Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

Working team status reports, 1992-07-22

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Working team status reports, 1992-07-22

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Content • • • • • • • • • • • OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS CITY OF LOS ANGELES PRlvILEGED AND CoNFIDEN11AL ATIDRNEY WORK PRODUCT WORKING TEAM STATUS REPoRTS JULY 22, 1992 CHRONOLOGIES TEAM LAPDTEAM INTER-AGENCY TEAM PUBLIC OFFICIALS/COMMUNITY TEAM COMPARISONS TEAM 1 2 3 4 5 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT CHRONOLOGY TEAM INTERIM DRAFT REPORT July 22, 1992 DRAFT 7 /22/92, 11 :33am • • • • • • • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT TABLE OF CONTENTS I. THE PURPOSE OF THE CHRONOLOGY TEAM . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. THE HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 111. INITIAL, TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING EACH HYPOTHESIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 A. Whether it Was a Riot That Occurred in Waves in Terms of Intensity, Location, Duration, Times of Crime Occurrence, or Types of Crime Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 a. Analyses of High-Crime Incidents Over Time . . . . . . . . 8 b . Analyses of Crime Incidents by Location . . . . . . . . . . . 9 c. Analyses by Type of Crime ..... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 d . (1) Crowds/Disturbances, Property Crimes, and Violence Against Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 (2) Structure Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 (3) · Deaths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Analysis of Crime Incidents in Narrative Form . . . . . . . 25 2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Available Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 a. 911 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 b. Fire Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 c. Deaths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3. Hypotheses Supported by the Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4. Initial Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 - i - • • • • I , . • • • • • • B. PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Whether it Was a Riot That Began at Discrete Geographic Location ( s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 1. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 a. One Geographic Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 b. Housing Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 C. Commercial and Residential Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2. Strengths and Weakness of Available Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3. Hypotheses Supported by the Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 4. Initial Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 C. Whether it Was a Riot in Which Discrete Groups of Persons, in Terms of Demographic Types, Participated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 1 . Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 a. - Arrest Profile by Rand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 b. Demographic Profiles of the City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 ( 1 ) Per Capita Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 (2) Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 (3) Crimes Against Persons and Property . . . . . . . . 47 (4) Gang Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2. Strengths and Weakness of Available Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 3. Hypotheses Supported by the Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4. Initial Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 D. Whether it Was a Spontaneous or Organized Riot · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 1 . Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 - 11 - • • • E. • • • F. • • • • • 2. 3 . PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Strengths and Weaknesses of Available Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Hypotheses Supported by the Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 4. Initial Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Whether it Was a Riot That Had High and Low Points in Terms of Activity and Geographic Extent Which Were Caused or Affected by LAPD Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 1. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 a. Deployment Data Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 b. Analysis of LAPD Response and Deployment in Narrative Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 2. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Available Data . . . . . . . . . 57 3 . Hypotheses Supported by the Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 4. Initial Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Whether a Lack of Cooperation and Coordination Among Various Federal, State and Local Officials and Agencies Led to Disarray in Responding to and Quelling the Riot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 1 . Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Available Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 3. Hypotheses Supported by the Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 4. Initial Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 - 11 1 - • • • • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT I. THE PURPOSE OF THE CHRONOLOGY TEAM. The purpose of the Chronology Team is to assemble a factual chronology of the events that occurred during the civil disorder in Los Angeles from April 29, 1992 through May 4, 1992 that will provide the necessary data for analyzing and understanding the response of the Los Angeles Police Department ( 11 LAPD 11 ) to the civil unrest. The ultimate goal is to save lives and property by assisting the LAPD in future planning concerning the deployment strategies and tactics to be used in the event of another major civil unrest. In order to quantify and analyze the response of the LAPD to the civil disorder in Los Angeles, we first have to define the phenomenon to which the LAPD responded. What occurred in Los Angeles from April 29, 1992 through May 4, 1992? What was 11 it 11 ? II. THE HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED. A number of hypotheses have been posited by various public and private sources as to what exactly happened in Los Angeles during the six days of civil disorder. Each of these hypotheses will be tested by the Chronology Team to • determine the inception, course, and characteristics of the phenomenon to which the LAPD responded during the civil unrest. The suggested hypotheses include: • - 1 - • - - - - - - -------- • • • • • • • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT 1. "It" was a riot 1 during which crime incidents were committed in waves in terms of intensity, location, duration, times of crime occurrence, or types of crime incidents: a. it had a time sequence, b . it leap-frogged and did not spread systematically along the boulevards, C . there was a correlation between the outbreak and level of incidents during the rioting and the beginning and end of the work day and/or school day, d . there was a positive correlation between the incidents of shootings and the incidents of lootings, e. there was a positive correlation between the incidents of lo9tings and the incidents of fires, f. its movement was fed by the media, g . the rioters decided at some point to export the violence from their own neighborhoods to other, higher socio- economic neighborhoods; 2 . "It" was a riot that began at discrete geographic location(s), i.e., a. it had only one geographic source, 1 Of course, some suggest that "it" was not a riot at all, but rather a rebellion. A riot is defined as an unrestrained outbreak, a wild, turbulent, and/or violent disturbance of the public peace. A rebellion is defined as an uprising, or organized opposition that is intended to effect a change or overthrow an existing government or ruling authority, or as an act of defiance against an authority. The American Heritage Dictionary 1031 , 1064 (2d ed. 1985). The analysis and determination as to whether "it" was a riot or rebellion is beyond the scope and purpose of the Chronology Team . • • • • • • • • • • • b. C . PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT it began at the housing project(s), it had one center point from which the activity spread along the major boulevards, d. it had multiple, spontaneous geographic sources, e . it had staggered, spontaneous flash points; 3. "It" was a riot in which discrete groups of persons participated in terms of certain demographic patterns, i.e., a. class, b. race, c. undocumented aliens, d. gangs; 4. "It" was a spontaneous riot; 5 . 11 lt 11 was an organized riot; 6. "It" was a riot that had high and low points in terms of activity and geographic extent which were caused or affected by LAPD deployment: a. there was an initial command and control failure of the ?7th/South Bureau command post that contributed to escalation of violence and destruction. b. geographic areas of the LAPD that did not initially experience problems, later experienced problems in - 3 - • • • • • • • • • • • 7. PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT responding to the civil unrest as a result of the . redeployment of LAPD personnel and resources, c. geographic areas of the LAPD that did experience civil unrest but were initially dealing effectively with the incidents, later lost control and experienced a higher number of incidents as a result of the LAPD'S tactical alert which pulled those officers off the street who, up until that point, had been maintaining control, d. e . as time passed the riot had multiple points of occurrence and a geographic spread to which the u\PD'S methodology of assuming a single, concentrated source of · violence could not effectively respond, the LAPD was slow in responding, which led to further violence; "It" was a riot during which the lack of cooperation among various federal, state, and local officials and agencies led to disarray in responding to and quelling the riot. In order to reach a conclusion concerning the validity of these various hypotheses, the Chronology Team is developing methods of testing the hypotheses. This entails identifying, obtaining, and analyzing data in order to determine whether the data will either confirm or deny the hypotheses, and also quantifying the degree to which the data are able to confirm or deny the hypotheses. - 4 - • • • • 111. PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT INITIAL, TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING EACH HYPOTHESIS. A . Whether it Was a Riot That Occurred in Waves in Terms of Intensity, Location. Duration. Times of Crime Occurrence, or Types of Crime Incidents. 1. Methodology. In order to analyze the response of the LAPD to the civil unrest, it is necessary to determine what the LAPD was facing with regard to the riot's intensity, location, duration, times of criminal activity, and the types of crime incidents that • occurred during the hours and days following the announcement of the Rodney King verdict. As of this date, the best and most comprehensive source of information available to us concerning criminal activity during the riot are the activities reported to • • the 911 emergency hotline. Such calls represent reported eyewitness accounts of on- going criminal suspicion and activity. Once received, the calls are reported directly to the appropriate police unit for resolution . Although 911 calls may not be the complete record of all criminal activity, a cumulative record of 911 calls p·assed on to the LAPD should provide much insight • and information_ into the true levels of activity that did exist and should help answer the following questions: (1) the type of crimes being committed; (2) the volume of • • • criminal activity; (3) the date and time of the activity; (4) the location of the activity; (5) the duration of the criminal activity; and (6) the priority of response assigned by the LAPD. With these data parameters, a useful 11 picture 11 of the post-verdict aftermath, as seen through the eyes of the LAPD can be constructed by compiling data for each LAPD bureau and division. This "picture" will provide the backdrop for the analyses - 5 - • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT and reviews of the LAPD's reactions, responses, and/or deployment, as well as the actions, responses, and/or deployment by other key agencies and officials, from which a determination can be made whether such collective actions were appropriate and adequate under the circumstances. The city of Los Angeles is divided into four LAPD Bureaus: (1) the South Bureau, {2) the West Bureau, (3) the Central Bureau, and (4) the Valley Bureau. These bureaus are further divided into 18 LAPD divisions. See Appendix A, tab _. • {We need to obtain further relevant information concerning each bureau and division - size, command post, average number of crimes, personnel, numbers of command posts, etc.) The Chronology Team has compiled the incident data by bureau and • • division to provide a picture of what confronted each bureau and divisions, as well as an overall picture of the numbers of incidents confronting the LAPD as a whole. The initial approach to providing this picture was to develop an animation that depicts the incidents, fires, and deployment of police personnel in connection with the riot. In addition to culling the incident information from the 911 data, the • Chronology Team obtained maps from the LAPD by bureau and division. The maps had to be digitized by coordinates and defined for the computer. A model of the first twenty-four hours of the riot was created for the five most active LAPD divisions in • • • terms of crime incidents reported. It was later decided that the video model was expensive, and that we should define the models we wanted to develop first, and create static "pictures," before deciding whether to proceed with the animation . - 6 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Initial conclusions developed from the animation are: (1) the level of incidents did not begin to rise at the announcement of the King verdict, but rather after 7:00 p.m., four hours later; (2) incidents rapidly increased from 10:00 p.m. to after midnight; (3) incidents reduced in the early morning hours; (4) incidents shifted • from South Central Los Angeles and Downtown to the Wilshire/Koreatown area after day 1. On a normal weekend day in the city of Los Angeles, the 911 hotline will • receive _ calls. _% of these calls will be Code 2H or higher. Thus, on average, the LAPD will receive 40 calls for help that are prioritized Code 2H or higher for each hour of the day. During the five calendar days after the Rodney King verdict was • • announced, a total of approximately 10,000 calls prioritized Code 2H or higher were received. During the 6Q hours or 2 1 /2 days immediately following the verdict, a total of _ calls for an average o~ 130 per hour were received, as compared to the normal average of 40 calls per hour. See Appendix A, tab 2. The peak during this 60 hour time period occurred between and o'clock on April 30, 1992, at a volume of - - • _ calls. The early morning hours provided the low periods for an average of approximately _ per hour. (Once we have obtained the baseline for the 911 system we will compare peak period to normal baseline and to capacity limits.) Thus, the • • • LAPD and supporting agencies were faced with, on average, four to five times the normal level of high priority calls each and every hour for 2 1 /2 days after the verdict. The abnormal volume increases to _ times the baseline during the peak periods . - 7 - • • • a. PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Analyses of High-Crime Incidents Over Time. As shown in the accompanying graph, the volume of 911 calls and, thus, the level of intense criminal activity experienced, followed pronounced and regular 24 hour time cycles. See Appendix A, tab 3. In general, the level of total calls would • peak during the late afternoon to early evening hours, 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., but would gradually decline during the night to a 24 hour low during the early morning hours of 4:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. See Appendix A, tab 4. This cycle holds true for each , • crime type and each geographic division, as well. See Appendix A, tab 5. These 24 hour cycles are not abnormal, rather they are very similar to the cycles experienced during times of normal levels of criminal activity. (We need evidence to support this • • proposition and to graph a normal day.) On its surface, the data indicate that even during times of intense and wide spread levels of violence, such violence will peak and then drop to very low levels at predictable times of the day. If the data proves that even during large scale crises, criminal activity levels are systematically cyclical, then such patterns would be • predictable and expected and, thus, could be planned for. The time patterns strongly reveal that police could expect a fall off in activity to very low levels each and every morning at approximately the same hour. If true, such a window could provided the • • • police with the needed time to regroup to better handle the approaching upturn in crises activity, and the regrouping could be planned in advance. (Empirical evidence from other riots in the U.S. could also be informative and powerful, if consistent.) - 8 - - - - --- - - - ---------- • • • • • • • • • • • - - --- - - - - -------------, PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT The call pattern also shows that the level of 911 calls for high priority criminal activity returned to close to normal and pre-verdict levels by Saturday, May 2, 1992, and even more so by Sunday, May 3, 1992. The breakout of calls by calendar day are as follows: April 29, 1992* 1,065 April 30, 1992 4,290 May 1, 1992 2,388 May 2, 1992 1,296 May 3, 1992 922 May 4, 1992 736 * 3 p.m. to midnight only. b. - Analyses of Crime Incidents by Location. Over 10,000 high priority responses were requested via the 911 system alone for the April 29, 1992 to May 4, 1992 post-verdict period. The calls were fairly evenly placed in total crimes among three of the city's four police bureaus. See Appendix A, tab 6. The Central Bureau received or 33% of the calls, the West Bureau received or 27% of the calls, and the South Bureau received a similar number,_, or 26% of the total calls. Id. The Valley Bureau experienced markedly less calls, only _ or 13% of the total calls. ~ The South Bureau experienced its highest levels of activity on April 29, 1992, the day of the verdict. See Appendix A, tab 7. The Central and West Bureaus also had some activity on that Wednesday, id., but did not experience their highest - 9 - • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT levels of activity until April 30, 1992. See Appendix A, tab 8. At noon on Thursday, April 30, 1992, the South, Central, and West Bureaus were all experiencing about the same high levels of activity -- approximately 100 criminal incidents per hour. Id. However, activity in the South Bureau soon trailed off significantly, while activity in the Central and West Bureaus increased. Id. By May 1, 1992, with the exception of the less active Valley Bureau, the South, Central, and West Bureaus were all experiencing relatively the same lower levels of activity with the Central Bureau being slightly more • active than the others. See Appendix A, tab 9 and tab 10. • • When broken down into the city's 18 police divisions, the geographic locations of the more active areas becomes more concentrated and centralized . Although the South, Central, and West Bureaus each experienced similar levels of total activity, the Central Bureau, the bureau that experienced the greatest volume in criminal incidents, was fueled almost entirely from two of its five divisions: Rampart and Newton. See Appendix A, tab 11. The next most active bureau, the West Bureau, experienced the majority of its activity in only two divisions as well: Wilshire e and to a much lesser extent Hollywood. ~ The South Bureau's activity was spread among its three northern divisions: 77th Street, Southwest, and Southeast. Id. • • • Finally, the Van Nuys division was the primary recipient of criminal activity in the Valley Bureau. kl Thus, the majority of the activity from the verdict until the end of May 2, 1992, _ %, occurred in only seven of the city's eighteen divisions: Rampart, Wilshire, Newton, 77th Street, Southwest, Southeast, and Hollywood. Moreover, the divisions are neighboring divisions geographically and cut a narrow north-south corridor - 10 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT through the center and heart of Los Angeles. See Appendix A, 'tab 12. The remaining activity, _%, was spread among the city's remaining eleven divisions . An analysis of crimes by division over time shows that the 77th Street Division was hit first beginning at 6:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992, approximately three • hours after the King verdict. See Appendix A, tab 13. The rest of the city showed no increase in criminal activity until one hour later when other divisions began experiencing significant levels of incidents: Southeast, Southwest, and Newton, which • are all adjoining divisions to the 77th Street Division -- the riot's origination point. Id. • • By 8:00 p.m., 5 hours after the verdict was reached, the violence had spread from 77th Street Division, the division in which the Florence and Normandie intersection is located, to four adjacent divisions of the eighteen LAPD divisions. By the fifth hour after the verdict was announced, 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., the violence had spread further north to the Wilshire Division of the West Bureau, but in much less volume than experienced by the South Bureau's three divisions and the Newton Division in the Central Bureau. kt The high volume · of incidents remained in • those five divisions for the rest of April 29, 1992 and into the early morning of April 30, 1992, with the focal point of violence shifting among the five: from the 77th Street Division at hour 4, 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., to the more northern Wilshire and • • • Southwest Divisions, and to the northeast in the Newton Division following hour 8, 10:00 to 11 :00 p.m. It is important to note that throughout the entire first night, April 29, 1992, the Rampart and Hollywood Divisions experienced relatively little high priority incidents. The violence appeared confined to the five divisions. kt - 11 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT On Day 2, April 30, 1992, after an early morning lull in criminal activity to pre-verdict levels, there was a resurgence in violence that pushed further north to encompass the Wilshire, Rampart, and Hollywood Divisions, again maintaining a narrow north-south corridor with Normandie Street as its central axis. See Appendix • A, tab 14 and tab 12. In addition to the violence spreading further north, the violence also seemed to shift away from those divisions which had seen the greatest volume in criminal incidents on the night of April 29, 1992. Id. The level of violence in the South • Bureau's 77th Street, Southwest, and Southeast Divisions, and in the Central Bureau's Newton Division, which divisions all experienced an active April 29th, showed relatively much fewer incidents than the now active and further north Wilshire and Hollywood • • • • • • Divisions. Id. Further analyses should reveal whether the reduction in activity in the southern divisions coulq be attributable to: (1) the northern movement of the rioters; (2) the adequate and effectiv_ e suppression of the activity by enforcement agencies; and/or (3) the arrest and containment of the rioters responsible for the first night's violence. (These analyses will probably be expanded and refined.) By May 1 , 1992, day three of the riot, the heaviest areas remained the Wilshire, Rampart, and Hollywood Divisions, which experienced their highest levels of activity after dusk. See Appendix A, tab 15. The activity was much more aligned, however, with the total incident levels in each of the more southern divisions: 77th Street Division, Southwest Division, Southeast Division, and Newton Division. Id. It is interesting to note that the Hollywood Division, while seventh in ·rank of total incidents overall, experienced significant activity during an eight hour period only during the - 12 - • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT night of April 30 - May 1, 1992, from approximately 5:00 p.m. on April 30, 1992 to approximately 1 :00 a.m. on May 1, 1992. See Appendix A, tab 14. Again, by Saturday, May 2, 1992, the incidents in all divisions were relatively back to pre-verdict levels. tyve need support for this -- a graph.) C • Analyses by Type of Crime. (1) Crowds/Disturbances, Property Crimes, and Violence Against Persons. The next task of the Chronology Team has been to determine whether there was any correlation between the types of crimes committed during the civil unrest. To aid the analysis, criminal incidents reported via the 911 system were • broken down into three categories. 2 The first category, crowds/disturbances, consists of: disturbances (Penal Code ("P.C.") § 415); shots fired (P.C. § 246); and disputes (P.C. § 620). The second category, property crimes, consists of: burglaries • • • • • (P.C. § 459); alarms (P.C. § 906); thefts (P.C. § 484); prowlers (P.C. § 921); vehicles (P.C. § 503); and vandalism (P.C. § 594) . The third category, violence against persons, consists of: battery (P.C. § 242); assault with a deadly weapon (P.C. § 245); calls for help (P.C. 999); attacks (P.C. § 261); screaming (P.C. § 162); robberies (P.C. § 211); and kidnappings (P.C. § 207). Over the 3 1 /2 day period following the announcement of the King verdict, a total of approximately _ high priority incidents were reported. (Support 2 The category of fires, including arson (P.C. § 447), explosions (P.C. § 995), and bombs (P.C. § 996), and the category of deaths, including murder (P.C. § 187), and deaths (P.C. § 927), will be tracked separately. - 13 - • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT needed.) Of the total, 55% were crimes against property. See Appendix A, tab 16. A much lower percentage of the total, 18%, was attributable to crimes against individuals. Of the total incidents reported, 17% of the incidents consist of crowd related disturbances. The remaining 11 % of the incidents consist of _. Id. The Chronology Team also compiled a list of all 911 calls by reported crime incidents for the first six days. See Appendix A, tab 17. This list is broader than the three categories of crimes listed above and includes traffic accidents, forgery, • unknown trouble, etc. The list has been edited to remove multiple reports of the same incident. Once again, despite the broader range of calls considered, crimes against property still dominate. The numbers of reported burglaries is in the 50% range. Id . • • • I • I • • Although looting and burglary dominated the incident activity through May 1 , 1991 , the mix of crimes reported throughout the 3 1 /2 day period changed from day to day. See Appendix A, tab 18. The correlation between crowds/disturbances and crimes against individuals remained high throughout the 3 1 /2 day period. Id. Each division also experienced differing percentages of crime types throughout the 3 1/2 day period. See Appendix A, tab 19. The chart illustrates that while property crimes clearly dominated reported crimes in the five most active LAPD divisions, the divisions varied as to whether the next most numerous category of incidents was crimes against persons or crowds/disturbances. Crimes against persons were more numerous than crowds/disturbances in the "Rampart, Southwest, and 77th Street Divisions. kl - 14 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT A summary of reported property crimes in the five most active LAPD divisions over the first 60 hours of the riot reveals that the number of incidents peaked around hours 20 to 23, i.e., between 11 :00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. on April 30, 1992. See Appendix A, tab 20. The peak of reported property crimes ranged from approximately • 28 to 70 new calls per hour. Id. Division 12, the 77th Street Division peaked at the lowest level, while reported property crimes were highest in Division 2, the Rampart Division, with Division 7, the Wilshire Division, following closely behind. Id. Although • • • there is an earlier spike in the graph around hours 5 to 8, 7:00 p.m. through 11 p.m. on April 29, 1992, the numbers of reported property crimes only ranged from approximately 18 to 37 new calls per hour. ki Once again, the graph illustrates a pronounced wave pattern in terms of numbers of reported new incidents. Unlike property crimes, violent crimes peaked much earlier. A summary of reported violent crimes in the five most active LAPD divisions for the first 60 hours of the riot reveals that highest volume in reported incidents occurred around hours 4 and 5, from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m: on April 29, 1992, in the 77th Street Division, with • approximately 14 new calls per hour. See Appendix A, tab 21. A second, smaller spike in the numbers of reported violent crimes occurred approximately between hours 20 to 26, 11 :00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on April 30, 1992, ranging from 10 to 12 new • • • calls per hour. Division 3, the Southwest Division received approximately 1 O new calls per hour; Division 7, the Wilshire Division received approximately 11 new calls per hour; and Division 2, the Rampart Division, received approximately 12 new reports of violent crimes per hour. ~ This second, smaller peak in violent crimes overlaps the - 15 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT highest peak somewhat in the numbers of property crimes repo'rted per hour. Similar also to the property crimes graph is the marked wave pattern in the numbers of reported violent crimes. The summary of reported crowd crimes for the five most active LAPD • divisions during the first 60 hours of the riot exhibits a high correlation with violent crimes, or crimes against persons. See Appendix A, tab 22. Like violent crimes, there are two peaks in the numbers of crowd crimes which occur at roughly the same time • that the violent crimes peaked. The first, smaller peak in crowd crimes occurred approximately between hours 4 through 6, 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992. Divisions 12 and 13, the 77th Street and Newton Divisions, received approximately 1 0 • • new calls an hour concerning crowd crimes. Id. The second, higher peak occurred from approximately hours 22 to 27, 1 :00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. on April 30, 1992. Division 7, the Wilshire Division, had the highest number of newly reported crowd crimes ranging from approximately 13 to 14 new calls an hour. Division 2, the Rampart Division, was a close second at approximately 13 new calls a· n hour. kl Similar to the • summary of property crimes, and unlike the summary of violent crimes, the summary of crowd crimes demonstrates that the highest peak in crowd crimes occurred on the second day and not the first. • • • Summaries of the three crime categories by LAPD division for hour 1 to 81 also illustrate wave-like periods of intensity in the numbers of crimes reported for the five most active LAPD divisions, with the most pronounced periods of intensity occurring on the first and second days at around roughly the same time period for - 16 - • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT each division. See Appendix A, tab 23 to tab 27. Similar to the chart summarizing the three crime categories by division, these graphs illustrate the varying volumes of crime incidents experienced by each of the five most active LAPD divisions. Id. (2) Structure Fires. In order to complete the analyses of criminal incidents confronting the LAPD during the riot, the Chronology Team also has analyzed structure fires. During the riot in Los Angeles numerous fires of all types were set. The Chronology Team • has limited its analysis to structure fires because structure fires often represented arson and required a police response to prevent further arson. In addition, the LAPD were often required to provide escort to the structure fires for the Los Angeles City • • Fire Department ( 11 LAFD 11 ). While the other types of fires also may have been as a result of arson, it is likely that those fires were assigned a much lower priority and, therefore, were often ignore~ by an overwhelmed LAPD and LAFD . The Chronology Team discussed the numbers of structure fires reported in the newspapers and we were concerned that the numbers were overestimated. In • order to determine the accurate number of structure fires, our initial approach was to obtain the 911 logs from the Los Angeles City Fire Department ( 11 LAFD 11 ), and then plot the location of each fire to determine their impact on each LAPD bureau, division, and • • • district. A review of the logs quickly revealed, however, that we could not isolate the numbers of structure fires as opposed to other such reported fires as vehicle fires or fires in trash dumpsters. .Limiting our analysis to the 911 logs also would not eliminate - 17 - • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT multiple reportings of the same fire. In addition, the maps of the LAFD do not correspond to the maps of the LAPD bureaus and divisions . The next step was to obtain data from other sources wt,ich could be cross-referenced against the LAFD's 911 logs. We obtained a listing from the Pasadena Field Office of the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA"), which identifies structural damage which occurred in the city of Los Angeles during the riot by address, type of occupancy, building occupants, and source of damage. • Unfortunately, FEMA could not identify the source of this data. • • Next, we took the list from FEMA to the Los Angeles City Department of Building & Safety. The department was able to identify the inspectors on the list as inspectors from three divisions: (1) Building & Safety, (2) Community Safety, and (3) the Earthquake Division. Although the Department of Building & Safety could not identify the department that had generated this list, they felt that it was a very accurate list in terms of information concerning structural damage. Building & Safety also supplied us with a computer print out of all structural damage which occurred in the • city during the civil unrest. The Building & Safety print out identifies the structures by address and also identifies the cause of damage. • • • The information contained in the Building & Safety report is based on inspections which began May 4, 1992 and ended approximately one week later. The inspectors were sent out in grids to perform the inspections. Most of the buildings have been reinspected at least once. The inspectors were instructed to verify whether the damage occurred during the civil disorder and to verify the cause of the damage. - 18 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Nonetheless, there may be inaccuracies in the Building & Safety report. It is possible that some damaged buildings have not been included on the list. The report could also overestimate the numbers of individual buildings damaged because some of the addresses are located within strip malls. Since these addresses have • been counted by the Chronology Team as individual fires, there is a certain degree of overinflation in the numbers of structure fires. In addition, some of the addresses listed could be inaccurate. In some circumstances, an entire block may have burned • • making it difficult for the inspectors to determine the correct number of the address or, for corner buildings, which street is the correct address. The Chronology Team next cross-referenced the list from FEMA with the print out obtained from the Department of Building & Safety and the LAFD 911 logs to obtain an accurate number of structure fires which occurred in the city during the civil I e disorder. Approximately 1,000 structure fires have been identified as a result. Those addresses which cross-referenced with exact addresses in the 911 log ("direct hits"), were assigned times of occurrence which match the reported • time listed in the 911 log. Those addresses on the FEMA list or Building & Safety print out which did. not cross-reference against exact addresses in the 911 log were assigned dates and times of occurrence which match the reported times, if any, of • • • fires at adjacent addresses ("indirect hits"), listed in the 911 log. Approximately 60% of the structure fires for the first cycle of the riot - from the announcement of the verdict until April 30, 1992 at 7:00 a.m. -- have been identified as "direct hits" by time and location within the eighteen LAPD divisions. See - 19 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Appendix A, tab 28. It is anticipated that 40% of all structure fires which occurred during the riot will be identified as 11 direct hits 11 by time and location by Tuesday, July 20, 1992. Another 30% will be identified as "indirect hits 11 and will be assigned the date and time of adjacent fires. Of the remaining 30%, it is uncertain how we will determine • the date and times of the fires. After identifying the 11 direct hits" and "indirect hits, 11 the Chronology Team began to plot the fires by L.APD division. To date, the fires for the first cycle of the • riot, through hour 17, have been plotted by time and geographic location. Since the LAFD 911 logs do not identify the geographic locations of the fires by I...APD bureaus, divisions (now called areas), and districts, the Chronology Team has used a Thomas • • Guide to determine the location of each fire with the L.APD divisions. This has proven to be a very time-consuming and laborious task. Given that there are approximately 800-900 fires left to identify by location, the Chronology Team has discussed other methods of plotting this information for at least the first 35 hours of the riot. The Chronology Team has contacted Captain Burke of the LAPD to determine whether we • can supply the LAPD with a list or diskette of addresses that could be run through the 911 system to determine the geographic location by LAPD division and district. Captain Burke will contact us the week of July 19-25, 1992 to let us know whether the • • • LAPD can assist us in this task. Captain Burke also mentioned that even if we cannot run 900 addresses through the 911 system, we may be able to use 11 RD 11 books which list addresses by division . - 20 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT After the locations and times have been determined, the next step was to redraw a city map to correspond with the LAPD bureaus, divisions, and districts because none of the maps are consistent with each other. Once this was done, the Chronology Team plotted the fires identified to date within each division. Eventually, • we may want to identify the locations of the fires at the district level in order to obtain a clearer picture of the spread of the fires. Unlike the marked wave pattern exhibited in the analyses of lootings, • burglaries, assaults, and robberies, a pattern of highs and lows in terms of numbers and times of structure fires is not as clear. See Appendix A, tab 29. The baseline for fires in the city of Los Angeles is approximately 30 fires a day. (Support for this is • • needed, and a determination whether the 30 fires are limited to structure fires.) The graph shows a great increase in numbers of fires over the norm and demonstrates that the numbers of fires remained high through May 1 , 1992. The valleys in the graph may be misleading in that graph represents only the new fires reported each hour and does not account for ongoing fires. This graph may be converted to a • cumulative graph to avoid this effect. • • • Current data for structure fires shows that the earliest structure fires began during hour 5, 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., after the Rodney King verdict was announced. The most intense period in terms of numbers of structure fires for the first 17 hours of the riot occurred from April 29, 1992 at 9:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m. April 30, 1992. See Appendix A, tab 28. The data also demonstrate that during the first cycle - 21 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT the fires were not limited to the most active of the LAPD divisions in terms of numbers of crime incidents. Id . In order to track the spread of structure fires, the Chronology Team has identified the LAPD divisions in which the fires were located for approximately 60% of • the fires that occurred during the first cycle. The numbers of newly reported fires by hour in each division, and the cumulative numbers of fires for each division have been mapped for the first 16 hours of the riot. This information also has been cross- • referenced with crimes against persons, property, and crowd/disturbances to determine whether any positive or negative correlation exists between the types of crime incidents. The data show that while the categories of crowds and crimes • • • against persons seem highly correlated, there appears to be a lack of positive correlation between fire? and the categories of crowds, property crimes, and crimes against persons. See Appe~dix A, tab 30 through tab 60. The maps of structure fires for the first cycle of the riot reflect the same movement through the center of the city as was exhibited by the other incidents, except that the fires appear to have been • more widespread. • • • (3) Deaths. The Chronology Team is assembling information on riot related deaths by time of death and location in order to analyze whether there is any positive correlation between the deaths and other criminal incidents. This assumes, of course, that the location of death corresponds to the location of the beating, stabbing, or shooting, thereby indicating the location where police response would be required. - 22 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Since the highest priority for the LAPD in the event of a riot is the preservation of life (support), it may be helpful to determine whether there are any discernible patterns which may assist the LAPD in future response planning. The Chronology Team has reviewed newspaper articles concerning the • riot related deaths, and has received a list from the Los Angeles County Coroner's Office. The sources include such information as the name, age, and race of the deceased, the cause of death, and the location. Often, however, the newspaper • • articles and the list from the Coroner's Office have not identified the geographic location of each death with any degree of precision. Next, we reviewed the LAPD logs to search for any supporting information and obtained a list of riot related deaths that had been included in the logs from the South Bureau. The list identifies the South Bureau division in which each death occurred. To date, we have been able to identify • by both time and geographic location approximately 17 of the 61 deaths considered riot related by the Coroner's Office. • • • In making a determination as to whether the deaths were riot related, the Coroner's Office has used the following methodology: Would the victim have died at that time and location if the riot had not occurred? In most cases, the Coroner's Office has concluded that the answer is no. The Coroner's Office has indicated that some questions remain concerning whether the deaths were really riot related with respect to 3 out of 61 deaths: (1) Harry Doller - a fire victim who probably burned down his own residence with a lit cigarette; (2) George Alvarez - assaulted by unknown persons on Main Street and believed to be a transient who was assaulted by - 23 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT another transient; and (3) Susan Morgan - shot by her boyfriend during a domestic dispute . The Chronology Team has assembled a grid that lists the deaths in chronological order and identifies the name, age, and race of the decedent, the cause • of death, and the geographic location in terms of street address and LAPD division for each riot related death. See Appendix A, tab 61. All 61 deaths identified by the Coroner's Office have been included. The grid has revealed the following information • • • • • • • concerning the riot related deaths: Recap of Deaths by Ethnicity Race No . % Black 27 44% Hispanic 19 31% Caucasian - 12 20% Asian 3 3% Unknown 1 2% Recap of Causes of Death Cause No. % Gunshots 40 66% Traffic Accidents 7 11% Fire 6 9% Assaults 4 5% Stabbings 2 3% Drug Overdoses 1 2% Heart Attack 1 2% The grid will be edited to remove those deaths that are not considered by the Coroner's Office to be clearly riot related. Additionally, deaths that occurred as a result of traffic accidents, drug overdoses, and heart attacks may eventually be deleted. - 24 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT The next step will be to determine the exact geographic location of each death. The Chronology Team will review the files at the Coroner's Office to determine whether there is any additional information concerning the location of death. This will not identify the LAPD division, however, and we will have to manually plot the deaths • on an LAPD map by using the Thomas Guide again. If the LAPD is able to assist us in connection with the addresses of structure fires, we may be able to provide them with a list of addresses of where deaths occurred, as well. Another approach could , e be to contact Homicide for this information. The possible advantages to this approach are that the location of each death in the LAPD divisions may have been identified already in the files, and that the files may have been updated with more current and • • more accurate information. d. Analysis of Crime Incidents in Narrative Form. In addition to the analyses of crime incidents provided by the graphs and charts, the Chronology Team has assembled a grid which sets forth in narrative form a chronological account of the incidents which occurred during the riot. The grid • tracks incidents and compares the data to information concerning LAPD response and deployment; LAFD response and deployment; the actions of local and city officials; the response and deployment of the Sheriff's Department, California Highway Patrol • • • C'CHP"), and other local police departments; the actions of state officials; the response and deployment of the National Guard; the actions of federal officials, and the response and deployment of federal troops. See Appendix B . - 25 - • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT The grid includes information culled from the following sources: (1) newspapers, magazines, and television programs; (2) the minutes from the May 7, 1992 meeting of the Board of Fire Commissioners; (3) LAPD logs from the Central, South, and West Bureaus; and (4) the confidential interviews conducted by the LAPD and lnteragency Teams. Id. Since the Chronology Team has just begun its review of the interviews, little information from the interviews has been included to date. It is anticipated that the Chronology Team will finish its review of the interviews shortly after • the last interview memorandum has been completed. The next step will be to extract information from the deployment data base, see discussion Section E, and add that data to the grid . • • The initial approach was to create a grid that would include all pertinent information and reveal conflicts in information from the various sources. Given the length of the document in its present form, and concerns that including all information would drown out a view of the "big picture," a decision was made to edit the grid to include only the more significant events. The Chronology Team has not begun the • edit, but anticipates that the edit will be completed shortly after the interview information has been added. • • • 2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Available Data . a. 911 Data. The 911 system has physical/structural limitations. Based on its current design and layout, it is only capable of handling _ calls per hour. Once that limit is - 26 - I • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT reached, the system becomes overloaded and clogs, with the result that the additional calls are not answered . At the present time we still lack certain pieces of information that will shed light on the situation faced by the LAPD during the riot. We have yet to obtain information concerning the baseline for the normal volume of 911 calls and, thus, cannot complete the comparison between the volume of calls received during the riot versus the typical volume. We also lack information concerning how long it took the • LAPD to reconfigure additional boards in order to expand the capacity of the system on the night of April 29, 1992. We will also try to obtain a record of the back-up in • • 911 calls by hour and a record by hour of the number of calls that were dropped from the system, i.Jh, 911 calls that were never answered. The 911 lo_gs likely do not represent the total number of criminal incidents that occurred and, therefore, the total number of incidents are under reported. Although calls to the city's 911 emergency hotline represent eyewitness accounts of past or on-going criminal suspicion or activity, the 911 log may not e represent all criminal activity that has occurred or is occurring since it seems reasonable to assume that some criminal activities occurred unnoticed or unseen, and some criminal activities were noticed or seen, but unreported . • • • The 911 logs likely do not provide an accurate time of occurrence for each criminal incident reported to the 911 system. The result is that the 911 logs cannot present a completely accurate picture as to when LAPD · response was required. 911 calls do not necessarily represent on-going, "real-time" criminal activity - 27 - • • • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT or suspicion since some 911 calls are reporting the activities as discovered or "after the fact." For example, a burglary of a closed retail store may have occurred at 3:00 a.m. yet was not eyewitnessed as it occurred. Its effects,~. broken doors and missing property, may not have been "discovered" until later that morning as store personnel began to arrive to open the store for the day's business. The crime is still reported, but the timing of the activity, and thus the need for police response, is not disclosed or known by the 911 call alone . Crimes in less populated areas inherently may possess a higher probability of not being reported (or at least reported timely) via 911 as criminal activity in more densely populated areas. Thus, two different geographical areas may be experiencing similar criminal activity levels and thus require similar responses by the police, yet may not receive similar levels of 911 calls due to each respective areas' population density; the locations of the crimes (inside structures versus outside on the street, in commercial zones versus residential zones); the time of day (some areas have more people "out and about" than other areas at various times of day, ~. • downtown versus 3rd Street in Santa Monica); the day of the week (work day versus weekend); the availability of, and accessibility to, phones for the eyewitnesses; the existence of security devices to help alert individuals of crimes being committed (noisy • • • alarms, dogs); the desire and willingness of eyewitnesses to report the activity (no desire to get involved, fear of retaliation by the criminals, "see it everyday and nothing ever gets done about it anyway, so why bother," "its not my property and it's none of my business"); and the perception of the eyewitness as to what constitutes, or is - 28 - • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT worthwhile enough to report as, criminal activity ~. shouts and screams versus gun shots) . Nonetheless, graphs and charts generated from the incident data base indicate that the activities and actions of the citizens of Los Angeles following the King verdict occurred mostly during the day, with intense media awareness and coverage, and mostly in large crowds in densely populated areas with close similarities in demographics, so that the aforementioned weaknesses of using 911 calls as a • comparative measure of criminal activity among different areas of the city are mitigated. • • Calls to the city's 911 emergency hotline cover a wide range of seriousness and composition. The calls for police help can be for incidents ranging in seriousness from screams heard from an apartment down the block, to a gathering of youths on a street corner, to an eyewitness account of a looting or drive-by shooting and murder. When received, the calls are prioritized with a police response code. The police response code provides a signal to the responding police unit(s) as to the • severity of the activity, and how fast and pronounced the .police response should be ~. lights and signal, silent response, immediate dispatch, all speed, etc.). 911 calls are coded as follows: (We will provide a full list here in the future) . • • - 29 - • • • • • • Code I I I ~,2H I I I Example of Crime I I I Armed Robbery I I I PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Response Expected I I I Immediate, w/ lights & siren I I I Due to the abnormally large volume of calls for help via the 911 system during the civil unrest, and due to the abnormally large volume of the higher priority calls demanding immediate help, we limited our analyses of the 911 data to calls prioritized Code 2H or higher, with the premise that the lower priority calls, although important, could forgo immediate police response, and thus be ignored until the • higher priority calls lessened or could be answered and resolved. • • • • • b. Fire Data. We have not been able to identify the source of FEMA's data. This is mitigated by the fact that we have been able to cross-reference this data with the 911 logs and the Department of Building & Safety computer print out. The report from the Department of Building & Safety identifies all structural damage that occurred within the city of Los Angeles during the riot and also identifies the cause of the damage, both of which the Building & Safety inspectors were instructed to verify. Some structure fires identified through FEMA or the Department of Building & Safety's inspections have not appeared on the 911 logs and did not occur anywhere near another fire. (We need the numbers for each source.) The result is - 30 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT that we have not been able to pin down by time and location approximately 30% of the structural fires identified from these sources . Where we have been able to identify the fires by time and location, the Chronology Team has then had to look up each address to determine its location • within the LAPD divisions and districts in order to plot the information. This is because the LAFD 911 logs do not identify the fire's location within the LAPD division and district. The Chronology Team has plotted the time and location of structure fires for • • • the first 16 hours of the riot by using a Thomas Guide, and has an additional 800-900 · fires to identify. This has proven to be a very time-consuming task. The Chronology Team has contacted the LAPD to find out whether they can assist the Team in this task by running the addresses through the 911 system. Since the LAFD 911 logs, and the information obtained from FEMA and the Department of Building & Safety do not contain any data on the duration of each fire, the Chronology Team also needs to determine how to treat multiple reports of fires at the same address. If the report was called in within a couple of hours of • another report, it would seem reasonable to assume it is a likely flare up of a previous fire. When the reports are 18 hours or 48 hours apart, an assumption that the second report represents a resurgence of an earlier fire seems less strong . • • • There will be a certain degree of overinflation in the numbers on structure fires due to the existence of strip malls, etc. Where a damaged structure is listed in the 911 logs, the Building & Safety report, or the information from FEMA, and has been cross-referenced and verified by one of the other reports, we have counted it as - 31 - - - - - - - --------- - -- • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT an individual structure fire. Since some of these addresses are likely to be located within such structures as strip malls, multiple addresses of damaged structures counted as separate structure fires by the Chronology T earn may, in reality, represent only one building. In cases where an entire block burned, there could be inaccuracies • in the correct number or street of reported addresses. c. Deaths. The Coroner's Office has not reached a final determination whether three • deaths are riot related. In addition, they have included traffic fatalities as riot related deaths. w_e may want to edit these deaths from our data and limit ourselves to deaths resulting from violence and arson. We have been able to identify the locations of • • deaths for approximately 25% of the deaths, 75% of the deaths remain to be identified by location. It is expected t~at we will never be able to obtain a precise location for all the deaths. In some cases a victim staggered away from the location of the attack and collapsed in another location to be later found by LAPD or LAFD personnel, in • other cases friends drove the victim miles from the location of the attack to a hospital. • • • It is anticipated, however, that in most cases the location of death will be identified and will roughly correspond to the location of the beating, stabbing, or shooting resulting in death, and will therefore be a fair indicator of the locations where police response was needed . - 32 - • • • • • • • 3. (1) PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Hypotheses Supported by the Data. During the riot crime incidents were committed in waves in terms of intensity, location, duration, times of crime occurrence, or types of-crime incidents. (2) The riot had an observable time sequence. (3) No initial conclusion whether the riot leap-frogged and did not spread systematically along the boulevards. Analysis concerning this hypothesis is continuing. The Chronology Team will not reach an initial conclusion concerning this hypothesis until the Chronology Team has plotted the incidents, including fire and deaths, to at least the district level for the first 35 hours of the riot. ( 4) It is unclear whether there is a correlation between the outbreak and level of incidents during the rioting and the beginning and end of the work day and/or school day. The Los Angeles Unified School District closed schools in the affected areas on April 30, 1992. It is possible that there was a correlation between the level of incidents and the end of the work day on the first day of the riot. On April 29, 1992, there was a marked increase in violence starting at approximately 7:00 • p.m. • • • (5) No initial conclusion whether there was a positive correlation between the incidents of shootings and the incidents of lootings. We will not begin to make a determination until the deaths have been plotted by geographic location. We will also need to plot, to the extent possible, reported shootings that did not result in deaths. It should be possible to cull this information from the 911 incident data base . - 33 - • • • • (6) PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT There does not initially appear to be a positive correlation between the incidents of lootirigs and the incidents of fires. Nor does there appear to be a strong positive correlation between fires and crowds/disturbances, or property crimes. (7) No initial conclusion whether the riot's movement was fed by the media. The Chronology Team has not yet developed a methodology to test this hypothesis. It is felt that information concerning television programming will not be of much assistance. It likely would remain unclear whether the stations programming • changed due to a change in the level of incidents, or whether the level in incidents changed due to a change in television programming. One possible approach to testing this hypothesis would be to interview the arrestees to determine whether the • • media had any influence over the arrestees' participation in the riot. This would be extremely time consuming and labor intensive, however, since the arrests number in the thousands. Another approach might be to conduct a random sampling of, ~' 200 arrestees. (8) No initial conclusion whether the rioters decided at some point to • export the violence from their own neighborhoods to other, higher socio-economic neighborhood$. The Chronology Team needs to obtain further data to test this hypothesis. One method might be to obtain the addresses of those arrested and • • • cross reference that against the location of arrest. The data maintained by the Los Angeles Municipal Courts on arrestees probably does not include the address of the arrestee. We need to check with the LAPD to see if we can obtain this information from them. It is not certain whether it will be possible to obtain such information, or - 34 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT whether the information obtained will be accurate. It seems likely that arrestees may have given false names and addresses . 4. Initial Conclusions. (1) The volume of 911 calls and, thus, the level of intense criminal • activity followed pronounced and regular 24 hour time cycles. In general, the level of total calls would peak during the late afternoon, early evening hours (6:00-9:00 p.m.) and would gradually decline during the night to a 24 hour low during the early morning hours (4:00-7:00 a.m.). (The cycles hold true for each crime type and each geographic division, as well.) Even during times of intense and wide spread levels of violence, such violence appears to peak and then hold off to very low levels at • predictable times of the day. If criminal activity levels are systematically cyclical, then the LAPD may be able to plan for such patterns. The very low cycles typically • experienced between the hours of 4:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. might provide the LAPD with an invaluable window of opportunity to regroup in the case of another civil disorder. (2) The calls were fairly evenly placed in total crimes among three of the • city's four police bureaus. • • • (3) The LAPD and supporting agencies were faced with, on average, four to five times the normal level of high priority calls each and every hour for 2 1 /2 days after the verdict. ( 4) The South Bureau experienced its highest levels of activity on April 29, 1992, the day of the verdict. The Central and West Bureaus did not experience their highest levels of activity until April 30, 1992. At noon on Thursday, - 35 - • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT April 30, 1992, the South, Central, and West Bureaus were all experiencing about the same high levels of activity (approximately 100 criminal incidents per hour) . (5) The 77th Street Division was hit first beginning at 6:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992, approximately three hours after the King verdict. One hour later the Southeast, Southwest, and Newton Divisions began experiencing significant levels of incidents. These divisions are all adjoining divisions to the 77th Street Division -- the riot's origination point. Throughout the entire first night, April 29, 1992, the Rampart • and Hollywood Divisions experienced relatively little high priority incidents. The • • · violence appeared confined to the five divisions. This indicates that the riot began at one concentrated point of origin from which it later spread northward, and belies the hypotheses that the riot had multiple, simultaneous points of origin. (6) The majority L %) of the activity from the verdict until the end of May 2, 1992, occurred in only seven of the city's eighteen divisions: Rampart, Wilshire, Newton, 77th Street, Southwest, Southeast, and Hollywood. Moreover, the divisions are neighboring divisions geographically and cut a narrow north-south • corridor through the center and heart of Los Angeles. (7) The number of structure fires initially reported is overinflated. (8) The pattern of structure fires does not exhibit a marked wave • pattern observed when tracking other incidents. (9) The earliest structure fires during the riot did not occur until hour 5, 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., after the announcement of the King verdict. • - 36 - • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL e ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT • (1 O} The numbers of structure fires remained high through May 1, 1992 . (11) The structure fires appear to have followed a similar path northward through the city as the other incidents the Chronology Team has tracked, • but the fires appear to have been more widespread. • • • • I • • • (12) Data concerning riot related deaths have revealed the following statistics: (a) Recap of deaths by ethnicity: (1) Blacks 44%; (2) Hispanics 31 %; (3) Caucasians 20%; (4) Asians 3%; and (5) Unknown 2% . (b) Recap of causes of death: (1) Gunshots 66%; (2) Traffic Accidents 11 %; (3) Fire 9%; (4) Assaults 5%; (5) Stabbings 3%; (6) Drug Overdoses 2%; and (7) Heart Attacks 2%. B. Whether it Was a Riot That Began at Discrete Geographic Location(s). 1. Methodology. To determine whether the riot began in one geographic location we have taken the incident data and mapped it for the first cycle of the riot, up to hour 17. The methodological discussion has been provided in Section A. The Chronology Team has compiled maps that correspond to the LAPD maps of the bureaus and divisions. The geographic data has been compared to the maps of bureaus and divisions, and the incident data discussed in Section A, to - 37 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT determine whether there are any positive or negative correlations between the geographic profiles of each area and the level of riot activity experienced in each area . We will also be comparing this information to deployment data. The Chronology Team has obtained certain geographic data concerning the city of Los Angeles and has compared this data with the incident data to determine whether there is any correlation between characteristics of the areas in terms of housing projects and commercial and residential usage, and the five LAPD • divisions that experienced the greatest level of criminal incident activity during the riot. • • The Chronology Team has also analyzed this data to determine whether any patterns are exhibited in terms of riot activity that can be taken into account by the LAPD in planning for possible future civil disorders. a. One Geographic Location. The mapping done from the incident data base for crime incidents Code 2H or higher reveals that the riot started in a concentrated area and did not spread for several hours. The location of the inception of the riot was the 77th Street Division. It • then spread from 77th Street Division to immediately adjacent LAPD divisions and later spread north. See discussion in Section A. • • • b . Housing Projects. The Chronology Team contacted the Department of Housing and Urban Development to obtain information pertaining to the locations of housing projects within the city of Los Angeles. (Obtain date of data.) - 38 - • • • - - ------------ ---------------------~ PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT After obtaining this information, the next task was to map the information so that it could be compared to the LAPD maps of bureaus, divisions, and districts . Because none of the maps were consistent with other, each map from the National Data Base and Los Angeles County had to be redrawn to match the format of the • maps of the LAPD bureaus, divisions, and districts. The city and county project information then had to be plotted on the redrawn maps. • • • • • • • We are still in the process of mapping the housing projects within the county. We have plotted all the housing projects located within the city of Los Angeles. The tentative conclusion is that there is not a positive correlation between the locations of the housing projects and the area in which the riot began. See Appendix A, tab 62 and accompanying attachments providing the coding legend for the map. There may be some correlation between the locations of the housing projects and a couple of the most active LAPD divisions. Id. Analysis is continuing . In addition, we still are in the process of obtaining more data from the county, and unincorporated areas of the city . C. Commercial and Residential Usage. The Chronology Team has obtained maps of the thirty-five planning areas of the city of Los Angeles. These maps include data on the character of usage within each area, i.e., whether it is commercial or residential. The maps provide information down to the plat level. These maps will have to be redrawn to conform with the maps of the LAPD bureaus, divisions, and districts . - 39 - • • • 2. PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Strengths and Weakness of Available Data. For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the incident data base from which the spread of the riot was mapped, see Section A. The information obtained concerning the locations of the housing • projects is still not complete. We will be obtaining more information from the county, and obtaining information from those unincorporated areas located near active LAPD divisions to complete the analysis . • • • The maps concerning commercial and residential usage will need to be completely redrawn to the format consistent with the LAPD maps of bureaus, divisions, and districts. We have not yet redrawn the planning maps. In some cases, we are working with maps that date from 1985. More detail will be provided as the maps are redrawn. 3 . Hypotheses Supported by the Data. (1) The riot had only one initial geographic source at the corner of Normandie and Florence. It then spread to the rest of the 77th Street Division before • spreading to immediately adjacent LAPD divisions and later northward. • • • (2) There is not a positive correlation between the locations of the housing projects and the area in which the riot began. There may be some correlation between the locations of the housing projects and a couple of the most active LAPD divisions. Analysis is continuing . - 40 - I • • • (2) PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT We are in the process of mapping the usage characteristics of areas of the city and will correlate this with the maps of active LAPD divisions to determine whether the riot occurred in mostly commercial or residential areas. (3) No initial conclusion whether the riot spread from one center point • along the major boulevards. If we map the crime incidents and fires down to the district level, we may reach a tentative conclusion. • • • • ( 4) The data does not support the hypothesis that the riot had multiple, spontaneous sources. (5) No initial conclusion whether the hypothesis is correct that the riot had staggered, spontaneous flash points . 4. (1) Initial Conclusions. The riot had only one geographic source, not multiple, spontaneous sources . (2) The riot did not start at the housing projects. C. Whether it Was a Riot in Which Discrete Groups · of Persons, in Terms of Demographic Types. Participated . 1. Methodology. In order to determine whether what occurred in Los Angeles during the • civil unrest was a riot in which discrete groups of persons, in terms of demographic types, participated, the Chronology Team has endeavored to obtain a profile of the rioters. It is hoped that the demographic data on the rioters and the geographic • - 41 - • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT locations in which the riot occurred will reveal certain patterns to the violence, and that these patterns will assist the LAPD in planning for possible future civil disorders . The Chronology Team has compiled maps from the demographic data obtained that correspond to the maps of the LAPD, the bureaus and divisions. The • demographic data has been compared to the maps of bureaus and divisions, and the incident data discussed in Section A, to determine whether there are any positive or negative correlations between the demographic profiles for each area and the level of '• • riot activity experienced in each area. We will also be comparing this information to deployment data. a. Arrest Profile by Rand . The Chronology Team has obtained a Rand Study which presents a profile of the Los Angel~s riot arrestees based on information obtained from Los • Angeles Municipal Court dat~. This study demonstrates that the arrestees show distinctive demographic profiles. See Appendix A, tab 63. According to the study, the arrestees were primarily males between the • ages of 18-24. kl The racial characteristics of the arrestees are: (1) Latino 51 %; (2) Black 36%; (3) Anglo 11 %; and (4) Other 3%. From the study, Rand has concluded that 11 it wasn't a black riot so much as a minority riot." kl The Rand Study also • reveals that more Blacks were arrested for weapons than Latinos, but that more Latinos were arrested for arson than were Blacks. Overall, however, more Latinos • were arrested than Blacks for civil disturbances, property crimes, and violent crimes . - 42 - • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT The Rand Study indicates that the arrests were made by the following LAPD bureaus: Central Bureau Valley Bureau West Bureau South Bureau Metro, Traffic 1458 arrests 11 03 arrests 856 arrests 734 arrests 669 arrests As has been shown in Section A, this data does not necessarily correlate • with the incident data. For instance, the Valley Bureau experienced comparatively few incidents compared to the other LAPD bureaus, yet the Valley Bureau is listed as second highest in rate of arrests. One explanation may be that the data on arrests • • begins on April 30, 1992 and does not account for arrests made on April 29, 1992, the day that the rioting began. It is also possible that the LAPD in the South and Central Bureaus did not make any arrests during the initial hours of the riot. To some extent, the data is also skewed by the fact that the location of arrest was assigned according to the arresting officer's regular assignment within the LAPD bureaus, rather than the • actual geographic location where the arrest was made. It is anticipated, however, that roughly 80% of the arrests were made by officers within the bureau to which they are regularly assigned . • • • The Chronology Team is attempting to obtain data from the LAPD concerning arrests. It is hoped that this data will reveal the actual location and time at which the arrest was made. Once more exact information is obtained, we will be able - 43 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT to determine whether there are any positive or negative correlations with the incident data base discussed in Section A, and the deployment data discussed in Section E. b. Demographic Profiles of the City. The Chronology Team has obtained certain demographic information • concerning the city of Los Angeles and has compared this data with the incident data to determine whether there are any correlations between demographic characteristics and the five LAPD divisions that experienced the greatest level of criminal incident • • • activity during the riot. The Chronology Team has also analyzed this data to determine whether any patterns are exhibited in terms of riot activity that can be taken into account by the LAPD in planning for possible future civil disorders . The Chronology Team contacted the National Data Base to obtain regional information on demographic characteristics. Information was obtained from the National Data Base relating· to: (1) per capita income; (2) race; and (3) high crime areas. The Chronology Team also contacted the Department of Housing and Urban Development to obtain information pertaining to the locations of housing projects • within the city of Los Angeles. We also obtained a map of the city, from a report prepared by the Los Angeles County District Attorney, which identifies the areas experiencing high levels of gang activity. (Obtain dates of each map and report.) • • • After obtaining this information, the next task was to map the information so that it could be compared to the LAPD maps of bureaus, divisions, and districts. Because none of the maps were consistent with other. each map from the National Data Base and Los Angeles County had to be redrawn to match the format of the - 44 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT maps of the LAPD bureaus, divisions, and districts. The city and county project information then had to be plotted on the redrawn maps . To aid the reader in identifying the location of relevant areas within the city, several maps were created which conform to the format and size of the LAPD • maps. A map was created in which the lines of the bureaus and divisions were removed and the major freeways and certain cities were plotted on the map to aid the reader in identifying relevant areas. See Appendix A, tab 64. A second map was • • • • • • • created which includes the LAPD divisions and major freeways. See Appendix A, tab 65. Another map was then created which outlines the most active LAPD divisions in terms of crimes incidents, based upon information in the incident data base discussed in Section A.1. See Appendix A, tab 66. In addition to this map, a color overlay was created which can be used in connection with the demographic maps to determine whether there are any discernible demographic patterns exhibited in the most active LAPD divisions. See Appendix A, back pocket. (1) Per Capita Income . When the map of per capita income in Los Angeles is compared to the overlay of the most active LAPD divisions, it becomes clear that the civil unrest started in one of the areas of the city with the lowest and next to lowest income levels: below $10,000 and from the $10,000 to $30,000 per capita income levels. See Appendix A, tab 67 . - 45 - • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL e ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT • (2) Race. A comparison of maps showing the racial make-up of the areas of the city with the overlay of the most active LAPD divisions also reveals some interesting patterns. With respect to the Asian population there does not appear to be a • significant correlation between the area in which the riot began and those areas of the city with high percentages of Asians. The map does show that certain portions of the most active LAPD divisions do contain areas with a high percentage of Asians ranging • • from 12.9 to 36.9%. See Appendix A, tab 68. With respect to the map of African-American populations, it appears that there is a positive correlation between the area that has a high percentage of African Americans and the area in which the riot began. See Appendix A, tab 69. The incident data base indicates that the riot began in Division 12, the 77th Street Division, • which has a 45-90% African American population throughout most of the division. Significant portions of other active divisions, Divisions 3, 7, 13, and 18 also have areas which have either a high percentage of African-Americans, or a medium percentage, • 1 0 to 45% of the population. Id. The correlation between the areas with a high percentage of Hispanics in the population and the most active LAPD divisions in terms of crime incidents is not • • • quite as high. The riot apparently began in an area which has a medium level of Hispanics in the population, 20.4 to 34.4%. See Appendix A, tab 70. Significant areas of the most active LAPD divisions, however, either have a high percentage of Hispanics, 56.4% to 94.%, or a medium level. kl - 46 - • • • (3) PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Crimes Against Persons and Property. A comparison of the crime index map which illustrates levels of crimes against persons and property by area also reveals a high correlation between the area in which the riot began and areas experiencing high levels of crime. See Appendix A, • tab 71 . In addition, those LAPD divisions which experienced the highest levels in crime incidents during the riot are also either entirely located within high crime areas, or significant portions of the division are located in high crime areas. kl • • • • • • • (4) Gang Activity. A comparison of the overlay of the most active LAPD divisions with the Los Angeles County map of gang activity reveals that the riot started in an area of heavy gang activity (20-39 gangs active in the area), but not in the very heavy gang activity areas ( 40-90 gangs active in the area). See Appendix A, tab 72. On the other hand, much of the area in th~ South Bureau where the riot began is surrounded by areas of very high gang activity. Id. Further data concerning the degree of gang participation in the riot might be provided through arrestee interviews . 2. Strengths and Weakness of Available Data. The Rand analysis is based on "Los Angeles Municipal Court data on 5,633 adults arrested and held for arraignment between April 30, 1992 ... and May 5, 1992 ... . " The Rand analysis includes only those arrests which occurred after midnight following the announcement of the Rodney King verdict and, therefore, does not present a profile of riot participants during the initial stages of the riot. The Rand data also exclude juvenile arrestees and adult arrestees who were processed through - 47 - • • • • • • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT the courts located in the areas of East Los Angeles, Downey, Culver City, Inglewood, and Compton. Some of these areas experienced significant levels of riot related activity. The location of arrest may be misleading by as much as apP.roximately 20%. The location of arrest was assigned according to the usual assigned location of the arresting officer. Thus, for those officers redeployed from other bureaus who made arrests, the assigned location of arrest indicates the bureau to which the officer is usually assigned and does not indicate the actual bureau where the arrest was made. The demographic information reveals a profile of the rioters only to the extent that the rioting in the active LAPD divisions was carried out by those persons living within the divisions. To the extent that the crime incidents were committed by persons from other geographic locations, any conclusions concerning the demographic profile of the rioters will be misleading to a certain degree. It seems likely, however, that for at least the initial period of the riot, the majority of the criminal incidents that occurred were committed by those who live within those LAPD divisions in which the crimes were committed. 3 . Hypotheses Supported by the Data. (1) The riot occurred largely in areas with low income levels. To the extent to which the demographic data provides an accurate profile of the rioters, the riot was carried out by those populations with low income levels. (2) The riot occurred largely in areas with a high percentage of African-American and Hispanic populations. To the extent to which the Rand Study - 48 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT and the demographic data provide an accurate profile of the rioters, the riot was carried out largely by Hispanics and African-Americans . (3) The Chronology Team has not addressed yet the hypothesis whether undocumented aliens participated in the riot to a large degree or began the • riot. The Chronology Team has not yet determined how to obtain the data or develop a methodology for testing this hypothesis. • • • ( 4) The tentative conclusion is that the riot began and took place to a large extent in areas of the city which experience heavy gang activity, and began in areas of the city that are adjacent to very heavy gang activity areas in the county. Further data concerning the degree to which gangs participated in the riot might be obtained through arrestee interviews. 4. Initial -Conclusions. (1) The most active LJ\PD divisions in terms of crime incidents committed during the course of the civil unrest are located primarily in areas with low income levels. The majority of the rioters have income levels that range from under $10,000 a • year to $30,000 a year. • • • (.2) The most active LAPD divisions in terms of crime incidents committed during the riot are located in areas with high African-American and Hispanic populations. The majority of the rioters were African-Americans and Hispanic. (3) No initial conclusion concerning participation in the riot by undocumented aliens. - 49 - • • • • • • • • • • • (4) - - -------------- PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT No initial conclusion concerning the degree of participation in the riot by gangs . D. Whether it Was a Spontaneous or Organized Riot. 1 . Methodology. The Chronology Team has yet to address these hypotheses, and has yet to develop methods of testing these hypotheses. E. 2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Available Data . 3. Hypotheses Supported by the Data. 4. Initial Conclusions. Whether it Was a Riot That Had High and Low Points in Terms of Activity and Geographic Extent Which Were Caused or Affected by LAPD Deployment. 1. Methodology. a . Deployment Data Base. The LAPD provided printed reports of incoming 911 emergency calls from which an initial "incident database 11 was created. The Chronology Team discussed how to identify and substantiate police response to these incidents by tracking officer deployment to the incident areas. An initial approach was to attempt to match specific officers to reported incidents . To test this proposed methodology, we reviewed deployment data supplied by the LAPD for the 77th Division, to determine whether this data would be manageable, useful and allow us to link officers to incidents. These records consisted of Daily Worksheets which served as the sergeants' roll call sheets. Each officer was - 50 - • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT required to initial the sheets to show his or her presence on duty during that shift. Other data supplied included Daily Field Activities Reports which served as a daily timesheet for all officers on which they recorded the time, location and assignment or activity being conducted at any particular moment. Presumably, due to the emergency situation in the station at the time of the afternoon watch, none of the Daily Worksheets were initialled after the AM watch on April 29, and were useless in establishing who was actually on duty that shift. • Moreover, the officers' Daily Field Activities Reports, in large part, do not identify the 77th Divisions officers' activities in any detail, if at all, once they were assigned to the command post within hours of the announcement of the verdict. Because this basic • • or original source data was incomplete and was deemed not useful for our purposes, we did not review similar data for the other divisions. Next, we reviewed the logs from the following sources: ECC, EOC, 77th Division, South Bureau, Wilshire Division, Hollywood Division, and Lt. Moulin's CP Log. According to the LAPD, these logs were respectively prepared by a "log officer" who is • usually in close proximity to the field commander, and whose responsibility is to keep a running chronology of the calls, reports, orders and events happening at that post. We have not identified or interviewed the various log officers to verify their • • • methodology, criteria for entries, or circumstances under which they were prepared, such as whether or not they were contemporaneous, or whether they were partially reconstructed after the fact. Such interviews would be recommended, however, in - 51 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT that based on our discussions with the LAPD, it appears that these documents are the best contemporaneous written records of the events and the LAPD's response . From a review of the logs and a comparison to the incident database, it quickly became apparent that the 911 call transcripts did not represent the true extent • of activities taking place. Indeed, discussions with the LAPD confirmed that the 911 calls were but one way that reports of incidents or emergencies are received. They indicated this is especially true in a chaotic situation like this where a command post is • • set up and calls are rerouted. We initially reviewed the logs to cull out deployment data. We defined deployment as the movement of personnel from one bureau, division, or district where they might normally be assigned, to another. As we discovered the additional incident data discussed above, we decided to track that as well to attempt to compl.ete the "incident picture." In addition to incident and • deployment data, the logs al~o contained reports of problems encountered when attempting to deploy resources. These problems included many logistical barriers which hindered or delayed responses to riot-related incidents, such as having • available officers, but no available cars, ammunition, flak vests, radios or other necessary equipment. So that it could be captured in the data base, we created a "deployment • data base" and encoded the information contained in the logs as follows: • - 52 - • • • • • • • • • • D = F = C1 = C2 = C3 = C4 = = R = T = 0 = K = H = A = PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT CODING LEGEND FOR COMMAND POST LOGS Deployment entry ( 11 11 O people from S/E; 140 from 77th ... 11 , 11 CHP notified to be sent to Crenshaw Plaza. 