Interview, Chief Daryl F. Gates, 1992-06-25

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Content ~ --------------- - --------
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR
TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS
CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Privileged and confidential
Attorney Work Product
Attorney-.client Communication
July 1, 1992
TO: Judge William H. Webster
Special Advisor
FROM:
Chief Hubert Williams
Deputy Special Advisor
Richard J. Stone
General Counsel and Staff Director
Terry W. Bird
Deputy General Counsel
Elizabeth D. Lear
Deputy General Counsel
RE: Interview of Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl F. Gates -
June 25, 1992
On June 25, 1992, from approximately 11:20 a.m. until
approximately 1:15 p.m., at Parker Center in Los Angeles, Richard
Stone, Terry Bird, and Elizabeth Lear interviewed Los Angeles
Police Chief Daryl F. Gates. Commander Rick Dinse was also
present. The following is a summary of our recollection of this
meeting, including our questions and comments, together with our
mental impressions, conclusions and opinions, based upon the
meeting.
Chief Gates' Opening Statement
Following introductions, and Mr. Stone's opening
statement regarding our investigation and our awareness of Gates'
concerns regarding the Christopher Commission's work, Chief Gates
commented on the work of the Christopher Commission. Gates
stated that he feels that the staff of the Christopher Commission
was unethical and underhanded in their release of his testimony
before the Christopher Commission. Next, Chief Gates stated that
he does not believe our investigation is necessary. Gates said
that while he likes Judge Webster and Chief Williams, he does not
believe that Judge Webster or Chief Williams knows how to deal
with a riot. He went on to say that "no one knows how to handle
RECORD NO.
COPY d-
OF -~(p __ _
a riot better than I do." Gates stated that he believes that
Judge Webster was appointed to conduct this investigation because
of "politics" with the Police Commission.
Comparison of 1992 Civil Disturbance to Watts in 1965
When Mr. Stone asked ·him what was the same or different
about the civil disturbance in April 1992 as compared with the
Watts riots in 1965, Chief Gates said that he saw differences,
but that there was a lot of similarity between the two
disturbances. He said that he thinks that the April 1992
disturbance may have been more organized than Watts in 1965, but
that he cannot yet determine whether this was the case. Gates
described the Watts riots in 1965 as "complete bedlam."
When asked about the spread of the disturbance, Gates
said that the LAPD and the FBI are looking into how the fires
spread during the 1992 disturbance in an attempt to determine if
there was organized looting and structure fires. Chief Gates
said that the Divisions were given a list of gun stores and pawn
shops in their area, and that these establishments were the first
places that should have been protected, but "they forgot about
it." Gates said, based on his helicopter tour of the affected
areas during the evening of Wednesday, April 29, 1992, he thought
that those involved in the rioting selected places where there
was a lot of material to loot, and then set the establishments on
fire. Gates described the pattern of violence in 1992 as an
attempt to "loot first, then cause destruction."
Continuing his comparison of the Watts riots to what
happened in April 1992, using the Korean community as an example,
Gates told us that he thought those involved in the rioting in
1992 pinpointed certain areas more than those involved in Watts
did in 1965. In contrast to the events in 1992, Gates said that
many kinds of establishments were hit in Watts in 1965, including
black-owned businesses, as well as those owned by Jewish
proprietors. Gates said that the disturbance in 1992 showed more
of a tendency toward stealing and burning, while in Watts in
1965, this form of activity did not get started until
approximately the third day of the disturbance.
Planning and Training for Responding to a Civil Disturbance
When Mr. Bird asked Chief Gates about a statement in
his book, Chief, My Life in the LAPD, that while the LAPD had
academy training in riot techniques prior to Watts in 1965, when
they got out in the field during the riot, they were not able to
make use of the specific techniques they had learned, Gates said
that he thought Mr. Bird had misread his statement in his book.
Mr. Bird then asked Gates whether he would agree that,
notwithstanding the fact that events during a riot can be hectic
2
and unpredictable, it is important to plan and train for unusual
occurrences, such as a riot, beforehand. Chief Gates agreed.
Then, Mr. Bird asked Gates if he would suggest that it is not
possible to plan or train for a situation like Watts in 1965 or
what occurred in April 1992. Gates responded that it is possible
to plan and train for events like what occurred in Watts in 1965
and in April" 1992.
