Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

Review of 1992 riot-related planning, 1992-07-08

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Review of 1992 riot-related planning, 1992-07-08

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-INTRADEPARTMENf AL CORRF.SPONDENCE
July 8, 1992
1.1.6
TO: Chief of Police
FROM: Officer-in-Charge, Inspection and Control Section
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF 1992 RIOT-RELATED PLANNING, PREPAREDNFSS AND
RESPONSE
I. PURPOSE
II.
As part of the continuous improvement process, the Chief of Police directed a
critical review of the Department's planning, preparedness, and response
regarding the civil unrest that followed the announcement of verdicts in ~e
"Rodney King'' case. A critical analysis of events during the first six hours will
provide a basis for improving the Department's response to similar, future
emergencies.
· METHODOLOGY
Staff gathered all available data and conducted interviews primarily regarding
incidents that occurred in South Central Los Angeles and particularly 77th Street
Area during the first six hours of rioting. However, incidents occurring in other
parts of the City were also examined. Staff also analyzed the availability and
deployment of logistic and personnel resources in preparation for and response to
the emergency .
Interviewees included LAPD staff and command officers, supervisors and a cross
section of rank and file employees. Los Angeles Fire Department command
personnel were asked for their perceptions and assessment of cooperative efforts
and LAPD performance .
Staff reviewed videotapes (obtained from the media) depicting riot incidents.
The Department's Tactical Manual, Emergency Operations Guide, First
Responders Checklist, and the Emergency Operations Board Master Plan and
Procedures were used as references by staff in conducting the review and
analysis of:
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Tapes of police radio transmissions;
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Chief of Police
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1.1.6
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MDT messages;
Printout of priority calls for setvice (2H and 3);
Los Angeles Fire Department report of structure incidents;
Log of events and incidents prepared by the Field Command Post (FCP),
Emergency Operations Center (EOC), geographic bureaus, watch
. commanders, field supervisors and officers;
Unusual Occurrence Time Cards (Forms 14.13 and 14.14).
Staff reviewed analyses prepared by geographic bureaus and Areas of their plans
and responses and by Tactical Planning Section of their training and planning
prior to the riot.
This report is broken down into a variety of areas and functions that proved to
be significant in the overall picture of the Department's response in the initial
hours of the riot. All findings and recommendations are included in the
appropriate categories.
The topics that were included and the reason for their inclusion are as follows:
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Overview - Provides a perspective of the unrest with numerical details of
riot incidents as well as other crimes and arrests .
Planning and Preparation - Provides an overview of Department-wide
preparation.
Florence/Nonnandie - Provides details of 77th Street Area's planning,
preparation and response to the civil unrest and a specific response to that
location.
Command Post Development - Provides an insight into the set-up and
operation of the FCP in 77th Street Area during the initial hours of the
incident.
Metropolitan Division Deployment - Discusses Metro's planning and
deployment during the initial hours of the disturbance .
Fire Department - Provides an insight into the concerns and criticisms of
the Police Department's response to the Fire Department's needs .
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Chief of Police
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1.1.6
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Emergency Operations Center and Mutual Aid - Addresses the set-up and
functioning of the EOC and the request for and problems encountered in
obtaining mutual aid .
Parker Center Incident - Scenario of this disturbance and analysis of
Department's response, which may have impacted the Deparnnent's overall
response to the widespread unrest.
Foothill Area Incident - Scenario of this disturbance and analysis of
Department's response, which may have impacted the Departtnent's overall
response.
Westwood Village Incident - Scenario of this disturbance and analysis of
Deparnnent response, which may have impacted the Department's overall
response.
In preparation for a preliminary report to the Police Commission regarding
the Department's contingency plans and response to the riot, documentation
was developed by Inspection and Control Section. This documentation
includes Department contingency plans, geographic bureau preparedness
and chronology of events, an event chronology (timeline-first six hours),
overview of fire incidents, overview of calls for service, and visual aids.
This is found in a binder maintained at Inspection and Control Se~tion, but
copies have been given to the then Chief of Police, Daryl F. Gates, members
of the Police Commission, and members of the Police Commission's Special
Advisor's staff. This documentation is only a part of the addenda to this
report and is included as a reference source.
Witness statements are included herein with an index of interviews. Due to the
volume and nature of other addenda, it will remain at Inspection and Control
Section and will be available for review and/ or acquisition upon request .
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report was necessitated by the apparent lack of response by the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) at the inception of the massive civil disturbance in South Central
Los Angeles on April 29, 1992.
Most complaints of a lack of response focused on the incidents occurring at the
intersection of Florence and Normandie Avenues. Those incidents were being broadcast
live by numerous television and radio stations between the hours of 1830 and 1930.
This location was described by the media as the flashpoint of the riot. The lack of
Police Department response was alleged to be a catalyst in the rapid escalation of
riotous behavior over a widespread area, which continued for three days. It was also
alleged that the Department failed to appropriately plan for the possibility of civil
unrest.
This report primarily addresses the initial six hours of the event and focuses on
planning, preparedness and response. It is believed that this was the most critical time
relevant to the Department's response and set the stage for the subsequent three days .
An analysis of the initial hours resulted in the following major findings and
recommendations which hopefully will enhance the continuous improvement process.
FINDINGS
Planning and Preparedness
The Department did have plans in place and did perform some tasks to prepare
for the possibility of civil unrest following the verdict in the King case. Standing
plans were reviewed, mobilization rosters updated, audits of equipment
conducted, training given and some exercises to test readiness were completed.
Staff determined, however, there was a lack of ongoing communication, at least
in 77th Street Area, between management and the majority of line officers
regarding intelligence information and specific plans. Staff further noted an
apparent lack of a team effort to address the potential for problems due to the
King verdict.
There was a perception by many of the 77th Street line officers that 77th Street
commanding officer level management was unconcerned with their input. And,
regardless of the training and preparation they had received in the days prior to
the riot, they perceived that there were no specific plans devoted to the potential
aftermath of the King verdict.
Executive management had directed citywide ·planning and preparation. The
Commanding Officer of Operations-South Bureau did impress upon the Chief of
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Police and other staff officers the need to plan and prepare for potential civil
unrest resulting from the Rodney King verdict. He maintained that the
Community-Based Policing Pilot Project command configuration detracted from
his ability to insure appropriate planning and preparedness in South Bureau.
However, regardless of any Department configuration at the time, the direction
to plan and prepare was communicated to all command officers. Whether that
direction received appropriate emphasis is arguable and depends on the
individual's preferred management style.
Although there were standing plans in each division, based on documentation
provided by each Area, there was minimal evidence of emphasis on ongoing,
realistic, and fundamental training regarding the laws, policies and tactics for
response to civil unrest, particularly as they relate to command and staff level
responsibilities.
The vast majority of line officers interviewed perceived a lack of support by City
Government leadership and by some Department management following the
release of the Christopher Commission Report and the political atmosphere
enveloping the Police Department during the last year and a half. This, coupled
with the constant barrage of negative information by the media about the Police
Department, caused many police officers to question their authority to use any
force and to do their job to the best of their ability. Although there is no direct
evidence that this issue affected the Department's overall response, it is an issue
of concern and may require management attention.
There were several instances of political and special-interest criticism of the
Police Department for planning for civil unrest. There were also instances of
political leadership strongly advising police management to maintain a low-key
role pending and following the King verdict, ostensibly to avoid inciting civil
unrest. As a result, the Police Department was forced to prepare for the verdicts
under the guise of Earthquake Preparedness Month and other such facades.
The Department's policy of arresting all violators of laws was not reemphasized
at this time. It was the perception of a large number of supervisors and officers
that the Department had taken on a low-key approach of restraint, rather than
the historical, aggressive, but appropriate response. These factors not only did
not assist the Department in planning and preparing, but very probably
developed a mindset of restraint to the point of inaction at some leadership
levels, which caused frustration and impatience throughout the ranks .
Response
It was detennined that the Department's response to Florence and Normandie
Avenues was indeed deficient. Several factors were discovered which
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cumulatively caused an inability to respond efficiently or effectively. The
· lieutenant field commander did not initially follow the basic fundamental
Department plans for a response to a civil disturbance. He failed to exercise his
authority and take appropriate action.
The primary responsibility of the field commander during the initial stages of an
unlawful assembly or riot is to assemble sufficient forces to immediately confront
participants, then overwhelm and arrest law violators. However, absent the
ability to assemble such forces, it's a field commander's and police officer's duty
to do whatever is necessary to protect life and property, with whatever resources
are at their disposal. In the instant case, the lieutenant field commander did
have sufficient forces at his disposal to respond quickly to Florence and
Normandie Avenues and at least stop the life-threatening criminal activity, and
he certainly had the authority and responsibility to request additional personnel
immediately in order to respond appropriately.
It was further determined that the failure to request a tactical alert, or to request
additional personnel immediately, critically impeded the Department's ability to
respond quickly.
It was apparent that the initial 77th Field Command Post (FCP) management
was overwhelmed by the scope of the situation and lacked sufficient information,
knowledge and direction to effectively deal with the circumstances. A lack of
trained cadre personnel further complicated the task of deploying and
coordinating resources. The failure of the Emergency Operations Center
(EOC)/FCP to utilize a variety of intelligence sources available to it critically
hampered the Department's ability to respond.
The level of violence and the widespread scope of the unrest was unprecedented .
There were simultaneous occurrences of riot-related behavior at locations around
the City, including Parker Center, Westwood Village, Foothill Area, and
throughout South Central Los Angeles. This created a situation which was
beyond the resources of any single city Police Department, particularly the LAPD,
which is resource poor in the best of times. Very little riot-related equipment
was available. Conspicuously absent were non-lethal weapons that could have
been used to disperse large crowds without causing serious injuries. It was not
until a curfew was declared and mutual aid became available that the
Department was able to restore some semblance of order and control. Even this
was complicated by the LAPD's lack of radio equipment capable of
communicating with the various agencies.
Generally, a civil disturbance is the primary responsibility of the Police
Department, with the Fire Department working in a support role. However, in a
situation in which widespread arson is occurring, it must be realized that the Fire
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Department's role is extremely critical to the survival of the City. During this
incident the Police and Fire Departments had difficulty in functioning as a team;
the Police Department was unable to provide adequate protection to further the
Fire Department's mission. This was caused by two basic factors: a lack of
organization and deployment of available resources at the FCP, and a failure to
appropriately plan for the joint deployment of police and fire teams during a riot
situation. The resultant inefficiency caused friction between the Police and Fire
Department management at the 77th PCP and may have generated a division
between agencies.
The EOC was compromised in its operating efficiency because the Department
unwittingly converted it to a task force command post primarily concerned with
operational issues. Operations is not an intended concern of the EOC. Rather,
the EOC is designed to manage information and facilitate resource movement in
support of disaster response and recovery. This is accomplished through
management level liaisons from concerned City departments and outside entities
who are assigned to the EOC. Each supporting department manages its own
resources apart from the EOC. When those resources are inadequate to the task
at hand, the EOC liaisons coordinate acquisition of additional resources either
from other City departments or from County, State and Federal mutual aid. The
EOC is the City's command post. The EOC liaisons are the mayor's and council's
staff for information gathering concerning the unusual occurrence (UO).
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The Emergency Operations Board is the policy level staff that makes
recommendations to the mayor as director of the Emergency Operations
Organization.
During the riot, the Department Commander's presence in the EOC interrupted
the normal flow of EOC information by drawing away police personnel to meet
his immediate needs.
The EOC was confronted with problems on multiple fronts in addition to those
previously mentioned. The police staff needed additional training, but more
importantly, those who were trained for a particular function were not assigned
to that function. Thus, on-the-job training was occwring during the most critical
times, which delayed activities. The sudden overload caused by the incident
created poor use of available intelligence resources. The existence of bureau
command posts interfered with established personnel reporting procedures. The
sheer size of the UO created extraordinary logistics problems. The feeding of
personnel and the lack of appropriate radio equipment were the largest logistics
issues. Communication between the EOC and the PCP was essentially
unavailable when most needed, during the early hours .
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RECOMMENDATIONS
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It is recommended that commanding officers develop an ongoing communication
process with all subordinates to deal with planning and preparedness issues. It is
important to the success of any operation to have communication flow both
ways, particularly as it relates to intelligence gathering and mental preparedness.
It is recommended that all staff and command officers receive additional ongoing
training in the basic concepts of emergency operations and procedures.
It is recommended that during any preparedness process that the Department
reaffirm existing policy of response to civil unrest, similar to the policy statement
issued pursuant to the Gay Rights demonstrations in 1991. The Police
Commission should also periodically publicly reaffirm their support of the
mission of the Police Department. Commanding officers should, through
continuous training, reaffirm the Department's policy on use of force. The
ultimate goal, over time, would be to instill in all officers the knowledge and
confidence necessary to do their job effectively with the belief they are supported
by their Department and their community.
4. It is recommended that all watch commanders and supervisors be given ongoing
training regarding "first responders" issues to instill knowledge and confidence.
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It is recommended that additional ongoing training be conducted for selected
FCP cadre personnel. This training should run deep in the organization to permit
adequate staffing of the EOC/FCP by trained personnel regardless of rank at any
time activation occurs.
It is recommended that the importance of utilizing all available intelligence
sources, such as line officers, Air Support Division, the Intelligence Command
Center and . commercial television, be stressed through training to all officers, but
particularly to command and staff level officers.
It is recommended that the Department examine existing strategies involving
decentralized FCPs and satellite staging areas to determine if new strategies are
required to address the needs of widespread unusual occurrence activities.
It is recommended that the Department develop new approaches to confront the
type of widespread civil unrest recently experienced. This would include use of
force options, specifically tools and tactics which address crowd control with less
than lethal use of force.
It is recommended that serious consideration be given to the immediate
acquisition of 48-channel radios, to be issued to each officer so that during
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mutual aid occurrem:es appropriate radio frequenci~s could be designated for
mutual aid use. Officers with radios could then be teamed with mutual aid
• personnel, assigned a frequency and immediately be deployed. Radios assigned
to each officer would eliminate delays caused by lack of equipment experienced
during the recent rioting. Notwithstanding acquisitions of new equipment, the
Deparnnent should investigate new methods for managing existing equipment
resources, such as radios, vehicles and shotguns, so that they can be quickly
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10. It is recommended that this Department build a partnership with the Fire
Department and jointly develop strategies that address the mutual deployment
needs of both agencies during civil unrest and other catastrophic incidents .
CONCLUSION
The first six hours of the riot on April 29, 1992, were extremely chaotic and one of the
most taxing experiences in Department history in terms of decision making, personnel
resources, and logistics. The fast moving and widespread unrest impeded the
Department's ability to focus on any significant overall response. However, there was
an opportunity to respond to extremely violent acts at the initial stages of unrest using
existing Department strategies and plans. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons,
mainly human failure and possibly the political climate, this opportunity was lost.
Planning was made an issue by some Department personnel, however sufficient plans
were in place to deal with the initial outbreak, but the appropriate execution of that
plan never occurred. The lack of mental preparedness might have had a role in the lack
of execution but planning most certainly did not.
Some of the findings involve perceptions of rank and file officers regarding
management's lack of concern for potential unrest and/or a management mindset that
deviates from the Department's usual aggressive, but appropriate response to civil
unrest. There is no direct evidence· that this perception was totally accurate or that the
perception, if accurate, caused a lack of response by the Department. This perception
also manifested itself during the gay rights demonstrations in 1991 .
It is interesting to note the strikingly similar findings involving this issue which were
developed in the analysis of the Florence and Normandie/77th Field Command Post
scenario and the Parker Center scenario. The staff examining Parker Center were
totally independent from the staff examining the other scenario. The two scenarios
being examined were made up of two seperate Areas, 77th Area and Central Area .
There was little, if any, communication between the two groups (staff) prior to the
consolidation of this report. This situation lends credence to the theory that those rank
and file perceptions are indeed widespread and whether totally accurate or not, demand
management attention.
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There is no doubt that human failure occurred and that some systems did not meet all
the needs generated by the enormity of the circumstances. It should be noted that in
all cases of response to emergency situations, some human failure and systems
breakdowns occur. In this case, the Department's personnel were overwhelmed and
