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Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
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After action reports for the April-May riots, 1992-06-12/1992-06-29
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After action reports for the April-May riots, 1992-06-12/1992-06-29
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,. . l_A';i) 01 .15.0 (~81) DATE o F 6 / 1 2 / 9 2 REQUEST: _______ _ STAFF RESEARCH CONTROL FORM RESEARCH REQUEST ORIGINATOR'S DUE DATE: 6/29/92 FIRM 4L.L. 5U951t0UltNT our. OATltS ON "ltVl[ .. SI[ TO: __ A_L_L _O_H_B_E_N_T_I_T_I._ES _____ _ C'M,.L.OYl[I[ TAKING ,-1,.ST ACTION ON .... OJltCT SUBJECT (Brief description of research topic): DR NO.: ________ _ OltTAINltD '"'OM .. . I . C. 8Y tM,.L.OYEt 0"'1 GINA TING ,.IIOJltCT AFTER-ACTION REPORTING FOR THE APRIL/MAY RIOTS INSTRlJCTIONS (Form of report, suggested sources, person$ ~o i:ontact, etc. ): 1. TACTICAL PLANNING SECTION: Type of Occurrence This section shall include, but is not limited to: * Type of occurrence * Location of occurrence * Dates, times and duration * Brief background/intelligence summary FIELD COMMAND POST INFORMATION This section shall include: * Location of command post and satellite command posts. * The field coIT1Tiand post staffing levels. * The mob i- 1 e command post veh i c 1 es used. * The watch schedule during the UO. PROPERTY DAMAGE This section shall include all significant property damaged during the UO. * Private property * City property * Other publi~ property 2~- DETECTIVE HEADQUARTERS BUREAU: DEATHS AND INJURIES This section shall include significant infonnation on UO related deaths and rnJuries. There shall be a statistical summary of deaths and injuries, including distinctions between officers, suspects and victims that were injured or killed. Additionally, there shall be a one line summary depicting the circumstances surrounding each death and pennanently incapacitating ("A") injury. 3. ALL OTHER OHB DIVISIONS & SPECIALIZED SECTIONS: CRITIQUE All Areas and specialized division commmanding officers shall submit a written critique. Commanding officers shall encourages their subordinates to provide EMPLOYEE ORIGINATING PROJECT: __________ O.w.JHI-LIB _________ _ (CONT.) GENERAL FILE NO. OFFICE FILE NO. BUREAU FILE NO. OTHER FILE NO. 122/92 NOTE: The original of this form remains with the original of the latest revision of the staff research report. / ~ (;1.15.0 (2181) .. . ,.•" 0.4 TE OF 6 / 12 / 9 2 STAFF RESEARCH CONTROL FORM RESEARCH REQUEST REQUEST: _________ _ ORIGIHATOR•s cue DATE: 6/29/92 · FIRM DR NO.: __________ _ TO: ~-A~l~L_O_H_B ____ E N_T_I_T_I_E_S _______ _ C'oe•I.OYCC TACl,.11 ,,IIIST AC:TIO• O• ••teUCC:T SUBJECT (Brief clescription of research topic): Al.I. •u••couc•T ouc OATCS O• ltCVCIISC AFTER-ACTION REPORTING FOR THE APRIL/MAY RIOTS INSTRUCTIONS (Form of report, s1199ested sources, pe~sons to contact, etc.): .' .... . . . . - - - --- - .. - - -·. --· . · •.- ~ ••r~~ ...... _ ; .. / :·. :.~ : --· ~ · . ~.- . · .: ._ . ·~ ---- ~ . =.->.: -~~::: . ) :::_~:: ;:,• ~i~ ::\>~-(~. ~.:;,- : :_ 3 •. ALL OTHER OHB · oIVISIONS & SPECIALIZED SECTIONS: - ~ · CRITIQUE - ~- oaT•••co ,.ltOM •••• c: • • ,. CM•t.OTCC 0111.-. ATI ... •--CT . "' -- - -.-.. ~-- :.~ :: . . :- :- ·-::~ .. ,.·· ::. · ·.-.. All Areas and ·speci~lized· division cammanding officers shall submit .a written ·crit~que. Conmanding officers shall encourages their subordinates -to provide EMPLOYEE ORIGIN>. TING PROJECT: ___________ 0..,.HB--. _________ _ .· (CONT.) GENERAL P'ILE NO. Ol"P'IClt ll'IU NO. DIVISION I Lit NO. OTMltllt ll'ILlt NO. ·122/92 q~;·· NOTE: Tl,e originol of this fo,- ,_ans with the origin•l of 1he latest revision of the staff research report. ' . -t . . . ·- --- - . ------------ .,-,· STAFF RESEARCH CONTROL FORM (CONT.) Page 2 input and compile that input into a single written critique. . All original written critiques submitted by subordinates shall be attached to the commands' critique. The command critique shall include, but is not limited to: * An appraisal of procedures used during the UO. * A statemerit evaluating the effectiveness of the effort while operating within established procedures. * Recommendations for changes in procedures. Special consideration should be given to these areas: * Strategy * Tactics * Personnel * Logistics * Communications (specifically, availability/efficiency and availability of frequencies). * Field jail of ROVERS • Commanding officers may use the attached UO Critique Form (Attachment A) to solicit critiques from their subordinates. Certain commands perfonned duties that were specialized, unique or significant (i.e., Metro, ASD, Communications; etc.). In those cases, conmanding officers should expound on that specialized assignment . I - , ,. • ~ .• t ,., t ' . :. · . . .. ·uo CRITIQQB PORK Name Rank _______ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time __________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) ATTACJDDDIT A Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; (Continuation sheets may be used) ; • • • • • • • • • • •• • ~4 ... ·- •• -- • • c ....... •···-. -,---- ~- -- .... -- \ , w' INTRADEPARTMENTA t · CORRESPONDENCE / / ' June 19, 1992 8.2.6 TO: FROM: SUBJECT: Commanding Officer, Juvenile Division Officer-in-Charge, Child Protection Section AFTER-ACTION REPORTING FOR THE APRIL/MAY RIOTS The following information was elicited from personnel in the Child Protection Section (CPS) in regard to the April/May riots. PLANNING There was a concensus among CPS personnel that the problems experienced during the recent civil unrest in Los Angeles substantially antedate events that occurred. Tfie problems began with a complete lack of anticipation, planning and training. This, in turn, exacerbated the myriad problems and errors that plagued the police task throughout the period of unrest. There is ample evidence to suggest that any act of preparation prior to the unrest would have been viewed as inflammatory rather tha~ preventive by many politicians in the City. This effectively paralyzed the command structure of this Department. While there may be standing plans to deal with civil unrest and other unusual occurrences in the City, such plans have not been reviewed or rehearsed by specialized divisions for who knows how long. Perhaps the one saving grace was the uniform inspection conducted by the Commanding Officer during the Summer of 1991; the lone such inspection ever, within recall, in Juvenile Division. This measure at least ensured a proper uniform appearance during the civil unrest. Had it not been for that inspection, it would have been an embarrassing sight to behold on April 30, 1992. RECOMMENDATIONS 1) Annual uniform inspections for all sworn personnel, complete with all equipment needed for deployment during unusual occurrences. 2) Annual tactical training on a divisional basis to include squad formations, deployment, tactical maneuvers, use of force and weapons training. Commanding Officer, Juvenile Division .Page 2 8.2.6 STRATEGY The lack of strategy was glaringly apparent from the outset of unrest. Television coverage at both Parker Center and the intersection of Florence and Normandie during the early hours after the jury verdict clearly refute any notions to the contrary. The only conceivable strategy that could be ventured is a strategy of inaction and it is doubtful, in retrospect, that anyone would own-up to such a strategy. CPS personnel responded to their normal work site during the late evening hours of April 29, only to stand by in soft clothes, never to be called upon prior to EOW in the early hours of April 30. Personnel followed events on television and were aware that even those entities who were better prepared, i.e., patrol and Metro, were either not deployed or were deployed very ineffectively. Throughout the course of the unrest, CPS personnel first reported to Juvenile Division where they would often stand by for one hour or longer waiting for assignments. They would then be instructed to go to the CP at 54th and Arlington where they would again stand by for an hour or longer. Finally, they would be dispatched to a satellite Command Post for ultimate field assignment. Personnel often found themselves unexpected, unwanted and u~needed at the various CPs. In addition, squads that were already formed were (/ ·split · up for various reasons. When EOW came, t hese squads would , not be released until they had re-formed into their original squads -::. in order to ensure that all personnel were accounted for. While / the accountability for all personnel is of paramount importance, \ ..many hours were wasted in waiting to re-form squads for dismissal · . RECOMMENDATIONS 1) Eliminate some of the staffing levels so that personnel can be dispatched to field assignments in a more direct, timely and efficient manner. 2) Develop and rehearse strategies beforehand so that sufficient personnel can be deployed quickly and effectively. 3) Develop and rehearse strategies to seal off "hot spots" and contain illegal activities within those areas. 4) Train detectives and other non-uniformed personnel to more effectively augment patrol and Metro personnel. 5) Maintain squad integrity during unusual occurrences. 1 Commanding Officer, Juvenile Division Page 3 8.2 ~6 TACTICS With the exception of a few officers who had recently worked patrol or Metro assignments, CPS personnel were generally unfamiliar with the tactics necessary to deal with civil unrest. This was also evident in interaction with most other non-uniformed personnel throughout the Department. Tactics primarily consisted of forming into squads, deploying three or four to a vehicle for officer safety and random patrolling to establish a police presence. While this was effective after the violence had subsided, it was not effective in dealing with violence, crowd control and incidents of looting. At the outbreak of violence, there was a need for a well coordinated and controlled response by large numbers of officers and that response was simply not in evidence. One would be hard pressed to cite an example of a well executed police response at any level during the first two days of unrest. This was due to both indecisive management and a Department-wide laxness of tactical training. Better tactical preparedness would surely have fostered a more positive and calming influence among the citizenary and may have resulted in fewer vigilante actions in the community. - The formation of vigilante groups demonstrates a distinct lack of confidence in the ability of the police to adequately protect citizens and property. Such confidence cannot be easily restored. RECOMMENDATIONS 1) Increased tactical training for individuals and squads and training to integrate squads into large, coordinated enforcement actions. 2) Media attention to departmental preparedness activities to heighten community awareness and confidence. PERSONNEL The personnel aspect of the recent civil unrest was perhaps the most positive factor to emerge in the entire fiasco. The attitude, spirit of cooperation and willingness to help was generally outstanding among CPS personnel. The only thing lacking wa~ the management skills to channel and direct these personnel in a manner that would promote both a sense -of purpose and a sense of accomplishment. Few if any personnel came away from this experience feeling that they had been part of an efficient and effective operation. From beginning to end there was a general feeling of total disarray and a huge waste of manpower. : .. __ . - . ~ · ·-- --- - ____ ....,.......,_.,.__.__ .......... _ .. ......... _ ' .. . - - -- -.. ··-- - - -- ~~ Commanding Officer, Juvenile Division Page 4 8.2.6 Personnel problems began with initial call-up procedures. Telephone numbers were generally accurate but officers were often called more than once during the early, confusing stages of mobilization. Response was adequate and timely. Once squads were formed, they remained quite consistent for the duration of the unrest. Direction at the level of Lieutenant and squad leaders and communications among squad members was generally appropriate and consistent. However, above the level of Lieutenant, namely EOC and CP, direction and communication was often slow, poor and confusing. RECOMMENDATIONS 1) Separate A & B Watch rosters to avoid confusion of personnel and call-up procedures. 2) Increased training of personnel staffing the EOC and CPS's to enhance decision-making, communication and direction. LOGISTICS Logistics were, quite simply, a nightmare. The Department fleet --· and other items of equipment are generally outdated and in a state of disrepair. Personnel were initially dropped by bus at different · hot spots and left without transportation, communications, food or water. While this situation was generally corrected by the second or third day, there was still a lack of equipment and a lack of knowledge on how to operate equipment. For example, many persons who have been out of patrol for an extended period had no idea how to operate a patrol vehicle. The MDT, emergency equipment and radio procedures are foreign to many. - - RECOMMENDATION 1) The primary remedy for poor logistics lies in major budgetary outlays to upgrade the fleet and equipment. Prospects for this in the foreseeable future are dismal at best. However, news med~a attention has been given to this problem and public awareness is a definite plus in any solution that may be forthcoming. If attained, training needs to be provided in ·the proper utilization of vehicles and equipment. COMMUNICATIONS The problems experienced with communications are similar in nature to those of logistics. Much of the communications equipment is outdated and in disrepair. In addition, much of the equipment did ___ not have the necessary frequencies for the areas of operations in which it was utilized. This obviously created a problem of officer safety and decreased effectiveness of operations. There was also ..., .. •• .. .,. Commanding Officer, Juvenile Division Page 5 8; 2 .. 6 much confusion as to unit designations and sectors of operation. Unit designations would often be assigned at Juvenile Division, only to be changed at one or more of the CP's. Lastly, rumor - - control seemed to be nonexistent during the period of unrest. Many rumors of gangs and guns were circulated throughout the events. While this is important to officer safety, it ceases to be so when it is so common as to be blase. RECOMMENDATIONS 1) Updated communications equipment with increased frequencies for enhanced communications capabilities. SUMMARY The Department image suffered a severe blow during the recent unrest in the City. We were held up to the world as slow to respond and ineffective in safeguarding the community. The only redeeming quality of this scrutiny was the fact~that field personnel were generally recognized as dedicated and eager to take action. They simply lacked the necessary direction of high level Department management and other City officials to accomplish the task at hand. There is much that needs to be done to restore th~ image of this Department. While there may be some opposition to the necessary changes and training, the vast majority of personnel are eager to do their part to restore public confidence. One thing is certain, dedication and commitment are not lacking. n.~ E. D, MOEN, Lieutenant Officer-in-Charge Child Protection Section Juvenile Division June 22, 1992 8.2.6 TO: FROM: SUBJECT: INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Commanding Officer, Juvenile Division AFTER-ACTION CRITIQUE 4-30/5-18-92 The attached critiques prepared by the four Section Lieutenants assigned to Juvenile Division, who all served as acting Commanding Officers of Juvenile Division, comprehensively address issues that arose concerning Juvenile Division personnel during the Unusual Occurrence. The Commanding Officer, Juvenile Division, was assigned as the "A" watch Military Liaison Officer for Operations-South Bureau. In that capacity I functioned in a very different 1 capacity than if I had remained as C/O of a specialized detective division whose primary responsibility was to provide generic personnel to support various Department missions. Captain J. Curreri, Commanding Officer Major Violators, Narcotics Group, was my counterpart on the "B" watch. He arrived on scene six hours before I did and began the process of defining our role·s. When I arrived I continued the process. My first call was to the EOC to speak with the Department Military Liaison Officer. He was not available, I left numerous messages for him and none were returned prior to the conclusion of the UO. I did see him once on a tour of our facilities with a regular Army general but he did not have .time to talk. During the days and weeks that followed, the organization that we established continued to evolve. By the time the National Guard pulled out of town we knew what we were doing. Our relationship with military personnel was nothing short of outstanding. If we had anticipated our needs and planned for the employment of the National Guard months in advance, I believe much of the second day's violence could have been prevented. If the Department had on-going table top exercises with our counterparts in the National Guard much of the initial confusion would have been avoided. · .. ; .. -- I - INTRODUCTION JWENILE NARCOTICS SECTION AFTER-ACTION REPORT APRIL/MAY RIOTS On April 29, 1992, Juvenile Narcotics Section (JNS) personnel were mobilized in concert with other Department personnel. PERSONNEL Thirty-one detectives and officers were assigned to JNS at the time of the mobilization. Ten officers and detectives were assigned to the "A" watch, and 20 to the "B" watch. One Detective III was on vacation and was not mobilized. In addition to the regularly ¥ assigned JNS personnel, five undercover officers were also deployed in uniform, one on "A" watch and four on "B" watch. The undercover officers assigned to the School Buy Program were not mobilized and were given modified assignments during the civil unrest. Four JNS civilian clerical personnel were also mobilized - two assigned to "A" watch, and two to "B" watch. A breakdown of those assigned to each watch, by rank, is as follows: "A" Watch "B" Watch 1 D-III 2 Lt-II 1 D-II 5 D-III 3 D-I 2 D-II 6 P-III 1 D-I 5 P-II 1 P-III 4 SCT 1 P-II 5 CT 1 CT 2 CRITIQUE OF OPERATIONS The initial mobilization involved officers assigned to "B" Watch and necessitated a response to Parker Center. Slight delays were experienced by some officers who had to initially go to their Bureau Offices to gather uniform and equipment items and then respond to PAB. However, within approximately two and a half hours of the initial off-hour notification, two squads of JNS officers were available for deployment. The OHB mobilization plan called for OHB entities to initially check-in with an OHB coordinator for an assignment. The OHB Coordinator would respond to requests from the EOC. This procedure proved to be cumbersome and on several occasions resulted in delays in deployment and/or mis-communicated assignment orders between the EOC, OHB and the requested personnel resources. A direct response to the EOC Personnel Unit would have expedited the deployment of personnel. -2- During the initial stages of the civil unrest, JNS personnel were involved in the following uniformed activities: 1) Escort d~ty for SID response teams 2) PAB Security 3) Looting enforcement 4) Security for Fire Department personnel 5) Field Task Force patrols 6) Food give-a-way security 7) Shopping Center security JNS personnel were normally deployed by squads from Field Command Post locations. Some problems developed at the FCP locations. These generally centered around the issuance of equipment and vehicles, and the lack of communication between the EOC and FCP. The problems were more prevalent during the initial days of the Unusual Occurrence. On one occasion, squads were deployed on "A" Watch without rovers, vehicles, and without a mission or a command and control network in place. They were merely told to go by bus to a looting location. On another occasion on "A" Watch, a squad was deployed to a food giveaway location at 0800 without any relief or planning in place for food or water. Numerous requests for the items were made with no response from the FCP until 1430 hours when 50 individually wrapped cherry pies arrived! At times the deployment of JNS squads appeared to be inconsistent with the tactical situation. On one occasion during the second night, two squads were sent to North Hollywood to provide security at a shopping center strictly on a precautionary basis. There was no apparent threat to the shopping center. During the same time period, large scale looting and arson activity was being reported in other parts of the City. Repeated requests to the FCP and EOC to redeploy the personnel assets that were not deployed properly met with a negative response. Although FCP procedures improved drastically after the first few days, it was apparent that well trained Bureau FCP Cadre personnel were not in place during the early stages of the mobilization. CRIMES AND ARRESTS Numerous arrests were made by JNS personnel. These included the arrests of armed robbery suspects subsequent to vehicle pursuits on two different days. A sweep of a park in Southwest Area by JNS squads during the early A.M. hours on one day resulted in the arrests of six juveniles and four adults, and the recovery of two guns and narcotics. The arrestees were processed at the Field Jail Unit of the South Bureau FCP. It should be noted that the support from the personnel working the Field Jail Unit was outstanding. The arrestees were processed in an expeditious manner allowing JNS personnel to quickly return to Task Force support. ,, . .- •· ' . -- ~ ( ' ... • · , I ,._ -3- INJURIES No major injuries were reported by JNS personnel. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Refresher training on civil disturbance control should be given to all personnel. Included in this training should be special training for Command Officers and supervisors covering their responsibilities during the initial stages of a civil disturbance. 2. Each Operations Bureau should have a well trained FCP Cadre that is able to immediately respond and able to deploy for an extended period of time. 3. Refresher training should be given to the EOC Cadre. 4. Unusual Occurrence (u~o.) periodically to include the Divisions. exercises should be held involvement , of specialized 5. A Cadre of police officers that are involved with the military reserves should be formed to be immediately available to deploy as L.A.P.D. liaison officers to the National Guard or with Federal troops. 1 6. Vendor contracts should be reviewed to ensure food services and other items not normally maintained by the Department are immediately available during major U.O.s. CONCLUSION The response and performance of JNS personnel during this major U. O. should be considered nothing less than outstanding! All personnel were fully prepared to immediately deploy in uniform. The tactics utilized during the long and arduous period of extended watches were noteworthy. Although civil disturbance refresher training should be of top priority for the Department, this emergency proved that a group of "old dope cop detectives" can still respond to the call and get the job done when the 'ol flag goes up! ... , ~ - Lieutenant Vasquez UO CRITIQUE Let's begin at the beginning - telephonic notification to our troops. Everyone knew the riots had started early in the evening on the 29th. Yet, we all waited for a telephone call-in from the Commanding Officer or a supervisor. It is suggested that a supervisor(s) be designated from the A-B Deployment Watch to immediately contact the Commanding Officer when public circumstances during off-hours may evolve into a Department mobilization situation. The Commanding Officer will advise the respective supervisor to respond to the office · and undertake call-in procedures. The key term here is designated - someone (responsible) selected in advance to touch bases with the Commanding Officer. • I • • In some instances, the communication may not evolve into anything more than a telephone call. We need to select and train, in advance, key people for the positions of executive officer, personnel officer, desk and radio officer, etc. People who know their jobs in advance save time and confusion. ------If possible, OHB should be out of the equation for reporting of available divisional personnel and deploying of those personnel. Confusion arose at change of watch regarding assignments given by OHB to Juvenile Division and passed on to the on-coming watch. Confusion resulted not only by the on-coming watch as to where they were suppose to go, but also by the EOC, who had other plans for • ., I • ' division personnel. This confusion wasted a lot of time in finally deploying people where they were really needed. Example - two squads of people sent ~ by OHB, to a location in Newton to assist in controlling looters and assisting the Fire Department. Not needed at the location - no looters and everything was already burnt down. The important thing here is that no one (EOC and OCB Command Post) knew we were deployed there. Once they found out, we were redeployed to North Hollywood area. Unfortunately, several hours had passed before redeployment. In the Newton scenario above, we were bused into the area and dropped off to operate on foot. Not needed there, we floundered in the area until transportation was arranged to redeploy us. None of this confusion would have happened if OHB was not involved. North Hollywood - once deployed and later not needed, OVB would not _________ _ .. -· release us to the EOC. OVB preferred to keep two squads intact and available "just in case." I thought the EOC called the shots, and when they requested release and redeployment, that was done. <----·- Apparently, the Deputy Chief of OVB had more power than the EOC ! ! ! There were squads of North Hollywood personnel sitting and standing by at the station when squads of Juvenile Division personnel were guarding malls along with private security. The point here is that, in the heat of the battle City-wide, personnel (available) were not being used efficiently and effectively. -3- EOC personnel - when dealing with the personnel officer (telephonic) it appeared several different subordinate officers would answer and provide you assistance. If you called back in five minutes to clarify a matter, your usually got a different person assisting you (sometimes original person not available or was just sitting in) and you would have to explain the circumstances of your situation again. On, some occasions, your resolution would be better than what the original person offered you. The point being - there appeared to be confusion or lack of continuity in the handling of personnel deployment at the EOC. Streamlining the handling of calls on their en~ and/or continuity of information being disseminated by EOC personnel may want to be looked at!! .... ' ~ ' ... .. \ ~ . - Strategy AFTER ACTION REPORT - L.A. RIOTS OPERATIONS SECTION Even though the Department has a strategic tactical plan for major disasters, as outlined in the Tactical Manual, it became obvious that the Department was .somewhat overwhelmed by the amount of wide-spread crime and violence. However, with the influx of more Department personnel, outside law enforcement officers and the men and women of the armed services, a feeling of control began to prevail in the field operations. For future reference, it is suggested that all sworn employees, including detective and staff personnel, should receive periodic training delineating the specific duties of their division of assignment during a u.o. The Department's objectives during each type of u.o. should be stressed. Tactics Overall, Operations Section officers and supervisots felt that the men and women of Juvenile Division performed effectively under the adverse conditions of the riots. The officers were well disciplined, cooperated fuily with supervisory personnel and for the most part practiced proper tactics while engaged in dangerous field operations. Many detectives assigned to Juvenile Division by the mere nature of their positions do not encounter tactical field operations. It is suggested that periodic training be provided to update detective personnel on current tactics to be utilized in the field. Personnel Subsequent to the U.O. being declared, Juvenile Division personnel were contacted by supervisory personnel in a timely manner consistent with U.O. procedures. All personnel responded to Juvenile Division in a timely manner and had available serviceable uniforms and equipment necessary to perform uniformed field duty. (.,,,.,,,P ersonnel received their duty assignments from Operations \ Headquarters-Bureau who had received the original orders from the _ ___ evel can create confusion and delay the response time. It is U mergency Operations Center (E.O .. C.). The second communication uggested that personnel assignments be made directly by the • 0. C. ( . I , . ,;,.., • ' \,.: ii' -2- Logistics/Communications During the first two da7s of rioting, Juvenile Division personnel were transported to specific assignments by either Department buses or Rapid Transit District buses. Personnel later utilized Department vehicles assigned to Juvenile Division and drove them to their assigned areas. Upon reaching certain assigned areas, personnel were "dropped" off in a sometimes out of control and chaotic environment. They were left at the scene with no transportation and/or radios. They encountered numerous groups of looters and vandals. Several fires raged throughout the area. The officers were placed in a highly hazardous situation without sufficient support equipment or transportation. Subsequent to the flash point of the riots and after National Guard personnel were deployed, Juvenile Division personnel were reporting to the Coliseum Command Post in order to receive deployment instructions and to check out black and white vehicles, rovers and shotguns. The equipment check-out and check .in procedure was orderly but more persons should have been assigned to this function in order to expedite the prbcess. Additionally, in many instances, rovers that were manufactured by other companies were issued to officers without adequate instructions on how to operate them. In the future, it is recommended that officers assigned to respond to these hazardous situations be properly equipped to carry out their assignment under the safest possible condition. Rovers issued to personnel during a U.O. should also be compatible with the frequency in use in that specific area of the City. Field Jail During the u.o. Juvenile Division personnel did not utilize the Field Jail, therefore cannot critique its operation. . I June 22, 1992 8.2.6 TO: FROM: SUBJECT: INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Cdmmanding Officer, Juvenile Division AFTER-ACTION CRITIQUE 4-30/5-18-92 The attached critiques prepared by the four Section Lieutenants assigned to Juvenile Division, who all served as acting Commanding Officers of Juvenile Division, comprehensively address issues that arose concerning Juvenile Division personnel during the Unusual Occurrence. The Commanding Officer, Juvenile Division, was assigned as the "A" watch Military Liaison Officer for Operations-South Bureau. In that capacity I functioned in a very different 1 capacity than if I had remained as C/O of a specialized detective division whose primary responsibility was to provide generic personnel to support various Department missions. Captain J. Curreri, Commanding Officer Major Violators, Narcotics Group, was my counterpart on the "B" watch. He arrived on scene six hours before I did and began the process of defining our roles. When I arrived I continued the process. My first call was to the EOC to speak with the Department Military Liaison Officer. He was not available, I left numerous messages for him and none were returned prior to the conclusion of the UO. I did see him once on a tour of our facilities with a regular Army -✓ general but he did not have time to talk. During the days and weeks that followed, the organization that we established continued to evolve. By the time the National Guard pulled out of town we knew what we were doing. Our relationship with military personnel was nothing short of outstanding. If we had anticipated our needs and planned for the employment of the National Guard months in advance, I believe much of the second day's violence could have been prevented. If the Department had on-going table top exercises with our counterparts in the National Guard much of the initial confusion would have been avoided. INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE June 19, 1992 8.2.6 TO: FROM: SUBJECT: Commanding Officer, Juvenile Division Officer-in-Charge, Child Protection Section AFTER-ACTION REPORTING FOR THE APRIL/MAY RIOTS The following information was elicited from personnel in the Child Protection Section (CPS) in regard to the April/May riots. PLANNING There was a concensus among CPS personnel that the problems experienced during the recent civil unrest in Los Angeles substantially antedate events that occurred. The problems began with a complete lack of anticipation, planning and training. This, in turn, exacerbated the myriad problems and errors that plagued the police task throughout the period of unrest. There is ample evidence to suggest that any act of preparation prior to the unrest would have been viewed as inflammatory rather th~n preventive by many politicians in the City. This effectively paralyzed the command structure of this Department. While there may be standing plans to deal with civil unrest and other unusual occurrences in the City, such plans have not been reviewed or rehearsed by specialized divisions for who knows how long. Perhaps the one saving grace was the uniform inspection conducted by the Commanding Officer during the Summer of 1991; the lone such inspection ever, within recall, in Juvenile Division. This measure at least ensured a proper uniform appearance during · the civil unrest. Had it not been for that inspection, it would have been an embarrassing sight to behold on April 30, 1992. RECOMMENDATIONS 1) Annual uniform inspections for all sworn personnel, complete with all equipment needed for deployment during unusual occurrences. 2) Annual tactical training on a divisional basls to include squad formations, deployment, tactical maneuvers, use of force and weapons training. ' I . / commanding Officer, Juvenile Division Page 2 8.'.2.6 STRATEGY The lack of strategy was glaringly apparent from the outset of unrest. Television coverage at both ~arker Center and the intersection of Florence and Normandie during the early hours after the jury verdict clearly refute any notions to the contrary. · •'!'he only conceivable strategy that could be ventured is a strategy of inaction and it is doubtful, in retrospect, that anyone would own-up to such a strategy. CPS personnel responded to their normal work site during the late evening hours of April 29, only to stand by in soft clothes, never to be called upon prior to EOW in the early hours of April 30. Personnel followed events on television and were aware that even those entities who wer· e better prepared, i.e., patrol and Metro, were either not deployed or were deployed very ineffectively. Throughout the course of the unrest, CPS personnel first reported to Juvenile Division where they would often stand by for one hour or longer waiting for assignments. They would then be instructed to go to the CP at 54th and Arlington where they would again stand by for an hour or longer. Finally, they would be dispatched to a satellite Command Post for ultimate field assignment. Personnel often found themselves unexpected, unwanted and unneeded at the various CPs. In addition, squads that were alre~dy formed were split up for .various reasons. When EOW came, these squads would not be released .until they had re-formed into their original squads in order to ensure that all personnel were accounted for. While the accountability for all personnel is of paramount importance, many hours were wasted in waiting to re-form squads for dismissal. RECOMMENDATIONS 1) Eliminate some of the staffing levels so that personnel can be dispatched to field assignments in a more direct, timely and efficient manner • 2) Develop and rehearse strategies beforehand so that sufficient personnel can be deployed quickly and effectively. 3) Develop and rehearse strategies to seal off "hot spots" and contain illegal activities within those areas. 4) Train detectives and other non-uniformed personnel to more effectively augment patrol and Metro personnel. 5) Maintain squad integrity during unusual occurrences. Commanding Officer, Juvenile Division Page 3 8.2 . 6 TACTICS With the exception of a few officers who had recently worked patrol or Metro assignments, CPS personnel w~re generally unfamiliar with the tactics necessary to deal with civil unrest. This was also evident in interaction with most other non-uniformed personnel throughout the Department. Tactics primarily consisted of forming into squads, deploying three or four to a vehicle for officer safety and random patrolling to establish a police presence. While this was effective after the violence had subsided, it was not effective in dealing with violence, crowd control and incidents of lo?ting. At the outbreak of violence, there was a need for a well coordinated and controlled response by large numbers of officers and that response was simply not in evidence. One would be hard pressed to cite an example of a well executed pplice response at any level during the first two days of unrest. This was due to both indecisive management and a Department-wide laxness of tactical training. Better tactical preparedness would surely have fostered a more positive and calming influence among the citizenary and may have resulted in fewer vigilante actions in the community. The formation of vigilante groups demonstrates a !distinct lack of confidence in the ability of the police to adequately protect citizens and property. such confidence cannot be easily restored. RECOMMENDATIONS 1) Increased tactical training for individuals and squads and training to integrate squads into large, coordinated enforcement actions. 2) Media attention to departmental preparedness activities to heighten community awareness and ~onfidence. PERSONNEL The personnel aspect of the recent civil unrest was perhaps the most positive factor to emerge in the entire fiasco. The attitude, spirit of cooperation and willingness to help was generally outstanding among CPS personnel. The only thing lacking was the management skills to channel and direct these personnel in a manner that would promote both a sense of purpose and a sense of accomplishment. Few if any personnel came away from this experience feeling that they had been part of an efficient and effective operation. From beginning to end there was a general feeling .of total disarray and a huge waste of manpower. commanding Officer, Juvenile Division Page 4 8.:2.6 Personnel problems began with initial call-up procedures. Telephone numbers were generally accurate but officers were often called more than once during the early, confusing stages of mobilization. Response was adequate and timely. Once squads were formed, they remained quite consistent for the duration of the unrest. Direction at the level of Lieutenant and squad leaders .. . a.nd communications among squad members was generally appropriate and - consistent. However, above the level of Lieutenant, namely EOC and CP, direction and comrnunication was often slow, poor and confusing. RECOMMENDATIONS 1) Separate A & B Watch rosters to avoid confusion of personnel and call-up procedures. 2) Increased training of personnel staffing the EOC and CPS's to enhance decision-making, communication and direction. LOGISTICS Logistics were, quite simply, a nightmare. The Department fleet and other items of equipment are generally outdated and in a state of disrepair. Personnel were initially dropped by bus at different hot spots and left without transportation· , communications, food or water. While this situation was generally corrected by the second or third day, there was still a lack of equipment and a lack of knowledge on how to operate equipment. For example, many persons who have been out of patrol for an extended period had no idea how to operate a patrol vehicle. The MDT, emergency equipment and radio procedures are foreign to many. RECOMMENDATION 1) The primary remedy for poor logistics lies in major budgetary outlays to upgrade the fleet and equipment. Prospects for this in the foreseeable future are dismal at best. However, news media attention has been given to this problem and public awareness is a definite plus in any solution that may be forthcoming. If attained, training needs to be -provided in the proper utilization of vehicles and equipment. COMMUNICATIONS The problems experienced with communications are similar in nature to those of logistics. Much of the communications equipme:ct - i:; outdated and in disrepair. In addition, much of the equipment did not have_the necessary frequencies for the areas of operations in which it was utilized. This obviously created a problem of officer safety and decreased effectiveness of operations. There· was also · Commanding Officer, Juvenile Division · Page 5 8.2.6 much confusion as to unit designations and sectors of operation. Unit designations would often be assigned at Juvenile Division, only to be changed at one or more of the CP's. Lastly, rumor control seemed to be nonexistent during the period of unrest. Many rumors of gangs and guns were circulated throughout the events. While this is important to officer safety, it ceases to be so when it is so common as to be blase. RECOMMENDATIONS 1) Updated . communications equipment with increased frequencies for enhanced communications capabilities. SUMMARY The Department image suffered a severe blow during the recent unrest in the City. We were held up to the world as slow to respond and ineffective in safeguarding the community. The only redeeming quality of this scrutiny .was the fact that field personnel were generally recognized as dedicated and eager to take action. They simply lacked the necessary direction of high level Department management and other City officials to accomplish the task at hand. There is much that needs to be done to restore the image of this Department. While there may be some opposition to the necessary changes and training, the vast majority of personnel are eager to do their part to restore public confidence. One thing is certain, dedication and commitment are not lacking. n.~ E. D, MOEN, Lieutenant Officer-in-Charge Child Protection Section Juvenile Division INTRODUCTION JUVENILE NARCOTICS SECTION AF'l'ER-ACTION REPORT APRIL/MAY RIOTS on April 29, 1992, Juvenile Narcotics Section {JNS) personnel were mobilized in concert with other Department personnel. PERSONNEL Thirty-one detectives and officers were assigned to JNS at the time of the mobilization. Ten officers and detectives were assigned to the "A" watch, and 20 to the "B" watch. One Detective III was on vacation and was not mobilized. In addition to the regularly assigned JNS personnel, five undercover officers were also deployed in uniform, one on "A" watch and four on "B" watch. The undercover officers assigned to the School Buy Program were 'not mobilized and were given modified assignments during the civil unrest. Four JNS civilian clerical personnel were also mobilized - two assigned to "A" watch, and two to "B" watch. A breakdown of those assigned to each watch, by rank, is as follows: "A" Watch "B" Watch ~ D-III 2 Lt-II 1 D-II 5 D-III 3 D-I 2 D-II 6 P-III 1 D-I 5 P-II - .1 P-III 4 SCT 1 P-II 5 CT 1 CT 2 CRITIQUE OF OPERATIONS The initial mobilization involved officers assigned to "B" Watch _ .,.,-· and necessitated a response to Parker Center. Slight delays . were experienced by some officers who had to initially go to · their Bureau Offices to gather uniform and equipment items and then respond to PAB. However, within approximately two and a half hours of the initial off-hour notification, two squads of JNS officers · were available for deployment. The OHB mobilization plan called for OHB entities to initially • check-in with an OHB coordinator for an assignment. The . ORB Coordinator would respond to requests from the EOC. This procedure .proved to be cumbersome and on several occasions resulted in delays in deployment and/or mis .. communicated assignment orders between the EOC, OHB and the requested personnel resources. A direct ·resp0nse to the EOC Personnel Unit would have expedited the deployment of personnel. -2- During the initial stages of the civil unrest, JNS personnel were involved in the following uniformed activities: 1) Escort duty for SID response teams 2) PAB Secu=ity 3) Looting enforcement 4) Security for Fire Department personnel 5) Field Task Force patrols 6) Food give-a-way security 7) Shopping Center security JNS personnel were normally deployed by squads from Field Cormnand Post locations. Some problems developed at the FCP locations. These generally centered around the issuance of equipment and vehicles, and the lack of communication between the EOC and FCP. The problems were more prevalent during the initial days of the Unusual Occurrence. On one occasion, squads were deployed on "A" Watch without rovers, vehicles, and without a mission or a cormnand and control network in place. They were merely told to go by bus to a looting location. ' On another occasion on "A" Watch, a squad_ was deployed to q. food giveaway location at 0800 without any relief or planning in place for food or water. Numerous requests for the items were made with no response from the FCP until 1430 hours when 50 individually wrapped cherry pies arrived! I At times the deployment of JNS squads appeared to be inconsistent with the tactical situation. On one occasion during the second night, two squads were sent to North Hollywood to provide security at a shopping center strictly on a precautionary basis. There was no apparent threat to the shopping center. During the same time period, large scale looting and arson activity was being reported in other parts of the City. Repeated requests to the FCP and EOC to redeploy the personnel assets that were not deployed properly met with a negative response. Although FCP procedures improved drastically after the first few - days, it was apparent that well trained Bureau FCP Cadre personnel were not in place during the early stages of the mobilization~ CRIMES AND ARRESTS Numerous arrests were made by JNS personnel. These included the arrests of armed robbery suspects subsequent to vehicle pursuits on two different days. A sweep of a park in Southwest Area by JNS squads during the early A.M. hours on one day resulted in the arrests of six juveniles and four adults, and the recovery o· f ~o guns and narcotics. The arrestees were processed at the Field Jail Unit of the South Bureau FCP. It should be noted that the support from the personnel working the Field Jail Unit was outstanding. The arrestees were processed in an expeditious manner allowing JNS personnel to quickly return to Task Force support. .. ------ - -- . ------·-'--~ -3- INJURIES No major injuries were =eported by JNS personnel. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Ref re sher training on civil disturbance control should be given to all personnel. Included in this training should be special training for Command Officers and supervisors covering their responsibilities during the initial stages of a civil disturbance. 2. Each Operations Bureau should have a well trained FCP Cadre that is able to immediately respond and able to deploy for an extended period of time. - 3. Refresher training should be given to the EOC Cadre. 4. Unusual Occurrence. (U.O.) periodically to include the Divisions. exercises should be held involvement of specialized 5. A Cadre of police officers that are involved with the military reserves should be formed to be immediately available to deploy as L.A.P.D. liaison officers to the National Guard or with Federal troops .. 6. Vendor contracts should be reviewed to ensure food services and other items not normally maintained by the Department are immediately available during major u.o.s. CONCLUSION The response and performance of JNS personnel du.ring this major U. O. should be considered · nothing less than outstanding! . All personnel were fully prepared to immediately deploy in uniform. The tactics utilized during the long and arduous period of extended _ ,.,,..,... . watches were noteworthy. Although civil disturbance refresher training should be of top priority for the Department, · this emergency proved that a group of "old dope cop detectives" can still respond to the call and get the job done when the 'al flag goes up! · Strategy AFTER ACTION REPORT - L.A. RIOTS OPERATIONS SECTION Even though the Department has a strategic tactical plan for major disasters, as outlined in the Tactical Manual, it became obvious that the Department was somewhat overwhelmed by the amount of wide-spread crime and violence. However, with the influx of more Department personnel, outside law enforcement officers and the men and women of the armed services, a feeling of control began to prevail in the field operations. For future reference, it is suggested that all sworn employees, including detective and staff personnel, should receive periodic training delineating the specific duties of their division of assignment during a U.O. The Department's objectives during each type of U.O. should be stressed. Tactics Overall, Operations Section officers and supervisqrs felt that the men and women of Juvenile Division performed effectively under the adverse conditions of the riots. The officers were well disciplined, cooperated fully with supervisory personnel and for the most part practiced proper tactics while engaged in dangerous field operations. Many detectives assigned to Juvenile Division by the mere nature of their positions do not encounter tactical field operations. It is suggested that periodic training be provided to update detective personnel on current tactics to be utilized in the field. Personnel Subsequent to the u.o. being declared, Juvenile Division personnel were contacted ·by supervisory personnel in a timely manner consistent with u.o. procedures. All personnel responded to Juvenile Division in a timely manner and had available serviceable uniforms and equipment necessary to perform uniformed field duty. Personnel received their duty · assignments from Operations Headquarters-Bureau who 'had received the original orders from the Emergency Operations Center (E.O.C.). The second communication level can create confusion and delay .the response time. It is· " suggested that personnel assignments be made directly by the E.O.C. · . . . . ~ -2- Logistics/Communications During the first two days of rioting, Juvenile Division personnel were transported to specific assignments by either Department buses or Rapid Transit ~istrict buses. Personnel later utilized Department vehicles assigned to Juvenile Division and drove them to their assigned areas. Upon reaching certain assigned areas, personnel were "dropped" off in a sometimes out of control and chaotic environment. They were left at the scene with no transportation and/or radios. They encountered numerous groups of looters and vandals. Several fires raged throughout the area. The officers were placed in a highly hazardous situation without sufficient support equipment or transportation. Subsequent to the flash point of the riots and after National Guard personnel were deployed, Juvenile Division personnel were reporting to the Coliseum Conunand Post in order to receive deployment instructions and to check out black and white vehicles, rovers and shotguns. The equipment check-out and check in procedure was orderly but more persons should have been assigned to this function in order to expedite the process. Additionally, in many instances, rovers that were manufactured by other companies were issued to officers without adequate instructions on how to operate them. In the futute, it is recommended that officers assigned to respond to these hazardous situations be properly equipped to carry out their • assignment under the safest possible condition. Rovers issued to personnel during a U.O. should also be compatible with the frequency in use in that specific area of the City. Field Jail During the u.o. Juvenile Division personnel did not utilize the Field Jail, therefore cannot critique its operation • .. : - ~ : . '\} ·. - . · . . ' .. . , - . --- . ... -~-- .. / Lieutenant Vasquez UO CRITIQUE Let's begin at the beginning - telephonic notification to our troops. Everyone knew the riots had started early in the evening on the 29th. Yet, we all waited for a telephone call-in from the Commanding Officer or a supervisor. It is suggested that a supervisor(s) be designated from the A-B Deployment Watch to immediately contact the Commanding Officer when public circumstances during off-hours may evolve into a Department mobilization situation. The Commanding Officer will advise the respective supervisor to respond to the office and undertake call-in procedures. The key term here is designated - someone (responsible) selected in advance to touch base~ with the Commanding Officer. In some instances, the communication may not evolve into anything more than a telephone call. We need to select . and train, in advance, key people for the positions of executive officer, personnel officer, desk and radio officer, etc. People who know their _jobs in advance save time and confusion. If possible, OHB should be out of the equation for reporting of available divisional personnel and deploying of those- personnel. Confusion arose at change of watch regarding assignments given ,_ __ ~~ OHB to -Juvenile Division and passed on to the on-corning watch. Confusion resulted not only by the on-corning watch as to where they . ' were suppose to go, but also by the EOC, who had other plans for -2- division personnel. This confusion wasted a lot of time in finally deploying people where they were really needed. Example - two squads of people sent, by OHB, to a location in Newton to assist in controlling looters and assisting the Fire Department. Not needed at the location - no looters and everything was already burnt down. The ·important thing here is that no one (EOC and OCB Command Post) knew we were deployed there. Once they found out, we were redeployed to North Hollywood area. Unfortunately, several hours had passed before redeployment. In the Newton scenario above, we were bused into the area and dropped off to operate on foot. Not needed there, we floundered in the area ·until transportation was arranged to redeploy us. None of I this confusion would have happened if OHB was not involved. North Hollywood - once deployed and later not needed, ·oVB would not release u· s to the EOC. OVB preferred to keep two squads intact and available "just in case." I thought the EOC called the shots, and when they requested release and redeployment, that was done. _ ,,,,--- Apparently, the Deputy Chief of OVB had more power than the EOC ! ! ! There were squads of North Hollywood personnel sitting and standing by at the station when squads of Juvenile Division personnel were guarding malls along with private security.. The point here is that, in the heat of the battle City-wide, personnel (available) were not being used efficiently and effectively. f . ~ -3- EOC personnel - when dealing with the personnel officer {telephonic) it appeared several different subordinate officers ) would answer and provide you assistance. If you _ called back in five .minutes to clarify a matter, your usually got a different person assisting you (sometimes original person not available or was just sitting in) and you would have to explain the circumstances of your situation again. On, · some occasions, your resolution would be better than what the original person offered you. The point being - there appeared to be confusion or lack of .continuity in the handling .of personnel deployment at the EOC. Streamlining the handling of calls on their end and/or continuity of information being disseminated by EOC personnel may want to be looked at!! July 8, 199·2 8.1.1 TO: FROM: SUBJECT: INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Commanding Officer, Metropolitan Division AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR APRIL/MAY RIOTS As a participant in the Department's efforts during the recent riot and in conjunction with various personnel, the following is submitted in the spirit of constructive criticism. OVERALL APPRAISAL OF PROCEDURES UTILIZED DURING THE UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE The myriad of rapidly escalating events throughout the City during the April/May riots proved difficult for the Department to meet and address. The escalation of violence occurred quickly and seemed to paralyze the Department's ability to react. Unfortunately, the riot was not a surprise; the events which occurred had b~en predicted, and the Department neglected to take advantage of the advance warnings and pre-incident indications. On April 8, Assistant Chief Robert L. Vernon directed that Metropolitan Division (Metro) renovate existing Division plans and mobilization rosters and develop necessary tactics and training to cope with an impending major unusual occurrence (UO). Other Department entities were advised to do the same at that time. In reflection, it was apparent that during the initial stages of the riot little had been done in furtherance of direction provided. It was not until the third day that the Department was able to mesh with other entities (both internal and external) and finally start performing as a unified force. Although many members of this Department performed their duties exceptionally well, the Department, as a whole, appeared to be "overcome by events" and was playing "catch up" throughout much of the scenario. It is difficult to explain · why so rnuch---of --wha__!. Fe ,a.;i,d seemed inadequate. Although established procedures are sound, the Department clearly failed to execute. c~mmanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page two 8.1.1 A critical assessment of the Department's efforts, particularly the initial hours and days of the riot, compel me to identify the following as major weaknesses. 1. INTELLIGENCE (Pre-riot) The Department appeared to suffer from inadequate intelligence-gathering and a failure to funnel information to a centralized repository in which data could be evaluated and appropriately used. Recommendation There must be a review of the capabilities of Anti-Terrorist Division and the Community Relations Section of the Office of the Chief of Police as well as the intelligence-gathering potential of Areas, Narcotics and Vice. 2. INITIAL RESPONSE The initial patrol response appeared uncoordinated and ineffective. The situation was not adequate~y assessed nor was it communicated properly to key members of the Department. Recommendation Additional training of supervisory and command level personnel in the handling of riots. Also, consideration should be given to a "scramble" type of response in which a continuous "officer needs help" call is broadcast until adequate resources are on-scene to address the problem. 3. COMMUNICATIONS (INTERPERSONAL) This failure may rest with many people and may include those initially receiving information and assuming it was typical and business as usual. However, the magnitude of the incident demands every effort must be made to ensure proper response. Recommendation Additional training and team building sessions as an adjunct to UO exercises. commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page three 8.1.1 4. SITUATION ESTIMATES The simultaneous problems occurring in Operations-Central Bureau (OCB) and Operations-South Bureau (OSB) reveal an interesting and noteworthy point. The problem at Parker Center (OCB) was a traditional, unlawful assembly and riot situation; i.e., a large crowd in a relatively observable area. Command officers and supervisors were able to see the problem and recognize basic strategies to deal with it. In OSB, the problems were literally everywhere, involving innumerable violent crowds, and were impossible to quickly and accurately assess. It appeared, based on slowness of response, that it was extremely difficult for the EOC to assess the problems City-wide and respond adequate personnel and logistics. Recommendations Consideration should be given to tasking Air Support Division with this assignment as in an earthquake situation. 5. PERSONNEL RESPONSE Although large numbers of personnel were eventually sent to the OSB Command Post (CP), clearly the Department must respond much quicker with larger numbers of officers. Recommendation The Department should evaluate how the Fire Department responds to major incidents for consideration. Additionally, we should review the Sheriff's procedures. Various options should be studied. 6. POOR DISCIPLINE AT THE COMMAND POST During the initial hours of the incident, officers failed to remain in formed squads to stand by for immediate deployment. It is impossible at this point to effectively evaluate what occurred and why. However, it was obvious that squads "melted away" on many occasions. Recommendation Mandatory Department-wide training is necessary. ---------------------------------- - ----------- Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page four 8.1.1 7. LACK OF A STRATEGIC PLAN 8. 9. General Tactical Manual guidelines and training are a solid foundation for UOs. However, a more specific strategic plan must be prepared for the type of "non-traditional" riot which occurred. Recommendation Mandatory Department-wide training and unannounced exercises. INADEQUATE INTEGRATION OF RESOURCES Although many entities of the Department are well-trained, they infrequently train in an integrated fashion. It was also apparent that various command level personnel had not recently trained with the many varied entities of the Department. Recommendation Department-wide management training and mandatory unannounced exercises. 1 INADEQUATE TACTICAL SUPPORT Integrated tactical support elements must be trained to ensure enforcement strike forces can be rapidly deployed with immediate support capabilities to hold secured areas, receive arrestees, and transport and process the arrestees. Recommendation Review Metro rapid response project. 10. LACK OF TECHNOLOGY In all aspects, modern technology must be employed. For example, clearly the Department should have a full bank of television monitors available at key fixed locations and in several mobile vehicles. It is unacceptable for thousands of viewers to be able to casually watch dramatic news events live from all over the City, while those who must deal with the event must wait for sporadic and often limited bits of information to trickle in from field personnel. Everyone in the City was watching Florence and Normandie except those of us who could have responded to address the problem. commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page five 8.1.1 Recommendation The Department must identify the various items necessary to update our capabilities and request funding by the City, County, State and Federal governments. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS STRATEGY On April 29, initial tactical strategy employed by Metropolitan Division included directing divisional resources to "hot spots" in order to quell riotous activity. The configuration of Metro was eight Tactical Support Elements (TSEs) consisting of 14 member squads. Note: TSEs are self-supporting units with counter-sniper and K-9 capabilities. Each squad has grenadiers (shotguns) and counter-snipers (AR-15 rifles). Primary missions included penetrating hostile areas and reestablishing control. D Platoon (SWAT) personnel were utilized for rescue,~ high-risk and barricaded subject situations and were configured accordingly. During the early ·stages of the riot, Metro was not able to respond as quickly as desirable in order to ~esolve the problem. This was due in part to the preestablished late "start of watch" times. Initially, during the first few hours at the CP, Metro sought their own missions based upon the gravity of the situation. For example, "probes" were sent into the affected area to perform rescues with D Platoon personnel. B, C and E Platoon personnel performed searches of the area involved. The lack of available patrol personnel to assist in holding ground greatly hampered expeditious movement and the progress of Metro resources. At one point, it became necessary for a Metro lieutenant to physically organize patiol elements, place them into squads, gather transportation, and send them into the field. This should have previously been done by field CP personnel. During the later hours of -the first day, mere_coo~ation between Metro and a "defined" CP began to develop. Effected areas were sectored off at the recommendation of Metro personnel. TSE elements were deployed to those areas and reestablishment of control began. Again, a setback occurred in the unavailability of patrol personnel to assist with retaken areas and the lack of mass booking capability. ' Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page six 8.1.1 Metro TSEs assisted in Fire Department security during the early hours. It was obvious to Metro and the Fire Department that, unless emergency equipment was escorted into the affected areas, the City would either burn to the ground or suffer mass casualties as a result of the lack of emergency units combatting the large number of fires and citizen injuries. Early on, these missions were established by Metro at the request of the Fire Department. The field CP was subsequently notified. At the direction of the Metro CP, D Platoon personnel performed rescue missions of Fire Department personnel and citizens. Later in the evening of the first day, D Platoon performed a rescue mission of B, C and E Platoon personnel who became trapped in a sophisticated ambush. Initially, most of the missions were self-generated, based on the monitoring of activity and assessment of on-scene events. D Platoon proved to be an effective entity in "rescue situations under hostile conditions''; however, if the violence had ~pread to the Valley Areas, there were simply not enough personnel to go around. Late in the evening of the first day, as more coordination occurred, specific missions were assigned via the CP to Metro entities. I At the conclusion of the first night, it appeared that some control was being reestablished. Metro personnel were sent home for rest at the conclusion of B Watch. During A Watch of the following day, widespread looting and escalating violence was revealed. In reflection and had this been known, Metro could have been held over with teams rotated for rest and reconfigured to spearhead a light striking force to neutralize looter activity. This was not done, and the second evening proved to be extremely difficult to recontrol. During the initial response phase by Metro to the south Bureau CP, it became apparent that Central Area was being affected by widespread riotous activity. C Platoon assets were initially directed to Parker Center in order to respond to the impending situation there. This caused approximately a one-hour delay inc Platoon elements responding to the more serious South Bureau incident. TACTICS Initial planning by Metro consisted of developing TSEs and D Platoon personnel into initial responders. This was not possible due to the activities that were occurring and the staggered, oncoming watches in transit at the very time they were needed. There was a lack of communication between Metro and South Bureau. It was not until late in the scenario that Metro became aware of the escalating events. Among the casual factors for this were deployment of Metro field forces during night watch hours. Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page seven 8.1.1 Metro had conducted extensive training internally and for elements throughout the Department in civil disorder countermeasures. Additionally, on its own initiative, Metro acquired ballistic helmets, body armor, and ammunition for the counter-sniper weapons deployed. The entire Division was reconfigured to accommodate the TSE concept; D Platoon personnel reconfigured to support rescue operations with the two V-l00s and specially configured Chevrolet Suburban vehicles. Throughout the entire three-day riotous event, the training and configuration of the Division proved to be superb and effective in providing highly-mobile, tactical elements to secure hostile areas. The staging area of the existing CP was too confining and prevented Metro from ingress and egress. Subsequently, divisional assets were staged on Van Ness Street adjacent to the CP. Chemical agent deployment was non-existent during 'the riot, yet it could have been an effective tool for access denial to critical areas and buildings. Currently, chemical agents must be approved by a "commander" rank and, as such, were not considered as an option during the early stages. Also, most if not all patrol resources were unfamiliar with such equipment. Additionally, Metrq did not have the required launchers or ordnance to effectively utilize chemical agents. It is recommended that LAPD policy be amended to allow Metro to deploy chemical agents at the discretion of a supervisor upon the approval of the field commander. Also, research into various chemical agent devices suitable for riotous situations should be implemented. The preestablished officer-involved shooting protocol proved to work exceptionally well. All Metro personnel were advised to notify a supervisor of a discharge of firearm, attempt to locate a victim, and record the date, time, number of rounds, and direction fired. Following that, if a hit or injury occurred, they were to attempt to locate and recover the injured party and transport him/her to the field CP ·for medical treatment. If a death occurred, they were to attempt ~o recover the body and locate witnesses for future interviews. Supervisory response included contacting the Officer-Involved Shooting Team, Robbery-Homicide Division, and making the involved officers available for interview as soon as possible. Metro was involved in three officer-involved shooting situations. Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page eight 8.1.1 PERSONNEL During the initial hours of the riot, Metro established its own Tactical Operations and Command Center inside the confines of the field CP. At that location, a hasty communications/command/control element was established to deploy Metro elements. Fortunately, two police service reps from Communications Division had been assigned to Metro, and they were utilized very effectively to staff the communications position. Additionally, light duty personnel staffed positions consisting of journalist, runners, etc. The total number of Metro personnel throughout the riot period included all personnel ~at on vacation or IOD status. In some cases, personnel voluntarily gave up their vacations and opted to work. LOGISTICS The ballistic helmets and soft body armor temporarily loaned from the California Office of Emergency Services proved to be absolutely essential. This equipment needs to be procured and permanently assigned to the Division. l Counter-sniper ammunition utilized by Metro personnel for training and actual deployment was procured through emergency funding sources. Currently, TSE/counter-sniper elements do not have enough ammunition for recurrent training, and Metro is without adequate numbers of qualified counter-snipers. Additional ammunition was unofficially procured through military liaison sources but is woefully inadequate. The approval of budgetary requests for counter-sniper ammunition would greatly relieve this problem. Utility vehicles, such as the Chevrolet Suburban and large pickup trucks, are necessary to support each Platoon's response profile. Various modifications can be made to accommodate utilization as rapid response vehicles. The Division currently needs three additional aforementioned style vehicles to enhance its capability. Low-light night-vision optics were requested in the early stages of the riot. Once obtained, the devices were utilized for sniper and looter detection in dark, unlit areas of the City. The devices were extremely useful and proved effective. Metro could benefit greatly by having such logistics permanently assigned to its inventory. Vehicles proved to be an extremely critical commodity in the riot. The current state of the Division's fleet is that 99 percent of all vehicles are very high mileage and in constant need of maintenance. These vehicles should be replaced as soon as possible. Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page nine 8.1.1 Less lethal projectiles and chemical agents were not utilized during the riot despite proposals as early as March 1992 to add such ordnance to Metro's inventory. Subsequent to the riot, 37mm multi-rubber projectiles were temporarily approved and have been deployed against riotous crowds. They have proven to be extremely effective and are highly recommended as permanent counter-riot control measures. Additionally, it is believed the utilization of a 12-gauge shotgun, multi-projectile (rubber) and single "sabot" less lethal style rounds would greatly enhance the capabilities of Metro. The rounds would provide a stand-off distance from a crowd and preclude requiring forces to physically engage rioters. The ~se of such projectiles is an effective way to avoid the use of the baton in crowd control and normal field situations. Ther~ is also a potential patrol application. It is recommended that research be conducted into utilization of rubber sting-ball type ordnance. Such equipment could be utilized to deny access of looters in situations involving buildings that have been vandalized and to prevent further looter activity. The use of these devices would provide non-contamination of the environment and the probability of minimal injury to involved subjects. Additionally, there are manufacturers of barrier wire that can rapidly be deployed from vehicles. This wire can be strategically placed around areas to assist in access denial. COMMUNICATIONS Radio communication initially amongst Division personnel was hampered due to the overload of traffic on the Metro frequency. Tactical Frequency 1 was utilized to facilitate individual communication. As the events continued and Metro operations became more expansive, it became obvious that additional frequencies were necessary. Those frequencies were unavailable. A recommendation would include at least two additional Metro frequencies. Approximately one hour into the Division's response, a portable base station was erected at the CP. Th1s portable- bas~ation came from Metro and proved to be extremely effective in allowing the dispatching of missions from the CP. Metro was self-sufficient in terms of radios, battery chargers and ROVERs. This proved to be beneficial. Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page ten 8.1. 1 Confidential communications were non-existent. There were no voice privacy systems; subsequently, news media personnel were constantly aware of and monitored all activities of Metro. At times, this compromised mission capabilities. As a recommendation and as radio systems improve, Metro needs to have digital voice privacy radios for all personnel. Cellular telephones were temporarily assigned to divisional lieutenants (these telephones were recalled shortly after the riot period). Currently, tactical leaders are without such equipment which greatly hampers their effectiveness today. Additionally, cellular telephones can be utilized for strategic planning and administrative conversations. It is recommended that they be reinstated. FIELD JAIL This was the biggest deficiency noted in the counter-force strategy. At the start of the event and throughout the three days following, there was never a system to accommodate mass arrests that would allow the custodial processing of several . hundred persons ~ithin a reasonable period of time. Additionally, the lack of a "field" jail that was highly-mobile, could respond to the scenes of arrests, and process persons was a great detriment. Throughout the riot period, Metro procured several buses, including some from the Sheriff's Department, to deploy to the field with TSEs to assist in arrest of looters. On the second night, this deficiency severely hampered operations, and makeshift bus transportation was developed to accommodate several hundred arrestees taken into custody by Division personnel. Throughout the remainder of the emergency period, E Platoon pickup trucks were utilized to assist in transporting prisoners. The issue of mass arrests and bookings with highly-mobile photographic and custodial personnel needs to be developed and implemented immediately. Metro has recently completed a project addressing this issue. This critique would not be complete without some closing thoughts on the following key issues. PLANNING AND PREPARATION In situations which may result in major UOs and where adequate time exists in which to prepare, the Department should seriously consider assigning a specific group of trained tactical managers and supervisors to confront the problem. The costs of training the personnel of each geographic Area may be prohibitive, and as an alternative, a number of pretrained, preassigned experts should be maintained for response City-wide. Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page eleven 8.1.1 A comprehensive training program must be developed to prepare selected personnel. Frequent exercise of this tactical cadre must occur with the mandatory integration of local command officers, watch commanders and supervisors. In addition to immediate and appropriate initial response to the problem, a major goal should be the establishment of a total tactical package which can be properly handed off to local command officers when appropriate or upon the direction of the Chief of Police. Since all functions and responsibilities of the Department will continue, it must also be a consideration that local command or staff officers not be given responsibility for the tactical problem. RAPID RESPONSE It is critical that the Department embrace a philosophy of an available and fully capable rapid response. Rough'plans and recommendations relative to stand-alone packages must be analyzed ·and, at a minimum, must include: 1. Emergency response of uniformed personnel fully equipped for any contingency, including counter-sniper actfon 2. Support elements to provide for evidence-gathering and mass arrest videos at scenes of arrests 3. Support elements to hold areas secured by tactical elements 4. Support elements to transport and process arrestees A rapid response proposal, from a Metro perspective, has been completed and will be submitted immediately. DECISION-MAKING Regardless of competing interests, the decision to initiate a tactical deployment in anticipation of a UO must be made in a timely fashion by the Chief of Police or his designee. Concerns as to political rarnificatio• ns or costs must be subordinate to the proper handling of a tactical problem of any magnitude. Q~~~ Commanding Officer Metropolitan Division Attachments ~ Hame ~.S Rank $-// uo CJ+TIQTJI PQRM Up ~tA-IL-Ci ' ' Assignment durinq a.a. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Aff>.C:SMIN'f A Pat=ol in Geographic Division Other <ye;rz!/? ·-;t1r.r/ < '.': .11~ - :S11t4Z~r/:l/"'J11~r- Geographic Area of assignment 771l:!. ) !. Command Pos't: ; rz- ._. , so 'dNli Ii Ji_5 r Sec1:or ; - f/Vj 6vRflfV Oate / Watc!'l/Time ✓ l}/21r1J_,,. # 6--tu#~~ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Pos1: Operations, etc) COMMENTS: fk (ilvJ11u.s 7)/L /)~~ /J1lJ fr 6ltltii- - -r ~ 1 d- 7)/{ 011E~ t)/ fbut't. A f /Jl)/'I' /) ;)JJ4:J .S/~6✓ -J f/.J If_ Wif /l ~ /ftto I /1CM~ W1r-H (Continuation sheets may be used) . . -- -·-·-·---·-· · •~ .. . --. -- . > .· .. ·• . • ·· • f • ' . ' Name ~IE.ID , 1)a}(;. SC7 .:J.C Rank _______ _ ·uo CJ+tlQVI l9M ' ' Assignmen~ during a.a. (check all t.~at apply) Elnergency Operations canter Field Command Post tField Tas k Fore~ Fixed Post Security Pat=ol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignmen~ Command Pos-e.; Sec-e.or; Date/ Wa~ch/Time __ //_L_L _____ _ (i f necessary or specific to tilis topic) ALL A~'Oll't' A Topic of Discussion: ~crlt1e,Jr, 4ao ...JAIL I Coi,(lf>..Jo ~ o~ia;Js (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Pos-e. Operations, etc) COMMENTS: ' (Continuation sheets may be used) . . -·-·----··· . ·--.... -~ I .., . I .. /J '\ ~ r • I U O CRITIQUE ON APRIL 29, . 1992, "B•• PLATOON, METROPOLITAN DIVISION WAS CONDUCTING A TRAINING DAY AT LAFD, FIRE STATION #89 (LAUREL CANYON AND SHERMAN WAY BOULEVARDS). THEIR TRAINING DAY STARTED AT 1400 HOURS. THE PURPOSE OF THAT TRAINING DAY WAS TO PRACTICE SQUAD FORMATIONS, SPECIFICALLY METRO'S TACTICAL SUPPORT CONFIGURATION (TSE). AT APPROXIMATELY~ HOURS THAT DAY, THE PLATOON WAS REASSIGNED AND WAS REQUESTED TO RESPOND TO SOUTHWEST AREA STATION. WHILE ENROUTE TO SOUTHWEST, WE WERE REDEPLOYED AND REQUESTED TO RESPOND TO THE SOUTH BUREAU COMMAND POST, 54TH ST AND VAN NESS AVENUE. "to . AT APPROXIMATELY~ HOURS THE ENTIRE PLATOON WAS AT THE CP. THE PLATOON WAS IMMEDIATELY BROKEN DOWN INTO THREE TSE'S AND READY FOR DEPLOYMENT. STRATEGY: METROPOLITAN DIVISION PERSONNEL AFTER FORTY HOURS OF TRAINING DEVELOPED THE TSE CONFIGURATION. IT WAS "B" PLATOON'S MISSION TO DEPLOY UPON REQUEST FROM THE FIELD COMMANDER TO: MAJOR DISTURBANCES/LARGE ASSEMBLIES SEARCH AND CLEARING OF UNLAWFUL OCCUPANTS FORM BUILDINGS HAZARDOUS EVACUATION OPERATIONS FIRE DEPARTMENT SECURITY IN HAZARDOUS AREAS DOWNED/CITIZEN RESCUE SUPPORT LINE TACTICS FOR SWAT DEPLOYMENT: UPON ARRIVAL TO THE CP AND WITH-IN 30 MINUTES, "B" PLATOON WAS REQUESTED TO RESPOND TO THE AREA OF FLORENCE AND NORMANDIE. WE RESPONDED TO THAT AREA AND STAGED OUR VEHICLES EAST OF. NORMANDIE AT VERMONT AND FLORENCE. TWO OF THE PLATOON'S THREE TSE DEPLOYED ON THE INCIDENT. MY SQUAD REMAINED AT THE STAGING AREA TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE VEHICLES AND TO HAVE IN CONTINGENT AN OFFICER RESCUE TEAM IN THE EVENT OF INJURY. WE REMAINED AT THAT LOCATION FOR APPROXIMATELY 90 MINUTES AND AFTER SQUADS #2 AND #3 RETURNED, WE STARTED TO RETURN TO THE CP. WHILE TRAVELING NB ON VERMONT WE OBSERVED THE START OF LOOTING AT SLAUSON. WE REPORTED OUR FINDING TO THE CP AND THEY REQUESTED US TO "NOT ENGAGE" BUT TO CONTINUE TO RETURN TO THE CP. WE RETURNED AS REQUESTED. l AT THE CP, MY SQUAD REMAINED THERE FOR AT LEAST THREE TO FOUR HOURS BEFORE OUR FIRST MISSION. THAT FIRST MISSION WAS TO ASSIST THE FIRE DEPARTMENT SO THEY COULD RESPOND TO A FIRE IN A HAZARDOUS AREA. WE R~MAINED THERE FOR TWO MORE HOURS AND RETURNED TO THE CP. SQUAD THREE RECEIVED A COUPLE MORE INSIGNIFICANT MISSIONS BUT REMAINED AT THE CP FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE NIGHT. P:E:RSONNEL: SQUAD THREE WAS NOT USED TO ITS POTENTIAL. COMMUNICATIONS: THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM FAILED. SWAT HAD SEVERAL MISSIONS AND FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE NIGHT AND RESERVED THE FREQUENCY FOR THERE DEPLOYMENT. IF METRO PERSONNEL WE DEPLOYED AS PLANNED, THE FREQUENCY WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY INADEQUATE (OVERBURDENED). FIELD JAIL: THE FIELD JAIL FAILED. SEVERAL ARRESTS WERE MADE BY METRO PERSONNEL AND THE FILED JAIL SYSTEM, IF THEIR WAS ONE, PROVIDED LITTLE ASSISTANCE TO EXPEDITE THE BOOKING PROCESS. . ·--.... :-:- - .-~ . - - - -· I ' ·'-'...' , "' • • - AffM!B111°' A /4 uo C3+':XQVI J'QBK Name ~GGf2.A4&';;, ~£2.Y AJ. Rank o/G>,J:r c. c:: ~ _ -~-r.:-. ·'"'·' \ . ' I• I ~ . f ----- - -..:.-- UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE CRITIQUE FORM NAME: Mi Chae 1 R. H 11 lmann # 12995 RANK: Lieutenant ASSIGNMENT DURING UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE: Acting Commanding Officer, Metropolitan Division and Operations Officer. Signed: Date: • 1 (' , ' . Metropo1itan Division. C Platoon critique of events which occurred during the 1992 Los Angeles area riots. INTRODUCTION: OVERALL APPRAISAL OF PROCEDURES UTILIZED DURING THE UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE: The myriad of rapidly escalating events throughout the city during the Apri 1 / May, 1992 Riots proved difficul°t for the Department to meet and address. The escalation of violence occurred quickly and seemed to paralyze the Department's ability to react. Unfortunately, the riot was not a surprise, the events which occurred had been predicted and the Department neglected to take advantage of the advance warnings and pre-incident indications. On April 8, 1 992, Assistant Chief Vernon, directed that Metropolitan Division renovate existing Division plans, mobilization rosters and develop necessary tactics and training to cope with an impending major unusual occurrence. Other Department entities were advised to do the same at that time. In reflection, it was apparent that during the in it i a 1 stages of the riot, 1 it t 1 e had been done in furtherance of direction provided. It was not until the third day that the Department was ab 1e to mesh with other entities (both internal and external) and finally started performing as a unified force. Although many members of this Department performed their duties exceptionally well, the Department, as a whole appeared to be "overcome by events" and was playing "catch up" throughout much of the scenario. It was interesting to note that conversations held in advance of April 29, 1992, between LASO and LAPD Command personnel addressed the possibility of conducting joint table top, civil disorder exercises. On March 2, 1992 members of LAPD Metropo 1 i tan Division and LASO Special-Enfor-eement-... Bur.eau ~n:ga-in joint training addressing crowd control and civi 1 disorder. Operational tactics were developed and put in place by both agencies. What was lacking was the command perspective. From this .point forward, it is highly recommended this joint training continue and involve command personnel from both agencies working with tactical entities. .. r , During the week of April 20 through 24, 1992, Metropolitan Division participated in extensive civil disorder training to include: Counter sniper response, conventional crowd control tactics, use of chemical agents, _ specialized counter-force measures, rescue of citizens under hostile conditions, barricaded subject situations, structure search and clearing operations utilizing K-9s and Tactical Support Elements. The training was timely and appropriate. Throughout much of the riot it appeared that doubt and de lay were a result of inexperience, lack of preparation and ineffective leadership. The current Department command structure consists of a hierarchy where supervisors and managers are placed in leadership roles regardless of their tactical skills. We cannot be all things to all people. Some individuals possess skills others do not and vice versa. It was unfortunate that selected command officers who were well versed in civil disorder strategy were not utilized in more significant leadership roles. The same appeared true regarding some of the Command Post cadre as we 11. It is recommended that in the future, the Department consider placement of persons in appropriate positions based upon experience, skill, kn~wledge, tenacity and leadership - with secondary consideration given to rank. I STRATEGY: 1. On April 29, 1992 initial tactical strategy employed by Metropolitan Division included directing Divisional resources to "hot spots" in order to quell riotous activity. The configuration of Metropolitan Division was 8, Tactical Support Elements (TSEs) consisting of 14 member squads . . NOTE: TSEs are self-supporting units with counter-sniper and K-9 capabilities. Each squad has grenadiers (shotguns) and counter-snipers (AR~ 1 s rifles). Primary missions included penetrating hostile areas and reestablishing _ control. D Platoon (SWAT) personne 1 were utilized for rescue, high risk and barricaded subject situations and were configured accordingly. 2. During the early stages of the riot, Metropolitan Division was not able to-respond as quickly as desirable in order to resolve the problem. This was due to the pre-established late "start of watch" times. On April 15, 1992 and again on April 17, 92 Metropolitan Division recommended that duty hours be scheduled from 1000 to .~ 1800 hours. This would have provided on duty personnel in the field at the time of a verdict return. As a result of command evaluation, Metropolitan Division ·vvas directed that duty hours would commence at 1 600 and 1800 hours. The Division was so assigned on April 29, 1992. 3. Initially, during the first few hours at the Command Post, Metropolitan Division sought their own missions based upon the gravity of the situation. For example, "probes" were sent into the effected area to perform rescues with D Platoon personnel. B - C and E Platoon personnel performed searches of the area involved. The lack of available patrol personnel to assist in holding ground .greatly hampered expeditious movement and the progress of Metropolitan Div i s i on res o u re es. At one point i t became necessary for a Metropolitan Division Lieutenant to physically organize Patrol elements, place them into squads, gather transportation and send them to the field. This should have previously been done by Field Command Post personne 1. 4. During later hours of the first day, more coordinaqon between Metropolitan Division and a "defined" Command Post began to develop. Effected areas were sectored off at the recommendation of Metropolitan Division personnel, TSE elements were deployed to those areas and re establishment of contra l began. Again, a set back occurred in the unavailability of patrol personnel to assist with retaken areas and the lack of mass booking capability. 5. Metropolitan Division TSEs assisted in LAFD security during the early hours. It was obvious to Metropo 1 i tan Div is ion and LAFD that unless emergency equipment was escorted into the effected areas the city would either burn to the ground or suffer mass causalities as a result of the lack of emergency units combatting the large number of fires and citizen injuries. Early on these missions were established by Metropolitan Division at the request of LAFD. The Field Command Post was subsequently notified. 6. D P 1 a toon, SWAT pers onne 1, at the direction of the Metropo 1 i tan Division Command Post, performed rescue missions of LAFD personne 1 and citizens. Later in the evening of the first day, D Platoon performed a rescue mission of B, C and E Platoon personnel who became trapped in a sophisticated ambush. Most of the missions initially were self generated based on the monitoring of activity and assessment of on scene events. D Platoon proved to be an effective . ., entity in "rescue situations under hostile conditions ", however if the violence had begun to spread to the Valley areas, there were simply not enough personne 1 tv go around. 7. Late in the evening of the first day as more coordination began to occur, specific missions were assigned via the command post to Metro po 1 i tan D ivi si on entities. 8. At the conclusion of the first night it appeared that some control was being reestab 1 ished. Metropolitan Division personnel were sent home at the conclusion of the B watch for rest. Subsequent activity revealed during the A watch period of the following day indicated wide spread looting and escalating violence. In reflection and had this been known, Metropolitan Division could have been held over with teams rotated for rest and reconfigured to spearhead a light str iking force to neutralize looter activity. This was not done and the second evening proved to be extremely difficult to recontrol. 9. During the initial response phase by Metropolitan Division to the South Bureau Command Post it became apparent that ~entra 1 Area was being effected by wide spread riotous activity. Metropolitan Div ision directed C Platoon assets initially to Parker Center in order to respond to the impending situati~n there. This caused approximately al hour delay in C Platoon elements res~onding to the more serious South Bureau incident. 11 TACTICS: 1. In itial planning by Metropolitan Division consisted of developing TSEs and D Platoon personnel into initial responders. This was not possible due to the activHies that were occurring and the staggered, on coming watches who were intransit at the very time they were needed. There was a lack of communication between Metropolitan Division and South Bureau. It was not until late in the scenario that Metropolitan Division became aware of the escalating events. The casual factors for this were deployment of Metropolitan Division field forces during night watch hours. 2. Metropolitan Division had conducted extensive training internally and for elements throughout the Department in civi 1 disorder counter measures. Additionally, Metropolitan Division on it's own initiative, acquired ballistic helmets, body armor and ammunition for the counter-sniper weapons deployed. The entire division was .. , reconfigured to accommodate the "TSE" concept, D Platoon personne 1 reconfigured to support rescue operations with the 2, V-1 OOs and specially configured Cr.evrolet Suburban vehicles. Throughout the entire 3 day riotous event the training and configuration of the Division proved to be superb and effective in providing highly mobile tact i ca 1 e 1 em ents to secure host i 1 e areas. 3. The staging area of the existing Command Post was too confining and prevented Metropolitan Division from ingress and egress. As a result, Divisional assets were subsequently staged on Van Ness Street adjacent to the Command Post. This relieved much congest ion and conf armed to Linear Riot Contra 1 Strategy. 4. Chemical_ agent deployment was non existent during the riot and could have been an effective tool for access denial to critical areas and buildings. Currently, chemical agents must be approved by a "Commander" rank and as such were not considered as an opt ion during the early stages. Also, al 1 if not most, patrol resources were unfamiliar with such equipment. Additionally, Metropolitan Division did not have the required launchers or ordnance to effectively utilize chemical agents. It is recommended that LAPD policy be amended to allow Metropolitan Division to deploy chemical agents at the discretion of a supervisor and upon the approval of the Field Commander. Also research needs to be implemented into various chemical agent devices suitable for riotous situation. 5. The pre-established Officer-Involved-Shooting protocol proved to work exceptionally well. Metropolitan Division advised all personnel that if an officer involved shooting occurred,. they were to notify a supervisor of a discharge of fire arm, attempt to locate a victim, record the date and time, number of rounds and directiqn fired. Following that, if a hit or injuries occurred, attempt to locate and recover the injured party, transport to the Field Command Post for medical treatment. If a death occurred, attempt to recover the body and locate witnesses for-.future- iAterv-~ew.- Su_Qef:V~ response included contacting the Officer Involved Shooting Team, Robbery Homicide Division and making the involved officers available for interview as soon as possible. Metropo 1 itan was involved in 5 officer involved shooting situations. 111 PERSONNEL: the riot, Metropolitan Division Operations and Command Center inside nand Post. At that location, a hasty Contra 1 element was es tab 1 i shed tu ~lements. Fortunately, two PSRs form been assigned to Metropolitan Division ively to, staff the communications juty personne 1 staffed posit ions ers etc. o 1 i tan Oivi sion personne I throughout rsonnel not on vacation or 100 status. ntari ly gave up their vacations and soft body armor temporarily loaned Emergency Services proved to be s little· doubt this equipment saved Off 1cer·s lives. This equipment needs 1 y assigned to the D iv is i on. n ut1ltzed by Metropolitan Division tual depl oyment was procured through '"'urrently TSE / counter-sniper ammunition for recurrent training and out adequate numbers of qua 1 i f i e d ammunition was unofficially procured es but is woefully inadequate. The ts for counter-sniper ammunition would 1e Chevro 1 et Suburban and large pickup ort each Platoon's response profile. made to accommodate utilization as Divis i on currently needs three yle vehicles to enhance their capability. ptics w·ere requested in the early stages 1e devices were utilized for looter > of the city. These devices were tment·s assistance but in spite of it, _________ _____:__........__ ___ ....:.___:____:. __ --- - evices were requested Department Commander for --emely useful and proved • - ~~e f ~ t greatly by having such inventory. emely critical in response to m·s fleet is that 99% of all 1stant need of maintenance. n as possible. 3gents were not utilized 1 as March t 992 to add such 1 tory. Subsequent to the re temporarily approved and Is. They have proven to be 1mended as ,permanent t 1on of a I 2 guage shotgun, >t", less lethal style rounds · Metropolitan' Division. The ! from a crowd and preclude ers. The use of such he use of the baton in . There is also a potential being conducted into the 1ducted into utilization of quipment could be utilized valving buildings that have ter activity. The use of nation" of the environment 1ed subjects. Additionally, hat can rapidly be ;trategically placed around Division personnel was the Metropolitan Division . - . --·- . - . __ ____ i_ .·_ .. · . - - -- · .._ . .. ., frequency. LAPD, Tactical frequency 1 · was utilized to facilitate individual communication. As the events continued and Metropolitan operations became more expansive it became obvious that additional frequencies were necessary. Those frequencies wPre un3v~i lah le. A recommendat1on would include at least two additional Metropolitan Division frequencies. 2. Approximately 1 hour into the Division's response, a portable base station was erected at the Command Post. Th1s portable base station came from Metropolitan Division and proved to be extremely effective in allowing the dispatching of missions from the Command Post. 3. Metropolitan Division was self sufficient in terms of radios, battery ch a r g er s and ROVER 5. Thi s proved to be be n e f i c i a 1. 4. Confidential communications were non-existent. ' There were no voice privacy systems and subsequently, news media personne·l were constantly aware and monitored all activit1es of Metropolitan Dtvision. At times this compromised mission capabilities of the. D1vision. As a recommer)dation and radio systems becpme improved, Metropolitan Division needs to have DVP (Digital Voice Privacy) rad i os for all personnel. . 5. Cellular telephones were temporarily assigned to Divisional Lieutenants, subsequently these telephones were recalled shortly after the riot period. It is believed the City of Los Angeles is still in an emergency state and the fact Platoon leaders are without such equipment greatly hampers their e.ffect1veness today. Addit ionally, cellular telephones can be utilized for strategic planning and administrative conversations. It is recommended they be reinstated. VI FIELD JAIL: 1. This was the biggest deficiency noted in the counter-force strategy. At the start of the event and throughout the 3 days following there was never a system to accommodate mass arrest that would allow the custodial processing of several hundred persons within a reasonable period of time. Additionally, the lack of a "Field" jail that was highly mobile and could respond to the scene of arrest and process persons was a great detriment. Throughout the riot period Metropolitan Division procured several buses, including LASO to deploy to the field with TSEs to assist in arrest of looters. ·----- - · - ----- - --------·---- On the second night this deftciency severely hampered operations and make shift bus transportation was developed to accommodate several -hundred arrestees taken into custody by Division personnel. , Through!" 1 1t .the remainc;er of the emergency period, E Platoon pick-ur trucks were utilized to assist in the transport of prisoners. The issue of mass arrest and booking with highly mobile photographic and custodial personnel needs to be developed and implemented immediately. ·-. :-: . ' : ~~-- --: . .. '\ . "t • UO CRITIQUE Name: Christensen, John _E. #12196, Assistant Platoon leader in behalf at D-Platoon Rank: Sergeant II SWAT Assignment during uo ••• Field Task Force ••• Metropolitan Division Area of Assignment ••• South Bureau •• Watch hours ••• varied ••• Topic of Discussion: Utilization of D-Platoon/Metropolitan *Personnel *Mission *Tactics *Equipment D-Platoon[SWAT] was at a state of readiness on April 29, 1992 during the initial stages of the Riot. Deployment consisted of the Lt. (OIC] and 5 of 6 assigned Sgts. working Pm watch hours. D-Platoon has an assigned TO of 60 officers, 45 of the 60 officers were working during the initial stages of the violence. Note: Of the 15 remaining officers, 2 were on regular days off; 3 were on T/0 days off; 7 were on vacation days off; 2 were on IOD status and 1 was on iight duty status. Of the 15 total officers off duty, 5 were notified and reported for duty within a short time frame. D-Platoon personnel responded in a timely manner, Riot ready. Mission: The D-Platoon OIC and assistant OIC reported to the field commander and received a brief of what had occurred and was occurring in the field as he knew it at that time. The field commander was advised of D-Platoon personnel on scene and of those due to arrive within minutes of the conversation. No mission was immediately assigned by the field commander. During the next several minutes the D-Platoon OIC attempted to obtain an assessment of what was occurring at Florence and Normandie. The field commander finally requested that D-Platoon deploy available officers in a rescue mode to Florence and Normandie. Further, a D-Platoon supervisor was deployed in an air unit. Unfortunately the unit experienced mechanical problems and was forced to make ari emergency I~nding after~~ brief fly over of the effected area. As this was taking place the _ remainder of the D-Platoon assets arrived at the command post and were configured into elements designated "Rescue one, two, and three." The initial squad strength response to Florence and Normandie had two missions: to gather intelligence and affect the rescue of a Black man trapped in a black vehicle. Upon the return ------ - - ----- ----- - - - - --. -- - · ·. of the "probe 11 and the rapid de-generation of the overall situation, D-Platoon switched roles from crowd control/riot response to SWAT Rescue response. Missions were generated by monitoring the radio fr~quency of s~~~h Bu~eau a~<l liason through the Metropolitan command post. CRITIQUE AND SUGGESTIONS: D-Platoon SWAT personnel could have been used more efficiently if the Field Commander had been more aware of section B/400 of the Tactical Manual and recognized the resource of trained and equipped personnel to handle the "Mission Concept". * Sector the effected area and assign SWAT personnel to gain access, hold and relinquish the area, [intersection, shopping center, gun store, pawn shop etc.) to patrol squad. * Respond to Help calls, shots fired at fire fighting personnel, police officers, citizens etc. * Remain ready to be in an arrest mode throughout the incident when priority missions diminish. * Monitor commercial radio stations to enhance intelligence gathering capabilities. EQUIPMENT NEEDS: * Multi-channel radios throughout the department, but especially within Metropolitan Division to provide a link with the various entities tasked with controlling the incident. Limited programmable radios (digital] inter-agency communications. * Small vans for transporting squad strength support to various "hot spots" thus eliminating multiple black/white vehicles in congested areas. Vans could also double as jail transport. * Streamline field jail/evidence system. Without the ability to arrest violators without depleting field forces, the mob mentaiity cannot broken. * Additional cellular telephones to connect management/ supervision during peak critical radios overload. * Authorization and deployment of several new less than lethal rubber projectile ordnances (37mm multi projectiles, Def-tech 12ga. rubber pellet projectiles] * Authorization for use of "noise-flash" devices in special limited circumstances. Authorization by SWAT OIC. - - - -. ···- - - -- . _ . . · .. ,. . - ,f . • , , l!,''. ~ TRAINING All future field training exercises involving Riot suppression, major hostage holding incidents, natural disasters, should exercise command officers who would be tasked with resolving the incident. Sergeant and Lieutenant Field Commanders are often paralyzed into in-action in the presence of staff officers. Staff officers are often reluctant to intercede to move field grade commanders to action or relieve them of their responsibilities. I July 8, 1992 8.1.1 TO: FROM: SUBJECT: INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Commanding Officer, Metropolitan Division AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR APRIL/MAY RIOTS As a participant in the Department's efforts during the recent riot and in conjunction with various personnel, the following is submitted in the spirit of constructive criticism. OVERALL APPRAISAL OF PROCEDURES UTILIZED DURING THE UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE The _ myriad of rapidly escalating events throughout the City during the April/May riots proved difficult for the Department to meet and address. The escalation of violence occurred quickly and seemed to paralyze the Department's ability to react. Unfortunately, the riot was not a surprise; the events which occurred had been predicted, and the Department neglected to take advantage of the advance warnings and pre-incident indications. On April 8, Assistant Chief Robert L. Vernon directed that Metropolitan Division (Metro) renovate existing Division plans and mobilization rosters and develop necessary tactics and training to cope with an impending major unusual occurrence (UO). Other Department entities were advised to do the same at that time. In reflection, it was apparent that during the initial stages of the riot little had been done in furtherance of direction provided. It was not until the third day that the Department was able to mesh with. other entities (both internal and external) and finally start performing as a unified force. Although many members of this Department performed their duties exceptionally well, the Department, as a whole, appeared to be "overcome by events" and was playing "catch up" throughout much of the scenario. It is difficult to explain why so much of what we did seemed inadequate. Although established procedures are sound, the Department clearly failed to execute. ., Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page two 8.1.1 A critical assessment of the Department's efforts, particularly the initial hours and days of the riot, compel me to identify the following as major weaknesses. 1. INTELLIGENCE (Pre-riot) The Department appeared to suffer from inadequate intelligence-gathering and a failure to funnel information to a centralized repository in which data could be evaluated and appropriately used. Recommendation There must be a review of the capabilities of Anti-Terrorist Division and the Community Relations Section of the Office of the Chief of Police as well as the intelligence-gathering potential bf Areas, Narcotics and Vice. 2. INITIAL RESPONSE The initial patrol response appeared uncoordinated and ineffective. The situation was not adequat~l~ assessed nor was it communicated properly to key members of the Department. Recommendation Additional training of supervisory and command level personnel in the handling of riots. Also, consideration should be given to a "scramble" type of response in which a continuous "officer needs help" ·call is broadcast until adequate resources are on-scene to address the problem. 3. COMMUNICATIONS (INTERPERSONAL) This failure may rest with many people and may include those initially receiving information and assuming it was typical and business as usual. However, the magnitude of the incident demands every effort must be made to ensure proper response. Recommendation Additional training and team building sessions as an adjunct to UO exercises. Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page three 8.1.1 4. SITUATION ESTIMATES The simultaneous problems occurring in Operations-Central Bureau (OCB) and Operations-South Bureau (OSB) reveal an interesting and noteworthy point. The problem at Parker Center (OCB) was a traditional, unlawful assembly and riot situation; i.e., a large crowd in a relatively observable area. Command officers and supervisors were able to see the problem and recognize basic strategies to deal with it. In OSB, the problems were literally everywhere, involving innumerable violent crowds, and were impossible to quickly and accurately assess. It appeared, based on slowness of response, that it was extremely difficult for the EOC to assess the problems City-wide and respond adequate personnel and logistics. Recommendations Consideration should be given to tasking Air Support Division with this assignment as in an earthquake situation. 5. PERSONNEL RESPONSE Although large numbers of personnel were eventually sent to the OSB Command Post (CP), clearly the Department must respond much quicker with larger numbers of officers. Recommendation The Department should evaluate how the Fire Department responds to major incidents for consideration. Additionally, we should review the Sheriff's procedures. Various options should be studied. 6. POOR DISCIPLINE AT THE COMMAND POST During the initial hours of the incident, officers failed to remain in formed squads to stand by for immediate deployment. It is impossible at this point to effectively evaluate what occurred and why. However, it was obvious that squads "melted away" on many occasions. Recommendation Mandatory Department-wide training is necessary. Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page four 8.1.1 7. LACK OF A STRATEGIC PLAN General Tactical Manual guidelines and training are a solid foundation for UOs. However, a more specific strategic plan must be prepared for the type of "non-traditional" riot which occurred. Recommendation Mandatory Department-wide training and unannounced exercises. 8. INADEQUATE INTEGRATION OF RESOURCES 9. Although many entities of the Department are well-trained, they infrequently train in an integrated fashion. It was also apparent that various command level person~l had not recently trained with the many varied entities of the Department. Recommendation Department-wide management training and mandatory unannounced exercises. INADEQUATE TACTICAL SUPPORT Integrated tactical support elements must be trained to ensure enforcement strike forces can be rapidly deployed with immediate support capabilities to hold secured areas, receive arrestees, and transport and process the arrestees. Recommendation Review Metro rapid response project. 10. LACK OF TECHNOLOGY In all aspects, modern technology must be employed. For example, clearly the Department should have a full bank of television monitors available at key fixed locations and in several mobile vehicles. It is unacceptable for thousands of viewers to be able to casually watch dramatic news events live from all over the City, while those who must deal with the event must wait for sporadic and often limited bits of information to trickle in from field personnel. Everyone in the City was watching Florence and Normandie except those of us who could have responded to address the problem. Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page five 8.1.1 Recommendation The Department must identify the various items necessary to update our capabilities and request funding by the City, County, State and Federal governments. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS STRATEGY On April 29, initial tactical strategy employed by Metropolitan Division included directing divisional resources to "hot spots" in order to quell riotous activity. The configuration of Metro was eight Tactical Support Elements (TSEs) consisting of 14 member squads. Note: TSEs are self-supporting units with counter-sniper and K-9 capabilities. Each squad has grenadiers (shotguns) and counter-snipers (AR-15 rifles). Primary missions included penetrating hostile areas and reestablishing control. D Platoon (SWAT) personnel were utilized for rescue,i high-risk and barricaded subject situations and were configured accordingly. During the early stages of the riot, Metro was not able to respond as quickly as desirable in order to resolve the problem. This was due in part to the preestablished late "start of watch" times. Initially, during the first few hours at the CP, Metro sought their own missions based upon the gravity of the situation. For example, "probes" were sent into the affected area to perform rescues with D Platoon personnel. B, C and E Platoon personnel performed searches of the area involved. The lack of available patrol personnel to assist in holding ground greatly hampered expeditious movement and the progress of Metro resources. At one point, it became necessary for a Metro lieutenant to physically organize patrol elements, place them into squads, gather transportation, and send them into the field. This should have previously been done by field CP personnel. During the later hours of the first day, more coordination between Metro and a "defined" CP began to develop. Effected areas were sectored off at the recommendation of Metro personnel. TSE elements were deployed to those areas and reestablishment of control began. Again, a setback occurred in the unavailability of patrol personnel to assist with retaken areas and the lack of mass booking capability. Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page six 8.1.1 Metro TSEs assisted in Fire Department security during the early hours. It was obvious to Metro and the Fire Department that, unless emergency .equipment was escorted into the affected areas, the City would either burn to the ground or suffer mass casualties as a result of the lack of emergency units combatting the large number of fires and citizen injuries. Early on, these missions were established by Metro at the request of the Fire Department. The field CP was subsequently notified. --- At the direction of the Metro CP, D Platoon personnel performed rescue missions of Fire~rtment personnel and citizens. Later in the evening of the first day, D Platoon performed a rescue mission of B, C and E Platoon personnel who became trapped in a sophisticated ambush. Initially, most of the missions were self-generated, based on the monitoring of activity and assessment of on-scene events. D Platoon proved to be an effective entity in "resc~ situations under hostile conditions"; however, if the violence had spread to the Valley Areas, there were simply not enough personnel to go around. Late in the evening of the first day, as more coordination occurred, specific missions were assigned via the CP to Metro entities. I At the conclusion of the first night, it appeared that some control was being reestablished. Metro personnel were sent home for rest at the conclusion of B Watch. During A Watch of the following day, widespread looting and escalating violence was revealed. In reflection and had this been known, Metro could have been held over with teams rotated for rest and reconfigured to spearhead a light striking force to neutralize looter activity. This was not done, and the second evening proved to be extremely difficult to recontrol. During the initial response phase by Metro to the South Bureau CP, it became apparent that Central Area was being affected by widespread riotous activity. C Platoon assets were initially directed to Parker Center in order to respond to the impending situation there. This caused approximately a one-hour delay in C Platoon elements responding to the more serious South Bureau incident. TACTICS Initial planning by Metro consisted of developing TSEs and D Platoon personnel into initial responders. This was not possible due to the activities that were occurring and the staggered, oncoming watches in transit at the very time they were needed. There was a lack of communication between Metro and South Bureau. It was not until late in the scenario that Metro became aware of the escalating events. Among the casual factors for this were deployment of Metro field forces during night watch hours. Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page seven 8.1.1 Metro. had conducted extensive training internally and for elements throughout the Department in civil disorder countermeasures. Additionally, on its own initiative, Metro acquired ballistic helmets, body armor, and ammunition for the counter-sniper weapons deployed. The entire Division was reconfigured to accommodate the TSE concept; D Platoon personnel reconfigured to support rescue operations with the two V-l00s and specially configured Chevrolet Suburban vehicles. Throughout the entire three-day riotous event, the training and configuration of the Division proved to be superb and effective in providing highly-mobile, tactical elements to secure hostile areas. The staging area of the existing CP was too confining and prevented Metro from ingress and egress. Subsequently, divisional assets were staged on Van Ness Street adjacent to the CP. < Chemical agent deployment was non-existent during the riot, yet it could have been an effective tool for access denial to critical areas and buildings. Currently, chemical agents must be approved by a "commander" rank and, as such, were not considered as an option during the early stages. Also, most if not all patrol resources were unfamiliar with such equipment. Additionally, Metro did not have the required launchers or ordnance to effectively utilize chemical agents. It is recommended that LAPD policy be amended to allow Metro to deploy chemical agents at the discretion of a supervisor upon the approval of the field commander. Also, research into various chemical agent devices suitable for riotous situations should be implemented. The preestablished officer-involved shooting protocol proved to work exceptionally well. All Metro personnel were advised to notify a supervisor of a discharge of firearm, attempt to locate a victim, and record the date, time, nwnber of rounds, and direction fired. Following that, if a hit or injury occurred, tbey were to attempt to locate and recover the injured party and transport him/her to the field CP .for medical treatment. If a death occurred, they were to attempt ~o recover the body and locate witnesses for future interviews. Supervisory response included contacting the Officer-Involved Shooting Team, Robbery-Homicide Division, and making the involved officers available for interview as soon as possible. Metro was involved in three officer-involved shooting situations. Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page eight 8.1.1 PERSONNEL During the initial hours of the riot, Metro established its own Tactical Operations and Command Center inside the confines of the field CP. At that location, a hasty communications/command/control element was established to deploy Metro elements. Fortunately, two police service reps from Communications Division had been assigned to Metro, and they were utilized very effectively to staff the communications position. Additionally, light duty personnel staffed positions consisting of journalist, runners, etc. The total number of Metro personnel throughout the riot period included all personnel not on vacation or IOD status. In some cases, personnel voluntarily gave up their vacations and opted to work. LOGISTICS ~ The ballistic helmets and soft body armor temporarily loaned from the California Office of Emergency Services proved to be absolutely essential. This equipment needs to be procured and permanently assigned to the Division. Counter-sniper ammunition utilized by Metro personnel for training and actual deployment was procured through emergency funding sources. Currently, TSE/counter-sniper elements do not have enough ammunition for recurrent training, and Metro is without adequate numbers of qualified counter-snipers. Additional ammunition was unofficially procured through military liaison sources but is woefully inadequate. The approval of budgetary requests for counter-sniper ammunition would greatly relieve this problem. Utility vehicles, such as the Chevrolet Suburban and large pickup trucks, are necessary to support each Platoon's response profile. Various modifications can be made to accommodate utilization as rapid response .vehicles. The Division currently needs three additional aforementioned style vehicles to enhance its capability. Low-light night-vision optics were requested in the early stages of the riot. Once obtained, the devices were utilized for sniper and looter detection in dark, unlit areas of the City. The devices were extremely useful and proved effective. Metro could benefit greatly by having such logistics permanently assigned to its inventory. Vehicles proved to be an extremely critical commodity in the riot. The current state of the Division's fleet is that 99 percent of all vehicles are very high mileage and in constant need of maintenance. These vehicles should be replaced as soon as possible. Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page nine 8.1.1 Less lethal projectiles and chemical agents were not utilized during the riot despite proposals as early as March 1992 to add such __ ordnance to Metro's inventory. Subsequent to the riot, 37mm multi-rubber projectiles were temporarily approved and have been deployed against riotous crowds. They have proven to be extremely effective and are highly recommended as permanent counter-riot control measures. Additionally, it is believed the utilization of a 12-gauge shotgun, multi-projectile (rubber) and single ''sabot'' less lethal style rounds would greatly enhance the capabilities of Metro. The rounds would provide a stand-off distance from a crowd and preclude requiring forces to physically engage rioters. The use of such projectiles is an effective way to avoid the use of the baton in crowd control and normal field situations. There is also a potential patrol application. It is recommended that research be conducted into utilization of rubber sting-ball type ordnance. Such equipment could be utilized to deny access of looters in situations involving buildings that have been vandalized and to prevent further looter activity. The use of these devices would provide non-contamination of the environment and the probability of minimal injury to involved subjects. Additionally, there are manufacturers of barrier wire that can rapidly be deployed from vehicles. This wire can be strategically placed around areas to assist in access denial. COMMUNICATIONS Radio communication initially amongst Division personnel was hampered due to the overload of traffic on the Metro frequency. Tactical Frequency 1 was utilized to facilitate individual communication. As the events continued and Metro operations became more -expansive, it became obvious that additional frequencies were necessary. Those frequencies were unavailable. A recommendation would include at least two additional Metro frequencies. Approximately one hour into the Division's response, a portable base station was erected at the CP. This portable base station came from Metro and proved to be extremely effective in allowing the dispatching of missions from the CP. Metro was self-sufficient in terms of radios, battery chargers and ROVERs. This proved to be beneficial. . Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page ten 8.1. 1 Confidential communications were non-existent. There were no voice privacy systems; subsequently, news media personnel were constantly ·---. aware of and moni tared all activities of Metro. At times, tnis compromised mission capabilities. As a recommendation and as radio systems improve, Metro needs to have digital voice privacy radios for all personnel. / Cellular telephones were temporarily assigned to divisional lieutenants (these telephones were recalled shortly after the riot / period). Currently, tactical leaders are without such equipment _ _ ,_.,- ( which greatly hampers their effectiveness today. Additionally, ' cellular telephones can be utilized for strategic planning and administrative conversations. It is recommended that they be ·" reinstated. FIELD JAIL This was the biggest deficiency noted in the counter-force strategy. At the start of the event and throughout the three days following, there was never a system to accommodate mass arrests that would allow the custodial processing of several hundred persons withi~ a reasonable period of time. Additionally, the lack Q:f a "field" jail that was highly-mobile, could respond to the scenes of arrests, and process persons was a great detriment. Throughout the riot period, Metro procured several buses, including some from the Sheriff's ·Department, to deploy to the field with TSEs to assist in arrest of looters. On the second night, this deficiency severely hampered operations, and makeshift bus transportation was developed to accommodate several hundred arrestees taken into custody by Division personnel. Throughout the remainder of the emergency period, E Platoon pickup 7 trucks were utilized to assist in transporting prisoners. The issue of mass arrests and bookings with highly-mobile photographic and custodial personnel needs to be developed and implemented immediately. Metro has recently completed a project addr~~_ s _ ing this issue. This critique would not be complete without some closing thoughts on the following key issues. PLANNING AND PREPARATION In situations which may result in major UOs and where adequate time exists in which to prepare, the Department should seriously consider assigning a specific group of trained tactical managers and supervisors to confront the problem. The costs of training the personnel of each geographic Area may be prohibitive, and as an alternative, a number of pretrained, preassigned experts should be maintained for response City-wide. .. Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page eleven 8.1.1 A comprehensive training program must be developed to prepare selected personnel. Frequent exercise of this tactical cadre must occur with the mandatory integration of local command officers, watch commanders and supervisors. In addition to immediate and appropriate initial response to the problem, a major goal should be the establishment of a total tactical package which can be properly handed off to local command officers when appropriate or upon the direction of the Chief of Police. Since all functions and responsibilities of the Department will continue, it must also be a consideration that local command or staff officers not be given responsibility for the tactical problem. RAPID RESPONSE It is critical that the Department embrace a philosophy of an available and fully capable rapid response. Rough plans and recommendations relative to stand-alone packages must be analyzed and, at a minimum, must include: .1. Emergency response of uniformed personnel fully equipped for any contingency, including counter-sniper action I 2. Support elements to provide for evidence-gathering and mass arrest videos at scenes of arrests 3. Support elements to hold areas secured by tactical elements 4. Support elements to transport and process arrestees A rapid response proposal, from a Metro perspective, has been completed and will be submitted immediately. DECISION-MAKING Regardless of competing interests, the decision to initiate a tactical -deployment in anticipation of a UO must be made in a timely f ashio· n by the Chief of Police or his designee. Concerns as to political ramifications or costs must be subordinate to the proper handling of a tactical problem of any magnitude. IDJ.Gffl~ Commanding Officer Metropolitan Division Attachments ( Ji) UO CRITIQUE Name: Christensen, John E. # 1 ~19n ~ Assistant Platoon leader in behalf of D-Platoon Rank: Sergeant II SWAT Assignment during UO ... Field Task Force ..• Metropolitan Division Area of Assignment •.. South Bureau .• Watch hours •.. varied ... Topic of Discussion: Utilization of D-Platoon/Metropolitan *Personnel *Mission *Tactics *Equipment D-Platoon[SWAT] was at a state of readiness on April 29, 1992 during the initial stages of the Riot. Deployment consisted of the Lt. [OIC] and 5 of 6 assigned Sgts. working Pm watch hours. D-Platoon has an assigned TO of 60 officers, 45 of the 60 officers were working during the initial stages of the violence. Note: Of the 15 remaining officers, 2 were on regular days off; 3 were on T/O days off; 7 were on vacation days off; 2 were on IOD status and 1 was on light duty status. Of the 15 total officers off duty, 5 were notified and reported for duty within a short time frame. D-Platoon personnel responded in a timely manner, Riot ready. Mission: The D-Platoon ore and assistant ore reported to the field commander and received a brief of what had occurred and was occurring in the field as he knew it at that time. The field commander was advised of D-Platoon personnel on scene and of those due to arrive within minutes of the conversation. No mission was immediately assigned by the field commander. During the next several minutes the D-Platoon OIC attempted to obtain an assessment of what was occurring at Florence and Normandie. The field commander finally requested that D-Platoon deploy available officers in a rescue mode to Florence and Normandie. Further, a D-Platoon supervisor was deployed in an air unit. Unfortunately the unit experienced mechanical problems and was forced to make an emergency landing after a brief fly over of the effected area. As this wa's taking place the remainder of the D-Platoon assets arrived at the command post and were configured into elements designated "Rescue one, two, and three." The initial squad strength response to Florence and Normandie had two missions: to gather intelligence and affect the rescue of a Black man trapped in a black vehicle. Upon the return .... .. '.' -:,\ - -~• ·~ ,,.; • : ... _.L ~ ., , • - • •• • • . - ~ ·. ~ . of the "probe" and the rapid de-generation of the overall situation, D-Platoon switched roles from crowd control/riot response to SW~T Rescue response. Missions were generated by monitoring the radio frequency of South bureau ana liason through the Metropolitan command post. CRITIQUE AND SUGGESTIONS: D-Platoon SWAT personnel could have been used more efficiently if the Field Commander had been more aware of section B/400 of the Tactical Manual and recognized the resource of trained and equipped personnel to handle the "Mission Concept". * Sector the effected area and assign SWAT personnel to gain access, hold and relinquish the area, [intersection, shopping center, gun store, pawn shop etc.] to patrol squad. * Respond to Help calls, shots fired at fire fighting personnel, police officers, citizens etc. * Remain ready to be in an arrest mode throughout the incident when priority missions diminish. * Monitor commercial radio stations to enhance intelligence gathering capabilities. EQUIPMENT NEEDS: * Multi-channel radios throughout the department, but especially within Metropolitan Division to provide a link with the various entities tasked with controlling the incident. Limited programmable radios [digital] inter-agency communications. * Small vans for transporting squad strength support to various "hot spots" thus eliminating multiple black/white vehicles in congested areas. Vans could also double as jail transport. * Streamline field jail/evidence system. Without the ability to arrest violators without depleting field forces, the mob mentality cannot broken. * Additional cellular telephones to connect management/ supervision during peak critical radios overload. * Authorization and deployment of several new less than lethal rubber projectile ordnances [37mm multi projectiles, Def-tech 12ga. rubber pellet projectiles] * Authorization for use of "noise-flash" devices in special limited circumstances. Authorization by SWAT ore. __ - • •• , \ ...... •• • • • ·1 ' ~ . ..; • J • TRAINING All future field training exercises involving Riot suppression, major hostage holding incidents, natural disasters, should exercise command officers who would be tasked with resolving the incident. Sergeant and Lieutenant Field Commanders are often paralyzed into in-action in the presence of staff officers. Staff officers are often reluctant to intercede to move field grade commanders to action or relieve them of their responsibilities. ~ : .. ' ~ - - . -- ~· .· .. ,, .. . .. . :.. • ~ ' . ''l " AfflLCBNll'f A Name J0~N D. M c ~~ILLIS Rank LIEUTENANT II uo cai::oms r2BK ... .... Assignment during a.a. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Canter Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other METRO PLATOON LEADER Geographic Area of assignment Command Post; Sec-:or; Date/Watch/Time _________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: __ c_-_A_T_T~AwC"H~E~p._ ______ _ (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: C - ATTACHED (Continuation sheets may be used) .. -·-··--~··· - ~~:-:.--··:-·.::- . .. -.·.·. ·--:-:- -~ ·~-.. -···~=---~:. ·--....... -~-,~ . ..:c::.~.!""!".~.-~ ----r:-- ·'" ,. 4 • • • l • • • - • • • •• ---....:......---- ' J _ ~· ... - ~ --- -- . . .. , _ _ ..,;__ __ ~ - __, •_ '---- ·- ._:_ . .. _ : ·~ :.__-: :- . :.., .. ; . .. ~;" . · ... · ... _.~ ;, . . .. .. . : _ . _ .. • - • - - • ,a._ -~ - - • • - -=-- - ~ -_:!_- ~ ... .. . •• ' 1 , ' - ... ' 1. COMMAND POST It's a sad day when the Department allows liberal politicians to subvert our tactical op~rations during a major unusual occurrence. Two days before the riot, Ridley-Thomas and company threatened that if the Department over deployed in South Central Los Angeles than LAPD would be the instigator of any civil unrest. Apparently, our command staff listened to those liberal politicians. As a result, LAPD was ill prepared to handle the riots and was embarrassed and ridiculed on world wide television. RECOMMENDATIONS: Due to the magnitude of the King incident the Department should have set up a command post the day the jury went into deliberation. The ideal location would have been the Coliseum, not the cramped RTD yard at 54th Street and Van Ness Avenue. The command post should have been staffed by tactical experts who have absolutely no affiliation with politicians and who know how to sector a disaster zone in a hurry. Whatever happened to our command post cadre? I recommend that the commander of Uniform Headquarters Bureau be the field commander at all major unusual occurrences. That person should hold the position because of tactical expertise, period. Due to political ties to the community, area captains and staff officers have absolutely no business running a tactical operation. We witnessed such a debacle on the 29th of April. Let's hope we never go through that again. 2. FIELD JAIL The field jail at Southeast Division was a hindrance to the front line troops, whose job it was to quell the riot by arresting looters. The processing was slow and when a designated number was reached the operation shut down. What kind of support is tha- t during war tim- e conditions? Delaying arresting officers at a field jail site does not help the cause. Southeast should have taken notes from Central. Now there was a smooth and well organized operation. Officers were in and out in no time. In fact, Central accepted arrestees from all over the city, but, still maintained a rapid processing time. One could tell that they prided themselves in supporting the field troops . . - .---------- ~--~- - ----- ---- --- - ···-- · - ----·· . - -- .. ... . ... .. . -~-- ... ... ~ ....___,,. _:_ _.. ... .... .... ... . - - ~..._- •· · .. . .. ~- -- ---... "'• ~· - __.. . , RECOMMENDATIONS: Ideally, the Sheriff's should be manning field jail operations. They are the experts and they have the manoower and lo~istics necessary to handle mass arrests. Employing LASD would free up detectives for field assignments. If an LASD field jail had been set up in advance, mass arrests could have immediately been affected and the riot quashed within hours. All we have to do for future events is break that political barrier that makes both departments want to operate independently. 3. METRO DEPLOYMENT Before the riot Metropolitan Division re-configured platoons B, C, E and K-9 into eight tactical support elements (TSE). Officers were trained in crowd control and counter assault tactics. During the riots, Metro performed beyond all expectations. RECOMMENDATIONS I strongly suggest that Metro continue training for TSE deployment, But, more importantly Metropolitan Division's T.O. should be increased to man a total of ten TSE squads plus SWAT. Logistically we need at least two suburbans per platoon. One modified suburban with running boards can easily transport 16 to 20 officers. During the ·riot SWAT' s suburbans were effectively used to move squads of officers for quick response. · -- ·- .- '"'-:--: · ·- ----- - ~ -. - . -- -·-- ---,--··. ·· . : .. ~ ·-., . : .. _,.......:__,_. ' , .. • Name Ky';W £. uo CB+%XAVI lQM Rank J6;/-£ Assignmen~ during a.a. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Canter Field Comm.and Pos,: Field Task Force _x __ Fixed Pos,: Security Patrol in Geographic Division __ _ Other ______________ _ AffAC:HMift A Geographic Area of assignmen,: _s;,4 r!.br; (,#6St ,6~.S. Command Pos,:; Seci::cr; Date/Watch/Time ________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Taci::ics, Command Pos,: Operations, etc) COMMENTS: HELD :T41l: NtJAI -£Y-1s'lt3-,J1 1r.1 .JtJv-1# ~ . Cnm1n/JtJ°o /ltJsJ IJ~tJS: /vJertio 1.s 77K fJF! lJ/iJG Srltri.e ;::;;t..L&. ~ lci.J/t~ DAI DIW ~D or kl rollf&D ~t:=1ll-O -rv kwtMN 1/J ~--;1 eu~ ~ --774-r:nl~H // IJA-:1 LJ!sr/tous ~ 6lJr /24,D n1or1GD TD 1.NEsT I ~NI t:u,~. (Continuation sheets may be used) •• • • · ___:_ - 4 · · ~-· • • • ~- • :. -- · ~ ---- . · · - - _J._,._._ _! , _ - ~ - .. - ... r ............ :~- .... _:..- . .. ~ ....... .!·-~·: .~ .... · ·- . _ _ ... \- ~·-· J._ - • _. • .) • • ) , I 'll AffAC HNift A + Assignment during a.a. (check all that apply) Emergency operations Center Field Command Post Field Task .Force Fixed . Post Security Patrol i~:=::aphic � ¼,-vision Other 11(LJ~ ::I::>e.. --- Geographic Area of assignment -s;o/c"FJ Command P0s1:; Sec~or; Dat:e/Wat:ch/Time ~ ( if necessary o_r_s_p_e_c_i-f1.-· c_t_o_t:h_i_s_tcpic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: Fl eL ~ J t11 L '. ti Alo Lfl I~, IT w,,, A- J?f /}YJI-.. ,:To 51l/CLS Tl) WJA1J1illt, UW~f NL5l51'6.P ~0~. ,~ LJ/15 ~t.!f~ Tl~c U9?1ivW/AI/,, f')/6 <lf.7t7.t'..l'AI(. ,v'/W{,.53 5 Hf,1-Sr"B.!' S~cJIVIV4cf2',. AN ~r Ftl}C.£ 51/45[ .JI Hf 5 ti 1PdZ., / N FO r /J <o~ /Jr N MA~ t../M-'i) ::S,Jff!<.L'. TJlv 1Jµ._i53q Nb Oh//l. C,(Jt,,,,i fl1.-cn53 1 r, 1J1r5N ;/Jf?v;J5 1 , ,. JJJu io) f Ot/L9L. w ,mo 1?JIJf<s ~oo.,uRv Jltft.?MA/tll. 7Jn.S'/ ot1t?K / ✓~ /4G<Ll"3.7; Ww{wuN, •. J/111;,<fll.o /1.Jr.,<L'tJ&J TO 13..r 01v <'B~ t.JJff4L~. TW u.d-# 11-onv,rj )VJ{1Nt, fJfo J)jj./ y/'Ml..iF Caf, ~r :~/ - Fo.A! 17~ r;-o ~ l./J ~J-/(h/1.,~ /fy,Jv<s'° 'be'&¥ ~,Al '!1}c_ ,1~ ;?it{'~ 70 17;,(J J,J,</ I «}t,vv/'11, 1/V,. IS e': 1 .5MV'-V flJ1v.{ 1}c2191f 71<.rl.A-fwcffe 70 I :5/i71 >- /{) tJfr./-5 ~ U<-<Jt'i11116 t.u,d-.s- :5,01/vS, 1 (Continuation sheets may be used) . . ---·---· - · - --·-·-·- ._ -~ - . . ---1.J ..!...: ...:..!. - -· ·· ~-- • __ ,:,.-; .. ·:..: _ ~-;:_. - ~ ~ .!.!Y~~ ' ' ~ ' .. ' ·· ~ ' .... • • • ·2 ..... ~ • ... · : • :· -· .:., .. . :..- • ~ · _, ~ ~ ·- • .._ - •• -- .• · • - :.:. . :_, _ __ , .. ... . ,...,;:_, .--,:_:....:..:. · ·:,.:.___: ·~- . ..:._:., · • ~ -,...L.~;....__-'--"- ' ., Name JOHN D. i 11 1cCRI LLiS ) Rank LIEUTENANT II ' .... Assignmen~ during a.a. (check all t.~at apply) Emergency Operations Cen~er Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Pos~ Security Pat=ol in Geographic Division Other METRO PLATOON LEADER Geographic Area of assignment Command Post:; Sect:or; Date/ Watch/Time __________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: __ c_-_A_T_T~A.....,c_H_E~P----------- A~C:SMll'f A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; C - ATTACHED (Continuation sheets may be used) . . -·-···-----:·-· ·. -~~-- •4•-·-. ;·::: -·:-:· - ~ ·-:-:--,:-:-;-:-•-.-·•·--=--=-----~ : . . ·------·-·--·-: _ :... .. ~ -. ~ - -::.~_:=- . . : - .-- . _ :..._ ...:_ .: _ - ~ -.-- -- ~.- -. ~_.:..:.:._ : .,_:__ · ...:. ~-=- : . ...: ·_ . - .. :_ -_ - _ .....;.-- _ .j_ .; . . :.= - = ·-·= = ===== ··= ·==========·= · . ::::::==== .· ... ~ - .. . . .. .. -· I _A ', "', 1. COMMAND POST It's a sad day when the Department allows liberal politicians to subvert our tac ;...ical o~~r9.tj _.-:-;..!"!~- ~ 1 . ~ .!'ing a major unusual occurrence. Two days before the riot, Ridley-Thomas and company threatened that if the Department over deployed in South Central Los Angeles than LAPD would be the instigator of any civil unrest. Apparently, our command staff listened to those liberal politicians. As a result, LAPD was ill prepared to handle the riots and was embarrassed and ridiculed on world wide television. RECOMMENDATIONS: Due to the magnitude of the King incident the Department should have set up a command post the day the jury went into deliberation. The ideal location would have been the Coliseum, not the cramped RTD yard at 54th Street and Van Ness Avenue. The command post should have been staffed by tactical experts who have absolutely no affiliation with politicians and who know how to sector a disaster zone in a hurry. Whatever happened to our command post cadre? I recommend that the commander of Uniform Headquarters Bur~au be the field commander at all major unusual occurrences. That person should hold the position because of tactical expertise, period. Due to political ties to the community, area captains dnd staff officers have absolutely no business running a tactical operation. We witnessed such a debacle on the 29th of April. Let's hope we never go through that again. 2. FIELD JAIL The field jail at Southeast Division was a hindrance to the front line troops, whose job it was to quell the riot by arresting looters. The processing was slow and when a designated number was reached the operation shut down. What kind of support is that during war time conditions? Delaying arresting officers at a field jail site does not help the cause. Southeast should have taken notes from Central. Now there was a smooth and well organized operat..i.on ·· - Off i-.ce.~ _ were in and out in no time. In fact, Central accepted arrestees from all over the city, but, still maintained a rapid processing time. One could tell that they prided themselves in supporting the field troops. RECOMMENDATIONS: Ideally., the Sheriff's should be manning field jail operations. They are ihe experts and they have the manpower ~nd lagist lcs necessary to handle mass arrests. Employing LASD would free up detectives for field assignments. If an LASD field jail had been set up in advance, mass arrests could have immediately been affected and the riot quashed within hours. All we have to do for future events is break that political barrier that makes both departments want to operate independently. 3. METRO DEPLOYMENT Before the riot Metropolitan Division re-configured platoons B, C, E and K-9 into eight tactical support elements (TSE). Officers were trained in crowd control and counter assault tactics. During the riots, Metro performed beyond all expectations. RECOMMENDATIONS I strongly suggest that Metro continue training for TSE deployment, But, more importantly Metropolitan Division's T.O. should be increased to man a total of ten TSE squads plus SWAT. Logistically we need at least two suburbans per platoon. One modified suburban with running boards can easily transport 16 to 20 officers. During the ·riot SWAT's suburbans were effectively used to move squads of officers for quick response . • .. · . . 1 -: . . • . . • . · . I . . e I ,; • uo C3+1XQVI fQRM Name Rank~j~ . ~~-~/~------~_--_ 1 -__ Assignment during a.a. (check all t.~at Emergency Operations Canter Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security apply) ;,( Patrol in Geographic Division __ _ Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post; Sector; Date/Watch/Time ________ _ (if necessary or specific to this copic) Topic of Discussion: AffAC!HRH A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post Operat~ons, etc) COMMENTS: H~LD Y4tl .' J)/IJAJ-£'/./5~1 IN _J~~ CnrnlrllwO lbsr !J/?&t!POON5: l1erteo J.5 77K dN lJtiJG S~r~ HJl/£. ~ ICU/tc_s DN Z)~y ~D or kl h:>/cb5:D ~~ -rv ftwt4'fA/ IN ~,I &.~ E:r;l6r.) ~hu,H // w/J-:5 o6r/tous ~ £ZJT J/4,D ntovGC:> TD 1/4s1 I C:G/\/t Lu~. (Continuation sheets may be used) ....... . . . .. . . ··- . . : ... _ --·· . -~ .. -... • - • ·• . ·. -• ~ : . ...... • • • r ll • . . . . . . . ~ .. · . : . -~--. . ' •, . • , , .. > , + cro C3+?XQQ'1S fQBM name ~\(f/S tJl<.ta/Jk_ Rank 2lfJC )(~ Assignment: during a.a. (check all that apply) Emergency Operat:ions Cent:er Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol i~~aphic Division Other .filt:::JM :J::)€ --- Geographic Area of assignment -s52/ct3 Command Post:# Sec~or; Date/Watch/Time ~ (if necessary o_r_s_p_e_c_i_f_i_c_to_t_h_i_s-topic) Topic of Discussion: Aff>.CSQft A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, command Pos~ · '""Operat: 1 ons, etc) COMMENTS: fl1..,>L.~ J/J1L '. rlNoL>lJ~, 1T t,,j~ fl #1/-}J:JI-. <7os~s Tl) WJPrf-/1.J~ utJcd N<-~6'11 rr·1.Jt .. L_r3:,_ ,~ LJ"5 ~e-j~ T1t11c C,0;v1(/i#//,/1s-. ~ <c(v7tJ.e..l'AIG, /'/Wts35 //;J//5; 'BJ S~c~UA/v?J_ AN ~r F~ 5/n::dl ~; nf :SvjPc~ /NFD r rf (pl(JJ"F /\I//IU.mi/.S- l,,/a/<-) 5',JPFJL.I.E',. TJ-lu" ~tu317/Vb OF'f/ll.. Cflwt/J<-L'T/3 1r 1 17/rYv /t?t7VJ5 1,>-~ jo)y Ot/~ TO ,mo ;?;Ms "'300.,u,i1& /JJ£7t?/J'#tX. 7Jli.sf 'Bt:7t7K / 1/l! ~'--1?7; ~f lhf u}/\ ', J1?1;;,"'fllo /\/1.,~Q}&J TD 13c! 0/Y <73011/ t./ JffL/f,._,---:,. 7VO ~ l/-vnV1r--/ )i!>VNb- ,}fD YIJ./ '-r/l'Ml.-lf C42f, <( -?o) Fo~ /l~ 'tO l/4Ni).,. L/ J -:, J-/o(/l, ~ tfy,/tAs" 17 rl0/' c?,,f/ ,,-J'Jc__ ,f ~ r I' /pl,t 'TO 7MY" J iJ ,< / ~/"{; 1/\l, TS i I 5ai,1~ f/1njt" 1}c_215}\j 77<JU,~tJJI 70 I S(i?1 >- /{) (}ft.f. 5 I ~ -U..°!111tf6 '-1A.A(}l<J 30/h) S, (Continuation sheets may be used) .. -·-···------·-· ....... . . •· · . • . ··- . : ... ·-· . .• . -~- ... -... --...-...~ -. ·-- .. . . I• " . t · ;a .. ... ~ ;- • •• . . ; . ' . , . ~ . ... .. . . -- Name Rank __ S; __ .,__:r ___ _ uo CJ+::oa PORX ' ' Assignment durinq a.a. (check all t..~at apply) Emergency Opera~ions Canter Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Pos~ Security Pat=ol in Geographic Division Other ::ra<=vffi l Sl Jj?f?:EJ: euroa-::x ( Geographic Area of assignmen~ Command Pos~; Sect:r; Dat:e/ Watc:i/ '!'!.::ne V&\Q, lS (if necessary or specific to this topic) Aff1CSNBH A Topic of Discussion: TSE l Fi'et.Q .JA\L (ie Field =ail, Squad Tac~~cs, Command Pos~ Operations, etc) ~ COMME!JIS: C. - Al4C\Cr-\E0 (Continuation sheets may be used) ·. ·. - - -··--97·-· ~ - ... ~---- --- . . ·.: ·.· --:- -~·~-.. ----~=--~ -. ·----~-·~,.-.c:=-::-: .. ~.-~-...--.. ::cc:. ----~--..;_;,::_.:,_..:..:=._:_:....._:....::._.::. _ _ _ - . ~ _ ..:. _ :.:: _ ~~ - .- ~ .. - . - . ----~--:--.:....::.-===- =--=--~=-= ~--=---=-=-~- . · .,._. . .,;.:, • .. ' r Tactical Support Elements The TSE was an extremely effective way to arrest large numbers of looters. The squad was able to t, 1 ork ~~ ?.. t,,~ ). l coordinated unit to contain and arrest suspects while also providing cover for the Officers. Unfortunately two things prev~nted the TSEs from being even more successful. The first, originally the TSEs were deployed to provide much needed protection to the fire department. This assignment, which could have, and eventually was handled by patrol and the Highway Patrol, prevented the TSEs from taking any aggressive action toward the looters. The looting spread dramatically because none of the individuals involved were faced with any real threat of arrest. The second problem that slowed aggressive action down during the initial days of the riot was the unbelievable backup at the j ail facilities. Officers were faced with delays that kept them out of the field and unable to quickly process a simple looting or curfew arrest. , This process needs to be uniform throughout the city, and it needs to be quick. Each curfew or looting report should have a generic nar~ative that is pretyped and the arresting officers should have to fill in no more information then is contained on a FI. Polaroid cameras available to Officers in the fieQd would have enabled them to take pictures of looting suspects·, arresting offices, and property in front of the establishment that they looted. The F.I. card could be attached to the back of the photo and trans with the body. The suspect could then booked and processed independently of the arresting officers. The booking procedures improved two to three days into the riot, but it was to late to allow officers to go out and make mass arrests early on that might have stopped the escalation of the incident. It is extremely important to have the ability to make mass arrests immediately. Therefore the system must be able to be implemented and running smoothly within hours not days. The department's intelligence and the word on the street pointed to a strong possibility of civil uniest. Metro's week of training did a great deal to prepare it's officers for this incident. Unfortunately most patrol divisions received little or no training. Standing plans are no good unless they are reviewed. A number of officers showed up to the C.P. at 54 and Arlington with no helmet. This type of readiness is unacceptable. Especially when the possibility for an incident was so great • ---··-··. -------·- - ·--·-- . ··· ··· -···-··-··- - -- · . --·---··· .. -. · .: ... ... . .._:__ - -- -~ - • -·, ':... __ j • ~ - •. . .: • • ~ _ .. _ .....1,. __ ..__ _ · _._ __ - . •·: · . • ., . · · -~· ·•_-:~ ........... __:__:._.;...._......__ __ ~ • , ..,.,_ , .. uo CJXTIOgB lQBK t-lame Sc;, .::::a,'J.,..,--.., X e ,-V--J. C (_ Rank~Gr ...Z- ' ' Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Pat=ol in Geographic · Division Other ,/7?:5; r7'C- o Geographic Area of assignment Command Pos-c.; Sec~or # Date/ Watch/Time __________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: S c \<4-:d -;:;;ct-/ cs Aff1C:SN8ft A (ie Field J'ail, Squad Tac-:ics, Command Pos-c. Operat:~ons, etc) COMME?-iTS: (Continuation sheets may be used) ---··~--:"·-· -~ - ~ ~--·-·-·-. ,· :.:.·--::· -~·~--,-.. •'-:--:----------:- ~. -----~ c. c:: ....... --~-~ - ~·· Metro trained very hard in preparation for this and other prospective U.O.'s. In fact, many occurrences, including the initial incidents, were tailor made for the specialized tactics developed by Metropolitan Division's platoon leaders weeks prior to the riots. Unfortunately, Metro squads were not utilized for the first few hours of the U.O., and in some cases, were ordered not to engage looters or other criminals. For at least the first full night of the riots field jails were essentially non existent, and no prisoner transportation was available. When Metro was finally deployed, the tactical squad formations developed I earlier worked like a Swiss watch. Incidents of violence were quickly quelled, looters and arsonists quietly and efficiently arrested, and all with a minimum of force and manpower to safely and effectively complete the assigned operation. . , . uo _ CllTXQVI fQRM ) N'ame G-AR'I rn, FENNELL (' /- Rank ~ o / ' ' Assignment durinq a.a. (check all t.~at apply) Emergency operations center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post: Security Pat:=ol in Geographic Division Other fr) l!.Tn.c r:::.c~,,A,-J ~, V Geographic Area of assignment: Command Pos-e; Sec-eor; Date/Wat:ch/Ti:ne (Jin .,-t' n :1. /?::, (if necessary or specific co this topic) Topic of Disc~ssion: A~CSNll'f A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post: Operatipns, etc) COMMENTS: (Continuation sheets may be used) . . ---------· . . . ~~-:-:-··-·-·-- .·:.·.··-~- - -·~--.--•·-:--:-----:- : . . . . -~· --- · - . . · ·· - ·-· -·--·- - · ----~~--itC":"."'l:C::=--:":,. .~.-~ . ---,:-• .• I ii C • 4 - ·--·- · -·-- ---··: . - ... -· ··-. =-·=- --~ ·_::_:_ -~--==~- --- - ~ - ,._ # _ __,, . - - _ ._._ - · · - - ·" ,our:.. -- i7 I' Lf-c__ I . C. __, - ~ c~ './ r / ~ - __ , Tin::.. ,!_//~ // .... , , . - - : "-.... _:. 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(cneck _all that apply) EJDergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Pat=ol in Geographic Division other a:4e77.-!/') · -;.1c.r/ (-: -' 1 ~-- ~11@l)N!..r ld/--;11,y.J~ Geographic Area of assignment 77Tl:L ) !. Command Post: ; /7- ~ . so 'dNli µ)L.1 r Sec1:.or; ..,,,.., · 6t,)RE/kJ 0ate/Watch/Ti!ne ✓ /f:~lftJ-" /rf 6-,!AJ,tfC~ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post: Operations, e~c) COMMENTS: ~ ~lw~l/..s 7)/l /)~;ff /) 1 1) IT ~2-1 i~-·! :Jc 1 d - 7}; £ 0/ 1E~ t)/ /pu ct .$;/J,76✓ -J //iJ l. W,f /t ~ /1,,;-;1111, tJ /J-H.o I ./JCM~ W1'm ;)J~ (Continuation sheets may be used) ____ ,, ______ ... - ·- -· .. .. . - ' ,,_,- I ' ~ ... ~ Name ~ f}-c_s Rank_$-- ___ ~_ // ___ _ ' ' Assignment during u.a. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force ?: Fixed Post Security AT'n<!SUft A Pat=ol in Geographic Division~-- . other <Y ergo ~ <-T/ :-:: ~ 1 ~ --- ~11/41 1),,dr dfl.['il'6f'jr-~ Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sect:or # Oat e / watch/Time v'!/:t2.1aJ"" ,ti(; ?U4-7C~I (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ____________ l (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post: Operations, etc) COMMENTS: !J-s ~W~f.:/.s 7)/L /J✓~ /),~ ft 61),f ~ - 1 :Jb t1 - ff!£ 0/ /E~ ff fbuc~ S;,41~ £J t,.;l. Wl/l £ Ar j)1111t t:> /+Mo T . /IG"u~ W t-n-1 v)JM' (Continuation sheets may be used) Jtme 29, 8. 2. 1 TO: FROM: SUBJECT: 1992 INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE Commanding Officer, Planning and Research Division f Commanding Officer, Detective Headquarters Division CASUALTY INFORMATION CENTER AFTER ACTION REPORT Attached is the Casualty Information Center After Action Report. If you require additional information. Please c~ntact Detective D. Stark at (213) 485-5381. Captain Co, manding Officer D tective Headquarters Division OVERVIEW CASUALTY INFORMATION CENTER AFTER ACTION REPORT On April 29, 1992, the Casualty Information Center <CIC) was activated at the direction of Chief Frankle, Commanding Officer, Operations Headquarters Bureau. The CIC provides a centralized location for the recordation of all U.O. related c asualties. The CIC gathers records and disseminates information concerning deaths~ injuries, missing and found persons. The CIC was deactivated on May 10, 1992. REVIEW OF OPERATION The activation and operation of the CIC was conducted in accordance with an established CIC Checklist maintained in the CIC Manual of Detective Headquarters Division (OHO). Upon reviewing the CIC Checklist, and DHD's Standing Plan for the Activation of the CIC and the Tactical Manual, the following discrepancies in procedure were noted. 1. Notification to the City Hall telephone operator super v isor. The CIC Checklist and the CIC Activation Standing Plan calls for notifying the City Hall telephone operator supervisor upon activation of the CIC. Such notification is not required by the Tactical MaT'llual. Inquiry with a city hall telephone operator supervisor disclosed no known reason for the notificat{on. 2. Establishing liaison with the Hospital Council of Southern California. The CIC Checklist and the CIC Activat i on Standing Plan also r~quires the establishment of liaison with the Hospital Council of Southern California, but the Tactical Manual does not. An inquiry with the Hospital Council of Southern California failed to establish a reason for the required liaison. 3. Establishing liaison with the Medical Alert Center, Los Angeles County Department of Health Services.Both the Tactical Manual and the CIC Activation Standing Plan require the establishment of liaison with the Medical Alert Center o - f the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services. However, the CIC Checklist did not contain the requirement, and the liaison was not established. Liaison between the CIC and the Medical Examiner-Coroner operated efficiently and accurate· information concerning deaths related to the U.b. was continuously available. However, information on the injuries related to the U.O. proved to be troublesome. The U.O. \., ' , , ··• Casualty Information Center-After Action Report Page two 8. 2. 1 c o vered a wide area and lasted for a long duration. Victim's from the U.O., for the most part, were not transported to hospitals by ambulance, but rather, provided their own transportation to hosp i tals. They chose which hospital to go to, and when to go t here. At the hospital, i.njured persons often gave conflicting information on how they were injured, and where it occurred. After t he initial outbreak of the U.O., officers were sent to selected hospitals to gather casualty information. As the number of injur i es depreciated, officers were not stationed at the hospitals, but were sent to the various hospitals at frequent intervals to obtain the information. This proved ineffective because of record distribution procedures employed at hospitals. Specifically, all their records were not available when officers went there, and the hospitals did not have all t~e information the CIC wanted. Consequently, complete injury information was not obta i ned. To illustrate the problem, the CIC gathered injury information on 520 persons, while the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services reported treating 2,325 injured p e i- sons county w i de . RECOMMENDATIONS It is recommended that DHD's Standing Plan for the Activation of the CIC and the CIC Checklist be revised to agree with the Tactical Manual and that an annual audit of the CIC be conducted to ensure the CIC Checklist and the CIC Activation Standing Plan dre current. It is also recommended that in future occurrences, the Los Angeles County Medical Alert Center be asked to broadcast through the Hospital Emergency Administrative Radio (HEAR) network that all hospitals . treating U.O. victims are to notify the CIC to record -the injury information. DEATH AND INJURY SUMMARY Table I represents a statistical summary of deaths and injuries r esulting from the U.O. LAPD Officers Othe,- Officers National Guard Citizens TABLE I DEATH AND INJURIES DEATHS CRITICAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 46 248 NON-CRITICAL 101 3 1 1 2077 June 25, 1992 8.2.4 INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE TO: Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau FROM: Commanding Officer, Robbery-Homicide Division SUBJECT: AFTER-ACTION REPORT APRIL/MAY 1992 RIOTS PROCEDURES Notifications Robbery-Homicide Division (RHD) personnel were notified of the initial mobilization by Detective Headquarters ' Division personnel. The notifications were made in a timely manner. The B-Watch personnel reported as ordered. The A-Watch personnel were notified by on-duty RHD personnel. Subsequent daily watch assignments were made by ~he RHD Personnel Officer at the request of the E.O.C. or the Field Command Post. The notification procedure was effective after the initial broadcast was made and RHD was able to put its division mobilization plan into action. Assignments THE RHD Fixed Post minimum staffing as defined by Operations Headquarters Bureau guidelines was changed py the Commanding Officer of RHD due to the nature of the event. The Bank Robbery Section was made available to the Field Task Force. Note: The FBI was notified and agreed to conduct the preliminary and follow-up investigations. They maintained daily liaison with the Bank Desk Officer. All geographic divisions were notified that RHD would not respond to bank robberies. The Officer-Involved Shooting Section was deployed on both A and B Watch. The Officer-in-Charge maintained functional supervision of non-hit shooting incidents (see attached). The Major Crime Investigation Section and Homicide Special Section were combined as one unit and deployed in uniform on both A and B Watch as a fixed post minimum staffing unit. The unit ~-Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 2 8.2.4 was charged with the investigation of any criminal acts that resulted in serious injury to a police officer. A secondary mission was to provide security for the Officer-Involved Shooting Team at the scene of the shooting investigations. Note: After the initial two days of response, the Major Crimes/Homicide Special Unit was made available to the E.O.C. and field commanders with the understanding that they be deployed as a unit that could be re-assigned from the field to a more urgent investigation. The remainder of the Division was made available for task force , assignment. Deployment ' The Tactical Manual indicates that the available specialized detective personnel be assigned to the Task Force or that they provide security for Parker Center under a plan as directed by the Commanding Officer of Detective Services Group. The mobilization occurred after the specialized detectives had gone off duty. The initial security and protection of Parker Center was performed by Central Division. The RHD officers who responded to the B-Watch received no assignments during their first tour of duty. On subsequent days they were assigned to various locations in the City at the direction of the E.O.C. Evaluation and Recommendations of Procedures Call-up procedure worked well, it should not be changed. However, with regards to this •type of preplanned .event, several changes should be made. 1. Security of Parker Center and other police facilities. During the year preceding the King verdict, numerous demonstrations occurred in front of and inside of Parker Center. During that time, either Metropolitan Division or Central Division was used .for security. There was not effort to train the personnel in the building in security. For the specialized detective divisions, it was business as usual. If the specialized detective divisions are to be given this assignment, they must be equipped and trained. In the event of a natural disaster, i.e., earthquake, the other divisions ,,. . commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 3 8.2.4 may not be able to provide this help. Personnel in the building must be ready. 2. Preplanned Events. The pending resolution of the King trial caused the Department to make precautionary plans. The Department command was given an estimate of when the verdict would be returned. The Judge promised a three hour lead time to notify all parties. The time that the verdict would be returned was known to all who watched it on television. A Tactical Alert should have been preplanned and set in motion prior to the return of the verdict. The deployment of the units on tac alert could have been made prior to heavy traffic hours and non field personnel would have been available in the station as needed. The general climate in the country appears to be one of violent destruction regardless of the reason, i.e., the demonstrations because of sports events in Chicago, Detroit and on several college campuses. We must an~icipate the event, plan to be heavily deployed and highly visible and prepared to take decisive action. It is easier to scale down than up. Staffing The minimum staffing procedure must be dependent o'n the type of incident that is occurring. A civil disturbance, such as this riot will require a response that differs from the response of a natural disaster. Deployment Deployment of the field force must have strict lines of command. During the first watch of a non planned event, a degree of confusion is expected. In this riot situation, OHB immediately appointed a personnel officer .for both the A and B Watch. The available OHB personnel were compiled by rank and number and given to E.O.C. Requests and assignments from the E.O.C. did not go through the Bureau Personnel Officer. Both the E.O.C. and the Field Command Post called directly to the detective divisions with their requests for personnel. The result was a duplication of assignment of the same personnel. - -- Deployment must be controlled by the Department Commander and staff. Valuable time was lost during the first days by having - ---- ------ (. , ';co~anding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 4 8.2.4 the detectives report to their Division of assignment before being sent on a mission or to the Command Post for assignment. There were several instances where RHD personnel were sent from Parker Center or the C.P. to the Valley Bureau for looter control. The Valley detectives were doing the same thing in South Bureau. This was after we had control. Strategy and Other Areas The attached responses of officers involved in the actual attempt to control the situation deal directly with the problems encountered. The major areas of concern were: 1. Lack of direction from Command Staff. 2. Not enough personnel or equipment to do what was expected. 3. Non arrest posture in first days. 4. Moving of looters from involved area without arrests and being unable to secure an area. 5. Lack of vehicles and radios. 6. Lack of protective vests for detectives. Note: This was addressed as an issue prior to the riots. Supply Division was non cooperative and could or would not give a definite answer to our requests for new equipment. After the riot started, they suddenly had plenty of equipment. We lost man-hours sending officers to Supply Division for protective equipment during the riot. 7. Field Jail: We did not use established procedures, detectives must be assigned, etc. 8. Criminal Justice System: We are on a different schedule. They went · home when we mobilized. It took needless days to get things turned around. :;ilJ.~ W. O. GARTLAND, Captain Commanding Officer Robbery-Homicide Division Attachment \ --- , ' ·• Name Rank , uo CR+T+QVB PORK J. Grayson #14006 Detective III Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force X Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time "A" Watch (if necessary or specific to this topic) AT'l'ACJDCBJI'!' A Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi · see attached sheet (Continuation sheets may be used) ·- ---·····-- . -.. - . ··- ..... . .... . .... ~, ... ' •· .. ·--·- .. ---.. --.-. -.-···-c ........ ·- ~~~::.-~'~ _____ _:_-=---~---- --~~:__-- UO Critique J. Grayson #14006 Page 2 AFTER ACTION REPORT BACKGROUND: Initially, the possibility of a riot/revolt in Los Angeles following the King incident was speculative, however highly probable. The symptoms were increasingly heightened day by day. There were controversial police issues, political in-fighting and rheotric between public officials and the Judge Carlin issue regarding the shooting death of Natasha Harlan by a Korean merchant. Tensions were high and tempers were short. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), from my point of view, represented a prepared entity ready to respond"yet maintaining low visibility. As a Detective III in Robbery-Homicide Division (RHD), a specialized division, early notifications were made to prepare for field duty i.e, uniforms and safety gear. This endeavor was satisfied, however, there were no plans for respohse. The UO roster was changed two days prior to the riots without any notifications. Safety equipment and communication equipment were unavailable to specialized units. Response plans were unavailable. On the evening of the riots there were no original proposed plans for notification or response precedures. I attempted to contact Detective-Headquarters Division and RHD every hour following the outbreak as shown on television at Florence and Normandie. I was unable to get through to the Department and the phone was out in various areas due to call overload for emergency service and downed lines. The following morning at 0600 hours, I was contacted and notified to report to RHD in uniform. Upon my response I was instructed to wait in the office for 2 1/2 hours. Later I was directed to the command post at 54th and Arlington, where I was assigned by a P-II to take a squad car to pick up food at the Convention Center. Needless to say, I had to wait another hour for a truck. My entire tour of duty in the field consisted of dredged up details. My assignments were without planning and purpose. ., ' UO Critique J. Grayson #14006 Page 3 The personnel that made field assignments, in my opinion, did not take into consideration expertise nor did they have any knowledge of the assignments or personnel needed to address certain problems. In conclusion, the response of the police department was that of political puppets rather than professional police officers. Basically, any problem that necessitates police presence should be handled as such or left alone. The initial response was too small and the follow-up was too large. Police on the scene of a police problem should be allowed to handle it as they are trained. The political rhetoric caused the rank in file to become gun shy and to be manipulated by non police personnel with no training for law enforcement. "THE ACT PERDICTS THE ACTION": Considering the fact that the ball was fumbled early in the first quarter, common sense and unity prevailed at half-time, resulting in a controversial victory with injuries to the world's finest police department. RECOMMENDATIONS: The Department must monitor the pulse of its constituents and prepare to serve and protect accordingly. In a major UO involving the City, the Emergency Operations Command (EOC) should be activated as a headquarters operational facility with a readiness to decentralize in all 18 Areas. The divisionalized command post should be selected and prepared for activation with a supervision, logistic and personnel officer (minimum). The EOC can monitor the need for activation in each area and provide manpower, equipment and support to each activated area. The divisions should coordinate and operate the field command post with the EOC as a headquarters. The assignment of manpower and equipment should be made by a supervisor within the division of occurrence. . ' . U0 Critique J. Grayson #14006 Page 4 Specialized personnel ahould be assigned to details to maximize their expertise. For safety reasons, officers assigned should, if possible, be from the same division or unit. Respective divisions should operate, coordinate the field command post in their area with continued liaison with the E0C. The E0C should prepare in the early stages for mutual aid and the deployment of the National Guard if necessary. The deployment, staging areas facilities should be the responsibility of the E0C. The commander of the Department or his designee should be available to the E0C for major decisions as presented by the field command post commander. There must be an alternate notification procedurel for officers and the City for response to major U0's. The telephone is an unreliable source in the event of a major occurrence. The feasibility of an U0 AM radio frequency should be considered. All officers should be equipped with proper safety equipment and communication equipment. Civilian personnel need to be provided with pictured identification that allow them to travel to and from the City, also for entry into restricted facilities. \ -;- - ·, r uo CRrTroms PORK Name Ron Hanson #13225 Rank Detective III Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force x Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other ________________ _ Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time "B" Watch (4-29/5-23-92) (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic ·of Discussion: ATTAClDDDl'f A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post operations, etc) COMMENTS: On the first night I-was called in from home and arrived at Parker Cen approximately one hour later. I was in uniform with all equipment. I the entire night in the office awaiting an assignment, along with approx i mately thirty other officers. There was no plan as to what to< _-~-- with the third floor detectives. On the second night, I came on duty at 1800 hours, _ but was·_ not sent out ! - until 2130 hours. I was serrt to Dev6nshire Divisio~ t~ eniorce t~e curfew. I was told that ve+y few if any arrest had been made prior to our arrival. On the third night, . I reported to _ Parker Center at 1800 hours and was then - sent to the command post at 54th and Arlington. After a · short time, I was told to report to a mini com_ mand 10st at 54th and Vermont-. I was then sent out as part of a squa·d to patrol the streets in 77th Street Ar.ea·.