11 ) (People) Fire incident Crime incident involving "Disturbances with guns (or bottles)" (245/246/415) Crime incident involving "Looting and burglaries 11 (259/594/906/ 459) Crime incident involving 11 Violence against individuals (includes officers) 11 (211 /245) Riot related bad acts/crowd control Inquiry into or request for orders, more assistance, supplies, etc. Response (via communications, actions, etc. - e.g., calling a tact alert; closing gun stores; establishing curfew; Chief calling a conference call) Threats against police officers or individuals Other; gathering of people (before incident) Killed Hurdles/Tactical (Deployment related) Command/control - policy issues Arrests For a partial example of the Deployment Log, see Appendix A, tab 73. This method of coding also allows for computer sorting of data so that activities may be viewed in terms of time, place and type, as well as for comparing the events and responses, including problems encountered in that response, among the different divisions. In short, the goal was to develop a way to identify and organize • the data in order to test our developing hypotheses as accurately as possible. - 53 - • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT The last source of documentary evidence which we reviewed was 11 after action" reports prepared by the various bureaus, divisions and areas. These reports contain, in varying degrees of specificity, information concerning major events that occurred in each area as well as specific deployment data. This information has been coded as appropriate and will be entered into the data base. We have not substantiated the source of the underlying information in the reports, or the existence of supporting documentation. Reports were reviewed from the following bureaus and • divisions (now areas): Metropolitan Division; Central Area; Rampart Area; Newton Street Area; Northeast Area; Hollenbeck Area; Hollywood Area; Wilshire Area; West Los Angeles Area; Valley Bureau; Foothill Area; Van Nuys Area; Pacific Area and • • • • • • South Bureau. The LAPD reviewed additional sources of information in the creation of their own chronology and deployment figures, which, in addition to the information described above, included officer interviews, radio transcripts and other records. Some of these other sources are described as follows: (1) Metro Frequency Transmissions .. These tapes are in real time and can be ordered with "shadow time," i.e., a "clock," but must be transcribed. These are not dispatches, but, according to LAPD, contain interesting deployment and tactical information. They have not been requested . - 54 - • • • • (2) (3) PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT DD In-Station Audio Messages. These, as well as all tactical frequencies, are recorded. LAPD reviewed these to get deployment figures. They have not been requested. Code 2 High and Above Radio Dispatches. This information is available in hard copy and has been requested but not yet received. [?] (4) MDTs. LAPD reviewed the information from the Mobile Digital • Terminals for the time period 3:15 p.m. to 6:15 p.m. on 4/29. They did not find information after that time to be helpful once the situation escalated. This information has not been requested . • • • These additional sources of information should be reviewed if an additional level of detail is needed to test or substantiate hypotheses. The tapes of the actual radio transmissions were considered to be very helpful to the LAPD chronology. b. Analysis of LAPD Response and Deployment in Narrative Form . In addition to the deployment and tactical information culled from the various sources that will be plotted on the graphs and charts, the Chronology Team • has assembled a grid which sets forth in narrative form a chronological account of the certain responses and deployment of the LAPD during the riot. The grid tracks incidents and compares the data to information concerning LAPD response and • deployment; LAFD response and deployment; the actions of local and city officials; the - 55 - • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT response and deployment of the Sheriff's Department, California Highway Patrol ( 11 CHP 11 ), and other local police departments; the actions of state officials; the response and deployment of the National Guard; the actions of federal officials, and the response and deployment of federal troops. See Appendix 8. The grid includes information culled from the following sources: (1) newspapers, magazines, and television programs; (2) the minutes from the May 7, 1992 meeting of the Board of Fire Commissioners; (3) LAPD logs from the Central, ! • South, and West Bureaus; and (4) the confidential interviews conducted by the LAPD • • · and lnteragency Teams. Id. Since the Chronology Team has just begun its review of the interviews, little information from the interviews has been included to date. It is anticipated that the Chronology Team will finish its review of the interviews shortly after the last interview memorandum has been completed. The next step will be to extract information from the deployment data base and add the data to the grid . The initial approach was to create a grid that would include all pertinent information and reveal conflicts in information from the various sources. Given the • length of the document in its present form, and concerns that including all information would drown out a view of the "big picture," a decision was made to edit the grid to include only the more significant events. The Chronology Team has not begun the • • • edit, but anticipates that the edit will be completed shortly after the interview information has been added . - 56 - • • • 2. PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Strengths and Weaknesses of the Available Data. A significant and glaring deficiency of the data is the almost total absence of detailed, reliable, contemporaneous information that can be reduced to written form. The transcripts of the 911 calls contain duplications which have been • accounted for, yet as previously discussed they are quite incomplete. One explanation for this is that citizens stopped reporting incidents via 911 when it became obvious that calls received no response from the police. For example, in the 77th • • • Division, not until the command post was organized and all the backlogged calls were worked off, with little discernible effect on the escalating riot, were calls responded to in a timely manner. For that reason, citizens may have been wary of using 911, and incident information was communicated in other forms, i.e., direct calls to individual stations. Furthermore, as noted above, because of the volume of calls, and the chaotic and emergency conditions during that period, the individual officers were not able to keep detailed records of their activities or responses to incidents. This is also • a significant weakness. Because much of the available data was admittedly completed or reconstructed after-the-fact, it may have been clouded by memory or contaminated (affected) by hindsight, and its reliability may be doubtful. • • • The strength of the data is its volume. The quality of the available evidence is more than sufficient to develop and test hypotheses of what transpired. The volume is manageable and lends itself to reasonable verification through cross referencing sources, depending on what facts are sought. - 57 - • • • • • • • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT We were informed by the LAPD that certain radio frequency taped transmissions may be a valuable source of information. It would be extremely time consuming, however, to listen to, transcribe, and extract the useful data from "real time" transmissions. 3 . Hypotheses Supported by the Data. Our review of the materials described above tentatively appears to support the following hypotheses concerning deployment: (1) There was an initial command and control failure of the 17th/South Bureau command post that contributed to escalation of violence and destruction. (2) The riot had high and low points in terms of level of activity (criminal incidents) and geographic extent which were caused or affected by LAPD deployment. (3) Geographic bureaus, divisions, and districts of the LAPD that did not initially experience problems in responding to the riot, later experienced problems in responding as a result of the redeployment of LAPD personnel and resources. Analysis is continuing and examples are needed here. Significant deployment information will be plotted and cross-referenced with the incident data for further support . (4) Geographic bureaus, divisions, and districts of the LAPD that did experience an upsurge in criminal incidents early in the riot but that were dealing affectively with the incidents, later lost control and experienced an even higher number of incidents as a result of the tactical alert which pulled those officers off the street - 58 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT who, up until that point, had been maintaining some control. Analysis is continuing and examples are needed here. Significant deployment information will be plotted and cross-referenced with the incident data for further support. (5) No initial conclusion as to whether, as time passed, the riot had • multiple points of occurrence and a geographic spread to which the LAPD's methodology of assuming a single, concentrated source of violence could not effectively respond. It is expected that the LAPD interviews will provide information • concerning the methodology of preparing for an unusual occurrence such as a riot, and how that methodology influenced the command post structure, communications, deployment, etc . • • • • • • 4. Initial Conclusions. Our review of the materials described above gave rise to the following initial conclusions concerning deployment: (1) Lack of immediate response in ?7th/South Bureau emboldened lawbreakers and caused an escalation in violence and looting. (2) Officers were deployed from other bureaus and divisions to assist the ?7th/South Bureau, and this initial deployment caused the "sending" divisions to be understaffed and unable to respond to later events in their own areas, further escalating the problems occurring in ?7th/South bureau. (3) Tactical assignment of available officers to other duties, such as administration of field jails, fire department escorts, and building security, drew - 59 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT significant resources away from the crime locations and may have hindered efforts at situation control . ( 4) The initial criminal activities in the 77th division caused a chain reaction which spread to other divisions, and continued until sufficient law enforcement • resources were marshalled to quell the violence several days later. (5) There was an initial lack of response from the 77th Division. From the time that the officers were ordered back to the station at_ p.m., officers were not • re-deployed from the Command Post until_ p.m. • • • • • • (6) During the initial hours of the occurrence, there was a significant flow of officers from other locations to the South Bureau Command Post. The available data indicates that _ officers were deployed from other locations to the South Bureau Command post during the first _ hours of the occurrence. (7) At the outset of the occurrence, a significant number of officers were deployed from other locations to Parker Center. The data shows that approximately _ officers were detailed to Parker Center and surrounding downtown locations . (8) The next noticeable criminal activity ( other than demonstrations at Parker Center) occurred in __ Division at or about_ p.m. (9) A significant number of officers were required to effect and process arrests. The data reflects that approximately_ officers, primarily detectives, were detailed to the field jails set up by the respective divisions, bureaus and areas. Further regarding arrests, it does not appear that any arrests were effected by the 77th Division until_p.m./a.m. - 60 - • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT (1 0) Beginning at approximately _ p.m. and continuing until approximately_p.m. on ___ , the LAPD deployed nearly_ officers to escort LAFD personnel or otherwise provide security for the same. (11) In areas where there was immediate deployment or response to • initial criminal activities, including arrests, the criminal activity was curtailed. [Examples?] • • • • • • • ( 12) There was insufficient deployment of available officers during the initial stages of the occurrence. The ECC log shows that as of 0300 hours on April 30, only 1,351 officers and 103 supervisors were deployed from all bureaus. By that time, _ incidents had been reported through the 911 system. ( 13) The total number of officers available to be deployed to the field was depleted by the facts that _ officers at various times were assigned to LAFD escort and security and _ officers were detailed to the various field jails to process arrests. (14) Where divisions had available officers detailed to other areas, when the occurrences shifted to those areas the respective divisions were unable to respond or their response was limited . - 61 - • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT F. Whether a Lack of Cooperation and Coordination Among Various Federal, State and Local Officials and Agencies Led to Disarray in Responding to and Quelling the Riot. 1. Methodology. The Chronology Team has yet to address these hypotheses, and has yet to develop methods of testing these hypotheses. Anecdotal information obtained from interviews, logs, and newspapers, indicates that these may be valid hypotheses. By way of example, once the National Guard troops did arrive they often did not receive a specific assignment until hours later and it would seem reasonable to assume that this had an effect on the abilities of the various agencies to respond to and quell the riot. It is anticipated that significant events concerning federal, state, and local officials and • agencies will be correlated with the incident data to determine their effect, if any, on the ability to respond to the riot and reassert control. 2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Available Data. Hypotheses have not been addressed yet. 3. Hypotheses Supported by the Data. Hypotheses have not been addressed yet. • 4. Initial Conclusions. Hypotheses have not been addressed yet. • 5090008) • - 62 - • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I • • • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Draft: 07/21/92 The Response Of The Los Angeles Police Department To The Civil Disorders Following The King Verdict. DRA.Fr I. INTRODUCTION . The charge to the Special Advisor and his Deputy was to analyze and critique the response of the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD" or the "Department") to the urban disorders that followed the verdicts of acquittal handed down in the King trial. To do so, the Advisor has looked at the response from a number of viewpoints, including that of City Officials, other concerned law enforcement and related agencies, community leaders, and citizens. This portion of the report will examine the response from the standpoint of the LAPD. We will first give an overview of "what happened" from the standpoint of the Department. We will then analyze -- and criticize -- key facets of the LAPD response, including planning, training, command and control, intelligence, logistics, and a number of other less, specific but nevertheless important issues . Finding a norm against which to judge the response has been a difficult task. Perhaps one of the better standards, although general, is set out in the Department's Tactical Manual: When a disaster or other emergency • • • • • • • • • • • occurs, the effectiveness of the Department's emergency preparedness planning and training will be thoroughly tested. The Department must respond rapidly with sufficient personnel and Logistical resources to control the situation. Concurrently, the Department's ability to respond to high priority calls for service must be maintained . Developing a more specific standard for the control of civil disorder raises a basic political issue what type of police department does the City want and what is it willing to pay for? At least in theory, the Department could have sufficient officers on hand at any point in time to quell immediately any type of disorder~ Whether the citizenry would be willing to pay for such a force is questionable, particularly in these economic times. An even more fundamental issue is whether citizens would chose to live under such "militaristic" circumstances. Although this section of the report seeks to make some judgments considering the adequacy of the response of the LAPD, until these basic political issues are addressed, and answered, it is virtually impossible to judge objectively the adequacy of the Department's response . 2 • • • • • • • • • • • II. WHAT HAPPENED . Determining exactly what happened as has proven to be a much more difficult exercise than initially contemplated. It is relatively easy to get an overview of what happened -- widespread looting, fires, shootings, and other violence that flared out of control and remained out of control for days after the initial incidents on the late afternoon and evening of April 29. After numerous delays and difficulties, the LAPD, assisted by thousands of other county and regional law enforcement agencies, the National Guard, and eventually federal troops, was finally able to gain control; the City eventually returned to normalcy on May_. The statistics showing the degree of violence are staggering. [Either insert statistical data or refer to other sections of the report where these figures are discussed.] Upon closer examination, however, it becomes clear that although the violence and destruction were widespread, certain areas of the City were hard hit while others remained virtually unscathed. Part of these differences are explained by the demographics of different sections of the City •. But it is clear that the response of the LAPD varied greatly in different part of the City, and this was a key factor influencing the amount of destruction sustained in different neighborhoods. Accordingly, rather than 3 • • • • • • • • • • presenting an overall assessment of "what happened" from the standpoint of the Department, we have selected key areas of the City to study in greater depth both what happened in terms of the violence that took place, and the response of the Department. Before proceeding with this detail, it is necessary to explain the organization of the Department • Geographically, the Department is broken down into four Bureaus: Central, West, Valley, and South. Each of the Bureaus is then subdivided into separate geographic areas formerly referred to as "Divisions" but not denominated "Areas." There are some 18 separate Areas city-wide, ranging from the Harbor Area in the southern part of the City, north to the Foothill Area in the San Fernando Valley, and from the West Los Angeles and Pacific Areas on the west side to Hollenbeck and Northeast on the east . In order to describe "what happened," we have selected several areas for our study. These include the 77th Street, Southeast, and Southwest Areas in the South Bureau; Rampart, Central, and Newton in the Central Bureau; Foothill in the Valley Bureau; and Wilshire, West Los Angeles, and Pacific in the West Bureau . (This portion of the report has yet to be drafted from an overall standpoint. From the time being, we 4 • • • • • • • • • • • -- -- --------------------------------, attached an assessment of what happened from the standpoint of individual police officers within one of the Areas where interviews have been conducted to date.] III. SUBSTANTIVE AREAS • A. Planning. One of the major issues that has arisen in the aftermath of the King disorders is whether the LAPD had a plan for control of civil disorder. Chief Gates, and other top LAPD officials, have insisted that there were such plans. Others, including a number of public officials, have said there was no plan. Both groups are correct. The LAPD did in fact have several plans for the control of what the Department refers to as Unusual Occurrences, including civil disorders and riots. The main such plan is referred to as the "Tactical Manual." The Manual that was in effect has been an evolving document with parts dating back to __________ and other parts prepared as recently as___________ (Subsequent to the disorders, the Department issued a revised Tactical Manual dated January, 1992. Although dated prior to the disorders, the plan was not disseminated until several weeks after the disorder, and, contrary to several news reports, this revised version was not changed as a result of any "lessons learned" from the disorders.) 5 • • • • • • • • • • • The Tactical Manual is a complex document setting out in detail instructions for the response to Unusual Occurrences, including organizational charts, chains of command, specific responsibilities for different Department officials, procedures for establishing command posts, and procedures for coordination with outside agencies. It also contains Appendices that serve as "checklists" for high department officials, Area and Watch Commanders, and even individual officers. Overall it provides a detailed blueprint for response to civil disorder. (A detailed analysis of the Tactical Manual is currently being prepared by the police officers serving as consultants to the advisors.] In addition to the Tactical Manual, each Area had what is referred to as a "Standing Plan" for that Area. The standing plans vary from Area to Area, but generally contain key portions of the Tactical Manual, maps showing important locations within the Area (schools, power stations, public buildings, etc.), locations for command posts and staging areas, and various personnel lists. [Consultants to the Advisor are preparing analyses of the standing plans.] The Manual describes the importance of Standing Plans, and their contents, as follows: REQUIRED STANDING PLANS. Standing plans enhance the Department's response to 6 • • • • • • • • • • • controlling emergencies. These plans are adjunct to and include procedures established in other chapters of this manual. The following standing plans are required for the Department elements and commands indicated: * All Commanding Officers: * * * * * Mobilization Plan (refer to Watch Commanders Guide #4) . Protection of Department Facilities Plans. Note: If more than one Department element is located in the same facility: See section A/300. Earthquake Response Plan Civil Defense Warning Plan (refer to City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Master Plan). * Air Pollution Emergency Plan. Area Commanding Officers: * Mobilization Plans * Protection of Department Facilities Plans * Air Pollution Emergency Plans * Area Earthquake Response Plan (refer to Watch Commanders Guide #13) * Vital Point Surveys * Command Post Sites, Staging Areas, and Evacuation Centers Listings 7 • • • • • • • • • • • * Dam Inundation Plans (as applicable) * Special Area Plans and Single Use Plans What the Department did not have was a comprehensive department-wide specific plan for control of any disorders resulting from the verdicts in the King case. There were Department directives to Area Commanding Officers to conduct training exercises and to check riot control equipment in anticipation of the disorders, and some of the Areas actually developed their own specific plans for anticipated difficulties, but there was no overall plan. The localized plans although helpful in some respects, often were of limited, if any, value. For example, one the evening before the King verdict was handed down, various officers in the Southeast Area prepared their own ad hoc plan for the control of disorders that they expected to break out in several large housing developments in Southeast. As it turned out, however, the main acts of violence took place elsewhere, and hence the plan was not implemented. (Give examples of other specific plans.] In contrast to the failure to develop an overall specific plans in anticipation of the King verdicts, the Department in the past has prepared, and successfully 8 • • • • • • • • • • • implemented, very specific plans to cover other "Unusual Occurrences." Such plans are called "Single-Standing Plans" described in the Manual as follows: SINGLE-USE-PLANS. Single-use plans are plans developed for a specific or special event and shall contain certain procedures and operational concepts found in the Department and Tactical Manuals. For example, the Department prepared, and successfully implemented, a specific plan for handling the immense crowd control, security, and traffic control problems created by the 1984 Olympics. Other "Single Standing Plans" were developed for the Department response to the efforts of Operation Rescue, and other events. [Give examples.] Various areas within the Department have also prepared Single-Standing Plans for expected incidents within the area. Key examples are the plans developed by the West Los Angeles Area for control of demonstrations at the Federal Building in Westwood, and plans of the Wilshire area for demonstrations and other events at the hotels and other locations in the Mid-Wilshire Area. The Department's failure to prepare such a plan cannot be excused by the various countervailing considerations stated by Department officials. One of the main arguments expressed by top LAPD officials, including 9 • • • • • • • • • • • Chief Gates, to excuse the lack of a specific plan is that the Department did have plans, including the Tactical Manual and the hrea Standing Plans, which should have covered the King disorders. Although there is merit to this argument, based upon the information that we have developed, we are quite clear that neither the Tactical Manual nor the Area Standing Plans led to an overall coordinated response to the disorders by the Department. Another stated reason to justify the lack of a specific plan was that any such plan, and the planning process itself, could have served as an aggravating factor in the community, and could have been a factor leading to disorder. There is again some merit to this argument, particularly in view of the criticism directed against the Department in requesting overtime pay to have officers on hand, but, as will be discussed below, any such problems could have been overcome. Another major underlying factor to attempt to explain the failure of the LAPD to develop a specific plan is that no one expected verdicts of acquittal. This may be true, but it is more a criticism of the lack of intelligence and foresight among those at the top of the Department than an excuse for the lack of planning. Information about expected problems was available and should have been communicated and acted upon within the Department. There 10 • • • • • • • • • • • was widespread feeling among patrol officers that some problems were to be expected, regardless of the nature of the verdicts. While overall acquittals of all officers on all counts but one was not expected, it certainly was expected that regardless of the verdict there would be unhappy citizens or unhappy officers, and it was easy to see that there could have been acquittals on at least some counts. And, as one police officer observed, it didn't take a "rocket scientist" to conclude that there would be trouble if there were any verdicts of acquittal . Other factors contributed to the failure of the Department to develop specific plans, but cannot excuse the failure. In the weeks and months preceding the King verdict, the upper echelons of the Department were in a state of turmoil. There were a number of vacancies of key positions. The Department was in the process of selecting a new Chief of Police, with a number of top Department officials in contention for the position. It has been said that the easiest way to stay out of difficulty during the selection process was to do nothing; unfortunately, this appears to be true in regard to planning. There was also political turmoil involving the Department. The Major and the Chief of Police had apparently not been on speaking terms for months. There was dissension within the City Council with different members 11 • • • • • • • • • • • supporting and attacking the Department. And there is no doubt that the confrontational tactics of Chief Gates contributed to the turmoil ~hat pervaded the upper echelons of the Department . Despite the validity of some of these objections, it was inexcusable for the Department not to have anticipated the potential for violence in the aftermath of the King trial, and not to have developed specific plans for a coordinated response. As the Department's Tactical Manual states: It is essential that the Department prepare plans for controlling emergencies . Such plans should be comprehensive, taking into account foreseeable emergencies, and should state procedures to counter expected problems. Proper and thorough planning provides a strong but flexible framework to facilitate management of emergencies. The failure of the Department to prepare a specific plan for anticipated problems resulting from the outcome of the King trial undoubtedly contributed to the numerous problems encountered by the Department in responding to the disorders, particularly the events that 12 • • • • • • • • • • • took place on the late afternoon and evening of the 29th • As will be discussed below, there were particular difficulties at a Command Post established in the 77th Street area at 54th and Arlington. In a number of other Areas the Standing Plans for the Area permitted area commanders to respond effectively to incidents within the area, but is equally true that the failure to have an overall and specific plan inhibited the Department's response to the disorders. The necessary planning should have involved key personnel within the Department, and agencies outside the Department. At the very minimum, key officials of the Department, the Fire Department, the Sheriff's Office, the Mayor's Office, prosecuting authorities, and other key City and county officials should have met to prepare a coordinated response to any disorders arising out of the verdicts in the King case. Even accepting the views of the Department and others that there were overall general plans for coordinated responses, these same officials, at the very minimum, should have met to discuss implementation of existing plans. The planning process should have encompassed consideration of under what circumstances a Tactical Alert would be called, and at what state the Department was to be mobilized. Deployment of specialized cadre should have been planned for key locations (e.g., 13 • • • • • • • • • • • command posts), and identification of the precise persons to be involved in the coordination among all the agencies responsible for control of civil disorder. Tha planning should have also encompassed changes in the law that may be necessary as a result of disorder (e.g., curfews), when and how a state of emergency was to be declared, provisions for handling arrestees, and related topics . [We need more information concerning the Emergency Operations Organization and the Emergency Operations Master Plan referred to in the Tactical Manual.] Once a specific plan had been developed, or procedures for implementing existing plans put into effect, this information should have been disseminated within . the Department with clear directions from the Chief's Office that the plans be clearly understood by all area commanders, with -specific instructions to discuss the plans with Watch Commanders and other key personnel. Training exercises involving such plans will be discussed below . B. Implementation Of Existing Plans. In that the Department had existing plans for the control of civil disorder, mainly the Tactical Manual and Standing Plans for the Areas, well these plans were implemented must be discussed and evaluated. The failure of the Department to prepare a specific plan for anticipated 14 • • • • • • • • • • • problems resulting from the outcome of the King trial undoubtedly contributed to the numerous problems encountered by the Department in responding to the disorders, particularly the events that took place on the late afternoon and evening of the 29th. Implementation of the Standing Plans at the Area level varied from Area to Area. From what we have been able to learn, implementation of the standing plans in the following Areas preceded without undue difficulty. (To be drafted.] It is also, unfortunately, completely clear that there were major difficulties within other Areas. In particular, there were major difficulties within the 77th street Area, particularly at a Command Post established at 54th and Arlington. Although the Standing Plan for the 77th provided for the establishment of a Command Post at this location, and such a post was established relatively early on the evening of the 29th, there is almost universal agreement among the officers interviewed that this Command Post became in effect a "black hole" swallowing resources and preventing deployment of officers to troubled areas in a timely and efficient manner. Particularly in the early stages, there were serious chain . of command problems with unclear lines of authority, conflicting orders, and general chaos . 15 • • • • • • • • • • • The resulting problems were many faceted . Officers were assigned to the Command Post and reported for duty, but instead of being deployed to control incidents of violence, wasted minutes and hours waiting for orders . Directives were given to respond to particular locations by one official, but the orders were countermanded by other officials. Officers from outside areas were assigned to the Command Post rather than being used to respond to incidents in their own Areas, while officers from other Areas were assigned back to the Areas vacated by those going to the Command Post. As a result, precious time was lost and resources diverted to familiarizing officers from other Areas with the location to which they were assigned . The requirement that officers be assigned to the Command Post for some sort of central dispatch in theory may be appropriate, but the practical result was that Area Commanders were stripped of both their authority and resources necessary to control incidents in their own geographic area • There were also extensive logistical problems in setting up and manning the command post. The command post, an RTD bus station, was initially filled with buses that had to be relocated so that police and other organizations could be accommodated. The lack of proper communications equipment was a particular problem. In theory each Watch 16 • • • • • • • • • • • Commander's car is equipped with a portable Command Post, but in reality the equipment initially available is practically nonexistent. As a result, there was a severe shortage of radios and frequencies. Although telephones were installed at the post, a limited number of land lines were available. Cellular phones were essentially nonexistent, particularly during the key initial hours • These issues are discussed in more detail below. [The difficulties experienced at the 54th and Arlington Command Post appear to be one of the more significant problems faced by the Department in its response to the King disorders. Although we have completed our interviews of Lieutenants Moulin and Haggerty, and Captain Jefferson, three of the key actors at the command post in the early stages, we have yet to interview other police officials for further explanation of the command difficulties at this CP.] (We will also include in this section of our report a description of operations at the Emergency Operations Center and the Communications Center. Interviews of officers in charge at these facilities will be conducted in the near future. The interrelationship between the Command Post at 54th and Arlington and the EOC is of great interest, but we do not yet have the information necessary 17 • • • • • • • • • • • to either describe what happened, or what problems were experienced.] There were other major problems in implementing existing plans. One of the initial steps in the Department's response to civil disorder is the calling of a Tactical Alert. Although the Manual describes in detail the ramifications of calling such an alert, there are no clear guidelines for when an alert is to be called or who can call it. The Manual states that a tactical alert can be called by any officer at any time for any area, but there are no guidelines for the exercise of this discretion. There are also dichotomies between theory and practice. For example, the Manual states that the officer initially calling the alert becomes the commanding officer for response to the particular incident that engendered the alert. Although in theory a lower ranking officer can make the decision to call a tactical alert, and remain in charge after an alert has been called, in practice the presence of a superior officer means that the subordinate defers to the senior person. In such circumstances, no one is really in charge. These and other factors undoubtedly resulted in a delay· in calling a Tactical Alert in the evening on the 29th when the Communications Center finally acted. There were also problems in determining what geographic area was actually covered by the alert. The alert quickly expanded 18 • • • • • • • • • • • to cover the entire City, but by the time a city-wide alert was called, there was already serious and widespread incidents of violence, and matters may well have been out of control by that time . The more difficult issue is when the alert should have been called. As with the issue of the possible provocation involved in the planning process, the premature calling of a Tactical Alert could in and of itself create a disturbance. Nevertheless, at the very minimum a Tactical Alert should have been called the minute the verdicts were handed down in the King case. This is something that advance planning should have covered . The next step up from a Tactical Alert in the · Department's response to civil disorder is mobilization of the Department. Once the mobilization process is ordered, the number of officers available is increased because leaves and other off-duty activities are cancelled, the Department shifts to a two-watch system increasing the number of officers on each watch, and the officers are available for longer periods of time. As with the Tactical Alert, the Manual does not spell out under what circumstances mobilization should be ordered, and who is responsible for so ordering. Proper planning should and could have resolved these issues . 19 • • • • • • • • • • • A Department-wide mobilization was called at approximately 8:00 p.m. on the 29th. Once mobilization had been called, each Area Commander was responsible for making a series of phone calls to off-duty personnel to inform them of the mobilization and give instructions for where to report for duty. Although there were some difficulties, it appears that the mobilization, once ordered, proceeded without undue difficulty. (Again, without having interviews of the top LAPD officials, we do not yet have a fix on the actual effect of calling a Tactical Alert and Mobilization, particularly the actual effects on the command structure. There are also a number of questions remaining as to who is responsible for allocating Department resources once the Department has been mobilized.] [Another unresolved issue is what happened to a cadre of officers that was supposedly trained to command posts? Newspaper articles state that there was such a cadre, but the cadre for whatever reasons, was not mobilized and dispatched to the command centers. Once again, we need to complete the interview of the top LAPD officials in order to answer these and related questions.) [There are also very serious questions of implementation of plans for coordination with other law 20 • • • • • • • • • • enforcement and related agencies. We need to discuss this with the interagency group in order to make appropriate writing assignments.) c. command structure. The LAPD's command structure proved to be afflicted by flawed planning and implementation during the King disorders. Notwithstanding a seemingly clear delineation of command responsibility, the King disorders revealed serious_ problems in the manner in which the LAPD assigns responsibility for and exercises command of major Unusual Occurrences. Confronted with widespread and fast moving disorders in the aftermath of the King verdicts, the LAPD was unable quickly to establish and properly maintain a coherent and efficient chain of command. As discussed more fully below, weaknesses within the LAPD's command structure produced a poor delineation of responsibility for and an inadequate execution of: (1) Command Post operations; (2) the assignment of patrol units and the field task force; (3) EOC activities; (4) coordination with the Mayor's office; (5) coordination with ~ther law enforcement agencies; and (6) logistical support for field operations. Our interviews and review of LAPD's documents, internal interviews and After-Action Reports reflect a Command Staff which was marked by 21 • • • • • • • • • • • indecision and the lack of a central and coherent plan for LAPD's response to these disturbances. Officers and commanders have descr~bed the Command Staff as "paralyzed," subject to "mind freeze" and a "vacuum of leadership." This preliminary report descr~bes the manner in which the LAPD planned for its command structure to operate and a brief analysis of the LAPD's actual operations during the April disturbances The Chain of Command and Command Responsibility For Normal Operations The command structure for standard operations of the LAPD is relatively straight-forward . Department command during normal operations is seated with the Chief of Police. Direction of the day-to-day operations of patrol officers and their commanding officers is placed with the Director of the Office of Operations. The commanding officers of each of the five LAPD Bureaus report directly to the Director of the Office of Operations. In turn, Area Commanding Officers report directly to the Bureau commanding officers. Area commanding officers are normally a Captain-III supported by junior captains, lieutenants, and supervising sergeants • The Community-Based Policing Command Structure 22 • • • • • • • • • • • In January of 1992, the LAPD, at the urging of the Christopher Commission and L.A. City Council, implemented a new community based policing program. That program provided, among other things, for a change in the command structure as it related to seven Area pulled out of the Department's five Bureaus. Those Areas included 77th Street, Harbor, Southeast, Hollenbeck, Northeast, Foothill, and Pacific. The commanding officers for each of these seven Areas were required to report directly to Chief Gates through Commander Rick Dinse . For all practical purposes the command structure relating to what became known as the "Magnificent Seven" was altered dramatically so as to remove the Director of the Office of Operations and the applicable Bureau commanders from the chain of command. Indeed, prior to the King disturbances the "Mag-Seven" reported to Commander Dinse in Chief Gates' Office, but continued to receive training directives from the Office of Operations . This change in the normal chain of command led to repeated questions within the LAPD as to how the command struc~ure was to respond during an Unusual Occurrence . Deputy Chief Hunt repeatedly expressed his frustration and concern about direction of south Bureau Areas (77th Street, Southeast and Harbor) during an Unusual Occurrence. Hunt is reported to have made Staff Meeting inquiries about the 23 • • • • • • • • • • • chain of command on more than one occasion prior to the April riots. Notwithstanding his questions, it was not until 4:30 p.m. on April 29, 1992, when Hunt personally called Chief Gates, that Hunt was able to reclaim control of three of the key Areas from the Community Based Policing command structure. The Command Structure Established By LAPD's Tactical Manual on April 29. 1992 The general theory expressed in the LAPD's Tactical Manual is that the LAPD command structure is not to be altered during an Unusual Occurrence except to the extent that a field task force is established and directed to respond to a specific Unusual Occurrence. There are, of course, various sizes and kinds of Unusual Occurrences. such occurrences arise frequently and are normally dealt with by units and officers assigned within a particular division. The Department's working premise is that those Bureaus or Areas not affected by an Unusual Occurrence will maintain their normal command structure while the Area or Bureau affected will alter its normal command structure only to th~ extent necessary to provide a field task force to address the occurrence. The field task force will theoretically be comprised of those forces necessary to quell the disturbance at hand. If necessary, the field task force will be placed under a field commander and will 24 • • • • • • • • • • establish its command center at an impromptu or predesignated command post, depending on the circumstances. The Department's Tactical Manual dictates that the Chief of Police has the ultimate responsibility for the control of an Unusual Occurrence. The Manual also permits the Chief of Police to designate another staff officer to act as the Department Commander for the duration of the Unusual Occurrence. This discretion is commonly exercised to allow the Chief of Police to continue in his normal functions • The Tactical Manual also directs that: "The Department Commanders shall be in the Emergency Operation Center when the Emergency Control Center is activated. The Department Commander shall maintain communications with the Emergency Control Center when not in the Emergency Operations Center Facility. Unless otherwise directed by the Chief of Police, the Department Commander shall make his own provisions for relief." The Department Commander is responsible for issuing orders to redistribute or mobilize personnel during an Unusual Occurrence. Personnel redistribution and 25 • • • • • • • • • • • mobilization is, according to the Tactical Manual, depended on the magnitude of the Unusual Occurrence. The Department categorizes Unusual Occurrences as follows: 1. Minor -- A minor unusual occurrence is one in which the Department organization and the organizational structure of the area in which the unusual occurrence is occurring remains unchanged. The area of occurrence shall be responsible for policing the event . 2. Serious -- A serious occurrence is one in which a large distribution of personnel may be necessary, therefore, the department organization may be modified temporarily. 3. Major -- A major unusual occurrence is one defined as a mobilization of extensive portions of the department as necessary to control the unusual occurrence. The Department organization shall be modified as required to accomplish the mission. Mobilization is initiated only with the approval of the Department Commander or a Chief Officer acting in his stead . It is thus clear from the Tactical Manual that the Department Commander or a Chief Officer is required to set in motion any modifications in the command structure . 26 • • • • • • • • • The Commanding Officer of the Bureau in which a Unusual Occurrence occurs is to be the Field Task Force Commander unless another staff officer is appointed by the Department Commander. If the Unusual Occurrence encompasses more than one Bureau, the Director of the Office of Operations is required to designate which Bureau commanding officer shall be the Field Task Force Commander. When two or more Unusual Occurrences occur simultaneously, at separate locations, or there is one Unusual Occurrence in which there are two or more separate and distinct tactical areas of activity, the Field Task Force Commander is responsible for directing the activities of the concerned Field Commanders. The Field Task Force Commander may assign any officer from the Field Task Force to the position of Field Commander. The Field Task Force Commander may assume operational command of any or all involved areas, in which case he then assumes the title of Field Commander. When the Field Task Force Commander assumes the operational command as a Field Commander, he is required to notify the Department Commander and all concerned Field Commanders. In such case, the Department Commander may appoint another Field Task Force Commander. The Field Task Force Commander is responsible for evaluating the Field Task Force needs, and coordinating the distribution of resources to the involved areas. He is also responsible for advising the Department commander as to the utilization of available 27 I 1 • • • • • • • • • • • personnel and as to the reassignment of personnel and equipment. The chain of command for the Field Task Force is as follows: (1) Department Commander; (2) Field Task Force Commander; (3) Field Commander; (4) Personnel assigned or present at the scene . The Field Commander, regardless of his rank, is required to have complete authority and responsibility for conducting the Field Task Force operations within his tactical area. The order of succession is the normal order of precedence in which officers assume field command. Thus, the normal order of succession at an Unusual Occurrence, according to the Tactical Manual, is as follows: (1) The Commanding Officer of the area in which the major portion of the unusual occurrence is occurring; (2) The Commanding Officer of the Operations Division in which the major portion of the unusual occurrence exists; (3) The Commanding Officer of the Support Division of the area in which the major portion of the unusual occurrence exists; and (4) The senior police officer at the scene • 28 • • The normal order of succession to field command may be altered by: (1) The appointment of any officer to field command by the Field Task Force Commander; (2) A Field Commander ordering any officer of lesser rank to assume field command; (3) The assumption of command by an officer not • in the normal succession of command, but of a higher rank than the existing Field • • • • • • • Commander; (4) Relief of the Field Commander based on his physical or mental inability to perform his duties . The Tactical Manual specifies that when a serious or major Unusual Occurrence appears imminent, the Commanding Officer of the Operations Division of occurrence, or in his absence, the senior officer of the Operations Division of occurrence, shall assume field command until relieved of such responsibilities by a superior officer, or by the appropriate officer of an ensuing watch. The mere presence of a senior officer at the scene of an Unusual Occurrence does ·not necessarily indicate his assumption of command • The senior officer is supposed to remain in an advisory capacity unless he specifically assumes command. When in such an advisory capacity, senior officers are not supposed 29 • • • • • • • • • • • to issue orders or direct the activities of personnel. An officer of superior rank may assume field command from an existing Field Commander at any time during an Unusual Occurrence. The officer then acting as Field Commander must be specifically informed that he has been relieved of command. All orders or commands within a tactical area of responsibility concerning that event shall originate from the Field Commander or an officer acting under his authority. This is to say that command of the LAPD's response to an Unusual Occurrence is to originate from the Field Commander or an officer acting under his authority and not from a an area or Bureau commander, unless such a Commander is also the Field Commander . A Field Commander's orders or requests may be countermanded only after the countermanding officer has specifically relieved the Field Commander of his command unless the situation requires the change of instructions and time will not allow such assumption. In such cases, the countermanding officer shall as soon as possible, inform the officer issuing the order that it has been countermanded and the reason for that action. A Field Commander shall have access to the full resources of the Department and is to requisition from the emergency control center department personnel and equipment necessary to contain the occurrence 30 • • • • • • • • • • • and prevent injury, loss of life, destruction or loss of property, or the threat of any of these. The Commanding Officer of an area (Bureau or Area} experiencing an Unusual Occurrence has the ultimate responsibility for emergency control operations within the boundaries of that area. During an escalating emergency which has the potential of becoming either a serious or major Unusual Occurrence, the Area Commanding Officer shall go to the scene (or to the Field Command Post, if established} and assume command. If the Unusual Occurrence involves two or more Areas, the person assuming field command shall be determined by mutual agreement of the concerned Commanding Officer or as directed by the Bureau Commanding Officer. During an Unusual Occurrence involving more than one Bureau, assumption of command shall be determined by the concerned Bureau Commanding Officers . Normally, field command will be assumed by the Commanding Officer from the Area/Bureau most effected by the emergency . Area Commanding Officers are responsible for the maintenance and implementation of Area emergency procedures as re~uired, for example, the Area Mobilization Plan and the controlled issuance of equipment and supplies. Watch Commanders are key personnel in co~trolling emergencies; therefore, Commanding Officers are supposed to ensure that 31 • • • • • • • • • • • Area standing Plans are available to Watch Commanders at all times. Upon learning of an Unusual Occurrence, or an emergency having the potential of becoming an Unusual Occurrence, the Watch Commander of the involved area is supposed to designate a supervisory or senior officer as acting Watch Commander and is required to immediately go to the scene, assume command, and establish a Field Command Post. If appropriate, the Watch Commander should implement Area Standing Plans . During the early stages of an Unusual Occurrence {prior to activation of the Emergency Control Center), the Tactical Manual describes it as essential that communications between the Field Command Post and the concerned Area station remain open to facilitate the immediate dispatching of personnel and equipment and to communicate a situation estimate and ·subsequent periodic intelligence reports to the area's acting watch commander . Therefore, a Watch Commander assuming field command is required to establish an open telephone line (when possible) or utilize a tactical frequency to accomplish these operations. During an actual or potential serious or major Unusual Occurrence, the watch commander who has assumed 32 • • • • • • • • • • • field command can be expected to be relieved of that responsibility upon arrival of the concerned Commanding Officer. During a serious or major Unusual Occurrence, the Department Commander evaluates department needs in an involved area. He issues appropriate instructions to ensure a coordinated and effective deployment of personnel and equipment for control of an Unusual Occurrence and policing the remainder of the City. When necessary, he requests law enforcement mutual aid . The Emergency Control Center (ECC) is the Department Command Post and headquarters for the Department Commander during a serious or major Unusual Occurrence or when directed by the Department Commander. Depending on the magnitude of the occurrence and the extent of activation, the ECC is organized with a Commanding Officer, Executive Officer and various other staff officers. When activated the ECC is supposed to coordinate the Department's Emergency Control activities and gather, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence from the Field Command Post, department sources and o~tside agencies . This, in theory, is how the command structure of the Department should have operated during the King 33 • • • I I • I • • • • • • • disorders. Unfortunately, the reality was far different from the theory. Command Structure Failings During The King Verdict Disorders On April 29, LAPD followed the chain of command which had been in effect since January of 1992. As discussed above, this included the standard chain of command save for the Community based Mag-Seven Areas. The investigation to date reveals that there were no Departmental-wide efforts taken to implement a Tactical Alert or otherwise modify the chain of command prior to the announcement of the King verdicts. The only efforts taken by the command staff within the Department or individual bureaus or divisions involved individual decisions by Area Commanders to hold over day watches and to ready the officers on the P.M. watch for potential occurrences. This "preparation" varied in substance and extent from Area to Area . Once the King verdicts were announced, various individual steps were taken within the various Bureaus to prepare the LAPD command structure for Unusual Occurrences . The following are key incidents and actions which had an impact on LAPD's command structure: 34 • • • • • • • • • • • {i) At approximately 3:15 p.m. -- King verdict announced and some divisions decide to hold watches ove:i..·. { ii) 3:55 p.m. -- Chief Gates activates the EOC with minimum staff -- in the words of one officer, the lights and the coffee pot were turned on . {iii) Approximately 4:30 p.m. -- Commander Hunt telephones Chief Gates and asks Gates to release the Mag-Seven Areas of South Bureau to Hunt's command; Gates releases 77th Street, Harbor, and Southeast to Hunt's command . {iv) Approximately 5:05 p.m. -- Chief Hunt conducts a conference call with Southeast, Southwest, and 77th Street Area Commanders . Approximately 5:00 p.m. Mayor Bradley makes public announcement concerning the verdict. {v) Approximately 5:20 p.m. -- Chief Hunt calls 77th and Harbor Commanders. {vi) Approximately 5:30 p.m. - Disturbances at 71st and Normandie; officers need assistance. {vii) Approximately 5:45 p.m. -- Chief Hunt attends meeting at First AME Church • 35 • • • • • • • • • • • (viii) Approximately 6:00 p.m. -- Lieutenant Moulin calls Metro Division for assistance regarding citizens throwing b<)ttles and rocks at Florence and Normandie • (ix) Approximately 6:00 to 6:30 p.m. - Command Post at 54th and Van Ness set up; 77th Station closed off as command center . (x) Approximately 6:55 p.m. -- city-wide tactical alert is called by Communications Division . (xi) Approximately 8:30 p.m. -- Commander Hunt takes command of the Command Post at 54th and Arlington . (xii) Approximately 10:30 p.m. -- Chief Gates arrives at Command Post and directs Hunt and others to establish sectoring . Analysis of Command Structure Operations [Detailed analysis to be provided upon completion of command structure and command post interviews and review of applicable documentation and chronologies. Among other thing~, the analysis will compare the LAPD response with the requirements of LAPD's own Tactical Manual.] D • Training For The control Of civil Disorder. 36 • • • • • • • • • • • Even the best plans for control of civil disorder are of limited utility unless the Department personnel are sufficiently trained to implement the plans, and to conduct operations pursuant to the plans. The Department's own Tactical Manual makes this clear: Training is an essential part of emergency preparedness; therefore, the Department continuously trains its personnel in emergency control functions and tactics. Such training provides a wide base of personnel resources on which to draw for emergency deployment to a major incident . Unfortunately, it does not appear that the · Department followed its own guidelines. Although some limited training of field personnel took place just prior to the date of the verdict in the King case, the lack of training, particularly in setting up and operating Command Posts, inhibited the departmental response to the disorders . As with the issue of the adequacy of the LAPD planning for the control of disorder, there· are similar issue~ in regard to training. There has been some degree of training throughout the Department for control of civil disorder, but as with planning, it is quite clear there was 37 • • • • • • I . • • • • no specific training of command officers in anticipation of disorder resulting from the King verdicts. This is not to say there was no training for control of civil disorders within the Department. All police officers receive some training for the response to Unusual Occurrences at the Police Academy. (We will expand on this training, once we receive the training materials pursuant to our request for documents.] Further training for a response to Unusual Occurrences also takes place at Sergeant's Schools and at instruction for Command Officers. (Again, we need to receive the material before we can ~ comment more on this issue.) There were also training exercises conducted by most Areas within the Department specifically for anticipated problems in the wake of ~he King verdict. At a meeting on April 10 (22?) of Area Commanders, LAPD officials (Vernon?) instructed the Area Commanders to conduct training exercises for control of civil disorder. Commanders were cautioned to be as low key as possible in the course of this training, and if questioned about the training, to state that it was for the purpose of responding to "earthquakes" or other natural disasters . 38 • • • • • • • • • • • Some training at the Area level did take place . Squad tactics and close order drills designed to instruct the officers to work together at a unit were conducted at various watches in the days immediately preceding the verdict; in fact, some of the Areas were conducting this sort of training at the moment the verdict was announced. There was also some minimal "check-outs" of Command Post equipment. It is equally true, however, that this training was of minimal value to the Department in responding to the disorders. Although various crowd control tactics were generally useful in some instances, these tactics were of limited value in responding to instances of looting and arson that typified the violence that ensued after the King verdict . The lack of training was particularly apparent at the command level. The problems with the Department's command structure discussed above could at least have been attenuated by proper training exercises and detailed critiques of such exercises. Written information produced by the Department states that training exercises of this sort have been conducted, and written critiques prepared. A review of these documents, however, as well as information based upon interviews conducted to date, demonstrates that these training exercises were of little or no value, and the 39 - I • • • • • • • • • • • critiques, at best, superficial. The Department, again, appears to have not lived up to its own directives as out in the Tactical Manual: EXERCISING, TESTING, AND EVALUATING RESPONSIBILITIES. To maintain a state of emergency preparedness for all personnel and equipment, and to validate plans and training programs, the Department conducts announced and unannounced exercises, tests, Nd evaluations of emergency control plans, procedures, and tactics . The Tactical Manual describes in detail the command structure for the control of Unusual Occurrences, and assigns specific and detailed responsibilities to various officers up and down the chain of command. In order for such a detailed and complex scheme to operate under emergency conditions, it is necessary that the Department conduct training exercises in accordance with its own Manual to make certain that all those involved in the chain of command for Unusual Occurrences know what they are to do, and have the training to do their job correctly. Training, of course, is not the entire answer. As noted. above, the Department claimed to have a specially trained cadre available for operations at Command Posts. These specially trained officers, however, failed to 40 , . • • • • • • • • • • materialize when needed, and many of the police officers interviewed had never even heard of them. Once special cadres are developed, it is incumbent that information concerning the specialized cadre be disseminated properly within the Department . 41 • • • • • • • • • • E • Problems with Logistics. Shortages of Equipment: In general,the LAPD is "resource deficient," both in terms of equipment and personnel. Among the equipment shortages that were cited by various police officers are: radios, remote out-of-vehicle radios (ROVERS), cellular telephones, police cars and buses, ammunition, tear gas masks, flexible handcuffs, maps, and personal protective equipment such as entry vests and Kevlar helmets. This section of the Report will describe the shortages and the resulting impact on the Department's response. Shortages of (and Status of) Vehicles: Judging from the interviews completed to date, in some areas the shortage of vehicles was real and had negative effects. In the 77th Area, for example, a detective who watched the televised beating of truck driver Denny saw approximately 12 uniformed police officers simply sitting in 77th unable to respond because of the lack of cars. A number of detectives at 77th who also viewed the televised beating wanted to organize a rescue mission, but had no cars in which to respond . . An officer eventually found one police car, and four officers piled into it. Unfortunately, because they were alone and faced with a 42 • • • • • • • • • • • large crowd blocking access to the intersection, they could not get through to the intersection. In Wilshire, a lieutenant cited a lack of cars on April 29th and April 30th. Wilshire normally has 10 cars and, in his opinion, needed 20. Even with four officers in a car, Wilshire did not have enough cars on April 30th • An officer from the Pacific Area noted that especially on the first night of the civil disorders, other Areas, borrowed squad cars and shotguns from Pacific • Consequently, officers sat around after roll call, unable to be deployed because there were not enough squad cars to go around. Officers in other Areas reported similar problems, many of which were the results of holding over prior watches which, in effect, doubled the number of personnel on duty, but not the vehicles available at 54th and Arlington . There were similar shortages at the Command Post. According to one supervisor, even the cars that were available were often not useable because Command Post personnel did not know to whom they belonged. According to this officer, police officers tend to be very territorial, and they wanted to keep the cars in which they reported under their control. However, because these officers were not deployed promptly, some of the cars simply sat around unused. The shortage of cars apparently continued on the 43 • • • • • • • • • • • second night. One officer stated: "I also waited with my squad for over 6 hours on the 2nd night for equipment & vehicles." Even the vehicles that were available were criticized. "It's unfortunate to see that these other agencies (outside responding agencies) have equipment, i.e., cars, guns far more superior to our own." Officers from other agencies even commented on the sad state of LAPD equipment: "I can't believe a big department like LAPD has such old equipment." Other City agencies, for whatever reasons, did not cooperate with the Department in making vehicles available . Communications Equipment: The lack of communications equipment, both at the Command Post and city-wide, was a major problem. As a result, LAPD Areas were unable to communicate with each other or with the Communications Center. In turn Communications, and later the EOC, were similarly unable to communicate with officers in the various Areas. The LAPD's ability to communicate with outside agencies was also r severely compromised by the lack of equipment with sufficient range and frequencies to make this possible. Shortages of ROVERS (portable radios) posed particular problems. In some instances, this equipment left with a 44 •• • • • • • • • • • • departing officer at the end of the watch and thus was not available for further use. The effect of the shortage was summed up by one Newton offic~r who stated that "communicating by semaphore flags" would have been more effective than using the equipment that was available. The LAPD also needs additional radio frequencies to allow communications among various Areas. A Foothill officer, arguing the need for more than one frequency, stated that during the demonstrations in Foothill, he had to run outside to find officers because he could not communicate by radio. Each officer should have a multiple frequency ROVER available for civil disturbances . One solution to the lack of portable communications equipment is for the Department to purchase and have available for use cellular telephones. Although some phones were available, this simple step could alleviate some of the most severe shortages of communication equipment . Command Post Communications Shortages: The Command Post at 54th and Arlington had especially severe shortages of equipment on the night of April 29th. When a captain arrived to establish the Command Post, there was, in effect, nothing there. Although he asked for an Emergency Response Vehicle, which comes 45 • • • • • • • • • • • equipped with at least a computer and Tactical Manual, this was not provided. The logistical needs included telephones, a television, a stable place in which to work, and a process for evaluating and acting on information . The Command Post initially had only five means of communication: two cellular phones, two radio frequencies {base frequency and tactical frequency), and one runner who used an RTD telephone. The Captain in charge could not communicate with Metro cars, because their radios were on a frequency he could not monitor. As a result, he did not find out until after the fact that Metro units never were able to carry out instructions to reach the intersection of Florence and Normandie. The Captain also received the same reports of crimes in progress three or four times, but because of conflicting sources and inability to depend upon one clear communication source, he never knew if the information related to the same incident or to different incidents • Poor communications equipment at the Command Post also prevented the Communications Division from calling the Command Post became available when lines were jammed. This problem remained until mobile phones arrived three days later. As one officer stated, "The ability to contact the Command Post in the early stages of the U.O. was very 46 • • • • • • • • • • • difficult -- few phone lines -- always busy -- or no answer." Requests were made to the Communications Area and later to EOC for additional officers and communications equipment, but the attitude was "It's yo~r problem, handle it." Communications Control Center: The communications equipment available at the Communications Area Control Center also was inadequate to handle the volume of calls and to deploy officers in response to emergency calls. The Communications Center is equipped with 51 telephone lines in a computerized console . There are 36 lines to handle 911 calls, broken down into 18 level I and 18 level II lines. Four lines are dedicated to Spanish-speaking calls. A console for each Area shows how officers have been dispatched in response to each call. The Communications Center is equipped with a depletion chart which prioritizes the Areas from which officers should be transferred to assist another Area whose personnel resources have been exhausted. For example, if 77th can no longer respond to a crisis because all its units have been deployed, the console's depletion chart would indicate which neighboring Areas should be called in, and in what order. On the night of April 29th, however, the Center 47 • • • • • • • • • • • console became completely backed up, calls were stacked up on computer screens, and the Communications Center was unable to respond or to send officers to respond to the calls. In essence, the Communications Center went into "meltdown" and stopped functioning. At that point, LAPD could not even communicate with the Fire Department because the two agencies' mutual 911 lines were backed up . Once the EOC took over as the coordinating unit, officers in order to communicate opened the doors between the Communications Center and other LAPD and Fire Department offices in order to permit the LAPD and the Fire Department to speak with one another . Communications With Other Agencies: Because of the inadequacy of communications equipment -- both in quantity and quality -- the Department experienced major problems in communicating with other agencies. The LAPD's equipment does not include frequencies which are compatible with those used by outside agencies . Under the Mutual Aid Plan, the LAPD must have the same frequencies as other agencies in order for the plan to work. (Commander Dinse said that LAPD is now obtaining radios with channels which will enable LAPD to communicate with other agencies.) Alternative Use of Force Equipment: 48 • • • • • • • • • • • The interviews completed to date have yielded some information on other weapons which might be needed in the future to control civil disorders. The subject most discussed was the LAPD's inability to even consider use tear gas because of the lack of gas masks. In Newton, for example, there were only 15 gas masks in the station. Another practical problem is that tear gas can only be used when authorized by a Commander. Considering the communications problems faced in any emergency, requiring an officer with the rank of Commander or above to authorize tear gas in effect guarantees that tear gas will not be used. One captain interviewed stated that other agencies have experimented with and approved the use of intermediate force options such as water cannons, rubber bullets, plexiglass shields, etc., in controlling civil disturbances . He felt that the LAPD has not considered these alternatives because, in part, of the LAPD attitude that, "If we didn't invent it, we will not use it." As it is, officers have a limited number of choices when facing civil unrest. They can do nothing (retreat), use their batons, or use deadly force~ Several officers interviewed stated that they were very confused as to what level of force the department considered acceptable during civil disturbances. They believe that since the Rodney King incident, use of force 49 • • • • • • • • • • • has been a topic that no one wants to discuss. They are seeking guidance, leadership, and training. Obviously, the use of alternative tactics and weapons requires considerable training . Other Equipment Shortages: Some officers reported a shortage of ammunition, particularly in the early days of the disorders. One captain stated that he actually had to buy ammunition for his officers from local gun shops. Another officer from the 77th stated that officers were short of ammunition until it was obtained from the police academy on May 1st, the third day of the civil disturbance . Lack of food (sometimes also expressed as lack of good food) for the large number of officers working long hours at the Command Post or at other assignments was an additional problem. The City's General Services Department has a contract to provide LAPD with necessary food under these circumstances, but the requested food was not delivered. Eventually, thanks to the efforts of one officer who used his own contacts to obtain food, the officers at the Command Post were fed • In some instances, citizens donated food to officers. For example, when the communities served by Wilshire and Foothill learned that lack of food was a 50 • • • • • • • • • • • problem, community members donated food to both stations . Foothill in turn sent some of its food to the main Command Post. Personnel Shortages: The LAPD does not have enough officers to handle a civil disturbance or other emergency situation. That is the conclusion of officers from every rank and every Area interviewed to date. A lieutenant in Wilshire concurred that a major problem on April 29th was lack of personnel. He sent officers to "hot spots" and then had to recall them because he needed them more for the latest breaking "hot spots." In short, there were not enough officers to secure areas, which allowed looters to return at will. This shortage of officers lasted all through the night on April 30th, with a resulting inability to secure locations. In particular, the Command Post needed additional personnel. The Command Post supervisor on April 29th requested 200 officers, but did not receive them at that time. In addition, even though there were supposed to be almost 100 officers trained in Command Post operations, no one in charge at the Command Post knew who they were or how to locate them when the civil disturbances hit . 51 • • • • • • • • • • • Even when officers later became available at the Command Post, the process of filling out Unusual Occurrence (U.O.) cards contributed to long waits before they could be deployed. One captain said: "Our u.o. Card System has been in use for decades and is archaic. The personal function should be automated. The use of magnetic strips on the back of ID cards would be helpful." G. Problems in Handling of Arrestees. The normal procedure for handling of arrestees at the division level is still being researched. However, it is clear that it is the responsibility of the Detective Division to process arrestees brought into the station by arresting officers. Detectives are assigned this duty because of their familiarity with felony and misdemeanor filing standards and are qualified to review the arrest and crime reports and assist the arresting officer with any remaining duties. He or she also interviews the arrestee. The arrestee is then taken into the station jail where he is physically booked. At this point, the jailer uses the Decentralized automated booking Information System (DABIS) to obtain from the Sheriff's Department the booking number which will follow the arrestee throughout the county criminal justice system • 52 • • • • • • • • • • Most divisions used field jails during the King disorders. Field jail procedures, however, were not intended to process the quality and variety of arrests made during the initial states of the civil disturbance. They were designed primarily to handle misdemeanor bookings such as might occur after a large demonstration. They were not desired for mass felony bookings, although almost half of those arrested during the civil disturbance were, in fact, booked as felony arrestees. There were special problems at Rampart because Rampart was designated as a female jail facility, but immediately had to be converted to a male jail. Because female jailers could not staff a mail jail alone, they had to receive backup from, or be replaced by, male officers which caused a temporary backlog. In addition, the computer (DABIS) became overloaded and could not process the arrestees quickly enough. This caused a logjam of arresting officers who could not leave to return to the field until their arrestees were processed . One Rampart officer stated that because there were not e~ough buses available to transport arrestees to County Jail, the arrestees had to be transported in cars. This was an inefficient use of police vehicles. Several officers recommended that instead of using detectives to handle the 53 1 . • • • • • • • • • • field jail during civil disturbances, reserves should be used to staff the field jail. Some divisions, which had fewer arrestees, functioned quite well under the field jail arrangement . Wilshire organized a field jail at the Wilshire Command Post. The arrestees were transported to county jail without major incidents or problems . The field command post structure provided for field jail units to be under the personnel function. During the civil disturbance, however, personnel were unable to properly coordinate multiple field jail operations because of the other demands upon its staff . Delays occurred in processing arrestees at several stations, including the following: Arresting officers who were not familiar with the field jail concept failed to identify suspects and to properly complete reports . Field jails were inadequately staffed in relation to the number of arrestees processed . Blocks of Unusual Occurrence Booking Numbers: 54 • • • • • • • • • • • Booking numbers were not readily available through records and identification division. Therefore, arrestees who were booked were processed through the Decentralized Automated Booking Information System (DABIS). However, DABIS was not intended to process large numbers of arrestees. The number of terminals available for processing arrestees was limited, which caused major delays and a concern for the security of the large number of arrestees . Accurate accounting and training of Unusual Occurrences related arrests was difficult because divisions failed to request and use Unusual Occurrence booking numbers . Additional problems included delays caused by the need for fingerprinting and booking of physical evidence . These problems caused subsequent problems in filing and prosecuting cases. [Processing the arrestees from county jail to court, however, is a Sheriff's Department 55 I • • • • • • • • • • • function. Therefore, the discussion of the impact of booking procedures upon case prosecution should probably be handled by the Inter-Ag€ncy Team, which has already interviewed representatives from the District Attorney's Office.) One recommendation is that a committee be formed to study procedures, training, and operations in field jail facilities, including use of civilian employees, improving transportation of arrestees, integrating LAPD processing systems with Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department systems, and expanding training in field jail procedures. F • Problems With Information/Intelligence. An obvious question is why the Los Angeles Police Department seemed to be so unprepared for what happened after the announcement of the verdict. Common sense would have indicated that if any of the verdicts returned was an acquittal, there was a considerable likelihood that disturbances could occur. It appears that this verdict was so unexpected to the Department's command structure that there was no attempt to prepare for the possibility of a not guilty verdict . One of the fundamental elements of preparation is to gather intelligence or information as to what might happen, where it could happen, and who could be the cause of 56 • • • • • • • • • • • any problems. It is clear, however, from the interviews conducted with Department personnel, and a review of documents prepared at the time and those prepared at the request of the Special Advisor, that the Department did not conduct any formal or organized intelligence or information gathering prior to the announcement of the jury verdict in the King case • Although the Department has units specifically assigned to the gathering of intelligence, these sections did not conducted any operations or assessments to determine the extent of disorder that might occur. The Gang Intelligence Section stated that due to mandated personnel depletion of the section, no information concerning anticipated gang activity resulting from the King verdict was requested of gathered. Other sections, including CRASH, were not requested or ordered to obtain any information . The Department also obtains intelligence from sources other than the sections specifically assigned to intelligence gathering. Information is obtained from the contact of the uniformed officers with the public, from contact with community leaders, informants, unsolicited information provided by citizens and others, and from other law enforcement departments. From whatever source the information could have been obtained, there was no organized effort on the part of 57 • • • • • • • • • • • the Department to either obtain or accumulate and disseminate any intelligence regarding the possible consequences of a King verdict. There are some indications that while some members of the Department, primarily those who were assigned to patrol duty and a few Command Officers, were concerned that there might be trouble following the verdict, this was not acted upon by the Department. A Metro unit, for example, held a training session at which personnel from each Area expressed their opinions that following the verdict there could be trouble, and that each Area would be on its own. Even this information was discounted by most of those in the Department. Intelligence and information were gathered once the disturbances began. In some areas undercover officers were sent into neighborhoods where disturbances were occurring and infiltrated and observed various demonstrations and activities and were able to keep Watch Commanders advised of ongoing events. But there did not seem to be any coordination to this effort, and many Area Commanders and personnel expressed the view that information coming from downtown was slow in coming and sporadic at best • One of the primary elements of preparation for any type of civil disturbance is accurate intelligence or information. The Department did not attempt to obtain any 58 • • • • • • • • • • such information, and this lack of preparation contributed to the Department's inability to respond quickly and forcefully to the events that occurred after the announcement of the verdict . H. Impact Of the Media. The video tape of the beating of Rodney King was shown on television numerous times in the year before the beginning of the trial. Further, for the first time in the history of Los Angeles, an entire criminal trial was televised live on a local television station. This coverage also included commentary from local legal experts as to significance and meaning of the testimony and other events that occurred in the courtroom. This unprecedented coverage, coupled with the daily newspaper stories and other local media coverage, and the controversy surrounding the sentencing of a Korean shop owner in killing of the Black teenager, further heightened the interest in the King verdict . The reading of the verdicts was covered live and was immediately followed by statements of condemnation of the verdict by various officials including the Mayor of Los Angeles. Once disturbances began, television helicopters and mobile units began to cover the disturbances. As the number and severity of the disturbances increased, · local 59 • • • • • I I • • • • • • • television and radio began exclusively to cover what was happening in the City. What became increasingly clear from this extensive coverage was that the Department was either unable or unwilling to control what was happening. The scenes at the Command Post which projected a scene of confusion, disarray, and lack of purpose contributed to this view. The scenes of people being pulled from their cars and beaten without a police officer in sight increased the belief that the City was out of control. These scenes were followed by coverage of fires in the vicinity of the main police administration building, Parker Center, further reinforcing the image of a City in chaos. This coverage continued the next day with scenes of looting with uniformed police officers either standing by doing nothing or directing traffic. This further reinforced the view that the police were impotent and the City was ripe for taking. Interviews with citizens of Los Angeles during the disturbances demonstrated the effect the media coverage. Again and again it was repeated that they were home watching television and what they saw caused them to leave their homes to get involved in the looting and stealing -- or to help someone they saw being victimized . 60 • • • • • • • • • • • In a free society, the media cannot and should not be controlled even for the most beneficial of purposes. The Department could attempt to establish a procedure or protocol for an exchange of information with the media in an attempt to prevent the spreading of incorrect information and toutilize the information obtained by the media. There many pitfalls and problems to this approach but it could at least be explored. I • could The Disorders Be Controlled? Could the Department have controlled the disturbances with perfect planning, training, and execution of the plans in a city as diverse and as large as Los Angeles? In the context of the factors that existed in this City at the time, the answer is probably NO. The events of the preceding year, the selection of a new police chief, the failure of Chief Gates to fill vital command positions in the Department, the blurring of the chain of command in the South Bureau, the unrelentless media pressure on the Department and the corresponding lack of morale, the budgetary process of the City which places the Department's budget at the mercy of the bureaucracy and politicians, and the resulting decline in the infrastructure of the · Department prohibited the Department's ability to prepare for and respond to the events that occurred . CL922000.009 61 • • • • • • • • • • • TO: l'RON: RI:: OFFICE OF THE SPECTAL ADVISOR TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS CITY OF Los ANGELES July 15, 1992 Audrey B. Collins General Counse~ / Don M. Tamura# Counsel ' PRIVILEGED AND ATTORNEY CONFIDENTIAL WORE PRODUCT Synopsis of Activities at Rampart Division, Los Angeles Police Department, During Civil Disorder of April 1992 Factual synopsis Prior to April 29, 1992, Rampart Division had conducted crowd control training in anticipation of May Day demonstrations conducted by the Revolutionary Communist Party. About a week prior to the verdicts, Metro Division held a briefing, which was attended by Sergeant Diaz of Rampart, that outlined the possibility of civil unrest in the city. On the day of the verdicts, Captain Wemmer was at Command School in Ventura, . and Captain Deal was on day watch. It was the opinion of most rank and-file officers and supervisors at Rampart that any unrest would not occur in Rampart Division after the verdicts. On April 29th, a notification was sent to the Watch Commander that the verdicts would be handed down in the afternoon. After the verdicts were read, the supervisors at Rampart made the decision to hold over the day watch. After consulting with Central Bureau, the day watch was released. Captain Wemmer came into the station that evening and began organizing the mobilization. He set up a Tactical Operations Center in the Watch Commander's office. That first evening, Rampart officers were sent to Parker Center to assist in quelling the disturbance there. Rampart Division itself was relatively calm the first night, and there was an adequate number of officers to monitor the division, even though some had been sent to assist the South Bureau. Because some day watch officers were held over to B watch on the first night, there was a larger number of officers on B watch as compared to A watch. When A watch began the morning of April 30th, they were already short officers. Twenty officers were sent to South Bureau, which left only four squads to cover the four sectors of Rampart . Widespread • • • • • • • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT looting began on the day of the 30th, primarily near the Third and Vermont areas. Captain Deal set up a Command Post near Third and Vermont, but did not have communication equipment to have direct contact with the station. Because of the lack of manpower, Rampart officers were unable to stop any of the looting or make mass arrests. Fires broke out as the day wore on. As night began to fall, shooting incidents involving officers and homicides increased. That evening, there were four homicides, including one of a storeowner. A limited curfew was in place the night of the 30th, but looting and arsons continued throughout the night. It was not until the next day, when the National Guard was in place, that order began to be restored. By that time, large numbers of arrests were being made, although most were still being transported by individual patrol units. By the night of the city wide curfew on Friday, May 1st, Rampart Division was calm and the _fires had stopped . Adeguacy of LAPP Plans for Control of Civil Disorder Rampart Division had adequate access to the standing plans of LAPD and had conducted training on numerous occasions regarding its implementation. Most of that had been done in preparation of demonstrations by Operation Rescue and the Revolutionary Communist Party. Captain Deal suggested that the plan include instructions on what role LAPD would have in escorting fire crews to fires in a civil disorder situation. Officer Scurria said that there had been a plan devised by one of the rank-and-file officers to deal with sniper attacks on the station, but that this had been ignored by the supervisors . Implementation of Plans The key problem in the implementation of any plan at Rampart was the imbalance of officers between the A and B watches. In addition, the deployment of Rampart officers to the South Bureau only served to further deplete the ranks of patrol officers. The imbalance essentially left the day watch with so few officers that arrests were impossible. While plans called for the use of the detectives in Rampart for field jail and station security duties, many of the officers felt that some of those officers could have been used in the field. The creation of a Command Post at Third and Vermont was not a part of any plan. PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT 2 • • • • • • • • • • command structure PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT One of the chief complaints of the command structure organization during the riots was the necessity of Central Bureau within the organizational structure. Requests to the EOC were made through the Central Bureau. This created a layer of bureaucracy that had a direct impact upon the operation of Rampart Division during the riots. Some examples of problems were the snafus regarding who would provide food for officers and deployment of too large a number of officers to Rampart for them to handle. On the divisional level, both Captains were in the field during their watches. Because of the inadequacy of their communications with the station, their effectiveness was diminished. Captain Deal's decision to create a Command Post with a minuscule staff was probably an error. Training for the control of Civil Disorder From all comments received, Rampart appears to be one of the best trained divisions within LAPD. Individual officers apparently get more practical and hands-on training at Rampart. A training cadre was in place and operating at Rampart prior to the riots. Captain Wemmer suggested that the type of program Rampart had should be instituted department-wide. He felt that other officers from other divisions were not trained in the basics of crowd control. Much of Rampart's training was done at Lopez Canyon and the Ambassador Hotel to familiarize officers with the problems they would encounter in various situations. Even with this training, however, Rampart was unable to handle the widespread unrest within its boundaries . Problems with Logistics There was clearly a lack of communications equipment within Rampart Division. The fact that during normal watch shifts officers would have to wait until others returned from the field to get rovers shows the extent of the problem. On April 30th, Captain Deal did not have direct contact with the station so phone communications were routed through the Ralphs grocery store next to the Command Post. The lack of cars was evident. For example, when the squad that Officer Gonzales was in was shot at, one car was disabled and the officers had to wait until another car was dispatched. Busses were not used to make mass arrests, although PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT 3 • • • • • • • • • • • PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT they appeared to be available. Ammunition was adequate, mainly because arrangements had been made with local gun shops to supply the division in case they ran low. One officer complained that many officers had other personal weapons in their cars at the station, but that they were not allowed to use them because of a command decision made by Central Bureau. This observation is made in light of the fact that Lt. Fletcher indicated that there were not enough shotguns for all officers. Problems with Information/Intelligence Officer Scurria indicated that most of the patrol officers knew there would be trouble even before the verdicts were handed down. This, coupled with the briefing held by Metro Division immediately prior to the verdicts, indicates that Rampart had a fairly good idea that there would be unrest. Intelligence within Rampart Division, however, was meager at best because the demographic nature of the division prevented any useful information from being garnered by officers within the division. There was no problem with gathering intelligence, but the division itself yielded little information on the possibility of civil unrest. Problems in Handling of Arrestees The chief problem in the booking of arrestees was the lack of DABIS machines and personnel who could adequately handle them. One suggestion made was to use Sheriff's personnel, who have a better familiarity with the booking process, run a field jail. Clearly, busses or other large vehicles should have been used to transport arrestees. The use of individual police units to transport arrestees created two problems. First, squads were split up and effectively disengaged from patrol effectiveness. Second, officers transporting arrestees were not always the arresting officers, creating problems in filing cases based on the arrests . Impact of Financial constraints It is unclear whether lack of financing directly contributed to the inability of LAPD to control the civil unrest. Officers and command personnel at Rampart universally believe that more money should be spent on equipment and communications devices. The inadequacy of communications equipment, however, had little to do PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTtAL ATTORNEY WORJ PRODUCT 4 • • • • • • • • • • • PR+Y+LEGED AND CQNf+DENT+AL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT with mistakes or inaction on the part of commanders and supervisors. Captain Wemmer felt that the failure to provide for paid overtime in case the riots broke out put LAPD at a disadvantage since manpower requirements could not be beefed up . Attitude of the LAPP One officer said that the attitude that LAPD did not need help in doing its job was an inhibiting factor in dealing with the riots. At Rampart Division there is a very wide schism between the views of the rank-and-file patrol officers and views of management . Some of the Rampart patrol officers feel that management evinced an inability to make command decisions during the rioting. Furthermore, some officers believe that some decisions actually endangered the lives of police officers. For example, the stationing of officers on the Rampart station roof without radios and in very visible posts left them in a very precarious position . It is the view of some of the patrol personnel that people from the Captain level on up were unwilling to take charge of the situation or take a proactive stance. Other Issues The feeling is universal throughout Rampart Division that· the Mayor and the City Council encouraged the civil unrest by statements made after the verdicts. Moreover, every officer, without exception, felt the media fueled the rioting by showing the inability of LAPD to maintain control of the unrest and by creating an atmosphere which encouraged lawlessness . PR+Y+LEGED AND CONF+DENT+AL ATTORNEY WORJS'. PRODUCT 5 • • • • • • • • • • • TO: FROM: OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS CITY OF LOS ANGELES Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work Product July 20, 1992 Richard J. Stone General Counsel and Staff Director Elizabeth D. Lear Deputy General Counsel RE: LAPD Resource Analysis I. OVERVIEW Based on interviews conducted to date, the general consensus seems to be that, while there are deficiencies in some of the LAPD's resources, the real shortcomings in the LAPD's response to the civil disorder in April 1992 were in the training, deployment, and management of existing resources. While there is agreement that questions should focus on what resources were available and whether the resources were sufficient, the consensus seems to be that it _is more important to focus on the internal command structure of the LAPD and its management decisions. Did the LAPD do the best it could with what it had? While those interviewed agreed that the LAPD could always use additional officers, they seemed to conclude that just • • • • • • • • • • • adding additional officers to the police force would not necessarily improve the LAPD's ability to respond during unusual occurrences. The biggest problem during the events of April 1992, they have indicated, was the lack of planning and training for an unusual occurrence. The LAPD had people doing jobs that they were not trained to do, and as a result, the Department was not deploying its existing resources effectively. In addition, the crumbling infrastructure within the Department is thought to have played a significant role in the Department's inability to perform adequately . II. ARE THERE SHORTAGES OF PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, OR OTHER RESOURCES THAT PREVENT THE LAPD FROM ADEQUATELY RESPONDING TO UNUSUAL OCCURRENCES? A. PERSONNEL In recent years, no matter how serious the deficiencies in the LAPD's infrastructure became, there was a school of thought that the first priority was more officers, and a second, more distant, priority was more support for the Department's infrastructure. There was political support within the Mayor's Office and the City Council for more officers, but it was not as politically appealing to provide funding to re-build the Department's infrastructure. As a result, the City Council established the Seven-Minute Response Time/40 Percent Proactive Patrol Program as an ideal for police response to citizen needs . - 2 - • • • • • • • • • • • Those interviewed have indicated that the seven-minute response time standard is the key standard that affects the level of staffing. This standard requires a level of staffing that assures response by the LAPD to all calls for service that are Code 2 and higher within an average of seven minutes. The Department met this seven-minute standard at one point, but has since fallen behind. The 40 percent proactive patrol standard requires that 40 percent of officer time is spent on crime prevention. The Department has never met this standard. In an attempt to support these goals, from 1987 to 1990, there was a "contest" between the Mayor's Office and the City Council to see who could give the LAPD the most police officers. As a result, the Department increased its force from approximately 7,100 sworn officers to approximately 8,300 sworn officers in two and one-half years. 