Issues emerging from interviews, 1992-07-02

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Issues emerging from interviews with local police departments, local law enforcement agencies, and superior court, 1992 July 2.

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Content SE NT ay:x ero x Te lecop i er 70 21 7- 10-92 : 12:2 2P M ; 213626 0010~ 213 362 75 99 ;; 2
TO&
FROMI
DATIi
RI:
A.
KIRKLAND & ELLIS
Ml!MORANDUM
Richard J. Stone
General Counsel and Staff Director
Jan Lawrence Handzlik
Vincent J. Marella
July 2, 1992
Issues Emerging From Interviews With Los Angeles
Sheriff's Department, Federal Law Entorcement, and
Superior Court
Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan -- Structure
1. Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan divides California
into seven Mutual Aid Regions. Each Region is
made up of several Operational Areas, which are
the counties within that Region. The sheriff of
each county is the head ot his operational Area ;
all sheriffs within a given Region elect a
Regional Coordinator from among themselves. Los
Angeles and Orange Counties constitute Region I,
and Sheriff Sherman Block 1s the Regional
Coordinator.
2. The mutual aid plan is triggered by any unusual
occurrence which cannot be handled completely by
the police agency in charge ot the area where the
event occurs. The unusual event can be either a
natural disaster (e.g. earthquake) or a civil
disturbance. Once triggered, the Mutual Aid Plan
contemplates that the Regional Coordinator
(Sheritt Block) will receive requests for
assistance trom affected police departments, and
will apply the law enforcement resources available
trom the Region, or as volunteered trom outside
the Region.
3. Two facts indicate that the City ot Loa Angeles
might be considered a separate region in a
emergency situation. First, the Law Enforcement
Mutual Aid Plan drew an exception for the City of
San Francisco, where the city'• Chief of Police is
the Operational Area Law Enforcement Coordinator
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213 362 7699:# 3
instead of ·the county sheritt. This shows that
the state Office of Emergency Services ("OES")
recognizes that, in some circumstances, it makes
sense tor the chief o! police for the largest city
in the county to coordinate etforts rather than
the county sheri!!. Second, the Southern
California Earthquake Response Plan ("SCERP")
suggests that the City of Los Angeles should be
considered a separate operational area in the
event of a "level J" earthquake (an undefined
term). Fritz Patterson, Deputy Chief of the Law
Enforcement Division of OES was careful to point
out that the SCERP excludes assistance by fire
departments and law enforcement, and so is
consistent with the Mutual Aid Plan.
Nevertheless, the SCERP could also contri~ute to a
feeling of autonomy by the City of Los Angeles.
4. Fritz Patterson also told us that the Law
Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan might be strengthened
by reference to emergency response to fire
departments in the state. The fire departments
have developed an Incident Command System ("ICS"),
which sets clear lines of authority in advance for
fires that might happen in a given area. The
ranking fire fighter with the tirst unit on the
scene or a· fire is the incident commander, and
therefore has the authority to marshal the
necessary resources. Also, the fire department
ICS contains detailed plans for staging,
mobilization, demobilization, and deployment of
fire fighters. This leads to greater uniformity
and coordination in responding to a fire.
Finally, the fire departments around the state
have made uniform their terminology (e.g. the
number and rank ot !ira fighters constituting a
"squad") and equipment.
B. Execution During Events Surrounding The King Verdict
1. The MUtual Aid Plan did not operate as designed.
The LAPO did not request assistance from Sheriff
Block until the second tm that Sherift Block
telephoned Chief Gates. At that time, Thursday
morning, April 30 at 10:00 a.m., Chief Gates
admitted to being short staffed and asked for two
platoons (112 people), which Sheriff Block
deployed on specitic missions. By that time, the
Mayor's office had called the Governor directly to
request National Guard assistance, and the
Governor had ordered National Guard deployment.
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2. The approach taken by the LAPD and the City was
very inefficient. The National Guard was deployed
approximately seventeen hours after the first
request was made -- seven hours ahead of the time
contemplated in the Mutual Aid Plan. Significant
law enforcement resources were available within LA
County, however, and were not put to full use
because Sheri!! Block, as Regional Coordinator,
did not have the facts necessary to properly
deploy these resources. Indeed, Sheriff Block
told us that by the time Chier Gates first
requested assistance, Sheritt Block had declined
offers ot manpower from various law enforcement
agencies from around the state because no requests
tor assistance were coming in.
3. The LAPD's tact appears to reflect an attitude of
complete self-reliance. While admirable in
principle, this LAPD mind-set impeded the
efficient functioning of the Mutual Aid Plan.
Chief Gates told Sheriff Block in late 1991 that
he could not imagine a situation in which the LAPD
would request assistance from the Sheriff's
Department and, in fact, noted that many requests
for assistance had come in the other direction ,
trom LASO to LAPD, Also, several days before the
April disturbances, Lt. Bruce Ward of the LAPD
