Interview, Alan R. Cowen, 1992-07-08

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Content I;
LAW OFFICES
IRELL & MANELLA
A Partnerahip Including Professional Corporation,
MEMORANDUM
File: WEBSTER STUDY/Interagency Group
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Re: Los Angeles Fire Department
Interview of Alan R. Cowen
Summary
Date: July 8, 1992
To: Richard J. Stone
From: Susan Sakai
Dory Feit
This interview with Chief Alan R. Cowen, Commander of the
Los Angeles City Fire Department's Bureau of Emergency Medical
Services ("EMS Bureau"), focuses on (a) the EMS Bureau's
experiences in responding to medical emergencies during the
recent civil disturbances, (b) the interface between the EMS
Bureau and (i) the Los Angeles Police Department, (ii) the
California Highway Patrol, and (iii) the California Office of
Emergency Services during the disturbances.
On July 29, 1992, at 10:00 a.m., we met with Alan R.
Cowen of the Los Angeles City Fire Department in his office.
Chief Cowen's office is located at 200 North Main Street, Los
Angeles, California 90012. His telephone number is (213)
485-6669.
The following is a summary of our recollections of our
meeting with Chief Cowen, including our questions and
comments, together with our respective mental impressions,
conclusions and opinions, based upon the meeting.
SAICA0339.WP RECORD NO.
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Exhibit No. 1
SUMMARY ABSTRACT
Interview with Phil Depoian
Phil Depoian is Special Counselor to the Mayor and
the Mayor's liaison with L.A.P.D. and the Police Commission.
He has worked for the Mayor for 20 years, and has been the
police liaison for seven years.
Highlights of Interview:
Depoian lays the blame for inadequate police
response to the civil disturbances "100%" at the feet of
Chief Gates.
According to Depoian, Gates was irrelevant to, and
uninvolved in, the operation of the Police Department and
the establishment of Department policy for many years.
L.A.P.D. response to the civil disturbances, arson, and
looting was inadequate because Gates, during the last year,
interfered with the command structure in place at the
Department, which otherwise could and did function
adequately without his participation.
Gates' interference took three forms. He
ostracized and cut out of the direct command structure any
officer he felt was disloyal. For example, after Assistant
Chief David Dotson testified before the Christopher
Commission, Gates removed him from the line of command and
communication. Dotson is responsible for providing vehicles
and equipment in response to emergencies. Because he was
"out of the loop," officers did not have cars and phones to
respond to the outbreak of civil disorder and to communicate
with headquarters.
Second, about a year ago, Gates ordered seven
divisions to report directly to him, by-passing the Bureau
Chiefs and Assistant and Deputy Chiefs. When civil unrest
broke out, however, Gates was unavailable, so the officers
responsible for Florence and Normandie, for example, were
without leadership.
Third, about a week before the verdicts were
announced in the trial of the officers charged with beating
Rodney King, Gates reassigned officers from Metro who were
experienced in emergency response, and replaced them with
new, inexperienced officers. When the civil disturbances
broke out, therefore, the officers who would usually manage
the crisis from downtown were unavailable.
Privileged and confidential
Attorney Work Product
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Depoian believes that once Gates is gone and a
responsible new Chief is in command, the problems of
L.A.P.D. management and emergency preparedness will largely
be resolved.
CL921900.098
Privileged and confidential
Attorney Work Product
2
Exhibit No. 1
SUMMARY ABSTRACT
Interview with Stanley J. Sheinbaum
Stanley J. Sheinbaum has been a member of the Los
Angeles Police Commission since April 4, 1991, and its
President since July 16, 1991. Summarized below are the key
points of the interview which Jim Clark, John Brinsley, and
Jeremy Matz conducted with Mr. Sheinbaum on June 10, 1992.
It is fair to say that Commission President
Sheinbaum was less critical of the response of the Los
Angeles Police Department to the civil unrest which
commenced after the verdicts of acquittal in the Rodney G.
King beating case on April 29, 1992 than he was of the
general management of the Los Angeles Police Department, and
the planning and equipping of the L.A.P.D. for that
response.
Thus, according to Mr. Sheinbaum, the
"intelligence" operation of the L.A.P.D. is extremely weak,
and probably should be discontinued, with the officers
dedicated to that function used elsewhere. Nor was the
L.A.P.D.'s planning (of which Mr. Sheinbaum was aware)
adequate to respond to the reaction of the public to the
acquittal in the King beating trial, although the Police
Commission, the Mayor's Office, and the City Council
apparently all were told by Chief Daryl Gates that a "plan"
was in place. Mr. Sheinbaum candidly admits that the Police
Commission, at least, could have done far more to press
Chief Gates as to the L.A.P.D.'s specific plans for dealing
with the possibility of civil unrest following the King
trial verdicts.