- The command post ·at 54th and Arlington seemed well organized -and appeared t run smoothly. The security for the command post was adequate._ The mini command post a.t 54th and Vermont however, was an open parking lot with part destroyed buildings directly across Vermont. · This area was a £niper's drec There was little or no security at this location. (Continuation sheets may be used) ·- --··•···-- . -. . . . ··- • .. . •• • .• •• 7'.. ' •·· -:-- :•-..-•--:- . ---~---···--,-- ...... _- ____ .-.--:-P.-~-~·~'~ .; , u:o Critique R. Hanson #13225 Page 2 I was then sent to anothdr mini command post in the market parking lot at 54th and Figueroa. This command post was in the parking lot of one of the only open markets in ·the area. There were manny citizens walking through the command post which was an . unsafe condition for the officers and the citizens. Field jails at Devonshire Division and Southeast D±vision were utilized by me during the riot. Both ran fairly smooth, but neither had prepared for arrest of juveniles. In the future it would be beneficial if a field jail were set up to expedite booking of juveniles. uo CR+TXQVI lQRM Name J. Rush Rank D-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force x Fixed Post Security ---- Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time "A" watch (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operatlons, etc) COMMENTS; PROCEDURES USED DURING THE U.O: 1. Strategy - The news media covered ~trategy; not enough police personnE ' (i.e., outside agencies, military) and no immediate containment of troubled areas. Of course one has to consider it was the media that tc everyone in Southern California where there was no polic~ or containmer 2. Tactics - At the beginning of the riots we were -- -informed by the "Staff' to maintain a high profile and to use our "best judgement" in making ar kind of arrest. 3. Personnel - No stafr people to make a decision. No one : t9ok command of the situation or once the riot got started no on~ (staff) wanted an~ responsibility. ·someone· in the command staff might have _ moved faster : they (like us) had been in the field requesting "help" arid there was nc one available. No fire . personnel available for fires. 4. Logistics - No comment 5. Communications - Okay (Cen:tinuati on :.heets may Le t1:!led, 6. Field jail - It was obvious, based on response time and amount of time to book people, the field jail was not started up immediately and it we poorly under-manned. -·--··----· -•- - - ~ -:-:-····· ·-·-- .... . · .. -.... ·.-:--:;--;;- .. , ·•·· --:--:•-..--•--:- \ .--.,.. , . Name . uo CRXTXOVI PQRH N. Jackson/L. Hedwall Rank __ D __ -_I_I_I--'-/_;;D~-~I~I~ Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post apply) Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time "A" Watch (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: x AT'l'AcmmJl'l' A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operat1ons, etc) COMMENTS; 1. Slow response to·field jail areas. 2. Indecisions of command levels as to who was in charge and what the plan of attack might be. 3. Lack of active criminal enforcement, partly due to logistical nightmarE i.e., lackof . field jails. (Continuation sheets may be used) · - --···· ··-·- '. . ··- • .. . •• • .••• •'4 ' ••• -:-- :·--·--:- ------- - - --- - -- -- • - --..-. -.--· c ...... .. .. ·- -~--:ii-::-~·~ oo CRITIQQB PORK Name K. Lady Rank __ L_T_rr ____ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post apply) Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time ___ B _______ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) x S/W, 77th, S/E 2-3-4 ATTACJDDD1'f A Topic of Discussion: Field Jail, CP, Deployment (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: The Department planned. for a U .. O. Before the King verdict, Metro had special training. The Chief put aside a million dollars for overtime. Tactical Planning had their equipment ready, a C.P. location, Coliseum, had been selected. The C. P. should have been set up at the Coliseum several days prior to the verdict. The mobil units are set up - prior t6-other major events, such as the L.A. Street Scene. Money had been allocated for a U. O. A tactical alert should have been called as SCX)n as the verdict was read. The officers in the field that night should have stayed in the field and responded to calls for service. Later, all the officers could fill out U. O. cards. Sufficient number of officers should have responded to stores that were being l(X)ted, arrest everyone. Instead, officers ran suspects out of the store, and as soon as the officers left, all the looters returned. It is recommended that in this type of U .o., Field Jails be set up immediately as part of the program • (Continuation sheets may be used) UO Critique Form K. Lady Page 2 Vehicles: Many of the officers at the C. P. could not be deployed or sent out to relieve fixed post positions due to a lack of vehicles. RHD was fortunate in that we had our own cars to take to the field. The City should buy more cars. More cars are needed for day-to-day use as well as for a U .0. Deployment: On April 29, we were called into the station for a mobilization. RHD B Watch sat in the station all night. Never asked to report to C. P. or for station defense. On April 30, Friday, we reported to work at RHD. At approximately 2130, two squads from the division were sent to Devonshire Division because they ha:l .sent all extra officers and detail ves to South L . A. C. P. Saturday and Sunday we reported to Parker Center. Then requested to report to C. P. , 54 th and Arlington. The C. P. ran smooth for us. The Personnel Unit was waiting for us. We were assigned as a squad and sent to a Satellite C. P. We were in and out of the C.P. In a very short time, I saw other law enforcement people just sitting in the staging area. Eventually, the C. P. was moved to the Coliseum and we rep·mted directly there. We were assigned as a squad. It was generally well run as far as we were concerned. Relief was a problem at E.O. W. Personnel went from their division to the C. P. and were eventually assigned to relieve on-duty officers. This ran into several hours on occasions. One day, RH D was assigned to direct traffic at intersection without working tri-light signals. RTO' s were requested by the C. P. First the rumor was they didn't start until 0630, then they, RTO 's, thought it was too dangerous to be out in the area and vice relieved us at 1000. After the first few days, there were too many officers in the field. We were given Sectors to patrol at night. There was nothing rolling after midnight or 0100 hours. Two or three squads would be in a sector. Anything that moved got stope.pd and booked for something to do. Recommended that officers report directly to C. P. That officers from the same division form a squad and report to the personnel unit for quicker deployment. UO Critique Form K. Lady Page 3 Field Jails: On Thursday, April 30, two squads from RHD were sent from Parker Center to Devonshire Division. Devonshire officers and detectives had been sent to South Los Angeles. One RHD squad was assigned to a Field Jail, the second squad went to the field, no one really knew how to set up the Field Jail. We followed the Field Jail guide and it did work. They had exemplars for curfew arrests and all the officers had to do was complete an F.I. On felony's and other misdemeanor, an arrest report had to be written. Juveniles had to be transported to a juvenile facility. Devonshire officers did so. 77th had a Field Jail _ on some nights. The nights it was open, it ran smooth. Depended on detective deployment. It was not open every night. Southeast Station - Field Jail operated by Narco detectives and civilians. There were too many arrests for the crew. It took an hour or so to book our two curfew suspects. I don't know i£ there was a coordinated system regarding which field jails would be open. Recommend more field jail training for divisional detectives or selected cadre. In a U.O. have more field jails - Don't change re:pert criteria. There were a few arrests where the arresting officer was told to make an F .I. and leave the suspect only to be called back later and told to do an arrest report. Recommend that arrangements for juveniles be made by division for transportation. Satellite C • P. Locations : We were sent to three satellite C. P. areas. 1. . Vernon and Vermont - in the parking lot of a burned out market. There was no security. It was an open area. National Guard detail there. Burned out buildings across the street. There was no cover if needed. The field commander's office was the trunk of his car, had a mobil phone. It is on a busy intersection. 2. Vernon and Figueroa - N/E - another burned out Thrifty that was being cleaned and refurbished - on busy intersection - civilian work crews in and out of parking lot between the police cars. Field commander used a car trunk, had a mobil phone. 3. 7 6th and Broadway - school across the street from 77th Street - good location - fenced area, had a MERV van for C. P., much better : · U. O. Critique Form K. Lady Page 4 for C.P. staff. 77th across street for reports, booking, detectives. Recommend a Merv type van for all satellite C. P. 's. Use schools or other fenced areas for security. Logistics: For us· - logistics were great. Supply Division was open all the time, officers were able to exchange equipment or get new equipment immediately without the usual B/S. At the C. P., there were plenty of supplies, notebooks, plastic cord cuffs, ammunition, etc. Most of us got new vests. This should be an ongoing program - our vests were issued 16 years ago and should have been replaced, years ago. uo CRITIQQB PORM Name D. Foster Rank Lieutenant II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply) x x x AT'l'ACJDDDl'r A ·Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# S/E, Central, 77th Coliseum ' Date/Watch/Time B Watch -------------- (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Call-up procedures. (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; Although the initial call-up of RHD personnel went relatively smooth, the procedure could be improved by having selected personnel responsible for calling X number of individuals upon notification of mobilization, i.e., Detective "A" receives notification, he in turn is responsible to notify Detectives "B, C, D" etc on his designated list. Time would be saved and notification times couJ_d oe given to the RHD recorder later. This method of noti£ication is currently in use by the military services. Command Post Assignments As reported by the detectives -assign~d for deployment, much confusion reigned. If a plan could be worked out wherein the middle location for assembly could be eliminated, deployment of personnel would be expedited, i.e., "X" number of personnel predesignated to report directly to an area in close proximity to the occurrence rather than report to one location and then another before actually being deployed at the trouble spo~. (Continuation sheets may be used) uo CRITIQVI PORK Name E B r.ewi s Rank I,T JI Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post apply) Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time "A" Beginning 4-30-92 (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: X X X S/E, 77, S/W Various AT'l'AClDDDl'l' A ( ie Field Jail,· Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; in 1991, RHD and other OHB entities were required to stand a formal uniform inspection. This was viewed by detectives to a certain extent as troublesome and a nuisance. At the time maybe · it was, but it was the first uniform inspeciton for RHD in decades. If RHO had gone into the '92 riots without having that inspection, it would have been embarrassing and rendered this personnel resource useless relative to any uniform assignment. Although future inspections may be just as much of a nuisance, they are very necessary. In house day-to-day administrative procedures used by RHO served us well. Although .the initial call-up on 4-29-92 left something to be desired, the subsequent administrative process which resulted in daily - A and B watch · deployment rapidly evolved- into efficient and usable procedures. This. is due to the efforts of Gloria Martin and Paula Donahey. They provided lieutenants with A and i3 watch packages of personnel rosters, completed U. O. cards and any other necessary information. This was probably unique, but extremely beneficial to lieutenants. RHO' s standing plans were deviated from to a certain extent. A watch detectives, except for one watch, were assigned to Field Task Force Sector missions ( patrol) in various geographic areas. The exception mentioned found A watch deployed as perimeter defense and security for civic center facilities. We were also used for arrest purposes at a demonstration corraled at 1st and (Continuation sheets may be used) . - . UO Critique Form R. B. Lewis Page 2 Broadway. The initial assignment of A watch on 4-30-92, late morning, was to OCB. Although we sat around in a roll call room for some time, we were given a mission to Washington and Main. Although there was some urgency to get there, additional time was lost in gaining black and whites, rovers, unit numbers, etc. The objective was to curtail looting. The bottom line direction in curtailment was to cause a cease, desist and dispersal. What a joke!! Strategy: Direction given was to cause dispersal with no emphasis on arrest. This strategy was ludicrous. Riotous looters were dispersed from one business to merely go down the street or around the corner to start on another business. Efforts to gain assistance in notifying owners were futile. The only business saved from total destruction was Oshman' s at 9th and Hill. That was from going to phone booth books and calling sev 1 eral Oshman numbers. Owners sent employees to stand security. Other locations had to be abandoned to continue the dispersal circle jerk only to discover on the next A watch, rioters had returned and torched the businesses. When assistance for fixed post security was requested to put a perimeter in a relatively unattacked area, it was indicated one squad would be provided. They never arrived. It wouldn't have been enough anyway. An effective strategy with sufficient personnel and logistics did not exist until it was too late. The eventual curfew, sheer numbers of national guard and outside agencies put a lid on things more than any strategy. Certainly our tactics didn't. If immediate, proper, and necessary strategy and tactics had appeared on T. V. instead of what was seen or not seen, depending on how one considered the spectual, a different message may have been conveyed as to our tolerance of riotous behavior. · We were had either way.. The necessary aggressive approach would have been condemed and second guessed just as slow response has been. RHD's standing plans call for this division to provide a ready reserve for Parker Center defense as an additional specific duty. This duty should be eliminated or RHD should receive periodic training in such defense strategy and tactics • . If RHD is to staff a Field Command Post, the cadre concept should be utilized with appropriate training. UO Critique Form R. B. Lewis Page 3 If the respective sections are to fulfill their primary responsibilities as specified in the standing plans, provisions to immediately relieve necessmy personnel, Robbery Special Section detectives for a kidnapping, should exist. uo CRITIQUE PQRM Name Major Crime Investigation Section Rank -------- Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post x Field Task Force __ x __ _ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division x Other ---- Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time A & B ----------- (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; Major Crimes personnel--.worked A and B watches. It was the general consensus that the following areas need to ?e addressed. 1. Lack of command decisions in the field, lieutenant and above. 2. Poor command decisions as far as deployment of manpower. 3. Food and water av ail.ability . 4. Availability · ·of radios. 5. Better planning by command staff in regards to logistics. (Continuation sheets may be used) ~ - . uo CRITXQVI PQ,US Name James R. Barry Rank __ o_-_3 ____ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force X Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment ~ Command Post# Sector# Oate/Watch/Time __ B ___ W_a~tc~h ______ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) ---- Various AT'l'AClDllD1'1' A Topic of Discussion: Assignments, Juvenile arrestibooking procedures (ie Field Jail, . Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: C/Attached -·-· -·-·-·--· . · -- .. . (Continuation sheets may be used) ·-·~ ~-- ·~ · ·:.:---. ; •. •.•• ~ •• • -., .• •• •'4 •• , ..••••• ---- . ••• C • -. • . - .. •-~~ :-. _• . . : •~ !' C • t , AFTER ACTION REPORT APRIL/MAY RIOTS TIMELY RESPONSE: At the time of the riots, I was assigned to Robbery Homicide Division. On the first evening of the riot, I was called in from home to work the "B Watch." We never received an assignment and sat in the office for the remainder of the watch. The next several evenings were spent waiting for an assignment, occasionally for several hours before we were sent to the field. For the remainder of the U.O. we responded directly to the Command Post and were placed into squads and assigned to roving patrol in designated sectors. PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS: Initially, assignments were given out with little or no regard for keeping supervisors, partners, and members of the unit together, even though squad assignments, including squad leaders, consisted of multiple personnel. Once this became apparent, we as individuals rather than those of the Command Post Cadre were able to instill logic in making the assignments and most often were able to keep supervisors, partners, or units together. Later, assignments from the Command Post at 54th ~ Arlington appeared to be directed in a smooth, logical manner. Again, after the Command Post was moved to the Colesium, assignments were initially made without regard to keeping personnel together. Note: It is understood that in a time of urgent manpower needs "a body is a body," and keeping together personnel of a particular unit can not be a priority, however; after the first two days of the U.O., I saw no such urgency, yet it continued. JUVENILE ARREST/BOOKINGS: My assignments included areas of Devonshire, Southwest, 77th ·st, and Southeast. Field jails were setup in Devonshire, and Southeast Divisions only. Much of the criminal activity was committed by juveniles, however; no arrangements appeared to have been made for handling juveniles. No juvenile officers were present to provide direction and advice. No probation officers were present to assist in detentions. Juveniles in need of detention were transported to the juvenile detention facilities by the arresting officers, taking them out of the field for hours, occasionally for the remainder of the watch. Many juveniles who should have been arrested were released in the field without having been booked. Even juveniles arrested and to be released, required time consuming efforts by field officers, rather than fixed post personnel. Name D. J. Lang Rank LT II oo CRITXOQB PORK Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post apply) Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time B Watch (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: X X X X ATTACJDIDIT A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post operations, etc) COMMENTS; Assignments of Homicide Special Section/Major Crime Investigation Section 11 B II watch personnel were limited due to specialized duties related to • ors situations. The Command Post personnel were advised . of this primary responsibility and they adjusted their assignment of our personnel accordingly. We were assigned to non fixed post duties, primarily as rovers in different geographic divisions or were placed as a stand-by reserve cadre at RHD. The squad integrity of our personnel was allowed to remain intact, which allowed us to maintain tactically safe assignments with personnel who have not been ·in a uni£orm assignment in many years. RHD sueprvisors, who know the abilities and training of their personnel, were able to enhance the safety of their personnel with this squad integrity. RHD personnel were not part of the initial deployment of this U .o. ( Not until 12 hours after it began.) When deployed, they were utilized as uni£orm field personnel. At that time, the deployment, logistics, etc, were in place and functioning properly · (Continuation sheets may be used) Name W illiam D. Hall Rank Lt II uo CRITIOQE FORM Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other ors Investigations ( see attacfied) Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector # Date/Watch/Time A & B Watches (if necessary or specific to this topic) N/A Topic of Discussion: ors 1 (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; The ors Section was assi gned to A & B watches and acted as an available resource t o respond to and investigate officer-involved shootings. Our pr eplanned and abreviated procedures worked well, providing required information and returning involved units back to their patrol functions in a timely manner. (Continuation sheets may be used) ------------· . ·- - ---·-·· ·--- - : .. . ' ,. .~ .. -~~ . ........ .. -;--:·------~ . ··-~-- _ _., .. ~ -·~ --~ .. UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE ACTIVITY OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING INCIDENTS The following statistics reflect the L.A.P.D. Officer-Involved Shootings that occurred during the Unusual Occurrence beginning April 29, 1992, at 1800 hours and lasting until May 11, 1992, at 0800 hours. INCIDENTS Shootings with Hits 10 Shootings without Hits 13 Accidental (Non-Hits) 2 Custody Death 1 Total 26 INJURIES Deaths 7 Injuries {, Officers Injured 3 Custody 1 Total 17 INVESTIGATIVE UNIT OIS 13 DHD 9 Narcotics 4 Total 26 In addition to the above shootings involving · L.A.P .• D. personnel,· the National Guard was involved in three shootings; One resulted in a death, one in an ·injury, and one was a Non-Hit· shootin~; ~- -- _.- ~ I J l ,I -~ 4 June 29, 1992 8.2.7 INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE TO: FROM: Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Officer-in-Charge, Investigative Analysis Section SUBJECT: COMMAND CRITIQUE: AFTER-ACTION REPORTING FOR APRIL/MAY RIOTS The following command critique of the Apr i l/May riots is submitted by Investigative Analysis Section. LINES OF COMMUNICATION * Internal Communicatio~: The lines of internal communication were slow and · ineffective on such matters as deployment, strategy, tactics, arrests made, procedures, the mission, etc., resulting in personnel lag time of up to three hours for each change of watch. Recommendation: Improved internal lines of communication are necessary for effective UO operations and should include current and timely briefings and feedback to the rank and file. * Public Communication: The Department maintained no formal lines of communication with the press during the UO. Spontaneous interviews were conducted throughout the UO by the media with unprepared and often uninformed field command staff and _ the rank and file, which resulted in the public receiving sporadic, inconsistent and incomplete information from unreliable Department sources. Without frequent formal Department press releases, - - - - --the public mainly received media-hype and media-editorialized coverage of the riots. Public thought and emotions were stimulated by live televised coverage of the riots, and by the hundreds of questions thrown out by the media that were left unsatisfied without reliable Department responses designed to accurately inform, reassure and calm. Recommendation: Frequent Department staged press releases should play a key role in future major unusual occurrences, similar to the press conferences provided by the military's command staff cadre during last year's Operation Desert Storm. All Department personnel should receive training in how to effectively and appropriately communicate with the media during a riot situation. Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau June 29, 1992 Page 2 8.2.7 FIELD COMMAND POST * Use of Cadre: The Department has a trained Field Command Post (CP) cadre, however, this cadre was not used at the Coliseum Command Post during the UO. The personnel deployed in the various CP assignments for the UO were not trained in these assignments. Recommendation: During a UO, Command Post cadre personnel should be deployed in assignments for which they have been specifically trained. * Communications Equipment: Officer safety was jeopardized because many Department personnel were not familiar with the communications equipment used during and after the riots. Additionally, officers were provided with a variety of ROVERS and other hand-held radios, most of which could not fit into Department convert-a-cams and the batteries discharged rapidly. Recommendation: There should be adequate training and uniformity in the type of radios issued to field officers. * Security: The Coliseum Command Post Security Detail was under-staffed. Only one roving patrol was deployed, leaving the CP vulnerable to attack. Additionally, the fixed post security at the main entrance to the CP <Gate 14) was removed during the last week of mobilization, and the personnel assigned to the post were assigned to other CP duties . .-::::.-- The Logistics Trailer was placed against the fence, preventing the main entrance to the CP (Gate 14) from being closed and locked. Also, Command Post shotguns were stored in large plastic barrels which were located approximately 50 feet from the entrance to the CP (Gate 14), leaving them vulnerable to theft if the CP was stormed by a mob. On one particular day, several thousand soccer fans attended a gam~ inside the Coliseum. If a riot had erupted outside the Coliseum by fans entering or leaving the game, or inside the Coliseum itself, the inability to secure the CP main entrance gate and the easy access to the shotguns may have resulted in the need to use deadly force against the crowd. Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau June 29, 1992 Page 3 8.2.7 Recommendations: There should have been more two-officer roving security patrols around the CP. Also, the main entrance to the CP should have been staffed for the duration of the mobilization. It is also recommended that placement of command post vehicles be arranged to take maximum advantage of closeable gates to prevent an attack on the CP. Shotguns and ammunition should be kept in a secured location, such as inside the Coliseum office or other buildings, rather than in unsecured plastic barrels located 50 feet from an open gate. * Department Field Task Force Command Post Location: The Coliseum Command Post was vulnerable to attack because the location surrounding the CP was open to public access and visibility. When the CP was moved from the west side to the north side of the Co•liseum, expended rounds were found on the west side pavement. Recommendation: The Command Post should have been located to minimize exposure to public view and access. PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT * Change of Watch: Change of watch for officers reporting to the Coliseum Command Post for f ield duty resulted in many officers standing around doing nothing for one to three hours while squad leaders received briefings, developed plans, organized personnel into squads and officers checked equipment in and out. During this lag time, officers congregated in an open area near Gate 14 where they were vulnerable to gunfire from the nearby neighborhood along Vermont Avenue. Additionally, after plans were developed and executed, they seemed to be disregarded if immediate arrests were not made. Recommendation: To eliminate wasted time and provide for officer safety, - ---supervisors should arrive early to prepare for change of watch. Also, a secure location out of public view should be provided for change of watch. * Supervisor Assignments: It was common practice in command post assignments to place uniformed sergeants in charge of senior uniformed detectives II. Recommendation: The senior ranking officer, whether it be sergeant or detective, should be designated as supervisor with the consideration for expertise in the function to be performed. ,' I Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau June 29, 1992 Page 4 8.2.7 * Deployment: I \ Deployment problems arose between Operations-Headquarters Bureau <OHB) and the Department Field Task Force Command Post, which involved the number of OHS personnel assigned to the CP. The CP claimed considerably fewer officers reported to the CP than OHB had reported to the Emergency Operations Center <EOC). It was later determined that the OHB figures were correct and the CP personnel counts were based on the number of UO personnel cards completed by officers, rather than the actual number of officers deployed. It is speculated that deployed officers reported to duty, but did not submit their UO personnel card to CP personnel at the beginning of their watch. , I , I • I . / Recommendation: Training is needed on deployment procedures during a major unusual occurrence, including completion and processing of UO ' personnel cards. FIE~D JAIL PROCEDURES * Mass Arrest Responsibilities: Arrestees could not be effectively processed at field jails. Metropolitan Division (Metro) officers making mass arrests did not provide trans~ortation officers with adequate information necessary for booking arrestees at field jails. Metro officers did not record identifying numbers on the arrestees' flex cuffs, and they did not take photographs of the Metro arresting officers with their arrestees. This may have occurred because mass arrest kits containing cameras, indelible markers and other necessary equipment were either unavailable or not used by Metro officers. Major delays of up _ to five hours at field jails placed undue hardships on transporting officers and prisoners alike, who were forced to remain in the transportation vehicles until a Metro arresting officer could arrive with the necessary information to book the arrestees. Recommendation: More training is needed on field jail procedures and mass arrest situations to ensure that arrestees can be effectively and expeditiously processed from the location of arrest through the field jail, and successfully prosecuted. Also, more attention should be given to the availability and use of mass arrest kits by field task force personnel. --- -· -------·- - - . . --- --- -- ~..,._ _______ ....__ "!_. • J ·/ ( I Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau June 29, 1992 Page 5 8.2.7 * Pri?oner Transportation Vehicles: Inadequate transportation vehicles were a major problem during the UO. The Department was provided with RTD buses, rather than secured vehicles with locks and barred windows suitable for transporting arrestees. Recommendation: Advanced planning should provide for the loan of secured prisoner transportation vehicles from neighboring county sheriff's departments when such vehicles are needed on short notice. TACTICS * Use of F l ex Cuffs: The proper use of fle x cuffs was a prob l em for some officers. In many instances, a single flex cuff instead of two was tightly secured to an arrestee's wrists, causing pain and the loss of blood ci r culation. l Recommendation: Department personnel should be trained in the proper use of flex cuffs, and supervisors should take immediate action to correct situations when flex cuffs are applied improperly. It is also recommended that the Department consider the use of Monadnock's Double Cuff (see attachment). This disposable plastic cuff accomplishes the purpose of two standard single-strap cuffs while reducing discomfort to an arrestee's shoulders when handcuffed from behind. Officer-in-Charge Investigative Analysis Section Attachment .i and model. fitting a radar unit and video camera would be a moderatefy simple operation. There may be enough room to mount a LEIN or computer terminal on the right side of the vehicle. Because it is a compact. two-door u-tility vehicle, the Typhoon isn't suitable for a security cage, making prisoner transport difficult; a problem shared by other pursuit vehicles. The fold-down rear seat does make contraband searches easier after such transport. which partially offsets the cage problem. For patrolling remote areas. the Typhoon offers the advantage of a large storage area behind the rear seat. A considerable amount of rescue and emergency equipment can be stored there. If the rear seat is folded down an area 68.6 inches long by 53.4 wide is available. The total volume becomes 67 .2 cubic feet: considerably larger than pursuit or even full-size cars. Again. the Typhoon isn ·t designed to be a police vehicle. but because it" s based on a sport/utility vehicle the basic components are designed to take abuse. The Vonec V-6 engine has been used for several years and is a pi-oven design. Turbocharged engines require stricter maintenance schedules. but virtually every law enforcement agency has a schedule that meets that requirement. Repair concerns can be addressed by purchasing an extended warranty. One caution: the Typhoon definitely isn ·t designed for off-road use. Even though it has all-wheel drive. it"s not meant for pounding across open fields or through the woods. The lowered suspension that gives it improved handling also restricts its off-road usefulness. While it will successfully negotiate an interstate turnaround or cross most median :-,. the r_ educed Llearance hetween the transfer case and differentiab and the ground effectively keep it from negotiating anything more than a si x-inch curh. From a law enforcement point of \·iew. the Typhoon·s assets are offset by its most unfavorahle feature-cost. In today·s tight budget times, the MSRP (manufacturer's suggested retail price) of$29,470 would buy two conventional pursuit cars. However, today the MSRP doesn' t mean much because dealers will trim prices to make sales. Typhoon's have gone for just under $20.000 and the purchase of several at one time might cut the price even more. Though that' s still a bit steep for most department. it' s closer to the cost of contemporary pursuit cars. A careful consideration of its assets might make it very affordable to some agencies. There· s no price a department can put on the safety of its office· . and that's the greatest feature the Typhoon offers: safe, high spe~J performance. It gets its power to the ground more efficiently than conventional pursuit cars. even under adverse conditions. Its higher clearance and AWD system, while not making it an off-road vehicle. do allow it to handle severe weather conditions. such as deep snow, more effectively. The higher driver·s seat position also gives officers a better range of vision than standard patrol units. The Typhoon offers features that police cars of the future should have: a relatively fuel-efficient engine that delivers high perfofl' 1 - ance: AWD: ABS: interior comfort that keeps officers alert dur. .•i long hours on the road; and room to store emergency equipment. If the Typhoon had four doors and a lower price tag,_ many police officers could be driving a police car for the year 2000 by next year. ' A GMC spokesperson said they're seriously looking at a pursuit version of the Typhoon and they're trying to get the price down by eliminating the ··ground t;ffects·· exterior trim. leather interior. and high tech entertainment system. Another option could be to simply transplant the turbo engine :md AWD system to a 4-door Jimmy. If they can·r find a solution to · _ pricing problem. they may try alternate ways to market it ;:y emphasizing the utility and cost effectiveness of their vehicle. L&O Tom Yates is a freelance writer specializing in motor vehicles. MONADNOCK'S DOUBLE CUFF™ Cat. No.'s: DC/W (white) DC/B (black) DC/f (RED TRAINER) 74 LA\\' and ORDER Juni: 1992 1st Suspect Control Disposable Plastic Cuff FEATURES: • Gives an officer the ability to control a suspect after one cuff is placed on the suspect' s wrist/forearm • Designed to cuff a suspect using standard handcuffing techniques • Double Cuff reduces stress in the ~uspect' s shoulder while handcuffed from behind • Has a tensile strength of over 350 lbs. · • Double Cuff can be used to secure a suspect's legs • 1 Double Cuff does the job of 2 standard single strap · disposable cuffs MONADNOCK LIFETIME PRODUCTS, INC. P.O. Box B •Fitzwilliam• NH 03447 • 1 800 PR24-USA Circle 74 on Reader Service Card 1 I I C a t Na~e ( · "' •. · UO CRITXQVB lQRX t1-ro /1. ~L //<' ~,-~ Rank __ __. ___ ~ __ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that ElDergency Operations Center Field Command Post apply) Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# //131" j( r ... Date/Watch/Time / f o, H,t. ✓ ( if necessary or 1 specific to this topic) /:) d /4~ ff Topic of Discussion: t:,,-,,,0 .r,q, '.t Cf' 0 fl~ \/'ft..d"' . (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: (Continuation sheets may be used) .:' uo CRitXQVB .l9BX Name C:_· 1 ~ 9&/ J , \\\ o Y-✓ l S Rank Det--3 Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations c~nter Field Command Post .........-- Field Task Force Fixed Post Security v' ·r Patrol in Geographic Division Other ,~6.v"-S Qav+c:in '3v\ cf Pr\s~f)V~ ~ ~1 eL.9 J 0\ 1 Geographic Area of assignment • Command Post # c.......::.\ \ ~Pv ~ Sector# Date/Watch/Time 6 W ~\L \-1 ( if necessary or 1 - specific to this topic) .ATTAC!ridft A Topic of Discussion: C P c4?Evc~V\.<;, h.e(,.i\ ._J Al"- 1 .S~ c~v· ~· ~ , ~cJ)_~ ..s ( ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: -· ' ·.-· : I.. '; ::~· . - ·.--:- • • . .. .. , ~ - · ' :. - - . ·- ·· . - ~~- ' :_ • , . ·'/ ~~ .·: : ' .•· .. ..... .., . . 1 !( t _ -- --- -- -- : .~ (Continuation sheets may be used) .. ~ ·--.: · . · .. - .:- - . - ' ·• '. ... - -. ,. ~ . :·~ -;;:t t · ; '.;~:;-/ , · ·-: .. · .· ·- • ·• . · .· .. . . ... .:,_ r - .' ... .. • • • ,.:. .: : ..... _.__.!_ t..~ .. ... r Name Ra4U. uo CRITXQVI lQRX (h,p4- . Rank____.J)..__j. __ _ Assignment during- u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations c~nter . Field Command Post- . =::::x:: Field Task Force ~ Fixed Post Security 1a Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time i)/AAA7io,J ( if necessary or'• specific to this topic) .ATTAC!BM@ft A ....... Topic of Discussion: FtP ~. £du,~, s---··~ l.o6f111NJ (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post Operations, etc) 0&1'~1111£ ..,. IJ,~tA .. 1161} ~?M 71,,,~ COMMENTS i F1~U, -;jA,f. , •• UUJM- ?'"'4:11,~ I (Continuation sheets may be used) : : _ ?t\):: . : : . . •· ' -.... · ... - ~ _ ., .:. , . :· ,, .. ~ ... ,. . :· . . . ,.., .. ~ .. : - .. ·.' ~-t . :_ ·. .. . . '- - ~ : · ' . . . \ . I ,. . t'-·· ' •~ - :.·. :. , ' . . '.~.· . ' -:. 0 ·· . . · _·: · . ~ :~ ~ .· '.~.--·-· .,_ 7 .AffACHNlft A _ _ .. . ..... ;- . .. . . _,.~.:- . !'- ·-··:.· ... - - ·· · \ .- ··· •·~ ~ .c .~ · ~::~:: : 1_ rf t1 1 ?f it~f ittttf ~~r 2:?1:- ·.· . Name· _ · ·~_ · · -~- · - J___.0 __ $/1/ ___ · --' . t_J;...._t>..,;;;;S __ , __ _ Rank.~ · fJ~c.;... ·:··_;,,-._lf-_::-_· _ ~~ - Ass1~ent during ~.o. (che~k--all that apply) Emergency Operations c~nt~r · Field Comm.and Post Field Task Force . Fixed Post . Security Patrol.~~ Geographic Division Other J-FR-£0N. N 16'.... C)tz: ,z OH!::? Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector #· DateiWatch/Time __________ _ ( if necessary or 1 , specific to this topic) - .. - :.· - - .... . -.- ... , .. " .: : •. - . .. : .. -::··:~:-. .- ~.: ... .: .. : --~ .: -= ::- · :.. · ., ·: . - -~: ! - -_- :..; , _ _ _ - . • - • • 'c. -~~ ~~. .... .-.... . _ _ .. .. "' ~ -:· . .. .... - .. __ _ ,. : ~ ·-. -· . • .' ·-· .,..,,,J ... . , . •• - .. -. • - · ' :: ~ c ~· .. ·:.. : r ~ ·-J: :·- ::~ · 1cc-{f: . ~;!:(/~ ~ ~ . ... ~ .;::>_ ~ · . . - .:· Topic of Discussion: £U;:So~;r-1 E;L- , (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; I .. • .,,.. June 29, 1992 8.2.7 INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE TO: Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau FROM: Officer-in-Charge, Investigativ~ Analysis ~ec~ion SUBJECT: COMMAND CRITIQUE: AFTER-ACTION REPORTING FOR APRIL/MAY RIOTS The following command critique of the April/May riots is submitted by Investigative Analysis Section. LINES OF COMMUNICATION * Internal Communication:" The lines of internal communication were slow and ineffective on such matters as deployment, strategy, tactics, arrests made, procedures, the mission, etc., resulting in personnel lag time of up to three hours for each change of watch. Recommendation: Improved internal lines of communication are necessary for effective UO operations and should include current and timely briefings and feedback to the rank and file. * Public Communication: The Department maintained no formal lines of communication with the press during the UO. Spontaneous interviews were conducted throughout the UO by the media with unprepared and often uninformed field command staff and the rank and file, which resulted in the public receiving sporadic, inconsistent and incomplete information from unreliable Department sources. Without frequent formal Department press releases~ the public mainly received media-hype and media-editorialized coverage of the riots. Public thought and emotions were stimulated by live televised coverage of the riots, and by the_hundreds of questions thrown out by the media that were left unsatisfied without reliable Department responses designed to accurately inform, reassure and calm. Recommendation: Frequent Department staged press releases should play a key role in future major unusual occurrences, similar to the press conferences provided by the military's command staff cadre during last year's Operation Desert Stor.m. All Department personnel should receive training in how to effectively and appropriately communicate with the media during a riot situation. --~; commanding Officer, ·oper~tio~s-Headquarters ~- -~June -29; 1992 - _ - _ __ =:· .c_"': __:_· - .::.•"·':'. 0 _ - -Page 2 _ ·-· ~, ~ 8.2.7 - ~ - .:, :-:·· ·--- -----: - FIELD COMMAND- POST * Use -of Cadre: _ The Department has _ a trained Field Command Po$t .<cP· ) cadre, however, thjs cadre wa.s ·not used at ~h~ _ Coliseum Command _Post ~tJr~Dg ·the UO. The personnel deployed -in the · v_ar ious CP assignments for -the UO were not -trained in these assignments. Recommendation: During a UO, Command Post cadre personnel should be deployed in assignments for which they have been specifically trained. * Communications Equipment: Officer safety was jeopardized because many Depa!tment personnel were not . ~amiliar with the communications equipment used during and after the riots. Additionally, officers were provided with a variety of ROVERS and other hand-held radios, most of which could not fit into Department convert-a-cams and the batteries discharged rapidly. Recommendation: There should be adequate training and uniformity in the type of radios issued to field officers. * Security: The Coliseum Command Post Security Detail was under-staffed. Only · one roving patrol was deployed, leaving the CP vulnerable to attack. Additionally, the fixed post security at the main entrance to the CP (Gate 14) was removed during the last week of mobilization, and the personnel assigned to the post were assigned to other CP duties. The Logistics Trailer was placed against the fence, preventing the main entrance to the CP (Gate 14) from being closed and locked. Also, Command Post shotguns were stored in large plastic barrels which were located approximately 50 feet from the entrance to the CP (Gate 14), leaving them vulnerable to theft if the CP was stormed by a mob. On one particular day, several thousand soccer fans attended a game inside the Coliseum. If a riot had erupted outside the Coliseum by fans entering or leaving the game, or inside the Coliseum itself, the inability to secure the CP main entrance gate and the easy access to the shotguns may have resulted in the need to use deadly force against the crowd. :.C.ommanding Officer, · Operations-Headquartefs __ Bureau - _ -June2«t, 19,_ 92 _ 0 •• •• ·a,-,. -.--- _ ... -. -.··.- Page 3 8.2.7 Recommendations: There shouid have bee~ more two-officer roving 5ecurity patrols around th_ e CP. Also, the main entrance to the CP shoul~ hav~ been .staffed for the dura~ion -of the mobilization. It is al_ so recommended that placement of _ command post v_ ehitle· s be arranged to take maximum idvant~ge of closeable g~tes to prevent a~ attack on the CP. Shotguns and am~uniti. on should be · kept° in a secured -lo -cation;·such as inside the Coliseum office or other buildings, rather than in unsecured plastic barrels located 50 feet from an open gate. * Department Field Task Force Command Post Location: The Coliseum Command Post was vulnerable to attack because the location surrounding the CP was open to public access and visibility. When the CP was moved from the west side to the north side of the Coliseum, expended ~ounds were found on the west side pavemen€. - Recommendation: The Command Post should have been located to minimize exposure to public view and access. PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT * Change of Watch: Change of watch for officers reporting to the Coliseum Command Post for field duty resulted in many officers standing around doing nothing for one to three hours while squad leaders received briefings, developed plans, organized personnel into squads and officers checked equipment in and out. During this lag time, officers congregated in an open area near Gate 14 where they were vulnerable to gunfire from the nearby neighborhood along Vermont Avenue. Additionally, after plans were developed and executed, they seemed to be disregarded if immediate arrests were not made. Recommendation: To eliminate wasted time and provide for officer safety, supervisors should arrive early to prepare for change of watch. Also, a secur~ location out of public view should be provided for change of watch. * Supervisor Assignments: It was common practice in command post assignments to place uniformed sergeants in charge of senior uniformed detectives II. -Recommendation: The senior ranking officer, whether it be sergeant or detective, should be designated as supervisor with the consideration for expertise in the function to be performed. ' . 4 ' Command i_ ng Of 1: i c~_r, Oper_ a ti ons-Headquar ters -Buf eau Ju rie 29 , -1 992 · - - ·=· _ - · - Page 4- 8.2. 7 * Deployment: Qeployment problems arose between Operations-Headquarters .Bureau <OHB> : and <t_ he Department Field Task Force Command Post, ·which -ilJVolved ··the - number of OHB personnel ass~gned to the CP. The CP claimed considerably _ fewer ~fficers reported to -the -cP than OHB had reported to ·the Emergency - Oper~tions Center <EOC). It wa~ lat~~ defer~ined t~at fh~ OHB .figures ~ere correct and the CP personneJ counts were based on lhe number of UO personnel cards completed by officers, rather than the ~ctual number of officers deployed. It is speculated that deployed officers reported to duty, but did not submit their UO personnel card to CP personnel at the beginning of their watch. Recommendation: Training is needed on deployment procedures during a major unusual occurrence, including completion and processing of UO - personne 1 cards. FIELD JAIL PROCEDURES * Mass Arrest Responsibilities: Arrestees could not be effectively processed at field jails. Metropolitan Division <Metro) officers making mass arrests did not provide transportation officers with adequate information necessary for booking arrestees at field jails. Metro officers did not record _ identifying numbers on the arrestees' flex cuffs, and they did not take photographs of the Metro arresting officers with their arrestees. This may have occurred because mass arrest kits containing cameras, indelible markers and other necessary equipment were either unavailable or not used by Metro officers. Major delays of up to five hours at field jails placed undue hardships on transporting officers and prisoners alike, who were forced to remain in the transportation vehicl~s until a Metro arresting officer could arrive with the necessary information to book the arrestees. Recommendation: More training is needed on field jail procedures and mass arrest situations to ensure that arrestees can be effectively and expeditiously processed from the location of arrest through the field jail, and successfully prosecuted. Also, more attention should be given to the availability and use of mass arrest kits by field task force personnel. Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau · June 29, 1992 Page 5 8.2.7 * Prisoner Transportation Vehicles: Inadequate_ transportation vehicles were a major problem during the~�. _ ·The Department was provided with RTD buses, rather than -secured vehicles ~ith locks : arid bar~ed windows suitable for tiansporting arrestees. Recommendation: Advanced planning should provide for the loan of secured prisoner transportation vehicles from neighboring county sheriff's departments· when such vehicles are needed on short notice. TACTICS * Use of Flex Cuffs: The proper use of flex cuffs was a problem for some officers. In many instances, a single flex cuff instead of two was tightly secured to an arrestee's wrists, causing pain and the loss of blood circulation. Recommendation: Department personnel should be trained in the proper use of flex cuffs, and supervisors should take immediate action to correct situations when flex cuffs are applied improperly. It is also recommended that the Department consider the use of Monadnock's Double Cuff (see attachment). This disposable plastic cuff accomplishes the purpose of two standard single-strap cuffs while reducing discomfort to an arrestee's shoulders when handcuffed from behind. Officer-in-Charge Investigative Analysis Section Attachment .... .-:-.., ... and tnodel, fitting a radar unit and video camera would be a moderately simple operation. There may be enough room to mount a LEIN or computer terminal on the right side of the ve~cle, . Because it is a compact, two-door utility vehicle, the Typhoon isn • t suitable for a security cage- . making prisoner transport difficult; a problem shared by other pursuit vehicles. The fold-down rear seat does make contraband searches easier after such transport, which partially offsets th_ e cage problem. - For patrolling remote areas. the Typhoon offers the advantage of a larg(storage area behind the rear seat. A considerabie amount of rescue and emergency equipment can be stored there. If the rear seat is folded down an area 68.6 inches long by 53.4 wide is available. The total volume becomes 67 .2 cubic feet; considerably larger than pursuit or even full-size cars. Again, the Typhoon isn't designed to be a police vehicle, but because it's based on a sport/utility vehicle the basic components are designed to take abuse. The Vortec V-6 engine has been used for several years and is a proven design. Turbocharged engines require · stricter maintenance schedules. but virtually every law enforcement agency has a schedule that meets that requirement. Repair concerns can be addressed by purchasing an extended warranty. One caution: the Typhoon definitely isn' t designed for off-road use. Even though it has all-wheel drive, it's not meant for pounding across open fields or through the woods. The lowered suspension that gives it improved handling also restricts its off-road usefulness. While it will successfully negotiate an interstate turnaround or cross most medians. the ~educed clearance between the transfer case and differentiab and the ground effectively keep it from negotiating anything more than a si x-inch curb. From a law enforcement point of view. the Typhoon·s assets are offset by its most unfavorable feature--cost. In today" s tight budget times, the MSRP (man~facturer's suggested retail price) of $29.470 would buy ~wo conventional pursuit cars. However, today the _ MSRP doesn't mean much because deal~rs will trim prices to make sales. 'fyphoon's have gone for just under $20,000 an_ d-the purchase of several at one time might cut the price even more. · Though that's still a bit steep for most department, it's closer to the cost of contemporary pursuit cars. A careful consideration of its assets might make it very affordable to some agen~i~. _ - - There's no price a department can put on the safety of its office: . and that's the greatest feature the 'fyphoon offers; safe; high spel!<l performance. It gets its power to the_ ground more efficiently than conventional pursuit cars, even under adverse conditions. Its higher clearance and AWD system, while not making it an off-road vehicle, do allow it to handle severe weather conditions, such as deep snow, more effectively. The higher driver's seat position also gives officers a better range· of vision than standard patrol units. The Typhoon offers features that police cars of the future should have: a relatively fuel-efficient engi~e that delivers high perfomi ance: AWD; ABS; interior comfort that keeps officers alert duri.:g long hours on the road; and room to store emergency equipment. If the Typhoon had four doors and a lower price tag,_ many police officers could be driving a police car for the year 2000 by next year. A GMC spokesperson said they·re seriously looking at a pursuit version of the Typhoon and they' re trying to get the price down by eliminating the "ground effects" exterior trim, leather interior. and high tech entertainment system. Another option could be to simply transplant the turbo engine and AWD system to a 4-door Jimmy. If they can't find a solution to · e pricing problem. they may try alternate ways to market it oy emphasizing the utility and cost effectiveness of their vehicle. L&O Tom Yates is a freelance writer specializing in motor vehicles. MONADNOCK'S DOUBLE CUFF™ Cat. No· .'s: DC/W (white) DC/B (black) o~rr (RED _ TRAI~R) 74 LAW ancL ORDER June 199:? 1st Suspect Control Disposable Plastic Cuff FEATURES: • Gives an officer the ability to control a suspect after one cuff is placed on the suspect' s wrist/forearm • . . Designed to cuff a suspect using standard handcuffing techniques Double Cuff reduces stress in the suspect' s shoulder while handcuffed from behind • Has a tensile strength of over 350 lbs. • Double Cuff can be used to secure a suspect's legs • 1 Double Cuff does the job of 2 standard single strap · disposable cuffs MONADNOCK LIFETIME PRODUCTS, INC. :, P.O. Box B •·Fitzwilliam• NH 03447• 1 800 PR24-USA Circle 74 on Reader Service Card Th . D.- L: co-· a c tri - srr. ' lS - .· _j · :·:: re~ ~ - S t e. ., tar - . :. rt _ (_ -~ '\ oo CBITIOUJ PORK Na~e t/,,70 #- ~L{/< Rank_- _ - '4-_r_2Jr-_--_ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center . Field Command Post ,C. Field Task Force )C,,,, Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division r Other _______________ _ Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# .... ,/ L::)~, Date/Watch/Time O / f o, #/t-✓ ( if necessary or 1 , specific to this topic) ~ d /4~ ff Topic of Discussion: t:,r1-0 4"]:#, c./c Cf' (1 f'~ ~"' (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi (Continuation sheets may be used) r ·r .l' ~ATTACHNllft A .. '. -:-- -· · .. .-7 .. · - _-·. oo CRI'l'IQJJI . PQRX . Nam~ C0¢:Lf J .. \'\\ov✓ls Rank Det:-3 Assignment during u~o - . (check all that apply) Emergency Operations C~nter ·. ___ _ Field Command Post -~ Field Task Force - Fixed Post Security ~ Patrol in Geographic Division Other Tv--ciV'.s QaV~::b &A cf Py\.s~~v~ ~ (::,ctt.9 Jo~\ Geographic Area of assignment Command Post # ~\\-:::Pu~ Sector# Date/Watch/Time b W ~\C \--\ ( if necessary or 1 • specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: C v-J cy'.)Evc::~V\.<; , h·e( , i\ .J Al'-- 1 SG;?c'-Jv· '\. ~ ,. ~~~.:i (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: (Continuation sheets may ~ - h, \ 4 • .;: •~ ~ ~ r~• ~ • t=- --~~=•- •. :- • • -' .: -~~- -: ·:_ ~--:\l?:t: - · .. - ~ - -·-: ·. ~ ._ ;-o ., • .. _ '";. ,~: _:~ - • . :. . .. .. _i:; ·:· .. ( r / • -~. r~ . ~ - - . . • 1 : . .;_ . -- - • 'I' - - • - - - - - - . . f • ·- - - . Name oo CRITXQtnr ·PoRX /hJPC- . Rank_,,, __ £ __ _ . - Assignment during- u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations c~nter . ·Field Command Post- · · ::X:: Field Task Force ~ Fixed Post Security ,. Patrol in Geographic Division ___ _ Other _______________ _ Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector #· Date/Watch/Time i)IAA.AllO,J ( if necessary or'• specific to this topic) .AffAC!HRH A Topic of Discussion: Ffr' ~, £dv1MI#{ Sldlttt~ to.,.,,_,., (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post Operations, etc) Df:1'~1111£ .._ JJ,~-.,IIEII ~._71,.~ COMMENTS; F1•u, tl"H , ..... __ ..,"'4:11,~ I (Continuati.on sheets may be - used) . ~ ... Geographic .~ea of .assignment command Post# Sector #· OateiWatch/Time_,.. ________ _ ( if necessary or 1 • specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad COMMENTSi - £~6~~ E::,L- Tactics, Command Post --~ -- -·-. -- Operations, ... ... . -· etc) .. ;/·-.: "";-, ·_ ... ... t, °:'11..:'~,.- .--· J ' •~ .. -! .. uo CRITIOUB PORK Name Rank _______ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency -operations Center Field Command Post Ffeld Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time __________ _ ( if necessary or 1 , specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: . . ATTACJDIDl'l' A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; (Continuation sheets may be used} STAFF RESEARCH CONTROL FORM RESEARCH REQUEST - - DATEOF 6/12/92 REQUEST: _______ _ ORIGINATOR'· s DUE DATE: 6(29/92 FIRM OR NO.: ________ _ TO: __ A_L_L_O H_B_E_N_T_I_T_I _E. _S ____ _ EMPLOY[[ T AIUNC. l'"IAST AC-:'ION OM PROJECT SUBJECT (Brief description of research topic): ALL SUIISEQUCNT OUE OATES ON AEVEASE AFTER-ACTION REPORTING FOR THE APRIL/MAY RIOTS INSTRlJCTIONS (Form of report, suggestel sources, pers~ns to contact, etc . ): 1. TACTICAL PLANNING SECTION: Type of Occurrence This section shall include, but is not limited to: * Type of occurrence * Location of occurrence * Dates, times and duration * Brief background/intelligence summary FIELD COMMAND POST INFORMATION This section shall include: * Location of command post and satellite command posts. * The field command post staffing levels. * The mobi-le command post vehicles used. * The watch schedule during the UO. PROPERTY DAMAGE OBTAINED ,11OM 11 . 1. C. IY EMPLOYEE OAIC.INATINC. PROJECT REC E \ \J E_ O JUN 1 S 199'2. ll~VESTIGATIVE ANAL YS\S SECT\ON This section shall include all significant property damaged during the UO . * Private property * City property * Other public property 2. DETECTIVE HEADQUARTERS BUREAU: DEATHS AND INJURIES This section shall include significant information on UO related deaths and 1nJurie~. There shall be a statistical summary of deaths and injuries, including distinctions between officers, suspects and victims that were injured or killed. Additionally, there shall be a one line summary depicting the circumstances surrounding each death and permanently incapacitating C'A") injury. 3. ALL OTHER OHB DIVISIONS & SPECIALIZED SECTIONS: CRITIQUE All Areas and specialized division commmanding officers shall submit a written critique. Commanding officers shall encourages their subordinates to pro~ide EMPLOYEE ORIGINATING PROJECT: _________ __,..O'-'-'H ..... B _________ _ (CONT.) GENERAL FILE NO. f OFFICE FILE NO. BUREAU FILE NO. " I DIVISION FILE NO" OTHER FILE NO. I 122/92 - I NOTE: The original of this form remains with the original of the latest revision of the staff research report. ·' ·~ ,. ~ " ...., ,l STAFF RESEARCH CONTROL FORM (CONT.) _· Page 2 input and compile that input into a single written critique. All original written critiques submitted by subordinates shall be attached- to the commands' -critique. The command critique shall include, but is not limited to: * An appraisal of procedures used during the UO. * A statement evaluating the effectiveness of the effort while operating within. estabTished procedures. * RecommendatiODS for changes in procedures. Special consideration should be given to these areas: * Strategy * Tactics * Personnel * Logistics * Communications (specifically, availability/efficiency of ROVERS and availability of frequencies). * . Field jail Commanding officers may use the attached UO Critique Form (Attachment A) to solicit critiques from their subordinates. Certain commands performed duties that were specialized, unique or significant (i.e., Metro, ASD, Communications, etc.). In those cases, commanding officers should expound on that specialized assignment. ! • ~ INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE Jnne 29, 1992 8.2.8 TO: Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau FROM: Officer-in-Charge, Traffic Coordination Section SUBJECT: AFTER-ACTION CRITIQUE FOR THE APRIL/MAY RIOT Traffic Coordination Section (TCS) has 59 sworn officers, 10 civi: employees, and 21 reserve officers. Personnel assignments in the event of an unusual occurrence (UO) are delineated in the TCS Standing Plans. During the Department's mobilization, April 29 through May 9, 1992, TCS deployed the following full-duty sworn officers to the UO personnel pool: "A" Watch 1 - Lieutenant 4 - Sergeants 9 - Police Officers "B" Watch 1 - Lieutenant 3 - Sergeants 18 - Police 1 Officers On May 3, the motor officers assigned to the Specialized Enforcement Unit (SEU), TCS, were redeployed to "A" watch and worked their primary responsibility of special escort details as directed in the TCS Standing Plans. The full-duty sworn officers available to the UO personnel pool were reduced to: "A" .watch 1 - lieutenant '3 - sergeants 5 - police officers "B" Watch 1 - lieutenant 2 - sergeants 11 - police officers In addition, the Immediate Booking and Release Systems (IBARS) Unit, TCS, was deployed as a field jail unit on "B" watch with: 2 - sergeants l - police officers 2 - civilian employees 21 · - reserve officers (days worked varied due to availability) TCS was also responsible for security operations at: * * * 1945 S. Hill Street - Traffic Court Building 227 N. Lake Street - La Cadre Building 419 s. Spring Street - City building which houses TCS, Administrative Vice Division, Detective Support Division and other City administrative offices -- • :ommanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 2 8.2.8 APPRAISAL OF PROCEDURES USED DURING UO The individual response to duty by TCS personnel was immediate. TCS Standing Plans require that personnel report to the TCS office at 419 South Spring Street. During the initial critical hours of the UO, logistics planning for TCS personnel was inadequate and ineffective as evidenced by the lack of sufficient vehicles, rovers and shotguns on hand at our office. TCS does not maintain equipment appropriate for an emergency response of any magnitude. Once TCS personnel arrived at the 54th Street and Van Ness Avenue Command Post, it was apparent that the Personnel Section was unequipped to process and deploy the large number of officers reporting for assignment during the first days of the mobilization. As a result, available personnel was not utilized effectively. Frequently, officers were not relieved on schedule and worked many hours past their normal 12-hour watch. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EFFORT WITHIN ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES The key factor in the Department's effectiveness in controlling the violence of the riot was the tremendous response of personnel from the California National Guard and other outside law enforcement agencies. Until the large numbers of enforcement personnel became a visible presence, our established procedures were largely ineffective due to the escalating momentum of the disturbances that developed after the initial UO incidents. Outside assistance was essential since the Department has traditionally operated with a level of sworn personnel below adequate and appropriate officer-population ratios. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES IN PROCEDURES The line officers of our Department did a commendable job during the entire .mobilization. However, a prompt assessment of the situation is of paramount importance, along with the quick implementation of a tactical plan which addresses the possibility of escalation into mass civil disobedience. It is essential that the command officers of the Department become proficient in all facets of UO procedures, with specific emphasis on riot control and incidents of civil unrest. The training should be provided annually to both line and command __ personnel. A minimum number of command officers (i.e., one for each bureau) should be identified beforehand as the key field commanders in the event of a major uo, with the ultimate responsibility for the 1nitial assessment, deployment and management of the occurrence. . ... . Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 3 · 8 . ?.8 SPECIALIZED ASSIGNMENT OF THE IBARS inlIT The IBARS Unit, TCS, was deployed on the first night of the UO with the main IBARS Unit at Southeast Station and .the Valley IBARS Unit at Foothill Station. The Valley IBARS Unit was de-activated after three days and personnel were re-assigned to the main IBARS Unit. During the first four days of the UO, IBARS processed 640 arrestees. On May 3, IBARS was re-deployed to the command post at the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum. During the next six days, which was after civil order had essentially been restored, IBARS processed only 20 arrestees. While IBARS was deployed at Southeast Station, the normal speedy field jail processing of arrestees was slowed due to the procedures imposed by the Southeast Detective Division. Southeast required that all arrestees from Southeast Area have an arrestee package assembled. This was not necessary for arrestees from other areas of the City. This requirement greatly lengthened the arrestee processing time and essentially defeated the purpose of the IBARS Unit. It is evident that the Southeast Detective Di.vision did not realize that the IBARS Unit was deployed for the benefit of all personnel working the UO, not just for Southeast Area arrests. In addition, the IBARS Unit was not supported with sufficient Jail Division personnel during this UO. In order for the Unit to be properly deployed and functional, a minimum of three additional station officers is needed. Under the current arrangement, the station officers come from Jail Division and work for IBARS for cash overtime on their days off. Because of the mobilization, Jail Division station officers were not available and IBARS had to depend upon reserve officers and volunteers to supplement the regularly assigned personnel. It is of utmost importance that the IBARS Unit receive three additional full time station officers so that the Unit c.an be fully staffed at all times. These additional positions, along with sufficient cash overtime funds to cover 12-hour shifts, are essential to ensure that all IBARS operations -- including mobilizations, DUI, narcotics, vice and gang task force operations can function effectively under any contingency. · 0~- J ~~t-----~~- CHARLES F. KUNZ, Lieutenant Officer-in-Charge Traffic Coordination Section Attachments -- r~ - -. Name 'DEAJ \JAR,\(".£~"");~ Rank ~ff ~o CRITIQVB fQRM Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post x Field Task Force X Fixed Post Security ( Patrol in Geographic Division Other ---- Geographic Area of assignment R~ Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time ___ --:-------- (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Co,-,..,-"'.lA ?::.H"' o-1 {ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post o t ·' · pera ions, etc) COMMENTS: · X. S'""'-PO\.J•-.t'l~ · SE~..,.tt.,-;-7 ;t.-r "'i)IC C.or".,-.>i.r-J ~ Fca.r-r. Co~tl-0,,JA7';•.J _ C•'-"-'-/j UA...JE J!£(,...) /"Y'-AO£ ~ ~(tbt:.Jl ,- Al;iH-U'l-'t ~ j:;1i 12 /.I.ft Srl,h-1. RiLU✓ 1~~ 1 lloof.r AftftpJ(J ~ ?( C,f. I>, -r-- 11Jt,l.. t:. )LJ\-s AF-rt, n.. t,,JI.A ~ L.. tf. .,/. t.>I A. , u-1. o FcJt. r vi~ n. ~ ~r N,~--r'\ n ( ~ 71.,J /t I) J A) c £ 7)/ -4 r ~ 'f" W o-. L ~ (1 f.... ~ ~ ~ /?- ,p.K- I , i w::,..,.... '- a R-,; .. P:, A..-- "" -p+ "fl. D1 J u ... ,.j • o>l c E" Ar -n-r c .P . \A. ,.o. I WH'E.) A U, D. CC t::. ..,..fl-\ T,\L,'- oF<~S . SHo-'-Jl Jc.Al~~ "'-'~ ~ ~'ff...Po"-T. --rJ.4t .J9;,/.-.A...J ~"' I), 12.Ec -n.. ;I --,. /-l- C, {) • I ft.A----;;-1 (JI. --Tll A ..J ~ --ph:, /1... 5-,-...,-,-, .,. -.J • '!'<'S on... E. fl A.ft.. dJ Of- PLo1 ~t ,I~ w ~--'-JJ ~·c.:s-'""'- -r. (Continuation sheets may be used) ...... -. ····· .......... ·-- ·--·-·- . . - ·-··-·- -·-...-.----------·- y uo CB+TIQVJS PQRM Name - r~ · , , .. _i.,_.. . , ,,,,,- Rank '::r,. · TL-1- ¾: Assignment during a.a. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post X Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Pat=ol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time ( if necessary o _r_s_p_e_c---:-i_f_i_· c __ t_o_t_h_i_s-to pi c) Topic of Discussion: A1'TACDm1'1' A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, command Post i Operations, etc) COMMENTS: -r;-1~ ) , ) ~ C ( - Lv(( ? C: _ .·• -- · ,/ -,,:::.__ I :~ -,- C- - v t./ I c..~--- ' . '?:;''-< -..~- · -- ! - :::_ · : V '; er:· ( ' (. :; tf./}-u Crl ~ · .) iA-S.:.:-,'-6,Vf: ( I j ~ - -� ,.,. ; I I • i f . . ,' : . '.--: ·':. .· _;..,.::; ,i·{ ...... :!. 'i -✓~ (__ ... / . , , l C((~ ~ ,c~ .. ) i <P'-' } ~~ ,-r f 11'.:... i -/ ··,: _ I, ~ lr ~ 1 fr' ( ,.J j ,i<-t.. .. I ,,. k ,--· · :, i· t2 C·~ ·(/ ,>Ive.' ·.· ,. i .>·,: .1~ . - ~. v.' ,, .. -i/{'/ _, , : .. · , _ ., ,. . 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L~- \ L~6.Jt.Cc:..J ~ ),,b 61 ~ ·(ZJ <..i5 1 1•.:.·( 5c,J . 7'd C £~&'"rs w~u ~ 0_ r:.tr&;vt~ (Continuation sheets may be used) ~ /U~t ~ _ ;.j.L-8 _-•.:. : . ~ -~/ :. ::.cJ../•>~ .. \ 7_;; ~ (_ i 1 1:J.A L.'.' ! f 0 / · 1 ~- () .- - >-,: L_ - _. _ _ ... ,J-· L • < { , ) { '.'· t - .,.. ,. - .._.. . ; ./ ,~ (. :J, (.,, - ; l-i~- (.+ v-..J L, . I j I ." :_ ,. .... , .. /• t.,>-~- • . ·' , _ _: , i . f I c: c •, , 1 / • i.,.(,/ -· / -:-!· I 1 ;..c:- {' •. / . ! • , _ • I � - - • , J I ' / / -- 7· l t :-~ .. ,:S)U /) ---5 • ,-~,.J -• 1 ,./Jt- ", l, f-; • , t I I . , L .. ~./ - I , ·"' - :J.-..., -·<) t -_, ~,._ .. I " ' l ),.. <"t . . I 1 ·' ,./ _. .J t lc~.:... C,J -f- 1:... · -----: .. : t L ~ . J_ _ _ [)j /ft c .-;; '-:-, 1..4,£:-f ( v "c_ • ' 1 / /.,,. ,;{/ I ; -L • C~u G c.,9~ ~ v ·- _ - - :,, __ I ,v I-\ /l M.. t.. {L, j l..,(..,i.., t... ,-{ . .-· ~ -...:_ I (b G · 1 .' J N·/· . _ ~Jc., j - ;<.-c . ~ - c-u1 \ ~v~ I :.c✓ - . .,r_ ... , • I I/ • '--· 1 • f,. . -L'-::· - .. ..._ , . /-1--h .. (__ Cc~ /tfL , ; ··· .. :, _ , ! L7 o -- ......... /C.-;: ii ✓ , ·1-t • ..._"10-0 c.., ~ ! fr..-:- ._ - -·; r' :" ·'- ~ ,;.. j 2. I );_-,·_ •- -• l;.. V \, ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: BATTLED. Rank: DET-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division • Other apply) : _X_ Geographic Area of Assignment: 77th & South East Division Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: Various (If necessary or specific to this topic) Various Topic of Discussion:----,------ 1 (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHMENT ------- - UO CRITIQUE FORM Battle, James Page 2 COMMENTS: During the riots, I worked the "A" and "B" Watch. I worked the Command Post at 54th and Arlington and the Coliseum. I worked the following divisions: Southwest, 77th, Southeast, Wilshire, Rampart, Central, and Hollywood. It would be easy to write about all that went wrong doing the L.A. Riots and there would be plenty to say but to be fair, I think that we have had to deal with what we were against at that time. Florence Avenue and Normandie Avenue the so called flash point, may well have been a smoking mirror. It is my opinion that even if we had controlled the initial violence at that · intersection, it wouldn't have changed the overall outcome of the L.A. Riots. On that day at about the same time, fires were breaking out all over South Central Los Angeles. This required responses by the Fire Departments to fight the fires and attempt to save properties. As they arrived on scene, they were attacked by citizens with rocks, bottles and even fired on. This necessitated r .esponses from an already depleted Police Department to protect fellow city employees. This is my point, the best way to prepare for a future war is to closely critique previously fought wars. We haven't had these kind of problems in Los Angeles since the Watts Riots of 1965. During the recent war with Iraq (Desert Storm) we had the advantage of having command officers in key position, that knew of the mistakes of the Vietnam War. Since that time our military has improved in both capacity and the ability to make war. They've mastered the techniques for moving men and materials half the way around the world. During the early stages of the L.A. Riots we had a logistical nightmare on our hands with the movement of officers and materials. In fairness, I must say that we have never had to coordinate such a massive movement of people and materials before in our history. Today, we have almost no officers still working, the street that were around during the 1965 Riots. Communication was the other problems. We used our Divisional cars for the first days of the riots and we didn't have all the regular frequencies. Many times we didn't know what was going on around us. There were also the other agencies from not only California but neighboring states as well. We also had the military deployed who also had to be integrated into a working communication system. UO CRITIQUE FORM BATTLE, James Page 3 I hope that as a result of the L.A. Riots, that we not only develop hind sight but fore sight as well. ( ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: Rosalina, F .. Rank: D-II Assignment during u.o. (check all. that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assi· gnment: Command Post# Sector# apply): X - -- x - -- S/W,Wilsh, 77th, S/E, Ramp., Hwd., Cent., Newt. 2 and 3 ' 1,2,3 & 4 in various days and areas . . Date/Watch/Time: 4/29-5/22 B Watch 1800 hours If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: See Below (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: The use of seasoned officers, like myself with 27 1/2 years. · with no training on the M.T.D. and manadnock and black and white vehicles was very ill-advised due to officers safety. The lack of food and drink the first two nights was totally unexcusable as a catering truck either a (canteen) ours or rented could have been used especially on "B" watch where nothing was open. I realize assigning hundreds of officers throughout the City is a major undertaking, but the deployment of manpower and decision making was very slow weeks after the start of u.o. -- j tfP=-0 1 .15.0 (2/81} STAFF RESEARCH CONTROL FORM RESEARCH REQUEST DATEOF 6/12/92 ORIGINATOR'S DUE DATE: 6/29/92 FIRM REQUEST: _______ _ DR NO.: ________ _ TO: __ A_L_L_O_H_B _E N_T_I_T_I_E_S _____ _ C'lo,U•l.OYCE TAKl"lt. ,111sT 4C:TION ON PIIOJECT SUBJECT (Brief description of research topic}: 4l.l. 3U9SCOUCNT OUC OATltS ON "CVltllSC AFTER-ACTION REPORTING FOR THE APRIL/MAY RIOTS INISTRlJCTIONS (Form of report, suggested sources, persons to contact, etc.): · 1 . TACTICAL PLANNING SECTION: Type of Occurrence This section shall include, but is not limited to: * Type of occurrence * Location of occurrence * Dates, times and duration * Brief background/intelligence summary FIELD COMMAND POST INFORMATION This section shall include: * Location of command post and satellite collilland posts. * The field co111T1and post staffing levels. * The mobi·le corranand post vehicles used. * The watch schedule during the UO. PROPERTY DAMAGE O TAINltD l'IIOM "-1.C. BY IChUtl.OYltlt OIIIGINATING PIIOJltCT RECEiVED JUN 1 5 1992 BURGLARY-AUTO THEFT DIVISION This section shall include all significant property damaged during the UO. * Private property * City property * Other public property 2. DETECTIVE HEADQUARTERS BUREAU: DEATHS AND INJURIES This section shall include significant information on UO related deaths and rnJuries. There shall be a statistical summary of deaths and injuries, _ including distinctions between officers, suspects and victims that were injured or killed. Additionally, there shall be a one line summary depicting the circumstances surrounding each death and permanently incapacitating ( 11 A 11 ) injury. 3. ALL OTHER OHB DIVISIONS & SPECIALIZED SECTIONS: CRITIQUE All Areas and specialized division commmanding officers shall submit a written critique. Commanding officers shall encourages their subordinates to provide EMPLOYEE ORIGINATING PROJECT: __________ O:..uH ..... B _________ _ (CONT.) GENERAL. FILE NO. OFFICE Fl LE NO. I , BUREAU FILE NO. 122/92 · I OIVISI ON Fl LE NO. OTHER FILE NO. NOTE: The original of this form remains with the original of the latest revision of the staff research report. i •• I I uo CJlTlQQI fQRK Rank __ ~- · _,_:I: ____ _ ' ' Assignment during u.a. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other :::rneucA l SJ JPftfC a[ln.fi-:J ( Geographic Area of assignment Command Post ; Sector # Date/ Watch/Time VBeruS (i f necessary or specific to this topic) AT'rAC:HMIH'f A Top i c of Discussion: TSE) hELQ :JA\L (i e Fi eld Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: C. - Atrf\C t4EO (Continuation sheets may be used) . . ---------- ·-· · - --··-···· . . -. . . - . ··- .. ·. ·.·.·--::· - ~•7.~--.-·•·-:-- :-~ . . ... _ _.,,.._ . ' - . ~ . . . · . .. .. ' : ,, .~ ...... ~ ...... , .. !.. ..... __,_~......: ..... _ , • •• .. _' _ '§_ ·:·. ·· ·-~ · • • . . - ,. ---· --··- ' •• • . I IC C • I ... .., ---- --- --------------------- '' ,, 'to I .., Tactical Support Elements The TSE was an extremely effective way to arrest large numbers of loote ==· Th~ ~~u0~ ~as able to work as a well coordinated unit to contain and arrest suspects while also providing cover for the Officers. Unfortunately two things prevented the TSEs from being even more successful. The first, originally the TSEs were deployed to provide much needed protection to the fire department. This assignment, which could have, and eventually was handled by patrol and the Highway Patrol, prevented the TSEs from taking any aggressive action toward the looters. The looting spread dramatically because none of the individuals involved were faced with any real threat of arrest. The second problem that slowed aggressive action down during the initial days of the riot was the unbelievable backup at the jail facilities. Officers were faced with delays that kept them out of the field and unable to quickly process a simple looting or curfew arrest. This process needs to be uniform throughout the city, and it needs to be quick. Each curfew or looting report should have a generic narrative that is pretyped and the arresting officers should have to fill in no more information then is contained on a FI. Polaroid cameras available to Officers in the field would have enabled them to take pictures of looting suspects, arresting offices, and property in front of the establishment that they looted. The F.I. card could be attached to the back of the photo and trans with the body. The suspect could then booked and processed independently of the arresting officers. The booking procedures improved two to three days into the riot, but it was to late to allow officers to go out and make mass arrests early on that might have stopped the escalation of the incident. It i s extremely important to have the ability to make mass arrests immediately. Therefore the system must be able to be implemented and running smoothly within hours not days. The department's intelligence and the word on the street pointed to a strong possibility of civil unrest. Metro's week of training did a great deal to prepare it's officers for this incident. Unfortunately most patrol divisi- ons·~received 1- i.t i=::J- '= or no training. Standing plans are no good unless they are reviewed. A number of officers showed up to the C.P. at 54 and Arlington with no helmet. This type of readiness is unacceptable. Especially when the possibility for an incident was so great. ,-. "' . ~ uo Cl\•?lQVI l9M r, __ ~ \.(' /I? ✓ c Name , __ "- , . ~."1.,,-"-.J /4(c~~ (. Rank~Gr;?: ' ' Assignment during a.a. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other ,,,P? 6 ~ o Geographic Area of assignment command Post; Sect:or; Date/Watch/Time __________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: So I,' 4--::) z;;: (_ /-/ C .s (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMME,TS: (Continuation sheets may be used) . . ---------·-· . · - -----···- . .. -·· .. . ··- .. ·.:·.· - -::· --. ·~--.-·•· ~ --~ : . ·-------~-~(":""'. -=c::~-~.":":.-:9"·~ _,_, ________ - --· ~_._--~------- . .. ·, .: '- _ - r_ .... ... •;,-.- .. ~~-- ··" . .. ~· ,. ' .~ ' ~ , _. . - . ,..•, . Metro trained very hard in preparation for this and other prospective U.O.'s. In fact, many occurrences, including the initial incidents, were tailor made for the specialized tactics developed by Metropolitan Division's platoon leaders weeks prior to the riots. Unfortunately, Metro squads were not utilized for the first few hours of the U.O., and in some cases, were ordered not to engage looters or other criminals. For at least the first full night of the riots field jails were essentially non existent, and no prisoner transportation was available. When Metro was finally deployed, the tactical squad formations developed earlier worked like a Swiss watch. Incidents of violence were quickly quelled, looters and arsonists quietly and efficiently arrested, and all with a minimum of force and manpower to safely and effectively complete the assigned operation. · --- ~ - ---~ · --- - - -: .... ~ - ~ . - - - ----- ··- -· -;-- :-~,.-- - . -·····--- . -··-----· -- • • - • . -- - - ~ - ~ ~ --.=.:....,.:__;__ _ ___ _ / / / I INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE June 28, 1992 8.2.5 TO: FROM: Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters· Bureau Commanding Officer, Burglary-Auto Theft Division SUBJECT: AFfER-ACTION REPORT FOR THE APRIL/ MAY RIOTS DIVISIONAL OVERVIEW: The Commanding Officer and other personnel of Burglary-Auto Theft Divisio· n (BAD) were off duty and at home on the evening of April 29, 1992. Upon learning of the beginning to the riotous conditions, Captain Whitley made contact with his section OIC's in preparation for mobilization. Prior to being moh>ilized by Detective Headquarters Division (DHD), Captain Whitley contacted DHD and requested direction. He was eventually informed that BAD's "B" watch was to be activated and assembled at BAD's office at Parker Center. The off duty section OIC's made timely notifications and the "B", and subsequently the "A" watch the following morning, reported in a timely manner as directed. Once personnel arrived at BAD, delays of up to three hours were experienc~d before assignments were made and BAD personnel were deployed. Burglary-Auto Theft Division deployed squads to the command post at 54th Street and Arlington on the first night of mobilization. Personnel assigned to the "A" watch were deployed as Parker Center security on April 29th - 30th, 1992. For the remained of the mobilization, BAD deployed squads on both the "A" and "B" watches to functions in West Bureau and South.Bureau. Even though Captain Whitley has been trained as a member of the Field Command Post Ca_ dre as a sergeant, a lieutenant, and a captain in the operations functions, he was never called upon to perform any of those functions during the entire riot period. Captain Whitley's first personal involvement in the riots occurred on April 30th when he was assigned by Commander White of Detective Services Group (DSG) to monitor station security at Parker Center. In carrying-out that assignment, Captain Whitley learned that CP-1 (Central Area) also had the assignment for security at Parker Center and a minor conflict developed and had to be resolved with a Central . i Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 2 8.2.5 Area lieutenant. Captain Whitley assumed responsibility for Parker Center property and Central Area assumed the surrounding area. His second personal involvement occurred on May 2nd. Even though unassigned to the security detail around the Civic Center area, Captain Whitley observed an unlawful assembly of over 200 people at Los Angeles Street and Second Street advancing upon Parker Center. Recognizing that the ten officer squad from Bunco Forgery Division (BFD) deployed at Los Angeles Street and First Street would be unable to stop and control the crowd, Captain Whitley mobilized three other squads in the immediate area, stopped the crowds advance at First Street, and moved them back to Second Street, where they were dispersed. Two arrests were made at Captain Whitley's direction. Subsequent to Captain Whitleis involvement in this situation, he had contact with Commander Moore of Operations-Central Bureau (OCB), who thanked him for his actions. PERSONNEL CRITIQUE SUMMARIES: The following information is a summary of the critiques completed by assigned sworn personnel of Burglary-Auto Theft Division. The opinions varied, however many officers agreed on numerous issues. Command Post Operations: • The command staff at 54th and Arlington seemed to be fairly organized in the early stages. When the command post was moved to the coliseum it stalled. Too much time was wasted prior to any personnel assignments and once assigned, the deployment was slowed due to the process of issuing vehicles, · radios and shotguns. • The command post improperly used Department personnel without considering their training or special skills. Individual officers were used to fill any openings requiring a "warm body". This practice was certainly understandable on the first day but not on days four or five. • To much time was wasted requiring officers to report to BAD first and then waiting to be assigned to a Bureau CP, and.finally an Area CP. The satellite CP's were a waste of time and manpower. • In general, there appeared to be a total lack of planning and organization at the CP's in the first week. Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 3 8.2.5 • Being relieved on time at end of watch (EOW) should have been given much more consideration, mainly because of the fatigue factor and officer safety. After spending 15 to 17 hours a day in a very high stress situation, officers drove home to rest and due to distances traveled, a maximum of only 4 to 5 hours of sleep in between shifts were not uncommon. Due to logistical problems 12 hour shifts rapidly turned into longer and longer days and nights. Logistics: • Under utilization or lack of proper equipment caused long delays at the beginning of every watch. • A lack of food for field personnel was evident. A mobile canteen or catering truck and relief officers should have been provided so the field personnel could eat. • Some detectives at BAD were amazed at how suddenly "good equipment" (vests, _ h~lmet face shields and batons) became available duriµg the riots. Patrol officers were given money a few years ago to purchase new vests. Most detectives were still using the vest that were issued to them over 20 years ago. • The time lapse between EOW and being relieved was too long. Two to three hour delays were not uncommon even though relief personnel were awaiting orders and assignments at the CP's. • Vehicles at the CP's should have been separated by B/W and plain cars and parked in separate areas which could have avoided time wasted trying to locate the vehicles. · • Some officers assigned to fixed-post positions were deployed without transportation or food. Attempts to contact the CP's by radio failed. Officers were forced to search for rides back to the CP's causing delays of up to 3 hours after the end of their 12 hour shifts. In many cases, the CP's were not even aware the officers were still in the field. • There was a lack of available maps of the Areas to be patrolled. Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 4 8.2.5 Field Jails: • Units were instructed that the field jails were operational and small buses would be sent out to transport arrestees so all of the involved field units would not be tied up. However, the buses never arrived and when contacted, the CP advised units to transport the arrestees themselves or release them. • Field jails took entirely too long to process arrestees. • Most field jails were not adequately prepared resulting in poor prosecutions. Intelligence: • Little or no intelligence information existed to be given td field units prior to being deployed on their shifts. What little ~ntelligence information we did receive came from outside agencies such as the LASD or the Housing Authority Police. Communications: • Communications during the first few days and nights was a "nightmare". Different frequencies and messages made communicating a disaster. Calls for help and medical assistance went unanswered. Some officers felt there was "no one at home on the other end of the radio." A very frustrating feeling indeed. • Officers assigned to patrol South Bureau were on many occasions given Valley Bureau radios by mistake. • . In some instances, we used BAD divisional vehicles for the first few days and we only had the old tactical frequencies Tac 1 and Tac 3. Many times officers didn't even know what was happening around them. Many Department radios also were issued to outside agencies and the military in order to integrate them into our communica_ tions system which caused a short supply of radios. • On many occasions, ROVERS were not available and smaller, low-powered radios were issued. Personnel and Training: • Inadequate training and preparation for this NO was evident. Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 5 · 8.2.5 • Most detectives have not been trained in crowd control and squad formations for years. Most were totally unfamiliar with squad techniques and hand signals. • Most older detectives have never been trained in the use of the side-handle baton. • Most detectives have not been-trained in the use of the MDTs used in B/W police vehicles nor were they even familiar with how to remove a shotgun from the shotgun rack. FIELD OPERATIONS AND TACTICS: • We failed to secure pawnshops and gun stores with major supplies of firearms and ammo which are now on the streets of Los Angeles. , • No special weapons were deployed within the squads even after the huge exchanges of AK-47 gunfire. Even some CHP officers, although primarily noted mainly for traffic enforcement, had 223 caliber Mini-14 Semi-Automatic rifles. 1 • After the first night of the riots, Parker Center security was over staffed leaving many officers standing around while "help calls" were being broadcast only a few blocks away in the downtown area. • During a downtown demonstration, demonstrators were given a dispersal order but were surrounded and not given a chance to disperse. Many peaceful demonstrators with children wanted to leave but were blocked and arrested. • Officers were transporte.d by buses to scenes where looting had been reported, · only to find the call was hours old. The buses did not remain at the scene and thereby stranding the officers when they could have been used elsewhere. LEADERSHIP: • Indecision, fear and possible political concerns by Central and South Bureau command staff kept the Department from responding in adequate numbers at the initial onset of the riots. When finally deployed, our mission was unclear. Arrests were discouraged and when we were allowed to make arrests, field jails were not prepared for the volume. -- - - ---- - - Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 6 8.2.5 • A total lack of leadership. One thirty year veteran detective stated "I was embarrassed as other departments got to see how "screwed-up" we were in the initial stages of the riots." "Experienced field commanders were not evident". "Seventy-Seventh and Southeast Area sergeants would have done a much be. tter job." • One detective pointed out a "shinning example" of a leader in Commander Scott LaChasse. "He exemplified himself as a command officer." His deployment of squads were carefully orchestrated with a specific mission to get the job accomplished as quickly and efficiently as possible. • It appeared most of our "leaders" were more concerned with their ability to promote and avoided making decisions that could jeopardize their "climb to the top." ' • This riot was a disgrace and a failure by command staff officers to clearly provide rapid and proper leadership. I • There seemed to be a reluctance to utilize necessary force by the command staff. A management oriented command staff is totally ineffective in a crisis. We need leaders not managers. PERSONAL FEELINGS: • Our inability to protect the citizens and fire fighters at the initial onset of the riots was an embarrassment to the men and women of this Department. • The rank-in-file police officers were ready and eager to receive their orders . . The troops were initially enthusiastic until the lack of leadership became self evident. As a result, moral on this Department is at an all-time low. • The use of veteran detectives without proper training, equipment and knowledge of squad tactics was ill-advised. These veteran detectives should have been used in other ways where their expertise and experience could be put to good use; and for officer safety. Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 7 8.2.5 · • The command staff of this Department should be held accountable for their actions or lack of action and should be disciplined just as rapidly and severely as this Department's command staff would discipline a police officer or detective in a similar situation. • Personnel from BAD have expressed concern about their personal image as law enforcement officers and the image of the Los Angeles Police Department as a whole. The mending process has started, however it will not be easy and will take a joint effort between the line-officers, detectives, patrol supervisors, lieutenants and the command staff. RECOMMENDATIONS: • Detectives who still have old ineffective vests be. immediately issued new vests as safety equipment by the Department. • Detectives be immediately issued and trained in the use of side-handle baton. \ • Televisions should be placed in the CP's to allow field commanders to view "real-time" activities (live television and videotape of the events in progress). • Devise a way to identify the shop numbers of vehicles from a distance to speed up deployment of the field units at the CP's. Perhaps a temporary white cardboard with the shop number largely printed with a black felt pen. The sign could be placed on the windshield when parked and put in the trunk when the vehicle was in use. • Develop a "C" watch which would also be a 12 hour shift. The shifts would overlap but it would ensure a relief factor and cover the "peak" hours of the ·u.o. • One of the biggest problems was relief at EOW. The officer-in-charge of personnel at the· CP should not be allowed to go EOW until all the personnel from his watch are accounted for. • Establish a cadre of liaison personnel from which to draw in the event of a U.O. requiring LAPD representation. Because of the possibility that National Guard troops may again be in a U.O. and the fact that such support is by doctrine administered from the LASO Emergency Operations Center (EOC), Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 8 8.2.5 the cadre personnel designated should have sufficient military experience and understanding to facilitate communications.with military personnel. • Immediately assign LAPD liaison personnel from the established cadre to the LASD - EOC upon its activation for U.O. situations which have actual or potential impact on the City of Los Angeles. • Because the LASD - EOC operations officer is a lieutenant and the staffing of the EOC is primarily by sergeants, LAPD liaison personnel should ideally be of the sergeant/detective II rank. • In these times of resource shortages, we cannot afford to continue promoting professional "test takers". The LAPD must develop its managers so that they can be leaders and decision makers. The rewards system must allow people to make mistakes so they can have experience in making decisions. As it presently stands, the Department does not condone "risk taking" or making mistakes. It's a known fact if you have leaders in place, any job regardless of difficulty or availability of resources, will be accomplished efficiently and effectively.· COMMANDING OFFICER'S INSIGHT: I believe there is a fundamental flaw in the way the Tactical Manual addresses unusual occurrences that require resources beyond those available at the concerned Area level. For example, when an Area level tactical problem exists, establishing a small on-site command post is . usually reasonable and functional. However, when the problem involves multiple Areas and outside agencies, the concept of taking the field command post to the problem is usually ill-advised and ineffective. A more appropriate method is to follow the Fire Department's example of establishing their command post at the closest fire station rather than attempting to establish an entire command post from scratch at a field location. Over the years, I have participated in many types of unusual occurrences. Those that have been the most effective and most easily established have adjoined the police station of the involved Area. In fact, while at Devonshire Area, I was involved in having Devonshire Area station wired for electrical, radio and telephone lines so that the Department's mobile fleet could almost immediately be up in an operational mode upon arriving at the station. It makes little sense to attempt to re construct the facilities and resources of a police station at an off-site command post when they are already readily available at each police station. Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 9 · 8.2.5 Area standing plans should include the installation of electrical, radio and telephone receptacles for the command post fleet as well as the arrangements for the closure of adjoining streets and businesses or schools as staging areas surrounding the police station. The current standing plans should only be used for small Area command posts or satellite command posts associated with the main command post at the Area station when a major incident occurs. The only function performed at a satellite command post would be the execution of operational plans and limited · radio and telephone communications. The Area command post van should be the largest vehicle deployed at the satellite command post. All other command post functions should be carried out at the Area station command post utilizing · Department command post vehicles. The functions of the field commander arid the executive officer should also be more clearly defined. The field commander should not concern him or herself with the establishment and functioning of the field command post at the Area station; that should be the sole responsibility of the executive officer. The field commander should be at the satellite command post(s) directing the tactical operations. It appears the original field commanders in South Bureau became more involved in the establishment of a command post rather than dealing with the tactical problem at hand. Had they used the resources at the Seventy-Seventh Area station as a command post and focused on the tactical problem with the resources they had immediately available to them; they would have likely been more effective. Tactics: The tactic of deploying four officers in a vehicle should be reconsidered; that arrangement leaves no space for the transportation of arrestees. The alternative of holding a large number of arrestees for transportation by bus is extremely c~mbersome and non-functional in most riotous conditions where suspects are very · mobile. This is especially true at the beginning of a riot when the personnel and resources necessary for the activation of buses is delayed. Although not an expert in this field, I am of the opinion that research should be undertaken into tactics whereby officers in vehicles and officers on foot work together as a team to drive back and arrest violent, projectile throwing crowds of suspects. The U.S. Army and/or the British Army should have previously developed tactics for joint infinity, armor combat or riotous situations that could be adapted to this type of circumstance. Tactics for the safe deployment of motor officers on their motorcycles in conjunction with black/white vehicles and officers of foot should also Commanding Officer, Operations-Headq~arters Bureau Page 10 8.2.5 be explored. These new tactics should be addressed in the Department's Tactical Manual. Personnel: Personnel assigned to BAD were formed into squads prior to their deployment to command posts. Had that been done by all Divisions and Areas, the personnel function at the command posts could have been stream-lined and field deployment time shortened. Logistics: The shortage of black/white police vehicles was obvious and had a direct bearing on the Department's ability to deploy to the riotous conditions; more vehicles must be purchased for patrol divisions. Had the Department had either more dual-purpose vehicles or portable converta-coms, we would have been in a much better position to effectively deploy all of the Department's vehicles in a short period of time. Portable converta-coms that plug into cigarette lighters need to be purchased immediately. Burglary-Auto Theft detectives were involved in a number of arrests related to the riot. The camer· as they had available to them were extremely valuable in identifying suspects and for photographing evidence for court. Had the Department been able to provide each squad leader with a Polaroid camera, many of the suspect identity problems would have been eliminated by having each suspect photographed with the arresting officer at the scene of the crime. This type of on-scene photographing has proven to be extremely valuable in multiple arrest situation such as vice "trick task forces" and would be just as valuable in a riot situation. Communications: In a modern metropolitan police department the issuance of radios capable of communicating with officers in any part of the city is as essential to officer safety as the issuance of a service pistol. The objective of issuing each officer in the Department a personal radio should be of the highest priority; even higher than the hiring new officers. This riot was prnof that ill-equipped officers are extremely ineffective, and amount to little more than a ready reserve at a command post that cannot by deployed. Until the above is accomplished, the City should immediately purchase as many 48 channel ROVER radios as possible and get them into the hands of the officers that Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 11 8.2.5 need them on a daily basis. Most specialized divisions have nq communication equipment other than tactical frequencies in their vehicles. Field Jail: Should the Department adopt the field command post strategy explained above, field jails would be established in conjunction with existing Area police station jails and not in the field. This change in philosophy - not taking an entire command post to the problem, but utilizing existing station facilities - would make field jail processing easier, especially when Area stations are pre-wired for portable DABIS terminals that could be used in station parking lots. Conclusion: All in all, the civil unrest in Los Angeles which began on April 29, 1992 must be used as a learning experience. The lessons learned, and hopefully the recommendations enacted should enhance our ability to respond to any future situations. · C. ~ ) v'k~4 ~ / 7 JIM WHITLEY, Captain / Commanding Officer . .,. Burglary-Auto Theft Division APPROVED: JOHN D. WHITE, Commander Commanding Officer Detective Services Group Attachments ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: CORELLA, A. Rank: LT-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command' Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "B" apply) : _X_ _X_ (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Command Post (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) 1 COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHMENT --- -- - - -------- Regardless of the Unusual Occurrence the Field Commander will never have the sufficient number of personnel, radios,vehicles, and other critical logistics to deal with the problem at hand. One could write volumes blaming these shortcomings ad nauseam. However, the number 1 difficulty in dealing with the civil unrest within the City was the lack of leadership and direction by · personnel (Lieutenants and above) at the operational level of this endeavor. It appears that the Department has traditionally groomed individuals to be outstanding managers. Managers are those who deal with and maintain the status quo. However,this chaotic situation called for decision makers and leaders. With a few exceptions these qualities were in short supply. I was assigned to the Field Task Force for 14 days. And for 14 days the source of frustration was the incompetence I had to deal with at the command post. Invariably my daily deployment in the field required a minimum of one to two hours of downtime. ·This downtime meant waiting to be assigned to sectors and obtaining equipment. The first two days of the riot were the most critical days in restoring order. These were also the days where the lack of leadership and direction were the most evident. The following are examples: On the first night of the riot the BAD "B" watch was called in from home and was available for deployment by 2400 hours. We were subsequently assigned to the command post at 54th Street and Arlington. Upon my arrival to this location you could see on the faces of the awaiting field officers that they wanted direction and an opportunity to deal with the problem at hand. Conversely,those individuals tasked with the leadership role, had confusion, uncertainty and fear written all over their faces. Finally at 0400 hours after many, many requests to be deployed I was given a mission, cars and radios. Day 2 _ my platoon and I were assigned to the intersection of LaBrea and Sunset. We did not have a specific mission. We were assigned on foot with only five rovers. This was one of many examples in the mismanaging of critical resources during this overwhelming incident. I was continually in contact with the command post at Hollywood Station. During these. contacts I dealt with the operations lieutenant. On several occasions relief and food for my 42 -officers was promised. We were never provided with relief but after a pointed discussion with the lieutenant, I finally secured enough food for my officers RECOMMENDATION: In these times of resource shortages we cannot afford to continue promoting professional test takers. The organization· must develop its managers so that they can be leaders and decision makers. The rewards system must allow people to make mistakes so that they can have experience in making decisions. As it presently stands, the organization does not condone risk taking or making mistakes. Its a known fact that if you have leaders in place, any job regardless of difficulty or availability of resources, will be done efficiently and effectively. Name: WOODINGS, M. Rank: D-II UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post apply) : _X_ Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "A" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Liason (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: ' SEE ATTACHMENT AFTER ACTION REPORT * DII Michael Woodings, BAD/BSS, was initially assigned with other BAD personnel in a station security role · at PAB during the first ,· two days of the u.o. On 5-1-92, Woodings was individually reassigned to the LASO EOC to act in the capacity of liaison officer with the Sheriff and the military. Liaison had been established at that location already with Capt Keith Bushey and Sgt Tim Anderson filling the ·roles of liaison officers for LAPD. Woodings was selected for the liaison assignment because of his background as a senior military officer with knowledge of the operations of both the LAPD and the military. Woodings was assigned to "A" watch and Anderson to "B" watch. DII Jim Ward was also assigned to "B" watch to assist Anderson and has similar qualifications as Woodings and Anderson. Woodings and the other LAPD personnel assigned to this liaison role proved to be vital assets to the operations of both the LASO and the LAPD EOCs and were commended by LASO for their support to the LASO EOC. * Current procedures do not specifically adpress the liaison manning by LAPO at the Sheriff EOC during u.o.s with specific · emphesis on collateral liaison with military (National Guard) personnel. Further, an established cadre of personnel equally conversant in both LAPD and military procedures does not currently exist. * Recommendations: 1. Immediately established cadre to situations which have Angeles. assign LAPD liaison personnel from an the LASO EOC upon its activation for u.o. actual or potential impact on the City of Los 2. Establish a cadre of liaison personnel from which to draw in the event of a u.o. requiring LAPD representation. Because of the possibility that National Guard support might again be necessary in a u.o. and the fact that such support is by doctrine administered from the Sheriff EOC, the cadre personnel designated should have sufficient military · experience and understanding to facilitate communication with military personnel. 3. Because the LASO EOC operations officer i.s a lieutenant and the staffing of the EOC is primarily by sergeants, liaison personnel should ideally be of the SGT/DII level. Name: TOLAND, J. Rank: D-IlI UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that ·apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division X Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Hwd, S/E, S/W, 77th Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Command Post Operations (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: The Command Post (Coliseum) lacked organization with respect to immediate deployment of troops and logistics of transportation. Past the second or third day the troops should have been immediately sent to the command posts instead of their Divisions to avoid time lags. Vehicles could have been separated by black and white and p1ain cars, in separate areas to avoid wasting time locating them. · · Although it may be impractical dollar wise to train a C.P. group for management purposes, it appeared that the C.P. could have been more effectively run had it been run by more ~nlisted troops (Lt's, Sgt II's, and below) than -by having commanders and captains running around like chickens with their heads cut .off. The people who best handled the organization of the C.P. appeared to be those with either current or past military experience as opposed to those who were "staff personnel from under management.'' I believe that our Department has lost its ability to respond to large U. O. 's by promoting "managers" instead of well trained leaders and can act immediately using common sense and quasi military tactics. You don't have time to vote on the necessary plan when an emergency occurs, you have to have a previously planned well laid out method of attack. Name: WARD, J. Rank: D-II UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during U.O. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center X Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division X Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "B" Watch, 4-29-92 (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: S/W, S/E 54th & Van Ness (i.e. F_ ield Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: 1) Disorganization among the command staff. 2) Improper planning and utilization of transportation. I.E. transported to scenes where looting was in progress by bus only to find that the call was hours old. The buses did not remain and thereby stranded the involved personnel. 3) Indicated lack of experience among the comm~nd staff. 4) Reluctance to utilize necessary force by the commanders. 5) Management oriented command staff totally ineffective in a crises. Prior military officers should have been drafted. Name: MARTIN, A. Rank: D-II UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# 3 Sector# Various Date/Watch/Time: "A" and "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Command post operations/squad tactics (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: The LAPD reacted to this riot inadequately. By not responding we allowed the situation to feed off itself and grow. We failed. We did not protect the citizens because the brass was worried about political ·repercussions. Our division was left standing for a day and a half, ordered not to arrest looters or leave the building when "help" calls were going out. We failed to secure pawnshops and gun stores with major cashes of firearms and ammo, and now those guns are on the street. No special weapons were deployed within the ranks even after the huge exchange of AK47 gunfire. The first night in Southeast the Department should have at least given squad leaders adequate firepower to protect the officer under their command if they came under hipowered rifle attack, Even the CHP had deployed 223/mini 14's. The logistics were awful, we often were forced to wait . in excess of 2-4 hours for an assignment while at the - command post. This was the only time in my entire law enforcement career I was truly embarrassed. I feel we let the Fire Department and citizens down due to lack of leadership. Name: MONROE, G. Rank: D-II UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) I COMMENTS: Currently on vacation. Name: RAMIREZ, C.J. Rank: D-III UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during U.O. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post X Field Task Force X Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division X Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: (If necessary or specific to this topi~) Topic of Discussion: 77TH, S/W, S/E 2 & 3 Various (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: During the first week, there were delays in deployment of "B" watch, BAD personnel at the RTD command post, 52nd and Van Ness. There _ appeared to be a lack of proactive leadership from the high command at this particular C.P. In contrast, the rank and file were ready and eager for orders. At .the time, it was my impression that the troops were initially enthusiastic until the lack of leadership became self-evident. Hours of delay were a factor, and should be considered during any future unusual occurrences. Name: SAMANIEGO, J. Rank: D-III UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security X Patrol in Geographic Division X Other Geographic Area of Assignment: S/W, S/E, 77th Command Post# 3 ·sector# Various Date/Watch/Time: "A" watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: 1) In general too many man hours were wasted waiting to be assigned and relieved. 2) The food provided was terrible (box lunch). 3) Radio communication between units C.P. and BCC was very bad for various reasons. ( Name: ZAVALA, M. Rank: D-I UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u·.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post X Field Task Force X Fixed Post Security X Patrol in Geographic Division X Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# S/W, Coliseum Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "A" & "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Command Post (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: I believe there was alot of time and money wasted by having officers standing around waiting for assignments to be given out. I also believe they should have had civilians working -the command post or light duty officers. Example: They had (3) officers ((1) detective and ( 2) P-2 's) issuing rovers while another P-3 was issuing vehicles to officers. .. uo CRITXPVI fQRH Name PESANTI , ;Ac Rank Sgt. I Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post x ---- Field Task Force x Fixed Post Security ---- Patrol in Geographic Division X Other ---- AT"l'lt.CH•11R'l' A Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# 77th, SE, RAMP, WILS, HWD, CENT 3 & 12 Date/Watch/Time 4-29-92/5-21-92 "B" Watch (if necessary or specific to this topic) All Topic of Discussion: _c~._P_._0pe ___ r_a_t_io_n_s _______ _ (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; First week of riots we were stranded at C.P. several times. Transportation to C.P. by bus even though we had radio's and cars. Left at C.P. due to lack of resource_ s to deploy B.A.D. squads. Throughout riots assigned on several occasions to fixed post positions and not relieved until several hours past EOW. Had to get transportation for my squad back to C.P. from outside agency. (Continuation sheets may be used) · • .. L • - · • · - • ·~ ·· • ·-- ·----- r uo CRITIOVB PORK Name BECKER, J, - Rank_o_-_J ______ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security X ---- Patrol in Geographic Division x Other ---- ATTAC!ff Hlft A Geographic Area of assignment Command Post; Sector~ CENT/SW/77th/SE/RAMP/WILS 3 &- 12 All Date/Watch/Time "B" Watch 4-29-92/5-12-92 5-15-92/5-16-92 ( if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: U/0 OPERATIONS ( ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) C OMMENTS; 1. My unit was not deployed from the station on the first night of rioting. 2. My unit did not receive any training on riot control, patrol techniques, officer safety concerns, or mission objectives, prior, during or after the U/0. 3. My unit, which investigates persons who receive stolen property, was deployed as a patrol squad. It should have been assigned to recover property looted (especially guns) during the riots. (Continuation sheets may be used) ··•- · ··-· - ·- .. . -- - ·•·· . .. . -- . . . . ~ - · ' • ..... ·-.•-.--•-- oo CBITXOVI fQRH Name (-QNZALEZ , , >h Rank ____ ~D_-_r _____ _ Assignment during u.a. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply) X X AT'?AC!H� Jllff A Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 12, 18 3 & 12 All Date/Watch/Time "B" Watch 4-29/5-9-92 (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ( ie Field .Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post op·erations, etc) COMMENTS; Need more and better equiµnent. Someone in a corrmand :position should have roll call with the street troops and let us know what is going on. The time one checks in and gets assigned (approximately one hour) should be shortened. The relief for fixed :post should be earlier. (Continuation sheets may be used) - • • • - • • - • ••••• ••• \4 •••• • --- . ·-....-•-- . - --- . -.-···~~~---,.--:.•-.--:-,-,,~ uo CRXTXOtJlS fog Name GALLCJ',JAY 'J T._. Rank D-JII Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field ·command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector; apply) X X 3 & 12 All AT'?Ac:ann A Date/Watch/Time "B" Watch 4/29-5/7, 5/9-5/15 "A" Watch 4/17-5/22 (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Tactics/I:€ployment 1 (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; TACTICS: I personally have not VvD_ rked unifonn for nearly 18 years. During the riot, I was assigned patrol duties in a black and white. I had not been trained in the use of the MDT or the latest patrol tactics. DEPLOYMENT: On several occasions I was assigned to a fixed post security and was not relieved in a timely manner. On one occasion I was left with an entire squade with no transportation or food. Corrmunications with the comnand post was not adequate. It appeared many fixed posts that were deemed necessary at the beginning of the U/O were continued even after there need had diminished. (Continuation sheets may be used) . . . .. ·-· -. ···•· ... '~ .. ... . . ·--·-- ------ . - . - ···~~~:-,.-- :.·- .-:,--r,~ Name TIEfilIBY, B. - Rank P-~ III · ao CRITIQVI PORK Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force x ---- Fixed Post Security _x __ _ Patrol in Geographic Division _x_. __ _ Other AnAcann A Geographic Area of assignment Command Post; Sector# CENT, RAMP, SW, HWD, WILS, ' 77TH, SE 3 &12 All Date/Watch/Time 4-29/5-17-92 "B" Watch (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Comnand Post Operations (ie Field Jail~ Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; At oeginning, approixmately first week, left. stranded at assigned post, transported by bus even though we had our own cars and radio's. (Continuation sheets may be used) .. . . - .. · - .····· .. ·' • .. ····--.•-..-•-- --- . -.-- --~~~ ---,.-•_ -:.·-.-:,-,,~ r . • uo CRITIQVB PORK Name M:ORE, T • Rank P-JI~ Assignment during u.o. (check •all that · Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply) x x x AT'l'AC!H� Jlft A Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector;; CENT, RAMP, SE, HWD, WILS, SW, NEWT, 77TH 3 & 12 Date/Watch/Time 4-29-92/5-29-92 "B" Watch (if necessary or specific to . this topic) Topic of Discussion: ALL ( ie Field Jail, Squad Tact.ics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; I was assigned a fixed I_X)St, Eorsey High School, dropped off with no transI_X)rtation or focx:i. Tried to contact C.P. at EOW for relief and transI_X)rtation back to C.P. Finally received transI_X)rtation from outside agency back to C.P., 3 1/2 hours after EOW. C. P. was not aware of where we were! ! ! Same situation at intersection directing traffic, waiting for D.O.T. until 10:00 AM. (Continuation sheets may be used) .... -. . -.. ···· .. . \ - .. . .. - . --.----- uo CRITIOVJS PORK Name SABA.IX), f ._ Rank __ P_ , -_r_r _____ _ Assignment during tJ. a. . ( check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply) X X X ATTACH•l1Jff A Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# CENT, RAMP, ·sw, HWD, WILS, 77TH, SE 3 & 12 Date/Watch/Time "B" Watch; 4-29-92/5-20-92 (if necessary or specific to this topic) All Topic of Discussion:---~----------- 1 (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; During the U/0, our unit was assigned to a fixed :E;X)st without trans:E;X)rtation. U:E;X>n calling the C.P. at 54th/Arlington, we were never picked up, and we were left at the fixed post for over three hours. L.A. School Police gave our unit a ride back to the C.P. In addition, once re:E;X)rting to the C.P. it took approximately two to three hours before we were given an assignment. There was alot of standing around and waiting for someone to make a comnand decision. (Continuation sheets may be used) . .. . --· -. ···•· ... '.. .. . .. ·--. •-.--•-- _ _,,,,...--- . -.-···~~~---,.-- :.·-.-~,~ ~ ' . uo CRITIOQI fQRK Name PULLEY' ~ - Rank P-:II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force X ---- Fixed Post Security _x ____ _ Patrol in Geographic Division _x ___ _ Other An'ACHQft A Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# SE, 77TH, HWD, SW, RAMP, WILS, . CENT, NEWT 3 & 12 Date/Watch/Time "B" Watch; 4-29-92/ 5-17-92 (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: All (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) ,,, COMMENTS; Assigned to a fixed post, Ibrsey High School, were unable to make contact with C.P. We were unable to receive transportation at EOW. Received transportation from outside agency who supplied transportation to C.P. (Continuation sheets may be used) · ·•-· ··-· - ·- .. . . . . . ··- . ... ·-· - . .... ... \ ,. ...... · --. -------- ----- . -.- ··-~~~~-,.-- ~----~,~ ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: Sparks, J. Rank: D-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed ·Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: ___ A Watch ___ _ If necessary or specific to this topic) apply): X - -- X - -- Topic of Discussion: See Below (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics-,-Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: On April 30, 1992, I was assigned to E.O.C. and reported to R/C room at Parker Center, I sat in R/C room for several hours. During this period the streets were out of control. Approximately 100 officers were present. Several captains and lieutenants were present. It took several hours before any of us were deployed. Once deployed we ended up in Newton Area, we were told to go out into the streets and try to save everything north of the Santa Monica. Freeway·, as south of the freeway was already on fire. We had a plain car, no emergency equipment, and one hand held radio. I'm still not sure who was on the other end of the radio. We were at one location and a crowd of approximately 400 persons were looting. We arrived and started to disperse the looters. When a shot is fired from someone in the group, the person that got hit was a male black, near us I attempted to get help for us and medical treatment using the police radio, no response. If preparation was made it certainly did not show up where I was · at, simple things like bookings, deploying, and radios should at least of been in tune, and wasn't. Name: Pixler, R. Rank: D-II UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post apply): Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# 12/3 Sector# Date/Watch/Time: ____ B __ _ (If necessary or specific to this topic) X Topic of Discussion: Command Post (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Opetations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: The field command post was poorly run, it appeared that no one had given any thought to the assignment of the next watch until it arrived it ·took as long as two hours to be assigned. This took place not only during the first few days of the riot, but throughout the u.o. I was surprised to find that three sergeants were assigned the duty of handing out radios, car keys and shotguns, is this an appropriate assignment for sen1or supervisors? I rate . our performance during the riot as poor. We need ·some leadership. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: HAMMOND, A. Rank: P-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _X_ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: S/W, S/E, 77TH, NEWTON, RAMPART, HOLLYWOOD, WILSHIRE Command . Post# Sector# _UNK_ Date/Watch/Time: "B' Watch, 04/29/92 - 05/24/92 (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: My initial impression of the u.o. was one of confusion within the command element. Upon arrival at my division during the .first week, I was forced to sit around an await further instructions. Upon receiving instructions to report to CP, transportation was an obvious problem and further "Standing Around" was necessary awaiting a bus. Eventually arriving at a CP, more waiting was required while equipment (primarily police cars) were located and dispersed (generally with one rover per car - not tactically sound). . Now after "3" to 115" hours, I was dispatched. My instructions being to patrol from point "A" to "B" and "C" to "D". No mission, no purpose - instructions were unclear and unspecific. My average working day for the first week approximated 15-17 hours per day. This was a result of not being relieved in a timely manner (especially if one was assigned to a fixed post). Upon being relieved and returning to CP it was then a case of attempting to locate transportation back to division (sometimes another hour) add to that driving time home - this adds up to tired, ineffective officers with low morale. I believe one of the "worst" things I experienced during the u.o. was the inability of those supervisors unable to make a command decision and the continuous "passing of the buck" a scene I witnessed many times. It was obvious to all (except command) the last week of the u.o. was a waste of manpower, time and money. Other than a show of strength (too late) there were police patrolling police on virtually empty streets for hours on end seemingly with no purpose. A 'standby' unit would have served as well. "Ready reserve" is not an uncommon element in most para-military units. It is apparent we were not prepared for this however, we did appear to recover somewhat by the second week (of course nothing much happened after the first week). Placing detectives who have not been in ·the field in years, in uniform was a serious mistake and it is only by good luck a tragedy did not occur. One can not expect an officer who has never seen a rover - inside of ·a black and white to receive a five minute block of instruction and then take to- the streets. Tactics and equipment change over the years and it is obvious training for some officers does not. After the initial 72 hours, I believe the effort put forth was effective - however, a little to late. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: SANCHEZ, J. Rank: P-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post apply) : Field Task Force _X_ _X_ _x_ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Other Division _X_ Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: BOTH "A" AND "B" WATCH (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: SO. END (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: This was the poorest show of LAPD organization I have ever seen. To be assigned a position took about three to four hours. Which meant once you were out there, you weren't relieved. After a "12" hour shift, it was more like "15" hours. Walking around were Sergeants that didn't assist you if they didn't know you. Lieutenants that expected you to bow you head while they walked by. P-II's and P-III's so confused at what they could or could not do. I believe most of this confusion occurred due to the . lack of support by this department towards its owri officers. No one wanted to take charge or even make a decision. This is not a surprise after seeing -the in-house fighting. This had a great effect on the moral of its officers. All this showed was when a P-II or P-III gets discipline he takes his medicine, a Lieutenant or Captain screws u~ he goes off on IOD, claiming the department is after him. · During the U.O there was no strategy. The only ones who had any . tactics and strategy were Metro. To put a bunch of old timer detectives in uniform probably made this department look bigger than life. Yet with their "real" street experience was a hair raising experience. To take a police officer from day watch and put him on the street on a so called "12" hour shift and expect him to adjust to it over night .is a joke. After a shift with your blood pumping, going home dog tired, it sets up officers to make mistakes if not to himself to some one else. I personally was lucky to get four hours of sleep. Only towards the end . of this mess, did the command post begin to make sense. To put it in a nut shell, there was no strategy, tactics, logistics, and personnel were not used correctly. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: ANDERSON, C. Rank: D-III Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post apply): Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other X X Geographic Area of Assignment: All South Bureau Area's except .Harbor Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: 1800/0600 "B" Watch for initial 2 weeks (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: 1) Field jail took entirely too long to process an arrestee. 2) 3) 4) 5) At least one half of the two weeks I was assigned to patrol South Bureau Area's and I was given a Valley Area rover. · Way to much time was wasted by reporting to our Division first then waiting to be assigned to a particular Bureau C.P. and then being assigned to another Area satellite C.P. - probably a minimum of 2 hours daily. It seems one Bureau C.P. would be more than sufficient. The satellite C.P. 's were not necessary and a waste of manpower; in my opinion. During the first week of the riots I was assigned to "B" Watch in various South Bureau Area's and was not relieved until usually between 0800 to 0900 hours, the second week I was usually relieved ort time. Being reliev~d on time should be given much more consideration, mainly because of the fatigue factor which leads to safety concerns. There were entirely to many people standing around at the various C. P. 's doing nothing and nobody appeared to be in charge or knew what was going on. In general there appeared to be a lack of planning and organization. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: HEINLEIN, B. Rank: D-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _X_ Fixed Post. Security Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Fire and Ambulance escort Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: S/Bureau, W/Bureau (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: I worked the LA Riots from 4-29-92 to 5-23-92, all but one day I was assigned to "B" Watch. At the beginning of the U0.1 s · quads from my division reported to PAB at the start of the watch, then drove to the 54th and Arlington Command Post where we all checked in. I feel approximately 1-2 hours of my watch were wasted just checking in and waiting for assignments. After a few days the same procedure occurr.ed until smaller command ·posts were opened and units had to go to .the secondary locations which caused additional delays. There seemed to be very little planning and direction as to what the units were to do. On about seven occasionsJ rover radios were not available and smaller, low powered radios were issued jeopardizing officers s~fety. Two nights the black and white vehicle MDT's were B/0 and no other vehicles available. Units were ·instructed that the field jail was operational and smaller buses would be sent out to transport prisoners so all involved field units would not be tied up, the buses never arrived and when the Command Post was contacted units were told to either transport themselves or release the prisoners. Fixed post units were not relieved on time and often were not relieved at all by supervision, but at the request of other officers. Some personnel were actually shown EOW while still on duty; again jeopardizing officer safety. ATTACHMENT A UO. CRITIQUE FORM Name: LEE, B. Rank: D-I Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ _X_ -~- Other South Bureau - Hollywood Division Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "A" & "B" (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: S/E, 77th, Hollywood, S/W Variou~ (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: 1) Lack of police safety equipment, face shield, new bullet proof vest, radios, etc. 2) No roll call intel in gang act and mission was not clear and who was in charge· of Command Post. 3) Lack of maps of area to be patrolled coordination at Command Post operation. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: MCCARTY, D. Rank: D-I Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post apply) : Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: (If necessary or specific to this topic) _X_ _x_ SIB Various Topic of Discussion: C.P.O (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: 1) Poor radio equipment. 2) Slow on assignments and deployment. 3) Lack of up dated intelligence info for officer safety/no roll call info. Name: SUGGS, R. Rank: D..:.rr UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _X_ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other BAD DESK FIXED POST Geographic Area of Assignment: 77th, S/E Command Post# Sector# Various Date/Watch/Time: (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: A lack of preparation at the Command Post 54th and Arlington. To . much manpower was wasted waiting for an assignment. Radios and communication was inadequate and in some cases useless. After a few days when it was apparent that the major part of the riot was over, much of the personnel should have returned to their normal duties. -~ - - -- - - - - - - ---- - --- ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: TOLEDO, P. Rank: D-I Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _X_ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division _x_ ·_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# . Sector# Date/Watch/Time: 4-29/5-19-92 (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: 77th, SED, & Wil South Bureau Various (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: 1) Very slow on assignments and deployment of officers. 2) Lack of intelligence for officer use, in regard to information on gangs (for officer safety). 't 3) Lack of information from command . staff on the current situation. Also lack of confi~ence from the command staff. 4) Lack of logistics between National Guard and LAPD units. (Neither. one knew what the other was doing.) ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: VALDEZ, · E. Rank: D-I Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Fire Station Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# apply) : _X_ _X_ _X_ Ramp, 77th, S/W, S/E, Ntn Date/Watch/Time: "A" & "B" Watch, 4/29-5/26 (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: 1) Extremely poor planning - Department should have been better prepared to handle such critical incident. 2) Lack of proper equipment - outdated, · radios, vest, etc. Placed officers in dangerous situations, and prevented them to effectively conduct their missions. 3) Lack of training of, in riot/U.O. situations of non-street personnel, such as baton skills, squad tactics, patrol procedures, etc. placed many officers is peril. r . • uo CRXTXOVI PORK Name ~HE.VO/..E~. T; Rank 'l) • I Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center X Field Command Post --x-- Field Task Force x Fixed Post Security --x-- Patrol in Geographic Division Other PARAMEDIC ESCORT Geographic Area of assignment CITY WIDE . Command Post # VARIOUS Sector# VARI0U5 Date/Watch/Timewot:;J<:EP BOTH A AND B WATCHES, THEN 1"10DIFIED NIGHT WATCH (if necessary or specific to this topic) SHIFTS. Topic of Discussion: OVERALL OPERATION (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; THIS PAST 1992 RIOTS WAS A REAL EYE OPENER FOR ME. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO COMMENT OR CRITIQUE ON SITUATIONS THAT ARE A30VE MY COMPREHENSION. I WILL COMMENT ON SITUATIONS I WAS INVOLVED IN PERSONALLY OR SAW ON TELEVISION. I THINK THE THING THAT BOTHERED ME HOST OF' ALL WAS TO SEE: THAT THERE WAS NO RE SPONSE BY OUR DEPARTMENT TO HELPLESS M0TGRIS'fS WHO WERE BEING PULLED FROM THEIR VEEICLES AND CRITICALLY BEATEN ON THE CORNEk OF F~0RENCE AND N0RMANDIE. I PER SONALLY HAVE SPOKEN TO BROTHER 0FFICE~WH0 TOLD ME THAT THEY WERE HELD BACK FROM RESPONDING TO HELP THESE CITIZENS. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS. I THINK OVERALL t.-.JE DID A GOOD jQB WITH THE FERSONNEL AND EQUIPTMENT THAT WAS AVAILABLE TO US. WITH A RIOT OF THIS MAGITLJDE THERE ARE GOING TO BE PROBLEMS frJITH THE ENTIRE OPERATION. THERE IS NO GETTING AWAY FROM THE FACT THAT THE R0DN' EY KING INCIDENT MIGHT iiAVE INFLUENCED A GREAT DEAL OF THE DECISIONS IN VOLVED IN THESE RIOTS AS FAR AS THE USE OF F0RtE IS CONCERNED. WE CAN'T PUT OUR BUSINESS COMMUNITY O& THE GOOD CITIZENS OF THIS CITY SECOND TO SUPERVISION OR MANAGEMENT WHO ARE AFRAID TO MAKE A DECISION. WHEN YOU i...OSE THE C0NFIDE~CE · OF THE PEOPLE THAT YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO PROTECT, THEN ~'JK{ E·✓EN HAVE A POLICE Z-lEPT. IF IN FACT IT IS PROVEN THAT SUPERVISION OR MANAGEMENT IS GUILTY OR LIABLE FOR THIS LACK OF RESP0NCE THEN I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THEM DELT WITH JUST AS SEVERELY AS THIS DEPARTMENT WOULD WANT TO DISCIPLINE A P-11. ONE OTHER THING THAT KIND OF GETS UNDER MY SKIN. IT HAS BEE. N 51 DAYS SINCE THE RIOTS BEGAN. ALL OTHER AGENCIES INVOLVED H.\VE BEEN PAID OR COMPENSATED FOR THEIR OVERTIME. I. M TIRED OF HEARING WHAT A GOOD JOB WE DID AND HO\-'J MUCH IT WAS APPRECIATED. LETS SEE SOME CASH. (Continuation sheets may be used) ..... - ::· -· ..... . , ... , .... . -.•-.--•-- - c .. - ..... . ·-. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: BYUN, J. Rank: D-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) -~ Various Topic of Discussion: Command post operations/equip (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: Underutilization/lack of equipment, causing long delays at the beginning of Watch. Inadequate training/preparation. Lack of leadership by command personnel. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: HOWE, S. Rank: D-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "A" & "B" Watch apply) : _X_ South Bureau 3 various (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Command post-communications (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post opsrations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: Many man hours were wasted at the C.P. waiting for assignments. It seemed that too many people were in charge. Communications (re: radios and frequencies) were a nightmare. Many • night we were issued radios that appeared to be of very low quality, made for home use. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: KAGELE, A. Rank: D-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center · Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post s~curity _X_ _X_ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Fire station guard team Geographic Area of Assignment: 2,12,3,7 Command Post# 2 & 3 . Sector # 4 , 2 , 3 ' Date/Watch/Time: 4/29/92-5/17/92 "B" Watch, 1800 hours (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Op~rations, etc .. ·.) COMMENTS: Detectives have not been trained in the past few years in squad formations and should they have been - needed no one would know the signals being given by the squad leaders. No one has practiced the different squad formations or the baton technics. The command post operations, were poor the first few days. The big thing on the first few nights - there wasn't any food; no organization. They could have had the mobile canteen there and give officers in the field relief so they could eat. Name: LOVOLD, W. Rank: D-III UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _X_ Fixed Post Security _X __ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: S/E, 77th, S/W, Wils · Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: Days "A" - one "B" Watch night (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command .Post Op~rations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: Initially nobody seemed to know what to do. My squad was assigned to station security at Parker Center on the first day guarding the flower pots in front. on the second day we were given the same assignment even though 73 Army troops were across the street guarding City Hall. Seems that if someone were to use . some initiative they could have moved the Army one block east and they could then guard the sacred Police Headquarters. I was amazed at how suddenly good equipment (vests, helmet shields, batons, etc.) became available during the riot. We could never get this equipment especially ·new vests to replace the 20 year old ones we were issued. The lapse time between EOW and being relieved was to long. Sometimes hours would pass after the end of your 12 hours shift before they would find replacement for you. This would happen even though men were standing around the c. P. awaiting orders and assignment. Communications was lacking with different radio channels being used on rovers. As the riots continued things smoothed out a little but overall I was embarrassed as other Departments got to see us in our initial stages and how screwed up we were. Experienced field commanders were not evident. 77th and S/E Division sergeants would have done a much better job. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: Marentez, G. Rank: P-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply): X - -- x - -- x - -- x Geographic Area of Assignment: S/E,77th, Wils, Ramp.,S/W Command Post# -CP-3 Sector# Don't Recall Date/Watch/Time: Unk Dates "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Logistics (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command P9st Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: Throughout this so-called u.o., there was nothing but random chaos; can't even call it organized. Most .of management was too busy on ego-trips wanting their orders .to be obeyed: A case of "Too many c.hief s and not enough indians" . My opinion is that we have too many squints writing manuals for "this and that" but when it came right down to practical application, they all went out the window. Confusion, lack of decision-making abilities, and power struggles were the key factors that made this already tarnished department look like a greater fool in the eyes of not only the nation, but the world. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: ROSS, M. Rank: P-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _X_ Fixed Post Security _X_ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: 04-30-92, 0600, A WATCH (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: S/E, S/W, 77TH, CENT, HWD, WIL, RAMP _X_ _X_ · (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, .command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: I would like to start by saying to the best of my knowledge, I was never prepared a month prior to the King verdict for a possible riot incident as was mentioned to the media by our command. Although I am prepared with my equipment the-re was never a refresher course on squad formation and riot control. I have been out of patrol a short time and I do remember many of the riot tactics. Many of the detectives I worked with during the riots have been out of patrol for many years with little or no knowledge of riot tactics. · The night of the King verdict I sat at home watching the TV news wondering what happened to the number one police department in the world not doing their job we were trained for, to save the victims of unnecessary assaults. That night I received three phone calls from my Sergeant advising me to come to work in uniform. Each call was to change the time I was being assigned. This was the beginning of a unorganized, poorly planned incident by the higher command. In the days to follow, I went into work ready to do my job just to be told to wait in my office for my assignment. After "5" to "6" hours, I was· assigned, just to receive more of the same not being relieved at end of watch for "l" to "4" hours. Of course this was the beginning and I can honestly say that towards the end things were more organized. UO CRITIQUE FORM ROSS, Max _ Page two My advice, go back to basic's and get the politics out of the Department. ATTACHMENT A Name: SALDANA, E. Rank: P-II UO CRITIQUE FORM - Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Em~rgency Operations Center Field Command Post _X_ Field Task Force Fixed Post Security _X_ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: 77TH, S/E, S/W Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: Numerous (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: The first two days of u.o. were filled with doubt about what our role was going to be. I felt that we (our unit) were being neglected by command staff. I later changed my opinion about being neglected to just being forgotten. I honestly felt that a break down in command structure resulted in our unit not being deployed at a critical time. I sat at my desk in full uniform waiting for assignments while looting and burning was occurring in this city. Reports that man power shortages in police personnel were one contributing factor to Rampart lawlessness only added to my frustration ·of not being deployed. On the fourth day through the remainder of the u.o., I experienced additional _frustration because relief watches were slow in relieving us. Food was boxed, or hot meals were cold. Days off were changed back and forth; as well as watches. Assignments were handed out with no instructions. - - - - - - - -------- ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: GONZALES, s. Rank: P-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# apply) : _X_ _x_ _X_ S/E, S/W, 77TH Date/Watch/Time: 04/29/92, "B" Watch, 1800 (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: I felt the U.O was a disaster. Not only did we (LAPD) have to contend with the wrath from the citizens of Los Angeles but we had no support from our own within the Department. Many times we were told to respond to an area, only to stand around and wait before given an assignment. Once we got an assignment, at end of watch time, it took "2" to "3" hours to be relieved. Many times an assignment wasn't given until close to end of watch. Then again, not relieved until "2" to 11 3 11 hours later, after already standing and waiting around a full 11 12 11 hours. This happened because decisions were not made. There was not a prepared plan. Many police officees were stepping on each other with nothing constructive being accomplished. This was "operation overkill." ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: EVANS, D. Rank: SGT-I Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Fiel_ d Command Post Field Task Force _X_ Fixed Post Security _X_ Patrol in Geographic Division _ ·X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: S/W, S/E, & 77th _1._ Command Post~ Sector# Various Date/Watch/Time: Various hours, "A" watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Response, Squad Tactics, C.P. Operations (i.e. - Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: Response: On a scale of 11 1 11 to 11 10 11 , with 1 being the lowest, our response to the riots was 11 1 11 • The riot wasn't controlled by our Department; it was just over. There .were a lot of Police Officers and Sergeants who wanted to do something, but like good subordinates, · they waited for their orders and wanted to be lead, but that never materialized. There was a saying during the riots, it was, "We were damned if we do or damned if we don't." If that was the case, then we ·should have done something. Squad Tactics: There was no set mission, except for high visibility patrol. From talking to younger officers in the field, I detected a lack of confidence in themselves to even make a decision. Comm.and Post Operations: The Command Post at 54th and Arlington never really functioned smoothly until about 11 2 11 to 11 3" days before the Department de~mobilized it. The field task force at the Coliseum functioned at an acceptable level, but the amount of personnel was excessive . . An example was a Sergeant assigning "meal tickets" that were never used. UO CRITIQUE EVANS, Dave Page 2 General Observations: I worked Parker Center during the first days of the riots. There were a lot of bodies who were not doing a thing except looking for a place to hide and getting off at a reasonable hour. I know there was a lack of equipment, but Offic_ ers improvised and converted their "cool cars" to unmarked police vehicles. The biggest problem was relief at end of watch. The personnel officer at the command post shouldn't go end of watch until the personnel in his watch were accounted for. We were forgotten numerous times. Suggestion: I think the Department should get away from the "A/B Watch". Perhaps establish a "C" watch, all o:fi which would be twelve hour .shifts, but would over lap. It would ensure relief and cover the peak hours of u.o. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: THORESON, R. Rank: D-III Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security _X_ _X_ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "A" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: S/W, 77th, S/E Coliseum Various (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: During the first few days of the riot there seemed to be a complete paralysis in the decision making process of the Department's command staff, especially in Sou.th Bureau and Central Bureau. I was embarrassed for myself and the Department during most of this incident. I feel that the main problem, barring some logistical shortcomings, was the command staff's lack of flexibility in deploying personnel. Staff become too wrapped up in the fixed post security vis a vis mobility - a lesson learned in the Civil War, much less not learned by our Department command staff by 1992. On the first night of the riot, Wednesday, April 29, 1992 I was off on vacation. I saw the early hours of the riot on tv and called my Division to see if I should come in. This was around 8 p.m. I was told to stand~by. At approximately 9 p.m. I received a call and was told not to be concerned. At nearly 10:30 p.m., - I received a call to report in uniform to "A" Watch at 0600 on 4-30-92. The Mayor's office was calling for the National Guard before our Department was even calling in its police officers. I actually wondered at the time of this wasn't intentional. During the entire day of 4-30-92 hundreds of uniformed officers sat around the building at Parker Center "providing security," while dozens of "officer-needs-help" calls were made from only blocks away and we were told to sit around and .do nothing. We could see what needed to be done on tv but our . management could make no decisions. UO CRITIQUE FORM THORESON, R. Page 2 On 5-1-92 we were deployed to the field at RTD Terminal at 52nd and Van Ness; deployment and relief took hours. Radios were almost useless. Different frequencies and different messages made communications a mess. Meals were horrible - relief a long time coming. on day watch there was no field jail for processing our multiple arrests creating great difficulty in court two weeks later. Shifts that should have been 12 hours were 14 to 16 hours. We reported to the Division and then to the C.P. - a loss of time. There appeared to be a lack of aggressiveness in putting down the rioters. It seemed like no one was in charge and there was no plan. On Saturday there was a demonstration in downtown and the demonstrators were arrested after being given a dispersal order but were surrounded and not given a chance to disperse. It appeared the commander just wanted "numbers" to arrest without good cause. Many peaceful demonstrators with children wanted to leave but were blocked. There appeared to be a mis-utilization of persohnel. We become security guards - not riot police. We failed to respond rapidly in strength. We were slow to use force. It seemed like our intelligence on the rioters was non-existent. Lastly, I feel that the politicians and media were in no small way also responsible. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: SIMS, G. Rank: D-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post _X_ Field Task Force Fixed Post Security _X_ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "A" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: 77th, S/E Coliseum (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) l COMMENTS: The command post was not established in a timely manner, was improperly staffed, and lacked clear and concise orders or direction from senior Department staff officers. Department improperly used Department personnel without considering their training or special skills. Indi vidu·a1s were used to plug any opening requiring a warm body. This was understandable on the first day but not on the fourth or fifth day. Most field jails were improperly prepared resulting in poor prosecution of arrestees. It appears that most of our leaders are more concerned with their ability to promote and avoid making decisions that could affect their promotions. The Departments constant desire to always hold someone accountable may have affected the ability of supervisors to make important decisions. As a whole, the Department either over reacts or under reacts. After the first night of the riot Parker Center security was over staffed leaving numerous officers standing around while help calls were being put out a few blocks away. Leaving officers of all ranks in large pools or at their Divisions for hours prior to assignment is clearly a sign of poor planning and a lack of leadership by mid level and upper command staff. UO CRITIQUE FORM SIMS, G. Page 2 Communications is an area that failed. This may be directly related to LAPD always studying a thing to death, then starting a project, and then modifying the project to meet needs that the system was not originally designed to handle. In today's modern news media era perhaps the Department should · invest in a few tv's and place them at the command post to allow commanders to view "real time" activity. (Live tv photo's and video of the event in progress.) This riot was a disgrace and a failure by command to provide clearly rapid and proper leadership. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: HETRICK, G Rank: D-III Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security _X_ _X_ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) S/E, 77th, S/W, Hwd, Ramp 2 & 3 Various Topic of Discussion: Command po~t and sector patrol (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: The command staff at 54/Arlington seemed to be fairly organized in the early stages. When the CP moved to the Coliseum it became stalled. Too much time was wasted prior to any assignments and once assigned it was slow obtaining vehicles, radios and shotguns. It appeared there was a plan but it was not followed. The reverse was even worse at EOW. My evaluation of the command staff at the Coliseum CP was a "F." The command staff lacked leadership and common sense. The best part of the shift was always the changing of the· vehicles at the CP Commander parking space between Commander Banks and Hunt. What a sight to see. That was more important than riot logistics. Once assigned I question 10 officers at a burned out, to the ground, · shopping center. Maybe someone on the Department is sleeping with ABC Market or Boys Market. Once assigned ·to the Division and sector patrol the Divisions had no plans for the deployment of additional personnel and did not seem relieved to see at a minimum of 10 more cars in their Division. It seems a little unfair to not have let the Valley Divisions participate in the riot deployment and not force personnel to work 100+ overtime hours in the first two weeks. If it wasn't for the Valley we wouldn't have even been there. UO CRITIQUE FORM HETRICK, G Page two If the. command staff would get their heads and body to physically enjoin the field troops doing routine police work and not maintain their paper chase/castle they would be more in tune to managing a command post not filling up file cabinets with "nice to know" proj~cts, papers and audits. I am truly embarrassed for the staff officers and their "part" in the managing during the riots. Name: ALLEN, R.D. Rank: D-III UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during U.O. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _X_ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post #3 _X_ Sector# Various Date/Watch/Time: · 11 A" and "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Field task force - squad leader ( i ~ e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ). COMMENTS: Our inability to protect the citizens and Fire Fighters at the initial onset was an embarrassment to me personally as well as the integrity of this Department. I personally know that we had done our homework and Metro was trained and responding to the initial incident. Only because of fear and possible political concessions by Central and South Bureau command did we not respond in inadequate numbers. We at BAD sat around for a complete day and a half before we were deployed. When we finally were deployed on Day Watch our mission was always unclear and consisted solely of a . uniform presence. Arrests were down played and when we did arrest a large amount of looters field jails were not ready _ for the volume. The one shinning leader in this disaster was - Commander LaChasse. He exemplified what the citizens of this city were desperately in need of, "A leader." His deployment o_ f squads were carefully orchestrated with a specific mission to get the job done as quickly and efficiently as possible. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE . FORM Name: MYRDAHL, M. Rank: D-III Assignment during U.O. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "B" Watch apply) : _X_ 77th, SED, & Wil CPIZ and the Coliseum Various (If necessary or specific · to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Command Post and Filed Task force operations (i.e. Field Jail·, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: 1) Too much time was spend on transportation to and from the Command Post, causing long delays at shift change resulting in unnecessary overtime and fatigue. 2) There always seemed to be a lot of confusion at the various C.P. 's. Officers were just standing around, waiting for something to do. There appeared to be a lack of planning and organization. 3) There was little or no intelligence info given to officers prior to going into the filed - -all of the intelligence info received (in the field) came from LASD or the Housing Authority Police. 4) Basic safety equipment was lacking in many cases. Detectives had old, out-dated body armor, no face shields for their helmets, and rovers that frequently did not work. - - ------ ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: CORRAL, J. Rank: D-I Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security _X_ _X_ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post # · Sector# Date/Watch/Time: (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: _X_ VARIED (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: 1) Failure by the command structure to assign officer promply. Detective personnel had their own ·assigned vehicles and were not allowed to use them. This crippled the immediate response time. 2) Very poor radio communications, hampered officers out in the field. 3) The food provided was of poor quality. 4) Relief for officers was often put off for hours due to poor planning. ,r t' ' ., , ·- June 28, 1992 . 8.2.5 INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE TO: Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau FROM: Commanding Officer, Burglary-Auto Theft Division SUBJECT: AFfER-ACTION REPORT FOR THE APRIL/ MAY RIOTS DIVISIONAL OVERVIEW: The Commanding Officer and other personnel of Burglary-Auto Theft Division (BAD) were off duty and at home on the evening of April 29, 1992 .. Upon learning of the beginning to the riotous conditions, Captain Whitley made contact with his section OIC's in preparation for mobilization. Prior to being mobilized by Detective Headquarters Division (DHD), Captain Whitley contacted DHD and requested direction. He was eventually informed that BAD's "B" watch was to be activated and assembled at BAD's office at Parker Center. The off duty section OIC's made timely notifications and the "B", and subsequently the "A" watch the following morning, reported in a timely manner as directed. Once personnel arrived at BAD, delays of up to three hours were experienced before assignments were made and BAD personnel were deployed. Burglary-Auto Theft Division deployed squads to the command post at 54th Street and Arlington on the first night of mobilization. Personnel assigned to the "A" watch were deployed as Parker Center security on April 29th - 30th, 1992. For the remained of the mobilization, BAD deployed squads on both the "A" and "B" watches to functions in West Bureau and South Bureau. Even though Captain Whitley has been trained as a member of the Field Command Post <;:adre as a sergeant, a Iieutenan~ and a captain in the operations functions, he was never called upon to perform any of those functions during the entire riot period. Captain Whitley's first personal involvement in the riots occurred on April 30th when he was assigned by Commander White of Detective Services Group (DSG) to monitor station security at Parker Center. In carrying-out that assignment, Captain Whitley learned that CP-1 (Central Area) also had the assignment for security at Parker Center and a minor conflict developed and had to be resolved with a Central C' - 1, , . · Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 2 8.2.5 Area lieutenant. Captain Whitley assumed responsibility for Parker Center property and Central Area assumed the surrounding area. His second personal involvement occurred on May 2nd. Even though unassigned to the security detail around the Civic Center area, Captain Whitley observed an unlawful assembly of over 200 people at Los Angeles Street and Second Street advancing upon Parker Center. Recognizing that the ten officer squad from Bunco Forgery Division (BFD) deployed at Los Angeles Street and First Street would be unable to stop and control the crowd, Captain Whitley mobilized three other squads in the immediate area, stopped the crowds advance at First Street, and moved them back to Second Street, where they were dispersed. Two arrests were made at Captain Whitley's direction. Subsequent to Captain Whitley's involvement in this situation, he had co11tact with Commander Moore of Operations-Central Bureau (OCB), who thanked him for his actions. ' PERSONNEL CRITIQUE SUMMARIES: The following information is a summary of the critiques complet~d by assigned sworn personnel of Burglary-Auto Theft Division. The opinions varied, however many officers agreed on numerous issues. Command Post Operations: • The command staff at 54th and Arlington seemed to be fairly organized in the early stages. When the command post was moved to the coliseum it stalled. Too much time was wasted prior to any personnel assignments and once assigned, the deployment was slowed due to the process of issuing vehicles, radios and shotguns. • The command post improperly used Department personnel without considering their training or special skills. Individual officers were used to fill any openings requiring a "warm body". This practice was certainly understandable on the first day but not on days four or five. ____. To much time was wasted requiring officers to report to BAD first and then waiting to be assigned to a Bureau CP, and finally an Area CP. The satellite CP's were a waste of time and manpower. ~ • In general, there appeared to be a total lack of planning and organization at the CP's in the first week. f ' i' l, ." Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 3 8.2.5 _,,. • Being relieved on time at end of watch (EOW) should have been given much more consideration, mainly because of the fatigue factor and officer safety. After spending 15 to 17 hours a day in a very high stress situation, officers drove home to rest and due to distances traveled, a maximum of only 4 to 5 hours of sleep in between shifts were not uncommon. Du~ to logistical problems 12 hour shifts rapidly turned into longer and longer days and nights. Logistics: • Under utilization or lack of proper equipment caused long delays at the beginning of every watch. • A lack of food for field personnel was evident. A mobile santeen or catering truck and relief officers should have been provided so the field personnel could eat. • Some detectives at BAD were amazed at how suddenly "good equipment" (vests, helmet face shields and batons) became available during the riots. Patrol officers were given money a few years ago to purchase new vests. Most detectives were still using the vest that were issued to them over 20 years ago. • The time lapse between EOW and being relieved was too long. Two to three hour delays were not uncommon even though relief personnel were awaiting orders and assignments at the CP's. • Vehicles at the CP's should have been separated by B/W and plain cars and parked in separate areas which could have avoided time wasted trying to locate the vehicles. _ ____ • Some officers assigned to fixed-post positions were deployed without transportation or food. Attempts to contact the CP's by radio failed. Officers were forced to search for rides back to the CP's causing delays of up to 3 hours after the end of their 12 hour shifts. In many cases, the CP's were not even aware the officers were still in the field. ---- • There was a lack of available maps . of the Areas to be patrolled. ,. Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 4 8.2.5 Field Jails: • Units were instructed that the field jails were operational and small buses would be sent out to transport arrestees so all of the involved field units would not be tied up. However, the buses never arrived and when contacted, the CP advised units to transport the arrestees themselves or release them. • Field jails took entirely too long to process arrestees. • Most field jails were not adequately prepared resulting in poor prosecutions. Intelligence: _____ • Little or no intelligence information existed to be given to field units prior to being deployed on their shifts. What little intelligence information we did receive came from outside agencies such as the LASD or the Housing Authority Police. Communications: --- • Communications during the first few days and nights was a "nightmare". Different frequencies and messages made. communicating a disaster. Calls for help and medical assistance went unanswered. Some officers felt there was "no one at home on the other end of the radio." A very frustrating feeling indeed. • Officers assigned to patrol South Bureau were on many occasions given Valley Bureau radios by mistake. • _ In some instances, we used BAD divisional vehicles for the first few days and we only had the old tactical frequencies Tac 1 and Tac 3. Many times officers didn't even know what was happening around them. Many Department radios also were issued to outside agencies and the military in order to integrate them into our communications system which caused a short supply of radios. • On many occasions, ROVERS were not available and smaller, low-powered radios were issued. Personnel and Training: • Inadequate training and preparation for this UO was evident. Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau · Page 5 8.2.5 • • -- • Most detectives have not been trained in crowd control and squad formations for years. Most were totally unfamiliar with squad techniques and hand signals. Most older detectives have never been trained in the use of the side-handle baton. Most detectives have not been trained in the use of the MDTs used in B/W police vehicl~s nor were they even familiar with how to remove a shotgun from the shotgun rack. FIELD OPERATIONS AND TACTICS: • We failed to secure pawnshops and gun stores with major supplies of firearms and ammo which are now on the streets of Los Angeles., • No special weapons were deployed within the squads even after the huge exchanges of AK-47 gunfire. Even some CHP officers, although primarily noted mainly for traffic enforcement, had 223 caliber Mini-14 Semi-Automatic rifles. 