Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

Inter-Agency Team Final Report, City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Center, 1992

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Inter-Agency Team Final Report, City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Center, 1992

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Content INTER-AGENCY TEAM FINAL REPORT APPENDIX: CITY OF LOS ANGELES EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER APPENDIX Emergency Operations Organization Booklet Interview of LAPD Commander Banyan Lewis (August 6, 1992) Interview of LAPD Sergeant Robert Gandy (August 18, 1992) Interview of LAPD Captain David Kalish (August 20, 1992) Interview of LAPD Captain Dan Watson (July 23, 1992) Interview of LAPD Commander Lawrence Fetters (August 24, 1992) Interview of LAPD Commander Frank Piersol (August 26, 1992) Interview of LAPD Commander Jim Jones (July 17, 1992) Interview of LAPD Lt. George Godwin (June 11, 1992) Interview of FBI Special Agent Tom Parker (August 10, 1992) Memorandum from David Kalish to EOB (July 10, 1992) Memoranda from Office of City Administrator to David Kalish (June 12, 1992) Interview of LASO Lt. Don Rodriguez (June 30, 1992) Interview of LASO Sgt. Robert Puente (July 1, 1992) Interview of LASO Lt. Richard Odenthal (June 24, 1992) Interview of LASO Lt. Richard Odenthal (August 25, 1992) Emergency Operations Improvement study (July 14, 1992) 2\S\Z013204H.LU8 To: From: SHARENOW & CORBIN IAWYERS A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION MEMORANDUM (/ , PRNil.EGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK. PRODUCT Office of Special Advisor, Richard J. Stone Leonard Sharenow Date: Re: August 13, 1992 Interview of Los Angeles Police Department Commander, Banyan Lewis File: WEBSTER STUDY/lnteragency GToup Report of Interview On August 6, 1992, at 8:00 a.m., Richard Rosenthal, Scott Edelman and Leonard Sharenow interviewed Banyan Lewis, LAPD Commander, Uniform Services Group, Headquarters Bureau. This interview was conducted at Parker Center. This report of interview focuses on the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Organization and its task of preparing the City's response to emergencies. C:\DOC\\VEBSTER\MEM0.12 -1- £0'd Ol NI Sc:lOJ GNt:l M0t--13c:lt:IHS WOc:l=l 6S : t, T c56 T-£ T-£lnrd I participated in the interview to ask Commander Lewis about the City of Los Angeles' Emergency Operations Organization ("EOO"). A copy of the EOO's description, obtained from the Tactical Manual of the Los Angeles Police Department is attached to this report. My report involves only the EOO. Richard and Scott will prepare a separate report with regard to Commander Lewis' activities before and during the riots. Banyan Lewis has been an LAPD Commander for two years. He has been on the LAPD for 291/2 years. He is 50 years old. He has been in charge of the Uniform Services Group since March 1991. With regard to the EOO, Commander Lewis said that the City has had a Master Plan which 11 covers and dictates" how the City will respond to disasters. Historically, the Master Plan has addressed itself to natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, etc. The EOO budget is different from other City agency budgets which have to be renewed each year. The EOO budget is carried over from year-to-year and surpluses do not have to be spent in that fiscal year. Commander Lewis said that within the last two years, there has been close cooperation between the City and the County with regard to planning for natural disasters. The County has its own EOO. C:\DOC\WEBSTER\MEM0.12 -2- 170"d 0nc10c 01 NI8~0) ON~ MON3~~HS WO~~ 00:S1 c661-£1-Dn~ The Mayor is the head of the EOO. The EOO is the umbrella organization for the EOB and EMC. The Emergency Operations Board ("EOB") is chaired by the Chief of Police. The General Manager of each City Department is a member of the EOB. The Chief of Police's assistant on the EOB is the City's Chief Administrative Officer (Keith Connery). Under the EOB is the Emergency Management Committee ("EMC'). Commander Lewis is one of the principals on the EMC. A representative of each City department has a principal on the EMC. Shirley Mattingly is the head of the EMC. The EMC is the working "arm" of the EOO. The EMC has monthly meetings to plan for emergencies and to discuss budget. The EOO has a yearly budget of about $500,000. The $500,000 does not include salaries, but covers equipment, training, seminars, etc. Employee time comes out of the applicable City Department budget. Commander Lewis said the EMC had done no planning with regard to riots or civil disturbances. The last riot was the Watts riot - 27 years ago. The EMC got out of the "civil disturbance mode." The City adopted the McCone Commission Report after the Watts riot. The Vietnam disturbances were considered "protests," not "riots" and not within the concerns of the EOO. C\DOC\ WEBSTER\MEM0.12 -3- Starting in March, 1991, because of the King beating and the Latitia Harlan sentencing, the LAPD began to do some planning for riots. The City EOO did not do any such planning. Commander Lewis said that the EOO was like an "ostrich" in that it did not believe that riots would occur and that any that did occur could be handled by the LAPD within its accepted procedures. There was never any direction by the Mayor or his staff to have the EOO plan for riots. Starting in March, 1991, the LAPD did 'brief' the EMC that it was doing some riot planning. Commander Lewis said that the briefings were general ( no details were given). He recalls that the LAPD advised the EMC that the lAPD was doing training for civil disturbances. Commander Lewis said that minutes of the EMC meetings were kept, but they are not verbatim. The City's administrative office keeps copies of the minutes and the person to contact there would be Bob Canfield. Commander Lewis was asked whether the EOO or the EMC considered the possibility of civil disturbances during or just after an earthquake. He said that it never came up because it would have been considered a police responsibility. Commander Lewis said that the EOO never asked the lAPD specifically as to what planning they were doing because of the Rodney King trial. C:\DOC\ WEBSTER\MEM0.12 -4- 90'd Ol He said that the l.APD would not necessarily keep the EOO informed as to what it was doing. This would have been intentional so as to prevent the "spreading of plans" to other Departments. Commander Lev.is has a copy of the EOO Master Plan. He can provide us with a copy if we do not already have one. It is two loose-leaf books and a supplement. Terrorist activity is another subject that the EOO would not concern itself with. This was considered a responsibility of the LAPD. \Vhen the rioting started, Chief Gates called Le'Wis and told him to activate the LAPD's EOC, which is located in the Parker Center basement. At that point in time, the City's EOO Master Plan goes into effect. Since the "incident leader" was the l.APD, the I.APO took charge of operations. Lewis said that the EOO adopted the attitude that the LAPD has tried to foster, i.e., that it is capable of handling all civil disturbances and that it does not need assistance. Commander Lewis made a point of stating that the number of incidents rose "dramatically" right after Mayor Bradley's speech on April 29. Commander Lewis believes there was a "cause and effect" between the speech and the spreading of the C:\DOC\ WEBSTER\MEM0.12 -S- l0'd Ol NI8~0J ON~ MON3~~HS WO~~ Z0:St Z66t-£t-Dn~ AUG-13-1992 15:03 FROM SHARENOW AND CORBIN TO 2012110 P.08 ...... -. . • .-~ .. . riots. I believe that reflects the sentiment of many of his LAPD colleagues. Commander Lewis believes in a "high profile" with regard to planning for potential rioting. He believes the Mayor should have gone on television and said that "maximum" law enforcement would be present to stop any disturbances. When the City's EOC was activated, each City agency, such as Water and Power, Transportation, Fire, etc. sends its representative to the EOC, pursuant to the Master Plan. I had previously interviewed CHP personnel. The CHP had been assigned to guard the Fire Department. The CHP were very positive as to how that worked out. I received a different perspective from Commander Lewis. Commander Lewis said that the Fire Department sent its trucks en mass to the LAPD staging area at 54th and Arlington. The CHP had told me that the operation went smoothly in that a CHP squad escorted the LAFD as it left the staging area. According to Commander Lewis, there was "mass confusion," and it was a bad idea to have the LAFD in that location. He said the LAFD should have had its own separate staging area. Commander Lewis said there was a recently executed memorandum of understanding ("MOU") with the LASO and the CHP that provides that the CHP's mission during a riot will be to protect the Fire Department. The request is to be made form the LAPD to the LASO who will then notify the CHP. C:\DOC\ \VEBSTI:R\MEM0.12 -6- "A_UG-13-1992 15: 04 FROM SHARENOW AND CORBI t" TO 2012110 P.09 Commander Lewis said that other persons familiar with the EOO would be Shirley Mattingly and LAPD Lieutenant Bruce Ward, who is Lewis' right-hand man and an "expert in the EOO process." A member of the State OES attends EMC meetings. Also, a member of the Army Corps of Engineers sometimes attends EMC meetings. C:\DOC\ VIEBSTER \MEM0.12 -7- AUG-28-1992 17=14 FROM ML B LOS ANGELES TO OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS CITY OF LOS ANGELES MEMORANDUM 96201398 P.02 TO: FILE DATE: August 28, 1992 CC: FROM: RICHARD J. STONE ~ CHARLES G. BAKALY, ill RE: INTERVIEW WITH SERGEANT ROBERT E. GANDY <EOC) On August 24, 1992, Bill Grojean and I met with Sergeant Gandy, whose title is Officer-in-Charge, Long-Range Planning Unit, Planning & Research Unit. Indirectly through Lieutenant Williams, I had been directed to Sergeant Gandy as an individual who could dis~ LAPD deployment from the EOCs perspective. The following is a summary of my recollections of this meeting, including my questions and comments, together with my mental impressions, conclusions and opinions, based upon the meeting. At the outset, Sergeant Gandy explained that the EOC does not have a .,,. ·directive" function. In other words, the EOC does not assign officers to missions from l IZ the command post, rather, that responsibility belongs to the respective field com.man.de However, th · decide wher e field forces are de 1 e During the crisis, the department commander for "A"-Watch was D u z. 8 Chief Booth and for "B"-Watch was Deputy Chief Frankle. ergeant Gandy explained that e may bes ed e ore a ac c e 1s ever called, whereby they would request that the eighteen geographic areas and four traffic divisions report their U /0 personnel status. · The system for · e el ~ tatus d · 0 has been in _.Rlace since the Watts · It involves a teletype called the LAPP Unusual Occurrence PersonnelStatus Report being sent from the EOC to the eighteen geographic areas and four traffic divisions requesting their personnel status ("U /0 Personnel Status Report"). Prior to the announcement of the verdict the EOC staff had been asked ''weeks prior" b ~ z._ c; the chiefs office to have the EOC 0 ready''. Sergeant Gandy organized the EOC personnel records and restocked the EOC with the' various needed forms and other administrative items. They practiced with the U /0 Personnel Status Report referred to above for about 3-5 weeks prior to the verdict in order to get the areas and divisions used to the form again since it had not been used much since the Watts riots. C:\OOCS\CG9\WE9STEQ\~DT. !'1D1 CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY CLIENT COMMUNICATION ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT / AUG-28-1992 17:15 FROM ML B LOS ANGELES TO 96201398 P.03 " • TO: CC: FROM: DA"IE: PAGE: Fll.-E RICHARD J. STONE CHARLES G. BAKA.LY, ID August 28, 1992 2 While the verdicts were being announced, the chiefs office called and told them to set up the EOC. When Sergeant Gandy arrived Captain Paul Coble was already there and told Sergeant Gandy that he had asked for the U /0 Personnel Status Reports from the areas. Sergeant Gandy is not sure what Sergeant Coble received in response to 2 f) that request and did not say that he had identified or retrieved that data. The personnel procedure within the EOC during an unusual occurrence is that the EOC personnel officers gather the information received from the areas and divisions and assemble a general form in order to respond to any specific requests for personnel. The data from the U /0 Personnel Status Reports is included in the "Unusual Occurrence Situation Report Summary" ("U /0 Report Surnrnary 0 ) which is done at the end of every 24 hours and is designed to recap the. prior day's activity. It is referred to as the "24 hour morning report ... At about this point in the interview, Sergeant Gandy asked Sergeant Dan Keefe to join us to explain the different entries on·the form. Ser eant Keefe was one of the personn £& · · e crisis and prepared these reports for e - Watch. ere are three principal categories/columns in the Personnel Deployment section of the report: "active", "ready reserve" and "total". The '"active" category denotes anyone who is deployed to the unusual occurrence, i.e., to the task force. The ·•ready reserve" category denotes what officexs are left at the area or division above minimum operating force requirements. The "mjnimnm operating force 0 is defined in the LAPD tactical manual at B-002.13 wbicb provides that in case of an unusual occurrence, 50% of the personnel for each geographic area is available reserve for the task force. The other 50% remain at the respective area to perlorm re ar duties. According to both sergeants, very early on in the crisis, the perso· nnel reporting system through the U /0 Personnel Statm Report and the U /0 Report Summary stopped. Sergeant Keefe said that the Personnel Deployment section in the U /0 Report Summary was discontinued after the second day. At the direction of the department commander that report was abandoned and they designed and used another form called "LA.PD EOC Watch Deployment''. This form brew down deployment by bureaus as opposed to city-wide. The first such form is for May 3 at 0500 hours. The EOC personnel commanders during the crisis were Joe Peyton, B-Watch and Ed Gagnon, A-Watch. According to Sergeant Keefe, Gagnon created the new form. Sergeant Gandy believes that the department commander wanted a one page form that would show deployment within the bureaus so that he could put that on a display board. ccording to Sergeant Keefe, they "never got straight numbers on what was out there 0 C:\00CS\CG&\W£9STt~\GAN0Y.MD-! CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY CLIENT COMMUNICATION ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT AUG-28-1992 17=16 FROM ML B LOS ANGELES ', TO: CC: FROM: DATE: PAGE: FILE RICHARD J. STONE CHARLES G. BAKALY, ill August 28, 1992 3 TO 96201398 P.04 from the various buream and areas. There is no EOC personnel sheet for the first day and the first situation report summary is for the period April 30, 0600 hours to May 1, 0600 hours. According to Sergeant Keefe, they got the raw dat~ i.e., the teletypes from the areas but they did not have sufficient resources within the EOC to compile it. Sergeant Gandy said they would have taken 8· l 0 trained people in personnel to handle only that task. According to Sergeant Gandy, the best data for bow many officers were initially available are the 18 daily worksheets, both the day and p.m. watches, as well as the four traffic divisions. Sergeant Keefe also observed that Deputy Chief Hunt wanted to go to ''mobilization" early. He did not offer any other explanation or context for that statement. He also stated that "nobody had any information to make decisions·•. Sergeant Gandy explained that they do not have ACC (Area Command Center) capability in the trailers at the field command posts, nor was there ACC capability in the EOC during the crisis. Sergeant Gandy provided us with copies of all of the U /0 Report Summaries and deployment sheets for the first days. The qualification to· the information that he provided us is that the EOC has no way of knowing what the officers did once they are assigned to the task force, ie .. , once the officers are under the control of the field commanders at the bureaus then the EOC is out of it. The next level of inquiry would be to interview the personnel officers at the various bureaus to see how they advised the respective field commanders as to available forces. As a starting point, I have contacted John Vandevelde to set up an interview with the appropriate personnel at South Bureau. With regard to other EOC documentation, we discussed the EOC journals which we have reviewed, analyzed and coded into our deployment data base. B _ il;-- 1 __ _ Gro"ean is o· t ,.,....,, .. __ w have a com lete set of the ·ournal materials Both the sergean~ explained that the EOC journal is a c ono ogical record of written messages, i.e., if a message is not made then it does not get reflected in the journal. Again, there is no "automatic" data input system to record the activities and responses · g such a crisis. CGB:klt C.G.B. CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY O..IENT COMMUNICATION ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT .. • •• Sheppard, Mullin, Richter, Hampton Since 1927 To: Webster Study File From: Gordon A. Greenberg James L. Sanders MEMORANDUM PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Date: September 1, 1992 Our File: 009-47049 Re: Interview with Sergeant Robert E. Gandy on August 18. 1992 Gandy's Assignment and Background Sergeant Gandy is a 20-year veteran with the Los Angeles Police Department. He has worked both street assignments, including narcotics and vice, and administrative assignments. For the past six years Sergeant Gandy has been responsible for training LAPD personnel for performing tasks in the City of Los Angeles' Emergency Operation Center ("EOC"). In the LAPD command, Gandy's assignment falls under the Planning and Research Division ("PRO"). Sergeant Gandy's Description of the EOC's Mission Sergeant Gandy explained that the EOC is part of the city's Emergency Operations Organization. The city's EOC is separate and distinct from the county EOC; however, both seek to interact with each other and keep each other abreast of information that relates to an emergency situation in the city 2\G\M013502S.LD9 -1- or the county. The mission of the city's EOC is to gather information from various city departments and from various field and police commands into one central location during emergency situations. The EOC serves as a conduit for infor mation so that various agencies are fully advised of the status of an emergency situation. In civil unrest situations, the LAPD takes the lead role in the city's EOC. The LAPD officer in charge of the EOC is responsible for coordinating the flow of information in and out of the EOC. That officer, who is usually a captain, is not responsible for making command deci sions concerning the allocation of resources within the police department. Those decisions are to be made by field commanders who are the recipients of the information. Therefore, accord ing to Sergeant Gandy, the representatives of the EOC should not be making any decisions as to where resources within the Los Angeles Police Department should be sent. Training Personnel for EOC Operations LAPD personnel assigned to administrative duties con stitute the pool of available personnel to be assigned to the EOC. At any given time there are approximately 125 LAPD offi cers who may be called up for EOC duty. Those 125 individuals on the EOC roster have received training in EOC duties and operations. Individuals assigned to the EOC receive training approximately every three months. Sergeant Gandy is the person who is primarily responsible for training individuals within 2\G\M013502S.LD9 -2- the LAPD. In addition, Sergeant Gandy also assists in the training of individuals assigned to the EOC by other city agencies and he also provides training to smaller police departments in the Los Angeles area. Sergeant Gandy provided us with slides of the EOC and also showed us a video tape of the EOC. The EOC consists of a main room where a large horseshoe shaped table with telephones is centered. There are several television monitors and a status board in the EOC's main room. The television monitors can be used as a source of information from the media covering an emergency. The status board is used to show significant events and where resources are currently located. In operation, the main room is used by representatives of the LAPD and various agencies that participate in the EOC, e.g. the Department of Water and Power, the Department of Building and Safety, the Los Angeles Fire Department, etc. The operation center in the main room is adjoined by side rooms which are intended to be used by support personnel whose presence is not needed in the EOC. In addition to familiarizing the trainees with the physical layout of the EOC, Sergeant Gandy instructs the trainees about the various types of emergencies that may arise. Civil unrest is one of the emergency situations for which EOC personnel are trained, however, it was not a major portion of the training for the past six years. 2\G\M013502S.LD9 -3- Because of reassignments, Sergeant Gandy loses approximately four people per month who were assigned to the EOC. Consequently, Sergeant Gandy is constantly training those who are newly assigned to the EOC. Sergeant Gandy cited the lack of continuity in EOC assignments as an impediment to obtaining optimum performance in the EOC. Sergeant Gandy also noted that the degree of interest among the LAPD personnel assigned to the EOC duty varies greatly. Gandy explained that EOC duty is not perceived as being an important task by many. Sergeant Gandy believed that this may also impact performance in the EOC. The EOC is only sta fed in emergency situations. The number of personnel needed in the EOC is largely determined by the captain who is in charge of the EOC shift or on some occasions, the chief of police. Sergeant Gandy is responsible for maintaining the roster of the approximately 125 indi viduals from the LAPD who are assigned to EOC at a given time. Once the decision is made to activate the EOC, it is usually Gandy's responsibility to locate those on his roster for service in the EOC. In the recent past, the EOC has been activated in connection with the Sierra Madre earthquake in June, 1992 and the February, 1992 floods. Personnel assigned to the EOC are trained to receive information by telephone, reduce the pertinent information onto a written message form which is then routed to supervisors within the EOC. 2\G\M013502S.LD9 -4- Supervisors in the EOC decide whether any action is required on the message. Sergeant Gandy's Observations of the EOC Operations During the April. 1992 Civil Unrest Sergeant Gandy informed us that there was no definite plan to activate the EOC prior to the return of the verdict in the Rodney King case. Sergeant Gandy knew of no specific information concerning the possibility of civil unrest following the verdict. During the four-week period prior to the verdict, t he PRO of the LAPD did prepare for the possibility that the EOC would need to be activated following the verdict. Specifically, the EOC began to distribute teletypes of "LAPD Unusual Occurrence Personnel Status Reports" to field commands throughout the city. These reports requested the field commander to detail the personnel resources that they had available as of the date of the report. These status reports were to be used by EOC staff, if necessary, to organize manpower. We need to follow up with Sergeant Gandy to find out if these status reports were actually used and if so whether they were beneficial to the personnel assigned to the EOC. On April 29, 1992 at approximately 4:00 p.m., Chief Gates ordered that the EOC be activated. The EOC was activated as a precautionary measure and only a handful of individuals, including Sergeant Gandy were in the EOC facility. At 2\G\M013502S.LD9 -5- approximately 6:00 p.m. the decision was made to fully activate the EOC. Sergeant Gandy recalled that during the initial hours of the operation of the EOC he was spending all of his time contacting the 125 individuals on his roster. Initially, Sergeant Gandy had difficulty contacting many of the people on the EOC roster. However, as media coverage of the unrest widened, he was able to contact many if not most of the personnel assigned to the EOC. Sergeant Gandy worked in the EOC from 4:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992 until 9:00 a.m. on April 30, 1992. Sergeant Gandy felt that the EOC was overwhelmed with information. He noted that all 20 lines in the EOC were often engaged and that the EOC needed additional telephone lines. He also noted that the amount of information flooding in could not be controlled with the paper message method of detailing reports of events on the street. He believed that a computer system with multiple operators inputting information could be a more effective way of collecting information in similar emergency situations. Gandy also believes that field commanders frequently failed to provide current information about personnel and activity in their area. Gandy thought that this situation was understandable considering the tremendous pressures that the field command was under. However, Gandy felt that there must be a better way of collecting the information from the field commanders so that the EOC could be kept up to date. He 2\G\M013502S.L09 -6- • suggested that individuals within the particular stations and bureaus could be assigned to update the EOC in emergency situations. Sergeant Gandy referred us to a consultants' report by VSP Associates entitled "Emergency Operations Improvement Study," dated July 14, 1992. Gandy explained that VSP Associates had been hired by the city to review the operations of the EOC and to make recommendations for improving the EOC. Observers from the consulting firm were also in the EOC during the April, 1992 civil unrest. Gandy endorsed the consultants' suggestions for changes that are contained in their July 14. 1992 draft report. We obtained a copy of that draft report for the Webster study. Sergeant Gandy's Recommendations To Improve EOC's Operations Sergeant Gandy made the following recommendations to improve the EOC: 1. The LAPD command structure must emphasize that an assignment to EOC is viewed by the command as being important. Without the support from the LAPD command, many officers will continue to· view the assignment as an unnecessary burden. 2\G\M013502S.L09 -7- .,> , ,. 2. There should be greater continuity of personnel assigned to the EOC. This will ensure that those who have been assigned have had adequate training for the variety of emergency situations that may arise. 3. The EOC's equipment must be updated as indicated in the consultant's report. 4. The LAPD should have a tracking system for its cars as the fire department does for its fire fighting equip ment. This tracking system will reduce the need for verbal communication concerning location of personnel. 2\G\M013502S.LD9 -8- SfNT ,BY:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-28-92 3:45pM 12136260010� 213 620 1780 :# 2 • • • . ' ., ., TO: FROMl DATB: RI: KIRKLAND & ELLIS MEMORANDUM Webster Study File James L. Sanders Brian F. Fitzpatrick August 20, 1992 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNBY-CLI!NT COMKUNICATIONS ATTORNIY WQBI PRODUCT Interview with Captain David J. Kalish, Commanding Officer of the Planning and Research Division, LAPD SOHMARY On Thursday, August 20, 1992, at 1:30 p.m. at the L.A. Law center, James Sanders and Brian Fitzpatrick interviewed David Kalish, Commanding Officer of the Planning and Research Division of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). The following is a summary of our recollection of this meeting, including our questions and comments, together with our mental impressions, conclusions and opinions, based upon the meeting. This interview focused upon (a) David Kalish's background, training and experience, (b) his current position as Commander of the Planning and Research Division (PRO), (c) the function and role of the LAPD Emergency Operations Command (EOC), and (d) Kalish's perception of the .effectiveness of the EOC during the riots and his recommendations to help the LAPD and the EOC function more effectively in future emergencies. David Kalish'• Backqround David Kali'sh has worked at the LAPO almost 17 years. During this time, he has worked in a variety of patrol and investigative units. For example, as a Lieutenant, he was in charge of the Airport Department at the Los Angeles International Airport. As a Captain, he served as Captain of the Hollywood Patrol. The Planninq and Research Divi•ion Kalish assumed the responsibilities of Commander of the PRD in December of 1991. It is comprised of 21 sworn officers and 11 civilians. Its responsibilities include coordinating and directing the research and planning for the entire LAPO. specifically, the PRO handles r~s~a~~h ragarding procedural matters such as the proper police procedure for handling a rape I f'J SENT .BY:Xerox Telecopier 7020 8-28-92 3:46PM 12136260010� 213 620 1780;# 4 . ' Th• EOC During the Riots and Kalish'• Raoommendationa When the riots began on April 29th at about 3:00 p.m., Kalish was not on duty. Ironically, he was in San Luis Obispo at the EOC Design Course receiving training on how the EOC functions in times of emergency. He left San Luis Obispo that evening and reported to the EOC the next morning, April 30th, at 6:00 a.m. Upon arriving, he relieved captain Dan Watson, who was in charge of the "B-watch," which runs from 6:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. Normally, Kalish is assigned the "A-watch" at the EOC, which runs from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. and Watson is assigned the B-watch. Kalish said that he was in charge of the A-watch from April 30th until the riots were over. Because he was not present, Xalish did not comment on the police activities or the functioning of the EOC from the outbreak of the riots until he arrived at 6:00 a.m. the next morning. When asked to describe the EOC when he arrived on Thursday morning, Kalish said it was "chaotic." However, throughout the interview, Kalish observed that this was a large z_C scale disaster of such magnitude that the LAPD was simply "overwhelmed." In his opinion, the EOC could have functioned better, but it could not have solved all of the problems. Heh d the following specific observations and recommendations. 1. Training Kalish cited a lack of training as one problem. For example, when asked what t~aining h~ had r•e•ived prior to assuming his position at the PRD, he responded, "On the job." He '<- C did state that he was briefed by Captain Dan Watson, the prior Commanding Officer, but received no formal training. Since his arrival, Kalish could recall three or four I(. EOC training sessions. In early March, the roster listing the members of the EOC staff was updated. on March 16th there was some EOC training exercises, but Kalish did not elaborate. on March 19th they practiced mobilizing the emergency operations units and just before the riots, Kalish attended formal EOC training in San Luis Obispo. In spite of this, Kalish said that there was some confusion in the EOC during the riots. Some EOC staff members were not clear about how the EOC was to function and what each member's responsibilities were. Kalish noted that this confusio was particularly acute early in the riots when the EOC was 1_(_ becoming "operational. 11 He said that, in any emergency, a certain amount of time is needed to get the EOC set up and functional. However, due to the magnitude of the riots, the confusion intensified the EOC's difficulties as it attempted to simultaneously deal with the incoming reports and become operational. - 3 - SENT.BY:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-28-92 3:47pM 12136260010� 213 620 1780:# 5 Kalish attributed the confusion to a lack of training and a turnover in the individuals selected from each department to staff the EOC. Without regular training, previously trained EOC members may forget how the EOC operates and their specific responsibilities. He conceded that it is difficult to train z_C seriously for events that may or may not occur in the future, but stated that proper training is crucial to the EOC functioning well in large scale emergencies. In addition, under the present system, trained EOC staff members from a given division could leave that division and be replaced by untrained personnel. According to Kalish, some of these individuals arrived at the EOC and did not know what to do. Kalish also stated that some field commanders did not 7-C have a sufficient understanding of the EOC's role. During the / riots, this resulted in delays in receiving information from the field. He stated that additional training might alleviate this problem. As a solution, Kalish suggested that more emphasis be placed on training and that it occur more regularly. He stated )~ that increased continuity in training would avoid the problem of having recently appointed and untrained members of the EOC to learning the system during a large scale emergency. 2. Preparation In addition to training, Kalish citad a laok ot preparation prior to the riots as another problem. While Kalish did not say that the LAPD had any specific intelligence that trouble would erupt upon a not guilty verdict, he did say that there was a "suspicion." However, when asked what preparation was taken in anticipation of possible unrest, Xalish said that cG they requested Deployment Teletypes (DT's) from the various bureaus. Deployment Teletypes show how many resources are available at each location throughout the city. Kalish said any preparation was done "low key" because the police were fearful of instigating unrest by their mere preparation. In retrospect, Kalish would have been more aggressive in making preparations and less concerned about provoking / 1 violence. Specifically, Kalish would set up the EOC earlier, L ~ although he did not state exactly how much earlier. Also, he would pre-wire some of the FCC's because there were difficulties in establishing communication lines between the EOC and some FCC's. 3. Facilities and Logistics Kalish noted problems with the facilities and the logistics in the EOC. First, Kalish said that the EOC's small · __, 7-£ physical size hampers performance in a large scale disaster when numerous EOC members are needed. Second, he said that a location - 4 - SENT.BY:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-28-92 3:47pM 12136260010� 213 620 1780;# 6 four stories underneath a building with a large water tower on top is not very good since the most probable large scale disaster in Los Angeles is a big earthquake. As Kalish noted, in such an event, the EOC would become '' lake EOC. " Third, Kalish said that the information retrieval system has become antiquated. Having EOC members write incoming information on pieces of paper and place them in trays to be collected does not work in large scale emergencies. The delays in responding to the FC's caused them to become frustrated, which exacerbated the problem. The information must be communicated and received by the Commanding Officer more rapidly. Kalish suggested a computerized information ret~ieval network, but noted its cost. In addition to the physical facilities, Kalish discussed a logistical problem. He said that it was a problem to have the Emergency Control Center (ECC) in the same location as the EOC. As Kalish explained, the ECC is headed by a Deputy Commander who reports to Chief of Police. In contrast to the EOC, the ECC functions as a command center and not merely as an information center. The ECC oversees the strategy and execution of an overall plan of attack. Kalish noted a tension as the Commanding Officer of the EOC between his duties in the EOC and his accountability to the Deputy Commander of the ECC. Although he did not elaborate, Kalish said that, during the riots, the EOC and its personnel were recruited by the Deputy Commander to carry out ECC functions and responsibilities. This made it difficult for the EOC to perform its own functions. Kalish suggested separating the EOC and the !CC to avoid this tension. 4. cooperation with other Agencies Finally, Kalish discussed difficulties in cooperating with other agencies and departments. We asked him about the mutual aid program with the county and other law enforcement agencies. However, because he ~rrived the day arter the riots began, Kalish said that he did not know how this functioned as it was already in place when he arrived. On the other hand, Kalish did note problems in coordinating with the National Guard (NG). He said they had problems in transporting and deploying the NG. One problem was inherent in the two different systems. The LAPD system and the military system each had its own hierarchy and method of functioning. Simple problems such as knowing with whom to speak in order to move NG troops in the field made the relationship a difficult one. Also, different terminology caused problems. Kalish explained that "deployment" means different things to the LAPD and the NG. The inconsistent terminology intensified the communication difficulties. As a solution, Ralish suggested joint training with the military to coordinate the logistical difficulties. - 5 - -31) SENT sy:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-28-92 3:48PM 12136260010� 213 620 1780:# 7 Kalish also mentioned problems with other agencies. He said that the Department of General Services had problems with the quality and quantity of the food supplied under its contracts. Also, the Department of Transportation, in charge of G,c traffic control, did not report for work for two days. This created difficulties in managing traffic in the peaceful parts of the city that had traffic signals go out. Finally, Kalish noted problems with police escorts for the Fire Department. He said that the LAPD has dealt with this problem and now has escort systems in place for the Fire Department and the Department of Water and Power. - 6 - 08 / 28/92 15:49 '8'213 620 1780 SMRH LOS ANGELES RECEPTION OK TX/RX NO . CONNECTION TEL CONNECTION ID START TIME USAGE TIME PAGES RESULT *************************** *** ACTIVITY REPORT *** *************************** 1219 12136260010 08 / 28 15:45 04'12 7 OK [4]001 SENT ~ BY:xerox Telecopier 7020 B-28-92 3:45pM 12136260010� 213 620 1780:# 3 suspect or victim. After researching the matter, the PRO will generate a directive, which is sent throughout the LAPD. In addition, the PRO coordinates space allocations, researches long range planning and environmental impact forecasts, and writes staff support research memoranda. For further information on the PRO, Kalish referred us to his predecessor, Captain Dan Watson. The Bmergency Operations Command The EOC is a special command center that is activate ~ during emergency situations. It is located 4 floors underground in the City Hall building. The EOC is not staffed in non emergency times. During an emergency, the EOC is staffed by LAPD officers and by civilians from other city departments. Kalish did not discuss the staffing in detail. However, he did mention that various divisions throughout the LAPD designate certain officers to serve as EOC members during an emergency. These individuals serve in their regular positions during normal operations and only staff the EOC during emergencies. In addition, the entire PRO, both sworn officers and civilians, is transferred to the EOC to assist in its operation. As the commander in charge of the PRO, Kalish becomes the Commander in charge of the EOC. Kalish explained that the purpose of the EOC was to serve as an information center dealing with resource allocation and deployment. Ideally, the EOC gathers information from the various Field Command Centers (FCC) each of which has a Field Commander (FC). Officers at the EOC receive the information, write it down on small pieces of paper and place the paper in a tray, which is placed behind them. Periodically, another offi passes by and collects the pieces of paper so that the information can be read and processed. Upon gathering the information, the EOC Commander makes a decision. Routine decisions such as minor personnel or equipment allocation are made by him and communicated back to the FC's. Major resource allocation decisions involving major competing interests are referred to the Deputy Commander of the Emergency Control Center (ECC). However, according to Kalish, the EOC at all times should concern itself with gathering information that it may need to make decisions regarding resource allocation. Kalish did not elaborate further on the functioning of the EOC. He assumed that we had already been briefed on its operation from prior interviews with Dan Watson and other officers. - 2 - IE .. , TO: FROM: DATE: RE: KIRKLAND & ELLIS MEMORANDUM Webster Study File Todd Gale Victor Wright Marci Rothman August 4, 1992 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Interview with Captain Dan Watson, Commanding Officer Personnel Division, LAPD SUMMARY On Thursday, July 23, 1992, at 1:45 p.m. at the Parker Center, Todd Gale, Victor Wright, and Marci Rothman of the Special Advisor's Staff interviewed Captain Dan Watson, Commanding Officer of the LAPD Personnel Division. Captain Watson commanded the B-watch shift (6 p.m. to 6 a.m.) of the LAPD Emergency Operations Command (EOC) during the civil disturbance. The interview lasted 3 1/2 hours and focused on the operation of the EOC during the riots. The following is a summary of our recollection of the meeting, together with our mental impressions, conclusions and opinions. . Watson specifically requested that his comments not be attributed publicly t-d~him. Overall, Watson believes the LAPD responded reasonably to the riot. He hypothesized that "no city could have hired a police department to handle [it]." Although it took some time for the EOC organize, the EOC was eventually able to quell the activity. DAN WATSON'S BACKGROUND Captain Watson has been with the LAPD for 19 years, working at 6 of the 18 patrol divisions in all 4 Bureaus. He held the positions of Sergeant at Rampart; Captain for 10 days at Wilshire, and Watch Commander in Hollywood and North Hollywood. Additionally, for a few months in 1991, Watson headed the Planning and Research Division (PRD). At times, he has also done training and traffic coordination. : During the course of his career with the LAPD, Watson attended several training seminars. As a Sergeant, he completed an earthquake and c i vil disturbance course at the California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI). He also attended an EOC ' ' design course at CSTI when he became captain. Last August, Watson took an earthquake course at the Emergency Management Institute in Maryland. The school is a federal version of CSTI, run by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA, which is a federal version of ca.lifornia's Office of Emergency Services). The course included both classroom instruction and realistic emergency simulations. Currently, Captain Watson is the Commanding Office~ of the Personnel Division of the LAPD. As part of this job, Watson becomes the B-watch Commander of the LAPD's EOC when it ' activates. He held this role during the riots. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS COMMAND AT LAPD 1. Purpose The EOC exists to coordinate the efforts of all the people responding to major emergencies. Various city departments and agencies congregate in one location, eliminating the need to make a lot of phone calls. LAPD's EOC closely resembles -- and runs parallel with -- the County EOC, which is established pursuant to the Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan. Ideally, the EOC activates whenever there is an actual or potential need for a large scale response. 2. -operation The actual EOC office is located 4 floors underground, in a sub-basement of~City Hall East. It has a main room, side rooms for the support staff, and a major's room used as the Commander's office. The office remains empty until an emergency necessitates its activation. On the occurrence of such an event, the EOC becomes the c~ter of an interdepartmental response. According to Watson, smaller agencies and some corporations (e.g. Northrop) normally design EOCs to gather key people together to make policy level decisions, discuss strategy, and operationalize their tactics in the field. The LAPD rejects this model because it does not work with an organization of its magnitude. Leaders have too many political issues to deal with. The EOC simply acts as a coordinating center, delegating many of the decisions down. Captain Watson gave a cursory explanation of the chain of authority at LAPD's EOC, but he did not know enough to elaborate. There were four Field Command Posts established during the disturbance. Emergencies follow the Incident Command System. Basically, the first people on the scene are incident commanders. That policy was followed during the riots. Watson describes the EOC as "the place everybody loves to hate" because there are never enough resources or people. - 2 - Most EOCs are never utilized except in training (originally for nuclear bomb attacks, and more recently for earthquake preparedness). The EOC opens with a decision to activate it. In theory, the EOC Commanding Officer does not make that decision; the job is merely functional. Only the Chief of Police or the Commander of the Uniform Services Group (currently Bane {sp) Lewis and before that George Morrison) can make the official decision. In reality, the captain of the PRO can tell someone to start the process before the official activation. Watson's personal feeling is that it's always better to er~· on the side of activation. / The LAPD EOC has different levels of activation. It functions with anywhere from 3 to 60 people, depending on the extent of the problem. The EOC has activated for natural disasters like the Landers earthquake, the Valley floods, and the Sierra Madre earthquake. It also responds to actual or expected civil disturbances like the threatened closure of LAX during the Gay Rights Parade. When an emergency sparks the EOC into operation, it is supposed to bring in a skeleton crew from different departments, do an initial damage assessment and deactivate if the problem is not major. Watson had little or no understanding of the way the EOC was designed to operate, and referred us to Shirley Mattingly, Bob Canfield, and Valerie Meloff to better explain how the system works. 