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Collective bargaining in California charter schools: cooperation or conflict?

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Collective bargaining in California charter schools: cooperation or conflict?

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Content COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN CALIFORNIA CHARTER SCHOOLS:
COOPERATION OR CONFLICT?

by
James R. Moss, Jr.

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC ROSSIER SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

December 2010

Copyright 2010 James R. Moss, Jr.

ii
Dedication

This study is dedicated to my children, Lauren, Hannah, James and
Benjamin (born during the first year of my doctoral program), who are smart, curious and
diligent learners at home and at school; their most important teacher, my wife Lindsay,
who patiently put up with far too many detours, false starts and stops, and absent
Saturdays while completing my Ed.D. program on top of a busy litigation practice; and
my parents, James and LaVelle Moss, wonderful examples as teachers in the home,
university professors, and dedicated workers for Utah’s public schools.
I would especially like to thank my dissertation committee, Drs. Guilbert
Hentschke, Lawrence Picus, and Margaret Chidester, who have given me continual
support and an invaluable education on charter schools, governance, school finance and
school labor law in the course of completing this study.

iii
Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to the administrators who participated in this study, who
do fascinating and challenging work in leading the teachers in their schools. Hopefully
this study will provide information and insights that they and their colleagues will find
useful.
I would also like to thank the charter school leaders who have participated
in U.S.C.’s United Kingdom charter visit program under the direction of Drs. Gib
Hentschke of U.S.C. and Brent Davies of the University of Hull in England. Guiding
visiting U.K. charter leaders around Los Angeles charter schools introduced me to the
incredible variety of charter schools in California, and helped me identify elements of
personnel policy that present opportunities and challenges for school leaders in union and
non-union settings.
My thanks also to Dr. Katharine Strunk at U.S.C., who helped focus my
comparison between charter bargaining agreements and conventional district agreements.
Finally, this study was inspired by my fellow students in U.S.C.’s Ed.D.
cohort of 2006, many of whom wrestle daily as urban school leaders with the issues
addressed in this study. In addition to being great friends, they were extremely patient
with my questions as an outsider, and provided invaluable ground-level insight into
charter school governance and union relations.

iv
Table of Contents
Dedication ii
Acknowledgments iii
Abstract vii
Chapter I: Introduction 1
Background: Criticism of Collective Bargaining Agreements 2
Interest-Based or “Reform” Bargaining 3
The Rise and Development and of Charter Schools 4
Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining 5
Statement of the Problem 6
Research Questions 7
Sample, Methods and Analysis 8
Significance of the Study 9
Limitations, Delimitations, and Assumptions 10
Definitions 11

Chapter II - Literature Review 15
Introduction 15
History of Collective Bargaining 16
Development of the National Teachers’ Unions 16
California’s Collective Bargaining Law: The Equal Employment
Relations Act (“Rodda Act”) 19
Property Rights in Public Employment 24
Collective Bargaining -- Criticism and Reform Proposals 25
Background: The Debate over Teacher Quality and Placement 25
Criticism of Collective Bargaining Agreements 28
Studies Regarding Restrictiveness of Bargaining Agreements 31
Studies on the Effects of Collective Bargaining Agreements 36
Los Angeles Unified School District’s Collective Bargaining
Agreement 40
The Promise of “Reform Bargaining” 41
Compensation in Collective Bargaining Agreements 46
Teacher Attitudes Regarding Performance Pay 49
Successful Models 51
Charter Schools in California 53
General Background of Charter Schools 53
California’s Charter School Law 54
Studies of California’s Charter Schools 57
Charter School Performance 58
Performance Pay in Charter Schools 59

v
Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining 60
Historical Background 60
The EERA and Charter Schools 63
The Teachers Unions’ Vision for Charter Schools 67
Charters and Unions: A Grand Bargain, or
Fundamentally Incompatible? 68

Chapter III – Methodology 75
Introduction 75
Population 78
Table: California Charter Schools with Collective Bargaining Agreements
in This Study 81
Collective Bargaining Agreement Analysis 81
Data Gathering and Analysis 85
Semi-Structured Interviews 89

Chapter IV - Results and Analysis 95
Summary of Most Significant Findings 96
Review of California Law and Comparison of Bargaining Agreements 101
Research Question No. 1: Assignment and Transfer 101
California Law Governing Teacher Assignment and Transfer 101
Collective Bargaining Regarding Assignment and
Transfer Decisions 102
Findings Related to Bargaining Agreement Provisions on
Assignment and Transfer 103
Research Question No. 2: Evaluation of Teachers 111
California Law Governing Teacher Evaluation 111
Application of State Teacher Evaluation Law to Charter Schools 111
Evaluation in Collective Bargaining 116
Findings Related to Bargaining Agreement Provisions on Teacher
Evaluation 117
Research Question No. 3: Teacher Discipline and Dismissal 128
California Law Governing Teacher Discipline 128
Collective Bargaining Regarding Teacher Discipline 130
California Law Governing Non-reelection or Dismissal of
Probationary Teachers 131
California Law Governing Dismissal of Permanent Teachers 134
Collective Bargaining Regarding Teacher Dismissal in California 140
Findings Related to Bargaining Agreement Provisions on
Teacher Discipline and Dismissal 140
Research Question 4: Teacher Compensation 147
California Law Governing Teacher Compensation 148
Collective Bargaining Regarding Teacher Compensation 148

vi
Findings Related to Bargaining Agreement Provisions on
Teacher Compensation 148
Plans for Consideration or Adoption of “Merit Pay” 150
School Administrator Interviews 151
Green Dot Interview 152
LA Leadership Interview 159
Choice 2000 Online School Interview 165
Darnall Charter School Interview 169
Live Oak Charter School Interview 176
Summary of Findings Regarding Administrator-Union Relations 183

Chapter V – Conclusions and Recommendations 192
Recommendations Regarding Advantages or Disadvantages
of Unionization 193
Recommendations for Establishing Productive Union Relations 198
Recommendations for Schools Negotiating Their First Union Contract 199
Recommendations Regarding Specific Bargaining Agreement Provisions 199
Assignment and Transfer 200
Teacher Evaluation 204
Classification 209
Discipline 209
Dismissal 211
Alternative Compensation / “Merit Pay” 215
Recommendations for Further Research 217

Conclusion 218
Bibliography 219
Appendix: Charter and District Bargaining Agreement Provisions 226

vii
Abstract
Teachers at a small but growing number of California’s charter schools are
represented by teachers’ unions, and the administrators and teachers at these schools have
negotiated collective bargaining agreements that govern administrators’ personnel
decisions regarding teachers. This study begins to explore those agreements, focusing on
provisions in four key policy areas in which public school district agreements are often
criticized as being unduly restrictive: (1) teacher assignment and transfer, (2) teacher
evaluation, (3) teacher classification (including permanence or “tenure,” discipline and
dismissal, and (4) teacher compensation, including “merit pay.”
The literature review includes a discussion of criticism directed at public
school collective bargaining agreements, and suggestions for “reform” bargaining; a
history of charter schools with a focus on operational flexibility; and a review of the
research on the interaction between unions and charter schools in California, very little of
which has focused on actual bargaining agreements or their effect on administrators.
The study took a qualitative and exploratory approach, comparing the
bargaining agreements of nine unionized charter schools with the school districts by
which they are chartered, and conducting interviews with five unionized charter school
administrators, focusing on specific bargaining agreement provisions and the relationship
between administrators, teachers and union officials. On the four general research topics
listed above, the study found that unionized charters have achieved some of the flexibility

viii
sought by charter proponents, while appearing more similar to conventional public school
districts in other policy areas: (1) charter schools have generally departed from the
seniority-based assignment and transfer provision in school districts, with notable
exceptions; (2) they have negotiated more flexible, customized and thorough evaluation
procedures, which often place more responsibility on teachers; (3) they have often
negotiated some form of “tenure,” or a “good cause” or “just cause” standard for teacher
dismissal; and (4) they have rarely negotiated any form of “merit pay,” although charter
schools increasingly appear to be evaluating the possibility of doing so.
With respect to charter-union relationships, the study found that charter
schools are susceptible to union organizing efforts by a small number of dissatisfied
teachers; that they have little experience in negotiating initial bargaining agreements; that
charter schools generally appear to have cooperative relationships with their unions; but
that charter schools have had little success in modifying restrictive bargaining agreements
to increase operational flexibility. The study also found that a number of comparatively
restrictive provisions have yet to be enforced or tested, suggesting that the effect of such
provisions is not yet fully understood.
The study recommends that charter schools involve teachers heavily in
school governance if they prefer to avoid unionization; that schools at which a union is
recognized consider several options for personnel policy provisions, using the schools in
this study and others either as positive or negative models; that policy-makers avoid
changes in California law that could diminish the involvement of teachers in charter
school governance; and that future research examine personnel policies at all unionized

ix
California charter schools in comparison with non-unionized charter schools and
unionized conventional public schools.

1
Chapter I - Introduction
The purpose of this study is to examine the intersection of two major
forces in public education --- charter schools and teachers’ unions --- by analyzing
collective bargaining agreements in unionized California charter schools, and the effect
of those agreements on the decisions of charter school administrators. The study will
focus on the level of restraint or flexibility established by the bargaining agreements of
nine California charter schools, in four areas: (1) teacher assignment and transfer, (2)
evaluation (3) classification (including versions of “tenure”), discipline and dismissal,
and (4) differential or “merit pay,” which form the basis for the study’s main research
questions. Taking a qualitative approach, the study will analyze the charter schools’
provisions in these four areas, and compare the extent to which each charter school’s
bargaining agreement departs from the agreement of the school district by which the
school is chartered. For a smaller group of unionized charter schools, the study will also
examine through interviews the school’s history of unionization, the development of the
school’s bargaining agreement, and the relationship between the school’s administrators
and the union representing the school’s teachers.
The study will draw upon prior research on collective bargaining
agreements in conventional (non-charter) public schools, the development of charter
schools as a means of increased administrative flexibility, and the interaction between
charter school advocates and teachers’ unions in the legislative and academic arenas.

2
However, there is very little research on the specific provisions of collective bargaining
agreements in charter schools, or the experience of school administrators whose
personnel decisions are governed by those agreements.
Unionized charter schools are still fairly rare, and the union-charter
relationship usually arises in an ad hoc manner, shaped largely by the unique
circumstances and history of particular schools --- which, in California, range from small
“mom-and-pop” charters to multi-school Charter Management Organizations (“CMOs”)
and Educational Managements Organizations (“EMOs,” which are essentially for-profit
CMOs). Accordingly, generalized findings are difficult to make at this stage of the
union-charter story. This study seeks to sketch the historical and legal landscape on
which these two forces are engaging (including the application to charters of suggestions
for reform or “interest-based” bargaining in public schools), to begin to examine the
initial results of union-charter engagement from a ground-level perspective, to use the
results of that examination to explore questions about the compatibility of charters and
unions, and to provide recommendations to charter schools evaluating the possibility of
unionization or negotiating their first bargaining agreement.
Background: Criticism of Collective Bargaining Agreements
In California, collective bargaining agreements are an established fixture
of the public education system. However, teachers’ union analysts such as Terry Moe

3
have argued that bargaining agreements often include provisions that unduly restrain
administrators:
• Rules making it difficult to dismiss teachers for poor performance
• Rules limiting discretion of principals in assigning teachers to
classes, and requiring them to base such decisions on seniority;
• Rules allowing teachers to make voluntary transfers to other
schools, and resist being transferred away from schools, based on
seniority. (Moe, 2001).

Critics contend that these rules have negative consequences for students,
as they prevent administrators from putting teachers to their most productive use, raise
costs, and entangle schools in bureaucracy. They have also been criticized for limiting
administrators’ ability to accurately evaluate lower-performing teachers, which, as
explained in this study, is related to the school’s ability to dismiss teachers under
California law. (Hess, 2006). Chapter 2 of this Study discusses in more detail the
criticism leveled at teachers’ unions, and critics’ recommendations for the modification
of legal and contractual restraints governing public schools.
Interest-Based or “Reform” Bargaining
Following a trend in the corporate world, some union leaders and
education policy researchers have recently advocated the use of “interest-based”
bargaining in public schools. This model of bargaining focuses on collaboration and the
search for common purposes or interest. Proponents of reform bargaining seek a return
to the “guild” concept, in which unions consider themselves the guardians of their
profession’s standards of excellence, even to the extent of policing poor performance, and

4
pay special attention to the training of new members. (Kerchner, Koppich & Weeres,
1997). More recently, proponents have focused on the bargaining process itself, arguing
that the scope of bargaining should be expanded from protecting the terms and conditions
of teachers’ employment to contractually requiring the performance of schools and the
success of students.
The Rise and Development and of Charter Schools
One of the primary arguments for the rise and spread of charter schools is
that they release administrators from the restraints that apply to traditional public schools,
including collective bargaining agreements. Without these restraints, supporters have
argued that charters are able to operate as laboratories, developing best practices
available for replication by other charters while allowing policymakers to determine
whether conventional public schools might benefit from a similar loosening of
administrative constraints. The four policy areas noted above --- assignment and transfer,
evaluation, discipline and dismissal, and differential compensation or “merit pay” ---
feature prominently in this justification for charters. Consistent with this “laboratory”
function, charters in California, including the schools in this study, have developed a
wide array of contractual rules and personnel policies.

5
Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining
In California, charter schools can generally be classified either as
“conversions” from existing schools or “start-ups.” Conversion charters’ teachers
typically retain membership in the union that represents the teachers in the district from
which the school obtains its charter. “Start-ups” may or may not be unionized when they
commence operation, but may become unionized through organizing activity. Under
California law, charters between schools and authorizing agencies determine whether
teachers remain members of the public district’s union; if not, the school will potentially
be open to new organizing and bargaining efforts, as demonstrated by some of the
schools in this Study.
Within California there are just over thirty unionized charter schools or
Charter Management Organizations. The nature of the bargaining agreements at these
schools depends partly on the relationship between the school and the teachers’ union,
ranging from agreements retained during a “conversion” from a conventional public
school to a charter school, to agreements reached in planned cooperation with a union, to
agreements reached after a union gains representational rights against the wishes of the
school’s administrators. The recent takeover of Locke High School in Los Angeles by
Green Dot, a California-based Charter Management Organization, has highlighted Green
Dot’s unique approach to collective bargaining: it voluntarily allowed the creation of a
new union at its inception, negotiated a dramatically streamlined bargaining agreement,
and seeks to follow a cooperative approach to union relations. The agreements also vary

6
dramatically in length, and in the degree to which they depart from the contract of the
district in which they are located. Finally, they vary in the extent to which they have
been modified and developed following initial execution.
Statement of the Problem
Little has been written about how specific charter schools’ bargaining
agreements differ from conventional school districts’ agreements, or from each other;
how the bargaining agreements or policies have changed since the charter schools began
operation; or how these agreements affect the daily practice of school administrators.
There is little or no research summarizing, analyzing or comparing the bargaining
agreements in unionized charter schools within California, or comparing these
agreements with the agreements of conventional school districts. Likewise, there is little
research analyzing the modification or development of these agreements since their
original execution, including analysis of whether any modification of the agreements has
increased or decreased operational flexibility.
There has also been little research regarding the relationships between the
unions and charter school administrators as they seek to implement bargaining
agreements, or the effect of the agreements on the daily practice of school administrators.
This study will attempt to fill in some of these gaps in the research, at a time when the
intersection of the charter school movement and the teachers’ unions has the potential to
have a significant impact on broader education policy debates.

7
Research Questions
The study asks four primary research questions, related to the specific
areas of personnel policy outlined above.
Research Question No. 1: To what extent, and in what ways, do the
collective bargaining agreements in unionized California charter schools differ from the
agreements of the school districts by which they are chartered, and from each other, with
respect to provisions governing assignment (or reassignment) and transfer decisions?
Research Question No. 2: To what extent, and in what ways, do the
collective bargaining agreements in unionized California charter schools differ from the
agreements of the school districts by which they are chartered, and from each other, with
respect to provisions governing teacher evaluation?
Research Question No. 3: To what extent, and in what ways, do the
collective bargaining agreements in unionized California charter schools differ from the
agreements of the school districts by which they are chartered, and from each other, with
respect to provisions governing teacher classification (including whether or not the
school provides “permanence” or “tenure”), discipline and dismissal?
Research Question No. 4: To what extent, and in what ways, do the
collective bargaining agreements in unionized California charter schools differ from the
agreements of the school districts by which they are chartered, and from each other, with
respect to provisions governing differential compensation or “merit pay”?

8
Sample, Methods and Analysis
This study will first examine California law governing the policy areas
addressed by this study: assignment and transfer, evaluation, discipline and dismissal
(including the provision of “tenure”), and differential pay including “merit pay.” The
study will next analyze the provisions of collective bargaining agreements of nine
unionized charter schools in California on those topics, and the collective bargaining
agreements of the districts by which each charter school is chartered. The study focuses
particularly on the level of restraint such provisions place on administrators. The
question of whether such restraints are beneficial or harmful is beyond the scope of this
study.
A quantitative portion of the study was originally designed to gather and
analyze data regarding administrators’ decisions in the policy areas outlined above from
the same sample of unionized charter schools and conventional school districts. As
explained in detail in Chapter 3, I had intended to use statistical tests to determine the
effect certain independent variables (the terms of agreements or policy documents, and
the level of union activity, including grievances) on independent variables (the personnel
practices of administrators, including consideration of seniority in assignment and
transfer decisions, the use of negative evaluations for underperforming teachers, the use
of differential pay, especially pay for performance, and the number of dismissals for poor
performance), while controlling for the effect of extraneous factors using control
variables. However, due to the small initial sample size and smaller response rate, the

9
quantitative portion of the study was eliminated. Instead, the study examined in greater
detail the specific provisions of nine charter schools’ agreements on the topics outlined
above, and added a detailed, point-by-point comparison with the comparable provisions
in the conventional school district by which the charter school is chartered.
The study then focuses on five charter schools --- a limited but, to some
extent, representative group --- for a more in-depth analysis through in-depth interviews
with administrators. The interviews were designed to obtain information about the
schools’ approach to collective bargaining, including the use of “interest-based” or
“reform” bargaining; and the reasons for any modifications to the bargaining agreement
among unionized charters. The interviews were also designed to obtain information
about the effect of the bargaining agreement on administrators’ daily practice in the
selected topic areas described above. The interviews were also intended to explore the
interplay between the bargaining agreement and other factors influencing operational
flexibility, including state law, the mission of the school, and the personal relationships
between union leaders, teachers and administrators.
Significance of the Study
Researchers, policy makers, administrators, teachers, unions and interested
citizens (including parents) could benefit from the availability of more information and
analysis regarding the variety of approaches to the negotiation of collective bargaining
agreements. Such information could be used by researchers and policymakers to evaluate

10
charter schools’ success in increasing flexibility in policy areas in which the conventional
district agreements have been considered too restrictive. The study could also help
schools and unions choose their own approach to bargaining, or to re-evaluate their
existing approach.
Limitations, Delimitations, and Assumptions
As explained in Chapter 3, a limited number of collective bargaining
agreements (nine charter schools and the school districts by which they were chartered)
were examined, and a smaller number of administrators (five) were interviewed, which is
a significant limitation of the study. Another limitation is that because the sample size is
very small, it was not possible to determine whether there were statistically significant
differences between unionized charter schools and conventional school districts in each
of the policy areas addressed by the study. In response to this limitation, the study was
modified from its original design, which was to compare unionized charter schools to
non-unionized charters, to focus instead on a more in-depth comparison between the
charter schools, and between the charters and conventional school districts. The study
was also modified to eliminate the quantitative component, and to rely more extensively
on qualitative analysis, including in-depth interviews with administrators.
Delimitations include the focus on unionized charter schools within
California, to the exclusion of other states. However, given California’s significance in
terms of the complexity of its Education Code, the prevalence of public teachers’ unions,

11
and the large number of charter schools, California’s experience must figure prominently
in any analysis of the intersection of teachers’ unions and charter schools in the United
States. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the study examined union-charter
relations primarily from the perspective of charter school administrators. Neither
teachers nor union officials were interviewed regarding their views on collective
bargaining, union-charter relations or administrative decision-making. Moreover, the
background for the study focuses on criticism of collective bargaining in public schools,
and suggestions for “reform” bargaining, with less extensive discussion of the position of
union supporters. Thus, the study is necessarily one-sided, and further research should
include the perspective of teachers and union officials. However, this study is
exploratory in nature, and was designed to examine the extent to which administrators at
unionized charter schools possess the flexibility that charter supporters have advocated.
Examining bargaining agreements and interviewing administrators were determined to be
the best methods of addressing that question, while interviews with teachers and union
officials would shed a great deal of light on the reasons that teachers seek to restrain
administrative discretion through union representation in charter schools.
Definitions
Assignment: The process by which a public school teacher is initially assigned to a
school and a class.

12
Collective Bargaining Agreement: A contract negotiated by the exclusive, recognized
representative of a group of employees forming a bargaining unit (for purposes of this
study, public school teachers, including public charter school teachers) and the employer,
which governs the terms and conditions of the employment of all employees in the
bargaining unit.
Discipline: For purposes of this study, any action taken against a teacher, short of
dismissal, examples of which can include verbal warnings, written warnings, letter of
reprimand, or suspension with our without pay.
Discharge / Dismissal: For purposes of this study, the process of terminating
involuntarily the employment of a public school teacher for cause during the agreed-upon
term of employment. This does not include a decision not to renew an employment
contract upon the expiration of the term. The ability of employers to make such decisions
varies widely between conventional public schools, which provide tenure to certain
teachers, and charter schools, which do not provide tenure but may provide restraints on
the ability to discharge teachers through collective bargaining agreements or school
policies.
Due process: For purposes of this study, a legal requirement imposed on employers of
public school teachers, based on the protection of teachers’ employment as a property
right recognized by the United States Constitution, preventing employers from limiting or
removing that property right without following certain required procedures, including
notice and an opportunity to be heard.

13
Evaluation: The process by which teachers are evaluated for purposes of pay, dismissal,
promotion or other employment decisions.
Grievance: "A complaint filed by an employee or by the union alleging that the employer
has violated a term of a collective bargaining agreement." A complaint filed by an
employee alleging that the employer has violated a term of a collective bargaining
agreement.
Organizing: The process, protected by law, in which a group of employees seeks
recognition of a union as their exclusive representative for purposes of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment to the extent allowed by law.
Peer Review: A form of evaluation in which a teacher’s peers, other teachers, are asked
to evaluate the teacher. This form of evaluation has been implemented through collective
bargaining in several districts, and is provided by school policy as several non-union
charter schools.
Permanency (often referred to as ‘tenure’): A status of employment, granted by state law,
in which a teacher cannot be dismissed at the sole discretion of the employer, but can
only be dismissed for cause or laid off in accordance with the provisions of statute.
Permanency does not apply to public charter schools, but such schools are free to provide
similar protection through school policies or collective bargaining agreements negotiated
with a recognized union.

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Reassignment: The process by which a school changes the assignment of a teacher
within the same school.
Transfer: The process by which a public school teacher moves from one school to
another. A transfer may be either voluntary or involuntary, depending on state law,
school policy and, potentially, the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. For
purposes of this study, transfer within single-site charter schools will consist of transfer
between classes; transfer within multi-site charter operators will refer to inter-school or
intra-school transfers.

15
CHAPTER II - Literature Review
Introduction
This chapter will review the historical background of the issues addressed
by this study, and survey some of the current developments and policy arguments
regarding those issues. The history of collective bargaining agreements in charter
schools is fairly sparse, as relatively few charter schools are unionized. Accordingly,
little research has been done regarding the variety of bargaining agreements in such
schools, and the effects of those agreements on the personnel practices of charter school
administrators. This study is intended to help fill that gap. In order to understand the
interaction between these two significant forces in education policy --- unions and
charters --- this chapter will review their histories separately, and then discuss the recent
literature on collective bargaining in charter schools themselves.
The first section will outline the history of collective bargaining in the
United States, and will then outline the development of the law governing collective
bargaining in California’s public schools. The second section will introduce the statutory
framework governing personnel decisions in California schools, which will be explained
in more detail in relation to each research question in Chapter 4. The third section will
review the literature related to criticism of collective bargaining and other union activity,
with a particular focus on critics’ concerns regarding restraints imposed on school
administrators’ ability to make personnel decisions in the areas of assignment and

16
transfer, differential pay, and evaluation and dismissal. This section will also review the
literature related to “reform bargaining” or “interest-based bargaining,” in which Unions
are viewed as partners with school districts in seeking to improve schools --- including
improvements in the areas of personnel policy that are examined in this study. This
section will also include a review of literature regarding differential compensation, and
the involvement of teachers’ unions in opposing or enabling innovations in teacher
compensation. The fourth section will review the history of charter schools, focusing
again on the areas of school personnel policy covered by this study. Finally, the fifth
section will review the available literature regarding collective bargaining and other
union activity in charter schools. This will examine union leaders’ early advocacy for
charter schools, subsequent opposition by unions, and recent discussions regarding the
potential for cooperation by unions and charter schools.
History of Collective Bargaining
Development of the national teachers’ unions
The National Education Association (“NEA”) was founded in 1857, as a
professional organization for both teachers and administrators. As an advocate of reform,
it was influential in shaping curriculum in the United States toward providing all high
school students with a liberal arts education. (Kahlenberg, 2006). The American
Federation of Teachers (“AFT”) was founded in 1916, when a group of teachers in
Chicago organized and were granted a charter by the American Federation of Labor. Its

17
first membership card was issued to John Dewey, who favored membership in unions as
a way of helping teachers relate to their working-class students. (Kahlenberg, 2006).
During the first half of the twentieth century, collective bargaining by
teachers (and other public employees) was seen as inappropriate, even by union
advocates, because it had the potential to paralyze an important sector of the government.
(Kahlenberg, 2006). Teachers themselves were reluctant to view themselves as union
members, because unions were seen as blue-collar organizations while teachers viewed
themselves as white-collar professionals. (Kahlenberg, 2006). By midcentury, several
factors created increased interest in collective bargaining for teachers: teachers’ pay was
poor, even compared to that of unionized factory workers; teachers felt they were
subjected to unfair working conditions, including extra duties like cafeteria monitoring,
clock-punching, and long staff meetings; and teachers felt that they were at the whim of
administrators, including playing favorites with class assignments and publicly berating
teachers. (Kahlenberg, 2006). A few isolated collective bargaining agreements were
executed between the 1930s and 1950s. In 1960, Albert Shanker and David Selden,
young AFT organizers in New York City, engineered the consolidation of elementary and
secondary teachers into the United Federation of Teachers. Although New York law
required the dismissal of striking teachers the UFT conducted a one-day strike the day
before the 1960 Presidential election. A city committee subsequently recommended a
collective bargaining election, which was won by the UFT. In 1962 the UFT engaged in
a much larger strike, after which it negotiated the first major teacher collective bargaining
agreement, which included a pay increase and a duty-free lunch. (Kahlenberg, 2006).

18
The UFT then moved quickly to use collective bargaining to influence
school operations, including reducing class size and establishing a special program for
poor schools. Opponents objected to the Union’s insertion into school policy, while
defenders argued that expanding the scope of bargaining to include operations would take
advantage of teachers’ expertise, and that because teachers are blamed when schools
perform poorly, they had the right to take part in improving them. In 1967 the UFT
struck, mostly over non-wage issues including class size and a stronger school discipline
policy, adopting the slogan, “Teachers Want What Children Need.” The Board
eventually reached an agreement on wages, but determined that it would not “delegate the
making of policy . . . to the union and exclude participation of parents and the public.”
(Kahlenberg, 2006).
Following the UFT’s success in New York, AFT membership surged,
threatening to surpass the NEA’s. This prompted the NEA to transform itself from a
professional group into a union and to compete with the AFT for recognition.
Meanwhile, state legislatures began to pass laws authorizing public employees to engage
in collective bargaining. Both unions’ membership skyrocketed, increasing to
approximately 70% of teachers nationwide by the late 1970s. With increasing
membership, the unions were able to increase their involvement in political affairs and
lobbying. (Kahlenberg, 2006). Union advocates consider unions to be indispensable to a
professional and stable teacher corps. They argue that unions increase pay for teachers,
improve professionalism through mentoring and professional development, and protect
teachers from arbitrary decisions by administrators. (Goldhaber, 2006; Casey, 2006).

19
California’s collective bargaining law: the Equal Employment Relations
Act (“Rodda Act”)
Today, almost all of the school districts in California are unionized. The
vast majority of certificated teachers are represented by the California Teachers’
Association (“CTA”), an affiliate of the NEA, or the California Federation of Teachers
(“CFT”), which is affiliated with the AFT. The CTA was organized in 1863, and the
CFT in 1919. However, until 1961, school districts had sole discretion to establish
teachers’ working conditions. In 1961, the Brown Act gave teachers the right to join
unions, and gave the unions the right to meet with school districts to discuss working
conditions. Yet the districts were not required to negotiate, and there was no dispute-
resolution mechanism. The Winton Act of 1965 distinguished school employees from
other public employees, and provided mechanisms for dispute resolution such as
mediation.
The Educational Employment Relations Act (the “Rodda Act”), passed in
1975, paved the way for the unionization of most California public school teachers. (Cal.
Educ. Code §§ 3540-3549). Modeled on the National Labor Relations Act, which
governs unionization and collective bargaining in the private sector, the Rodda Act gives
employees full bargaining rights, which include: (1) the right to organize collectively if
they choose, (2) the right to be represented by a single agent, (3) determination of wages,
hours and other working conditions through bilateral negotiations with management, (4)
the right to a binding contract between the employer and the union if terms can be agreed

20
upon, (5) the right to strike, and (6) the right to negotiate binding arbitration of
“grievance disputes,” disagreements concerning the application of the contract, and
“interest disputes,” disagreements arising from the negotiation of the contract itself.
(Kemerer et al., 2005)
Under the EERA, if a Union demonstrates --- through signatures gathered
from employees --- that at least 30% of the employees are in favor of organizing, an
election is held under the supervision of the California "Public Employment Relations
Board" (“PERB”). If more than 50% of the teachers vote to be represented by the Union,
the PERB determines an appropriate bargaining unit, and the Union becomes the
exclusive representative of the employees in the unit. The bargaining unit is defined by a
“community of interest,” meaning essentially that the employees perform similar work.
In conventional public schools, a bargaining unit typically includes most certificated
teachers in the school district except substitutes. The Rodda Act also protects employees
from discrimination on the basis of their participation in organizing activity. The Act
specifically provides that it does not authorize any departure from the Education Code’s
provisions relating to tenure or a merit or civil service system, which will be discussed
later in this section.
Once a unit is recognized, the Union assumes the duty to “fairly represent
each and every employee in the appropriate unit.” See Cal Govt. Code § 3544.9. A 2000
amendment to the EERA requires that once a Union has been elected as the exclusive
bargaining representative, all teachers in the bargaining unit are required to pay either the

21
full amount of dues charged by the union, or a “fair share” agency fee if they decline to
be full dues-paying members. At the Union’s request, the district or other employer is
required to deduct this amount from the teacher’s paycheck and turn it over to the Union,
even if the teacher disagrees (Cal. Educ. Code § 45061). Agency fees include the costs
of bargaining contact administration and other activities related to the bargaining process
(presently, approximately $1,100 per year for a full-time teacher). The California
Supreme Court has ruled that unions can use money collected as agency fees to support
lobbying related to collective bargaining issues, but not for lobbying on unrelated
political issues (Cumero v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 49 Cal.3d 575, 581, 262
Cal.Rptr. 46, 48, 778 P.2d 174, 176 (1989)).
After a Union has been recognized, the employer takes on the obligation
to negotiate with the Union’s representatives in good faith. The EERA defines areas of
potential bargaining as mandatory, consultative, or nonnegotiable. If a topic is the
subject of mandatory bargaining, both parties must negotiate in good faith until an
agreement is reached, or they have reached an impasse in negotiations (the point at which
either party or both parties reject the possibility of further compromise), which can result
in the failure to establish a contract. If the parties reach impasse, the PERB can appoint a
mediator to try to bring the parties to agreement, or the parties can develop their own
mediation process. If mediation is not successful, either party may request that the
dispute can be submitted to a three-person fact-finding panel, which investigates and
provides non-binding findings and settlement recommendations. If the parties still cannot

22
agree, the district may implement its “last, best and final” offer, while the union may
strike. (Kemerer et al., 2005).
Mandatory subjects of bargaining include wages, hours, and other “terms
and conditions of employment,” which include health and welfare benefits; leave,
transfer and reassignment policies; safety conditions; class size; evaluation procedures;
grievance procedures; and layoff of probationary employees (Cal. Govt. Code §
3543.2(a)). Bargaining is also mandatory, if requested by either party, regarding causes
and procedures for disciplinary action (other than dismissal); payment of additional
compensation based on criteria other than years of training and experience; and payment
of a salary schedule based on criteria other than uniform allowance for years of training
and experience (Cal. Govt. Code § 3543.2(a)). In the absence of mutual agreement on
these subjects, the provisions of the Education Code govern (Cal. Govt. Code §
3543.2(b)).
Even when a topic is not specifically enumerated in the EERA as a subject
of mandatory bargaining, it may fall within the scope of mandatory bargaining if it meets
a three-part test developed by the PERB and endorsed by the California Supreme Court in
1983:
1. The subject is logically and reasonably related to hours, wages, or an
enumerated term and condition of bargaining;
2. The subject is of such concern to both management and employees
that conflict is likely to occur and the mediatory influence of collective
bargaining is the appropriate means of resolving the conflict;

23
3. The employer’s obligation to negotiate would not significantly abridge
its freedom to exercise those managerial prerogatives (including
matters of fundamental policy) essential to the achievement of the
district’s mission.
(San Mateo City School District v. Public Employment Relations Board, 33 Cal. 3d 850,
857, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 811 (1983)).
On other topics, the district is required to consult with the union(defined
as “consultation”), but is not necessarily required to bargain to impasse (the point at
which bargaining ceases). Such topics include educational objectives, course content and
curriculum, and text selection. All other subjects are reserved to the discretion of the
district (Cal. Govt. Code § 3543.2(b)). The EERA specifically excludes issues pertaining
to dismissal from the scope of collective bargaining (Cal. Govt. Code § 3543.2(b)).
However, school districts and unions are authorized to bargain over the causes and
procedures for disciplinary action other than dismissal, including suspension for up to
fifteen days.
Once a bargaining agreement is negotiated in a public school, a grievance
and arbitration clause usually provides a mechanism for the union to present formal
complaints on behalf of teachers for the employer’s violation of the agreement. Such
agreements typically include initial steps such as bringing the matter to the teacher’s
immediate supervisor; and appealing to a higher-lever official. The EERA allows the
parties to include a provision for binding arbitration to settle disputes that are not
resolved through the grievance process (Cal. Govt. Code § 3548.5). Employees have the
right to file a grievance with or without the involvement of the Union (Cal. Govt. Code §

24
3543). The school district cannot agree to resolve the grievance until the union has
received a copy of the grievance and the proposed resolution, and has had an opportunity
to respond. Id.
The PERB also receives and adjudicates Unfair Labor Practice charges
(“ULPs”), which can be brought by either party to accuse the other of failing to follow
the law. ULPs most often accuse the other party of failing to meet its obligation to
bargain in good faith. The PERB also provides fact-finding when mediation has failed.
If no agreement is reached via the factfinding process, the factfinding panel issues an
advisory report, which the parties are obligated to consider in good faith in an effort to
reach agreement. As referenced above, if the parties are not able to do so, upon reaching
a second impasse, the district may unilaterally implement its last, best and final offer, and
the union may call a strike.
Property Rights in Public Employment
The United States Supreme Court established in 1972 that school teachers
have a protected property right in employment if the state gives them a “legitimate claim
of entitlement” to it. This entitlement can be created through state law or a collective
bargaining agreement. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from depriving a
teacher of this property right without “due process.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694 (1972).

25
Teachers’ rights under state law are determined in large part by their
membership in one of four categories: substitute, temporary, probationary or permanent.
For districts with 250 or more teachers, any teacher who has worked for two consecutive
school years and is reelected for the next school year must be classified as a “permanent”
employee (Cal. Educ. Code § 44929.21). As explained in Chapter 4, permanent
employees are provided significant protection by California law, and probationary
teachers are also protected to a lesser extent.
Collective Bargaining -- Criticism and Reform Proposals
Background: the debate over teacher quality and placement
During the same period that the legal framework surrounding teachers’
employment status and rights has developed and evolved through state law and collective
bargaining, the debate over the ability of teachers to improve performance of schools and
individual students has also intensified. Since the publication of the Coleman report in
1966, which argued that students’ background characteristics such as race, income and
parental education levels largely determined student performance, critics, including
economist Eric Hanushek, have criticized the methodology and conclusions of the report.
Some recent research has suggested that, background characteristics being equal,
qualified and effective teachers can have a significant impact on student achievement.
(Hanushek, 2005). Hanushek has argued that “[i]ncreasing teacher quality easily trumps
reducing class size as an educational investment.” (Hanushek, 1992). One study has

26
estimated that the achievement gap could be closed by ensuring that disadvantaged
students had a good teacher for five years in a row. (Hanushek et al., 2005).
However, some research has also suggested that some of the most
frequently-used indicators of teacher quality, including certification and advanced
degrees, and years of experience (after the first few years) do not necessarily predict
teachers’ success. Rather, successful teachers often possess attributes which cannot
necessarily be measured on a purely objective basis. (Hanushek, 2005; Kane et al.,
2006).
This question has significant implications for resource allocation decisions
and for debates over personnel policy. In the battle for federal, state and local funding,
school leaders and policymakers have argued about whether money is best spent on
teacher salaries or on attempting to improve the socioeconomic circumstances of
children. This debate has recently created a dramatic split among education policy
experts and advocates, producing dueling “manifestos” for education reform. One group,
referred to as the “Broader, Bolder” coalition, essentially advocates turning schools in
poorer neighborhoods into full-service community centers, providing nutrition, daycare,
after-school programs, and community services to all residents. Supporters of this
approach contend that combating poverty in the communities surrounding schools is the
best way to help students come to school ready to learn. (A broader, bolder approach to
education, 2008).
The other group, which includes the Education Equality Project headed by
New York Chancellor of Schools Joel Klein and Reverend Al Sharpton, argues that

27
improving the quality of teachers is a key leverage point for improving academic
performance, and that money and policy should be focused on empowering schools to
attract the most qualified teachers and place them where they can do the most good. The
EEP’s “Manifesto,” released in 2008, included several recommendations directly related
to the areas of personnel policy addressed by this study:
• “Ensure that there is an effective teacher in every classroom, and
an effective principal in every school, by paying educators as the
professionals they are, by giving them the tools and training they
need to succeed, and by making tough decisions about those who
do not;”
• “Create accountability for educational success at every level— at
the system and school level, for teachers and principals, and for
central office administrators;”
• “Commit to making every decision about whom we employ, how
money is spent, and where resources are deployed with a single-
minded focus: what will best serve our students, regardless of how
it affects other interests. . . .” (Education Equality Project, 2008).
These recommendations have both monetary and non-monetary
implications. Critics of collective bargaining agreements have argued that such
agreements prevent schools from making decisions about teachers and money that are in
the best interests of students. Defenders of unions, including advocates of “reform
unionism,” argue that unions are a necessary participant in any effort to achieve the goal
of having an effective teacher in every classroom, and that, to the extent that current
bargaining agreements are an impediment to that goal, such agreements can be and are
being modified in collaboration with school districts. The arguments and literature on
both sides of this debate will be examined in the next section.

28
Criticism of collective bargaining agreements
As labor agreements have become the norm in states that allow collective
bargaining, critics have argued that these agreements have eroded the ability of school
administrators to act as educational leaders. Political scientist and union critic Terry Moe
has argued that unions are able to shape education policy in two important ways. First,
depending on state law, unions are usually authorized to collect at least a minimum level
of dues or agency fees from all teachers. As noted above, California law gives unions
this authority. Using union dues paid by member teachers, they are able to wield
considerable power at the state and national levels, by lobbying government officials and
conducting grass-roots campaigns. In fact, for the period 2000 through 2009, the
California Teachers’ Association was the largest lobbyist in the state of California in
terms of campaign contributions and lobbying efforts. (Sacramento Bee, 2010). Second,
by negotiating collective bargaining agreements with school districts, they are able to
establish many if not most of the rules that govern the daily life of the schools covered by
the agreements. (Moe, 2001). Others have argued that the sheer length and complexity
of labor agreements has a chilling effect on the willingness of teachers to make difficult
decisions that might be in the school’s best interest. The average length of a teacher
collective bargaining agreement on file with the Bureau of Labor Statistics as of 2005
was 105 pages. (Hess and West, 2006). Moe and other critics contend that these rules
have negative consequences for students, as they prevent administrators from allocating
teachers to their most productive use, raise costs, and entangle schools in bureaucracy.
(Moe, 2001; Lieberman, 2000; Hess, 2006). As expressed by Moe and John Chubb,

29
“The alleged leader of the school, the principal, is purposely
prevented from staffing the organization and arranging incentives
according to his best judgment. The principal may value expertise,
enthusiasm, collegiality, communication skills, creativity, facility
in dealing with parents, special sensitivity to student problems, or
any number of qualifications related to the school’s goals --- but he
is prevented from taking effective action to obtain teachers who
possess these qualifications and to eliminate those who do not. For
the most part, the principal is stuck with the teachers the system
gives him. They are stuck with him. And the teachers are stuck
with each other.” (Chubb and Moe, 1990).
According to Moe, bargaining agreements can include several provisions
that unduly restrain administrators:
• Rules making it impossible to dismiss teachers for poor performance;

• Rules limiting discretion of principals in assigning teachers to classes,
requiring them to base such decisions on seniority;

• Rules allowing teachers to make voluntary transfers to other schools, and
resist being transferred away, based on seniority. (Moe, 2001).
Likewise, Frederick Hess argues that the unions restrict efforts to use
compensation as a tool to recruit, reward and retain effective teachers; impede attempts to
assign or remove teachers on the basis of performance or alignment with the school’s
mission; and over-regulate school life through the use of work rules that stifle creative
problem solving. (Hess, 2006). Some have argued that the Los Angeles Unified School
District’s (“LAUSD”) bargaining agreement (one of the longest and most complex in the
country, comprising more than 300 pages), and other public school district agreements,
do not allow administrators to use some of the tools potentially available to school
leaders to attract and effectively utilize high-performing teachers, including the ability to

30
assign them where they are deemed to be most needed, transfer them to better suit the
schools’ needs, pay them for performance, and dismiss them to make room for new
teachers. Some have criticized LAUSD for the limited number of teachers the District
has successfully taken through the dismissal process: only one teacher between 1990 and
1999. (Dawson, 2000). As one example cited by Hess, in 2000 the Los Angeles Unified
School District Board tried to remove 400 of 35,000 teachers. Challenged by the
teachers’ union through grievance procedures, they were able to remove only three, and
two were overturned on appeal. (Hess, 2004).
Hess and others have recommended loosening contractual and legal
restrictions, arguing that such changes would empower school administrators to make
better personnel decisions: Hess’ suggestions include: (1) teacher pay should reflect the
scarcity and value of teachers' skills, the difficulty of their assignments, the extent of their
responsibilities, and the caliber of their work; (2) tenure should be eliminated from K-12
schooling or, at a minimum, contracts and state laws should be modified to enable
management to more readily remove ineffective educators; (3) personnel should be
assigned to schools on the basis of educational need rather than seniority; and (4) work
rules should be weeded out of contracts, and contracts should explicitly define
managerial prerogatives. (Hess, 2004; Hess, 2006).

31
Studies regarding restrictiveness of bargaining agreements
Several recent studies have examined the content of collective bargaining
agreements in conventional public schools, in an effort to analyze the degree of restraint
imposed on administrators. Most have focused on contracts in a single state, including
Michigan, Washington, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. (Hess and Kelly, 2006). A
California study by the Pacific Research Institute in 2002 studied contract strength in 460
districts, rating each from 1 to 20 for restrictiveness in five content areas, including
grievance procedure, teacher evaluation, transfer and assignment. The study found that
the ten largest districts had the most restrictive contracts, and argued that 75 percent of
the districts “contained numerous restrictions on the ability of school boards and district
staff to manage.” (Riley et al., 2002).
The Makinac Center for Public Policy conducted a study of 583 collective
bargaining agreements in Michigan in 1998. This study found that many districts had
negotiated “just cause” standards for all teachers, even though state law only imposed
such a standard on permanent employees. (Munk, 1998). The study also found that most
contracts included only seniority-based pay schedules, although state law allowed
districts to negotiate for performance-based schedules. Finally, the study found that most
districts had weak teacher evaluation clauses, requiring districts to rate a teacher as either
“satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory,” which impeded the school’s ability to document
performance deficiencies in a way that might ultimately be used to support a decision to
dismiss a teacher whose performance declines over time. The study recommended that

32
school districts work to renegotiate these clauses in order to provide greater
administrative discretion. (Munk, 1998).
In 2005, the Education Partnership conducted a study in Rhode Island,
examining seven contract clauses, including teacher evaluation, salary, and seniority, and
concluded that the bargaining agreements severely restricted management freedom.
(Education Partnership, 2005). The Evergreen Foundation examined approximately 260
contracts in Washington State regarding exclusive representation, agency shop, and
reduction in force provisions, and offered policy recommendations, most of which did not
relate directly to personnel policy. (Helland and White, 2000).
Dale Ballou conducted a study of 40 Massachusetts contracts in 2000,
examining compensation, teacher evaluation, transfers, layoffs, and length of day
provisions. Ballou found that districts’ teacher evaluation and transfer policies varied
considerably. Ballou concluded that “on virtually every issue of personnel policy there
are contracts that grant administrators managerial prerogatives they are commonly
thought to lack. Yet, administrators do not take advantage of the flexibility available to
them.” (Ballou, 2000).
Following up on these earlier studies, Frederick Hess and Andrew Kelly
examined a random sample of 20 school districts across the country. They coded the
contracts on a 0 to 2 scale, with 0 representing a clause that was nonexistent or very
vague, 1 that the issue is addressed but in a flexible or ambiguous way, and a 2 that the
clause is clearly restrictive. They examined the 20 contracts for provisions on the length

33
of the school day, class size, transfer policy, and teacher input into curriculum. Hess
found the same variety as Ballou had reported. With respect to teacher transfers, some
were based strictly on seniority, some made seniority one factor for consideration, and
some left decisions to the discretion of the administrator. For example, the agreement in
Little Rock, Arkansas provided that the senior employee was to be given preference in
transfer decisions. The St. Louis contract requires administrators to give “consideration”
to grade level and subject matter areas, qualification and experience, available vacancies,
staff balance, and locality preference; but it also provides that if two employees are
equally qualified, “transfers or promotion of the employee shall be made on the basis of
system-wide seniority.” The contract does not tell administrators how to decide whether
two transfer applicants are “equally qualified.” The Oklahoma City contract was
similarly confusing, requiring transfer decisions to be based on “the needs of the students
of [the] school,” while also providing that the senior applicant must prevail “when
individual qualifications are equal.” Likewise, the contract in Kansas City, Missouri
mandates consideration of the specialized academic needs of the district and length of
service, but also requires that where length of service is equal or within 60 days of being
equal, the applicant with greater professional preparation, as measured by the district’s
code, must prevail. (Hess and Kelly, 2006).
Hess and Kelly concluded that, although bargaining agreements are often
faulted for being unduly restrictive, they are often more ambiguous than administrators’
concerns would imply. Hess quoted a prominent urban district superintendent, who said
that “[d]istricts tend to be far less aggressive in asserting management prerogatives than

34
the language of their contracts arguably permits.” (Hess and Kelly, 2006). Hess
questioned why administrators did not take advantage of any ambiguity in the contracts
to make personnel decisions they deem necessary for the improvement of their schools.
He presented three hypotheses. First, management and labor share a common history.
Many trustees, school board members and superintendents were previously union
members, and may be reluctant to “rock the boat.” Indeed, Moe has argued that school
board members may be union sympathizers, or may fear reprisal by unions in school
board elections. (Moe, 2006). Second, administrators understand that pressing an
aggressive interpretation of contract language will lead to grievance and arbitration,
which can be costly and time-consuming. Hess argued that arbitration proceedings, and
their effect on administrators’ decision-making process, is a poorly understood subject
that warrants additional research.
Third, some agreements have “past practice” clauses, which require that
personnel and other provisions must be interpreted to be consistent with the district’s
previous practices. According to Myron Lieberman, such clauses act as an invisible
restraint, making contract provisions more prescriptive than they appear. (Lieberman,
2000). On the other hand, Union defenders such as Leo Casey contend that such clauses
do not allow unions to evade clear contractual language supporting administrators’
decisions when those decisions are challenged in arbitration. Hess asserted that the
impact of “past practices” clauses is poorly understood, and urged that further research be
done in this area. (Hess and Kelly, 2006).

35
Susan Moore Johnson and Morgan L. Donaldson reviewed research
regarding staffing policies across the country; like Hess, they found a wide variety in the
levels of restraint imposed on administrators. (Johnson, 2006). Johnson and
Donaldson’s findings on transfer rules and on evaluation and dismissal rules are most
relevant to this study.
Transfers. In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the bargaining agreement gives
full discretion to the Board, and exempts the decision from the contract’s grievance
procedure. In Rochester, New York, seniority plays no role in determining whether to
grant a voluntary transfer, but may be the decisive factor in an involuntary transfer
decision. In Montgomery County, Maryland, seniority plays little effect. The contract
stipulates that it is “in the best interest of the school system and the union” to let teachers
“seek positions that are the best matches with skills and abilities,” and to give
administrators and staff the “most simplified, timely, and open access to the pool of
internal and external candidates.”
Evaluation and Dismissal. Although dismissal itself is often exempted
from the union grievance process (as in California), unions can limit the potential for
dismissal in several ways: (1) district officials can find the procedures for reviewing
teachers burdensome, (2) contracts may have a rating system distinguishing only
competent from incompetent, (3) union officials can aggressively defend all members
receiving negative evaluations, which can prevent the district from using negative
evaluations to support an eventual dismissal. (Johnson, 2006). Johnson also found

36
variety among unions in their approach to negotiating evaluation instruments. Unions
with an “industrial” philosophy generally prefer a two-tier evaluation, either
“satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory,” in order to limit the subjective input of the evaluator.
Examples include Philadelphia. Those with a “reform” approach are more likely to allow
for the use of a more extensive form or “rubric.” Such districts include Minneapolis,
Minnesota, which includes a detailed form to be completed during classroom visits while
reserving to the evaluator the right to make formative and summative judgments about
the teacher’s performance. Seattle’s contract allows evaluators to consider student
achievement data in teachers’ evaluations. (Johnson, 2006).
Studies on the effects of collective bargaining agreements
In addition to studies analyzing the restrictiveness of bargaining
agreements, some studies have examined the effects of agreements on staffing practices,
teacher pay, and student performance. Many of the studies, like this Study, have relied
on anecdotal evidence and subjective reports, but they have focused on conventional
public schools rather than charter schools.
Teacher pay. Several studies have concluded that collective bargaining
agreements increase pay for teachers. A study by Caroline Hoxby, considered among the
most rigorous, reviewed changes in district salaries between 1982 and 1992, and
concluded that unions provided a 5% wage premium. (Hoxby, 1996). Earlier studies had
estimated the premium to be as high as 15%, but most of these studies failed to control
for other effects on rising salaries. (Johnson, 2006).

