Unusual occurance critique, 1992-05-17

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Content UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE CRITIQUE
The L.A. Riots, 1992
Sergeant P. Vernon, #26177
Following the verdicts in the case, People v Powell. et al. April
29, 1992, few could have predicted the magnitude to which the
large numbers of L.A. residents rioted. PM watch officers watched
the verdicts as they were announced that day during roll call. I
think the scope of the verdicts surprised all. Some officers were
pleased, others were not. Every one kept their personal opinions
to themselves. They went to their cars weary of what might be in
store for them and the city.
The evening began quietly. I advised the officers over the MDT to
try to get something to eat early, just in case. Wilshire's only
disturbance was a woman holding a sign at Olympic-Fairfax, about
1700 hours. It said, "Honk if you disagree with the Rodney King
verdict." Over the next 45 minutes, two more calls came out
there. The group had grown to five, all standing peacefully on
the sidewalk. I spoke with them and .the merchants, who had
called. Every one was cooperative.
Even when all hell was breaking loose downtown and at Florence
and Normandie, Wilshire Area remained quiet. Once the city
mobilized, Lt. Di Mauro assigned me and SLO Newman to set up a CP
in the Wilshire parking lot. When the sun went down, though, the
mob mentality seemed to sweep northward into Wilshire. Looters,
from south of Venice Blvd., swept into Midtown Plaza. The radio
went crazy with "hot shot" calls from Communications division.
The Command Post
The most difficult task was getting officers to complete U/0
cards and form into squads. Initially, there were only two
supervisors available to lead squads. SLOs Duran and St. Pierre
assumed the temporary role as squad leaders until more sergeants
arrived. It took 45 minutes to an hour to get things running
smoothly and to have enough full-strength squads to be able to
send officers into the field and have a reserve in the station.
Logistics
Equipment - We were able to coordinate equipment quickly.
Of course there was not as many radios and
. shotguns to go around as one would want,
equipment assignment went well. I sent out
three cars to a squad; 1 shotgun and 1 rover
to a car. Though .some complained that every
officer should have a shotgun, even if we had
them, this would not be advisable. If one
encountered an arrest situation, what would
one do with the shotgun. One radio per car
worked out fine, too. But of course, a larger
supply of radios would be much better, but
Unusual Occurrence Critique
Sergeant P. Vernon, #26177
Page 2
Food -
Station Security
then again. with so many out there, one would
have a problem getting officers to maintain
radio discipline.
The officers who worked logistics on "B"
watch: Rita Vallejo, Leon Jackson, Mike
Manjra, did a great job. All rovers and
shotguns have been accounted for since the
U/0. The mobile shotgun rack in the kit room
worked out very well for storing shotguns and
shop keys while the CP was in the parking
lot.
We had no food the first night. All personnel
worked until at least 0700 hours in the
morning. PM watch officers who had not eaten
immediately out of roll call got very hungry.
Should we have a recurrence of an event this
size, we should fall back on restaurant
owners in the area, e.g. pizza parlors, and
ask them to supply us with "emergency
rations." It took two days for the city or
the department to begin supplying officers
with food. The first couple of days there was
not enough. For another couple of days the
food was wonderful and plentiful, but then we
started getting the boxed lunches. Those were
atrocious! Sustenance is not a minor thing
when you are asking so many to sacrifice so
much. It has a major impact on morale. Next
time, we cannot wait for downtown to arrange
our food. We are going to have to act
quickly, especially in the first two days.
God help us when the "big one" hits.
While forming officers into squads, I noticed several heads
bobbing up and down from the east wall of the station. All
officers had been deployed at their stations per the Standing
plan guidelines, but they would not have been enough defend the
station against attack. Each officer had a radio, but it would ·
have been difficult for him to get the air, had it been
necessary. An additional procedure to have station security
officers switch to simplex 8 would be advised. The CP could. then
monitor this frequency as well as get status reports when needed.
The station's east wall poses a very serious threat to station
security. It could be easily scaled by intruders. I recommend
that barbed wire be placed along it. However, it .is so low that
an adult could reach over it and fire a gun into the parking lot
with iittle trouble. Until the squads responded to Midtown Plaza,
the only safe · area in the parking lot was on the west side of the
garage.
Unusual Occurrence Critique
Sergeant P. Vernon, #26177
Page 3
Any one at Wilshire station the first night of the riots knew
that we were out gunned. Station security officers, especially
those on the roof, should have AR-15 rifles. We could not have
waited for Metro to show up, if it could, had a sniper started
taking pot shots at the station.
0__peration_ s
Realistically, there is no way to defend against a major civil
disturbance such as the L.A. riots. Even while mobilized, any
given geographic Area does not have the manpower to take back
more than a few square blocks and hold it. Wilshire officers were
well drilled in squad formations, but squad formations are almost
worthless in a civil disturbance of this size. What we lacked
were some specific goals or a mission, for example: provide
escort for the fire department; secure pawn shops and gun stores;
have a file of the owners who ·can be called 24-hours a day to .
secure or empty their businesses; identify and prioritized the·
kind of calls (property vs violent) to which we will respond; .
divide the division into sectors and place a visible deterrence
as soon as possible. Dividing the division into 5 sectors worked
well, but it was not implemented until "B" watch, April 30, 1992.
This sectoring should be added to the Standing plans.
The National Guard provided us with the ability to take back
areas of the c ·ty and the fire power we needed to protect the
station.
As there are no hard telephones lines at the gas pumps (location
of CP), communication was very difficult between the watch
commander's office and the CP, especially on the first night. We
had to use runners. I recommend that either a modular phone line
extension be installed on the west wall of the -garage or a direct
intercom-type line be set up between the gas pumps and the watch
commander·s office.
The cellular telephones were a God-send. They allowed squads with
their supervisors to operate more independently in their sectors,
not having to rely on RTO's for call backs. They also enhanced
the efficiency of intelligence gathering and reporting.
When I worked on the preliminary after action report, I found
that many assignments given to squads by the CP did not have
dispositions for them. In the future; a routing slip should be
created so that the CP can follow up on the dispo of calls logged
onto the journal. Supervisors should be reminded on reporting
dispositons of calls to the CP. The cellular telephones come in
very useful here again.
Unusual Occurrence Critique
Sergeant P. Vernon, #26177
Page 4
C9IBmap _ d _Po_ st Sites and National Guard Liai~on
Sergeant Abella did an outstanding job as liaison with the
National Guard. Operations between two agencies, who have never
worked together before, could not have gone smoother.
The Scottish Rite Temple provided an outstanding CP location for
the Guard after they had to vacate L.A. High school. This
location should be added to the Standing plans. The people there
are very cooperative and generous. The location could be easily
defended and could house and feed our entire division, if we
needed it to. I also found that the pastor at the Methodist
church across the street from the Temple (a designated CP site
location) is not very pro police. So not to ruffle his feath~rs,
the guard used the east parking lot of the Ebell theater, instead
of the church's parking lot, to park its trucks.
When the Guard used our radios for assistance, there was
naturally a problem with using the proper radio terms. Many
military radio terms have entirely different meanings than ours.
A list of common LAPD radio terms should be included in the
Standing plans for distribution to the Guard in the event of
another disturbance.
Mike Menza
INTRODUCTION
The 1992 Los Angeles Civil Disturbance
A Sergeant's Critique
May 17, 1992
The third week following what has become known as the "92' Riots" has
passed. The time for reflection has been mixed with physical and
mental, fatigue, the result of a daily work regimen involving a
heightened state of tactical awareness. The riots are approaching the
state of becoming "old news" to the media, but- to uniformed officers
and detectives, a return to "normality" has not yet been realized. The
President of the United States has come and gone, as have many other
sundry activists, actors, and politicians . Opinions of "what went
wrong" for the most part have been predictable based on the activist
bent of the person or politician making the critique. The thrust of
this critique will deal specifically with the role of officers in
Wilshire division during this unusual occurrence.