3. staffing ~ - Captain Watson explained that he is not an expert on staffing. He suggested that Sargeant Rob Gandy could better respond to detailed questions, as his job is to train, organize, staff, and do other wdf-k related to the EOC. In fact, Watson told us that 75% of Gandy's salary is funded by FEMA. Gandy apparently is the only full-time EOC person at LAPD. EOC consists of representatives from every Los Angeles city agency involved in a response to a particular emergency. Member agencies include: the Emergency Operations Board (EOB), headed by the Mayor, and its subcommittees; the Department of Water and Power, which also has its own internal EOC; General Services, providing meals, equipment, and radios; Public Works; Department of Transportation, controlling traffic; Police Department, providing 1/3 of the staffing and coordinating routing, intelligence and maps; the Emergency Operations Organization (the EOO), doing the accounting of equipment and payment (headed by Shirley Mattingly); Department of Recreation and Parks, working with the Red Cross to provide housing for earthquakes and other disasters; Animal Regulation; City Personnel Department, coordinating the volunteers; and the RTD. - 3 - EOC also has official liaisons to facilitate communication with other agencies. Lieutenant Don Rodriguez is the Sheriff's Department liaison. The CHP and the National Guard also provide contact people to the EOC. Once the National Guard federalized, the EOC set up a 24-hour link with the FBI (Charlie Parsons and other regular agents). Anton Galleas provides a connection with the Mayor's office, and CLA acts as the general liaison between the EOC and the various other departments. Additionally, the EOC maintains ringdown lines between the µPD and County EOC. They set up supplementary lines during t1}e· riots. Depending on the nature of the incident, agencies play different roles. For example, the police department is the designated lead in civil disturbances while the fire department takes over for natural disasters. During civil disturbances, PRD is lead division of the EOC. As such, the captain of PRD becomes the A-watch (6 a.m. to 6 p.m.) Commanding Officer of the EOC during an emergency. David Kalish holds this position currently. Under normal circumstances, PRD plans internal departmental changes. Its function is purely administrative, but it is known as a grooming spot for the young and upwardly mobile. Personnel is another lead division. As its head, Watson is the Secondary Commander, on B-watch (6 p.m. to 6 a.m.). Unlike the LASO, which staffs the EOC with a standing team that completely turns over every 30 days, LAPD has a "cadre" which has EOC as part of its responsibility and whose members come and go one at a time. Several weeks prior to the riots, the cadre members of the~EOC had a refresher training course for responding to general disasters. Because the people involved steadily turn over, few of them had practical experience. The training sessions take place at least once per quarter. Some of the newer representat~ves never attended any training sessions prior to the riots. 4. Tension Between the city of Los Angeles and the county Captain Watson views Los Angeles as a separate region with respect to the EOC. He noted the existence of professional jealousy between the LASO and the LAPD. Both Agencies perceive themselves as the "big guy in town" and claim to be the best department. There is also competition between the city and the county for resources because the county controls finances and the city wants more local control. The State is divided into Mutual Aid Regions by the Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan. According to Watson, during a disaster, the city i s supposed to make requests to the region, which requests money f rom the state, which turns to the federal government. - 4 - The city of Los Angeles also dislikes the Mutual Aid Plan. They feel that if L.A. cannot handle a given problem, Burbank (for example) will not be much help. Watson feels that although Mutual Aid works well with the fire department, it is an unrealistic model for the police department. Unlike with a major fire, if the police have a problem too big to control, the rest of the county would likely be affected as well. Mutual Aid coordinators therefore would have to provide aid to other cities within the county. In making these distributive decisions, the county would probably view L.A., because of its size, as ha~ing more than its share of resources. As a result, Watson doe's not see Los Angeles as gaining much from this system. Watson expressed the view that Los Angeles sacrifices too much for a system that benefits it little. Basically, the chain of command slows down the bureaucracy. LAPD wants to go straight to the top. The state concurs, according to Watson, but the county does not want to give up control. They have become "long term competitors." With the riots, the situation exploded so quickly the mayor went straight to the governor. Watson did comment, however, that he felt the LAPD and the LASO had a good exchange of information. WATSON'S ACCOUNT OF EVENTS DURING THE RIOTS 1. General Perceptions Watson stated that he has never been as stressed as he was in this situation, because of the huge amount of work and short time in which to do .it. LAPD's EOC did not have enough staffing during the initial stages of the riots. As a result, the Command spent most of its time "playing catch-up." Watson claimed nothing anyone could have done would have curtailed the riot, and no city coul,a have hired a police department to handle it. Still, Watson's account of LAPD's EOC being overwhelmed in the early stages is consistent with LASO accounts of LAPD's EOC. Once the EOC got organized ·and experienced, Watson believes the operations went smoothly. After the first few days, Watson basically saw his role as a cheerleader to keep up staff spirits. He felt the initial response was slow, unorganized and poor until the plans got going. Effective elements of the riot response were Mutual Aid, the decision to bring in the National Guard and the curfew. Watson expressed his hope that the department would do a critical analysis internally to improve the situation for next time. On June 1, he gave LAPD's Inspection and Control Division a lengthy interview; the LAPD team of the Webster Study should get the report soon. - 5 - 2. Activation of the EOC In Captain Watson's opinion, Mayor Bradley activated the EOC quickly. He called the Governor directly, and by 9:00 p.m., he had a local state of emergency declared. The Mutual Aid System response was almost immediate. The CHP, for example, had 200 officers committed soon thereafter. Watson said he was "impressed that it worked so quickly to get resources enroute to the city." 3. Operation of the EOC During the Riots / The department-wide policy decisions were made in the EOC by the Department Commanders, with input from the Bureau Chiefs. They had some face-to-face meetings and some by telephone. Most of the strategy planning occurred during the A watch, and the bulk of the implementation happened during the B watch. There was a constant tension between EOC and the field officers because the Command needed information to function effectively. The people in the field were too busy "putting out fires" to relay information. The intelligence was highly informal and did not work effectively until they developed some degree of control. The EOC tried to facilitate intradepartmental communication. Major intelligence was summarized in 24 hour reports, put out qt 8 a.m. They included a narrative recapitulation of the previous day's events and statistics about arrests, the number of units deployed to each area, etc. The EOC staff also · kept a journal log, which went to the Chief. Theoretically, the EOC is supposed to record all decisions made. The log is accurate when people have time to fill it out, but during the riots, they were only able to record about 10% of the activity. Additionally, every three to four hours, the key people do briefings to keep the staff informed and help solve each other's problems. At the end of each shift, the watch stayed over for an hour to brief the oncoming staff on the day's events. By the third day, this process took only 15 minutes. The EOC did not have a specific arrest policy for the first few days. Different areas implemented their own plans. Watson referred to Darryl Gates' book for a discussion of the Watts riots as a lesson in how to handle riots. In Watts, the police made a lot of mistakes that later generated effective policies. The faulty strategy there was to stay back and wait for the riot to die down on its own. The current strategy for a full fledged riot is high profile. Even so, if only 4 officers confront 100 looters, this policy does not work. - 6 - 4. Day 1 Captain Watson reviewed notes he made to prepare for his Inspection and Control interview to refresh his memory on the events surrounding the riots. He commented from them throughout the chronological discussion. On Wednesday, April 29, Captain Watson anticipated the Rodney King verdict coming in around 3 p.m. The overall reaction to the not guilty verdict around the office was surprise at··the time. In retrospect, Watson said it was not that shocking' because the officers were charged with criminal, not depa1/tmental policy, violations. As such, the district attorney had to meet a higher standard of proof. As the Secondary Commander, Watson did not participate in any .discussions regarding the EOC. His role was simply to wait for word and respond. He assumed it would be activated. At 4 p.m., he was called and told that it was activated with minimal staff. A lieutenant '\-!as selected as the Commanding Officer. Watson did not view the decision as a problem, as it was standard for some circumstances. Gates did not want a captain in there because he did not want to give the appearance of overreacting, given recent criticism for the LAPD's posture to expect the worst (as evinced in Chief Gates attempt to set aside money for possible social upheaval in response to the King Verdict). A back-up plan was set up in case the EOC needed full scale activation. At the time of this decision, David Kalish, commanding officer 0£ PRD, was at CSTI attending a course. To compensate, Captain Watson was assigned to A-watch and Captain Paul Coble, since retired, was assigned to B-watch. Watson went.~o the lobby after this discussion, knowing Gates would be coming to hold a press conference. He saw a small group of about 10 people milling around the front of Parker Center. He sensed the potential for problems and became concerned about security. In the back of his mind, he worried that protesters would burn down the building. To prevent any problems, Watson called the jail division to request additional people. Later, Watson learned of dissention over the staffing level of the EOC. Deputy Chief Frankel did not agree with the proposal to keep a low profile, and spoke to Gates about putting EOC on maximum staffing. Watson ran into Chief Dotson (his boss once removed), who Watson described as a "persona non grata in the department" and 11 out of the loop." Dotson told Watson that there was a change in plans. The EOC was to be fully activated, with Watson on B-watch. Capt. Watson listened to the part of the press conference and went upstairs to change clothes. When he got - 7 - downstairs, the situation outside had escalated. The protesters were now loud, vocal, and had bullhorns. At this point he became concerned that there would be a problem. Because he was in uniform, Watson decided to drive over to the EOC office across the street rather than walk. He · logged into the EOC at 6:08 p.m., relieved Larry Townsend of his charge and made him an aide. Eight. to ten people staffed the EOC at this time. In the office, ten television screens broadcast local news coverage of the riots. // . / Once there, Watson reorganized to treat the situation as a full blown problem. He began adding people to the normal functions. For example, one person usually handled logistics; he expanded it to six. He also told Townsend to get more officers to return to work at the EOC. Many of them were already headed home, creating some lag time. People did trickle in, but the EOC was extremely understaffed. Watson commented that, even at full staff, they would have had problems. At 6:40 p.m., the Communications Watch Commander, Lieutenant George Godwin, called to say "South Bureau has lost it; we need to declare a tactical alert." A tactical alert (tac alert) means the resources in one area are insufficient to handle the police problems, and directs people to shift their response. Officers must stop responding to all non-primary calls and move people -to areas that need it. The alert is fairly routine, occurring about once every six weeks. Any huge crime scene, too big for the affected Division to handle, triggers a tactical alert. Although they are usually cancelled after an hour, tac alerts are not done on a whim. They involve immense paper work and have to be justified. Only a Field Commander or the Communications Watch Commander can declare it. _ .. _ No one wanted to make the decision. They were all second guessing themselves. Even though he had the authority, Lt. Godwin wanted to run his suggestion by the Department Commander before declaring the alert. Watson could have approved it because Frankel was not around, but he called Commander Rick Dinse of Chief Gates' staff and told him the circumstances. He asked whether he should run the situation by Gates. Dinse told him to just go ahead do it. Watson felt that because the whole process took only seven minutes, it did not impact the response significantly. It does illustrate, however, the lack of clear lines of command at LAPD's EOC. They ended up declaring a tac alert for South Bureau. Ten minutes later, the situation intensified. Godwin then declared a tac alert for the entire city. The EOC became chaotic. Watson only had time to occasionally look up at the television to follow the progress of the riot. Nonetheless, he was aware from these reports that the police were not in the area of Florence and Normandie. - 8 - At 7 p.m., Godwin called again from the Communications Center. He was frustrated because his efforts at assigning Code 3 calls were being hampered. (Code 3 represents a life and death emergency; it is rare. Code 2 is urgent, like a burglary in progress or a fist fight. "Hot shots" refers to both code 2 and 3 calls.) Godwin said ne was receiving all kinds of hot shots and then the 77th Division watch commander would call in and cancel them. The 911 c~lls were coming in, and the radio officers heard 12L10 (the code designation or name for the field commander in 77th division who happened to be Michael Moulin, the 77th watch commander) directing the radio workers to cancdi them. Godwin could not understand what Moulin was trying to do. _ _ Watson explained to Godwin that it was not within his role at the EOC to make decisions. He was just supposed to supply information. Watson then tried to contact Deputy Chief Frankel to pass on the information. He also informed Commander Dinse. Chief Vernon also called Watson. Although he had retired and cleared out his office, he was technically still on the books as Assistant Chief. He informed Watson that he just got off the plane from Colorado Springs and was due to be in Florida the next day. He volunteered to come in if the department needed him. Watson relayed the information to either Jones or Frankel (he does not remember which), who decided they did not need Vernon. Consequently, the department was left without Vernon or anyone else functioning at the Assistant Chief level . . The decision was made to elevate Deputy Chiefs Booth and Frankel to Department Commanders during the riots. (See Perceived Problems below). Gates was in and out of the EOC office throughout the night. He initially t0ld Watson that they did not need the National Guard; they could just get the units on the street to take care of it. Wat:ron felt it was not his job to disagree. Just before 9 p.m., Godwin called again. He informed Watson that they had taken over 1400 calls in the past hour. The night before, there were less than 200 calls in the same hour. By 9 p.m. the LAPD declared a mobilization. A step beyond a tac alert, a mobilization puts the entire LAPD on 12-12 shifts, and cancels all days off. Watson felt impressed that the decision to mobilize was made this early. To illustrate the role of the EOC, Watson gave an example of the kind of situation he handled throughout the night. South Bureau had asked for a lot of people. The department assembled everyone, but they had no way of getting them into the f ield quickly. The problem was that the first shift took all the black-and-whites to the city. The time lag between the first shift returning the cars and the second shift driving to their assignments would be t oo great. Watson spent much of the first night obtaining buses. He first tried to call the LASO, but the - 9 - ~· ,, slow response forced him to call RTD as a back-up. The RTD came through with drivers , buses and security quickly. Even with the planning, the system took a while to iron out. Not all the buses showed up, poor communications caused the people to come in at staggered,times for their shifts, and the off-shift people came back in late. Overall, Watson felt that the EOC was inadequately_ staffed the first day. People were inexperienced and unfa~iliar with the roles they had to fill. In his opinion, by the ~ime they acquired the necessary experience, it was too late, the riot was over. 5. Day 2 At 8 a.m. on Thursday, Frankel asked for all _motorcycles to respond to the academy. Gates wanted them transported in buses rather than on their cycles. The scarcity of department buses and the unavailability of drivers slowed the process down. Watson also tried to get the Metro people out of Parker Center and onto the streets. He felt that, with their extensive training, keeping them as caretakers was a waste of resources. Metro had special units which had been trained to respond to civil disturbances, such as demonstrations or protests, but they had no training for controlling massive riots or looting. He asked for half of the motor cops to cover for Metro, so Metro could get into the field. Recognizing that police officers are independent thinkers, who routinely handle problems on their own, he gave his staff a certain degre,e~of autonomy. He told them to approach each problem from scratch, as if there were no policy, because the uniqueness of the situation warranted such an approach. He observed that the police officers followed his orders, but other agency representatives are more bureaucratic and had problems with this approach. General Services, /for example wasted a lot of time working out how to package the food. Chief Hunt, the Command Post Logistics Officer, requested food for his men. He wanted something that could easily be distributed on the field, such as a bag lunch. General Services showed up the next day with tubs of hot food. Despite promises to work it out, somewhere along the line it kept failing. It took several days to work out even this small problem. Watson felt that the food situation diminished morale. People became tired and frustrated. Deputy Chiefs ended up yelling at each other over meals. By Thursday night, the EOC was running better, but it still had problems. The Bureau Chiefs spent time planning the - 10 - resource distribution for Friday. West Bureau, Rampart and Wilshire sustained heavy damage. Lacking resources, the Department Commanders had to decide which areas to leave exposed. They could either write off South Bureau and save the rest of the city, or send all the units to South Bureau and try to stop the riot at its core. Because th~ problem began in South Central L.A., they decided to send 1 units there. Parks and Lavante argued that they would lose their areas, and they could not give up the resources. Frankel overruled their objections. This inter~al fighting highlighted the problem of peer-to-peer leadership · (see discussion below). / 6. Day 3 Friday, everything blew up in the rest of the city. Watson maintains that the Commanders were in a "no win" situation. Their strategy to flood South Bureau did work in that area, where the rioting slowed tremendously. He felt the decision prevented significant damage. · By the end of Day Three, the EOC felt it had more of a grip on the situation. By Friday night, the whole operation was running well. Watson attributed this development to a smooth intelligence flow from the police, the news media, and informants. The improvement in EOC operations coincided with more control in the streets. The National Guard was also in the field, which helped. · From there, the situation progressively improved. The police~still had some difficulties to work out with the Guard. Namely, the two agencies use a different language. For example, he LAPD uses "deployed" to mean out in the field and working. The Guard uses the same word to mean that the relevant people have been aler;fed. Once "deployed", it still takes time to get Guardsmen on the scene. The EOC consequently believed that the National Guard would be on the street long before they actually were. 7. Day 4 and beyond The system was operating smoothly, and the riot was under control. Everything was running well, and Monday was the first "normal" day. The Department of Transportation (DOT) was asked to provide traffic control at intersections that still had no power. The EOC estimated they would need 200 workers. The DOT could only provide 75. They were final l y able to get 150 by 5 a.m., but Watson felt it was "too little, too late." He cited this situation as an illustration of the problem with bureaucratic leadership. - 11 - PERCEIVED PROBLEMS 1: Hesitancy to Respond In Watson's estimation, the post-Rodney King criticism maµe the department gun shy. When Gates responded to .the problem of understaffing at the upp~r l~v~ls, he was criticized for trying to make these changes. He was told that increasing the staff he would trigger riots. This background of disapprov~l interfered with decision-making and reaqtion during the ri9ts. Gates considered public perception of the department when be chose not to put a captain in charge of the EOC during th~ initial stages. Probably, no one in the public sector would have been aware of the staffing anyway. The paranoia filtered down to the entire department. 2. Peer-to-Peer Chain of Command Because of the recent retirements .and Gates' insistence of never talking to Chief Dotson, the department did n0t have a functioning Assistant Chief. The decision was made to elevate two of the six Bureau Chiefs to Department Commanders. The other 4 would make up the Field Command. Watson speculated that Booth and Frankel were chosen because they had bureaus without geographic responsibility. The appointments escalated existing tensions between the Bureau Chiefs. They had been competitors for as long as they were contemporaries. Four of them (Croker, Parks, Lavant and Hunt) had recently competed for the Chief's job. Moreover, scarce resources always caused rivalry. With the temJ?orary assignments came difficulties. Booth and Frankel had~to make tough decisions about sacrificing areas of the city. Furthermore, Frankel and Booth held interests in opposition to the other Bureau Chiefs. They had existing Commands that they needed to run, so their tendency was to return operations to normal functioning. The other Bureau Chiefs liked the mobilization because they had problems in their areas. Watson felt that some possible questioning of authority slowed down the response time. Having someone with a higher office in charge would have helped the situation. 3. Inadequate Training of EOC staff EOC currently has a cadre pf untrained people. People are assigned there depending on where they work. Interdepart mental transfers constantly shift the make-up of the EOC. The bulk of people never have time to get enough experience or training. Watson suggests a better strategy would be to use volunteers who permanently maintain their membership. However, this suggested str ategy also presents the problem of keeping the - 12 - permanent staff close to the EOC headquarters so that they can respond quickly when activated. Additionally, the CSTI had switched their focus from civil disturbance management to natural disaster training. Many courses that might have been valuable had been cancelled. Watson felt that in light of the riots, h renewed emphasis on the civil disturbance material would better prepare people for future problems. · 4. Federalization of the National Guard Gates was against it; Bush wanted it, and Bradley indicated he might be for it. Watson felt federal intervention was unnecessary. The infusion of federal agents interrupted an operation that was starting to work. The bureaucracy crippled the current procedures. The Guard's strength was securing areas once the police got them under control. Federalization forced the police to waste r~squrces doing what the Guard could have done. Watson did not know whether federalization made any r eal difference, but he commented that it was extremely frustrating. - 13 - I. i I SENT-BY:xerox Telecopier 1020 B-29-92 1s:5a \ ., RM & S #2� 3i0-8S6-4515 TO; FROM: FILEa DATE: MEMORANDUM PRIYILIGIQ ANJ) CQNFIPINTIAL A'l"tQRNIY 1981 PRQPUC'l' Susan I. Spivak and Jan L. Handzlik Maren Christensen and Stacey M. Byrnes Web ter Study Pila August 24, 1992 Interview w1·th connandar Lawrance B. Fettar1 August 39. 1992 SUIQIA.RY OF INTBRYIEW or CONIIANDIR LAWRENCE ;s. FETTERS. LQS ANGJ;LIS POLICI DIPARDIHl On Monday, August 24, 1992, at 2130 p.m., we interviewed Commander Lawrence E. Fetters at the Weat Bureau. Iaaues diacusaed included Petter' assignment ae commanding officer of the !OC on April 29 and April 30, 1992, his asaignment to the South Bureau for a portion of that time, and his field ae1ignment in a sector of the south Bureau beginning on April 30, 1992, Also discussed were: the LAPD•• preparation for the verdict•; the purpose and staffing ot the EOC; Mutual Aid procedures, city emergency proaedurea; the general types of command posts; and Fettera' .suggestion• for addressing some of the problema encountered in responding to the events. The following is a summary of our reoollectian of the meeting, along with our mental impressions, concluaiona and opinions. l)OC!br 'l':\8MB\W03.HIM I: SENT. av:xerox Telecopier 1020 B-29-92 1a:59 RM & s #2� s,o-ese-4si5 TO: PROM: FILE: RE: DATE: MEMORAMDUM PBIYILIQEQ AND CQNFIDINTIAL ArtQRNIY WQBI PROQUC:T Susan I. Spivak and Jan L. Handzlik Maren Christensen and Stacey M. Syrnea Webster Study Fila Auguet 24, 1992 Interview with commander La~rence B. Fetters Auguat 29, 1992 INTERVIIW or COMNANllER LAWRINCB 1, l"l'l'TERS, LOS ANGELES PQLIC! DBPARffllN'l' on Monday, August 24, 1992, beginning •t 2130 p.m., we interviewed LAPD Coanander Lawrance E. Fetters at the West Bureau, The following 11 a summary of our recollection of the meeting, along with our mental impression, concluaions and opinions. Fetter, who had not bean interviewed before in this investigation, 1a a commander with the Los Angeles Police Department Office of Operations, Ha is now with the West Bureau, In April of this year, Fetters waa the A1sistant to the Director for the Office of Operations, working directly for Chief Vernon, At that time, Fetters had held the position for three yaare. Fetters has worked for the Los Angeles Police Department for 29 years, experiencing the 1965 riots as a police officer. In 1978, ha became a commander and staff officer, In 1986, he became assistant commanding officer for the support Services Bureau. A, FETTERS' INVOLVEMENT IN THE EYEN'l'S B!GIQING ON UDNESDAY, APRIL 29, 1992 Announcamant of the Vardiet.1: Fett•rs' office was in Parker Cent~r. someone 6aid that the verdicts were about to be announced, and Fetter• w•tched them read on televi•ion, Aa he heard the verdicta, "you could have heard his jaw bounoe on the floor." Fetter• stated that although he does not want to pae independent judgment on events, he, just as a caaual observer of television and newspaper coverage, expected a hung jury at beet and a guilty verdict against Powell. Later, there was a demonstration in front of Parker Center. He went to the rooftop to observe. The demonstration was fairly orderly in the early afternoon. Si.NT. 5y:xer0x T elecopier 7020 B-29-92 1e:59 IQC.: At some point that afternoon, Pettera became aware, through television and commercial radio, of some typ• of turmoil in the city. At about 6 p.m,; he left his office and went to the BOC. He had not been assigned any responsibility for the EOC, but because Chief Frankel was his boas, it was natural for him to go to the EOC and ask what Frankel wanted him to do. The EOC ls the nerve center ot the department; anyone with experience would know to go there, When Fetters arrived, many people were there from the LAPD -- police officers, supervl•ory personnel, Chief Frankel - and from other city departments, La.t,.. the Departmnt of Tran1portation and the Fire Department, All of the positlona appeered to ba staffed fully. The televisions were tuned to the commercial stations. He doe• not know who had decidad to open th• EOC or how much time passed before thet decision waa made. His conjecture would be that captain Dav• kalieh of PRD might have gotten people started. A tactical alert, which redistributes uniformed personnel, nad been called city-wide before he got to the EOC. Fetters reported to Frankel, who wee in tha conference room adjacent to th• 1cc. Frankel briefed him and aasi;ned him as commanding officer of the EOC. ratters &pant everal hours at the EOC. Mia responsibility was to ensure that the EOC was properly staffed and functioning, that is, that people ware sitting at the phones, that people knew their reep0nsibilitie1, that the flow of information waa appropriate, Fetters' being interposed as commanding officer was happenstance. rxan.kal wanted a staff officer to make sura that the EOC waa running correctly. Fetters at•ted that he thought, but was not ure, that a oaptain waa there. It could have bean Kalish or Watson. (Watson was on the B watch.) A captain would virtually have run things at the BOC, The EOC i a large offioe, about 60 feet by 25 feet. There 11 a ho~aashoe in the cantar with 20 poaitions, each clearly marked,~ LAPD Logistics, LAPD Intelligence, Building and Safety. (Fetta~s said that there 1a no court liaison on tha 100, but there 1a one in the offi0e of the police chief, Fetter 2/1 doe• not know if the EOC was in contact with the courthouse in Simi Valley.) The personnel section gathered infor•tion regarding city-wide availability of resources. Aid requests ware received from involved a~eas. Everything waa smoothly functioning, woe fully staffed; there were no ;litchas. Everyone knew what h• or she was doing; tha routine was down. A system of massage-routing was uaad at the EOC. J 4 < Someone at the phone would take notea on a multi-••t form, and a L---V- runne~ would distribute the form; the recipients depended on tha nature of the massage and the namea checked off on the form for receipt. All forma would go to Chief Frankel. The BOC also had 2 :, .-. ,,__,,_.,..-·--·,·-· -· , ····-···-·-~•-• ..... -- ... SENi av:xerox Telecopier ?020 B-29-92 17:00 RM & S #2~ 310-886-4515 a atatus board to Which people were assigned. That board showed, I...Jl.a., the number of people deployed, the command posts, property damag• and caaualties. Everyone in the EOC could aea it. Frankel, not Fetter•, did the analysis and atratagizing. Frankel was using his jud(Jlllant to decide where to put the limited reaourcea. Soon afte~ Patters arrived, Frankel mobilized the entire department. Reaasigna1nt to South Bu;e1~s The South Bureau's aoJ1111and poat was at !4th and van Ne•• in an KTD tao111ty p•rking lot. The telephone line ware jammed, and not all were functioning, The !OC was severely hampered by the lack of timely information from this Bureau. At about 9 p.m., Frankel reaaaignad Fetter to the south Bureau to identify the problems there and work to correct them. Pettera went to the South Bu~eau co81ffland post with · Sergeant Hundehamer (with whOnl he worked ovar tha next few days). En route to the command post, there eemed to be a dearth of personnel. He thought it was because the pro~lam,s were city wide, and the reaourcea were depl•ting, Driving to South Bureau1 he saw looters and fires on avary block. When Fetters arrived at the comnand poat, the telephone lines were not yet functioning. General services was till working to install them; the procesa waa slowed bllQauae General Services had to hard wire all of the linaa, Generally, the LAPD knows when en event will happen, and the lines are up hour or day• in advance. Hare, the auddeMa11 of the event left them without proper communications for many hours, Fetters told the south Bureau that the BOC was "dying on the vina 0 because of lack of information, He found some cara with cellular telephone and moved them over to the command po1t. On• or two hour later, the trailer telephones were activated. Fetters continued with liaison duty until 11:30 p.m. or midnight, establishing a good, reliable command post through a "variety of means.,. Fetters then contactad the EOC, Prank.el decided that Fetters should work the day shift (peraonnel are generally divided into two 12 1/2 hour shift) and told him to go home. Fetters and the Sergeant then want into the field to aee about protection for th• Fire Department. Petters want home et l or 2 a.m. Return to EOC: At 6 a.m. on Thur day, April 30, Fetter• went ba0k to the EOC aa commanding officer. Frankel had stayecl all night. Booth showed up at 6 a.m. or earlier and assumed responsibility, but Fetters stayed until 8 or 9 a.m. Then, an adjustment wa made, Asked about Piersol and Pomeroy, Fettara explained that they were the executive officers for the department oommandera (Frankel and Booth). 3 ;# 5 ----··-···------·····- ···--··--·--·••··--···---·-----·-- -- -·--~-- . ·-·•...-·~-· se~t sv:xerox Telecopier 7D20 ; B-29-92 ; 11:01 ; RM & S #2� 3i0-8SB-45i5 Rt,asaianment ta Fiel~: At 11 a.m. on April 30, Petters waa assigned permanently into the field. He waa aaei;ned to a actor in South Bureau and given personnel and resources to police a location. on Thursday, he had LAPD peraonnel; on Friday, he had a "potpourri" of Mutual Aid paraonnel from, .1..t.JL.., Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearas; Pri on•~ Huntington Beach Police Department. On Saturday, he had personnel from the N•tional Guard. Fetters began requesting National Guard personnel on Friday. on Saturday, h~ wae aa igned a Guard intant~y company from Central California. He put the Guard to good uee, aeaigning them to secure high ground and to guard the command poet--thera had been two ambush ahootinqa the day before. When asked it it was difficult to work with the Guard, Fetters stated that the company commander of the Guard aaai;ned to Fetters waa outstanding. The commander may have been so cooperative because he felt that Fetters was giving the Guard appropriate mlaeiona. When ha could, the Guard commander dealt directly with Fetters rather than going through the Guard's chain of cotnmand. Thia made the association particularly useful. On• benefit to the Guard aaaigned to his command post was that Fetters was able to get volumes of hot food from a nearby churchJ when they arrived, the Guard h8d not eaten for one and one-half days. Alao, the command post was at a school, so the Guard could leap and shower in the gym. The National Guard was recalled to the Coliseum on Sunday. Regarding the general effect of fedarall1ation, Fetters said that he was no expert, but fedetalizing the National Guard caused serious conrplicationa. Fetters stated that Commander Jim Jones would know more about th• effeat of federalization. Baaed on the information which Fetter• ~ece!ved from Jones during and after the avent, Fetters is 99.91 certain that fedaraliaation complicated matters. Before federalization, the Guard would get miaeiona from the LAPD. After federalization, the Guard would have to oall through it• chain of coramand and obtain approval from lawyer• in Wa•hington. Four to five hours after the request, the Guard would finally get the okay. The other federal law enforcement a;enciea did not seem to have this problem. A po11ible explanation is that persoMel from other agencies, LJL:., the Bureau of Prison• and ATF-, routinely worked with local l~w enforcement, and would recogniie and respond to an LAPD authority figure. The National Guard, not being compri•ad of regular law •ntorcemant official•, would not know whether or how to respond. 4 •. SENT~ sv:xerox Telecopier 1020 B-29-92 11:01 B. PftEPARATIQH roR THI VERDICTS A special purpose meeting WAS held by the Office of Operations two or three weeks, or perhaps a month, before the verdicts. This was a regulAr meeting of ataff and command officers in Operations. Attendance by the 18 area commanding officers {captain•) and at least one staff officer from each of the five bure4ua was mandatory. At first, Fetters said that the meeting concerned what to do to prepare for the verdiota. Later, he said that the session waa part of normal diaaster contingency plannino tn Lo Angele although the verdicts were also a consideration. Fetters said that the department did not want to ba obvious al:>out planning for the verdicts, did not want to set up an alarm. A package of material was distributed at the meeting. The package included, !..:Jl.t., existing directive• regarding standing plans and documanta concerning updating the A and B mobilization roster• (Every four weeks, people change h1fts, the rosters must be adapted.) Pre-designated command poats were 1dant1fied. · C • BAClCGRDtnm RELATING TO THE !!QC Purpoae of EOC: The EOC does not eontrol police action on the •t~eet. It primarily exist to coordinate reque1ta for ;# 7 resource• from around the city--to coordinate and integrate departmental raepone1b1litie in ca • of, .L..SL:., earthquake, fire. l (;_ One function 11 to deal with LAPD response to other city d'!P•~t!:.,a. ~Alfi_l!!d.lii-[iiiLJfl_,,,,,,...11 fi.tllt ~~• 1ffli~es la I9aa-fik~ly !n riot situations, although outside vendors will still be contacted for food, watar and bedding. stoffing of 10c, T;a1n1M oC D11ign111: EOC personnel from the LAPD are determined based on where people are aeaigned in the department, Deaignees 11.x-e part of "the EOC Cadre." They are pr:e desionatad, pre-trained, and know when and where to go. The PRD is part of tha Support Service• Bureau, and is the primary ource for EOC staffing, Anyone assigned from PRD would know if he or •he had the EOC night shift or day shift, and would know what to do there. Call-up systame, using call-out rosters and the telephone, are used to contact the de igneee, As soon aa • tactical alert ie callad, people go to their officee and break out the rosters. Each LAPD position at the !OC has some depthJ there is redundancy built in. For example, tor the personnel 5 SENT 5y:xerox Telecopier 1020 B-29-92 11:02 --------- -- ~ ' · ., section, you might have eight or nine people that you could call; you m i ght need to call that number over a holiday weekend in ~ ordar to get t hree. Fetters guesses that other departments work , the same way a the LAPD in terms of BOC staffing procedures, he assumes that there are pre-designated people. Commander Jones of SSB has some primary responsibility for taffing the EOC. He woul~ be a good parson to talk to about these procedures, as would lali1h. For LAPD deaigneea to the !OC, training takes plaae within each deaignee's own command. Designees are taught tactical plannin9 and overall responsibilities; they are also aent to seminars. The deaignees get together to train. There is a City Emergency organiaation which trains as a city family. commander Dan Lawis, in Tactical Planning at Headquarters, informed him that once a year the city family goes to Arrowhead with the mayor. There th•Y receive training in unusual occurrences and engage in tabletop exeroises. D. MUTUAL AJD/CITY EMERGENCY Pl\®EDUREB Mutual Aid Process: Fetter explained the Mutual Aid procedur•s, noting that he has no personal knowledge of the process used here. To initiate a request for MUtual Aid, the mayor has to declare a local emergency. This allow• sheriffs, other police departments and the National Guard to be brought in. Th• TAC manual describes the process by which an emergency ia declared and the shar1ff ia brought in and coordinate•. Under at•te law, the 1nar1ff of the county is tha Mutual Aid coordinator through the Office of Emergency services, Whan asked his views of thia process, Fetters re•ponded that the system has worked for years. The premise 1• that for a local emergency, it is desirable to uae local resources. If tho1e are inadequate, they move to the next level of resource• The sheriff has authority to bring in the sheriff's own department and other departments. Th• idea 1a to get a reasonable 0ommitment from Los Angeles county before going beyond the county level, The aid grows in an organized manner from level to level. cit~ hl,rgengy froceduraa --Notification of Emargancya Fetter• gave an example of the notification procedures employed 1n an emarganoy. If a field unit ware to find a fire, and knew that it waa going to l)e a big one, the LieQtenant called to the acene would know that a tactical alert was necessary. The Lieutenant would radio or telephone Communications to call a city-wide tactical alert. Communication would notify the 0eteative Headquarters d1Vilion at P•rker center, that division la open 24 hours, Detective HQ would dispatch someone to open and power up the EOC. Detective HQ would contact Tactical Planning, which would take over notifying appropriat• personnel. PRD, rather than Detective HQ, 6 SENT 5y:xerox Telecopier ?020 B-29-92 17:03 could be notified of the tactical alert directly by Communications if the problem occurred during normal working ~ hours. (He does not know what prooedure was followed hare.) ,Those EOC staffing divisions Which are not open 24 hours •re contacted by beeper. --~ommand Poa~a and communications: once a command poat is established for a bureau, it assumes direct line command in the involved area. Communicationa no longer has pxim•ry rasponsibility, although they still handle ordinary calla. Communications would direct calls to the command poats. --EQ<. Fvnc:iton1 The EOC does not nacesauily take over - one~ ,,,- there !a a city-wide tactical alert. The KOC makes more global \~ deci ione, providing resources for field coananders, who than decide where to send the resources. --M9bilizttio91 ffhan there is a mobilieation, the A ana B liete are activated. The non-uniformed police, .1..aJL. detective•, become uniformed officers. E. ISTAILISHING COQAND POSTS A command post can be operated out of a car. The next level 1 a van, which has more sophisti0ated equipment and which has placea for everyone to ait. For example, if an overflow were expected at the Palladium for a ~ock show, a van would be used as a command poat. The next level is the command post fleet, which consists of semis and tractors that tit together to form different offices. These trucks were sent to the R'l"D facility at south aureAu, which was probably a pre-designated command post because of the huge parking lotJ hundreds of police officer• could •uster there, and an office building was there. F, fROBLEMS--POBSIBLE SOLUTIOK§ 1. The courts should assume a proactive postur~. The jury verdicts came in quickly. Had the LAPD known 8, 18, or 24 hours before the verdicts, it would have been in a much better po•ition to deal with them, Evan four hours would have been helpful. Fetters said that his judgment in hindsight 1• that the LAPD should have been ready ror the verdicts. With a minimum of 12 hours• notice, the LAPD could have sat up an infrastructure~ staffed the EOC, establish•d connand posts, set up telephones. With 24 houra, they could have put 2,000 police officers on th• street. Because problems wera most likely to occur at South Bureau, 1,000 officers could have been put there. The re t could have been available for redeployment into other areas, .tL...ae.., Pacoima., if naceasary, The theory i1 to cover hot spots. 