapter). With an increasing number of units being converted into motels and restaurants, the exclusive-private-individual spaces within the building are being converted to privately-owned-publicly-accessible spaces. This character, along with the complementary uses in nearby locations, ensures that the building functions as a de-facto privatized public space, much like a mall. Yet it is also different than a typical mall because of the intensive use by ethnic minorities, and the consequent association of a strong sense of belonging within these communities. It is in fact a market, and a place with strong class and ethnic associations. The association is not just with one ethnictiy, however, but rather with several ethnicities, all of whome have a large number of people at the economic and political (in terms of residency) margins. That is, it is privatized also by virtue of being a place of marginalization (ethnic and economic), and being somewhat isolated from mainstream Hong Kong society even though it sits right in the middle of a densely populated district. 76 Observations on the site there is very little evidence of intergroup interactions. The various communities get along, but there are tensions below the surface. The society at Chungking Mansions (as we will see in the following chapter) is divided into various religious and ethnic clubs. Various interviewees made comments regarding being in that place at that time to do business and make some money. “They live their life and we live ours.” There are no interfaith initiatives or inter-community dialogs. In addition there is also some degree of stereotyping, racism and incidents of fights breaking out between groups. Further, as we will see in Chapter 4, there is a tendency among some to blame UN decisions regarding asylum on religion. During field visits soon after the Mumbai blasts of 2008 the tensions between the Indian and Pakistani communities was palpable Figure 2.2: Graffiti in Chungking Mansions 77 all over Chungking Mansions. In every restaurant TV channels were switched to the respective country’s news stations, loudly repeating their positions. During my fieldwork I also witnessed some unexpected expressions of hatred, some disguised and some not so subtle. Figure 2.2, for example, shows anti-Semitist graffiti on a door inside Chungking Mansions. I have discussed the internal social divisions in much greater detail in the next two chapters. Here my purpose is to argue that there are several instances of fragmentation within the confined and dense space of Chungking Mansions, and very few instances of interactions across lines of identity beyond commercial transactions. Multiculturalism is an idea which does not exist in isolation. Its interpretation in any particular society is influenced by local factors. This study of Chungking Mansions allows us to contextualize multiculturalism and examine how it actually affects spaces in the neoliberal city. To recapitulate, most of the literature on the loss of publicness has focused on privatization through ownership. I have tried to show through this chapter that use values of public space are also lost through other kinds of privatization. That is, public space can acquire characteristics of a private good through other means too. In this argument public space is symptomatic of the tensions acting on the public sphere. I have already mentioned in the Introduction section of Chapter 1 that the changes wrought by globalization make contemporary enclaves very different from those of earlier periods. This chapter helps to substantiate that claim. Whereas enclaves in the assimilationist era were an expression of exclusion of minorities by the majority groups, the contemporary enclaves gives all minority groups ‘equal opportunity’ to exclude everyone else. This subtle shift reflects the transition from one kind of loss (the absolute 78 exclusion of certain groups to privilege a majority-imagined idea of the public sphere), to another (the loss of publicness by mutual agreement to exclude each other from a fragmented public sphere). Neither can be considered acceptable. This chapter allows us to view the Chungking Mansions phenomenon in the context of wider urban processes of marginalization of groups, fragmentation of the public sphere, and the resultant loss of the public character of the city. In the following chapters I will investigate more closely the character of this kind of place – i.e. one created by the interplay between privatizations of market and ethnicity. How are today’s enclaves different from the enclaves produced by the assimilationist and Fordist era? What is the impact of the forces of globalization on how we perceive enclaves? How do we theorize the resultant complexity of roles and motives of the place and the social groups that use it? I will address these questions by examining the effectiveness of the ghetto/enclave classifications in capturing the complexity of Chungking Mansions; by analyzing how agency responds to new opportunities and constraints by exploiting the interstices of citizenship to create alternative ways of belonging; and finally by critiquing certain images that seem to fix the character of the place in one way or another. I would like to add a few more points here regarding the contribution of this chapter. As a response to the ill-effects of privatization and its influence on social life, the idea of “insurgent citizenship” has been discussed in connection with the reclaiming of “publicness” (Crawford, 1995; Holston, 1998; Banerjee, 2001). Insurgent citizenship will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 4. Here I would like to make the 79 connection explicitly between practices of insurgent citizenship and privatizations of the city. ‘Insurgent citizenship’ is the name given to the spatial modes of challenge to mainstream (or bourgeois) urbanism by those at the economic periphery of the city. Holston holds that insurgent spaces or insurgent citizenship springs from the crevices of modernist city building where the state assumes the role of the provider of rights, identity and citizenship. The insurgent population adapts and uses the landscape of their urban experience for protest, because their way of life, or indeed even their existence (formal status) cannot be accommodated within modernist institutions. Holston’s project focuses on the ‘agency’ of the insurgent population. Crawford’s (1995) study of the struggle of street vendors and the homeless in Los Angeles highlights the insurgent and intransigent nature of agency. This idea, one which integrates space and citizenship into one “socio-spatial” model, deserves careful consideration in view of the idea of privatization and fragmentation. On the face of it, ‘insurgent citizenship’ creates hope for a viable scale and mode of resistance. Places of insurgent citizenship are intermediate or transitory when viewed in the context of formal institutions of planning and governance, and often provide a space for those at the margins of the social and economic structures of society. What is described above is an ideal-type. Insurgent practices and places are not all the same. The styles and objectives of “insurgence” could vary, and could also be subject to internal politics. Thus the margin could be as divided as the mainstream. Further, if insurgent practices do not challenge the mainstream logic of production they also become 80 subject to the same rationality. The argument here is not that insurgent practices are a panacea for the problems of the marginalized. In fact there is a need for exercising care not to romanticize resistance. I want to argue that resistance, which was once imagined in terms of class solidarity, is now fractured into ethno-class identifications. Thus resistance is divided into clubs that are often competing with each other despite significant overlap of interests. The phenomenon of spatial identity clubs needs to be viewed in this context. The spatial organization and ordering of bodies that result from the privatizations of neoliberalism and multiculturalism (and from the interaction of the two with each other), has a profound impact on not only the lives of immigrants, but also on the urban public sphere in general. It is difficult to say where insurgence gives way to exclusion. It is the multicultural working class of any city that has to make these choices on a daily basis. The same population acting in the same space might be insurgent one day and exclusionary the next. For example, Latino food vendors in LA might feel threatened by, say, a Vietnamese vendor in their midst. Indeed, in LA, spaces are so defined as to reflect the market – and a random Vietnamese food vendor will likely make no attempt to “invade” Latino space. This is plainly visible in the multitude of minority spaces that Los Angeles has been divided into, with hardly any place for “everyone”. Insurgent citizenship can become the touchstone for democratic and inclusive (that is, public rather than privatized) public space, but insurgency colored first by ethnic identity can also be counterproductive. Thus we can see how the shift of the public sphere from a public good 81 to a club good, is as problematic for the ideals of publicness as its outright privatization by ownership. Conclusions The critical tension evolving from this discussion is about whether expression of identity itself can be questioned. Needless to say, identity, particularly that of minorities and marginalized communities is at the heart of various urban struggles. Liberal states have in recent times adopted policies of multiculturalism, which allow for difference and minimize the burden of assimilation on minority communities. In this environment, where planning theory is encouraged to focus on utilitarian “ethical compromise” (Sanyal, 2002) rather than normative ideas, the political appeal of multiculturalism is easy to understand. The issues of conflation of the issues of immigration reform and “homeland security” in the United States, for example, reflects the contemporary policy environment. “[T]he regime that has taken hold of political and cultural power around the world involves the sharpening of social divisions…. The control of public space is a central strategy of that neoliberalism” (Low, 2006, p.15). Low is referring to plazas and parks, but the statement is equally relevant to the urban public sphere in general. Obviously expression of identity must not be subdued as this would be the greatest injustice of all. The lesson from this study is that multicultural cities run the risk of having their public spaces (and more generally their streets and neighborhoods) become sites where difference is deepened and embodied rather than overcome. It is important to pursue strategies that go beyond merely permitting expression of difference, to active 82 promotion of intercultural interaction among people that promotes both recognition and understanding. It has been the attempt of this chapter to make four points. First, that privatization of public space can be critiqued by viewing it as an economic good, and that this would facilitate a deeper understanding of the reasons for the ‘loss’ that is being reported in literature. Second, there are two related (not competing) arguments to explain the ‘narrative of loss’ – one each based on structure and agency. The third point made in this chapter is that conditions of privatization can be seen in the urban public sphere even outside privately-owned public spaces. The fourth part of the argument is theoretical, and relates the well-recognized business idea of ‘market segmentation’ with the Marx’s idea of ‘commodification’, which he originally used in the context of the value of labor. I will discuss this last point here as the conclusion of the chapter. As has been discussed earlier, market segmentation of economic goods for efficient servicing of the market “demand” can lead to a concomitant segmentation of the spaces where these goods are displayed and sold. Air conditioning, leather seating and other accessories, for example, can become the basis of segmentation of automobiles. The chapter also touched on Marx’s idea of commodification. The idea of commodification is based on distinguishable “value”, “use value” and “exchange value” of goods. In simple terms, the “value” is the labour-value of producing the good, the “use-value” is what it is worth to a user (or users), and “exchange-value” is the closest approximate of the price of the commodity. It is only when something acquires an exchange value that it becomes a 83 ‘commodity’, and commodification creates a gulf between the good’s use and exchange values. For example, a pair of shoes has a certain use value for protecting feet and providing comfort – but their exchange value might be quite exaggerated by comparison, reflecting costs of marketing or the stamp of a fashion label. Exchange values are thus socially created, and represent a loss of essence – and a disconnect between the utility of a good and the price paid for access to it. It is this intangible essence that is hard to define. In the context of public space, market segmentation is based on the brands of goods being retailed, and the socially determined price of exclusivity. Thus these factors create a gulf between the use value of space and its exchange value (that is the price of consuming this space). The argument, then, is that the factors that become the bases of segmentation (the equivalent of air conditioning and leather seating in cars, for example) are the same as those which commodify the space (change use value to exchange value). Thus the ‘narrative of loss’ (which is at least partially predicated on market segmentation, as we have seen in this paper) is instrumental in supporting the very idea of commodification. Looking at public space from the perspective of economic goods is critical to bring us to this conclusion. The connection is not trivial and could be instrumental in adapting critical theory to the age of flexible accumulation. 84 Chapter 3 : Beyond the Ghetto/ Enclave duality Introduction This chapter revisits the debates surrounding the idea of the ‘ethnic enclave’ with new evidence from the case of Chungking Mansions in Kowloon, Hong Kong. The case offers a counterpoint to various theories propounded by previous scholarship. I attempt here to ask the following questions. (i) How is ‘choice’ as a defining variable operationalized in the ethnic enclave? (ii) The case study is a multi-ethnic enclave – why was it formed as such and how can we predict its recurrence? Three significant results from fieldwork are presented here. First, the case shows evidence that concepts like 'segregation' (percentage of total population of the enclave that is coethnic), 'encapsulation' (percentage of all coethnics in the region that live in the given enclave) and other similar measures, though useful, are not sufficient to grasp completely the economic and social importance (significance, scale or order) of enclaves. Second, the case study disaggregates the enclave’s internal differentiation, in terms of the economic, political and cultural experiences of the participants. We find that there are non-economic reasons that are, for some of the participants, the most important in deciding to participate in the enclave. These variables are an important part of the explanation of the outcomes of enclaves. Third, the case provides an example of a multi- ethnic enclave – combined product of historical conditions, a free market economy, and a high-density urban form. The study attempts to reach beyond the ghetto/enclave duality that has constrained our understanding of enclaves, and highlight some factors that have been relatively downplayed but emerge strongly in this case. 85 With the twin threats of a falling birth rate and an aging population already apparent in various economies in the region, I believe that difference and multiculturalism in Asian cities is likely to become a key area of focus in the near future. This study is a valuable empirical work which revisits theory and sheds light on this important aspect of Asian urbanization. Literature review Literature on ethnic enclaves has focused on three aspects - Sociology, Geography and Urban Planning. This grouping of themes should not be viewed in a strict sense as studies are often interdisciplinary and touching on variables that are not always easily categorized. First, the perspective of Sociology has attempted to define and understand the ethnic enclave in terms of wages and labor markets, measuring payoffs to participants. The literature emanating from Sociology has had a bias for economic variables and quantitative methodology. The second stream, from the perspective of Geography has studied spatial characteristics (clustering, segregation etc.) of demographic variables (race, nationality, religion etc.). The third body of work, emanating from the discipline of Urban Planning has attempted to understand the ethnic enclave as a product of the forces of globalization. Each perspective attempts to fill the gaps of the previous approach and each succeeds to some extent. Three weaknesses are noted in the work so far on the subject. Firstly, there is considerable ambiguity in the definitions and measures employed. This is due, in part, to 86 the variety of fields involved in this study, and also to the complex nature of the phenomenon. There have been multiple approaches and foci, and a general inconsistency in using the terms of reference. Secondly, most of the literature is based on empirical work in North America and Western Europe. Asian cases, in particular, are greatly underrepresented in this scholarship. Thirdly, few qualitative studies have been attempted to acquire a thick understanding of the social and spatial processes underlying the numbers and maps. Thus, with a few exceptions, 'how' and 'why' questions regarding the processes of growth and evolution of enclaves have been underrepresented. The review is organized here according to principal disciplinary focus - the ‘Sociological’, 'Geographic' and 'Urban Planning' approaches. I will highlight the important contributions of each and some weaknesses. The framework for analyzing the selected case will be drawn from the debates within the current literature and the shortcomings observed. I. The Sociological Approach An example of the tensions in the understanding of definition and scope is the conceptual overlap between the 'ethnic enclave', 'ethnic enclave economy' and the 'ethnic economy' in various studies. Light et al. (1995) compare the 'ethnic economy' with the 'ethnic enclave economy'. According to their thorough literature review the 'ethnic economy' was chronologically the first field of inquiry. The conceptualization of the enclave was that of an economy running parallel to the 'main' economy. The ethnic economy was not considered “informal” in a strict sense, but it did not entirely conform to the principles that determined the functioning of the mainstream economy either. Light et al. go over the development of 'dual labor market' theory, and the expansion of the definition of the 87 enclave in-group to include self-employed individuals in addition to co-ethnic labor. The authors contend that the ethnic economy extends well beyond the enclave and study the networks and relationships that constitute the former (broader) term. This argument was quite in keeping with theoretical trends of the mid-1990s, when the study of the deterritorialization of production processes was gathering momentum. The debate pivots on whether or not an economy (in this case an “ethnic” one) can be contained within physical space. External networks are undoubtedly an important aspect of the experience of ethnic enclaves. In the case studied several important links, not only economic but also social, have been noted between the enclave and other sites in the city – related to social and commercial purposes. I would like, however, to contest the idea that the 'ethnic economy' is a “more useful” (Light et al., 1995, p.38) concept than the ethnic enclave economy. The claim may be valid for those studying only the economy of the enclave, and find a spatial boundary restrictive in analyzing the flows of capital, commodities and labor. From a social and political perspective, however, the “enclave” as the physical space of this unique economy holds a wealth of information. Further, as long as we are studying only the economy of the ethnic community (without the enclave or otherwise), we are missing out on various other aspects of the phenomenon. I propose that while we do study the external linkages of the ethnic economy, we also retreat into its physical boundary to study it as a socio-spatial outcome of immigrant incorporation into host societies, particularly in terms of the internal differentiation of enclaves, for example in terms of solidarity, class and expectations. 88 The idea of ethnic solidarity was already being questioned in the late 1980s. Sanders and Nee (1987) distinguished between the payoffs to employees and to entrepreneurs. This distinction is also supported in the case analyzed in this paper. On the same theme Gilbertson and Gurak (1993) provide evidence that the ethnic labor market does exist but is not favorable to the coethnics employed there. Their analysis of the case of Dominican and Colombian men in New York City suggests that they are not better off in terms of wages, skills acquisition and fringe benefits by participating in the enclave labor economy as compared to a similar demographic working outside the enclave. This evidence goes against previous research that cited ethnic networks and identity solidarity as unique advantages available to those working in the ethnic economy. This kind of analysis could, however, add even more variables to the assessment of labor benefits in the enclave. For example, psychological comfort, “soft landing” in terms of introduction to local language and customs, acceptance and kinship etc. If measured, these variables might explain why the ethnic enclave economies thrive even if the payoff to workers is not attractive. This has been argued before by Light (1972) and Alejandro Portes and collaborators (1989, 2005, 2006). In terms of economic indicators alone, Sanders and Nee (ibid) suggest that working in the enclave is most beneficial only to the “self-employed”, which roughly translates to “business-owners”. Additionally the authors voice support for “assimilationists” who argue that immigrants working outside the enclave are significantly better-off than those who continue to remain inside the enclave. Sanders and Nee (1987) argue against the ‘dual labor market’ theory, which suggests that workers in the ethnic economy receive benefits not available to those working outside. 89 They argue that there are no benefits to the workers in the ethnic economy, which is in fact more like a trap. Their analysis shows that in the case of Cuban immigrants in Miami and Chinese in San Francisco, the workers employed outside the enclave are better off than those within. They favor the view that assimilation enhances and segregation impedes the achievements of immigrants. Additionally, they make a case for distinguishing the experience of the immigrant workers and the immigrant bosses. They conclude that the dual labor market theory is only partially true, that is true for only a certain part of the enclave population – the entrepreneurial class, who can benefit from a somewhat more vulnerable and less-organized labor force. This is a valid counterpoint, but vulnerable to the criticism that the authors assume membership in the enclave economy is a result of segregation. It need not always be so. From a methodological perspective the authors compare the sample within the Miami enclave to Cubans “living elsewhere in Florida”. They do not consider the possibility that those living elsewhere in Florida may also be living in other small enclaves, which causes problems of internal validity. Finally in comparing the workers inside and outside the enclave, their model is static in terms of time, and therefore does not consider the turnover of participants. That is, they do not factor in or control for the period of time spent by the workers in the United States. It may be the case that those working outside have been in the United States longer and have been able to move out because of the benefits they enjoyed in the enclave. As a corollary we should also consider that low language skills, poverty, lack of legal status etc, may be the causes for many immigrants to remain in the enclave, rather than the results this decision. The case of Chungking 90 Mansions provides support for the nuanced dual labor theory proposed by Sanders and Nee. Portes and Jensen (1992), in a reply to Sanders and Nee, defend their work by suggesting that the latter duo changed the definition of the phenomenon in their critique. For Portes and Jensen, a comparison with the non-participating group of coethnics living outside the enclave cannot be compared with the “in-group”. They accept the findings of Sanders and Nee, but argue that they have no bearing on their own work as the two are examining different subjects. This defense is valid. Portes and Jensen did not theorize about the enclave as an experience to be contrasted with entire group of coethnics living outside the enclave, but rather against the experience that the same participants would expect to have outside the enclave at the same time. Portes and Jensen did unintentionally leave some room for ambiguity on this point, which led to this debate in the American Sociological Review in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This debate is also reviewed by Waldinger (2001, pp. 302-305). Ethnic enclaves have also been contrasted with “middleman” economies (Portes and Manning, 1986). This comparison is based on similarities in social relations common to both “processes of incorporation” (p.160) of immigrants. What distinguishes the two is concentration and scale of economic activities. Whereas the 'middleman minority' is defined by the overrepresentation of a certain minority in a given trade, an 'ethnic enclave' involves the spatial concentration of the members. According to this distinction an enclave also operates at a much larger scale than the 'middleman minority' and 91 (eventually) becomes a self-sufficient institution where a member can spend his or her life without needing to engage with the host community or any another out-group. This distinction bridges the economic (though the literature appeared in journals of Sociology) and geographic (spatial) aspects of enclaves. Since it emerged in the mid-1980s this perspective has been developed further with a focus on measuring the geographic variables. These are discussed in the next section. There are important differences in the policy recommendations that may be drawn out of the literature on the economic approach to ‘ethnic enclaves’. One line of research leads to policies of assimilation drawing on evidence that suggests immigrants do better when they do not remain bound to the enclave. Another line of research suggests that multiculturalism allows the formation of zones of safety for immigrants so that they are able to survive the initial hardships better and advance with help from their community. It is not hard to imagine how conservative or liberal political views can be tagged on to these findings to promote or question policies of assimilation. One problem arising from this duality is that ‘multiculturalism’ gets further entrenched as the only valid response to assimilation. There is a hesitance in critiquing ‘multiculturalism’ itself as this is seen to lead back to an assimilationist policy outlook. II. The Geographic Approach Wilson and Portes (1980) are credited (by Light et al., 1995) with introducing the 'enclave' into the discussion, thus bringing in the dimensions of clustering and location to the study of the ethnic economy. Poulsen et al (2002) have designed a measure of 92 residential concentration using 'density' and 'size' in conjunction with 'thresholds'. The rationale for their methodology is that maps showing percentages or shares of ethnicities in parcels of a metropolitan area (e.g. neighborhoods or census tracts) do not show the size and degree of ethnic mixing within the measured area. They argue that their model of classifying enclaves, using “residential concentration”. “assimilation” and “encapsulation”, allows meaningful comparison of enclaves across temporal and spatial contexts. Other variations on the theme of measuring density and “qualifying” ethnic niches as enclaves using quantitative criteria include Walks and Bourne (2006) on enclaves in Canadian urban areas, Pamuk (2004) on Chinese, Filipino and Mexican immigrants in San Francisco, Johnston et al (2002) on ethnic enclaves in English cities, Poulsen et al (2001), Zhou (1998) on the location of Chinese firms in Los Angeles, Light and Bonacich (1991) on Korean entrepreneurship in Los Angeles etc. Ceri Peach's work (1996, 2001, 2002) offers a different geographical take on ethnic enclaves. For Peach, enclaves are inexorably distinct from ghettoes. This approach implicitly suggests that enclaves are formed by top-down structures of economic and social discrimination. In other words it discounts the possibility that human agency at the grassroots level is responsible for the location decisions that creates ethnic enclaves. Peach's arguments raise the appropriate questions about the methodology used by Poulsen and others in the literature cited above. At the same time, however, Peach's theory discounts the possibility of voluntary enclaves that are formed by those wanting to live in the company of those with whom they have or perceive to have a bond based on ethnic, racial or linguistic identity. 93 Earlier we saw an evolution in the conceptualization of the phenomenon from economic to geographic variables through the distinction between 'middleman minorities' and 'ethnic enclaves'. Now, with the distinction between the 'ghetto' and 'enclave' we see a transformation of the debate into one where quality of life, location decisions, and capabilities are important variables. This second evolution brings 'ethnic enclaves' closer to the field of urban planning. This brings us to the third part of this review. III. Urban Planning Approach Analyses from the perspective of segregation seem to suggest that ethnic enclaves, the physical manifestations of the marginalization of ethnic communities, are comparable (if not equal) to ghettos. Talking about ‘inequality in global city-regions’, Susan Fainstein (2001) reminds us of the “correlation between low income and membership in marginal ethnic or racial groups…. Nevertheless, there is not a simple relationship between the existence of large foreign-born populations and inequality” (p.294). Peach (2003) distinguishes between the ghetto and the enclave asserting that the enclave is part of the assimilationist model (melting pot) of immigrant incorporation whereas the ghetto is part of the multicultural model (mosaic). “Multiculturalism is a necessary condition for the ghetto, but it is not a sufficient condition” (p.99). This argument represents a new turn in the debate because it draws a connection between place and citizenship, a theme we will examine in more detail in the next chapter. The argument itself, though, requires closer scrutiny. In my view multiculturalism does not have any necessary relationship with either the enclave or the ghetto. It is hard to fathom why Peach considers enclaves to be associated with assimilation, especially when the debate around enclaves frequently 94 engages the ideas of segregation and isolation. Paradoxically, in the last sentence of the same piece, Peach urges us to “recognize the difference between the chosen enclave and the enforced ghetto”, thus making choice the important variable, rather than the model of ethnic incorporation policy (assimilation versus multiculturalism). This has been brought up by others. There has been a strong response (Marcuse and van Kempen, 2000; Poulsen, 2002) suggesting dismissing the equating of enclaves and ghettos. This critique stands to reason as clearly not all enclaves have conditions resembling ghettos. Further, 'enclaves' and 'ghettos' are not the same kind of phenomena. Whereas the key variable in defining a ghetto is the quality of life (measured by various means), an ethnic enclave is defined by demographics and the social and economic functions it serves. Some ethnic enclaves may resemble ghettos in terms of the quality of life offered there, but they may, over time, cease to be enclaves, yet remain ghettos, or vice versa. As Qadeer and Kumar (2006) put it a Ghetto is another type of local community. It is an ethnically and/or racially segregated area of poor living conditions. Residential segregation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a ghetto. Poverty, deprivation and discrimination are the defining conditions of ghetto (p.2). Peter Marcuse (2005) considers both ghettos and enclaves as different types of clustering. In a normative tone he argues that whereas hierarchical clustering is undesirable, non- hierarchical clustering is acceptable. He also groups the terms “hierarchical” clustering with “involuntary” and “non-hierarchical” with “voluntary”. Though the intent of this 95 conceptualization is essentially sensible, the grouping itself is problematic. Marcuse wants to discourage class-based (hierarchical) segregation leading to permanent ghettoization of some communities. He considers this process involuntary. He wants to encourage the kind of clustering that is “organic” and not imposed. Marcuse does not, however, consider that the former type (hierarchical) may be created by voluntary processes (for example, zoning ordinances creating a high threshold for minimum lot sizes). In addition, some clusters that emerge from free market development (Los Angeles’s municipal Tieboutian clubs) are involuntary formations, to a large extent, of non hierarchical character. Indeed to some extent, this debate hinges on whether one considers market outcomes as voluntary or involuntary, which is a much more contentious issue. In this regard, I submit that it is better to understand his recommendation in terms of class and race rather than “voluntary” and “involuntary” clustering. Marcuse defines ghettos as places of exclusion and enclaves as products of choice. Since enclaves may not always be “chosen”, the author finds himself defining what he calls the “exclusionary enclave” which combines characteristics of the first two. The focus should, however, be on the substance of Marcuse’s recommendations rather than the semantics. The essential point is that clusters are unacceptable when they are imposed on a community (however it may be defined) by unequal relations of power. Clusters may be encouraged when they do not involve exploitative subjugation of a community by another. I support the spirit of this formulation. I would recommend, however, that based on research reviewed above, we temper Marcuse’s opinion with the insight that power is also unequally distributed within 96 the enclave (entrepreneurs and business-owners have more of it than coethnic employees and workers). The case presented in this paper provides evidence of unequally distributed power in a space bearing characteristics of both an enclave and a ghetto. Banerjee and Verma (2005) have critiqued previous scholarship, which distinguished “enclaves” from “ghettos” based on the assertion that the former is a product of choice, while the latter is an abject market outcome. In their analysis based on Los Angeles, they used the term “enclave” to define not only ethnic but also all other Tieboutian clubs. This analysis suggests that the ethnic enclave is in fact a socio-economic location decision, such that ethnicity is a variable comparable to taxes, income class, school district quality etc. Thus, while on the one hand being a product of choice, enclaves are also inexorably market outcomes. In other words, the authors’ critique of market-led urbanization lies in suggesting that ghettos are also enclaves – of those communities whose choices are most limited. This analysis confirms that concentration is an integral part of the definition of an 'enclave'. The paper, however, makes a case for adding aspects of choice and capabilities to the understanding of the enclave. This paves the way for a socio-political analysis or cultural variables, beyond the relatively inert study of the formation of clusters. The review of literature suggests that various fields have studied the phenomenon of 'ethnic enclaves' and tried to define them in the terms that suit their methods and theories. It is clear that the 'ethnic enclave' is a complex and multidimensional social phenomenon. The interest it has generated is encouraging, although it is somewhat deterministic. There is a lack of consensus on the definition of an enclave, as also on the nature of the 97 phenomenon and the essential motivation that leads to this social formation. Further, the 'ethnic enclave' has many manifestations. A general theory has been difficult to formulate because of particularity of each case. This is true for both economic and demographic variables as also cultural and political variables. The diversity of specific outcomes implies that the cases do not sit well with a ceteris paribus examination. This leads to a situation where cases are observed showing a variety of outcomes for almost any variable considered. Another theme to emerge from the literature review is that the cases studied so far seem to suggest that enclaves are a problem because they represent a segregation of minorities and a balkanization of the city. This pessimistic perspective overlooks the creative possibilities of the ethnic enclave. It also suggests a causality that might in fact be inverted (or at least reciprocal). It might easily be the case that groups want to live in enclaves because of their real or perceived marginalization from the mainstream, thus consolidating their economic and political strength through numbers. The phenomenon of enclave-formation may be interpreted either as (a) the group being shunned by society, or (b) the group coalescing voluntarily based on an ascriptive identity (as groups do based on other identities). The proliferation of numerous ethnic-towns is only partially explained by the idea of class-based residential segregation. Middle-class enclaves suggest that co-ethnics could prefer to live in enclaves. The case of Chungking Mansions is analyzed here from the perspective of the literature outlined above. In particular I will attempt to resolve some of the oppositions that 98 characterize the debate on enclaves, such as ‘ethnic economy/ enclave economy”, “voluntary/involuntary”, “multicultural/ assimilationist”, “hierarchical/non-hierarchical”, and “acceptable/ undesirable”. Historical overview Before 1961 Chungking Mansions received its construction permit from the Planning Department of Hong Kong in 1961 (HK Planning Department). An interview with Ms. Lam, the chairperson of the Incorporated Owners of Chungking Mansions revealed some pertinent characteristics of the site before the building was built there. According to Ms. Lam the site was a horseshoe-shaped market with all single-storey shops before the highrise was constructed. The site was close to the old airport and thus attracted tourists even at that time. Being close to the pier at Tsim Sha Tsui it also attracted sailors. The market offered an eclectic set of commodities to tourists including wine, watches, clothes, and “gwai-lo souvenirs”. (Gwai-lo is a Cantonese slang term of reference, often but not always derogatory, likening foreigners, particularly White foreigners, to ghosts.) According to Ms. Lam’s account, the market was a prosperous one, benefiting from its proximity to hotels and developing as a tourist-oriented place even at the time. “It was already emerging as a gwai-lo place”. Further, Chinese businessmen returning from Philippines first conceptualized Chungking Mansions. There was only one owner at the time, who pooled the investments of several associates. According to Ms. Lam, these businessmen saw themselves as patriots working for the country. They picked the name ‘Chungking Mansions’ to commemorate victory over Japanese in the ‘8 year War of Resistance’ also 99 known as the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). (During the course of the war the city of Chungking, Chongqing in Mandarin transliteration, had become the capital of the Chiang Kai Shek administration, and suffered major destruction in Japanese air raids). The original horseshoe-shaped market was not called Chungking Market or Mansions, and the association with Chungking started only when the building was named. According to Ms. Lam this account was passed on to her through word of mouth by old- time residents of the building. The South Asian presence in the area also predates the building. “Before the Pacific War, Hong Kong had two battalions of Indian soldiers stationed at Whitfield Barracks, which later became Kowloon Park. The Kowloon Mosque was originally built for Muslim Indian soldiers.” (South China Morning Post, 2008a). All historical reviews of Hong Figure 3.1: Promotional materials from 1961 Source: Hong Kong Planning Department 100 Kong include an account of the city’s ethnic minorities. Pluss (2005) has traced the growth of the “Indian” community in Hong Kong, though given the timeframe she is working with (1840-1950), it would be more accurate to call it the history of the South Asia (or pre-Independence India). Her account, which is organized on the basis of the religions of the Indian groups suggests that mainly Indians migrated to Hong Kong either to trade (some business families rising to the top echelons of the Hong Kong economy) or as soldiers in the British army (creating the stereotypical role of the Sikh guard which is visible until this day). The influx of cheap labor is a post-colonial phenomenon which, to a large extent, has built on prior coethnic presence and status in the city. The point I want to make here is that due to reasons of location and demography, the site where Chungking Mansions is located had acquired an international image and role before the building was constructed. This is not to say, however, that the building merely carried on the trend and only provided expanded room for processes already under way. Chungking Mansions both intensified and profoundly modified these processes. Since 1961 The building was not originally conceptualized as a marketplace – ethnic or otherwise. The “mansions” were planned as high-end residential option with a shopping arcade on the ground and first floors (see Figure 3.1). The site was zoned “R/C” (Residential/ Commercial), a use which allowed certain commercial uses in addition to residential use. This created the potential for realizing higher rents through commercial use of residential property. Figure 3.2 shows the “Schedule of Uses” as published in a map of the Tsim Sha 101 Tsui planning area in 1965. A note in the lower part of the figure says “[o]n land designated “Commercial/Residential”, certain non-industrial uses such as schools, churches, hotels, cinemas, shops, offices, and petrol filling stations may be permitted” (Hong Kong Planning Department, 1965). There is a lot of flexibility built into this provision. The possibility of converting residential use to hotels, shops and offices began to be explored as early as the 1970s. Original residents moved to fancier and more exclusive options on Hong Kong Island. These were relatively well-off middle class families. This trend became stronger over the next decade. The ethnic niche began with textiles and garment stores – that is, exotic and expensive products. In the 80s, as the Pearl River Delta emerged as the focus of Deng Xiaoping’s industrialization of the mainland, with Hong Kong as its gateway, African trading posts began to appear in the city, often in Tsim Sha Tsui’s Chungking Mansions” (South China Morning Post, 2008b). As the trading links diversified, Chungking Mansions was internationalized even more than before. The proprietor of a traditional costumes and textiles store on the first floor (second floor in the US) reports having been in business for the past 25 years (that is, from the mid-1980s). According to him very decent Indian families used to live here with their children. Now they all have shifted out because as the business boomed there were too many guest houses beginning to open – too many restaurants – to entertain the customers – then a lot of 102 Source: Hong Kong Planning Department Figure 3.2: Schedule of Uses, Tsim Sha Tsui, 1965 103 things happened like major fires because of the overload of guest houses’ air conditioning etc. A lot of crime – murders – suicides – so a lot of decent families just started leaving. Just became more commercialized place. The falling socio-economic profile of the residents due to commercialization and other factors seems to have started off a spiral of decline. By the late 1980s the building had already acquired a reputation of crime and vice. Extents of the Enclave Kowloon Park: Kowloon Park is a large public park on Nathan Road, a block north, and across the street from Chungking Mansions. It is used intensely by locals (including resident and immigrant communities) and also considered a tourist attraction. The park features well kept lawns, water bodies, shaded areas, paved plazas, and small fauna (Flamingoes, colorful fish, turtles etc.) It is common to see parents with children taking a walk through this accessible green oasis in the dense Hong Kong urban fabric. The elderly can be seen here throughout the day, a lot of them reading newspapers or taking a nap on the benches. As with other public spaces in Hong Kong, the park is used by Filipina and Indonesian women on Sundays, as a gathering place where the domestic helpers spend their Sunday off work. Unlike other public spaces in Hong Kong, however, Kowloon Park also has a heavy presence of South Asian and African men. Most of them are waiting for decisions from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) or the Hong Kong Immigration department. The political status of these South Asians and Africans is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. It is important to note here that there is a sizable 104 spillover of activities from Chungking Mansions to Kowloon Park. My purpose here is to locate on a map one of their centers of activity immediately outside the case study site. Some spend their days in a cycle of sleeping in Kowloon Park, showering in a friend’s lodgings in Chungking Mansions, having meals at a Church or NGO, and wandering in the streets nearby. Kowloon Moque is tucked into the southeast corner of Kowloon Park. It is, however, outside the park premises and with a separate entrance directly from Nathan Road. This is a major international mosque and draws Muslims from Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Its proximity to the site also means that many of the mosque’s visitors share the experience of the two locations, each contributing to their sense of belonging in Hong Kong and to the neighborhood of Chungking Mansions. 