Gates further responded that what he was referring to
in his book was "classical" training; training that is designed
to plan for handling riots involving large crowds. In 1965,
Gates said, there were no large crowds; it was all "hit and run."
He said people were "all over the place" in 1965, and that when
the LAPD would try to stop them, they would just run somewhere
else. Gates then said that, yes, there are things that can be
done to plan for a civil disturbance, and cited the LAPD "Model
Plan." Gates made a point of going on to say, however, that
while there is a belief that these types of events can be stopped
quickly, in reality, they cannot be stopped quickly. Gates said
that police response on an everyday basis is "pretty limited,"
and to expect the Police Department to respond immediately to
everything that is happening at once is "silliness"; it cannot be
done.
When Mr. Stone asked Chief Gates what "it" was that
happened in April 1992, Gates avoided the question and went on to
talk about the Los Angeles Fire Department. Gates said that he
would not criticize the Fire Department; they do a "great job."
He said they are well organized, and have a more immediate mutual
aid system than does the Police Department. Gates noted,
however, that while buildings in Los Angeles burned to the
ground, there has been no criticism with regard to responding to
fires, except for the criticism that the Police Department did
not provide security for the firefighters. He said that the
firefighters were simply overwhelmed, and could not knock the
fires down the way they usually do.
Mr. Bird asked Chief Gates what difference, if any,
preparation would have made. Gates responded that "we prepared
as well as we ought to; we didn't execute as well as we ought to.
Some of our Commanders made mistakes; they responded to me as if
I was teaching grade school."
Gates said that if the Department were to hold all of
the day watches over, they would have no one to come back to work
the next day. He said this was one of the mistakes made in Watts
in 1965; everyone was tired and there was no one to protect
against the looting that occurred during the day. Gates said
that, in addition, the Department was not as well organized early
on as they should have been. He told us that the Department
should approach a civil disturbance the same way they would
3
approach any disaster. They should evaluate the situation, then
deploy to suit the situation.
In a riot, Gates said, it is necessary to deploy
officers out into the field in large groups or squads; it is not
feasible to put one or two officers in a car and send them out.
In Watts in 1965, Gates said, they surrounded one area on foot
using a large number of LAPD and Sheriff's personnel before they
realized that the crowd had dispersed and moved on to another
area, where the police officers, two in a car, were outnumbered
and being attacked.
Gates reiterated that it is possible to prepare for
something like this, but expectations cannot be to put it down
quickly. He also reiterated that the most important aspect of
preparation is the LAPD's standing plan, which he wrote after the
riots in Watts in 1965. Chief Gates said that it is impossible
to re-write the Plan to plan for a new contingency; the same plan
should be used for every kind of disaster. He said that the
approach should be the same for every kind of disaster: call a
tactical alert, re-deploy people, evaluate the situation and
identify areas of concern, get people in there, close off the
area and limit ingress and egress.
Gates again reiterated that the Standing Plan, once in
effect, would have been enough to deal with this problem. He
said that it is important to begin to arrest from the very
beginning of a disturbance. Gates said the more they arrest, the
more they reduce the problem. He said that they should never
pull people out, but continue to add people. Gates said that all
of the officers do not need to know the entire plan, only their
area and their squad. He said all they need to do is all of the
things that they normally do; that is all they need to focus on.
Command and Control
In response to Mr. Stone's question about
responsibility for command and control within the Department,
Gates said that command and control initially rests with the
Lieutenants and Sergeants, and that they must understand their
responsibilities.
Chief Gates reiterated that a riot should be policed in
basically the same way that policing is done every day. He said
he still cannot get over what they did in the 77th Division,
observing that they pulled people in and then did not re-deploy
them. Gates said that after he viewed the area from a
helicopter, around 10:00 p.m. on Wednesday night, he and
Commander Rick Dinse drove around the 77th Division and "could
not find anybody out there." He said that he asked Dinse, "Where
the hell are they?"
4
Gates said that returning to the command post between
calls is not the way the Department should operate. He said they
should divide the area into sectors, using communications to talk
to people in the field. He said the key is keeping people in the
field. Gates said that the most important thing to do is to move
in quickly and start making arrests. He reiterated that making
arrests is the key to gaining control. Prisoners should be
booked in the field, Gates said, and personnel should be sent in
to pick up the prisoners.