37
Staffing rules: transfer, evaluation and dismissal. In 2006-2007, The New
Teacher Project (“TNTP”) analyzed the teacher staffing rules and processes in Chicago
Public Schools (CPS). (New Teacher Project, 2007). TNTP concluded that CPS faces
many challenges common to urban school districts, but also progressive school staffing
policies and procedures. First, the majority of teachers and principals were satisfied with
CPS’s teacher transfer and reassignment processes, in which all teacher placements must
receive the mutual consent of both the teacher and principal. Second, top-performing
teachers were vulnerable to being displaced because of a reassignment policy based on
seniority rather than teacher quality or school fit. Half of the principals reported losing a
teacher whom they preferred to keep at their schools, due to reassignment or layoff.
Third, the CPS teacher performance evaluation system did not distinguish strong
performers, and was ineffective at identifying poor performers and dismissing them from
Chicago schools. Only 0.3% of teachers were rated “Unsatisfactory.” Eighty-eight
percent of CPS schools had not issued a single “Unsatisfactory” rating in the previous
four years. In failing schools, where student test scores were below the district average
and had been declining in recent years, the vast majority of teachers were still rated
”Superior” or “Excellent.” Principals reported that they did not have confidence in the
evaluation tool, and teachers report that they believe the evaluation process was not
meaningful. (New Teacher Project, 2007).
In a study of transfer rules in the collective bargaining agreements of 158
California public school districts, Terry Moe found that in districts without transfer rules,
disadvantaged schools had approximately 22% more low quality teachers than

38
advantaged schools. Where transfer rules were strong (meaning they require seniority to
be the overriding factor in transfer decisions), disadvantaged schools had 58% more low
quality teachers than advantaged schools. (Moe, 2006a). Moe concluded that the
strength of transfer rules significantly affected the distribution of low-quality teachers
within districts.
A study by William Koski for California’s “Getting Down to Facts”
project reached a different conclusion. Again studying California schools, he determined
that, contrary to some prior research, there was no persuasive evidence that seniority
preference rules in bargaining agreements independently affected the distribution of
teachers among schools, or exacerbated the relationship between higher minority schools
and teacher quality. (Koski, 2005). Koski also found that administrators often negotiate
discretionary language in transfer and assignment rules, and collaborate with union
leaders to suspend or work around restrictive rules.
A survey of collective bargaining agreements in the 50 largest districts in
the country by the National Council on Teacher Quality found that only 42% of districts
require observation of tenured teachers once a year, and 20 % require observation only
once every 3 or more years. For untenured teachers, only about a quarter require
observation two or three times a year, and more than 20% have no requirement.
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2008). Education Week examined state laws on the same
subject. Their study found that 43 states require formal evaluations, but only 12 states
require evaluation annually, and only 12 states connect evaluations to student

39
achievement. (Olson, 2008). A survey of districts in the Midwest found that over 60%
of districts studied did not identify specific criteria to be evaluated, and less than 10%
identified what type of training the evaluator were required to receive. (Brandt, 2007).
Dale Ballou conducted a review of the contract between the City School
District of New York and the United Federation of Teachers in 1999, which at that time
was 204 pages long. (Ballou, 1999). He also interviewed principals in eleven schools,
all of whom were involved in education reform efforts. Ballou found that the contract
could force administrators to accept veteran teachers, despite their preferences, in three
ways: by being transferred in through a system allowing the UFT to select half of the
transfer applicants; by being “excessed” in when jobs are eliminated in other schools in
the system; and by being transferred in during downsizing, when teachers were being laid
off. Ballou reported that some principals intentionally tried to “scare off” unwanted
teachers. Successful principals were often penalized by attracting teachers looking for a
successful school, but not necessarily willing to follow the program that had brought the
principal success. With respect to teacher evaluations, Ballou found that the procedure
for resolving a grievance related to a negative evaluation took an average of 285 days.
Ballou reported that the contract’s assignment provisions prevented principals from
reassigning teachers to grades that needed help, based partly on threats that the Union
would grieve the assignment. Finally, Ballou found that the presence of the union,
combined with a lengthy removal process, made many principals reluctant even to
attempt to remove unsuccessful teachers. One principal reported that the removal process
“sets you up for ridicule by the union.” He complained that the school board “doesn’t

40
show principals how to prepare the necessary documentation,” forcing them to “walk
through a legal minefield with no help.” (Ballou, 1999).
Researchers including Paul T. Hill have pointed out that there is still a
dearth of studies evaluating the effect of bargaining agreements on personnel practices.
Among other suggestions, Hill saw a need for research comparing personnel practices for
teachers hired with and without collective bargaining agreements. (Hill, 2006).
Los Angeles Unified School District’s collective bargaining agreement
In 2007, the Fordham Foundation published a study of collective
bargaining agreements in America’s fifty largest school districts, which included Los
Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”). The authors ranked LAUSD 34
th
out of 50
in flexibility, assigning it an overall rating of “Somewhat Restrictive.” The authors
examined the Agreement in two policy areas that are germane to this study: personnel
policies generally, and compensation. With respect to personnel policies, the authors
assigned a “D+” rating. The Agreement allows administrators to factor student
performance into teacher evaluations, but is silent on whether they may consider test
scores; layoffs must go to teachers with less seniority; internal job applicants get
preference over new hires for vacant positions; and tenure is governed by the Education
Code. LAUSD’s Compensation provisions were given a “B+.” According to the
authors, the Agreement is silent on raising salaries for college-teaching experience and on
rewarding for performance. The Agreement allows schools to provide a monetary reward

41
to teachers in high-needs schools, but it limits the amount of the reward. The authors
recommended that LAUSD should negotiate several new provisions, some of which are
relevant to this study: (1) raise starting salaries of teachers with any form of prior
experience; (2) incorporate “pay for performance”; (3) consider student test scores in
teacher evaluations; and (4) base transfer decisions on individual merit and performance
rather than seniority. (Hess & Loup, 2007).
The promise of “reform bargaining”
Partly in response to these critics, some union leaders and researchers have
advocated the use of “interest-based” bargaining. This model of bargaining focuses on
collaboration and the search for common purposes or interest. In the context of school-
based bargaining, proponents of reform bargaining seek a return to the “guild” concept,
in which unions considered themselves the guardians of their profession’s standards of
excellence, and paid special attention to the training of new members. (Kerchner,
Koppich & Weeres, 1997). More recently, they have focused on the subjects of the
bargaining process itself, arguing that the scope of bargaining should be expanded from
protecting the terms and conditions of teachers’ employment to the performance of
schools and the success of students.
Two of the leading scholars advocating reform bargaining in schools are
Julia Koppich and Charles Kerchner. Koppich has examined the tension between unions
which advocate for teachers in the terms and conditions of their employment, and

42
management and union critics, who argue that unions prevent management from
allocating resources in ways that improve student learning. (Koppich, 2007). Koppich
argues that freedom from all constraints on management prerogatives is not a viable or
attractive option. Rather, the choice is between a union-management contract shaped
through agreement by both parties, or one determined by an outside authority which all
parties must simply accept. Koppich favors the use of collective bargaining agreements,
but argues that “reform agreements,” characterized by greater flexibility and cooperation
between unions and management, will empower teachers to improve learning to a greater
extent than “traditional,” industrial-style bargaining.
According to Koppich, in traditional bargaining teachers merely act as
workers who follow orders, and if they are unhappy, they must file a grievance through
their union. Management’s job is to decide what teachers will do and supervise them to
ensure that they do it. In reform bargaining, management and the union form a personnel
partnership, which works toward mutual goals and seeks to resolve differences through
cooperation. Both traditional and reform contracts provide mechanisms for reaching
agreement. In traditional contracts, the process is often formal, and involves arms-length
proposals and counter-proposals, while reform agreements often commit both parties to
placing a joint commitment to student learning at the center of the contract. (Koppich,
2007). Koppich accuses conservative critics of seeking to maintain the status quo,
relegating teachers to an industrial-era role of simply following orders, while reform
bargaining promises to unleash teachers’ ability to improve schools at the policy level.
Koppich points out that newer teachers are more likely to favor “reform” concepts such

43
as differentiated pay, and want their union to not only protect their rights but also to help
them become better teachers. (Koppich, 2007).
However, Kerchner and Koppich have criticized teachers’ unions for
seeking a broader scope for bargaining, while refusing to accept a corresponding
expansion of their own responsibility. Spurred by leaders such as American Federation
of Teachers President Albert Shanker, and Rochester, New York union leader Adam
Urbanski, interest in reform bargaining has spread over the last twenty years, at the same
time that the scope of union-management discussion has widened. (Kerchner & Koppich,
2007). Reform advocates have identified several initiatives advocated or enthusiastically
accepted by unions that are designed to improve educational opportunities. In Denver, a
merit-pay program was implemented, and a similar program was introduced in
Minneapolis. In Boston and in Pinnelas County, Florida, the union agreed to alteration of
provisions giving placement preference to veterans, and in Maryland, Rochester, and
Minneapolis, they worked to expand the scope of professional development to focus on
effectiveness rather than merely limiting the amount that could be required. In New
York, teachers in the lowest-performing schools are chosen by a joint management-labor-
parent committee, rather than seniority. Peer review has been adopted through union-
management cooperation in dozens of districts, creating a teacher-supported mechanism
for coaching and potential removal. (Taylor & Rosario, 2007). In the last five years,
according to Kerchner and Koppich, the drive toward reform bargaining appears to have
waned. However, they see charter schools as a new and potentially fertile field for
exploration of the benefits of reform bargaining. (Kerchner & Koppich, 2007).

44
Koppich conducted a study of collective bargaining agreements from 15
school districts in 2007 for California’s School Finance Redesign Project. The districts
were selected purposely rather than randomly, in order to obtain a range of districts
including both “traditional” and “reform” contracts. Among the fifteen districts studied
by Koppich, only three were engaged in traditional bargaining. Koppich reviewed the
districts to determine whether reform bargaining had substantial monetary implications
on selected bargaining topics. She found that differences between traditional and reform
bargaining were more common on the topics of salaries, transfer and assignment,
professional development, evaluation, career development, and improving student
achievement. Differences were relatively rare on the issues of benefits, workday and
work year, leaves of absence, non-teaching duties, class size, dispute resolution, and
tenure, layoffs and dismissal. While Koppich found that there were rarely differences in
dispute resolution clauses, she found that reform districts reported handling procedural
issues in a less combative, more cooperative manner, which decreases the costs of
administering the grievance process.
Compensation. Of the districts classified as “reform,” six out of seven had
differentiated pay schedules, while only one of three of the “traditional” districts used
them.
Transfer Rules. With respect to transfer rules, in the “reform” districts the
agreements more often provide that a school-based team of teachers and administrators

45
would select the candidate for the job, based on the school’s needs and the candidate’s
abilities, rather than using seniority as the determinative factor.
Evaluation and Dismissal. While traditional contracts generally require
evaluations by administrators every two years, the “reform” districts employed a variety
of methods, including intervention programs focusing on student achievement, and
standards-based processes of peer assistance and review (“PAR”). Most of these
methods are school-based, and are focused on the teachers’ current interests and student
achievement standards.
Traditional contracts typically do not address student achievement.
Reform contracts are more likely to include an explicit commitment to improving
learning shared by teachers and management. However, they do not typically provide
specific mechanisms or strategies for achieving these goals. In “traditional” contracts,
the union is given at most an advisory role in budget, curriculum and other areas that are
placed within management’s prerogative by the contract. In “reform” contracts, joint
committees are often established for discussion and even decision-making on topics such
as instructional leadership, school climate, teacher recruitment, professional
development, and class size. Where these committees are given decision-making
authority, they can have a direct impact on the allocation of resources. Finally, while
none of the “traditional” contracts in the study allowed for departure during the term of
the contract, three out of the either “reform” districts allowed the parties to execute

46
“waivers” allowing the other party to deviate from the contract in order to implement a
school-specific program.
Compensation in collective bargaining agreements
One of the most interesting reforms creating tension among union critics
and defenders is differential performance, especially “performance pay.” This section
will review recent developments in this area, including the three types of differential pay
that will be examined in this study: pay for individual performance, pay for school-wide
performance, and pay for hard-to-staff subjects or in hard-to-staff schools.
Merit pay can be provided either to individual teachers, groups or grade
levels, or an entire school. (Podgursky & Springer, 2006). Where it is awarded on an
individual basis, the administrator must determine the value the teacher has added by
comparison to the value added by other teachers with similar credentials and experience.
(Podgursky & Springer, 2006). Interest in performance-related pay programs has grown
recently, as a number of programs have been implemented at district-level, state-level and
national-level. (Podgursky & Springer, 2006). A prior generation of reformers attempted
to introduce performance pay incentives, but they were rejected. (Hannaway &
Rotherham, 2008). In recent years, however, changes in technology and data-tracking
procedures have improved the ability to assess teachers’ effects on student performance.
The recent emphasis on school accountability, including the data-reporting requirements
of NCLB, has put a wealth of information into the hands of the public and school

47
administrators. (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2008). However, most states are yet to take
advantage of this new capability, with only 12 matching student data with performance
data from their students. (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2008).
Teachers’ unions have traditionally been among the staunchest foes of
performance pay, at least on the individual level, because it creates distinctions among
teachers, while the unions are philosophically and legally committed to representing all
teachers collectively. (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2008). When the New York City
Department of Education launched a pilot study to assess the value added by individual
teachers to student test performance, Randi Weingarten, the President of the UFT, vowed
to fight the program, writing that the UFT would “fight this on all grounds – educational,
legal and moral.” (UFT, 2008) Likewise, when the Democratic leadership of the House
of Representatives announced that they would consider including performance pay in the
reauthorized No Child Left Behind Act, Reg Weaver, President of the NEA, responded
that “NEA will oppose any legislative proposal that mandates implementation of a pay
for performance plan.” (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2008).
The NEA’s policy statement explained that the NEA opposed pay for
“hard-to-recruit positions,” and “merit pay or any other system of compensation based on
an evaluation of an education employee’s performance.” (NEA 2007). The has been
more amenable to differential pay:
“[T]he AFT is encouraging its locals to explore various teacher
compensation systems based on local conditions. It is not
recommending abandoning the traditional salary schedule. An
adequate salary base for all teachers, labor-management

48
collaboration based on mutual trust, and easy-to-understand
procedures for awarding teachers additional compensation are
among the conditions that must be part of any professional
compensation system. . . . The AFT supports such efforts, but
wholeheartedly rejects any pay proposals that resemble the failed
merit-pay plans that some have advocated.” (AFT 2008 (emphasis
in original))
Unions’ opposition to performance-based pay is founded upon several
concerns. First, about half of teachers teach non-tested subjects such as art or other
specialized subjects. Second, teachers argue that incentives lead teachers to alter their
instruction in harmful ways, focusing on lower-level skills rather than higher-order
thinking skills. A subject-matter bias is also created in favor of subjects measured by
standardized tests. Third, individual incentives combined with scarcity of those
incentives can foster competition at the expense of cooperation. And fourth, performance
incentives raise fairness issues. The measures may not be accurate; they may not account
for individual traits of students assigned to the teacher; and they may not take school
conditions into account. (Hannaway & Rotherham 2008). Goldhaber (2005) concluded
from SASS data that districts with stronger unions are less likely to have pay incentives
for “excellence in teaching.” Districts with no collective bargaining agreement were
twice as likely to have some form of merit pay as districts with a collective bargaining
agreement.

49
Teacher attitudes regarding performance pay
Attitudes toward performance pay vary among teachers themselves.
Teachers themselves have expressed views that appear to indicate generally that it should
be possible for administrators to decide which teachers deserve performance incentives:
• 78% of teachers believe it is easy to spot who the truly great teachers are
• 72% say most teachers could pretty much agree who the truly great
teachers are
• 70% support giving extra pay to teachers in “tough neighborhoods with
low-performing schools.”
• 67% support extra pay for teachers “who consistently work harder than
other teachers.”
• 62% support extra pay for teachers “who consistently receive outstanding
evaluations from their principals.”
• 78% say there are at least a few teachers in their school who “fail to do a
good job and are simply going through the motions.”
• 58% say tenure doesn’t necessarily mean teachers have worked hard or
proven their ability. (Public Agenda, 2003).
Ballou and Podgursky (1993) conducted one of the first studies examining
teacher attitudes. They found that teachers who had previously received performance pay
were more likely to support it; that private school teachers held more favorable opinions

50
about it than did public school teachers; and that female teachers and more experienced
teachers tended to oppose it --- all of which were expected results. However, Ballou and
Podgursky’s study also challenged the widely held belief that most teachers oppose
performance pay. For example, contrary to conventional wisdom that failure to receive a
reward would turn teachers against performance pay, non-recipients in districts that used
performance pay were generally more supportive of performance pay than teachers in
districts that did not use it. And contrary to conventional wisdom that teachers of low-
performing students would consider performance pay unfair, they found that teachers of
disadvantaged and low-achieving students were more supportive of performance pay than
most teachers.
A survey in Washington State in 2006 found that only 17% supported
merit pay, but 72% supported “combat pay” for teachers in high-need schools, and 41%
supported extra pay for subject-area expertise. In all three forms of differential pay,
veteran teachers were less supportive than novice teachers; and high school teachers were
more supportive of merit pay and subject-area pay than elementary school teachers.
Interestingly, teachers who trusted their colleagues were less supportive of merit pay.
(Goldhaber et al., 2007). A Public Agenda survey of teachers with five or fewer years of
experience found that 69 percent support differentiated pay in the abstract, though most
opposed pay tied to student performance. (Farkas, Johnson, & Foleno, 2000). A Public
Agenda poll conducted for The Teaching Commission found that 85 percent of teachers
and 72 percent of principals said that providing financial incentives would help to attract
and retain high-quality teachers. (Public Agenda, 2004).

51
A more extensive 2003 Public Agenda poll of teachers nationwide found
that 76% of teachers favored paying more to teachers in low-performing schools; 67%
favored financial incentives for teachers who “consistently work harder, putting in more
time and effort than other teachers”; 63 % favored paying more to teachers who teach
difficult classes in hard-to-staff schools; 62% supported incentives to teachers who
consistently receive outstanding evaluations from their principals, and 57% favored
incentives for teachers who earn certification through the National Board for Professional
Teaching Standards. (Farkas, Johnson & Duffett, 2003). However, only 42 % favored
paying more to teachers in shortage areas such as mathematics and science, and only 38
% support financial incentives for teachers whose students score consistently higher on
standardized tests. (Farkas et al., 2003). Sixty-three percent indicated that they believe
“merit pay” would create unhealthy competition and jealousy among teachers, and 52%
said that such a system also would prompt principals to play favorites, rewarding teachers
who are loyal to them. (Farkas et al., 2003).
Finally, a recent study found that while only 33% of teachers with more
than twenty years of experience support new compensation schemes, 55% of teachers
with less than five years of experience did so. (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2008).
Successful models
Hannaway and Rotherham (2008) examined five prominent teacher
performance incentive plans: The Denver “ProComp” plan, a New York pilot program,

52
the Teacher Advancement Program; the Toledo, Ohio “TRACS” program, and
Minnesota’s “Q-Comp” system. Most had four elements in common: (1) the local union
was involved in its design and implementation, (2) they had provisions allowing teachers,
schools or districts to participate, rather than mandating participation, (3) they used more
than one basis for evaluation, and (4) they provided some form of “off-the-books”
funding, at least in the initiation stage.
An essential condition for securing union cooperation in most plans has
been to ensure that existing teachers do not lose money, which means that bonuses must
come from increased funding. Denver received money from foundations to finance its
pilot, and then from a levy passed by 58% of the voters. New York’s pilot program was
supported by private funding. Several programs receive funding from the Teacher
Incentive Fund, including the Toledo TRACS Plan. In Minnesota, funding comes from
the state. (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2008).
Providing incentives to entire schools rather than individual teachers may
alleviate concerns about the erosion of cooperation between teachers, but it can also
provide incentives for “free-loading” by some teachers. (Hannaway & Rotherham,
2008). For example, the New York City plan allows the principal, with two union
members, to make decisions on the distribution of a school-wide bonus. This is intended
to empower the principal to encourage high performers and sanction poor performers.
Performance pay is made difficult by the irregularity of the evaluations
upon which variations in pay are usually based. Among the country’s fifty largest school

53
districts, as of December 2007 only 42% required observation of tenured teachers once
each year, and 20% only require it once every three or more years. (Hannaway &
Rotherham, 2008). Even among non-tenured teachers, only about 25% of the districts
require observation two or three times per year, while over 20% had no requirement at
all. As reported in Education Week, 43 states require formal evaluations, but only 12
states require it annually, and only 12 states consider student performance as part of the
evaluation process. (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2008). It is also difficult to predict
whether compensation incentives will a draw high-quality teachers into high-poverty
schools or attract other high-quality individuals to join the teaching profession.
(DeArmond & Goldhaber, 2008).
Charter Schools in California
General background of charter schools
Chubb and Moe’s 1990 book, “Politics, Markets and America’s Schools”
is considered a significant development in the argument over school choice. Although
the book did not specifically advocate for charter schools, its demand to release schools
from bureaucracy and restrictive personnel rules formed part of the impetus for the
development and spread of charters. Chubb and Moe argued that people at the school
level “know collegiality, enthusiasm and sensitivity when they see them,” but there is no
formal test for such factors, and they are therefore removed from the realm of
administrative discretion. The bureaucratization of personnel tends to ensure that public
schools “will lack the proper mix and balance of talents on which effective education

54
inherently depends.” Chubb and Moe predicted that schools operating in a market system
would operate very differently. The principal would be free to recruit the type of teachers
he wanted, based on the qualifications he correlated with organizational performance
(including a “good fit,”) and reward them through an incentive system. This would
encourage teachers to be “team players,” and motivate them to focus on actual
performance rather than “paper qualifications.” Having the ability to form his own team
would actually empower the principal to share power with his teachers, since the teachers
would have a strong incentive to succeed both individually and collectively. While
unions would have the ability to organize such schools, Chubb and Moe predicted that
they would be at a disadvantage, because teachers would have autonomy, a share in
decision-making, and would be treated as professionals. (Chubb and Moe, 1990).
California’s charter school law
The Charter Schools Act of 1992 made California only the second state in
the country to allow public charter schools. The stated intent of the law was to “provide
opportunities for teachers, parents, pupils and community members to establish and
maintain schools that operate independently from the existing school district structure.”
Cal. Educ. Code § 47601.
Charter schools are governed by the California Charter Schools Act,
codified as Education Code sections 47600-47664. The legislation initially limited the
number of schools to 100, with a limit of 10 per school district. The law provided that

55
funding would follow any student who left a district school to attend a charter school. In
1998, Assembly Bill 544 the state increased the number of charters from 100 to 25, and
allowed the state to approve up to 100 per year thereafter. The law allowed only non-
profit organizations to operate charters, and authorized the State Board of Education to
grant and revoke charters, in addition to local school districts. Assembly Bill 544 also
required charter school teachers in core academic subjects to hold a Commission on
Teacher Credentialing certificate or equivalent document equivalent to the certification
that traditional public school teachers are required to hold. Educ. Code § 47611.5
Assembly Bill 1115, passed in 1999, allowed all charter schools to receive
funding either through their district or directly from the state in the form a general
purpose entitlement and a categorical block grant. The block grant program allows
charters to receive the state average amount allocated to schools for the programs in the
block grant, but schools cannot apply for additional funds from those programs. Charters
were authorized by the law to apply directly for categorical programs not included in the
block grant. The law also provided charter schools with the state average in Economic
Impact Aid for disadvantaged pupils through the categorical block grant. Finally, AB
1115 allows charter schools to serve as their own Local Area Authority for special
education funding.
Assembly Bill 631, passed in 1999, made clear that charter school
employees are allowed to join or form a union and engage in collective bargaining. It

56
also required charter schools to declare whether the school or the charter-granting entity
would be the employer for purposes of collective bargaining.
In 2001, Senate Bill 740 placed tighter controls on charters offering non-
classroom based instruction. It also provided schools up to $750 per student based on
Average Daily Attendance (“ADA”) to assist with lease or rent costs, up to a maximum
of 75% of such costs. In 2002, responding to complaints about financial mismanagement
by some charter schools, the state passed Assembly Bill 1994, which increased oversight
of charter schools and restricted their ability to serve any grade or to locate anywhere in
the state. Assembly Bill 1137, passed in 2003, increased charter accountability by
requiring districts or other authorizers to identify a contact person for charter schools,
visit each charter once each year, and ensure that charter schools submit all required
reports (including fiscal reports). The district is also required to monitor the fiscal
condition of each charter, and notify the State Department of Education whenever a
charter is granted, denied, revoked or closed. Finally, AB 1137 required that charter
schools show a certain level of academic performance in order to have their charter
renewed.
In the areas of personnel policy analyzed by this study, California law
provides that charter schools are generally “exempt from the laws governing school
districts.” Cal. Educ Code section 47610. One important exception, addressed below,
allows a unionized charter school to choose between following California law regarding
discipline and dismissal, or bargaining with its union on those subjects.

57
Studies of California’s charter schools
As charter schools in California have proliferated, they have been studied
extensively, but little of the research addresses the presence or activity of unions. In a
1998 study, Amy Stuart Wells found that most conversion charter schools in California
retained their union membership at the time of the study, while most start-up charter
schools began, and remained, non-union. (Wells, 1998). While that is still mostly true,
as this Study finds, significant exceptions have emerged since that study.
In 2002, the Rand Corporation studied all California charter schools, and
compared them to conventional public schools according to socioeconomic status and
race of their students. The study paid particular attention to the difference between
“dependent” charter schools, which effectively remain under the control of the district,
and “independent” charters. Rand found that 70% of chartering authorities with
dependent schools require collective bargaining, compared with only 26% of authorities
with independent or undefined charters. They also found that in staff hiring, discipline
and dismissal, 55% of charter authorizers exerted no control over independent charter
schools, while only 15.2% of authorizers exerted no control over dependent schools in
these policy areas. (Rand, 2003). However, little has been done to study the specific
terms of collective bargaining agreements in charter schools at the school level.

58
Charter school performance
There is abundant, yet conflicting and incomplete, research on the success
of charter schools as compared to conventional public schools. The National Alliance for
Public Charter Schools, a charter advocacy group, examined 70 comparative analyses of
charter schools and traditional public schools. They found that only 40 of the studies
attempted to measure change in student performance over time; of those, 21 found gains
in charter schools that were larger than in other schools, ten found gains that were higher
in certain significant categories of schools, five found comparable gains in charters and
district schools, and four found that charters’ gains lagged behind district schools’ gains.
(Hassell et al., 2007) However, another researcher examined the reports reviewed by the
National Alliance, re-coded them, excluded certain studies for failing to examine
statistical significance, and concluded that that only 15 studies showed that charters were
out-performing district schools, while 21 showed that charters were comparable or worse
than district schools. (Gyurko 2008). Both new research and debate over the merits of
existing research continue to shape our understanding of the results of charter schools.
This study will not attempt to compare the performance of charter schools with
conventional public schools, but will focus narrowly on the influence of bargaining
agreements and policy documents on the personnel decisions of charter school
administrators.

59
Performance pay in charter schools
As most charter schools are not unionized, they present a more open field
for introduction of differential compensation schemes. Kowal, Hassel and Hassel (2007)
studied data from 2000 through 2001, mostly in charter Networks, as these multi-site
charter operators most closely resemble school districts. As of 2000, 71% of the charters
they studied used a salary schedule. However, only 23% of the schools used the same
schedule as the local district. Charters offered teachers a higher base salary – an average
of $26,977 for teachers with a bachelor’s degree and no experience, while public schools
offered an average of $25,888. However, at the highest step of the salary schedule public
schools paid an average of $48,728, while charters paid an average of $46,314. The
authors determined that charters tend to use a salary schedule as a starting point, but are
more innovative after a teacher has spent time working. (Kowal, Hassel and Hassel,
2007).
Another study by Podgursky and Ballou supports this conclusion. They
found that in initial job offers, just over 25% of charters consider performance, while
more than 30% provide extra pay for hard-to-staff subjects. The least important factor
was certification from the NBPTS, for which only 7% provided additional pay.
However, more incentives became available for teachers after the initial hiring phase.
When determining raises, individual teacher performance was considered in nearly 50%
of the charters studied; 30% considered schoolwide performance; 44% paid more for
difficult subjects; and 50% provided individual performance incentives. In 2000, a total

60
of 46% of the charters studied used merit or performance as the basis for additional pay.
Where such rewards were offered, approximately 75% of the teachers received a reward.
(Podgursky & Ballou 2001).
Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining
Historical background
The history of the charter school movement is intricately intertwined with
that of the major teachers’ unions. AFT President Albert Shanker was one of the earliest
advocates of charters, laying out his vision of innovative and relatively autonomous
schools in a seminal address to the National Press Club in 1988 and in subsequent articles
and speeches. (Gyurko, 2008). Shanker described schools that would be released from
many regulations and bureaucratic restraints, control their own budget, allow parents to
choose to send their children and teachers to choose to work, and would be accountable
to meeting pre-determined goals. (Gyurko, 2008). Shanker followed up by advocating
the professionalization of teaching through concepts such as peer review, board
certification, and choice among public schools. (Kahlenberg, 2006) Shanker argued that
many of the major reforms of the era, including higher standards, higher salaries, stronger
certification standards and standardized tests, were not succeeding, partially because they
were implemented in a top-down fashion that stifled local school leaders’ ability to adapt
and customize their educational approach. (Gyurko, 2008). Shanker argued that creating
an environment where innovation was encouraged, and teachers were involved in shaping

61
the direction of the school, would allow schools to attract and retain a more capable work
force. He announced that the AFT planned to visit schools across the country
empowering teachers to implement this vision. (Gyurko, 2008).
Other reformers, including Chubb and Moe, shared Shanker’s interest in
freeing schools from bureaucratic restraints, but advocated that the entire school system
be de-regulated to introduce choice and competition through a market-driven, voucher-
based system.
In 1991, the first Charter School law was passed in Minnesota. The law
established charters as independent corporations, freed from the school district and from
existing collective bargaining agreements. Conservative advocates of charters, while
agreeing with Shanker on the need for autonomy, extended that desire to include freedom
from the unions that Shanker viewed as essential for teacher support and professionalism.
(Gyurko 2008; Kahlenberg 2007)
For-profit “Education Management Companies” (“EMOs”) such as Edison
Schools, launched in 1991, set out to open and manage charter schools, prompting
Shanker and other union advocates to warn that such groups threatened to put profit
ahead of the core educational interests of their students. (Kahlenberg 2007). Ultimately,
Shanker and his allies turned against the charter movement, arguing that it had become
essentially an anti-union effort. (Gyurko 2008).
Shanker predicted that opposition from Unions would ultimately undercut
the potential of the charter movement. Indeed, Shanker and other leaders have presented
strong resistance to the expansion of charters. Among other examples, the Detroit Public

62
Schools staged a one-day walkout to protect charter expansion in 2003, and the Ohio
Federation of Teachers filed lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of charters in 2001.
(Gyurko 2008). Charter advocates have responded in the legislatures, in the courts and
“on the ground.” The Atlantic Legal Foundation has even issued guides for charter
schools seeking to avoid unionization, prepared by a management-side labor law firm.
(Jackson Lewis, 2005).
Union resistance has helped to impose restraints on the growth of charters,
including funding limitations and human resource barriers. (Gyurko, 2008). A 2005
study by the Fordham Institute covering 16 states and the District of Columbia, as well as
27 school districts, found that charters were under-funded in 26 of the 27 districts studied,
and 16 of the states, facing deficits between $414 per pupil and $3,638 per pupil. (Hassel
et al., 2005). This funding deficit creates obvious challenges for schools seeking to
attract top teaching talent. According to the National Charter School Alliance, charters
tend to hire teachers who attend more selective colleges, but are younger and less
experienced than their district counterparts. (Gyurko, 2008). One study by researchers at
Western Michigan University found that the national attrition rate for new charter school
teachers was close to 40%. (Miron and Applegate, 2007). The National Charter School
Research Project’s 2006 report questioned how charters can build a “sustainable teacher
force” given the human resource constraints which are likely to increase in the next five
years. (Gyurko, 2008). Charters have compensated by turning to private philanthropy,
and have received support from foundations such as the Walton Family Foundation.

63
Some have speculated that the growth of charter schools might eliminate
collective bargaining entirely, if charters empower teachers and administrators to
collaborate as professionals. However, a survey by Johnson and Ladman showed that
(1) teachers in charter schools still wanted limits on what they can be asked to do, (2)
teachers wanted a role in policymaking; (3) they a wanted way to voice complaints and
resolve disputes, and (4) they might move toward collective bargaining (Johnson and
Kardos, 2000).
The EERA and charter schools
The EERA applies to charter schools as well as conventional public
schools. Cal. Education Code § 47611.5
1
Under Education Code section 47611, the
school’s charter must state whether the school will be the exclusive public employer for
purposes of collective bargaining if the school’s employees choose to unionize. If the
charter is not designated as the exclusive representative, the conventional school district
becomes the exclusive employer for bargaining purposes (Cal. Educ. Code § 47611.5).
A 1999 amendment to California’s charter school law provides that if the
charter school, or its authorizing charter, does not state that the school will comply with
California’s statutes and regulations governing tenure, then discipline and dismissal
become mandatory topics of bargaining (Cal. Educ. Code § 47611.5(c)).

1
However, the PERB has confirmed that collective bargaining agreements do not regulate the process of
granting or denying a charter to a charter school. Unified Educators of San Francisco v. San Francisco
Unified School District, PERB Decision No. 1438 (2001).

64
Unionization of charter schools presents a possible dilemma when
teachers have taken on a management role in the school. For charter school advocates,
one of the most appealing aspects of charter schools is that teachers often lead the drive
to develop a charter petition, and are often given a significant role in the operation and
management of the school. The EERA excludes management employees from the
bargaining unit. (Government Code sections 3540.1(g) and 3543.4). However, the
PERB ruled in 2003 that rotation of teachers into management roles, blurring the
distinction between management and employees, did not violate the EERA by precluding
other teachers from organizing, while leaving open the question of whether teachers
holding management positions should be excluded from the bargaining unit. Robert L.
Mueller Charter School, PERB Order No. Ad-320.
Charters which include teachers in a management role must also negotiate
through California’s laws governing conflicts of interest. State law currently provides
that the Board of a non-profit corporation cannot have a majority of voting members with
a financial interest in the school, which includes teachers receiving salaries from the
School. State law also prohibits any Board member from voting on any measure in
which the member has a financial interest, which would include any teacher’s own
salary.
2
A change proposed in 2004 and again in 2008, which was vetoed but remains a
topic of debate, could prohibit any members of the Board from having a financial interest.
As explained in Chapter 4, some of the charter school administrators interviewed for this

2
See California Corporations Code § 5227 (only 49% of board of directors for nonprofit may be
“interested person,” including person receiving salary from nonprofit); Gov’t Code § 1090 (public school
district trustee is prohibited from holding a financial interest in any contract the board votes on).

65
study are concerned that this reform, which was primarily prompted by concerns about
Board members who used their position to contract with companies in which they had a
financial interest, could also prevent teachers from serving on charter school boards.
A union organizing drive at the LA Leadership Academy in 2005 initiated
an important legal dispute over the nature of charter schools in California. In 2005, a
group of teachers formed LA Leadership Academy Community United, as a CTA/NEA
affiliate. In December of 2005, the Union filed a petition for representation with the
PERB. In response, LA Leadership filed a Petition for a Representation Election with the
National Labor Relations Board, contending that the school was not a public entity within
the jurisdiction of the PERB. A number of prior decisions had held that charter schools
were not public entities for certain purposes, including California’s Tort Claims Act,
access to records, and issues regarding the ability of employees to hold a financial
interest on the Board. Charter schools, which can qualify as non-profit organizations
under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3), may allow employees to have a 49%
interest in the organization, while true “public” organizations cannot allow employees to
do so, which would preclude teachers from being on board. In response to LA
Leadership’s NLRB petition, the PERB filed a motion to intervene, seeking to dismiss
the petition.
The NLRB ultimately dismissed the Academy’s petition in March of
2006, holding that charter schools are part of the state’s public school system and a
political subdivision of the state, and that the NLRB therefore lacked jurisdiction over the

66
school. (See Los Angeles Leadership Academy and Los Angeles Leadership Academy
Community United, Docket No. 06-0371, National Labor Relations Board, Case No. 31-
RM-1281 (PERB Case No. LA-RR-1123-E)). The Union was then recognized by LA
Leadership Academy, and has since represented the Academy’s teachers at both schools.
Another legal question raised by the proliferation of charter school
operators is whether teachers at a charter school operated by a private company remain
public employees. In such schools, are the teachers subject to the EERA, covering public
employees, or the NLRA, which applies to private employees? If the school does not
substantially affect interstate commerce, it may not be subject to the NLRA. (Kemerer,
p. 155). A private nonprofit entity called Options for Youth obtained a charter from the
Victor Valley Union High School District. When the teachers chose to be represented by
a union, which then petitioned for recognition by the PERB under the EERA, the school
opposed the request on the grounds that the teachers were not public employees. The
PERB followed a test established by the Supreme Court in National Labor Relations
Board v. Natural Gas Utility District of Hawkins County, Tennessee, 402 U.S. 600, 604-
05, 91 S.Ct. 1746, 1749, 29 L.Ed.2d 206 (1971), which treats employees as public if the
employing entity is created by the state or is administered by officials accountable to the
state or the electorate. In the case of Options for Youth, the Board found that the charter,
like all charters, was part of the public school system created by the State, and that the
operators were clearly accountable to the chartering institution, an arm of the State.

67
Teachers unions’ vision for charter schools
In 2004, Randi Weingarten, then President of New York City’s United
Federation of Teachers (“UFT”), an affiliate of the AFT, convened a Charter School Task
Force to study the possibility of AFT-founded charter schools, which resulted in the
recommendation to form two charters. The Task Force was in part a reaction to Mayor
Bloomberg’s 2002 assertion of mayoral control over New York’s schools, which
produced widespread changes implemented with less consultation with the Union than in
previous administrations. The UFT set out to demonstrate that Shanker’s original vision
for teacher professionalism could be implemented in a union-driven charter. (Gyurko
2008). The UFT’s elementary school opened in September of 2005, and its secondary
school opened in 2006. According to Gyurko, the UFT seeks to alter the charter school
image from markets and competition to innovation and professionalism. (Gyurko 2008).
Weingarten argued that the UFT intended to shift the debate over charter schools “back to
best practices in education – just as Al Shanker intended.”
The unions’ critics and defenders disagree about the importance of
administrative discretion in forging a collaborative workplace. Moe argues that “it is the
principal’s concentrated authority that frees him to . . . grant teachers discretion in their
work . . . [given that] the effectiveness and success of the organization are heavily
dependent on [teachers’] expertise and professional judgment.” (Chubb and Moe, 1990).
Union advocates argue that “power should be broadly and contractually distributed
throughout an organization, and collective bargaining is an indispensable mechanism to
vest teachers with greater ownership over their enterprise.” (Gyurko, 2008). Koppich

68
(2006) asserts that “reform unions have bridged what conventional wisdom would have
us believe is the unnatural divide between classic wages, hours, and conditions of
employment issues central to building a quality profession.” Koppich’s examples include
Denver’s ProComp system, Minneapolis’ merit-based tenure, and Toledo’s peer review
program. (Koppich, 2006).
One significant modification to the collective bargaining landscape
proposed by the UFT is school-based collective bargaining, which separates schools from
the one-size-fits-all district agreement while establishing a free-standing relationship with
the Union. (Gyurko 2008). This form of bargaining is in place in several unionized
charter schools in New York, including the Amber Charter School in East Harlem, the
Roosevelt Charter School on Long Island, Maritime Academy Charter School in Buffalo,
and the Charter School for Applied Technology in Tonawanda. (Gyurko, 2008). Single-
school contracts can apply to a single school or to school networks. According to one
analyst, unionized teachers would likely insist on several key principles: “fair pay with
compensation based on what is appropriately within a teacher’s control, fair treatment
with a contractual guarantee of due process, and mechanisms to stimulate and heed the
voice and judgment of employees.” (Gyurko, 2008).
Charters and unions: grand bargain, or fundamentally incompatible?
Given increased flexibility to formulate personnel policies independent of
district policies, Charter schools typically make use of employee handbooks, board
policies and administrative regulations, and individual contracts of employment to set the

69
terms of employment. These establish the “status quo” from which a union must bargain
when it organizes charter school teachers.
Against this backdrop, as the unions have begun to show an interest in
organizing charter schools, a variety of bargaining relationships have been formed
between charters and unions in a limited number of charter schools across California.
Malin and Kerchner (2007) assert that the central question in determining the proper
model for union organizing and bargaining in charter schools is: “what legal regime can
best encourage collaborative, high-trust workplaces, and simultaneously empower and
safeguard workers against ‘domination,’ understood as illegitimate instrumental coercion
and endogenous shaping of workers’ preferences and interests?” Their answer is to
provide more choices to schools and unions. They advocate a charter-by-charter
approach to unionizing – not an industrial model, yet not full employee empowerment.
Some schools might choose joint problem solving groups, continuous negotiation,
autonomous work teams, or other approaches. They explain that most districts adopting
reform unionism have formed joint labor-management teams to address problems. In
good times, union leaders and superintendents meet and work well at an interpersonal
level, while principals and local union leaders meet less often. Malin and Kerchner
recommend against legislative adoption of any particular model, leaving charters free to
experiment. However, they argue that legislation should require charter agreements to
specify a vehicle for teacher involvement in decision making as a condition of the
charter. (Malin & Kerchner, 2007).

70
Malin and Kerchner suggest that teachers should agree to a fundamental
trade-off with charter school operators, accepting less job security in exchange for a
greater voice in running the school. This proposed bargain is based on several principles
and assumptions:
1. Where teachers bet their jobs on the success of the school,
they deserve a voice in its operation.
2. Teachers like charter schools because they give them the
chance to practice their profession free of traditional
restraints, but turnover in charter schools is high.
Mandating that some form of voice be given to teachers
may reduce turnover.
3. Placing a burden on schools to included teachers in
management will lead to experimentation, such as teacher
cooperatives.
4. Producing success in a joint-management approach places
competitive pressure on traditional schools to include
teachers.
As various forms of unionized charters have appeared, unions and charter
leaders have begun to take a deeper look at their relationship, exploring areas of tension
and areas of possible cooperation. (Gyurko 2008). In the Spring of 2006, the Progressive
Policy Institute and the National Charter School Research Project held a conference
involving twenty-five union and charter school leaders to explore areas of agreement and
disagreement. (Hill, 2006). As recounted by Gyurko (2008), the 2006 convention of the
American Federation of Teachers included intense discussion about charters. In April
2007, the annual conference of the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools included
a session exploring the question of whether charter schools and unions can “get along.”

71
The AFT’s July 2007 education conference included sessions for AFT members teaching
in charter schools.
The 2006 conference resulted in the publication of a document titled “The
Future of Charter Schools and Teacher Unions.” The report indicated that the
participants --- from the charter movement and the unions --- tried to move beyond
confrontation and zero-sum analyses. The participants found six main themes that
summarized the state of the union-charter relationship:
• Charter school and teacher union leaders are deeply divided by the
metaphors they use and by their institutional histories;
• Each side assumes that the other is defined by the views of its most
extreme members
• Leaders on both sides agree on many attributes of a good school
• Each side thinks the other insists on something that interferes with
quality teaching
• The two sides’ disagreements are exacerbated by conflicting
beliefs about questions of fact that could be resolved empirically
• A gap exists in beliefs and values between the most flexible
members of both sides, but it is much smaller than the gap between
the extremes and could be narrowed further by reasonable steps
that both could take.
The group reported that there is distrust in both camps: some union
leaders believe charter leaders seek to shut down public school districts and “bust
unions,” while some charter leaders cite unions that sued public officials who sponsored
charter schools, and unions that threatened to block hiring of teachers training at
universities that authorized charter schools. However, there is actually significant

72
overlap among advocates in both camps: many charter leaders are former union
members, and not all are strong free-market advocates. The group reported that it
understood the assessment made by Stephen Page, “Chartering is a left-wing movement
with right-wing money.” (Hill, 2006). Most leaders on both sides agreed on certain
common principles:
• All children need safe and serene environments, personal attention from
adults, pressure to achieve, combination of didactic and self-initiated
learning activities; institutions and teachers matter.
• United against a common enemy, school district bureaucracy. Believed
cumbersome bargaining agreements in large urban districts are response to
big district bureaucracies.
• Charter leaders saw benefit to having formalized group with which
managers could collaborate and consult.
• No charter leaders believed charter could be governed by district-wide
CBA without losing instructional flexibility. Every school needs its own
bargaining unit.
• Union leaders open to charters agreed that mandatory transfer rules to
protect senior teachers and other forms of standardization common in
district wide agreements were inappropriate for charters.
• Many agreed that unionization transforms teachers from employees to
partners.
The participants also clarified areas of disagreement:
• “Sticking points” include hiring, firing, differential pay, turnover, the
formalities surrounding at-will employment, and the ability of
administrators to select teachers on basis of fit with school’s need.
• Union leaders dislike charters having cadre of senior teachers and rotating
younger teachers spending only a few years; teaching can only be
profession if it is lifelong career

73
• Union leaders say no school’s staffing decisions should be determined by
how expensive a teacher is. Seniority is the only unbiased basis for career
progression.
Finally, the participants agreed on the need for more empirical research on
several questions:
• How does the charter teaching force differ from the teaching force in
neighboring district?
• Are charters constantly disrupted by teacher turnover, or have they learned
to stabilize instruction and build teacher skills despite turnover?
• Are charter teachers more or less satisfied in their jobs than teachers in
public schools?
• Do charter teachers use their market power (ability to leave jobs they don’t
like) to exert influence on schools? How?
• Do parents use their market power (ability to choose and leave) to exert
influence on schools? If so, how?
• How does at-will employment work in charter schools? What proportion
are bullied or arbitrarily dismissed in charter schools?
• Do charter school principals differ from conventional public school
principals in leadership styles and openness to teacher input?
• Do unionized charters suffer more internal conflict and focus less on
instruction than non-unionized schools?
The participants also agreed that it would be helpful to be able to review
certain exemplars and models:
• Charters that have thrived after unionization
• Innovative district-union agreements allowing different uses of teacher
time and tradeoffs between teacher labor and technology

74
• Non-unionized charter schools in which teachers play strong leadership
roles
• Charters that successfully mix teachers who expect to stay for many years
and those who expect to leave after one to three years. (Hill, 2006).
Perhaps the most significant example of union-charter cooperation is the
Green Dot model. In September of 2007, the Los Angeles Unified School District’s
Board of Education voted to turn over Locke High School to the Green Dot schools, a
Charter operator launched by former labor organizer Steve Barr. Barr had successfully
convinced a majority of teachers to vote to leave LAUSD and re-establish Locke, a
failing high school near downtown Los Angeles, as a charter school. The unique element
of the turnover is that Barr and Green Dot voluntarily supported the creation of a union
for Green Dot teachers when Green Dot began operating, the Asociacion de Maestros
Unidos, meaning that all teachers at the Locke campus remain bargaining unit members,
but are no longer governed by the LAUSD contract. Instead, they are protected by a
smaller, more streamlined agreement designed to encourage the kind of cooperation
between the union and the school that reform-union advocates have sought. The extent to
which this model succeeds in encouraging the type of reforms that both union critics and
union-reform advocates seek will contribute significantly to our understanding of the
possibilities for charter-union cooperation.

75
Chapter III - Methodology
Introduction
This chapter will describe the design, sample, data collection and data
analysis portions of the study. As set forth in Chapter 1, the purpose of the study is to
compare collective bargaining agreements in unionized charter schools with the
agreements of conventional school districts, to explore the relationship between the
unions and charter school administrators, and to examine the effect of unions and
bargaining agreements on the personnel practices of charter school administrators. The
study focuses on four areas of decision-making in which unions and/or collective
bargaining agreements may impact administrators’ decision-making ability: (1)
assignment and transfer, (2) evaluation, (3) classification, discipline and dismissal, and
(4) differential pay. In each of these areas, California’s charter school laws make it
possible for charter schools to operate outside of many of the restrictions on
administrative discretion that are imposed by state law or collective bargaining
agreements, but union bargaining agreements have the potential to diminish that
flexibility. The study asks four primary research questions, related to the specific areas
of personnel policy outlined above:
Research Question No. 1: To what extent, and in what ways, do the
collective bargaining agreements in unionized California charter schools differ from the

76
agreements of the school districts by which they are chartered, and from each other, with
respect to provisions governing assignment (or reassignment) and transfer decisions?
Research Question No. 2: To what extent, and in what ways, do the
collective bargaining agreements in unionized California charter schools differ from the
agreements of the school districts by which they are chartered, and from each other, with
respect to provisions governing teacher evaluation?
Research Question No. 3: To what extent, and in what ways, do the
collective bargaining agreements in unionized California charter schools differ from the
agreements of the school districts by which they are chartered, and from each other, with
respect to provisions governing teacher classification (including whether or not the
school provides any form of “permanence” or “tenure”), discipline, and dismissal?
Research Question No. 4: To what extent, and in what ways, do the
collective bargaining agreements in unionized California charter schools differ from the
agreements of the school districts by which they are chartered, and from each other, with
respect to provisions governing differential compensation or “merit pay”?
The study was originally designed to use a combination of three tools to
evaluate the effect of union presence and bargaining agreements on administrators’
decisions: (1) bargaining-agreement analysis and coding for unionized schools, (2)
quantitative data-collection, using a questionnaire given to all unionized and selected
comparable non-unionized schools, and (3) semi-structured interviews with a smaller set

77
of unionized and non-unionized charter schools. Due to the low rate of response to the
questionnaire, the quantitative element of the study was eliminated. Instead, the first
element of the study was expanded to include a more in-depth analysis of the terms of
each school’s collective bargaining agreement, and included a comparison with the
district in which the charter school was located, which would govern the personnel
practices of that school if it was not a charter school. Additionally, due to the difficulty
of making direct comparisons between a small number of unionized charters and
comparable non-union charters, the interviews with non-unionized charters were also
eliminated from this study. The elements that were not included in this study could
provide useful topics for further study.
Researchers, policy makers, administrators, teachers, unions and interested
citizens (including parents) could benefit from the availability of more information and
analysis regarding the variety of approaches to bargaining agreements, and the formation
of policies on similar topics currently being used by non-union charter schools in the Los
Angeles area. Such information could be used to evaluate the success of charter schools
in increasing flexibility in policy areas in which the LASUD agreement has been
considered too restrictive. The study could also help schools and unions choose their
own approach to bargaining, or re-evaluate their existing approach.

78
Population
The sample for this study was intended to cover the full spectrum of
unionized charter schools in California. Charter schools are generally classified as either
“conversion” or “start-up” schools, and as “dependent” or “independent.” “Conversion”
charter schools --- existing public schools that become charters --- enter into a charter
agreement with a school district, almost all of which are unionized. “Start-up” charters
are schools that commence as charters, rather than conventional district schools, although
they are usually chartered by a conventional school district.
A “conversion” charter school may be chartered as a “dependent” charter
school, which typically is part of the district for funding purposes, and may be required to
retain obligations under an existing collective bargaining agreement, depending on the
terms of the charter, or may be “independent”; some conversion schools, like one in this
study, begin as dependent charters and become independent. By contrast, most “start-up”
charter schools, although they are usually authorized and chartered by their local district,
are exempted by their charter from any obligation to bargain with the district’s union, or
to comply with the district’s bargaining agreement. Such schools are more likely to be
“independent,” meaning they are not bound by the district’s policies. “Conversion”
schools have the ability to decertify the district’s union by a majority vote of the
certificated staff, but few conversion schools have used that procedure. Conversely,
although the terms of a “start-up” charter may exempt the school from any union
obligation, the school remains subject to organizing efforts by a teachers’ union.

79
The two national teachers’ unions, the National Education Association and
American Federation of Teachers, have recently made organizing charter school teachers
a high priority. This is accomplished by obtaining a majority vote of the teachers in the
bargaining unit in an election supervised by the National Labor Relations Board.
Because most California charter schools are single campuses, the bargaining unit is
typically a single school site.
To date, these unions have organized only a limited number of charter
schools in California. As of the date of this study, a total of just over 30 charter schools
in California had executed collective bargaining agreements that were independent of a
district bargaining agreement. These include all five campuses operated by the Camino
Nuevo Charter Academy in Los Angeles, one of the schools analyzed in this study, and
two of the four campuses operated by Leadership Public Schools in the Bay Area.
Organizing efforts will likely continue, and could have a dramatic impact on the future of
staffing policy and practice in California’s charter schools. While this study was being
completed, Accelerated Charter School in Los Angeles, one of California’s first
successful charters, was presented with a demand for union recognition. Given the rise in
importance of non-profit Charter Management Organizations (“CMOs”) (such as Green
Dot, one of the schools in this study) and for-profit Education Management
Organizations (such as Edison Schools, which is also included in the study), multi-site
organizing efforts may become more prevalent. Finally, Green Dot Schools, a CMO
based in Los Angeles, has forged a new direction in charter-union relations by supporting
the creation of its own union, and voluntarily entering into a bargaining agreement with

80
that union that applies to all Green Dot schools --- which now include twelve high
schools in the Los Angeles area.
This study was originally designed to include all unionized charter schools
(a number of which, including Green Dot schools, are covered by the same bargaining
agreement). However, due to a low response rate, bargaining agreements were only
obtained for a total of nine schools, and the school districts by which they are chartered,
and these schools formed the population for the first part of the study (analysis of
collective bargaining agreements). Five of those schools agreed to be involved in the
administrator interviews. However, the schools that agreed to participate actually
reflected fairly well the diversity of charter types described above; some began as
dependent charters and became independent, while some took the opposite path, and
some have remained independent throughout their existence. As explained in Chapter 4,
the history of the union’s involvement at the schools also varied widely, providing a
fairly representative, if anecdotal, view of the possible paths to unionization for charters
in California.
The chart below provides information for each school in the group of
charter schools included in the study: the school district by which the charter school is
chartered, the grades taught at the school, the type of charter (whether a “conversion” or
“start-up”), the date on which the school was originally authorized, and the name of the
union recognized by the school, with its organizational affiliation.

81
California Charter Schools With Collective Bargaining Agreements in This Study
School
Name
School District

Grades
Served
Type of
Charter
Date
Chartered
Union
Green Dot
Public
Schools
LAUSD (most
schools)
9-12 Start-up 2000 Associacion de
Maestros Unidos
(CTA)
Camino
Nuevo
Charter
Academy
LAUSD K-8 Start-up 2000 Camino Nuevo
Teachers
Association (CTA)
Choice 2000
On-line
School
Perris Union
High School
District
7-12 Start-up 1994 On-line Teachers
Assocation (CTA)
Darnall
Charter
School
San Diego
Unified School
District
K-6 Conv. 1993 Darnall Charter
Tchrs Assoc (CTA)
Ravenswood
Edison
Charter
Schools
Ravenswood City
School District
(Palo Alto)
5-8 Conv. 1998 RTA/Edison McNair
Edison Brentwood
(CTA)
Helix
Charter High
School
Grossmont
Union High
School District
9-12 Conv. 1998 Helix Teachers
Association (CTA)
LA
Leadership
Academy
LAUSD 6-11 Start-up 2002 Los Angeles
Leadership
Academy United
(CTA)
Live Oak
Charter
School
Petaluma City
Elementary
School District
K-8 Start-up 2001 Live Oak Teachers’
Association (CTA)
Ocean
Charter
School
LAUSD K-8 Start-up 2004 Ocean Charter
Teachers
Association (CTA)
Collective Bargaining Agreement Analysis
The first step in the study was to compare the level of restriction placed on
the decision-making ability of administrators by (1) collective bargaining agreements at
unionized charter schools, and (2) the collective bargaining agreements in the
conventional school district by which each charter school is chartered. Originally, each
school’s governing document containing the policies relevant to the study was to be

82
evaluated and coded, by assigning it a rating for each subject in the study. A higher score
would be used to indicate a greater level of restraint on administrators’ discretion. These
codes were intended to allow a quantitative comparison between the bargaining
agreements and administrators’ responses to the study’s questionnaire. Because the
questionnaire was eliminated, the bargaining agreement analysis was expanded to include
a more descriptive evaluation of each school’s provisions in the same areas originally
outlined for study. Following is a description of the research questions used in the study.
Assignment and transfer
The first research question analyzes the assignment and transfer provisions
in collective bargaining agreements.
Schools assign teachers to classrooms when they are hired; they may later
“reassign” teachers within the same school; both decisions can be the subject of seniority-
based rules. Transfers from one school to another may also be governed by seniority
rules. Transfers can be initiated by teachers seeking a transfer to an open position for a
variety of reasons, which are termed “voluntary transfers” in the study. They can also be
initiated by teachers who have been displaced from their positions due to declining
enrollment, or by the administrator’s decision to reallocate the school’s staff. These are
termed “involuntary transfers.” Schools may require seniority to be considered in either
voluntary or involuntary transfers, or in both types of transfers. When a senior teacher
requests a transfer, she may or may not have the right to take a position currently held by
a more junior teacher, “bumping” that teacher to another position or out of the school.

