Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

After-action report, Hollywood area's unusual occurrence, 1988-11-17

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After-action report, Hollywood area's unusual occurrence, 1988-11-17

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Content ' .. - ~ ... ) •D l ~.02.0 '4-73) INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE I ' Novent>er 17, 1988 6.1 TO: Commanaing Officer, Operations-West Bureau AIOM: Commanding Officer, Hollywood Patrol Division ~~ECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT Attached is the After Action Report for the Unusual Occurrence incident which occurred on October 31, 1988. APPROVED: . B TSON, Capt ommanding Officer Hollywood Area .. . . -. .. . .. . ~ .. . . . ~ .. , ' ·~ · - .. . -~~- '·. - '7::..- :·' ..: ~ . - -~ F:rm 15.07.0 <~2) SUBJECT After Action Re DATE I. TIIIE OCCURRED Los Angeles Police Department EMPLOYEE'S REPORT DR LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE 10/31/88 1500-0400 hours , I DIVISION OF OCCURRENCE TO: <Rank, NMw, Aui~ant, Di,isionl Camanding Officer, Hollywood l'atrol Division DETAILS: - l TABLE OF CONTENTS · Type of Occurrence •••••••••.••••••••..•.•••••.•••.••.••••..•••.• 1 Field Command Post Information .•.•..•..•.....••.•••........••... 2 Chronological Narration ..•.•.•.••••.••••••..•.•••••••.••..••••.. 3 Crimes, Property Damage, and Arrests .•••••••••.••.•.•.•.•..•••.• 6 Deaths and Injuries .••.•.•..••.••.•...••••.••.•.••.••••••••••••. 8 Personnel •••.••••••••.•.•••••...•..•.•••..•••••••.••.••••••••.•. 9 Logistics •.•.•••••.....•••••••••.•.•.•••.•.•••.••••• .•••••.•••••• 12 Critique ..•.•••••.••..•.•.•••.•...••..••••••.....•••.••••••••••• 14 NOTE: Copies of the involved crime reports are included in Appendix A, and a copy of the Halloween operations guide is included in Appendix B. TYPE OF OCCURRENCE Historically on Halloween, large numbers of pedestrians and vehicles converge upon Hollywood Area. They primarily congregate on Hollywood Boulevard and Sunset Boulevard between La Brea and Gower. A crowd of approximately 100,000 celebrants was expected. The crowds along Hollywood and Sunset Boulevards have been large on past H~lloween nights. The dominant mood has usually been one of festive celebration. In the past, hostile crowds have been relatively small in nuntl:?er but have included sophisticated political ~emonstrators, Hispanic and Black gang members, punk rockers, cruisers, and low riders, Hollywo street'people and a very large contingent of on-lookers. In preparing f this event, the potential for unlawful activity and the Department's ability to respond with sufficient manpower to control these activities was of paramount importance. In addition, the Department was concerned with maintaining control of access routes for police, fire and medical response vehicles. :.. DATE£ TIME l'Yf'ED DIVN. IPTCi. Cl.ERK EMPLOYEE<Sl REPORTING SElt. NO. DMI . Sgt. M. Schneider 21595 HWD . . ... . • -. . . ., . ..... .. After Action Report - Halloween " Page Two 6.1 FIELD COMMAND POST INFORMATION fl In an effort to provide sufficient traffic and crowd control, protect property and prevent crime, a maximum deployment plan was instituted on all three Hollywood Area watches. Personnel needs extended beyond Hollywood Area's capabilities, necessitating assistance from Tactical Planning Section, Metropolitan Division, West Traffic Division, the Mounted Unit, Air Support Division, the Department of Transportation, and Operations-West Bureau CRASH. The hours of occurrence were f.rom 1500 hours, October 31, 1988, to 0500 hours November 1, 1988. The Field Command Post was iocated at Hollywood Station. The Field Command Post was staffed by a Field Commander, an Operations Officer, Radio Operator, Journal Clerk, Staging and Locations Officer, Personnel Officer, Intelligence Officer, Jail Supervisor, and Traffic Control Officer (TCO) Supervisor. In addition, there was telephonic liaison with the California Highway Patrol. During the entire event the Commanding Officer, Hollywood Patrol -:'Division, was present to advise and direct as necessary. The Mobile Emergency Response Vehicle (MERV) .was present at the Field Command Post during the entire event • • .. 1 .