Chief Gates said that on Wednesday night, on his way
back from his "ill-fated" trip to the fundraiser in Brentwood, he
looked at the City to see what was happening. Gates then
qualified his statement by saying that the gathering he attended
on Wednesday night in Brentwood was not really a fundraiser, but
a gathering of people opposed to Proposition F. (However, later
in the interview, Gates repeatedly referred, without
qualification, to the same event as a "fundraiser.
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It is not
clear from the context of the interview whether Gates' repeated
references to the "fundraiser" were a disclaimer to his previous
comments regarding the nature of the gathering.) He said that on
the way out to Brentwood, he felt comfortable that they had
enough resources deployed; he expected that all of Metro Division
would have been deployed to South Central.
Mr. Bird asked Chief Gates about who was supposed to be
in command during the disturbance. Gates responded that the
Department Commander, Ron Frankel, had the responsibility to make
sure that there was a field commander in necessary locations.
The field commander could be a Captain. In addition, Gates said,
in each of the four Bureaus, the Bureau Chief is supposed to
respond to see that policing is going well in his area. He said
initially they thought the concentration of the disturbance was
in South Central, so they did not have each of the four bureaus
set up with field commanders. Gates said that the initial
declaration of a curfew was going to be limited to South Central,
then they realized that the scope of the activity was going to be
broader because it was spreading to other areas.
Gates said that when he returned from the fundraiser at
8:30 or 9:00 p.m. on Wednesday night, he expected that all field
command posts would be up and running and all forces deployed.
He thought that all motor officers would have been brought in and
re-grouped as light striking units, field jails would have been
set up, and the Metro Division deployed. Gates said that he
thought that all of these measures would have been in place by
9:00 p.m. at the very latest. He said that Metro had been
deployed, but not the way he thought they would be deployed.
Mr. Bird asked if there had been a change in the
command structure within the Department following the Rodney King
incident, and if so, whether this had had an impact on the
5
Department's ability to make decisions on April 29, 1992. Gates
responded that "it had a great impact." He said that the command
structure was very concerned about themselves and the image of
the Department, and they did not want to be the cause of a major
mistake. Gates said that they have been extremely sensitized to
all of it, and reiterated that it has had a great impact on
decisions being made in the field. For example, he said, not
only have command officers backed off from the decision to use
force in the field, but so have police officers.
Deployment
Chief Gates said that Wednesday night, April 29, 1992,
he talked with Matt Hunt who was at the command post in the South
Bureau. He said he asked Hunt, "Where do they have everybody
deployed? Where is your sector patrol?" Gates said Hunt replied
that his units were handling calls for service, and that Metro
was assisting the Fire Department. Hunt then told Chief Gates
that they had 50 motor officers on a bus, but that they did not
have any cars.
Gates said that he had no idea that they had not
deployed officers out into the field when Hunt said that they
were answering calls; he did not know that they were answering
calls from the command post.
Gates said that the command post location is not a bad
location; it has phones, walls, and a large parking lot.
However, after the Fire Department was brought in, Gates said,
ingress and egress became difficult because the post was too
crowded. At this point, Gates said, it was too late to find
another location for the Fire Department.
Chief Gates said it is likely that initial confusion
will always exist in a situation of this kind, unless they were
to say that "tonight we are going to have a riot," and bring
everyone in and put them all in riot gear, including helmets.
But, Gates said, just putting police in helmets and riot gear
might provoke an accusation that this was provoc~tion for a riot.
He said that this was the accusation in earlier "mini-riots."
Gates said that after his helicopter ride Wednesday
evening, he told the Mayor that he had a strong sense that they
were going to put it down themselves, even though there were a
lot of fires. He said he did not get a clear understanding about
how people were not being deployed until he "started to get into
it" and realized that they were not deployed on the street.
Gates said he went home at about 7:00 a.m. Thursday morning and
while taking a shower, felt that it still was not right; there
was not tight enough control in South Central. So, he went back
to the EOC and said that he wanted to assign commanders to each
of three areas within South Central. Gates said that it was not
6
until this system was in place that things started to die off
significantly.
