University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

New public management in Chile (1990 - 2008): exploring its impact on public employees

(USC Thesis Other)

New public management in Chile (1990 - 2008): exploring its impact on public employees

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN CHILE (1990 – 2008): EXPLORING
ITS IMPACT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

by

Cristian Pliscoff

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF POLICY, PLANNING,
AND DEVELOPMENT
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

August 2009

Copyright 2009 Cristian Pliscoff
ii

Dedication
I want to dedicate this work to my wife Claudia and my son Cristóbal. This effort belongs
to both of you; is for both of you.

I also want to dedicate this work to my parents, my brother and my grandparents.
Without their love, I would not be here.

A ti hijo, solo te quiero dejar las ganas por superarte, por alcanzar logros. Yo sé que tu
vas a llegar muy lejos.

iii

Acknowledgments

There are many individuals to acknowledge upon finishing a challenging project such as
this dissertation. It is fair to start with my professors at the School of Policy, Planning,
and Development. In particular, I would like to thank the chair of my committee, Dr.
Peter Robertson, who has been not only a truly advisor all these years at USC, but also a
great friend. His advice and support from the very beginning of this journey have been
fundamental. I would also like to thank Dr. Terry Cooper for being a role model in terms
of scholarship in the public administration realm. Conversing with him has been an
opportunity to learn and work towards advancing our understanding on this academic
field. I also want to thank him for giving me the chance to participate in the Collaborative
Learning Project he leads, in which I had an invaluable opportunity to contrast theory and
practice in the key area of civic engagement. Dr. Caiden is also someone that truly
deserves a special mention. He has been a mentor during these years, not only in
academic terms, but also in matters that go beyond academy. He is an exemplar in terms
of being someone who has always behaved according to his beliefs. His critical, and
sometimes skeptical, point of view regarding academic life was a wake up call to
understand the meaning of being scholar in public administration. I also want to thank Dr.
Macarena Gomez-Barris for involving me in one of her research projects, and also for her
positive attitude in terms of helping me in the difficult process of wrapping up my
dissertation. Finally, I would like to thank my friends at the International Public Policy
and Management Program at SPPD, the IPPAM family. The opportunity they provided
me to help them in the program as a TA and also as support for the administration of the
iv

program was one of the richest experiences I had at USC. Being exposed to all the
different cultures participating in this program is something I will treasure for the rest of
my life. Thanks Joanna, Ann, Joyce, Melissa and Erlyana for letting me be part of this.

Another person that deserves special recognition is June Muranaka, the Doctoral Student
Services Advisor at SPPD. Her crucial advice during all these years helped me to
understand the knots and bolts of being a student at USC. Her positive attitude to solve
every problem has been a major thrust to pursue my dream of being a Ph.D. I also like to
acknowledge all my colleagues at the School of Policy, Planning, and Development,
particularly my great friend Ariel Ramirez who helped me since the outset of my life in
Los Angeles. He and his family help me in the difficult process of establishing myself in
a new city. I also want to acknowledge all my friends during these years in Los Angeles,
their support for me and my family was essential in order to adjust to the difficult
experience of being away from family and friends. They really make us feel at home.

I also want to thanks my parents for setting an example for me, for being always with me
and for giving me their unlimited love that gave me strength to overcome those difficult
moments in life. Also to my brother who has been my partner all this time. Finally, I want
to thank my wife. Her support and commitment with this dream of pursuing a Ph.D.
degree abroad was vital for me. She was not only a companion during these days, but also
a real collaborator on this project. Her sacrifice of leaving everything behind to join me is
nothing but an expression of true love. Mi amor, sin tí este sueño habría sido imposible.
v

Table of Contents

Dedication ........................................................................................................................... ii

Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................. iii

List of Tables: ................................................................................................................... vii

List of Figures: ................................................................................................................. xiii

Abstract ............................................................................................................................ xiv

Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2: Public sector reform and the NPM movement .................................................. 8
2. a. The NPM movement ............................................................................................... 8
2.b. Main characteristics of NPM as an administrative philosophy ............................. 11
2.c. NPM reform in Latin America: .............................................................................. 14

Chapter 3: Theoretical basis of NPM style reforms.......................................................... 20
3.a. Theories framing NPM-style reform policies ........................................................ 20
3.a.i. Managerialism:................................................................................................. 20
3.a.ii. Public Choice: ................................................................................................. 23
3.a.iii. New Economics of organization: ................................................................... 26
3.b. Incentives: Where Managerialism, Public Choice and The New Economics
of the Organization meet ............................................................................................... 31

Chapter 4: Public Sector Reform in Chile (1990 – 2008): NPM policies changing
the old bureaucratic apparatus .......................................................................................... 42
4.a. The structural reforms undertaken during the Military Regime (1973 – 1990) ..... 43
4. b. The Definition of a new State (1990 – 1994) ....................................................... 46
4. c. The Managerial Revolution: New ideas to modernize the Chilean public
sector (1994 – 2000) ..................................................................................................... 53
4.c.i. Strategic Plan for Public Management Modernization (1997 – 2000) ............ 55
4. d. Reforming the State and Overcoming the Political Crisis (2000 – 2006): ........... 60
4.d.i. The Project of Reform and Modernization of the State ................................... 60
4.d.ii. The Political and Legislative Agreement of 2003 .......................................... 63
4.d.iii. Ley de Nuevo Trato (Law 19882) (Law for a New Deal) ............................. 68
4.d.iv. Management Control System (Ministry of Finance: Budget Office) ............ 69
4.e. Bachelet’s Government: Shifting the Strategy ....................................................... 75
4.e.i. Transparency: ................................................................................................... 75
4.e.ii. Management Control System:......................................................................... 78
4.e.iii. Setting up the baseline for a new civil service: ............................................. 80
4.f. Conclusions of the Chapter: ................................................................................... 81
vi

Chapter 5: Theoretical Framework and Propositions ....................................................... 86
5.a. Erosion of Public Values as an Outcome of NPM Style Reforms in the
Chilean Public Sector .................................................................................................... 86
5.b. The Managerial Implications of NPM style reforms in the Chilean Public
Sector .......................................................................................................................... 101

Chapter 6: Methodology ................................................................................................. 108
6.a. Overview: ............................................................................................................. 108
6.b. Elements of the data collection strategy: ............................................................. 111
6.b.i. Public Service Motivation Survey ................................................................. 111
6.b.ii. Managerial Implications of Implementing NPM style Reforms in
the Chilean Public Sector: ....................................................................................... 129

Chapter 7: Results ........................................................................................................... 133
7.a. Overview: ............................................................................................................. 133
7.b. Public Service Motivation Survey: ...................................................................... 134
7.b.i. Reliability: ..................................................................................................... 134
7.b.ii. Addressing propositions: .............................................................................. 135
7.c. Managerial implications of NPM style reforms in Chile: .................................... 163

Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusions .......................................................................... 180
8.a. Regarding NPM ................................................................................................... 182
8.b. Regarding the erosion of values ........................................................................... 185
8.c. Regarding changes in managerial practices ......................................................... 186
8.d. Policy recommendations ...................................................................................... 190
8.e. NPM in Chile: Further research ........................................................................... 194

Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 196

Appendices:..................................................................................................................... 212
Appendix 1: List of Interviewees ................................................................................ 212
Appendix 2: Demographics of the dataset .................................................................. 213
Appendix 3: Reliability by Item ................................................................................. 216
Appendix 4: Descriptive Statistics by Item ................................................................ 219
Appendix 5: ANOVA Analysis PSM Scores ............................................................. 238

vii

List of Tables:
Table 1: Definitions of NPM ............................................................................................ 13

Table 2: Two Stages of Economic Liberalization (Naim, 1994:36) ................................. 18

Table 3: Legitimating Managerialism (source Clarke and Newman, 1997: 65) ............... 22

Table 4: Situation before and after the implementation of structural reform policies
during the dictatorship ...................................................................................................... 45

Table 5: Agenda of State Modernization included on the 2003 Political Agreement
(Chile, 2003). .................................................................................................................... 67

Table 6: Basic Framework Program: Areas y Systems .................................................... 73

Table 7: Advanced Framework Program: Areas y Systems ............................................. 73

Table 8: Evolution of performance based bonuses: .......................................................... 79

Table 9: Implementation of the Senior Civil Service System 2003 - 2008 ...................... 81

Table 10: NPM Doctrines and how those doctrines have been implemented in Chile ..... 83

Table 11: Advantages and disadvantages of surveys (Nardi, 2006:17-18) .................... 109

Table 12: Summary of the Research Design ................................................................... 110

Table 13: Wilson’s Typology of Public Agencies (Wilson, 1989) ................................. 112

Table 14: Agencies included on this research categorized under Wilson`s typology .... 113

Table 15: Number of employees ..................................................................................... 117

Table 16: Public Service Motivation Items by Subscale ................................................ 119

Table 17: Summary of the five stages to implement the survey ..................................... 121

Table 18: Comparing Different Methods of Data Collection ......................................... 123

Table 19: Number of surveys by Institution ................................................................... 125

Table 20: Public employees and Contractors by Institution ........................................... 128
viii

Table 21: Total number of employees by institution, sample size and percentage
surveyed .......................................................................................................................... 128

Table 22: Reliability Statistics 40 Item Instrument ........................................................ 134

Table 23: Reliability Statistics 24 Items Instrument ....................................................... 134

Table 24: Reliability Scores for each Category (40 Item Instrument) ............................ 135

Table 25: Reliability Scores for each Category (24 Item Instrument) ............................ 135

Table 26: Descriptive Statistics PSM Score ................................................................... 136

Table 27: Public Service Motivation: Average by Item (whole sample) ........................ 138

Table 28: Perry’s Six Categories (1996) ......................................................................... 141

Table 29: Perry’s Four Final Categories (1996) ............................................................. 142

Table 30: Descriptive Statistics Six Categories (40 Item Instrument) ............................ 142

Table 31: Descriptive Statistics Four Categories 24 Item Instrument ............................ 143

Table 32: Items included on Category Attraction to Policy Making (24 Item
Instrument) ...................................................................................................................... 143

Table 33: PSM 11 - Politics is a dirty word. (Reversed) ................................................ 144

Table 34: PSM 31 - I don't care much for politicians. (Reversed) ................................. 145

Table 35: Reliability Statistics 40 Item Instrument ........................................................ 146

Table 36: Reliability Statistics 24 Item Instrument ........................................................ 147

Table 37: PSM Mean Scores by Institution for both Instruments .................................. 148

Table 38: ANOVA PSM Scores by Institutions (40 Items Instrument) ......................... 149

Table 39: Multiple Comparisons PSM Score (40 Items Scale) Scheffe Test ................. 150

Table 40: ANOVA PSM Score 24 Items (DV) by Institution (IV) ................................ 151

Table 41: Multiple Comparisons PSM Score (24 Item) by Institution, Scheffe Test ..... 152

ix

Table 42: PSM Scores by Categories by Institution (40 Items)...................................... 154

Table 43: PSM Scores by Categories by Institution (24 Items)...................................... 155

Table 44: Sig Scores for each ANOVA of mean score for each category (DV) by
Institution (IV) (40 item instrument) .............................................................................. 158

Table 45: Sig Scores for each ANOVA of mean score for each category (DV) by
Institution (IV) (24 item instrument) .............................................................................. 158

Table 46: ANOVA: PSM Score (DV) and Rank (IV) PSM Score (40 Items Scale) ...... 159

Table 47: Multiple Comparisons: ANOVA PSM Score (DV) and Rank (IV) 40
Items Instrument, Scheffe Test ....................................................................................... 160

Table 48: ANOVA PSM Score (24 Items) (DV) Rank (IV) .......................................... 161

Table 49: Multiple Comparisons ANOVA PSM Score (24 Items) (DV) and
Rank (IV), Scheffe Test .................................................................................................. 161

Table 50: Gender Distribution (whole sample) .............................................................. 213

Table 51: Type of Contract (whole sample) ................................................................... 213

Table 52: Rank (whole sample) ...................................................................................... 213

Table 53: Years working in the public sector ................................................................. 214

Table 54: Years working in the public sector (grouped) ................................................ 215

Table 55: Public Servants ............................................................................................... 215

Table 56: Reliability by Item - Item-Total Statistics ...................................................... 216

Table 57: PSM 01 - Making a difference in society means more to me than
personal achievements. ................................................................................................... 219

Table 58: PSM 02 - I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged.
(Reversed) ....................................................................................................................... 219

Table 59: PSM 03 - Most social programs are too vital to do without. .......................... 220

Table 60: PSM 04 - It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people
in distress. ....................................................................................................................... 220
x

Table 61: PSM 05 - I believe in putting duty before self................................................ 220

Table 62: PSM 06 – Doing well financially is definitely more important to me
than doing good deeds. (Reversed) ................................................................................. 221

Table 63: PSM 07 - People may talk about the public interest but they are really
concerned only about their self-interest. (Reversed) ...................................................... 221

Table 64: PSM 08 - To me patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others. ............ 221

Table 65: PSM 09 - Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. .................... 222

Table 66: PSM 10 – I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don't know
personally. (Reversed) .................................................................................................... 222

Table 67: PSM 11 - Politics is a dirty word. (Reversed) ................................................ 222

Table 68: PSM 12 - Serving citizens would give me a good feeling even if no
one paid me for it. ........................................................................................................... 223

Table 69: PSM 13 - I am often reminded by daily events about how dependent
we are on one another. .................................................................................................... 223

Table 70: PSM 14 - When public officials take an oath of office. I believe they
accept obligations not expected of other citizens. .......................................................... 224

Table 71: PSM 15 - I respect public officials who can turn a good idea into law. ......... 224

Table 72: PSM 16 - It is hard for me to get intensely interested in what is going
on in my community. (Reversed).................................................................................... 225

Table 73: PSM 17 - I feel people should give back to society more than they get
from it.............................................................................................................................. 225

Table 74: PSM 18 - I believe that there are many public causes worth championing. .. 226

Table 75: PSM 19 - I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss
to help someone else. ...................................................................................................... 226

Table 76: PSM 20 - I do not believe that government can do much to make
society fairer. (Reversed) ................................................................................................ 227

Table 77: PSM 21 - I am willing to go great lengths to fulfill my obligations to
my country. ..................................................................................................................... 227
xi

Table 78: PSM 22 - Ethical behavior of public officials is as important as
competence. .................................................................................................................... 228

Table 79: PSM 23 - I unselfishly contribute to my community. .................................... 228

Table 80: PSM 24 - I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling
to take the first step to help themselves. (Reversed) ....................................................... 229

Table 81: PSM 25 - Public service is one of the highest forms of citizenship. .............. 229

Table 82: PSM 26 - I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good
of society. ........................................................................................................................ 230

Table 83: PSM 27 - The give and take of public policy making doesn't appeal
to me. (Reversed) ............................................................................................................ 230

Table 84: PSM 28 - I believe everyone has a moral commitment to civic affairs
no matter how busy they are. .......................................................................................... 231

Table 85: PSM 29 - I have an obligation to look after those less well off...................... 231

Table 86: PSM 30 - Meaningful public service is very important to me. ....................... 232

Table 87: PSM 31 - I don't care much for politicians. (Reversed) ................................. 232

Table 88: PSM 32 - If any group does not share in the prosperity of our society
then we are all worse off. ................................................................................................ 233

Table 89: PSM 33 - I am willing to use every ounce of my energy to make the
world a more just place. .................................................................................................. 233

Table 90: PSM 34 - I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for
the whole community even if it harmed my interests. .................................................... 234

Table 91: PSM 35 - To me the phrase "duty, honor, and country" stirs deeply felt
emotions. ......................................................................................................................... 234

Table 92: PSM 36 - It is my responsibility to help solve problems arising from
interdependencies among people. ................................................................................... 235

Table 93: PSM 37 - An official's obligation to the public should always come
before loyalty to superiors. ............................................................................................. 235

xii

Table 94: PSM 38 - I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights of others even if
it means I will be ridiculed. ............................................................................................. 236

Table 95: PSM 39 - I consider public service my civic duty. ......................................... 236

Table 96: PSM 40 - There are few public programs that I wholeheartedly support.
(Reversed) ....................................................................................................................... 237

Table 97: ANOVA – PSM Score (40 Item) and Type of Contract ................................. 238

Table 98: Multiple Comparisons (ANOVA PSM Score and Type of Contract) ............ 238

Table 99: ANOVA – PSM Score (40 Item) and Years working on the public sector .... 238

Table 100: Multiple Comparisons (ANOVA – PSM Score (40 Item) and Years
working on the public sector) ......................................................................................... 239

Table 101: ANOVA – PSM Score (24 Item) and Institution.......................................... 239

Table 102: Multiple Comparisons (ANOVA – PSM Score (24 Item) and Institution) .. 240

Table 103: ANOVA – PSM Score (24 Item) and Type of Contract ............................... 241

Table 104: Multiple Comparisons (ANOVA – PSM Score (24 Item) and Type of
Contract) ......................................................................................................................... 241

Table 105: ANOVA – PSM Score (24 Item) and Years working on the public sector .. 242

Table 106: Multiple Comparisons (ANOVA – PSM Score (24 Item) and Years
working on the public sector) ......................................................................................... 242

xiii

List of Figures:

Figure 1: A Model of Public Management Reform (Pollit and Bouckaert, 2004:25) ...... 10

Figure 2: Strategic Planning for Public Management Modernization 1997 – 2000
(Comité Interministerial de Modernización de la Gestión Pública, 2000). ...................... 57

Figure 3: Project of Reform and Modernization of the State............................................ 62

Figure 4: Management Control Integration in the Budget Cycle ..................................... 70

Figure 5: Rationale behind the implementation of NPM-style reforms. .......................... 87

Figure 6: A theoretical model of the dynamics of planned Organizational change
(Robertson, et al. 1993:621).............................................................................................. 88

Figure 7: The Crowding-out effect from Frey (1997) ...................................................... 92

Figure 8: Means by item (whole sample) ....................................................................... 140

xiv

Abstract

The New Public Management is an administrative philosophy that can be pinpointed as
the theoretical background for many of the public sector reform processes the world has
witnessed in both developed and less developed countries. It is conceived as an
administrative philosophy, which entails a group of new assumptions regarding the
manner in which public agencies should be managed. In the last fifteen years or so,
public administration literature has assessed the outcomes of the implementation of this
new paradigm. The following dissertation is an effort to add a new case to this growing
literature. The Chilean case can be seen as an example from less developed country,
which is not normally analyzed in the mainstream literature on public administration.
After justifying the argument that NPM style reforms have been implemented in Chile in
the last ten years, two outcomes of these reforms are analyzed. First, the potential erosion
of public values due to NPM style reforms is tested among Chilean public employees.
The Public Service Motivation survey conducted among 767 employees was applied to
test for the notion of erosion of public employees. Second, the (un)intended outcomes of
NPM style reforms is analyzed. A group of interviews with key players of the public
sector reform process in Chile was developed to explore this issue. Conclusions regarding
the implications of NPM style reforms in Latin America, drawing from the Chilean case,
are provided.

1

Chapter 1: Introduction

Public sector reform has been a key issue in the public administration literature since
the early 1980s. The wave of reforms that started in the developed world reached the
majority of the world by the late 1990s (Caiden, 1991a; Batley and Larbi, 2004;
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Dibben, et al., 2004). The reasons for undertaking those
reforms have been country specific, but, some common justifications have been
raised in the literature (Christensen and Laegrid, 2001; Kettl, 2000; Zifcak, 1994;
Aucoin, 1995, among others). For instance, public sector reforms have been triggered
by the new economic roles of governments in a new global economy, and demands
for new government services and regulations (Aucoin, 1990). Pollitt and Bouckaert
(2004;25) find justification for these reforms in socio-economic forces (such as global
economic forces, sociodemographic change, socio- economic policies), political
system characteristics, and unpredictable events. Special attention should be payed to
justifications related to public finance issues and legitimacy issues; most of the
changes have been justified to reduce the great fiscal burden of most welfare states. In
the case of Latin America, the financial justification of these reforms stems from the
implementation of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’, with pressures coming
from international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF for major
changes in the role of the state in the economy. A second justification for
implementing public sector reform ‘packages’ was the need for increasing legitimacy
to the system, by focusing in the improvement of service delivery and performance.
2

Despite nuances or orientations in terms of policies implemented, it is agreed in the
public administration literature that there is a certain degree of consistency among the
changes implemented worldwide. It is claimed that a new administrative philosophy
(Hood and Jackson, 1991) labeled as the New Public Management (NPM) (Hood,
1991) has emerged. The New Public Management has been championed by scholars,
practitioners and even international organizations as the new manner in which public
management should be reformed and conducted. It is novel because it breaks with the
old and traditional assumptions and practices of the old bureaucratic paradigm.
According to Aucoin (1990), the theoretical underpinnings of NPM reform packages
are grounded in either public choice theory and managerialism or neo managerialism.
These two theoretical sources have applied certain administrative tools, such as
incentives or performance measurement, as requirements to improve public
administration delivery.

After a period of consolidation, evolution, and even decline, new public management
reform policies have been criticized or scrutinized by scholars from different parts of
the world, because of the consequences and theoretical assumptions that this model of
public management has rendered (Dent, et al., 2004; Box, 1999; Vigoda, 2002;
Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000; Frederickson, 1999; Lynn, 2006). In this context of
questioning, there are scholars that have even proposed a new model altogether, as in
the New Public Service championed by Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) or its death
3

and reemergence as the Digital-Era Governance (Dunleavy et al, 2006). In spite of
these different analyses and criticisms, the reality is that in many countries NPM
oriented policies are still being implemented.

Beyond the theoretical criticisms that one can have with regards to this new
administrative philosophy, it is still important to study the real impact and changes
that these reforms have yielded. The literature provides two different approaches to
address this issue. One approach to study the impact of these reforms is to focus on
the level of analysis. This literature deals with the impact of NPM reforms at the
organizational (Kelman, 2005), sector or area level (Dawson and Dargie, 2002) or
national level (OECD, 2005). The second approach to address the issue of the impact
of NPM-style reforms is to study the type of impact. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004)
provide four categories of impacts that they consider relevant to assess the relative
impact of these reforms: operational results, improvement of management and
decision making processes, capacity of the system, and attainment of a desired state
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004:104-105). The present study proposes to address the
impact of NPM reforms at the individual and organizational level, similar to the first
and second categories, proposing an exploratory study oriented to address the
potential erosion of public sector values among Chilean public employees, along with
the managerial modifications among public agencies, after a period of
implementation of NPM style reform policies. The erosion of values will be
addressed by conducting a survey to study the level of level of public service
4

motivation (PSM) (Perry and Wise, 1990;Perry, 1996, Perry, 1997; Perry, 2000) in a
sample of Chilean civil servants. This exploratory research will also try to study the
nuances among institutions in these matters. The justification for this study is that
NPM reform policies have brought to the public sector a set of ideas and assumptions
that are new to the “bureaucratic” mindset. These new ideas have had an impact in the
bureaucratic ethos, and particularly in the manner in which employees rationalize
their jobs. The second approach to address the implication of these reforms is the
recognition by key players of the actual managerial changes as an outcome of NPM
style reform implemented in Chile in the last 18 years or so.

The key element in this NPM mindset is the idea of extrinsic motivation, which is
linked to the Principal Agent Theory that is one of the main theoretical frameworks of
this new administrative doctrine. The majority of the reform packages have had, as a
key element, the application of rewards for those showing “good” performance,
which is consistent with the notions of extrinsic motivations and principal agent
theory. The use of incentives, in this context, implies a divorce with the Weberian
notion of technical expertise, professional ethics or vocation that is supposed to be the
driving force of public service employees. In this context, the rationale driving public
employees to perform in a particular way was not the incentive of a particular
incentive, but their obligation either to their fellow citizens or with their professional
standards. In the NPM mindset extrinsic motivation is a powerful driving force
behind any attempt to make employees comply.
5

Following Terry (1998), Box (1999) and Maeschack (2004), the problem is that these
theoretical assumptions necessarily have an impact in the way in which public
employees make decisions. Over-reliance in extrinsic motivation could jeopardize the
distinctive features of the public sector and potentially could leave room for unethical
decisions (OECD, 2005). That is why this study is important, because it tries to
address in an exploratory fashion the negative effects that this new paradigm could
eventually engender. Yet, is this a pure theoretical undertaking or not? A few
incidents occurred in Chile in late 2005 that might help evaluate this issue. Two
postmen were involved separately in acts that showed a clear break with the
traditional values championed to public service advocates. In one case, the postman
threw a bag of letters and packages on a hill in Valparaíso. On the other case, a
postman burned letter in his house. After an internal investigation undertaken by top
officials of the Chilean Post office, the reason for doing those unreasonable acts were
to meet the goals they were committed to achieve in order to obtain performance
based bonuses. Top managers were laid off of the company because they had instilled
an ill conceived structure of incentives that engendered this lack of commitment to
the needs of citizens in need of receiving and sending letters.
1

In this context of potential erosion of public sector values, it is important to test
whether or not, even with all these new doctrines, the core values of the public sector

1
For more information go to
http://www.lanacion.cl/prontus_noticias/site/artic/20061003/pags/20061003165846.html accessed
february 2009.
6

activity are still observed by public employees. PSM is mainly oriented towards
intrinsic motivation, so how come public sector reform policies can be designed
accordingly? What are the motivations that should prevail? A study like this could
help in explaining the real consequences at the individual level of the “privatization
process” that has been witnessed by the State, and whether or not core values of the
public sector are jeopardized.

The Chilean case also justifies the study’s pertinence. Chile has faced one of the most
radical changes in its State, due to the period of structural changes undertaken during
the dictatorship that ruled from 1973 to 1990, and to the modernization process that
the State endured during the following seventeen years. It is in this period (1990 –
2008) that public sector reform policies have been implemented steadily. The analysis
of those policies shows us that the majority of them have been inspired by the NPM
philosophy. The example presented previously shows that the outcome of these
reforms may not be the one that policy makers and citizens were expecting. It may be
just an isolated case in a fairly successful reform process. However, other corruption
scandals that occurred in 2004 and 2006 are starting to show a potential threat in the
normal functioning on a state that it is proud to be one of the less corrupted in the
world (Transparency International, 2006). Yet, the study of the connection between
NPM doctrines and corruption is far from the scope of this exploratory study.
However, the episodes of corruption may be explained by the erosion of PSM among
public employees, which rely too much on extrinsic motivation.
7

The structure of this dissertation is the following. Chapter 2 analyzes the origin and
context where New Public Management emerged, providing specific insights
regarding what has happened in Latin America. On Chapter 3, the underpinnings of
New Public Management are developed, stressing the major sources of ideas that
were combined to create this new administrative philosophy. Chapter 4 is a
description of the Chilean case in particular. The key element of this chapter is an
argument regarding whether or not the New Public Management program has been
implemented in Chile in the period 1990 – 2008. Chapter 5 provides the theoretical
foundations and proposition to the address the object of study of this dissertation. The
methodological aspects of the research design are presented in Chapter 6. The results
of the Public Service Motivation Survey and the Interviews that deal with change in
managerial practices are presented in Chapter 7. On Chapter 8, conclusions and
comments regarding the topic of this dissertation are presented, along with a list of
suggestions for further research to increase our understanding of this disciplinary
field.

8

Chapter 2: Public sector reform and the NPM movement
2. a. The NPM movement

The New Public Management is part of a broad theoretical discussion dealing with
how the public sector changes according to the requirements yielded by societies.
Caiden (1991a) proposes that reform in the public sector is “the induced systemic
improvement of public sector operational performance” (1). Taking into account his
definition, it is possible to say that public sector reform does not pertain to any
specific historic period or ideological framework, because it can be present in any
time period. The conceptualization of a rational form of administration of public
affairs ( proposed by Weber at the end of the nineteen century – “the bureaucratic
paradigm”) calls for a separation between politics and administration posed by
Wilson (1887). The emergence of the so called New Public Administration during the
1960s or the development of a “governance” perspective (Kooiman, 2003), can all be
seen as major efforts to reform or at least to challenge the ideas and notions then
broadly accepted in those days regarding public administration. In spite of the
apparent omnipresence of reform in the public sector, it is possible to make
distinctions between different moments in which reform processes have been
implemented. In this study, the focus of analysis will be the reform process carried
out mostly in developed world in the early 1980s and then propagated to the rest of
the world. According to Pollit and Bouckaert (2004), “the changes since 1980 have –
9

in many countries- been distinguished by an international character and a degree of
political salience that mark them out from the more parochial or technical changes on
the preceding quarter century’ (Pollit and Bouckaert, 2004:24). Public sector reform
in this period keeps the core notion of reform in the public sector, but it also adds
some components.

The reasons behind this wave of reforms in countries as varied as the US, New
Zealand, India, Brazil, Chile, and so on, are very diverse and in most cases are linked
to particular political processes in those countries. However, some common
justifications have been brought up by scholars (Christensen and Laegrid, 2001; Kettl,
2000; Zifcak, 1994; Aucoin, 1995). For instance, according to Aucoin (1990) public
sector reforms have been triggered by: a new economic role of governments in a new
global economy, and due to demands for government services and regulations. In
Latin America, the movement is part of the so-called “second generation wave of
reform,” which took place after the implementation of the “Washington Consensus”
2
.

Pollit and Bouckaert (2004;25) developed a model of public management reform that
tries to encompass all the factors at the moment of explaining a particular public
sector reform process. This model can be applied to different contexts and in different
moments. This model includes socio-economic forces (such as global economic
forces, sociodemographic change, socio- economic policies), characteristics of the

2
This topic will be developed with more detail at the end of this dissertation.
10

political system, unpredictable events, the characteristics of the decision making
process of the elite, and the characteristics of the administrative system.

Figure 1: A Model of Public Management Reform (Pollit and Bouckaert, 2004:25)
B.
Global economic
forces
D.
Socio-economic
policies
F.
New
management
ideas
G.
Pressure
from citizens
H.
Party political
ideas
C.
Sociodemographic
change

A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORCES

E. POLITICAL SYSTEM
J. ELITE DECISION MAKING
What is
(a) desirable?
(b) feasible?
Global economic forces
I. Chance events,
e.g. scandals,
disasters
L. Content of reform package
M. Implementation process
N. Results achieved
K. Administrative System
11

2.b. Main characteristics of NPM as an administrative philosophy
3

According to Hood (1991) the changes undertaken since the 1980s created a new
administrative philosophy or a new paradigm that entailed a distinctive approach to
public management. He coined the notion of New Public Management and since then
it has been broadly accepted as the appropriate term for changes in this realm
4
. From
the perspective of public management reform policies, NPM has been the source of
ideas for designing and implementing new practices and processes in public
management. According to Minogue et al (1998) “the overall objective, central to
NPM reforms, is to make working practices more efficient, and to obtain ‘value for
money’ by using organizational and managerial changes to obtain a more efficient use
of resources” (27).

A brief point has to be made at this stage. The idea that NPM is a broadly accepted
term does not mean that it is a single and homogeneous framework (Hood, 1995;
Ferlie et al, 1996; Peters, 1996; Flynn, 2002). There is variance among countries. This
is related to the fact that bureaucracy was not a single and homogeneous phenomenon
either. For instance, there were many differences among bureaucracies in developing
and developed countries. However, the notion of bureaucracy was fully adopted
throughout the world and the differences did not jeopardize the use of the term. This

3
The notion of administrative philosophy is adopted from Hood and Jackson (1991).

4
There are other terms, like The Neo-Weberian State (Pollit and Bouckaert, 2004), which try to
highlight some nuances in the administrative reform process. However, the power of NPM has
overridden other concepts.
12

reflects what happened with the adoption of NPM. In spite of the differences and
complexities in the process of changes, the idea of NPM has been adopted as the
designated term to dub this new trend in public management reform.
5

The debate about the particular characteristics of NPM has been very diverse in
perspectives and approaches. The following table provides different characterizations
of NPM:

5
Ferlie et at (1996) recognizes four different models of new public management oriented reforms.

Table 1: Definitions of NPM
Hood (1991) Minogue et al
(1998;18)
Toonen (2001;185) Schedler and Proeller
(2002:165)
Newman (2002:82-87)
- Greater
disaggregation
- Enhanced
competition
- The use of
management
practices drawn
from the private
sector
- Greater stress on
discipline and
parsimony in
resource use
- Move towards
more hands-on
management
- A concern for
more explicit and
measurable
standards of
performance
- Attempts to control
according to pre-set
output measures.

- A separation of
strategic policy
from operational
management.
- A concern with
results rather than
process.
- An orientation to
the needs of
customers rather
than those of
bureaucratic
organizations.
- A withdrawal
from direct
provision in favor
of a steering or
enabling role.
- A transformed
bureaucratic
culture.

- A business-oriented approach to
government
- A quality and performance
oriented approach to public
management
- An emphasis on improved public
service delivery and functional
responsiveness
- An institutional separation of
public demand functions (councils,
citizens’ charters), public provision
(public management boards) and
public service production functions
(back offices, outsourcing,
agencification, privatization).
- A linkage of public demand,
provision, and supply units by
transactional devices (performance
management, internal contract
management, corporatization,
intergovernmental covenanting and
contracting, contracting out) and
quality management
- Whenever possible, the retreat of
(bureaucratic) government
institutions in favor of an
intelligent use of markets and
commercial market enterprises
(deregulation, privatization,
commercialization, and
marketization) or virtual markets
(internal competition,
benchmarking, competitive
tendering).

- Organizational
restructuring: delegation
of responsibility, reduction
of hierarchy, and political
and managerial roles.
- Management
instruments: Output
orientation,
entrepreneurship, and
efficiency.
- Budgetary reforms:
closer to private sector
financial instruments.
- Participation:
Involvement of the citizen
- Customer orientation and
quality management: gain
legitimacy in service
delivery, and re-
engineering.
- Marketization and
Privatization: reduction of
public sector, and
efficiency gains through
competition.
Strategic decision making:
- Organizational goals (survival and success of
this organization)
- Partnerships developed where these can
contribute to the realization of organizational
goals; organizational strategy not influenced by
partners
- Accountable for organizational performance
policy
- Evaluated through performance indicators and
league tables which indicate the performance of
the individual organization
Power and control:
- ‘Hands off’ control through contracts and
framework documents
- High levels of devolution to managers
- Competition used to drive up performance
- Privatization where performance does not meet
required standards
- Universal incentives and levers of control
Relation with the public:
- Managers free to make decisions within the
legislative and policy frameworks set by
politicians
- Organizations designed to deliver efficiency
through structures linking common function or
forms of professional expertise
- Strong organizational boundaries, weak
networks
- Relation with consumers governed through
limited mechanisms (e.g. complaints procedures,
market research)
- Relations with the public governed through the
(weakened) institutions or representative
democracy.
13
14

Regardless of the positive and negative outcomes of implementing NPM style
reforms, it is impossible to disregard the extensive influence private management
exerts in this process. These changes are far more complex than a simple shift in
public management procedures. The notions ingrained in this new perspective could
imply outcomes that are not explicit nowadays. For instance, what will be the
outcome of contracting out and privatization in some key areas such as social
services, health, and defense? Beyond the type of changes and their potential
outcomes, one of the most relevant and controversial issues in public organizations -
due to the implementation of NPM reforms, is the adoption of incentives, which has
been broadly adopted in private management. Most of the reform processes
implemented in several countries have included the implementation of incentives
6
.

2.c. NPM reform in Latin America:

Before analyzing the characteristics of the NPM movement in Latin America, it is
important to provide a brief characterization of the State prior to the reform processes
carried out during the 1980s. According to Cavarozzi (1992), the political and
economic organization of Latin America starting in 1930 up until the reforms of the
1970s and 80s is the so-called “state centered matrix” (SCM). This axis of

6
For instance, in the US incentives were implemented in the late seventies and early eighties (Condrey
and Brudney, 1992). A pair of strong incentive supporters is Osborne and Gabler (1992 and 1997). In
Pollit and Bouckaert (2004) it is included a brief report of public sector reforms in several countries,
most of them OECD countries. Another source of information in this case is the OECD web page, with
articles such as the one by David Marsden (2003).
15

organization had an economic and a political dimension. The economic dimension is
called Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI):

ISI involved a process of state-led resource allocation, using high tariffs walls,
to stimulate local manufacturing. Policymakers combined industrial
promotion with programs of limited redistribution, creating a market
accessible to urban workers and to a burgeoning middle class, a large
proportion of which worked for the state. Local private firms benefited from
cheap inputs, such as energy, steel, transportation, and communication
services, provided at below-cost prices by subsidized, overstaffed state-owned
enterprises (Armijo and Faucher, 2002:2).