7/11 on Mody Road beside Holiday Inn On the north side of Mody Road, only a few shops East from Nathan Road, facing Holiday Inn hotel (which is in the same block as Chungking Mansions) is a ‘7/11’ establishment. From about 7pm until midnight the store (and the sidewalk immediately outside it) attracts a crowd of mostly African asylum-seekers and refugees. During this time the place becomes a rendezvous point, a bar (incognito), an information desk, and a discussion forum. The Africans gathering around 7/11 are not all the same though. The African Muslims usually do not condone alcohol consumption in the streets and stay away from such gatherings. Those who come include the relatively well-off traders looking for a good deal in Chungking Mansions for Chinese-manufactured mobile phones, watches or other commodities. Their buying power relative to the asylum-seekers 105 is evident in the clothes they wear, the drinks they hold and the phones they talk into. Their economic well-being, though better than the asylum-seekers, is still modest. They are not inclined to wander off to the many upscale locations on either side of the harbour within easy reach from the central location of Chungking Mansions. That space in that time fulfills the functions of public space for that community. Later at night South Asian sex workers join the small crowd. They usually sit in small groups on the doorsteps of businesses neighboring 7/11, waiting passively rather than soliciting aggressively. The sex trade is also market-segmented - marginalized clients served by marginalized workers – in the what, I’m told, is the ‘affordable’ end of that particular market. Star Ferry Star Ferry is an iconic institution of Hong Kong. This ferry service across the Victoria Harbour connects Kowloon with Hong Kong Island. The pier from where these ferries leave Tsim Sha Tsui is known simply as Star Ferry. The place is usually filled with commuters and tourists. It is very close to a large mall and various other retail centers. Covered spaces at Star Ferry are often used as a space for displays. For example, the Falun Gong group, which has been outlawed in Mainland China, uses this space periodically to display posters and exhibitions about their faith and the alleged mistreatment at the hands of the PRC government. Star Ferry is relatively deserted late at night and the exhibition spaces transform into dormitories for asylum-seekers to sleep at night for a few hours before the bustle returns in the morning. 106 Mirador Mansion Mirador Mansions is located in the next block North from Chungking Mansions on Nathan Road. It is in some ways similar to Chungking Mansions, in that some members of the same community use this building too. Mirador , however, has a lower profile and is more residential in character. A lot of asylum-seekers are able to find shelter in Mirador, often with 8 or more people sharing a room. The architecture of Mirador Mansions is also very different from Chungking Mansions. There is no common mall beyond the shops on the ground level. Further, the commercial establishments there do not cater to an ethnic market, nor does any ethnic minority dominate the provision of goods and services available there. Mirador contributes to the lives of asylum-seekers and other ethnic minorities in Hong Kong. Its role is akin to a dormitory extension of Chungking Mansions, and it does not have nearly the same cultural or economic significance. Tailor shops A large number of South Asian-operated tailoring businesses dot the streetfronts of Tsim ShaTsui, not least around Chungking Mansions. Many of these businesses have been around for generations. Not only are these tailor shops part of the ethnic enclave economy (discussed in more detail in Chapter 5) but they also contribute to the image of Chungking Mansions in a profound way. The sidewalks in front of Chungking Mansions and in its immediate vicinity are known for the aggressive marketing of businesses, predominantly restaurants inside Chungking Mansions and the tailor shops around it. Restaurant “recruiters” usually stay right in front of the business entrance and in the 107 entrance corridor. Tailor shop representatives are scattered on sidewalks near the building. Throughout the day, particularly in the evening, tailor shop representatives walk up to pedestrians offering “discounts” on suits. Often working on a commission basis with more than one business they might also offer a “cheap Rolex”. More than one of these shops reported having originally been located inside Chungking Mansions, moving out in search of a larger space and better image. Internal differentiation in Chungking Mansions To guide this analysis I will use two questions derived from the preceding review. (i) How does internal differentiation affect the definition of an enclave, particularly with regards to ‘choice’? (ii) The case study is a multi-ethnic enclave – why was it formed as such and how can we predict its recurrence? The first research question is regarding the impact of internal differentiation. I will begin the analysis with a discussion on the three kinds of internal differentiation that were found to be most influential in determining the behavior of people and the production of space in Chungking Mansions – (i) identity (ascriptive), (ii) class, and (iii) political status. In the second section of the analysis I will discuss the effect of this differentiation on the positioning of Chungking Mansions within the ‘ethnic economy/ ethnic enclave economy’ and ‘ghetto/ enclave’ oppositions. I hope that this will provide a good picture of the nuances of the case, and contribute to relevant theories, addressing some basic tensions. I will then conclude with an assessment of whether Chungking Mansions is a hierarchical creation, whether it is voluntary, and whether it is desirable. 108 Fieldwork at Chungking Mansions revealed a diverse and fractured society. Figure 1 shows the main divisions of society in the place. The figure also shows some of the alliances and associations (in circles) that appear sporadically. The society is fragmented along lines of (i) Identity (ascriptive markers such as race, nationality, religion), (ii) Political status class, and (iii) Citizenship. These divisions are reflected in Figure 1. Finally, ‘Gender’ is another important variable and will be discussed at the end of the analysis. Identity: Race, Nationality and Religion Ascriptive markers of identity such as race, nationality and religion are the main divisions within the society of Chungking Mansions. In some cases these differences run deep and are associated with significant historical baggage. The South Asian, Chinese and African racial groups form the most obvious divisions. (This must immediately be followed by the caveat that each of these three categories equates a geographical unit with a race, which is inaccurate. Each of these groups actually contains more than one race within it.) This division is shown in the top row of Table 3-1. Since this study is focusing on the South Asian group, we will deconstruct this group more carefully. The second row of Table 3-1 shows the nationalities that constitute the South Asian group – citizens of India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The third row of Table 3-1 shows the third basis of solidarity and group-formation within Chungking Mansions – religion. Of these three divisions (race, nationality and religion) the South Asian population of Chungking Mansions is affected most by nationality. The importance of a certain identity Figure 3.3: Chungking Mansions and vicinity, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong Mirador Mansion 7/11 at Mody Road Chungking Mansions Kowloon Park / Kowloon Mosque Star Ferry Pier Source: Map from Hong Kong Planning Department, marked up by author 109 110 Table 3-1 : Internal differentiation in Chungking Mansions society Nationality South Asian Chinese African Others Within S.Asia (for example) India Nepal Bangladesh Pakistan Religion Hindu Sikh Muslim Christian Others Status Business owners Residents Legal workers Others HK ID card holders Visa holders Torture claim/ UN refugees / Asylum claim with HK immigration Overstayers Illegal immigrants identity is also influenced by an individual’s class position and experiences in Hong Kong. Mutations and transformations happen often when individuals evaluate their new experiences in a mixed and stressful environment. I found asylum-seekers who bonded more with other asylum-seekers, even if they were from another country, and found themselves disillusioned by the business-like treatment they received from their fellow- nationals and from members of their own religion. In this case, the “other” in their mind changed to someone else outside their newly redefined in-group – either the local Chinese, or White (loosely conflated with ‘Western’ people). Consider this extract from an interview with a Pakistani asylum-seeker. They just say that your case does not fit the category as per the 1959 Convention. What category is that? Will they give it to Nawaz Sharif? Will they give it [asylum] to Bush? – their father. They will give to those people who were born with a golden spoon. They will get it. The poor have no rights. The poor have a different criteria altogether. 111 This individual was refused asylum by the United Nations. His case is dealt with in greater detail in the next chapter. Here I want to highlight his reaction. His angst is directed against the elite, in terms of both privilege and nationality, and his in-group is “the poor”. I asked him if he spoke much with people of other nationalities in a similar situation. Yes we talk – everyone is shouting the same thing. Nothing is happening for anyone. Everyone is worried. And everyone says the United Nations is not doing anything….. They do it for some people. Those who have a family (status) are helped. There is discrimination – Muslims are not helped. I also asked him his opinion of Hong Kong people. I had been here twice before – to Hong Kong. I knew that in Hong Kong people can manage – human rights are respected here. But after I came here I realized that it is a different story in practice. Everything is a drama – there’s nothing – an elephant’s teeth, different ones for eating than for showing….. [Hong Kong people] act as if we’re some sort of disease. The well-educated community they don’t feel bad about our presence. The Chinese women often cover their mouths when they see us as if we’re stinking. They stink most of all. A Muslim reads the namaaz five times a day – cleans himself 5 times. They don’t cut their hair – they don’t stay clean – and they tell others that they stink – it is they who stink more. The government here is good though. They have the right intention. The UN does nothing. And emigration – if they work – people’s lives can be made. 112 Another Pakistani asylum-seeker had a similar opinion. I don’t like the Chinese people at all. They are so proud in the world – they think that they have been born into paradise. Except white people they don’t like people of other nations. They are so proud. They don’t even want to talk. They’re not educated – they don’t have the courtesy to talk properly. They are animals. I’d like to see them go out and work in another country. They are worse than animals…. [A] Chinese won’t even tell you the way. They don’t know how to talk. They follow only white people. They are their fathers. They created this place. So they follow them. No other nation is respected. You are traveling in a bus and they will cover their face with a cloth – that you are smelling. This is how they are. And look at them – they smell so much. They don’t bathe for 2 months. And they think of others as third class. These vitriolic accounts, although somewhat exaggerated (and plainly racist) need to be considered in the context of being confronted by an unsympathetic UN (in some case rightly so) and an unfriendly host population. The stories of locals covering their noses were related by many people, which may be partly racism, and partly a general post- SARS fear, especially with the Chungking Mansions’ reputation of having been the place where it started. The point of citing these words is not to make a general statement about the treatment this individual received being a common occurrence. The point is to show that identity is constantly renegotiated, and the configuration of in-groups and out-groups may change. 113 A Bangladeshi asylum-seeker also spoke of his contradictory feelings towards staying in Hong Kong. I am not saying I “cannot” [adapt] … I am saying I don’t really like it. It’s not even that I don’t want to. It doesn’t feel like our Bengali culture – that is what I like. But if I am given residence here, then of course, I will have to adapt and live here, for my life….. In the beginning it will be difficult. But it will be okay with time….. if I bring up my child in this culture, then there will be no problem for the child. But we have grown up in a different culture, so it is a little tough for us. But if my child is here from a young age it will not be a problem. At the same time other interviews suggest that these attitudes are changing and Hong Kong people are opening up increasingly to foreigners in their city. From an African asylum-seeker’s perspective this is explained by globalization. I think globalization has changed the mind of Chinese people – they are trying to learn the culture of Africans and other foreigners … actually they are not trying to learn – they have a lukewarm attitude of always negative ideas – they have the ideas their parents gave to them – that blacks are like this and like that – they can kill you – they live on trees and so on – now they have learned from those of us who have traveled to HK – they have learned that blacks have unique culture – they are people you can rely on – I think it is about globalization that has changed the attitude of Chinese people. When I came here – even to say hello was like a dream. But now things have changed. 114 Africans, in general, are more keenly aware of race to begin with. A narrative of the “brotherhood” of African people is commonly heard. One interviewee, also an asylum- seeker said, African people – our culture is that even if you haven’t met the other person you have to at least greet – he is your brother…. When we are here we don’t think of the problems back at home – we think of ourselves as one – brothers. There’s nothing to say that you are my enemy or we are having problems back at home. So just do things together. This account may be slightly exaggerated as I did observe a separation between Africans of Muslim and Christian faiths. At the 7/11 on Mody Road (with Nathan Road), the first intersection North of Chungking Mansions, Africans of different countries gather together at night to discuss their situations in Hong Kong, politics in their home countries and football (which also involves the politics of African players in European leagues). The Muslims, however, are absent from this group because of the involvement of alcohol and, occasionally, sex workers. Even so, the relationships between African groups (of different countries, speaking different languages, and practicing different religions) is distinctly more friendly than the somewhat more cold separation between South Asian groups. During the six months spent on site, tensions were witnessed among the business community of Chungking Mansions on two occasions – once between Nepalese and Pakistani individuals, and once between Indian and Pakistani individuals. On both occasions people on both sides intervened very quickly, the individuals were separated 115 and the scene was restored to normal. Similarly, The Standard (1995) reports that “fists and furniture were flying when a brawl broke out” between Indians and Pakistanis and a policeman was forced to withdraw a weapon to calm things down. During interviews Indian and Pakistani business-owners claimed that they had friends in the other community and that there was no tension in Chungking Mansions – at least not more than one would expect in any community. Interviewees emphasized the need to maintain good relations in order to maintain a good business reputation for the entire place. Even if it is perceived as a compromise to work in the same place with the other community, it is a burden they are willing to bear for the sake of their business. But an African asylum-seeker who is a “third party” yet an insider in Chungking Mansions related the animosity he has observed. One thing I have learnt here – blacks are friendly to all Asians – and they don’t say I don’t like Pakistan or I don’t like India. But surprising – Indians and Pakistanis are like enemies – they are never together – but we are not like that – we are friendly to everybody. Some business-owners complained more about the illegal immigrants, including those of their own community, than they did of the business-owners of the other community. They said the illegal immigrants give the place a bad image and drive away customers to other locations of wholesale because they are hired on a commission basis. This brings class and political status (closely correlated) into the discussion on identity. 116 Class: Consciousness sans solidarity A parallel division (fourth line of Table 3-1) is ‘class’, which applies to all identity groups, and defines their relative position within Chungking Mansions. In “descending” order there are business owners, residents, legal workers and others. Business owners are relatively wealthy as compared to legal or illegal workers. They are almost always permanent residents of Hong Kong, sometimes the second generation to be running the business. They maintain close links with their family back home, frequently (though not always) in small towns or villages. Several family-owned stores reported that they had been in Hong Kong, running their businesses, for more than 15 years. Some of these business-owners have over time expanded their business into various sectors, including more than one operations inside Chungking Mansions itself (e.g. restaurant, guest house and electronics). There are now few residents in Chungking Mansions compared to the 1960s. A lot of the former “mansions” have been converted into restaurants, offices and guesthouses. A reconnaissance survey of the 5 towers showed that there are about 200 apartments in Chungking Mansions that are still used as residences. In addition, there are about 1,000 hotel rooms. So, about 3,000 people could be expected to be living in Chungking Mansions on any given night. The 17 th (top) floor of each of the 5 blocks is, however, invariably residential. This floor is not served by elevators, and the floor plan allows for bigger apartments. 17 th floor residents include both apartments of long-time residents and also transitory housing for asylum seekers, which is broken up into extremely small 117 rooms. These asylum-seekers are an exception to the rule that residents of Chungking Mansions may be categorized as middle-class Legal workers are either permanent Hong Kong residents (having been born with or acquired this status). The rules of acquiring residence and the various subgroups are discussed in more detail in the next chapter (on Citizenship). For this discussion it is only important to note that legal workers are in a lower socio-economic category than business owners and also most of the long-time residents of Chungking Mansions. This brings us to the group of refugees, asylum-seekers, illegal immigrants and others, which is actually the largest and most visible groups of people in the place, and responsible, in large part, for its image. They are the lowest socio-economic class of people in Chungking Mansions. Their situation and contribution to Chungking Mansions is discussed further below and in the next chapter. There is a strong sense of class-consciousness in Chungking Mansions (in a vulgar sense, not in the sense of having realized their position in the mode of production) but this does not translate to class solidarity. That is the people who work and live in Chungking Mansions and who use the place regularly know that it is not simply a place for immigrants. It is actually a place for relatively poor ethnic minority immigrants. The most striking evidence of this acknowledgement is the concentration of these people in and around Chungking Mansions (and also around a couple of other emerging enclaves) and their complete absence from the upscale areas of Central. Even the sidewalks where they stand and talk are around Chungking Mansions, though nothing is to stop them from 118 walking around in a mall or on the streets elsewhere in Hong Kong. There is a tacit acknowledgement that they belong here and nowhere else, which is similar to the position skid row has in Los Angeles and other US cities, that of being the assumed addresses of the cities’ poorest. I only mean this in the sense of being relegated to a designated place in the city, however the inhabitants of skid row live in far more dire conditions. Political status: multiple levels of legitimacy The group in the lowest box of Table 3-1 draws from each of the nationalities mentioned above, most being from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Here we are not talking about the permanent residents, business owners and legal employees. The individuals may be (i) refugees or asylum seekers with applications in UN and/or Hong Kong Emigration Department with pending decisions, (ii) asylum seekers whose claims have already been rejected, (iii) visa overstayers or those entering illegally, or evading the law, (iv) who have surrendered or who have been caught and have served their sentence. In categories (iii) and (iv) above those who entered Hong Kong illegally have a further compromised legal position, as compared to those who have overstayed their visa. Political status is closely correlated with economic class positions. Table 3-2 summarizes the situation of the various groups in Chungking Mansions with regards to their Socio-economic Class and Political Status (i.e. the legitimacy of their presence in HK). The processes of climbing up the ladder of legitimacy of political status and meanings of citizenship are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Here I only intend to show the internal diversity of the society to aid the analysis within the Ghetto/Enclave framework. 119 High political status implies permanent residence in Hong Kong, and is correlated with a higher economic standing. The Medium level implies dependence status or a work visa, or a legitimate claim for asylum in the UN or with HK Immigration Department, and is correlated with relatively lower economic standing. Individuals with low political status are those whose claim has either been rejected, or those who have become involved with illegal activities. This group is struggling in every way and has lowest economic standing. Of course, for those working illegally, their economic status depends entirely on how long they can evade the law. Table 3-2: Immigrant social positions in Chungking Mansions Political status (legitimacy of presence in HK) Socio-economic Class High Medium Low Upper South Asian old- timers Middle Permanent resident employees Other employees, non-perm. residents Lower Legitimate asylum- seekers Illegals / refused asylum-seekers In this section I described the diversity of the immigrant society of Chungking Mansions. In the next two sections I will discuss how internal differentiation creates affects the classification of the place as a Ghetto or Enclave. I will begin with the reasons why Chungking Mansions may be termed a Ghetto. In particular I will talk about the phenomenon of “ruralism” that lends it this image. In the subsequent section I will analyze the place as an Enclave, with particular focus on the ethnic (enclave) economy. 120 Chungking Mansions as a Ghetto Ethnic enclaves are either seen as “multicultural exoticism” or as “immigrant ghettos” (Werbner, 2001). Chungking Mansions can qualify as either one depending on which aspect one focuses on. By the late 1990s the place had earned itself a reputation of crime and squalor. In 1994, Wong Kar-Wai's widely acclaimed authorial work Chungking Express, named partially after the building, seemed to solidify the untame and criminal image of Chungking Mansions. In fact the Chinese name for the film translates to “Chungking Jungle”. The film still continues to be influential in popular perceptions, especially of foreigners. In a survey conducted online to gauge outsiders’ perceptions of Chungking Mansions, responding to a question about the image that the film Chungking Express created in the respondents’ mind about Chungking Mansions, respondents used the words ‘cool’, ‘illegal’, ‘subaltern’, ‘underground’, ‘dim’, ‘untidy’, ‘crowded’, ‘hidden places’, ‘mystery’, ‘illusion’, ‘romantic’, ‘variety’, ‘dynamic’, ‘complex’, ‘free’, ‘dark’ and ‘increased curiosity’. It should be mentioned that only 62% of respondents had seen the film, and of these only 28% said that it influenced their opinion of Chungking Mansions. Both the film and the survey will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. After a change of management in 1994 the image was partially restored, but has not completely left the popular imagination. In the same survey 16 out of the 36 people who responded to an open-ended question about whether their opinion changed after visiting Chungking Mansions, said that it was less scary, dangerous, disorderly than they had 121 imagined. All others said that their opinion did not change – that the place was as dark and dangerous (or worse) as they had imagined. In all cases the image going in was negative. There was no significant correlation between these responses and the respondents’ political status, income level, or place of residence (HK Island, Kowloon, New Territories). With its continued survival and successful transformation over time, Chungking Mansions also became known for its numerous budget motels and restaurants. As Chungking Mansions became a backpackers' haven, it's success came to be closely related with the success of south Nathan Road as a tourist-oriented market street. The fanfare peaked with the building’s appearance in Time Magazine as one of the top 10 places to visit in Asia. With multiculturalism itself becoming a hot issue, Chungking Mansions now attracts numerous researchers and filmmakers seeking to study and document the exotic experience that is Chungking Mansions. Very few of them, however, stay well into the night, betraying the lingering doubts. In terms of race, income, language, dress and behavior – that is, because of both its poverty and its habitus Chungking Mansions appears to be a ghetto. A majority of the people in Chungking Mansions seem different from Hong Kongers. Several respondents of the online survey claimed that going to Chungking Mansions felt like being in a foreign country, e.g. an Indian bazaar. The respondents were not suggesting that Chungking Mansions does not belong in Hong Kong (inquired through a different question), but rather highlighting its being an exotic place. 122 In this section I will present evidence in terms of photographs from inside Chungking Mansions and further findings from the survey on outsiders’ perceptions to show why Chungking Mansions has an image of a ghetto. There are two ways in which Chungking Mansions acquires the image of a ghetto. First- because of its structural conditions and second, because of its habitus, both of which appear alien in Hong Kong, particularly in the heart of Tsim Sha Tsui, in the neighborhood of landmark buildings such as the Peninsula and Holiday Inn hotels. First, I will present evidence to illustrate the ghetto- like physical conditions of the place, and then discuss the issue of the habitus in context of the phenomenon of “ruralization”. Poor sanitary and structural conditions Figures 3.4a through 3.4f show the sanitary and structural conditions inside Chungking Mansions. Fires have been a long-standing hazard in the building. The first picture (Figure 3.4a) was captured from the rooftop of Block E when a fire broke out in the 7 th floor of the building. Everyone on higher floors was evacuated to the top of the block, across the roof to another block, and then down. At the lower levels of the common 2- storey platform, the shopkeepers were not even aware of a fire and were surprised when the fire trucks pulled up outside. Soon there was a horde of photographers and news channels reporting the ‘event’. It was business as usual downstairs even as the fire department went to work extinguishing the flames in Block E. This regular occurrence which has claimed lives in the past is a constant threat to the building, especially so given that it is impossible for fire trucks to access most parts of it. Figure 3.4b is a photograph taken from the platform level (Level 3, top of the two-storey mall, from Level 3 on the 5 123 buildings rise separately). A makeshift arrangement of wooden and metal structural “elements” has been used to create an additional multipurpose space for hanging clothes and storage. This overflowing space is evidence of the density of the living conditions inside, where former apartments have been divided up to accommodate the maximum possible number of paying tenants. These shanty-like constructions along with layers of pipes, cables and fittings are reminiscent of slums. Figure 3.4c is a picture of one of many chutes that run through the 17-storeys of the building, to provide “fresh” air to bedrooms and baths that have windows opening into them. These have turned into de-facto garbage dumps that are difficult to access and clean. Not only the narrow chutes, but also more open areas on the platform level are also turned into garbage dumps (Figure 3.4d). I will return to this image later in the next section, with regards to the general impression this kind of lack of communal responsibility creates. Figure 3.4e shows a clothesline, not uncommon all over Hong Kong, and ubiquitous on all five towers of Chungking Mansions, stretching out from one of the windows, highlighting the lack of space in tight accommodations of the building. Figure 3.4f shows a poster inside Chungking Mansions warning residents against Malaria and advising them to remove stagnant water. These are only a few of the images that create an image of poor structural conditions. Ruralism in an urban setting Urbanization is most commonly understood as the growth of urban areas, where the term ‘urban’ refers to the existence of one (or a combination) of the following predefined 124 features – a threshold population and population density, employment in secondary and tertiary activities, and a local government. Needless to say there are certain social and cultural codes and norms that are associated with ‘urban’ areas, which vary with context, and do not necessarily become part of the definition of ‘urban’. Lefebvre (2003) posits a line from 0% to 100% urbanization (p.7), which he terms a spatial and temporal scale, and represents the evolution of human society from its hunter-gatherer phase to contemporary cities. Describing the Renaissance in Europe as essentially an urban phenomenon he argues that the city through its mediation of reason and rationality “clarified the opposition between urbanity (cultured) and rusticity (naïve and brutal)…. [T]he dimension of knowledge and reason…dominated and constituted a totality: the city” (pp 12-13). What I want to derive from Lefebvre’s is the idea that being ‘urban’ is being at a point on a continuum between complete absence of urbanism to being completely embedded and surrounded by it. Further, ‘urbanism’ in this regard stands for certain attitudes and codes of behavior that are associated with modernity and civility, however it may be defined in any given context. But context matters more subtly in another way. The existence of different contexts means that there are many scales of zero-to-hundred per cent urbanism, and all societies around the world do not share the same scale. In Chungking Mansions a large number of newcomers jump from an earlier point on the spatial-temporal scale of urbanism to a later (contemporary) point. But they also jump from one scale to an altogether different one. That is, they immigrate to a city where the meaning of urbanism (culture, “sophistication”, rules of interaction, codes of consumption etc. are different). 125 This is an understanding based on the experience of European Enlightenment, which happened to coincide closely with colonization of much of what is now the ‘developing’ world. In many of the colonized societies then, including most of South Asia and Africa, the indigenous urban continuum was ruptured by the introduction of colonial urban planning and urbanisms. Cities in South Asian and Africa are famously inhabited by vast numbers of urban poor, most of whom are migrants from rural areas attracted to the cities in the hope of finding a niche in the urban economy. This creates a counter phenomenon to what Lefebvre considers the linear progression of urbanization – to wit, ruralization. It occurs due to both the movement of rural immigrants to urban areas, and also because the boundaries of urban areas grow rapidly past what used to be outlying rural areas. By ruralization I refer to the process by which the rural (i.e. pre-urban, pre-modern, “rustic”) way of life reasserts itself in the city. I do not intend to argue that certain islands in the city revert back to an agricultural economy, or a more primitive system of self- government. My concern is more with the habitus of rural life. From this point forth, I shall refer to the phenomenon as ruralism in the city. Ruralism becomes manifest in many ways. One significant way is in terms of a distinctly pre-modern social contract, so that citizens display diminished care for public resources and civic life. If we think the ‘urban’ or ‘urbane’ as a set of codes and rules, rather than simply a set of physical attributes, we can understand how the degree of urbanization may be thought to diminish as the codes are compromised. By ‘compromised’ here I mean that the rural elements in cities cannot completely adopt them or adapt to them. Thus by ruralism I actually mean less-urbanism (from the perspective of the destination city), or a movement (tendency) towards the rural end of the continuum. This can be 126 induced by immigrants from rural areas (villages) or small towns, peri-urban areas. That is, the agents of ruralization need not come from rural areas only, but from areas that are themselves closer to the rural end of the continuum than the destination or host city. I would like to reiterate that the idea of ‘ruralism’ should not be understood to imply a judgment on anyone’s way of life. Rather, the point is to highlight the differences in the meanings of ‘urbanism’, and the resultant disruption created by Chungking Mansions in the urbanism of Hong Kong. The disruption that “villagers in the city” (Gans, 1965) create in urbanism has been noted before (Abu-Lughod, 1961, Mangin, 1970 and Afshar, 1994). My contribution, based on this case study, is that, the disruption in urbanism caused by ruralism could be two-fold - by virtue of rural origin and foreign origin. In Hong Kong “ruralism” is most clearly visible at Chungking Mansions. It is Chungking Mansions, in the heart of the city, which has become the hub of agency for immigrants from Africa and South Asia, who are twice alienated from the local context. Firstly, they are foreigners. Secondly, they are from rural areas or small towns in their countries of origin, and therefore unexposed to even the most rudimentary homogenizing elements of consumptive urbanism, which has come to be accepted as a phenomenon of globally networked economic systems. In other words, they display ruralism through behavior, ways of life and habitus that is typical of a less urban society, and also differently urban society, as compared to Hong Kong. 127 Based on observations and interviews conducted, I estimate that 70%-80% of the employees and asylum-seekers in Chungking Mansions were found to have come from a small town or village. That is, the respondents were not from the major ‘metropolitan’ cities. I should be the first to point out that the estimate is based on formal interviews and informal conversations and not generated by scientific sampling. Further, often respondents offered the name of the closest recognizable city when asked, and only revealed the actual place of origin when asked again. Sometimes, for privacy, or for not wanting to be “labeled” as “villagers” they would not provide a village name, though they would admit to being from “near” a town but not from the town itself. In most cases the towns themselves were relatively small urban areas. The principal areas of origin identified were Punjab for Pakistanis; again Punjab, with some representation of the South (mainly Kerala and Tamil Nadu) among Indians; and areas around Dhaka and Kathmandu for Bangladeshis and Nepalese respectively. Respondents from Sri Lanka were few and showed no geographical bias. Some Bangladeshi and Nepalese nationals claimed to be from India, ostensibly because of a perceived sense of status associated more with the Indian community in Hong Kong that the other South Asian communities. These immigrants bring practices and codes that are indigenous to their cultures (that is, foreign to Hong Kong), and relatively rural in character. This case is an example of how Hong Kong imports its share of ruralization. Similar islands of ruralism are also created by other immigrant groups in Hong Kong, not least, the low-income (and sometimes illegal) immigrants from mainland China. 