Gates said that they did a poor job in the initial
stages in one area: deploying people. He said the performance
was not consistent with the Plan or the LAPD's policy of moving
people in aggressively. Gates said they did not respond to -the
Reginald Denny problem; that they backed away was alright, he
said, but, they should have gone right back in. He said Metro
and 77th had enough resources to do so, "why they didn't, I don't
know." Gates said that they could have gotten there early
enough, and they could have used deadly force (and it probably
was warranted) .
Chief Gates said he ordered Metro deployed before he
went to the fundraiser in Brentwood on Wednesday night. He said
that when he left to go to Brentwood, he thought that Metro had
been fully deployed. At that time, the only thing that was
happening was a demonstration at Parker Center, and Gates thought
they could handle it. Gates left Frankel in charge.
When Gates heard at approximately 6:45 p.m. on KFWB
about the situation at Florence and Normandie, he said, he called
Commander Dinse from his car on his way to Brentwood and told him
to deploy Metro. Later, Gates said, he was checking things out
on his way back downtown from Brentwood. Gates said that he has
a beeper, as does his driver, and that he also has a cellular
phone; however, no one called him on his way back downtown from
Brentwood.
Measuring the Temperature of the City
Mr. Stone asked Gates what he and the Police Department
knew about the temperature of the City in advance of the verdict
in the Rodney King beating trial. Gates said that they had
talked about it a lot, and that they really did not think that
"it" was going to happen. He said that they thought there would
be some remembrance about what occurred in Watts in 1965 and its
lasting impact on the community. Gates said they thought there
would be outbreaks of violence in the housing projects and the
gang community; they thought it would be a "shooting war," but
isolated. He said they thought there would be some
demonstrations that might turn violent, but they thought they
could handle it.
Mr. Bird asked Chief Gates about statements by police
officers who have been interviewed indicating that they had
received information to the contrary regarding anticipated
problems. Gates said that that information did not filter up to
him. Mr. Bird then asked Chief Gates whether Captain Jefferson
ever told him about information from police officers indicating
that those officers were concerned that there would be riots if
7
there were "not guilty" verdicts in the Rodney King beating case.
Chief Gates responded that Captain Jefferson had not relayed such
information to him. In fact, Gates said, information indicating
just the opposite message filtered up to him. Gates said that
they have always looked at what is happening on the street,
especially in the housing projects. He said that the hint of
problems was "almost non-existent." Information gathered from
other interviews suggests that there may have been a breakdown in
communications. Patrol officers in the 77th Division apparently
communicated to the Lieutenants in the Division their concerns
that there would be rioting. Chief Gates' responses to our
questions suggest that Chief Gates was not aware of these
concerns.
Arrest Statistics
When Mr. Stone asked Chief Gates about a recent study
regarding arrest statistics showing that 51% of those individuals
arrested were Hispanic, Gates responded that it is important to
look at the relative segments of the population of the City.
Gates said that "this was essentially a black riot right from the
beginning. A lot of Hispanics got caught up in it." Gates said
that this was an opportunity, not only for gangs, but for others
to engage in criminal activity.
Community-Oriented Policing
Chief Gates then volunteered that he had taken the 77th
Division into the community-oriented policing project even though
he did not want to do so. He said he was forced to do so as a
result of a political decision made by the Board of Police
Commissioners and City Councilman Mark Ridley-Thomas. Gates said
he did not want to involve the 77th Division in that project
because they had a new Captain (Jefferson) in that Division, who
was not yet acquainted with Division personnel and operations.
Gates then opined that "putting layers in there is part
of the problem we have today." Gates said that, during the
disturbance, they had to revert back to the old system because
they are still at the experimental stage with community-oriented
policing. But, he said, this should not affect performance.
Gates said that it takes five minutes to establish command, and
then the organization should function the way it is supposed to
function, once command is established.
Chief Gates said that there is a unique situation in
Los Angeles. He said that they are not set up for all of this.
Gates said that what happened to the command staff in the
Department was that a crisis occurred and "a lot of them fell
apart." He said that this goes back to the Rodney King incident;
they did not want to be "tainted" by being associated with 'him as
Chief. Gates said that Commissioner Brewer and Dave Dotson both
8
testified before the Christopher Commission, disavowing any
responsibility for anything that went on in the Department.