The political dimension of the SCM according to Cavarozzi (1992) was linked to two
relationships: the state and the market, and the state and civil society. The political
dimension of the SCM expressed in the bond between the state and the market refers
to the state’s political regulation of the normal functioning of the economy. “Political
regulation of the economy and, more specifically, of capital flow was functional for
growth, it helped to generate investment capital, to create dynamic externalities, and
to impose limits on the sometimes predatory and collectively dysfunctional behaviour
of the individual firms.” (Cavarozzi, 1992:671). The other political dimension of the
SCM was the relationship between civil society and the state. In this context, the
promotion of social participation - particularly via unions and political parties -
expanded the civil society domain although with an important level of restrictions and
control by the political elite. “It also involved (1) the creation of corporativistic and
quasi-corporativistic channels linked to public organisations, political parties,
professional associations, and unions, and (2) the emergence of direct linkages
between national political leaders and the popular masses.” (Cavarozzi, 1992:673).
16

The State in Latin America was a very active and present actor in almost every area
of the society. Yet, this intense participation of the state in political and economic
terms was not the main problem for Latin American societies in the greater part of the
19
th
century. The major problem of the state in this region of the world, and hence the
main objective of public sector reform in Latin America, was to overcome
patrimonialism in the state and to create a professional public body (Bresser-Pereira,
2001). It is what Cunill (1999) claims as the real model of bureaucracy in Latin
America or what Castañeda called “the nature” of the State in Latin America
(Castañeda, 1993). This model of bureaucracy, and for extension of the state as a
whole, was tainted by the intent to keep control of the decision-making process and
institutions of the State in the hands of the political elite. This model of state enabled
the private appropriation of the State and the reduced accountability of the political
elite. The promise of separation between politics and administration as prescribed by
the bureaucratic movement was not totally fulfilled (Ramio, 2001; O`Donnel, 2004;
Gascó, 2004). This problem is not a lack of understanding or comprehension of the
traditional model of bureaucracy, because, supposedly, the bureaucratic apparatus is
ruled by bureaucratic norms. “As a matter of fact, in reality, in Latin America, only
rules and formal procedures have followed the weberian requisites while real
procedures and values keep being prebureaucratic or patrimonial” (Gascó, 2004:4). In
theory, the traditional public sector reform towards a professional state was adopted
during the 20
th
century in Latin America, but the gap between theory and practice was
17

significant: a State dominated by patrimonialism and a SCM was the environment in
which the structural reforms took place.
Public sector reform in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, according to Kliksberg
(2005) had a basic pattern of “transforming the existing state, which was
characterized as ‘obese’, ‘omnipotent’ and ‘intervening’, into a ‘minimal state’”(309).
This trend was followed during the 80s by the majority of non-democratic regimes,
and during the 90s by the rest of the subcontinent. Advocated by international
economic organizations such as the IMF, it was part of the implementation of the so-
called “Washington Consensus”. The consequences of these reforms were different
than those expected (Kliksberg, 2005; Stiglitz, 2003; Przeworski, 1991). The social
costs are still a matter of debate among supporters and followers of the so called “first
generation of reforms”.
7

In this context of a state undergoing a period of transition, the NPM movement was
seen as a new source of ideas to address the problems the state was suffering.
According to Bresser-Pereira (2001)
8
the implementation of NPM style reforms was
not part of the original plan laid out by international organizations. In fact, the main
concern of the “Washington Consensus”- oriented policies was trying to influence
was the structure of the society itself, and particularly the role of the state in the

7
Armijo and Faucher (2002) and Remmer (1998) proposes hypothesis regarding why these supposedly
unpopular policies were still implemented and even improved by political and economic elites in Latin
America.

8
Bresser-Pererira is a key scholar and practitioner in this domain. He was Finance Minister and
Minister of Federal Administration and Reform of the State. His ideas regarding public sector reform
in Latin America are not only from someone studying these issues, but also as a senior civil servant
playing a key role during this time.
18

economy. Contrary to what happened in countries like the United Kingdom, New
Zealand, Australia and Canada, NPM style reform policies appeared in the 1990s,
after major reforms took place. NPM reforms were part of the so called second wave
of reforms in Latin America (Naim, 1994). Table 2 presents a comparison between
stage I and stage II or first and second wave of reforms in Latin America.

Table 2: Two Stages of Economic Liberalization (Naim, 1994:36)
Stage I Stage II
Priorities Reduce Inflation – Restore growth Improve social conditions – Increase
international competitiveness – Maintain
macroeconomic stability
Reform Strategy Change macroeconomic rules –
Reduce size and scope of state –
Dismantle institutions of
protectionism and statism
Create and rehabilitate institutions –
Boost competitiveness of private sector
– Reform production, financing, and
delivery of health care, education, and
other public services – Create
“economic institutions of capitalism” –
Build new international economic
insertion”
Typical Instruments Drastic budget cuts and tax reform
– Price liberalization – Trade and
foreign investment liberalization –
Private-sector deregulation –
Creation of social “emergency
funds” bypassing social ministries –
“Easier” privatizations
Reform of labor legislation and practices
– Civil-Service reform – Restructuring
of government, esp. social ministries –
Overhaul of administration of justice –
Upgrade of regulatory capacities –
Improvement of tax collection capacities
– Sectoral conversion and restructuring
– “Complex” privatizations – Building
of export-promotion capacities –
Restructuring of relations between states
and federal government
Principal Actors Presidency – Economic cabinet –
Central Banks – World Bank and
IMF – Private financial groups and
foreign investors
Presidency and cabinet – Congress –
Public bureaucracy – Judiciary – Unions
– Political parties – Media – State and
local governments – Private sector
Public Impact of
Reforms
Immediate – High Public visibility Medium and long term – Low public
visibility
Administrative
Complexity of
Reforms
Moderate to low Very high
Nature of Political
Costs
“Temporary corrections” widely
distributed among the population
Permanent elimination of special
advantages for specific groups
Main Governmental
Challenge
Macroeconomic management by
insulated technocratic elites
Institutional development highly
dependent of midlevel public sector
management

19

Bresser-Pereira (2001) and Naím (1994) both agree that public sector reforms,
oriented towards civil service and particularly towards the manner in which public
administration worked, were part of the second stage after the “shock” reforms of the
1980s. Once the structure was established, NPM style reforms came to the forefront
to address (or at least intend to) issues of efficiency and effectiveness at the
organizational level. This was the context in which public management reform
policies were implemented.

20

Chapter 3: Theoretical basis of NPM style reforms
3.a. Theories framing NPM-style reform policies

There is no conclusive approach with regards to specifically clarifying the theoretical
background of NPM. Authors such as Aucoin (1990), Lynn (2006) or Lane (2000;
2005), among others, present a number of theories. In this dissertation, the three most
representative will be developed: Managerialism (or Neo Managerialism), Public
Choice and the New Economics of Organization.
3.a.i. Managerialism:

The first source of ideas is managerialism. Managerialism
9
or neomanagerialism
refers to the idea that organizations, both public and private, should change the way
they have been managed toward a new and more dynamic fashion. “It is a set of
beliefs and practices, at the core of which burns the seldom-tested assumption that
better management will prove an effective solvent for a wide range of economic and
social ills” (Pollitt, 1990:1). During the 80s, there was a boom in the managerial
literature - in the practitioner and academic milieu. Most of this literature was
oriented to show the need for change in the traditional approach in management to a
more dynamic notion of organizations and management. One of the most important
examples of this phenomenon was In search of Excellence by Peters and Waterman

9
Dibben and Higgins (2004) propose, along with the notion of managerialism the ideas of
marketization and consumerism, which for purposes of this research proposal will not be developed.
However, further analysis will be needed to understand the implications of these concepts.
21

(1982). This new vision assumes that “the complexities of modern complex
organizations to realize their objectives can be enhanced by management structures
and practices with debureaucratized organizational systems” (Aucoin, 1990:117). In
the case of the public sector, the idea that bureaucracies were not performing well
implied a shift towards adopting business-like measures to improve the performance
of public bureaucracies. This shift entailed change, not only in practices, but also in
language, because we move from the idea of public administration to the notion of
public management (Bozeman, 1993). Clarke and Newman (1997) claim that the
application of managerial ideas from the private sector in the public sector was not
only a technical matter. They claim that in adopting these new practices, private
management is viewed as more legitimate than ideas such as bureaucracy, politicians
and administration. This contrast is depicted in Table 3. In an environment where
private organizations were in better shape than public ones, the adoption of this new
managerial approach can be deemed as logical.
22

Table 3: Legitimating Managerialism (source Clarke and Newman, 1997: 65)
Bureaucracy is: Management is:
Rule bound Innovative
Inward looking Externally oriented
Compliance centered Performance oriented
Ossified Dynamic
Professionalism is: Management is:
Paternalist Customer oriented
Mystique ridden Transparent
Standard oriented Results oriented
Self-regulating Market tested
Politicians are: Managers are:
Dogmatic Pragmatic
Interfering Enabling
Unstable Strategic

In this context, managerialism is seen as an ideology with particular ways of
understanding reality, which is totally accepted not only in the private but in the
public sector. Pollitt (1990:2-3) presents a list of five main features that can be
pointed out as the “specific beliefs” of this ideology:

The main route to social progress now lies through the achievement of
continuing increases in economically defined productivity.
Such productivity increases will mainly come from the application of ever-
more-sophisticated technologies.
The application of these technologies can only be achieved with a labour force
‘disciplined in accordance with the productivity ideal’ (Alvesson, 1987:158).
‘Management’ is a separate and distinct organizational function and one that
plays the crucial role in planning, implementing and measuring the necessary
improvements in productivity.
To perfom this crucial role managers must be granted reasonable ‘room for
manouvre’ (i.e. the ‘right to manage’). (Pollit, 1990:2-3)

These ideologies are at the core of any discussion about reform organizations, not
only in the private sector, but also in the public sector. The NPM is devoted to this
way of understanding the new evolution of managerial thinking.
23

3.a.ii. Public Choice:

The second group of theories that explain NPM is Public choice. Public choice theory
is usually associated with the emergence of the New Right. The arrival of Thatcher as
a Prime Minister of England and of Reagan as the President of the United States
brought new ideas to old problems of the political system,. Both had a very powerful
free market discourse, along with a very conservative bias in moral and cultural
issues. In some sense they were the political face of a movement initiated in the 1950s
by Downs, Olson, and continued by Niskanen, Tullock, and others. These scholars
tried to apply the assumptions of economics to the political arena. The widely cited
allegation of President Reagan claiming that the government is not the solution “but
the problem” reflects this new approach toward bureaucrats. In the same vein,
Thatcher, at the outset of her period as Prime Minister, appointed some industrialists
to major political positions, showing that bureaucrats did not have the monopoly of
decision-making in government, and also raising the issue of performance
improvement.

Public choice scholars tackle the traditional approach rooted in the notion that
altruistic bureaucrats were the founding stones of public agencies. Among those
leading this trend was Anthony Downs. Downs’ theory developed in Inside
Bureaucracy depicts new types of bureaucrats. He challenges the notion developed
mainly by sociologists and political scientists, which presents bureaucrats as “heroic”
24

individuals. On the contrary, Downs developed a theory grounded in two
components: that bureaucrats are utility maximizers and that they have different goals
to pursue (1967;2). Bearing in mind these two elements, he defined the existence of
five types of bureaucrats each one of them trying to maximize a particular goal, those
types being climbers, conservers, zealots, advocates, and statemen (Downs, 1967:88).
The first two types are grounded in the notion of self interest, while the rest pursue
some type of altruism or societal concern as their goal.

Although many officials serve the public interest as they perceive it, it does
not necessarily follow that they are privately motivated solely or even mainly
by a desire to serve the public interest per se. If society has created the proper
institutional arrangements, their private motives will lead them to act in what
they believe to be the public interest, even though these motives, like
everyone else’s, are partly rooted in their own self-interest. Therefore,
whether or not the public interest will in fact be served depends upon how
efficiently social institutions are designed to achieve that purpose. Society
cannot insure that it will be served merely by assigning someone to serve it.
(Downs, 1967: 87)

Although radical in some of his assumptions, Downs left room within the
bureaucratic structure for those individuals with some kind of concern for the rest of
humanity. He did not fully reject the traditional approach, and recognized that
bureaucrats are not a homogeneous social group. According to Downs, when we talk
about bureaucrats, we are merely talking about different types of individuals working
in the public sector.

Some of Downs’ assumptions lay the groundwork for William Niskanen, another
distinguished scholar in this stream of thought. He adopts a different approach using a
25

fairly similar set of assumptions - bureaucrats are not different within the public
sector, and they all have the same natural inclination of self interest maximization. He
criticizes those traditional scholars who claim bureaucrats are community oriented.

Most of the literature from Confucius to Weber, proceeds from an organic
concept of the state, that is, a concept of a state for which the preferences of
individuals are subordinate to certain goals of the state. Starting from the
premise that the personal preferences of the general population are
subordinate or irrelevant, this literature does not recognize the relevance of the
personal preferences of the bureaucrats. (Niskanen, 1971;4-5)

The picture Niskanen is proposing has several implications for the study of public
bureaucracies. First, it challenges the traditional notion of authority; second, it raises
concerns regarding the real motivations of public employees. Niskanen jeopardizes
the very notion of authority in the public sector. As previously mentioned in the
context of the traditional approach, the politics - administration dichotomy delineates
clear boundaries of authority within the State. Politicians were those selected by the
population to define the goals and objectives to be pursued by bureaucrats. Once
those goals were defined, bureaucrats were responsible for applying those decisions
and for making the administrative arrangements to achieve those goals. In this
context, the authority structure was unambigouos, but with the new perspective
presented by Niskanen, the structure started to fall apart. Assuming bureaucrats have
a particular set of preferences, they will behave according to those preferences. In
some occasions politicians and bureaucrats share the same set of objectives and no
problem should emerge; however, in some cases, bureaucrats have different goals
than those pursed by politicians. In this case, the line of authority is endangered to the
26

extent that bureaucrats could reject some decisions made by politicians and take
advantage of the privileged position they have.

Public Choice approach has been analyzed and criticized by many authors (Udehn,
1996), even those in the public administration realm (Terry, 1998; Lynn, 2001). In
spite of these criticisms, it seems important to recognize that Public Choice theorists
defy an almost sacred notion that public administrators have no other motivation than
that of the well-being of the community and the fulfillment of societal values. Public
choice theorists challenge this notion and question the real rationale of bureaucrats
while making decisions. The NPM paradigm adopts this idea, and builds its
recommendations and prescriptions around these notions.

3.a.iii. New Economics of organization:

This school of thought is a reaction to the neoclassical approach that lacked a real
understanding of organizations. According to Moe (1984), this new approach can be
summarized in three elements: “a contractual perspective on organizational
relationships, a focus on hierarchical control, and formal analysis via principal-agent
models” (739). Organizations - and bureaucracies of course, - are understood as
contracts deployed to achieve different objectives. The problem is that, due to the
characteristics of the exchange, there are disagreements regarding information
asymmetry among the actors involved in the exchange (Macho-Stadler, Perez-
27

Castrillo et al., 2001). The most important problems of information asymmetries are
moral hazard and adverse selection.

Principal Agent Theory:

The Principal Agent Theory or Framework is the widely used formal approach to
address the problems of information asymmetry. This theory takes into account the
following elements: a principal, an agent, their relationship, and a problem of
information asymmetry. This theory tries to tackle the problem of potential
mismatched interests between those of the principal and those of the agent. “The
principal concern is how the principal can best motivate the agent to perform as the
principal would prefer, taking into account the difficulties in monitoring the agent’s
activities” (Sappington, 1991;45) According to this theory, in order to obtain a certain
outcome, both parties (the principal and the agent) have to agree to a contract or
agreement. The principal can obtain a certain outcome; the agent a compensation for
doing something that yield the principal’s desired outcome. Lane proposes that in an
ideal contract ‘one party instructed another party to work to his/her benefit and
received compensation’ (Lane, 2000; 46)

In order to reach a perfect agreement, the contract must hold at least four
assumptions: the same information is provided to both parties before the agreement,
the agent must be risk neutral, there is no cost in enforcing the terms of the
28

agreement, and the possibility of open observation of the agent’s activities
(Sappington, 1991) All these assumptions are hardly present in most of the contracts
for easing the principal agent main problem. Particularly important are the
asymmetries of information between the principal and the agent. The problems of
adverse selection and moral hazard are usually problems that thwart the ideal
agreement.
10

The Principal Agent Framework has been widely used in the private sector due to
possibilities and conditions that the sector has to apply this model (Laffont and
Martimort, 2002). For instance, in any contract carried out in the private sector, the
agent has a clear principal, the criterion of profit is defined as the key objective
pursued by principal and agents, among other reasons, however, in the public sector
these conditions do not necessary hold. Problems such as the definition of the
principal, the element that should be maximized, and the clarification of the agent are
a few examples of the questions that arise when the PAF is applied in the public
sector (Lane, 2005:29). For instance, one of the key problems in using the PAF is the
characteristics of the activities undertaken by public agencies, particularly what
Wilson (1989) refers to as “the unobservable trait” of outputs and/or outcomes in
many public agencies. This leads to the problem of moral hazard. “The problem is
that the principal is often unable to observe that actions taken by the agent, and
consequently has to base his evaluation of the agent’s contract performance on the

10
Adverse selection refers to information before the agreement, such as the real skills of the agent, and
moral hazard is the actions undertaken by the agent after the contract is agreed.
29

results of those actions” (Lane, 2000;47). In craft, procedural, and coping agencies,
there are either outcomes or outputs (or both) that are impossible or very difficult to
observe. Public sector’s particular characteristics lead to what Lane (2005) dubs as
“the agency problem in a bureaucracy.” It addresses “how to motivate the agent A to
work for the principal P in an efficient manner given the institutional constraints in
place (47).

In spite of the difficulties the literature presents with regards to the application of this
theoretical model, the PAF is one of the most widely used theoretical backgrounds in
the NPM literature, which could be due to the extensive use of contracts in public
agencies, both within the agency and with external actors.

Transaction Costs Theory:

The other stream of literature under the New Economics of Organization is the
Transaction Costs Theory (Williamson, 1975;1979;1988;2000;1999;2002). The main
purpose of this theory is to compare different governance arrangements in terms of
their efficiency according to the characteristics of the transaction involved.
Individuals involved in these transactions have special characteristics: they are
bounded rational, and opportunistic. Because of this, he encourages “organiz[ing]
economic activity so as to economize on bounded rationality while simultaneously
safeguarding the transactions in question against the hazards of opportunism”
30

(Williamson, 1988;68). Therefore, organizations should be tailored to diminish the
costs of being involved in a particular transaction.

Williamson proposes different types of governance structures or arrangements. The
definition of the most appropriate governance structure is “the institutional
framework within which the integrity of a transaction is decided” (Williamson,
1979:235). This governance structure is intended to “craft order, thereby to mitigate
conflict and realize mutual gains” (Williamson, 2000:599). In his opinion, firms,
hierarchies and hybrid organizations should be examined to find the most
appropriate governance structure for the particular transaction being analyzed. In
some cases, hierarchies are more appropriate as means to reduce transactions; in
other cases, firms are more acceptable. For instance, hierarchies tend to be used
when transactions require important administrative controls so that the transaction is
carried out. On the other hand, when intensive use of incentives make a more
efficient activity, market governance structures are more suitable.
The key criterion to assess current governance structures is the so-called
“remediableness criterion”. According to this criterion, an extant mode of
organization or governance “for which no superior feasible alternative can be
described and implemented with expected net gains is presumed to be more
efficient” (Williamson, 1999:316). This criterion can be rebutted if the origin of the
organization or its development is tainted by vicious or authoritarian practices. In
31

those cases, the extant organization cannot be assumed to be more efficient, and
comparison can be appropriate.

The key element of this theory relies on the fact that any activity can be subjected to
this analysis regarding what type of governance structure is more suitable for a given
activity. In so doing, the debate regarding the boundaries of the public sector is not
one oriented to the objectives of the state; rather, it is a matter of governance
arrangements, particularly with respect to how efficient a particular governance
structure might be. Therefore, the door for privatization and all new modes of
governance, particularly championed by NPM supporters, is wide open.

3.b. Incentives: Where Managerialism, Public Choice and The New Economics of the
Organization meet

In the NPM literature, the notion of incentives has achieved a relevant position due to
the fact that it is in this administrative tool where the three theoretical backgrounds of
this new paradigm meet. For Managerialism, incentive is a tool related to the need of
acknowledging the motivations of employees. For Public Choice theorists, incentives
are means to punish or reward, via an extrinsic mechanism, utility-maximizing
bureaucrats. For the economics of organization, incentives are the appropriate tools
for aligning the interest of the principal with the actions of the agents. According to
Miller and Whitford (2007), “even in hierarchical institutions, much of the work of
32

controlling subordinate behavior can be left to the subordinate’s self-interest, guided
by the correct incentives; the expense and moral ambiguity of monitoring, rule
making, and coercion can be largely avoided” (214).

The central justification of incentives rests in the idea that someone expects to receive
something for completing a particular action. ‘The idea is that the best way to get
something done is to provide a reward to people when they act the way we want them
to’ (Kohn,1993:3). Incentives are a broadly accepted tool for changing or shaping the
way people behave. In organizations, incentives have been used to reward and punish
the performance of employees. By using incentives, managers exert control in
organizations. It is widely recognized that there are different types of incentives
11

(Clark and Wilson, 1961; Wilson, 1995). The NPM philosophy usually focuses on
monetary incentives as the means to reward a particular action. The literature poses
the existence of two types of these incentives: high and low powered incentives.
12

The idea of incentives in the management literature is closely related to performance-
based payment systems, as well as merit pay systems. They have been present in the
academic and practitioner debate of how to manage organizations since the beginning
of scientific management. Two examples can be useful to highlight this point, one

11
According to Clark and Wilson (1961) there are three broad types of incentives: material, solidary
and purposive. A refinement of this approach is presented in Wilson (1995) where four types of
incentives are recognized: material incentives, specific solidary incentives, collective solidary
incentives, and purposive incentives (33-34).

12
“High-powered incentives are those provided by market transactions, in which efficiency gains from
a particular transaction flow directly to the parties transacting. In hierarchies (organizations), on the
other hand, incentives are low powered.” (Frant, 1996:367)
33

from the practitioner side and the other from the academic side show that incentives
have been present in the mind of those interested in these issues for a long time.
Henry Ford in 1914 thought that increasing the daily wage of his employees could
yield an increase in productivity (Meyer, 1981 quoted in Miller, 1992:1). On the
academic side, Simon in his classic Administrative Behavior claims incentives are
highly relevant for employee participation, which promote more employee
involvement with their work in the organization (1947:115).

According to Miller (1992) there are two groups or streams of literature about control
in organizations. These two groups have a particular view about the role of incentives
in organizations. He proposes that the first group “views organizational control as a
mechanistic problem of designing incentive systems and sanctions so that self-
interested and intrinsically unmotivated employees will find it in their own interest to
work toward the organization’s goals” (1). In this group one could include all the
traditional scientific management approaches in organizations and the recent
Principal Agent Theory. On the other hand, one could include a more managerial
approach. He includes in this stream “the literature regards the manager’s primary job
to be one of leadership – that is, inspiring a willingness to cooperate, to take risks, to
innovate, to go beyond the level of effort that a narrow, self-interested analysis of the
incentives would summon” (2).

34

In the first stream of literature, the main concern is how to design an incentive system
that rewards those behaving properly and punishes those not aligned with managers’
interests. From the point of view of the expectancy theory, incentives play a major
role in organizations’ performance. Scholars in this stream of literature suggest that
“people choose their behavior (efforts levels, persistence) based on their perceptions
of whether the behavior is likely to lead to valued outcomes” (Mitchell, 1997:82). It is
interesting to mention that when thinking about motivation in organizations, there are
some scholars that believe that the types of incentives that motivate public employees
are different than those of the private sector
13
. For instance, Perry and Porter (1982)
claim that “there is some indication that individuals entering the public sector value
economic wealth to a lesser degree than do entrants to the profit sector” (94). This
element is important to consider because it could help us in explaining why public
sector employees are less concerned with monetary incentives than those working in
the private sector.

In the second stream, incentives are seen from quite a different perspective. They are
understood as mechanisms for enabling cooperation among workers. In some sense
this literature tries to redefine the very notion of incentives, stressing the potential
positive externalities of defining incentives in a particular organization. Despite this,
both streams of inquiry agree on the causal relationship between incentives and
behavioral change.

13
“There is some indication that individuals entering the public sector value economic wealth to a
lesser degree than do entrants to the profit sector” (Perry and Porter, 1982:94)
35

Special attention should be placed in three authors - Skinner, Vroom and Lawler
14
-
that have developed the idea of incentives as a fundamental force for shaping
behaviors,. Skinner is the leader of the behaviorist school, which suggests that
individuals behave according to external reinforcements. People behave as long as
reinforcements are in place, but once they are removed “the behavior that was
receiving the reinforcement tends to cease” (Patten, 1977: 143). Consequently, if
incentives are allocated to reward one particular behavior, individuals will tend to
behave accordingly while the incentives are in place. Vroom (1964) develops a
theory of motivation grounded in two sets of concepts: first and second level
outcomes, and valence and instrumentality. The first set refers to the idea that
individuals try to fulfill first level outcomes as long as they help in obtaining the
fulfillment of second level outcomes.
15
Valence is defined as “the strength of an
individual’s affect or desire for a particular outcome” (Patten, 1977:134) and
instrumentality refers to “the person’s perception of how a first level outcome leads to
the realization of second level outcome” (Patten, 1977:135). In this context,
incentives are justified, or acquire “valence” insofar as they help in achieving second
level outcomes or purposes. Lawler
16
includes the idea of incentives as part of the
evolution of organizations. He claims that the “traditional or bureaucratic approach”

14
Undoubtedly, the work of these scholars is abundant being impossible to cover in depth their
theories. Only some elements useful for a better understanding of this dissertation proposal will be
included.

15
Mitchell (1997) points out that first level outcome are things like performance, and second level
outcome are things like pay or promotions. (83)

16
The original work of these authors can be found in Porter and Lawler (1968) and Lawler (1971).
36

(Lawler, 1990:6) implied a notion of hierarchy where each member played a specific
role. In this context incentives were not required to improve performance, so as the
idea of organizations evolves into a more flexible conception, incentives begin to play
a role. “Reward systems affect organizational performance and individual behavior
largely through the impact that they have on people’s beliefs and expectations about
how they are and will be rewarded” (Lawler, 1990:38).

With regard to the application of incentives in public agencies, there are two
approaches. First, some suggest that incentives cannot be applied to the public sector,
due to the special type of organizations public agencies are. In this group, there are
those with a more skeptical approach that explain the lack of incentives in the public
sector by the power of unions and even to the lack of power of some governments
(Burguess and Ratto, 2003). A second group includes those assuring the total
applicability of incentives in public agencies. This stream of literature is usually
related to the NPM program of reforms. For instance, Osborne and Plastrick (1997)
consider that incentives are pertinent and necessary to improve performance in public
agencies. They also include other types of incentives as part of the potential
alternatives available for public managers. However, the point is that public
employees require external motivators to improve performance. By the same token,
Klitgaard, acknowledging the complexities of defining incentives, asserts that “better
incentives can result in much better performance” (2005,5). If public organizations’
complexities are considered, incentives can improve performance.
37

The complexity of implementing an incentive system in the public sector can be
explained by these three points: the contractual relationship between the agent and the
principal is not straightforward; multi-tasks job settings and intertemporal issues.
First, Principal-Agent theory sheds light on the problem of information in contractual
relationships. Often, public agencies are involved in several principal-agent
relationships. The definition of incentives in a context where one organization has
several principals is highly complex, due to the different objectives principals are
looking for. “Efforts on behalf of one principal can divert efforts on behalf of other
principals” (Asch, 2005:321). This is even more complicated due to the difficulties of
monitoring and controlling so many public agencies with such diversified tasks
(Burguess and Rato, 2003). Second, multi task job settings are also complex
environments to implement incentive systems. As Burguess and Ratto (2003) suggest.
“a general insight is that interaction among the different tasks affects the power of the
incentive scheme: if actions are substitutes the use of high powered incentive schemes
may have undesirable effects on overall performance” (3). This notion is also
presented by Dixit (1997), who claims an employee will exert too much effort to
achieve those tasks that imply more incentives and will leave aside those less
rewarding tasks. By the same token, public employees are subjected to job settings
that rely on others’ work to perform; thus, it is very difficult to recognize each
individual’s effort. Finally, the notion of intertemporal aspects in designing incentives
is very important. A problem could arise due to the fact that incentives are defined
38

according to a baseline or level of performance. Usually, this parameter is defined in
relation to the performance of a certain employee in a previous period. If the
employee is aware that incentives will be determined by her previous action, she is
tempted to underperform. This is the so-called “ratchet effect”
17
. “Ratchet effects
arise when the principal cannot commit to an incentive system that will not change as
results become available” (Burguess and Ratto, 2003:4), therefore, public agencies
find it difficult to implement an appropriate incentive system. Since they have multi
principals
18
, their employees are involved in multi tasks job settings, and
intertemporal issues are always involved in defining criteria for assessments.

Another approach proposed by Frant makes a new distinction in the debate about
incentives in public organizations. He argues that the primary issue of comparing
incentives in either private or public organizations is the notion of high powered
incentives, because it in this type of incentives when the implementation of incentives
is different. The traditional – pre NPM – approach in public organizations has been to
use low powered incentives, which is similar with what happened at the outset of the
scientific management movement. Low powered incentives are the milestone of the
incentive structure in public agencies, because “public employees are never entitled to
retain cost savings or revenue increases for their personal use” (Frant, 1996:370).

17
One of the implications of this effect is a positive correlation between discretion and nominal
incentives Olsen and Torsvik (2000).

18
As a matter of fact, Dixit (1997) suggests that this is a good ‘inconvenient’, because our political
systems must be confronted to checks and balances. This produces the problem of multiple principals
in the public sector.
39

However, the idea of high powered incentives must be adapted to each new reality.
He compares the notion of profits in the private sector with votes, since politicians
have to define a system of incentives to obtain more votes. Consequently, high
powered incentives in the public sector have the same allocative effect as those of the
private sector. High powered incentives in the public sector “do promote allocative
efficiency by increasing the likelihood that the public sector’s products will be valued
by the people” (371).

The comprehensive research undertaken by Burguess and Ratto
19
proposes that even
given the complexities highlighted in the previous paragraphs, it is possible to apply
an incentive system in public agencies. According to the special features of
bureaucracies “the theory predicts that low powered incentive schemes are optimal
and task assignment and work organization become crucial in promoting better
performance and may sometimes be substitutes for high powered financial incentives.
But ‘the’ optimal incentive scheme for public agencies depends ultimately on the type
of the organization and on which of the above aspects are more important” (Burguess
and Ratto, 2003:23).

Therefore, incentives are a reality in public sector management. They are part of the
set of new ideas and perspectives that constitutes the new paradigm of public sector
management, the New Public Management paradigm. There are three elements that

19
They are involved in the ‘The Centre For Market And Public Organisation’ at the University of
Bristol (http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/index.htm).
40

can be highlighted from this literature review. First, incentives for public employees
are grounded in a particular notion of human behavior. It is assumed that public
employees cannot change only because of internal motivations. There must be a
certain external factor shaping their behaviors in order to obtain a desired outcome,
such as performance improvement. The literature does not take into account the
differences between private and public organizations. It is assumed that the successful
experiences obtained in the improvement of private companies during the eighties
and part of the nineties, due to a defined set of incentives for private employees of
different levels, can also be useful to change public organizations. (Klitgaard and
Light, 2005; and Osborne and Gaebler, 1992)

The second element to take into account is that most of the articles dealing with
incentives in public agencies refer to the complexities of implementing an incentive
system among public employees, assuming that they are vital to improve
performance. For instance, the research undertaken by Burguess and Ratto (2003) and
Dixit (1997) among others are mostly intended to define the factors of failure and
success for implementing incentive systems, but they take incentives for granted.
Another element in this line of reasoning is the lack of consideration toward the
organizational implications of applying an incentive system in public organizations.

A final point has to be made regarding the lack of literature in the main journals
dealing with the reality that public managers have to face in areas like Africa, Asia
41

and Latin America. Most of the literature is dominated by a northern hemisphere
bias.
20
This is a major problem because an important number of books and articles
has been translated into various languages with purpose of spreading the analysis and
recommendations to different areas of the world. However, it is fair to place a
warning sign in this trend. The cultural, economic, social, and historic differences
between developed and less developed countries could make a big difference when
trying to implement a successful policy from a developed country in a less developed
country. More than claiming that the total rejection of using successful policies from
one country to another, it is important to be responsible in weighing the pros and cons
of using policies implemented in other countries.

20
With the exception of books and articles regarding the experiences of New Zealand and Australia.
42

Chapter 4: Public Sector Reform in Chile (1990 – 2008): NPM policies
changing the old bureaucratic apparatus

The purpose of this chapter is to present the implementation of public sector reform
policies in Chile from 1990 to 2007. This description will allow analysis as to
whether or not the Chilean public sector takes into account NPM doctrines. The last
part of this chapter will be devoted to showing how NPM doctrines have been
adopted in the Chilean public sector.

For the last 18 years, all four governments in office have undertaken, with different
levels of depth, reform policies in the public management domain (Secretaria General
de la Presidencia, 2006; Ramirez, 2004; Waissbluth, 2006). Particularly during this
period, three major policy changes can be recognized: Strategic Planning for Public
Management Reform (1997 – 2000), Project of Reform and State Modernization
(2000) and the Political and Legislative Agreements (2003). These reform packages
have different trajectories, different dynamics, and different ranges of scope. In order
to understand each of these policies, it is important to contextualize them. The
following section of this dissertation will be dedicated to describing the environment
in which public management reform policies were implemented, along with the
historical background required to understand their contexts.

43

4.a. The structural reforms undertaken during the Military Regime (1973 – 1990)

Due to the characteristics and scope of the reforms undertaken during the
Dictatorship, it is impossible to attempt a serious analysis of the current state of
affairs of the Chilean public sector, without paying attention to the changes
undertaken during the 70s and 80s. After the 1973 coup, the Chilean state was the
economic guinea pig of major policy changes regarding the extent to which the state
should run the economy. The government adopted a radical set of policies to
reconstruct the Chilean economy, in addition to a radical transformation of the
Chilean State.

The theoretical background of these reforms was the policy recommendations of the
Chicago School of Economics, particularly those championed by Friedman and his
free-market strategy
21
. His policy recommendations, which relied on the private
sector and the market as the engine of development, were adopted by a group of
academics who had the opportunity of being educated at the School. This group was
called the “Chicago Boys” and played a key role in the implementation of the
structural reform package. (Silva, 1991; Bethell, 1993; Valdés, 1995; Biglaiser,
2002).

In this context, public sector reform at the macro level was oriented to change the role
of the state in the economy, which had an expression at the level of the structure of

21
For more details on his work see Friedman (1962).
44

the state in modifications of public agencies, suppressing others, and reshaping key
state activities. The Chicago Boys were interested in liberalizing markets, fostering
private initiative, decreasing the role of the state in the society by diminishing
bureaucracy, and selling public enterprises, along with a strong commitment to open
the Chilean economy (Silva, 1991). These ideas and its theoretical background were
embodied in the so-called “structural reform policies”. From the military’s
perspective, the Chicago Boy’s proposal was very tempting, since it “offered a new
utopia in contrast to the failures of the past, and the offer of a utopia could ‘justify’
the brutal suppression that followed the military coup” (Bethell, 1993:181). These
policies were oriented to modify the role of the state and the role of private actors in
the economy and in the country altogether. Table 4 presents a list of these reforms,
along with the situation prior to the implementation of those policies.
45

Table 4: Situation before and after the implementation of structural reform policies
during the dictatorship

Situation in 1972-73 Post – 1973
Prices Generalized price control Freed prices (excluding
wages and the Exchange
rates)
Privatization State controls over 500 firms and banks In 1980, twenty-five
companies (including a
bank) belong to the public
sector
Trade Regime Multiple Exchange rates; import quotas and
bans; high tariffs (average 94 percent,
maximum of 220 percent); prior deposits on
imports (10,000 percent)
Unified exchange rate;
uniform tariff of 10 percent;
no other barriers to trade
Fiscal Regime Taxes on buying and selling; swollen public
employment; high fiscal deficit
Value added tax (20
percent); fiscal surplus
(1979-81)
Domestic capital
market
Controls on interest rates; nationalization of
the banking sector; credit controls
Market-set interest rates;
privatization of the banks;
liberalization of the capital
market
Capital account Absolute control of capital movements; the
government is the main external debtor
Gradual liberalization of
capital movements; the
private sector is the main
external debtor
Labor regime Powerful unions with strong bargaining
power; law of permanence; obligatory
salary increase; high proportion of non-
salary labor costs (40 percent equivalent of
salaries)
Atomized unions with no
bargaining power; simple
dismissal procedure; drastic
fall in real salaries; low
proportion of non-salary
labor costs (3 percent
equivalent of salaries)
Source: Meller, Patricio (1990:7), quoted in Valdes, J. (1995:22).

In spite of the liberal bias in economic terms of the regime, the intervention at the
public administration level was highly “traditional”, in Weberian terms, to the extent
that it tried to consolidate a concept of career civil service with a single and fixed
payment system. Important legal bodies were enacted, such as the law 18.575 of
Legal Basis of the Chilean Public Administration, the Administrative Statute, and the
Single Salary Structure (Escala Única de Sueldos). Perhaps one of the more liberal
46

measures was the implementation of a regionalization process to decentralize the
administration at the regional level.

The consequences of the economic model implemented by the dictatorship are far
from the scope of this dissertation. However, it is important to understand the burden
which the newly born democracy had to inherit, and the reason why many
institutional changes took place:

Real wages fell 40 percent during the first decade of military rule, and only by
1989 had they returned to the level of 1970; even then, they were still short of
the peak of 1981. Throughout the 1980s, urban unemployment was the highest
on the continent, reaching 20 percent in 1982 and dropping to single-digit
figures only in 1989. Today experts calculate that 45 percent of the population
is living below the poverty line, still waiting for the promised “trickle-down”
to reach them, long after other indicators show recovery to be well on the way.
(Constable and Valenzuela, 1990:6)

Addressing the social costs of the structural reforms undertaken during the
dictatorship was one of the first priorities the new government had in mind while
restoring democracy in the country.

4. b. The Definition of a new State (1990 – 1994)

After 17 years of military regime, the two principal tasks of the democratic
government taking office in March 1990 were the democratization of the state and the
implementation of policies directed towards improving the well-being of the less
beneficiated by the inherited economic model. The political context of this
47

government was extremely complex in the social, political and economic arena. The
new authorities had to initiate a process oriented to change the old anti-democratic
practices into a completely different scheme. The government knew that major
changes could jeopardize the relatively weak democracy and reluctant trust among
actors. The new government had to foster the economic structure as well as maintain
the delicate equilibrium among the different actors in the political system. It had to
create an environment of trust and stability in which every actor could perform their
given task safely and comfortably, without feeling that their interest were endangered
or overlooked.

