Interview summaries, 1992

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Content -----
Interviewee:
Interviewers:
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR
TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS
CITY OF LOS ANGELES
MEMORANDUM
ABSTRACT
Councilman Mark Ridley-Thomas
Cornell Price, Donald Walton, Marion Fay
Councilman Ridley-Thomas was Vice Chair of the Public Safety Committee of the
Los Angeles City Council, which had no plans for the verdict and did not anticipate it.
The Councilman worked with many community leaders before the verdict at the First
AME Church. His goal was to work privately and informally rather than publicly, and his
assessment was that going public would have invited comment by Darryl Gates, which was
unpredictable and often negative.
He believed that Gates could say and do anything, and the Police Commission let him
go too far without consequence. No one was in charge when the riots started, as evidenced by a
meeting that the Councilman had with two Chiefs prior to the verdict, when he got the sense that
Gates was not even open to hearing input from his own people.
The Councilman denied asking for restraint by LAPD after criminal activity began.
He only wanted the LAPD not to send the wrong message initially by, for example, appearing in riot
gear and sending out the SWAT team if it were not justified, which might have made them targets
for attack, as well as exacerbated the situation. However, once criminal activity or violence started,
he didn't expect restraint by police.
The Councilman also denied comment on a $1 million set-aside by Gates for police
overtime. He believes this was mistakenly attributed to him.
CONFIDENTIAL
Privileeed Information
Attorney Work Product
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-WORK PRODUCT
ABSTRACT OF INTERVIEW
On July 31, 1992, Dep. Chief Matthew V. Hunt was
interviewed. He has been c.o. South Bureau since March, 1991.
South Bureau includes four areas: 77th, Southeast, Southwest,
and Harbor. Control and supervision at three areas, all but
Southwest, were totally taken from Hunt on January 26, 1992, when
Chief Gates made them part of the seven areas used for a pilot
Community Based Policing program commonly known as "Mag-7." Hunt
told Gates at two of the weekly staff meetings in March that he
was concerned about community anger and the danger of civil
disturbances following the verdict. Hunt also expressed concern
about his own ability to prepare in South Bureau because of the
loss of control over Mag-7 areas. Gates' response was not to
worry, that the community would handle the outcome of the trial.
Despite that, on March 23, 1992, in a Bureau meeting, Hunt
directed all South Bureau area captains to prepare for
disturbances. Only Capt. Zimmon, Southwest Div., reported back
on his preparations. Ast. Chief Vernon held a meeting on April
10, 1992, in which preparations were discussed.
Hunt had a log or chronology prepared (copy attached to
memo) of the events of April 29. He had conference calls at 2:30
p.m. and 5:05 p.m. with South Bureau Area Captains and told them
to be prepared, suggesting a number of specific steps. He
requested and obtained operational control of South Bureau's Mag-
7 areas from Gates at 4:30 p.m. He went to the AME Church at
5:45 p.m. He was paged at 7:00 p.m. and told about the dis
turbances, whereupon he went back to South Bureau- . Hunt
requested a mobilization at 7:20 p.m. and at 7:25 p.m.
recommended that they request the National Guard. He was at the
Command Post at 9:10 p.m. and took over as Field Commander,
sharing it with cmdr. Banks until the post was terminated. He
does not say that anyone took improper action before he arrived.
He feels people made their best judgment, but the situation was
much larger than they could handle. Communications were
terrible. Deployment was limited because of lack of vehicles.
Processing changes of the large watches was extremely difficult
because of the number of people involved. Support from EOC and
City Departments was inadequate.
Hunt recommends a "satellite" approach in the future,
with Areas serving as satellites to a command post and with
separate staging areas in order to avoid concentrating and
processing huge numbers of people at the Command Post. He also
feels that cooperative, supportive leadership of the department
and the City was lacking.
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FROM:
SUBJECT:
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR
MEMORANDUM
FILE DATE: July 16, 1992
CHARLES G. BAKALY, m (;~
RAND INTERVIEW
Today, David Wolfe and I met with Joan Petersilia, Ph.D., Director,
Criminal Justice Research Program and Allan Abrahams, statistician, of the Rand
Corporation to discuss their analysis of arrest data as reflected in Rand's June 17, 1992
press release.
By way of background, Ms. Petersilia explained that the ACLU, Alan
Paraducci, had asked them to analyze arrest data in preparation for a civil suit which
required a very quick turnaround. The "data trail" was as follows: Marcia Skolnick,
Director of Information Services for the Los Angeles Municipal Court, provided a disk to
the ACLU who in tum provided the same to Rand. Rand contacted Ms. Skolnick to
confirm that they had what she had initially provided to the ACLU.