83
Such a transfer has both a voluntary component (for the senior teacher) and an
involuntary component (for the “bumped” junior teacher). In conventional public
schools, the “bumping” process is determined on a district-wide basis: a teacher may
bump a junior teacher in another school within the district, and seniority is determined by
the teachers’ tenure within the district.
As explained above, most California charter schools are single-campus
operations, so inter-school transfers are rare. However, California’s unionized charter
schools’ intra-school “reassignment” policies must take into account the same competing
interests that affect transfer decisions in conventional districts --- the administrator’s need
to make school-wide judgments about the best match between teachers and students, and
the interest of senior teachers in applying their own judgment and maintaining stability.
As a result, the intra-school transfer or “reassignment” provisions of the charter schools
in the study reflect the same type of diversity as conventional multi-school districts’
inter-school transfer provisions. Additionally, multi-site charter school operators now
run many charter schools in California, including some of the schools analyzed in this
study, and these operators may have the ability to transfer teachers from one campus to
another. Although there are differences between “reassignment” and “transfer”
decisions, because both decisions can involve tension between an administrator’s
judgment about the best location for the teacher, and the teacher’s own judgment and
interests, and because single-campus charters’ “reassignment” decisions provide the
closest comparison to conventional districts’ “transfer” decisions, this study treated

84
grouped both types of decisions together for purposes of comparing the degree of
restraint placed on administrators.
Originally, a quantitative rating was to be assigned to each school’s
agreement for the degree to which administrators were required to consider seniority
when making assignment or transfer decisions: no consideration, one factor required for
consideration, or the determinative or “tie-breaking” factor. Due to the low response
rate, the quantitative comparison was eliminated. Instead, the study analyzed the same
aspects of each school’s assignment and transfer policies using a more in-depth,
qualitative and descriptive approach, comparing each school’s provisions to those of the
school district by which it is chartered, and to the other charter schools in the study.
Teacher evaluation
Second, the study was intended to evaluate designed to rate the amount of
discretion given to administrators in the area of teacher evaluation, focusing on the
aspects of evaluation in which conventional district agreements have been criticized for
being overly restrictive, and other elements that the district agreements frequently
contained, including: the frequency of evaluation, the process of establishing evaluation
criteria for each teacher, the flexibility of the evaluation instrument, the ability to use
informal or “drop-in” observations in the evaluation process, and the ability to challenge
the evaluation process or outcome.
As with assignment and transfer provisions, an intended quantitative
component was eliminated in favor of a more in-depth qualitative comparison.

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Teacher discipline and dismissal
Third, the study was intended to evaluate the degree of restriction placed
on administrators’ ability to make discipline and dismissal decisions.
3
As conventional
public schools are heavily regulated by California law in this area, most significantly by
providing “permanent” status after two years of teaching, this research question presented
the most significant opportunity for charter schools to depart from their comparable
school districts.
As with assignment and transfer provisions, the study was modified to
address the same issues, but through a more detailed, qualitative approach.
Differential pay
Finally, bargaining agreements were reviewed to determine whether they
provided differential compensation to teachers. This study is interested in three forms of
additional pay: (1) individual “merit pay,” or pay for performance (2) pay for
performance by the entire school, as opposed to an individual teacher; and (3) pay for
teaching a subject that is in demand and hard to staff. As explained in Chapter 2 these
are among the more controversial and infrequently-used forms of differential pay. They
require an administrator to make a judgment about the value or “output” a particular
teacher might provide to their school (in the case of hard-to-staff schools or hard-to-staff
subjects), or about the value they have added to their students’ performance (in the case

3
As explained in detail in Chapter 4, some charter schools offer a form of permanency or
“tenure”; some employ teachers “at will,” and others offer renewable contracts of
employment for a term of one or more years.

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of merit or performance pay), rather than the “input” provided by additional education or
training. (Podgursky & Springer, 2006).
Data Gathering and Analysis
The study was designed to gather and analyze data regarding
administrators’ decisions in the policy areas outlined above, from the same sample of
unionized charter schools and conventional school districts.
The study was initially designed to include a quantitative element. After
receiving IRB approval and obtaining approval from the operator of each charter school
in the study, quantitative data would be gathered using a questionnaire submitted by e-
mail to the administrator of each school. The questionnaire was sent via e-mail to all of
the unionized schools in California, followed by telephone and e-mails. However, only
four administrators completed and returned the questionnaire, out of a total of
approximately 30. As the initial population was very small, it was unlikely that any
definitive conclusion could have been drawn from quantitative data obtained through the
questionnaire. Given the low response rate, the results could not be used even
anecdotally, and this element was therefore eliminated.
Therefore, instead of conducting a quantitative analysis of the schools’
bargaining agreements, a more in-depth, qualitative and comparative analysis of the
schools’ bargaining agreements was used, expanding each of the four main Research
Questions into a number of sub-topics. The sub-topics consist of common elements in

87
the relevant sections of the conventional school districts’ bargaining agreements, as
determined through a preliminary review of all of the agreements. In reviewing and
comparing the agreements, I did not ask specific questions regarding each sub-topic, but
asked essentially the same questions for each element: to what extent does the agreement
reserve administrative decision-making authority to the school, or restrain such authority
(which includes the granting of enforceable rights to teachers or their union); and how
does this allocation of decision-making authority differ from the comparable district
agreement? Given the qualitative and exploratory nature of the study, I did not make any
attempt to quantify the results, and focused more closely on those schools whose
agreements were unique or innovative, or those in which the difference from the district
agreement was significant. Some schools’ agreements were silent as to certain sub-topics
or even major topics, and such silence (and its effect) was noted. The sub-topics
examined were the following:
Research Question 1: Assignment and Transfer Policies:

• Assignment: Procedure
• Assignment: Criteria for Selection
• Assignment: Ability to Challenge or Grieve
• Voluntary Transfer: Procedure
• Voluntary Transfer: Criteria
• Involuntary Transfer: Procedure
• Involuntary Transfer: Criteria
• Transfer: Ability to Challenge or Grieve

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Research Question 2: Evaluation policies:

• Frequency of Evaluation

• Timing of Evaluation, Planning Process

• Type, Frequency, Notice of Observation

• Individuals Involved in Evaluation

• Evaluation Instrument and Criteria

• Evaluation Report

• Alternative Evaluation / PAR

• Follow-up for Low-Rated Teachers

• Ability to Challenge or Grieve

Research Question 3: Discipline and Dismissal policies:

• Classification / Security
• Standard / Grounds for Discipline
• Discipline Process / Progressive Discipline
• Discipline: Challenge or Grievance
• Dismissal: Procedure
• Dismissal: Grounds
• Dismissal: Ability to Challenge or Grieve
Research Question 4: Compensation policies:

• Pay for Performance – Individual

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• Pay for Performance – School

• Pay for Subject-matter
For each Research Question, the study first analyzed California law as it
relates to each subject (including each sub-topic where applicable), and then discussed
the application of California law to charter schools on that topic. I then analyzed the
bargaining agreement for each charter school in the study, and applied the same analysis
to the district in which each charter school is located, providing a point-by-point
comparison on each sub-topic listed above. In Chapter 4, I summarize the most
significant differences among the charter schools, and between the charter schools and
the conventional school districts. In the attached Appendix, each element is analyzed in
detail.
Semi-Structured Interviews
In addition to the bargaining agreement analysis, the study involved semi-
structured interviews at a smaller number of charter schools, in order to add context and
history to the document analysis. I initially planned to interview both administrators and
union representatives, but ultimately limited the study to administrators in the interest of
time and space. These interviews included questions about the school’s approach to
collective bargaining, including the use of “interest-based” bargaining; expansion or
modification of bargaining agreements since the school’s creation or conversion to a
charter, whether through formal modification, extraneous memoranda, or informal

90
agreements between unions and administrators; the reasons for any modifications to the
bargaining agreement among unionized charters; and the administrators’ and union
representatives level of satisfaction with their school’s current contract. All responses
were anonymous. I used the following questions as my guide in the interviews:
School’s Union History
1. Were your school’s teachers represented by a Union when the school
began operating? If teachers are not currently represented, how did they
eliminate representation?
2. If your teachers are currently represented, but were not represented when
the school began operating, how was the Union recognized? Did the
School resist unionization / welcome it?
3. Has any Union attempted to represent your teachers? What was your
response?
4. Has your school attempted to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement
with any Union? Explain the history of negotiations.
5. If your teachers have never been represented by a Union, what is your
school’s philosophy toward unions? Would you resist or welcome a
Union that tried to organize your teachers?
School’s Relationship with Union
6. Would you describe your school’s relationship with the Union as
adversarial or cooperative?
7. Would you describe the bargaining process between your school and the
Union as traditional/adversarial or interest-based?
8. Has the collective bargaining agreement become more or less restrictive
since the Union became the representative of your school’s teachers
(referring to your school’s commencement as a charter school for
conversion charter schools)?
9. Has your relationship with the Union become better or worse since the
Union became the representative of the teachers at your school (referring

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to your school’s commencement as a charter school for conversion charter
schools)?
10. Has the Union’s grievance-related activity at your school increased,
decreased or remained the same since it became the representative of your
school’s teachers (referring to your school’s commencement as a charter
school for conversion charter schools)?
Collective Bargaining Agreement: Compensation
11. Do you feel that the compensation authorized by your school’s collective
bargaining agreement allows you to recruit the best available teachers, or
would you prefer that your school offer some form of additional
compensation such as (a) pay for hard-to-staff subjects, (b) pay for hard-
to-staff classrooms or schools, or (c) performance pay?
12. If you were able to offer performance pay, would you prefer to offer
bonuses for individual performance or school-wide performance?
13. Do you know whether you be able to negotiate such compensation with
your school’s Union?
14. During the 2007-2008 school year, how many teachers would you have
provided additional compensation based on their performance if additional
pay was allowed by your school’s collective bargaining agreement?
15. Are there any specific teachers you believe you could have hired if you
had been able to offer them additional pay based on performance?
16. Are there any specific teachers who left your school, whom you believe
you could have retained if you could have offered them additional pay
based on performance?
Collective Bargaining Agreement: Assignment
17. Do you agree with the following statement: “The assignment process at
my school allows me to select the best teachers for each classroom.”
18. For those teacher assignment decisions in which you considered seniority,
did you do so because you believed a more senior teacher would likely be
better for the position, or because you felt you required to do so by the
collective bargaining agreement?
19. During the 2007-2008 school year, in how many assignment decisions did
you take seniority into account because you believed you were required to

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do so by your school’s collective bargaining agreement or personnel
policies?
20. During the 2007-2008 school year, in how many assignment decisions did
you use seniority as the determinative factor because you believed you
were required to do so by your school’s collective bargaining agreement
or personnel policies?
21. During the 2007-2008 school year, how many assignment decisions would
you have made differently if not for seniority provisions governing such
decisions contained in your school’s collective bargaining agreement or
personnel policies.
Collective Bargaining Agreement: Transfer
22. Do you agree with the following statement: “The transfer process at my
school allows me to select the best teachers for each classroom.”
23. For those teacher transfer decisions in which you considered seniority, did
you do so because you believed a more senior teacher would likely be
better for the position, or because you felt you required to do so by the
collective bargaining agreement?
24. During the 2007-2008 school year, in how many transfer decisions did you
take seniority into account because you believed you were required to do
so by your school’s collective bargaining agreement or personnel policies?
25. During the 2007-2008 school year, in how many transfer decisions did you
use seniority as the determinative factor because you believed you were
required to do so by your school’s collective bargaining agreement or
personnel policies?
26. During the 2007-2008 school year, how many transfer decisions would
you have made differently if not for seniority provisions governing such
decisions contained in your school’s collective bargaining agreement or
personnel policies?
Collective Bargaining Agreement: Evaluation
27. Do you feel that your school’s collective bargaining agreement allows you
enough discretion to give negative evaluations to poor teachers?
28. During the 2007-2008 school year, how many teachers would have been
given the lowest performance rating allowed by your school’s rating

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system, but were not given that rating because of rules contained in your
school’s collective bargaining agreement or personnel policies? Why?
29. During the 2007-2008 school year, how many teachers would have been
given the lowest performance rating allowed by your school’s rating
system, but were not given that rating because you were concerned about a
possible challenge by the teachers’ union?
Collective Bargaining Agreement: Dismissal
30. Do you feel that your school’s collective bargaining agreement allows you
enough discretion to dismiss poor teachers?
31. During the 2007-2008 school year, how many teachers would you have
dismissed for poor performance, but did not do so because of rules
contained in your school’s collective bargaining agreement or personnel
policies? How many? Why?
32. During the 2007-2008 school year, how many teachers would you have
dismissed for poor performance, but did not do so because you were
concerned about a possible challenge by the teacher’s union? How many?
Why?
33. Have you / other administrators at your school ever had a discussion with
a teacher about leaving the school, because you believed you could not
dismiss the teacher? During the 2007-2008 school year, how many
teachers left the school after such a discussion with you or another
administrator regarding their performance?
Collective Bargaining Agreement: Union Activity and Presence
34. Aside from any direct effect that the terms of your school’s collective
bargaining agreement may have on your personnel decisions, does the
Union’s presence as the bargaining representative of teachers at your
school have any effect on your decision-making process in the areas of
teacher assignment, transfer, differential compensation, evaluation, or
dismissal? What effect? Has this effect changed over time?
35. Aside from any direct effect that the terms of your school’s collective
bargaining agreement may have on your personnel decisions, does the
Union’s activity at your school (including the filing of any grievances)
have any effect on your decision-making process in the areas of teacher
assignment, transfer, differential compensation, evaluation, or dismissal?
Has this effect changed over time?

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Due to the time constraints of the interviewed administrators, and the
variation in the significance of each subject from one school to another, I did not ask all
questions to each interviewee. Rather, I attempted to address each of the main topics
covered by the study, while focusing on those areas in which the administrator indicated
that his or her interaction with the Union and the school’s teachers, or the application of
the particular provisions of the bargaining agreement, had been most interesting or
significant, and on areas or in which the administrator expected future activity that could
affect the school’s personnel policies and practices. The interview responses are reported
in Chapter 4, and are used to provide context to the bargaining agreement analysis. In
Chapter 5, the Study presents recommendations and conclusions for charter schools,
unions and policy-makers.

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CHAPTER IV - Results and Analysis
This Chapter will present the results and analysis of the Study for each of
the Research Questions described in Chapter 3 (Assignment and Transfer, Evaluation,
Discipline and Dismissal, and Teacher Compensation), each of which was divided into
several sub-topics. After a summary of the key findings, for each Research Question the
Chapter will first review the requirements of California law that apply to conventional
public schools, and the scope of collective bargaining required or allowed by California
law. Next, it will present a descriptive analysis of the key elements of the collective
bargaining agreement of each charter school for which agreements were obtained,
comparing the agreement with the provisions of the bargaining agreement for the school
district by which the charter school is chartered. The complete descriptive analysis of
these agreements is found in the Appendix.
The Chapter will then present the results of interviews conducted with
administrators at five of the charter schools: Green Dot Public Schools, LA Leadership
Academy, Choice 2000 Online Charter School, Darnall Charter School, and Live Oak
Charter School. The interviews were focused on the same topics as the bargaining
agreement analysis, but also included questions regarding the school’s union history, and
the relationship between the schools’ administration and the union.

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Summary of Most Significant Findings
Research Question 1: Assignment and Transfer
California’s conventional school districts, and its charter schools, are free
to negotiate the amount of discretion given to administrators for assignment and transfer
decisions. Most of the charters in this study have negotiated more lenient provisions than
the comparable districts in these areas.
Assignment. While LAUSD requires assignment of permanent teachers
before probationary teachers, and requires that initial assignments be made on the basis of
seniority, most schools eliminated consideration of seniority, although Green Dot made
seniority the determining factor where there are no “substantial distinguishing
differences,” and another made seniority only a “major factor,” departing from its
district’s requirement that it be the “deciding factor.”
Voluntary Transfer. The charter schools in the study were also able to
negotiate more discretion to make transfer decisions, or reassignment decisions, than
their comparable districts, and that departure from the district agreements was fairly
consistent. Most schools omitted any consideration of seniority, while some prohibited
decisions made in an “arbitrary, capricious or punitive” manner, which avoids a bright-
line seniority rule but introduces significant ambiguity and may invite grievances. Green
Dot and Darnall departed from their districts by allowing voluntary transfer of poorly-
performing teachers, which the district Agreements prohibits.

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Involuntary Transfer. The charters in the study generally departed from
district provisions protecting senior teachers from involuntary transfer, or requiring the
district to accept voluntary applicants rather than making an involuntary transfer. Green
Dot must transfer a voluntary applicant if one can be found, and must otherwise have
“just cause” for involuntary transfers, but was not bound by seniority. Unlike standard
district agreements, which protected senior teachers from involuntary transfer, under
Darnall’s agreement teachers in their first three years were completely protected from
involuntary transfer.
Research Question 2: Evaluation of Teachers
Frequency of Evaluation. While California law requires the conventional
districts in the study to evaluate permanent teachers every other year, and probationary
employees every year, many of the charter schools in the study require more frequent
evaluation, for a longer period of time, and some agreements were silent, effectively
allowing administrators to decide how frequently to conduct evaluations.
Evaluation Planning / Setting Objectives. The charter schools in the study
generally provided administrators more discretion to establish the objectives by which
teachers will be evaluated, requiring that the evaluation criteria be discussed with the
teacher without giving the teacher a right to select criteria.
Type, Frequency, Notice of Observation. Teachers’ unions in public
schools generally negotiate the right to receive notice of the date for formal evaluation, to
establish the length of the observation, to have more than one observation, and to define

98
the criteria by which the teacher will be evaluated. The charter schools in the study
usually required pre-notification of formal observations, but allowed administrators to
supplement planned and controlled observations with informal observations, often
allowing those observations to be used in the teacher’s official evaluation.
Individuals Involved in Evaluation. The districts in the study generally
prohibited anyone but the teacher’s supervisor to evaluate the teacher. Several of the
charter schools allowed others, including fellow teachers, to be involved in the
evaluations.
Evaluation Instrument and Criteria. Conventional school districts,
including those in the study, usually use a binary, “Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory” or “yes
or no” evaluation form. Most of the charter schools adopted more detailed, rubric-style
evaluation instruments, with more elements and a greater range of possible ratings. Like
the districts, the charter schools often made use of the California Standards for the
Teaching Profession, but they were more likely to select only Standards the school
deemed relevant, to apply different Standards to teachers at different levels of experience,
or to add their own unique Standards.
Alternative Evaluation / Peer Assistance and Review (“PAR”). The
charter schools in this study generally distinguish between newer and more experienced
teachers in the use of alternative forms of evaluation, including Peer Assistance and
Review (“PAR”), more often than conventional district agreements. While the districts
generally authorized the use of PAR only for low-performing teachers, the charter

99
schools were more likely to authorize variation in the evaluation process for experienced
teachers, who were given greater control over evaluation standards.
Follow-up for Low-Rated Teachers. While the charter school agreements
in this study generally were more likely to depart from the standard evaluation process
for experienced teachers, they were generally less likely to mandate formal assistance for
poorly-performing teachers than the conventional districts, while holding teachers more
strictly accountable for their failure to improve their performance --- including possible
dismissal.
Research Question No. 3: Teacher Classification, Discipline and
Dismissal
Classification and Security. The conventional school districts in the study
are subject to the Education Code, which provides that teachers who serve two complete,
consecutive years, and are not dismissed, become permanent employees. The charter
schools in the study were able to obtain some flexibility in these areas, but their unions
negotiated for more restraint than they did in the areas of assignment, transfer and teacher
evaluation, often providing a form of “permanence” or “tenure.”
Discipline. While California law allows conventional public school
districts to bargain over discipline short of 15-day suspension, the charter schools in the
study were able to bargain regarding all disciplinary causes and procedures. However,
they often followed the example of the conventional school districts, even though they
were not required to do so, and several negotiated requirements of “good cause” or “just

100
cause” for discipline. Some of the charter schools also negotiated elements of
“progressive discipline,” while the complexity and restrictiveness of the provisions
varied.
Dismissal. LASUD and the other conventional districts in the study are
governed by the Education Code, which requires that permanent teachers may be
dismissed for unsatisfactory performance under The Stull Act, or “for cause,” as defined
by the Education Code. Although charter schools in the study were free to negotiate their
own terms for dismissal, a number of the charters negotiated fairly restrictive provisions,
often requiring “good cause” or “just cause” for “permanent” teachers, although Green
Dot provides that protection for all teachers. The schools varied in the extent to which
they provided examples of the “cause” standard to guide administrators in the application
of the standard.
Research Question 4: Teacher Compensation
Despite the current interest in differential pay, discussed in Chapter 2 of
the study, few of the charter schools in the study have implemented any form of
differential or “merit” pay. However, some of the schools reported that they were
considering modification of their Agreements to incorporate merit pay; these efforts will
be an interesting topic of further study.

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Review of California Law and Comparison of Bargaining Agreements
Having presented the central findings regarding the four primary research
questions, the study will now present (1) a description of California law governing
conventional school districts on the topic addressed by each research question, (2) a
description of school districts’ and charter schools’ ability under California law to
negotiate provisions on the subject addressed by each research question, and (3) a more
detailed comparison between the provisions of the conventional school districts and the
unionized charter schools chartered by those districts, on each sub-topic of each research
question.
Research Question 1: Assignment and Transfer
As explained in Chapter 2, some critics of collective bargaining
agreements have argued that conventional district agreements unduly restrict
administrators in their ability to place teachers where they are best suited to help students
achieve. This Research Question was intended to evaluate the extent to which the charter
schools in the study have been able to negotiate less restrictive assignment and transfer
provisions than those governing conventional school districts, to the extent authorized by
California law.
California law governing teacher assignment and transfer
Under California law, the district Superintendent has the duty of assigning
teachers to their positions. Subject to limited exceptions, the Superintendent may

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generally transfer a teacher when the district concludes that the transfer is in the best
interests of the district (Cal. Educ. Code § 35035(c)).
4
Although a teacher has a vested
property right in his position as a teacher, there is no vested property right in the location
of the teaching assignment. See Bolin v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 202
Cal. Rptr. 416 (1984). California’s tenure law does not interfere with a Board’s general
power to assign teachers to particular classes and to particular schools, in accordance
with its reasonable judgment. Leithliter v. Board of Trustees (1970, Cal App 2d Dist) 12
Cal App 3d 1095, 91 Cal Rptr 215, 1970 Cal App LEXIS 1695.
Collective bargaining regarding assignment and transfer decisions
Collective bargaining agreements can diminish the discretion otherwise
permitted by California law, by establishing specific criteria and procedure for transfers.
Under California law, mandatory subjects of bargaining include wages, hours, and other
“terms and conditions of employment,” which include transfer and reassignment policies
(Cal. Govt. Code § 3543.2(a)). Thus, each school district or charter school in this study
was required to consider and respond to any bargaining proposals presented by its union
regarding assignment and transfer of teachers.

4
A District may not transfer a teacher to a K-12 school that is ranked in deciles 1 to 3 on the Academic
Performance Index if the principal of the school refuses to accept the transfer (Cal. Educ. Code §
35035(a)). Additionally, a district may not give priority to a teacher applying after April 15 for a transfer to
a position sought by other qualified applicants who have applied for positions requiring certification
qualification at the school (Cal. Educ. Code § 35035(b)).

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Findings related to bargaining agreement provisions on assignment and
transfer
Assignment. California’s conventional school districts and its charter
schools are free to negotiate the amount of discretion given to administrators for
assignment and transfer decisions. Most of the charters in this study have negotiated
more lenient provisions than the comparable districts in these areas. LAUSD’s
Agreement restricts administrators’ assignment decisions in several ways: permanent
teachers must be assigned before probationary teachers apply; each school must ensure
that the proportion of permanent to non-permanent teachers is consistent with the
district’s proportion; and initial assignments are made on the basis of seniority. The
Agreements negotiated by some of the schools within LAUSD --- Camino Nuevo, LA
Leadership and Ocean --- differ significantly from LAUSD: they do not require any
consideration of seniority, and these schools’ administrators reported that, in fact,
seniority is not considered in those decisions, demonstrating that they have achieved
some of the flexibility sought by charter school advocates despite the establishment of a
union agreement. However, Green Dot’s Agreement is similar to LAUSD’s, requiring
that seniority is the determining factor where there are no “substantial distinguishing
differences.” Green Dot’s Administrator reported that no grievance has been filed
regarding this provision, but it is unclear how often school administrators determine that
there are “substantial distinguishing differences,” and make assignment decisions without
regarding for seniority. This may be a fruitful topic for further study.

104
The Ravenswood District Agreement makes seniority the “deciding
factor” in assignment decisions when other factors (certification, experience, and the
school’s needs) are equal. Edison’s Agreement closely mirrors Ravenswood’s, but
makes seniority only a “major factor,” rather than the “deciding factor.” On this topic
and others, Edison’s Agreement was the most similar to its comparable district of any of
the schools in this study, while providing slightly more discretion to administrators than
the district’s agreement. The Perris District’s Agreement is more lenient than LAUSD’s,
imposing no consideration of seniority, and Choice 2000 also does not require
consideration of seniority. Likewise, the San Diego, Grossmont, and Petaluma District
Agreements impose no seniority restriction on assignment decisions, and their
comparator charter schools --- Darnall, Helix and Live Oak respectively --- also require
no consideration of seniority. While the Petaluma Agreement guarantees an interview for
any teacher interested in an open position, Live Oak’s Agreement requires only that
available positions must be advertised internally --- another example of a charter
Agreement using the District Agreement as a model, but modifying it slightly to provide
greater discretion to administrators.
Voluntary Transfer. The schools in this study took widely varying
approaches to consideration of seniority and performance in transfer decisions.
LAUSD’s Agreement has been criticized for emphasizing teacher seniority over
performance. However, although the Agreement uses seniority to break ties among
teachers seeking voluntary transfers, it also prevents teachers with poor evaluations from
requesting a transfer. Green Dot’s Agreement gives preference to teachers with

105
satisfactory performance, but differs from LAUSD’s by giving administrators discretion
to transfer a poorly performing teacher upon request; unlike LAUSD, it does not require
consideration of seniority in transfer decisions. Ocean’s Agreement requires
consideration of both performance and seniority in reassignment decisions (the closest
comparison to “transfer” decisions), but neither criterion is the “tie-breaker” or the
determinative factor. LA Leadership’s Administrator reported that it has never
considered seniority in any transfer decision, because the school hires and contracts
teachers for specific positions; these contracts have not yet been tested, raising another
interesting question for future study.
While Perris’s Agreement includes seniority as one factor in transfer
decisions, Choice 2000 does not require any consideration of seniority. Choice 2000
requires that reassignment decisions cannot be made in an “arbitrary, capricious or
punitive” manner --- a slight variation on the Perris District’s provision that changes in
assignment cannot be made for “arbitrary or capricious” reasons, a lower standard than
requiring “good cause” or “just cause.” San Diego’s Agreement uses a “bid and post”
process for transfer decisions, which requires that seniority be used as the basis for a
decision where the administrator cannot made a selection among eligible bidders. The
Darnall Agreement is actually more restrictive in this area, requiring that seniority be the
determining factor for reassignment in the absence of “substantial determining factors.”
Like LAUSD, San Diego’s Agreement precludes poorly performing teachers from
participation in the “bid and post” process, while Darnall’s Agreement departs from San
Diego’s by allowing administrators to consider such requests. Under the Ravenswood

106
Agreement, an administrator making a transfer or “assignment change” must make
seniority a “major factor” if other factors are equal; Edison’s Agreement incorporates the
same requirement.
Both Grossmont District’s and Helix’s Agreement require the school to
follow five specific steps to facilitate transfers, which include making efforts to promote
a positive view of transfers among teachers; and both Agreements include five criteria for
any transfer decision, including seniority, which must be the deciding factor when other
qualifications are equal.
The Petaluma District’s Agreement is procedurally unique in requiring
that a Union representative must be invited to any staff meeting at which vacancies
necessitating transfers will be discussed. The District must also allow application for
transfer by existing teachers before opening a position to outside applicants. However,
the Agreement gives administrators the discretion to choose the criteria they apply to
such decisions. Live Oak’s Agreement does not include any of these provisions. The
Agreement imposes no restriction on administrators’ ability to make transfer decisions
according to the Administrator’s judgment regarding the educational needs of the school.
Involuntary Transfer. With respect to involuntary transfers, LAUSD’s
agreement has detailed “displacement” provisions that apply during periods of declining
enrollment or budget cuts. The teacher with the least district seniority in an affected
group is displaced, unless the school administrator determines teacher has special
instructional skills or qualifications not possessed by another available teacher. While

107
the schools compared to LAUSD in this study do not face the same scale of displacement
as LAUSD, they can face the same issues on a smaller scale. The Camino Nuevo and LA
Leadership Agreements do not address displacement, but they impose no restriction on
administrators’ ability to make transfer decisions. Thus, when positions are eliminated,
modified or consolidated, administrators are able to transfer teachers to the any positions
they deem most suitable for their educational objectives. The Green Dot Agreement does
not impose specific criteria for involuntary transfers, but requires that the School have
“just cause,” and that there be no voluntary applicant. The Ocean Agreement does not
address displacement, but, like Green Dot’s Agreement, requires that before making any
involuntary transfer, the School must seek voluntary applicants. Additionally, teachers’
seniority is one of the factors the School must consider. This provides an element of
protection for incumbent teachers somewhat similar to LASUD’s, in restraining
administrators’ ability to determine that a teacher could better serve the school’s
objectives in a different position.
The Perris Agreement also requires the school to seek voluntary applicants
before making an involuntary transfer decision; requires that seniority be the first
criterion considered; and requires that the decision not be made for “arbitrary, capricious
or punitive” reasons. The Choice 2000 Agreement includes the same standard for all
transfer decisions. The Choice 2000 Administrator had been faced with one involuntary
transfer decision involving competing requests, and felt that the discretion given to
Choice 2000 that is not provided in the Perris agreement allowed the School to make the
decision that was in the best interest of the students.

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The San Diego District Agreement requires that before making
involuntary transfer decisions, the school must seek voluntary applicants, but the School
is not required to select a voluntary applicant; if none apply, the applicant with the least
seniority generally must be chosen. The Darnall Agreement requires the School to
transfer any voluntary applicant rather than making an involuntary transfer. This is one
of the few instances in which the charter school Agreement is more restrictive than the
comparable district agreement. Additionally, under the Darnall Agreement, new teachers
(as opposed to more senior teachers) are completely protected from involuntary transfer.
This provision takes a position opposite to most district agreements, including San
Diego’s, which generally protect the most senior teachers from involuntary transfer. This
apparently reflects agreement between Darnall and its Union that new teachers need time
to develop without the disruption caused by involuntary transfer.
This contrast in perspectives likely results from the administrators’
differing experiences, pointing to the need for charter school operators to consider all
possible applications of bargaining agreement terms when negotiating the school’s first
agreement. The Darnall Administrator interviewed for this study reported that the School
had not yet encountered any tension between the Agreement’s transfer provisions and the
Administrator’s views regarding the needs of the School.
Ravenswood’s Agreement requires administrators to have a “rational basis
in fact” for any involuntary transfer; the administrator must consult with the teacher
before making the transfer decision; and such decisions cannot be made for disciplinary

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reasons. As with assignment decisions, Edison’s Agreement incorporates all of these
provisions. As in the areas of assignment and voluntary transfer, Helix’s Agreement is
very similar to Grossmont’s. Both Agreements limit the permissible reasons for
involuntary transfers to staff imbalances, reduction in enrollment, or reduction in
programs or services. Thus, the transfer of a teacher to better address student needs does
not appear possible under either Agreement. Both Agreements regulate “reassignment”
necessitated by overstaffing, requiring the school to advertise available openings
elsewhere in the district and seek volunteers to transfer out of the school; if no teacher
volunteers, the school must attempt to assign the teacher at the teacher’s school.
Although Helix cannot transfer teachers to other schools in the district, it has taken on the
responsibility of determining whether other positions are available in those schools. This
appears to be a result of using Grossmont’s assignment and transfer provisions as a
template, although it was not required to do so. In this area, Helix demonstrates one
model for the creation of a charter’s bargaining agreement --- mirroring the local district
not only in the degree of restraint imposed on administrators, but also in the selection of
topics covered by the Agreements.
In contrast to the close relationship between Helix’s Agreement and
Grossmont’s, Live Oak’s Agreement is significantly different than the Petaluma
District’s, and this difference extends to involuntary transfer decisions. While
Petaluma’s Agreement specifies that district seniority, school-site seniority, and grade
level experience are the criteria that must be considered in any such decision, Live Oak’s
Agreement requires only that the Administrator consult with the teacher as early as

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possible when the transfer is for a reason other than filling a vacancy. As discussed
above, San Diego’s Agreement appears to view such transfers as a tool for reallocating
poorly performing teachers, while Darnall’s Agreement appears to treat them only as a
tool for filling vacancies. In light of these differing approaches to involuntary transfers,
Live Oak’s provision on this topic is interesting, in that it distinguishes between filling
vacancies and “other” purposes for involuntary transfers. This seems to indicate that
performance concerns or filling vacancies could be legitimate reasons for such a decision.
Finally, while the Petaluma Agreement prohibits any involuntary transfer decision based
on any “arbitrary or capricious” reason, Live Oak’s Agreement does not impose any
substantive restriction on administrators’ decisions.
In general, it is difficult to discern any pattern in the extent to which the
charter schools in this study differ from each other, or from their districts, in the areas of
assignment and transfer. As the need and opportunity for transfer decisions inherently
depend on the number of teachers at a school or within a school system, the size of the
charter organizations likely has a significant effect on the development of the
organization’s transfer policy, but the sample size of this study is too small to allow
meaningful consideration of that question. Rather, the schools’ varying approaches
suggest several models for charter schools considering the prospect of unionization, or
for schools and unions approaching negotiation of their first bargaining agreement.

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Research Question 2: Evaluation of Teachers
Teacher evaluation is a multi-purpose human resources tool. It forces
school leaders to pay attention to the performance and progress of teachers, and allows
them to provide guidance, correction and motivation. It also enables schools to make
formal decisions about teachers, which can include retention, assignment to leadership or
other specialty positions, additional pay, or, if an evaluation is negative, discipline or
dismissal. Because the evaluation process carries the potential for adverse action against
teachers, California’s “Stull Act” (from which charter schools are generally exempt)
restrains school leaders’ discretion, providing specific guidelines school districts must
follow in developing and implementing an evaluation system. Cal. Ed. Code § 44660 et.
seq.
California law governing teacher evaluation.
Frequency of Evaluation. The Stull Act requires that permanent teachers
in conventional public schools must be evaluated at least every other year, while
probationary teachers must be evaluated every year (Cal. Educ. Code § 44664(a)).
However, teachers who have been employed at least ten years by the district, met or
exceeded standards in the teacher’s last evaluation, and are considered “highly qualified”
as defined by the No Child Left Behind Act, may be evaluated only once every five years
if the evaluator and teacher both agree (Cal. Educ. Code § 44664(a)).

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Type, Frequency, Notice of Observation. Under California law,
evaluation must be conducted on a uniform basis, absent compelling circumstances
(Educ. Code § 44660). Otherwise, this subject is left to the discretion of the district,
subject to terms negotiated in a collective bargaining agreement.
Evaluation Instrument and Criteria. As explained in the sub-section on
collective bargaining below, the specific criteria used to evaluate teachers may be
negotiated with the teachers’ exclusive bargaining representatives. However, those
criteria must include certain minimum requirements, including (1) students’ performance
toward standards of expected achievement, as established by the district and, if
applicable, “state adopted academic content standards as measured by state adopted
criterion referenced assessments,” (2) the teacher’s instructional techniques and
strategies, (3) the teacher’s adherence to curricular objectives, and (4) the teacher’s
creation of a suitable learning environment (Educ. Code § 44662(b)(1)-(4)).
5

The Stull Act does not limit the district’s authority to adopt additional
evaluation or assessment guidelines (Educ. Code § 44662(f)), with one significant
exception: “The evaluation and assessment of certificated employee performance
pursuant to this section shall not include the use of publishers' norms established by
standardized tests (Educ. Code § 44662(e)).” This measuring tool has recently been the

5
(b) The governing board of each school district shall evaluate and assess certificated employee
performance as it reasonably relates to: (1) The progress of pupils toward the standards established
pursuant to subdivision (a) and, if applicable, the state adopted academic content standards as measured by
state adopted criterion referenced assessments. (2) The instructional techniques and strategies used by the
employee. (3) The employee's adherence to curricular objectives. (4) The establishment and maintenance
of a suitable learning environment, within the scope of the employee's responsibilities.

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subject of considerable discussion and controversy, including public debate between
California’s public officials and the United States Department of Education, which has
supported the use of test results in evaluation through its Race to the Top initiative. As
explained below, the charter schools in this study, which are exempt from the Stull Act’s
restriction, are currently grappling with the possible use of test scores in evaluation,
spurred in part by the Obama administration’s favorable position.
Delivery of Evaluation. A teacher’s evaluation must be prepared in
writing and given to the teacher no less than 30 days prior to the end of the school year
(Cal. Educ. Code § 44663(a)). The evaluator must discuss the evaluation with the teacher
prior to the last day of the school year, and the teacher has the right to provide a written
response which must be placed in the teacher’s personnel file (Cal. Educ. Code §
44663(a)).
Alternative Evaluation / PAR. If a school district participates in
California’s Peer Assistance and Review (“PAR”) program, the teacher’s involvement in
the program must also be included in the teacher’s evaluation (Educ. Code § 44662(d)).
The PAR is a mentoring program applicable only to teachers in districts with 250 or
greater units of daily attendance, and who volunteer for the program or are referred to the
program pursuant to Section 44664, or pursuant to a collectively bargained agreement.
PAR is an optional program, but districts that do not participate do not receive state
money tied to the program, including funding for the Administrator Training and
Evaluation Program (California Education Code section 44500(b)(2)) (although, as of

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this writing, the state’s financial problems have considerably depleted the budget for the
PAR program).
If a district adopts a PAR program, it must include at least the following
elements: (1) Performance goals for individual teachers must be in writing, clearly
stated, aligned with pupil learning, and consistent with Section 44662 (described above);
(2) Assistance and review must include multiple observations during periods of
classroom instruction; (3) The program shall expect and strongly encourage a cooperative
relationship between the consulting teacher and the principal with respect to the process
of peer assistance and review; (4) The school district shall provide sufficient staff
development activities to assist a teacher to improve his or her teaching skills and
knowledge; (5) The program shall have a monitoring component with a written record;
and (6) The final evaluation of a teacher’s participation in the program shall be made
available for placement in the personnel file of the teacher receiving assistance (Cal.
Educ. Code §§ 44500(b)(2)-(7)).
Follow-up for Low-Rated Teachers. Under the Stull Act, the
Superintendent or a designee must meet with any teacher receiving an unsatisfactory
review, and provide specific recommendations for improvement. (Cal. Educ. Code §
44664(b)). The evaluation must include recommendations, if necessary, regarding areas
of improvement for the teacher. If the teacher is not performing in a satisfactory manner
according to the District’s standards, the District must notify the teacher in writing and
describe the unsatisfactory performance. The District must then confer with the teacher,

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making specific recommendations for improvement, and endeavor to assist the teacher in
his or her performance. If any permanent teacher receives an unsatisfactory evaluation,
the District must annually evaluate the teacher until he or she “achieves a positive
evaluation or is separated from the district” (Cal. Educ. Code § 44664(b)).
Any evaluation containing an unsatisfactory rating in the areas of teaching
methods or instruction may also require that the teacher participate in a program designed
to improve in those areas (Cal. Educ. Code § 44664(c)). Additionally, if a district
participates in the Peer Assistance and Review Program for Teachers any certificated
employee who receives an unsatisfactory rating on an evaluation must participate in the
Peer Assistance and Review Program for Teachers (Cal. Educ. Code § 44664(c)). Thus,
for districts that participate in California’s PAR, the practical effect of the combination of
the Education Code’s PAR and dismissal provisions is that if a teacher’s performance is
unsatisfactory, the teacher must spend at least one year in PAR; if performance is still
unsatisfactory, the District may provide 90-day notice and move toward dismissal.
Application of state teacher evaluation law to charter schools
Subject to limited exceptions not relevant to this study, Charter schools are
generally exempt from the Education Code provisions regarding employment by
governing boards, unless stated in the school’s charter (Cal. Educ. Code § 47610).

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Evaluation in collective bargaining
The EERA applies to charter schools (Cal. Educ. Code § 47611.5(a)).
Under California law, mandatory subjects of bargaining include “terms and conditions of
employment,” which include “procedures to be used for the evaluation of employees. . .
.” (Cal. Govt. Code § 3543.2(a)). Many districts have determined that a multi-faceted
evaluation rubric is a more accurate and useful tool than a simple rating system that
forces administrators to choose between “satisfactory” and “unsatisfactory,” or even a
multiple-choice rating system. Rubrics generally enumerate a number of criteria for
evaluation, list several possible ratings, and explain the type of performance on each
criterion that would warrant each rating.
If a school district obtains the agreement of the Union representing its
teachers, it may adopt or include standards from the California Standards for the
Teaching Profession. The California Commission on Teacher Credentialing developed
the California Standards for the Teaching Profession in 1997. The Standards are
designed to help teachers: (1) prompt reflection about student learning and teaching
practice; (2) formulate professional goals to improve teaching practice; and (3) guide,
monitor and assess the progress of a teacher's practice toward professional goals and
professionally-accepted benchmarks. (California Commission on Teacher Credentialing,
1997). There are Standards in six categories of teaching practice: (1) Engaging and
Supporting All Students in Learning; (2) Creating and Maintaining Effective
Environments; (3) Understanding and Organizing Subject Matter; (4) Planning

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Instruction and Designing Learning Experiences; (5) Assessing Student Learning; and (6)
Developing as a Professional Educator. (Id., p. 3). Each Standard includes a number of
“elements,” for each of which the Commission has provided a specific examples of
development toward meeting the standard. The Standards are also used in California’s
credentialing system, which is beyond the scope of this study. (Kemerer, p. 66.) As
explained below, several of the schools examined in this study have adopted the
Standards in whole or in part.
Findings related to bargaining agreement provisions on teacher
evaluation
Frequency of Evaluation. Consistent with State law, most of the
conventional districts in the study (LAUSD, Perris, Ravenswood, Grossmont, and San
Diego), require that permanent teachers be evaluated every other year, and probationary
employees every year. The charter schools in the study generally have adopted the same
standards, or require more frequent evaluation for a longer period of time. Camino
Nuevo requires that each teacher must be evaluated every year. Green Dot also requires
schools to evaluate teachers every year: more experienced teachers on “Track II” are
evaluated each year, while less experienced teachers are formally evaluated at least twice
each year. Like the conventional school districts, Choice 2000 and Helix require
evaluation of permanent employees every two years. Edison generally requires
evaluation each year during the first four years, and then every other year. LA

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Leadership’s, Ocean’s, and Live Oak’s Agreements are silent regarding the frequency of
formal evaluation.
Evaluation Planning / Setting Objectives. The charter schools analyzed in
this study generally provide administrators more discretion to establish the objectives by
which teacher will be evaluated. LAUSD requires the administrator to meet with each
teacher to establish objectives by which the teacher will be evaluated, and allows the
teacher to appeal to a higher level administrator if the administrator and teacher disagree,
and to note on the evaluation that the teacher did not agree with the objectives. By
comparison, Camino Nuevo requires the administrator to provide the school’s checklist to
the teacher each semester, but does not require the school to involve the teacher in
establishing the objectives for evaluation. Green Dot requires a meeting to determine
whether the teacher will proceed under “Track I” or “Track II.” Track II, designed for
more experienced and successful teachers, is less structured, and the teacher takes much
more responsibility for the development of objectives and evaluation criteria.
Similarly, while Perris requires the school and teacher to meet and agree
on the standards for evaluation, Choice 2000 does not require any meeting, or any form
of discussion or collaboration. San Diego requires a meeting to review evaluation
procedures and to reach agreement on the objectives and criteria for evaluation. The
teacher must prepare a document setting forth the objectives, which the administrator
must then approve or disapprove. The Darnall agreement is silent, reserving discretion to
administrators. Ravenswood requires that the teacher be given a copy of the evaluation

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procedure and criteria; in the event of disagreement which the teacher and evaluator
cannot resolve, they must involve an Associate or Assistant Superintendent, who must
issue a written statement which becomes part of the teacher’s evaluation. The Edison
Agreement also requires that the evaluator and teacher meet to discuss evaluation criteria,
specifies that they must select three CSTP standards, only one of which is selected by the
teacher. Grossmont requires a conference in which the teacher advises the evaluator of
the teacher’s objectives, but does not require the teacher’s agreement to the objectives or
standards. Likewise, Helix’s agreement requires that teacher be given a copy of their
evaluation form and the California Standards by which they will be evaluated; although
the teacher may provide relevant material to the evaluator, the teacher’s agreement is not
required.
Type, Frequency, Notice of Observation. The central element of the
evaluation process is the observation of teachers performing in the classroom. Where
schools conduct only one observation, that single classroom experience can have a
disproportionate effect on the teacher’s reputation, and possibly on the school’s decision
about retention or dismissal. Accordingly, teachers’ unions have sought to protect
teachers by negotiating the right to receive notice of the date of the observation, to have
more than one observation, and to define the criteria by which the teacher will be
evaluated. The charter schools in this study provide some of these protections to
teachers, but are also more likely than conventional districts to allow administrators to
supplement these planned and somewhat controlled observations with informal
observations.

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LAUSD only requires the evaluator to provide a copy of written records
related to the conference within four working days of the observation. Camino Nuevo
requires the teacher to provide a lesson plan two days in advance of the observation; it
allows informal observations throughout the year, and specifically allows such
observations to be used in the teacher’s formal evaluation. Green Dot requires two
informal observations before the formal evaluation, requires a pre-observation conference
for beginning teachers in which the teacher and evaluator identify areas of focus from the
CSTPs, and requires the evaluator to include one artifact showing that the CSTP standard
was met. Ocean’s Agreement requires the teacher to provide a lesson form in advance of
the observation, and requires the evaluator and teacher to agree upon and sign the form.
The Perris District Agreement requires that the school provide formal notice in advance
of each observation and that the observation last a full class period; requires a post-
observation conference within ten days; and allows a teacher to request an additional
observation. The Choice 2000 Agreement requires prior notice and a post-observation
conference within 10 days, but does not mandate the length of the observation.
San Diego requires the teacher to provide an outline of the lesson to be
observed, requires a written report by the evaluator within ten days, and allows the
teacher to attach a written response; the Agreement also allows evaluators to observe
teachers outside the formal evaluation process. Darnall’s Agreement requires two formal
observations, but also allows unscheduled observations and evaluations. Ravenswood
mandates the length of time required for an observation, requires a pre-observation
conference and at least two days notice of the observation; any teacher receiving a

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negative observation must receive two additional observations. Edison’s Agreement is
very similar, mandating the length of time for the observation and requiring two days’
notice with a pre-observation conference; but it requires three formal observations rather
than two, and authorizes two informal observations. Grossmont’s Agreement requires a
pre-observation conference at which the teacher may provide material pertinent to the
review process; a post-observation conference; a report must be given to the teacher
within ten days; and each observation must be for the “appropriate” amount of time. The
Helix Agreement requires the school to give a copy of the observation to the teacher
within 7 days, and the teacher may submit a written response; any deficiencies must be
stated in writing, with specific ways to improve, and the teacher may provide a written
response. The Petaluma Agreement allows a teacher to request that a specific class be
observed, while the Live Oak Agreement requires only 24-hour notice, and allows drop-
in observations, enabling the school to obtain a more thorough understanding of the
teacher’s performance.
Individuals Involved in Evaluation. LAUSD generally requires that the
teacher’s supervisor must evaluate the employee, but allows the supervisor to delegate
these evaluation functions. The charter schools in its area do not specify the individual
who must conduct the evaluation, although Camino Nuevo’s Agreement suggests that it
may be someone other than the principal, by requiring advance notice if someone else
will conduct the evaluation. The Perris District requires the site level administrator, and
prohibits the use of non-administrators without the agreement of the teacher, while
Choice 2000 is silent, imposing no restrictions on the school. The San Diego District

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requires the teacher’s supervisor to act as evaluator, while Darnall’s Agreement is silent.
The Ravenswood Agreement requires the teacher’s immediate supervisor to perform the
evaluation; Edison’s Agreement prohibits teachers from evaluating other teachers, except
through the Agreement’s PAR program. The Grossmont Agreement requires advance
notice of the identity of the evaluator, and allows teachers to request the participation of
another teacher; the Helix Agreement allows the teacher to object to the choice of the
evaluator, but the teacher cannot request that another teacher be assigned as part of the
evaluation team. While the Petaluma Agreement requires evaluation by a management
team member, the Live Oak agreement allows evaluation by an outside Waldorf teacher.
Evaluation Instrument and Criteria. Conventional public school districts
have often been criticized for using a binary, “Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory” type of
evaluation, which can allow the teacher to challenge any dismissal on the grounds that
the teacher had previously received “Satisfactory” evaluations. Most of the charter
schools in this study have adopted a more detailed, rubric-style evaluation instrument
than those used by their comparable districts, allowing a broader range of overall
evaluations. LAUSD’s Stull Evaluation Form includes “yes” or “no” ratings on 25
categories in five enumerated Areas (Instructional Objectives, Preparation and Planning,
Classroom Performance, General Professional Skills, and Punctuality and Attendance),
and requires an overall rating of “Meets Standard Performance” or “Below Standard
Performance.” Camino Nuevo uses a detailed rubric for evaluation, based on the
California Standards for the Teaching Profession; rather than requiring “yes” or “no”
ratings and an overall “Meets” or “Below Standards” rating, it requires that each teacher

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be rated on each of the CSTP standards using a rating from 1 to 4. Camino Nuevo has
the discretion to offer two-year contracts to teachers based on their performance, as
evaluated using this rubric. Green Dot uses a formal evaluation following criteria
developed by teachers based on the CSTPs, and also a Unit Portfolio involving in-depth
reflection and work samples, with customized requirements for Track I (beginning
teachers) and Track II (more experienced and successful teachers). Ocean also uses a
rubric, requiring one of four ratings for criteria that are based on the CSTPs. LA
Leadership’s agreement does not require any specific form for teacher evaluation.
The Perris Agreement requires evaluation on enumerated CSTP standards
based on the teacher’s years of experience, using one of four ratings: Meets Standard,
Needs Improvement, Unsatisfactory, or Not Applicable. The Choice 2000 Agreement
does not require the use of any specific form or criteria. San Diego requires evaluation
on three objectives from enumerated standards similar but not identical to the CSTPs;
teachers are rated “Unsatisfactory,” “Requires Improvement,” or “Satisfactory.”
Darnall’s Agreement uses five ratings: “Far Below,” “Below,” “Developing,” “Meets,”
and “Exemplifies Standard.” Ravenswood’s evaluation process uses the CSTPs, but
requires one of four ratings. Edison’s evaluation uses the six CSTP standards but adds its
own: compliance with Edison’s own professional requirements. Edison’s evaluation
departs from the district’s in adopting a comprehensive approach that incorporates
assistance by a lead teacher and peers, a professional portfolio, and self-appraisal in
addition to the formal evaluation. Grossmont’s Agreement requires evaluation according
to CSTP standards, using one of four ratings. Helix’s evaluation form also uses the five

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CSTP standards, but adds its own measurement of the teacher’s professional attitude and
interpersonal relationships, and requires one of three ratings. Petaluma’s Agreement
focuses on the “affective domain,” while allowing the school and teacher significant
leeway to develop goals. Live Oak’s evaluation process assigns one of four ratings on six
areas of performance, which are spelled out in more detail than Petaluma’s, but are
modified from the CSTPs to suit Live Oak’s own emphasis, including Yearly Curriculum
Planning, Incorporation of the Arts in Teaching, and Parent & Organization
Responsibilities.
Alternative Evaluation / Peer Assistance and Review (“PAR”). The
charter schools in this study generally distinguish between newer and more experienced
teachers in the use of alternative forms of evaluation, including Peer Assistance and
Review, more often than conventional district agreements. As explained in the
Evaluation Instrument section above, these schools generally give teachers less influence
over the development of the standards by which they are evaluated; but they are more
likely to authorize variation in the evaluation process for experienced teachers, who are
given greater control over those standards.
LAUSD adopts the PAR program outlined by the State, but the program
only supplements the standard evaluation. For teachers who receive a “Below Standard
Performance” rating, the PAR program provides assistance from a Consulting Teacher,
who may report to the PAR panel any teacher who does not make sufficient
improvement. Green Dot does not provide a formal PAR program, but its Track II

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program is available for all experienced teachers, and its Track I program includes many
of the elements typically provided through a PAR program, including customized goal-
setting, portfolios of teachers’ work, and continuous interaction and observation. Camino
Nuevo’s Agreement allows teachers with three years of satisfactory evaluations to use an
alternative form of evaluation, but does not include specific guidelines for that
evaluation.
San Diego’s Agreement allows an alternative form of review for teachers
with five years of experience, which allows teachers to grow in self-chosen areas of
interest, while still holding them accountable for basic Education Code performance
requirements. The Agreement also provides a PAR for poorly-performing teachers. The
Darnall Agreement allows a teacher to request a “process-based” approach, following a
project and case-study method based on the CSTPs. Ravenswood requires teachers to
participate in PAR when they receive unsatisfactory ratings in “subject matter
knowledge,” “teaching strategies,” or “teaching skills” in any evaluation; a Consulting
Teacher must monitor the teacher, provide customized assistance, and report to a PAR
Panel. However, the District does not provide any form of alternative evaluation for
more experienced teachers. As described above, Edison’s standard evaluation could be
considered an “alternative” evaluation process, and Edison does not provide a separate
PAR program. Grossmont’s Agreement provides one form of PAR for experienced
teachers receiving “Meets Expectations” ratings, which is designed to shift to a “student-
centered” evaluation, and also requires that any teacher receiving “Does Not Meet
Standards” ratings in any three of the first five CSTP standards must participate in a PAR

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program. Helix’s Agreement also requires any teacher receiving an overall “Does Not
Meet Standards” rating to participate in a PAR program, in which a Consulting Teacher
monitors the teacher and determines whether further support will be productive; however,
Helix provides no opportunity for experienced teachers to depart from the standard
evaluation process.
Follow-up for Low-Rated Teachers. While the charter school agreements
in this study generally are more likely to allow departure from the standard evaluation
process for experienced teachers, they are generally less likely to require formal measures
to assist poorly-performing teachers than their comparable school districts.
The LAUSD Agreement requires teachers rated “Below Standard
Performance” to participate in its PAR program. Camino Nuevo does not have a formal
PAR program, but teacher receiving low evaluations ratings (1 or 2 out of 4) must be
provided a guidance plan and given customized resources. Green Dot allows, but does
not require, the creation of a “Development Plan” for a teacher rated “meeting” or
“partially meeting” any CSTP standard. If performance does not improve, or if a teacher
is rated “Practice Does Not Meet Standards,” an Improvement Plan must be
implemented, and the Principal must take enumerated steps to help the teacher improve.
Failure to improve can result in dismissal, which, under the Green Dot Agreement,
requires “just cause.” Ocean provides a less formal means of assistance, authorizing a
second observation at the request of the teacher or administrator, and requiring

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affirmative action by the school to assist the teacher, including released time and visits to
other classes.
The Perris District Agreement requires an “Improvement Plan” for
teachers receiving “unsatisfactory” or “needs improvement” ratings; the teacher must be
given recommendations and assistance, but no specific forms of assistance are
enumerated. The Choice 2000 Agreement requires only that teachers rated as
“Unsatisfactory” must be evaluated every year until the teacher receives a “Satisfactory”
rating or is separated from the School. San Diego’s Agreement requires the development
of a remediation plan when a teacher’s evaluation is “less than satisfactory,” which must
include specific direction for improvement, resources to be made available, and
consultation with the principal. The teacher must also be evaluated every year under the
evaluation is effective or other action is taken. The Agreement also provides a detailed
improvement program, which involving development of detailed lesson plans, peer
coaching, and in-service training. The Darnall Agreement requires the development of
an “Improvement Plan” for teachers rated as “Below” or “Far Below Standards.” The
Plan can lead to dismissal if sufficient improvement is not shown within 60 days.
Darnall’s improvement plan imposes less detailed requirements on the school, and a
greater obligation on teachers to show prompt improvement.
The Ravenswood Agreement also requires action by the evaluator after a
low rating on any key CSTP standard, which includes the PAR program described above,
or other district training; however, a teacher cannot be required to participate unless

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notice has been given and the teacher has failed to improve. Edison’s Agreement closely
mirrors Ravenswood’s, requiring participation after an unsatisfactory rating on any key
CSTP element; but it also requires yearly evaluation for teacher performing
unsatisfactorily, and requires additional two additional observations within the next two
months. Grossmont’s Agreement requires participation in the PAR program if a teacher
receives a “Does Not Meet Standards” rating on an of the first three CSTP standards, and
requires the school to evaluate the teacher annually until sufficient improvement is
shown. Helix’s agreement tracks Grossmont’s in requiring any teacher receiving three
“Does not Meet Standards” ratings to enter PAR, and requiring annual evaluation until a
Satisfactory rating is achieved or the teacher is dismissed. The Petaluma Agreement
requires an additional evaluation the next year for teachers receiving an overall “Needs
Improvement” or “Not Satisfactory” rating, but does not mandate any specific assistance.
The Live Oak Agreement does not include any specific requirement of assistance for
low-rated teachers.
Research Question No. 3: Teacher Discipline and Dismissal
California law governing teacher discipline
Discipline of teachers is action taken against the teacher falling short of
dismissal. Other than serious misconduct warranting immediate action, progressive
discipline is usually followed, which can include placement of a derogatory comment in
the teacher’s file, an oral warning, a conference, a written warning, a letter of reprimand,
or suspension. California law establishes a fairly detailed process for unpaid suspension

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of more than 15 days, but is silent regarding the standards and procedures for less serious
discipline, allowing the school and union to negotiate such provisions(addressed below).
In California’s public schools, a probationary teacher may be dismissed
during the school year for cause (as defined in Cal. Educ. Code § 44932), or for
unsatisfactory performance, 44660 (the Stull Act) (Cal. Educ. Code § 44948.3(a)). A
teacher may be suspended on the same grounds (Cal. Educ. Code § 44948.3(b)).
A permanent teacher may be suspended on grounds of unprofessional
conduct, provided the school provides a written description of the improper conduct and
an opportunity to improve (Cal. Educ. Code § 44932(b)).
6
A teacher may be immediately
suspended based on written charges of immoral conduct, conviction of a felony or a
crime involving moral turpitude, incompetency, or willful refusal to perform regular
assignments without reasonable cause. Cal. Educ. Code § 44939.
A “Skelly” conference --- an informal meeting between the administrator
and employee --- must be held before a certificated teacher is suspended without pay, as
the loss of pay constitutes an infringement on the teacher’s property right. See Skelly v.
State Personnel Board, 15 Cal.3d 194 (1975). The conference provides the teacher

6
As the Court held in Crowl v. Commission on Professional Competence (1990, Cal App 3d Dist) 225 Cal
App 3d 334, 275 Cal Rptr 86, Education Code section 44938, subd. (a), providing that a school board shall
"not act upon any charges of unprofessional conduct" unless the statutory notice is given, requires that
notice be given when it suspends a teacher on the ground of unprofessional conduct, not merely when it
dismisses a teacher on that ground. Education Code section 44938, subd. (c) states that "unprofessional
conduct as used in this section means, and refers to, the unprofessional conduct particularly specified as a
cause for dismissal or suspension ..."