under-equipped. However, these factors did not stop individual officers from rising
above and beyond the occasion with heroic acts and selfless contributions to the
enormous task at hand .
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ANALYSIS OF· TI-IE LOS ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT'SPIANNING,PREPAREDNESS
AND RESPONSE TO TI-IE 1992 RIOT.
(TI-IE FIRST SIX HOURS)
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O'VERVIEW ................................................ 1
• PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS ................................ 8
FLORENCE AND NORMANDIE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . 16
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FIELD COMMAND POST DE'VELOPMENT AND OPERATION ............ 32
METRO POLIT AN DMSION .................................... 4 7
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EMERGENCY OPERA TIO NS CENTER AND MUTUAL AID ............... 55
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FIRE DEPARTMENT ......................................... 71
P .AR.KER CENTER • • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . • . • • . • . . . • • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . 77
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FOOTHILL AREA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
WES1WOOD VILLAGE .......................•............... 96
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L.A. RIOT 1992 - OVERVIEW, TI-IE FIRST SIX HOURS
On April 29, 1992, at 1510 hours, the jury empaneled in the Simi Valley trial of Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Officers Koon, Powell, Briseno and Wind announced
a verdict of "not guilty." The Chief of Police activated the Emergency Operations Center
at 1555 hours. Southwest, 77th Street, Southeast, South Traffic Division, West Traffic
Division, Central Traffic Division, Foothill and West Los Angeles day watches were held
over. Approximately 838 uniformed supervisors and officers, including Metro, Motors, ·
and other specialized units, were on duty citywide. Prior to the verdict, very little
indication of civil unrest had been observed. However, there were subtle signs of a
potential problem by way of threats by gang members and others in South Central Los
Angeles.
At 1700 hours, Mayor Bradley held a news conference regarding the Rodney King
verdict. Between 1600 hours and the time the Mayor spoke, there had been only
sporadic incidents of looting (at most, four occurrences spread over three divisions) and
one documented occurrence of an object being thrown at an occupied motor vehicle
occurring in the 77th Street Area. From 1700 until 1715 hours ( during the news
conference), there were no high priority calls· dispatched in South Bureau. Six riot
related crimes, spread over three divisions, were reported to have occurred during that
quarter-hour, but all six reports were taken at a later time. Consequently, the listed
time of occurrence is dependent on the victim's memory .
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At 1722 hours, 77th Street Area received reports that males were striking passing
vehicles with baseball bats in the area of Halldale and Florence (one block west of
Florence and Normandie). Three units responded and were confronted by a large,
angry crowd composed primarily of gang members. By 17 40 hours, two "officer needs
help" calls had been broadcast in the area of Florence and Normandie Avenues.
Lieutenant Moulin, the 77th Street Watch Commander, was on scene with a force of
25-30 police officers and two sergeants. The size of the crowd was estimated by
witnesses at between 50 and 500. The officers formed a skirmish line to prevent an
arrestee's lynching and endured a constant barrage of rocks and bottles. At 1745 hours,
Lieutenant Moulin ordered his officers to withdraw from Florence and Normandie. By
1815 hours, Lieutenant Moulin had conferred with his commanding officer, Captain
Jefferson, at 77th Street station and returned to the field to establish a Field Command
Post (PCP) at a predesignated site at 54th and Van Ness.
Crime reports indicate that an additional 28 riot-related crimes occurred throughout
South Bureau between approximately 1715 and 1815 hours. Large groups of gang
members were reported in the area of the Baldwin Hills Theater. Looting and riot
related robberies occurred at and near the Crenshaw Shopping Center and in the area of
Manchester and Vermont Avenues. Looting was documented at locations in Southeast,
Southwest and 77th Street Areas .
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Although it may be successfully argued that the riot's beginnings were simultaneous and
widespread, there can be no doubt that the incidents which occUITed at Florence and
Normandie were unique in many respects. The crimes committed at Florence and
Normandie were perpetrated by a core group of individuals who remained in the area,
literally taking it over as their own, for a protracted length of time. This contrasted to
other areas in me City where criminals fled after the commission of a crime, or upon
the presence of authority. The type of crimes committed at Florence and Normandie
also differed from other occUITences throughout the City in that a high proportion were
crimes committed against person (such as robbery, ADW and battery), rather than the
crimes against property which were predominant in other locations.
Radio calls were broadcast describing major riot related activity in Newton and 77th
Street Areas and on the border of Southeast Area, during the quarter-hour between
1815 and 1830 hours. Crime reports indicated that robberies and assaults were
occurring at Florence and ~ormandie and major looting had begun on Vermont at
Manchester. Shots were also being fired by an angry crowd at a swap meet in Newton
Area .
From 1830 until 1845 hours, looting or large violent crowds were reported in Rampart,
Southwest, 77th and Southeast Areas. Five high priority radio calls were dispatched
and nine riot-related crimes were reported to have ocCUITed during this time period.
The crimes included robberies at 60th and Nonnandie, assaults near Slauson and
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Western and an Assault with a Deadly Weapon (ADW) at Century and Main. At about
1845 hours, the beating of truck driver Reginald Denny at Florence and Normandie was
televised. Approximately 1,050 uniformed officers and supervisors including Metro,
Motors and other specialized units were on duty citywide .
By 1900 hours, a large riotous crowd had formed in front of Parker Center. They were
intent on storming the building and required additional squads of Metro and Central
Area officers to hold the crowd back. In the quarter-hour ending at 1900 hours, 64
riot-related crimes that would have required a high priority response were documented
in 77th Street, Southeast and Southwest Areas. Two new major groups of rioters were
reported during the same time period; one at Gage and Normandie, the other in
Southwest Area at 43rd and Vermont.
Between 1900 and 1930 hours, 75 looting-related crimes which would normally have
required a high priority response were reported to have occurred in 77th Street,
Southwest and Southeast Are~. Nineteen high priority radio calls were broadcast
during the same time period. Riot-related activity was being reported in 77th,
Southwest, Southeast, Newton, Van Nuys, Pacific and Wilshire Areas.
The Fire Department received its first reports of riot-related fires between 1900 and
1930 hours. Three fires were reported during this time period. Within another hour,
an additional 31 structure fires were reported. Firefighters were the subject of violent
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attacks by crowds of rioting citizens throughout 77th Street, Southeast and Southwest
Areas. Because of this, Fire Department resources were directed to assemble at the
Police Department FCP. The Fire Department Incident Commander formed the various
companies that responded to the FCP into strike teams. Each strike team was led by a
battalion chief and required that a police escort be assigned before being dispatched to
fires in riot areas. The first strike team was formed, ready to be dispatched, at about
2040 hours. The FCP was unable to provide police escorts until 2143 hours, when the
first strike team was dispatched from the FCP. From 2030 to 2143 hours, 152 structure
fires were reported to the Frre Department in 77th Street, Southeast, Southwest and
Newton Areas. (This number does not take into account multiple calls at one location
or rekindles.)
The Fire Department received a total of 502 calls regarding structure fires between
1900 and 2359 hours. Over 25 strike teams were dispatched with police escorts during
the first evening/morning of rioting .
From 1930 until 1945 hours, 12 high priority radio calls were broadcast in 77th Street,
Southeast, Newton and Southwest Areas. All these calls involved groups looting or
exchanging gunfire. During the same time period, 99 crimes occurred in 77th Street,
Southeast and Southwest Areas that would normally have required a high priority
response. These occurrences were spread throughout those Areas, with a heavy
concentration in the area of Manchester and Broadway, and ranged from
Robbery/Grand Theft Auto (GTA) to looting-related arsons.
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Fifteen high priority radio calls were broadcast during the quarter-hour ending at 2000
hours. For the next three hours, up until 2300 hours, these high priority calls came in
at a rate approaching 20 calls per quarter hour. They peaked during the period ending
2230 hours, with a total of 26 calls for that 15 minute period. These calls reported
riot-related crimes throughout the City, with a concentration in 77th, Southeast and
Southwest Areas .
There were 76 riot-related crimes reported to have occurred in 77th, Southeast or
Southwest Areas during the quarter-hour ending at 2000 hours. The following seven
quarter-hours indicated a decline in occurrences, posting a total of 98 riot-related crimes
among them. However, a sharp rise in these reported crimes was indicated during the
quarter-hour ending at 2200 hours. Seventy-six riot-related crimes occurred during that
period; all but one were high priority in nature.
The next four quarter-hour segments, 2200 to 2300 hours, all showed a decline in
reported crimes. A total of 45 crimes were reported as occurring during that 60 minute
period. This is the last time period addressed in this portion of the audit.
During the first six hours of the riots, the LAPD received 302 high priority calls for
service through Communications Division citywide and had over 500 riot-related crimes
reported in the three South Central divisions - Southeast, Southwest and 77th Street
Areas. Between 1800 and 2300 hours, 110 riot-related arrests were made citywide .
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The Los Angeles Fire Department received 420 requests to respond to structure fires in
Southeast, Southwest and 77th Street Areas and an additional 82 requests in Newton
Area during the five hours preceding midnight on the first night of the riot. All 502 of
the Fire Department's requests for service required police escort for response with an
assigned fire strike team.
The media declared the "flashpoint" of the riot to be the intersection of Florence and
Normandie Avenues in 77th Street Area. This was mainly due to the much televised
events occurring there between 1830 and 1900 hours. Although there were several
problems involving the Department's response to Florence and Normandie and other
occurrences in 77th Street Area, it appears that other Areas were responding to their
respective occurrences appropriately and in a relatively timely manner. There were
several problematic areas of Department operations and they are discussed in more
detail in other sections of this report .
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PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS
The Department has a lengthy history of emergency preparedness planning for all
hazards and in particular civil disturbances. Following the riots of 1965, the Police
Department increased its planning efforts with an emphasis on response to civil unrest .
The Department's Tactical Manual details organizational structure, procedural response
and individual responsibilities .
In the months following the Rodney King incident, the Department anticipated civil
unrest depending on the trial outcome. The political climate in the City was such that
the Department could not openly discuss civil unrest potential and planning without
incurring further public criticism. Nevertheless, while a low profile was maintained, the
Department conducted readiness efforts for potential civil unrest .
During the months prior to the verdict, Operations-South Bureau (OSB) was
reconfigured, with three of the four Areas (77th Street, Harbor and Southeast) placed
under the command of the Office of the Chief of Police, to facilitate Phase One of
Community-Based Policing. Phase One included four other Areas (Foothill, Northeast,
Hollenbeck, and Pacific) throughout the City which were also assigned to the Office of
the Chief of Police. All commanding officers (CO's) involved in the Community-Based
Policing project received instruction regarding the possibility of civil unrest following
the verdict in the Rodney King case. They were all advised to make preparations,
which would include heavy deployment and planning in anticipation of the verdicts .
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Chief Hunt advised all CO's in South Bureau, regardless of the Community-Based
Policing mode, to plan and coordinate contingencies for the possibility of civil unrest
after the verdict .
Examples of the Department's efforts included roll call training for uniformed officers
and supervisors assigned to geographic patrol divisions, riot control tactics for
Metropolitan Division (i.e. SWAT, Mounted Unit), exercises for Bureau Command Post
Cadres simulating civil disturbance scenarios, practical civil disturbance training for
patrol supervisors, and audits of equipment, patrol division response plans, response
vehicles and tear gas availability. In addition, the Department contacted the State of
California, Office of Emergency Services, to ensure that law enforcement mutual aid
resources would be readily available .
In addition to audits and training conducted by centralized Department sources, the
geographic bureaus and Areas conducted individual reviews of their specific plans, such
as intelligence gathering methods, deployment procedures including mobilization,
liaison with critical facility managers responsible for potential FCP sites and station
security plans. Also included in this effort were sessions of specialized training for
patrol personnel in squad formations, riot control tactics, baton training, FCP
operations, inspections of uniform equipment (including detectives), readiness of
response vehicles and unusual occurrence (UO) supplies .
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Preparedness and planning for possible civil unrest was discussed in several OSB staff
meetings in the year prior to the Rodney King verdicts. The importance of updating
standing plans, having equipment ready and providing roll call training was stressed by
South Bureau staff to all South Bureau, Area and division COs. Audits of UO
equipment were completed in all South Bureau Areas and a UO exercise was conducted
to test OSB riot control readiness .
Seventy-seventh Street Area planning and preparedness consisted of discussing staging
areas, reviewing standing plans, inspecting equipment, training in crowd control and
tactics and updating "call up" rosters.
FINDING
Although media reports focused on the criminal activity at Florence and Normandie
Avenues, numerous other incidents of a similar nature were occurring at other locations
within the City at the same time. The rapid spread of civil disorder was of an
unprecedented magnitude. The effect of the massive involvement of multiple locations
of violent lawlessness made it very difficult to focus a police response of any
significance.
RECOMMENDATION
Historically, the Department has focused its tactical thinking and planning toward UO's
and civil unrest which were fairly geographically isolated. Most, if not all, of the
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Department's standing plans involving civil unrest concentrate on responding to isolated
incidents. The Department must now begin thinking and planning for civil unrest on a
much larger geographical scale. Planning on how a Department of this size can respond
to a fast moving widespread problem should be a priority .
The fact that the incident spread so widely and at such a rapid pace should cause the
Department to reassess the standing crowd control strategies. It is recommended that
as a Department we rethink our strategies in order to address similar incidents that do
not lend themselves to containment. In order to be effective, this strategy must be
coordinated with other citywide and multi-agency entities to ensure rapid response and
coordination of efforts .
FINDING
There is no doubt that UO plans were in place in each Area. Standing plans involve
tested and proven techniques and strategie~ but are necessarily general in nature. It
would be impossible and undesirable to attempt to develop a plan for every conceivable
eventuality, particularly scenarios involving riot situations. Although more specific
planning could have been done, such as identifying more potential targets for violence
and destruction, no one could have foreseen the extent of the violence and destruction
which actually occurred •
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The issue raised by some line officers and a lieutenant watch commander (Lt. Moulin)
that there was no plan is not supported by any documented evidence. One must then
question why these officers perceived that no plan existed. In analyzing this issue,
interviews of officers in 77th Patrol Division and Central Patrol Division uncovered a
perception that management was not overly concerned about potential unrest. There
was also a perception that management did not spend much time soliciting input
regarding specific plans and intelligence information concerns. Management, on the
other hand, believed that the long-standing and proven plans in place (Tactical Manual
and First Responders Guide, etc.), even though general in nature, were sufficient to
address potential situations. One must also consider that the political climate of the
day dictated a mindset that may have stifled open discussion regarding planning and
preparation.
There was little evidence that management at the lieutenant level and above in 77th
Street Area discussed fundamental response tactics such as those found in the First
Responders Guide and the Tactical Manual with all line officers. However, it should be
noted that these techniques are meant for those individuals, who at the time of
emergencies, have authority and responsibility to direct a response. In most situations
this authority and responsibility would go to sergeants and above. Historically, these
plans have been part of supervisors' and watch commanders' training and the
promotional examination and study processes. These plans are well known to all
supervisors, particularly lieutenant watch commanders .
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The open discussion with line officers of standing plans with a request for input
involving specific concerns might have alleviated the perception by those line officers
that they had no input, management was unconcerned, and that no plan existed. This
open discussion might have also reinforced response techniques in the mind of the
lieutenant watch commander and assisted him with his field commander tasks.
Planning, or the lack of planning, was not in any way the root cause of the
Department's deficient response to Florence and Nonnandie. Suitable plans were in
place for an initial response; however, the appropriate execution of those plans did not
occur.
RECOMMENDATION
77th Street Area management, including lieutenant watch commanders, must start
developing an approach to solving problems facing their Area which includes an
opportunity for input from line officers, senior lead officers and supetvisors regarding
their concerns. Management must show by their actions that they give value to what
their subordinates have to say. Line personnel have valuable insight and information
and are more than willing to share it, if given the opportunity.
All lieutenant watch commanders have the authority to develop more specific plans for
their watch if they believe Department planning is not sufficient. Watch commanders,
as well as commanding officers, should be the driving force for planning and
preparedness at the Area level.
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FINDING
The Police Department was forced to prepare for the King verdict in many areas under
the guise of Earthquake Preparedness Month and other such facades due to political
pressures to maintain a low key posture, ostensibly in an effort to minimize the
possibility of inflaming emotions. Planning and preparedness are two separate issues.
Planning can be done surreptitiously, but preparedness requires realistic and ongoing
training as well as rather obvious deployment of personnel and equipment .
Being totally prepared would have involved contingencies of Metropolitan Division
personnel deployed in South Cen~ Los Angeles, riot ready from the time the Rodney
King case went to the jury. This would have also included deployment of rescue
vehicles in South Bureau, as well as buses, command vehicles and other obvious UO
equipment before the verdict was rendered. This deployment would, without a doubt,
have been considered provocative by many politicians, specialized interest groups and
the media.
Preparedness also involves mental readiness. There was some evidence that some
management personnel did not believe the verdicts would involve a "not guilty'' finding
and therefore believed civil unrest would not occur. This may have affected their
approach to readiness and level of command emphasis .
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There was also evidence that some staff and command officers lacked the knowledge of
some basic civil unrest control concepts. Planning was done throughout the
Department, however, planning is only a tool to facilitate preparedness. If those people