April 29, 1992 - PM Watch - Scenario
As Assistant Watch Commander for the Wilshire PM Watch, I began the
roll call with the announcement that the verdicts in the trial of four
Foothill Division officers were due out any moment. Lt. Dimauro, the
Watch Commander, entered the roll call room and informed the officers
that during roll call we would watch the . verdicts on the television in
the roll call ro om. After the verdicts were read, and roll call ended.
Not a single word was spoken as the officers and sergeants filed out
of the roll call r oom. An air of "what will happen next:" pervaded.
NOTE: For over a year, these officers have been subjected to the
regular, almost routine, barrage of media disapproval of their
Chief, and their Department. Morale had been bad, and the
underlying reason has been that many officers ~ave b~en subjected to
criticism for reasons they have had no control over; i.e. the
Foothill incident, the disdain of the Chief hy the Mnyor, and the
media "bashing" of police officers.
The watch was deployed routinely, with little expectation of the
impending civil unrest. The television set in the watch commanders'
office was tuned into the local news which was discussing the verdict.
Very little was happening- in the streets of Wilshire Area. The news
broke with a story of some type of disturbance in South Central L.A.
The police radio started to pick up a heightened state of activity,
mostly by 77th St. Area officers. Sevetal "officer needs help" calls
were heard adding to the anxiety. The disturbance grew on the
television. Live reporting was showing people being yanked out of
their vehicles and pummeled and robbed. It was still daylight when
Lt. Dimauro instructed me to get out the mobilization roster and start
page two
calling people at home who were on "B" watch. I instructed two reserve
officers to do the calling and tell the officers to come into work.
Note: we had not received official notification by Bureau or
Communications yet of a Mobilization.
Finally, a tactical alert ~as sounded by the Communications Division
watch commander. About a dozen Wilshire Area officers who were off
duty called in to inquire if they could come in and "help out" .
As the officers started to trickle into the station they were advised
to get dressed and stand by. A Department Mobilization was finally
declared about an hour after Lt. Dimauro instructed me to call the "B"
watch officers. The UO van was set up in the parking lot for
receiving and assigning incoming officer's. Squads were being formed
as fast as the officers filtered into the staging area. Logis~ics,
which on a high deployment night became an arduous task, became an
exasperating headache with so many officers needing cars and radios.
As darkness fell, the Midtown Shoppin~ Center adjacent to Wilshire
Station is overrun by looters. A squad of officers respond and chase
the looters away. Several Korean storekeepers are in the station
lobby pleading with the desk officer to send out some officers to
protect their businesses. A list of businesses that are getting
burglarized are listed in the watch commanders office as they are
reported. One particular young Korean shopkeeper who was angrily
persistent in getting t~e police to his store was refusing to leave
the station unti l we send a patrol car. · I check his store address,
and informed hi. p olitely that his store is number five on a growing
list of 27 bu s · n e s ses on our list. Operations West Bureau CRASH
officers r~port t o Wilshire Station and are assigned to a squad. The
CRASH unit immedi ately goes into the field and stops the looting of a
radio store in the Wilshire Area. They make several arrests. Before
the CRASH officer s bring their arrestee's into the station they are
briefly observed on the television news making the arrests. As they
arrive in the station with their arrestee's, the store where they made
the arrests is shown on the television news being looted. The Midtown
shopping center is again overrun by looters. Several intrepid single
police cars drive through the Midtown parking lot in an attempt to
route the looters. Some looter flee. However, numerous shots are
heard as the black and white cars drive by the midtown looting frenzy.
Several black and whites return to the station with bullet holes in
them. One car has an inch wide hole in the passenger door from what
appears to be a single shotgun slug. By 2300 hours the formed squads
are being regularly dispatched by ·the.'station to the list of stores
that _ are being looted. For the most part, the officers tell the same
story. The looters flee when the black and white police cars arrive,
but resume the looting when the police care turn the corner. The UO
squad list grows, but providing a viable police response to the
rampant looting and gunshots remains beyond our grasp as the night
wears on and dawn app~oaches.
page three
Critique
To say that the initial phase of the 92 Riot was not expected is to
state the obvious. The Department has existing Mobilization plans and
station security plans. But no plan is any good if the mental
attitude and preparation is lacking. There was no heightened state of
awareness or specific planning for the actual 92 riot. Within
Wilshire Patrol Division the mechanics for handling the UO had several
faults that need improvement.
NOTE: Training needs have been incorporated throughout the
discussion.
1) Mobilization - The current method of mobilizing officers into "A"
and "B" watches can be further refine~. As it stands now, officers
are randomly placed into squads as they arrive. Pre-planned squads
with designated squad leaders would facilitate forming the squads.
Sergeants would have squads pre-assigned and areas of responsibility
in case of a UO. Preplanning for this would have to be done on a
monthly or perhaps every three months. One or two roll call training
periods each deployment period could be mandated for squad and- sector
familiarization. Squad leaders should need to know how to contact
each member of the squad in case of a UO.
The recall effort can also be improved through a system of recall
where the supervisors are called instead of the individual officers.
The supervisors would then have the responsibili~y of calling their
squad officers into the station. In this fashion, the recall would be
faster than it' s current practice. This system of recall was utilized
by the Strat e -~ ·~c Air Command during the "air alerts" in the 1960' s and
proved to b e effective. A recall drill to contact officers off duty
should be performed at least once a year to test it'; effectiveness.
Any future UO ~ r aining ~hould be area specific within each
geographical divi sion to include potential hA~ards for each sector.
Areas of patrol responsibility, the sectors, would be incorporated
into regular training for the Area. The geographical division's UO
book has lists of sensitive locations to be protected in case of an
unusual occurrence, but t.hese are no good if offic~rs ~re not aware of
them.
2) Logistics - Equipment needs require strict evaluation. To do "the
most with least" sounds good, but in reality, the nightmare of an
officer stuck in a dangerous field situation without a radio, or
proper firepower is what every p·atrol officer thinks about.
Radios - It would be desirable to assign every officer who graduates
from the police academy a field radio. However, the radio is not
maintained by the officer, but in the divisional kitroom,. and when the
officer transfers to a new division the radio is transferred to the
new division's kit room. The assigned radio would follow the officer
to any assignment whether it be detectives or a staff job. This
system would eliminate many of the problems associated with mobilizing
page four
a uniformed force whether it be for the Hollywood parade, the Pope's
visit, or the 92 Riot.
Weapons - Shotguns were available for each car.
The Department shotgun is still a useful weapon and should not be
discounted. However, a rifle, along with specially trained field
officers to use it would be desirable. Relying on highly trained
SWAT officers to respond with rifles is not practical during a UO of
the magnitude of the 92 riot. Magnum shotgun ammunition should be
updated twice a year. Additionally, officers should train with magnum
loads instead of bird shot.
Tear gas was not used for this riot. A good pepperfogger at the
Midtown Plaza would been effective to keep the looters away.
Personal tear gas ("mace" or "chemshield") is generally disc6unted by
the officers as a nuisance. An effective substitute needs to be found
and used to replace it.
NOTE: Consideration could also be given to authorizing officers who
desire to carry the .45 caliber handgun to do so. Although it
carries less ammunition than the 9MM, the close range stopping power
of the slow traveling round has yet to be matched by the 9MM.
Having trained with the .45 and qualifying with it four times per
year for a seven year period, I have noted no major difference in
handling that weapon over the 9MM.