128 Janet Abu-Lughod (1961) used the idea of ‘ruralization’ in describing the phenomenon of rural-urban migration in Egypt. In this article she also made a comparison between what she observed in Egypt and certain “ethnic ghettoes” (p.25) in the United States. In claiming similarities on grounds of physical, economic, social and cultural characteristics between rural Egypt and sections of new urban Egypt, the author did not treat income as a primary intervening variable. Indeed low-income families around the world share certain physical and social characteristics. This weakness notwithstanding, Abu-Lughod introduced a useful term in planning theory lexicon. The term has since been revisited, mainly in the context of slums in major cities of the developing world. Mangin’s (1970) edited volume, for example, collects case studies of “peasants in cities” from Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Puerto Rico, Mexico, Morocco, Indonesia, Uganda, Zambia and Nigeria. Abu-Lughod (1961) confirms that urban and rural are extremes of a continuum rather than a dichotomous variable. She then argues that the experience of the immigrants in the city is “cushioned” by various circumstances and institutions. Thus she concludes that rural to urban immigration does not imply an individual or group’s transfer from one extreme of the continuum to another, but rather a shift towards ‘urbanity’. This indicates a process of transition (cultural, social and economic) for the immigrant and also for the urban space she comes to inhabit. Thus a hybrid urbanism is created in developing countries marked by a high rate of rural-urban migration. I agree with Abu-Lughod that immigrants do not need to adapt dramatically when they move to the city and that there is transition before transformation. This is also true in the context of international rural to urban movement. If a large number of immigrants are 129 rural, then immigrant enclaves become de-facto rural enclaves. Chungking Mansions is exactly such a place. Moreover there is a high turnover rate for residents and workers of Chungking Mansions, which allows it to remain a perpetual haven for rural immigrants seeking opportunities and anonymity. The idea of ruralization developed here follows the various dimensions used by Abu-Lughod. As in Cairo, here too, ruralization (Abu-Lughod’s preferred term) has physical, economic, social and cultural dimensions. But it is the cultural dimension that is of interest here, and it is this aspect that I am calling “ruralism”. This is not a narrative involving “an oversimplified image of a one-way adjustment of rural man to a ‘stable’ urban culture, despite lip service paid to feedback and mutual assimilation” (Abu- Lughod, 1961, p.22). Indeed the whole point here is to study space (our comparable proxy for Abu-Lughod’s “stable urban culture”) as a dependent variable. Indeed the author herself underlines the importance of the cultural variable. The physical attributes of Chungking Mansions, though ordinary by Hong Kong building standards, are much better than any slum in the countries or origin of the immigrants using the space. Indeed slums in Hong Kong itself are in much worse condition than Chungking Mansions. Chungking Mansions was not listed among the sites for renewal by the Urban Renewal Authority in the Urban Renewal Strategy of 2001, which listed nine sites for redevelopment over the next 20 years, to “contain the problem of urban deterioration”. Further, there have been significant improvements in the recent years. The “Incorporated Owners of Chungking Mansions” have made changes to enhance public safety and security, cleanliness, information services, and the general image of the place. The report 130 of the 12 th Management Committee of the Incorporated Owners (2005) claims the success of its 5-year Improvement Plan (although it reports fiscal problems for the management committee.) The economic conditions follow the same trend. Though Chungking Mansions is home to a largely poor community of workers (though wealthy owners), they are generally better off than they were in their places of origin. Socially and culturally the immigrants to Chungking Mansions do undergo a tremendous culture shock only partially allayed by the presence of their compatriots and others sharing their situation. These last two of Abu-Lughod’s variables are of interest to my understanding of “ruralism”. Let us take a look at how social-cultural ruralism is distinct from physical and economic aspects. Whereas the physical and economic aspects represent a similarity of outcome the social-cultural aspects are transferred by human agency. In other words, physical and economic ruralization tells us how urban space begins to appear like rural space. The reason for this is the economic marginalization of the people involved. For rural to urban migrants, poor structural conditions and low indicators of wealth, health and education are directly related to low income. The cultural codes they bring to the city, however, are not related to income per se, but to the habitus, traditions, values and socialization associated with rural (less urban and differently urban) life. These have a more subtle, behavioral impact on city space. Thus this model of ruralization accepts and develops Abu-Lughod’s understanding that the immigrant does not simply adapt to the city, but also changes it. The rural immigrant does not change the behavior of urban residents, but, 131 through a place like Chungking Mansions, creates a disruption in the urbanism of the city. The Chungking Mansions case shows some typical characteristics of rural-urban migration, seen anywhere in South Asia, and in many other locations in the developing country context. The case study shows that rural immigrants from South Asia collect in a well-defined space in Hong Kong. They tend to form groups with those who share their geographical, religious and linguistic identities. An overwhelming number of them are in Hong Kong with an economic agenda. These economic endeavors may not always be entirely legal. They change jobs frequently. They are often stigmatized by the host society. A large number of these immigrants also experience a culture shock in the city, and adapt by changing attitudes, if not practices. For a long time Chungking Mansions has been associated with an image of criminality. The image was acquired in the 1980s when Chungking Mansions became a centre for drug trade. This was, however, followed by a cleanup operation which included instating new management, exhaustive security measures, and increased police checks. This increased attention from the police resulted in the formation of special working group in Tsim Sha Tsui Police Station dedicated entirely to one building – Chungking Mansions. Despite these efforts and the flourishing businesses (mostly budget hotels, restaurants and wholesale small electronics) now operating in the towers of Chungking Mansions, the image of crime still lingers. 132 Ms Lam (President of the Incorporated Owners of Chungking Mansions) commenting on the challenges of working with international tenants, employees and visitors, said that they have different requirements… [their] standards of hygiene are different. It is a difficult place to manage. They [foreigners] don’t always see eye to eye with our standards. Spitting on walls is common, and it looks like blood. Some throw things out of the windows. Hygiene standards are lower. Indians and Pakistanis urinate in the back alley. Some Africans don’t know how to use the lift. It is difficult to impose standards. It is difficult to control what happens in the dark. The section of the sidewalk in front of the building where scores of South Asians and Africans gather to smoke and talk in the evening (and in smaller numbers throughout the day) is unlike any other place in Hong Kong, as is the Seven-Eleven at the corner of Nathan Road and Mody Road. The codes of behavior are different here than most places in Hong Kong. Groups of Africans or South Asians often gather and drink on the sidewalk. They surround these sections of the sidewalk, sitting on the shopfronts and also on the railing at the edge of the sidewalk, and using the small section of the sidewalk as a plaza. This kind of activity is uncommon in Hong Kong. At night sex-workers join the milieu, taking up any remaining seating in the same area. There is a tacit agreement of sharing this time and space with these sex-workers. It is as if all parties (South Asians, African, sex-workers) acknowledge belonging to the same place even though they may have little to do with each other. 133 There are many salesmen on the sidewalk all day, but their activity intensifies in the evening. They compete aggressively against each other for the attention of pedestrians – passing out flyers and inviting them to the hotel or restaurant they represent. The loud marketing is often too much for tourists and Hong Kong locals, who have an entirely different idea of their personal bubble of space. This section of the population will not be interviewing for jobs in software engineering or business administration. It is this army of middlemen, speaking heavily-accented broken English, invading personal space, dressed shabbily, and behaving crassly – as much out of ignorance as defiance, that illustrate ruralism. This ‘rural’ image of Chungking Mansions is formed before one arrives at its doors. These aspects of ruralism are social and cultural. Coming out of villages and small towns in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, the immigrants in Chungking Mansions are neither used to foreigners nor their urban codes (such as standards of personal space). Let me underline that this is not being said in a pejorative sense at all. It is, rather, an unfortunate circumstance quite out of control of the immigrants themselves, who are unaware of even the existence of such codes far less trained in their practice. The result however is that there is certain degree of prejudice formed in the minds of the onlooker about both the race and the place. Ethnic (Enclave) Economy of Chungking Mansions In the previous section I presented a case for classifying Chungking Mansions as a ‘ghetto’. In this section I will argue that despite poor quality of life and other indicators 134 resembling a ghetto, based on an economic account Chungking Mansions could also be classified as an enclave. One of the points of contention within EEE is whether the ethnic economy has a spatial boundary. Various cases provide conflicting evidence regarding this question. At Chungking Mansions the space of the economy is quite clearly delineated. Although economic networks expectedly breach any kind of physical boundaries, a large part of the business that goes on in Chungking Mansions can be viewed as 'contained' within the physical structure of the building. Werbner's idea of an ethnic niche fits well with Chungking Mansions. South Asian coethnics can be found running businesses at other locations near Chungking Mansions too (within a 1-mile radius), but these businesses, usually tailoring, are very few in number relative to the concentration at Chungking Mansions. Concentration of businesses is usually studied in two ways – first, the concentration of coethnics in a particular business or line of work, and second the concentration of (co)ethnic-owned businesses of any kind. Chungking Mansions meets both criteria. There is a concentration of South Asian coethnics in (a) restaurants and (b) electronics and mobile phone businesses in Chungking Mansions. In addition, beyond these two businesses, the enclave has a large number of South Asian-owned stores in close proximity to each other (i.e. within Chungking Mansions) including motels, travel agencies, salons, convenience stores etc. In addition there are also a large number of ethnic niche businesses – that is, businesses that cater to an ethnic market. These include stores selling fast food, traditional apparel, ethnic groceries and DVDs (see Figure 3.5a through 3.5f). The mobile phone business is very much like a “middleman economy” Portes and Manning, 1986). 135 The entrepot characterization is apt for the mobile phone business but not for Chungking Mansions as a whole. The enclave changed its image and the mix of products and services on offer over time. Despite making these changes successfully and thriving over the decades, it appears that the enclave has not grown physically. That is, its physical boundaries have not grown to incorporate larger tracts of the neighborhood. This is a little misleading as the economy has been growing inside the building – that is, ever larger sections of the five towers have been brought under commercial use – especially by motel and restaurant uses. In addition, existing businesses have grown bigger over time. Some businesses have been around for more than 40 years and have the third generation of a family managing them. Some families now own more than one business and many have other operations in other parts of the city. The lack of outward physical expansion of the enclave could be attributed to spatial organization. With the number of units in the building fixed, and rents high in the neighboring areas (already being put to profitable uses), the ethnic enclave is constrained to Chungking Mansions for the time being. Changes Inside Chungking Mansions To recapitulate, Chungking Mansions is a single building with five 15-storey towers rising on top of a two-storey ‘platform’. The first two levels, which constitute the platform, are dedicated to commercial uses. The rest of the towers, however, were originally planned for residential use in 1961 when the building received its planning permit, hence the name “mansions”. Zoning regulation allowed restricted commercial 136 uses in residential zoning in keeping with the traditional urban pattern of Hong Kong. The rent gap was quickly noticed and the property was slowly converted to commercial uses, primarily motels and restaurants. Figure 3.6 shows the building plan for the ground floor of the building. My purpose here is to provide an overview of the physical characteristics of the inside of the building. The entrance lobby is highlighted in blue color. This area has been renovated several times and features several money exchange service outlets near the entrance and an information/ security desk near the staircase. Other services including DVD stores, phone cards, groceries, eateries etc. start from around the back of this highlighted space and are spread all over the ground floor. The sign announcing the name of the building features gold lettering on a green marble background. Flooring in the entrance way is sparkling clean. The ceiling of the entrance corridor has recently been redone with a shiny reflective surface. In the front lobby and on the first (ground) floor in general, the overall look is one of cleanliness and good management. The crowds of South Asians and Africans at the entrance way may create an image of chaos in the mind of an average Hong Konger, but it is easy to see that there has been a marked effort to project an image of control and safety in the place to inspire confidence in consumers and potential investors. The intent is for the Chungking Mansions brand to be associated with wealth and high value. The bright (and somewhat kitschy) entrance lobby contrasts sharply with other parts of the building. The lights are dimmer and alleys narrower as one moves towards the back of 137 the building. Cleanliness and order also are also compromised towards the back. Away from the entrance the currency exchange outlets, give way to South Asian restaurants. Some of the restaurants have seating in the corridor – creating small gathering places The second floor has more businesses and restaurants, and looks similar to the ground (first) floor. Before we proceed it is important to note that the part of the second level overlooking the front of the building (Nathan Road side) has a separate access from the rest of the building. This small part of the building has two establishments – a small shopping mall called Chungking Express (exactly the same as Wong’s film) dominated by the cosmetics retail chain ‘Sasa’, and a chain restaurant called Café Coral. The two parts of the building operate separately and attract distinct clientele. These two floors together constitute the shopping arcade, which was part of the original plan for the building. Inside the main building, on the first two levels retailers sell clothes, bags, trinkets, DVDs, small consumer electronics and groceries. Wholesalers specialize in mobile phones and other small electronic goods. Services here include shipping, travel agencies, currency exchange, internet access, salons and restaurants. Tailors, present in large numbers in the streets around Chungking Mansions, are conspicuously absent inside the building, which is an indication of the negative perception of Chungking Mansions as a business address except for a well-established niche market. Stairwells are dimly lit but kept clean. There are trash cans at every level of the stairwell. The walls are discolored in many places. Graffiti is present but sporadic. The motels vary greatly in quality of furniture, flooring and wall finishes. Restaurants usually have to 138 economize on space. It is usually quite easy to recognize the blueprint of the former apartment with the bedrooms turned into dining rooms. It is common to find kitchen provisions stocked outside the restaurant or near the entrance. Elevators are very small in size and allow only eight people on at any time. Often these are cramped by people carrying goods. It is common to see long queues outside the elevators in the morning and evenings. Employees are seen carrying large trays of food from kitchens of restaurants on upper floors to their subsidiary vending windows on the ground level, and to offices and motels all over the building. Both floors are cleaner and less overflowing with goods and packaging as compared to images from earlier years, and also as compared to 2005 when I visited the place for the first time. The first thought that struck me on entering the building in 2007 was that someone cares about how the place looks and the image it projects. The annual report of the Incorporated Owners of Chungking Mansions (2005) reports improvements in safety features and facilities (floor tiles, lifts etc.) The upgrade has definitely made the entrance lobby and the ground floor of the shopping arcade a neater, more orderly and more inviting space. There are now bright lights and reflective surfaces instead of the darkness that tourists used to peer into with trepidation. The building shows evidence of layers of improvements. Figures 3.7a (front lobby entrance) and 3.7b (security camera) show some of the improvements made by the Incorporated Owners’ Association. As noted earlier, the lobby is well-lit, the floor is shining, and the bright, clean look is well highlighted by the reflective surface on the ceiling. 139 One of the most significant changes in the building has been made by the numerous hotels in the five towers. Hotels have added rooms by dividing existing rooms in the former apartments into ever smaller units, often no more than four feet in width. Figure 3.7c and 3.7d show typical single and double rooms in Chungking Mansions. The single room is as wide as a single bed, and the double room is as wide as the length of a bed. This is a typical arrangement in the Chungking Mansions guest houses. The rooms often have no access to fresh air and have to be sufficed with air conditioning units, which open into 15-storey ducts running all the way down to the first floor of the building. These ducts, created to provide fresh air to internally “locked” rooms without windows, ironically have transformed into garbage chutes, collecting all kinds of household waste at the bottom or the 15-storey pit. Beyond these changes individual owners have undertaken a multitude of improvement projects around their properties. Figure 3.7e shows how single air conditioners have been attached to the buildings from outside, often replacing windows, with leftover spaces filled in with bricks. This pattern is typical in buildings constructed in pre-central air conditioning days, though not for buildings aspiring to be popular business addresses. Central air-conditioning is difficult to retrofit into a building, and for now the façade will have to bear these units. Figure 3.7f shows an exterior view of the North wall of the building, with a large number of similar air conditioning ‘attachments’. Other similar iterative changes that can be seen all over the building include cables and wiring, pipes and plumbing installations, and structural additions. Together they give the building a feel of being constantly under repair, and constantly in need of it. 140 The entrance corridor is clean and well-kept. A large digital screen hangs over the main entrance showing clips of TV news and advertising the building’s attractions. Immediately outside the building the sidewalk is a community space for men from Africa and South Asia. They gather in groups of two or three to socialize and talk. Others distribute printed flyers in this area as they do through the length of the block and less intensely around the area. The place becomes a de facto public space with the activity intensifying at night. Tourists, studying the prices of electronic goods, continue to walk right through the groups of foreigners late into the night. The front gate of Chungking Mansions leaves only a single door open for entry and exit after 11:00 pm. Businesses shut down by this point and all other points of entry are sealed. Tourists continue to trickle in at all hours. The second floor cannot be accessed, and only the occasional resident or lodger can be seen walking on the ground floor. The security aspects of the building were revamped completely in the late 1990s. A centralized security center is located on the second floor platform. From here all part of the building are monitored through numerous CCTV screens. From the perspective of the labor market the enclave is significant for both business owners and workers. As I have discussed earlier in this chapter the workers are highly differentiated. As we will see in the chapter on citizenship, employment is a big issue for the immigrants who use Chungking Mansions. In particular the asylum-seekers are in a vulnerable position. Often driven to desperation by dwindling personal funds as their cases drag on, asylum-seekers often look for employment though they are not legally allowed to do so. Another group is the legal workers who face a high degree of 141 Fire smoke seen from rooftop Makeshift additions to tiny rooms Chute for ventilation of bathrooms Platform level, communal dump Clotheslines extended out of windows Warning to prevent mosquito breeding Figure 3.4: Ghetto-like conditions inside Chungking Mansions a b d e f c 142 Specialized Indian sweets Halal food targeting Muslims of South Asia Bollywood poster at Western Union Traditional apparel store Ethnic provisions: snacks to shampoos Africa-bound: mobile phone wholesale Figure 3.5: Ethnic Enclave Economy inside Chungking Mansions a b d e f c 143 Entrance Lobby Elevators Circulation and exits Figure 3.6: Ground Level Shopping Arcade Plan Source: Hong Kong Planning Department 144 a b d e f c Figure 3.7: Physical changes inside Chungking Mansions 145 discrimination in Hong Kong and are also often disadvantaged linguistically. They have the right to work in Hong Kong by virtue of having stayed there for 7 years (usually as dependents). Yet another group is short-term workers, who are in Hong Kong on a short- stay (tourist) visa and also do not have the right to work. Yet they are not strictly working in Hong Kong – their job is to bring goods in their luggage and take other goods back to the home country. They are paid for this service by the employer (whom they usually know through links in the home country). The most unique group of workers in Chungking Mansions, are the trilinguals. These individuals speak their native language, English, and Cantonese. They work as agents recruiting customers for restaurants and retailers – menial work for a trilingual individual – but reflective of the fact that it is only in Chungking Mansions that their third (i.e. native) language is valuable. Among these groups there are certainly cases of individuals with college degrees handing out ads on the sidewalk outside the building, but in general the South Asian newcomers do not have the educational background to secure a high- paying job in their home country. Some other retailers frequently hire local Hong Kong Chinese (usually women) to work as attendants in their shops to deal with Chinese- speaking customers. At the top of the chain are the business owners. Often absent from their establishment having left in the care of a manager, the business owners are usually old-timers who have had links with Hong Kong for 15 years or more, and sometimes have passed on the business to the next generation. It is evident from this discussion that the enclave provides several kinds of employment opportunities for individuals with different needs. 146 This suggests that, to some extent, the place represents a (relatively short) phase for one group of its occupants – the workers also engaged with UN or HK immigration procedures, but a more permanent or longer term of occupancy for another group – residents and business owners. This is another aspect of the duality of the place. Many of the business owners at Chungking Mansions have been there for more than 15 years. Some for as long as 30 years. The second generation of these families, who were either born in Hong Kong or arrived when they were very young, are now managing the businesses. On the other hand, most of the workers are newcomers, having spent less than three years, and in many cases less than a year in Hong Kong. Some do not look for jobs on arrival, in strict keeping with Hong Kong law, and having money sent from home. As court cases stretch out over years or opportunities present themselves most succumb to illegal work. The wage, training and other benefits (retirement fund, health insurance etc.) have been studied in various contexts. The case of Chungking Mansions reveals yet more ways in which ethnic enclave employment can be useful to the immigrant. Firstly, there is the benefit of anonymity, which is useful to many immigrants who for one reason or another wish to keep a low profile. Employment in the firm of a coethnic also ensures a certain cultural understanding which is beneficial to both the employer and employee. At the same time the economy is also extremely introverted in that a large number of businesses are oriented towards niche markets and ‘ethnic’ goods and services. There is limited demand for these products outside the group of coethnics, though some of the restaurants have become popular among Hong Kong locals and tourists. 147 Conclusions ‘Ruralism’ and marginalization creates spaces that embody the tension between memory and movement. The memory of South Asia is recreated and sold in restaurants, DVD stores, grocery stores, salons and guest houses. For many Hong Kong residents, particularly the young Chinese, Chungking Mansions is most commonly associated with cheap Indian and Pakistani food. Despite claiming an association with particular ethnicities in the minds of the host society, there is very little in Chungking Mansions that suggests bonds between the South Asian and the host Chinese community. On occasion one might find an Indian businessman settled in Hong Kong for a long time (15 years or more) speaking fluent Cantonese. These rare individuals have obvious relations with the Chinese community – though these too are limited mostly to the work arena. When groups form for food, drinks or a smoke, they are usually entirely homogenous – primarily based on nationality, and within countries, particularly among Indians, based on language. This creates a place with a strong sense of belonging for those associated with it, but at the same time also a strong economic raison d’être, which dominates social relations. In the conclusion I will return to the question of what kind of space Chungking Mansions is. The first strong characteristic of the place is “in betweenness”. Chungking Mansions does not easily fit into the categories such as the Castellian framework of ‘spaces of place’ and ‘spaces of flows’. It has both a strong cultural identity and also the ephemeral quality of a space of flexible accumulation. The in-between extends from functional classification to citizenship and legality of status of the occupants, their identity (urban, 148 national, cosmopolitan), and the nature of the economy. Even the architecture of the building, a metamorphic production with layer upon layer of improvements and alterations, connotes a permanently unfinished character. The second defining characteristic is that of ‘class-consciousness’. Here, I do not mean class consciousness in an emancipatory sense, but rather less subtly – as the place and its users being identified with poverty, lack of “sophistication”, and marginality. This phenomenon is so pervasive that it is internalized by the users themselves. This ‘class’ of immigrants ‘knows their place’. They stick to the areas that are considered safe. Because of the threat of the police and also because of their limited financial resources the ruralizing poor rarely go to Hong Kong Island. Some even expressed difficulty in getting to a doctor should one be needed. In other words, a large part of the community is place- bound. For this ‘class’ Chungking Mansions is home because it is the place most like home, but also because other places are not as welcoming. As some interviewees complained, at their very sight, many Hong Kongers will preemptively cover their faces. This could be explained by an elevated fear of disease after the SARS epidemic, but to the ‘class’ in question the behaviour seems xenophobic. In other places in Hong Kong their difference comes into even starker contrast. Thus Chungking Mansions, despite all its imperfections, remains the home away from home for immigrants at the margins of legitimate society. The lesson for planning theory is that multiculturalism has the potential to create vibrant multi-ethnic, multi-cultural places. The commodification of culture nurtures tolerance for 149 preserving conditions of business-as-usual. This, however, does not automatically translate to greater understanding across cultural boundaries or agency for emancipation of the marginalized. If planning still hopes to work towards a goal of inclusionary planning, and collective visioning and decision-making market-culturalism alone cannot be the answer. Chungking Mansions is a special place in Hong Kong as a symbol of the city’s freedoms and tolerance. The city of Hong Kong should, however, seek to measure the success of the place by indicators such as empowerment and local collective agency, and not tax revenues alone. In this view policy-makers will need to actively promote community-building in Chungking Mansions, as a long-term solution to its tensions, afflictions and stigmas. Let us examine the case from the perspective of ‘choice’ and ‘constraint’. The case shows elements of both. For the employers and business-owners who are relatively well-off and the principal beneficiaries of the dual labor market created by the enclave, location in the building is a matter of choice. Business owners have responded in interviews that they were attracted to the location because of the presence of coethnics. Cheap labor was not mentioned directly and indeed may not have played a part in the original decision. But most have benefitted from it. On the other hand, the employees and laborers are not quite so well off. Coming from small towns and villages in South Asia, they have arrived in Hong Kong to make some money and have very few employment opportunities outside Chungking Mansions. Those applying for asylum are also not allowed to work, though if they are going through the process legitimately, they do get food and rent from the government of Hong Kong. For this group location for work or shelter in Chungking 150 Mansions is not a matter of choice as much as necessity. Some do stay in other locations where rents are low, but they always find themselves back at Chungking Mansions for information, services, products and community. Those who stay in Chungking Mansions know that the building quality is not of the highest standards. A negative image has followed the place despite the best attempts of the management to shed it. Most of the South Asian (and African) users and occupants of Chungking Mansions are at the margins of Hong Kong society. For this population, which struggles with the system on a daily basis, and cannot partake in the benefits of the global supply chain, the place does resemble a ghetto – a rundown building with cheap products, poor quality of life, crime and squalor. One weakness with this definition, as with many others, is that it does not foresee the possibility of multiple ethnicities in a single enclave. It is this feature of the studied case that begs closer scrutiny. The presence of South Asian and African entrepreneurs and asylum seekers of various religions and economic classes has earned the place the local moniker of ‘United Nations’. The significance of the place is not limited to the economy. There are various aspects of the economy itself, however, that contribute to our conception of the place as a socio-spatial phenomenon. Within Hong Kong it is only in and around Chungking Mansions that African tourists and businessmen are seen in large numbers wearing traditional costumes. There is now an African-cuisine restaurant exploiting its own niche and competing with the numerous Indian and Pakistani restaurants. They hang out on the sidewalks, using them as de facto public space. It is in front of the 7/11 store on Mody Road, around the corner from 151 Chungking Mansions, that their identity is practiced every night over alcohol, excited conversations about politics back home and the occasional songs shared through mobile phone speakers. But the African group remains, for the most part, detached from the South Asian group, which uses another part of the sidewalks – right in front of the front gate of Chungking Mansions. In many ways, particularly by way of their poverty and their cases in the United Nations, many members of the two groups share the same experience, often as competitors. They are quite helpless in confronting the systems of the United Nations and of the HK government. Language and race differences do, however keep them on different sections of the sidewalk, even though, in some cases religions does not. The space is a point of concentration where they can blend into the crowd. It is the home within Hong Kong where they do not have to worry about being sized up and evaluated. It can be concluded from this discussion that there are various kinds of users (and thus producers) of space in Chungking Mansions. Their motivations for being in Chungking Mansions vary greatly. Their identities and affiliations vary greatly. Being diasporic and being in the business community (by choice or by fate) is what binds this society. Some traditionally long-alienated identities co-exist cheek by jowl, because anything but peaceful coexistence threatens to damage business interests. Many individuals living or working in Chungking Mansions have no legal right to do so. They are willing to take the risk because they have no choice and the punishment, even if it means several years in jail, is perceived as a small price to pay for escaping the conditions back home. None of the business-owners interviewed accepted hiring illegal workers. The threat of police 152 raids is very real. At the same time, those raids are still always imminent because illegal immigrants are living and working in this space. After every raid, which involves sealing the building, and police personnel sweeping all the floors, about 20-30 illegals are rounded up and taken away. Through this chapter I traced the history of Chungking Mansions highlighting the contingent factors that were key in its evolution. Further, I attempted to answer the simple question of whether Chungking Mansions is a ‘Ghetto’ or an ‘Enclave’. The analysis showed that Chungking Mansions shows characteristics of both, and the dualism is unable to capture the complex character of the place. Chungking Mansions is an internally differentiated society with diverse groups, which creates multiple choice sets and use values for its users. It is not homogenous, as it is often appears to outsiders. Finally, I concluded by highlighting certain factors – drawn from the discussion on ghettos and enclaves - that contribute to the urbanism of Chungking Mansions. In the next chapter I will discuss citizenship in Hong Kong, its evolution, and in particular the practice of citizenship by those at the margins (illegal immigrants and those with very low socio-economic status). 