This need for a major reform in the state can be perfectly draw from the speech given
by President Patricio Aylwin after only two months in office. In his first traditional
speech at the Chilean parliament, he proposed the five main ideas that will lead his
government:
To establish the truth and make justice regarding human rights, as an
unavoidable moral exigency for the national reconstruction;
To democratize the institutions;
To promote justice, amending the great inequalities and necessities that afflict
important sectors of the Chilean people.
To impel economic growth, development and the modernization of the
country; and
To reinsert Chile in the place that historically had wan in the international
community (Aylwin, 1990: iv).

As one can see, these priorities reflect the real concerns this government had in the
first days in office. Public management policies were far from the top priorities of the
government. Though, from the priorities listed above, some changes were required to
48

adapt the state to the new challenges as a country. This is why the notion of state
modernization or state reform, usually linked to public management reform policies,
emerged. From this conception, policy recommendations came up. First, faced with
the need for legal changes, the idea of democratizing institutions was introduced to
allow for the direct election of city mayors and city councils. This was a major step
forward which gave power to the communities in electing their authorities. But with
this change, the pressure to improve the management of the municipalities arose.
Second, the intention of the government to amend the inequalities of the system
yielded the need for setting up new institutions specifically focused on those groups
less beneficiated with the changes undertaken during the eighties. Keeping in mind
the lack of appropriate institutions for overcoming major social issues, the
government created the National Institute for Youth (Instituto Nacional de la
Juventud), the National Women’s Service (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer), and the
Solidarity and Social Investment Fund (Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversion Social).
Along with these changes, there were major overhauls in some ministries, such as the
Ministry Secretariat of Government, the Ministry General Secretariat of the
Presidency, and the new Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (former Planning
Office).

As one can recognize, these changes do not have a clear connection with public
management reform policies, as they were conceived in the introduction of this paper.
However, the political and social environment that the newly elected government had
49

to confront left public management policies in a second or third position on the
political agenda. All the efforts were oriented to concentrated on creating the
conditions for a more democratic and fair society, without jeopardizing the
advantageous situation of the Chilean economy. Changes in public management
reform policies would have yielded a potential problem with some public sector
unions or with some professional groups, threatening the main objective of stability.

But after three years in office, there was a clear need for major changes in this
domain in the opinion of intellectuals, senior civil servants, advisors and politicians.
This concern had no relation to the people’s priorities of public management reform.
According to Lahera, “it is a paradox this theme is not on the public debate, which is
always centered on the great orientations or in particular public policies, as if
management would be a premise given, irrelevant to be discussed” (1993:4). This
argument is similar to the debate about implementation in public policies, which was
masterly tackled by Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) and by a large literature in the
subfield of public policy analysis.

Continuing with his argument, Lahera claimed the need for improving public
management had a direct relation to the Reform of the State. He focused his attention
on four major areas of the public management reform policy domain. First, increasing
the efficiency of public expenditure; second, improving human resource management;
third, generalizing the use of several tools and mechanism of management; and
50

finally, improving the attention and the service to consumers. These four areas of
intervention are exactly what one could include in the category of public management
reform policies.

The diagnosis in this area was far from satisfactory. According to Vignolo, Lucero et
al (1993) the main characteristics of the Chilean public administration were: (1) Lack
of vision and objectives internalized in the organizations. (2) Allocation of resources
more with an historic criteria associated to results to produce. (3) Lack of incentives
related to the increase of productivity, efficiency and savings. (4) Lack of effective
systems of institutional and individual assessment. (5) Negative evaluation by citizens
regarding the quality of the services provided by the state. (6) Lack of appropriate
human resource management. (7) Complex systems of ex ante control.

There is another source of criticism regarding the lack of interest in public
management in the Chilean government – i.e., the bureaucrats. Some advisors and
senior civil servants of the Ministry of Finance put forward their concern regarding
public management due to the difficulties of implementing public programs and the
lack of significant results in institutions and sectors where substantial sums of public
money were allocated (Marcel and Toha, 1993). This stress on the efficiency of
public expenditure is certainly a convincing rationale to argue for implementing
major changes in the public management reform policies. The need for efficiency is a
51

constant factor in major reforms, such as those implemented in most OECD countries
during the eighties (Aucoin, 1990).

Finally, the political actors committed themselves to the issue of improving public
management. As a manifestation of this apprehension, they endeavored the first
attempt at defining a comprehensive public management reform policy. In the
political program of the governmental coalition presented to the 1993 general
election, the issue of public management was the eighth point on their program.
Under the title “Modernizing the Management of the State”, the Coalition included a
list of initiatives the future government would achieve while in office, such as a
public management oriented to results, punishing inefficiency and rewarding good
performance, and initiating means for citizens’ involvement, among other ideas
(Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, 1993). The last point of the list was
expressed in the Presidential commitment to create a High Level Committee to
overcome the weaknesses of the Chilean public administration.

Without a doubt, there was a policy window
22
, particularly created by negative
assessments of the actors involved in this policy domain, which can be recognized as
the first step of including a real public management reform policy into Chilean
government. The criticism were oriented to the lack of policies related to public
personnel, lack of evaluation of public policies, focus on procedures rather than

22
This notion is adopted from Kingdon (1995). An application of this analytic approach to the Chilean
case can be found in Pliscoff (2000).
52

results, and a weak structure and management of state owned enterprises (Lahera,
1995).

It would be unfair not to mention some efforts undertaken during the 90 – 94 period
in the area of public management policies. According to the presidential address
before Congress in 1994, some incipient efforts were carried out during this period,
which fit in the area of our interest. First, there was an effort to improve the quality of
training among public workers. Secondly, there was a program which simplified
procedures in the government. Last but not least, near the end of 1993, the
government created an experimental program with five public institutions in order to
begin a process for improving public management. The program was called ‘Plan
Piloto de Modernizacion’ (Experimental Plan for Modernization) and can be
identified as the antecedent of the policy decision adopted by the next government.
According to Marcel (1999):
The program was grounded on the idea that public services (rather than
institutions of the central government) would define successes and failures in
public sector management and that those services had ample room, despite
legal and regulatory restrictions, to carry out initiatives aimed at improving
management. [..] With the participation of senior managers, officials, clients,
and supporters, this exercise would define each institution’s mission,
including its primary management objectives, clients and principal products.
(316)

It is important to mention that the institution in charge of public management policies
at the time was the Undersecretary of Regional and Administrative Development.

53

According to the elements presented in this section, the “state of the art” in the public
management policy domain at the end of Aylwin’s government could be summarized
in terms of the particular attention towards structural reforms, rather than focusing on
managerial or cultural improvements. After four years of governing, pressures from
all sides demanded the beginning of a reform in public management issues. On one
hand, scholars, practitioners and consultants shared a very similar diagnosis regarding
the performance of public agencies and, of course, the need for changing its situation.
High level officials, on the other hand, preferred to initiate the process of improving
performance by undertaking measures such as establishing the Modernization
Commitments and other institutional changes in a group of agencies. Politicians,
bearing in mind the diagnosis of the Chilean public administration, presented an
electoral manifesto fostering public management improvement, or at least including
for the first time a clear intention to address the issue. All these actors, at different
levels, were subjected to the international debate regarding new public management
and those debates regarding changes in the public management domain. The leverage
exerted by the international community can be, in some way, derived from the
language they used and the changes they presented.
4. c. The Managerial Revolution: New ideas to modernize the Chilean public sector
(1994 – 2000)

The general election did not bring great changes in the political sphere. The coalition
in office not only maintained his popular support but increased it and President
54

Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle took office in March 1994. In the first year, the government
moved forward in a clear direction towards designing a comprehensive public
management reform policy. They had the experience of four years governing and a
different economic and political environment. In 1994, the Interministerial
Committee for Public Management Modernization was set up, a milestone in this path
of furthering changes in the public management domain. According to the
Presidential Instructive that created this Committee, the Interministerial Committee
for Public Management Modernization had:

The mission of coordinating different ministries with attributions in the area
of improvement, development, rationalization and modernization of public
management, with the goal of proposing the President policies regarding this
subject, and the actions, projects and tools needed for its implementation,
monitoring and assessment. For those purposes, the Committee will promote
the modernization of state’s agencies management and will guard the
consistency and articulation of its plans oriented to this end (Ministerio
Secretaria General de la Presidencia, 1994:1).
23

Finally, the government had realized the need for undertaking a comprehensive public
management reform policy. In order to achieve this goal, the officials responsible
understood the complexity of the domain and created a gradual but decisive process
determined to make groundwork for major changes. From 1994 to 1996, the
Committee was interested itself in persuading senior public officials and functionaries
about the benefits of engaging in a modernization process. In addition, the Committee

23
The ministries involved in this Committee were: Finance, Work, Economy, Secretariat of
Government and Secretariat of the Presidency, being the last ministry in charge of coordinating it.
There was an Executive Secretary in change of the administrative functioning of the Committee, with a
General Secretary in charge. This official had the responsibility of being the Head of the Division of
Public Management Modernization at the Secretariat of the Presidency, as well.
55

considered necessary to develop a strategic management system grounded in results.
(Comité Interministerial de Modernización de la Gestión Pública, 2000).

The outcomes of this initial period were the implementation and diffusion of several
managerial tools among public administrators on all levels, in order to create a new
culture in public management. According to the Final Report of Activities
implemented by the Committee, during this two-year period, almost every public
agency defined its own performance indicators, ministerial goals and modernization
commitments. Along with these changes, some adjustments were included in the area
of evaluation in public personnel management, particularly in the performance
appraisal system. In fact, in 1998 a new decree (Decree 1825 of September, 7, 1998)
was enacted to improve the appraisal mechanism for public employees.

4.c.i. Strategic Plan for Public Management Modernization (1997 – 2000)

Taking into account almost two years of experience, the Executive Secretary
presented a major comprehensive proposal to tackle the pernicious loop holes in the
public management domain. Many of the programs and initiatives included in this
program were already being implemented. Therefore, the plan was not only an effort
to begin the implementation of certain policies, but also a perfect opportunity to take
advantage of the changes and programs already in existence. It is important to
highlight that this plan was consistent with the perception of a strategy grounded in
56

the idea of gradual changes. According to the former Executive Secretary of the
Committee, Claudio Orrego, “the strategy to generate pilot plans, to try, to evaluate
and then to generalize policies and programs, has been shown to be a safer and more
sustainable path. Nevertheless, this does not suppose the strategy is always effective
for all subjects” (Comité Interministerial de Modernización de la Gestión Pública,
2000:12). The Strategic Plan was part of this constant and gradual process of change,
with a pace cogently conceived to improve successes and correct mistakes.

The plan was conceived in three areas: principles, objectives and innovative features,
and courses of actions. The principles of this Plan were probity and responsibility,
equality and no discrimination, transparency, accessibility and simplification,
participative management, and efficiency and efficacy.
Priorities and objectives:
To create a stable network of public servants, leading and committed to a state
serving the people.
To be involved in an ongoing process of improving the accessibility and
quality of services delivered to citizens.
To assure transparency and probity in the performance of public functionaries.
To set up an institutional framework of the state aimed at improving
efficiency, flexibility and coordination among actions within public sector.
To prioritize goal attainment, fostering the efficient allocation of human,
monetary and technological resources, and including a culture of evaluation.
To include in the public agenda and among public services, the meaning and
projections of the Modernization Plan and generating the commitment and
participation of all the sectors involved. (Comité Interministerial de
Modernización de la Gestión Pública, 2000:18)

57

All these principles and objectives were translated into the outcomes summarized in
Figure 2. In it can be seen the results effectively achieved during the implementation
of the strategic plan.
24

Figure 2: Strategic Planning for Public Management Modernization 1997 – 2000
(Comité Interministerial de Modernización de la Gestión Pública, 2000).

24
This evaluation might be complemented with a qualitative analysis of those general outcomes
included in Figure 2 Along with that, the general report of the actions undertaken by the Committee
during 1994 -2000 (Comité Interministerial de Modernización de la Gestión Pública, 2000) has a lot of
information regarding the details of these achievements.
Integral system of
management:
• Ministerial Goals
• Modernization Commitments
• Management improvements
programs
• Assessment of goals and
commitments system
• Integral Management Reports

Informational Technologies:
• Network of technology experts
• Implementation of state web
pages
• Presidential Decree fostering
the creation of web pages in
public agencies

Transparency and probity:
• Appointment of the General
Internal Auditing Council.
• Enactment of law 19.653,
ruling probity of state’s
institutions
• System of procurement and
contracts of the public sector
• Program for evaluating
governmental programs

Service quality and participation:
• National award to the quality of
public services
• National award to the innovation in
public management
• Offices of information and
complaints
• Project for blue print simplification
• Citizens rights’ charters

Human Resource Management:
• Agreements with ANEF (National
Union of Public Employees)
• System of incentives for individuals
and groups
• Increase in resources for training

Others:
• Commitments for decentralization
• Initiatives for fostering
participation
• Changes in the regulatory role of
the state

58

As one can see from this summary, the idea of a managerial revolution expressed on
the Strategic Plan was rooted in the bias towards efficiency, performance
measurement, incentives, and evaluation. To the extent this reform process assumes
the idea of gradualism, many of the changes listed above do not require major legal
changes. The main responsibility was placed in the hands of top officials, particularly
those leading public agencies. They had to commit themselves to the idea of creating
a cultural change by modifying certain administrative practices. Participation in
programs such as the National Award of the Quality of Public Services were
voluntary, but the prestige involved in participating in this program was an alluring
opportunity to show the changes and achievements of a given organization.

In summary, a few points should be made regarding the public management reform
policy effort during Frei’s government. The idea is not to do a major evaluation of
this period, since it is beyond the boundaries of this dissertation, but rather to put
forward some ideas useful in explaining the next period. First, according to the
outcomes of this period, it was arguably the appropriate strategy for initiating a major
process of reforms in a traditional bureaucratic state apparatus such as the Chilean
government. No great legal changes were required to modify the functioning of many
institutions; unfortunately, the unintended consequence of this approach would
surface in the near future. Second, due the deliberate decision of focusing on the
managerial issues, other important aspects of the public sector management were
overlooked. Issues such as the institutional organization of the public sector, the
59

consequences of outsourcing and contracting out
25
, etc., were generating some
outcomes the state was not addressing properly. If the consequences of those actions
had been foreseen, many of the future problems would have been avoided. Third, the
pace of the changes among institutions seemed to be varied. The Strategic Plan lacked
the power to pressure institutions not strongly committed with the modernization of
their management. Some institutions, such as the Internal Revenue Service, were
considerably ahead of the process while others, such as many ministries, did not had
an incentive to move forward in their efforts as a more efficient and effective public
management.

As a whole, the Strategic Planning for Public Management Modernization was a
straightforward effort to create a culture of change in public agencies. The façade of
the state changed. The old rigid, rule-abiding, procedurally-oriented, bureaucratic
Chilean public sector was subjected, in different manners and on different levels, to a
managerial revolution. Concepts such as “client”, “total quality management”,
“service quality”, “performance measurement”, and “strategic planning” were all part
of the regular jargon among public functionaries by the end of President Frei’s term.

25
The best example in this area is the impact in the Ministry of Public Works of the implementation of
a broad program of concessions to private firms in order to build and/or improve freeways.
60

4. d. Reforming the State and Overcoming the Political Crisis (2000 – 2006):
4.d.i. The Project of Reform and Modernization of the State

With a new general election in 1999, albeit with the same coalition in office
running for a third term, the debate about public management reform policies was
renewed. New ideas, new actors and new perspectives were brought to the table.
The tension between those interested in continuing the improvement and fostering
of managerial capabilities in public agencies, and those interested in beginning a
new step in the reform – “the institutional change” - was part of the debate about
defining the electoral program for the 1999 general election. The initiatives
proposed in this electoral program were a blend of programs already in practice,
such as the Management Improvement Programs, and new ideas such as the
Ombudsman. These proposals were included under the title of ‘State Reform’
(Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, 1999).

The existing coalition succeeded and in March 2000 the new government took office.
New authorities were in charge of the process, particularly in the public management
reform policy domain. The new government adopted the decision of creating a new
institutional environment for this governmental task, therefore, the Interministerial
Committee of Public Management Reform was replaced by the Committee of
Ministers for the Reform of the State. Only the ministers of Interior, Finance,
61

Secretariat of Government and Secretariat of Presidency were included in this new
committee, with an Executive Director in charge of the coordination and monitoring
of the agreements and guidelines defined by the Committee of Ministers.

The new package of public management reform policies was presented on May, 11,
2001. In this opportunity, the President proposed to the citizenry the “Project of
Reform and Modernization of the State”. Figure 3 presents only the part of this
project that is important for the purposes of this dissertation: measures and initiatives
included in the category of public management policies.
62

Figure 3: Project of Reform and Modernization of the State
(Public management component) (Proyecto de Reforma del Estado, 2000:5)

The original argument of this project was that no major changes can be accomplished
without a real modification of the state as a whole. According to the former Executive
Director of the Ministerial Committee and Director of the Division of Public
Management Modernization at the Ministry Secretariat of the Presidency:
Project of Reform and
Modernization of the State
Human Resource
Management
Service quality
Public Service
Management
E-Government
Public Management
Participation
Transparency and Probity
Principles:
• A democratic and
participatory state
• A transparent state
• A decentralized and
united state
• A solidary state
• A strong and flexible
state
• An efficient and
effective state
• A normative and
subsidiary state

63

a new impulse to the modernization of management requires new parameters
with the perspective of a state transformation. Those coordinates are rooted in
what has been done by prior governments, but it requires new concepts in
order to yield a new model of public management, with an axis on the specific
attributes of public service, and relocating the contribution of tools and
managerial techniques coming from the private sector. At the same time, it is
required to move forward in the provision of legal tools suitable for this task.
(Egaña, 2001:12)

The sole idea of using the concept of “state reform” showed the change in perspective
and the broad conception the new authorities had in mind. This strategy did not reject
prior efforts in this area (as was stated in the previous paragraph), but instead opened
doors to concerns linked to public management policies. It was, in some sense, a very
risky strategy, because it relied on major legal changes to continue the process of
reforms. In so doing, the Project assumed the need for more actors participating and
debating in this area. The Project established a Committee of Consultants, a
Committee with Scholars and Universities, and a roundtable with ANEF (National
Union of Public Employees). All these activities had the intention of generating a
debate regarding the need for a revised state, with new rules and a new culture,
broadening the scope of the changes required (Proyecto de Reforma y Modernización
del Estado,2002).
4.d.ii. The Political and Legislative Agreement of 2003

In spite of the cogently conceived Plan, the tension between those advocating for
major changes and those in favor of continuing the pace and content of the reforms
64

from the last period threatened the entire conception of the Plan
26
. Along with that,
the issue of public management reform policies was not one of the government’s
main priorities as one can conclude from the scarce attention given by the President
during the annual presidential address before Congress regarding the state of the
nation in 2001 and 2002. In 2001, the President highlighted only the important
advances in e-government and the drafts sent to the Congress to create the
Ombudsman and to regulate public enterprises. In 2002 there was no specific
reference to public management policies, only those ideas about the major changes in
the public health sector, but nothing related to public management. (Lagos, 2001;
Lagos, 2002).

Nonetheless, 2002 was a very difficult year for the state and the political system as a
whole. Three major scandals erupted this year, raising a red flag in the supposedly
non corrupted Chilean political system, or even in Chilean society as a whole. The
three cases exploded on the scene in the last three months of 2002. Each had a
twofold implication. On one hand, politicians and senior civil servants were involved;
on the other, the cases had a direct connection with public administration and public
management. The first case, called “The Bribe Case” dealt with the role of numerous
politicians, top executives and law makers in an irregular allocation of permits to
operate a vehicle testing plant. The second case was related to the irregular system of

26
It is important to mention that during this period the Executive Director of the Committee of
Ministers resigned, leaving a certain idea in the environment of lacking of support in the
implementation of the Plan.
65

payments to top officials such as ministries and under secretaries.
27
Finally, the “The
GATE Case”
28
dealt with irregular payments to high and middle level officials, linked
to the assignation of public infrastructure projects. It is important to mention that all
these cases still have pending trials, therefore, it is unfair to assign responsibility
when the judicial system in Chile is still in progress.

In spite of the particularities of the cases mentioned above, these three cases together
produced a major blow to the Chilean bureaucratic and political system. It forced and
in-depth review of many practices and gray areas. Also, this crisis was helpful to
create a policy window in which many of the reforms previously ignored by political
actors were now a priority. The notion of a weak public management policy had to
change in order to convince the public opinion of an updated approach regarding the
need for new practices and a new culture in the Chilean public administration.

The agreement was signed in January 2003 with the participation of all the political
parties with representation in Congress. It was a broad agreement and can be
pinpointed as a major policy change in the public management arena and in the
Chilean public administration. Table 5 shows the aspects of interest for purposes of
this dissertation. The agreement was dubbed “Acuerdos Politico-Legislativos para la

27
This crisis led to a major change in the system of salaries for those public officials in ‘critical’
activities. The law 19.882 was enacted and regularized a gray area in the Chilean public administration
in many levels of the state apparatus.

28
The name of the case GATE stands for the name of a Consultant Firm, which supposedly received
overpayments in some projects to pay other items not included in the original project.
66

Modernizacion del Estado, la Transparencia y la Promocion del Crecimiento”
(Political and Legislative Agreements for the Modernization of the State,
Transparency and Growth Promotion). By agreeing to this agenda, the political
parties committed themselves to the enactment of the legislative changes included in
this agreement. There was a list of forty nine projects, grouped in three main areas:
Modernization of the State, Transparency, and Growth Promotion. It is important to
highlight that the idea of mixing all these issues is an expression of how the actors
involved took advantage of the situation and negotiated their support, provided that
some important project were included. For instance, the government capitalized on
the situation and included a draft for limiting and controlling electoral expenditures,
while the opposition parties from the right wing coalition pressured to include an
important change in the appointment of senior civil servants with a non-partisan /
technical approach. But also this confusion of mingling elements like political
campaign financing and public acquisitions shows the complexity of this field and of
the interest involved, apparent or vested, in many of the rules and practices framing
the public management realm.

67

Table 5: Agenda of State Modernization included on the 2003 Political Agreement
(Chile, 2003).
1. Public
Management:
• Strengthening institutions and reorganization of the
policies oriented to extreme poverty.
• Making administrative procedures simpler
• Quality control in public management
• Reorganization of ministries and under secretaries
• Reformulation of the Council for the Defense of the
State
• Ombudsman
• Modernization in the composition of high courts
2. Human
Resource
Management:

• Professionalization of the civil service
• Creation of the National Agency for Civil Service
• Strengthening and professionalization of senior public
management
• Legal consolidation of budgetary rules regarding human
resources
3. Financial
Management

• Legal consolidation of the rules regarding finance
management and diffusion of programs and public
services
• Reorganization of the System of Public Enterprises
• Public Acquisitions
• Tendering procedures for investment projects
• Fiscal transparency
• Permanent Commission of Public Budget in Congress
4. Decentralization Under this title projects to reorganize the resource
allocation system among municipalities, the modernization
of regional and local governments, and the like, were
included.

In spite of the combinations of actions and topics, the Political and Legislative
agreements created a policy window to put forward several initiatives that were much
needed to give a new thrust to the public sector reform movement.
68

4.d.iii. Ley de Nuevo Trato (Law 19882) (Law for a New Deal)

This law is one of the consequences of the Political and Legislative Agreements of
2003. It is a new approach to address the key problems that the Chilean public
administration has suffered in the last few decades. This law was intended to create a
new deal between the government and the public employees’ association, in matters
of salaries for key positions, scholarships to pursue graduate studies, and a new
recruitment process for first, second and third level public managers. Under this law,
a Senior Civil Service System is created, monitored by the Council of the Senior Civil
Service System, and an Agency in charge of administering this new system, the
National Agency for Civil Service (Direccion Nacional de Servicio Civil (DNSC)).

The Dirección Nacional del Servicio Civil has the responsibility of developing
“coordination, supervision and improvement of public personnel on the agencies
belonging to the civil public administration” (Chile, Law 19882). Two units were
created to fulfill the goals of the Law: the Senior Civil Service unit and the Personnel
Development unit. Regarding the Senior Civil Service System, the government
decided to make a distinction between “advisory” and “executive” agencies to start
the process. The former were not included in this process due to their particular
political orientation, while the latter were assumed to perform a managerial role in
69

terms of implementing political decisions.
29
A total of 53 public agencies were
included as the first group of public agencies to be part of the Senior Civil Service
System. The entity in charge of carrying out the recruitment process for appointing
first- and second-level senior civil servants is the Council of the Senior Civil Service
System (Consejo de Alta Dirección Pública). This council has five members, four of
them appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. Heading this council is
the director of the National Agency for Civil Service.

The other unit of the DNSC deals with all the different steps of the development cycle
of public employees. It is conceived as the human resource management unit of the
Chilean civil public administration. This unit deals with all issues related to
recruitment procedures, training, performance measurement, and the like. It is more
of an advisory unit that provides a government-wide perspective of the manner in
which public personnel should be administered.

4.d.iv. Management Control System (Ministry of Finance: Budget Office)

On a different level, public management reform processes were evolving at a gradual,
but steady pace. Starting in 2000, the government, through its Budget Office
(DIPRES), decided to consolidate the improvements and actions oriented to monitor
the performance of public agencies, and focus on the effectiveness of the budget.

29
It is interesting to draw the conclusion that the old politics and administration dichotomy is still
playing a role in the manner in which modernization processes take place.
70

There are five elements under the System of Management Control: (1) performance
indicators, (2) evaluation of government programs and institutions, (3) competitive
common fund with a standard format to apply for funding for new government
programs, (4) management improvement programs, and (5) comprehensive
management assessments. All these tools were created or amended to improve
DIPRES’s ability to control expenditure and performance measurement. Figure 4
presents the components of the Management Control System developed by DIPRES,
and its links with the budget process.

Figure 4: Management Control Integration in the Budget Cycle
(Source: DIPRES, 2003:8)

71

Performance indicators were designed originally in 1994 and discontinued in the
period 1999 – 2000. In 2001, the DIPRES resumed the application and development
of these indicators as part of the budgetary process. “Performance indicators are a tool
oriented to provide quantitative information with regards to the outcomes (products or
services) delivered by a given institution” (Guzmán, 2005:19). Performance
indicators are useful to monitor the level of impact that a given institutions achieves
by using their resources. Evaluations of programs and institutions were designed to
develop a comprehensive analysis of current programs. The evaluations are
conducted by external individuals with expertise in the program’s or institution’s
topic. The outcome of these evaluations can go from minor modifications to the
termination of the assessed program. Institutions are evaluated in terms of the use of
their resources and can be translated into changes regarding the functioning of the
institution and the targets they aim towards. The Competitive Common Fund was
originally intended to improve the expansion and creation of new programs to be
included in the budget. It was an effort to standardize a process and to gather better
information for the decision-making process of the budget. Currently, this mechanism
has changed, keeping only some aspects of the whole process. The last component
and the most important in terms of managerial modifications is the Management
Improvement Programs (PMG), which is an incentive system that fosters efficiency
and effectiveness.

72

The Management Improvement Programs (PMG) started in 1998 with the
implementation of the law 19.553. The aim of these programs was to include a reward
system to the agency’s performance. The design of PMG was devised to link the
improvement of the institutional performance to the improvement of public
employees’ salaries. According to the level of achievement, the employees could
improve their salaries by 5% for those working in agencies achieving 90% or more of
their PMGs, or 2.5% for those achieving between 75% and 90%
30
. By 2001, PMGs
were redesigned to “foster the development of management systems improving the
routines of public agencies” (DIPRES, 2007: 2). Particularly, they were framed to
improve five key areas of institutional performance, divided in eleven systems, called
“Programa Marco Básico” (Basic Framework Program). This Program is presented in
Table 6. In 2005, this program was complemented by a Plan Marco Avanzado
(Advanced Framework Program) (Table 7), which included new areas and was
created for a group of agencies with a higher standard in terms of performance
control.

30
According to the Law 20212, these percentages were modified.
73

Table 6: Basic Framework Program: Areas y Systems
Areas Systems
Personnel

Training
Hygiene – Security and improvement
of work environments
Performance Appraisal
Client Satisfaction Integral System of Clients attention
e-Government
Planning/ Control/ Territorial
Management
Planning /Performance Control
Internal Auditing
Territorial Management
Finance Administration Public Sector Procurement System
Financial Management
Gender perspective Gender perspective
Source: Budget Office (Dipres, 2007)

Table 7: Advanced Framework Program: Areas y Systems
Areas Systems
Personnel

Training
Hygiene – Security and improvement
of work environments
Performance Appraisal

Client Satisfaction

Integral System of Clients’ Attention

Planning / Control Planning / Performance Control
Internal Auditing
Finance Management Public Sector Procurement System
Source: Budget Office (Dipres, 2007)

The long term objective of the new Advance Framework Program was to install a
total quality management system in the Chilean public sector. The intention was to
replace the old PMGs’ system with a new one, in which public agencies adopt all the
appropriate criteria to be certified under the ISO 9001:2000 norms. The natural flow
of changes in this area leads to a Quality Plan, which is the last stage in this
incremental process of quality adoption among public agencies. During this period
the Management System Control developed by DIPRES was consolidated and a
74

network of professionals was created to support the control systems included in this
model. A network of institutions in charge of validating each of the systems presented
on Table 6 and 7 was developed. This network of professionals provides an external
appraisal of the indicators presented by all public agencies in their matters of
expertise. For instance, professionals working on the National Service for Women are
in charge of validating the PMGs related to gender.

President Lagos’ term finished with an inconsistent situation in terms of public
management reform policies. On the one hand, corruption scandals tainted all efforts
to continue the modernization process. The veil of suspicion over government
activities produced a lack of initiative from officials, who were uninterested in risking
their prestige by doing actions that might be construed by external actors as
impropriate. On the other hand, the Management Control System and the creation of
the Chilean Civil Service were milestones in terms of the push they gave to the
adoption of new routines among public agencies, in particular regarding the
appointment process of first- and second level senior civil servants. The Management
Control System was introduced to the routines of public employees, and has been
accepted because of two main reasons. Firstly, because it engenders an increase in
salaries, and secondly, because it establishes a new rationale to address the issue of
management control within the public sector.

75

4.e. Bachelet’s Government: Shifting the Strategy

The government that took office in March 2006 started without a clear intention to
change the path previous governments took in terms of public sector reform. There
was no intention to create a new Commission or Task force to consider new actions
oriented to foster the modernization process initiated in previous governments. The
first speech given by the newly elected President Michelle Bachelet before Congress
set the tone of her government’s plan of handling the issue. The only mention she
made to public management was her intention to improve transparency and ethics
among civil servants. “Because I also want a Chile more transparent. For the state, we
want to know what, how and when we do things, how much do they cost and why we
do it. More information means more democracy. I want a country where public ethics
is a valuable asset spread on every level of government” (Bachelet, 2003). This
intention to focus on transparency served as a premonition of what layed ahead in
terms of political crises during the first part of her government conditioning the
trajectory of public management reform actions. The evolution of public sector
reform policies during these three years can be summarized in three subjects:
transparency, management control, and the initial steps of a new civil service for the
Chilean public administration.
4.e.i. Transparency:

The political context the government has had to face has been tainted by several cases
of corruption and maladministration. For example, in October 2006, the National
76

Institute of Sports (Chiledeportes) was under scrutiny due to a group of cases
showing an alarming degree of maladministration and in some cases corruption. The
General Comptroller Office (Contraloría General de la República) presented a report
with a list of anomalies in the allocation of resources that were supposed to be
allocated for the improvement and fostering of the practice of sports at the local level.
Another case the government had to confront the irregularities in the National Train
Company (Empresa de Ferrocarriles del Estado), currently under investigation. This
episode is a combination of maladministration and corruption at the higher levels of
the company. Finally, one of the bigger scandals was that found at the Ministry of
Education, where after an investigation, it was unclear how a total of US$560 million
were spent. The investigation undertaken by the General Comptroller Office unveiled
a series of lack of procedures to certificate the proper use of public resources in the
public education system.

The outcome of these cases was the creation of a non-partisan Commission oriented
to advise the President regarding the actions required to make the state activity more
transparent, more efficient, and to enhance the ethics of civil servants. After 100 days,
the Commission presented a document with recommendations in the following areas:

Initiatives to implement active and passive transparency.
Reforms to the Senior Civil Service System.
Financing political campaigns and political parties.
Reinforcing the system of control in the state.
Other initiatives to foster probity and transparency: Protective initiatives for
whistleblower and prohibitions for former public employees, probity and
77

transparency in Congress, lobby regulations and improving the procurement
system.
(Informe Comisión Probidad,2006:2)

From the point of view of the government, this group of initiatives was a necessity to
show decisiveness and commitment to act against corruption scandals. As with any
other Presidential Commission, the big problem is that once the Commission presents
its final report, there is no clear mechanism to follow in order to fulfill the proposed
initiatives. However, in this case, the Ministry Secretariat of the Presidency (the
Secretary in charge of governmental coordination) monitors the initiatives. Perhaps,
the most important of the proposed initiatives that have been implemented thus far is
the enactment in August 2008 of the Law for Open Access to Public Information.
This law is oriented to rule the principle of transparency in the public function, the
right to access information from all public entities, procedures to assure the right is
upheld, and the exceptions to the publicity of public information. The entity in charge
of overseeing the implementation of this law is the Council for Transparency. The
members of this Council are appointed by the President with the approval of the
Congress. The Council has to promote transparency of public information, advocate
the implementation of the Law 20285, and guarantee the right to access public
information. The other initiatives are still pending, either being discussed in Congress
or still being a matter of disagreement within the government.

78

4.e.ii. Management Control System:

The other area that had been an important series of actions in terms of public
management reform has been the work carried out by the Budget Office (Dipres). As
it was already presented in the previous section, the Dipres has played a key role in
terms of advancing public sector reform policies, with a particular concern for
improving the mechanisms that monitor the use of public resources. It has furthered
the management controls that started as a system in 2001 and were improved in 2004.
Particular interest has been paid to the evaluation of programs, which in the last two
years has carried out 217 evaluations (www.dipres.cl). Yet the real outcomes of all
the assessment mechanisms set up by this office directorate are not only discursive,
but they have had consequences in terms of modifying programs or even closing
them.

Due to the debate in terms of concern for improving the salaries of public officials,
the government and the National Association of Public Workers - the main public
workers’ union - agreed to a program to increase salaries through rewarding. The Law
20212 was enacted to develop performance based mechanisms to improve their
earnings. Particularly important were the modifications to the Management
Improvement Programs, according to the plan presented in Table 8:

79

Table 8: Evolution of performance based bonuses:
2007:
Achieving 90% or more of goals 7.7%
Achieving between 75% and 90% of goals 3.85%
2008:
Achieving 90% or more of goals 9.3%
Achieving between 75% and 90% of goals 4.65%
2009:
Achieving 90% or more of goals 11%
Achieving between 75% and 90% of goals 5.5%
Starting 2010:
Achieving 90% or more of goals 12.6%
Achieving between 75% and 90% of goals 6.3%
Source: Chile, Law 20212

Another element that deserves attention in this period is the evolution of the Advance
Framework Plan of the Improvement Management Programs towards a Quality
Program. The Advance Framework Plan had the intention of creating conditions to
apply the ISO 9001:2000 norms in order to install a set of managerial practices within
the Chilean public sector; therefore, the logical next step was to encourage the
appropriation of new administrative practices in order to increase efficiency and
effectiveness.

The Advance Framework Program has contributed to the process of
improving the management of public services, by including working
methodologies that include concepts associated to constant improvement and
quality, which has allowed building Quality Management Systems in public
agencies. This has been done without overlooking the efforts oriented towards
management excellence. (DIPRES, 2008:3).

Another element of the Management Control System developed by DIPRES is the
Evaluation Program. During Bachelet’s government, this program outlined a process
of consolidation and incorporation of new mechanisms to provide more information
to the budgetary process. Along with the evaluation of governmental programs,
80

impact evaluation and comprehensive institutional expenditure evaluations, a new
mechanism will be implemented starting in 2009 - the evaluation of new programs.
This new tool will be employed to create a baseline for new programs that will help in
the future to improve their evaluations.

4.e.iii. Setting up the baseline for a new civil service:

The last realm of public management reform has been developed in the National
Agency for Civil Service (Direccion Nacional del Servicio Civil). This agency,
created after the political agreements of 2003, leads the process of creating a model of
civil service for the Chilean public sector. In the last two years, the DNSC has
focused its attention on two topics. The first topic is the implementation of a Senior
Civil Service System (Alta Dirección Pública) which focuses on the selection of first-
and second- level public managers. Table 9 presents the level of achievement this
agency has reached up to July 2008. The second one is the development of a new
culture of human resource management. It is oriented to improve the personnel
function on the Chilean public sector. Under this area of activity, the DNSC has
developed several studies to understand how this function has been performed by
ministries and agencies. The DNSC has recognized recommendations and good
practices that can be taken into account by other agencies in order to improve the
manner in which they manage their functionaries.