Uniforms - The fi l d uniform for this UO was not adequate. The wool
patrol uniform s a r uncomfortable and do not hold up for wear during
UO situations. one piece jumpsuit in which the equipment belt and
body armor woul d e worn would be far more comfortable during the long
extended hours. Additionally, the jumpsuit would provide comfort and
some protection f r om the heat, smoke and other contaminants officers
experienced duri ng the riot. Each officer would be required to have
his/her "riot" jumpsuit in his/her locker at all times.
Video Cameras - Selected uniformed detectives should be equipped with
video cameras during any UO to aid in prosecution and follow up of
crimes. RP.liance on the media images is not adeqnate.
Vehicles - Many cars went "down" during the UO, and the garage
personnel did an admirable job of keeping the cars roadworthy.
However, night time mechanics for the Area would solve many of the
transportation problems that normally have to wait during the course
of normal patrol operations.
The "caged cars" proved to be a nuisance for the squads. They .simply
could not accommodate four officers. The idea of using caged cars to
save money may work in a pleasant suburb somewhere but not Los Angeles.
UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE CRITIQUE
SERGEANT CHEATHAM
CRITICISMS
1. The initial call out of A/B watches could have been improved.
Several Am watch officers including myself were not notified.
Either this was from an oversight or as one desk officer advised
- the phone number on the A/B rooster were not all current.
2. Calls were assigned one at a time to response squads from Wilshire
commands post. This created extra travel time in returning to
command post for additional on next assignment.
3 .
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Communication system was non-existent.
overloaded not allowing transmissions.
per 4 officers.
The radio system was
As well as only 1 radio
NOTE: When field sergeants were given cellular phones the
crises was stabilized.
Public fear of arrest was minimal. The number of looters was
staggering. Once a squad was able to get to a "hot spot" with
suspects, the ability to arrest then transport to jail was non
existent. A jail bus or large transportation system was
desperately needed. All B/W vehicles were filled with officers.
Continuit y 0 f squad members was not maintained. Each day the
team mem e r changed. Each squad should have been same for
teamwork in ~ e tactical situations.
The shotg· deployed by officers looked impressive but would
have been a~ ost useless during the riot. Target identification
was stressed , but with the large groups of suspects a shotgun
blast woul d h ave hit to many extra people. CHP deployed
Ruger mini -1 4 rifles. This type of weapon would be outstanding
for defense.
Posting uniform officers with the National Guard was a waste of
departmental manpower. Two squads were used initially on the 3rd
day. National Guard had their radio's. We had a liaison officer
at their command post who could have forwarded any request for
police assistance. This could have been handled by available
squads.
Even though I had recently transferred into Wilshire it appeared
the field officers were lacking in knowledge of how a U.O
operates. Ma~y still wanted to do individual tasks instead of
squad assignments. They did not know how a field jail works, and
even simple tasks of filling out u/o cards was confusing. The
average time on street by field officers is not much, and they
may not haye been to other major long lasting U.O. situations.
I -
SERGEANT CHEATHAM
PAGE 2
PRAISES
1. The officers spirits were high. They are dedicated
professionals. Many had to brave rioters in their personal cars
without back-up just to report to work.
2 . Tte decision to allow officers to remove their ties, was great.
Hopef,· 111 y it can be kept that way permanently.
3 . Paperwork for the field troops was waived as it went into the
U.O. log. This too is an idea that could be carried forward
especially since MDTs record radio calls.
4. SLO Chuck Newman on "B" .watch did a outstanding job in
coordinating personnel, and the command post in the parking lot .
His efforts should not go unnoticed.
5. The ability of the field otficers to refrain from using force
showed through the whole riot, and was probably well documented
with all the news cameras. Plus home cam recorders too.
CONCLUSION
Overall, with t e young officers in the street, handling a once in a
lifetime cris e ~, W ilshire can be proud of the response and dedication
of the troops .
Mistakes were ~ = as in any tactical situation. These items can be
handled intra . ng .
It is unfortun ate t hat officers will not get the public recognition
they deserved. I t seems as though the fire department and the
National Guard hav e gotten all the attention. The riots were larger
this time than the watts riots and our officers were able to stop the
unrest in two days before the guard arrived, instead of five days.
"l
UO CRITIQUE
by Sergeant Abella# 22679
Pre-Plann~ng
I feel if the Department had called every division on Tac
Alert beginning the day deliberations started, we may have
been better prepared for the major U.O. that had occurred.
The majority of officers, Department employees and citizens
· knew that if the jury returned back with anything other than
guilty verdicts a riot would have ensued. Which of course
is what happened. Had every division been on Tac Alert and
had a pre-planned deployment for squads, sectors, and
strategy for a riot we may have been able to get a jump on
the riot.
Luckily, Wilshire Division was somewhat prepared. We had
just had a training day with the UO/FCP _cadre and had
several officers and supervisors that knew command post
functions . The week prior to the riots, Wilshire Division
had three demonstrators that we handled. There were no
major problems during these U.O. 'sand the CP's were manned
by trained personnel.
Initial Day of the Riot
I was w r k i ng a special detail on day watch the initial day
of the r~ t s. After watching the news, I could tell things
were no t s i ng well in South Bureau and I figured South
Bureau wa s on Tac Alert, I anticipated a phone call from the
statior ~ t night but never received one. Supposedly,
everyo ~ , s called. I checked the mobilization roster and
discove ed m y phone number was incorrectly listed. I suggest
we have al l divisional personnel, check the mobilization
roster t o e nsure the information is accurate.
Second Day of the Riots and there after
Positive
Chuck Newman and the majority of the "B" watch personnel did
an outstanding job of running the CP. It was very hectic,
confusing, and chaotic but everyone did an outstanding job
especially once we got the system down pact.
Placing officers in squads and sectors was a good idea, too.
It was easier to handle the officers and more locations were
covered. This increased officer safety.
My assignment as the National Guard Liaison was also a
positive. The Guard was utilized on nume~ous occasions and
assisted our Department greatly. The additional manpower
.was a plus and they were a pleasure to work with.
The cellular pl. ·.es given to supervisors w an added bonus.
It made communications easier and faster. It was impossible
to talk on the radio due to the heavy radio volume.
Negative
There was some confusion on who was to assign calls out. It
appeared that Communications Division would assign calls,
the Watch Commander, and the Field Commander of the CP. The
calls should only be dispatched by the CP. This would have
ensured more control and accountability over the radio calls
. being dispatched.
The equipment was a joke. Or should I say the lack of
equipment. The officers did not have enough rovers,
shotguns, etc .. to be out in the field with. The vehicles
w~re hardly able to keep up and the ones that were running
were vandalized and/ or involved in TC's.
At least the officers looked good in their uniforms and had
the proper field equipment. This was due to the annual
inspection we had two weeks prior.
Summary
All in all, this was an experience that no one on LAPD
would ever forget. The majority of the officers did an
outstanding job and probably worked harder in the two week
period than they ever had. I know I did. It was a learning
experience and I am sure no one will ever forget this part
in history that we, LAPD, took part in be it good or bad.
...
U/0 CRITIQUE
A RIOT SITUATION IS A RARE EVENT ESPECIALLY OF THE MAGNITUDE THAT WE
HAVE EXPERIENCED. TWENTY SEVEN YEARS AGO WE HAD A SIMILAR SITUATION.
BUT THE TIMES WERE VERY DIFFERENT. THE PUBLIC SUPPORTED THE POLICE
DEPARTMENT, MORALE HADN'T BEEN DECIMATED JUST PRIOR TO THE RIOT. THERE
WASN'T NEARLY THE POPULATION,TRAFFIC AND LOW MANPOWER OF THE
DEPARTMENT. THIS SITUATION WAS MORE WIDESPREAD AND ORGANIZED.