2. Better communications are needed early on. Pre designated comand poat sites could be wired in advance to plug ' ' • ' - ..... ,..,,..-•• -:w-- .... ~-·· ~ ·· · - · no power end telephone eyateu. Thia wauld coat thouaands of dollars. In addition, aor• cellular telephone are needed in - patrol cars. Radios are not designed for conver ation -- they , are deeigned for bursts of information, There are ve.ry few cellular telephones; they tend to be only in staff officers' cars. sometimes Fattera' cellular telephone worked and ometimea it did not, (He noted that cellular telephones were the only way to communicate in the San Francisco Bay area during the earthquake when radio transmissions were lost.) To increase radio transmission capacity, LAPD has acquired 39 new f~•quencies from the FCC; implementation will cost $250 million. A media connection could have helped. The police halicoptar et Florance and Normandie had television capacity, but had broken down. (Not all of the police heliooptera have talevia!on capacity.) 3. Additional police ara naade4. ~hrwe to t1ve thou•and police officers should be available to respond to major incidents. Had there been those numbers, unit would not have had to leave Florence and Normandie for faar of being overwhelmed. The police got off the atraet to e•e if the incident would cool off, but sending in 500 officer& would have been better than withdrawing. The depArtmant 11 too small, particularly given the city's cultural and ethnic d!varaity, social problems and language ba~ri~rs, as well•• its geographical 1praad. Tha police have to create a situation where the likelihood of such incidents is minimal. Had thoee who are criminally inclined aeen a police response on television, they might not have gone out on the streets. 4, The EOC needs more time for training and a better training budget. The only training is by the State ot California. The Po t Commi eion provides limited monay. Patter Memorial raises funtta through, !..a.i,.a.., golf and tenni1 tournaments -~ Fetters thinks it odd that the police have to seek funds from •uch an organiiation. LAPD needs a d11cretionary training fund for unusual occurrence procedures. The EOC team needs to be larger and better ateffed. This would be a banetit becau e thay could train more people who could perform more efficiently earlier on. Fetter• did not, however, see deficiencies at the EOC, He believes that it would be a waste to have an EOC skeleton standing crew. The EOC should, howev~r, have four or f1ve training days a year. 8 .~ """"', •• ~ ~ . •-t ..... :· ··. • · . , . . . . . .~ .. \ .. •. ~ .: . . ' .. . .. ~ .. •-:-·· , ........... . . ---- ----- -~--·-··--- - TO: FROM: FILE: RE: DA'l'E I MEMQRAMDUH PRIVILEGED AND CONFIQENTI~ ATTORNEY WORK PRODUC:'t SUSAN I. SPIVAK/JAM L, HANDZLIK MAREN CHRISTENSEN/STACEY M. BYRNES WEBSTBR STUDY SUMMARY/COMMANDER PIERSOL INTERVIEW AUGUST 28, 1992 BtJIIMARY OF INTBRVlEW or FRANK PIIRSQL, LAPQ commander Frank Pieraol ("Piersol") was interviewed on August 26, 1992, by Maren Christensen, Stacey M. Byrnes and Paul sower. The topic• covered in tha interview include the structure and operation of LAPD'a Emergency Operation Center ("BOC"), specifically with regard to Piarsol'e involvement with the EOC beginning April 30, 1992 at approximately 2100 p.m. and continuing for approximately twenty days. Piersol served a• aaaistant to Chief Booth, who acted as Department coaunande~, A watch. Th• following 11 ~ summary of our recollections of thia meeting, including our questions and comments, together with our mental impressions, concluaiona and opinions. SENT ev:xerox Telecopier 7020 B-29-92 ; 17:ia RM & s #2� s,o-ase-45i5 i.' ,. j ,, TO: FROM: FILis RE: OATIS lf.EMORANDUM PRIVILEGBD AND CONFIDENTIAL A'rl'QBNII IORIS PBQDUCT SUSAN I. SPIVAK/JAM L, HANDZLIK MARIN CHRISTEMSBH/STACEY M. BYRIIES WEBSTER STUDY COMMANDER PIERSOL INTERVIEW AUGUST 28, 1992 On Wednesday, August 26, 1992 at 9 a.m., Maren Chriatansen, Stacey Byrnes and Paul Bower inter~iewed Commander Frank Piersol ( 11 Piersol") of the Las Angele• Police Departmant, in the Police Commission's offices at 150 Parker Center. The following ia a summary of our recollections of thie meeting, including our question• and comments, together with our mental impressions, eonclusiona and opinions. We began the interview by telling Piersol that we had read the notes of his last in-erview and would not inquire into the i1suas which had already been covered, Wa did not ask him to again tell us his background with the police force but did point out that in hie last interview ha ha~ stated that he believed hie job description would change on July 1, 1992, He told ua that his po&ition had not changed, that he ts still the liaison between the LAPD and th• Police Commission and that he expects to remain in that capacity until early 1993. Piersol told ua that he wanted ue to understand the situation in tha city on April 29 and 30, and related to ue substantially the same events which ha had mentioned in hia prior interview regarding his activities with the Police Commissioners on the evening of April 29 and the morning ot April 30. The diacua110n moved to toe-related issues when his chronology raeched the late afternoon of April 30, At that time, Pier•ol waa back 1n the commission offices r~maining on call to the commissioners. He received a call from Chief Booth ("Booth") which Piersol described as "frantic. '' Booth was the Department Commander of the A watch (6:00 a.m. to 6100 p.m.), Booth told h1a that he needed Pi raol to help him out and wanted him to come to the BOC iDllllediately. Piersol reported to Booth, who was stationed in a room adjoining SENT av:xerox Telecopier 7020 B-29-92 11:is RM & S #2� a,o-8S6-45i5 .. ,. , the EOC. Piersol was assigned there for the next twenty days as assistant to Booth. 1 Piersol doee not know who would ordinarily have been Booth's assistant. Piersol had had no prior experience at the BOC. Whan aake4 why he thought he wae chosen to asai t sooth, he stated that ha had hed extensive experience at field command activities, He also said that they were running out of "staff,'' which he defined as commanders and chiefs. These officers were all being deployed so quickly that they simply ~•n out of people. STA'J'US or 'l'HI EQC UPQN PIERSOL'& ARRIVAL QN APRIL 30, 1992 Piereol believes that ha arrived at th• EOC at about 2 to 2130 p.m. He described the EOC room a large, with a horseshoe-shaped table in the oenter, 2 Around that table sat the representatives of the various aoencies which participate in the BOC, !..:.SI.:., Dept. of Water & Power, Dapt. of Building and safety, the Rad Cross, the Fire Department, the Nation rd. Each desk had a telephone and a computQr terminal. Soma had maps and var o gancy emergency proce ure llt4nua s, glaaa wall separated the Department commander'• office from the EOC room, so Booth could see but not hear the activity around the horseehoe shapad table. The EOC also contained a bank af televlaions which Piersol described as .. always on," though not ~aally monitored. (Piersol also ~entioned some kind of cable or cloaed-circuit television; whether that was alway available or whether it becmne available later was unclear.) Whan asked about the status board in the EOC, Piersol responded that he could not sae it from where he waa and that frankly no one paid much attention to it. When Piersol arrived, things se8Dled to be in disarray, with many people trying to talk to Booth at once. It was not an environment consistertt with getting the job aone in an orderly Z... manner. He felt that Booth was overwhelmed with th• crush of activity and simply could net get everything done. Piersol told us that Booth, who hed been Chief since May, 1991, was highly re1pacted but had had no recent field cormnand experience when he suddenly found himaalf running the entire c Piersol decided the firet thing to do waa to try to establish calm in the command po t. He gathered all of the department people together and told them that frorn. that point forward they were to bring all of their requests and information 1 Piersol pointed out that he was with the Department Command, net the EOC; the command happened to adjoin the BOC. stated that Kalish was the EOC ooanandar during the A watch. He a After the interview, Lt. Voge, an assistant to Piersol, gave us a tour of the CDC and the EOC. 3 ~-··--·'- ·- ··- -·- ···-·· ._ ' ---- , _,,,..._,,_, _ _ .,.._. ____ , SENT 5y:xerox Telecopier 7020; B-29-92 11:19 RM & S #2� 310-886-4515 I [3 I . , ,to him for •valuation and he would make whatever recol'mllendat!ona to Booth he felt appropriate. He becmne the funnel th:r:ou;h which all requests, ooncerna ~nd information were filtered. He said ha felt that somebody need8d to have the courage to make some ~ decis!ona and that he was that parson. Ha told Booth that the L---. activity in his office wo~ld drop 901 !nee the department atatf would mainly be daoling with him instead of with Booth. Booth wee very pleased with thi• THE FQNC'l'tQNIN<; QI' 'l'HI liOC THBQUQHQUT THI DISTURBANCE Piersol stated that the IOC generally ran smoothly once he took charge of the information flow to Booth. He had to make some changes in order to get the information ha needed, Por instance, ha revamped the message system. When he arrived, they Z wera using a runner system employing special message forma which allowed copies of meaaages ta be routed to the various representative who needed the information. Pieraol ••id ~hDt these messaoa forms simply did not work because they were often ml•-routed and/or ignored, ao he discontinued their uee. He found it much more efficient to simply walk around and talk to all of the personnel and get fro• them first-hand reports cf the information they were obtaining. Technically, the communications worked well, Although the communications systems were not a problem, however, the accuracy and timeliness of the information was a problem. It was not uncommon tor the Field commanders to forget to notify tha EOC z_ of the activitiee in their areas simply because they were •o busy . A lot of the information which the EOC received. waa wrong or would come in 12 to 24 houre late. For instanc•, they heard on April 30 that the Guard waa eetabli1had at the Police Academy; it turned out that there were only a handful of National Guard at that time. The EOC did, howeve~, receive a lot of good information, Piersol stated that the purpose of the EOC was the coordination of resources within the City of Los Angelea. Once the resources were sent to the field oommand poste, the operations deci ion1 (~, where per onnel should go and what they should do) were made by the field commanders. The EOC dealt with city-wide policy decisions; such as cancelling the Dodg•~ game and the activitie• at the Sports Arena, and closing Venice beach. Booth had "drop lines" to the field conuaand post and to the National Guard. The field command posts would call Booth directly with competing raqueets and it was Booth'a job to "break the ties," The types of decisions with which Piersol we involved concerned tran portation, food, and people needin9 special consideration. Piersol also instituted briefings of the arriving ataff each time there was a watch change in order to 4 - ·-- ·-· -- -- ·- --- · ' ----- SENT av:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-29-92 ,1:20 RM & S #2� 3 10-88 6-4515 ;, pass on a full picture of the events which had occurred over the prior 12 hours. He put together packages of information for these briefinga which included some written reports regarding intelligence, DWP, locations of firew, eta. Chief Gates waa not there much, although he and Booth talked a lot by telephone. Gates would come on occasion to the morning briefings. As time went on, these briefings grew and finally became the city b~iafinga. Firat, Piersol would brief Booth, then Booth would brief the Mayor. Sometimes they briefed the press. There were no press present at the EOC, The Emergency Operations Board ( "EOB") was briefed three or f01u: t1m$s during the disturbance. Piersol took part in this, ----~Generally, the interaction between the emergency agenciea workett well. There was a specific military liaison at th• Department Commander level. There was a National Guard re reaent~tive at the EOC twent -four hour• a da. iersol would 1.n orm Boot o a requests or uar pe· reonne and Baoth would make the request of the Guard representative. Lt, Voge mentioned tQ us during our tour of the EOC premises that it was very helpful to have the Guard representative present at the !OC. A repreaentativ• of the Emergency Reaource Board, named Canfield, was in tha IOC constantly. Tha mayor also had representatives there, The FBI representative aat right in Booth'• office instead of in the EOC room with tha representatives from the other agencies, which made it difficult for Booth and Piersol to frankly discuss use of the federal law enforcement personne-:t.--------------------- Piarsol doee not ram.ember •••1ng much of the sheriff's ~epresentative, They did not really use the sheriff'• Mutual Aid Plan. Ha does remember eeing and coordinating with the CHP representative, Sari'eant Gamez, mainly with regard to Fire '2-D-t-£ Department escoxts. Most of Piareol'a activity was with the National Guard or federal law enforcement,• Whan asked whether he saw police from outlying areas, he 1tated that one night the San Diego police came. They were sent to the Sport, Arana parking lot, but were not deployed, so they want back home. He l Lt. Voge told UB that the relationahip with the CHP worked well becauae LAPD ;ave CHP a epac1f1c, discrete task (Fire Dept. eacort) that CHP could do !ts own way using its own procedures and pa~sonnel. ' Lt. Voge atated that the bigga1t problem was the deployment of the National Guard. They r•n into a lot of problems with the military in term• of communicati0n1. For example, the word "deployment" means one thing t.o LAPD and another thing to th• Guard. 5 • • . .. t • ~ -- .. - __,,,..__ , __ SENT av:xerox Telecopier 1020 B-29-92 11:21 RM & S #2� 3i0-8S6-4515 r thought there might still be tension with the San Diego police because of that. He does not know who requested the San Diego polic• or why they were there. Piersol mentioned that the DWP representative was frustrated because he could not get the LAPD to pay attention to his requests until Piersol took over. As an aside, Piersol, referring to the LAPD, said to ua "Sometimes we're not very nice to people." Piersol was asked whether, in his view, the Department Commander usu~pad EOC pereonnel. Ha responded that thi• heppened, but 1t was bound to, because a good manager is going to use the people around him, For inatAnca, Lieutenant Doan was essentially commandeered by Booth and Piersol even though ha was actually with the EOC- TRAlNINQ Piereol was not very knowledgeable about IOC training, Ha said that he believed the EOC ii staffed by a standing team. and thus, in theory, there are people treined to do this, He went on to comment that he has h••rd that the training of the personnel at the field command poets was not good. The field commander is determined ~y the gravity of the situation. In a situation •uch as this, a Bureau commanding officer should assume the field commandership. RIC!OMNENDATIONS Pier1ol doe not think that the Department Commander should have been offtced with the EOC. First, the Department Commander sees people ae qeneric resources and enli1ta for hie purposes whomever he seas. Although the EOC was not supposed to be a command poat, it became one because the Department Coamna de wn.s there, 5 Further, he feels that the Department Commander should not have been buried in an artifigial environment three floors below the ground. On• could not even tell if it waa day or niQht, o~ what kind of D aay or night it was: On• had no aan e of the reality of what wa• happening on the streets. The Department Commander should have bean somewhere, with his own statf, where he could have obtained immediate information and sent out hia own scouts to verify the accuracy of th• information he wea getting. The Department commander need• his "eyes and 'tt. vo;a thaQght that it was great having the Department Commander officed w1th the EOC. He thought that the downeida was that traffic could ;et bad, 6 __ ,..,,_ ,. _ .......,,. ___ - •~.....-----..-•- · SENT 5y:xerox Telecopier 7020 B-29-92 17:21 RM & S #2� 310-836-4515 eara" out in the field or needs to be in the field himself in a rhelicopter to insure the accuracy of the information, In addition, a tentacle syatem should be used for redundancy in information~gathe~ing. The Department commander should be connected to a person at each field coanmand post; the Department Commander could pick up the phone and call that person directly, As a final point, Piersol and the Bureau Chiefs generated a demobilization plan. People were tired of the mobilisation, and thie atop-gap measure was developed; it took the police into the next 30 to 60 4ays. It is a voluminous report and covera command posts, watches, and a deployment plan which would work for future deployments. It repreaenta "good work on the part of a lot of people." He promised to send us a copy. NOTBt We recommend that Lt. Voge be interviewed ~egarding BOC operations. 7 . . ··\: .. • .. · ·... : . •, . - .... ·-- ······:· .. -·- -:-··· --,----· ~·--· .. ·· . · . . , .... , .. I • ;, TO: FROM: DATE: RE: summary KIRKLAND & ELLIS MEMORANDUM Webster Study File Vince Marella Shannon Hansen July 22, 1992 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT / Interview with Jim Jones, Commander, Special Support Services Bureau, LAPD On Friday, July 17, 1992 at 11:30 a.m. at the Parker Center, Vince Marella, Elizabeth Lear and Shannon Hansen interviewed Jim Jones, Commanding Officer of Special Support Services Bureau. The following is a summary of our recollection of this meeting, including our questions and comments,: together with our mental impressions, conclusions and .opinions, based upon the meeting. Jim Jones is a commander at the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). He has worked at the LAPD for more than 28 years. He was the Commanding Officer of Support Services Bureau (SSB) during the riots. As Commanding Officer, he was responsible for the EOC. This interview focused upon (a) Jim. Jones' background, trai~ing and expertise, (b) the function and role of the LAPD EOC, (6) Jim Jones' perceptions of the effectiveness of their response during the -riots, and (d) recommendations to help LAPD become more effective in its response to future emergencies. Jim Jones' Background Jim Jones has worked at LAPD for more than 28 years, and has held many positions during his career. He has an extensive background in emergency services. In 1968, he was taken out of the field to develop several emergency systems manuals . ·ouring the 60' s and 70' s, he worked on the planning task force in several capacities and was involved in all of the "events" or incidents in which the department was involved. He has also been responsible for officer deployment. ' 1 •.: He was an operations officer during the 1971 earthquake and has been a commander since 1979. Before coming to SSB a year and a half ago, he worked in several other LAPD departments, including the Bureau of Special Investigation (Narcotics, Vice), Detective Services Group, and Operations (Valley, South and Central Bureaus). He also was the Chief of Staff to Chief Gates for two years. His background showed that he had extensive experienc~ throughout LAPD and expertise in emergency services. He was therefore able to explain how the different internal departments worked together and how LAPD worked with other organizations. The Function and Role of LAPD's EOC 1. Background The SSB has several divisions, including the Planning and Research Division (PRO) and Emergency Operations Center (EOC). EOC, however, is an "ad hoc division." Jim Jones called EOC an ad hoc division because it is only activated in an emergency. Once activated, the PRO Commander becomes the EOC Commander, and runs the division until the emergency is under control. The EOC is staffed by PRO personnel, who are :"trained to be grabbed" from PRD to EOC ~uring an emergeri~y. Unlike the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office's (LASO's) EOC, LAPD's EOC does not have predetermined teams set up for an incident. When an incident occurs, LAPD's EOC activates and deploys the people in PRO who are most readily available and who have the necessary skills. The PRD/EOC commander, who is responsible for staffrhg and scheduling the personnel, gets the names from a list. of available people. Jones also talked about committees that are interrelated with EOC. The Emergency Management Committee (EMC) is chaired by Shirley .Mattingly, the City Administrative Officer. EMC, a city committee, is part of the Emergency Operations Board, which is chaired by the chief of police. LAPD's Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) is Commander Lewis. As ERC, he is part of EMC. Although Lewis is the ERC, his primary responsibility is in the Uniform Services Group, which contains the tactical planning section responsible for maintaining the unusual occurrences fleet. When asked about the Emergency Operations Master Plan, Jones stated that he did not know ·much about it. He suggested that either Lewis or Mattingly would have more information. When asked if there was something developed beyond the TAC manual, Jones suggested that we talk to Dave Kalish as he would have the most knowledge about that. - 2 - 2. Training The PRO personnel receive emergency training to respond if they are activated into EOC. The training consists of letting them work through scenarios of potential incidents. These training classes occur about once about every 3-6 months. Additionally, they run either "small" scenarios, which are for just PRD personnel, or "large" scenarios, which include per~onnel from several departments. / Jim Jones stressed that repeated training is important because PRO has a lot of turnover. Additionally, personnel from other departments are trained because EOC may need to activate those people during a large scale emergency. 3. General Function of EOC in LAPD Historically, if LAPD was called to an unusual incident, the dispatched officers dealt with the situation. LAPD couldn't or didn't rely on anyone else. As Los Angeles grew, LAPD began to realize that they could not handle every situation alone. They did not have enough policemen to fix every situation to which they were called. They needed a way to contact other groups who were equipped to handle emergency or unusual situations. Emergency Operations and organization (EOO), which is coordinated on a city level, grew out of ·that need to handle bigger problems more efficiently. EOC grew out of EOO. EOC is a clearinghouse for information, equipment, and services. Its function is to gather information from all organizations to determine available resources and needs of the community. Once this~information is obtained, it makes recommendations f9r distributing these needed resources. EOC is not a command center. It makes no decisions beyond resource deployment. Those tactical and planning decisions are made in the f:i,eld. Generally, a large disaster (like an earthquake) will automatically activate the EOC. For smaller incidents, the EOC is activated on the chief of police's approval, though many people can urge him to activate the EOC. Once the EOC is activated, information needs to come in from organizations (so available resources are known) and from the LAPD Field Commanders (FC's) (so needs are known). Once the EOC commander has this information, he can begin deploying resources. When one large incident occurs, the EOC commander works directly with the FC to determine his needs and to deploy resources to him. When two or more incidents occur at the same time, the EOC commander works with a department commander (who is a - 3 - representative of the chief of police) to determine and set priorities between the FC's. During the daytime, the EOC can be adequately staffed in about 30 minutes once it is activated. At night, it can be adequately staffed in 2-3 hours. However, "adequately staffed" is not equivalent to "operational." Information flow makes the EOC operational. The EOC is not considered operational until it is receiving information from the FC's and its resources. / 4. EOC compared to the Communications Center The Communications Center (CC) is used by the LAPD for all routine calls and small incidents. Information about needs and resources are instantly available in this system. The CC has authority to reallocate on-duty resources immediately and deploy them to needed incidents.· They use a matrix plan (or depletion schedule) to determine who to deploy. Because of the limited number of LAPD resources, this system can overload easily. Once the cc cannot provide the necessary resources for an incident or incidents, the EOC is activated. Once the EOC is activated, a Field Command Point is set up at the incident and the cc is no longer directly involved. Information and resources then flow through the EOC to the FC ~ntil the incident is over. Unlike the cc, however, the "EOC does not have the capability to receive and deploy information instantly. Also, the EOC does not receive information about any routine calls. Because of this, the CC remains operational during any incident to handle routine calls unrelated to that incident. Although the cc does not communicate directly with the FC about the incident, i~~does communicate information it receives from routine cal l ~. During an incident, the FC is responsible for controlling and monitoring the area around the incident. If the cc ·gets a routine call from inside that area, the cc will contaqt the FC, who will decide if he wants to or can handle that call with his allocated resources. In this way, the FC becomes aware of all events that occur in his area. Jon~s said that this system has worked very well on small scale incidents, and that it should w~rk exactly the same on a large scale. This system was not very effective during the. riots for nearly two days. The riots were so massive that communications broke down. Jones' Perception of the Events During the Riots - 4 - ,. \ 1. General Perceptions Soon after the verdict came down at about 3:00 p.m. on April 29th, Jones did not notice or hear of unusual incidents. He saw demonstrations growing outside of the .Parker Center, so at about 6:00 or 7:00 p.m., he went to the EOC office. When he arrived, Chief Frankel, the Department Coordinator, asked him to run the EOC that evening. Jones said that every unusual occurrence has a period of chaos before the system ·(EOC) is running smoothly. However, the EOC needs information to run. Their problem that evening _was that they did not receive information from the field. Therefore, they could not deploy the available resources. Because of this lack of information flow, the chaos lasted for nearly two days. That evening, EOC's best source of information was the news. Although it showed then where some of the incidents were occurring, it did not give information which was helpful to them. They needed the FC's evaluations of the situation to determine the needs of the FC's and priorities for their resources. Communication was not established that evening although FC's are required communicate with the EOC. Jones did not know the reason, but he imagined that the FC's were too inundated by the riots to communicate. _ Late that evening, Jones sent someone out to check the . situation and report back to ·the EOC. Although this helped start the flow of information, it remained difficult to communicate for some time. Because the riots were s . o massive, LAPD had four Field Command Points. To establish priorities for these four groups required information flow so that the Department Commander and the EOC Commander could set priorities on their resources. During the r~ots, each FC had 500-600 people under him to deal with all riot,,incidents occurring in his area. One separate division of people were relegated to routine calls. Because of commu~ication problems, there was little coordination between the riot and routine calls groups. We asked if there was a tendency to hoard personnel because it was likely that new emergencies, which would need additional resources, would emerge after the ini~ial deployment decisions were made. Jones said that the FC's could not hoard personnel because all of their resources are known, and all known resources are deployed if needed. He mentioned that the real struggle was not hoarding, but getting an accurate A/B watch personnel list into the system. 2. LAPD's Dealings with the Mutual Aid Plan and National Guard - 5 - LAPD did not make a call to the LASO EOC for Mutual Aid r under the Mutual Aid Plan {MAP). Jones explained that the LAPD historically was not involved with MAP. LAPD was a huge department, and generally did not need help from outside departments. Additionally, the LAPD felt that because other departments had less resources, they would be continually providing outgoing aid and receiving no incoming aid. 'Since the riots, however, LAPD plans to become more involved with the MAP. The Mayor called in the National Guard {NG) on the evflning of April 29th, but they were not deployed until the afternoon of April 30th. There was a general expectation that the riots would quiet down by the morning of the 30th. However, the riots instead escalated, and the presence of the National Guard worsened LAPD's communication and deployment problems. To explain the communication problems, Jim Jones drew a schematic of the different organizations and their communication lines. (Reproduced in Table 1.) Table 1 Communication Lines Between organizations I - I I I I I National I I I I I National4" .. / Guard Guard Units Attorney General I • I I . , Attorneys I I I I Joint Task Force (I,L,O,P*) I I I I EOC {LASO) I I I I .:';. ~ , S : •. /f I -~~I?.J:?:• ..... . · ... . . · ... J<t>> . :/. ··:?/::':l ::'.: ... •. >:.:• .. • • Field •••••• ...... : .. :.:•::::;;:::; H coitrmana t>r> .. \i?Bl (#t,()()~J\\: .... ... ·.· . :.:. : .. I I I I Federal Troops\ * Intelligence, Logic, Operations, Personnel \ \ \ \ \ \ \ Federal Troops Units If only LAPD was neutralizing an emergency situation, then the only communication link required would be the one from the LAPD EOC to each of the Field Command Points (FCP's). (See shaded portion of Table 1.) - 6 - The communication network became more complicated with the addition of the NG. The NG was linked to the LAPD EOC through the LASO EOC. No direct communication could take place between any FCP and National Guard Units. If an FC wanted to deploy a National Guardsman who was standing next to him, he needed to funnel his request up through LAPD and LASO to the NG so that the NG could deploy the guardsman. Federalizing the troops only worsened the situation. Oping that added several more layers of communication lines. A 4 oint Task Force, made up of Intelligence, Logic, Operations, and Personnel Commanders from the NG and the Federal Troops needed to agree on a potential deployment plan. Once that committee agreed, the plan needed to be approved by the federal attorneys and the Attorney General's (AG's) office. The AG's office had a liability concern and were therefore hesitant to send in their troops. This communication neb;ork and liability concern significantly delayed approvals to use federal troops and resources. By the time the FC's were getting approval to use the federal troops and the National Guard Units, the emergency situation had long been neutralized. Additionally, the governor's office asked the LASO to assume responsibility for the liability of the acts of the National Guard. This has caused problems because the LASO has refused to take responsibility for any of the National Guard. Jones' Criticisms and Recommendations 1. Bringing in the National Guard and then federalizing the troops magnified LAPD's existing communications and deployment problems. 2. LAPD had probiems communicating during the riots. Jones attriputed much of '-the problems to the lack of equipment, network~, and frequencies. He also stated that the city needs to have 2laces in the city prewired so that General Services does not hav~ to spend time running temporary lines. During the riots, General Services did not have most of the temporary lines in until Saturday or Sunday, and by that time, the riots were under control. 3. People who were placed in critical positions were not trained to do those jobs. Therefore, it took people three days instead of three hours to get up to speed on how to accomplish their tasks. Jones suggested training a separate specialized unit, or "Command Post Cadre" to take charge of emergency situations and run the critical positions in the field. He said that the SWAT team would be a good model for this cadre. Additionally, he suggested that lower level officers should be responsible for making some of the tactical decisions because they are the people who are more routinely making tactical decisions in the field. \ - 7 - Captains, Commanders and Chiefs have had little recent experience with the basic types of tactical operations. 4. He mentioned budget problems, but due to time constraints, we did not discuss that in detail. That information can be gleaned in a followup interview. / \ - 8 - 1 . .. , LAW OFFICE.5 BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT & MATZ TERRY W. BIRD JOEL E. BOXER MARKT. DROOJc:S TiiOMAS R.. FREEMAN JEROME H. FRIEDBERG DENISE D. GORGES SHARON E. JONES JASON D. KOGAN VINCEm" J. MARELLA A. HOWARD MA1Z RONAID J. NESSIM JOHN IC. RUBINER DIANE P. SHAKIN DARON L TCXX:H OOROIHY WOLPERT A PROFf5SIONAL CORPORAl10N File: Re: WEBSTER STUDY/Interagency Group Summary/OES Interview PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Date: To: Fran: 1875 CENTURY PARK EAST 23rd FLOOR LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90067 TELEPHONE (310) 201-2100 FAX (310) 201-2110 / June 24, 1992 Richard J. Stone Vincent J. Marella Gerald L. Chaleff SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF LT. GEORGE GODWIN, LAPD Lt. George Godwin was interviewed on June 11, 1992, by Vincent J. Marella and Gerald L. Chaleff. The topics covered in the interview include the structure and operation of LAPD's Communications Division, specifically the Central Dispatch Center ("CDC"), and the Emergency Operations Center ("EOC"). Lt. Godwin was also questioned and gave his account of the events leading up to his decision to call a tactical alert on Wednesday, April 29, 1992. The attached memorandum of interview is a summary of our recollection of the meeting, including our questions and comments, together with our mental impressions, conclusions and opinions. * * * '1 ; To: From: Date: Re: OPPZCB OP THE SPECZAL ADVZSOR TO THB BOARD OP POLZCB COMMZSSIONERS CITY OP LOS ANGELES MEMORANDUM PRIVILEGED AND CONFXDEN'l'XAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Richard J. Stone Office of the Special Advisor Vincent J. Marella, Gerald L. Chaleff June 15, 1992 Interview of Lt. George Godwin, LAPD / ------- --------- on Thursday, June 11, 1992, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Jerry Chaleff and Vince Marella met with and interviewed Lt. George Godwin of the Los Angeles P~lice Department. The interview took place at the LAPD Communications Center, which is in the basement of the City Hall East Annex. The following is a summary of our recollection of this meeting, including our questions and comments, together with our men~al impressions, conclusions and opinions. Lt. Godwin outlined his background with LAPD, which includes being a patrol officer in the Wilshire District; an instructor at the Police Academy; an officer in Hollywood Vice, where he was promoted to Sergeant; assignment to the Administrative Vice Division, where he formed the Civil Abatement Unit; assignment to the Planning and Research Division (PRD), where he was the ., coordinator for the LAPD Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Police Facilities Coordinator; assignment to the Anti-Terrorist Division , where he was Adjutant to the Commander; a lieutenant in - 1 - C:\WP51\0ATA\VJM\9007504 . M (3) the 77th Division. Lt. Godwin is currently assigned to the LAPD (_>) Communications Division. Godwin explained that the Communications Division is under the Support Services Bureau which is commanded by Jimmy Jones. He said that his captain is Greg Burke and the Assistant Commanding Officer for the Communications Division is Lt. Dave Musil. / Lt. Godwin explained at some length the purpose and function of the LAPD Central Dispatch Center ("CDC"). The CDC is comprised of 50 consoles which receive emergency calls from the public and dispatches police units throughout the city. Several of the consoles handle 911 emergency calls, others handle non- emergency ( 912) calls. Other consoles dispatch police units. Godwin explained that, under normal circumstances, all LAPD dispatching is handled through the CDC rather than through the LAPD bureaus or divisions. CDC personnel assign priority to the responses by "queing" _the calls in each division. Commanders in the divisions have the ability to alter the priority assigned to the calls, but rarely..do so • . In response to our questions, Godwin said that he was not aware of any specific planning that was done in the 77th Division with respect to the Rodney King verdict. He said that at the Communications Division there had been no specific planning for the verdict prior to the time that it was returned. I asked Lt. Godwin whether, to his knowledge, LAPD was in contact with the Superior .~ Court in Simi Valley where the trial was taking place. Godwin explained that the office of the Chief of Police has a judicial liaison officer who is supposed to coordinate with the Court. - 2 - C:\UP51 \ DATA\VJM\9007504.M (3) {Note: We should identify who the judicial liaison officer was at · ) the time of the riots and interview him/her.] Godwin stated that on April 29, 1992, there were no special preparations or precautions that he was aware of before 3: 00 p.m. He said that when he arrived at Parker Center, which was at approximately 3:00 p.m., he saw many news vans outside. Thereafter, at the roll call, which was approximately 3:10 p.m., he received news of the verdicts in the King case. our discussion then turned to the operation and functioning of LAPD's EOC. The EOC is generally activated .by the commanding officer of PRO which staffs and runs the EOC. Lt. Godwin explained that while there is an EOC coordinator in the PRO, running the EOC is really a very small part of what PRO does. PRD also is in charge of the Department ';s manuals and legal research and the Police Facilities Coordinator operates from that Division. Captain Dan Watson was the person in charge of PRO in April 1992. He is now in the Personnel Division. In terms of training for the EOC, Godwin said trtat there used to be training sessions approximately two times a year when he was in charge of the EOC which was roughly in 1985 to 1986. Godwin stated that on April 29, 1992 the LAPD's EOC was activated at approximately 4:00 p.m. When we explored this further, he explained that by "activated" he meant that the EOC's doors were merely opened, and the lights and coffee turned on. He said that it was "activated" primarily as a precautionary measure. In response to our questions, Godwin explained that LAPD' s EOC does not function as a command and control center, but rather serves a coordination and support - 3 - C:\IJP51\DATA\VJM\9007504.M (3) function. He said that it is also a place where information is gathered and liaisons are established with other city and law enforcement agencies. We viewed the EOC with Lt. Godwin. In so doing, it appeared that much of the equipment in the EOC is outdated, the surroundings are cramped, some updating of the facility appears to have been made at the time of the lB84 Los Angeles Olympics, but no significant improvements have been made since then. Godwin then explained what a tactical alert is in the LAPD. A tactical alert occurs when there are not enough law enforcement resources at a particnlar level to respond to a disturbance or problem. This lack of resources could occur at the division or the bureau level. When a tactical alert is called, it eliminates all calls below. the level of Code 2-High. Godwin explained the various codes for LAPD responses. From highest to lowest those codes are: Code 3. A response with lights and sirens -- usually a serious crime is in p:togressr Code 2-High. This is sometimes referred to as a "hotshot." It is more serious than a Code 2. Code 2. Response is to be with all deliberate speed. (The department tries to achieve a dispatch time within five minutes for these calls.) Code 1. Merely a call to locate a car • . , When a tactical alert is called, the Communications Division consults a depletion chart and pulls units from other areas as - 4 - C:\UP51\DATA\VJM\9007504.M (3) specified in the chart. When these units are located, they are then dispatched to the area where the disturbance exists. Godwin explained that, in a tactical alert, once these units are dispatched to the disturbance area they are deployed under the command of the field officer and are no longer under the control of the Communications Division. If all of the resources / of the department are depleted, the Chief or some high-ranking officer in the department decides whether to mobilize. Godwin gave us the following informal chronology of events based on his recollection of what occurred on April . 