81

Table 9: Implementation of the Senior Civil Service System 2003 - 2008
Level

Positions
included
in the
system
% Positions
filled by
the
system
% Appoint
ments in
process
% Still not
open for
applications
%
I Level 101

100 63 62 7 7 31 31
II Level 730

100 279 38 166 23 285 39
Total
System
831 100 342 41 173 21 316 38

Source: Dirección Nacional de Servicio Civil: Statistical Report October 2008
(www.serviciocivil.cl)

To sum up, during President Bachelet’s term, public management reform policies
have followed a different path. These policies have been implemented “from within”,
meaning they have been an evolution of actions that started in previous governments,
rather than a product of a rational plan to address changes in practices and routines to
make a more efficient public sector. As was mentioned earlier, the fact that no agency
was created or defined as the single “leader” of a modernization effort demonstrate a
particular vision regarding how this policy domain should be conducted. The
leadership, or a “de facto” leadership
31
, of DIPRES in this realm implies that public
management reform should be “efficiency” oriented.

4.f. Conclusions of the Chapter:

The Chilean public sector is worth studying, given the trajectory this sector has
followed in the last 30 years or so. The starting point was a public sector dominated

31
This leadership has been pointed out by scholars (Waisbluth, 2006), but also by international
institutions working in Chile (World Bank, 2005).
82

by one of the oppressive dictatorships in Latin America, and one of the first “real-
world” laboratories in which the neoliberal experiment was carried out. The ending
point in this process is a public sector, on the one hand, coping with episodes of
corruption, but on the other hand, with a public service beginning a new civil service
system and consolidating a system of management control tied to the budgetary
process. The panorama is a bureaucracy filled with paradoxes and conundrums,
particularly regarding the values that should prevail in it and the type of public sector
that should predominate.

According to Waissbluth (2006), public sector reform policies - particularly those
implemented by the Budget Office (DIPRES) - follow the program designed by
advocates of the NPM paradigm. The definition of standards, performance indicators,
evaluation of programs, and incentives to improve performance are part of the normal
life of public agencies after a period of ten years of reforms. The intensive use of
information technologies not only provides services to citizens, but also improves
internal processes within organizations, such as the highly developed and awarded
32

procurement platform, ChileCompra. Table 10 provides a list of NPM style reforms
that are drawn from the list of NPM definitions presented in Chapter 2. As one can
see from the table, NPM style reforms have been implemented to a great extent. Of
course, this list of NPM traits is not fully applicable to the Chilean reality. However,

32
ChileCompra is a procurement system created in 2003 that uses a web based platform to allow
agencies to improve their ability to contract and/or purchase goods and services. This project has been
awarded with several prizes in Chile and abroad, due to its revolutionary methodology, which can be
considered as a lever to increase transparency in public management.
83

one can argue that NPM has been a theoretical paradigm influencing the adoption of
public sector reform in Chile for the last eighteen years.

Table 10: NPM Doctrines and how those doctrines have been implemented in Chile
Doctrine Implementation in Chile

1. Concern for defining standards or
means of measurement of activities

Management Control System:
Improvement Management Programs
2. Efficiency in the use of resources

Management Control System:
Comprehensive Spending Review
3. Adoption of private sector
managerial techniques (i.e. intensive
use of ITs)

Adoption of procurement
mechanisms such as ChileCompra
Intensive use of private sector
oriented managerial techniques,such
as strategic management, ISO
9001:2000 certification
4. Flexibility in financial
management

Management Control System:
Evaluation of new programs
5. Efforts to achieve organizational
restructuring (decentralization,
flexibility, hierarchy reduction,
among others).
Pending

At least in normative terms, NPM doctrines have been implemented in the Chilean
process of public sector reform. The implementation of these doctrines has
engendered different outcomes. The current literature dealing with the implications of
NPM style reforms in the world is based on two key areas of academic inquiry: the
impact of this new paradigm on public employees’ values and the managerial
implications in terms of the adoption of new managerial practices among public
employees. This is what Hood and Peters (2004) called the unexpected outcomes of
reform processes. Yet, what happens in Chile?

84

The first element deals with public employees’ values, which is highly connected to
issues of public service ethics and corruption. The perception of corruption in Chile,
according to Transparency International, is relatively low. In fact, the perception of
corruption index undertaken by Transparency International around the world ranks
this country 22
nd
in the 2007 Survey. In general, there is still a sense of public service
ethic among public employees; however, for various political and intellectual actors,
the scandals linked to alleged episodes of corruption, such as the one in the Ministry
of Education, show the weakness of a public administration unable to cope with the
economic, social and political changes of the 90s and the new century. “The inability
of a ministry that spends close to a fifth of the government's budget to keep its books
in order suggests that Chile's public administration, which just two years ago was
described by the Inter-American Development Bank as one of the most efficient in
the region, is not all that it is reputed to be” (The Economist, 2008: 48). Perhaps, the
reason for this decay has been an ill-defined process of public sector reform, which
focused on changing structures, defining standards, improving results, but overlooked
the culture and particularly the values of the Chilean public sector.

The second element dealing with the impact of NPM style reforms in Chile refers to
the real implications of interventions at the organizational level. Reforms usually tend
to be highly consistent programs of actions oriented to modify practices, routines, and
sometimes even cultures and values. It has been presented in this dissertation that the
central purpose of NPM reforms is to direct the behavior of individuals towards
85

efficiency, and to make a government that cost less and does more, paraphrasing the
National Performance Review motto. Yet, is this the case in Chile? Are these new
practices truly adopted by public employees?

These two inquires lead us to the central topic of this dissertation: what is the impact
of NPM style reforms in Chile, particularly, do NPM style reforms erode public
sector values and yield actual change in managerial practices? A public sector with a
clear intention to develop a more professional civil service, with highly sophisticated
mechanisms of control, such as the management control system, and significant levels
of efficiency (albeit flawed by a growing sensation of maladministration and
corruption, at least according to the scandals unveiled in the last 15 years) deserves
attention. It deserves attention because of the potential contradictions public servants
may be facing in their jobs. It raises a reasonable doubt as to how public employees
should be motivated to participate in this new Chile. The following chapters develop
the topic of motivation in the public sector, stressing the normative and descriptive
approaches of the literature. It presents the actual opinions of current public servants
with regards to these topics. Along with that, an assessment of the real implications of
managerial practices was conducted. A complete understanding of the public
employee’s situation would act as an important input to modify or adapt public sector
reform policies. This dissertation is an effort to provide new elements in this line of
inquiry.
86

Chapter 5: Theoretical Framework and Propositions

In this section, the theoretical foundations of the dissertation will be developed to
provide a framework to explain how all the theories are connected. The intention of
this dissertation is to explore the connection between NPM style reforms
implemented by the Chilean government and their potential impact in erosion of
public values of Chilean public employees and its implications in terms of modifying
managerial practices. According to the literature review presented in the previous
chapter, the theoretical foundations of NPM reforms are highly grounded in theories
that highlight the utility maximizing dimensions of public employees. Therefore, the
reason to implement certain managerial tools is grounded in the idea of the
preeminence of extrinsic motivations over intrinsic ones.

5.a. Erosion of Public Values as an Outcome of NPM Style Reforms in the Chilean
Public Sector

The literature indicates that NPM reforms are finally oriented to change the behavior
of individuals, by changing the organization where these employees perform their
duties. Figure 5 shows the flow of changes that should engender NPM style reforms.
87

Figure 5: Rationale behind the implementation of NPM-style reforms.

Following Robertson et al. (1993), NPM-style reforms are consistent with the logic
they depicted for implementing organizational planned change. Figure 6 is the model
presented by Robertson et al. (1993). Adapting this model to this study, one can claim
that the so called “intervention activity” present in the model, can be associated to the
NPM style reform policies, which are meant to be implemented on a government
wide basis. The organizational work settings in public agencies that have been more
influenced by these policies are the organizing arrangements and technology.

Individuals, in this case, public employees modify their behaviors in order to achieve
the organizational outcomes, particularly increasing efficiency in the NPM paradigm.
Due to the characteristics of the NPM movement and the policies implemented so far,
NPM-style Reform Policies
O
R
G.
O
R
G.
O
R
G.
O
R
G.
I
N
D.
I
N
D.
I
N
D.
I
N
D.
Level 1: NPM-style reform policies are
designed to be implemented at all levels of
the public sector.
Level 2: These government wide changes
modified organizational practices and also
organizational functioning.
Level 3: It is assumed that these changes at
the organizational level modify behaviors
at the individual level.
88

it is fair to say that the focus has been organizational performance rather than
individual development.

Figure 6: A theoretical model of the dynamics of planned Organizational change
(Robertson, et al. 1993:621)

One of the key managerial tools that NPM style reforms propose to create individual
change in public employees is the use of incentives, particularly monetary incentives,
to motivate the employees to improve their performance and to unleash
organizational change. This notion is grounded in the idea that motivation is the
driving force to instill a particular behavior. Drawing from the PAF literature, it is
assumed that any employee will tend to improve performance as long as the allocated
incentive works as an extrinsic motivator. The paradox emerges in terms that the
89

public administration literature has suggested that public employees tend to have
different motivations vis-à-vis private employees. Crewson (1997) found that private
employees tend to be more oriented toward extrinsic motivation rather than public
employees. His findings are consistent with a stream of literature that started in the
1960s, with authors such as Kilpatrick, Cummings and Jennings (1964) who found
that public employees have significant differences in the attitude towards external
rewards with private employees.

The psychology literature recognizes two types of motivation: intrinsic and extrinsic
motivations. Individuals are compelled to perform a particular action, meaning
motivated to performs a given act, either by internal drives or actions undertaken by
an external subject or entity: ‘One is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an
activity when one receives no apparent reward except the activity itself’ (Deci,
1971:105, quoted in Frey, 1997: 13). Intrinsic motivation is a phenomenon that has
been widely developed in the psychology literature (DeCharms, 1968; Deci, 172,
1975; Deci and Ryan, 1985). Along with this type of motivation, psychologists claim
that individuals are also motivated by external actions performed by an individual or
an entity. Extrinsic motivation is understood as a motivation engendered by any type
of intervention exerted to an individual from a different entity. These types of
motivation are either rewards or controls.

90

In spite of these differences in terms of motivations, the NPM doctrine, contrary to
the normative approach in Public Administration (Moynihan, 2008) is intended to
highlight incentives among public employees (Burguess and Ratto, 2003). The
problem is that the psychology literature suggests that when intrinsic motivations are
overlooked and managers put an overemphasis on extrinsic motivations, employees
tend to decrease their performance, particularly when their primary motivation was
intrinsic (Deci, 1975; Kohn, 1993). In the public administration literature, several
authors suggest that incentives such as pay merit are not efficient among public
employees because they are not motivated by them (Fox, 1991; Gabris, 1986;
Kellough and Lu, 1993; Perry and Wise, 1990). The fact that public employees are
not extrinsically motivated, but the bulk of the reforms undertaken around the world
in the context of the NPM paradigm stress a different approach to increase
performance among public employees, creates a great paradox in the manner in which
public sector reform policies are implemented. So far that potentially is translated into
the erosion of public values among civil servants.

The fact that rewards are not efficient or inappropriate in Public Administration is due
to what the psychology literature recognizes as the “Crowding-out Effect” (Frey,
1997; Frey and Osterloh, 2002; Weibel et al, 2007). This effect is yielded by
undermining intrinsic motivations in a given person, due to the overemphasis of
external or extrinsic motivation. It is part of the so-called corruption effect (Deci,
1975) or the hidden costs of rewards (Lepper and Greene, 1978), which have been
91

overlooked by economist, particularly those advocating the principal agent
framework. There are three psychological effects that explain the underlying
processes generating the negative effects of rewards. These effects are: impaired self-
determination, impaired self-esteem, and impaired expression possibility (Frey,
1997). Impaired self-determination refers to the process in which individuals, when
perceiving an external reward or control, tend to lower their self determination and
tend to switch from intrinsic to extrinsic motivation as the primary driving
motivation. Impaired self-esteem is produced when individuals are forbidden to show
their intrinsic motivation for a given activity, due to the rewarding or controlling
action of an external agent or entity. Finally, the impaired expression possibility is the
consequence of not being able to show intrinsic motivations to others. The
consequence is that the individual “will in reaction relinquish the inner motivation
and behave according to the external motives” (Frey, 1997: 17). Figure 7 presents a
scheme of this process.

92

Figure 7: The Crowding-out effect from Frey (1997)

This figure presents a theoretical explanation of the process. Scholars suggest that
individuals are not totally intrinsic or extrinsic motivated, there is always a
combination of both. For the purpose of explaining the process Figure 7 shows the
movement from high intrinsic motivation to high extrinsic motivation. In real life
situations the movement will tend to be more moderated towards a middle ground. In
spite of these details, the movement from 1 to 2 is the process that happens when a
reward overemphasizes extrinsic motivation, while overlooking intrinsic motivation.
The potential movement from 2 to 1 would create a crowding-in effect, which would
imply an increase in the intrinsic motivation by the application of an external reward.

Intrinsic
Motivation
High Low
Crowding-out
Effect
Extrinsic
Motivation
Low
High
(1)
(2)
93

Another line of analysis consistent with the one proposed by supporters of the
crowing-out effect is those who are against the use of extrinsically motivated
motivators, such as incentives, claiming that neither change employee’s behavior, nor
help in improving cooperation within an organization. In this group one can include
those thinking that the assumptions in the idea of incentives do not fit with how
people take decisions in real life situations. A clear example in this literature is the
work undertaken by Kohn (1986; 1993; 2006), who claim that incentives in
organizations
33
are more detrimental than beneficial. He starts from a very critical
point of view. Particularly, he tries to tackle the supposedly almost conventional
wisdom that individuals require incentives in order to do something. Consequently, if
one manager does not allocate incentives for improving performance in her
organization, the organization will be doomed to perform poorly. ‘My premise here is
that rewarding people for their compliance is not “the way the world works,” as many
insist.]...[It may seem natural to us, but it actually reflects a particular ideology that
can be questioned’ (Kohn, 1993: 4). He claims that the idea of incentives in
organizations is too narrow because it does not take into account other values that are
more important for improving performance. Particularly, his argument is grounded in
the idea that competition (rewarding) should not be preferred over cooperation. By
narrowing to incentives the way an employee is motivated, a myriad of other less
costly factors, such as friendship, trust, responsibility, among others, are not taken
into account to improve performance. In this context, the use of incentives or external

33
He applies his theories in organizations such as enterprises, but also in public organizations such as
schools.
94

control to improve performance might be even more inconsistent with the objectives
or values that public officials should pursue.

In a similar line of argumentation, although not fully rejecting externally controlled
behaviors, such us the use of incentives, Etzioni (1986)
34
places a caveat in assuming
that incentives are as effective to change behavior as it is proposed by neoclassical
scholars. Etzioni claims those scholars portray a notion of rationality grounded in the
idea that individuals define means according to the benefits they obtained: “The
rational person is out to enhance his or her goals. Means, according to neoclassicists,
are chosen and resources are allocated in such a manner as to maximize the actor’s
utility” (146). In this context, incentives are an appropriate means to improve
performance, because individuals, knowing their behavior could engender benefits for
them, will behave in the manner foreseen by the person defining the incentive.
Etzioni criticizes this approach because he thinks it does not include the full picture of
human rationality. He believes individuals make decisions not only by taking into
account means, but also taken into account some values and emotions. “Actors pursue
two or more goals (utilities): seek pleasure (and hence self-interest), and seek to abide
by their moral commitments” (254). So, if we use this framework to challenge the
idea that incentives are fundamental to shape human behavior, we have to say that in
some conditions this prediction can hold, but in others does not. Individuals cannot
accomplish certain tasks, and obtain a retribution for their attainment, because the
action or the means involved is against the individuals’ values or emotions. The

34
All quotations in this paragraph are from Etzioni (1988).
95

difference between Etzioni and Kohn is that the former leaves room for incentives as
far as they do not challenge individuals’ values and emotions. Kohn, on the other
hand, is more straightforward in rejecting the whole idea of incentives because it does
not reflect human nature and because it is counterproductive for organizations.

The present dissertation is intended to address the paradox or incongruence that
derives from the analysis of the NPM and the psychology literature, and also from the
potential consequences of a crowding-out effect among public employees. It is an
exploratory effort to test whether or not the modernization process undertaken in the
last decades have had an impact on the intrinsic motivation of public employees. Yet,
how can someone measure erosion of public values? The ideal approach might be to
conduct a time series study using the same survey prior to the implementation of
NPM style policies and after a certain period. Unfortunately, there is a lack of
experience in terms of surveys in the Chilean public service, and it is impossible to
find or create a proxy to address this issue using a temporal approach. For purposes of
this dissertation, and assuming the limitations of this option, the manner in which
erosion of public service values and intrinsic motivations are expressed in the public
sector will be measured under the umbrella of the Public Service Motivation (PSM)
concept (Perry, 1996;1997). Perry has taken into account several elements that fit in
the definition of intrinsic motivation already presented in this chapter, and that can be
labeled as public service values oriented.

96

According to Perry and Wise (1982), there was a lack of specific theories in the
public sector to understand the motivation of public employees. The traditional
stream of literature in the public administration had two approaches to this topic. On
the one hand, it assumed a normative approach, grounded in a notion of public service
or professional ethic. This is an individual approach, because it refers to the
individual characteristics of any public employee that justify her actions in public
agencies. On the other hand, the other stream of literature was the empirical approach,
which was mainly connected to the developments of motivation from the
Organization Theory domain, highlighting the contextual factors that motivate public
employees (Perry and Porter, 1982). This dissertation will focus on the motivation
analysis from an individual point of view.

The normative approach regarding the motivation of public employees was oriented
to justify the ultimate end of public administration, and consequently of the final
motivation of public employees, in terms of providing a service for the community.
Their job was not to fulfill their individual needs. On the contrary, their decisions had
to be oriented to accomplish the community’s will. Morstein-Marx portraits this idea
precisely:

When the career man consciously devotes himself to service, he must be able
to displace within himself his private interests to the extent that these would
be in the path of his public responsibilities. But that is only the first step. In
addition, he must learn to recognize the difference between the public, as the
generality of men, and the willing multitudes formed into separate publics. By
becoming subservient to any one public, he fails the general public. Above all,
97

his public spirit should grow with thought and time into a guide toward, the
common good. (1960;138)

Public employees’ motivation was clearly oriented to the fulfillment of those interests
pursued by the society as a whole. The “public” to be served was the society in
general. There was an ethical dimension in the job of those working in the public
sector. “Public Administration participates in the creation of opportunity for the
fructification of moral ends” (Appleby, 1947;95). When one public employee shirks,
his or her mal-performance is not in his or her detriment, but to the society as a
whole. In this context, public employees’ motivation was grounded in an idea of
pursuing some values, such as fairness, justice, solidarity, and so on. Public
employees performed their work because they wanted to contribute to the society’s
well being, not because they were obtaining some personal benefit.

The shift from the normative to the descriptive approach to motivation in the public
sector was given by Perry and Wise (1990). They created the notion of Public Service
Motivation (PSM) as a concept to understand the phenomenon of motivation among
public employees: “Public service motivation may be understood as an individual’s
predisposition to respond to motive grounded primarily or uniquely in public
institutions and organizations” (368). Following the conception of motivation
developed by Knoke and Wright (1982), Perry and Wise characterize PSM as a
construct of three different categories: rational, norm-based and affective. This work
is the initial effort to match the normative approach of traditional public
98

administration literature with the developments accomplished in the organizational
and psychology literature regarding motivation.
35

The instrument developed by Perry (1996) to measure this concept is a five-scale
likert survey with 40 items
36
. Every item is a sentence that refers to one of the three
dimensions. Individuals are called to assess their level or agreement or disagreement
with each of the 40 items. The first proposition of this dissertation is that, if the
crowding out effect yielded by the discourse and instruments deployed by NPM style
policies, is real among public employees, then PSM scores may tend to be low. Public
employees should tend to assign lower values to propositions related to values such as
self-sacrifice, social commitment, and others, which can be linked to public values,
and should be higher in propositions related to extrinsic motivations or external
control. From this analysis one can draw the first proposition:

Proposition 1: Due to the ideological background and practical recommendations of
NPM style reforms as it is seen in the Chilean public sector, public values, expressed
in PSM score, tend to be eroded, which engender a low PSM score.

35
The use of this concept to study motivation among public employees is vast and growing. Authors
such as Bright (2005), Naff and Crum (1999), Wright (2003) and Moynihan and Pandey (2007),
among a long list of others have used and tested the concept in different settings and link it with other
organizational factors, such as commitment, performance, and others.

36
For more analysis of this instrument go to Chapter 6.
99

Another manner to approach this phenomenon is taking an organizational approach.
As it was presented at the beginning of this chapter, NPM style reforms are usually
implemented on a government wide basis. As a matter of fact, Barzelay (2001) uses
the notion that NPM style reforms can be studied as public policies, to the extent that
they are a set of actions oriented to address the issue of public service’s performance.
Drawing from the public policy literature, one could claim that implementation of
NPM style reforms are not free of the vices that any other public policy has.

Particularly, public policies tend to suffer with the so called “implementation gap”,
which refers to the distance between what is decided and what is done. By adapting
this point of view, one could make an argument claiming that organizations have
different levels of adoption of government wide policies. Therefore, public agencies
could have different levels of modernization, and in particular, different levels of
adoption of NPM style practices. In the Chilean case this might be the case because
despite the fact that the government has implemented several of the key “instruments”
consistent with the NPM doctrine, one can recognize different levels of adoption or in
a broader sense, different levels of modernization.

As a matter of fact, the Chilean public sector recognizes different levels of adoption
or different levels of modernization. First, the National Civil Service Agency is in
charge of the Annual Award for Institutional Excellence. According to the law
19.882, this award is intended to recognize the efforts carried out by public agencies
100

of the Chilean public sector in terms of their improvements in performance and
service. The winners of this award receive a bonus of 5% to increase their salaries.
Initially, this award was given to one institution, but in 2008 the government decided
to add two new institutions to reach a group of three institutions. According to
Loeffler (2001), these types of awards are oriented to address two issues: competition
and fostering excellence. Along with those two elements, the Chilean award is
consistent with another element of the NPM movement, the use of incentives to foster
changes, particularly in performance.

The second element where the Chilean public sector recognizes different levels of
modernization is in the implementation and monitoring of the Management
Improvements Programs (MIP). As it was already presented in Chapter Four, one of
the current elements to instill performance improvement is the implementation in
1998 of the Programs for Management Improvement linked to the allocation of a
monetary incentive. The recognition of different levels of modernization can be found
in the fact that the agencies can be included on one of the following two programs:
the Basic Framework (Programa Marco Básico) and the Advance Framework
(Programa Marco Avanzado). Each agency defines its MIPs according to their current
modernization level and to the commitment it does for the coming years. The
Advance Framework is linked to the use of the ISO 9001:2000 standards. In adopting
these mechanisms, the Chilean public administration recognizes different levels of
101

performance, which imply different levels of modernization. From this aspect one can
put forward the following proposition:

Proposition 2: In agencies with a higher level of modernization, meaning a higher
adoption of NPM style managerial recommendations, the erosion of public values
tend to be bigger, implying a smaller score of PSM.

Summing up, PSM is a new notion in the public administration literature, which tries
to tackle the normative and empirical dimensions of motivation among public
employees. It is a theory in progress, because the results so far have shown different
results, suggesting that either the factors studied are still unclear or the instrument to
study the concept needs further development. Maybe, one of the major flaws of PSM
is the lack of comprehensive studies in different parts of the world, along with more
comparative studies. This undertaking could create a major impact in the theory
behind the notion of PSM, because the diversity of public administration from
different countries could unveil other factors that could explain the opposite studies
conducted so far.

5.b. The Managerial Implications of NPM style reforms in the Chilean Public Sector

The second approach to address the outcome of the reform process implemented in
the Chilean public sector in the last eighteen years is to study the managerial
102

implications of those administrative reforms. The intention of doing this effort is to
grasp the real implications of an agenda of reform that was already presented on
Chapter 4. Following Robertson et al (1993), it is assumed that organizational
interventions at the organizational level have an implication at the individual level
yielding organizational outcomes, particularly organizational performance and
individual development. As a matter of fact, the purpose of administrative reforms is
to improve the performance of public agencies, by changing the manner in which
public organizations work.

As in any other planned organizational change, organizations tend to react either by
adapting the new rules or rejecting them. Barriers to change in the public sector or
resistance to change tend to play a key role in terms of permitting or jeopardizing an
effort of organizational change. Popovich (ed.) (1998) claims one of the key elements
any organizational change in public organizations should be taken into account is the
so called politics of change (38-46). In public organizations, the impacts in terms of
benefits and losses for stakeholders are relevant to allow or make change difficult.
Denhardt, et al. (2001) point out what the leadership role is in succeeding change in
public agencies. One leader might be highly committed to a particular organizational
change, but politics could jeopardize this effort and might imply a modification of
plans, usually, by changing the leader. Planned organizational change in public
organizations tends to be replaced by incrementalism or any other type of non rational
decision making process. Denhardt (2000) coined the concept of “pragmatic
103

incrementalism” to acknowledge the particularities of the strategy public managers
and public organizations should follow to bring about organizational change.
Organizational change in public organizations is also a matter of questioning to the
extent that innovation, which is the initial step for most of the organizational change
strategies, is difficult to achieve and allow in public agencies. A last point is raised by
Borins (1998) who found that organizational change in public organizations should be
grounded in the work of middle level managers. Without a certain degree of
devolution or decentralization, organizational change in public agencies cannot take
place. However, the normative elements found in the previous paragraph presents as
necessary to bring about change in public organizations are normally hard to find in
public agencies. The list of vices and wrong doing in public bureaucracies is well
studied in the public administration literature (Caiden, 1991b).

When reality and theory meet, or in this case when the normative aspect of
organizational change in public agencies and the real characteristics of public
organization are contrasted, a key topic for research emerges. The impact of NPM
style reforms can be understood as a good example of how in theory organizational
change in public organizations is conceived, but when these assumptions are usually
overridden by the real characteristics of public organizations, a particular hybrid
emerges. In the case being studied, NPM style reform has an impact in terms of
change in organizational practices, meaning change in the manner in which public
organizations of the Chilean public sector work. Yet, is it possible to assume that the
104

declared organizational changes by public officials or the impact public officials tried
to achieve was met? This dissertation tries to point out to the real implication of NPM
style reforms in administrative practices, by asking key players of the process to
address this topic.

This line of inquiry is the successor of a long term tradition of scholars who have
studied the unexpected outcomes of the implementation of reforms or organizational,
and the implementation of a particular model of public administration, as it is
developed by Hood and Peters (2004). Unexpected outcomes, organizational
paradoxes or in simple terms, surprises, are “outcomes and developments that were
unexpected, unintended, or contrary to received belief, particularly but not only in the
form of unanticipated negative side and reverse effects” (Hood and Peters, 2004:269).
The emergence of these unexpected outcomes is linked to the existence of competing
values in the manner in which organizations are conducted. (Quinn and Cameron,
1988)

Hood and Peters acknowledge three theories or authors that are the most
representative of this tradition: first, Merton and his theory unintended consequences
of social action, second, Cultural Theory, and, third, Complex Socio-technical
Systems. The Mertonian tradition poses the idea that every action generates a myriad
of derivative or unexpected actions or in his terms, consequences: “The consequences
of purposive action are limited to those elements in the resulting situation which are
105

exclusively the outcome of the action, i.e., those elements which would not have
occurred had the action not taken place (Merton, 1936: 895). These consequences
might not be negative necessarily. They can be either positive or negative. They are
the outcome of a purposive action carried out by a particular individual, group or
organization, who did not foresee these resulting unintended actions. The Cultural
Theory tradition proposes emergence of “surprises” while implementing change or
adapting a new managerial reform. Particular attention is placed to the difficulty in
terms of implementing certain doctrines or prescriptions that do not fit with the
cultural norms of the “receiving” country or organization. Finally, the nonlinearities
dynamics proposed by the complex system theory, usually, are overlooked by mostly
rational approaches to organizational change and public sector reform processes.

Looking at the actual impacts of NPM style reforms is consistent with what Hood and
Peters (2004) conceive as the “middle aging of NPM”. For them, the NPM literature
has evolved from the early writings regarding the NPM assumptions and
prescriptions, to the comparison of approaches and cross national differences Pollit
and Bouckaert (2004) being one of the most important, and finally to the final
(current) stage of evolution. In this middle aging, “numerous scholars of public
management reform rediscovered the ironies of social intervention, with more
identification of paradoxes and surprises in public sector management reform” (Hood
and Peters, 2004:268). The last stream of literature combines the impact of NPM style
reform at the national and sector level (Christensen and Laegrid, 2007). At this stage
106

of scholar and practitioner debate, the interest has shifted towards the real
consequences of NPM style reforms.

In Latin America these three streams of literature are hardly developed. Particularly,
due to the fact that when the first stage of NPM literature started to be disseminated in
journals and academic seminars, the majority of the countries of the region where
either beginning transitions to democracy or had regain their democratic status. The
second moment of NPM literature evolution, the comparison of different reform
processes, has been more developed, for instance, Haggard (1998) or Nickson (2006)
can be used as examples. The last step on this evolution of the NPM literature is
starting to emerge or has started in later years. The cases of the impact of NPM style
reforms in the Dominican Republic (Julnes, 2006), Peru and Brazil (Nickson, 2002),
Argentina (López y Zeller, 2006), México (Moctezuma Barragán and Roemer, 2001),
among others.

This dissertation is intended to contribute to this stream of literature as well. The
focus on analyzing the consequences of NPM Style reforms in Chile will be oriented
to understand what had happened in terms of changing managerial practices. In so
doing, the questioning of the real outcome of NPM style reforms in Chile is unfolded.
A narrative effort generated from data obtained in interviews and articles will be
outcome to address this topic. Key players analyzed the managerial modifications
rendered by the wave of NPM style reforms implemented in Chile in the last eighteen
107

years or so. Next chapter presents the methodology adopted for undertaken the survey
and the interviews.
108

Chapter 6: Methodology

6.a. Overview:

The following chapter is intended to present the methodological approach of this
dissertation. As it was presented on the previous chapter, the implications of NPM
style reforms in the literature can be arranged in two groups: potential erosion of
public values and managerial implications. On the one hand, rather than comparing
public agencies’ performance or other quantitative measurement, the intention is
trying to understand whether or not individuals working in public agencies in Chile
have experienced what the public administration literature is prescribing, the erosion
of public values after the implementation of the NPM ideology. On the other hand, a
narrative effort will be made to present the managerial implications of NPM style
reforms in Chile, by taking into account the perspectives of key actors in the scholar
and practitioner realm. This is an exploratory study, because no research study has
dealt with this topic in the Chilean public administration, and no method has been
clearly pointed out as the most appropriate for addressing the topic of interest.

In order to address the first topic, the research strategy will be quantitative, because it
relies on the data generated by a survey applied to public employees in the Chilean
public sector. The quantitative method for data collection used in this study is a
109

survey that was distributed among public employees in a group of public
organizations belonging to the Chilean public sector. It is important to remember that
survey questionnaire “is the conduit through which information flows from the world
of everyday behavior and opinion into the world of research and analysis; it is our
link to the phenomena we wish to study” (Czaja and Blair, 1996;51). Nardi (2006)
summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of this type of quantitative analysis,
which are presented on Table 11.

Table 11: Advantages and disadvantages of surveys (Nardi, 2006:17-18)
Advantages Disadvantages
Less costly to reach larger samples
Standardized questions
Ideal for asking about opinions and attitudes
Les labor intensive to collect data or train
researchers
Can guarantee anonymity
Suitable for probability sampling and more
accurate generalizability
Easier to code closed-ended items.
Respondents can answer at own pace
Better for sensitive and personal topics
Easier to replicate study
Can address multiple topics in one survey
Ideal for computer-based and web-based surveys
Easier to compare with other studies using
similar questions
Self-report requires reading ability in the
language (age, eyesight limitations, education)
Possible gap between what people report they
do and what they actually do
Return rate can be low for mailed and
computer-based surveys, thus limiting
generalizability
Closed-ended questions can be restrictive and
culturally sensitive or dependent
Difficult to explain meaning of items and probe
answers
Depend on asking about recollected behavior
More difficult to code open-ended responses
Can’t guarantee respondent answering it was
the person intended to answer it
Requires skills in questionnaire design
Long and complicated surveys can be tiring to
complete and lead to errors
Easy to overlook, skip around, and
misunderstanding questions
More difficult to generate reliability and
validity for one-time-use questionnaires

Taking into account these elements, survey research seems to be the most appropriate
method to address the central objective of this research to find out about the level of
public service motivation of Chilean public employees. The lack of previous studies
in this topic, the scarce history of survey research in the Chilean public
110

administration, and the natural restriction to undertake a dissertation are factors that
make pertinent the decision of using a survey as a strategy for data collection.

The second strategy will be a narrative effort presenting the main implications of
NPM style reforms in Chile in the last eighteen years. According to Bar-On (2006), a
narrative effort yielded from interviews is a means of generating data that cannot be
easily accessible by other methods. It allows grasping the told and untold stories
regarding a particular phenomenon; in this case, it is a matter of knowing the real
managerial implications of NPM style reforms in the Chilean public sector. Table 12
presents a summary of the research strategies adopted on this research.

Table 12: Summary of the Research Design
Topic Theoretical
Background
Operationalization Technique Sample
Erosion of
Public
Values
The crowding
out effect
Public Service
Motivation
Survey 767 surveys
Managerial
Implications
Unintended
consequences
Evaluation of
Changes in
Practices and
Routines
Narrative
Analysis
Interview
with 15 key
actors and
analysis of
secondary
sources of
information.

In this dissertation the idea was to undertake a “pure research” type of inquiry
37
. The
outcome of this undertaking is “reflection”. “This is where an existing theory,
technique or group of ideas is re-examined, possibly in a different organizational or
social context” (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, et al.,2002: 9). In this context, this

37
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, et al. (2002) recognize three types of research in the management field:
pure research, applied research and action research (8). Each type has different outcomes.
111

dissertation can be seen as a reflection in two ways. First, it is conceived as a
reflection in terms of the contrasting normative approach to motivation among public
employees championed by the NPM “ideology” and the real motivations declared by
real public employees. Second, it is also conceived as a reflection because it tries to
explore the theories broadly developed in developed countries in the context of a
specific country, Chile. There is a lack of scholarly debate about these issues in Chile.
This has created a tendency from practitioners and even scholars of adopting new
ideas without adapting the concepts from a particular country into the particularities
of Chile. The problem with having a non critical approach to this type of literature is
that most of the recommendations for organizational interventions do not take into
account the economic, cultural, or political particularities of each country. This could
entail the adoption of ill defined measures with unintended consequences. This
dissertation will try to help in providing a Chilean perspective to the impact of NPM
style reform in Latin America.

6.b. Elements of the data collection strategy:

6.b.i. Public Service Motivation Survey

The selection of the agencies to be involved in this research responded to two main
criteria: agencies willing to participate in the research and agencies representing
112

different types of public agencies of the Chilean public sector. In terms of the first
criterion, the idea was to include agencies that were willing to grant access to the
required information to fulfill the objectives of this study. In order to satisfy this
criterion, several agencies were contacted via a formal letter either to the director of
the agency or his or her personal advisor. Six out of a total of twelve agencies
contacted gave access to the researcher to undertake the study.

In order to meet the criterion of representation, the typology developed by Wilson
(1989) was adopted to include in this research a broad diversity in terms of agencies
coexisting in the Chilean public sector.
38

Table 13: Wilson’s Typology of Public Agencies (Wilson, 1989)

In this research, the intention was to have at least two agencies for each of the four
categories. Unfortunately, the response did not come out as expected, but all four

38
The typology developed by Wilson (1989) will be adopted because it provides a means to arrange
different types of public agencies only in four types. He uses two criteria: Outputs, or “the work the
agency does” (158), and Outcomes, or “the results of agency work” (158). By combining these two
criteria and whether or not they can or cannot be observable, he defines four types of agencies (Table
13).
Outcomes
Observable Unobservable
Outputs
Observable Production
Examples:
IRS, DMV, SSA.

Procedural
Examples:
Army, Hospitals

Unobservable Craft Examples:
Ministry of Labor,
Forest Service.

Coping
Examples:
Police, Schools.

113

categories were covered, in two cases with only one institution. Table 14 shows the
list of institutions for each of the categories presented by Wilson where surveys were
administered.

Table 14: Agencies included on this research categorized under Wilson`s typology
Outcomes
Observable Unobservable
Outputs
Observable
Institution 2
Institution 3
Institution 4
Institution 6
Unobservable
Institution 5 Institution 1

In this context, this is a purposive or judgmental sampling, because it “involves
designating a group of people for selection because you know they have some traits
you want to study” (Nardi, 2006:119). The traits in this case were the two criteria
already mentioned. By being a purposive or judgmental sampling, this is a
nonprobabilistic sampling. Using Henry’s typology of nonprobability sampling, the
sample strategy of this dissertation was a convenience sampling “select cases based
on their availability for the study” (Henry, 1990:18) or most similar/dissimilar cases
“select cases that are judged to represent similar conditions or, alternatively, very
different conditions” (18). The main characteristic of this type of sampling refers to
the fact that the results are applicable only to those participating in the survey,
because on the definition of the sample “subjective judgments are used to determine
the units of the population that are contained in the sample” (Henry, 1990:17). The
research lacks the intention of generalization of results to a population.
114

The characteristics of each institution are the following:

Institution 1

This agency was created in 1991, as part of the new organizations designed to cope
with the so called less privileged sectors of the Chilean society. This institution was
thought as a technical institution in charge of collaborating and providing advice to
the president, in topics such as design, planning and coordination of public policies
oriented to the youth population of the country. In order to fulfil that mission, the
institution has a relatively small number of employees. The individuals working on
this institution tend to have a political commitment with the political parties of the
coalition in office, because all its employees have been hired when this coalition took
office. The society has witness several scandals that have emerged in this institution
because of this high level of politicization.