THE MEDIA WASN'T EVERYWHERE BROADCASTING INFLAMMATORY STORIES TO FUEL
THE RIGTING. THE SOCIETY AT LARGE STILL HAD TRAD!TIONAL VALUES AND
VIOLENCE WASN'T AS PERVASIVE AS IT IS TODAY. NOT TO MENTION THE MAYOR
AND CITY COUNCIL IN CONFLICT WITH THE POLICE DEPARTMENT. IN ESSENCE
WE REALLY HAD NO GUIDELINE TO FOLLOW, NO RECENT HISTORY TO LEARN FROM
OR CONFIDENCE THAT ANY ACTION THAT WOULD BE TAKEN WOULD BE SUPPORTED
BY THE PEOPLE WE ARE SWORN TO PROTECT. I CAN'T THINK OF ANY SCENARIO
THAT COULD HAVE BEEN MORE DIFFICULT TO OVERCOME BUT WE DID AND I THINK
HANDLED SUPER/BLY.
NOW IS THE TIME TO LOOK AT THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF THE ACTION. SURE
THERE WERE MISTAKES MADE. MOSTLY LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS THAT WERE
OVERCOME BY TRIAL AND ERROR AND SOME PERSONNEL PROBLEMS. _ FOR THE MOST
PART THEY WERE UNDERSTANDABLE AND EXPECTED.
CRITICISMS
1. INITIALLY, NO ONE HAD ANY IDEA OF THE." RULES OF ENGAGEMENT".
SHOULD WE TAKE A PROACTIVE AGGRESSIVE APPROACH OR SIT BACK AND LET
THE WHOLE CITY FALL. THAT HAD TO BE THE MOST FRUSTRATING AND
COMPLAINED ABOUT ASPECT OF THIS INCIDENT.
2. WHEN DECISIONS WERE MADE THEY WERE INVARIABLY CHANGED. I UNDERSTAND
THAT THERE HAD TO BE SOME FLEXIBILITY BUT IT GOT TO THE POINT THAT
THE OFCRS DIDN'T TAKE THEM SERIOUS. PEOPLE GET DEMORALIZED WHEN
THEY HAVE KNOW IDEA WHAT THE NEXT MINUTE HOLDS.
3. ASSIGNMENTS WERE GIVEN WITH TOTAL DISREGARD TO ABILITY,
TEMPERAMENT OR EXPERIENCE. THERE WERE OFCRS THAT HADN'T BEEN IN A
PATROL CAR FOR YEARS. THEY HAD NO IDEA HOW TO HANDLE THE MDTS OR
RADIOS LET ALONE A VOLATILE PATROL SITUATION. SOME WERE EVEN SQUAD
LEADERS .THESE OFCRS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED DUTIES SUITABLE TO
THEIR ABILITIES. WE HAD OLD DETS AND BUILDING PEOPLE OUT IN THE
THICK OF THE SITUATION AND OTHER YOUNG AGGRESSIVE PATROL . ORIENTED
OFCRS WORKING STATION SECURITY ANii 'FIXED POST POSITIONS.
4. POOR EQUIPMENT. ONE ROVER PER CAR wAs RIDICULOUS. IF THAT ROVER
HAD BEEN LOST, STOLEN OR BROKEN DURING A CONFRONTATION THERE COULD
HAVE BEEN A REAL TRAGEDY. ONE SHOT GUN PER CAR AND ONLY 4 ROUNDS,
AGAIN RIDICULOUS. I'M SURE OFCRS HAD EXTRA AMMO BUT IF WE
REALLY HAD BEEN UNDER ATTACK WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE RUN .OUT.
I THINK THAT'S HOW THE MEXICAN ARMY DEFEATED THE ALAMO.
5. MORE EMPHASIS NEEDED TO BE PLACED ON PROTECTING STORES THAT SOLD
GUNS. LETS FACE IT FOOD AND FURNITURE WONT KILL PEOPLE, GUNS WILL.
WE HAD OFCRS PLACED IN FIXED POSTS THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN LOOTED AND
BURNED. OTHER ~USINESSES WERE HIT THE FOLLOWING NIGHT [ie:
pawnshops and sporting goods stores], THAT SOLD GUNS. A LIST OF
ALL BUSINESSES THAT SELL WEAPONS IN OUR AREA SHOULD BE COMPILED.
I'M SURE THAT'S EASILY AVAILABLE FROM ATF. RIGHT NOW OUR BIGGEST
CONCERN IS THESE GUNS THAT ARE OUT IN THE STREET.
PRAISES
1. THE OVERALL ESPRIT de CORP. THE OFCRS SHOWED THEY COULD WO~K
TOGETHER UNDER AN EXTREMELY ADVERSE SITUATION .AND STILL SHOW m.JMOR
AND A SENSE OF TEAMWORK. THERE WERE SOME SQUABBLING BUT IT WAS
RARE. I FELT THE MANAGEMENT STROVE TO ENCOURAGE THIS ATMOSPHERE
WHICH WAS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION. THE RELAXING OF
THE DRESS CODE AS WELL AS OTHER RESTRICTIVE DEPARTMENT .POLICY WENT
ALONG WAY IN MAKING THE SITUATION A LITTLE MORE TOLERABLE.
2. I FELT THAT THE HANDLING OF THE PERSONNEL PAP~R MILL WAS VERY
EFFICIENT. I HAVE BEEN AT NUMEROUS U/O'S THAT WERE A PAPERWORK
DISASTER. IT WAS NOT THE CASE IN THIS SITUATION.
3. MANAGEMENT UNDERSTANDING. THE MANAGEMENT WENT OUT OF ITS WAY TO TRY
TO ACCOMMODATE THE INDIVIDUALS NEEDS EVEN THOUGH IT TOOK TIME AND
EFFORT TO DO SO. THIS AGAIN WENT ALONG WAY IN MAKING THE SITUATION
A BIT MORE TOLERABLE.
4. I FELT THAT THERE WAS LITTLE OR NO OVER REACTING ON THE PART OF THE
MEN OR THE MANAGEMENT. THERE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO CONTAIN EMOTIONAL
RESPONSES TO VOLATILE SITUATIONS WHICH PREVENTED DISASTER.
IN CONCLUSION THE ENTIRE EVENT WAS HANDLED EXTREMELY WELL. THE
CRITICISMS WERE MAYBE UNFAIR, GIVEN WHAT WE HAD TO WORK WITH, BUT
IDEALLY I FEEL THEY ARE VALID. THE PRAISES WERE DEFINITELY WARRANTED.
I'M SURE THERE ARE COUNTLESS OTHER OPINIONS THAT MIGHT BE RAISED BUT
THESE SEEMED TO STICK OUT IN MY MIND.
SGT S. NATALE 21539
U.O. CRITIQUE
By Sergeant G. Nanson
The greatest problem encountered in my position in the Command Post
involved the filtering of information through OWB and the numerous
"ASAP requests" for information from OWB .
At the onset of the Mobilization, I communicated directly with the
EOC. This proved to be efficient and all needs were met.
Once direction came to communicate through OWB, my requests were not
responded to because someone at Bureau decided I didn't really need
what I asked for. Direction from the EOC was miscommunicated, and
confusion became the norm.
OWB personnel continually asked for information "ASAP" during periods of
high activity. This information was only for Bureau use and not
requested by the EOC. When told that we could not respond "ASAP",
were were given threats by Sergeant-I Kelliher and P2's of "Should I
tell Commander Taylor your refuse to respond to his request." We had
to take time away from crisis situations to provide information/stats.
If Bureau officers are to be included in the chain during a
· Mobilization, much training and coordination needs to be accomplished
on their part. The practice of second-guessing our needs/requests
should be completely eliminated from Bureau personnel.
Ideally, the Command Post at the Divisional level operates much more
efficiently when communicating directing with the EOC.