29: • Approximately 3: 15 p.m. the verdict in tbe King case was announced. • Approximately 4:30 p.m. he noticed that in the Central Dispatch Center there was a high call load. Specifically he said that there were many 911 calls that were backed up. • Approximately 5:30 p.m. calls increased to 911. ,, • Division assignments were back up. • He tried t~~monitor the 77th Division frequency since there were no TVs available. • He told the EOC that calls were increasing to 911 and that it was getting busy. • Captain Watson got a printout of all units in the city which provided him with a snapshot of where all the units were at that moment. • Approximately 6:00 p.m. things were getting very busy and "bad" at this point. • The 77th Division was holding approximately ten Code-2 calls . - 5 - C:\UP51\DATA\VJM\9007504.M (3) • He called the 77th and spoke to a sergeant who was the assistant Watch Commander and asked him if he wanted to call a tactical alert. The sergeant asked him to stand by and said that they were "looking at it." According to Godwin, it was about this point that Lt. Moulin issued his order and pulled all LAPD units out of ~he area of Florence and Normandie. Godwin explained that Moulin•s Unit was designated as "12-L-10." When Moulin pulled the units out of this area, Godwin located and attempted to dispatch outside units to that area. However, when he did so, 12-L-10 (Moulin) canceled those calls as well. Godwin said that cancellation orders were also issued by 12-L-20. While he does not know who exactly had that designation, he said that it would have been a field sergeant. Godwin explained that this occurred at approximately 6: 00 and lasted until 6:30 on Wednesday evening. (Note: We have requested the computer printouts which will show the cancellation of assignments by 12-L-10.J Godwin coulcl not recall the exact time that the Denny beating occurred, however, he says at that time calls to 911 "went crazy." He said that 911 was essentially flooded in that they were holding more than 90 calls. At this point, Godwin assessed the number of calls that they were holding at 911, he considered the fact that incidents were not being handled in the 77th, and that there was a cancellation order which prevented units in the 77th (as well as outside units) from responding. Godwin did not know whether someone in the EOC was planning something to respond to this situation. He called Captain Watson at the EOC and explained - 6 - C:\\JP51\DATA\VJM\9007504.M (3) the above situation to Watson. Godwin told Watson that he was prepared to call a tactical alert and Watson told him to stand by. Godwin states that while he is not sure exactly what Watson was doing while he was holding, he _ believes that Watson was trying to locate the chief or the command duty officer (COO)~ He believes that Watson was not able to reach anyone and Watson ultimat;.ely got back on the phone and told Godwin to call the tactical- alert. Godwin called the tactical alert at approximately 6:45 p.m. on April 29th. Initially he called the tactical alert for the South, Central and West Bureaus. Within approximately five minutes, however, he added the Valley Bureau to the tactical alert. At approximately 8:00 p.m. on April 29th, there were essentially no units available anywhere in the city. At that time, Godwin called the EOC and spoke with ;Deputy Chief Frankel who was the field commander. Frankel asked Godwin what percentage of the units in the Valley were committed. Godwin explained that there were not enough units in the city to respond to calls and that they were holding over 20 ct>de 2-High calls at that time. Frankel then mobil-ized the A and B watches, which means that he called in all off duty officers and the department went on 12/12 shifts. Godwin explained that when officers are mobilized in a situation such as this they are called in from the individual division and that they are assigned to command posts. They are not assigned through the CDC nor does the CDC get involved with the mobilization. Once the department is mobilized, additional units go to the divisions and are outside the control of the communication system. - 7 - C:\\JP51\0ATA\VJM\9007504.M (3) By Thursday, April 30th, the Communications Division had reconfigured additional consoles in the CDC to be 911 consoles. At this time, the communications division was still not dispatching units but rather was merely queuing calls to the command posts. Godwin explained that it was not until Friday, sometime during the day, that the communication center started to dispatched units again. our discussion then turned to the issue of LAPD acting as a liaison with the fire department. Godwin explained that the fire department relocated its equipment to one location across from the 77th Division. He said that there were approximately 10 engine companies located there and that the fire department requested escort from the LAPD. In response to this, Godwin located ten units and issued the order for them to escort fire engines. However, this order was canceled by the watch commander in the 77th. Similar orders were issued by the other watch commanders with the effect being that there were no units issued to escort fire department perso11nel. ·Godwin called the EOC and spoke to Watson who issued an order per the department commander, countermanding all the cancellations. Watson instructed Godwin to issue the order countermanding the cancellations and the department commander's Frankel's name. Godwin explained that the fire department units asked for more help on various occasions. There were some communications difficulties in that the fire department couldn't get through to the LAPD on the 911 lines because they were blocked. LAPD was having a similar problem getting in touch with the fire department - 8 - C:\\IP51\0ATA\VJH\9007504.M (3) I • • because it couldn't get through on the fire departmen~ 911 lines. As a result of these problems, Godwin had communication department personnel open all of the doors to the various rooms in the communications center in the basement of City Hall so that messages could be taken back and forth between LAPD, the fire department and other agencies. / In response to our questions, Godwin explained that there are normally approximately 150 to 180 police units available throughout the entire city at any given time to respond to calls. * * * ·· " - 9 - C:\\JP51\0ATA\VJH\9007504 . M (3) PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION AND ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT MEMORANDUM TO: FROM: DATE: CASE: RE: WEBSTER STUDY FILE MARKE. BECK, TERESA R. BARRERA and TODD GALE AUGUST 11, 1992 WEBSTER COMMISSION AUGUST 10, 1992 INTERVIEW OF FBI ASSISTANT SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE TOM PARKER On August 10, 1992, Mark Beck, Teresa Barrera and Todd Gale interviewed Tom Parker, Assistant Special Agent-In Charge of the Los Angeles FBI office. The interview lasted approximately one hour and fifteen minutes _ and took place at the Los Angeles Office of the FBI. The following is a summary of our recollection of the interview, and reflects our mental impressions, conclusions and opinions. Initially, we briefly described the role of the Webster Commission. More particularly, we told Parker that the purpose of the interview was to obtain information with respect to the FBI's coordination with LAPD during the riot. j In this regard, we referred to our understanding,~hat the FBI was the central law enforcement agency responsible for coordinating the federal response to the riot. In response to our questions, Parker provided the information set forth below. Parker explained that he is one of six Assistant Spe cial Agents-In-Charge at the Los Angeles FBI office. He was originally assigned to the Violent crime, Organized Crime and Drugs Unit. During the riots, he oversaw the Organized Crime and Drug Unit. Two weeks ago he was assigned to the White-Collar Investigative Unit. MEM17\92-65.8 Tom Parker Interview Page 2 On Wednesday, April 29, 1992, Parker had lunch with LAPD Deputy Chief Glen Levant. He had gone to high school with Levant. They have been friends for a long time. During lunch, the two of them speculated about what could happen when a verdict was returned. Parker stated that Levant was quite concerned that there may be some problems, although Levant believed the West Bureau, which Levant commanded, was prepared to deal with whatever happened. Following the return of the verdicts, Parker began monitoring the television. The FBI's gang units were re porting back, and everyone was speculating about what would happen. At first they did not do much except gather intel ligence. Parker stated that this would be the anticipated response, since the FBI is not an enforcement agency with respect to civil disturbances. By Thursday afternoon, when they saw Wednesday's vio lence beginning to repeat itself, Parker was ordered to get the FBI's command post in operation. This entailed tasks such as staffing and setting the schedule. He had several supervisors assisting him in this regard. Parker called Deputy Chief Bill Booth at LAPD on Thurs day afternoon. Booth was the Department Commander during the day shift at LAPD EOC. When Parker asked if he could place an FBI representative at LAPD, Booth said he would love to have a FBI representative at the LAPD EOC. On Thursday evening, Parker went to the LAPD EOC. He left FBI Supervisor Ralph Lumpkin in charge of setting up the FBI command post. When Parker arrived at the LAPD EOC at around 7:30, Booth had gone home. Deputy Chief Frankel was in charge and Parker learned that LAPD was working two 12-hour shifts . The ranking command offi cers were working the night shift, while the second-level command officers MEM17\92-65.8 Tom Parker Interview Page 3 were working the day shift. Because Parker had strong relationships at LAPD, he became the FBI's representative at the command center during the evenings. Alan Dukote re lieved Parker during the days. Parker also stated that the FBI had a supervisory special .agent at each LAPD Bureau Command post. Parker stated his belief that LAPD's portion of the EOC appeared to be in good shape, especially when compared to other city departments like DWP. He offered that one reason for the LAPD's relative organization was that police are trained to react to emergencies and therefore think better on their feet. Parker was initially briefed by Frankel and stayed in contact with him throughout the night. As LAPD made decisions, Parker relayed the information to the FBI. Parker did not participate in any decisions at LAPD to request mutual aid. On Friday, Buck Revell and the other FBI personnel were beginning to arrive in Los Angeles. Parker stayed for the morning briefing at LAPD, which occurred during the shift change. Parker stated that the briefings were very detailed and a written log of events from the evening was,9iven to the oncoming day shift. Parker left the LAPD EOC at about 11:00 a.m. or noon, after briefing his replacement, Alan Dukote. Parker said he saw himself and Dukote as liaisons between LAPD and the FBI. ;. . After getting a few hours' sleep, Parker returned to the FBI at approximately 4:00 p.m. on Friday. From there he went to LAPD's EOC. Upon his arrival, he learned that the National Guard had been federalized and Chief Gates was angry. It was Parker's impression that Gates was more upset because he had not been consulted by the Mayor and Governor HEM17\92-65.8 Tom Parker Interview Page 4 prior to the request for federalization, than by the feder alization itself. At one point on Friday, the Department of Justice called. the LAPD EOC and Parker briefed Attorney General William Barr before Barr met with the President. Parker immediately thereafter called Director Sessions' office and provided him with the same briefing. When asked about pre-planning efforts of LAPD, Parker stated he was aware of no prior efforts. However, he reit erated that he saw very little disarray at LAPD. To him, it appeared that LAPD knew how to staff the crisis. Parker stated that he witnessed only one dispute among command level people and it concerned how to get box lunches out to the people in the street. We next discussed how LAPD and the FBI handled requests for assistance. Prior to Parker's arrival, LAPD was working directly with the California National Guard. Parker did not know of any direct contact between the National Guard and LAPD command post set up at each Bureau. To his knowledge, there were no requests for assistance made to the,•FBI until Friday, in part, because the role of federal agents was still unclear. When the presidential proclamation came out on Friday afternoon or evening, the lines of authority were more clear and everything began to filter through Parker. He sent all requests back to the FBI command center, where the nocus was to match the proper agency with each request. Parker stated that the requests for federal assistance really began on Saturday, and became more organized on Sunday. One of the initial problems was that some of the federal agencies (~, the Marshals and ATF) had sent people to LAPD and tried to deal with LAPD directly. By Sunday or Monday _ the military command structure also was in MEM17\92-65.8 Tom Parker Interview Page 5 place and was taking direction from Buck Revell and Bob Mueller. With respect to coordination between officers in the field, Parker stated that the main problem was a lack of compatible radio equipment. Thus, people from different agencies often could not communicate. Parker has since learned there is a· mutual aid radio network in California, but he does not know when or how it comes into play. The types of requests for federal assistance by I.APO included requests for personnel to ride in patrol cars, transport prisoners, ride shotgun on fire trucks, and to maintain secure areas. Requests for assistance also includ ed requests for compatible radios and automatic weapons. It was Parker's impression that there was an absence of suffi cient resources during the first few days of the riots. When questioned about any resistance from LAPD to federal assistance, Parker reiterated that the only resis tance he was aware of occurred when the presidential procla mation was issued. Again, Parker stated that Gates' dissat isfaction related to not being part of the proce~s of re questing federalization. With respect to the troops in the field, Parker stated that everyone seemed to be getting along fine. ,When asked about recommendations he would make to improve the response to the situation, Parker stated that there should be some preplanning. On the federal side, he recommended a greater clarity of purpose and communication with respect to the role of federal agents in this type of dispute. Parker believed LAPD was unaware of the effects of federalization of the National Guard. MEM17\92-65.8 • Tom Parker Interview Page 6 Parker also stated it is important to standardize radio systems for law enforcement. To the extent the equipment cannot be standardized, he suggested each agency having a portable base station which could be transported to a cen tral location. Parker believes the absence of any assistant chiefs had an effect on LAPD. The command level for LAPD was at the deputy chief level (i.e. the third level). He does not believe Gates is used to running operations. He also did not see Gates at the command center very often and does not know what kind of interaction there was between Gates and the deputy chiefs. Without elaborating, Parker stated that whenever there are peers in charge of a situation, as was the case with the LAPD, there are more turf battles and egos tend to get in the way. MEM17\92-65.8 July 10, 1992 9.4 INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE TO: Chairperson, Emergency Operations Board FROM: Commanding Officer, Emergency Operations Center SUBJECT: AFTER-ACTION CRITIQUE AND RECOMMENDATIONS-EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER ACTIVATION FOR CIVIL UNREST on April 29, 1992, the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated for a civil disturbance in the City. It is requested that the Emergency Operations Board (EOB) receive and file the attached after-action report and critiques of EOC activities from April 29 to May 26, 1992. The attached reports were prepared in accordance with sections 103.06 and 103.07 of the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Master Plan. It is also requested that the EOB approve the following recommendations regarding the EOC that are a result of the critiques. RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendation #1 The coordination of logistics with the Department of General Services (GSD) is imperative during an emergency. It is recommended that the EOB direct the Police Department to incorporate GSD personnel in the staffing pattern ,of the EOC Logistics Section within the EOC facility when it is activated. Recommendation #2 The information and communications network within the EOC (telephones, radios, computers, maps, status boards etc.) were unable to handle the volume of inf9_ rmation during this activation. The City's EOC consultants, VSP Associates, Inc., have done an extensive review of this issue. It is recommended that the EOB review the recommendations made by VSP Associates, Inc. and defer action until after review o~ VSP's report. a· Chairperson, Emergency Operations Board Page two · 9.4 Recommendation #3 The EOC facility was overcrowded. The Police Department was the lead entity during this activation and occupied EOC space that would otherwise be used by other City Departments. The utilization of space in the EOC was reviewed by VSP. It is recommended that the EOB delay action on this issue until release of VSP's report. Recommendation #4 The notification of EOC personnel prior to, and during an aativation remains an unresolved issue. To facilitate requests to city departments who have removed personnel from the EOC, it is recommended that the EOB direct the EOC Commanding Officer to maintain a roster at his or her position in the EOC with names and emergency telephone numbers of departmental personnel not present in the EOC. These name3 and phone numbers will be used to make timely requests to City departments who have removed their personnel from the EOC. Additionally, it is recommended that the EOB review the issue, as addressed by VSP Associates, Inc., for further action. · Recommendation #5 Some City departments did not receive adequate briefings on the status of the unrest as it progressed. It is recommended that the EOB direct the Police Department to have frequent briefings in the EOC that include other City departments. I have directed Sergeant R. E. Gandy of ~y staff be available to answer questions you or your staff may have. He can be reached at (213) 237-1653. olefVLaptain Commanding. Officer Emergency Operations Center Attachments ,~~ GEN. ,_, ("-". I-IC>) CITY OF LOS ANGELES INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE Date: June 12,. 1992 To: Captain Dave Kalesh, Commanding Officer Planning and Research Division From: ' _)ey Mattingly, Chief A~inistrative Analyst fo~~e of the City Administrative Officer Subject: EOC ACTIVATION APRIL 29 - MAY 26, 1992 AITER-ACTION REPORT Representatives from the Office of the City Administrative Officer (CAO) reponed to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) for its civil disturbance related activities commencing on April 29, 1992. The following observations and comments are forwarded for your consideration in accordance with Sections A/103.06 and .07 (EOC Activation Critique) of the EOO Master Plan and Procedures. Notification The City Administrative Officer was notified at approximately 3:45 p.m. of the activation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC); however, the Mayor's Office was not notified at all. The CAO notified the Mayor's Office representative at S:30 p.m., but this notification should have been made immediately along with all other departmental notifications. Sign-In Log It is critical that upon activation of the EOC a sign-in sheet should be staned immediately and it must be ensured that all staff both sign in and out. The sign-in sheet is pan of the necessary documentation to be submitted to state and federal agencies for cost reimbursements of staff response rime in the EOC. EOC Staffing EOC staffing continued to be a problem. There were delays in some divisional responses after notification of the EOC's activation. These delays hampered response and recovery efforts in the impacted areas. As the activation continued, some divisions ensured that staff were in the EOC during the day, but were less responsive in the evening. The EOC.Commanding Officer should maintain a duty-roster of on-call EOC staff for ~~h division not present in the EOC. All divisions and departments should be reminded of Master Plan provisions concerning staffing. There seemed to be an excessive number of Police personnel in the EOC. Police personnel occupied the Mayor's Office sideroo~ and as far as it could be determined, Police personnel did not request the use of this sideroom. Overall the number of EOC staff for each division increase~ making the room somewhat noisy, overcrowded and very stuffy at times. Training in the use of siderooms and staffing needs may be necessary. ~- ,l Security and Escorts Obtaining escorts through the Police Department was a problem at times. Building and Safety came to the CAO staff with this problem to request assistance. LAPD was reticent to respond and this issue was ultimately, perhaps unnecessarily so, escalated to the Mayor's Office. The entire issue of escons was a problem for many other departments besides Building and Safety. It is important to state that because this event was of such a significant magnitude, Police resources were extremely limited and therefore unable to meet all escort requests in a timely manner. This event of civil unrest, as well as others including a large magnitude earthquake, could result in the same unavailability of Police personnel for escort services because all resources are committed to the response and management of the event. A suggestion is that the Police Department, along with other law enforcement agencies including the Sheriffs Department, California Highway Patrol and State Police, develop a plan· and procedures that establish provision for and identify the agency/agencies who will handle this issue in the future. Telephone and Work Space for CAO Staff CAO staff were, once again, left without a designated telephone and work space. As the Police Department occupied the Mayor's Office and the table set up during the flood emergency for CAO staff was removed for this emergency, these options were basically unavailable to us. CAO staff were forced to move from space to space while requesting other divisions to use their telephones. This situation completely hampered our ability to efficiently and effectively perform our tasks, especially early in the event when we were receiving numerous telephone calls. It is necessary for the CAO to have an assigned work area and telephone to coordinate our effort with state and federal agencies, as well as the Mayor's Office. EOC Fax The EOC fax machine was very useful once it was located and someone figured out how to use it. It was difficult to use the newer and easier to operate EOO fax machine located in the Mayor's sideroom because it was occupied by high level Police personnel. A suggestion is during the next exercise which utilizes the EOC the EOC fax machine should be tested and also simple instructions should be written up and placed next to the machine so that during an activation anyone can use the machine without difficulty. EOC Maintenance and Clean-Up One final comment is that staff needs to ensure that the EOC will be cleaned periodically. This is probably a General Services Department responsibility and should be coordinated through their EOC representative. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact Denise Glascow at extension 7-1 S94. ------. . ,..,.. 0#• · • . • , , . _ t June 12, 1992 .._, l T vr LU~ ANu~Lt..) INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE TO: David J. Kalish, Captain Planning and Research Division Police Department FROM: Fire Department SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC) ACTIVATION IN APRIL 1992 1 S CIVIL DISTURBANCE SUMMARY At approximately 1600 hours on April 29, 1992, the Fire Department was notified that EOC had been activated as a result of the rioting in South Central Los Angeles. At approximately 1840 hours, a Fire Department representative staffed our position at EOC. With the exception of two evenings, Fire Department representatives remained at.EOC until May 25, 1992. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. That telephone numbers assigned to specific departments be accessed by that department only, and be changed and remain confidential: 2. That an ''electronic mail" capability between EOC positions be developed: 3. That a "fail safe" link between "911" and Operations Control Dispatch Section (OCOS) be developed; and 4. That the escort issue be resolved. FINDINGS At approximately 1600 hours on April 29, 1992; aattalion Chief Claude Creasy of aces was made aware of the Police Department's intention to activate EOC. I, the on-call Disaster Preparedness Officer, was paged and recalled at 1830 hours, arriving at EOC at 1905 hours. Captain Greg C~rlson of ocos had staffed the Fire Department's position at EOC since 1840 hours. The Fire Department's EOC position continued to be staffed until May 9, 1992, when it was closed on an intermittent basis until May 11, 1992. It remained staffed from May 11, 1992, until EOC was closed on May 25, 1992. David J. Kalish, Captain June 12, 1992 Page 2 The Fire Department's EOC journal indicates a relatively low level of activity from May 12, 1992, until the close of EOC. Based on the level of activity and involvement of Fire Department staff in various EOC activities, it is viewed by this Department that the decision to remain·at EOC for the duration of the · activation was beneficial. The areas of activity for the Fire Department's EOC staff were as follows: 1. 2. 3 • 4. Information Involvement in providing and/or exchanging information between the Police Department, military, State Office of Emergency Services, and Los Angeles County EOC, as well as other City departments. Important information obtained at EOC was passed along to Fire Department staff and aces. Intelligence information obtained from the Police Department was used to assist Fire Department field units. communication Link At one point during the first hours of the riot, the communication link between "911" operators and ocos failed, due to excessive calls to "911." OCDS provided a runner, and the Fire Department's EOC staff were able to communicate security and other needs to Police Department, as well as other departments. The Fire Department's EOC maintained a link with the Los Angeles County's EOC. Additionally, staff was able to inform other City departments of Fire Department activity during the entire crisis. Escorts Staff worked with Police Department and OCDS staff to initially provide escorts and/or backup for isolated Fire Department units operating or housed in the riot area. Later, staff assisted the Police Department in implementing an escort action plan, based on agreements by high-level Fire Department and Police Department officers. This was an ongoing process that continued fo~ the duration of the activation. Relief Staff devised and implemented a plan to relieve off-duty members in the unsafe areas. Staff interfaced with Police Department and the southern California Rapid Transit ------- :..-.. ........ ·. - ·. : .. ' •· · -, .... ... . David J. Kalish, Captain June 12, 1992 Page J 5. District in order to provide transportation and escorts into the area. Logistics Several logistical areas were addressed early in the incident. Staff obtained and distributed food from fast food restaurants and the food market industry, provided personnel for this task, and coordinated the pickup and distribution of military flak jackets to Fire Department and mutual aid resources entering the unsafe area. Although the EOC operation was generally smooth and well practiced, the following areas could be improved: 1. Telephones on several occasions early in the incident, telephone lines dedicated to Fire Department use were not available, due to others using the lines. As a result, several important telephonic messages were delayed and, in some cases, a runner had to be used by ocos to transmit several important messages to EOC. A method should be developed to preclude unlimited access to dedicated telephone lines. The OCDS "ringdown" line was inoperative at this time. As a result of several recent incidents, the Fire Department's EOC telephone numbers have been made available to persons outside EOC. Many calls were received, including requests for dispatch of Fire Department resources, by persons that had no business with the telephone numbers. This caused a delay in dispatch and tied up important telephone lines. For example, during the floods in March 1992, the Fire Department's EOC telephone numper was inadvertantly released as a sandbag information line. This is not appropriate use of EOC telephones. A telephone number change would alleviate this problem. 2. Message forms/Electronic Mail Message forms were used relatively effectively during the entire incident; however, during the first few hectic hours of the riot, message forms were delayed in delivery even when a "rush" tag was attached. People with pickup and delivery responsibilities were too busy or assigned other vital tasks. Later in the incident, when time permitted, message forms were actually used less. It was simpler to approach the individual with whom liaison was required and • I._• .., t • • • . ,,,. David J. Kalish, Captain June 12, 1992 Page 4 to handle the issue in person. Sometimes, a follow-up message form was used in those cases. Everyone recognizes the importance that message forms play in record keeping. Fire Department staff maintained a journal of activities, as well as providing message forms. In addition, all messages from the forms were transferred into a computer by a Police Department clerk. Redundancy would be reduced if an electronic mail link was established between each position at EOC. Messages could be sent electronically to appropriate positions and provide excellent documentation at the same time. J. ocos/"911" communication Link Early in the incident, aces established a "runner" system in order to access Police Department support for Fire Department field operations. They were unable to access "911" because the operators were just too busy. This resulted in valuable time lost in providing backup to isolated Fire Department field units caught in unsafe areas. This issue should be addressed, even though it is not an EOC problem per se. 4. Escorts The Police and Fire Departments are currently working toward resolving the escort issues for future incidents where protection is needed. CONCWSION It is obvious that the majority of the personnel who responded to EOC during this activation were knowledgeable and trained in the operations of EOC. Addressing the problems encountered and continued training by all persons with EOC responsibility will ensure a smooth and efficient operation in the future. Gli II and Development Unit Disaster Preparedness Division Bureau of Support Services LG:jd .. . "' "· · . : ~· . \ . . . ---. - . ... · ... "' · .. ,..,,·, - --· ... ....... . SENT sy:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:48PM 12136260010� 213 620 1780:#29 IJ.W omas BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT & MATZ TiiRRYW, IIRD JOiL B. 90XD ~T.DROOIS ni~lt~ 1EJtOMli ft PmDBbC DENlSE D. c;QICl!S SHARON !. JONES JA90N D. k'OOAN V?NCENTJ.M-U!ll.A A. HOWAJtD MATZ lONJJ.O J, NmSIM JOHN ~ 1l'l.181NER DCANE P . SHAICJN DAltONLT000-1 DOROTHY wot.PERT 11 le: Ile: WEBSTER STUDY/Interagency Group Swrwary/OES Interview PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY worus, PROOUCT D te: To: Frcrnr 1875 CENnJR.Y PARK EAST 23rd FLOOR LOS ANGELF.S. CALIFORNIA 90067 TELEPHONE (310) 201-2100 FAX 010) 201•2110 July 2, 1992 Richard J. stone Vincent J. Marella SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF LT. DON RODRIGUEZ Lt. Don Rodriguez was interviewed on Tuesday, June 30, 1992, by Vincent J. Marella. The topics covered in the interview include the function and operation of LAPO's Emergency Operation Center. The attached memorandum ·of interview is a summary of my recollection of the meeting, including my questions and comments, together with my mental impressions, conclusions and opinions. * * * C:\~P51\0ATA\VJ~\9007S09.MS (3) SENT BY=Xerox Te lecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:48PM 12136260010 ... 213 620 1780:#30 To: From: Date: Re: o~rICB OP TBB SiBCXAL ADV%SOR TO TB! BOAR.D OP POLICE COMMISSIONERS CITY OF LOS ANGBLBS KEMORANDtJK PRIVXLEGBD 1'ND CONPIDEN'l'IAL Richard J. Stone Office of the Special Advisor Vincent J. Marella July 1, 1992 Interview of Lt. Don Rodriguez, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT on Tuesday, June 30, 1992 at approximately 3:00 p.m., I interviewed .Lt. Don Rodriguez in my _offices in West Los Angeles. The following is a summary · of my recollection of this meeting, including my questions and comments, together with my mental impressions, conclusions an. d opinions based upon the meeting. The meeting lasted approximately one and a half hours. Lt. Rodriguez has been with the Los An~eles County Sheriff•s Office (LASO) for twenty years beginning in 1972. At that time, he was assigned to patrol and continued in that assignment until 1977. Thereafter, he was assigned to the Special Weapons Section until 1983, at which time he became a sergeant and " was again assigned to patrol duties. Between 1983 and 1988, Rodriguez's assignments included patrol, the surveillance team, and administration .. In 1988 he was promoted to Lieutenant and was assigned to inspection services and later to patrol. Presently, he - l - C:\\JPS1\0ATA\VJM\90O7509.~ (3) SENT sy:xerox Te lecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:4spM 12136260010� 213 620 1780;#31 is assigned to Administration where he is the Operations Lieutenant for one of' the patrol divisions. He is also an aide to the Division Chief where he does staff work tor the Division Chief. In April 1992, Rodriguez was part of the Emergency Operations Team. He explained that he is assigned to one of two teams designated to operate the LASO's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in- case of a County emergency. Two teams staffed with LASO deputies rotate on a monthly basis as the primary team to operate the EOC in case of an emergency. He said that in April 1992 his team was not the primary team to man the EOC and that his chief was out of the country. Despite this, however, when LASO was mobilized, he was called up, and when the EOC was operational, be was designated as a relief person to man the LAS0 1 s EOC. Lt. Rodriguez explained that in the past he was assigned to be the liaison between the LAS0 1 s and the IAPD's EOCs. Specifically, during the Operation Rescue demonstrations in Los Angeles' County which occurred roughly three years ago, he was assigned to the LAPD's EOC to coordinate the Sheriff's activities with . . those of LAPD. His specific assignment at that time was as historian on the Emergency Operations team. He was actually sent to the LAPD's command post during the Operation Rescue demonstrations. It was because of his previous background as liaison to the LAPD's EOC, that he was assigned that task during the civil disturbances that erupted in April 1992 . . , At this point, the discussion turned to the events of April 29, 1992 and the civil disturbances that occurred in Los Angeles after the Rodney King verdict. - 2 - C: \WP51\DATAWJ'4\9007'509.N ()) Rodriguez said that on SENT sy:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:4sPM 12136260010-+ 213 620 1780;#32 Wednesday, April 29, he heard early in the afternoon that the verdict was coming out. He was cm duty at the time, and his office (Administration) raxed tactical information to the various Sheriff's stations in order to prepare them for disturbances that might occur. Later that afternoon (he does not recall the specific time), he watched the verdict on television, after which he went back to work. At this time he was working in his office downtown in the Hall of Justice. At approximately 5:00 p.m. his shift was over and he went home to have dinner. Later that evening, at approximately 7:30 p.m., he saw the news and saw the beatings that were occurring at various intersections in South Central Los Angeles. He called the LASO' s EOC, which already had been activated, and asked the staff there if he was needed. He was told that he wouid not be needed that niqht, but that he would have a job assigned to him for the following day (Thursday, April 30). · · For the remainder of Wednesday night, Lt. Rodriguez stayed at home. on Thursday, April 30, Rodriguez was told that he would be assigned as the liaison with the Los Angeles Police Department and that he would work the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift. He was actually deployed to the LAPD's EOC, which is in the basement of the City Hall East Annex adjacent to the LA.PD Communications Room. At 6:00 p.m. on Thursday, he went to the LAPD's EOC at which time, in his view, the EOC seemed to be completely staffed. At least, it was chock full of people and there was little, if any, room for him ., ' in the EOC itself. His observation at that time was that the EOC seemed to be functioning smoothly, but it was extremely busy. Lt. Rodriguez was in his LASO uniform so that he could easily be - 3 - C:\\JP51\0ATA\VJ"\90O7509.M (3) SENT sy:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:50PM 12136260010� 213 620 1780;#33 identified as a Sheriff's officer DY all of those in the EOC in case they had requests ot the Sheriff's Office. In response to my questions, Lt. Rodriguez explained that he functioned primarily in several areas, including: 1. coordinating and arranging for transportation (busses) for arresteeg. Rodriguez sa.id that the LAPD had a lieutenant (whose name he does not recall) assigned to transportation. The transportation that was being dealt with was that of people who had been arrested during the civil disturbances. He emphasized that the transportation he coordinated with the LAPD was not of officers, but rather of prisoners. He said that the transportation ot officers primarily was done through the use of RTD busses. Rodriguez explained that he and the LAPD lieutenant, as well as another LAPO officer, set up a room across from LAPD's EOC in which they worked out and coordinated transportation to be supplied by the LASO to the LAPD. With respect to this transportation, Lt. Rodriguez said that he assigned LASO busses to the LAPD's command Post.- -~ he believes it was the south Bureau at 54th and Van Ness. He said that each night during the riots he provided LASO busses (sometimes two and sometimes as many as four or five) to LAPD Divisions so that prisoners could be moved to central jails. He said that~each bus is staffed with two LASO deputies. 2. coordination of Manpower Requests from LAPP t2 ., LAS,Q. Lt. Rodriguez explained the procedure by which LAPD made requests to LASO tor manpower. He said that the LAPD had - 4 - C:\WP51\DATA\VJ•\9007'509.M (3) zD SENT sy:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:50PM 12136260010-+ 213 620 1780:#34 routing slips whioh came to him in the LAPD•a EOC by runner. These routing slips contained requests for manpower. Specifically, the routing slips reflected the name and rank of the person generating the request. When Rodriguez received a routing slip requesting manpower, he asked how many deputies were needed and what was the mission contemplated for the deputies. LAPD would then check, through the ran.ks, and provide him with the answers to those questions. When he had all the information he needed, Rodriguez relayed the request for manpower to the LASO Personnel or LASO Logistics section, both of which were located in LASO's EOC. An IASO sergeant usually called Rodriguez back and either agreed or refused to provide the requested manpower. I asked Rodriguez whether there were situations in which the LASO refused to provide manpowei in the face of a request by LAPD. He said that there were such refusals. :r asked him to explain what he recalled as the basis for the refusals. He said on one occasion LASO platoons were committed to Long Beach, Signal Hill, Compton, and county areas, and were not available to the LAPD·. . He said that he does not recall exactly when or what day this occurred, because all of the days merge in his mind at this point. [Note that Rodriquez said that be di4 not keep a journal or a diary re0ounting events that ceourred through the riots.] He said that~on other occasions refus~ls occurred because the mission was not acceptable to LASO. I asked him for examples of this and ., he said that on least ~ne occasion LAPO made a request of the LASO to provide deputies for static security at a mall. This request - 5 - C:\\JP51\PATA\VJ~\900'7509.M (3) 2}1) SENT sy:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:51PM 12136260010� 213 620 1780;#35 was refused because, as a matter of policy, the LASO does not provide deputies for that purpose. 3. Intelligence Lt. Rodriguez said that another area in which he functioned while assigned to the LAPD's EOC was to coordinate and pass on intelligence. He said that he routinely received intelligence from LAPJ;) personnel while he was in their EOC and passed that intelligence along to the LASO. He did the same in the opposite direction -- namely, receiving information from his own EOC and passing that along to the LA.PD. When I asked for more details of this process, Rodriguez explained that LAPO officers received information and intelligence while they were in the ~ield. He said it was this information that was passed to him and, at the same time, passed to the National Cuard representatives in the LAPD's EOC. He said that he called his intelligencQ sergeant to _ pass the information along. He said that each day he talked with his intelligence sergeant to get information that the LASO had developed and he passed that ·along to the LAPO. He explained that he tried to verify information he was receiving as much as he could in the process of passing it along. staffed. ~ - I asked Lt. Rodriguez to explain how the LAPD • s EOC was He said that th~re were representatives from various sections in the LAPD, as well as representatives from outside the LAPD, stationed in LAPD's EOC. When I asked how he knew this, he said that the different areas of LAPD's EOC are labelled and that - 6 - C:\W51\0ATA\VJM\9007509.M (3) SENT sy:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:51PM 12136260010� 213 620 1780;#36 staff was located in each section that bore a label. The labels ha recalls seeing in the EOC included Intelligence, Personnel, Operations, Logistics, Fire Department and streets Department, as well as other City agencies the names of which he doesn't specifically recall at this point. In response to my questions, Rodriguez said that other agencies and organizations had people located in LAPD's EOC. Those representatives included a representative from the California Highway Patrol (Rodriguez said that this person was a sergeant, but he does not recall his name), two National Guard representatives (one for the day shift and one for the night shift), a Marine representative, a representative from the District Attorney's Office and from the City Attorney's Office, as well as several civilians whom he could not identify. On Thursday, April 30, which was the first night Lt. Rodriguez was assigned to LAPD's EOC, he could not tell whether there were any problems in the operation of LAPD 1 s EOC. During c-0 that night he met everyone and tried to get an understanding of how their EOC was operating in order to figure out the people with whom he should interface. As mentioned above, all areas in the EOC were clearly identified and therefore it was easy for Rodriguez to understand what was going on and who was who in the EOC. In terms of LASO personnel, Rodriguez said that he doesn't khow if anyone from LASO was stationed in LAPD's EOC on Wednesday night, April 29. He said that his counterpart assigned .~ to LAPD's EOC during the day shift was Sgt. Puente. He said that he knows Sgt. Puente· was stationed in the LAPD's EOC on Thursday during the day because he relieved Puente at 6:00 p.m. on Thursday - 7 - C:\WP51\0lTA\VJ"\9007S09.