Institution 2

In July 1884, the government decided to create an institution in charge of registering
three key milestones in the life of every citizen: birth, marriage and death. These three
basic responsibilities have been expanded to the registration of several formal acts
that require an official certification and an official record. The current mission of the
institution is "To facilitate the exercise of individual’s rights through the registration,
115

certification and verification of facts related to the marital status, identity, goods and
other specific deeds defined by law, preserving confidentiality, trust and accuracy of
information, providing a good service in terms of opportunity and quality”.
39
It is
pointed out as one of the agencies in the forefront of the modernization process.

Institution 3:

The Institution’s origin can be traced back to 1892 when the government at that time
considered important to have an institution working in the field of public health. Ever
since that moment, this institution has been working to certify medicines, provide
vaccines and oversee the pharmaceutical industry. The current institution was created
in 1980 with the mission of “to contribute to the improvement of people’s health,
guaranteeing the quality of goods and services, by reinforcing reference, control and
normalization”.
40

Institution 4

Created in 1962, this institution is oriented to promote development and increasing
the wellbeing of the rural world. It provides subsidies and implements programs to
foster sustainable development of rural cities and families. It is part of the senior civil
service system and it is also pinpointed as one of the most modernized agencies in the

39
Extracted from www.resgistrocivil.cl accessed july, 19
th
, 2008.

40
Extracted from www.ispch.cl accessed july, 19
th
, 2008.
116

Chilean public sector. Despite its modernization level, during 2006 it was involved in
several corruption scandals.

Institution 5

The institution was created in 2003 as part of a major reform in the area of
procurement of the Chilean public sector. The institution that preceded this new
organization worked from 1927 to 2003 as the supplier of goods for public agencies
using a traditional method of acquisition. By relying on the intensive use of
technologies, the new institution modified the manner in which the whole
procurement process took place in the Chilean public sector. In the last 5 years, the
new system has been a linchpin in the process to make bureaucracies more
transparent and to open the market for the public sector open to not only major
companies, but also to small and medium enterprises. It is conceived as a small
institution relying on technology to fulfill its mandate.

Institution 6

Created in 1980, this institution was conceived as a central actor in the pensions’
reform implemented during the dictatorship. The objective of this institution was to
coordinate the pension system of individuals not being part of the new private system.
117

Along with that function, this institution was in charge of promoting risk prevention
and health in the workplace.

In terms of numbers of employees, the institutions that gave access to conduct the
survey include a wide range of sizes. Table 15 provides the total number of
employees for each institution. It is important to mention this is the total number of
employees with a long and short term contract with the institution. Individuals
working as contractors on a given institution are not included on this Table.

Table 15: Number of employees
by Institutions
*

Institution Employees
Total
Institution 1 103
Institution 2 2800
Institution 3 592
Institution 4 1359
Institution 5 64
Institution 6 3083
*
: According to the 2007 Comprehensive
Management Assessment of each agency
(available at www.dipres.cl).

The instrument: The Public Service Motivation Survey (Perry, 1996)

PSM Index: Surveys

The key data collection strategy of this dissertation was the application of an
instrument to measure the level of Public Service Motivation (PSM) among public
118

employees. This survey is an effort to address the topic of motivation using a “public
administration bias”. The aim of this instrument was to study the level of PSM that
employees have, and then at the aggregate level, to know the level of PSM of the
organization as a whole, and the levels of PSM by groups. The instrument to measure
this phenomenon was created by Perry (1996) and can be pointed out as the standard
in this field, due to its extensive use.
41
In terms of regional settings, this survey has
been used in other realities different from the US, where this notion has gained
recognition among scholars.
42
This survey uses a list of statements that individuals
being surveyed have to mark using a Likert scale. Table 16 shows the items and
categories included on the original version of the survey.

41
In terms of the debate regarding the technical aspects of the instrument developed by Perry, the
discussion was initiated by the author himself. Perry (1996) proposes initially a six-category and forty-
item instrument. After conducting the survey, Perry (1996) modifies the instrument moving to a four-
catgory and 24 item survey. In terms of testing the instrument, Coursey, Perry, Brudney and Littlepage
(2008) develop a psychometric verification of the original instrument developed by Perry (1996).
Coursey and Pandey (2007) test Perry’s four-category instrument, eliminating one of the categories
that according to them can strengthen the capacity of the instrument and make the instrument more
consistent with the original Knoke and Wright’s three category approach. They also created a smaller
instrument for practical purposes, meaning that the smaller the instrument the better for conducting
research in public agencies. Their results do not reject the original instrument developed by Perry.

42
Vandenabeele, Scheepers and Hondeghem (2006) develop a modified notion of PSM, which takes
the essence of Perry’s definition and proposes some modifications. They also take this new definition
and test them in the UK and Germany. Camilleri (2006) studied PSM in the Maltese public sector,
focusing his attention on the connection between PSM and organizational commitment.
119

Table 16: Public Service Motivation Items by Subscale
Attraction to Policy Making (5 items)
PSM11
PSM15
PSM22
PSM27
PSM31
Politics is a dirty word. (Reversed)
I respect public officials who can turn a good idea into law.
Ethical behavior of public officials is as important as competence.
The give and take of public policy making doesn't appeal to me. (Reversed)
I don't care much for politicians. (Reversed)
Commitment to the Public Interest (7 items)
PSM7

PSM16
PSM23
PSM30
PSM34

PSM37
PSM39
People may talk about the public interest, but they are really concerned only about their
self-interest. (Reversed)
It is hard for me to get intensely interested in what is going on in my community.
(Reversed)
I unselfishly contribute to my community.
Meaningful public service is very important to me.
I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the whole community even if it
harmed my interests.
An official's obligation to the public should always come before loyalty to superiors.
I consider public service my civic duty.
Social Justice (5 items)
PSM18
PSM20
PSM32
PSM33
PSM38
I believe that there are many public causes worth championing.
I do not believe that government can do much to make society fairer. (Reversed)
If any group does not share in the prosperity of our society, then we are all worse off.
I am willing to use every ounce of my energy to make the world a more just place.
I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights of others even if it means I will be ridiculed.
Civic Duty (7 items)
PSM14

PSM21
PSM25
PSM28

PSM29
PSM35
PSM36
When public officials take an oath of office, I believe they accept obligations not
expected of other citizens.
I am willing to go great lengths to fulfill my obligations to my country.
Public service is one of the highest forms of citizenship.
I believe everyone has a moral commitment to civic affairs no matter how busy they
are.
I have an obligation to look after those less well off.
To me, the phrase "duty, honor, and country" stirs deeply felt emotions.
It is my responsibility to help solve problems arising from interdependencies among
people.
Compassion (8 items)
PSM2
PSM3
PSM4
PSM8
PSM10
PSM13
PSM24

PSM40
I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged. (Reversed)
Most social programs are too vital to do without.
It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress.
To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others.
I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don't know personally. (Reversed)
I am often reminded by daily events about how dependent we are on one another.
I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first step to
help themselves.(Reversed)
There are few public programs that I wholeheartedly support. (Reversed)

120

Table 16: Public Service Motivation Items by Subscale (Continued)

Self-Sacrifice (8 items)
PSM1
PSM5
PSM6

PSM9
PSM12
PSM17
PSM19
PSM26
Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements.
I believe in putting duty before self.
Doing well financially is definitely more important to me than doing good deeds.
(Reversed)
Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself.
Serving citizens would give me a good feeling even if no one paid me for it.
I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it.
I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone else.
I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of society.

This original framework was modified by Perry (1996), who reduced the survey to a
24-item and 4-categories survey, according to the results he obtained on his data
collection. The researcher decided to maintain the original version, because this
survey has never been implemented in Chile and the problems that Perry found on his
implementation in the US does not imply the same results in the Chilean context. It is
out of the purpose of this dissertation to address the technical issues presented by
Perry (1996) and Coursey and Pandey (2007) among others, in terms of the fit of the
model or how pertinent are the 40 or the 24 items included in the survey. The survey
is appropriate for the purposes of this dissertation as it is, further research might be
necessary to test whether or not the instrument should be modified.

The administration of the survey took place in five stages (following Czaja and Blair,
1996). The first stage was the selection and translation of the survey, along with the
communication with the agencies asking for permission to conduct the survey. The
translation of the instrument was not only literal, meaning it was not only a
translation from English to Spanish, but also, a translation in cultural terms, to adapt
121

the reality of the American Public Administration to the Chilean one. Some of the
statements required adaptation to the Chilean reality, because in some cases the literal
translation of words did not grasp the real meaning of what the author intended to
capture. Two faculty members of the University of Chile helped in this literal and
cultural translation, both with degrees in the US. A third person was contacted to
provide a different view, a high level practitioner with expertise in these topics,
contributing to polish the instrument. In terms of contacting agencies, a sample of
twelve agencies was selected to be contacted via a formal letter of invitation to
participate in the survey. Six out of those twelve answered the invitation and gave
access to the agency. The second stage was the implementation of a pilot of the
survey to a limited number of employees, in order to test whether or not the
instrument was clear and fit the Chilean reality. In the third stage, a revised version of
the survey was created with the information gathered from the pilot of stage 2. The
fourth stage was the application of the survey itself in the six agencies that provided
access. The final stage was the creation of a dataset with the surveys obtained. The
cleaning of the dataset at this stage was the key task to perform. Table 17 presents a
summary of these actions undertaken to apply the survey.
Table 17: Summary of the five stages to implement the survey
Phase Activities
First Translation (literal and cultural)
Contacting agencies
Second Pilot testing the instrument
Third Creation of a revised version of the survey
Fourth Application of the survey
Fifth Creation of the dataset

122

In terms of the administration of the survey to the population, it is important to
mention that there are many methods to implement surveys and each one of them has
different potential levels of response and different levels of reliability. The traditional
approach is to distribute among the population one wants to study a survey in paper
and to define a period to respond. This is a very time consuming activity, but, the
information is thought to be highly reliable.
43
Nowadays, Internet provides a new
alternative for applying surveys, although the reliability of the information obtained is
not clear. Table 18 provides a comparison of different mechanisms for data
collection.

43
Czaja and Blair (1996) provide a comparison among three main types of survey methods, mailed
questionnaires, telephone, and face-to-face.

123

Table 18: Comparing Different Methods of Data Collection
Personal
Interviewing
Telephone
Interviewing
Self-
administered
data collection
Group
administration
Mail
procedures
Dropping off
questionnaires
Internet
Potential
Advantages
Create more
cooperation with
the study
Complex
Questions can be
explained
Different means
of data collection
can be feasible
Increasing levels
of confidence are
possible
Longer surveys
can be
administered
Less expensive than
personal interviews
Random-digit-
dialing can be used
to sampling a
general population
Short period of data
collection
Less staff is
required to
implement the
survey
High response rate
Use of visual
aids is easier.
Complex
questions are
feasible.
The respondent
does not share
her questions
with an
interviewer.
High
cooperation
rates
Low cost
It is possible
to explain the
survey
Relatively
inexpensive
Small number
of staff and
facilities are
required
Access to
areas of
difficult
access
Respondents
can have time
to think about
the questions.
The
interviewer can
engage the
respondent
Higher
response rates
than mail.
Respondents
can have time
to think about
the questions.
Low cost per unit
Potential high
speed of
answered surveys
Same advantages
as in self-
administered
surveys.
Respondents can
have time to think
about the
questions.
Potential
Disadvantages
Likely to be
costly
Training of staff
to survey might
be required
The data
collection might
be longer
Not all samples
can be surveyed
by this method
Sample problems
due to the exclusion
of those without
telephone number.
Constraints in terms
of data collection.

The
questionnaire
must be
carefully
designed.
The respondent
requires a
particular level
of writing and
reading skills.
Quality control
of answers is
difficult
Small number
of surveys can
be taken
together.
Difficulties to
engage
potential
respondents.
The list of
mailing
address must
be highly
reliable.
Expensive
Trained staff is
required to
administer the
survey
Sample is limited
to those using
and/or Internet
Requires a level
of expertise of
respondents.
Problems in
engaging
potential
respondents.

Source: Adapted from Fowler (2002:71-74)
124

Taking into account the pros and cons of each data collection, a web based survey
platform
44
was adopted, particularly, due to the relative low cost, the level of
penetration of email use among public officials and the time that people being
surveyed can allocate to answer the instrument. Unfortunately, the experience in
Latin America, let alone Chile, is very limited. There is a lack of consistent research
in public administration using this type of method of data collection.

In order to have a higher level of response several actions were carried out,
individuals received in their emails addresses one email inviting to participate on the
investigation. This email provided information regarding the survey, but also about
the method used for administering the survey. A second email was sent to the same
email list inviting to participate to those putting off filling the survey. The last email
was sent between two and three weeks after the original email was sent. It was a
reminder to those still postponing the activity. As expected, the response rate was
higher right after the emails inviting to participate were sent. Very limited number of
responses was received after three or four days reminder emails were sent. It seems
this is one of the characteristics of web-based surveys.

44
The web page selected was www.surveymonkey.com

125
The number of surveys submitted using the web based method was the following:
Table 19: Number of surveys by Institution
45

Total surveys Complete Incomplete
Valid Institution 1 30 28 2
Institution 2 122 96 26
Institution 3 125 103 22
Institution 4 240 200 40
Institution 5 30 28 2
Institution 6 220 190 30
Total 767 645 122

Characteristics of data collection on each institution:

Institution 1: The invitation to participate in the survey was distributed only to the
emails of employees working on the central offices of the institution. The Director of
the institution showed interest on the survey, so he tried to invite employees to
participate.

Institution 2: In this institution, after access was granted, an employee provided
access to a total number of 400 emails of the central offices of the institution. This
was considered a representative number of the employees working on that agency.
From that list on emails, the response was 123 responses, which represents a 30%
response rate of this sample.

45
Complete: The respondent filled all the information required in the survey, including the control
variables. Incomplete: the respondent failed to fill the required information.

126
Institution 3: Once the Director of the Institution granted access, the Public Relations
office sent an invitation to all employees. The institution used the official mechanism
of communication of the agency to invite to participate on this research.

Institution 4: This institution decided to send the invitation to the whole agency,
including those working outside the capital of Chile. This implied that the number of
potential responses was higher. There were problems to contact the people in charge
of sending the invitations to participate on the research project, which limited the
possibility of sending reminders and other mechanisms to increase the response rate.

Institution 5: The invitation to participate in the survey, after the director granted
access to the institution was to the whole institution. This is a small and new
institution, which reaches a total of 83 employees.

Institution 6: This institution provided the highest level of support to undertake this
research. The institution assigned a professional to serve as a liaison with the
researcher to send the invitation to a representative number of the population. The
professional combined several databases of the agency to make sure that the sample
was going to be representative of the whole population.

127
Sample Size

In order to define the level of representation of this sample, there is a key element to
clarify. In Chile, public employees are divided in two big groups: public employees in
strict sense and contractors
46
. In the first group, one can include full time employee
and fixed term employee. In the second group, one can include all those employees
that are providing a service to the institution, but without having all the benefits of
being a public employee. For the first group, there are clear statistics clarifying the
number for each year. However, for the second group, there are no clear databases,
because one person can be providing a service in the same institution using different
contracts. Moreover, the same person can provide a different service in the same
institution, which means two different contracts. The problem for this research is that
it is difficult to find numbers to clarify the real number of employees that might be
part of the investigation, and hence, the percentage of the population the sample is
covering. Table 20 presents the distribution of the public employees and those under
contracts. After that table is presented, Table 21 presents the number of public
employees that might participate in the survey, and the percentage of response.

46
For purposes of this research both groups are part of this investigation. The fact that the type of
contract makes a distinction in their duties and rights does not imply that they cannot be considered
civil servants. Due to financial and even legal restrictions, public agencies tend to have people
providing key services for the institution and even for the population, but cannot be hired as a fully
civil servant.

128
Table 20: Public employees and Contractors by Institution
Public
Employee
Contractors Percentage
Public
Employees
Percentage
Public
Contractors
Missing
Institution 1 19 9 67.9 32.1 2
Institution 2 87 10 89.7 10.3 25
Institution 3 99 4 96.1 3.9 22
Institution 4 170 31 84.6 15.4 39
Institution 5 22 6 78.6 21.4 2
Institution 6 184 6 96.8 3.2 30
Total 581 66 89.8 10.2 120

Table 21: Total number of employees by institution, sample size and percentage
surveyed
Institution Employees
Total
1

Employees invited
to participate
Respondents Percentage
Institution 1 103 103 19 18,44%
Institution 2 2800 400 87 3,1%
Institution 3 592 592 99 16,72%
Institution 4 1359 1359 170 12,5%
Institution 5 64 64 22 34,38%
Institution 6 3083 Uninformed 184 5,97%
1
: According to the 2007 Comprehensive Management Assessment of each agency.
2
: Invitations were sent to a representative sample of the institution.

The information obtained in the data collection of this dissertation will be analyzed
according to the propositions presented on Chapter 5. In particular, the intention was
to test whether or not the results can be used to support the argument of erosion of
values, finding different PSM scores among the institutions involved on this study.

129
6.b.ii. Managerial Implications of Implementing NPM style Reforms in the
Chilean Public Sector:

Due to the characteristics of this topic, the research strategy to gather data was a
qualitative one. Rather than focusing on quantitative data to address the changes or
outputs of reforms in Chile, the research strategy was oriented to generate qualitative
data to grasp the implications and key players of the process conceived as important.
In this context, the research strategy followed two streams. The first one was oriented
to gather data from newspapers articles and documents addressing the issues being
studied. The second strategy was the implementation of a group of interviews to grasp
the real implications of these managerial implications from the perceptions of key
actors, both from the academic and consultant realm and from practitioners.
47
The
objective of newspaper articles reviews and interviews was to find the outcomes of
the process rather than doing a historical analysis, which has been included on
Chapter 4 of this dissertation. In other words, the data collection strategy was oriented
to have an overview from different sources of information of the implications in
terms of changes in practices, routines, organizational culture, and others, after a
period of managerial changes in the Chilean public sector. Semi-structured or
nonscheduled-structured interviews were important to grasp the perception of key
players either involved in public sector reform policies at the central level or at the
agency level. This technique was more appropriate because “respondents are given

47
Appendix 1 presents the list of individuals interviewed.

130
considerable liberty in expressing their definition of a situation that is presented to
them” (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1981:191).

Following Bar-On (2006), the definition of the sample of interviews followed two
strategies. The first method was the definition of a list of practitioners, scholars and
union leaders of the public sector. This list came up from a comparison with other
research projects such as Olavarria (forthcoming) or Ramirez (2004) that used the
same data collection strategy. The second strategy was the improvement of the list. In
order to do that, a snow ball method was adopted to include new members to the list,
because each interviewee provided new names that might be willing to participate on
this research or that might provide a new perspective to the topics being studied.
Interviews were transcribed or notes were taken when the interviewee did not allow
recording the interview.

One of the key elements on this data collection strategy was to have a broad and
comprehensive array of individuals included on the list of interviewees. It was
necessary not only having the official discourse of public sector reform policies in
Chile, but also to have more critical perspectives. As a matter of fact, the list included
former directors of public sector reform units, former and current heads of public
agencies, high level professionals working or with experience on this issue, scholars
and members of think tanks both supporters or in opposition to the current coalition in
office, consultants, and union leaders. Particularly interesting was the incorporation

131
of union leaders in this research, because they are usually seen as a reactive and
critical actor in many of the reform processes undertaken within the public sector.
However, for the outlined research strategy their notions of the process were
extremely interesting in terms of what public employees were really thinking about
the process, and as to how modernization processes were implemented in real life
situations.

Two criteria were followed in order to follow the expected standards of any social
science inquiry. First, the construct validity of the data collection will rely on the fact
that multiple sources, in this case interviews, were consulted to gather the required
data to come up with the categories emerging from the interviews. Second, the
reliability of the data collection process will be protected by reporting all the
procedures that were followed to gather the information.

As it has been defined in several parts of this proposal, the delimitations of this study
are very clear: the population subject to study is public employees working in public
agencies of the Chilean public sector. Due to the characteristics of this study the
limitations one could highlight refer to the lack of generalization to other cultural
realities. The conclusions of this study cannot be extrapolated to different countries
due to the role that cultural, political, and economic facts play in shaping public
agencies. This is a particularly important deed in the public sector, because each
country has a different public administration culture, which has evolved for years and

132
years. Hence, the conclusions one could recognize, are only orientations to be taken
into account, and could be used to recognize the nuances in the public administration
domain.

Another limitation of this research is the scope of the data collection strategy. It
means a limited number of institutions involved on the survey, and a limited number
of interviews conducted. In the first case, it was difficult to get access to other
institutions, because of the moment the formal communications took place, from
October to December 2007, which is the moment where public agencies are finishing
their activities of the year and planning for the coming year. Several agencies decided
not to participate, because their employees were too busy to distract their attention on
this matter. In the second case, the limited number of interviews can be explained on
the difficulties of having time to interview key actors that usually have limited time to
spare.

The final and most important limitation of this research is the lack of a baseline to be
used as a standard to compare the reality drawn after the analysis obtained on this
research and previous analyses. Due to the characteristics of this research, it would
have been important to have a point of comparison with a previous research to be able
to find potential changes overtime on the topic studied on this research. However, the
limited research on this subject forced the study to follow proxies and adopt a
particular purview to address the topics of this research.

133
Chapter 7: Results
7.a. Overview:

The following chapter contains two datasets, each one of them is oriented to address
different approaches to the impact of NPM-style reform policies in the Chilean public
sector. The first dataset is the result of the Public Service Motivation Survey
conducted with 767 individuals who work on the central apparatus of the Chilean
public sector. In order to have a better understanding of the dataset, the results will be
presented according to the two instruments that can be drawn from Perry (1996). The
first instrument includes all forty statements included in the survey. The second
instrument is the refined instrument, which includes only twenty four out of the forty
items of the instrument. Providing both sets of statements provides a better picture of
the dataset yielded for this dissertation.
48
The second dataset is the outcome of the
interviews conducted with fourteen key players of the public management policy
domain. Extracts of the interviews are used to develop an argument in terms of the
key topics the interviewees presented regarding the topic of this dissertation.

48
Both analyses will be included, because it is out of the scope of this dissertation to follow the 40 or
the 24 item instrument. It is assumed that the Chilean reality and the reality in the US are not
necessarily similar, then, the process Perry (1996) follow to refine the instrument do not necessarily
lead to the same results. Further research is required to test whether or not the decision taken by Perry
is also appropriate for the Chilean reality.

134
7.b. Public Service Motivation Survey
49
:
7.b.i. Reliability:
Alpha scores were calculated to check the reliability of the dataset generated in the
data collection phase. Tables 22 and 23 provide the Cronbach’s Alpha scores for the
40 Item Instrument and the 24 Item Instrument respectively. Tables 24 and 25 report
the Cronbach’s Alpha for the categories created by Perry (1996). The reason for using
this test is that it shows the internal consistency and reliability of the scales of the
dataset. In both cases, Alpha is higher than .7, which is the standard accepted in this
type of analysis. This means the dataset has internal consistency, and we can use the
information generated to draw conclusions from this sample.
50

Table 22: Reliability Statistics 40 Item Instrument
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's Alpha
Based on Standardized
Items
N of
Items
.876 .891 40

Table 23: Reliability Statistics 24 Items Instrument
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's Alpha
Based on Standardized
Items
N of
Items
.803 .818 24

49
In order to focus our attention on the results obtained after the application of this survey, the
description of the demographics of the dataset can be found on Appendix 2.

50
Appendix 3 provides the reliability statistics by Item.

135
Table 24: Reliability Scores for each Category (40 Item Instrument)
Category
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's Alpha
Based on
Standardized Items N of Items
Attraction to Policy Making items .602 .562 5
Commitment to the Public Interest items .578 .628 7
Social Justice items .578 .646 5
Civic Duty items .713 .727 7
Compassion items .425 .442 8
Self-Sacrifice items .697 .711 8

Table 25: Reliability Scores for each Category (24 Item Instrument)
Category
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's Alpha
Based on Standardized
Items N of Items
Attraction to Policy Making items .743 .738 3
Commitment to Public Interest items .689 .702 5
Compassion items .425 .442 8
Self-Sacrifice items .697 .711 8

7.b.ii. Addressing propositions:

Proposition 1: Due to the ideological background and practical recommendations of
NPM style reforms as it has been implemented in the Chilean public sector, public
values, expressed in PSM score, tend to be eroded, which engender a low PSM score.

Erosion of public values is a very complicated topic to address. The means chosen on
this dissertation to address this issue was the concept of Public Service Motivation.

136
The assumption was that lower scores of PSM show lower levels of interest for values
that are usually considered as part of the “public service values”. The instrument used
to measure PSM, as shown in Chapter 6, was the one developed by Perry (1996). The
theoretical assumptions of this instrument were already developed in previous
chapters.

If the notion of erosion of public values is right, the scores should be lower than 3,
which is the number assigned as “neutral” on the five-item scale used in Perry´s
instrument. According to the data obtained in the data collection stage of this
dissertation, the PSM mean score for the 40 item instrument of the 767 filled surveys
was 3.7905, while the score for the 24 item was 3.7495, as they are presented on
Table 26. These scores mean that on average individuals tend to have a public service
motivation relatively high, closer to 4, which implies that on average public
employees of the Chilean public sector tend to agree with the statements of the
survey.

Table 26: Descriptive Statistics PSM Score

N Minimum Maximum Mean
Std.
Deviation
PSM Score (40 Items Scale) 767 1.37 4.75 3.7905 .41455
PSM Score (24 Item Scale) 767 1.25 4.79 3.7495 .43304
Valid N (listwise) 767

137
This score implies that the sample of the public employees surveyed tend to have a
concern for public values, rather than showing erosion of values. They tend to agree
with the sentences presented in the survey. This acknowledgement implies that they
have a considerable recognition for a set of values that are linked to “public values”,
which belong to the most internal justifications of fulfilling public duties on public
agencies, as it was developed in Chapter 5. In order to go more into details of the
dataset, Table 27 presents the list of the forty items included, as taken by the
individuals who participated. In order to increase the robustness of the survey, Perry
included several statements that were conceived in reverse terms. In so doing, the
author tried to combine positive and negative statements to avoid bias on the
instrument. However, in order to make all statements equivalent, and to create a
unique index, the score for those items are presented reversed in Table 27. Figure 8
presents a graph with the average scores per item, showing a consistency in terms of
the tendency towards commitment to public service values, with only a couple of
items that can be considered as outliers.

138
Table 27: Public Service Motivation: Average by Item (whole sample)

N Media
St.
Dev.
PSM 01 - Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements. 767 3.22 1.187
PSM 02 - I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged. (Reversed) 767 4.27 .813
PSM 03 - Most social programs are too vital to do without. 767 3.96 1.109
PSM 04 - It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress. 767 3.99 .904
PSM 05 - I believe in putting duty before self. 767 3.68 1.109
PSM 06 - Doing well financially is definitely more important to me than doing good deeds. (Reversed) 767 3.85 .965
PSM 07 - People may talk about the public interest, but they are really concerned only about their self-interest. (Reversed) 767 2.32 1.128
PSM 08 - To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others. 767 3.93 1.043
PSM 09 - Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. 767 3.89 1.000
PSM 10 - I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don't know personally. (Reversed) 767 4.04 .938
PSM 11 - Politics is a dirty word. (Reversed) 744 3.56 1.261
PSM 12 - Serving citizens would give me a good feeling even if no one paid me for it. 744 3.96 .928
PSM 13 - I am often reminded by daily events about how dependent we are on one another. 744 4.20 .800
PSM 14 - When public officials take an oath of office, I believe they accept obligations not expected of other citizens. 744 4.05 1.009
PSM 15 - I respect public officials who can turn a good idea into law. 744 4.29 .782
PSM 16 - It is hard for me to get intensely interested in what is going on in my community. (Reversed) 744 3.75 .966
PSM 17 - I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it. 744 3.93 .849
PSM 18 - I believe that there are many public causes worth championing. 744 4.45 .637
PSM 19 - I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone else. 744 3.67 .933

139
Table 27: Public Service Motivation: Average by Item (whole sample) (continued)
PSM 20 - I do not believe that government can do much to make society fairer. (Reversed) 744 3.58 1.405
PSM 21 - I am willing to go great lengths to fulfil my obligations to my country. 727 4.09 .745
PSM 22 - Ethical behaviour of public officials is as important as competence. 727 4.51 .875
PSM 23 - I unselfishly contribute to my community. 727 4.09 .714
PSM 24 - I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first step to help themselves. (Reversed) 727 3.17 1.164
PSM 25 - Public service is one of the highest forms of citizenship. 727 3.68 1.009
PSM 26 - I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of society. 727 3.53 .884
PSM 27 - The give and take of public policy making doesn't appeal to me. (Reversed) 727 3.56 1.114
PSM 28 - I believe everyone has a moral commitment to civic affairs no matter how busy they are. 727 4.00 .864
PSM 29 - I have an obligation to look after those less well off. 727 3.91 .887
PSM 30 - Meaningful public service is very important to me. 727 4.27 .770
PSM 31 - I don't care much for politicians. (Reversed) 716 3.27 1.285
PSM 32 - If any group does not share in the prosperity of our society, then we are all worse off. 716 3.93 1.015
PSM 33 - I am willing to use every ounce of my energy to make the world a more just place. 716 4.27 .643
PSM 34 - I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the whole community even if it harmed my interests. 716 3.87 .863
PSM 35 - To me, the phrase "duty, honor, and country" stirs deeply felt emotions. 716 3.54 1.117
PSM 36 - It is my responsibility to help solve problems arising from interdependencies among people. 716 3.75 .828
PSM 37 - An official's obligation to the public should always come before loyalty to superiors. 716 3.81 1.107
PSM 38 - I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights of others even if it means I will be ridiculed. 716 3.82 .931
PSM 39 - I consider public service my civic duty. 716 4.13 .821
PSM 40 - There are few public programs that I wholeheartedly support. (Reversed) 716 2.16 .941

140

Public Service Motivation
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
4,5
5,0
PSM 01
PSM 02 Reversed
PSM 03
PSM 04
PSM 05
PSM 06 Reversed
PSM 07 Reversed
PSM 08
PSM 09
PSM 10 Reversed
PSM 11 Reversed
PSM 12
PSM 13
PSM 14
PSM 15
PSM 16 Reversed
PSM 17
PSM 18
PSM 19
PSM 20 Reversed
PSM 21
PSM 22
PSM 23
PSM 24 Reversed
PSM 25
PSM 26
PSM 27 Reversed
PSM 28
PSM 29
PSM 30
PSM 31 Reversed
PSM 32
PSM 33
PSM 34
PSM 35
PSM 36
PSM 37
PSM 38
PSM 39
PSM 40 Reversed
Mean

Figure 8: Means by item (whole sample)

141

In order to refine the information obtained by using the survey, it is important to show
the categories that take into account the different motives that Perry and Wise (1990)
had in mind when they presented the notion of Public Service Motivation, grounded
on the concepts developed by Knoke and Wright (1982). The original categories
developed by Perry (1996) are the following six: (1) attraction to policy making, (2)
commitment to public interest, (3) social justice, (4) civic duty, (5) compassion, and
(6) self sacrifice. Table 28 presents the items included in each of the six categories
presented.
Table 28: Perry’s Six Categories (1996)
Category Items included
Attraction to policy making

PSM 11, PSM 15, PSM 22, PSM 27 and PSM 31
Commitment to public interest

PSM 7, PSM 16, PSM 23, PSM 30, PSM 34, PSM 37
and PSM 39.
Social justice

PSM 18, PSM 20, PSM 32, PSM 33 and PSM 38.
Civic Duty

PSM 14, PSM 21, PSM 25, PSM 28, PSM 29, PSM 35
and PSM 36.
Compassion

PSM 2, PSM 3, PSM 4, PSM 8, PSM 10, PSM 13,
PSM 24 and PSM 40.
Self-Sacrifice PSM 1, PSM 5, PSM 6, PSM 9, PSM 12, PSM 17,
PSM 19 and PSM 26.

In this approach, the category “attraction to policy making” was considered as a
group of items connected to rational motives. “Commitment to public interest”,
“Social Justice” and “Civic Duty” fall under the category of norm-based or justified
by the normative tradition that can be found in the public administration literature.
Finally, “Compassion” and “Self Sacrifice” fall under the notion of affective motives.
Table 29, on the other hand, presents the four categories that Perry obtained after the
142

analysis of the results reported by Perry (1996). This analysis was achieved after
applying confirmatory factor analysis.
Table 29: Perry’s Four Final Categories (1996)
Category Items included
Attraction to policy making

PSM 11, PSM 27 and PSM 31
Commitment to public interest

PSM 16, PSM 23, PSM 30, PSM 34, PSM 39.
Compassion

PSM 2, PSM 3, PSM 4, PSM 8, PSM 10, PSM
13, PSM 24 and PSM 40.
Self-Sacrifice PSM 1, PSM 5, PSM 6, PSM 9, PSM 12, PSM
17, PSM 19 and PSM 26.

Tables 30 and 31 present the results for both sets of categories. In Table 30, only one
category has a mean higher than 4.0, Social Justice, while in Table 31, the highest
category is Public Interest. Both categories are norm based, and refer to the traditional
values of scholars of public administration since Wilson (1887). In spite of that, the
tendency presented by the PSM score for the whole dataset (either the 40 or the 24
item instrument) is similar, in terms of the high mean score for each category.

Table 30: Descriptive Statistics Six Categories (40 Item Instrument)

Six Categories (40 Item)
N Mean
Std.
Deviation
Attraction to Policy Making 716 3.8419 .67185
Commitment to the Public Interest 716 3.7520 .48910
Civic Duty 716 3.8651 .56150
Compassion 716 3.7233 .43013
Self-Sacrifice 727 3.7211 .55696
Social Justice 716 4.0168 .58870
Valid N (listwise) 716

143

Table 31: Descriptive Statistics Four Categories 24 Item Instrument
Four Categories (24 items) N Mean Std. Deviation
Attraction to Policy Making 716 3.4665 .99335
Commitment to Public Interest 716 4.0265 .55209
Compassion 716 3.7233 .43013
Self-Sacrifice 727 3.7211 .55696
Valid (listwise) 716

The only category, on Table 31 that is closer to 3.0 or neutral, is the “Attraction to
Policy Making” Category. The interesting element of this category is not only the fact
that it has the lowest mean score, but it has the highest standard deviation of .99335.
That means that an important number of individuals who participated in this survey
tend to be neutral or disagree with three items included in this category of the 24 item
instrument. Table 32 presents the items.

Table 32: Items included on Category Attraction to Policy Making (24 Item
Instrument)
51

Item
N Mean
Std.
Deviation.
PSM 11 – Politics is a dirty word. (Reversed) 744 3.5632 1.26077
PSM 27 – The give and take of public policy
making doesn't appeal to me. (Reversed)
727 3.5640 1.11388
PSM 31 – I don't care much for politicians.
(Reversed)
716
3.2682 1.28494

The key feature of these items is their high standard deviation. This means that the
distribution of responses is widely spread among the different options. In other words,

51
The results shown on this table were reversed from those obtained on the survey to keep the same
scale with the rest of the items.
144

while people agree with the statement, there are others that disagree with it. Items 11
and 31 are particularly interesting. Item 11 says “Politics is a dirty word”. According
to Table 33
52
, while 58% of the sample agree or totally disagree with this statement
there is a 42% who are neutral, disagree or totally disagree with the statement. It
means that while half of the sample has a high regard for political activity the other
almost half does not. In Item PSM 31, presented by Table 34, “I do not care much for
politicians”, the sample is split. Half is neutral, agrees or totally agrees, while the
other half disagrees or totally disagrees.

Table 33: PSM 11 - Politics is a dirty word. (Reversed)

Frequencies

Percentages

Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Agree 212 27.6 28.5 28.5
Agree 220 28.7 29.6 58.1
Neutral 149 19.4 20.0 78.1
Disagree 101 13.2 13.6 91.7
Totally Disagree 62 8.1 8.3 100.0
Total 744 97.0 100.0

Missing System 23 3.0

Total 767 100,0

52
The categories were inverted to keep the same scale with the rest of the survey, but to have a better
understanding of the actual responses of the individuals included on the survey.
145

Table 34: PSM 31 - I don't care much for politicians. (Reversed)

Frequencies

Percentages

Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Agree 133 17.3 18.6 18.6
Agree 222 28.9 31.0 49.6
Neutral 156 20.3 21.8 71.4
Disagree 114 14.9 15.9 87.3
Totally Disagree 91 11.9 12.7 100.0
Total 716 93.4 100.0

Missing System 51 6.6

Total 767 100,0

One potential explanation for these results can be linked to the fact that public
employees do not escape from the widely accepted notion of the lack of legitimacy of
political activity. Surveys such as the one undertaken by Latinobarometro
(www.latinobarometro.org) have shown in the particular case of Latin America that
political activity is discredited. The results obtained from this research might be
consistent with this reality to the extent that they show in part of this sample a
negative concept of the political activity. However, one might think that it is not
consistent with the nature of public service to have a negative perception of political
activity, because public administration and politics are two sides of the same coin. It
would be interesting for further research to go more into detail on this matter.

146

Proposition 2: In agencies with a high level of modernization, meaning a high
adoption of NPM style managerial recommendations, the erosion of public values
should tend to be bigger than in less modernized agencies, implying a smaller PSM
score.

In order to test this proposition, first of all, it is important to test for the reliability of
the survey for each of the subsamples of the dataset. Table 35 and 36 provide the
alphas for each of the institutions in the dataset, for the 40 and 24 Item Instruments
respectively.