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written notice of the charges justifying suspension, and an opportunity to respond to the
administration’s accusations.
A teacher must receive notice of any disciplinary document that could
affect the status of his or her employment. If notice is not given, the discipline cannot
proceed, and the disciplinary document may be ordered removed from the teacher’s file
(Cal. Educ. Code § 44031). Any information of a derogatory nature may not be placed in
the teacher’s file unless the teacher has been given notice and an opportunity to review it
and enter his own comment in the file regarding the material.
Under the EERA, teachers potentially subjected to discipline are entitled
to have a union representative present for any conference or discussion with the
administrator when he or she reasonably believes, based on the objective circumstances,
that the particular conference could lead to discipline (Cal. Govt. Code § 3543.1(a));
Redwoods Community College Dist. v. PERB, 150 Cal. App. 3d 619, 205 Cal. Rptr. 523
(1984).
Collective bargaining regarding teacher discipline
Under the EERA, bargaining is mandatory, if requested by either party,
regarding the causes for discipline and disciplinary procedures, including suspension of
pay for up to fifteen days. This applies to both probationary and permanent teachers.
Cal. Govt. Code § 3543.2(b). In the absence of mutual agreement on these subjects, the
provisions of the Education Code applicable to suspension and dismissal govern (Cal.

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Govt. Code § 3543.2(b)).
7
Thus, conventional school districts can use the bargaining
process to incorporate flexibility into the disciplinary process in most cases.
California law also provides that “[i]f the charter of a charter school does
not specify that it shall comply with those statutes and regulations governing public
school employers that establish and regulate tenure or a merit or civil service system, the
scope of representation for that charter school shall also include discipline and dismissal
of charter school employees” (Cal. Educ. Code § 47611.5(c)). Thus, while charter
schools are not subject to the provisions of the Education Code governing discipline of
fifteen days or more, or dismissal, if a charter becomes unionized and does not
voluntarily adopt those provisions, it must negotiate with the union regarding those
subjects. Accordingly, a charter’s ability to discipline or dismiss teachers will largely be
based upon the position and strength of the union.
California law governing non-reelection or dismissal of probationary
teachers
Classification. Teachers who are not substitute or permanent teachers are
probationary teachers. Educ. Code § 44915. Certificated probationary teachers (in
districts with more than 250 average daily attendance) become permanent employees

7
“Notwithstanding Section 44944 of the Education Code, the public school employer and the exclusive
representative shall, upon request of either party, meet and negotiate regarding causes and procedures for
disciplinary action, other than dismissal, including a suspension of pay for up to 15 days, affecting
certificated employees. If the public school employer and the exclusive representative do not reach mutual
agreement, then the provisions of Section 44944 of the Education Code shall apply” (Cal. Govt. Code §
3543.2(b)).

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once they have taught for two complete, consecutive school years. Educ. Code §
44929.21(a).
Grounds for Non-reelection. A defining characteristic of probationary
status is non-reelection. Educ. Code § 44944(a). A probationary teacher may be released
by giving notice of non-reelection, meaning the teacher will not return to the school the
following year. For teachers in their first year of employment, notice can be given at any
time prior to the end of the school year that the district will not reelect the teacher for the
following year. No finding of cause is necessary. See Board of Education of Round
Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. Round Valley Teachers Association, 13 Cal. 4
th
269, 279, 52
Cal. Rptr. 2d 115, 121 (1996).
Grounds for Dismissal During School Year. In California’s public
schools, a probationary teacher may be dismissed during the school year for cause (Cal.
Educ. Code § 44932), or for unsatisfactory performance, 44660 (Stull Act) (Cal. Educ.
Code § 44948.3(a)). In the alternative, a teacher may be suspended on the same grounds.
(Cal. Educ. Code § 44948.3(b)). Although Education Code section 44932, stating the
grounds for dismissal of a permanent employee, by its terms refers only to permanent
employees, the statute also applies to dismissals of probationary employees that occur
during the school year. See Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Commission on
Professional Competence (1977) 20 Cal 3d 309, 142 Cal Rptr 439, 572 P2d 53.
Immediate suspension is authorized for immoral conduct, conviction of a
felony or other crime involving moral turpitude, incompetency due to mental disability,

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or refusal to perform assignments without reasonable cause (Cal. Educ. Code § 44939).
The school’s governing board must meet to adopt a resolution authorizing any non-
reelection decision. The meeting can be held in a closed-door session, without notice to
the public or the teacher. See Fischer v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 70
Cal.App.4th 87 (1999).
Dismissal: Procedure. For teachers in their first or second consecutive
year of employment, the school must give 30 days’ notice of dismissal during the school
year by March 15 of the second year of employment (Cal. Educ. Code § 44948.3(a)(1)).
The Notice must include a statement of the reasons for the dismissal and notice of the
opportunity to appeal (Cal. Educ. Code § 44948.3(a)(2)).
In the event of a dismissal for unsatisfactory performance, a copy of the
evaluation conducted pursuant to Section 44664 (above) must accompany the written
notice. (Cal. Educ. Code § 44948.3(a)(1)). If the school district fails to notify a
probationary teacher that her performance was unsatisfactory, pursuant to Education
Code sections 44948.3, 44938, or to work with her for a reasonable time to improve it, as
required by Education Code section 44664, the dismissal will be considered void and
reversed. Achene v. Pierce Joint Unified School Dist. (2009, 3d Dist) 2009 Cal App
LEXIS 1336.
Dismissal: Right to Challenge. A probationary teacher has 15 days from
receipt of the notice of dismissal to submit a written request for a hearing (Cal. Educ.
Code § 44948.3(a)(1)). The district is authorized to establish procedures for the

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appointment of an administrative law judge to conduct the hearing and submit a
recommended decision to the board. The failure of an employee to request a hearing
within 15 days from receipt of a dismissal notice constitutes a waiver of the right to a
hearing. Cal. Educ. Code § 44948.3(a)(2). The school board may conduct a hearing or
defer it to an administrative law judge, but the school district retains the discretion to
make the final decision. The Education Code does not set forth specific requirements for
a dismissal hearing for a probationary teacher, but the hearing must comport with basic
due process requirements, including notice and an opportunity to be heard (Cal. Educ.
Code § 44948.3(a)(2)). However, the decision cannot be challenged except on grounds
that the decision was made for an unlawful reason, such as a bias against the teacher’s
race or gender.
California law governing dismissal of permanent teachers
Classification. Under California law, any teacher in a district with more
than 250 average daily attendance, who serves two complete, consecutive years and is not
dismissed, becomes a permanent employee (Cal. Educ. Code § 44929.21(b)). The term
“complete” is defined as seventy-five percent of the days that schools are in session
(which, by law, is 180 days between July 1 and June 30). Education Code section 44908;
Vittal v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 8 Cal.App.3d 112, 118 (1970). .

135
Dismissal: Grounds. Education Code section 44932 provides a specific
list of permissible reasons for dismissal of a permanent teacher:
1. Immoral or unprofessional conduct.
2. Commission, aiding, or advocating the commission of acts of
criminal syndicalism.
3. Dishonesty.
4. Unsatisfactory performance.
5. Evident unfitness for service.
6. Physical or mental condition unfitting him or her to instruct or
associate with children.
7. Persistent violation of or refusal to obey the school laws of the
state, State Board of Education or the governing board of the
school district.
8. Conviction of a felony or of any crime involving moral turpitude.
9. Advocacy or teaching of communism
10. Knowing membership by the employee in the Communist Party.
11. Alcoholism or other drug abuse which makes the employee unfit to
instruct or associate with children.

Other grounds may justify dismissal, but the district must specify the
instances of behavior that constitutes unprofessional conduct (Cal. Educ. Code § 44933).
Dismissal for Unsatisfactory Performance: Procedure. Dismissal for
unsatisfactory performance requires that a teacher be provided 90-day notice, and the
school must identify the specific instances of unsatisfactory performance. The teacher
must be given a grace period in which to attempt to cure deficiencies before dismissal is
carried out (Educ. Code § 44938(b)(1)). The Morrison factors do not apply to dismissals
based on unsatisfactory performance. However, the Stull Act provides several factors

136
that may be relevant to such a determination: (1) progress of students toward meeting
state standards, (2) instructional techniques and strategies, (3) adherence to curricular
objectives, and (4) establishment and maintenance of a suitable learning environment
(Cal. Educ. Code § 44662).
Under California law, dismissal of a permanent teacher or suspension for
poor performance follows a four-step process. First, notice of intent to dismiss or
suspend must be given to the teacher (Educ. Code §§ 44934, 44936). Notice must be
given at least 90 days prior to the intended dismissal date. The teacher’s evaluation must
be included with the notice. The notice requirement is intended to provide the teacher
sufficient time to correct any faults and overcome the grounds for the charge. Therefore,
the notice must be sufficiently specific to allow the teacher to correct any faults addressed
by the notice.
After the 90-day period has expired, written charges must be filed with the
governing board (Cal. Educ Code §§ 44934, 44938(b)(1)). Charges must be sufficiently
specific to allow the teacher to prepare a defense. The statutes or rules allegedly violated
must be listed, as well as the conduct allegedly violating the rules or statutes. Only
conduct occurring in the previous four years may be included.
Any teacher who wishes to contest the proposed dismissal may file a
request for a hearing within 30 days of receiving notice (Cal. Educ. Code § 44934). If no
hearing is requested, the teacher is dismissed or suspended at the end of the 30-day
period. After receiving a demand for a hearing, the district may rescind its decision or

137
schedule the matter for a hearing (Cal. Educ. Code § 44943). The hearing is conducted in
accordance with California’s Administrative Procedure Act (Cal. Govt. Code § 11500 et
seq). The hearing must be held within 60 days of the teacher’s request. The Board must
issue a formal accusation, after which both parties may take discovery as in a civil trial,
including oral depositions. The teacher has the right to be represented by counsel, to
obtain the names of the district’s witnesses, and to inspect all relevant documents. The
hearing is held by a 3-member board called a Commission on Professional Competence
(“CPC”). One member is chosen by the teacher, one by the district, and the third is an
administrative law judge. The teacher’s representative is typically chosen by her Union,
from a list of employees trained to serve as CPC hearing officers.
A majority vote is required for dismissal (or suspension), and the CPC
must issue a written ruling containing findings of fact and determination of issues. If the
district’s decision to dismiss is overruled, the teacher is reinstated. Under the California
Supreme Court decision in California Teachers Assn. v. State of California, 20 Cal. 4
th

327 (1999), the district must pay the costs of the hearing, even if it prevails. Both parties
must pay their own attorney’s fees.
Finally, either party may petition to the Superior Court for review of the
CPC’s decision (Cal. Educ. Code § 44945). The Court exercises independent judgment
in reviewing the CPC.
Dismissal on grounds that teacher is “unfit to teach.” In Morrison v. State
Board of Education, 1 Cal. 3d 214 (1969), the California Supreme Court provided

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guidelines for determining whether a teacher’s conduct makes him or her “unfit to teach.”
Such a dismissal requires an analysis of whether the teacher’s conduct adversely affects
students or teachers, the degree of such adversity, the proximity or closeness in time of
the conduct, the type of teaching credential held by the teach, the extenuating or
aggravating circumstances, the likelihood of recurrence, and the extent to which
disciplinary action might have a chilling effect on the constitutional rights of the teacher
or other teachers.
If the teacher is dismissed for unprofessional conduct, the teacher must be
given written notice 45 days before the filing of the charge specifying the nature of the
conduct to allow the teacher to correct the problems. Educ. Code s 44938(a). The Court
in Woodland Joint Union School Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence, 2
Cal.App.4th 1429 (1992) established that the school need not apply the Morrison factors
to each allegation, only to the allegations as a whole. If application of those factors
indicates that the teacher is unfit, and the unfitness is a character trait, rather than specific
unprofessional conduct that might be corrected, the teacher may be terminated without
the 45 days’ notice required for dismissals based on unprofessional conduct.
Dismissal for Refusal to Obey School or State Laws or Regulations.
California’s Rules of Conduct for Professional Educators provide ethical rules for
teachers which, if violated, may warrant dismissal. Conduct prohibited by the rules
includes failure to use candor and honesty in letters of recommendation, obtaining private
gain from the use of confidential student information, performance of duties when

139
mentally impaired, including impairment from drug or alcohol use, and harassment of
those who report wrongdoing. 5 Cal Code Regs. §§ 80331-80339. A teacher’s refusal
to meet goals set by the teacher may constitute “Persistent violation of or refusal to obey
the school laws of the state,” also warranting dismissal. See San Dieguito Union High
School District v. Commission on Professional Competence, 174 Cal.App.3d 1176
(1995).
Dismissal for Unprofessional Conduct. Education Code section 44938(a)
requires that the Board may dismiss a teacher for unprofessional conduct after giving the
teacher written notice of the conduct, specifying the nature of the conduct and providing
specific examples with sufficient particularity to allow the teacher to correct the
problems. The written notice must include the teacher’s evaluation issued pursuant to the
Education Code. Before filing charges, the teacher must have been given at least 45
calendar days prior to the date of the filing, the board or its authorized representative has
given the employee against whom the charge is filed, written notice of the unprofessional
conduct, specifying the nature thereof with such specific instances of behavior and with
such particularity as to furnish the employee an opportunity to correct his or her faults
and overcome the grounds for the charge. The written notice shall include the evaluation
made pursuant to Article 11 (commencing with Section 44660) of Chapter 3, if applicable
to the employee.” (Cal. Educ. Code § 44938(a)).

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Collective Bargaining Regarding Teacher Dismissal in California.
Dismissal of permanent teachers is governed by the Education Code, and
falls outside the scope of collective bargaining (Cal. Govt. Code § 3543.2(b)). Due
process rights for probationary employees also fall outside the permissible scope of
bargaining. Accordingly, attempting to bargain for such rights is nullified by the
Education Code. See Board of Education of Round Valley Unified School Dist. v. Round
Valley Teachers Association, 13 Cal. 4
th
269, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115 (1996). However,
while charter schools are not subject to the provisions of the Education Code governing
dismissal, if a unionized charter has not voluntarily adopted those provisions, it must
negotiate with the union regarding teacher dismissal (Cal. Educ. Code § 47611.5(c)).
Moreover, any dismissal must include consideration of whether the teacher was evaluated
in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement.
Findings related to bargaining agreement provisions on teacher discipline
and dismissal
Classification and Security (Including Permanence or “Tenure”). The
conventional districts in the study ---- LAUSD, Perris Union, San Diego Unified,
Ravenswood, Grossmont, and Petaluma --- are subject to the Education Code, which
provides that teachers who serve two complete, consecutive years, and are not released,
become permanent employees. Conventional school districts are prohibited from
modifying those provisions through collective bargaining, but the charter schools in this

141
study were free to negotiate their own terms regarding classification, discipline and
dismissal. Thus, Camino Nuevo’s Agreement gives the school discretion to offer a two-
year contract after three years, renewable at the school’s option. Green Dot does not
technically provide any form of “tenure,” but provides all teachers the primary protection
associated with tenure, by requiring “good cause” for dismissal. Likewise, LA
Leadership requires “good cause” for discipline or dismissal after two years. Ocean
classifies teachers as “ongoing” after two years, and allows dismissal thereafter only for
“just cause.” At Live Oak, after a teacher’s third year, if the teacher is invited back for a
fourth year, the teacher becomes “permanent” and receives tenure. While the Perris
District is subject to the Education Code, Choice 2000 does not include any provision
classifying teachers; it requires “just cause” for discipline, but imposes no standard for
dismissal. Darnall, which falls within the San Diego District, provides teachers a one-
year contract after two years of service, which is automatically renewed only if the
teacher receives a rating of “Developing,” “Meets” or “Exemplifies Standard.” This
provision was a unique hybrid model not found in any other district or charter school: a
semi-automated contract renewal requiring no new agreement by the school (similar to
conventional districts’ permanent status), but dependent on performance (like at-will
status in charter schools).
Edison’s Agreement is silent regarding “permanent” status for teachers.
As explained in the Assignment and Transfer and Evaluation portions of this study,
Edison’s Agreement closely tracks the Ravenswood District’s agreement in many
elements, and appears to have tracked the District’s agreement on this provision as well.

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However, while Ravenswood’s silence is mandated by the EERA due to the Education
Code’s mandatory application regarding classification and dismissal, because the
Education code does not apply to charter schools (as long as they bargain regarding
discipline and dismissal), provided Edison bargained on those issues (Edison was not
interviewed), its silence has the effect of eliminating any “permanent” status for teachers.
Helix, which falls within the Grossmont District, requires “just cause” for discipline of
any teachers after two years including suspension of up to 15 days, and classifies such
employees as “permanent” for evaluation purposes, but does not impose any “good
cause” or “just cause” standard for dismissal.
Standard and Grounds for Discipline. As explained above, California law
allows conventional public school districts to bargain over the “causes for discipline and
disciplinary procedures, other than dismissal, including suspension of pay for up to
fifteen days.” The districts in this study have taken advantage of that flexibility in
varying degrees. Surprisingly, the charter schools in the study --- which have complete
discretion to bargain regarding disciplinary causes and procedures --- often followed the
example of the conventional districts, although they were not required to do so. For
example, LAUSD requires that teachers can only be disciplined for “just cause.”
Although Camino Nuevo does not impose any specific standard for teacher discipline,
Green Dot requires “good cause” for discipline of any teacher, as does Choice 2000,
while LA Leadership and Ocean require “just cause” for any discipline after two years.
Darnall’s Agreement authorizes discipline, up to a letter of reprimand, for “unsatisfactory
performance,” unprofessional conduct, or violation of reasonable regulations, policies

143
and procedures. This list of permissible bases for discipline is somewhat similar to that
provided by California law, and in that sense Darnall’s Agreement is the closest to its
comparable district among the schools in the study. See Cal. Educ. Code § 44948.3(b).
The Ravenswood District allows discipline only for “just cause,” while
Edison’s Agreement imposes a lower standard, requiring only that discipline cannot be
imposed for “arbitrary or capricious” reasons. The Helix Agreement is unique in
specifically incorporating reference to the Education Code, requiring “just cause” for
discipline not specifically permitted by the Education Code. The Petaluma District
negotiated a modification from the Education Code provisions, requiring “just cause” but
defining it more broadly than the Education Code, to include violation of district policy,
the code of ethics, or the conduct expected of professional educators; abusive behavior;
or failure to perform contractual obligations. Live Oak’s Agreement provides that a
teacher with permanent status (in the teacher’s fourth year) can only be suspended
without pay “for cause”; examples listed include unsatisfactory performance, neglect of
duty, inefficiency, discourteous treatment, and unprofessional conduct.
Discipline Process / Progressive Discipline. As allowed by California law,
LAUSD negotiated a specific process to govern discipline short of suspension of more
than 15 days, including a Notice of Unsatisfactory Service or Act. The Agreement
requires that “progressive discipline” must be followed in most situations; the Agreement
also requires due process, consisting of notice to the teacher, a meeting to discuss the
issue, and the presence of a Union representative if requested by the teacher. Other

144
discipline must follow the provisions of the Education Code. Camino Nuevo does not
require any form of “progressive discipline.” Green Dot likewise does not impose any
“progressive discipline” requirement, although it establishes procedural protections for
teachers on an “Improvement Plan” for performance problems. Ocean’s Agreement
require progressive discipline in several enumerated steps, from verbal warning to
dismissal; in that respect, it is more restrictive than LAUSD’s Agreement, which does not
establish a specific progression. Ocean also requires the elements of due process
provided by the LAUSD Agreement. The Choice 2000 Agreement is similar to the Perris
Agreement in requiring “progressive discipline,” without establishing any specific
progression, while omitting the Perris Agreement’s requirement that the District must
discuss the discipline with the teacher in advance and take the teacher’s response into
account. San Diego’s Agreement, unlike LAUSD’s, requires several enumerated steps of
“progressive discipline” in most situations (verbal warning, written warning and letter of
reprimand), leading to suspension. Darnall’s Agreement is substantially similar, but also
provides that each step must be followed for each distinct conduct by the teacher.
Ravenswood’s Agreement establishes a four-step progressive discipline process.
Edison’s Agreement, which tracks Ravenswood’s on many topics, does not require any
form of progressive discipline. Helix closely follows Grossmont’s Agreement, requiring
progressive discipline without establishing any specific progression. The Petaluma
Agreement requires the elements of due process outlined above, and requires a verbal
warning before any formal discipline, even for more “serious” incidents, followed by a
written warning, suspension without pay for up to five work days, and additional

145
suspension (for up to 15 days). Live Oak does not require any form of progressive
discipline.
Generally, the charter schools in this study have not retained as much
discretion with respect to disciplinary decision as they have in assignment or transfer
decisions. This is likely a reflection of the importance teachers place on protection from
discipline, which clearly has a more immediate and negative effect on a teacher’s career.
Grounds for Dismissal. As explained above, LASUD and the other
conventional districts in the study are governed by the Education Code, which
enumerates the grounds for dismissal. Because the districts are prohibited from
modifying those provisions through collective bargaining, the Agreements are silent on
that subject. Under California law, a probationary teacher may be released by giving
notice of non-reelection, meaning the teacher will not return to the school the following
year, with or without “cause.” Permanent teachers may be dismissed for unsatisfactory
performance under The Stull Act, or “for cause,” as defined by Education Code section
44932. The same standards apply to dismissal of probationary teachers during the school
year.
Most of the charter schools in the study negotiated some form of “cause”
standard for dismissal. At one end of the spectrum, Camino Nuevo’s agreement allows
the school to provide two-year contracts, renewable at the complete discretion of the
school. The agreement authorizes immediate dismissal during the term of a contract “for
cause,” and gives the school discretion to define “cause,” while providing a number of

146
examples to guide administrators and assist in the adjudication of any dispute regarding a
dismissal decision. Choice 2000 and Helix, which fall within the Perris and Grossmont
Districts respectively, do not impose any standard for dismissal. Edison’s Agreement is
silent regarding the grounds for dismissal. At the other end of the spectrum, Green Dot
requires “good cause” for dismissal of any teacher. LA Leadership requires “good cause”
for dismissal after two years. Ocean classifies teachers as “ongoing” after two years, and
allows dismissal thereafter only for “just cause.” Darnall, which falls within the San
Diego District, may choose not to renew the contract of any teacher who does not receive
an evaluation rating of “Developing,” “Meets” or “Exemplifies Standard” (the top three
of five possible ratings). Live Oak is authorized to dismiss a probationary during the
school year only for “reasonable cause.” A permanent teacher can only be dismissed “for
cause”; examples listed include unsatisfactory performance, neglect of duty, inefficiency,
discourteous treatment, and unprofessional conduct.
Dismissal – Procedure. As with the grounds for dismissal, the Education
Code’s provisions regarding the procedure for dismissal govern the conventional districts
in this study. Dismissal of permanent teachers, and dismissal of probationary teachers
during the school year, requires 90-days notice, providing a grace period in which to
attempt to cure deficiencies before dismissal is carried out. Camino Nuevo’s Agreement
allows dismissal during an employment contract “for cause” immediately, without
requiring 90 days’ notice. Green Dot’s Agreement imposes a specific dismissal
procedure only for teachers placed on an Improvement Plan for performance problems.
LA Leadership’s Agreement is silent regarding the procedure for dismissal. For

147
dismissal of permanent teachers, Ocean must provide a copy of the materials and rules or
regulations on which the dismissal is based, and provide an opportunity to respond.
Choice 2000’s Agreement allows dismissal of any teacher with 30 days’
written notice, or pay in lieu of notice. Darnall’s Agreement requires that any teacher
dismissed for poor performance must be notified by December 1 and placed on an
Improvement Plan, after which the Board has discretion to terminate. The Edison and
Helix Agreements do not establish any dismissal procedure. Live Oak is authorized to
dismiss a probationary teacher during the year for “reasonable cause,” provided the
teacher is notified by April 1. Permanent teachers may only be dismissed for cause, but
the school must provide a statement of charges and an opportunity to respond. Thus,
although the charter schools generally provide substantive protection similar to
conventional school districts (as described above), the process of dismissal was found to
be generally less restrictive, and only Green Dot provided the equivalent of a “grace
period.”
Research Question 4: Teacher Compensation
The Compensation component of this study sought to determine the extent
to which the charter schools have taken advantage of the flexibility afforded to them by
negotiating for differential pay. Specifically, the study focused on additional pay for
individual performance, additional pay for the performance of the school, and pay based
on the subject matter taught by the teacher.

148
California law governing teacher compensation
The Education Code provides that certificated employees must be
classified on a salary schedule, based on uniform allowance for years of training and
experience (Cal. Educ. Code §§ 44944, 45028).
Collective bargaining regarding teacher compensation
Under California law, bargaining is mandatory, if requested by either
party, regarding causes and procedures for disciplinary action (other than dismissal);
payment of additional compensation based on criteria other than years of training and
experience; and payment of a salary schedule based on criteria other than uniform
allowance for years of training and experience (Cal. Govt. Code § 3543.2(a)). In the
absence of mutual agreement on these subjects, the provisions of the Education Code
govern (Cal. Govt. Code § 3543.2(b)).
Findings related to bargaining agreement provisions on teacher
compensation
Despite the current interest in differential pay as discussed in Chapter 2,
few of the charter schools in this study have implemented any form of differential or
“merit” pay. However, some of the schools are considering modification of their

149
Agreements to incorporate merit pay; these efforts will be an interesting topic of further
study.
Pay for Performance – Individual. None of the districts in this study
provided additional compensation based on a teacher’s individual performance. Only one
of the charter schools considered teacher performance as one element of compensation.
Choice 2000’s Agreement did not provide a bonus payment for high performance, as
recommended by many merit-pay proponents. However, Choice 2000 has a four-step
salary schedule, and its teachers can only progress through the steps of the schedule if
they receive a “Satisfactory” evaluation. Helix’s salary schedule includes an “Incentive
(Merit pay) Salary” component. However, additional pay is actually provided only for
good attendance: teachers using two days or less from their allotted ten days during the
school year are eligible for a one-time payment of $200 to $600. None of the other
schools include any performance-based component.
Pay for Performance – School-wide. As discussed in Chapter 2, some
merit-pay proponents suggest that providing financial incentives on a school-wide basis
is more equitable than individual merit-pay, given the difficulties of attributing the
success of particular students to a single teacher, and is more likely to encourage
cooperation among teachers. However, none of the schools in this study has
implemented any form of school-wide performance pay.
Pay for Subject-matter. Finally, two of the charter schools in the study
provided additional pay based on the subject being taught. Camino Nuevo provides a

150
bilingual stipend of $2,000, and a stipend of $1,000 for “hard to fill” positions. Edison
also provides a bilingual stipend, originally set at $750, or $1,500 for teachers with
BCLAD certification who are working in a bilingual setting. Some of the schools
provide additional compensation for teachers who take on specialist duties, but such
compensation, which does not reward teachers for performance in their regular classroom
duties, is beyond the scope of this study.
Plans for consideration or adoption of “merit pay”
Several of the schools indicated in interviews that they are considering
implementing some form of “merit pay.” Green Dot is interested in exploring the
possibility, and believes it could have retained some teachers who left to enter other lines
of work, including Teach for America teachers. Reflecting its collaborative approach to
union relations, Green Dot reported that it had discussed a joint survey of teachers’
attitudes toward merit pay in cooperation with its Union. LA Leadership reported that it
was too small to consider implementing merit pay, partly because the stratification on a
small scale would be more obvious than at a large school or group of schools, and could
create resentment that outweighed the motivational aspects of the financial incentives.
Darnall has also discussed implementing some form of merit pay, spurred in part by the
Obama administration’s support of the concept, but the school strongly believes that
rewards would need to be based on student growth over time, and the data currently
available would make that difficult to measure accurately. The school is therefore
exploring the feasibility of developing its own internal standards, including year-end

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assessments that could be used to gauge progress from one year to the next. Live Oak, as
a Waldorf-inspired school, is not naturally inclined toward the competitive nature of
merit pay; however, its Administrator believes that the school needs to hold itself and its
teachers accountable, and that merit pay might be one way of working toward that end.
Thus, the limited survey of schools included in this study demonstrates the extent to
which internal factors, including the schools’ educational philosophy and their approach
to union relations, and external factors, including state and national policy and the
development of tools for measuring student progress, will affect the implementation of
merit pay in unionized charter schools.
School Administrator Interviews
This section will report the results of interviews with administrators from
five of the charter schools whose collective bargaining agreements were analyzed above:
Green Dot Public Schools, LA Leadership Academy, Choice 2000 Online School,
Darnall Charter School, and Live Oak Charter School. I initially sought participation
from each unionized charter school in California, but only these five schools agreed to
participate in the interviews. The interviews were intended to include each question
listed in Chapter 3; however, due to time constraints, I focused on those areas in which
administrators reported that bargaining agreement provisions had a significant impact on
their decision-making process, areas that had been the subject of notable collaboration or
dispute between administrators and the Union, and areas in which the administrator

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indicated an interest in seeking modification to the existing terms of the collective
bargaining agreement.
Green Dot interview
Topic A: Union and Bargaining History (Interview Questions 1-5). I
interviewed a Green Dot administrator based at Green Dot’s headquarters. Green Dot is
a Charter Management Organization formed in 1999. It now operates 15 charter schools
in the greater Los Angeles area, most of which fall within the LAUSD boundaries. Green
Dot’s founder, Steve Barr, had been a member of the Teamsters while working at UPS
during college, and wanted to have a unionized teaching force from Green Dot’s
inception. His approach was partly driven by Green Dot’s unique mission, which was not
only to assist its own students and to serve as laboratories for the development of best
practices that might be adopted by conventional district schools, but to change the
educational landscape of Los Angeles by mounting a direct challenge to LAUSD. Barr
believed that political power, including the support of non-educational unions like the
SEIU, would be critical to this mission, and that the LAUSD Board would be more
receptive to changes proposed by a unionized organization. Green Dot’s teachers
initially explored the possibility of organizing as a unit of the California Teachers’
Association, but then decided to form their own union, the Asociacion de Maestros
Unidos (“AMU”).

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Topics B and G: Union Relationship, Activity (Interview Questions 6-10,
34-35. Green Dot’s Administrator describes the relationship with AMU as “pretty
cooperative.” The administration and Union leaders generally “try to talk through
things.” Green Dot understands that teachers are “here for kids” and that they seek good
working conditions and the ability to teach well. From Green Dot’s perspective, conflicts
may arise when teachers are perceived as focusing on themselves rather than the interests
of students.
One of the most interesting aspects of charter-union relations is the
affiliation of the charter-based unions with the established union organizations such as
the NEA and AFT or their state affiliates. The AMU is affiliated with the California
Teachers’ Association and the National Education Association. AMU negotiates with
Green Dot on behalf of all California-based Green Dot schools, and the CTA is involved
in all negotiations. All of AMU’s negotiation committee members are also CTA
members. However, teachers vary in the extent to which they identify and sympathize
with the CTA. Green Dot’s Administrator perceives AMU’s leadership as generally
more “progressive” than other union leaders, meaning that it is willing to compromise
with the administration. On occasion, AMU leaders have expressed the belief that Green
Dot does not dismiss poor teachers often enough.
Voting for AMU’s officers --- President, Vice President, Treasurer and
Secretary --- is conducted through an on-line survey, and AMU’s officers usually run

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unopposed. On a number of occasions, Union officers have sought support from their
membership to press for measures that might have imposed additional restraint on Green
Dot’s management, but fellow teachers have rejected the proposals.
Green Dot’s Administrator indicated that there are several provisions of
the Agreement that can restrain administrators from making decisions they consider to be
in the school’s best interest. At a general level, Article 14 of the Agreement authorizes
AMU to present a grievance not only for any decision made pursuant to any provision of
the Agreement, but for any strategic or policy decision. In the past, CTA representatives
have threatened to invoke this clause to file a grievance contesting Green Dot’s conduct
during collective bargaining. Normally, one party’s challenge to the other party’s
conduct in bargaining must be brought as an Unfair Labor Practice charge, filed with the
Public Employment Relations Board, and the challenging party must establish that the
other party has not acted in good faith. Procedurally, Article 14 makes it easier to bring
such a challenge, while potentially subjecting Green Dot to the expense and delay of a
multiple-step grievance and arbitration process. Substantively, it could eliminate the
ability of Green Dot to defeat a challenge by showing that it acted in good faith. It is
unclear whether this provision, if invoked by AMU, would be upheld, as it might intrude
on the jurisdiction of the Public Employees’ Relations Board. Green Dot has presented a
proposal to change this provision, but AMU rejected it.

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Topic C: Compensation (Interview Questions 11-16). Green Dot’s
Agreement currently does not include any form of “merit pay,” but Green Dot has
discussed the possibility of negotiating to add some form of merit pay to the Agreement.
Green Dot believes it might be able to more effectively allocate and retain the best
teachers if it implements performance pay. Green Dot also believes it may have been
able to retain some teachers who have left for jobs outside education. Additionally, a
number of Teach for America (“TFA”) teachers have worked for Green Dot. TFA
requires its teachers to spend two years teaching, after which they are free to pursue other
careers. Green Dot believes that some TFA teachers who have left the teaching
profession after two years might have stayed if the School could have competed with jobs
outside the education sector by offering them more money. However, it is difficult to
obtain data or other information confirming this assessment, or indicating how much
additional pay would be required to keep such teachers. In order to gauge teacher interest
and approval, Green Dot has discussed conducting a joint survey of all teachers with
AMU.
Topics D and E: Assignment and Transfer (Interview Questions 17-26).
Although Green Dot’s Agreement includes restrictions on administrators’ ability to
assign teachers, Green Dot’s Administrator reported that a Principal has sufficient
authority to make all necessary assignment decisions. The Agreement requires
administrators to seek agreement on assigning teachers to open positions. If agreement
cannot be reached, the decision must be based on teachers’ legal requirements and

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qualifications; whether teachers have satisfactory evaluations; and teachers’ expertise and
length of service. If there are no “substantial distinguishing differences,” the teacher’s
length of service at the school site is the “determining factor.” For teachers desiring
reassignment outside their existing department, preference must be given to incumbent
members with satisfactory performance and credentialing.
These requirements are the most restrictive of any school analyzed in this
study, and appear to provide considerable opportunity to challenge an administrator’s
decision. However, the Administrator reported that this provision has never been
grieved. Given the potential for more aggressive use of these provisions, this appears to
confirm the Administrator’s judgment that AMU’s leadership takes a collaborative
approach to school operation. The interaction between the AMU and the CTA, as
described above, may have a significant effect on future Union activity, as will the
relationship between Green Dot administrators and AMU leaders. If Green Dot’s
teachers perceive that the current, collaborative relationship between Green Dot and
AMU is not serving their interests, they may become more inclined to identify with the
more aggressive union elements, which could result in a more assertive approach to
enforcement of the Agreement.
Topic F: Evaluation (Interview Questions 27-29). Green Dot spent two
years working with AMU’s leadership on a new evaluation process, which was approved
and added to the 2006-2009 Agreement. The Agreement authorizes Administrators to

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place a teacher on a “Development Plan” if the teacher is rated lower than “meeting” or
“partially meeting” any CSTP standard. If sufficient improvement is not shown after 45
days, the teacher may be placed on an “Improvement Plan.” A teacher may also be
placed on an Improvement Plan if he receives an overall “Practice Does Not Meet
Standards” rating. A teacher on an Improvement Plan who does not make sufficient
progress to meet the standard may be dismissed. The teacher may challenge the decision
by requesting a conference with the Board, with a Union representative, present, and can
also use the Agreement’s grievance process. Green Dot received one grievance under the
former evaluation procedure. To date, no teacher has filed a grievance under the new
procedure.
Topics G and H: Discipline and Dismissal (Interview Questions 30-33).
Article 18 of Green Dot’s Agreement requires “just cause” for discipline or dismissal of
any teacher. However, the Agreement does not provide any definition of the “just cause”
standard, or establish a process for discipline, making this provision subject to
considerable dispute. Green Dot has proposed a probation period before a “just cause”
requirement is imposed, and has proposed that the standard be defined, in order to
provide practical guidance to Principals and reduce the threat of a grievance based on
misunderstanding or misinterpretation, but has not been able to obtain such
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Green Dot’s Agreement authorizes either a teacher or the AMU to bring
grievances. Green Dot’s grievance process includes five steps: (1) presentation to the
Principal, (2) presentation to the Board President, (3) presentation to the Board, (4)
Mediation through the California Mediation and Conciliation Service, and (5) final
Mediation. Because AMU is a CTA affiliate, it is empowered to handle the grievance on
AMU’s behalf. The Administrator reported that, to his knowledge, no grievances
regarding dismissal have been pursued through the Board stage.
Green Dot’s Administrator reported that terminations based on
performance issues usually are not grieved, which the Administrator attributes to the
successful training of administrators to follow the evaluation and dismissal procedures set
forth in the Agreement. There were a total of approximately nine teacher dismissals
between 2007 and 2009, of which four were based on poor performance. The CTA
became involved in three cases, only one of which resulted in a grievance. In that case,
the dismissed teacher’s performance had been documented for three years. After the
teacher filed a grievance, it was soon dropped, and the Administrator was informed that
the Union had advised the teacher to abandon the grievance. Other dismissals have been
based on misconduct, including teachers who have hit students. In such cases, the
teacher is placed on administrative leave, during which the administrators investigate the
alleged conduct and meet with the meet with teacher and the union representative. The
Administrator reported that these issues are typically treated by AMU as matters of
personnel relations, not as contract issues.

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LA Leadership interview
Topic A: Union and Bargaining History (Interview Questions 1-5). LA
Leadership Academy was established in 2002 by Roger Lowenstein, a former attorney
and law professor. The Academy operates a middle school and a high school, serving
grades 6-12. At LA Leadership, I interviewed one of the school’s organizational leaders.
The School’s charter was approved by LAUSD in 2002. In 2005, a group of teachers
formed LA Leadership Academy Community United, as a CTA/NEA affiliate. In
December of 2005, the Union filed a petition for representation with the PERB. In
response, LA Leadership filed a Petition for a Representation Election with the National
Labor Relations Board, which adjudicates labor disputes involving private employers,
contending that the school was not a public entity and therefore fell under the jurisdiction
of the NLRB rather than the PERB. The School’s position was based in part on a number
of prior decisions holding that charter schools were not public entities for certain
purposes, including California’s Tort Claims Act, access to records, and issues regarding
the ability of employees to hold a financial interest on a charter school Board --- charter
schools, which can qualify as non-profit organizations under Internal Revenue Code
section 501(c)(3), may allow employees to have a 49% interest in the organization, while
true “public” organizations cannot allow employees to do so, which would preclude
teachers from being on board.

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LA Leadership’s action initiated an important legal dispute over the nature
of charter schools in California. The PERB filed a motion to intervene and sought to
dismiss the NLRB petition. The NLRB ultimately dismissed the Academy’s petition in
March of 2006, holding that a charter school is part of the state’s public school system
and a political subdivision of the state, and that the NLRB therefore lacked jurisdiction
over the school. (See Los Angeles Leadership Academy and Los Angeles Leadership
Academy Community United, Docket No. 06-0371, National Labor Relations Board, Case
No. 31-RM-1281 (PERB Case No. LA-RR-1123-E)). The Union was then recognized by
LA Leadership Academy, and has since represented the Academy’s teachers at both
schools. The Academy and Union negotiated their first collective bargaining agreement
in 2006. One of the most significant elements of the new agreement was the elimination
of “at-will” employment and the imposition of a “just cause” requirement for the
discipline or dismissal of any teacher.
Topics B and G: Union Relationship, Activity (Interview Questions 6-10,
34-35). As a result of the concerns raised by the teachers during the drive for Union
representation, LA Leadership recognized that while the Academy’s leaders were good
teachers, they might be less effective as instructional leaders. After the Union was
recognized, the middle-school Principal was replaced by a new Principal with
significantly stronger management skills. The administrator I interviewed reported that
with good instructional leadership, the Union is not an impediment to administrators’
ability to effectively manage a charter school. In general, the administrator considers

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unions a “plus” in the charter world. By the same token, while the CTA is generally
opposed to charter schools, he believes that the CTA should support charters. He also
believes that while the CTA should support and protect teachers, it must also treat
teachers as professionals by supporting self-policing practices like those that apply to
doctors and lawyers, including self-discipline by a professional Board which could
recommend dismissal of poor teachers.
The Academy’s Administrator reported that trust is a key to making the
management-union relationship collaborative rather than contentious. As an example of
the positive relationship between LA Leadership and the Union, the last bargaining
session lasted only 45 minutes. While each side rejected some proposals made by the
other, other proposals were accepted quickly, and the negotiations concluded with little
dispute. Further evidence of the relationship is that no grievances have been filed at
either LA Leadership school since the Union was established at the School.
Topic C: Compensation (Interview Questions 11-16). LA Leadership’s
salary schedule follows LAUSD’s, and does not provide any form of “merit pay.” The
Academy has considered implementing some form of merit pay, but currently feels that it
is too small to introduce it successfully. With fourteen middle school teachers and fifteen
high school teachers, the Academy believes that basing salaries on test scores or other
measures could create significant stratification. Some teachers could become outliers,
with very high or low salaries, which could suggest an element of arbitrariness.

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Topics D and E: Assignment and Transfer (Interview Questions 17-26).
Consistent with the lack of any contractual criteria governing assignment or transfer
decisions, the Administrator reports that the Academy has never considered seniority in
assignment or transfer decisions. Teachers are hired for specific positions, as stated in
individual employment contracts given to each teacher. Such contracts are rare among
charters, including unionized charters. Accordingly, teachers also are rarely transferred
from the position stated in their contract.
However, due to current financial difficulties, the Academy was facing the
possibility of layoffs when my interview was conducted, which would also necessitate
consolidation of positions and transferring of teachers. The Academy’s general approach
is to obtain consensus for any transfer, which it intends to follow in any transfers made as
a result of layoffs. However, the Academy faced the prospect that following any layoffs,
the Union would argue that remaining teachers whose classes have been eliminated or
reduced should have “bumping” rights, allowing senior teachers to take their choice of
remaining positions. LAUSD’s Agreement provides senior teachers such rights, but LA
Leadership’s does not.
Thus, this potential conflict would not technically constitute a contractual
dispute, but would take the form of a more generalized negotiation, in which the Union
could threaten to more aggressively police and challenge dismissal decisions or push for
expansion of the Agreement to include bumping rights, if the Academy does not

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voluntarily agree to respect seniority in the realignment process. Given the Academy’s
interest in maintaining its cooperative relationship with the teachers and their Union
leaders, the Academy faces pressure to accede to such demands despite the lack of any
specific contractual obligation. In this way, the Academy’s position is different from that
of a non-unionized charter with identical provisions, as those provisions would not be
backed by the threat of union activity, and the school would not face the need to engage
in ongoing bargaining over the scope of its management prerogatives.
Topic F: Evaluation (Interview Questions 27-29). The Academy’s
Agreement does not specify any procedure or criteria that must be used for teacher
evaluations. The Academy has developed its own criteria and forms, tied to the CST,
including Star and CAHSEE standards. The standards were adapted from standards
developed by PUC schools, a Los Angeles-based Charter Management Organization.
The Academy’s Teachers have not attempted to challenge the process or its application.
The administrator reports that most poor evaluations are given for conduct problems, or
for poor classroom management or laziness. To date, none of the Academy’s teachers
have challenged the Academy’s evaluation process or its application.
Topics G and H: Discipline and Dismissal (Interview Questions 30-33).
The most significant element of the LA Leadership Agreement is the requirement that
after a two-year probationary period, discipline or dismissal can only be imposed for “just
cause.” The primary impetus for the Union’s organizing drive was the perception that

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management decisions were being made arbitrarily. Thus, after the Union was
recognized and commenced negotiations, the Union indicated that its key demand was
the elimination of at-will employment. The Academy agreed to incorporate a “just
cause” standard, while insisting that it needed the Union’s understanding that teachers
who treated students poorly, including inappropriate sarcasm or other abusive behavior,
should be dismissed. According to the Administrator, the Union confirmed its
willingness to support such decisions, but that was not incorporated in the Agreement.
Thus, the Union maintains a latent ability to challenge any decision by the Academy.
The Academy’s ability to exercise discretion in dismissing poor teachers rests to a
significant degree on its ability to maintain a cooperative relationship, in which the Union
feels that its needs are being met and that it does not need to aggressively challenge the
Academy’s leadership.
The Academy and Union recently demonstrated this collaborative
approach in the dismissal of four teachers at the Academy’s high school. The School’s
math scores failed to meet the School’s Adequate Yearly Progress requirement for two
years in a row, forcing the School into Program Improvement under the No Child Left
Behind Act. Concluding that a significant shake-up was required, the School’s
administrators decided to dismiss four of the school’s six math teachers. Only one of the
teachers threatened to file a grievance over the decision, a teacher who held a Ph.D. in
mathematics but was deemed to be ineffective in the classroom. However, after
discussion with the Administration, the Union and teacher agreed that he would remain

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with the School through summer school, but would then leave, and would not pursue any
grievance.
Choice 2000 Online School interview
Topic A: Union and Bargaining History (Interview Questions 1-5). At
Choice 2000, I interviewed a Site Administrator. Choice 2000 is part of a parent
organization called Education Options, which also includes an Adult Education program
and an Independent Study program. The school was granted its first charter in 1993, one
of the 100 schools initially authorized by the California Charter Schools Act. Choice
2000 is charted by the Perris Unified School District. Choice 2000 administrators
consider the Perris District Union to be fairly strong, and the PUSD collective bargaining
agreement to be relatively restrictive. Approximately fifteen years ago, the Perris Union,
initially seeking higher pay through collective bargaining, negotiated instead for stronger
job protection. In the view of some Choice 2000 administrators and teachers, the
District’s teachers then became somewhat complacent. This view has informed Choice
2000 administrators’ approach to Union relations.
Choice 2000 was initially created as an Independent charter school in
1994. In 1997 it obtained a new Charter and became a Dependent charter. The School
conducts classes primarily on-line, serving grades 9-12. When Choice 2000 was
launched in 1993, California law did not require all charter school teachers to be
credentialed – an exemption that was eliminated through a change in state law in 1999.

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Because the school operates on a lean budget, many of the school’s teachers are not
credentialed. Accordingly, when the School sought to become a Dependent school
affiliated with PUSD in 1997, the Union resisted. The School was able to obtain a
Dependent Charter with PUSD, but the Union would not accept its teachers into the
bargaining unit. The School’s teachers therefore organized their own Union, the Online
Teachers Association, affiliated with the CTA, and were recognized by the School after
an election supervised by the Public Employee Relations Board. Unlike the PUSD
contract, the teachers did not negotiate for tenure.
Topics B and G: Union Relationship, Activity (Interview Questions 6-
10,34-35. The School has a total of 10 teachers, most of whom are not actively involved
in the Union. The same teacher has been elected as Union President each year. Choice
2000 has never had a grievance filed on behalf of a teacher.
Topic C: Compensation (Interview Questions 11-16). Choice 2000’s
Principal did not report any discussion among school leadership or the Union about
implementing any form of merit pay.
Topics D and E: Assignment and Transfer (Interview Questions 17-26).
The Principal of Choice 2000 agreed with the statement: “The assignment process at my
school allows me to select the best teachers for each classroom,” while feeling that the
question did not apply to transfer decisions, as the School has only one site. Most
subjects at Choice 2000 are taught by only one teacher, with the exception of math. Most

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teachers have four classes. Accordingly, there is little opportunity to reassign a teacher
from one subject to another. When a math teacher left the School, administrators had a
choice of two teachers to take her class --- a new math teacher and a veteran teacher
supported by the Union. Under the PUSD Agreement, requests for a voluntary transfer
must be considered on the basis of (1) appropriate credentials, (2) district-wide seniority
with appropriate subject matter experience, and (3) recentness of a teacher’s subject area
preparation. The Choice 2000 Agreement does not specify any criteria that must be used
in assignment or transfer decisions, requiring only that decisions cannot be made for
arbitrary, capricious or punitive reasons. Due to the discretion provided by the
Bargaining Agreement’s assignment provision, the administrators were able to determine
that the class would be given to the best teacher, without considering seniority. On
another occasion, due to declining enrollment, an earth sciences teacher who had
normally taught four classes had only enough students to fill three classes. Again, the
administrators reported that they utilized the discretion provided by Choice 2000’s
Agreement to assign the teacher a general education class, which did not trigger any
complaint from the teacher.
Choice 2000’s administrators reported that the Union has not indicated
any interest in altering the bargaining agreement to require consideration of seniority in
making assignment decisions. Most teachers are willing to teach any assigned classes, in
order to receive the benefits associated with being classified as full-time teachers.