Gates said they were co-opted by the Mayor's office. He said
that this psychology impacted throughout the ranks of the
Department, all the way down. Gates again said that he hears
from officers who tell him that "th~re is no one between you and
us.'' He said officers tell hi~ that no one is giving them any
support. But, Gates said, this is not true because there are
some great Captains and Commanders.
What Went Right
We made a point of asking Chief Gates what went right
during the recent civil disturbance. When Mr. Stone asked Gates
what went right during the civil disturbance, Gates said that
once they got around to doing the job they were supposed to do,
the next morning (Thursday morning), and once they left the
command post and started deploying people, it was the first time
he had a sense that they were getting on top of it.
We made a point of returning to the topic later in the
interview to give Chief Gates another opportunity to respond to
our question. Once they got moving, Gates said, he thinks a lot
went right. He said deployment got to be what it should have
been; the command post worked well; the mission was defined.
When asked when he thought things were under control, Gates said
that he was very comfortable by the time President Bush said he
was sending his people to Los Angeles. Gates said he did not
need them; he had plenty of resources at that point.
Assistance From Other Agencies
Mr. Bird asked Chief Gates when he first realized that
they needed assistance from other agencies, such as the National
Guard. Gates said "right away." He said that they thought they
could put it down themselves, but that they would need the
National Guard to "stand guard."
Gates said that when he returned from his helicopter
tour on Wednesday night, the Mayor had signed the State of
Emergency, and the Mayor told Gates that he thought they needed
the National Guard. Gates said he agreed with the Mayor, and
that they then had a conference call with the Sheriff and the
Governor. Gates said that the Sheriff was the only one who
"balked" at the idea, despite what Governor Wilson says. Chief
Gates said that he told them that they needed the National Guard
to be deployed into armories as quickly as possible. He said
they told him that they could get 1,000 National Guardsmen from
the local area right away, and that another 1,000 would be
available by Thursday night; they thought they could have the
first 1,000 ready to be deployed within six hours.
9
Mr. Bird asked Gates when he first had a sense that he
needed assistance from the Sheriff. Gates said he thought he
could manage with the help of the National Guard. However, when
they were not able to get the National Guard deployed as quickly
as Thursday morning, Gates said he called the Sheriff's office
and talked to Bob Edmonds. (According to Sheriff Block, however,
Block called Gates.) Gates said that Edmonds told him the
National Guard was not ready and they did not know when they
would be ready, but that the Sheriff could send 100 to 200
officers right away. This, according to Gates, was the initial
mutual aid.
With regard to help from the California Highway Patrol,
Gates said that one of the commanding officers tried to tell the
Captain of the CHP how to do what the CHP was asked to do. Gates
said he told the commanding officer to tell the Captain of the
CHP what he wanted done and that the Captain would do it. Chief
Gates said the CHP did do it, and did a great job.
Resources
Mr. Stone questioned Chief Gates regarding the
allegations that certain resources were in short supply. Gates
responded that there was no excuse for not having maps at the
command post. As far as a shortage of rovers, Gates said that
"we don't have them, period." He said they knew going in that
they did not have enough rovers. With regard to shotguns, Gates
said that they need a few shotguns; that there are two shotguns
in every car; and that the objective is not to go out and kill
people.
With regard to a shortage of cars, Mr. Bird asked Gates
what impact this had on the Department's ability to respond in
the first four or five hours. Gates said that he has a problem
with the idea that there were not enough cars, at least in the
initial stages. However, he said, he "could be persuaded on that
one." Gates said that when officers are called up, they are
called up with their cars, and that every officer should
understand the system for reassignment of cars.
As far as the need for escorts for the firefighters,
Gates said that it is not clear to him that there was a shortage.
Initially, he said, there were not enough escorts; however
initially, there are not going to be enough escorts. Gates said
he was told that Metro was providing security for the
firefighters, who had requested escorts after the experience in
Watts in 1965. He said that this is an area that needs to be
looked into with more precision; Chief Manning has no right to
criticize the Police Department.
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Tactical Alert
Gates volunteered that if a tactical alert had been
called, he never would have left Parker Center to go to Brentwood
on Wednesday night. Gates said that they learned in Watts in
1965 that the worst thing he could do was, as Chief, put himself
in ·the EOC. He said that he would not know what was going on if
he did not get out on the streets.