Table 35: Reliability Statistics 40 Item Instrument
Institution
Cronbach's
Alpha N of Items
Institution 1 .881 40
Institution 2 .855 40
Institution 3 .889 40
Institution 4 .877 40
Institution 5 .912 40
Institution 6 .873 40

147

Table 36: Reliability Statistics 24 Item Instrument
Institution
Cronbach's
Alpha N of Items
Institution 1 .811 24
Institution 2 .788 24
Institution 3 .815 24
Institution 4 .786 24
Institution 5 .871 24
Institution 6 .808 24

In both cases the Alphas are higher than .7, which is the standard for this type of
analysis. In other words, the subsamples of each institution are internally consistent.
Knowing the dataset of each institution is consistent, one can move to the comparison
between institutions. Table 37 presents the PSM scores by institution with both
instruments.
148

Table 37: PSM Mean Scores by Institution for both Instruments
Institution Mean Std. Deviation
Institution 1 PSM Score (40 Items Scale) 3.8467 .37639
PSM Score (24 Item Scale)
3.8204 .38569
Institution 2 PSM Score (40 Items Scale) 3.8179 .39418
PSM Score (24 Item Scale)
3.7725 .42572
Institution 3 PSM Score (40 Items Scale) 3.7239 .41950
PSM Score (24 Item Scale)
3.6879 .44291
Institution 4 PSM Score (40 Items Scale) 3.7926 .43471
PSM Score (24 Item Scale)
3.7504 .43299
Institution 5 PSM Score (40 Items Scale) 3.7358 .42272
PSM Score (24 Item Scale)
3.6612 .44511
Institution 6 PSM Score (40 Items Scale) 3.8108 .40340
PSM Score (24 Item Scale)
3.7729 .43520

These results do not show any relevant information to compare among institutions.
There are marginal differences among the institutions in terms of the PSM mean
scores obtained after applying the survey. The mean scores range from 3.8467 to
3.7239 in the 40 Item Instrument, and from 3.8204 to 3.6879 in the 24 Item
Instrument among the six institutions. This suggests the lack of meaningful difference
across institutions in terms of their PSM scores. If one follows the argument that there
are different levels of adoption of NPM style within the Chilean public sector, it
would be likely to have different PSM scores among the groups of institutions
involved in this study. In the case of the institutions included in this research, one can
take into account several elements to claim there are different levels of modernization
and, therefore, different levels of adoption of NPM style managerial techniques. For
149

instance, only two out of six of the institutions included in this survey have been
awarded with the Annual Award for Institutional Excellence (Premio Anual a la
Excelencia Institucional).
53
One of these institutions has been awarded with
international awards of quality management, innovation and the UN public service
award. Three out of six of these institutions are included in a list of the six most
“effective” public agencies of the Chilean public sector, according to a survey filled
out by key actors in the Chilean public administration domain (Olavarria,
forthcoming).

In order to make a more rigorous analysis of the means among institutions, ANOVA
analyses were conducted. Table 38 presents the results for the ANOVA analysis
across Institutions.

Table 38: ANOVA PSM Scores by Institutions (40 Items Instrument)

Sum of
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups .921 5 .184 1.073 .374
Within Groups 130.716 761 .172

Total 131.637 766

The significance level in Table 38 is higher than .05 level accepted in social science
to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in means between groups. In order to
refine the analysis, Scheffe test was conducted to test whether or not there are
differences in between specific agencies. Table 39 presents the results. The high

53
More information regarding this Award go to www.serviciocivil.cl
150

significance levels show there are not differences of means in pairwise comparison
across Institutions.

Table 39: Multiple Comparisons PSM Score (40 Items Scale) Scheffe Test
(I) Institution (J) Institution Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
Institution 1 Institution 2 .02877 .08446 1.000
Institution 3 .12273 .08426 .832
Institution 4 .05410 .08026 .994
Institution 5 .11083 .10701 .956
Institution 6 .03587 .08066 .999
Institution 2 Institution 1 -.02877 .08446 1.000
Institution 3 .09396 .05275 .673
Institution 4 .02533 .04608 .998
Institution 5 .08206 .08446 .967
Institution 6 .00710 .04678 1.000
Institution 3 Institution 1 -.12273 .08426 .832
Institution 2 -.09396 .05275 .673
Institution 4 -.06864 .04571 .813
Institution 5 -.01190 .08426 1.000
Institution 6 -.08686 .04642 .623
Institution 4 Institution 1 -.05410 .08026 .994
Institution 2 -.02533 .04608 .998
Institution 3 .06864 .04571 .813
Institution 5 .05674 .08026 .992
Institution 6 -.01823 .03868 .999
Institution 5 Institution 1 -.11083 .10701 .956
Institution 2 -.08206 .08446 .967
Institution 3 .01190 .08426 1.000
Institution 4 -.05674 .08026 .992
Institution 6 -.07496 .08066 .973
151

Table 39: Multiple Comparisons PSM Score (40 Items Scale) Scheffe
Test (Continued)
Institution 6 Institution 1 -.03587 .08066 .999
Institution 2 -.00710 .04678 1.000
Institution 3 .08686 .04642 .623
Institution 4 .01823 .03868 .999
Institution 5 .07496 .08066 .973

The same analysis was conducted for the 24 Item Instrument. Similar results were
obtained (Tables 40 and 41). The significance value for the ANOVA analysis is
higher than .05, and the significance levels of the comparisons between agencies are
all high enough to claim there are not differences between the mean scores of the
institutions included in the research.

Table 40: ANOVA PSM Score 24 Items (DV) by Institution (IV)

Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 1.045 5 .209 1.115 .351
Within Groups 142.601 761 .187

Total 143.645 766

152

Table 41: Multiple Comparisons PSM Score (24 Item) by Institution, Scheffe Test
(I) Institution (J) Institution Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
Institution 1 Institution 2 .04783 .08822 .998
Institution 3 .13246 .08801 .811
Institution 4 .06997 .08383 .983
Institution 5 .15917 .11177 .845
Institution 6 .04743 .08425 .997
Institution 2 Institution 1 -.04783 .08822 .998
Institution 3 .08463 .05509 .797
Institution 4 .02214 .04813 .999
Institution 5 .11134 .08822 .902
Institution 6 -.00040 .04886 1.000
Institution 3 Institution 1 -.13246 .08801 .811
Institution 2 -.08463 .05509 .797
Institution 4 -.06249 .04775 .887
Institution 5 .02671 .08801 1.000
Institution 6 -.08503 .04849 .688
Institution 4 Institution 1 -.06997 .08383 .983
Institution 2 -.02214 .04813 .999
Institution 3 .06249 .04775 .887
Institution 5 .08920 .08383 .951
Institution 6 -.02254 .04040 .997
Institution 5 Institution 1 -.15917 .11177 .845
Institution 2 -.11134 .08822 .902
Institution 3 -.02671 .08801 1.000
Institution 4 -.08920 .08383 .951
Institution 6 -.11174 .08425 .881
Institution 6 Institution 1 -.04743 .08425 .997
Institution 2 .00040 .04886 1.000
Institution 3 .08503 .04849 .688
Institution 4 .02254 .04040 .997
Institution 5 .11174 .08425 .881
153

In order to address the potential nuances of the information generated by the
application of the survey, two tables are presented. Table 42 presents the PSM scores
for each of the six categories of the original 40 item instrument, arranged by
Institution. Table 43 presents the results for the four categories of the 24 Item
Instrument.

154

Table 42: PSM Scores by Categories by Institution (40 Items)
Institution 1 Institution 2 Institution 3 Institution 4 Institution 5 Institution 6
Mean
Std.
Deviation Mean
Std.
Deviation Mean
Std.
Deviation Mean
Std.
Deviation Mean
Std.
Deviation Mean
Std.
Deviation
Attraction to Policy
Making 4.2286 0.71536 3.9193 0.621 3.6991 0.65554 3.9098 0.63436 3.9214 0.69355 3.7412 0.70667

Commitment to the
Public Interest 3.7296 0.51923 3.7669 0.4442 3.6474 0.53202 3.764 0.47108 3.75 0.55345 3.7894 0.49277

Social Justice 4.2143 0.54685 4.0526 0.52617 3.9748 0.61088 4.0902 0.59857 4.1071 0.53189 3.9033 0.59469

Civic Duty
3.7653 0.50427 3.9261 0.49605 3.7516 0.59207 3.8418 0.61325 3.7449 0.56257 3.9458 0.51524

Compassion
3.6741 0.30112 3.7336 0.40102 3.6577 0.41516 3.6987 0.44469 3.6652 0.40118 3.7927 0.44966

Self-Sacrifice
3.7768 0.54471 3.7963 0.52168 3.6449 0.54424 3.6989 0.57476 3.567 0.54484 3.7577 0.56181

155

Table 43: PSM Scores by Categories by Institution (24 Items)
Institution 1 Institution 2 Institution 3 Institution 4 Institution 5 Institution 6

Mean
Std.
Deviation Mean
Std.
Deviation Mean
Std.
Deviation Mean
Std.
Deviation Mean
Std.
Deviation Mean
Std.
Deviation
Attraction to
Policy Making 4.0476 1.03723 3.5760 .96271 3.2733 .95579 3.5863 .95462 3.5714 1.01372 3.2907 1.01250
Commitment to
Public Interest
3.9643 .55525 4.0632 .49229 3.9009 .65331 4.0491 .52720 3.9071 .58241 4.0730 .53965

Compassion
3.6741 .30112 3.7336 .40102 3.6577 .41516 3.6987 .44469 3.6652 .40118 3.7927 .44966
Self-Sacrifice
3.7768 .54471 3.7963 .52168 3.6449 .54424 3.6989 .57476 3.5670 .54484 3.7577 .56181

156

On both Tables the level of homogeneity is very high. Table 42 shows that category
“Social Justice” ranks the highest in four out of six institutions, while “Compassion”
category ranks the lowest in three out of six institutions. Therefore, the level of
homogeneity is high, making it difficult to draw conclusions in terms of the potential
differences among institutions on these matters. Yet, there are two things that can be
drawn from this analysis that would require further analysis. First, it is interesting that
Institution 1 ranks the highest on the “Attraction to Policy Making” category. Maybe
the reason for this high score refers to the fact that this agency tends to be highly
politicized, due to the particular goals it aims at. The mission of this institution is to
advise the President in matters of public policies aimed at improving the wellbeing of
the youth population. Appointed employees working on this institution tend to be
supporters of the coalition in office, and usually have had a role as young political
leaders either at the university or on political parties. In general, this type of employee
tends to be interested in political matters and have a high regard for politics in
general. The second relevant element worth mentioning is that similar to what was
found by the whole dataset, the highest standard deviation scores are in the
“Attraction to Policy Making” category. The same reason could be used to explain
this situation. In every agency, there are an important number of employees who
either agree or disagree with the statements linked to political activities. This could
lead us to think that the potential lack of legitimacy of political activity can also be
found in each agency included in this research.

157

Moving to the 24 item instrument, the reality presented on Table 43 is not that
different. The “Public Interest” category has the highest score for five of the six
institutions, which is very consistent with the 40 Item instrument to the extent that
both “Social Justice” and “Commitment to Public Interest” are norm based motives to
work as a public employee. This implies that in both instruments, these sets of
statements weigh more than rational or emotive based motives, which might be
consistent with the notion that norm based motives are justifications individuals bear
in mind for working in public agencies. Another element to take into account is the
mean scores and standard deviation scores of the “Attraction to Policy Making”
category. In all six institutions, this category has the highest standard deviation,
implying a high level of disagreement. Along with that, this category has the lowest
mean score in four out of six institutions. The interesting thing is that the same
institution that had the highest mean score on this scale using the 40 Item structure,
ranks this category in the first place as well. It confirms the particularities of this
Institution, as described on previous paragraphs.

In order to refine the analysis of the average score by category, for both the 40 item
and 24 item instruments, Table 44 presents the significance scores for ANOVA
analysis comparing the mean for each category across Institutions. This table supports
the analysis already presented in terms of pointing out that the mean of the category
“Attraction to Policy Making” (40 item instrument) changes from institution to
institution.
158

Table 44: Sig Scores for each ANOVA of mean score for each category
(DV) by Institution (IV) (40 item instrument)

Sig.
Average of Attraction to Policy Making items
.000
Average of Commitment to the Public Interest items
.251
Average of Social Justice items
.006
Average of Civic Duty items
.025
Average of Compassion items
.082
Average of Self-Sacrifice items
.160

But also, this analysis provides new insights regarding differences in mean scores
across categories. According to this analysis, the “Social Justice” and “Civic Duty”
categories present different mean scores across institutions. For the 24 item
instrument, which has only four categories, the situation is presented by Table 45.

Table 45: Sig Scores for each ANOVA of mean score for each category (DV) by
Institution (IV) (24 item instrument)

Sig.
Average of Attraction to Policy Making
.000
Average of Public Interest items
.081
Average of Compassion items
.082
Average of Self-Sacrifice items
.160

Again, the mean score of the category “Attraction to Policy Making” differs across
institutions.
159

Due to the exploratory characteristics of this research, ANOVA analyses were
conducted with other groups of the dataset, generated according to the control
variables included in the survey. The reason being that this is a new area of research
and there are no previous conclusions drawn on this topic. Several ANOVA analyses
were conducted to test for differences among groups of the survey.
54
The only control
variable that showed significant results was the analysis undertaken using Rank as the
independent variable. Table 46 provides the significance level of the ANOVA, which
is lower than .05. Using that significance value, one can draw the conclusion that
there is a difference across institutions on the PSM score that each rank presents.

Table 46: ANOVA: PSM Score (DV) and Rank (IV) PSM Score (40 Items Scale)

Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 2.688 4 .672 4.243 .002
Within Groups 101.336 640 .158

Total 104.023 644

Table 47 presents the pairwise comparisons indicating the differences among groups
that show significance levels below .05, which allows us to state that the means of
PSM scores are different. In particular, this table shows that the only groups with
significant differences in their means are “Professional Senior Civil Servants” and
“Administrative Staff”.

54
Appendix 5 provides details of these ANOVA analyses.
160

Table 47: Multiple Comparisons: ANOVA PSM Score (DV) and Rank (IV) 40 Items
Instrument, Scheffe Test
(I) Rank (J) Rank
Mean
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
Professional Senior
Civil Servant
Non Professional Senior Civil Servant -.02136 .16020 1.000
Professional .17195 .05900 .076
Technician .18863 .07200 .145
Administrative Staff .24865
*
.06409 .005
Non Professional
Senior Civil Servant
Professional Senior Civil Servant .02136 .16020 1.000
Professional .19331 .15184 .805
Technician .20999 .15735 .776
Administrative Staff .27001 .15389 .545
Professional Professional Senior Civil Servant -.17195 .05900 .076
Non Professional Senior Civil Servant -.19331 .15184 .805
Technician .01668 .05075 .999
Administrative Staff .07670 .03872 .417
Technician Professional Senior Civil Servant -.18863 .07200 .145
Non Professional Senior Civil Servant -.20999 .15735 .776
Professional -.01668 .05075 .999
Administrative Staff .06002 .05659 .890
Administrative Staff Professional Senior Civil Servant -.24865
*
.06409 .005
Non Professional Executive Officer -.27001 .15389 .545
Professional -.07670 .03872 .417
Technician -.06002 .05659 .890
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Tables 48 and 49 present the results for the 24 Item Instrument. The results are
consistent, because the significance score is lower than .05 and the significance value
for the comparisons between pair of groups provide similar results. However, it also
indicates that there is another difference in means, along with the one between
161

“Professional Senior Civil Servant” and “Administrative Staff”, the one between
“Professional Senior Civil Servant” and “Professional”. In both cases, the mean
difference is positive for the “Professional Senior Civil Servant” group, meaning this
group has a higher mean score vis-à-vis the other groups.

Table 48: ANOVA PSM Score (24 Items) (DV) Rank (IV)

Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 2.546 4 .636 3.715 .005
Within Groups 109.643 640 .171

Total 112.189 644

Table 49: Multiple Comparisons ANOVA PSM Score (24 Items) (DV) and Rank
(IV), Scheffe Test
(I) Rank (J) Rank
Mean Difference
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
Professional
Senior Civil
Servant
Non Professional Senior Civil
Servant
-.00847 .16664 1.000
Professional .19070
*
.06137 .048
Technician .19166 .07490 .163
Administrative Staff .24229
*
.06667 .011
Non
Professional
Senior Civil
Servant
Professional Senior Civil Servant .00847 .16664 1.000
Professional .19917 .15794 .810
Technician .20013 .16367 .827
Administrative Staff .25076 .16007 .653
Professional Professional Senior Civil Servant -.19070
*
.06137 .048
Non Professional Senior Civil
Servant
-.19917 .15794 .810
Technician .00096 .05279 1.000
Administrative Staff .05159 .04027 .801
162

Table 49: Multiple Comparisons ANOVA PSM Score (24 Items) (DV) and
Rank (IV), Scheffe Test (Continued)
Technician Professional Senior Civil Servant -.19166 .07490 .163
Non Professional Senior Civil
Servant
-.20013 .16367 .827
Professional -.00096 .05279 1.000
Administrative Staff .05063 .05886 .946
Administrative
Staff
Professional Senior Civil Servant -.24229
*
.06667 .011
Non Professional Senior Civil Servant -.25076 .16007 .653
Professional -.05159 .04027 .801
Technician -.05063 .05886 .946
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

An exploratory explanation of these differences between means might come from the
fact that it is said that in the level of salaries in higher ranks of the Chilean public
administration the difference between this sector and the private sector is significant,
while in lower levels of the public sector the difference tend to decrease, and even is
higher in public agencies. That could explain why the highest levels of public
organizations a have higher PSM mean score, because they are motivated by norm
based motives rather than rational or other type of incentives. The element that
justifies working in a similar position and making less money might be grounded on
high regards for intrinsic motivations. In the case of the difference between
professionals and professional senior civil servant, it might be explained by the fact
that these middle level professionals tend to have high mobility from the private to
the public sector, or they have been working for a certain period of time in a public
agency, and there are not possibilities to move on the hierarchical ladder, decreasing
the motivation and taking a potentially cynical attitude towards his or her job.
163

Another explanation could be a self-selection process, that those with the strongest
public service motivation are those more likely to stay in a public servant career and
work their way to the top, while those with weaker public service motivations would
be more likely to leave the sector. Further research, particularly, qualitative analysis
is required for testing these hypotheses.

7.c. Managerial implications of NPM style reforms in Chile
55
:

This section will provide an analysis regarding the changes in terms of modifications
of managerial practices, as an intention to evaluate the real consequences of NPM
style policies in Chile. The starting point of this analysis is grounded on three ideas.
First, public management policies yield a change in routines and procedures. The
actual policies implemented in Chile during the last eighteen years were presented by
Chapter 4. It is assumed that those policies had an expression in terms of changes in
procedures. As a matter of fact, new managerial tools were designed and
implemented that might engender changes in public organizations, such as the
Programs for Management Improvement, evaluation of programs, and so forth. These
new managerial techniques were backed by new institutions pushing an agenda of
reforms such as the one work of the National Civil Service Agency. Second,
following Hood and Peters (2005), there are unintended consequences that public

55
Fragments of the interviews are included in some parts of the analysis to support the findings in this
section. The former or current position of the key informant is provided after each fragment to keep his
or her anonymity.
164

authorities cannot foresee prior to their implementation. Third, as in any other policy
domain, the so called “implementation gap” plays a role in terms of the difference
between the expected outcomes of a particular policy, and the manner in which it was
implemented. All in all, this section tries to make sense of the consequences
perceived by those having a privileged position, either as scholars or as practitioners
or union workers in this policy domain.

Culture of performance:

According to the interviewees the Chilean public sector has witnessed several
changes that can be taken into account in assessing this period of NPM style reforms.
The first issue that arises when dealing with this topic is the inclusion (or
development) of a managerial culture among public employees. This new concern for
performing, rather than following procedures can be understood as a paradigmatic
change to the extent that it modifies an important trait in public bureaucracies in Latin
America that tend to abide by the traditional model of public administration. The
starting point on this domain is a public administration highly connected to the
history. The newly elected government that took office in 1990 did not have a clear
approach on this matter. However, after the political situation became normal, new
managerial techniques were part of the new manner in which public official had to
function. Maybe the first managerial tool to be implemented with a certain degree of
success was strategic management. The use of this managerial tool was the
165

manifestation of a new administrative culture that was growing among public
employees (Marcel, 2002).

A new language has arrived to the public sector:

NPM style reforms have also installed a new language among public employees.
Concepts such as “internal and external client”, “business areas”, “strategic
products”, “mission”, “vision” among others, are concepts that were totally alien to
the administrative culture of the Chilean public sector. However, these concepts
belong to the normal functioning of public agencies nowadays. Language is a key
element, in terms of the modifications carried out by public sector reform policies. It
is acknowledged that adopting a new concept or a new terminology is not just a
cosmetic manifestation. Using a concept such as client in the public sector has an
ideological content that some individuals recognize, while others overlook it. For
some “client” is a manner to highlight the relevance of taking into account the
recipient of public sector’s services. For others, “client” means privatization of the
public domain. In spite of this debate, it is impossible to deny the power of language.
The use of these new concepts is an expression of a new mindset that the public
sector reform policies have yielded. As a matter of fact, the previously analyzed
“culture of performance” goes hand in hand with this new “lingo” among public
employees and consultants.

166

Measuring activities:

The tendency and recognition to measure public action and activities is another
expression of change in the Chilean public sector, in terms of managerial practices.
Public employees have migrated from a culture of fulfilling a task to a culture of
knowing what has been done. Public employees acknowledge the actions they have to
carry out and the functions they have to perform cannot be done without a notion of
measurement. It is important for public officials to measure their performance,
because in so doing a public official can ponder, whether or not they are achieving
their goals. As it was already presented by Chapter 4, the Chilean system relies on the
Management Control System implemented by the Budget Office to instill the
measurability of public activities. Particularly, the Management Improvement
Programs, included by this System, are oriented to measure the level of achievements
in public agencies, which once attained by public employees allow them to receive an
incentive according to the level of achievement.

The Management Control System developed by DIPRES has forced
institutions to think, categorizing, and sorting out all the information regarding
the manner in which things were carried out. (Former professional of the
Budget Office)

The Programs of Management Improvement have created a concern for
measuring, to know what are agencies actually doing. (Current member of the
Senior Civil Service Council)

167

If I have to compare the functioning of public administration at the beginning
of the new democracy, with the current state of the art, I have to say that now
there is much more interest in assessing activities according to quantitative
elements. In those days our evaluation relied in more qualitative aspects.
(Current Head of a public agency)

In this same line of analysis, the culture of “measurement”, particularly linked to the
Management Control System and it components, has instilled new criteria among
public employees in the manner in which they work. Particularly, the inclusion of
criterion, such as participation and gender, on this system makes public management
more inclusive and diverse. However, the pressure to be more inclusive should also
be manifested in “measurements” such as performance indicators. The culture of
measurement should also be expressed in something as complex such as instilling the
“gender perspective” in public activities.

The comprehensiveness of the Management Control System has installed new
criteria (such as gender and participation) in the manner in which public
management is carried out. (Senior civil servant)

Parsimony in the use of resources:

NPM Style reforms have gone really deep in terms of molding public employees’
minds to use public resources in a rational and efficient basis. This is one of the
spillovers of instilling a culture of efficiency. As a matter of fact, one of the pillars of
the public sector reform movement in Chile has been the connection between changes
168

in managerial practices, and the budgetary process. Having a better performance
implies being more efficient in the manner in which public resources are allocated.
The allocation of incentives to strengthening this connection has been a key factor for
the consolidation of the system. Marcel (1999;2002) claims that the need for a more
efficient public sector has been the driving force of the public sector reform process
in Chile, particularly, because the government was interested in having more
resources for carrying out its social plans. The other element that has helped to put
forward this agenda of parsimony in the use of public resources is the budget surplus
rule (Marcel, et al, 2001). Under this rule, the government decided to maintain the
public budget with surplus. This rule was sought as a counter cyclical policy oriented
to save in times of economic expansion and spending in times of economic
contraction. This rule, although belonging to the “Public Finance” policy domain, has
had an important triggering effect in the manner in which public resources are
allocated, to the extent that it has meant more thoroughness in the manner in which
agencies present their budgets to be approved by the Congress.

Citizens as clients:

The new approach NPM style reforms has brought to the Chilean public sector is the
notion of client applied to the users of public services. Usually, the assumption was
that individuals were interested in getting the services the public administration
169

delivered. This approach assumed a passive attitude from the point of view of the
individuals being served. With the implementation of the reforms in the Chilean
public sector, the person asking for services had a different status, a more active one
to the extent that she is entitled to certain rights, and can expect certain level of
quality of the services she is receiving. However, there is another way to make sense
of the new manner in which individuals are treated by public employees. Using a
more market oriented approach, the centrality of the client is understood as way of
providing “value for money” to the citizens being served. It is a more business
oriented approach to the extent that it assumes the client is the one looking for
something, thus, its voice has to be heard.

Another change in managerial practices is moving towards a notion of citizens
as client. In other words, public sector has understood that the person in front
of the window must be understood in a different way. It is no longer a passive
user of a given service, but a client, citizen – client, asking for and requiring a
good service. (Current head of a public agency)

Public management reform has empowered citizens. They feel entitled to
demand for better services. The connection between citizens and public
employees render better services tailored to the real need of citizens. (Current
head of a public agency)

New participation mechanisms have been implemented for citizens. There are
remarkable improvements in this domain regarding participation. There are
changes in managerial practices; the Presidential Instructive on Participation
has been a key factor in this sense. New procedures are implemented to allow
citizen’s participation. (Current head of a public agency)

170

The State is more polite with its citizens. People have more rights, therefore, it
pressures for more from its public employees. (Current head of a public
agency)

Professionalization:

The pressure for more efficiency and for better services from the state has engendered
a pressure for more professionalization among public employees. Public employees
are expected to perform accordingly and to address the challenges of an increasingly
more technical public management. The implementation of a Senior Civil Service has
reinforced this process. Patrimonialism and nepotism, traditional features of
bureaucracies in Latin America, although not fully eradicated, are in a clear process
of decay.

Due to the pressure to increase efficiency and effectiveness, new professionals
have been invited to work on public agencies. (Former head of a public
agency)

It is more attractive for young professionals to work on the public sector,
particularly, in those agencies with better reputation. (Former head of a public
agency)

Technology: triggering changes

According to the interviewees, the use of technology has been a major triggering
force to change managerial practices in the Chilean public sector. Technology has
been understood as a mean to improve service delivery (front office) and also to
171

enhance internal procedures at the organizational level (back office) or within the
organization. It has helped in allowing more transparency in the activities of the state,
particularly, regarding procurement and personnel.

Too much focus on outputs instead of outcomes:

The stress in efficiency is a widely accepted trait of the Chilean public sector reform
processes. The Management Control System is the widely used instrument
implemented by the Budget Office to make public administration more efficient. It is
particularly concerned with procedures rather than outcomes. The problem is that too
much focus on one aspect of public administration has created a notion of goal
displacement in the activity of the state. In particular, scholars and practitioners are
questioning the stress of efficiency, because the activity of the state cannot be
assessed only by understanding the manner in which resources are used. There is also
a concern for things like quality, effectiveness and impact. When a system stresses
efficiency too much, other criterion are left aside.

The current system of management control is oriented to procedures rather
than outcomes. In this sense, it does not have an impact of the citizens, on the
quality of the public administration as a whole. (Former professional of the
Budget Office)

Too much focus on measuring procedures has engendered a lack of impact or
institutional evaluation. There are no clear means to evaluate public activities.
(Head of a public agency)

172

The current problem with the implementation of the Management Control
System refers to the lack of connection between those activities that are
measured and the real impact of public administration. The quality of public
services is not at stake when implementing this management control
mechanisms. (Former head of the public management modernization office)

Performance indicators are not aligned with strategic objectives. (Head of a
public agency)

In this line of argumentation, the current Management Control System has been very
successful in terms of installing a rationale of efficiency. However, the manner in
which the system has been implemented has created several situations. The current
system is grounded in an institutional evaluation, however, at the different levels of
the organizations there are individual evaluations aligned with the objective of the
unit, and then with the institution’s objective that creates pressure for individual
assessments. In these lines, an academic highlights the negative consequences of the
current system:

One of the outcomes of the current process of changes in the public sector is a
decreasing listening ability of public employees. Several studies I have
undertaken show that due to the current system of management control and
due to stressing evaluation at the individual level, an alienation process is
unleashed. Individuals in this context tend to stop listening and start a process
of isolation. Public employees tend to cooperate less, therefore, start
mistrusting their fellow workers. (Scholar and public management consultant)

This point seems to contradict the “Culture for Performance” section of this chapter.
However, after analyzing the data collected for this research, rather than a
contradiction, this situation can be conceived as a paradox. It is a paradox, because
173

the official discourse is moving to focus on results and performance, however, the
actions undertaken by different actors involved in the public management domain,
particularly, those of the Budget Office, seem to rely on controlling the process and
procedures rather than the outcomes of public agencies. The only element oriented to
address outcomes is the “Program Evaluation” component of the Management
Control System, already presented in Chapter 4.

Disconnection between politics and administration:

One of the problems in the process of public sector reform has been the lack of
leadership, particularly in the political domain. Politicians, particularly those
belonging to the coalition in office, have overlooked the need for an efficient and
effective public administration. This has created a wide space for technocrats to
implement what they think are the most appropriate routines. In this design, it is not
clear where politics end and administration or management begins. The usually
“neutral” domain of technocrats has been intensely bombarded with new systems and
new procedures. This “neutral” realm necessarily requires a connection with the
political domain.

There is an uncovered political myopia, because legitimating the Senior Civil
Service only using professional or technical criteria does not take into account
the real dynamics of public management. The action of any public manager is
not only technical, it is also tainted by political criteria. Therefore, there must
be equilibrium between these two criteria. (Former head of the public
management modernization unit)
174

In the new context of relationships between politicians and public managers
appointed by the Senior Civil Service System, there is not clarity in terms of
what are the real domains of influence of each one. (Senior civil servant)

One senior public manager appointed by the President in a political position goes one
step further and clarifies the tension between political duties and the burden of filling
forms:

The time dedicated to fulfilling the tasks of governing is constrained. Filling
forms and reporting activities all the time creates a burden on the creativity
and entrepreneurial spirit of public managers. (Head of a public agency)

Yet, this disconnection it is not only because of lack of comprehension from the
administrative side of the equation, it is also because there is a lack of understanding
from the political side in terms of what are the boundaries, if any, between politics
and administration.

The members of the political elite are neutral about the real relevance of
focusing the discussion (of public sector reform) on matters of management.
(Former head of one of the first agencies involved in public management
reform processes)

The topic of public management is not attractive for politicians. It usually
involves too many costs and very few gains. (Head of a public agency)

The political elite, particularly, those of the government coalition, lack interest
for management. They do not have a clear vision about the topic. Management
produces heartburn to the coalition in government. (Member of the Senior
Civil Service Council)
175

Worshiping the instrument:

The implementation of a highly developed system of management control has created
a negative effect in terms of the concern and interest in putting too much attention on
filling the forms and abiding by the manuals of the system, and overlooking the real
impact of public agencies. Too much time is allocated to fill out forms and too little
time in trying to see whether the agency is doing its job or not.

A good portion of the working time of public employees is allocated to filling
out forms, rather than fulfilling the art of governing. (Head of a public
agency)

One researcher in this area claims that the main objective of improving efficiency in
the public sector has created a pressure for increasing the number of personnel
dealing with these matters.

A specific bureaucracy is created to control the bureaucracy. (Member of the
Senior Civil Service Council)

Moreover, after a certain period of time, the clear reason for applying the instrument
oriented to increase efficiency begin to decrease and a process of goal displacement
takes place. The instrument is justified not because of its impact, but because of its
own application. Along with that process, an imitation process begins and managerial
techniques lose their real reason to be implemented.
176

The current Management Control System has been successful, but after a
period of time the paperwork captures you, and there is little room for real
management improvement. (Member of the Senior Civil Service Council)

Several instruments are applied or implemented, such as reengineering,
strategic planning, or the system of management control, not because of the
potential impact of these managerial practices, but because it is a fad among
public managers, or because an external actor is pressuring for its application.
(Former head of one of the first agencies involved in public management
reform processes).

The management control system lacks the flexibility to adapt to the
characteristics of each institution. Usually, the agency has to adapt to the
instrument rather than the other way around. (Head of a public agency)

This discussion goes back to the point put forward by Merton (1968) regarding the
dysfunctions of the bureaucratic model. Due to the particular characteristics and
requirements of the bureaucratic model, unintended consequences emerge such as
goal displacement, rigidity and lack of adaptability. Particularly interesting for the
purposes of this analysis is goal displacement, which according to Merton (1968)
refers to a situation where an “instrumental value becomes a terminal value” (253). In
the case being analyzed, it seems the Management Control System can be seen as an
aim on itself rather than a mean to improve quality or efficiency.

177

Lack of accountability:

In spite of the great interest in trying to achieve a more efficient public
administration, the implementation of a control system without all the required
elements to create real impact, creates a situation where instruments for control are in
place, but there is a lack or limited accountability when individuals do not achieve
their goals. This situation can be found in the following statements:

The big problem in the Chilean public sectors is an ill understood notion of
stability. Lack of accountability is yielded by a lack of alignment between the
control and reward mechanisms. (Former head of one of the first agencies
involved in public management reform processes).

Public employees are more subjected to control, however, there is still a way
to go around and avoid punishment. (Head of a public agency).

The negative use of contracting out

The use of contracting out techniques has helped improve some areas, particularly,
those that are not strictly connected to the particular mission of any public agency.
However, when these techniques are not implemented correctly, taking into account
the real capacities and particular features of these organizations, negative effects
might appear.

178

The extensive use of contracting out mechanism in some areas has created
parallel structures, which in some cases jeopardize the functioning of public
agencies. (Current public employees’ union leader)

Some agencies have use contracting out strategies without contrasting their
own capacities to control those providing the services. This has yielded a
decrease in the capacity of the state in some areas. (Senior civil servant)

The topics already presented portray an interesting picture regarding the
consequences of the managerial reforms put forward in the last ten years or so
according to the perceptions of key actors. Drawing on this analysis, it is possible to
agree with the idea that changes have happened in the Chilean state. Particularly
interesting is the new language adopted by the actors involved in this domain, a
culture of performance, and the adoption of mechanisms to improve efficiency and
performance altogether. However, it is also interesting that parallel to those changes,
there are problems that are not new to the public administration literature. The
criticism is grounded on the notion that reforms have engendered a renewed interest
in procedures rather than outcomes, and the tendency to increase administrative tasks
and, consequently, put personnel in charge of these activities rather than spending
more time and money on the particular objective of a given agency, lead one to think
that the promise made by NPM supporters of focussing only on results and leaving
the old bureaucratic vices aside might not be fully true. Underlying the analysis of the
actual changes in the Chilean public sector is the notion that at some level the NPM
ideology has been adopted. Yet, this adoption has not fully reached all corners of the
public administration domain. It might mean the old bureaucratic model is still
179

playing a role these days or that the NPM has not spread through the administrative
culture of the state apparatus.
180

Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusions

After more than seventeen years of evolution, New Public Management is a trend or
paradigm in a period of crisis. For some (Dunleavy, et al, 2006) it means the death of
the trend, while others (Chistensen and Laegrid, 2007) claim is on a process of
changes. In spite of the growing interest in contending or claiming the death of NPM,
more research is required to test the real consequences of the application of this
administrative philosophy that has dominated both the scholar and practitioner debate
in the disciplinary field of public administration. In so doing, scholars will provide
more elements to the public administration community for developing a new
paradigm or to modify the current one. Addressing the negative consequences of
implementing NPM style reforms in a given context is a major challenge scholars
should aim for, which is necessary for moving forward in the long standing history of
public administration.

This dissertation has been an effort to cooperate with the academic task of
understanding the consequences of NPM Style reforms. Particularly, this research
undertaking has been an effort to provide new insights regarding Chilean public
administration, which has not been significantly studied. The reason for this lack of
interest on this topic relies on two arguments: lack of academic research and public
administration’s good performance. The first argument is aimed at justifying lack of
181

scholarship on this topic on the limited resources to undertake independent research
on these matters, weak academic institutions on the disciplinary field, among other
reasons. This is a contingent argument to the extent that the discipline is gaining
increasing interest among public and private universities, and think tanks in Chile.
However, the second argument is the more interesting, because the lack of research in
this area is justified by the good performance the state has shown. Following Nickson
(2006), Chile implemented reforms to achieve the “four Es”, which are under the
umbrella of the so called second generation of reforms. “the effectiveness of public
sector intervention in terms of coverage and quality service; the economic efficiency
of service delivery; improved equity of service delivery through a more targeted
approach to current and capital expenditure in the social sectors (especially health and
education); and the creation of an enabling environment for private sector
development.” (82). If the government has performed well, why undertake research
on this matter? In spite of those arguments, the need to unveil the pros and cons of
NPM Style reforms in Chile was addressed.

Five sections are arranged to cover the wide range of potential areas where comments
and conclusions can be drawn from this dissertation. The first group of comments
refers to NPM as a theory. Second, addresses the topic of potential erosion of public
values among public employees. Third, regarding change in managerial practices.
Fourth, some policy recommendations are presented. Finally, some ideas as to how
further research on this area might be carried out are presented.
182

8.a. Regarding NPM

This dissertation provides new insights, using a particular case such as the Chilean
one, to add to the debate regarding the applicability of NPM style reforms in less
developed countries, such as Chile. In particular, the conclusion that one can draw
from this dissertation is that NPM has been the theoretical background supporting
public management reform policies in Chile, which adds to the argument that NPM
can be conceived as a worldwide phenomenon, not limited to developed countries,
where most of the literature has been developed. This dissertation helps in showing
that NPM style reform policies are essentially implemented on a government wide
basis. The strategies implemented in Chile, particularly the first implemented during
1997 – 2000, and the one developed in the current government (2006 – 2008), are
conceived as changes implemented in every single public agency. Either through a
well conceived plan or through a package of management control systems linked to
the budgetary process, the NPM agenda can still be pursued.