U.O. CRITIQUE
By Lieutenant W. Fierro
ASSIGNMENT
My position throughout the U.O. was executive officer on A-Watch. My
perspective of Wilshire's command post operation and personnel
assigned to it was very positive. The configuration which had
personnel and logistics outside with the command post in the watch
commander's office worked very well.
PROBLEMS
It was interesting to observe personnel problems increase as the U.O.
and 12 hour watches dragged on. Communications with OWB became
strained due to a perceived felling of unreasonable requests and
demands that the information be obtained asap. This needs to be
addressed because it was very disruptive and added to the strees level
here and I'm sure at the Bureau.
Another unfortunate incident that needs to be addressed is the
attitude by the OIC of Crash regarding an assignment to a fixed post
for his 2 squads. During this difficult time we were faced with
controlling morale and keeping the stress level at a minimum. The
attitude and inappropriate remarks made by Lieutenant Merritt in
defiance of the assignment were uncalled for and unfortunate. I
hesitate to mention this incident, however, I'm concerned about the
attitude reflecting towards patrol officers by a lieutenant from a
specialized unit.
It was very unfortunate that we did not have enough officers to occupy
locations which we had cleared during the first 2 days of the riot.
This was very frustrating to us and to the citizens who could not
understand our failure to protect property.
FUTURE CONCERNS
Hopefully there will not .be a repeat performance but in our line of
work we must anticipate. Creature comforts need to be stressed,
decent and timely food, water. Also, more control over unnecessary
teletypes and annoying information, ie. The possibility that we would
not get cash for overtime. Poor timing and a morale killer.
Overall Wilshire personnel performed admirable. out people are still
our greatest asset and when given leadership and direction they
perform! After the first 12 to 24 hours of the riot, (confusion time),
we settled in and ·did a terrific job with what we had to work with.
UNUSUAL ' ' OCCURRENCE CRITIQUE
SGT. CUMMINGS
On April 29, 1922, while enjoying my vacation, watching a television
program, a news bulletin flashed across the screen and a live report
from Normandie Avenue and Florence Avenue. Proceeded to depict a
horrible sight. I was literally shocked I could not believe by own
eyes, this type of incident was occurring. My first thought was where
is the police? As I sat and watched, I quickly observed that the City
and South Central was under seized being over ran by hoodlums, burning
and looting businesses. At approximately 2230 hours, I received a
telephone call from the Watch Commander informing me that the
Department was mobilized and to report to work the following day "B"
watch hours.
Upon reporting to work on April 30, 1992, at 1800 hours, I discovered
that Wilshire Command Post was a little unorganized, this was
approximately 24 hours later. There were confusion among the command
staff, who was giving instructions and who would carry them out. It
appeared to me that we had too may people giving orders, to a point of
confusion. There were not enough equipment i.e. (rovers, vehicles).
Missions were not specific or outlined in detail-supervisors were given
squads and told to go - no clear directions. Food was another issue, I
brought my own food, but I do believe a better method can be
implemented to feed personnel working 12 hours without scheduled
breaks. Four officers per car become very inconvenient, it is
difficult to ride around for the time periods we were required to ride
4 (four) per car including equipment. Three days later I observed
some order being restored and we were given some clear instructions,
we began to make some arrests. This incident spelled out to us the
need to have a Command Post Cadre capable of setting up within a
thirty minutes notice for both Day and PM watch.
Senior Lead Officer Chuck Newman did an outstanding job as the
Personnel Officer, but even he was overwhelmed with the number of
personnel assigned to the Command Post. May I make a suggestion for
future reference, prior to roll call each day a meeting between
command staff and supervisors should be conducted, so everybody will
at least be on the same page. We had entirely too many people giving
directions.
The Event
UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE CRITIQUE
LIEUTENANT BERTRAND
Though Wilshire Area officers responded to every task they were
assigned, the raw numbers simply overwhelmed us. One alternative to
deploying units and squads from the command post may have been to have
two or three squads assigned to a specific sector. The response to
specific problems may have been quite a bit quicker. The down side of
this would have been a loss of control by the field commander.
Personnel
As mentioned above, nearly every officer deserves a pat on the back.
How~ver, several weaknesses became obvious. One squad of detectives,
from Wilshire, showed they were simply not ready for deployment. On
three separate occasions, they took so much time to leave on a
mission that another squad had to be sent.
As the event wore on, more and more officers arrived late for roll call
or called off sick. Other officers took advantage of details to
"disappear'' for extended periods. On several occasion, ofticers were
re-assigned to fixed posts in order for the command post cadre to
monitor their activities.
The O.I.C. of OWB crash, Lieutenant Merrit, displayed a lot less than
"team spirit" by announcing, in effect, his officers were "too
important" to be assigned to fixed posts. This elitist attitude did
nothing for Wilshire personnel how had worked their tails off on the
less than glorious assignments, without relief, for twelve or more
hours. Maybe a charm school course to remind him where all of our
roots lie.
Logistics
Equipment, for the most part was great when we needed it. The change
of watch procedure was a bit cumbersome. Command post personnel
assigned to logistics and personnel should have a staggered watch time
staring an hour or two prior to A and B watch. That would probably
facilitate more orderly transition.
Mission
Unfortunately, little or no direction from Department command staff
was received in the early stages. This coupled with the lack of
, occupational forces, caused us to spin our wheels. We responded well
but simply couldn't hold captured ground. We were simply not in a
mass arrest mode and probably could not have handled a large number of
arrests.
Food
At times, barely palatable, it seems the troops in the trenches
continue to suffer when it comes to creature comforts.
-- ---· - - - - - --------------------,
UO CRITIQUE
by Sergeant T. Smart
As with any large scale response there is both praise and criticism.
First the positive:
1.
2.
3.
1. Officer Safety
2. Morale
3. · CP Operations
Officer Safety: Our initial response (4 man cars, responding in
squads) prevented any serious injury to officers. Decisions were
consistently made with Officer Safety first.
Morale: Both the officers and supervisors are to be commencled for
maintaining their up-beat attitude. Despite the trying conditions
the majority of officers kept a positive attitude.
CP Operations: The CP was outstanding due to the experience .·and
training of the CP staff. Smooth operation.
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
1.
2.
Maintain Positions: Countless locations were saved the first night
by responding Wilshire Squads-only to be looted and burned 24 hours
later. There are many explanations, but communications between
CF/Squad leaders on both damage estimates and potential for further
damage would have helped. Wilshire could have used many additional
officers to protect threatened locations and those already in place
should have stayed until relieved.
Equipment: This was our most glaring weakness. We need more cars,
rovers, (initially one to a · car-4 officers), shotguns, ammo (all
types), and plastic cuffs.
TEAR GAS (NON-LETHAL FORCE)
Squads should be trained in tear gas response (formations, masks, etc.)
This could have prevented some of the looting.
HIGH-POWERED RIFLE
Supervisors should have a rifle and selected officers should be trained
in it's use. We are ridiculously outgunned!
PII WATCH NECBANIC
Several vehicles were damaged the first night and there was some delay in
their repair, reducing our fleet. A PM watch mechanic would reduce this
delay and be able to make minor repairs (lights, etc.) *On a daily
basis.
----- - -
UO CRITIQUE
Sergeant T. Smart
Page 2
3 .
4.
5.
Pre-Planning: We need both food (even military MRE) and water in
the event of future civil disobedience/major earthquake. The lack
of preparation was obvious.
Communication: Squads were quickly becoming "The Lost Squad" not
checking in with the CP. We desperately need our own radio
frequency (separate from Pacific Division) and radio discipline
continually stressed.
Misc: Some delay in booking by the field jail several days into the
u.o.
* Police Officers assigned to fixed posts with National Guard
* Need more training in squad formations and response Metro should
instruct all supervisors.
* The unnecessary guarding of "Gutted Out" locations.
Overall our response was quick and effective for the size of the task.
Granted we don't have the best equipment, but we do have good people and
they rose to the challenge as best as they could.
U.O. CRITIQUE
During the past twenty three years I have been involved in
many U/O incidents, both localized and city wide in scope.
The circumstances that sparked this civil unrest were
different in fact but similar in nature to past incidents.
The problems we faced were also similar in nature but our
response was unique. Because of recent events and the
resulting political fallout that followed I believe that for
the first time (in my experience) we were unsure of our role.
We have traditionally attempted a measured response to any
tactical situation but when the situation demanded we
"handled" it. I believe our initial paralysis in concert with
live media coverage of the erupting violence fanned the
flames of anger and opportunist criminal activity to a level
that made it a logistical impossibility to deal with it.
It is certainly possible that any response would have been
insufficient to deal • with the spreading violence, but to sit
back and wait seemed to me as abrogating our responsibility.
My primary criticism rest with a lack of planning and
control. On the day the verdicts were announced I was
surprised at our tactical response. Even at my level I could
anticipate the necessity to gather resources for possible
contingencies. We have held our watches overtime for
excessive calls for service yet we released day watch
citywide. This left us with minimal personnel resources and
put us behind the power curve from the start.
When we did gear up our people were unsure of what to do or
how to do it. We have not trained for civil unrest for years
and its tou9h- to- learn combat tactics on the battlefield.
The lack of logistical planning was also very evident
considering the lack of material resources. Moral, already
suffering becawse of constant media attacks and attacks by
certain high ranking members of the community, was further
reduced by long hours and poor food. It took too long to feed
the troops and the quality of the meals was poor. In a city
this size we have numerous mobile catering services which
could provide hot high quality food.
Once we returned to enforcing the law I believe our people
did an outstanding job. This is what they are trained for and
do best. Our inability to secure certain locations was a fact
we had to deal with but I believe it should not dictate our
enforcement posture with serious felonies.
Finally, I believe we did an outstanding job on a local level
with what we had once we got going.
---- ------ --- ---------------------.
PAGE 2
Our CP cadre was second to none. Our operation ran smoothly
and the paper mill was not the usual nightmare. For the most
part our officers did an outstanding job under the worst of
circumstances, working long hours day in and day out. They
were· tired and spirits sagged but I heard few complaints.
The squads I led both here and at the S/B CP displayed the
LAPD spirit I have always been proud of and set us apart from
the crowd.
- ------- ------ -----,
UO CRITIQUE
SGT SAM LAYTON
I WAS AT HOME WHEN THE RIOT STARTED. I WAS NOTIFIED VIA THE PHONE
TO REPORT TO WORK AT 0600 HOURS. UPON MY ARRIVAL, THE COMMAND POST
WAS IN FULL SWING. DUE TO THE SIZE OF THE UO, I WAS IMPRESSED WITH
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CP. I WAS ASSIGNED AS A SQUAD LEADER AND
GIVEN A SQUAD.
DURING THE ENTIRE EVENT MY SQUAD WAS PRIMARILY IN THE FIELD .
FOR THE MOST PART, LAPD OFFICERS RESPONDED WELL, AND DISPLAYED A
PROF~SSIONAL DEMEANOR.
THIS UO PRESENTED AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS ENVIRONMENT FOR FIELD
OFFICERS, AS WELL AS STATION PERSONNEL. THE POTENTIAL FOR DANGER
WAS ENORMOUS. IN ADDITION, THE POTENTIAL TO RECEIVE EMERGENCY
MEDICAL TREATMENT WAS VIRTUALLY NON EXISTENT DUE TO THE WORK LOAD
OF LAFD.
WE HAVE NO CONTROL OVER WHAT OCCURS. WE MUST RESPOND TO WHATEVER
THE SITUATION. THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES HOLDS US (LAPD) ACCOUNTABLE
TO RESOLVE ANY DISORDER.
~OWEVER, I FEEL THE CITY DOES NOT PROVIDE. US WITH THE PROPER SAFETY
EQUIPMENT. OUR HELMETS ARE OUTDATED AND NOT MADE TO ACCEPT FACE
SHIELDS. ONCE THE CITY FINALLY REALIZED THE CONSTRUCTION GOGGLES
WERE NOT ADEQUATE ·, THEY CAME UP WITH A MAKE SHIFT FACE SHIELD
THAT DOES NOT PROPERLY FIT THE HELMET. DURING THIS UO, I HAD TO
CAREFULLY LIFT MY FACE SHIELD UP AND DOWN TO ENSURE IT WOULD NOT
COME APART. DURING THIS UO, WE TOOK ROCKS AND BOTTLES NUMEROUS
TIMES. IF ONE HAD HIT THE FACE SHIELD, I DOUBT THE SHIELD WOULD
HAVE PROPERLY REFLECTED THE OBJECT. I NOTICED THE CHP AND NATIONAL
GUARD HAD HELMETS WITH FACE SHIELDS DESIGNED AS ONE UNIT, OFFERING
OPTIMUM PROTECTION.
OUR OFFICERS WERE PLACED ON THE FRONT LINES MANY TIMES FACING
ANGRY PEOPLE THROWING ROCKS AND BOTTLES. THE SHERIFF'S HAVE CLEAR
PLASTIC BODY SHIELDS TO OFFER PROTECTION TO THE OFFICER. WE HAVE
NOTHING.
ADDITIONALLY, THE POTENTIAL FOR EXTREME VIOLENCE EXISTED DURING
THE RIOTS AND STILL EXISTS. _WE ARE NOT EQUIPPED TO GO AGAINST THE
FIREPOWER ON THE STREET. OUR 9MM'S AND OUTDATED SHOTGUNS HAVE
THEIR PLACE. BUT, DURING THESE TIMES, OUR FIREPOWER IS INADEQUATE.
WE SHOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH RUGER MINI 14'S OR SOMETHING OF THAT
TYPE. THE ARGUMENT OF BEING IN THE CITY DOES NOT HOLD WATER.
WHEN IN A FIRE FIGHT, FIGHTING FOR YOUR LIFE, IT DOES NOT MATTER
WHERE YOU ARE. YOU AND YOUR FAMILY HAVE TO LIVE WITH THE RESULTS
FOR EVER.
IT APPEARS THAT MONEY IS ALWAYS AN ISSUE. TO ME, OUR SAFETY IS THE
ONLY ISSUE.
---~---
.., ' ')at
:HE CELLUAR PHONES PROVED TO BE VERY USEFUL. SUPERVISORS SHOULD
ALWAYS HAVE CELLUAR PHONES AVAILABLE. THE WAY REPORTS WERE HANDLED
PROVED TO BE VERY GOOD; THERE WAS NO TIME TO TAKE REPORTS.
TO SUM THIS UP, I AM DISAPPOINTED, AND HAVE BEEN SO FOR A LONG TIME
WITH THE WAY THE CITY EQUIPS FIELD OFFICERS. HOWEVER, ALL IN ALL,
I THINK WILSHIRE AREA DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB.
- - - - - -- -
....
URUSUAL OCCURRENCE CRITIQUE
BY SGT K. ROMERO
During the recent uo, my involvement in the event was that of
Personnel Officer. At the time that I reported to Wilshire station
at 0500 hours on April 30, a system for personnel accountability
was already in place from the "B" watch. The system used by the
"B" watch was sufficient to get the "A" watch stated, but I
tailored it to meet my own organizational comforts within the first
day.
COMPLETION OF UO CARDS AND OVERTIME REPORTS
Because of the large numbers of personnel assigned to the watch and
the need to deploy them to the field in an expeditious manner, it
was critical to pass out the UO cards and greenies during the roil
call period, and have them completed before dismissing the watch.