1 During this period, the LAPD was adding more officers than the Department could absorb, and the infrastructure fell further behind . The Department stretched itself to the limit with large Academy classes and insufficient qualified instructors, resulting in inadequate training for the recruits. In addition, the LAPD rushed to quickly deploy the new officers into the field without an infrastructure that could support additional officers. Not only must each new officer be provided with, among other things, Sworn staffing within the LAPD is currently less than 7,900. The authorized level for sworn staff is 8,417; at its peak, sworn staffing in the Department was at 8,332 . - 3 - • • • • • • • • • • • a uniform, weapons, and a vehicle, certain incremental additions to all Department support functions, such as communications, are required in order for each additional officer to effectivP-ly and adequately perform his or her job. As an example of the potential impact on the infrastructure of adding additional officers, it has been predicted that if the 1,000 additional officers proposed to be added as a result of an upcoming ballot initiative were ready to roll tomorrow, it would "blow the existing communications system out of the water." 1 • Planning and Training While some of those interviewed have indicated that the LAPD does not plan or budget for unusual events (described as events which may occur every 15 years), others have cited provisions for emergency operations in the 1992-93 budget, 2 and have asked whether the available resources were managed well. The most important thing, those interviewed have said, going forward, is for the Department to plan for unusual occurrences and to provide special training to a unit whose primary duty is to move in at the very beginning of an unusual occurrence and establish a command post and communications. This, they said, is more important than adding additional communications equipment or personnel, and is a particularly critical need in unusual situations which occur simultaneously in multiple locations 2 See Page 10 of the Mayor's Budget for 1992-93. (The City Budget, as adopted by the City Council, has not yet been printed.) - 4 - • • • • • • • • • • • throughout the City. Where there is not just one field commander, but as many as four (as there were during the events of April 1992) competing for resources, it is essential that there be adequately trained personnel in place to deploy personnel and equipment in a timely and effective manner. These issues need to be explored more fully. 2 • Deployment Deployment of personnel within the LAPD does not work very well, those interviewed said, but they indicated that deployment could work well with the addition of some very inexpensive computers. The observation has been made that while the LAPD may be spread thin with respect to the absolute number of officers on the street, the only way the Department can function well is to be on the cutting edge technologically. According to those interviewed, this will require a significant upgrade in the capabilities of the Department's infrastructure . Those interviewed also said that a change in the Department philosophy as to assignments of sworn personnel would result in more effective deployment of existing resources. Of the less than 7,900 officers in the LAPD, only approximately 4,000 are uniformed officers. It has been suggested that this is a result of Former Chief Daryl Gates' preference for special task forces; as a result, personnel were moved from black and whites to specialized units . - 5 - • • • • • • • • • • • Of the approximately 4,000 uniformed officers, a significant number are on restricted duty. These restrictions affect the jobs to which these officers can be assigned, and as a result, limit the Department's ability to deploy adequate numbers of officers onto the streets. In addition, due to the current City hiring freeze and unwillingness on the part of the City Council to add money to the budget to increase the number of civilians in the Department support staff, there are currently a number of sworn officers in support positions that could otherwise be staffed by civilians. Actual deployment figures for the approximately 7,900 sworn personnel need to be assessed more fully. In addition, LAPD overtime liability, as well as total overtime booked historically, needs to be explored on a division by division basis. This booked time already exceeds $45 million, not including $20 million in overtime related to the events of April 1992 . Finally, it has been suggested that the deployment schedule for sworn personnel should have a built-in allowance for training time. For example, if an officer were to work three 12 1/2-hour days or four 9-hour days, this would allow for the accumulation of one to two days per month for training purposes. This and other possible deployment alternatives need to be explored more fully • - 6 - • • • • • • • • • • • B. VEHICLES There appears to be a consensus among those interviewed that there is no shortage of police vehicles, but that during the events of April 1992, the existing fleet of vehicles was not deployed in the right places to be effective. While not all, or even a majority, of the LAPD's vehicle fleet consists of black and white cars, it is believed that there are a sufficient number of cars, that if effectively deployed, would be adequate to handle unusual situations, such as what occurred in April 1992. Current budgeted LAPD vehicles include 925 black and white cars and 1,636 unmarked or plain cars. 3 Of the total number of budgeted cars, 830 cars are authorized for home garaging. Availability of 94% to 95% of the vehicle fleet is maintained at all times. It has been said that the operating policies and philosophies within the LAPD, including the number of specialized operations, affect the ratio of black and white cars to plain cars within the LAPD vehicle fleet. Department operating policies and philosophies with regard to deployment of personnel also necessarily have an impact on deployment of vehicles. Vehicles are not budgeted for full-mobilization, or for response to certain types of calls. As a result, there are only 3 The LAPD vehicle fleet also includes 434 motorcycles and 247 miscellaneous trucks and buses, as well as 110 Narcotics Seized Vehicles and 120 Hold Harmless Vehicles. (Based on LAPD Motor Transport Division statistics.) - 7 - • • • • • • • • • • • approximately 150 to 180 cars routinely deployed on the streets at any given time. Nevertheless, all cars, whether marked or plain, should be available for use during an unusual situation. With regard to the Department's response during the events of April 1992, however, those interviewed have cited the following examples of ineffective deployment of what they believe to be an adequate number of cars. First, it has been suggested that there may have been a breakdown in the recall and re deployment of the 830 cars designated for home-garaging. In addition, those interviewed have indicated that the EOC ordered that cars be rented for the CHP, who was providing escort service to the Fire Department, instead of deploying LAPD vehicles. c. LAPD INFRASTRUCTURE Those interviewed have indicated that the infrastructure within the LAPD is so over-stressed that any one or more of its functions, including, among other things, communications, scientific investigations, and various support staff functions, could "crash" at any moment. It is predicted that even if people had performed properly during the events of April 1992, there still would have been an inability to adequately deal with the events, due to the seriously declining state of the Department's infrastructure • - 8 - • • • • • • • • • • • 1. communications The observation has been made that about ten years ago, the LAPD was on the cutting edge technologically, when the Rover Command System and the Emergency Command Control and Communications System (ECCCS) were implemented. When the existing communications system was installed, it was the state of-the-art and thought to be the best system of its kind in the country. However, now, it is obsolete . The current communications system was purchased in 1981, using the proceeds from a $41 million bond issue. While the equipment has a four to five-year life span, by the time of purchase, the radios that were designed for use with the system were already obsolete. Those interviewed have indicated that all of the LAPD's equipment, not just the Department's communications equipment, is used longer than it should be, and this increases the demands put on Department personnel. A new communications system would be so costly that funding for such a system is handled separately from the LAPD's operations budget. The City does not have sufficient funds to replace the existing system, and the voters have twice rejected a proposed bond issue to raise money for a more modern system. However, a new proposal will be placed on the November ballot. Those interviewed within the LAPD have indicated that unless funding for this radio "backbone" of transmitters and other equipment can be obtained, additional equipment needed by the Department, such as rovers, or hand-held radios, ultimately will - 9 - • • • • • • • • • • • be useless in improving the Department's communications capabilities. In recent years, however, the City Council has approved purchases of replacement hand-held radios 4 and new mobile phones for commanding officers. In addition, funding has been made available for the first batch of replacements for the Mobile Digital Terminals (MDTs), as well as for repairs of the current communications system. It is said, however, that the LAPD has a tendency to push specifications to the state-of-the-art, resulting in long procurement lead-times. For example, currently, the LAPD has authority to purchase $8 million in radios from Motorola. These radios are approximately 18 months away from completion, and are currently in the design stage in a process that started three or four years ago. Historically, these long lead-times have not been factored into the LAPD budget process, resulting in significant delays in procurement. 5 4 There is a replacement program in place for rovers (hand held radios), under which about 1,500 rovers will be replaced each year (out of the current budget), up to 7,000 replacements . The new rovers are supposed to be compatible with a future communications system and with the 39 new FCC channels allocated to the Department. The replacement program began in the 1990-91 budget, but was delayed until 1991-92 because the LAPD was not ready to proceed. Additional funds ($5.7 million) are provided for in the 1992-93 budget for the Department of General Services to purchase new and replacement communications equipment items. 5 Nevertheless, during the events of April 1992, the LAPD did purchase, directly from the manufacturer, $100,000 in hand held radios that are compatible with the existing communications system . - 10 - • • • • • • • • • • • While saying that the LAPD does not have communications equipment and frequencies necessary to do the job, and that the Department has not had the necessary equipment for a long time, those responsible for communications are equally concerned that there is no communications planning for unusual occurrences. For example, it has been suggested that there needs to be some thought given ahead of time to the fact that there are locations throughout the City that the LAPD uses for command posts on a repetitive basis. There are locations, like the Coliseum, that the Department has used over and over again during civil disturbances and other unusual events. During the events of April 1992, the LAPD had to wait for General Services to run temporary communications wires to the Coliseum, once the command post was moved to that location. Why do these locations not have telephone lines hard-wired for LAPD use? 2. Other Equipment and support Functions Other Department equipment is also said to be in a serious state of disrepair. The existing vehicle fleet includes numerous vehicles which need to be replaced. More than half of the total Department fleet of black and whites has travelled over 100,000 miles; approximately 300 of the Department's plain cars have also travelled over 100,000 miles. Those interviewed also have indicated that even if the tactical decision had been made during the events of April 1992 to make arrests right away, the - 11 - • • • • • • • • • • • LAPD could not have done so because the Department lacks buses and other field jail equipment. Scientific and technical equipment has not been funded for two years, nor has office equipment replacement. No other equipment has been approved for two years, including office automation and related items which would increase productivity. As discussed earlier, those interviewed have indicated that more effective deployment of personnel could be accomplished if the Department could acquire new computers. In addition, the LAPD appears to be ineffectively deploying personnel into, or lacking altogether, many support functions. Due to the current City hiring freeze and other budgetary constraints, the Department has moved sworn personnel into some support positions that could be staffed by civilians . However, other existing support positions remain vacant, and still others remain unfunded . III. FUNDING FOR LAPD RESOURCES A. LAPD FUNDING SOURCES The City's General Fund is the source of most of the LAPD's funding. The LAPD's budget is partially financed using Forfeited Assets Trust Fund (FATF) and Traffic Safety Fund (TSF) monies. If the amounts budgeted as income from these sources are not actually received by the Department, the total funds - 12 - • • • • • • • • • • • available to the LAPD are reduced accordingly. For example, in 1992-93, $4.5 million of FATF and $3 million of TSF monies are scheduled to balance the Department's budget. 6 However, cuts in narcotics and traffic personnel may impact these anticipated revenues. The Department also receives grants from the Department of Justice and the Office of Criminal Justice Planning (OCJP). These monies, however, are accounted for in the same fashion as the FATF and TSF monies. As a result, anticipated availability of these funds reduces the funding that the City Council is willing to allocate to the LAPD . B. LAPD BUDGET The Mayor's Budget for 1992-93 appropriates $533.2 million to the LAPD for direct costs 7 and $394.4 million for indirect costs, totalling $927.6 million, which is approximately 37 percent of the total amount appropriated for all City Budgetary Departments. 8 While the budget for the City as a whole has been constrained in the post-Proposition 13 years, the LAPD currently receives more of the total available funding than any other City Budgetary Department. 9 6 See Page 68 of the Mayor's Budget for 1992-93. 7 See Page 67 of the Mayor's Budget for 1992-93. 8 See Exhibit G to the Mayor's Budget for 1992-93. 9 The City Budgetary Department with the next highest appropriation in the Mayor's Budget for 1992-93 is the Fire Department (approximately 15%). See Exhibit G to the Mayor's Budget for 1992-93 • - 13 - • • • • • • • • • • • ---- - --·- - ---------------------------, Those interviewed in City government, outside the LAPD, . have observed that both in the happier days of an expanding budget, and in the more recent period, the LAPD has consistently had a disproportionate share of its requests for funding approved, compared to all other City departments. The LAPD has been described as the largest and fastest growing department in the City. Those interviewed within the LAPD also admit that the LAPD has always received a high percentage of support from other City departments. 1 ° For example, funding for items such as helicopters is included in the Transportation Department's budget, whereas funding for helicopter repairs is included in the General Services Department's budget. Funding for computers is included in the Computer Services Department's budget; General Services runs the City's microwave transmitter and is responsible for repairing the LAPD's radios. However, those interviewed have also indicated that budgets for other City departments have been cut back so far that the LAPD is experi~ncing difficulties in obtaining repairs for its equipment . c. LAPD BUDGET PROCESS The LAPD budget package must be turned over to the Mayor's Office by November 15th of the prior year. In August, the Mayor's budget message tells the Department, and other City 10 See Exhibit G to the Mayor's Budget for 1992-93 . - 14 - • I • • • • • • • • • departments, the exact percentage the Department can either request over the prior year or must decrease its request from that of the prior year. The LAPD budget is, thus, only a budget of incremental changes from the prior year to the next year; there is no annual re-examination of the existing budget, unless there is a required reduction from the previous year's budget. In years prior to 1987, individual divisions within the LAPD submitted information regarding their individual needs. Now, however, rather than being built from the ground up based on objective assessments of needs, objectives are provided from the top of the Department down to the divisions. Objectives are determined by the Assistant Chiefs based on problems experienced during the prior year, the current budget message, and perceived gaps in personnel and equipment. The LAPD budget has two levels: (1) the current level, which includes replacement parts for equipment and an inflation factor; and (2) a "service betterment" level, which includes requests for additional officers and equipment. Those interviewed within the LAPD have indicated that the City provides for no lifecycle replacement whatsoever for equipment; once the equipment is acquired, it is expected to last forever. In recent years, while the shortage of funds in the total City budget, and thus the Mayor's budget message, has confined the budget primarily to the current level, the LAPD traditionally has asked for more than the budget message will - 15 - • • • • • • • • • • • allow, telling the Mayor what money is needed to provide an "adequate level of service." However, in spite of this approach, those interviewed within the LAPD admit that the LAPD budget ts self-censored to the LAPD's detriment. Those responsible for the budget within the Department acknowledge that they take the realities of the political environment into account in determining the nature and extent of the Department's budgetary requests. Those interviewed within the Department have indicated, however, that in preparing the 1992-93 budget request, Chief Gates requested a written supplement of everything the LAPD "needed," stating that he had been criticized often by the City Council when he had not asked for something and then a crisis occurred. While the Department attempted to accommodate Gates' request, those responsible for preparing the Department's budget admit that this written supplement was really just a "wish list." 1. The Mayor•s Office After review by the Board of Police Commissioners, the LAPD submits its annual budget to the City Administrative Officer (CAO), who then makes his recommendations to the Mayor. Under the City Charter, the Mayor is required to present a budget for the coming fiscal year (which begins on July 1st) to the City Council by April 20th. The CAO budgets based on available City revenue, not based on abstract departmental needs. In developing his - 16 - • • • • • • • • • • • recommendations to the Mayor, the CAO and his staff meet with department heads, including the Chief of Police. Those interviewed within the LAPD have indicated, however, that there is not much give and take during this process; department heads are told what the budget will be. When the CAO cuts dollars from the LAPD budget, those inside the Department say, the CAO does not necessarily consult with the LAPD. They say that the CAO goes through the Department's accounts in detail, and decides what to fund and at what level. One City Council Member has observed that Former Chief Gates said that, for a number of years, during this review process, the CAO dealt harshly with LAPD budgetary requests. There is speculation that Gates' claim that the Mayor's Office has been uncooperative and unresponsive to the LAPD's budgetary needs, such as funding for improved communications equipment, has some truth to it, due to the apparent lack of communication between the Mayor and the Chief of Police. Others, however, say that while it is possible that the "intense dislike and antipathy" between Gates and the Mayor found some reflection in the Department's budget, they doubt that the Mayor's feelings had any significant fiscal impact. These individuals say that the LAPD has had top priority in terms of budget funding during the lengthy period they have been working with the City's budget, and that the Mayor's budgetary judgments are colored more by his experience as a police officer, than by his apparent dislike for Gates. They - 17 - • • • • • • • • • • • describe the Mayor as conservative and disciplined; his approach to equipment is "make it last a little bit longer," and this approach is not limited to the LAPD. However, they say, while he could be a bit penurious with respect to equipment and "frills," he has not been that way when it comes to adding officers to the force. 2. The City council The City Council receives the budget from the Mayor's Office, and evaluates the Mayor's budget through the efforts of the office of the Chief Legislative Analyst. Once this initial evaluation takes place, the Chair of the Finance Committee of the City Council meets with department heads, including the Chief of Police. The Finance Committee makes recommendations to the entire City Council; hearings are held; changes are made; by early June, the City Council must adopt a budget, which constitutes its statement of fiscal priorities. While the Mayor is given the power to veto items in the City Council's budget, this veto power appears to be illusory. For all practical purposes, the LAPD budget is authorized on a line-by-line basis by the City Council. One City Council Member points out that Chief Gates would say that the City Council supplied the LAPD with inadequate resources; another, the Chair of the Finance Committee, Zev Yaroslavsky, has said that it would be "sheer hypocrisy" for the LAPD to now blame its inadequate response to the civil unrest on inadequate supplies or budgetary constraints. Yaroslavsky says that if - 18 - • • • • • • • • • • • something the LAPD really wanted was eliminated from the budget, Gates generally came to him, as Chairman of the Finance Committee, in an attempt to persuade him to allow the expenditure, and it generally worked. Yaroslavsky says that the LAPD always got what it asked for in the way of helicopters, special night surveillance and photography equipment, and other high-tech "toys or gadgets." However, Yaroslavsky points out, that Gates never asked for buses or vans or other equipment needed in case of civil unrest. Furthermore, he says, the LAPD never indicated to the City Council that there might be a problem with communications in case of an emergency. Yaroslavsky says, when the subject of hiring more officers came up, Gates responded, "I don't know what I'd do with more cops," and that he "didn't have enough cars for any more cops." But, Yaroslavsky says, Gates did not ask for more cars, or more vans; and at one time, Gates even had a deal with the Mayor, whereby Gates would not object to cuts in the LAPD budget, so long as Gates did not have to hire more officers. D. HISTORICAL FUNDING OF THE LAPD In spite of Former Chief Gates' alleged reaction to hiring additional officers, one City Council Member says, most increases in the City budget in the past years have been for funding for the LAPD, particularly in the area of increasing the number of officers on the force. It appears that, historically, the LAPD has received a generous share of the limited funds - 19 - • • • • • • • • • • • available in the total City budget. This share primarily has been allocated to hiring additional officers, however, rather than to rebuilding and maintaining the Department's infrastructure. This appears to be the result of political considerations within the Mayor's Office and City Council, and self-censoring within the LAPD itself, both based on the relative political appeal of funding for additional officers on the street, as compared to that for equipment, supplies, and support personnel. IV . ADDITIONAL AREAS OF INQUIRY The foregoing observations are tentative and are based on the limited interviews conducted to date and limited document review. These tentative observations may change as additional information is obtained. Some of the additional areas that should be explored more fully are identified above. Interviews of personnel in the LAPD, and in the Offices of the City Administrative Officer and Chief Legislative Analyst, will be required in order to more thoroughly investigate these and other issues. In addition, more extensive review of City budget documents, in particular, the historical records of the disposition of LAPD budget requests, will be required . - 20 - • • • • • • • • • • • - --- - - - - - - ----------------- Page 10 CITY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Under the direction of the Mayor, the Emergency operations Organization provides emergency services to mitigate the effects of a diaaater occurring in the City. The City's emergency planning, preparedness, response and recovery programs are planned and directed by the Emergency opera.tions Board. The chairman of the Board, who is th.! chief of Police, i• also Deputy .Director of the organization. The major divisions of the Emergency Operations organization are the city departments or agencies moat capable of providing the specific service. The general managers of these departments are the chiefs of the divisions. These departments or agencies are: Police, Fire, Public works, Building and Safety, General services, Transportation, Personnel, Barbor, water and Power, Recreation and Parka, Animal Regulation, Airports and Planning. The City Administrative officer coordinates the authorities, powers, duties and responsibilities of the Emergency operations Board and the organization • SUPPORTING DATA DISTRIBUTION OF AMOUH'l'S PROVIDED IR 1992-93 APPROPRIATIONS Geaeral Aaoaat Depu1:aeatal City Eligible for ladir.e't la4ir.et Fifty hrceat 8alari•• Coat• Co•t• !fotal a.iuur .... at• am>GftA&T DEPUDCEJ1'1'8 City Admini•trative Officer. $ 22',851 $ 43,531 $ 236,656 $ 505,038 $ 214,428 fire . . . . . . . 102,771 9,517 86, 37' 198,667 89,258 Police . . . . . . 274 ,su 22,518 240,784 537 ,u, 288, eo, Total Budgetary Departaenta. I 602 1 166 I 75,566 I su,au 11,241,551 I s,2,os Because of Federal budget cuts, it is expected that the actual reimburaeaent received will be conaidera.bly le••· • • • • • I • • • • • • Page 67 POLICE DEPARTMENT This Department has the duty and power to enforce the penal divisions of the City charter, the ordinances of the City, and the laws of the state and the Nation for the purpose of protecting persons and property and for the preservation of the peace of the community. To these ends the Department engages in · patrol, prevention of crime, investigation of reported · crime, apprehension of •uapects, the gathering and presentation of evidence, detention of unarraigned persons, enforcement of traffic laws, investigations of traffic accidents, custody of property, and such staff services as are necessary to engage in these activities • BXPEIII>ITURES AlfD APPROPRIATIOHS E•tilllated Budget Expenditures Expenditures Appropriatioti 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 SALARIES $ 85,086,284 $ 91,200,000 General . . . . . . . . $ 89,021,195 414,028,757 437,500,000 Police Officers . . 416,792,081* 469,730 515,000 Marksmanship Bonus 660,707 6,430,194 unused sick Time . . . 125, 126 100,000 To Be Employed as Needed 215,736 942,112 1,000,000 overtime-General . . . . 757,833 15,570,947 16,244,000 overtime-Police officers 2,244,935* 1.821.864 1.800.000 Accumulated overtime 1.223.128 $524.475.014 $548.359.000 Total salaries . . . . . . . . . SSl0.915.615 EXPOSE $ 1,005,035 $ 950,000 Printing and Binding $ 751,822 802,186 810,000 Traveling Expense . . 728,199 473,061 750,000 Ammunition and Tear Bomba 510,108 5,523,477 S,800,000 contractual services 5,521,905 1,328,639 4,500,000 Field Equipment Expense . . . . . . . . 4,507,904 1,191,348 1,600,000 Institutional supplies and Expense 1,403,101 4,741,923 4,300,000 Petroleum Products . . . . . 4,381,825 164,813 300,000 Traffic and Signal Expense 307,408 15,422 39,000 Transportation Expense 39,420 572,510 430,000 secret service . . . . . 437,960 1,190,645 800,000 Uniforms . . . . . . . . 421,402 115,780 112,000 Reserve Officers Expense 112,125 5,388,875 2,200,000 Office and Administrative Expense . 1,902,953 1.036.347 L200.ooo operating supplies and Expense 91L616 $ 23,550.061 s 23.791.000 Total Expense . . . . . . . s 21.937.748 EQUIPMER"r $ 1,989,259 $ Furniture, office and Technical Equipment . . . . . . . $ 6,829,351 Transportation Equipment 104,000 646.892 300.000 Other operating Equipment 236,315 s 9.465.502 s 300,000 Total Equipment s 340.315 $557,490,577 ss12.4so.ooo Total Police . . . . $533,193.678 •No po._!tion of this appropriation •ball be u•ed ·to pay the •alarie• of police officer• for tiae devoted to servic~_on the Police Band or the Police Motorcycle Drill Teaa except during vacation tiae or other off-duty tiae for vhicb coapen•ation i• allowed by applicable lav • • 1 • • • • • • • • • • Page 68 POLICE DEPARTMENT SOURCE OF FUHDS Budget Actual Estimated Appropriation 1990-91 1991-92 $544,047,397 $565,885,000 General FUnd . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,500,000 4,500,000 Forfeited Asset• Truat Fwld (Schedule 3) . . . . . . . . . 3,921,020 2,000,000 Traffic safety FUnd (Schedule 4) 65,000 Off-Highway Motor Vehicle Fund (Schedule 17) . . . . 20,160 Proposition A Local Transit Assistance FUnd (Schedule 26) . . . . !557.490.577 1572.450.000 Total FUnda . . . . . . SUPPORTIIIG DATA DISTRIBU'lIOH OF 1992-93 APPROPRIATIOHS BY PROGRAM C:od• Progr- Salari•• ....... &4pi,-at 8pecial AC7001 Criae Control $355,277,309 $ 15,244,780 $ $ CC7002 Traffic Control 37,551,527 1,,11,318 AE70O Technical Support ,2,,,o,u4 4,004,777 340,315 AE7050 General Adainiatration and Support 2i 1 0H 1 365 !,07'.873 l510,,1s,ns I 21,n1,1u $ 340,315 $ DISTRIBUTIOR OF 1992-93 TOTAL COST OF PROGRAMS &atlloriaN a.galar C:ode Poeiti-• ..... t AC7001 Criae Control ,,,84 CC7002 Traffic Control 710 AE70O Technical support 2,41' AE7050 General Adainiatra- tion and Support___f.!! $370,522,089 3t, 1'2, 845 ",lls,so, 2',173,238 ••pport Progi- &llocatioa $111,102,475 11,10,,20 ('7,335,506) ,2,,111,211, 10.154 ss1J 1 1,J,,11 i $357,010,405 11,402,0,s $394«412 1 500 $ $ Coet &llocat-4 to otMr ·•·t• 1992-93 $525,693,678 4,500,000 3,000,000 i533.193.678 ... t $370,522,08' 3',162,845 '7,335,506 2,,173,238 $533,193,678 1'otal Coat of Prop-- $839,334,969 88,271,209 $972,606,178 • • • • • • • • • • (. EXHIBIT G SCHEDULE OF DIRECT COSTS OF OPERATION OF BUREAUS AND DEPARTMENTS, INCLUDING DIRECTLY RELATED COSTS IN OTHER APPROPRIATIONS Thi. echedule II pr•Mnted lo provld• more comp&. .. dela with re-,.d lo lolal dlr•d o,-rellon cotll for el bureau• end d•parimenll. The dlrectlv r.laled co• of unlraJINd funclon1 have been allocated lo other bureau, end departmenll for which the Mrvlc.1 are performed. a:ISJS IMCI I O:D Ill OWEB Bl D:iEI APOAf oaaa~ ........ ........,.,._. ... oa. ... ... ~ ........ ...... c:-.ka .... na. ........ ,._.,. e.,..... ....... ......... ......... .. _ c-,,-. .... .......... ....... ....... ........ ......._ ...... 0...- Aging .. . ..... . ..... . .. . ... . .. .. . .. . . . .. . $ ~ lwgulllllon . ... . . . .. ..... .. . . ....... . 8~ and Safetv , . . . , , , . , , · · , · , · , , , • · · · · · Clli, ~allw Olllc:er ..... .... . .. •. . •. ... Clli, Allonlly ... ... . . . . ...•. . ...... .. •.. . • c1111c1er11 .. •. •.•.•..•.. . . . ... . . •. . .. •••. . eo...-.lon on SCalul of Women •• • •• • •• •••• • • • COflllllUnlly~ ••••• •• ••••••• • •• • •• Cclnlroler • •• • ••. .• • • •••••• • •••••••••••••. Coundl .. . . .. •.. . . .•... .. . . . . ..• . • .• • .. . Cullur .. /ltllan •. • .• •••••.•••. .• •••••• • • . • • E....,..._ Allellonl . . .. . . . . .. ....... .. .. .. . . Ellllk-"'11 AlfMt .••. . . . .•....•.•• . •.... EthlaCOftlllllMlon .. .......•. . ...... . . .. . .. Fir• ..••• • •• •• .. •. . • •.• . . •. . . • . •• •• ••• .. Gene, .. ~ . ... .. ...... .. ... . . ..... . . . Houllnt ~ and Prockdon . . ....•.... . lnlorfflallon ~ . . . •• . • . .•..•.... ... .. • . Loe An9eln Conwnllon C.nllr ••. .. . •.• •• ..• •• MIii/Of ..• . ..... . ... . .... .. .. ... . . . ...... Penonnel . •....... .. ... . . ... . ..... .. . . ... Planning . ..... . ... . • .. ... ... ....... . ..... Pole.I . . ..•• . . . . . • . • •...•. • . ....• . •. .. •. . PubNc Worlll 441,103 $ 1,253,248 10,114,141 1,643,ln 1,060,313 2,73.1,719 50,662 2,963,373 1,588,(69 2,542,960 608,431 3.1,131 211,424 170,102 96,13.1,813 15,525,006 2,019,241 4,727,554 786,601 1,070,624 3,660,151 2,9'l3,638 250,973,367 ZM,116 $ 216,174 $ 947,273 311,166 3,909,393 271,641 606,039 26,764 2,610,883 97,365 1,666,604 156.764 51,606 14,179 2,536,191 250,463 621.123 3.1,169 808,393 225,257 334,804 45,742 37,213 9,272 118,434 59,172 95,286 16,431 21,366,209 13,111,517 1,111,:1;2 2,648,:fil 1,131,122 565,130 1,786,577 191,440 627,235 156,471 368,902 26,626 1,082,223 263,007 59,359,683 38,o:l>,521 . ........... s ............ $ ............ $ 13.1,03> $ 46.969 324,711 312,871 492,721 365,626 1.146,699 62,574 1,289,215 129,853 631,266 429,579 264,157 1,621,460 713,152 522,364 1,00,347 3,003,416 2,932 9,650 8,170 1,3.17,825 62,574 33.1,876 56,618 224,893 5,657,438 282,125 2,206,734 312,871 2,797,021 15,033 214,604 51,971 13,310 10.214 11,469 7,630 7,630 5,443,2fi0 3,689,076 563,167 3,832,800 2,426,960 5,031,359 2,146,901 :u;,196 239,118 670,121 62,574 61,047 141,677 604,667 125,141 121,1151 294,003 1,770,136 62,574 2,300,677 147,390 340,554 496,094 3,356,491 12,873,108 1,939,799 11,597,401 Board Offlot . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534,039 . · 182.275 40ll,327 34,948 1115,882 18,772 150,042 Accounlng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814,479 33.1,597 1,637 34,948 1115,882 18,772 150,042 Contrect Admlnlalrllllon • .. . . . . .. .. . . • .. • .. .. 3,834,826 1,101,851 225,999 25,810 619,190 110,214 Englne1""9 • . • . . • • . . • • . . . . • . . • • . • . • . • . • . 14,593,669 4,801,248 451.287 599,325 1,311,045 421,445 2,934,191 ~ -Ell!playee S.rw:.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245,254 109,743 92,769 34,948 1115,882 25,o:I> 150,042 Sanka11on... ...... . . . .. .. .. . ........ . . . . 24,085,230 9,097,158 7,047,902 1,790,123 1,551,376 41,098,344 775,174 SltHt Ughllng • . , • •.• , , .. .• • , . , •... •. . , • • 1,531,432 631,563 147,006 5,244,376 91,086 438,019 142,897 Slreet Mllllntenlnca . • • . . . . . • • . • . . . . . . • . • . . . 9,879,881 7,267,913 3,037,644 1,544,862 137,246 14,131,186 118,o:1> · SocW 5m11o1 . • • . • • • • • • . . . . . . • . • • • • • . • . . • . 114,357 90,729 11,326 10,756 21,409 22,139 Te~ • • • • • • . • . . • • • . . . . • • . • . • • 233,910 17,737 1.215 4,413 52.211 TranlpONllan • • . • . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . • • . . . . 10,883,579 5,423,661 370,225 4,495,729 1,340,971 3,817,024 136,1115 TreWlffl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416 1 684 230 1 360 52 1 924 25,166 94 1 915 712 1 780 ~ --BudtetalV lllpemenll . . . .. .. . ..... . $477,480,325 $137,111.266 $ 69,099!,97 $ 34,594,(i;7 $31,141,425 $ 75,511,103 $42,722,951 $ UM-,, Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,730,716 4,194,780 423,044 915,090 1,250,911 125,141 1,129.507 Alcrellllon and P_.. Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,404,316 1,849,291 3,121,960 l 1,820,023 2,9m,240 4,567,914 524,617 Clli, E....,.,.._' Adrenwnl Fund . . .... . . ... .. . ............ $ 3,240 20,465 3,140 30,334 11,102 302 15,643 4,:u; 16,756 3,162 16,361 1,367 829 10,295 12,257 5 ,449 128,231 1,592 4,541 1.132 7,244 2,264 6.415 311 10,092 1,139 219,900 $ 409,341 1,761,649 402,543 2,079,062 1,908,889 9,088 2,312,483 322,358 1,647,968 74,873 41,260 1,130,257 1,752,703 502,984 1,084,025 2.520,178 12,207,190 203,468 108,3.19 80,011 57,006 10,000 28,085 1,754,777 17,147,886 1,889,930 9,073 3,946,702 1,857,903 8,979,976 108,3.19 1,688,481 66,902,227 324,1'14 1,112,649 3,934,114 3.1,344 159,697 2,298 4,546,934 3.761,661 3.353 78.013 324.311 $40,696,073 $109,121.444 22,462 4,257,097 93,622 19,086 927,898 m.a Fire and Palot Penllon Fundl . . . .. ..•. . .. ... . ·---=----==----==-------=---..,;,;;,;= .... ---=..:..-...:.=;.;.;.;.,-...... ;.;;.;.;,;;.;.;.;;. _ _.==--== $ T .... ...... C-11 l,<fi2,021 4,158,546 19,719,103 3,862,060 15,626.726 11,03>,275 146,519 9,812,428 8,509,263 10,868,176 1,341,627 155,869 396,660 ·219,449 147,741,307 53,807,812 4,<rl0,689 11,266,517 1,703,837 2,972,774 9,114,523 7,778,533 394,412,500 1,719,345 1,662,237 5,999,03.1 :l>,957,3.13 ~,271 161,043,130 8,557,904 42,510,694 306,599 546,253 :1>,471,274 1.6142'6 $1,023,271,629 11,142,454 47,620,287 JCJlal .. Olpnnenlal .-... . .. . . .. . ... . ... . ... $496,615,497 $151,632,3.17 $ 73,351,601 $47,329,170 $39,997,513 $ 80,204,165 $44,377,145 $ 365,936 $ 45,180,068 $109,917,868 $1,089,741,370 General Clli, Purpcaes ...... . . ... .. .. .... .. . W•r end Eledrtdlv . ... . ... . . . : ... . ... . ... . w......._PN,gr- ... ...... . .. ... .. .... .. . C..,italf'lnmlolAdiftkllllrllllon ... . . ... . ....... . Juclge-nt O,llgellon Bondi ..... . ... ...... . . . lJnapproprlaled ~ . .. .. . . . . ...... . .... . Cllpllal lmprowment Expenditure Program ...... . . Comtnunlly Dewlopmenl Trust Fund .. . . . . .. . . . . Propo.tllon A .. Local Trantk Aul.&Mce Fund . .. . . • Speclal Parking Aevenu« Fund .. ....... .. ..... . Other Spedel f>utpoM Funds ............. .... . Bond Redemption and lnteresl Funds .. . ........ ..,. _...;.;.;.....;;_,;..._.....;.;.=,;.;,;.;..-~_,_,;;.;.;.;. _ _,.==---==--==.:....-..:.:;.:.=.:.:...---=..:..-...:.=;.;.;.;.,---_.:;== $ C..11 Alleailll te 0.... ...... (179,632,6311 (45,373,8341 (230,114,4941 $ (456,820,9661 ( 158,094,670I (326,201.2411 $ (940, 116,877) (29,000,000, (40,090,9001 (88,467,902) (26,641,3281 (6,0001 Subloul--Nondepwl-ntal .... ... ........ ... $ ............ $ ............ $ ............ $ ............ $ ............ $ ............ $ ............ $ ............ $ ............ $ $ $ (184.206.l30t Other Agende, ... .. , . . ... .. . .. . .. .. . . . .... $ 16.680.414 $ 378.582 S 2.469.336 $ 871.730 S 9.347.283 $ 739.251 $ 996.689 $ ............ $ 3,098 352 $ $ 34.581.637 ... s __ .....,.= Total · · , · · · · · · · , , . , • , .. , .. . , . , ...... , , . . $513:296,911 $152,010,919 $ 75,820,937 $ 48.200,900 $ 49:344:866 $ ao,943,416 $ 45,373,834 $ 365,936 $ 48,978,420 $109,917:868 $ U2A,323,007 su,124,323,007, ~ clllrl>ullon of the followlng: medkal care fof prllonen, englneerlng-lransponallon lrMllng expenM (from apedel a- IMI, i.- llnandng OOICI on equlpmenl and rnc11111e1, end cerlaln m111 of !he wmtewater program. •~• not Include operalk>nl financed by depaflmental revenue, . .. -tndude, lndependenl depatment coals whkh •• relmburMd. l.3c. --.. ... ...... ........... $ 2,431,027 7,366,913 52,376,631 8,866,991 50,580,195 19,999,429 287,02'l 20,077,575 8,119,151 14,018,877 10,319,957 253,585 1,158,929 1,317,009 231,990,970 191,031,159 12,634,892 34,107,317 24,186,695 4,180,375 243,694,175 16,973,93.1 533,193,678 4,204,143 4,00,000 21,693,256 78,297,150 1,228,021 164,011,908 11,334,715 84,180,580 5115,IOI 1,381,861 77,163,046 3..240.209 $1,941,231,296 32,691,591 61,002,173 158,094,670 326.201~1 $2,519.227 ,971 42,410,178 40,090,900 321,770,174 26,641,328 7,CXX>,000 51,956,000 451 ,004,13.1 66,758,980 146,223,326 56,213,756 95,028,674 15.364.451 $ 1.320,531.900 $ $3:839:759,871 • T .... Da.ct C-tef 0,-llaM $ 3,413,(l',5 11,525,459 72,095,734 12.121.m1 66,207,621 31,034,704 433,611 29,890,003 16,629,114 2A,887,m3 11,668,584 409,454 1:0,,589 1,606,458 379.~77 66,206,3.13 16,656,581 25,890,532 7,153,149 22,064,904 Z'l,752,466 927,606,178 5,923,418 5,695,237 27,692,289 114,254,483 2,182,299 332,(l',5,0JI 19,892,619 127,461,274 892,407 1,928,121 112,641,320 4.854.474 $2,508,681,959 51,541,045 .. 108,622,460 .. $ 2,681,1152,464 13,410,178 233,302,272 7,000,000 51,956,000 451,004,13.1 66,758,980 146,223,326 56,213,756 95,022,674 15,364.451 $ 1.136.325.770 I 34.581.637 $3:839:759,871 • • 3 • • • • • • • • • I le I I . • • • • • • • • TO: FROM: DATE: RE: KIRKLAND & ELLIS MEMORANDUM Richard J. Stone General Counsel and Staff Director Jan L. Handzlik Vincent J. Marella July 16, 1992 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT First Draft of Report Related to Los Angeles Sheriff's Office, Federal Law Enforcement, Other Local Police Departments, and the Los Angeles County Superior and Municipal Courts I. STRUCTURE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT MUTUAL AID PLAN A. Definition and Scope of the Plan 1. 2. 3 • 4. The Plan is designed to provide a mechanism by which law enforcement entities throughout the state can combine their resources and respond to a variety of emergency situations which may arise. It was developed at the state level and is administered throughout the State Office of Emergency Services ("OES"). The Plan therefore provides an existing mechanism to pool and distribute law enforcement resources during emergencies, including civil disturbances. The Plan divides California into seven Mutual Aid Regions. Each Region is made up of several Operational Areas, which are the counties within that Region. The sheriff of each county is the head of his Operational Area. All sheriffs within a given Region elect a Regional Coordinator from among themselves. Los Angeles and Orange Counties constitute Region I, and Sheriff Sherman Block is the Regional Coordinator . • • • • • • • • • • • B. How The Is Plan Designed to Work 1. 2. The Plan is triggered by any unusual occurrence which cannot be handled completely by the police agency in charge of the area where the event occurs. The unusual event can be either a natural disaster (e.g. earthquake) or a civil disturbance. Once triggered, the Plan contemplates that the Regional Coordinator (Sheriff Block) will receive requests for assistance from affected police departments, and will apply the law enforcement resources available from the Region, or as volunteered from outside the Region. If no assistance is requested, the Regional Sheriff can initiate contact if he believes mutual aid may be called for. C. Where the City of Los Angeles Fits Into the Plan 1. 2. 3. The City of Los Angeles might be considered a separate region in an emergency situation because: a. b. The Plan drew an exception for the City of San Francisco, where the city's Chief of Police is the Operational Area Law Enforcement Coordinator instead of the county sheriff. This shows that the state OES recognizes that, in some circumstances, it makes sense for the chief of police for the largest city in the county to coordinate efforts rather than the county sheriff. The Southern California Earthquake Response Plan ("SCERP") suggests that the City of Los Angeles should be considered a separate operational area in the event of a "level 3" earthquake (an undefined term). Fritz Patterson, Deputy Chief of the Law Enforcement Division of OES was careful to point out that the SCERP excludes assistance by fire departments and law enforcement, and so is consistent with the Plan. Nevertheless, the SCERP could also contribute to a feeling of autonomy by the City of Los Angeles . Dr. Richard Andrews, Director of OES, contributed to Los Angeles' autonomy by providing National Guard troops in response to a direct request from the City, without requiring the City to go through Sheriff Block. As it occurred, the conflicting signals left even Sheriff Block, the Regional • • • • • • • • • • • Coordinator, unclear as to whether the City and LAPD should go through him for mutual aid assistance . II. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN DURING EVENTS SURROUNDING THE KING VERDICT A. The Plan Failed to Operate as Designed 1. The LAPD did not request assistance from Sheriff Block until the second time Sheriff Block called Chief Gates on the telephone. At that time (Thursday morning, April 30 at 10:00 a.m.), Chief Gates admitted to being short-staffed and asked for two platoons (112 people), which Sheriff Block deployed on specific missions . 2. By that time, the Mayor's office had called the Governor directly to request National Guard assistance, and the Governor had ordered National Guard deployment . 3. 4. 5. 6. The approach taken by the LAPD and the City was very inefficient. LAPD did not appear to have an operational EOC of its own until the weekend. As a result, the LAPD was unaware of resources available within the area, and even within its own department . LAPD representatives were unaware until told by LASO representatives on Wednesday night, April 29, that the City had requested National Guard assistance. We also received reports of LAPD bureaus requesting resources from outside the Department when another LAPD had the materials sought. Also, some individual LAPD officers called acquaintances in other police departments to request assistance. As LASO's EOC chief told us, "it is difficult to manage something you know nothing about." The National Guard was deployed approximately seventeen hours after the first request was made -- seven hours ahead of the time contemplated in the Plan. Significant law enforcement resources already were available within Los Angeles County, however, and were not put to full use because Sheriff Block, as Regional Coordinator, did not have the facts necessary to properly deploy these resources. Several Federal law enforcement personnel agreed when debriefed for this study that they were not - 3 - • • • • • • • • • • 7. necessary, given existing resources at the local level. Many local police departments believe they have no real option but to act independently, and are largely ignorant of mutual aid available under the present system. Indeed, Sheriff Block told us that, by the time Chief Gates first requested assistance, Sheriff Block had declined offers of manpower from various law enforcement agencies from around the state because no requests for assistance were coming in. B. "Command and Control" -- The Effect of Organizational Structure on Implementation of the Plan 1. 2. 3. 4 • Centralization of command, both day-to-day and in emergency situations, also presents an issue. At LAPD, dispatch is handled centrally from two locations for the entire city. In an emergency situation, each of the LAPD bureaus takes responsibility for . activity within its area. An argument can be made that this offers the worst of both worlds, with the division watch commander unable to keep his finger on the pulse of activities within his division on a day-to-day basis, but emergency response being uncoordinated because lines of command are unclear . The LASO is the opposite: day-to-day dispatch is handled by the individual stations for increased responsiveness, but command is centralized in emergency situations. Local police departments also benefit from greater sensitivity to happenings in their community. LAPD's emergency response approach is flawed in at least one other respect. In responding to calls during emergencies, the LAPD puts together squads of officers and patrolmen that are the most junior in their rank and have never worked together before. A more sensible approach, followed by many smaller area police forces, involves sending out existing squads to handle calls during emergencies. The lack of an entire level of command at the LAPD -- the Assistant Chief -- may also have contributed to slow response time. Vernon was on leave preparing for retirement; Brewer had also retired; and Dotson had been demoted . - 4 - • • • • • • • • • • • C. How the LAPD's Attitude Contributed to a Failure in the Plan's Implementation 1. 2 • 3. 4. 5. 6. The LAPD's self-reliant conduct during the riots appears to reflect an attitude of complete self-reliance. While admirable in principle, this LAPD mind-set impeded the efficient functioning of the Plan. Local police departments noted difficulty communicating with LAPD, both in general and during the riots. The LAPD considers itself better than other police departments in the area. Also, LAPD is less committed to positive community relations than smaller departments, which are trained to take a personal interest in assuring the safety and welfare of the communities they serve. Communications among local police departments was especially weak during the riots; for example, Pasadena police found out that Federal law enforcement personnel were using the post office in Pasadena as a staging area when they saw the people assembling there. One possible exception is the LAPD West Bureau-UCLA Police Department relationship; their overlapping jurisdiction in Westwood has led to a comfortable interrelationship over time. LAPD was so comfortable that on Wednesday night, April 29, only 6 LAPD personnel patrolled the Westside of Los Angeles, and the UCLA Police maintained order there. Chief Gates told Sheriff Block in late 1991 that he could not imagine a situation in which the LAPD would request assistance from the Sheriff's Department and, in fact, noted that many requests for assistance had come in the other direction, from LASO to LAPD. Also, several days before the April disturbances, Lt. Bruce Ward of the LAPD Metro Division told Fritz Patterson of OES the same thing, that he could not imagine the LAPD requesting assistance from anyone. The mind-set goes back even further, to the Watts' Riots in 1965. Then, the Sheriff's Department called the LAPD to offer 300 deputies coming of a specific mission to help at the beginning of the riots. The LAPD flatly declined and chose to deal with the situation itself. By contrast, nearly all local police departments enjoy good relationships with the LASO and feel - 5 - • • • • • • • • • • • D. E. comfortable calling on them during times of emergency. The local police departments perceive, however, that the LASO may often not have the resources to help the locals. Thus, the locals feel great pressure to be independent. Contingency Planning for the King Beating Verdict 1. 2. In preparation for the King verdict, the LASO organized the Operation Monarch Task Force. This group met three or four times before the verdict, and gathered intelligence from various elements of the community. Despite its efforts, the best indications gathered by Operation Monarch were that no significant disturbance would result after the verdicts . There was no apparent LAPD analog. Furthermore, neither local police nor federal law enforcement had a King verdict-specific plan. This could be explained in part by widespread belief that the verdict would not come down as it did . 3. During the disturbances, the LASO called a Phase 4 alert and mobilized the emergency broadcast network, cancelled all days off and placed its stations on a twelve hour alert . The National Guard 1. Lack of centralized coordination of mutual aid resources, including National Guard, limited their use by smaller municipalities in the area. Even after requests for Guard assistance were lodged with LASO's EOC, response time could be slow. 2. Federalizing the National Guard, while desirable to the State because costs shift to the Federal government, detracts significantly from the Guard's utility . 3 • Once federalized, the Guard is restricted by "posse comitatus" (18 u.s.c. § 1385 et seq.), and lawyers in Washington must sign off on all missions. We were informed by the Chief of LASO's EOC that the Guard did not accept a single mission from him after it was federalized . F. The State OES' Recommendations Concerning the Plan 1. Fritz Patterson told us that the Plan might be strengthened by reference to emergency response of fire departments in the state . - 6 - • • • • • • • • • • • 2. 3 • 4. The fire departments have developed an Incident Command System ("ICS"), which sets clear lines of authority in advance for fires that might happen in a given area. The ranking fire fighter with the first unit on the scene of a fire is the incident commander, and therefore has the authority to marshall the necessary resources. Also, the fire department ICS contains detailed plans for staging, mobilization, demobilization, and deployment of fire fighters. This leads to greater uniformity and coordination in responding to a fire. Finally, the fire departments around the state have made uniform their terminology (e.g. the number and rank of fire fighters constituting a "squad") and equipment. In one extreme example of terminology gaps, a Compton police officer asked Marines at a riot scene to "cover" while he went into the area. To the police officer, "cover" meant sit tight. To the Marine, it meant fill the air with bullets, and about 100 rounds were fired into the area before the difference was resolved. III. TRAINING ISSUES A. The California Specialty Training Institute ("CSTI") B. 1. The CSTI trains law enforcement officers statewide in emergency preparedness. 2. During the 1980s, the focus of CSTI training shifted away from civil disturbances and toward natural disasters . 3. In July 1990, Assistant Sheriff Jerry Harper presented a proposal to John Mirella of CSTI and Fritz Patterson of OES, suggesting an increase in training for civil disturbances . Survey of Agencies Statewide Concerning Need for Training 1. OES conducted a "needs assessment" of other agencies statewide, and most agencies agreed that they would like increased training in civil disobedience. 2. Patterson presented this needs assessment to Mirella and to Dr. Richard Andrews, head of the State OES. Nevertheless, the proposal was never - 7 - 1 . • • • • • • • • • • C • acted upon. It is, however, being reexamined in light of recent events. Recommendations by the State OES 1. 2. 3 • Fritz Patterson suggests increased training in the use of the Plan. Given the fact that most local police departments -- as well as Federal law enforcement personnel and court employees - apparently know little about the Plan, Patterson's suggestion makes good sense. In fact, initial meetings have been held, and further meetings are scheduled, around the state with Sheriffs and chiefs of various police departments to discuss the Plan and how it should be implemented. Patterson also suggested that the Los Angeles Mayor's Office and the Governor's Office may have been unaware of the correct functioning of the Plan, given their actions during the riots . IV. OTHER ISSUES A. Coordination Between Law Enforcement and Court Personnel 1. Pre-verdict coordination between the LAPD and the court system appears non-existent. LAPD does not regularly communicate with the Superior or Municipal Court in any structured way, and gave no indication of possible violence or contingency plans in this situation . 2. Part of the reason could be confusion as to jurisdiction: Although the LAPD is responsible for public areas in the courthouses, the Sheriff's office provides courtroom security. 3 • Federal Protective Service personnel and court security officers protecting the Federal courthouse downtown reported that it received no assistance protecting the courthouse on Wednesday night, April 29. They had no number to call for assistance other than 911, and could not get through on that line. Also, although court security officers could see LASO deputies surrounding the Hall of Justice -- across the street from the courthouse -- no LASO personnel helped protect the Federal courthouse . - 8 - • • • • • • • • • • • B. Coordination Between the LAPD and Federal Agencies 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Pre-verdict planning between the LAPD and federal law enforcement also never happened. An anti-terrorism committee, which evaluates risks to the judiciary in L.A. County posed by pending cases, meets monthly and is chaired by Sheriff Block. Chief Gates has never attended a meeting of this committee; Assistant Chief Dotson attended until his demotion following publication of the Christopher Commission report, but no LAPD representative has attended since. On May 1, 1992 the President signed an Executive Order to provide for the restoration of law and order in the City and County of Los Angeles. The Attorney General was designated to coordinate the activities of all federal agencies participating in the effort to restore peace to Los Angeles. A specific number of agents from various federal law enforcement agencies were designated to participate in the federal effort. In addition to agents stationed in Los Angeles, customs agents and deputies from United States Marshall's Service from outside the Los Angeles area were mobilized and transported to Los Angeles. Two hundred Customs agents were immediately deployed to Los Angeles to assist in stemming the violence that had erupted. Three hundred fifty deputy Marshals were also deployed to the Los Angeles area. The FBI was chosen as the agency responsible for organizing and coordinating the federal agencies in Los Angeles; although it does not appear that all federal agencies were directed by the FBI. A command center was established at the Federal Building in Westwood. Both Customs and the Marshall's Service set up their own individual command centers . During the disturbance, the LAPD still did not coordinate with federal officials. The Customs command center set up on Orange County, for example, received no direct orders from either LAPD or LASO. Instead, LAPD put federal buildings at risk by driving crowds away from Parker Center and toward the Federal Courthouse with no containment . - 9 - • • • • • • • • • • • C. Coordination with the Fire Department D. 1. The Los Angeles Fire Department was unable to respond to a large number of fires during the early stages of the disturbances because the LAPD did not guarantee that the Fire Department would be provided with escorts. The LASO then provided escorts and arranged later to have the CHP do so. There should be a liaison from the LAPD assigned to the Fire Department during emergency situations. 2. The Fire Department should also be an active participant in the EOC process, especially in terms of planning . Use of INS Agents 1. The LAPD asked INS to provide uniformed agents to assist during the disturbances. 2 • Some advocacy groups report that INS agents rounded up Latinos, who were not involved in any criminal activity, during the disturbances. If true, this could constitute a violation of Police Commission Order #40, which forbids stopping and detaining anyone solely based upon a suspicion of illegal immigration status . E. Appropriate Arrest Policy During the Disturbances 1. 2. The LASO instituted an "aggressive arrest policy" during the disturbance, as did local police departments. LASO even suspended its policy of not booking misdemeanor suspects, which would include looters. From all appearances, LAPD officers were either unable to or were told not to make arrests during the earliest stages of the disturbance. This undoubtedly contributed to the criminal activity . F. The Media's Impact 1. 2. Law Enforcement personnel universally expressed concern that the media's coverage of the events depicted an opportunity to have a good time and to get something for nothing as opposed to participation in illegal activities. Many interviewed do recognize, however, that media coverage could be valuable. At times during the disturbance, some relied upon television coverage - 10 - • • • • • • • • • • • G. to determine where the "hot spots" were. The LASO is now investigating how best to utilize the media in its operation. For example, it is considering establishing some kind of communications link with radio and television stations so that it can be kept apprised of events in the field. But the LASO wants to encourage the media not to disclose the location of trouble spots over the air, thereby keeping the inquisitive and those prone to participate away from such situations . Contingency Planning 1. The dawn-to-dusk curfews had a positive effect on quelling the disturbance . 2. Other measures which seemed to be effective include the restrictions placed on the sale of gasoline, alcohol and weapons. H. Long Term Planning 1. 2. 3. Many of the local police departments believe that civil unrest is likely to repeat itself if changes are not made in the economic and social conditions of the cities, as well as the criminal justice system. Community leaders also have to address the obvious racial tension in the cities . Although the initial looting during the riots appeared to have been gang related, the vast amount of the looting on Thursday and Friday was merely opportunistic by members of the community. Some people went from community to community to loot . The local police departments would like to have better coordination and regular communication with the LAPD and Emergency Services groups. They believe it would be helpful to develop detailed manuals to deal with major emergencies. These manuals should include information on what emergency services are available, how they are obtained, where to best deploy personnel, how to set up area command posts, and resources needed for emergencies. Better knowledge of the existing Mutual Aid Plan could serve the same purpose . - 11 - • • • • • • • • • • • 4. In addition to statewide meetings organized by OES, a seminar of the International Chiefs of Police is to be held in Washington, D.C. on July 22-24. Representatives of both LAPD and LASO apparently are scheduled to speak about law enforcement in Los Angeles during the riots . - 12 - • • • • • • • • • • • LAW OFFICES IRELL & MANELLA A Partnership Including Professional Corporations MEMORANDUM File: WEBSTER STUDY /lnteragency Group Re: Draft Report re Interaction of the LAPD with the LAFD Date: July 17, 1992 To: Richard J. Stone From: Ken Heitz Diann Kim PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT SUMMARY The interaction between the Los Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD) and the Los Angles Police Department (LAPD) during the civil disturbance which took place April 29 - May 2, 1992 raises serious questions concerning the preparation for and the early stage command management over the incident by the LAPD. While there is general praise within the LAFD for the bravery and dedication of LAPD officers in the field, there is an even stronger consensus among LAFD personnel that the disorganization of senior commanders, lack of an efficient incident command system, failure to communicate priorities, lack of knowledge in the preparation of staging areas, failure to promptly utilize personnel, and bureaucratic constraints detracted severely from the ability of the LAPD to fulfill its mission of protecting LAFD strike tea ms. One of the principal themes that arises from our interviews of LAFD senior officers is the fact that massive emergencies and the implementation of command systems which are designed to manage them occur far more frequently within the fire prevention, earthquake relief and disaster management provinces of fire departments and forestry service than in law enforcement. A well honed, frequently exercised Fire Mutual Aid System (FMAS) works virtually on autopilot to muster and deploy resources to combat these emergencies without missing a beat. Similarly, there are well-defined incident command systems (ICS) which are designed to establish immediate command over an acute incident, but with the flexibility to expand the command responsibilities on the run. Both the FMAS and ICS' capabilities result in common language, common terms and frequent interagency HE IT0431. WP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 17, 1992 Page 2 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT coordination that result in smooth, expeditious response. These systems grew out of a disastrous set of brush fires in 1971 -- the result of that debacle, where houses burned while fire companies could not communicate, is a finely tuned system that serves the Southern California community well today. The LAFD personnel expressed sincere respect for the capability, resources and bravery of the LAPD, qualities they experience on a frequent basis. They also noted a new openness and spirit of cooperation and self examination in the LAPD since the disturbances. PRE-RIOT PLANNING AND COORDINATION WITH LAPD There was very little pre-riot planning between the LAPD and the LAFD. Starting in early April 1992, Deputy Chief Donald Anthony, head of the LAFD Bureau of Fire Suppression and Assistant Chief Robert Ramirez, the second highest ranking officer in the same Bureau, began planning for possible problems arising after the Rodney King verdict was announced. They considered the potential for violence, identified likely target areas, assessed the need for additional body armor, identified potential staging area sites and updated the LAFD tactical alert plans. In connection with these planning activities, Assistant Chief Ramirez attempted to set.up meeting with the LAPD to coordinate the escort and equipment support the LAFD would need in the event of a disturbance. It took several calls to the LAPD Anti-Terrorist Task Force to schedule a meeting. On April 13, 1992, Assistant Chief Ramirez met with Commanders Rick Dinse and Bayan Lewis of the LAPD. At that meeting the LAPD and Assistant Chief Ramirez confirmed that both considered the Southeast, 77th and Southwest Divisions as the most probable areas for civil disturbance. Commander Lewis then told Assistant Chief Ramirez that fire department protection had been identified as the third highest priority for the LAPD in the event of a disturbance. The higher priorities were: (i) countersniper activity and (ii) barricaded suspects. When Assistant Chief Ramirez questioned why barricaded suspects were a higher priority than fire protection, he was told that the first two categories often overlapped because suspects were armed. Commander Lewis explained that during the first four-six hours of a disturbance, LAFD escort protection would be provided by local division HEIT0431.\JP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 17, 1992 Page 3 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT officers. After the first four-six hours, police protection could be arranged for individual responses. Chief Ramirez understood that this second category of escorts would be provided by elite LAPD Metro Units. (With respect to anticipated escort duties, it is interesting to note that a pilot program for LAFD escort had been initiated in the 77th Division in October 1991 and continued in February of 1992. Accordingly, LAFD and the 77th Division had experience in coordinating escort protection in non-riot situations.) Commander Lewis stated that LAPD believed that if a riot occurred, it would start slowly and build over several days as the Watts riots had. Commanders Lewis and Dinse advised Chief Ramirez that they had not discussed training or preparations with the National Guard because they did not want to create unnecessary alarm in H:1e public and the news media . Commander Lewis informed Chief Ramirez that additional body armor and gas masks could be arranged through the Office of Emergency Services (OES) upon 24 hours notice. Eventually, additional body armor was obtained through OES on April 29, 1992. The LAPD Was provided with a copy of the LAFD Tactical Alarm Plan. No LAPD planning documents were shared with the LAFD. As an aside, it is worth noting that there was a very active interagency planning group that worked together closely in connection with the 1984 Olympics. Detailed training and contingency plans were developed. After the Olympics, these interagency meetings stopped, plans were not updated and training ceased. MANAGEMENT OF THE EARLY STAGES OF THE DISTURBANCE The interaction of the LAPD and the LAFD during the early stages of the civil disturbance (i.e., 8:00 p.m. - Midnight on April 29) was marked by delay, indecision, disorganization and near command paralysis. Those factors resulted in lines of LAFD strike teams (a strike team consists of five engine companies and a strike team leader, i.e., a group of 20-22 firefighters) backed up in the 54th and Arlington staging area, unable to respond to calls while they waited for the LAPD to release police escorts so they could begin to bring fires under control. Smooth coordination of police escorts for LAFD did not really occur on HE IT0431 . WP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 17, 1992 Page 4 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT a consistent basis until responsibility for LAFD escorts was transferred to the California Highway Patrol (CHP) on Thursday morning . The description of the 54th and Arlington staging area by every LAFD senior officer who was at the scene is consistent. Each describes a disorganized, chaotic situation lacking a visible LAPD command structure, an efficient liaison with LAFD and control (or even a grasp of) the law enforcement resources at hand. Until Thursday morning, there was not even a definitive command post for LAPD. During much of Wednesday night, Metro and LAPD patrol divisions maintained separate command posts which did not appear to communicate well with one or the other. The disorganization at 54th and Arlington extended to many fronts. The LAPD had paid no attention to the logistical needs of a mass staging area. The location of the command center within the area of hostility created numerous problems ranging from the practicality of getting firefighters and various services safely to the staging area to the persistent lobbing of Molotov Cocktails into the enclosure. By 9:30-10:00 p.m., the disorganized arrival of police cars, fire units, ambulances and equipment had created a virtual grid lock within the one block area such that new arrivals were having problems getting into the staging area at all. The LAFD, which has substantial experience setting up staging areas, took responsibility for reconfiguring the staging area. Within two hours, the area had been configured with traffic cones into smoothly flowing traffic patterns for fire (and refueling), paramedic, and law enforcement staging. The major problem that the LAFD encountered in arranging for LAPD escort was the absence of a responsible LAPD officer with the authority to act. Battalion Chief David Badgett functioned as the LAFD liaison officer with the LAPD (and later CHP) in arranging for escorts. Battalion Chief Badgett served this function from 10:00 p.m. Wednesday evening through Friday at 2:00 p.m. (During Wednesday from 8:30 a.m. until about 11 :00 a.m., Battalion Chief Dahlstein also served as liaison, until relieved and released by Badgett.) It is LAFD's policy as part of its ICS management system to designate a senior LAFD officer to be a liaison with law enforcement in any such emergency. In contrast, at no time did LAPD ever designate a senior officer to be liaison officer with LAFD. This lack of senior level coordination contributed substantially to much of the delay and inefficiency . HEIT0431.\.JP • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 17, 1992 Page 5 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT The initial provision of escorts was accomplished by Battalion Chiefs Badgett and Dahlstein on an ad hoc, "catch as catch can," basis. Each would try to establish relationships with the LAPD patrol or Metro officers to plead for resources. The "blue shirts" were never a problem. Most of the LAPD officers who were milling around, waiting for assignments, were enthusiastic about helping the LAFD. Many field level officers complained about not being able to help. Occasionally, the LAPD lack of central command was a plus. Requests for escort help to senior officers was met with responses that "not enough resources were available" or "you are not a high priority." However, the LAPD officers at the sergeant and lieutenant level were often able to provide help from the hundreds of officers who were milling around "outside the chain of command." These "end run" activities by lower level LAPD officers accounted for much of the early escort support . There was considerable tension between the LAFD and the LAPD concerning the difficulty securing LAPD escorts. At some time between 2:00- 4:00 a.m. on Thursday morning, there was a heated discussion between Deputy Chief Parsons, who was in charge of the LAFD command center at 54th and Arlington and Chief Hunt, who was the senior LAPD officer present . The discussion, witnessed by several LAFD and LAPD officer, revolved around why LAPD was failing to fulfi ll its priority assignment to provide escorts for fire department strike teams. Chief Hunt's response was that he did not have enough people available. This response was not credible to LAFD because there were large numbers of LAPD officers "lingering around" at all times during the early stages. [Note: Because of his vacation, we have not yet interviewed Deputy Chief Parsons.] At approximately 1 :00 a.m. Thursday morning, escort resources "dried up" as LAPD retained its resources at 54th and Arlington for a massive "sector sweep" operation. The preparation for this sweep limited escort availability for more than an hour. Then, the sweep was abandoned and escort service resumed. There were several additional LAPD organizational snafus which contributed to delays in providing escorts. At one point, Battalion Chief Badgett was told that no escorts could be provided because there were no cars available. Battalion Chief Badgett asked how that could be when he could see 10-15 squad cars. The LAPD explained that the cars were locked and the officers had taken the keys. Battalion Chief Badgett suggested that LAPD send HEIT0431.WP • • • • • • • • I • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 17, 1992 Page 6 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT a police explorer to search for keys. That was done and 15 cars for escorts were obtained. This is another example of poor organization for mass staging areas. (The LAFD procedures require valet boards at staging areas and key lock boxes on bumpers or trucks to prevent this kind of problem.) Escort operations were seriously hampered during the period it was being provided by the LAPD by problems with escorts sticking with fire strike teams. When the fire strike teams finally "married up" with an LAPD escort squad, the most efficient method of fighting fires was to "dispatch on the run" after one fire was controlled or to move on to nearby fires while letting the LAFD ICS command center know. The goal was to keep a fire strike team actively fighting fires until the team needed to refuel or break for needed rest. The problem with the LAPD escort teams was that all or part of many escort tactical squads would hear other calls and break away, leaving the LAFD team exposed. Several teams had to return to the staging area, get back in line and lose valuable fire fighting time because of this phenomenon. In several cases, escort teams refused to cross certain geographic or jurisdictional lines. Therefore, to fight a fire, the LAFD strike team had to go unprotected or had to find another escort. The most serious impediment was shift changes. The LAPD operates on 12-hour shifts while the LAFD operates on 24-hour shifts. (Although many LAFD strike teams worked up to 30 hours to avoid problems caused by their shift changes.) During the Wednesday/early Thursday time frame, several LAPD escort teams declined to continue to provide protection to . LAFD when shift changes occurred. According to Battalion Chief Badgett, who was in charge of the escort function for the LAFD, this "it's time to go home now" factor was the biggest "in the field" problem with the LAPD escort protection of the LAFD . LATER ESCORT MANAGEMENT By early morning on Thursday, Battalion Chief Badgett was beginning to get significant escort protection from CHP units arriving at 54th and Arlington. By daylight Thursday, the CHP had set up a command trailer at the staging area. Battalion Chief Badgett had begun to liaison with all law enforcement agencies. Because the LAPD was disorganized in how to use other agencies, Battalion Chief Badgett was able to obtain support from several different police forces who sent personnel. For example, Battalion Chief Badgett said that one HE JT0431. \.JP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 17, 1992 Page 7 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT group sent from Seal Beach was exemplary and was sought out for repeat missions by the LAFD strike teams it protected . As Thursday morning progressed, Battalion Chief Badgett found that he was getting more help from the CHP and that the quality of escort services was good. He observed that the CHP got its command structure organized quickly and intelligently and that the CHP just kept improving its organization. (The LAFD and CHP had, in the past, made presentations to each other about their respective command structures and had achieved a good working relationship on the management of large incidents prior to the riots.) By early Thursday morning, Battalion Chief Badgett approached Lt. Hahn, Lt. Peris and an LAPD captain with a suggestion that the CHP take over the LAFD escort responsibilities. Those officers endorsed the idea and presented it to Capt. Hunt. Coincidentally, at higher levels, Chief Anthony, Chief Gomez of the CHP, Governor Wilson and Chief Gates had reached a similar conclusion. After escort responsibility shifted to the CHP, there was excellent coordination and the operation went very smoothly. MANAGEMENT OF ESCORTS AT 64TH STREET LAFD STAGING AREAS [Interviews are not yet completed] THE IN-FIELD COOPERATION OF THE LAPD AND THE LAFD Although our task force has only interviewed a few strike team leaders and field commanders within the LAFD at this point, except for the issues of shift changes and geographic boundaries, the in-field performance of all law enforcement units appears to have been exemplary. The field tactics utilized seem to have been effective and the bravery of the LAPD officers was praised by many. [We intend to follow-up and flesh out these largely anecdotal incidents] HE IT0431. \.JP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 17, 1992 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Page 8 It was noted that the LAPD faces a greater challenge than other law enforcement agencies in providing escort services. Because of its hostile relationship with the community, where the LAPD escort teams were used, crowds were bigger, more verbally abusive and more threatening. The CHP and other local police officers with distinctive uniforms engendered less severe reactions. This is consistent with general community relations. LAFD Battalion Chiefs in South Central LA report that the presence of an LAPD unit at an incident often results in more tension and verbal taunting. The LAFD, on the other hand, seems more accepted as a community service provider. · A manifestation of tl:)is is the fact that while nearly all the fire stations in the riot areas were left unmanned and unprotected, none were attacked and minor graffiti was the only vandalism experienced. It should be noted that contrary to escort services formally assigned at command centers, the LAPD was very responsive to incidents in the field. Several examples of "waving down" LAPD patrol and Metro teams to respond to protection needs were described. In each case, response time was immediate. Several of the LAFD chiefs we interviewed stated that the curfew appeared to give the LAPD the best means of achieving control. During the curfew, the police resources could much more effectively control those trying to disrupt the LAFD efforts. _ RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The LAPD needs to plan and train for resource-draining emergencies. (a) The LAPD needs an incident command system to utilize in such settings; (b) The LAPD needs to work with the LAFD to identify and pre configure a number of staging areas. Staging area organization should probably be delegated to the LAFD, which has more HEIT0431.WP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 17, 1992 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Page 9 experience. Staging areas should be set up outside hostile territory; (c) The LAPD must design a management system that can expeditiously request and deploy aid from other law enforcement agencies. Since the LAPD appears to be understaffed, this appears imperative; (d) (e) Practice and training on mutual aid must be ongoing. The LAFD recognizes the value of this and observed that the LAPD did not have a system to utilize mutual aid well. The LAPD must improve its vehicle control management at staging areas so that all resources are available. 2. The LAPD needs to designate a senior level liaison officer with authority to authorize resources to coordinate activities with the LAFD liaison officer . 3. The LAFD and LAPD need to cooperate to understand each other's needs and procedures better. This is already occurring. 4. 5. The CHP should automatically be assigned LAFD escort duties as soon as practicable. This will free up LAPD resources, put less provocative resources on these duties and allow two organizations which routinely deal with large emergencies to coordinate. The L·APD's attitude that it is a resource-rich department that does not need to plan and work with others must change . HE IT0431 • WP • • • • • • • • • • • LAW OFFICES IRELL & MANELLA A Partnership Including Professional Corporations MEMORANDUM File: WEBSTER STUDY /lnteragency Group Re: Draft Report re Interaction of the LAPD with the LAFD Date: July 17, 1992 To: Richard J. Stone From: Ken Heitz Diann Kim PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT SUMMARY The interaction between the Los Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD) and the Los Angles Police Department (LAPD) during the civil disturbance which took place April 29 - May 2, 1992 raises serious questions concerning the preparation for and the early stage command management over the incident by the LAPD. While there is general praise within the LAFD for the bravery and dedication of LAPD officers in the field, there is an even stronger consensus among LAFD personnel that the disorganization of senior commanders, lack of an efficient incident command system, failure to communicate priorities, lack of knowledge in the preparation of staging areas, failure to promptly utilize personnel, and bureaucratic constraints detracted severely from the ability of the LAPD to fulfill its mission of protecting LAFD strike teams. One of the principal themes that arises from our interviews of LAFD senior officers is the fact that massive emergencies and the implementation of command systems which are designed to manage them occur far more frequently within the fire prevention, earthquake relief and disaster management provinces of fire departments and forestry service than in law enforcement. A well honed, frequently exercised Fire Mutual Aid System (FMAS) works virtually on autopilot to muster and deploy resources to combat these emergencies without missing a beat. Similarly, there are well-defined incident command systems (ICS) which are designed to establish immediate command over an acute incident but with the flexibility to expand the command responsibilities on the run. Both the FMAS and ICS' capabilities result in common language, common terms and frequent interagency HEIT0431.~P • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 17, 1992 Page 2 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT coordination that result in smooth, expeditious response. These systems grew out of a disastrous set of brush fires in 1971 -- the result of that debacle, where houses burned while fire companies could not communicate, is a finely tuned system that serves the Southern California community well today. The LAFD personnel expressed sincere respect for the capability, resources and bravery of the LAPD, qualities they experience on a frequent basis. They also noted a new openness and spirit of cooperation and self examination in the LAPD since the disturbances. PRE-RIOT PLANNING AND COORDINATION WITH LAPD There was very little pre-riot planning between the LAPD and the LAFD. Starting in early April 1992, Deputy Chief Donald Anthony, head of the LAFD Bureau of Fire Suppression and Assistant Chief Robert Ramirez, the second highest ranking officer in the same Bureau, began planning for possible problems arising after the Rodney King verdict was announced. They considered the potential for violence, identified likely target areas, assessed the need for additional body armor, identified potential staging area sites and updated the LAFD tactical alert plans. In connection with these planning activities, Assistant Chief Ramirez attempted to set.up meeting with the LAPD to coordinate the escort and equipment support the LAFD would need in the event of a disturbance. It took several calls to the LAPD Anti-Terrorist Task Force to schedule a meeting. On April 13, 1992, Assistant Chief Ramirez met with Commanders Rick Dinse and Bayan Lewis of the LAPD. At that meeting the LAPD and Assistant Chief Ramirez confirmed that both considered the Southeast, 77th and Southwest Divisions as the most probable areas for civil disturbance. Commander Lewis then told Assistant Chief Ramirez that fire department protection had been identified as the third highest priority for the LAPD in the event of a disturbance. The higher priorities were: (i) countersniper activity and (ii) barricaded suspects. When Assistant Chief Ramirez questioned why barricaded suspects were a higher priority than fire protection, he was told that the first two categories often overlapped because suspects were armed. Commander Lewis explained that during the first four-six hours of a disturbance, LAFD escort protection would be provided by local division HE IT0431 . ~p • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J . Stone July 17, 1992 Page 3 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT officers. After the first four-six hours, police protection could be arranged for individual responses. Chief Ramirez understood that this second category of escorts would be provided by elite LAPD Metro Units. (With respect to anticipated escort duties, it is interesting to note that a pilot program for LAFD escort had been initiated in the 77th Division in October 1991 and continued in February of 1992. Accordingly, LAFD and the 77th Division had experience in coordinating escort protection in non-riot situations.) Commander Lewis stated that LAPD believed that if a riot occurred, it would start slowly and build over several days as the Watts riots had. Commanders Lewis and Dinse advised Chief Ramirez that they had not discussed training or preparations with the National Guard because they did not want to create unnecessary alarm in the public and the news media . Commander Lewis informed Chief Ramirez that additional body armor and gas masks could be arranged through the Office of Emergency Services (OES) upon 24 hours notice. Eventually, additional body armor was obtained through OES on April 29, 1992. The LAPD Was provided with a copy of the LAFD Tactical Alarm Plan. No LAPD planning documents were shared with the LAFD. As an aside, it is worth noting that there was a very active interagency planning group that worked together closely in connection with the 1984 Olympics. Detailed training and contingency plans were developed. After the Olympics, these interagency meetings stopped, plans were not updated and training ceased. MANAGEMENT OF THE EARLY STAGES OF THE DISTURBANCE The interaction of the LAPD and the LAFD during the early stages of the civil disturbance (i.e., 8:00 p.m. - Midnight on April 29) was marked by delay, indecision, disorganization and near command paralysis. Those factors resulted in lines of LAFD strike teams (a strike team consists of five engine companies and a strike team leader, i.e., a group of 20-22 firefighters) backed up in the 54th and Arlington staging area, unable to respond to calls while they waited for the LAPD to release police escorts so they could begin to bring fires under control. Smooth coordination of police escorts for LAFD did not really occur on HE IT0431. WP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 17, 1992 Page 4 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT a consistent basis until responsibility for LAFD escorts was transferred to the California Highway Patrol (CHP) on Thursday morning . The description of the 54th and Arlington staging area by every LAFD senior officer who was at the scene is consistent. Each describes a disorganized, chaotic situation lacking a visible LAPD command structure, an efficient liaison with LAFD and control (or even a grasp of) the law enforcement resources at hand. Until Thursday morning, there was not even a definitive command post for LAPD. During much of Wednesday night, Metro and LAPD patrol divisions maintained separate command posts which did not appear to communicate well with one or the other. The disorganization at 54th and ,Arlington extended to many fronts. The LAPD had paid no attention to the logistical needs of a mass staging area. The location of the command center within the area of hostility created numerous problems ranging from the practicality of getting firefighters and various services safely to the staging area to the persistent lobbing of Molotov Cocktails into the enclosure. By 9:30-10:00 p.m., the disorganized arrival of police cars, fire units, ambulances and equipment had created a virtual grid lock within the one block area such that new arrivals were having problems getting into the staging area at all. The LAFD, which has substantial experience setting up staging areas, took responsibility for reconfiguring the staging area. Within two hours, the area had been configured with traffic cones into smoothly flowing traffic patterns for fire (and refueling), paramedic, and law enforcement staging. The major problem that the LAFD encountered in arranging for LAPD escort was the absence of a responsible LAPD officer with the authority to act. Battalion Chief David Badgett functioned as the LAFD liaison officer with the LAPD (and later CHP) in arranging for escorts. Battalion Chief Badgett served this function from 10:00 p.m. Wednesday evening through Friday at 2:00 p.m. (During Wednesday from 8:30 a.m. until about 11 :00 a.m., Battalion Chief Dahlstein also served as liaison, until relieved and released by Badgett.) It is LAFD's policy as part of its ICS management system to designate a senior LAFD officer to be a liaison with law enforcement in any such emergency. In contrast, at no time did LAPD ever designate a senior officer to be liaison officer with LAFD. This lack of senior level coordination contributed substantially to much of the delay and inefficiency . HEIT0431.WP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J . Stone July 17, 1992 Page 5 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT The initial provision of escorts was accomplished by Battalion Chiefs Badgett and Dahlstein on an ad hoc, "catch as catch can," basis. Each would try to establish relationships with the LAPD patrol or Metro officers to plead for resources. The "blue shirts" were never a problem. Most of the LAPD officers who were mil.ling around, waiting for assignments, were enthusiastic about helping the LAFD. Many field level officers complained about not being able to help. Occasionally, the LAPD lack of central command was a plus. Requests for escort help to senior officers was met with responses that "not enough resources were available" or "you are not a high priority." However, the LAPD officers at the sergeant and lieutenant level were often able to provide help from the hundreds of officers who were milling around "outside the chain of command." These "end run" activities by lower level LAPD officers accounted for much of the early escort support . There was considerable tension between the LAFD and the LAPD concerning the difficulty securing LAPD escorts. At some time between 2:00- 4:00 a.m. on Thursday morning, there was a heated discussion between Deputy Chief Parsons, who was in charge of the LAFD command center at 54th and A rlington and Chief Hunt, who was the senior LAPD officer present . The discussion, witnessed by several LAFD and LAPD officer, revolved around why LAPD was failing to fulfill its priority assignment to provide escorts for fire department strike teams. Chief Hunt's response was that he did not have enough people available. This response was not credible to LAFD because there were large numbers of LAPD officers "lingering around" at all times during the early stages. [Note: Because of his vacation, we have not yet interviewed Deputy Chief Parsons .] At approximately 1 :00 a.m. Thursday morning, escort resources "dried up" as LAPD retained its resources at 54th and Arlington for a massive "sector sweep" operation. The preparation for this sweep limited escort availability for more than an hour. Then, the sweep was abandoned and escort service resumed. There were several additional LAPD organizational snafus which contributed to delays in providing escorts. At one point, Battalion Chief Badgett was told that no escorts could be provided because there were no cars available. Battalion Chief Badgett asked how that could be when he could see 10-15 squad cars. The LAPD explained that the cars were locked and the officers had taken the keys . Battalion Chief Badgett suggested that LAPD send HEIT0431.\./P I . I I • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 17, 1992 Page 6 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT a police explorer to search for keys. That was done and 15 cars for escorts were obtained. This is another example of poor organization for mass staging areas. (The LAFD procedures require valet boards at staging areas and key lock boxes on bumpers or trucks to prevent this kind of problem.) Escort operations were seriously hampered during the period it was being provided by the LAPD by problems with escorts sticking with fire strike teams. When the fire strike teams finally "married up" with an LAPD escort squad, the most efficient method of fighting fires was to "dispatch on the run" after one fire was controlled or to move on to nearby fires while letting the LAFD ICS command center know. The goal was to keep a fire strike team actively fighting fires until the team needed to refuel or break for needed rest. The problem with the LAPD escort teams was that all or part of many escort tactical squads would hear other calls and break away, leaving the LAFD team exposed. Several teams had to return to the staging area, get back in line and lose valuable fire fighting time because of this phenomenon. In several cases, escort teams refused to cross certain geographic or jurisdictional lines. Therefore, to fight a fire, the LAFD strike team had to go unprotected or had to find another escort. The most serious impediment was shift changes. The LAPD operates on 12-hour shifts while the LAFD operates on 24-hour shifts. (Although many LAFD strike teams worked up to 30 hours to avoid problems caused by their shift changes.) During the Wednesday/early Thursday time frame, several LAPD escort teams declined to continue to provide protection to LAFD when shift changes occurred. According to Battalion Chief Badgett, who was in charge of the escort function for the LAFD, this "it's time to go home now" factor was the biggest "in the field" problem with the LAPD escort protection of the LAFD . LATER ESCORT MANAGEMENT By early morning on Thursday, Battalion Chief Badgett was beginning to get significant escort protection from CHP units arriving at 54th and Arlington. By daylight Thursday, the CHP had set up a command trailer at the staging area. Battalion Chief Badgett had begun to liaison with all law enforcement agencies. Because the LAPD was disorganized in how to use other agencies, Battalion Chief Badgett was able to obtain support from several different police forces who sent personnel. For example, Battalion Chief Badgett said that one HEIT0431.YP • • • • • • • I • • • • Memo to Richard J . Stone July 17, 1992 Page 7 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT group sent from Seal Beach was exemplary and was sought out for repeat missions by the LAFD strike teams it protected . As Thursday morning progressed, Battalion Chief Badgett found that he was getting more help from the CHP and that the quality of escort services was good. He observed that the CHP got its command structure organized quickly and intelligently and that the CHP just kept improving its organization. (The LAFD and CHP had, in the past, made presentations to each other about their respective command structures and had achieved a good working relationship on the management of large incidents prior to the riots.) By early Thursday morning, Battalion Chief Badgett approached Lt. Hahn, Lt. Peris and an LAPD captain with a suggestion that the CHP take over the LAFD escort responsibilities. Those officers endorsed the idea and presented it to Capt. Hunt. Coincidentally, at higher levels, Chief Anthony, Chief Gomez of the CHP, Governor Wilson and Chief Gates had reached a similar conclusion. After escort responsibility shifted to the CHP, there was excellent coordination and the operation went very smoothly. MANAGEMENT OF ESCORTS AT 64TH STREET LAFD STAGING AREAS [Interviews are not yet completed] THE IN-FIELD COOPERATION OF THE LAPD AND THE LAFD Although our task force has only interviewed a few strike team leaders and field commanders within the LAFD at this point, except for the issues of shift changes and geographic boundaries, the in-field performance of all law enforcement units appears to have been exemplary. The field tactics utilized seem to have been effective and the bravery of the LAPD officers was praised by many . [We intend to follow-up and flesh out these largely anecdotal incidents] HEIT0431.WP • I • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 17, 1992 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Page 8 It was noted that the LAPD faces a greater challenge than other law enforcement agencies in providing escort services. Because of its hostile relationship with the community, where the LAPD escort teams were used, crowds were bigger, more verbally abusive and more threatening. The CHP and other local police officers with distinctive uniforms engendered less severe reactions. This is consistent with general community relations. LAFD Battalion Chiefs in South Central LA report that the presence of an LAPD unit at an incident often results in more tension and verbal taunting . The LAFD, on the other hand, seems more accepted as a community service provider. A manifestation of this is the fact that while nearly all the fire stations in the riot areas were left unmanned and unprotected, none were attacked and minor graffiti was the only vandalism experienced. It should be noted that contrary to escort services formally assigned at command centers, the LAPD was very responsive to incidents in the field. Several examples of "waving down" LAPD patrol and Metro teams to respond to protection needs were described. In each case, response time was immediate. Several of the LAFD chiefs we interviewed stated that the curfew appeared to give the LAPD the best means of achieving control. During the curfew, the police resources could much more effectively control those trying to disrupt the LAFD efforts. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The LAPD needs to plan and train for resource-draining emergencies. (a) The LAPD needs an incident command system to utilize in such settings; (b) The LAPD needs to work with the LAFD to identify and pre configure a number of staging areas. Staging area organization should probably be delegated to the LAFD, which has more HEIT0431.\.JP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 17, 1992 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Page 9 experience. Staging areas should be set up outside hostile territory; (c) The LAPD must design a management system that can expeditiously request and deploy aid from other law enforcement agencies. Since the LAPD appears to be understaffed, this appears imperative; (d) (e) Practice and training on mutual aid must be ongoing. The LAFD recognizes the value of this and observed that the LAPD did not have a system to utilize mutual aid well. The· LAPD must improve i_ ts vehicle control management at staging areas so that all resources are available. 2. The LAPD needs to designate a senior level liaison officer with authority to authorize resources to coordinate activities with the LAFD liaison officer . 3. The LAFD and LAPD need to cooperate to understand each other's needs and procedures better. This is already occurring. 4. The CHP should automatically be assigned LAFD escort duties as soon as practicable. This will free up LAPD resources- , put less provocative resources on these duties and allow two organizations which routinely deal with large emergencies to coordinate. 5. The LAPD' s attitude that it is a resource-rich department that does not need to plan and work with others must change . HE IT0431 • WP • I I . • • • • • • • • • TO: FROM: RB: DATE: CC: Summary Augustini & Wheeler MEMORANDUM Office of the Special Advisor DRAFT Leonard Sharenow Robert Corbin Julie Huffman PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Draft Report On the Involvement of the California Highway Patrol in the Los Angeles Riots July 16, 1992 Kenneth R. Heitz Diann H. Kirn Susan Spivak The California Highway Patrol ("CHP") planned extensively for the possibility of a riot following announcement of the verdicts in the King officers' trial. Planning began in mid-March. By late April, the CHP had identified individual officers who would be placed in command of the CHP's response to a riot, created an Emergency Response Center ("ERC") to centralize communications and command, equipped two mobile communications vehicles, identified and equipped three staging areas for patrol officers, reserved hotel rooms for officers coming from out of town, arranged for catering services from private caterers and ordered additional riot gear and supplies. Although the CHP made overtures toward the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD"), to coordinate its plans with that agency, LAPD Assistant Chief Bob Vernon rebuffed those efforts. Vernon told the CHP that the LAPD was taking a "low key" approach toward the possibility of a riot, but had had meetings to plan for such an event. He did not ask to review the CHP's plan nor would he agree to meet with the CHP to create an inter-agency plan. Vernon, and other LAPD commanders, apparently held the view that open planning could create a "self-fulfilling prophecy" of violence. The CHP had at least 120 officers formed into companies and ready to respond to the riots by 9:00 p.m. on April 29. These officers were not effectively utilized during the first night of the riots. Other CHP personnel were used to block access to freeways and major surface street intersections in South Central Los Angeles, and to provide some crowd control. During the • • • • • • • • • • • Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work Product Page 2 afternoon of April 30, the LAPD, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office ("LASO") and CHP jointly decided that the CHP would take primary responsibility for escorting fire department personnel . The CHP continued to perform that duty during the riots. CHP officers also escorted Los Angeles Department of Water and Power ("DWP") crews on their attempts to restore p ower to South Central Los Angeles. It appears that the CHP did an outstanding job of planning for, and responding to the riots. It was able to mobilize large numbers of officers quickly, and provided effective protection to the LAFD and DWP personnel. There were no major collisions or injuries involving CHP personnel or the parties they escorted. Most of the officers we interviewed indicated that it would have been helpful to have more communication and planning with the LAPD before the riots began. They emphasized, however, that once the riots were underway, communication and cooperation among the responding agencies was efficient and open. One officer expressed the view that it would have been beneficial to have more communication between officers at the highest levels of command, because, in his view, the law enforcement community never arrived at an overall plan for responding to the riots and instead reacted to each separate incident as it occurred. The officers we interviewed were uniformly unwilling to openly criticize the LAPD's planning efforts or response to the riots, for fear of jeopardizing their long-term working relationships with that agency . In studying the CHP's response to the Los Angeles riots, members of the Special Advisor's staff interviewed the CHP officers most directly involved in planning and implementing the CHP's response. These officers included: Deputy Commissioner Dwight Helmick, Jr., second in command of the CHP, Assistant Commissioner Bob Rengstorff, Helmick's immediate subordinate, and Chief Edward Gomez, commander of the CHP's Southern California Area. Staff members also interviewed Captain Greg Augusta (commander of the Newhall Area), Captain Ray Blackwell (commander of the East Los Angeles Area), and Captain Cal Minor (commander of the West Los Angeles Area). These officers drafted the CHP's contingency plan for responding to a riot following the announcement of the verdicts in the King officers' trial, and were placed in charge of CHP companies formed on April 29 to respond to the violence that erupted after the verdicts were announced. We also interviewed Sgt. Robert Grimsley, Jr. and Officer Jim Abele, two officers involved in gathering and disseminating intelligence concerning the possibility of a riot, and the progress of the riots once they began. In addition, staff members reviewed the California Mutual Aid Plan, the CHP's Emergency Response Manual, other CHP manuals discussing emergency preparedness and the CHP's contingency plan for the Los Angeles riots. We found the CHP to be very willing to speak with the Special Advisor's counsel, and to provide us with the documents we requested . • • • • • • • • • • • Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work Product Page 3 Background The CHP has primary responsibility for law enforcement and emergency response on state freeways, highways, and county roads in unincorporated areas. The CHP also responds to requests for assistance from local law enforcement agencies who are overwhelmed by an emergency. Although CHP officers will always respond to an "officer needs assistance" call from another agency, the CHP will not provide greater levels of assistance unless the local agency follows the protocol established by the state's Mutual Aid Plan. Like other agencies, the CHP maintains command of its own personnel when responding to a request for assistance. Thus, the CHP will accept "missions" from another agency through the Mutual Aid Plan, but will not turn its officers over to the control of another agency . The CHP frequently provides support to local law enforcement agencies during emergencies, demonstrations and natural disasters. For example, the CHP was heavily involved in providing disaster relief after the 1989 San Francisco earthquake, and in providing crowd control for demonstrations at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant and at gay rights demonstrations held following Gov. Wilson's veto of A.B. 101. Because it frequently responds to such incidents, the CHP is familiar with contingency planning, and frequently creates contingency plans to respond to anticipated events. The CHP maintains an Emergency Response Manual which outlines how plans are to be drafted and the matters each plan should take into consideration. The officers we interviewed indicated that, unlike many other local agencies, the LAPD and LASO are generally reluctant to engage in contingency planning with the CHP. These officers believe the LAPD and LASO view the CHP as ill-equipped to respond to such emergencies or to handle general law enforcement duties during a disturbance. The LAPD and LASO are not perceived as "approachable" by other agencies, because they are so well equipped, so high-profile and so confident of their own abilities to control disturbances . Representatives of the CHP regularly attend meetings with representatives of other area law enforcement agencies. Chief Gomez, for example, attends regular meetings with other area police chiefs. Members of the intelligence division attend monthly meetings of the California Gang Investigators, Prison Gang Task Force, Outlaw Motorcycle Gang Task Force and an intelligence liaison group that includes representatives from LAPD, LASO, the FBI, CIA and Secret Service. During these meetings, members of the CHP learned that other area agencies were also anticipating violence in the wake of the verdicts in the King officers' trial. It was clear, however, that no one wanted to engage in any public planning for a disturbance, because they believed that planning might lead to more violence . • • • • • • • • • • • Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work Product Page 4 Internal CHP Planning For the Los Angeles Riots During March and April 1992, the CHP planned extensively for the event of a disturbance following the announcement of the verdict in the King officers' trial. Although the CHP made initial efforts to communicate with the LAPD concerning its contingency plan, those efforts were rebuffed by LAPD Assistant Chief Bob Vernon. Thereafter, the CHP had little communication, and no formal planning sessions, with the LAPD . Chief Edward Gomez, Commander of the CHP's Southern California Area, stated that, in the weeks and months before the verdict was announced, the CHP had received some informal intelligence indicating that a disturbance might occur if the officers involved in the King beating were acquitted. The CHP intelligence officers we interviewed confirmed that, in the weeks preceding the riots, they had received reports from informants and from individuals who called CHP offices, that gang members were planning to kill LAPD and other law enforcement officers. The CHP also received some information that Korean store owners, liquor stores and gun shops would be targets for violence and looting . CHP personnel also appear to have paid close attention to media reports of community unrest. Many of the officers we interviewed stated that media coverage of the trial, and statements made by community leaders to the medial contributed to their perception that a riot might occur . Chief Gomez also knew, from discussions with LAPD and other area police chiefs, that everyone in the law enforcement community believed there was a potential for violence after the verdicts were announced. It was Gomez's impression that the LAPD and other area agencies were reluctant to make visible plans with other agencies for responding to the threat of a disturbance. They feared that public planning efforts could create a self-fulfilling prophecy -- a public perception that law enforcement expected a riot might provoke violence that otherwise would not have occurred. Gomez understood that everyone was thinking about the potential for violence, but that no one wanted to talk about it . The CHP's internal planning began after a routine meeting among area captains held on March 18, 1992. During that meeting, Captain Greg Augusta (commander of the Newhall Area), Captain Ray Blackwell (commander of the East Los Angeles Area) and Captain Cal Minor (commander of the West Los Angeles Area) expressed their belief that violence would occur after the verdicts were announced. Some area commanders disagreed -- they apparently believed that the officers would be found guilty and that the community would not resort to violence. After discussion, the group came to a consensus that the CHP should develop a contingency plan. Chief Gomez assigned Captains Augusta, Blackwell and Minor the task of drafting the CHP's plan . Although Augusta, Blackwell and Minor believed violence was likely following the verdicts, especially if any of the officers • • • • • • • • Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work Product Page 5 were acquitted or if there were hung juries, they believed that the 1,000 officers available in the Southern California area would probably be sufficient to handle any disturbance. They also believed that they would have several hours after the verdict was announced before violence erupted. It was their belief that it usually takes several hours for a frenzy to develop. Augusta, Blackwell and Minor met on March 25 to begin drafting their plan. All three Captains emphasized that the plan was intended to assure the safety of CHP officers and to allow the CHP to mobilize quickly to provide appropriate assistance to the LAPD and LASO during a disturbance. The CHP was not certain whether the disturbance would occur in an area in which it has the primary obligation to respond (e.g., a demonstration attempting to block access to area freeways), or whether the CHP would be involved in providing assistance to other area agencies. The planners did identify potential "flash points" where a distrubance could occur. These flash points were: South Central Los Angeles, the Verdugo Hills area and Simi Valley. Because the CHP was unsure of the role it would play in responding to a disturbance, the plan was not specific about the responsibilities patrol officers or companies of officers would assume. Instead, the plan was designed to provide a logistical framework for mobilizing, housing, and feeding approximately 1,000 CHP officers, setting up an Emergency Response Center ("ERC") to centralize communications, and then dismantling the operation . The CHP's contingency plan identified key personnel who would be involved in coordinating the CHP's response to a disturbance, including an intelligence officer, logistics officer, public information officer, finance officer, operations officers, and liaisons to other area agencies. The plan provided that, when the jury began its deliberations, intelligence concerning the community's reaction to the trial and the trial itself would be monitored and key personnel would be notified and made available to report immediately to the ERC. In addition, the CHP would prepare two mobile units, to assist in coordinating its field operations. The plan also included a "tactical alert" phase, which would be implemented if a disturbance appeared likely to occur. Under the tactical alert, personnel assigned to the ERC would report there for duty, personnel assigned to mobile units would report to them, and increased security measures for all CHP facilities would go into effect. On-duty personnel would be ordered to wear their bullet-proof vests and to ride two to a car. All area commanders would identify one-half of their on-duty personnel to respond immediately to pre-arranged staging areas. The CHP created such staging areas at its stations in West Los Angeles, Verdugo Hills and Los Alamitos. Personnel assigned to respond would be ordered to remain on-duty indefinitely, and to use a specified radio frequency for communications. Finally, the plan provided that, if called upon to assist other agencies, the CHP would prepare for the deployment of off-duty personnel and of personnel from other areas . • • • • • • • • • • Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work Product Page 6 On April 1, 1992, the plan was distributed to all area captains. In keeping with the law enforcement community's apparent desire for secrecy in the planning process, the plan was printed on red paper, making it difficult to photocopy, and thus more difficult to leak. Patrol officers were not provided copies of the contingency plan but were given copies of the Tactical Alert order. That order describes what patrol officers are expected to do whenever such an alert is implemented; it does not specifically address the possibility of a riot following the verdicts. During the next two weeks, the CHP mad e more specific logistical arrangements for responding to a riot. CHP officers contacted area hotels to reserve rooms for officers corning from out of town, and arranged for catering services from both private caterers and from the Forestry Department. Area commanders in other areas of the State were also ordered to create a contingency plan for providing support to the Southern California Area. Key personnel, including Chief Gomez, all area commanders, and all personnel assigned to the ERC were issued cellular telephones to be used only for communications concerning a disturbance. The CHP also procured several portable fax machines. A list of these telephone numbers was distributed to concerned personnel. In addition, area commanders inventoried their officers' riot gear (e.g., helmets, bullet-proof vests, shields, groin protectors, etc.), to determine whether additional supplies would be needed . Some additional supplies were ordered. Arrangements were made for officers trained in the use of automatic weapons to be prepared to respond to a request for assistance from the Southern California Area. On April 10, after receiving permission from Assistant Commissioner Rengstorff, Chief Gomez telephoned LAPD Assistant Chief Bob Vernon. Gomez told Vernon that the CHP had begun to plan for responding to a disturbance after the verdicts were announced. He inquired whether Vernon wished to meet to discuss the CHP's plan, and to coordinate the LAPD's response with the CHP. Vernon told Gomez that the LAPD had had a meeting to plan for a possible disturbance, but that the LAPD wanted to maintain a low profile on the issue . Vernon declined to meet with Gomez, or to discuss the LAPD's plan with him. Vernon did not ask to review the CHP's contingency plan. Gomez stated that he was not surprised or worried by Vernon's response to his inquiries. In fact, Gomez derived some comfort from the fact that the LAPD was beginning to plan for a disturbance. Gomez felt that it was his job to insure the CHP could adequate respond to a disturbance; the LAPD's planning was its business. In addition, he felt that it was not unusual for the LAPD to decline invitations to plan with other agencies. Because the LAPD is so large and so confident of its own abilities to respond to disturbances, it rarely requires assistance from other agencies. Gomez also felt the LAPD had better intelligence concerning the potential for violence among gangs and minority • • • • • • • • • • • Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work Product Page 7 groups than did the CHP. He stated that, when Vernon told him the LAPD was taking a low key approach, he gave that statement a lot of credibility. Gomez came away from his conversation with Vernon believing that the LAPD was doing something to plan for a possible riot. Many of the other officers we interviewed also spoke informally with members of the LAPD concerning the potential for violence. They told these officers that the CHP would be ready to respond to a disturbance, but that the LAPD would have to use the Mutual Aid Plan in order to obtain extensive CHP assistance. Some CHP officers heard informally that the LAPD was preparing for a riot, although none learned any significant details about the LAPD's plans, nor did they share details of the CHP's plans with LAPD personnel. All of the officers we spoke with were very aware of the political realities and protocols of the situation. None were anxious to step on any one's toes by suggesting that more planning occur, nor did they wish to go outside the chain of command and communicate directly with their counterparts at other agencies without a formal invitation and the approval of their commanding officers . Two of the three captains involved in creating the CHP's contingency plan believed they could have developed a more efficient plan had they had the opportunity to discuss the plan with representatives of the LAPD. These captains expressed the view that they were planning in a vacuum -- the CHP simply had no idea of the role it would play in responding to a riot. Had they known how the LAPD envisioned using their services, they might have been better able to coordinate their response. One captain indicated that he had asked his immediate superior whether he could contact his counterparts at the LAPD and LASO to discuss the . contingency plan. He was told that the LAPD and LASO were not interested in planning with the CHP. These captains also believe that the LAPD and LASO tend not to take the CHP very seriously as a general law enforcement agency. They believe the LAPD and LASO view the CHP as "ticket writers" and "traffic cops" who are not well equipped to respond to a riot. In realty, these captains say, the CHP is well equipped to respond to emergencies, since it does so all over the state whenever a natural disaster or other large-scale emergency occurs. These captains shared Gomez's impression that the LAPD and LASO are so high-profile, and so confident of their own abilities that they are reluctant to engage in interagency planning. Since the LAPD and LASO want to take the lead, and believe they can handle such emergencies themselves, they are not very approachable. Implementation of the CHP Plan On April 29, the day the verdicts were announced, Chief Gomez telephoned Vernon every hour because he had heard that the verdict • • • '· I • • • • • • Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work Product Page 8 would be announced that day. By 12:30 p.m., Gomez received word from the trial court that the verdict would be announced at 3:00 p.m. Although Gomez telephoned him following this call, Vernon did not request CHP assistance or suggest that LAPD representatives meet with the CHP to plan for a possible disturbance. When the verdicts wer announced, most captains in the Southern California Area were together at CHP's Glendale headquarters, watching the news on television. The highest ranking officials in Sacramento gathered at CHP's state headquarters for the same purpose. The officers we interviewed stated that, as soon as the verdicts were announced, they knew violence would occur. Most believed, however, that it would take several hours for the violence to erupt. Everyone was surprised that the situation deteriorated as quickly as it did. The officers we interviewed were also surprised by the size and extent of the riots, and the speed with which they spread to other portions of the city. Although they anticipated a major disturbance, no one predicted the riots would be as extensive as they were. After the verdicts were announced, the CHP immediately formed two companies {of about 50 officers each) to respond to the disturbance. Captain Blackwell was placed in charge of a company staging at Verdugo Hills. Captain Minor was placed in charge of the company staging in West Los Angeles. Blackwell estimated that his company was complete and ready to respond to requests for assistance by 8:00 that evening. Minor estimated that his company was operational by 9:00 p.m. At 3:45 p.m., all chiefs statewide had a conference call with the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners . The chiefs were told to begin implementing their contingency plans by, among other things, checking their equipment and locating their off-duty officers. At 4:00 p.m., Assistant Commissioner Rengstorff was ordered to identify 500 officers in Southern California who could be called in immediately. He also identified another 750 who could be prepared to deploy within 10 hours. Rengstorff also started the process of shipping extra supplies from Sacramento to Los Angeles. These supplies included 22 automatic weapons (together with CHP officers who had been specially trained to use them) and extra ammunition. CHP officers on duty in Los Angeles County were ordered to ride two to a car, wear their bullet proof vests and take other emergency precautions. At 4:45 p.m., Gomez held a conference call with all captains in the Southern California Area, and ordered them to go on tactical alert. All CHP in Los Angeles County went on 12 hour shifts. Gomez also had subordinates make inquiries about the LAPD/LASO's emergency response center and asked to have a CHP representative present there. He arranged to have an LAPD representative available at the CHP emergency response center, to • • I • • • • • • • • • Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work Product Page 9 serve as an additional liaison. Assistant Commissioner Ted Starr was placed in charge of CHP emergency field operations. His immediate subordinates were Captains Blackwell, Augusta and Minor . At 8:00 p.m., Commissioner Hannigan participated in a conference call between Bradley, Gates, Governor Wilson, and representatives of the OES and National Guard. According to Deputy Commissioner Helmick and Assistant Commissioner Rengstorff, Hannigan initiated the call. During the call, everyone appeared most concerned about obtaining the assistance of the National Guard, and seemed to consider the CHP as an afterthought. When Hannigan indicated that the CHP was prepared to respond and had approximately 750 officers available, others involved in the call immediately accepted the offer of assistance. Helmick was not sure whether Gates dissented when the Governor ordered the CHP to respond. Following the call, Rengstorff was ordered to deploy 750 CHP officers in Los Angeles by midnight. At the same time, CHP officers statewide were ordered to go on 12 hour shifts. Rengstorff stated that the CHP almost made its midnight deadline . Although these officers were available in the CHP staging areas shortly after midnight, they were not given a specific mission until noon the next day, when they were assigned the task of protecting the fire department, ambulances, and specific intersection perimeters . At 11:00 p~m., the CHP was requested to deploy an additional 750 officers in Los Angeles by 3:00 a.m. This necessitated calling in officers from San Francisco, Madera, Fresno and other locations throughout the state. Some officers from Northern California flew ~own in military transport planes, with all of their gear, except for vehicles. Rengstorff stated that, in hindsight, he should have had the officers drive to Los Angeles, since they later experienced a s hortage of patrol cars, necessitating that some be brought to Los Angeles from other locations. Although the CHP did not meet the 3:00 a.m. deadline, it did have 1500 officers present in Los Angeles by noon the next day . Minor and Blackwell both stated that their companies were prepared to respond to missions by 9:00 p.m. on April 29, but were not effectively used. Minor's company received no missions on the first night. Blackwell's company had only one. The LASO's Wayside Honor Farm experienced a riot among its prisoners, and the Sheriff asked for CHP assistance. Blackwell's company responded, helped to put down the disturbance and then escorted Sheriff's Department busses to the County Jail (they were unable to keep many prisoners at the Honor Farm because the prisoners had destroyed some of the living quarters). Both Captains believed that the CHP could have effectively been used for general law enforcement duties, such as looting control, had they been requested to do so by the LAPD . • • • • • • • • • • • Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work Product Page 10 Captain Augusta was ordered to work as a liaison with the LAPD. At around 9:00 p.m. on the 29th, he reported to the LAPD's command post with a mobile communications vehicle. During the night, Augusta relayed LAPD requests for assistance to Chief Gomez at the CHP's ERC. Augusta indicated that, during the first night of the riots, the CHP was requested to provide some crowd control, to block freeway access to South Central Los Angeles and to control intersections of major surface streets in South Central Los Angeles. Gomez indicated that he always verified LAPD requests for assistance by cnecking his own intelligence reports prior to deploying CHP officers. He described the CHP's work with the LAPD as "collaborative." Gomez stated that the CHP had the staff and equipment to respond to more missions than it was asked to do. From midnight on the 29th until noon the next day, Gomez had extra officers who were waiting for orders. Blackwell worked until about 5:00 a.m. on April 30. He then left and reported back to work at about 2 p.m. on April 30. Minor left the West Los Angeles staging area at about 2:00 a.m. on April 30, and was told to report back to work by noon. At 1:00 p.m. on Apri l 30, Gomez and Rengstorff participated in a conference call with Block, Gates and Delh. During that call, the CHP was requested to provide protection to the fire department and ambulances . When he reported back to work on April 30, Minor was told to move his company to the Coliseum where they would receive orders from the LAPD to conduct a sweep of the area. Blackwell's company received the same order. When they arrived at the Coliseum, no one from the LAPD was there to meet them. Another CHP company arrived shortly thereafter. Approximately two hours later, the CHP gathered at the Coliseum were ordered to report to 54th and Arlington, to escort the fire department. For the rest of Thursday night, and most of Friday, the CHP worked around the clock, providing escort services to the Los Angeles city and county fire departments and ambulance crews. Blackwell and Minor agreed that, once given this mission, communications between CHP, LAPD, LASO and LAFD went smoothly and the mission was efficiently carried out. By Friday night, the CHP was also providing escort services to the Department of Water and Power in its attempts to restore power to South Central Los Angeles. That duty continued through Saturday. Blackwell felt that the decision to provide escorts to the DWP was politically motivated. Politicians from the area decided that restoration of power was an immediate necessity, so the law enforcement people went along with that assessment. He felt that was the only example of political interference he witnessed . • • • • • • • • • • • Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work Product Page 11 Interaction with the LAPP Most of the CHP personnel we interviewed were reluctant to endanger their working relationship with the LAPD by criticizing its response to the riots. Many, however, were critical of the LAPD's attitude toward the CHP, and of its reluctance to engage in contingency planning with the CHP. No one felt that the CHP's resources were effectively used on the first night of the riots . While many CHP officers were involved in cordoning off the freeways leading into South Central Los Angeles, and in providing perimeter control at various intersections within South Central, others were underutilized throughout the night. Two CHP companies (about 120 officers), as well as other on-duty personnel were prepared to respond to requests for assistance by 9:00 p.m. on April 29. Instead, they spent most of that night watching the riots on television. Once the riots were underway, and the CHP was given a mission, all agreed that communications with the LAPD, LAFD and LASO worked smoothly. No one reported substantial "turf battles" or political conflicts concerning the response to the riots. All agencies responding to the riots were open about sharing the information they had. In general, the CHP officers we interviewed believed that communications among the various agencies were amiable and efficient. At least one officer indicated his belief that more communication at the highest level of command would have been beneficial. That officer stated he thought that a lot of "haphazard" planning occurred during the riots. The major players never sat down to create a coordinated plan for responding to the riots; instead, they responded to each separate incident as it occurred . Officers were particularly pleased with the manner in which CHP officers were assigned to escort fire department vehicles. The ERC at 54th and Arlington apparently created three lines for response vehicles -- one for fire trucks, one for ambulances and one for CHP. When a call came in, vehicles from each line would respond. After the call was completed, the vehicles returned to the ERC and went to the end of the line to wait for their next turn. After the disturbance calmed down a bit, and LAFD units were returned to their stations, some CHP units were assigned to specific fire stations and ordered to escort LAFD personnel whenever the fire department responded to a call . The CHP officers we interviewed were very proud of their own planning efforts. They believe their contingency plan allowed the CHP to mobilize large numbers of officers very quickly, although those officers may not have been used as effectively as they could have been at the beginning of the disturbance. CHP officers were also well-housed and well-fed, with a few exceptions. Chief Gomez stated that the staging area at Los Alamitos was not well equipped to handle the influx of officers, because it did not have enough beds, showers or toilets. Once that problem was identified, • • • • • • • • • • • Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work Product Page 12 officers were assigned to hotel rooms in the area. The CHP experienced no problems feeding its offices, and in fact was equipped to feed officers from other agencies as well. On Friday night, for example, the CHP fed approximately 600 steak dinners to its officers and to officers from other agencies. The CHP experienced some difficulties equipping officers from other areas. Because many flew to Los Angeles on military transports, without their vehicles the CHP was left without an adequate number of vehicles for some hours. CHP recruits and car carriers were used to deliver more vehicles to Los Angeles on Friday. · The CHP was also proud of its performance during the riots. Although it responded to thousands of missions with the LAFD, no CHP officers were seriously injured, no major collisions occurred, and the LAFD was able to effectively perform its job. Recommendations 1. The LAPD and LASO should be encouraged to engage in pre emergency contingency planning with the CHP and other area agencies whenever events occur that indicate a major disturbance is likely to develop. Almost every CHP officer we interviewed believed that the LAPD and LASO were so confident of their own abilities to respond to a disturbance that they rarely wished to engage in such planning. Yet it is obvious that the CHP's assistance will be required whenever a major disturbance occurs, and that the CHP is well equipped to provide such assistance. We were dismayed to learn that Assistant Chief Bob Vernon of the LAPD rebuffed attempts by the CHP to engage in such planning before the Los Angeles riots began. Such plann i ng might have lead to a speedier response, and allowed the L D to control the violence more quickly. Moreover, the Los Angeles riots demonstrate that violence can develop and spread throughout a wide area much more quickly than many law enforcement officials previously thought possible. Pre-emergency coordination among area agencies may allow the LAPD and other agencies to contain the spread of such violence more effectively . 2. The agencies should attempt to assign specific tasks to the CHP, and other assisting agencies, before a disturbance occurs, so that those agencies can better plan for their own response. It is clear that the CHP's effectiveness is hampered by its inability to determine, before it receives a request for assistance, how its resources will be utilized. Accordingly, better communication among the agencies. could lead to a more efficient and effective response by all agencies. 3. The LAPD and LASO should be encouraged to contact the CHP as soon as possible after a major disturbance occurs, and to use the CHP's resources in responding to such a disturbance. It appears that, during the Los Angeles riots, the LAPD and LASO concentrated its efforts on securing the assistance of the • • • • • • • • • • • Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work Product Page 13 National Guard, while ignoring the many CHP officers who were in the area and ready to respond. It seems incredible to us that, while Los Angeles waited for the National Guard to appear, two full companies of CHP officers were prepared to assist in general law enforcement duties on April 29, but were never called. 4. The LAPD, city government and community leaders should re-examine the political and philosophical question whether public planning for the possibility of a disturbance does, in fact, lead to more violence than it prevents. Each of the officers we interviewed stated it was their impression that the LAPD was reluctant to openly plan for the possibility of a riot because it feared community criticism and because it believed such plans might create a self-fulfilling prophecy of violence. It appears that the LAPD may have been too intimidated by the prospect of such criticism to engage in any meaningful planning with other agencies, including the CHP, and that its ability to respond quickly to the violence was hampered as a result. Accordingly, all concerned entities should consider whether advance law enforcement planning can create a self-fulfilling prophecy of violence; it may well creatd a self-fulfilling prophecy of peace . I • • • • • • • • • • • File: Webster Study LAW OFFICES IRELL & MANELLA A Partnership Including Professional Corporations MEMORANDUM Re: Role of the California National Guard During the Los Angeles Civil Disturbance PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT I. OVERVIEW DRAFT Date: July 15, 1992 To: From: cc: Richard J. Stone, General Counsel and Staff Director Brian J. Hennigan/)1p Kenneth R. Heitz The California National Guard ("CNG") successfully mobilized 7,100 Guardsmen to duty in response to the Los Angeles civil disturbance which began on April 29, 1992. The initial call-up of 2,000 troops was begun at 9:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992. Successive call-ups of equal numbers of Guardsmen were made on April 30, 1992 and May 1, 1992. There were two factors with regard to the CNG activities which could have significantly impacted the effectiveness of the CNG. First, at the time of the initial call-up, there was no clear statement from the Governor's office, or the Office of Emergency Services ("OES"), as to who was in charge of the law enforcement activities in Los Angeles. In fact, the CNG did not learn that the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office ("LASO") was in charge of the law enforcement response to the civil disturbance until mid-afternoon on April 30, 1992. It should be noted that the CNG did not begin deploying troops into action until this time so that there was no time lost as a result of this leadership uncertainty. Second, the CNG was federalized by order of the President at 6:00 p.m. on May 1, 1992. The federalization of the CNG had the effect of restricting the types of mission which the CNG could undertake and placing additional bureaucratic obstacles to an effective CNG response. In effect, the federalization of the CNG diminished the ability to support the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") . HENN0440.~P • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 15, 1992 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Page 2 The information concerning the CNG was derived from interviews with: Major General Robert C. Thrasher; Major General Daniel J. Hernandez; Brigadier General James Delk; Colonel Edmund C. Zysk; Capta i n Troy Armstrong; Captain David Baldwin; Sergeant Hubbard; Sergeant Zuchowski; and Specialist Salazar. A. IL PRE-PLANNING ACTIVITIES GENERALIZED PRE-PLANNING ACTIVITIES The CNG is normally called into action during a civil disturbance through the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System. Under that system, the State of California is divided into seven regions. Requests for aid are made to the coordinator for each region. The first level of response to a request for aid is delegated to the Regional Coordinator. The Southern California area is contained within Region 1. Sheriff Sherman Block, the head of the LASO is a Region 1 Coordinator . The OES is responsible for the maintenance and operation of the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System. There was no indication from the OES that there would be a need for CNG troops in connection with the Los Angeles civil disturbance. Indeed, in approximately mid April, 1992, the OES had requested that the CNG allow California Highway Patrol ("CHP") officers to be placed at various CNG armories. Sometime later, the OES also requested the CNG to provide equipment for local law enforcement officers in preparation for possible unrest in Los Angeles . On April 14, 1992, the CNG provided the LAPD with flak jackets, Kevlar helmets, and 380 gas masks. In addition, the CNG provided similar equipment to the Los Angeles and Orange County Fire Departments. With regard to troop deployment, however, there was no indication from the OES before the troop call-up on April 29, 1992, that there was to be a request for CNG troops. Indeed, in mid-April, 1992, the OES had expressed the opinion to the CNG that the CNG would only be needed for potential back-up support and would not be called into action . HENN0440 . WP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 15, 1992 Page 3 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT B. PLANNING ACTIVITIES WITH REGARD TO THE LAPD Under . the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid system, it is expected that a local law enforcement agency would make the request to the OES requesting CNG support and identify specific missions and roles for the CNG. Under normal processes, the CNG would expect to hear about an LAPD request only through their contact with the OES . With regard to the Los Angeles civil disturbance which began on April 29, 1992, there was no contact from the LAPD to the CNG notifying them of potential problems with regard to the ability of the LAPD to respond effectively to civil disturbances. As far as the CNG was aware, the LAPD had made no request for any increase in the readiness status for the CNG. III. MOBILIZATION OF CNG TROOPS The CNG troops and officers were aware of the civil disturbance in Los Angeles by watching the telecast of the disturbances beginning in the late afternoon on April 29, 1992. At that time, a number of the CNG platoon leaders telephoned the troops and informed them that there may be a call-up of troops with regard to the civil disturbance. There was, however, no request for CNG troops until 9:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992. On April 29, 1992, at 8:30 p.m., the OES requested that the CNG provide support for 500 CHP officers at the Armed Forces Reserve Center in Los Alamitos, California . At 9:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992, Governor Wilson's office notified Major General Robert C. Thrasher of the CNG that the Governor was calling up 2,000 CNG troops for deployment into the Los Angeles area. At the time of the call, the Governor's office further informed Major General Thrasher that the decision to call in the CNG was made in response to a request from Mayor Tom Bradley. There was no indication at the time that the LAPD had made a request for CNG assistance. Immediately after the phone conversation from the Governor's office, the CNG began the process of calling up HENN0440.WP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 15, 1992 Page 4 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT troops for mobilization into the CNG armories throughout the State . Approximately one hour after the Governor's phone call, Major General Thrasher participated in a conference call with Mike Guerin (OES), Governor Pete Wilson, Mayor Tom Bradley, Sheriff Sherman Block, LAPD Chief Daryl Gates, CHP Commissioner Maury Hannigan, OES Director Mike Andrews, and Randy Rossi (California Attorney General's Office). That phone conversation was the first time in which the LAPD had any direct contact with the CNG. During that phone conversation, LAPD Chief Gates stated that the LAPD was completely mobilized, with approximately 1,000 officers currently on duty and calls in to bring an additional 400 to 500 into the area. Additionally, LAPD Chief Gates indicated that there were many fires burning out of control in Los Angeles and looting on the street, but not as many people on the street as there were during the Watts riot. LASO Sheriff Block stated that there were no areas out of control at the time and, therefore, there was no need for State resources in support of County law enforcement officers at that time. However, at the end of the conversation, Mayor Tom Bradley specifically asked LAPD Chief Gates and LASO Sheriff Block whether they wanted CNG troops on the street and both responded affirmatively. During the period of time of CNG mobilization, there was an uncertainty within the CNG as to which law enforcement agency was in charge of making the response to the civil disturbance. Major General Thrasher, who was the Adjutant General in charge of the overall operation for the CNG, stated that he had raised that issue on Wednesday evening when he was first alerted to the request for CNG troops. At that time, both the Governor's office, then later the OES, stated that it was not settled who was responsible for being in charge of the missions which would ultimately be assigned to the CNG. Indeed, even by the late morning hours of April 30, 1992, when General James Delk from the CNG arrived in Los Angeles and met with the LAPD, the LAPD Captain who met with General Delk informed him that he did not know who was in charge of the official response to the civil disturbance. As late as 1:15 p.m. on April 30, 1992, the CNG did not have a clear indication from the LAPD or the LASO as to who was in charge of directing the CNG missions during the civil disturbance. At 1:15 p.m., General Delk contacted Major HENN0440.WP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 15, 1992 Page 5 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT General Thrasher to discuss the uncertainty as to which agency, LAPD or LASO, had the authority to provide missions and directions to the CNG . At 2:00 p.m. on April 30, 1992, the issue of which agency was responsible for tasking the CNG was resolved. During a conference call involving Governor Pete Wilson, LASO Sheriff Block, CHP Commissioner Hannigan, LAPD Chief Gates, OES Director Mike Andrews, General Delk, and Major General Thrasher, it was agreed that all law enforcement tasking would go through the LASO Emergency Operation Center ("EOC"). Colonel Edmund C. Zysk was assigned to the LASO EOC, which was located at the Sheriff's Station, Biscailuz Center, 1060 North Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles. The Biscailuz Center had liaison officers from the CNG, LASO, LAPD, and OES. The mission tasking was run through the EOC, with requests being made primarily by the LASO to the OES. It was during the early afternoon on April 30, 1992, that the first group of CNG were sent into the streets . IV. FRONT OFFICE LIAISON WITH LAPD By early afternoon on April 30, 1992, the issue of which law enforcement agencies would be involved in the tasking for CNG was resolved. At approximately 2:30 p.m., General Delk met with LAPD Chief Gates, LASO Sheriff Block, CHP Commissioner Hannigan, Under Sheriff Bob Edmunds, and three senior CHP commanders. At that meeting, LAPD Chief Gates asked CHP Commissioner Hannigan if CHP would provide protection for the fire fighters who were under siege . Commissioner Hannigan agreed to that request. LAPD Chief Gates then asked General Delk if the CNG would handle "everything else." General Delk replied that the CNG was ready and prepared to do whatever was necessary throughout the duration of the civil disturbance . In terms of the tasking for the CNG, the LASO EOC at the Biscailuz Center was activated in mid-afternoon on May 30, 1992. Colonel Edmund C. Zysk was the liaison officer for the CNG at that Center. Colonel Zysk indicated that he worked with the LASO and LAPD officers with regard to the assignment of CNG troops. Zysk stated the LASO was primarily responsible HENN0440.WP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 15, 1992 Page 6 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT for requests to the CNG for troop deployment. Colonel Zysk stated that the LASO liaison officer, Bob Edmunds, would request a certain number of troops to be deployed at specific locations. The request was then made to Colonel Zysk, who would be in charge of contacting the operations officer to actually dispatch the necessary CNG troops. Colonel Zysk stated that the tasking assignment given to the LASO made it appear as if there were a formalized manner or mechanism for troop requests to be made to Colonel Zysk. Zysk stated that he was working alongside the LAPD and LASO officers and such "formalized" requests were not necessary. Indeed, Colonel Zysk stated that requests were taken equally from the LAPD with regard to requests for CNG troops. According to Colonel Zysk, however, the requests were generally discussed between the LAPD, LASO, and CNG. Thus, when the "request" was actually made, it was something which had already been discussed by the relevant law enforcement agencies. On that basis, Colonel Zysk stated that he would contact the operations officer for the purpose of actually dispatching the necessary CNG units . v. FIELD OPERATION LIAISON WITH LAPD Once CNG troops had been deployed to perform certain functions for the LAPD, the CNG expected that the law enforcement officer would be present at the scene when the CNG troops arrived and instruct the CNG troops as to the specific problems at hand as well as arming orders with regard to the CNG readiness. It was further expected that the LAPD officer would stay at the scene throughout the time period to provide direction to the CNG troops. The CNG troops were told to follow the lead of the LAPD officer at the scene with regard to proper loading instructions for the weapons. CNG troops uniformly expressed satisfaction with regard to the leadership shown by the LAPD officers involved in the field operations . Before federalization of the CNG, the CNG accepted 100% of the missions or tasks assigned to them through the LASO or LAPD. CNG stated that there were a number of occasions in which fewer troops were sent out than had been requested, but explained that the CNG had determined that fewer troops were HENN0440.WP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 15, 1992 Page 7 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT in fact needed. With regard to the actual field utilization, CNG troops expressed satisfaction with regard to how the troops were used and the direction provided by the LAPD . VI. EFFECT OF FEDERALIZATION The first indication that there was to be a request for federal troops was raised during a press conference held by Mayor Bradley at 11:00 p.m. on April 30, 1992. During that press conference, Mayor Bradley announced that there was consideration being given to the possibility of requesting federal troops. During a staff meeting at 3:00 a.m. on May 1, 1992, Governor Wilson discussed the rationale in requesting federal troops as added insurance for the CNG, insofar as there was a concern of having insufficient forces available for law enforcement purposes. By 6:00 a.m. on May 1, 1992, Governor Wilson telephoned Major General Thrasher and advised him that Governor Wilson had spoken with President Bush and General Colin Powell and that 3,500 federal troops were being sent to El Toro for possible re-deployment to Los Angeles. Within the CNG, there seemed to be a general belief that the calling up of the federal troops ultimately meant that the CNG was to be federalized. The CNG learned that the President ordered federalization under the command and control of General Colin Powell by watching the President's news conference at 6:00 p.m. on May 1, 1992. Approximately 25 minutes after the press conference, Governor Wilson called Major General Thrasher to inform him that the CNG would be federalized. The CNG remained federalized from May 1, 1992 until May 9, 1992. The effect of the federalization had an enormous dilatory effect on the responsiveness by the CNG. That effect had at least three separate manifestations. First, U.S. Army and CNG officials each pointed to the effect of the Posse Comitatus statute, Title 18 U.S. Code §1385, as prohibiting the U.S. military from becoming involved in law enforcement functions. As a result, when missions were HENN0440.~P • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 15, 1992 Page 8 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT received by the U.S. military and requests for CNG troops were made, the military would consider whether the request was for a "law enforcement" function or a "military" function. If the request were for a law enforcement function, the request was uniformly denied. The Posse Comitatus statute is widely believed within the CNG as well as the U.S. Army to prohibit any member of the Armed Forces of the United States from being engaged in standard internal law enforcement functions . The result of the Posse Comitatus statute can most easily be seen with regard to the number of missions accepted or rejected by the CNG. Colonel Zysk had indicated that before federalization of the CNG, there had not been a single request for CNG troops which had not been fulfilled. However, as noted by General Delk, after federalization of the CNG troops, only 20% of troop requests were fulfilled by the CNG. By way of example, General Delk indicated that there had been a request for CNG troops to transport the numerous prisoners arrested during the riots. General Delk believed that that was a function which the CNG would have performed before federalization. However, after federalization, the request was denied b~cause it involved potential violation of the Posse Comitatus statute. Second, the federalization of CNG troops introduced a new element of bureaucratic overlay on the deployment of the CNG. Before federalization, Colonel Zysk met at the LASO EOC and received specific missions from the LASO or the LAPD. Colonel Zysk described his function as a "clearing house" for requests for troops from the LASO and/or LAPD. However, once the federalization had taken place, Colonel Zysk would receive the initial assignment request from the LAPD or LASO. Colonel Zysk would then contact the U.S. Army liaison officer to discuss the request for troops. The U.S. Army liaison officer then referred the matter to ~a Joint Task Force set up of Army and Marine forces. Frequently, that Joint Task Force would request more information with regard to the specifics of the mission involved. The Joint Task Force would then make a decision as to whether it should become involved in the activity or reject it for possible problems with Posse Comitatus concerns. Third, the U.S. Army had changed the specific willingness to accept assignments and the method by which it would s e nd troops out for assignments or missions after CNG became federalized. Specifically, the Army had issued orders to t he HENN0440.WP • • • • · • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 15, 1992 Page 9 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT CNG reducing the level for "Army Orders" ("AO") for all CNG troops. Before the federalization had taken place, CNG personnel were allowed to carry loaded weapons at an AO-6 level. However, once federalization had taken place, the Army had ordered the AO level be reduced to AO-6. Moreover, in the context of changing the troop deployment, the Army had taken the position that CNG troops would only be deployed in platoon strength (approximately 30 persons) and only if a commissioned officer accompanied each platoon. The effect of the federalization on the LAPD and CNG relationships was felt immediately. Before federalization, the CNG troops mentioned that they considered themselves to be completely supportive of the LAPD and other law enforcement agencies' efforts with regard to the civil disturbance. On a number of occasions, CNG troops were asked to assist in making arrests or transporting prisoners after arrests were made. Additionally, CNG troops would accompany LAPD officers in squad cars. However, after federalization, the number of missions or tasks given to the CNG was significantly reduced. As a result, the CNG were kept at full strength for the next several days but had few actual assignments to perform. This had the effect of creating morale problems within the CNG. VII. EFFECTIVENESS OF CNG UTILIZATION The first phone call alerting the CNG of the order to report was. received at 9:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992. Within two days of that request, and after two additional call-ups of 2,000 troops, the CNG had approximately 7,000 CNG troops available for use in quelling the Los Angeles civil disturbance. The troops moved into action quickly and provided effective support for the LAPD and LASO. The initial request for CNG mobilization was prompted by Mayor Tom Bradley in his request to Governor Pete Wilson. The CNG did not have any information suggesting that the LAPD had made that initial request. Indeed, it appeared that even shortly after the request had been made, the LAPD was essentially lukewarm to the request. However, by the time CNG troops were deployed into the Los Angeles area, they were provided missions and tasks by the LAPD, as well as the LASO . HENN0440.\.IP • • • • • [ . • • • • • • LAW OFFICES IRELL & MANELLA A Partnership Including Professional Corporations MEMORANDUM File: Webster Study Re: Role of U.S. Armed Forces During the Los Angeles Civil Disturbance PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT I. OVERVIEW .DRAFT Date: July 15, 1992 To: Richard J. Stone, General Counsel and Staff Director From: Brian J. Hennigan cc: Kenneth R. Heitz The United States Army and Marine Corps deployed 3,500 troops to Los Angeles, beginning on May 1, 1992. The federal troops themselves did not actually move into the streets of Los Angeles until May 3, 1992. By May 7, 1992, all federal troops were ordered back to the El Toro Marine Base. To evaluate the effectiveness of the federal troops, it is first necessary to determine the proper role for those troops. In a domestic civil disturbance, the U.S. military follows a plan of action developed within the Department of Defense referred to as the "garden plot." Under that plan, the U.S. military is permitted to intervene in "civil disturbances," but not in law enforcement activities. Moreover, the "garden plot" provides that a Special Civilian Representative for the Attorney General ("SCRAG") will make decisions concerning the acceptability of specific missions. During the Los Angeles civil disturbance, the federal military routinely rejected mission requests from the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") as calling for "law enforcement" activities, rather than military actions. The federal military ultimately concluded that the LAPD was not able to limit their requests to the military for proper missions. This problem was compounded by the fact that the LAPD and LASO routinely bypassed, or ignored, the SCRAG . HENN0441.\.IP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 15, 1992 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Page 2 The information on the federal troop activity was obtained through interviews with: Major General Marvin Covault; Brigadier General Buck Kernan; Colonel Mike Canavan; Colonel Ed Buckley; Lieutenant Colonel Randy Glass; Lieutenant Colonel Mike Smith; Major Kurt Latsha; Colonel Steve Parsons; Major Bren Smith; and Major Mark Volk. II. PRE-PLANNING ACTIVITIES A. GENERALIZED PRE-PLANNING ACTIVITIES In the context of the U.S. Army's role in civil disturbances, the Defense Department developed a plan of action in the 1960's referred to as the "garden plot" plan. That plan had been developed at the time of civil disturbances involving race riots in Washington, o.c., New York, and Chicago. The "garden plot" plan was a generalized statement of the role of military officers in the context of civil disturbances within the United States. In general terms, the "garden plot" plan provided that the Army could be involved in domestic operations which involved civil disturbances, as opposed to domestic operations, which involved law enforcement activities. As interpreted by the U.S. Army, the "garden plot" plan allows the Army to become involved in a civil · disturbance which involves a gathering of people or groups whose conduct will pose a danger to the general safety or health of the community. However, the "garden plot" plan prohibits the federal troops from being involved in law enforcement operations in which criminal activities by individuals pose a danger to individual victims of the activity . In terms of military preparedness, the Fort Ord military operations call for a large contingency of the troops to be in a constant state of military preparedness. There are three light infantry brigades in some stage of preparedness at Fort Ord. Those brigades are referred to as "Division Ready Brigades" ("ORB"). The DRB-1 is a group of 2,000 soldiers who are essentially on alert for call-up into action within a few hours' notice. The DRB-2 is the training brigade, which goes through military exercises for purposes of preparing themselves for military alertness. Finally, the DRB-3 is in the support cycle for the DRB-1 . HENN0441.~P • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 15, 1992 Page 3 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT B. PLANNING ACTIVITIES WITH REGARD TO LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT There had been no contact by the LAPD or the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office ("LASO") with the Armed Forces at any time before the Presidential call-up of federal troops. Within the context of the military command system, such contact by local civilian law enforcement agencies would have been inappropriate and would not have called for a response from the military. Specifically, any request made by the LAPD or the LASO with regard to military preparedness would have been referred up the chain of command through the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary of the Army would then presumably alert the President if such a request had be~n made and the federal forces would make an appropriate response . III. MOBILIZATION OF TROOPS The initial order for activation of federal troops was received on May 1, 1992 at approximately 0330 hours. At that time an order was received by Fort Ord that federal troops would be sent to assist in quelling the civil disturbances in Los Angeles. The entirety of the troop movement from Fort Ord to the El Toro staging area was completed by 1830 hours on May 2, 1992. The first contact between the federal forces and the local law enforcement officers occurred at 10:00 p.m. on May 1, 1992. At that time, Major General Marvin Covault met with LAPD Chief Daryl Gates and the liaison officer to the military for the LAPD, Captain Keith Bushey. Additionally, LASO Sheriff Sherman Block was present at the meeting, with the liaison officer for the LASO. That meeting took place at the command post, which was located at the LASO Emergency Operation Center ("EOC") at the Biscailuz Center, 1060 North Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles . The U.S. Army troops met with the Marine troops which were also located at the El Toro Marine Base. In total, there were 3,500 federal troops dedicated to the mission of quell i ng the civil disturbances in Los Angeles . HENN0441 . \.IP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. stone July 15, 1992 Page 4 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT By May 9, 1992, the Armed Forces began a re-deployment of their forces, with the Army troops returning to Fort Ord . IV. FRONT OFFICE LIAISON WITH LAPD The first meeting between the LAPD and the federal military occurred on May 1, 1992, at the LASO EOC. The express purpose for that meeting was for LAPD Chief Gates and LASO Sheriff Block to meet with Major General Covault. At that meeting, it was apparent that neither Gates nor Block had a clear idea as to the role of the federal military with regard to their presence in Los Angeles. Specifically, it appeared that Gates believed that the U.S. Army and Marines were there to partition up the City and to post soldiers throughout the City in various neighborhoods. On the other hand, Block appeared to believe that the Army and the Marines were present essentially to follow orders from the LASO in what Major General Covault referred to as a "rent a soldier" fashion . Rather, Major General Covault set up a process wherein the Army would take requests from the LAPD or the LASO to respond to civil disturbances. Major General Covault set up a system in which the Army posted four liaison officers at each of the LAPD Bureaus, whereby the Army would take requests from the LAPD or LASO. Additionally, the liaison officers were at the LAPD Bureau sections and would meet with the LAPD Chiefs to discuss the deployment of Army troops. In practice, each liaison officer with the U.S. Army would receive a request from an LAPD Bureau Chief. Those requests were then referred back to the operation commander for the Army, Colonel Mike Canavan. Colonel Canavan would then discuss the request with the liaison officer and inform the LAPD whether the request would be accepted by the Army and whether troops would be sent to the location. By the evening of May 1, 1992, the California National Guard ("CNG") had become federalized and placed under the direction of the U.S. military. By that time, the Armed Forces set up a Joint Task Force~ with the Army and Marines being part of the Task Force. The CNG, once federalized, came under the general heading of the Army with regard to representation on the Task Force . ..J HENN0441.WP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 15, 1992 Page 5 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT By placing responsibility for quelling the civil disturbance in the hands of federal troops, the chain of command with regard to making orders for troop deployment had significantly changed. Generals Covault and Kernan indicated that, by Friday evening, Governor Pete Wilson's office began making requests for the presence of CNG and Army troops on the streets by Friday evening. General Covault rejected those requests, explaining that the Armed Forces do not report to the Governor of the State. Rather, General Covault informed the Governor's office that the Armed Forces report to the Federal Commander in Chief, not the State Commander in Chief. The U.S. Army also began the training of troops at the El Toro Base on May 2, 1992. Specifically, the Army troops began training for the civil disturbance missions and learning the applicable rules of engagement. There were no missions accepted by the U.S. Army troops on May 2, 1992. v. FIELD OPERATIONS LIAISON WITH LAPD The federal troops did not begin field operations in reference to the Los Angeles civil disturbance until May 3, 1992. By that time, the Army Joint Task Force had concluded that the military would take on non-confrontational functions, allowing the law enforcement officers the support to take on the more common law enforcement type operations . With regard to a number of the missions assigned, General Covault indicated that the U.S. Army was simply unwilling to perform specific missions. In that regard, General Covault stated that he had told Mayor Bradley, Governor Wilson, LAPD Chief Gates, and LASO Sheriff Block that there were certain missions that the Army would simply not do, because they were not trained to do them. General Covault noted that his reminders to the Governor, Mayor, LAPD and LASO that there were problems with regard to certain types of missions were not warmly accepted by those groups. However, General Covault stressed that the "garden plot" plan prohibited the troops from becoming involved in common or typical law enforcement functions. In discussions with the military liaison officers, it appeared that there was a general misunderstanding as to what role the U.S. military could play in quelling a civil HENN0441.WP • • • • • • • • • • • Memo to Richard J. Stone July 15, 1992 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Page 6 disturbance. In that regard, there was continual reference to the fact that military troops could not perform common law enforcement type functions--i.e., making arrests, transporting prisoners, or pursuing individual wrongdoers. Rather, the military presence in Los Angeles, and the military mission during the time of the civil disturbance, was to prevent civil disturbances which would lead to questions or problems with regard to the general safety or health of the community . VI. EFFECTIVENESS OF UTILIZATION OF U.S. MILITARY The role of the U.S. military with regard to quelling the civil disturbances in Los Angeles was negligible. The U.S. Army and Marines were not prepared to move into action until May 3, 1992. At that time, military forces were operating under restrictions with regard to the type of activities which they would undertake. The "garden plot" program which was developed by the Department of Defense provides for a SCRAG who is intended to be in charge of making determinations as to the acceptability of certain missions for purposes of troop deployment. Moreover, the military seemed to feel that a SCRAG officer would make decisions with regard to whether troops should in fact be deployed upon the request of law enforcement officers . The SCRAG officer present throughout this time period was Robert Mueller of the Justice Department. The U.S. military uniformly expressed the opinion, however, that law enforcement officers essentially ignored or bypassed Robert Mueller in terms of making requests for the deployment of troops. The result of that bypassing of the chain of command was that the U.S. military did not have orders from a SCRAG with regard to moving into action on particular types of missions . HENN0441.\./P • • • • • • • I I • • • • LAW OFFICES IRELL & MANELLA A Partnership Including Professional Corporations MEMORANDUM File: WEBSTER STUDY/lnteragency Group Re: Draft Report re Interaction Between the LAPD and the California Office of Emergency Services PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Date: July 20, 1992 To: Richard J. Stone From: Ken Heitz Diann Kim The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) did no significant pre-verdict planning with the California Office of Emergency Services (OES). There was no attempt whatsoever to preplan law enforcement mutual aid activities. Indeed, when OES informed the LAPD that the California Highway Patrol (CHP) was doing substantial planning with OES, the LAPD's response was that it could not foresee any need of help from the CHP. The only LAPD activities with the OES before the riots were requests for gas masks and Kevlar body armor by the acting captain of the Metro Division and the communication of a request for body armor by the LAFD . This lack of planning stands in stark contrast to the activity of the CHP. The CHP began interfacing with the OES in mid-March. By early April, the CHP had requested and the OES had the California National Guard prepare Los Alamitos as a support base for the CHP. There were several meetings to formalize these plans . Once the riots were under way, no one in authority, including Mayor Bradley, Governor Wilson or Chief Gates, appeared to have a working knowledge of the Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System. This system is capable of mustering trained law enforcement officers much more quickly than the National Guard can be mobilized. While there may be public or political reasons for calling out the National Guard, the CHP and other police departments around the state can provide better trained resources faster. In addition, all law enforcement departments have the proper equipment at hand, so another logistical hurdle facing the National Guard can be avoided . HE IT0438. WP • • • •• • • • • • • PLANNING ACTIVITIES As noted above, the LAPD did nothing with OES to plan for mobilization of law enforcement support. INTERACTION DURING THE RIOT No assistance from OES was requested by LAPD following the verdict . At 7:00 p.m., Governor Wilson offered Mayor Bradley any state assistance he needed. At 9:00 p.m., Mayor Bradley requested 2,000 National Guard. OES immediately alerted General Thrasher who commenced mobilization activities . At 10:00 p.m., a conference call between Governor Wilson, Mayor Bradley, Chief Gates, Sheriff Block, Richard Andrews (Director of OES), General Thrasher and CHP Chief Hannigan occurred. The focus of discussion was the National Guard, although Chief Hannigan advised the participants of the CHP's planning and resources and offered help. The CHP offer was accepted and CHP mustered 750 officers by 3:00 a.m. Thursday. The OES, through its Southern California law enforcement Chief Fritz Patterson, surveyed the various Southern California mutual aid regions for the availability of resources. By Thursday morning, OES had located more than 1,800 officers who were available to provide mutual aid. Patterson does not recall any LAPD request for those resources, although some departments sent aid directly to the LAPD command centers . RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Los Angeles City and Police officials need to understand law enforcement mutual aid . 2. 3. Law enforcement mutual aid should be the first line of reinforcement. The attitude of the LAPD has made it difficult to work with in contexts such as mutual aid. The LAPD' s attitude that it _ is a provider, not a receiver, of mutual aid is counterproductive. The LAPD should train to work more effectively with the law enforcement mutual aid systems . HEIT0438.WP • • 4 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • SPECIAL ADVISOR'S STUDY PARTIAL INTERIM DRAPT STUDY REPORT OB INTERVIEWS WITH PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE COMMUNITY PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT • • • • • I • • • • • • ------------- -----------------------. Table Of contents I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW .....•..•............... 2 II. ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ...•.............•....... 6 A. Effect Of Local Officials' Actions/Inaction ......•.•••.•••....••....... 6 1. Mayor's Office ...•..•••••.............. 6 2. The City Council ....................... 8 3. The Police Commission .................. 9 B. Effect Of Inter-Relationships Among Local Officials With One Another ........... 10 1. Mayor's Office ........................ 10 2. City Council .......................... 11 3 • Police Commission ..................... 11 III. INFORMATION GARNERED FROM PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE COMMUNITY AS TO LAPD PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ........................................ 12 A . Anticipation Of Verdicts ................... 12 1. The Prospect Of Acquittals ............ 12 2. The Hours Before The Verdicts Were Announced ............................. 14 3. Anticipation Of The Verdicts And Planning For Reactions ................ 15 B. LAPD "Intelligence" Or "Community Assessment" ................................ 1 7 1. LAPD Anti-Terrorist Division .......... 17 2. The Police Comrnission ................. 18 3. The Mayor's Office .................... 19 i • • • • • • • • • • • c . 4. The City Council •••••••.••••..•.•••.•• 19 s • The Board Of Supervisors .•.•.•..•.•.•. 20 6. The District Attorney's Office ..•.•••. 21 7. The Community ..•.•••.••..••........... 21 I.APO' s Planning .•.....••....•.....•....•... 23 1. Communications Between LAPD And Other Governmental Offices Re Preparedness .....••••••••••••••••••... 23 2 • Planning -By Other Governmental Offices ............................... 26 (a) The Los Angeles District Attorney's Office .....•.•........ 26 (b) The Mayor's Office ............... 26 (c) Los Angeles County ............... 27 D. Public Officials' Oversight Of LAPD •....... 27 E. 1. Police Commission Oversight ........... 27 (a) The Chief of Police .............. 28 (b) The City Council ................. 29 (c) The Lack of Polic~ Commission Resources ........................ 31 2. The Mayor's Office .................... 31 (a) The Mayor's Office Directly Communicates and Coordinates with the LAPD .................... 3 3 3. The Office Of The CA0 ................. 34 Effects Of Political Atmosphere And Pre-Verdict Comments On LAPD Performance ................................ 3 5 1. Tensions In The Community And Between Sectors Of The Conununity ...... 36 ii • • • • • • • • • • • • F . 2. Tensions Between The Chief Of 3 • 4. LAPD 1. 2. 3 • 4. Police And City Leaders •.•...•........ 38 Tensions Within The Police Department .....•..•...•••••...•...•... 40 The Effects Of Pre-Verdict Comments By Public Officials ................... 41 Management .............•.............. 41 LAPD Structure ..............••.•••.... 4 2 LAPD's Management Style ......••.••.... 44 LAPD's Management Decisions ....•...... 45 Conclusion ............................ 4 7 G. The LAPD's Relationship To The Police Commission ................................. 4 7 H. Views Re Adequacy Of LAPD Response ......... 53 1. Initial Response ...................... 54 2. Escalation.· ........................... 55 3. Criticism Of The LAPD Response ........ 56 4. The Response In Various Locations ..... 58 (a) Koreatown ........................ 58 (b) South Central .................... 58 (c) East Los Angeles ................. 59 (d) Parker Center .................... 59 5. Views Re The Adequacy Of The Response Of Other Agencies ............ 59 (a) The National Guard ............... 59 (b) The Sheriff's Office ............. 60 I. Factors Affecting The Police Response ...... 61 1. Pre-Verdict Factors And Dynamics ...... 62 2. Post-Verdict Response ................. 65 iii • J. The Nature Of The Violence •.••.....••...... 67 • 1. Forms of Violence Experienced .•..•.... 68 2. Perpetrators of the Violence ..•.....•. 70 3. Victims of the Violence .•..•.........• 73 • K • Lessons Learned ..••....•••.•.•••••••••..... 75 1. The Chief Of Police .•.•.•••••••••..... 75 2. Police Officers ...••••••••••.••••..•.. 77 • 3 • Police Policies ....••••••.•.....•..... 80 4. Police Commission ..•.•................ 88 5. The Mayor's Office ....•............... 89 • 6 • Economic/Social Programs .............. 91 7. Racial Problems ....•.................. 93 8. Public Officials ..........•.........•. 94 • 9 • The Media ............................. 9 5 10. Miscellaneous ..... ~···················97 IV. INFORMATION FROM "THE COMMUNITY" ............... 101 • v . EFFECT OF RELATIONSHIPS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS WITH NON-LOCAL OFFICIALS ....................... 102 A. State ..................................... 102 B. Federal ................................... 102 • VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................ 102 • • iv • • • • • • • • • • • • I • Ilf'l'RODUCTION AND OVBRVID Set forth below, perhaps at more length than is appropriate, is a draft summary of interviews and related information received by the "Public Officials and Community" team of the Special Advisor's study. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this draft is partial, interim, and incomplete. our interviews are "in process," and, although substantial progress has been made, much remains to be done. 1 In particular, additional dialogue with Federal and State authorities is a must, as is comparative analysis of information gleaned by other teams (such as those working in the LAPD and interagency areas. All of this additional work and substantially more information must be obtained from the City's various communities is essential to balance the necessarily fragmented picture presented below. In a very real sense, the preliminary and partial product which follows is a worst case version of the Indian parable of the six blind men attempting to describe the elephant. Fairly adapted here, that fable would describe six persons who were not only blind, but "informationally impaired" as well. This is not to say that the picture will 1 A list of those interview memoranda from which information was gleaned for this Interim Draft is attached hereto as "Appendix A." 2 • • • • • • • • • • • not grow clearer and brighter, rather we simply would observe that, thus far, this draft merely is beginning, and an incomplete one at that. Having said all of this, and particularly having not yet had an opportunity to interview many from the various communities that were affected by the civil unrest following the verdict in the Rodney King beating case on April 29, 1992, we nonetheless have seen some preliminary themes emerge from our work which are elaborated upon below. Although not free from doubt, and by the product of absolute consensus, those themes seem to include at least the following: • • The response of the the Los Angeles Police Department to the civil unrest which occurred over several days following the verdict in the Rodney King beating trial was inadequate in a number of areas of Los Angeles, and woefully so in at least some of them . Although the Los Angeles Police Department appears to have had a general contingency plan for emergencies, either there was no general specific planning for the contingency of widespread civil unrest following the King trial verdicts, or the 3 • I • • • • • • • • • • • existence of such a · plan was unknown outside of the Police Department . • The City's civilian authorities, . whether ·in the Mayor's Office, on the City Council's, or on the Los Angeles Police Commission, systematically have failed to .exercise effective oversight of the LAPD, both as a result of limitations in the City Charter circumscribing their authority, and because of political infighting, and a lack of political will . • The performance of the LAPD's intelligence operation, insofar as the public officials are concerned, consistently has been poor to inadequate, and the Department's intelligence units performed woefully, if at all, in anticipating violence following the verdicts in the King beating trial. • While few in City government appear to have anticipated either acquittals in the King trial, or civil unrest of the nature and extent that followed those verdicts, people in the community, particularly the African-American community, had substantial suspicions both that acquittals might 4 • • • • • • • • • • • be in the offing, and that there would be serious unrest in the event such verdicts were returned . • • The LAPD's command structure, and the implementation of that structure, have been inadequate for a number of years; the Chief of Police essentially has been an "absentee leader" for that period of time, and the changes in management personnel, and the command structure itself, have undermined seriously the Department's ability to respond to a number of challenges . There is a widespread feeling among many public officials, and some members of the community, that the media's handling of the civil unrest following the King trial verdict was irresponsible, at times suggesting that the unrest was worse, and more widespread than was the case, thereby "fanning the flames," and at other times, showing or describing a lack of police response to looting and arson, thereby, encouraging others to commit violence at least against property and persons as well. Undoubtedly, as our process continues and we move toward a more final version of our study Report, 5 • • • • • • • • • • • additional points upon which there is consensus, or at least substantial agreement, will arise. In the meantime, set forth below is a wide variety of differing opinions and points of view which have emerged from our work and which we, at once, both incomplete and redundant perhaps, at this preliminary stage, those flaws are inevitable. There is a final caveat as well. Most of our efforts, of course, are based upon the opinions of others, and, invariably, those opinions are, in turn, filtered through the perspectives of the dozen or so Deputies and Counsel in our group who authored various sections of this Preliminary Interim Draft. What is presented below, accordingly is not always objective, not invariably factual, not necessarily entirely "true." It is, however, our best, first "shot." We do not apologize for the draft, because it is, we believe, a reasonable beginning, but only that. We intend to, and undoubtedly will, do better . II. ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT A. Effect Of Local Officials' Actions/Inaction 1. Mayor's Office As the Mayor's staff informed us, his office has limited authority under the City Charter to oversee the Los 6 • • • • • • • • • • • Angeles Police Department; instead, authority over the Department reposes in the Los Angeles Police Commission which, particularly after the passage of Proposition J, is subject to the "veto power" of a two-thirds majority of the Los Angeles City Council. Nonetheless, the Mayor's Office had, and played, a role in the civil unrest following the acquittal of the four LAPD officers in the Rodney King beating trial . Specifically, the Mayor's Office engaged in planning of community groups for several weeks prior to the day the verdicts in the King trial were handed down, meeting with community leaders on several consecutive Wednesdays in April to discuss possible community reactions, the Mayor's staff prepared four separate versions of a speech for Mayor Bradley to give after the verdicts were "in," depending upon the number of convictions or acquittals involved. Thus, while the Mayor's Office steadfastly maintains it did not expect acquittals, obviously that prospect must have occurred to the staff, or the speech which the Mayor actually gave on following the acquittals on April 29th would not have been prepared and delivered. The Mayor's Office was deeply involved in the decision to seek National Guard help, and Mayor Bradley (along with Chief Gates) spoke to Governor Wilson at approximately 8:30 p.m. on the evening of April 29th to secure the Guard's assignment to Los Angeles. The Mayor 7 • • • • • • • • • • • also was involved in monitoring events throughout the weekend, and certainly in speaking at the First AME Church after the verdicts were rendered. Although members of the Mayor's Office are adamant that Mayor Bradley's emotional speech on the evening of the 29th did not "fan the flames" of the violence, others in the community disagree. In any event, and at least in a symbolic sense, the Mayor's Office definitely played a role in the preparation for, and aftermath of, the King trial verdicts, and the civil unrest which followed . 2. Th• City Council The City Council, perhaps because of its size and makeup, was not intimately involved in preparation for the verdicts in the King trial, nor in a collective sense, in dealing with the aftermath of those verdicts. There are, of course, some exceptions to that analysis, in particular the role of Councilman Mark Ridley-Thomas in contacting members of the police command structure and the community to urge that nothing provocative occur after the King verdicts so as to prompt a confrontation between the LAPD and members of the African-American community, in particular. In addition, of course, because of its role as a entity with "veto power" over the Police Commission, it fairly can be said that the Council has served as an effective check on the Commission's 8 • • • • • • • • • • • ability to exercise oversight ·over the policies, and, of course, the operations of the LAPD . 3. Th• Police Commission Virtually everyone agrees that the Police commission's effective power over the operations and policies of the Los Angeles Police Department either has been extremely limited, or has not been exercised effectively. Under the City Charter, the Police Commission has theoretical oversight power, but that authority is more apparent than real. This is so in part because of the exclusion from the Commission's regulatory ambit of operation, tactical, and personnel matters, which, of course constitutes the vast majority of what the LAPD does. A major complicating factor has been the personality of Chief Daryl Gates, who simply regarded any (even ineffective) oversight by the Commission as an attempt to "meddle" in the affairs of the Department. Stymied by civil service protection for the Chief of Police, hindered by severe legal constraints on its ability to probe the LAPD's actions, and blocked by the ability of the City Council (which has been strongly both pro-Chief Gates and pro-police) to thwart any meaningful Commission action, the Police Commission has, in all but rare circumstances, exercised little, if any, effective oversight of the Department . 9 • • • • • • • • • • • • B. Bffect Of Inter-Relationships Among Local Official• With one Another 1. Mayor•• Office Plainly, the "line in the sand" relationships between the Mayor's Office and the Police Commission on the one hand, and the Chief of Police, the Department (and, on occasion, the City Council) on the other has exacerbated the effective lack of civilian oversight of the LAPD. It is undisputed that Mayor Bradley and Chief Gates refused to speak to one another for almost thirteen months prior to the date the King verdicts were rendered; it is also a fact that other mayoral aides and the Chief were not speaking as well. While this may have been less a problem than one might otherwise think -- due to continuing communications between the Mayor's staff and other portions of the LAPD command structure, and Chief Gates alienation from that structure as well -- it does seem clear that the adversarial relationship between the Mayor and the Chief contributed to the absolute absence of any effective review of the nature and extent of the Department's planning for possible unrest following the verdicts in the King trial. In addition, because of the highly politicized nature of the relationships among the City Council, the Mayor, and the Police Commission where police matters are concerned, politics, rather than policy, seems to have dominated the 10 ------------------------ - - ------- • • • • • • • • • • • agenda of many in City government. In effect, this led to "oversight gridlock" of the Depa~tment for at least a year preceding the verdicts. 2. City Council As noted, the City Council's role vis-a-vis the Mayor, given the Council's extensive powers under the City Charter, has permitted the Council effectively to "block" actions taken by the Mayor's appointees to the Police Commission, thus making the Commission's oversight of the Department limited, if not largely ineffective. The Council's refusal to "back" the Commission in a number of areas, such as the Commission's attempts to reverse demotions and transfers of certain officers by Chief Gates, and to place Chief Gates on adminstrative leave and, ultimately, the Council's support for Proposition J, gave the Council a "veto" over Police Commission actions, all have served to undermine the Commission's authority dramatically. It cannot be doubted, moreover, that, where police matters are concerned, the Department, the Police Protective League, and Chief Gates, all have had a very strong political influence over a substantial number of Councilmembers . 3. Police Commission The Police Commission's relationships with the Council and the Police Department seemingly have alternated 11 • • • • • • between being excessively cozy and passive, and unduly strident and and confrontational. Too often, in the view of many officials, the Police Commissioners have "played to the press," or perhaps to the Department, instead of attempting simply to do a dispassionate and effective job of reviewing and monitoring the Department's policies. Certainly, Police Commission members are forced to walk a difficult tightrope between sufficient oversight and excessive involvement, but the challenge of that task, together with the political and structural difficulties described above, often have overwhelmed many Commissioners in the past. As a result, the Commission has been largely ineffective in dealing with the other parts of City government in general, and with the Department in particular . III. INFORMATION GARNERED FROM PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE COMMUNITY AS TO LAPD PREPAREDNESS AND e RESPONSE • • • • A. Anticipation Of Verdicts 1. The Prospect Of Acquittals Most of the public officials from the Los Angeles City Council, the Mayor's Office, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, the Police Commission, and the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office with whom we have spoken did not anticipate the verdicts acquitting the officers 12 • • • • • • • • • • • charged with beating Rodney King. They had contemplated a range of possibilities -- all convictions, many convictions, few convictions -- but when the jury came back with D.Q convictions, the most common response was "shock." Their surprise may be understandable, however, since the District Attorney's office also expected at least some convictions, and conveyed that information to certain public officials in the Mayor's Office • A handful of officials, including at least some on the Police Commission, were not as surprised; these officials had realized that a total failure to convict was a possibility, particularly after the case was transferred to the Simi Valley. Further, the length of the jury deliberations, and certain questions the jury asked of the judge, led several to believe that acquittals were possible. This group included some African-Americans, and others with some knowledge of the evidence, or experience with the inherent difficulties in prosecuting and convicting police officers. Moreover, at least one official noted that the request by Chief Gates to set aside $1 million for overtime suggested that he anticipated non-guilty verdicts, and least some public reaction to them . At this stage, only a few community leaders and workers in the minority communities have been interviewed. However, from the evidence gathered to date, a somewhat 13 • • • • • • • • • • different picture emerges than that characterizing public officials. Among this group, and especially among African-Americans, many were -psychologically prepared for the possibility that a jury without African-Americans would fail to convict white police officers of criminal charges for beating a black suspect. The African-Americans and others who work in the minority community, while somewhat surprised, were not shocked by the verdicts, and nor by the unrest and anger which the acquittals ignited. 2 • Th• Hours Before Th• Verdicts Were Announced According to a Chief Deputy in the District Attorney's Office, the District Attorney's Office and the LAPD knew that the verdicts were "in" at approximately 1:00 p.m. on April 29th from officers .stationed at the Simi Valley Courthouse. However, they knew only that there were verdicts on some counts, but not as to others. The District Attorney's Office asked the judge for a two-hour delay prior to announcing the verdicts in order: (1) to allow the LAPD to go on alert status and; (2) to accommodate the media who needed set up time . 14 • • • • • • • • • • • • 3. Anticipation Of Th• verdict And Planning Por Reactions As is noted at greater length in Section III.C, below, officials from the Mayor's Office and the Police commission at various times prior to April 29th, had asked Chief Gates whether the LAPD had a plan in the event of unrest following the verdicts. Chief Gates assured them that there was a plan in place for handling any disturbances. It now is clear (or at least so the City's public officials believe) that, while there was a general Emergency Contingency Plan available, it was not designed for the unrest that occurred, nor specifically addressed to potential post-verdict disturba"nces . Several public officials contend that, in fact, there was no specific plan developed to handle any problems following the verdicts. It was noted that, while specific plans for unusual occurrences had been prepared in the past, e.g., for the 1984 Olympics, for Operation Rescue, for the visit by the Pope to Los Angeles, and for public demonstrations, etc., no such plan was prepared in this instance. Further, one Police Commissioner reported that Deputy Chief Hunt inquired of the Chief of Police about whether any specific planning was being developed in connection with the verdicts, but these inquiries were ignored by Chief Gate· s . 15 • • • • • • • • • • In sum, most public officials did not anticipate the outpouring of rage which followed the verdicts and the resulting chaos in the City. Even after the verdicts were announced, most did not expect the level of violence which ensued, although, again, there are a few exceptions, people who believed that there would be at least~ trouble if there were a significant number of acquittals. But one interviewee noted that the LAPD was expected to handle any disturbance and to prevent escalation of any violence. It also was noted by a few interviewees that, in early April the Mayor's Office had looked into organizing church and community leaders in anticipation of the verdict. Subsequently, meetings were held with these leaders and the Mayor. Prior to the verdicts, there also was a meeting at the First AME Church attended by, among others, Councilman Ridley-Thomas, Deputy Chief Hunt, and Reverend Murray to discuss community reaction to the verdicts and what could be done. One Councilwoman stated that African-American church leaders were prepared for whatever might happen. African-Americans in particular had noted escalating tension and distrust in their communities, exacerbated by the eroding economy, very poor living conditions, and racial conflict between (and among) various minority communities, aggravated by what black Angelenos saw as regular police disrespect for, and abuse of, African-Americans . 16 • • • • • • • • • • • B • LAPD "Intelligence" or 11 co1111unity Assessment" The overwhelming majority of the persons interviewed stated either that they were unaware of any intelligence produced by the LAPD in anticipation of post-verdict unrest, or that there was Jl2 such intelligence. Those few who did hear "rumblings" appear to be closer to members of the City's various communities; however, even those individuals did not report the existence of any organized or formal intelligence gathering or sharing on the part of the LAPD In short, the LAPD seemed to these people to be insensitive to the · mood of those segments of the community that ultimately were most involved in the civil disturbances. As a result, the Department was unable to develop any factual information upon which it could make preparations fo~ potential post-verdict problems, or to gauge the mood of those likely to protest or riot in the event of acquittals. 1. LAPD Anti-Terrorist Division Some members of the Police Commission hold the opinion that the LAPD's Anti-Terrorist Division ("ATD"), was ineffective. They uniformly had a low opinion of the ATD and the officer in charge, Steven Gates, Chief Gates' younger brother. None of the interviewees was aware of any information of consequence developed by the ATD prior to the 17 • • • • • • • • • • • riot. It appears that the ineffectiveness of the unit can be traced in part to a perceived poor relationship between the LAPD and the community. As a result, the community had no enthusi~sm for providing information to the LAPD. There also is evidence that, even when information was supplied, the LAPD did not listen. In particular, and ironically, Chief Gates appeared to put little stock in the information produced by his Department's intelligence units . 2. Th• Police Collllli aion Both current and former Police Commissioners and their advisors stated either that no effective intelligence gathering operation exists in the LAPD, or that they were unaware of any advance intelligence being generally and systematically available. As an example of the generalized lack of intelligence, one of the Commissioners stated that the LAPD was ignorant of a Communist Party rally which was held annually in May, even when leaflets were being distributed. One former Commissioner did state that certain LAPD Deputy Chiefs had attempted to alert Chief Gates to the possibility of civil unrest in response to the King beating verdict, but that they were ignored. The LAPD liaison to the Police Com.mission reported that, although intelligence is not a formal agenda category, the Commission has an ongoing relationship with the Department's various intelligence units. However, no specific intelligence 18 • • • • • • • • • • • information was provided to the Commission with regard to the potential for violence following the King verdicts, and it is our understanding that none was generated. 3 • The Mayor•• Office Those persons interviewed from the Mayor's Office stated that that Office knew of no advance intelligence that there might be planned acts of post-verdict violence, and that the "across-the-board acquittals" were not anticipated. The two likely sources for LAPD intelligence were the Anti-Gang Unit and ATD. The Mayor's Office did hear rumors that gangs planned to "wipe out" upper income shopping districts in Baldwin Hills and then move into the white communities. This rumor, of course, turned out to be unfounded. The Mayor's office and the Police Commission had been assured repeatedly by the LAPD that contingency plans had been formulated in the event of "unrest" following the King verdicts. And, while the City of Los Angeles has an Emergency Contingency Plan, it was designed to prepare for natural disasters, not for civil unrest, and apparently was of little, if any, assistance in dealing with the post-verdict civil disturbances . 4. The City council Similarly, certain of the Los Angeles City Council members were aware of· the Emergency Contingency Plan, but 19 • • • • • • i• I • • • • believed that it was not utilized. The Council members generally agree that 'there existed somewhere between "no intelligence" and "very little intelligence" about the community's potential reaction to verdicts of acquittal, and that there was no specific plan to respond to any potential reaction. A few council members had heard that Chief Gates had stated that the LAPD had a plan, that $1 million in overtime monies had been set aside, and that they (the police) were "ready." s. Th• Board Of supervisors The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors apparently did not have access to any significant pre-unrest intelligence, although they acknowledged speculating as to the possibility of a civil disturbance following the verdicts. The Supervisors' Office does not have any formal system in place for collecting intelligence. Thus, an Assistant Deputy to one of the Supervisors had "heard" of a "rumor" a few weeks before the verdict that the Black Muslims would "take over" and organize .a response, but the Supervisors had no hard "assessment information." The Supervisors now say that they actively sought intelligence from community members during the weeks prior to the verdicts, and also received an anonymous tip that arson would be attempted at the Kenneth Hahn Plaza. several 20 • • • • • • • • • • • deputies had contacts with community leaders such as Reverend Chip Murray, who told them that a significant amount of anger would be unleashed in the community in the event of acquittals. The Supervisors did not know in detail what type of reaction would occur, however, and assumed that it would take the form of demonstrations and protesting, rather than looting and violence . ,. The Diatrict Attorney•• Office The District Attorney's office did not receive intelligence from the ~D concerning possible post-verdict unrest, and was unaware what the LAPD knew, or what the officers may have "heard on the street" prior to the verdicts. One of the administrators interviewed stated that the LAPD has an "Emergency Communication Center" which is supposed to gather intelligence. Another Deputy commented that there was an unwillingness by the LAPD to share its information with other interested agencies. 7. The Community Those persons having closer ties to the minority communities, such as an African-American State Senator and minority community leaders, appeared to have been aware of a certain level of informal or "street" intelligence. One Korean-American community spokesperson reported that various Korean-American merchants had heard "warnings of impending 21 • • • • • • · • • • • • violence" and had experienced "bad vibes" for over a week before the verdicts. Some African-American community leaders related that they were aware of a significant increase in the "general level of tension" and "rage and frustration" in the community, and that the subsequent outbreak of violence was not surprising. While not asked prior to the verdicts, certain people in the African-American community had stated that "if the cops get off on this one, this town is going to burn down." A u.s.c. Professor with expertise in gang studies was told after the disturbances that, prior to the verdicts, rumors circulated that Black Muslim groups planned acts of violence, which were to be attributed to the gangs as a "cover." He also stated that the Sheriff's Department tactics of intelligence gathering are more effective than those of the LAPD in that the Sheriff's Department sends plainclothes officers to single areas for a long period of time while the LAPD send uniformed officers to patrol in a random manner. The Los Angeles County Probation Office's Gang Units had heard rumblings from some of their juvenile probationers, and from the LAPD officers on the street, about the potential for violence following the verdicts . 22 • • • • • • • • • • • c. LAPD'• Planning 1. communications Between LAPD And Other Governaental Offices Re Preparedness Virtually all of the public officials interviewed told us that they were relying to a greater or lesser extent upon the national reputation enjoyed by the LAPD as a pro-active, efficient and effective paramilitary organization that could be expected to issue a swift, firm response to any civil disturbance. While some interviewees simply assumed that the LAPD would be able to control any outburst better than, or at least as well as, any other police force in the nation, many (e.g., several Police commissioners, City council members and members of the Mayor's staff) affirmatively asked for, and received, general assurances from Chief Gates and other high-ranking officers that the Department did, in fact, have a plan to respond in the event of any violent reaction to the verdicts, and that the Department was prepared to implement that plan . Chief Gates' statement that he had allocated $1 million to cover the cost of overtime containment efforts was perceived as indicative of police preparedness. No one we interviewed ever pressed Gates or others in the LAPD command structure for any specific logistical or operational 23 • • • • • • • • • • • details of the plan or the Department's preparedness efforts, nor did anyone view it as their responsibility to do so. Although, in hindsight, various City and County officials uniformly now wish that they had probed the subject further, each felt that that responsibility for planning belonged to the LAPD, and that he or she was entitled to rely on representations of preparedness made by Chief Gates and his Deputies. Opinions among our interviewees are divided as to whether the LAPD's initial inaction was due to the absence of a plan, inadequacy of· an existing plan, or inability to properly execute an otherwise adequate contingency formulation. The largest group, which includes most of the City Council members and community leaders, generally believes that the disorganization and indecisiveness exhibited by the LAPD during the afternoon and evening after the verdicts were announced is proof that "the emperor had no clothes," i.e., that, in fact, no plan -- or at least no relevant plan -- existed . The second group, which includes several current and former Police Commissioners, expressed the view that the general contingency or tactical plans upon which Gates apparently relied were overbroad, outdated, and inadequate to handle current realities, and that very little, if any, additional planning was done to address the specific 24 • • • • • • • • • • • disturbances which could have been anticipated by LAPD in these circumstances. One Commissioner stated that the LAPD should have developed specific procedures along these general plan guidelines, and· should have,· but did not, conduct Department-wide training exercises to audit preparedness. Several interviewees reported that Deputy Chiefs Hunt and Banks had tried to focus Chief Gates on such post-verdict planning efforts, but were dismissed by Gates as "worriers." The smallest group of interviewees, generally those with current or past LAPD affiliations, expressed confidence in the Department's written plans, but blamed flaws in execution for the rapid escalation of the unrest, and the inability of the LAPD to respond quickly and to control the disturbance. Echoing early speculation reported in the press, several political l .eaders opined that the LAPD' s inaction during the first few hours of the civil unrest was part of Gate's private plan to teach the city a lesson by revealing how rough, mean, and out of control the streets of South Central really were, how "rough and tough" he and the LAPD really ·were, and that Charter Amendment F was unnecessary and not in the best interest of the public. However, none of the interviewees who touched on this subject offered any facts or other details to support this theory, for which we have discovered no "hard evidence." 25 • • • • • • • • • • • 2. Planning By 0th.er Governmental Offices (a) The Los Angeles Diatrict Attorney•, Office Various other governmental offices described their own efforts to conduct or review their preparedness planning in anticipation of problems following the verdicts. In particular, the L.A. District Attorneys• Office held meetings to review their written plan for dealing with civil unrest, and to ensure that the staff was alert, familiar with the details of the plan in general, and with their own personal duties and responsibilities. (b) Th• Mayor••· Office The Mayor's office was actively involved in planning at the community level, having received and relied upon assurances from Chief Gates and Deputy Chiefs Hunt and Parks, that the LAPD had planned for and was ready to respond to any possible disturbance. Planning by the Mayor's office included working with community leaders to map out a response plan to control and calm public reactions, to direct energy in nondestructive ways, to provide a centralized forum from which the congregated community could voice its reaction, to communicate with the press and, finally, to attempt to reach out to area gangs. When the verdicts were announced, the Mayor had four 26 • • • • • • • • • • different speeches prepared and, by the time of the rally at the First AME Church, had prepared, with the help of community leaders, and distributed "talking -points" that public figures should emphasize. (c) Loa Angeles county At the county level, Sheriff Block met with the Board of supervisors, at their request, several times in the weeks before the verdicts. At these meetings, Sheriff Block outlined his contingency plans and provided operational details concerning notification procedures, deployment, overtime, equipment, etc. The Supervisors generally felt that the Sheriff's Department was "ready," and have since commended the Sheriff's preparedness and response . D. Pul:>lic Officials' oversight Of LAPD 1 • Police Commission oversight Pursuant to the City Charter, the Police Commission is responsible for the oversight of LAPD. One key member of the Commission views this responsibility as two-fold in nature: (1) to protect the public in terms of interactions with the Department, and (2) to ensure that as an internal matter, the Department is a "good department." Three elements seemed primarily to influence the effectiveness of the Commission in carrying out its 27 • • • • • • I • • • responsibility: (a} The Chief of Police; (b} the City council; and (c} the lack of Police Commission resources. (a) Th• Chief of Police Police Chief Daryl Gates, and his antagonistic relationship with the Police Commission, seem to be one of the primary influences on the effectiveness (or lack thereof} of the Commission's oversight of LAPD. One interviewee commented that, prior to the issuance of the Christopher Commission Report and Chief Jesse Brewer joining the Commission, Chief Gates ran the Department essentially unfettered by the Commission. In response to the Commission's attempts to take more of an activist role, Gates ignored the Commission, creating a very contentious atmosphere. According to one key member of the Commission, Gates viewed questions by the Commission regarding the planning and preparation of LAPD for the possible aftermath of an acquittal in the King trial as pertaining to "operational stuff," and not a proper subject matter for Commission inquiry. This Commissioner noted that, as a result of what he referred to as a "don't meddle" attitude, Gates would respond to planning questions posed by the Commission "only in generalities." This same Commissioner, however, also clearly conceded that the Commission had failed to press Gates hard 28 • • • • • • • • • • enough on these issues. A former Commissioner also commented that the Commission should have asked Gates about his "riot plan" either publicly or privately. "The problem is," one Commissioner stated, "they're afraid if they take (Gates) on, he won't leave." The Commissioner went on to say that "elected officials" (without stating which ones) had instructed the Commission not to "take on" Gates . Another Commissioner commented that the Commission did not want to ask Gates too many questions; they just wanted him to leave without further delay. One Councilperson commented that, for most of 1992, Commission President Sheinbaum had been trying to maneuver Gates out. The interviewee noted that it was obvious that there were no visible changes or new procedures in the Department as a consequence of the Christopher Commission Report. The Commission was simply "waiting Gate out." (b) The City Council Clearly, the City Council has influenced the effectiveness of the Commission in overseeing the LAPD . Because the Commission itself lacked the authority to dismiss or demote Gates without the support of the City Council, the Commission was faced both with a Chief who refused to cooperate with them, and a lack of power to do anything about it. One Councilperson commented that the City Council, by its vote to re-instate Chief Gates after 29 • • • • • • • • • • • his suspension in 1991 by the Commission, made it clear to Gates that he had the City Council "in his back pocket." That action by the City Council also signaled to the then-newly -constituted Commission that the Chief had enough votes on the City Council to fend off any attempt at an ouster. Since the Commissioners could "count to eight" (referencing the number of City Council votes to constitute a majority), they knew that there were not enough Council members to remove Gates. As mentioned above, the powerless Commission was seemingly "waiting Gates out" until he resigned. Moreover, as one Commissioner commented, the Council effectively has controlled the Commission, either discreetly or through legislation and litigation. The Commissioner cited examples of such control, including Gates being put on administrative leave by the Commission and then reinstated by the council in 1991, and the enactment of "Proposition J," which essentially gave the Council veto power over city commissions . One former Commissioner noted that a number of Councilpersons (Messrs. Alatorre, Holden, Wachs and others) are "pro-Gates, "even though not traditionally police supporters politically. This former Commissioner theorized that Chief Gates might have held compromising information on 30 - - - - --- --------------- • • • • • • • • • • • these members to garner such consistent support; again, we found no hard evidence to support. such suspicions. (C) Th• Lack of Police Collllli aion Resources The lack of resources available to the Commission has influenced its effectiveness in overseeing the LAPD . One commissioner commented that the Commission lacked sufficient access to information regarding the Department; the Commission receives only information which it specifically requests, and even then, is not guaranteed that it will receive all of the information requested. The Commission often learns about events and other information regarding the Department through the media. More than one interviewee commented that the Commission was understaffed, and one cited this as a possible reason that the Commission was "caught unawares" by the reaction to the King verdict, and the LAPD's response. 2. The Mayor's Office The Mayor's Office believes that it does bear some oversight responsibility for the LAPD, although the extent of that responsibility is limited to setting policy and making inquiries, not to involving itself with logistical details. Once an inquiry has been answered, the Mayor's staff asserts, the answer is relied upon, and no further 31 • • • • • • • • • • • probing is necessary, unless, of course, there is reason to doubt the LAPD's assurances. This was the case when the Mayor's Office asked the LAPD whether they were prepared and had a plan for potential public reaction to the King trial verdicts. One office staffer was present when Gates assured the Police Commission that the LAPD was prepared for the verdicts. After receiving that assurance, the Mayor's Office relied upon it. This official now wishes he had probed further into preparedness for the verdicts. A former Commissioner, however, disagrees with the Mayor's Office's limited •view of its role. This former Commissioner stated that, in the case of the recent civil unrest, the Mayor's Office had a duty to step in to fill a leadership void (that it knew existed), and to insist upon finding out what contingency plans were in place. In other words, the Mayor's Office had reason to doubt the LAPD assurance, and the duty to inquire into the specifics of the Department's plan. The Mayor's Office directly or indirectly performs its oversight of LAPD in two ways: (a) It directly communicates and coordinates with the LAPD; and (b) Through the Office of the City's Chief Administrative Officer ("CAO"), it influences the LAPD budget and conducts management reviews and audits . 32 • • • • • • • • • • • (a) Th• Mayor•• Office Directly co1111unicat•• and Coordinates with the LAPD The Mayor's Office directly communicates with Deputy Police Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of the LAPD. Admittedly, the Office did not communicate directly with Chief Daryl Gates. One official in the Mayor's Office described this lack of communication as a result of the effect of "trying to beat one's head against the wall" (the Mayor's head and Gates' wall) . This adopted mode of communication had become the norm, and had proved effective in recent past events, since the real operational control of the LAPD has been in the hands of Assistant Chief Bob Vernon for quite some time. Dealing with operational matters meant dealing with Assistant Chief Vernon. Gates' absenteeism from active command has been reiterated in numerous interviews. 2 Illustrating the effectiveness of communicating directly with the Deputy and Assistant Chiefs, the Mayor's 2 one interviewee referred to Gates as an "absentee leader," another referred to the Chief as a "ten-to-three guy." A third stated that Gates had effectively been "off duty" since April 1, and that he would have left the LAPD on April 1, but for the fact that publication of his autobiography had been delayed and the Chief wanted his departure to coincide with the publication of his book . 33 • • • • • • • • • • • Office pointed to recent situations involving significant potential for civil disturbance where coordination and planning between the Mayor's Office and the LAPD were successful, including the Operation Rescue demonstrations, the Janitors for Justice demonstrations, and the demonstrations at LAX following the Governor's veto of gay rights legislation. This coordination was arranged directly between the mayoral staff and LAPD commanders below the Chief's level. Only in one instance did the Mayor's Office appeal to the Chief, and that was because it disagreed with Assistant Chief Vernon's decision. These demonstrations occurred uneventfully, and the LAPD generally is credited with having responded appropriately and well . 3. Th• Office Of The CAO The Office of the City's Chief Adminstrative Office ("CAO") has no direct oversight functions with regard to the LAPD. It is involved indirectly, however, in two ways: the LAPD budget, and management reviews and audits. The Office of the CAO staffs the preparation of the Mayor's budget. In the formal budget process, both the Mayor and the CAO sit down individually with the heads of the various departments, including the LAPD, and listen to their requests. According to the CAO, the LAPD receives almost all of its budgetary requests; in fact, according to the Chair of the City Council's Budget Committee, the 34 • • • • • • • • • • • Department's expenses account for almost a billion dollars, fully 40% of the overall City budget. Thus, compared to other City Departments, the LAPD receives a disproportionate share of its demands. This may be attributable to the fact that Gates heavily lobbies the City Council, or to the potential importance of being seen as supportive of the Department . The Office of the CAO conducts routine management reviews and audits and an occasional targeted review. One such review resulted in criticisms of and recommendations for change. We were told that Chief Gates received this report by throwing it on the floor and giving it his "stomp of approval." E. Effects Of Political Atmosphere And Pre-verdict comments on LAPD Performance The political atmosphere preceding the unrest can be viewed in three distinct contexts; first, in the community, and among different groups, in the areas where the disorders erupted; second, in the relationships between LAPD management and City government, particularly the Mayor's office; and third, within the Los Angeles Police Department itself. We examine each of the environments below, and then consider the possible effects of comments by 35 • • • • • • • • • • • public figures made prior to the April 29 verdicts on the unrest which followed. 1. Tenaion• In Th• Colllllunity An.4 Between Sector• Of Th• COJlllllUnity Virtually everyone interviewed reported a significant and growing level of tension, frustration, and anger in the African American community in the year or so preceding the unrest. In large part this was attributed to the strain of a deepening recession, which was in fact a depression for many people of color throughout Los Angeles. our sources also confirmed the Christopher Commission's finding that a large number of citizens, particularly young African-American males, have experienced what they perceive as mistreatment at the hands of LAPD officers. In addition, a widespread belief exists that the "system" often has not worked to discipline officers who mistreat people of color. In the African-American community, there had been, in particular, a sense that, perhaps in this one case, in which Rodney King's beating had been recorded on videotape, "justice would be done." Rapid demographic and economic changes in Los Angeles also have increased greatly the level of tension between members of differing ethnic groups in some areas, most acutely between African-American and Korean-Americans 36 • • • • • • • • • • • • in south Central Los Angeles. This tension heightened and became known to the broader population with the light sentencing in the Harlins/Du case. Many sources indicated that they were surprised that significant violence did not occur after the Harlins/Du sentencing. Some credited leaders in the African-American community for channelling rage into channels of non-violent protest and political action. [ADD DISCUSSION OF COMMUNITY AND POLICE RELATIONSHIP] Before April 29, streams of frustration, alienation and cynicism in many sectors of the community merged to create a vast reservoir of anger and potential for chaos, which one career prosecutor characterized as "20 years of repressed rage". Many community members expressed surprise that the violence had not erupted earlier -- that some other event had not broken the dam. Some believe that, had there been at least some guilty verdicts in the King case, the flood of violence and destruction could have been postponed. However, many believe that the forces producing the anger and frustration persist today, as does the potential for future violence . 37 • • • • • • • • • • • 2 • Tenaion• Between The Chief Of Police And City Leader• It appears that, for a very long time, Chief Gates relied on his ability either to run the Department without ADY supervision by the political structure of the City, or to bypass all forms of political supervision other than the City Council by relying on his considerable base of support in the Council. This tendency prompted a complete rupture between the Mayor and the Chief in April, 1991, when Mayor Bradley asked Chief Gates to resign. It evidenced itself throughout the struggles over the future of the Chief of Police and the Police Commission. The Mayor and Chief did not speak directly to each other from April, 1991, until the disorders were underway on April 29, 1992. The rupture of relations between the Mayor and Chief made a significant change in the way the Office of the Mayor related to the Police Department. Notwithstanding the breach between the Mayor and the Chief, the Mayor's office continued to work directly, and reaso~ably effectively, on specific problems with police management at the Deputy Chief and Commander level. The problems following the "Justice for Janitors" demonstrations in Century City, and more than one gay rights demonstration, are cited as examples of cooperation and communication. In addition, the Mayor's office and Deputy Chief Matthew Hunt had worked together to 38 • • • • • • ie I I I • • • • end the boycott of Korean-American owned stores in South central Los Angeles because they feared the potential for violence. Indeed, in the several days before the post-verdict unrest, members of the Mayor's office were in direct communication with high officials of the Department (Chiefs Hunt and Parks) about the Department's preparation for reaction to the disorders, although these discussions plainly lacked significant detail. In doing so, they were following a practice that had evolved over time. Given the highly delegated nature of LAPD operations, this is the course that would have been followed even had there been no rift between the Mayor and the Chief. The week before the unrest, it appears that LAPD managers gave general assurances to the Mayor's office that adequate plans existed for dealing with potential civil unrest, but that officials in the Mayor's office did not inquire into the nature or content of these plans. Whether this was a failure of the City's executive branch depends on one's assessment of the proper role of the various sectors of City government. In general, the Mayor's office has relied on the Police Commission for whatever direct supervision of the Department has been possible in recent years. If one believes it is the responsibility of the Mayor more directly to oversee the Department, the lack of effective review by the Mayor's office in this instance can 39 • • • • • • • • • • • be seen as an error . Both Mayor Bradley and Chief Gates were very active and directly involved in the City•_ s general emergency planning entity, the Emergency Operations Board (EOB). The tensions between Mayor Bradley and Chief Gates do not seem to have interfered with the EOB planning function, but that function does not seem to have been adequate to the task . The chief function of the EOB is the coordination of emergency planning between City departments, with each department left to develop its own internal operational plans; this structure did not ensure that the Police Department had adequate plans for dealing with this specific disturbance . 3. Tensions Within The Police Department Some char~cterize the internal problems within LAPD as merely management problems, but they seem to have had a political aspect as well. Chief Gates viewed as personal disloyalty and political heresy the actions of some of his subordinates in their dealings with the Christopher Comrniss·ion. This contributed in turn to the estrangement of the Chief from some of his key subordinates, and a breakdown of communication within the management structure of the Department. This breakdown clearly contributed to the 40 • • • • • • effective collapse of LAPD management control in the early hours of the April 29th disturbances. 4. Th• Bffecta Of Pre-Verdict CoJIIDlenta By Pul>lic Officials It appears that in the weeks prior to April 29, some officials, notably Councilman Ridley-Thomas, made efforts to affect in some manner the LAPD response to potential civil disorder following the King verdict. In general, these efforts can be construed as seeking to avoid provocation and a police reaction that would make matters worse; some in the Police Department may have interpreted these efforts as a suggestion that the police effectively make no (or only a limited) response to violence. P. LAPD Management • The City officials and community leaders • • • • interviewed to date generally have criticized both the management structure of the LAPD and the management style of then-LAPD Chief Daryl Gates. While many interviewees were not privy to the inner workings of the Department, the overwhelming majority were convinced that the LAPD was in "disarray" in the time period immediately before the April 29th civil unrest. Many believe that the inexplicable paralysis in the decision-making ability of the LAPD "high command" in the initial hours of the post-verdict unrest had 41 • • • • • • • • • • • direct and disastrous impact on the LAPD response to that unrest, faulting the "LAPD high command" in general and Chief Gates in particular for the ineffective police · response. _ , JThe following discussion describes briefly the LAPD structure, key management decisions made by Chief Gates, and the apparent consequences of the management decisions that were noted by the interviewees . 1. LAPD structure As the attached chart illustrates, 3 the LAPD is headed by the Chief of Police who answers (at least in theory, and as to limited subjects) to the Police Commission. The Department is divided into three (3) offices that are headed by Assistant Chiefs. Those offices are: (1) Office of Administrative Services ("OAS"); (2) Office of Operations ("00"); and (3) Office of Special Services ("OSS"). Assistant Chief Jesse Brewer had headed OAS until March 1991; that position has remained unfilled since his retirement. Until very recently, Assistant Chief Bob Vernon headed 00 and Assistant Chief Dave Dotson headed oss. By Department structure, the head of the Office of Operations is in charge of 83% of the police personnel, 3 see Appendix 2 . 42 - - - - - - --- - ----------- • • • • • • • • • • • because all patrol bureaus are "operational," and, accordingly, are housed under this Office. In order of command, Deputy Chiefs rank immediately below Assistant Chiefs and usually are in charge of Bureaus. Below the rank of Deputy Chief is Commander followed by Captains, Lieutenants and Sargents. While interviewees often were not specific in describing what rank constituted "LAPD high command," it is apparent that, by structure, the "top LAPD management," consists of 3 Assistant Chiefs, 9 Deputy Chiefs and Commanders. Many interviewees observed that the retirement of Assistant Chief Bob Vernon, who headed the Office of Operations until five days before the outbreak of the post-verdict civil unrest, left a critical leadership vacuum in the LAPD's top command because Chief Gates had relied heavily upon Vernon to run LAPD's day to day operations. Moreover, the estrangement between Chief Gates and Assistant Chief Dotson, who had headed the Office of Special Services, also was seen by interviewees as a contributing factor to the "disarray of the Department." Interviewees focused upon an apparent morale problem in the LAPD's top command that occurred in the wake of the Christopher Commission Report, and the selection process for a new Police Chief. In April of 1991, Chief Gates announced that he would step down within a year . 43 • • • • • • • • • • - -- - ------ ---------------------, Chiefs Vernon, Dotson, Hunt, Parks, and Frankel all emerged as competitors for the coveted Chief of Police position. This highly competitive process resulted in "finger-pointing" and hard feelings among the competitors, opening wounds that have yet to heal. Thus, for almost one year before the 1992 civil disturbance, none of the top LAPD commanders was talking to, or working with, a number of his colleagues. In addition, the Christopher Commission investigated the LAPD and issued a report critical of the Department. Chief Dotson had testified before the Commission and Chief Gates felt betrayed by Dotson's testimony. 2. LAPD'• Management style Since the 1984 Olympics, when Chief Gates intimated that he would retire soon, the Chief had shifted his priority from day-to-day management of the Department to being a "remote-control, Reagan-type manager." Many interviewees stated that Gates had "retired on the job," leaving operational matters to Assistant Chief Vernon, while Gates handled LAPD public relations. We were told that Chief Gates' subordinates were reluctant to tell him bad news, rather than what they thought he wanted to hear, which fostered an atmosphere of fear and paranoia within the Department. Chief Gates, we were told, also had "an arrogant attitude" that permeated the Department, and made 44 • • • • • • • • • • • it clear that, while theft or narcotics dealing by officers would be dealt with severely, mistreatment of minorities would be dealt with leniently. Many interviewees also noted that Assistant Chief Vernon's personal religious "fanaticism" lowered Department morale because promotions were dependent upon "correct religious practices" by police officers. Also the LAPD has been "statistics-driven" to maximize arrests and characterize them as the most serious crime for booking purposes. As a member of the Office of the District Attorney observed: the LAPD did not accept criticism in any form under Chief Gates; the LAPD always "counter attacked" and blamed others for its apparent deficiencies . 3. LAPD'• Management Decisions Many interviewees familiar with the LAPD management structure expressed the belief that Chief Gates' decision to enact a pilot "community-based policing program" by altering the LAPD reporting structure had a deleterious effect on decision-making during the civil disturbance. Under the Chief's directive, the commanding officers of seven Divisions were redirected to report to Chief Gates himself, rather than to their respective Bureau Chiefs. Three of the five pilot programs were in South Bureau, under Deputy Chief Matt Hunt, including the Southwest and 77th 45 • • • • • • • • • • • Divisions, areas directly and heavily affected by the civil unrest. The restructuring left Deputy Chief Hunt with virtually no one to command. It is reported that Hunt approached the Chief about preparing a riot response strategy, but Chief Gates refused Hunt's request; Some interviewees opined that the restructuring order's impact upon the delayed police response was illustrated by the fact Chief Matt Hunt did not learn of the outbreak of violence at Florence and Normandie until 6:45 p.m. on April 29th while he was at First AME Church . Deputy Chief Hunt would have been the Bureau Chief to contact if Chief Gates had not ordered the Division Captains to by-pass Hunt and report directly to him. Chief Gates was away from Parker Center at a political fund-raiser, however, and was not available to direct these Division Commanders. Another important management decision identified by the interviewees was Chief Gates' reassignment of experienced command officers from Metro Division at Headquarters Bureau, which includes the Department's Rapid Response and SWAT units, and the transfer into Metro of new officers one week before the Simi Valley trial verdicts. Specifically, the transfer of Captain Patrick McKinley, an experienced officer, from Metro to Valley Bureau, and the decision to replace him with an inexperienced officer (Captain Gascon) was cited . 46 • • • • • • • • • • • ,. concluaion Many interviewees expressed the belief that, now that Chief Gates has left LAPD, the management problems will subside if not disappear because the structure itself is sound. We are not so certain, particularly because the Department's creation of specialized units for narcotics, gang-related activities and the like has stripped many Bureaus and Divisions of much-needed manpower, and muddled the Bureau Chief's Chain-of-Command. It also was observed that the LAPD has a tactical manual, setting out a plan for emergency police response and that the LAPD could have and should have utilized something as simple as a tactical alert earlier to quell the possibility of full-fledged civil unrest. Thus, the reported "disarray of the top command" stemmed from the void left by the recent departure of Assistant Chief Vernon as Gates' right-hand man, and the distance Chief Gates had put between himself and the remaining high ranking police personnel . G. The LAPD's Relationship To The Police Commission It was said long ago that war is too important to leave to generals . It might be also said that preparing for and responding to major civil disorders may be too important 47 • • • • • • • • • • • to leave to the Police Department. In the case of the disorders that began on April 29th, it appears that civilian government in Los Angeles relied principally upon the Police Commission, which in turn relied entirely, and some would say unreasonably, on the representations of the Police Department. It is clear that the reliance was in both instances misplaced . In theory and in law, of all of the elements of Los Angeles City government that have relations with the Police Department, it was the Police Commission that is supposed to exercise general supervision of the Department. The institutional and political arrangements have, since the disorders, been modified by the voters in enacting Proposition F. our review confirms the seriousness of the problems identified by the Christopher Commission. It appears that those problems contributed significantly to the failure of the Department either to prepare for the disorders or to respond to them adequately. Equally clearly, there remain further lessons. It is clear that the Police Commission did not insure that the Police Department had an adequate, specific plan for responding to disorders, despite the contrary assurances of Chief Gates to the Commission. There are, to be sure, explanations as to why the Police Commission did not assure that adequate plans existed. However, so long as the citizens of Los Angeles 48 • • • • • • • • • • • rely upon the Police Commission as ultimately responsible for their safety and the maintenance of order throughout the City, those explanations cannot excuse what happened in this instance • on April 21, 1992 -- 8 days before the verdict in the King beating case was returned -- Chief Gates assured the Police Commission that the Department had adequate plans for dealing with any disturbances that might arise because of the King case. Chief Gates had requested and obtained authorization for $1 million in overtime for officers in the event of disturbances. In fact, many believe that the Police Department had no specific plan to deal with these disturbances, and Chief Gates had squelched an attempt by Commander Matthew Hunt to initiate such a plan. We were told that, in reality Department's plan consisted only of an off-the-shelf generic plan for civil disorders and other emergency situations. But the Police Commission never asked to see the nonexistent specific plan, or inquired into the nature of the general plan. Instead, it accepted (or possibly misunderstood) the representations of Chief Gates and others in LAPD management. That the Commission ought not to have done so is now obvious, of more utility at this point is understanding why the Commission did no more. Over the years, the relationship between the Police Commission and Chief of Police has fluctuated, in 49 • • • • • • • • • • • --- --· ---------- - - ------;-----, large part as a function of changes in its membership . There have been periods during which the Police Commission has been merely a token, "rubber stamp" entity, and other times when it has been more active. It is ·clear, however, that, in recent times, Chief Gates never accepted the Police Commission as having any significant legitimate function in overseeing the operation of the Department. Gates did not routinely report to the Police Commission on the activities or plans of the Department. Members of the Police Commission could --and did -- obtain information only upon specific request. Accordingly, the lack of oversight in the area of planning for disorders was not exceptional. In nearly all areas, the Police Commission accepted on faith the representations of the Chief and lAPD management. It is also clear, however, that the Police Commission was never envisioned by any of the segments of City government, or the citizenry, for that· matter, as exercising detailed supervision of lAPD operations. It is equally clear that this institutional bias increased greatly in the year before the disorders. Also clear are some of .the reasons . First, Chief Gates plainly communicated his hostility to any appearance of Police Commission intervention in the operations of the Department, and strongly resisted any such efforts. over many years, for the most part, Police Commission members acquiesced. When a 50 • • • ! I 1 . • • • • • • • newly constituted Police Commission did attempt to take some action following the King beatingJ a majority of the City council supported Chief Gates, thus making clear that the Police Commission lacked any significant authority. As one observer told us, "All the members of the Police .Commission can count to eight". There was nothing new in Gates• ability to draw on the direct support of members of the council: he typically did so in many other contexts, including the Police Department budget. In this instance, however, the City Council's actions effectively destroyed what little supervisorial authority the Police Commission had ever had. In the months after Council actions to support Chief Gates and before the disorders, members of the Police Commission also engaged in a form of self-censorship. Virtually all of the Police Commission members were afraid that if they confronted Chief Gates about anything, he would enforce his repeated threat not to retire. In effect, members of the Police Commission bit their tongues and bided their time with regard to many issues. It was in this context that the Police Commission declined to ask the Chief about the purported plan for dealing with civil disorders . Many of the Police Commission members now acknowledge this decision as a failure of their responsibility to the citizens of Los Angeles . 51 • • • • • • • • • • • Had the Police Commission inquired into the state of LAPD preparedness in accordance with what nearly everyone now agrees is an appropriate manifestation of Police commission supervision of the Department, it seems likely that the complete lack of a specific planning document might have caused alarm and action. It is not clear, however, that the Police Commission had the authority to review any such plan. Clearly, the Police Commission lacks the ability to do more than exercise general supervision. Moreover, of the Police Commission do not have the specific professional competence to judge the merits of operational plans of the Department independently. The sole LAPD staff person assigned to the Police Commission obviously could not do so either . Nor would most people think that the Police Commission should engage in 'micromanagement' of the Department. That principle cannot, however, justify an abdication of responsibility for effective oversight. There is nothing unusual in public bodies (or corporate boards, for that matter) having to rely in large degree on the representations and abilities of their chief executives. It is unusual, however, for public bodies (or corporate boards) to rely entirely on their chief executives for both information and wise judgment. Just as public bodies and corporate boards may require the assistance of outside 52 • • • • • • • • ., • • experts or independent auditors, so too may the Police commission. Indeed, there are sufficient reasons for concern raised in our inquiry to consider a full-scale audit of the City's preparations to meet another major emergency; certainly, providing the Police Commission with a knowledgeable competent professional staff should be a~ high priority . B. Views Re Adequacy Of LAPD Response The overwhelming consensus of all of those interviewed was that the police response to the civil unrest which erupted after the Rodney King verdict was inadequate. Some places were worse than others; i.e. in South Central and Koreatown the response was non-existent, while in Hollywood and the Westside it was much better. With very few exceptions, the universal belief was that the LAPD was ineffective, inefficient, poorly organized, lacking in planning, leadership and equipment. The failure of the LAPD to react quickly and forcefully to the initial incidents of violence led to a situation which rapidly careened out of control, and which quickly spread and intensified. The only exceptions to this general opinion were expressed by John F. Lynch, Director of Central Operations, Los Angeles District Attorney's Office, and Los Angeles City Councilman Joel Wachs. Mr . Lynch feels that the LAPD 53 • • • • • • • • • • responded well to the disorder·, except for some initial glitches which prevented an immediate response; that the Department made one month worth of arrests in three days, and that it is an efficient and effective paramilitary organization when in a deployment mode. In Mr. Lynch's view, the LAPD worked with the D.A.'s office to make and deliver photo I.D. •sat the arrest sites to ensure proper booking. It would have been impossible to contain the rioting unless the LAPD was three to four times larger than it is. Councilman Wachs believed that the police response was fairly decent, that the situation was out of control, and that no amount of planning or responsiveness would have helped. The response might have been so good that the unrest ended after three or four days when it could have gone on for ten. 1. Initial Response Although most people agree that much of the violence and looting could have been prevented if the LAPD would have taken control earlier, some people believe that the LAPD faced a real conundrum. They believe that the police and demonstrators would have been killed if they went in where the riots started because the police would have been overwhelmed, and that there was a self-imposed restraint designed to avoid the provocation of further violence. Too much force would have made the situation 54 • • • • • • • • • • • worse due to the anger over the verdicts; too little exacerbated the violence. Those who did not agree believe that a massive show of force at Florence and Normandie would have nipped the unrest in the bud. Bradley Pye, Assistant Chief Deputy to Supervisor Kenneth Hahn, went so far as to say that if the initial response had been quick and forceful, additional violence would have been halted; for instance, if the LAPD would have shot the first, second or third looter/rioter, the more than 50 other victims would be alive today. Others suggested that the LAPD should have immediately gone to the "hot spots" in large numbers using non-lethal force such as fire hoses, tear gas and stun guns . 2. Bacalation Most interviewees believed that the lack of a swift, powerful response by the LAPD led to escalation of the violence and looting. When people saw on television that nothing much was being done by the LAPD on the night of April 29th, they "joined in," because it was "like a free give-away." There is a divergence of opinion on when the LAPD got the situation under control. Some people say it took two days, or until Friday, while others believe that the LAPD never got the situation under control; the violence 55 • • • • • • • • • • • ended only because the rioters tired, the targets were destroyed, and the National Guard ·. arrived. One former Police Commissioner believes that the LAPD's response was intentionally inadequate. Under this theory, because of the history of minorities destroying their own communities, Gates believed that the unrest would be contained. However, when it escalated toward other areas, a decision was made to respond. 3. criticism Of The LAPD Response The consensus seems to be that the LAPD exhibit no leadership, and that no decisions were made on a timely basis regarding necessary action. Gates was blamed for this overwhelmingly. Among the criticisms: • There was insufficient planning; police came up from San Diego to help but had to be sent back because they could not be deployed and there was no place for them to stay . • equipment. • del Rey and spots . There were not enough cars, radios and other The officers in quiet areas such as Marina the Valley should have been moved into the hot 56 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • --·----------------------, The LAPD was isolated from other city agencies and was thereby hampered in its emergency response. There were 16 police captains in Oxnard who should have been called back immediately. In addition to Gates, Deputy Chief Frankel was blamed for letting the situation get out of control in the first hours. Lt. Michael Moulin was criticized for his leadership at the 77th Division, however, he does have defenders . Frank Piersol really shined for his work at the EOC. • Ron Banks· was indecisive . • Captain Carlson at the Pacific Division did a good job . What went right? Not much. The imposition of the curfew was decisive and quick and helped. The Mayor and the Governor worked well together. The Federal Troops were called in quickly . 57 • • • • • • • • • • • 4. Th• Re pon•• In variou Location (a) Koreatown Koreatown was hit very hard, and the police response was woefully inadequate. There was no help for the people under attack. They dialed 911 and the Mayor's Office but no one came. The Koreans armed themselves for protection. They did not believe that they would be protected by the LAPD. Members of the Korean community interviewed had horror stories regarding the police response. The police would not help them defend their property and then, in some instances, arrested them for being armed . (b) south central Some people interviewed feel that the LAPD "wrote off" South Central early on, based upon an order from the top. However, others feel very strongly that there is no credible evidence to support this theory. At any rate, the response time to violence and looting in South Central was very slow. Adding to the problem in South Central were the facts that 40,000 homes were without power, and that the LAPD did not provide police escorts for the DWP to fix the 58 • • • • • • • • • • • power outage. There was also a food shortage, and food trucks would not come into south Central unescorted. (c) Baat Los Angeles The violence and looting in East Los Angeles was minimal, we were told, because it is a tight knit community. The Sheriff acted quickly and decisively and the violence did not spread. Obviously, more investigation is needed regarding these contentions. (d) Parker center After the verdict, there were only five or six police officers at Parker Center when the demonstrations began. They were greatly outnumbered, and there was no relief in sight. The officers restrained themselves under the leadership of Chief Parks. It was only after the crowds were disbursed that the real trouble started . 5. Views Re The Adequacy Of The Response Of Other Agencies (a) The National Guard Everyone agrees that the National Guard should have been deployed on the streets of Los Angeles earlier. Some people believe that the Mayor acted promptly in calling the National Guard, however, the deployment was delayed . 59 • • I • • • • • • • • • • There is a general feeling that the LAPD did not effectively coordinate the use of the National Guard troops. The people with inside knowledge state the facts as follows. On April 29, at 7:00 p.m. Matthew Hunt advised Phil Depoian that National Guard should be called. At 8:30 p.m. the Mayor called the Governor and said that the National Guard was not necessary. At 9:30 p.m. the Mayor, the Governor, Gates, and Sheriff Block had a conference call; Gates opposed calling the National Guard but ultimately acquiesced. Gates said he needed 2000 National Guard, but could have gotten more. At 7:00 a.m. on April 30 Gates had second thoughts. When the National Guard did arrive they were assigned to the Sheriff's office because the LAPD was too disorganized to deploy them. People did not see the National Guard on the street until much later. When they arrived they had to meet regarding deployment when they could have been prepared beforehand. Then they did not have sufficient ammunition . (b) The Sheriff's Office Again, the general assessment was that the LAPD did not coordinate with the Sheriff's office effectively . There were three Sheriff's divisions which could have reached Florence and Normandie within 10 minutes. However, they did not have jurisdiction, and the LAPD never requested 60 • • • • • • • • • • ----------- - - --- ----- - - ------i their help. On April 30, in the morning, the Sheriff's office got started with 60-90 pla- toons. They used 4 members per squad car and attacked the problem areas. I. Pactora Affecting Th• Police Response Interviews conducted to date reveal that many factors contributed to the inadequate police response to the violence which began on April 29, 1992. The failure of the Los Angeles Police Department promptly and effectively to control the looting, rioting and arson which occurred was the result of breaches of civic and police leadership, poor or non-existent planning, inept resource management, questionable judgment, as well as racial, economic and social stratification in the Los Angeles community pre-dating the violence by many years. Despite a perception by many that Los Angeles, its leadership and its law enforcement, were prepared for a major event, such as~ significant earthquake or civilian disaster, the City was not prepared. At the time of the initial disturbances, civic and law enforcement leaders were at odds with one another. The public and the press have been aware for many years of the overt conflict and wrestling for authority among the offices of the Mayor, the Chief of Police, the Police Commission and the City Council. The status quo in government had been more akin to a 61 • • • • • I • • • • • • political stand-off than an alliance in service to a dynamic and promising community. The events of this Spring revealed just how these breaches in leadership, and stratification in the community, affect us personally in our homes, businesses and personal safety. There is a developing consensus, gleaned from interviews of public officials and members of the public, that all of the following were contributing factors to the inadequate police response: 1. Pre-verdict Factors And Dynaaics There was no specific, effective plan by civil or law enforcement leaders to deal with wide-spread violence or civilian activity following the King verdict. Plans for police action during special events, such as the Pope's visit or the activities of Operation Rescue, have only limited value; they do not address deployment, communication or management of a massive police presence on a broad geographic scale, or support by fire department and other resources. The ersatz plan for Los Angeles in the event of a major earthquake did not materialize in the days of the disturbances. Many interviewees wondered aloud what the plan was, or if it existed. Even those chiefly responsible 62 • • • • • • • I • I I• • for the safety of the community admitted no personal knowledge of the plan. Many said they had been told by Chief Gates directly, or had read in the press, that he was prepared for "whatever" might occur after the verdict. To date, however, no interviewee has commented that she/he pressed Chief Gates to describe the plan or its specifics. Some civic leaders commented that they "thought" the LAPD was prepared, and did not question or inquire further. Chief Gates made assurances to the Police Commission, the Mayor and the City Council that the Department was prepared for the public's reaction to the verdict . The strained relations among the offices of the Mayor, the Police Chief, the Police Commission and the City Council pre-dating the disturbances have been identified as a cause of the poor police response. Among the consequences of this chasm were: (1) lack of information flowing to/from civic leadership about law enforcement's potential response to a natural or civilian disaster; (2) lack of civic leadership contribution to the plan; (3) lack of accountability of the Los Angeles Police Department; (4) lack of a coherent or comprehensive plan for the response; and (5) lack of control or authority by civilian leaders in the exercise of police power at the time of the riots. 63 • • • • • • • • • • • Other pre-verdict fictors identified to date are the failure to budget for and acquire police equipment (radios, vehicles); the failure to employ an adequate number of officers for a city of this size; and the lack of intelligence from the community about the potential response to the King verdict. Some observers noted that the members of the Police Commission have no formal training or expertise in police matters. In addition, many have demanding positions and businesses, which prevent them from devoting needed time and attention to the Commission's work. Some have suggested that the Commission is inadequately staffed and uninformed; others commented the Commission is generally at the mercy of the Chief of Police when it comes to obtaining needed information. As a result, the Commission is not readily able to deal effectively with issues which are properly its domain. The relationship between the LAPD and the community, and more particularly the minority community, was cited as a contributing factor in the police response. Officers on the force do not live within the community they serve, or in the minority community directly affected in the disturbances. Some noted the police response was destined to be inappropriate because of their preconceived notions regarding residents of the minority community. Others 64 • • • • • • • • • • • commented that Chief Gates' personal attitude and management style were a substantial factor. Furthermore, prior to the verdict, Chief Gates had instituted a new chain of command procedure which eliminated bureau chiefs; Chief Gates' plan relied upon his direct contact with numerous captains in various divisions. (AUGMENT] 2. Po t-Ver4ict Response As noted above, there was no apparent, specific, generalized plan for response to the public's reaction to the verdict. Although there was a brief two hour delay in the actual announcement of the verdict by order of Judge Weisberg -- a postponement which was adequate for the media to prepare the delay was not sufficient to allow for the Chief, the Mayor, or the force to organize. In addition to - insufficient numbers of officers and equipment, factors identified as contributing to the inadequate police response immediately after the verdict include: (1) failure immediately to call tactical alerts in affected areas; (2) failure to exert (and show) force early in the course of the riot, namely, on Thursday evening and Friday morning; and (3) failure properly to deploy officers to riot locations, as evidenced by the concentration of officers at Elysian Field and the turning back of 175 "volunteer" San Diego officers. Some interviewees commented that officers should not have been released from duty on April 29, and 65 • • • • • • • • • • • that reserve and off-duty officers should have been called in. Some observers commented that Chief Gates failed promptly to endorse Mayor Bradley's request for National Guard troops and, as a result, this support was delayed. Other factors contributing to the unsatisfactory response were inexperienced commanders and the failure promptly to call on "Mutual Aid," such as Sheriff and local county law enforcement . In stark contrast, the media was able to broadcast instantaneously the newest site of looting, the next fire and, lamentably, this moment's victim. Many interviewees faulted the media for failing to assist law enforcement in their efforts to contain the violence by commenting repeatedly that other non-minority areas of Los Angeles were not targeted by the vandals and arsonists, some observers concluded the media had incited wide-spread violence. Others commented that ·the media personnel failed to contact "911," or to intervene to help victims or call law enforcement, preferring instead to broadcast the grim scenes. Some leaders were incensed that the media failed to show police on duty , broadcasting instead unprotected areas and alerting "opportunists." The media's coverage has been criticized by many interviewees, some suggesting the city 66 • • • • • • • • • • • negotiate with the press regarding coverage of natural or man-made disasters so as to serve the community's interests. J • Th• Batur• Of Th• Violence The information received about the violence experienced throughout the City of Los Angeles falls into essentially three broad categories. First, interviewees described the types of violence which occurred, pointing to assault, looting and burning as the most oft-observed forms of violence. Second, interviewees speculated about the perpetrators of the violence and concluded that people of all races and ages were involved in various forms of violence. Third, interviewees discussed their views about the real "victims" of the violence, noting that race and economic condition often played a part in who became the "target" of the rage which was so prevalent in the City. 4 Although most conceded that their knowledge of this violence was obtained from watching television during the disturbances and reading newspaper accounts afterward, a few of the people with whom we spoke actually "patrolled" the streets while the disturbances were ongoing. 4 Each interviewee had slightly different observations and opinions on these topics. Although it is impossible to recount in detail all of these opinions and observations, we have done our best to provide a general overview and to note points as to which interviewees generally agreed and disagreed . 67 I I . I • • • • • • • • • • • 1. Pora• of Violence Experienced The three most prevalent forms of violence experienced throughout the City were personal assault, looting and burning of businesses. Several people who were working in the streets of the City during all three days of the disturbances noted that the violence was cyclical in nature . The first day, people essentially exploded into fits of rage, expressing their anger through all forms of personal assault. These assaults ranged in severity from the throwing of rocks and beer bottles at passing police cars, to the beating of Reginald Denny, to the shooting of innocent motorists. One interviewee who was present at City Hall all night on Wednesday evening noted that a group of youths, approximately 18 to 20 years old, "roamed" the streets of downtown, pushing people around, setting cars on fire, destroying building windows and generally causing mayhem. Another interviewee (who spent the hours of 6:30 p.m. until midnight on Wednesday evening guarding Kenneth Hahn Plaza from an arson threat), observed that although a "little United Nations" of youth was milling about the Plaza throwing things and overturning garbage cans, the group made no overt attempt to destroy the Plaza. Yet another person, who spent three days trying to control the violence, recalled that she saw teenagers setting 68 • • • • • • • • • • • garbage cans on fire in one area as a "diversionary" tactic so that they could then run undetected to another area to begin looting. These examples illustrate that the violence which occurred as an initial reaction to the verdict was extremely varied in form. The second day of the disturbances saw an extensive outbreak of looting and burning throughout the City. Grocery stores, mini-malls and swap meets suffered the brunt of this destructive activity, although liquor stores, clothing shops, and stereo stores also were looted . One person pointed to the destruction of a "mini-City Hall" which had been established by Mark Ridley-Thomas in his district. Most people felt that a "pattern" of looting and burning occurred on Thursday, pointing to entire blocks in South Central Los Angeles and Hollywood which were looted and/or burned out. one Korean businessman noted that the path of destruction generally stayed within the boundaries of Koreatown. Others, however, felt that the looting and burning was widespread, commenting that Venice, Oakwood and Lenox also suffered sporadic looting and burning attacks. Although property damage definitely escalated on the second day of the disturbances, some of the physical violence witnessed immediately after announcement of the verdict appeared, by this time, to be dissipating . 69 • • • • • • • • • • • By Friday, the third day of the disturbances, much of the physical violence and burning had diminished. People began to focus their efforts on cleaning up the areas hardest hit, although a fair amount of looting continued in portions of South Central Los Angeles. one social services worker observed that the reduction in violence by this time may well have been due to the fact that the majority of businessmen began "packing" firearms, ostensibly because they could not count on the LAPD to protect the area. In fact, when she arrived at a stereo store to help discourage youths from looting, she was threatened by the store owner to "keep away." She had to explain to him, at gun point, that she was there to stop the looting, rather than to participate in it . 2. Perpetrators of the Violence The general consensus among those with whom we spoke was that the perpetrators of the violence were primarily young males of all races. As one City Hall employee stated, "they were kids about 18 or 20 years old with high testosterone levels and nothing else to do." Several interviewees made it a point to note that Blacks, Whites, Asians, and Latinos all were involved in the physical assaults and looting which occurred . 70 • • • • • • • • • • • In addition to this generalization, a number of people observed that people of all ages and gender participated in the looting. The television stories were replete with visuals showing older women vith children taking food and clothing from stores. 5 At the same time, middle-aged white males were filmed carrying off stereos and other equipment which they had taken illegally. 6 Although a number of people with whom we spoke felt that "gangs" of all races were largely responsible for the violence which occurred, not one of those people could provide any evidence to support this hypothesis. For example, one politician believed that 20% to 30% of the violence was perpetrated by Black gangs, although she did not provide the basis for this estimation. In fact, no one seemed to be able to point to any concrete evidence of planning which occurred among gangs to set a pattern of fires, to spark riots or to loot. The most they could say was that they were aware of a growing sense of anger and frustration among gangs during these past several years, and 5 Although a few interviewees felt that these people were looting the "necessities" of life which they otherwise could not afford, the prevailing attitude among interviewees was to the contrary -- that these people were merely trying to "get away" with something . 6 several people commented that it appeared from the media coverage that a high percentage of Latinos participated in the looting. Whether this observation is borne out by statistics is unclear at this point . 71 • • • • • • • • • • • that they would not be surprised if gang members reacted negatively to the King verdicts. In fact, sociologists and other trained professionals who work with gangs on a regular basis concluded that gangs simply do not, as groups, have the cohesiveness and organizational skills necessary to plan and participate in this type of massive unrest. Rather, they believe that because individual gang members are impulsive, these individuals probably saw what was happening in the streets and joined in the fray . 7 This was particularly true, they felt, because· the gangs {and the public as a whole), perceived the LAPD to be unresponsive to unlawful activity. Thus, the widely held public perception that gangs as a group were responsible for the disturbances does not, at this point, have any basis in fact. 8 7 For example, one person observed that a few members of the Eight Trey Crips took over a gun store at the corner of Florence and Normandie, and only allowed certain people into the store to purchase ammunition etc. That person did not have any evidence that this takeover was planned prior to the eruption of violence at that place . 8 one person recounted a rumor which heard immediately before the verdicts were announced that a Black Muslim group intended to plan disturbances and to blame the gangs for those disturbances. Like most of the rumors which we heard, he had no evidence to support this . 72 I • • • • • • • • • • 3. Victia of th• Violence The victims of the violence literally came from all walks of life. A San Francisco businessman who flew to south Central Los Angeles on Thursday to close his plant and to assure that his workers made it home safely was shot in his car while he stopped for a red light. A significant number of Korean-owned businesses were looted and burned to the ground. At the same time, Black youths were shot in the streets. In short, it was very difficult for interviewees to generalize about exactly who suffered the most during the disturbances. Nonetheless, several interviewees concluded that that certain groups were "victimized" more than others. A large number felt that Korean-Americans were hardest hit, citing statistics that 60% or 600 million dollars worth of the damage which occurred was suffered by Korean-owned businesses. Whether this disproportionate amount of the damage was the result of racism or geography is unclear. A member of a prominent Korean-American organization felt that his constituency suffered the most because they happened to be located in South Central Los Angeles -- the area hardest hit by the violence. In support of this theory, he pointed to the fact that Black-owned Pep Boys and Boys Markets were looted and burned. On the other hand, several people commented that Blacks may well have "targeted" 73 • • • • • • • • • • • • Korean-American owned businesses because of the overwhelming feeling that Korean-Americans are ."rude" to their Black patrons. The majority of the people with whom we spoke at least acknowledged that the tensions among the Black and Korean communities played at least some part, however small, in sparking the violence which occurred. Although a few people with whom we spoke felt that racial hatred and anger about poor economic condition~ sparked these violent activities, most felt that much of the violence was the result of "opportunism. 119 People saw their neighbors and children looting and burning in the streets. When they saw little or no reaction to such lawlessness from the LAPD, they were undeterred from joining the frenzy of activity. As one councilperson put it, "mob mentality took over." lO 9 This seemed to be particularly true with respect to some of the arson which occurred. One person saw a group of young Black men prevent a store owner from burning his own business to recover the insurance money. Similarly, another person speculated that some of the fires in certain neighborhoods were set for the purpose of "burning out" competitors. 