In terms of the implementation of this reform, the Chilean model follows one of the
three models explaining the implementation of NPM Style reforms as presented by
Chistensen and Laegrid (2007). The first model is the one grounded on external
pressure, meaning NPM style reforms are a consequence of the action of external
actors or institutions to apply these reforms. The second model is rooted on “national
183

historical – institutional context” (5). This model explains reform processes
implementation as part of the natural evolution of the administrative systems. It is a
path dependent approach to the extent that justifies changes according to a series of
deliberate independent actions. The last model is grounded in the notion of “different
constitutional features and political-administrative structures” (6). “This perspective
is based on the assumption that political and administrative leaders use the structural
design of public entities as instruments to fulfill public goals” (6). This last model
seems to be the one that fits the best the Chilean “way” of NPM style reform
implementation. According to what one can draw from the Chilean case, since the
very beginning, political leaders have understood that more money is required for
social policies (Marcel, 1999), then public management reform policies were applied
to achieve that goal. That notion has installed the need for efficiency in the majority
of the reforms being implemented in the last years. Therefore, it is not by chance that
the agency pursuing and pushing an agenda of reform has been the Budget Office,
which is the entity in charge of overseeing the rational and efficient use of the public
budget.

Regarding a more theoretical analysis, it is clear that the NPM model implemented in
Chile is not totally “clean” or pure. In the Chilean case, one can find particular traits
of the NPM model. However, after the historical analysis of public management
reform policies in Chile, presented by this dissertation, one can find doctrines that do
not necessarily belong to the orthodox model. As matter of fact, the tendency towards
184

more transparency and more accountability in public management in the last few
years of the period included in this dissertation are closer to models such as the New
Public Service (NPS) (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000), because they are oriented to
bolster and empower citizens’ role in a democracy. In a similar vein, the intensive use
of information technologies among public agencies might be explained by the so
called Digital Era Governance Model (Dunleavy et al, 2006). Moreover, the
implementation of the senior civil service system in Chile can be even justified using
a Bureaucratic model of Civil Service. Finally, after a period of twenty years or so of
NPM style reforms, and particularly due to the unintended consequences of these
reforms, a “whole-of-government” approach can also be found within the myriad of
policy interventions in this area. “The phrase ‘whole-of-government’ denotes the
aspiration to achieve horizontal and vertical coordination in order to eliminate
situations in which different policies undermine each other, to make better use of
scarce resources, to create synergies by bringing together different stakeholders in a
particular policy area and to offer citizens seamless rather than fragmented access to
services” (Pollit, 2003 quoted in Christensen and Laegrid, 2007:11). In the Chilean
case, this model is not clearly assumed so far, however, the notion of “Single Point of
Access” (Ventanilla Única) is aiming at addressing the problems this new approach is
intended to overcome.

These examples tell us that it is difficult to clearly distinguish at what point one
model of public management is fully implemented, and the old one is completely
185

discredited and replaced. Therefore, when doing an analysis such as the one
performed on this dissertation is important to remember that reality surpasses theories
and sometimes there are more grays than black and whites in terms of identifying
models being implemented. Maybe this is a sign of the times, and in the future, public
managers will have to cope with different and eventually contradictory “doctrines”
coming from different normative approaches, such as NPM, NPS, whole-of-
government or others.

8.b. Regarding the erosion of values

According to the results obtained with the survey, there are no elements to claim the
crowding out effect among the sample of public employees surveyed for this
research. The results obtained from the 767 employees show that on average they
have a high regard for values explaining the motives for being public employees. The
results presented in Chapter 7 provide a clear picture of what items are more relevant
in characterizing public employees’ motives. It also shows PSM scores are not
explained by working in a given institution. The high level of homogeneity might be
explained by the notion that, at least in the Chilean case, NPM style reform policies
have been implemented on a government wide basis. Perhaps, this could also lead one
to think that despite the “label” of the institutional reform that provides the theoretical
background for a particular set of reforms, the results might be similar, which allows
one to think that institutional reforms might not have a real impact in the PSM score.
186

Yet, even with this important level of homogeneity, the high regard for traditional
values is still difficult to understand due to the collision of NPM doctrines with
traditional old bureaucratic values. A potential explanation for this high regard for
public values can be explained by the fact that public agencies seem to be spaces of
indoctrination of public values for public employees. Therefore, even if someone
accepts the theoretical backgrounds of the NPM doctrine, the organizational culture
dominating the agency, or the public sector as a whole, will pressure employees to
adapt their values to those of the majority.
56
Another explanation might be that people
that have been contracted or attracted to public service already come with a high
regard for public values, which could explain their decision to work in this sector
(Crewson, 1997; Norris, 2003); therefore the potential impact in terms of erosion of
values, could be marginal.

8.c. Regarding changes in managerial practices

The Chilean case provides several interesting insights regarding the change in
managerial practices and the eventual (un)intended outcomes of NPM Style reforms.
The first idea is that change in public organizations has relied to a great extent on
external pressures, primarily on agencies and secondly on employees. This is
consistent with the theoretical background of NPM, in particular, Neo Institutional

56
Parker and Bradley (2000) studied this phenomenon in the Australian government and found that the
dominating organizational culture have not accepted the new values that the administrative reform
undertaken during the 90s tried to put forward.
187

Economics that relies on reorganization of the structure of incentives to align the
different interest cohabiting in any organization. The policy decision of connecting
changes in managerial practices, particularly those included in the Improvement
Management Programs (PMGs), with monetary incentives is a clear manifestation of
that rationale. Moreover, the fact that external agencies, such as the Budget Office
and the other technical agencies certifying PMGs, have to oversee the managerial
changes is another expression of that. It is more important to show others, that a given
organization is modern, than having an internal acknowledgement of that. In other
words, it is more important to show external entities the agency has accomplished
performance commitments or the Improvement Management Programs, rather than
having a true organizational learning process.

Another interesting element that can be drawn from this study is the notion of a lack
of recognition of diversity among public agencies. Due to the fact that public
management reform policies implemented in Chile have been implemented on a
government wide basis, there is a tendency to apply similar models to very different
institutions. Nonetheless, this problem has been addressed to some extent by
including stages on the Improvement Management Programs, although there is still a
notion that the same sets of indicators of those programs should be taken into
account.

188

Another element from the analysis of the change in managerial practices according to
the actors interviewed for this dissertation is the role that participation and
transparency are playing as triggering factors in levering changes. The fact that these
two factors are playing an important role on this domain can show a potential
evolution toward a different model of public management reform. In particular, both
factors are closer to the New Public Service model. The New Public Service is a
normative model of public management grounded in three tenets: theories of
democratic governance, models of community and civil society, and organizational
humanism and discourse theory (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000: 552). It is a reaction
against both old public administration and new public management. The authors
claim that due to the vices and deviation of previous normative frameworks and due
to the characteristics of the post modern society, public management should be based
on the following seven ideas. First, serve citizens, not costumers. Second, seek the
Public Interest. Third, value citizenship over entrepreneurship. Fourth, think
strategically, act democratically. Fifth, recognize that accountability isn’t simple.
Sixth, serve rather than steer. Seventh, value people, not just productivity (Denhardt
and Denhardt, 2007:42-43). Most of these ideas are sounding currently in Chile
among those looking for a new notion of public management. The call for more
citizen involvement in public management and the need for more transparency and
accountability are starting to be seen by the public, political leaders and scholars as
solutions to address the problems NPM style reforms have yielded in the Chilean
public sector.
57

57
As a matter of fact, the discussion of the actual implications of the implementation of the Law
189

The managerial improvements after these years of NPM style reform policies are
recognized not only by all the key actors interviewed in this research project, but also
by scholars and international institutions. However, these improvements have not
avoided the eruption of several cases of corruption at different levels. The discussion
lead us to a potential paradox in terms of having better and more efficient agencies
that lack the necessary controls to avoid corruption, which at the end of the day is
maladministration (Caiden, 1991b). It is important to remember that several
institutions in Chile are now certified by ISO standards. Does this mean they are
shielded against corruption scandals? It seems they are not, because certification
focuses on procedures, without a reference to values or principles ruling those
procedures or the objectives those procedures are aimed at, which should be
distinctive features of public administration. Understanding the real meaning of
public administration implies the clarification of the connection between public action
and democracy. Relying on improvement procedures is important, but it seems it is
not the only matter of concern when dealing with public agencies.

After fifteen years of public management reform policies, one can say there is a big
risk of reaching a complex point. This point is the level in which changes are no
longer significant in terms of improvements, and the effort to keep up with the
increasingly high expectations of citizens for better services becomes more and more

20285, called Transparency and Access to Public Information, has been oriented towards the issue of a
more accountable and postmodern state apparatus.
190

difficult. At the very beginning, small changes in public management were very
significant to the extent that implied clear changes in the manner of which, for
instance, citizens received their services. Yet, when those changes are already
assimilated by individuals, the expectations start to increase, but the efforts to meet
those expectations are more difficult. For instance, the implementation of e-
government techniques in “paper based” public agencies implied a radical change in
service delivery. However, once those procedures are implemented, new ideas to keep
up with the notion of being innovative and oriented to citizen satisfaction are more
and more difficult to conceive and usually imply significant amounts of money. At
the end of the day, it is easy to start reform processes where expectations are low.
But, citizens tend to refine their taste, therefore, their level of tolerance to errors and
their capacity for awe decreases significantly. In this context, public agencies should
be able to embody the notion of continuous improvement and use organizational
learning applications to keep up with the expectations of their users. A key
recommendation in this area is the use of citizen involvement in assessing potential
changes in the quality of service and in the performance improvement of any public
organization.

8.d. Policy recommendations

After the analysis being presented by this dissertation, it is important to present a list
of policy recommendations from the Chilean case.
191

The first policy recommendation is trying to include a wider analysis of the
implementation of public management reform policies. So far, the bulk of
interventions have been oriented to the modification of procedures. This is consistent
with the notion of gradualism that has governed public management reform policies
in Chile. However, there are signs that should be taken into account that are calling
for a more “meso” or inter organizational perspective. This recommendation is
consistent with the criticisms that were already mentioned that are justifying the
emergence of a “whole-of-government” approach. In Chile, despite the high level of
sophistication its Management Control System presented in this dissertation, there are
criticisms in terms of the real ability public agencies have to address complex social
problems such as education, public health, public safety, among others. The
complexities of these problems require a comprehensive response that cannot be the
sole responsibility of a single agency. How the government can stimulate this
interconnection is a fundamental question. One possibility to bolster this networking
ability might be to consolidate goals at the interorganizational level, similar to what
each agency is doing at the organizational level. This approach is similar to the
propositions posed by the governance approach (Kooiman, 2003) or the collaborative
perspective (Cooper et al., 2006; Huxman and Macdonald, 1992; Thomson and Perry,
2006).

192

The second policy recommendation is to promote organizational change within public
organizations. Rather that overseeing only improvements in processes, key agencies
such as the National Service for Civil Service or the Ministry of the Presidency,
should promote assessments agency by agency, not only regarding key processes such
as performance appraisal or auditing but also as to how public agencies should learn
this ongoing process of organizational change. It would be fundamental for the
reform process take into account more qualitative elements of these reform processes.
In so doing, the government will be able to learn and to move to a different level of
evolution. Moynihan (2008) studied a similar situation at the federal level in the US,
proposing that performance management should be complemented with other sources
of information to achieve real improvement in achieving the government’s goals.
Drawing on that analysis, in Chile, the tendency towards focusing on procedures
should be complemented with taking into account other elements that might foster
success in public management, such as leadership styles, organizational culture,
organizational commitment, among others.

Following Parlberg et al. (2008), the third policy recommendation is the use of Public
Service Motivation as a criterion for improving human resources in public
management. This could imply the use of Public Service Motivation as a trait to take
the recruitment, selection or promotion processes into account. It can also be used to
foster commitment with the agency where the work is undertaken, and to bolster a
particular type of leadership and organizational culture tailored to public agencies.
193

Underlying this potential agenda is the notion that “values are also influenced by
environmental forces, such as workplace relationships and practices” (268). Again,
this recommendation can be implemented in Chile to the extent that important
changes in public personnel management, as it was shown in Chapter 4 have been
conducted over the last 5 years.

Drawing on the last point, a fourth policy recommendation can be posed. Focusing
the attention on a more ethical public employee or, in DiIulio and DiIulio (1994)
terms, a more principled agent is fundamental to bolster the role public administration
plays in any society. Putting more interest in values and principles among public
employees is highly relevant to create a framework for future public sector reform.
This dimension gives substance to the important modifications in procedures that
have been highly developed in Chile. As a matter of that, the National Agency for
Civil Service has recently started a training program for key public employees in
matters of ethics and probity. Despite this valuable effort, the problem goes beyond a
training course, even if it is taken by many public officials. The relevant situation is
to instill values among public employees in every dimension of public activity. Along
with that, the government has to pursue an agenda in several areas to show this
commitment to a more ethical public administration. For instance, it would be very
important to foster public service values in the society by including this topic in the
curriculum of primary and secondary schools. In the past, a similar topic, “civic
194

education”, was part of public education for a long time and has been taken from the
current curriculum.

8.e. NPM in Chile: Further research

After completing the present research, and taking into account the limitations of this
study presented in Chapter 6, it is important to present issues that might be considered
as further research to advance our understanding of NPM style reforms in Chile. The
first element to increase our understanding of this topic is to increase the numbers of
cases surveyed and interviewed. Increasing the number of individuals and institutions
involved in the Public Service Motivation survey might bring new understanding of
the problem, and could present new conclusions that were not found by this research.
Another element could be to include local and subnational government bodies in the
sample to control by region. Potentially, this could take into account the diversity of
realities in a country as vast as Chile.

It would also be interesting to conduct focus groups to address the erosion of values
and unintended consequences of public sector reforms. In so doing, new data might
be generated, unveiling the nuances of these topics. Another mechanism, other than
the Public Service Motivation survey, could be developed or adopted to test the
crowding out effect in public agencies. In terms of the key actors involved in the
interviews, it might be interesting to include others that could bring new perspective
195

to understand both erosion of public values and managerial changes in the Chilean
public sector. It would have been interesting to include the insights from middle and
low rank employees to have a more diversified arrange of perspectives in these
matters. In analytical terms, more sophisticated models of analysis might be
conducted to refine the analysis, in particular, of the survey component of this study.
Finally, it would be interesting to follow the path of reforms undertaken by the
Chilean government to have a wider analysis of the real consequences of the
implementation of NPM style reforms in Chile. Only with a longer time perspective
one can have a better understanding of the real implications of public sector reform
policies. Changes in public agencies could take years to settle. Future research is
required to assess the real consequences of these reforms among public employees
and within institutions.

196

Bibliography
Alvesson, M. (1987). Organization Theory and Technocratic Consciousness:
Rationality, ieology and quality of work. New York, de Gruyter.

Appleby, P. (1947). “Toward a Better Public Administration.” Public Administration
Review 7(2), 93-9.

Armijo, L. E. and P. Faucher (2002). ""We have a consensus": Explaining political
support for market reforms in Latin America." Latin American Politics and Society
44(2): 1-40

Asch, B. (2005). The Economic Complexities of Incentive Reforms. High-
Performance Government:Structure, leadership, incentives. R. Klitgaard and P. Light.
Santa Monica, RAND.

Aucoin, P. (1990). "Administrative Reform in Public Management: Paradigms,
Principles, Paradoxes and Pendulums." Governance 3(2): 115-137.

Aucoin, P. (1995) The New Public Management: Canada in comparative perspective
(Québec, Ashgate : IRPP Governance).

Aylwin, P. (1990). Mensaje Presidencial: 21 de mayo 1990. Santiago, Chile,
Ministerio Secretaria General de Gobierno.

Bachelet, M. (2006). Mensaje Presidencial 21 de Mayo de 2006. Santiago, Chile,
Ministerio Secretaria General de Gobierno.

Bar-On, D. (2006). Tell Your Life Story: Creating dialogue among Jews and
Germans, Israelis and Palestinians. Budapest, Central European University Press.

Barzelay, M. (2001) The New Public Management: improving research and policy
dialogue.: New York, University of California Press; Russell Sage Foundation).

Batley, R. and G. Larbi (2004). The Changing Role of Government: The Reform of
Public Services in Developing Countries. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Beaumont, E. (1974). “A Pivotal Point for the Merit Concept.” Public Administration
Review 34 (5), 426-430.

Bethell, L., Ed. (1993). Chile since Independence. Cambridge [England] ; New York,
NY, USA, Cambridge University Press.

197

Biglaiser, G. (2002). "The Internationalization of Chicago's Economics in Latin
America." Economic Development and Cultural Change 50(2): 269-286.
Borins, S. (1998). Innovating With Integrity: How Local Heroes Are Transforming
American Government. Washington, D. C., Georgetown University Press.

Boston, J. (1996) Public Management: The New Zealand model. Melbourne, Vic. ;
Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Box, R. (1999). "Running Government Like a Business: Implications for Public
Administration Theory and Practice." The American Review of Public Administration
29(1): 19-43.

Bozeman, B. (ed.) (1993). Public management : the state of the art. San Francisco,
Jossey-Bass.

Bresser-Pereira, L. C. (2001). “Reforma de la Nueva Gestión Pública: Ahora en la
agenda de América Latina, sin embargo...”. Evaluando la Nueva Gestión Pública en
el Mundo. Río de Janeiro, Brazil.

Bright, L. (2005). "Public Employees With High Levels of Public Service
Motivation: Who Are They, Where Are They, and What do They Want?" Review of
Public Personnel Administration 25(2): 138-154.

Burguess, S. and Ratto, M. (2003) The Role of Incentives in the Public Sector: Issues
and Evidence, working Paper No.03/071, May, The Leverhulme Centre for Market
and Public Organization, University of Bristol.

Caiden, G. (1991). Administrative Reform Comes of Age. Berlin ; New York, W. de
Gruyter.

Caiden, G. (1991b). "What Really Is Public Maladministration?" Public
Administration Review 51(6): 486-493.

Camilleri, E. (2006). "Towards Developing an Organisational Commitment - Public
Service Motivation Model for the Maltese Public Service Employees." Public Policy
and Administration 21(1): 63-83.

Castaneda, J. (1993). Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War.
New York, Knopf.

Cavarozzi, M. (1992). "Beyond Transitions to Democracy in Latin America." Journal
of Latin American Studies 24(3): 665-684.

198

Cejudo, G. (2003). “Public Management Policy Change in Mexico, 1982 – 2000.”
International Public Management Journal 6(3): 309 – 325.

Chile (1994) Presidencial Instruction (6/12/1994) MINSEGPRES (D.EJEC) No 12.

Christensen, T. and Laegreid, P. (eds.) (2001). New Public Management: The
transformation of ideas and practice. Aldershot, Ashgate.

Christensen, T. and P. Lægreid (2007). “The Whole-of-Government Approach to
Public Sector Reform.” Public Administration Review 67 (6):1059-1066.

Christensen, T. and P. Laegreid, Eds. (2007). Trascending New Public Management:
The transformation of public sector reform. Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT,
Ashgate.

Clark, P. B. and J. Q. Wilson (1961). "Incentive Systems: A Theory of
Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 6(2): 129-166.

Clarke, J. and J. Newman (1997). The Managerial State: Power, Politics and Ideology
in the Remaking of Social Welfare. London; Thousands Oaks, Calif., Sage.

Comisión de Probidad (2006). Informe sobre medidas para favorecer la probidad y
eficiencia de la gestión pública encargado por S.E. la Presidenta de la República.
Santiago, Chile.

Comité Interministerial de Modernización de la Gestión Pública (2000) El Estado al
Servicio de la Gente. Balance 1994-2000. Santiago de Chile.

Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (2000) Crecer con Igualdad: Bases
Programáticas del Tercer Gobierno de la Concertación. Santiago de Chile.

Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (1993) Un Gobierno para los
Nuevos Tiempos: Bases Programáticas del Segundo Gobierno de la Concertación.
Santiago de Chile.

Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (1989) Programa del Gobierno de don
Patricio Aylwin Azócar. Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, Chile.

Condrey, S. and J. Brudney (1992). “Performance-Based Managerial Pay in the
Federal Government: Does Agency Matter?”. Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory. 2(2):157-174.

Constable, P. and A. Valenzuela (1990). "Democracy Restored." Journal of
Democracy 1(2): 3-12.
199

Cooper, T. L., T. A. Bryer, et al. (2006). "Citizen-Centered Collaborative Public
Management." Public Administration Review 66: 76-89.

Coursey, D. and S. Pandey (2007). "Public Service Motivation Measurement: Testing
an Abridged Version of Perry's Proposed Scale." Administration and Society 39(5):
547-568.

Coursey, D., J. Perry, et al. (2008). "Psychometric Verification of Perry's Public
Service Motivation Instrument: Results for Volunteer Exemplars." Review of Public
Personnel Administration 28(1): 79-90.

Crewson, P. (1997). "Public-Service Motivation: Building Empirical Evidence of
Incidence and Effect." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 7(4):
499-518.

Cunill, N. (1999). "Retos de las Reformas de Segunda Generación: ¿Mercantilización
y neo-clientelismo o reconstrucción de la administración pública." Nueva
Sociedad(160).

Czaja, R. and J. Blair (1996). Designing Surveys : a guide to decisions and
procedures. Thousand Oaks, Calif., Fine Forge Press.

de Charms, R. (1968). Personal Causation: The internal affective determinants of
behavior. New York, Academic Press.

Deci, E. (1972). "Intrinsic Motivation, Extrinsic Reinforcement, and Inequity."
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology(22): 113-120.

Deci, E. (1975). Intrinsic Motivation. New York, Plenum.

Deci, E. and R. Ryan (1985). Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human
Behavior (Perspectives in Social Psychology), Springer.

Dent, M., J. Chandler, et al., Eds. (2004). Questioning the New Public Management,
Ashgate Publishing.

Denhardt, R. (2000). The Pursuit of Significance : Strategies for Managerial Success
in Public Organizations, Belmont, Calif., Waveland Pr Inc.

Denhardt, R. and J. Denhardt (2000). "The New Public Service: Serving Rather Than
Steering." Public Administration Review 60(6): 549-559.

200

Denhardt, R., J. Denhardt, et al. (2002). Managing Human Behavior in Public and
Nonprofit Organizations. Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage Publications, Inc.

Denhardt, J. V. and R. B. Denhardt (2007). The New Public Service: Serving, not
steering. Armonk, New York; London, England, M. E. Sharpe.

Dibben, P. and P. Higgins (2004). New Public Management: Marketisation,
Managerialism and Consumerism. Contesting Public Sector Reforms: Critical
Perspectives, International Debates. P. Dibben, G. Wood and I. Roper. New York,
N.Y, Palgrave Macmillan.

DIPRES (2003). Systems of Management Control and Results-Based Budgeting: The
Chilean Experience. Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección de Presupuestos, Chile.

DIPRES (2007). Programa de Mejoramiento de la Gestión 2008 Programa Marco:
Documento técnico. Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección de Presupuestos, Chile.

DIPRES (2008). Programa de Mejoramiento de la Gestión (PMG) AÑO 2009:
PROGRAMA MARCO DE LA CALIDAD. Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección de
Presupuestos, Chile.

Dixit, A. (1997). "Power of Incentives in Private versus Public Organizations." The
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 87(2): 378-382.

Downs, A. (1967). Inside bureaucracy. Boston, Little, Brown.

Dawson, S. and C. Dargie (2002). New Public Management: a discussion with special
reference to UK health. New Public Management: Currents trends and future
prospects. K. McLaughlin, S. Osborne and E. Ferlie. London, Routledge.

Dunleavy, P., H. Margetts, et al. (2006). "New Public Management Is Dead: Long
Live Digital-Era Governance." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
16(3): 467-494.

Egaña, R. (2001). El Proyecto de Reforma y Modernizacion del Estado: Creacion de
un Gobierno Flexible, paper presented at the , . VI Congreso Internacional del CLAD
sobre Reforma del Estado y la Administración Pública, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 5 -
9 nov.

Easterby-Smith, M., R. Thorpe, et al. (2002). Management Research: An Introduction
(SAGE Series in Management Research), Sage Publications Ltd.

201

Etzioni, A. (1988). The moral dimension: toward a new economics. New York: Free
Press ; London : Collier Macmillan.

Ferlie, E., A. Pettigrew, et al. (1996). The New Public Management in Action. Oxford
; New York, Oxford University Press.

Flynn, N. (2002). Explaining the New Public Management: The importance of
context. New Public Management: Current trends and future prospects. K.
McLaughlin, S. Osborne and E. Ferlie. London, Routledge: 57-76.

Fowler, F. J. (2002). Survey Research Methods. Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage
Publications.

Fox, C. J. (1991). Employee Performance Appraisal: The keystone made of clay.
Public Personnel Management: Current concerns - Future challenges. C. Ban and N.
M. Riccucci. New York, Longman.

Frant, H. (1996). "High-Powered and Low-Powered Incentives in the Public Sector."
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 6(3): 365-381.

Frey, B. (1997). Not Just for the Money: An economic theory of personal motivation.
Cheltenham, UK ; Brookfield, Vt., Edward Elgar Publishing.

Frey, B. and M. Osterloh (2002). Successful Management by Motivation: Balancing
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Incentives (Organization and Management Innovation). Berlin
; New York, Springer.

Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago, University of Chicago
Press.
Gabris, G. (1986). "Can a Merit Pay System Avoid Creating Discord between
Supervisors and Subordinates? - Another Uneasy Look at Performance Appraisal."
Review of Public Personnel Administration 7(1): 70-89.

Gaetani, F. (2003) “Public Management Policy Change in Brazil: 1995 – 1998.”
International Public Management Journal 6(3): 327 – 341.

Gascó, M. (2004). ¿Luces? Y sombras de la reforma del Estado en América Latina”.
Documentos de Trabajo. Barcelona, Institut Internacional de Governabilitat de
Catalunya. 8.

Guzmán, M. (2005). Sistema de Control de Gestión y Presupuestos por Resultados:
La experiencia chilena. Santiago, Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección de Presupuestos.

202

Haggard, S. (1998). "La Reforma del Estado en América Latina." Reforma y
Democracia (CLAD)(11).

Henry, G. T. (1990). Practical Sampling. Newbury Park, Calif., Sage Publications.

Hood, C. and G. Peters (2004). "The Middle Aging of New Public Management: Into
the Age of Paradox?" Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 14(3):
267-282.

Hood, C. and M. Jackson (1991). Administrative argument. Aldershot, Hants,
England; Brookfield, Vt., USA, Dartmouth Pub. Co..

Hood, C. (1991). "A Public Manageemnt for all Seasons?.” Public Administration
69(1): 3-19.

Hood, C. (1995). “Emerging Issues in Public administration.” Public Administration
73(1): 165-183.

Huxham, C. and D. Macdonald (1992). "Introducing Collaborative Advantage:
Achieving Interorganizational Effectiveness Through Meta-Strategy." Management
Decision 30(3): 50-57.
Julnes, P. (2006). "Lo Universal y la Particular en la Reforma Gubernamental en
América Latina y el Caribe." Reforma y Democracia (CLAD)(36).

Kellough, J. E. and H. Lu (1993). "The Paradox of Merit Pay in the Public Sector:
Persistence of a Problematic Procedure." Review of Public Personnel Administration
13(2): 45-64.

Kelman, S. (2005). Unleashing Change: A Study of Organizational Renewal in
Government. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press.

Kettl, D. (2000). The Global Public Management Revolution: A Report on the
Transformation of Governance. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press.

Kingdon, J. W. (1995). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York,
HarperCollins College Publishers.

Kilpatrick, F., M. C. Cummings, et al. (1964). The Image of the Federal Service.
Washington, D.C., Brookings.

Kliksberg, B. (2005). "Public administration in Latin America: promises, frustrations
and new examinations." International Review of Administrative Sciences 71(2): 309-
326.

203

Klitgaard, R. (2005). Introduction. High-Performance Government: Structure,
Leadership, Incentives. R. Klitgaard and P. Light. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation.

Knoke, D. and C. Wright (1982). "Individual Motives and Organizational Incentive
Systems." Research in the Sociology of Organizations(1): 209-254.

Kohn, A. (1986). No Contest: The case against competition. Boston, Houghton
Mifflin.

Kohn, A. (1993). Punished by Rewards: The trouble with gold stars, incentive plans,
A’s, praise, and other bribes. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company.

Kooiman, J. (2003). Governing as Governance, (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.:
SAGE Publications).

Laffont, J.-J. and D. Martimort (2002). The Theory of Incentives : The Principal-
Agent Model. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

Lagos, R. (2001). Mensaje Presidencial 21 de Mayo 2001. Santiago, Chile, Ministerio
Secretaría General de Gobierno.

Lagos, R. (2002). Mensaje Presidencial 21 de Mayo 2002. Santiago, Chile, ministerio
Secretaria General de Gobierno.

Lahera, E. (1993) ¿Como mejorar la gestión pública?. Santiago, Cieplan-Flacso-Foro
90.

Lahera, E. (1995) “Las reformas del Estado.” Revista Chilena de Administración
Pública. Agosto(6):

Lane, J.-E. (2000). New Public Management. London; New York, Routledge.

Lane, J.-E. (2005). Public Administration and Public Management: The Principal-
Agent Perspective. London ; New York, Routledge.

Lawler, E. (1971). Pay and organizational effectiveness: a psychological view. New
York, McGraw-Hill.

Lawler, E. (1990). Strategic pay : aligning organizational strategies and pay systems.
San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Lepper, M. and D. Greene, Eds. (1978). The Hidden Costs of Reward : new
perspectives on the psychology of human motivation. Hillsdale, N.J.; New York L.
Erlbaum Associates.
204

Loffler, E. (2001). "Quality Awards as a Public Sector Benchmarking Concept in
OECD Member Countries: Some guidelines for quality award organizers." Public
Administration and Development(21): 27-40.

Lopez, A. and N. Zeller (2006). La Administración Pública Nacional en la Argentina
(1983-2001): El impacto de las reformas sobre su estructura y el personal. Revista
Argentina de Sociología 4(6): 129-159.

Lynn, L. (2001). "The Myth of the Bureaucratic Paradigm: What Traditional Public
Administration Really Stood For." Public Administration Review 61(2): 144-160.

Lynn, L. (2006). Public Management Old and New. New York ; London, Routledge.

Macho-Stadler, I., D. Perez-Castrillo, et al. (2001). An Introduction to the Economics
of Information: Incentives and Contracts, Oxford University Press.

Maesschalck, J. (2002) “When do Scandals have an Impact on Policy Making? A
Case Study of the Police Reform Following the Dutroux Scandals in Belgium.”
International Public Management Journal 5(2): 169 – 194.

Marcel, M. (1999). Effectiveness of the State and Development Lessons from the
Chilean Experience. Chile: recent policy lessons and emerging challenges. G. Perry
and D. Leipziger. Washington, D.C., World Bank: 265-325.

Marcel, M. (2002). Las Opciones para la Reforma del Estado en Chile. Reforma del
Estado. Volúmen II: Dirección Pública y Compras Públicas. S. Valdés. Santiago,
Centro de Estudios Públicos: 209-282.

Marcel, M. and C. Toha (1993) Reforma del Estado y de la Gestión Pública. ¿Como
mejorar la gestión pública?. E. Lahera. Santiago, Cieplan-Flacso-Foro 90.
Marcel, M., M. Tokman, et al. (2001). "Balance Estructural: La base de la nueva regla
de política fiscal chilena." Economía Chilena 4(3): 15 - 27.

Marsden, D. (2003). Perspectives on performance pay in government organisations: a
short review of history, research and theory so far, and main trends in OECD Member
countries. Introductory Paper for the OECD-GOV/PUMA Experts Meeting,
Performance-Related Pay of Government Employees: Assessing Reforms across
OECD Countries. Experts Meeting, OECD, Paris, 7 October 2003

Meller, P. (1990). Revisión del proceso de ajuste chileno de la década del 80.
Colección Estudios CIEPLAN. Santiago, Chile, CIEPLAN.

205

Merton, R. (1936). "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action."
American Sociological Review 1(6): 894-904.

Miller, G. J. (1992). Managerial Dilemmas: The political economy of hierarchy.
Cambridge [England] ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

Miller, G. J. and A. B. Whitford (2007). "The Principal's Moral Hazard: Constraints
on the Use of Incentives in Hierarchy." Journal of Public Administration Research
and Theory 17(2): 213-233.

Minogue, M., C. Polidano, and C. Hulme. eds. (1998). Beyond the New Public
Management: Changing ideas and practices in governance. Cheltenham, UK ;
Northampton, MA, E. Elgar.

Mitchell, T. R. (1997). Matching motivational strategies with organizational contexts.
Research in Organizational Behavior. L. L. Cummings and B. M. Staw. Greenwich,
Conn., JAI Press. 19: 57-149.

Moctezuma Barragan, E. and A. Roemer (2001). A New Public Management in
Mexico: Towards a government that produces results. Aldershot, UK, Ashgate
Publishing Company.

Morstein-Marx, F. (1960). “The mind of the Career Man.” Public Administration
Review. 20(3):133-8.

McLaughlin, K., S. Osborne, et al., Eds. (2002). New Public Management: Current
Trends and Future Prospects (Routledge Studies in the Management of Voluntary &
Nonprofit Organizations). London, Routledge.

Moe, T. (1984). "The New Economics of Organization." American Journal of
Political Science 28(4): 739-777.

Moynihan, D. P. (2008). The normative Model in Decline? Public Service Motivation
in the Age of Governance. Motivation in Public Management: The call of public
service. J. L. Perry and A. Hondeghem. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 247-267.

Moynihan, D. P. and S. K. Pandey (2007). "The Role of Organizations in Fostering
Public Service Motivation." Public Administration Review 67(1): 40-53.

Naff, K. and J. Crum (1999). "Working for America: Does Public Service Motivation
Make a Difference?" Review of Public Personnel Administration 19(4): 5-16.

Naím, M. (1994). "Latin America: The second Stage of Reform." Journal of
Democracy 5(4): 32-48.
206

Nardi, P. (2006). Doing Survey Research (2nd Edition). Boston, MA., Allyn &
Bacon.

Nachmias, D. and C. Nachmias (1981). Research Methods in the Social Sciences.
New York, St. Martin's Press.

Newman, J. (2002). The New Public Management, Modernization and Institutional
Change: Disruptions, disjunctures and dilemmas. New Public Management: Currents
trends and future prospects. K. McLaughlin, S. Osborne and E. Ferlie. London,
Routledge.

Nickson, A. (2002). "Transferencia de Políticas y Reforma en la Gestión del Sector
Público en América Latina: El caso del New Public Managament." Reforma y
Democracia (CLAD)(24).

Nickson, A. (2006). Public Sector Management Reform in Latin America. Public
sector reform in developing countries : capacity challenges to improve services. Y.
Bangura and G. Larbi. Basingstoke [England] ; New York Palgrave
Macmillan/UNRISD: 82-98.

Niskanen, W. (1971). Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago, Aldine,
Atherton.

Niskanen, W. (1994). Bureaucracy and Public Economics. Aldershot, Hants, England
; Brookfield, Vt., USA : E. Elgar.

Norris, P. (2003). Is there still a public service ethos? Work values, experience, and
job satisfaction among government workers. For the People - Can we fix public
service?. J. D. Donahue and J. S. Nye Jr. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution
Press: 72-89.

O’Donell, G. (2004). Acerca del Estado contemporáneo en América Latina
contemporánea: diez tesis para discusión. La democracia en América Latina. Hacia
una democracia de ciudadanas y ciudadanos. Contribuciones para el debate. PNUD.
New York, PNUD.

OECD (2005). Modernizing Government: The way forward. Paris, France, OECD.

Olavarria, M. (Forthcoming). "Efectividad en la Gestión de Servicios Públicos
Chilenos."

207

Olsen, J. and Peters, G. (eds.) (1996) Lessons From Experience: Experiential
Learning in Administrative Reforms in Eight Democracies. Oslo ; Boston,
Scandinavian University Press.

Olsen, T. and G. Torsvik (2000). "Discretion and Incentives in Organizations."
Journal of Labor Economics 18(3): 377-404.

Osborne, D. and P. Plastrik (1997). Banishing bureaucracy : the five strategies for
reinventing government. Reading, Mass., Addison Wesley Pub. Co. (1996 printing).

Osborne, D. and T. Gabler (1992). Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial
spirit is transforming the public sector. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.

Paarlberg, L. E., J. L. Perry, et al. (2008). From Theory to Practice: Strategies for
Applying Public Service Motivation. Motivation in Public Management: The call for
public service. J. L. Perry and A. Hondeghem. New York, Oxford University Press:
268-293.

Parker, R. and L. Bradley (2000). "Organisational Culture in the Public Sector:
Evidence from six organisations." International Journal of Public Sector Management
13(2): 125-141.

Patten, T. (1977). Pay: employee compensation and incentive plans. New York : Free
Press.

Perry, J. (1996). "Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of Construct
Reliability and Validity." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 6(1):
5-22.

Perry, J. (1997). "Antecedents of Public Service Motivation." Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory 7(2): 181-197.

Perry, J. and L. Porter (1982). "Factors Affecting the Context for Motivation in Public
Organizations." The Academy of Management Review 7(1): 89-98.

Perry, J. and L. Wise (1990). "The Motivational Bases of Public Service." Public
Administration Review 50(3): 367-373.

Peters, G. (1999). Institutional Theory in Political Science. Continuum, London and
New York.

Peters, T. and Waterman, R. (1982) In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's
best-run companies. New York, Harper & Row.

208

Pliscoff, C. (2000) Public Management Reform in Chile: A pre decisional approach.
M.Sc. Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science. London,
England.