The data does not distinguish between the arrest date and arraignment
date. The ACLU told Rand that the dates are the same. There is no separate code for
the arrest date. The data they analyzed begins with April 30, 1992. They have not seen
data for April 29. Rand is unable to determine where arrests were made, i.e., there is no
arrest address it is just coded by the arresting agency or division. But, of course, an
officer assigned to Wilshire may have effected an arrest in the 77th and it would come
out as an arrest in Wilshire. In addition, the data does not include the total Sheriffs'
arrest data in that it contains only those matters that were processed by the LA
Municipal Court. They will ask the ACLU if they object to our receiving Rand's data
but do not think that will be a problem. The data they analyzed was "publicly accessible"
data and there may be more information available to us.
Mr. Abrahams identified several other potential sources of arrest data,
including, P ACMIS which is the 1APD's automated data system for arrests. P ACMIS
does not reflect the arrestee's home address, but does give the arrest location. Secondly,
the Bureau of Criminal Statistics of the California Attorney General's Office in
Sacramento has an Arrest and Citation Register and we should be able to ask 1APD for
the data it provides for the ACR. The Off ender Based Transaction System, another data
CONFIDENTIAL
ATfORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
RECORD NO.
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Charles G. Bakaly, III
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tracking system of the Bureau of Criminal Statistics, starts with police provided data but
is focused upon adult felony case disposition and may not be applicable here.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1) Request that the LAPD provide us with arrest data from PACMIS as well as
the data submitted in connection with the Arrest and Citation Register.
(2) Request arrest data from the Sheriffs.
(3) Contact Ms. Skolnick regarding what additional data is available from L.A
Municipal Court.
OBSERVATIONS:
Rand appears interested in staying involved in this project and assisting in further
data analysis. It is possible that Rand may be a positive addition to the analytical
process because of their sociological as well as analytical approach, background and
reputation.
Distribution:
Richard J. Stone
Barbara A Reeves
Charles Pereyra-Suarez
David Wolfe
CONFIDENTIAL
ATI'ORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
RICHARD STONE,
VINCE MARELLA,
JAN HANZLIK
ROEL CAMPOS
LAURIE L. LEVENSON
AUGUST 5, 1992
INTERVIEW WITH INS
summary
This interview with Robert Moschorak, Director of the Los
Angeles District of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
focused on the role of INS officers in responding to the civil
unrest. INS officers participated in four ways in the law
enforcement response to the riots: (1) INS officers interviewed
suspected illegal aliens who had already been arrested on riot
related offenses and transported to L.A. County Jail; ( 2) INS
officers assisted LAPD officers in conducting searches for evidence
of looting; (3) INS officers assisted in gang task force
operations; and (4) INS officers assisted in escorting public works
vehicles to work sites. INS officers deny that there widespread
sweeps to apprehend illegal aliens.
The statistics for INS arrests during the civil unrest are
attached to this memorandum as Exhibit A.
RECORD NO. '\ DD
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MEMORANDUM
Jan Handzlik
Brenda Penny . 1'1f
August 6, 1992
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATIORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Webster Study - Inter-agency Group Summary/DEA Interview
SUMMARY
On July 22, 1992 at 10:30 a.m. Jan Handzlik and I had a follow up interview with Gil
Avila of the Drug EnforceOJ~.Q.t Age_n_aj_'.12~A:'). The purpose of the follow uo meeting was
to learn what Gil Avila saw from the windows of the DEA on April 29, 1992, the date the
unrest began. From his vantage point above the downtown area, which included Parker
Center, Federal Court, the old Federal Building and the Criminal Courts Building, Mr. Avila
was able to observe a portion of LAPD's activities in the downtown area as well as crowd
movement during the early hours of the unrest.
wet»cer.006
RECORD NO. \ \[\
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J Augustini & Wheeler
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:
CC:
MEMORANDUM
Office of the Special Advisor
Leonard Sharenow
Robert L. Corbin
Julie Huffman
Interview with W.L. Kelley
August 4, 1992
Kenneth R. Heitz
Diann H. Kirn
Susan Spivak
On July 29, 1992, Leonard Sharenow and Julie Huffman
interviewed CHP Assistant Chief W.L. "Bill" Kelley. Kelley was
instrumental in informing other CHP commanders of the need to plan
for a riot in the wake of the King officers' trial, and worked in
Governor Wilson's Los Angeles office during the rioting. The
following is a summary of our recollection of this meeting
including our questions and comments, together with our mental
impressions, conclusions and opinions based upon the meeting.
Kelley was not suprised by the LAPD's failure to plan with
other agencies for the possibility of a riot. He view the LAPD's
prevailing attitude as condescending toward members of other law
enforcement agencies. He also was not surprised that a riot
occurred following the verdicts; in fact, he thought a riot was
likely to occur no matter what the verdicts were.
Kelley believes the LAPD must have known the prevailing
attitude in the community, and thinks that its failure to plan for
a disturbance was intentional. "That amount of ineptitude can't
exist without some common design."