In fact, the lack of knowledge of the Police
Commission about the L.A.P.D.'s planning for post-King
verdict activities was a function of the difficulties with
the oversight of the L.A.P.D. experienced by virtually all
aspects of the Los Angeles City Government. Specifically,
because of Chief Gates' "don't meddle" attitude concerning
the Department's tactics and operations, and view that any
oversight of the Department was inappropriate, the Police
Commission has not been able to discharge its oversight
duties vis-a-vis the Police Department effectively for
years, and the Mayor's Office and City Council have fared no
better. Thus, while the L.A.P.D. is remarkably free of what
traditionally would be considered "corruption," discipline
is weak, and oversight is virtually non-existent.
Privileged and Confidential
Attorney Work Product
This situation may have been exacerbated by the
atmosphere of political animosity between and among the
Mayor's Office, the Police Commission, the City Council, and
the L.A.P.D., culminating in the fact that there was a
virtual freeze in communications between the Mayor's Office
and Chief Gates beginning ·in the Spring of 1991. This
compounded problems in the internal management of L.A.P.D.
caused by the lack of communication between Chief Gates and
his subordinates, inadequate training, and poor internal
controls.
Mr. Sheinbaum's overriding theme however, is that
the L.A.P.D. 's response, which he does not believe to have
been entirely inadequate, was hindered by the lack of police
manpower, effective and updated communications equipment,
necessary vehicles, and other logistical support. It is
Mr. Sheinbaum's view that at least $250,000,000 in increased
expenditures is necessary for communications equipment
alone, and that the numbers of police (approximately 8,300)
for Los Angeles, and the way in which they are deployed
(with far too many in desk jobs), simply makes the police
force, as currently equipped, inadequate to police Los
Angeles at the level, and in the fashion, the public
expects.
JPC/hs
CL921900.093
Privileged and confidential
Attorney Work Product
2
I
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR
TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS
CITY OF LOS ANGELES
MEMORANDUM
ABSTRACT
Interviewee: John Mack, President Los Angeles Urban League
Interviewers: John H. Brinsley and Lynne Hobbs
John Mack is the president of the Los Angeles
Urban League whose national office has serviced the African
American community for 70 years. He is considered a
community leader. Major issues covered in the interview
were: (1) the pre-verdict planning and comments made at two
meetings -- one at First African Episcopal Church and the
other at City Hall; (2) the different motivations for
looting; and (3) the recommendation to coordinate community
organizations with the Police Department to create better
public relations.
RECORD NO. JIO\
COPY d OF (o
SUMMARY ABSTRACT
INTERVIEW WITH JOHN LYNCH
John Lynch is the Chief of Central Operations of the
Office of the District Attorney of Los Angeles County.
His office prosecutes all felonies in downtown LA (about
2,000 per month), 90% of which arise from LAPD arrests.
His office is handling the felony prosecutions that arose
from the civil disturbances.
Highlights of Interview
Lynch was not critical of LAPD's performance during
the civil disturbances. He believed that the riots,
which arose from 20 years of suppressed rage, were so
monumental that no police force could have contained
them. The situation required an army.
Lynch believes that LAPD works well, if you take it
on its own terms -- that it is a paramilitary
organization, the goal of which is to arrest as many
people as possible and process them efficiently.
However, Lynch was very critical of LAPD. He said
that LAPD's "fuck you" arrogant attitude pervades the
organization, from Chief Gates down. That attitude
impairs officers' relations with the community and with
other agencies of government. He hopes that the
Commission and the new Chief will take advantage of the
opportunity offered by the rioting to change that
attitude.
In particular, he believes that:
LAPD needs to reward police officers who
provide and recognize service, not those with the highest
arrest statistics.
LAPD needs to open lines of communication from
the bottom up, to improve communication and to break down
the hierarchical, paramilitary culture.
LAPD needs to improve its procedures in
officer-involved-shootings, to break the code of silence
and improve accountability to the Police Commission and
the public.