153 Chapter 4 : Citizenship Through Place-Based Practice Introduction This chapter will focus on aspects of citizenship relating to the immigrant population of Chungking Mansions. The literature reviewed on the “rescaling” of citizenship provides the framework for analysis. By “rescaling” I refer to a departure from the definition of citizenship being exclusively linked to the nation state towards conceptualization at other supra- and infra- national levels. Firstly, there has been an attempt to conceptualize citizenship as cosmopolitan - i.e. held on the basis of shared universal human values. At the same time there is also an emerging body of literature examining citizenship at the local level, i.e. citizenship practiced by communities through political (strategic) action in the public realm. This does not necessarily portend the eclipse of the nation state or its control over various aspects of citizenship. The idea of “rescaling” is not intended to mean that the position of the nation state as the sole legal authority over citizenship guarantees is being challenged. It does, however, point to the need to acknowledge the impact of increasing global interdependence and intensifying flows of information, ideas, labor and capital on the conceptualization and practice of citizenship. I am interested particularly in the immigrants of relatively low socio-economic status because it is this group that is most represented at Chungking Mansions, and is generally associated with the place. For the purpose of brevity I shall refer to the group as the ‘marginal immigrants’ or ‘margizens’ (Sautman, 2004). This study attempts to capture the practices of immigrants in the city – related to an early meaning of citizenship – through which they attempt to create kinship and collectivities. This process allows the 154 marginal immigrants the opportunity to develop a sense of belonging in their new adopted city. The Greek language retained the superiority of the city over the citizen (polites and politeia are derived from polis); Latin first recognises the citizen, from which it derives the city and citizenship (civitas comes from civis). The civis is the compatriot… it marks a relation originally based on kinship and not on territory…. the city is only comprehended as the whole of compatriots, as a ‘collectivity and a reciprocity of cives’. This singular etymology is a sign of two major characteristics of Roman citizenship: it reveals its civic nature in the modern meaning of the term and it foretells the flexibility of the status that is not, contrary to its Greek equivalent, by definition confined to the ‘natural’ boundaries of the city (Magnette and Long, 2005, p.19). Further, through their interactions with others who are, or have been, in a similar position, and with gatekeepers of various institutions, these immigrants attempt to obtain access to resources that can fulfill needs not met because of their marginal status in the new host society. The literature review (next section) shows that these local-level practices are being termed acts of citizenship in Urban Planning literature. Friedman (2002) uses a framework of three kinds of citizenship – “statist, cosmopolitan [and] insurgent” (p.67). The first is the predominant understanding of citizenship – a bundle of rights accorded by an authority representing a nation state. Cosmopolitan citizenship is a relatively recent idea representing the universality of human rights. The 155 third form of citizenship - insurgent citizenship - is local, place-based, not necessarily authorized by agency, and claimed through practice rather than received. As Friedman puts it acts of citizenship falling in this last category are best understood as instances of nonterritorial, self-proclaimed form of grassroots citizenship that, in concerted ‘acts of resistance’ (Bourdieu, 1998) and in its claiming of new rights, constitutes a new form of insurgent citizenship and practice (p.68, original emphasis). I would like to argue that this kind of practiced citizenship is best understood in the context of ‘statist’ citizenship and its limitations. We need to keep in mind however that practiced citizenship is not an alternative to the statist idea of citizenship in the sense of completely replacing the latter. The intention is not to put an end to statist citizenship or to suggest that practiced citizenship is a panacea for the problems of stateless people and immigrants at the margins of one or more citizenship regimes. The intent, rather, is to acknowledge and theorize the phenomenon of protest and resistance through practices of everyday life (as different from a large-scale organized movement or public demonstrations). Further, the notion of citizenship in practice aims to highlight the work of exactly those individuals and communities who are most disadvantaged by the rules of formal (statist) citizenship. For Friedman it is a counterpoint to “the unfinished project of democracy” (p.78). The work on practiced citizenship has tended to focus on resistance to neoliberalism and its fallout in various countries. In these contexts people have found their civil, political and social rights diminishing and been motivated to act. I hope to situate the analysis of this case within the discussion of practiced citizenship in this limited sense. 156 After a review of the literature on practiced citizenship and the idea of “rescaling”, I will examine the rules of participation for various scales of citizenship in Hong Kong, with regards to the community at Chungking Mansions. Following Friedman’s framework, referred to above, I will distinguish ‘statist’ (during and after British rule), ‘cosmopolitan’ as guaranteed by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and ‘insurgent’ (locally practiced) citizenship. The last section, on ‘practiced citizenship’ at Chungking Mansions, will tie together the analysis and I will conclude with a summary of the findings. The inquiry is driven by two research questions. (i) How are scales of citizenships interrelated? (ii) Why does this community, unlike so many others in the literature on practiced and insurgent citizenship, not organize or protest against the state, neoliberal institutions or other factors perceived as causing its multiple marginalities? As an extension of the second question I examine how this form of practiced citizenship may be characterized in relation to Holston’s idea of ‘insurgency’. I conclude with two findings from the study responding directly to the questions posed above. First, I will argue that the characteristics and terms of citizenship at the three scales are interdependent. The features of citizenship at one scale may influence the rules at another scale. Further, immigrants, particularly those at the margins of society, make claims across the scales of citizenship to maximize their stability and welfare. Second, I will argue that the case shows evidence of an “inverted resistance”, where practiced 157 citizenship represents a struggle for greater incorporation into capital and commodity flows rather than protection from neoliberalism, which has been the dominant narrative in the literature on this subject. In keeping with the broader theoretical interests of this study the analysis in this chapter considers both the ‘structures’ of citizenship and the reaction of ‘agency’ to these structural constraints and opportunities. I will discuss citizenship at the ‘statist’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ scales in terms of the rules and characteristics of citizenship constituting the structure. Immigrants adapt and react to these structures through their local practices, making claims based on both statist and cosmopolitan citizenship provisions. Literature Review Various scholars have found incoherence in the terms of reference used to describe and analyze citizenship. Purcell (2004), for example, reports that “new forms and practices of citizenship have proliferated in recent years” (p.564). This is due to both the multiplicity of meanings that constitute the term ‘citizenship’ and the diversity of fields involved in its study. Scholars are often referring to different things when they use the term ‘citizenship’, and, worse, these meanings are sometimes conflated in ways that are counterproductive. This chapter is concerned with citizenship experiences and practices of the community associated with Chungking Mansions at the supra-national, national and infra-national (local) levels, and the interconnectedness of the scales. The conceptualization of citizenship as delinked from the nation state has followed two trajectories. On one hand 158 there is the idea of citizenship being “post-national”, denoting a tendency towards belonging to jurisdictions larger than the nation state. The term ‘post-national’ in this view is somewhat similar to the word ‘international’ in that it refers to political entities that encompass multiple national boundaries. On the other hand citizenship, as something different from state-authorized rights, has also been conceptualized as a practice undertaken at the local level. In this section I will review the literature on both aspects of the rescaling of citizenship. This review aims to organize the literature in the field according to the two senses of ‘rescaling’ of citizenship. I also hope to disambiguate various understandings of the term ‘citizenship’ that are often conflated. The idea of ‘post-national’ citizenship Postnational citizenship has three major supporting arguments, which are sometimes invoked in conjunction. First, is the example of the European Union (EU) as a successful regime of postnational belonging. Second, universal human rights are seen as the basis of a new kind of citizenship. Third, the ‘weakening’ of the nation-state is seen as a precursor to the need for reconceptualizing citizenship. The idea of citizenship being ‘postnational’ is directly related to the flexibility of production processes and capital flows in the post- Fordist economy. Flows of capital, information and (to a lesser degree) labor have transcended national boundaries. Variables that have a close correlation with national boundaries also come under pressure from these sweeping changes (such as ‘culture’, nationalism’, ‘loyalty’ etc.) Citizenship, as such a variable, is not only related to national boundaries, but is also considered a resource which can be exchanged in whole or in part for fulfilling labor market needs. The post-Fordist condition of flexible accumulation 159 creates individuals and societies that do not fit in to the “traditional” system of citizenship. In many countries this has resulted in a variety of options for limited citizenship offering the right to live, work as a guest, work full-time, become a permanent resident, be a citizen of two countries simultaneously etc. Also human rights regime – both come together in Chungking Mansions. Yasemin Soysal (1994, 2001) is one of the leading voices advocating a postnational model of citizenship based on universal human rights. Soysal proposes a model of citizenship based on “universal personhood” as protected by various UN mandates. In contrast to the existing nation-state model of belonging, the postnational model allows for multiple citizenship status, membership delinked from territory, drawing legitimacy from transnational communities. The “organization of membership” for individuals, however, remains the same in Soysal’s model – the nation-state. I agree with Soysal’s basic premise that the reality of transnational flows necessitates new ways of understanding citizenship, but I find the utility of the new model limited, beyond insisting on the implementation of UN charters. In other words the model itself does not provide a real alternative to the existing situation. Further, the case of the European Union does not support Soysal’s new model very well. EU membership is not based on a vision of universal human rights, and it is a single unique case with limited generalizability. For Bosniak (2000), the conceptualization of postnational citizenship, defined by the extension of a universally accepted human rights norms, is a weak argument. Human rights regimes do not cover all aspects of citizenship, nor does their acceptance actually guarantee individual protections. I agree with Bosniak in her conclusion that though there 160 is some weight to the argument that rules of creating in- and out-groups of citizenship have seen some changes in recent times, but its being ultimately a national enterprise cannot yet be questioned. Sassen (2002, 2003) espouses the idea of postnational citizenship in the context of the geography of late capitalism, including relatively diminished salience of national boundaries, and the rise of networked global cities as centers of capital and power. Like Soysal, Sassen critiques state-based citizenship and argues that belonging ought to be reconceptualized in universal terms. The two scholars differ in terms of the administration of this new citizenship. Whereas Soysal sees a continuing role for the nation-state in the administration of citizenship, for Sassen it is the network of global cities that is the new locus of authority. Sassen acknowledges the scholarship on locally practiced citizenship, but does not see this as a matter of scale, but rather a distinction of the field of study. She terms this scholarship as “sociological versions of citizenship” (p.281), ostensibly as distinct from the political versions. I find that this distinction does not do justice to the complexity of citizenship, to the interdisciplinary nature of its study, and particularly to the political character of everyday life. Sassen surveys the various meanings of citizenship that have been explored in recent scholarly literature, and clearly marks the departure of her understanding of post-national citizenship from the rest of the field. For Sassen, new conceptions of citizenship, while useful, “do not necessarily cease to be nation-state based” (p.281). She uses the term 161 “denationalized” to club together critiques and alternative conceptions of citizenship, identifying them as being outside the nation-state paradigm, yet inextricably tied to it. For Sassen, a post-national political framework is a prerequisite for conceptualizing post- national citizenship. Her idea of post-national citizenship is best understood in the context of her view of globalization processes in general. This approach is more critical than normative. Unlike Soysal, Sassen is not proposing a new model of citizenship. The need for a post-national citizenship, in Sassen’s view, arises from the creation of layers and webs of belonging because of the nascent network of global cities. The eclipse of the nation-state is intrinsic to the argument. A relatively less significant yet noteworthy point of distinction between Soysal’s and Sassen’s ideas is that the former uses the term “postnational” while the latter prefers “post-national”. In my opinion the former term (postnational sans hyphen) qualifies a condition – akin to ‘postmodern’ – where the preeminence of the nation-state is questioned. The latter (Sassen’s ‘post-national’) qualifies a period of time when whatever we know as ‘national’ has ended. Both Soysal and Sassen aim to reconceptualize citizenship in global or universal terms. They begin with dissatisfaction with the current nation-state-based citizenship, which they believe to be outdated. According to both authors economic activity and human networks have transcended national boundaries to such an extent that the idea of citizenship (in terms of both belonging and claiming rights) tied to the nation-state can no longer serve the needs of the diversity of emergent social and political formations. For 162 both authors, the way forward is to conceptualize citizenship based on universal human rights. Locally practiced ‘insurgent citizenship’ Dissatisfaction with the nation-state model of citizenship has also led to its reconceptualization at a smaller scale – that is in terms of practices at the local level. In this view, citizenship, which has traditionally represented a modernist, Cartesian institution operating at the national level, evolves into a flexible idea, imagined at the local level. James Holston (1995) is originally credited for the term “insurgent citizenship”, which has been used subsequently by other scholars, notably Crawford (1995), Sandercock (1998) and Friedman (2002). Practiced citizenship at the local level has also been identified by other names. Miraftab and Wills (2005), for example, use the idea of “insurgency” in reference to an anti-eviction campaign in Cape Town refer, adding to it the term “active citizenship” (p.200). I would like to begin the discussion with a review of Holston’s original idea of the spaces of insurgent citizenship – or insurgent spaces of citizenship, which amounts to the same thing. By insurgent, I mean to emphasize the opposition of these spaces of citizenship to the modernist spaces that physically dominate so many cities today. I also use it to emphasize an opposition to the modernist political project that absorbs a certain concept and practice of planning itself. At the heart of this modernist political projects in the doctrine – also clearly expressed in the tradition of civil or positivist law – that the state is the only legitimate source of citizenship rights, meanings, and practices. I use the notion of 163 insurgent to refer to new and other sources and to their assertion of legitimacy (Holston, 1998, p.39). Insurgent citizenship in this view is proposed an improvement on modernist precepts of the professions of architecture and planning. Modernist planning, according to Holston, “does not admit or develop productively the paradoxes of its imagined future…. and fails to consider the unintended and unexpected” (p.46). The author seeks to introduce activism and resistance as fundamental values to be espoused by these professions. Holston’s project is to present insurgent citizenship as a “counteragent” (p.47) to modernist planning which “relies on and builds up the state”. The choice of the word ‘citizenship’ is intended to highlight the departure from modernist understandings of legitimacy and authority. In other words insurgent citizenship is not meant by Holston to be a new kind of citizenship that may replace modernist (statist) citizenship, but rather a phenomenon that allows for the emergence of alternative ideas of belonging and identity. This is a socio-spatial conceptualization as space is tied in completely with the process of insurgency, such that insurgent spaces can be equated to insurgent citizenship. A defining aspect of insurgent citizenship is resistance to “state-directed futures” (Holston, 1998, p.47). These insurgent forms are found both in organize grassroots mobilization and in everyday practices that, in different ways, empower, parody, derail, or subvert state agendas. They are found, in other words, in struggles over what it means to be a member of the modern state – which is why I refer to them with the term citizenship (ibid). 164 Holston’s idea, originally conceived in opposition to the modernist state, has been reinterpreted in recent scholarship as resistance to neoliberalism. This modification of perspectives seems to serve two purposes. Firstly, in response to the increasingly role of the private sector in development issues, it broadens the scope of the term to include those activities that are not directed directly towards the state. Second, it shifts the focus from a critique of modernism as the predominant paradigm in planning and architecture, to an assessment of neoliberalism as the new organizing principle. (Depending on the perspective of individual scholars, and the specifics of the case, the state may be seen as a helpless onlooker, weak mediator, or entirely co-opted by neoliberal forces.) The basic meaning of ‘insurgent citizenship’ – the set of practices through which the dispossessed attempt to take control of the basic conditions of their life – does not change. Linda Bosniak (2000) endorses a four-fold “ordering” (p.455) of the “chaotic field” of citizenship, similar to that of Friedman referred to in the Introduction of this chapter. This includes understanding citizenship as “legal status… as rights… as political activity, [and]… as a form of collective identity and sentiment” (ibid). This scheme organizes the formulations based on the substance of citizenship whereas Friedman’s framework has to do with the scale at which citizenship is realized or played out. The categories of the two schemes overlap, e.g. collective identity can exist at all scales, and rights may be claimed (not considering the merit of the claim for the time being) at multiples scales etc. It is at the local level, however, that the overlap is most significant. Friedman’s “insurgent” scale and Bosniak’s category of “political activity” both refer to practiced citizenship at 165 the local level. This scale is the focus of this chapter, though other scales of citizenship are included in the analysis. “[W]hile in theory political rights depend on membership in a nation-state, in practice, new entitlements are being realized through situated mobilizations and claims in milieus of globalized contingency” (Ong, 2006). Thus the model of the nation state as the preeminent guarantor of the rights of citizenship is challenged by new movements and initiatives that rely on self-help and local organizations to create a sense of belonging urban places. The expectations of citizenship that are elusive at the national level are renegotiated – that is, revalorized and reassessed by participants, and claimed locally (with or without state recognition), in the interstices of formal institutions. Based in the debates of globalization and flexible accumulation, Ong’s idea of ‘flexible citizenship’, attempts to provide the immigrants’ local micro-level perspective of transnationalism. I disagree partially with Ong, especially about the larger political ideas within which she places her work. It might be said that while being critical of some aspects of globalization, Ong nevertheless suggests that it is not all bad and that it is detrimental to neither the nation nor local cultures. The validity of this observation might vary with the scale of investigation. Looking very closely at cultural subtleties in the adoption of globalization, Ong finds ample evidence of evolution, change and hybridization and, as she reports, not quite as much of ‘homogenization’. Media and culture flows may not lead to the universalization 166 of cultural norms, or inspire the whole world to turn into a copy of the cultural hegemon from where most media flows emanate. This, however, is not evidence against the argument that a hegemon does exist and it influences the world much more than the world influences it. In other words, there are imbalances in subjectivities, that follow from relative concentrations of capital and the projections of culture and media from these points of concentration. To argue that the world does not turn into America (or “the West”) but rather negotiates its own cultural outcomes is not to argue against the proposition that America (or “the West”) is increasingly influential in shaping cultural outcomes in the world. Setting aside this part of the argument, I share Ong’s concern for the micro scale where citizenship is translated from state guarantee of rights to a practiced act of belonging to a place. The full gamut of rights is elusive, but space is created (in an epistemological sense) for new experiences and for what did not exist before. This chapter is about how interstices of citizenship are found, explored and enlarged by place-bound immigrant agency. Cities and citizenship We have already noted Sassen’s opinion regarding the world order being rewrought along the hierarchy of global cities, and citizenship following suit. In this view cities are part of a global international web of command centers. Cities are involved to a much greater extent in the literature on insurgent citizenship and its variations, as sites of everyday practices. For Purcell (2004) the new formulations of citizenship “undermine the hegemony of the current model of citizenship, [which] has opened greater political opportunity to imagine and realize new citizenships.” Purcell summarizes an 167 “imaginative opening” that reorients citizenship, from “Westphalian state relations” towards Lefebvrian idea of ‘rights to the city’. The author outlines three aspects of “contemporary changes in citizenship”. These are “rescaling” (alternatives to national scales), “reterritorialization” (eroding the salience of national boundaries), and “reorientation” (nation no longer the “predominant political community”). Through the combination of these factors “citizenship is beginning to become unhinged from its formerly dominant tie to the nation-state.” These changes to citizenship are being carried out primarily in major urban centers that are places of high concentrations of immigrant labor. It is not surprising therefore that this has led to a convergence of literatures emanating from Political Science and Urban Studies. Being at the interstices of global networks of flows of commodities, services, capital, labour, images and ideas, the global city, both as a milieu and object of struggles for recognition, engenders new political groups that claim either new types of rights or seek to expand modern civil, political and social rights (Sandercock, 1998). Sassen (2000) agrees that “the space constituted by the global grid of global cities, a space with new economic and political potentialities, is perhaps one of the most strategic spaces for the formation of transnational identities and communities” (p.56). According to Sassen global cities are seeing a discontent over polarization of spaces – “overvalorized corporate centers” on one hand, and the devalorization and marginalization of everything outside. According to Sassen it is in these devalorized spaces of marginalization that struggles of identity take place. Though I agree completely with the author regarding the polarization of power in “global cities”, it appears to me to 168 be a contradictory to her own argument. On one hand she predicts the eclipse of the state and would like citizenship to follow suit, yet on the other hand she plainly states that there is a mass discontent with the global city system. I also want to add that these struggles of claiming the city are themselves internally differentiated and are usually “fought” neither with a common agenda nor on a single frontier. As we have discussed before, the devalorized spaces outside the commercial cores are fragmented along lines of identity, further undermining the possibility of a class-based resistance to processes of marginalization. Dagger (2000) analyses some basic urban characteristics affecting the practice of citizenship. He identifies “three enemies of citizenship” – size, fragmentation and mobility. Size and mobility are two sides of the same coin of rapid suburbanization. Fragmentation may be thought of as its social and political outcome. It is intuitive that large size and high mobility induce a sense of alienation or not-belonging among citizens. Dagger presents evidence to suggest that, in the United States, large metropolitan areas have lower voting rates than communities of less than 25,000, when educational attainment and income are controlled for. The author lays explanatory emphasis on the ‘anonymity’ in large cities, which encourages citizens to pursue private motives more than civic engagement. This argument is subject to the obvious critique that ‘voting’ by itself is not a complete indicator of ‘citizenship’. It might be the case that smaller communities perceive a more direct relationship with their elected representative than voting citizens in big cities. 169 Modern (and postmodern) urbanism itself could also have something to do with the voting pattern, so that the lower voting rate is not necessarily a reflection of apathy or lack of a civic sense, but rather of the constraints of the system on the lifeworld, such as the pace of life, traffic, parking issues etc – that is, variable that would affect the pursuit of private or personal goals too. The point of this analysis of Dagger (2000) is to contextualize his findings. The author insists that large cities could generate citizenship (understood in terms of citizen participation, voting rates and action towards civic or collective goals), but they currently lag behind small towns in this regard. I want to argue that (i) the author’s conceptualization is too limited, (ii) that big cities see more expression of discontent, social movements and insurgency, than relatively homogenous and conservative (per the author’s own description) small towns, and (iii) that the limited evidence offered in terms of lower voting rates in big cities (even when income and education are controlled) may be the result of complexity of urban life rather than civic apathy. It is possible, in this view, that citizens of big cities see other forms of acting out citizenship as more fruitful and that these options may not be available in small towns. It is Dagger’s (2000) engagement of the idea of ‘fragmentation’ that relates most closely to this study. The author’s understanding of ‘fragmentation’ includes proliferation of jurisdictions (suburbanization and new towns) and the model of segregated land use zoning that has been a popular modernist tool for preservation of land values. Certainly this conceptualization is useful in understanding the social-psychological aspects of the 170 attrition of civic values. To add further to these two physical aspects, earlier chapters of this study have dealt in detail with ‘fragmentation’ as a cultural and political phenomenon, its production under market conditions, and its outcomes in terms of public space and everyday life. Dagger’s own take is instructive as it makes the explicit connection between the fragmented city and practiced citizenship, which I attempt to explore further in this chapter. Fragmentation of space through the creation of identity clubs is closely linked with the rescaling of citizenship. Both phenomena are examples of new institutional arrangements breaching formerly salient lines that circumscribed and separated social relations and identities. In both kinds of fragmentation there exists a core-periphery relationship between groups. Both kinds of fragmentation are results of the agency of marginal groups trying to create space for themselves in order to fill perceived voids in their political status or economic opportunities. Statist citizenship in Hong Kong – uncertainty and enterprise To respond to the first question regarding the relationships between citizenship at different scales I use Friedman’s framework of three models of citizenship – statist, cosmopolitan and insurgent. I begin at the statist scale tracing the evolution of citizenship in Hong Kong under British rule. The analysis suggests that citizenship regimes were characterized by a high degree of uncertainty in terms of residence and employment. Further, political and civil rights were restricted, and an ideal of the ‘enterprising’ citizen was promoted to fill the gap. 171 British legacy and Chinese future In 1997 the British government handed over Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China. To promote the smooth and gradual integration of Hong Kong, the Chinese government adopted the policy of “one country, two systems”, which allowed Hong Kong freedom in determining economic and social policies. This policy was put in place for 50 years, i.e. until 2047. This quelled fears of a Communist “takeover” both in the market institutions and among the people of Hong Kong. Thus the city-state made the transition from being a port colony of the British Empire to an awkward appendage of rising China. The freest market in the world and a major node in the world economy had not known democracy as a colony and could not foresee it as part of China. In this context, citizenship was, and remains, a complex arrangement of rules of residence, travel, work etc. Therefore, in Hong Kong, ideas of identity, solidarity and nationalism are less significant in conceptualizing and guarding citizenship, as compared to more orthodox national contexts. This study of the geographies of citizenship in Hong Kong begins with the city under British rule. I will then describe the Chinese rules, followed by Hong Kong’s own regulations post 1997. Finally I will discuss the presence of the UNHCR as a guarantor of global citizenship. Before 1997 Hong Kong residents were considered subjects of the British crown. After World War II and until 1981 Hong Kong residents existed under the identity of ‘Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies’ (CUKC). The British Nationality Act of 1981 (implemented in 1983) created new categories of British subjecthood, namely (i) British citizenship, (ii) British Dependent Territories Citizenship (BDTC), and (iii) British 172 Overseas Citizenship (BOC). Hong Kong people with CUKC status as of 1983 transitioned to BDTC citizenship. This status did not carry right of abode in UK as CUKC had. Verified Hong Kong residents carried Hong Kong ID cards. As travel documents, someone who had lived in the city for at least three years could have a Document of Identity (DI), and someone who had stayed in Hong Kong for seven years could have a Certificate of Identity (CI). These were not strictly passports, but were valid travel documents for Hong Kong people. In 1987 the British government started awarding the British National (Overseas) designation through the Hong Kong Act of 1985. The BN(O) status, once acquired, was lifelong, and not lost under conditions of dual citizenship, though it still did not provide for right of abode in UK. The system carried on until 1997 and millions of Hong Kong residents acquired BN(O) status and the associated passport. Wary of possible upheaval after the handover, a large number of Hong Kong Chinese and ethnic minorities in Hong Kong opted for dual citizenship, particularly of Canada and Australia, in addition to BN(O) status. Australia reckons 30,000 people hold both Australian and Hong Kong passports. Canada estimates that 220,000 Canadians live in Hong Kong. Britain controversially refused to make a blanket offer of citizenship when it quit Hong Kong, but it slipped papers to a favoured few. And about 3.5m people, mostly still living in Hong Kong, hold “British National Overseas” passports, which provide the holder with no right of abode in Britain. (The Economist, 2008) 173 Those who did not opt for BN(O) status automatically became British Overseas Citizens as of July 1, 1997. This arrangement left a large number of people potentially stateless after the handover to China. These were the people who would not qualify for Chinese nationality (being ethnic minorities, mostly of South Asian origin) and also had no other statehood, either because they were born before the independence of their country of origin, or because they were born and raised in Hong Kong. This issue was resolved with the British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act of 1997, which allowed stateless ethnic minorities in Hong Kong full citizenship with right to abode in UK (Office of Public Sector Information at the British National Archives, 1997). In the final count some members of ethnic minorities were still left stateless, because (despite being in the category described above) they were not holding domicile in Hong Kong (studying abroad, handling business in home country without being citizen there etc.), or were minors and dual nationals through their parents and therefore did not qualify for full UK citizenship. After 1997 Hong Kong Chinese were considered citizens of the People’s Republic of China and eligible for Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) passports. Ethnic minorities could not be considered Chinese nationals, hence could not apply for HKSAR passports (except under special circumstances relating to marriage etc.). This still remains the case. Newcomers to Hong Kong from, say, South Asia or Africa cannot hope to seek nationality from either UK or China. Outside the UNHCR process (which I will discuss presently) the only option for acquiring ‘status’ is to stay in Hong Kong 174 legally for seven years and become a Permanent Hong Kong Resident. This status itself is not really “permanent” and could be lost if the person remains outside Hong Kong for a continuous period of three years. As we can gauge from this discussion citizenship and nationality processes have involved a complex web of subjects, ways of belonging and granting authorities for the territory of Hong Kong (at a scale comparable to other national contexts). The community being studied consists of those who have British nationality of one form or another, or Hong Kong Permanent Residence only, or neither. British nationals are the fewest in number, business owners and a few “managerial” workers (more trusted employees who manage the business in the absence of the owner) are permanent residents, others working in Chungking Mansions (legally) have been there for less than seven years. The latter group has legal status by way of a work or dependent visa, and has also acquired a Hong Kong ID (i.e. legitimate residence, though not permanent residence). The community also consists of a large number of residents, workers and visitors who are not strictly legal. The Ideal of the ‘enterprising’ citizen Peter Hall (2002) identifies Hong Kong (along with London and Baltimore) as a “city of enterprise” (p.379). Hall claims to have proposed in 1977 the “fairly shameless free enterprise” (p.387) of the 1950s and 1960s Hong Kong as a solution for United Kingdom’s declining cities. The political and economic geographies of Hong Kong have seen it assume the roles of a colonial outpost, an entrepot economy in international supply chains, a center of (postcolonial) immigration, the services and finance end of an 175 industrial megaregion, a distinct ‘system’ within the People’s Republic of China, and a ‘world city’ embedded in the global network of ‘command centers’. Through these changes economic productivity and the adherence to free market ideals has been constant guiding principle. In terms of citizenship and belonging in Hong Kong, the consistent pursuance of material growth and development of free markets has resulted in the promotion of the ideal of the enterprising citizen. In an edited volume Ku and Pun (2004) have examined citizenship in Hong Kong from a variety of critical perspectives including ideology, gender, exclusion, and resistance. Some of these arguments are summarized here. In the Introduction section Ku and Pun argue that the projection of Hong Kong as a global city has been backed by “the construction of a citizen-subject who is required to acquire a specific ethic of self: the enterprising individual” (p.1). “Citizenship in Hong Kong was never intended to be a nation-building exercise” (Turner, 2004, p.xix). Government policies attempted to “delimit political development, by stressing law and order, local belonging, economic rationality, governing effectiveness, and material welfare” (Ku and Pun, 2004, p.4). Ip (2004), in her contribution to the volume, argues through the example of public housing that even nominal efforts of promoting social welfare under British government, were ultimately means of legitimizing colonial rule in Hong Kong and establishing a sanitary and controlled environment in Hong Kong. This ideological model of governance, particularly in the Thatcher era, was transferred to the rules of belonging in Hong Kong through the successive Acts described earlier. 176 With neoliberalism becoming the mantra for governance, “the production of the enterprising individual” (ibid, p.6, original emphasis) became more entrenched as a policy objective. According to So (2004) the policy of the enterprising citizen was followed aggressively after 1997 to implement the city’s ‘grand project’ of becoming a leading global city. The year 1997 marks both the handover to the People’s Republic of China and the Asian financial crisis, both of which had created an atmosphere of great uncertainty in the city. Tse (2004) shows how civic education in Hong Kong, through curriculum content, learning styles and control of student activity, has been focused on training a “patriotic and compliant subject and enterprising individual” (p.66). Chan (2004) also weighs in with evidence from the schooling process – arguing that “students as citizens-to-be are regarded as human capital; they have to develop necessary skills and dispositions to help their country to compete efficiently” (p.75). The impetus for conceptualizing and aggressively pursuing the production of the enterprising citizen in post-1997 Hong Kong must be seen in the context of groundwork already done in this direction by the British government, the absence of a national myth, the prospect of takeover by a state perceived to be unsympathetic to free markets and free speech, and the internal instability precipitated by the Asian financial crisis. In addition to these factors, it is important to note that an alternative route towards greater political liberalization (including empowering civil society and democratic institutions) would have been extremely unpopular among the local elite (as most likely it is even today). 