In the early days of the uo, I had the supervisors heading· the
various squads collect the UO cards and greenies, ensure
completeness, and arrange them by assignment on their Squad Cards.
Upon completion of this task, ·the supervisors submitted the cards
for my verification as the squads received their equipment from the
Equipment Officer. This system seemed to avail the squads to
immediate deployment in quick order.
The above system was also utilized for those squads that reported
to Wilshire from outside divisions. Most of the squads reported
with their uo cards and greenies already completed. This made it
quicker to deploy the personnel because the only thing lacking was
to arrange the squads on the Squad Cards and issue equipment.
Each of the squads were organized into squad packets and held until
change of watch.
END OF WATCH PROCEDURES
As_ personnel were relieved by the oncoming watch, supervisors
reported to the Staging Area and picked up their squad packet. The
uo cards and greenies were signed off and returned to me for
verification. Once the verification was complete, the squad was
released. This worked out fairly well. Personnel who were held
over were checked out by the "B" watch Personnel Officer (Chuck
Newman). I did the same for Newman.
On the following day, the UO cards and greenies were once again
audited for accuracy and completeness and then filed
alphabetically. My job was made easi~r by the assistance of Ofer.
Maria Brignoni and Ofer. Art Sandoval. The tasks of the Personnel
Officer are volumous and burdensome and should never be attempted
alone. Having reliable and efficient assistance was the key to my
own success.
- - - - - - - ---- - --------------------,
Unusual Occurrence Critique
Page 2
OVERALL MANAGEMENT OF 00 CARDS AND GREENIES
The aforementioned procedures were followed throughout the uo.
Each day was bundled separately and arranged chronologically. By
keeping up with the system, it made subsequent inquiries into
individual timekeeping problems easy to resolve.
Having read the Tactical Manual, at the beginning of the uo, for
procedures to follow when the UO was terminated made development of
a system for management easier. On about the 5th or 6th day, I
checked with Officer Newman to see what he was doing with the cards
and greenies for "B" watch. Unfortunately, he was unaware of what
was to happen with the cards at the termination of the UO which
placed him in the position of playing catch up with hundreds of
cards and greenies. Once we were both "on board", we were able to
submit overtime greenies to the Timekeeper on a daily basis, thus
enabling swift credit to all personnel for the time worked.
OVERALL CRITICISM OF WILSHIRE'S IlfVOLVEMEHT Ilf THE 00
overall, I was impressed with the way that Wilshire handled this
unforgettable experience. I think that the only thing we could
have done to improve our response would have been to hold day watch
over on April 29th. In spite of the fact that that did not occur,
I felt that our response was swift and organized (at the least the
portion that I observed).
I was a little surprised at the "whining" that started to develop
at about the 3rd or 4th day, but could pretty much dismiss it to
fatigue and the lack of "creature comforts". The whining th$it
persisted was just immaturity and minimal, I would like to add.
I found resolution in my own discomforts and fatigue by keeping in
mind that no one was exempt from these feeling. Having experienced
this UO as a Department will serve to better prepare us for any
possible future events. I can't imagine that it could get much
worse, so those of us who may find ourselves involved in a future
uo should reflect on this experience to draw strength for the next.
INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE
June 24, 1992
6.4
TO:
FROM:
Commanding Officer, Operations-West Bureau
Commanding Officer, Wilshire Area
SUBJECT: CRITIQUE - APRIL/MAY RIOTS
Wilshire Area's response to the riot reflected it's experience in
policing large scale unusual occurrences. The Department went on
tactical alert at 1900 hours and by 2015 hours the command post
had been established and squads consisting of five officers and a
supervisor were formed. They were subsequently dispatched by the
command po.st to emergency calls for service. This was being done
while off-duty personnel were being contacted and ordered to
report to Wilshire Station. As with most major operations during
the initial stages, there was some confusion, however the command
post was up and running smoothly within a relatively short period
of time.
The first incident in Wilshire occurred at approximately 1715
hours at the corner of Olympic and Fairfax Avenue. This consisted
of a lone black female holding a sign which read "Honk if you
disagree with the King verdict." There were no other incidents
until approximately 2030 hours. However, it became very clear
within a span ;. of a couple of hours, that Wilshire Area was a
major affected area and additional resources would be needed.
Wilshire Area was not designated as an affected area until
approximately the third day of the riot. The impact of this delay
was devastating.
Wilshire Area was required to send personnel resources to the
Department Command Post and other affected areas at a time when
personnel needs were greatest at Wilshire. Also, requests for
additional personnel by Wilshire often went unanswered.
Therefore, strategies that could have been used were not
implemented until sufficient personnel were deployed. The
frustration in not being able to implement a more aggressive
stance was reflected in some supervisors critiques. They also
expressed a concern that missions assigned to squads were not
clear. The majority of the supervisors felt the tactics used were
sound under the circumstances.
· :JI
CRITIQUE
PAGE 2
6.4
The decision to utilize each area as a decentralized command post
worked well. It allowed for a more orderly operation. Personnel
resources were more easily deployed to the affected areas and
decisions more timely. However, there were other concerns and
recomIJlendations that were noted during the riot and are listed
below.
The problems encountered were minimal and most were inherent to
this type Major Unusual Occurrence. The observations are as
follows:
* Requests for food were initially not filled. It took one
day for the food to arrive.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Specialized Units wanted to respond to the Command Post in
buses instead of cars because they did not want to use their
undercover vehicles. This was resolved by assigning a black
and white vehicle to their squad to accompany the plain cars
while on patrol.
Nor
Some specialilized units did want to work fixed post
positions which created some confict.
Consideration must be given to gasoline for officers private
vehicles during riots. All public stations are either burned
or closed.
Prior to the EOC making personnel request, consideration must
be given to the status/involvement of the Areas. By day two,
there were 1700 officers deployed in South Bureau and 300 in
Wilshire. There simply were not ·enough officers deployed in
Wilshire.
The premature release of information regarding cash overtime
funds not being available devastated morale and required
managers to work twice as hard to overcome the effects.
Additional communication equipment should have been provided
for the National Guard. Their radios were very bulky and
would not transmit. This required the assignment of
uniformed officers at each location where the National Guard
was deployed which was a drain on limited personnel
resources.
The delay in deploying the National Guard in Wilshire Area
resulted in additional arson and looting because there were
not enough officers to protect businesses. There were only
enough to respond to life threatening situations.
CRITIQUE
PAGE 3
6.4
* The National Guard was deployed, in some instances based on
policital considerations rather than need. Only six of the
ten locations identified by the command post staff as being
.cri~ical were approved for their deployment.
* Intelligence information Vs. rumors - initially all rumors
were being presented as intelligence information.
* Areas are without commmand post armbands. This added to the
initial confusion of officers responding to the command post.
It is recommended that each Area be assigned armbands that
identify command post positions.
* Metropolitan Division officers were deployed in anti-sniper
mode without the knowledge of the field commander. It is
critical that the field commander be advised of any
specialized assignment prior to the deployment of officers in
the field.
* Change of watch was sometimes hectic. It is recommended that
the Command Post Cadre work 9 to 9 and all field personnel
work 6 to 6. This would eliminate the confusion created by
Command Post personnel going end-of-watch at the same time
as officers assigned to the field.
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDTAIONS:
* BSS personnel available at Command Posts in involved Areas.
* Department policy for employees calling in sick during UO
should be established so that uniform· . procedures are used
through,·out the Department during the emergency.
* Use of tear gas to disperse riotous crowds should have been
considered.
* Recommend the use of bar codes to account for personnel and
equipment .