Metro Division told Fritz Patterson of OES the
same thing, that he could not imagine the LAPD
requesting assistance trom anyone. The mind-set
goes back even further, to the Watts' Riots in
1965. Then, the Sheriff's Department called the
LAPD to offer 300 deputies coming of a specific
mission to help at the beginning of the riots .
The LAPO flatly declined and chose to deal with
the situation itself.
4. Centralization of command, both day-to-day and in
emergency situations, also presents an issue. At
LAPD, dispatch is han~led centrally from two
locati~ns for the entire city. In an emergency
situation, each of the LAPD bureaus takes
responsibility for activity within its area. An
argument can be made that this offers the worst of
both worlds, with the division watch commander
unable to keep his !inger on the pulse of
activities within his division on a day-to-day
basis, but emergency response being uncoordinated
because lines of command are unclear. The LASO i s
the opposite: day-to-day dispatch is handled by
the individual stations, but command is
centralized in emergency situations.
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5. The lack of an entire level ot command at LA.PD -
the Assistant Chief -- ·may also have contributed
to slow response time, Vernon was on leave
preparing !or retirement; Brewer had also
retired; and Dotson had been demoted.
6. In preparation for the King verdict, the LASO
organized the Operation Monarch Task Force. This
group met three or four times before the verdict,
and gathered intelligence from various elements of
the com..~unity. There was no apparent LAPD analog.
Despite its efforts, the best indications gathered
by Operation Monarch were that no significant
disturbance would result after the verdicts.
7. Federalizing the National Guard, while desirable
to the state because costs shift to ~he Federal
government, detracts significantly from the
Guards' utility. Once federalized, the Guard is
restricted by "posse comitatus" (18 U.S.C. S 1385
et seq.) and lawyers in Washington must sign off
on all missions. Chief William Baker, head of
LASO's EOC during the day shift, told us that he
could not recall a single mission that the
Guardsmen could accept after they were
Federalized.
C. Training
1. The California Specialty Training Institute
("CSTI") trains law enforcement officers statewi de
in emergency preparedness. During the 1980a , the
tocus ot CSTI training shifted away from civil
disturbances and toward natural disasters. In
July 1990, Assistant Sheri!! Jerry Harper
presented a proposal to John Mirolla of CSTI and
Fritz Patterson ot OES, suggesting an increase in
training for civil disturbances. OES conducted a
"needs assessment" ot other agencies statewide,
and most agencies agreed that they would like
increased training in civil disobedience.
Patterson presented this needs assessment back to
Mirella and to Dr. Richard Andrews, head ot state
OES. Nevertheless, the propo·sal was never acted
upon. It is, however, being reexamined in light
ot recent events.
2. Fritz Patterson of OES also suggests increased
training in the use of the Law Enforcement Mutual
Aid Plan. In tact, meetings have ceen set up
around the state both with Sheriffs and Chiefs of
various police departments to discuss the plan and
how it should b9 inplemented. Patterson also
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suggested that the Los Angeles Mayor's Oftica and
the Governor's Office may have been unaware of the
correct functioning of the Mutual Aid Plan, given
their actions during the riots.
D. Other Issues
1. The LAPO asked INS to provide unitormed agents to
assist during the disturbances. Soma advocacy
groups report that INS agents rounded up Latinos,
who were not involved in any criminal activity,
during the disturbances. If true, this could
constitute a violation of Police commission Order
#40, which forbids stopping and detaining solely
based on suspicion of illegal immigration status.
2. Pre-verdict coordination between LAPD and the
court system appears non-existent. Part of the
reason could be confusion as to jurisdiction:
although the LAPD apparently is responsible for
public areas in the courthouses, the Sheriff's
office provides courtroom security.
3. Pre-verdict planning between LAPD and federal law
enforcement also never happened. An
anti-terrorism committee, which evaluates risks to
the judiciary in L.A. County posed by pending
cases, meets monthly and is chaired by Sheriff
Block, Chiet Gates has never attended a meeting
of this committee; Assistant Chief Dotson attended
until his demotion !ollowing publication of the
Christopher Commission report, but no LAPD
representative has attended since. During the
disturbance, LAPD still did not coordinate with
federal officials and, in fact, put federal
buildings at risk by driving crowds away from
Parker Center and toward the Federal courthouse
with no containment.
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Asset Metadata

Core Title Issues emerging from interviews, 1992-07-02

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 5 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), memoranda (aat)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-42507

Unique identifier UC11410155

Identifier box 24 (box),web-box24-04_05-07.pdf (filename),folder 4 - folder 5 (folder),webster-c100-42507 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier web-box24-04_05/web-box24-04_05-07.pdf

Dmrecord 42507

Format 5 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),memoranda (aat)

Type texts