177 In the section on practiced citizenship I will argue that the ‘marginal immigrants’ or “margizens” (Sautman, 2004) of Chungking Mansions find themselves adjusting to the entrepreneurial ideal through formal and informal institutions that embody this principle. This is reflected in the nature of their relationships with each other, and also in their interactions with the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Hong Kong government and non-governmental organizations. In response to the first question this review will clarify the scales and meanings of belonging in Hong Kong. UNHCR and the offer of cosmopolitan citizenship The group that most directly contributes to the image of Chungking Mansions is the drifting refugees and asylum seekers. The UNHCR’s definition of “refugee” is someone who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UNHCR, 2006) As long as someone has applied for refugee status and such status has not been granted, that individual is an “asylum-seeker”. In other words, asylum-seekers are those individuals that have applied for UN refugee status but have not yet received a decision. There are two options open to refugees and asylum seekers when they get to Hong Kong, if they play by the book and do not violate any regulations (particularly “overstaying” 178 their visa, to which they are particularly wont, due to lack of information and options). The first option is to register a case with the UNHCR and follow procedures until their case is decided. If accepted for asylum, the UN will assign the individual to one of several receiving countries. The second option is to register a case with Hong Kong Emigration Department and follow their procedures. Most refugees and asylum-seekers try both processes. Figure 4.1 shows the growth of the total number of refugees and the share of asylum seekers in Hong Kong during the first decade after the handover. The trend has been of a widening gap between applicants and resolved cases. As of 2006 more than 50% of the 4347 refugee cases were unresolved. These data from the UNHCR website show only the legal asylum seekers and refugees. In addition there are many immigrants in the city whose status is not entirely legal. Of course, outright criminal offences (drug trafficking, harassment, theft etc.) sometimes turn refugees and asylum-seekers into criminals. Other offences, considered somewhat lower in the order of misconduct, can also hurt their status and chances of successful asylum. Among these the most prominent are entering illegally, overstaying the term of the visa, conducting business on tourist visa, working while designated as refugee or asylum-seeker etc. If discovered under these situations a refugee or asylum-seeker faces legal proceedings including detention followed by prison sentences ranging from a few months to two or three years, depending on the seriousness of the offence and whether it is the first time or a repeat incident. Further, the individual loses welfare benefits if convicted. In practice some degree of 179 flexibility is applied in the enforcement of these laws, as much out of practical difficulties of catching offenders, as out of a sense of leniency. As has been reported before, Chungking Mansions is a center of activity for immigrants and asylum seekers from various countries in Asia and Africa. Asylum seekers have a guarantee of human rights in Hong Kong, but this does not include the right to work. This problem is rendered even more acute by the sheer expense of living in the city, and the fact that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has no fixed time for reviewing and deciding cases. I have indicated above that not being allowed to work for the duration of the UN case investigation process creates a very unfair situation for the asylum-seeker. Source: Data from United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2007 a, b; compiled by author Figure 4.1: Growth of Asylum-seekers in Hong Kong, 1997-2006 180 The procedure requires the asylum-seeker to make the application while their Hong Kong visa is still valid. After this the applicants are interviewed repeatedly, and the same questions are asked many times, ostensibly to determine the veracity of the claim. At the beginning asylum-seekers have to go to the UNHCR office every week, after a couple of months, the frequency is reduced to once in two weeks and then to once a month until the case is decided. Applicants also have the option of applying directly to Hong Kong Emigration Department, which follows a similar procedure. While the case is open the applicants are given a document to carry with them. This document tells the local authorities that the bearer is a refugee or asylum-seeker and has an open case in the United Nations or Hong Kong Emigration. The year 2005 saw a major change in regulations to address the problem of abuse of UN procedures. According to a public document of the Immigration Department of Hong Kong (2009), “administrative visa-free arrangements [were] cancelled or formal bilateral visa-free access agreements terminated” for Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, along with Republic of Congo, Togo and Ghana. Travelers from the countries now have to apply for and acquire visas before arriving in Hong Kong. The document further notes that “[i]n 2007, more than 2,211 doubtful passengers from the top six sending states were refused permission to land.” In summary, the interviews with refugees and asylum-seekers reveal that their expectations from the process are mostly satisfied at the local, city level. There are no expectations that pertain to the national level. The situation with Africans and South 181 Asian asylum-seekers in Hong Kong is not similar to, say, the case of Tibetans in India, for whom the expectation of asylum and citizenship includes protection of a nation and culture threatened by occupation. Of course, the combined expectations of all refugees and asylum-seekers, when considered together may have consequences at a system-wide scale, particularly in terms of employment in the case of the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong. In the previous two sections I presented the rules and characteristics of statist and cosmopolitan citizenship in Hong Kong, especially as it applies to the ‘margizens’ of Chungking Mansions. Based on this foregoing information, and fieldwork conducted on site, I will now respond to the research questions presented at the beginning of the chapter. I will present aspects of place-based agency (marginal immigrants) whereby ‘margizens’ assume the role of entrepreneurial individuals, claiming citizenship benefits at both the statist and cosmopolitan scales. I will conclude with some thoughts on the relationship between the practices of this community and the idea of ‘insurgent citizenship’. Practiced citizenship My main objective in this section is to show how the uncertainty and the entrepreneurial ideal that have characterized statist citizenship in Hong Kong are transferred to the immigrants, particularly those at the margins. I also attempt to contrast the practiced citizenship of the margizens of Chungking Mansions with the idea of ‘insurgency’, and 182 explain why this community, despite its marginalities, does not protest against the structures that create these conditions. Focus on asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants Very few individuals come to Hong Kong with a work visa for a job at Chungking Mansions. The legal workers in Chungking Mansions are usually those who have already been in Hong Kong for at least seven years and have become Hong Kong Residents. A common trajectory is to come to Hong Kong as dependents of someone else who was born there or has been working there, and to become a resident over time. The long-term connections stretch back to both the South Asian business community and to the South Asians serving in the British army. Both groups have been in Hong Kong since well before the British left the subcontinent. Legal immigrants usually try to stay at least seven years so that they can get Hong Kong permanent residence which allows them easy entry into Hong Kong. For ethnic minority immigrants, permanent residence includes the right to vote, right to abode, right to accept any work or study opportunities offered, and access to certain government welfare opportunities such as public housing. It should be mentioned here that nine years of education is free for all children in Hong Kong regardless of whether they or their parents are permanent residents. As mentioned before, there is no chance for ethnic minorities to acquire a Hong Kong SAR passport even after becoming permanent residents because of the requirement of Chinese nationality, which is based on ethnicity. (Marriage to a Chinese national, however, does create the option of becoming a naturalized national of China and thereby applying for a Hong Kong SAR passport, if other criteria are met.) 183 The group of legal workers and Hong Kong residents in Chungking Mansions, are co- users of space and part of the networks and activities observed. These business-owners and their kin are already entrepreneurs in the conventional understanding of the word, and on their way out of economic and political (civil) marginalization (at least). Their needs and expectations of citizenship are not exactly the same, and certainly less critical. This analysis focuses on the refugees and asylum-seekers, for whom the citizenship as protection of rights – mostly critically, human rights – is of central importance, and who are also most marginalized economically and politically. This group also faces stigmatization within the social structure of Chungking Mansions. An example from my fieldwork is instructive in this regard. I was teaching an introductory English language course at Christian Action.. During one of the sessions the class was visited by reporters from South China Morning Post newspaper. They took pictures, talked to some people and wrote up an article which appeared both in the print and online editions. The picture they used erroneously labeled immigrants (most of whom were in Hong Kong as dependents) as “asylum-seekers”. The classmates appealed to the newspaper. An apology was issued in the next issue, and the online caption was changed (Figure 4.2). Yet the stigma associated with the term “asylum-seeker” was so great in the minds of these individuals that they stopped coming to class altogether. The individuals in the picture are from a country from where a large number of asylum- seekers have been arriving recently, many of whom frequent Christian Action and interact with this group. They also interact with many other asylum-seekers on a daily 184 basis, and to a large extent share the same life situation. But it was not about nationality or class. The protest of quitting the class was about legitimacy. South Asian and African asylum-seekers and illegal aliens find themselves facing cultural, economic and physical (spatial) marginalization in Hong Kong. They are relegated to slum-like conditions, with no permission to work, and a surprising lack of Figure 4.2: Christian Action language class picture on South Chuna Morning Post website Source: South China Morning Post, 2007, online edition 185 support from their co-ethnic communities. As they participate in the enclave for basic needs, information and kinship, they make changes to adapt to the role of the ‘entrepreneur citizen’. For this group, being enterprising involves creating innovative narratives to claim political status under various international conventions, surviving uncertainty, seeking all possible opportunities for welfare, taking risks - in some cases working illegally, and creating a sense of belonging through place-based practices. Aspiring cosmopolitans: flocking together but not of feather Immigrants and asylum seekers come to Hong Kong and to Chungking Mansions from many different parts of the world and from many different walks of life. Some go on to acquire residence and refugee status, while others are relegated for long periods to the grey areas between scales and jurisdictions of belonging. Their expectations of citizenship in Hong Kong vary according to their personal situations and future goals. The class differences between South Asian and African communities are not apparent because by sharing the space of Chungking Mansions they give the impression of being on equal footing in terms of purchasing power, and by extension, life situations and social class. The differences are important to note because though they seem similar, the two communities (given the inaccuracy of clubbing together various nationalities thereby suppressing internal differentiation) are quite different in terms of their training, experience and life options. This affects their expectations of employment and the immigration process in general. 186 Among the margizens of Chungking Mansions, South Asians are usually in a lower socio-economic category as compared to the African immigrants (including refugees and asylum seekers) in their respective home countries. Considering both flight costs and relative purchasing power in the two regions, the financial threshold for coming to Hong Kong from Africa and continuing to subsist is much higher compared to the cost for South Asians. Those who can afford this trip from Africa are relatively well-off in their home countries. Many of the Africans languishing in the UNHCR process were businessmen and professionals before coming to Hong Kong. The South Asians by contrast are not well-off in their home countries. They are not the poorest of the poor, but they are lower on a socio-economic ladder in their home countries than the Africans are in their own. It helps to bear in mind, however, that the middle class in South Asia is very large and sends large numbers of legal immigrants to USA, Canada, UK and Australia among other countries. Going to Hong Kong, where the odds are stacked against them (in terms of numbers, language, economic situation etc.) and existing in the filth of Chungking Mansions is not an attractive option. The ones willing to take on these odds and face the risks are the one who cannot make it to the developed world through legal channels. At least among South Asians, those coming to Hong Kong as asylum-seekers, do not represent the urban middle class. This brings us to the question of why these margizens come to Hong Kong to make claims of cosmpolitan citizenship. Among Africans, a handful of countries represent most 187 of the cases filed in the UNHCR. Nigerians and Somalians have the largest numbers. The expectations of the African refugees and asylum-seekers are in line with the aims of the UNHCR. Their claims are related to political persecution and torture and they seek shelter from any receiving country, as determined by the UNHCR office in Hong Kong. South Asians, with the exception of recent cases from Nepal and Sri Lanka, seem somewhat less aware of what they can legitimately expect from the asylum process. In the interviews conducted with South Asian refugees and asylum seekers one recurrent theme was of the respondents’ involvement in legal proceedings in their home country. In most cases the narrative was one of having been victimized or unfairly treated on grounds of personal enmity or religious differences. These individuals seek protection from what they perceive to be a hopeless situation. As we will see, however, things often do not work out to their liking. Innovative narratives of citizenship: “fresh start” as a human right It is a common expectation that in Hong Kong they might get a “fresh start”. Some of the individuals expressing this opinion are actually evading legal proceedings in their home countries. In a few cases the respondents admitted to having “made mistakes”, though this never amounted to a confession of guilt. Their narratives of their situation and their expectations show a clear lack of understanding of the intentions of the system of political asylum. This narrative projected a ‘fresh start’ or “second chance” as a human right. This right was even portrayed as the whole point of having not only the system of asylum, but also the UN itself, as a “highest authority”. One interviewee from a South Asian country threaded the logic together as follows: “Don’t human beings make 188 mistakes? Aren’t we human? Don’t we deserve another chance?” The narrative avoids the mention of law and due process. It is as if just by virtue of being in Hong Kong the individual had ‘escaped’ the time and place of his incrimination and had no need or intention to return to it. For these asylum-seekers the expectation of “new” citizenship also includes amnesty for previous previously alleged involvement in illegal activity. I must reiterate that I am not attempting to pass judgment on the accused. It is entirely possible that respondents truly were persecuted, and not guilty of the crimes they are accused of having committed. Once again, no admissions of guilt were made to me during the interviews. Respondents did however report being accused of theft, abduction and murder. Abdul (name changed), an asylum-seeker of Pakistani origin, told me of his marriage by elopement. He said that this kind of marriage was looked down upon and he was sure of being persecuted for it, and therefore had no option but to run away. They tell everyone that their cases don’t fit in the criteria. I want to ask – what is that criteria? Is there no hope for the poor? If one has a problem and this office cannot solve it – what is the purpose of having it? They will work for ministers, prime ministers and presidents – others have no rights. They are humans, others are not? We have a problem and we have come here and they talk of their criteria. Clearly Abdul, like many others, does not understand the role and responsibilities of the UNHCR – most importantly that it cannot intervene in ongoing legal proceedings in other countries unless it is undisputable that the proceedings cannot be fair. Later, when I asked him if he would ever want to go back, Abdul shook his head. 189 They [his wife’s family] have threatened me repeatedly. They say they’ll kill me if I ever appear in front of them. Her husband, he’s looking for me night and day. I do not intend to judge any of the asylum-seekers, including those looking for a ‘fresh start’. I only wish to highlight that people in dire situations, sometimes fleeing for their lives, do not have the time to research the laws and processes for immigration and political asylum. In some cases it is very difficult to decide whether the case merits asylum or not, keeping aside for the moment the matter of determining veracity. Another asylum-seeker, from Pakistan, asked me to help him write a letter to the UNHCR, appealing the rejection of his application for asylum. The basic details of his case are reproduced here but names of people and places have been changed to preserve anonymity. My name is Khan Razzaq, also known as Rashid Khan (names changed for anonymity). I arrived in Hong Kong in March 2002 (month changed) after changing the name on my passport (latter to former) in Pakistan. I had an irrigation and waterworks business in Pakistan. I also owned and operated a body- building gym. Some of my Shia friends visited my gym. They were also my classmates. I often visited Shia madrassa with them. When I visited the madrassa my family did not like it. This was because Sunnis and Deobandhis harassed my family about my visiting the Shia madrassa. My parents argued with me about this. This went on from 1999 until 2002. 190 During this time I witnessed a Shia woman's funeral. Sunnis again visited my parents and harassed them about it. My parents disowned me and threw my things out of the house saying I had become a Shia. Sometime later there was a brawl between Shias and Sunnis. Some badmouthing and exchange of abuses ensued between the men of both sides. This turned into a fight and people began throwing bricks at each other. I was injured during this fight. I lost consciousness there due to the injury to my head. When I regained consciousness I was at a government hospital. My friend told me that there was another fight after the one where I was injured. In the second fight a man was killed and many were injured. He told me some people were also looking for me with the intention of killing me. He also told me that the Sunnis and Deobandhis were trying to include my name in the FIR. My friend advised me to run away from there as soon as possible. I ran away from the hospital and went to my uncle's place (mother's brother), which was about 60km from my house. From there I called back to my father-in-law. He confirmed what my friend told me and advised me to get away from there because the police might be able to find me there. After that I went to Faridkot (name of place changed) - approximately 500 km from my house (distance changed). I hid there for three 191 and a half months. While I was away from home my wife and children were tortured. They are now with me in Hong Kong. After that my friend took my Pakistan ID and got me a passport. He then sent me to Hong Kong via China. I have now been living here for 5 years and I now have a claim under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). My wife and children were able to join me in 2007. If I now return to Pakistan, my case will not reach the court. I will be killed through a fake "encounter" or by other means at the airport or somewhere else. Even if the case reaches the court, the decision will be against me, because there is a Sunni majority and they are very powerful. Officers usually work under their influence. In addition, the local authorities have also filed fake cases of terrorism against me. Now terrorist groups are looking for me and my family, because it is their mission to kill Shias wherever they find them. My case at the UNHCR has been refused once. Our lives are wasting away in our existence here. I now need your assistance. Please consider my case with compassion and help me. My UNHCR case number is abc-05 and my wife's case number is def-07 (case numbers changed). My children's case numbers are the same as my wife's. His application was later denied again on the grounds that Faridkot, where he spent some time before coming to Hong Kong, was a safe place to live by his own account. Further, 192 the UNHCR was of the opinion that it was not its purpose to provide asylum from the due process of law, and if he was innocent he would be acquitted through legal channels. The UNHCR could not pass judgment on the legal institutions of Pakistan and saw no reason for him to have to move to Hong Kong. Further there are places in Pakistan where the applicant could live in peace, and therefore there was no case for asylum. At the same time, however, anyone familiar with the way government and judiciary work in many parts of South Asia knows that this man, assuming his story is true, could disappear without a trace upon returning to his country. One can only conclude that both sides may be correct. The man’s fears may be well-founded, and yet, these fears are not within the scope of the UNHCR’s work. There is some help available for the enterprising aspirants of citizenship. Christian Action, an NGO operating out of Chungking Mansions, provides free legal advice to asylum-seekers who have to present their cases to UNHCR (though this service is provided in a service center outside Chungking Mansions). As we know, clients are not well-versed in the legal aspects of political asylum, and also usually not conversant in English. Volunteer translators are often used to translate cases to the advisors who work at the Service Center. Volunteering for translation at Christian Action was part of my participant observation. Advisors at Christian Action try to simulate an interview with UNHCR case officials. It is usually the first time that the asylum-seekers’ stories are closely heard and evaluated. Internal inconsistencies in the stories are pointed out and lack of evidence is questioned. It is often recommended to asylum-seekers that they have a credible authority send a letter corroborating the events narrated by the applicant. 193 Further evidence is sought in terms of newspaper articles covering the events etc. The advisors are not allowed to go with the applicants to the UNHCR office. They may only prepare the applicants for that interview as well as possible. Stuck in limbo: vagaries of the asylum process No help is available, however, for some of the other problems related to the asylum process. Interviewees expressed deep discontent with the UN procedures, including claims of neglect of due process, inaccurate translation of statements at the UN offices, lack of transparency, and physical and psychological torture. Frank (name changed), an asylum-seeker from Cameroon, has procedural complaints. UNHCR doesn’t have a transparent mechanism of evaluating claims. Hong Kong [Emigration Department] has a transparent system – but they have not been accepting people. I have submitted everything – they [UNHCR] keep telling me ‘we are processing your case’. With Hong Kong anything you say – they give you a copy and you sign – in UNHCR if you say ‘A’ someone can write ‘B’ and I don’t get a copy. They just want to find a fault and then reject you. Frank’s friend Bob (name changed) is from Ethiopia. He reports seeing inconsistencies in the asylum process. I think the system of UNHCR in Hong Kong is different from anywhere. Even in Africa the process is more transparent. You don’t know what people are typing – they don’t tell you what you said – they decide by just looking at you. It is questionable. We know that some fake cases were accepted – and some genuine people stay here forever. I don’t know how they make the decision – but they 194 don’t go to the ground to find out. You may be given a case officer who does not know the background of your country. That office is supposed to be humanitarian – they should investigate – they should find out the details. From the perspective of the UNHCR it is indeed difficult to trace some of these cases and get reliable information. Investigating cases is an intricate process lengthened by bureaucratic treatment and by the sheer volume of applications. There is no definite ‘turnaround period’ for applications. As a result all asylum-seekers tend to miscalculate the time taken by the UNHCR to review cases and make decisions. Interviews revealed that the UNHCR could take anywhere between a few months to six years in deciding a case. Six years is not a defined limit, it was the longest-lasting case that I came across. It is entirely possible that other cases might have taken even longer. Paul (the community spiritual leader we met in an earlier chapter), is unsure of how the investigation into his case is being carried out. I asked him why he thought it was taking so long. This is what I am also asking. They always say “your case is in process” … what process? I don’t know how they are doing it … maybe they send someone to investigate in my home country – I don’t know how they are doing it. If they spend 6 months or a year, it’s better, rather than just waiting … you don’t know what will come next… rather than wasting 4 or 5 years… we are not getting younger. 195 For Frank the uncertainty and lack of transparency amounts to torture. I believe they are torturing us – mental torture. Most people can have mental breakdown. If you are thinking tomorrow I could be sent back and face death – it is not easy. Two years with UNHCR were miserable years – constantly waiting for their result. They interviewed me after 2 years they closed the case and said it “lacked credibility” … I don’t know what it means. That’s what they tell everyone – I don’t think they know the meaning of credibility. They are just torturing us…. within 6 months or 1 year you should know your fate – then the decision will be accepted. The people in UNHCR should stop maltreating, marginalizing, discriminating, frustrating the lives of people who are running away from death. Bob also doubts the decision-making process. In an unusual twist to the narrative, Bob goes a step further, laying the burden on the UNHCR to disprove his case. If you call me a thief and prove it, I can accept it… But if you call me a thief and you cannot prove it – that I cannot accept. You can tell me my case is not credible – but you haven’t even checked. You have to go deep down and really verify the information. Some very real cases were told they were not credible. You cannot push – you cannot take them to court – whatever they decide is final. Frank seconds Bob’s opinion that the process of investigation is not thorough. They make silly decisions. They only rely on the computer – they don’t check – everything that happens in Africa is not on the internet. You face torture in Cameroon or you face torture in Hong Kong. All these things are loopholes of UNHCR 196 The discontent over UNHCR procedures is not unique to individuals from African countries. Abdul, whom we met earlier in this chapter, related the story of his wife, who cannot speak English or Cantonese, and was handed over to the police by the UN with no information having been passed on to him. I came here in 2003. 19 September 2003 I came here. We had an entry visa. On 22 September 2003 we applied for asylum. Our case went on – we had interviews. In the last interview – her name was Lisa – she asked me for my papers – she said she had to photocopy them. I gave them to her. She interviewed me and told me to sit outside, and called my wife inside. She (Lisa) came back out after half an hour and said “Your wife will not go back with you, we will not let her go. We have to ask her something – she will return later”. I said okay. I asked about the papers – she said – “tomorrow”. No papers. One day passed, two, three – I came daily and asked “Where is my wife?” They said “We can’t tell you”. I asked them “why can’t you tell me?” Finally, on 20 May 2004, I told them I have written to you so many times and written so many letters, please tell me, where is my wife. They said they can’t tell me. I said “My children are suffering, I am suffering”… they said “wait, we’ll do something.” After 5 minutes they called the police, had me caught. The police took me in, I went to jail. The policeman said I have overstayed – I said “I’m not overstay”. He said “why?” I said I have a paper from the United Nations. He said they don’t listen to the UN – according to HK immigration department I am “overstay”. I said “what is that?” If I am overstay according to HK law, then why have you kept the UN here? Why are they here? …. 197 Then they detained me. In all they kept me for 1 year, 1 day and 18 hours. I had a ‘torture claim’ – I applied that – I wrote thousands of letters to the United Nations and made thousands of phone calls they didn’t listen to anything. And they said “we did not turn you in”. Why are they saying this? - “we didn’t turn you in”. “It is immigration’s job whether they let you go or not”…. When we were caught they kept my wife with them – in North Point – and they wouldn’t tell me where she was. When I came back I asked them “where is my wife?” Then they said “No, we don’t know”. When they cleared her case they threw her out at 12 midnight from their facility. Where could she go? An illiterate woman, she doesn’t know the city – she went around God knows how, asking at people’s homes. I contacted her with much difficulty and brought her back. Now tell me – if in that time something had happened to her – who would have been responsible for it? The UN? And they’re not even telling me – they say “we don’t know where she is”. He described his disgust in no uncertain terms. Like I’m saying – its wickedness. They have power. The UN told the police. The UN is wicked. The one or two percent cases they tackle are to keep people quiet. Nothing more than that. It is like putting dust in people’s eyes – that the UN is working here. No one is working here. They come and sit in their air conditioning – they have cars – they have laptops – they have all the conveniences – they have places to live – everything – to eat and drink – what do they know of what people 198 are going through. What conditions people live in- how lives are being lived. Let them sleep a couple of days at Star Ferry in the heat or cold then they will know – what human life is – and what is happening with humans. UNHCR offices face the difficult job of researching and making determinations for thousands of cases often originating from inaccessible areas and based on events that are not well-documented. It is understandable, to some extent, that it takes a long time to make decisions on a case-by-case basis. It does not, however, make sense that there is no outer limit at all by which the UNHCR is committed to make a decision regarding any given case. This leaves asylum-seekers in a situation of great uncertainty over a prolonged period of time. The uncertainty is heightened by the fact that Hong Kong is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, ostensibly because of a fear of its widespread abuse in conjunction with the liberal visa policies. In this situation protocols are not established for dealing with various emergent legal issues related to the asylum- seekers’ presence in Hong Kong. For example, the police sometimes accepts their papers establishing an ongoing case with the UNHCR, and sometimes not, leading to arbitrary detention. This leads to misinformation, with newcomers getting mixed messages from their networks, which reproduces the cycle. Though some people have reported being mistreated by the Hong Kong Police, many have also expressed deep appreciation of the Hong Kong government for taking care of them and their families. The interviewees were more unanimous though in criticizing the long time taken by UNHCR to make decisions. It is not the intent of this study to get into a lengthy critique of the UNHCR or its work in 199 Hong Kong. My purpose is to highlight the uncertain, marginal and recondite nature of the asylum-seekers’ life in Hong Kong. Claiming the right to work: innovative narratives, risky jobs During the time it takes to process applications and make a final determination, asylum- seekers are not allowed to work. If they qualify for welfare in terms of rent allowance, that amount goes directly to the landlord. The only thing they can take home is the food rations handed out thrice a month. It is not surprising that the need for employment opportunities is felt by all refugees and asylum seekers. There is, of course, good justification for the restrictions on employment. Not only would unrestricted access to the labor market skew wages but also it would turn a refugee/ asylum-seeker status into a de facto work visa. While it is the sovereign right of the ‘host’ country to protect its economy, the human aspect of the phenomenon deserves closer attention. There are several narratives claiming the right to work. The first, most common, and in my opinion the most compelling, is that the asylum-seekers end up wasting many years of potentially gainful employment in the application process. Bob argues If we spend 4 dead years in life – it is a lot. At our age we have to work, save, plan for the future. We are not earning, saving … we have problems. It is getting out of hand now. We ran from our country because of problems – and here the problems are just being added on. A period of several years is very long for an individual to go without employment. Not only does he or she have to spend this entire time without wages, but also his or her skills 200 and experience stagnate. By the time a decision is finally made, the individual’s competitiveness in the any job market has regressed considerably. The second narrative in justifying the demand for the right to work has to do with the waste of talent. Paul, for example, informs me that the African asylum-seekers can make a contribution to the Hong Kong economy. They should allow us to work. Each of us have different talents, most of us had professional jobs back home…. 80% are trained people with good qualifications. Because of situations they are here. They have ability and talent of doing one or two things. Here in Hong Kong we are wasted. Frank adds that Asylum-seekers Africans are mostly trained professionals. Accounting, teaching, carpentry - it is a matter of giving them an opportunity. Bob moderates the other two’s opinion a little bit. Wouldn’t say ‘most’ – but yes people have skills. If they were given chances many are also ready to learn … ready and willing. Most of Africans are in this funny situation. The third narrative used to claim the right to work is that the needs of the asylum-seekers are far greater than the allowance they receive. A Pakistani man whose case was rejected by the UN after over 2 years of consideration, and is now being considered by Hong Kong Immigration Department under the provisions of the Convention Against Torture (CAT) described his desperation as follows. There is no decision, and they are not telling us anything. We are getting money only to eat – there is no money for clothes – we don’t have clothes. Where should 201 we go? When we talk to the ISS they say they don’t have permission. Should we beg? I need to visit the doctor, I have to go often. My wife is also ill – her feet ache – I have an ache in my hip – emigration people know it, UN knows it. If the weather becomes a little cooler my pain starts, I can’t move. If I have to go to the doctor – will I have the money to go? Where do I get the money from? Should I pick someone’s pocket? Should I steal? That I don’t want to do, nor will I. Should I beg? Am I not a human being? I feel like eating something – I can’t. I think about buying a shoe – I can’t. I think about buying clothes – I can’t. Life cannot be lived on flour and rice alone. We all have other needs too. There is also a moral argument. The fourth narrative is that employment is a basic human need. Paul explains that living on charity does not sit well with trained able people. I think it is okay if they allow us to work. No matter the situation – you need work. You cannot just sit. They are assisting – but there’s nothing to do – it’s still not okay – I didn’t come here for food or shelter. I prefer to work than to received food and shelter. I have no option and no choice. It’s very necessary to allow us to work. Frank chimes in with a similar opinion. We are frustrated here. You wake up and you have nothing to do. You just collect food – and even the food is not very good for us. If they allow us to work, we can fetch our food ourselves. We can buy ourselves. Teach a person how to fish rather than give them fish every day. We should be allowed to fish ourselves. Abdul, the asylum-seeker from Pakistan, feels that receiving aid is like begging. 202 They should give permission to work – at least part-time – at least we wouldn’t have to beg. We would at least be able to take care of ourselves. We are also human beings. The Chinese people – who are locals – compare them to the refugees. Are they not humans? They have no rights? Are they supposed to keep begging? The person who begs, how is that person viewed by people? …. It’s the same as begging. I can’t bring myself to do it. Those clothes, for example, if they give something, the pant will be too big, the shirt will be big. It’ll look like the clothes are stolen from someone else. The fifth narrative claiming the right to work relies on dubious reasoning, but nevertheless shows the cosmopolitan views of the asylum-seekers. Bob is the one who posits this idea. If you look at China or Hong Kong – Chinese are scattered around the world – and they are allowed to work there – so why are they doing this? The world is a global village – if they don’t allow us to work – why should they be allowed to work in other countries? It is so frustrating. Obviously Bob overlooks the difference between immigrants and asylum-seekers, and also between UNHCR regulations and Hong Kong’s domestic policies. The invocation of the notion of the world as a “global village” shows the margizens’ willingness to use a cosmopolitan idea to make a claim on an aspect of ‘statist’ citizenship, to be realized, of course, at the local level. 