-- A f ter Action Report Page Three · 6.1 ! CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATION On October 30, 1988, prior to 1600 hours, "No Parking Tow Away Zone" signs were posted on both sides of Hollywood and Sunset: Boulevards between La Brea and Gower Avenues. The Department of Street Maintenance delivered wooden street barricades to every intersection along Hollywood and sunset Boulevards from La Brea to Gower Avenues. On October 31, 1988, at 1500 hours, the Command Post Cadre assembled and the Command Post was activated. Additionally, Captain T. King, Commanding Officer, Hollywood Patrol Division, was present to direct and advise as necessary. ROVER 6 was restricted for Hollywood Area for this incident. At 1600 hours the Task Force roll call was conducted. The task force consisted of seven squads, each directed by a sergeant. Three squads were deployed as footbeat units on Hollywood Boulevard between La Brea and Gower. An additional squad in vehicles was deployed in the same area as a quick response unit. The pri~ary function of these four squads was crowd control and crime suppression. In addition, one B-Wagon was deployed along Hollywood Boulevard to facilitate arrests, RFC's and evidence. One Metropolitan Division .squad in vehicles, was ·deployed as a crime suppression unit between Hollywood Boulevard and Franklin Avenue. Another squad of Metropolitan Division officers was deployed between Hollywood Boulevard and Sunset Boulevard. The last squad was deployed along Sunset Boulevard to handle crowd control and crime suppression. In addition, twenty motor officers were deployed on motorcycles along Hollywood Boulevard to assist with crowd control. A contingent of vice officers consisting of 1 sergeant and 3 officers was deployed as intelligence officers. At 1630 hours the Department of Transportation began impounding and citing vehicles illegally parked along Sunset and Hollywood Boulevards. The Mounted Vnit, consisting of two sergeants and 12 police officers, moved into the staging area at the Blessed Sacrament Church, 6657 Sunset Boulevard. Their primary function was crowd control. , . . \.. ' After Action Report - Halloween Page Four 6.1 At 1700 hours, a roll call was held for Metropolitan Division. Present were one Lieutenant, two sergeants and 20 officers. Their primary function was crime suppression. By 1715 hours, all Task Force Units were deployed in the affected area. At 1830 hours, a second roll call with 33 Traffic Control Officers was conducted. They were assigned to major intersections for traffic control. At 1900 hours they were at their posts. At 2008 hours, gridlock-necessitated the closure of Hollywood Boulevard between La Brea and Gower Avenues to vehicle traffic. In addition, the CHP closed the Hollywood Freeway off-ramps at Hollywood Boulevard and Sunset Boulevard. At 2015 hours, the Mounted Unit detail was deployed on Hollywood Boulevard between Highland Avenue and Vine Street. For the next two hours the size of the crowd grew, ultimately reaching approximately 100,000 people. Along Hollywood Boulevard, pedestrians occupied the entire sidewalk, the parking lane, and the number two lane. The crowd often occupied the entire roadway. There were numerous incidents of beer throwing, sporadic rock and bottle throwing and other disturbance related activity. Several arrests were made pursuant to these criminal violations. At 2205 hours, the crowd had become very unruly, completely occupying the intersection of Hollywood Boulevard and Highland Avenue. Rocks and bottles were being thrown at officers at Hollywood Boulevard and Wilcox Avenue, Hollywood Boulevard and Hudson Avenue, and Hollywood Boulevard and Whitley Avenue. The Air Unit reported that there was sporadic rock and bottle throwing in the area of Hollywood Boulevard and Gower Street. A major disturbance involving window smashing was reported. It should be noted that officers of the Observation Post (O.P.) observed the locations of several calls and saw no criminal activity • . Due to the rad'io frequencies being overloaded, officers at the OP's were unable to notify the command post or the Operations Officer of their observations. When officers did respond to these radio calls, the crowd became even more agitated. It appeared to the vice officers manning the OP's that the calls were false and had been made purposely to escalate the already aggravated situation. Air 10 advised of numerous large and unruly groups throwing rocks and bottles and surging onto the entire roadway. At approximately 2240 hours the widely separated groups of officers were tactically disadvantaged and ih danger. It was also apparent tha the crowd was an unlawful assembly ,,-and eventually would have to be dispersed with squad formations • • . After Action Report - Halloween Page Five 6.1 In order to facilitate this plan, the Task Force officers, Metropolitan Division officers, the Mounted Unit, and all the Motor Units were assembled on Cherokee Avenue north of Hollywood Boulevard. At approximately 2310 hours, Air 10 broadcast the declaration of an unlawful assembly and instructed the crowd to disperse north and south from Hollywood Boulevard. Five minutes were allowed for compliance. During that period of time, Air 10 noted that the announcement had no discernible effect in dispersing the crowd. Vice officers in the crowd reported hearing the announcement. At approximately 2330 hours, five squads of task force officers, two squads of Metropolitan officers, one squad of CRASH officers and two squads from the Mounted Unit were deployed to clear Hollywood Boulevard of the now unlawfully assembled and unruly crowd. A skirmish line consisting of mounted officers, backed by a double skirmish line of officers on foot backed by a third skirmish line of officers, was utilized. The plan was to divide the crowd on Hollywood Boulevard at Cherokee. A portion of the crowd was moved west to Highland. The remainder of the crowd was moved east to Vine Street. This operations took approximately 20 minutes. During the dispersal of the crowd, at about 2345 hours, looting was reported at Hollywood and Vine. At approximately 2400 hours, a tactical alert was declared, ten units and 2 sergeants were requested to assist with looters on Hollywood Boulevard. Radio calls relating to burglaries in progress were handled by these additional units. When the crowd was dispersed, order was maintained by squads of officers holding Hollywood Boulevard free of pedestrian and vehicular traffic until approximately 0200 hours. At that time, Hollywood Boulevard and the Hollywood Freeway were opened to normal traffic. At 0400 hours the command post was deactivated. / / . Af.ter Action Report - Halloween Page Six 6.1 CRIMES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE Several businesses along Hollywood Boulevard received varying amounts of property damage ranging from broken windows to the complete ransacking of a retail store. Wide spread looting occurred at British Imports, located at 6303 Hollywood Boulevard. Numerous attempts by LAPD officers to complete a crime report have been unsuccessful. The following is a list of crimes that have been DR# LOCATION VICTIM 880645233 5958 Hollywood Bl X-Theatre 880645221 6349 Hollywood Bl Regal Shoes 880645203 6328 Hollywood Bl HWD Hallmark 880645313 6363 Hollywood Bl Junk for Joy 880645347 6355 Hollywood Bl Stars Fashion 880645346 6366 Hollywood Bl 2-SHA 880654344 6378 Hollywood Bl Domain 880645328 6394 Hollywood Bl Shaky's Wigs 880645194 CITY PROPERTY · Cahuenga/Hollywood City of L.A. ARRESTS A total of 26 arrests were made: Felony 12 males 2 Females Misdemeanor 11 males 1 Female . FELONY MALES reported. CRIME 459/Vand 459/Vand 459/Vand Vandalism . Vandalism Vandalism Vandalism Vandalism BFMV 01077923 459 P.C. DAMAGE $500 $500 $1,000 $900 $2,000 $200 $160 $300 $2,000 Cole, Robert James Cornejo, Carlos Cox, Steven Gary Green, Anthony Gonzalez, Gilbert Holiway, James James, Robert D. Johnaon, Dominic Strciahine, Joseph CorDeqo, Carlos A. wdtherbee, Kenneth ·00114391 001094276 001094159 001094257 001094226 001094247 00114986 01094348 1094092 1077926 1077929 Vandalism of Police Vehicle 495 P.C. ~anow, Christian ? • 245 (A) P.C. 12020 (A) P.C. 459 P.C. 245 (B) P.C. 459 P.C. 245 (B) P.C. 602 WIC (459 PjC.) 459 P.C. 602 WIC 459 PC Arter Action Report - Halloween Page Seven 6.1 FELONY FEMALES Pinchback, Miriam_R. Sewell, Michael R. MISDEMEANOR MALES Chacon, Sual Fair, Terry Gil, Pedro Giron, Pedro Hay, Craig Lee, Christopher Leff, Mathew Olguin, Rafael Sullivan, Patrick ·Tamanaha, Richard Enriquez, Raul Masseria, Charlene R. I MISDEMEANOR -FEMALE Masseria, Charlene R. I , .. 01093999 00114389 00114390 00114201 00114399 00114397 0011492 00114393 001094263 00114398 001094210 0011440 0014395 1094008 1094008 . 211 PC 245 PC 243 PC Warrant Warrant 23152 A V.C. 148 P.C. Warrant 404 A P.C. 502 Warrant .23152 A. P.C. 602 WIC 242 P.C. 23152 A V.C. 23152 (A) V.C. After Action Report - Halloween Page Eight 6.1 DEATHS AND INJURIES •' Police Officer III Burton R. Franks #12426, Hollywood Patrol Division, received a sprained knee when he tripped while in a squad formation at Hollywood Boulevard and Cherokee Avenue. Officer James Reid #23653, Metropolitan Division, received a ·contusion of the right eye when he was hit by an egg thrown by a pedestrian at Gower Street and Santa Monica Boulevard. - Miriam Pinchback, Booking #109399, received a strained back when taken into custody for 211 PC at Vine and Yucca. - Charlene Masseria, Booking #1094008, received cuts and abrasions while being taken into custody for 23152 A VC at LaBrea and Sunset. Anthony Green, Booking #1094159, received a broken leg when he was arrested for 245 A P.C., at Highland Boulevard and Hollywood Boulevard. Gilbert Gonzales, Booking #1094257, received a laceration to his right ear while being taken into custody for 12020 A P.C. · Joseph Stroshine, Booking #1094348, received a broken ankle while being . taken into custody for Assault With a Deadly Weapon on a Police Officer at Orange Drive and Hawthorne Avenue_ ., : . : I t . .... . .- ·· ... - - . - . - ~ .of,,. After Action Report Page Nine V 6.1 PERSONNEL Deployment consisted DIV/Unit LT Hollywood 1 Metropolitan 1 Mounted Unit 0 Tactical Plan. 0 Communicat1ons 0 Air Support 0 Dept/Transp. 1 Motors WTD 0 *OBW CRASH 0 of the following SGT OFCRS DETS 9 66 4 2 20 0 2 12 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 20 0 1 10 0 · ' officers: PSRs TCO SUPV TCO so 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 39 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 The following is a list of involved personnel and their assignments: Field Commander - Lieutenant P. Marks Assistant Field Commander/Operations Officer - Sergeant Schneider Radio Operator - PSR s. Carnine Journal Clerk - PSR H. Mott Staging Officer - Officer Stubeck Logistics Officer - Officer M. Kidd Personnel Officer - Sergeant R. Whittington Intelligence Officer - Officer M. Pelletier Field Jail Supervisor - Sergeant R. Fox Traffic Control Liaison - Lieutenant Brown (D.O.T.) *OWB CRASH personnel were working in the Hollywood Area but were not specifically assigned to the Task Force until called to the Command Post at 2300 hours. , , / ,, / ,, I . "· . ... I ••· • _ ,.,.__ After Action Report Page Ten 6.1 The following are. the man hours expended and the ~osts incurred for this incident. SWORN Captain I 8 hours straight time at $32.90 4 hours overtime at $32.90 Lieutenant II 8 hours straight time at $29.88 1.5 hours overtime at $44.82 Lieutenant I 8.5 hours straight time at $28.30 8.5 hours overtime at $42.45 Sergeant II 42.3 hours straight time at $24.06 12 hours overtime at $36.09 Sergeant I 100.8 hours straight time at $22.78 60 hours overtime at $34.17 Detective II 17 hours straight time at $22.78 2 hours overtime at $34.17 P.O. 3+I 17.5 hours straight time at $20.44 18 hours overtime at $30.66 P.O. III 462.2 hours straight time at $19.36 148.8 hours overtime at $29.05 P.'O. 2+2 179.1 hours straight time at $20.44 29 hours overtime at $30.66 P.O. 11: :372. 5 hours straight time at $18. 34 211.9 hours overtime at $27.51 P.O. I 174 hours straight time at $17.37 104.8 hours overtime at $26.06 SWORN TOTALS Stralght Time OVe¢ime Tcltal Wages I =263.20 =131.60 =239.04 =67.23 =$240.55 =$360.83 =$1,017.74 =$433.08 =$2,296.22 =$2,050.20 =$387.26 =$68.34 =$357.70 =$551.88 =$8,948.19 =$4,321.15 =$3,660.80 =$889.14 =$6,831.65 =$5,829.37 =$3,022.38 =$2,731.09 =$27,264.73 =$17,433.91 =$44,f:98.64 After Action Report Page Eleven 6.1 CIVILIANS TCO Supv. III 8 hours straight time at $18.64 TCO Supv. IV 24 hours straight time at $16.63 TCO 312 hours straight time at $13.58 66.5 hours overtime at $20.40 Station Officer 8 hours straight time at $13.68 4.5 hours overtime at $20.52 CIVILIAN TOTALS Straight Time Overtime Total Total Personnel Costs '· . I --~ ,> • I =$149.12 =399.12 =$4,236.96 =$1,336.20 =$328.32 =$277.02 =$5,113.52 =$1,613.22 =$6,726.74 =$51,425.38 ... · · • . .s- After Action Report - Halloween Page Twelve 6.1 LOGISTICS The following is a list of equipment used during the Halloween night incident: 1 2 458 1 10 14 50 1 27 34 22 ITEM Bus Mass Arrest Kit Barricades . MERV Van Vehicles (Plain or B/W) ROVER Barricades B-Wagon Blk/Wht Vehicle Plain Vehicle 2 Wheel Motors FROM Jail Division Jail Division Street Maintenance . Tactical Planning Section Motor Transportation Division Property Division Hollywood Area Hollywood Area Wilshire, Hollywood, Rampart, Central Hollywood, Central West Traffic Division The following is a summary of the vehicles involved. TYPE WTD WILSHIRE HOLLYWOOD RAMPART CENTRAL TOTAL B/W 0 6 15 6 0 27 Plain 0 0 11 0 23 34 2 Wheel Motor 22 0 0 0 0 22 B~wagon · O 0 1 0 0 1 MERV 1 0 0 0 0 1 Total Number of Vehicles Used 85 Cost of Vehicles Since we do not know the exact location of each unit prior to assignment to the u.o., co~t per vehicle will be co~puted by use of the following formula: · · · cost. ~le , 0 ,,.Cost Cost =distance from area station to and from C011111and Post multiplied by the average cost to run each vehicle for one mile. =Wilshire station to CP and back is 10 miles. · Cost per mile for black and white is .36/mile. · =10 miles X .36 =3.60 . After Action Report Page Thirteen 6.1 Division ~ WTD 2 Whl. Wilshire B/W . Hollywood B/W Hollywood Plain Hollywood B Wagon Rampart B/W Central Plain Tac Plan. MERV Distance to C/P* 35 10 5 5 5 12 16 16 I • # Vehicles Total f Cost per Miles Mile** 22 770 .36 6 60 .36 15 75 .36 11 55 .28 1 5 .46 6 72 .36 23 386 .28 1 16 .42 Total Vehicular Cost *Distance to C/P and back, or miles driven **Costs per mile are approximate AIR SUPPORT COSTS Number of Hours 1.3 Cost per Hour 112.00 Total Logistical Costs Police Vehicles Air Support Total Cost $484.28 $145.60 $629.82 TOTAL DEPARTMENTAL EXPENDITURES , Personnel Costs - $51,425.38 Logistical Costs - $ 629.82 Total Cost $52,055.20 , , / ,,.,,,, / j ' . .. Total Cost 145.60 Total Cost 277.20 21.60 27.00 15.40 2.30 25,92 108.08 6.72 484.22 After Action Report - Halloween ' Page Fourteen 6.1 CRITIQUE ., I As stated in the Halloween operations Guide, the mission of the Task Force was _ as follows: .... Primary - Control vehicle and pedestrian traffic on Hollywood and Sunset Boulevards from La Brea Avenue t°o Gower Avenue and suppress crime within the affected area. Secondary- Maintain and control emergency access routes within the affected area. • I . • The maJor goal of the operation was to ensure the safety of the public and to protect property. Felony violators were to be arrested. Misdemeanor violators might be arrested or cited. The Field Commander had to ensure that the available manpower in the affected area was ·not depleted to the point where officers and citizen safety became jeopardized. With these operational goals in ·mind, several issues must be addressed. PLANNING There was an intense effort expended in coordinating the development of the Halloween Operations Guide. Still, there were last minute personnel t .'· S"changes. The logistic needs ot the operation necessitated a few ft , ht~ v modifications throughout the incident. A~~,i,tJonaL.eff. or_t_is __ fl~~g~_ cLta- -- 1 I •' de_ y~J:9l?_ a more effici~nt: ___ 90~~ -~ii __ pg_ ~~ ---~~g;--e. This issue will be addressed ( 1 in the personnel section of the critique. .- _... ~ - INTELLIGENCE The historical information presented in the Halloween Operations Guide gave no indication of the magnitude of violence which w6uld develop. ~e project~d eize of the crowd was at 100,000. This turned out to be an accurate estimate. However the dominant mood of the crowd changed rapidly from "one of celebration" to one of criminal intent. The initial spark for the violence appeared to be .' a lawful arrest which caused the crowd to become excited and seemed to prompt chanting. Within a few more minutes, rocks and bottle throwing began, and eventually looting took place. However, close monitoring of the crowd provided no prior indication of its intent. Intelligence confirmed only a large crowd nearing 100,000. This certsinly was not unexpected nor unusual for Halloween night on Hollywood Boulevard. 1/ ' , ~ {--: ... ·' ,J;. After Action Report - Halloween Page Fifteen 6.1 There has been some suggestion that "outside agitators" -were responsible for escalating the situation. However, examination of the data revealed nothing extra ordinary. Of the 26 arrests, 10 resided outside of the Hollywood Area, one as far away as Palm Springs. · These arrest statistics are consistent with the demographics of crowds traditionally lured to Hollywood on Halloween. Perhaps the riotous behavior of the crowd reflects a disturbing trend regarding crowd control. In light of increased juvenile, narcotic, and gang activity, it seems apparent that the. Department will have to deploy for massive crowd control situations on an increasing basis. In order to plan and control future occurrences of this nature, it is suggested that additional intelligence officers, as many as 20, be utilized \ to monitor more closely the mood of the crowd and as many as 10 (1~- \{'·observations posts be utilized. Also, it is suggested that a tactical ~ : ri <;>perat~ons center be established at the command post to manage and display ,~ intelligence for the· use of the field commander. PERSONNEL Based on the assumptions made in the Halloween Operations Guide, the deployment of field officers was sufficient to handle a "celebrative" crowd of 100,000. However, when the mood became riotous, a far larger field force was needed. The success of the field task force in preventing increased violence involved the quick response to the crowd's mood change. This was achieved through an immediate formation of nine squads used in the dispersal of the crowd. In the future, the following personnel changes are suggested: ' f~ 1) 1 . ) tncrease the size of the command post staff. Institute training ,\ , ,\·.~·to improve the efficiency of command post personnel. Maintain tp: t,\l · ~ : close supervision of the command post's activities. It is . • , ~ u v~· recommended that the command post deploy a sergeant and two \ officers dedicated exclusively to the personnel section. It is recommended that next year, Mobile-7 be utilized for the command post. It is further recommended that the command post staff be as follows. Field c0111nander (Captain) Executive Officer (Lieutenant) Operations Officer (Sergeant I) Assistant Operations Officer (Police Officer) Personnel Officer (Sergeant I) · Assistant Personnel Officers ( Two Police Officers) Intelligence Officer (Sergeant II-Vice) Intelligence Staff-To staff 10 Observation Posts To Field 20 Scouts .~ .. After Action Report - Halloween Page Sixteen 6.1 2) 3) 4) 5) _ . EQUIPMENT .. Logistics Officer (Sergeant I) Assistant Logistics Officer (Two Police Officers) Press Relations Officer (From Press Relations) Radio Operators (Three plus one relief) Journal Clerks (Three plus one relief) In addition, it is recommended that three radio frequencies be utilized as follows: -command Frequency -Operations Frequency -Intelligence Frequency Provide for as many as 20 plain clothes vice officers in the crowd, plus 10 observations posts. All on a separate frequency. Increase the field task force to 10 squads for crowd control. Utilize Metropolitan Division at full divisional strength for crowd control.- Maintain a full contingent of 40 horses on the Hollywood Boulevard. The logistics of this operation was sufficient overall. There was, however, a shortage of vehicles. This occurred as unused vehicles were prematurely returned to Motor Transport Division. Additionally, as has · been suggested, attention needs be given to augmenting the logistics of the command post itself, i.e. furniture. MISSION -· As defined 1n the Halloween Operations Guide, the mission's three goals were to 1) control the effected area 2) prevent crime, and 3) facilitate the movement of pedestrians and vehicles. However, special emphasis should be placed on preventing property damage and looting. The additional personnel suggested above will facilitate this goal. ; 1 >-- t ; " 1· - / •- - ~ After Action Report - Halloween Page Seventeen 6.1 OIPERATION M-indicated by the chronology, the implementation of the tactics used ifoba.bly prevented far more ~evere riot~ng. However judicious and heavy QISe of the crossbow arrest circle technique _ would be very effective in . c:j,ntrolling vandalism and looting. It does however, require a relatively large number of squads of well-conditioned officers. Emphasis should be pl~ced on arresting felony suspects and those who fail to disperse. In order to not deplete the field force, additional squads and the implementation of some sophistated tactics such as using two squads in a pincer movement would be wise. Additionally, the presence of additional officers would have encouraged more arrests. ccmroNICATIONS Initially the Mobile Emergency Response Vehicle (MERV) was parked behind Hollywood Station under the metal overhang. This contributed to poor radio reception. Eventually the MERV was moved out from under the overhang which improved the quality of radio transmissions. ·However, the frequency was still over loaded due to the number of radio transmissions. In order to improve communications, it is suggested that three frequencies be utilized, one each for intelligence, operations and command transmissions. TACTICS In the aftermath of the incident questions have been raised concerning the wisdom of closing Hollywood Boulevard to vehicular traffic (Letters to The Times Metro Section, L.A. Times, November 10, 1988). Historically extremely large crowds gather on Hollywood Boulevard on Halloween. Total -gridlock is experienced because the density of pedestrian activity is so great th•t '. eyen the sidewalks become full. The crowd of pedestrians a,erflows onto the street further aggravating the vehicular gridlock. This oandition greatly potentiates, confrontation and violence. The ability of .,i/-1.- ·.Po_ lice and fire personnel to ·respond in a timely manner in such a ~ -,··. grid.locked condition is greatly reduced. There have been incidents in the .. - .~ ~ - . . ~~~:paJlt ·where emergency personn~l were unable to respond to calls for service . . i~~dwl~ the massive crowd conditions. In order to preclude this situation, -~ ~:-=-- ~~:_:.~'?"-OD hours, the field conmander elected to close Hollywood Boulevard to · "'~~,-~ : -V4._ll.ar traffic. This decision was based on the fact that vehicular . ..:~?:·~- ~ ---- '.~k existed from Vermont to La Brea and that pedestrians had occupied , _ ~ :-- _-~ - ~:_ ~.,_. . · : ... ire sidewalk and parking lane. Additionally, the Hollywood Freeway · -~ - -:~ - - . - . s connecting with Hollywood Boulevard were bumper ~o bumper for one ~ >-if'- . ~" in either direction. . . >-;~ i-~- /t . ::~~~,-- ·=· E i·••·· ~;;:·_- ~~~\ . 'i:·~ ~ - ~ --~ if ~ -- l ... .. . ... A~ter Action Report - Halloween Page Eighteen " 6 .1 As the crowd continued to grow, large portions ot ... Hollywood Boulevard were completely occupied by pedestrians. In order to maintain an accessible pathway for emergency vehicles on Hollywood Boulevard, pedestrians were encouraged to remain out of the roadway. However, there was not sufficient space on the sidewalk to accomodate all of the citizens. This may have contributed to a general feeling of frustration. Aggravating the situation further, it was obvious that large segments of the crowd expected a parade. Officers continually announced to the crowd via various public address systems that there was no parade. This, however, was not effective. It is recommended that, in the future, the media be used extensively to inform the public that no parade is planned for Halloween. In addition, earlier closing of the freeway off-ramps may help alleviate massive traffic congestion. To provide greater freedom for the pedestrian traffic, officers will maintain only the two center lanes for emergency vehicle use. Pedestrians will be allowed to use the remainder of the roadway. / ,, I , / ,, ·-

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Description

After-action report, Hollywood area's unusual occurrence on Halloween October 31, 1988, reported, 1988-11-17

Asset Metadata

Core Title After-action report, Hollywood area's unusual occurrence, 1988-11-17

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 19 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), reports (aat)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-71848

Unique identifier UC11429371

Identifier box 33 (box),web-box33-20_21-16.pdf (filename),folder 20 - folder 21 (folder),webster-c100-71848 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier web-box33-20_21/web-box33-20_21-16.pdf

Dmrecord 71848

Format 19 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),reports (aat)

Type texts