Gates said that a tactical alert probably should have
been called in the 77th, and that it would not have hurt for it
to have been called before the verdicts were returned. He said
that this is the purpose of a tactical alert; it was designed
after 1965 because they had nothing like it. A tactical alert,
Gates said, allows them to stay in a "hovering" pattern, and
alerts other areas that they may have to send resources to
assist. He said it also makes "top brass" aware of the need to
assess the situation. Again Gates said, "It was a terrible
mistake to go to the fundraiser." Again, he said that if there
had been a tactical alert called, he never would have left Parker
Center.
Matthew Hunt's Command
Chief Gates said that everyone in the Department knew
ahead of time that if anything happened, the command structure
would revert back to the "original organization (Banks/Hunt)."
Gates said, however, that Matt Hunt was not at the command post
until 9:10 p.m. Wednesday night, when he arrived from the First
A.M.E. Church. Gates said Hunt had talked with him on the
telephone earlier in the day, around 4:30 p.m., regarding
assistance in the community. Gates said he told Hunt that the
Department would help the community in any way they could. While
Gates said he does not fault Hunt for "getting out into the
community," community concern regarding anticipated violence
should have alerted Hunt to get back to his post quickly. Gates
said that the community thought they could control everything,
and that Hunt was "trying to play to this audience."
Cadre of Officers to Man EOC and Command Post
Mr. Bird asked Gates about a special cadre of officers
who are specially trained to man the EOC and the command post.
Gates responded that such a cadre was supposed to be trained and
ready to assume their duties, but that they had problems getting
them in place. Gates said that they train a number of people so
that at least one person will be available at any given time to
man each position; they are assigned on various watches, so there
should be enough specially trained personnel available to man the
posts in the initial stages of a disturbance. Gates said that he
believed that these officers had been trained, but a lot of them
just did not show up at their posts.
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Captains' Training Program in Oxnard
Mr. Bird asked Chief Gates about a large number of
Captains attending a training program in Oxnard on the afternoon
of Wednesday, April 29, 1992. Gates said that he had told them
in a staff meeting prior to that time to cancel it. At this
point in the interview, Commander Dinse interrupted to indicate
that he was not so sure that he remembered the chain of events in
the same way. Gates responded that it was not a big deal. Dinse
added that there was a Captain on duty in every Division anyway,
and that should have been sufficient to handle the command; Gates
agreed.
Chief Gates' Closing Statement
In closing, Chief Gates said that he will make himself
available to answer all of our questions, but that we will have
to work out the details. In addition, Gates said that he would
like to critique our report.
Referring to our investigation, Chief Gates then went
on to reiterate that he does not believe any of this is
necessary. Gates said that "you don't shine dung." He said that
"we," referring to the Department, "just say we screwed up.'' In
this context, Gates again made reference to his attendance at the
fundraiser in Brentwood on Wednesday night and the South Bureau
deployment. He then went on to say that "maybe it won't hurt to
have somebody look at it from the outside."
However, again, Gates made reference to the Plan and
his experience in dealing with riots. He said that the
Department has a plan, and that it is effective if executed
properly. The plan is simple, Gates said, not complex. Gates
said that he has studied every riot in other cities since Watts
in 1965, including riots in Hong Kong, in developing the Plan;
and that they have incorporated some of the information regarding
other riots into the Plan (except, he said, they shoot people in
Hong Kong, and we do not do that here). With regard to the Plan,
Gates said "I know it works." According to Gates, all the
Department has to do is deploy people as outlined in the Plan,
and ultimately they will gain control. He views the issues
relating to sufficient resources as "side issues." Gates says
the Department must do fundamental things; officers must perform
in basically the same way they do their job every day.
When Mr. Bird commented on the dedication that officers
he has interviewed have exhibited, Chief Gates' last statement
was that he never would have singled out a Lieutenant, referring
to Lieutenant Moulin; it is not his style. Gates said that he
thought long and hard before he did so, and never mentioned
Moulin's name. However, Gates said, because the 77th Division
12
r
police officers were feeling so bad, he had to relieve that
pressure.

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