During the riots, Kelley worked with Governor Wilson's staff
in Los Angeles, acting as a liaison with the Black community. He
indicated that Gov. Wilson asked many high-ranking Blacks in state
government to assist him in forming ties with the Black community
in Los Angeles, since until that point Gov. Wilson had been
unsuccessful at forming such ties himself.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
On July 29, 1992, I conducted an interview with George Rodriguez, Special Agent
in Charge, Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Mr.
Rodriguez's office is located at 350 South Figueroa, 8th Floor, Los Angeles, California.
The following topics were discussed:
(1) The role of ATF and the extent of its participation in connection with the Los
Angeles riots;
(2) The extent and nature of the relationship which exists between ATF and
local law enforcement agencies; and
(3) Comments and criticisms of the response by law enforcement agencies in
connection with the riots.
RECORD NO. \ \o:)
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT
ABSTRACT OF INTERVIEW
on August 5, 1992, Commander Ronald C. Banks was
interviewed. At the time of the disturbances, he was the Assistant
Commanding Officer of South Bureau, reporting to Deputy Chief Hunt.
He was also involved in the supervision of the "Mag-7" Community Based
Policing program, reporting to Commander Dinse and Chief Gates. He is
now Chief of Staff to Chief Williams.
In early March, Banks was asked by Gates to help Dinse
supervise the Mag-7 areas. He had one-on-one meetings with Mag-7 area
captains and reported to Gates.
Hunt expressed to Banks concerns about the possibility of
civil disturbances following the verdicts and inability to prepare the
Bureau because of the Mag-7 configuration. Hunt said he had expressed
those concerns to Gates, and Banks witnessed Hunt doing so once.
Gates was not responsive. Hunt independently met with his Area
Captains, including those in Mag-7, and directed certain preparations.
Dinse later told Banks to do so with the Mag-7 Area Captains, and
Banks did so.
Banks did not expect wide-scale disturbances following the
verdicts, although Hunt did. People generally assumed the officers
would be convicted.
When the verdicts were announced, Banks was at South Bureau.
He went into the field, heard the broadcast to avoid F1orence &
Normandie and go to 54th & Van Ness, and arrived there close to the
time Lt. Moulin and Captain Jefferson arrived. He considered it a
77th incident, so did not take command, but was briefed and was
satisfied that the proper steps were being taken and that they did not
have enough resources at the command post to take control of the
intersection. He stayed while a Metro squad went to the intersection
to investigate reports of a possible hostage there. Metro found no
hostage and left. Banks went back to South Bureau, learned it was a
wide-scale problem, and returned to the CP with Hunt when the mobile
CP trailers were there. Banks served as x.o. to Hunt that evening,
leaving at midnight, and as A-Watch c.o. at the CP from then on.
Communications to and from the CP was poor. It was chaotic at first,
but seemed to be more organized by midnight. Initial deployment from
the CP was to escort fire units. Effective deployment to enforce the
law was not feasible until the National .Guard was in place.
BanJcs' recommendations include: better training,
particularly of command staff; city-wide support through EOB; training
in flexible, appropriate decision-making rather than by-the-book
decision-making; better resources, especially communications and
mobile command post; more personnel (minimum 9,000 sworn); use of
press relations officers; and better leadership from LAPD command and
city politicians. Banks thinks LAPD did a good job under these unique
circumstances. He feels the community has a broad sense of
frustration as evidenced by attacks directed at everyone, even fire
department.
RECORD NO.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-WORK PRODUCT
ABSTRACT OF INTERVIEW
On Friday, August 7, 1992, Det. David J. Grabelski,
Officer In Charge of Detectives, South Bureau CRASH, was
interviewed. He explained that CRASH has constant contact with
gang members. In the days prior to the riots, they observed
unusual "truce" meetings and other conduct by rival gangs which
could signify either a truce or joint planning of post-verdict
disturbances. He says they reported this to the chain of
command, but it was not acted upon. He also says that LAPD
failed to ask CRASH to gather intelligence on this issue.
CRASH was not prepared at all for the riots. The
Tactical Manual does not mention them and they had no standing
plan. There was no training or preparations for riots.
After the verdicts were announced their CRASH unit spent
most of their time merely guarding their offices, which are over
a Korean market. They had little or no communication or
direction from anyone.
Det. Grabelski's criticisms include lack of training,
lack of experienced middle management in LAPD, a tendency for
management to try to avoid having to make decisions, politicians'
inflammatory comments, lack of resources, and failure to use the
intelligence capability of CRASH.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-WORK PRODUCT
ABSTRACT OF INTERVIEW
On August 7, 1992, a veteran LAPD officer provided
anonymous information about policies in South Bureau contributing
to the disturbances. Source explains that in a number of
specific ways Deputy Chief Hunt restricted aggressive police
action in South Bureau and did not back the officers. That
reportedly caused officers to be cautious and appear weak to the
community, especially gang members. As a result, gang members
became emboldened, to the degree that on April 29 they thought
they could act out and would not be stopped by the police.
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