~ (3) SENT sy:xerox Te lecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:52PM 12136260010� 213 620 1780:#37 evening. Rodriguez was stationed in the LAPD's EOC from Thursday, April 30, through the following Saturday, May 9. I asked Lt. Rodriguez if he was aware that LAPD had received assistance from other law enforcement agencies and particularly, agencies outside the county. He said that he was aware that LAPD had received some such assistance, but he does not know how the assistance came about. Specifically, he does not know whether LA.PD requested the assistance, and, if so, from whom, or whether the assistance was provided by the outside agency on its own. He said that over the weekend (May 2 and 3), the tally board in LAPD's EOC showed the number of officers deployed throughout the city. This number included LASO deputies and personnel from outside agencies. Lt. Rodriguez said he passed that information on to the Sheriff's Department. He reiterated the fact that he does not know how the assistance from outside agencies came about. He also noted that there were . occasions when he got numbers of personnel from the ·board in LAPD' s EOC and, when he transmitted that information to LASO's EOC, the Sheriff's Department had a number . different from the LAPD • s. There were occasions when he saw the numbers posted on the board and he was surprised at the personnel levels. I asked Lt. Rodriguez if he was aware of a situation in which law \enforcement assistance was provided by Kern county to the LAPD. He said that he was aware of such assistance. He said that -"2-D ., someone in the LAPD EOC asked him if he had requested assistance from Kern County. Lt. Rodriguez checked with the LASO's EOC which said that they had no record of this assistance. Lt. Rodriguez - 8 - C;\IJP51\DATA\VJM\9007509." (3) SENT sy:xerox Te lecopier 7020 6-24-92 5:52PM 12136260010� 213 620 1760;#36 then called Xern County and was told they had received a request for assistance had been received and provided the name of the person who made the request. Lt. Rodriguez said that he did not recognize the name (he . also said he do·es not now recall the name). Lt. Rodriguez said that the officials in Xern County wanted to know if the person who made the request was from LAPD or from LASO. Lt. Rodriguez informed Kern county that assistance was not needed. He said that as far as he knows, the assistance was not then provided. Lt. Rodr°!guaz explained the procedure l:>y which LASO provided busses to LAPD during the civil disturbances • . He noted that there was a good working relationship with LAPD and that providing transportation for prisoners seemed to work very smoothly. He said there was good coordination between LASO and LAPD in this area. He explained that the local division jails operated by LAPD only hold approximately 40-50 people. He said that they worked out a system in which the LAPD would make a ·request of LASO to provide busses when the local jails were approximately 70% full. Because of this advance notice, LASO had '· time · to provide busses to the stations in sufficient time before the jails got completely full. They were also successful in working out routing for busses so that the same bus could be sent to more than one division. Thus, they were able to fill the busses rather th~n send out busses tor less than a tull load. They were also successful in providing busses for female prisoners when that need arose. As to staffing of LAFD's EOC, Lt. Rodriguez said that he believed that the deputy chief (Ron Frankle) was in the EOC during - 9 - C:\-'P51\DATA\VJM\9007509.M (3) SENT sy:xerox Te lecopier 7020 B-24-92 5:53PM 12136260010� 213 620 1780;#39 his shifts. He .said that he does not now recall the names of the LAPD commander and captain assigned to the EOC, but he believes that a lieutenant by the name of Chambers and a sergeant by the name of Miller were present. I asked Lt. Rodriguez i! Chief Gates was in the EOC during the time that he was there. He said that Gates was in the EOC from time to time, and he recalled that Gates was in the EOC on Thursday night at approximately a:oo to 9:00 p.m. [Lt. Rodriquez notact that earlier in the day on Thursday. , April 30 1 he aav Chief Gate in the Ball of Justice meeting vith Shariff Block.] On Thursday evening, when Lt. Rodriguez saw Chief Gates in LAPD's EOC, Rodriguez said that Gates greeted everyone in the EOC and then went into the adjoining conference room for a briefing by the Deputy Chief. Rodriguez noted that Gates was in there ~nd the briefing lasted tor approximately one hour. Rodriguez said that over the weekend (May l through 3) Gates was in LAPD's EOC several times. The interview was concluded at approximately 5:00 p.m. • * * \ ., - 10 - C:\WP51\0ATA\VJ"\9OO7509.N (3) 08 / 24 / 92 17:54 '0'213 620 1780 SMRH LOS ANGELES RECEPTION OK TX/ RX NO. CONNECTION TEL CONNECTION ID START TIME USAGE TIME PAGES RESULT *************************** *** ACTIVITY REPORT *** *************************** 1460 12136260010 08 / 24 17:34 20'04 39 OK @001 SENT sy:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:44pM 12136260010� 213 620 1780 ;#20 • If U..W OFFICES BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT & MATZ TBRJlY W. BIRD JOliL I. ICDCJilt WAJU: T. DR0CJJ:5 ntOMASI..F'REEMAN ]DOME H. FRmD8EllC OEN3i 0. GORCES SHARON '- JCWBS JA50N D. me.AN YJN'CJINTJ.MAUUA A, HOWARD MATZ l0NAU) J. NSS5IM JOHN ,:, RumN'liJl DIAN'li.P.SHAJaN DARONLTOOc:H DOR0'THY WOJ...Pmn' Re: WEBSTEk STUDY/Interagenoy Group Swmnary/OES Interview PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTQBNEX WORK PRODUCT Date: To: from: 1875 CENTIJP.Y PAlK E>5T 23rd FLOOR LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90067 TELEPHONE (310) 201·2100 PAX <310) 201·.2110 July 2, 1992 Richard J. Stone Vincent J. Karella -----------------~--~~---~~--~-------------------~-------~-~~~~~- SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF SGT, ROBERT PUENTE Sgt. Robert Purente was interviewed on July 1, 1992, by Vincent J. Marella. The topics covered in the interview include the function and operation of LAPD's Emergency Operation Center. The attached memorandum of interview is a sul'Dl'l'lary of my recollection of the meeting, including my questions and comments, together with my mental impressions, conclusions and opinions. • • • C:\WP51\DATA\VJ"\9007511.MS (3) SENT sy:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:44pM 12136260010-+ 213 620 1780;#21 To: From: Date: Re: O~~ICB OF TBB S~ECIAL ADVISOR TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS CITY OF LOS ANGELES KBMORANDOX PRXVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORlt PRODUCT Richard J. Stone Office of the Special Advisor Vincent J. Marella July 2, 1992 Interview of Sgt. Robert Puente Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office On ~ednesday, July l, 1992 at approximately 10:00 a.m., I interviewed Sgt. Robert Puente of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office at the offices of the Special Advisor. The following is a summary of my recollection of this meeting, including my questions and comments, together with my mental impressions, conclusions and opinions based upon the meeting. '1B meeting lasted approximately one and a half hours. Sgt. Puente has been with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office (LASO) for 30 years. He has been a sergeant for the past 16 years. Since joining LASO he has served in various capacities, including the following: the jail division; various \. stints as a patrol deputy; a detective; Internal Affairs; the civil Iii.ability Unit; and the Court Discovery Unit. He is currently assigned to the Forgery and Fraud Section and is a supervisor in the Computer Crime Investigation Section. - l - C:\WP51\0ATA\VJ~\900~11.M (3) SENT sy:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:45pM 12136260010� 213 620 1780:#22 ,, .1 ••· .... Sgt. }-Uente explained that there are two Emergency Operations Center (EOC) teams in LASO. Each EOC team has approximately 15 to 20 individuals assigned to it and is on call on alternating months. on Wednesday, April 29, Sgt. Puente was in his office in Whittier and wat· ohed televfsion at the time the trial verdicts were announced. There was discussion among . various deputies at that time as to what the verdicts would be and there was generally shock among the deputies when the verdicts were announced. Many of the deputies present at that time felt that there were going to be problems in the County because of the verdicts. · Sgt. Puente personally thought that the Los Angeles Sheriff's stations would start beefing up in anticipation of -problems. At approximately S:oo to 6:00 p.m., Sgt. Puente left his office in downtown Los Angeles and went home. Later that evening, as he watched television, he saw that there were demonstrations under way at Parker Center and he saw that they were becoming destructive. At or about that time, he received a call from LASO I instructing him to report on Thursday, April 30, at 5:30 a.m. to the LASO's EOC. On Thursday morning, April 30, at approximately 5:30 a. m. , he reported to the LA.SO • s EOC. Puente explained that he holds a po~ition as Operations Liaison to one of the Field Regions. ~pere are five deputies with that same assignment, but there are only three Field Regions. Thus, three of the five deputies were assigned as liaison to the Field Regions and Puente was assigned to .... .. be the liaison with the LAPD's EOC. We discussed the fact that - 2 - C:\WPS1\0ATA\VJM\90O7511." (3) ]J) SENT sy:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:45PM 12136260010-+ 213 620 1780;#23 there are no standing assignments for liaison with LAPO's EOC and that there is no training for that position. At approximately 8: 30 to a: 45 a. m. on Thursday, April 30, Sgt. Puente reported to the LAPD 1 s EOC. He described the configuration of LAPO's EOC as being a rectangular room containing designated places for various agencies and for functions within the LAPO. He s~id at the time he reported to the EOC there was a sergeant (whose name he does not specifically recall) who seemed to be in charge ot the EOC. Puente met him and they set about to find a place for Puente sinoe there was no designated place inside the EOC for a representative of the. LASO. Th~re are auxiliary rooms near the EOC, and it was in one of these rooms in which Puente was stationed. The room had several desks and Puente operated from that location throughout his assignm· ent to the LAPD' a EOC. Also operating in the same room was LAPD 's personnel roster team. Puente noted that later, representatives from the U.S. Marshall's Office and the L.A. County Marhall 1 s Office also had desks in the same room adjacent to the EOC. Across the hall in another room, military personnel set up their office. The military personnel included representatives trom the National Guard. In still another room the executive staff was located, including Deputy Chief Booth, who was in charge during the day shift. t..I asked Sgt. Puente to explain in some detail what exactly it was that he did during his assignment to LAPO's EOC. In ., response, he said that he was primarily involved in bus routing. He said that LASO made bussas available to transport prisoners who had been arrested by LAPD during the riots. He explained that the - 3 - C:\~51\DATA\VJH\9007511.M (3) SENT BY:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:46PM 12136260010� 213 620 1780;#24 busses that were provided were not used for transporting LAPD personnel. LAPO officers were transported instead by RTD bus. The procedure he followed in assigning busses to the LAPD was that a representative from the LAPD came to him and told him where prisoners were located who needed to be transported. He then communicated with LASO's EOC and arranged to have busses dispatched to pick up the prisoners and transport them to central jails. He noted that this operation seemed to work smoothly and that there were no major problems. I asked Sgt. Purent whether he was involved with personnel requests and requests for support trom LAPD directed to LASO. In response he said that he was not "plugged in" in that area and that surprised him. He said that personnel requests and requests for mutual aid were not directed through him. He said that he does not know why this was the case, but that he does no~ recall receiving any requests ·for personnel, nor does he recall passing such requests ·along to the LASO. He said that the same was true for intelligence -- namely, he was not involved to any great ' degree ·in receiving and passing along intelligence. He speculated that the reason he was not receiving and passing along intelligence may have been because he was located in a separate room from the EOC. In addition, Sgt. Puente was not in uniform and thus, may not have been As identifiable as a Sheriff's Deputy as his counterpart, ~t• Rodriguez, on the night shift. He did note, however, that he wore a Sheriff's tag identification on his suit. Toward the later days that he was assigned to LAPD's EOC, he did start to receive some intelligence from LAPD and he did pass - 4 - C:\~S1\DATA\YJH\9007511." (3) w SENT sv:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:46PM 12136260010-+ 213 620 1780;#25 • that along to LASO. This came about primarily because he had received information form the LASO's EOC and took it upon himself to go into the LAPD's EOC and confirm the intelligence with LAPO personnel. He explained that there was no formal structure for him to receive information but that informally he did receive some based on the above inrormal procedure. [Note that the CBP did have a apeoif'ic atation in LAPI>'s BOC and they appeared to be "in the loop" vith reapeat to what was going on in the zoc.] I asked Puente whether he was generally aware of whether and to what levels LASO deputies had been assigned within the City boundaries. In response, he said that he was not generally aware of whether deputies were deployed and, if so, how they were deployed within the City. He noted that in fact the first time ha knew that deputy sheriffs were deployed inside the City was when there was a request trom the Sheriff's Office to him to have an LAPD officer assigned to a Sheriff's platoon in order to provide coordination. Until that time, and he does not specifically recall exactly when that was, he was not aware of any deployment ot Sheriff's deputies. In response to my question, Sgt. Puente said that he was not aware of the deployment . of two platoons of Sheriff's deputies on Thursday morning to two shopping centers where arrests were made. Sgt. Puente said that on Thursday morning National Guard personnel started setting up their operations in LAPD•s EOC • . , On Friday, May 1, he said that essentially the same routine occurred as had occurred on Thursday, and that nothing special occurred which now stands out in his mind. He did note, - 5 - C:\\IP51\J)ATA\VJM\9007'511.~ (3) I SENT sy:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:47PM 12136260010� 213 620 1780:#26 . .. , .. -,. however, that in the afternoon o~ Friday, an LAPD Metro lieutenant, whose name he thinks is Mike Hammond (phonetic) approached him and told him that he really liked the way the LASO field booking operation worked and asked whether any Sheriff's mobile booking units were available. Sgt. Puente contacted the LASO's EOC and passed on the request from Lt. Hammond for one or two mobile booking teams. He was told by the Sheriff's office that none of these were available and that they were all deployed at that time. Sgt. Puente said that on Saturday, May 2, things started to quiet down quite a bit. He said that by this time his function was almost exclusively bus routing as described above. He said that he continued to try to obtain and pass along intelligence between LAPD and LASO. Specifically, he said that he received flyers from the LASO about matters that were occurring and passed that along to the LAPD. He said that it is his recollection that it was not until Sunday, May 3, that the LAPD started providing LASO with information and checking information through LASO. From that point forward, he believes that intelligence sharing occurred with ·some frequency. Sgt. Puente said that he was assigned to LAPD's EOC from Thursday, April 30, through Saturday, May 9. In response to my question he said that by the time he reported to LAPD's EOC on Thursday m~rning, April 30, the EOC was operational and was "up and running." As noted above, representatives from various agencies ,4 were stationed in the EOC after that time, including the u~s. Marshall, the Los Angeles County Marshall and representatives of the National Guard. His overall opinion was that from his vantage - 6 - C:\'-"S1\0ATA\VJ"\9007511.M (3) SENT BY:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:47pM 12136260010� 213 620 1780;#27 .. ... r' ' ·· point the LAPD's EOC aaamed to function well, although he acknowledged that he was not privvy to a lot of information. He said that he saw Chief Gates in the EOC at least once a day, usually at approximately 10:00 a.m. for a daily briefing. In addition, he said that Chief Gates occasionally came to the EOC in the afternoons. With respect to requests by t~e LAPD for outside assistance, Sgt. Puente noted that at one point he was told by someone in LAPD that there was information that San Diego had personnel available to assist and that LAPD wanted to utilize this · 2,D personnel. Sgt. Puente contacted LASO's EOC and advised them of the request. He was told by LASO to tell LAPO that they should use the normal procedure of which they were aware and that procedure should be followed in all. requests; for mutual assistance. Ha relayed that message to the sergeant who was in charge of LAPD's EOC with whom he interfaced. It was sometime after this incident that Sgt. Puente saw personnel from the Mono County Sheriff• s Office in LAPD's EOC. He a·lso believes he saw law enforcement person~el from other towns in Northern California. He does not recall seeing anyone from Orange County law enforcement in the EOC. He said he does not know how these people came to be in Los Angeles and in LAPD ' s EOC. He also said that he was not aware of any personnel~from law enforcement in San Diego County being deployed to the Los Angeles area . . , Sgt. Puente stated that on or about Wednesday, May 6, while he was still assigned to the LAPD's EOC, a representative .from the Coroner's office was in the EOC and had received - 7 - C:\WP51\0ATA\VJM\9007511,M (3) SENT sy:xerox Telecopier 7020 8-24-92 5:48PM 12136260010-+ 213 620 1780;#28 ., ••,, , information that there possibly were bodies located in some of the burned out buildings. The Coroner's official made a request to LAPD tor a coordinated search of a building and further requested that Coroner's personnel be assisted by the LAPD. While Sgt. Puente was not involved in the details, it is his understanding that the Coroner's office and representatives of the Building & Safety Department wanted to search one or more of the burned out buildings for bodies, but there was a problem in LAPD providing protection for the search teams. Sgt. Puente said that it took some period of time to work this out and he was not sure what the genesis of the problem was. He thinks, however, that it was not a problem with a lack of manpower, but rather a failure ot coordination. I The interview was ·concluded at approximately 11:30 a.m. * * * _ ,. - 8 - C;\WP51\DATA\VJ~\9007511.M (3) LAW OFFICES BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT & MATZ TERRY W. BIRD JOEL E. BOXER MARKT. DROOJ<S TI-IOMAS R FREEMAN JEROME H. FRIEDBERG DENISE D. GORGES SHARON E. JONES JASON D. KOGAN VINCENT J. MARELLA A. HOWARD MA1Z RONALD J. NFSSIM JOHN K. RUBINER DIANE P. SHAKIN DARON L. TOOCH DOROTHY WOLPERT A PROFPSSIONAL CORPORATION Fi le: Re: WEBSTER STUDY/Interagency Group Summary/OES Interview PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Date: To: From: 1875 CENTURY PARI< EAST 23rd FLOOR LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90067 TELEPHONE (310) 201-2100 FAX (310) 201-2110 June 29, 1992 Richard J. Stone Vincent J. Marella SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF LT. RICHARD ODENTHAL Lt. Richard Odenthal was interviewed on June 24, 1992 at 1: 00 p. m. by Vincent J. Marella. The topics covered in the interview include the structure and functioning of the Los Angeles Police Department's Emergency Operations Center. The attached memorandum of interview is a summary of my recollection of the meeting, including my questions and comments, together with my mental impressions, conclusions and opinions. * * * C:\~P51\DATA\VJM\9007508.MS (3) -� To: From: Date: Re: OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS CITY OF LOS ANGELES MEMORANDUM PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL Richard J. Stone Office of the Special Advisor Vincent J. Marella June 26, 1992 Interview of Lt. Richard Odenthal, Los Angeles Sheriff's Office ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT ================================================================= On Wednesday, June 24, 1992 at 1:00 p.m., I interviewed Lt. Richard Odenthal of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office ("LASO") at the LASO's Emergency Operations Center ("EOC") east of downtown Los Angeles. The following is a summary of my recollection of this meeting, including my questions and comments, together with my mental impressions, conclusions and opinions based upon the meet~ng. This interview was a follow-up interview to the one conducted on June 2, 1992, at which time Lt. Odenthal, along with other officials of the LASO were interviewed by representatives of the Webster Study. The purpose of this interview was to follow up on particular points centering primarily on the operation of the · "' LASO's EOC and to identify additional personnel in the LASO and the LAPD to be interviewed. - 1 - C:\WP51\DATA\VJM\9007508.M (3) 1. Los Angeles Sheriff's Department's EOC Lt. Odenthal and I discussed at some length the function and operation of the LASO' s EOC. Lt. Odenthal explained that the LASO's EOC uses the Incident Command System ("ICS") format for its organization. A copy of the ICS organizational plan is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Lt. Odenthal explained that the EOC is the central point of contact for all operations in the Sheriff's Department as well as for other county agencies. All of the other county agencies have representatives assigned to the LASO's EOC in an emergency. Thus, representatives from the eight major departments of the county are stationed in LASO's EOC (Fire Dept., Health Dept., etc.). LASO attempts, by means of its EOC, to keep up on everything that is going on throughout the county during an emergency. Priorities are established in the EOC. For instance, all requests for law enforcement mutual assistance directed to the Sheriff's Department are handled through the EOC. The officer in charge of the EOC will generally clear decisions regarding mutual assistance through the incident commander. Odenthal stated that, while the Sheriff's EOC is a central clearing house for information and for priorities, specific tactical assignments are not made directly from the EOC. Instead, these are made by field commanders. In this sense, the Sheriff's EOC operates in a similar manner as does ~pe LAPD's EOC, in that after a platoon is dispatched by the EOC, the platoon leader gets his mission from and coordinates with the field operations chief. At that point, the EOC is out of the picture with respect to that platoon which has been assigned. - 2 - C:\~51\DATA\VJM\9007508.M (3) 2. operation of the LASO's Eoc During the civil Disturbances Lt. Odenthal stated that there are two core EOC teams within LASO. Odenthal is the officer of the "A" EOC team which, during the civil disturbance, staffed the EOC during the night shift. The "B" EOC team staffed the EOC during the day shift. [A copy of the EOC s taff personnel roster is attached hereto as Exhibit B.] Lt. Odenthal stated that the LASO's EOC became operational at approximately 6:30 p.m. on Wednesday, April 29, 1992. He explained that all EOC team members carry pagers on a 24-hour basi&. On Wednesday evening, in the · early hours of the -~ivil disturbance, Odenthal decided to call the EOC teams in and the pagers were activated by approximately 6:30 p.m. By 8:30 p.m. on Wednesday, April 29, the LASO's EOC was staffed with LASO personnel and was fully operational. I questioned Odenthal on how long it should take to mobilize an emergency operations center to the point where it becomes effective during a civil disturbance like the one experienced in April in Los Angeles. He said that based upon his experience in major earthquakes, riots and fires, it takes approximately four hours to staff an emergency operations center and get it to the point where it can effectively react to a major disturbance. He added that in the case of the recent civil disturbance, this rule of thumb was borne out in that, while the LASO's EOC was staffed in well under four hours, it took at least that long for the EOC to , -#- catch up and deal with the events that were occurring throughout the county. He also explained that there is a direct telephone line from the LASO' s EOC to the LAPD' s EOC, which is used to 1-D - 3 - C:\WP51\DATA\VJM\9007508.M (3) facilitate communications to LAPD during a crisis. He stated that during a major disturbance like the one that occurred in April, LASO has a member of its staff stationed in the same to facilitate effective communication. 3. Assessment Of The Functioning Of LAPD'a BOC During The civil Disturbance We talked at some length about whether the LAPD's EOC operated effectively during the course of the April civil disturbances. According to Odenthal, the LAPD's EOC did not fm:iction effectively. He added that in his view, this was a key issue in the overall response by the LAPD to the civil disturbances. According to Odenthal, the LAPD's EOC never really became functional for about three to four days after the riots began. Thus, for the critical early period of the riots, specifically, Wednesday evening , Thursday and Friday, April 29, 30 and May 1, respectively, the LAPD' s EOC did not function effectively. When I pressed Odenthal for specifics relating to this issue, he reiterated points that were made in the earlier interview to the effect that LAPD routinely made requests directly to other police departments and to law enforcement agencies within and outside the county for assistance during the riots, and he pointed out that in many instances this was done without the knowledge of the LAPD's EOC. §e specifically pointed to the instance which he had related in our earlier interview wherein he received information from Fritz Paterson of OES on Wednesday evening, April 29, that the LAPD had requested the National Guard. He said that when he tried to - 4 - C:\\JP51\DATA\VJM\9007508.M (3) / confinn this with the LAPD's EOC, he was told that they knew nothing about such a request. It was clear that such a request had been made from one of the LAPD's four Bureaus without the knowledge of the EOC. In addition to the points he made in the earlier interview, he added the following two incidents to demonstrate that LAPD's EOC was not functioning effectively during the riots: Odenthal stated that at one point on either Thursday or Friday night during the riots, the LAPD's EOC was "screaming" for two platoons for Sheriff's deputies to be deployed to the City. He said that the situation .got so tense that Comma~der Squires of the Sheriff's Department went to the LAPD Command Center and talked to the LAPD Commander who supposedly needed the Sheriff's deputies. However, the LAPD Commander told Squires that he did not want additional people. In order·to get this point across to the LAPD's EOC, a conference call was placed in which a representative from the Sheriff's off ice, the LAPD Commander and Operations Headquarters Deputy Chief Ron Frankle participated. During the course of that conversation the LAPD Commander told Frankle that he did not need the Sheriff's deputies. It was only at this point, and after this effort on the part of LASO, that the LAPD's EOC was convinced that the additional resources were not in fact necessary. A second incident occurred on either Thursday or Friday during the riots, in which the LAPD liaison told the Sheriff's Department that the LAPD needed 1,000 men. Odenthal responded to the LAPD's ., request by pointing out that the LAPD had already received 1,000 National Guard troops and that he only had two platoons of deputies available. Odenthal quickly asked the LAPD liaison what the LAPD - 5 - C:\WP51\DATA\VJH\9007508.H (3) was doing with the resources that it already had, to which the liaison responded that that didn't make any difference. Odenthal finally told the LAPD liaison that until the LAPD knew what it was doing with the resources already allotted to it, the Sheriff's Department would not allocate additional resources. After the liaison went back and spent some checking to see how the current resources allotted to the LAPD were being used, the request for manpower was drastically reduced. 4. Odenthal's View of Problems With The LAP~ During the Civil Disturbances During the course of the interview, Odenthal said that from his perspective the following appeared to be the major problems in dealing with the LAPD during ·the course of the civil disturbances: (a) LAPD's EOC did not become operational in time so , # that it worked effectively during the course of the civil disturbances. (b) LAPD did not utilize its resources effectively, nor did the various bureaus share resources. Odenthal discussed the decentralized approach of the LAPD during the course of a large scale civil disturbance and pointed out that such an approach can lead to an uncoordinated response. Specifically, each of the Bureaus fights for resources independently and stockpiles those resources rather than sharing them with other Bureaus that may need them. This, in turn, results in inflated requests for resources and deployment of resources where they are not needed. Odenthal said that in many cases - 6 - C:\~P51\0ATA\VJM\9007508.M (3) · ,. this occurred during the riots in that in some areas the LAPD had resources available to it but did not deploy them because they either did not realize they had them or could not get sufficiently organized to deploy them effectively. Odenthal observed that there appeared to be a lack of coordination among the Bureaus. (c) LAPD was missing at least one level of command. Odenthal said that it seemed to him that the LAPD's command above the field lieutenant level was missing during the critical time of the· ~ivil disturbances. (d) The LAPD made direct requests for assistance outside of the Mutual Aid Plan. This point was discussed at the earlier interview and was reiterated by Lt. Odenthal during this discussion. 5. Additional Interviews That Might Prove Helpful I asked Lt. Odenthal for the names of other people in LASO and also in LAPD who would have first-hand information and experience with ·respect to how the LAPD's EOC operated during the course of the recent civil disturbances. In response, Odenthal suggested that we interview the following people: Lt. Don Rodriguez - LASO. Odenthal said that Lt. Rodriguez was stationed in the LAPD's EOC during the civil disturbances. He said Rodriguez's telephone number is 974-4205, and noted that . # Rodriguez was in the LAPD's EOC during the second night of the disturbances. - 7 - C:\WP51\DATA\VJM\9007508.M (3) : Sgt. Bob Puente - LASO. Puente is stationed in Whittier and his telephone number is (310) 946-7212. Lt. Odenthal said that during Thursday, April 30, 1992, Sgt. Puente was in the LAPD's EOC as the LASO liaison. Sgt. Tim Anderson - LAPD Metro Division. Lt. Odenthal said that Anderson would have information that might prove valuable on this topic. The interview was concluded at approximately 2:30-p.m. * * * - 8 - C:\WP51\0ATA\VJM\9007508.M (3) ., 11: 50 lT.AAYW 111no 1ve1, r . . BOxr:m MARX T, f)R.QOK:,; Tl1U.MAS R. l'lt.f.F.MAN JE~OMI: M, FRIED?ltrtr. OE.NJSF. L>. <.;UJ<(,F.<; SHA~()N E. JUN!:~ JA.!iON D. !(Qr.AN VlNCENT _I. 'MAJill:ll ,A A . HOWARD MATZ TIC"NA.l.0 J. NES~fM Ji'.IIJN IC' i:I ffiTNEil ClAl'-11:s, C:'IJA'l:IN T)A.~01'! l . 1i'Y'CH ooncrr1.1¥ w,-11. "tl:1T Ffle: Re; 'a'3102012119 . B_ I_ ~~ MARELLA BWM ...... SMRH LOS ANGELES 1../\ w OFFlCl?.5 BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT & MATZ /', rROFES~IONAL C()Rl'I.JIV,1 IIJN WEBSTER STUUJ/Int~r~~~acy Group summ~ry of Odenthal lntervi~w n:,te: To; 187. 5 Ct.N ruR'r' J>ARr-: EAST 2~rd FLOOR LOS ANGCl.t£. CAU~ORNl.4 ~0067 Tl::LEPJi<)NE 010) 201-:WJ() }-'A Y (:'ilfll 201-2110 Auqust u,, 19n ~,r:hard J. Stone @002 ~ . '\. rrom; VincQnt .J - Marella I \· PRlYiLEGEO AND CON~IDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORJ( PBO. DUC.I ----~---~--~---~-----------~-------·----------------------~~------ SUMMARY OF TNTERV_ U::W Of LT. RICHARD oonTTHAL Lt:. Richard OdenLba l was interviewed hy telephone on Augus1: i5, 1992 at 2:00 p.rn. by Vincent J. Marel.lc1. The 3Ubject matter cf this int~rview was U1e n~ture of th~ Lo~ Ange.Les Sh~:riff's l)epartrnenL's new Emergency Op'?r~t.ion Center ("EOC"). The interview a.lso covored t .he structure uf Lo!\ Angeles County's Emergency Op~rations orgi:iuizaticn, which is c-:11l~d the Emergency Management Council. The attad1ed rnemorundum of intP.rview is a sumrnary of my recollection of the interviP.~, includinq my question~ and comm~nts, together with my mental irnpr·essions, conclusion~ ~nd opinions. * -1, * 11 = 50 To: From: Date: Re: '8'3102012119 OFFICE OF TllE SPECIAL ~DVTSOR TO THE BOllRD OF POLIC~ COMMISSIONERS CITY OF LOS ANCELES .MEMORANDUM PRIVILEGED AND CONfIDENTI•L ATTORNEY WOR~ PRODUCT Richarn J. Stone Offi~e of the Special Advisor Vincent J. Marella Augu~t 26, 199~ Supplemen~~, Interview of LL. Richard Odcnthal, LOS Anqeles Sheriff's Office On Tuccday, Augus~ ~5, 1992 at appruximately 2:00 p.m., I interviewed Lt. Rich3rd OdQnthal nf the Los Angeles Sheriff's Off i.ce ("LASO"') by telephone. The follol,,Jing is a summary of rny recoll~ction ot this inL4:!:t:view, including my questions and comments, tog~t.her wi t.n roy rnentc'.11 impr~3siono, conclu!,;i~:n!=; and opinion3 bo~cd upon th~ int~rview. The subject matter of this interview wa~ the nature of t .hP- Los Angeles s11~1.-iff' s Dep3rtrnent' s nPw F.mergency oper1:1tion CentQr e'EOC") • 'l'he inte.r;v .i~w al$o covered thc2 strnr.ture ot LOS Angele~ county's ErnArgency operations org~nization, which is r.~1led th~ Emergency ManagemQnt Cm1ncil. 1. Los Angeles sh~riff•~ Dep~rtmant's New EOC I ask~d T.t. ooent.hal tu 1-'1:ovide 3ornc details ,.,; th respect to the LASO I s new EOC which is uml~r construction just P.r!St ot - l - t:\~P51\0ATA\~JM\9OO750~a.~ ~3) '41003 - ~ 11: 5 ;. 1 ~~~ ~3~ 1 : 02 : 0 ~ 1 :2 -:- 1~19 =---- - ~B~I ~ - --------------------- . Rp MARELL.4. BWM ...... SMRH LOS ANGELES 141004 downtown Los Ang~l~~- In responst:! to my quc£tions, r.t. Odent.hal explained thi:it Los Angell?-~ county is now .in the process of building a new $24 million facility whir.h will served~ a new County EOC. In addition to ~he EOC, the new cornp1P.X ot bu11dinys will ~l~o include off ices tor the Sheriff• s Dcpartm<rnt ar-=- well as ror ot.he1.· county di~a~tGr ~gencies. Lt. Odcnthal said that the new EOC will be a ~tate-of-th~-art tacili ty. It will includi? ~ computerized c;uminunication~ system wnich w i 11 t:nable the Ll\SO to c.l'"'lmmun ica te w 1th edL;h of its Sheriff's Stat.ions on a computer .:i:::; well as comm11nicat.e wi'th all of the ~urrounn i ng cities. Thi!:; equipment wil 1 enable t.hP. LASO to receive information if an emerqency u~velop~ much faetQr than it presently docc. In addi t". ion, tne new toe will have redundant t.elephon~ systems eo that if one sy~t.em is either down or unable to handle the call load, the !jccond, standhy system will become functiomil. The new radio t:>y~tem that .,;rill be installP.n in the EOC will have all LASO radio frequencle~ as well Q~ the county-wjrle frequencies. He said th~t the tacility wlll be approximately a 45,000 square foot building which will include Loth the EOC poTtion, as well d$ the County officQs d~~r.ribed aoove. I a~ked Lt. Udenthal Lv provide Q brief des~rip~ion ot t.he physical layout of the facility. He ~aid that the EOC will h~V9 a situation room which will bi::- r.npable of holdiny as many o.s SO to 60 decision makeLs at any given time. Tn addition, there will be sever;\ 1. breakout roum~ adjocent to thQ si tn;:;it i on room which are designed t.o house support ::;Laffs and tho staff cf the count.y die~stcr agQnci@~- These breakouL rooms will have a completP. array - ~ - C.\WPS1\DATA\VJH\900?'508~ .W (,) - ----------------- - • 'a'3102012119 08./26./92 11:51 . __ ,., __ , " -•• 7,- 7 ... BI R _ D MARELLA BWM ...... _ SMRH LOS ANGELES of communication~ equipmP.nt as well as cornpulers. The EOC, a. w~ll as the situation rooms and br~akout rooms, will dll be fitted with fax machines and photocopiers. In t~rm~ of video equipm~nt, Lt. OdP-nthal said that: an eutirely new video sy~tem will be installed which will a) low for tour large-;;;creen tel.cvic ions, as w~ 11 as monitoro on which intP.rnal view graphs will be able to be viQWQd. The EOC will alco have a :[)ress room which will aceonrmod"tc s1gn1fic~11t numbers of the prg~~ durjng a county-wioe erneryency. 2. Log Angeles ~OU~ty tm~rqency Management Coun9il I askQd Lt. Od~nthal to describe Lhe nature and ctructure of the Los Angcle5 County E>tnP.rgency management u.r. ganization. He explaineu that the principal co'-mi-y ~gency is the Los Angeles County Emergenc.;y Management Counci 1. The r.h~ i rperson of that or(Jani zation is -Che counLy Admini.strativc OfficQr, anti t.h~ vice chair is t.hP. Los Angeles county Sberiff. on thie council are representatives of th~ 8ight leaa county depdrtments. Lt. Odcnthal expl<1lned that there are two or thrP.P. layers of subcomrn.i t tees under the Emergency Man~yement Counci 1, and it is in t-.hRse subcornm1 ttees that thP. planning ~nd occurs. Specifically , h~ P.~plainea that there is the Emergency ManagQm~nt Steering Committee under which is the ~ubcomml~L~~ of the Emergency council Steering committee. Lt. nrienthal explained Lhat it is in this latter subc.;ommittee in which the staffs ot ~he lead cuunty agancies work ana prepare cm the county level for ~rnPrgencies. Lt. OdQnthal P.Xplainect. that the ::;tructure of the ~rnerry':'ncy management organizations nn the County level correspond~ for the - 3 - ~:\WP~1\0A1A\VJH\9OO75OSo.H Cl) @005 11: 52 '83102012119 BI RD MARELL.4. BWM .. ,( • '9; ' • •• .. ~ -.. . , ~ .. . ......... .... . SMRH LOS ANC_ gJ.,ES most pare to Lhe emergency response $~ructure in the city of Loa Angeles. :tte noted that the city has an nmhrella agency, the Emergency ~perations urganho L.iun, under which is thP. F.merqency Operations Board and t.hen the t.:mergency Management Committee. A~ with the County, it is this l~ht. level in Which Lb~ staffs of the responsible agen~ie~ do the planning f~r P-m~rgencies. The int.erview was <,;uucluded et upproximatoly 2:35 p.m. • * * - 4 - c,,~PS1\DAT&\VJ~\9007S0Sa.M (3) @006 08 / 26 / 92 11: 52 '0'213 620 1780 SMRH LOS ANGELES RECEPTION OK TX/RX NO. CONNECTION TEL CONNECT ION ID START TIME USAGE TIME PAGES RESULT *************************** *** ACTIVITY REPORT *** *************************** 1635 3102012119 BIRD MARELLA BWM 08/26 11: 49 02'31 6 OK @001 + - ~ EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER IMPROVEMENT STUDY for the EMERGENCY OPERATIONS BOARD CITY OF LOS ANGELES DRAFT VSP ASSOCIATES, INC. 455 UNIVERSITY AVENUE - -SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95825 (916) 648-9112 July 14, 1992 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY [To be added for final .version] I TABLE OF CONTENTS l.O INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ................. ·. . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 .2 City Emergency Management and Project Objective . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.3 Work Process ....... ~ ............................. · 2 1.4 Organization of Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 2 2.0 REQUIR~MENTS AND FUNCTIONS RELATED TO EOC OPERATIONS .... 4 2.1 Operational Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Principal Functions Within the EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3 EOC Space, Site and Structural Requirements ............... 6 3.0 ANALYSIS OF THE LA CITY EOC .............................. 7 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 . 3.2 Seismic Hazard Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3 Facility Use Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.3~ 1 Insufficient Floor Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.3.2 Insufficient Personal Work Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.3.3 Inability to Monitor Displays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.3.4 Inadequate Sideroom Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.4 EOC Operations and Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.4. 1 EOC Organization and Management ............. ~ . . 11 3.4.2 EOC and ECC Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 11 3.4.3 Information Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.4.4 Situation Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.4.5 Monitoring of Commercial and Closed Circuit Television . . . 14 3.4.6 Resource Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.4. 7 Public A ff airs/Public Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.4.8 EOC Activation ... · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 3.5 Information Systems ............... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.5.1 Information System Review ................. ~ . . . . 17 3.5.2 EOC Information System Functional Requirements . . . . . . 17 3.5.3 Message Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.5.4 Current Status of EOC Information Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.5.5 Existing Information Systems and Equipment .......... 28 3.6 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.6. 1 Telecommunications Systems Functional Requirements . . 32 3.6.2 Current Status of EOC Telecommunications Systems ~ . . . 34 3. 7 Staffing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3.8 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.9 Interface with Emergency Broadcast Systems (EBS) . . . . . . . . . . 40 4.0 · AN IMPROVED EOC - THREE ALTERNATIVES .............••.... 41 4. 1 Introduction . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 4.2 Option A - New Emergency Operating Center ...... ·. . • • • . • 41 4.2.1 . Requirements Relating to the EOC . . . . . . . . . . . •. . • • . . 41 4.2.2 Purpose and Functions . • • • . . . • . . • . . . . . . . • . • . . • . 42 4.2.3 General Facility Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4.2.4 EOC Cost Consideration . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . 43 v4_3 5.0 5., 5.2 5.3 5.4 4.2.5 Advantages and Disadvantages Related to Constructing a new EO·c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 4.2.6 Information Systems - Option A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4.2. 7 Telecommunications Systems - Option A . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Option B - Improve the Existing EOC Facility ............... 47 4.3. 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 4.3.2 Seismic Hazard Mitigation (Summary) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 4._ 3.3 Facility Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 4.3.4 Operations and Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.3.5 City and County EOC Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4.3.6 Emergency Broadcast System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4.3. 7 Information Systems - Option B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4.3.8 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 4.3.9 Staffing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 4.3.10 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 · Option C - Expand Existing Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 4.4. 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 4.4.2 Seismic Hazard Mitigation .. ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 4.4.3 Facility Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 4.4.4 Operations and Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 4.4.5 Information Systems ........................ .- . . 66 4.4.6 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 4.4. 7 Staffing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4.4.8 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 The Mobile Emergency Operating Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Analysis of the Mobile Emergency Operating Center . . . . . . . . . . 68 5. 1. 1 · Description ................... ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 5. 1 .2 Operations Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5.2. 1 Telephone Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 5.2.2 Radio Communications Systems ....... ~ ........... 70 5.2.3 Data Communications Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Analysis of Communications Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Improvements to the Mobile Emergency Operating Center (MEOC) 71 5.4.1 Facility Use and Operations ... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 5.4.2 Communications and Support Systems .......... · . . . . 73 ii 1 .0 Introduction and Background 1. 1 Introduction Los Angeles is a city that is unique in many respects. With a population of over 3.5 million people, contained in a 465 square mile area, there is an average density of over 7500 people per sq. mile. The population base is steadily increasing with a 15 % increase between 1980 and 1990. The City resides in a metropolitan area of over 14 and 1 /2 million people and thus represents nearly 25 % of the area population. The city is multi-ethnic and multi-cultural. This is demonstrated by the fact that the people are served by nineteen television stations and seventy-one radio stations. transmitting in a variety of languages. Many languages are spoken, and there are many boundary interfaces with adjacent jurisdictions which can and . do effect emergency planning efforts .. The City has its sha·re of emergencies. It lies within or adfacent to several significant earthquake fault zones, and is prone to extensive flooding and wildfires given the right conditions. Because of the multi-racial and cultural diversity, _ it can as recent events have shown, also have the potential for civil disorder. In recognition o~ these factors, the City has established a Emergency Management Organization. It is a functional organization, and one which involves all levels of decision making. While the organization is effective, the Emergency Operating Center facilities are woefully inadequate to meet the needs of a city of this size and complexity. VSP's analysis of the Emergency Operating Center took place between November 1991 and March 1992. During that time the VSP team was able to witness several activations of the EOC, both for exercises and actual events. While the civil · disorders of April 1992 took place after most of VSPs analysis , the problems in staffing and operating which were pointed out to us have been considered in our recommendations. VSP's recommendations present three options for improvement to the City's EOC facilities. The options are framed around cost and time-to-implement considerations. VSP strongly recommends City selection of the option which will provide a new EOC complex that will meet future needs. 1.2 City Emergency Management and Project Objective Over the years a tiighfy ·effective Emergency Management Organization (EMO) has evolved within the City of Los Angeles. Based on a well recognized set of typical emergen~y management functions, the EMO involves all levels of policy and operational decision making within the City. 1 Well organized, efficient, and p~operly equipped EOCs are critical to effective multiagency and intergovernmental emergency responses. An EOC must be able to coordinate the response and recovery efforts which are being conducted by the several City departments, and it must be able to help integrate the supporting efforts and resources provided by external agencies and organizations. Consequently, to perform this complex coordination role the EOC staff must have current information about the situation, be able to rapidly decide priorities and communicate them to the appropriate operating departments, and be able to analyze information so the staff can look ahead and plan for actions to be taken later. The City's Emergency Operations Board (EOB) contracted with VSP Associates, Inc. to examine the existing EOC in the City Hall East building and to recommend how it might be improved. The City also asked VSP to provide a general concept for a new EOC. While the new EOC was a secondary focus originally, VSP recommends in this report that it become the principal alternative for the City to consider. Two other options discuss how to improve the existing facility in City Hall East. 1.3 Work Process The VSP -project team used several methods to gather and analyze information on which to base its recommendations in this report. These included thoroughly reviewing existing EOC procedural manuals, conducting a workshop with r_ epresentatives of the City's various departments and analyzing the resulting data, holding follow-up individual interviews with key people, analyzing the existing City's emergency plan to determine the assignment of emergency functions and information requirements, and conducting several site inspections for various purposes. Other project activities included preparing an earthquake vulnerability assessment of the EOC, observing several EOC-related actual and exercise events (flooding, "Response 91 ", civil disorders, and a mobile EOC training session), and having numerous informal discussions and team meetings to help sharpen our focus for this final report. 1.4 Organization of the Report In addition to this brief background section, there are four other elements of this report. Section 2.0 discusses the overall requirements to be met by the City's EOC and the principal functions to be performed in it. Section 3.0 offers from several viewpoints a detailed analysis of the e~isting EOC. Section 4.0 presents three options (A,B,C) to the City for improving its EOC. Option A recommends a long term strategy for a new·facility. Option B recommends detailed immediate improvements that could be made regardless of the longer term strategy to substantially remodel the existing or build a new facility. Option C, recommended only if a new facility is not feasible, suggests major modifications be made to the 2 '------ ----- - - - --- - - -------- - existing facility. The concluding section (5.0) comments on the operations of the Mobile Emergency Operations Center and what could be done to enhance its capabilities. 3 2.0 Requirements and Functions Related to EOC Operations. 2. 1 Operational· Requirements The principal requirements which are ·necessary to ensure effective EOC operations are listed below. These requirements would apply to both the fixed EOC facility and the Mobile EOC as appropriate. · 1 . The City EOC could be activated for any major emergency or important event that requires multiple (more than two) department simultaneous operations over some period of time. Activation guidelines will be part of the EOC procedures. 2. The EOC facility must be capable of rapid activation (within one hour) and be able to maintain full operational status under all emergency conditions. 3. Safe access into the facility for operating personnel must be assured. 4. Internal EOC operations will follow the concept of using Emergency Operations Divisions as functional coordinators as described in current City EOO (Emergency Operations Organization) (February 1987) procedures. 5. Provision must be made within ~he EOC for inclusion of other City and non-city agencies and liaison representatives as required by the situation. 6. When activated, the City EOC will operate primarrly in information processing and coordination roles. It will not provide tactical direction to field elements of the various departments. 7. The City EOC will assist in coordinating the allocation of resources between City Departments, and be the central location for locating and requesting supplemental and out-of-city resources when necessary .. 8. City Departments will pre-designate fixed and or mobile site locations external to the EOC as primary and alternate points of contact for information exchange with functional EOC division work stations. 9. Upon EOC activation EOC division work stations will have the capability to directly communicate by telephone and or radio to designated external Departmental EOC or field command posts as required for information exchange. 10. The City EOC will be the primary location from which information is developed to brief and update the_ ;~ergency Operations Board. 11. The City EOC will be the location from which information on overall Citywide priorities and policy changes will be developed and provided to operating departments and divisions. 1 2. The City EOC will be the primary point for developing city-wide situation and 4 damage assessment information, setting public information standards and guidelines for departments, and/or approvi_ ng official information for distribution to media and the public. 2.2 Principal Functiqns Within the EOC There are a number of functions which the City EOC may be called upon to perform in an emergency. EOC functions can vary based on the type of emergency or event. Functions can also change in priority and importance over time. These functions will also apply to the City Mobile Emergency Operating Center (MEOC). Listed below are primary functional activities which can be anticipated. Each of these may have several sub-functions as necessary to accomplish the activity. In addition, each of the functions will have associated requirements related to communications, information needs, communication systems, display, staffing and others. Primary functional activities within the City EOC will include, but not be limited to: 1. Information Processing Collect, process, evaluate and display timely information on any emergency situation which may require multiple city department interactions. 2. Priority Assessment Prioritize incidents to ensure that a coordinated Citywide response effort serves the greatest needs in the most cost effective and efficient manner possible. 3. EOO Divisional. Departmental and Other Agency Coordination Provide inter-divisional (EOO) and departmental coordination as necessary to ensure the most effective response. Provide coordination and information exchange with support agencies and organizations as necessary. 4. Resource Support Coordinate requests from City Departments for supplemental resources with appropriate City, other local, state, federal, and private sector agencies and organizations. 5. Communication Systems Coordination Monitor the effectiveness of City. wide communication systems and services to meet the needs of the emergency. Coordinate the procurement, distribution and use of additional communications equipment to meet field requirements . . 5 6. Information Dissemination Provide current situation assessment information to Departments on the City response to the emergency, with a clear statement of priorities and future planning actions that could affect Department operations. 7. Public Information Provide a central location for the development and distribution of factual information for ·release to the media and the public. Provide public information and media guidance and _ standards to Departments as necessary. 8. Damage Assessment Act as the focal point for the City in collecting, analyzing and processing initial and follow on damage assessment information required for state and federal disaster assistance and recovery programs. Coordinate the initial disaster recovery process to ensure that appropriate damage assessment and cost accounting measures are being implemented to meet state and federal reporting requirements. 2.3 EOC Space, Site and Structural Requirements Requirements related to the above considerations are described in the Federal Emergency Management Agency Civil Preparedness Guide (CPG-1-20), Appendix I Emergency Operating Technical Design Guidance, dated May 16, 1989. Guidance includes recommendations for both fixed and mobile EOC's. Requirements in the Guidance are listed in several categories, and there is considerable amplifying discussion. Categories include: Space Requirements, Site Requirements, Structural Shell Requirements, and EOC components. Note: VSP to figure out what of this guidance should be included in the report. The guidance document is 73 pages. The following statements are listed now for information purposes: Space Allocations - " ... a minimum of 50 square feet per EOC staff mem_ ber assigned to the EOC in an emergency on a sustained 24-hour basis. A range of 50- 85 square feet per person is recommended ... " Site Requirements ·"It is recommended that the EOC be entirely below the ground." "The EOC should not -be "located too close to medium or high rise structures." "The proposed EOC site should be readily accessible to vehicular traffic and should not be located near hazardous products or facilities ... "Etc., etc ... 6 " ' 3.0 Analysis of the LA City EOC 3.1 Introduction The EOC functions as an information gathering and resource allocation center for emergency operations within the City. Management. of the facility is exercised by personnel from the Planning and Research Division of the Police Department. The facility also functions as the Emergency Control Center (ECC) for the Police Department. During the course of the contract, VSP personnel had the opportunity to gather information about the EOC from several sources. These include interviews with the personnel who function within it, from those who have the responsibility to maintain the facility, and from personal observations made during several activations of the facility. The analysis is intended to present and discuss various aspects of EOC operations. Recommendations related to the analysi~ are presented in Section __ . 3.2 Seismic Hazard Assessment The location of the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Southern California exposes the facility to seismic hazards. The major seismic threat will result from a large earthquake occurring on the Newport-Inglewood Fault Zone or the segment of the San Andreas Fault in the northeast side of Los Angeles County. The EOC is also located in Zone 4 of the seismic risk map of the United States ( 1991 Uniform Building Code). Zone 4 is defined as the zone of highest seismic risk in the United States. The current report addresses the nonstructural hazards, water supply, power supply, and access to the EOC for continu· ous operation following an earthquake. The structural integrity of the building (CHE) itself has been addressed in the November 1 2; 1987 report from the Emergency Operations Center Facilities Subcommittee to the Emergency Management Committee. This report indicated that the building is seismically sound. A survey of the facility was conducted in December, 1991 by a team from Agbabian Associates. There are 22 rooms and closets in the P-4 ·sublevel, housing personnel from several city departments, communication equipment and control, shelves, cabinets, desks and computer. Water supply, emergency generators, and the utilities room are located in P-3 parking sublevel. The criteria for seismic integrity of the EOC is based on the following stipulations: a. Thefe shall be no loss of life or any injury leading to the loss of fife in the EOC. b. The EOC should be in full operation and remain 7 . -. accessible following an earthquake. c. The emergency. power generators, emergency batteries and emergency water supply should _ provide back-up power and water supply following an earthquake. The seismic investigation of the facility indicates several seismic problems and provides recommendations for mitigation of these problems. A summary of these problems is given in the _ following: 1. Room partitions extend in height to the acoustical ceiling and are not anchored to the top roof slabs. Movement of these partitions can result in cabinet and shelf overturning, glass breakage and jammed doors. 2. Acoustical ceiling mounted items such as light fixtures, acoustical panels, fluorescent tubes, tee-bar grids and fire sprinkler systems are not diagonally braced and may rupture or fall. 3. Pipes and ducts are not braced and may break. 4. Shelves and cabinets are mostly unanchored and may slide or overturn. 5. Television monitors hanging from ceiling are not braced. They may swing as a pendulum during an earthquake and fall. 6. Television monitors on standing units will overturn. 7. Television monitors and fax machines placed on tables and shelves are not anchored in some cases and may slide and fall. 8. Telephone units are not tied to tables or desks and may slide and fall. 9. Control consoles and emergency broadcast cabinets are not anchored in some cases and may slide or overturn. 10. Raised computer floors in the coordination room are not braced and may collapse Jeading to equipment damage and loss of function of the coordination room. 11. Items thrown from shelves, cabinets or stacks of storage boxes may block the use of the EOC following an earthquake. 8 1 2. Fire extinguishers are hanging on small bolts and are not strapped to the walls. 1 3. Generators and piping in the utility room adjacent to emergency water tank n P-3 sublevel are not braced or anchored. The seismic investigation i'ndicated that the EOC does not meet the seismic integrity criteria and will not be immediately operable following a major earthquake. 3.3 Facility Use Analysis This section presents material related to the use, organization and activation of the EOC facility. The analyses done on the EOC by City Staff or VSP's consulting team have pointed out problems with the existing EOC facility. These include: 3.3. 1 Insufficient Floor Space The Coordination Center of the EOC (Room 143), has approximately 1750 square feet of usable space. A full EOC activation will bring 55 to 60 persons from City organizations which have assigned responsibilities into this facility. This figure does not necessarily include liaison representatives from state, county and private sector organizations. Federal guidelines for EOCs call for 50-8 5 square feet per person operating within an EOC. This would indicate the need for 3000 to 5100 square feet for the city EOC. The current facility has less than 60 percent of the space that should be available. 3.3.2 Insufficient Personal Work Space EOO Division personnel are assigned to 30 inch wide table top carrels placed in a rectangle in the center of the room. The normal work station will seat one person. Actual work space is limited to three to four square feet. There is little room for w· ork materials, e.g., maps, listings, etc. Additional support personnel for the work station have to stand or sit behind persons in each of the carrels. The EOC and/or ECC commander and immediate support personnel are positioned directly inside the largest (6 foot) doorway to the facility. Movement in and out of the doorway area is distracting to the operations of the command group. The location and configuration of the carrels and information display requires that these persons must stand to get an overview-·of on-going operations. Recommendations to increase the work area and to increase available floor space are contained in the descriptions of the various options in Section _ of this report. 9 3.3.3 Inability to Monitor Displays Primary displays consist of a three panel wall mounted map and a Situation Board. Both of these displays are difficult to see from most of the positions within the facility. T~e small scale of the map requires viewers to be directly in front and only inches away from the surface. 3.3.4 Inadequate Sideroom Operations The "siderooms" allocated to various City departments for planning and EOC support operations are not currently used in most cases because they are not effectively equipped to support the needs of the departments. At present, approximately 5500 square feet of space is allocated for sideroom support to the EOC. We have not found widespread acceptance of the sideroom concept among the various departments. There are several possible reasons for this: 1. Sideroom activities may duplicate ·activity already taking place at Department level ECC's/EOC's. 2. Sideroom set up requires displacing day-to-day occupants of this space, and necessary resource material is generally not available in the sideroom. Some /EOC activations are for events which do not warrant disruption of the daily activities conducted in those areas. · 3. Lack of good communications into the EOC and to the outside world. 4. Siderooms, while part of the EOC, are not ~'in the EOC"; thus they are somewhat outside the mainstream of EOC activity. 5. General uncertainty and lack of procedures about how the siderooms would function or the purposes· they might serve. Departments have not built sideroom use in to their concept of emergency operations. With two exceptions, City Administrative Office {CAO) and the Building and Safety Department, VSP could find no department that had actually used a sideroom either for an exercise or for actual operations, however during the '9 2 February flood activation, the CAO's staff and State OES representative occupied the space (Room 139) allocated to the Mayor's office. Building and Safety arranged to occupy their assigned sideroom (119). Building and Safety personnel were pleased with the sideroom operation although their use of existing telephone numbers- created a problem during business hours. It should be noted that Building and Safety did not-establish a department level ECC for this emergency, so the side room operation filled an important function between what was happening in the EOC and within their department. 10 I . Due to the lack of experience in actually using siderooms and the conditions outlined above, we believe that the City should try a different concept in the use of siderooms. This will be describ~d in the Recommendations under Option A. 3.4 EOC Operations and Management 3.4. 1 EOC Organization and Management The current overall EOO organizational structure appears to _ work effectively, and it provides through the Emergency Operations Board and Divisions, the opportunity for a truly functional organization · where Departments can support multiple divisions. The use of functional Divisions in coordination roles within the EOC is a good procedure. The direct management of EOC operations during activati. ons is currently handled by the Police Department, and is an extension of their management responsibilities as outlined for the Department's ECC operation. VSP does not see any compelling reason to change that direct management role (the "keepers of the facility"), however we would point out that the Fire Department, because of the proximity of considerable staff on the P-4 level, could also manage the EOC facility. Internal management of emergency operations within the EOC once activated .however, could be accomplished by any one of several City Departments depending upon the nature of the event and the period in time that is of operational interest. The primary function within the facility is to be a coordination center. An organization needs to be in place to ensure that the best possible coordination is taking place for the varying phases of any emergency. . While true that all emergencies initially will require some form of Police Department presence, the situation can change over time where another of the EOO Divisions could be placed in primary coordinating roles within the EOC. This is _ particularly true in the latter phases of some emergencies and in those s_ ituations where other departments must act in primary operating roles. VSP suggests the City consider the recommendations in Section _ with regard to the internal coordinating organization of the EOC after it has been activated. 3.4.2 EOC and ECC Operations The Coordination Center (Room 143) currently fulfills two emergency assignments. The primary (but less often used role) is to serve as the City Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The facili_ ty also functions as the Police Department's Emergency Command Center (ECC) for police tactical alerts. Several of the work station carrels at one end of the rectangle are utilized to support this operation. An activation of the EOC can be done either as an extension of a situation for 11 which the Police Department has already activated the ECC function in the room, or the EOC can be activated as a direct result of some event which requires the facility to be placed into operation as City EOC. One advantage of the current dual use is to obtain greater utilization of the facility space than would be the case if it was only used as the city-wide · EOC. Another advantage is that when the facility is being used as an ECC and then moves into an EOC mode, there is already a part of the organization is in place. Even with those advantages, VSP does not believe that the EOC should be functioning with a department ECC as an integral part of the EOC operation. As . stated in the ECCD Handbook, "The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is an expansion of the Emergef)cy Control Center (ECC) configuration utilized for some time by the Police Department during emergencies and natural disasters." VSP'S reasons for recommending that the City consider a change to this. arrangement are: 1. The function of an ECC is to be a department command post. None of the other departments (except Police) attempts to operate an ECC type operation from within the EOC facility after the full EOC is activated . . As stated in the EOC guidelines, the functions of a command post are different from those to be performed within the EOC. 2. The Police Department's operation of the ECC during a City-wide EOC activation tends to involve a relatively large number of uniformed police personnel. Because of this, an impression is created that the primary functions being performed are . those oriented to and around the Police Department. 3. The extension of the ECC Intelligence function by Police personnel into full scale EOC operations while well intentioned, does not necessarily work to the full inclusion of high priority and required information for and from other Divisions. VSP believes that the use of the EOC as an ECC by the Police Department during an emergency involving the other Divisions creates an environment in which the other divisions are functioning in a support capacity to the Police Department rather than operating as a balanced Emergency Operations Organization. 3.4.3 Information Management For the facility to operate as a focal point for information gathering, means of communication have to be established .with the various city departments and their facilities from which emergency operations will be controlled internally. These department facilities are· referred to as Emergency Operations Centers (Department EOC's), Emergency Control Centers (ECC's) and/or Dispatch Centers - depending on the department and activity. These facilities have the detailed information which the City EOC must obtain for monitoring and evaluating the overall situation. 12 :, f Police and Fire maintain their City-wide dispatch operations in separate facilities on the P-4 level. Other departments do not. The information handling system as currently operated is heavily de·pendent upon the use of telephone to connect the EOC with department facilities. The limited space available within the existing facility makes movement difficult to effect face-to-face coordination and communication between staff members. As a result, a portion of the required inter-divisional coordination is done by the preparation anq passing of written messages which have a preparation and routing procedure which is not very well understood. VSP noted on several occasions during EOC activations that messages were mis routed, lost or not acted upon because of the congested facilities and the volume of paper produced. The lack of space and a detailed information flow pattern for the facility results in a tendency on the part of the staff to just stay in place at their assigned carrels. Information display is limited to a single lined "white board" used to record situations; a large Thomas Brothers wall map mounted under plexiglas; and a "Streets on a Disk" software program for forward projection onto a screen. There are no displays for such items as top priority incidents, weather, meeting a0d briefing announcements, important phone numbers, shelters and occupancy data, casualty totals, hospital status, out-of-city freeway and major roadway information, objectives to be achieved, and similar information. The method for posting incident information to the wallmap is through the use of yellow "post-its". There is no color-code system for posting information to identify type of incident, resources applied to the incidents or like information. The "post its" cannot be read from any location other than immediately in front of the map. Because of the size and layout of the room, none of the existing displays are readily viewable or easily accessible from most of the Division carrels. Because of this,. there is little use made of the above listed display surfaces. This is a difficult problem in al. I EOC environments, and not restricted to this facility. The Police Department provides the total staff for the processing and posting of information received in the EOC. The impression given is that priority to the posting of information goes to operations which are brought in through the police ECC function. An established process for the analys_ is of all incoming information from the other divisions was not observed. Several of the Division carrels are equipped with computer terminals for selected information display. The total system is not yet fully functional, and therefore was not used during the activations which VSP observed. 3.4.4 Situation Assessment Currently, the intelligence gathering function for the EOC is managed and staffed by the Police Department. When the EOC is activated, other divisions are requested to 13 · ✓ provide their situation information to the Police Department's intelligence function. In reviewing the log and situation display items from exercises, VSP noted that priority to the posting of information goes to information commonly collected as part of police operations. A process for the analysis of all incoming information from the other divisions was not observed. VSP is not concerned about continued Police Department management of the intelligence activity (although it could also be done by the Fire Department). However, we believe that the function is too important to have only one department managing all of the information, analysis, and output of situation assessment activities. 3.4.5 Monitoring of Commercial and Closed Circuit Television ~ rJ/c ceiling hung twenty-one inch television screens are available for the viewing of commercial broadcasts within the EOC. Normally these are tuned to separate channels. Audio must be kept low in order to reduce noise levels in the room. Additional small television monitors are mounted on the wall at the back of the room. It does not appear that these units are effectively used, although VSP had only one opportunity to observe du_ ring an actual EOC activation where there. would be outside coverage available. · 3.4.6 Resource Requests Resources requests for supplies, materials and equipment are handled by the General Services Supplies Section who uses two three-- ring binders titled the "A" and "B" books. These books are transported to the . EOC from the Police Detective Bureau when the EOC is activated. They contain reference sheets for the supplies which are most frequently required · for emergency management use. This position is staffed by ·one person who has the responsibility to coordinate with other city departments to obtain on-hand resources, to procure items from vendors, and to submit requirements to the Office of Emergency Services (OES) should such action be required. This could be a major activity in an emergency. Personnel resource requests are handled by the Personnel Department which has a single position in the EOC. 3.4. 7 Public Affairs/Public Information One of the major functions that the EOC serves is the coordination and management of emergency informatio"!~ -- Currently, the information-gathering responsibility (as listed in the October 1987 Responsibilities Matrix of the City Emergency Plan) is assigned to the Police Department. Police and Fire are both listed as having responsibility for Public Information Centers. 14 ' . ' ' There is little information on thi~ function in current procedures. EOC Guidelines - Tab J, Emergency Control Center Division X for the Police Department, states that the ECCD "Disseminates pertinent information to the public and news media". One of the requirements related to EOC operations, which VSP has recommended, is restated below: "The City EOC will be the primary point for developing city-wide situation and damage assessment information, setting public information standards and guidelines for departments, and/or approving official information for distribution to media and the public. VSP believes that this activity is a vital and primary function of the EOC. It is particularly important because of the size and diverse nature of the population, and the variety of media which supports the distribution of information. VSP has recommendations related to this function, which can be found in Section of this report. 3.4.8 EOC Activation Activation of the EOC consists of two major components: 1. Deciding when to activate 2. Making the activation happen 1. Deciding When to Activate Current procedures state that: "The EOC may be activated by the Mayor, City Council President, or in their absence, the Chief of Police, or in the Chief's absence any member of the Emergency Operations Board." Also, " The EOC may be activated whenever ari event or pending event will require significant resources beyond those normally available from one City Department." Perhaps the greatest single difficulty which confronts those responsible for emergency management decisions is when to activate the EOC. This is especially important in those situations in which it is not readily apparent whether the activation should be done immediately, delayed or not done at all. If there is a delay, and then a subsequent decision to activate the EOC, .there is a problem of getting operations up to speed and a risk of always being behind the work curve. On the other hand, activati_ ng the EOC in recognition of a possible threat which may not materialize, risks excess personnel costs and negative reactions of staff and ·leaders if the situation does not materialize and the activated · staff is not being effectively utilized. The decision when to activate is one which can require considerable assessment. Some situations will clearly indicate the need. However, other situations may not. There is a natural tendency to "wait a little longer", "get more information", "get a 15 " ,. ~ ' J group consensus" always with the unstated concern that making a presumptive move may not be required and may subject the maker to criticism. While these concerns will always exist and can never be totally eliminated, a phased activation procedure with threshold related guidelines as discussed in Section __ may facilitate the process. 3.5 Information Systems The collection of data, its assembly into useful information, and the subsequent communication and display of that information for decision making purposes are critical functional requirements of the City's EOC. Although some Personal Computer (PC) systems and networking equipment have been very recently purchased for use in the EOC, they have not as yet been either fully installed or implemented as part of an integrated information system design. EOC operations and capabilities with respect to data collection, data analysis and reporting exist today as almost entirely manual functions. The data structures and information flows which currently exist have developed to their present status in an evolutionary manner as the result of insights gained from both simulated exercises and actual activations of the center. Modifications have been made to the information handling processes on a substantially ad hoc basis within the severe restrictions imposed by the physical limitations of the EOC space and the economic realities of local government finance. As both the role of the EOC and the information and decision-making needs of its users have become better defined, it has become apparent to the Emergency Management Committee (EMC) and the EOC participants that the current manual approach to information handling, which relies on courier-routed handwritten messages and manual report generation, is insufficient to meet the functionality requirements of the Center. It is widely recognized by EOC participants that vast improvements in information - processing, and thus improved decision making, could be achieved through the implementation of modern computing and communications technology. Some important initial steps towards this goal have already been implemented through the procurement of a limited number of computing workstations and some of the components needed to implement shared data and communications between them . via a local area netw· ork (LAN). There exists, however, no overall design for integrating either these new components or future computer capability into an information structure which will improve EOC operations. One of the objectives of VSP's report is to provide macro-level information system design and recommendations. It is essential that more detailed systems configuration and design (micro-level design), installation, and parallel/simulation testing be undertaken and completed before placing any new system configuration into actual operation. This section of this report provides a description and background for some of the elements which are essential to understanding the basic needs and requirements of the EOC's information systems, a.nd pre~ents a rationale for the overall design 16 ... recommendations which are presented in Section Specifically, this section: • Recaps information systems study efforts to date • Outlines the basic functional requirements for an upgraded EOC information system • Reviews the existing EOC information system structure • Summarizes existing and budgeted computer and network hardware and software · 3. 5. 1 Information System Review The VSP team has used several formal methods of gathering information in order to assess EOC user needs and requirements for information .flow and processing. An initial overview of user-perceived deficiencies and ·desires was derived from the documented minutes of the day-long EOC Needs Assessment Workshop which was held by on May 25, 1989, prior to the commencement of work by VSP under this contract. An interdepartmental workshop designed by VSP, which f~atured desktop scenarios of events, was held in October 1991. As a result of participant discussions, this workshop generated a substantial quantity of useful information concerning data and communications requirements under the varying scenario conditions. A set of pre-workshop questionnaires were also helpful in identifying linkages between departments, and in pointing out specific EOC operational difficulties perceived by each department. The VSP team also observed an on-site EOC training exercise on November 14, 1991, in which we were able to track information flows and interview City departmental participants during simulated operating conditions. This training exercise also yielded a written evaluation by the Emergency Management Committee Training Subcommittee, which VSP has had the benefit of using in this assessment. Finally, formal individual interviews have been conducted by the VSP team with selected EOC users, as well as many informal communications and discussions. 3.5.2 EOC Information System Functional Requirements One of the primary functions of the EOC is the acquisition and coordination of information. As a result of our team's observations of current EOC operations, a review of the latest EOC-related literature, our team's experience with other EOC facilities, and the information system review outlined above, the following items comprise what we consider to be the essential information systems elements which need to be accommodated within the basic design for any upgraded EOC information system. These items are not intended as an all-inclusive list of desired functions and capabilities, but are considered the basic and essential components and characteristics to _ e~tablish a functional and expandable system consistent with the operational requirements of LA City's EOC. · 1. Incident Designation The information system must incorporate a consistent and well 17 --------------- - - - .. , defined procedure for uniquely identifying/designating an emergency field incident. This is a vital element in establishing any information system for several reasons. At the most basic level, an incident designator establishes a common reference framework for communication, and removes (or at a minimum reduces) ambiguity between departments when interacting with each other. From a computer-based tracking, logging, and summary reporting standpoint, a unique designator is requisite for rapid automated processing. An important byproduct of such an approach is the establishment of a common basis for the further refinement of incidents such as incident prioritization, associated impact analysis (eg. damage and/or casualty assessment), and social services/recovery needs assessment. 2. User Interface Format Standardization The information system should be based upon a standard communications format which quickly becomes recognizable and familiar to system users. Primary data elements such as the incident designator, message designator, time and date information, and sender/addressee fields, should be clearly indicated and mandatory for message transmission. Wherever possible, it is desirable to have information fields either automatically supplied as a function of the computer system, or as check-off boxes which minimize the need for typing. _ The benefits of standardization are realized on an individual basis through time savings in reading and responding to communications, and on a system-wide basis in an overall reduction in error potential. In a hypothetical large and extended activation of the EOC (beyond the scope of any previous experience), it is extremely likely that error rates in information processing and communications will rise as fatigue of the individuals occurs, and second-line less experienced personnel are brought in to relieve EOC regular staffers. Format standardization will reduce both the effort required to generate a message and the potential for misinterpretation on the receiving side. 3. Simultaneous Distribution of Communications An efficient and effective information system supporting EOC applications must be capable of distributing copies of a message/request to multiple receivers simultaneously. The time critical nature of emergencies and the rapidity with which situations change does not generally permit the luxury of allowing information to be passed in_ a sequential manner. Situational priorities may well be perceived differ- ently by the individual departments within the EOC, and the potential exists for a message to be bottlenecked and delayed in a scenario where a message is passed sequentially from one station in the EOC to the next. Under emergency response conditions, thi~ sequential approach to messaging is not acceptable. 18 ---------------- - - .. ' 4. Graphic Image Handling Capability The information system design should include the capability to support graphics image display at each Departmental station within · the EOC. Ideally, this capacity should include a capability to transmit graphic · images as an integral part of regular message handling. The primary focus would be initially in support of map handling, and eventually with technological development aerial photography and video image capture. 5. Automated Message Logging/Auditability Message auditability can be considered an essential feature for an EOC information system from the standpoint of the need to provide rapid situation recap, post-activation performance analysis and improvement training. It was also noted in the workshop in October of 1 991 that a very detailed level of documentation will likely be essential for supporting post-event City financial claims for state and federal compensation. Automated logging should be sufficient to meet these requirements. 6. Modularity for System Expansion As a result of our analysis, the capability for information system expansion on relatively short notice, and without major computer hardware or program modification, is considered to be a required element of any selected design. Our analysis clearly indicates that doubling or tripling of the initial system configuration is almost a certainty as the expanded capabilities of the systems are integrated into ongoing operations. Given the financial realities of local government funding, a modular design will allow for incremental improvement and upgrading of information system functional components without major disruption to overall system design. 7. Non-Exclusive Hardware/Software/Communications Interfaces Despite efforts by the city to standardize upon hardware and software across all departments, it is likely that the demand for non standard interface/data exchange capability to the EOC information system will exist. Outside agencies at the county, regional, state, and federal levels, as well as private companies and the media may at some point require integration and communication with the EOC system. It would not be reasonable to expect that all of these "foreign" interfaces will align precisely with the City standards. - Recognition of this potential need, as well as recognition of the uncertainties which exist in the direction of future technology, make the incorporation of this capability in the design phase a prudent action for the City. · 19 • , l, 8. Summary Reporting and Analytical Capability An essential function of ·the EOC information system is to provide high-level decision makers with the proper information to enable and support strategic decision-making. The EOC information system must incorporate a flexible capacity to summarize by incident, multiple incident, geographic designation, time parameter. or any other custom-designated element, the history and status of events. While most reports will likely assume a standard format, flexibility is essentiai to meet the requirements of rapidly changing and often unexpected events. Not only must the capacity for customized summary reports exist within the information system, but the capability to generate them rapidly and in a format which enhances for readability is needed. Ideally, custom report generation should not require that the user need to have substantial" training in order to retrieve information. 9. Minimal Training Requirement Our analysis has clearly shown that one characteristic of EOC operations is that because of event unpredictability, the abil_ ity to assume consistency in terms of the individuals responding and manning the EOC is not possible. Compounded by factors such as staff rotation and turnover, the need to rest staff during a long duration event, and relative infrequency of use, the information system must be designed to be as self instructional and easy to operate as possible requiring only a very minimal level of introductory training. 10. Low Maintenance Requirement As there are no City staff who are funded and/or permanently assigned to providing technical support for the EOC information system, it is imperative that the selected system be an "off-the-shelf" product which will require only minimal support in terms of installation and maintenance. Given both the financial limitations for maintenance, and the likelihood of a continually evolving EOC information systems design, a fully custom designed system should be avoided. A large financial advantage is gained through selection of a standard product, as all modifications and testing of the application software to support an upgrade in the computer operating system software is handled as part of standard product maintenance and upgrade. Standard product maintenance is traditionally provided by the manufacturer - ~n a fixed-price annual upgrade · basis which spreads . the total cost across the base of all product users, as opposed to placing the full cost on a single user as is the case for the owner of a custom software system. 20 - 3.5.3 -··Message Components For purposes of developing a macro-level design for the City's EOC information system and as a capabilities assessment tool for selecting and evaluating potential computer software, VSP's information systems analysts have identified a set of message-level elements which we have considered as basic to meeting the EOC user requirements for information. Any software cons_ idered for EOC use was required to explicitly include (or provide for easy customization for inclusion) of these minimal data elements. It should be noted ~hat these elements are considered as the absolute minimum information elements which would be needed for internal communication· within the EOC. Other message features are .considered in many cases as highly desirable but not necessa"rily essential. The essential message elements are summarized in Table 3.5 .3-1. 