1 • After the first night of the riots, Parker Center security was over staffed leaving many officers standing around while "help calls" were being broadcast only a few blocks away in the downtown area. • During a downtown demonstration, demonstrators were given a dispersal order but were surrounded and not given a chance to disperse. Many peaceful demonstrators with children wanted to leave but were blocked and arrested. • Officers were transported by buses to scenes where looting had been reported, · only to find the call was hours old. The buses did not remain at the scene and thereby stranding the officers when they could have been used elsewhere. LEADERSHIP: • Indecision, fear and possible political concerns by Central and South Bureau command staff kept the Department from responding in adequate numbers at the initial onset of the riots. When finally deployed, our mission was unclear. Arrests were discouraged and when we were allowed to make arrests, field jails were not prepared for the volume. -I Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 6 8.2.5 • A total lack of leadership. One thirty year veteran detective stated "I was embarras ~ ed as other departments got to see how "screwed-up" we were in the initial stages of the riots." "Experienced field commanders were not evident". "Seventy-Seventh and Southeast Area sergeants would have done a much better job." • One detective pointed out a "shinning example" of a leader in Commander Scott LaChasse. "He exemplified himself as a command officer." His deployment of squads were carefully orchestrated with a specific mission to get the job accomplished as quickly and efficiently as possible. • It appeared most of our "leaders" were more concerned with their ability to promote and avoided making decisions that could jeopardize their "climb to the top." • This riot was a disgrace and a failure by command staff officers to clearly provide rapid and proper leadership. \ • There seemed to be a reluctance to utilize necessary force by the command staff. A management oriented command staff is totally ineffective in a crisis. We need leaders not managers. PERSONAL FEELINGS: • Our inability to protect the citizens and fire fighters at the initial onset of the riots was an embarrassment to the men and women of this Department. • The rank-in-file police officers were ready and eager to receive their orders . . The troops were initially enthusiastic until the lack of leadership became self evident. As a result, moral on this Department is at an all-time low. • The use of veteran detectives without proper training, equipment and knowledge of squad tactics was ill-advised. These veteran detectives should have been used in other ways_ where their expertise and experience could be put to good use; and for officer safety. Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 7 8.2.5 • The command staff of this Department should be held accountable for their actions or lack of action and should be disciplined just as rapidly and severely as this Department's command staff would discipline a police officer or detective in a similar situation. • Personnel from BAD have expressed concern about their personal image as law enforcement officers and the image of the Los Angeles Police Department as a whole. The mending process has started, however it will not be easy and will take a joint effort between the line-officers, detectives, patrol supervisors, lieutenants and the command staff. RECOMMENDATIONS: • • • • • • • Detectives who still have old ineffective vests be immediately issued new vests as safety equipment by the Department Detectives be immediately issued and trained in the use of side-handle baton . Televisions should be placed in the CP's to allow field comrrianders to view "real-time" activities (live television and videotape of the events in progress). Devise a way to identify the shop numbers of vehicles from a distance to speed up deployment of the field units at the CP's. Perhaps a temporary white cardboard with the shop number largely printed with a black felt pen. The sign could be placed on the windshield when parked and put in the trunk when the vehicle was in use. Develop a "C" watch which would also be a 12 hour shift. The shifts would _ overlap but it would ensure a relief factor and cover the "peak" hours of the u.o. One of the biggest problems was relief at EOW. The officer-in-charge of personnel at the CP should not be allowed to go EOW until all the personnel from his watch are accounted for. Establish a cadre of liaison personnel from which to draw in the event of a U.O. requiring LAPD representation. Because of the possibility that National Guard troops may again be in a U.O. ·and the fact that such support is by doctrine administered from the LASO Emergency Operations Center (EOC), Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 8 8.2.5 the cadre personnel designated should have sufficient military experience and understanding to fa~ilitate communications with military personnel. • Immediately assign LAPD liaison personnel from the established cadre to the LASD - EOC upon its activation for U.O. situations which have actual or potential impact on the City of Los Angeles. • Because the LASD - EOC operations officer is a lieutenant and the staffing of the EOC is primarily by sergeants, LAPD liaison personnel should ideally be of the sergeant/detective II rank. • In these times of resource shortages, we cannot afford to continue promoting professional "test takers". The LAPD must develop its managers so that they can be leaders and decision makers. The rewards system' must allow people to make mistakes so they can have experience in making decisions. As it presently stands, the Department does not condone "risk taking" or making mistakes. It's a known fact if you have leaders in place, any job regardless of difficulty or availability of resources, w1ll be accomplished efficiently and effectively. COMMANDING OFFICER'S INSIGHT: I believe there is a fundamental flaw in the way the Tactical Manual addresses unusual occurrences that require resources beyond those available at the concerned Area level. For example, when an Area level tactical problem exists, establishing a small on-site command post is usually reasonable and functional. However, when the problem involves multiple Areas and outside agencies, the concept of taking the field command post to the problem is usually ill-advised and ineffective. A more appropriate method is to follow the Fire Department's example of establishing their command post at the closest fire station rather than attempting to establish an entire command post from scratch at a field location. -over the years, I have participated in many types of unusual occurrences. Those that have been the most effective and most easily established have adjoined the police station of the involved Area. In fact, while at Devonshire Area, I was .involved in having Devonshire Area station wired for electrical, radio and telephone lines so that the Department's mobile fleet could almost immediately be up in an operational mode upon arriving at the station. It makes little sense to attempt to re construct the facilities and resources of a police station at an off-site command post when they are already readily available at each police station. Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 9 8.2.5 • Area standing plans should include the installation of electrical, radio and telephone receptacles for the command post fleet as well as the arrangements for the closure of adjoining streets and businesses or schools as staging areas surrounding the police station. The current standing plans should only be used for small Area command posts or satellite command posts associated with the main command post at the Area station when a major incid~nt occurs. The only function performed at a satellite command post would be the execution of operational plans and limited radio and telephone communications. The Area command post van should be the largest vehicle deployed at the satellite command post. All other command post functions should be carried out at the Area station command post utilizing Department command post vehicles. The functions of the field commander and the executive offic~r should also be more clearly defined. The field commander should not concern him or herself with the establishment and functioning of the field command post at the Area station; that should be the sole responsibility of the executive officer. The field commander should be at the satellite command post(s) directing the tactical operations. It appears the original field commanders in South Bureau became more involved in the establishment of a command post rather than dealing with the tactical problem at hand. Had they used the resources at the Seventy-Seventh Area station as a command post and focused on the tactical problem with the resources they had immediately available to them; they would have likely been more effective. Tactics: The tac~c of deploying four officers in a vehicle should be reconsidered; that arrangement leaves no space for the transportation of arrestees. The alternative of holding a large number of arrestees for transportation by bus is extremely cu~bersome and non-functional in most riotous conditions where suspects are very mobile. This is especially true at the beginning of a riot when the personnel and resources necessary for the activation of buses is delayed. Although not an expert in this field, I am of the opinion that research should be undertaken into tactics whereby officers in vehicles and officers on foot work together as a team to drive back and arrest violent, projectile throwing crowds of suspects. The U.S. Army and/or the British Army should have previously developed tactics.for joint infinity, armor combat or riotous situations that could be adapted to this type of circumstance. Tactics for the safe deployment of motor officers on their motorcycles in conjunction with black/white vehicles and officers of foot should also Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 10 8.2.5 be explored. These new tactics should be addressed in the Department's Tactical Manual. Personnel: Personnel assigned to BAD were formed into squads prior to their deployment to command posts. Had that been done by all Divisions and Areas, the personnel function at the command posts could have been stream-lined and field deployment time shortened. Logistics: The shortage of black/white police vehicles was obvious and had a direct bearing on the Department's ability to deploy to the riotous conditions; rriore vehicles must be purchased for patrol divisions. Had the Department had either more dual-purpose vehicles or portable converta-coms, we would have been in a much better position to effectively deploy all of the Department's vehicles in a short period of time. _ _ P~ ortable converta-coms that plug into cigarette lighters need to be purchased immediately. Burglary-Auto Theft detectives were involved in a number of arrests related to the riot. The cameras they had available to them were extremely valuable in identifying suspects and for photographing evidence for court. Had the Department been able to provide each squad leader with a Polaroid camera, many of the suspect identity problems would have been eliminated by having each suspect photographed with the arresting officer at the scene of the crime. This type of on-scene photographing has proven to be extremely valuable in multiple arrest situation such as vice "trick task forces" and would be just as valuable in a riot situation. Communications: In a modern metropolitan police department the issuance of radios capable of communicating with officers in any part of the city is as essential to officer safety as ~ the issuance of a service pistol. The objective of issuing each officer in the Department a personal radio should be of the highest priority; even higher than the hiring new officers. This ·riot was proof that ill-equipped officers are extremely ineffective, and amount to little more than a ready reserve at a command post that cannot by deployed. Until the above is accomplished, the City should immediately purchase as many 48 channel ROVER radios as possible and get them into the hands of the officers that I • T ' L " · Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 11 8.2.5 need them. on a daily basis. Most specialized divisions have no communication equipment other than ta?tical frequencies in their vehicles. Field Jail: Should the Department adopt the field command post strategy explained above, field jails would be established in conjunction with existing Area police station jails and not in the field. This change in philosophy - not taking an entire command post · to the problem, but utilizing existing station facilities - would make field jail --- processing easier, especially when Area stations are pre-wired for portable DABIS terminals that could be used in station parking lots. · Conclusion: All in all, the civil unrest in Los Angeles which began on April 29, 1992 must be used as a learning experience. The lessons learned, and hopefully the recommendations enacted should enhance our ability to respond to any future situations. · l 1 t/ 'k~4~ / ,' JIM WHITLEY, Captain Commanding Officer · Burglary-Auto Theft Division APPROVED: JOHN D. WHITE, Commander Commanding Officer Detective Setvices Group ' Attachments ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: CORELLA, A. Rank: LT-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Fore~ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "B" apply) : _x_ _X_ --- (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Command Post (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHMENT Regardless of the Unusual Occurrence the Field Commander will never have the sufficient number of personnel, radios,vehicles, and other critical logistics to deal with the problem at hand. One could write volumes blaming these shortcomings ad nauseam. However, the number l difficulty in dealing with the civil unrest within the City was the lack of leadership and direction by personnel (Lieutenants and above) at the operational level of this endeavor. It appears that the Departlllent has traditionally groomed individuals to be outstanding managers. Managers are those who deal with and maintain the status quo. However,this chaotic situation called for -decision makers and leaders. With a few exceptions these qualities were in short supply. I was assigned to the Field Task Force for 14 days. And for 14 days the source of frustration · was the incompetence I had to deal with at the command post. Invariably my daily deployment in the field required a minimum of one to two hours of downtime. This downtime meant waiting to be assigned to sectors and obtaining equipment. The first two days of the riot were the most critical days in restoring order. These were also the days where the lack of leadership and direction were the most evident. The following are examples: On the first night of the riot the BAD "B" watch 1 was called in from home and was available for deployment by 2400 hours. We were subsequently assigned to the command post at 54th Street and Arlington. Upon my arrival to this location you could see on the faces of the awaiting field officers that they wanted direction and an opportunity to deal with the problem at hand. Conversely,those individuals tasked with the leadership role, had confusion, uncertainty and fear written all over their faces. Finally at 0400 hours after many, many requests to be deployed I was given a mission; cars and radios. Day 2 my platoon and I were assigned to the intersection of LaBrea and Sunset. We did not have a specific mission. We were _assigned on foot with only five rovers. This was one of many examples in the mismanaging of critical resources during this overwhelming incident·. I was continually in contact with the command post at Hollywood Station. During these contacts I dealt with the operations lieutenant. On several occasions relief and food for my 42 officers was promised. We were never provided with relief but after a pointed discussion with the lieutenant, I finally secured enough food for my officers . •· . ', RECOMMENDATION: In these times of resource shortages we cannot afford to continue promoting professional test takers. The organization must develop its managers so that they can be leaders and decision makers. The rewards system must allow people to make mistakes so that they can have experience in making decisions. As it presently stands, the organization does not condone risk taking or making mistakes. Its a known fact that if you have leaders in place, any job regardless of difficulty or availability of resources, will be done efficiently and effectively. :,..., ' ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: WOODINGS, M. Rank: D-II Assignment during U.O. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geogr·aphic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "A" Watch apply) : _x_ (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Liason (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHMENT ,, r· AFTER ACTION REPORT * DII Michael Woodings, BAD/BSS, was initially assigned with other BAD personnel in a station security role at PAB during the first two days of the u.o. On 5-1-92, Woodings was individually reassigned to the . LASO EOC to act in the capacity of liaison officer with the Sheriff and the military. Liaison had been established at that location already with Capt Keith Bushey and Sgt Tim Anderson filling the roles of liaison officers for LAPD. Woodings was selected for the liaison assignment because of his background as a senior military officer with knowledge of the operations of both the 1 LAPD and the military. Woodings was assigned to "A" watch and Anderson to "B" watch. DII Jim Ward was also assigned to "B" watch to assist Anderson and has similar qualifications as Woodings and Anderson. Woodings and the other LAPD personnel assigned to this liaison role proved to be vital assets to the operations of both the LASO and the LAPD EOCs and were commended by LASO for their support to the LASO EOC. * current procedures do not specifically address the liaison manning by LAPD at the Sheriff EOC during u.\o.s with specific emphesis on collateral liaison with military (National Guard) personnel. Further, an established cadre of personnel equally conversant in both LAPD and military procedures does not currently exist. * Recommendations: 1. Immediately established cadre to situations which have Angeles. \ assign LAPD liaison personnel from an the LASO EOC upon its activation for U. O. actual or potential impact on the City of Los 2. Establish a cadre of liaison personnel from which to draw in the event of a u.o. requiring LAPD representation. Because of the possibility that National Guard support might again be necessary in a u.o. and the fact that such support is by doctrine administered from the Sheriff EOC, the cadre personnel designated should have sufficient military experience and understanding to facilitate communication with military personnel. 3. ·Because the LASO. EOC operations officer is a lieutenant and the staffing of the EOC is primarily by sergeants, liaison personnel should ideally be of the SGT/DII level. ,, , r Name: TOLAND, J. Rank: D-III UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during U.O. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division X Other · --- Geographic Area of Assignment: Hwd, S/E, S/W, 77th Command Post# Sector# Date / Watch/Time: "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Command Post Operations (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: The Command Post (Coliseum) lacked organization with respect to immediate deployment of troops and logistics of transportation. Past the second or third day the troops should have been immediately sent to the command posts instead of their Divisions to avoid time lags. Vehicles could have been separated by black and white and plain cars, in separate areas to avoid wasting time locating them. Although it may be impractical dollar wise to train a C.P. group for management purposes, it appeared that the C.P. could have been more effectively run had it been run by more enlisted troops (Lt's, Sgt II's, and below) than by having commanders and captains running around . like chickens with their heads cut off. The people who best handled the organization of the c. P. appeared to be . those with either current or past military experience as oppos·ed to those who were "staff _ personnel from under management." I believe that our · Department has lost its ability to respond to large U. o. 's by p·romoting "managers" instead of well trained leaders and can act immediately using common sense and quasi military tactics. You don't have time to Vote on the necessary plan when an emergency occurs, you have to have a previously planned well laid .out method of attack. ,, ,.. Name: WARD, J. Rank: D-II UO C~ITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center X Field Command 1 Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division X Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "B" Watch, 4-29-92 (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: S/W, S/E 54th & Van Ness (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: 1) Disorganization among the command staff. 2) Improper planning and utilization of transportation. I.E. transported to scenes where looting was in progress by bus only to find that the call was hours old. The buses did not remain and thereby stranded the involved personnel~ 3) Indicated lack of experience among the command staff. 4) Reluctance to utilize necessary force by the commanders. 5) Management oriented command staff totally ineffective in a crises. Prior military officers should have been drafted. " i ' Name: MARTIN, A. Rank: D-II UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# 3 Sector# Various Date/Watch/Time: "A" and "B'' Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Command post ooerations/sguad tactics (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: The LAPD reacted to this riot inadequately. By not responding we allowed the situation to feed off itself and grow. We failed. _We did not protect the citizens because the brass was worried about political repercussions. Our division was left standing for a day and a half, ordered not to arrest looters or leave the building when "help" calls were going out. We failed to _ secure pawnshops and gun stores with major .cashes of firearms and ammo, and now those guns are on the street. No special weapons were deployed within the ranks even after the huge exchange of AK.47 gunfire. The first night in Southeast the Department should have at least given squad leaders adequate firepower to protect the officer under their command if they came under hipowered rifle attack, Even the CHP had deployed 223/mini 14's. · The logistics were awful, we often were forced to wait in excess of 2-4 hours for an assignment while at the command post. This was the only time in my entire law enforcement career I was truly embarrassed. I feel we let the Fire Department and citizens down,_ due to lack of leadership. ,., ,. Name: MONROE, G. Rank: D-II UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e . Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) I COMMENTS: Currently on vacation. Name: RAMIREZ, C. J. ) Rank: D-III UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post · X Field Task Force X Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division X Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: 77TH, S/W, S/E 2 & 3 Various (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: During the first week, there were delays in deployment of "B" watch, BAD personnel at the RTD command post, 52nd and Van Ness. There appeared to be a lack of proactive leadership from the high command at this particular C.P. In contrast, the rank and file were ready and .eager for orders. At the time, it was my impression that the troops were initially enthusiastic until the lack of leadership became self-evident. Hours of delay were a factor, and snould be considered during any future unusual occurrences. f'I ( • Name: SAMANIEGO, J. Rank: D-III UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security X Patrol in Geographic Division X Other · --- Geographic Area of Ass'ignrnent: S/W, S/E, 77th Command Post i 3 Sector i Various Date/Watch/Time: "A" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... )' COMMENTS: l 1) In general too many man hours were wasted waiting to - be assigned and relieved. 2) The food provided was terrible (box lunch). 3) Radio communication between units C.P. and BCC was very bad for various reasons. ... Name: ZAVALA, M. Rank: D-I UO · CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post x Field Task Force X Fixed Post Security X Patrol in Geographic Division X Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# S/ W, Coliseum Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "A" & "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Command Post (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc .. . ) COMMENTS: I believe there was alot of time and money wasted - by having officers standing around waiting for assignments to be given out. I also believe they should have had civilians working the command post or light . duty officers. Example: They had (3) officers ((1) detective and ( 2) P-2 's) issuing · rovers while another P-3 was issuing vehicles to officers. ,, ~ . , . uo CB+?X001S l9M Name PESANII , ;Ac Rank Sgt. I · Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post x Field Task Force __ x __ _ Fixed Pos~ Security Pat=ol in Geographic Division X Other ---- AftM!Hdlft A Geographic Area of assignmen~ Command Pos~; Sec~or j 77th, SE, RAMP, WILS, HWD, CENT J & 12 Date/Watch/Time 4-29-92/5-21-92 "B" Watch ( if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: C.P. Operations All ~~-~----------- ( ie Field .Jail, Squad Tactics _ , Command Pos~ Operations, etc) COMMENTS: First week of riots we were stranded at C.P. several times. Transportation to C.P. by bus even though we had radio's and cars. Left at C.P. due to lack of resources to deploy B.A.D. squads. Throughout riots assigned on several occasions to fixed post positions and not relieved until several hours past EOd. Had to get transportation for my squad back to C.P. from outside agency. (Continuation sheets may be used) . . . .... -.. ···· .. · ..• . . . .. · --. ·----·-·- --.-----··• -., ..... ...,,_,--_ - .. -- .=- Name BECKER' J' Rank p .... T · oo Clt;I?XAVI fORK Assignment during a.a. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security _x ___ _ Patrol in Geographic Division x Other · ---- ~,·a-•" 1 Geographic Area of assignment Command Post; Sector~ CENT/SW/77th/SE/RAMP/WILS 3 & 12 All Date/Watch/Time "B" Watch 4-29-92/5-12-92 5-15-92/ 5-16-92 (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: . U/O OPERATIONS ~~-~----------- ( i e Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; 1. My unit was not deployed frcm the station on the first night of rioting. 2. My unit did not receive any training on riot control, patrol techniques, officer safety concerns, or mission objectives, · prior, during or after the U/O. 3. My unit, which investigates persons who receive stolen property, was deployed as a patrol squad. It should have been assigned to recover property looted (especially guns) during the riots. (Continuation sheets may be used) I • ~ ao CEX?XAVI PORK Name C--QNZALEZ , a 1h Rank .p~r Assignment during U.O. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post:. Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply) X X ~•H-ll'f 1 Geographic Area 9f assignment:. Command Post:.; Sect:.or; 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 12, 18 3 & 12 All Date/Watch/Time "B" Watch 4-29 / 5-9-92 (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tact:.ics, Command Post:. Operations, etc) COMMENTS: · ' Need more and better equipnent. Saneone in a corrmand position should have roll call with the street troops and let us know what is going on. The time one· checks in and gets assigned (approximately one hour) should be shortened. The relief for fixed post should be earlier. (Continuation sheets may be used) · ·••.~~. :.· ..... ·--. -~---·- _ _,,_.-----.-··· ~~ ~~-· :-.----.-.,-.-: oo Cl\I?IQVJS fQRK Name GALLCJ.IJAY '1 t_. Rank O-JII Assignment during u.o. (check all that ElDergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector; apply) X . X 3 & 12 All Date/Watch/Time "B" Watch 4/29-5/7, 5/9-5/15 "A" Watch 4/17-5/22 (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Tactics/Deployment (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; TACTICS: I personally have not ~rked uniform for nearly 18 years. During the riot, I was assigned patrol duties in a black and white. I had not been trained in .the use of the MDT or the latest patrol tactics. DEPLOYMENT: On several occasions I was assigned to a fixed post security and was not relieved in a timely rranner. On one occasion I was left with an entire squade with no transportation or food. Corrmunications with the corrmand post was not adequate. It appeared many fixed posts that were deemed necessary at the beginning of the U/0 were continued even after there need had diminished. (Continuation sheets may be used) ,, .. ao cax:xovw roBH Name TIERNEY, B. - Rank p ..... rn Ass•ignment during u. o. ( check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply) X X X Affl.C:H� Jlft A Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector; CENT, RAMP, SW, HWD, WILS, 77TH, SE 3 &12 All Date/Watch/Time 4-29/5-17-92 "B" Watch (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Corrrnand Post Operations I (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; · At beginning, approixrPately first week, left stranded at assigned post, transported by bus even though we had our own cars and radio's • . (Cont~nuation sheets may be used) ···•~-.:. .. ·• · ·-. ·--·-·- ------··· c. -· . . ·- - .~-- -:.---.,-,,,-:- . . . oo cax:xoms rog Name M::ORE, T. Rank P-JI• Assignment during a.a. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply) x x x Aft161H� Wft A Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector; CENT, RAMP, SE, HWD, WILS, SW, NEWT, 77T1 3 & 12 Date/Watch/Time 4-29-92/5-29-92 "B" Watch (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ALL (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; I was assigned a fixed :post,· I:orsey High School, dropped off with no trans:portation or food. Tried to contact C.P. at row for relief and trans-r:ortation back to C.P. Finally received trans-r:ortation frcm outside agency back to C.P., 3 1/2 hours after row. C. P. was not aware of where we were l l l Same situation at intersection directing traffic, waiting for D.O.T~ until 10:00 AM. (Continuation sheets may be used) uo CJ+':lQVI lOM Name SABAOO, f: ._ Rank __ P _ _ -_r _r _____ _ Assignment during a.a. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post. Field .Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply) X X X Geographic Area of assignment Command Post; Sec~or ~ CENT, RAMP, SW, HWD, WILS, 7711-I, SE 3 & 12 All Date/Watch/Time "B" Watch; 4-29-92 / 5-20-92 ( if necessary or specific to this topic·) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: During the U/0, our unit was assigned to a fixed post without transportation. Upon calling the C.P. at 54th/Arlington, we were never picked up, and we were left at the fixed post for over three hours. L.A. School Police gave our unit a ride back to the C.P. In addition, once reporting to the C.P. it took approxirrately t\.vO to three hours before we were given an assignment. There was alot of standing around and waiting for someone to make a corrmand decision. (Continuation sheets may be used) · ·•·. -:-.. :, . .... • · --. ·------4 - -------··· C • -· •• · - ~~-- ~.-- .~•~ - . , . cro CBI'l'lQtnS PORK Name PULLEY, M, - Rank P-:II Assignment during u.a. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply) X X X &ft:11 ff -Jlft A Geographic Area of assignment Command Post; Sec-cor # SE, 77TH, HWD, SW, RAMP, WILS, CENT, NEWJ 3 & 12 Date/Watch/Time "B" Watch: 4-29-92/ 5-17-92 (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: All (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; Assigned to a fixed post, D'.:)rsey High School, were unable to make contact with C.P. We were unable to receive transportation at EOW. Received transportation from outside agency who supplied transportation to C.P. (Continuation sheets may be used) .. . --· -.. ····. ~ .. :; .. . .. ·--. ·---·-- ------· ·· --,-. ----. - .. -. --~ _.,. -- -:-.·- --,.,, ,-:' ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: Sparks, J. Rank: D-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: ___ A Watch ___ _ If necessary or specific to this topic) apply): X - -- X - -- Topic of Discussion: See Below (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics-,-Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: On April 30, 1992, I was assigned to E.O.C. and reported to R/C room at Parker Center, I sat in R/C room for several hours. During this period the streets were out of control. Approximately 100 officers ~ere present. Several captains and lieutenants were present. It took several hours before any of us were deployed. Once deployed we ended up in Newton Area, we were told to go out into the streets and try to save everything north of the Santa Monica .Freeway, as south of the freeway was already on fire. We had a plain car, no emergency equipment, and one hand held radio. I'm still not sure who was on the other end of the radio. We were at one location and a crowd of approximately 400 persons were looting. We arrived and started to disperse the looters. When a shot is fired from someone in the group, the person that got hit was a male black, near us I attempted to get help for us and medical treatment using the . police radio, no response. If preparation was made it certainly did not show up where I was at, simple things like bookings, deploying, and radios should at least of been in tune, and wasn't. Name: Pixler, R. Rank: . D-II UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post apply): Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# 12/3 Sector# Date/Watch/Time: ____ B __ _ (If necessary or specific to this topic) X Topic of Discussion: Command Post (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Ope~ations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: The field command post was poorly run, it appeared that no one had given any thought to the assignment of the next watch until it arrived it took as long as two hours to be assigned. This took place not only during the first few days of the riot, but throughout the U.O. I was surprised to find that three sergeants were assigned the duty of handing out radios, car keys and shotguns, is this an appropriate assignment for senior supervisors? I rate our performance during the riot as poor. We need some leadership. · ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: HAMMOND, A. Rank: P-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _X_ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division _X _ _ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: S/W, S/E, 77TH, NEWTON, RAMPART, HOLLYWOOD, WILSHIRE Command Post# Sector# _UNK_ Date/Watch/Time: "B' Watch, 04/29/92 - 05/24/92 (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Ja"il, .squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: My initial impression of the u.o. was one of confusion within the command element. Upon arrival at my division during the first week, I was forced to sit around an await further instructions. Upon receiving instructions to report to CP, transportation was an obvious problem and further "Standing Around" was necessary awaiting a bus. Eventually arriving at a CP, more waiting was required while equipment (primarily police cars) were located and dispersed (generally with one rover per car - not tactically sound) -. Now after "3" to "5" hours, I was dispatched. My instructions being to patrol from point "A" to "B" and "C" to "D". No mission, no purpose - instructions were unclear and unspecific. My average working day for the first week approximated 15-17 hours per day. This was a result ~ f not being relieved in a timely manner (especially if one was assigned to a fixed post). Upon being relieved and returning to CP it was then a case of attempting to locaie transportation back to division (sometimes another hour) add to that driving time home - -this adds up to tired, ineffective officers with low morale. I ·believe one of the "worst" things I experienced during the U.O. was the inability of those supervisors unable to make a command decision and the continuous "passing of the buck" a scene I witnessed many times. It was obvious to all (except command) the last week of the u.o. was a waste of manpower, time and money. Other than a show of strength (too late) there ~ere police patrolling police on virtually empty streets for hours on end seemingly with no purpose. A 'standby' unit would have served as well. "Ready reserve" is not an uncommon element in most para-military units. It is apparent we were not prepared for this however, we did appear to recover s9mewhat by the second week (of course nothing much happened after the first week). Placing detectives who have not been in the field in years, in uniform . was a serious mistake and it is only by good luck a tragedy did not occur. One can not expect an officer who has never seen a rover - inside of a black and white to receive a five minute block of instruction and then take to the streets. Tactics and equipment change over the years and it is _ obvious training for some officers does not. After the initial 72 hours, I believe the effort put forth was . effective - however, a little to late. •· . ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: SANCHEZ, J. Rank: P-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post apply) : Field Task Force _x_ _x_ _x_ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Other Division _X_ Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: BOTH "A" AND "B" WATCH (If necessary or specific to this topic) SO. END Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: This was the poorest show of LAPD organization I have ever seen. To be assigned a position took about ·three to four hours. Which meant once you were out there, you weren't relieved. After a "12" hour shift, it was more like "15" hours. Walking around were Sergeants that didn't assist you if they didn't know you. Lieutenants that expected you to bow you head while they walked by. P-II's and P-III's so confused at what they could or could not do. I believe most of this confusion occurred due to the lack of support by this department towards its owri officers. No one wanted to take charge or even make a decision. This is not a surprise after seeing the in-house fighting. This had a great effect on the moral of its officers. All this showed was when a P-II or P-III gets discipline he takes his medicine, a Lieutenant or Captain screws u~ he goes off on IOD, claiming the department is after him. . During the u.o there was .no strategy. The only ones who had any tactics and strategy were Metro. To put a bunch of old timer detectives .in uniform probably made this department look bigger than life. Yet with their "real·" street experience was a hair raising experience . . To take a police officer from day watch and put him on the street - - - ---- ' ,.. ;,. on a so called "12" hour shift and expect him to adjust to it over night is a joke. After a shift with your blood pumping, going home dog _tired, it sets up officers to make mistakes if not to himself to some one else. I personally was lucky to get four hours of sleep. Only towards the end· of this mess, did the command post begin to make sense. To put it in a nut shell, there was no strategy, tactics, logistics, and personnel were not used correctly. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: ANDERSON, C. Rank: D-III Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: .command Post # Sector# apply) : X X All south Bureau Area's except Harbor Date/Watch/Time: 1800/0600 "B" Watch for initial 2 weeks (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: 1) Field jail took entirely too long to process an arrestee. 2) At least one half of the two weeks I was ·assigned to patiol South Bureau Area'~ and I was given a Valley Area rover. 3) Way to much time was wasted by reporting to our Division first then waiting to be assigned to a particular Bureau C.P. and then being assigned to another Area satellite C.P. - probably a minimum of 2 hours daily. It seems one Bureau C.P. would be more than sufficient. The satellite c. P. 's were not necessary and a waste of manpower; in my opinion. ·· 4) During the first week of the riots I was assigned to "B" Watch in . various South Bureau Area's and was not relieved until usually between 0800 to 0900 hours, the second week I was usually relieved on time. Being relieved on time should be given much more consideration, mainly because of the fatigue factor which leads to safety concerns. 5) There were entirely to many people standing around at the various C. P. 's doing nothing and nobody appeared to be in charge or knew what was going on. _ In general there appeared to be a lack of planning and organization. ATTACHMENT A Name: HEINLEIN, B. Rank: D-II UO CRITIQUE FORM Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force -~- Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division-~ Other Fire and Ambulance escort Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# S/Bureau, W/Bureau \ Date/Watch/Time: "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Op~rations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: I worked the LA Riots from 4-29-92 to 5-23-92, all but one day I was assigned to "B'" Watch. At the beginning of the U0.1squads from my division reported to PAB at the start of the watch, then drove to the 54th and .Arlington Command Post where we all checked in. I feel approximately 1-2 hours of my watch were wasted just checking in and waiting for assignments. After a few days the same procedure occurred until smaller command posts were opened and units had to go to the secondary locations which caused additional delays. There seemed to be very little planning and direction as to what the units were to do. on about seven occasions.1 rover radios were not .. available and smaller, low powered radios were issued jeopardizing officers safety. Two nights the black and white vehicle MDT's were B/0 and no other vehicles available. Units were ·instructed that the field jail was operational and smaller buses would be sent out to transport prisoners so all involved field units would not be tied up, the buses never arrived and when the Command Post was contacted units were told to either transport themselves or release the prisoners. Fixed post units were not relieved on time and often were not relieved at all by supervision, but at the request of other officers. Some personnel were actually shown EOW while still on duty; again jeopardizing officer safety. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: LEE, B. Rank: D-I Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division _x_ _x_ _x_ Other South Bureau - Hollywood Division Geographic Area of Assignment: Co_ mmand Post # Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "A" & "B" (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: S/E, 77th, Hollywood, S/W Various · (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: 1) Lack of police safety equipment, face shield, new bullet proof vest, radios, etc. 2) No roll call intel in gang act and mission was not clear and who was in charge .of Command Post. 3) Lack of maps of area -to be patrolled coordination at Command Post operation. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: MCCARTY, D. Rank: D-I Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post -~- Field Task Force Fixed Post Security -~- Patrol in Geographic Division Other -Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: C.P.O SIB Various (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: l) Poor radio equipment. 2) Slow on assignments and deployment. 3) Lack of up dated intelligence info for officer safety/no roll call info. ATTACHMENT A Name: SUGGS, R. Rank: D-II UO CRITIQUE FORM Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _Z_ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other BAD DESK FIXED POST Geographic Area of Assignment: 77th, S/E Command Post# Sector# Various Date/Watch/Time: (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: A lack of preparation at the Command Post 54th and Arlington. To much manpower was wasted waiting for an assignment. Radios and communication was inadequate and in some cases useless. After a few days when it was apparent that the major part of the riot was over, much of the personnel should have returned to their normal duties. - - - - - - --- - -- ATTACHMENT .A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: TOLEDO, P. Rank: D-I Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _i_ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division _i_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: 4-29/5-19-92 (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: 77th, SED, & Wil South Bureau Various (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Op~rations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: 1) Very slow on assignments and deployment of officers. 2) Lack of intelligence for officer use, in regard to information on gangs (for officer safety). 3) Lack of information from command staff on the current situation. Also lack of confidence from the command staff. 4) Lack of logistics between National Guard and LAPD uni ts. (Neither one knew what the other was doing.) ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM 'Name: VALDEZ, E. Rank: D-I Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Fire Station Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# apply) : _x_ _x_ _x_ Ramp, 77th, S/W, S/E, Ntn Date/Watch/Time: "A" & "B" Watch, 4/29-5/26 (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Op~rations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: 1) Extremely poor planning - Department should have been better prepared to handle such critical incident. 2) Lack of proper equipment - outdated, radios, vest, etc. Placed officers in dangerous situations, and prevented them to effectively conduct their missions. 3) Lack of training of, in riot/U.O. situations of non-street personnel, such as baton skills, squad tactics, patrol procedures, etc. placed many officers is peril. uo cax:xoms roBM Name e HIE. VOL IE K, . -r: Rank l> • I Assignment during a.a. (check all that · Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other -=, At RA t:1 Eii Ir- r SCQEI Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# SeC'tor # apply) X X X CITY WIDE VAIUOUS VARIOUS A~c:anw A Date/Watch/Timewo~KEP BQTH A AND 8 WATCHES, THEN MODIFIED NIGHT WATCH (if necessary or specific to this topic) SHIFTS. Topic of Discussion: OVERALL OPERATION (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operatfons, etc) COMMENTS: THIS PAST 1992 RIOTS WAS A REAL EYE OPENER FOR ME. IT !S VERY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO COMMENT OR CRITIQUE ON SITUATIONS THAT ARE A30VE MY COMPREHENSION. I WILL COMMENT ON SITUATIONS I WAS INVOLVED IN PERSONALLY OR SAW ON TELEVISION. I THINK THE THING THAT BOTHERE:> ME :-10ST OF' ALL WAS TO SEE THAT THER2 WAS NO RE S?ONSE BY OUR DEPARTMENT TO HELPLESS MOTCRis·rs WrlO WERE BEING PULLED FROM THEIR VEHICLES AND ~RITICALLY BEATEN ON THE CORN2k OF FLORENCE AND NORMANDIE. I PER SONALLY HAVE SPOKEN TO BROTHER OFFICE~WHO TO~D ME THAT THEY WERE HELD BACK FROM RESPONDING TO HELP THESE CITIZENS. THE~E !~ ABSOLUTELY NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS I THINK OVERALL WE CID A GOOD JOB WITH THE FERSONNEL Ario EQUIPTMENT THAT WAS .~VAILABLE TO US. WITH A RIOT OF THIS MAGITLJDE THER.:: ARE GOING TO BE PROBLEMS f!'JITH THE ENTIRE OPERATION. THERE IS NO GETTING AwAY FROM THE FACT THAT THE RODNEY KING INCIDENT MIGHT 3AVE INFLUENCED A GREAT DEAL OF THE DECISIONS IN VOLVED IN THESE RIOTS AS FAR AS THE USE OF FORCE IS CONCERNED. WE CAN'T PUT OUR BUSINESS COMMUNITY OR THE GOOD CITIZENS OF THIS CifY S~COND TO SUPERVISION OR MANAGEMENT WHO ARE AFRAID TO MAKE A DECISION. WHEN YOU i...OS2 '"i'HE C:JNFIDE!'{CE CF THE PEOPLE THAT YOU ARE SUPPOS£D TO PROTECT,TrlEN WHY EVEN .HAVE A_POLICE ~EPT. _ IF IN FACT IT IS PROVEN THAT SUPERVISION OR MANAGEMENT IS GLlILTY OR LIABLE FOR 7HIS LACK OF RESPCNCE THEN I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THEi"l DELT WITH JUST AS SEVERELY AS THIS DE?ARTMENT WOULD WANT TO DISCIPLINE A ?-11. ONE OTHZ2 ThlNG ThAT KIND CF GETS UNDER MY SKIN. IT HAS BEEN 51 DAYS SIN=E THE RIOTS BEGAN. ALL OTHER AGENCIES INVOLVED H~VE BEEN PAID OR COMPENSATED FOR THEIR OVERfIME. I'M TIRED OF HEARING WHAT A GOOD JOB WE DID AND HOW ~UCH IT WA3 APPRECIATED. LETS SEE SOME CASH. (Con~inuation sheets may be used) ... . ·-:-· - .. ·····. --;-~.: : .. ····--.•-..-•-·- -------- . - ·· • ~:-~• .-,.- ~-•-, ._..,.,,-..-: ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: BYUN, J. Rank: D-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division-~ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) 3 Various ' Topic of Discussion: Command post operations/equip (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, e_ tc ... ) \ COMMENTS: Underutilization/lack of equipment, causing long delays at the beginning of Watch. Inadequate training/preparation. Lack of leadership by command personnel. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: HOWE, S. Rank: D-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "A" & "B" Watch apply) : _X _ _ South Bureau _2_ Various (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Command post-communications (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: Many man hours were wasted at the C.P. waiting for assi~nments. It seemed that too many people were in charge. Communications (re: radios and frequencies) were a nightmare. Many night we were issued radios that appeared to be of very low quality, made for home use. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: KAGELE, A. Rank: D-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Fire station guard team apply) : _X_ _x_ _X_ Geographic Area of Assignment: 2,12,3,7 Command Post# 2 & 3 Sector# 4,2,3 · Date/Watch/Time: 4/29/92-5/17/92 "B" Watch, 1800 hours (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: Detectives have not been trained in the past few years in squad formations and should they have been needed no one would know the signals being given by the squad leaders. No one has practiced the different squad formations or the baton technics. The command post operations, were poor the first few days. The big thing on the first few nights ~ there wasn't any food; no organization. They could have had the mobile canteen there and give officers in the field relief so they could eat. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: LOVOLD, W. Rank: D-III Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _X_ Fixed Post Security _X __ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: S/E, 77th, S/W, Wils Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: Days "A" - one "B" Watch night: (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: Initially nobody seemed to know what to do. My squad was assigned to station security at Parker Center on the first day guarding the flower .pots in front. On the second day we were given the same assignment even though 73 Army troops were across the street guarding City Hall. Seems that if someone were to use some initiative they could have moved the Army one block east and they could then guard the sacred Police Headquarters. I was amazed at how suddenly good equipment (vests, helmet shields, batons, etc.) became available during the riot. We could never get this equipment especially new vests to replace the 20 year old ones we were issued. The lapse time between EOW and being relieved was to long. Sometimes hours would pass after the end of your 12 hours shift before they would find replacement for you. This would happen even though men_ were standing around the C. P. awaiting orders and assignment. Communications was lacking with different radio channels being used on rovers. As the riots continued things smoothed out a little but overall I was embarrassed as other Departments got to see us in our initial stages and how screwed up we were. Experienced field commanders were not evident. 77th and S/E Division sergeants would have done a much better job. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: Marentez, G. Rank: P-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply): X - -- x - -- x - -- x - -- Geographic Area of Assignment: S/E,77th, Wils, Ramp.,S/W Command Post# -CP-3 Sector# Don't Recall Date / Watch/Time: Unk Dates "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topi c) Topic of Discussion: Logistics (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) I . COMMENTS: Throughout this so-called U.O., there was nothing but random chaos; can't even call it organized. Most of management was too busy on ego-trips wanting their orders to be obeyed: A case of "Too many chiefs and not · enough indians". My opinion is that we have too many squints writing manuals for "this and that" but when it came ·right down to practical application, they all went out the window. Confusion, lack of decision-making abilities, and power struggles were the key factors that made this already tarnished department look like a greater -fool in the eyes of not only the nation, but the world. . ,. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: ROSS, M. Rank: P-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _X_ Fixed Post Security _X_ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: S/E, S/W, 77TH, CENT, HWD, WIL, RAMP Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: 04-30-92, 0600, A WATCH (If necessary or specific to this topic) _x_ _x_ Topic of Discussion:___________ 1 (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: I would like to start by saying to the best of my knowledge, I was never prepared a month prior to the King verdict for a possible riot incident as was mentioned to the media by our command. Although I am prepared with my equipment there was never a refresher course on squad formation and riot control. I have been out of patrol a short time and I do remember many of the riot tactics. Many of the detectives I worked with during the riots have been out of patrol for many years with little or no knowledge of riot tactics. The night of the King verdict I sat at home watching the TV news wondering what happened to the number one police department in the world not doing their job we were trained for, to save the victims of unnecessary assaults. That night I received three phone calls from my Sergeant advising me to come to work in · uniform. Each call was to change the time I was being assigned. This was the beginning of a unorganized, poorly planned incident by the higher command. In the days to follow, I went into work ready to do my job just to be told to ·wait in my office for my assignment. After "5" to "6" hours, I was assigned, just to receive more of the same not being relieved at end of watch for "l" to "4" hours. Of course this was the beginning and I can honestly say that ~awards the end things weie more organized. , r ~ . .. UC CRITIQUE FORM ROSS, Max Page two >. My advice, go back to basic's and get the politics out of the Department. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: SALDANA, E. Rank: P-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): · Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post _X_ Field Task Force Fixed Post Security _X_ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time: Numerous (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: 77TH., S/E, S/W (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Oprrations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: The first two days of u.o. were filled with doubt about what our role was going to be. I felt that we (our unit) were being neglected by command staff. I later changed my opinion about being neglected to just being forgotten. I honestly felt that a break down in command structure resulted in our unit not being deployed at a critical time. I sat at my desk in full uniform waiting for assignments while looting and burning was occurring in this city. Reports that man power shortages in police personnel were one contributing factor to Rampart lawlessness only added to my frustration ·of not being deployed. On the fourth day through the remainder of the u.o., I experienced additional frustration because relief watches were slow in relieving us. Food was boxed, or hot meals were cold. Days off -were changed back and forth; as well as watches. Assignments were handed out with no instructions. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: GONZALES, s. Rank: P-II Assignment during U.O. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector #. apply) : _x_ _X_ _x_ S/E, S/W, 77TH Date/Watch/Time: 04/29/92, "B" Watch, 1800 (I£ necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: I felt the u.o was a disaster. Not only did we (LAPD) have to contend with the wrath from the citizens of Los Angeles but we had no support from our own within the Department. Many times we were told to respond to an area, only to stand around and wait before given an assignment. Once we got an assignment, at end of watch time, it took 11 2 11 to "3" hours to be relieved. Many times an assignment wasn't giyen until close to end of watch. Then again, not relieved until "2" to "3" hours later, after already standing and waiting around a full "12" hours. This happened because decisions were not made . . There was not a prepared plan. Many police officees were stepping on each other with nothing constructive being accomplished. This was "operation overkill." ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: EVANS, D. Rank: SGT-I Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _X_ Fixed Post Security _X_ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: S/W, S/E, & 77th -~- Command Post-# Sector # Various Date/Watch/Time: Various hours, "A" watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Response, Squad Tactics, C.P. Operations (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Opfrations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: Response: On a scale of "l" to "10", with 1 being the lowest, our response to the riots was "l". The riot wasn't controlled by our Department; it was just over. There were a lot of Police Officers and Sergeants who wanted to do something, but like good subordinates, they waited for their orders and wanted to be lead, but that never mat~rialized. There was a saying during the riots, it was, "We were damned if we do or damned if we don't." If that was the case, then we should have done something. Squad Tactics: There was no set mission, except for high visibility patrol. From talking to younger officers in the field, I detected a lack of confidence in themselves to even make a decision. Command Post Operations: The Command Post at 54th and Arlington never really functioned smoothly until about "2" to "3" days before the Department de-m·obilized it. The field task force at the Coliseum functioned at an acceptable level, but the amount of personnel was excessive. An example was a Sergeant assigning "meal tickets" t~at were never used. UO CRITIQUE EVANS, Dave Page 2 General Observations: I worked Parker Center during the first days of the riots . . There were a lot of bodies who were not doing a thing except looking for a place to hide and getting off at a reasonable hour. I know there was a lack of equipment, but Officers improvised and converted their "cool · cars" to unmarked police vehicles. The biggest problem was relief at end of watch. The personnel officer at the command post shouldn't go end of watch until the personnel in his watch were accounted for. We were forgotten numerous times. Suggestion: I think the Department should get away from the "A/B Watch". Perhaps establish a "C" watch, all of which would be twelve hour shifts, but would over lap. It wo~ld ensure relief and cover the peak hours of u.o. ·I I . ) te t's I his cal in ost ar, off d my was and ed a The e no UO CRITIQUE FORM THORESON, R. Page 2. Jn 5-1-92 we were deployed to the field at RTD Terminal at 52nd and 7an Ness; deployment and relief took hours. Radios were almost '1seless. Different frequencies and different messages made :onununications a mess. Meals were horrible - relief a long time :oming. On day watch there was no field jail for processing our \ul tiple arrests creating great difficulty in court two weeks ~ter. Shifts that should have been 12 hours were 14 to 16 hours. e reported to the Division and then to the C.P. - a loss of time. ~ere appeared to be a lack of aggressiveness in putting down the loters. It seemed like no one was in charge and there was no Lan. i Saturday there was a demonstration in downtown and the ~onstrators were arrested after being given a dispersal order but '.re surrounded and not given a chance to disperse. It appeared e commander just wanted "numbers" to arrest without good cause. ny peaceful demonstrators with children wanted to leave but were ~eked. . . are appeared to be a mis-utilization of personnel. We become :uri ty guards - not riot police. We fa1led to respond rapidly in :-ength. We were slow to use force. It seemed like our :elligence on the rioters was non-existent. Lastly, . ! feel that \ politicians and media were in no small way also responsible. , . • I. Name: SIMS, G. Rank: D-II UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during U.O. · (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post _X_ Field Task Force Fixed Post Security _X_ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: 77th, S/E Command Post# Coliseum Sector# Date/Watch/Time: "A" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: The command post was not established in a timely manner, was improperly staffed, and lacked clear and concise orders or direction from senior Department staff officers. Department improperly used Department personnel without considering their training or special skills. Individuals were used to plug any opening requiring a warm body. This was understandable on the first day but not on the fourth or fifth day. Most field jails were improperly prepared resulting in poor prosecution of arrestees. It appears that most of our leaders are more concerned wi~h their ability to promote and avoid making decisions that could affect their promotions. The Departments constant desire to always hold someone accountable may have affected the ability of supervisors to make important decisions. As a whole, the Department either over reacts or under ·reacts. After the first night of the riot Parker Center security was over staffed leaving numerous officers standing around while help calls were being put out a few blocks away. Leaving officers of all ranks in large pools or at their Divisions for hours prior to assignment is clearly a sign of _poor planning and a lack of leadership by mid level and upper command staff. .. .. . . UO CRITIQUE FORM SIMS, G. Page 2 Communications is an area that failed. This may be directly related to LAPD always studying a thing to death, then starting a project, and then modifying the project to meet needs that the system was not originally designed· to handle. In today's modern news media era perhaps the Department should invest in a few tv's and place them at the command post to allow commanders to view "real time" activity. (Live tv photo's and video of the event in progress.) This riot was . a disgrace and a failure by command to provide clearly rapid and proper leadership. .. . .. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: HETRICK, G Rank: D-III Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security _x_ _X_ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# S/E, 77th, S/W, Hwd, Ramp 2 & 3 Various Date/Watch/Time: "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Command post and sector patrol (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) I COMMENTS: The command staff at. 54/Arlington seemed to be fairly organized in the early stages. When the CP moved to the Coliseum it became stalled. Too much time was wasted prior to any assignments and once assigned it was slow obtaining vehicles, radios and shotguns. It appeared ther~ was a plan but it was not followed. The reverse was even worse at EOW. My evaluation of the command staff at the Coliseum CP was a "F." The command · staff lacked leadership and common sense. The best part of the shift was always the changing of the vehicles at the CP Commander parking space between Commander Banks and Hunt. What a sight to see. That was more important than riot logistics. · once assigned I question 10 officers at a burned out, to the ground, shopping center. Maybe someone on the Department is sleeping with ABC Market or Boys Market. Once assigned to the Division and sector patrol the Divisions had no plans for the deployment of additional personnel and did not seem relieved to see at a minimum of 10 more cars in their Division. It seems a little unfair to not have let the Valley Divisions participate in the · riot deployment and not force personnel to work 100+ overtime hours in the first two weeks. If it wasn't for the Valley we wouldn't have even been there. .; UO CRITIQUE FORM HETRICK, G Page two If the command staff would get their heads and body to physically ~ enjoin the field troops doing routine police work and not maintain their paper chase/castle they would be more in tune to managing a command post not filling up file cabinets with "nice to know" projects, papers and audits. I am truly embarrassed for the staff officers and their "part" in the managing during the riots.· , ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: ALLEN, R.D. Rank: D-III Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _X_ Fixed Post Security Patrol · in Geogr~phic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post #3 _X_ Sector# Various Date/Watch/Time: "A" and "B" Watch (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Field task force - squad ·leader (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ·) • l COMMENTS: Our inability to protect the citizens and Fire Fighters at the initial onset was an embarrassment to me personally as well as the integrity of this Department. I personally know that we had done our homework and Metro was trained and responding to the initial incident. Only because of fear and possible political concessions by Central _ and South Bureau command did · we not respond in inadequate numbers. We at BAD sat around for a complete day and a half before we were deployed. When we finally were deployed on Day Watch our mission was always unclear and consisted solely of a uniform presence. Arrests were down played and when we did arrest a large amount of looters field jails were not ready for the volume. The one shinning leader in this disaster was Commander _ _ LaChasse. He exemplified what the citizens of this city were desperately in need of · , "A leader." His deployment of squads were carefully orchestrated with a specific mission to get the job done as quickly and efficiently as possible. om the ting in various ng for ing and fficers ce info Housing actives their ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM ORRAL, J. I lent during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security _x_ _x_ Patrol in Geographic Division _X_ Other ' ,hie Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# ttch/Time: ressary or specific to this topic) ,f Discussion: _x_ VARIED [~:ld Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Op~rations, etc •.. ) µ°lure by the command structure to assign officer promply. ?tecti ve personnel had their own ass·igned vehicles and were )t allowed to use them. This crippled the immediate response Lme. i i ary poor radio communications, hampered· officers out in the ield. ~e food provided was of poor quality. alief for officers was often put off for hours due to poor lanning. , .. Name: BATTLED. Rank: DET-II UO CRITIQUE FORM ATTACHMENT A Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply): Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force -~- Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of Assignment: 77th & South East Division Command Post# Sector# Various Date/Watch/Time: Various (If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (i.e. Field Jai·1, Squad Tactics, Command Post Op~rations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHMENT ., UO CRITIQUE FORM Battle, James Page 2 · COMMENTS: During the riots, I worked the "A" and "B" Watch. I worked the Command Post at 54th and Arlington and the Coliseum. I worked the following divisions: Southwest, .77th, Southeast, Wilshire, Rampart, Central, and Hollywood. It would be easy to write about all that went wrong doing the L.A. Riots and there would be plenty to say but to be fair, I think that we have had to deal with what we were against at that time. Florence Avenue and Normandie Avenue the so called fla.sh point, may well have been a smoking mirror. It is my optnion that even if we had controlled the initial . violence .at · that · intersection, it wouldn't have changed the overall outcome of the L.A. Riots. On that day at about the same time, fires were breaking out all over South Central Los Angeles. This required responses by the Fire Departments to fight the fires and attempt to save properties. As they arrived on scene, they were attacked by citizens with rocks, bottles and even fired on. This necessitated responses from an already depleted Police Department to protJct fellow city employees. · This is my point, the best way to prepare for a future war is to closely critique previously fought wars. We haven't had these kind of problems in Los Angeles since the Watts Riots of 1965. During the recent war with Iraq (Desert Storm) we had the advantage of having command officers in key position, that knew of the mistakes of the Vietnam War. Since that time our military has improved in both capacity and the ability to make war. They've mastered the techniques for moving men and materials half the way around the world. · During the early stages of the L.A. Riots we had a logistical nightmare on our hands with the movement of officers and ·materials. In fairness, I must say that we have never had to coordinate such a massive movement of people and materials before in our history . . Today, we have almost no officers still working, the street that were around during the 1965 Riots. Communication was the other problems. We used our Divisional cars for the first days of the riots and we didn't have all the regular frequencies. Many times we didn't know what was going· on around us. There were also the other agencies from not only California but neighboring states as well. We also had the military deployed who also had to b.e integrated into a working communication system. . r ., l I UO CRITIQUE FORM BATTLE, James Page 3 I hope that as a result of the L.A. Riots, that we not only develop hind sight but fore ·sight as well. ( ,fl I .. ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Name: Rosaline, F .. Rank: D-II Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division .Other Geographic Area of Assignment: Command Post# Sector# apply): X - -- x - -- S/W,Wilsh, 77th, S/E, Ramp., Hwd., Cent., Newt. 2 and 3 1,2,3 & 4 in various days and areas. Date/Watch/Time: 4/29-5/22 B Watch 1800 hours If necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: See Below (i.e. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ... ) COMMENTS: The · use of seasoned- officers, like myself with 27 1/2 years. with no training on the M.T.D. and manadnock and black and white vehicles was very ill-advised due to officers safety. The lack of food and drink the first two nights was totally unexcusable as a catering truck either- a (canteen) ours or rented could have been used especially on "B" watch where nothing was open. I realize assigning hundreds of officers throughout the City is a · major undertaking, but the deployment of manpower and decision making was v~ry slow weeks after the start of U.O. 1 .. ~~o 01.1 s.o (21e1 1 . ~. '. DATEOF 6/12/92 STAFF RESEARCH CONTROL FORM RESEARCH REQUEST REQUEST: _______ _ ORIGINATOR'S DUE DATE: 6/29/92 FIRM DR NO. : ________ _ TO: __ A_L_L_O _H B ___ E ___ N_T __ I_T_I_E_S ____ _ £',IPLOYCE T A K INO. ,-ii.:,T ACT I ON ON Pi.O J CC T SUBJECT (Brief description of research topic) : ALL 5UB5EQ U CNT OUC DATC5 O N i.cvc.-sc AFTER-ACTION REPORTING FOR THE APRIL/MAY RIOTS INSTRlJCTIONS (Form of report, suggested sources, persons to contact, etc.): 1. TACTICAL PLANNING SECTION: Type of Occurrence This section shall include, but is not limited to: * Type of occurrence * Location of occurrence * Dates, times and duration * Brief background/intelligence summary FIELD COMMAND POST INFORMATION This section shall include: · * Location of command post and satellite command posts. * The field corrmand post staffing levels. * The mobi·le command post vehicles used. * The watch schedule during the UO. PROPERTY DAMAGE OBTAINED ""OM ,- , 1, C. BY lMPLOYEE o.-1c.1NATINC. 11.-oJtCT RECEIVED JUN 1 5 1992 TACTICAL PLANNING SECTION This section shall include all significant property damaged during the UO. * Private property * City property * Other public property 2. DETECTIVE HEADQUARTERS BUREAU: DEATHS AND INJURIES This section shall include significant information on UO related deaths and injuries. There shall be a statistical surmlary of deaths and injuries, including distinctions between officers, suspects and victims that were injured or killed. Additionally, there shall be a one line summary depicting the circumstances surrounding each death and permanently incapacitating ("A") injury. 3. ALL OTHER OHB DIVISIONS & SPECIALIZED SECTIONS: CRITIQUE All Areas and specialized division commmanding officers shall submit a written critique. Commanding officers shall encourages their subordinates to provide EMPLOYEE ORIGINATING PROJECT: __________ O ..... H ...... B.__ ________ _ (CONT.) GENERAL FILE NO. OFFICE FILE NO. BUREAU FILE NO. DIVISION Fl LE NO. OTHER FILE NO. 122/92 NOTE: The original of this form remains with the original of the latest revision of the staff research report. I STAFF RESEARCH CONTROL FORM (CONT.) Page 2 input and compile that input into a single written critique. All original \vritten critiques submitted by subordinates shall be attached to the commands' critique. The command critique shall include, but is not limited to: * An appraisal of procedures used during the UO. * A statement evaluating the effectiveness of the effort while operating within established procedures. * Recommendations for changes in procedures. Special consideration should be given to these areas: * Strategy * Tactics * Personnel * Logistics * Communications (specifically, availability/efficiency of ROVERS and availability of frequencies). * Field jail Commanding officers may use the attached UO Critique Form (Attachment A) to solicit critiques from their subordinates. 1 Certain commands performed duties that were specialized, unique or significant (i.e., Metro, ASD, Communications, etc.). In those cases, commanding officers should expound on that specialized assignment. '·" uo CRIT+OUB PORK Name Rank _______ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Colil!Dand Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time. _________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: AT'l'ACJDIDl'r A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; (Continuation sheets may be used) ; ... . . . . ....... ,.- : -, .... --- . --· !.'...C." - --- =· -~-~-- June 29, 1992 8.1 . 7 · INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE TO; Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau FROM: Officer-in-Charge, Tactical Planning Section SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR APRIL/MAY RIOTS Attached is Tactical Planning Section's After Action Report for their involvement in the riots that took place in April and May of 1992. This report has been prepared in response to your request, dated June 12, - 1992. This report follows the format contained in your request. ~' /7 / 1~ ( ;/BRUCE s. WARD, Lieutenant Officer-in-Charge Tactical Planning Section Attachment I p r.- !"I I" ' ,, I= D -JUN :3 J 1992 HEAUQ U A R1t:.re -> biJIJc .. . - 1..J1U AFTER ACTION REPORT LOS ANGELES APRIL/MAY RIOTS '92 TYPE OF OCCURRENCE The occurrence was a civil disturbance which initially began with protesting and quickly evolved into random rioting which included, but was not limited to, vandalism, assaults, arson and looting. LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE This disturbance occurred randomly throughout the City of Los Angeles as well as neighboring cities. However, the most affected areas occurred in South Los Angeles. DATES/TIMES/DURATION The incidents began on Wednesday, April 29, 1992 at approximately 1600 hours. A Tactical Alert was initiated by Communications Division at 1855 hours and Department Mobilization occurred at approximately 2010 hours. Although much of the unrest occurred within twenty-four to thirty-six hours of the first incidents, the Department Mobilization continued through Tuesday, May 26, 1992 at 0700 .hours. ( A partial Demobilization tobk · place for much of the Department, on May 10, 1992.) BRIEF BACKGROUND/INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION This disturbance was directly related to the not guilty -verdicts given to four Los Angeles Police Officers accused of beating a Los Angeles motorist, Rodney King, at the termination of a vehicle pursuit. Prior to April 29, 1992, there were several indications, as expressed by several individuals, organizations and the media, that the public would protest. Several individuals predicted that there would be some civil disturbances. On April 29, 1992, at approximately 1510 .hours, the verdicts for the defendants were announced. Results of the verdict were televised locally, nationally and internationally as well as broadcast on news radio. Within an hour of the verdict announcements, civil disturbances began to occur. FIELD COMMAND POST INFORMATION LOCATION OF COMMAND POST AND SATELLITE COMMAND POSTS * COMMAND POST The Field Command Post was initially set up at 54th Street and Van Ness Avenue at a Southern California Rapid Transit District (RTD) facility on April 29, 1992 through May 3, 1992. On May 4, 1992, it was moved to the Los .Angeles Memorial Coliseum (west side-gate 14) where it remained until May 26, 1992. An additional staging area was set up at Seventy Fifth Street Elementary School just north of 77th Area Station from May 3, 1992 thru May 5, 1992. * SATELLITE COMMAND POSTS West Bureau - Command Posts were set up at each of the four Geographic Areas and Operations West Bureau. Deputy Chief Glen Levant was the Field Commander. Valley Bureau - Command Posts were set up at each of the five Geographic Areas as well as Operations Valley Bureau. Deputy Chief Mark Kroeker was the Field Commander. Central Bureau - Command Posts were set up at each of the fiv~ Geographic Areas as well as Operations Central Bureau. Deputy Chief Bernard Parks and Commander Mpurice Moore were the Field Commanders for "B" and "A" Watch, respectively. MOBILE COMMAND POST VEHICLES USED * MOBILE EMERGENCY RESPONSE VEHICLES (MERV) * * * * * Deployed at the Field Command Post and sector 4 staging area. Mobile 5 (command post) Mobile 6 (command post) Mobile 7 (command post) Mobile Canteen (command post) Mobile Generator (command post) Note: To enhance lighting at the Field Command Post, TPS deployed a solar powered portable light unit which was donated for use during the riots by Barrett Solar Systems of Palm Springs. TPS had previously requested budgetary funds for portable lighting from the Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) as well as the Police Department to be used in Unusual Occurrence (UO) situations. In both lnstances, the request was denied. STAFF AND . WATCH SCHEDULES All available TPS sworn personnel were deployed during the riot. Lieutenant Bruce s. Ward, directed Sergeant Bryan Pearson and Officer Michael Hagen, at 1830 hours~ to respond to the Field Command Post Unit ·(FCPU-Piper Tech} to activate FCPU resources. They were also tasked with notifying all other TPS Personnel as to when to respond to the FCPU. Their details included, but were not limited to, deploying mobile trailers and the MERVs, managing the field stores and mobile canteen, facilitating supply requests, obtaining and transporting supplies to the • Field Command Post and were deployed as security at the Field Command Post as well. All sworn personnel worked 12 hour watches and were assigned as follows: * SWORN PERSONNEL * 0600-1800 hours 1 Sergeant II 4 Police Officer III 1 Police Officer II * 1200-2400 hours 1 Lieutenant II 1 Sergeant II * 1500-0300 hours 2 Sergeants I 1 Police .Officer II * 1800-0600 hours 1 Sergeant II 4 Police Officer III 3 Police Officer II PROPERTY DAMAGE * Private Property - The following information reflects a summary of statistics for buildings damaged by the 1992 civil disorder. The cost estimates provided are for structure damage only and do not include the value of structure contents. Type of Building Inspected Number Damaged Estimated Cost Residential 1008 76 $12,823,200.00 Commercial 1992 1121 $448,935,574.00 Mixed Use 44 32 $ 7,397,100.00 Un-Specified 408 0 $ 0.00 Total: 3452 1229 $469,155,874.00 I • • • k * * ---- - ---------------------========i..=~-===~=- Note: Information provided by Los Angeles Police Department of Building and Safety, May 26, 1992, 1730 hours. City Property - The following City facilities sustained damage: City Hall, City Hall East, City Hall South, Parker Center, Los Angeles Mall, Council Field Offices, Wilmington Multipurpose Center, Chinatown Public Safety Association and Southern Parking Enforcement. The total estimated cost of repairs is $970,000. There are no individual property damage costs per facility at this time (e.g. Parker Center). The cost of damage to department vehicles including cost and labor are as follows. South Bureau Central Bureau Valley Bureau West Bureau 42 Vehicles 42 Vehicles 10 Vehicles 27 Vehicles 121 Vehicles Total Cost: $56,963.80 Other Public Property Several Government Facilities, such as the Federal Building, sustained broken windows and damage to various other structures. However, at this time, cost of damages are not available. CRITIQUE FIELD COMMAND POST OPERATIONS * Now that the riot is over, the Department is reeling from tts inability to take action quickly enough to stop even the violent crimes let alone the entire event. In my opinion, it was less the result of a system failure than a failure of belief that it would take place at all. The mindset seemed to be that some disturbance could occur but nothing serious. Because nobody really believed a riot. on a large scale was possible it was not given any real priority for preparation until it was too late. The training that was given was not taken seriously. The feeling from the top was cursory preparation on a low key basis. Because of the charged political atmosphere, everyone was walking on eggs. Nobody wanted to make things worse. When the rioting began, the difficulty in mobilizing resources was partly due to lack of decisiveness by l eadership (probably because they feared no support in a no win environment) and a lack of properly trained personnel in key command post positions. Certainly there were other problems but these were foremost. Of all the hazards facing the City, most are the lead agency responsibility of the Fire Department. The one occurrence where the Police Department takes the lead is for a riot (civil disturbance). Of all the things we need to be prepared for, this is it! Unfortunately it only occurs every 30 years or so. Unlike the Fire Department, who practices daily, we don't get much opportunity to do so. Without much practice it doesn't seem so important and consequently it looses its priority. On the other hand, practicing for riots for 20 to 30 years without a riot is a difficult concept .to sell. Nevertheless, something must be done. I recommend that the command post function be assigned as a permanent responsibility of some Department entity such as Dare Division for example. Or, taking it a step further, assign components of a FCP to Divisions whose daily duties parallel FCP duties. For example, assign the personnel function to Personnel Division, Intelligence to ATD or OCID, Operations to Metro, etc. This would free field officers to work the field to a certain extent and training could be accomplished through quarterly or semi-annual training days. This may not solve all the ills but at least 1 people would know their jobs and may unclog some major response delays. * Lack of planning. Command Post sites for use in a possible riot should have been designated by each Area and Bureau and coordinated by TPS. On April 29th, the Command Post fleet should have been moved to the OSB Command Post site have it established including telephones. Field Command Post personnel were sent home and had to be recalled. We set up the Command Post fleet for other possible u.o. events, we didn't here. TPS personnel at the Command Post were used, for the most part, as "go-fers". These officers are trained in CP operations and work it every day. Their valuable expertise was wasted. OSB personnel who were assigned training as Command Post cadre were not always used. Because of a lack of command emphasis on staffing, training and exercising Command Post .cadres by the Operations Bureaus, the Command Post cadre system did not work. Because of a lack of command emphasis on improving systems and equipment for use in a major UO we did not have what we · needed to run a large Command Post. Existing procedures in Unusual Occurrence ·control were not always used; probably because staff and command officers either forgot or never knew what the procedures were. * It was apparent that the Department's ability to manage the riot was affected by many years of budgetary neglect. The fact that the· City of Los Angeles has the lowest ratio of Officers to citizen's of any major department in the country, had a greater impact on controlling the riot than any failure to plan for it. * The tents rented for the CP were excellent. Four would fit into mobile 2 and provide covers for logistics and personnel. Lighting at night for their functions was minimal. Shop light (48") suspended from the tents would provide the required lighting. I issued helmets, shields and covers to many officers (including Sgts, Lts, and P-3's). It is my opinion that these officers never had the issued equipment inspected. I find it hard to believe that one could not have a helmet issued to them. Supply Division went out of their way to assist with supplying the Command Post and they deserve a medal. PUBLIC SAFETY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT * It is recommended that the Department make an honest appraisal of public expectations tempered by reality and clearly define the role of police officers within the City to reflect current authorities, available equipment and tactics, and limitations. The public and political leaders must be advised of the limited ability and resources of public safety organizations. They must know what to anticipate when emergencies cause demand to exceed resources. The City in general and the Department in particular seem to iack readily available stockpiles of resources to sustain operations (i.e. food, water, ammunition, vests, shotguns, protective masks (gas), face shields, riots shields, riot batons). It is recommend that a permanent position within the Department for a Military Liaison Officer be established. This individual should be of supervisory rank with military affiliation to facilitate mobilization and deployment of state and federal resources in addition to other Department/military functions. There is a manifest need for riot control agents (tear gas), protective masks and decontamination facilities to break up crowds, channel movement, and protect property by making it t emporarily uninhabitable. UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE TIME CARDS * Observed that many individuals were unclear on how to fill out u.o. time cards, especially when calculating time (e.g. starting time, total u.o. hours, total u.o. O/T hours). With the amount of cards generated by the riot, it became a monumental task to correct the times that were miscalc.ulated. I recommend that the Department research the idea of an alternative means of accounting for personnel.