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Confidential & Privileged/Attorney-Client & Work Product
I
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
Interviewee:
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR
TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS
CITY OF LOS ANGELES
MEMORANDUM
ABSTRACT
Councilwoman Joy Picus
Interviewers: Belinda Walker and Lynne Hobbs
Councilwoman Joy Picus discussed concerns that
Gates' accusation that the Mayor's Office was uncooperative
and unresponsive to the LAPD's budgetary needs may have some
truth. The Councilwoman is very knowledgeable about the
budgetary process and the City Council's attitude towards
Gates. She was aware that the Police Department's
communications system was outdated. She was not present for
the weekend of the disorder and cannot comment on police
response.
II l l
RECORD NO.
COPY OF (p
SUMMARY ABSTRACT
Interview with Gloria Romero
Gloria Romero is a professor of psychology at Cal. State L.A.
and has been on the Hispanic Advisory Council to the Police
Commission for approximately two years.
Highlights of Interview:
In Romero's view, hunger, homelessness, unemployment and urban
decay are themselves a form of violence visited on minority
communities by the government, which has abandoned the poor and
especially minority youth. Police brutality against African
Americans and Latinos is also government violence. It is
inevitable that the residents in these communities responded to
violence with violence, and . their."rage .is. understandable.
Romero believes the most important issue is not improvements
in police deployment, increases in resources, and improved
planning. Conditions in South Central and parts of Pomona, Pico
Union and East L.A. are so horrible that violence cannot be
prevented until the socio-economic devastation of these are areas
is reversed. African-Americans and Latinos are alienated and
enraged. This must be addressed.
LAPD must learn and accept that it is its duty to protect and
serve immigrants as well as citizens. If LAPD continues to act in
concert with INS, Latinos cannot expect and will not expect fair
treatment from the police. The police must stop viewing Latinos as
"illegals."
Privileged & Confidential -- Attorney Work Product
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TO: Richard J. Stone
ATTORNElWORK PRODUCT
PRIVILEGED AND CONflDENllAL
MEMORANDUM
General Counsel and Staff Director
FROM: Karen R. Smith
DATE: July 7, 1992
RE: Interview With Ruth Galanter, Los Angeles City
Councilwoman 6th District
SUMMARY
Councilwoman Galanter, who represents the 6th District, had limited first hand
know ledge of the civil disturbances as she was in Washington, D. C. on April 29th and
returned to Los Angeles late on Thursday April 30th.
Councilwoman Galanter does believe that critical city services such as fire, water and
police need to be centralized so that emergency response services can be co-ordinated better.
Galanter recalled participating in an emergency simulation at Dodger Stadium two years ago
but felt that the city council has not received enough practice or instruction in what to do in
case of an emergency. Her district did experience unrest, with looting activity in the
Crenshaw area and some violence against white residents in the Oakwood section of Venice.
She believes that the City Charter does not lend itself to collaborative City Council oversight
of the LAPD. The City Council, by its vote to re-instate Chief Gates after his suspension in
1991 by the Police Commission made it cl~ to Gates that he had the City Council in his
pocket. The action by the city council also signaled to the newly constituted Police
Commission that Gates had enough votes on the City Council to fend off ouster. The Police
Commission was seemingly "waiting out Gates" until he resigned.
Galanter and her staff have praise for the effectiveness of the Police Pacific Division
during the civil disturbance but feel that the police need more personnel and equipment to do
the job right.
1
RECORD NO. 1115
COPY d OF (,
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TO: Richard J. Stone
ATTORNEYWORKPRODUCT
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
General Counsel and Staff Director
FROM: Karen R. Smith and Ann Park
RE: Interview With Los Angeles City Councilman
Richard Alatorre, 14th District
SUMMARY
Richard Alatorre, Councilman for the 14th District, emphasized the importance of
having an emergency plan for the City that everyone understands and can execute. Alatorre
however saw no evidence of a plan in effect during the city unrest April 29th through May
3rd.
Councilman Alatorre believes that there was very little police planning in anticipation
of a possible civil disturbance following the Simi Valley verdicts and the police clearly did
not anticipate the city-wide pattern of the violence. Alatorre also observed that the absence
of a strong police presence contributed to the widespread looting. Alatorre's district did not
experience extensive outbreaks of violence and Alatorre attributes this law-abiding response
to the widely held feeling by district residents that "F.ast L.A. is my home." Alatorre
characterized the civil disturbance as a "revolution in a third world city" where the "have
nots" rose up against the "haves." Alatorre felt that police officials did not involve the
elected officials enough in handling the civil disturbance.
Ill (p
RECORD NO.