who must make decisions are not mentally prepared to follow the plan, the plan is
useless.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the Department readily address its actual and specific concerns
through training and deployment. This can best be facilitated through an atmosphere
of support by political leadership and by realistic, ongoing training and deployment.
Management should prepare themselves mentally for all possible contingencies and
place appropriate emphasis on training and developing their subordinates to insure that
all personnel are mentally prepared to respond to any emergency. Training of all
personnel, especially staff and ~ommand officers, should be ongoing and should involve
the basic procedures and concepts of controlling civil unrest .
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FLORENCE AND NORMANDIE
The intersection of Florence and Normandie Avenues was identified by the news media
as the flash point of the riot even though several other locations were also points of
civil unrest within hours after the verdicts were rendered. As many as seven news
helicopters orbited over the intersection from approximately 1825 hours until after
1900 hours. Their video images went out across the country detailing numerous acts of
violence and other riotous activity without any evidence of police response. This
created a public furor which resulted in this investigation and others, most notably the
Special Advisor to the Board of Police Commissioners (Webster Panel). For this reason,
the I.APO planning, preparedness and response to the activity at Florence and
Normandie has been looked at in great detail, with an eye on the causes for a lack of
response and recommendations to improve response to future emergencies.
RESPONSE
On April 29, 1992, at approximately 1510 hours, the verdict in the Rodney King case
was announced. At 77th Street Area, Captain Jefferson, along with Lieutenant M.
Moulin, watched the verdict being announced on television. Captain R. Hansohn, 77th
Street Patrol Commanding Officer, was at Command Officer's Training in Omard.
Lieutenant Moulin suggested to Captain Jefferson that due to the verdict, the 77th day
watch be held over and Captain Jefferson approved the request .
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At 1617 hours, a radio call was broadcast in 77th Street Area at 1521 West Florence
Avenue regarding looting. Officers responded and completed a 211/ ADW investigation
and the appropriate reports. The suspects were gone and no riotous situation was
occurring. A few other calls regarding possible riotous activity were also being
broadcast throughout South Bureau.
At 1630 hours, the Commanding Officer of OSB contacted the Chief of Police regarding
reconfiguring the four southern Areas back to the bureau mode. The Chief of Police
approved the request .
At 1705 hours, the Commanding Officer of OSB notified the commanding officers of the
South Bureau Areas of the reconfiguration to a bureau mode and stressed the
importance of ensuring that officers were sensitive to the situation. He ordered that
officers make no comments that would inflame the situation. He then assigned
Commander Banks as the "B" Watch Incident Commander. Numerous calls were being
broadcast throughout South Bureau relative to 415 group activity .
At 1722 hours, a radio call was broadcast depicting males with bats hitting passing
vehicles at Florence and Halldale. A minute later, 12FB2 arrived at the location,.
observed the group and requested a backup. At 1730 hours, 12L10, Lleutenant Moulin,
responded to the backup call. The incident involved a brief foot pursuit that brought
officers eastbound on Florence to Normandie. At 1734 hours, 12FB2 requested help at
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that location, as they were being attacked by a crowd with rocks and bottles. At 1736
hours, 12Jl requested additional units for suspects in the alley between 70th and 71st
west of Nonnandie. The situation escalated and they requested help. Air-3 responded
and requested two supervisors respond and also a tactical frequency be made available.
Air-3 requested units stop northbound pedestrians on Nonnandie. Units 12L20 and
12L30 responded to the location. A large crowd gathered in the vicinity of this
intersection and became hostile toward the officers. To facilitate an arrest and prevent
the lynching of a prisoner by a hostile crowd, 25-30 officers formed a skirmish line
around those officers making the arrest. The officers were being spit on, kicked and
were targets of rocks and bottles. The suspect was immediately transported to 77th
Street Station. The air unit overhead requested perimeter control, and at least one unit
did in fact stop traffic on Nonnandie for a short period of time. However, no other
attempts to set up a perimeter or stop traffic ever occurred.
At 1745 hours, 12L10 (Lleutenant Moulin) issued the first order for all units to leave
the area of Florence and Nonnandie. A minute later, 12L10 again ordered everyone out
of the area. It was Moulin's judgement that he did not have sufficient forces to remain
at the location and deal with the crowd. Most officers did not have their helmets on at
the time and the crowd appeared to be too violent for officers to effectively and safely
remain at the location.
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While leaving the area, 12L10 and other units rescued a New York Times cameraman
who had been beaten by the hostile crowd at 71st and Normandie and transported him
to 77th Street Station so that he could receive medical treannent. At 1756 hours, a
second rescue was effected by officers from the same general vicinity. The victims in
this incident were a Hispanic couple with a young child, all of whom had head wounds .
At about this time, Moulin was confronted by a 77th Street supervisor and was
requested to call a Tactical Alert and regroup existing forces at 77th Street Station .
According to that supervisor, Moulin said that he would confer with the captain.
At approximately 1800 hours, Lieutenant Moulin arrived at 77th Street Station and
discussed the situation with Captain Jefferson. The scenario has two versions at this
point. Moulin says that he told Captain Jefferson that "we lost it out there" and that
the situation was out of control. He advised Jefferson to go to "A" and "B" Watches for
the purpose of bringing in more resources to handle the situation. According to Moulin,
Jefferson told him to go back out and make an assessment and then go to the FCP
(54th and Van Ness), and he would meet him there after he put on his uniform.
According to Jefferson, Moulin came into the station and told him ''we lost it out there."
Jefferson observed that officers with Moulin had arrestees in custody and believed what
Moulin was saying was that they had lost it and had regained it, since they had
arrestees in custody. However, Moulin said, "No, you don't understand, we lost it, it's
out of control. We need to call a Tactical Nert." Jefferson then told Moulin that he
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(Moulin) was the field commander and that if he needed to call a Tactical Alert and get
more personnel that he should do that and that he should go back out and handle the
situation. Jefferson stated he believed that when Moulin left he was on his way to deal
with the situation at Florence and Normandie .
Moulin left the station and proceeded through the intersection of Florence and
Normandie on his way to the FCP. •
During this time period, another 77th Street unit responded to a Code-3 radio call
involving 50 males throwing rocks at a vehicle with a female victim inside. That unit
responded to the location and immediately received rocks and bottles. They observed
the crowd destroying the vehicle with baseball bats and rocks. They got out of their
vehicle and approached the victim's vehicle, at great personal risk, as they were being
bombarded with large rocks and bricks. While one partner held off the crowd at
gunpoint, the other removed the 46-year-old, Oriental female victim, who was badly
beaten and unconscious. The officer rescuing the victim was hit several times with
bricks and fell to his knees, still clutching the unconscious victim. The officers managed
to place the victim in their police vehicle and. leave the scene to take the victim to the
hospital. Both officers received minor injuries, were treated briefly at the hospital and
returned to the field where they were directed to go to the FCP .
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At 1816 hours, Lieutenant Moulin, via his vehicle radio, ordered all units out of the
area at 71st and Normandie and soon after that ordered all available 77th Street units
to the predesignated FCP location (54th and Van Ness) .
At 1820 hours, an all · units broadcast advised there was a possible ADW victim left in
the area of 71st and Normandie. Moulin told all units not to enter the area to search
for any victims. He repeated his order to respond to the FCP .
At approximately 1825 hours, the first Metro supervisor arrived at the FCP. Soon
thereafter, approximately 1835 to 1845 hours, Captain Jefferson, Commander Banks
and Lieutenant Lorenzen (Metro) arrived at the FCP. Only Commander Banks was
briefed to any extent by Lt. Moulin.
A Tactical Alert was declared at 1843 hours by Communications Division, not by the
PCP. At approximately 1845 hours, victim Reginald Denny was seen on several local
television stations being pulled out of his gravel truck and viciously beaten by several
suspects at Florence and Normandie .
The FCP received several calls from 77th Street Area re~ding people being pulled out
of their vehicles and being beaten, with no police response .
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During this time, an off-duty LAPD captain was at home watching the televised beatings
occUITing at Florence and Normandie, with no police response, and subsequently went
to his police vehicle in his garage and placed a call stating that ADW's and 187's are in
progress at Florence and Vermont and to assign a unit Code-3. (He mistakenly
designated Florence and Vermont, rather than Florence and Normandie.) That call was
broadcast at 1851 hours and was basically canceled by Moulin, who told all responding
units to go to the FCP. This order and the other preceding orders given by Lieutenant
Moulin to Communications Division and responding units canceled all police services in
the 77th Street Area .
One squad of Metro personnel was quickly equipped and assigned the "rescue probe"
mission. At this time, it should be noted tha~ there were approximately 40-50 77th
Street officers assembled at the FCP. However, only_ one squad of Metro was sent out
to effect rescues and assess the situation at Florence and Nonnandie. Witnesses stated
that the 77th Street officers were not organized in a state of readiness .
At approximately 1853 hours, the Metro squad left the FCP en route to Florence and
Nonnandie. They arrived one block north of Florence on Normandie at approximately
1858 hours and were met with a barrage of rocks, bricks and bottles. They observed
no victims to be rescued and reported this to the FCP. Metro Lt. Lorenzen (R-10O), at
the FCP, told them that if they did not have a rescue to return to the FCP. The
supervisor directing the probe advised the FCP that the location was too hot to enter
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and that they would ne~d additional personnel. They were again told to return to the
FCP, which they did. At 1900 hours, a 77th Street sergeant phoned the FCP and
advised of the need to respond to Florence and Nonnandie as people were being pulled
from their cars and beaten .
At 1906 hours, Air-3, now carrying a Metro supervisor, was over the scene at Florence
and Nonnandie. He reported looting and a large hostile crowd. Four minutes later,
still over the scene, he reported a vehicle being stopped at the intersection, a family
being pulled out and "pelted" and then continuing southbound .. At this point in time,
the air unit experienced possible mechanical problems and made a precautionary
landing at Slauson and Western.
At approximately 1900 hours, the Commanding Officer of OSB was attending a rally at
the AME Church. He was advised telephonically by his aide of the incidents at Florence
and Nonnandie and that there was no apparent police response. He then ordered
Metro, rescue ambulance and any available units to the location, through his aide, Lt.
Pesqueira .
At 1930 hours, the first evidence of major structure fires occurred. An air unit
requested fire units at Florence and Nonnandie but was advised that the Fire
Department was holding back due to the riotous crowd conditions and the lack of police
escorts. However, the Metro frequency, which is not monitored by the air units or
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those in command at the FCP, was broadcasting that they were sending tactical support
elements into the areas of Western and Florence, Norrnandie and Florence and Vermont
and Florence .
At 1945 hours, 77th FCP requested four sergeants and 40 officers to respond to the
FCP. They also requested that all radio calls be routed through the FCP. A process to
handle radio calls was developed at the FCP by the command personnel. This process
involved dispatching whole squads to a single emergency call at a time. Some of these
calls were hours old. After handling each call, the squad was directed to report
immediately back to the FCP.
The level of violence continued to escalat~ in South Central Los Angeles involving
numerous incidents of looting, fires, beatings and homicides. Also occurring at this
time period was the escalation of violence at Parker Center involving vandalism, arson
and riotous activity. Foothill Area was also experiencing large groups of people in front
of the Foothill Station throwing rocks· and bottles ..
At 2010 hours, the Department was officially in the process of mobilizing.
At 2013 hours, approximately one and one-half hours after the Denny incident, a
faction of Metropolitan Division personnel arrived at Florence and Normandie, took
sniper fire and were forced out of the intersection .
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At 2016 hours, there was reported looting of the Western Surplus store at 1800 West
Manchester. It was estimated that over 1,100 firearms of all types, as well as an
unknown quantity of ammunition, were taken from this location by gang members .
At 2030 hours, the intersection of Florence and Nonnandie was occupied by LAPD
personnel. Several of the surrounding businesses had been set on fire after being
looted, and no suspects remained .
FINDING
The initial response to the help call at 71st and Normandie and the pull out appeared to
be an appropriate tactic based on the officers' readiness to face a hostile crowd. Most
officers did not have their helmets on, nor did they have a plan to move the crowd
which had gathered all around them. In their minds, they had responded to a help call,
not a potential riot situation. However, after the field commander had knowledge of
beating victims it should have been obvious that the situation was growing very violent
and people were being injured severely .
RECOMMENDATION
The recommended response would be to regroup at a safe but fairly close location,
probably 77th Street Station. The next course of action would be to call a Tactical
Alert or at least request all necessary personnel (probably five squads) and enough
personnel to set up a perimeter and stop traffic through the intersection. A plan of
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action should have been developed and then a directed return to the location as soon as
possible, to stop the criminal activity, should have occurred. The need to set up a
perimeter first should not have had priority over stopping the activity. However, at
some point in time, soon after a response, resources should have been utilized to stop
traffic from going through the intersection. This may have been problematic in that it
would have taken a massive amount of personnel to seal off the intersection without
putting exposed officers in great danger. This tactic should have been attempted but
may not have been attainable. These tactics would be consistent with the Department's
basic and fundamental tactical plans for riot control which should be known and
practiced by all personnel, particularly watch commanders.
FINDING
Based on interviews with most officers at the original help call, videotaped accounts of
the activities occurring at Florence and Normandie, and on the number of available
personnel in 77th Street Area, there appeared to be a window of opportunity in which a
swift police response prior to 1830 hours would have been able to effectively disperse
the crowd of approximately 100 rioters. However, based on the videotaped accounts,
the crowd grew and became much more violent after 1830 hours. This would have
required a different and larger tactical response. Absent a tool of some kind which
would have dealt with a use of force above the baton level but below the deadly force
level, any response after i830 at Florence and Nonnandie probably would have
required the use of deadly force against the crowd and individuals in the crowd .
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The need to quickly respond back to Florence and Normandie was obvious, fundamental
and critical to protect life and property. The retreat by Lt. Moulin to the station to
discuss the situation with the captain did not hasten any response and was unnecessary.
It should be noted that although the field commander (Lieutenant Moulin) did have
knowledge of at least two victims of beatings at Florence and Normandie prior to
responding to 77th. Street Station and then to the FCP, he did not have specific and
direct knowledge of the beatings involving Reginald Denny and others as he_ had no
access to television at the FCP, nor did any other officer at the initial FCP location .
FINDING
No field commander maximized the resources of Air Support Division. This omission
continued beyond the first six hours and went into the third day of operations. This
resulted in the field commander not being provided with very valuable intelligence
information which could have formed the basis of tactical decisions .
Air Support Division was not utilized after the retreat from 71 st and Normandie nor
was it utilized during the transition to the FCP. It was not utilized to supp<>rt the
Metro probe sent to Florence and Normandie. These were very critical times in which
ground units would have benefitted greatly from the type of information normally
provided by air units .
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Some Air Support Divis~on helicopters have the capability of being very quickly fitted
with on-board closed circuit live video feed to an established PCP. This was neither
requested nor utilized during the most critical times after the first six hours even though
Air Support Division attempted on several occasions to make their services known and
available to the EOC and the PCP.
RECOMMENDATION
The basics of riot control which would include the "First Responders Guide" and the
resources available to assist in riot control such as Air Support Division should be the
topic of training and discussion on a routine basis within all patrol divisions ~d staff
meetings. Just as professional sports teams go over the basic fundamentals of their
sport on an ongoing basis, the Department must routinely practice and discuss
fundamentals of leadership, riot control and response to emergencies. Training must be
solid, realistic, ongoing and verifiable and must discuss relevant laws and Department
policy as well as techniques and tactics. This training should include all ranks,
particularly those wiQt leadership and decision making roles. Some human failure will
most certainly occur in emergency situations; however, it seems reasonable to believe
that ongoing training and discussion in this area would build on self-confidence,
knowledge and ability, and could reduce incidents of failure .
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FINDING
The Police Department is the primary City agency responding to civil unrest situations .
Although riots such as the Watts Riot and the latest riot do not occur with regularity,
civil unrest on a smaller scale involving large and violent crowds does occur several
times a year. The Department is in serious need of equipment to effectively deal with
incidents of civil unrest and other catastrophic emergencies. The Department is
resource poor in the best of times, having barely enough equipment such as patrol
vehicles, radios and shotguns to deploy a normal daily patrol force. When incidents
occur which require holding over watches, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to
appropriately field the oncoming watch. Even more to the point, the patrol force has
little or no equipment specifically intended to deal with violent ci-vjl unrest. The
Department has no tactical shields of any kind and no tools to fill the gap between
deadly force and the baton. And, the Department's communication system is severely
lacking when it comes to multiple frequency radios to facilitate communications with
outside units or other agencies .
The Department has no tools to deal with mass looting other than mass arrests. Mass
arrests in the best of circumstances require a great deal of personnel and equipment to
secure arrestees, process arrestees, book evidence and secure looted locations .
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RECOMMENDATION
The Department and City should make equipment a very high priority. Hand-held
radios, preferably the latest multi-channel ROVER radios are critically needed and
should be assigned to every officer in an assignment which would be required to
respond to a civil unrest situation or other major emergency. Other equipment such as
shotguns and vehicles should be obtained in sufficient numbers to allow for two watch
deployment during a tactical alert or mobilization mode for patrol divisions .
Department experts should test available tools such as tactical shields, rubber bullet
weapons and water cannon devices and then request the appropriate equipment through
the Emergency Budget process. The City of Los Angeles is no doubt in a tight fiscal
situation but City leadership should consider the costs involved in not equipping their
Police Department with the necessary tools to do its job.