Pollitt, C. (1990). Managerialism and the Public Services: The Anglo-American
Experience. Cambridge, Mass., USA, Basil Blackwell.

Pollitt, C. (2003). "Joined-Up Goverment: A Survey." Political Studies Review 1: 34-
49.

Pollitt, C. and G. Bouckaert. (2004). Public Management Reform: A comparative
analysis. Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press.

Porter, L. and E. Lawler (1968). Managerial Attitudes and Performance. Homewood,
Ill., R.D. Irwin.

Popovich, M. G., Ed. (1998). Creating High-Performance Government Organizations:
A practical guide for public managers Jossey-Bass Nonprofit and Public Management
Series. San Frnacisco, Calif., Jossey-Bass.

Pressman, J. and A. Wildavsky (1984). Implementation: How Great Expectations in
Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It's Amazing that Federal Programs
Work at All, This Being a Saga of ... on a Foundation (The Oakland Project Series).
Berkeley, University of California Press.

Proyecto de Reforma y Modernización del Estado (2000).Bases del Proyecto de
Reforma y Modernización del Estado. Ministerio Secretaria General de la
Presidencia, Santiago, Chile.

Proyecto de Reforma y Modernización del Estado (2002). Balance de Gestión 2002.
Ministerio Secretaria General de la Presidencia, Santiago, Chile.

Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms
in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Studies in Rationality and Social Change),
Cambridge University Press.

Quinn, R. and K. Cameron, Eds. (1988). Paradox and Transformation: toward a
theory of change in organization and management. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Pub.
Co.

Ramirez, A. (2004). El Proceso de Reforma del Estado y Modernización de la
Gestión Pública en Chile: Lecciones, experiencias y aprendizajes (1990 - 2003).
Madrid, Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública.

209

Remmer, K. L. (1998). "The politics of Neoliberal Economic Reform in South
America, 1980 - 1994." Studies in Comparative International Development 33(2): 3-
29.

Robertson, P., D. Roberts, et al. (1993). "Dynamics of Planned Organizational
Change: Assesing empirical support for a theoretical model." Academy of
Management Journal 36(3): 619-634.

Sappington, D. (1991), “Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships.” (in
Symposium: Organizations and Economics) The Journal of Economic Perspectives
5(2): 45-66.

Simon, H. (1946) “The Proverbs of Administration.” Public Administration Review
6(1), 53-67.

Simon, H. (1947). Administrative behavior. New York, Macmillan Co.

Secretaria General de la Presidencia (1994) MINSEGPRES (D. Ejec) Nº 012.
Instructivo Presidencial, December 6, 1994.

Secretaria General de la Presidencia (2006). Reforma del Estado en Chile: 2000 -
2006. Secretaria General de la Presidencia, Santiago, Chile.

Silva, P. (1991). "Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the
CIEPLAN Monks." Journal of Latin American Studies 23(2): 385-410.

Skinner, B.F. (1974). About Behaviorism. New York, Knopf.

Stiglitz, J. (2003). The Roaring Nineties. New York, W.W. Norton.

Terry, L. (1998). "Administrative Leadership, Neo-Managerialism, and the Public
Management Movement." Public Administration Review 58(3): 194-200.

The Economist (2008) “Not so shiny: How and excess of political stability can get in
the way of good government”, May, 17
th
– 23
rd
2008.

Thomson, A. M. and J. L. Perry (2006). "Collaboration Processes: Inside the Black
Box." Public Administration Review 66: 20-33.

Tomassini, L. (2004) “El Problema de los Consensos en las Reformas
Administrativas en America Latina.” Reforma y Democracia 28: 85 – 140.

210

Toonen, T. (2001). The comparative dimension of administrative reform. Politicians,
Bureaucrats and Administrative Reform. G. Peters and J. Pierre. London, Routledge:
183-201.

Schedler, K. and I. Proeller (2002). The New Public Management : a perspective
from mainland Europe. New public Management. Current trends and future
prospects. K. McLaughlin, S. P.Osborne and E. Ferlie. London, Routledge: 163-180.

Udehn, L. (1996). The Limits of Public Choice: A sociological critique of the
economic theory of politics. London; New York, Routledge.

Valdes, J. (1995). Pinochet's Economists : The Chicago School of Economics in Chile
(Historical Perspectives on Modern Economics). Cambridge, England ; New York,
NY, USA, Cambridge University Press.

Vandenabeele, W., S. Scheepers, et al. (2006). "Public Service Motivation in an
International Comparative Perspective: The UK and Germany." Public Policy and
Administration 21(1): 13-31.

Vignolo, C., J.C. Lucero and C. Vergara (1993) Modernización de la Gestión Pública.
¿Como mejorar la gestión pública?. E. Lahera. Santiago, Cieplan-Flacso-Foro 90: 51-
60.

Vigoda, E. (2002). "From Responsiveness to Collaboration: Governance, Citizens,
and the Next Generation of Public Administration." Public Administration Review
62(5): 527-540.

Vroom, V. (1964). Work and motivation. New York, Wiley.

Waissbluth, M. (2006). La Reforma del Estado en Chile 1990 - 2005: De la
confrontación al consenso, Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Ingeniería
Industrial: 1-132.

Weibel, A. A., K. Rost, et al. (2007). Crowding-Out of Intrinsic Motivation –
Opening the Black Box, SSRN.

Williamson, O. E. (1979). "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations." Journal of Law and Economics 22(2): 233-261.

Williamson, O. (1988). "The Logic of Economic Organization." Journal of Law,
Economics, & Organization 4(1): 65-93.

211

Williamson, O. (1999). "Public and private bureaucracies: a transaction cost
economics perspectives." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15(1): 306-
342.

Williamson, O. E. (2000). "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking
Ahead." Journal of Economic Literature 38(3): 595-613.

Williamson, O. E. (2002). "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From
Choice to Contract." The Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(3): 171-195.

Wilson, J. Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they do it.
New York, Basic Books.

Wilson, J. Q. (1995) Political Organizations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wilson, W. (1887). “The Study of Administration.” Political Science Quarterly 2(2):
197-222

World Bank (2005). Chile: Estudio de Evaluación de Impacto del Programa de
Evaluación de programas. Santiago, Chile, World Bank.

Wright, B. (2001). "Public-Sector Work Motivation: A Review of the Current
Literature and a Revised Conceptual Model." Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory 11(4): 559-586.

Wright, B. (2003). Toward Understanding Task, Mission and Public Service
Motivation: A conceptual and empirical synthesis of goal theory and public service
motivation. 7th National Public Management Research Conference. Georgetown
Public Policy Institute, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

Zifcak, S. M. (1994) New Managerialism: Administrative reform in Whitehall and
Canberra. Buckingham ; Philadelphia, Open University Press.

212

Appendices:
Appendix 1: List of Interviewees

Scholars and consultants

Mario Waissbluth
Marianela Armijo
Carlos Vignolo
Marcela Guzmán
Nuria Cunill
Juan Carlos Cortázar
Rossana Costa

Practitioners

Marcos Lima
Rodrigo Egaña
Tomas Campero
Luna Israel
Gustavo Rayo
Francisco Estévez
Eduardo Dockendorff

Union leaders:

Nelson Viveros

213

Appendix 2: Demographics of the dataset

Table 50: Gender Distribution (whole sample)

Frequencies Percentage
Valid
Percentage
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Female 363 47.3 56.1 56,1
Male 284 37.0 43.9 100,0
Total 647 84.4 100.0
Missing System 120 15.6
Total 767 100,0

Table 51: Type of Contract (whole sample)

Frequencies Percentage
Valid
Percentage
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Tenure
employee
126 16.4 19.5 19,5
Fixed term
employee
455 59.3 70.3 89,8
Contractor 66 8.6 10.2 100,0
Total 647 84.4 100.0
Missing System 120 15.6
Total 767 100.0

Table 52: Rank (whole sample)

Frequencies Percentage
Valid
Percentage
Percentage
Cumulative
Valid
Professional
Executive Officer
52 6.8 8.1 8,1
Non professional
Executive Officer
7 .9 1.1 9,1
Professional 363 47.3 56.3 65,4
Technician 74 9.6 11.5 76,9
Administrative staff 149 19.4 23.1 100,0
Total 645 84.1 100.0
Missing
System
122 15.9

Total 767 100,0
214

Table 53: Years working in the public sector
Frequencies Percentage Valid Percentage Percentage cumulative
Valid 0 2 .3 .3 .3
1 45 5.9 7.0 7.3
2 39 5.1 6.0 13.3
3 34 4.4 5.3 18.5
4 41 5.3 6.3 24.9
5 30 3.9 4.6 29.5
6 17 2.2 2.6 32.1
7 32 4.2 4.9 37.1
8 13 1.7 2.0 39.1
9 10 1.3 1.5 40.6
10 37 4.8 5.7 46.4
11 23 3.0 3.6 49.9
12 13 1.7 2.0 51.9
13 13 1.7 2.0 53.9
14 23 3.0 3.6 57.5
15 50 6.5 7.7 65.2
16 14 1.8 2.2 67.4
17 17 2.2 2.6 70.0
18 8 1.0 1.2 71.3
19 8 1.0 1.2 72.5
20 19 2.5 2.9 75.4
21 1 .1 .2 75.6
22 6 .8 .9 76.5
23 6 .8 .9 77.4
24 5 .7 .8 78.2
25 22 2.9 3.4 81.6
26 14 1.8 2.2 83.8
27 13 1.7 2.0 85.8
28 12 1.6 1.9 87.6
29 9 1.2 1.4 89.0
30 and more
71 9.3 11.0 100.0
Total 647 84.4 100.0
Missing System 120 15.6
Total 767 100,0

215

Table 54: Years working in the public sector (grouped)

Frequencies Percentage
Valid
Percentage
Percentage
cumulative
Valid 0 to 9 years 263 34.3 40.6 40.6
10 to 19 years 206 26.9 31.8 72.5
20 to 29 years 107 14.0 16.5 89.0
30 or more years 71 9.3 11.0 100.0
Total 647 84.4 100.0
Missing System 120 15.6
Total 767 100,0

Table 55: Public Servants
58

Frequencies Percentage
Valid
Percentage
Percentage
cumulative
Valid No 66 8.6 10.2 10.2
Yes 581 75.7 89.8 100.0
Total 647 84.4 100.0
Missing System 120 15.6
Total 767 100,0

58
For purposes of this dissertation Public Servants are those in a category different than “Contractor”.

216

Appendix 3: Reliability by Item
Table 56: Reliability by Item - Item-Total Statistics

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if
Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha if
Item Deleted
PSM 01 - Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements. 148.9874 247.210 .235 .876
PSM 02 - I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged. (Reversed) 147.9162 243.078 .554 .870
PSM 03 - Most social programs are too vital to do without. 148.2346 245.900 .298 .875
PSM 04 - It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress. 148.1941 246.087 .376 .873
PSM 05 - I believe in putting duty before self. 148.5000 243.864 .362 .873
PSM 06 - Doing well financially is definitely more important to me than doing good deeds.
(Reversed)
148.3617 249.207 .239 .875
PSM 07 - People may talk about the public interest, but they are really concerned only about their
self-interest. (Reversed)
149.8827 253.306 .079 .879
PSM 08 - To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others. 148.2709 243.619 .394 .873
PSM 09 - Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. 148.2835 243.227 .431 .872
PSM 10 - I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don't know personally. (Reversed) 148.1704 245.163 .389 .873
PSM 11 - Politics is a dirty word. (Reversed) 148.6397 244.905 .276 .876
PSM 12 - Serving citizens would give me a good feeling even if no one paid me for it. 148.2388 241.097 .538 .870
PSM 13 - I am often reminded by daily events about how dependent we are on one another. 147.9972 246.903 .401 .873

217

Table 56: Reliability by Item - Item-Total Statistics (Continued)
PSM 14 - When public officials take an oath of office, I believe they accept obligations not
expected of other citizens.
148.1383 244.612 .378 .873
PSM 15 - I respect public officials who can turn a good idea into law. 147.9106 248.062 .355 .873
PSM 16 - It is hard for me to get intensely interested in what is going on in my community.
(Reversed)
148.4441 244.147 .411 .872
PSM 17 - I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it. 148.2612 244.381 .469 .872
PSM 18 - I believe that there are many public causes worth championing. 147.7556 246.901 .511 .872
PSM 19 - I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone else. 148.5335 241.396 .523 .870
PSM 20 - I do not believe that government can do much to make society fairer. (Reversed) 148.5978 243.253 .280 .876
PSM 21 - I am willing to go great lengths to fulfil my obligations to my country. 148.1117 243.906 .562 .871
PSM 22 - Ethical behaviour of public officials is as important as competence. 147.6899 247.750 .325 .874
PSM 23 - I unselfishly contribute to my community. 148.1089 244.797 .546 .871
PSM 24 - I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first step to help
themselves. (Reversed)
149.0293 248.775 .198 .877
PSM 25 - Public service is one of the highest forms of citizenship. 148.5168 242.065 .456 .871
PSM 26 - I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of society. 148.6704 242.034 .536 .870
PSM 27 - The give and take of public policy making doesn't appeal to me. (Reversed) 148.6397 246.211 .286 .875
PSM 28 - I believe everyone has a moral commitment to civic affairs no matter how busy they are. 148.1955 245.156 .425 .872
PSM 29 - I have an obligation to look after those less well off. 148.2933 240.043 .608 .869

218
Table 56: Reliability by Item - Item-Total Statistics (Continued)
PSM 30 - Meaningful public service is very important to me. 147.9330 243.618 .556 .871
PSM 31 - I don't care much for politicians. (Reversed) 148.9372 241.393 .360 .874
PSM 32 - If any group does not share in the prosperity of our society, then we are all worse off. 148.2709 244.010 .390 .873
PSM 33 - I am willing to use every ounce of my energy to make the world a more just place. 147.9330 244.893 .601 .871
PSM 34 - I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the whole community even if it
harmed my interests.
148.3310 242.896 .512 .871
PSM 35 - To me, the phrase "duty, honor, and country" stirs deeply felt emotions. 148.6662 246.869 .265 .875
PSM 36 - It is my responsibility to help solve problems arising from interdependencies among
people.
148.4595 242.979 .532 .871
PSM 37 - An official's obligation to the public should always come before loyalty to superiors. 148.3966 247.854 .239 .876
PSM 38 - I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights of others even if it means I will be ridiculed. 148.3855 241.960 .503 .871
PSM 39 - I consider public service my civic duty. 148.0768 241.635 .591 .870
PSM 40 - There are few public programs that I wholeheartedly support. (Reversed) 150.0433 273.683 -.551 .889

219

Appendix 4: Descriptive Statistics by Item

Table 57: PSM 01 - Making a difference in society means more to me than
personal achievements.

Frequencies Percentage
Percentage
Valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally
Disagree
74 9.6 9.6 9.6
Disagree 162 21.1 21.1 30.8
Neutral 144 18.8 18.8 49.5
Agree 297 38.7 38.7 88.3
Totally Agree 90 11.7 11.7 100.0
Total 767 100.0 100.0

Table 58: PSM 02 - I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged.
(Reversed)

Frequencies Percentage
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally
Disagree
331 43.2 43.2 43.2
Disagree 347 45.2 45.2 88.4
Neutral 64 8.3 8.3 96.7
Agree 12 1.6 1.6 98.3
Totally Agree 13 1.7 1.7 100.0
Total 767 100.0 100.0

220

Table 59: PSM 03 - Most social programs are too vital to do without.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 31 4.0 4.0 4.0
Disagree 70 9.1 9.1 13.2
Neutral 91 11.9 11.9 25.0
Agree 282 36.8 36.8 61.8
Totally Agree 293 38.2 38.2 100.0
Total 767 100.0 100.0

Table 60: PSM 04 - It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see
people in distress.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 11 1.4 1.4 1.4
Disagree 47 6.1 6.1 7.6
Neutral 108 14.1 14.1 21.6
Agree 370 48.2 48.2 69.9
Totally Agree 231 30.1 30.1 100.0
Total 767 100.0 100.0

Table 61: PSM 05 - I believe in putting duty before self.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 26 3.4 3.4 3.4
Disagree 120 15.6 15.6 19.0
Neutral 115 15.0 15.0 34.0
Agree 316 41.2 41.2 75.2
Totally Agree 190 24.8 24.8 100.0
Total 767 100.0 100.0

221

Table 62: PSM 06 – Doing well financially is definitely more important to
me than doing good deeds. (Reversed)

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 196 25.6 25.6 25.6
Disagree 352 45.9 45.9 71.4
Neutral 140 18.3 18.3 89.7
Agree 63 8.2 8.2 97.9
Totally Agree 16 2.1 2.1 100.0
Total 767 100.0 100.0

Table 63: PSM 07 - People may talk about the public interest but they are
really concerned only about their self-interest. (Reversed)

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 27 3.5 3.5 3.5
Disagree 119 15.5 15.5 19.0
Neutral 129 16.8 16.8 35.9
Agree 288 37.5 37.5 73.4
Totally Agree 204 26.6 26.6 100.0
Total 767 100.0 100.0

Table 64: PSM 08 - To me patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of
others.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 30 3.9 3.9 3.9
Disagree 54 7.0 7.0 11.0
Neutral 104 13.6 13.6 24.5
Agree 332 43.3 43.3 67.8
Totally Agree 247 32.2 32.2 100.0
Total 767 100.0 100.0

222

Table 65: PSM 09 - Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 21 2.7 2.7 2.7
Disagree 64 8.3 8.3 11.1
Neutral 110 14.3 14.3 25.4
Agree 352 45.9 45.9 71.3
Totally Agree 220 28.7 28.7 100.0
Total 767 100.0 100.0

Table 66: PSM 10 – I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don't
know personally. (Reversed)

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 260 33.9 33.9 33.9
Disagree 355 46.3 46.3 80.2
Neutral 81 10.6 10.6 90.7
Agree 61 8.0 8.0 98.7
Totally Agree 10 1.3 1.3 100.0
Total 767 100.0 100.0

Table 67: PSM 11 - Politics is a dirty word. (Reversed)

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 212 27.6 28.5 28.5
Disagree 220 28.7 29.6 58.1
Neutral 149 19.4 20.0 78.1
Agree 101 13.2 13.6 91.7
Totally Agree 62 8.1 8.3 100.0
Total 744 97.0 100.0

Missing System 23 3.0

Total 767 100.0

223

Table 68: PSM 12 - Serving citizens would give me a good feeling even if
no one paid me for it.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 8 1.0 1.1 1.1
Disagree 68 8.9 9.1 10.2
Neutral 83 10.8 11.2 21.4
Agree 371 48.4 49.9 71.2
Totally Agree 214 27.9 28.8 100.0
Total 744 97.0 100.0

Missing System 23 3.0

Total 767 100.0

Table 69: PSM 13 - I am often reminded by daily events about how
dependent we are on one another.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 6 .8 .8 .8
Disagree 34 4.4 4.6 5.4
Neutral 41 5.3 5.5 10.9
Agree 390 50.8 52.4 63.3
Totally Agree 273 35.6 36.7 100.0
Total 744 97.0 100.0

Missing System 23 3.0

Total 767 100.0

224

Table 70: PSM 14 - When public officials take an oath of office. I believe
they accept obligations not expected of other citizens.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 12 1.6 1.6 1.6
Disagree 73 9.5 9.8 11.4
Neutral 68 8.9 9.1 20.6
Agree 301 39.2 40.5 61.0
Totally Agree 290 37.8 39.0 100.0
Total 744 97.0 100.0

Missing System 23 3.0

Total 767 100.0

Table 71: PSM 15 - I respect public officials who can turn a good idea into
law.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 7 .9 .9 .9
Disagree 17 2.2 2.3 3.2
Neutral 58 7.6 7.8 11.0
Agree 336 43.8 45.2 56.2
Totally Agree 326 42.5 43.8 100.0
Total 744 97.0 100.0

Missing System 23 3.0

Total 767 100.0

225

Table 72: PSM 16 - It is hard for me to get intensely interested in what is
going on in my community. (Reversed)

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 162 21.1 21.8 21.8
Disagree 340 44.3 45.7 67.5
Neutral 143 18.6 19.2 86.7
Agree 91 11.9 12.2 98.9
Totally Agree 8 1.0 1.1 100.0
Total 744 97.0 100.0

Missing System 23 3.0

Total 767 100.0

Table 73: PSM 17 - I feel people should give back to society more than they
get from it.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 7 .9 .9 .9
Disagree 34 4.4 4.6 5.5
Neutral 151 19.7 20.3 25.8
Agree 363 47.3 48.8 74.6
Totally Agree 189 24.6 25.4 100.0
Total 744 97.0 100.0

Missing System 23 3.0

Total 767 100.0

226

Table 74: PSM 18 - I believe that there are many public causes worth
championing.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 4 .5 .5 .5
Disagree 7 .9 .9 1.5
Neutral 14 1.8 1.9 3.4
Agree 346 45.1 46.5 49.9
Totally Agree 373 48.6 50.1 100.0
Total 744 97.0 100.0

Missing System 23 3.0

Total 767 100.0

Table 75: PSM 19 - I am one of those rare people who would risk personal
loss to help someone else.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 11 1.4 1.5 1.5
Disagree 77 10.0 10.3 11.8
Neutral 190 24.8 25.5 37.4
Agree 335 43.7 45.0 82.4
Totally Agree 131 17.1 17.6 100.0
Total 744 97.0 100.0

Missing System 23 3.0

Total 767 100.0

227

Table 76: PSM 20 - I do not believe that government can do much to make
society fairer. (Reversed)

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 253 33.0 34.0 34.0
Disagree 230 30.0 30.9 64.9
Neutral 43 5.6 5.8 70.7
Agree 132 17.2 17.7 88.4
Totally Agree 86 11.2 11.6 100.0
Total 744 97.0 100.0

Missing System 23 3.0

Total 767 100.0

Table 77: PSM 21 - I am willing to go great lengths to fulfill my obligations
to my country.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 4 .5 .6 .6
Disagree 18 2.3 2.5 3.0
Neutral 95 12.4 13.1 16.1
Agree 405 52.8 55.7 71.8
Totally Agree 205 26.7 28.2 100.0
Total 727 94.8 100.0

Missing System 40 5.2

Total 767 100.0

228

Table 78: PSM 22 - Ethical behavior of public officials is as important as
competence.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 16 2.1 2.2 2.2
Disagree 25 3.3 3.4 5.6
Neutral 16 2.1 2.2 7.8
Agree 186 24.3 25.6 33.4
Totally Agree 484 63.1 66.6 100.0
Total 727 94.8 100.0

Missing System 40 5.2

Total 767 100.0

Table 79: PSM 23 - I unselfishly contribute to my community.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 3 .4 .4 .4
Disagree 14 1.8 1.9 2.3
Neutral 96 12.5 13.2 15.5
Agree 417 54.4 57.4 72.9
Totally Agree 197 25.7 27.1 100.0
Total 727 94.8 100.0

Missing System 40 5.2

Total 767 100.0

229

Table 80: PSM 24 - I have little compassion for people in need who are
unwilling to take the first step to help themselves. (Reversed)

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 88 11.5 12.1 12.1
Disagree 255 33.2 35.1 47.2
Neutral 127 16.6 17.5 64.6
Agree 210 27.4 28.9 93.5
Totally Agree 47 6.1 6.5 100.0
Total 727 94.8 100.0

Missing System 40 5.2

Total 767 100.0

Table 81: PSM 25 - Public service is one of the highest forms of citizenship.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 17 2.2 2.3 2.3
Disagree 79 10.3 10.9 13.2
Neutral 182 23.7 25.0 38.2
Agree 288 37.5 39.6 77.9
Totally Agree 161 21.0 22.1 100.0
Total 727 94.8 100.0

Missing System 40 5.2

Total 767 100.0

230

Table 82: PSM 26 - I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good
of society.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 9 1.2 1.2 1.2
Disagree 80 10.4 11.0 12.2
Neutral 242 31.6 33.3 45.5
Agree 310 40.4 42.6 88.2
Totally Agree 86 11.2 11.8 100.0
Total 727 94.8 100.0

Missing System 40 5.2

Total 767 100.0

Table 83: PSM 27 - The give and take of public policy making doesn't
appeal to me. (Reversed)

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 142 18.5 19.5 19.5
Disagree 306 39.9 42.1 61.6
Neutral 138 18.0 19.0 80.6
Agree 102 13.3 14.0 94.6
Totally Agree 39 5.1 5.4 100.0
Total 727 94.8 100.0

Missing System 40 5.2

Total 767 100.0

231

Table 84: PSM 28 - I believe everyone has a moral commitment to civic
affairs no matter how busy they are.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 10 1.3 1.4 1.4
Disagree 47 6.1 6.5 7.8
Neutral 69 9.0 9.5 17.3
Agree 406 52.9 55.8 73.2
Totally Agree 195 25.4 26.8 100.0
Total 727 94.8 100.0

Missing System 40 5.2

Total 767 100.0

Table 85: PSM 29 - I have an obligation to look after those less well off.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 6 .8 .8 .8
Disagree 56 7.3 7.7 8.5
Neutral 118 15.4 16.2 24.8
Agree 366 47.7 50.3 75.1
Totally Agree 181 23.6 24.9 100.0
Total 727 94.8 100.0

Missing System 40 5.2

Total 767 100.0

232

Table 86: PSM 30 - Meaningful public service is very important to me.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 5 .7 .7 .7
Disagree 17 2.2 2.3 3.0
Neutral 63 8.2 8.7 11.7
Agree 336 43.8 46.2 57.9
Totally Agree 306 39.9 42.1 100.0
Total 727 94.8 100.0

Missing System 40 5.2

Total 767 100.0

Table 87: PSM 31 - I don't care much for politicians. (Reversed)

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 133 17.3 18.6 18.6
Disagree 222 28.9 31.0 49.6
Neutral 156 20.3 21.8 71.4
Agree 114 14.9 15.9 87.3
Totally Agree 91 11.9 12.7 100.0
Total 716 93.4 100.0

Missing System 51 6.6

Total 767 100.0

233

Table 88: PSM 32 - If any group does not share in the prosperity of our
society then we are all worse off.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 14 1.8 2.0 2.0
Disagree 84 11.0 11.7 13.7
Neutral 57 7.4 8.0 21.6
Agree 341 44.5 47.6 69.3
Totally Agree 220 28.7 30.7 100.0
Total 716 93.4 100.0

Missing System 51 6.6

Total 767 100.0

Table 89: PSM 33 - I am willing to use every ounce of my energy to make
the world a more just place.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 2 .3 .3 .3
Disagree 6 .8 .8 1.1
Neutral 47 6.1 6.6 7.7
Agree 401 52.3 56.0 63.7
Totally Agree 260 33.9 36.3 100.0
Total 716 93.4 100.0

Missing System 51 6.6

Total 767 100.0

234

Table 90: PSM 34 - I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for
the whole community even if it harmed my interests.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 6 .8 .8 .8
Disagree 53 6.9 7.4 8.2
Neutral 122 15.9 17.0 25.3
Agree 379 49.4 52.9 78.2
Totally Agree 156 20.3 21.8 100.0
Total 716 93.4 100.0

Missing System 51 6.6

Total 767 100.0

Table 91: PSM 35 - To me the phrase "duty, honor, and country" stirs deeply
felt emotions.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 40 5.2 5.6 5.6
Disagree 71 9.3 9.9 15.5
Neutral 234 30.5 32.7 48.2
Agree 205 26.7 28.6 76.8
Totally Agree 166 21.6 23.2 100.0
Total 716 93.4 100.0

Missing System 51 6.6

Total 767 100.0

235

Table 92: PSM 36 - It is my responsibility to help solve problems arising
from interdependencies among people.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 4 .5 .6 .6
Disagree 52 6.8 7.3 7.8
Neutral 179 23.3 25.0 32.8
Agree 368 48.0 51.4 84.2
Totally Agree 113 14.7 15.8 100.0
Total 716 93.4 100.0

Missing System 51 6.6

Total 767 100.0

Table 93: PSM 37 - An official's obligation to the public should always
come before loyalty to superiors.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 27 3.5 3.8 3.8
Disagree 80 10.4 11.2 14.9
Neutral 118 15.4 16.5 31.4
Agree 269 35.1 37.6 69.0
Totally Agree 222 28.9 31.0 100.0
Total 716 93.4 100.0

Missing System 51 6.6

Total 767 100.0

236

Table 94: PSM 38 - I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights of others even
if it means I will be ridiculed.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 16 2.1 2.2 2.2
Disagree 54 7.0 7.5 9.8
Neutral 128 16.7 17.9 27.7
Agree 363 47.3 50.7 78.4
Totally Agree 155 20.2 21.6 100.0
Total 716 93.4 100.0

Missing System 51 6.6

Total 767 100.0

Table 95: PSM 39 - I consider public service my civic duty.

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 7 .9 1.0 1.0
Disagree 30 3.9 4.2 5.2
Neutral 69 9.0 9.6 14.8
Agree 368 48.0 51.4 66.2
Totally Agree 242 31.6 33.8 100.0
Total 716 93.4 100.0

Missing System 51 6.6

Total 767 100.0

237

Table 96: PSM 40 - There are few public programs that I wholeheartedly
support. (Reversed)

Frequencies Percentages
Percentage
valid
Percentage
cumulative
Valid Totally Disagree 14 1.8 2.0 2.0
Disagree 43 5.6 6.0 8.0
Neutral 171 22.3 23.9 31.8
Agree 305 39.8 42.6 74.4
Totally Agree 183 23.9 25.6 100.0
Total 716 93.4 100.0

Missing System 51 6.6

Total 767 100.0

238

Appendix 5: ANOVA Analysis PSM Scores

Table 97: ANOVA – PSM Score (40 Item) and Type of Contract
PSM Score (40 Items Scale)

Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups .564 2 .282 1.755 .174
Within Groups 103.484 644 .161

Total 104.048 646

Table 98: Multiple Comparisons (ANOVA PSM Score and Type of Contract)
PSM Score (40 Items Scale)
Scheffe
(I) Type of Contract (J) Type of Contract
Mean
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
Full time employee Fixed Term
Employee
.02957 .04035 .765
Contractor .11293 .06091 .180
Fixed Term
Employee
Full Time employee -.02957 .04035 .765
Contractor .08336 .05280 .288
Contractor Full time employee -.11293 .06091 .180
Fixed Term
Employee
-.08336 .05280 .288

Table 99: ANOVA – PSM Score (40 Item) and Years working on the public sector
PSM Score (40 Items Scale)

Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups .141 3 .047 .291 .832
Within Groups 103.907 643 .162

Total 104.048 646

239

Table 100: Multiple Comparisons (ANOVA – PSM Score (40
Item) and Years working on the public sector)
PSM Score (40 Items Scale)
Scheffe
(I) Experience (J) Experience
Mean
Difference (I-J)
Std.
Error Sig.
0 to 9 years 10 to 19 years -.02737 .03740 .911
20 to 29 years -.02429 .04609 .964
30 or more years -.03997 .05376 .907
10 to 19 years 0 to 9 years .02737 .03740 .911
20 to 29 years .00307 .04790 1.000
30 or more years -.01260 .05532 .997
20 to 29 years 0 to 9 years .02429 .04609 .964
10 to 19 years -.00307 .04790 1.000
30 or more years -.01567 .06153 .996
30 or more
years
0 to 9 years .03997 .05376 .907
10 to 19 years .01260 .05532 .997
20 to 29 years .01567 .06153 .996

Table 101: ANOVA – PSM Score (24 Item) and Institution
PSM Score (24 Item Scale)

Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 1.045 5 .209 1.115 .351
Within Groups 142.601 761 .187

Total 143.645 766

240

Table 102: Multiple Comparisons (ANOVA – PSM Score (24 Item)
and Institution)
PSM Score (24 Item Scale) Scheffe
(I) Institution (J) Institution Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
Institution 1 Institution 2 .04783 .08822 .998
Institution 3 .13246 .08801 .811
Institution 4 .06997 .08383 .983
Institution 5 .15917 .11177 .845
Institution 6 .04743 .08425 .997
Institution 2 Institution 1 -.04783 .08822 .998
Institution 3 .08463 .05509 .797
Institution 4 .02214 .04813 .999
Institution 5 .11134 .08822 .902
Institution 6 -.00040 .04886 1.000
Institution 3 Institution 1 -.13246 .08801 .811
Institution 2 -.08463 .05509 .797
Institution 4 -.06249 .04775 .887
Institution 5 .02671 .08801 1.000
Institution 6 -.08503 .04849 .688
Institution 4 Institution 1 -.06997 .08383 .983
Institution 2 -.02214 .04813 .999
Institution 3 .06249 .04775 .887
Institution 5 .08920 .08383 .951
Institution 6 -.02254 .04040 .997
Institution 5 Institution 1 -.15917 .11177 .845
Institution 2 -.11134 .08822 .902
Institution 3 -.02671 .08801 1.000
Institution 4 -.08920 .08383 .951
Institution 6 -.11174 .08425 .881

241

Table 102: Multiple Comparisons (ANOVA – PSM Score (24 Item)
and Institution) (Continued)
Institution 6 Institution 1 -.04743 .08425 .997
Institution 2 .00040 .04886 1.000
Institution 3 .08503 .04849 .688
Institution 4 .02254 .04040 .997
Institution 5 .11174 .08425 .881

Table 103: ANOVA – PSM Score (24 Item) and Type of Contract
PSM Score (24 Item Scale)

Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups .232 2 .116 .668 .513
Within Groups 112.033 644 .174

Total 112.265 646

Table 104: Multiple Comparisons (ANOVA – PSM Score (24 Item) and Type
of Contract)
PSM Score (24 Item Scale)
Scheffe
(I) Type of
Contract
(J) Type of
Contract
Mean Difference
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
Full time
employee
Fixed Term
Employee
.02008 .04199 .892
Contractor .07272 .06338 .518
Fixed Term
Employee
Full Time
Employee
-.02008 .04199 .892
Contractor .05265 .05494 .632
Contractor Full Time
Employee
-.07272 .06338 .518
Fixed Term
Employee
-.05265 .05494 .632

242

Table 105: ANOVA – PSM Score (24 Item) and Years working on the public sector
PSM Score (24 Item Scale)

Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups .143 3 .048 .274 .844
Within Groups 112.122 643 .174

Total 112.265 646

Table 106: Multiple Comparisons (ANOVA – PSM Score (24 Item) and
Years working on the public sector)
PSM Score (24 Item Scale)
Scheffe

(I) Experience (J) Experience
Mean
Difference (I-J)
Std.
Error Sig.
0 to 9 years 10 to 19 years -.02651 .03885 .926
20 to 29 years -.03091 .04788 .937
30 or more years -.03688 .05585 .933
10 to 19 years 0 to 9 years .02651 .03885 .926
20 to 29 years -.00440 .04976 1.000
30 or more years -.01037 .05747 .998
20 to 29 years 0 to 9 years .03091 .04788 .937
10 to 19 years .00440 .04976 1.000
30 or more years -.00597 .06392 1.000
30 or more years 0 to 9 years .03688 .05585 .933
10 to 19 years .01037 .05747 .998
20 to 29 years .00597 .06392 1.000

Abstract (if available)

Abstract The New Public Management (NPM) is an administrative philosophy that can be pinpointed as the theoretical background for many of the public sector reform processes the world has witnessed in both developed and less developed countries. It is conceived as an administrative philosophy, which entails a group of new assumptions regarding the manner in which public agencies should be managed. In the last fifteen years or so, public administration literature has assessed the outcomes of the implementation of this new paradigm. The following dissertation is an effort to add a new case to this growing literature. The Chilean case can be seen as an example from less developed country, which is not normally analyzed in the mainstream literature on public administration. After justifying the argument that NPM style reforms have been implemented in Chile in the last ten years, two outcomes of these reforms are analyzed. First, the potential erosion of public values due to NPM style reforms is tested among Chilean public employees. The Public Service Motivation survey conducted among 767 employees was applied to test for the notion of erosion of public employees. Second, the (un)intended outcomes of NPM style reforms is analyzed. A group of interviews with key players of the public sector reform process in Chile was developed to explore this issue. Conclusions regarding the implications of NPM style reforms in Latin America, drawing from the Chilean case, are provided.

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

Shortcomings of institutional reform in public sector governance: the case of Kyrgyzstan

PDF

Community foundations and new governance networks: three studies exploring the role of regionally-networked philanthropic organizations in local problem-solving

PDF

Outcomes-based contracting through impact bonds: ties to social innovation, systems change, and international development

PDF

The functions of the middleman: how intermediary nonprofit organizations support the sector and society

PDF

The effects of interlocal collaboration on local economic performance: investigation of Korean cases

PDF

The influence of new media marketing public relations on the South Korean film industry -- in relation to the U.S. film industry

PDF

Quango reforms and challenges in South Korea: social relations, informal networks, and hidden actions

PDF

The impact of trade liberlaization on firm performance in developing countries -- new evidence from Pakistani manufacturing sector

Asset Metadata

Creator Pliscoff, Cristian (author)

Core Title New public management in Chile (1990 - 2008): exploring its impact on public employees

School School of Policy, Planning, and Development

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Public Administration

Publication Date 07/31/2009

Defense Date 02/11/2009

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Chile,Latin America,Modernization,new public management,OAI-PMH Harvest,public sector reform,public service motivation

Place Name Chile (countries)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Robertson, Peter J. (committee chair), Caiden, Gerald (committee member), Gomez-Barris, Macarena (committee member)

Creator Email cpliscoff@gmail.com,pliscoff@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m2440

Unique identifier UC1467656

Identifier etd-Pliscoff-3028 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-182358 (legacy record id),usctheses-m2440 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Pliscoff-3028.pdf

Dmrecord 182358

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Pliscoff, Cristian

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu