Close
About
FAQ
Home
Collections
Login
USC Login
Register
0
Selected
Invert selection
Deselect all
Deselect all
Click here to refresh results
Click here to refresh results
USC
/
Digital Library
/
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
/
After-action report, West Los Angeles area's unusual occurrence, truck bomb at IRS, 1990-03-14
(USC DC Other)
After-action report, West Los Angeles area's unusual occurrence, truck bomb at IRS, 1990-03-14
PDF
Download
Share
Open document
Flip pages
Contact Us
Contact Us
Copy asset link
Request this asset
Transcript (if available)
Content
······• \ I • Marc:h 14, 1990 6.3 INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED MAR 1 9 1990 OFFICE OF THE. CHIEF OF POLICE ., REC E i :j • . . , , ~: J l".J fl. ..., . Md l 9 1·r•na j;:;' CHIEF c ; r: . .._.,.., _ · ' 0 li-!t·F TOI Commanding Officer, West Le• Angele• Area FROM1 Commanding Officer, WLA Patrol Division SUBJECT1 UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE AFTER-ACTION REPORT Attached is the After-Action Report of the West Los Angeles Area ~n~sual occurrence of February 22, 1990. The incident involved a truck bomb and occurred at 11500 W. Olympic Boulevard, which contains an office of the Internal Revenue S•rvica • . ~/~ [/u-kY!~rY . ~ V.M. PROCTOR, Captain Commanding Officer West Los Angeles Patrol Division <. . . L :-1L l . , ~ - c I {)':Iv TYPE OF OCCURRENCE UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE 1,FTER ACTION REPORT FEBRUARY 22, 1990 "Truck Bomb". Target: Internal Revenue Service office, 11500 Olympic Boulevard West Los Angeles. BACKGROUND/INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY Within the past two years the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) office, located in the First National Bank building, 11500 West Olympic Boulevard, fifth floor, has been the site of two bbmbings. The first incident occurred two years ago when unidentified suspect(s) parked a car loaded with explosives and other chemicals in the building's subterranean garage. Detonation occurred causing minor damage to the parking structure. The second incident occurred approximately one year ago. The unidentified suspect(s) attached a detonation device and explosives to three power poles located on Tennessee Avenue at Colby Avenue. The power poles are located one quarter block south of Olympic Boulevard. Although the power poles and lines appear~d to feed electricity to the First National Bank building and the IRS office, they did not service the building. Subsequent investigation revealed that the detonation device had activated. However, no explosion occurred. Criminal Conspiracy Section (CCS) and Anti-Terrorist Division (ATD), .linked these occurrences to similar occurrences in Los Angeles and Orange counties. Consequently, Anti-Terrorist Diwision had summarily initiated periodic surveillance of the IRS office at 11500 West Olympic Boulevard. West Los Angeles (WLA) Patrol Division was al$O aware of the threat level at the location and provided it with extra patrol. The Westside Division, Department of Transportation (DOT), was also aware of the previous incidents and had established an unofficial "No Tow" policy concerning "suspicious" vehicles parked adjacent to the IRS office. NOTE: The manager of the First National Bank building reported that, previous to the incident in question, the concerned truck had been parked north-bound, on Colby Avenue, south of Olympic Boulevard, and it had received several parking citations. LOCl\TION The location of the incident was 11500 West Olympic Boulevard. The "truck bomb" was parked south-bound on the west side of Colby Avenue . approximately forty feet south of Olympic Boulevard. After Action Report -Page 2 ~----------- - - -------"7 Eventually the incident perimeter encompassed Tennessee Avenue on the south, Barrington Avenue on the west, La Grange Avenue on the north, and Sawtelle Avenue on the east. DATE/TIME/DURATION The incident occurred on Thursday, February 22, 1990. West Los Angeles Patrol Division was notified of the incident at 0615 hours. The incident terminated at 1930 hours. FIELD COMMAND POST INFORMATION Location of Command Post The initial command post was at Butler Avenue and ~ississippi Avenue. Once d Tactical Alert was called, the Command Post was re located to Stoner Park, 11759 Missouri Avenue. A satellite staging area was unofficially established by the Bomb Squad, Anti-Terrorist Division, and Criminal Conspiracy Section across the street from the bomb, between Colby Avenue and Butler Avenue on Olympic Boulevard. Command Post Staffina Level Staff Officer present - Commander James Jones, Commanding Officer, Operations West Bureau Field Commander - Captain I Vance Proctor, Commanding Officer West Los Angeles Patrol Division Executive Officer - Lieutenant II Ronald Hall, Commanding Officer, West Los Angeles Detective Division. Operations Officer - Sergeant II Jeff Hanson, 'Assistant Watch Commander, Day Watch, WLA Patrol Division Staging Officer - Sergeant I Stan Schott, WLA pratrol Division. Intelligence Officer - Sergeant! James Mascola, WLA Patrol Division Personnel Officer - Sergeant I Stan Schott, WLA Patrol Division Aid to Personnel - P.O. III Robert Lewis, WLA Patrol Division Officer Aid to Personnel - P.O. I Sergio Guzman, WLA Patrol Division Officer Logistics Officer - P.O. III Frank Pettinato, WLA Patrol Division Communications - P.O. III+I Don Evans, WLA Patrol Division Officer After Action Report ~Page 3 Journal Keeper - P.O. I H.C. Henry, WLA Patrol Division· Aide~ to Field Commander - All from West Los Angeles Patrol Division Sergeant I Russel Kilby Sergeant I Robert Smith P.O. I Lynn Arceneaux Mobile Command Post Vehicles Initially, the M.E.R.V. van responded and was utilized at the first Command Post location. It was also utilized for a short period at the second Command Post site, Stoner Park. Thereafter, it was replaced by Mobile-5. CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATION Outlined herein are the significant incident developments along with the tactics and strategy that resulted from those ~evelopments. At approximately 0150 hours Station 59, Los Angeies Fire Department ( L.A.F.D.), responded to a vehicle t"ire at Colby Avenue and Olympic Boulevard. Fire Station 59 is located at Butler Avenue and Olympic Boulevard (approximately 200 feet east of the incident location). The firefighters were apprehensive about the circumstances and condition of the fire. It had been emitting strangely colored flames and smoke. Consequently, they elected to fight the fire from across the street, approximately 100 feet away. At 0320 hours, the fire was extinguished. Although extinguished, firefighters were still apprehensive about the circumstances of the fire. The source of the fire was an unknown substance contained in fifty-five gallon drums in the bed of a pick-up truck. Some of the drums had pipes protruding from them. Concerned that the drums contained a hazardous substance, Station 59 contacted the ·Los Angeles County Hazardous Material Unit. After the involved area was marked with yellow caution tape, but prior to the response of the Los Angeles County ~azardous Material Unit, the firefighters cleared the scene. Between 0600 and 0615 hours, County Hazardous Material workers and an officer from Anti-Terrorist Division, who was routinely checkirig on the location, responded to the scene. The ATD officer notified various entities of the found explosive device, and subsequently Detective Headquarters Division Detectives, Anti-Terrorist Division Detectives, Criminal Conspiracy Section Detectives, Bomb Squad officers and WLA Patrol Division officers were dispatched. At 0615 hours West Los Angeles Division A. M~ Watch supervisors arrived at the scene in order to investigate a "possible explosive device" radio call. They received no direction by the entities on the scene and were allowed to walk upon the concerned truck and surrounding area. Afterward, they were advised that the vehicle possibly contained toxic and hazardous materials coupled with a possible explosive device. Thereafter, .they closed Olympic Boulevard between Purdue Avenue and Barrington Avenue. The Department of Transportation assisted in the street closure. The West Los Angeles Day Watch Commander, Sergeant II Jeff Hanson, who was now on duty, J After Action Report .Page 4 was notified. He responded to the scene and assumed command of the incident. At approximately the same time, Lieutenant Lang, Officer In-Charge of the Bomb Squad, responded and assessed the situation. He was the only specialized entity that addressed uniformed personnel. Contrary to his assurance of safety, patrol personnel were alarmed by the situation. Consequently, they referred to the U. s. Department of Transportation's Emeraency Response Guidebook for Hazardous Material Incidents. Keeping with its guidelines, West Los Angeles Patrol personnel expanded the perimeter and re-located to a safer distance from the bomb. A Command Post was established on Butler Avenue north of Olympic Boulevard. The enlarged perimeter involved: Barrington Avenue on the west, Tennessee on the south, Sawtelle Blvd on the east and Mississippi Avenue on the north. Communications was advised and tactical frequency six was restricted. Additional Department ~f Transportation personnel and a supeivisor were requested and arrived within minutes. Additional West Los Angeles Patrol units, two Wilshire Patrol Division units and West Traffic Division Motor Units responded. Despite specific requests to have a liaison officer from the Los Angeles Fire Department and the specialized detective personnel responding to the scene, only Patrol, Traffic and Department of Transportation personnel participated in the Command Post. The M.E.R.V. van arrived shortly after the Command Post was established. At 0840 hours Captain Proctor, West Los Angeles Patrol Division, arrived on the scene. Captain Proctor directed that Press Relations be contacted and a representative directed to the Command Post as soon as possible. At approximately 0910 hours Commander Jones, Commanding Officer, Operations West Bureau, arrived on scene. Together, Captain Proctor and Commander Jones conferred with representatives of the Bomb Squad. They learned that the concerned vehicle was loaded with explosives and chemicals and that the potential public hazard was great. If the explosive material rtetonated, two to four blocks would be involved. Anyone in the i mmediate area would most certainlv be killed. At 0935 hours Captain Proctor assumed command of the incident and assigned his staff. The perimeter was enlarged to include La Grange Avenue on the north, Temescal Avenue on the south, Sawtelle on the east and Barrington on the west. Captain Proctor called a Tactical Alert and requested 50 officers and five sergeants. Stoner Park was designated as the new Command Post site. A decision was made to evacuate; however, adequate personnel had not arrived to carry out an orderly controlled evacuation. Los Angeles Fire Department, Battalion Chief Anthony, who had arrived on scene, was instrumental in causing contact with the Los Angeles Unified School District, the American Red Cross, the Department of Animal Regulation, and the Department of Parks and Recreation. Department of Transportation supervisor, James West, West Side Task Force, called a Tactical Alert for the Department of Transportation. Approximately sixty Dep.artment of Transportation personnel from throughout the City responded to the incident as well as command and staff personnel. The Tactical Alert was expanded from West Bureau to include all Traffic Divisions after the Watch commander, Communications Division, advised that West Bureau resources were exhausted. ----------- ------------------ ~fter Action Report -Page S At 0955 hours Communications Division broadcasted a Sig-Alert for the effected area. At 1105 hours, the Command Post at Stoner Park was officiallv established and operational. It was staffed by West Los Angeles Patrol personnel. Lt. Dave Ganning, WTD, was designated as the traffic control ore and also directed to develop a plan for Fire Department's Mobile Command Post. Representatives from the American R~d Cross, especially Mr. William Frazier, who was on scene at the Stoner Park Command Post, were extremely helpful in establishing a Civilian Evacuation Center. The evacuation center was established at the Westwood Recreation Center, located at Sepulveda Boulevard, north of Ohio Avenue. At 1215 hours two Los Angeles Fire Department buses and one Los Angeles Police Department bus arrived to assist in the fourth coming evacuation. Subsequently, personnel were assigned to the incident from Valley Traffic Division, Central Traffic Division, South Traffic Division, West Traffic Division, Hollywood Patrol Division and West Los Angeles Patrol Division arrived at the Command Post. The majority of the personnel were motor officers. Personnel were divided into squads of nine officers and one supervisor or Senior Lead Officer as squad leaders. Care had been taken to keep officers from the same division teamed together with their divisional supervisor. At approximately 1315 hours, the systematic evacuation of the cordoned area began. The area was divided into five sectors. Initially a squad was assigned to each sector and two squads were kept in reserve. Each squad was directed to complete a log of addresses and individuals that were evacuated. The Command Post was given periodic updates concerning the status of the evacuation. At 1310 hours, the American Red Cross updated the command Staff on their preparations to feed personnel via a mobile canteen. Additionally, Tactical Planning Section authorized the use of emergency funds to purchase hamburgers. -At approximately 1400 hours sandwiches and hamburgers were provided for luncn. At 1315 hours, Lieutenant Nixon, Press Relations, announced to the press that the Command Staff had elected to allow the press to enter the perimeter and photograph the truck from Olympic Boulevard and Barry Avenue. At approximately the same time, Captain Proctor directed that the LAUSD police be contacted and asked to send a representative to the Command Post to deal with the problem of school children returning to the evacuated area. At 1350 hours, councilman Braude arrived on the scene and was briefed by Captain Proctor. At 1400 hours, Commander Jones was given a status report. Captain Proctor advised him that Day Watch traffic officers assigned to perimeter duties were to remain at their post. Traffic officers from other bureaus not assigned to a post or other assignment were going to be released at their normal end-of-watch time. After Action Report . Page 6 At 1430 hours, the evacuation was completed. One squad was assigned to anti-looting patrol. At 1440 hours, the Bomb Squad started to dismantle the bomb. A forklift truck obtained from Sams U-Drive rentals was used to lift the drums of chemicals from the truck. Captain Proctor assigned Lieutenant Gunning, West Traffic Division, to prepare an expanded traffic diversion plan for rush hour traffic. At 1445 hours, the American Red Cross advised that hot meals would be available at 1800 hours. At 1500 hours, the Command Post was advised by Sergeant McCarty, Los Angeles Unified School District, who had arrived earlier as a liaison specialist, that children in school would not be allowed to leave their respective campuses until they were picked up by their parents. At 1505 hours, Captain Proctor prepared a letter of explanation and appreciation to the community for their cooperatio~. At 1510 hours, Air Support Division advised the Command Post that Chief Vernon was enroute and that he would make an aerial assessment of the area. At 1550 hours, a Light truck was ordered. At 1555 hours, Communications requested a personnel update and authorization to allow units to go end-of-watch. At 1600 hours, Chief Vernon arrived and expressed his concern about traffic congestion on Pico Boulevard. Approximately fifty motor officers and several Department of Transportation Traffic officers subsequently wer~ deployed to divert traffic as recommended by Lt. Gunning. At 1620 hours Commander Jones telephonically briefed Chief Gates of ' the incident status. At 1630 hours, Councilman Yaroslavsky arrived at the Command Post and was briefed on the incident status by Commander Jones. At 1700 hours, hot meals were served by the American Red Cross. At 1715 hours, the bomb was considered safe. At 1720 hours, Lieutenant Lang advised Captain Proctor that it was safe to resume normal traffic flow and relax the perimeter except for Colby Avenue between Olympic Boulevard and Tennessee Avenue. There was to be no vehicle traffic. However, pedestrian traffic was allowable. The crime scene investigation was continuing. At 1725 hours, authorization was given for residents and business people to re-enter the evacuated area. At 1800 hours, all traffic diversion was removed. After Action Report · Page 7 At 1815 hours, all personnel were released except: Command Post personnel, Command Post security, officers assigned to anti-looting patrol, and a squad of officers assigned from West Los Angeles Patrol Division, PM's, to assist in crime scene protection. At 1835 hours, the Tactical Alert was cancelled. At 1900 hours, the anti-looting detail was released. Captain Proctor went end-of-watch. At 1930 hours, the Command Post was deactivated. CRIME AND ARRESTS None DEATHS AND INJURIES None PROPERTY DAMAGE The truck containing the explosives was destroyed by fire. An Internal Revenue Service office building window had been shattered by a projectile that was l aunched from the drums of chemicals when they were burning. Some interior room damage also occurred to the Internal Revenue Service office as a result of this. U.O. CONTROL TASK FORCE PERSONNEL The following lists the number of sworn personnel assigned to the Unusual Occurrence by rank, regular assignment, and their hours dedicated to this incident. The recap shows the breakdown by rank a nd division of dedicated Unusual Occurrence hour~. NO' RANK REGULAR ASSIGNMENT 1 Assistant Chief Office of Operations 1 Commander Operations West Bureau 1 Captain III West Los Angeles Area J. Captain II West Traffic Division 1 Captain I West Los Angeles Patrol l Lieutenant II West Los Angles Detectives l Lieutenant I West Traffic Division 1 Sergeant II West Los Angeles Patrol 1 Sergeant II West Los Angeles Vice 1 Sergeant II Tactical Planning Section 1 Sergeant I Tactical Planning Section 4 Sergeants I West Los Angeles Patrol l Sergeant I Hollywood Patrol Division l Sergeant I West Traffic Division ~fter Action Report ·Page 8 1 Motor Sergeant 4 Motor Sergeants 2 Policeman III+I 1 Policeman III+I 3 Policeman III 2 Policeman III ?. Policeman III 2 Policeman III 2 Policeman III 15 Policeman II+II 8 Policeman II+II 31 Policeman II+II 19 Policeman II+II 5 Policeman II 2 Policeman II 2 Policeman II 5 Policeman I 2 Policeman I 1 Policeman · r 1 Line Reserve West Traffic Division Valley Traffic Division West Los Angeles Patrol Hollywood Patrol Division West Los Angeles Patrol Wilshire Patrol Division Hollywood Patrol Division Tactical Planning Section West Los Angeles Vice Central Traffic Division South Traffic Division Valley Traffic Division West Traffic Division West Los Angeles Patrol Hollywood Patrol Division West Traffic Division West Los Angeles Patrol Hollywood Patrol Division Wilshire Patrol Division Hollywood Patrol Division Total number of Personnel/Manhours The total number of Personnel dedicated to the u.o. was 127. The total number of manhours concerned with .the u.o. was 933.30 hours. RECAP STRAIGHT TIME HOURS West Los Anaeles Division Captain III Captain I Lieutenant II Sergeant II Sergeant I Policeman III+I 8.0 8. 5 8 • .5 13.7 10.3 15.3 27.5 43.0 · Policeman III Policeman II Policeman I Total hours 224.0 5.7 358.~ West Traffic Division Captain II Lieutenant I Sergeant I+II Sergeant I Policeman II+II Policeman II Total hours 7.2 4.0 4.0 6.8 106.2 5.4 7.6 --133.6 O.T. HOURS 0.0 2.0 2. 3' 7.3 34.2 4.7 18.6 10.7 28.1 ~-3 . 2 3.5 3.5 4.5 54.6 13.0 ~. 9 TOTAL 8.0 10.5 10.8 21.0 44.5 20.0 46.1 =j 3. 7 :?.27.7 7.2 7.5 7.5 11. 3 160.8 207.3 ---------------------- ----- ----~----- ~fter Action Report Page 9 Central Traffic Division Policeman II+II Total hours 66.9 66.9 Valley Traffic Division Sergeant I+II Policeman II+II Total hours 18.3 130.3 i.48.6 South Traffic Division Policeman II+II Total hours 34.7 34.7 Hollywood Patrol Division Sergeant I Policeman III+I Policeman III Policeman II Policeman I Line Reserve rrota 1 Hours Grand Total~ RANK Captain III Captain II Captain I Lieutenant II Lieutenant I Sergeant I+II Sergeant II Sergeant I Policeman III+I Policeman III Policeman II Policeman II+II Policeman I Line Reserve GRAND TOTALS 4.5 5.0 9.5 9.0 9.5 5.0 3.3 -- -- 42 .. 5 8.0 7.2 8.5 8.5 4.0 22.3 13.7 21.6 20.3 37.0 57.4 338.1 31. 9 5.0 3.3 583.30 u.o. SPECIALIZED/INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL 54.5 54.5 9.1 68.1 --=p; - 2 29.5 29.5 3.0 3. 3 6.6 6.6 6.6 8.3 . 29. 4 0.0 . 2 2.0 2.3 3.5 12.6 7.3 41. 7 1 8.0 25.2 24.9 206.7 12.3 8.3 150.0 1 1 1 1 l 1 1 1 Lieutenant II Lieutenant II Sergeant I Detective I Detective III Detective III Detective II Detective II S.I.D. Explosive Unit Office of C.O.P. Press Relations Air Support Division Detective Headquarters Division Anti-Terrorist Division D.S.D. · / C.C.S. D.S.D. / C.C.S. West Los Angeles Detectives 121.4 121.4 27.4 198.4 225.8 64.2 64.2 7.5 8.3 16.1 15.6 16.1 64.2 8.0 7.2 10.5 10.8 7.5 34.9 21. 0 63.3 28.3 62.2 82.3 544.8 44.2 933.30 ~fter Action Report .Page 10 2 Policeman III 1 Policeman III 2 Policeman II 2 Policeman II 2 Policeman II 5 Civilians 1 Civilian S.I.D. Explosives Unit Training Division - Video Unit Air Support Detective Headquarters Division Tactical Planning - Hazard Materials Unit S.I.D. - Photo Unit Tactical Planning - Hazard Materials Unit The total number of Specialized/Investigative personnel is as follows: 2 Lieutenant J.l. 2 Sergeant II 3 Detective III 4 Detective II 4 Detective II 3 Policeman III 5 Policeman II 6 Civilians NOTE: The computation of accounting of the Specialized and/or Investigative personnel was compiled from the available data. rhe total number of officers, their rank, and units of assignments was incomplete. Not all officers checked at the Command Post and nearly none of them checked out with the Corcµnand Post. CRITIQUE Initial Response It is obvious from the chronology of events that personnel from Station 59 committed several grave errors in this incident. They_ failed to make timely notification to the Police Department about t-.heir observations and apprehensions. The hazard was not properly isolated. 'L'he latter allowed West Los Anaeles Patrol nersonnel to enter a hot zone of possible hazardous ch~icals and explosives .. Adequate liaison between the Fire and Police Department was not established until later in the event. There was poor assessment and control of the situation by initial specialized investigative personnel. In fact, throughout the event, investigative personnely for both the Department and other outside agencies, unnecessarily endangered themselves by their persistence t-.o stage in the bomb's kill zone. It was not until Commander Jones directed the investigative officers to retire to a safer distance did they respond to their immediate peril. Initial West Los Angeles Patrol Division personnel deserve credit for their foresight in quickly expanding their perimeter and securing additional police and Department of Transportation personnel. Department of Transportation Supervisor James West was very instrumental in calling a Tactical Alert for the Department of Transportation and establishing proper control of Department of Transportation employees. After Action Report ·Page 11 DECLARATION OF TACTICAL ALERT Captain Proctor's assumption of conmand was timely and appropriate. This was also true of his decision to declare a Tactical Alert. His decision to request motor units from throughout the Department proved critical for the quick response of a large number of personnel into a heavily congested traffic area. COMMAND POST Stoner Park proved a sound Conmand Post site. The West Los Angeles Patrol personnel who established and staffed the Command Post facilitated its smooth operation and control of personnel. Tactical Planning Section was very prompt .in their response of the M.E.R.V. Van and Mobile 5. Both vehicles proved a boon to the incident .. Unqualified appreciation should be rendered to the ·American Red Cross. Their cooperation and efficiency in establishing dn Evacuation Center and feeding incident personnel eannot be overstated. Conmand Post personnel made several poignan~ observations concerning general improvements of future Conmand Post operations. The Conmunications (Radio} Officer should be supported by a scribe. Access to the interior of the Command Post should be limited to assigned personnel. Confusion was enhanced by numerous non-essential officers. of all ranks, coming into the Command Post. Too many people became unofficial members of the Command Staff .. This contributed to the distraction and extra effort of as~igned personnel and the break down of the Command Post concept. The Command Post Radio Officer must have exclusive use of the call sign "CP 8". Too many other entities were using the CP 8 designation . . This caused delays and confusion both in radio operations and decision making. This condition, in part, was a consequence of the syndrome of too many people becoming unofficial members of the Command Post Staff. EVACUATION Formal evacuation was completed in an efficient, systematic manner. Admittedly, it would have been desirable to have evacuated the concerned area earlier in the incident. However, potential problems would only have been augmented by its premature undertaking. Necessity dictated that an adequate number of personnel be available to efficiently manage the task, as well as having an evacuation center established and properly staffed prior to evacuation. The day after the evacuation, WLA Patrol Division officers distributed addendum #7, Letter of Appreciation and Explanation, to the citizens of the affected area. The letter was approved ·through the chain of command and served as a community relations tool to enhance cooperation between the Department and its citizens. - --- ---, After Action Report Page 12 TRAFFIC West Los Angeles .is notorious for heavy t:raffic congestion. While t·.his incident d.id negatively impact that congestion, it was not as severe as expected. Credit must be given to t:he California Highway Patrol and the Department of Transportation personnel for their ~ruick response and steadfast work. Additional credit must be given t_ o the 78 motor officers and other patrol personnel who participated in the incident ' s management. c·aptain K.ensic,, Co11B11anding Officer, West Traffic Division, provided an aerial assessment via an air unit that provided immediate response to problem traffic areas. Lt. Dave Gunning, Day Watch Commander, West Traffic Division, was assigned by the Field Commander as · the Traffic Coordinator for the incident and did an excellent job. CRIME SCENE/BOMB MANAGEMENT Naturally, the defusing of the bomb was the exclusive domain of the Bomb Squad. Those involved with the actual handling of it must be heralded for their courage. However, the crime scene investigators and Bomb Squad managers initial notification to uniform personnel of the bomb's potential for destruction was not. properly communicated. Numerous investigative personnel both within and without the Department remained in close proximity of the device. It was not until a staff officer ordered them from the area that they moved. 1?ERSONNEL A total -of 127 personnel were used for · this event. There response was timely. The tactical alert quickly exhausted OWB and the Field Commander expanded the tactical alert to include all traffic divisions. The use of motor officers proved once again their t remendous value during an u.o. The patrol divisions were allowed to continue operations without significant disruption while the motor officers were able to respond in a much more timely manner, through heavy traffic. Personnel responding · to the Command Post were assigned t o squads based on their Divi~ion of assignment. The latter made squad effectiveness much more evident and Department morale high. INTELLIGENCE Initial information regarding ~he potential destructive nature of the explosive device was the main area of improvement needed. It is also noteworthy that the personnel from the LAFD station across the itreet from the IRS building claimed they had not been notified regarding the danger of responding to any cal·ls at the IRS building. This may be a little self-serving and is questionable in light of their previous two responses to bombing incidents at the IRS building in the last two years. After Action Report ·Page 13 LOGISTICS Since its inception, the Mobile Command Vehicle has been a great tool of emergency management operations. However, it is time that its equipment and configuration be updated. All telephone and radio locations require a modern workable headset. The headsets that were available did not work. Better maps and select area photos should have been more readily available. Ideally, a second Command Post vehicle should have been used. All liaison personnel could have been relocated to save the Field Commander and his staff a distraction. Consideration shouid be given to the purchase of an expandable mobile home shell. Partitions and or rooms would be readily available and the floor space would be doubled. Further consideration should be aiven to the ourchase of a motor home as a self-contained Mobile Command Post. Many other law enforcement agencies are successfully using these vehicles as mobile Command Posts. The Command Post vehicle should be equipped with water, a coffee pot and coffee, soft drinks and energy bars. · This would be extremely beneficial in a large disaster of _ extended duration. The steps of Mobile 5 are unstable. They should ·be replaced with a more substantial type similar to the steps of the Fire Dept's Mobile Command Post. Better lighting should be installed in Mobile 5. Likewise, the air conditioner/heater is in need of thermostat repair. The use of cellular telephones is an absolute necessity. Portable cellular telephones need to be assigned to the Field Commander and other key personnel. The ability to communicate in a confidential manner, without interference, to other City, County, and Federal agencies by key personnel is essential. The Field Commander assigned an aid to accompany him with a Rover and a portable cellular telephone which proved invaluable. -- RECOMMENDATIONS It i s recommended that a Command Post Operations Training Day be initiated throughout the Department utilizing the 'evacuation scenario and the u.o. mobil fleet. Currently, Tactical Planning periodically stages disaster scenarios. The knowledge, skill and understanding of concerned personnel is observed and evaluated during those sessions. However, empirical knowledge gleaned from the "Truck Bomb" showed that many or most ofticers not associated with a divisional u.o. Cadre could benefit from routine training about unusual occurrence procedures. Training should include the Command Post concept, its staffing, disaster management and a brief overview of specific disasters or other emergencies. A training scenario should be developed that no~ necessarily tests the concerned personnel, but rather, rehearses them in unusual occurrence operations. Command Staff Officers should participace in the training as secondary responders. The exercises should be approached with the goal to impart knowledge, build upon previous experiences, refine skills, develop teamwork and build confidence. ~.fter Action Report - Page 14 ADDENDA 1. WLA Watch Commanders Log, AM'S 2 / 22 / 90 2. Sergeants log 2 / 22/90: Kilby 3. Sergeants log 2 / 22/90: Mascola 4. WLA Watch Commanders Log, Days, 2 / 22 / 90 S. DHD Notification Log, 2/22/90 6. Incident Log 7. Letter of explanation & appreciation to Citizens of affected area. , 5.~ .o (10-.0 Loa ........ Police Departa1Ht SERGEANT'S DAILY REPORT ,Suop:!F&~9 J} Sergeanr ... ~{!_'S_ ~ - Q --~ ------ - ---------------- ------ - - Division _ __ W LA ----------------- ---------- -- Watch _____ A _ ~ ---~--------· Assignment ____ _ ~_;;;_Q_ _ _ _ _______ Oat• Z. -2..Z:_ Details: 2230HRS: ROLL CALL & ADMIN. FUNCTIONS. 2345/0400HRS: FIELD. Available Field Time-5-.:_ ~---· 2627 SEPULVEDA, WOMAN SCREAMING. 8A15(MARSHALL/GIBSON) ASSIGNED CODE 2H. SEVERAL UNITS BACKED. EXCELLENT RESPONSE TIME-FIRST UNIT AT SCENE WITHIN 2 MINUTES. INVEST REVEALED FEMALE TO BE A POSS 5150 TRANSIENT WITH NO APPARENT CRIME. SLOW NIGHT. THE AM WATCH UNITS WERE DOING A GOOD JOB OF PICKING UP THE FEW CALLS THAT WERE DrSPATCHED. MET WITH 8L47(OCONNER) FOR INFO EXCHANGE. 0400HRS: STA-ADMIN FUNCTIONS/AVAILABLE. REVIEWED AM WATCH DFARS AND CITATIONS FROM 2-21-90. SEVERAL MOVING CITATIONS WERE ISSUED FOR VC SECTIONS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO, AND AT LOCATIONS WHERE A AND K TIA'S FREQUENTLY OCCUR. MET WITH OFCR MORGAN AND DISCUSSED MORALES'(3RD PHASE PROB.) PROGRESS. MORALES CONTINUES TO PROGRESS AT A SATISFACTORY RATE. 0630HRS: RESPONDED TO THE 11500 BLK OF OLYMPIC WITH SGT SMITH CONCERNING POSS EXPLOSIVE DEVICE IN VEH. THE INFO HAD BEEN TELEPHONICALLY RECVD FROM DHD. WE MET WITH SGT KILBY AND LA COUNTY HAZ MATERIALS UNIT AT SCENE. WE WERE ADVISED THAT A VEH CONTAINED POSS TOXIC/HAZARDOUS . MATERIALS COUPLED WITH A POSS EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. NOTIFICATIONS WERE MADE, CP ESTABLISHED AND PERIMETER CORDONED OFF. LAFD REALLY DROPPED THE BALL ON THIS ONE. PER ON DUTY CAPT AT STA #59 LAFD UNITS HAD RESPONDED TO A VEH FIRE AT LOC. THEY NOTED THE FLAMES AND BURNING TO BE UNUSUAL AND SUSPECTED UNK POSS DANGEROUS MATERIALS. THEY EXTINGUISHED THE FIRE VIA WATER CANONS FROM A(SAFE) DISTANCE AWAY AND THEN WRAPPED THE VEH WITH CAUTION TAPE. LAFD THEN CLEARED SCENE AT APPROX 0330HRS. THE AREA WAS NOT SECURED FOR SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS AND PD NOT IMMED NOTIFIED. LAFD APPARENTLY NOTIFIED LA COUNTY HAZ MATERIALS UNIT. LAPD WLA RECVD FIRST ACCOUNT OF INCIDENT AT APPROX 0630 HRS WITH NO INDICATION OF POSS TOXIC MATERIAL INVOLVED.THIS ENDANGERED OFCR SAFETY AND CAUSED OFCRS TO ENTER A POSS UNSECURED HOT ZONE .HAD THE MATERIALS BEEN TOXIC. ASST'D AT CP AS PERSONNEL/STAGING OFCR. 1700HRS:EOW. ---------------· ------·-------- w.:. ~- , ._. _w_· s.Q,-- _____ =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Siana = ~ ==-------- - - · - ~~ - - x _ ·, :". , ____ _ ------ WATCH COMMANDER'S DAILY REPORT ...... , >o , 3 .80, 'J : ~ '301 ::ATE OAY OF WEEK I WATCl"I : WATCH C0 ~ .4MAN OER --- 7 · Q ROLL CALL TRAINING --ru- : : ! Cona~ ~,Lj j Sub1 ect : Mid Conauctad By: / J - / ) ~~~ - U.I!::" };;-(:77Y t!.='0 ~ '- lnsc,ecuon Sy: 1 Inspection Sy: LOG OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES Include all shoot1n1s. unusual arrests. demonstrations. officer-,nvotved altercations. m, ss,n1 Juv.,lles. s0ec1a1 ev•tt•~ visits from outs, de a1.,c1 es. v1 sits from V.1. P. s (i ncludin1 Oecunment V.I.P .s), items of unusual interest. Numbw eacn 1t9m a,ci include time occurred. Attach al4 ~plicable r~n• to th1 s sheet. _ SPECIAL INSPECTJ:ONS AND AUDITS Time Init. Inspection Subpoena Service Storm Log GCI Log Holding Tanks Station Security Station Security Jail Inspection Kit Room Audit Court Book Audit Fel. £ Misd. £: Other/4 ~- On 2-22-90 at approximately 0150 hours a pick up truck loaded with 1------five 55 gallon drums of ammonia nitrate and gasoline was set on fire resulting in an explosion damaging the windows of the ~----- Internal Revenue office at 11500 West Olympic Blvd. The area was secured and the bomb squad and other specialized units responded. -~---The fire was extinguished by the fire department and the drums were secured and the truck and drums were removed. The incident i----~-necessitated a Tactical Alert. Capt. Proctor responded to the sc·ene and acted as the Field Commander for this incident. Several f-------blocks surrounding the truck were evacuated. There were no injuries as a result of the explosion. A formal after action · -------report is being completed. 7 .-, /.- _ 7 ✓- • I -·----'- ..... ... J ... ¼ .... - . . ., A.I.U. NOTIFICATION LOG DATE: WATCH: .__./f....,;,_.ft? __ _ DUTY DEPUTY CHIEF: ~/.,,(~02~~-----o.J----.::-._0 __ L_y._~ __ '.P_1_c...,...._ _____ ~~--- CP 8 (Zt3) 7t'X)-8$3 - M0- ?202 TIME TIME PERSON PERSON A.I. D.H.D. DHD CALLED CALLING MESSAGE OFC! NOTIFT~n r~T.T.~ T'N t'.lo'U) ))GT, ,~~ t'~101. f?o~§ \/01,,ill °"o1'.L..J tt21l.D ' l am ~l~ • ,o~6 St.cAa.o s~-r ... . • ()lt11~ WU.. w/L I?~ Z-"-, UNl r ll '"''1M I .__ . . Mo~t. \Ac. roz. 1lttc:tic. ,~i't(ol lJfl11J 51! J.tu 1$,.::' f}'l)v1.s-ro I /ll Ct✓ Mt;' t<-t;,, I) (I) ~1] l&ov~'- I/ IN/lCd/~- tJ/4~Z) F?4c/ // // !JlD3~ 4'./ -~YVA ·/1 JI - ✓ . . rt, s=r . ~ K _ t::: . 2- II · I I 1.-1 _ __, ~ ~ ,,- ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ II I/ I) I,,, 2 ((" 7). .. r i~) m;W,..,,l.. /l 7)(/ I,:- c-·~· l 1n t:, 1./5 r:✓,~ H 7) V/ s &-·-/? ~u.liS '- -I- // ' (}lj tf <; ;i09¢,c< 07..30 ! f?+tJ I~ &~o.s I o7t/o '7Ar,,-u~/l.. .,- agx, l:3dlu~~ 'J?e:.Q )/AZA1~tJ . ·osos ~,J Non~~JJ . --- ! ~ v,- ,: 082-5 I ~7 J AJ)v' ()i- CP LU'91 #AAISbA ( - \ -------- -------:-:---- --- -----;-::----- .. . -- ~· l 1 s . .:-.o.o (1 / 8 WATCH COMMANDER'S DAILY REPORT Y 0~ WIEIEK WATCH WATCH COMMANDER Thur AM Sgt R S-MITH Earty ROLL CALL TRAINING Mid '' j ,ect:, Conducted By: Sgt SMITH Subiect: Conciuctaa By: Videota e: Officer Survival lnapectaon By: lna,,ection By: Sgt R SHITH Informal - Excellent LOG OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES Include all llhootin1s. IM'IUIU&I arrest . damonatr•iona. office .. involved .,twcac,ona. mi aain1 juveniles • .,,ecial eveta. vi sets from outa1de •1a1ciea. viaita from V.I.P.a (includin1 Oapwvnant V.1.P.a), itama of unusual int•••· Numbw uch itwn 111• incfuda time occurred. Attach all applicable ,..,.,,ta to this sheet. SPEC%AL INSPECTIONS AND - AUDITS Time Init. Inspection 2230 2315 ~ 0200 0530 0120 0515 2400 2230 hrs 0615 hrs E._K (RS) Subpoena Service Storm Log GCI: Log Holding Tanks Station Security Station Security Jail Inspection · Fel. 7 Misd. 5 other Kit Roan Aud.it --- --- --- Court Book Audit -v- - ' One Sta Ofer "sick. " Dropped A47. Deployed L47. - - I was notified, via the phone, by DHD, of "Passi- ,. D.J.e .C.XIJ.1.u;:::,.1.ves, .l. ll a UUlllt::!G ven1.c.1.e I::' 1 .l. .JUU w. Olympic Bl. The location is a multi-storied office building nausea oy c.ne l. .1(~' ana cne ODJeCt or several past bombings/attempt bombings. I had L40(Sgt KILBY) to respond to the location. Inv revealed a burned p/u truck, containing several large metal containers, w/possible explo- sives. , FDS9 had extinguished the vehicle fire(0150-0320 Loe- ....._,... 0.,.-twwwwl SDGIANM DAILY REPOllT ·se,veant _ ___ _;{!fj:~ ~,? /4_~ ? __ _ 1 ision~_1/g _______ Watch __ l/-1 Assignment_.......a~~~-~_o _____ o~ .. _,?_-_.2_'.2_ ·_J_o_ Details: ::~ Available Field Time__.~___.~'----- ..::r ~&-OED TD A sc,,e~.,._,,t::;: µar,~ e,;?,C-L ~ ~~ ./ t1c,.. 0/ J'.L Y7 ~~c:Je t:JC()~,,;t../t:,1£ ,, CJ CuA//f-/0_ ~ /.1':zf{) 4 - - -- ·• ~ . - ~ -~~c U/?'"'.C.._ _ __ ~ ___ <;_~t::,-L. .zv-~~t"--a ~~ :::z:t.J dr - - ·- - ~ - -- 6.4!'- .L:_ ~ - -~ . c:J<'cJ-~/C ---- --~~~c:,~~-:-D ~ --- --··- · - - - . -- ·----· --- ----- --------------- -··----- . - - - ----- -····· · __ __:z::-_ ____ ~e~~~--r~ _ -4._ s,,r·-~~~- - ~ - -~ --~~c/ZC -'a _ _ c__o/-- - __ .. _ _ _ -----~c;,,,:q, 4 _ _ __ __ _ ~ - ~ --- a~- ---~-~ --~ - --·& C:-a_ o~ ___ _ ~S'f _#,)~~ --~t-!:>r'_ ~ __ __ _ c_t1,;11. o'~ -~~/ v~~~:--r-.. ~?-c--0 ~ c~. ~ 4</1/?e'7"Z"D .,,# ~)""" ~A!?ot/~k · ~ ~ ~,-?tJ~F0- -- - ~ - -- -~-1 - ~ --~~c:- V~if. - ~y/'C--/t:.-5-r ~~ - ----- ~ 9c --:.~ - --- -~~- --..z_ ?:1 ~--~~s- ~~1::1.r:~~~ ___ 2).c'--"?&-C-~-- -· __ _ _ _ _ .,<pC . _ _ ____ __ _ t/~_ lf.. __ ~.,,,~-- --r:::=_-~~ ---~ _-2::,~ ..Z-~ _:_ __ ~f _ _ cl/.2:L __ ~l"~;e. /~,,.&i;J --~--t:J~~e~. --~ s~-- ···-·w:..~_s~aSt;"-:£) _ ____ ~2)/77<.J,4-/~~~ ~ --d~,,-,,E-0 - --~--- ~--- ~..LM'~-~ ~.,<:7~c--O_ ~f.,//£ _ _ 7-:!!. 4 /%.r,1~~--- -· ---~,,frJ_~e_ - -~~~-J'~~ -~ L~c. -~ /Sa~~ ___ -r.-:P✓H-D ~ -~ -- - · ~f1.,,A/f ___ ~~ ~~c-s: _ __c~;r- . . ~_p~/?-_ __ _ ~/~--- 4,-D __ ___ _ ~~~~ /dJe1~ 4- ~ -~ --~ --~ 7lcn:-· cJP~~t:1,<./ w-~ -.</'-?e,,oZ'P'· 7~ ~.,,,De>-:~ __ ,_,..,, _____ _ . CG_,,-) -~--------- _ c s Ange res Pol ice Ceoarrment PAG E. NO . ,ye £ () F REP ORT / ~ -~- / ~0/77 -<3 / /"7'~,-<7' ,T"" I I I _EM Q :.J A', . ·,o. -'- R 7 I C LE 5 :: =t I A L "!0. ~- /l . , ~ _, CONTINUATION SHEET .:; RANO / . ,, '.'O DEL '10. ,,· ~OT,.. ~,::,~_~--- -- · .. ::_ .. ::;',T I N 'J E ON REI/ERSE s : :; r. CONTINUATION SHEET 0. OR NO . ·.,1 sc . CESCRIPT I Q'I f EG . c :;:..o R . S I ZE . :;OLLAR 1/ALUL ' ', SCRIPT I Q', S , CAL I GER , "IE V OLI/ER . ETCI OVE~ � 1 !5 09 0112•7 / i. T C:M ~ 'J AN. I i I ·10 . • AP.TIC LE SEIII IAL NO. aP.ANO MODEL NO. / -r'C A.//f") ,,.- / 1/'L ,.::;,::.:..,..., b<. c.,)-pJ.; ~?O BO OKING NO. I :J R NO. MISC . OESCIIIIPT I ON I EG . COLOR , S I ZE , I NSCIIIIPTIONS , CAL I BEP.. REVOL VE R . ETC ) OOLLAIII VAL U E ~ 9.J-5' - <-.S~ _;r-/~ ~ ~ /'r C :;,' ~ ~ ,,..< ./7?~ ._r ..z-O;!._/' ,,,..r,;,-· //Y $-'y ~ , -:-,).(' y_,..77~7.__ ---sc;r ~A-'(./~o~ (~...s ~ <.JG T .__;;,.-....z,;r;y ?"a-e~O..-UA../E.9 ,., ~A~o.1c:,~., /~-~-- \ ., T • \.. /' - -c- /,.:: -~ _ _,,' ......J"C'~'l~ ~C)trz:J r.::z::::_;- ', . \ - ../ <.30.,,,,,,,,e o'r.<5 . ~7 .<,(i'~u=,E ....:-p~I ;"_) a/,-,1/4"./C> Jc;. ;:,-- --~'; .:;-:.:.- - ~~/,< ...,-/4. ,,-·u,,..,_:;,-· (;:--4( <) ~ ,<K.rJ·~ ~~:,r- //~Y? ~ //yQo O~J;-. /4"> •) .•, c:'~.....s Co ~c~ V/,.J 0",'-J ._~,,,,,., ~..E"'~ ~r ,,,pe,,,,,,,--,,c-.-,1'_,/ - ,,,<J-<Lr;n ,,A:/4 ,e&:;:..r. A-r ~ /OQ.s- r'o~.rO<. E°' .EVAC . /::J/,-:, - r',C..:Z fir C/p ~ .;t:;,<,/' ;Q.,4://-L.~~ /0/-5 7c:, ~t/£ · o/....,o .~/~-:J,,/1 ,,-?_?-~~/I Av ct" c'C/r< .,-t;;<- "' .- . -.,,,, ~ ' F' MORE SPACE I S IIIEQUIIIEO. USE CONTINUATION SHEET , 15.09 .0, CONT INUAT ION SHEET ~6~ >· -/1/' C ~ Q . o? -.;~ - /:) P AG:.. '; 'J . - ·( P E O F R EP O R T 'BOO K ING NO . ID R NO. 1 ' -:: .... IOU A <s . •; () , .O.R TI C L E: 5 !'.R I AL S O. I J RAN O I "1 00EL '< 0 . I •,11 sc . o tscR 1P T 1o •i 1e:c. C O L O R . s1ze: . I · o oLLAR VAL UE 1'1 SCR I PT 10 '1 S . CA L I OE:R . RE:VOLVER . E:TC l /Y,7 · -::, - c:x,~ ~,.l-' ..... 1(_ - r.:X ~.,......£. ~~ _ On...c,c c;,-Y-' ~:· -:-~ - _ - · C /77-CJ-e cr o ,,.....,,~~ A"'~P ,,,<? '- ·rA'T ._/ ,,r .-,F>~ ,,,<?T. /Y/.:::;,- ~-' / y 6 C-.,A:;r~ ~ ~.....-eoc ro.-e.. ..s .,,,ao,,< ~ • c-,y .?'" ,A' ca.,.,..;/?~~ ~..r ~ ~ ~---·.::: . ./" ' ,,,4.ov co,.,,,,,., .::;rO,.,<./..e<J T#'/Qr· r-~ ~ ~~ ~ -~,.<<: ._r:.,,.,.,y ,.,,,q;;,,- .,,.a~~ .-'?/6~;C:._ .A:?~a /-C:,,.,,e:c~'5- ~0....-?7 c:J7/'Y',&;,,e ~E~~ <),9.,,,c..1 <E...<JV-< /tt'r ~OU/ · / Y~5 -< T ~<./,'f/,</_z-'N~ .A.,,0(/ ....-??,C _,,,.,,,~ ~/-<. < ~ .. .e;,-~AJ 0./.Z-T~ ~~ ~/~_.c1)1""""'.ZQ,~· Cl~ _,,,,,.,,,_2CJ O~J' ~<11Utl'7U C - ~t.,1,,_c-~,,< .. n;;. ,C-Ga.Jr a,,c/~~ Cc o~..-&/A'.,,.n,£' ,,,g) ,<7~ (,/A/..Z-,- k,,/ /~ < :ONTIN U E O 'S REVE R SE SIO t . CONTINUATION SHEET 1 5 . 09 . 0 ( 12 •7 L,::s Ar -;ie ie s P0I ir; <? i)eoarr-,,enr CONTINUATION SHEET /7~4..Kf .,H C. .,,., ~;'~c o?-oloZ- YO I TE:M Q U A 'l . -<0. a?O O · :J GR NO. "'RT I C L t S~ " I A L "10 . J ~ AND MODEL •10. •,11s c . D ESCR I PT ION ' E G . CDL Dl'I . S I Zt . :lO L L Al'I V A LUE l 'l5 CR I PT I O'l5 . C A L I O t R ."tVO L Vt l'l . t T C I e;..-J..z;:,-,,.- ;;r ~ c ·. ./" --:.r,<.: ::;)(.,;ttJ/;f,./ .._ o,,.-/??,c_z-c .. r 7~:;v✓...t✓e.EAV :J' ,,,c ~A./ ,&o,.,,;:_ ........ ,-:.r.o /°;£ ,.,-..l,C,,,c.Jc_ Q;\J ,6,4\S'/ ..SJ~ CJ-,v'-<. ,,,.c-,,_ Wo v e/," .T~A?.,,e-~) - A./072",,<:;"E-CJ ,,,,-0.-< ~~ ----'":-;,,..,/ /AP.--:--:.,-..J ~~ . ~ <' Ccx..J 7 ~ Ve ..<' 0 .~ r:£.,e ......-~~- .::X /,,. c/ .;U T" ...7~ / /?O.