COPY OF V,
ABSTRACT
Witness: KEITH COMRIE, Chief Administrative Officer, City of Los
Angeles
Major Issues/Summary: As the chief of the politically neutral
administrative staff of the City, Comrie has a perspective on the
long-term funding and operations of the Police Department, and a
perspective on the emergency preparedness of the City, as a member
of the Emergency Operations Board (EOB). Before the disorders,
Comrie believed that the EOB planning and response functions were
being carried out well, and in particular that LAPD had its own
internal planning well under control. Someone ironically, City
managers looked to LAPD as the model of excellent planning and
management in this area. Comrie was shocked at the lack of LAPD
response early in the disorders, and "mystified" at how the command
structure seems to have fallen apart on April 29. He and other
City executives are looking to the report of the Special Advisor to
identify what went wrong and what is capable of being corrected.
Comrie is emphatic that the pre-disorder political atmosphere
(as between Chief Gates and Mayor Bradley) had no actual effect on
either the planning or response to the disorders. Both Gates and
Bradley were active, strong supporters of the EOB emergency
response planning structure. That structure is highly
decentralized and delegated to departments, so that even had
Bradley and Gates been close personal friends in constant contact,
nothing would have been different in terms of oversight by the
Mayor's office of operational planning within LAPD.
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Page 7
I
File: WEBSTER STUDY
LAW OFFICES
IRELL & MANELLA
A Partnership Including Professional Corporation,
MEMORANDUM
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Re: Summary of Interview LAPD Pacific/Officer
~
SUMMARY
Date: July 9, 1992
To: Richard J. Stone
From: Raul Ayala
David Lee
On Wednesday, June 24, 1992, at approximately 1 :30 p.m., David Lee and I
interviewed Senior Lead Officer ~onna Cox of the Los Angeles Police Department,
Pacific Division, at the Pacific Division Headquarters on the corner of Centinella
and Culver Boulevards.
This interview focuses upon (a) the officer's background, (b) the informa
tion available prior to the disturbance, (c) the immediate response to the
disturbance, (d) an evaluation of intelligence, command and control, communica
tions, tactical alert, community based policing, equipment availability and
coordination with other law enforcement agencies, (e) the officer's recommenda
tions and criticisms and (f) possible investigative leads.
The following is a summary of our recollection of this meeting, including our
questions and comments, together with our mental impressions, conclusions and
opinions based upon our meeting.
HEIT0415.\I»
RECORD NO.
COPY a
OF lf}
I
File: WEBSTER STUDY
LAW OFFICES
IRELL & MANELLA
A Partnership Including Professional Corporation,
MEMORANDUM
Date: July 9, 1992
To: Richard J. Stone
Re: Summary/LAPD Pacific Officer Green
From: Jennifer Miller
David Lee
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
SUMMARY
On Thursday, June 25, 1992, at approximately 10:30 a.m., David Lee and I
interviewed P3 Officer Mark Green of the Los Angeles Police Department, Pacific
Division, at the Pacific Division Headquarters on the corner of Centinella and
Culver Boulevards.
This interview focuses upon (a) the officer's background, (b) the informa
tion available prior to the disturbance, (c) the immediate response to the
disturbance, (d) an evaluation of intellig· ence, command and control, communica
tions, tactical alert, community based policing, equipment availability, and
coordination with other law enforcement agencies, (e) the officer's recommenda
tions and criticisms and (f) possible investigative leads.
The following is a summary of our recollection of this meeting, including our
questions and comments, together with our mental impressions, conclusions and
opinions based upon this meeting.
RECORD NO. I J JO
HEIT0413.\JP
COPY °' OF {p
I
LAW OFFICES
IRELL & MANELLA
A Partnerthip Including Profeuional Corporation,
MEMORANDUM
File: Webster Commission Study
Re: SUMMARY of Interview with Captains
David Baldwin and Troy Armstrong
of the California National Guard
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
· CONFIDENTIAL
Date: July 9, 1992
To: Richard J. Stone,
General Counsel & Staff
Director
From: Arif Alikhan
cc: Kenneth A. Heitz
This interview with Captains David Baldwin and Troy Armstrong refers
to the role of the California National Guard (CNG) during the civil disturbances
in Los Angeles. Both Captains were company commanders of CNG troops
deployed in the Los Angeles area. Specifically, this interview summary focuses
on the following areas: ( 1) the initial deployment of CNG troops; (2) CNG
interaction with LAPD personnel; (3) the effects of federalization; and (4) the
problems associated with the CNG deployment in Los Angeles.