Whether or not new equipment is received, the Department should develop new ways
to better accrue and manage needed equipment. Forty-eight channel radios are in place
in some specialized units. Plain cars, patrol vehicles and shotguns are also available in
most situations. A better plan to quickly retrieve that equipment from uninvolved
entities and get it to divisions or staging areas in need, should be developed .
Recognizing that arrests are the best deterrent to civil unrest and looting, experts
should also begin thinking about dealing with hundreds and even thousands of looters
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in ways other than mass arrests. Enforcement action~ be taken. It may not,
however, be the most tactically sound response to try to arrest hundreds or thousands
of people at one location. Stopping the activity and moving the looters out of the area
with minimum resources may be the most advisable tactic in that situation. Rubber
bullets, water cannons or even tear gas may be possible deterrents which could save
resources and stop the looting. This would be preferable to a few available officers
standing around and watching people loot businesses with impunity .
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FIEID COMMAND POSf DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION
The Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD) Depot at 5425 South Van Ness
Avenue was predesignated as a potential Field Command Post (FCP) location. Its
selection was a result of its size (9.5 acres), ability to be secured, available facilities and
supplies. In general terms the facility appeared to be appropriate for an FCP.
After the initial confrontation and help call at 71st Street and Normandie Avenue on
April 29, 1992, at 1736 hours, Lieutenant M. Moulin (77th Street Division Watch
Commander) ordered all police units out of the area. Subsequently, all 77th units were
ordered to report to the FCP at 54th Street and Van Ness Avenue. Lieutenant Moulin
was the first unit to arrive at the FCP, after he briefly stopped at 77th Street Station to
speak with Captain Jefferson. Upon arrival, sergeants were directed to form their
subordinates into squads and to stand by for further instruction and assignment.
Commander R. Banks, South Bureau Assistant Commanding Officer, had been
designated as the "B" watch field commander by Deputy Chief Hunt shortly after the
verdict was announced. Lieutenant Moulin briefed Commander Banks upon Banks'
arrival. According to Banks, Moulin told him the crowd at Florence and Normandie
was very violent and estimated it to be 500 and growing .
Banks observed the evidence of violence in terms of damage to the police vehicles he
· saw at the FCP. During this time, the bus depot was operating as usual and was a busy
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place. This further complicated an already confusing situation. Although several
, sergeants and lieutenants attempted to organize the situation, by all accounts, the FCP
was chaotic. Metropolitan Division (Metro) units, Fire Department apparatus of all
types and 77th Street units were responding to the FCP. Rapid Transit District buses
were being moved to other RTD lots around the County in order to provide enough
room for the emergency equipment .
There was a major problem with communications from the FCP because RTD's phone
system design does not allow ready access to making outside calls. Captain Jefferson
arrived at the FCP and, upon seeing the chaotic situation, took command. Jefferson
stated that _ he believed that Commander Banks was at the FCP prior to his arrival.
According to Jefferson, no one was in charge when he arrived, which is why he
assumed command from Moulin.
During this period, while forces were being massed at the FCP, 77th Street Area was
literally without police service. Lieutenant Moulin had not only ordered all 77th units
to the PCP, but also had Communications Division refrain from broadcasting calls and
rather phone the calls to the PCP for dispatch. At one point in time, over 60 priority
calls were given to the PCP to handle.
At the PCP, an officer accepted the list of calls, wrote them on scraps of paper and
passed them to a sergeant who logged them on a yellow pad. The calls were screened
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by the supetvisor, with low priority calls held and life-threatening calls forwarded to the
room where the ranking officers were present. Once the FCP vehicles were in place,
the calls were forwarded to the PCP. Eventually, one squad of officers per call was
dispatched and told to report back to the PCP upon completion of the call .
After receiving several phone calls at the PCP from various sources with information
regarding the televised beatings at Florence and Normandie, Lieutenant Moulin
requested Lieutenant Lorenzen of Metro to respond. According to Lorenzen no one
briefed him on the situation at Florence and Normandie regarding a violent crowd of
500 people. A plan was formulated to send a "rescue probe" to the intersection. This
probe was formed to effect the rescue of any victims at Florence and Normandie. The
probe, which consisted of one sergeant and ten officers in three unmarked police
vehicles, never arrived at Florence and Normandie. At approximately 71st and
Nonnandie, they encountered numerous rioters who threw rocks and bottles at them.
They did not observe any victims who required rescue; therefore, they were ordered to
return to the PCP .
Air Support Division (ASD) was tasked with only a minor role in the situation
assessment. Due to a possible mechanical problem, the air unit that was transporting a
Metro supervisor over Florence and Nonnandie for an "eyes on" was forced to make a
precautionary landing. A second air unit was dispatched to replace it, but the delay
came at a critic~ time. After that point, the field commander did not coordinate with
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ASD to function as an intelligence source. There was no evidence that the Metro probe
that was sent to Florence and Normandie was aware of the air unit's presence, and the
two were not in contact.
· The number of officers at the FCP during the first few hours were estimates only and
varied widely. Lieutenant Young made the first actual count at approximately 1830
hours (according to Young, who doesn't wear a watch), and discovered that there were
approximately 10 squads of 77th and Metro officers available. Officers continued
arriving at the FCP in large numbers, especially Metropolitan Division officers .
A tally of UO cards was completed. Based on the time assigned to the UO, the
( following numbers were obtained: At 1900 hours 116 officers from 77th Street Area,
• 94 Metropolitan Division officers and 270 officers from other divisions were assigned to
the UO. At 2400 hours, 1,793 officers were assigned to the UO .
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The above numbers indicate officers assigned to the UO. The information necessary to
ascertain numbers at the 77th FCP is not available. It should be noted that 141 officers
• indicated that they were assigned to the UO by 1700 hours and a total of 205 officers
indicated that they were assigned to the UO by 1800 hours. The times indicated by
these officers are questionable and are probably approximations, at best .
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Commander Banks arrived at the FCP early in its initial set-up. He estimated that he
arrived at about the same time as Captain Jefferson, while Jefferson stated that Banks
was at the FCP upon his arrival. Banks did not assume command; however, he stated
that he was briefed by Moulin, participated in conversations regarding a Metro rescue
attempt at Florence and Normandie, the declaration of a Tactical Alert, and the need for
a MERV van. The need for isolating Florence and Nonnandie was discussed, but it was
determined that they did not have enough personnel. Banks stated that the FCP was
still in a very chaotic state and that Jefferson was attempting to attain some
organization. Banks left the FCP at approximately 1930 to 1945 hours for Operations
South Bureau in order to confer with Chief Hunt at OSB .
Commander Banks briefed Chief Hunt at OSB and they discussed the subject of
mobilization and a request for the National Guard. Chief Hunt in tum telephonically
spoke with the Mayor regarding requesting the National Guard and also spoke
telephonically with the Department Commander, DC Frank.le, regarding mobilization
and the National Guard .
Captain Jefferson requested that the Mobil Command Post (MCP) trailers be sent to the
FCP. This request was facilitated by Tactical Planning Section, and the MCP trailers
arrived at approximately 2030 hours. The FCP was relocated to the trailers which
provided additional phone capacity; however, telephone problems persisted .
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At approximately 2110 hours, Chief Hunt arrived at the FCP and assumed command
from Captain Jefferson. Deputy Chief Hunt observed that the FCP was in a chaotic
state. Chief Hunt reorganized the FCP staff and assigned cadre positions .
Security for the FCP was provided by Rapid Transit District Police, and the facilities for
the FCP are owned and operated by the Southern California Rapid Transit District .
The Fire Department expressed frustration over their inability to obtain police escorts in
the early stages of the riot. Their perception was that there was a large contingent of
officers available at the FCP, despite the fact that the command staff told them that
they did not have enough officers available to provide escorts. The Fire Department
issue is addressed as a separate topic herein.
FINDING
With regard to future FCP locations for an incident of a sizable magnitude, it was found
that the RTD Bus Depot, although a massive facility, was inadequate for this scope of
operation. The Fire Department alone required a great deal of space to stage their
operations.
The fact that the RTD was an active, busy bus depot further complicated the chaotic
situation that was so evident early in the incident. It was found that the phone system
in place at RTD did not facilitate the needs of an active FCP due to dialing procedures
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employed to prevent ab~se of the system by RTD employees. There were no personnel
assigned to facilitate staging large quantities of equipment and personnel in the first
several hours .
RECOMMENDATION
In order to limit initial confusion in setting up an FCP, it is recommended that Area
Standing Plans be reevaluated and that practical consideration be given to the issues of
phone availability and staging. Decision makers of each entity in control of a
prospective FCP location must be included in planning. Line supervisors and officers
must be made aware of their roles and responsibilities. For an operation with the
potential of reaching a substantial magnitude, it is recommended that a staging officer
be assigned immediately. It is imperative that this officer have a strong command
presence in order to organize personnel and equipment, obtain vehicle keys, collect
radios and otherwise facilitate the expedient deployment of personnel and resources .
It is further recommended that the feasibility of a single FCP with satellite staging areas
should be examined by the appropriate Department entities, in conjunction with the
Fire Department and other member departments of the Emergency Operations
Organization. .
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FINDING
Communications, i.e. verbal briefings and situation assessments, were less than ideal
within the FCP. Available information was not appropriately transmitted to arriving
resources. This was particularly crucial in the case in which Metro arrived at the FCP
and did not initially become aware of the scope of the problem at Florence and
Normandie. The decision to send in one squad of Metro personnel to effect a rescue did
not appear to be based on all known information at the time, especially information
involving a large violent crowd of 500 persons as originally reported by Lieutenant
Moulin to Commander Banks .
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the need for complete and thorough situation assessments and
updates be reemphasized through training addressing interpersonal communication
issues, particularly involving emergency situations .
FINDING
The FCP, during the early stages of the riot, became the focal point for the lack of
police response to incidents throughout 77th Street Area but particularly to Florence
and Normandie.· The FCP was repeatedly described as a chaotic situation, particularly
during the initial hours of the rioting. There were several attempts to coordinate the
police response effort; however, the perception of those line officers and sergeants at
the FCP was that they should have been deployed from the FCP much earlier. Their
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instructions to stand by until sufficient forces could be massed proved to be a major
point of increasing frustration as they became aware that the situation was escalating
and spreading across the City. There is evidence that this frustration contributed to a
breakdown of a disciplined state of readiness by 77th Street officers at the FCP .
Sectoring would have been a basic response scenario; however, the FCP was so
disorganized and with the perceived lack of personnel resources and lack of
information, sectoring was not discussed or implemented .
RECOMMENDATION
When a delay is anticipated in deploying available officers due to tactical
considerations, it is recommended that the person in charge ensure that a mission
statement and strategy be communicated to those officers. The officer-in-charge should
also stress the importance of officers maintaining a state of readiness and appropriate
discipline. This would minimize the level of frustration that was created at the FCP by
uncertainty and lack of direction. This would also address a high state of readiness
which would allow for faster deployment to meet the needs of the emergency .... A
personnel officer should have been immediately assigned to keep track of personnel
resources and manage personnel readiness.
FINDING
Another issue that impacted police response dramatically was the fact that an order was
given to Communications Division to forward all calls, via telephone, to the FCP rather
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than to broadcast them as usual. This resulted in all police response to calls for service
being completely suspended for a period of time in 77th Street Area. The FCP was not
ready or capable, at that time, to facilitate dealing with prioritizing and dispatching
radio calls .
RECOMMENDATION
All Field Commanders should adhere to the established procedures as outlined in the
Tactical Manual, which basically states that radio calls should not be directed to the
FCP for dispatch prior to the PCP being fully operational .
FINDING
Radio communication was an area of critical significance. There was a breakdown in
several areas that resulted in substantial delays in response, lost communications and
extreme frustration on the part of all involved .
The ROVERs were problematic, both in the number available and in the lack of uniform
frequencies available. There was a limited number of 48 channel radios issued;
however, the number was relatively insignificant for the scope of the incident.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that Support Services Bureau forward a budgetary request through
the chain of command with the needs of the Department, as found during the riot,
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clearly explained. This incident demonstrated this Department's critical lack of
resources which cannot be rectified without full City Council support.
FINDING
Food was a continual logistical problem at the FCP and for officers assigned to fixed
posts .
Note: This did not occur during the first six hours. However, this issue was
so acute later in the event it is discussed here .
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that a system be established to provide quality food and beverages in
convenient packages to large numbers of personnel and that the appropriate entities
become jointly involved in the plan, e.g., Tactical Planning Section and General Services
Department.
FINDING
Responsibilities that would normally be part of an initial FCP set up were not addressed
during the initial hours of the riot. Functions and tasks such as a Personnel Officer,
response vehicle, maps, etc., were forgotten or overlooked .
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A Fire Department liaison was not assigned during the initial set up of the FCP.
Although several people did try to facilitate their needs, efforts were insufficient at best .
Air Support Division (ASD) was not fully utilized. While attempts were made to get a
situation estimate by Metro, a mechanical problem with one helicopter diminished the
effectiveness of those efforts. ASD was not called upon again for some time after the
first helicopter developed problems. There were additional ASD airships available, but
they were not requested. This resulted in a communication void as to the scope and
impact of the problem .
RECOMMENDATION
The information and strategy regarding the need for and method of implementing a FCP
operation are clearly delineated in existing LAPD policies and procedures. Continued
and more frequent training regarding these issues for all personnel, including
commanding officers and above, is recommended. This can be facilitated through roll
call training, training days, Training Bulletins and unusual occurrence exercises .
FINDING
A response vehicle equipped with a television deployed in a timely manner and an
intelligence officer assigned to monitor television broadcasts concerning the incidents of
violence when the FCP was being set up, would probably have substantially altered our
initial response .
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RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that all Area response vehicles be equipped with televisions which
can either be utilized in the vehicle or in a designated location. It is also recommended
that at least one person be designated as an intelligence officer to monitor the television
and collect other intelligence information. The Department should fully utilize the
media for intelligence gathering purposes as they have become a very valuable resource.
Absent television capability, commercial radio stations should be monitored .
FINDING
During the initial set up of an PCP the availability of personnel with FCP expertise may
be lacking. This is to be expected initially. In this case the FCP cadre was comprised of
officers selected without regard to previous training. ~ a result, cadre personnel were
forced to learn their roles and duties as they went along, resulting in some issues not
being addressed and other issues receiving a duplication of effort. There had been a
PCP cadre training session given to South Bureau personnel prior to the riot; however,
those officers given the training were ·not deployed in that capacity. This could have
been facilitated later in the incident as those personnel became available but this did
not occur.
RECOMMENDATION
A system was in place to have a trained cadre. It is recommended that sufficient
personnel in each division be cross-trained in a variety of cadre assignments, to allow
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for enough trained personnel to be available to fill the demand at any given time.
Trained personnel should be a priority over rank and trained personnel should be
utilized .
FINDING
There was an almost universal feeling among all officers interviewed that there was
little evidence in the early stages of the FCP set up that anyone was actually taking
charge, ma.king decisions and causing things to happen. The extreme chaos at the RTD
depot, coupled with severe communication problems and limited resources enhanced
this perception. This perception had an extremely negative impact on the morale of all
at the FCP and of all who would be involved as the incident unfolded .
The on-duty 77th Street Watch Commander was the officer-in-charge at the FCP,
although a commander arrived and was briefed on the situation. Concurrently, or very
shortly thereafter, the 77th Street Area Commanding Officer arrived at the FCP and
subsequently took command. The South Bureau Assistant Commanding Officer, a
commander, remained available, for a time, to the Incident Commander for counsel.
However, due to a problem in communications, he left the FCP and drove to the OSB
office to speak with the Bureau Commanding Officer. At approximately 2100 hours,
two and a quarter hours after the televised beatings, the Bureau Commanding Officer
arrived at the FCP and took command .
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The situation at the FCP was indeed overwhelming by all accounts; however, due to the
magnitude of the problem it should probably have been managed by a staff level officer
at an earlier stage. Decisive action at an early stage could have bolstered morale and
communicated a definitive mission statement. Even if they do not assume command,
staff level officers should remain at the FCP to at least give advice, counsel and
assistance to subordinates .
It is also recommended that consideration be given to reemphasizing to senior officers
that they will be held accountable for the actions or inactions of a subordinate officer if
the senior officer is present at the scene of a UO but chooses not to take command.
This could be reemphasized by adding a statement to section B106.04 of the Tactical
Manual under the "Note." The note would state, in part, ''however, senior officers who
choose not to take charge do not relinquish accountability for the actions or inactions of
their subordinates." This would be consistent with the Department Manual Section
1/532 .
Note: The situation of senior officer accountability also occurred in the Parker
Center incident (page 80) but is dealt with here as a finding and
recommendation to avoid repetition .
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METROPOUTAN DMSION
PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS
Metropolitan Division (Metro) conducts civil unrest training on a regular basis. It
consists of ongoing and substantial training in tactics to handle all types of potential
disturbances. Their training is extensive and specific to all known or anticipated tactical
situations. Metropolitan Division is the Department's expert entity regarding civil
unrest tactics .
During the two weeks preceding the Rodney King verdict, Metro conducted specific
training for potential riot-related situations, such as crowd control, snipers, etc. It also
assisted in training all area training coordinators for civil unrest s~tuations .
As part of efforts to plan for possible problems resulting from the King verdict, a
meeting was held between Metropolitan Division and Operations-Headquarters Bureau
(OHB). Metro was directed to assign and deploy three platoons of personnel during PM
Watch hours in a "soft patrol" mode. This deployment was to occur in 77th Street,
Newton, Southwest, and Southeast Areas. "Soft patrol" meant they were to be in their
regular uniform and provide a very friendly, high profile demeanor with no proactive
police enforcement ·to be initiated unless necessary. In addition, Metro supervisors were
directed to obtain intelligence information from businesses in the community and
provide this information to the respective patrol division watch commanders .
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Metro personnel had requested a more riot ready deployment on Mid-Days and Mid-PMs
(including their Chevy Suburbans and armored personnel carriers). The intent of this
type of deployment would be to facilitate the fast deployment of a considerable number
of Metro officers to any potential problem location in the south end of Los Angeles .
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These officers would have already been in their "riot ready" uniform and equipment,
ready to immediately address any riot type of situation. The Metro request was denied
by OHB, and they were directed to work in their assigned configuration .
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DEPLOYMENT
On April 29, 1992, Metro's full duty deployment, which involved "B" Platoon, "C"
Platoon and "D" Platoon, consisted of one captain, five lieutenants, 26 sergeants, and
201 officers. Metro had the majority of their personnel working by 1800 hours.
However, approximately 71 officers and five sergeants were called in from home after
1800 hours .
"B" Platoon had one lieutenant, six sergeants and 39 officers deployed. The platoon
was involved in civil unrest type training at a Los Angeles City Fire Department facility
in North Hollywood at Laurel Canyon and Sherman Way. Their training started at
1400 hours. Even though involved in training, the platoon was ready and available for
immediate call-out if necessary. This platoon was prepared to respond to Foothill Area
if need dictated .
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"C" Platoon had three sergeants and 26 officers deployed. "D" Platoon had one
lieutenant, three sergeants and 21 officers deployed. Both platoons conducted roll call
at the Police Academy, at 1800 hours and 1600 hours, respectively. Both platoons
were then going to work in the aforementioned Areas .
"D" Platoon had a portion of their personnel assigned to sniper training at the Angeles
Range. They had two sergeants and 17 officers involved in the training, which started
at 1400 hours. This portion of "D" Platoon was also available for a rapid reassignment
to any situation in the City .
The Mounted Unit had been included in the Metro plans to respond to any crowd
control situation. All members of the unit had been trained to become part of Metro
during any crowd control situation which would not be an appropriate situation for
them to be mounted on horses. They had conducted a training day at their facility,
starting at 1000 hours. All Mounted Unit personnel were advised to be available for an
immediate call-out if needed .
The K-9 Units were working their regular duties and reporting in at their usual times.
The K-9 officers had various start of watch times, i.e. 1300 hours, 1900 hours, 2100
hours .
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With the aforementioned configuration, Metro personnel were prepared to respond as
needed anywhere in the City of Los Angeles .
RESPONSE
At the time the Rodney King verdict was being reported, most of Metro's supervisors
and police officers were en route to work. One of the first significant acts from Metro,
after the verdict, was a directive from the Metro Desk, at 171 S hours, canceling training
for "C'' Platoon units. They were to suit up in uniform. After roll call, all "C'' and "D"
Platoon officers were directed to go to their respective areas on their pre-assigned "soft
patrol" mission.
At 1807 hours Metro was directed to respond to the recently activated 77th Street FCP
at 54th Street and Van Ness Avenue. Metro activity began to rapidly escalate. All "D"
Platoon units were directed to respond to the FCP. Three of Metro's Chevy Suburbans,
designed to be used in rescue work, were first sent to Central Facilities Building for the
rapid installation of "running boards" (used for rescues), loading of additional
equipment, and to ensure the gas tanks were full. Then they were directed to proceed
Code Three to the FCP.
Upon the initial arrival of Metro at the command post, they were requested to conduct
a rescue mission at Florence and Normandie, due to reports of victims being pulled
from cars and assaulted. There was only a sufficient number of Metro officers present
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to form one full squad for a rescue attempt in the form of a Metro probe. The probe
arrived at the intersection at approximately 1905 hours and encountered severe riot
conditions, but no evidence of victims being assaulted in the intersection. The probe
returned to the command post. As the remainder of Metro officers arrived at the
command post they were made ready to respond by being placed in a "riot ready"
manner of dress and equipment .
A significant distraction for Metro's deployment at the PCP occurred when they were
notified that Parker Center was under assault and rioters were possibly going in the
front doors. At approximately 1900 hours all of "C" Platoon was redirected to Parker
Center. They arrived and were deployed at approximately 1910 hours. After a time, a
decision was made to have Metro leave Parker Center and go to the 77th Street
command post. A sufficient number of Central Bureau officers had formed at Parker
Center to provide security and it was determined Metro officers were needed in South
Los Angeles .
As quickly as Metro could form up sufficient officers in a response configuration, they
deployed to three intersections in response to reports of looting of stores and violence
to passing motorists. Metro began deploying squads at approximately 1930 hours, to
the intersections of Western and Florence, Normandie and Florence, and Vermont and
Florence. This proved to be a slow process as they moved en masse from west to east.
Metro rescued one motorist who had been assaulted. One contingent of Metro
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personnel was fired on near Florence and Nonnandie at 2013 hours. Metropolitan units
finally arrived at florence and Nonnandie at approximately 2030 hours to find several
fires raging but suspects gone on arrival .
The next significant mission assigned to Metro personnel was the escort and rescue of
City fire fighters and equipment, and the evacuation of fire fighters and their equipment
from their fire stations. Metro was asked to evacuate three fire stations and they did
so. They also began to escort fire fighters and their equipment on fire fighting
missions. This mission was a major drain on Metro resources .
FINDING
Metropolitan Division did not strictly follow deployment directives. Metro was
deployed and had roll calls in too many different locations at too many times outside
the South Central area .
RECOMMENDATIONS
All Metro personnel should have been grouped together in a fashion which would have
allowed a faster response of a substantial number of officers to anticipated problem
areas, particularly South Central Los Angeles .
All Metro officers should have been dressed in appropriate gear and prepared to
immediately deal with riot type problems .
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The roll call locations should have been in close proximity to anticipated trouble areas.
Training should not have been planned or conducted .
FINDING
Metro personnel were earmarked in pre-planning for Fire Department escort.
RECOMMENDATION
Escort service should have been earmarked for other uniformed personnel. The
exception to this would be in sniper and rescue situations wherein support from Metro
could have been requested on an "as needed" basis. Metro should be utilized for quick
response to problem areas and for rescue and sniper situations exclusively as those are
their areas of expertise. Fire department escort does not require Metro-type expertise.
This is more fully developed and discussed in the Fire Department section.
FINDING
Metro's two V-100 vehicles (armored personnel carriers) and Chevy Suburbans were not
ready to be deployed to initial South Central area incidents in a timely tp.anner •
RECOMMENDATION
The V-100's and Suburbans should have been pre-deployed in close proximity to
possible trouble locations in South Central Los Angeles. The Chevy Suburbans should
have been already set up in a rescue configuration .
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NOTE: It should be noted, however, that the Suburbans are used as patrol
• vehicles by Metro supervisors but are not conducive to regular patrol
duties when in a rescue configuration .
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, .
INTRODUCTION
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER
AND MUTIJAL AID
The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is where the City manages logistical resources
and personnel on a Citywide basis during emergencies. On April 29, 1992, at 1600
hours, the Department conducted a limited activation of the EOC to monitor community
attitudes following the return of verdicts in the Rodney King trial. By 1730 hours,
several riotous incidents had occurred and subsequent major Citywide rioting resulted in
full staffing of the EOC for the next 27 days .
PREPARATION
Several weeks prior to April 29, 1992, preparations were made by the Police
Department to ensure that existing systems were ready for activation should any civil
unrest occur. During that time, maps were updated, supplies were stocked and police
cadre rosters were updated. One week prior to the return of the verdicts, the personnel
status information system was tested by directing geographic Areas to transmit seven
days of deployment information to the EOC via a formatted screen in the Network
Communications System (NECS) computer. A second test was scheduled for
May 1, 1992, but was preempted by the riot. It was generally felt that established
plans would function well for any incident since all estimates of activity were based on
a major earthquake which was considered to be a worst case scenario. Additionally,
past EOC activations, although not perfect, were effective and manageable. The most
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recent EOC activation prior to the riot was for the February, 1992, storms and flooding.
The EOC police cadre had been recently tested through exercises and real events and,
by any assessment, was ready to respond .
RESPONSE
The Department partially activated the EOC on April 29, 1992, and it quickly became
apparent that complete activation would be necessary. The EOC commanding officer
arrived at 1808 hours and after a brief assessment ordered complete EOC staffing.
During the cadre notification process, there were problems of a routine nature due to
unanswered telephones, answering machines, simple delays from repeated dialing and
people in transit between work and home. Whatever the reasons, they collectively
delayed proper staffing of the EOC .
Without adequate staff, those who were present were drafted to fill perceived critical
positions. In many cases, the "draftees" were not trained to perform the tasks they were
assigned. As additional people responded, they too were drafted. This ultimately led to
a staffing pattern where EOC trained personnel were learning new assignments and a
high percentage of the police contingent was essentially untrained for the jobs they
were doing. This was not corrected during the first 24 hours and clearly handicapped
EOC activities •
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The flow of information generated by widespread rioting was overwhelming. From a
staffing standpoint, there were not enough people to handle the input. Nobody could
write fast enough to document all the incoming messages. The Emergency Operations
Center "B" watch commanding officer estimated that only about 25% of the actual input
was written down and retained. Existing systems could not keep up, particularly in a
learning environment. In spite of this, involved individuals were making every effort to
accurately and effectively respond to the civil unrest .
The Commanding Officer, Support Services Bureau, a principal police representative to
the City's Emergency Management Committee, responded to the EOC at about 1845
hours. Following him at 2000 hours was the Commanding Officer,
Operations-Headquarters Bureau, who was the designated Department commander. The
presence of these two staff officers had a significant, although probably unrecognized,
impact on EOC activities. The first impact was to draw the EOC commanding officer
away from his focus on EOC coordination activities and essentially make him
subordinate staff to these two policy level managers. In the police hierarchy, this works
well because rank immediately provides a chain of command during times of crisis. In
the EOC, however, other City Departments look to the EOC commanding officer to keep
them informed and to ensure equitable treatment while in the EOC. During this event,
the activities of the two police managers inadvertently overshadowed the established
routine of the EOC and placed an uncomfortable burden on various EOC staff and
Department representatives .
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The Emergency Operati~ns Center (EOC) was compromised in its operating efficiency
because the Department unwittingly converted it to a task force command post
primarily concerned with operational issues. Operations is not an intended concern of
the EOC. Rather, the EOC is designed to manage information and facilitate resource
movement in support of disaster response and recovery. This is accomplished through
management level liaisons from concerned city and outside entities who are assigned to
the EOC. Each supporting department manages its own resources apart from the EOC.
When those resources are inadequate to the task at hand, the EOC liaisons coordinate
acquisition of additional resources either from other City departments or from County,
State and Federal mutual aid. The EOC is the City's command post. The EOC liaisons
are the Mayor's and Council's staff for information gathering concerning the unusual
occurrence (UO) .
The staffing by other City departments, in some cases, created delays in deciding issues
because representatives lacked authority to make the decisions themselves. It is likely
that this same lack of authority resulted in perceptions that the police were an
intimidating presence in the EOC. Had management levels been closer to parity, such
feelings would have been minimized. Staffing by other City departments was also
inadequate in terms of numbers. This was particularly true of the need for logistics
from the Department of General Services. Although the General Services representative
worked furiously, he was simply overwhelmed. Adequate staffing at this position is
essential for major events such as a riot or earthquake. The work levels generated by
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the riot should be food for thought for all City Departments when planning for future
disaster staffing in the EOC .
The EOC had some problems with communications. The largest problem was associated
with telephone communication between the EOC and the Field Command Post (FCP).
At the outset, during the busiest time of a UO, communication is critical. Naturally, it
is also the most difficult time to respond with telephone installation at the FCP. On
April 29, 1992, every effort was made to utilize available telephones at the FCP; but
dialing complications with the Rapid Transit District (RTD) phone system frustrated
efforts to complete calls. Also, endless busy signals and lost calls occurred due to the
initial limited availability of cellular phones and phone batteries that were not fully
charged .
A rapid solution to at least four phone lines was lost when the Department of General
Services elected not to immediately deploy either of two microwave vans that provide
microwave centrex connections during emergencies. Instead, they deployed a crew of
telephone installers who were ultimately able to provide a very complete system, but
lacked the critical immediacy of the microwave vehicles.
Another area of communications breakdown occurred in the EOC itself. Dl.l!lllg the
normal course of UO events, the commanding officer of the EOC periodically interrupts
the EOC activities long enough to go around the room to gather the most recent status
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information. This also updates all participants while eliminating misconceptions.
During the first 24 hours, this was not done, partly because of the pace of events and
partly because the EOC commanding officer was busy doing staff work for the
Department Commander who was not as familiar with EOC protocols .
The EOC status boards and wall maps were not posted with a significant amount of
status information until well into the second day. Again, this broke down the
established method of sharing UO information with everyone in the EOC. This may
seem trivial, but uniform information flow keeps the EOC staff together and provides a
"quick glance" status update for authorized visitors. Without it, the EOC staff may
become disjointed and work at cross purposes at a time when teamwork is imperative .
The intelligence function of the EOC was so overwhelmed with messages and worked at
such a pace during the first 24 hours that it could not keep up. In the EOC, the
intelligence position has the listed telephone number for all incoming calls .
Consequently, a large amount of time is spent routing information to the right person.
With all the activity going on, there was no time left to establish an organized
intelligence analysis system. There was insufficient personnel to even detail someone to
monitor the commercial televisions for media intelligence. The pace was so quick that
Air Support Division was never requested to provide airborne video to either the EOC
or FCP, although they were equipped to do so. The Intelligence Control Center (ICC)
was never activated even though the ICC notified the EOC they were standing by to be
activated.
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The logistics function was inadequate to the task, primarily because existing systems
were ill equipped to deal with the quantities of items requested, particularly regarding
food. The food issue caused more consternation than almost any single problem for the
entire event. Once again, the adequacy of staffing and the inability to deliver what was
needed in a timely manner were the key issues. The frustration caused by the intensity
of the circumstances and the immediate needs resulted in personal confrontations and
high levels of stress .
The personnel function was confronted with several problems. The most significant
involved training. Simply put, when EOC trained personnel were assigned the function,
it operated much more quickly and smoothly than when they were not. When
unfamiliar personnel became involved, the decision making process became three to
four times longer (adding 25-30 minutes) because everything was pushed up the chain
to the Department Commander. Additionally, the Department Commander was ·
relocating personnel separate and apart from the Personnel Officer. This lack of
communication created unnecessary problems .
Another personnel problem centered on the EOC's routine interaction with geographic
Areas. In this case, personnel accounting began in a normal manner; but because of the
Citywide problems, the geographic bureaus established their own Command Posts which
caused Areas to freeze their personnel pending bureau approval. Ordinarily, the EOC
does not interact with the bureaus on the routine redistribution of personnel during a
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UO. This forced the EOC to create a new method of accounting for personnel while the
operation was in progress .
MUTUAL AID
The nature of any kind of UO may result in a need for resources beyond the capabilities
of the Department or even the City. Resources may be required in any form and
quantity and are acquired through mutual aid during an emergency. The California
Emergency Services Act establishes the authority for conducting emergency operations
following the proclamation of an emergency by the Governor or an emergency
proclamation by a local jurisdiction. Should an emergency (such as a riot) occur in the
City of Los Angeles that is of the magnitude requiring mutual aid on a statewide basis,
certain assumptions are made by the State .
* The Director of the Office of Emergency Services, acting for the Governor, will
coordinate the State's disaster response in conformance with Section 8587 of
the Emergency Services Act .
.
* The resources of State government will be made available to State agencies,
local governments and citizens to cope with disasters affecting any area of
California .
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Local govemm~ts will commit their resources to a reasonable degree before
requesting assistance from the State .
Federal assistance will be requested when disaster relief requirements exceed
the State's ability to meet them.
A California Master Mutual Aid Agreement has been adopted by most cities and all 58
counties in California. This agreement creates a formal structure within which each
jurisdiction retains control of its own personnel and facilities while giving and receiving
help whenever it is needed. The State is a signatory to this agreement and provides
available resources to assist local jurisdictions in emergencies .
On April 29, 1992, a local ei:nergency was declared in the City by the Mayor, as
Director of the Emergency Operations Organization. In doing so, this officially activated
the Emergency Operations Organization and made it possible to request mutual aid
from the ~s Angeles County Sheriff, who is the regional mutual aid coordinator. The
Sheriff is the conduit to the State of California for statewide mutual aid. At 1950
hours, the Commanding Officer, Operations-South Bureau, requested that the
Department Commander seek mutual aid from the Los Angeles Sheriffs Department and
the National Guard. In the assessment of the Commanding Officer, Operations-South
Bureau, 2000 guard troops were needed. This request was directed to the Mayor for
implementation .
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When mutual aid responders began arriving at the FCP, many problems were
encountered. The most significant problem was communications. Before missions
could be assigned and units deployed, it was first necessary to ensure a communication
link between the units and the PCP. Since such a link was not readily available, it
became necessary to team responders with Department personnel. This created a major
problem for the personnel and logistics officers since equipment was frequently
unavailable and units could not be deployed. The difficulties associated with mission
assignments were so profound that many law enforcement responders became tired of
waiting and left to return home. Added to the complications of deployment were the
misunderstandings of mutual aid in general. Some Department mid-management level
officers contacted friends fr~m other agencies and requested them to respond as well.
This only setved to further confuse an already confused arena. Since then, a Notice has
been published by the Department to ensure such requests are not repeated, unless
requested through the EOC by the proper authority .
In spite of the confusion, inadequate systems, and what seemed like interminable
delays, · the task of suppressing the riot was accomplished. This was no small feat given
the spontaneity of the rioters, the rapidity with which the rioting spread and the large
geographic area of involvement. Add to that the massive influx of responding
personnel, nearly 1800 LAPD officers by midnight on April 29, 1992, plus other
agencies, it is not surprising that complications occurred. The logistics considerations
involved in deploying all these officers were staggering, yet deployment was
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accomplished with hard work by everyone involved, including. the EOC. Hard work
notwithstanding, there are several areas that should be addressed with an eye toward
improvement. The recommendations are listed in the findings .
FINDING - EOC First 24 Hours
The EOC activation following the verdicts was proper but should have included more
complete staffing .
RECOMMENDATION
In the face of such controversial social issues with rather clearly defined decision points,
it would be advisable to provide full-scale staffing of the EOC initially, then · scale back
as circumstances permit. Staffing under non-crisis conditions would permit properly
trained personnel to perform their assigned duties with minimum confusion.
FINDING
The EOC telephone system was inadequate and placed an unnecessary burden on the
intelligence position to route calls .
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that an assessment be made to determine an appropriate number of
incoming EOC phone lines. It is also recommended that a switchboard configuration
with multiple operators be considered to effectively route incoming calls .
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FINDING
The PCP telephone system was inadequate for emergency response purposes, thereby
limiting critical communication with the EOC during the early hours of this UO .
RECOMMENDATION
Examine methods of providing more rapid telephone connections that would permit
immediate communication between the EOC and PCP. At least one ringdown line to
the EOC should be provided, if at all possible .
FINDING
The ability of the EOC to record requests and manage information in a fast paced
environment is outdated and inadequate .
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that an automated, screen formatted information management
network be created to expedite message taking, message routing and more complete
processing of police situation reports. Such a system should not be limited to messages
but· should also permit personnel, logistics, intelligence and other City department
information gathering, via preformatted screens, that could be collated into periodic
EOC status reports .
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FINDING
The presence of the Department Commander and other staff officers in the EOC caused
the involvement of EOC personnel in operational concerns which are not normally an
EOC function .
RECOMMENDATION
Relocate the Department Commander and a significant portion of the police functions
that are now in the EOC away from the EOC. Maintain a task force command post at
the Police Department but provide a ringdown phone connection to the EOC
commanding officer to facilitate urgent information flow between the two when it is
needed. A consultant's report will be submitted to the Emergency Operations Board on
July 20, 1992, that supports this recommendation and provides options for
implementation along with other recommendations. This report was developed prior to
the riot and is independent of this audit .
FINDING
Other City Departments in the EOC did not provide staff with adequate authority to
make decisions or enough staff to adequately manage their responsibilities.
RECOMMENDATION
Recommend, via the Emergency Operations Organization, that City departments
consider these issues when planning for UO staffing in the EOC .
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FINDING
Regular EOC staff briefings did not occur and should have been a regular part of EOC
activations .
RECOMMENDATION
"Around the room" EOC staff briefings/updates are a necessity and should be
coordinated by the Police Division of the Emergency Operations Board as often as
necessary .
FINDING
Emergency Operations Center status boards and maps were not posted in a timely
manner during the early hours of EOC activation .
RECOMMENDATION
Provide adequate EOC staff to maintain current status and map postings at all times .
FINDING
. The EOC intelligence function was unable to keep pace with incoming information. The
ICC was not activated, although they had notified the EOC they were standing by .
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RECOMMENDATION
Provide adequate staffing to assist with managing intelligence information. Activate the
ICC to augment EOC intelligence staff .
FINDING
The EOC logistics function was unable to respond in a timely manner to requests for
radios, shotguns, cars and meals .
RECOMMENDATION
. Develop a system whereby police resources, such as radios, shotguns and cars, can be
moved up from geographic Areas to an FCP in a timely manner while maintaining
accountability for the equipment. Recommend to the Department of General Services,
via the Emergency Operations Organization, the development of a system for feeding
large numbers of City employees who are working a major UO. Whatever system is
developed, ensure that the meals be individually packaged so they may be distributed to
personnel in the field .
FINDING
The personnel function of the EOC was compromised by untrained supervision and
bureau personnel who circumvented established procedures .
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RECOMMENDATION
Utilize established procedures, provide adequate staff to perform personnel related
duties, and rely on experienced staff rather than independent crisis management .
FINDING
Law enforcement mutual aid responders were under-utilized and inconvenienced by an
inadequate system of identifying officers, assigning missions and ensuring proper
equipment.
RECOMMENDATION
Develop a method to expeditiously process mutual aid personnel to ensure rapid field
deployment .
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FIRE DEPARTMENT
Commanders Bayan Lewis of Operations-Headquarters Bureau and Rick Dinse of the
Office of the Chief of Police met with Deputy Chief Robert Anthony of the Los Angeles
Fire Department on April 13, 1992, at about 1330 hours. Lewis briefed Anthony on the
Department's plans to provide security for the Fire Department during any civil unrest
which came about as a result of the verdict in the "King'' trial. Metropolitan Division
was to provide security escorts for the Fire Department as one of their primary
missions. The only situations which would take precedence over aid to the Fire
Department would be riot-related snipers or barricaded suspects. Lewis also made
arrangements to obtain body armor through the Office of Emergency Services, State of
California, for Fire Department personnel. The Department's plan was based on an
incident which could be controlled by resources within the Police and Fire Departments
of the City of Los Angeles.
The verdict in the Rodney King trial was announced at 1510 hours on April 29, 1992 .
At about the same time Battalion Chief Terry Manning advised Lieutenant Sergio Diaz,
Southeast Area, that Fire Department units in South Bureau had reported that rocks and
bottles were being thrown at them. At 1800 hours Terry Manning contacted Captain
Willie Pannell of Southeast Area and requested that police escorts be made available to
the Fire Departtnent units within his battalion. Pannell assigned an officer to liaise
with the Fire Department and two squads to act as escorts .
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Terry Manning responded to a Fire Department call for service in the area of Florence
and Nonnandie Avenues at 1900 hours. While at that location he became the victim of
an ADW and received reports that other Fire Department personnel were being attacked
by citizens. He advised all Fire Department units not to respond to incidents without
police escorts.
Battalion Chief Tim Manning (Terry Manning's brother) arrived at the Police
Department's Field Command Post (FCP) and became the Fire Department's Incident
Commander at 1910 hours. He contacted FCP personnel and was asked to provide a
medical station for expected casualties at the FCP. He complied by setting up a triage
and aid center using rescue ambulances. There were no reports of riot-related fires at
this time .
At 1930 hours Tim Manning received reports of structure fires in South Bureau. He
advised his available resources to respond to the FCP to be formed into strike teams,
the Fire Department's equipment/personnel configuration used to handle large scale
operations. A strike team is three to five engine companies led by a Battalion Chief .
While strike teams were being formed, Tim Manning contacted a police lieutenant who
he believed to be Mike Moulin at the FCP. He requested that the Department provide
escorts for his strike teams. Moulin advised him that they would provide escorts as
soon as personnel became available. Tim Manning believed that a full-time liaison with
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the Police Department would be appropriate and assigned Battalion Chief Donald
Dahlstein .
By 2040 hours the Fire Department had formed approximately twelve strike teams .
Dahlstein requested escorts for those teams from several persons at the FCP. One was
possibly Lieutenant Young. Battalion Chief David Badgett also requested escorts from
an unidentified Metropolitan Division lieutenant at about this same time. Both
Battalion Chiefs were told that they would be assigned escorts as soon as personnel
became available but that no one was available at that time. Fire Department
personnel found this difficult to understand because they could see police officers and
vehicles that appeared to be unassigned in the FCP lot .
FCP personnel reported that they were unable to supply the Fire Department with
escorts upon their initial request due to lack of available personnel. Personnel were
either assigned or did not have vehicles or other equipment needed to go in the field .
Police vehicles were parked and locked. at the FCP and unavailable because their keys
had not been turned in to logistics and their drivers had been reassigned to four officer
units.
At 2143 hours the first strike team/escort combination was deployed from the FCP. Lt .
McCrillis of Metropolitan Division was the squad leader assigned. During the next hour
three to five additional strike team/ escort combinations were deployed. They
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responded to a single Fire Department incident and then returned to the FCP. The
escort squad then returned to the personnel pool and the strike team received its next
assignment. The strike team then requested a new escort squad from the FCP .
Battalion Chief David Badgett took over as Fire Department liaison to the Police
Department and at 2200 hours spoke with Deputy Chief Hunt and requested escorts for
strike teams which were ready to be deployed. Hunt told Badgett that as soon as
squads were available he would assign them as escorts. Additional discussions
concerning the lack of available escorts occurred between Commander George Morrison
and Fire Department Deputy Chief Donald Anthony at the Emergency Operations Center
and between Deputy Chief Davis Parsons of the Fire Department and Hunt at the FCP.
Parsons and Hunt had a spirited discussion wherein Parsons expressed his exasperation
over the lack of escorts.
By 2240 hours the FCP was able to supply escorts in a manner that was considered
satisfactory by the Fire Department Incident Commander. Over the course of the night
and the next morning 26 to 28 strike teams with escorts were deployed from the FCP .
The California Highway Patrol assumed escort responsibilities for the Fire Department
at approximately 0200 hours on April 30, 1992 .
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FINDING
There was no plan for marrying the Police Department escorts with the Fire Department
strike teams .
RECOMMENDATION
Jointly develop a deployment plan to facilitate the Fire Department's mission. Conduct
continuous training exercises to develop escort expertise and to establish a partnership
with the Fire Department.
FINDING
During the initial FCP operations, the Fire Department was not included in
staff/management meetings .
RECOMMENDATION
Upon establishing an FCP, a Fire Department liaison officer should be assigned ASAP .
The Fire Department should be included in the planning and strategy meetings .
FINDING
It had been predetennined that Metropolitan Division would be assigned to the Fire
Department for protection .
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RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that Metropolitan Division not be used as escorts. They should be
allowed to utilize their training and expertise in civil unrest tactics wherever it would
best serve the City and the Department. Metropolitan Division's expertise area is riot .
control, SWAT and other such civil unrest situations. That expertise should be utilized
to its fullest extent. It is recommended that a contingent of traffic division officers be
trained with the Fire Department to facilitate this function until mutual aid, probably
the California Highway Patrol (CHP), arrives. Further, it is recommended that training
be conducted with the CHP, the Fire Department and designated officers from all four
geographic bureau traffic divisions to facilitate escort operations .
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PARKER CENTER
OVERVIEW .
On April 10, 1992, the Director, Office of Operations, held a meeting with all Area
commanding officers to discuss unusual occurrence preparation. At that meeting, the
possibility of civil disturbance resulting from the Rodney King trial was addressed. Even
though other aspects of unusual occurrences such as earthquakes and the Operation
Rescue demonstrations were discussed, the main focus centered on the Rodney King
trial. Three Areas were not represented at this meeting: Central, 77th Street and
Harbor .
Personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division developed training for supervisors on civil
disturbance response. That training was presented on April 15 and 16, 1992. Field
supervisors from each Area attended that training and were tasked with the
responsibility of training their personnel.
On April 29, 1992, Captain Jerry Conner, Central Area Commanding Officer, was
present at his work assignment. However, Captain James Tatreau, Central Patrol
Division Commanding Officer, was absent from his command, having been assigned to
sit on lieutenant interviews for the City of Long Beach. Lieutenant Stan Ludwig was
assigned as the acting patrol division commanding officer during his absence .
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At approximately 1330 hours, the media disclosed that the verdict in the Rodney King
trial would be announced at 1500 hours. Although this was common knowledge
throughout the Department, no meetings on the potential problems or last minute
preparations took place during this time period. When the verdicts were read,
Lieutenant Ludwig walked down the hall to discuss the impact of the verdicts with the
Operations-Central Bureau staff. Ludwig asked both Deputy Chief Bernard Parks and
Commander Maurice Moore if he should hold over day watch personnel. Parks and
Moore stated that it did not seem necessary at the time.
Shortly after 1600 hours, demonstrators began gathering in front of Parker Center. In
response to this, Central Area dispatched a sergeant and six officers to the location. At
the time, only 25 demonstrators were present and their demeanor was peaceful. The
Central Area sergeant in charge of this squad was approached by Lieutenant Larry
Sewell, Jail Division Watch Commander, who stated that it might be best to have the
Central Area squad stay out of sight so as not to incite the demonstrators. The Central
Area sergeant interpreted the lieutenant's statement to be more than a suggestion and
deployed his squad inside the building and out of sight of the demonstrators .
Jail Division personnel normally deployed for Parker Center security remained at their
post in the lobby. However, despite the controversy of the verdicts, no additional fixed
post security was deployed at the many entrances to the building .
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From approximately 1650 hours, the crowd continued to grow in size. Demonstrators
with signs and hand-held P.A. systems converged on the area in a manner that appeared
very organized. Also converging on Parker Center were representatives from the news
media. A 1700 hours press conference had been scheduled in the Parker Center
auditorium. This press conference was called by the Chief of Police so that he could
make a statement concerning the verdicts. The press conference did not take place until
17 40 hours and was very short in duration. Immediately after the press conference
ended, the news media with all their equipment went to the front of Parker Center and
conducted intetviews with many of the demonstrators. It was the observation of many
of the officers monitoring the event that once the camera lights came on, the
demonstrators became increasingly animated in their anger.
The crowd continued to grow in size and, although very vocal, the demonstrators
initially conducted themselves in a relatively peaceful manner. Many of the
demonstrators presented a traffic hazard by standing in the roadway in front of the
building. This caused a considerable disruption in traffic. However, this information
was not relayed to the Central Area Watch Commander nor acted upon in any way .
At approximately 1840 hours, Captain Tatreau arrived at Parker Center to assess the
crowd. It is estimated that there were 1 SO demonstrators at that time. Tatreau was in
the process of making his first assessment when the crowd rushed toward the front
doors of Parker Center. The demonstrators threw rocks, bottles, metal objects and
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uprooted plants at the glass doors, shattering glass inside the building. Although some
of the demonstrators pushed the doors open, they stopped short of entering the facility .
At 1858 hours, a help call was broadcast and officers responded to several different
locations around the building. This was done despite specific instructions broadcast
with the help call that asked for responding units to go to the rear of the facility. Once
additional officers had arrived, the crowd backed away from the front door to a location
near the police memorial. Tatreau had all the available officers form a skirmish line in
front of the building where the lawn begins. As additional officers arrived, Tatreau was
able to increase the size of the skirmish line from the north parking lot to beyond the
south driveway .
With this police presence established, the demeanor of the crowd became more
peaceful. At 1910 hours, Metropolitan Division "C" Platoon arrived at Parker Center
and took a position behind the established skirmish line. The platoon leader discussed
the situation with Captain Tatreau. It was opined by the platoon leader, Sergeant
Grady Dublin, that the situation in South Bureau was much more serious than the
demonstration at Parker Center. Tatreau concurred and allowed "C" Platoon to be
reassigned to the situation in South Bureau. Tatreau made this decision based upon a
promise he received from the EOC that motor squads would soon be assigned to his
location.
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Shortly after the skirmish line was established, Chief Parks, Commander Moore and
Captain Conner arrived at the location. No change in command took place. The three
staff and command officers monitored the situation .
From approximately 1905 hours until 2030 hours, the skirmish line was maintained.
During this time, the crowd continued to grow in size and their demeanor again became
hostile. For nearly 90 minutes, objects were intermittently thrown at the police, often
striking them. At times, demonstrators would get close to the police line and shout
obscenities at the officers. Black police officers seemed to be a target of many of the
demonstrators .