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Topic F: Evaluation (Interview Questions 27-29). Choice 2000’s
evaluation procedure closely mirrors the procedure established by the PUSD contract.
Like the PUSD contract, observations require notice. The Principal did not report feeling
constrained in the ability to accurately evaluate teachers or use the evaluation procedure
as a motivational or corrective tool.
Topics G and H: Discipline and Dismissal (Interview Questions 30-33).
As a “dependent” charter school, Choice 2000’s disciplinary process is unique, in that it
is actually conducted by PUSD. Essentially, as the Administrator put it, “Choice
recommends and the District suspends.” Even though Choice 2000 has a separate
collective bargaining agreement, PUSD expects the school to treat teachers as if they are
governed by the District’s bargaining agreement, and Choice 2000 has not attempted to
change this arrangement. The Administrator reported that school leaders are expected to
write up teachers for performance or other problems, and to be diligent about following
up. Choice 2000 follows the “FRISK” model, developed by a California law firm, which
describes the model as a “communication framework for successfully remediating
performance problems and developing legally defensible documentation when discipline
is necessary.” (Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, retrieved 2010).
The School dismissed one teacher in 2008-2009. The School had
previously provided a Skelly-type hearing, although Choice 2000’s Agreement does not
require the School to provide such hearing either for discipline or dismissal. The teacher

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did not challenge the dismissal. The School believed that the teacher would have little
chance of reversing the decision, given the discretion provided to the School by the
Agreement. In fact, the School’s non-certificated personnel, who are governed by a
separate agreement negotiated by another union, have greater protection than its teachers,
as demonstrated by the complicated procedure the School was required to follow when it
dismissed a computer employee.
Darnall Charter School interview
Topic A: Union and Bargaining History (Interview Questions 1-5). At
Darnall, I interviewed a site administrator. Darnall was one of the first charter schools
authorized by the Charter School Act of 1992. The school’s teachers wrote the initial
Charter. Darnall functioned as a dependent charter for its first ten years, receiving its
funding from the San Diego Unified School District and following its personnel policies.
In 2003, it became an Independent charter. Because the change meant that teachers
would no longer be governed by the District, teachers were concerned about giving up
their membership in the Union. The Administration told them they could set up a Darnall
union, and the teachers then organized the Darnall Charter Teachers Association
(“DCTA”), as an affiliate of the California Teachers Association.
Topics B and G: School’s Relationship with Union (Interview Questions
6-10). Darnall’s administrator noted that unions are often viewed as representing the
antithesis of the ethos of charter schools. The Administrator believes that unions serve a

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legitimate purpose, but that they can create problems if they make members their primary
focus rather than students. The Administrator described how the possibility for tension
can be particularly acute in a small, “mom and pop” charter like Darnell. While a district
can be compared to a cruise ship, large and hard to turn, a small charter school is like a
speed boat – it can be very responsive and timely. If a union is able to negotiate
restrictive and complex provisions protecting teachers, the charter’s ability to respond can
be slowed down. Additionally, the administrator explained that small charters like
Darnell have limited resources. Especially in a small charter school, the risk of having to
allocate resources to legal process and defense against grievances or lawsuits can lead
administrators to avoid making decisions they believe are necessary for the school.
Darnall’s Administrator believes that one of the primary reasons for
support of teacher unions in conventional public school districts is to provide teachers a
voice in management. In charter schools such as Darnall, this need is often fulfilled by
having members on the board of the charter. Among unionized charters, such members
may be Union members or officers. Article 34 of the Darnall Agreement provides that
the DCTA will establish a “collaborative school environment,” where teachers will offer
perspective in “administrative, curricular and extra-curricular decision making.” The
DCTA must also have representation on all committees, and on the Darnall Board. The
Board is required to have between 8 and 11 members; three of the voting members are
teachers. At one time, a Union officer sat on the Board. Thus, teachers serve on all
schools committees, including the budget, personnel, and curriculum committees. All

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unit members also have access to the Darnall Board agendas and minutes. The
Instructional Governance Council (“IGC”) is comprised of a majority of unit members,
and is responsible for all curricular decisions. As set forth in Darnall’s by-laws, the IGC
also has a designated role of advising the Board on all other non-curricular issues, and
develops school instructional policies. On the personnel committee, teachers are
involved in all but dismissal decisions. Teachers are also involved in hiring, transfer, and
job description decisions.
Finally, the budget committee essentially acts as a subcommittee of the
Board. Because the committee is responsible for understanding and analyzing budget
cuts, the teachers and union officers understand the effect of any cuts on teacher
compensation and other funding needs. The Administrator believes that this involvement
and understanding diminishes the potential for misunderstanding and conflict. If the
Union proposes changes requiring money, the teachers on the Budget committee or on
the Board know whether money is available, and are able to discuss the School’s
budgetary situation with the Union officers and other teachers. Essentially, the
Administrator feels that Darnall’s teachers know they are “all in the same boat,” and that
if they believe the Union’s proposed action would be counter-productive, they block it.
The Administrator explained that the teachers’ extensive participation in
school governance helps to keep the relationship with the Union collaborative rather than
confrontational, and decreases the need for formal grievances or other disputes. To date,

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the DCTA has not filed a single grievance against the School. On several occasions,
teachers have called for a meeting and asked for details regarding School decisions, but
have then taken no action. The Administration also understands that the Union’s
leadership has pressed teachers to take action on certain issues, but the teachers
apparently have not been persuaded that the issues needed to be addressed through the
formal grievance process. The Administration believes that the internal collaboration
process described above has kept teachers satisfied that their voice is heard. Because
teachers are used to having input on all decisions through the School’s committees, they
have told the Union leadership that a formal grievance is not necessary. The
Administrator describes the Board as “very functional,” explaining that teachers on the
Board are able to “put on a different hat” and put aside their individual interests when
necessary.
One of the most interesting concerns raised by the Darnall Administrator,
and mentioned by others, is the possible threat to teacher participation in governance
created by a proposed change to California law. State law currently provides that the
Board of a non-profit corporation cannot have a majority of voting members with a
financial interest in the school, which includes teachers receiving salaries from the
School. State law also prohibits any Board member from voting on any measure in
which the member has a financial interest, which would include any teacher’s own

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salary.
8
A change proposed in a 2008 Assembly Bill, which was not passed but remains a
topic of debate, could prohibit any members of the Board from having a financial interest.
This reform, which was primarily prompted by concerns about Board members who used
their position to contract with companies in which they had a financial interest, could also
prevent teachers from serving on the Board. The Darnall Administrator believes that
such a change could deny teachers an important means of participation in charter school
governance. This could have a negative effect on the School’s relationship with its
teachers, and make teachers more likely to adopt a more confrontational approach to
union-management relations, resulting in an increase in the filing of formal grievances to
address issues that have typically been resolved through discussion and debate at the
Board level. Moreover, under existing state law, Board members who also receive a
salary from the school are required to recuse themselves from any vote regarding Union
members’ salaries, which necessarily includes their own salary. Another proposed
change to state law would prohibit Board members from voting on any decision that
could affect their own financial interest. The Darnall Administrator was concerned that if
this change was implemented, teachers could be required to recuse themselves from any
budget-related discussion, as any vote affecting the School’s budget could have an effect
on teachers’ salaries, including their own.

8
See California Corporations Code § 5227 (only 49% of board of directors for nonprofit may be
“interested person,” including person receiving salary from nonprofit); California Government Code § 1090
(public school district trustee is prohibited from holding a financial interest in any contract the board votes
on).

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Topic C: Compensation (Interview Questions 11-16). Darnall’s
Agreement does not provide any additional pay for performance. The only additional
compensation currently available is for National Board certification. However, teachers
and administrators at Darnall have discussed the possibility of adding merit pay in light
of the Obama Administration’s “Race to the Top” initiative. School leaders view merit
pay as a potentially important tool to enable the School to measure progress and hold
itself and its teachers accountable. However, the School’s administrators feel strongly
that any “merit pay” component would need to be based on student growth, rather than on
a “snap-shot” assessment of student performance. The School feels that it could not base
any merit-pay system solely on California’s CST scores, as they do not currently track
student growth from year to year. On a more general level, the School’s administrators
feel that criterion-referenced tests are inadequate for use in merit-pay decisions because
the criteria are referenced by grade level. Some grade levels, such as third grade, are
more challenging than others in the extent to which they introduce novel subjects and
skills. The School would prefer to use or develop its own internal measures in
cooperation with its committees, all of which include teachers. The School currently uses
trimester assessments, but is working to develop a new system to track and evaluate
student progress. In order to implement merit pay, the School would need to be able to
post-assess students at the end of each year, in order to allow the School to track their
progress during the next year. Moreover, individual teacher performance would only be
one component of any merit pay system. The Administrators’ assessment is that teachers

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generally accept the concept of merit pay, partly due to the support provided by the
Obama administration through the “Race to the Top” initiative.
Topics D and E: Assignment and Transfer (Interview Questions 17-26).
The Administrator at Darnall agreed with the statement: “The assignment process at my
school allows me to select the best teachers for each classroom,” indicating that the
Board has full authority to make such decisions. Likewise, the Administrator did not feel
constrained in the ability to make decisions about transfers. Unlike assignment decisions,
the Darnall Agreement does include restraints on voluntary and involuntary transfer
decisions. For voluntary transfers, the School must make openings available to
incumbents before open hiring, must give preference to incumbents with satisfactory
performance and credentials, and must use seniority as the determining factor in the
absence of “substantial distinguishing differences.” For involuntary transfers, the School
must first ask for volunteers; teachers cannot be involuntarily transferred if they have
taught three years or less or have accepted a “non-preferred” position, and if other factors
are equal, the School must transfer the teacher with the least recent involuntary
assignment, or, if two or more teachers have never received an involuntary assignment,
the least senior teacher must be transferred. As explained in the document-analysis
portion of this study, these provisions essentially treat involuntary transfers as a method
of filling open positions, rather than as a tool for moving teachers from positions in which
they ineffective to positions in which the School believes they would be more effective.

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The Darnall Administrator had not yet experienced any tension between these restraints
and the School’s interest in teacher effectiveness.
Topic F: Evaluation (Interview Questions 27-29). The Darnall
administrator did not report any concerns regarding Darnall’s evaluation procedure, and
did not report any discussions about revising the process.
Topics G and H: Discipline and Dismissal (Interview Questions 30-35).
As explained in the document analysis portion of this Study, Darnall’s Agreement
contains relatively complex provisions governing the dismissal process for poorly
performing teachers. These include the use of an Improvement Plan, which authorizes
the School to dismiss a teacher if sufficient improvement is not shown after 60 days, but
requires the School to re-start the 60-day observation period if the dismissal is based on
any “new” performance problem not addressed in the original Improvement Plan.
Darnall has successfully dismissed at least two teachers for poor performance following
this process, without prompting a grievance from the Union.
Live Oak Charter School interview
Topic A: Union and Bargaining History (Interview Questions 1-5). At
Live Oak, I interviewed a site administrator. Live Oak was established in 2001, and
serves Grades K-8. It is a school inspired by Waldorf education, based on principles
expounded by Rudolph Steiner. The Administrator I interviewed explained that the

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Waldorf philosophy influences every aspect of the School’s operation, including its
approach to personnel policy and union relations. Steiner’s educational vision included a
high level of faculty involvement. Live Oak’s Administrator believes the School is only
recently beginning to approach the implementation of that vision.
The teacher who organized Live Oak’s union started organizing a union
effort after she had received notice that she would not be invited back in the spring of her
first year of teaching at the school. The teacher was one of only three employed by Live
Oak at the time. The Administrator I interviewed then was a new administrator at Live
Oak. The teacher approached other teachers about organizing a union, and petitioned the
Public Employee Relations Board for a recognition election. The PERB held an election,
in which the teachers voted in favor of the Union by a vote of two to one.
After the Union was recognized, it took approximately two years to
negotiate the School’s first collective bargaining agreement. The most significant
element of the Agreement was a two-year tenure track. In 2007, the tenure track was
extended tenure to three years. Formal Waldorf training was included as a necessary
condition for receiving tenure.
Both of the teachers who originally voted for union representation have
since left the School. The School currently has thirteen faculty members, only two of
whom are dues-paying Union members. The School continues to operate under the

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contract negotiated with the original organizing teacher, and has not attempted to
decertify the Union. There is no formal Union representative or steward.
Topics B and G: Union Relationship, Activity (Interview Questions 6-10,
34-35. Live Oak’s Administrator reported that the School’s relationship with the Union
is a mixture of collaboration and confrontation. By design, the union is confrontational,
as it represents the interests of teachers only. Negotiation for the school’s collective
bargaining agreement is done by local teachers, not by CTA officials. In the most recent
negotiations, discussions lapsed for approximately nine months, while the faculty
attempted to formulate new proposals. The Administrator understood that the teachers
had initially considered exiting the Agreement and requesting that teachers be added to
the Board, but this position was never presented.
Live Oak’s administrative team includes an Executive Director,
Educational Director, and Development Director. As Live Oak has matured and grown,
it has developed a strong committee structure. The School has a Compassionate Campus
committee dedicated to fostering and promoting the School’s cultural and behavioral
values; a Parent Education committee; and a Development committee responsible for the
school’s financial development. The faculty as a body has recently taken on more
responsibility for governance, such that proposals now grow out of the committees. The
Administrator expects this process to accelerate over the next few years. Among other

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issues, the School and its committees are exploring ways to maintain the School’s
identity as a Waldorf school while improving the School’s STAR test scores.
To date, the Union has not submitted any formal grievances. Because
Live Oak’s union members do not belong to the Petaluma bargaining unit, the CTA’s
representative is on-call to talk to the teachers about the Union. However, the
representative does not discuss specific issues with Live Oak’s administrators. On one
occasion a teacher’s concern about possible nepotism in the hiring of a teacher, which
also created difficulty for Live Oak’s Board, was clarified by the outside CTA
representative, who explained that the hiring followed normal procedures and was not
improper, and that the hiring was addressed by a side letter incorporated into the
collective bargaining agreement.
The Administrator sees value in a collective bargaining agreement, but
believes that in a small school like Live Oak, the Union can on occasion come between
the School and its teachers. Even when a Union representative is not present, the
presence of the Union acts as another significant entity in the room during any
interaction. The Live Oak Administrator feels that one of the most significant effects of
the Union presence and the existence of the Agreement is that administrators must be
more careful and formal in their discussions with teachers, especially about the benefits
or negative effects of the Union. The Administrator also believes that the existence of the
Agreement can exacerbate the process of sharing information. Administrators feel that

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they cannot share information about benefits that might be provided to teachers if parts of
the Agreement were removed, as sharing such information could be characterized as
“union-busting.” Live Oak’s Administrator believes that one benefit of a collective
bargaining agreement is that it is valuable to have an articulated understanding between
faculty and administration regarding teachers’ working conditions, evaluations and other
personnel policies. However, the Administrator believes that this would likely be easier
to achieve in a personnel manual, which could remove some of the fear and trepidation
from conversations between administrators and teachers.
Like the Darnall Administrator I interviewed, Live Oak’s Administrator
was concerned about the prospect of changes to California law that could prevent
teachers from serving on the Board of a non-profit charter school. The faculty recently
considered the possibility of voting to eliminate the Union and instead requesting two
seats on Live Oak’s Board. That process was then stalled while the teachers awaited the
outcome of the proposed changes in California law.
Topic C: Compensation (Interview Questions 11-16). Live Oak does not
currently provide any form of “merit pay,” but does provide incentives for teachers who
obtain Waldorf training. Live Oak’s Administrator reported that the School has
considered the concept of merit pay, but has not yet seriously addressed it. The School’s
initial emphasis was on attempting to fully implement the Waldorf philosophy. Having
recently determined that this is being accomplished, the School is turning more attention

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to its performance on recognized tests and standards. Since the School is still in a
developmental stage, it does not expect to perform highly on California’s STAR testing
in the early grades, but to achieve greater levels of overall student proficiency as the
children progress through the grades. The administrator reported that this expected
pattern has been borne out. The Administrator explained that, if the School believes in a
developmental philosophy for its students, it should be able to evaluate itself using
quantitative measures, which may eventually lead to consideration of merit pay.
Topics D and E: Assignment and Transfer (Interview Questions 17-26).
Live Oak’s Administrator did not report that the School’s Agreement restrained
administrators in their ability to assign or transfer teachers in a manner that was in the
best interest of the School. Accordingly, this topic was not explored in detail.
Topic F: Evaluation (Interview Questions 27-29). Live Oak’s
Administrator reported that the School successfully modified its evaluation process,
primarily with respect to the timeline for the process, since the 2008 Agreement was
executed. The Educational Director proposed the changes, and the Union accepted them
without dispute. The Administrator also reported that the School has been considering
additional changes to its evaluation process, including implementation of peer evaluation,
which is consistent with the Waldorf philosophy. However, this would present
significant questions about how such a system would work in practice. The
Administrator reported that the faculty plays a central role in the governance of private

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Waldorf schools, and that while some elements of the Waldorf philosophy work well in
practice, others present challenges. Specifically, while the Waldorf philosophy tends to
favor a “horizontal structure,” a structure without any verticality can create problems.
When teachers must work together as colleagues, it can be difficult to make hard
decisions about other teachers. The Administrator is interested in learning from other
Waldorf schools about their experience with peer review. However, other Waldorf
schools’ experience may not be directly comparable or transferrable, because Live Oak is
one of only two unionized Waldorf schools, and the other is part of a larger school
district, and does not have a stand-alone Agreement like Live Oak’s.
The School recently supported eight teachers through a Masters training
program. The Administrator reported that the School provides significant support to
teachers, including an Education Director, remedial professionals focused on general
rather than special education, and school mentors. The School also separates its
mentoring process from the evaluation process. Some teachers have been recruited from
the ranks of parents, some of whom obtained credentials before State law required all
charter teachers to have credentials.
Topics G and H: Discipline and Dismissal (Interview Questions 30-33).
The Administrator believes that the requirement that teachers can only be dismissed “for
cause,” which applies to Live Oak teachers beginning in their fourth year, can be a
disservice to faculty members, and that it is inconsistent with the principles of a Waldorf

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school. The Administrator explained that because a challenge to the dismissal of a
permanent teacher through grievance and arbitration can cost as much as $100,000,
schools must make a determination very early on about the longevity of a teacher at the
school. The Administrator believes that this forces schools that are in doubt about a
teacher’s ability to terminate the teacher’s employment during probation, while the
school’s preference would be to attempt to help the teacher continue to grow for a longer
period. Live Oak has dismissed at least one teacher during the probationary period whom
the School would have retained if it could have done so without providing tenure
protection, and almost dismissed another for the same reason. The Administrator also
pointed out that, while teachers are protected from unforeseen dismissal, the School does
not have reciprocal protection from teacher resignation. Thus, after the School has
invested time and expense in teacher training, the teacher may walk away from the school
at any time; during Live Oak’s history, some teachers have voluntarily left the school and
created difficulty in replacing them.
Summary of Findings Regarding Administrator-Union Relations
The purpose of this study was to explore the intersection of teachers’
unions and charter schools, focusing on the provisions of collective bargaining
agreements negotiated between these two significant and seemingly disparate forces in
American education policy. The five charter school administrators interviewed in this
study provide an interesting, although limited, glimpse into the spontaneous and

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unstructured development of charter-union relations in California. The unions at the
charter schools were created and recognized for a variety of reasons, ranging from a
“hostile” organizing drive by a teacher who was not invited back to the school, to
reaction by administrators to the district union’s refusal to accept the school’s teachers, to
the creation and recognition of a union as part of the school’s core philosophy and
political strategy. Each of the charters in the study has developed its own approach to
union relations and collective bargaining, based on its educational philosophy and the
circumstances in which the union relationship arose.
Despite their varying origins, some common themes emerged, some of
which appear to suggest that some of the charter schools are accomplishing the goals of
“reform bargaining” advocates described in Chapter 2. The schools generally indicated
(1) that relations with the Union were cooperative, and (2) that no (or few) formal
grievances had been filed. Given the combined number of years that the schools have
been in operation, and the fact that some of the schools have fairly restrictive bargaining
agreement provisions, the lack of grievance activity is significant. However, it is
somewhat difficult to draw causal conclusions from these reports. The administrators
reported that many of the charter school unions are still developing and “growing into”
their function as teacher advocates. Moreover, some do not have the full or active
support of their teachers; in smaller charter schools, the union’s activity may be driven by
as few as one or two interested teachers. Additionally, the interviews suggested that
teachers’ involvement in school governance, or other forms of teacher autonomy
presented by charter schools, lessened the need for union activity, rather than a change in

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the approach to bargaining, which appears to have produced provisions in many schools
that are similar to conventional school districts’ bargaining agreement provisions.
The interviews also suggest that there may be some validity to union
critics’ concern that unions’ institutional function as advocates for teachers inherently
brings them into tension with schools’ educational objectives. The interviews generally
indicated that (1) once established in an initial bargaining agreement, charter schools
generally have not been able to modify provisions perceived to interfere with effective
school leadership, and (2) either external or internal forces, or both, have the potential to
make the relationship between the school and its union more adversarial in the future.
Indeed, the study suggests that the nature of administrator-union relationships appears to
be highly dependent on the personalities of the primary participants in the relationship,
and the unique culture of each school. Several specific observations related to individual
schools are set forth below.
Green Dot
Green Dot represents a fairly rare approach to union relations. Its founder
supported the creation of a union --- not in response to specific teacher concerns, but as
an intrinsic part of the school’s philosophy of governance. Green Dot’s Administrator
reported that relations with the Union are generally cooperative. However, the
Administrator noted a divergence of interest between some teachers who are perceived to
be more confrontational in their positions, and others who have taken a collaborative

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approach and rejected more restrictive teacher proposals. This variation among teachers’
attitudes is common in most union settings, but it presents a unique dynamic in a charter
school that deliberately supported the creation of the Union. While the School’s vision of
a friendly and cooperative relationship has largely been realized, neither the School nor
the Union officers have the ability to control internal forces such as more aggressive
teachers, or external forces such as the CTA, which has the potential to move the Union
toward a more confrontational posture in bargaining and in enforcing the Agreement
through its grievance and arbitration procedure.
Green Dot’s Administrator reported that some provisions of the
Agreement could be changed to better serve the interests of students and teachers,
including the ability of the Union to bring a grievance not only for violation of specific
provisions but also over strategic and policy decisions, which is unique among the
schools analyzed in this study. However, the Agreement generally has been modified
only in the direction of providing more protection for teachers, and imposing greater
restraints on the decisions of administrators. It will be interesting to observe whether
Green Dot’s support for its union will enable it to obtain desired modifications of the
Agreement as its schools continue to develop, or whether, once established, the
bargaining relationship will essentially function in one direction (sometimes called the
“ratchet effect”), in which the union obtains greater restriction on administrators’
decision-making ability, while the administration is unable to obtain increased flexibility.

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LA Leadership
LA Leadership Academy’s union history is different from some of the
other schools interviewed for this study, in that the school was forced to recognize the
union after a PERB election, over the school’s objection. Both of the Academy’s schools
continue to be bound by the contract negotiated by those teachers, including the
requirement of “just cause” for the discipline or dismissal of any teacher. In spite of the
somewhat adversarial commencement of the relationship, the Academy’s leaders have
come to view the Union in a positive light and have developed a collaborative
relationship. To date, no grievance has been filed against the Academy. The Academy
has also taken steps to improve its instructional leadership in response to the concerns
raised by the Union. However, the financial difficulties facing public education in
California at the time of this study, and the resulting possibility of layoffs, threatened to
induce a more aggressive posture by the union, which has the potential to enforce
provisions that it had previously allowed to lie dormant while the administration and
union resolved concerns cooperatively.
Choice 2000 Online Charter School
Choice 2000 was one of the first 100 charters authorized after California
approved the creation of charter schools in 1992. The school is unique in its operation as
a fully on-line school, which presents a number of challenges, some of which are not
addressed in this study. The school also demonstrates the ad-hoc nature of union

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establishment. In Choice 2000’s case, its on-line status and lack of funding led to the use
of non-credentialed teachers, which was permissible for charter schools until a change
was made to California law in 1999. After the school had operated for several years as a
non-unionized “Independent” charter, it became a “Dependent” charter in 1997. But the
District’s union rejected the school’s non-credentialed teachers, leading them to create
their own Union and negotiate their own collective bargaining agreement. Like most
other schools in the study, no grievances have yet been filed against the school.
However, while the school’s Agreement is less restrictive than the Perris District’s
Agreement --- most significantly by failing to provide tenure or a “good cause” or “just
cause” standard for dismissal --- the District continues to exercise final control over the
discipline and dismissal of teachers, which, the Administrator reported, introduces a
degree of caution and restraint beyond that suggested by the terms of the Agreement
itself.
Darnall Charter School
Like Choice 2000, Darnall was also one of the first 100 charters
authorized under California law. Like many other charter schools, its teachers wrote its
first charter, immediately becoming more intricately involved in school management than
most district teachers. Darnall followed the opposite path of Choice 2000, beginning as a
“Dependent” charter but becoming an “Independent” charter ten years later. Its route to
unionization was also slightly different than the other schools in the study --- the

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Administration encouraged its teachers to set up a union to address fear of losing
membership. Darnall’s Administration generally reported a collaborative relationship
with its Union, including the lack of a single grievance against the School; although the
Union has called for meetings and its officers have encouraged certain action, teachers
have not chosen to proceed. However, the Administrator indicated that the Union’s
presence, if more aggressively asserted, can have the effect of slowing the school’s
ability to adapt and change. Comparing a small charter school to a speed boat, the
Administrator indicated that an aggressive Union can make the school more like a
conventional district, which functions more like a cruise ship. Darnall’s Administrator
expressed most strongly the view that teachers played a very constructive role in school
governance by serving on every important committee and on the Board, thus fulfilling
their need for a voice in school operation. But the Administrator expressed concern that
this participation could be threatened by proposed changes in California’s conflict-of-
interest law, which could disqualify teachers from service on the boards of charter
schools. If that participation was eliminated or limited, the Administrator felt that the
current, cooperative relationship, could become more adversarial and counter-productive.
Live Oak Charter School
Finally, Live Oak is unique in its status as a Waldorf-inspired charter
school. This philosophy includes a high level of faculty involvement, with or without the
presence of a union. Live Oak’s path to unionization demonstrates the effect that a few,

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or even one, interested teacher can exert on a small charter school. The union was
established by the vote of only two teachers in favor of the union, one of whom requested
the vote after being notified that her employment would not be renewed, and both of
whom later left the school. Live Oak continues to be bound by the contract negotiated by
the original organizing teachers, including the establishment of tenure, after which
teachers can only be dismissed “for cause.” However, Live Oak was successful in
obtaining the Union’s agreement to lengthen the tenure track from two years to three.
Live Oak reported that there is no formal representative or steward at the school, while
the Union appears to be growing into maturity.
Like the Darnall Administrator I interviewed, Live Oak’s Administrator
felt that teachers took a less aggressive approach toward union activity because they are
deeply involved in school governance through the school’s committees. The
Administrator was also concerned that proposed changes to California’s conflict-of-
interest law might force teachers from the Board, and that they might be replaced by a
non-teacher Union official who lacked understanding of the School’s unique Waldorf-
based philosophy. The CTA has some involvement with Live Oak’s teachers, which, to
date, has been perceived as non-intrusive and even helpful. However, the school’s
Administrator reported that the Union’s presence makes administrators more formal and
less candid in their discussions with teachers about the needs and direction of the school.
Additionally, the perceived cost of defending a grievance or arbitration after dismissing a
tenured teacher led the school to dismiss one teacher before she obtained tenure. The

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Administrator would have preferred to continue to help her develop, if the school
believed that it could have dismissed her later if she failed to show sufficient progress.

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Chapter V – Conclusions and Recommendations
As noted above, some common themes emerged from the schools in this
study, while other observations were limited to the unique circumstances of individual
schools. In combination, these findings may provide useful recommendations for at least
three groups: charter schools considering voluntary recognition of a union, or negotiating
their first agreement with a union; policy-makers considering changes to state charter
school laws; and researchers exploring the interaction of charter schools and unions.
Charters considering the advantages or disadvantages of unionization
might find instructive the experience of the schools in this study. These schools
demonstrate that some of the promise of “reform bargaining” may be achieved in charter
schools, as most administrators have established a cooperative relationship with their
unions. However, comparison between the charter school bargaining agreements and
district agreements revealed that, in some of the key areas for which district agreements
have been criticized (notably classification and dismissal), unions have been able to
impose restraints on administrator discretion to the same extent as in conventional
districts. Some administrators reported that they now feel unduly restricted by certain
bargaining agreement provisions. If schools wish to preserve school leaders’ ability to
manage teachers through personnel decisions, they might take caution from the example
of some of the schools in the study.

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Charter schools negotiating their first bargaining agreement may find
instructive examples among the schools in this study, and may wish to negotiate
provisions similar to those negotiated by these schools, while avoiding others, depending
on the school’s management philosophy and the strength of the union. Possible
recommendations are discussed below, in the following areas: (1) recommendations
regarding advantages or disadvantages of unionization; (2) recommendations for
establishing productive union relations; (3) recommendations for schools negotiating
their first union contract; and (4) recommendations regarding specific bargaining
agreement provisions (in each policy area addressed by this study).
Recommendations Regarding Advantages or Disadvantages of Unionization
Unionized charter schools are currently a rarity in California, but it is clear
that unions will continue their efforts to represent charter school teachers. If the schools
in this study are any guide, charter-union relationships will likely continue to develop in
varying and unexpected ways: through targeted campaigns by the major teacher unions,
through the efforts of small groups or even a single teacher; or by perhaps by the
voluntary initiative of a school or CMO like Green Dot, or through a combination of
factors. What is clear is that unions will usually target charter schools, rather than the
other way around, and will often enter a school through a teacher or small group teachers
who are dissatisfied with an administrator’s leadership or a specific decision. Charter
schools must be aware of the concerns and incentives of unions, attempt to understand

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the likely effect of unionization on the operation of the school, determine whether and to
what extent they want to prevent or welcome unionization, decide how they will respond
to a unionization effort,
9
and, if the school’s teachers become unionized, decide how to
negotiate terms that are best calculated to achieve the school’s educational objectives
while satisfying the concerns that led teachers to unionize.
The schools in this study, while a small sample, provide useful and varied
insights regarding the “pros” and “cons” of unionization. While Green Dot deliberately
created a cooperative unionized environment, and has negotiated several innovative
bargaining agreement provisions, other provisions are among the most restrictive in the
study, in many cases comparable to the provisions of the district agreement. Moreover,
Green Dot’s cooperative relationship has not allowed it to negotiate any loosening of the
restraints imposed by the original agreement. As expressed by Darnall’s administrator, a
union can slow down the school’s ability to adapt and respond if the administration and
union have a confrontational relationship. At Darnall, teachers have a significant
decision-making role through committee participation, but that participation might be
threatened by changes to state law, raising the prospect that the union may begin to
enforce the agreement more vigorously. Additionally, the risk of having to allocate
resources to legal process and to defending against grievances or lawsuits can lead
administrators to avoid making decisions they believe are necessary for the school, as

9
Complicated rules limit the type of action schools may take in response to any effort to organize teachers,
including communication with teachers and changes to the terms or conditions of teachers’ employment.
The bargaining process itself is also governed by detailed rules. Those rules are beyond the scope of this
study.

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reported by the administrator at Live Oak. That cost can disproportionately affect smaller
charters like Darnall, Choice 2000, Ocean or Live Oak.
Charter schools should also understand the power that a a single teacher,
or a small group of teachers, can exert over a school by initiating a union recognition
drive. The teacher who organized Live Oak’s union was dismissed after the third year,
just before she would have obtained permanent status. After the teacher requested an
election, the teachers voted for the Union by a vote of only two to one. The Union then
negotiated a bargaining agreement with a two-year tenure track, which was later extended
to three years. Several years later, although teachers engage in little union activity, the
School is still governed largely by the terms of the original contract. Given the increased
focus by the national and state teachers unions on unionizing charter schools, even small
schools should be aware of the possibility of unionization.
One conclusion from this study is that charter schools appear uniquely
capable of satisfying one of the key demands that often leads teachers seek union
recognition --- the ability to participate in establishing the school’s educational
philosophy and goals, and to play a role in implementing that philosophy by participating
in school governance. As discussed in the study, Darnall appeared to provide such
participation most thoroughly through its committee structure, but other schools also
fostered teacher participation in management through less formal means. If schools do
not satisfy these needs, however, unions may provide an ever more readily available
means of establishing formal involvement in decision-making, but in a more adversarial

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and reactive manner --- challenging and potentially reversing decisions, or affecting
decisions through the threat of a challenge.
The schools in the study also demonstrate that union recognition creates or
alters a number of relationships, beyond merely establishing a formal negotiating team
for the administration and union. Most of the school administrators reported that they
had established cooperative working relations with the union officers at their schools.
However, the schools were aware that the union officers were involved in ongoing
interactions with other stakeholders with an interest in shaping the union’s approach to
the administration. Most importantly, each union in the study, including Green Dot’s
AMU union, is affiliated with one of the large state teachers’ unions, primarily the CTA.
While the bargaining agreement negotiations at some schools are conducted by local
officials, others are conducted by CTA representatives. Several administrators reported a
perception that the CTA was interested in taking a more aggressive approach to
bargaining and contract enforcement than the on-site teachers. One significant limitation
of this study is that it did not include interviews with union officials, teachers or
representatives of the CTA or CFT. Accordingly, it is difficult to draw conclusions about
the relationships between local charter union officers and the state union organizations.
However, charters evaluating the prospect of unionization should be aware that a
collective bargaining agreement places a school within the purview of the CTA or CFT’s
operations, and that on-site officers will be influenced in varying degrees by state union
representatives who are not directly involved in the operation of the school.

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Additionally, the union officers may or may not hold views representative
of other teachers. Several administrators reported that local union officers have often run
unopposed, because a limited number of teachers were actually interested in union
activity. Moreover, the teachers who are involved are not necessarily the best teachers.
But the teachers who are involved have a disproportionate ability to affect administrators’
decision-making, by negotiating bargaining agreements and deciding how aggressively to
enforce the agreements. Schools should take this into account when evaluating the likely
effect of being unionized.
Finally, schools should be aware that the presence of a union can restrain
administrative decision-making beyond the formal restraints negotiated in a collective
bargaining agreement. For example, LA Leadership Academy reported that it was
considering layoffs. The school expected the Union to argue that remaining teachers
should have “bumping” rights. Although the Agreement does not provide such rights, the
Union has the ability to take a more aggressive posture toward contract enforcement as a
means of exercising leverage, or to push for expansion of the Agreement to include
bumping rights. The Academy faced pressure to comply with such demands in order to
maintain amicable relations with the Union. A non-unionized charter school without a
policy providing “bumping” rights would be able reassign teachers without regard to
seniority, based on the administrators’ judgment of the remaining teachers’ effectiveness.
Thus, charter schools should consider both the effect of a formal collective bargaining
agreement on administrative decision-making, and the unofficial but direct impact that
the union can have.

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Recommendations for Establishing Productive Union Relations
The schools in the study also provide insights for unionized charters
seeking to establish a productive working relationship with the union. As LA
Leadership’s administrator explained, trust is a key to making the management-union
relationship collaborative rather than contentious. LA Leadership is an example of
responding to what was perceived as a negative development by taking positive steps to
make the most of the new reality of a unionized workplace. After being involuntarily
unionized, the school immediately addressed the concerns that led the teachers to
unionize, including strengthening the school’s instructional leadership. Subsequently,
bargaining sessions were reported to be brief and cooperative, and no grievance has been
filed since the Union was established.
Darnall demonstrated the importance of teacher participation in
governance for schools hoping to construct positive union relations. Darnall’s Board has
three teachers on its Board of 8 to 12 members, and has even had a Union officer on the
Board. Teachers serve on all school committees (including the personnel and budget
committees), and hold a majority on the Instructional Governance Council, which makes
all curricular decisions. The Administration believes that teachers involved in these
committees have rejected suggestions that the Union take a more aggressive posture
toward the administration, because teachers are satisfied that they are able to represent
their own interests . Darnall’s example could also be useful for charter schools that wish
to avoid unionization, and seek to preserve the ability to work directly with all teachers

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rather than through elected union officials. Although the study did not include schools
where union drives were rejected or were not pursued by teachers, extensive participation
in school governance appeared to be a key deterrent to union-management conflict, and
therefore would also be a likely deterrent to unionization.
As explained by more than one administrator in this study, the ability of
charter schools to provide full teacher participation in governance may be threatened by
changes to state law governing conflicts of interest. If California law prohibits any
members of a Board from having a financial interest in the organization, teachers could
be precluded from serving on the Board, denying them an important means of
participation in governance. This might lead teachers to rely more on unions to represent
their interests, and might lead teachers who are already represented to take a more
aggressive approach toward challenging administrators’ decisions. Policy makers
considering such a change should be aware not only of the possible detriment to school
governance itself (which, the charter administrators in this study believed, is enhanced by
teacher participation), but also of the possibility that such a change would make relations
between administrators and teachers (and their unions) more adversarial.
Recommendations for Schools Negotiating Their First Union Contract
Next, the schools in this study have done something very few charter
schools have done: negotiated their first collective bargaining agreement beginning from
a blank slate. Although only a smaller subset of the unionized charters in California were

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studied in detail, those schools provide a somewhat representative glimpse into the
opportunities and challenges inherent in this process. While the detailed analysis of the
schools’ bargaining agreements and Administrator interviews highlighted a number of
issues, some stand out for consideration by charters negotiating their first agreement.
Green Dot, the most pro-union charter in the study, negotiated a provision
allowing its union, AMU, to present a grievance not only for any violation of the
Agreement itself, but for any strategic or policy decision. Although the Union’s ability to
enforce this provision is unclear and has not been tested, it appears to expand AMU’s
influence beyond that normally enjoyed by unions, which is usually limited to
challenging specific decisions related to specific teachers. Thus far, Green Dot has not
been able to modify this provision. In light of Green Dot’s union-friendly position,
Schools negotiating their first agreement should be aware that, even if the school takes a
favorable view of unions, concessions made during initial bargaining can be difficult to
retract through subsequent bargaining.
Recommendations Regarding Specific Bargaining Agreement Provisions
Assignment and transfer
Schools adopting their first collective bargaining agreement might find
useful examples of provisions to negotiate, or to avoid, in the agreements examined in
this study. With respect to assignment and transfer provisions, the schools in the study

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generally negotiated more flexible terms than those found in the comparable district
agreements, which often require schools to give priority to more senior teachers in
making initial assignments, granting requests for voluntary transfers, involuntarily
transferring teachers due to performance issues, or re-allocating teachers after positions
are eliminated or become available through retirement. As explained above, the
difference is partly explained by the fact that most charters are still single-campus
operations, and even the larger CMOs and EMOs are usually much smaller than
conventional school districts. Accordingly, transferring teachers is not as frequent an
issue as it is in conventional districts, and unions do not appear to have made transfer
provisions a central focus of bargaining.
Choice 2000 provided an example of the increased flexibility negotiated
by many charters. The Choice 2000 Agreement does not require consideration of
seniority (or any other specified criteria), but does require that decisions cannot be made
for “arbitrary, capricious or punitive reasons.” This provision may or may not be a
possible model for other charter schools. Although such terms are also found in
conventional school district agreements, including LAUSD and Perris, those Agreements
also require the district to take seniority into account. Choice 2000’s Agreement provides
a teacher the opportunity to challenge a decision with no legitimate rationale, while
shielding the school from grievances based solely on violation of seniority rules or
disagreement with the wisdom of the decision. When a math teacher left that school, two
teachers requested the open class: one was a veteran teacher supported by the Union, the
other was a newer teacher favored by some in the administration. If the school had been

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part of the Perris Unified School District, it would have been required to take into
account the teachers’ district-wide seniority and appropriate subject matter experience.
Choice 2000’s administrators were able to consider only the needs of the students in the
class and the ability and personality of the two available teachers, and made the decision
they believed to be in the best interest of the students without considering seniority.
Although the Union could have claimed that the decision “arbitrary, capricious or
punitive,” it accepted the decision. However, other charter schools successfully
negotiated full disretion in such decisions, suggesting that unions are willing to
compromise in this area.
Charter schools negotiating transfer provisions might also consider the
decision by two of the schools in the study --- Green Dot and Darnall --- to depart from
their districts’ agreements by reserving to administrators the ability to grant voluntary
transfers to poorly performing teachers. The Agreements of LAUSD and San Diego
Unified prevent teachers with poor evaluations from requesting voluntary transfers.
Green Dot’s Agreement gives preference to teachers with satisfactory performance, but
allows administrators to transfer a poorly performing teacher upon request. Likewise,
while San Diego’s Agreement precludes poorly performing teachers from participation in
the “bid and post” process through which new assignments are obtained, Darnall’s
Agreement allows administrators to consider such requests.
Although this study did not explore the possible reasons for preventing
poorly performing teachers from voluntarily transferring, the restriction may provide an

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incentive for such teachers to improve, and may prevent principals from transferring a
problem teacher away from their school. Further research would also be required to
determine the reasons for and results of allowing transfer of such teachers. In a one-
campus charter organization, the concern for “exporting” a problem teacher would not be
present, as the transferring principal would keep the teacher in the same school.
However, Green Dot, a multi-campus CMO, would confront that problem, but still chose
not to negotiate this type of restriction. Additionally, while the provision adopted by
LAUSD and San Diego Unified would impose a measure of accountability for poor
performance, a principal may want to reserve the ability to give a teacher a “fresh start”
in a different classroom. Charter schools considering whether to adopt a conventional
district’s language on this subject might learn from schools such as Green Dot or Darnall
regarding their reasons for preserving administrator discretion in this area, and their
experience with any transfers granted to poorly-performing teachers.
Finally, while the charter schools in this study generally reserved more
discretion than the conventional school districts, and avoided requirements that seniority
be a factor (or the deciding factor) in the area of assignment and transfer, Green Dot is a
notable exception. Its agreement provides that if there are no “substantial distinguishing
differences” when considering teacher reassignment, the teacher’s length of service at the
school site is the “determining factor.” For teachers desiring reassignment outside
existing department, preference must be given to incumbent members with satisfactory
performance and credentialing. Green Dot reported that these provisions have never been
the subject of a grievance, which may be an indication that there have been no “close

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calls” in which seniority should have been the determining factor. On the other hand, it
might confirm Green Dot’s judgment that its Union’s (AMU) leadership takes a
collaborative approach to school operation, and has refrained from filing grievances that
might be brought in conventional school districts. Charter schools negotiating their first
contract may conclude from Green Dot’s example that contractual restrictions do not
necessarily have the same effect as they would in a conventional school district with a
more aggressive union. However, they should also be aware that if their teachers
perceive that a collaborative relationship between the school and the union, like that of
Green Dot and AMU, is no longer serving their interests, they may become more inclined
to encourage a more aggressive approach by their union to enforcement of the
Agreement.
Teacher evaluation
The schools in this study also provide valuable suggestions regarding the
development of contract provisions regarding teacher evaluation. Several schools in the
study have departed from the binary “yes” or “no” rating system used by many
conventional school districts (including LAUSD), adopting instead a matrix requiring one
of several ratings in a number of categories. The standards adopted were often tied to the
California Standards for the Teaching Profession (“CSTP”).
10
However, some schools

10
There are Standards in six categories of teaching practice: (1) Engaging and Supporting All Students in
Learning; (2) Creating and Maintaining Effective Environments; (3) Understanding and Organizing Subject
Matter; (4) Planning Instruction and Designing Learning Experiences; (5) Assessing Student Learning; and
(6) Developing as a Professional Educator.

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chose to use the CSTPs selectively, modified the Standards, or added other standards to
suit their own needs.
Charter schools considering the prospect of negotiating their first
Agreement should consider adopting the CSTPs, while examining their own needs and
the experience of other schools in order to adapt and develop evaluation standards that
best meet their educational philosophy and goals.Charters dealing with unions for the
first time might consider following LA Leadership’s example by surveying the evaluation
systems developed by existing charter schools and charter networks. Models such as LA
Leadership itself could be especially useful, as they have been tested in a unionized
charter environment.
Schools might also consider the two-track system negotiated by Green
Dot, which allows administrators to help teachers develop their own goals and
demonstrate performance through authentic assessment tools, and assigns teachers to a
“Track” based on experience and performance, rather than simply their years of service.
As outlined above, Green Dot’s “Track I” is for new teachers, with a focus on the
California Standards of Teaching Profession (“CSTP”), while Track II is for more
experienced teachers who have received either “Meets Standards” or “Exemplifies
Standards” on all elements of the CSTPs. Track I teachers develop a Unit Portfolio,
which includes personal reflection, unit outlines, connection with the CSTPs, and a
summary of professional development. Track II teachers adopt one of several Growth
Plan options, each of which is product-based, involving a staff presentation, a portfolio,

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or a report. Edison’s Agreement also uses portfolios as part of a comprehensive approach
to evaluation for all teachers, including observation, assistance by a lead teacher and
peers, a professional growth plan, a professional portfolio, self-appraisal using Edison
standards, and assessment by the principal or supervisor. These charters’ adaptations,
while not unique to charter schools or to schools with collective bargaining agreement,
provide insight into the range of possibilities for unionized charters. Charters should
consider whether these evaluation tools would give them a more complete view of their
teachers’ abilities than the forms typically negotiated by conventional, unionized school
districts.
Some of the schools in the study also departed from the frequency of
evaluation required by the Stull Act --- at least yearly for probationary employees, and
every other year for permanent employees. Some schools require more frequent
evaluation: Green Dot requires evaluation of Track I teachers twice each year, and Track
II teachers once per year; Camino Nuevo requires all teachers to be observed and
evaluated at least once each year. Edison requires evaluation each year during a teacher’s
first four years, and thereafter at least every other year, but teachers performing
unsatisfactorily must be evaluated every year. Again, schools confronted by a union
should be aware that they have the ability to negotiate terms that give them more latitude
in assessing even long-term teachers.
Schools seeking to increase the use of evaluation, both as a tool for
improvement and to determine whether teachers are not meeting the needs of the school,

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should also consider negotiating the ability to use informal observations as part of the
evaluation process. Such “drop-in” assessments are often prohibited by conventional
school district agreements because they do not allow the teacher to plan ahead. But
administrators have argued that they provide a more accurate picture of the teacher’s day-
to-day performance, precisely because the teacher cannot plan ahead. Thus, Camino
Nuevo and Edison are authorized to use informal observations in teachers’ final
evaluations; Live Oak specifically authorizes observations on a “drop in” basis; and
Darnall is authorized to use informal observations, but must afford teachers the same
rights that apply to a formal observation. Schools have a number of available models,
and should negotiate provisions that help them meet their educational objectives.
Several schools in the study also demonstrated flexibility in their use of
the evaluation process to assist low-rated teachers. Under the Darnall Agreement, if a
teacher receives a “Below” or “Far Below” rating, the School must notify the teacher by
December 1, and the Administrator and teacher must meet to create an Improvement
Plan, and meet again after thirty and then sixty days to decide whether sufficient progress
has been made. If the teacher fails to demonstrate progress, the Director should
recommend non-renewal to the Board, whose decision is final. Edison requires a yearly
evaluation for teachers performing unsatisfactorily; additionally, following a negative
observation a teacher must be observed a minimum of two additional times within two
months, and the evaluator must conduct pre- and post- observation conferences and
provide a written assessment. At Helix, a teacher receiving less than a “Satisfactory”
rating is evaluated every year until the teacher receives a “Satisfactory” rating. While

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conventional school districts often participate in a “Performance Assistance and Review”
program, charter have more freedom to negotiate a continuation of the “probationary”
revaluation schedule, and should consider the remediation efforts adopted by these
schools.
Finally, this study found few examples in which a school was able to
renegotiate a bargaining agreement to obtain more latitude in personnel decisions than it
had in the original agreement, but Green Dot successfully did so in the area of evaluation.
Green Dot worked extensively with AMU’s leadership on a new evaluation process,
which was approved and added to the 2006-2009 Agreement. The Agreement authorizes
administrators to place a teacher on a Development Plan if the teacher is rated lower than
“meeting” or “partially meeting” any CSTP standard, to place the teacher on an
Improvement Plan if sufficient improvement is not shown after 45 days (or if a teacher
receives an overall “Practice Does Not Meet Standards” rating), and to dismiss the
teacher if sufficient progress is not made thereafter.
Green Dot reported that it had received one grievance under the former
evaluation procedure, but that no teacher has filed a grievance under the new procedure.
This is a significant development in the context of this study, as it represents a departure
from what is sometimes called the “rachet effect,” in which bargaining agreements tend
to become more, not less, restrictive over time. The key to Green Dot’s success was its
close and lengthy collaboration with its Union, demonstrating again that once a union is
established at a charter school, the relationship between administrators and union leaders

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is critical to the administration’s ability to make personnel decisions without opposition
by the Union. Further research should be able to track the extent to which various
evaluation models are successfully negotiated with charter unions, and the extent to
which the administration is able to make personnel decisions, following those provisions,
that are accepted by the union.
Classification
The study also suggests that unionized charter schools have not departed
significantly from the Education Code’s provision of “permanent” status after two
complete years of service, which is one of the elements of state law most consistently
criticized by charter proponents. These provisions suggest that unions place a high
priority on obtaining some form of tenure protection when they approach charter schools.
Schools concerned about the ability to decide the makeup of their teaching force, and to
replace ineffective teachers, should review these agreements and seek to avoid them.
Indeed, for schools seeking administrative flexibility, such provisions provide a strong
incentive to avoid unionization by ensuring teacher empowerment in other ways.
Discipline
Consistent with the retention of some form of tenure, the schools in this
study generally did not negotiate away the “just cause” standard” applicable to
conventional school districts such as LAUSD. As in the other policy areas in the study,

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the schools demonstrated several possible ways to balance administrator discretion with
teacher protection, while hewing more closely to provisions found in conventional school
districts than in the other policy areas analyzed in the study. While Camino Nuevo’s
Agreement does not impose any “cause” or other specific standard for discipline, Green
Dot’s and Choice 2000’s Agreements require “just cause” for any discipline. Other
schools provide such protection only for more senior teachers: LA Leadership and Helix
require a form of “just cause” after two years, Ocean for any “ongoing” teacher, and Live
Oak for teachers with permanent status (in the teacher’s fourth year). Darnall’s
Agreement, rather than using the “just cause” standard, which carries with it a body of
interpretive case law and arbitration decisions, specifies that discipline is authorized for
“unsatisfactory performance,” unprofessional conduct, or violation of reasonable
regulations, policies and procedures. Finally, Edison’s Agreement imposes a lower
standard, requiring only that discipline cannot be imposed for “arbitrary or capricious”
reasons.
Choice 2000’s disciplinary process demonstrates the influence that an
authorizing district may exert over a “dependent” charter school. Although Choice 2000
negotiated a separate bargaining agreement, its parent district, Perris Unified, retains the
authority to approve or reject proposed discipline of Choice 2000 teachers --- effectively
eliminating one aspect of independence typically associated with charter schools.
Accordingly, Choice 2000 follows the comprehensive “FRISK” model used by many
conventional school districts. This arrangement may serve as a model for unions
negotiating with other “dependent” charter schools. As unions and charter schools

211
continue to interact, a larger sample of such arrangements should allow more detailed
study of the benefits and drawbacks of “dependent” status when the dependent charter
negotiates its own agreement.
Dismissal
As with disciplinary provisions, a number of charter schools in the study
negotiated protections from dismissal that are fairly similar to the protection given to
conventional schools by state law. Green Dot allows dismissal of any teacher only “for
cause,” although the Agreement has been modified to specifically allow dismissal for any
teacher on an Improvement Plan (as described above) who fails to show sufficient
improvement. LA Leadership’s Agreement requires “just cause” for dismissal after two
years. Ocean’s Agreement allows dismissal of “ongoing” (permanent) teachers only
when “substantiated and for just cause.” Live Oak requires dismissal of teachers with
permanent status only “for cause,” which includes unsatisfactory performance, neglect of
duty, inefficiency, discourteous treatment, and unprofessional conduct. Choice 2000’s
Agreement, on the other hand, authorizes discipline only for “just cause,” but does not
specifically require “just cause” for dismissal.
Darnall, which does not have a “just cause” standard but has a
complicated dismissal procedure (allowing dismissal after 60 days on an Improvement
Plan, but requiring that the 60 days start over for any “new” performance issue), did not
dismiss at least one teacher because the School was concerned that the teacher might file

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a grievance. While this restraint is one reason unions negotiate such provisions, charter
schools encountering union activity should understand that provisions that might appear
to provide significant administrator discretion take on added strength when backed by the
presence of a union with the ability to file a grievance.
Additionally, while a “just cause” standard is a high priority for unions
seeking job protection for teachers, this protection has lead at least one school, Live Oak,
to dismiss a teacher before the fourth year (when “permanent” status is reached).
Although the school would have preferred to continue to develop the teacher, it was
concerned about the cost of having to defend a dismissal after the teacher became
“permanent.” Thus, schools and teachers given the opportunity to develop their own
dismissal standards should be aware that a “just cause” standard, supported by the right to
grieve a dismissal, might actually hasten the dismissal of some teachers before they reach
their potential. Schools seeking to take a case-by-case approach to teacher development
and retention should be prepared to take a strong position regarding any “cause” standard,
These schools might need to be prepared to compromise in other areas during the
bargaining process in order to reserve discretion for dismissal decisions, and should
consider other forms of protection that strike a more comprehensive balance between
teachers’ and administrators’ needs.
Schools that do negotiate a “just cause” standard should also consider
specifically defining the standard with concrete, but non-exclusive, examples. Green
Dots agreement did not include any definition or examples, creating ambiguity that can

213
chill administrative decision-making (an example of the “psychological” contract
described in Chapter 2), while other schools, including Live Oak and Ocean, provided
administrators with a greater level of certainty by listing examples or categories of
conduct or deficiency constituting “just cause.” LA Leadership Academy’s experience
provides another note of caution. The school agreed to incorporate a “just cause”
standard, while obtaining verbal agreement from the Union that certain conduct, such as
inappropriate sarcasm or other abusive behavior, would constitute “just cause.”
However, because this understanding was not incorporated in the Agreement, the school
may at some point be challenged by teachers who do not recognize or respect the original
understanding. As explained above, a consistent theme that emerged in the study is the
degree to which amicable adjustment of disagreements depends on productive
interpersonal relationships. While administrators will want to continually work to foster
such relationships, given the possibility for turnover in administrative and union
personnel, it would be safer to remove ambiguity where possible.
Next, despite Green Dot’s strict dismissal standard, the CMO’s
administrator reported that terminations based on performance issues usually are not
grieved, which was attributed to the successful training of administrators to follow the
Agreement’s evaluation and dismissal procedures. Charters should learn from this
experience that administrators in unionized charters with a “cause” standard must take the
same care in compliance and documentation related to dismissal decisions as
conventional public schools.