Brian Hennigan and I interviewed Captains David Baldwin and Troy
Armstrong on June 15, 1992. This interview took place in Colonel Edmund C.
Zysk's office at the CNG headquarters in Sacramento. The following is a
summary of this interview which includes our questions, comments, mental
impressions and conclusions regarding the CNG's response to the civil
disturbances in Los Angeles.
BALDWIN.ORF
RECORD NO.
COPY-~-
OF
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
M E M O R A N D U M
Susan I. Spivak, Esq.
Jan L. Handzlik, Esq.
Maren Christensen, Esq.
Tracey W. Young, Esq.
July 8, 1992
Summary of Interview of Cecil J. Mills,
Supervising Judge, Central Criminal,
Los Angeles Superior Court
Summary
This interview with Cecil J. Mills, Supervising Judge,
Central Criminal, Los Angeles Superior Court, focuses upon the
impact of the civil unrest on the Criminal Division of the
Los Angeles Superior Court, the inter-agency coordination before
and during the unrest, and Judge Mills' recommendations for
planning for possible future unrest.
On June 26, 1992, at 2:00 p.m. at the Criminal Courts
Building, Ms. Young and I interviewed Cecil J. Mills. The
following is a summary of our recollections of this meeting,
including our questions and comments, together with our mental
impressions, conclusions and opinions, based upon our meeting.
Cecil J. Mills is the Supervising Judge, Central
Criminal, of the Los Angeles Superior Court.
OOCID: T:\MC\WEBSTER\SUMHARY.2
RECORD NO.
COPY
OF (p
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07-13-1992 1s:02 2134892080
MILLER & NOLAN INC.
P.02/0::
MEMQRANQUM
FILE: Web•ter study/Interagency Group CATE: July 10, 1992
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTOI\N!Y WORX PRODUCT
RE: summary/Interview Federal
Protection Service
stoowty
TO: Richard J. Stone
FROM: Thoma J. Nolan
Vicki I. Podbereaky
Thia interview with Charles Sheppard, Acting Chief, Federal
Protection Service, focuses upon (a) the Federal Protection'•
responae to the civil diaturbancaa the evening of April 29, 1992 7
and (b) the communications between the Loa Angel•• ottice ot the
Federal Protection service ("PPS") and representatives ot the Loa
Angel•• Police Department ("I.APO").
on June 10, 1992 at S:30 a.m. at the ottic•• ot the FPS in the
Federal Building, Thomas J. Nolan of Millar & Nolan, Inc. conducted
an interview ot Charles Sheppard, Deputy Chief and Acting Chiet of
the Federal Protection services. The following 1• a summary of
Mr. Nolan'• recollection of thia interview, including queationa and
comments, together with mental impression•, concluaiona and
opinions upon the meeting. Thia memorandum does not contain a
verbatim transcript of Mr. Sheppard's comments, nor has this
memorandum been reviewed or adopted by Mr. Sheppard.
RECORD NO .
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OF (p
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
MEMORANDUM
SUSAN SPIVAK, ESQ.
KEN HEITZ, ESQ.
ALVIN S. MICHAELSON, ESQ.
BRENDA LIGORSKY, LAW CLERK
JULY 6, 1992
HUNTINGTON PARK POLICE DEPARTMENT INTERVIEW
SUMMARY
This interview with Patrick M. Connolly, Chief of
Police of Huntington Park, focuses on the role and resources of
the Huntington Park Police Department during the civil unrest.
The interview covered:
A. Huntington Park's relationship with the Los
Angeles Police Department, the Sheriff's Department and the
surrounding cities;
B. The planning activities by the Huntington Park
Police Department; and
C. Reaction during the unrest.
The interview took place July 2, 1992, at 3:40 p.m. at
the Huntington Park Police Department. The following is a
summary of our recollection of this meeting, including our
questions and comments, together with our mental impressions,
conclusions and opinions, based upon the meeting.
RECORD NO.
COPY a
OF (p
I
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
MEMORANDUM
SUSAN SPIVAK, ESQ.
KEN HEITZ, ESQ.
ALVIN S. MICHAELSON, ESQ.
BRENDA LIGORSKY, LAW CLERK
JULY 6, 1992
SOUTH GATE POLICE DEPARTMENT INTERVIEW
SUMMARY
This interview with Chief Ronald P. George and Captain
Mike Blaska of the City of South Gate, focuses on the role and
resources of the South Gate Police Department during the civil
unrest. The interview covered:
A. The planning activities by the South Gate Police
Department;
B. Reaction during the unrest; and
C. South Gate's relationship with the Los Angeles
Police Department and the Sheriff's Department.