3.5.4 Current Status -of EOC Information Flow This summary provides a brief overview to the current information handling procedures which VSP has noted in the course of observing EOC operations. This analysis is provided as a baseline for comparison with the recommendations and designs presented later in this report in Section _. In order to highlight the specific areas and capabilities which would benefit from the recommended upgrade of the system, we have used this section to note information flow deficiencies and areas of sub-optimal performance which could adversely affect the effectiveness of the EOC. 1. Message Form The existing message generation, message routing, and message response system in the EOC is entirely manual. The message sender first _ checks marks routing destinations (in no explicit priority order); initials next to his/her own department to indicate the message originator; manually inserts date, time, source, and telephone number information; checks a box indicating message type (request, response, information only); and proceeds to handwrite a freeform message on a 3-part carbonless paper form. The sender then places the form into an 'out' basket to be collected by the message router; one of several designated people who circulate inside the EOC. The form (see Figure 3.5.4-1) is • • •" by ••*"in size, and is suitable only for relatively small and simple messages. The original message copy is routed sequentially to the designated recipients. One of the duplicates is retained by the sender I while the other duplicate is given to the Intelligence Officer, who assigns a priority for routing this copy to the situation report, journal, posting board, map board, and press · relations. The only standardized prioritization method available to message senders !s to attach a red 'RUSH' tag to their message. Numerous deficiencies related to this form have been noted by VSP, with confirmation for many of these being expressed by EOC users in the course of 21 • I Message Element Field Field Contents Data Element Characteristics Identifier Incident designator Unique incident code alphanumeric Message designator Unique message code alphanumeric Geographic reference mapping coordinate end/or standard coordinate J address or intersection system designator Incident short description One line short description for alphanumeric phrase rapid identification Chronology Message transmittal Date/time message sent date/time format Message read Date/time message read by date/time format recipient Incident events Date/time of occurrence. status date/time format updates, closure Participant• Message originator Department, name, title alphanumeric Message recipient(s) Name, department alphanumeric Resource• Resource needs/durations Personnel, equipment ·and alphanumeric anticipated durations Resource availability/status Personnel, equipment alphanumeric Management Incident priority EOC established priority numeric Established Incident specific information alphanumeric decisions/strategies Incident status Status (pending, in progress, alphanumeric completion) Descriptions Message content Free format message text alphanumeric Table 3.5.3-1 Basic EOC Message Elements the workshops and interviews. The most notable problems include: • There is no provision on the form for a unique identification designation for the message. As a result of this there is no clearly standardized method for a message respondent to refer back to a specific message and ensure that no confusion arises between multiple messages~ . It is also not possible to readily log, track, or audit requests and responses. Messages ~ become only partially auditable when they are recorded in the Incident Rep. orting Log (journal). . • Inherent in the form design is the consequence that the message system 22 • ' i.- Figure 3 .5.4-1 Insert copy of EOC message form \ is "single-threaded" (sequential). In the case where it is desired to s~nd the message to multiple recipients, the message actually moves on to the next recipient only when the previous recipient forwards it. This creates the potential for catastrophic incident assessment and response failure if one of the recipients is temporarily absent, misplaces the form, or does not forward the message in a timely manner due to preoccupation with another event. Sending a simultaneous message to multiple users is prohibitively time consumptive, since as there is no readily available photocopier in the EOC it would require the sender to hand write multiple messages. • There is no pr·ovision on the form for prioritization of incidents. Each participant in the EOC decides what to do with 'messages based on their departme_ nt's emergency criteria, which may not be consistent with the criteria of other departments. • The error potential for the form is high. The fact that the message is . handwritten introduces an extremely high level of potential error from handwriting interpretation alone. In order for the message sender to circumvent the single-threa·ded problem noted above, multiple hand transcribed copies of messages would need to be generated thereby compounding the probability for transcription and interpretation error. • The message space limits the communication of important information. 23 • • I, The form discourages the creation of explicit and detailed messages, resulting in duplicative efforts and calls to obtain information neglected in the first message. The message system clearly appears to lack efficiency. During the November exercise the VSP team observed exercise participants using the internal phone communication lines for coordination with other departments, and then using the message forms only as confirmation of agreements reached verbally. This view was supported by numerous comments received on the pre-workshop questionnaires, which indicated that many participants felt the message forms to be unnecessary. 2. Incident Log Incident Log maintenance is an Intelligence function. Some, but not all, messages are sent to a word processing operator by the Intelligence Officer. The information is entered simply as a text file into a word processing package on a PC, with no standardization of format. Only_ the message content, exclusive of the identity of the sender or recipient, is recorded in the Log. Messages in the log may or may not contain all of the information that is on the original message form. There is no automated way to search the log for a particular incident, actor, or location other than scrolling through it on, the PC screen, or manually paging through a printout. EOC participants can view the log on the display monitor system at their station as it is being created, but _ cannot interactively page through it themselves. An excerpt from the log is presented in Figure 3.5.4-2. The value of the incident log is seriously impeded by a number of factors: • The log's lack of fixed-format structure makes sorting, and therefore selective extraction, impossible. • The absence of sender/recipient information limits its usefulness to many potential users. • The manual transcription process is subject to errors in the translation of handwriting. • Under high message volume conditions significant delays are likely in the transcription process. 3. Situation Analysis and Reports This function ·is currently staffed filled by the Police D~partment. In addition to general management of the EOC, it has several information responsibilities, including management of message form traffic, maintenance of the Status Board and Incident Log, and the generation of 24 Figure 3.5.4-2 Place a reduced excerpt from the Incident Log here Situation Reports. The Situation Officer is tasked with generating reports, called Situation Report Summaries, from the incident log described above every four hours. This officer also keeps an informal journal for tracking incidents and supplementing the Situation Report. This position is part of the LAPD Intelligence function; it receives the message forms after they have been processed by the Intelligence Officer. The situation reports reflect the limitations brought on by the message form design and incident reporting system described ·previously . . Because of these systems, it is extremely difficult and labor-intensive to generate an accurate custom report on demand. It is extremely likely that during a lengthy activation of the center, the quality of these reports will tend to decline as transcription errors are compounded. In addition, as Sityation Officers are changed across shifts, they will need to familiarize themselves with active incidents by the reading back through . the incident Log; however, this will be increasingly difficult as the log grows and there is no capability to eliminate closed and inactive incidents. 25 ., t l 4 l 4. Status Board The situation status board · serves as a rolling tally of incident reports extracted from the message forms processed by the Intelligence Officer. The board can be used to display about two dozen lines of information, and is updated manually by a police officer. Although it is a fairly large display, it can be difficult to read from some parts of the EOC. There is no log record made of listings once they are taken off the board. Incident recording is limited to the Incident Log, which may not appear in the same order as incidents on the board. Its overall usefulness is limited by its size, visibility from the workstations, and free-format structure. The criteria for Ii. sting a notation on the board has been noted by VSP to be somewhat subjective; items are implicitly prioritized with the incident's status being updated occasionally. Incidents that have been resolved are removed from the list. Figure 3.5.4-3 shows an example of the status board from an EOC activation exercise- 5. Map Displays Map .displays in the EOC consist of two kinds: the wall mounted maps of the city, and the projected display from the computer mapping station. The wall mounted maps are annotated using "Post-it" stickers and/or crayon. A photo of the wall map display is presented in Figure 3.5.4-4. While the maps are generally useful, their value is limited by physical factors; the user must be standing directly front of them, and they are not visible from most of the departmental positions. The computer-based EOC mapping station utilizes an off-the-shelf product called Streets on a Disk for display of geographic information. Program capabilities include a limited ability to display street maps of locations within the city, plot travel routes and print directions, display symbols for incidents, and search for addresses. The graphic display from the Mapping Station (Figure 3.5.4-5) can be projected onto a screen on the north wall of the EOC. Room display is accomplished through use of a color LCD (liquid crystal display} tablet and overhead projector. The value and usefulness of the display is limited by the physical characteristics of the EOC; to achieve acceptable visibility all of the lights in the room must be dimmed. The screen display is however available to the five computer monitors in the room through the switch boxes. · The Streets on a Disk software is not a true GeogrQphic Information System (GIS). The graphic. display is relatively crude, and it is difficult to produce a custom map in a reasonable amount of time. The capabilities to store and display information tor separate discreet locations is very limited. A serious limitation is the absence of a stored database capability for analyzing incident information. The program offers little advantage over a paper map approach, and requires the expertise of a skilled operator to achieve useful results. 26 .l ( • ' Figure 3.5.4-4 Insert photo of wall map here It should be noted that many EOC users are working primarily with Thomas Guides, others occasionally refer to wall maps, while others have and utilize proprietary departmental maps. The Fire Department will utilize a terminal connected to their new dispatch center to access full GIS capabilities when the system becomes operational. This lack of consistency in map base makes it difficult to transf~H geographic location identifiers in any way other than street addresses, which must then be re-located by the recipient to fit his/her map structure. · 6. TV and Radio Monitors The television sets and radio consoles in the EOC are intended to allow participants to monitor commercial broadcasts as a supplemental source of information. These devices are discussed in the communications section· of this report. There are no connections currently in place to allow monitoring of broadcasts on any computer system. · Some EOC participants have commented thaJ these systems contribute substantially to the noise level in the EOC, adding only limited information value. 7. Connections to Department ECCs Approximately half of t _ he departments represented ·in the EOC have their own departmental Emergency Command Centers (ECCs). At present, connections from these to the EOC is limited to telephone and radio. The 27 Figure 3.5.4-5 Insert photo of mapping station here exceptions to this are the Police Department, whose ECC operates within the existing EOC, and the Fire Department, which has recently installed a physical link to their dispatch center which is located on the same building level as the EOC .- 3.5.5 · Existing Information Systems and Equipment 1 The status of computer hardware and software in the EOC is relatively dynamic under the current conditions. ISO is proceeding with upgrades to new releases of existing software, additions in accordance with acquisitions underway, and testing of new software. The description provided here should be viewed as only a snapshot in time. 1. Computer hardware Until recently the computing resources of the EOC were limited to two stations: an IBM PC dedicated to rnapping utilizing the Streets on a Disk software, and a PC supporting the word processing functions of Incident Reporting. The mapping station PC is equipped with a modem capable of telephone linkage as well as a display convertor for transferring images to the auxiliary monitors in the room. The Incident Reporting Station PC also supports an image convertor and has an attached laser printer. These two stations are not physically connected to each other except for display, and the tentative network configuration plans do not call for 28 connecting them into the new network. A recent acquisition of computer equipment has now added additional PCs and the capability for connecting them together through installation and configuration of a Local Area Network (LAN). This activity is being carried out in two phases. The first phase, constituting the majority of the hardware purchase and installation, is complete. The new hardware acquisition consists of one network server, five workstati. ons, and a laser printer. The server is an IBM PS/2 Model 95 (80486133MHz) with 4MB memory and a 320MB disk drive. Each workstation is an IBM PS/2 Model 70 (80386120MHz), with 4MB memory and 1 60MB disk drive. All of these units have been configured with 14" color VGA displays, math ·coprocessors, and internal boards which allow their connection to a Token-Ring Lan. The printer is an HP LaserJet IIISi equipped with capability to function as a shared device on the LAN. The new equipment has been partially installed, with the five new workstations cabled and located at the division positions of Police lntelli"gence, Fire, Water and Power, Engineering, and General Services/Personnel. The server station is located at the northwest corner of the EOC, on the opposite side of the guard station from the main entrance. Current plans incorporating Phase two involve the acquisition of additional workstations in the new fiscal year, sometime after July 1, 1992. This second phase would also include some additional workstations and the network software, a tape backup unit, two 16" color monitors, and mod.ems for all units. Currently there is no tape backup or modems on the server or workstations. 2. Power Protection The Incident Reporting and Mapping stations are connected to an existing uninterruptible power supply (l:JPS) that is of very limited capacity. Two small independent UPS' may be acquired in the next fiscal year to upgrade the level of protection for these two computers. The new LAN server is connected into a general City Hall protected circuit that is covered by emergency backup power. No additional UPSs were acquired in Phase one. It is expected that the second phase of LAN hardware acquisition will include a 1 KVA UPS for the network and two smaller UPS for the Mapping Station and the Incident Log Station. 3. Computer Software Software running on the EOC computers, tabulated for both the Mapping and Incident Stafions as well as the LAN server and workstations is as follows: 29 ------------------ - - --- - -- - - - I \ 'f I Word processing Spreadsheets Mapping/Incident Professional Write Word Perfect Display Write LAN Professional Write Word Perfect Quattro Pro ........... Quattro Pro Lotus 1-2-3 Excel Database . . . . . . . Paradox Paradox Utilities . . . . . . . . PC Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . PC Tools Random Access Norton Utilities Backit Quarterdeck Diagnostics SYTOS (tape backup) Communications . . Emergency Information System SmartCom Weather Brief Mapping . · ..... . Streets on a Disk Operating System . DOS 3.03 ............ DOS 5.0 Software acquisition to support the LAN is currently underway and is expected to consist of Novell Netware·V3.11 licensed for 20 nodes. It is also anticipated that all machines will be upgraded to DOS 5.0 in the near future. 4. Printers The Incident Reporting Station currently has a Hewlett-Packard Laser Jet IIP printer and an old line printer. There are two IBM Proprin. ters in the EOC that are currently unattached to any station and available for use. As described above, the new LAN is configured for one Hewlett-Packard Laser Jet lllsi printer which, under current plans, would be located at the server station. Two additional printers are expected to be acquired in the second phase. One _ would be installed at either the Police Intelligence or Incident Reporting position, and the other at the Fire position. 5. Display Monitors The Mapping and Incident Reporting · stations are configured under current _plans into the new network. They are connected to a display 30 .. I f' system through image co~vertors and switch boxes. Video monitors are positioned at six locations in the EOC. These monitors can display the screen from either the Mapping or Incident Reporting stations at any time those machines are running. The workstations and server for the new LAN are not connected to this system. 6. Copier and Facsimile There is no photocopier in the EOC. There is no facsimite machine in the EOC, nor are there fax c· apabilities on any of the computers. 7. Computer Communications Only the mapping station has a modem installed. Modem communications from this machine are used primarily for weather reports from the National Weather Service via the Weather Brief software package. 8. Projection System A Sharp color LCD tablet and overhead projector has been installed at the mapping station. The projector utilizes the existing 1 2 foot screen on the north wall of the EOC. This system is capable of displaying any image generated by the Mapping Station as well as traditional transparencies. The projected image is somewhat faint when all the lights are on in the EOC, and requires partial dimming to be useful. 3.6 Communications Without effective telecommunications, the EOC cannot perform its vital functions. In the existing operating environment, far-flung departmental EOCs directly control response efforts, and coordination of those efforts occur downtown at the City EOC. Therefore, it is essential that highly reliable communications links of considerable capacity exist to handle the needs for bulk information transfer (of both voice· and data) in time of emergency. The exact nature of these links varies. They may be City radio systems, they may be telephone calls, they may be a modem connection to a PC in the field. But they must extend to all key decision-making points in the City, they should be redundant, and they must be reliable and accessible in the EOC. As with information systems, it is widely recognized that vast improvements in EOC operations could - occur with improvements in telecommunications. Substantial telecommunications facilities exist currently within the EOC. Steps have been taken to improve the access of EOC participants to these resources, but more should be done. We will detail these steps in this report. This section of the report provides a description and background for some of the 31 "' f • elements which are essential to understanding the basic needs and requirements of the EOC's telecommunications systems, and presents a rationale for the overall design recommendations which are presented in Section_. Specifically, this section: • Recaps the telecommunications systems study efforts to date • Outline the basic functional requirements for EOC telecommunications systems • -Summarizes existing telecommunications systems in use 3.6.1 Telecommunications Systems Functional Requirements The following items comprise what we consider to be the essential telecommunications system criteria which need to be accommodated. These items are not intended as an all-inclusive list of desired function_ and capabilities, but are comparable to those listed in the previous section on information systems and are considered the basic and essential components and characteristics to establish a functional and expandable system consistent with the operational requirements of the City's EOC. 1. Interoperability The systems in use must be able to operate not just with City-owned-and-operated systems, but with systems used by other agencies at all levels of government, and with the private sector as well. 2. Breadth The City operates a wide variety of telecommunications and information systems. The EOC should have access to as many of them as technically feasible to help it meet its primary function of information gathering and coordination. 3. Access The telecommunications and information systems must be directly accessible to the EOC staff without .the use of an operator, except in those circumstances where a licensed operator is legally required. This will minimize any bottlenecks which may occur when ~ommunications must be passed through centralized access points, such as a radio room. 4. Capacity In an emergency, the lf')formation flow is of a great volume, rapid-fire, and continuous. The telecommunications and information systems in use must be of sufficient capacity and/or bandwidth to deal effectively with this great flow. 32 I ' 5. Reliability It is essential that the systems ·utilized for telecommunications be available for immediate use in time of emergency. Therefore, the equipment in place must be of high quality and dependability. Further, as the EOC is not utilized on a daily basis, regular maintenance and operational tests must be conducted on an ongoing basis to maintain this high level of reliability. 6. Redundancy · To enhance the previously stated reliability requirement, there must always be more than a single method which may be used to contact a particular point. Equipment utilized in this critical environment should also be fault-tolerant to the degree economically feasible. Circuits to key locations should also be redundant and diversely routed. 7. Logging/ Accountability · Accountability in operations is an essential feature of EOC operations. Actions take,n and decisions made and transmitted to the field must be documented and recorded, along with the response from . the field. This should be accomplished as transparently to the user as possible, without user intervention. 8. Open Architecture The systems must be able operate with equipment from a wide variety of manufacturers, and with the widest possible variety of protocols. 9. Modularity The system must be capable of growth, both in a rapid fashion in emergencies, and on an ongoing basis, to meet the evolving needs of the City as telecommunications and information systems in use change and grow. 10. Minimal Training Requirement The ability to assume consistency in terms of the individuals responding to and manning the EOC is not possible. Compounded by factors such as staff rotation and turnover, the need to rest staff during a long duration event, and relative infrequency of use, the systems used must be designed to be as self-instructional and easy to operate as possible, requiring only a very minimal level of training. 11 . Low Maintenance...Re_ guirement As there are no City staff who are funded and/or permanently assigned to providing technical support to the EOC systems, any systems utilized should require only minimal support in terms of installation and maintenance. 33 • • I ' 3.6.2 Current Status of EOC Telecommunications Systems The status of telecommunications in the EOC is relatively dyn 9 mic under the_ current conditions. GSD continues to add channel access and telephone capability as requested. The description provided here should be viewed as a only a snapshot in time. 3.6.2.1 Voice First, we will review the EOC's voice communications systems. These are the primary systems utilized for information transfer in the present operating environment, and are the principal focus of most EOC users. 1. Telephone Instrumentation Telephone communications irt the EOC are provided by a city-owned 1 A2 key telephone system. This technology, first implemented in the early 1930's, is generally considered _ obsolete by modern standards, and most manufacturers (including AT & T) no longer manufacture these instruments. This system utilizes telephone instruments equipped with a key to select which line is to be used. A "hold" function in provided to permit the user to suspend a call on one line, make a call on another line, and then return to their original call. Lights under the keys indicate line status, i.e. busy, ringing or on hold. This type of telephone system generally requires 6 conductors in a cable for each line in use at a given station. The cabling to support these stations are 25 pair cables, and expansion beyond 9 lines requires larger cables, such as 50, 75, 100 pair. While the cabling to these stations get quite unwieldy, 1 A2 key systems are capable of essentially unlimited growth. They are also highly reliable, and have no single point of failure vulnerabilities other than power failure. Most positions in the EOC are equipped with 6 button telephones (capable of handling 5 line appearances), although a few 20 button sets (capable of handling 19 line appearances) are installed at some positions. Switching Switching is · provided principally by the City's Pacific Bell Centrex service. Centrex is a service whereby the operating telephone company (e.g. Pacific Bell} provides special lines from the public switched telephone network with certa_ in features, such as a private dialing plan (2,3,4,or 5 digits), transfer, call waiting, call forwarding and so on, to provide a simulation of a privately-owned telephone system. All switching is performed at the telephone company central office. This Centrex system is the City's primary telephone system, and lines of the City Centrex appear on the 1 A2 key system in the EOC at each position. Also appearing on many stations are regular business lines, also provided by Pacific Bell from the same switch providing the City Centrex. Public switched telephone network failures, depending on their nature, are very likely to have negative impact on the availability of both the City Centrex lines and the regular business lines simultaneously. The public network services are backed up by a City-owned Mital 34 'I ' J ' SX-200 Private Electronic Branch Exchange located in City Hall East. This backup system is capable of providing an intercom function to as many as 208 lines located throughout key location. s in City Hall, City Hall East, City Hall South, and Parker Center. Lines provided by this system are equipped on approximately one-third of the 1 A2 telephones in the EOC. It should be noted though, that this system is only capable of carrying 31 simultaneous conversations. Transmission Most telephone transmission is handled through the City Centrex (the public switched telephone network). Transmission for the City-Owned backup switch is limited to the immediate City Hall-area facilities by its cable plant, which only covers that area. The Gamewell fire alarm and police box telephone system, which was used as a backup wide-area transmission system in the event of public network failure, has-fallen into disrepair due to the obsolescence of both its cable plant and transmission components, and cannot be repaired due to restrictive agreements with Pacific Bell, who own the conduits through which the cables that connect the system are run. There are some ringdown circuits in use. Ringdown circuits are special private telephone ·lines used for point-to-point connections. When a ringdown line is picked up on one end, the other end of the circuit is immediately rung. These circuits bypass the switching elements of the public switched telephone network, a17d only share cable with regular telephone lines. Because these circuits bypass the switching element of the public network, they are not subject to degradation of service when public_ calling demand is high . These circuits are also given a higher priority for repair than dial circuits, and are generally much more reliable than . dial circuits. Ringdown circuits are used by Pacific Bell itself_ as its primary means of coordinating its own operations in time of emergency. The following ringdown circuits are i'n use in the EOC. Only the destination of the circuit is listed. Los Angeles County Information Center• Los Angeles City Fire ,Operations Control Division• Los Angeles City Schools Police Dept. LA Dept. of Water and Power (DWP) Power Emergency Control Center• LADWP Electric Trouble Board• LA DWP Central Water Trouble Board• LA DWP Western Water Trouble Board• LADWP General Office Bldg. Water Trouble Board• LADWP East Valley Water Trouble Board• LADWP West Valley Water Trouble Board• LADWP Harbor Water Trouble Board• LA City 'Dept. of Street Maintenance LA City General Services Department (Communications) The locations marked ·with an "•" have been verified and tested. We were unable to obtain an answer on. the other end of the circuits not marked, despite repeated and lengthy efforts. In the case of all of the circuits shown above~ the service for these circuits is provided by Pacific Bell. 35 J I ; I Facsimile No facsimile machines currently exist in the EOC proper. Fax service to the EOC is currently provided by a machine. in the space currently occupied by the ___ _ (ECCCS) program staff. An additional machine was brought into the EOC during the April Incident. 2. Radio Chart 3. 1 on the following page lists Radio Systems and Channels available for operation in the· EOC. While most City-Owned radio systems are available for access in the EOC, some are notable by their absence. These include the DWP 800 MHz system and the Transportation Department's 800 MHz system. No High Frequency radio capability exists in the EOC, and Amateur Radio capabilities are quite limited, with only remote base stations on City Hall available. It-is important to note that no radios are actually installed in the EOC. Antenna restrictions on City Hall East imposed by the presence of the Heliport have forced all local radios to the top of City Hall. This situation where an access to radio communications requires the proper operation of other telecommunications circuits places the EOC in a highly vulnerable position if these circuits should fail. The City currently does not have a Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service plan on file with the State of California, Office of Emergency Services. Numerous elements of a program do exist, however. The Police Department has a "Hamwatch" program in which Amateur Radio operators assist the police with surveillance communications. A memorandum of understanding exists between the American Radio Relay League's Amateur Radio Emergency Service and the Fire Department, and Amateur Radio clubs exist in both the DWP and General Services Department. The lack of an integrated City RACES program, combined with the expectation of support from an organization which is principally committed to serve non-governmental agencies, such as the American Red Cross, can combine to make for undependable Amateur Radio support in time of emergency. 36 , ' t ' POLICE: C-1 C-2 C-3 S-1 S-2 S-3 V-1 V-2 V-3 W-1 W-2 W-3 Tac 1 Tac 2 Tac 3 Tac 4 Tac 5 Tac 6 Tac 7 Metro (Central, Traffic) (Rampart, Northeast) (l:iollenbeck) (Harbor, Southeast) (Southwest, Traffic) (77th St.) (Van Nuys, West Valley) (Devonshire, Traffic) (N. Hollywd, Foothill) (West LA, Traffic) (Pacific, Wilshire) (Hollywood) (Mt. Lee, Oat Mtn, Parker Center) (Mt. lee, Oat Mtn, Briarcrest) F-66 (6Y Units) F-67 (4Y Units) Narcotics 122. 7 5 (Air Units) OTHER CITY DEPARTMENTS: Airports (Police) Animal Regulation/Street lighting Civil Defense (San Pedro Hill, West LA, Parker Ctr, Mt. Lee, Oat Mtn.) General Services Dept. (Radio Shop) Recreation & Parks Sanitation Street Maintenance A Street Maintenance B Transportation (Signal Maintenance) Water & Power (Silver) Water & Power (Purple) 3. Data . CHART 3.1 Radio Systems and Channels Available For Use in The EOC FIRE: F-1 F-2 F-3 F-4 F-5 F-6 F-7 F-8 F-9 F-10 F-11 (Operations) (Operations) (Operations) (Rescue) (Inspectors) (Administrative) (Dispatch South) (Dispatch Valley) (Disp. Brush Fires) (Rescue) (Command 1 l F-12 (Command 2) OTHER AGENCIES AND INTERSY$TEM CHANNELS: American Red Cross (Mt. Lee) California law Enforcement Mutual Aid Radio System (CLEMARS) California law Enforcement Radio System (CLERS) Hospital Emergency Administrative Radio 1 and 2 (HEAR) Fire White 1 LA County Fire Dispatch (No Longer Used) Southern Cal Gas (2 Freqs.) Amateur 10 Meter (Freq. Unknown) Amateur 146.58 MHz (simplex) LA County EBS The only data communications device in use in the EOC (not described under the Information Systei:ns Section of the report) is a single IBM 3270-type terminal for access to the City's large- Systems Network Architecture-based mainframe computer system. It sits on a table next to the Incident Log preparation area. 37 J C i I 4. Audio Distribution Audio is distributed to the various positions by a series of mini-consoles located at each w'orkstation. These consoles can be patched into any of the radio circuits· previously described, for both transmission and reception. Also included at each console is broadcast radio audio from KFI, KLAC, KMPC, KFWB, and an FM tuner. The various audio sources are mixed and presented through headsets at each individual operating position. A public address capability· exists whereby messages from the EOC may be transmitted through the public address system installed in The Triforium, a piece of public art which is located south of City Hall East near the Children's Museum. This capability is limited to the immediate area of The Triforium. 5. Video Distribution The City Hall complex features a CATV distribution system that is capable of inserting program material on television channels 3, 6, 8, 10 and 12. _ Generally, Police Closed-Circuit transmissions are carried on Channel 6, with other programming carried as required on the other channels. These same facilities also have very limited production capability; only the ability to broadcast a pre-recorded 3/4" U-Matic tape, or to switch between other video sources. There are a number of television receivers located throughout the EOC. While these are useful for intelligence purposes, they· are of limited utility because their audio must be played over speakers to the entire EOC, raising the noise level and complicating other operations. 6. Emergency Public Information The principal Emergency Pubic Information conduit is a radio circuit on the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Emergency Broadcast System Radio Network. However, in recent actual operations, direct contact between the media and a Public Information Officer has been the means ·whereby information has been released to the media. 3. 7 Staffing The Police -Department has the largest staff in the EOC since it handles the Command and Control, Intelligence, Posting, Routing, Journal Clerk, Police Personnel and other support positions. This staff varies in size from 13 -20 personnel, depending on the situation. There are carrels, seating, and/or operating stations for all of these personnel. The Fire Department location in the EOC is normally staffed with from two to five people. There is sufficient space for three people at the designated carrel. The· 38 ' ( y' close proximity of the Fire Dispatch operation (OCD) on the P4 level works to the advantage of this department, a situation which does not hold true for other departments. The Care and Sheltering Division is staffed by two people generally, expanding to six people when all volunteer agencies are represented. The one carrel designated for this function allows for only one person to effectively operate though the others are required if all aspects of the function are to be addressed. The balance of the Divisions are staffed with one or two people fr:om departments which have primary responsibility assignments. They operate from carrels which are designed for one person. 3.8 Training _ The EOC staff receives training for the most part through infrequent exercises (perhaps semi-annually) which are preceded by orientations to internal operations within the facility. This training is provided to those personnel who are assigned by the city departments to perform EOC functional duties. Desk side interviews conducted with the departments reveals that, generally, this staffing level is two to three people deep (except for Fire and Police Departments). No formal overall emergency management training program is conducted toward the end that all operating personnel understand the concept of EOC and emergency management operations. Those interviewed advised that the exercises were usually short-lived and that in- . depth learning about the cqncepts of overall operations was not realized. Statements were made repeatedly that personnel were not taxed with significant problems/issues during the exercises. A majority of the personnel interviewed stated that they did not fully understand . their duties within the EOC. They identified a need for job descriptions, Division function checklists, and for a policy regarding what information was required, by whom, how often and in what format so that they could better assist in an event situation. Their interface requirements between the EOC and their departments operations locations were considered to be hQZY at best. Many did not know how they would communicate from the EOC if the telephones were not working. It should be noted that there is a considerable turnover of personnel assignments to the EOC. For this reason, the procedures must be kept as simple as possible, and - the training must be a recognized ongoing responsibility of the EOO. Most persons interviewed indicated a need for their departments to develop more material and guidance for their use in the EOC. The EOC "Red Book" was not considered to be sufficient guidance for them in the performance of their specific Division EOC assignments. Classroom type instruction was identified as a need to bring EOC staff personnel 39 • • 1, "up to speed" in the City's concept of emergency management operations, especially for any catastrophic event. · 3.9 Interface with Emergency Braodcast System (EBS) The critique of the 1992 activation of the EOC for February flooding indicated that the release of public announcements regarding City volunteer recruitment and other flood related information was done as a general press release rather than through the use the Co~nty Emergency Broadcast System. The City felt that the direct dissemination of information to the media was faster than if it had beeri sent through the County managed EBS. Los Angeles is faced with a complex problem when it comes to providing its citizens with emergency information. The City with a population of over three and_ one-half million and the surrounding metropolitan area is served by 1 9 television stations and 71 radi. o stations. The EBS function for all 89 cities in the County and the unincorporated area is managed by the C(?unty Sheriff, with the information access point at the County EOC facility on Eastern Avenue. Los Angeles City represents nearly 40 percent of the County population. The EBS system for the area has, over the past several years, been significantly expanded by including many more stations, some of which serve the diverse and multi-lingual needs of the population. Because of the number of cities, the large distributed population and the large number of stations, it is difficult to use the EBS system for purposes of providing detailed information relative to specific cities. In addition, because of the large number of cities which may require access to the system there is a high potential for delay. On the other hand, there is a clear need to have an official line of communication from responsible authorities to the media. Because of the number of broadcast stations, it does not seem practical to try to feed them with information on an individual basis. This is difficult and time consuming even under conditions when communications to them allow for such action. Recommendations related to how the use of EBS can be better optimized for the City are contained in Section_. 40 l L 4.0 An Improved EOC - Three Alternatives 4. 1 Introduction There are a variety of ways in which recommendations to provide an improved EOC for the City of Los Angeles could be presented. For purposes of- this report,. VSP presents recommendations under three separate options. This concept, and the main attributes of each option were outlined in a presentation to the Emer~ency _ _. Operations Boar:d on March 16, 1992. The first option (A) describes a new EOC which would be in a different location. Two of the options {B) continue the EOC operation on the P-4 level of City Hall · ca:, . East. ~~J The options are closely linked. VSP's primary recommendation is for Option A - a new EOC. However, because of the time element involved, if Option A is selected, then Option B - Improvements to the Existing Facility is recommended as an interim measure . .If the City were not to select Option A, then VSP recommends Option C which is a major expansion of the existing facility. The principal features and improvements are listed for each option. An estimate of the general costs to achieve the option are included using 1992 dollar figures. Option A costs for a new EOC include representative costs but do not include cost factors related to a specific site 9 An average cost furnished by the City Engineer for three example sites of about three acres each is about $3.8 million. Many of VSP's general recommendations pertaining to Operations in 4.2.4 are applicable to alt Options. 4.2 Option A -- New Emergency Operating Center VSP recommends that the City plan now for a new EOC. This section of the report describes the basic requirements for a new EOC and provides a conceptual design recommendation. The functional activities listed within this Section are VSP Recommendations for City consideration. They are offered as a base to initiate further discussion. Estimates related to facility size, potential configurations, and cost are general and subject to further revision after discussion. 4.2. 1 Requirements R_ el_ ating to the EOC The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides jurisdictions with recommended design guidance for EOC's. That guidance is found in CPG 1 -20 Chg. 1, Emergency Operating Centers Handbook, May 16, 1989. Several of the space and site requirements for an EOC have been previously discussed in Section 41 '. . 2 of this report. VSP recommends that the City locate the new EOC on City property outside of the heavily built-up central business district, and away from other structures. The facility should be in a relatively open area, large enough to contain the facility, vehicle parking for conferences, communication antennas, underground fuel and water storage, and be able to accommodate two helicopters. The site should .be free from any known earthquake faults, landslide or flooding areas. It should not be adjacent to any significant hazardous materials production or storage areas. 4.2.2 Purpose and Functions Primary Purpose The EOC will be the protected site from which the City's Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) will provide overall management and coordination of response and recovery operations at the time of a· major emergency. Possible functions and or activities to be housed at the EOC facilities include; 1. Location for the City Emergency Operating Center 2. Alternate 911, Police and Fire dispatch facility. 3. Site for City emergency amateur radio services . . 4. Emergency Public Information Media Center 5. Location to store the Mobile Emergency Operations Center (MEOC). 6. Training and conference facility for the conduct of exercises, training classes, workshops, meetings and conferences. 7. Administrative offices for certain EOC and emergency related planning functions. 4.2.3 General Facility Design VSP recommends that the city consider a two level facility design as shown in the following figure. The bottom portion would be all underground. The upper portion would be above ground, bunkered on three sides, on top of the lower level, and would cover approximatety 1 /3 to 1 /2 the size of the bottom portion. A full width viewing area in the upper portion, would look down and into the main floor of the lower level coordination center. See the following figure. 42 I I I I I CONFERENCE ll CENTEI.? - ·- GROUN D LEVEL MEDIA /4 'Y/ SUPPORT ~FF ICES D NOT[S, l. Heavy line tndica tes load bearing woll 2. Colurms size$ are approxtna te r L..l . EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER -· OPTION. A OVERALL VIEW OF BUILDING GROUND LEVEL - DISPLAYS COOR DI NAT ION l-. CENTER I J I 1 · I I I I ITTI I I I I ,--------------------- -----··· ·· - ·· .. EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER AREA DATE, 6- 11-92 PROJECT MUMBER1 913•1 -----·---------------------· VSP ASSOCIATES AGBABIAN ASSllCIAll." \ Socroriento, CA Posoc.l(•no, CA -----~~ - --__________:__ _ _ _ _ _:___~ ~- - - OHICC u, ... , SUf'f'llU AV UNIU RCCCPTUlN/ CLCAICAL I lit L0IIY I aJIIIIIIJI CIN'UCNCC ROOH AND HCDIA/8Al£rlNG C[HTCA PODIU1 I I I i � w ~ CL > . ~ I .... u ~ i:i COl•IP CBS/CPI STAff orr1ct PRODUC flOtt EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENT_ ER DRAWING -2 I I TRAl~ING CDf[R I [H[RG[NCY 1 · [H£RG[NCY OPtRATIONS I OP[RAllONS [HPLOY[[ fCONf[R[NC[ LOUHG£/0INING I ROOH ___L :r 0 0 0( .... VI w 0( VI :z 1,J :r [OUIPH(Nl I I . l-ou-,r-H-Ct-..1 STORAG[ n. :::> :r ur ]ij 0 0 1¥ .... VI ,., 1¥ VI :z w :r 0 JllLIIY :> SfORA=l I I I S~lPPORT Af-iENCY \/(llRK I I ~'-- . I =f 1 _ _ _____ _ SPA~T I SUPPORT AG[NCY VORK SPAC[ VI z w e > VI - <l .... ~ 4 ..J ,- z >- t., ~~ lJ 1k'. I.:> 0 . <l IJ 1¥ I ClJ� RDINAT ION CENTER ~ VI 1l , :- }, -< w 1> z }( r -----, - J <r ( ) r - ~-~ Du ~ l1-l <l: __ J u ~·' •- 1 ' z _J :J <{ 1 - ·E-U ---· L Z D <[ U I u l.d EOO AND ljlAISON � rFICES I I I I L----------------1--------------·----1 .