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Finally, California law establishes a complicated notice and hearing
procedure for dismissal, and conventional public schools are specifically prohibited from
negotiating regarding this procedure. Charter schools, instead, are free to negotiate the
terms and procedures for dismissal in lieu of following the Education Code. They are not
required to negotiate any particular provisions or process. Accordingly, some charters
have specifically removed dismissal from the scope of grievance and arbitration
provisions in their Agreement. Camino Nuevo allows grievance of any termination of an
individual contract, but not a decision not to renew a contract or a reduction in force.
Green Dot and Choice 2000 authorize grievance and arbitration for any alleged violation
of the agreement, including the dismissal provisions, while other agreements were silent,
which generall has the effect of allowing the general grievance procedure to be used.
Each of these schools made important decisions in negotiating the dismissal provisions of
their first agreement. Given the scarcity of unionized charters, most did not have models
of contractual provisions to consider, and could not review other schools’ experience in
applying the variety of possible contractual terms. As examples continue to multiply,
schools should consider those examples in determining not only the strength of the
standard required for dismissal, but also whether there is a more efficient method of
allowing teachers to challenge decisions than the full grievance and arbitration process.
Overall, these schools’ experiences suggest that charter-based unions are
more concerned about restraining administrator discretion in discipline and dismissal than
in other areas of personnel policy, in contrast with the charter schools’ fairly consistent
departure from their districts’ assignment, transfer and evaluation provisions. This

215
contrast suggests that charter schools and unions are making an interesting trade-off when
freed from established bargaining agreements in conventional public schools: unions
achieve one of their key traditional objectives by protecting teachers from potentially
arbitrary discipline or job loss (a core property right protected by law in standard public
schools), while administrators obtain more leeway in areas of personnel policy that more
directly relate to day-to-day student performance, such as assigning and transferring
teachers to those classrooms in which they are best able to improve student performance,
and using the evaluation process to obtain a thorough assessment of teachers’
effectiveness and to guide the teacher’s effort to improve. An interesting question for
further research is whether the increased administrator discretion for placement and
evaluation in unionized charters has decreased the need for discipline and dismissal.
Alternative compensation / “merit pay”
Given the significant recent focus on merit pay in conventional school
districts, this study found surprisingly little activity among unionized charter schools.
Although several schools in the study had begun to analyze and discuss alternative
compensation arrangements, none had actually negotiated any element of a true “merit
pay” system. The interviews with charter school administrators revealed that several
schools, while interested in some of the potential advantages of merit pay, had not yet
determined how it would be integrated into their operational model and educational

216
philosophy, and no school had yet obtained its union’s approval for any form of merit
pay.
Green Dot expressed interest in exploring the possibility of merit pay,
partly in order to retain teachers who have left the teaching profession for jobs outside the
education sector, and discussed conducting a survey to gauge teacher interest. The
school favors providing merit pay on an individual basis, based on student outcomes, but
not on test scores alone. LA Leadership Academy has considered merit pay, but feels
that it is too small to introduce it successfully, and was concerned that basing salaries on
test scores or other measures could create stratification and resentment. Teachers and
administrators at Darnall have discussed merit pay, but administrators feel that any “merit
pay” component would need to be based on student growth, rather than on a “snap-shot”
assessment of student performance, and individual performance would only be one
component. The School would likely develop its own internal performance measures in
cooperation with its committees, all of which include teachers. Live Oak, a Waldorf
school, has considered merit pay, but has not yet seriously addressed it. Although
Waldorf schools are skeptical of testing and grading, Live Oak’s administration believes
that the school should be able to evaluate itself using quantitative measures, which may
eventually lead to consideration of merit pay.
These widely varying perspectives on merit pay demonstrate that charter
schools are far from uniform in their approach to compensation issues, and suggest that
further developments will provide interesting ground for ongoing research. The study

217
also points to challenges and opportunities for unionized charters considering merit pay.
It will be interesting to determine through further research whether administrators who
negotiate a traditional compensation system in their first bargaining agreement, and then
formulate an approach to merit pay that suits their school, will actually be able to obtain
union cooperation to effectuate such a change through subsequent negotiations.
Recommendations for Further Research
Finally, the study suggests avenues for future research. First, a primary
limitation of the study is its size. Although there are relatively few unionized charter
schools in California, a number were not included in this study, and analysis of those
schools’ agreements would help provide a more complete picture of the charter-union
landscape. Additionally, the schools included in the study were those whose
administrators chose to participate, among the total population of unionized charters
schools in the state. Accordingly, there was no attempt to focus on different sizes or
types of schools. The fact that the study included one large CMO (Green Dot), several
smaller or “mom and pop” charters, and one for-profit Educational Management
Organization was somewhat fortuitous. As there are a limited number of such schools in
California in which unions have been recognized, it could be useful to compare
comparable unionized charter schools outside of California.
A final limitation of the study is that it included only interviews with
school administrators, excluding teachers and union officials. Interviewing union

218
officials would provide a more balanced and complete analysis of the topics addressed by
the study. However, this approach provided insight regarding the effect of bargaining
agreements and union activity on the decision-making process of administrators, which
was a primary focus of the study.
Conclusion
This study demonstrates that the charter school movement and teachers’
unions, two significant forces in education policy and practice, will continue to interact
not only in the policy-making arena, but also “in the trenches” of charter schools and
charter management organizations across California. Charter schools, especially those
with multiple sites, will continue to be targets for unionization, and should study
carefully the experience of the small number of unionized charters now in operation. The
outcome of this interaction, in charter schools of varying sizes and educational missions,
will be shaped by the philosophical approach and institutional needs of the two forces,
and by the personalities and relationships of individual charter leaders, union leaders and
teachers. The results of this interaction could have a significant effect on the direction of
the larger charter school movement, by demonstrating that charters and unions can work
cooperatively to improve school performance, or by showing that the flexibility sought
by charter schools is fundamentally incompatible with the teacher-protection mission of
teachers’ unions.

219
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Appendix:
Charter School and District Bargaining Agreement Provisions

This Appendix analyzes the provisions of the charter schools in this study
in each policy area addressed by the Study, comparing them to the school districts whose
bargaining agreements would apply to the schools if they were conventional district
schools.
Assignment and Transfer
Assignment: Procedure and Criteria
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. LAUSD’s assignment provisions are complex, and highly
protective of seniority. Although the CBA’s management rights clause gives the District
authority to assign teachers to any location, facility, classroom, duties, academic subject
matter, grade level, or department, the District’s authority is constrained by seniority-
based preference rules. First, permanent teachers receive preference over non-permanent
teachers. Permanent (tenured) teachers are allowed to apply for positions before non-
permanent teachers, and non-permanent teachers are only given assignments after
permanent teachers have been assigned. Moreover, when assigning non-permanent
teachers, each school’s administrator must ensure that the proportion of non-permanent

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teachers in each grade and track level is approximately equal to the percentage of non-
permanent teachers in the school as a whole.
Second, permanent teachers generally must be assigned on the basis of
District seniority. The District may only depart from the seniority rule when “the site
administrator reasonably determines that any specific assignment is not in the best
interests of the educational program.” After initial assignments are made, subsequent
assignment decisions must take into account seniority and the school’s educational needs.
Thus, seniority is not automatically the determinative criterion.
Camino Nuevo. Camino Nuevo’s assignment provisions give complete
discretion to school leaders, who are able to make decisions based solely on their
assessment of the educational needs of the school.
Green Dot. Under the Green Dot Agreement, after the school provides a
notice of intent to return, teachers who timely return the form (by February 14) may
indicate their preferred assignment, which is assumed to be their current assignment
unless the teacher indicates otherwise. Provided the teacher has satisfactory evaluations,
the preferred assignment will be given. When teachers express competing preferences,
the school and teacher are to attempt to reach mutual agreement. If agreement cannot be
reached, the Board is authorized to make the final decision based on: (1) teachers’ legal
requirements and qualifications; (2) whether the teachers have satisfactory evaluations;
and (3) the teachers’ expertise and length of service. If no there are no “substantial
distinguishing differences,” the teacher’s length of service at the school site is the

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“determining factor.” When teachers request reassignment outside their existing
department, the opening is posted and preference is given to incumbent members with
satisfactory performance and credentialing.
LA Leadership. The LA Leadership Academy Agreement does not
include any specific provisions governing assignment or transfer provisions. The
Agreement’s management rights clause provides that the Academy retains all rights
under Charter School Law and the regulations for 501(c)(3) corporations. The clause
requires the school to include input from teachers in a collaborative process. It reserves
to the school the right to “determine staffing patterns and designs,” and the “number of
personnel and kinds of personnel required,” and provides that the school’s authority is
limited only by the express terms of the Agreement.
Ocean. Ocean Charter School’s Agreement requires teachers to submit an
“Intent to Return” form, and allows them to include a statement of preferred assignment,
but the Agreement does not mandate any criteria that must be included in making
assignment decisions.
Perris Union High School District, Riverside, CA: Choice 2000 Online
School
Perris. The Management Rights clause in the Perris Union High School
District’s Agreement reserves to the District authority over “assigning [and]
transferring.” Assignment is the initial assignment into an instructional department or
grade level at the same school site or facility. The District makes preliminary

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assignments as soon as practicable, in no event later than last day of school. However,
making initial assignments does not limit the District’s right to make changes in
assignments or programs provided the changes are consistent with the Agreement. Any
such change can only be made with two weeks’ notice to the teacher.
Choice 2000. Choice 2000’s “Charter Rights” provision also reserves to
the School the authority for “assigning [and] transferring.” Choice 2000’s assignment
provision is procedurally similar to PUSD’s; administrators are to make preliminary
assignments as soon as practicable, but no later than the last day of school, while the
making of preliminary assignment does not limit the ability to later change assignments.
Like the Perris Agreement, a change in assignment can only be made after giving the
teacher two weeks’ notice.
Perris’s Agreement requires that changes in assignment cannot be made
for “arbitrary or capricious” reasons. This provision could apply either to initial
assignment decisions that are changed before a teacher takes the assignment, or to
“reassignment” decisions. Upon request, the District must provide written reasons for the
change. Choice 2000’s Agreement is similar to Perris’ in this regard, requiring that
reassignment decisions cannot be made in an “arbitrary, capricious or punitive” manner.
Like the Perris Agreement, the Choice 2000 Agreement requires that the reason for any
reassignment must be provided upon request, but it does not specify that the reasons be

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provided in writing, which could create ambiguity if those reasons are challenged through
a grievance.
San Diego Unified School District, San Diego, CA: Darnall Charter
School
San Diego. The San Diego Agreement’s “Management Rights” clause
provides that all rights not enumerated are reserved to the District, and may not be the
subject of meeting and negotiating or grievance. The Board has rights to determine
staffing patterns and structure.
Darnall. Under the Darnall Agreement, at the end of each year the next
year’s classes are formed from “power cards” completed by teachers re students. The
Agreement does not specify any criteria that must be used for assignment decisions.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. Ravenswood’s “Management Rights” clause reserves to the
District the right to “hire, classify, assign, transfer, evaluate, promote, reprimand, and
terminate employees.” Procedurally, the Agreement requires the Administrator to send
“Intent to return” forms which teachers must return by the end of January, and to make
preliminary assignments by February 6 (subject to change) for all teachers who returned
forms. The School must then notify teachers of all known openings for the following
school year. Prior to the first work day in April, only current teachers may be selected to
fill preliminary openings. Thereafter, positions may be opened to external applicants,

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who will be considered on the same basis as outside applicants. All postings must be sent
to the Union president.
To be considered for an opening or vacancy, a teacher must meet the
minimum requirements. If two or more teachers apply, the decision must be based on:
(1) the certification, major and minor subject areas of the applicants; (2) the recent
experience of the applicants; and (3) the program needs of the school. After application
of above factors, if two or more teachers are equal, seniority must be the “deciding
factor” for selection.
Edison. Under the Edison Agreement, an “Intent to return” form must be
sent by February 15 to determine openings, vacancies, and assignment preferences.
Teachers must return the forms by March 1, indicating their preliminary assignment,
reassignment, and transfer requests. Decisions are to be made by the Principal, in
consultation with the school leadership team, by March 15. Returning teachers must be
given a contract offer by May 1, including a preliminary assignment, but the assignment
may change. Teachers must return the contract by May 15. Unlike the Ravenswood
Agreement, Edison’s Agreement does not restrict the School from seeking outside
applicants at any point during the assignment process.
Edison’s Agreement requires the School to consider the following factors
in making assignment decisions: (1) the certification, major and minor subject areas of
the applicants; (2) the prior experience of the applicants; (3) the teachers’ performance
and qualifications; and (4) the needs of the School’s educational program and students,

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including the potential for disruption. If two or more teachers are equal in the application
of these factors, seniority becomes a “major factor” in the decision.
Edison’s assignment criteria are similar to Ravenswood’s, with some
significant differences. The second criterion refers to teachers’ “prior” experience, rather
than only their “recent” experience. This change would allow a more thorough
consideration of the teacher’s career, but might introduce consideration of experience
with less indication of current skill levels. The third criterion is not present in the
Ravenswood Agreement. Explicit consideration of the teacher’s performance and
qualifications is the type of change that charter advocates see as integral to the purpose of
charters. Finally, if teachers are equal in the application of the enumerated factors, the
Edison Agreement requires only that seniority become a “major factor,” while
Ravenswood Agreement requires that it become the “determinative” factor. The fourth
criterion also differs from Ravenswood’s, in explicitly taking into account the possibility
of disruption caused by the decision. The addition of performance and qualification is
especially significant in light of the requirement to consider seniority a major factor if the
applicants are equivalent with respect to the enumerated categories. The addition of this
criterion formally allows the administrator to avoid any consideration of seniority when
one teacher has demonstrated superior performance, while an administrator applying the
Ravenswood Agreement would be largely precluded from making performance a
significant element of his decision.

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Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. The Grossmont Agreement’s Management Rights clause
reserves to the District the power to “hire, classify, assign and terminate.” All teachers
must be given written notice of the next year’s tentative assignment prior to the end of the
school year. Unassigned teachers are must in assignments meeting their qualifications
before any vacancy is advertised.
Helix. The Helix Agreement, like the Grossmont Agreement, reserves to
the District the right to “hire, classify, assign, and terminate employees,” and contains no
other provision governing teacher assignment. Both Agreements provide broad latitude
to administrators, although the Grossmont Agreement gives significant protection to
current teachers provided they are unassigned.
The Grossmont Agreement also addresses reassignment necessitated by
overstaffing. Administrators are required to inform all teachers in an overstaffed
department of projected District-wide vacancies, seek volunteers, and inform the Human
Resources Department of the names of any interested teachers. Placement must then
follow the Voluntary Transfer procedures outlined below. If no teacher volunteers, the
administrator must attempt to reassign the teacher to another department or discipline for
which the teacher is qualified. Such reassignments must also follow the Voluntary
Transfer provisions. If a department remains overstaffed, the administrator must declare
the teacher unassigned. The Administrator must then apply the Agreement’s general

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Transfer guidelines, considering whether the teacher has any special assignment that
cannot be adequately performed by another teacher, and the district seniority of the
teacher. If a position for which the teacher is qualified becomes available at the school
within three years of the original transfer, the teacher has the option to return to the
school.
Helix. Under the Helix Agreement, unassigned teachers --- those in an
overstaffed school due to a decline in enrollment, programs or services --- must be placed
in an assignment for which they are qualified before any vacancies are advertised. The
Administrator in any overstaffed school must notify all teachers of any District vacancies
and seek volunteers, following the Agreement’s voluntary transfer rules. If there are no
volunteers, the Administrator must attempt to reassign the teachers at his school. If the
department still overstaffed, the teacher must be declared unassigned. As under the
Grossmont Agreement, the Administrator must consider the Agreement’s general
guidelines, whether the teacher has any special assignments that others cannot fulfill, and
the teacher’s seniority. Like the Grossmont Agreement, the Helix Agreement gives an
unassigned teacher the right to return to the school declaring him unassigned, if a position
for which he is qualified becomes available within three years of his transfer from that
school.

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Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. Under the Petaluma agreement, school staff have the right to
develop the criteria for choosing new staff members, and to interview with those criteria
in mind. The Agreement provides every teacher the right to receive an interview, but the
school staff have the right to recommend selection according to the criteria they develop.
Live Oak. Under the Live Oak Agreement, upon initial employment the
Administrator is authorized to make initial assignments of classroom and grade level.
The Administrator must notify teachers of their tentative grade level assignments by June
1. In the event of a vacancy, the Administrator must communicate the vacancy to
existing teachers, and solicit requests from teachers prior to advertising the position.
Assignment: Ability to Challenge or Grieve
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. In LAUSD, if a school fails to give priority to the most senior
teacher in assigning secondary teachers, that teacher may grieve the decision under the
CBAs standard grievance and arbitration provisions, where the decision can be reversed
if it is found to be “arbitrary or capricious.” An elementary teacher may invoke an
informal alternative grievance procedure involving an informal meeting between the
grievant and administrator, a second meeting with the Chapter Chair, and submission to a

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Joint Panel composed of a union and district representative, who alternate acting as tie-
breaker in the event of deadlock. The Panel must determine whether it was proper to
depart from seniority in making the assignment because “the site administrator
reasonably determines that any specific assignment is not in the best interests of the
educational program.”
Camino Nuevo. The Camino Nuevo Agreement specifically precludes
teachers from challenging a school’s assignment decision through the Agreement’s
grievance procedure.
Green Dot. At Green Dot, if a request for reassignment outside the
teacher’s current department is denied, the teacher can demand written reasons for the
denial. Additionally, any decision made pursuant to any provision of the Agreement may
be grieved.
LA Leadership / Ocean. LA Leadership’s and Ocean’s Agreements do not
specifically address grieving an assignment decision; accordingly, the Agreements’
general grievance provisions may be utilized.
Perris Union High School District, Riverside, CA: Choice 2000 Online
School
Neither the Perris nor the Choice 2000 Agreement provides any specific
mechanism for challenging an assignment decision. Accordingly, both Agreements’
general grievance provisions are available.

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San Diego Unified School District, San Diego, CA: Darnall Charter
School
Neither the San Diego or Darnall Agreement provides any mechanism for
challenging an assignment decision. However, Darnall’s grievance section authorizes a
complaint for violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of any provision of the
Agreement. Darnall’s Agreement also allows a grievance for any violation of law or of
the Charter.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. The Ravenswood Agreement requires that, upon request by
a teacher not selected for a vacancy, the District must provide written reasons for the
teacher’s non-selection. The Agreement provides that the exercise of management rights
is not be subject to the Agreement’s grievance procedures, except where the exercise of
those rights conflicts with the Agreement. In practice, any assignment decision could be
challenged as failing to properly apply the procedures or criteria governing assignments.
Edison. Under the Edison Agreement, any applying, qualified member
must be given an interview for an open position. If the request is denied, the School must
provide a written explanation upon request by the teacher.

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Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont, Helix. Neither the Grossmont nor Helix Agreement
specifically authorizes any method of challenging an assignment decision. Accordingly,
the Agreements’ general grievance provisions may be used. However, as the Helix
Agreement provides administrators with complete discretion in such decisions, it would
be difficult to base any grievance on the violation of any specific provision of the
Agreement.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma, Live Oak. Neither the Petaluma nor Live Oak Agreement
specifically authorizes any method of challenging an assignment decision. Accordingly,
the Agreements’ general grievance provisions may be used.
Transfer Provisions
Comparison of transfer provisions between LAUSD’s bargaining
agreement (and the other districts) and the charter schools addressed in the study is
somewhat problematic. While the term “transfer” in LAUSD’s Agreement refers to the
movement of teachers between schools, most of the schools are single-campus entities.
Some are part of a Charter Management Organization (including Camino Nuevo and
Green Dot) or an Education Management Organization (such as Edison Schools), but

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those organizations are dwarfed in size by LAUSD, and even the larger organizations
have lesser need or opportunity to transfer teachers from one campus to another.
Several of the schools’ definitions also demonstrate the difficulty of
drawing meaningful comparisons in this area. Under the Perris agreement,
“Reassignment” is the movement of a teacher from (a) one subject area to another, (b)
one grade level to another, (c) one track to another at same facility. Reassignment can be
voluntary or involuntary. The Agreement also contains provisions governing voluntary
and involuntary transfers, which refers to movement between schools. The Choice 2000
Agreement does not distinguish between “reassignment” and “transfer.” The San Diego
Agreement defines a transfer as a change from one school site to another, or to a program
with a different cost center. Transfers may be voluntary or involuntary. Under the
Ravenswood Agreement, an “assignment change” is defined as movement from one
grade level to another within the same school, while a “transfer” is defined as a change in
work location from one school to another within the district. As both terms refer to a
change in position for existing teachers, and both types of change present similar
questions regarding procedural requirements and criteria for consideration, both can serve
as comparators for Edison’s provisions. However, as all transfer or “reassignment”
decisions, whether between schools, classrooms or subject matter, can involve balancing
the needs of the institution and the rights and interests of teachers, it is interesting to
compare the degree of discretion given to administrators for the decisions made possible
by the structure of each school.

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Voluntary Transfer: Procedure and Criteria
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. In LAUSD, teachers who receive a Notice of Unsatisfactory
Service or “Below Standard” evaluation are ineligible for voluntary bargaining unit
member-initiated transfers. Additionally, while any other credentialed teacher may apply
to any school in the district for a voluntary transfer, a transfer cannot adversely affect
teacher integration, Rodriguez compliance, the Bilingual Master Plan of the receiving or
sending school, or the instructional program of the sending school. The District is also
precluded by California law from giving priority to any teacher applying after April 15 if
other qualified teachers have applied.
Seniority plays a role in voluntary “continuous service” transfers. A
teacher who has served at a Title I or Urban Impact I school for eight consecutive years,
or has served for four consecutive years at a non-Title I or Urban Impact I school, but is
willing to transfer to such a school, may apply for transfer. Eligibility for transfer is
ranked, based on years of continuous service, and district seniority is used to break ties.
Camino Nuevo. At Camino Nuevo, as the School has complete discretion
in making transfer decisions, teachers with the equivalent of “Below Standard”
evaluation are not eligible for transfer. LAUSD’s agreement excludes such teachers from
voluntary transfer.

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Green Dot. Under the Green Dot Agreement, a teacher may request a
voluntary transfer at any time. When an opening is posted, preference must be given to
teachers with satisfactory performance.
Ocean. The Ocean Agreement requires teachers to submit voluntary
reassignment requests by February 15, and the school must inform the teacher of its
decision by May 1. The administrator has discretion in making reassignment decision;
must be based on: (1) the teacher’s credentials; (2) whether the teacher has a satisfactory
evaluation; (3) the teacher or teachers’ years of service at the school; and (4) the teacher
or teachers’ total years of teaching.
Perris Union High School District, Riverside, CA: Choice 2000 Online
School
Perris. Under the Perris Agreement, after preliminary assignments are
made, the District must post all vacancies to provide an opportunity for transfer
applications. Requests for voluntary transfer must be considered on the basis of (1)
appropriate credentials, (2) district-wide seniority with appropriate subject matter
experience, and (3) recentness of a teacher’s subject area preparation. If a request is
denied, the District shall, upon request, provide specific written reasons for the denial.
Preference (defined as “special weight,” but not a guarantee) for any vacant position must
be given to a qualified unit members over non-unit applicants. However, the final
selection is within the discretion of District management.

242
Choice 2000. Under the Choice 2000 Agreement, the School has
authority to change a teacher’s assignment after giving the teacher two weeks’ notice.
The school is not required to apply any specific criteria in making such decisions,
provided the decision is not made for arbitrary, capricious, or punitive reasons.
San Diego Unified School District, San Diego, CA: Darnall Charter
School
San Diego. Under the San Diego Agreement, transfers are accomplished
primarily through a “post and bid” process, which takes place once in February and again
in May. The Administrator responsible for job postings must allow the union
representative to review the postings prior to sending them to the Human Resources
Department for editing and posting. The District then posts a list of vacancies and
provides the list to the Union, after which eligible teachers have ten days to bid for a
transfer to those positions.
The San Diego Agreement gives preference to “priority employees” who
have no present assignment because of declining enrollment or program elimination.
Such employees are guaranteed an interview for any open position for which they are
qualified, and must be selected for a vacancy, regardless of seniority, unless there is an
overriding issue of qualification based on the criteria required for the posted position.
Otherwise, transfers are awarded based on the criteria in the job posting. However, if the
site administrator cannot make a selection within thirty days after receiving the names of

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eligible bidders, the District’s Human Resources Division is required to assign qualified
members to positions according to seniority. The District may interview and select a
teacher to fill each vacancy from the five bidding teachers with the greatest seniority,
provided they meet the basic credentialing requirements. A teacher with an applicable
minor may be considered for vacancies receiving less than five qualified bidders with the
appropriate required major, but the District is not required to accept such an applicant. A
teacher who is awarded and accepts a bid may not participate again until the following
February posting period. Positions made available after May are required to be offered in
seniority order to qualified unit members in priority consideration status; such teachers
must accept any position for which they are qualified.
The San Diego Agreement also gives priority to existing personnel when
filling postings in priority-staffing schools, which is done in February; positions not filled
within the district may be filled by non-district personnel only if does not cause layoff or
“excessing” of a bargaining unit teacher. Transfer decisions made after the formal
bidding process in May must be based on the educational needs of the District, the
teacher’s request, and the qualifications of the teacher. If all other things are equal, one
of five teachers with the greatest seniority who request the position and are deemed
qualified by the Human Resources Department will receive the transfer, except that
teacher in excess at the site must be given priority within the school.

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Under the San Diego Agreement, when multiple assignment positions are
reduced or consolidated, the affected teachers must request transfer to other school or
multiple type assignment within the District, bid on any vacancy for which they are
qualified, or be transferred under provisions governing reduction of staff. Priority is
given to qualified teachers in affected multiple assignments, and teachers whose recent
assignment included all or part of a multiple assignment. If no teacher has a claim to
priority, the teacher with the greatest district seniority will be awarded the position.
Special provisions apply to the opening of a new school, a school reorganization, or a
school’s change to a magnet focus, all of which are beyond the scope of this study.
Darnall. Under the Darnall Agreement, “reassignment” is movement from
one program or grade level to another, which is roughly equivalent to transfer decisions
under the San Diego agreement. The Agreement provides that after openings must be
made available to incumbents prior to open hiring. Once openings are announced,
preference must be given to incumbents with satisfactory performance and credentials.
In the absence of “substantial distinguishing differences,” seniority at the school site is
the determining factor.
Under the San Diego Agreement, teachers with evaluation ratings other
than “effective” cannot participate in the “post and bid” procedure. There is no
comparable restriction in the Darnall Agreement. In this sense, the San Diego Agreement
could be seen as imposing a greater degree of restraint on administrator discretion.

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However, rather than protecting less effective teachers, a criticism often expressed
regarding District bargaining agreements, this provision essentially punishes them, by
excluding them from a voluntary, Union-negotiated process available to other teachers.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. Under the Ravenswood Agreement, transfers may be
voluntary or involuntary. Each teacher applying to transfer to an open position must be
interviewed if the teacher meets the basic requirements for the position, is not a candidate
for the District’s Peer Assistance and Review program (addressed in the Evaluation
section of this study), and agrees to the interview schedule. No teacher can be pressured,
threatened, coerced or intimidated to seek transfer. The same provisions that govern
assignment decisions apply to voluntary transfers. Thus, when two or more teachers are
equal after the application of the enumerated factors above, seniority must be the
“determinative factor.”
The Principal of each school is also authorized to determine assignment
changes, but he must take the following steps before making such a change: (1) discuss
with the teacher the necessity for the change prior to finalizing the decision, (2) consult
with other teachers who will be affected by the change, and (3) upon request from the
teacher assigned contrary to the teacher’s wishes, provide reasons for the change in
writing. Involuntary assignment changes cannot exceed two grade levels from grade
presently taught.

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The Principal must consider the same criteria in making assignment
changes as in making initial assignment decisions: (1) the certification, major and minor
subject areas of the applicants; (2) the recent experience of the applicants; and (3) the
program needs of the school. However, if two or more teachers are equal after the
application of these factors, seniority will become a “major factor” for selection, but not
the “determinative factor” as it is for initial assignment decisions.
Edison. Under the Edison Agreement, an assignment change is a
movement from one grade level or subject to another within same school, or to a
combination class. Teachers given assignment changes after the start of the start of
school year must be given two days release time to prepare for the new assignment.
Under the Edison Agreement, a voluntary transfer is a request to transfer
from one work site to another. Any teacher may submit a request, and must be
interviewed. Teachers cannot request more than one transfer per year. Decisions must be
based on the same criteria that apply to assignment decisions: (1) the certification, major
and minor subject areas of the applicants; (2) the prior experience of the applicants; (3)
the teachers’ performance and qualifications; and (4) the needs of the School’s
educational program and students, including the potential for disruption. As with
assignment decisions, if two or more teachers are equal in the application of these factors,
seniority becomes a “major factor” in the decision.

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Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. The Grossmont Agreement addresses both reassignment
(within a school) and transfer (between schools). A teacher seeking reassignment must
submit a written request to the site administrator before April 15. The school must send a
list of all vacancies to the Union, and post it in a conspicuous place at each teacher
location, after which the list must be updated every two weeks. Unit members must be
given first consideration in filling any vacancy.
Under the Grossmont Agreement, a teacher seeking a transfer must submit
a request to the Assistant Superintendent or Associate Administrator for Human
Resources at any time before May 1. District officers are required to be actively involved
in matching requests with school needs and promoting transfers with school principals.
Specifically, district officials must: (A) guarantee that permanent teachers receive
interviews for requested positions; (B) reduce the stigma of transfer by supporting
teachers desirous of transferring; (C) make sure the concept of transfer is recognized as
healthy and rejuvenating; (D) develop a mentor program at school sites to facilitate
successful transfer; and (E) promote transfers with the understanding that transfers are
based on interest of teachers and school. The Helix Agreement mirrors the Grossmont
Agreement in requiring that all requests for transfer be submitted by May 1, and in
requiring Administrators to take the steps outlined above (A-E) to facilitate transfers.

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Transfer decisions must be based primarily on the needs and interests of
the District, and cannot be made for arbitrary or capricious reasons. The following
factors must be considered in any transfer decision: (A) ensuring a well-balanced staff
relative to program, staff, and student needs; (B) teacher training, recent experience, and
credentials; (C) implementation of the District’s affirmative action objectives; (D)
placement of unassigned teachers; (E) teacher preference. District seniority (F) must be
used as the deciding factor when all other qualifications are equal.
Helix. Under the Helix Agreement, a written request for voluntary
reassignment must be submitted by April 15; unlike the Grossmont Agreement, the
Agreement does not specify the process or criteria used in responding to such requests.
The Helix Agreement’s voluntary transfer provisions, like the Grossmont
Agreement’s, requires that the School prepare a list of vacancies, send the list to the
Union, post it, and update it every two weeks. Existing teachers must be given first
consideration. Transfer decisions must be based on the needs and interests of school, and
cannot be for arbitrary, capricious, or vindictive reasons. The Agreement mirrors the
Grossmont Agreement in requiring consideration of the following factors in any transfer
decision: (A) ensuring a well-balanced staff relative to program, staff, and student needs;
(B) teacher training, recent experience, and credentials; (C) implementation of the
District’s affirmative action objectives; (D) placement of unassigned teachers; (E) teacher

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preference. District seniority (F) must be used as the deciding factor when all other
qualifications are equal.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. Petaluma’s Agreement indicates that transfers should be made
available “to encourage renewal and growth.” School staff have the right to develop
criteria for choosing new staff members, and to interview with those criteria in mind.
The Agreement provides every teacher the right to receive an interview, but the school
staff have the right to recommend selection according to the criteria they develop. The
Agreement makes clear that teachers are personnel of the District, not of a particular
school. Transfer is defined as a move from one school to another, from a special
education position to another, or from a regular position to a special education position.
A voluntary transfer is initiated by the teacher; involuntary is initiated by district.
Transfers within the District must be consistent with equal opportunity
policy. Vacancies must be identified in staffing meetings involving site administrators,
which the Union President and designee must be invited to attend. Transfer decisions
must be made through the following steps: (a) retirees are identified; (b) leaves are
granted for the following year; (c) teachers returning from leave are identified and
placed; (d) administrative transfers are made at the first staffing meeting; (e) vacancies
are identified at first staff meeting; (f) a vacancy notice is developed and posted; and (g)
interviews for transfer applicants and outside applicants are held.

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When a teacher with continuing employment or reemployment rights is
displaced, he is not required to go through more than three interviews before being
placed, and the District must consult with Union representatives regarding the placement.
If excess teachers are employed for a given year, classroom or other positions will be
assigned, including resource teachers, team teaching positions.
The District must post all vacancies as soon as they are identified.
Interested teachers must notify the District Human Resources Office and the principal
using the appropriate form. Teachers applying during the spring are guaranteed an
interview following the “District Hiring Protocol.” The vacancy notice must include the
required skills, specialty areas, and competencies. Teachers may attach supporting
documents to their application. Vacancies not filled through individually – initiated
transfers are then subject to “outside” vacancy notice. Vacancies resulting from
individually-initiated transfers are also subject to “outside” vacancy notice procedure.
Unit members may also apply for these positions, but must compete with outside
applicants. Teachers wishing to be notified of a specific vacancy must submit a written
request to the District Human Resources office on the appropriate form. A request for a
transfer must include information as to the school, position, and grade level desired. A
transfer request will be considered for any vacancy identified during the year in which the
request is filed.

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Live Oak. Live Oak’s Agreement provides only that reassignment is
change of classroom or grade-level assignment.
Voluntary Transfer: Ability to Challenge or Grieve
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. The LAUSD Agreement does not specifically address the proper
avenue for challenging voluntary transfer decisions; accordingly, the Agreement’s
general grievance procedure is available. Camino Nuevo’s Agreement specifically
exempts all transfer decisions from the grievance process. The Green Dot Agreement
includes no specific provision for challenging a voluntary transfer decision, but the
agreement allows a teacher to challenge through the grievance process any decision made
pursuant to any provision in the Agreement. The Ocean Agreement is silent on the
ability to challenge or grieve a voluntary transfer decision; accordingly, the general
grievance procedure is available.
Perris Union High School District, Riverside, CA: Choice 2000 Online
School
The Perris Agreement and the Choice 2000 Agreement both provide that if
a transfer request is denied, the District or School shall, upon request, provide specific
reasons for the denial, although the Perris Agreement requires such decisions to be
provided in writing. Neither Agreement specifically provides any other way to challenge

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or grieve a voluntary transfer decision; accordingly, the Agreements’ general grievance
procedure may be utilized.
San Diego Unified School District, San Diego, CA: Darnall Charter
School
Under the San Diego Agreement, any provision may be challenged
through the Agreement’s grievance procedure. Under the Darnall Agreement, if a request
for reassignment is denied, a teacher may request a meeting with the Director, who must
provide written reasons for the denial. Additionally, Darnall’s grievance section
authorizes a complaint for violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of any provision
of the Agreement, or violation of law or Charter regulation.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
The Ravenswood and Edison Agreements are silent regarding the ability
of teacher to grieve the denial of a voluntary transfer; accordingly, the general grievance
procedures of the Agreements may be used.
Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Under the Grossmont Agreement, if a voluntary transfer request is denied,
upon request by the teacher the District must provide a written rationale for the rejection,
and grant a meeting with the responsible administrator and department chair to discuss

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the rejection. The Agreement’s general grievance provision is also available. The Helix
Agreement allows a teacher to demand a written rationale for the rejection, but does not
require the School to arrange a meeting with the responsible administrator.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. The Petaluma Agreement requires the Union and District to
notify in writing any teacher not transferred to a requested position when the position has
been filled. The teacher has the right to confer with the Superintendent or designee.
Involuntary Transfer: Procedure and Criteria
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. Under the LAUSD Agreement, teachers may be transferred
involuntarily when it is in the interest of the District’s educational program. The District
maintains a pool of teachers available for transfer, including those necessary to comply
with the Teacher Integration Program.
Detailed “Displacement” provisions apply when a transfer is made
necessary by an “over-teachered” condition, caused by declining enrollment. In that
event, the teacher with the least district seniority in the affected group (which is an entire
elementary school, or the over-teachered program or subject for a secondary school) is
displaced, unless the school administrator determines teacher has special instructional

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skills or qualifications not possessed by another available teacher. In a secondary school,
if the least senior teacher has at least ten years of district seniority, the teacher may
change subject fields, and displace another teacher with at least five years less seniority,
if the senior teacher has taught in the second subject at least six periods in the previous
six semesters with satisfactory evaluations, has a subject credential or secondary
credential with a major, minor or advanced degree in the subject, and passes a district
examination in the second subject field if requested.
Some teachers are made exempt from displacement by their involvement
in the Teacher Integration Program, which ensures that school faculties are integrated so
the ratio of minority to non-minority teaching staff in each school is substantially same as
the district-wide ratio. In the event that all teachers in an over-teachered school are
exempt, the teacher with the least district seniority must be reassigned to a school in the
same geographic area. A displaced teacher may have return rights, if the teacher is the
most senior in the subject and the school determines the teacher’s return is in the best
interest of the school.
Camino Nuevo. The Camino Nuevo Agreement gives the School
complete discretion to make transfer decisions, imposing neither procedural nor
substantive restraints on administrators.
Green Dot. The Green Dot Agreement does not include procedural rules
for involuntary transfers, but allows such transfers only for “just cause,” and only when
there is no qualified voluntary applicant.

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Ocean. Under the Ocean Agreement, the school must notify a teacher that
he is being considered for involuntary reassignment by April 1, and must notify the
teacher of any decision by May 1. The Agreement includes a significant procedural
protection against involuntary transfer: the school must use due diligence to attempt to
hire a qualified teacher in order to avoid involuntary reassignment. This provision is a
significant restraint on the school’s discretion, while appearing to support the Union’s
interest in expanding employment opportunities for its members or potential members.
The Agreement does not explain what constitutes “due diligence,” nor the extent to which
budgetary constraints would excuse the school from conducting a search for a new
teacher. If the school has complied with the due diligence provision, it may reassign a
teacher involuntarily only where the decision is for the “good of the institution.” When
selecting a teacher for involuntary reassignment, the school must consider the same
factors that apply to voluntary reassignment decisions, except that priority is given to
teachers with the least, rather than greatest, amount of seniority. The factors are: (1) the
teachers’ credentials; (2) whether the teachers have satisfactory evaluation; (3) the least
years at school; and (4) teachers’ total years of teaching.
Perris Union High School District, Riverside, CA: Choice 2000 Online
School
Perris. The Perris Agreement authorizes the District to make involuntary
transfers to fill vacancies. The District must first seek voluntary applicants, but it is not
required to grant a request by a voluntary applicant. The District must notify the Union

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in writing when considering any involuntary transfer. Upon request by the union, the
District must consult with the union prior to making any transfer decision final.
Specified criteria must be followed when making any involuntary transfer
decision: (1) seniority (teachers with the least seniority must be considered first); (2) the
teacher’s recentness of subject area evaluation; (3) whether the teacher’s credential
matches the new assignment; and (4) the selection must be based on best interests of
educational program. The District must provide explicit written reasons for its decision.
Involuntary transfer decisions cannot be “arbitrary or capricious,” and cannot be made for
punitive or disciplinary reasons.
Choice 2000. The Choice 2000 agreement does not specifically authorize
involuntary transfers, but does not preclude such transfers. Similar to the Perris
Agreement, the School cannot make any transfer decision for “arbitrary, capricious, or
punitive reasons.” However, the Choice 2000 Agreement does not require that any
specific criteria, including seniority, be applied to such decisions.
San Diego Unified School District, San Diego, CA: Darnall Charter
School
San Diego. The San Diego Agreement includes original provisions
regarding administrative transfers, and an amendment to the Agreement resulting from
the settlement of a dispute between the union and the District. The original Agreement

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provides that when a Supervisor believes the interests of the District, pupils, and teacher
will be served by an administrative or “voluntary” transfer, the administrator will file a
request for a transfer with the division head. Any involuntary transfer decision must
include due process. Before any transfer recommendation is acted upon, the supervisor
must advise the teacher through a personal interview, and in writing, of the
recommendation and reasons for the transfer. Upon request, the administrator must meet
with the teacher to discuss the proposed transfer. Ultimately, the District has authority to
determine whether the transfer should be made. However, the decision cannot be made
for “arbitrary or capricious” reasons.
Under the San Diego Agreement, involuntary transfers to reduce staff
levels may be made at the end of the school year based on enrollment estimates, and may
be made during the year based on actual enrollment. Administrators must poll all
teachers regarding their interest in transfers. Volunteers may be transferred to achieve
the necessary reduction. However, if no teacher volunteers, the teacher with the least
amount of seniority at his level or subject area or in the affected program may be
transferred. Any teacher who has taught in the District for two years, in a different
subject or different level within last 9 years, or for at least one year within the last five
years, and is deemed qualified by the Human Resources Department, may exercise
seniority rights within that other level, subject or program. A teacher involuntarily
transferred after October 15 cannot be transferred against during the same year for the
same purpose.

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In the San Diego District, teachers in enumerated key positions may be
protected from involuntary transfers, including teachers in positions where no qualified
teacher is available to fill the position, and positions requiring special credentials,
including gifted programs, special education, bilingual and ESL, Opportunity School
positions; district reading teachers; in-school counselors; senior high school positions
involving extended-day pay; and itinerant teachers budgeted to divisions other than
Office of Instructional. Teachers cannot be reassigned due to declining enrollment after
October 31, other than for severe declining enrollment caused by circumstances beyond
district control.
After a dispute arose regarding the San Diego Agreement’s involuntary
transfer provisions, the District and Union negotiated a pre-arbitration settlement
significantly expanding those provisions. The settlement agreement provides that
administrative transfers cannot be based on activities protected by labor law, such as
Union meetings, or “working to rule,” which generally involves performing the minimal
required amount of work. When an administrator considers an administrative transfer
based on the teacher’s behavior, and the teacher’s activity is not protected, the Site
Administrator must determine whether the behavior action can be addressed the
evaluation process, or through a letter of reprimand or suspension. If it cannot, the site
administrator has discretion to consider recommending transfer, but the decision must be
based on the negative impact of the teacher’s behavior or action, and the best interests of
the district, school, pupils and teacher. The administrator must have a factual basis for

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the transfer, supported by documentation. He must meet with the teacher to discuss the
action, any negative impact, and any possible consequences of the transfer. He must also
notify the teacher of the school’s expectation for future conduct, and of the forms of
support provided to mitigate the behavior or action, and must create a written record of
any conferences or interventions, which must be given to the teacher with the right to
respond, but cannot be placed in the teacher’s file.
Darnall. Darnall’s Agreement is in some ways more restrictive than the
original provisions in San Diego’s Agreement, but it provides administrators with
significantly more discretion than the provisions added to the San Diego Agreement
through the settlement agreement explained above. Unlike the San Diego Agreement,
under the Darnall Agreement the School must first take volunteers before initiating an
involuntary transfer. Moreover, teachers are exempt from involuntary reassignment if
they are new (defined as having taught three years or less), or if they have accepted a
“non-preferred” position (defined as teaching out of their preferred level, a combination
class, etc). If all other factors are equal, and all teachers have previously accepted an
involuntary assignment, the teacher with the least recent involuntary assignment must be
considered first. Finally, if two or more teachers have never received involuntary
assignment, and all other factors are equal, the least senior teacher will be transferred.
This provision actually gives more weight to seniority than the San Diego Agreement.

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The comparison between Darnall’s and San Diego’s involuntary transfer
provisions is interesting because they approach the issue from different perspectives.
Darnall’s agreement is focused primarily on the need to fill open positions. The
agreement’s restraints on administrator discretion are designed to equalize the use of
administrative transfers among teachers. Protection against transfer is based on teachers’
previous transfers, their current position, and their seniority --- all factors unrelated to the
teacher’s performance or activity. The San Diego Agreement appears to assume that
such decisions are used as tools of administrators for moving teachers with performance
or behavior problems that cannot be remedied through the evaluation or discipline
process. Thus, the restrictions on administrator discretion are focused on the particular
teacher under consideration, including whether the activity for which the teacher is
criticized was related to his rights under labor law, whether the Administrator has
considered alternative means of addressing the teacher’s activity, and whether the
administrator has provided the teacher sufficient notice and opportunity to correct his
behavior.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. The Ravenswood Agreement provides that involuntary
transfers may be necessary to equalize a school’s teaching load, compensate for
enrollment changes, meet instructional requirements, or to meet other educationally
related needs. Only the Superintendent or his designee is authorized to initiate such
changes. The teacher must be notified before any involuntary transfer is made, and the

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District must discuss alternatives and attempt to obtain the teacher’s mutual consent.
Specific reasons for the transfer must be given in writing. A teacher cannot be
involuntarily transferred without a “rational basis in fact,” and cannot be transferred
involuntarily for disciplinary reasons. Any teacher subject to involuntary transfer must
be given the opportunity to visit schools with openings. Teachers transferred after the
school year begins must be given five days’ notice, and five days’ released time to
transfer. Teachers involuntarily transferred cannot be given a similar transfer for at least
two years, except for loss of enrollment, program size reduction, or loss of funds.
Edison. The Edison Agreement is similar to the Ravenswood Agreement
with respect to the permitted reasons for involuntary transfer: to equalize the school’s
teaching load, compensate for changes in enrollment, meet instructional requirements, or
for other educational reasons. As in the Ravenswood Agreement, the teacher must be
consulted before an involuntary transfer is made, and the school must discuss alternatives
and attempt to obtain the teacher’s consent. The Agreement also mirrors the
Ravenswood Agreement in requiring that the Decision cannot be made without a rational
basis in fact, or for a disciplinary purpose. Likewise, a teacher subjected to involuntary
transfer cannot receive another involuntary transfer for at least two years, except for loss
of enrollment, program size reduction, or loss of funds. Finally, any teacher involuntarily
transferred must receive five days notice; the Agreement differs only slightly in providing
three days Released Time rather than five days.

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Helix Charter School - Grossmont Union High School District
Grossmont. Under the Grossmont Agreement, involuntary or
“Administrative” transfers are authorized in the event of staff imbalances, reduction in
enrollment, or reduction in programs and services. Any such transfer must involve
discussion and input from the teacher and department chair. The teacher must be given
written notice of any District-initiated transfer as soon as possible. Any teacher who is
administratively transferred must, upon request, be given three release days to prepare.
Helix. The Helix Agreement also authorizes administrative or “District
initiated” transfers to address staff imbalances, or reductions in enrollment, programs or
services. The School must first discuss the possible transfer with the teacher and
Department chair. If the teacher objects, the School must make a good faith effort to find
an acceptable solution. If a teacher is involuntarily transferred during the school year, he
must be given three release days to prepare for the transfer. Teachers must also be given
notice of any anticipated administrative transfer as soon as the transfer decision is known.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. Under the Petaluma Agreement, Involuntary Transfer decisions
cannot be made for “arbitrary or capricious” reasons. The Petaluma Agreement
authorizes the District to initiate involuntary transfers when made necessary by
enrollment, or when it is otherwise in the best interest of the school or the District. No

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such transfer may take place without prior consultation with the Union, the school
Administrators, and the teacher. All affected teachers must be notified by letter.
Transferred teachers will be given first consideration to apply for return to their original
assignment if appropriate vacancy occurs.
When declining enrollment makes staff reductions necessary, the District
must select teachers for involuntary transfer using the following criteria: (1) least amount
of district seniority, (2) least amount of seniority at the school site, and (3) grade level
experience. If consensus cannot be reached, the final decision must be made by the
principal and Assistant Superintendent. Any teacher involuntarily transferred or
reassigned must be informally notified in advance of the formal notice, and must be given
the opportunity to apply on voluntary basis for another position. The District should
attempt to give notification by June 1 where possible, but in any event must give
notification as soon as the determination is made.
A reassigned teacher must be informed of the assignment at least one
month prior to the assignment. When the decision is made by the District, the teacher
must be paid for the time spent moving at the substitute rate, and the District must
provide physical assistance with the move. The Agreement provides that teachers should
not be subject to an excessive number of transfers. If a teacher is transferred two or more
times in four years, weight must be given to seniority in any transfer decision considered
by the District.

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Live Oak. The Live Oak Agreement provides that where a reassignment
decision is made for reasons other than filling a vacancy, the Educational Director must
consult with the affected employees as early as reasonable. No reassignment decision is
permitted without including the affected parties. Reassignment during summer may be
necessary, in which case the teacher must be notified within five days. The Live Oak
Agreement does not impose any restriction against “arbitrary or capricious” decisions, as
Petaluma’s does.
Involuntary Transfer: Ability to Challenge or Grieve
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. In LASUD, when possible, a teacher must be notified and
counseled regarding an involuntary transfer, and upon request, written reasons for the
transfer must be provided. A teacher transferred involuntarily may request, within five
days of notice, a 30-day mediation period. The mediation proceeds upon mutual
agreement, except that mediation is mandatory if requested by the Union within ten days
of the notice of transfer. The District must respond within five days of the request. If the
District refuses to mediate, the teacher or Union may proceed under to Step One of the
Agreement’s standard grievance procedure (presenting the matter to the Administrator)
within fifteen days. If mediation is attempted, but fails, the teacher or Union may
proceed under Step Two of the grievance procedure (to the Superintendent or designee)
within fifteen days.

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Camino Nuevo. Under the Camino Nuevo Agreement, as with voluntary
transfer decisions, involuntary transfer decisions are specifically exempt from the
grievance process, and no other process is provided for challenging such decisions.
Green Dot. The Green Dot Agreement includes no specific provision for
challenging an involuntary transfer decision, but the agreement allows a teacher to
challenge through the grievance process any decision made pursuant to any provision in
the Agreement. Because involuntary transfers may only be made “for just cause,” and
only when there is no other qualified voluntary applicant, such decisions are highly
susceptible to challenge.
Ocean. The Ocean Agreement is silent as to the ability to challenge or
grieve an involuntary transfer decision. Accordingly, the Agreement’s standard
grievance procedure may be used.
Perris Union High School District, Riverside, CA: Choice 2000 Online
School
Perris. Under the Perris Agreement, prior to any involuntary transfer the
District must inform the teacher of its intent in writing, whereupon the teacher has five
days to accept the transfer or request a meeting with the Superintendent or his designee.
Upon request by the teacher, the District must provide specific reasons for the
involuntary transfer within five days. Any dispute over a decision regarding a transfer to
a new site is referred to a conflict resolution panel within five days of a request. The

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dispute must be resolved within five days of an initial meeting. The panel hearing the
dispute includes three teachers selected by the Union, and two selected by the
Superintendent or designee, giving a potentially dispositive advantage to the Union.
Choice 2000. The Choice 2000 Agreement requires the School to provide
specific reasons for any change upon request, but provides no other method of
challenging or grieving an involuntary transfer decision. Accordingly, the Agreement’s
general grievance procedure can be utilized.
San Diego Unified School District, San Diego, CA: Darnall Charter
School
San Diego. Under the San Diego Agreement, any involuntary
(“administrative”) transfer decision may be appealed through the Agreement’s grievance
procedure. Darnall’s Agreement does not specifically provide authorize any grievance or
other form of challenge to an involuntary transfer decision. However, Darnall’s
grievance section authorizes a complaint for violation, misinterpretation or
misapplication of any provision of the Agreement, or violation of law or Charter
regulation.

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Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood, Edison. These schools’ provisions are silent on this subject;
accordingly, the Agreements’ general grievance and arbitration provisions may be used.
Helix Charter School - Grossmont Union High School District
Grossmont. Under the Grossmont Agreement, if a teacher objects to an
administrative transfer, the Administrator must make a good faith effort to find an
acceptable solution. The Agreement’s general grievance procedure is also available to
challenge such decisions.
Helix. The Helix Agreement does not include any specific provision for
challenging involuntary transfer decisions. Accordingly, the Agreement’s general
grievance procedure can be used.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. The Petaluma Agreement provides any transferred teacher the
right to confer with the Superintendent or designee about the reason for the transfer. The
Agreement’s general grievance procedure may be used to challenge any decision made
pursuant to the Agreement, including involuntary transfer decisions.