~ #.,c'..._" . A··/~ ,,,-.c;e .....J:Jl'VA./E < ~ ,{ ....;: ~ A',£~~ ,£'.n::: .. ,E~ ~ ,,,-~,e..ro~ <- . ,,,..4-;r ~~ .:;,,,~ ~0 c- C/~ ...S.,EC~7""r;_, ~,,.e\.j- ....-?J~GA.,, 70..<'.~~~ J~.,e:, ~c~ ..A....S....s::;T:$,,,, ....<I;:,- c~.ie ._;-~,,,,~ ~ ~r.e.c::~ /-t:f'- - ·---- --------- - - -EOW :CN T INU E ON Rt V tl'ISC 5 10£. CONTINUATION SHEET 1 5 0 9 0 ( 12•7 LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT DARYL F. GATES Chief of Police TOM BRADLEY Mayor P. 0 . Box 30158 Los Ange les , Calif. 90030 Tel ephone: (213) • Ref #: The Los Angeles Police Department wishes to thank you for your cooperation in the evacuation on February 22, 1990. The evacuation became necessary when a large explosive device was discovered on Colby Avenue south of Olympic Boulevard. The device was of such a nature that its possible detonation could have resulted in damage and death over a wide area. The resources of the Los Angeles Police Department, Department of Transportation, Los Angeles Parks and Recreation, Los Angeles Fire Department, Animal Regulation, Red Cross and the Los Angeles Unified School District were mobilized to deal with the perimeter control of the area and its eventual evacuation. An evacuation center was located at the Westwood Regional Park facility, 1310 Veteran Avenue, to deal with anyone who was displaced with no where to go. The device was rendered inoperable by the Los Angeles Police Department Bomb Squad. I The Los Angeles Police Department wishes to thank you for your cooperation, patience and understanding during this time of confusion and displacement. DARYL F. GATES Chief of Police AN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY-AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EMPLOYER
Linked assets
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
Conceptually similar
PDF
After-action report, Hollywood area's unusual occurrence, 1988-11-17
PDF
After-action report, unusual occurrence related to the March 25, 1989 anti-abortion demonstration in Rampart area; operations-central bureau
PDF
After-action report, Iranian demonstration, 1980-07-14
PDF
After-action report, Southeast Area, 1992-03-03
PDF
After-action report, Operations-Valley bureau's Hammer #1, 1990-03-08
PDF
After-action report, Wilshire Area's demonstration by the Armenian Youth Federation, 1990-04-24
PDF
After-action report, Los Angeles student coalition demonstration, 1990-04-18
PDF
After-action report, UCLA Mardi Gras, 1990-06-14
PDF
After-action report, Central Area, 1992-10-28
PDF
After-action report, Hollywood area's Halloween event, 1989-12-07
PDF
After-action report, West Los Angeles' Century City political demonstration, 1992-07-19
PDF
After-action report, West Los Angeles' AIDS demonstration, 1989-12-05
PDF
After-action report, Anti-War demonstration, 1991-01-15
PDF
After-action report, 1983 May Day demonstration, 1983-05-01
PDF
After-action, Pro-Choice rally on November 12, 1989 at Cheviot Hills Park, 1989-12-15
PDF
After action report, 1992-04/1992-05
PDF
LAPD, Labor relations division mobilization roster and unusual occurrence manual, 1992-04
PDF
Foothill area after action report, 1992-04-29/1992-05-11
PDF
LAPD, Narcotics group, mobilization roster and unusual occurrence control plan, 1992-04-19/1992-05-16
PDF
Wichita after-action police report, 1980-06-20
Description
After-action report of the West Los Angeles area's unusual occurrence of February 22, 1990, truck bomb on Olympic Boulevard at internal revenue service (IRS), 1990 March 14.
Asset Metadata
Core Title
After-action report, West Los Angeles area's unusual occurrence, truck bomb at IRS, 1990-03-14
Tag
OAI-PMH Harvest
Format
25 p.
(format),
application/pdf
(imt),
reports
(aat)
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-71841
Unique identifier
UC11429381
Identifier
box 33 (box),web-box33-20_21-09.pdf (filename),folder 20 - folder 21 (folder),webster-c100-71841 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
web-box33-20_21/web-box33-20_21-09.pdf
Dmrecord
71841
Format
25 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),reports (aat)
Type
texts
Tags
Folder test
Inherited Values
Title
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
Description
Chaired by former federal judge and FBI and CIA Director William H. Webster, the Los Angeles Webster Commission assessed law enforcement's performance in connection with the April, 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest. The collection consists of materials collected and studied by the Commission over the course of its investigation. Materials pertain to both the Los Angeles incident specifically, and civil disturbance, civil unrest control, and policing tactics in general.
Included in the collection are the following: interviews with LAPD officers, law enforcement personnel, government officials, community leaders, and activists; articles, broadcasts, and press releases covering the civil unrest; various tactical and contingency plans created for disasters and emergencies; reports, studies, and manuals about civil unrest control and prevention; literature about community-based policing strategies; emergency plans and procedures developed by other cities; and after-action reports issued once the civil unrest had subsided. Also featured are items related to the internal operations of the LAPD both before and during the civil unrest, including activity reports, meeting agendas and minutes, arrest data, annual reports, curricula and educational materials, and personnel rosters.
See also the finding aid (https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2266).
See also The Los Angeles Riots: The Independent and Webster Commissions Collections (https://scalar.usc.edu/works/the-los-angeles-riots-christopher-and-webster-commissions-collections/index).
Related collections in the USC Digital Library:
? Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2251)
? Richard M. Mosk Christopher Commission records, 1988-2011 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/393)
? Kendall O. Price Los Angeles riots records, 1965-1967 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/979)
? Watts riots records, 1965 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/83)
Thanks to generous support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the USC Libraries are digitizing this collection for online public access.
Coverage Temporal
1931/1992