203 The last (sixth) narrative involved a carefully made distinction between asylum-seekers and economic immigrants. Bob tries to explain this point. We didn’t come for jobs or food or shelter. We are just running away from political problems. We need protection. We know under UN conventions, someone who is running away due to political problems should be protected under international law – that’s why we went to UNHCR. Not to advocate for jobs. The argument is that though the Hong Kong government has a reason to expect a huge influx of job-seekers should asylum-seekers be allowed to work, this is not really going to happen, because African asylum-seekers, unlike those from South Asia, do not come all the way to Hong Kong for jobs. Some individuals in dire straits end up working illegally. The risks are high. If caught, they face loss of welfare support, prosecution, jail, extradition and refusal of reentry to Hong Kong. Describing the people he knows who work illegally, Bob says They do petty jobs – but it’s risky. But you know – when you are in a corner – you are forced to do what you don’t want to do. Compared to Africans, it is easier for South Asians to find work illegally in Chungking Mansions. Firstly, there are a lot more South Asian employers, and secondly, there are also a lot more legal South Asian workers and visitors making it easier to blend into the crowd. Frank notices the advantage South Asians hold. Those people do not care – they believe they can work – they come work and go back. But we Africans have problems back home. If an African man picks up a 204 trolley in Chungking Mansions, the police will immediately arrest him, because of his color – but those Pakistanis and Indians – they have Hong Kong ID card – they take the card of their brothers or sisters and work. Some of them don’t care of being caught – they will go back. They don’t have fear of facing death at home. At least they will make something for themselves. Paul agrees The Chinese person will not give me a job – it is risky for him. And I also cannot bear the risk – because I know the consequences. I have been told not to – if I do it I will be against the law. They may make me go back…so I follow the law and keep waiting. Bob adds Pakistanis and Indians are a bit different. Some of them are residents – it is difficult for the Hong Kong government to identify who is who – they cannot stop everyone – and they look alike – it’s not like Africa. An African individual working in Chungking Mansions is much more likely to be interviewed during a random police check. Many of the Africans prefer to make neighboring Mirador Mansions their base. They mostly stay indoors and out of sight, many sharing a single room together. Mirador Mansions is comparable to Chungking Mansions in size but of a much more limited commercial and cultural profile. As discussed in the chapter on ethnic enclaves illegal work, in most cases, involves handing out flyers, finding clients for businesses (particularly restaurants), carrying messages, 205 making small deliveries, and loading and unloading goods. The jobs do not pay much and have to be located on a day-to-day basis. Locating basic necessities: aid from faith-based organizations Food and shelter are problems facing the margizens on a daily basis. Food aid is provided by the NGO Social Security International. For legitimate asylum-seekers food rations are given out thrice a month. In addition, the Welfare Department of Hong Kong also provides a small allowance of 1200 Hong Kong Dollars per month towards rent. The common practice is for four of five recipients (more or less depending on personal resources) to pool their money and lease a room together. The payment goes directly to the lessor from the government once the government is notified of the lease terms. As we have discussed before, those applying for aid should have the proper papers from the UN or Hong Kong emigration departments. Prior records of illegal entry, overstaying a visa period, or other criminal offences can disqualify an individual from this aid. Christian Action makes a significant contribution to the welfare of refugees and asylum- seekers. The NGO’s stated mission is “ to help the poor and disadvantaged in Hong Kong and Mainland China with particular emphasis upon displaced persons, irrespective of race, sex, religion or nationality.” Lunch and dinner is served daily, free of cost, for 50 - 100 refugees and asylum-seekers at the Chungking Mansions service center of Christian Action. Clients are also given clothes, blankets and other helpful items on a regular basis. It is one of the most recognized social service organizations in Hong Kong. For ethnic minority immigrants from South Asia and Africa, the services of Christian Action are 206 critical in the struggle for survival in the city. In the words of an asylum-seeker from Ghana “Christian Action – they don’t segregate – it is supposed to be for Christians but 95% of the people there are Muslims, Buddhists.” The organization also works with immigrants from Mainland China and all other places, with no national or religious bias. English and Cantonese language classes and special interest classes such as sewing etc. are conducted at the Chungking Mansions Service Center. Christian Action also used to offer medical facilities through doctors visiting voluntarily twice a week, but this service was terminated in late 2008. Free Internet access was also a common attraction for many asylum-seekers, but this service was also terminated at the end of 2008. Figure 4.3 shows the office and promotional materials of Christian Action. There are also several major religious institutions in the immediate vicinity of Chungking Mansions. Whereas Christian Action, as an NGO, is more secular in mission and in terms of its clients these centers of organize religion provide services principally on the basis of affiliation. Muslims from both Africa and South Asia visit the Kowloon Mosque, which is a block away from Chungking Mansions, across the street. I spoke with the Imam of the mosque who told me that the mosque was built during the British colonial period at the behest of Muslim soldiers who wanted a place to pray. But one Pakistani asylum- seeker described his experience with the Kowloon Mosque with some indifference. We have neither asked for it nor do they have any. Earlier on when I had just arrived, they had helped me two times – the people at the Masjid – they had helped me twice - but they said ‘we can’t do any more than this.’ But they did help twice. 207 Figure 4.3: Christian Action office and promotional material Source: Christian Action , Hong Kong 208 Figure 4.4: Kowloon Mosque (above) and St. Andrew’s Church (below) 209 The Imam of the mosque confirmed that the mosque is not used officially as a place for circulating employment referrals, or for welfare handouts, but strictly as a place of worship. If people meet during this community activity and make networks it is outside the work and control of the mosque. The mosque does help those who have no papers from home with certificates verifying their background for the Hong Kong Government, for example to help someone who wants to officially get married in Hong Kong. Christianity is the next biggest religion in Hong Kong after Buddhism and Taoism. The network of Christian organizations working for asylum-seekers and immigrants is consequently very large. Various churches also contribute through donations and charity work. The churches in Hong Kong are more numerous and rely on the community’s generosity to provide food and clothing to the needy. Asylum-seekers often establish relationships with one or more churches. The Christians among asylum-seekers are mostly from Africa, though a small minority is also from South Asia, particularly South India and Sri Lanka. St. Andrew’s Church in Kowloon, which is also a few blocks North of Chungking Mansions is one location that is home to a brotherhood of asylum-seekers and refugees. They are aided by a mainly Hong Kong Chinese leadership and also some British expatriate volunteers. One of the sermons I attended was about the relationship between ‘power’ and ‘authority’, how Jesus gave both to His apostles to spread His word, and how it would be against His word to use power without authority. This sermon, given by a preacher who is also an asylum-seeker himself, embodies the sentiments of the asylum-seekers both towards the problems at home and towards the UN system in Hong Kong. The narrative is one claiming human rights as having been accorded equally by 210 God to all humans, and decrying morally those who attempt to diminish these rights. The political dimension of the sermon has obvious appeal to the brotherhood, and it is here, through the support of Hong Kong Chinese and British expatriate Christians, that asylum- seekers create this space in the public sphere. Being a spiritual leader, Paul (who was mentioned earlier), of course has a strong association with his Church. In my case the Church plays a very big role. When I’m down I go to church to meet people and friends and take strength from the words of the gospel … of the bible, and I forget the negative thoughts I was having. When you are away from home at times you feel very down. Church is like a home. Help us to get together and to forget our problems. They also help financially – we are not allowed to work – so they fill the gap. Before ISS and the HK government came in to help – there was basically nothing. UNHCR would register you but would give you no help. So church plays a big role. ISS gives 1000 dollars for our rent – and there’s no room in Hong Kong for 1000 dollars. So you need another 1000 – Church can fill that gap. One church – Divine Church in Central – not only Christians, they even give to Muslims – because they give aid to everyone. So people go for aid, not even for worship – but in the process you find someone worshipping. Sometimes even the Muslims are worshipping, nonbelievers too – they go. We don’t go – because the 211 for us the main point is not money – we don’t go to several churches for money – we go to only one – St. Andrew’s. Frank has also found spiritual well-being and material assistance from being associated with the Church. But he cautions against attending Church for the purpose of extracting money or support. HK is big and expensive. In church we can find shelter and comfort – someone who can talk to you – hear your problems – the minister can give you one or two ideas that can redevelop your mind. Most asylum-seekers have no jobs. In church they can check email, find comfort – someone knows your problem – what you are going through. You can make friends.… Haven’t been there [Divine Church mentioned by Paul] – don’t think of it. I have principles – I cannot go just to get assistance – it is like selling your faith. My church helps me depending on what I tell them – I am lucky. I cannot be moving from one church to another because I want to make ends meet. They even have food now through ISS. My church also helps me to pay rent in addition to the 1000 – so why should I go to another church? Figure 4.4 shows pictures of the Kowloon Mosque and St. Andrew’s Church. Located on Hong Kong Island, the Sikh Gurudwara (Khalsa Diwan Sikh Temple) is somewhat far removed from Tsim Sha Tsui and Chungking Mansions. It is used by Sikhs and Hindus, nevertheless, as a place of worship and as a community resource. As is common practice among Gurudwaras (Sikh temples) in South Asia and around the world, 212 free food (langar) is offered every day. In addition Hong Kong’s Khalsa Diwan Sikh Temple also provides language classes, tuition for students, a kindergarten, medical consultation, and training in religion, music and traditional martial arts. Finally, the Gurudwara also provides temporary shelter for short periods, which is also common practice for temples of the Sikh faith, derived from its strong commitment to community service. Food and shelter services are widely availed by asylum-seekers of Hindu and Sikh faiths, especially when they first arrive in Hong Kong. Visiting these organizations on a regular basis is a strategic choice for most of the asylum-seekers in Hong Kong allowing them to create the first foothold for the vulnerable asylum-seekers when they arrive in Hong Kong. The most direct benefits are in terms of food and shelter. Asylum-seekers also acquire a ‘home’ in the most general sense of the word, contacts among their peers and in the broader community, membership to networks of aid, and a sense of belonging to the city. These civic aspects are of course in addition to the original value of practicing their faith. Through the work of these organizations religion continues to inform identity-formation, though the participation of “clients” may often be borne out of physical rather than spiritual need. Negotiating identity: seeking new ways to belong There is another important component of citizenship, which, although not directly verbalized is omnipresent in the actions of any immigrant community, by which they make space in the public sphere. Immigrants construct a belonging to the place they share and also make the place belong to them. Certainly, there are historical reasons why 213 this place (unlike any other in the city) has become a center for foreigners, and in particular Africans and South Asians of a certain economic class. It is the latter group that organizes events such as Nepalese Dusshehra celebrations (Hindu festival widely celebrated in Northern India and Nepal), the Kowloon Cricket Tournament, Durga Puja (major festival in Eastern India and Bangladesh), concerts etc. Marginal groups, as described earlier, participate in these events, though mostly as viewers. The Nepalese Dusshehra celebrations were conducted in Kowloon Park, a block North of Chungking Mansions, and included visits from political leadership from Nepal, and also minor Nepalese celebrities leading the song and dance after the political speeches had been made. The Nepalese community turned out in strength (more than 1000), but most of the participants were of the lower or lower middle income groups. The national identity, in practice, remains divided along class lines. Wealthier Nepalese did not join this celebration of Nepalese national and religious identity, even though it was an opportunity to publicly decry the Communist takeover, which is neither popular with the business elite nor with the religious folk, many of whom are actually seeking asylum from mistreatment by that regime. Durga Puja, which is celebrated in Eastern India and Bangladesh mainly by the Bengali Hindu population is organized at more than one locations in Hong Kong. The events draw participants from as far away as Guangzhou and Shenzhen in Guangdong Province of mainland China. The puja closest to Chungking Mansions was organized in Yau Ma Tei, which is two metro stops North of Tsim Sha Tsui (the station serving Chungking 214 Mansions and directly below it). A large number of asylum-seekers showed up over the week-long celebrations, to pray, seek blessings, relive memories of puja at home, becoming one with the crowds of permanent residents in front of the deity. Similarly other events such as concerts and cricket tournaments are advertised in Chungking Mansions, inviting (at least passive) participation. There is no entry charge for the Cricket tournament, but it is located quite far away from Chungking Mansions where the poster was photographed. It is expected that some members of the South Asian community in Chungking Mansions will be sufficiently interested in a Cricket tournament that they might attend, even though there is no chance for most of them to ever join any of the clubs that are participating. The poster for the cricket tournament is interesting from another perspective. While on the one hand inviting the denizens of Chungking Mansions out of their enclave and into the public sphere, at the same time it attempts to assert Pakistani national “ownership” of Cricket in Hong Kong. Cricket is perhaps one of the greatest binding and dividing force in postcolonial South Asia, with a perennial rivalry between India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and recently Bangladesh. The trophy being played for, in this case, is named after Pakistan’s Muhammad Ali Jinnah (aka Quaid-i-Azam), a figure not quite as uniformly popular in the subcontinent as the sport itself. The tournament was sponsored by the Pakistani consulate in Hong Kong (Figure 4.5). From the fieldwork it is clear that Chungking Mansions is home to a community where a large number of individuals is dissatisfied with their national belonging. They come to 215 Hong Kong to escape whatever it is they are dissatisfied with. For some it is a matter of political or religious persecution, for others it is just a question of getting away from their personal issues, and for yet others it is the lure of quick money. They attempt to create a new sense of belonging in Hong Kong. They are able to do it best in Chungking Mansions. They spend their days in and around the building and use the services it offers. From this location they launch their search for both universal human rights and particular (local) needs, both of which could not be guaranteed to them in their home country for various reasons. At this micro level each asylum-seeker wages a personal battle for survival. In this unique situation, where belonging to the city represents the hope of belonging to a formal citizenship regime, sometimes for those at the margins, loyalties seem to shift Figure 4.5: Poster for the Quaid-i-Azam Trophy 216 quickly. For one Bangladeshi asylum-seeker being supported by the Hong Kong government is by itself close to having become a Hong Kong resident. One obviously likes a place after staying there long enough. I am not of Hong Kong and not of Bangladesh, I am of nowhere. I meet you, talk to you, see you again… and you become a friend. It is good to talk and tell someone what is going on. Same way, whoever looks after you, asks after you, feeds you … one thinks of them. Now I think of Hong Kong government as my family. They ask if I have eaten and they take care of me. They give us food and a place to stay. They even give pillows to those who don’t have them. That is like a family. Normally after you stay in a place for a while you like that place. If I lose my place, I will be unhappy to leave. I won’t be able to return to my country- might have to go somewhere else – we’ll see what happens - but I feel whatever has to be done should be done quickly. There seemed to be a consensus that the Hong Kong government had done a good job of providing for asylum-seekers. Another Bangladeshi asylum-seeker expressed his gratefulness. The arrangements here have been very good. In this country the way they work for human rights. In our country they don’t work like this for human rights. Where human rights are being violated, the government sees it and yet does nothing. But the complete freedom one has here, that freedom you can enjoy… we haven’t had that in Bangladesh, and is not likely either. Frank and Bob believe the Hong Kong government could do a better job of handling the UNHCR system. 217 I would like the Hong Kong government to take over UNHCR. So that it can be a transparent mechanism. It is not that everybody wants to get status. Despite his assurance that not everybody wants to come to Hong Kong to get refugee status, Hong Kong seems disinclined to take that chance. Conclusions I have tried to show in the foregoing analysis that practiced citizenship in Chungking Mansions reproduces Hong Kong’s ideal of the enterprising citizens among the African and South Asian margizens. Through the process of creating narratives, crossing into legal grey areas through their work and travels, scrambling for basic necessities, and negotiating their values and identity, these refugees, asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants show a high degree of entrepreneurship. In this way the city’s values are institutionalized and transferred to these newcomers. In the conclusions I want to discuss what this experience means for the “postnational” paradigm. There are many strong social movements in Hong Kong. Perhaps the most prominent amongst these is the pro-democracy movement, which culminated in a massive protest on July 1, 2003 and also led to the creation of a political party named after the date. Similarly the grassroots response to the Hong Kong government’s plainly revanchist Urban Renewal Act is also gathering momentum and public attention. These areas are being “renewed” in the shape of tall apartment buildings in the place of traditional styles of housing and community lifestyles. 218 During my fieldwork, I was hosted by the School of Social Work at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, where I met several students engaged with community struggles through resident groups called ‘kai fong’. The kai fong groups fight legal battles with government agencies pressing for due process, just compensation and inclusive planning practices in various older neighborhoods around Hong Kong. They also organize formal protests and awareness campaigns through exhibitions, demonstrations and media appearances. Despite having very limited resources and a largely indifferent public opinion (thought this might be changing of late) the kai fong groups have consistently resisted unfair practices in state policies and projects, and the large business interests supporting these projects. In stark contrast, Chungking Mansions has no grassroots-level self-organization. Given the levels and extent of marginalization some degree of organization and activism would be expected, even if it were in the form of dialogue rather than protest. Beyond the welfare efforts of Christian Action and other NGOs, however, the margizens of Chungking Mansions have nowhere to turn for resources, advice and support in the form of a shared voice. Though discontent is felt, it is considered acceptable compared to the frame of reference of the immigrant’s point of origin. In a limited sense – that is in terms of accepting poor physical conditions and social marginalization – this might even be considered marginalization ‘by consent’. There are several reasons why such is the case. First, as we have seen before, this group is highly fragmented and interests are diverse and differentiated. Second, and in my 219 opinion more significant, is the fact that this group of individuals have no stake in resisting the structures of political and economic power. Their real interest is fuller participation in the very same institutions. Through self-selection and through socialization into the ‘enterprising citizen’ paradigm, the group at Chungking Mansions consists of mobile, networked, quick-to-adapt, and extremely ambitious individuals who have not had access to the development and growth that has happened in their home countries. For them Hong Kong is a fortunate aberration – an easily accessible developed economy. Marginalization in this view is the collateral for an opportunity to leapfrog over the slow rise in personal well-being in their home countries – particularly in the rural areas and small towns. This does not justify marginalization, nor should it be considered a reason to deny people rights they may not even be aware they have. I am only trying the explain the reasons why marginalization seems to be accepted without resistance in Chungking Mansions. Practiced citizenship in Chungking Mansions cannot be considered a resistance to neoliberalism in the conventional sense. I want to argue that practiced citizenship in Chungking Mansions shows evidence of an “inverted resistance”. The actions observed and reported in this chapter are not targeted towards any fallout of the neoliberal order, unlike vendors in LA (Holston) or evicted tenants in Cape Town (Miraftab). The resistance in Chungking Mansions is, rather, a struggle for more complete participation in a get-rich-quick dream. Immigrants (both legal and illegal) in Chungking Mansions are there to participate in Hong Kong’s free market economy. There is no sense here that there is something unfair about neoliberalism. When there is discontent it is expressed in 220 terms of identity (calling the Chinese racist. or the UNHCR system biased against Muslims) rather than class. That is, discontent arises from a perception of unfair play, not unfair rules. Though there is an awareness of class positions, it is not class consciousness in the sense of solidarity and common purpose. As I have noted before, a vast majority of the participants of this enclave are not the urban middle class of their respective countries, nor the poorest of the rural poor. They are relatively wealthy people from the small towns and villages, who want desperately to climb into the middle class and are willing to take risks, and endure marginal existence and poor living conditions in the short run. I would like to call this process “inverted resistance”. As I have discussed in this chapter, Hong Kong’s particular history of citizenship created the ideal-type of the “enterprising” citizen. This is exactly the kind of citizens that the immigrants in Chungking Mansions aim to be. The resistance in Chungking Mansions is competitive – internally, between businesses and between fracture groups, and also externally as a group of outsiders competing for survival in the foreign marketplace. The resistance is aimed towards the participants’ own lowly class position or marginal political status, with the sole purpose of rising in the class ranks, either in Hong Kong or back in the home country. The only expectation is the ability to do business, and the free market system delivers that quite well. This is a tacit acknowledgement of the informality and at times illegality of the operations running in the place. The low expectations represent a political balance – the immigrants do not ask for more than an open business environment, and the government does not throw the book at every transgression. 221 There is an obvious omission in literature on locally practiced citizenship – acknowledging the difference between the capabilities of local actors whose national- level status is secure, and those whose is not. Though members of both groups might find themselves economically marginalized, options for the latter group are necessarily limited because of the additional burden of insecure status. In other words, the potential for what Miraftab (2009) calls “counter-hegemonic practices” is significantly lowered for a community like the one seen at Chungking Mansions, which is variously marginalized externally and fractured internally. In this kind of socio-spatial formation, which I have earlier termed a “space of market-culturalism”, the community does not commonly launch protests or challenge the hegemony. Their limited “insurgence” is more along the lines of Holston’s take on the idea. Even in that limited sense Chungking Mansions is different. Whereas street vendors in Los Angeles or squatters in Brazilian favellas are actually attempting to challenge the system, in the case of Chungking Mansions, the community is attempting to make the most of the system, from within it, to improve their lot. There may be discontent, but there is no element of a real challenge or upheaval. Even those who are discontent harbor hope of success, and share a belief in the logic of the system. They find the system transparent and they see numerous success stories, even in failing to strike it big, they are likely to improve their lot. At least for the community in Chungking Mansions, coming to Hong Kong and existing in the building is a calculated risk. They have no incentive to overthrow the very system on which they are counting. In this context, the politics (in a basic sense) of the individuals of this community is not practiced around a shared sense of class consciousness, but rather emanates from immediate personal needs. 222 Further, Chungking Mansions is a delicately balanced social and economic ecosystem. The lack of any real political movement also points to the fact that the degree of empowerment is quite low. Most Africans and South Asians in Chungking Mansions, certainly the vulnerable sections, do not have legal right of abode in Hong Kong. Their stay in Hong Kong, no matter how long it drags on, remains temporary. For some of them the place is a mere stepping stone. Thus the individuals who most need a change are not invested or embedded enough in the place to demand it, or fight for it. And those not in the most vulnerable situations prefer to practice their “inverted” citizenship to achieve greater integration within existing structures. 223 Chapter 5 : Imagining Chungking Mansions Introduction So far I have presented my analysis of the case of Chungking Mansions. Before presenting my conclusions, through this chapter, I will analyze how Chungking Mansions has been imagined in Hong Kong. I read the image of the Chungking Mansions from three sources. These are (i) a survey of Hong Kong residents who are not associated with Chungking Mansions (2008), (ii) the film Chungking Express (1994), (iii) an article by Prof. Gordon Matthews (2007). I will discuss the significance of each of the sources, and what they contribute to our understanding of the place. This will be followed by an argument for the need to re-present Chungking Mansions to reflect its complex contemporary realities, which will lead directly to my conclusions. Survey findings: Dark but changing To assess the image of the building among outsiders I conducted an online survey through the website www.surveymonkey.com. Respondents were asked for basic demographic information (age, sex, income etc.) and their opinions regarding the conditions of Chungking Mansions and its future. As described in the methods section, the survey employed a snowball sampling technique. To qualify respondents needed to be outsiders (not working or living on the site) who had visited Chungking Mansions. They were asked to rank their agreements with several statements about the image of Chungking Mansions on a scale of 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). In addition, there were open-ended questions to allow respondents to explain their choices. 224 Reported below are some findings from this survey. For the complete survey instrument see Appendix 1. The survey was conducted through a snowball sampling technique and 70 valid responses were collected. About 97% of the sample was non-South Asian. About 21% of respondents were from North America, Europe and Australia/Oceania. All others were ethnic Chinese (from Hong Kong or Mainland China). The sample suffers from several shortcomings. First, it was an online survey and thus necessitating access to the Internet and ability to use a computer. The snowballing started with university students and as it turned out 57% of the sample has a graduate degree (Master’s degree or higher). 33% of the population is in the highest income bracket (monthly household income HKD 50,000 or higher), though the median is about between HKD 30,000 and HKD 39,999. Clearly the sample of this survey is small and has several biases. As stated in Chapter 1, the point of the survey was to assess the image of Chungking Mansions in general terms. The arguments and conclusions made through this study do not rely on this survey alone. The survey triangulates what we already know, and helps us get a basic understanding of the outsiders’ perspective. Aggregate data from the survey suggest that outsiders hold both a good and bad image of the place. There are lingering doubts about safety and sanitation. Survey findings show that while only 4.5% of the respondents thought that Chungking Mansions “spoils Hong Kong’s image” and only 3% though it “does not belong in Hong Kong” (that is, an agreement rank >4 on a scale of 7), as many as 48.5% of the same sample though it “is an 225 unsanitary place” (with an additional 20% reporting 4/7, i.e. undecided). In addition, 48.5% also thought it “is an unsafe place” (an additional 21% reporting a rank of 4/7). There is, nevertheless, a general acceptance that the place and its society have no significant negative impact on Hong Kong, and people are trying to get by or make some money in the place, just as in any other commercial center in Hong Kong. About 90% of the respondents disagreed with the proposition that “Chunking Mansions should be demolished”. At the same time, 58% agreed that the place “should continue as it is, but with major renovations and cleanup”. Further, 77% of respondents agree that “Chungking Mansions is a unique place that should be preserved”. Again, it is important to remember that the sample is biased towards people with higher education and thus biased towards the “enlightened” citizen, or at least those who are aware of the remarks that may appear intolerant and inappropriate. In addition to aggregate statistics possible relationships between demographic variables and opinions were tested. The Pearson’s Coefficients of Correlation reveal that there is a significant, though moderate, positive correlation between the image of Chungking Mansions held by individuals and their frequency of visiting the building. That is, more frequent visitors tend to hold a more positive image of the place. In addition, there is also a significant moderate positive correlation between Educational Attainment and certain opinions. Even though the frequency of visits tends to be correlated with a better image of the place, very few respondents reported being regular visitors. This may be seen as people 226 voting with their feet. They may accept the place as a part of Hong Kong and even appreciate its value to the economy, however, almost 90% have been to Chungking Mansions less than 10 times in all (this includes 22% who have been inside just once and 18% have not actually entered the building at all.) This phenomenon is part of the issue that I am trying to address. Ethnic places may be accepted in the city by individuals, but that does not make them attractive destinations. There are certainly issues of class involved in explaining why a lot of people will not consider Chungking Mansions as a serious shopping or dining destination. Its image as described earlier also plays a part. Even so, accepting the place without visiting it constitutes a paradox that is central to the critique of the ethnic places produced through multiculturalist policies. The paradox is that though people see the ethnic place as holding value for its primary user community only, and not for the whole society. They accept the place on one hand, see its values, and support its continuation, yet on the other hand, they refrain from actually participating in the place. This is discussed in more detail through the course of the study. Some findings are summarized in Appendix 3.1 through 3.4. The survey also included open-ended questions. Although statistically inconclusive, these responses show support for the basic findings, and also provide a more nuanced understanding of how the place is perceived by people. The opinions regarding the image of the place and its users are quite varied, representing the entire range of reactions from somewhat xenophobic to the open-minded and tolerant. Some respondents, for example, said that “it is great to have a place like Chungking Mansions…. I don’t feel discriminated going in” and “it’s cleaner and brighter inside now compared to 3 or 4 227 years ago”. Others said “it was not as bad as I expected” and “people there are generally more friendly than I imagined”. Another respondent also called the people at Chungking Mansions “kind and friendly to others”. There was also a shared sense, among some respondents, of viewing Chungking Mansions as an example of successful globalization. “It shows that Hong Kong is a diverse city.” Others with similar view said “Chungking Mansions is a place where foreigners gather from various countries… we can experience cross-cultural interactions there”, “I love that building and the diversity it contains and symbolizes” and “it really helps Hong Kong’s image of diversity”. “It needs to survive like Chinatowns in foreign countries”. Some opinions were not quite as positive. “It is far sketchier than I thought”. The words “sketchy” and “seedy” appear repeatedly in the negative opinions. Some respondents were more blunt in their criticism. For example, “businesses in there, I’d think they are dodgy dealers”, “nice kids, cunning grown ups, golden necklace, nice – but seems cannot be trusted”, and “they don’t want to assimilate in the wider society, want to live with others like them.” Another respondent said that South Asians at Chungking Mansions appeared to be “clannish – mix with their own culture.” Other common words were ‘mysterious’, ‘dark’, ‘exotic’, ‘informal’ and ‘illegal’. One respondent captured the ambivalence aptly. “[W]hether or not it is an eyesore is very subjective. I think it is the beauty of HK culture, very tolerable, incorporative, and accepting of differences”. Another view supports the previous quote – “unlike the Filipina maids occupying public rest areas, people in Chungking Mansions are not really disturbing other people. If you don’t want to see them, just don’t go there.” Regardless of the whether the overall 228 impression was positive or negative, and whether the respondent was conservative or liberal in terms of their views regarding immigrants, there was consensus that there are serious security and sanitary issues in the building, that need to be addressed right away. In addition most respondents seemed to agree that the business “promoters” handing out flyers and sometimes aggressively soliciting the unsure diner, were a nuisance. Another recurring theme was that Chungking Mansions is the flipside of Hong Kong’s success. “It’s a very dynamic, cosmopolitan place. I consider it the underbelly or ‘leftover’ of Hong Kong’s success as a world financial capital.” Another response characterizes it as “a place that lets people without large sums of money to start and continue their life in Hong Kong’s centre”. Highlighting the treatment at the hands of the Chinese, a respondent said Chungking Mansions is a unique place…. that shows how isolated these ethnic groups are in HK… Chinese seem to have little regard for them, and provide very little help for them to interact, far less integrate with the mainstream HK society. Underlining the marginalization, one respondent claimed that “it is a place where many who are or feel left out by the rest of HK have taken over… and good for them”. There were also several comparisons to the Kowloon Walled City, a part of Kowloon with a history going back to the 10 th century. The site had a disputed status having been an island of Chinese authority within Hong Kong, later abandoned by successive administrations in China, evacuated and partially demolished by the Japanese, and later filled in with squatters who turned it into a very dense place that eventually turned into a 229 haven for crime. The place was cleared of the worst of its criminal linkages in the 70s and demolished completely in 1994, with some remains turned into a park. The fact that Chungking Mansions shares a cognitive association with the Kowloon Walled City is significant, not least in view of the ultimate outcome of the latter. The point is not lost on the businesses and owners within the building. Despite the illegality and informality of some, this is not the place of “high-end” criminal operations of the Hong Kong triads, and all efforts are being made (as we discussed earlier) to change that image. Contrary to expectations no significant relationship was discovered between factors of age and image. No relationship was found between place of residence (Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, New Territories) and opinions regarding Chungking Mansions. ‘Chungking Express’ (1994): Difference and Speed Acclaimed auteur filmmaker Wong Kar-wai used Chungking Mansions as one of the locations for his film Chungking Express (1994). The film was nominated for the Palme d’Or at the Cannes Film Festival. The award was won by Quentin Tarantino for Pulp Fiction (1994), but the latter brought Wong’s film to English-speaking audiences through a DVD release by his company Rolling Thunder, prefaced with his own commentary. The film has, since then, attracted tourists to the building in large numbers. On any day one is likely to find tourists assessing the front façade of the building and peering cautiously into the lobby. A UK critics’ poll by the British Film Institute’s (BFI) ‘Sight and Sound’ magazine (2002) ranked Chungking Express among the top 10 films of the last 25 years. The significance of the film can be gauged from the fact that there is a store in the front end of the second floor of Chungking Mansions called “Chungking 230 Express”, that is, a store named after the film, which was named after the very building in which the store is located. In this section I will revisit Wong Kar-wai’s representation of Chungking Mansions. Through its metaphorical allusions and narrative roles, I will discuss how Chungking Express has created a lingering image of the space and society of Chungking Mansions. The analysis based on the ideas of difference and compression. Ackbar Abbas (1997) has dedicated a chapter in his book on Hong Kong on analyzing Wong Kar-wai as a “Hong Kong filmmaker”. Referring to Deleuze, Abbas cites Wong’s films as observations of Hong Kong’s mutations. Wong’s first four films, for Abbas, are the most intent examination of Hong Kong in cinema (of which Chungking Express is the third). These films do not critique or comment explicitly on social issues, but rather, are political through the act of true observation. In this sense Abbas likens the relationship between Wong’s films and Hong Kong to Ozu’s observations of post-War Japan, and Godard’s record of France in the politically volatile 60s. Abbas characterizes Hong Kong as a space of “déjà disparu” – or the process of repeatedly disappearing – from both physical and cognitive space, and within it Chungking Mansions as a “heterotopic… portmanteau space” (p. 54). Difference The opening sequence of the film follows a Chinese woman (an operative of the drug trade) through the alleys of Chungking Mansions and into the dark back rooms of the trafficking underworld. The shots emphasize fast movement through tight spaces. Wong uses brief glimpses of the place to express difference and alienation between the ethnic 231 Chinese woman and the South Asians of Chungking Mansions (Figure 5.1 a – c). The mood is dark. The place is poorly lit, crowded and full of smoke. People look at her with curiosity or mistrust, no one smiles. The dark faces contrast with her tan raincoat and blonde wig. She is the only woman in a male space, pushing her way past a rude (and shirtless) group of men. Their skin, their ways, their language is all foreign to her. One of them says something to her, she smacks him, he continues to shout behind her, she swirls around angry but says nothing, thwarted by language as much as disgust. Yet she knows her way around, walking purposefully through the labyrinthine corridors, until she disappears inside a room through a gap held open in the plastic curtains. Half of the name of the film comes from the Chungking Mansion and the other half from the restaurant in the film called the ‘Midnight Express’, which is where the characters of the two parts of the film trade places in the narrative. The original Chinese name of the film, however, translates to “Chungking Jungle”, which may be interpreted as a reference to the “wild” (or untame) image acquired by the place due to its foreignness, informality and association with crime (particularly in the 1980s and early 1990s.) The Chinese woman’s presence in this place highlights her isolation, and also her willingness to take big risks to make a living. Later in the film she oversees a drug deal using a group of South Asian men to traffic the white powder, but is double crossed when the group decides to collaborate with a white man leaving her without the goods or payment. Ultimately her story is the same as that of the South Asians who double-cross her. In this wild place, surrounded by vice of all kinds, and people living by the rule of the jungle, everyone is out to make the most of their time. 232 An additional point needs to be brought out that has gone unnoticed in the numerous reviews and scholarly analyses of the film. The extent of the other being invisible to the mainstream Hong Kong society can be gauged from the naming of the South Asian characters in Chungking Express as “Indians”, when lines from the film’s dialogue suggest that the characters are in fact from Pakistan. These lines are clearly audible in Urdu: “I have to call Pakistan… telephone… I have to call Pakistan!” spoken by a South Asian character who is a member of the group smuggling drugs. Later when their accomplice and boss, a Hong Kong “femme fatale” (Huang, 2004), after being double- crossed, relates her position to the audience in voiceover, she refers to these people as Yindu-ren or Indian people. Further the English subtitles of the film (in the US version released by Quentin Tarantino’s Rolling Thunder label) also translate her words to “Indians”. Huang (2004) inherits this inaccuracy (p.34) as does Abbas (1997). By the time Huang comes to critique the film the characters’ being Indian is already a fact. There is no malice in this inaccuracy, which started with the script itself, but rather ignorance borne out of not caring, and not having to care, about distinguishing ethnic minorities. It might be argued that the term Yindu-ren is more of a racial classification rather than political one, hence applicable broadly to all peoples of South Asia. In that case too, its casual use is part of the problem. Huang (2004) reads the characters of Chungking Express as flaneurs. “What corners on the map of Hong Kong represent the ‘lived’ global space for these walkers?” (Huang, 2004, p.33). The author reads the portrayal of Chungking Mansions as the antithesis of the legitimate global spaces, in the case of Hong Kong, exemplified by Central district on 233 Hong Kong Island. The flaneurs, in her opinion, walk through the marginal spaces of Hong Kong in a way that both reflects their sense of alienation, and maps their desires. Their paths through the dark, squalid and mysterious spaces trace their ambitions in the city. They demystify these places and make them legible, and thus controllable. For the “femme fatale” walking through Chungking Mansions, her South Asian accomplices are like unwieldy instruments incapable of independent thought and meant only to be manipulated. Her struggle with the South Asians emanates not only from the otherness of skin and language, but also class and gender. The same scene that shows her disappearing into a crowd of dark-skinned men (Figure 5.1a), also contrasts her blonde wig and trenchcoat against the men’s bare backs. The shot at once highlights the differences in their class positions and aspirations, and also in her intrusion into male corridors of Chungking Mansions. In supervising the preparations for the deal she leads the men through a cycle of purchases including the luggage and consumer goods within which the drugs are to be concealed. She guides them along at each step (Figure 5.1 d-f) controlling their unruly behavior wrestling things away from then and shouting them into submission. The men, on the other hand, play with electronic novelties, run in and out of establishments, make untimely demands, and drink bottled water from store coolers and replace the half-empty bottles on the shelf. Through almost every scene shot inside Chungking Mansions, Wong highlights difference in terms of habits, sophistication, and comfort with the codes of consumption. 