During this time period, members of the news media contributed to the confusion and
endangered officers. They set up some of their cameras in the small area between the
demonstrators and the police line. Camera lights from behind the crowd blinded many
of the officers and put them in a position where they could not see the objects being
thrown at them. Some members of the press honored requests to turn off their lights,
others comrtely ignored the requests. '
At 2030 hours, a portion of the crowd suddenly broke off and ran to the guard shack at
the entrance to the north parking lot. They pushed the structure over and set "it on fire .
At 2046 hours, the bulk of the crowd moved south to First Street and broke windows at
the New Otani Hotel. Other elements of the crowd broke the front doors of City Hall
South and started small fires on the first floor.
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The police slowly moved the remaining demonstrators away from the front of Parker
Center and took up positions at the intersection of First Street and Los Angeles Street .
From these positions, they were able to protect the hotel from further damage. The
demonstrators split in several different directions. One group moved west. on First
Street causing damage to many businesses, including the Times Mirror Building and set
fire to a small coffee shop. Another portion of the crowd ran through the City Hall
mall area, breaking the windows at City Hall East. They also turned over three vehicles
and set fire to a police car. Another part of the group traveled west on Temple Street
and caused damage to the Criminal Courts Building .
Once the demonstrators had scattered from the Parker Center area, the officers
regrouped and were sent out as mobile units to restore order and make arrests. This
mobile force was able to contain several demonstrators as they damaged buildings along
Broadway and Spring Street. Several arrests were made. By 2330 hours, order had
been restored to the Civic Center area .
The incident at Parker Center clearly did not escalate until 1900 hours. Until that time,
a squad of eight officers from Central Area was all that had been assigned to Parker
Center to police the incident. After the help call was broadcast, units from Central
Area, Central Traffic Division and Rampart Area were called upon immediately. None
of these divisions had been tapped to provide personnel to South Bureau. Between
1900 and 2030 hours, additional personnel were requested for Parker Center but were
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not assigned to the loca~on. Finally, at approximately 2030 hours, units from West and
Valley Bureaus arrived for assignment .
Metropolitan Division "C' Platoon had been assigned to Parker Center. Due to the
serious situation in South Bureau, however, the field commander at Parker Center
consented to having "C' Platoon reassigned to South Bureau. "C" Platoon was at Parker
Center for no longer than 20 minutes and reported to their South Bureau assignment
prior to 2000 hours. The motor officers promised to the Parker Center field commander
as a replacement for "C' Platoon did not arrive until after 2030 hours. In fact, it is
believed that the Operations-Valley Bureau motor units that staged at the Police
Academy were originally intended for Parker Center. This motor reserve was instead
assigned to South Bureau at approximately 2130 hours .
FINDING
There is a wide variety of interpretation as to the actual amount of preparation
completed for this civil disturbance. Some individuals interviewed stated that an event
of this type was anticipated and that appropriate training for supervisors and line
officers was conducted. Others perceived that the issue was only discussed in loose,
general terms and treated like "no big deal." Watch commanders and sergeants
interviewed for this report stated they scheduled additional roll call training on squad
formations on their own initiative. These individuals did not perceive that management
had serious concerns about potential riots. From their perspective, a not guilty verdict
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in the trial would virtually guarantee a major disturbance. They also believed that
Parker Center, the site of several anti-police demonstrations in the past twelve months,
would be a focal point for demonstrators .
The captains intetviewed for this report believe that they clearly communicated their
concerns regarding potential disturbances. However, the fact that Central Area had
successfully handled several demonstrations at Parker Center may have given Central
Area management a false sense of security.
Another aspect that impacted the planning and preparation stage was the political
climate that forced the Department to conduct civil disturbance training under the guise
of other generic UO training. The attempts to disguise the real issue may have resulted
in mixed messages being conveyed to the rank and file.
RECOMMENDATION
In order to successfully address critical issues, clear communication is essential. When
it comes to matters of life and death, the wrath of political noisemakers must be
subordinate to instructions issued to officers. The fact that the Department message on
this matter received varied interpretation clearly indicates that this veiled form of
communication failed to get the job done. The basic tenets of verbal communication
"say what you mean" and "tell me what you want" are still applicable in today's society .
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FINDING
A Parker Center security plan developed by Support Services Bureau contains detailed
plans for the security of the building. While the plan seems to be appropriate, various
entities within the Department who have designated responsibilities in this plan do not
agree on many of the plan's aspects. Although this disagreement is well known, none
of the principal parties have met to resolve the differences. This disagreement played a
part in the security for the interior of the building on April 29, in that vital fixed post
positions were not staffed. The plan calls for personnel assigned to Detective
Headquarters Division (OHO) and Juvenile Division to secure entrances to the building
when the station defense plan is activated. This allows Jail Division personnel to attend
solely to securing the jail. However, this did not occur due to the plan not being
disseminated through Operation-Headquarters Bureau to DHO.
RECOMMENDATION
Develop a concise plan for Parker Center security that contains the input of all involved
entities. Consideration of staffing security positions during off hours needs to be
addressed. A clear distinction of who is in charge of security during all phases of any
situation needs to be communicated.
FINDING
It has become common practice for Central Area to assume responsibility for incidents
occurring outside of Parker Center. This has worked successfully for several years.
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However, there is no detailed plan written on contingencies for unusual
occurrences/ demonstrations at Parker Center or anywhere else in the Civic Center area .
RECOMMENDATION
Concise contingency plans should be documented for the Civic Center area so that all
personnel, including those assigned to interior security at Parker Center, are aware of
specific responsibilities .
FINDING
During the early stages of the Parker Center incident, several individuals of command or
staff level took it upon themselves to make "suggestions" to field level supetvisors. This
clearly presents an intimidating factor to a sergeant who is trying to facilitate the needs
of the Field Commander.
RECOMMENDATION
As stated in the Tactical Manual, any officer of a higher rank who is assuming
command shall clearly state that fact. Any other individuals should either stay clear of
the incident or, if appropriate, clearly state that they have an observation or suggestion
that may assist the Field Commander .
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FINDING
Although this is purely speculation, a uniform presence in front of Parker Center might
have deterred the initial assault on the front doors. The "suggestion" that the Central
squad deploy inside the lobby out of sight of the demonstrators clearly was not an
advantage. What supports the uniform presence theory is that once the demonstrators
reached the front doors, they chose not to enter when they observed the officers inside .
FINDING
Many of the sergeants interviewed stated there is a perception among the rank and file
that the Department is taking a low profile approach to policing all demonstrations that
have political ramifications. Some even cited the recent gay rights demonstrations as an
indicator of the direction the Department is leaning toward in dealing with
demonstrations. Further pressures from politicians, special interest groups and the
media have contributed to the "gun shy'' syndrome. In short, despite what is written in
the Tactical Manual, the rank and file are unsure how the Department wants them to
proceed. The use of terms such as "show restraint" are ambiguous and interpreted by
some as "don't do anything."
Even though this stance may only be a perception from the rank and file, it is
significant enough to be included as a finding in this report .
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RECOMMENDATION
It is recognized that guidelines for handling demonstrations are meant to provide
commanding officers with the flexibility to make changes as necessary. However,
certain procedures should be consistent in response to all demonstrations. The
Department's responsibility to protect life and property should remain as consistent as
the Department's responsibility to pr~tect the rights of demonstrators. Violation of laws
and unlawful assemblies must be dealt with consistently. A decision by some
management personnel to bend or break these principles creates confusion for
subordinates .
FINDING
The one unanimous observation by all employees close to the situation was the
inappropriate conduct of members of the news media. Early in the demonstration, they
provided the demonstrators with a forum in which to act out their hostilities and later
deliberately impeded the police mission to obtain a desired camera angle. The media's
direct illumination of the officers jeopardized their safety by obstructing their vision.
This created a situation in which officers could not see and possibly avoid incoming
missiles thrown by the crowd.
A more concise plan from the Office of the Chief of Police needs to be established to
control the conduct of the press in situations such as this. Many interviewed felt that
the demonstration should have been handled as a crime scene with an area specifically
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designated for the press to assemble and receive information. The Department's
inability to take a firm stance on the media contributed to the circus like atmosphere .
Those interviewed felt that the conduct of the media went well beyond the First
Amendment right of a free press .
RECOMMENDATION
The Department's Press Relations Officer should meet with representatives of the news
media to establish criteria for media access to volatile incidents such as demonstrations.
The Department curre~tly restricts media access when evidence could be destroyed or
an investigation could be hampered. The Press Relations Officer should also discuss
with the media those situations in which the media operation could endanger officers.
FINDING
After the initial assault on the building, the crowd was pushed back from the doors and
a skirmish line was established in front of the building near the memorial. The officers
and the demonstrators remained in this stand-off mode for more than 90 minutes. As
the police remained essentially frozen in place, the demeanor of the crowd grew more
and more hostile. Even when objects were thrown at the police lines and an arson fire
was set, no action was taken. The demonstrators evolved into a mob, possibly due to a
perception that laws were not going to be enforced. In this vein, it can be concluded
that the lack of action on the part of the Police Department actually contributed to the
property damage that followed .
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When the crowd finally broke up and went on their rampage throughout the Civic
Center area, it was not the result of any overt action by the police. The crowd
apparently decided that they were going to be allowed to act with complete disregard
for the public safety and existing laws.
RECOMMENDATION
This lack of action is in opposition to the findings of the McCone Commission Report
after the 1965 riots and our current written policy on how to handle civil disobedience.
The lack of personnel resources contributed to the command indecision at Parker
Center. However, in retrospect, it can be concluded that an action taken with only the
officers at hand that night may well have been far more successful than allowing the
crowd the free rein they were allowed.
FINDING
Within the Civic Center area, there is a vast ai:r3y of facilities that come under the
responsibility of State, Federal and County law enforcement agencies. In an event of
this magnitude, there should have been a contingency to establish direct
, communications with those agencies. The fact that LASO had personnel resources
available for assistance was not acted upon seriously. Despite this, communication with
those various agencies may have adequately prepared them to provide for increased
security at their facilities. The case in point is the damage that occurred to the Criminal
Courts Building which may have been prevented had status reports been provided to the
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LASO Incident Commander at the Hall of Justice. The fact that this demonstration did
not remain at Parker Center and that it caused damage throughout the Civic Center
area should provide us with the motivation to create an inter-agency plan for future
events .
RECOMMENDATION
Consider all demonstrations at Parker Center to have an impact on the entire Civic
Center area. Make notifications to all appropriate outside agencies a normal part of
doing business and consider having an outside agency representative at the Department
command post to facilitate the information flow. Meet with representatives of these
agencies regularly to discuss contingency plans for future incidents.
FINDING
One of the first responsibilities of the Department in any unusual occurrence is
perimeter control. It is realized that personnel resources at Parker Center were limited .
However, in addition to providing security for the building, the Department had a
responsibility to prevent innocent citizens from driving into the affected area and to
prevent further destruction as demonstrators left the immediate area.
RECOMMENDATION
In future events, the establishment of perimeter control should be considered as one of
the first objectives if sufficient resources are available. Also, thought should be given to
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follow any dispersing crowd out of the area to insure further destruction and/ or other
crimes of violence do not occur. Both of these recommendations can be facilitated
through further ongoing training of personnel, particularly command and staff
personnel.
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FOOTIIILL AREA
OVERVIEW
In anticipation of an unpopular verdict in the King trial, Foothill Area engaged in UO
training prior to April 29, 1992. Tactical and· crowd control training were given at roll
calls and at a Training Day on April 14, 1992. Squad formation drills were conducted
in the station parking lot throughout the month of April. Officers were inspected for
the proper equipment, i.e., helmets, face shields, etc., and deficient equipment was
replaced or repaired. A station security unit was assigned to patrol the station as well
as the parking lot and its perimeter beginning April 25, 1992 .
On April 29, 1992, at 1530 hours, after the verdict was announced the Foothill Day
Watch Watch Commander held over one-half of his watch to augment PM Watch
deployment.
At 1630 hours, the first group of protestors (approximately 45) gathered at Foothill
Boulevard and Osborne Stre~t at the original site of the King incident. At 1705 hours, a
second group formed in front of Foothill Station and units were deployed around the
station in a manner designed to maintain a low profile.
At 1804 hours, the protestors at the station numbered 50. The cro~d at Foothill and
Osborne had grown to 120-150, and police vehicles were being pelted by rocks and
bottles. Foothill continued to upgrade station security .
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At 2005 hours, the Department was mobilized and "B" watch was activated .
At 205 7 hours, officers deployed in a squad formation as protesters blocked the street
and impeded vehicular traffic in front of Foothill Station. The crowd, which numbered
approximately 400, pelted the station with objects. A skirmish line was formed to move
the crowd away from the station. As the crowd moved back, a male suspect in the
crowd fired a handgun into the air. The suspect evaded capture as the line continued
with their task to move the crowd out of the street and away from the station.
At 2215 hours, a second "shots fired" incident occurred. The skirmish line held while
being pelted by rocks, bottles and eggs.
Following the dissipation of the crowd, a group of approximately 150 demonstrators
assembled at El Dorado Avenue and Osborne Street. Two squads of officers moved the
crowd down the street where the crowd dissipated .
At 2100 hours, Osborne Street was closed at San Fernando on the east and at Haddon
Avenue on the west .
At 0509 hours on April 30, 1992, the street was opened for through traffic .
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During the course of the demonstration at the station, four suspects were arrested: two
for interfering and two for resisting. The shooting suspects were not identified or
arrested .
FINDING
It was determined that there was no significant criticism of the planning, preparedness
and response in Foothill Area. The command staff had no negative findings and no
recommendations for improvement for future incidents of this type .
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WFSIWOOD VIILAGE
OVERVIEW
During 1991, each West Bureau Area, West Traffic Division and West Bureau CRASH
were inspected. This included a review of their Standing Plans and their readiness to
respond to a major unusual occurrence. Additionally, Tactical Planning Section did an
audit of Emergency Response Vehicles which identified that West Bureau was properly
equipped. In July, Tactical Planning Section conducted a Bureau Unusual Occurrence
Functional Exercise in which most OWB command personnel participated.
During 1991, there were several unusual occurrences which included demonstrations,
plane crashes, flooding and planned major events such as parades. Unusual occurrence
preparation awareness was also a topic of discussion at numerous commanding officers
meetings, and tabletop exercises were not uncommon.
During 1992, Hollywood and Wilshire Areas were inspected; this again included a
review of their Standing Plans and their readiness to respond to a major unusual
occurrence. Both were ready to immediately respond to unusual occurrences .
Operations-West Bureau emergency response capabilities were in place and had been
consistently reinforced in roll calls and training exercises .
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In direct preparation for the possibility of violence related to the Rodney King verdict,
West Los Angeles Area completed a comprehensive review of its UO preparedness .
Mobilization rosters were updated, the Field Jail Kit inventoried, Office of Operations
mandated roll call training in squad formations and crowd control presented and
contingency plans reviewed and updated. In addition, an Area formal inspection was
originally scheduled for April 29, 1992, and preparation was nearly complete before the
inspection was postponed on April 27, 1992, in anticipation of the King verdict .
Preparation for the possibility of violence related to the Rodney King incident indirectly
began during May 1991, as the result of civil unrest associated with the UCLA Mardi
Gras. Groups of Black youths entered Westwood after attending the Mardi Gras and
were involved in numerous acts of vandalism and theft. Some members of the crowd
shouted that the violence was related to the mistreatment of Rodney King by the police.
Additionally, Westwood had increasingly been the site of unrest involving gang
members, particularly after the showing of movies portraying gang members. In
response to those incidents, West Los Angeles Area prepared a contingency plan for the
1992 UCLA Mardi Gras scheduled for May 15-17, 1992. The contingency plan was .
completed during the early part of April 1992. This Operations Plan for the 1992 UCLA
Mardi Gras directly addressed the type of violence which, in fact, did break out in
Westwood following the announcement of the Rodney King incident .
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Following the verdict W_ est Los Angeles Area (WLA) was mobilized along with the rest
of the Department. Over half of WI.A's patrol resources were committed to the FCP in
South Bureau by 2200 hours. At about that time, some window breaking and looting
occurred in Westwood Village. By 2222 hours, a crowd of some 100 demonstrators
which had originated at the Federal Building arrived in Westwood and began to break
windows and engage in looting activities. West Los Angeles units and UCLA police
dispersed the crowd by 2300 hours. An additional group of demonstrators organized at
the Federal Building arrived in Westwood Village at about 0052 hours. Some windows
were broken but no looting was observed. At 0130, this group was dispersed by
declaring it an unlawful assembly. Five arrests for failure to disperse were made and
Westwood Village was closed to all vehicular and pedestrian traffic. It remained closed
to all traffic for the remainder of the mobilization. No additional riot-related problems
were reported.
FINDING
The Department does not have a written agreement with the UCLA Police Department
for mutual aid or assistance in policing Westwood Village .
RECOMMENDATION
Prepare an agreement with the UCLA Police Department .
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Description