10 The interviewees also were almost universal in their criticism of the media. They felt that the media aggravated the already explosive condition in that reporters continually pointed out that the LAPD simply was not responding to unlawful activity. Many people felt that this encouraged others to loot and burn without any fear of reprisal. Others felt that reporters provided gangs with a road map to commit crime by stating on television that people successfully had looted stores by [Footnote continued on next page] 74 • • • • • • • • • • • Leaaona Learned The resounding theme expressed by interviewees in this category was communication -- communication between the LAPD and the communities they serve, the Mayor and the public during emergencies, public officials and community leaders, all branches of government, the Mayor and the Police Chief, the Mayor and federal officials, the Police Commission and the LAPD, the Sheriff's Department and the LAPD, community leaders and gang representatives and youth leaders, and between different ethnic groups. There is a sense that if everyone was communicating better problems like the civil unrest would be less likely. The following is a list of lessons learned provided by the interviewees . 1. Th• Chief Of Police ·(a) There is no substitute for an active, involved, hard-working Chief of Police . The new Chief must be informed, involved and someone on whom the city can rely in emergencies . [Footnote continued from previous page) first setting a fire in another area as a diversionary tactic . 75 • • • • •· • • (b) The new Chief needs to confront directly the problems of tensions between the African-American, Korean-American and Hispanic communities. · He must communicate with all members -of the community, including minorities that feel they have been abandoned by the LAPD (c) One priority of the new Chief of Police should be to highlight stories of "heroes" during the April 29 civil disturbance, e.g., people who took risk by saving victims. such heroes are more representative of the community than the looters and rioters featured on television . (d) It should be the Chief or Police's job to lead the response to any future civil • disturbance. This will be possible if the Chief has a good relationship with the Mayor and the City council. • • • Although the new Chief must secure the Department's allegiance, he also has to insist that changes in the institution of police law enforcement take place . 76 • • • • • • • • • • • 2. Police Officers (a) Police officers take a great deal of abuse on the streets. There is a responsibility of citizens to treat the police with the same respect with which they would like to be treated. (b) It is essential that the values of "respect for human dignity" become as equally important as the value of an "incorruptible police force." The internal LAPD departmental tapes contain no reference to police corruption, but numerous reference to police giving a low priority to human dignity of many minorities in the community. This latter value is as important as the former value in creating the type of police force the City wants. (c) The LAPD needs to revise its corporate culture. At present, there is too much of the "Dirty Harry" attitude of "make my day." (d) Police officers must be better trained in the future. Also, the police need to 77 • • • • be provided with proper equipment, including additional black and white cars, dual purpose cars and a better communication system . . (e) In order for the LAPD to be better prepared, it needs more money for officers and equipment • (f) In order to improve the LAPD's image, there must be greater coordination with • community groups. The LAPD is not well liked in the community. In order to gain citizen support, elected officials • • • • • • ( g) and community leaders must be willing to take the message to the community that the LAPD is fair and it protects minority communities. A partnership between the police and such entities such as the NAACP and Urban League, as well as Korean-American and Hispanic community groups, would provide a better opportunity for close relationship with the community . Police officers should be assigned, to the extent possible, to the neighbors in 78 • • • • • • • • • • • which they · live so that they will develop close ·ties with community members and will more effectively be able to obtain "intelligence" about unlawful activities occurring in the community and potential civil unrest. (h) The LAPD should adopt the Sheriff Department's method of obtaining "intelligence." (i) Police reserves were not experienced enough to be used in riot situations. The Police Protection League does not want reserves taking over police jobs; but they are needed in emergency situations . (j) The LAPD needs to communicate more effectively with the Sheriff's Department so as to allow the Department to assist once faced with an emergency into which the Department might otherwise not be invited to respond . (k) There needs to be a better plan covering items of communication, including available television sets, equipment and 79 • • • • • • • • • I • • 3 • personnel. Police command headquarters lack television monitors to review even what the public at large knew. (1) The citizenry of Los Angeles cannot afford to be alienated from its police force. The LAPD serve a vital function and a pivotal role in the community, which has been deeply undermined by hatred, animosity and alienation between city officials and the LAPD, which has now spilled over to citizens at large. This has created a very dangerous situation that must be addressed immediately. Police Policies (a) Community-based policing only works in communities which are stable. Unstable areas such as Nickerson Gardens and Jordan Dawns require more than community-based policing; they require stronger infrastructure including better schools, recreation and parks. (b) There must be better communication between community leaders and 80 • • • • • • • • • •• representatives of gangs and youth groups so as: . to gather intelligence concerning when additional violence may be imminent . (c) The LAPD's specific plan to handle civil unrest was one of the city's "best kept secrets". In the future, the city must demand a specific plan, and the Department must train officers on how to implement it . (d) One lesson is that people make the institution, and in there is no communication between Los Angeles citizens and the LAPD with each other, the best emergency plan will be useless . (e) Even assuming there was an adequate plan, for it to have any value, it must be properly implemented. In the future, planners should pay attention to working through all possible scenarios of a civil disturbance. There should be an emphasis on the "city family" which follows the plan designed by the LAPD Apparently, police and fire officials 81 • • • did not want elected officials involved in the emergency response, which meant that there was no coordination. (f) There needs to be a better intelligence and communications with gang members. (g) Although oversight of the LAPD by public i • officials has been improved by the passage of Proposition F, the Christopher Commission recommendations • • • • • • • that were not a part of that Proposition should be reexamined. (h) There is a deficiency in the manner of planning for staffing during emergencies. Many staff were released early because of curfew and personal concerns. There were no prearranged emergency assignments so that much of the staffing during critical periods was completely spontaneous. There needs to be a better mechanism to distribute food in the aftermath of a civil disturbance . ( i) The LAPD needs substantially more officers and a better communication system. Although community reaction may 82 • • • be mixed about spending more for officers and equipment, such equipment is needed if the police are to do their intended jobs . (j) The civil disturbances were the result of years of accumulated, but unredressed • hostility among minorities to mistreatment by the LAPD. The attempted reforms, such as putting Proposition F • • • • on the ballot and securing a commitment from Chief Daryl Gates to resign, were long term reforms, but they failed to relieve the pressure in a minority community, which was set off by the King beating verdicts . (k) To have a citizenry in the city who will not resort to riot, all or the minority constituencies must feel that they are investing in a cooperative enterprise between the community and the police. There must be reciprocal credibility and • respect. (1) Intelligence should be improved. Perhaps there should be a community hot • 83 • • t I line that would provide greater • information to public officials. • • • • • • • • • (m) The LAPD should give more authority to commanders in the field . (n) Even with improved LAPD capacities in the future, there will still be a need nor supplemental federal response, such as from the national guard, which can be made available within a very short time . (o) The police protective league has been the hindrance and not a help in the process of improving city policing, because the league has not assisted in getting more patrol officers on the street . (p) Even the appointment of a new police chief may not bring about the desired improvements, because of the alleged depth of racism among some LAPD officers, the fact that not many LAPD officers actually live in Los Angeles, and the lack of effective communications between the LAPD and the communities they serve. The riots and the 84 • • • • • • • • • • (g) inadequaci'es of the LAPD were primarily the fault of Chief Gates personally. Now that he is gone most of the problems will go with him . Community based policing should enable the LAPD to improve not only relations between the police and the areas they serve, but also to improve the LAPD's ability to predict the kind of a violence that could erupt. Police should patrol more by walking instead of driving through the streets. Only in that fashion can the police get to know the citizens they are supposed to protect, and vice versa. (r) · The LAPD must realize that it is part or whole law enforcement community, which includes 29 law enforcement agencies in the County. The LAPD should take part in joint plans and operations among all of these agencies, so that it never again finds itself overwhelmed by any incident . 85 • • • • • • • • • • • - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - ----- ------, (s) There should be a unified procedure regarding police arrests. During the recent disturbances, some cases were filed with the City Attorney, while others were filed with the District Attorney, which left the procedure far from unified • (t) None of the plans adopted thus far in the City (including earthquake, operation rescue or general contingency plans) have addressed the kind of widespread fires, looting and violence that recently occurred. The process by which planning is done for future disturbances, such as by updating various manuals, should be thoroughly reviewed. The current process is very bureaucratic and cumbersome, and some plans are more than ten years old . (u) The LAPD needs to be organized from the top down. An important organizational effort is the allocation of police resources and proper deployment. The LAPD needs to reexamine its priorities and assign more officers to the streets, 86 • • • • • • • • • • • (v) answering questions and establishing a visible presence. New officers should be assigned to desk jobs and plain clothes work. Also, the narcotics, anti-terrorists and intelligence units should be reorganized to come under the purview of the field commanders. These units should also be reduced in size. The mentor approach currently used in the LAPD to train officers is not working. The training officers are selected on the basis of their "productivity", which means aggressive arrest records. These officers are not well trained themselves and perpetuate hostile attitudes and techniques which inhibit good relationships between the community and the LAPD. (w) In addition, roll call and other in-service training is not handled consistently throughout the Department. In the future, in-service training should be organized on a Department-wide basis by a separate centralized unit in order to ensure consistency credit must 87 • • • • • • • • • • • be given to the officers and the commanders for training provided. Police comaiaaion (a) Some of the members of the Police Commission lack the experience necessary to be able to ask the right questions of the LAPD management, in order to ensure that the LAPD is ready for an emergency. Therefore, it his important that the Mayor select police commissioners who are experienced with police work. Presently, the only experienced commissioner is Jesse Brewer. Also, members of the Police Commission should not change too often, so that there is some continuity. Perhaps the Police Commission should not be made up entirely of civilians . (b) The LAPD and the Police Commission must work together to implement and better plan for dealing with potential unrest . (c) The Police Commission should be more active and ask more questions of the Police Chief and the L.A.P.D. It may be 88 • • • • • • • • s. • • • (d) (e) The that some of the police commissioners may not have enough specialized knowledge about police work to be able to utilize the additional information effectively. The Police Commission should be paid a salary, just as the department of public works. If the community expects the Commission to expend the necessary time and effort to perform an oversight function of the LAPD. The Police Commission and other political entities in the city must work more closely with the Chief of Police. More oversight must be exercised and more forceful review of police conduct is a necessity. The Police Commission should serve this more forceful role without meddling . Mayor's Office (a) There should be some system for the Mayor, or other city officials, to be able to address the city via television on an emergency basis. None of the 89 • • • • • • television stations was willing to send a remote broadcast truck and camera crew to the Civic Center because of the fear of violence. City Hall is not equipped to communication by television directly with the citizenry. (b) The Mayor's office should receive more complete, systematic and regular briefings. The Mayor's office should demand to see emergency preparedness plans by the LAPD and take nothing on faith . (c) The Mayor's office needs to focus its attentions on non-LAPD work, addressing the social problems underlying the civil disturbances. This would include racial tensions, the safety net system for food, health care, etc. after an • emergency. • • • (d) The Mayor's office must have daily contact with the federal offices responsible for delivering the social programs and services promised by recent federal legislation. The City must be 90 • • • • • • • • • • • ,. able to absorb the promised aid. For example, money has been appropriated for 20,000 summer jobs, but now the City must create all those jobs immediately . The police commission ought tp deal with the LAPD, and City Hall should turn its attention to social service problems . (e) A curfew should have been imposed · sooner in the recent disturbance. Bconoaic/Social Programs (a) Affirmative action and other programs for minorities must be implemented so as to alleviate the feeling of many that they have been disenfranchised. (b) When the community ignores racial and economic tensions for long periods of time, the community will inevitably experience some type of civil outburst . ( C) Widespread looting during the riots crossed ethnic lines. It suggests that there is a class problem as much as a race problem in the city . 91 • • • • ·• • • - - ------------------------------------, (d) Gangs in Los Angeles need constructive alternative to· "gang banging." Many gang members are concerned with their physical and economical survival. They need legitimate outlets to be able to pay their rent and feed their children. (e) Each minority group has its own problems. The individualized nature of these problems cannot be ignored. Thus, there are specific cultural and economic problems involving such overlooked immigrants such as Cambodians, Vietnamese and Central Americans who, as first generation immigrants, feel particular disenfranchisement. On the other hand, Blacks and Hispanics experience different kinds of problems, mostly economic, as t~ey move into later generations of life in the city . (f) The fact that Los Angeles is facing particularly hard economic times added • to the combustibility of the situation on April 29, 1992 . • 92 • • • • • • • • 7 • • • • (g) It will take some years to alleviate the conditions that produced the riots that exploded on April 29, 1992. As a consequence, the City .can be reasonably certain that major violence will erupt again. If proposed cuts in the state budget on survival programs are implemented, major violence over the next months and years is virtually certain . (h) There must be an improvement of education and job opportunities (particularly job training programs) in the depressed areas of South Central and East Los Angeles. There should be apprenticeship program that allow employers to mentor employees in the community. Racial Problems (a) The City is still very segregated along ethnic and class lines . What has been presumed to be an improvement of relations was an illusion. Relations between the African American and the Korean-American communities are 93 • • • particularly troublesome, because of the resentment that some African American feel towards Korean-Americans who are "making it" in the business community . a. Public Officials (a) There is no substitute for full and open • communication between all branches of government in the community. Of course, a perfect world of communication can • never be achieved; nonetheless, people in the city must demand from jaded or cynical government officials that they • be held accountable. • I (b) Politicians have to pay more attention to the racial tensions which obviously have been mounting in the past decade. There is a tenancy on politicians' part to pretend that the days of racism have past -- an illusion with little basis in fact. I • I • • (c) Public officials need to pay more attention to the indicators of potential unrest. Prior to the April 29 disturbance, a number of city officials 94 • • received information concerning an increase in "hate crimes". (d) All public officials need to be held e accountable to the City; they need to rise above their personal biases. • • , . • • • • • • (e) The (a) Some elected officials were not positive influences in their immediate response to the riots. This is particularly true of politicians who are running for office. Kedia Television accelerated disorder. It quickly told already agitated people where the violence was and where there was no control by the police. TV was virtually a "how to" riot lesson by telling viewers that they could light diversionary fires .a block away from the store they wanted to loot. (b) The media have acted too superficially in treating the problems underlying the riots. Also, the media will not discuss certain forbidden subjects including the 95 • • • • • • • • • • • number of illegal aliens who took part in the riots and who are a burden on the county's social services. (c) Local television stations acted irresponsibly during the riots. Some felt that they fanned the riots day after day by showing inactive police, unimpeded looters and members of ·the community who were prone to violence, rather than the more truly representative citizens. (d) There should be less posturing by the LAPD, the Police Commission and the City Council for the media. Each public official should be listening more to the other parties, rather than making pronouncements in the press and on television . (e) Once television showed an aggressive police response, it had a positive effect in curtailing casual looting . Also, once television showed positive public figures such as Edward James Olmos grabbing a broom or Arsenic Hall 96 • • • • urging the public to "stay cool", this sort of appearance had a positive effect. (f) Any plan to handle future civil disturbances should include the media. Notwithstanding First Amendment protections, there may be lessons to be learned about the way the American military during the Gulf War dealt with the press in controlling access to • certain areas of activity. It is particularly television, rather than radio or the press, which has the • • • • • • potential to fuel a riot. 10. Miscellaneous (a) Racism is not just practiced by whites. Racism exists among minorities as well. (b) Los Angeles obviously did not learn the important lasting lessons from the Watts riots . (c) There needs to be a mechanism to give people peaceful means to vent their emotions. Although this is the goal and 97 • • • • • • • • • • • result of a gathering at the First AME Church, the AME gathering seemed to be overwhelmed by the depth and breadth of reaction to the verdicts . (d) There may be some positive lessons learned from the disturbances. First, the Sheriff's Department performed admirably. Second, people outside the Los Angeles community acted generously in volunteering time and help to clean up the city and help rebuild. Third, there may be a better understanding developing among Koreans, Blacks and Latinos as a result of losses suffered by all minorities. At least, they are talking about their mutual problems, thereby hopefully fostering a better understanding among themselves. (e) It is not possible to anticipate all potential sources of future disturbances, rather verdicts, clashes between community members and the police or other incidents. Los Angeles is a volatile city, and many of its community members have believed for years that the 98 • • • • • • • • • • justice does not work for them. As long as this feeling persists, the city must be in a position to respond quickly when incidents of violence ·and civil unrest arise. (f) When all the rules are gone, even ordinary people will loot. When people saw on television that they could get away with stealing, because no one from the LAPD would stop them, they simply succumbed to temptation. (g) City services were not well coordinated and people did not know what emergency services were available during and after the riots. For example the DWP will provide dry ice to keep food from spoiling in an emergency, but this information was not widely known. Most people were ill-prepared to deal with emergencies such as lack of a phone system, and most people lack emergency supplies including flashlight, batteries, canned food and water 99 • • • • • • • • • • • (h) The City should develop a contingency plan that would utilize the National Guard to bring in food, cash (for banks) and other supplies to riot stricken areas. The National Guard and Sheriff's Department should also be used to provide escorts for fire fighters and utility workers to affected areas of the civil disturbance. The emergency plan in effect as of April 29 was not designed to cope with the type of unrest that emerged; (i) In anticipation of any further violence, such as the possibility of violence following the Reginald Denny beating trial there should be a "truth squad" on every corner prepared to speak to the media about positive responses to the verdicts. Also, there should be more community churches · and other public places where people can meet and talk, rather than resort to the streets and to violence. ( j) There should be some effort by the Legislature and the court system to make 100 I I • • • • • • • • • • • more time available to arraign arrestees in the aftermath of a future civil disturbance. IV. IIIPORKATIOlf FROM "THE COMKUlfITY" A. What information was available concerning possibility of violence after the King verdict? B. What are the community's expectations concerning the role and performance of the LAPD? c. What currently is wrong with the LAPD's performance in the community? D. What could be done to . cure these inadequacies by: 1. The LAPD itself? 2. The City's political leadership? 3. The community itself? E. Spontaneity and patterns of the violence . 101 • • • • • • • • • • • v . BPPBCT OP RBLATIOBSBIPS OP LOCAL OPPICIALS WITH BOB-LOCAL OPPICIALS A. state B. Federal VI. COBCLUSIOBS Alfi) RBCOMHBlfDA'l'IOBS CL921990.021 102 • • • • • • • • • • • APPBlmIZ A IHDIVIDUALS IIITBRVIDBD Reflected in this Initial Preliminary Draft Study Report are interviews with the following ·individuals: Alatorre, Richard Bernard, Ernani Brewer, Jesse Cleaver, James Dana, Deane Depoian, Philip Ellison, Jane Fabiani, Mark D. Galanter, Ruth Griego, Linda Kim, Richard Klein, Malcolm Lane, Ann Reiss Lee, Mary Lomax, Melanie Lynch, John Position Los Angeles City Council, 14th District Los Angeles City Council, 7th District Vice Chair, Los Angeles Police Commission Senior Deputy to Supervisor Kenneth Hahn Los Angeles County Supervisor, 4th District Special Counselor to the Mayor Counsel to the Mayor Deputy Mayor Los Angeles City Council, 6th District Deputy Mayor President, Korean-American Electronic Dealer's Association Professor of Sociology, USC Former Commissioner, L.A. Police Commission Directing Attorney, Legal Aid Foundation Former Member, Los Angeles Police Commission Director of Central Operations, L.A. District Attorney's Office • • • • • • • • • • • Mack, John Picus, Joy Piersol, Frank Pye, Bradley, Jr. Rhee, Jay Romero, Gloria Sheinbaum, Stanley Thompson, Gregory Wachs, Joel Watson, Diane Yamaki, Michael Yaroslavsky, Zev CL922010.024 - ----- - --- -------------- --------, Position President, Los Angeles Urban League Los Angeles City Council, District Commander, L.A.P.D., Liaison L.A.P.D.-Los Angeles Police Commission Assistant Chief Deputy to Supervisor Kenneth Hahn Spokesman, Korean-American Community Member, Hispanic Advisory Committee, Los Angeles Police Commission President, Los Angeles Police Commission Chief Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles County Los Angeles City council, 2nd District State Senate, State of California Member, Los Angeles Police Commission Los Angeles City Council, District 2 • APPENDIX B • LAPD Co11J1and Police couiaaiop Chief Assistant Chief Deputy Chief Commander Chief of Police Captain Lieutenant • Sargent (OAS> 12Ql. (088) Office of Office of Office of Special Administrative Operations Patrol Services Services Areas Bureaus • Training south Bureau organized Crime (Diviaiona) Intelligence Fiscal Areas Southwest Anti-Terrorist 77th • Personnel Southeast Administrative Harbor Vice Internal Affairs West Burea"Q • Areas Pacific West L.A. Wilshire Hollywood Valley Bureau • Areas North Hollywood Northwest Foothill West Valley Devonshire • Central Hollenbeck Downtown Northeast • Headquarters Metro SWAT • CL922040.033 • • • • • • • • • • • • TO: FROM: RE: DATE: DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product M E M O R A N D U M Richard J. Stone, Esq. Andrew D. VEalez-RiveraA,, V-'1_. R;tll(,-- {f) 1'0 ft) lV dJ £? ll Special Advisor Comparisons Group July 21, 1992 The following is an initial rough draft of the Comparison Group's working paper for the Special Advisor. Certain omitted portions of the paper will be forthcoming soon . CC: Linda S. Peterson, Esq. Thomas P. Hanrahan, Esq. Thomas A. Mcwatters III, Esq. Robert A. Sacks, Esq . Stevens. Lucas, Esq. Peter A. Burke, Esq. Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Esq. T. Warren Jackson, Esq. Jill A. Switzer, Esq. Brian O'Neill, Esq . • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product 2.0 COMPARISONS: PROCEDURE AND METHODOLOGY 2.1 Preliminary Analysis The Comparisons Group of the Office of the Special Advisor ("Comparisons") began its analysis by identifying all cities wth populations of 250,000 persons or more as reflected in the 1990 Criminal Justice Sourcebook. The 64 cities, including Los Angeles, that fall within this category are set forth in Appendix (with basic populations and crime statistics). The use of this population threshold was designed to segregate a broad and objective cross-section of large cities for further review and analysis. Within this broad group, Comparisons began by gathering basic information about each city in the following [four] areas: (i) demographics, (ii) criminal activity, (iii) police department characteristics, and [(iv) government e~penditures]. The goal of this exercise was to compare various characteristics of Los Angeles with other large cities in the United States in order to identify, in conjunction with an analysis of information being collected through a survey of the police departments in these 64 cities and an historical review of past civil isturbances, a much narrower group of cities to be examined in greater depth . -2- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Comparisons began its analysis by extracting basic demographic information about each of the 64 largest American cities from the census information for each of the years 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990. Although not all data was available for all years, and although the classifications employed by the Census Bureau are not in all cases comparable over time, the information collected includes generally the following: (i) total population, (ii) total white population, (iii) total non-white population, (iv) total black population, (v) total hispanic population, (vi) total asian population, (vii) percentage of population having graduated high school, (viii) percentage of population having graduated college, (ix) per capita or per family income and income levels, and [(x) unemployment statistics]. In order to make meaningful comparisons, we also made normalizing calculations to measure (a) population density (people per square mile) and (b) percentage changes in population, by category, over time. We also collected basic crime date for each of the 64 cities from extracts published by the U.S. Department of Justice for the years 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990. This data included total serious crimes, total violent crimes and total homicides. Using this information, together with the basic demographic data obtained from the census, we again made normalizing calculations to determine the incidence of each of these categories of crime per thousand people. That analysis is found at Appendix __ . - 3 - • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product For the years 1960, 1970, 1980, and (1990], we obtained from the Justice Department extracts the number of law enforcement officers in each of the 64 cities in our sample. For 1990, we were also able to obtain as well for the 50 largest of those cities the hispanic and black officer composition of those police forces. Using that information, together with the other data collected, we calculated the following measures: ( i) officers per square mile, (ii) officers per 1,000 people, (iii) percentage of black officers (1990 only) and (iv) percentage of hispanic officers (1990 only). We also compared, for each of the 50 cities for which the information was available in 1990, the percentage of black officers on the police force against the percentage of blacks in the population of the city as a whole, and the percentage of hispanic police officers against the percentage of hispanics in the general city population. Finally, Comparisons is presently in the process of collecting available information concerning spending by the 64 cities in the following areas: (i) total spending, (ii) spending on police, (iii) spending on welfare, and (iv) spending on education. 2.2 Survey Comparisons is also obtaining comparative information about cities other than Los Angeles through the use of a -4- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product questionaire sent to the police departments in the 64 cities contained in the core study group, as well as the police departments in_ additional cities. These additional cities were selected on the basis that [add justification]. The questionaire, which was developed principally through the efforts of law enforcement professionals with input from the Comparisons team, is designed to elicit detailed information from the police department in each city concerning: (i) the composition, size and structure of the police department, (ii) the operational philosophy of the police department, (iii) the performance of the police department as indicated by various measures, (iv} training of police officers, (v) planning for civil disturbances, (vi} resources available to the police department and individual police officers, and (vii) budgeting and spending on law enforcement activities. A copy of the questionnaire is at Appendix __ . In order to facilitate the comparison of the information expected to be obtained from the responses to these surveys, Comparisons intends to enter the responses into a computerized database. At present, no responses have been obtained . 2.3 Incidents Database - 5- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priv iledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product A database of civil disorders also was compiled, by reviewing newspaper items, magazines articles and pieces from major news services from the past 27 years, in which a civil disorder was referred by the newspaper or magazine as a "riot" or "civil disturbance." These materials were compiled primarily through access to computerized information services, cornrnerically available computerized information systems, the general information system of the University of California - Los Angeles, (Sidley & Austin - D.C.), and resources generally available at the Los Angeles Public Library. This database indicates such civil disorders occurring since 1965, of varying magnitude . 2.4 Selection of Cities From an analysis of the basic demographic data, the results of the survey and the revelations in the incident database, Comparisons focused attention on civil disturbances that had occurred in cities. These events were chosen [insert to come explaining rationale]. These events are the following: [insert to come] 2.4 Interviews Comparisons undertook in-depth interviews of police officers in each of those cities to determine how the police -6- • • • I • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product response to those incidents compared with that of the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") to the 1992 riots . [More to fallow] 2.5 Statutes Finally, Comparisons undertook a review of state statutes and local ordinances, including both those of California and other states (must correspond with at least the states of the cities we examine in depth) to determine their impact on police control of civil disorders. Appendix such statutes and ordinances . -7- contains a table of • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product 3.0 COMPARISONS: PLANNING A key element in planning for civil disorder control is the development and maintenance of an emergency civil disorder plan. Most major police forces have such plans, although the plans are not often updated. Many cities have plans crafted to deal with such expected emergencies as earthquakes or hurricanes, or with planned events, such as political conventions or concerts, but do not have specialized plans for the type of community disturbances which escalate into a riot. Miami and Dade County, presumably because of the number of significant riots that occurred there in the 1980's, seem to have the most incident specific civil disorder plans. See,~, The Northside Station Emergency Operations Plan - Lozano Trial Contingency Plan 1989. following: Ideally, a civil disorder emergency plan would do the 1) The plan should be as simple as possible, given that there will be mass confusion during a rapid mobilization of personnel and should be designed to reduce the potential for confusion; 2) planning must be initiated as soon as potentially explosive situations or increased community tensions are known (i.e., in Miami and Dade County, planning began soon after the Lozano shooting); 3) plans must be kept current; 4) plans must clearly describe the decision-making authority of both police officers and first line supervision during the initial stages of -8- • • • , . • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product a disturbance and permit immediate mobilization; 5) planning and agreements on policy issues should be done among the police, government and political leadership and other agencies including Fire Department, State Attorneys, other law enforcement agencies, jail personnel, etc; 6) plans should identify critical sites, ~, government operations, mass transit, pawn shops, gun shops, shopping centers, stores with highly movable goods, and ascertain how continuing police presence can be maintained; and 7) plans should identify the tactics which will be used and accepted for disorder control . 3.1 "Industry" Standards and Planning in Other Cities 3 .1.1 Introduction "A major civil disturbance requires a police department to convert itself, suddenly, into a different organization with new operational procedures", different from those in which police are traditionally trained. 1 "Critical issues include dealing with organizational inertia, availability of personnel, mobilization, deployment, tactics, the provision of strong command presence throughout wide-based field activities, and 1 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders ("Kerner Commission Report"), p. 485 . -9- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product prior understanding and agreements about what actions are to be taken in order to limit or control the spread of a disorder. 2 This section identifies the major areas to be considered by police agencies when planning to confront and control civil disorder, reviews several police departments' emergency plans for mobilization, and compares the LAPD standing plan with the proposed model plan components. 3.1.2 . Developing the Plan 3.1.2a Policy Considerations Policy planning has been divided into three areas of concern: 3 administrative policy; 4 organizational policy; 5 and operational policy, which addresses the specific guidelines for 2 Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders: Issues for the 1980s (Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders), p. 21 . 3 Guidelines for Civil Disorder Mobilization and Planning (Guidelines), pp. 2-5. 4 Administrative policy involves a stated position on the issues of police-community relations, human relations, and civil disturbances. Guidelines, p. 2. 5 Organizational policy requires some means of measuring the attitude of the community. Ibid, p. 3-4; Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders), p. 20. ("Disorder assessment is not widely viewed as part of the disorder process. Police departments need to learn to carefully analyze neighborhood tensions.") -10- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product ·controlling disturbances. 6 The first stage of planning for establishing civil disorder control is to focus on operational policy considerations and the procedures required for: organization for control; training; equipment requirements; mobilization; coordination and mutual aid; decision-making procedures during a riot; communications; rumor control; containment and de-escalation; and mass arrest. 7 Other identified policy and planning issues include use of the National Guard and other resources; communicating plans to departmental personnel; training of personnel; and testing the plans. 8 3.1.2b Participants in the Policy Planning Process The Kerner Commission Report noted that "[c]ivil disorders are fundamental governmental problems, not simply police matters. As the chief elected official, the mayor must take ultimate responsibility for all governmental action in times of disorder. To make this meaningful, he must have the corresponding authority and control. He must become fully involved in disorder planning and operations. He must understand 6 Special consideration must be given to the policies regarding use of force. Guidelines, pp. 4-5. 7 8 Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders, p. 21. Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders, p. 44. -11- • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product the nature of the problems posed by a disorder, the strategy of the response, and the pattern of field operations." 9 "Similarly, police chiefs must involve the mayor in planning activities and operations. Only regular participation by the mayor in police problems ... will educate both the mayor and the police to the mutually reinforcing nature of their relationship. 1110 "Governors and other civilian officials ... such as attorneys general, also have an obligation to supervise planning and operations for civil disorders. " 11 "For effective control of civil disorder, planning must include at least the basic city agencies (police, fire, courts) involved in control activities. Enlightened planning will also use the personnel and resources of all government agencies, together with groups of private citizens, that may be helpful in restoring and maintaining order." 12 In fact, community debate is recommended in order to achieve a level of consensus on acceptable police actions. 13 9 Kerner Commission Re:gort, p . 333. 10 Ibid, p. - . 11 Kerner Commission Re:gort, p. 333. 12 Kerner Commission Re:gort, p . 509. 13 Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders, p. 44. -12- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product 3 .1. 2c Architects of the Final Plans 3.1.2c(l) Planning Office/Personnel The Report on the Conference on Civil Disorders 14 recommends that after the first stage of planning has been completed, a subcommittee should be created, consisting of police planning personnel and operations supervisors, to carry out the remaining staff work. 15 Standard 46.1.1 recommends that a written directive specify a position in the agency responsible for planning for response to unusual occurrences. The person holding this position should be the principal advisor on unusual occurrences to the agency's chief executive officer. In larger agencies, an important part of the duties attendant to this position may be to act as an expediter of resources during_ an emergency situation . CALEA's Standards recommends "a full-time and permanent planning office ... for larger law enforcement agencies in order to respond to the amount and complexity of required planning and research. 16 The Los Angeles Police Department has articulated a continuing responsibility to: plan for foreseeable 14 Source. 15 "Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc.'s ("CALEA") Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies, October, 1991, Standards Manual ("Standards"), 16 Standards, Chapter 14, p. 14-1. -13- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product emergencies; train personnel in emergency control functions and tactics; exercise, test, and evaluate emergency control procedures; respond rapidly with sufficient personnel and logistical resources necessary to fulfill police responsibilities when a disaster or other emergency occurs. 17 3.1.2c(2) Responsibility Within the Los Angeles Police Department for Disorder Control Planning 3.1.2c(2-a) The Tactical Planning Section The Tactical Planning Section (TPS) is responsible for: developing and maintaining the Tactical Manual; observing and evaluating Department activities in the control of serious or Major unusual occurrences; coordinating the preparation of a written history of an unusual occurrence when directed by the Director of the Office of Operations'; and providing specialized assistance to the field commanders. 18 The TPS is also responsible for, among other things: developing and maintaining the Mobile Command Post Fleet; 19 evaluating all lesson plans intended for emergency control 17 18 Tactical Manual, § A/201. Ibid, § A/205.05. 19 There are some exceptions. See Tactical Manual (version that had been distributed at time of unusual occurrences) ("Tactical Manual"), § A/205.05; Mobile Command Post Fleet. -14- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product training at Department organized schools; evaluating all Area, bureau and Department standing plans, after-action reports, unusual occurrence histories, special events critiques, journals, and other reports related to unusual occurrences for consideration in future planning and training; and conducting training through the use of field command post exercises; field command post cadre schools; and emergency control classes at roll calls, training days, and in-service training. 20 3.1.2c(2-b) Metro Division Metro Division also has duties in relation to planning for unusual occurrences. This division is responsible for maintaining a program for continuous training of Metro Division personnel in emergency control tactics, 21 and has the additional 20 Ibid . 21 There is a reference in§ D/006 to a light striking force, described in§ A/006 as "a mobile force · of officers, held in reserve, available for immediate deployment in a reinforcing mode or to control a particular incident within an involved area. The light striking force is a mobile force that may consist of one or more squads (nine officers and a sergeant). After the initial difficulties of a U.O are overcome, light striking forces are deployed as a reactionary force. When units or squads on patrol cannot handle problems such as: a growing crowd that may develop into mob activity; looting; and roving gangs. Tactical Manual, § D/006.05. Is this a standing team, or another tactical alternative? -15- • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product duty of planning for immediate deployment of division personnel during disasters and other emergencies. 22 3.1.2c(2-c) Other Tactical Manual, § D/003 states that commanding officers "shall survey their operational areas and develop contingency plans for the control of a foreseeable U.O. Such planning should ~e thorough, but remain flexible to allow for change .... Unless reduced to written form, a plan is of marginal value .... When written, the elements of planning represent a product of the planning process. The following elements should ·be included in the plan and, when necessary, made available to all concerned personnel[:]" maps (including predrawn sectoring maps [§ D/005.02]; key installations and building plans; building and street light placements; and deployment estimates. (See§§ D/003.02 - D/003.05). 3.1.3 The Emergency Plans for Control of Civil Disorders The emergency plans can be divided primarily into three parts: assessment of, and response to, the potential for disorder; 23 and mobilization and operational planning. 24 22 23 Tactical Manual, § A/205.03. Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders, pp. ·32-43 . -16- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product 3.1.3a Assessment of the Potential for Disorder Experience in Miami and Dade County indicate that a significant amount of officers were aware of tension in the various communities and neighborhoods. 25 However, apparently no one was assigned regular responsibilities to assess what was termed the "state of community mental health. 1126 Assessment of such information may be used to design and carry out policies, procedures, strategies, and tactics which may lessen the escalation of patterns of conflict. 27 Further, sharing of assessment information may, in the end, "stimulate community involvement in seeking creative solutions to emerging patterns of disorder", and generate support for the police, which is necessary in order for them to carry out the police function in a democracy. 28 Response to the potential for disorder is also important. "The challenge for the police administrator is to 24 ( ... continued) 24 See Guidelines, pp. 7-12; Urban Disorders, p. 45 ("There is a need for police organizations to separate personnel mobilization issues from disorder control strategies."). See also, CALEA Standards, Standard 46.1.3. (requiring a written emergency mobilization plan that is separate from the operational plan) . 25 26 27 28 Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders, p. 32. Ibid. Ibid, p. 33 . Ibid, p. 34. -17- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product develop a strategy for police and community responses which will either correct system failures or defuse community tension." "Creative intervention seeks to affect deteriorating social relationships within a neighborhood and between the neighborhood and police.11 29 Collective efforts may have to go beyond neighborhood advisory groups to incorporate community agencies, institutions and individuals prior to a disorder, and implementation of the beat officer's recommendations for lessening tensions. 30 3 .1. 3b Mobilization "Sufficient manpower is a prerequisite for controlling potentially dangerous crowds; the speed with which it arrives may well determine whether the situation can be controlled. I.n the summer of 1967 [the Kerner Commission] believe [sic] that delay in mobilizing help permitted several incidents to develop into dangerous disorders, [ 31 ] in the end requiring far more personnel and creating increased hazards to life and property. 1132 Further, 29 30 Ibid, p. 39 (emphasis in original). Ibid, p. 40 . 31 Comments by Dade County field commanders in response to inquiries about the May, 1980, unusual occurrences, indicated that they also were not prepared to respond quickly. 32 Kerner Commission Report, p. 326. However, the report also noted: (continued ... ) -18- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product because most cities do not have sufficient personnel quickly available to assure control in the event of a sudden large disorder 33 , short of preventing disorders, it is imperative "to contain them before they develop into serious problems. 1134 3.1.3b(l) The written emergency mobilization plan Standard 46.1.3 requires a written emergency mobilization plan that would provide for the mobilization and deployment of needed manpower with a minimum deviation from established operating procedures. 35 Additionally, the plan should also describe the method for adJusting or modifying the plan, and there should be a series of contingency plans developed 32 ( ... continued) "As the FBI riot control manual states: 'the basic rule, when applying force, is to use only the minimum force necessary to effectively control the situation. Unwarranted application of force will incite the mob to further violence, as well as kindle seeds of resentment for police that, in turn, could cause a riot to rear. Ill advised or excessive application of force will not only result in charges of police brutality, but also may prolong the disturbance.'" Ibid, p. 330. 33 Police personnel on duty during the May, 1980, Dade County disorder indicated that there was a lack of personnel on duty at the time of the first reports of incidents. 34 35 Kerner Commission Report, p. 327. Ibid, pp. 486-489. -19- I • I I • • • • • • • • , . I DRAFT 7/21/92 ·Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product for dealing with each escalating stage in a riot situation. The mobilization should be practiced at least once a year . 3 . 1. 3b ( 1- a) Concerns "A study of 30 major police departments found that all had some form of written mobilization plan. Principal defects were: inadequate attention to implementing the plan; inadequate relief of reserve forces after the plan has been activated; inadequate accounting for personnel dispatched to a disorder; inadequate predesignated assembly areas or command posts in the various areas of the cities where trouble might be expected; inadequate logistical support of police and other law enforcement officers engaged in control activities; inadequate flexibility in planning to cope with disorders of varying natures and magnitudes; and unnecessarily complicated planning that deviated excessively from normal operations. 1136 "[M]ost emergency mobilization plans appear to be directed toward mobilizing police personnel based on the assumed severity of a disorder. Assumed phases and needed personnel are linked into a plan for mobilization. The disorder is often a well developed logical sequence of expected phases: who does what, where resources can be drawn from, and who has what 36 Kerner Commission Report, p. 486 . -20 - • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product responsibility. 1137 One of the purported problems with the effectiveness of such phased plans is that actual mobilization in response to a major disorder does not unfold in an organized way . When the process of mobilization is regularly perceived as beginning with the minor incident, the initiation of a mobilization is automatic and within the scope of lower-level personnel. [need to fix quote marks in this paragraph] "The plan which begins with the small disorder as the basis of all responses will also serve to reinforce understanding among lower ranking police officers that every situation is potentially explosive. This type of disorder plan effectively solves the problem of the unwillingness of lower ranking officers to suggest or initiate a mobilization plan without the authorization of higher ranking commanders. 1138 3 .1. 3b (1-b) Contents The heart of a mobilization plan is a current personnel duty roster, 39 including names, home addresses, and telephone number. This provides the essential tool for attempted rapid 37 Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders, p. 43. 38 Ibid, p. 46. 39 In a post action review of the May, 1980, Dade County disorder, it was noted that the emergency mobilization plan was not updated to reflect reorganizations in the agency. - 21 - • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product notification of personnel by telephone of the situation. 40 Moreover, updated lists of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of directors of municipal departments and other jurisdictions should be maintained. It is recommended that these lists show predetermined locations for staging of squads of officers, where they will go, unless otherwise instructed. It is also important that the disorder control [mobilization] plan provide for assignment of non-patrol personnel. Without specific assignments, specialists such as detectives may end up determining their own assignments. Also included in the plan should be provisions for and methods of rotating and relieving officers in the event the civil disorder continues for many hours or days. 3.1.3b(l-c) Structure The Guidelines, which were developed 41 for the Kerner Commission and first published in 1968, describe a three-phased "Tactical Alert" as a means of alerting all personnel that an 40 Some departments utilize automatic dialing devices to expedite notifications. Automatic equipment could make and record emergency calls not only to police personnel, but also to business places and community leaders. Civil Disorders After Action Reports: Spring 1968. Some plans allow for the use of electronic media for notification of mobilization. 41 Then L.A.P.D. Deputy Chief Daryl F. Gates was one of the advisors on this project. -22- • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product unusual occurrence is either anticipated or already going on. 42 The initial phase addresses minor unusual occurrences that can be handled by on-duty patrol division with the assistance normally available from other divisions. 43 The second phase involves serious, unusual occurrences of such proportion that: the normal on-duty structure is insufficient to establish control; there is immediate need for rapid mobilization of personnel; the department should discontinue normal non-essential functions; the on-corning shift should be called up early to augment on-duty forces, and all other personnel should b e placed on 24-hour standby. 44 Finally, a major disorder which threatens safety of the jurisdiction for an indefinite period of time, and necessitates a completely restructured police organization requires that there be immediate extension of the work day to twelve hour watches, deferments of days off, and requests for major assistance from other police departments, the National Guard, and other governmental agencies. 45 42 Guidelines, pp. 8-9. 43 Ibid, p. 8 . 44 Ibid . 45 Ibid, p. 9. -23- • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product 3.1.3b(2) Review of Vari~us Cities Mobilization Plans A cursory review of various mobilization plans 46 reveals tiered plans that incrementally increase the number of personnel available to respond to an unusual occurrence. 47 Among the main questions are: when does the department curtail the provision of 'routine police services' in order to cope with the unusual occurrence, at what stages are watches held over, at what point is the entire department mobilized to respond to the unusual occurrences, and when are off duty personnel called in? 3.1.3b(2-a) Atlanta's mobilization plans Atlanta has a five-level plan. Level 1 deals with a single zone occurrence that is handled by personnel in that zone. Level 2 is zone mobilization with assistance from the Special Operations Section. In the affected zone, minimum service levels are implemented. Level 3 involves a mobilization for multi-zone occurrence, and involves all available on-duty field operations division personnel. In this stage mobilization, all zones provide minimum service levels. A Level 4 mobilization requires 46 Mobilization plans for the cities of Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, Miami, and Los Angeles, as well as the Metro Dade Police Department plans, were reviewed . 47 LAPD's mobilization plans appear to be as extensive as any of these departments' plans. -24- • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product all employees ·to be mobilized, anrt all divisions provide minimum service levels. Level 5 involves other law enforcement agencies, and the National Guard as well. All personnel are placed on 12- hour shifts. 3.1.3b(2-b) Chicago Police Department's Mobilization Plans 3.1.3b(2-b-i} The "Immediate Emergency Plan" Chicago has three plans for response to civil disorders. The first plan is the "Immediate Emergency Plan[, which] consists of a series of plans designed to meet manpower needs during emergencies while providing continuous police coverage of areas not affected by the em~rgency. The. plans are to be used as a guide, but any other arrangement of vehicles or personnel that the emergency calls ~or may establish the 'Plan.'" This emergency plan consists of five plans: plan I calling for one sergeant's car, four patrol cars, and one paddy wagon; and plans II through V consisting of multiples of plan I (e.g. plan V calling for five sergeants' cars, 36 patrol cars and 5 paddy wagons). Any sworn member is authorized to call into effect any plan which, in his opinion, is required to bring a situation under control. This two-page plan also provides for, among other things: notification of the first Deputy Superintendent; -25- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product identification of city-wide frequencies to be used; centralization of communications at the scene; response of conunand to, and chain of command at, the scene; and operations at emergency scenes. 3.1.3b(2-b-ii) The Special Response Manual In the front of its Special Response Manual, dated February 23, 1989, the Chicago Police Department has a detailed general order 48 regarding Processing Multiple Arrests. The rest of the manual is divided into two sections. 49 The first section, titled Plans and Organization, contains two special response plans: 50 Plan Red (Phases 1 and 2), and Plan Blue (Phases 1 and 2) • • Plan Red. 51 Phase one requires twelve 8 (eight) man squads 52 to be assembled from each of the three watches from the patrol 48 49 This is dated August 22, 1986. The second section addresses Special Response Considerations. so These plans can be activated only by the superintendent, the first deputy superintendent, the chief of the patrol division, or the on duty assistant deputy superintendent for operational services. 51 The complete plan, including organizational attachments, totals 6 (six) pages. 52 The basic operational element in plan red. -26- • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential • Attorneys' Work Product • • • • • • • • • division. The configuration of the squad 53 is one sergeant, seven officers, and additionally one paddy wagon 54 with a driver and an operator. Phase two requires that, in addition to the phase one build up, on the second and third watch, respectively, there be an additional twelve 8 (eight) man squads assembled from the Detective Division. These "Special Response Squads" are formed and numbered in accordance with an organizational chart appended to the special response manual. Plan Red, Phase One outlines the basic command structure and has minimal guidelines for notification and radio call identification. The contents of Plan Red, Phase Two, are quite similar to those of Plan Red, Phase One, two of the biggest differences being that department vehicles instead of paddy wagons are used for transport, and there is a pre-designated identification system for when platoons are formed . • Plan Blue. Plan Blue is a four-page plan requiring, among other things, placing designated units of the Chicago P.D. on 12-hour shifts; recalling off-duty personnel except those on annual furlough/vacation or medical roll; selected personnel working a 6-day we~k; and each of twenty-one districts to furnish one 53 A separate "Incident Control Teams" patrol division special order dated 31 August 1990 also identifies this configuration as an incident control team. 54 The paddy wagons are used to transport the Special Response Squads to a staging area, and arrestees to designated detention facilities. -27- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product platoon (21 officers and 3 sergeants) for each twelve-hour shift. The remainder of officers, after each platoon is created out of each shift, will comprise the district day or night shift. Phase one includes recall of selected personnel in selected units. Phase two includes recall of additional Departmental personnel. There are predesignated platoon and squad numbering systems, and radio call identification for the field commander. 3.1.3b(2-b-iii) Detroit Detroit's mobilization Plan One mobilizes all on-duty members and employees within a specific command and/or the entire department; Plan Two mobilizes any command and/or the entire department as specified . 3.1.3b(2-b-iv) Houston Houston's plans are divided into three parts: full mobilization, which is the total involvement of all commands and police personnel; partial mobilization, which involves the initial division or command response, until supplemented by personnel from Special Operations or Tactical Operations; and minimum mobilization, which primarily involves Special Operations . -28- • • I • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product 3.1.3b(2-b-v) Metro-Dade Police Department Mobilization and Emergency Operations Plan (SOP 4 -07) SOP 4 - 07 is a four (4)-phased plan "designed to cope with situations in a manner befitting their seriousness and urgency." 55 Prior to mobilizing, there is an emergency alert (in which off-duty employees are notified that they may be required to report for duty) and emergency standby (where off-duty employees are notified that a requirement to report for duty is imminent}. Operational Phase I, which may be activated by any supervisor, is primarily executed with manpower and other resources assigned to a district. Assistance may, however, be requested from adjacent districts prior to implementing Operational Phase I. 56 In Phase I, personnel in the district where the emergency is occurring are to be dispatched to the command post or a suitable staging area, station detective units will assume routine patrol, and off-duty personnel and available reserve officers will be called to duty in uniform. 57 Other districts will place personnel on standby, and, at the discretion of the· supporting district commander or field supervisor, Operational Phase I may be implemented to supplement 55 56 57 SOP 4 - 07, § 1.III. Ibid, § 1.III.A . Ibid, § 2.II.B. -29- • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential • Attorneys' Work Product • • • • • • • • • field forces. Phase II is primarily executed with manpower and other resources of Police Services. 58 Phase III draws on the manpower and resources available to Police Services and Investigative Services. 59 Phase IV is executed with the manpower and other resources of the department, and may involve other law enforcement agencies. 6 ° Finally, Phase IV involves mobilization of National Guard units. 61 Alert notification procedures are contained in the plan. 62 It is the responsibility of each division chief to prepare a separate division plan which complements the departmental Mobilization and Emergency Operations Plan and enumerates the responsibility of each element in his respective command. 63 The responsibility to implement the Mobilization and Emergency Operations Plan is delegated to the district level in 58 Ibid, §§ 1.III.B. 59 Ibid, §§ 1.III.C. 60 Ibid, §§ 1. III. D 61 Ibid, §§ 1.III.E. 62 Ibid, §§ 1. III. V 63 Ibid, § I.IX. Apparently, the Northside Station Emergency Operations Plan has been developed pursuant to this section. ("Experience [over the past twenty years] in responding to [various forms of civil disturbance in the Northside Station has proven that there are certain strategies which can be deployed to contain a disturbance and minimize property damage and injury .... This contingency plan has been developed to serve as a supplement to other departmental directives pertaining to manpower mobilization and emergency operations concerning civil disturbances in Northside Station.") -30- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Police Service and to the bureau level for other departmental elements to ensure a smooth transition from normal to emergency operations . 3 .1. 3b (2-b-vi) Miami's Mobili_ zation Plan The Miami Police Department's mobilization, like MDPD's, is five-phased. Phase I involves a situation that cannot be controlled by a single district, requires curtailment of calls for service, and involves temporary redistribution of on-duty personnel. Phase II requires response of all on-duty personnel, plus a call up of the oncoming patrol shift in order to deliver routine patrol services. Additionally, it requires notification to other municipal officials. Phase III incidents prevent routine response to calls for service, cannot be controlled by all on-duty personnel under Phase II, and requires recall of off duty personnel. Phase IV is Phase III with implementation of mutual aid agreements. Finally, Phase V requires assistance of the National Guard. This request is made by the Chief, after consultation with the city manager, through the director of MDPD, and is instituted by the Governor. Each Miami Police Department section is responsible for establishing standard operating processes and procedures for mobilization . -31- • • • • • • • • • • • 3.l.3b(2-b-vii) DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product LAPD's Mobilization Plan 3.l.3b(2-b-vii-i) The Tactical Alert A "Tactical Alert is the preliminary stage of the Department mobilization plan for unusual occurrences (U.O.). It provides for the controlled redistribution of on duty personnel to achieve the manpower level necessary for control of a major police incident. 1164 Its purpose is to alert personnel to the possibility of redistribution; 65 announce the existence of a major police incident; 66 provide a manpower reserve which can be used in control of the incident; 67 control the depletion of field 64 Ibid, § B/101.01 . 65 Officers in alerted areas are required to change the focus of their activities (§ B/101.05), and affected Areas are required to adjust their operations by deploying the "minimum operating force" {MOF) during the time of the tactical alert (§ B/101.09) . Additionally, commanding officers in other divisions are required to compute their MOF, with the remaining personnel, who continue their routine duties until activated, designated as the available reserve, available for assignment to the U.O. Control Task Force (§§ B/101.10; 101.12). 66 Upon notification, or if, pursuant to§ 101.03 s/he declares one, the Communications Division watch commander "shall cause a notice of the Tactical Alert to be broadcast Department wide by radio and teletype." Tactical Manual, § B101.04. 67 Upon notification of initiation of a tactical alert, all personnel on off-going watches are automatically held over until supervisors and watch commanders are authorized to release them. Ibid, § 101.06. -32- ~' • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product resources; and discourage uncontrolled voluntary response to the scene of a major police incident. 68 Tactical Manual, § 204.03 directs that "[u]pon learning of an unusual occurrence, or an emergency having the potential of becoming an U.O., the watch commander of the involved Area 69 shall designate a supervisor or senior officer as acting watch commander and shall immediately go to the scene, assume command, and establish a field command post (FCP); if appropriate, the watch commander should implement the Area standing plans." A field commander at the scene of a police incident may declare a Tactical Alert when, in his judgment, that action is necessary to ensure the availability of sufficient personnel to control the incident. 70 "When a serious 71 or major 72 U.O. appears imminent, the commanding officer of the operations division of the occurrence, or in his absence, the senior officer of the 68 Ibid, § B/101.02. See also§ B/102.06 (Available Reserve - Tactical Alert). 69 An Area is a geographic subdivision of an operations bureau, and includes field services and detective divisions. Tactical Manual, § 006. 70 Ibid, § B/101.03. 71 A large distribution of personnel may be necessary, therefore the Department organization may be modified temporarily (emphasis in original). Tactical Manual, § A/102.03. 72 A mobilization of extensive portions of the Department is necessary to control the U.O. The Department organization shall be modified as required to accomplish the mission. Mobilization is initiated only with the approval of the Department Commander or a Chief Officer acting in his stead (emphasis in original). Ibid. -33- • I • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product operations division of occurrence, shall assume field command until relieved of such responsibility by a superior officer, or by the appropriate officer of an ensuing watch." 73 3.1.3b{2-b-vii-ii) Personnel Mobilization Plan 74 "A mobilization is the principal personnel deployment 75 plan for U.O. control. In addition to the implementation of a Tactical Alert, the Mobilization requires: [t]he immediate extension of the work day to twelve-hour watches[;] [t]he temporary deferment of days off]; and] [t]he recalling of off duty officers. 1176 The purpose of a mobilization is "to provide the necessary manpower when ... a U.O. is of sufficient magnitude to require major deviation from normal police procedures and necessitates a general modification of Department organization and command; or the forces assembled by a Tactical Alert are insufficient to meet the tactical situation. 1177 73 Ibid, § A/106.03. 74 A mobilization is initiated by the Department Commander, and may involve the entire Department or selected Areas and divisions. Ibid, § B/102.03. 75 Pursuant to Tactical Manual, § B/101.13, the Department Commander has other alternatives to mobilization. 76 77 Ibid, § B/102.01 . Ibid, § B/102.02. -34- • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product When an Area or division is mobilized, the concerned commanding officer shall activate the Area or Division Mobilization Plan, which shall include, among other things: implementation of twelve-hour watches and arranging an inventory of personnel and equipment remaining in the Area or division. 78 Again, watches are to be divided into- two groups: the minimum operating force and an available reserve. 79 Station supervisors on duty in mobilized Areas or divisions shall cause notifications to be made to off-duty officers assigned to their respective Areas or divisions, instructing them to report to their Area or division of assignment. 80 Officers assigned to the Field Task Force (FTF} 81 shall continue reporting on-duty at their Area or division of assignment throughout the duration of the incident unless otherwise directed by their FTF supervisor. 82 78 Ibid, § B/102.05. 79 Ibid, §§ B/102.10-102.12 . 80 Ibid, § B/102.07. Mobilization watch assignment rosters are to be prepared pursuant to the plan, although it is not clear when these rosters are to be prepared. 81 Tactical Manual, § 102.15 indicates that, in selection FTF personnel, supervisors and watch commanders should consider qualities of experience and job knowledge, exemplary work habits, physical stamina, emotional stability and fortitude, and that these characteristics are of increased importance when selecting supervisors. · 82 Ibid. Again, as in the Tactical Alert situation, there are MOF guidelines. See Tactical Manual, § B/102.11. -35- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product 3.1.3b(2-b-vii-iii) Unusual Occurrence Control Task Force "The U.O. Control Task Force is the total Department commitment employed exclusively for control of an Unusual Occurrence. It has responsibility for accomplishing the police mission with respect to the Unusual Occurrence." 83 The FTF is an element of the U.O. Control Task Force, and the FCPs are components of the FTF. 84 During a serious or major U.O., the Emergency Control Center (ECC) is the Department Conunand Post and Headquarters for the Department Conunander. 85 Tactical Manual, §§ 303.01 through 315.08 identify its component parts, and their staffing and functions . 3.1.3b(2-b-vii-iv) The Field Task Force The directions and plans for the Field Task Force structure are contained in Tactical Manual, §§ 318 to 343.01. 86 These sections describe approximately eighteen specialized units 83 84 85 Ibid, § A/301. Ibid. 'Ibid, § A/303 . 86 The organization of a field conunand post is: field conunander; assistant field commander; executive officer; personnel section; intelligence section; operations section; and logistics section. Tactical Manual, §A/318. at a minimum, a field conunand post should not function with a staff of less than three persons: a field commander; a personnel staging officer; and a radio operator/journal recorder. Ibid. -36- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product or sections that may comprise the Field Task Force Command Post, 87 with corresponding individuals invested with responsibility for their respective operations. It is not clear whether these individuals are members of TPS, or police personnel who have been trained by TPS to function in or as the Field Command Post Division Cadre. 88 3.1.3b(2-b-vii-v) Logistics During Mobilization In a mobilization, if the field commander indicates that squads will be used, the station supervisors or watch commanders shall arrange officers and supervisors into squads 89 as they arrive for roll call. 90 "Whenever any element of the tactical organization 91 is assembled, and prior to deployment, all officers must have the necessary equipment to complete the 87 The FCP should not function with a staff smaller than three persons. Tactical Manual, A/318: Note . 88 Ibid, § A/201.02, Tactical Planning Section. 89 Squads are part of the tactical organization. See § D/006.02 . 90 Ibid, § B/102.16. ·91 This includes units (one or more officers detailed a mission during a u.o. [§ D/006.01]), squads (usually nine officers and a sergeant [§ D/006.02]), platoons (two or more squads commanded by a lieutenant [§ D/006.03]), companies (two or more platoons ordinarily commanded by a captain [§ D/006.04], and the light striking force. -37- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product mission. Immediate supervisors should inspect their assigned personnel for individual readiness." 92 If the ECC is activated, 93 the ECC logistics officer is responsible for, among other things: maintaining communications with Supply Division to coordinate issuance of supplies and equipment; administering the FCP Logistics Officer's 94 requests for supplies and equipment; coordinate acquisition and assignment of supplies and equipment from other agencies, groups, or individuals; maintain communications with the FCP Staging 95 and Logistics Officers to coordinate assignment of supplies and equipment; and maintain communications with Jail, Supply, and Motor Transport Divisions to coordinate assignment of supplies and equipment. 96 The corresponding duties of the FCP-Logistics Section and its Logistics Officer are listed in the Tactical Manual at§§ 340 and 340.01. If the ECC is not activated, liaison shall be established with Investigative Headquarters Division to procure necessary supplies. 97 92 93 94 95 96 97 Tactical Manual, § D/007. See IV.A.2.a. above . [???] Tactical Manual, § A/340.01. Ibid, A/340.02. Tactical Manual, § A/309.01 . Ibid, § A/340.01. - 38- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product 3 .1. 3c Developing an Operational Plan 3.1.3c(l) The Written Operational Plan 98 Standard 46.1.3. provides that a police agency must have a written plan for responding to civil disturbances, including components for: communications; field command posts; 99 casualty information; 100 court and prosecutorial liaison; 101 community relations/public information (media briefings); 102 general liaison (with other agencies); legal considerations; other law enforcement agency support; 103 military support (martial law) ; 104 public facility security; traffic control; 105 98 "The many variables affecting the response to unusual occurrences preclude developing standards on specific situations. Therefore, these standards address the administrative and operational measures an agency should take in developing plans and preparing operationally to respond effectively to an unusual occurrences. Other standards related to this chapter are included in the chapters on mutual aid (Chapter 2), special operations (Chapter 47), training (Chapter 33), and property management (Chapter 84) ." Standards, text at Chapter 46, p. 46- 1 . 99 See Tactical Manual index, Field Command Post (FCP). 100 See Tactical Manual index, Casualty Information Center (CIC) . 101 Tactical Manual, § A/206. 01. 102 Ibid, § A/324. 103 Ibid, §§ 006; B/700. 104 Ibid, §§ B/710-719 . 105 Ibid, § D/005.04. L.... -39- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product juvenile offenders; 106 equipment requirements; deescalation procedures; rumor control; availability for command (order of precedence); post occurrence (aftermath) duties; after-action reports; 107 transportation; and arrest/confinement." 108 3.1.3c(l-a) Communications Communications is a function of both planning and equipment, and is essential for effective command and control in a civil disorder. At the time of the Kerner Commission Report, forty-two percent of all police departments studied by the Kerner Commission had no special radio frequency for emergencies, causing overloads of normal frequencies, which may preclude effective command and control of police in the disturbance area, as well as impact the provision of vital services to the remainder of the city. 109 Additionally, almost 50 percent of all police agencies surveyed had inadequate means to coordinate with neighboring jurisdiction; incompatible radio frequencies have prevented effective use of men and equipment from a neighboring 106 107 Ibid, § A/206.02. Tactical Manual, §§ B/900 et seq . 108 "It is important that disorder plans be written in a clear, jargon-free language which approximates the operational style of the police organization .... [D]uring a time of crisis, there is little time to read." Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders: Issues for the 1980's, p. 46 . 109 Kerner Commission Report, pp. 485-486 .. -40- I • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential e Attorneys' Work Product • • • • • • • • • police department. 110 "Miniature communications equipment for officers on foot is critically needed for command and control in civil disorders, particularly if riot commanders are to exercise command and control over police units in control operations. 11111 The Report on the Conference on Civil Disorder recommends that there should be adequate number of communications channels for emergency operations within the agency, channels for transmission of routine information, common emergency channels for coordination with other emergency services within the city, a common channel or network with other police, and a common channel or network with the National Guard. "An inventory and analysis should be done of the need for procuring and/or improving: regular or emergency radio frequencies; telephone equipment both base and mobile; portable base stations; walkie-talkies and accessories ... ; emergency power transmitters for base and remote sites; portable radios; [and] scrambler gear. 11112 Operating procedures for the linkage of communications during emergency conditions should be spelled out in the plan. The plan should also provide for periodic testing of the linkages . 110 Kerner Commission Report, p. 486. 111 Kerner Commission Report, p . 487. 112 Guidelines, p. 22. -41- • • • • • • • • • • • 3.1.3c(l-b) DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product General Liaison (with other agencies) 113 Liaison should be identified for, and agreements and coordination developed with, ambulance services; detention facilities; courts; legal aid services; probation and parole services; city or county human relations commissions, public and private transportation systems, public and private utilities; public health departments; hospitals; sanitation departments, telephone companies; news media; municipal works; civil defense agencies; private guard services; youth service groups; service agencies; churches; social workers, community action agencies; poverty program workers; and others. 114 3.1.3c{l-c) Legal Considerations All identifiable legal issues need to be considered. 115 "An extensive amount of time was spent during the Dade County disorders in debating the legal requirements and language of state statutes or local ordinances regarding: the exact nature of police powers in a riot, disorder, or a civil disturbance; the legal steps and procedures to be followed in declaring a curfew; 113 See Tactical Manual, §§ A/206.01; A/305.01. 114 Kerner Commission Report, p. 331. 115 See Civil Disorder Control: A Planning Program of Municipal Coordination and Cooperation (Civil Disorder Control), pp. 13-18. -42- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product the legalities of local use and control over state forces, such as the National Guard, or the state police; the legal and logistical steps to be followed in conducting searches, mass arrests, bookings, fingerprinting, gathering witness statements, and evidence collection during a riot, disorder or civil disturbance; and the legal confusion about standards on the use of deadly force based on existing state statutes, as opposed to local agency policies which may be more restrictive than state statutes." 116 There was also confusion about acceptable levels of use of lethal and non lethal force. 117 Training in the uses of devices such as batons, shields and chemical agents should occur, and officers must be made aware of the department's firearms policy, and of the fact that restraint in the use of deadly force is highly imperative in a riot situation. The Kerner Commission recommended a plan requiring the use of tear gas before the use of deadly weapons, and indicated that any plan should issue clear 116 Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders: Issues for the 1980's, p. 62. After the May, 1980, Dade County disorder, there were concerns that there was a lack of clear policies reflecting acceptable levels of enforcement of existing laws during the disorder • 117 The Miami Police Department instituted a revised use of ·force policy in the middle of the disorder that formally tightened departmental restrictions on the use of firearms. Additionally, police officers came close to walking off the job in disagreement with comments made by elected officials and others regarding amnesty for arrested looters and the disciplining of police officers charged with vandalizing looters' cars. - 43 - • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product guidelines on when and how police may employ such control measures. 118 Concerns were also expressed that there was a lack of training of command personnel concerning how to make field decisions consistent with agency policy. Another concern is whether state law presents obstacles to mutual assistance pacts. 119 Also, there may be questions regarding liability when one municipality provides assistance to another experiencing civil disorders, which should be addressed prior to the need for intercity assistance . 3.1.3c(l-d) Other Law. Enforcement Agency Support Planners should create and review mutual assistance agreements with other local law enforcement authorities. Without proper planning and objective evaluation of the community resources available, mutual agreements are largely worthless. 120 Determine in advance what role the assisting law enforcement agency will play in the strategy. After the Dade County incident, concerns were expressed that outside police agencies were used to conduct riot duty while local officers were kept on duty in non riot zones; there was a lack of prior comprehensive 118 Kerner Commission Report, p. 330; Civil Disorder Control, pp. 13-18. 119 California specifically authorizes inter-local police contacts. Civil Disorder Control, pp. 14; 18 . 120 Kerner Commission Report, p. 514. -44- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product planning and coordination with outside assistance agencies; and the extant mutual aid pacts did not function well. The method of cost allocation must also be addressed in these agreements so that there will be prompt and immediate response in time of emergency . 3.1.3c(l-e) Military Support (Martial Law) Coordination and mutual aid should be solidified in advance to reduce the response time of the Guard and avoid confusion once it is brought in. Guidelines should be developed to outline the activities and responsibilities the Guard is to assume. Planners need to determine: the role of the Guard; its acceptable missions; who is in charge of joint police/Guard forces; who is the police liaison with the Guard and field units during the emergency; when the Guard will be notified in terms of mobilization; the logistics of coordination; and communications {assign officer to Guard units so that there can be communication with police personnel). Additionally, advance discussions with the Governor concerning the needs of the police and the logistics in controlling a riot should occur. In a post review of the Dade County incident, concerns were expressed that police services in non-riot areas were lacking during the riot, and that there was a lack of communication about the National Guard's mission, and - 45- • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product loss of time in determining circumstances under which the National Guard could be used. 3.1.3c{l-f} Public Facility Security After the Dade County incident, concerns were expressed that there was a lack of plans to secure specific targets or to maintain security of critical facilities . 3.1.3c{l-g} Eguipment Reguirements Arrangements for obtaining equipment must be made, and purchasing agreements should be developed with other agencies. Equipment must also be periodically inventoried, checked and tested . 3 .1. 3c (1-h) Rumor Control Rumor control should occur through periodic press conferences held with the media, and through identification of community leaders who can both quell rumors and assist in establishing procedures for doing so. Dade County police personnel expressed concern there was an absence of rumor control. Police departments must also develop means to obtain adequate intelligence for planning -46- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product purposes, as well as ou the scene information for use in police operations during a disorder. After the Dade County incident, concerns were expressed that there was a lack of intelligence gathering mechanisms or information systems which could have alerted police to potential for disorder . 3.1.3c(l-j) Availability For Command (Order of Precedence) Decision-making procedures should identify who is to be involved in the decision making and how information is communicated to and from the field. In the Report of the Conference on Civil Disorders, the police chiefs noted that many bureau, division and shift commanders ordinarily do not work together at the same time or place, and recommended that the plan should therefore provide clear guidelines for the division of work and for the assignment of key tasks during a period of full mobilization. Moreover, after the Dade County incident, concerns were expressed that there was a lack of training of command personnel concerning how to make field decisions consistent with agency policy, and a lack of specific tactical plans to control crowds . -47- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product 3.1.3c(l-k) Arrest/Confinement Procedures 121 Individuals arrested should be immediately removed to prevent aggravating incidents. In the Report on the Conference on Civil Diso.rders, the police chiefs indicate that during mass arrest, initially persons must be treated en masse . (However, Standard 46.1.3 lists as a separate category juvenile offenders.} After the Dade County incident, concerns were expressed that there was a lack of plans to make mass arrests . 3.1.3c(l-l) Other Considerations Plans must be developed to prevent boredom, which can lead to police officer frustration, ultimately resulting in threats of job actions or officers trying to take the law into their own hands. 122 · Additionally, prolonged violence cannot be accepted as inevitable. Police must also undertake preventive actions to reduce lingering tension, thereby reaching an end result of renewed agreement from neighborhood residents to work jointly with police to reduce future outbreaks of tension. 123 Furthermore, there is a need for greater supervision during the 121 See Tactical Manual, §§ A/333.03; B/304.02; B/311; B/328. See also Tactical Manual index, Field Jail Unit, Field Command Post. 122 123 Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders, p. 60 . Ibid, p. 61. -48- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product period after a disorder to prevent tendency for some officers to transfer disorder control perspectives back into the provision of daily police service. 124 Finally, creative strategies must be developed to resolve problems, and police must avoid taking actions which will lead to confrontations with neighborhood residents for some time after a disorder . 3.2 Interviews [INSERT TO COME FROM PETER BURKE] 124 Ibid. - 49 - I • • • • • • • • • • • 4.0 COMPARISONS: TRAINING 4.1 Training Overview DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product As of July 14, 1992, the Office of the Special Advisor had received materials from the following law enforcement agencies: Atlanta Police Department, . Baltimore Police Department, Chicago Police Department, Detroit Police Department, Houston Police Department, Metro-Dade Police Department, Miami Police Department, Newark Police Department, Newport News Police Department, Philadelphia Police Department, Richmond, Virginia Police Department, San Francisco Police Department, San Jose, California Police Department, Tampa, Florida Police Department, Teaneck, New Jersey Police Department (Bergen County Police Department} and the California Highway Patrol, along with various monographs and reports of various governmental and law enforcement agencies both in California and across the country. The majority of the resource materials provided to date do not specifically contain materials relating to the training for civil disorders. Much of the material discusses various aspects of the community policing concept, with little substantive material on civil unrest. There is almost no discussion of academy training on civil disorders. Some of the law enforcement agencies have materials on training, but they are in the minority; the materials that are available focus on planning and -50- I I • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product implementation when disorder occurs, rather than prevention and education. Several source materials in the "Industry Standards" discuss the need for training to encompass more than merely responding to· civil disorder; they stress the need for training in its prevention and discussion of the conflicts that police officers face in trying to quell disorder. There is a sense of "deja vu;" the Kerner Commission, as far back as 1968, warned the nation and its law enforcement agencies that training in civil disorders was critical, both in the academy and in-service on a regular basis. That warning was reiterated in 1980 when the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration prepared a monograph on civil disorders after the disturbances in Dade County. However, twelve years later, and with some exceptions, law enforcement agency materials reviewed to date reveal a conspicuous lack of written materials on training. 