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Live Oak. Live Oak’s Agreement does not specifically address this issue.
Accordingly, the Agreement’s general grievance procedure can be used.
Teacher Evaluation
Frequency of Evaluation

Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. Consistent with the Stull Act, evaluations in LAUSD must be
made at least yearly for probationary employees, and every other year for permanent
employees. As authorized by the Education Code section 44664, “highly-qualified
teachers” (as defined by the No Child Left Behind Act) employed by the District for at
least 10 years may be evaluated every three, four or five years, if jointly agreed by the
evaluator and teacher. Such consent may be withdrawn at any time, upon written notice
not later than the end of the school year before the next evaluation. Such withdrawal may
not be grieved, but failure to provide proper notice may be grieved.
Camino Nuevo. Under Camino Nuevo’s Agreement, each teacher must be
formally observed at least one during each year. A mid-year evaluation must be
completed by the end of the first semester, and a comprehensive evaluation must be
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Green Dot. Green Dot’s Agreement establishes a two-track evaluation
system. Track I is for new teachers, with a focus on the California Standards of Teaching
Profession (“CSTP”). Track II is for more experienced teachers (defined as having
taught for three years at Green Dot or four years overall, with at least one year at Green
Dot), and focuses on professional development. Entry into Track II requires that a
teacher receives either “Meets Standards” or “Exemplifies Standards” on all elements of
the CSTPs. Track I teachers are formally evaluated twice each school year – the first
time prior to the end of the first semester, and the second fifteen days before the end of
the school year. Track II teachers are evaluated once per year prior to end of school year.
LA Leadership. LA Leadership’s Agreement does not specify the
frequency with which teachers must be evaluated.
Ocean. Like LA Leadership, Ocean’s Agreement is silent regarding the
frequency of evaluation.
Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Perris. Permanent teachers are evaluated every two years. Teachers
receiving an unsatisfactory rating must be evaluated annually until the teacher receives a
positive evaluation or is separated from the District. As allowed by Education Code
section 44664, evaluation may be done every five years for teachers who have been
employed for at least ten years, are “highly qualified” as defined by the No Child Left

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Behind Act, and whose previous evaluation was rated as meeting standards. Requests to
be evaluated only every five years must be made on the Summative Evaluation Form; if
the request is rejected, the teacher will be evaluated at least every other year.
Choice 2000. Under the Choice 2000 Agreement, all teachers are
evaluated every two years. The Agreement does not allow five-year evaluation gaps like
the Perris Agreement.
San Diego Unified School District: Darnall Charter School
San Diego. Probationary teachers are evaluated at least every year.
Permanent teachers are evaluated every other year if their recent performance evaluation
is “effective.” Teachers in alternative evaluation process may deviate from this schedule.
Teachers in the National Board Certification Program are exempt from routine
evaluations while participating in program.
Darnall. Under the Darnall Agreement, new teachers have a two-year
probationary period, in which they are evaluated both years. After the probationary
period, teachers are evaluated every other year.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. Under the Ravenswood Agreement, evaluation must be
conducted in accordance with the Stull Act. Probationary teachers must receive one

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formal observation with a written evaluation each school year. Permanent employees
must receive one formal observation with a written evaluation summary at least every
other school year.
Edison. Under the Edison Agreement, a formal evaluation must be
conducted each year during a teacher’s first four years. Thereafter, teachers must be
evaluated at least every other year, except that teachers performing unsatisfactorily must
be evaluated every year.
Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. Under the Grossmont Agreement, Permanent teachers must
be evaluated at least every two years, and probationary teachers every year.
Helix. Helix’s Agreement provides that permanent teachers must be
evaluated every two years, and probationary teachers are evaluated every year.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. Under the Petaluma Agreement, probationary teachers are
evaluated at least twice each year, following a schedule to be adopted by the District.
Permanent teachers receiving “satisfactory” evaluations are formally evaluated once
every four years (contingent upon State Board of Education approving the evaluation
model), unless there is a significant change in the teacher’s performance. If a teacher

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receives a rating of “Unsatisfactory” or “Does Not Meet District Standards,” an
additional evaluation is required in the following year. The teacher must also participate
in an improvement plan, and must receive intensive supervision from school leaders.
Live Oak. Live Oak’s Agreement is silent regarding the frequency of
teacher evaluations.
Evaluation Planning / Objectives
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. Under the LAUSD Agreement, the evaluator and employee
must meet soon after commencement of the academic year and “work cooperatively” to
establish the teacher’s objectives. The objectives must relate to standards of expected
student progress and achievement based on District, special program and local school
determinations, including appropriate instructional objectives, strategy-planning methods,
instructional materials, and methods of assessing student progress and achievement.
They should also address expected employee competence, including subject matter
knowledge, adherence to curricular objectives, use of effective teaching and supervision
techniques, effective use of time, maintenance of appropriate professional relationships,
communication with students, parents, and staff, and compliance with District and school
rules, policies and standards. Finally, objectives should include the teacher’s
performance of duties set forth in the Agreement (including hours of work); and

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maintenance of proper student control and a suitable learning environment, with proper
sensitivity to race, sex, ethnicity, handicapped and socioeconomic differences. If the
evaluator and employee cannot reach agreement, the employee can appeal to the next
higher administrator, and may ultimately note on the evaluation form that the objectives
were not mutually agreed upon. The objectives may be modified during the year.
Camino Nuevo. The Camino Nuevo Agreement requires the School to
provide a copy of the school’s evaluation checklist to each teacher once per academic
semester, with the understanding that all standards will not necessarily be addressed in
each semester. Unlike the LAUSD Agreement, Camino Nuevo’s Agreement does not
require that the teacher be involved in establishing the objectives for evaluation.
Green Dot. For all teachers (in Tracks I and II), the Principal must hold a
conference with each teacher by September 30 to discuss the teacher’s goals and
benchmarks. Prior to the meeting, the Principal must give the teacher the documents that
will be used for evaluation, and the expectations for the meeting. The focus areas for
each teacher’s evaluation may be changed during school year based on the “mutual
discretion” of the Principal and teacher. For teachers qualified to be evaluated through
the Track II process, by September 30 the School’s administrator must also present each
teacher with the options for that year’s evaluation: (1) continue with Track I, (2)
collaborate with other Track I teachers to create an Action Research Group, (3) develop
an individual research project, (4) assist an intervention team or other project for

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improving student achievement, (5) develop a Student Study Portfolio focusing on a
specific student or sub-group, or (6) assist in professional development programs.
Teachers must submit their proposal by October 31.
Ocean. Ocean’s Agreement requires a pre-observation conference,
discussed below, but does not otherwise require any evaluation planning process.
Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Perris. The teacher must be notified of the need for evaluation and the
identity of the primary evaluator within fifteen days of the start of school. Within six
weeks of the start of school, the evaluator and teacher must meet and mutually agree on
the standards by which the teacher will be evaluated.
Choice 2000. The Choice 2000 Agreement does not require any
particular form of planning meeting, or discussion and collaboration regarding the
standards by which the teacher will be evaluated.
San Diego Unified School District, San Diego, CA: Darnall Charter
School
San Diego. The evaluator is required to hold a staff meeting during the
first four weeks of school, review evaluation procedures, distribute forms, make job
descriptions available, and review the evaluation calendar. Within 35 days, each teacher

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must meet with the Principal or designated evaluator, and reach agreement on the
objectives and criteria for evaluation, and on the assessment techniques. Within ten days
of the conference, the teacher must prepare a written copy of the objectives, criteria and
assessment techniques (Part A, B, C of an evaluation worksheet), and submit them to the
supervisor. Within ten days of receipt of this material, the supervisor must approve or
disapprove of the teacher’s objectives. If they are not approved, the supervisor must
schedule a conference with the teacher.
Darnall. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. By the first work day in October, each teacher to be
evaluated during that school year must be notified of the evaluation, receive a copy of the
evaluation procedures, and be advised of the criteria for evaluation. New teachers must
receive this information within ten days of the execution of an employment contract.
The School must hold a planning meeting by the last day of the first
academic quarter (45 working days from the start of the school year). This meeting must
cover the objectives and standards to be achieved, a timeline of observations, and
schedule conference and final evaluation dates. In the event of disagreement, the teacher
and evaluator must attempt to resolve the disagreement, and invite an Associate or
Assistant Superintendent or their designee to resolve the dispute; that individual must

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prepare a written statement that is attached to the teacher’s evaluation form. During the
evaluation period, the teacher may initiate a change in the objectives by which the teacher
will be evaluated.
Edison. Like the Ravenswood Agreement, the Edison Agreement requires
that teachers must be given a copy of the evaluation procedures, and advised of the
criteria by which they will be evaluated, by October 1. New teachers must receive this
information within ten days of the execution of an employment contract.
The Edison Agreement is also similar to Ravenswood’s in requiring the
evaluator and teacher to hold a planning meeting by the end of the first reporting period,
to discuss the objectives and standards by which the teacher will be evaluated. The Pre-
Evaluation conference form attached to the Agreement requires that the evaluator and
teacher choose three of the six CSTP standards as the focus of evaluation; the teacher
may select one standard, and the evaluator chooses the other two. Reflecting one of the
most significant differences with the Ravenswood Agreement, the evaluator and teacher
must also discuss the teacher’s Professional Growth Plan (“PGP”). If the evaluator and
teacher cannot reach agreement regarding the objectives and standards, or the focus of the
PGP, another Edison Principal must be involved.
The original objectives and standards may be changed for changed
circumstances, and the professional growth plan changed by mutual agreement.

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Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. Under Grossmont’s Agreement, a pre-evaluation conference
between the evaluator and teacher must be held at the beginning of the school year for
each teacher to be evaluated. The teacher may apprise the evaluator of the teacher’s
objectives for the year, and the methods and materials planned for the lesson to be
evaluated.
Permanent teachers must be notified that they will be evaluated by
September 15 in their evaluation year. The teacher and evaluator must determine a
mutually-agreeable date for a conference to be held during September. The first
conference must include a review of the evaluation instrument and the CSTP standards,
but the teacher can provide material that the teacher deems pertinent to the evaluation
process. A second conference must be held by April 15, at which the results from the
implementation process are reviewed, and suggestions for improvement are discussed.
Probationary teachers must be notified by September 15 who their
evaluator will be. The evaluator and teacher must also determine a mutually acceptable
date for the first evaluation conference to be held in September. The teacher must submit
goals and objectives, and any other material the teacher deems pertinent, two weeks prior
to the conference. The first evaluation and observation must be submitted to the Human
Resources office by December 1, describing the implementation of the recommendations
decided upon in the first evaluation. A copy must be provided to the teacher.

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Helix. Teachers in their evaluation year must be notified of their
evaluation by September 20. Teachers must be given a copy of their evaluation form, the
California Standards by which they will be evaluated, and the dates of their observation.
Permanent teachers must agree on observation dates by October. The teacher may give
relevant material regarding evaluation to the evaluator. The evaluator and teacher must
hold a second meeting by April 1 to review the evaluation results. For probationary
teachers, the school must follow the same process, but teachers must submit their goals
two weeks prior to the meeting.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. The Petaluma Agreement requires that “early in the school
year,” the School’s Management Team Member must hold a conference with each
teacher to be evaluated, regarding the criteria set forth in the District’s Guidelines for
Evaluation of Certificated Personnel. Each teacher must write an annual Professional
Development Plan, which is designed to stretch the teacher’s professional expertise, take
professional risks, and be professionally innovative. The format must be agreed upon by
the teacher and site administrator. The Plan must be submitted within forty-five days of
the start of the school year. If it is not submitted on time, a Career Enhancement Plan
must be developed by the principal and teacher. The teacher must use the Plan as a self-
evaluation tool at the beginning of the year, and share it with the Management Team
Member. The Agreement indicates that because the District and Union agree on the
importance of the relationship between the administrator, teacher and students, one goal

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for each teacher will be drawn from the “body of awareness and skills commonly referred
to as the affective domain.”
Each teacher must also form a Professional Development Team, and meet
periodically during year to discuss the Professional Development Plan. The list of team
members must be submitted within forty-five days of the beginning of the school year.
Within ten days of the end of school, the teacher must present a year-end report to the site
administrator detailing meetings held with Professional Development Team, the progress
made on the teacher’s Career Enhancement Plan. The Report and Career Enhancement
Plan are placed in the teacher’s personnel file.
Live Oak. Teachers must be given the criteria by which they will be
evaluated by October 1. The Agreement does not include any of the Petaluma
Agreement’s provisions regarding a Professional Development Plan or Team. The
teacher’s performance goals must be aligned with the School’s mission and charter, and
must be submitted to and approved by the Educational Director by October 15 of each
year.
Type, Frequency, Notice of Observation
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. All observations should be followed by conferences to discuss
the teacher’s performance. The evaluator is required to make “specific recommendations

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for improvement, and offer appropriate counseling and assistance.” Within four working
days of the conference, a copy of all written records related to the observations, advisory
conference, or assistance offered, must be given to the teacher “for the employee’s
information, guidance, and as a warning to improve performance.”
Camino Nuevo. The Camino Nuevo Agreement requires that each teacher
must be formally observed at least one during the year. A teacher may request additional
observations to collect evidence of proficiency in any standard. The teacher is required
to provide a lesson plan two days in advance of the observation, and to attend pre- and
post-evaluation meetings. The School must schedule a conference within ten days of any
formal evaluation to review the findings with the teacher. Informal observations may be
ongoing throughout the school year, and such observations can be used in the teacher’s
mid-year and comprehensive evaluations. The mid-year evaluation must be completed
by the end of first semester using a standards-based evaluation checklist, and a
comprehensive evaluation must be completed by the end of the year using the same
checklist.
Green Dot. For teachers on Tracks I and II, two informal evaluations must
be held prior to each formal evaluation. The school must provide ten days notice for any
formal evaluation. The School and teacher must have a pre-observation conference three
working days before the observation, and a post-observation conference within ten
working days to review and sign the observation form. For Track I (beginning) teachers,

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the pre-observation conference must determine the areas of focus for the Formal
Evaluation, which should be drawn from the California Standards for the Teaching
Profession, depending on the teacher’s years of experience: in year one, CSTP Standards
1,2,4, and 6; in Year 2, CSTP Standards 3,4,5, and 6; in Year 3 and beyond, the
conference should review goals set by the teacher and administrator. For Track I
teachers, a formal written evaluation must be issued, and must include one artifact from
the lesson demonstrating or highlighting the teacher’s achievement in the relevant
CSTPs. The evaluation must be given 15 days before the end of the academic school
year.
Ocean. Under Ocean’s Agreement, the teacher and administrator must
agree on the date of observation. The teacher must provide his lesson form in advance of
the observation, and the School and the Union must agree on the form. The administrator
and teacher must then meet prior to the observation to discuss the lesson plan, using the
pre-observation questions as a guide, and the teacher and administrator must sign the
plan. After observing the teacher, the administrator must prepare a report using the
agreed-upon form. If the teacher receives a “Requires Strengthening” or “Below
Standard” rating, the teacher or the administrator can request a second observation, for
which the same procedure applies.

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Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Perris. Under the Perris Agreement, for permanent teachers a pre-
conference must be held prior to each formal evaluation, to agree upon the lesson plan,
the data required on the pre-observation form, the class period, and the date of the
evaluation. The teacher and evaluator must also complete a pre-observation form
explaining how the teacher will be evaluated. Permanent teachers must receive at least
one formal evaluation by March 1 in the year of evaluation. Formal observations must
last an entire class period. The evaluator must give prior notice of all formal evaluations.
The teacher may request an additional evaluation by administrator of teacher’s choice,
provided the chosen administrator agrees. Each formal evaluation must be followed by a
post-evaluation conference within ten school days, in which the evaluator and teacher
discuss the evaluation and jointly make specific recommendations for improvement. If
additional observations are deemed necessary, the teacher must be notified in advance.
At the teacher’s request, the reasons for additional observations will be given in writing.
Probationary teachers must receive at least three formal evaluations within
their first eighteen weeks of service. As with permanent teachers, a pre-conference must
be held prior to each formal evaluation to agree upon lesson plan, data required on pre-
observation form, class period and date of evaluation, complete pre-observation form.
Formal observations must last the entire class period. The Agreement recommends, but
does not require, that observations be three-four weeks apart to allow for growth. As
with permanent teachers, the evaluator must give prior notice of all formal evaluations.

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The teacher may request an additional evaluation by an administrator of the teacher’s
choice, provided the chosen administrator agrees. As with permanent teachers, each
formal evaluation must be followed by a post-evaluation conference within ten school
days – evaluator and teacher discuss evaluation, specific recommendations for
improvement. If additional observations are deemed necessary, the teacher must be
notified in advance, and, on request, reasons for additional observations will be given in
writing.
Choice 2000. The Choice 2000 Agreement mirrors some elements of the
Perris Agreement. The School must give prior notice of each formal evaluation, and
must conduct a post-observation conference within ten days, in which the evaluator and
teacher discuss the observation and plan for improvement.
San Diego Unified School District, San Diego, CA: Darnall Charter
School
San Diego. When classroom observations are used, the evaluator should
notify the teacher when the observation is to be conducted, the method of observation,
and who will do observation. The teacher must provide the evaluator with a brief outline
of the lesson being observed and the assessment or observation method used to measure
student achievement. The observer must prepare a written statement concerning each
observation being used as an assessment technique within a reasonable time (which
should be approximately 10 days) and attach it to the evaluation worksheet. The teacher

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may attach a written response. No electronic recording device may be used to record any
classroom instruction or conference unless agreed by teacher. The Agreement does not
prevent evaluators from observing a teacher’s job performance at any time, independent
of the formal observation process.
Darnall. Under the Darnall Agreement, teacher evaluation includes two
formal observations. Unscheduled evaluations are also permitted, for which the same
rights apply.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. Probationary teachers must receive one formal observation
with a written evaluation each school year. Permanent employees must receive one
formal observation with a written evaluation summary at least every other school year.
Each formal observation must be preceded by pre-observation conference at least two
days prior to the observation, in which the evaluator and teacher discuss the date and time
of the observation, and the objective of the lesson. Pre-observation conferences and
formal observations must be completed by the last work day January for probationary
teachers, and by the last work day of March for permanent teachers.
Formal observations must last at least 45 minutes, or one full period.
Formal observation must normally take place within 15 days after pre-observation

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conference, unless rescheduled due to illness. A post-observation conference must be
held within five days of the observation.
Any teacher who receives negative observation must have a minimum of
two additional formal observations, with pre- and post-observation conferences and a
written assessment.
Edison. Edison’s Agreement requires three formal observations, while
Ravenswood’s requires only one. Additionally, Edison’s Agreement specifically
authorizes informal observations. As with Ravenswood’s Agreement, prior to each
observation the evaluator and teacher must hold a Pre-Observation Conference.
However, the Edison Agreement requires the use of the Agenda form attached to the
Agreement.
Like Ravenswood’s Agreement, Edison’s provides that formal classroom
observations must last 45 minutes. The teacher must be notified two work days in
advance, but the observation can then take place any time within the 15-day period after
notification. The observation must be followed by a post-observation conference within
five days. Each of these provisions is essentially identical to Ravenswood’s provisions.
Finally, as in Ravenswood’s Agreement, any teacher receiving a negative
observation must have a minimum of two additional observations with pre- and post-
observation conferences and a written assessment. However, Edison’s Agreement

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requires that the additional observations must be conducted within two months of the
original observation. It is not clear whether the two additional observations required after
a negative observation fulfill Edison’s requirement of three formal observations each
year, or whether two additional observations must then be conducted.
Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. Each observation must be preceded by a conference between
the teacher and evaluator to clarify the objectives of the observation, and must be and
followed by a post-observation conference, for which the evaluator must prepare a
written evaluation report. All observations must be conducted openly. All evaluations
must be in writing, and a copy must be given to the teacher within ten days after the post-
evaluation conference. Any teacher who disagrees with the post-observation evaluation
may attach a written response, which must be placed in the teacher’s file. Each
observation of a teacher in must be for the “appropriate amount of time,” which is not
specified. However, if deficiencies are noted, the observations must be for at least one
full period or an equivalent period.
The Agreement specifically provides that the observation provisions shall
not be construed to preclude classroom visits where alleged deficiencies found during
evaluation process, or reasonably suspected.

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Helix. All observations must be conducted openly. The school must give
a copy of the observation to the teacher within 7 days, and the teacher may submit a
written response. Any student involvement must be done during an appropriate time.
Each observation requires a pre- conference and a post-conference. The evaluation must
be given to the teacher within seven days. Any deficiencies must be stated in writing,
with specific ways to improve. The teacher may then provide a written response. For
probationary teachers, the first evaluation must be completed by November 1, and the
second by April 1.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. The Petaluma Agreement requires that, as part of the visitation
and evaluation process, a teacher may request that a specific class be observed.
Additionally, no electronic devices may used to record a teacher during an observation
without the teacher’s consent.
Live Oak. Under the Live Oak Agreement, Probationary teachers must
receive at least two formal observations and evaluations each year. For one of the
observations, the teacher must be given twenty-four hours notice. The first observation
must be conducted by November 15, and the second must be conducted by March 19.
Permanent teachers must receive at least one formal observation. Observations can also
be done on a drop-in basis. The teacher must be given feedback at mentoring sessions
with the Educational Director.

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Individuals Involved in Evaluation
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. LAUSD requires that the teacher’s supervisor evaluate the
employee, but may delegate evaluation functions.
Camino Nuevo, Green Dot and LA Leadership. These Agreements do not
specify the person who must conduct observations or evaluations. The Camino Nuevo
Agreement addresses the subject, requiring that the Administrator must notify the teacher
by September 15 if the evaluator is to be anyone other than the site principal.
Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Perris. The primary evaluator must be the site level certificated
administrator, who signs each teacher’s evaluation. The secondary evaluator, if any, is a
current District certificated administrator, who may provide direct input. Each
administrator involved in the evaluation must sign the evaluation report. Non-
administrators cannot be involved in the evaluation process unless agreed upon by all
parties.

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Choice 2000. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
San Diego Unified School District, San Diego, CA: Darnall Charter
School
San Diego. The Teacher’s supervisor as designated in the teacher’s job
description must be the teacher’s evaluator. However, the Supervisor may delegate to
other credentialed supervisory personnel; such delegation must be explained to teacher.
Any special evaluation must be conducted by the supervisor, or it may be delegated with
division head’s approval. Teachers cannot evaluate other teachers.
Darnall. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. Under the Ravenswood Agreement, immediate supervisors
must evaluate probationary and permanent teachers.
Edison. The Edison Agreement provides that teachers shall not evaluate
or conduct formal evaluations of other teachers. Lead teachers may observe and assist
others only for the purpose of supporting the teacher’s professional development.
However, teacher involvement in Edison’s PAR program does not violate the agreement.

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Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. Probationary teachers must be notified by September 15 who
their evaluator will be. For all teachers, prior to the beginning of any evaluation, the
teacher may put in writing any concerns about the evaluator. Additionally, the teacher
has the right to request that another teacher be made part of the evaluation team.
Helix. A teacher may object to the choice of evaluator, but is not
authorized to request that another teacher be assigned as part of the evaluation team.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. The Petaluma Agreement requires that teachers must be
evaluated by a Management team member assigned by the Superintendent or the
Superintendent’s designee.
Live Oak. Under the Live Oak Agreement, classroom observations are
generally conducted by the Education Director, but can also be conducted by an outside
Waldorf teacher. The Education Director can ask the Executive Director to conduct a
second observation.

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Evaluation Instrument and Criteria
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. LAUSD’s Observation Conference Sheet includes notes,
commendations and recommendations on Communication, Decision-Making,
Management, Interpersonal, and Personal dimensions. LAUSD’s Stull Evaluation Form
includes “yes” or “no” ratings on 25 categories in five Areas (Instructional Objectives,
Preparation and Planning, Classroom Performance, General Professional Skills, and
Punctuality and Attendance), and requires an overall rating of “Meets Standard
Performance” or “Below Standard Performance.”
Camino Nuevo. Camino Nuevo uses a detailed rubric for evaluation,
based on the California Standards for Teaching Profession (“CSTP”): (1) Engaging and
Supporting All Students in Learning; (2) Assessing Student Learning; (3) Creating and
Maintaining Effective Environments; (4) Understanding and Organizing Subject Matter;
(5) Planning Instruction and Designing Learning Experiences; and (6) Developing as a
Professional Educator. The Evaluation requires the evaluator to rate the degree to which
the teacher demonstrates evidence of mastery of the CSTP: 4 = clear, consistent,
convincing evidence; 3 = clear evidence; 2 = limited evidence; and 1 = no evidence. The
Evaluation also requires the evaluator to report: (1) next steps for the teacher; (2) support
to be provided to the teacher; and (3) the next meeting and review date. If the teacher
provides a responsive statement, the Teacher Statement must be attached.

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Green Dot. Green Dot’s Agreement includes a flowchart for teachers on
Track I and on Track II. For Track I teachers in the first year, the goals measured in the
evaluation process must be based on Standards 1, 2, 4, and 6 of the California Standards
for the Teaching Profession. The required elements of evaluation are two Formal
Observations; Informal Observations; and a Unit Portfolio in Quarter 2 or Quarter 3. In
the second year, the goals must be based on CSTP Standards 3, 4, 5 and 6, and must
include two Formal Observations; Informal Observations; and a Unit Portfolio in Quarter
2 or Quarter 3. In year three and beyond, the goals should be determined by teacher
choice, but the evaluation must still include two Formal Observations, Informal
Observations; and a Unit Portfolio in Quarter 2 or 3. For Track II teachers, the School
must present the options to experienced teachers, but teachers develop their own
Professional Growth Plan based on the goals agreed upon with the administrator. The
teachers should then continue to meet with the administrator about their progress, and the
Administration should conduct at least one informal evaluation. Track II Teachers
present the findings from their Professional Growth Plan to the teaching staff.
Track I teachers also develop a Unit Portfolio, designed to help showcase
the teacher’s best unit. The portfolio includes: (1) a description or timeline; (2) a
reflection prior to the teaching unit (explaining why the teacher chose the project, the
goal of the project, the connection to the next unit, and the place of the project in the
larger picture); (3) an outline of the unit (including essential questions, standards to be
met, measurable outcomes, bibliography of resources, copies of student assignments with

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applicable rubrics, and student work samples); (4) a Reflection after teaching the Unit
(including whether goals have been met, and suggestions for others); (5) connection to
the CSTPs (those which were the appropriate focus for that year); and (6) a summary of
professional development (including a list or chart of development completed during the
year).
For Track II teachers, the Agreement includes a chart describing the
Professional Growth Plan options available, with details for each: (1) Action research, (2)
Curriculum Development, (3) Instructional Strategies Implementation, (4) Peer
Consultation / Coaching, (5) Professional Growth Portfolios, and (6) Structured
Professional Dialogue – Study Groups – Support Teams. The Agreement explains that
growth tasks are product-based, involving a staff presentation, a portfolio, or a report.
Each Track II teacher is required to complete Project Components and Timeline Sheet
prior to Oct. 31. Administrators must meet with the teacher once each quarter to discuss
the teacher’s standing and progress. Finally, the school must issue a Culminating
Assessment. The Administrator must meet with the teacher fifteen days prior to the end
of the school year to share feedback from formal observation, and discuss possibilities for
the next year. After a teacher has received a “series” of below standard informal
observations, the teacher can return to Track I if any CSTP ratings do not meet the
required standard. Likewise, the School may move a teacher back to Track I at any time
at the administrator’s discretion.

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Track II teachers are provided with questions to ask in formulating their
Professional Growth Plan form: What is the goal? What essential questions will guide?
How will the Plan impact or improve student learning? What format or approach will be
used? What is the timeline for the plan? What methods or strategies will be used? What
are the indicators of progress? What resources or support are needed? The Professional
Growth Plan must be signed by the teacher and the administrator. The Agreement also
includes guidelines for development of the Professional Growth Plan, with suggestions
for each aspect of plan.
Ocean. Ocean’s Agreement specifies the following criteria for
evaluations: curriculum planning and development, pedagogy, student motivation,
classroom management and student assessment, teacher-parent relationships,
colleagueship, self-improvement, and professionalism. One of four ratings must be give
for each criterion: (1) Above Standard; (2) At Standard; (3) Needs Strengthening; or (4)
Below Standard. The Agreement incorporates a form for use in rating teachers, but it
consists of a series of questions, rather than specific standards or a rubric.
Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Perris. Under the Perris Agreement, probationary (non-permanent) level-
one teachers are evaluated on the California Standards for Teaching Profession,
Standards 2 and 4. Level-two teachers are evaluated on Standards 1, 3 and 5, and on any
CSTP Standard for which the teacher received an “unsatisfactory” or “needs

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improvement” rating the previous year. Teachers are given one of four ratings: Meets
Standard, Needs Improvement, Unsatisfactory, or Not Applicable.
Choice 2000. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
San Diego Unified School District, San Diego, CA: Darnall Charter
School
San Diego. Teachers’ competency must be evaluated as it relates to: (a)
progress of pupils toward established standards; (b) instructional techniques and
strategies; (c) adherence to curricular objectives; (d) establishment and maintenance of
suitable learning environment; and (e) performance of non-instructional duties including
supervisory responsibilities. The evaluator and teacher are required to mutually
determine the teacher’s objectives, and the assessment techniques to be utilized. A
minimum of three objectives must be selected. Elementary teachers must select at least
one objective in an academic area (language arts, reading or mathematics), and one in
another areas; at least one shall reflect district / site goals. Secondary teachers must
select at least one objective reflecting district and site goals in a subject area within the
teacher’s major or minor teaching assignment.
If the evaluator and teacher disagree as to the areas of evaluation,
objectives and standards, evaluation elements, support requirements, or the teacher’s
ongoing plans, they must solicit a recommendation from a third party. The evaluator and

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teacher must attempt to agree on the third party, and if they cannot, they must refer to the
evaluator’s supervisor for the selection of the third party, who may be a teacher,
specialist, consultant, coordinator, director or assistant director. If the third party’s
recommendation does not resolve the dispute, the evaluator’s supervisor is authorized to
make the final decision after considering the third party’s recommendation. The goals
and objectives selected must take into account the characteristics of the teacher’s
students, class size, availability of resources, equipment and materials, and board-
established goals.
While each year’s evaluation concentrates on the selected areas, the
teacher is expected to maintain effective performance in all areas. The evaluator and
teacher must also identify any constraints which would hinder or limit the teacher’s
achievement of the objectives they have agreed upon. If such constraints cannot be
overcome or become inappropriate, the evaluator and teacher may modify the objectives.
Finally, teachers cannot be evaluated based on publisher’s norms established by
standardized tests.
Darnall. Darnall’s evaluations use the California Standards for the
Teaching Profession. Each teacher is assigned one of five ratings on each Standard.

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Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. Ravenswood’s evaluation process assesses competency
using the CSTP standards: (1) engaging and supporting all students in learning, (2)
creating and maintaining effective environments, (3) understanding and organizing matter
for student learning, (4) planning instruction and designing learning experiences for all
students, (5) assessing student learning, (6) developing as professional educator, while
adding a seventh criteria: (7) the District’s professional requirements.
The School’s formal observation form must use four ratings: (1) Exceeds
Standards / Integrated Mature Practice; (2) Satisfactory / Consistent Application of
Standards; (3) Needs Improvement / Developing Beginning Standards; and (4)
Unsatisfactory / Not Consistent with Standard Expectations. The Agreement
incorporates District evaluation forms in the Appendix.
Edison. Like the Ravenswood Agreement, Edison uses the six CSTP
standards (listed above), while adding its own seventh standard: (7) Edison professional
requirements.
However, Edison’s Agreement is broader than Ravenswood’s in
describing a comprehensive approach to evaluation for all teachers (not only those on an
improvement plan or in PAR), explaining that the components of evaluation are:
observation; assistance by a lead teacher and peers; a professional growth plan; a

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professional portfolio; self-appraisal using Edison standards; and assessment by the
principal or supervisor. Edison’s Agreement outlines seven elements of the Evaluation
process, and includes forms for use by the evaluator.
1. A Professional Growth Plan must be developed each year, including
specific professional development goals from the school’s performance standards, a plan
for achieving specific goals, a self-appraisal with evidence and the teacher’s reflections.
At least one goal must be developed in cooperation with the teacher’s “house team.” The
goals must address both short-term and long-term goals identified by the teacher’s house
team and supervisor.
2. The evaluation includes three formal observations in professional
settings, and informal observations.
3. Formal classroom observations must last 45 minutes. Observations
must be made known to the teacher two work days in advance, but can take place any
time within the 15-day period after notification. Prior to the observation, the evaluator
and teacher must have a Pre-Observation Conference using the Agenda form attached to
the Agreement. The observation must be followed by a conference within five days.
4. The evaluator must provide direct assistance in correcting deficiencies;
resources for such assistance include a lead teacher, coach, and Edison’s in-service
training.

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5. The teacher must produce a Professional Portfolio, by agreement
between the teacher and principal, which can include individual or team work. The
Portfolio must be submitted by May 1. It should include observation reports, lesson
plans, the teacher’s self-appraisal, the teacher’s Professional Growth Plan, evidence of
student achievement, and peer observations.
6. Each teacher creates a Self-Appraisal twice yearly, identifying goals
for the teacher’s Professional Growth Plan. The teacher must self-assess progress in
achieving the seven Edison standards described above. The initial appraisal must be
completed by the end of the first quarter, and the final appraisal by May 1. This
assessment must be used in the teacher’s summative evaluation, and in the Professional
Growth Plan.
7. A Final Formal Evaluation must be produced by the Administrator
each year. The Final Evaluation must be based on formal and informal observations,
conferences, student performance data, and the teacher’s Professional Growth Plan, and,
may include the teacher’s Professional Portfolio. The Evaluation must include a
summary performance rating as part of a the official record of the teacher’s performance.
The evaluation of any lead teacher must include any supplemental evaluation. The Final
Evaluation cannot include any Publisher’s norms established by standardized tests or test
result or program excluded by law.

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A final evaluation conference must be conducted at least thirty days prior
to the end of the school year. The teacher may attach a written statement of
disagreement. The final evaluation form must use the following ratings: Exceeds
(integrated mature practice); Satisfactory (consistent application of standards); Needs
Improvement (developing beginning practice); and Unsatisfactory (not consistent with
standard expectations).
The Agreement incorporates forms to be used in the evaluation, including
a Pre-Evaluation Conference Form, describing the School’s assessment methods, which
is to be given to the teacher by the end of the first reporting period; an Evaluation
Worksheet, to be completed during or after the observation, and reviewed in a post-
observation conference within five days; and an Evaluation Form on which the teacher
must rated on the standards described above.
Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. Grossmont’s Agreement includes a Certificated Evaluation
Form. The form requires evaluation according to the CSTP Standards, and includes
recorded observations and dates. The evaluator is required to assign one of the following
ratings as an Overall Evaluation: “Meets Standards”; “Meets Standards with Growth
Recommended”; “Does Not Meet Standards.” Copies of the CSTP Standards are
included.

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Helix. Helix’s evaluation form uses the five standard CSTPs, but adds
“related duties and responsibilities,” which include seeking out opportunities for
improvement, demonstrating willingness to accept suggestions for change, working
constructively with colleagues, and being prompt in attendance. Teachers are given a
rating of “Does Not Meet Standards”; “Meets Standard with Growth Recommended”; or
“Meets Standard.”
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. As explained above, based on the District and Union’s
agreement on the importance of interpersonal relationships, one goal for each teacher
must be drawn from the “body of awareness and skills commonly referred to as the
affective domain.” Otherwise, the Agreement affords significant discretion to the
administrator and teacher to develop goals and criteria. However, each teacher must be
given an overall rating of “Satisfactory,” meaning the teacher meets or exceeds district
standards; “Provisional,” meaning the teacher continues to work toward meeting district
standards; or “Unsatisfactory,” meaning the teacher does not meet district standards. The
evaluation must include recommendations for improvement as necessary; negative
comments shall not be included unless discussed with teacher during year.
Live Oak. Live Oak’s evaluation process includes performance goals;
class observation; self-evaluation; and a summative evaluation. Summative Evaluations
include a conference with the Education Director or Executive Director. Probationary

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teachers must have this conference by March 24, and permanent teachers by May 15.
The evaluator must assign the teacher one of four ratings: Exemplary, Competent, Needs
Attention, or Not Satisfactory. The criteria specified for evaluation are: Classroom
Management, Rapport, and Learning Environment (11 elements); Curriculum &
Instruction – Day to Day Lessons (9 elements); Yearly Curriculum Planning (5
elements); Incorporation of the Arts in Teaching (12 elements);l Parent & Organization
Responsibilities (9 elements); and Professional Development (4 elements). The evaluator
must assign one of three possible overall recommendations: Recommended for continued
employment without conditions, Recommended with conditions (which must be
attached), or Not Recommended.
Teachers must also complete a Self-evaluation, guided by the District’s
goals as stated in an Appendix to the Agreement. Probationary teachers must submit this
by March 1, tenured teachers by May 1. The Self-evaluation form must include the
teacher’s reflections regarding: Curriculum, Teaching Methods, Assessment /
Recordkeeping, Work with Parents, Work with Colleagues, Work with Students, and
Individual Characteristics or Qualities.
Delivery of Evaluation Report
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. No later than 30 days before the last day of school, the evaluator
must issue a Final Evaluation Report indicating the teacher’s overall performance and

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progress toward the objectives previously decided upon. Prior to the end of the school
year, the evaluator must hold a conference with the teacher. The teacher may attach a
written response to the Report within 10 days of receipt, which becomes a permanent part
of the teacher’s record. A teacher must be given a copy of the Final Evaluation Report at
the conference, and a copy must be placed in the teacher’s file. Such forms are not
considered public records. The administrator or teacher may also request an evaluation
upon the teacher’s termination of employment, which shall be performed and sent to the
employee.
If the school receives any written material from the public that is critical
of a teacher’s performance or character, it must be investigated, and the teacher normally
must be given a copy within 30 days. The document will only be placed in the teacher’s
file if it is reasonably determined to have some substance or plausibility, and the teacher
must be given the opportunity to attach a reply. If the document comes from District
personnel, investigation is not necessary, but the same protections apply. These
provisions do not apply to references obtained from outside the District prior to
employment, or documents prepared as part of the examination procedure during the
hiring or promotion process.
Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA Leadership. These Agreements are silent
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Ocean. Ocean’s Agreement provides that the School cannot base a
teacher’s evaluation on information not actually observed, unless it has been fully
investigated and discussed with the teacher. Hearsay evidence cannot be included as a
basis for any evaluation.
Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Perris. Under the Perris Agreement, for permanent teachers, a Summary
evaluation must be given to the teacher on a Certificated Evaluation Form at least thirty
days prior to the end of the school year. The Summative Evaluation may include
informal observations and other factors in addition to the reports of formal observation.
The Evaluator must discuss the Evaluation with the teacher prior to the end of the year.
The teacher must sign only to confirm reading the Evaluation, and may attach a written
reaction or response. A copy must be given to the teacher. A copy of the Certificated
Evaluation Form and any adverse data, and any other information used in the evaluation,
must be placed in the teacher’s personnel file as required by the Education Code.
For Probationary Teachers, the Summary Evaluation must be given to
teacher on the Certificated Evaluation Form by the eighteenth week after the start of
school. As with permanent teachers, the Summative Evaluation may include informal
observations, and other factors in addition to formal observation. The Evaluator must
discuss with the teacher prior to the end of the year. The teacher must sign the
Evaluation only to confirm reading it, and may attach a written reaction or response. As

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copy must be given to the teacher. A copy of the Certificated Evaluation Form and any
adverse data, or other information used in the evaluation, must be placed in the teacher’s
personnel file as required by the Education Code.
Choice 2000. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
San Diego Unified School District, San Diego, CA: Darnall Charter
School
San Diego. The evaluator and teacher must complete and sign the
designated portion of the evaluation worksheet and addendum. Before doing so, the
evaluator must first prepare a draft copy to discuss with the teacher. This must be done
by the third Friday in February for second year probationary teachers, and by the last
workday in April for permanent teachers and first year probationary teachers. By thirty
days before the end of school, the teacher must sign and receive a copy of the evaluation.
The teacher may attach a written response within thirty days.
If a teacher is evaluated as “Requires Improvement” or “Unsatisfactory” in
any area of evaluation, the evaluator may continue the evaluation process for the balance
of the year. The evaluator may attach an addendum explaining the reasons for
continuation related to areas identified as “Requires Improvement” or “Unsatisfactory.”
If the teacher’s performance fails to improve, the teacher will be scheduled for a special
evaluation during the next school year. If “Requires Improvement” or “Unsatisfactory”

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ratings are changed to “Satisfactory,” a Summary Evaluation reflecting the teacher’s
improved performance will be prepared, and signed by both parties. The teacher must
also sign any addendum, and may attach a written response within thirty days. Final
responsibility for evaluation rests with the evaluator, who must sign the evaluation upon
request of the teacher. The Division Head must review all evaluations reflecting less-
than-effective performance.
Darnall. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. By the first work day April, all documents for initial
satisfactory evaluations must be completed. All teachers evaluated in any given year
must receive a formal summative evaluation at least thirty days prior to the end of the
school year. A formal summative conference must be held at least thirty days prior to the
end of the school year to discuss the summative form. The teacher may prepare a written
statement of disagreement with the evaluation. The evaluator must rely on data collected
through classroom observations and conferences. Any deficiencies corrected by the
teacher cannot be included in the evaluation. The teacher has the right to identify any
constraints inhibiting the teacher’s ability to meet the objectives. The evaluation cannot
be based on publisher’s norms established by standardized tests, or any test
result/program excluded by law.

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Edison. The Agreement requires that the school must prepare a formal
observation adhering to contractual guidelines, which are explained herein. The teacher’s
final Formal Evaluation, which is produced by the Administrator each year (as explained
above) must be given to the teacher at a final evaluation conference at least thirty days
prior to the end of the school year. The teacher may attach a written statement of
disagreement.
Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. Grossmont’s Agreement requires that a signed final report be
given to the teacher, the evaluator, and the supervising administrator, and placed in the
teacher’s personnel file. Any complaint against any teacher used in the teacher’s
evaluation must be called to the teacher’s attention if it is placed in the teacher’s file.
Helix. Any teacher evaluation must be written, and a copy must be given
to the teacher.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. The evaluation described above must be provided to the
teacher, the teacher’s file, and the Division of Human Resources file. Any teacher may
attach written comments to the evaluation.

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Live Oak. Summative Evaluations include a conference with the
Education Director or Executive Director. Probationary teachers must have this
conference by March 24, and tenured teachers by May 15.
Alternative Evaluation / PAR
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. LAUSD participates in and adopts the PAR program designed
by the State of California. The Agreement specifies that it is to be interpreted in
conformity with the State program, but that the District retains the ability to develop
additional evaluation and assessment guidelines. The PAR program is intended to
supplement, but not replace, the Evaluation provisions in Article X of the Agreement.
The PAR program does not create an entitlement for any teacher, and is not a
precondition for any evaluation, disciplinary action, non-reelection, contract non-renewal,
or dismissal. The program is governed by a PAR panel, whose decision may not be the
subject of any grievance or arbitration.
The PAR program has three components: (1) review, assistance and
guidance to permanent teachers who have received an overall Below-Standard Stull
Evaluation or a Notice of Unsatisfactory Service due to below-standard teaching skills,
which is mandatory; (2) assistance and guidance to non-permanent teachers, with priority
assigned to teachers in schools of greatest need; and (3) a voluntary program for

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permanent and non-permanent teachers who have been positively evaluated but seek to
improve their performance.
Technically, only Component 1 relates to the Agreement’s evaluation
procedure, and the other components therefore fall outside the scope of this study. Where
Component 1 applies, teachers receive assistance from a Consulting Teacher, who is
either a current or retired teacher meeting the Agreements requirements for experience
and exemplary performance. The Consulting Teacher is responsible to (1) conduct initial
assessments of Participating Teachers, (2) establish individualized performance goals,
based on the California Standards for the Teaching Profession, which must be set forth in
writing in a written plan and calendar, while the teacher’s School remains responsible for
the teacher’s regular evaluations, (3) meet regularly with the Participating Teacher, and
conduct classroom visitations and observations, (4) assist the Participating Teacher in
obtaining Professional Development Activities, and (5) prepare periodic reports to the
PAR Panel on the progress of each teacher, informing the Panel of any Participating
Teacher who was not able to demonstrate satisfactory improvement.
The PAR Panel consists of nine members --- five appointed by UTLA and
four by the District. The District and UTLA may establish their own criteria for
selection, but each member must have had satisfactory evaluations and service for the
previous five years. The Panel must seek to act through consensus, but may act by
majority vote where consensus cannot be reached, which ultimately gives the Union

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members the ability to make final decisions if all Union members agree. The Panel
establishes its own guidelines, selects a PAR coordinator, and determines the
coordinator’s duties. It also selects, assigns, evaluates and renews or releases Consulting
Teachers, and reviews reports submitted by Consulting Teachers regarding the
performance and progress of Participating Teachers (those receiving an overall Below-
Standard Stull Evaluation or a Notice of Unsatisfactory Service). Finally, the Panel is
authorized to make recommendations to the LAUSD Board of Education regarding the
ability of each Participating Teacher to demonstrate satisfactory performance, and
regarding the retention of Participating Teachers.
Camino Nuevo. After three years with satisfactory evaluations, a teacher
can request an optional method of evaluation.
Green Dot. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
LA Leadership. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Neither the Perris nor the Choice 2000 Agreement provides any alternative
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San Diego Unified School District, San Diego, CA: Darnall Charter
School
San Diego. The San Diego Agreement allows an alternative form of
evaluation for teachers who have consistently demonstrated effective performance.
Teachers with minimum of five years of effective certificated experience in the District
may elect to participate, if they obtain the agreement of their supervisor. The alternative
evaluation is flexible, in order to allow growth in the teacher’s self-chosen areas of
interest related to student learning and instructional leadership. The goals, objectives,
projects and criteria established under the alternative assessment serve as the teacher’s
certificated performance evaluation in lieu of regular evaluation. Teachers and evaluators
must hold a pre-evaluation conference similar to that for all other teachers, in which they
agree on an evaluation plan, including possible constraints on the teacher’s ability to
follow the plan. The evaluator and teacher are encouraged to be creative and take risks.
They are not required to follow the requirements for selecting performance criteria under
the standard evaluation procedure. However, they are required to schedule evaluation
updates throughout the assessment period. Unlike the regular evaluation process, the
plan may transcend the traditional school year, and the final evaluation conference may
be extended.
While in the alternative evaluation process, the Agreement provides that
teachers are still responsible for their basic job responsibilities and Education Code
requirements regarding (a) progress of pupils toward established standards; (b)

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instructional techniques and strategies; (c) adherence to curricular objectives; (d)
establishment and maintenance of a suitable learning environment; (e) and performance
of non-instructional duties including supervisory responsibilities. The Agreement
specifies that participation assumes compliance with the Education Code.
At the conclusion of the evaluation period, the teacher presents to the
evaluator the results of the agreed-upon evaluation plan. The evaluator must then review
the results, and complete a summary evaluation form to include in the teacher’s file.
Upon mutual agreement, the plan may be modified. Additionally, the teacher may
choose to revert to the regular evaluation process. If the teacher does make such a
change, appropriate timelines and objectives must be mutually established.
Peer Coaching / Assistance Program. The San Diego Agreement also
establishes a Peer Coaching and Assistance Program, part of which relates to teachers’
evaluations. The District and Union are required to establish a joint committee
consisting of equal numbers of representatives, who develop guidelines and models for
peer coaching and assistance, designed to assist teachers in the alignment of curriculum,
teaching, methodology, classroom management skills, and program specific
responsibilities. Part of the Program is a voluntary Peer Enrichment Program, which is
beyond the scope of this study as it does not directly relate to teacher evaluation. The
other component is a mandatory Peer Assistance and Review program (“PAR”) in which
Consulting Teachers assist Participating Teachers, defined as teachers who have received

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an unsatisfactory evaluation, based on a combination of ratings on the first four elements
of their evaluation, or an overall evaluation of less effective.
The PAR is administered by a joint panel of thee permanent teachers
chosen by Union, and two administrators chosen by the District. The Panel is expected to
attempt to make decisions by consensus, but may rule by majority vote. The Panel is
required to submit to the Board the names of teachers who, after sustained assistance, are
unable to demonstrate satisfactory improvement. The Panel also selects Consulting
Teachers to assist Participating Teachers. Consulting Teachers must be credentialed,
have a minimum of five years teaching experience, and must have demonstrated
exemplary teaching ability, as shown by effective communication skills, subject matter
knowledge, knowledge and support of District curricular goals and standards, mastery of
a range of teaching strategies, ability to work cooperatively, and effective leadership
skills. Consulting Teachers serve for terms of four years.
Assistance provided by consulting teachers includes: consultative
assistance in specific areas targeted by evaluating Principals; meeting and consulting with
the Principal; observing the teacher in classroom instruction, providing
recommendations; allowing teacher to observe the Consulting teacher or others; attending
specific training in techniques or subject matter, and maintaining appropriate records.
The Consulting teacher’s records are not subject to disclosure except as required by law.
The Consulting Teacher’s assistance and review must focus on the areas rated less than

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effective in a remediation plan developed after receiving an unsatisfactory rating.
Recommendations must be written, aligned with student learning, clearly stated, and
consistent with the Education Code. Recommendation shall be considered performance
goals as defined by Education Code sections 44664(a) and 44500.
The Consulting Teacher and participating teacher must meet to discuss the
teacher’s plan, and the Consulting teacher will provide assistance throughout the year,
including multiple observations. Before April 1, the Consulting Teacher completes a
written report consisting solely of (1) summary of areas targeted for improvement, (2) a
description of the assistance provided to the teacher, and (3) sufficient information to
enable the Joint Panel to make recommendations to Governing Board. The Report is
issued to the Joint Panel, the teacher, and the Principal, and shall be included as part of
the teacher’s annual evaluation. The evaluating Principal has discretion regarding the use
of the report, and the teacher has discretion regarding its use in response to the teacher’s
evaluation. After a year of assistance, the Joint Panel must report (1) that the teacher is
now effective, or (2) that further assistance and review will not be successful. The Panel
must include the reasons for its conclusion; if the Panel concludes that further assistance
will not be successful, the teacher’s name will be forwarded to the Governing Board,
which may use the Report as a basis for dismissal. Intervention may be extended to a
second year if the Joint Panel believes that sufficient progress is being made to justify
additional assistance.

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San Diego’s Agreement incorporates the voluntary component of the
California Peer Assistance and Review Program described by Education Code section §
44500(b)(1). This program is completely separate from the evaluation and Peer
Assistance and Review process, and no information developed through the voluntary
program shall be used in a teacher’s evaluation or placed in the teacher’s file unless
requested by the teacher.
Darnall. The Darnall Agreement allows a teacher to request a “process
based approach,” in which the School will conduct a project and case study evaluation
based on the California Standards for the Teaching Profession.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. Ravenswood’s Agreement establishes a Peer Assistance
and Review program, which must be conducted consistent with the Education Code.
Permanent teachers receiving unsatisfactory ratings in “subject matter knowledge,”
“teaching strategies,” or “teaching skills” in any evaluation must participate in the
program. Likewise, any teacher receiving unsatisfactory ratings in two key elements of
the CSTP must participate in the PAR. Program. Temporary, new, or experienced
teachers in need of development in “subject matter knowledge,” “teaching strategies,” or
“teaching skills” may volunteer to participate. Because such participation cannot be used
in the teacher’s evaluation, it is beyond the scope of this study.

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The Agreement establishes a Joint Teacher Administrator Peer Review
Panel, composed of four certificated teachers chosen in a District-wide secret ballot
conducted by the Union; three District Administrators chosen by the District; and one
alternate each selected by the District and Union. Action can only be taken by majority
vote. The Panel elects “Consulting Teachers” by observation in classroom settings. The
Panel decides the number of consulting teachers available, and recommends mandatory
participants to the Board. The Panel also submits recommendations regarding assistance
to be provided, assesses the teacher’s participation, makes recommendations about
whether further assistance should be provided, and identifies teachers who, after
sustained assistance, have not demonstrated satisfactory improvement.
For mandatory PAR participants (teachers receiving unsatisfactory
ratings), the evaluator’s recommendations regarding the need for improvement in
“subject matter knowledge,” “teaching strategies,” or “teaching skills” are considered the
performance goals for the teacher while participating in the program. The goals must be
stated in writing, and must be clearly stated, aligned with pupil learning, and consistent
with the Stull Act, which requires that schools evaluate teachers based on (1) progress of
students toward meeting state standards, (2) instructional techniques and strategies, (3)
adherence to curricular objectives, and (4) establishment and maintenance of a suitable
learning environment (Cal. Educ. Code § 44662).

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The evaluator must discuss the goals with the teacher within ten days of
the teacher’s final evaluation, and develop a plan for assistance. The Plan must
commence by the third week of school, and must be completed by the last week of
February. The evaluator and teacher are expected to establish a cooperative relationship,
and must meet to discuss the plan for assistance within the first week of school.
Once a Consulting Teacher is assigned, the Consulting Teacher’s
assistance may include (a) consulting with the teacher, (b) meeting and consulting with
the evaluator, principal or their designee (c), observing the teacher in classroom
instruction, (d) allowing the teacher to observe the consulting teacher or other teachers,
(e) allowing the teacher to receive training in specified techniques or subject matters, (f)
demonstrating good practices to the teacher, (g) maintaining appropriate records of
activities and progress, and (h) discussing activities and progress. The District must also
provide sufficient development activities to help the teacher to improve.
While providing assistance, the Consulting teacher must monitor the
teacher, report on the teacher’s participation, and submit periodic status reports to the
Peer Review Panel, including a description of the assistance provided and the teacher’s
participation. The Consulting teacher must prepare a final status report at the completion
of the assistance plan, including a description of the assistance provided, the teacher’s
participation, the outcome of the teacher’s participation, and a recommendation for
whether further assistance should be provided. Copies must be submitted the evaluator

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and teacher. The Panel must then review the Report, and make recommendation for
whether further assistance should be provided. The Panel must make its final report
available for placement in the teacher’s personnel file by the last work day of the school
year. The results must be made available as part of the teacher’s evaluation, consistent
with Education Code section 44664. The evaluator has discretion as to whether and how
to use the teacher’s PAR results in the teacher’s evaluation.
Edison. Edison’s Agreement does not establish any formal alternative
evaluation process or any Peer Assistance and Review program.
Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. Grossmont’s Agreement establishes an Alternative
Evaluation Program, which is intended to allow teachers to establish criteria for the
evaluation of their professional growth. The Program applies to teachers with a
minimum of five years of teaching, whose most recent evaluation is at least “Meets
Standards.” Teachers in the program set goals that serve as the basis for their
professional growth and evaluation. The teacher and administrator must hold a
conference early in the fall, at which they discuss and agree upon goals, establish criteria
and options to be used for evaluation, and schedule approximate dates for two short
evaluation conferences during the year to discuss the teacher’s progress toward the
agreed-upon goals.