The interview took ·place July 2, 1992, at 11:20 a.m. at
the South Gate Police Department. The following is a summary of
our recollection of this meeting, including our questions and
comments, together with our mental impressions, conclusions and
opinions, based upon the meeting.
RECORD NO.
COPY
OF _Y,_
I
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
MEMORANDUM
SUSAN SPIVAK, ESQ.
KEN HEITZ, ESQ.
ALVIN S. MICHAELSON, ESQ.
BRENDA LIGORSKY, LAW CLERK
JULY 6, 1992
BELL POLICE DEPARTMENT INTERVIEW
SUMMARY
This interview with Jim Edwards, Chief of Police of
Bell, focuses on the role and resources of the Bell Police
Department during the civil unrest. The interview covered:
A. Bell's methods of training and policing;
B. Reaction during the unrest; and
C. Bell's relationship with the Los Angeles Police
Department and the Sheriff's Department.
The interview took place on July 2, 1992, at 2:00 p.m.
at the Bell Police Department. The following is a summary of our
recollection of this meeting, including our questions and
comments, together with our mental impressions, conclusions and
opinions, based upon the meeting.
RECORD NO.
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File:
Re:
LAW OFFICES
IRELL & MANELLA
A Partnership Including Professional Corporations
MEMORANDUM
Webster Commission Study
SUMMARY of interview with
Major General Daniel J. Hernandez
of the California National Guard
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK-PRQDUCT
SUMMARY
; CONFIDENTIAL
Date: July 6, 1992
To: Richard J. Stone,
General Counsel & Staff
Director
From: Arif Alikhan
cc: Kenneth R. Heitz
This interview with Major General Daniel J. Hernandez refers to the role
of the California National Guard (CNG) during the civil disturbances in Los
Angeles. Gen. Hernandez is the Division Commander for the 40th Mechanized
Infantry Division of the CNG. In addition to commanding the 40th Division,
Gen. Hernandez also became the Army Forces (ARFOR) commander after the
CNG was federalized by President Bush. This interview summary focuses on
the following areas: ( 1) the initial notification and deployment of CNG troops;
(2) the effectiveness of the Mutual Aid System; (3) logistical constraints; (4)
the effects of federalizing the CNG; (4) federal troop deployment; and (5) post
action analysis.
Brian Hennigan and I interviewed Major General Daniel J. Hernandez on
July 2, 1992 at 10:00 a.m. This interview took place in General Hernandez's
office at the Armed Forces Reserve Center in Los Alamitos, California. The
following is a summary of this interview which includes our questions,
comments, mental impressions and conclusions, based upon this meeting,
regarding the CNG's response to the civil disturbances in Los Angeles.
RECORD NO • \ l ~i
B:HERNANO.FIN
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webster.002
MEMORANDUM
PRMLEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
Jan Handzlik
.Q
Brenda J. Penny'::\~~
, 'fo -u·
June 19, 1992 Y
Webster Studies/Inter Agency Group
Summary/DEA Interview
SUMMARY
The interview with John Zinter, Gil Avila and George Hurd of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) focused on this agency's role, if any, during the period of unrest in
the City following the verdict in the Rodney l(jng beating trial. The interview also focused
upon DEA's involvement and/or interaction, if any, with the LAPD during the unrest.
On June 16, 1992 at 10:00 a.m. at the offices of DEA I interviewed John Zinter, Gil
Avila and George Hurd. The following is a summary of my meeting with these individuals.
The DEA had no involvement with the events surrounding the unrest other than to
secure its own building in concert with the GSA Federal Protective Service Department.
The emergency plan implemented by the DEA is a general one and was not designed for
civil unrest specifically. Its only contact with the LAPD was a casual conversation between
certain personnel at DEA and LAPD at a refreshment station for personnel located in the
area in which an LAPD officer told one of the DEA personnel that because of the situation
LAPD would probably not be able to patrol the DEA office. That individual asked if the
DEA was being protected by its own personnel. The LAPD officer was informed by DEA
personnel that they, as-well as the Federal Protective Service, were securing the facility. The
DEA did offer its assistance to the FBI once federal personnel were activated by the
Attorney General. However, no assistance by DEA was required.
RECORD NO.
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