4.2 Industry Standards Although there are no generally-recognized standards for training for a police department's response to a civil disorder, there are some recognized authoritative sources . -51- • • • • • • • • • • • 4.2.1 DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders {the "Kerner Commission") When the Kerner Commission issued its report in 1968, it commented that the most critical deficiency in the police departments surveyed was inadequate training. The Kerner Commission stated that supervisory police personnel received almost no riot control training, that recruits only received an average of 18 ~ours of such training, and that there was no team training for riot control. 125 The Kerner Commission noted that "Basic riot control should be taught in recruit school, and intensive unit training should be conducted subsequently on a regular or semi-annual basis," and that both command and supervisory personnel also should have continuing training. The Kerner Commission commented that, without such training, police responses to civil disorders would continue to be ineffective. The Kerner Commission made seven recommendations to strengthen police training: 1. Allocation of whatever time is necessary for riot training; 125 Of the thirty police departments that the Kerner Commission surveyed, not one coordinated training with fire units. Only two of the agencies had undertaken coordinated training with other community agencies, and only two had coordinated riot control training with state police and the National Guard. -52- • • • • • • • • • • • 2. DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Training that encompasses all members of the department, that continues after academy graduation, and that includes training in the uses of alternative devices to control civil disorder; 3. An emphasis on team training, since police respond to civil disorders in teams; 4. Frequent review, updating and practicing of mobilization plans and emergency procedures; 5. Interagency coordination and training for civil disorders with other law enforcement agencies, the military, state police, National Guard and other agencies of local government; 6. Training programs designed to learn from the lessons of past civil disorders and anticipate the pattern of future disturbances; and 7. Establishment of a national center and clearinghouse to develop, evaluate, and disseminate riot prevention and control data and information, including the assignment of observer teams to incipient or developing civil disturbances . -53- • • • • • • • • • • • 4.2.2 DR.AFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product The 1980 Conference on Civil Disorders As a general rule, most departments train police offciers to act as individuals without a great deal of supervision. In contrast, riot and disorder control require the work of highly disciplined and coordinated teams. Twelve years ago, a Report prepared by the Police Executive Research Forum on the 1980 Conference on Civil Disorders pointed out the need for a different kind of training for police officers who confront civil disorders. The Report recommended that officers be trained to understand the dynamics of riots and sensitized to the factors that can lead to civil disorder. The Report also suggested a small group of selected officers receive specialized training in crowd control. The Report noted that the use of deadly force is not the answer to civil disorder management and that devices such as batons, shields, and chemical agents are more effective in quelling disorder. The Report recommended that police officers receive frequent refresher training in the use of such devices. The Report also suggested that there should be formal written agreements for the emergency acquisition of equipment . Existing interagency agreements, even with the military, would allow for the needed procurement of supplies which are simply unfeasible or prohibitively costly for individual law enforcement -54- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product agencies to maintain. The Report additionally recommended that all such equipment must be periodically tested and ready for use. The Report also recommended that emergency mobilization plans for immediate response be established and continually revised . 4.2.3. Office of Criminal Justice Programs. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration In August, 1980, The Enforcement Division of the Office of Criminal Justice Programs, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, issued a monograph for law enforcement executives on the topic of "Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders: Issues for the 1980s." The monograph discusses the necessity of written plans for civil disorder and the need for consensus on police and planning issues pertaining to civil disorders. The monograph commented that training in the use of various tactics to assist them in controlling civil disorder is essential. The report noted that many of the tactics are grounded in military doctrine and practice, such as formations, crowd control techniques, mass arrest tactics, securing of various types of buildings, moving and fixed perimeter patrol placements, and the use of non-lethal force, such as chemical agents . -55- I • • • • • • •· • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product As of 1980, there were serious deficiencies in civil disorder training. The training was not part of the normal routine formation and training of police officers; minimal training was provided in the academy setting, and even less on the job. The monograph noted that the effective use of disorder control tactics requires regular drill and practice, which is both timely and costly since the training should be in units, akin to training a military squadron preparing for battle. Additionally, the monograph cautions against training of only selected groups of officers to respond to disorder as specialized cadres. Since in the early stages of a disorder, there are usually widespread and sporadic disturbances, small cadres would be unable to respond effectively to all of them, so other police personnel must be able to act. Even specially training larger numbers of police officers and keeping them on routine assignments has its drawbacks. Although the agency would have a pool of trained officers from which to draw, assigning the officers as temporary squad leaders or supervisors, unless such temporary leaders are identified, mobilized, briefed, and deployed rapidly in the earliest stages of a major disorder, their usefulness will be limited . The monograph noted another critical issue in training: the basic role conflict that officers experience during disorder, since the police are not military personnel, who are trained to defend the nation against its enemies, but citizens of the -56- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product community engulfed in disorder. The monograph commented that little attention has been given to this issue, either in training or in discussions with law enforcement executives . 4.2.4 Law Enforcement Guide for Emergency Operations Planning The State of California, Governor's Office of Emergency Services, issued a Law Enforcement Guide for Emergency Operations Planning in October, 1989. The purpose of the Guide is to serve as a minimum standard for law enforcement departments and agencies through california. The Guide reflects a new concept in managing law enforcement emergencies: the Law Enforcement Incident Command System, which provides for five major functional responsibilities: command, planning/intelligence, operations, logistics, and finance . The Guide recommends that details of an emergency response should be worked out through the development of the department's emergency plan and training exercises so that roles and responsibilities will not require clarification in the midst of the response itself. To be effective, the Guide suggests emergency training must include everyone from top management down through the rank and file employees, including civilians. The training should be accomplished through new-hire tactical orientation, on the job briefing and musters, recalls and alert notification exercises, tabletop exercises and games, -57- • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product communication exercises, command post exercises, full field operational exercises and emergency simulations. 4.2.5 The Standards Manual of the Law Enforcement Agency Accreditation Program This manual, issued in October, 1991, devotes a chapter to the standards for the training of law enforcement personnel. While Chapter 33 enumerates a number of criteria for training, it does not specifically address training for civil disorders. In Chapter 46, the manual discusses the administrative and operational measures that a law enforcement agency should take in developing plans and preparing operationally to respond to emergencies, including civil disturbances. Again, while the chapter provides detailed standards for such plans, there is no discussion of any training component. Chapter 47 provides standards for special operations, including riot control. Once again, the focus is on a written plan and does not discuss training for these matters. 4.2.6 International Association of Chiefs of Police The International Association of Chiefs of Police issued a model policy for civil disturbances in February, 1992 . The purpose of the policy is to establish guidelines to -58- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product effectively deal with crowds engaged in or posing a significant threat of engaging in violence, property damage or breaches of the peace. The policy outlines procedures to be followed: e.g . what the first officer on the scene should do, command options, physical arrests, use of nonlethal force, use of deadly force, a policy for mass arrests, and deactivation procedures. However, the policy does not address any issues of training. 4.3 Training in Other Cities 4.3.1 Atlanta Police Department Atlanta has some materials on civil disorders: A Standard Operating Procedure issued March 1, 1990 on the topic of "Unusual Occurrences" was distributed to all supervisory personnel; however, it does not specifically discuss training for civil disorders. The Procedure discusses planning and organizing the police action, crowd control, riot control tactics, related tactics such as extended roadblocks, sniper control, etc, chemical agents tactics, arrests during civil disorder, and return to normal operations. The Procedure also discusses National Guard assistance and the availability of mutual aid. While there is a requirement that there be an emergency equipment readiness inventory with monthly reporting requirements, there is -59- • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product no discussion of training. The Procedure requires an annual review and updating each January . 4.3.2 Chicago Police Department In 1991, the Chicago Police- Department conducted a training program for all sworn members of the Department in crowd control training. A 35-hour program intended to train the Department in the most recent methods, tactics and philosophies of crowd control, the program emphasized crowd control management of civil disorders and political demonstrations. The presentation encompassed a five-day, thirty-hour schedule with classes in the following: classroom and practical training in crowd control formations, crowd behavior psychology, special response plans that the department has in place, communications and protective masks, passive resisters, legal aspects of civil disturbances, first aid, weapons retention and disarming techniques, principles of handcuffing and searching, processing multiple arrests, reporting procedures and the chain of command, and a CPR review. The program consisted of classroom lectures, discussions, demonstrations and hands-on training in crowd control formations and maneuvers, handling of passive resisters, weapons retention and disarming techniques, crowd psychology and the processing of multiple arrests . -60- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Additionally, in 1990, the Training Coordinator drafted a proposal for an in-service training program on cross cultural communication and the behavioral and communication variances arising from different cultural backgrounds. This suggested program would be a three-day, twenty-one hour program for all sworn officers. Class topics would include prejudice and discrimination, values, attitudes and power, socialization process and culture, and manifestation of personal prejudices. In 1988, the Department issued a training bulletin on Crowd Control Formations. The bulletin discussed the two different types of crowd formations, crowds and mobs, the police response and the various disturbance control formations, basic commands, and use of hand and arm signals. Chicago has two special response plans for large scale crowd control situations, and there is a separate manual that details those plans. The manual addresses the mobilizing, assembling, orienting and committing of personnel to a situation that requires more than a routine police response, such as riots, protest demonstrations, civil disturbances, and disasters requiring police response. The manual's purpose is four-fold: to standardize tactical operations, establish a basis for crowd control procedures, identify the planning and operational considerations for the commanders and staff required both in the -61- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product field and in the command posts, and identify tactical concepts. 126 Topics in the manual include discussions of considerations of disturbance control, the characteristics of disturbance control operations, disturbance control formations, dispersal operations, and the duties of the field command post . 4.3.3 Detroit Police Department A year before the riots of 1967, the Detroit Police Department formulated a written riot control plan. The plan, which is still being used, defines a riot as an unlawful assembly of twelve or more persons armed with clubs or other dangerous weapons, or thirty or more whether armed or not. The plan discusses the establishment of a headquarters command post and how the officers are to conduct themselves at the scene. Detroit also has a department handbook on crowd control formations issued in November, 1976. The handbook is a resource on basic types of crowd control formations and provides some guidance on tactical principles needed for crowd control, outlining the three goals of containment, isolation, and dispersion . The department also issued in June, 1986 a general order on the subject of mobilization. The order describes the 126 Chicago has a General Order dated April 13, 1988 which describes in detail the special response plans. -62- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product two basic types of mobilization plans that the department uses. Mobilization Plan One mobilizes all on duty members and employees within a specified command in order to have on duty personnel in a state of readiness pending deployment to a specific task. Mobilization Plan Two mobilizes all off duty members and employees assigned to a particular command. Civilian employees of the department are also included in both plans. The general order discusses the dissemination of mobilization orders, mobilization planning and mobilizing off duty members and employees for emergency duty. Included in the general order is a procedure for testing the mobilization plans on a periodic basis, but only to the extent of notifying personnel. Detroit also issued a general order, effective December 15, 1978, discussing procedures to be used in processing prisoners resulting from mass arrests. The order establishes a prisoner processing team to facilitate the a large influx of prisoners through the initial processing stage. The team is composed of one lieutenant and five other police officers in the precinct in which the arrests occurred. The order details the responsibility for processing and the actual processing procedures to be employed. However, as noted infra, at this time, Detroit does not have any specialized in-service training for civil disorders . -63 - • • • • • • • • • • • 4.3.4 Houston Police Department DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product In preparation for the Republican National Convention in Houston this August, Houston and the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education prepared a 32-hour training course for Houston police officers. Houston Police Department believes that, in crowd control situations, small trained units working in formations on command are better suited to disperse or control a group of people than individual or groups of untrained officers, so the course includes training in the formations to be used for this purpose. There is also baton/stick training designed to show updated methods of using intermediate weapons. The lesson objectives include identification of three stances and demonstration of each; knowledge of nine strikes for the twenty-six inch baton and demonstration of each; knowledge of seven strikes for the thirty-six inch stick and demonstration of each; identification of two methods of handcuffing prisoners and identification of each; use leg restraint devices; knowledge of two pressure points and demonstration of each; identification of seven squad sized formations and demonstration of each; knowledge of nine group sized formations and demonstration of each; knowledge of four formations working with mounted units and demonstration of each; use of the department issued gas mask and familiarity with its protection capability against tear gas. -64- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product The lesson plan includes discussions of the basic formations {classroom and practice), use of the different kinds of police batons, arrest tactics (proper handcuffing, leg restraint and pressure point techniques and the use of different techniques to handle selective and mass arrests--classroom and practice exercises), use of the gas mask (both in the classroom and in the field), and training with mounted patrol units. 4.3.5 . Metro-Dade Police Department In 1990, the Metro-Dade Police Department produced a training manual on its Mobile Field Force (the "Force") and other techniques it has to manage civil disturbances. The Force is used to maximize the department's initial response efforts whenever a major civil disturbance occurs. One hundred percent of the department staff is called to duty. If the situation is not quickly resolved, then outside assistance is requested. The department has arrangements to use the National Guard for certain specified functions during a civil disorder. The Force responds to civil disorder, crowd control, or other tactical situations. It is, essentially, a platoon of police officers and sergeants commanded by a lieutenant. The platoon usually consists of six to eight squads. The manual discusses personnel, vehicle, and equipment requirements, -65- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product establishment of a command post, and use of a dedicated radio frequency . As note infra, the Mobile Field Force conducts annual trainings on a rotational basis for all uniformed members of the Department . 4.3.6 Philadelphia Police Department Philadelphia has a Civil Affairs Unit; it has a Statement of Policy and Operations Handbook, issued in November, 1990. The unit is responsible for the policing of demonstrations, labor disputes, acts of civil disobedience, and the like. The policy establishes flexible guidelines for response. There is no discussion of training in the handbook. The Unit also issued in November, 1990 an "Abortion Clinic Blockages and Subsequent Mass Arrest Procedure," but again, no mention of training is made . 4.3.7 chapters. San Francisco Police Department San Francisco has a crowd control manual with three The first discusses event management: spontaneous events or incidents, such as crowd disorders, strikes, bombings, etc. and scheduled special events, activities for which permits are required where large numbers of people may gather. An "event -66- I I • • • • • • • • • , . DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product co .. nmander" has certain enumerated duties, including establishing an on-scene command and staging area, setting up a command post, and requesting needed personnel. The second part of the manual is devoted to crowd management methods. An "event coordinator," a police officer specially trained to perform crowd management tasks, is in charge of working with the group(s) planning these events. The chapter also discusses general principles of crowd control management . The third section discusses crowd control measures and procedures and crowd dispersal techniques. There is no specific reference to training in these materials . 4.3.8 Teaneck Police Department . Teaneck, New Jersey has a civil disturbance preparation survey guide, which includes a Bergen County Police Chief's Association Mutual Aid Plan. In January, 1992, the Bergen County Police Academy conducted a one-day Command Control Exercise. The objectives of the exercise included leadership training, management experience, and the testing of organizational inter operability [sic]. The operational concepts included composition of the field force, command and control mechanism, and field tactical operation. The exercise was based on the following scenario: a rally intended to protect perceived mistreatment of members of the black community. An estimated crowd of 500 - 67- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product protesters :xpected, and a previous rally by the same group had ended in arrests, injuries, and property damage. The problem: organize and deploy emergency personnel to maintain order. The Bergen County Police Department also conducted a one-day course on Basic Crowd Control Tactics of approximately 2 1/2 hours classroom time and 4 1/2 hours of field training time. The objectives for the students were the following: 1. Identification of basic crowd control formations . 2. Acting in a team, the demonstration of basic crowd control formations and techniques. 3. Demonstration of the proper use of the riot helmet. 4. Demonstration of the proper use of the crowd control baton. 5. Identification of the proper protective measures for police chemical agents . 6. Identification of first aid techniques for people exposed to police chemical agents. 7. Identification of the chain of command for police units on crowd control duty. Three of these seven-hour Crowd Control classes were held in June, 1990 . In August, 1990, the Bergen County Police Department issued a written Standard Operating Procedure for Civil Disturbances-Crowd Control-Mitigation of Riotous Activity. The Procedure discusses how rules of engagement will be defined, -68- I le I • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product deployment of personnel, media-press relations, and arrest procedures. However, there is no specific discussion of training in the context of this Procedure . In May, 1990, a recommendation was made for all Teaneck officers to participate in an ethics seminar and a community relations program. The recommendation also included a suggestion that a long range planning and training proposal should include some type of additional incentives for officers to obtain undergraduate training . 4.3.9 California Highway Patrol The California Highway Patrol has a Departmental Training Manual first issued in June, 1980. However, the manual does not specifically discuss training for civil disorders . There are a number of different kinds of courses for the initial training of officers, including cadet, certified motorcycle training officer, communications specialist training, and the lake. Refresher training courses include bomb incident familiarization, a bomb incident procedure course, first aid recertifications, hazardous material training, shooting policy refresher training, and the like, but there is no specific training geared either at the academy level or in-service for civil disorders . -69- • 1 . I • • • • • • • • 4.4 DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Interviews with Police Officers Suggest that In Service Training Should Focus on Preventing Civil Disorder. Not Merely Responding to It Chief Jimmy Brown of the Metro-Dade Police Department, Lieutenant Curtis McGhee of the Detroit Police Department, and Sergeant Brian Morris of the Newark Police Department all agree that while some training for civil disorders should be done at the academy level, the training emphasis should be on in-service training. Academy training can provide an overview and an introduction to this specialized training, as well as strategy, but training is more effective as an in-service tool. All three departments include in the academy curriculum some basic training in civil disorders in the context of other classes, such as basic formations, firearms training, and the like. The officers thought that, optimally, recruits in the academy should receive forty hours of instruction, including basic terminology, issues in civil disorders, and drill practice. The three officers agreed that all in-service training for civil disorders must be multi-faceted and be geared to all levels of command, from the top down, and that the goal must be prevention of the outbreak of disorderv rather than merely how to handle it when trouble erupts. In addition to firearms refresher courses, field practice drills, and CPR recertification, there must also be classes in sensitivity and multi-cultural training . All three noted that the majority of police work is dealing with -70- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product people, not shooting weapons, and so, the police must be sensitized and trained in techniques to de-escalate potentially explosive situations, rather than to exacerbate them . The training for civil disorders should emphasize training of the prevention of civil disorders. Departments need to train police officers in ways to de-escalate tension, to lower the level of confrontation, to become more "people-oriented" in the delivery of services, and to be sensitized to cultural, racial and ethnic differences in the communities served . Presently, Newark Police Department devotes twenty four hours of multi-cultural training in its academy. Detroit provides eight hours annually in such subjects, and Metro-Dade does likewise. All three departments also provide in-service training in violence reduction, be it in the context of domestic violence, landlord tenant, or other aspects of interpersonal relationships likely to cause tension. The officers also noted that the primary function of the police is to save lives, and so police officers need to be trained in techniques to reduce the levels of tension and violence and reduce the risks of confrontation. The officers agreed that another essential aspect of training should include education in prevention through the use · of community policing techniques and the development of relationships of trust and confidence with the communities being served. If a situation does erupt, there is a need for officers -71- • , . I • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product to be knowledgeable in how to de-escalate it. All officers pointed out that the police departments need to recognize that the individual uniformed police officers constitute valuable resources and can provide a wealth of information about their particular patrol areas. The uniformed officers who attend these training should be called upon for their input as to problems in particular areas, how best to resolve them, and how to de escalate sources of potential friction. 127 There is also a need to rethink styles of management in the context of civil disorder training, acknowledging that those "closest to the ground" so to speak, are usually more knowledgeable about flash points, neighborhood tensions, and what can create the climate for disorder than those higher up. The three officers agreed that when disorder does erupt, police familiar with the affected area should be visible, and those unaccustomed to the vagaries of that area should be given perimeter and support function duties. Newark conducts all its training in house. Detroit and Metro-Dade contract with trainers, especially in the cultural diversity training component. The Mobile Field Force relies on trainers within the department with experience in the field force concept. To pay for the costs of in-service training, both 127 The officers also commented that uniformed officers make the most felony arrests and are most likely to know what is happening in a particular area well before those higher up the chain of command have any knowledge. -72- • • •· • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Detroit and Metro-Dade receive a portion of the revenues earmarked from traffic ticket receipts. Metro-Dade, with its Mobile Field Force concept, conducts annual trainings for its entire uniform complement of approximately 1500 officers. Metro-Dade has been conducting a week-long training exercise in anticipation of the retrial of police officer William Lozano this fall. 128 The Mobile Field Force annual training serves several important functions: in addition to providing an annual training mechanism for civil disorders, it creates a presence in the community by its very existence. Seeing the massive deployment of police vehicles, even in the context of a training drill, displays a high profile for friend and foe alike. The training is done on a rotational basis among all the police districts. It • normally in~olves two Mobile Field Forces at one time, teaching the officers how to rescue police under fire, how to handle snipers, the processing of mass arrests, and similar topics. 129 • • • • 128 Lozano is scheduled to be retried in November on manslaughter charges arising from the death of two black motorcyclists; the original incident sparked disorder in Several changes of venue now have the trial scheduled in Tallahassee. 1989. 129 The Northside District of Miami, home to Liberty City and the 1980 civil unrest, has a separate disturbance plan that must be updated annually. Miami works with Metro Dade, but conducts separate field force training. For example, if unrest breaks out in an area within Miami's jurisdiction, it will handle the situation, and Metro Dade personnel will be used to control the perimeter of the affected area and seal it off. -73- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product It also teaches the officers how to work in teams, which was a recommendation that the Kerner Commission made back in 1968 . When civil unrest occurs in Metro-Dade's jurisdictioµ, the commanding officer of that district is in charge, utilizing all available on duty forces and requesting assistance from adjacent districts. Working command posts are created in which the commanding officers have sufficient authority to act. The Mobile Field Force takes its orders from the command post. One command post is established at the emergency operations center; the top command of the department and all interagencies representatives gather there. When two or more Mobile Field Forces are operating, one task force commander is designated as the person in charge. Metro-Dade and Miami exchange command officers to monitor the situations. Detroit Police Department has a Riot Plan, developed in 1966, which is still in operation. While Detroit trains people to handle high risk problems, it has no specialized training for civil disorders at this time. Detroit also has a ten-week command school, which emphasizes the interpersonal aspects of management; within that curriculum, there is some discussion of training for civil disorders . Newark also has no specialized training, but it does have strict adherence to the chain of command when trouble flares . Both cities are looking at the Mobile Field Force concept for possible implementation in their respective - 74 - • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential • Attorneys' Work Product • • • • • • • • • departments. All three officers commented that there is a need for rethinking of command management styles in the context of civil disturbances . -75- • • • • • • • • • • • 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 COMPARISONS: Overview [INSERT DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product INTELLIGENCELCOMMUNITY ASSESSMENT TO COME FROM DICK FRUIN] Industry Standards [INSERT TO COME FROM DICK FRUIN] Other Cities Miami Dade County assigns an Intelligence Coordinator to any ongoing event which could lead to civil disorder to gather facts, dispel rumors and provide assessments. Metro-Dade has adapted an existing emergency plan to an incident-specific purpose. The intelligence gathering in Metro Dade is sophisticated and guidelines exist for the weekly or bi weekly dissemination of the intelligence to sector commanders . Metro-Dade's intelligence guidelines apparently do not authorize undercover agents . -76- • • • • • • • • • • • TO: FROM: DATE: RE: PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT MEMORANDUM COMPARISON STUDY GROUP RICHARD L. FRUIN, JR. July 21, 1992 POLICE INTELLIGENCE (COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT) FUNCTION - INDUSTRY STANDARDS The purpose of this draft memorandum is to identify standards applicable to community assessment activities by metropolitan police departments for the purpose of anticipating civil disturbances. The materials which have been collected from various police departments (Baltimore, Detroit, Metro-Dade, Miami, Newark, New York, Richmond and Tampa) contain relatively little information regarding intelligence and/or community assessment functions. However, it apparent from our interviews of the assigned police officers (Lt. Jimmie L. Brown, Lt. Curtis McGhee, Lt. Barbara Frost, Sgt. Bryan Morris) that community assessment to some degree is institutionalized in the police departments of major cities. Two of the publications provided to the Comparisons Study Group do contain informative discussions of police department community assessment functions. See: Reoort on the Conference of Civil Disorders (June 30- July 1. 1980), published by the Police Executive Research Forum (circa 1980) pp. 10-11; and Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders: Issues for the 1980's, published by the Enforcement Division, Office of Criminal Justice Programs, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (August, 1980), pp. 20 and 32-33. There is a difference between intelligence gathering and community assessment. The Report on the Conference on Civil Disorders makes the following revealing statement: RLF03609 "Police effectiveness in dealing with community tensions and grievances and in preventing civil disorders is highly dependent on good information and its proper evaluation. Police administrators need to develop channels that will sensitize and alert them to --------- - - - --- ----- - - - - -- - • • • • • • • • • • • these tensions and grievances, particularly if and when dangerous developments that threaten the public safety are imminent. (As indicated in Chapter I, information gathering of this kind should never be carried out by police intelligence units.)" (Id. p. 11; emphasis added.) Traditional Intelligence Gathering. The traditional purpose and justification for police intelligence gathering is to obtain information regarding organizations or persons who are perceived to threaten public safety in order to anticipate and thus prevent planned violence. The police, therefore, routinely collected information from both public and private sources regarding terrorist organizations and/or individual terrorists . The police also would collect intelligence regarding persons, places and, events that might be a target of terrorist organizations. Such justification often extended to gathering intelligence regarding organizations which by engaging in civil protest might trigger civil disturbance or riot. There is admittedly a fine line between intelligence gathering or potential terrorists or rioters and on civil protesters whose activities are constitutionally protected. See White v. Davis, i3 C.3d 757, 120 Cal.Rptr. 94 (1975). This intelligence function is usually conducted secretly (so as not to forewarn those planning terrorist acts or civil disorder) by a centralized police bureau usually acting under strict guidelines and supervision by senior police management. Community Assessment. This memo covers something different - "street intelligence" or community assessment. Community assessment is the function of gathering information by which a police agency can assess the state of tension in a community. Some commentators have called it nothing more than police officer intuition and a routine part of every patrol officer's daily experience. Community assessment, nonetheless, to be effective must be systematically gathered in order to be available for analysis and, when appropriate, dissemination to individual officers . For community assessment to work effectively there must be a consensus within a particular department as to which factors are significant (as well as flexibility to consider new or other factors); a process by which such information may be systematically collected; and a procedure by which the information can be evaluated and, when appropriate, acted upon . Different police departments appear to consider different factors as significant in measuring the community tension. The variation in factors is based upon the history, culture and dynamics of each community. The Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders monograph identifies five common factors: RLF03609 2. • • • • • • • • • "Overly aggressive police enforcement activities; "Aggressive actions against the police when they are dealing with routine incidents; "News media attention focused on claimed inequalities within the criminal justice system; "The neighborhood conflict existing over a long period of time; "Racial attacks on minorities (or attacks by minorities on others) over neighborhood access or housing issues." (Id. , p. 3 7 • ) Such information is collected in a variety of ways. The police officers whom we interviewed indicated that their department had community relations bureaus or specialists. These officers were detailed to establish contacts with community organizations, community leaders and "street leaders" for the purpose, among others, of obtaining from them advance warning of community tension. Several of the departments during times of perceived community tensions requested patrol officers at the roll call to make contact with their sources in the community to obtain intelligence regarding possible problems. The Newark Police Department in selected experiments has gone so far as to conduct polls of residents of a small area to determine their attitudes toward the police and community problems. The Chicago Police Department has developed an informal procedure whereby patrol officers are permitted to write up reports which are sent through their division to the Office of the First Deputy Superintendent. That office evaluates such reports and determines whether further information should be sought. While the mechanics differ from city to city, police departments apparently believe that systematic collection of certain information may disclose potential or patterns for civil disorder. The materials do not contain sufficient specific data to describe procedures used within different police departments for the analysis of community assessment information. However, if the police department is systematically collecting such information, it must have a procedure to evaluate the information, and to alert senior police management to any rising potential for civil violence. Senior management, in turn, would be responsible for preparing an appropriate response including informing the appropriate precincts (divisions) of the civil disorder potential . RLF03609 3. • • • • • • • • • • • 5.4 Interviews DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product The police officers assigned to assist Comparisons consider the ability to assess the potential for civil disorder to be critical. Traditional methods for obtaining intelligence, such as informants and plants are considered outmoded, while community-based policing concepts are seen as necessary to have a way to measure the community temperature. A relationship of cooperation with the community does not happen overnight, but is begun by developing a dialogue with schools, news media, members of the clergy, local community groups and leaders. An often under-used resource critical to the intelligence mission is the input from the officer on the street. These officers have the best understanding of neighborhood tension levels and should serve as an early warning systems. In addition, there is no benefit to merely obtaining information, if there is no individual who can make informed judgments about the information. A police department's image in the community it serves is a critical factor -- to the extent the police are perceived to having an "us versus them" mentality or as contributing to community tensions, they will not obtain adequate intelligence . The LAPD to date has not endorsed community-based policing, and has suffered from the absence of that community dialogue. Indicators of potential community unrest include an increase in disturbance calls (particularly unfounded calls), -77- • I i • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product assaults against police, and an increase of disturbance calls involving violence or weapons . - 78 - • • • • • • • • • • • 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product MOBILIZATIONLTACTICSLPHILOSOPHY Overview [INSERT TO COME FROM BOB SACKS] "Industry" Standards [ INSERT TO COME FROM BOB SACKS] Other Cities [INSERT TO COME FROM BOB SACKS] Interviews The importance of strong leadership at the highest levels during a disorder cannot be overemphasized. An immediate response and show of force by police personnel is imperative, including a disciplined show of force, with specific squad formations directed at dispersing groups, crowd control techniques, mass arrests, the securing of critical sites and buildings, and the use of nonlethal force and personnel trained in the use of these tactics. Accordingly, the mobilization plan must provide for getting a significant number of officers to predetermined locations for staging and assignment. There must be a plan for -79- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product rotating and relieving officers so that objectives can be met with the existing resources . -80- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product 7.0 COMPARISONS: COMMAND. CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS Effective command and control during a civil disorder depends upon communications, which is a function of both planning and equipment. In addition to adequate communication equipment, other equipment needs must be taken into account, including bullet proof vests, helmets, shields, batons, chemical agents and radios. The availability of personal protective equipment is key for any quick full mobilization. Logistical support issues must be properly planned. Coordination with other departments within the city and mutual aid pacts with other law enforcement agencies already should have been formalized so that upon mobilization responsibilities are clearly delineated. Several resource materials 130 provide information regarding pertinent command, control and communications issues as they relate to civil disorder, planning and control. These materials focus on local law enforcement agencies, state police and the National Guard, not elected officials. However, since major emergencies/civil disorders may require control forces beyond the personnel and equipment of a single city, and involve 130 Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders: Issues For the 1980's, August 1980; Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner), 1968, Report on the Conference on Civil Disorders, June 30 - July 1, 1980; Riots, Revolts and Insurrections, Raymond M. Momboisse, 1967; Communication: A Unique Significance For Law Enforcement, Morris M. Uomach ad Hayden H. Finley, 1986. - 81 - • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product political and management concerns beyond the narrow focus of law enforcement, the relationship between elected and law enforcement officials must be considered. The assumption here is that a city's chief elected official and, if necessary, the Governor would be in command . For law enforcement agencies, the essence of the problem is that during civil disturbances or riots, they undergo a transition, both organization and operationally. While there is always a command structure, traditional policing seeks to develop officers who can work independently and with little direct supervision. Understandably, the control of civil disturbances requires organizing and mobilizing a large number of disciplined personnel, comparable to soldiers in a military unit, to work as a team. This requires a highly unified command and control system. To accomplish this, a chain of command must be established well in advance of any particular emergency or civil disorder . 7.1 "Industry" Standards 7 .1.2 Command Structure As set forth in the report the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, U.S. Department of Justice Law Enforcement -82- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Assistant Administration, Washington, D.C., 1976 (hereinafter "NACCJSG" ) : "The clarity with command responsibility is specified in advance and the degree to which the principal of unified command is followed in practice will determine the speed, quality and effectiveness of police response in emergencies involving mass disorders ... The extent of a department's capability to centralize command responsibility in emergencies will depend, in turn, on the degree to whioch the Department has given continuing centralized attention to the potential for extraordinary violence and to specific issues of departmental preparedness during non-emergency periods." NACCJSG, p. 175. The paradigm command structure for a police department generally involves a Chief or overall Commander. In normal or emergency police functions, the overall responsibility for command cannot be delegated to subordinates. However, the delegation of some authority and responsibilities for subordinates is essential. The extent to which this delegation works in either situation is largely a function of good organization, administration, and the Chief's attitude. An emergency or disaster plans must specify who does what, where resources can be found, and who has the responsibility during -83- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product five stages of operations: prevention, detection, mobilization tactical response, and post-operational review . 7.1.2a Chief/Overall Commander The Chief commands the resources the Police Department and makes policy decisions concerning mobilization, tactics and the allocation of those resource in a civil disorder. Resources of a department and other agencies must be managed so that field receive sufficient support and that the community receives services commensurate with known and anticipated problems. The chief will have overall but not directed tactical command of the field units. Disorder control activities place extraordinary pressures on a police organization. Under those circumstances, what makes a good commander? What is effective leadership and command in a civil disorder? There is not unanimity of thought. One approach is that the Chief should resist the tendency or notion to leave their headquarters and proceed to the scene of the civil disorder. The concern is that this will cause a leadership gap in decision making at the policy level in that subordinates will not exercise their delegated authority, if any; decisions will be left pending until the Chief can be contacted or that the Chief will leave and not ensure the continuity of operation . -84- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Another view is that effective leadership requires the Chief (or department command staff) to be on the scene during all stages of civil disorder. Under this approach, the Chief will regularly mix with operation personnel as a way of ensuring that the command structure during a civil disorder is successfully translated from planning documents. In addition, this avoids perceptions of isolation and abandonment by field officers. The NACCJSG states at page 159, as follows: 7 .1. 2b "When the police chief executive (or another headquarter official superior in rank to the emergency field commander) chooses to be present at an incident scene, that official should clear upon arrival, the capacity in which he or she is present. If this is as an observer or adviser, the emergency commander should be so informed; if it is to assume operational command, this too should be explained. And when the police chief executive departs as incident scene after having assumed command, the transfer of command authority back to the emergency field commander (or to another official) should be explicitly noted." Field Commander This commander exercises control of resources committed to the emergency/civil disorder. "The role of the emergency commander does not imply policy making responsibilities; rather it is this official's responsibility to translate existing -85- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product departmental policy -- as expressed in planning documents -- into practices. It is in the nature of extraordinary violence, however, that even the most scrupulous planning process canno~ anticipate every policy issue that will arise in emergency operations in order to impose his or her own policy positions or those of higher civil authorities on the conduct of operations . Thus, the police chief executive must be prepared to intervene in emergency operations in order to impose his or her own policy issues or those of higher civil authorities on the conduct of operations." NACCJSG, p. 159. 7 .1. 2c Scene Commander This is the Officer directly in command of forces in the field. The duties of the Scene Commander should be assumed by the highest ranking officer where the disturbance occurs, and that individual will continue to so act until he is replaced by superiors. The Scene Commander should be responsible for the following: coordination of scene activity, requesting and deploying all personnel, initiating proper tactics, maintaining appropriate communications, determining circumstances for and making arrests and establishing necessary controls . -86- • • • • • • • • • 7 .1. 2d Reserve Force Command DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Officers and material resources are typically directed to staging areas to be made available for field assignments. The Reserve Commander is responsible for organizing the units, dispatching units and equipment in accordance with orders . 7 .1. 2e Squad Commanders Typically, the Squad Leader would direct from the rear, where he can observe and supervise . 7 .1. 2f Staff These are specialized divisions of the command, such as Intelligence, Logistics, Personnel, Operation, and Public Information. Each staff function assists the Chief by (1) providing information to help plan and conduct operations; (2) making a continuing assessment of the situation for their functional section; (3) recommending policies and plans; (4) translating the decisions and plans of the Chief into action; and (5) exercising necessary supervision. In establishing a chain of command, it is important to recognize that there are varying degrees of emergencies/disorders which require varying degrees of involvement on the part of the - 87- • • • • I I • • • • • • • Police Department. DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product The command structure must recognize this escalation. There should be a distinction between incidents and occurrences that are more or less ordinary, routine police situations and those of increasing magnitudes. In terms of planning, it seems clear that if the magnitude of the incident or disorder increases, the functions and responsibilities increase in proportion. Likewise, the delegation of authorities would be more diversified. Yet, it must be recognized that disorders of the first magnitude can escalate quickly into extreme emergencies and disasters. Accordingly, the command structure and the emergency/disorder plan must describe the decision-making author ity of lower level field officers and managers and supervisors . during the initial stages of an escalating disorder to avoid delays in the mobilization of sufficient personnel to prevent further escalation. The command structure and plan must also consider the very real likelihood of mass confusion during the initial stages of an escalating disorder or a rapid mobilization of personnel, and reduce the potential for confusion or inaction . Outside assistance,~, National Guard, other police forces, military, could be called in because of a civil disorder so any effective command structure must address this coordina tion .. Who should control? The answer is difficult because of the understandable reluctance for or inability of other agencies to relinquish control of their manpower and resources. Thus, mutual aid pacts or inter-agency planning agreements should be -88- • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential e Attorneys' Work Product • • • • • • • • • developed prior to any emergency. And whether determined by law or formal agreements, an effective state-local or inter-agency plan must specifically resolve this question -- presumably, in favor of a single commander. 7 .1. 3 Command Post An effective unified command must be centrally located, particularly where there are state-local or interagency coordina tion requirements. If each agency establishes separate command posts, there will be a greater likelihood of communication and intelligence breakdowns, duplication of effort, confusion and disorder. Any lack of cooperation or trust or any infighting between the various jurisdictions, elected officials or command ers will aggravate these problems . Two . types of command post or centers seem o·ptimal: (1) an emergency operation center and (2) field command posts. Generally, the police chief, other public officials, and other interagency chiefs would be found at the emergency operation center, while a field commander would be in command of the various field command posts. The emergency operation center would usually be established at police headquarters or City Hall as those locations are best equipped to serve as the center of operations. It would be the control center for the entire -89- • • • • • • • • • • • operation. DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Field command posts would be established pursuant to the plan or by subordinate officers based on the troubled area . The following are selection factors: (1) ease of travel to the site, (2) the availability of communications; (3) number of personnel/agencies to be mobilized; (4) the availability of space; (5) distance from the scene of the actual civil disorder(s); (6) convenience to other facilities; and (7) security of the location. At times, a mobile command post may be used, which allows for greater flexibility and response to a fluid civil disorder. The most important thing to consider is that a command post is basically a communications center . 7 .1.4 Communications Rapid, efficient and consistent communications are a critical component of disorder control. This is particularly true in the incipient stages, where there are less forces available to respond to trouble spots. Appropriate and adequate communications must exist between all elements of the response forces. This is essentially a function of planning and proper equipment. The logistics of adequate communications among the various agencies that may be mobilized must be established in advance. A good supply of portable radios and telephones must be maintained and available. The Kerner Commission made several recommendations with respect to effective communications during civil disorders: (1) that sufficient frequencies be made -90- • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product available to police and related public safety services; (2) that miniaturized communications equipment for officers outside of their patrol cars is critical for command and control; and (3) that plans be developed to identify methods to handling and dispelling rumors, including the establishment of rumor control centers. 7.2 Other Cities e [INSERT TO COME FROM WARREN JACKSON] 7.3 Interviews e [INSERT TO COME FROM WARREN JACKSON] • • • • -91- • I I • • : • • • I • • • • • 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 HANDLING ARRESTS DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work· Product [OVERVIEW INSERT FROM TOM MCWATTERS] "Industry" Standards [INSERT TO COME FROM TOM MCWATTERS] Other Cities [INSERT TO COME FROM TOM MCWATTERS] Interviews [INSERT TO COME FROM TOM MCWATTERS] * * * [Below is an outline of Tom Mcwatters' materials] 1. Arrests * Alternatives to arrests * Directives re crimes subject to arrest Summons Arrest Procedures Abbreviated arrest form Use of processing teams to photograph arrestees, take fingerprints Gather evidence Police remain at disturbance site -92- • • • • • • • • • • • 2. DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Transportation * * Transportation teams created to transfer prisoners from disturbance site to detention facilities Plan for sufficient number of vehicles Police vehicles Vehicles from other agencies. 3. Detention Facilities * * * * Discussion of general responsibility of police for prisoners from time of arrest until court appearance Three types of detention facilities during disturbance At disturbance site Precincts Holding cells Advance planning must be done to ensure adequate facilities are available to detain prisoners Facilities must meet minimum standards Population control Separation of juveniles, males and females Sanitation equipment Medical care -93 - • • • 4. • • • 5 • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Communication by detained persons Access by defense counsel Booking Process * Additional people needed to handled large number of arrestees. Team approach. * * Use of expedited process, including short arrest form Process prisoners in ordered fashion, starting with most recently arrived prisoners from site, to minimize detention time * Separation of processed prisoners Screening * Purpose: reduce prisoners detained * Method: release, summons, bail -94 - • • • • • • • • • • • 9.0 DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Impact of Financial Constraints [TO COME AFTER SURVEYS] - 95 - • • • • • • • • • • • 10.0 10.1 DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Impact of Statutes and Ordinances Governing Police Actions During Civil Disturbances Overview Many state statutes that are effective and applied during normal times are also important for purposes of deterring and controlling riots and civil disturbances, the most obvious example being the penal code of a state. But in many states this statutory framework is supplemented with a set of statutes that is only applicable in the event of riots or civil disturbances specifically, or large-scale emergencies and disasters generally . Comparisons researched the state statutory law that might affect the decision making of, or empower the actions taken by, public officials and law enforcement personnel at both the state and local level during the outbreak of riots or civil disturbances in major American cities (as well as in Toronto, Canada). In addition to the 64 cities with populations exceeding 250,000 persons in 1990, as reflected in the "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1991," Comparisons also included: Teaneck, New Jersey; Newport News and Richmond, Virginia; and Toronto, Canada. In order to assess the state statutory law that would affect the decision making of, and empower the actions taken by, public officials and law enforcement in the event of a riot or -96- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product civil disturbance in these 68 cities, Comparisons researched the statutes of the 32 relevant states, plus the District of Columbia and Ontario, Canada (for Toronto). In focusing on these 34 "states," Comparisons looked for statutes empowering the Governor, mayors, county, city or other local officials to make emergency decisions during riots or civil disturbances, such as imposing curfews, restricting physical access to public property or affected areas, or prohibiting the sale of firearms, combustibles, alcohol or gasoline. This research encompassed statutes tailored specifically toward riots and civil disturbances, as well as general statutes dealing with large-scale emergencies and disasters that were defined so as to include riots and civil disturbances within their purview. For each of these 34 states surveyed, Comparisons summarized the significant statutes applicable to public officials and law enforcement at both the state and local levels in the event of an outbreak of rioting or other civil disturbances within these 68 cities. (See Appendix: State by State Survey of Statutes Related to Civil Disturbances.) [ [Note: provided under spearate cover with this draft]]. In addition, Comparisons compiled reference volumes containing the relevant statutes summarized for each of the states surveyed. (See Exhibits to State by State Survey of Statutes Related to Civil -97- • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Disturbances, Volumes I-VII.) of date of this draft]] . [[In Special Advisor's Library as What follows is a general summary of the major statutory provisions related to riots and civil disturbances that are currently in effect in the 34 states surveyed, including California, as well as certain conclusions drawn from a comparison of the states surveyed. [[Note: The statutes clearly may be delineated between organizational and empowerment statutes. Beginning here, this section may need to substantively revised in favor of a functional statutory characterization, as opposed to the more jurisdictionally-based one with which we began the analysis.]] 10.2 California State Statutes These statutes apply equally to all California cities . 10.2.1 The Governor's Powers The Governor has the authority to order into the service of the state the California National Guard. 131 The Governor also has the authority during a state of "emergency" (defined more fully below, but which inlcudes "riots") to make, 131 Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code§§ 128, 143, and 146. -98- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product amend, and rescind orders or regulations as necessary, 132 to suspend any regulatory statute, or the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency upon a declaration that strict compliance would prevent, hinder, or delay the mitigation of the effects of the emergency, 133 and to utilize any private property or personnel deemed necessary, other than any newspaper, radio, or television station. 134 10.2.2 The Powers of the Chief of Police The duties of the chief of police and others are set forth in Government Code§§ 41600 et seq . The chief has the powers conferred upon sheriffs by general (i.e., common) law. In all respects, he or she is entitled to the same protection as (county) sheriffs for the purposes of the suppression of riots, tumult, disturbances of the peace, or resistance against the laws or public authorities in the lawful exercise of their functions. 135 The chief's lawful orders must be promptly executed by deputies, police officers and watchmen in the city. Every 132 Cal. Gov't Code § 8567. 133 Cal. Gov't Code § 8571. 134 Cal. Gov't Code § 8572. 135 Cal Gov't Code§ 41601. -99- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product citizen also is required to lend his or her aid when required for the arrest of offenders and maintenance of public order. 136 The chief is required to perform such other services as general law and city ordinances require. 137 The government of a general law city is vested in the chief, along with a five-member city council, the fire chief, the city clerk, the city treasurer and others as may be appointed. 138 10.2.3 The Appointment Powers 1. The Chief. City Councils appoint the chiefs of police. 139 2. Police Officers. Police Departments are under the control of the chief. Presumably, this includes the power to make hiring decisions. 140 But, the legislative body of a city may delegate to the chief or to the city manager the authority to appoint one or more officers and others as they deem necessary for the preservation of the public order. 141 136 Cal Gov't Code § 41602 . 137 Cal Gov't Code § 41611. 138 Cal Gov't Code § 36501. 139 Cal Gov't Code § 36505. 140 Cal. Gov't Code § 38630. 141 Cal. Gov't Code § 38631. -100- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product 10.2.4 Authorities to Take Action During Civil Disturbances There are several general statutes conferring on the chief general authority to take action to control riots. 10.2.4a The Penal Code Penal Code, Part 2., Title 5 (Suppression of Riots), §§ 723 to 727 is devoted entirely to the suppression of riots . These laws date from the mid-1800's. When a sheriff or other public officer authorized to execute process finds, or has reason to apprehend that resistance will be made to the execution of the process, the officer may command as many able-bodied inhabitants of the officer's county as he or she may think proper to assist in overcoming the resistance, and, if necessary, in seizing, arresting, and confining the persons resisting, and their aiders and abettors. 142 Where any number of persons, whether armed or not, are and the of as 142 143 unlawfully or riotously assembled, the sheriff of the county his deputies, the officials governing the town or city, judges of the justice courts and constables thereof, them, must go among the persons assembled, or as near possible, and command them immediately to disperse. 143 Cal. Penal Code§ 723. Cal. Penal Code§ 726. -101- or to or any them • • • • • • • • • • 10.2.4b Other Penal Code DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Public offenses may be prevented by the intervention of the officers of justice by suppressing riots. 144 10.2.4c The Government Code Sheriffs are required to preserve the peace, and to accomplish this objective they may participate in the suppression of delinquency. 145 Sheriffs are required to prevent and suppress any affrays, breaches of the peace, riots and insurrections which come to their knowledge, and investigate public offenses which have been committed. 146 The duty conveyed by Cal. Gov't Code§ 26602 has been interpreted by at least two appellate courts to include the authority to limit public access to certain events, including discretion to permit or not permit the press and reporters to cross police lines. Los Angeles Free Press. Inc. v . City of Los Angeles, 9 Cal.App. 3d 448, 457, 88 Cal. Rptr. 605, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 982 (1970); Yarish v. Nelson, 29 Cal.App. 3d 893, 900 (1990) . 144 145 146 Cal. Penal Code§ 697(3). Cal. Gov't Code§ 26600. Cal. Gov't Code§ 26602. -102- • • • • • • • • • • • 10.2.5 Training DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product The Penal Code creates and governs the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training ("CPOST"), the state agency that creates, enforces and oversees the standards concerning police recruiting, training and education. The Commission also administers a state certification program under these laws. 147 Training may occur at approved institutions, and must include, among others, training in the use of tear gas. 148 No other specific, required training · appears directly relevant to the suppression of civil disturbances. Police officers must successfully complete a course of training prescribed by the CPOST. 149 150 10.2.6 Disaster and Other Emergency Statutes The California Emergency Services Act, Cal. Gov't Code §§ 8550 to 8668, provides a general statutory framework for the governance of emergencies at the state level. In part, the state 147 Cal. Penal Code§§ 13500 to 13519 . 148 Cal. Penal Code§ 13514. (Added to the Government Code in 1969). 149 Cal. Penal Code§ 832.3. 150 Peace Officers are defined at Cal. Penal Code§§ 830 to 832.8. They include police officers, sheriffs, marshalls, constables, inspectors, and others. -103- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product disaster statutes constitute a model code on which local level emergency service statutes are based, and facilitate interagency cooperation through informal mechanisms. Otherwise, they are not particularly instructive. The statutes are designed largely for implementation during natural, toxic, oil spill and other disasters, but not for macro- or micro-scale civil disturbances . The more notable state disaster laws are as follows: 1. Local Emergency. A local emergency is defined according generally to the actual or threatened existence of an emergency. 151 2. Mutual Aid Systems. A series of statutes establish the state's Master Mutual Aid Agreement, which is an informal agreement among the state, its departments and agencies, and the state's various political subdivisions and their departments and agencies. 152 151 Cal. Gov't Code§ 8558(c). See definition of "emergency" at section II.A below. 152 Cal. Gov't Code§§ 8559 to 8561, and 8615 to 8619. In emergencies of a limited scope, local agencies may use ordinary Mutual Aid from surrounding jurisdictions pursuant to jointly administered memoraanda of understanding. When a may or local chief of police, however, determines that an emergency in the jurisdiction is threatened or already exists and that addressing it would or already exceeds the department's resources, the chief is required to request Mutual Aid from the County Sheriff -- an Operational Area Coordinator. In accordance wwith the California Emergency Services Act (Cal. Gov't Code§§ 8550 et seg.), Law Enfrocement Mutual Aid is organized on an Operational Area, Region and statewide basis . Each County is an Operational Area. When an emergency develops or appears to be developing which cannot be resolved by a law (continued ... ) -104- , . I • • • • • • • • • • 3 • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product The California Emergency Council. This Council advises the Governor during emergencies. It consists of the top functionaries of state government and local political subdivision representatives. 153 4 • The Office of Emergency Services. This is the State Civil Defense Agency. Local agencies may coordinate emergency responses through local civil defense offices, if provided for in their local emergency response plans. 154 The 152 ( ... continued) enforcement agency within an Operational Area, the Operational Area Coordinator is required to provide needed assistance and coordination to control the problem. Cal Gov't Code§ 22602. This includes using resources from all agencies in the County. If the resources of the County would be or appear to be overtaxed in dealing with the emergency, or should a present or anticipated emergency be of a magnitude sufficient to justify committing reources of one or more operational areas within a region, the Regional Law Enforcement Coordinator must be advised in advance. That Coordinator is required to organize and coordinate the dispatch of resources within that Region to the emergency. The State is divided into seven Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Regions -- Los Angeles and Orange Counties comprise a single region for Mutual Aid purposes. If the combined resources of a Region are insufficient or are anticipated to be insufficient to deal with an emergency, the Regional Coordinator will request additional assistance through a State Law Enforcement Coordinator. See Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Emergency Planning Guidelines for Local Law Enforcement, December 1989, and Governor's Office of Emergency Services, Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan, October 1991. Interagency coordination issues will be addressed in more detail by Team III . 153 154 Cal Gov't Code§§ 8575 to 8582 . . Cal Gov't Code§§ 8585 to 8589.6. -105- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Office generally is charged with developing a state emergency response plan. 5. Local Disaster Councils. These are established to set forth local emergency response plans. 155 Local Disaster Councils may be certified by the California Emergency Council if they comply with certain standards for emergency service workers . Those standards are set forth through rules and regulations. 156 6. Declarations of State of Emergency. A local emergency can be declared only by the local governing body, and both the state and the local political subdivisions may seek mutual aid in their emergency response efforts. 157 10.3 Disaster Council Models of Selected California Cities Several California cities, including: San Francisco, San Jose, Santa Monica, West Hollywood, Beverly Hills and Culver City, have provided statutorily for the establishment and operation of an emergency response system centered around an interagency municipal disaster/emergency planning office. 158 155 156 157 Cal. Gov't Code§§ 8610 to 8614. Cal Gov't Code§§ 8580 and 8612. Cal Gov't Code§§ 8630 to 8634. 158 See San Francisco Administrative Code ("SFAC"), Ch. 7 (Disaster Council); West Hollywood Municipal Code ("WHMC"), Art . III, Ch. VI (Emergency Organization); Santa Monica Municipal Code ("SMMC"), Art. II, Ch. 3 (Creating Civil Defense and Disaster (continued ... ) -106- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product These cities have enacted slight variations of what probably is a state model code. Some have enacted remarkably identical provisions. They all, however, share the following characteristics: 10.3.1 Definition of "emergency" In most cases, an emergency triggering a City's emergency plan is defined broadly as the actual or threatened existence of conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons or property within a city caused by a number of specifically enumerated conditions, including a "riot". 159 In all cases, the definition expressly excludes conditions resulting from a labor controversy. 160 158 ( ... continued) Council); Culver City Municipal Code ("CCMC"), Ch. 12 (Disaster Council and Emergency Organization); San Jose Municipal Code ("SJMC"), Title II, Ch. 2.16 (Office of Emergency Services); and Beverly Hills Municipal Code, Title 2, Ch. 4 (Disaster and Emergency Services). 159 See,~' WHMC § 3601; SJMC § 2.16.020; §CCMC § 12-2; and SMMC § 2301. 160 See citations at note 158 above. -107- • • • • • • • • • • • 10.3.2 DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Disaster Council Membership In most cases, there is established a Disaster Council, whose membership consists of the Mayor, a Director of Emergency Services, an Assistant Director of Emergency Services, chiefs of emergency services as provided in the city's current emergency plan and such civil, business and other representatives or organizations having an official emergency responsibility, as the Director of Emergency Services may appoint. The Santa Monica Disaster Council goes one step further and includes a Coordinator for Emergency Services as well. In Beverly Hills, the heads of the city departments also sit on the Council, and, in San Francisco, the City Administrative Officer is a vice chair, and three members of the Board of Supervisors and the municipal comptroller also are members of the Council. 161 10.3.3 Disaster Council Powers and Duties The Council is responsible for developing and submitting to the City Council for approval, emergency and mutual aid plans and agreements and ordinances, rules, regulations needed to implement such plans. 162 161 See SFAC § 7.3; WHMC § 3602; SJMC § 2.16.030; CCMC § 12-3; BHMC § 2-4.102; and SMMC § 2302 . 162 See SFAC § 7.4; SMMC § 2303; CCMC § 12-4; SJMC § 2.16.040; BHMC § 2-4.103; and WHMC § 3603. -108- • • • 10.3.4 DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Director and Assistant Director of Emergency Services The City Manager or the municipal Chief Administrative Officer serves as the Director of Emergency Services. An Office of Emergency Services is created. Furthermore, an Office of • Assistant Director of Emergency Services is created, with the Assistant Director to be appointed by the Director (in Santa Monica, the Assistant Director is the Chief of Police). In Santa e Monica, the police chief appoints the Coordinator of Emergency Services, who occupies an office of that name. 163 • • • • • • 10.3.5 Powers and Duties of the Director. Assistant Director and Coordinator of Emergency Services The Director (i.e., the Mayor) is authorized to: (a.) request the City Council to proclaim the existence or threatened existence of a local emergency if the City Council is in session, or to issue such proclamation if the council is not in session; (b.) request the Governor to proclaim a "state of emergency" when, in the opinion of the Director, the locally available resources are inadequate to cope with the emergency; (c.) control and direct the effort of the emergency organization of the municipality: (d.) direct cooperation between and coordination of staff of the municipality's emergency organization, and resolve 163 See SMMC § 2304; CCMC § 12-5; WHMC § 3604; and SJMC § 2.16.050. -109- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product questions of authority and responsibility that may arise between them; (e) represent the municipality in all dealings with public or private agencies on matters pertaining to emergencies. 164 Significantly, in the event of the proclamation of a local emergency, or the proclamation of a state of emergency by the Governor or the Director of the State Office of Emergency Services, the Director/Mayor or the emergency services services office or other are empowered: (a) to make and issue regulations on matters reasonbly related to the protection of life and property as affected by such emergency; provided that the rules and regulations must be confimred as sooon as possible by the City Council; (b) to obtain vital supplies, equipment, and such other properties found lacking and needed for the protection oflife and property and to bind the City for the fair value thereof and, if required, to commandeer the same for public use; (c) to require emergency services of any City officer or employee, and if a "state of emergency has been proclaimed at the county level, to command the aid of as many citizens as he or she deems necessary in the execution of hisor her duties; (d) to requisition necessary personnel or material of any City department or agency; and (e) to execute all of his or her ordinary power as City Manager, all of the special powers conferred by the Disaster Council ordinances or by resolution or 164 See SFAC § 7.6; SJMC § 2.16.060; CCMC § 12-6; BHMC § 2- 4.103; WHMC § 3605 and SMMC § 2305. -110- • i • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product by the emergency plan, all statutory powers, by any agreement approved by the City Council, and other lawful authority. 165 The Director has the authority to designate an orde~ of succession in the event of his or her absence from meetings. 166 The Assistant Director is responsible for developing emergency plans with the assistance of the chiefs of emergency services, and also manages the City's emergency programs. In Santa Monica, this duty falls on the Coordinator of Emergency Services. The Assistant Director there is responsible for directing emergency services activities. 167 10.3.6 Emergency Organization The Emergency Organization of a City is comprised of all officers and employees of the City, together with any volunteer forces enrolled to add them during an emergency as well as any other persons or entities who by agreement or otherwise are charged with duties incident to the protection of life and property in the City. 168 165 See SFAC § 7.6; SJMC § 2.16.100; WHMC § 3605.a.6; CCMC § 12- 6.A(6); SMMC § 2305.f; and BHMC § 2-4.203 . 166 See SJMC § 2.16.050; CCMC § 12-6.B; SMMC § 2305.g; and WHMC § 3605.b. 167 See SFAC § 7.7; SJMC § 2.16.050; CCMC § 12-6(C); SMMC § 2305(i); and WHMC § 3605(c) . 168 See SFAC § 7.5; SJMC § 2.16.070; CCMC § 12-7; SMMC § 2306; and WHMC § 3606. -111- • • • • • • • • • • • 10.3.7 Emergency Plan DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product The Council, though generally charged with the duties in item 10.3.3 above, also is specifically charged with the development of a City's Emergency Plan, which plan shall provide for the effective mobilization of all of .the resources of the City, both public and private, to meet any emergency, and shall provide for the organization, powers and duties, services, and staff of emergency services. That plan must be adopted pursuant to resolution of the City Council. 169 170 10.3.8 Punishment of Violations It is a misdeamenor, punishable by a fine not exceeding $500.00 ($1000.00 in Los Angeles and West Hollywood) or imprisonment not to exceed six months (or both) to (i) willfully obstruct, hinder or delay any member of the City's Emergency Organization in the enforcement of any rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to the Disaster Council laws or in the performance of any duty arising therefrom; or (ii) do any act forbidden by any lawful rule or regulation issued pursuant to the 169 See SJMC § 2.16.080; CCMC § 12-8; SMMC § 2307; and WHMC § 3607 . 170 San Francisco abides by the "California Disaster and Civil Defense Master Mutual-Aid Agreement". SFAC § 7.2. -112- • • • • • • • • • • I . DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Disaster Council laws if the act is of a nature likely to imperil the lives or property of the inhabitants of the City. 171 10.4 Los Angeles Statutes Both the County and City and Los Angeles have emergency response/disaster statutes similar in structure to the simple models above, but made much more complex due to the proliferation of municipal and county resources available and responsible for disaster relief work. They are, in parts, extremely specific, 1 whereas the other local laws leave considerable discretion to the disaster councils . [They are not summarized here forthcoming.] The investigations being undertaken by Team III (Interagency Coordination) ought to shed light on the use of the state and local statutory structures and whether they need modifications so as to impose discipline on the interagency civil disturbance planning process. Instead, the other local models, any statutory models discernible from other non-California jurisdictions and Team III's work may form the basis for any recommended statutory changes. One preliminary observation is that neither the City's nor the County's laws appear to call for the presence of a representative of the other on its local disaster council. In 171 See SFAC § 2309; SJMC § 2.16.110; CCMC § 12-10; BHMC § 2- 4.205; SMMC § 2309; and WHMC § 3609. -113- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product light of the complexity of operations involved, this may be warranted, unless it turns out to be redundant in light of actual emergency operations and the effectiveness of the relevant mutual assistance agreements. 172 10.5 The California and Los Angeles Statutes: Preliminary Observations Local statutes all appear focused on organizational prerogatives. They grant broad police powers -- in the regulatory sense. They do not grant to the police or other local authorities any authority nor impose restrictions upon the use of specific riot suppression mechanisms. Instead, the local laws give law enforcement officials generous authorities to exercise their judgment as to which mechanisms to use in light of the circumstances~ The state laws clearly provide even stronger, yet vaguer, authority. In other words, at the time they are carried out, all facets of a civil disturbance control plan would seem to be a matter of pure discretion. Neither the state nor local statutes attempt to prescribe in detail the contents of riot or civil disturbance control plans. Rather, they delegate those tasks to the emergency services council and/or other office . 172 Los Angeles Codes here insert. -114- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product Through the composition of the disaster services council, the statutes provide a means of ensuring that as broad based a representative body that needs to be participating in developing a plan are included as participants in the process. In particular, some of these statutes, such as the Los Angeles and Beverly Hills Municipal Codes, provide statutorily for the police to be part of the disaster council. Others do not. It would be difficult, in any event, to fathom that a local police force would be shut out from the drafting and formulation of a local emergency plan, particularly since the burden of impelmenting it and making it operational would fall mostly on the force . What most of the statutes surprisingly do not require is the presence of officials from other significant political subdivisions to be part of particular cities' local disaster councils. The need for multi-jurisdictional participation and coordination appears most acute between the City and County of Los Angeles, on account of their sheer size and the proliferation of relevant agencies between and among them. The Los Angeles disturbances taught us all that local parochial concerns, if they exist, must be shun aside when it comes to disaster control . Unless officials from other jurisdictions are permitted to participate at the outset, (i.e., they are brought in under the catch-all categories that all of the statutes have), or unless mutual aid agreements work well, there may be a serious -115- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product organizational shortcoming here. Our interviews ought to bear this out further. If any statutory changes are warranted, they would need to be remedied first in the State Assembly, then locally. 10.6 10.6.1 Survey and Comparison of State Statutes Related to Civil Disturbances General Observations With the exception of Hawaii, all states surveyed currently maintain statutes dealing, either specifically or generally, with the outbieak of riots and civil disturbances. The statutes surveyed from the 34 states generally fall within one of two categories, statutes empowering public officials and law enforcement officials at the state level, and statutes empowering public officials and law enforcement officials at the local level . 10.6.2 Statutory Empowerment at the State Level Most of the states surveyed currently have in effect statutes providing the Governor with broad powers in the event of a riot or civil disturbance. Typically, the Governor, and sometimes the commander of the National Guard or militia, is -116- • • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product granted many of the following powers upon the outbreak of a riot or civil disturbance: (1) The power to declare a state of emergency . (2) The power to call into service the National Guard, the state guard, or the militia. (3) The power to utilize all available resources of the state government as are reasonably necessary to cope with the disaster emergency (including the transfer of the direction, personnel, or functions of state departments or agencies). (4) The power to suspend any regulatory statute, or the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency, if strict compliance would prevent, hinder, or delay the mitigation of the effects of the emergency. (5) The power to utilize any private property necessary to cope with the emergency . (6) The power to impose a curfew. (7) The power to regulate the working hours of certain businesses. (8) The power to direct or compel the evacuation of all or part of the population. (9) The power to control the movement in and out of an affected area. (10) The power to prohibit the occupancy of premises within an affected area. (11) The power to prohibit the use of certain public areas and streets. (12) The power to ban public gatherings . (13) The power to prohibit the transfer, use, manufacture or transportation of explosives or combustibles. (14) The power to prohibit the possession of firearms outside the home or business . (15) The power to prohibit the sale, purchase or dispensing of alcoholic beverages. -117- • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product (16) The power to prohibit the sale of any commodities or goods, or any activity that should be prohibited in order to protect the public order . (17) The power to suspend or limit the sale or dispensing of gasoline, except directly into the tank of a motor vehicle. (18) The power to make provisions for the availability and use of temporary emergency housing . (19) The power to limit or suspend utility services. Additionally, some states maintain statutory provisions explicitly providing that the militia, when called upon to quell a riot or civil disturbance, wi11· have the same powers of arrest and apprehension as do local law enforcement officers. Many states also currently have in place statutes that establish departments of emergency services. These departments are typically charged with the task of coordinating emergency services, and the responsibility of developing contingency plans and a system of local emergency planning committees to aid in the event of a riot or civil disturbance. Such departments generally exist under the authority of the Governor . 10.6.3 Statutory Empowerment at the Local Level Many states have in effect statutes that give to local authorities powers similar to those granted to the Governor during a riot or civil disturbance. The states vary a great deal with respect to which local officials receive the delegation of -118- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product power in the event of rioting, whether it be the mayor or the chief of police of an incorporated city or town, or the chairperson of the board of supervisors or the sheriff with respect to the unincorporated portions of a county. Among the powers typically delegated to local officials in the event of a riot or civil disturbance are: (1) The power to declare a state of emergency. (2) The power to impose a curfew. (3) The power to close any business . (4) The power to close to public access any public building, street or other public place. (5) The power to close all shops which engage in the sale of arms or ammunition . (6) The power to prohibit the sale or possession in a public place of alcohol. (7) The power to prohibit the sale or possession of gasoline (except directly into or within the tank of a motor vehicle) or any other flammable liquid. (8) The power to order any riotously assembled persons to immediately disperse, and if they fail to do so, to command any or all persons present in the community to aid in their arrest . Some state statutes provide that if the local authorities cannot contact the Governor after the outbreak of a riot or civil disturbance, the local authorities are empowered to direct the highest commander of the National Guard within the county to call to duty the National Guard to suppress the riot. A few states specifically limit the liability of law enforcement officers with respect to their actions during rioting -119- • • • • • • • • • • • DRAFT 7/21/92 Priviledged and Confidential Attorneys' Work Product or other civil disturbances, such as by providing that a law enforcement officer or fire fighter may use deadly force if necessary to disperse or apprehend rioters whose conduct is creating a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons, or by immunizing the commanding officer of any military force engaged in the dispersion of a mob from civil or criminal liability arising out of the firing upon or otherwise attacking such unlawful assembly, provided that the commanding officer exercises honest judgment in taking .such action . Many states also have statutes providing for the commissioning of additional law enforcement officers during a riot or civil disturbance, such as special deputies appointed by the sheriff, or special police officers appointed by the mayor with the limited power of making arrests for offenses against the peace. Several state statutes provide that a chief of police may call on another chief of police within the state for assistance (resources and personnel) in quelling such riots . A2V92B09.WPL {7/21/92 11:34am) -120-