Review of 1992 riot-related planning, preparedness and response, 1992 July 8.

Asset Metadata

Core Title Review of 1992 riot-related planning, 1992-07-08

Publisher University of Southern California (original)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 110 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), correspondence (aat)

Language English

Contributor The collection was given to the University of Southern California on October 30, 1992 by the Special Advisor to the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles. (provenance)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-41116

Unique identifier UC11410241

Identifier box 24 (box),web-box24-12-02.pdf (filename),folder 12 (folder),webster-c100-41116 (legacy record id),LAPD Performance Evaluation (series)

Legacy Identifier web-box24-12-02.pdf

Dmrecord 41116

Format 110 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),correspondence (aat)

Rights This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ All requests for permission to publish or quote from manuscripts must be submitted in writing to the Manuscripts Librarian. Permission for publication is given on behalf of Special Collections as the owner of the physical items and is not intended to include or imply permission of the copyright holder, which must also be obtained.

Type texts

Copyright This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ All requests for permission to publish or quote from manuscripts must be submitted in writing to the Manuscripts Librarian. Permission for publication is given on behalf of Special Collections as the owner of the physical items and is not intended to include or imply permission of the copyright holder, which must also be obtained.

Source Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992 (collection), University of Southern California (contributing entity)

Access Conditions Contact: Special Collections, Doheny Memorial Library, Libraries, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0189; specol@usc.edu; phone (213) 740-5900; fax (213) 740-2343

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Repository Location Doheny Memorial Library, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0189

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