· In this age of technology there should be some way to use computers, initially, for the accounting of personnel. In the meantime, if we are to use this antiquated means of personnel accounting, everyone should be trained how to fill out u.o. cards and calculate time. This would ensure that whoever is given the task to complete the time cards, can do so adequately. ·'? uo CRITXQVI J'QRM Name( _ ::s:t:1:'s:N . fsoD~--:S Rankg--y--- ;:)._. Assignment during U.O. (check all that Emergency Operations Center . Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division apply) c6:: --- Other _____________ _ Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time ________ _ rztH /4u). /;;;J_ . 3 ' } (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: FcP DP£-r:~ c;N.S 1 (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS i NOu/ ~ n+E R1or- 6 £Ji/8e -rH£- bEPr 1s K!e&£.JN6 F/2t:>rYJ 1r.s. //1Jl'J-z'3 1 .1-1~ Tl) 17/-k-E ~no;-/ cpurCl<J-L/ eA/t:Jtl61/ ro Srt'JP El/EA.I 'rJ..1.£.. · J/'/~£-F_AJr {!£/M~-5 L-F-r A-C--oA/£ 7J1£ &AJn/2£ EVE,Alr:: I /II 111"/ 6JPIN //)A) IT tv,4 _s Le.sS. 7Jf£ /CE~t.r &? F-A S'-/..S ~ FA-twlc€., T)M-A/ ,/1 F/HL-U/VL OP (3€UGC" nH+T ;T tA.J0tlL-b 7711<£ r'LAeE: ~ fk..L. TJf£. /}1/lllDSET" -S~: E£::> 7D 8£ l7Hf:r SOYV/1£ DJs TU/2f3,41t./c.£ C&JUl,.-/:::, ·O~(R_ t:3ll1 A.lOrJHAL~ SE:/2../ow.s. 6ECA-u~E /VDBoby' tf?EAtJ. ~EJ-/Et/12...D ~ ;2,/01c{)A./ · r1 t-A--126€.. 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H+E F1€L£) m ,4 ~✓ b---T'GAJ,' /MIO "rl2-A--t/UIA.k. WlU-.D 8E A-cL--<9?14/JL./.s~ T#--te£J · CAL::, l,J_ 4J t/ 4/2:TERLy O ,e .,5'-e.n,,;; AN//./ U/tt.....:. "TJ':!A--t, A/J ;<,I b bfrl(S .. TH-ts /1JA-q doT ~L1"'£ ~ 77-1-£_ tLL-s &i-rr- ;:,-r- ~r- /J£DP2.£,, WOULD l<NOt-() ~,e__ CTDB.5 /#..Rb /Vl/4<( UtJC~ ~tYVlE- ;,114:roe__ ~?OA-IS:.£" b~_.s oo CRITIOUE lQM / Name I / ' _ l / _j,- _ / ~ ) , I / I I/./ . '/ ,. / I ~ I ···- \ / r- . , - - -- .. " ...... ~ Rank_/ _;,_.;;...;; ____ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) ·Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time ________ -:-_ (if necessary or specific to this topic) / l / ~:-L---:t'.:-- (~-~- J _t_~ Topic of Discussion: -- , '- , / 1 etc) (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, COMMENTS: , -.1- •, /' . ~ \ ~ /1 -:c i.;_/ ,-· -C /.. _ C::. . . ··'/-er ,r- ' / 7 / -,-- ,.. , , - / . ,::, {. - '- - / (_ , ' , , .:._ , ,/ J / 1 ,,, , : <'. - ~ - .;·,.. - .• , -,.-. I - · ./ ·,,, L:7_~ · _/ C ,. .._ , , ,// i_,.,1 ·-·, , ;-;-· · / , I - /~'/t /J / \ -:: . ./"tc . (.,, i.:..,,'./L / ..._ _ :,,--- '- r-tz- . -..:- -~ .-) / , , ,-,- /'\ /l. ' / - ~ L (._ r:£5S -- - ----· --- , / \. 'l / ;--c:...,.:) .# / c- ·~ ... , /A (! 77 <.!_.4.L A_ A..£~{' Tr I; .l-- l -'L - uo CRITlQQB PORK NamE? \-\~C..r-\y ':n, ---Le~' Rank 7-3 . Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations center Field Command Post x, Field Task Force ----- Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other --- Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time ________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) T~pic. of Disc;ussion: C.f Q'1S /.J;QVlt' (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, c6mmand Post I Operations, etc) - ! \<\Ul:rO \-1-r::\..n\r-n" $t <;~"G,LOI ~'-'!) C..0v1'1\...~ T. h\a"' '( 0 FF- ,c.-n~ l \ WC..\.. <; ~.,. ~, L4t J i ?- '}'~). -r, Ii 1'\1\1 01, ~, ..... f~ ~f!<F. o-P~s N~~ ~o ~t:T' ,~~"wo ~,u,i' \ \.J\~l=;c..,,-,;o. -r ,=,'-A> \T l~T"'•~'-'""'; ~,.. ou\'? ~"'-0 ~, ~VW ~ ~~\..~\;, ~~~V\10 -r~ T~~"'~•. - Su1'1t1,..y 1)lV w,~"-1\" ovT o;: -n\°11\'lL \,,JQl(T-:> ~c;, • n- w, 1'11 ~"'"'-' .._ 1'\,l\'f C..f. ~ ~t-i"t 7:::>'it\"f..W1i ~ t'V\110~, J ------------.. (Continuation sheets may be used) --· ------·-· - ·- - · ··-·-~-- ··~-- . . •· • ·· . • . . ........ - -··---·---···-· l' ; "" uo CRITXQVI PORK Name SR Y A~l J. PEARSON Rank __ s_E_R_ G _E_ A _ M _T __ _ Assignment during cr.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other TACTICAL PLA MN I · lG SECTI ON Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time _________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: PUBLIC Sft.FETY E. E GE M CY ~1M!A GE M I: n (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; It is recommended that the Department m ake an honest appraisal of public expectations tempered by reality and clearly define the role of police officers within the City to reflect current authorities, available equipment and tactics, and limitations. The public and political leaders must be advised of the limited ability and resources of public safety organizations. They must know what to anticipate when e~ergencies cause demand to exceed resources. The City in general and the Department in particular seem t~ lack readily available stockpiles of resources to sustain operations (i.e. food, water, ammunition, vests, shotguns, protective masks (gas), face shields, riot shields, riot batons). There is an apparent need for a pernanent position within the Department for a M ilitary Liaise~ Officer. This indivirlual should be of supervisory rank with military affiliation to facilitate mobilization and deployment cif state and federal resources in addition to other Department/military functions. There is a manifest need for riot control a~ents (tear gas), protective masks and decontamination facilities to break up crowds, channel movement, (Continuation sheets may be used) and protect property by making it temporarily uninhabitable. ... .. -·-·-:=::.-:-:---:-·-· ·::. ~ ~ - ..... ____ - :~·. ·. •-.•::- ·•·7':4~: •-,-·•·-:--:--...-----: :·. • '• -. .. ,.._ . I I .. ~•~ · '• . .. uo CRITIQUE PORK Name .:T o HJJ T 2;;4RONQ t..-<_lSk( Rank SG:,/ 1 Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time _________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: £1GLD CQH-M8;if/) pos, ( ie Field Jail, Squad Tact_ ics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: 4 -L T w A 5 A f' () {+--fl,~-,,./1 TH,+ I me..- Oe f l}-r'Z. TM ti ,vT s fr~ I l. t ,-, ,-o /f,,1 /f;,V A,"L r~ 1?101 lA..IAS A-FF,ic. ,~o -~ Ye·Ml-s O -F- '8 v u <. ~ T.4 IL 'I ,'v 'i r. u; c. : 1-. . 77f-£ FA- (!_,J ,L___j/f/j-:a:;;>'" C "'t""11 a P.. Le.S A A.J <o ,i <.., E-S l+J4 S -r7-l-i.. L o W i-:>, r< A-F} o o F o {: G Je-5> TO c , 1 L '.s o F /tr-.J t "4 A Jl)R. 'DE p A- a. wt ,,.f;- , /J n-1 l ~ c.h•.fT1--'-/ , f/J+ o .+ ~ u,., rs, IL /M /JA<.,T o/J C£}/f./~U.4 A.Jf:; -nil 7<10 T TJ//f';J Awf FAl'-Ufi!...il. · ro tL.Av rDIL t,,,J: (Continuation sheets may be used) - - - ----- TO:TPS - -- ·-.' . -· . :, - :- · · :.JUN-25-' 92 THU 10: 09 ID: LAPD TPS FCPU TEL NO: (213 ) 237-0557 l:i653 P01 Na.me Tt1c~mc1s .... R_. ___ .. Gr_ i_-f:f. i. ·th R.,, k S•r_g_•il. n.t. ..... ...I). Ar1~ca of assignment ~ - E~H . . ~ . 11 e 11 w.-tr.:t, COMMENTS ua CRITIQUE FORM Lack of pl~nning. should have been coordin•ted by TPS. Command Post $ites for d~~s:t (,;r,ated by Si\c:h ~1se in Ar- c-i:t,;A a pc~u1ib l e riC"Jt c\.1 n d b LW ~? i~ u ii\ n d On April 29th, the comm.;1nd post , f: l SQ't. ~ : sl·toul d have:~ br - Hm m,Jywd tc:., th~ � SB command post· ~ite ~nci hav~ it e~t~bligh0d including ta! aphon~ •. Fiald Comm~nd Pest personnel were sent heme and ha~ t o be I"" ec: al l. ed • We set up th~ (.-:omm.lr1d po!;;t -fl e?.ett. ·fc1"' othf .❖- 1 1'" p <:. 15:r.. $_ ibl.,e ... ........ .. ur.1 ~ ~vt-mt.s we cHdn 't her-e. TP~ perfflcnnal ~t the c ommand pest were us~d , for tha most part, o.s "go--fwni". ThGHiU c)-f •F:lcers 11\rc~ trained ir, CF· operation$ ~nd wc,rk it every dc1y. Theif· valL.tc.\bla ei,:pertise wac.i& was;b;,d. osa parscnnal who were a~Migned training as CP c~dre were not • l ~-.a ys 1..tsad. Because of a lack of comm~nd emph~sis en staf4ing, training and •x•rcisin; CP cadr~s by the � pa bure~us the CP cadre $y~t~m did not work. · Because of a la~k of comm~nd emphami$ on improving ~yst~m5 ~nd ~quipment for u~e in a major UO we did not h~ve what we needsd to un. 1.rga CP'. Exisisting p~ocadures in UO control were probably bacauaa staff ~nd c~mmand officer• navar knew what the procedures were. not al w ,;;\ y » t..t s ~d ; . either forgot or INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE June -29, 1992 8.2.2 / .,' ~ _., TO: Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau FROM: Commanding Officer, Detective Support Division SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION CRITIQUE FOR APRIL/MAY RIOTS As directed, the attached critique of the April/May 1992 Riot has been prepared. The critique encompasses an overview from the division perspective, section perspective and the perspective of individual employees who willingly volunteered their opinions and insights. Q.W/~ R . . MANCINI, Captain Commanding Officer Detective Support Division RECEIVED JUN 2 9 1992 OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS BUREAU DETECTIVE SUPPORT DIVISION CRITIQUE - APRIL/MAY 1992 RIOTS June 25, 1992 PRE-RIOT PREPARATION/TRAINING In early April 1992, the Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau directed that Detective Support Division identify two lieutenants and at least four squads of sworn employees, to be taken from Fugitive Warrant and Gang Information Sections, to undergo unusual occurrence control/squad formation refresher training. These personnel would be trained by Metropolitan Division personnel and would be deployed in uniform to support Metropolitan Division personnel in the event of civil unrest anywhere in the City. On April 23, 1992, a total of 46 detectives and police officers (including two lieutenants) from Detective Support Division participated in a one-day refresher training program at the Police Academy. Upon completion of the training, these personnel returned to their assigned duties and work schedules. I Personnel assigned to Criminal Conspiracy Section, Asian Crime Investigation Section and Special Investigation Section were not involved in the refresher training due to the specialized nature of their routine duty assignments. On April 29, 1992, following the televised announcement of the findings of the jury in the trial of three Los Angeles Police Department employees and one former employee, the Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau, conducted an emergency staff meeting. The meeting addressed proper posture and iesponse to the jury verdict by all Department employees. Commanding Officers were directed to immediately begin meeting with their employees to furnish a factual basis of information upon which sworn and civilian employees could respond to inquirie~ from the public and news media. All available Detective Support Division personnel were assembled and briefed at 1615 hours by Captain Mancini. The majority of division personnel, however, were either end-of-watch or performing field related duties. Captain Mancini left his command at approximately 1830 hours. No notification of a City-wide tactical alert had been communicated to Detective Support Division, which is housed at 419 s. Spring Street. Metropolitan Division had not requested any personnel from Detective Support Division. Enroute to his residence, Captain Mancini monitored commercial radio broadcasts and Tactical Frequency No. 3. While at his residence eating dinner and watching events in South-Central Los Angeles unfold on television, Captain Mancini heard an announcement that the Los Angeles Police Department had declared a "Tactical Alert" and all off-duty After Action Critique For The April/May Riots Page 2 personnel were to report for work. Captain Mancini telephoned Detective Headquarters Division to determine whether a Mobilization had been declared or a Tactical Alert. Initially, Captain Mancini was informed that only a Tactical Alert had been declared and then, after being briefly put on hold, was informed that a Department-wide Mobilization had been declared and all B-Watch personnel were to report for duty. From his residence, Captain Mancini telephoned the Detective Support Division lieutenant Section Officers-in-Charge and instructed them to effect the call-up of B-Watch personnel. Special Investigation Section personnel were already responding to 419 S. Spring Street. RIOT-RELATED EVENTS The call-up of sworn and civilian B-Watch personnel resulted in the usual and anticipated initial frustrations encountered when recalling off-duty personnel. Some employees were not home; some quoted lengthy delays in reporting due to extreme travel distances. At least one sworn employee could not get to work because of street closures and was temporarily commandeered and put to work by Harbor Area where he reported in. Metropolitan Division was requesting the immediate r~sponse of the four squads of personnel who had been trained to work with them. Many, if not most of these personnel were routinely assigned to A-Watch which required additional special handling and complicated the mobilization of off-duty personnel. The call-up of B-Watch personnel and their arrival, in uniform, at Detective Support Division took several hours. Once B-Watch personnel were recalled, notifications to A-Watch personnel were completed. The overall mobilization recall of B-Watch personnel and notification of A-Watch personnel went reasonably smoothly. An initial minimum operating force and available reserve for both A and B Watches was not overlooked in the scramble to recall personnel. Personnel from Detective Support Division contacted the Emergency Operations Center and informed the Personnel Section of the status of division personnel. There were no delays in regard to reporting Unusual Occurrence Personnel Status Report information. Both Criminal Conspiracy Section and Special Investigation Section were exempted, with the concurrence of Operations-Headquarters Bureau, from contributing personnel to the available reserve pool. Asian Crime Investigation Section was not exempted. The inability to draw upon personnel resources from Criminal Conspiracy Section and Special Investigation Section proved to be a wise management decision, but · restricted the selection of personnel to furnish an available reserve pool to Asian Crime Investigation Section, Fugitive Warrant Section and Gang Information Section. On April 30, the Emergency Operations Center Intelligence Officer, Sergeant Sale, inquired whether Gang Information Section was involved in gathering and evaluating gang intelligence information. Because Gang Information Section personnel were working in uniform with After Action Critique For The April/May Riots Page 3 Metropolitan Division and only a skeleton crew remained to maintain the administrative operations of the Section, sufficient personnel were not available to field an intelligence detail. The Chief of Police personally called and asked that a squad of Gang Information Section personnel be deployed on B-Watch to gather and evaluate intelligence information. Accordingly, the commitment of personnel resources to Metropolitan Division was reduced, and a B-Watch Gang Intelligence Detail was formed. Initial detail reporting requirements were directly to the Emergency Operations Center Intelligence Officer. This later changed to require three separate reporting requirements: 1) The Emergency Operations Center; ·2) The South Bureau Field Command Post; 3) Intelligence Control Center. Ultimately, sufficient Gang Information Section personnel were available on the A-Watch to perform some day time intelligence follow-up work and the B-Watch detail adjusted its working hours as needed to best suit the intelligence gathering conditions in the field. Detective Support Division was tasked with the responsibility of providing a fixed number of personnel to the Field Task Force on a daily basis, without exception. This commitment varied depending upon the needs of the Field Task Force, but additional reductions in the number of personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division did not occur in order to meet the needs of the Field Task Force. TQ accommodate the increasing needs of the Field Task Force, the division's minimum operating force (fixed posts) was reduced. For example, the required eight officer station security detail was incrementally cut to as few as three officers at times, some of whom were light duty. Personnel needs of the Field Task Force were given precedence over divisional needs which led to frustration among some sworn personnel who felt their job assignment should have been different. Workload back logs developed in the Fugitive Warrant Section which led to further frustrations. Asian Crime Investigation Section personnel were committed to station fixed post details and .Field Task Force assignments. Friction developed among division personnel over the role of Special Investigation Section personnel .who were deployed on the B-Watch but held in reserve for a purpose consistent with their field of expertise · . None of these areas of frustration effected the performance of division personnel while assigned to Field Task Force functions, but many police officers and detectives felt they were not being effectively utilized within their area of expertise. The majority of the problems and frustrations associated with furnishing a constant fixed minimum commitment of personnel to both the Field Task Force and Metropolitan Division leveled-off within days. The granting of days-off to Detective Support Division personnel presented a challenge with regard to meeting fixed Field Task Force personnel commitments, but all minimums were met by continually evaluating the number of division fixed post requirements. Fixed post duties and responsibilities were, whenever practicable, consolidated to reduce the number of personnel held back from the available reserve. Restricted duty personnel were utilized to perform many of the fixed After Action Critique For The April/May Riots Page 4 post functions. Days-off needs were accommodated and personnel were rotated in and out of fixed post assignments to meet divisional needs. This rotation practice cause some disharmony among personnel who preferred a field assignment to standing station security. However, employees performed with only minimum expression of frustration. The accommodation of time-off needs of Detective Support Division personnel working with Metropolitan Division became a problem. In order to meet the deployment needs of the detail, some Fugitive Warrant Section and Gang Information Section personnel worked the duration of the riot without taking a day-off. The two lieutenant platoon leaders accommodated, as best they could, the needs of their personnel without sacrificing the light striking force capability of the three squads. Their collective dedication to duty took precedence over their personal needs; their performance was superb. Following the three days it took to suppress the riot, the tedious task of restoring order in the community began to take 1ts toll. Sworn and civilian personnel exhibited signs of fatigue; tempers flared and interpersonal relationship skills diminished. Employees began to express unfavorable opinions over the tactical management of the unusual occurrence. The majority of the opinions overheard were extremely critical of the initial tactical manageme~t of the events which preceded the actual riot, and the tactical control measures employed during the three days required to regain and maintain control in the involved areas of the City. However, Detective Support Division personnel did not allow their expressed frustrations to impact on their duty performance. Detective Support Division's administrative operations during the riots were geared toward the support of Field Task Force operations. Over the long haul, Detective Support Division complied with all routine and special requests from the Emergency Operations Center and Field Task Force Commanders in a timely and effective manner. MISSIONS -PERFORMED BY DETECTIVE SUPPORT DIVISION PERSONNEL Criminal Conspiracy Section Criminal Conspiracy Section personnel were assigned to A-Watch during the unusual occurrence and investigated a total of five arson-related homicides. Four of the homicides were riot-related. Special Investigation Section Special Investigation Section personnel remained on B-Watch stand-by status during the initial days of the unusual occurrence. When these highly trained surveillance detectives were committed to the Field Task Force, they were initially assigned to book property that had been seized by patrol. They were eventually reassigned to Sector patrol and · After Action Critique For The April/May Riots Page 5 then to assist 77th Area detectives with the investigation of the Reginald Denny incident. Their Lieutenant Officer-in-Charge felt that specialized units such as his are most effective when they are kept together as a team and given a specific mission. He also felt that some field commanders were not aware of the limitations or capabilities of specialized units and did not effectively deploy them. Asian Crime Investigation Section Asian Crime Investigation Section personnel were given various assignments unrelated to their cultural and linguistic expertise, including Command Post security, station security, street closure details, and support to Metropolitan Division. Given the specialized expertise of Asian Crime Investigation Section personnel, they generally felt that the needs of the involved communities would have been better served had they been deployed to the Asian communities that were singled out for arson and looting. Gang Information Section Gang Information Section B-Watch personnel were assigned to gather, evaluate and disseminate criminal gang intelligence ~nformation. Initially A-Watch personnel were assigned to Command Post and station security duties which impeded the gathering of gang/riot intelligence information. Gang Information Section personnel feel that the recent civil disturbance demonstrated the involvement of gang members in organized criminal activity, and justifies the need for a centralized gang unit to coordinate the gathering and dissemination of City-wide gang intelligence information. Their commanding officer, however, does not share the same opinion. Fugitive Warrant Section During the initial stages of the riot, Fugitive Warrant Section personnel worked in conjunction with Metropolitan Division. Fugitive Warrant Section personnel responded to locations where Metropolitan Division personnel had made arrests and took custody of the arrestees, booked all the related evidence and completed the required reports. This was an excellent utilization of Fugitive Warrant Section personnel and it freed the highly trained, better equipped Metropolitan Division officers to continue their enforcement activities. While processing the Metropolitan Division arrestees, Fugitive Warrant Section personnel did not encounter any significant problems with the Field Jail Units at Southwest and Southeast Stations. In the following weeks, Fugitive Warrant Section personnel were assigned to Field Task Force duties which included crime suppression in Southwest Area. Fugitive Warrant Section personnel were called upon to respond to major disturbance activities in the various housing projects · After Action Critique For The April/May Riots Page 6 in South-Central Los Angeles. On these occasions, members of the Fugitive Warrant Section, Metropolitan Division, and other task force personnel went into the problem locations and were able to restore and maintain order. Problems encountered during these operations included the unavailability of radio equipment with Metropolitan Division frequencies and inadequate time spent briefing Fugitive Warrant Section personnel as to their specific mission. Generally, the specific operations were well run by Metropolitan Division personnel. Note: Fugitive Warrant Section and Gang Information Section personnel were trained in advance of the riots to interface with and provide support to Metropolitan Division, however, the first two squads that responded to the South Bureau Command Post were absorbed into the personnel pool. These detectives and officers ended up providing escort services for the Fire Department. The remaining two squads did eventually supplement Metropolitan Division field strength, however, they waited over three hours betore they received their first mission. It appeared to the Detective Support Division supervisors present at the Command Post that Metropolitan Division's mission was being continually changed which added to the overall confusion. CONCLUSION The manner in which Detective Support Division personnel were utilized during the riots was, in the opinion of this Commanding Officer, appropriate and prudent. The magnitude of the riots clearly required a total commitment of all available sworn personnel in uniform. Detectives and police officers in specialized non-uniformed assignments were the "cavalry" for uniformed police officers who were caught-up in the riots as the violence expanded and engulfed major portions of the City. Specialized investigative functions which are important during non-emergency conditions, became non-essential when compared to the need for maximum uniformed police presence on the streets of the City. This distinction may have escaped the conscious mind of some Detective Support Division sworn personnel. The unusual chaos that accompanies the establishment of a major Field Command Post operation was present the evening of April 29, 1992. However, the Department mobilization added to the chaos when large numbers of uniformed personnel began reporting to command post sites and were held in ready reserve. The waiting led to frustration and impatience. Detective Support Division personnel have been highly critical of the manner in which they were utilized after reporting to the South Bureau Command Post. Police Officers and Detectives who were at the Command Post on April 29, 1992, lost confidence in the tactical command and control decisions that were slowly promulgated, changed, changed again and then implemented. The critiques of individual Detective Support Division officers and supervisors address these dispiriting events. · After Action Critique For The April/May Riots Page 7 The inadequate communications equipment and capability of the Department were severely criticized by personnel who worked Field Task Force assignments. The inadequate numbers of dual purpose vehicles, and vehicles in general, were also criticized. Inadequate mission briefings occurred; officers defined their own mission in the absence of specific and adequate instruction. The Emergency Operations Center and the South Bureau Command Post could not be promptly reached by telephone to report intelligence information and furnish updated personnel status reports; the telephone lines were busy. Personnel status report information FAX'd to the Emergency Operations Center never reached its intended destination. After awhile, inspite of confirmation that the material had been received, it was routinely sent again just to avoid a call from the Emergency Operations Center Personnel Section asking why the information had not been FAX'd on time. Direct_ ives from the Department Commander arrived a,t Detective Support Division by mail two days after they were signed. The lag time in receiving any "hard copy" directives regarding the riot was a constant annoyance for Detective Support Division managers who were trying their best to support the Field Task Force. Information flowed reasonably well in only one direction, up the chain-of-command. I All things considered, suppression of the riots in three days was remarkable. One can't help wondering how much sooner the riots could have been suppressed if the police officers had been adequately equipped to perform their mission. The teamwork, cooperation and quality of tactical decision-making by the Department staff and command officer who were calling the shots will be critiqued and evaluated by a higher authority. AftAC:an,rr A uo CBX%XOVI lQRH Name BRUCE MEYER Rank Lieutenant I I Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations center Field Command Post -Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# apply) X X X 77th Street, Southeast, & Southwest Areas ' Date/Watch/Time April 29 through May 25, 1992 -- Hours - vari ous (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: General U.O. Critique (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; Please see the attached (Continuation sheets may be used) I . COMMENTS (continued) In the wake of the Rodney King verdict on April 29, members of the Fugitive Warrant Section, Detective Support Division became involved in a myriad of police activities which challenged the resources of the individual officer as well as providing these officers with a wealth of experience that other officers will never savor. Prior to the civil disturbance of April 29, Fugitive Warrant Section personnel went through eight hours of baton and squad formation training given by Metropolitan Division. This training was an outstanding refresher course for those officers that have not received such training in years, however, proved of very limited value during the actual riots. On the evening of April 29, at approximately 2030 hours, I was informed by my Commanding Officer that the Department had been mobilized and that my B Watch personnel should report to our facility at 419 South Spring Street. Upon notifying my · supervisors of the mobilization and requesting them to notify their respective subordinates, I realized that many of my supervisors did not have their subordinates home telephone numbers at their own home and that the majority of the Fugitive Warrant Section personnel did not know which watch they were designated to be on. This situation has been corrected. After Fugitive Warrant Section personnel responded to their work location, they were divided up into four squads and sent to the Command Post at 54th and Van Ness. The Fugitive Warrant Section personnel were selected to interface with and provide supplemental forces for Metropolitan Division. The first two squads that responded to the Command Post were absorbed by the personnel pool and ended up providing escort services for the Fire Department . .. The remaining two squads did provide supplemental forces for Metropolitan ·Division. During the next few days, Fugitive Warrant Section personnel found themselves facing a diversity of problem situations. Among the activities provided by the Fugitive Warrant ·section personnel during the initial stages of the Civil unrest were provision of transportation for prisoners aboard buses driven by and security provided by Fugitive Warrant Section personnel and the processing of arrestees involved in criminal activities. Some of the problems incurred during this time was the lack of proper radio communications. The limited number of rover radios assigned to the Fugitive Warrant Section personnel did not interface with Metropolitan Division or the South Bureau Command Post making communications very difficult. As the week .progressed, Fugitive Warrant Section personnel worked in conjunction with Metropolitan Division in Southeast, 77th Street, and Rampart Areas initiating their own police actions and arrests, while continuing to assist Metropolitan Division in their police actions. Fugitive Warrant Section personnel would respond to locations where Metropolitan Division personnel had initiated enforcement activity. The Fugitive Warrant Section personnel would take custody of any arrestees and book the arrestees and any evidence and complete the required reports. This freed the Metropolitan Division officers to continue their patrol activities. During the Presidential visit to Los Angeles, Fugitive Warrant Section personnel provided security for the possible riotous situation created by Korean demonstrators at the Bonaventure Hotel. Fortunately, the demonstrators were loud but orderly. The police operation was well run by Central Bureau personnel. In the proceeding weeks, members of the Fugitive Warrant Section were assigned to the Department Field Task Force where their duties included visual crime suppression in Southwest Area. During this assignment, Fugitive Warrant Section personnel were called upon to responded to major disturbance activities in the various housing project in South Central Los Angeles. On these occasions, members of the Fugitive Warrant Section, Metropolitan Division, and· Area personnel went into the problem locations and were able to restore and maintain order. Problems encountered during these operations included, a lack of communications and proper time to brief personnel as to their specific mission. The specific police operations were well run by Metropolitan Division. Generally, the demeanor of the Fugitive Warrant Section personnel during the four week assigned to U.O. activities was exemplary. During this time, the investigation and service of all LAPD felony warrants by Fugitive Warrant Section personnel, ceased. This caused a back-log of approximately 300 felony warrant where no due diligence etforts were made. Approximately 85 of the back-log felony warrantswere riot related. The four weeks assigned to u.o. activities also had a negative impact on the Foreign Prosecution Liaison Unit and Fugitive Unit. Approximately 35 fugitiv· e cases were back-logged and over 20 requests for service by outside law enforcement agencies were denied. Approximately 40 requests for service from foreign governments to the Foreign Prosecution Liaison Unit were delayed, along with 35 requests for service by geographic/specialized detectives. Fugitive Warrant Section personnel, including myself, had difficulty understanding why they were selected to be the last detective entity assigned to the Department Task Force while the rest of the Department has resumed normal duties. We understood the need to have a cadre of officers to quickly respond to an Unusual Occurrence, but why not have the cadre made up of officers who do not perform essential Department functions. In conclusion, the communication problem can only be resolved through the purchase of new equipment which has the ability to interface with other Department entities throughout the City. I recommend that the Department have all personnel attend a two day ACIS UO CRITIQUE · During the recent riot related UO, ACIS was deployed to various assignments unrelated to their community, cultural or linguistic expertise. These duties included command post security, fire department security, building security, street closures and assignment to the Metropolitan Division Task Force. This critique is written from the perspective of the personnel assigned to ACIS. H,)pefully, it will include constructive criticism of both the Department's reponse to the riot in general and the specific deployment and mission given to ACIS both during the riot and its aftermath. The following is a discussion of some of the significant issues that have been reported to me. 1. The Department as a whole and specifically detective and specialized detective division personnel were not prepared nor equipped to respond to this riot. Specifically, personnel lacked the following items: *Radios *Dual purpose vehicles *Riot related equipment (face shields and helmets) *Training in Riot tactics (Squad formatins, skirmish lines, etc.) The discrepancy between the equipment issued to Metropolitan personnel (multiple layers of Kevlar, all city radios, cellular phones, jumpsuits, all black clothing and helmets and gas masks, special weapons) gave the appearance and haunting fee1ing about "who was going to come out ahead when the shooting starts." This in spite of the fact everyone was patrolling the same streets. 2. Given the specialized nature of the expertise of ACIS officers it was generally felt that the Department and the City would have been far better served, had ACIS officers been deployed to the Asian communities that were singled out for ars~n and looting. In fact being· available to answer ACIS phones would have significantly reduced the perception that the Department had abandoned· their neighborhoods instead of guarding the empty interior of the. coliseum. 3. There is the distinct preception that the Department leadership lacked the knowledge and decisivness to effectively manage this crisis. The rank and file were left without specific assignments or clear objectives and frequently waited hours for an assignment. Ironically, during the aftermath the Field Commanders chose to conduct "code alpha" practice runs implying that the Department's slow initial response had more to do with the ability and desire of the rank and file to respond quickly that their own leaders hesitance to confront criminal behavior, especially as it related to gang members. Submitted by Robert G. Swanson, Lieutenant, OIC/ACIS Name Sam Masuda Rank De t ect i ve III uo CB+?XOVI PORK Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Colllllland Post -Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Administrative (fixed post) · Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time "B" Watch (1800-0600) (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: . . - &ftl:C'lhlwt A {ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; C-ATTACHED COMMENTS During the UO I was assigned administrative duties on "B" Watch. My duties included assisting the "B" Watch, Watch Commander, communicating with the EOC on personnel deployment matters, coordinating assignments for "B" Watch personnel, maintaining the ."B'' Watch log, and responding to telephonic inquiries directed to DSD. This critique will address areas that I personally had experience with, and feedback received from officers assigned to my Section (ACIS), and the community. During the first few days of the UO, I perceived the EOC to be disorganized. Faxed copies of DSD personnel assignments sent to the EOC were frequently misplaced or lost; requests for available personnel were constantly being changed; available personnel were put on stand~by; and there was an apparent lack of coordination/communication between the EOC and other Department entities. These problems, however, seemed to dissipate ·as the UO continued. While I conducted my primary responsibilities from the adjutants desk, I continued to answer calls directed to the Asian Crime Investigation Section. The vast majority of these calls were requests for service and information from the non-English speaking segment of the Asian community. Without the appropriate ACIS personnel available to handle these requests/ citizens were frustrated and isolated to fend for themselves. I learned that many of these calls were transfered to the ACIS from City operators and geographic Areas. In fact, on one occasion, the EOC requested the assistance of a Korean speaking officer. I thought this was peculiar since the EOC had sent ACIS personnel to CP security. The feedback I received from ACIS officers were that the majority felt they were not utilized to their full effectiveness. The Asian community, in particular the Korean business community, was impacted throughout the riot periqd. Since the inception of the ACIS, the Section has successfully maintained liaison with Asian community leaders, business organizations and individuals. The ACIS was established to bridge the cultural and communication gap that had existed between the Department and the Asian communities. It would seem appropriate that in a time of crisis ACIS resources, with it's language . capabilities and knowledge of the community, would be deployed where it's expertise could be utilized to the Department's advantage. uo CRXTXQVI lQRK Name James M. Tiampo 23100 Rank __ oe_t_e_c_t_iy_e __ -rr __ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center __ x __ _ Field Command Post X ---- ·Field Task Force x Fixed Post Security -x--- Patrol in Geographic Division Other MFTBO Back Up strike force Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time __ B _______ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: _s_e_e_A_tt_a_t_c_h_ed ________ _ . . •-;.. .- - .. ···&m• 'IMIP. . A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; ·- '-· t·· -:- - · - '!: . • _ : - .· - :- ::1 - :-: .. ACIS CRITIQUE OF UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE This critique is designed to constructively delineate the strengths and weaknesses exhibited by the Department as a whole during the recent riots. As with any critique, the intent is to be utilized as a learning tool to avoid repeat failures and to ensure continued successes. From the start of the unusual occurrence, ACIS officers were treated as an afterthought. With A and B watch deployment limiting each squad to seven officers, neither shift was able to muster enough personnel to field a full squad of ten, thereby initially limiting ACIS involvement in the riots to various odd tasks and fixed post details. The command post was so disorganized that the personnel were unable to cope with anything other than a full squad of ten. Once at the command post, hours literally passed before assignments to details were made. Hundreds of officers stood waiting for the opportunity to take back the streets of Los Angeles yet were forbidden to do so by Command Officers. The only personnel allowed to engage in any enforcement activity during the initial hours was METRO. It was clear that the Command Staff of this Department had no confidence in the training of it's rank and file officers and were relying solely upon the limited resources of METRO to quell the civil unrest in the city. Those initial plans were underestimated and it soon became fact that one division of METRO officers was not enough to discourage the onslaught .of criminal activity directly related to the riot. Another shortfall on the part of Department mobilization planning was a lack of available equipment. The command post was unable to field units due to a shortage of radios and vehicles. It was very evident that in spite of what it professes, this Department is incapable of providing the barest of necessities to the officers to ensure that the job would or could get done. While this may have been a budgetary constraint levied on the Department by the City, it "is a prime example of a problem that must be rectified. Utilization of available manpower was at best poor. While assigned to the Command Post and in charge of hourly statistics, it was noted that at any given time, LAPD deployed somewhere in the vicinity of 400 officers. In excess of 169 of those were utilized at the Command Post alone. A casual glance showed the majority of the officers standing around waiting for a . mission of some importance to come their way. Rarely did that occur. The reason they were assigned to the Command Post was that they r~ported for duty with less than a full roster of ten. Fixed post details were manned by Police personnel. This involved several hundred Police Officers and Supervisors. In lieu of the fact that thousands of National Guardsmen and U.S. Marines were deployed, this Department wasted valuable manpower and hours by not utilizing the presence of these entities. They were .sent to Los Angeles to assist the Police with civil unrest yet there appeared not to be any contingency plans for their presence. In interacting with these personnel, it was learned that many of them are Military Police and stand guard duty on military bases on a regular basis yet this Department was initially unwilling to allow them to guard our stations and allow our personnel to do what they are trained to do. · The rank and file officers of this Department as a whole did not want to lose the confidence of the public that they serve. Each and every one of t _ he officers that I worked with felt betrayed by the decisions that the .command Staff were handing down. The Department management displayed a lack of knowledge in field tactics, and as a whole were unable to effectively manage the Department goals in a time of dire crisis. The lack of decisive action was a pure precursor to what Proposition F has in store for this Department, for it is very obvious to the rank iand file that the Command Staff was thinking about Politics not Policing when making decisions during the riot. RECOMMENDATIONS; 1. Instill more confidence in the people that built this Department, the field officers. METRO is a unique and highly specialized unit and should be utilized only under extreme conditions. They are not and should not be the only units allowed to engage in battle. The average street cop sees more action on a daily basis and is just as capable of handling any situation. 2. Ensure that this Department is no longer "bandaged" together with ill equipment supplies. Provide the rank and file with adequate and properly working equipment. 3. Provide more in service training in unusual occurrences for ALL personnel. Command Staff Included. oo CR:IT:IOVI lQBK Name __ , __.fl~AH~0--Q{ of!) ~ Rank f Jk-: } Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations center Field C0111JDand Post ·Field Task Force Fixed Post Se<;:Urity apply) / v' Patrol in Geographic Division Other --- Geographic ·Area of assignment · Command Post # Sector# Date/Watch/Time ________ _ ( if necessary or speci_ fic to this topic) Topic of Discussion: . . . . . : '!?--~-:.:: ,;. . -- '.,/&ftl,CSINMW .& .. :... _ .... .. - , .. I (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; '9<.,1,~/J 1 ---rn ~ H I .s1 of '(tit:- 0 ~ t.S t,.ll p €-- V I • ~(-,.; (~ I [a s1,nl<l..J S~11L11'j /ll--) ,- E,'' ~f1. Hj ~ ~ ~o Cl--0~(;- -&It .s1fi10~ HhtAJ G-r.e-1& M-oP&i wl11 oyfi(tf-_ s . . J- ~~.S SCf HAt1t--t> c1vt tf ~ f A-iii A) GtZ5 ~ I U1r' 6JJ Fn H'j uµ, 1 C ~H~ Ctz/Htr) 1 w tt1.\-fr - lo e(u.,M} PiA.1/ *1 i'itl,- Col'fh~t> rsT . j:, fc-c-L, -ii{o,\ 1v1uc- WI}.) tr . plft,,1v~ff- lfo~ op u.ll 1.,1c,N7 f j(.,\ f&t~.,,&U le /r-,5isJ 4-,-,o 6,6-1~~ ~1(~,<rz~cf-' ~ fJzut\_: . ~& OBJttStA-1~ utthATJl1· ,~~ # .-••-.•- -~.-,_,.._·------·----- --11{ ~ ftc., i > ( ~ 1~ (ili 1-1~ '[N-16f ¼I) C .cu Lt> ri.t \) ~ 15 Bd-.l \0\5 r~J8? 'J~, ~rc"(l,T~l ~\,~ ~ ~ PiMLl'rtr,Jf. \) Is f' (G ViEr ~1 J bll~y ~~t'=,(}-/~ ~I 0tl?si? ~te._ 'wl&-- A-c.,t .s ~ t-- 6-x ~1 h IP fw\ 1.1,~ o\.,J)J U>1-t N 1..t-.i , 'T ~ , ~le' Clf1J Gtf'1'4t4-..... 11·yr10Tmw1 tPfo f4- wv ,4,.,~ r,-~ 'lvi. E:-- ~ lt1-<l't::!? CuHttws (f 10 A,-J-17 I /,J ~-r:H · -L A~ - f " .¼ 11,0e fdw ~/L- 'lo C.:)1-{Ht,µVW~ «:>~ -1- ~1.;0/l1 86-{,i~&i ~~ 0'4-- ' if~n .. ~lo 'µ•/ (,.,Fl Us~ ov/- ~,1 lo Effc-<1iJ~ ' ; -r , ,. ~l,,c,j~ ~, I ~OPOlv ll 1o ~ Mt~ &HttuJ,1,~ / /4,,~ l ~t7/!~iJ1 ~ H4-tN E,iu,o-&- IA,-;f- '1\4--- ~f1-y cwµce:s. f fl.lil,c,,T1<>N ~ '\v\~rL ~i'I+ /~\.1€:STH-wl~ , 'l~ LD'\1twer,_s C.;x,,.yp k.a-v~ YJZ'W liriJc/p I 1f o<-f-.- t7~T t,(\IU~ ~ WJrf ~,<.) i~.-L f-th,i,-iK_ • L,IJ:Ji (,1 I ~ J- 5\,t~L;? .. H.4-vc,-- B~ E-f~"fu,h,L,f)(c;.rli1 CM )l,1raq~1 . . ~~ ,,,11'11 ~1 ,¥1~'11 L .. . 5541.L- ~WVl,l \I'.,- ;,-, (L.112t-A:>,.l I tAU¼- ,., < , -, .-:fl{uS~I? or~ M /t;ni~ \?Ew•I-J,ST~T~ .s1~ t~ fn-.Jr of1+vi,- 'OolA\J \~N rt_" Erl-- ~µ1 --tw&-- r~•t}ilJJr &-<J1 ~ "' v, )t'\ 1: L--~. 1- 'ft'.t\ H~\Mst1 \-{:,fl.-~~ 4w Gt--T'rz€tl/ · :V/~ 'lo 17tr A--rier +~ Ptf~T1u,1 " 11-+ 1~5ft.) /pn'p;is.f I Name ' -r . j" - , Rank / .,,· Assignment .during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operati ons Center Field ColDllland Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security appl ~ x::::::: \ ce::::::: Patrol in Geographic Division Other ---- Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time (if necessary o_r_s_p_e_c~i~f~i_c_t_o_t_h_i_s-topic) Topic of Discussion: ~-•e+ ft A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; I '/7.Yt /v / ( ;],Ji;:- G C, ,:~ t /4 J (./'/; r.::. J' 1 7.F ;-cf?, 7,?K Fl El u (_',)~--i ._,,,4,..., f1 /7cJJ T J ? ',/,}. 1(',<77,- ?vd S ,J-,0 ) 'c'...U /ft' / :;: ,-'Ei---&-,A,/ ,J" · ·.~ -z::::1-c; :--fl -~c -,,, ,,,,,v· t 5 .Y.1~--< 1 ~~~-e-r r,"<::- 7 /7 - j 7 [ --:< ,,., tc:7.:'.,vr-;- , 1 ,r,1 .,, _ ..., , I - --' / " ., . C 1 1-(.h) /J' c,. -/,-0-fJ / "-..! /'-1 ,,< le- : ,,-v G- O c ;,- c/< ,j)& c / ,J/ P-,'J 1 G.l.. I • /..---- j 1,· _i) 12;"c,r--7;'---t tAI-;- c,= / 7:.-t,' - ;r-f"'.J 7·/ ;:C...c n -./-5 --77,,...,..; A 1-M-zl ' r t,;i__, ;, A,; ,,1JJI f:✓ &..V fU'/77-; 17.,:,.c qu/ c le ,R.·d/pvf c-" '17 ( , _ /) -- /1 , / ✓'j w 1 ) ----r7 V, A / ,;,_ .,--<-t 0-;z.,· .- / H b/Y ~v - · / ~) 7 /_,,l c ~ <) ,!/ t; h - r /if·/ · / u fir - u l;: " _/1 Ai D· J; /1),'~l:_{"?/,~ . 1(.J ~ - L7 -( / '1 r .,--r:::_ (-, I J~ , , ::;,,, / C--~ f __,.("(' L., I V, ~ ,v" V. '-"' "-' (r:/ d- (C_,,QCJ/ l -:N - u c· -:O 'TV ft<'. · ;e 7 ., , , c,. (/ . , {?[ /t :-c,.{ ,<, '; <-"; 1 I ,'-I '/X r fC4,7?::-C.I) r. r fl6r 1 J; ~A- ;:?.c-JT C J ,F ·p, 1 > ~ ,f:_?_ ) ·- ye_ I S'lOC- T -C/ · - /-"< L-- I uo CBXTXOVI lQM Name K1tP . ~-3 Rank ___ r _____ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Colllllland Post ·Field Task Force Fixed Post Security C-- Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic ·Area of assignment C e1v·r Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time __________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: f;KE,4 /J(lJ'--( J~<.:1.f/2-iif -·&na•·HMI- � A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; ·(lflJ /1)) T JvA 5 1/ , 0,E C(L1. A T.£2-1 5'7.1'}-r~# .0 /1 ND ~ /<.tr A-V)2 E<!:> c,- c:{ / TE t,,,:11£-<. G • Name uo CR+TIOVI lQBK /(03-5 r A A'/2--/ Rank. __ ~~ ~ / ~ ~_ f _, _ r _/ __ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply) )( x ~•·---ft & ' Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# f;El-0 C~l'-'l#/JNlJ ~ .s 1 Date/Watch/Time If W/-tT~H (if necessary or specific to this topic) . . t T<;>P ic . 0 f Dis7uss ion: c),C {_,/~ ; ~ / r #e U-0 <' H s.E.JJ /r/ :r ,r-e J?./6-t'fTP,4,F.~ I (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; tJ/4 ""£.. ;::: ,e c .. ,r c~ -,err 7i c ~ ,-...:, ~ £.v F _.,,: ;J:i E cgu.4 r& ...?'~A'/ ,,A:; 7J./ / .S /t) C/ R- 0 ,C ,!) 1'/ -:-j< 0 / ,,-, ,,,,e_ ,::,J ,4 _:=: t-1// c.. / 2 ..£.:) /,,/ A ,"J' ,e,9-J tu J/ £/2€ HE W 8 .S Nt!)_sr E,C~f~Tit-/£,hxbD A .s-rJEc. "!.lti:/ --; ~ i,€CcZJ /;/9-.5K MA!t!.JZ A:J.. /"-/ZJ ~/£t:2J c:bM1tJ,-JA./-D Pa~r , ... ~ .:; . ... :: - . &ftl:C ·HMlri & uo CBXTXOVI lQRX Name Rank f'J,r/ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center ✓ Field Command Post ✓ ·Field Task Force ✓ Fixed Post Security ✓ Patrol in Geographic D~vision ✓ Other ----- Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# A1A41~ 1 5 e d ?7, e/fs,~,: St..,U ,,- /,/t,U~/ /Ve--'µ.}~ e$:2a14'.1 f t/£ ✓Lr4~~,,J Sector# Date/Watch/Time , ,. :?--'7 72- /$ c:?o (if necessary or specific to thi Topic of Discussion: c16,c:,c..,• topic) '(ie Field J'ail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS ; t,_/{.,I ~ I..<.} a.,/~'4:::_( ,.,_,. { ~.,,-;>;>,a,,._a / ID r ~ -:z; ,car .,.,k c:' fH ~U' 4J,5)t<" yt,,lrl"' U r; lt 'tt-,V I"-" ~ '77 •?11:lj /71~ ~ t;?t,~ /4, ~k ,;Ji~ ~ ~JH. ,!v /,-';s-;,,.,, ~ wL?r..c )'~$./j (t;~ 1 PG) I" o P !.i" r,,t.qc ?;" ,f)<,<J WDYJ..C 6 v!/ t,?,...i /{c~ j'/~ ~/t,;nfl-tj p./, tv#U<s:- Ptxk.t>-tA- -rtk ,t;,rci::J ~,na,-,,/ /vsf (6 fet'Xl'.,.J W/1-j ;,l/9s 1~ l'J ;rl.eN): -f'i!;, /4t#~tr ~lf"l~ 5/';J?;~tf./W /,r/Ji,~ ~~ ~ ~ oJ?I[~ ~t''fJ>t)f. IJ#YT ~ 7~ ~//>v~ -ro ~u~ Wtk /1.ef' ~ T~ ~011trA;/9 / 4,; -rt6r-,M cZ,,i) ~ Wn'/ 1,,.; ~ '111t?/Jc.,r or-rw /JUJA-4tV'~ affzp,., ~7 Wa~;A./6 1-~nt'Ar di>~ lt~c rt ,1/l,./C-rJe..t? CAP, #t-,;/44 ~ r . - . (C0nt1.nuation:ishaats::may-;1, 8 ·'::used) - :. - p-:1i:.:= ·;.~.-_ ~r~~ ~~>az •::-;,.. --:::..,,: ,c·· : · . ,;~ };~J,~-i fflf~('~ :=:}· . ~, f.'.~'i~:~:~~ ~;C~~ ~2tt~~~~ :- ::"• c •• · . Name 6ss Dt?r:JG Rank p~s oo CRXTXOVI PORK Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post -Field Task Force V < Fixed Post Security V Patrol in Geographic Division V Other ----- Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time V f-r<-{cr<---S,_ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ov-N 1, s cp • &ftl•'HNMP. A ( ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post operations, etc- ) COMMENTS; .: : " [)[JU ('-6 - Tt1e:: / N !Tl vk__ S~ c>~ () CF 7l-J-E /2,{ 0( I A r~ a U:,7'7 ' /7_ SSn-->/ ft>/4'-' .,..,,70~ n 1 V'-.ibfL ~-?5"77°',Y_,,-- - 72/ T?e~ L/77,1,tlUvl-v--01'1 p,a <:?( ~ 20 fi>--yz__ ~o- lrL tk;uGZ-<;, tJ-,f? s7750v 8/ !))fh c~ uJE c u'A-rl rr w A' Ha 1 ;-,u;; ~s or n+e rz ~?/¥; r1+en7f v~rrivcrz_0v"J ~'\_('.,,: (Jr tu Ht({,../ ()-~Q: lfJ r'l?-+ rJ / f!,U { ~ Or ~ cp,_ J- Fe-EL Tt/&A€ o-Jf}~ A C kt:-. . C) ~ . /Jlkii-: .· ( t--(l:Z &e bev---ce Cef/J-' usYL (J( 1---s w l--h-AS/3 /---"-/ '-Y''r· "'. -":~·_; /' . . . - -0 = " · .iL-r--r ~ b .-0:}~~,t~~~"i' . ·. . ;; l,lhYU:': ec-lf'-6 . ( I rr~-IC½; i ; f['~ .. : -~-~~ ~21 ~r~; ( Cont1.nua~0~. (.sh~~~~y~~ . · --< 1-?~~- -;~ ~ - ~ ~f,:~r.~ ~!~·- · -'~ )- . ~~ff ~ # . 7 . ~~,~~~ ~ ~ ~ - ~}F~~- ~-:~ --· 0 ~-" -. ~ :•= - -. . . - T . . Los Angeles Pol ice partmen t CONTINUATION SHEET PAGE NO . TYPE OF RE PORT DR NO. I:~~ QU A N. AR TI CLE S ER I AL '10. ORA NO MODEL '10 . MISC . DESCRIPTION ( EG. COLOR . SIZE. COLLA R V A L U E I N SCRIPT IO'IS , C A L l t3ER . REVOLVER .ETC I ' •• C ONTI N U E ON RE VE RSE S I DE . CONTINUATION SHEET 15.09.0 (11 -72) Name ~¼cl Rank ~2- uo CRXTXOVI lQRK Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post V Field Task Force v Fixed Post Security l< Patrol in Geographic Division V Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time __________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: • Aft»« 'HMM ft A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; (p V1 t-'\ c,;,,__):) -?0~:·. V 1 o~~ ,\q uo h 0 D L~0D 15 .. - • - . . - . .. :_. .:.;.,.:.! ~- ~ · • • . GANG INFORMATION SECTION AFTER-ACTION REPORT The o n 1 y p r e - r i o t p r e p aT a t i o n 1 - es u l t e d i n a t ,- a i n i n g s es s i o n w i th Metropolitan Di v ision. A co n tingent of Gang Infor- ma t ion Section < G I S ) f i e 1 d per so n n e 1 - j o i n e d w i th Fu g i t i v e sq u ads f o ,- t he t 1- a in i ng . It was blatantly ob v ious that detecti v e person nel ( i nclu d in g police officers assigned to Detecti v e Support Di v isi o ,1 ) we r e i ll equipped and, although the t r ai n ing was well done, it was insufficient to adequate 1 y prepare non- J i ne pe r son n e 1 f o ,- an anticipated riot. We must note that the lac k of equipment r emained evident throughout the ,- iot, and continued dur- i ,-,g post- r iot ga~g confrontations in Southeast Area projects. Our DSD pe,-sonnel deployed with Metr-o, vJere pelted l·Ji th r- � c k s · and bottles and lacked adequate bod y armor, helmets, sh i elds and batons. The GI S has been dee i mated b y 1 oans and a dee reas i n g v JO , I< f o-,-ce. Much o f the Depa r t men t be 1 i e '✓ e d th a t the G I S h ad been d i s banded . No requests were made for gang information pertai n ing to ant i c i p a t e d adv er s e re a c t i o n to the k i n g t r i a 1 • .''E ,- d j c t . Gang I n format i o n Sec t i on ' s " 8 " 1..-J a t ch pe r so n n e 1 r- esp o n de d , s u i t e d up i n u n i forms and r i o t gear , a n d rep o ,- t e - d t o the c omm a 11 d pa s t for- assignment. The first night the "8'' Watch GIS squad p,-o v ided the f i r e de par t men t p r o t e c t i o n th r ough o u t ,- i o t i mp a c t e d are as . \ Day 2: The gang presence and i ,-,v o 1 vement became ob ·, i ou s as did an ob v i o us l a c k of gang 1r- i o t ,- e 1 a t e d i n t e 1 1 i gen c e i n f o r-rn a t i on . The GIS "B" Watch squad's duties were revised to focus. o n intelligence, and were assigned by the Chief of Poli c e to wor k dir-ectly under the Department ' s Emergenc y Ope,- ations Comn,and Center <EDCC). Beginning on day two and throughout the entire incident, GIS 11 8 11 squad, in uniform, gathered, e v·aluated and disseminated ,-ele , a n t gang/r iot related informatio n to the EOCC, Sou th Bu,-eau Command Post and ICC. We should note that initially the bulk of the intelligence information was sparse and isolated. Citizens, arrestees, officers, watch commanders, even other age,-,cies were aware of gang/riot information, but lacked a system to ensure Department-wide collection and dissemination. Ga,-,g I,,fo,-mation Section plugged the gap and throughout the riot pro v ided the Department with valid info~mation. Un for tun ate l y , the G I S " A " 1,J a t ch per son n e l i n i t i a J 1 y v.s er- e relegated to non-producti v e and inappropriate assignments. Gang experts, and veteran detecti --.-es, waved ·pol ice ca,-s i,,to station parking lots, guarded the command post and pro v ide di v isional station security. No one is above any task that needs to be done, espec i a 11 y during the v o 1 at i le ti mes our Cit ·-1 e ,~ pe1- i enced. Gang Information Section personnel accepted each assig,,n,ent with a willingness and maturity that is a credit to the Di v ision and the De p a,- t men t , i n s p i t e of the tr a g i c was t e o f exp e ,- i e 11 c e and expertise. Page 2 When personne 1 became mo re ava i _ l ab 1 e, the GI 5 11 A 1 1 l ..Ja tch conducted follow-ups, analyzed intelligence, and deli v e r ed up-to-date , briefi n g gang/riot i _ ntelligence ta the EOCC a n d othe r- co ncerned entities. Other cities are learning f r om ou r lack of p,- epa,-ed ness. A ci t y i n F 1 o r i d a i s i n a s i m i 1 a,- s i tu a t i a n , aw a i t i n g a p a s s i. b 1 e ca 1 am i to us ca u r t de c i s i an • Gang i 11 t e 1 l i gen c e i s be i 1 1 g g a t h e i- e d , pawn shops, gun s -ta1-es 01- othe r possible ta r-gets of l oo ti ng a ,- e being monito r ed, and · thei,- personnel are being t,- ai11ed. W e l•Je ,- e fqrced ta play catchup, and we did. We must be p,-epa,-ed. ROBERT K. JACKS Officer-in-Char Gang I I I oo CBI%IOJJI PORK Name 4?7,4e<' Bfoc~~-,u Rank ;(}-3 Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post ·Field Task Force X Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographi~ Division Other tA/V:£ OtV H4:JrSs --- Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector # tJ:i$, ~ Date/Watch/Time /ff ( if necessary o_r_s_p ...... ea:;:c~i-f~i-c--to_t_h_i_s-topic) ~••&Miff .A Topic of Discussion: --=-:-:---------- 1 · (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; /)?f/ #-5/~/;):?~ ;(?~J;l,e_ ~ /. b/ /V/e# ~ ~ ~aD ck,~ ~ _:,,1;/7Z£.. . / t& r_;v ~A- fJ/I_Pv/40 ffe .&./2Y~/--r-u~~ ./4..,~,:;r- .u---v 77 e- // .cp ~ el ' / .,u ,6l / t// LJ~#-L- No7 - CONTINUAT ION SHEET . ' Los A~geles Pol ice pa rtment PAGE N_ O . TYPE OF R EPORT DR NO , •:~~ QUAN . AR TI CLE SE R I AL '10. ::lR A NO MODEL '10. MIS C. DESC R IPTION ( EG . COLOR . SIZE . DOLL AR VALUE INS CR I PT 10'1 5 , CAL IOE R , RE VOLV ER , ETC) (__ CONTINUE ON REVERSE , S I DE. CONTINUATION SHEET 15.09.0 (11-i oo CJITIOVI PORK Name 8\A.&eu-1 l": l-lol6-l.luJ . Rank D :.C Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force · ~ Fixed Post Security __ _ Patrol in Geographic Division Other C-P•lb !::!!!E, \.._ --- Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# ~ C,..\~ '-'-l ,t)E T"~~ Foe.cE: � Date/Watch/Time \fcC.O -tb ~:U:,O (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: C:...~~ \.~Te,,\.. &ftla•INMW A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENT§; 'oe:FQe.e, -n4-£ ~\O\~ t ~t)l~ \t)~Pt\.S T\-\o'-l.~\-t, -n,\-~ ~,~w. G.~& U.1-\,, / G.~G \~Te.- u.~\T' wA'- u~et...£'-S.• R~eu, u~et> e,'-' ou~ owN. DE,4)19\e•n,At:tC\, \..CT A\.O~C Y!>'I ou.'T"~\ oe- ~ENC!l ts . ~' c.Au...i..t WE" w E.ei:c t-\Nb,.-ee..~ OF t-->. 1 ~-r&e. 'y -...i. b ~~,... tJ<EX>e't> . ~o~E-l E'!., 'D\.Ae.-l ""'~ T\--\e ,2\gTS I w £ l O~t) <::.~sJ ~u.,ett::> ca"'-lv..c.'°' 1"1"\'lEt... ~ ,...)FOi'.M"T10~ ~t:) ~~e: ~ue.e ~b \~£\... ~~!. C:.~Ai-),l~ Oc.t.T iO AU. <!,o"'1~CEc.,.lEb ~N.01,J\C)u.-.\..!. • -n.\E, lt-l"t"el- ~ C.,...n-\E.CL~b " ""'''"""o"'-~- :'.:~~u.rr . ~a, Y<1u<..E~ ... t-). ~ uu~ ~~ D M,..~e _ n,\e: '!IT~ ,_ ,...: :: •. ~!: S ACA.J p.e,.c ~ -~ P1lo@J\..JeM ~ P.T ~N~~~ i:::::;,'. ;-'. _ : ,;-:,;;}< - >':'~- --- ~~~ ~~;;"~?cc, ::- - ~fl - (Continuation . <Sheets ~ - ;;;;,.,,, .. ·-. ·, '; - ;; - . ~f ~~_;~f f:\1ti~~;~'.:~~jw~~ :~~~ ' ~1d :?~,,f ~~- c·2~"~~p;:, ~=;-·· . -·~~--- ·_ -_ ~---·--- . -••-.-- -------------- - -- Name uo CRit+PVI FORK 'Pfh)L G-LA$Ct{)tµ Rank · :l:>Gr -.JZ;. Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post -Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other ~/GIS t«fft?f#a(Q;; ()P3i;e Ju~ Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time 5-11-'Jz ~~ (if necessary or specific to this topic) - ~t;..- Topic of Discussion: 1t{l;£1//e:EA/~ /N'tFCJ (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; l/!7€mPni:D /"ti Y61G''7 ~ kt<t?,,f/ ~L 1,J~ ,9t/ ~$St~U.. /1/er(!>aJ ~errk-e ~~~ ~r :lzezb ~ H),ee~ /?Jf/) .h-r& ~T UEUJt:/ 7j 4JY'.!~/?7.G""..-v'?J." ·--·- -----·-· -----·-- . - ---- .... . -- -.. ~· ··----- ., -1 - oo CRITIOVI PORK Name ~,J-'T"\.\o,..ay Avlc..A Rank () k.-t"' - :C Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post ,<. -Field Task Force _., __ _ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other ~" ::J:t!~~'-' t.,..W<.ti, ---- Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# .. ,. Date/Watch/Time t3 . WC.-,--C." (if necessary or specific to this topic) \ Topic of Discussion: C-Af¥'\t\ll"\"°~ fo s-,- 0f'C..~t->..U (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) - COMMENTS; --r~£ C.. 0 ~ -~C\~.!:) P~ S,- WOtS --.0 3'""'--~\,..l ~ ~ \.-\..• \,J ,,..a~ N'-I~ t,t;..~".s O ~l..r ~c:...c:...~,s ~o ~• '=Le <~•fl'-~.S. ~~~ ~,t.s-r tJlC.,.'-\, -'F --r,..\E:.. 1-,~-r, "-'b P\1-...~ -S-~-r ~~-:,"..ao \,JaT~ .,.J, o,a..~c..-r,~,.). \r-J't N~ll:.o O..Jt:,, \..~OE:.,~ '-,J~~ ~s ~c., p~w-1~~ ' Name l/+ru2. 7 {((;Jae, A oo CBXTXPVI PORK Rank __ ?_-_z;;._1 ____ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency ·operations center Field Command Post __ )( __ -Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol inLGeo~raphic Division Other ~Aµ~ ;LAJ]'e~16 ~Gt1 Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time ~ \-le,-~µ (if necessary or specific to this ~ic) Topic of Discussion: · ~d)r,.,jl,,.J:>...D \r-'✓ i ~~lfO,J.!.'. Aft>a•tiMMff A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; · ·- · · ------- · ··---•-•·--~ -_ :...::±:. SL-~---· - ----- ') oo CRITIOVI PORK Name J11C.J:!A8 ✓AUG"~ Rank])-JI. Assignment during u.o. (check a1i that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force a-::::::: Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division __ _ Other (;aAt;i(e T� >:t:'£L ._..... Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time ;6-'-')ArTCA::\ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: E,ao ON~ ~ G,PtJta, ~ (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) coMMENTs; EG>c.J,PTME.uT: I, wA5 00'11ou..S F'2eM-n-t€.. F,IZ6T DA'-' ,~-r l.uE:.. u)E:_(2.E. \LL EQU\Vt"Et> 1D -OE.AL LU 1-rH A-' 1 '2-101'' 6 f1UA111 We:..L.Aa.E:n F=ACE. ~~ltl...06, RA,DID 1 6, AM~UNlT\O~ AUO ~e:""t(..U:S. \Me_ C.OULO ~ dOMMuu l£A1"E. OtJ A- ~rt4< Lutt>~ "BAot.:5, A~O J:> 10 NOT fM.Vl -A'4~\L~\£ \J~,Cl~ {Mk;.,(26} Tb u..X)~ hr-tli:.LO "6Sl6 tJMfiUT lc-JJD ,, ,. I , LAGILE.o 1..ua.oo~5 ~on hMMo lb PIZOPr.JZ.L~ ~ w sutPEt.- ~. "1a.A1u1u(,,.: Mof,1' of~\C.E:4":> LAC.i£o 1"'E.. "Clt)ieJZ. --reAn.t,~6 'ft) :0'2A-L u:lf s M10Eil. ~u.P.P~~ 1 b tJ A~o AAl,l ~tJ ,pe:,z. ~,i.e.~. "Lm: .. LL16EMCE.: -i't-\f.a.E:. LU~6 MLllH P1Z..E.12,01 Puf>4•~"\~: AuD • . • • .• -: : ..... : 4--~.� , ..,..,· -:- .· · ~ -··. . • WQ~tJl~~ ~fZ-DN\ -n~E. 2.AO\U\L 8£Mo..lT.S fu OLlfl..5':)~t-- ... ~;~ ·: _-- @:5 A..io '110LOJ,C.e.. WA-~ PIZ:fDlC-re:D IU AnV~£.~ ~~i9i;!~ ~ --J""' ~ >oi S~1U -tb &..A:"tl-tEJl.. IU1E.L OtJ\\L ~ � ~~--Q. · > ~ :·< . :"-1i2.I~ ( Con_ ti~u- ~~io1~\f~~~~- _-- ~ - , ~ --_-- :,: =.iitti ~ ~ "';~'r~,- ,.:: ,~: " c;,:~1 ~::i~}£~,.:, - \ Los Ang_e !es Po Ii ce Department CONTINUATION SHE ET PAGE NO. TYPE OF REPORT DR NO. U.C . C eti'\Ci>tJE ITEM QUAN. NO. AR T IC LE: SERIAL NO, 3R A NO M OOE:L NO . MISC. OE:SCRIPTION ( EG. COLOR . SIZE:, COLL A R VALUE: INSCRIPTIONS , CALIBE:R,RE:VOLVE:R , E:TC) ~ VJE-. 1)10 'e,~I u .0 C-,A-lttEJ2.. lk)TeL., \I\IE:. PASS~ I rh~\NFD TO 3 "D\ff'E~"1.T LOCA--na~5,MA.r-J'( at' · LO~lCH '1),t) tJ.oTTP.L"- TO ~.~ ~. GAtJ<::, l~1'c.L ~u.vs at.) ~o .o 6~e LccA--no~ - ~~lc.H ~~ -n+E. CAf'.p.c ~"f -t0 Q..Ol LE.LT 1 ~LL.A-Te ~t) l)1Sf:M1NAIE 1\-tE: i~i:-o.l~e. u,~~ ,,z.,Puc'-",.,o~ D-F er.~~,~ lrt..Llnz.€1\S. 6At.J<& :X:-JJ.~ SHOULD i3€ COU.Ec..-rt:D S'1 ~"-le_ l,I.:> ,,,_.. ntE. E-ac'PeZTl~E ~-nz.A1~,~~ -ro ~~ \\1'E, 1Z~~, Qu~Tl1)~5 ~l) N\~1£.E. A-~~Pe:i2 1)E."1'£'2M1.0,-..'T\O~ fl'r-5 ~ \TS "ALtD':7. ~ '1/M.JJ.ft, Tt-,.)-re:L~Ll) t5E=, ~~l)~'Dl-Z~ ~D ~6Mlnt() 0~ FoeN\ \.E:f1 ot-iL~ ! ~ A~" TtJtra ... 5MOULD i:3E. :JU~, ~''TN-\tL'' ~'t) l' :S~UU) 'eE. OIJ~0I~<') o.,; ~ 'DA-\L"'f ~5'.5 "101 ~~ M'S~ LA\C, -rl-\1::i2.E:.. ~LO ~E. A-~~ C<lrt>C:tL ~~~ . '1'\-\-PrT ~ \S 'SE NlO-,.,f=\EO· Or ~', I ~TC..' lMM~ ,f'rTEut (FOtt.. ..,.,ME.U, Cot f€e,T'\.e-..) ~ \t-1T6L'1t6'.;)S) ~ ALL l~Fo ~5r-}ttt lCQ . 1> ,~ TO c .-tC. oe.cno~ ~,1- i-tcJ•~ • 00.:)51 o~~h..,(C!c1 ~or~.ffS • loc~rno~5 ~ ""-""1 1Qe ~ ~ Q... LOo-n C)~ ~ 1 P-rf2.60~6 o(Z. "4-~T -Pc~c -A--~~,, SlJ CH- A-5 PAu.l~ 6~PS,~e-nl'>4; Gcoi:tS 6'l.>tJ 6-ro~e5 PA-i~, 6TDe-t::5 oli I I ?\.lel.lC. ~lCES 5\..1o.tlt) 0-E.. C,-+€.C..llE'D ,,12.A,t-.1eD -/ki.WD vc.."1-J~ N\Proe.. ,=oa. ~vi,1~ (!ot-:)-,,~~&lC-tES.\\-H~ll--lfo COULO Be-- 06-i-f',~ED ~~M P~~J>~A-\L\l)nt> 6UJJ UM.la loJO L.A-¥D f ~ A~ ~HOULI> ~c ~ Llf>T Sf= LO c.~O~ W 1,-n-l 1~ ~,CZ 't) l\ll ~,0~'5. 5TA-n~ Sr:sv~l!'f: r oss ~lcexs a~ ~-FrOPS \A-J/ . 6HOT"~UtuS LO~OS) ~/000. l~l5 \67QTA~ \~lri>E.~U~ ~o \)"1.6-At=E. ~LUG.~ Oil.. Ae,s'~ lCOU_L.Q ee:-- MOil€. -~eeQfe,~ . A~0 ~\I\..) Of-F\C€25 e0tibO -6HOUL'0 _ °0E: ~f:Lec~_ . tt~. D ________ .... ~- · ,eA,NES). We. Mo:::D -io -se: ~cz:cs,_ -ro p-a,-rE'-'T oQ~ ------ _ _ ___ _ cPW ._t. ; ---·--··-·•• - .. CONTINUE: ON REVERSE SIOE:. 'CONTINUATION SHEE-T t !5 . 0 9 . 0 ( 12•7 oo CBXtXOVI lQRK Name '72~t=~/ .L.._ · a~ RankJ- / Assignment during u.o. (check all that appe-1 Emergency Operations Center Field ColDllland Post <'.'. · Field Task Force v' < Fixed Post Security ✓ Patrol ~eographic Divis~on __ 7 __ Other ~ D,.s'7Y{$uZ7a.AJ Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time i---36 -9 Z- ZJ4-Y> cU•.... /-t "~ {if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: {!.,I C),'£e477cJ~S - - -· &fta•'IMIIR' .. A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; /. ./..oc4f7oJ o;' C.~ A--~ ?ro ~~ /4 ;3oe_ c lo/V/cE c1"f 7&1 Jt:-I 0 / ,L; J 6- ,:,J,1-5 L) / ~ ~ c..-r. [l. ~ Wr-r.5 J J Ee 1. .5 l-d ,,J ,,,.J JtrSs / ~,. J &-- /J;~SdN Ak L ~ Z ¢ I- :~: ~o..J,Ja_ ,1:SS(~ ~r/ ~~fl uJ1:s ,N'~u~t:::!) ~ ~,£__ ~6- ~;4ee/4 -·- ·---·• _...:__ __ ==-.!!!...... - ~ -.•----- - AFTER ACTION REPORT SPECIAL INVESTIGATION SECTION The assignment for Special Investigation Section (SIS) during an Unusual Occurrence (U/O) is to remain on stand-by to assist on major crime investigations. Although this appears to be an ineffective use of manpower it is important that SIS remain in this mode and not be committed to the field task force unless absolutely necessary. The effectiveness of SIS depends on their working as one unit and being available as such for major crime investigations. I During the U/O, SIS was unnecessarily committed to the field task force. The initial request was for nine detectives and one supervisor to be deployed to 77th Division for a U/O assignment. The entire section responded in uniform in our regularly assigned vehicles. Upon arrival we were informed that the initial request was for ten light-duty personnel to book two truckloads of property that patrol officers had seized · (this concept in itself is incorrect). After being informed of this and having a discussion with the Patrol Commanding Officer, we were reassigned to sector patrol. During the entire time we were on patrol, only 2/3 patrol units were observed. We were -later reassigned to 77th Detectives where we assisted them with the investigation of the Reginald Denny incident. We held this assignment for six .days. ·After Action Report Special Investigation Section Page 2 My observations were as follows: Specialized units throughout the Department should be assigned missions as units and not be made part of the major field force. There are several reasons for this. Specialized units work as a team for years and are most effective in that mode. Mixing them with Metro or patrol units puts them at a disadvantage since they do not work with them on a regular basis. Example: Asian Crime Investigation Section should have been assigned in uniform to work with thk Asian _ business owners to assist them in securing and protecting their property. This would have built up a strong working relationship with that community. Additionally, the vehicles assigned to this division are on a different frequency and not compatible with other divisions. The Department needs to stop thinking everything is a ten-man squad and utilize specialized divisions/sections/units with a predetermined mission. Field commanders are too narrow in their thinking, are not aware of the limitations and/or c~pabilities of specialized units and thus do not properly and effectively deploy them. ·After Action Report Special Investigation Section Page 3 At the Command Post at 54th and Arlington and at 77th Street Station there were too many people sitting around in the station and parking area. This was not due to the personnel not wanting to work but they were not properly assigned. They lacked proper direction and ·supervision (leadership). Name LARRY HINRICHS Rank LIEUTENANT II uo CRITIOUB FORK Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post security Patrol in Geographic Division Other "B" Watch Comnand of DSD Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time __________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ASSIGNMENT OF ccs PERSONNEL AffAC!HMlft A {ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: OVERVIEW With the exception of the OIC, CCS personnel were assigned to the "A" Watch during the riot period. The unit was not deployed for riot duty other than being placed on a twelve hour watch. A total of five arson homicides were investigated by CCS personnel during the riot period, four of which were riot re'iated. The ore, tcs, was reassigned to the "B" Watch and assumed corrmand and control of Detective Support Division for that watch. RECOMMENDATIONS NONE. Because of CCS 's responsibility to investigate arson homicides it would. · ·· have been detrimental to overall operations by assigning CCS personnel_ . _ / .;,i __ . .. to riot related duties. · , ,.:·_- · · ,· .- : ~ ·: ~ ::: _..· : :'·:. ·.:: . . . · :· ·.:_-::·: ~ ·:~ · ~-- ·.~r. - , ,. ;;·:-~· - --:· ·. ,.,~ .. .. .. . --- ... -· . · .. · . . ,c ·, ~ ~;;{ . . . may :·be ·: us~~ }_ ,~oc: -~ · :- ·::.~::- .· ... -• :·, '· i.-~-~~· (. ?.. ~ ~ ~ ~--:· r . (Continuation sheets . .. ~---~ .,~ ---- ----- ------ ---- Name ~IS ,1 /;.,I, • Rank lJ.ET:z uo CRITXOVB FORM Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force ')I!_ Fixed Post Security _7 __ _ Patrol in Geographic Division i" Other _____________ _ Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time _______ _ 71th I Su)/ 5€ f t. (if necessary or specific to this topic) ATTACl!XD'l' A T<:>pic. of Dis<?ussion: C p /UntfurJcmrt1nictrliais 1 (ie Field Jail, Squad Taciics, comilandPost operations, etc) COMMENTS; COHHMJo it5T Q:aAmaus £-.Jerj do~ -thaf- 1 repo1d iD -ffe Commancl Pos~ G ObOO~ -:r: -fijurd -fie prcenne nof t,YLf U)e// .cr_prvze: ~ LLer'e.- o.llfqq, n_q an rct11 r/ Q.;,'1-Kl!l,J ti.if siln};:] anuncl unh \. an tf.55Tff}menf uas given. ®VJ°MIJ a.. iefj ti? rereui'1j ~ 'Y3 u M. (Continuation sheets may be used) Communiartion.s . . ¼lhi/e ass~nfd-fi>-the d~renf Sul-A &irtttus as a.... & Uni f, OUr' communi ccm'ons Je9uena; Ui7J /:Pt'~ hartiled act- of -+r€ CP. -rhe 111--6 'iJn +u Uhe ~,rq ct551Jnecl . . I (tl//s '. 11'-e~ ccills uere.. 0)\-- be l trj s ~ m.J ce1sf -ID -the, cP -le9u ) fvlMj ~,/,mes officers l,le(e ~ tA:f( rrC( . ~ ~~uerc,t1 (equesli~ ~ . CCII/a -In ~ . u/ c~af · 111,1 cout? fuce cauJd ~ ~ c6,fX?ft:JJ5 sildc>J no krtWd' t0i+h -the, A cofJ uiie- dOt'ng .. ,,. .. ...... _ .J Name 12A-~e S --- Rank O -]J..L uo CRITlOUJS PORM f S . Vrs-~~ Assignment during u.a. (check all that apply) ~ergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division ATTACllXZll'l' A Other 5~ ,.,,, t:,wl ,M.'-"~ .D-€ Plc.'~I'~~ .. ~, k-T a ~F, c €.. Geographic Area of assignmen~ Command Post; Sec1:or · # Oate/Watch/Time __ A ________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) co~ENTS: . ; , - --1. ",. 1 ,~ d - - ;t ·f I I\ I.,,;."'" (Continuation sheets may be used) r - W A~ ~s~ L ~NED . -~~~ i~I I I\J . [ l"'IUl'1 DEF'LO"Y l"IEN T Ar BF D DUF: i NG THE F : l OT . T"HE FOLLuW1Nb LOl"IMEl'·I r::; ?.;F:E SOt-lE OF THE i,::·~:IJBLEMS THAT I SA~J COIJLO H ···; 'E ---EE · --, AL~E~)U~TED. HV ~ I~ THE .~IR~T NI~HT ~~-- -TH_ E _ _ _ ~ rur _ _ i 'i' l>JULJLU HH~)E fjEE::N 1,uc:E lF (HE DEP;.;;RTi1l::i"·l 1 WUULO HA'vE lJ=>ED THE Nt=.w~ 1---tEU 1 H 1 U NU r IF Y DEPHR fMEN I'" PEh:Sor,11,JEL ( H?.; f THE MO 8 I L 1 Z i:4 T I (1 N HAD 8 EE N D t:: CLARE D 8 Y r h E D I=: t=' ~ F: T 1 ~1 EN T I NS TE AD OF t::: '· / E i::: y F' E F: SON HAVING ro BE PERSONALLY CONf~CTED. EACH DAY 8FD SEEMED TO HA'•JE CONTACT THE EOC TO AD'·JISE THEM OF THE PERSONNEL WE HAD AVAILABLE & WAIT FOR ASSIGNMENT. IT SEEMED THAT THE EOC WOULD NOT ASSIGN THE PERSONNEL UNTIL WE CBFD) WOULD CALL & ALMOST BEG FOR AN ASSIGNMENT FOR OUR PERSONNEL. THEN WHEN THE PERSO~NEL WERE ASSIGNED THERE SEEMED TO BE A REAL PROBLEM IN TRANSPORTATION FOR THE PERSONNEL FROM BFD TO THE ASSIGNMENT. THERE WERE DAYS THAT THE PERSONNEL DID NOT LEAVE THE DIVISION FOR A80Ut 3-4 HOURS THEN HAVE TO BE DEPLOYED FROM THE CP THE~ WEF:E ASSIGNED. THE COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS WAS TO THE POINT THAT IF AN OFFICER WOULD HAVE NEEDED HELP HE WOULD HAVE TO USE A PAY PHONE BECAUSE NO ROVERS WERE A~)A I LA8LE. THE PERSONNEL AT BFD SEEMED TO HAVE A REAL DESIRE TO BE ASSIGNED TO~ joB (ANY JOB) SO AS TO HELP IN THIS MOBILIZATION. 'THE REAL FRUSTRATION WOULD COME WHEN THERE WERE 3-4 HOUR DELAYS IN LEAVING THE DIVISION & GOING TO THE CP. THERE WERE THE 3-4 HOUR DELAYS IN BEING RELIEVED FROM THE NORMAL 12 HOUR SHIFT. THE OFFICE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE RLlTATED INTO THE FIELD DURING A MOBILIZATION EXCEPT FOR THE NON-FIELD CERTIFIED OFFICERS OR THE OFFICERS I WITH A MEDICAL PROBLEM. Name ~ uo CRITIQUE fORM 6_ r;l-v;-f? l!T Rank ___ e:,,,___-___ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# ATTAc:mam'l' A Sector# . oa.te/Watch/Time Lj-;11)-pl, & J--/,'l ~~ 1 ~tup:1--;, tJ /Jrj --/? ;fl) (if necessary or specific to this . topic) (/ . l Topic of Discussion: ( ie. Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi (Continuation sheets may be used) .... ,,,,,, .. ,· .. · .... ..-.,. ,, . -· . ~ . ' ,.. . ..,. > ' 1 ./ ~ ... "'( ,. • ., -:. l . · . • • I •• .... . ~ 0 ~ 0 _c.::i;.:R~+--'1' .... ;I~0111,,;:iUB,..._..ar.:.9~RM.:1 ' ..... ..,; -. ...... -~ · ..... . . .. ' . . ... '"... .. , .,... Name ~,t,/tFlt.ll' £crJff 1'~6 Rank . .)-.L . ·:. · . ,• .. ,. ·;·:~ ·· .. .. ,I . .. . ' .:-. ... ~ Assignmen~ during U .;.O. (,. check all. tiiat -.apply), Emergency Operations Center • •.< .. Field Command · Po~st -·- . . • • -- ~ ;:. S2' ~ . '.: - ~ '; ' . . ., ; .> ~f:;:': ~~=~- !~~:i ty - ~ . . ·. ~' . . ' ~ Patro~ in Geographic Divisibn .· ~. • . .. ... # . . , .· . .. . ··,, , . .. . . ~ \ ' \ ., .,J • J. ' ~ -· ✓ .; • . . • ·J Other .. ·. · . . · , . : :.. . •"'· · •.. ---- .. ' ' .. .... ,.,.. .. ..:. .· . . , . . ~ .. . . t Geographic Area of assignment .. Command · Post- # t • . . '. S~cto· r # . ·: - .2.:• • 1. ¥c .v~ ·· · ,,t:A , I / · ' •'' •, . J-. ' .. .... •. � : Date/Watch/Time ..) · . . ..,-· ·.7·:....·:," ..... ~- .. .. : . .. -- -. : : _ . .. ~ · .: : ··~ . \ (if necessary .or specific to this topic) t · . TC?pi~ :~~ ~is~_ ~:~-~~~: : P~~s~~;.;cl ')a-16-;;·;~s ~ ,' (ie_ Field J'a.tl, Squad Tactics_ ; -,co~arid Post' Operations· , ;-:etc) , .. ~ . . . .. : • , ! ' COMMENTS i - . . - . ··~ t . " , • .,i I .. . ..,. . ..,_ ;., :. ., . . . ..... ~ . ... _,•:.• \ d-iu ~ -~ W.vls. 1 ~- 2--r ct. KL<y ~- 1 ~ ~ ~ ~.A--j~ ~ ~ .,&, ••• ~- ..,;).."l(.,.,u... ,V-,,,,1.,Lt- /)v1 ~ ,~ ~ ~I ~ ~ p~ 7i~~ ~ I~µ_. ~/ ~ /4A-'f.a, ~ ~4 ) ~- A/'~ ~ ,/l.i -~ o--L ~~ f-'-+--fJM· . t:2~ ~124/ CL- ~L;Ci_ ~~ i /4M . ~~- · ·VA"~~~~ 0~· i .,u,, ~ __,,t; ;,-~ · ~ a ..... ~7~ 11A ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .,..c. ~ ~ ~- W.v ~ ~ ·~ ~ ~ ~ A:tu ~ ~,,ca . (,' T uo CRITIOUB PQRM Name -.JOH~ S?c:nz<r~Ue: · ... Rank_.p ___ lJC ____ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) ~ergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force ~ Fixed Post Security Pat=ol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Fo~-c; Sec~or # Date/Watch/Time 'l- l. 1 _, + ~Q •• l,,,Jl't~/ f-.o (if necessary or specific td"this topic) Topic of Discussion: C-A ,,,.e:,HEO (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: & _... X'7'c.-,l4 c,.,a sheets Name Rank ~ "\_ • , • ~ L l t.: h;..,l, .t ' uo CRXTXQVI lQRK Sa..itH-+J . '-· /JET:1& , Assignment during u.6. (check all that apply) · Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force E Fixed Post Security- Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment · Command Post # Sector# W,La.J/,RK'js. .l,A). / S. E.j77z:!I/ J./L-7 : Vfi/l1D~ . V,,,R lot.CS Oate/Watch/Time ___ 7'1- _______ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; ·.," uo CBXTXQVI PORK Name i,tAN0t.ft ~ · L,t>io§:C'(-- f~me} Rank 'J- \ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post . security Patrol in Geographic Division Other A.ss-r F•~'= 'J:>c"1'r Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Y-1.~ -cp_· Of.A5o Date/Watch/Time 5- i.. - c,2 o (if _ necessary or specific to this topic) S / . X )( ~Etycf?.AL' Topic of Discussion: ~AO 7M-,1e-5r (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; oo CRI~XOVI lQBH Name Rank __ ~_-_l_(_ ._ Assignment during u.o. (check .all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command ~est .Field Task Force ~ Fixed Post Security · Patrol in Geog~aphic ·Division Other ________________ _ Geogr~phic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time _________ _ (if necessary or specific to this top~c) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, . Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; J ; .. . sheets .may be used) ., ,I • • uo CB+TXQVI lQRX Name Ar Rank D-..zr: , Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task .Force ; x:: Fixed Post Security X: Patrol in Geographic Division. '><: Other ' Geographic;: Area o·f assignment Command Post# Sector # - .. Date/Watch/Time r./~~~ _q 2. z;~ -~ (~f necessary _ or specific_ to this topic) T~pic of _Dis~~ssion: . X ATTAcaan A ) ( ie Fitiid : J'.a!.l>k Squa'd Tactics, Commarid Post Operations, \ e:c) -:~ _ _ ? .. ~ . - _ ... - -~ .' :~~~~$i~ :~~:{•.~ ! ~ ~~'-< .. r ~~ WA.s::·As~ s· _ rGN.Eb .::.to II A" WATCH o u RING uo ON 4 - 3 o -9 2 ou R II A" WATCH WAS BUSED TO WILSHIRE .DIVISION. AT THIS TIME THE RIOTS WERE IN -FULL SWING WITH LOOTING AND BURNING THROUGH OUT THE CITY. UPON ARRIVING I NOTED THE MALL EAST OF THE STATION WAS BEING LOOTED · AND NO ~NFORCEMENT WAS WAS EVIDENT. WE WERE ADVISED BY THE PATROL CAPT. AT WILSHIRE STATION THAT THE LOOTING HAD BEEN GOING ON ALL NIGHT AND NOT TO GET INVOLVED BECAUSE OTHER UNITS HAD BEEN ROCKED AND BOTTLED PLUS . SHOTS HAD BEEN FIRED. THE CAPT. STATED WE DID HAVE THE MAN POWER _ OR EQUIPMENT TO STOP THE LOOTING THEREFORE WE ~ERE AS~IGNED TO f0 MAN SQUADS, RUNNING FOUR DEEP P~R BLACK & WHITES AND TOLD TO BACK UP.FIRE DEPT. AND BACK UP HELP CALLS. THE RADIO EQUIPMENT WAS SO BAD THAT . MOST OF THE DAY . WE RAN WITH NONE. , MOST OF THE SQUAD HAD NOT BEEN IN PATROL UNITS FOR OVER 10 YRS AND WHAT EQUIPMENr THAT WAS AVAILABLE WAS .·USELESS BECAUSE WE HAD NEVER BEEN TRAINED TO USE IT AND OUR TACTICS WERE VERY . POOR. THIS DEPT. HAD 13 .MONTHS PRIOR TO · THE RIOTS TO PREPARE FOR THIS CIVIL UNREST BUT DID NOTHING TO PREPARE. THE TOTAL . COMMAND o· F THIS DEPT FAILED US AND - THE _ CITY OF LA. TO LOOK INTO · THE FACES OF BUSINESS OWNERS WHILE THERE STORES . WERE BEING LOOTED AND BURNED AND NOTHING WAS BEING DONE TO STOP IT WAS THE LOWEST I HAVE FELT DURING MY 21 YRS ON THIS DEPT. WE ARE PAID TO PROTECT & SERVE · THIS CITY AND WE FAILED MISERABLY. IT WILL BE YRS BEFORE T.HIS DEPT CAN HOLD ITS HEAD- HIGH AGAIN. THIS DEPT .CAN· ILL AFFORD TO · EV~R ~;L~T ,_,.Jti~~,. L~£~ _ 9F: L~ADE~SJ-!~ -=---- & PREPARED~ESS . . . . ·· HAPPEN TO THIS CITY AGAIN. IT WAS ONL V BY " THE' ·uRACE OF GOD THAT ANY · . . . POLICE bFCRS WHERE. NOi KILLED OR SERIOUSLY INJURED. AT THE END OF . MY TOUR ON . THAT FIRST DAV (15)HRS . AS I . PULLED . BACK INT6 WIL~HIRE · STATION I NOTEO · THAT THE M~LL NEXT ·~o STATION HAD c6MPLETELV BURNED -~ TO .. THE GROUN.O. ·soME·, PROTECTION °!" · .· !i . . , . f AffA<!HOH A uo c3ITlQQ'B ?QRM Name --~-- - --..fd. ...... 'A- ________ _ Rank_~/l-_ - _;._1-_ ·l~~-- Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) ~ergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force _)( ____ _ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Oivision ___ _ Other Geographic Area cf a~signmen~ Command l?os"t.; Sec-:or # ·· ~ . ... ... Cate/Watch/Time 1 /3 / t,._)lf/::..Lccf (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ·------------- ( ie Fie- ld Jail, Squad Tac-:ics, Command Post Operations, · etc) COMMENTS: THE COMMAND POST OPERATION AT 54TH STREET AND VAN NESS BLVD LACKED ORGANIZATION AND DECISIVENESS FROM COMMAND STAFF. DURING THE FIRST ·NIGHT YOU COULD UNDERSTAND AND EXPECT AN UNORGANIZED COMMANP POST AND CONFUSION, . BUT NOT TO THE EXTENT EXPERIENCED AT 54TH STREET. THE FOLLOWING WERE MATTERS NEVER RESOLVED DORI. NG THE FIRST CRITICAL NIGHTS , .OF THE UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE: THE DEPARTMENT'S MISSION. THE UNITS ROLE FOR ACCOMPLISHING THE MISSION. 1) 2) .3) THE NEAREST -HOSPITALS, BOOKING FACILITIES, OR TRANSPORTATION - FOR PRISONERS. 4) APPROPRIATE BOOKING CHARGES. 5) 2 HOUR DELAY FOR CHANGE OF WATCH. · 6) WATCH PERSONNEL WERE RECYCLED, ·· WHILE RELIEF PERSONNEL WERE STALLED · . IN THE COMMAND POST STAGING AREA. · 7) PERSONNEL ON STATIONARY POSTS WERE NOT PROPERLY RELEAVED FOR RESTROOM RELIEVE OR CODE 7 (12-15 HOUR WATCH). : . : ~ ,.- ' . !It" CONTINUATION SHEET BKG NO. DR NO. 2/2 UO CRITIQUE THERE WAS HQ DIRECTION FOR AGGRESSIVE FIELD ENFORCEMENT. ON THE CONTRARY, THE PHRASE COMMONLY USED WAS "DO NOT INCITE". (HOW DO YOU "INCITE-" AN ON-GOING RIOT). COMMAND STAFF ATTEMPTED TO MAKE "POLITICALLY RIGHT" DECISIONS, RATHER THAN IMPLEMENTING "TACTICAL PLANS". IN GENERAL, FIELD PERSONNEL WERE DOING THEIR BEST, BUT FELT ABANDONED BY DEPARTMENT DECISION MAKERS. THE LACK OF ORGANIZATION AND INDECISIVENESS BY COMMAND STAFF CLEARILY DEMONSTRATED OUR DEPARTMENT'S LACK OF LEADERSHIP .DURING TIME OF CRISIS. \ ·J : ·--- oo CRITYOUB PORK Name ~$.z; Rank ,QEl.r y . Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division X Other · ________________ _ Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# .sector # Date/Watch/Time _________ _ - (if necessary or _ specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: s- AT-?Ac:an:n A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi . - Rank Assignment during u.o. (check all .that Emergency Operati'ons Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security . apply) Patrol in Geographic Division Other G&reQ .ftU n,t,,,,:,C --xJ- Geographic Area of assignment f~/L.I~~, Command Post# Y~1puJ -sector# v"i>rit~~? Date/Watch/Time <3 w(l-re,,,d (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: · C • p. OP~lf.44,,-Jv~J AT'!'Ac =aan A \ (ie .Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; l}J ~~~, Jr Ofl-.s 1/J.JJ:::,, J-t:J;,t.,,U£ 1 we LJ~s f,e,,..1~11.,A,1.,L.y rJIT /}S.S/6#~~ /} ~e-f»1e, u~r/L.. ,;J-Y }/ D "llJ /}JI-r~ ll co M 1 ;J ~ d,,..,,. D II T?", T )I I .S w !t,r/ -r ~,..; ~" ,t., ~1/.a.. w£1tJL>, Wi 'llel'tJLr~, ~ S~c-t,4 _ Ps · i w~ fll-t#'i9YS ~11,II Dy . /!'8/'L J ht wa·£tn R-T ~ /Ji6 P~7 Jw1e,"# ~ ,. (_ C'?ntinuation sheets . may , l oo CRI'l'XQVI lQRM Name u/2,J,J~ J;/. Rank~~~f)~:'lll:::~~~~ -,~:~~LL---- Assignment during u.o. (check all that .apply) ~ergency Operations Center · Field Command Post Field Task Force -9--- Fixed P<:>st ·security . -~--- Patrol in Geographic Division z;;;-, Other 6Suy r;u- PE/Jr; --- Geographic Area of assignment · Command Post# Sector# AT'l!AC:H lft A .. ' . ~ ( I) uo CRiiXPVB lQM Name ~R~·~L~•_¼_c_u_~-~---- Rank.~1?:_-......:;;;3 ____ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geogr_ aphic Division.I V Other ______________ _ Geographic Ar~a of assignment Command Post# Sec~or # Oate/Watch/Time~A-J...lw.~m_G_/1 ____ _ (if necessary orspecific to this topic) . ' i:) ,, -r. DAr1~b~..S Topic of Discussion: S&uAD 7:Ac:nc,s: - roo~ ,_ o (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; )lo DEC4 J>,, ,Jr t,;,ADf.. To ~~~ Tt(E t.,qw BY tl/'Pae... . ~NA"-M~ Ar ~M/+'\/lt,NO ?orr-s, /JO ~'Nlr,1 (r. /olL 'D£;r.S fu.~<,-v? ~..._ ~ 77-/1$ . INC. I Q (.,..,T • THE C Htfr A~ MPr Yoe.. NE.G-LE c~ To ' Pe=i-~~"'- -n~JP- 1R.. D v7,u 8 ;Y Iv 0, ~'""~"'.., l~IINU""' A 8t:J vr 77-lis Lv~ I L (Continua~ion sheets may be used) ATTACHMENT A UO CRITIQUE FORM Nam~ Richard T. Richardson Rank Detective II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post X Field Task Force · Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division X Other Geographic Area of assignment . 77th, S/W, S/E, NEWTON, CENTRAL, & WILSHIRE Command Post# Sector I DatejWatch/Time 4-29-92 TO 5-17-92, B WATCH (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: Command Post Operations • (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) • COMMENTS: The first night of the riots I was called in and arrived it my station at 2300. It was over three hours before I was assigned to the Command Post. At the Command Post it took over two hours to get an assignment. I was assigned to a foot beat in a residential area. I walked the streets of the residential area near the Command Post with eight other officers. There was no looting or fires in this area while other areas in the city were peing looted and burned. The entire BFD squad was assigned to a foot beat in the same area. We were told we couldn't be sent out in cars because there weren't any cars or radios for us. Every night I went to the Command Post and it took over three hours to get an. assignment and on the streets to do any patrol work. I remember one night at roll call were within fifteen minutes the Commander - and Captain in charge changed their minds over eight time· s in what they wanted us to do that night. This was over two week into the Command Post being in operation. You would think by that time they could get their act together. We never did get the proper equipment to do our jobs. We used our own plain cars to patrol the geo9raphic divisions and the radios were never compatible with the di vision we were -assigned to patrol. Many times went the Command Post would call us to respond to hot spot location we would never received the radio call because of the poor communications. I'✓ If there was any plal:11 I sure never heard of one. I never· receive~any training in one. I was never given any briefing on any plain. When the verdict we read on the news I couldn't believe I was allowed to go that day. I expected to be, at least, held over for some period time to see what was going to happen. When I got home and saw the demonstrators, I couldn't believe that the demonstrators were allowed to be up to the doors of Parker Center. Then later I couldn't believe that they were allowed to ransack the Civic Center area. Name . oo CRI%%QQ'B PORK @~ ~ _fu) : ~ Rank 7::) ~ Assignment during u.o. (check all .that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other _______________ _ Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time A Wlf[~):f- ( if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: <: _ /) 0/J ERIJ-;~ cJJ S WI '-Sl-/1~ W ris /e,..., (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; 1 I , I I , . : 1;.Jas assigned to the 1 'P1 11 watch, so on the mrn·-ni ng of 4-30-92 I arrived at BFD, in uniform ready for assignment. By this time the disturbance was at least 12 hours old. No one on day watch, was quite sure what our assignments might be. W~ waited while calls were made to determine our assignment. After waiting a lmost 5 hours we were finally assigned to get on a bus for transport to Wilshire station. Upon arrival at Wilshir e station it was immediately obvious t hat the rioting was continuing even next door to the station itself . While w~ stood in .the parking lot pf Wilshire station, I noticed men brandishing guns next to the mid-town mall ju~t E / of the station. Soon I heard shoots being fired and observed the men firing the guns at the crowd which was surrounding the station. I reported this to a field command post sergeant who told me not to worry, 11 that's been going on all night". Capt. Kurth met with us in the parking lot for a 10 min. briefing. Now most of our group were DIII & DII's with the majority having between 20 and 25 years e xperiqnce. It seemed to me that the most important issue was our appearance and our demeanor. We were told to be sure our sleeves on our long sleeve shirts were rolled down, although no one had there sleeves rolled up u l.iJe ~ •J ei..- e asked to c,. ct i n a pt- o-i- es s i on a 1 manner , 1 ' i;:e m emb et- th at when you leave ~•.ffE' still have to , ... un this division. 11 As if a fresh squad of young Metro officers had just arr ~ved to shake, rattle and roll. Looking good seemed to be more important th~n protecting life and property . , There wasn't enough .cars for everyone to go out at once, so our squad remained in the parking lot until some became available. The shooting in the mid-town mall had stopped. The building was secured and the guards had left. This didn't deter the rioters as approximately 100 people had torn off the plywood and begun looting the building of it's contents. The parking lot was filled with cars of looters as we sat and watched from the parking lot of Wilshire station. There were four Sgt's ·at the Wilshire C.P., but we were never sure who was in charge~ It would help if people working the C.P., wore arm bands designating there title or assignment. No one wanted us to secure -the Mid Town shopping Mall. Only after repeated insistence w~re ~e advised that we could go over to the area and secure the ~remises~ After getting the looters out and across the street, we returned to the station parking lot. No arrest were made,due to prior instructions from Capt. Kurth. Almost immediately the looters returned. This type of looting was going on all .a~ound Wilshire Station. We made bets that by 3pm the Mid Town mall would be · on fire. We were right. Instead of taking a~y action where looting was rampant · around Wilshire Station, we were now assigned to take our squad to the Beverly Center. The Center was closed early ~nd there didn't appear to be · any problems. By 4pm the area around Wilshire station was a real mess. At least three businesses were burning and looters were everywhere. Irani cal 1 y we were sent h~me right or:, ti me. The worst 'day of the riots and the only day ·we didn't work past our -12 ho~~ shift. While driving bacit to PAB on the bus we took, the· -Sant.a Mani ca , .. freeway. The vi ew was incredible. It reminded me of the recent coverage o f the war in Kuwait. Everywher e I looked I could see smoke risi ng from the burning buildings" Downtown couldn't be seen because of all the smoke in the air. We didn't arrest anyone that day. We took some guns off the street~ a nd watched a s chaos prevailed. We probabl y looked and acted very professional, and I never saw anyone with there s l eeves rolled up. I just had a ver y empty feeling at t h e end of that day. Things didn't get much better as the UO progressed. On the second day 5-1-92 we again sat around the s tation for nearly 5 hr's b e f ore being sent out. The third day we were dispatched to the CP at 54th and Ar lington without to much delay. By the fourth day ·we were being dispatched early enough but often when we got an assignme nt it i·nvolved station security. On 5-6-92 we were assigned to provi d e st a tion security at 77th st.station. Seven men were needed at the station and three were needed at 2 171 F l orence Ave. Lt .Harmond d ~rected me and two of my men to stand a fixed post at Signal Drugs. He siid the request came directly from the Chiefs offi ce . After arriving at Signal Drugs I contacted the owner Arnold � lice. I though t it was unusual that three of us were assigned to spend 12 h r 's watching a mini mall that was open for business. � lice told me he asked for help because his busi~ess had been bro ken into and looters had attempted to enter the cleaners. Other than the attempted break-in, there had been no other unusual threats to the business. After calls to the CP and 77 Sta., Olcie told me he called Councilman Ridley Thomas office. He fur ther told me he personally asked the Councilman for someone to watch his business. So there we were, watching this guys private business, because he's a friend of a city councilman. We spent about four hours at the business and returned to 77th sta. I made some inquiries regarding the order to watch this bus · ness. It seems that a list of locations to be watched was in the watch commanders office. Signal drugs was on the list, which meant that signal drugs was suppose to get extra patrol, not fixed post security. , I ' dpn't know ~ow it came down that we were assigned there ; for the .day, but to me it didn't make sense. These things don't go 6~ •in Los Angeles. Is this a sign of. things to come. ' That wasn't the oniy day spent watching a private business. Several days later 6 of us were assigned a fixed post at the SWAP MEET on Slauson and Western. he business is a large war~house containing about 100 smaller businesses. Although there were 13 armed private security guards watching the business we were assigned to the business for the day. Three times during the day Capt. Jefferson visited the business. During one of his visits he _ spent nearly an hour visiti~g with the business owners. Not once did he come over to say . hello or ask how things were going . . Again it seemed we were acting in the capacity of private security guards and not as Police Officers. From day one there seemed ta be a total lack of command. ~hen we did get ~ssignme~ts, some of them were to appe~se '~h~ various political grou~s in the community. .·. r ; : : .. · :' · : : , ,::o. ,: . . ,. u r: ,J. r ·, j : ·- ~:~· ::.~. i:: t i C J 1 -, I::. c1 p c:i t F.: n t: .i. -:.1 •. i. · ·-. 1 CJ l E\ t. i l f:~ ':::- i t u. -~J. t i D n ·::::• , ~·.: :::· . :: .. · ·. . . : ·: i : 1 :.·- ::::, \/ r:~ cj LI. iJ c : 1 r· 1 ::::: ::-~' · 1 ::. i/'J E :' c :} r-1 r·• C:) l l·J --::!. r·, (j ~::. J -i c ~ : -: e ;-:: ·t c ::i r·: i:-:- ~' .1 oo CRITlOVI FORM Name · LACASSE,, :REN~ Rank 0-:0:. Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division )(,. Other --- Geographic Area of assignment $QJTij~CSJrA~ Command Post# Sector# Date/Wa~ch/Time \3 ~ :B \,OPTCJ.I (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ~ ~~ ·ATTACBXBJ1'f A ( ie F.ield Jail, . Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) . COMMENTS: Name KA.AA· ,,.., , • uo CRITIQUE PORK LAwR«Nctr Rank-zl>;_-~7CC----- Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post >' Field Task Force )( Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division g Other ______________ _ Geographic Area of assignment HM,,o 1 tM11. 1 S/u., 1 S/,r Command Post~ Sector# Date/Watch/Time A ware H (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi I ,(JK€ _Al't?Sr dT//621!-.s roc.111.-10 /he £/6'?", u.v-_ P~'1'~t:r'O 1 ._. 1);1'.se>~~,1,0/Z.~ _ ~,.,. c~, ~ ~o svli!J'At.J .r sr,,eo~Ge-y 4c:Z/~tJr -rls- so,;t:1~.a-e:1A.S · ~,,r.J"AJ ISr-P P/~ A- ~~#Jt?'l-r ;:Jod /,,,U c;,4,o~/,V{& A-r~ l\ oo~ ~A,}. - /~ ~~ OP~y 'S'~ .AA UC. 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Tf//J-T {./r,o/l/?. 0 Ti>\ v ~ -r- f/-- cA-:: /J (/~ ;_,,c)o r -/~, . ~ /L-t~·.,, r r;-~ ......- ' I . 1' I • I • .:-- \_, - l' - - -, -- - I • '-- I I , a -r l +.-· tL Tt+-lll' '7 S c. o /Yl,,M v rv; c. +r I on s 'CJ P- ::f tJ /V 1C I fr 1_. S 0 LA- Ck. -r- ,_ I .,- _.-;- \. ¥ ~ ' ,.,.. . ~ 1.. t 1 · , ,_ / c> - : . ' - ~ ., ~ V _ _ _ ,, , r ' - ~ ..., _,/---Le~ . ~ f ~7L. T H-w ~ -} /"I ;__/ · ;t.T L-- e /.v l· , ' ._,. ... < p ILC1/Y\. (; t-~ eltlt-L- 5 f!!L '-" 1 . Ct::: ~ D r . w C U l D G I v e 1fl-e- () 1/ tfL_ A-vl- fl/-lJ-T) /11 G i' ~ -r1-Pf s t.J It':> J-fltrl /J , GZJ . ~ /Yle ./J-T Name Rank Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergenc· y Operations Center Field Command Post ~- . . Field ~ask Force Fixed Post Security . Patrol in Geographic Division )C Other _____________ _ • ATTAClDllDl'l' A ~.o/ ~f-:s~~ -r,. f .. · .... I i • " t •. uo CRITXQUJ FORM Name Rank D f:-:.~\ ::1__ Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post -Security apply) Patrol in Geographic Division Other --- ATTAcmmJl'r A Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector # · ":::() \;\ <-\ '::)\.'-1'-.E- !:l ""-, l\l I L:::, ti I P..t=_/ t£ NlRA L \IF\ p:: \ \j '--\.S Date/Watch/Time '-\ -~C\-9:~ .2 J...OO \\-\ ~\.-\., (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post operations, etc) COMMENTS; \j\,\,~-f\.~-~~ ¥ "-'~" c~ ~-\_, \,'-lii.\J~ ~~ CA_,fi:'-\,~.;t --"=~~~ ~w-0, C~.-\.\;v---\. ~e.-)t ~~ ~v-.L "-~ ~ - -.-'., y..~ . ©,\,\J0 _,v-1'-oJ;,_ti\ ~ Tu 1:-&-Y"I-'l"'-.w~-',__~ v-,...>Jc;\,, e,"'-4'-' _ &:,d, . ..1... ~ _J}_&__c..A<e. c\L 0- ~d:: \ c\.e.aJ:___,) --'--C _;;, J..,,___<>...J eA...1 e.-v'--' -4c c\ ~(:J '{\,t:,..., -\:_ ~~~v ~ ~ ~c.,:= _t__t-..c"---' '\: \..,V--L, C\__Q___,L V• -...e...e..~ ,jup.e,\,A.,&,~ w~ ~-0.. c. \__ ~"" ~Y"'-- <L.-0'C , v-.... ~ -"') CA°"--~ . . . . . - lYc )A_, A~- _::tv ~ · C\ . &\e,c.,--\wJ..~ ~Vv--ck' ~cl... 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J8 '1 . . P r2 ~ ~ l~J' I c::::-/2 J CONT IN U E ON REVERSE SIDE. CONTINUATION St1EET Name uo CRITIQUE PQRM G~e,~GG A. NiE-LSeN' Rank__.'D;IJJ::~..,_ ___ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division ~ ATTAcmmJrl' A Other ~e-Jl.O WLw l>N Geographic Area of assignment 4'42 >a 777"'1 CletAJTe4L Command Post# Sector# ~ '\ ' Ci'l .J. s;_ 1 4 1 I .i!J I J Date/Watch/Time J • • • I 11\lt'-\ -,~- t 'Z,, o '-41~ ,c"1" (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi Ttlt tb>t1~~a /Posr wA-J A)o, /'r/$'-£ ro ~/:J~ n,,-t:,. ~~ ~~ ~ /f'@J'1G,€, . ~ ~1t1TSI,;,~ A,e,ve/l'~ W"-lo ~tf.,c ~ c ,- FAt-~J l-.-... ~ w 1 ~ . "--A~ 7t./t,e1.. .}..,t~ r'-t f:-,,t., f w i.'1CL ,4- k r G> ~ A-T· Tllt:. ~~H-1~0 PosT. ~ Tl+-T J oA) ~A-rr£-o wiAN J,.,.~J c,;J A - 6 Lv J.-Ht! t-/' SA-wt.e SE--~reM .s :rr L,,c)o1.A.--L-p H~L .4'~'6.A.I l;,,e.s, · 19-rJ O t2A-rA,,5 ~ £,£ S .S . t!!d ,.,_,,~ / cv0 - (Continuation sheets may be used) uo CRITIQUE FORM Name ~ V-;1, ~ Rank {J-:;)._ Assignment during u.o. (check all that E~ergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force apply) Fixed Post security Patrol in Geographic Division-- ..,,__.....-- Other ----:---------- Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# ·ATTA~ A AT'l'ACBX2Jl'f' A uo CRITXOQ"B PQRM Name , Rank____;:a/J~E:4 ______ 1,_I ___ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) · Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post ___ '7 ___ _ Field Task Force ~ Fixed Post Security g: Patrol in Geographic Division _k: __ Other ______________ _ Geographic Area of assignment }<:... Command Post # ~ ~ (J:)Ui\..t~ _ Sector# 13 specific to this topic) . LA e-~ or Ll-A ot;-IL rri1 F,1 Topic of Discussion: /~ (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi A (Continuation sheets may be used) - ,, uo CRITIOU'B FORM Name C.F.SArIO L . "CHAYO" REYES #20934 Rank DETECTIVE I II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) E~ergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force __ x ___ _ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Pos-c; Sec~or; 77TH STREET', S/E, NEWIDN, S/W, RAMPARI1, & WILSHiru 3 1 , 2, 3, & 4 Date/Watch/Time 4-29 /5-14-92 (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: _c_a-1MAND ____________ PO_ST _________ _ ( ie Fie- ld Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post Operations, etc) THE COMMAND ?OST CF3:RATION AT C-1TH STREET AdD VAN NES21 BLVD :..JACKED ORGANIZATION AND DECISIVENESS FROM COMMAND STAFF. DURING THE FIR~T NIGHT YOU COULD UNDERSTAND AND EXPECT A J U~O?GANIZED cr\ J1Ad ... POST Am CONFUSi O N, BlT NOT ~o THE EXTE T EXrERIE!lCE~ AT 54 ~H STREEY. THE FO=~ =-- ~wI~~G W:S:2E M ... .;TTER~ ~ ffS'/EE ~F.=• OLV~D DUIL.NG n-E FIRST CRITICAL 1 HGHTS OF T JE UNUS 7 AL OCCJ RrvE :1CI!:: ! I TH E l I DE::::· · .ET~"E.TT' S MI 0S ION. :2 ) ·THE UJITS ROLE FOR ACCOMPLISH:NG THE MISSIO N. ') ', THE ._, ) F02 4 ) A ~ ??I: O?R I .1\ 'rE BC :i.)!( · r ~ \ r (~ c ::· ~:\ I~4 c ;1~ ~. 5) ~ .1,=:r .;:-L : )E~.AY ? t)FI 1 ~1: /~l~~ (Jf t .iI \·l 1 ~:c1-1. C :; WA' I'C~ -i 2EnSOJN~L WERE RECYCLED, WHILE RELIEF PERSONNEL WERE STALLED IN TEE COMMAND POST STAGING AREA. 7) PERSONNEL ON STATIONARY POSTS WERE NOT PROPERLY RELEAVED FOR RESTROCM RELIEVE OR CODE 7 ( 12 - 15 HOUR WATCH). (Continuation sheets may be used) a , "": / .. :· . -;_ ~ , CONTINUATION SHEET BKG NO. DR NO. UO CRITIQUE HERE WAS NO DIRECTION FOR AGGRESSIVE FIELD ENFORCEMENT. ON THE CONTRARY, HE PHRASE COMMONLY USED WAS "DO NOT INCITE". (HOW DO YOU "INCITE" AN N--GOING RIOT). COMMAND STAFF ATTEMPTED TO MAKE "POLITICALLY RIGHT" ECISIONS, RATHER THAN IMPLEMENTING "TACTICAL PLANS". IN GENERAL, FIELD 2ERSONNEL WERE DOING THEIR BEST, BUT FELT ABANDONED BY DEPARTMENT DECISION MKERS. 1HE LACK OF ORGANIZATION AND INDECISIVENESS BY COMMAND STAFF C LEARILY ·EMONSTRATED OUR DEPARTMENT'S LACK OF LEADERSHIP DURING TIME OF CRISIS. ATTACJDaD1'? A ~ ., "-~ I uo CRITIQUE lOlYI Name M,mc.,/~ A Rank A.or . Assignment durin E g U.O. (check all that F~erlgdency Operations Center e Command Post apply) / ,. .. Field Task Force Fixed Post Security ;~~~~l in Geographic Division--~-- Gedgraphic Area of assi· gnment . Sw11--\ ~ :::.-;- s out'i--l We:.:::,~ Command Post# W l L ~ H-\' , L.£-.: Sector# D~te/Watch/Time 0~ / . q ( l~ necessary . . _ t bO or specific td th · . is topic) T~pic_of Discussion: ( ie Field Jail, Squad-ToiTct-f;· ::;---;;-:-:=-:----:---- act1.cs, Command P COMM&NI~i ost Operations, etc) Of5W\. tv\ , , :\-t ... J') . ()n~• U ~77,,AT]· o ~ ~ ' 6fc,,tLS. c.0 01-E: ~'"\--'1 /1/"'f. ~ c..( p fo 'iZ- rtuu t2- S. WA-1- \1,¾ ' \1) 'b ec Ass- ( C. ~ e:= r) o'F-u2- S -f;"S:5. C ~E:-D 7\) Po~~ uJt:.fl.C N <Y( (4, { < E:--J E:--() l~ TL ~ ~c_-:,/ crz___ C0 OC:: 7 , ~ ~ t ~ ( rtV \.l u., '.:,.. p M l . .:----- '\ <[1~ /1_ OL ..:r Du -rt-{ '11 /Ill"\~ ~ ~ ~ -- -~lN 7lV\l\fl.A..Ot-J ~ 1 V----Pnt:. '12:><::: ~s c oR--n---S. (!;)_ L_I\ '1 -~( I L- .. ·. 4- s ~ Lrlt :~ ":, (Continuation sheets uJ LU 1}hs c..n_,-no,uf: s~ '7),f-£ {¥!.o,3~ ':, 77,h:· L,(' 0- \ w~'-- · A n ~ . ~ . may be used) OF . . .. .. .. .... '...lo ~-•1 ,_,,., J uo CRITXOVB fQRM Name u.trr,,1,:1.v, a. Rank----10~E_....T. .... ll: __ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center < Field Command Post ::;::>' Field Task Force ~ / .,.- Fixed Post Security ~ Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time _________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad .Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS; (Continuation sheets may be used) . .... ,. -r - THE HANDLING OF THE LA RIOTS BY T~E LAPD WAS IN MANY WAYS A PERFECT EZAMPLE OF HOW tIOT TO DO THINGS. BEFORE IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC PROBLEMS THOUGH, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS INEPT PERFORMANCE WAS GREATLY AFFSCTED BY AGENDA CARRYING SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS AND POLITICIANS AS WELL AS A NEWS MEDIA THAT WOULD RATHER CREATE AND SEi-ISATIONALI '.3E THE .-IEWS VIA THEIR TABLOID FSRMAT THAN TO REPORT THE FACTS. THE TONE F~R HANDLING THE RIOT WAS SET AT THE VERY BEGINNING WHEN IT BECAME EVIJENT THAT tHE 'LAME DUCK' CHIEF WAS EITHER LOOKING ?AST THE POTENTIAL FOR A RIOT TO HIS RETIREMENT OR MORE LIKELY WAS SO PREOCCUPIED WITH RESPONDING TO TRUMPETED UP ACCUSATIONS BY THE MEDIA AND POLITIC:ANS THAT HE HAD NO TIME ~EFT TO DO HIS JOE. IN ANY EVENT , THE RIOT BEGAN AND THE COMMAND STAFF CN HAND EITHER HAD NO CONTINGENCY PLANS OR THEY 'NERE SO CONCERNED WITH MAKING A WRONG DECISION TH.~T MIGHT. AFFECT THEIR POTENTIAL FQR UPWARD MOBILITY THAT THEY CHOSE TO DO NOTHING. THEN, R;..THER THAN .~CCSPT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR DECISION TO JO NOTHING THEY FURTHER ?ROMOTED THE IMAGE OF A FLOUNDERING DEP~RTMENT WITH · C.~STRATED LE~.DERSHIP BY .~LLOWING RUMORS TO FLOW THROUGH THE PENS OF THE FREN:IED MEDIA UNTIL THE DEPARTMENT FINALLY FCUND THE:R EXCUSE : A SKA?E-GOAT NAME8 LIEUTENANT MOULIN IN 1 992, HOWEVER, BUREAUCRATIC SCAPE-GCATS ARE NOT AS EASY TO !NTIMID.~~E .~ND HIDE SII-JCE A SCA?-30}: HAS BEEN PROVIDED . FOR THEM THROUGH OUR OTHERWISE HATED NEMESIS, ITALK RADIO. MEANWHI~E, THE RIOT CONTINUED AS DID THE LACK OF DECISION MAKI~G AND DIRECTION BY THE COMMAND STAFF. I WAS ASSIGNED TO THE COMMAND POST AT THE COLISEUM WORKING 1 B' WATCH WHERE I EXPERIENCED THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS. IT 2EOULD EE NOTED THAT THESE ?~OELEMS DID NOT :MPROVE THROUGHOUT THE TACTICAL ALERT. l.NO CON~INGENCY PLANS. 2. NO LE;..DERSHIP. 3.NCT ENOUGH ROVERS AND PERSONNEL ASSIGNING ROVERS DID NOT KNOW HOW TO EXPLAIN THE USE OF THE NEW ONES. ADDITIONALLY, ROVERS FROM ONE BUREAU. WERE OFTE1, I ASSIGNED TO OFFICERS WORKING A DIFFERENT BUREAU. 4.LONG DELAYS BETWEEN SHIFT CHANGES INDICATING A LACK OF PLANNI~G WHICH RESULTED IN UNNECESSARY OVERTIME AND AN ONGOING DECLINE IN MORALE. 5.NO C8MMUNICATION OR A DELAY IN COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMAND STAFF WHICH CREATED RUMORS THAT ADDED TO THE DECLINE IN MORALE. 'OFFICIAL INFORMATION' FROM DIFFERENT BUREAUS WAS OFTEN CONFLICTING AND SUBSTANTIATED THAT THE RIGHT HAND DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE LEFT HAND WAS DOING. 6.LACK OF TRAINING. OFFICERS USING EQUIPMENT THAT THEY WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH 'I.E. MANADNOCKS, ROVERS, M.D.T. 'S, LIGHTS, SIRENS, ETC. ON BLACK AND WHITE VEH. · 7.ASSIGNING SENIOR DETECTIVES TO HIGH PROFILE PATROL ASSIGNMENTS IN THE SOUTH BUREAU WHERE THEY WERE EXPECTED TO IMMEDIATELY RESPOND TO FUR~HER RIOTING. THEIR DEDICATION AND EGOS WERE SUBSTITUTED FOR LACK OF CURRENT TACTICAL TRAINING, UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE EQUIPMENT, UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE AREA, ETC. IT WAS AS THOUGH A WISE OLD MGR. HAD TRAINED AN EXTREMELY TALENTED BOXER FOR THE HEAVY WEIGHT CHAMPIONSHIP OF THE WORLD BUT WHEN THE FIGHT CAME ALONG THE MGR WAS SENT IN TO DO THE FIGHTING. THIS LIST COULD CONTINUE ON FOR A LONG TIME BUT SINCE THE RIOTS HAVE BACKED UP MY CASES I WILL CONCLUDE WITH ONE FINAL THOUGHT. I HAVE LOVED BEING A LOS ANGELES POLICE OFFICER FOR ALMOST 20 YEARS. I HAVE HAD A LOT OF RESPECT FOR UPPER MANAGEMENT DURING THIS TIME. BUT JUST AS A CHILD THINKS HIS FATHER WILL ALWAYS PROTECT HIM AGAINST EVIL, IT IS A TREMENDOUS. DISAPPOINTMENT WHEN THE EVIL CONFRONTS YOU AND YOU SEE YOUR FATHER RUNNING FOR COVER. C~IEF GATES HAS FOUGHT VALIANTLY BUT COULD SOMECNE PLEASE TELL ME WHERE HIS STAFF SUBORDINATES ARE HIDING. l AT'l'ACJDDD1'f A June 29, 1992 8.2.3 INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE TO: Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau FROM: Commanding Officer, Bunco-Forgery Division SUBJECT: AFTER-ACTION REPORTING FOR THE APRIL/ MAY RIOTS Attached are the Unusual Occurrence Critique Forms submitted by Bunce-Forgery Division personnel. The following are my observations: I was responsible for the perimeter and internal security of Parker Center, for the allocation of personnel and other Operations-Headquarters Bureau (OHB) resources to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), for ensuring the appropriate response of officer-involved-shooting teams, and for the maintenance of Detective Headquarters Division unusual-occurrence-related operations. 1 Problems were noted initially in relation to EOC requests for personnel. The numbers of personnel required and their assembly points were not clear. This was eventually smoothed out. A continuing problem was the failure to release field-assigned OHB personnel at end of watch; some personnel were held over for hours. For several nights no provision was made to provide food to the various personnel assigned within Parker Center and to perimeter security personnel. That situation was eventually remedied. Difficulty was initially experienced in securing shotguns. for OHB personnel; to my knowledge, sufficient shotgun ammunition was not available. OHB personnel assigned to the field were woefully underequipped in relation to hand-held radios. There were not enough radios and those that were available often did not have compatjble frequencies. There did · not appear to be a clearly understood vehicle allocation policy. OHB personnel arriving at command posts sometimes had their vehicles requisitioned, without adequate replacement transportation being provided. There was a strong feeling among many OHB personnel that they were not field deployed as effectively as they might have been . ... • ,,..,..._ ...,. __ !;J · ·-- ~ Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau Page 2 8.2.3 The deployment and use of civilian personnel during an unusual occurrence is inconsistent. There is also an oversight on the part of the Department to include civilian personnel in the documented response plans. AN, Captain Commanding Officer Bunce-Forgery Division Attachments ATTACl!XElff A uo CRITlOUB FORM Name c~~Ate.TQ.J, D. 6. /G,'22'1 Rank D· I Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply) '~ ' Geographic Area of assignment Command Pos:t. # Sec~or # JJvJ. ,~ 1! • J t!' ,, Date/Watch/Time ., B WATc.+I (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field .Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: . . A c,e, i•cA l > &l.,\,,r . C..ON sT,0A.e.11vt= 1 UvlevJ ~ E. c~ SSA/2,'/ • Tl2A i,J J ,j G,, 1 ? I Av.-1, ,J ~ 1 WI. t:>,,J Pow €IL J N p po 4,-~o1l1 ~ jbQ. l C,41111\_.,._,.,, ~uo~) t.,.J€)ee OC.ft ~l (i.,.J\. · . · (Continuation sheets may be used) r' Name uo CRITIOOB FORM I:{_ €:JV .A./ ~ . /1 C K f: ~ ;-l l PlA,, Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) · Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in~eograp~c Div.).sion Other 4~ .CJ (21:f_ ✓ -3 , ~ C.,, _J,t-~ij Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# A'l'TAcmmB'l' A Date/Watch/Time tf5 wJ4T C 6f F 0>-~ /~ tr r?r!7tC -cJ d ·f: ~r;;):J'/ ~. ,• .2/ J'T/o,c / (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: (Continuation sheets may be used) ,•• ., • • -- • - • •--•---• •~ - ~ -LI..-~- - •- - -- uo CRITIQUE PQRM Name Brenda O'Brien Rank Managerren t Analyst II Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) E~ergency Operations Center Field Command Pas~ Field Task Force Fixed Post ~ecurity Pat=ol in Geograohic Division Other BFD Office· Geographic Area of assignment Command ~o~t: # Sec--:or #- Date/Watch/Ti:ne "A" Watch - Entire Mobilization (if necessar1 _ or specific to this topic) ATTACXKElrr A T'?pic . of Disc:ission: Use of Civilian Personnel During a VO/Mobilization (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Pas~ operations, etc) COMMEN'!'S: Are we civilians considered by any managers in this Departrrent as "Department Personnel?" I could not find in the Tactical Manual any specific role/position civilians have in the Police Departrrent in case of an Unusual Occurrence. Although several Departrrent managers pay lip service to the fact that civilians have a role in this Departrrent, I have seen no evidence of it. (Continuation sheets may be used) uo CRITlOtrB ?ORM Name !Y'l (1 YLj (l_ LL --t,y-; Rank Dtt'.lL, Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) E~ergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force c::::---=- Fixed P~st Security L-::::::: Pat::-ol i.n Geographic Division ,.__. Other ----------- Geographic Area of assignment w · ;L~l~l1L6 /' ,... E / l ____,;- / i ·1 ~ 1 Command Post ~ -- ~ Sec<cor - ~ !,... ~ tVOT ittcQLL ---rN K ~ '>ft LI\::. )(__ :sisuon__s Date/Watch/Time :-,-p<; '--j,d- /-j W A/L-N- -'v- r:.JIY'r, Y Y tG LYl/) T r:i~ - (if necessary or specific to th ' t . - is opic) T '?pi C . 0 f Discuss i On : {gjV) u ) 1--0 }'1 J? 'fos l O :i? £. J'(([T l {'Y'--D (ie Field Jail Squad T • · ~ · ' ac~ics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMME!'JTS: ~ 1 J./9') Yt K. ( ~ t\ I 7 lff nc w AS 7cJD if'/tl-tdJ... / 1 }1)1Q_ w0-.. is \£,0 J u s-T -L r°1 1 rv G- ID G-- £. -r e-u ft_ fiSS) trr0 M t rv-rc__:::, - l N A P V l Ti O t.-J / IT (i pp£, IW it> I/,,) p;i- IN-- & C.-[l'f-Y\.il)l1.\A, )'\,0 fNS. 7S DI p. (V2>T l'f A v £ - --n.-0 p '£ YL. \.J l'vl M v tV 1 \,P:,/ U(y\~ w ; I 1+- 5 A t- t-L i:) -nro JI.- A {V '{}, _ ())AI >I£ 0 , <:. ln-l 0 f- -r } Y)/L f 7:nlj } YlG TO f-1 e, \J\ 1rt ~ \£t tv ~ ri -r o Po w / )c:,..,fT ~ A \( '£ ns O N tJ Y: l-. ,,, /\Jo 'f L -Hl D f- A I I.Pi C... f\.. i (j (Continuation sheets may be used) --------------- uo CRITIOUB FORM Name _...,e .... '/4 __ L ____ f0_...,_ ·M-7....---- Rank ])77{ Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force apply) Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division X Other C' t-t }3 - E 1,JA n:.H - c_ lo A-12 ;2, 1 JJ\ N7"° GeographiG Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time ________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) ATTACXMm1'1' A Topic of Discussion: Ll,t1a<k>t' '-'.AF!Qt-t . - Ft1=Lp )4 1L- - c0? 2.,lA, n s:.,,y.s (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS i {;, ,....,._ v ,_, , c.-, r, c ,._, . ' J ,._ J1-~ J JI....,,,_, µn;.J_ n-,;,---- <:.0,..::b.,J· 1- .,_ .r,j ~bL<-;t,~_ · ·~u~~ . /i/Jll, .,J.L,""L~l- · ..__d... ~ J CL,:-,1.., ~U, ~ ~M'f. ~~ r~~s/ ~ ... ·IL ;_;ti. a...L ~~ _ *~~ -P,-,~ lJl rtcc , ~ 4':'..;-,.,._l _ ~ ~ fad-, ~.t._ ~~ J "-~ t~e:...ez ·-fb ~± ~ _ -p:J£_ ~..& a-1 ¼,Lv~ 1 r 7 r· D ;:' , -rt · - /J · .,r---/-:,;. · - (J<o ~~ jW_ ., ~~ ,(1/U,,--~~f.vd_ <'5 f./ftr' ~ ~~-kJ / :_, -ril, p;;,- ~:Ud:~ ~ . . . . FtE--LpJF11L.: //~f'--7:~ '-/t.sk:t P, ~~ (h Uo'.)u~ m:J)_ ~~Q - At:~ ~4-JZ_ V'-(bJ __ - ~ ~~ ~ I ~ - ftJlf? ~j {, .. ~~k ~ -~o+ zt 1<x0, ·~~ 8-4 ~ ~ /4~- p~m,,_ ~Jc,L-1-, ~ ~. J;t ~ ~ ~ fJw 1,...,~ /Jut ~~v-L{! v1 ·rt:, _P--~r1:.kl-1->.¾( O'L ~~ cf -ill l)CJ . (Continuation sheet~ may be ,used) I . uo CRITIQUE PORK Name Rt,&AJsl),.J, 2. Rank___,;a/J-.e=-'~•.-;r __ Assignment during u .o. (check all· that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force X Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Posi:: # S~::!,, j!~,<o--,,H,,f Sector # _ Date/Watch/Time /1 W>4 'fZ, M (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: A'l'TAcmmJl'f A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi -f/llz1t-1:-- /41,15 i jJ'f: ,S"(SA,frTJ,/I, )II Y } loOICO..AI' w,t>f ex.,;< it< A 1411N; r/h4 i we c:;...,,<...t? ,ur,T A-s,"6.AJI<? fr> tJk t=.,1~ ~ {.~ flNj , 1Jk tJer'#-~Olli ~ t'?~ f111''f If f(, o T lf~~e AN,:;, /r11 A~, ()~ ~//1'4'-/ re- /tet;-~~r:? fo,<. /7ff /Jexf ~JO/. (Continuation sheets may be used) Name . ~£'R~A ~4 Rank $:C :[C uo CRITIQUE FORM T. s" .Jiu., c..; Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division apply) Other ______________ _ Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# AT'l'ACllMlDl'l' A Date/Watch/Time ~-'2-i- <t~ / S--f t-1---,...., ( if necessary or specific torthis topic) T<?pic _ of DiscussionfY Ct1..-a,.J(:~ o€ ~ff @ I..A<r- o/!- /o,,c:C,_,e ..... (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, e~c)tAJ~, • COMMENTSi ~ ~ W)w "- :r,..1/ff4CTlfli ~ ~t£ e,~ ~~ (J)\1£11.1 (}) W<- 1..Ac.1t.- 6r /o1...,c~ t,..,~,._c~ ,..~....:r 'lJu,,;:.,,~ ~ l f.!' Z.it f/.c..r ~ ,.4f'//,.,:.," ii~"' ~ rll -~,IA?-\#4 'To & ,? ~.r ~(.&t.£.r /J'-',Gt!. Dff 1<:.€~ • -Z:: t /,f-,U. l.o,tM,,_,<I (k,t./'.uv,..A!./ f', /1- 1?li (' ,4;~ ,t)~ G/ ;, ."-' • . (Continuation sheets may be used) oo CRITIOUB FORM Name Assignment during u.o.· (check all that apply) · Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time _________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ATTAClDIEJIT A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: (Continuation sheets may be used) uo CRITXOQ"B FORM Name t\,, ~ z: ~. /. ~~477i!4A/-o ' Rank_.D._i,e_;-v-_-_. __ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post ;;;' Field Task Force al"/ Fixed Post Security 7) Patrol i~eogr~phic Divisign_ 7 Other ~,,.. ct'J'A.Jnt!.a.. r'44 ✓ Geographic Area of assignment Commarid P_ ost # Sector# Date/Watch/Time • _, sJ, , , (if necessary ors ecific .to his topic) 1 Topic of Discussion: 7!tlT14S I ~4/AIIA/G,. (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, cbnmand Post Operations, etc) 7'b:,aU:: COMMENTS i ~MbvP41'71?}/,' f'f?V~ ~II/ }'Vt, /1>/'L . Fi~ ~~I k~ IN /4,- fi 14"-'llf7iJIJ5 1/-N(J ~~ ~ / t/M- 1-utL w~ . - s,w ,p17:,,t.,,.,ru,AJ A1J't,1h:J/ 1fl.,1,w1N, 4r lo/'t- {Mo~. . JJtv1s1rA11Jl,, "f1lNAJ1N, ~~ /J4t Piv,s 1 r,v«,, 11Jd;11tU/l luJ1 ~ /)~ ~ Ill./ ~"'17nJ w/S/J:ID ~\UtJl ~ AAv ~ ""s : . I ~i.,lr),,11)l'111t1.· .l)~r. (Lt, IIPIJS AIU- ~Kl:P · s~ I'~ .111-r1~ 1fo1w. l}()frPRI t~IL.~LMJ-. ~ ~- Ll/l'P t!J;,l}d}':S ~u~ 7'7/1- U.,,,.7ht- /A/ f'ol..te.t- -neHNoLo'-'J I w~ .KJ.nt,v ~ / (JJJAff& v.5 MJl'C/c,I .' M DIJT' 71J I' I(,,, . {Continuation sheets may be used) · Pussfrv: ~th ,s..., J."1r.r.AJ.S ""'o ~'1 S:D.e.'s MDtJ, n'),(J/ l,, . uo CRITXOUB FORM Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post __ )'.' __ Field Task Force ·Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sect:or # Date/Watch/Time ft (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi ~;J J»,c-·~t,..JVI.J6, I~~~ /-rE].,D ~ ~ ~ ~ W t.h 1.-4£ '8' ~ lv9;'5 iSJVU<- 1.J 1fJf.. ~'2.-t>. 17}&,e.. ~ k>~ o-(---~ J}o,ifi-S Yet£ . Hil2- &w-~ T).ft£-ft~~l>A-ej~ (Conti~uation sheets may be used) ATTAcmmll'r A uo CRITlOUJS FORM Name /' Z),A-.,uµ~,<../BZ/~f:s' Rank ,/2.,ZZ; Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force X Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division X Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time 4-~9J92 7?-netu S--/7-9.2 L3 w/?rc/-1 (if necessary or specific to this topic) T'opic of Discussion: .. SQ~/1;0 7JL)C/?C-S E c./? 6PC~7lo.,OS· (ie Field Jail, _Squad Tactics, Command Post operations, etc) COMMENTS: (D . -:Z:: ;ec C.L'::/ jc-z:;; /,,{k ,,J , ' N (;.... ,, ,J S@ o✓ A,Q me ;r. c 5 / ,J 77,'C .,6,.C~bt4Y' /J?,,/zy~~~ A-Ge)/ ~ rk'AY.A./j,- ~~..) -;-Z' _A!.L,17 . C. (,..,4-;5..j e$ /7,7 ;e: ;z.,::-,,,.,. ,,,.--:;,, 4G 77w:J?,..; ,• ;,} G-- ,, :,.,, //,.;; d ,✓ ,4,o 77}-C ,'7 c. .:s ,. ~ j,uc;L ;?76) · A-,O,,::, /UJ .,,o /14 /?-~-G y c? ✓v G V\/6'-G--L / .. , , . . rrv 1 77-16' ~ 0 !./ c9 o/ ~ Z?/ y / .5/ ~ , .,J o.13/J1•;,0tf-;::J .Z/c 7r .S/>?e---t.,!)J A/.L Ot:/L /~v~• ,-r;-~ ~/4:!;-' ;<//~"#;,-'.., ~~~ / § ~~ JA!f'~uYe:tl /-,(.,/ A- S~uA?::) _,L.:::f}c;?rZ~ c7,J t,/!9Z;J11,J ~w~ A£L,;µ£7i)JA..J?' C/2c.iJ..S1Mi,J ~;77Hur ~~uJ/t:.A-??o.J ~/ti...J 1 .S:H'o '" v ,J S: A>J o ~ A µ.<Ze,uC-,J/7 , 1 .;.) cz:7 .,46,?MH ;r-.S//?ct::V 5 • "/;it! µ,µ;µ /J-C.. F;i..,;,fff<. 11 vtf G& ,.,t, l"fl/Jb.J -r .A/~c.:_,.qs.,,.;,;,e Y' ~ 6tJ µ 0 1 ./ (,.. -r' :PMJ~ ~ (Ct,»-LK f ,- ""'.//J-'j AJ A-t} .. ,/t~~,tt-1.4,e / ~✓r' /.Jt.-..I tJ A -z:;;_1 S~A-<£.. _:;:::- ..v ~ /-//& d·r-f 7""~ ,A;,LL--0 NtS:J., :z;- Al 4-,5 MS/ 6" .u60 -,;; ad 6,e/-¥d7'<:... L/1 J// J / 0 .A) ..s /.J p.J/14.4d;t:6z:J v61MCtc z,!':"...:,"/'t!J..V ,t?; ,JG- '7V 6 ,4-;,J? y; ,,t ,._,4.J c£ f ;"7} T .S/hJ 7$:. • 0 ,J ,,</ll ,,uB,<)V.S oCLA6n)/J~ /4'~7??'i>C~ oF ~ SA77,,C Jdlu,,,uJ u,c-,ec ,,,;r-J16 ..J6.o 12.o :1ca r%1Jµ P1/"r~ ,&..,,u!Au s /Jr7.-J o c.,r><-1c6.:J PIU71'6£. r~ &uC:UC 1 6::5 Tr:> CJD /4 ,u # ,v; c,A-175 vV / 17-1 el} CH t77)-IC-I<.. • .,.;;6::f?? ~J T7) ...f A Y., Z)1 45<:-:n tJ .,j A ,JO I.Su ;t?6i!V/ 5 / 0 .,) J=?:?.A)/A /#e· {!. ~ A~~~ 7ZJ ~6 ,,<.kJ,.J-et,jJ~'! ,,~ ~ ,✓ -:::;fi6? ~ ,,:...) 1)/.i y s ..I f-f ,!J ,f,,U f:7.)CLJ C.,,t✓ 1),e . L.A C#/Y-C., ~,o ,,,,,,:£JB=z) c=,,: c.6u..6 .J I 2',/ R cc n tJ ,0 4-,1.£) Vc.-<'#'-6/.Jt_ ~ /1'7 u-,,JI c4-77 a~ o-u1 A -z>,,q. / t. Y" ~ ,:s '4 r-;z:5 ~ ·C . ~ c:;,v/-½ /?? ti v16z;::J -;cJ -0~ C<J,L / .f Gu /!4' . ::Z:- ,<.,. ✓ ,r1 y z; /.,.,1 ,JJ..Ja ~ ~ :eer~r~~~#A,J£JJ?7-Jr~/A//J-:5A ~~LU~ ~r ?A?Z-rt:J~~~J.- ~ ~ (Continuation sheets may be used) ~ · ~ ,C}t./6--7"0 /bt.,/:77CA-c__ ///,C<..£✓C;z__lCc-/j't-'YP -;1-rc; _k',4 YtJI<) t!/ry C,t>t,oJC/L,, -A..A-YD ~77~ ,c;'v~U<:.., t?H'?C;.A-L.S b-V,,i-h'..J ~6 ~,,l_ O?J;.J A-6"<"--c;.JL)A_ A.JLJ _,,1 r~L ~ u.,uJ;;n-P,-??t!JU .-4~/(.,/6; C:,,</c., y 7ZJ ..f,P~/k /"'-..)~'7 G"tt-oU/!!". Name uo ELt,oTE. fl. CRI'rlOUB FORM Rank._&.--.a .... ~.&....;;;•if~-- Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security ;~;~~l ~nr:~~~c ~sion Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# ~ /I 1, ,., __ £-;1 , Date/Watch/Time '',8 "J. A ( v '/)-/~~,,_-,. (if necessary or specific to this topic) . /. Topic of Discussion: ~ Cl.. CJ~ fr' -ht:>rJ ATTACBXlD1'1' A (ie Field Jail, Squad -Tactics, Command P st Operations, etc) COMMENTSi uo CRITlOQJS FORM Name ;i?AJ~&AJ_ l. , Rank__..O~a:-----.r=--- Assignment during u.o. (check all that .apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector # Date/ Watch/Time ___ ,4 __ a_ !;7- _ ' _ R _ e_ # __ . __ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ATTAcmcmt'1' A /:7.,n /-;t, / / (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ) COMMENTSi (Continuation sheets may be used) o• CRITlltr! ltRM Name ($A-e~rA, S. Rank__.AL...&_iT[~---- Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field · Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply) ✓ v , , _ , - ~i. N _ ,,<h·li,l~ir, . c;:. /. J / ' ) / h 1-..J.- ~ • , '~ j f , , \ · ..,,)/ v\ , ·) ( .:..-- -c l . 1 ..f\ +k i~ t ,f-t l/J.._j I I I\ t I, Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector # Date/ Watch/Time / ) 1t1J- I ~ ; £ / l., i1)--i l,JJ (if necessary or speci ' ic to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc ) COMMENTS: (Continuation sheets may be used) Name Rank Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security x Patrol in G~graphic Division x: Other 't:'.At'?:tt- l<Ete_ Ct=& ·r~/2. ~ c_a~1T1/ Geographic Area of assignment Command Pos"t # Sec"tor # i Date/Watch/Time R J D (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ATTACBHEl1'r A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) (Continuation sheets may be used) uo · cRITXOUB FORM Name lAAU q 1 ;;~1 IZ& r?zf lZ I L ( Rank D - ~7 ve: Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division X Other AT'rAClDllm'l' A Geographic Area of assignment S'C '7 u? , 77. w1t.-7 llUJO Command Post ; 7 ' 1 f Sector# Date/Watch/Time ()y:frN!1. - &c-;l Jf c?Z &~CC-('?oc) (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi (Continuation sheets may be used) Name J) ~uE- \-\~Q...~§) Rank :S:,~ :S: uo CRITXOUB FORM Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security 7 Patrol in Geographic Division Z Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time ~ w~,c.~ o <o~o - \a,o.:> (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ATTAClDCD1'1' A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: ~'.-\~ vp(\'(\-OL- AL\\_u\°\'"\ CC.Lu~~ ,~ ~ I w-e.-~\ ~~ <:itt.. \),-..,. -::c. w<=>--""" ,~'-lo'-"~ ,~ v~L) 'S""i"P--.._, .. -4 -S1=.c..uO...,-M r.,.,,~ ~l.c,\l6-'Q...'-'\ o~ ~~ ~()EX'--"1. \~fa.. W€-~ ~~ WE.LL- l::~C..\J""'t"e~ . -- \ wo.-.~ ~~o ~c.,s,~~~ ~ - -r~ ~\...p..\l~~ Sw~ M~- ~ \.)~\~ w~ ~~~,~t-)~ • . I\\,') w~':l o~~ \<....,'-~ .. \~ S~o.J) t\~ ~(\.vu~~ \:) ~)9\,,0~~\.- VG.\l-'-»~~C-. -L. \~\~~ ~~~ow~ S\-\0~~ ~-h~ t::\J~~ ~\~\\L~\.l'"'=-~ -ro c~ ~~ (Continuation sheets may be used) < Name Rank_~--=---,r~ '------ uo CRITXOVB -PQRM Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post v Field Task Force ✓ Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division ✓ Other Geographic Area of assignmeht Command Post# Sector# ~ ' I Cku§-~ Mtt>Jf Date/Watch/Time ' ?, /~ (if necessary or specific ~~ ':>-?;f1c:rto FiA.Jffdf. to this topic) Topic of Discussion: A'l'TAcmaDtT A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi (Continuation sheets ~ay be used) Name !/,{l, R. Rank_/) __ ~_7 __ . __ ;_] __ uo c_ RITIOUB FORM Ra.I . JJ, l-1J .. 9z_ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post ,__. Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time __________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) ' Topic of Discussion: £~ ~'-~ ~ (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: \ {Continuation sheets may be used) uo CRITIQUE PORK Name Rank __ ~_ -_\ ____ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force x ---- Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division X Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time __________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ATTACBMDl'l' A ~ -· '' (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi (Continuation sheets may be used) uo CRITIQUE FORM Name Rank 7--D:L. Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post ~✓---- Field Task Force Fixed Post Security --:::j--- Patrol in Geographic Division-zr-- -~ · __ _ Other Geographic Area of assignment Command · Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time L./.30 -'72 O6c,o (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ATTACRXJm'l' A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: .....L U .)AJC...UI?... ~E.r. /'vJ 1::JCAL/: ~ EI -1:JAJJAJ B.JJiJU/11/c. .hEJ Foo&.rDAI DET YDUIJ6 _hEr .5.AAJrUce, 1 ~Er ·-put>J6CJIM LJ.J ,Tl./ 7~c_ k!XLOW1AIG -1JEra:r /{/cJ S7/97cfi18.) T..5 ~ (Continuation sheets may be used) uo CRITXOUJS FORM Name Rank __ )~ _· _,_ 7!. ~ - f~: __ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force K Fixed Post Security X Patrol in Geographic Division % Other _______________ _ ATTAClDDD1'1' A Geographic Area - of assignment ~Tf!-/!t Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time _________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi Fif-ST 1J16!-11- J)£fiai;yn£1..,0 . <;£c111£J S4Ju_)_ ComY7lUl'f)1e/fTJo,tJS VJ)1 f?AtJj() t1)£/L iti)/:_ t3Kr/JUSC aF N£At' Et?th/J/:7//AJT ~ -1.)c, L:tf)tJ1~n£d,/;-:- {?)ErTJttJG r{ ;2£;7J-/AJ/AJ:S .V£;/-leLES WAS A ?A:>BLE41- (Continuation sheets may be used) Name Rank uo CRITIOVB FORM Assignment during u.o. (check all that E~ergency Operations · Center Field Command Post apply) Field Task Force Fixed P~st security patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/~Time d (if necessary or specific to thi's topic) >< x X: ATTAClDODrl' A T<?pic. of Discussion: ,d~~ //4,..,,...,..,....-v~_..,, : (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Op t' _ - a ions, etc) COMMENTS: CJ:?£./~--=-~ ~ c C ✓ -4 L" ./7 /v' /;//A,// ._z-: c'. ~~c>::::- ~-/D ....:/ / /0 ..-;?? .,:::.--- ....,,,,,-v _,,;r- ~ . / ' - ,,,,,.. ,,. ? ~'-5- ✓ - 0 _;;:;;r-~ ~- ~ ~ - --V-<:::"'~ <'.'.:.C- -<1 ....s s= 0 ..s;-· , --:::::-5 (Continuation sheets may be used) --v ~ ~ / ~,:::--_:-~ c::: __.I C7 ~ ,0 ,//E! ~__s-,:;::_':). / G>...-z._ . ~ C/ , -· ··-·· uo CRITIQUE PORM Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post · Field Task Force X:, Fixed Post Security ~ Patrol in Geographic Division :x,, Other ------------- Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# . - ocJe£- ATTACHXlD1'1' A uo CRITXOVB FORM Name Rank_.(Je=---r,: ____ • __ l __ Z __ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) · Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force !---- Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division h--:--:::: Other ) A'l'TAcmmit'l' A ( 1 .r?/5-r-.,< Wi f~J.,~ 1 ~~~~.J Geographic Area of assignm·ent ·i . ._...'C,, / _j,. lc__.,Q_) ·~ -<-ke 1 . ~ W Command Post# ~ Sector # IR i--Jf:.- Date/Watch/Time B w1:kd-, sh.1,e;l---C-?,-,..._r,.1/..f- . ( if necessary or specif id' to this topic) . Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi (Continuation sheets may be used) , (? uo CRITIQUE FORM Name ---~-+- 1 l._.Cr;;..;..~~A..::;a.c:A;....:L::...;'~LU1ct...ll~~Q~~=--- Rank_~D~rr:---- ·-- Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post X. Field Task Force Fixed Post Security X. Patrol in Geographic Division ~ Other f, R. t. 4S,:A . >' . Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# ·sector# Date/Watch/Time QfWS ·e. (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ( ie Field Ja.il, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi T11f. oc-'€-aATiotJ APP£Afl.l:o ~TAtC..4t' ptSOQ.c.ANt7.ED 'THE. r dlST n,uo l:2.) OA\' s oF ou.T't (~-30.~1/6-c 1-'1 z). AMlUto A, e i::-o AT 0600 r\R.S f\NC> vJE..,~f- NOT AS5(6N e,o . TO AN"t' OTHtUc. ~0 CA11°"'- v.-~T ,L t-Z.00 \-\TlS rrlt~ FtRS, OA'( At-.10 ((001-\ftS nt. E _S~ND QAt. ~o ON~ S EE.M e:o <i?) Kt40\.U l,U\4AT . WA~ 60' ~, '» ON N€.J<.T. 11i£a~ uJA5 Dl"56(2,Ae.J.l"Z.R110"1 ~,. 'Tl-½E c.P.'s G €TT1N~ P~l ~ ou.. T , ""1"t> -n-t £. FI e L.O tl ""o tvtoii E- G ~Tn "H. P~C>(->(.~ olAT Of T\-t~ Fl£C.D (SH,FI CHAN&f- 0\JU<) (Continuation sheets may be used) uo CRITtOQ'B PORM Name ~'-c.~A'R..1) Mu LL., GA~ Rank ~ :rrr: apply) Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post • * Field Task Force ';tz= Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division ;¥? Other ~ ------------~-- Geographic Area of assignment . Command Post # S:~c'1t_ As2c_c.~7'='~--- Sector # 0PLc.-&-a::.uM . Date/Watch/Time .tf;-2-f--1.1- ( if necessary or specifi to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ATTACBHDl'r A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: u avi.10 1;; on.- k)~g ~ ~<Z_/1'\ G T u ~ l,~ G-- ~uµa tf:o..} ~R.__~~r -- . ) ~ Ft><~ (fasT ~ ~v-rr-J6 \JS Ou, &~ (r-"'TLeL- L~ ~~ - ( --· t~ Ot--1 ~, ~~?~t\\_ Dom ---n-m: ~~ (Continuation sheets may be used) uo CRITXOQJS FORM Name 02:TEGA, ~. Rank_~~--rr--...rr::-. __ Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post apply) Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time __________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ~ z . (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi (Continuation sheets may be used) Name /!,tnJ UJ. Rank Dsr. It , uo CRITlOUB FORM Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post apply) Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time __________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: X ATTACBKm1'1' A (ie · Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: (Continuation .sheets may be used) .1 I Name uo CRITIOQB PORK =p A Ut:: c..... ~~ 1 \J\, (C<:._ Rank __ , _ - - _ ·t_~_ . _ -_-z- __ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post ~ Field Task Force Fixed Post Security :t- Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment 5 c , -.,-,.\-,.l~'>);_ Command Post # I ClL•~u .--, Sector# Date/Watch/Time1/1 r rJ. . <-i,z.. A~ v,lA-,c---Q.,.. (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: --- AT'l'ACJIXBB'l' A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: (Continuation sheets may be used) uo CRITXOUB FORM Name JOAN F. CAMPBELL Rank Senior Clerk Typist Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Eme~gency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Ciyi Ji ao · Tiu:ekeewr Geographic Area of assignment BFD - PAB Command Post# Sector# Oate/Watch/Time "B" Watch - 1800-0600 ( if ·necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: _T_irre __ ke_e_p_rn_ · _g _________ _ (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi · It would be helpful to have sane kind of handout pertaining to special procedures re tirrekeeping for U .O. 's. (Continuation sheets may be used) L , J . ' uo CltI'l'IOtJB J'QRM Name /tvf./eJA: "/) 1 X OM . . Rank C.ieeKfjRt.s r Assignment during u.a. (check all that a · ~ergency Operations center pply) Field Comm.and ·Post Field Task Force Fixed Post security Pat=ol ).f. Geographic Division Other u_1f/2.IC B:L: --- Geographic Area of assignmen~ Command Pos-c _ ; Sec-cor; ,/ It ,t Date/Watch/Time ''L;J1 - ('.3 -/!{J)-1)/:,{)() ( lf necessary or specific to th. . . is topic) Topic of Discussion· ATTAc:mam'l' A . ( ie Field Jail' Squ~d~T~a;::c:=.7 • ::::---:::----~--- _1,cs, Command Post Operations etc) COMMENTS; . ' I, C,11/11,A-,J Pere.sv,JµE,L, Wko J)o rJo+- c.A~~ P~o"t?-e:h\/€ 'vJ'= A (Jo tJ,5, ot2, tA4::} No+- h AVe ~I ,,461& Ter+N5Po~t,'o, W h o A-e.~ ;J a.. h e-J> u I tW -ft> w oft. t: .(:) A-.j L ,·'1 h. +- I 8' o o 1"b 'QA-~''"' h. +- 0(,00 !) \., OIJ 1.0 Nd+ be, A-5Ke:D-+c 1.£-AII € A-r It rJ () rJ S A Ft 1-6Jt2. . ---:::,;> hou£.b Sh..oL,(,,11) ~ e.-+we:.~.u fW ---- {Continuation sheets may b . e used) Rank (. l </7 J Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other I Cl'YL3 c:, 1 (/Yl, t ( . Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# . t2 lU 1 -fr: /~ Date/Watch/Time ~ {L . --/ (if necessary or specific to this topic) ' Topic of Discussion: A'1'TACBXEl1'1' A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi (Continuation sheets may be used) uo CRITIQUE FORM Name :;t{JJ(lr?vv {±t 'W ; tt¥d Rank CJ: Assignment during u.o. (check all that E~ergency Operations Center apply) Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed P~st security . Patrol in Geographic Division --- Other ~,{ R&r: u;oeK c2 '55LfJh-ry,rJl grap l.C Area of assignment 8(P Geo h' . Command Post; ~~;..._-~ Sector# D~te/Watch/Time4-zq_ q 2 - ')--;~ -q2 DJtG\ wtvtei) Ci0CL / ft (if necessarf or s~ecific to th· ~- ~ is topic) T~pic of Discussion: (1.e Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post Operations COMME!:iTS: ' etc) 0 V e-rJvr-vvl, Co ~l,l c i ht\.\; e YX:' { r 1 f ?e f t:'r Lth Lt-z C i r i(___) e Wt' v6 cio i,,vt ~ U D rel~ -c y\ wad . Cz» vLt ~ ~ 5h u\}JC) ho u C fl,£, 0 P fO { ~ . fu ()Jo/2 /( ad Jl ho y1 td h O IA,//'5 0 Vl t1I VO/~ ~t 5l5 J cF ,Jhw V\o ux~ Clff ~1veuty veA ru-P J- · to ~ u o . ?i1 ci L,{.,t J 1V\ o -se ho vt v 0 b-r o crre r1 a 1 -sy::z j , -fN__ ..'J ~tlDLUJ ~ dY5tnhJe '-€6J L LC<._Jj Cvwl o (l~ aJJJ ('.,,{ 11L. lw.1v1 W'f(O~-ft'5. (Continuation sheets may be used) Name~ ) ~ Rank~/]z??; CRITIOUB FORM Assignment during u.o. (check -all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Pat=oy~eograEhi~ Division Othe(/~- /21;;.//4 J. Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sec-car# Date/Watch/Time '/-2 -Y-9,;2 1 A . {J&tJO ~ 1800 ( if necessary or specif iZ fd? this topic) Topic of Discussion: ____ A/, __ / __ 1):J~ ---------- ATTAClDIDJ'? A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: bu,.._ t,1-)A_-t t;; P--4- ~ ; ci,,'hY (?1B f«-f Jud (Continuation sheets may be used) uo CRITIQUE FORM Name {'(\ ::e,l'lc\ o·~ ' · zy:e,,-..,clfl /l __.,1· Rank __ ~-=------ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Div~sion Other C \-c:...v 'x-~c.. \ 32½ h< s. Geographic Area of assignment :EFO Command Pos-c; Sec-car# Date/Watch/Ti:ne S-4-'\. 'l. /4 / o bou - ~ t?-vo (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ATTAcmmlrr A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tac~ics, Command Pos-c Operations, etc) COMMENTS: ~ ~ · \ · . . c\_ ... , .. \ \ , . . -~y/<.. t_,\ -0 . O v-<.X··\-irn-<.. C~ \"=' Lt:' \..__.,°\ V \ .. \_Qt--l ~ -::::>r\ V\A. d ..__ I \ ~ r..e k.\-_, c-\ --\-,:, u . o) a.,,-., J \ F 0 ~ ~ v () \ u ,-..J -\-o..,r / \:i C\..~~ -e...°I U.."'-lll .. l,..) cf k. ~-t.-< d .R d ~'.:J)€\ ~ c.,,_ ~I--<- (Continuation sheets may be used) uo CRITIOU'B FORM V; t f Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in 1 ~~~~Iaphic Division Other ~t-V /,!..// ',<} . ~/cz-«£ /J Geographic Area of assignment fu:r:D Command Post # - Sector# Date/Watch/Time _________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: (Continuation sheets may be used) . Name oo CRITIOVB FORM I :, ,, i'- ". 7 , ' _,t Rank __ ~ ~-- '- · __ _ Assignment during u.o. (check .all that apply) E~ergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post; Sec1:or; Date/Watch/Time __________ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: ATTACBXlD1'1' A (ie . Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: - 1\ ...:. ::., _. ·.-\ ... --· ~ -- • # . .... ., · •• .:,. _ : : \ I ·• •, .. - •, I I" • _,, . ·- - ., ..,, ~ · (Continuation sheets may be used) uo CRITIQUE FORM , 'J , 7 Name //1 / ( /-/t-- L- l E :- A • K 1 'i' Z: Rank __ e~ , h_1 ____ _ Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other Geographic Area of assignment 8Pv-· PP-6 Command Pos-c; Sec-tor # Oate/Watch/Time _____ {A ___ . ______ _ (if necessary or specific to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTS: (Continuation sheets may be used) ill'- ,._;t_ .,.· -~ . CRITIOVB fQRM Name Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center __ v __ Field Command Post v ,.., Field Task Force -7---- Fixed Post Security -✓--- Patrol in Geographic Division v Other Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# uD ,, Date/Watch/Time o w~Tc..-u. (if necessary or specific to Topic of Discussion: this topic) ATTACJDIEl1'1' A (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi (Continuation sheets may be used) • RIOT AND L.A.P.D. TO START OFF I WORK~AN ASSIGNMENT THAT REQUIRES ME TO WEAR A BEARD AND THAT'S THE WAY IT GOES. I DIDN'T START THE RIOT I JUST REACTED TO IT. BUT, MY REACTIONS WERE NOT THAT OF A REASONABLE PERSON. WE (L.A.P.D.) WERE NOT PREPARED TO HANDLE THE PROBLEMS THAT WENT ON. STARTING FROM PARKER CENTER WHEN THEY STARTED ROCK AND BOTTLING THE BUILDING. WE STOOD BY AND LET THEM BURN THE AMERICAN FLAG, THE GUARD SHACK, AND WHAT EVER ELSE THAT STOOD IN THERE WAY. ONCE THIS HAPPENED WE WERE SENT IN TO HELP SOLVE OR RESOLVE THE PROBLEM THAT WAS FACING THOSE WHO HAD BEEN THERE FROM THE OFFSET. THAT DIDN'T WORK BECAUSE THE CITIZENS OF LOS ANGELES HAD ALREADY LOST RESPECT FOR US. BECAUSE OF ALL THE NEWS COVERAGE THAT WAS GIVEN THE RIOT AND WHERE WAS L.A.P.D. SITTING AROUND ON THEIR DAMN ASSES WAITING FOR SOMEONE TO MAKE A DECISION. UPON ARRIVING AT THE COMMAND POST IT WAS STAND AROUND1'HERE FOR THREE OR FOUR~ijlJS,.J\ND THEN STAND AROUND ANOTHER PLACE FOR ANOTHER TWO HOURS. THEN THE ~IP',l,~~l~~!-.:)~O BE SAID MOVE IT OUT AND WE WILL TAKE BACK THE STREETS, BULL!!!!. WELL THAT DIDN'T HAPPEN. SO BACK TO THE . COMMAND POST FOR US TO SIT AROUND, AND FALL PREY TO THE COMMAND STAFF AS TO WHAT TO DO WITH US FOR ANOTHER TWO OR THREE HOURS. STILL THE BUILDINGS WERE BURNING AND OFFICER NEED HELP CALLS WERE COMING OUT BUT WE DIDN'T HAVE CARS THAT WERE DUAL PURPOSE CARS TO GET US THERE IN A HURRY. SO MY BROTHER OFFICERS GOT THEIR BUTT'S BEAT AND WERE SHOT AT. AFTER ALL OF THE ABOVE HAPPENED THE COMMAND STAFF STILL COULDN'T FIND THEIR ASSES. THEY DID NOT HAVE A PLAN PREPARED TO TAKE BACK THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, AND IF THEY DID THEY SURE DIDN'T IMPRESS ME THAT THEY HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING. WHY WOULD ONE EXPECT TO HAVE THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT NOT BE ORGANIZED AND READY FOR ANY MAJOR OCCURRENCE. WE HAVE ALWAYS BE IN A STATE OF READINESS. BUT, FOR SOME REASON THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME MOR EQUIPMENT TO PUT IN PLACE TO PREVENT THE ON SLOUGH THAT OCCURRED. THERE WAS NO DIRECTION GIVEN TO us,~ THE~ HAND HELD RADIO'S, MARKED POLICE VEHICLES, DUAL PURPOSE VEHICLES, ~- THE LACK OF INDECISIVENESS AND ORGANIZATION IS INDICATIVE OF WHERE WE'VE BEEN AND WHERE WE WERE DURING THE RIOT .... BUT WILL IT BE THE SAME IF AND WHEN WE HAVE ANOTHER RIOT . .• HOPEFULLY NOT. ' ... - .,._r ~ "v- . ' . , RIOT AND L.A.P.D. TO START OFF I WORK AN ASSIGNMENT THAT REQUIRES ME TO WEAR A BEARD AND - THAT'S THE WAY IT GOES. I DIDN'T START THE RIOT I JUST REACTED' TO IT. BUT, MY REACTIONS WERE NOT THAT OF A REASONABLE PERSON. WE (L.A.P.D.) WERE N OT PREPARED TO HANDLE THE PROBLEMS THAT WENT ON. STARTING FROM PARKER CENTER WHEN THEY STARTED ROCK AND BOTTLING THE BUILDING. WE STOOD BY AND LET THEM BURN THE AMERICAN FLAG, THE GUARD SHACK, AND WHAT EVER ELSE THAT STOOD IN THERE WAY. ONCE THIS HAPPENED WE WERE SENT IN TO HELP SOLVE OR RESOLVE THE PROBLEM THAT WAS FACING THOSE WHO HAD BEEN THERE FROM THE OFFSET. THAT DIDN'T WORK BECAUSE THE CITIZENS OF LOS ANGELES HAD ALREADY LOST RESPECT FOR US. BECAUSE OF ALL THE NEWS COVERAGE THAT WAS GIVEN THE RIOT AND WHERE WAS L.A.P.D. SITTING AROUND ON THEIR DAMN ASSES WAITING FOR SOMEONE TO MAKE A DECISION. U PON ARRIVING AT THE COMMAND POST IT WAS STAND AROUND THERE FOR THREE OR FOUR HOURS AND THEN STAND AROUND ANOTHER PLACE FOR ANOTHER TWO HOURS. THEN THE COMMAND TO BE SAID MOVE IT OUT AND WE WILL TAKE BACK THE STREETS, BULL!!!!. WELL THAT DIDN'T HAPPEN. SO BACK TO THE COMMAND POST FOR US TO SIT AROUND, AND FALL PREY TO THE COMMAND STAFF AS TO WHAT TO DO WITH US FOR A NOTHER TWO OR THREE HOURS. · STILL THE BUILDINGS WERE BURNING AND OFFICER N EED HELP CALLS WERE COMING OUT BUT WE DIDN'T HAVE CARS THAT WERE DUAL PURPOSE CARS TO GET US THERE IN A HURRY. SO MY BROTHER OFFICERS GOT THEIR BUTT'S BEAT AND WERE SHOT AT. AFTER . ALL OF THE ABOVE HAPPENED THE COMMAND STAFF STILL COULDN'T FIND THEIR ASSES. THEY DID NOT HAVE . A PLAN PREPARED TO TAKE BACK THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, AND IF THEY DID THEY SURE DIDN'T I MPRESS ME THAT THEY HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING. WHY WOULD ONE EXPECT TO HAVE THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPA~TMENT NOT BE O RGANIZED AND READY FOR ANY MAJOR OCCURRENCE. WE HAVE ALWAYS BE IN A STATE OF READINESS~ BUT, FOR SOME REASON THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME N OR EQUIPMENT TO PUT IN PLACE TO PREVENT THE ON SLOUGH THAT OCCURRED. THERE WAS NO DIRECTION GIVEN TO US. THE HAND HELD RADIO'S, MARKED POLICE VEHICLES, DUAL PURPOSE VEHICLES, WERE NOT AVAILABLE. THE LACK OF INDECISIVENESS AND ORGANIZATION IS INDICATIVE OF WHERE WE'VE BEEN AND WHERE WE WERE DURING THE RIOT .... BUT WILL IT BE THE SAME IF AND W HEN WE HAVE ANOTHER RIOT ..• HOPEFULLY NOT. Name . uo CRITIQUE FORM · Kc: e,-:..e._"'.--- Q, \-l.c1-.. \J N Rank \)c_¼_~~, \JcE.)}]: Assignment during u.o. (check all that Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security Patrol in Geographic Division Other apply) ------------- Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# D"7teiwatch/Time 8 th~, .. , 1 S'.-'t-u:ti 0<£<5 o F" l)E. o(.O'ffV\C;}•--, (1.f necessary or specific::.,:to this topic) Topic of Discussion: (ie Field Jail, Squad Tactics, command Post Operations, etc) COMMENTSi -.........:__ €.'K ·?c_e_ \ l:i✓OCc> re. -e..~cs o c c. ~c~ c .-. :., .5 b lA.~1 ,✓E ~ ct:_CC£...~\- ~ \ c~ . - ~ CsE <.:..-~- - ~ <3 e_c..( f-\.....S - ~ G ~\..e_~ rlt":-.:) bc.-~ , \)&A\ce:5 C-c,,-ArA..~'- ~c~~ \ E-S ON p~_ c ~c..- ~\.c~ ~~y Poe..~t-\ \~ l \\]~ ~(_c, ~S" l5Q'f\t)C~, ~ SA~ ~~ c)Q"-=jc_ee5 ~~b , ~ 6' Pcs,\- 1 o:~s t ,J S+<. ,~_.v....,.st-4 \... 1 tJ E:. s , ~ , 0:-' ~;::. 1 ,.)6 r.l o AR__~ c,;, , ~ef s"r- J1.ie5,;, N , -s\_s . .:C- i.J As ~ .,,J.,_ K ~ ~ B£ ~ 1-!i ~A.t- Fr es'r-- N' 1 b ,1\-- f¼J ts n Eu> Dto s c M..: - ~11.Jf '\-c s½,p ~ fWM}:28.'1, ~t-lc IS kA...\.-,-o,J \v,,e_AlD '6 RilS~A - ~1 tr-.1 A. F~~ F1iJA-U-..'-f i3C, o\\(, .50-3\-c ~ ~c C.. . .P. ~ SJ../'rti...,.... \} ·" 0 '- '- 3o D~~'"''-K.S AJJ t\J.CS5 t ~ -A 1s U.S : ll~ ~ A..i , , ,~GC:;~\- c F ~o "''- \....c_ A- 6ti...e QA£..!, AND 'R.At,,c,S i:3.lc:.M,.\lD ~ :PA-e._1<c.~ ~ .. <>~, e._. W HeA.J WE:: c;,· c'-:-- 't--c, . ~ C.. • t', .J IJ:;e_ ~ E...eL.. ""-.o 1-..b ~ ~ E:..c.C r<.c ,fr __ t+t cl-ES (Continuation sheets may be used) ~ A.Nb e.. r\.M c s AN p.. 1 >-~ .__ c . ~ .-1 ~ ~. ""-E._ ,::, A-5 A3o<-&-- 6 3cc, 1'e.s • ,J \r-H-t e..s; - ~~ M oe..."4 1 N 6 . ~ I.( ✓ 1 e..¼c. 6F 5 c ,v-£e',J£: ~ 1 "1 !'=, -ll ~ ~ l 5 bcrA_, L.) £ <11.::ec:_ Pt-55'•"'~(.!) C\--o WA-1...~ -A ~a'--Bt:.~ u:\1\-tfrN ~ ~e.c P~ 1 MC:.ke cF ~ o.P. G"ce) , ,., ~ - _ .... . ... ,r •• Name Assignment during u.o. (check all that apply) Emergency Operations Center Field Command Post Field Task Force Fixed Post Security _~ __ , __ Patrol in Geo.graphic Division :;z: Other · Geographic Area of assignment Command Post# Sector# Date/Watch/Time ~9 /4-~k/fl.- ( if necessary or specific to this to'pic) ATTAClDDD1'1' A Topic of Discussion: --5&.~,.,,..,,a ~;?Zs/4~~ /4-r- cWE~~ (ie Field Jail, · Squad Tactics, Command Post Operations, etc) CO'MMENTS: (Continuation sheets may be used) -- . , . PAGE NO . I TYPE OF REPORT DR NO . ITEM QUAN. NO . ARTICLE S ER I AL NO . BRAND MO DE L NO. M I S C . DESCRIPTION (EG.COLOR , SIZE, INSCRIPTIONS, CAL I BER , REVOLVER,ETC) DOLLAR VALUE ~,t-) ~ /~ .4-;;-4-4~~ .d-300 /2/"A!:.S A-~~~cC::.. · _4~ /c",,dE,d . ~ /A/i!' ~Uo/ /~-::s;:,- ,,<',4 -f°~C~ ?)C° ~ . /l.e~//~ 47 A-~A~,R Cc._A-.i~_e . -~~~ ~ ~tr/A//;,'U? ~ d/Y/~~c.. ~~~/;,,c/ZA~,J /k~ ~~ ~ . ~~/~ ~e.-<:.-1~0 ~ ~"" ~...<-/. ~~?l-<--'~~ ,4.s-S/~EZ} , ~ 7#~ ''_g /r ~7c~ t:..,/~e- ~~ ;:g- /-4";?- ~;,;?,?~ .A:ts-;::r-A-;;--~~ ~ ~A::.,~;7~ J,uEd ~ ~,£//~~ ~~ ~~~4 -5""0~~ ~ /4~~xv J&~Ad ..L.eA&~. 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Q. .. . ,.._ June 29, 1992 8.1.2 INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE TO: Commanding Officer, Operati9ns-Headquarters Bureau FROM: Commanding Officer, Air Support Division SUBJECT: AFTER-ACTION REPORT FOR THE APRIL/MAY 1992 RIOTS Attached find the Air Support Division (ASD) After-Action Report · for the April/May 1992 Riots. That document includes the division's command critique and consideration of other areas and duties that were specialized, unique and significant to ASD. If you have any questions, please contact me or Officer Charles Perriguey at extension 52011. ~ OODS, Captain Commanding Officer Air Support Division APPROVED: BAYAN LEWIS, Commander Commanding Officer Uniformed Services Group / . ' . . A IR S U P P O R T D I V I S I O N AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR THE APRIL/MAY 1992 RIOTS JUNE 29, 1992 l, • Air Support Division (ASD) began initial planning for possible redeployment incidental to civil unrest associated with the "Rodney King Trial" (of four Los Angeles Police Department Officers) on April 10, 1992 (see Addendum A). Beginning with the early evening of April 29, 1992 and continuing through May 10, 1992, awareness of specific task organization requirements at division and Department levels remained the principle key to ASD force structure and incident response. This is to forward information of those structures and responses in a collective analysis, provide an assessment of division effectiveness and suggest recommendations for changes in procedures and logistics (personnel and equipment). I. SPECIAL CONSIDERATION AREAS A. Strategy ASD is normally organized into four entities: Command/Administration, Air Support To Regular Operations (ASTRO), Special Flights Section (SFS) and Support Section. Those entities performed normal duties during the April 29 A.M. and Day Watches. The P.M~ Watch began .its early shift at 1600 hours without change to scheduled .activities. NOTE: As referenced in Addendum A, an airborne video aircraft was configured and on stand~by at ASD during April 29, 1992. Before April 30 A.M. Watch personnel reported for duty, it became evident additional air crew would be required. The P.M. Watch Commander called in ASD personnel to constitute additional flights. The April 30 Day Watch was restructured into the A Watch, adding Support and some SFS _ personnel; the ASD Assistant to the Commanding Officer assumed command of the division during the A· Watch. The B Watch consisted of P.M. Watch, A. M. Watch and the balance of the SFS personnel; the division Commanding Officer was on duty during the B Watch. The division Maintenance Coordinator continued his duties on the A Watch; -he was relieved by a properly trained and rated maintenance test pilot during the B Watch. Except as noted below, the remainder of ASD non-ASTRO aircrew were ·assigned regular duties within either the A or B Watches; training and special flights (investigative surveillances) were discontinued for the duration of the u.o. ~n compliance with_ Department policy, an air liaison officer was deployed to the Field Command Post. Although not a supervisor, the officer assigned was uniquely and particularly qualified for the assignment. He has received formal military and civilian training in such activities, had military combat experience in Forward Air Controller and Air Liaison Officer billets at the battalion and regimental - 1 - levels, had management experience in Direct Air Support Coordination and Tactical Operations Centers (both fixed and mobile), and had previously served in Department command post - operations. Unfortunately, those talents went wasted; the Air Liaison Officer was not included in Department response planning efforts. The first officer assigned by ASD to the EOC was advised he was not needed! An ASD supervisor . subsequently dispatched to the EOC was advised he could not attend regular EOC morning briefings! Only after intervention by the Commanding Officer di.d the situation change to permit an ASD supervisor's attendance at those briefings. Most significant and timely intelligence information was not directed to ASD. The Department Commander's early definitions of the Department's response to the civil unrest were not received at ASD. It should be noted that many officers assigned to the Field Command Post also had not been made aware of those definitions. Regular 3 early/3 late ASTRO deployment was , supplemented by one additional aircraft both early and late and the standby airborne video aircraft for a total of 9 scheduled aircrew teams during each watch. The Department Commander and Incident Commander were advised an aircraft would always be available for staff and command officer airborne U.O. and response evaluation activities. Except for a 1 two hour airborne reconnaissance conducted by the Chief of Police, no staff or command officer went aloft during the U.O; no sector commanders; no area commanders; no special unit commanders. Supervisory and relief personnel· were available to constitute additional flights (aircraft permitting) should the need arise. ASD resumed a 3 and 3 schedule on May 8, 1992. The above deployment strategy continued through the U.O. Multiple, independent intelligence reports concerning a conspiracy to shoot down a Department helicopter, during take off or landing at the Jay Stephen Hooper Me~orial Heliport, was analyzed and the potential to consummate such an act was determined adequate to relocate all Department flight operations to . the Van Nuys Airport during the early morning hours of April 30; 1992. The division continued uninterrupted operations at the Van Nuys City Hangar until its displacement back to the Hooper Heliport during the May 1, 1992 A Watch. National Guard personnel provided 24-hour a day security until May 7, when they were replaced by non-ASD LAPD personnel. A helicopter landing zone (LZ) was located inside the perimeter of the Field Command Post on the RTD facility at 54th Street on Van Ness Avenue. An RTD Police supervisor participated with representatives of the Command Post - 2 - Commander and ASD during the location, set-up and operation of the LZ. A helicopter fuel truck was available to redeploy to the CP LZ should such support become necessary. An LAPD ROVER radio was issued to the RTD police and RTD police ··officers effected on-site control of all subsequent helicopter operations at the LZ. Continuous on-site presence of RTD police officers allowed a controlled, fluid existence to the LZ; when no helicopters were operating on, at or near the LZ, ground vehicles had complete freedom to relocate through the LZ. This flexibility was especially critical during the time LAFD assets were co-located at . the Field Command Post. RTD Police cooperation was exemplary. U.S. Border Patrol, San Diego Office, helicopters operated from the Jay Stephen Hooper Memorial Heliport from May 1 through May 6, 1992. National Guard and other federal, state and local law enforcement agency aircraft were staged at that facility from time to time during the u.o. No other significant strategic issues involved Air Support Division. B. Tactics For the purpose of this report, ASD tactics wfll include the deployment of aircrew and the flight disciplines exercised by those air crew. The discussion will be distributed by aircrew assignment. 1. Airborne Video The airborne video aircraft was launched during the early afternoon of April 30, to verify reception quality at the Emergency Operations Center and Field Command Post. Logistical problems associated with the airborne video system are addressed elsewhere in this report. The airborne video aircraft and crew remained available during the u.o. Except for overflights of the parade through Korea Town on May 1, the airborne video system was underutilized. The airborne video provided by local commercial television stations appeared to satisfy Department and Field Commanders; tactical planning directly related to riot management did not include consideration of Department airborne video information or capabilities. The Department's airborne video system includ~s a hand-held camera operated by Department observers sitting exposed at the right side of the cabin. The relatively ---~ low-quality of lens obligates the crew to operate at 500 feet above the ground or less. To provide usable information to ground-based viewers, the pilot must continuously maintain visual contact with people and - 3 - l - / f ,' I ! l••• T , • ~. ,/· i - - - objects on the ground in such a manner that criminal activity is quickly and clearly perceived. That altitude and exp·osure subjects the airborne video crew to an unacceptably high level of risk - small arms fire from ground-based snippers could easily incapacitate the crew at best and could- result in the catastrophic loss of crew, aircraft and people and property on the ground at worst. 2. ASTRO Communications is addressed elsewhere in this report. Some events immediately associated with Florence and Normandie were observed by an ASTRO crew (see Addendum B) . Air Support To Regular Operations became "air support to unusual occurrence operations" for the life of the U.O. Traditional ASTRO deployment was modified to field all helicopters in the metropolitan Los Angeles area except for specific requests in the San Fernando Valley. This task organization of ASTRO provided the ability to respond to calls for service from the Department Commander, the Incident Commander, the Septor Commanders the EOC and CP Operations Officers, field unit commanders and individual officers. Of all the just-mentioned entities, only the individual field officer made adequate use of the deployed aviation assets. ASTRO aircrew responded to a large volume of officer requests (See Addendum C). Most were quickly resolved. Aircrew-observed activities, however, went mostly unresolved. The exceptional observation capabilities existent in Department aircraft, combined with speed and complete ~utonomy, produced innumerable situations wherein Department aircrew observed multiple in-progress felonies and no officers were available to effect arrests or restore the peace. The volume of these occurrences resulted in most not being recorded on ASTRO activities , logs. '--- ASTRO pilots maneuvered Department aircraft slightly above traditional patrol altitudes (i.e., approximately 600 feet AGL), at a slightly higher speed (i.e., an increase of 10 knots Indicated Airspeed) and otherwise operated in traditional manners (e.g., left-hand orbits, changing locations to optimize viewing angles to Department observers, etc.). Department aircrew remained keenly aware of intelligence suggesting the potential for increased risk from ground-based small arms fire. It is unknown if these tactics contributed to Department aircrew and .aircraft surviving the riots without damage from gunfire, but an inference exists which suggests - 4 - other alternate tactics would not have provided any greater margin of safety. During the first two days of the u.o., local media aircraft operators congested the airspace over metropolitan Los Angeles. With minor exception, involved media pilots ·cooperated with requests from Department aircrew to _ enable LAPD aircraft direct access to any location. The problems experienced at the Sepulveda Flood Control Basin coincidental to the February floods and subsequent public service/media pilots meetings to define inter-agency operating guidelines appeared to help reduce media aircraft interference during the u.o . . Other issues regarding crew safety are addressed elsewhere in this report. c. Personnel \ As mentioned above, ASD personnel were deployed on A and B Watches beginning April 30·, 1992. Th~ir deployment included the traditional 12-hour tour of duty with a 12-hour break before the next assignment. The nature of that assignment system, combined with flight scheduling necessary to support Department operations, resulted in unacceptabiy high crew fatigue. Scheduling changes were made in an effort to reduce the risks involved in flights by fatigued personnel, but the situation was not completely manageable within Department ,/policies. Aircrew physiology demands a scheduling standard 1 different than what is necessary for Department field ·'' 1 operations. Effective · AsTRO and aviation support of u.o; ·-r ~- ~, · / operations· can be realized with ASD personnel on an 8-hour, / h ,,. _,,.. r r .:::- ,;,!(. -''~-✓ -f:i : r.1 1 : ABC Watch schedule. The benefit from an ABC Watch schedule 1 _,, ;;r1C·• 1 ·• / is reduced fatigue, which directly equates to a safer flight u~ D '. environment -and increased productivity. Most Department personnel assigned to the Field Command Post were ignorant of the radio systems available in the trailers and the .protocols associated with their employment. Call signs and frequency assignments were not clearly understood and no immediate action was witnessed to correct those deficiencies. It was apparent most Department personnel at the CP were not properly trained for Command Post operations. D. Logistics 1. Field Command Post Because other technicians proved unable to acquire and maintain the airborne video signal, a Department of General Services, Communications Services Division, Radio Repair Technician normally assigned to service City avionics was deployed to the video signal receiving van - 5 - ' .. ' ,_,,,-' i {, ,-:J ) .. • at the Field Command Post. The inability of the van receiving antenna system to automatically acquire and lock onto the airborne video signal necess~tates devoting one person to ensure the van's receiving antenna -is properly oriented. The described radio technicians uniquely possess expertise in all the involved technologies. Cabling and other equipment available at the field Command Post did not provide an airborne video feed to the Incident ·commander's trailer. This necessitated the Incident Commander relocating to the operations trailer each time he desired to witness the airborne video information. The video signal receiving van was not equipped to communicate on all frequencies available to Department helicopters, severely limiting communications between the two. Both situations were completely frustrating and unacceptable; they persisted unabated through the u.o. The physical nature of the Department's mobile fleet (CP trailers) is not compatible with modern U.O. management requirements. Ingress/egress limitations, narrow internal passageways and inadequate floor space combine to degrade user effectiveness. Stores, ipcluding maps and writing equipment, were not readily available; the aviation frequency radio was missing during the u.o. A work station for the ASD liaison officer does not exist - that person is at the mercy of other trailer residents to provide work space, equipment and telephone. Existing helicopter landing zone (LZ) portable lighting equipment is nearly 20 years old and the majority of that equipment is unserviceable. 2. Airborne Video One aircraft was equipped with and dedicated to the airborne video mission during the u.o. Airborne video equipment, including microwave broadcast, dates to before the 1984 Olympics. The Department of General Services, Radio Repair Technicians have modified i the equipment in an attempt to improve broadcast signal < . 1 quality. The modifications however, have not included \ component modernization. The auto-track antenna system i has been disabled in favor of the more "user friendly" ' omni antenna. The cumbersome camera mount has been abandoned, obligating the camera operator to physically hold the camera and associated cabling during all broadcast operations. The Department's airborne video system is not capable of providing information for suspect identification. - 6 - However, the self-contained video system resident on the Department's GRATS helicopter is capable of providing extremely accurate and useful information related to suspect identification. The quality of information produced by the latter system is arguably adequate for conviction. Unfortunately, the· GRATS helicopter system does not include microwave broadcast capability. Acquisition of such a capability has been denied in the budget process. 3. ASTRO Logistical Support of ASTRO aircraft was realized via previously established systems. The increased tempo of flight operations was accompanied by deployment increases of Department of General Services (DGS) Helicopter Mechanics and Radio Repair Technicians. DGS management, supervision and line personnel were anxious to perform · all tasks necessary to ensure continuous police department flight operations. The commitment of involved entities and individuals was exemplary. ASTRO personnel employed Department-issued and personally acquired vests in an attempt at protection from small arms fire. Improved personal protection ,(e.g., Kevlar panels, etc.) would increase crew survivability. 4. Special Operations The Department has developed airborne special operations tactics which have been emulated by military and law enforcement organizations throughout the world. Special equipment and procedures developed during the several years of this .development phase have proven effective. Unfortunately, the only aircraft in inventory to perform real operations is a military surplus UH-1B helicopter which is extremely difficult to logistically support. Most parts are not readily available; some are not available. The aircraft embodies 35 year old technology and is not properly configured to provide the margin of safety considered necessary to such high-risk operations (e.g., single engine instead of twin engine, etc.). This aircraft was on standby during the u.o., it was ·not requested. E. Communications 1. Airborne Video The airborne video signal receiving van must be adequately equipped to communicate with the airborne video crew. Coordination of the airborne video system includes technical information and other non-law enforcement voice traffic critical to continuous useful - 7 - .. • .s .1 .· i .,..,..J.,,a~ ... .... - .. _. · video information to the Department and Incident Commanders. The van's present two-way voice communications equipment does not provide necessary capabilities. · 2. ASTRO The EOC and CP were effectively "out of the loop" vis-a-vis Department aircrew. ASTRO crew unsuccessful°ly attempted regular radio communication with both. EOC and CP-directed ASTRO activities were minimal. CP personnel did not always monitor channels previously assigned as air/ground liaison. During the May 4 displacement of the Field Command Post from its 54th and Van Ness location to the Coliseum, CP communications with (and thereby control of) ASTRO aircraft was lost. This situation was not corrected for several hours. ASTRO personnel conducted most operations on regular patrol division dispatch frequencies. Officers and vehicles form outside divisions often were not in direct communications with ASTRO personnel. Ground officer safety was in jeopardy each time an indiv~dual officer was not properly equipped to communicate with an ASTRO crew. Had all officers been properly equipped, available ECCCS channels would have been inadequate. The volume of voice message traffic was intense. II. RECOMMENDATIONS A. Strategy 1. Incorporate specific training of Department staff and command officers to impart an appreciation for the need to properly integrate airborne . law enforcement assets into u.o. planning and management. 2. Add sufficient additional text to the LAPD Tactical Manual to reinforce the need for early and continuous planning and management considerations to the unique capability of the Department's airborne law enforcement program. 3. Assign ASD personnel as students at future Command Post Cadre Schools. 4. Define intelligence and other u.o. generated information routing to include ASD. B. Tactics 1. Include in CPX training a requirement for staff and - 8 - . : ... .. ,;.·.: ·~. -... command officers to go aloft in Department aircraft and exercise line command from the airborne platform. 2. Create Air/Ground Teams. Specifically, assign a supervisor and an appropriate number of officers to each of several teams devoted to interacting with each available ASTRO crew. Such teams would respond to criminal activity witnessed by the aircrew in such a manner to effect control and arrest the maximum number of suspects. Such operations would optimize Department assets and ensure maximum safety to deployed officers. c. Personnel 1. Delegate to the Commanding Officer, Air Support Division, sufficient authority to redeploy assigned personnel to eight hour tours (A, Band C Watches). Such redeployment would not degrade the division's ability to support Department field operations. D. Logistics 1. Reconfigure the van intended to receive Department airborne video information to accomplish the following: \ a. Automatic (hands-off) tracking of the helicopter; b. Full-spectrum two-way voice communications; and c. Video/audio reception in the Incident Commander's trailer. 2. Acquire air-mobile CP modules. 3~ Install a fixed-post position in the CP fleet for the air liaison officer (situated within view of the operations officer and his staff). 4. Acquire portable electroluminescent helicopter LZ marking systems. 5. Acquire a dedicated microwave broadcast system for the Department's GRATS helicopter. 6. Acquire improved personal and aircraft protection from small-arms fire. 7. Acquire a twin-engine medium lift helicopter similar to those employed by LAFD and DGS (i.e., Fire 1 and 2, N214WP) specifically configured for LAPD Special Operations. 8. Retrofit the Department aircraft fleet with dual C-5OOO Flexcomm systems. - 9 - ., ' . ,.,. � ' , 9. Acquire and install in field supervisors.' automobiles television monitors capable of receiving Department airborne video signals. · - 10 - WOODS. ROBERTO .• SERIAL NO. 10530 CAPTAIN II, COMMANDING OFFICER. AIR SUPPORT DIVISION. JOHNSON. KEITH D .• SERIAL _NO. 14221, LIEUTENANT I+6. STAM. CHARLES "CHIP." COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRICIAN. DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES. Sergeants Stan Roberts, Serial No. 13684 and Richard Ackerman, Serial No. 20943, interviewed Captain Woods and his staff coll~ctively on May 26, 1992, 0900 hours, concerning airborne video capabilities during the· first 24-hours of rioting on April 29/30, 1992. Captain Woods stated he had attended an Operation-Headquarters Bureau (OHB) staff meeting on April 10, 1992, where~n the agenda specifically addressed the response readiness of OHB resources should they be needed following the Rodney King trial. Commanding officers were directed by Chief Frankle to ensure preparedness of personnel and equipment and Captain Woods was responsible for the airborne video equipment. With some lead time, Captain Woods alerted his staff and Communications Electrician Chip Stam was set to the task- of testing existing but somewhat unreliable equipment. In conjunction with the TV Photo and Sound Unit from Training Division, a new configuration of equipment was devised to capture a quality picture at a command post for live video feed. This system was tested on April 26, 1992, in Central Area at Fiesta Broadway and proved effective. ,.. ,J ' ASD Interviews Page 2 On April 29, 1992, Captain Woods attended another OHB staff meeting where the topic focused on how officers should publicly conduct themselves following the King verdict. Field tactics were not discussed at this meeting. On the same date, ·Woods had _ an aircraft equipped with .video capability standing-by for use should it be necessary following the King verdicts. Note: Air-Support Division (ASD) does not automatically launch such an aircraft until requested by the field commander or Emergency Operations Center (EOC) because receiving equipment must be staged and on line before such a flight would be effective. Following the outbreak of rioting Woods and Johnson both confirmed that there was no direction from the field or EOC Commanders for air support missions. Air Support Division received no input from anybody other than to give Chief Gates a 2-hour flight over the area and conduct a brief flight with a Metro supervisor that was interrupted by a precautionary landing near the outset of the hostilities. Lieutenant Johnson attempted to make both the field commander and EOC aware that ASD resources including video were available but no requests were initiated. Air Support then simply continued its routine Astro missions. I -- · ASD Interviews Page 3 It was not until the afternoon of April 30, 1992, that in frustration Officer Perriguey was sent to the field command post (CP) as an Air Support Liaison and Stams working with Sergeant Mines in the EOC initiated for the first time an airborne video feed into the EOC. There is no evidence that either of these efforts were utilized or of any help to the field CP or the EOC. On April 30, 1992, the situation was still chaos and no air support role was ever defined for tactical app~ication. There continued to be a lack of information from the field or the EOC . • On May 2, 1992, at 0700, Frank Provenzano, Pb II+6 was sent to the EOC for liaison duty. Provenzano reported ttlat ASD liaison was not wanted in the EOC. At 1500 hours Lieutenant Dave Aikens confirmed this report and removed Provenzano from that detail. In an attempt to gain Department information of any kind concerning the Riot Sergeant Ken Kessner from ASD went to the EOC to attend the 0900 briefing. He was not allowed to attend. At 2100 hours that same day Captain Woods contacted OHB Lieutenant Bob Gale and voiced extreme displeasure that ASD was not even allowed to attend the EOC briefing. The next day and following the ASD representative was permitted to attend the EOC briefings. In the opinion of Woods and Johnson air support resources were wasted through disuse. Woods believes that the daily ASD mission to support field personnel results in a high level of . ...,,, ASD Interviews Page 4 understanding and use of air resources. Conversely, the lack of familiarity of air resource usage by staff and command officers generally results in an ineffective .use of an excellent tactical tool during major unusual occurrence _ and in particular this most recent riot. -As it presently stands, Woods believes the Department command staff needs tactical training in the use of ·- . .), i . . ' • Virgallito,12948 Air SupportDiv. 