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Description

Working team status reports, 1992 July 22.

Asset Metadata

Core Title Working team status reports, 1992-07-22

Publisher University of Southern California (original)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 454 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), official reports (aat)

Language English

Contributor The collection was given to the University of Southern California on October 30, 1992 by the Special Advisor to the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles. (provenance)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-42432

Unique identifier UC11410324

Identifier box 24 (box),web-box24-07_09-10.pdf (filename),folder 7 - folder 9 (folder),webster-c100-42432 (legacy record id),LAPD Performance Evaluation (series)

Legacy Identifier web-box24-07_09-10.pdf

Dmrecord 42432

Format 454 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),official reports (aat)

Rights This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ All requests for permission to publish or quote from manuscripts must be submitted in writing to the Manuscripts Librarian. Permission for publication is given on behalf of Special Collections as the owner of the physical items and is not intended to include or imply permission of the copyright holder, which must also be obtained.

Type texts

Copyright This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ All requests for permission to publish or quote from manuscripts must be submitted in writing to the Manuscripts Librarian. Permission for publication is given on behalf of Special Collections as the owner of the physical items and is not intended to include or imply permission of the copyright holder, which must also be obtained.

Source Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992 (collection), University of Southern California (contributing entity)

Access Conditions Contact: Special Collections, Doheny Memorial Library, Libraries, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0189; specol@usc.edu; phone (213) 740-5900; fax (213) 740-2343

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Repository Location Doheny Memorial Library, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0189

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