234 This is the film’s enduring image of the place – a dark “jungle” inhabited by uruly men and double-crossing cons. In the year leading up to the making of the film, scenes such as those in the film, are likely to have been common in Chungking Mansions. Wong’s vision, captured by the roving lenses of cinematographer Christopher Doyle, was brutally honest in its observation of the place, yet it fixed Chungking Mansions in a temporal space from which it is still struggling to emerge. The film also shows Chungking Mansions as a place of high speed – both through compression (of Newtonian space) and through the shifting of (Einsteinian) frames of reference. Speed In addition to the difference experienced by the Chinese characters in Chungking Mansions, the film is also important for narrating Chungking Mansions as an everyday place in Hong Kong. The place is shown as very different from Hong Kong, yet also a quintessentially Hong Kong place. This second motif is accomplished by integrating Chungking Mansions into a narrative of speed and compression. In Chungking Express Wong creates an image of speed and incessant flows. Doyle’s trademark handheld shots follow subjects at eye level as they move around the city and beyond it (airports, moving pedestrian ramps, running up long escalators, the metro, crowded Kowloon streets etc.) People are always on the go, always on their way to someplace. The compression of time – in the sense that shelf lives of goods and ideas are short, experiences are evanescent, memory is temporary – is a defining characteristic of Wong Kar-wai films. One of his earliest films, Days of Being Wild (1990) begins in 1960 with a 235 meeting between two strangers. A clock tells time as a man asks a woman to look at his watch for a minute. She reluctantly complies. At the end of the silent minute he says, “I will always remember that minute because of you. From now on we are one-minute friends”. The ticking clock impresses the weight of every second upon the viewer, and compresses the value of “always” into one minute. The idea is repeated in Chungking Express. The theme of interconnected lives and space-time compression runs through prominently through the film. A male lead wonders whether in a world where everything comes with a date of expiry, memories have an expiry date as well. If they do, he hopes they may last 10,000 years, which shows his yearning to remember, in a place of disappearance where things are constantly written anew. This desire is played out again in another scene the same character receives a birthday greeting on his pager. He thinks aloud in a voiceover, “A woman wished me on my 25 th birthday, because of that I will remember her forever”. For this character, starved of human affection and memories of true worth, a birthday wish from a near-stranger holds forever’s worth of value. Inevitably the compression of times meets the compression of space. “Everyday we brush past so many people. People we may never meet or people who may become close friends. I’m cop number 223. My name is He Qiwu.” We see the narrator, a young policeman, chasing a South Asian man (Figure 5.1 g), presumably a criminal. He brushes past the blonde-wigged Chinese femme fatale. At the point of contact, the visual pauses to a still image, and the voiceover continues, “This was the closest we ever got. Just 0.01 of a centimeter between us. But 57 hours later, I fell in love with this woman.” The chase itself takes us inside Chungking Mansions (Fig 5.1h). This is not the world of the brightly 236 lit shopping malls. Myriad different languages are being spoken and there are few Chinese faces. People from around the world have followed their dreams and their capital to this building – an international community living cheek by jowl – an embodiment of compressed space at the global scale and local scales. Speed is understood and reflected in the film as not only fast movement, but also in terms of constantly appearing anew. The film is replete with instances of shifting frames of reference. Cantonese-speaking South Asian men, a blonde-wigged Chinese woman, policemen referred to with numbers rather than names, a man in a bar trying to get a woman’s attention by speaking Cantonese, Japanese and Mandarin, references to California (a woman whose favorite song is California Dreamin’ misses a date in ‘California Bar’ because she leaves for the real California) are some of the ways in which Wong reinvents his characters and their environment. Standing in front of a bright display of oddities, the blonde Chinese drug-dealer “embodies many of the ironies and contradictions revolving around Hong Kong’s image as the melting pot of Asia.… [and] becomes another aspect of the spectacle of global consumerism” (Marchetti, 2000, p.289). Her blonde wig is a symbol of her global ambitions and postcolonial subjectivity. Her comfort with and contempt for the South Asians is a negotiated outcome of her search for wealth. Chungking Mansions itself portrayed as a place of danger and also of pursuing dreams, of alienation and also solidarity, of global connectedness and mysterious alleys. That is, a place where disparate motives are compressed into a confronting their contrary. 237 This film is a landmark in Hong Kong cinema and is particularly relevant to understanding Hong Kong – not only its perspective on ethnic minorities of relatively low socio-economic standing, but also the city’s assessment of itself, its postcolonial identity, and strict adherence to free market institutions. In this sense Chungking Mansions, in this film, is not just a wild place of others, but a metaphor for Hong Kong itself. In Wong’s perspective Chungking Mansions is not a jungle in contrast to an orderly Hong Kong, but rather one part of the larger jungle that is Hong Kong. Shaping popular perception The film has had a lasting impression on its audiences, particularly with regards to the place from which it derives the first part of its name. The table presented as Appendix 3.5 shows significant correlation coefficients from the online survey mentioned earlier for the question “Have you seen the film Chungking Express?” ‘Yes’ responses were found to have a significant and moderate correlation with agreement (on a scale of 7) with the statements that Chungking Mansions “is an unsafe place”, “is a center for illegal activity”, and “is a place where diseases start”. Of all respondents, 48.5% ranked agreement with “is an unsafe place” as 5,6 or 7, only 27.2% agreed with “is a center of illegal activity” (5,6 or 7), and an even smaller 9.1% of all respondents agreed (5,6 or 7) with “is a place where diseases start”. These numbers make the correlations more noteworthy, as these perceptions are not necessarily widely shared. I have already acknowledged the weaknesses of the survey in terms of sample size and sampling. Moreover, this is merely a correlation. We cannot say that these impressions 238 Figure 5.1: Stills from Chungking Express (1994) 239 were created by the film. In fact, both Wong’s film and people’s opinions may very likely be products of a general negative opinion of the place, which peaked around the mid- 1990s. Indeed even though the place has transformed tremendously since then through several cycles of investment and improvement, it has not been able to shed the image of crime and squalor. Matthews (2007): The colonial subject of globalization As a third source from which to read the image of Chungking Mansions, I would like to engage the work of Prof. Gordon Mathews who has been studying Chungking Mansions for about three years now. Prof. Mathews is closely associated with the community of Chungking Mansions through his extensive ethnographic studies from an Anthropological perspective. He is also famous for promoting Chungking Mansions in Time Magazine (2007) as one of the Top 10 places to visit in Hong Kong, lifting him to celebrity status within Chungking Mansions, particularly with the business community. The critique below is based on his 2007 article on Chungking Mansions. Mathews (2007) provides an overview of economic and social structures of Chungking Mansions. I agree broadly with the factual elements of the paper, with only a few reservations, which I will discuss below. It is Mathews’s analysis and theoretical extrapolations that I will direct my most of my critique towards. Let us begin with the idea of “low-end globalization”, of which both the first and second parts deserve a closer look. The author defines “low-end globalization” as “the 240 transnational flow of people and goods involving relatively small amounts of capital and informal, sometimes quasi-legal or illegal transactions, commonly associated within the developing world.” Thus the definition of “low-end globalization” hinges on (i) transnational flows of goods and people, (ii) relatively small amounts of capital, and (iii) quasi-legal or illegal transactions. This definition begs the following questions. Are legal transactions involving relatively small amounts of capital (i.e. low-end goods) involving transnational flows not a part of low-end globalization? (E.g. Numerous trinkets and souvenirs manufactured in China and sold around the world legally). Also, do transactions involving relatively higher amounts of capital, if traded illegally through transnational flows, constitute low-end globalization or not? (E.g. drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms deals etc.) Similarly, what about small amounts of capital, illegal trade, but without any transnational flows of capital or labor (e.g. pirated music)? Given how the definition is set up these examples are outside the realm of “low-end globalization”. What we have is “low-end globalization” defined by a peculiar combination of elements that, in fact, do not adequately define either “low-end” or “globalization”. What this combination of elements does partially address a part of the economy of Chungking Mansions. This is not a matter of semantics. To reiterate my criticism, there is a huge gap between observations and the theory derived from them. Most importantly, the analysis appears an afterthought – an appendage to bind together the assorted empirical observations. 241 One is also led to believe that there are some biases inherent in Mathews’s perspective, particularly in the way he interprets the everyday life of the margizens of Chungking Mansions. They have nothing to contribute to theory except to occupy the bottom rung of existing orders. The very last part of the definition about these elements being “commonly associated within the developing world” must, at best, be considered an inappropriately casual remark. The link between cheap goods and quasi-legal transactions is hardly one limited to the developing world. Indeed in the streets of New York, London, Paris or any of the other so-called “world cities” small “quasi-legal” transactions take place in every nook and cranny, and not only involving immigrants. Apropos the definition of “low-end globalization” I must also highlight internal inconsistencies within a relatively short essay. Whereas on the one hand the author insists that “relatively small amounts of capital” is a defining characteristic of “low-end globalization”, on the other hand in reporting his fieldwork the author claims that “[s]ome African traders hold more cash in their hands at one time than some Americans have held in their entire lifetimes”. This assertion (not surprising in itself) seems to contradict the very definition he himself put together. Similarly, whereas the author reports interviewing South Asian illegal workers married to teachers and civil servants back home, at the same time most of his respondents seem to be villagers and slum-dwellers. In the larger scheme of things, I find it quite incredible that middle-class South Asians (or in the author’s own words, those married to teachers and civil servants) would accept the life in a “dilapidated building”, not to mention risk going to jail in a foreign country, just to make a quick buck. This may have happened to 242 some individuals in desperate need of money but the generalization is deeply flawed. To me it reflects an inadequate understanding of the class relations in Chungking Mansions and also in the home countries of the South Asians. It is also worth pointing out that the author’s reasoning for “why Chungking Mansions exists” misses a couple of points. He is correct in highlighting the role of separate individual ownership of the units in the building in discouraging redevelopment. He is also correct to point to the visa regulations. The third reason, China’s boom as a manufacturing center, may explain the current business trends, but has only limited potential in explaining why Chungking Mansions exists. Chungking Mansions existed, and had acquired its foreign character, well before China’s manufacturing boom had begun. Let us assume that what the author means is “reasons why Chungking Mansions is what it is” or “has acquired its present character”. In that case, a far more important variable that the author left out here (though he mentions with less emphasis elsewhere) is the presence of the UNHCR in Hong Kong, which has attracted real and wishful cases from South Asian and Africa. Another very important reason for Chungking Mansions’ character is its location and history – the site had always been a center for foreigners as it had been a marketplace in close proximity to the harbor and the railway line, even before the building was built, attracting sailors, traders and British army personnel. With reference to another reported finding, it is quite impressive that the author tried to estimate the number of sex-workers (the author claims “some 80”) who are “plying their trade in and just outside Chungking Mansions” (p.171). One would have liked to know how he went about doing this. He would have had to deal with some problems. First, a 243 large number of sex-workers are as transient themselves as their clients, and for the same reasons (easy visa regulations, quick-money-and-back-home trajectory). Second, it is not clear what the author means by “plying their trade”. Soliciting is minimal inside Chungking Mansions and the deal has usually already been struck by the time the sex- worker arrives at Chungking Mansions, frequently invited from as far away as Jordan, Yau Ma Tei, Mong Kong and Kowloon Tong, the latter being a major center of hourly hotels. Kowloon Park, a block north and across Nathan Road, is another point of operation. If by “plying” Mathews means actively soliciting, then 80 is too high a number, and if he means using accommodations in Chungking Mansions, it is too low. This is not a major issue - I am willing to concede that observations could vary and he may have found this to be the approximate number during his time at Chungking Mansions. The point is to suggest that it would be a lot more useful to analyze the sex- trade in some way than to guess a number. Let me return to the focus of my critique, which are the theoretical weaknesses of the paper. At the beginning of the paper the author promises us that “low-end globalization, as observed in its microscopic particulars at Chungking Mansions, can teach something of interest about globalization in its macroscopic generalities as used in the analysis of globalization” (p.170). What is of interest regarding the “macroscopic generalities” is ultimately boiled down to support for the existence of Appadurai’s five “scapes”. Appadurai (1996) proposed five scapes as a framework to study the “disjunctures” between economy, culture and politics. Appadurai calls this the “new global cultural economy” (p.32) – and the scapes are “five dimensions of global cultural flows” (p.33). 244 Mathews’s vignettes are interesting in illustrating the meaning of each of the scapes. It would have been useful, however, to learn how the author sees “disjuncture” in the context of Chungking Mansions, and, in his opinion regarding the role of the place in terms of cultural flows. The way the paper engages the five scapes leaves to the reader’s imagination whether or not the case study has anything to contribute to the Appadurai’s theory. Whether these scapes exist or not is not a debated point. It might have been useful, for example, to probe the relationship between “scapes” and the actual transfer of culture, or perhaps how these scapes get written into (fixed in, or embodied by) the landscape, or this place of “low-end globalization”. This line of inquiry would have been quite in keeping with Appadurai’s own intentions as expressed in a later chapter of Modernity at Large (1996) – “space and time are themselves socialized and localized through complex and deliberate practices of performance, representation and action.” (p.180). Appadurai implicitly shares the concern of others (Soja, 1980; Zukin, 1990) making a case for socio- spatial analysis. Quite contrary to Mathews’s assessment that “Appadurai uses these scapes to deal with macroscopic matters” (p.178), Appadurai is actually using the notion of scapes to make sense of the local, the particular and the exception. Particularly in the concluding chapter of the aforementioned volume, Appadurai acknowledges both Lefebvre and DeCerteau as he expounds the applicability of scapes to studying the “global production of locality”. So when Mathews (2007) asserts that “the play of ethnoscapes is not only a matter of macroscopic forces, but can be seen in hundreds of individual interactions” (p.179), he is in fact not saying anything new, but rather 245 paraphrasing Appadurai’s (2005) own words, “indeed, the individual actor is the last locus of this perspectival set of landscapes” (p.33). The point here is not merely to nitpick about interpretations, but rather to emphasize the need for deriving theoretical insights from the case and for moving theory forward. In the last section of this critique I would like to argue that in reporting his findings the author needs to locate himself as a subject - as a locus of scapes. One stark example of a “finding” tending towards being an ethnocentric reading is the vignette about an African phone-buyer negotiating with South Asian and Chinese sellers, and each testing the other. Mathews reports this as a “play of ethnoscapes” in Chungking Mansions. I agree that there are numerous inter-ethnic interactions all around Chungking Mansions, mostly involving transactions of goods and services of various kinds. The importance given by the author to this act is not to emphasize the trade, the goods or the flows, but rather to emphasize who the low-end participants are. Surely it is not the fact that a buyer and a seller were negotiating prices that makes this act interesting. It could also not be simply the fact that they are of different ethnicities, as transactions between people of different ethnicities are commonplace around the world (and have been for centuries), and thus neither remarkable nor specific to Chungking Mansions. Therefore what is remarkable to the author is the fact that the ethnicities engaged in negotiations happen to be African and South Asian (or Chinese). Some support for this inductive interpretation is to be found within the paper – low-end globalization of Chungking Mansions involves not rich countries sending their manufacturing to poor countries, as is the typical pattern (Santos 2004:297), 246 but rather, very poor countries seeking manufactured goods from less poor countries (p.179). To begin with, “rich countries sending their manufacturing to poor countries” has not been the “typical pattern” for a long time. Keeping that minor issue aside, it is the interaction between very poor and poor countries that the author finds remarkable. Saying that people from poor and poorer countries can and do trade and interact is not news. It is not remarkable, unless the perspective (frame of reference) is one where such agency is not considered typical of these groups. This shows the effect of perspective on the interpretation of empirical findings. Similarly, Mathews would probably agree that a woman carrying on two relationships is hardly a Chungking Mansions phenomenon. But for Mathews it becomes remarkable when certain ethnicities are involved. So, an Indonesian woman, carrying on two relationships - with an Indian and a Chinese man is the highlight of the vignette, and the pivot of the arguments made from it. Again, this would appear to be a “finding” only if viewed from a frame of reference where certain actions and values (sexual agency in this case) are inconceivable for certain groups of people. I submit, then, that these findings are not value-neutral. The first vignette implicitly suggests that people from poor countries are not usually expected to be negotiating prices of commodities with each other (it is not the “typical pattern”), except in this remarkable place called Chungking Mansions. The second vignette seems to suggest that there is something about Chungking Mansions that either attracts or breeds individuals from poor 247 countries who have promiscuous lives with interracial partners. If we take a moment to think about it, there is nothing about these individuals and their actions that is native to, or typical of, either “low-end globalization” or Chungking Mansions. The fact that it appears so to the author is because of his frame of reference (i.e. his social identity, professional attitudes and personal values). I merely want to illustrate the argument made earlier about the disjuncture between the paper’s findings and its theoretical propositions. Despite the constraints of language, being himself an ‘other’ in this place of South Asians and Africans, and his near celebrity status because of his comments to Time magazine, Mathews has collected some fine details regarding the society and economy of Chungking Mansions, and has an indisputably deep understanding of the society. In particular his descriptions are very accurate in picking up the practices of everyday life in Chungking Mansions. It is the theoretical contribution derived from the rich empirical work that leaves something to be desired, in terms of both the depth of analysis, the connections made between findings and theory development.. Finally the author could be more open about his perspective and how he himself is an artifact of the place. For those studying Chungking Mansions from a perspective of immigration and diaspora and production of space focusing on ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions derived from current debates might be a good methodological approach. Conclusions The image of Chungking Mansions among outsiders has undergone a change. A more open-minded attitude seems to have replaced the outright rejection of the place and its 248 people. Once viewed as a place of squalor and crime, Chungking Mansions is now seen, at least by some, as a place to find deals and good food. Negative stereotypes are also giving way to an attitude of ‘live and let live’. The film Chungking Express first popularized the place, but it also created a lasting image that seemed to confirm the worst fears regarding the place. There seems to be more tolerance for difference among the new generation of Hong Kongers. It is not a coincidence that Christian Action approached the most popular entertainer of South Asian origin in Hong Kong, Gill Mohinderpaul Singh (Kiu Bo-Bo), to be an ambassador of their work with ethnic minorities and asylum- seekers (Figure 5.2). Singh giving the thumbs up to uniformed Hong Kong officials clearly is an attempt to project an inclusive image of Hong Kong to the immigrants and asylum-seekers. At the same time Singh helps to build recognition a positive image of ethnic minorities for outsiders. Some of the scholarly work has simultaneously caused Chungking Mansions to shine and disappear. On one hand Chungking Mansions has been resurrected as a place to be visited and studied, but on the other hand it has been relegated to the bottom of existing typologies, rather than explored for new theories and disjunctures. In my study I have tried to steer clear of exoticizing the community and the place, and develop theory grounded in the experience of the case.In the next chapter I will conclude with a review of the theoretical contributions made by this study, and tie these together using Appadurai’s theory of –scapes and ‘disjunctures’. 249 Figure 5.2: Gill Mohinderpaul Singh (aka Kiu Bo-Bo) endorses Christian Action Source: Christian Action , Hong Kong 250 Chapter 6 : Conclusions Introduction In the concluding chapter I intend to reiterate some of the major findings of the study. I will attempt to organize these findings in terms of a story of the changing character of ethnic enclaves, under the twin pressures that are acting on these places in this period of globalization – neoliberalism and multiculturalism. I will end with a statement of directions for future research. The subject of Chungking Mansions Appadurai (1996) proposes a framework of analysis for “exploring disjunctures” between the economic, cultural and political aspects of contemporary society in the globalized economy. The author suggests that analysts need to examine “the relationships among five dimensions of global cultural flows that can be termed (a) ethnoscapes, (b) mediascapes, (c) technoscapes, (d) financescapes, (e) ideoscapes” (p.33). With regards to ethnoscapes Appadurai admits that the “neologism has certain ambiguities deliberately built into it” (p.48). This is true, however, of all five scapes. Though he only provides a brief treatment to the description of these scapes, the point Appadurai wants to make is that the production of culture and of societies themselves is transforming, from once being characterized by cultural, temporal and territorial congruence, to a condition marked by interconnectedness, chaos and complexity. By considering together “the fluid, irregular shapes of these landscapes” (p.33) Appadurai aims to capture the multidimensional, shifting, deterritorialized, hybrid, ephemeral, transmogrifying reality 251 of our contemporary social world. This study has examined one part of the ethnoscapes of Hong Kong. All five scapes of the global economy are readily apparent at Chungking Mansions, as would be expected in just about any diasporic place that is a node for international flows of commerce, labor and information. More importantly, Chungking Mansions offers insights regarding the disjunctures to which Appadurai alludes. In this concluding chapter I will attempt to arrange the lessons learnt from the case so that they may contribute to our understanding of the intersecting and overlapping scapes. To begin with it is important to explain what is meant by the term ‘disjunctures’. According to Appadurai the landscapes of group identity – the ethnoscapes – around the world are no longer familiar anthropological objects, insofar as groups are no longer tightly territorialized, spatially bounded, historically unselfconscious, or culturally homogenous. (Appadurai, 1996, p.48) In other words, ethnoscapes have become kaleidoscopic in character. New social formations are proliferating, “changing social, territorial, and cultural reproduction of group identity” (ibid, p.30). In this context ‘disjuncture’ is a departure from what was earlier perceived as normal, or was in fact usually the case. ‘Disjunctures’ in this sense mark new disagreements between territory and society, between society and culture and so on, as perceived through the scapes. ‘Disjunctures’ are also unexpected changes and new formations that appear on the scapes. 252 The analysis of disjunctures does not end with the observation of mutation or hybridity on any of the scapes. Rather, disjunctures provide the possibility of identifying trends and patterns, for building theory that is locally grounded and also aware of global changes. The new global economy has to be seen as a complex, overlapping, disjunctive order that cannot any longer be understood in terms of existing center-periphery models (even those that might account for multiple centers and peripheries). Nor is it susceptible to simple models of push and pull… or of surpluses and deficits… or of consumers and producers. (Appadurai, 1996, p.32) ‘Disjunctures’, going by this elaboration, are also those social formations, cultural products and other phenomena observed on the five scapes, that defy classification within existing, often dichotomous, theoretical constructs. Existing theory might be found ill- suited to describe these phenomena of “disorganized capitalism” (p.33) either because it fixes them temporally in a nostalgic space where they do not belong, or because it utilizes a framework of analysis that superimposes the experiences of one society onto another. Abbas (1997), in his monograph on Hong Kong (which happens to be Volume 2 of the ‘Public Worlds’ series of the University of Minnesota Press, of which Appadurai’s Modernitity at Large is Volume 1), also highlights the risk of misrepresenting the city. The threat will be that Hong Kong will be presented and represented in terms of some of the old binarisms whose function is to restabilize differences and domesticate change, for example, binarisms like East and West, or tradition and modernity. In other words, the danger now is that Hong Kong will disappear as a subject, not by being ignored but by being represented in the good old ways (Abbas, 1997, p.25, original emphasis). 253 Some of the other studies of Chungking Mansions have been afflicted with such problems, as I have discussed earlier. As mentioned earlier, Abbas (1997) reads Chungking Mansions as a “heterotopic… portmanteau space” (p. 54). Here I will describe three disjunctures that can be identified from this case study. I call these (I) “in- betweenness”, (II) “marginalization by consent”, and (III) “market-culturalism”. (I) In-betweenness Ghetto / Enclave By “in-betweenness” I refer to an elusive characteristic of Chungking Mansions because of which several existing theoretical constructs are unable to capture the experience of Chungking Mansions. I have already discussed the futility of the Ghetto-Enclave dualism for the purpose of understanding the place. To recount briefly, Chungking Mansions shows the physical conditions and squalor, and more importantly, the poverty and marginalization that may be associated with a slum or a ghetto. At the same time it is also the hub of an international supply chain of mobile phones, host to numerous tourists from around the world, and also a robust ethnic economy. Research shows the coexistence of poverty within a thriving economy, of squalor behind a shiny, attractive façade, and of an ethnic concentration where co-ethnics remain bitterly divided. The place thus shares the features of both ‘ghettoes’ and ‘enclaves’. This is an aspect of in-betweenness where neither end of a dualism is able to capture the essence of the place. Closely related to this dual (or amorphous) character is its position in Castells’s (2000) conceptualization of “space of flows” and “space of place”. 254 Space of place / Space of flows The dualism of “space of place” and “space of flows” is another illustrative example of the in-between character of Chungking Mansions. According to Castells, a space of place is one “whose form, function, and meaning are self-contained within the boundaries of physical contiguity” (p.453). To illustrate his idea of a ‘space of place’, Castells uses the example of the Belleville quartier in Paris. In his description Belleville has a remarkable, if uncanny, resonance with Chungking Mansions. Castells describes Belleville as an entry point for immigrants, where tensions between communities exist under a façade of peaceful coexistence, and each group is acutely aware of its “own turf”. Clearly then, a “space of place” is not identified by isolation from cultural change or being disconnected from flows of capital and labor. A ‘space of place’ is also not defined according to an idealized notion of “community”. It is, rather, a place that has a self-contained meaning that is independent from its participation in the economy and the network society. Its history and its spatial and cultural specificity have not been written, or overwritten, by the homogenizing influences of deepening market integration and institutional convergence. In this sense Chungking Mansions is certainly a sense of place. Its reputation as a place of Otherness long precedes the “rise of the network society” (Castells, 2000), and has remained intact since the 1970s, even as globalization has brought about changes in demographics and the local economy. This does not mean, however, that it is not a ‘place of flows’. Our societies are constructed around flows: flows of capital, flows of information, flows of technology, flows of organizational interactions, flows of images, sounds and symbols. Flows are not just one element of social organization: they are the 255 expression of the processes dominating our economic, political, and symbolic life. ... Thus, I propose the idea that there is a new spatial form characteristic of social practices that dominate and shape the network society: the space of flows. The space of flows is the material organization of time-sharing social practices that work through flows. By flows I understand purposeful, repetitive, programmable sequences of exchange and interaction between physically disjointed positions held by social actors. (Castells, 2000, p.446) To illustrate a space of flows Castells uses the example of Irvine, California. According to the author Irvine characterizes a place that can be read only in the context of the contemporary economy. Irvine is indeed a place, although a special kind of place, where the space of experience shrinks inward toward the home, as flows take over increasing shares of time and space…. People do still live in places. But because function and power in our societies are organized in the space of flows, the structural domination of its logic essentially alters the meaning and dynamic of places (Castells, 2000, p.458). The meaning and dynamic of Chungking Mansions, to a large extent, depends on the production of mobile phones in South China, on the growing market for these phones in Sub-Saharan Africa, on the movements of immigrants and asylum-seekers, the arrival of tourists, and the general economic situation of Hong Kong. Whereas on the one hand Chungking Mansions has a long-established role and urbanism, on the other hand it is also continually written anew through its complete immersion in global flows. 256 Despite being at least a minor node in a global supply chain, however, it is not a space of the elite. But Castells did not mean that spaces of flows are necessarily elite spaces. He defines these spaces as belonging to “the spatial organization of dominant, managerial elites” (ibid, p.444, emphasis added), that is, a spatial organization suited to the requirements of the elite, and created with their help. Due to its significant economic linkages, Chungking Mansions can be thought of as belonging to such a spatial organization, albeit at a low order. As I have indicated earlier in my analysis, though it is a place of marginalization, it is also a place of entrepreneurship. These economic activities (arrival of tourists, rhythms of business, daytime and nighttime commerce etc.) are of a highly predictable and repetitive nature on a day to day basis. It appears then, that Chungking Mansions shows characteristics of both Castells’s categories at the same time. Legal / Illegal Another kind of in-betweenness we see at Chungking Mansions is through its straddling the domains of legal and illegal. Chungking Mansions offers exceptions to the clear-cut delineation of legal from illegal, or at the very least shows evidence of people and activities drifting back and forth across the line of legality. A person entering on a tourist visa may decide to become an asylum-seeker, in the process overstaying her permitted visa period, but having served her time in jail, she might return to the asylum process legitimately, and if rejected, find herself with no status at all, but with an open choice of when she wants to return to her home country. Closely related is the formal-informal divide. Activities in Chungking Mansions are a combination of both worlds. ‘Formally’- run restaurants may hire illegal part-timers to solicit patrons from among the passers-by 257 on the street. Motels may be owned and operated by the book, but may have a “sister” operation running out of what appears to be a private house, the latter of course being off the record. Of course such activities are not unique to Chungking Mansions, but the place successfully balances its “dark side” (knock-off phones, pirated DVDs, back-alley sales of print and electronic pornographic media, unlicensed extensions of businesses, drugs, prostitution, illegal immigrants and more), with its thriving and diverse “clean” economy, its fame as a one-of-a-kind location for affordable rooms for backpackers, becoming a tourist attraction in its own right, being the subject of films, and, not least, being cited in Time Magazine as one of the top-10 places to visit in Asia. It is this dual nature of Chungking Mansions that creates a disjuncture in the ideoscape of legality. From these three examples of in-betweenness it appears that through the case of Chungking Mansions we see features of both sides of certain dualisms juxtaposed unexpectedly against each other. This is not a case of hybridity of opposing sides of a dualism – it is simply a disjuncture in the dualism itself – a case where the dualism does not apply, but rather collapses into a single space. The resulting in-betweenness (which alternatively can be thought of as duality, multiplicity or amorphousness) is the first disjuncture (or, in other words, example of repeated disjunctures) represented by Chungking Mansions. (II) Marginalization by consent The second disjuncture witnessed at Chungking Mansions is the phenomenon of “marginalization by consent”. Ethnoscapes have always included marginalized groups. 258 The core-periphery model is no longer sufficient for understanding these unequal relations. In an interconnected world the relationship between the core and periphery becomes not just one of domination, but also of resistance. At the same time, however, new relations are formed between different peripheries, which in their own way resist the existing order. The globalization of social movements is an example of this change. The meaning of resistance itself also changes. A formerly homogenous order of domination and resistance is disturbed, when resistors themselves are no longer a homogenous group, i.e. no longer bound together by the same grievance, condition or motive. In a situation like Chungking Mansions we find grievances (and marginalizations) of various kinds, but no solidarity in resistance. Indeed, as we saw in the chapter on Practiced Citizenship, there is no uniformity in even the narratives that are used to frame discontent. In the case of Chungking Mansions, we find a disjuncture represented by the idea of “inverted resistance”. It may be thought of as a variant of the Stockholm Syndrome (a psychological condition where a hostage develops positive feelings towards his or her captor). The Stockholm Syndrome is considered to be an involuntary defense mechanism, produced by the mind to increase chances of survival. “Inverted resistance”, however, is a strategic, well thought-out, choice. Further, it is not based on the exigencies of an emergent situation, but rather on deeply-held values and preferences. Individuals from many developing countries try to take advantage of the easy access to Hong Kong (which is a result of the regulations instituted in the colonial period, and also Hong Kong’s commitment to open access to its market) by participating in the enclave 259 economy of Chungking Mansions and the institutions of cosmopolitan citizenship (UNHCR). In this process, some find themselves marginalized, either as cheap labor (legal or illegal) or as bodies stuck in the interstices of citizenship and immigration law. The “margizens” neither protest nor even self-organize. Instead, there remains a sense of gratefulness towards the Hong Kong government, and a hope for fuller integration with the economy. Even the remote hope of escaping their past, or returning to it with a net increase, is so attractive as to make marginalization an acceptable prospect. The marginalized individuals of Chungking Mansions remain admiring of the system, and hopeful of drawing benefits from it, by expanding their business, or through employment, formal citizenship, welfare activities, or simply by being away from their place of origin. Even though they are fully aware of its inequities, they want to become winners in the system, not resistors. (III) Market-culturalism The context of market-culturalism The most significant disjuncture we are able to detect and formulate through the case of Chungking Mansions is “market-culturalism”. The multicultural paradigm, which allows the practice of all identities to the fullest extent with minimal pressure to assimilate (i.e. becoming like the majority), is an attempt to manage the tension between avoiding the loss of “authenticity” of the host culture, and the need to avoid the perception of the persecution of minorities. Critiques of multiculturalism have brought out the tensions inherent in the idea, and indeed reflected in the term itself. It is argued that multiculturalism hides the reality of a fragmented society behind a policy framework 260 suggesting peaceful and inclusive incorporation of immigrants into the host society. I have discussed earlier the critique regarding the balkanization of the city (Appiah, 1994; Zizek, 1997). While the inclusion-balkanization tension has received plenty of attention, relatively less is written about the processes of identity formation and expression when multiculturalism is overlaid on market institutions. Some ideas do seem to have a concurrence though, such as multiculturalism as the “united colors of Capitalism” (Mitchell, 1993), or the commodification of identity through “aestheticized ethnicity” (Goonewardena and Kipfer, 2005, p.670). Further, the spatial dimensions of the market-based coexistence of multiple cultures, deserves much closer attention. In this context, “market-culturalism” (as evidenced by case of Chungking Mansions) is best understood as a disjuncture in the ethnoscapes of Hong Kong - a place where political and cultural recognition is sought, and ethnic identity expressed, through the market and market-based institutions. The idea of “market-culturalism” is at once a critique of multiculturalism, and a description of how multiple culture and ethnicities produce space in contemporary cities. As such, it is not a phenomenon limited to the case of Chungking Mansions or Hong Kong. It is expected that any ‘global city’ (i.e. a city that is part of the network society, with an economy well-integrated with global capital and labor flows) will show similar disjunctures in its ethnoscapes. In these cities multiculturalism overlaid on market institutions will create spaces that closely follow patterns of market-culturalism. 261 Defining market-culturalism Peter Hall (2002) identifies Hong Kong (along with London and Baltimore) as a “city of enterprise” (p.379) in his chronologically arranged functional classification. The classification, although temporally defined (i.e. 1975-1990), does capture the spirit driving the bustling metropolis. The “fairly shameless free enterprise” (p.387) of the 1950s and 1960s Hong Kong that Hall claims to have proposed in 1977, as a solution for United Kingdom’s declining cities, has come to characterize the identity of Hong Kong’s political economy. Castells (2000) draws attention towards the Hong Kong regional “megalopolis” (p.416) including Shenzhen, Guangzhou, the Pearl River delta, Zhuhai and Macau. Despite the physical discontinuity of urbanization in the region, Castells characterizes it as a space of flows that “is likely to become the most representative urban face of the twenty-first century” (p. 439). Heikkila (2004) locates cities on a matrix with one axis leading from traditional to market values, and the other axis (drawing on Harvey’s work) leading from temporal identity to spatial identity. The author situates Hong Kong in the box representing a combination of market values and spatial identity. The theory describes a spectrum of values ranging from traditional to market-based. Heikkila believes that there is a constant trend pushing cities from the former position towards the latter, with Hong Kong being ahead of the curve. Hong Kong is known to be one of the freest economies in the world and a node for the concentration of capital and decision-making Along with the labor-rich, restrictions-free (i.e. economic zone with reduced government regulation) Pearl River Delta, it represents 262 an efficient distribution of production functions. As this model of urban development is replicated, the core-periphery relations, of which the region is emblematic, will also be recreated within the cities (nodes) relying on cheap labor for supporting the decision- making elite. The laborers allowed into the city are likely to be concentrated in enclaves (ethnic, economic, or both), as already is the case in many parts of the developed world. Within this context the incorporation of immigrants, particularly those of lower socio- economic standing, becomes a key challenge. In defining market-culturalism, the first step is to acknowledge the contemporary political-economy of ethnic places (including ethnic enclaves), to complement what we know about multiculturalism. In this study I do this by situating ethnic enclaves within the wider context of privatization of the public sphere, and of public space in the city. As I have argued earlier, the enclave is an expression of privatization (i.e. of diminishing publicness), and may be seen as a “club” in a city or in a metropolitan area. In other words, the ethnic enclave is part of the process whereby a city (or the region) is fragmented into numerous clubs based on purchasing power and ethnicity. This idea has been discussed before in the context of “ethnoburbs” (Wei, 1998), but that conceptualization did not explicitly make the connection between fragmentation and privatization (i.e. clubs as private entities). The idea here is to interpret the formation of ethno-economic clubs (market-cultural enclaves) as a part of the ongoing trend of the “loss of publicness”. In the context of the privatization of the public sphere, the loss is attributed to the excesses of the neoliberal economic order. The idea of the market- cultural enclave explains another aspect of privatization, which is a result of economic 263 pressures on the production of space by ethnic minorities. Thus the loss of publicness by private ownership is inextricably linked to the loss of publicness due to club-formation. Although it is a different aspect of the phenomenon, market-culturalism arises from the same economic order, and results in the same issue of the loss of publicness. This perspective offers some insights regarding Chungking Mansions and multiculturalism in general. As a club among other such “clubs” in the Hong Kong area, Chungking Mansions is not one formed around a certain shared interest or identity. It is a place of “otherness”, and more precisely otherness of a certain relatively low socio- economic stratum (though, of course, there is a minority of wealthy business-owners operating from the place). As such it is a place of marginalization and exclusion – a club not chosen, but accepted as fait accompli by those trying to participate, at the lowest levels, in the get-rich-quick dream of Hong Kong. Its denizens cannot really belong to the glittering high-rise sections of the city. Considered outsiders in all other parts of the city, these marginalized individuals are ‘at home’ only at Chungking Mansions. They claim the space and use it intensively for business and for social purposes. Significantly, even its various constituent sub-groups of different national origins, who otherwise face the same challenges in the city, remain divided. These groups do not interact with each other, beyond the minimal cooperation of not letting their differences get in the way of business-as-usual. It is necessary to distinguish here between the idea of market-culturalism that defines some enclaves and those that do not fit that description. The idea of market-culturalism makes the connection between neoliberalism and multiculturalism. Both policy 264 frameworks have emerged at about the same time as globalization (understood as intensifying market integration and movements of capital, labor and information). Neoliberalism, of course, is one of the major organizing principles of the economic aspects of globalization. Similarly, multiculturalism, in its different practiced forms, has become the organizing principle for diverse societies, at least in developed countries receiving high volumes of immigrant flows. My argument is that these two constructs are closely related. From existing literature I have reviewed earlier, we learn that some scholars believe that multiculturalism reinforces neoliberalism. Indeed the radical view is that multiculturalism is part of the logic of neoliberalism. I take a different view, based on the analysis of socio-spatial entities (such as enclaves), and complementing the role of structure with responses of agency. There are official rules of multicultural policy that are scripted by the state – immigration laws, laws regarding language use, certain civil laws (e.g. related to attire and worship) etc. In my view, multiculturalism as a state policy is not inherently problematic, though specific elements might be contested. (For example I would not agree with recent French bans on certain elements of dress that are a part Islamic and Sikh religious practice.) In societies where it follows a past of forced assimilation and exclusion, multiculturalism represents a step forward towards protecting the rights of minorities. My purpose in no way is to suggest any reversal of this trend of recognizing minorities, their cultures and their ways of life. It is my intent, though, to consider what happens when multiculturalism is overlaid on the neoliberal city. This brings us to the multiculturalism that is created by the market, through the commodification of culture, the fragmentation 265 of (ethnic) markets for goods and services etc. (I have discussed this in depth in the first part of Chapter 2.) Finally there is the multiculturalism that is produced through the everyday life of people – by limiting interactions to our particular in-groups. But our choosing to spend our time within our own in-groups is also influenced by the market’s mediation and interpretation of multiculturalism. We do not interact intensively with out- groups partially because we are bodily separated in the public sphere (as discussed in Chapter 2). In addition, our interaction with ‘others’ is limited and superficial because of the way the market tends to reduce cultural recognition to a consumption activity. When the public sphere shifts towards increased privatization, the options available for engaging the other in a non-market setting are diminished. Further, the market-based multiculturalism often puts ethnic groups in contest with each other. Competition between groups intensifies as recognition and legitimacy are interpreted in terms of brand-name-recognition, market size and turnover. The competition inevitably extends to space in the city. Policies of language, worship etc. can create equal opportunities for self-expression for almost all groups – but space is a limited resource. Various groups vie for a share of urban space, which represents recognition, acceptance and permanence for minorities. Inter-group relations, already marked by limited cross-cultural understanding, are injected with tension and friction, when groups see each other as “invading” or “taking over” what they perceive to be “their turf”. This kind of concern is not limited to majority-minority relations, but extends to inter-minority relations as well. Thus contemporary enclaves, unlike those of the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, are products of a different socio-political dynamic. 266 The interaction of multiculturalism and neoliberalism, creates spaces (more accurately, socio-spatial entities) where the world’s diverse cultures come together, but remain separate and divided, except for consumption of “cultural” commodities. These kinds of spaces – produced by market-mediated multiculturalism, where communities interact in a spirit of competition, with limited cross-cultural interaction and understanding – are what I am calling “spaces of market-culturalism”. Following from the discussion above, I will describe here some of the characteristics of the spaces of market-culturalism. As indicated above, the first characteristic in defining “market-culturalism” is conceptualizing the enclave as an ethnic “club”. The club does not offer a single service or pursue a single interest. In many cases as in Chungking Mansions, participants (members), particularly the disadvantaged, find themselves with no real option but to “belong” to this club. In other cases, the existence of this club is the most important reason why some people choose to come to the city. Some are able to exploit cheap labor, while others are able to escape harsh conditions in their places of origin. It is safe to say that sub-groups within the club members (differentiated by class, status etc.) derive different uses from their membership. For all participants though, the club creates a separation from the “mainstream” of the city’s public life. This is closely related to the next part of the definition. Second, all participants experience economic and social/cultural marginalization, and some are politically disadvantaged as well. This qualifying characteristic of economic marginalization is based on the case of Chungking Mansions. As in the case of 267 “ethnoburbs,” (relatively wealthy ethnic suburbs) however, it is possible that market- culturalism may occur in other socio-economic strata. In Chungking Mansions, as in other cities where there is a large pool of foreign workers of relatively low socio- economic status, the market-cultural enclave offers an alternative place to belong, for those who find it hard to belong anywhere else in the city. Third, business-as-usual carries on without a significant explicit resistance either among the minorities or between the minorities and the majority. Commerce is the central driving force of the market-cultural enclave. People of different ethnicities (or divided in any other way) will continue to get along as long as they have an equal opportunity to do business. The differences, no matter how deep, can be overlooked. But differences are not forgotten, and individuals will turn on one another if one does something to compromise another’s ability to make money. In other words, despite the co-existence, the communities may remain antagonistic towards each other, either due to historical differences or due to current competition. Fourth, this kind of co-existence is marked by a low level of cross-cultural interaction and understanding. In the absence of initiatives for inter-cultural interaction outside the commercial sphere, people remain entrenched in their differences, with understanding limited to exchange rates. In Chungking Mansions fights still break out between Indians and Pakistanis, visa-holders perceive stigma attached to the term “asylum-seekers”, people of the same nationality receive little help from each other, and there is even evidence of anti-Semitist sentiment. The spirit of competition between ethnicities is 268 pervasive in the market-cultural enclave. This is not to say that competition itself is undesirable, but in the process market-cultural enclaves miss out on the cathartic and creative potentials of diversity in the city. Fifth, the participants of market-cultural enclaves are motivated by a fear of disappearance. Anderson (1987), in an oft-cited essay on “The Idea of Chinatown”, argued that the categorization was a way fixing a racist meaning of “China” and “Chinese” through the designation of place, people and everyday life of a diaspora. The market-cultural disjuncture can be seen clearly in contrast with this view. The ethnic community in a market-cultural enclave asks for this “fixing”. In the new multicultural ethnoscapes, the fear of persecution is replaced by a fear of disappearance (in the sense that Abbas, 1997, uses the term with reference to Hong Kong). Ethnic minorities find themselves competing for visibility and market position – with the majority, and also with other minorities. In this situation, legitimacy is derived from brand creation, and recognition from becoming consumable. This struggle is necessarily place-based, and the meaning of contemporary ethnic enclaves can be comprehended fully in this context. This is particularly relevant to the businesses operating in Chungking Mansions. Sixth, in somewhat more abstract terms, market-cultural enclaves become what Deleuze (1986) refers to as “any space whatever” on the ethnoscape of the city. Space itself has left behind its own co-ordinates and its metric relations. It is a tactile space…. Space is no longer a particular determined space, it has become any-space-whatever [espace quelconque]…. Any-space-whatever is not an 269 abstract universal, in all times, in all places. It is a perfectly singular space, which has merely lost its homogeneity, that is, the principle of its metric relations or the connection of its own parts, so that the linkages can be made in an infinite number of ways…. What in fact manifests the instability, the heterogeneity, the absence of link of such a space, is a richness in potentials or singularities which are, as it were, prior conditions of all actualization, all determination (pp 109-110). The idea of “any space whatever”, as described in the passage above, does not imply the space being “random”, “generic” or “characterless”. It means rather, that the meaning of the space becomes open to interpretation. The utility, significance, value, expectations, and potential of the enclave become variable, interpreted individually by its users. Further, the meaning of the space is variegated, and dependent on the context in which it is studied. Deleuze explains the term with the example of post-War cities in Europe. Why is the Second World War taken as a break? The fast is that in Europe, the post-war period has greatly increased the situation which we no longer know how to react to, in space which we no longer know how to describe. There were ‘any spaces whatever’, deserted but inhabited, disused warehouses, waste ground, cities in the course of demolition or reconstruction. (Deleuze, 2005, p.xi). The war turned cities into spaces whose meanings had changed. The positions of buildings and streets did not change, but they could no longer be read the same way as before. This is what the market-cultural disjuncture does to the ethnic enclave. The enclave which appears to be a concentration of people of a certain ethnicity must now be reread within the context of new social, economic and political conditions. The first point 270 that was made above with regards to defining market-culturalism (i.e the need to situate it within the debate on loss of publicness in the neoliberal economy) is an example of exactly this change of context. It is for this reason that certain dualisms are found to be weak in capturing the meanings of Chungking Mansions. Contributions and direction for future research In this concluding chapter I have distilled the findings from the case into a discussion on the disjunctures in the ethnoscape of Hong Kong that can be identified through the case of Chungking Mansions. Here I would like to highlight the contribution of this study and point to directions for future research. This study aimed to revisit the ethnic enclave phenomenon, particularly with an eye towards complementing structural explanations with an in-depth examination of the role of agency. Further, it was the objective of the study to challenge some old perceptions of Chungking Mansions. The study contextualized the ethnic enclave within the wider context of multiculturalism, and the spatial trends generated by its implementation in market economies. We found that the enclave was not easily located in the ghetto/enclave dualism, but rather through the agency of an intricate internal structure, showed characteristics of both. Finally on close inspection of citizenship practices we found that the “margizens” of Chungking Mansions showed evidence of what was termed “inverted resistance”. These findings were then summarized as “disjunctures” on the Hong Kong ethnoscape, culminating in the conceptualization of “market-culturalism”. 271 I believe this study serves to reinvigorate the debates around the spatial dimensions of multiculturalism. The current literature has tended to overlook the effects of globalization and new economic relations in the analysis of socio-spatial products of the new multicultural cities. I believe this study avoids determinism (structural, economic, disciplinary, or of any other kind), provides an insider’s view of the case study (which has been missing before), and reconceptualizes ethnic enclaves in a way that they have not been seen before. Not least, the study contributes to development of theory through a case in East Asia, which is underrepresented in the literature on the subject. The core interest of this research project is to analyze the socio-spatial outcomes that result from the intersection of multiculturalism and the contemporary economy. ‘Identity’ – that is, the politics of protection, recognition, and development of groups formed on the basis of ethnic or cultural signifiers of self – is poised to become (if it is not already) one of the most prominent arenas for political struggle at the local, national and regional scales. This phenomenon has been becoming stronger at the same time when world markets have been integrating, information traveling faster, and the movement of people becoming larger and more complex. The homogenizing threat of globalization, has engendered a fear of disappearance, and caused people to cling ever more tightly to what they know as a constant, or at least enduring. Race, gender, ethnicity, language, nationality etc. have acquired new meanings in this context. While resistance to persecution is not new, today the expression of identity is characterized by the dual impulse of (sometimes paranoid) preemptive self-preservation and simultaneous integration with the economy. Thus, identity, valorized and expressed through market 272 institutions, is the locus of a tension between fragmentation and integration. These new social and economic relations are reflected in the spaces they produce, but are also to be read from the changing context (or coordinates) within which spaces are embedded. I hope to continue this research project first in Chungking Mansions itself, by conducting formal social network analyses, and also by studying the relationships that the “margizens” of Chungking Mansions have with their home countries (sending states), and in particular with their specific regions or cities of origin. As a next step I would be interested in comparing Chungking Mansions with some other similar spaces in the Hong Kong ethnoscape, such as the Kowloon Mosque (which was mentioned in this study), the centers of activity of domestic workers from the Philippines (e.g. the World Wide House in Central District and numerous parks and public areas occupied by these workers on Sundays), and new “second-order” points of concentration of ethnic minorities (e.g. Jordan District, Sham Shui Po etc.). In addition, I would like to do comparative studies of the experiences of multiculturalism in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Japan, a region where immigration is likely to become an increasingly pressing issue because of the aging population and very low fertility rates. The idea of “market-culturalism”, though, is not limited to cities in Asia. Comparative international studies have a lot to offer to the scholarship on ethnic enclaves. The Los Angeles ethnoscape, for example, has recently seen a surge of officially designated ethnic “towns”, with Filipino, Thai, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Indian, Ethiopian and other communities all seeking recognition in different parts of the metropolitan area. The communities have been around for a long time, but the search for recognition is new. 273 Significantly, though the communities have various centers of concentration, and are dispersed around the region, the symbolic center is always a shopping district, even if it is not central to the population dispersion. In some cases they are supported by the city governments that are looking to create destinations as economic development initiatives. Another aspect of “market-culturalism” that deserves more focused examination is the interplay between ‘class’ and other identities. Chungking Mansions offered an insight into the agency of “margizens”, who are clearly not a uniform group. Several research questions arise in this context. How do immigrants relatively lower in the economic status experience market-culturalism differently than those who are more affluent? Is the phenomenon of seeking self-preservation in ethnic identity more likely to occur among the “margizens”, and to a greater degree? If so, are some market-cultural enclaves ultimately products of marginalization, not only by the majority, but also by minority co- ethnics themselves? Ethnic enclaves often see waves of ethnic succession. As one group accumulates wealth, or finds alternative locations, or simply gets absorbed in the majority culture, other groups slowly move into the vacated space. There are also other changes that may take place in an enclave. The resident population could accumulate capital and invest it in the enclave itself rather than moving out. The enclave could grow in size and economic diversity. In terms of the economy, certain products and services could lose favor and be replaced. The informality and marginality of the enclave may attract criminal activities, and enclaves may see periods of decline and resurgence. Most of these phenomena were 274 reported in the case of Chungking Mansions. This leads to idea of the “life cycle” of an enclave. Can we predict certain typical trajectories that enclaves might follow as they grow? Under what conditions are certain socio-spatial outcomes (encapsulation, crime, succession etc.) more likely than others? These questions are best answered through comparative analysis in varying contexts. The enclave is a complex web of hierarchies, networks and fractures. Members of this society are diverse in the terms of their life stories, trajectories, motives, values and aspirations. It is expected that this research agenda will help scholarship to understand better not only the spatial interaction of culture and the economy, but also the nature of globalization itself. 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City and Community, 1(4), 345-348. 286 Appendices Appendix 1: Opinion Survey: Perceptions of Chungking Mansions This short survey is intended to gauge the popular perceptions of Chungking Mansions among the residents of Hong Kong and visitors to the city. It is not essential for you to have visited Chungking Mansions to take the survey. You can take the survey even if you have only seen the place while walking or driving past it. The survey will contribute to a chapter of my doctoral dissertation on immigration, citizenship and multiculturalism in Chungking Mansions. I have studied the space and society inside Chungking Mansions through my fieldwork in Hong Kong. I want to use the survey to understand how it is seen by those on the outside. If you complete the survey and leave your email, you will be entered into a lucky draw, where you could win a 20 USD gift card for any online store of your choice. ALL RESPONSES WILL STRICTLY BE KEPT ANONYMOUS. Analysis and reporting of the data will aggregate the demographic information. No opinion will be reported in a way that it may be identifiable with any individual. The researcher is a PhD candidate at the University of Southern California. Thank you for taking the time to help this academic endeavour. About you, the respondent This non-identifiable demographic information is required for statistical purposes and a mandatory part of the survey. 1. What is your age? a) <20 b) 20-29 c) 30-39 d) 40-49 50+ 2. What is your household monthly income (in Hong Kong dollars)? a)< 10,000 b) 10,000 - 19,999 c) 20,000 - 29,999 d) 30,000 - 39,999 e) 40,000 - 49,999 f) 50,000 + 287 3. What is your highest educational attainment? a) High School b) Some college (not completed) c) College graduate (Bachelor's degree / diploma) d) Postgraduate (Master's degree or higher) 4. Sex: a) Female b) Male 5. Your status in Hong Kong (please identify the one most appropriate for you): a) Born outside Hong Kong, now Hong Kong permanent resident b) Born outside Hong Kong, visited (or visiting) Hong Kong as tourist, short-stayer or student c) HKSAR passport-holder, living in Hong Kong d) HKSAR passport-holder, living outside Hong Kong 6. IF you have lived in Hong Kong, which of the following did you reside in for the most time? (If you lived in more than one of these places for almost equal time, please select the one you feel you are more familiar with.) a) Hong Kong Island b) Kowloon c) New Territories 7. Which continent are you from? a) Asia b) Europe c) Africa d) North America e) South America f) Australia/ Oceania 8. If you answered 'Asia', please specify one of the following race/ethnicity options: a) Chinese (HK) b) Chinese (Mainland) c) Indian d) Pakistani e) Sri Lankan f) Bangladeshi g) Nepalese h) Filipino i) Indonesian Other Asian (please specify) About Chungking Mansions Thank you for sharing basic information about yourself. The following short questions are about Chungking Mansions. The researcher requests you to be as descriptive as possible about your opinions.* 288 1. Have you heard of Chungking Mansions? a) Yes b) No 2. Have you been inside Chungking Mansions? a) Yes b) No 3. If yes, for what purpose? a) Just to look around b) Buying electronics c) Buying other products d) Dining e) Motel / Guesthouse f) Other business g) Visiting a resident of Chungking Mansions Other (please specify) 4. How frequently do you visit Chungking Mansions? a) Never b) Just once c) Less than 10 times in all d) Once every few months e) Once a month f) Once a week g) Every few days 5. Did your opinion change after visiting Chungking Mansions? How so?(You do not need to answer this question if you have not visited the place.) 6. On a scale of 1-7 (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree) please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following: 1 (completely disagree) 7 (completely agree) Chungking Mansions is an ugly place, an eyesore. Chungking Mansions is an unsafe place. Chungking Mansions is a center for illegal activity. Chungking Mansions is an unsanitary place. Chungking Mansions is a place where diseases start. Chungking Mansions is not for Chinese people. Chungking Mansions is an undesirable business address. 289 Chungking Mansions spoils Hong Kong's image. Chungking Mansions does not belong in Hong Kong. 7. What is your opinion of Chungking Mansions and the people using it? Does it help or hurt Hong Kong's image? 8. Have you seen the film Chungking Express? (Directed by Wong Kar-wai) a) Yes b) No 9. If yes, did the film influence your opinion of Chungking Mansions? a) Yes b) No 10. If yes, what image did the film create in your mind of Chungking Mansions? 11. On a scale of 1-7 (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree) please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following: 1 (completely disagree) 7 (completely agree) Chungking Mansions should be demolished. Chungking Mansions should be redeveloped into a taller and more upscale building to capture higher rents. Chungking Mansions should be moved to a less prominent spot in Hong Kong. Chungking Mansions should continue as it is, but with major renovations and cleanup. Chungking Mansions should continue as it is. Chungking Mansions should be integrated more into the city tourism plan. Chungking Mansions needs more Chinese businesses. Chungking Mansions' future is not really important 290 for Hong Kong, I don't really care either way. 12. In your opinion, what should be done with Chungking Mansions? What changes would you like to see? 13. Does Chungking Mansions influence your opinion of the people of the Indian subcontinent and Africa? a) Yes b) No 14. If yes, what opinion or image of South Asian and African people have you formed through visiting or seeing Chungking Mansions? 15. On a scale of 1-7 (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree) please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following: 1. Completely disagree 7. Completely agree Chungking Mansions shows the tolerance of Hong Kong people. Chungking Mansions is a unique place that should be preserved. Chungking Mansions shows that Capitalism can bring diverse people together in a spirit of cooperation. Chungking Mansions is good for Hong Kong. There should be more similar places in Hong Kong. 16. If there are any further aspects of Chungking Mansions that you would like to comment on, please type them here. This may include anecdotes, memory of your visits, suggestions, etc. 17. If you are willing to be interviewed further about your opinion on Chungking Mansions (in person, or by phone, or by email), please provide your email here. Survey completed. Thank you for your help. If you left your email id, and are selected for the 20 USD certificate, you will hear from me about it before the end of June 2009. 291 Appendix 2: Interview guides I. Interview guide for residents (i) Work: (a) process of finding a job, (b) problems at work, (c) job satisfaction, wages, hours [Structure (ii) Residence: (a) process of finding residence, (b) satisfaction, (c) principal changes experienced, practices to adapt (iii) Public life: (a) public spaces used, purpose, frequency, (b) community representative, voting pattern, engagement, trust, (c) social capital, interactions with other groups (iv) Subjectivity: (a) self-concept, dominant identity, change, (b) future plans for self and family II. Interview guide for business owners In addition to points i. to iv. above, (v) Business: (a) Institutional support/ barriers, relationship with the authorities (b) cooperation, collective representation, (c) links with homeland, hiring practices III. Interview guide for representatives of NGOs (i) Activities: (a) People being dealt with, primary issues, services provided, (b) attitude of the government and authorities (ii) Insights: (a) Inter-group relations, (b) gender roles, (c) differences between groups IV. Interview guide for representatives of planning institutions (i) Multiculturalism: (a) Perception of immigrants, problems, (b) planning measures to incorporate the needs and opinions of immigrants, (c) plans for areas of concentration, particularly Chungking Mansion 292 (ii) Privatization: (a) Public-private model of development, deals and negotiations, (b) gentrification effects (iii) Public space: (a) Planning and provision of public space, hierarchy, functions, (b) control and management of Kowloon Park V. Interview guide for representatives of government agencies (i) Activities: (a) People being dealt with, primary issues, services provided, (b) attitude of the government and authorities (ii) Insights: (a) Inter-group relations, (b) gender roles, (c) differences between groups (iii) Policy: (a) Education, health, housing and welfare policies for immigrants and ethnic minorities, (b) citizenship effects on access to welfare, levels of access, (c) future plans for rights and controls, Beijing directives Appendix 3: Survey Results 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 CkM is an ugly place, an eyesore. is an unsafe place. is a center for illegal activity. is an unsanitary place. is a place where diseases start. is not for Chinese people. is an undesirable business address. spoils Hong Kong's image. does not belong in Hong Kong. Level of Agreement on a scale of 1-7 (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree) 7 (completely agree) 6 5 4 3 2 1 (completely disagree) Appendix 3.1: Opinions on image of Chungking Mansions 293 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Chungking Mansions should be demolished. should be redeveloped to capture higher rents should be moved to a less prominent spot should continue as is, with major renovations and cleanup should continue as it is should be integrated more into the city tourism plan needs more Chinese businesses future is not really important for Hong Kong, I don't really care either way Level of Agreement on a scale of 1-7 (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree) 7 (completely agree) 6 5 4 3 2 1 (completely disagree) Appendix 3.2: Opinions on Physical changes inside Chungking Mansions 294 B Appendix 3.4 Age Chungking M Chungking M Chungking M Chungking M Chungking M Chungking M Chungking M and more up Chungking M prominent sp Appendix 3 Just ar 2 Buying other products 10% Motel / Guesthouse 8% Other bu 6% Visit : Correlation Mansions is an Mansions is a c Mansions is a p Mansions spoil Mansions does Mansions shou Mansions shou scale building Mansions shou pot in Hong K 3.3: Purpose to look round 27% siness ting a resident 6% Bu coefficients fo n unsafe place center for illeg place where d s Hong Kong' s not belong i uld be demolis uld be redevel g to capture h uld be moved ong. of visiting Ch t uying electron 6% or 'Frequency e. gal activity. diseases start 's image. n Hong Kong shed. loped into a t higher rents. to a less hungking Man ics y of Visit' P t. . taller nsions Dinin 40% Pearson Corre Coeff - - - - - - - - ng % elation ficient P-v 0.417 0. -0.469 <0.0 -0.364 0.0 -0.306 0.0 -0.342 0. -0.353 0.0 -0.375 0.0 -0.306 0.0 -0.304 0. 295 value 0.005 0001 0027 0125 0.005 0036 0019 0125 0.013 296 Appendix 3.5: Significant Correlation coefficients for 'Have you seen Chungking Express?' Pearson Correlation Coefficient P-value Chungking Mansions is an unsafe place. 0.389 0.0012 Chungking Mansions is a center for illegal activity. 0.358 0.0032 Chungking Mansions is a place where diseases start 0.304 0.0131
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Chakravarty, Surajit
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Core Title
Spaces of market-culturalism: the case of Chungking Mansions, Hong Kong
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School of Policy, Planning, and Development
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Doctor of Philosophy
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Policy, Planning, and Development
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2010-08
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08/09/2010
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