. DAVIS, Captain
Co nding Officer
Wilshire Area
LA RIOTS - CRITIQUE
By Sergeant L. Kerchenske
.No one could be prepared for that type of reaction, so strong,
spread out throughout the City. However, as the events unfolded
on Slauson and Normandie, the criminal element could see the
police were not responding effectively. This fueled the fire and
allowed the "Mob" mentality to take over.
1
2
3
4
As the calls of violence moved north through Southwest.
I sent an MDT message to the station to activate CRU and
footbeats. I was send back "not to panic", clearly at
this point we in Wilshire should have been planning out
squads and assigning sectors.
As we became organized into squads and sectors, officers
were told not to respond to communications "Hot Spots"
radio calls. As minutes went by and calls on looting,
robbery and assault came out, no one was dispatching
units. When I went into the station, no one was
_listening to the radio. Some officers took it upon _
themselves to responds to calls, and probably saved the
life of a female who . was being dragged from her vehicle
at Venice and Rimpau.
The station security plan calls for us to have 2
officers with rifles on the roof. We do not have rifles
at our disposal. We need them. We can't wait for the
National Guard to arrive 2 days later.
Officer were fired on numerous times at Midtown Plaza by
gang members from south of Venice Boulevard with assault
rifles. When being fired on the best defense is a good
offense. We need approximately 20 officers trained in
the division with ARlS's or MINI 14's and taken into
the field on a nightly basis. When problems arises we
often need the firepower in the field immediately. We
can't count on Metro to come in and bail ·us out. We did
not see Metro in our division for 3 days. It took,
officer Archie Nugal getting shot in the neck, during
reloading, to get us 9mm pistols. Must some officers
die before we realize how badly we are outgunned. We
have to keep up with the criminal element.
- ~
U.O. CRITIQUE
By Sergeant T. McBride
The recent unusual occurrence demonstrated that we definitely need
additional training and preparation should an event of this magnitude
reoccur. Specific observations of weaknesses and areas for
improvement are as follows:
The initial response to the riots was with very little direction
from the command staff as to the enforcement actions to initiate.
We sent officers to location and chase away looters only to
return later and find the building totally looted and burned.
Looters knew they would not be arrested so they continued to
return. It was definitely a lesson in futility. Strong,
aggressive enforcement action should have been initiated from the
onset.
Unfortunately, if mass arrests had been made, we were not
prepared to handle a serious influx of arrestees. The field jail
would have been overwhelmed without any secure place to hold a
large number of arrestee. · When officers did bring in a group of
arrestees, established field jail procedures were not followed.
Many officer are not familiar with unusual occurrence jail procedures and left jail personnel guessing on information needed
to process arrestee. Training is definitely needed in field jail
procedures and transporting officers responsibilities.
The initial deployment of squads at the inception was very
ch~otic. Officers were called in from home and - wandered around
the station. Apparently lost or unsure of where to report. This
delay's the formation and deployment of squads. Again, this
occurred largely because of lack of training and exposure to
unusual occurrences.
Initially, squads were deployed to handle "Hot Shots" and were
then directed to return to the Command Post for another
assignment. Sector deployment should have been initiated the
first night, with units remaining in the field to handle all
calls in their sectors. All calls were sent out to the staging
area from the Command Post. Which caused additional delays and
alot of "down time" for squads.
The Detective squads were deployed as response units the first
few days. Their assignment seemed to change day to day at the
whim of their_ Commanding Officer, without notifying anyone in the
Command P9st. Detectives had been deployed to the field and had
been assigned to specific tasks, but suddenly they were removed
from the deployable personnel pool and Command Post personnel had
no idea that they were no longer deployable.
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UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE
PAGE 2
Many officers were assigned to fixed posts with National Guard
personnel. This was a tremendous waste of manpower. Each guard
at a fixed post had a rove or communication with the liaison at
the guard Command Post. Placing police officers at these
location to "guard the guards" was unnecessary.
Communication was extremely difficult, usually due to officers
needlessly talking on the radio. Many officers with MDT's,
failed to log on and only one rover to ·a vehicle. As the unusual
occurrence progressed the squad leaders were assigned cellular
phones. This made it much easier to contact supervisors and
assign tasks.
Change of watch procedure could have been expedited by leaving
equipment in the vehicles. Instead of checking equipment in and
out. Officers could have peen assigned fully equipped vehicles
ready to respond to any situation.
The City spend $8.50 for boxes containing something that was
supposed to be a lunch. "B" watch routinely received 200 of
these, which cost the City $1700.oo each night. We could have
fed everyone nightly with Prime Rib and Lobster with that kind of
money. The quality of food can impact morale.
We can definitely learn from the problems and mistakes encountered
during this unusual occurrence. The key to resolving the majority of
our weaknesses lies in additional training and application. Most of
the officer were eager, but lacked knowledge and exposure to this type
of situation. Hopefully, the next unusual occurrence will be more
efficiently handled, with positive direction form above.
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U.O. CRITIQUE
By Sergeant Randy Garcia
I (Sergeant Garcia, R.) was on vacation from April 9, 1992 to May 4,
1992. I volunteered to return to work in the middle of my vacation,
on April 24, 1992, for the Armenian Demonstration. Unfortunately, I
was out of town and unable to return the following week during the
height of the rioting. Because I was not at work during the rioting I
feel it would be inappropriate for me to critique the Department or
Wilshire Division officers from a supervisor's point of view.
When I returned to work on May 4, 1992, I was assigned to "A" watch.
By this time the flow of paperwork and the officers duties were
carried out in a smooth routine manner. There was some direction
given in that each sergeant was assigned a squad of officers and a
sector. This was good that each sergeant and squad had an area of
responsibility and were not allowed to wander aimlessly throughout the
division. This also allowed for immediate backup.
The Department has received endless criticism for its handling of the
rioting, which was expected no matter how the rioting has handled.
Obviously the morale is low throughout the Department, including
Wilshire Division. I have seen the Department's commendation that
each officer will receive in his/her package. The commendation' ·
recognizes all officer's efforts as a team, which is nice and generic.
It is my recommendation that we as supervisors take the officers
recognition one step further and commend those who were on vacation or
a stretch of days off and voluntarily returned to work. Because those
officers took it upon themselves to display a deep sense of dedication
and loyalty to the Department and their peers, we as supervisors
should recognize them for the same. This can be accomplished if each
supervisor checks the status of the officers in his/her den. The
seemingly lack of appreciation for the officers efforts was brought to
my attention by some officers who voluntarily returned to work.
'.)-':;!'
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UO CRITIQUE
By Sergeant D. Rosenberg
During this U.O. assignment, I was assigned to the Wilshire Field
Command Post. The major problem that I perceived during this period
has to be directed towards West Bureau and the EOC. There was
definitely a lack of coordination with their "Bean Counters" I
believed they· had numerous police officers or detectives assigned to
various assignments within their respective venues. However, the lack
of coordination between them and the probably direction given to them
demonstrated that they didn't have a standard operations system . ·
working. Through out the day the numerous and superfluous phone
calls, calling for the same information over and over again, became a
royal ·pain. The other problems I observed had to do with the
deployment of "A" and "B" watch personnel. As in any major response
there were personnel distributed to watches, they were not scheduled
to work. As soon as the problem was discovered, there was no effort
made to correct the problem until the end of the U.O.
Lastly, the arrangements made to .feed the officers. There must be a
better way, rather than those "box" lunches. I know I can't speak for
City procurements, but at least the Department should have some input
into the types of lunches and quality of food and especially the
delivery of this most valued commodity during such an event. It may
not have been cooked on as such, but the food being a "morale" builder
at a time of tension, can not be underestimated.
One more thing that must be discussed, is the relieving of the other
watch in a timely manner. It might be feasible to start roll call at
0530 hours, so the other watch can be relieved promptly at 0600 hours.

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