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Grossmont’s Program is designed to transition from teacher-centered
evaluation to student-centered evaluation. The Agreement provides that goals of teachers
in the program should include: Student Progress (e.g., classroom action research, pre and
post testing, and portfolios); Meeting Needs of Diverse Populations (e.g., addressing
learning modalities, and instructional strategies from World of Difference (anti-bias
education), and Crosscultural Language and Academic Development (CLAD), and
Bilingual Crosscultural Language and Academic Development certification); Integration
of Curriculum Framework (e.g. relating coursework to program majors, authentic
assessment); Student and Parent Feedback (e.g. phone logs, personal communication
tools regarding student success); and Peer Coaching (e.g. collaborative lesson planning,
modeling, reflective feedback).
An Alternative Evaluation Goals Form is attached to the Agreement, on
which the teacher and evaluator must list Goals; Plans for Implementation; Evaluation
Criteria; and Approximate Dates of Evaluation Conferences. The Agreement also
includes an Alternative Evaluation Final Form, on which the evaluator and teacher must
list Evaluation of Goals and Objectives; Reflection of Teaching; Plans for Subsequent
Growth; and Review and Reaction of Administrator.
The program provides significant discretion to the evaluator and teacher,
but includes guidelines for Program Elements to be completed throughout the year. In
September. teachers must receive information regarding the two evaluation procedures

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(the standard and alternative method), and Principals must discuss the two programs at a
staff meeting. In October, teachers must select the method of evaluation; meet with
Principal if they are interested in the Alternative Evaluation; and complete the
appropriate goals form. Principals must also conduct goal conferences, establish the
appropriate form of evaluation; and work with teacher to ensure that their plan includes
key elements of the program, and complete the goals form by October 30. Between
November and April, teachers work on completion of their goals. Principals must make
informal visits to classrooms, conduct two site meetings for participating teachers, and
support and assist teachers. During May, teachers must complete final evaluation forms,
and hold an evaluation conference with the Principal. Principals must conduct evaluation
conferences, and complete final evaluation forms by May 1.
Grossmont’s Agreement also requires that any teacher receiving “Does
Not Meet Standards” ratings in any three of the first five CSTP standards must participate
in the Peer Assistance and Review Program in order to improve the teacher’s
performance. (Appendix F: Peer Assistance and Review Program.)
Helix. Helix’s Agreement establishes a Peer Assistance and Review
Program administered by a Joint Committee consisting of seven members, five of whom
are chosen by the Union. The Committee is responsible for choosing Consulting
Teachers and evaluating them. Any teacher who receives a “Does Not Meet Standards”
rating on an Overall Evaluation must become a Participating Teacher in the program.

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After notice of such an evaluation, the panel must choose a Consulting Teacher for the
Participating Teacher within twenty days.
The Consulting Teacher must meet with the teacher to develop a plan,
conduct multiple observations, conduct pre- and post-observation conferences, and keep
monthly logs. The Consulting Teacher must monitor the teacher until the plan is
complete, or the Consulting Teacher determines that further assistance will not be
productive. The Consulting Teacher must issues a final report to the Joint Committee.
Any teacher with five years of experience may participate in the PAR on a
voluntary basis if the teacher obtained a Satisfactory or Meets Standards rating on the
teacher’s most recent evaluation, as an alternative to the biannual evaluation process.
However, such participation is intended only to help the teacher and make the evaluation
process more collegial, and cannot be considered part of the teacher’s performance
review.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Live Oak. This Agreement is silent on this subject.

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Follow-up for Low-Rated Teachers
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. If a teacher’s Final Evaluation Report is rated “Below Standard
Performance,” the evaluator must specifically describe in writing the areas of below
standard performance, with “recommendations for improvement, and the assistance to be
given.” Additionally, such teachers must participate in the Peer Assistance and Review
program described above.
Camino Nuevo. If a teacher’s evaluation is low (rated 1 or 2), the School
must give notice and offer guidance and support to correct any deficiency. The School
must make available a guidance plan, which may include coaching, released time,
classroom observations, or other resources as identified in a plan for growth identified on
the teacher’s classroom evaluation.
Green Dot. If teacher is not “meeting” or “partially meeting” any CSTP
standard in observation, a Development Plan “may” be created to foster growth. The
Plan must include: (1) areas of growth, identifying improvement needed and supporting
evidence; (2) specific suggestions for improvement; (3) resources to be utilized to assist;
and (4) means for measuring improvement. If there is insufficient evidence of progress
after forty-five days, a forty-five day Improvement Plan is implemented. Any teacher
receiving a “Practice Does Not Meet Standards” rating must receive an Improvement
Plan. The Plan must include: (1) areas of growth, where improvement needed and

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supporting evidence; (2) specific suggestions for improvement; (3) resources to be
utilized to assist; (4) means for measuring improvement; (5) reasonable date for
achieving specified improvement. The Principal must also take affirmative action to
help, including (1) providing specific suggestions, (2) offering direct assistance in
implementing the suggestions, and (3) giving adequate released time to visit and observe
teachers in other Green Dot schools.
If a teacher on an Improvement Plan does not improve sufficiently to meet
the School’s standards, Green Dot may terminate or not re-hire the teacher for the
following year. The Plan must follow a designated procedure: (1) written notice must be
given to the teacher by April 15 of that year; (2) the notice must include the reason for the
school’s action, and an opportunity to appeal; (3) the teacher may request a conference in
writing within ten days; (4) if no request is made, the conference is waived; (5) if
requested, the conference must be held before the Board in a closed session, unless the
teacher requests an open session; (6) the teacher may have a Union representative
present; and (7) the teacher may use the School’s grievance process.
LA Leadership. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Ocean. If a teacher receives a “Requires Strengthening” or “Below
Standard” rating, either the teacher or administrator can request a second observation, for
which the same procedure applies. The School must then take affirmative action to

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correct the teacher’s deficiencies, including providing released time and allowing time for
the teacher to visit other classes.
Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Perris. Under the Perris Agreement, for permanent teachers, if the
evaluation includes an “unsatisfactory” or “needs improvement” rating, the District must
require an Improvement Plan for each such rating, which must be in effect for four weeks
before notice of unsatisfactory performance can be given. The evaluation must include
the requirement that the teacher participate in a program to improve, and the teacher must
be given specific recommendations and assistance for improvement. The Improvement
Plans must be completed fifteen days prior to the end of the school year, and any post-
evaluation conferences must be held five days prior to the end of the school year. For
probationary teachers, if the evaluation includes an “unsatisfactory” or “needs
improvement” rating, the District may suggest an Improvement Plan for each such rating.
Choice 2000. Under the Choice 2000 Agreement, if the evaluation is
“Unsatisfactory,” the teacher must be evaluated every year until the teacher achieves a
“Satisfactory” rating, or is separated from the School.

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San Diego Unified School District, San Diego, CA: Darnall Charter
School
San Diego. When any aspect of a teacher’s evaluation is less than
satisfactory, the evaluator shall schedule a conference to discuss the teacher’s progress,
and must notify the teacher verbally and in writing of the specific objectives and criteria
in which sufficient progress is not being made. The evaluator shall then develop a
remediation plan, which must describe: (a) specific areas where improved performance
is necessary, (b) resources to be made available to assist the teacher, including peer
coaching, a mentor teacher or release time to observe others; (c) the evaluator’s role in
assisting to achieve improvement; (d) a timeline for monitoring performance; and (e)
consultation with the department head to develop a progress check. A conference must
occur sufficiently before the teacher’s final evaluation to allow sufficient opportunity to
improve, and generally must occur at least fifty days before the evaluation. The
evaluator’s failure to comply with these requirements may preclude the evaluator from
rating the teacher as less than satisfactory on the evaluation.
Special Evaluations are conducted when a teacher’s job performance is
less than effective: (1) to follow upon on teacher designated as less than effective
(14.8.1.1); (2) any time supervisor determines any aspect of performance is less than
effective (14.8.1.2). When a teacher is evaluated as less than effective in any year, the
teacher must be evaluated each year until the evaluation is effective or other appropriate

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action is taken. The evaluation must be conducted by the supervisor or as delegated at
the supervisor’s discretion, with the division head’s approval.
If an evaluation contains less-than-effective rating in area of teaching
methods, instruction, or control of classroom environment, the evaluator may require the
teacher to participate in an improvement program. Development of detailed lesson plans
may be required. With the teacher and district personnel, the evaluator must develop a
written plan, which includes: (1) areas in which improved performance is necessary,
limited to areas of “less than effective” performance; (2) resources to be made available,
including peer coaching, a consulting teacher (as described in the “PAR” section above),
released time to observe others, printed materials, attendance at in-service training, and
central office assistance; (3) a timeline for monitoring, (4) the evaluator’s role in
assisting; (5) constraints on the teacher’s ability to improve, if any, to be included in an
Evaluation Worksheet; (6) regular updates of the teacher’s progress; (7) and consultation
with the appropriate department head in the development of special evaluation objectives.
For teachers on an improvement plan, during the first four weeks of pupil
attendance, the evaluator must initiate a pre-evaluation conference with the teacher, and
attempt to reach mutual agreement on the issues described above. The evaluator must
inform the teacher of the exact areas of performance requiring improvement, and consult
with the teacher regarding objectives and standards for effective performance, assessment
techniques, timelines, support requirements, and constraints on the teacher’s ability to

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improve. If mutual agreement is not reached, the evaluator will establish the objectives
and inform the teacher. Such objectives must be related to areas marked “less than
effective. An Evaluation worksheet must be completed and signed within fifteen days of
the conference. By the third Friday in December, the supervisor initiates a Progress
Check Conference, at which the supervisor (1) reviews teacher’s performance, (2)
provides the teacher with a copy of the mid-year evaluation report; (3) if progress is
satisfactory, terminates special evaluation; if progress is not satisfactory, the special
evaluation is continued until February 15 for probationary teachers, or to a date within
thirty days before the last school day for permanent teachers; and (4) if performance is
not improved, the supervisor may proceed with appropriate action as necessary.
By February 15 for probationary teachers, and before the last school day
for permanent teachers, the evaluator must initiate a Summary Evaluation Conference, at
which the evaluator completes and signs the District’s evaluation worksheet, and prepares
and signs a Summary Evaluation Report and addenda. The teacher also signs and
receives the Report, and may submit written comments to attach to the report. If
performance is satisfactory, the evaluation is complete; if performance continues to be
less than effective, the supervisor schedules a special evaluation for the next school year,
and proceeds with appropriate disciplinary action. The Summary Evaluation report is
then forwarded to the District’s Human Resources Department.

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The District is also authorized to give an Expedited Special Evaluation
during a non-evaluation year for demonstrable deficiency. The teacher must be notified
through a conference and a written memorandum that an expedited special evaluation is
possible if performance has not improved within a reasonable period of time. A
conference not required in cases of severe misconduct. Expedited Special Evaluations
require a minimum of fifty work days, in which the pre-evaluation conference, progress
check, and summary evaluation conference must occur.
Darnall. Under the Darnall Agreement, if a teacher receives a “Below” or
“Far Below” rating, the School must notify the teacher by December 1, and the
Administrator and teacher must meet to create an Improvement Plan. The teacher is
authorized to bring an advocate, including a Union representative, to the meeting. The
Director and teacher must then meet after thirty days to review the teacher’s progress,
and meet again after sixty days to decide whether sufficient progress has been made. The
teacher cannot be judged on any issues not in the Plan. If any new issues are raised, a
new sixty-day period is commenced, during which the same procedure must be followed.
If the teacher fails to demonstrate progress, the Director should recommend non-renewal
to the Board. The Board’s decision is final.
During a non-evaluation year, the Director can initiate an improvement
plan any time prior to the second trimester in evaluating year. The same procedure
described above must then be followed.

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Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. After a negative observation, the evaluator must take
positive action to assist the teacher, including specific recommendations for
improvement, direct assistance to implement the recommendations, additional resources
including Peer Assistance and Review or other District training; techniques to measure
improvement; and time scheduled to monitor the teacher’s progress.
A teacher must participate in an Improvement Program after receiving an
unsatisfactory rating in any key element of the CSTP, defined as Standards 1 through 4.
11

No teacher may be required to participate in an improvement program unless (1) the
teacher was observed as unsatisfactory during school year, the principal has provided
reasonable assistance, and the teacher has not improved; (2) after the first year’s
unsatisfactory performance, the teacher was given notice of the requirement to participate
in an improvement program.
Participation in an Improvement Program is voluntary, but refusal may
result in termination, as authorized by the Education Code. The nature of the
improvement program must be mutually agreed upon. Release time shall be provided

11
Those standards are: (1) Engaging and Supporting All Students in Learning; (2) Standard Two:
Creating and Maintaining Effective Environments for Student Learning; (3) Understanding and Organizing
Subject matter for Student Learning; and (4) Planning Instruction and Designing Learning Experience for
All Students.

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when required. The plan must be related to the causes of the teacher’s unsatisfactory
evaluation. If the plan includes peer participation, the relationship between the teacher
and peer shall be confidential. Upon completion, the teacher must be reevaluated; the
overall evaluations shall be held in abeyance, and must be purged from the teacher’s files
after two years of satisfactory evaluation.
Any teacher receiving unsatisfactory ratings in two key elements of CSTP
must participate in the District’s PAR, which is explained above.
Edison. Edison’s provisions regarding assistance and follow-up for low-
rated teachers are very similar to Ravenswood’s, although they are more specific in some
respects, while omitting other elements of Ravenswood’s program for teacher
improvement. Unlike the Ravenswood Agreement, a yearly evaluation is required for
teachers performing unsatisfactorily or who are intern-credentialed. Additionally,
following a negative observation a teacher must be observed a minimum of two
additional times within two months, and the evaluator must conduct pre- and post-
observation conferences and provide a written assessment. The Ravenswood Agreement
does not specifically require additional observations.
Any teacher rated as Unsatisfactory or In Need of Improvement in a
formal observation or a final formal evaluation must participate in an Instructional
Improvement Program. As in the Ravenswood Agreement, a teacher must also
participate after receiving an unsatisfactory rating in any key element of the CSTP,

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defined as Standards 1 through 4. Teachers must be given notice that they need to
participate in the program, and refusal to participate may result in termination. As in the
Ravenswood program, the nature of the program must be mutually agreed upon; the
school must provide release time when necessary; and the Improvement Plan must relate
to the cause of the teacher’s Unsatisfactory evaluation. If the plan includes peer
participation, such participation must be confidential. Upon completion of the plan, the
teacher must be reevaluated.
Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. If the evaluator finds a teacher deficient, the evaluator must
set forth the reasons in writing, identify specific ways to improve, and describe specific
assistance that will be provided from the administrator and staff. When a permanent
teacher receives an unsatisfactory evaluation, the evaluator must evaluate the teacher
annually until the teacher receives a positive evaluation or is separated. Any teacher
receiving “Does Not Meet Standards” ratings on any three of the first five CSTP
standards must participate in the Peer Assistance and Review Program, described above,
in order to improve.
Helix. As described above, Helix’s PAR program is designed to provide
assistance to low-rated teachers. If teacher receives three “Does not Meet Standards”
rating, must enter PAR. Similar to Grossmont’s Agreement, if a teacher’s evaluation is

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Unsatisfactory, the teacher must be evaluated annually until a Satisfactory rating is
achieved or the teacher is separated.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. If a teacher receives an overall rating of “Needs Improvement”
or “Not Satisfactory,” the evaluator must recommend positive action to correct any
deficiencies. An additional evaluation is required for the next year, as well as an
improvement plan and intensive supervision. The teacher cannot be evaluated on any
aspect of teaching for which the teacher has no control.
Live Oak. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Ability to Challenge or Grieve
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. After receiving a Final Evaluation Report, a teacher may appeal
the matter to the next higher administrative level. Evaluations are not subject to
LAUSD’s grievance procedure (Article V), except when the overall evaluation is “Below
Standard.” If the overall evaluation is “Meets Standard,” but there is a “significant
disparity” between the rating and the comments on the form, the evaluation is also
subject to the grievance procedures.

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Pre-disciplinary actions such as warnings, conference memos and
reprimands are not subject to the grievance procedures, except when placed in the
teacher’s official District file, or used as the basis of formal disciplinary action (a “U-
Notice” or suspension), or an overall “Below-Standard” Evaluation. If the document is
later used as the basis of formal disciplinary action, the document cannot be considered
valid unless the school proves that it meets the “for cause” standard. Such documents
may be “worked off” by completing four years without a recurrence of the same or
similar conduct. The document must then be kept in a separate “expired” file. Finally,
no decision by the PAR may be the subject of a grievance or arbitration.
Camino Nuevo. The judgment of an evaluator is not subject to the
Agreement’s grievance procedure. A teacher may attach a responding statement to any
performance review. The teacher must be notified of any parent complaint and have the
opportunity to respond in writing before the complaint is referenced in any evaluation or
formal reprimand, or is used in a hearing under Article 19 (Evaluation).

Green Dot. The Green Dot CBA allows grievance of any provision of the
Agreement.
LA Leadership This Agreement is silent on this subject. Accordingly, the
Agreement’s general grievance procedure may be used.
Ocean. This Agreement is silent on this subject.

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Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Perris, Choice 2000. These Agreements are silent on this subject.
Accordingly, the Agreements’ general grievance procedures may be used.
San Diego Unified School District, San Diego, CA: Darnall Charter
School
San Diego. Under the San Diego Agreement, evaluation is subject to
grievance if the specified guidelines and procedures are not followed.
The Agreement also provides protection regarding derogatory material
about the teacher. Such material may not be placed in the teacher’s file unless the teacher
is notified and given an opportunity to review and comment. The teacher must be given a
copy of the material, during normal business hours, and acknowledge by signature that it
has been received and read. The teacher may also submit comments, which must be
attached to the derogatory materials.
Darnall. The Darnall Agreement provides that the Board’s decision
regarding teacher evaluation is final. However, evaluation decisions are not specifically
exempted from the Agreement’s grievance procedure.

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Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. The Ravenswood Agreement provides that any materials
serving as the basis for any decision affecting a teacher’s employment status must be
made available to the teacher, except those excluded by Education Code § 44031 (ratings,
reports, or records that were obtained prior to the employment of the person involved,
were prepared by identifiable examination committee members, or were obtained in
connection with a promotional examination). If an evaluation is based on derogatory
material, including complaints by a student, parent or other employees, such material
must be put in writing, and teacher has the right to (1) receive a copy of the complaint
within five days of its receipt; (2) to confront the person making the charge, (3) to
respond to any accusation, and attach the teacher’s own responsive comments, (4) and
appeal the decision to the Superintendent or a designee other than the site administrator
within five days of the disposition of the complaint by the evaluator. The
Superintendent’s decision regarding the use of such material shall be final.
No aspect of the District’s PAR program may be the subject of complaint
under the Agreement’s grievance and arbitration procedure. However, as the Agreement
is otherwise silent on the subject, any other element of the evaluation procedure may be
the subject of a grievance.
Edison. Under the Edison Agreement, materials affecting a teacher’s
employment status must be available for inspection, and a copy must be provided upon

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request. Derogatory information shall not be entered in an employee’s file except as
allowed by law, after review by the teacher. The teacher has the right to enter a
responsive comment. If an evaluation is based in part on derogatory information
submitted by a parent, student, or teacher, such information must be included in writing.
The teacher may include a response, and may appeal the decision regarding the use of the
complaint to Edison’s Vice President within five working days of receiving notice. The
Vice President’s decision is final.
As Edison’s Agreement does not exclude evaluation decisions from the
Agreement’s grievance procedure, such decisions may be the subject of a grievance.
Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. As Grossmont’s Agreement does not exclude evaluation
decisions from the Agreement’s grievance and arbitration process, such decisions may be
grieved.
Helix. Like the Grossmont Agreement, Helix’s agreement does not
address whether evaluation decisions may be grieved. The Agreement does provide that
a Participating Teacher has the right to have a union representative present throughout the
evaluation process.

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Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. The teacher’s personnel file containing any materials affecting
the status of the teacher’s employment must be kept at the district office. Derogatory
information or statements cannot be entered unless the teacher given notice and an
opportunity to comment within ten days. Positive material from any responsible outside
source may be entered, and shall be given to teacher. The teacher may review the file,
with a representative if requested, in the presence of administrator. No anonymous
materials may be included.
Public Charges should be made directly to the teacher. If they are not
resolved, they must be presented to the principal in writing. The Principal shall then hold
a conference; if it still is not resolved, if must be referred to the Superintendent, who will
issue a decision within 10 days. It may then be appealed to the Board, where it must be
addressed in a closed session unless the teacher requests an open session.
Live Oak. This Agreement is silent on this subject. Accordingly, the
Agreement’s general grievance procedure may be used.

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Teacher Classification, Discipline and Dismissal
Classification / Security
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. LAUSD is subject to the Education Code, which provides that
any teacher in a district with more than 250 average daily attendance who serves two
complete, consecutive years and is not dismissed becomes a permanent employee. Cal.
Educ. Code § 44929.21(b).
Camino Nuevo. Camino Nuevo’s Agreement provides that after three
consecutive years of employment, the School may, in its discretion, offer a teacher an
individual employment contract for a two-year term, or choose not to extent a contract
offer. Additionally, the School may, in its discretion, offer a teacher on an improvement
plan a one-year contract.
Green Dot. Green Dot’s teachers do not have any form of tenure;
however, as addressed below, no teacher can be disciplined or dismissed except for
“good cause,” which essentially provides tenure-type protection to all teachers, regardless
of their seniority.
LA Leadership. LA Leadership’s Agreement requires “good cause” for
discipline or dismissal of any teacher after two years.

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Ocean. Under the Ocean Agreement, teachers serve as probationary
employees for two years, which is defined as working at least 75% of a full-time load.
On the first day of their third year, teachers become “ongoing” employees.
Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Perris. Like LAUSD, Perris is subject to the Education Code provisions
regarding classification and security, which are explained above.

Choice 2000. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
San Diego Unified School District: Darnall Charter School
San Diego. Like LAUSD, San Diego is subject to the Education Code
provisions regarding dismissal, which are explained above.
Darnall. Under the Darnall Agreement, teachers have a two-year
probationary period. After the second year, teachers are provided a written contract. A
teacher’s contract is renewed automatically if the teacher receives a Developing Standard,
Meets Standard, or Exemplifies Standard rating, or if the teacher is not in an evaluation
year.

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Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. Like LAUSD, Ravenswood is subject to the Education
Code provisions regarding teacher classification, which are explained above.
Edison. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. Like LAUSD, Grossmont is subject to the Education Code
provisions regarding classification, which are explained above.
Helix. The Helix Agreement requires “just cause” for discipline of any
teachers after two years, and classifies such employees as “permanent” for evaluation
purposes.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. Like LAUSD, Petaluma is subject to the Education Code
provisions regarding classification and security, which are explained above.
Live Oak. After a teacher’s third year, if the teacher is invited back for a
fourth year, the teacher becomes “permanent” and receives tenure.

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Standard / Grounds for Discipline
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. LAUSD’s teachers may only be disciplined “for cause.”
Camino Nuevo. Camino Nuevo’s Agreement does not impose any
“cause” or other specific standard for discipline. The Agreement’s “management rights”
clause reserves to the School authority over “selection, classification, direction,
promotion, demotion, discipline and termination of all personnel.”
Green Dot. Green Dot’s Agreement, like LAUSD’s, requires “just cause”
for any discipline.
LA Leadership. LA Leadership’s Agreement requires “Just cause” for
discipline of teachers after two years, but does not impose any standard on discipline of
teachers prior to that point.
Ocean. Ocean’s Agreement requires that discipline for any “ongoing”
teacher must be based on “just cause.”
Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Perris. Under the Perris Agreement, an administrator may initiate
discipline only for “just cause.” Discipline may include suspension without pay for up to

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15 days; longer suspensions are governed by the Education Code. The Agreement
reserves to the District power to terminate and discipline only “for just cause” as set forth
in Education Code sections 44930 through 44960.
Choice 2000. Choice 2000’s Agreement requires that discipline of any
teacher must be based upon “just cause.”
San Diego Unified School District: Darnall Charter School
San Diego. San Diego’s Agreement provides that a teacher may be
suspended up to fifteen days for any reason in the Education Code, including
unsatisfactory performance, unprofessional conduct, or persistent violation or refusal to
obey state law or board regulations. The Agreement does not regulate suspensions of
fifteen days or more, which are governed by the Education Code.
Darnall. Discipline can be based on “unsatisfactory performance,”
unprofessional conduct, or violation of reasonable regulations, policies and procedures.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. The Ravenswood District’s Agreement allows a school to
discipline a teacher “only for just cause.” Discipline includes warnings or reprimands.

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Edison. Edison’s Agreement imposes a lower standard than
Ravenswood’s, requiring only that discipline cannot be imposed for arbitrary or
capricious reasons.
Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. Like LAUSD, Grossmont is subject to the Education Code
provisions regarding discipline, which are explained above.
Helix. The Helix Agreement requires “just cause” for discipline of any
teachers after two years. The Agreement explicitly incorporates certain elements of the
Education Code, providing that, other than as stated in Education Code sections 44939,
344940, and 44942, no discipline can be imposed without “just cause.”
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. Petaluma’s Agreement recites that the District and Union
negotiated as mandated by Government. Code section 3543.2 regarding alternative
methods of addressing unsatisfactory performance, short of dismissal procedures under
Education Code section 44941. The Agreement provides that teachers cannot be “cited”
without “just cause.” Specifically, the District may take disciplinary action only for (1)
violations of district policy, code of ethics, conduct expected of professional educators;

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(2) abusive behavior (physical or verbal) toward students, employees or public during
school-related activities; or (3) failure to perform contractual obligations.
Live Oak. A teacher with permanent status (in the teacher’s fourth year)
can only be suspended without pay “for cause”; examples listed include unsatisfactory
performance, neglect of duty, inefficiency, discourteous treatment, and unprofessional
conduct.
Discipline Process / Progressive Discipline
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. Under California law, bargaining is mandatory, if requested by
either party, regarding the causes for discipline and disciplinary procedures, other than
dismissal, including suspension of pay for up to fifteen days. This applies to both
probationary and permanent teachers (Cal. Govt. Code § 3543.2(b)). In the absence of
mutual agreement on these subjects, the provisions of the Education Code govern (Cal.
Govt. Code § 3543.2(b)).
Consistent with the Education Code, LAUSD’s Agreement (Section 11)
provides that discipline may include a Notice of Unsatisfactory Service or Act, or
suspension for up to fifteen days without pay (Cal. Govt. Code § 3543.2(b)). The
Agreement requires that the concept of “progressive discipline” must be followed,
although some circumstances may make progressive discipline unnecessary. A Notice of

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Unsatisfactory Service or Act may not be based on any event that occurred “more than a
reasonable period of time” before the suspension.
The Agreement also provides that when it is evident that an employee
conference may result in possible disciplinary action, the teacher must be notified of the
purpose of the meeting, and has the right to be accompanied by a UTLA representative or
other person. Likewise, prior to issuing a Notice of Unsatisfactory Service or Act, the
school must inform the teacher that (1) the action is about to be taken, (2) a meeting will
be held to discuss the matter, and (3) the employee may be accompanied by a UTLA
representative.
Discipline authorized by the Agreement (up to suspension without pay for
15 days) may be imposed independent of the evaluation procedures in the Agreement,
and independently of statutory suspension and dismissal proceedings. Such discipline is
not a precondition for a statutory suspension or dismissal process. However, if any
suspension or dismissal proceeding is predicated on the conduct on which any discipline
under Section 11 is based, any grievance under Section 11 that has not yet proceeded to
arbitration must be stayed pending resolution of the statutory proceedings.
Camino Nuevo. Camino Nuevo’s “management rights” clause gives the
School authority over “selection, classification, direction, promotion, demotion,
discipline and termination of all personnel.” It does not impose any progressive
discipline requirement.

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Green Dot. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
LA Leadership. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Ocean. Ocean’s Agreement requires Progressive Discipline, consisting of
several steps: (1) verbal warning, which may result in a post-conference memorandum,
to which the teacher may attach a written response; (2) written warning; (3) written
reprimand, which may only be issued after two verbal warnings within the preceding two
years, and to which the teacher may also attach a written response; (4) suspension
without pay for up to 15 days, which generally may be issued only after a written
reprimand has been issued for similar actions; and (5) dismissal, which can only occur
after the previous steps have failed, or for egregious conduct.
Any suspension or dismissal must be initiated in writing through a Notice
of Recommended Discipline, which must include a statement describing the factual basis
for the action, any rule or regulation violated, and the proposed penalty. The Notice must
also include any documentary materials supporting the action, and a statement of the
teacher’s right to respond within five days before discipline is imposed. A copy must be
sent to the Union President. As in LAUSD, teachers are entitled to Union representation
at all disciplinary meetings, conference or hearings. The teacher must be notified in
advance if the meeting or hearing could lead to disciplinary action. Finally, no
disciplinary action can be based on material from a parent or student unless it has been
properly investigated under Agreement.

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Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Perris. Under the Perris Agreement, any discipline must be consistent
with a “progressive disciplinary approach.” Prior to issuance of any discipline, the
school must discuss the proposed action and the reasons for the action, and take the
teacher’s response into account.
Choice 2000. The Choice 2000 Agreement requires the School to follow
Progressive Discipline, but does not establish any specific process.
San Diego Unified School District: Darnall Charter School
San Diego. San Diego’s Agreement authorizes several forms of
discipline, the most serious of which are a Letter of Reprimand and Suspension. Usually
a Letter of Reprimand can only be issued after progressive discipline, which includes the
following steps: (1) verbal warning (which is not provided in writing), (2) written
warning (maintained in teacher’s file or program personnel file), and (3) letter of
reprimand (maintained in teacher’s district personnel file). The Supervisor has discretion
to determine the number of verbal and written warnings prior to issuing a written
reprimand. However, for egregious conduct, Supervisor may issue a letter of reprimand
without verbal or written warning. A teacher generally cannot be suspended unless the
Supervisor has issued one verbal warning, one written warning, and one letter of
reprimand, although immediate suspension is authorized for “egregious conduct.” The

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teacher must be given a written statement of the charges forming the basis of the
suspension decision.
Darnall. Much like the San Diego, Darnall’s Agreement requires three
steps of “progressive discipline” for any disciplinary conduct warranting action by a
Director: (1) a verbal warning (which is not placed in the teacher’s file, but is
documented by the Director and a unit member); (2) a written warning (which is
maintained in the teacher’s personnel file); and (3) a Letter of Reprimand (maintained in
maintained in the teacher’s). Each step must be followed for any distinct conduct,
beginning with a Verbal Warning. However, egregious conduct may warrant a letter of
reprimand without verbal or written warning.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. Progressive discipline must be applied except where “the
serious nature of the offense” may require the District to impose a written warning or
reprimand. Progressive discipline includes: (1) Verbal Counseling or Warning, which
may result in a post-conference summary memorandum, but will not be placed in the
teacher’s personnel file (2) Written Warning, which can only be issued if the teacher has
been verbally warned about similar actions in the last twelve months, and which is not
placed in the teacher’s personnel file; (3) Written Reprimand, which can only be issued if
the teacher has received a written warning about similar conduct in the last 12 months;
the teacher must sign the reprimand to acknowledge receipt, and a copy may be placed in

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the teacher’s personnel file; and (4) Notice / Letter of Reprimand, which must contain a
statement of the specific acts or omissions on which it is based; a statement of the cause
for which the action is recommended; a description of the Education Code section, policy
or regulations that has been violated, if applicable; the proposed penalty and effective
date; and a statement of the teacher’s right to challenge the discipline by requesting a
hearing under the Agreement’s grievance procedure.
If a teacher is placed on administrative leave, the teacher must be given
advance notice in a letter sent by certified mail, which must also be sent to the Union
President and the site administrator.
Edison. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. Grossmont’s Agreement provides that all discipline shall
include progressive discipline, although it does not mandate specific steps to be followed.
Additionally, the School must provide prior notice to the teacher, and the opportunity for
a conference upon the request of the teacher. As authorized by the Education Code,
discipline can include suspension for no more than 15 days.
Helix. Helix’s Agreement closely follows Grossmont’s, requiring
progressive discipline, and prior notice of any discipline with an opportunity for a

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conference. As under the Grossmont Agreement, suspension cannot be more than 15
days.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. The Petaluma Agreement requires that a teacher must receive a
full, complete statement of any charges before discipline is imposed. The teacher must
also be given the opportunity to be represented by the Union or another representative, an
opportunity to rebut any charges, and the right to appeal. The District must give an
informal, verbal warning before implementing formal discipline procedures, except for
“more serious incidents.” Discipline must be commenced by giving notice to teacher in
writing. The notice and other documents cannot be placed in the teacher’s file until the
teacher has had the opportunity to respond. Following notification, a conference must be
held between the teacher, union representative, principal, and Superintendent or his
designee. Within five days of the conference, the Superintendent or designee must notify
the teacher of the District’s intended action.
The following steps of progressive discipline must be followed: (1) a
written warning, with suggestions for correction; (2) a second written notice, including
“probation” for a specified period in which the teacher may correct the problem; (3)
suspension without pay for up to five work days; and (4) if the unsatisfactory action is
repeated within 18 months, the District may continue with suspension.

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Live Oak. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Discipline: Ability to Challenge or Grieve
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. The LAUSD Agreement authorizes any teacher to file a written
statement in response to any Notice of Unsatisfactory Service or Act, which must be
attached to all copies of the Notice retained by the District. Additionally, any Notice of
Unsatisfactory Service or Act is grievable under Article V of the Agreement. However,
if the discipline includes suspension without pay, the teacher may submit a notice of
appeal to the District within three days. The District must then hold an appeal meeting,
and issue a decision by the following day. Within two days of that decision, the Union
must notify the District if it intends to appeal the matter to arbitration. After the District
takes action, it must provide the Union a copy of any written statements of students
related to the matter, upon request by the Union. The Union must be given an
opportunity to interview any student witness called to testify at arbitration.
Camino Nuevo. As Camino Nuevo’s Agreement is silent regarding the
ability to file a grievance regarding discipline, the Agreement’s general grievance
procedure is available.
Green Dot. Green Dot’s Agreement provides that any violation of any
provision of the Agreement is subject to grievance.

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LA Leadership. As LA Leadership’s Agreement is silent regarding the
ability to file a grievance regarding discipline, the Agreement’s general grievance
procedure is available.
Ocean. Ocean’s Agreement requires that a copy of any suspension or
dismissal must be sent to the Union President. The School must also provide a copy of
the materials, rules or regulations on which the discipline is based, and must provide the
teacher an opportunity to respond. The teacher also has the right to have a Union
representative present. As the Agreement is silent regarding the ability to file a grievance
regarding discipline, the Agreement’s general grievance procedure is available.
Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Perris. Under the Perris Agreement, a copy of any discipline must be sent
to the local office of the CTA and the President of Perris Secondary Educators
Association. A teacher may file a written appeal with the Superintendent within 7 days
of notice of disciplinary action. If a timely appeal is filed, it will be heard by a mutually
acceptable arbitrator. After the arbitrator rules, if the Board disagrees, it may reject the
decision and proceed under Education Code section 44944 with a panel hearing on the
same charges, whose decision will be final. However, the Appropriateness of the
particular discipline imposed is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board.

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Choice 2000. Under the Choice 2000 Agreement, a teacher may appeal
any discipline to the Superintendent, and then proceed to Arbitration. However, the
Board may reject the Arbitrator’s decision. Unlike the Perris Agreement, the Board is not
then required to proceed under the Education Code, but is authorized instead to act on its
own discretion. A copy of any discipline must be sent to the Union.
San Diego Unified School District: Darnall Charter School
San Diego. San Diego’s Agreement establishes a unique process for
challenging Letters of Reprimand and Suspensions. A teacher may challenge a Letter of
Reprimand by requesting review by the Superintendent’s designee within 10 days. The
Union has the right to request a hearing to review the District’s decision, but submitting a
written request within ten working days of the decision. The parties must then attempt to
mutually select a hearing officer; failing agreement, an officer is selected randomly from
a district panel. The parties may present oral and documentary evidence to the hearing
officer, who must provide a written decision upholding or setting aside the letter of
reprimand. That decision is final. If the reprimand is determined to be appropriate, the
reprimand and any rebuttal by the teacher is placed in the teacher’s personnel file, and in
a Human Resources file separate from the personnel file. If the reprimand is found not to
be appropriate, the decision and other documents must be kept in a Human Resources file
separate from the personnel file.

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The Union may also request a hearing on a teacher’s suspension within 10
days of the issuance of the charges, which must be conducted by a mutually-agreed
hearing officer or by a State Office of Administrative Hearings judge. Each party may
produce oral and documentary evidence at hearing. The standard of proof is the
“preponderance of the evidence.” The teacher has the right to receive the transcript; costs
are split evenly between the District and Union. The decision of the hearing officer is
final, but may be reviewed by the Superior Court through a petition for writ of mandate
under the California Code of Civil Procedure, filed within thirty days of the decision.
Darnall. The Darnall Agreement also provides a unique method of
challenging a disciplinary reprimand. Any teacher may request review by the Board, in
writing, within ten days of the reprimand. The Board President must place the request on
the agenda for the next Board meeting. The teacher may bring a representative. If the
reprimand is approved, it is placed in the teacher’s file; if not, it must be removed.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. Like LAUSD, Ravenswood is subject to the Education
Code provisions regarding challenges to teacher discipline, which are explained above.
Edison. Edison’s Agreement specifically provides that any disciplinary
decision may be the subject of a grievance.

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Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. Like LAUSD, Grossmont is subject to the Education Code
provisions regarding discipline, which are explained above.
Helix. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. The Teacher or Union may appeal any disciplinary decision on
the basis that the action is unwarranted. Notice of appeal must be given to the
Superintendent or designee within five days of notification of the action to be taken. The
action is stayed while the appeal is pending.
The teacher and Union may request an appeal panel, consisting of one
teacher selected by the teacher and Union, an administrator selected by District, and an
impartial party selected by other two. The panel must then hold a hearing to determine
only whether the action taken is warranted. The panel’s decision is binding, and the
expenses of any third party are equally shared by the Union and District. Alternatively,
the teacher and Union may invoke the binding arbitration procedure in the Agreement’s
Grievance provisions. The Arbitrator must decide only whether the action taken is
warranted, and the Arbitrator’s decision is binding.

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Live Oak. Prior to termination, the teacher must be provided with a
statement of charges and be given the opportunity to respond orally or in writing; the
teacher has the right to appear before the Board to contest the statement of charges, and
may obtain counsel. The Board’s decision is final.
Dismissal: Grounds
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. Because dismissal is a prohibited topic of bargaining, the
Agreement contains no provisions regarding the grounds for dismissal; rather, the District
is governed by the Education Code, which provides a specific list of permissible reasons
for dismissal (discussed above).
A probationary teacher may be effectively dismissed by giving notice of
non-reelection, meaning the teacher will not return to the school the following year.
Educ. Code § 44644(a). No finding of cause is necessary. Education Code section 44932
provides a specific list of permissible reasons for dismissal of a permanent teacher, or
dismissal of a probationary teacher during the school year, which include “immoral or
unprofessional conduct,” “unsatisfactory performance,” “evident unfitness for service,”
and “persistent violation of or refusal to obey the school laws of the state, State Board of
Education or the governing board of the school district.” Other grounds may justify
dismissal, but the District must specify the instances of behavior that constitutes
unprofessional conduct. Cal. Educ. Code § 44933.

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Camino Nuevo. The Camino Nuevo Agreement authorizes immediate
dismissal “for cause” during the term of a teacher’s contract, which includes
performance. The Agreement provides that “cause” is to be interpreted solely by the
Executive Director, the Principal or their designee. The Agreement lists examples “a”
through “s,” which are meant to be illustrative and not exhaustive. Examples include
unsatisfactory performance, as defined by the School’s Professional Evaluation Rubric,
provided that the teacher has been given written notice of any deficiency and has had
thirty days to cure any deficiencies. The administration must provide a written support
plan outlining the resources that were offered to the teacher to facilitate improvement
during the 30-day period. Examples also include being unfit for service, including
documentation of inability to appropriately instruct or associate with children or students;
refusal to comply with or support any regulation, law, or policy of the school; immoral
conduct, including conviction of a felony; failure to maintain a teaching credential; and
insubordination, including refusal to do assigned work.
Green Dot. Green Dot allows dismissal of any teacher only “for cause.”
The Agreement also specifically provides that if a teacher on an Improvement Plan does
not show sufficient improvement to meet the required standard, Green Dot may dismiss
the teacher or elect not to re-hire the teacher for the following year.
LA Leadership. LA Leadership’s Agreement requires “just cause” for
dismissal of any teacher after two years.

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Ocean. Under the Ocean Agreement, any dismissal of an “ongoing”
(permanent) teacher must be “substantiated and for just cause.” Causes enumerated by
the Agreement include (individually or collectively) discourteous or disrespectful
treatment; dishonesty; theft or destruction of property; unauthorized use of school
equipment; use of firearms or weapons; use of intoxicants; conviction of a felony or
crime of moral turpitude; insubordination; absence without leave; unprofessional
conduct; unsatisfactory performance (as defined by the Agreement’s Evaluation
provisions); violating the School’s safety or health policy; having a material conflict of
interest; harassment; failure to maintain the appropriate teaching credential; failure of
good conduct during or outside duty hours “tending to injure the public service”; and
abandonment of service.
Perris. Like LAUSD, the Perris District must comply with the Education
Code provisions governing dismissal, which are outlined above. The Agreement
provides that the District retains the power to terminate “for just cause” as set forth in
Education Code sections 44930 through 44960.
Choice 2000. Choice 2000’s Agreement authorizes discipline only for
“just cause,” but does not specifically require “just cause” for dismissal.

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San Diego Unified School District: Darnall Charter School
San Diego. Like LAUSD, San Diego is subject to the Education Code
provisions regarding dismissal, which are explained above.
Darnall. Under the Darnall Agreement, if a teacher receives a “Below” or
“Far Below” rating, the School must place the teacher on an Improvement Plan. If
sufficient progress is not made within sixty days, the Director should recommend non-
renewal to the Board. The Board’s decision is final.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. Like LAUSD, Ravenswood is subject to the Education
Code provisions regarding dismissal, which are explained above.
Edison. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. Like LAUSD, Grossmont is subject to the Education Code
provisions regarding dismissal, which are explained above.
Helix. This Agreement is silent on this subject.

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Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. Like LAUSD, Petaluma is subject to the Education Code
provisions regarding dismissal, which are explained above.
Live Oak. A decision not to renew a probationary teacher’s employment
is “at-will,” and does not require cause. A probationary teacher may be released during
the school year for “reasonable cause.” A teacher with permanent status (beginning in
the teacher’s fourth year) can only be dismissed “for cause”; examples listed include
unsatisfactory performance, neglect of duty, inefficiency, discourteous treatment, and
unprofessional conduct.
Dismissal: Procedure
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. Because dismissal is specifically excluded from the scope of
bargaining for conventional public schools, dismissal in LAUSD is governed by the
Education Code.
Probationary Teachers. A probationary teacher may be effectively
dismissed by giving notice of non-reelection, meaning the teacher will not return to the
school the following year. Educ. Code § 44644(a). No finding of cause is necessary.
For teachers in their first year of employment, notice of non-reelection can be given at

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any time prior to June 30; teachers in their second consecutive year of employment must
be given 30 days’ notice of non-election by March 15. The Notice must include a
statement of the reasons for the dismissal and notice of the opportunity to appeal. Cal.
Educ. Code § 44948.3(a)(2).
During the school year, probationary teachers may be dismissed for
unsatisfactory performance under The Stull Act, or “for cause.” When a teacher is
dismissed for unsatisfactory performance, a copy of the evaluation conducted pursuant to
the Education Code must accompany the written notice. Dismissal of a probationary
teacher for unsatisfactory performance requires 90-day notice, as does dismissal for
unprofessional conduct, providing a grace period in which to attempt to cure deficiencies
before dismissal is carried out.
Permanent Teachers. Under the Education code, before dismissing (or
suspending without pay), a permanent teacher for “unsatisfactory performance,” the
school must provide prior written notice at least 90 days prior to the intended dismissal
date. The dismissal process is initiated by the filing of written charges with the school’s
governing board, which must specify all of the facts relevant to the decision, and the
statutes and rules violated. Cal. Educ. Code § 44938(b)(1). Only conduct occurring in
the previous four years may be included. The notice requirement is intended to provide
the teacher sufficient time to correct any faults and overcome the grounds for the charge.
Camino Nuevo. Camino Nuevo may decline to renew any individual
contract by providing written notice of nonrenewal by May 15. The Agreement

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authorizes the School to immediately terminate a teacher “for cause” during the term of
an individual contract.
Green Dot. If a teacher on an Improvement Plan does not show sufficient
improvement to meet the school’s standards, the school may terminate or choose not to
re-hire the teacher for the following year. The school must follow a specified procedure:
(1) Provide written notice to the teacher by April 15 of that year; (2) The notice must
include the reason for the action, and an opportunity to appeal; (3) the teacher may
request a conference in writing within 10 days; (4) if there is no request, the conference
is waived; (5) the conference is held before the Board in closed session, unless the
teacher requests an open session; (6) the teacher may have a Union representative
present; and (7) the teacher may use the grievance process.
LA Leadership. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Ocean. Under the Ocean Agreement, if the School decides not to renew a
probationary teacher’s employment, the teacher must receive notification by April 1. If a
probationary teacher’s employment is terminated mid-year in the second year, the teacher
must receive 30 days’ pay and benefits. For any “ongoing” (permanent) teacher, the
Agreement requires that a copy of the dismissal must be sent to the Union President. The
School must also provide a copy of the materials, rules or regulations on which the
dismissal is based, and must provide the teacher an opportunity to respond. The teacher
also has the right to have a Union representative present.

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Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Perris. Like LAUSD, Perris is subject to the Education Code provisions
regarding dismissal, which are explained above.
Choice 2000. All Choice 2000 teachers are required to be given contracts
for each school year. However, the Agreement provides that the contract may be
terminable upon 30 days written notice or pay in lieu thereof. Choice 2000 does not
impose any specific procedural requirements for dismissal.
San Diego Unified School District: Darnall Charter School
San Diego. Like LAUSD, San Diego is subject to the Education Code
provisions regarding dismissal, which are explained above.
Darnall. Darnall’s Agreement specifically authorizes dismissal for failure
to meet the School’s performance standards. If a “Below Standard” or “Far Below
Standard” rating is anticipated on any California Teaching Standard on the teacher’s
Summary Evaluation, the school must notify the teacher by December 1, and must then
meet to create an Improvement Plan. If the school’s issues or concerns have not been
satisfactorily addressed within sixty days, the Director will recommend non-renewal to
the Board. The Board’s decision is final. The Director can also initiate an improvement
plan during a non-evaluation year, for which the same 60-day deadline applies.

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Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. Like LAUSD, Ravenswood is subject to the Education
Code provisions regarding dismissal, which are explained above.
Edison. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Grossmont. Like LAUSD, Grossmont is subject to the Education Code
provisions regarding dismissal, which are explained above.
Helix. This Agreement is silent on this subject.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. Like LAUSD, Petaluma is subject to the Education Code
provisions regarding dismissal, which are explained above.
Live Oak. A probationary teacher may be released during the year for
“reasonable cause,” provided the teacher is notified by April 1. Permanent teachers may
only be dismissed for cause, but the school must provide a statement of charges and an
opportunity to respond.

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Dismissal: Ability to Challenge or Grieve
Los Angeles Unified School District: Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA
Leadership Academy, Ocean Charter School
LAUSD. Because California law specifically excludes teacher dismissal
from the scope of collective bargaining in conventional public schools, LAUSD teachers
are protected by California law rather than the LAUSD Agreement. Under California
law, any teacher who wishes to contest a dismissal based on unprofessional conduct or
unsatisfactory performance may file a request for a hearing within 30 days of receiving
notice (Cal. Educ. Code § 44934). After receiving a demand for a hearing, the district
may rescind its decision or schedule the matter for a hearing (Cal. Educ. Code § 44943).
The hearing is conducted in accordance with California’s Administrative Procedure Act
(Cal. Govt. Code § 11500 et seq). The teacher has the right to be represented by counsel,
to obtain the names of the district’s witnesses, and to inspect all relevant documents. The
hearing is held by a 3-member board called a Commission on Professional Competence
(“CPC”). One member is chosen by the teacher, one by the district, and the third is an
administrative law judge. The teacher’s representative is typically chosen by her Union,
from a list of employees trained to serve as CPC hearing officers. A majority vote is
required for dismissal, and the CPC must issue a written ruling containing findings of fact
and determination of issues. If the district’s decision to dismiss is overruled, the teacher
is reinstated. Either party may petition to the Superior Court for review of the CPC’s
decision. The Court exercises independent judgment in reviewing the CPC.

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Camino Nuevo. Any termination of an individual contract “for cause” can
be grieved in writing under Article 9, initiating at Step 2 of the Agreement’s grievance
process, within five work days. However, a decision not to renew a contract is not
subject to grievance. Likewise, termination due to reduction in force is not subject to the
Agreement’s grievance procedure.
Green Dot. Any provision of Green Dot’s Agreement may be a subject of
grievance and arbitration. If a teacher on an Improvement Plan does not show sufficient
improvement to meet the school’s standards, the school may terminate or choose not to
re-hire the teacher for the following year. The Agreement’s dismissal procedures
specifically provide that the teacher may have a Union representative present for any
disciplinary steps including those leading to dismissal, and that the teacher may use the
grievance process.
LA Leadership. LA Leadership’s Agreement specifically provides that
any dismissal of a teacher after two years may be grieved. The grievance is initiated at
Step 2 (submission to the Executive Director).
Ocean. As Ocean’s Agreement is silent regarding the ability to file a
grievance regarding dismissal, the Agreement’s general grievance procedure is available.

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Perris Union High School District: Choice 2000 Online School
Perris. As in LAUSD, a teacher dismissed by the Perris District may use
the procedures provided by the Education Code to challenge a dismissal.
Choice 2000. Choice 2000’s Agreement provides that any provision of
the Agreement may be the subject of a grievance.
San Diego Unified School District: Darnall Charter School
San Diego. Like LAUSD, San Diego is subject to the Education Code
provisions regarding dismissal, which are explained above.
Darnall. If a teacher is dismissed for failing to make sufficient progress
while on an improvement plan, the teacher may appeal the decision to Board. The
Board’s decision is final.
Ravenswood City School District: Edison McNair / Brentwood
Ravenswood. Like LAUSD, Ravenswood is subject to the Education
Code provisions regarding dismissal, which are explained above.
Edison. This Agreement is silent on this subject. Accordingly, the
Agreement’s general grievance procedure may be used.

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Grossmont Union High School District: Helix Charter School
Grossmont. Like LAUSD, Grossmont is subject to the Education Code
provisions regarding dismissal, which are explained above.
Helix. This Agreement is silent on this subject. Accordingly, the
Agreement’s general grievance procedure may be used.
Petaluma City Elementary School District: Live Oak Charter School
Petaluma. Like LAUSD, Petaluma is subject to the Education Code
provisions regarding dismissal, which are explained above.
Live Oak. Any permanent teacher must be given a statement of charges
constituting cause for dismissal, and opportunity to respond. The teacher may appeal the
decision to the Board, and has the right to have counsel present.
“Merit Pay”
Pay for Performance – Individual
LAUSD, Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA Leadership, Ocean. None of
these schools currently provides any form of performance pay to individual teachers.

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Perris, Choice 2000. Choice 2000 has a four-step salary schedule, and its
teachers can only progress through the steps of the schedule if they receive a
“Satisfactory” evaluation.
San Diego, Darnall. Neither of these schools currently provides any form
of performance pay to individual teachers.
Ravenswood, Edison. Neither of these schools currently provides any
form of performance pay to individual teachers.
Grossmont, Helix. Helix’s salary schedule includes an “Incentive (Merit
pay) Salary” component. However, additional pay is actually provided only for good
attendance: teachers using two days or less from their allotted ten days during the school
year are eligible for a one-time payment of $200 to $600.
Petaluma, Live Oak. Neither of these schools currently provides any form
of performance pay to individual teachers.
Pay for Performance – School-wide
LAUSD, Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA Leadership, Ocean. None of
these schools currently provides any form of performance pay on a school-wide basis.

370
Perris, Choice 2000. Neither of these schools currently provides any form
of performance pay on a school-wide basis.
San Diego, Darnall. Neither of these schools currently provides any form
of performance pay on a school-wide basis.
Ravenswood, Edison. Neither of these schools currently provides any
form of performance pay on a school-wide basis.
Grossmont, Helix. Neither of these schools currently provides any form
of performance pay on a school-wide basis.
Petaluma, Live Oak. Neither of these schools currently provides any form
of performance pay on a school-wide basis.
Pay for Subject-matter
LAUSD, Camino Nuevo, Green Dot, LA Leadership, Ocean. Camino
Nuevo provides a bilingual stipend of $2,000, and a stipend of $1,000 for “hard to fill”
positions.
Perris, Choice 2000. Neither of these schools currently provides any form
of performance pay for the subject matter taught.

371
San Diego, Darnall. Neither of these schools currently provides any form
of performance pay for the subject matter taught.
Ravenswood, Edison. Edison provides a bilingual stipend, originally set
at $750, or $1,500 for teachers with BCLAD certification who are working in a bilingual
setting.
Grossmont, Helix. Neither of these schools currently provides any form
of performance pay for the subject matter taught.
Petaluma, Live Oak. Neither of these schools currently provides any form
of performance pay for the subject matter taught.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract Teachers at a small but growing number of California’s charter schools are represented by teachers’ unions, and the administrators and teachers at these schools have negotiated collective bargaining agreements that govern administrators’ personnel decisions regarding teachers. This study begins to explore those agreements, focusing on provisions in four key policy areas in which public school district agreements are often criticized as being unduly restrictive: (1) teacher assignment and transfer, (2) teacher evaluation, (3) teacher classification (including permanence or “tenure,” discipline and dismissal, and (4) teacher compensation, including “merit pay.”

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Asset Metadata

Creator Moss, James Rex, Jr. (author)

Core Title Collective bargaining in California charter schools: cooperation or conflict?

School Rossier School of Education

Degree Doctor of Education

Degree Program Education

Degree Conferral Date 2010-12

Publication Date 12/03/2010

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag California charter schools,collective bargaining agreements,good cause,merit pay,OAI-PMH Harvest,permanence or tenure,personnel policy,reform bargaining,teacher assignment and transfer,teacher classification,teacher compensation,teacher discipline,teacher dismissal,teacher evaluation,teacher seniority,teachers' unions

Place Name California (states)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Hentschke, Guilbert C. (committee chair), Picus, Lawrence O. (committee chair), Chidester, Margaret (committee member)

Creator Email jrm@paynefears.com,lcmoss@cox.net

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m3579

Unique identifier UC1467454

Identifier etd-Moss-4132 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-438157 (legacy record id),usctheses-m3579 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Moss-4132.pdf

Dmrecord 438157

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Moss, James Rex, Jr.

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu