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Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
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After-action report, unusual occurrence related to the March 25, 1989 anti-abortion demonstration in Rampart area; operations-central bureau
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After-action report, unusual occurrence related to the March 25, 1989 anti-abortion demonstration in Rampart area; operations-central bureau
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. . .. - .,
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INTRAD~TAL ~SPONDENCE
SEP 131989
METRO POLIT AN DIVISION
April 21, 1989
1.4
TO: Commanding Officer. , Uniformed Services Group
FROM: Commanding Officer, Operations-Central Bureau
SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT
Attached is the Unusual Occurrence After Action Report of the
activities related to the March 25, 1989, anti-abortion
demonstration in Rampart Area. Copies of this report have been
delivered to the Office of the Chief of Police and to the Office
of Operations.
ROBERTS. GI'L, Commander
Acting Commanding Officer
'operations-Central Bureau
I - · - - •
OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU
AFTER ACTION REPORT
ANTI-ABORTION DEMONSTRATION
MARCH 25, 1989
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After Action Report
Page 1
I. TYPE OF OCCURRENCE
Operation Rescue, the nationally known anti-abortion group,
staged its first extensive rally and demonstrations on the west
coast during the week of March 22-25, 1989. This week, Easter
week, was deemed the "Holy Week of Rescue." On March 25, 1989,
the demonstration took place in the City of Los Angeles at the
Family Planning Medical Group located at 601 South Westmoreland
Avenue in Rampart Area.
A. BACKGROUND
Operation Rescue nationwide has taken as its mission shutting
down abortion clinics to preyent as many fetuses as possible from
being aborted. The movement advocates, "social upheaval to bring
about political change." The group uses "peaceful" civil
disobedience as a means to disrupt normal business activity at
facilities where abortions take place. (See Addendum No. 1)
B. INTELLIGENCE
Operation Rescue has held demonstrations outside abortion clinics
in over 115 cities. Since May 9, 1988, the demonstrations have
reportedly involved over 17,000 participants and over 5,000
arrests nationwide. In July of 1988 in Atlanta, Georgia, over
1,200 demonstrators were arrested. In October, 1988, in
Sunnyvale, California 251 arrests were made within four hours.
Additionally, the veracity of Operation Rescue leaders in
negotiations with public officials was questioned by police in
both Sunnyvale and Atlanta. (See Addendum
1
No. 1)
, II. FIELD COMMAND POST INFORMATION
A. LOCATION
1. Field Comrn~nd Post: Shatto Park, 6th Street and
Shatto Place.
2. Staging Area: Los Angeles City College.
3. Satellite Command Post: 6th Street and
Westmoreland Avenue.
After Action Report
Page 2
Initially, due to the lack of intelligence regarding the
demonstration targets, each Operations-Central Bureau Area (OCB)
was charged with the responsibility for establishing an Area
Command Post, and an Area Field Jail Unit to potentially deal
with demonstrations at abortion clinics located in their
respective Areas. The Bureau Command Post was located at the OCB
Office. Once it was determined the target location was
601 South Westmoreland Avenue and that it was the only targeted
location, the Bureau Command Post was relocated to Shatto Park at
4th Street and Shatto Place.
B. STAFFING
OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU COMMAND POST:
Field Commander:
Executive Officer:
Operations Officer:
Assistant. Operations
Officer:
Press Relations
Officer:
Logistics Officer:
Personnel Officer:
Intelligence Officer:
Journal:
Radio: ·
FJU Coordinator:
Cut Coordinator:
Rampart FJU OIC:
Southwest FJU OIC:
Cmdr. · Chambers
Cmdr. Gil
Capt. McMurray
Lt. Seitz
Sgt. · oiaz
Sgt. Twohy
Sgt. Mazur
Det. Powers
Officer Bynum
Officer Mapson
PSR Lauder
Lt. McGinty
Sgt. Fletcher
Lt. Barker
Lt. Bakay .
RAMPART AREA SITE COMMAND POST:
Site Commander:
Asst Site Cmdr:
Operations Officer:
Asst Operations:
Personnel:
Logistics:
Capt. Lewis
Lt. Labriola
Sgt. Knopp
Ofc. Silva .
Ofc. Michaelson
Ofc. Robinson
OCB
OCB
OCB
OCB
OCB
OCB
OCB
. OCB
OCB
HOBK
Central
Dets.
OCB
Rampart
Dets.
Southwest
Dets.
After Action Report
Page 3
C. MOBILE COMMAND POST FLEET
The Bureau Command Post used Mobile 1 at Shatto Place and
4th Street. This was supplemented by a Satellite Command Post
utilizing the Mobile Emergency Response Vehicle (MERV). The
sound truck was used at the demonstration site.
D. WATCH SCHEDULES
Historically Operation Rescue personnel arrived at their
demonstration site in the early morning hours, consequently '
personnel designated as ·first responders began watch at 0600
hours whereas Field Command Post personnel and Area scouts began
watch at approximately 0500 hours. Additionally, Rampart Area
FJU began watch at 0700 hours and the Southwest Area FJU began
watch at 0600 hours.
III. CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE
A. PLANNING
The planning phase of Operation Rescue was conducted during the
weeks preceding March 22, 1989. Meetings were conducted with OCB
Area Commanding Officers, Area planners, the scout coordinators,
and the FJU OIC'S. Meetings were also conducted with personnel
from Metropolitan Division, Operations-Valley Bureau, Tactical
Planning Section and Training Division.
Information regarding Operation Rescue demonstrations in other
cities, background information and news reports were reviewed.
The proposed Bureau response was developed to meet a worst case
scenario as a decentralized three stage operational plan, with
each OCB. Area designed to function independently.
During the preliminary stages of planning each Area identified
potential anti-abortion demonstration sites and designated
corresponding Command Posts (C/P), staging and Field Jail Unit
(FJU) sites. Scouts were drawn from Area vice units and assigned
to the potential demonstration sites.
FJU personnel were selected. Area personnel were scheduled· to be
deployed at a maximum level with all units in excess of the basic
car plan deployed as "Q" units and assigned to squads with
pre-designated vehicles and supervisors.
After Action Report
Page 4
The Detective I and Police Officer III personnel assigned to Area
detective divisions and CTD AIFU were prepared for a uniformed
assignment.
Two Bureau-wide utility "cut" teams were selected and personnel
were trained to deal with the specific stalling and delaying
tactics used by Operation Rescue demonstrators (i.e. chaining
themselves together, chaining vehicles to clinic doors ~sing case
hardened locks, etc.). The "cut" teams were available for use by
the Areas.
The Areas were tasked with developing specific strategies for
each potential location. During Stage I ope-rations each Area
would function independently and respond to its own occurrences.
The plan called for the Bureau C/P during ·stage I to be located
in the OCB office and to act as an information gathering and
response coordination unit.
If the magnitude of an incident in any of the OCB Areas exceeded
the Area's resources, then OCB's plan provided for a second
level, Stage II, response.
During Stage II the plan called for the Bureau's resources to b~
reassigned to the involved Area. The Bureau Field Commander
would consider moving the Bureau C/P to the involved location.
The involved Area FJU staff would be supplemented by additional
personnel from the other OCB FJU's.
If the magnitude of the occurrence in OCB exceeded the Bureau's
resources, then a Stage III response would result and additional
resources would be requested from the EOC.
When Department management established the policy that arrestees
·were not to be carried from the demonstration site to the
transporation buses, Metropolitan Division and Training Division
developed and refined effective, humane pain compliance
techniques. Metropolitan Division personnel practiced and were
prepared to use the pain compliance techniques. As a result, the
overall tactical plan evolved from one in which OCB Area officers
functioned as arrest and tangle team members, to a generic plan
in which the Area personnel supported Metropolitan Division
personnel who would perform the arrest function.
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After Action Report
Page 5
Specifically, it was agreed by Metropolitan Division and OCB
that Central Bureau personnel would establish a secure
perimeter around the anti-abortion demonstrators, separating
the anti-abortion demonstrators from the pro-abortion
demonstrators and other on-lookers. Central Bureau personnel
would also provide security for the prisoner transportation
buses, escorts for those buses, a command post, and a field
jail.
Metropolitan Division accepted the responsibility for arresting
and controlling the demonstrators from the demonstration site
to the prisoner transportation buses. They aiso agreed to
provide one arresting officer per busload of prisoners. This
arrangement was to avoid the delays produced by a field jail
unit Mobile Identification Detail (M.I.D.) photographing and
preparing an arrest package prior to the arrestee being placed
on the bus. With the Metropolitan Division arresting officer
riding on the bus, identification and processing functions
could be performed with less disruption as the prisoners were
being off-loaded at the FJU.
FJU SITE SELECTION
RAMPART
The Rampart FJU was located at ~ellevue Recreation Center, a
Department of Recreation and Parks facility at Lucile and
Marathon Streets. This site was chosen because of its
location, size and accessibility. It was approximately two and
one half miles from the furthest possible demonstration s i te,
one half mile from the other potential site and one half mile
from the Rampart Field Command Post. Additionally, the site
was approximately one half mile from Northeast Area's possible
demonstration site and the Northeast Area Field Command Post.
The site provided a large gymnasium including a large
basketball court, bleachers, a stage, and restrooms.
Additionally, there was an office, a small kitchen area, and a
30 x 40 foot room adjacent to the east end of the gymnasium.
Bellevue Park was completely enclosed by chain link fence. A
large parking lot was located on the east end of the site.
Additional parking was available on the driveway and on a large .
grass area east of the gymnasium.
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After Action Report
Page 6
Since the site was also close to the potential Northeast Area
demonstration site, Rampart and Northeast Areas shared the site
and staffed a combined FJU. It proved to be well suited for
field jail operations.
SOUTHWEST
The Southwest FJU was initially set up at the California
Highway Patrol Central Headquarters, 777 West Washington
Boulevard. When one inch of rain was predicted for the night
of March 24 continuing through March 25, it became necessary to
relocate the FJU.
The best alternative was the Coliseum tunnel. The Coliseum
tunnel and adjoining locker rooms and cages provided an ideal
holding area where arrestees were separated and securely
confined. Ample parking was available.
The entire Bureau plan with location -maps and Area plans are
attached as Addenda #5.
B. INTELLIGENCE
The intelligence operations for the Anti-Abortion demonstration
of March 25, 1989, began well before the incident.
A review of news articles, interagency and intradepartmental
correspondence and a close examination of information regarding
the Operations Rescue Organization was conducted.
Potential demonstration sites in OCB were identified. Each
site was photographed and aerial photos of the locations were
obtained. Each OCB Area contacted the location management of
each abortion clinic and obtained information regarding hours
of operation, and number of patients; in turn, information was
given to management concerning the level of police service to
be provided. Twenty-four hour phone numbers for the management
contacts were obtained. On March 22, 1989, the Central Bureau
Commanding Officer and the Operations Officer inspected and
surveyed each location within Central Bureau.
On March 23 and 24 1989, the days before the Los Angeles
incident, demonstrations were held in Cypress and Long Beach.
These demonstrations were observed by command personnel and
tactical experts.
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After Action Report
Page 7
Scouts ~ere selected from Area vice units and assigned to the
potential locations. They observed the locations on days prior
to the demonstration observing routine operations. On the day
of the demonstration the scouts observed the clinics and
reported the activities of both the anti and pro-abortion
forces as they gathered at several of the OCB locations. The
scouts at 601 South Westmoreland Avenue repor~ed the arrival of
the first anti-abortion demonstrators as they arrived in vans.
This confirmed information received from the EOC as to the
actual demonstration site. When the other units at the other
potential demonstration sites reported an absence of activity,
the decision to commit personnel was made with confidence.
Generally, the intelligence function was successful. It was
particularly useful during the planning stage. For example,
information regarding the groups use of delaying tactics (i.e.
locks and chains) allowed the OCB planning team to develop
counter measures and to be prepared for the tactics • .
C. OPERATIONS
On March 25 1989, the incident began with scout units reporting
that pro-choice demonstrators were arriving at the clinic at
601 Westmoreland Avenue. This report was followed by a report
that Operation Rescue demonstrators were also arriving at the
location. The scout units' reports were accurate and
complete. The reports were received at 0630 hours as were
reports from the EOC that confirmed the scout reports that 601
Westmoreland Avenue was indeed the target of the demonstration.
'
A Field Command Post was established at Shatto Park and, after
obtaining a signed crime report, the Central Bureau Field
Commander, the Rampart Area Field Commander and the Central
Bureau Operations Officer, met to put the tactical plan into
operation.
·The Rampart Area Field Commander and Central Bureau Operations
Officer then assembled the squad leaders of 12 squads of
Central Bureau personnel. At this meeting an aerial photograph
of the demonstration site was utilized to ·identify specific
squad assignment locations. During the meeting it was not
raining and, after considering the officer safety aspects of
grappling with demonstrators, the Rampart Area Field Commander
gave the order to leave rain gear in the vehicles.
L
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After Action Report
Page 8
The squads were then formed into colwnns and marched eastbound
on 6th Street to Westmoreland Avenue. The colwnn made a right
turn and continued south on Westmoreland to the southern end of
the building located at 601 South Westmoreland Avenue. The
first squad turned right again and marched west across
Westmoreland until they reached the edge of the driveway to
601 South Westmoreland Avenue. The colwnn bunched up with
almost the entire column located in front of 601 South
Westmoreland on the east side of the street. The last squad
was then marched back along the route to a position mid-block
on 6th Street between Shatto Place and Westmoreland Avenue.
They marched southbound across 6th Street and once the squads
in the middle of the perimeter adjusted thefr positions, the
perimeter was in place. Yellow plastic banner tape was
effectively used to designate the perimeter.
This tape formed a very effective boundary backed up by ·
uniformed officers.
It should be noted that the perimeter was tighter in the
vicinity of the front door of 601 South Westmoreland Avenue
than in other places of the perimeter. As the perimeter
stretched along 6th Street, the interval between officers was
6-10 feet whereas on Westmoreland Avenue they were almost
shoulder to shoulder. This was necessitated by the large,
potentially hostile crowd on the east sidewalk of Westmoreland
Avenue, immediately across from the abortion clinic.
The perimeter was secure and Metropolitan Division was prepared
to enter the perimeter and make arrests of' the demonstrators.
The Commanding Officer, Metropolitan Division, gave nwnerous
warnings via an amplified sound system to leave the area inside
the perimeter. The pro-abortion demonstrators. immediately
complied. The anti-abortion demonstrators who remained were
again warned they faced arrest if they did not leave.
Two platoons of Metropolitan Division personnel, accompanied by
two squads from the Mounted Unit, entered the perimeter. One
platoon of officers and one squad of horses placed a second
perimeter at the front of the location and the other platoon
and squad placed an interior perimeter at the rear of the
location. Two prisoner transportation buses were summoned.
The first was told to approach the demonstration by coming
northbound on Westmoreland Avenue and the second by coming
eastbound on 6th Street.
After Action Report
Page 9
As the buses arrived, a squad of officers was placed around
each to prevent demonstrators from interfering with them. The
Metropolitan Division arrest plan was then placed into effect
and demonstrators were taken simultaneously from both sides of
the site to the closest bus. As the buses reached their
capacity, additional buses were summoned. This system worked;
however, a communication was received from the field jail unit
that the buses were arriving at the field jail with no
arresting officer. Consequently, the buses had to remain at
·the field jail with the prisoners aboard and could not return
to the demonstration site to pick up more prisoners. When this
information was conveyed to the Central Bureau Field Commander,
he met with the Metropolitan Division Commanding Officer and
received assurance that the previously agreed upon arrangement
of having a Metropolitan officer ride with each busload of
prisoners as the arresting officer would - be carried out. When
this was put into effect, the field jail unit was able to begin
processing arrestees.
Once the Department declared a city-wide tactical alert and
additional personnel began to arrive, the outer perimeter was
strengthened with these officers. The intersection of 6th
Street and Westmoreland Avenue was completely cleared and then
enclosed by the perimeter.
At one point mid-way through the arrest process, a handful of
anti-abortion demonstrators tried to penetrate the outer
perimeter. None got through and all were arrested for 148PC,
interfering.
D. FIELD JAIL OPERATIONS
1. Rampart Field Jail Unit
Both Rampart and Northeast Areas designated personnel for the
FJU. If the FJU was to be activated, the Area in which the
demonstration was occurring was to have command and control of
the FJU.
Originally, OCB plans called for the FJU's to be setup and
staffed with a maintenance team at 0600 hours. If activated,
the FJU maintenance team would then notify assigned personnel
to respond to the FJU site. Between March 21 and 24, 1989, ten
Rampart officers were available to respond to the FJU. On
Friday, March 24, 1989, the three Areas were directed to have a
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After Action Report
· Page 10
five person FJU team at the three primary FJU sites at 0700
hours. On Saturday, March 25, 1989, Rampart and Northeast
personnel reported to the Bellevue FJU. Hollenbeck personnel
were subsequently diverted to the Rampart FJU when they
reported for duty at Hollenbeck.
The Rampart FJU planned to use the processing method described
in the Field Jail manual with a Mobile Identification Detail
(MID). The MID teams were to be dispatched to the arrest scene
where they were to record specific facts regarding the arrest
and connect arrestees to arresting officers prior to
transportation to the FJU. At the FJU the arrestees iwere to be
prepared for release or detention in accordance with published
guidelines.
After a meeting between the OCB Operations Officer and
Metropolitan Division, the planned use of MID teams was
abandoned. Metropolitan Division agreed to have arresting
officers accompany each bus.
The first busload of arrestees arrived at the FJU at
approximately 0955 hours. No arresting officer was on the
bus. Three additional buses arrived without arresting
officers. As a result; field jail operations were stalled
before they could start, no processing could take place because
no arresting officer was present to identify the arrestees and
to give the .facts surrounding the arrest or to give a charge.
The problem was rectified when Metropolitan Division arresting
officers were sent to the FJU. The delay adversely impacted
transportation because the buses were not available to return .
to the demonstration site.
The 477 arrestees processed at the Rampart FJU nearly doubled
the projected capacity of the FJU, consequently, FJU personnel
were diverted from processing, identification, photography and
report approval functions to provide security. This further
slowed the process. An additional 40 personnel were acquired
from the CP for security and to aid in processing.
The mass arrest kits, provided by Jail Division were
deficient--they contained three empty camera boxes and no
film. Supplies ran short.
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After Action Report
Page 11
Female arrestees presented a special processing problem.
Detained arrestees needed to be DABIS'd prior to departure for
SBI. The information needed for the DABIS format was first
handwritten on a xerox form then carried by a runner to
Northeast Station and then placed in the DABIS computer. The
paperwork was then returned to the Field Jail Unit, processed
and the female arrestee transported to SBI. The process was
found to be inefficient.
As a result, the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department was
used to process the females at an LASO facility as well as at
the FJU. The Sheriff's mass arrest system proved to be
extremely efficient and effective in moving •a large number of
female arrestees in a short period of time. However, the use
of LASO for the processing of females complicated the report
distribution systems, . because no LAPD -liaison was assigned to
return the completed paperwork for entry into the LAPD records
system.
The processing of male adults from the FJU to Jail Division was .
lengthy and time consuming, even though Jail Division PM Watch
was held over to augment the booking process.
Initially Jail Division refused to give the c.ompleted DABIS
form to the transportation officer for return to the field jail
unit, but it was eventually resolved by Lieutenant
Michael Schaffer who responded to Jail Division and coordinated
this effort.
The noise level inside of the FJU made conversations and
processing difficult. The lack of a reproduction machine
further slowed operations. - The volume of arrestees taxed the
FJU operations; however, the arrestees were processed albeit
slowly.
2. Southwest Field Jail Unit
Southwest Area personnel were used to staff the Southwest FJU.
Additionally two station officers from Property Division and
two Station Officers from Southeast Jail were added to the
cadre.
The processing of arrestees was unexpectedly smooth. No
significant problems were encountered with processing, although
the FJU experienced shortages of plastic handcuffs and arrest
packages.
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After Action Report
Page 12
According to the OIC, Detective Heffernan, the FJU was directed
by the EOC to disregard the Support Services Bureau
instructions and to transport female arrestees to Van Nuys Jail
WITHOUT being DABIS'd. This effectively eliminated a
processing bottleneck and expedited ihe procedure.
At 2300 hours, after the FJU was secured, it was discovered at
Jail Division that the FJU had processed the male arrestees
· without a completed arrest report narrative. The single page
U/O arrest sheet and the 9 line face sheet were the only items
that had been processed, as per information .received from
Tactical Planning Section. No arrest reports had been
approved. Many of the OR releases had been ·processed without
. fingerprinting.
IV. CRIME AND ARREST SUMMARY
A crime report, DR #89-02-00530, was ·completed at 0800 hours by
Officer Campbell #25216. The victim was Family Planning
Associates.
There were a total of 815 arrests. Subsequently, 771 persons
were filed on for various charges while 44 cases were
rejected. For a complete listing of arrestees see Addendum
No. 3.
V. DEATH AND INJURIES
A. DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES (SWORN)
Injuries 1 lacerated finger
Deaths 0
B. ARRESTEES
MT Exams 43
Deaths 0
c. OUTSIDE AGENCIES
Injuries 0
Deaths 0
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After Action Report
Page 13
VI. PROPERTY DAMAGE
One Motor Transport Division Jail bus received minor damage during
a traffic accident while enroute to the staging area. There were
no passengers on the bus at the time of the accident.
(DR #89-11-09851)
VII. PERSONNEL
Planning for the Operation Rescue demonstrations began two weeks
prior to March 25, with the selection of the Field Command Post
(FCP) cadre.
Plans were developed to deploy 284 off ic- ers from Central Bureau for
the demonstrations. Suggestions from all Field Command Post
sections were solicited during daily meetings with
Captain McMurray, the Operations Officer.
On March 23 and 24, the operational plans were put into motion.
Sergeants were selected for squad assignments and all Central
Bureau Areas submitted their squad deployment to the Personnel
Officer.
The personnel pool procedures developed for this demonstration
worked exceptionally well. 284 Central Bureau officers were
originally assigned to the available reserve. At approximately
0945 hours, the crowd was estimated at 3,500 and the City was
placed on tactical alert. Fourteen Central Bureau squads and
approximately 50 Metropolitan Division officers and Mounted Units
were staged at the location on Westmoreland Avenue.
As the demonstration crowd continued to increase the Field
Commander made a request via the EOC for officers from Valley,
South and West Bureaus to assist in crowd containment.
Approximately 290 additional officers arrived at the FCP from other
Bureaus. Total personnel at the scene including all officers,
supervisors, Command officers and Metropolitan Division officers
with their Mounted Unit$ was 704 officers excluding FJU personnel.
The Unusual Occurrence wage report established by Tactical Planning
Section is attached as Addendum No. 4.
NOTE: There may be a discrepancy in the number of
personnel listed in the wage report submitted by
Tactical Planning Section. Numerous officers
that responded by bus from Valley, South and
West Bureaus did not report to the personnel
officer or turn in Unusual Occurrence cards.
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After Action Report
Page 14
VIII. LOGISTICS
A. COMMAND POST AND DEMONSTRATION SITE
Planning for this event involved independent operational plans
by each involved Area, with logistics support by OCB, Tactical
Planning Section, and the EOC. Each Area was responsible for
providing its own black and white and plain vehicles, as well
as ROVER radios. OCB made arrangements to provide one bus with
driver, two B-wagons, the Mobile Substation, a catering truck,
and lock cutting equipment to the involved site. Tactical
Planning Section (through the EOC) agreed to have available
sound trucks, two MERV vehicles, Mobile 1, eight additional MTD
buses with drivers, and two video crews. Nine additional buses
were supposed to be available from other Bureaus through the
EOC.
Previously the demonstrators had engaged in civil disobedience
using Kryptonite locks to thwart police efforts to arrest
them. The locks are impervious to traditional methods used in
cutting locks. Consequently, two Makita grinders and twelve
metal cutting wheels were purchased specifically for this
event. These items were not used.
B. FIELD JAIL SITES
Initially, the Rampart FJU prepared supplies to handle 100
arrestees. Some tables and chairs were provided by the
Bellevue Recreation Center. When the FJU was activated, Field
Jail Kits were requested from the EOC. Additional tables and
chairs, Polaroid cameras and fingerprinting supplies were
ordered via the EOC.
Southwest Area maintains its own field jail kit.
C. COST
Supply items used included office supplies and gasoline. The
cost of office supplies cannot be reasonably calculated because
there were neither inventory procedures nor cost breakdown
factors. The gasoline was provided at a. non-calculable level
by various entities of the Department. The use of gasoline,
however, was minimal in that the majority of police activity
was done on foot or horseback.
The grinders and cutting wheels were purchased at a cost of
$156.35.
C
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After Action Report
Page 15
IX. CRITIQUE
The event chronicled in this report is unique. A demonstration
of this type and magnitude had not been encountered by the
Department. Consequently, some of the recommendations made
throughout this critique are analysis specific to this
demonstration whereas others are more broad in their
application.
The following critique will discuss communications, Field Jail
operations, logistics, personnel, intelligence, operations and
press relations.
A. COMMUNICATIONS CRITIQUE
Several problems developed within the communications network
during the incident. Eliminating these problems in the future
will allow for a more efficient operation.
1. ROVER/Cellular Telephones
a. Maintenance - Due to heavy rainfall during the
incident the vast majority of ROVERS would not
transmit or receive messages. Additionally,
some of the ROV~Rs developed a short causing the
"help" buttons to activate. There were 26
activations causing unnecessary problems for the
Command Post, Communications Division and EOC.
Fortunately, the Command Post and the Satellite
Command Post were able to gain access to
cellular telephones. The cellular telephones
proved to be the primary mode of communication
and were the key factor in resolving the
communication problems.
It is recommended that ROVERs be kept out of
direct rainfall. During unusual occurrences
such as the instant case, the monitoring of the
frequencies by all personnel created a condition
that contributed greatly to the number of help
activations and the inherent confusion that
followed. The only persons who needed to
monitor and communicate over the ROVERs were
squad leaders and supervisors. This reduction
in th~ exposure would have significantly reduced
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After Action Report
Page 16
b.
the number of "help" activations. It is
therefore recommended that, when feasible,
ROVERs be protected from moisture by a cap
device sold by the ROVER manufacturer. Also
officers should be directed to turn off their
ROVERs. The appropriate frequencies should be
monitored by squad leaders and supervisors only.
It is also strongly recommended that cellular
telephones be ·provided to all Commanding
Officers. Again, it should be stated that the
cellular telephone utilized at the staging area
proved to be the backbone of ~he communication
system. It enabled the communication problems
to be resolved in a timely manner. A delay in
resolving the communication problems could have
resulted in an unsuccessful operation.
Frequencies - Four tactical frequencies were
reserved for the demonstration; one frequency
per Bureau. During the incident, OCB requested
but was unable to obtain a second frequency from
the EOC due to the reserve status of the
frequencies by the other Operations-Bureaus. A
second frequency is highly recommended in the
future. One frequency was needed for operations
and on~ frequency was needed for support
services (i.e. FCP, Staff Officers, Staging
Area, etc.). This would have reduced over
loading of the frequency.
c. Telephone - Prior to the start of the
demonstration the .Field Command Post was located
at Los Angeles City College. Mobile 1, MERV,
and land lines were set up and ready for
operation. At the onset of the demonstration it
became apparent that Los Angeles City College
was too far from the demonstration.
Consequently, it was moved to 4th Street and
Shatto Place causing Mobile 1 and MERV to
relocate. In doing so the staging area was
without a land line for approximately two hours
except for a cellular telephone. This caused a
lack of communication between necessary entities
(_
l-.
After Action Report
Page 17
and exacerbated any confusion. Once Mobile 1
arrived at FCP 2 (the Staging Area) a telephone
line was established within ten minutes. (MERV
was relocated to 6th and Westmoreland Avenue the
actual site of the event.)
The initial use of the cellular telephone · was
inhibited due to a lack of distribution of ·
available cellular telephone numbers.
Consequently, when possible all cellular
telephone numbers should be distributed to all
concerned personnel prior to .an incident.
It is also recommended that an open land line be
established and maintained between the FCP and
staging area to help facilitate and expedite
personnel procedures.
2. M.D.T • .
a. Deployment - The "Q" units assigned to the
· demonstration were unable to log on because they
were not deployed. It is recommended that prior
to an operation being activated the units be
deployed via the Area ACC. This can be
accomplished at the Area ACC by utilizing the
following format: SP;PW (pass word) _____ ;
WD (watch definition). If a problem occurs the
division should immediately telephone the BCC at
(5) 1400 for assistance. '
b. Operations - The M.D.T.s located in the MERV and
Mobile units should be manned by personnel
familiar with its many functions. The M.D.T.
Operator could be a police officer or trained
PSR. It should be noted that PSRs are not as
familiar with the M.D.T. as are the field
officers.
PSRs would best be utilized as radio operators
at the Divisional ACC, the FCP, staging area,
and FJU. A PSR's experience and expertise with
the ACC system is invaluable and they should be
utilized to their fullest potential.
,:.
C
C
~ ~- . .
After Action Report
Page 18
c. LOGISTICS CRITIQUE
A total of 11 Department buses, with authorized drivers, were
used to transport arrestees from the demonstration site to the
two Field Jails. Several of these buses had previously been
used to transport Department personnel from their Bureaus to
the staging area, and were commandeered for use by the FCP.
Because of processing delays at the Field Jails, the buses
could not quickly return to the staging area, and the 11 buses
proved insufficient. The EOC initially refused to provide any
of the Department's remaining seven buses, severely slowing
down the arrest process.
Subsequently five buses were provided by LASD to transport
arrestees from the Field Jail locations to permanent detention
facilities. It is suggested that arrangements be made with
LASD so that additional LASD buses will be available for future
events, as needed.
The sound truck provided by the· EOC malfunctioned possibly due
to the rain. A second sound truck arrived too late to be of
use necessitating the use of the hand held bullhorn by
Metropolitan Division. It is recommended the vehicle's sound
system be weather proofed and bullhorns be made available to
concerned personnel.
Operations-Central Bureau also arranged for a private catering
truck to be at the Field Command Post. It is recommended the
Department augment field operations with the Mobile canteen or
arrange for the presence of two private vemdors.
D. PERSONNEL CRITIQUE
The original number of personnel deployed for this
demonstration was inadequate for the number of demonstrators
that arrived at the location. Subsequently a tactical alert
was broadcast and an additional 290 officers responded to the
Command Post.
1. Relief - At least two squads should have been
assigned to relief for line officers.
2. Runners - It is essential that adequate personnel be
assigned to each entity (i.e. Field Command Post,
Staging Area, Field Jail Unit, etc.). A squad of
(
After Action Report
Page 19
E.
runners should be held at each designated location to
assist personnel in carrying out necessary duties.
This will allow the Field Commander, Personnel and
Intelligence Officers, etc. to remain at their
designated posts.
When possible, runners should be pre-selected and
briefed on their expected duties and the duties of
the individual entity they will be assigned to.
3. Squad leaders were failing to check in when
responding to the demonstration site. It is
recommended that all squad leaders check in with the
Personnel Officer immediately upon arrival and
receive a briefing as to their expected duties.
4. It is highly recommended that each site have a
check-in person at least the rank of Sergeant to
regulate the flow of personnel in and out of the site
and to assure that all officers are accounted for.
This check in system will help alleviate a
duplication of work and over deployment of
personnel. During the Operation Rescue
demonstration, officers were arriving at the FCP by
bus from other Bureaus. In many instances they
exited the bus, formed into squads and went to the
demonstration without checking in with the FCP
Personnel Officer. ·
5. It is recommended that future full deployment events
or demonstrations include police reserves, both line
and technical, to assist in staffing the FCP and line
relief positions.
INTELLIGENCE CRITIQUE
Prior to the event intelligence gathering measures were
extensive and successful. However, crowd size and number of
arrestees were underestimated.
During the actual incident and command post operations the
intelligence function nearly became dysfunctional because of a
failure in the communications system. Only one portable
cellular phone was available. It was shared with personnel,
logistics and operations.
(
\ ..
After Action Report
Page 20
F. PLANNING CRITIQUE
The planning phase of Operation Rescue was conducted during the
weeks before March 22, 1989. Meetings were conducted with OCB
Area Commanding Officers, Area planners, the scout
coordinators, and the FJU OIC'S. Meetings were also conducted
with personnel from Metropolitan Division, Operations-Valley
Bureau, Tactical Planning Section and Training Division. The
planning stage was well thought out and all appropriate
entities were contacted and considered.
The entire Bureau plan with location maps and Area plans is
attached as Addenda #5.
G. FJU CRITIQUE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. General Observations
a. The Department should· consider .utilizing the
Los Angeles Sheriff Department's mass arrest
processing system during an unusual occurrence
which taxes the department's ability to
efficiently process exceedingly large numbers of
arrestees. At the least, consideration should
be given to using Jail Division staff and
facilities to process the arrestees at an
established jail facility. This is especially
true when the arrestees are non-violent and the
return of arresting officers is paramount.
b. The ·capacity of a FJU should be limited to
between 200 and 250 arrestee. A FJU of this
size should be commanded by an officer of the
rank of captain with appropriate support staff.
c. Different John and Jane Doe numbers should be
issued at different FJU's (i.e. Rampart FJU #
Doe 2001 ..• southwwest FJU Doe 3001 .•. )
d. The. FJU processing staff should not be tasked
with security duties.
e. General modifications to the booking - DABIS
requirements could be made to streamline
paperwork. For example a handwritten DABIS form
could be used for later computer entry.
(
After Action Report
Page 21
2. Staff and Personnel
When the field jail became operational, there were
twenty-two officers assigned to the unit. It is estimated
that approximately 250 arrestees could have been processed
provided the FJU personnel were not used to staff security
positions. To properly handle the volume of arrestees
brought to Bellevue Recreation Center {447 arrestees), the
following staffing changes should have been made:
a. The size of the FJU staff should have been
doubled. Ideally the FJU was capable of
processing 200 to 250 arrestees, as long as
personnel were not diverted from the processing
duties. Nearly twice that number of arrestees
were processed.
b. A FJU Command Cadre, especially a personnel
officer, should have been assigned to the field
jail unit to log all arriving officers and to
facilitate their assignment.
c. A FJU press officer was needed to accommodate
the press. The response to press inquiries
further drained the FJU processing staff.
d. Security at the Bellevue Recreation Center FJU
needed to be enhanced. FJU officers were
involved in securing entrances and exits, the
searching of arrestees, segregating arrestees by
busloads, identification of the arresting
officer and escorting arrestees through
processing and to restrooms. Consequently, the
timely processing of arrestees suffered.
e. Runners were used for transporting u.o. packages
from the FJU to Jail Division with the arrestees
and then back to the FJU. After the packages
were completed the runners transported the u.o.
packages to Records and Identification
f.
Division. Due to the volume of arrestees
runners would have expedited the process.
An officer should have been designated for LASD
liaison to assist in the exchange of reports
between the two agencies.
After Action Report
Page 22
3. Logistics
a. The Field Jail Mass Arrest Kit should be checked
prior to delivery to the Field Jail Unit. When
the Field Jail Mass Arrest Kit was delivered to
the Bellevue Field Jail Unit the camera boxes
were opened and found to be empty.
b. Three portable fingerprinting tables should be
available. One portable fingerprinting table
was obtained from the Rampart Area CRASH Unit
and taken to the Field Jail by Rampart Detective
Division personnel. One fingerprinting table
was inadequate to handle the volume of arrestees
processed.
c. A copying machine should have been at the
Rampart site. The copying of arrest reports was
a major problem. Arrest and other reports which
required duplication became a time consuming
process. Officers assigned as "Report Runners"
had to shuttle reports from the Field Jail Unit
to Rampart Area, copy reports and bring them
back to the Field Jail Unit. An on site copier
would have expedited the process and saved
numerous hours.
d. A portable public address system such as a
bullhorn would have helped to communicate with
the arrestees who were spread over a large
area. The public address system could have also
been used to page individual officers as their
services were needed.
e. Additional telephones were needed. The use of
the public pay telephone was cumbersome and time
consuming. Calls to city entities were done
using the City 1-800 number. The pay telephone
was used by numerous entities and other law
enforcement agencies to call the Field Jail Unit
thus engaging the line for extended periods of
time. The arrival of the MERV unit did ease
this burden but a MERV unit should have been
requested and dispatched to the Field Jail
location earlier.
1 ..
L
(: •.
After Action Report
Page 23
H. OPERATIONS CRITIQUE
I.
1. It is recommended that in future large scale events
that the Command Post staff should have the benefit
of a training day conducted by Tactical Planning
Section prior to the event or demonstration. This .
would provide assigned Command Post personnel with
insight into the responsibilities of their
assignments and lead to a smoother Command Post
Operation.
2. There were no provisions made for Command Post
security. This became significant when the field
forces began moving demonstrators from the
Westmoreland area. Demonstrators were walking
through the Command Post site.
3. It is recommended that in future events of this
magnitude, the Field Commander's Aide ensure that ·the
proper designated arm bands are worn, this will
expedite accurate decisions by the proper individual
in charge thus increasing the efficiency of the
overall operation. Due to the large. number of
Department observers at the demonstration there was
confusion as to the unusual occurrence chain of
command.
4. It is recommended that in future events of this size,
that the Personnel Officer be the rank of Lieutenant~
PRESS RELATIONS CRITIQUE
. The presence of the news media at this unusual occurrence
was an asset to the Department. Notwithstanding the
complaints of Operation Rescue organizers that protesters
were improperly treated by the police, press photos and
. video tape provided by the Department was positive proof
of the professionalism of the officers and the minimal
force used.
It is recommended that the Field Command Post have the
capability of issuing temporary press passes, thereby
negating the need for personal accompaniment of bona fide
but uncredentialed journalists.
•
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Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
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Description
After-action report, unusual occurrence related to the March 25, 1989 anti-abortion demonstration in Rampart area
Asset Metadata
Core Title
After-action report, unusual occurrence related to the March 25, 1989 anti-abortion demonstration in Rampart area; operations-central bureau
Tag
OAI-PMH Harvest
Format
25 p.
(format),
application/pdf
(imt),
reports
(aat)
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-71847
Unique identifier
UC11429369
Identifier
box 33 (box),web-box33-20_21-15.pdf (filename),folder 20 - folder 21 (folder),webster-c100-71847 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
web-box33-20_21/web-box33-20_21-15.pdf
Dmrecord
71847
Format
25 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),reports (aat)
Type
texts
Tags
Folder test
Inherited Values
Title
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
Description
Chaired by former federal judge and FBI and CIA Director William H. Webster, the Los Angeles Webster Commission assessed law enforcement's performance in connection with the April, 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest. The collection consists of materials collected and studied by the Commission over the course of its investigation. Materials pertain to both the Los Angeles incident specifically, and civil disturbance, civil unrest control, and policing tactics in general.
Included in the collection are the following: interviews with LAPD officers, law enforcement personnel, government officials, community leaders, and activists; articles, broadcasts, and press releases covering the civil unrest; various tactical and contingency plans created for disasters and emergencies; reports, studies, and manuals about civil unrest control and prevention; literature about community-based policing strategies; emergency plans and procedures developed by other cities; and after-action reports issued once the civil unrest had subsided. Also featured are items related to the internal operations of the LAPD both before and during the civil unrest, including activity reports, meeting agendas and minutes, arrest data, annual reports, curricula and educational materials, and personnel rosters.
See also the finding aid (https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2266).
See also The Los Angeles Riots: The Independent and Webster Commissions Collections (https://scalar.usc.edu/works/the-los-angeles-riots-christopher-and-webster-commissions-collections/index).
Related collections in the USC Digital Library:
? Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2251)
? Richard M. Mosk Christopher Commission records, 1988-2011 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/393)
? Kendall O. Price Los Angeles riots records, 1965-1967 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/979)
? Watts riots records, 1965 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/83)
Thanks to generous support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the USC Libraries are digitizing this collection for online public access.
Coverage Temporal
1931/1992