5-3-92 ~R=E=S=E~R~VE=-~O~F~F=I~C=E~R~S~T=AN=--~B~R=I~T~T~S=AN=-----=S=E~R~-~#_R..___-~0=1~5~5 AIR SUPPORT DIV. 1730 hr. flew over Florence/Normandie responding to Officer needs help call. Obs.2 blk/wht and 2 plain vehs at 71 and Normandie affecting an arrest. Other Police vehicles converging. Approx. 20 officers formed skirmish line to protect arresting ofcrs. 4 news air units at location. 1810 returned to 71/Normandie obs rescue of woman being beat by 12FB1. Approx. 1900 returned to Normandie/Florence. Newp Pilots were asking why "no police response" Air3 explained that there were too many people and not enough officers at present time to maintain control. And, all radio traffic was monitored at the command post. At this time Brittsan indicated that the air unit began to develop a possible mechanical problem and they had to make an emergency landing at Western and Slawson. NOTE. When asked if Reserve Officer Brittsan saw a man down in the intersection next to a double dump truck, he indicated that "only for a moment did he see something that resembled a person down next to a truck. However, on his next orbit, the person was gone. ,,. ... , Statements of Stan Brittsah, Reserve Officer ASD First arrived at Florence & Normandie as a result of a Officer Needs Help 415 Gr~up. As they arrived they observed two black and whites and two plain vehicles at 71 and Normandie. The Officers were out of the vehicles chasing susps into a yard. At the same time he observed approx. 5 more black and whites pulling up n/b on Normandie at 71st. The crowd was growing and they were moving on and throwing objects at the approx.a to 10 officers who had formed a simi-circle around the two black & whites at 71st. street. It appeared that the crowd was going to attempt to take the arrestees away from the officers. Traffic was backed up south bound on Normandie from Florence to about 65th. street and still moving through the intersection. Northbound traffic was I _ stopped at Florence. About this time (1740) he heard L-10 request all units to leave the location. After the Officers left, he pulled a few more orbits to ensure that all Officers were gone and he left. At Approx. 1810 he stated he returned to the location because of an Officer needs help call wa broadcasted. At 71 and Normandie he observed two officers rescuing a woman that had been taken from her car and beaten. The Officers unde~ adverse conditions(rocks and bottles) placed her in their car and fled. At Approx. 1900 he returned to Florence and Normandie to get an overview of the situation. He observed a large 415 group. He observed a 18 wheeler with a man lying on the side. As he - "· . . .,. , ... , .... ' ' . , -. ' . ~ -~ ~~ continued his orbet he once again looked towards -the truck. This time he did not see the victim lying next to the truck. In fact the truck was moving away. 1 -~ :IIIJI - • r /A • ·'- Virgallito, 12948 Air Support Div. 5-5-92 OFFICER TERESA MCINTOSH SER.# 24476P-II AIR SUPPORT DIV. Assigned pilot of Air-3 on 4-29-92. At 1715 she was patrolling South Bureau and observed everything quiet. 1730 responded to a help call at Florence/Normandie.{l min. response time). Observed officers chasing a susp.The susp was taken into custody at 71 and Normandie. A small crowd began to grow. They began to hassle officers making arrest. 1735 News Air Units begin to arrive in air space over Normandie and Florence. Officer McIntosh observes a large crowd begin to I surge towards the officers.{100/150) Approx. 25 officers were at the location. As She was preparing to request help· for the officers, L-10 broadcasted "all units · leave the area . "Officer McIntosh took this to mean that he wanted the air unit to also leave. {due to heavy news air unit traffic, and possibility of air unit inciting the crowd, Officer McIntosh left the location.) 1745 entered the area for the second time after hearing radio call "family being beaten". Assisted ground unit to secure th~ area. (used air unit p.a. system to talk to victims on ground.) Summoned assistance for family. 1755 responded to officer needs help call (Nee & Phillips) attempting to rescue a woman down. Hovered over scene and ---~ ..... . . . Officer McIntosh Interview Page 2 observed 12FB1 rescue unconscious woman while being pelted with rocks and bottles. Officer Nee injured, windows on police vehicle broken. 1830 heard news air units talking about people being beaten. Did not relay info because Officer in Air-3 heard police radio indicating same information. Did not want to be redundant. 1844/1850 responded to C/P to pick up R-10 and notified news air units that Air 3 would be back in the area. 1900 Returned to Normandie/Florence, orbited approx. 500 ft. ! . . above intersection. · Officer McIntosh did not any trucks in the intersection. (her observer stated that he momentarily observed a man lying next to a double dump truck. Upon the next orbit, the man was gone and the truck was moving.) . . At this time Officer McIntosh began having difficulty controlling her Air Unit. She made an emergency landing at Slawson and Vermont. (see air support log) - ( _, Virgallito, 12948 Air Support Div. 5-5-92 OFFICER TERESA MCINTOSH SER.# 24476P-II AIR SUPPORT DIV. Assigned pilot of Air-3 on 4-29-92. At 1715 she was patrolling South Bureau and observed everything quiet. 1730 responded to a help call at Florence/Normandie.(1 min. response time). Observed officers chasing a susp.The susp was taken into custody at 71 and Normandie. A small crowd began to grow. They began to hassle officers making arrest. 1735 News Air Units begin to arrive in air space over Normandie and Florence. Officer McIntosh observes a large crowd begin to I surge towards the officers.(100/150) Approx. 25 officers were at the location. As She was preparing to request help for the officers, L-10 broadcasted "all units leave the area."Officer McIntosh took this to mean that he wanted the air unit to also leave. (due to heavy news air unit traffic, and possibility of air unit inciting the crowd, Officer McIntosh left the location.) 1745 entered the area for the second time after hearing radio call "family being beaten". Assisted ground unit to secure the area. (used air unit p.a. system to talk to victims on ground.) Summoned assistance for family. 1755 responded to officer needs help call (Nee & Phillips) attempting to rescue a woman down. Hovered over scene and ... · 1 Officer McIntosh Interview Page 2 observed 12FB1 rescue unconscious woman while being pelted with rocks and bottles. Officer Nee injured, windows on police vehicle broken. 1830 heard news air units talking about people being beaten. Did not relay info because Officer in Air-3 heard police radio indicating same information. Did not want to be redundant. 1844/1850 responded to C/P to pick up R-10 and notified news air units that Air 3 would be back in the area. 1900 Returned to Normandie/Florence, orbited appr~x. 500 ft. above intersection. Officer McIntosh did not any trucks in the intersection. (her observer stated that he momentarily observed a man lying next to a double dump truck. Upon the next orbit, the man was gone and the truck was moving.) . . At this time Officer McIntosh began having difficulty controlling her Air Unit. She made an emergency landing at Slawson and Vermont. (see air support log) T .... A I June 29, 1992 8.1.2 INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE TO: Commanding Officer, Operations-Headquarters Bureau FROM: Commanding Officer, Air Support Division SUBJECT: AFTER-ACTION REPORT FOR THE APRIL/MAY 1992 RIOTS Attached find the Air Support Division _ (ASD) After-Action Report for the April/May 1992 Riots. That document includes the division's command critique and consideration ocf other areas and duties that were specialized, unique and significant to ASD. If you have any questions, please contact me or Officer Charl·es Perriguey at extension 52011. ~ OODS, Captain Commanding Officer Air Support Division APPROVED: BAYAN LEWIS, Commander Commanding Officer Uniformed . Services Group A IR S U P P O R T D I V I S I O N AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR THE APRIL/MAY 1992 RIOTS . • JUNE 29, 1992 Air Support Division (ASD) began initial planning for possible redeployment incidental to civil unrest associated with the "Rodney King Trial" (of four Los Angeles Police Department Officers) on April 10, 1992 (see Addendum A).· Beginning with the early evening of April 29, 1992 and continuing through May 10, 1992, awareness of specific task organization requirements at division and Department levels remained the principle key to ASD force structure and incident response. This is to forward information of those structures and responses in a collective analysis, provide an assessment of division effectiveness and suggest recommendations for changes in procedures and logistics (personnel and equipment). I. SPECIAL CONSIDERATION AREAS A. Strategy ASD is normally organized into four entities: Command/Administration, Air Support To Regular Operations (ASTRO), Special Flights Section (SFS) and Support S~ction. Those entities performed normal duties during the April 29 A.M. and Day Watches. The P.M. Watch began its early shift at 1600 hours without change to scheduled activities. NOTE: As referenced in Addendum A, an . airborne video aircraft was configured and on stand-hr at ASD during April 29, 1992. Before April 30 A.M. Watch personnel reported for duty, · it became evident additional air crew would be required. The P.M. Watch Commander called in ASD personnel to constitute additional flights. The April 30 Day Watch was restructured into the A Watch, adding Support and some SFS personnel; the ASD Assistant to the Commanding Officer assumed command of the division during the A Watch. The B Watch consisted of P.M. Watch, A. M. Watch and the balance of the SFS personnel; the division Commanding Officer was on duty during the B Watch. The division Maintenance Coordinator continued his duties on the A Watch; · he was relieved by a properly trained and rated maintenance test pilot during the B Watch. Except as noted below, the remainder of ASD non-ASTRO aircrew were assigned regular duties within either the A or B Watches; training and special flights (investigative surveillances) were discontinued for the duration of the u.o. In compliance with Department policy, an air liaison officer w~s deployed to the Field Command Post. Although not a supervisor, the officer assigned was uniquely and particularly qualified for the assignment. He has received formal military and civilian training in such activities, had military combat experience in Forward Air Controller and Air Liaison Officer billets at the battalion and regimental - 1 - levels, had management experience in Direct Air Support Coordination and Tactical Operations Centers (both fixed and mobile), and had previously served . in Department command post operations. Unfortunately, those talents went wasted; the Air Liaison Officer was not included in Department response planning efforts. The first officer assigned by ASD to the EOC was advised he was not needed! An ASD supervisor subsequently dispatched to the EOC was advised he could not attend regular EOC morning briefings! Only after intervention by the Commanding Officer did the situation change to permit an ASD supervisor's attendance at those briefings . . Most significant and timely intelligence information was not directed to ASD. The Department Commander's early definitions of the Department's response to the civil unrest were not received at ASD. It should be noted that many officers assigned to the Field Command Post also had not been. made aware of those definitions. Regular 3 early/3 late ASTRO deployment was supplemented by one additional aircraft both early and late and the standby airborne video aircraft for a total of 9 scheduled aircrew teams during each watch. The Department Commander and Incident Commander were advised an aircraft would always be available for staff and command officer airbdrne u.o. and response evaluation activities. Except for a two hour airborne reconnaissance conducted by the Chief of Police, no staff or command officer went aloft during the U.O; no sector commanders; no area commanders; no special unit commanders. Supervisory and relief personnel were available to constitute additional flights (aircraft permitting) should the need arise. ASD resumed a 3 and 3 schedule on May 8, 1992. The above deployment strategy continued through the U.O. Multiple, independent intelligence reports concerning a conspiracy to shoot down a Department helicopter, during take off or landing at the Jay Stephen Hooper Memorial Heliport, was analyzed and the potential to consummate such an act was determined adequate to relocate all Department flight operations to the Van Nuys Airport during the early morning hours of April 30, 1992. The division continued uninterrupted operations at the Van Nuys City Hangar until its displacement back to the Hooper Heliport during the May 1, 1992 A Watch. National Guard personnel provided 24-hour a day security until May 7, when they were replaced by non-ASD LAPD personnel. A helicopter landing zone (LZ) was located inside the perimeter of the Field Command Post on the RTD facility at 54th Street on Van Ness Avenue. An RTD Police supervisor participated with representatives of the Command Post - 2 - Commander and ASD during the location, set-up and operation · of the LZ. A helicopter fuel truck was available to redeploy to the CP LZ should such support become necessary. An LAPD ROVER radio was issued to the RTD police and RTD police officers effected on-site control of all subsequent helicopter operations at the LZ. Continuous on-site presence of RTD police officers allowed a controlled, fluid existence to the LZ; when no helicopters were operating on, at or near the LZ, ground vehicles had complete freedom to relocate through the LZ. This flexibility was especially critical during the time LAFD assets were co-located at the Field Command Post. RTD Police cooperation was exemplary. U.S. Border Patrol, San Diego Office, helicopters operated from the Jay Stephen Hooper Memorial Heliport from May 1 through May 6, 1992. National Guard and other federal, state and local law enforcement agency aircraft were staged at that facility from time to time during the U.O. No other significant strategic issues involyed Air Support Division. B. Tactics For the purpose of this report, ASD tactics will include the deployment of aircrew and the flight disciplines exercised by · those air crew. The discussion will be distributed by aircrew assignment. 1. Airborne Video The airborne video aircraft was launched during the early afternoon of April 30, to verify reception quality at the Emergency Operations Center and Field Command Post. Logistical problems associated with the airborne video system are addressed elsewhere in this report. The airborne video aircraft and crew remained available during the u.o. Except for overflights of the parade through Korea Town on May 1, the airborne video system was underutilized. The airborne video provided by local commercial television stations appeared to satisfy Department and Field Commanders; tactical planning directly related to riot management did not include consideration of Department airborne video information _or capabilities. The Department's airborne video system includes a hand-held camera operated by Department observers sitting exposed at the right side of the cabin. The relatively low-quality of lens obligates the crew to operate at 500 feet above the ground or less. To provide usable information to ground-based viewers, the pilot must continuously maintain visu· a1 con~act with people and - 3 - I objects on the ground in such a manner that criminal activity is quickly and clearly perceived. That altitude and exposure subjects the airborne video crew to an unacceptably high level of risk - small arms fire from ground-based snippers could easily incapacitate the crew at best and could result in the catastrophic loss of crew, aircraft and people and property on the ground at worst. 2. ASTRO Communications is addressed elsewhere in this report. Some events immediately associated with Florence and Normandie were observed by an ASTRO crew (see Addendum B). Air Support To Regular Operations became "air support to unusual occurrence operations" for the life of the u.o. Traditional ASTRO deployment was modified to fiel~ all helicopters in the metropolitan Los Angeles area except for specific requests in the San Fernando Valley. This task organization of ASTRO provided the ability to respond to calls for service from the Department Commander, the Incident Commander, the Sector Commanders the EOC and CP Operations Officers, fiel~ unit commanders and individual officers. Of all the just-mentioned entities, only the individual field officer made adequate use of the deployed aviation assets. ASTRO aircrew responded to a large volume of officer requests (See Addendum C). Most were quickly resolved. Aircrew-observed activities, however, went mostly unresolved. The exceptional observation capabilities existent in Department aircraft, combined with speed and complete autonomy, produced innumerable situations wherein Department aircrew observed multiple . in-progress felonies and no officers were available to effect arrests or restore the peace. The volume of these occurrences resulted · in most not being recorded on ASTRO activities logs. · ASTRO pilots maneuvered Department aircraft slightly above traditional patrol altitudes (i.e., approximately 600 feet AGL), at a slightly higher speed (i.e., an increase of 10 knots Indicated Airspeed) and otherwise operated in traditional manners (e~g., left-hand orbits, changing locations to optimize viewing angles to Department observers, etc.). Department aircrew remained keenly aware of intelligence suggesting the potential for increased risk from ground-based small arms fire~ It is unknown if these tactics contributed to Department aircrew and aircraft surviving the riots without damage from gunfire, but an inference exists which suggests - 4 - other alternate tactics would not have provided any greater margin of safety. During the first two days of the U.O., local media aircraft operators congested the airspace over metropolitan Los Angeles. With minor exception, involved media pilots cooperated with requests from Department aircrew ·to enable LAPD aircraft direct access to any location. The problems experienced at the Sepulveda Flood Control Basin coincidental to the February floods and subsequent public service/media pilots meetings to define inter-agency operating guidelines appeared to help reduce media aircraft interference during the u.o. Other issues regarding crew safety are addressed elsewhere in this report. C. Personnel As mentioned above, ASD personnel were dep1oyed on A and B Watches beginning April 30, 1992. Their deployment included the traditional • 12-hour tour of duty with a 12-hour break before the riext assignment. The nature of that assignment system, combined with flight scheduling necessary to support Department operations, resulted in unacceptably high crew fatigue. Scheduling changes were made in an 1 effort to reduce the risks involved in flights by fatigued personnel, but the situation was not completely manageable within Department policies. Aircrew physiology demands a scheduling standard different than what is necessary for Department field operations. Effective ASTRO and aviation support of u.o. operations can be realized with ASD personnel on an 8-hour, ABC Watch schedule. The benefit from an ABC Watch schedule is reduced fatigue, which directly equates to a safer flight environment and increased productivity. Most Department personnel assigned to the Field Command Post were ignorant of the radio systems . available in the trailers and _ the protocols associated with their employment. Call signs and frequency assignments were not clearly understood and no immediate action was witnessed to correct those d~ficiencies. It was apparent most Department personnel at the CP were not properly trained for Command Post operations. D. Logistics 1. Field .Command Post Because other technicians proved unable to acquire and maintain the airborne video signal, a Department of General Services, Communications Services Division, Radio Repair Technician normally assigned to service City avionics was deployed to the video signal receiving van - 5 - at the Field Command Post. The inability of the van receiving antenna system to automatically acquire and lock onto the airborne video signal necessitates devoting one person to ensure the van's receiving antenna is properly oriented. The described radio technicians uniquely possess expertise in all the involved technologies. Cabling and other equipment available at the field Command Post did not provide an airborne video feed to the Incident Commander's trailer. This necessitated the Incident Commander relocating to the operations trailer each time he desired to witness the airborne video information. The video signal receiving van was not equipped to communicate on all frequencies available to Department helicopters, severely limiting communications between the two. Both situations were completely frustrating ·and unacceptable; they persisted unabated through the u.o. ' The physical nature of the Department's mobile fleet (CP trailers) is not compatible with modern U.O. management requirements. Ingress/egress limitations, narrow internal passageways and inadequate floor space combine to degrade user effectiveness. Stores, including maps and writing equipment, were not readily a~ailable; the aviation frequency radio was missing during the u.o. A work station for the ASD liaison officer does not exist - that person is at the mercy of other trailer residents to provide work space, equipment and telephone. Existing helicopter landing zone (LZ) portable lighting equipment is nearly 20 years old and the majority of that equipment is unserviceable. 2. Airborne Video One aircraft was equipped with and dedicated to the airborne video mission during the U.O. Airborne video equipment, including microwave broadcast, dates to before the 1984 Olympics. The Department of General Services, Radio Repair Technicians have modified the equipment in an attempt to improve broadcast signal quality. The modifications however, have not included component modernization. The auto-track antenna system has been disabled in favor of the more "user friendly" omni antenna. The cumbersome camera mount has been abandoned, obligating the camera operator to physically hold the camera and associated cabling during all broadcast operations. The Department's airborne video system is not capable of providing information for suspect identification. - 6 - However, the self-contained video system resident on the Department's GRATS helicopter is capable of providing extremely accurate and useful information related to suspect identification. The quality of information produced by the latter system is arguably adequate for conviction. Unfortunately, the GRATS helicopter system does not include microwave broadcast capability. Acquisition of such a capability has been denied in the budget process. 3. ASTRO Logistical Support of ASTRO aircraft was realized via previously established systems. The increased tempo of flight operations was accompanied by deployment increases of Department of General Services (DGS) Helicopter Mechanics and Radio Repair Technicians. DGS management, supervision and line personnel were anxious to perform all tasks necessary to ensure continuous police department flight operations. The coltUl\itment of involved entities and individuals was exemplary. ASTRO personnel employed Department-issued and personally acquired vests in an attempt at protection from small arms fire. Improved personal protection (e.g., Kevlar panels, etc.) would increase crew survivability. 4. Special Operations The Department has developed airborne special operations tactics which have been emulated by military and law enforcement organizations throughout the world. Special equipment and procedures developed during the several years of this development phase have proven effective. Unfortunately, the only aircraft in inventory to perform real operations is a m _ ilitary surplus UH-lB helicopter which is extremely difficult to logistically support. Most parts are not readily available; some are not available. The aircraft embodies 35 year old technology and is not properly configured to provide the margin of safety considered necessary to such high-risk operations (e.g., single engine instead of twin engine, etc.). This aircraft was on standby during the u.o., it was not . requested. E. Communications 1. Airborne Video The airborne video signal receiving van must be adequately equipped to communicate with the airborne video crew. Coordination of the airborne video system includes technical information and other non-law enforcement voice traffic critical to continuous useful - 7 - video information to the Department and Incident Commanders. The van's present two-way voice communications equipment does not provide necessary capabilities. 2. ASTRO The EOC and CP were effectively "out of the loop" vis-a-vis Department aircrew. ASTRO crew unsuccessfully attempted regular radio communication with both. EOC and CP-directed ASTRO activities were minimal. · CP personnel did not always monitor channels previously assigned as air/ground liaison .. During ~he May 4 displacement of the Field Command Post from its 54th and Van Ness location to the Coliseum, CP communications with (and thereby control of) ASTRO aircraft was lost. This situation was not corrected for several hours. ' ASTRO personnel conducted most operations on regular patrol division dispatch frequencies. Officers and vehicles form outside divisions often were not in direct communications with ASTRO personnel. Ground officer safety was in jeopardy each time an individual officer was not properly equipped to communicate ~ith an ASTRO crew. Had all officers been properly equipped; available ECCCS channels would have been inadequate. The volume of voice message traffic was intense. II. RECOMMENDATIONS A. strategy 1. Incorporate specific training of Department staff and command officers to impart an appreciation for the need to properly integrate airborne ·1aw enforcement assets into u.o. planning and management. 2. Add. sufficient additional text to the LAPD Tactical Manual to reinforce the need for early and continuous planning and management .considerations to the unique capability of the Department's airborne law enforcement program. 3. Assign ASD personnel as students at future Command Post Cadre Schools. 4. Define intelligence and other u.o. generated information routing to include ASD. B. Tactics .1. Include in CPX training a requirement for staff and - 8 - , ... . command officers to go aloft in Department aircraft and exercise line command from the airborne platform. 2. Create Air/Ground Teams. Specifically, assign a supervisor and an appropriate number of officers to each of several teams devoted to interacting with each available ASTRO crew. Such teams would respond to criminal activity witnessed by the aircrew in such a manner to effect control and arrest the maximum number of suspects. Such operations would optimize Department assets and ensure maximum safety to deployed officers. c. Personnel 1. Delegate to the Commanding Officer, Air Support Division, sufficient authority to redeploy assigned personnel to eight hour tours (A, Band C Watches). _ Such redeployment would not degrade the division's ability to support Department field operations. D. Logistics 1. Reconfigure the van intended to receive Department airborne video information to accomplish the following: a. Automatic (hands-off) tracking on the helicopter; b. Full-spectrum two-way voice communications; and c. Video/audio rec·eption in the Incident Commander's trailer. 2. Acquire air-mobile CP modules. 3. Install a fixed-post position in the CP fleet for the air liaison officer (situated within view of the operations officer and his staff). 4. Acquire portable electroluminescent helicopter LZ marking systems. 5. Acquire a dedicated microwave broadcast system for the Department's GRATS helicopter. 6. Acquire improved personal and aircraft protection from small-arms fire. · 7. Acquire a twin-engine medium lift helicopter similar to those employed by LAFD and DGS (i.e., Fire 1 and 2, N214WP) specifically configured for LAPD Special Operations. 8. - Retrofit the Department aircraft fleet with dual C-5000 Flexcomm systems. - 9 - l. � .... ··• 9. Acquire and install in field supervisors' automobiles television monitors capable of receiving Department airborne video signals. - 10 - ... ., .. WOODS, ROBERTO., SERIAL NO. 10530 CAPTAIN II, COMMANDING OFFICER, AIR SUPPORT DIVISION. JOHNSON. KEITH D .• SERIAL NO. 14221. LIEUTENANT I+6. STAM. CHARLES "CHIP." COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRICIAN. DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES. Sergeants Stan Roberts, Serial No. 13684 and Richard Ackerman, Serial No. 20943, interviewed Captain Woods and his staff collectively on May 26, 1992, 0900 hours, concerning airborne video capabilities during the first 24-hours of rioting on April 29/30, 1992. Captain Woods stated he had attended an Operation-Headquarters· Bureau (OHB) staff meeting on April 10, 1992, where~n the agenda specifically addressed the response readiness of OHB resources should they be needed following the Rodney King Trial. Commanding officers were directeq by Chief Frankle to ensure preparedness of personnel and equipment and Captain Woods was responsible for the airborne video equipment. With some lead time, Captain Woods alerted his staff and Communications Electrician Chip Stam was set to the task of testing existing but somewhat unreliable equipment. In conjunction with the TV Photo and Sound Unit from Training Division, a new configuration of equipment was devised to capture a quality picture at a command post for live video feed. This ~ystem was tested on April 26, 1992, in Central Area at Fiesta Broadway and proved effective. ASD Interviews Page 2 On April 29, 1992, Captain Woods attended another OHB staff meeting where the topic focused on how officers should publicly conduct themselves following the King verdict. Field tactics were not discussed at this meeting. On the same date, Woods had an aircraft equipped with video capability standing-by for use should it be necessary following the King verdicts. Note: Air-Support Division (ASD) does not automatically launch such an aircraft until requested by the field commander or Emergency Operations Center (EOC) because receiving equipment must be staged and on- l line before such a flight would be effective. Following the outbreak of rioting Woods and Johnson both confirmed that there was no direction from the field or EOC Commanders for air support missions. Air Support Division received no input from anybody other than to give Chief Gates a . 2-hour flight over the area and conduct a brief flight with a Metro supervisor that was interrupted by a precautionary landing near the outset of the hostilities. Lieutenant Johnson attempted to make both the field commander and EOC aware that ASD resources including video were available but no requests were initiated. ~.ir Support then simply continued its routine Astro missions. ~ ASD Interviews Page 3 It was nqt until the afternoon of April 30, 1992, that in frustration Officer Perriguey was sent to the field command post (CP) as an Air Support Liaison and Stams working with Sergeant Mines in the EOC initiated for the first time an airborne .video feed into the EOC. There is no evidence that either of these efforts were utilized or of any help to the field CP or the EOC. on April 30, 1992, the situation was still chaos and no air support role was ever defined for tactical application. There continued to be a lack of· information from the field or the EOC. On May 2, 1992, at 0700, Frank Provenzano, Pb II+6 was sent to the EOC for liaison duty. Provenzano reported t~at ASD liaison · was not wanted in the EOC. At 1500 hours Lieutenant Dave Aikens confirmed this report and removed Provenzano from that detail. In an attempt to gain Department information of any kind concerning the Riot Sergeant Ken Kessner from ASD went to the EOC to attend the 0900 briefing. He was not allowed to ·attend. At 2100 hours that same day Captain Woods contacted OHB Lieutenan~ Bob Gale and voiced extreme displeasure that ASD was not even allowed to attend the EOC briefing. The ·next day and following the ASD representative was permitted to attend the EOC briefings. In the opinion of Woods and Johnson air support resources were wasted through disuse. Woods believes that the daily ASD mission to support field personnel results in a high level of . \ a • 4\ # ... ' • . ' ASD Interviews Page 4 understanding and use of air resources. Conversely, the lack of familiarity of air resource usage by staff and command officers generally results in an ineffective use of an excellent tactical tool during major unusual occurrence and in particular this most recent riot. As it presently stands, Woods believes the Department command staff needs tactical training in the use of I 1f f .,, .,, Virgallito,12948 Air SupportDiv. 5-3-92 RESERVE OFFICER STAN BRITTSAN SER.# R-0155 AIR SUPPORT DIV. 1730 hr. flew ·over Florence/Normandie responding to Officer needs help call. Obs.2 blk/wht and 2 plain vehs at 71 and Normandie affecting an arrest. Other Police vehicles converging. Approx. 20 officers formed skirmish line to protect arresting ofcrs. 4 news air units at location. 1810 returned to 71/Normandie obs rescue of woman being beat by ' 12FB1. Approx. 1900 returned to Normandie/Florence. Ne~s Pilots were asking why "no police response" Air3 explained that there were too many people and not enough officers at present time to maintain control. And, all radio traffic was monitored at the command post. At this time Brittsan indicated that the air unit began to develop a possible mechanical problem and they had to make an emergency landing at Western and Slawson . • NOTE. When asked if Reserve Officer Brittsan saw a man down in the intersection next to a double dump truck, he indicated that "only for a moment did he see something that resembled a person down next to a truck. However· , on his next orbit, the person was gone. Statements of Stan Brittsah, Reserve Officer ASD First arrived at Florence & - Normandie as a result of a Officer Needs Help 415 Gr~up. As they arrived they observed two black and whites and two plain vehicles at 71 and Normandie. The Officers were out of the vehicles chasing susps into a yard. At the same time he observed approx. 5 more black and whites pulling up n/~ on Normandie at 71st. The crowd was growing and they were moving on and throwing objects at the approx.a_ to 10 officers who had formed a simi-circle· around the two black & whites at 71st. street. It appeared that the crowd was going to attempt to- take the arrestees away from the officers. Traffic was backed up south bound on Normandie from Florence to about 65th. street and sti11 · moving through the intersection. Northbound traffic was l stopped at Florence. About this time (1740) he heard L-10 request all units to leave the location. After the Officers left, he pulled a few more orbits to ensure that all Officers were gone and he left. At Approx~ 1810 he stated he returned to the location because of an Officer needs help call wa broadcasted. At 71 and Normandie he observed two officers rescuing a woman that had been taken · from her car and beaten. The Officers unde~ adverse conditions(rocks and bottles) placed her in their car and fled. At ApP.rox. 1900 he returned to Florence and Normandie to get an overview of the situation. He observed a large 415 group. He observed a 18 wheeler with a man lying on the side. As he continued -his orbet he once again looked towards the truck. This time he did not see the victim lying next to the truck. In fact the truck was moving away. Virgallito, 12948 Air Support Div. 5-5-92 OFFICER TERESA MCINTOSH SER.# 24476P-II AIR SUPPORT DIV. Assigned pilot of Air-3 on 4-29-92. At 1715 she was patrolling South Bureau and observed everything quiet. 1730 responded to a help call at Florence/Normandie.(1 min. response time). Observed officers chasing a susp.The susp was taken into custody at 71 and Normandie. A small crowd began to grow. They began to hassle officers making arrest. ' 1735 News Air Units begin to arrive in air space over Normandie and Florence. Officer McIntosh observes a large 1 crowd begin to surge towards the officers.(100/150) Approx. 25 officers were at the location. As She was preparing to request help· for the officers, L-10 broadcasted "all units leave the area."Officer McIntosh took this to mean that he wanted the air unit to also leave. (due to heavy news air unit traffic, and possibility of air unit inciting the crowd, Officer McIntosh left the location.) 1745 entered the area for the second time after hearing radio call "family being beaten". Assisted ground unit to secure the area. (used air unit p.a. system to talk to. victims on ground.) Summoned assistance . for family. 1755 responded to officer needs help call (Nee & Phillips) attempting to rescue a woman down. Hovered over scene and Officer McIntosh Interview Page 2 observed 12FB1 rescue unconscious woman while being pelted with rocks and bottles. Officer Nee injured, windows on police vehicle broken. 1830 heard news air units talking about people being beaten. Did not relay info because Officer _in Air-3 heard police radio indicating same information. Did not want to be redundant. 1844/1850 responded to C/P to pick up R-10 and notified news air units that Air 3 would be back in the area. 1900 Returned to Normandie/Florence, orbited approx. 500 ft. I above intersection. - Officer McIntosh did not any trucks in the intersection. (her observer stated that he momentarily observed a man lying next to a double dump truck. Upon the next orbit, the man was gone and the truck was moving.). At this time Officer McIntosh began having difficulty controlling her Air Unit. She made an emergency landing at Slawson and Vermont. (see air support log) . ... , . ,..,, )o. \ •• Virgallito,12948 Air SupportDiv. 5-3-92 RESERVE OFFICER STAN BRITTSAN SER.# R-0155 AIR SUPPORT DIV. 1730 hr. flew ·over Florence/Normandie responding to Officer needs help call. Obs.2 blk/wht and 2 plain vehs at 71 and Normandie affecting an arrest. Other Police vehicles converging. Approx. 20 officers formed skirmish line to protect arresting ofcrs. 4 news air units at location. 1810 returned to 71/Normandie obs rescue of woman being beat by 12FB1. Approx. 1900 returned to Normandie/Florence. Ne~s Pilots were asking why "no police response" AirJ explained that there were too many people and not enough officers at present time to maintain control. And, all radio traffic was monitored at the command post. At this time Brittsan indicated that the air unit began to develop a possible mechanical problem and they had to make an emergency landing at Western and Slawson. NOTE. When asked if Reserve Officer Brittsan saw a man down in the intersection next to a double dump truck, he indicated that "only for a moment did he see something that resembled a person down next to a truck. However· , on his next orbit, the person was gone. ----------- Statements of Stan Brittsah, Reserve Officer ASD First arrived at Florence & - Normandie as a result of a Officer Needs Help 415 Gr~up. As they arrived they observed two black and whites and two plain vehicles at 71 and Normandie. The Officers were out of the vehicles chasing susps into a yard. At the same time he observed approx. 5 more black and whites pulling up n/b on Normandie at 71st. The crowd was growing and they were moving on and throwing objects at the approx.a to 10 officers who had formed a simi-circle· around the two black & whites at 71st. street. It appeared that the crowd was going to attempt to take the arrestees away from the officers. Traffic was backed up south bound on Normandie from Florence to about 65th. street and sti11· moving through the intersection. Northbound traffic was ~ stopped at Florence. About this time (1740) he heard L-10 request all units to leave the location. After the Officers left, he pulled a few more orbits to ensure that all Officers were gone and he left. At Approx~ 1810 he stated he returned to the location because of an Officer needs help call wa broadcasted. At 71 and Normandie he observed two officers rescuing a woman that had been taken -· from her car and beaten. The Officers unde~ adverse conditions{rocks and bottles) placed her in their car and fled. At Approx. 1900 he returned to Florence and Normandie to get an overview of the situation. He observed a large 415 group. He observed a 18 wheeler with a man lying on the side. As he continued his orbet he once again looked towards the truck. This time he did not see the victim lying next to the truck. In fact the truck was moving away . . • Virgallito, 12948 Air Support Div. 5-5-92 OFFICER TERESA MCINTOSH SER.# 24476P-II AIR SUPPORT DIV. Assigned pilot of Air-3 on 4-29-92. At 1715 she was patrolling South Bureau and observed everything quiet. 1730 responded to a help call at Florence/Normandie.(l min. response time). Observed officers chasing a susp.The susp was taken into custody at 71 and Normandie. A small crowd began to grow. They began to hassle officers making arrest. ' 1735 News Air Units begin to arrive in air space over Normandie and Florence. Officer McIntosh observes a large 1 crowd begin to surge towards the officers.(100/150) Approx. 25 officers were at the location. As She was preparing to request help· for the officers, L-10 broadcasted "all units leave the area."Officer McIntosh took this to mean that he wanted the air unit to also leave. (due to heavy news air unit traffic, and possibility o_ f air unit inciting the crowd, Officer McIntosh left the location.) 1745 entered the area for the second time after hearing radio call "family being beaten". Assisted ground unit to secure the area. (used air unit p.a. system to talk to. victims on ground.) Summoned assistance . for family. 1755 responded to officer needs help call (Nee & Phillips) attempting to rescue a woman down. Hovered over scene and , .. . Officer McIntosh Interview Page 2 observed 12FB1 rescue unconscious woman while being pelted with rocks and bottles. Officer Nee injured, windows on police vehicle broken. 1830 heard news air units talking about people being beaten. Did not relay info because Officer .in Air-3 heard police radio indicating same information. Did not want to be redundant. 1844/1850 responded to C/P to pick up R-10 and notified news air units that Air 3 would be back in the area. 1900 Returned to Normandie/Florence, orbited approx. 500 ft. t above intersection.· Officer McIntosh did not any trucks in the intersection. (her observer stated that he momentarily observed a man lying next to a double dump truck. Upon the next orbit, the man was gone and the truck was moving.). At this time Officer McIntosh began having difficulty controlling her Air Unit. She made an emergency landing .at Slawson and Vermont. (see air support log) ---~~ . . , A I R s u p p 0 R T D I : · .. ' 4.' I . PERSONNEL RECAJ: FOR (04/29/92) TO (05/1 ( I (F TOTAL AVERAGE I I ~IS DAYS FLISHT FLT TIME OF (J ttlE WAT~ "'8fl" FLCIIN THE ~R-DAY OBS CJ .- f!IIRCZINKO, 6 DAY A0J 9 41.1 4.57 11 lt PJ[)\£Nlf:WO, F DAY A03 7 23.5 l.36 0 s EiiARPE, R DAY A03 7 19.3 2. 76 5 C .. HARKINS, R PM A0J 8 21.8 2.73 8 1~ lit INTD9-f, T PM A03 6 18.4 3.07 2 1~ LAFFERTY, 6 DAY A08 8 28.6 3. 58 0 ' NAGY, J DAY A08 7 18.5 2.~ 0 e CAMPOS, 6 PM A08 10 36.0 3.60 e l FLICKI~R, J PM A08 7 14.0 2.00 1 1~ POPE, L PM Al8 9 18.5 2.16 2 1E ~, R PM A08 8 29.8 3. 73 e E BASFETT, R DAY All 6 14.8 2.47 3 1~ STCIJGH, W DAY All 9 26.6 2.96 1 1i ~RA, L DAY All 9 38.0 4.22 4 4' 9ERLICH, S DAY All 7 29.0 4.14 6 11 BAKER, R Pfll All 11 35.4 l.22 2 2J l'El.SOM, B PM A11 9 43.9 4.88 5 j JOES, B DAY A16 9 Jlt.8 3.87 2 lJ KIi.SORE, J DAY A16 7 13.7 1. 96 6 11 HMIELL, J DAY A18 7 20.1 2.87 1 1t ~ J DAY A18 0 0.0 8.01 0 Q AVILA, D PM A18 7 39.2 S.60 1 ~ - - - -- STEVENSON, M PM A18 8 22.1 2.76 12 le MARIE SI CH, J AM A70 10 28.3 2.83 '+ 3j tit SEE, S AM A71 9 33.1 3.68 5 2Q ORNELA.S, E AM A70 0 0.0 8.00 0 Q JUM<E, L AM A7& 6 15.0 2.58 1 c PUffi, 6 AM A78 7 15.4 2.20 e ~ REECE, E AM A71 6 17. 7 2. 95 2 6 AIKINS, D DAY A-CO 4 5.1 1.28 0 e J:tRRiaJEY, C DAY ADJ 7 20.1 2.87 3 12 KRIESER, D ~ A-W/C 2 2.6 1. 30 1 e 9D), R DAY A-W/C s 12.2 2.44 0 1 WOODS, R DAY co s 8.9 1. 78 1 11 PlJTIAI, I OOY CHFPT 3 12.3 4.11 0 1 ONYSH<O, J Aft F-SGT 1 2.0 2.08 1 e 1-EINTZM~, J DAY F-SST 3 5.7 1. 98 e 1 PRESTON, J J'I F-SST . 4 9.2 2.30 3 E THILGEN, T. PM F-SGT 4 8.9 2.23 2 6 CAREY, W MY f!RINT 6 9.9 1.65 1 E TUCKER, B MY MAINT 5 11. 6 2.32 0 Q ABBOTT, D DAY RLIEF 5 17.6 3.52 3 lE ~TORRE, R OOY RLIEF 10 2c:.B 2.2& 0 ~ BECK, p DAY ll.IEF 8 16.5 ,.16 2. 4 ~, B OOY RUEF 10 . 18.6 1.86 0 9 CASE, Ill OOY RUEF 7 29.4 4.20 4 ·27 PERKINS, 6 DAY RLIEF 0 0.0 0.00 0 Q PHILLIPPE, K DAY IUEF 0 0.0 8.80 0 e ,SU p .P. 0 R T D I V I s I 0 N PAGE 1 PERSONNEL RECAP. FOR (04/29/92} TO (05/10/92) ----- ---·- ----- --- ( ACTIVITIES ( ARREST <-REC VEH-> AVERAGE I I I I I I I • I # TOT FLT TIME OF (F {F (F TOT FEL MIS RAD OBS TOT REC BY • PER-DAY OBS OFC R/C STA ACT ARR ARR ARR ARR ARR YEH ASD CIT ·---- - 4.57 11 16 64 a 99 16 0 4 8 16 2 I 1 J.36 I 9 21 4 34 1 i I I 1 1 0 0 2.76 5 5 35 3 48 11 8 11 0 11 5 I 2 2. 73 e 14 14 13 41 J 8 2 I 4 I 0 e 3.07 2 14 14 B 38 B I 3 8 38 2 • --···- -· '--·--·-- -- - J. 58 0 2 19 14 35 3 I 6 I 6 1 0 e 2.64 0 6 17 7 30 5 8 2 8 5 1 e 0 J.60 e 1 98 1 1"8 18 1 19 8 19 11 2 e 2.00 1 13 32 2 48 12 0 12 0 13 3 I 0 ·- --- - ·-- -- --- - ·--- 2. 06 2 18 28 7 47 9 8 6 e 9 I e e 3.73 " 8 68 2 78 . 11 3 11 a ·- 13 ---· ·· ; _ _ 1 · - ' 2.47 3 13 1'2 8 28 12 I 3 2 12 3 0 1 2.96 1 17 47 9 74 16 1 15 I 28 3 e 0 - -- --·- ---- ---· -- . 4.22 4 -42 33 1 80 19 11 18 0 29 1 0 0 4.H 6 11 46 0 63 H 11 15 8 24 4 8 0 3.22 2 23 65 2 92 27 26 44 3 53 6 0 0 4.88 5 3 71 1 80 25 2 25 1 27 9 " 2 ----·--- .. ·----·-· 3.87 2 . 13 41 12 68 13 8 11 8 13 7 0 0 1. 96 6 11 13 2 32 4 5 4 4 9 2 8 0 --·-- - · - - . 2.87 1 16 27 6 50 8 I J I 8 5 0 I 1.01 I 0 I I 0 0 I 8 i • 0 I I ----·- --· 5.60 1 9 45 I 55 g 0 8 8 9 J 0 0 2. 76 12 12 35 0 59 1S s 12 4 21 - ..... --.. ---- 2 __ 8 ____ 1 2.83 4 33 2t 5 62 18 0 4 1 11 2 0 2 3.68 s 20 60 5 90 32 1 18 e 33 8 8 1 e.ee 0 0 0 0 e 8 I e 0 I a 0 0 2.51 1 2 21 4 27 8 I . 5 8 8 l 1 e - -- -- 2.21 8 2S 17 10 52 12 0 l 0 12 1 0 0 2. 9S 2 6 42 0 50 17 8 17 0 17 ________ .,. 7 ___ 0 0 1.28 0 0 0 s 5 I e I 0 8 " 0 e 2.87 J 12 44 1 61 7 8 s e 7 1 1 1 - ·--- --- ------ ------ - 1.30 l 0 2 1 4 0 0 a 8 8 e 0 0 2.44 0 1 7 7 15 1 I I 8 1 1 8 ____ . 0 ... ·- . - 1. 78 l 11 12 2 26 7 0 1 0 7 1 0 - e 4.10 0 1 22 8 31 10 0 11 I 11 1 - I _ __ --- 0 2.01 1 8 2 0 3 I I 0 I 8 a 0 e 1. 98 0 1 5 3 9 2 8 J 0 3 1 0 0 - - - --- -·--- --·- -- - 2. 38 3 6 11 2 22 J 8 2 8 3 I 0 0 2.23 2 6 12 s 2S 4 3 2 1 7 1 I 0 ~ - --· 1.65 1 6 19 4 31 12 I 6 8 12 2 0 0 2.32 - · .• 0 0 0 9 9 0 8 I I a 0 I 0 - ------ 3.52 3 16 21 2 42 li 0 4 2 14 4 1 1 2.28 0 5 0 7 12 0 0 I I I 0 8 0 2.16 2 4 24 3 33 8 a 7 0 8 1 0 0 1.86 0 9 15 15 39 8 0 4 0 8 2 0 0 it.21 4 27 23 4 58 11 0 4 0 11 ~ 0 a 0.01 0 0 I 0 0 0 a 8 8 I 0 I 0 .. ---·-- - -------- -- -- 0.N 0 0 0 e I 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 A I R s U P P 0 R T PERSONNEL RECA FOR (04/2'3/'32) TO (05/ ( I CF TOTAL AVERAGE I # ASSIS DAYS FLIGHT FLT TIME OF NAME WATDi f'fENT FLOIN TJIIE PER-DAY OBS " BEAN, R PM RLIEF 7 • 27.2 3.89 1 BRITTSAN, S ~ llIEF 6 27.6 4,60 4 CLAR~ L PM RUEF 8 26.9 3.36 1 DClfERTY, J PM IUEF 4 9.2 2.30 1 DUlt.ER, A PN RLIEF 7 27.8 3.97 3 som:LEZ, J All RLIEF 11 44,2 4.82 5 LOEFFLER, R PM RUEF 7 13.7 1. 96 0 2t RCEINSON, N PM !LIEF 4 13.6 l. 41 1 ~R, T PN RLIEF 1 4.5 4.58 0 WHITMN, F A-1 RLIEF 8 25.3 3.16 5 i LAWIN, R DAY ASA 7 14.6 2.09 0 PERCY, R DAY SAFTY 0 0.0 1.80 0 GIU:S, L DAY SFS 7 20.6 2. 94 3 6£.JIEZ, D DAV SFS 8 19.0 2.38 1 rOJEN, p DAY SFS 8 24.1 3.01 1 1: JAROSCAK, flt DAY SFS 8 24.4 3.85 0 tit NA~RA, P DAY SFS 7 23.8 3.48 2 BRANDT, J PIil SFS 7 21.3 3.14 1 COPPIN, K PN SFS 7 20.1 2.86 0 KINS, F PM SFS 9 2.1.3 3.13 2. 1. LIEN, M PM SFS 2 4.9 2.45 1 Uii, C DAY !:fOIC 0 0.0 1.10 0 ANDERSCJI, W OOY TN6 8 1a.e 2.25 0 KESSNER, K DAY TN6 1 1.6 1.60 0 KREMPELS, W DAY TNG 10 28.4 2.84 1 MC t<EO., E DAY TNG 9 23.1 2.57 0 1'£VEAUX, N DAY Ni 9 18.3 2.03 0 1, JEUSER, D DAY TNG 7 18.0 2.57 3 2: WORE, A DAY TNOIC 3 3.8 1.27 0 ' Ktt1TT, D PM VAC 7 21.4 3.16 1 1 ~ JOtWSON, K DAY W/C 4 7.2 1.ae 2 HPLE, K PM W/C 2 4.4 2.20 0 AVERAGE ~TRO RESiL TS 6.9 22.2 2. 96 2.3 11~ S -U. ~ p 0 R T D I ' V I s I 0 N PAGE 2 PERSONNEL RECAP. FOR (04/29/'32) TO < 0 5 / 1 0 / '32 ) ( ACTIVITIES ( ARREST <-REC VEH-> AVERAGE I I I I I t • I I I TUT FLT TIME (F Cf OF OF TOT Fa MIS RAD OBS TOT REC BY i PER-DAV OBS CFC R/C STA ACT ARR ARR ARR ARR ARR YEH ASD CIT 3.89 1 7 17 9 34 3 I 1 a 3 1 1 0 4.61 4 28 28 9 69 11 0 4 I 11 1 1 0 3.36 1 13 5a 9 73 7 1 6 0 9 2 0 0 -- .. . ·-- - . - . - 2.31 1 1 20 1 23 4 0 4 I It 1 0 0 3.97 3 2 5e 5 68 12 0 12 • 12 6 e 0 4.82 5 1 ~ 7 105 '+7 I 47 0 47 12 1 11 1. 96 0 26 1S 0 41 1 0 I a 1 I e . - e - J.40 1 7 18 1 27 13 I 11 I 13 1 0 1 4. 51 0 3 6 8 9 4 0 3 0 4 0 I - 0 ---•-- ·-- - 3.16 5 26 18 7 56 14 25 38 0 69 I 0 8 2.09 0 24 14 2 48 1 0 I I 1 - . __ I -- ' ----- __ 0 1.01 e 0 0 0 e 0 0 I 0 0 8 e 0 2. 94 3 6 21 a 38 3 0 2 0 3 2 __ I -- 0 - -- ------ --- 2.38 1 4 16 13 34 4 0 2 2 4 2 1 e 3. 01 1 15 17 15 48 7 I I l 7 . 4 1 0 ------- --- - . 3.05 0 1 58 13 72 23 0 22 e 23 6 i 0 3.48 2 1 36 4 43 16 0 14 2 16 3 1 0 - 3.84 1 2 39 5 47 18 0 16 0 18 5 1 0 2.86 0 0 11 6 17 0 I 0 a • 0 I e ------------- - 3.03 2 12 19 11 43 2 I 1 I 2 2 1 0 2.45 1 1 7 5 14 5 I 3 2 5 3 I e -- -- ---- .... . - 1.10 e e e 0 I I e e I 0 8 I e 2.25 0 2 11 6 18 e I I I t 0 I 0 - ----· ·- 1.61 e 0 I 1 1 I I a 8 0 I I 0 2.84 1 8 16 12 37 4 1 4 1 5 1 1 0 -- - - -·· ·- -- . - 2.57 I s 0 6 11 0 e 0 8 0 e e 0 2.03 0 12 22 5 39 5 3 4 0 8 0 I 0 ---·- -- - - . - 2.57 3 23 26 7 59 20 1 10 1 22 5 1 2 1.27 0 0 3 3 6 3 0 3 0 3 8 I 0 - - - --·-- .. - ·- 3.~ 1 17 18 2 38 1 2 e 1 3 1 0 e 1.BI 2 2 s 6 15 3 0 2 0 3 0 a 0 ---- - . -- 2.20 I i 13 I 13 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 2. 96 2.3 11. 7 30.3 4.5 ~-1 10. 7 2.1 9.1 i. 7 14. 2 2.8 I. 2 0.2 ----·- ---- .. ____ --· . - ·---- ·- - . - - ----- ------- ·-- - -~ ------ - ·------ -·-·- -- -- - ·-- . A I R S U P P O R T D PERSONNEL RECAP FOR (04/29/92) TO (05/1 ~TIVITIES I OF TOTAL I ~T I OB ASSIS DAYS FLIGHT TOT / HR I ,; / HR NAME WATDf NIENT FL~ TIME ftT FL~ OBS OBS FLOW MRCZINKO, 6 DAY A0J 9 41.1 99 2. 41 11 11.1 1.27 PROYENZ~, F DAY Al3 7 23.S 34 1. 45 I 0.8 0.N SHARPE, R MY A03 7 19.3 48 2.49 5 18. 4 8.2& HARKINS, R PM A83 8 21.8 41 1.88 I 0.e 1.01 1-t INTOSH, T PM Ae3 6 18. 4 38 2.07 2 5. 3 e. 11 LAFFERTY, 6 DAY A88 8 28.6 35 1.22 0 0.8 e.ee NlGY, J DAV A08 7 18.S 30 1. 62 • 0. 0 e. 01 at1POS, 6 PN A88 10 36.0 t 180 2. 78 I 0.1 I.le FLICK1Nf£R, J PM A08 7 14.8 48 J.43 1 2. 1 0.07 POPE, L PM AIB 9 18.5 47 2.~ 2 4.3 0.11 VAN4, R PM A08 8 29.8 78 2.62 I 8.8 0.0t BASSETT, R DAY A10 6 14.8 28 1.89 3 18.7 1.21 STWGH, W MY A10 9 26.6 74 2.78 ·1 1. 4 0.04 CAPRA, L DAY AU 9 38.0 ae 2.11 4 5.8 0.11 aERLIOi, S MY A11 7 29.0 63 2.17 6 9. 5 0.21 BAKER, R PM All 11 35.4 92 2.61 2 2.2 1.16 t£LSOH, B PM A11 9 43.9 80 1.82 5 6. 2 8. 11 JMS, B DAY A16 9 34.8 68 1. 95 2 2.9 8.16 KIL60RE, J DAY A16 7 13. 7 32 2.34 6 18.8 ,.~ HARIELL, J DAY A18 7 28.1 50 2. 49 1 2.1 e.es KHN, J DAY A18 0 0.0 0 0.11 I 8.1 1.01 AVILA, D PM A18 7 39.2 55 1. 40 l 1. 8 a.~ STEY9SlN, fl PM A18 8 22.1 59 2.67 12 28.3 0. 54 MARIES I CH, J AN A71 18 28.3 62 2.19 4 6.5 e.14 tit GEE, S AM A70 9 33. 1 90 2. 72 s 5. 6 0.15 ORNELAS, E AN A70 0 0.0 0 e.ee e 0.1 0.00 PEAKE, L AM A7i 6 15.1 27 1.80 1 3.7 8.07 PU»iY, 6 AM A70 7 15.4 52 l.38 I 0.1 e.ee REECE, E AM A70 6 17. 7 50 2.82 2 _ 4.e I. 11 AIKINS, D DAY A-CO 4 5.1 s 8. 98 I 0.0 LN PERRIGUEY, C DAY ADJ 7 20.1 60 2. 99 J S.I 0.15 KRIESER, D AM A-W/C 2 2.6 4 1.54 1 25.0 0.38 GOOD, R DAY A-W/C 5 12.2 15 1.23 e e.e 0.01 WOODS, R DAY co 5 8.9 26 2.92 1 3.8 0.11 PUTNAM, I DAY CHFPT 3 12.3 31 2.52 e e. 0 8.08 ONYSHKO, J AN F-SGT 1 2.e 3 1.~ l 33.3 0.50 HEINTZMll-l, J DAY F-SST 3 5.7 9 1. 58 e 0.0 0.01 PRESTtJ.l, J PN F-sGT 4 9.2 22 2.39 3 13.6 0.33 THILGEN, T PM F-SST 4 8. 9 25 2.81 2 8.1 0.22 CAREY, W DAY MAINT 6 9.9 30 3.03 1 3.3 0.10 TUCKER, B DAY MINT 5 11.6 9 0. 78 I 0.1 e. 00 ABBOTT, D DAY RLIEF s 17.6 42 2.39 3 7.1 0.17 ALATORRE, R DAY RUEF 10 22.8 12 0.53 • 0.0 0.08 BECK, P DAY RLIEF 8 16.5 33 2.00 2 6.1 0.12 mflAH, B DAY RUEF 11 18. 6 39 2.10 0 0.0 0.00 CASE, Pi DAY RUEF 7 29.4 58 1. 97 4 6.9 8.14 PERKINS, 6 DAY RLIEF 0 0.0 ·0 0.00 0 e. e 0. 08 PHILLIPPE, K DAY RLIEF 0 0.0 0 0.00 0 0.0 0. 00 S u· _ p· P· Q R T D I V I (""' \.J I 0 N PAGE 3 PERSONNEL RECAP. FOR ( 04/29/92) TO ( 05/ 10/92) - -- - - ·-· - ~IVITIES ) ARREST ) (---C#US WT Cf AREA-) <~RT TIii£-) I ACT i OBS RADIO OBS % I I • i 0 TOT / HR # % / HR TOT / HR / HR BY TOT Cf CF Cf Cf CR T ~T FL~ OBS OBS FLOWN ARR FLOlrM .FLD"-W ASD OUT OBS (FC RAD STA EW WI EW R 99 2. 41 11 11.1 1.27 16 0.10 0.19 68.8 40 4 9 26 1 0 0 0 0 34 1. 45 i 0.0 0.N 1 l.i0 0.80 0.0 18 a 7 9 2 0 0 0 0 4B 2. 49 5 li. 4 a. 26 11 0.57 0.01 18.2 19 1 2 14 1 0 0 0 0 41 1. 88 0 0.0 a. 00 4 0.es i.80 0.0 13 e 6 4 3 0 0 0 4 38 2.07 2 5.3 0. 11 38 0.16 0.01 0.0 12 1 3 3 5 0 1 0 0 .. --- ____ .... ____ - ~ 35 1.22 0 0.a I.N 6 0.21 0.80 33.3 11 0 1 1 9 0 0 0 2 30 1. 62 a 0. 0 0. 01 5 0.11 0.00 0.0 11 8 1 8 2 0 0 0 0 100 2. 78 0 0.0 LN 19 0.53 i.80 S.3 54 I I 53 0 0 0 0 I 48 3.43 1 2. 1 0.07 13 0.86 0.01 15.4 20 0 6 13 1 0 0 0 J -- --- .. - - -·. 47 2. 54 2 4.3 0.11 9 8.32 0.80 11.1 17 0 11 5 1 0 0 0 0 78 2.62 e 8.0 0.01 13 0.37 0.01 7.7 27 0 3 22 2 e - - 0 ... 0 _ 8 28 1. 89 3 11.7 8.20 12 8.20 0.14 25.0 18 3 8 7 0 0 0 0 4 74 2. 78 1 1. 4 0,04 20 0.:,6 0.01) 48.0 32 0 5 21 6 0 0 0 2 ----- - - - -- 89 2.11 4 5.0 0.11 29 0.47 0.00 31.0 35 0 18 16 0 0 2 0 5 63 2. 17 6 9. 5 0.21 24 0.52 0.28 75.0 26 1 6 19 0 0 0 0 I 92 2.61 2 2.2 l."6 . 53 1.24 0.08 15.1 33 1 6 26 0 0 0 0 I 80 1. 82 5 6.2 0.11 27 0.57 0.02 22,2 28 1 3 22 1 1. 2 0 0 ---·-----··--- 68 1. 95 2 2.9 0.06 13 0.29 0.00 61.5 44 1 9 28 6 1 0 0 I 32 2.34 6 18. 8 0.44 9 0.29 0.29 88.9 4 1 1 2 I 0 0 0 I ------ 50 2. 49 1 2.a 8.05 8 1.15 0.00 37.5 33 0 11 18 5 0 0 0 4 0 0.01 I 0.1 8.01 0 0.10 0.00 0.0 0 I e I I 0 0 0 I 55 1. 40 1 1. 8 1.03 9 1.20 0.80 0.0 19 1 2 16 0 0 0 0 0 59 2.67 12 20.3 0.54 20 0.54 0. 18 40.0 15 3 3 9 I 0 0 0 -"--- --- 62 2.19 4 6.5 0.14 11 0.14 8.04 9.1 25 2 16 5 2 0 0 0 8 90 2.72 5 5. 6 L 15 33 0.54 0.00 27.3 24 1 8 15 0 0 0 0 I 0 8. 00 0 0.0 a.00 0 0.~ 0.00 0.0 8 0 I 8 0 0 0 0 0 27 1.80 1 3. 7 0.07 8 0.33 0.01 25.0 15 I 0 13 2 1 0 0 0 52 3.38 0 0.0 0.08 12 8.19 8.N 16.7 22 " ll 7 2 1 0 0 I 50 2.82 2 4.0 L 11 17 0. 96 0.0& 0.0 21 1 4 16 I 0 0 0 . 0 _ 5 e. ss I 0.i 8.00 0 0.00 8.80 0.0 • I a 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 2. 99 3 5.0 0. 15 7 0.25 0.08 0.0 21 1 4 15 1 0 0 0 2 - -- ----- 4 1.54 1 25.0 8.38 0 0.10 0.10 0.0 1 1 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 1.23 " 0.0 0.01 1 0.00 0.08 0.0 4 I 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 26 2.92 1 3.8 0. 11 7 0.11 0.00 85.7 s 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 31 2.52 I 0. 0 0.01 10 0.81 0.01 0.0 5 I ' 1 3 1 0 0 8 _ 0 _ _ 3 l.~ 1 33.3 0.50 0 0.10 0.00 0.0 1 0 I 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 1. 58 0 a. e 0.08 3 0.53 0.01 0.0 3 8 1 0 2 0 0 0 ·- 0 ·- - --·- -- 22 2.39 3 13.6 0.33 3 0.22 0.00 0.0 15 1 5 8 0 0 0 0 0 25 2.81 2 8. 0 0.22 7 0. 22 0.11 14.3 7 • 4 3 I 0 0 0 8 - -- - --- - 30 3.03 l 3.3 0.10 12 0.61 0.80 50.0 12 1 2 9 0 0 2 0 0 9 · 0. 78 8 0~ 1 0.01 0 0.00 0.08 0.0 0 0 0 8 " 0 0 0 - 0 - ----- ---- - 't2 2.39 3 7.1 1.17 14 0.23 0.11 35.7 30 3 12 14 1 0 0 0 • 12 0.53 8 0. 0 0.08 0 0.00 0.00 0.0 0 0 0 e 8 0 0 0 0 33 2.00 2 6.1 1.12 8 8. 42 0.00 25.0 24 l 3 17 2 0 0 0 0 39 2.10 0 0. 0 0. 01 8 0.22 0.0i 0.0 21 0 7 12 2 0 0 0 0 58 1. 97 4 6.9 0.1't 11 0.14 0.00 0.0 29 I 10 17 1 0 0 0 4 a 0.08 0 0. 0 B.01 0 0.00 0.0B 0.0 0 8 0 8 j 0 0 0 0 - -------- 0 0.00 0 0.0 0. 00 0 0.e0 0.00 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 A I R s u p p 0 R T PERSONNEL RECA FDR < 04/ 29/'32) TO (05/'· - ACTIVITIES I IF TOTAL i ACT ASSIS MYS FLIGHT TOT / HR I j NAfllE WATOi NIENT FU»~ TIME ACT Fl~ OBS OBS BE~, R Pfl1 RLIEF 7 27.2 34 1.25 1 2. 9 0. BRITTSAN, 5 PM RLIEF 6 27.6 69 2.50 4 5.8 0.1 CLARK, L Pfl RLIEF 8 26.9 73 2. 71 l 1. 4 0. D[liERTY, J PM RLIEF 4 9.2 23 2. 50 1 4.3 i.1 DUtt.ER, A PM RLIEF 7 27.8 60 2.16 3 s. 8 e. 1 GONZALEZ, J PM RUEF 11 44.2 105 2. 38 5 4.8 0.1 LOEFFl..ER, R All RUEF 7 13.7 41 2. 99 I 0.e e. 0i ROBINSON, N PM RLIEF 4 13.6 27 1. 99 1 3.7 0. 0~ SP~R, T PM RUEF 1 4.5 9 2.80 8 0.0 0. 0t WHITMAN, F PM RLIEF 8 25.3 56 2.21 5 8.9 e. 2' -.. -·· --- LAWIN, . R DAY ~A 7 14.6 48 2. 74 ' 0.0 0."' PERCY, R DAY SrFTY 0 0.0 0 1.80 0 0.e 1.8' GILES, L DAY s.:s 7 20.6 3B 1.84 3 7.9 0.1~ SOMEZ, D DAY SFS 8 19.0 34 1. 79 1 2.9 e. e: HOUtEH, p OOY SFS B 24.1 48 1.99 1 2.1 0.~ JAROSr.AK, M DAY SFS 8 24.4 72 2. 95 0 0.0 e.~ MC NAMARA, P DAY SFS 7 23.8 43 1. 81 _ 2 4. 7 0.0t BRANDT, J PM SFS 7 21.3 47 2.21 1 2.1 0. 8! COPPIN, K PM SFS 7 28. 0 17 0.85 - · 0.8 0. 0i KINS, F PM SFS 9 27.3 43 1. 58 2 4.7 8. 0i LIEN, M PIii SFS 2 4.9 14 2.86 L . 7.1 0.a WONS, C DAY SFOIC 0 0.0 0 i. 00 0 0.8 i.N ~DERSON, W DAY TN6 8 18.0 18 1.00 I 0.0 0."' KESSNER, K DAY TNS 1 1.6 1 e. 62 a 0.0 8. ~ KREMPELS, W DAY TNG 10 28.4 37 1.30 1 - 2. 7 0.~ MCKEON , E DAY TNB 9 23.1 11 i. 48 0 0.0 e." NEV"'~X, ~ DAY TNG 9 18.3 39 2.13 0 0.0 e.0i REUSER, D DAY TN6 7 18.0 59 3. 28 3 5.1 0. li OLMORE, A ~y TNOIC 3 3.8 6 1.58 0_ 0. e 0.011 KNOTT, D ~ VAC 7 21.4 38 1. 78 1 2.6 ··: JOHNSON, K DAY W/C 4 7.2 15 2.08 2_ 13. 3 0. HALE, K PM W/C 2 4.4 13 2. 95 e 0.0 e. AVERAGE ASTRO RESULTS 7 22.2 49 2.03 2 4.1 0.1 , S ·u . P P D R T D I V I S I O N PERSONNEL RECAP. FOR <04/29/92) TO (05/10/92) ------ACTIVITIES;----> i ACT t OBS TOT / HR i % / HR ACT Fla.N OBS OBS FLOWN 34 69 13 23 60 105 41 27 ·3 56 40 0 3B 34 48 72 43 47 17 43 14 0 18 1 37 11 39 59 6 38 15 13 1.25 2.~ 2. 71 2.~ 2.16 2. 38 2. 99 1. 99 2.00 2.21 2.74 i.\10 1.84 1. 79 1. 99 2. S5 1. 81 2. 21 0.85 · 1. S8 2.86 e. 00 1. 00 B. 62 1.30 a. 48 2.13 3. 28 1.58 1. 78 2.08 2. 95 49 2. 03 1 4 1 3 5 0 1 0 5 0 0 3 1 1 0 2 1 8 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 1 2 0 2. 9 0.04 5. 8 0.14 1.4 0.04 4. 3 i.11 5.0 0.11 4.8 0.11 e.~ 0.01 3.7 0.07 0.0 0.08 8. 9 ,. 20 0. 0 0.01 0.0 1.10 7.9 0.15 2. 9 i. 65 2. 1 0. 04 0.0 e. 00 4. 7 0. 08 2.1 0. 05 0. 8 0. 08 4. 7 8. 07 7.1 0. 29 0.0 i. 10 0.0 0.01 0.0 i. 00 2. 7 0. 04 0.0 0. 00 8. 0 0.08 5.1 0. 17 0. 0 0.01 2.6 I. 05 13. 3 0. 28 0.0 I. 00 2 4.1 0.10 . .. ---uAflREST--} RADIO OBS j TOT / HR / HR BY ARR FLOWN FLO~ ASD 3 0.04 0.01 66.7 11 0.14 0.80 18.2 9 0. 22 0. 00 0. 0 4 8.43 0.00 0.0 12 0.43 0.00 25.0 47 1.16 0.30 17.0 1 0.00 0.00 0.0 13 0.81 0.80 15.4 4 0.67 0.00 50.0 69 1.19 0.00 0.0 1 0. 00 0. 08 0. 0 0 0.10 0.80 0.8 3 0.10 0.08 66.7 4 0.11 0.11 75.0 7 0. 00 0. 0, 14. 3 23 0.90 0.00 4.3 16 0.59 0.08 75.0 18 0.75 0.00 61.1 0 0.00 0.00 0.0 2 0.04 0.00 0.0 5 0.61 0.41 60.0 0 a.10 0.00 0.0 0 0.00 0.00 0.0 0 0,00 0.10 0.0 S 0.14 0.04 20.0 0 0.80 0.80 0.0 8 0.22 0.00 12.5 22 0.56 0.06 13.6 3 0. 79 0. 00 0. I 3 1. a0 e. es 66. 7 3 0.28 0.~ 0.0 1 0.23 0.80 0.0 14 0.36 0.0J 20.2 (---OU.S OUT (F AREA-) t I t I TOT (F (F CF Cf OUT OBS ff'C RAD STA _ . 11 38 44 11 21 ~ 19 1J 3 1 3 2 4 15 13 e a 32 8 I 10 1 2 18 2 1 47 0 12 6 l 2 8 e 1 2 19 1 17 _ 0 8 5 11 5 e a 26 3 19 0 27 1 0 0 1 8 a 0 a e 0 25 18 25 a 11 2 0 a 8 12 8 17 25 1 18 6 11 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 8 a a 5 13 2 12 9 11 0 23 0 17 a 21 0 S i 3 0 2 0 0 2 6 0 0 4 6 0 0 6 8 13 10 e 1 8 8 2 1 I 10 5 6 4 1 0 6 e 0 0 5 1 0 5 5 6 2 1 3 2 3 0 0 i 0 l 0 3 1 0 1 1 0 21 1 5 13 2 PAGE 4 <-ABORT Til'E-> 0 CR T EllJ WX EW R 0 2 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ·-·-·---- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ---- 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ----- -----· _ 0 0 0 0 0 0 __ 0 ___ 0 _ _ __ _ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 _ ------- _ _ _ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ---- ·--· --- _. 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 --·-----··--· 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- _ ·- - - -- 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 _ 0 _ - - - ·--- _ 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 0 --·------- ... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 .. -·-- _ -- 1 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 __ _ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 A I R s u p p 0 R T D UNIT Ri::CAP. FOR (04/29/92) TO ( 05/ l j AM WATCH TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL CALLS # # AIR FLIGHT ABORT ACTIV ASD SPEC . .?ftFETY p UNIT TIME TIME ITIES ONLY CALLS CALLS E A70 2. 5 0.0 8 0 0 0 A80 0. 121 0.0 0 0 0 0 --------------------------------------------------- SUBTOTAL .-, ~ C.a .._I 0.0 a 0 0 0 DAY WATCH TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL CALLS # # AIR FLIGHT ABORT ACTIV ASD SPEC SAFETY Pl UNIT TIME TIME ITIES ONLY CALLS CALLS E' A02 2. 3 0.0 5 0 0 0 A03 c:',.. -. ...Jb. ~ 0.0 139 1 7 25 A08 28.0 0.0 55 1 2 7 A10 41.7 3. 4 88 2 1 9 Al 1 60. 1 2.8 140 7 5 23 A18 46.2 0.0 121 3 7 28 A14 0. 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 A16 25.3 0.0 63 2 2 8 A30 10. 6 e,. 0 9 0 0 1 A40 15.8 0.0 25 0 1 10 ---------------------------------------------------· SUBTOTAL 286.3 6 -:, . ,_ 645 1 E, 25 111 PM WATCH - - --·-- -- TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL CALLS # # AIR FLIGHT ABORT ACTIV ASD SPEC SAFETY p UNIT TIME TIME ITIES ONLY CALLS CALLS E A02 13. 0 0.0 24 0 0 8 A03 76. 8 1.4 188 2 9 60 A08 57. 1 0.0 161 1 4 47 A10 20.4 1. 1 39 2 0 5 A11 61. 7 IZt.5 1't9 0 6 24 A18 71.5 · 1. 1 156 2 10 . 20 A14 10. 4 0.0 21 0 2 6 A16 19.9 .-, ,::, c:. ~ 38 0 0 5 ·A30 2. 1 e,. er 6 0 0 .-, Co A40 1.0 0.0 7 0 0 0 --------------------------------------------------- SUBTOTAL 333.9 6 .. • w 78'3 7 31 177 , GRANDTOTAL 622.7 12.5 1442 23 56 288 . S. U . P .p· 0 R T D I V I S I O N PAGE 1 UNIT RECAP. FOR (04/29/92) TO (05/10/92> . - _.., ----------- AM WATCH # # # # # # TOTAL CALLS SPEC SAFETY PERIM TIMES REC CIT # OUT ----- .... ------ -- - CALLS CALLS ETORS FAS VEH ARREST AREA -------- tZI 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 e, 0 0 0 0 0 0 --·--- - --- ----- - 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 . - --- -- ------ DAY WATCH ----------· ------- ----- ------- # # # # # # TOTAL CALLS SPEC SAFETY PERIM TIMES REC CIT --- - . - # ---- - ·- OUJ ____ CALLS CALLS ETORS FAS VEH ARREST AREA 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 .... .::, 7 25 11 65 8 0 38 45 - ·--- ---------- - . - 2 7 1 20 4 0 9 37 1 9 3 38 2 0 17 50 ---·--- - ---- -----·-- 5 23 9 45 E, 0 25 81 7 28 7 37 7 1 19 _ 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 2 29 8 0 24 45 -- --·- ---- ---- 0 1 0 2 0 0 7 0 1 10 0 2 0 0 0 0 .. -·· 25 111 33 241 35 1 139 309 - ------- - - ----- ------- - - -·--- ·----- - . PM WATCH # # # # # # TOTAL CALLS SPEC _ SAFETY PERIM TIMES REC CIT # OUT --- -·-- .... _ --- -- -· - CALLS CALLS ETORS FAS VEH ARREST AREA -·- - ----- -·-·- - ----· -- --- - - 0 8 0 8 2 0 6 21 9 6,21 14 41 14 2 83 64 4 47 10 41 5 0 53 83 0 5 2 7 0 0 2 10 -- ----- 6 24 7 40 16 0 66 72 10 20 2 43 12 3 41 57 ·------- -·----- -·-----·- 2 6 1 2 1 0 5 20 0 5 . • 1 4 1 0 2 7 __ 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 ------------------------------------------------------------- 31 177 37 192 51 5 258 334 56 288 70 435 86 6 401 643 AIR UNIT A70 A80 SUBTO J_AL AIR UNIT A02 A03 A08 A10 A11 A18 A14 A16 A30 A40 SUBTOTAL AIR UNIT A02 A03 A08 A10 A11 A18 A14 A 16 A30 A40 SUBTOTAL GRANDTOTAL -- A I R S U P P O R T r UNIT RECAP. FOR <04/29/92> TO (05/1 - AM WATCH <----------------- FLIGHT TIME BY TYPE-----------------> •. t3ERIM PATROL TNG INV ADMIN EQUIP MAINT MISC ETERS 1 .,.., • a::. 0.0 0.0 0.0 (----------------- FLIGHT TIME - - .. PATROL TNG INV ADMIN 1.0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 32. 4 0.0 0.9 0.0 11.5 0.0 0. 0 0. 0 22. 3 e,. 0 0.8 0.0 2c- .,.., ..J. c:. 0. 0 0. 0 0. 121 18. 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0. 0 12. 6 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.5 0.0 1 ,::, • a;;;. 0. 121 14. 8 0.0 e,. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 DAY WATCH BY TYPE -----------------) eg RIIVI EQUIP MAINT MISC ETERS 0. 0 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5 0. 0 0. tZI 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 1. 1 0. 0 0. tZI 0. 121 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 3. 3 0. 121 0. 121 0. 121 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 ,:, .a;;;. 0. 0 0. 121 0.0 0.121 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ------------------------------------------------------------- 146. 6 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 -=- • i;;;, 12. 4 PM WATCH - (----------------- FLIGHT TIME BY TYPE -----------------) PERIM PATROL TNG INV ADMIN EQUIP MAINT MISC ETERS 7.0 0.0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 121 0.0 0. IZI 39. 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 e,. 0 5 -=- • a;;;. 27.5 0.0 0.0 0. 121 0. 121 0. 121 0. 121 5. 121 12. 0 e1. 0 121.0 e1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 33.6 0. e, 0.0 0. 121 1. 4 0. 121 0. tZI 3. g 32.8 0.1 e,. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 tZt. 0 1. 1 7.9 0.0 0.0 0. IZI 0. 121 0. 121 121. •Zt 121.2 11. 0 0.0 0.0 ~3. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.B 0.121 0.0 0. ,zi 0. ,21 0. 121 0. 121 121. 0 1. 4 0.0 e,. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ------------------------------------------------------------ 1 74. 5 0.1 0.0 3.0 1. Lt, 0.0 0.0 18.5 322.3 0. 1 2. g 3. 121 1.4 1 .-, • L::, 30.9 D I V I S I O N UNIT RECAP. FOR (04/29/92) TO (05/10/92) AM WATCH ----------------) (----------- PERIM \JT MISC ETERS MAINT RADIO I 0 0.0 0. 121 0.0 0.0 0 121.0 0.0 0.0 121. 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 DAY WATCH - .---------------) (----------- i PERIM T MISC ETERS MAINT RADIO 121 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0 0.0 5.5 0.0 0.0 IZt 0 .. 0 0.2 0. 0 0.0 0 1.0 1. 1 1 -:, a;;. 0.0 ,z, 0. 121 2. IZI 0. 0 0.6 0 0.2 3.3 0.0 0.0 121 0.121 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0 -:, .i;;;;. 0.0 0.0 121 0.0 0. 121 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0 1 -=- .i;;. 12. 4 1.2 0.6 - PM WATCH ---------------) (----------- PERIM T MISC ETERS MAINT RADIO ,z, 0. 0 0~ 121 0.0 0. 0 0 flt. 0 6 -:, • a;;. 1.4 12,. 0 121 0. 121 5. 0 0. 0 0. 12' 0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0 0. 121 3. 9 0. 0 0.0 0 0.0 l. 1 0.5 0.6 121 121. 121 ,21. 2 0. 0 0.121 0 0.0 -· 1 -:, • 7 0.0 0.0 121 0. 121 121. IZ1 0. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ABORT wx 0.0 0.0 0.0 ABORT wx 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 ABORT wx 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 ,-, -=- C. • ._ 0.0 0.0 PAGE 2 TIME ----------) # # REC REC BY -------·- -·- - -~· -- CREW OTHER VEH ASD 0.0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 - 0 - - - 0 0.0 0.0 _ 0 ______ __ 0 ______ .. TIME ------.---) # # REC RE_ C c=.-------:~- '-! y ___ _ CREW OTHER VEH ASD ·-------- 0.0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 8 ·- --- . 2 -----· -- 0.0 0.0 4 1 0.0 0.0 2 ______ ·- 0 __ _ 0.0 0.0 6 0 0.0 0.0 -- _ _ 7_ ----- __ 1 _ ----- 0.0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 a _____ 1 _ __ _ 0.0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 -· 0 ____ 0 _______ _ 0.0 0.0 35 5 - -~· ---· - - -- - -- ----- -- TIME ----------) # # REC REC BY CREW OTHER VEH ASD 0 .. 0 0.0 2 0 0.0 0.0 14 1 --- 0.0 0.0 5 1 0.0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 16 0 0.0 0.0 12 1 0.0 0. 0 1 0 0.0 0.0 1 0 .. -- ---- 0.0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0 0.0 18.5 1.9 0.6 3.8 e,. 0 0.0 51 3 121 1 ··-, • &::. 30.9 3. 1 1.2 8.2 0.0 0.0 86 a SUBTOTAL - -· SUBTOTAL GRAND TOTAL AIR UNIT A02 A03 A08 A10 All A18 A14 A16 AIR -· ----- - - UNIT A02 A03 A08 A10 All Al8 A14 A16 A I R S U P P D R T I UNIT RECAP. FOR (04/29/92) TO (05/l .. DAY WATCH - (------------------------------- CALLS OUT OF AS~ (---- CENTRAL -----) (------ WEST ------) l OBS OFC RAD ·sTA OBS OFC RAD STA 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 7 19 2 0 1 2 2 1 9 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 14 2 0 1 B 0 0 0 0 0 4 15 31 0 4 10 20 3 1 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 14 3 0 0 0 1 6 35 B5 10 5 20 49 3 •· - PM WATCH (------------------------------- CALLS OUT OF ASS (---- CENTRAL -----) (------ WEST ------) ( OBS OFC RAD STA OBS OFC RAD STA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 36 0 1 7 3 0 1 31 37 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 12 42 0 3 7 26 3 0 3 9 0 0 0· 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 ------------------------------------------------ 7 53 106 11 3 23 5i� 0 13 88 191 21 8 43 103 3 SUPPORT D I V I S I O N PAGE 3 UNIT RECAP. FOR (04/29/92) TO (05/10/92) DAY WATCH .. --·- - --·· CALLS OUT OF ASSIGNED AREA -------------------------------) -· - - - -- - -- WEST ------) (----- SOUTH ------) (----- VALLEY -----) OFC RAD STA OBS OFC RAD STA OBS 0FC RAD STA ----- -- --------- 1 2 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 · 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 l 1 2 ---- - ----- 1 8 0 1 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 15 31 0 0 5 13 4 0 3 1 3 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 - --- ·- - - - 0 --· 0 --- - ~ 0 0 0 1 0 6 17 1 0 0 0 0 . - - 20 49 3 1 16 48 5 0 7 2 8 ----·---- PM WATCH CALLS OUT OF ASSIGNED AREA -------------------------------) -- WEST ------) (----- SOUTH ------) (----- VALLEY -----) -- - - - - OFC RAD STA OBS OFC RAD STA OBS OFC RAD STA ----- - - ·- ----- --------- 0 0 0 1 0 17 1 0 0 0 1 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 __ ,._ --·- __ .., _ _ - ---- 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 - ------------ ------- - - 12 42 0 0 2 10 1 0 0 0 0 3 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 - ---- - --- --- --- 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 -· -- ~ - 0 0 -----------~--------------------------------------------------- 23 5it 0 1 5 40 9 0 3 3 2 -- - - - --- --- ----- ____ ,. ___ . • --�-- 43 103 3 2 21 88 14 0 10 5 10 AIR UNIT A70 A80 SUBTOTAL AIR UNIT A02 A03 A08 A10 All A18 A14 A16 A30 A40 SUBTOTAL A I R S U P P O R T D UNIT RECAP. FOR (04/29/92) TO <05/1 AM WATCH (---------------------------------------------------ARREST-- <-----------------ASD RESPONSIBLE------------------) ROBB BURG GTA B/TV FPER FPRO MPER MPRO OTHR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DAY - (- ROE 0 0 0 WATCH <---------------------------------------------------ARREST-- <-----------------ASD RESPONSIBLE------------------> (-- ROBB BURG GTA B/TV FPER FPRO MPER MPRO DTHR ROE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 ,.., a:. 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 g 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 a 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 2 12 13 1 10 1 a 0 2 3 PM WATCH <---------------------------------------------------ARREST- AIR (-----------------ASD RESPONSIBLE------------------) <-- UNIT ROBB BURG GTA B/TV FPER FPRO MPER MPRO OTHR RO A02 A03 A08 A10 All A18 A14 A16 A30 A40 SUBTOTAL GRANDTOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 2 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 E, 0 1 0 0 4 0 3 2 1 7 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ------------------------------------------------------------ 3 3 6 1 20 2 7 0 2 11 5 15 19 2 30 3 15 0 4 14 ·S U ,P P .0 I~ T D I V I S I 0 N PAGE 4 UNIT RECAP. FOR (04/29/92) TO (05/10/92) AM WATCH -------------ARREST--------------------------------------------------) ------------) <-------------------ASD ASSISTED-------------------) ~ MPRO OTHR ROBB BURG GTA B/TV FPER FPRO MPER MPRO OTHR 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 DAY WATCH 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 --- - 0 0 0 0 0 0 -··--• -- -· ------ - 0 0 0 .. ----- --- - ----------- -------------ARREST-------------------------------------------------) ------------) <-------------------ASD ASSISTED-------------------> - -- --- - ~ MPR0 OTHR ROBB BURG GTA B/TV FPER FPRO MPER MPR0 OTHR - - -----------· 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 7 2 15 1 1 0 1 ---- ----- 0 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 -- 0 0 0 7 2 0 10 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 l 5 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 - 0 --------- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - _0 0 2 3 18 24 3 35 1 5 0 1 ---· --- ·- PM WATCH ------------ARREST--------------------------------------------------> -----------) (--------- . ---------ASD ASSISTED-------------------> ·- -- --- MPR0 OTHR ROBB BURG GTA B/TV FPER FPRO MPER MPRO OTHR 0 0 1 3 . -. .::. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 l 0 6 9 0 23 0 1 0 30 ------------- 0 0 3 10 1 4 6 0 25 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 .-,c-_ i::.;:.i 1 20 0 2 0 0 0 l 3 5 '3 0 9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 - --·--·- -----~ - -·- . . - -------- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 26 52 5 60 0 2'3 0 31 • 0 4 14 45 76 11 95 1 34 0 32 A I R s u p p 0 R T D UNIT RECAP. FOR (04/29/92) TO (05/1 -- AM WATCH (--- TYPE CALL ----) (- SPEC ACTIVITY AIR VEH •. FT OBS AS~ UNIT OBS OFC RAD STA PUR PUR- - -- FIR DI A70 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 A80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 ------------------------------------~------ I SUBTOTAL 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 - DAY WATCH (--- TYPE CALL ----) (- SPEC ACTIVITY AIR VEH FT OBS ASS UNIT DBS OFC RAD STA PUR PUR - -F,IR 0/A A02 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 A03 2 21 94 22 1 6 0 0 A08 1 19 30 5 l 0 1 0 A10 2 9 65 12 1 0 0 0 .. -· .. - All 4 37 90 9 1 4 0 0 A18 11 30 70 10 4 3 0 0 A14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 A16 0 17 39 7 1 1 0 0 A30 2 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 A40 4 13 5 3 1 0 0 0 -----------------------------------~-------- SUBTOTAL 26 147 402 70 10 14 1 0 PM WATCH (--- TYPE CALL ----) (- SPEC ACTIVITY AIR VEH FT OBS AS UNIT OBS OFC RAD STA PUR PUR FIR 0/A A02 1 2 19 2 0 0 0 0 A03 15 52 112 9 3 4 2 0 A08 4 59 94 4 2 2 0 0 A10 2 11 16 10 0 0 0 0 All 7 21 119 2 4 2 0 A18 g 35 103 9 6 4 0 0 A14 0 0 16 5 1 1 0 0 A16 1 8 17 12 0 0 0 0 A30 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 A40 1 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 ------------------------------------------- SUBTOTAL 40 192 503 54 16 13 2 0 GRAND TOTAL 65 343 909 124 2E, 27 3 .! . . . · S u· p _ P . � RT D I V I S I O N PAGE 5 UNIT RECAP. FOR (04/29/92> TO (05/10/92> AM WATCH (- SPEC ACTIVITY--) VEH FT OBS ASS PUR PUR FIR 0/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 DAY 0 0 0 WATCH (- SPEC ACTIVITY VEH FT OBS PUR PUR FIR 0 0 0 1 6 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 4 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 10 14 1 PM WATCH (- SPEC ACTIVITY VEH FT OBS PUR PUR FIR 0 0 0 3 4 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 6 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 --) ASS 0/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 --) ASS O/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 <------------SAFETY-------------> <- ASD INIT --) RE HLP ASS B/U HLP ASS B/U DIR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (------------ HLP ASS B/U 0 0 0 5 . -, a::. 7 1 0 4 5 1 3 4 3 12 0 2 9 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 4 3 1 19 12 39 0 0 0 SAFETY (- ASD HLP 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 -- ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -------------) INIT --) RE- - ASS B/U DIR 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 14 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 5 31 - ----·-- . - -- - -~ -- -- ·---------------- ~- - - ·- - - -- -· - - 4 ------ - ·~ - -·----·- ----·---·------ (------------ SAFETY -------------) (- ASD INIT --) RE- - -- - - HLP ASS B/U HLP ASS B/U DIR 0 0 4 0 0 1 3 3 6 21 1 0 0 2'3 - ------ - ------- 3 8 1 '3 0 0 1 16 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 3 9 11 0 0 0 1 1 3 '3 0 0 0 7 ------ 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 ·-----•--··-- - - 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ------------------------------------------------------------- 16 13 2 0 14 29 74 1 0 2 57 2E, 27 3 33 41 113 4 2 7 88 p 0 R AIRCRAFT RECAP. FOR (04/29/'32) TO (05/ - - ··--~ - --- - --- --- TOTAL <-------------FLIGHT TIME B FLIGHT AIRCRAFT TIME PATROL TNG INV ADMIN ---- - - -------- - .. - 3LA 80.2 78.6 0.0 0.9 0.0 - -- 5LA 62.8 61. 1 0. 0 0. 0 0.0 6LA 77.2 69.3 0.0 4.0 0.0 7LA 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0.0 0.0 27S 34.3 27.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 SUB _JOTAL 254.5 236.0 0. 0 11. g _ 0.0 02Q . 73.8 73. 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 02X 80.9 80. 0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 1LA 82.6 81. 4 0.0 0.1 0.0 2LA 71.5 69.4 0.0 0.8 0.0 548 29.7 20.2 3.7 4. 1 0.0 53X 42.9 1. 8 0.0 35.0 0.121 479 17.5 0.0 12.7 3.8 0.0 576 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- -- - ----- - ---a- -- ... 577 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 578 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 579 50.3 47. 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 15J 33.3 27.4 0. 1 5. a 0. ,ZI 81N 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SUB TOTAL 482.5 400.8 16. 5 49. 6 0.0 771 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 182 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. e, 4'3U 6.1 0.0 0.0 4 .-, • i::. 0.0 GRAND TOTAL 743.5 636.8 15 .. 5 65.0 0.0 s u p p 0 R T D I V I 5 I 0 N . AIRCAAFT RECAP. FOR (04/29/'32) TO (05/ 10/92) - -- - - - ------FLIGHT TIME BY TYPE-------------) <-ABORT TIME-) TNG INV ADMIN EQUIP MAINT MISC RADIO MECH 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0. 0 0.0 0. 0 1.7 0. 0 0. 0 2. 6 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.6 0.5 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 0.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0. 0 0. 0 11. 2 0.0 0.0 6.3 1. 0 0. 6 3. 1 -----------------· --- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 ··- -- ...... - .. ~--- -- .... ----·--- 0.0 0. 1 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- -- - -- ----- 0. 0 0.8 0.0 1.4 0.0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 ---- - -- - - 3.7 4.1 0.0 0.0 1. 7 0.0 0.0 0.0 -· --·- --- . 0. 0 35.0 0. 0 121.0 0.7 5.4 0.0 0.0 12.7 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0. IZI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0. 0 - ----·---- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0.0 - ---- --- 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 - ·--•·- -·- 0. 1 5. 8 0. 121 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 - - - -- . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 - - - - -- - 16. 5 49 ,. 6 0.0 1.4 7.7 6. 6 0. 6 0. 0 ------ --· --- - . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. IZt 0.0 0. e, 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 ----- - 0.0 4 .... • i::; 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0. 0 15,. 5 65.0 0. 0 1.4 16.3 7. 6 1 -::, • L;. 3. 1 -------- --- __ _ j AREA <-----ACTIVITIES-----) OR # # * # - A I R TOTAL # S U P P O R T AREA RECAP. _fOR (04/29/92) TD (05/1 # # TI.MES OF DIVISION OBS OFCR RADIO STA ARREST FAS PERIM CENT 3 33 34 16 14 0 2 RAMP 3 35 110 3 51 48 2 S/W 7 27 109 17 41 5'3 5 HBK 2 3 27 2 11 11 2 - - - HARB 0 4 11 0 0 3 1 ----- - . HWD 3 32 68 4 21 35 2 WILS 10 26 89 4 23 56 7 W/LA 0 10 8 0 7 3 4 VNYS 1 15 25 36 4 12 1 W/VA 1 5 17 5 10 9 ,-, i::. NIE 0 13 43 4 41 18 7 77TH 16 EA 173 24 80 93 18 NEWT 14 38 109 3 68 55 8 PACI 0 9 14 0 6 3 1 - ... ~ ---- - N/HD 0 10 7 2 2 2 2 FTHL 1 3 7 13 0 3 1 DEVN 1 2 13 2 2 5 0 S/E 5 28 70 15 23 31 6 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ VBUR 4 35 70 58 1B 31 6 CBUR 22 1 · -, · -, a::..::. 323 28 185 139 21 WBUR 13 77 179 8 57 97 14 SBUR 28 123 363 56 150 186 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++· C I TY 68 34.5 ~-33E: 13121 LJ,09 4 4 7 71 . S tJ P " P ·o RT D I V I S I D N PAGE 1 AREA RECAP. FOR (04/29/92) TD (05/10/92) # # # <---------------SAFETY----------------) TIMES OF OF <--ASD INIT--) RE- FAS PERIM CIT HELP ASS B\U HELP ASS B/U DIR 5 2 0 3 1 10 0 0 0 1 48 2 0 2 5 17 1 0 1 5 _,.. ________ 513 5 1 3 3 6 0 0 1 12 11 2 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 1 3 3 0 0 0 3 . ---·- 35 2 1 4 5 7 0 0 0 5 - ·- ----- - -- - ·- - 56 7 1 3 2 12 0 0 0 5 - ---- -- -- -·- - 3 4 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 2 --· -----·- -----· 12 1 0 1 0 4 tZI 0 0 1 -- ----- - --- --·--- .. 9 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 - ------- ----- _ ., 18 7 0 1 1 5 IZt 0 1 3 _____ .., 93 18 2 11 7 23 1 0 1 20 -- -- --- -- 56 8 1 2 E, 10 --, .::. 2 2 13 3 1 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 - . - --·--- ------· 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 - - --- ---- 3 1 0 121 0 0 0 0 0 121 5 0 0 0 l 2 0 0 0 0 31 6 0 2 3 7 121 0 1 16 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 31 5 0 2 .-, C. 7 121 0 0 .-, C. . . ----·· ----· ----- 139 21 1 8 14 45 3 2 4 23 97 14 2 '3 10 23 tZt 0 0 14 186 30 3 17 15 3'3 1 0 3 51 - - - ----- +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 447 71 7 ""' -- .:,,=., 41 113 '+ ·':, '- 7 92 - - - - AREA OR DIVISION CENT ~~AMP S/W HBK HARB - HWD WILS W/LA VNYS W/V(.l NI E 77TH NEWT Pr.~C I A I R S U P P O R T l AREA RECAP. FOR (04/29/'32)- TO (05/ l (---------------------------------------------------ARREST-- <-----------------ASD RESPONSIBLE------------------> (-- ROBB BURG GTA B/TV FPER FPRO MPER MP~O DTHR ROE 0 121 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 9 121 1 ,.. i:: 121 4 .... 0 5 0 1 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 ,z, 0 121 0 0 ei 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 .-, i::. 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 Ql -~ 121 ,-, C 1 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 Q.'1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 121 0 0 ei 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 . -, i::. e1 - 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 e, 0 ~ ._ .- , .-. 9 0 7 2 4 0 1 2 i::. i::. IZI t;, 4 0 2 1 0 0 0 i= 121 0 0 0 3 0 0 121 0 IZi . -- - - - - N/HD iZt 0 0 0 0 0 0 tZI 0 0 I I FTHL 0 tZI 0 0 0 0 0 0 IZi l2i DE'v'N 121 e, 0 121 0 0 0 e, 0 0 5/E ..:> 0 ,zr e, e, 0 0 0 fZI l2i +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 'v'BUR 121 1 0 0 0 0 0 Q) 2 0 CBUR ,21 6 7 2 4 1 10 ,zi 1 a I WBUR 0 L1. 4 0 13 QI tZI 121 0 1 J. SBUR r:::- 5 ,ii: .-. 0 1 .-, 2 5 e, 1 r:: ..J .i.C i::. ...: ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++~ c:: TY 5 17 20 2 30 3 15 121 4 1 Li - StJPPO RT D I V I S I O N PAGE 2 AREA l~ECAP. FOR (04/29/92> TO (05/10/92) -------------ARREST--------------------------------------------------) -------------) (-------------------ASD ASSISTED---------- -:--- _ --:-=- - =~~ ~ MPR0 DTHR ROBB BURG GTA B/TV FPER FPf<D MPER MPRO DTHR 0 121 1 1 '3 0 .-. i::. 0 0 0 0 0 1 .-, a::. 12 12 4 7 121 1 0 e, ----- tZl 0 3 5 6 5 8 0 1 0 0 - . - - . - - --- - e1 0 0 6 3 0 0 121 1 0 0 - -- - ---- --- 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 -·~- ---___ ___ .__ tZl 0 0 5 2 0 7 0 ,-, a::. 0 0 - - --- ~ 0 0 1 1 7 1 . -. 1 0 0 0 i::. - - - -- - r Zt 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 -· ·--•------ 0 0 0 3 1 IZI 0 0 IZt 0 0 - ----- -- . - -- ---- ------ - 0 . -, a::. 0 1 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 - - - __ ,.. __ ---- - 0 0 3 1 0 e, '3 0 -::,,:::- i.;;.,...J 0 121 - -------- 0 1 .,.., a::. 5 21 0 22 0 2 0 1 121 0 2 4 4 1 13 0 e, 0 31 0 0 0 0 .... ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ----- e , 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 121 0 0 - - --~ - ---- --- - . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e1 tZI 0 IZI . -- - -- -· 121 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 :z1 0 0 - - -- ... - ---•--· ----·---·-· .. 0 0 0 1 0 1 21 19 0 0 0 , 21 - - ---· ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - . - -- -·-- ---- 0 2 0 4 5 0 4 0 . -, e 1 I Zt i::. .• -··---- I ZI 1 8 24 28 5 3 1 0 27 QI 31 1 21 0 1 E, 12 1 15 1 .-, 0 0 C. Qt 1 5 11 31 5 51 121 3 0 1 --- --· ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lZ, 4 14- 45 76 1 1 1121121 1 3'+ lZl 2:2
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