------------------------- - - - - · ··· EMERGENCY OPERA TING CENTER AREA . DATE: 6-11-92 PROJECT NUMBER, 9U~ VSP ASSOCIATES AGBABIAN ASSOCIAT[ S SocroMen to, C,\ Posocleno, CA " ' Facility Operations and Use Requirements There are several options for facility design. Presented below is a conceptual design, for a two-level reinforced concrete facility with one story constructed underground. It should be noted, that other EOC designs are possible for buildings entirely above ground to those that are completely underground. There are advantages and disadvantages and different costs associated with all designs. Certain locations may only allow for a single type design to be considered. The facility should be designed to survive and operate under all foreseeable natural and man-caused (non-war) disasters. These would include earthquakes, fires, floods, hazardous materials incidents _ and acts of sabotage or terrorism. The bottom floor or first level of the structure would be underground. This will improve earthquake resistance of the structure and provide greater protection. The upper portion would be above ground, and bunkered on three sides. A portion of the upper level (approximately one-third) would be used for offices and other purposes described below. The other two-thirds of the upper level would form a roof extending over the central portion of the lower story, creating a high ceiling over the central coordinating area. A full width viewing area in the upper level would look down and into the main floor of the lower level coordination center. 4.2.4 EOC Cost Considerations The cost of an EOC is made up of several components. These include: Cost of land Site Improvements Construction Cost Systems and Furnishings Architect and Engineers Fees Gross estimates are provided below for budgetary considerations. They are given· in 1992 dollars with no factor for inflation. 1. Cost of land The City has performed-~ preliminary survey of the cost to acquire three sites. No city owned property was considered. Locations were done without consideration of potential seismic hazard or landing and takeoff of helicopters. The size of properties ranged from 2. 73 to 3.56 a.cres. · Total acreage for the three sites equaled 9.49 acres at a combined cost of $11,460,000. This gives an avera· ge cost per acre at $1,207,587. Cost factors 43 1' .,, include a twenty percent contingency factor. 2. Site Improvements Site improvements include a parking lot, trailer/van parking and pavement, a heliport hardstand, roadways, fencing and gates, clearing and grading, water distribution and area lighting, a guard house, water and fuel underground storage tanks, and landscaping. Site improvement cost = $58 per structure square foot. Includes a fifteen percent contingency. 3. Construction Cost Construction cost includes the cost of constructing the structure, a· s well as mechanical and electrical equipment required to support the facility air conditioning, ventilation, heating, plumbing and fixtures, fire protection, lighting and power supplies, emergency generator, elevator, pedestal access floors and other facility support systems. Includes a fifteen percent contingency. Construction cost = $215 per square foot. 4. Systems and Furnishings Systems and furnishings include communication and ancillary equipment (consoles, towers, antennas, etc.) necessary for accomplishing the mission of the EOC. · Computer systems, including operations room displays, furniture and furnishing, including tables, chairs, desks, files and other items essential to operation of the facility .. Systems and Furnishing cost Estimate = $54. per square foot. Includes a fifteen percent contingency. {For estimating purposes, S&F costs are figured at 25% of construction costs. This is a difficult area to estimate, as some of the furnishings and equipment will be transferred from the existing EOC facility). 5. Architect and Engineers Fees A&E fees include basic A/E services for construction, A/E services for site improvements, site survey, and required reports. The reports are a Geologic and Earthquake Engineering Report, a Geotechnical and Geological. Report and an Environmental Impact Rep.art. Architect/Engineering Fees = $25 per structure square foot. Includes a fifteen percent contingency. 44 l ' Cost Summary For preliminary budgeting purposes assume: A four acre site A 15,S00·square foot structure • 1 9 9 2 dollars Contingen~y factors included as stated . 1. Cost of land 2. Site Improvements 3. Construction Cost 4. Systems and Furnishings 5. Architect and Engineers Fees TOTAL $4,830,348 . 899,000. 3,332,500. 837,000. 387,500. $10,286,348 . * = The size of the structure can only be established after it is determined what primary and support operations may be located within it. 4.2.5 Advantages and Disadvantages Related to Constructing a New EOC Advantages Provides a state-of-the-art, modern EOC facility designed to withstand natural and technological hazards. The EOC can be constructed of proper size and configuration to meet current and foreseeable operational needs. This advantage alone solves many of the existing operational problems. The EOC would be independent of the existing downtown office structures which may not be seismically suited for immediate post earthquake occupancy and use. The facility can be constructed as a multi-purpose facility for day-to-day use, which can support much needed emergency management orientations and training . The facility, with proper design, can provide backup for existing fire, police, and 911 dispatching, thereby helping to solve the communications problem identified. Properly located, the EOC will allow op_ erations personnel to a.void downtown traffic problems, particularly during any major earthquake or civil disorder event. 45 l , • r Disadvantages Cost will be a deterrent in these · economic times. Selection of the right location may present some difficulty. The relocation of some functional elements from downtown locations to the EOC may be looked upon with disfavor in some circles. 4.2.6 Information Systems - Option A Given the pace of technological advancement in the information field, projections spanning the 5 to 1 0 year term covered by this option are by necessity only generalities and problematical at best. Even given a vast supplement to the funding for information systems, it is our recommendation that insufficient real world data exists to design a custom software system for the 'EOC which would substantially improve in the configuration outlined in Option B. Numerous non-essential technological enhancements could be added which would improve functionality; however, probabl·y the most significant improvements would be obtained through adding full-time staffing support for systems improveme· nts, user training, and applications maintenance. An emphasis on aggressive exercise training for a .. worst case scenario would yield significant benefits and serve as a good planning foundation for system upgrades. 4.2. 7 Telecommunications Systems - Option A Our principal recommendation for Option A- is the City establish a satellite communications system to communicate with its key facilities. This is a technology that is deliverable today. Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) permit cost-effective installations of the highest possible reliability. These terminals can provide multipoint-to-multipoint, high bandwidth connections for as many as 128 locations. These networks are highly reliable. Operating in a true mesh configuration, there is no single point of failure in the network, except, of course, the satellite itself. This is proven technology, installed in hundreds of locations around the world, in networks with thousands of stations. Terminals of the type appropriate for the City's application would cost approximately $40,000 each, installed. Monthly recurring costs for satellite bandwidth would run from $10,000 to $100,000 per month, depending on how much transmission capacity the City w.ished to have available. Compared with a cost of $8,400 per month for terrestrial circuits - and given the reliability of satellite circuits - this Ts an option which merits consideration. This network could be used on a day-to-day basis for the transmission of data or voice, to keep the system active, and assure its status and availability. 46 ! • " • 4.3 Option B - Improve the Existing EOC Facility 4.3.1 Introduction The intent of Option 8, is to provide the city with near-term improvements to the existing EOC, and to effect these changes with minimum cost. VSP believes that these recommendations could be implemented within an eighteen month program and at a cost of approximately $550,000. The recommenoations represent the minimum essential improvements to place the existing facility and operating staff in an improved state of operational readiness. The recommendations are presented under the same classification scheme that was used for the analysis. 4.3.2 Seismic Hazard Mitigation (Summary) [This will need some of the material brought over from the AA Report] 4.3.3 Facility Use Under Option 8, several modifications would be made to the existing EOC. l;hese modifications are in addition to those changes recommended for structural hazard mitigation discussed above. The Option 8 floor plan is shown in the following figure. The existing rectangular table-top carrel arrangement in the center of the . room would be removed. Windows on the two sides of the rooms would be removed and all walls would be covered with sound proofed material. The lighting system would be modified to reduce glare and provide light level control. A reconfigurati· on of the room would be done by placing Division Work Stations along the periphery of the room. This will allow a significantly expanded work area for the Divisions and considerable wall space for the placement of maps, listings etc. Division Work Stations on the periphery would be sized to meet the requirement, bu· t would average approximately eight feet. An example of Division _ Work Stations is also shown. A bank of work stations somewhat similar to the existing carr. els but much larger would be placed in the center to accommodate liaison functions. Each of these stations would be approximately four feet in length. An improved internal movement pattern for the facility would exist. The relocation and expansion of the Division Work Stations, the use of existing adjacent rooms for EOC functions, the location of liaison fµnctions in the center will facilitate the movement, coordination and viewing of displayed information. The display orientation of the room would change, with the major displays to be located on the east wall (Guard End). This wall has approximately 170 square feet of usable display space. Even with this change, display surfaces will not be 47 v I ' 00 Zru W. � Y. I I.I EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER OPTIONS GENERAL FLOOR PLAN ( -------··-·'\. -··;;-, ~;~ r ,;~- ~ --- -- r-· · ---· -- GtlAR IJ 'l·- ··---· -- 1\SSr sst--1r1-1, ~/- - -- -· - · · - I · - · Cfll~t-1111·-JIC:~ I lfll-lS ---- ··1 · --- · ·- 1. . . . l)IR[C lf.lR CAIi z ,-. w C\J l: _. n, 3 Id rLI\ CflflRUIHA I II IM C[M ff.R . r - -"1J S · 1 llE RfJ� M SPACE I l·l·l f. ·· 1'16 I ---- -------------------------- -- ····-· NOT[S, I. tfeovy line lndlco tes lood bearing woll 2. Cotunns slzt>s ort- opproxlno te EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER AREA P-4 CITY HALL EAST, LUS ANGELES DATE, 5-7-92 PROJECT NUMBER, 91 J,1 VSP ASSOCIATES AGDABIAN ASSOCIATES Socronento, f.A Posodeno, CA __ oiv_isi_on _ _____.l Division Division . - - I - - - - - . l .. J 0 -- variable widths -- 1. optimum. There is only a limited amount of display space, and not all of the problems pointed out in the analysis will be removed by this change. It should however be a significant improvement. Two of the existing side room· s, ( 137 & 139) would become part of the EOC facility. Room 137 would be used by the Situation Analysis teams for the processing of information related to situation assessment function. A door would be made in the wall between 137 and 138 to accommodate the passing of message traffic into this room from the Communications room, and the south wall of Room 137 would be removed. Room 139 would be configured to house the Coordination Ce_ nter Director (CCD), and also provide for CAO and CLA staff positions. This room would also contain a table for EOC staff conferences. I The recommended work space configuration for the room is reflected i"n the following Figure. Siderooms VSP believes that the enlargement of Division work stations, and improvements to informa~ion management may reduce the need for additional sideroom support space. It may however not end the need. We recommend that rooms 123, 124,and 1 25 be allocated for supplemental EOC activity. This does not preclude day-to-day use for other purposes. Rather than pre-assign the space to various divisions as is currently done, we recommend that sideroom space should be retained in a "space pool" which would be available for any division or divisions that needed some extra space during an EOC activation. Recognizing that more than one division may occupy the space at one time, the configuration of the room (dividers etc.) should be capable of providing (within one hour) space separation for up to three Division users. Space in these rooms is approximately 1000 square feet.· This could accommodate fifteen to twenty additional personnel. This sideroom space should meet the following requirements: 1. Be accessible for move-in and take over within one hour of request. 2. Existing telephones and equipment within the "space pool" should be available and dedicated for Division users from time of occupancy. 3. Additional telephone trunks and jacks should be stubbed into the area at various wall tocations to provide additional lines. · 4. Ring down line access to all EOC Division Work Station positions should be available from at least three locations in the area. 48 -------------------- - ------------ - - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER -- OPTION COORDINATION CENTER CONFIGURATION 8 EOC DIVISIONS AND SUPPORT POSITIONS l._ _____ __,,...L 10000100001 ~ D t (/) (/) > <[ _J (L (/) t--t c::l 000 0 000 0 000 O 000 0 0 0 0000 0000 0000 LI ISON A\JD TI� NS 0000 0000 0000 0 0 0 b 0000 000 0 000 01000 EMERGENCY OPERATING CENfER AREA P-4 CITY HALL EAST, LOS ANGELES DATE1 5-7-92 PROJECT NUMBER1 913 1 1 VSP ASS� CJATES AGBABIAN ASSllCIATES SocroMento, CA Po so cJeno, CA I I - I I I 4.3.4 Operations and Management EOC - ECC Operations Based on· observations and procedures review, VSP believes that the Police ECC · and general EOC functions can best be served by having them housed in separate facilities. It is important to create an environment in which all Divisions within the EOC are represented in a balanced setting dedicated to the information processing and coordinating functions. We suggest that the relocation of the Police Departments ECC functions to another area would in the long term benefit the overall EOC operation, and be more in line with the expressed philosophy of the EOC. Situation Assessment [Intelligence Function] VSP recommends a change to the current intelligence processing activity within the EOC . Our recommendation would be as follows: 1. Rename the EOC Intelligence function to Situation Status (SITST AT) or Situation Assessment. 2. Create two or more SITST AT Teams with multi-department representation (initially at least to include police, fire, public works and DWP}. The team coordinator role could be either police or fire . 3. Depending upon the nature of the emergency, the team could be augmented by personnel from those departments who are currently having the heaviest involvement. For example in an earthquake environment this could include Rec. and Parks, Transportation, Building and Safety. The SITST AT teams would be part of the activation _ under all alert levels. Their responsibilities will be to: 1. Upon EOC activation, initiate the SITST AT function within the EOC. Initial team makeup will always be police and fire personnel because of their full time presence on the P4 level. Assigned SITST AT personnel from Public Works and DWP should be immediately advised regarding the activation of the EOC. 2. Immediately poll each Division for current situat_ ion and major incidents. 3. Establish and assig~ an incident based number and tracking system for use during the emergency. 4. Oversee and monitor operation of automated and manual message handling systems. 49 \ ' 5. Evaluate all incoming reports for relevance to the EOC coordination operation. 6. Establish, post and maintain a list of priority incidents affecting the city. 7. Maintain and update all EOC facility information displays. (See list below) 8. Monitor commercial radio and television broadcasts for current information that may be usefu· 1 to understanding the situation. 9. Maintain a master record log of incoming situation reports from Divisions and other agencies. Pass information on other incidents to those Divisions which may have interest. 10. Develop, and recommend to the Director, operational priorities for designated operational periods. These would be displayed, and would serve to provide all Divisions with a common statement of priorities which they could in turn furnish to Departments and field forces. 11. Assist the Director in advance planning, by looking ahead up to 72 hour's to consider the likely needs and priorities for which planning actions should now be taken. Situation Display In Option 6, the Information System described in Section 5.2.5 will begin to provide an improved capability for information management. VSP recommends that the following kinds of information be displayed in either a manual or automated format. These displays would be replicated at the MEOC. Priorities and objectives Major incidents and actions Shelter locations and occupancy Casualty collection points _ and status Casualties Summary Hospital Status Key Agency contact persons Status of external resource requests Shift organization . General announcements - e.g. weather forecasts, latest Public information bulletins etc. -· · 50 · ------------------------- - -- I I Message Forms General Messages VSP recommends that a four part NCR three/quarter or full page form be used rather than the current 1 /2 page. This would allow space for both a message and for a response. The specific design of these forms should be done by persons who will be using them, and have knowledge of the distribution and routing procedures. The distribution of the form would be: Two copies to the "action" designee (one is for the return if appropriate} One copy to the Coordination Center Director and then to the journal for information and recording. One copy to SITSTAT for possible ·use in updating situation displays. Resource Requests Open text or unformatted forms do not work well for resource ordering, especially in emergency conditions. Therefore, VSP recommends that all resource requests ( whether internal to the city or for outside resources be placed on a sepa.rate form that is formatted especially for this activity. The form would indicate in addition to the normal heading material: a request number that clearly identifies requester, kind, type (capability} and quantity of resources, when needed, where needed, person or title to be delivered to, and any special considerations. These message forms would be used at the EOC and also at the Mobile EOC. Monitoring Commercial/ CC Television VSP recommends the continuation of the radio and television broadcast monitoring function, but believe that this activity should be made a part of the Situation Assessment function. Having several · television monitors on at the same time, sometimes on different chann. els, can add noise and distract from other activities going on in the room. A single wide screen monitor should be included in the EOC for general viewing for those occasions where some major event or announcement would be of interest to the entire staff. Radio and small screen TV monitors with independent volume controls are. also recommended to be placed at Division-work Stations. · EOC Organization - Management Day to day EOC facility management responsibility should rest with either the Police or Fire Dept. who have full time staff on the P-4 level. VSP believes that either department could effectively manage this function. 51 ,, If the recommendation to separate the Police ECC activity from the EOC is accepted, then we would recommend the following organizational structure for management of the EOC after activation. The recommended organizatio~ is shown on Figure __ . Coordination Center Director (CCD) This person will have overall responsibility for overseeing the functional operations of the Coordination Center after activation. Currently, the· Police Department's ECC Commander fills this ,role, using Department ECC terminology. In theory, any. of the functional divisions could perform this role. For example, initially the CCD will undoubtedly be either from the Police or Fire Dept. However two days into the incident, the nature of the situation could call for a Recreation and Parks official to function on a shift as the Director. Situation Assessment (SITST AT) Coordinator and Teams This position and function as described earlier will provide both a current and projected situation assessme· nt function. It is a considerable expansion of the role now covered by the Police Departments ECC .Intelligence activity. _. Public Affairs / Public Information Coordinator This position will have multiple tasks, as described elsewhere in this Section. Liaison Representatives Coordinator Liaison representatives to the EOC especially in a major emergency (level 3) can be from a variety of agencies. For example, representatives could be on-site from the military, State OES, CALTRANS, CHP, from the County, Red Cross, Salvation Army, RACES and ARES Services, School District, Gas Co. and many others. All of these representatives will have varying needs, relationships and responsibilities. The Liaison Coordinator will work with them and be a focal point for ensuring that their needs are being met and that coordination is being done in an effective and non disruptive manner. EOC Activation 1 . The Decision to Activate · VSP recommends ·a -clarification to the decision process regarding the activation of the EOC. It is recommended that EOC activation procedures be amended to include a statement to ·the effect that, any member of the EMC may request the activation of the EOC. The decision to activate the EOC based on the request of an EOO member will normally be granted, but may require additional consultation with departmental representatives and a majority of the members of the EOB. 52 ------------- - --- -------- LOS ANGELES CITY EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER REC. OMMENDED INTERNAL ORGANIZATION FOR EOC ACTIVATIONS SITUATION ASSESSMENT COORDINATOR SITSTAT TEAM -SITSTAT TEAM MAYOR EMERGENCYIOPERATIONS BOARD DIRECTOR OF,COORDINATION CENTER PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND/ INFORMATION COORDINATOR LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES COORDINATOR EMERGENCY OPERATIONS DIVISIONS DIVISION COORDINATORS AND STAFFS RESPONSIBILITIES AS CURRENTLY DESCRIBED -- ... ....._ VSP also recommends a more standardized process of activation which allows for various levels of activation of the emergency management system. This would entail establishing a protocol for guiding the decision to activate. It could take several forms. One example is presented in the following figure. In this example, only the rough conceptual framework is being presented for a three level activation guideline. This is not intended to be the final product. Undoubtedly, the City would want to add to this and modify it to meet city needs. [Show the chart] 2. Making the activation happen After the decision to activate has been made, the next step is the activation itself. - · Currently, ~he responsibility for the activation rests with the Commanding Officer of the Planning and Research Division of the Police Department if the activation occurs during normal business hours. If the activation occurs during non-business hours the Detective Headquarters Division is responsible. During interviews, it has been suggested that the more appropriate entity within the Police Department to implement the activation would be the Departments Communications Division. VSP concurs with this suggestion. [The rest of this should deal with the mechanics and communications involved in the activation process and perhaps Tim will have suggestions to make that work more effectively]. Areas of concern should be: • Handling after hours activations • Use of the telephone as primary activation device. • Activation and recall/alert procedures when no commercial telephones are available. Public Affairs/Public Information VSP recommends that an expanded Public Affairs and Public Information function be developed within the. City Emergency Management Organization. The functions of the City Public Affairs and Public Information Officers should be considered as multiple, involving: • Providing public affairs information to the general public, business 53 r THREAT LEVEL ONE LOW RISK LEVEL TWO ,_ MODERATE RISK LEVEL THREE HIGHEST RISK LOS ANGELES CITY - RESPONSE AN~ RECOVERY ACTIVATION GUIDELINE CHARACTERISTIC - EXAMPLES MAJOR PLANNED EVENT EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION LOCALIZED SMALL INCIDENTS INVOLVING TWO OR MORE DEPARTMENTS GENERALLY SHORT TERM - ONE SHIFT LARGER LONGER TERM (2 SHIFT) INCIDENT. TWO OR MORE LARGE INCIDENTS INVOLVING TWO OR MORE DEPTS. MODERATE EARTHQUAKE OUTSIDE CITY. MAJOR WIND OR RAIN STORM MAJOR REGIONAL DISASTER LONG DURATION~ SEVERAL DAYS TO WEEKS. COUNTY AND STATE SUPPORT MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. RESPONSE ACTIONS ALERT LEVEL 1 STAFF ACTIVATE EOC SITSTAT UNIT ACTIVATE DIVISIONS ONLY AS REQUIRED NO GENERAL EOC ACTIVATION ALERT LEVEL 2 STAFF ACTIVATE EOC SITSTAT TEAM ACTIVATE EOC DIVISIONS AS REQUIRED. PLAN FOR MIN.JMUM TWO SHIFT OPERATION. FULLY ACTIVATE RESPONSE ORGANIZATION ON TWELVE HOtJR ~HTF'rS. MATN'J'ATN AS LONG AS REQUIRED. RECOVERY ACTIONS GENERALLY NOT REQUIRED AT THIS LEVEL ALERT RECOVERY MANAGEMENT TEAM ACTIVATE RECOVERY TEAM IF WARRANTED BY THE SITUATION. FULLY ACTIVATE RECOVERY MANAGEMENT TRAM . REGIN PLANNING FOR DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND RECOVERY TRANSITION. and industry which is essential for the understanding of emergency conditions and management of the event. This information would be supported and approved by the Board. • Developing news releases for the broadcasting and print media. The preparation of these releases must be based on the information- developed by the Situation Status function. • Developing information releases f.or city employees. These items should be developed and then disseminated through the City Emergency Operations Organization. The purpose is to ensure that the employees are aware of the emergency response and recovery effort, are made aware of special emergency conditions e.g. proclamations, emergency ordinances, resolutions etc; and, are made aware of any changes to city policy, e.g. work hours or change in priorities. The PA/PIO function must also be concerned with rumor control. They must be evaluating information being disseminated by the media, set up a rumor control activity if necessary, act rapidly to correct any errors, and ensure that only factual and supported information is being used. This function should also act as the voice of the EOB when Board members are unavailable or in situations where it is more appropriate to have PA/PIO persons function as spokespersons. 4.3.5 City and County EO_ C Interactions The complexity of emergency management in the Los Angeles metropolitan area will be evident very rapidly in any major emergency which involves any appreciable area of the Los Angeles basin. Currently, the City and County exchange liaison representatives between their EOCs for major exercises and for events which would require the liaison function. Under current procedures, the City/County representatives are from the Los Angeles Police Department and from the LA County Sheriffs Department. VSP recommends that this activity continue and be expanded. If the alerting and activation guideline describe earlier is accepted, then the liaison exchange would take place under all Level 3 events and would be considered under Level 2 if both EOC's are activated. -·-· We further recommend, that under Level 3 conditions, that additional City County liaison representation be accomplished at the City/County Administrative Office level. The City representatives, acting as a liaison team to the County would have the following functions to perform: 54 l I ... , 1. . Provide for the exchange of essential situation assessment information 2. Coor.dinate resource requests 3. Coordinate on the use of the Emergency Broadcast System. 4. Identify capabilities, shortfalls and limitations of respective governmental elements. - 5 Assist in coordinating the volunteer agency needs and subsequent allocation and coordination of assistance. 6. Provide the proper briefing and policy level representation to the respective City/Counw policy Boards. _ 4.3.6 Emergency Broadcast System As discussed in the analysis (Section 3} there are concerns about the adequacy of the EBS system to meet the specific information dissemination needs of any city. In as much as the City of Los Angeles represents nearly 40 percent of the County population, . the EBS system should be able to provide a wide range of the required information to the citizens of Los Angeles. VSP recommendations to improve the operational use of the existing EBS system are as follows: One alternative, is to pursue the separate Operational Area designation, and essentially provide appropriate EBS coverage directly. 1. Coordinate with the Office of Emergency Services (OES} in expanding the Operational Area identification for the City beyond the catastrophic . earthquake event (as spelled out in the Southern California Earthquake Response Plan) to lesser type emergency events .. Following this, designate key stations serving predominately the City Operational Area, and provide them with the appropriate information for EBS dissemination via a direct link. 2. Ensure that City liaison personnel are sent to the County EOC (see separate discussion) at anytime emergency events · may require activation of the EBS through the County. The City liaison team at the County EOC would receive City information for EBS dissemination, and perform the necessary on-site coordination at the County EOC to ensure timely EBS dissemination. 4.3.7 Information Systems - Option B The single most important criteria for successful implementation of an improved information system is the capability of · ail departments and persons having EOC responsibilities to participate and interact using the designed systems . . VSP recommends that at the minimum level of implementation of a new information system, there must exist a predetermined and cohesive design with sufficient equipment and software to support all EOC workstations from the first day of information system implementation. An attempt to implement a system on a 55 I, piecemeal basis without meeting this requirement will result in the effective establishment of two parallel systems, thereby defeating any chance of streamlining processes, improving communication, and meeting the goals of overall information handling improvement. This criteria should not be confused with our recommendation for modular system design, which will allow discrete incremental improvements to the system by adding functionality across the whole system as funding becomes available. As a result of our analysis, VSP's recommendations for the upgrade of the information systems under Option B include the following general capabilities and strategies: · • Procurement of sufficient computer workstations to provide access to meet the minimal requirements to connect all parties with EOC responsibilities. • Procurement of a software package (which is a relatively new development in the computer software industry) known generically as "groupware". • Procurement of computer hardware and ope.rating system software to support the groupware. • Supplement LAN connections and upgrade licenses to meet design demands for PC connections; complete LAN installation. • Retain existing mapping systems but proceed with detailed design and • prototype testing for ma_ pping implementation with groupware based upon integration with City GIS capability. · • Install data and fax communications capabilities tnto selected PCs. • Install communications interfaces to the network to allow telephone dial-in from remote locations. • Begin to internally specify detailed database designs, procure database design assistance services, and procure training for initial installation of groupware. Specific recommendations regarding each of these, along with an explanation of the supporting rationale, are provided below. Where appropriate, estimates of pricing and implementation costs for each component have been provided. A cost summary is provided at the conclusion of the recommendations. 56 Workstation Procurement Figure 5.2.5-1 graphically depicts the recommended configuration for the · implementation of an upgraded EOC information system under the assumptions previously provided for Option A. There are thirteen operating divisions of the City having EOC responsibilities and requiring direct access to the communication and massaging system instituted. Certain divisions may later be determined to· need . more than one computer workstation due to their larger responsibilities and/or communications load, however under this minimal configuration option it has been assumed that one computer terminal can be adequately shared. It has been assumed that tlie Liaison and Support representatives could adequately share two PCs; three additional computers would be needed to support _ the CCD; two would be required for SITSTAT; one for mapping, and three for MEOC access., adding from two to four additional required stations. In total, the network would require 24 computer workstations. A total of seven existing computer systems which could be applied to this design currently exist in the EOC including: an existing PC for mapping, the incident logging PC which can be used as one . of the SITST AT machines with only minor modification to include network access, and the five PCs which were recently procured under the first phase of upgrade. Although there is the expectation that additional PCs would be acquired under the currently planned and budgeted second phase, this analysis has been developed considering only actual in-place equipment. Should the anticipated procurement be realized, they should be subtracted from the numbers presented here. A functional deficit 1 7 PC workstations remains in order to accomplish this recommended design. Our analysis has indicated that the hardware configuration of the recently procured PS/2 systems is adequate for the information system design, and as they are already on the City's ISO-approved and negotiated pricing list they have been used as a basis for costing: Groupware Procurement A new computer software product is now available on the market which has the capability to meet the design requirements for an EOC. Although first generally introduced in 1989, only one manufacturer has moved the product forward far enough to incorporate the technology which can meet the design criteria which was outlined in Section 3.5.2 of this report. A product known as Lotus Notes appears to have all of the capabilities to provide an exceptional off-the-shelf solution for LA City. Specific functions and features provided in Notes which are important for the EOC include: • • Distributed a~d automatically replicated document databases; these are fully searchable and customizable Correspondence processing with full support for text, numbers, keywords, graphics, and images 57 U1 00 PtrlOMel Tt naporlation Harbor Animal "i .L Public WeHart and Shene, Alrpo1b Recovery and Aeconalrucilon &. __ & __ .L Ullll!Ht1 Recommended ~CC Information System Configuration For Option A A '------- Fill Police A.. ------ 7 - ~ - ... .... ... . ~:~.: 7' . . . ~ 2> ~ : Mapping IC\ · :.· . . ' ... . .. .. .. . • MEOC • Olrtciot CAO CLA CoordlnaUon C.nt.r OlrKtor ..... ..... .. .. ...... .... Lotua NolH S.r.11, , . .. IL~ ~ Network --=-....~ P,~,., SITS TAT l • -" Item Quantity Description Est. Price Total 1 17 IBM PS/2, 80386/20MHz, 160MB HO, 4MB $3,000 SSl ,000 RAM 2 17 Microsoft Mouse $75 $1,275 3 17 VGA Display $650 $11,050 4 17 Token-Ring LAN Support $700 $11,900 5 Misc $2,000 $2,000 6 Sales Tex $6,371 I $83,596 Table~S-1 Workstation Procurement Cost Estimates • A fully-integrated electronic mail system including address books anq personal filing systems · • Import/export capability for spreadsheets, major word processing programs, database packages (SQL to be incorporated within next 3-6 months) · I • Built-in comprehensive security system to all databases providing selective restriction levels • On-line context sensitive help • Forms design and data editing capability for customizing database input. • Software maintenance program • Support for remote and laptop computer use • Novice user point-and-click graphic interface A comparison of the EOC functional requirements to NOTES capabilities is provided in Table 5.2.5-2 below. As a relatively sophisticated and complex software product incorporating many integrated features, the manufacturer has opted to distribute the product through a Value Added Reseller (VAR) approach as opposed to a traditional mass marketing distribution. The VAR approach bundles the software with installation and training 59 EOC Functional Requirement Lotus NOTES Capability Incident Designation The Notes database supports keyword fields and flexible formats which will customization of an EOC incident designation. User Interface Format The software uses state-of-the-art icon representation and pull-down hierarchical menus to provide friendly user interface. Customizable forms design and filters will allow development of click and button style data input. Distribution of Communications A full-function electronic mail system is integrated into the software design. Gateways to other network mail systems are either already developed or in progress should this feature be needed at a later date. Graphic Image Handling The package supports and integrates into the database most of the industry standard image formats. Text, graphics, and scanned images can be merged into compound documents and distributed across the system. The capability to handle mapping images is present. Message Logging/Auditability Full database logging and tracking capability is built into the software. Full data security including encryption and adjustable levels of database access control are available. Modularity for Expansion The system is expandable to levels far beyond the needs of the EOC. Price Waterhouse has implemented the system for 10,000 u~_ ers in 450 distributed offices. Non-exclusive Interfaces Although designed initially for IBM DOSl'Nindows and OS/2 PM, development is in progress for an Apple platform. Software interfaces for most applications is already in place; completion of an SQL interface is anticipated within 3 to 6 months. All standard communi-cations from remote locations and across networks are supported. Summary Reporting/Analytical The database contains full reporting and formula functions sufficient to provide statistical analysis capability for EOC applications. Training Requirements Because of the Windows point-and-click mouse environment, user interface training should be straightforward . Some training requirement will exist for initial design of applications and support of the server (backup and database purging). A basic level of training is prov;ded as part of the VAR package upon procurement. Maintenance Requirements Maintenance will be minimal as the system is designed as a standard product. Application maintenance will vary depending upon the quality of detail design specification performed prior to system implementation. Table ~-2 EOC Functional Requirements and Lotus NOTES Capability support to ensure that the user is able to achieve functionality with the product. This is in fact an advantage for the EOC, as it would allow for rapid implementation of advanced EOC features. The Lotus Notes VAR servicing LA City .is Evernet Systems, Inc. in Woodland Hills ((818)-702-9744). Licensing for the software is priced in increments of 10, 20, or 60 50 users sets at approximately $13,000 (including tax) for 10 users, $23,000 (including tax) for 20 users, an~ $52,000 (including tax) for 50. VSP recommends that the city procure licensing for 50 users (unless a negotiation for a 30 user license can be achieved; approximately $36,000)· at approximately $52,000. Included in this package are 1 6 days of on-site training (possibly negotiable upward), one year of software maintenance and upgrades, and 24 hours (also may . be negotiable) of telephone support. Lotus Notes Server Implementation of Lotus Notes requires a dedicated server _ to support all of the software and databases. This server system should be configured with the OS/2 operating system from IBM, 9MB of RAM memory, and approximately 500MB of high speed disk capacity. An IBM PS/2 80486133MHz with this configuration would be priced in the range of $20,000. Novell LAN Connections, license Upgrades, Miscellaneous Software Approximately $3,000 would be required for purchase of M~ltistation Access Units (MAUs) and associated license upgrades to support users on the LAN. LAN wiring costs are priced elsewhere as part of the facility upgrade for the EOC under this option. An additional $2,000 would be required to purchase Windows software for all stations. Upgrade Data and Fax Communications Modems and internal FAX cards may be added to both the network and workstations to enable telephone connections to the outside at approximately $350 each. These may be critical for MEOC communications. An assumption of a mix of 8 of these devices would result in a_ n outlay of approximately $2,800. Database . Design and Training As previously indicated, some support for database design is included in the VAR procurement of the software. The availability of supplementary support from the City's ISD programmers has not been estimated at this point in time. Supplementary consulting from Evernet Systems Inc. on Lotus Notes is available at a quoted unnegotiated rate of $125/hour. VSP recommends that upon a decision · to proceed with this option, a team of EOC participants should be formed to outline the structure for a detailed information database design. Based upon a series of intensive software capability demonstrations and access to software documentation, a. fairly detailed preliminary design can be developed which will serve as a blueprint for ~~stem implementation. Mapping Capability VSP's analysis of mapping needs and existing capabilities has led us to recommend that substantial improvements to the EOC mapping capability should not be 61 " • I attempted until after implementation of the base information system. The base system should however be designed to allow for modular development of this functionality. The rationale for this approach stems from several considerations. A primary consideration involves functionality and cost. With the wide variance in required map bases to support each Division, a much more detailed analysis of map support requirements should be undertaken before attempting to load the massive database structures to support mapping. Our initial analysis indicates that users may actually not require extremely sophisticated GlS modification and analysis capability to exist at their workstation, but may in fact only require the capability to receive a map image relating to a specific incident via electronic mail or from a central database. This image could be annotated by the user and then passed on as a means of visual communication. Lotus NOTES would fully support this capability at a substantially reduced cost over providing full GIS functionality. In addition, the level of user sophistication and training required to use a GIS approach may well not be a reasonable approach within the operating framework of the EOC. VSP recommends that as implementation of the base information system is undertaken, prototype GlS images for various City GIS sources should be tested for interface with the system . . A possible solution to mapping in the EOC could prove to be straightforward and inexPBnsive if it is found that simply placing a GIS terminal from an existing City database supported by a trained GlS technician can be interfaced on the network to provide mapping on demand. Other All software and hardware requires maintenance. No attempt has been made to estimate hardware maintenance. General industry practice is to assume roughly 6- 10% of the current list price of software as an annual maintenance cost. Lotus Notes is supplied with one year of maintenance, after which a price of $60 per user has been quoted; this translates to an annual maintenance on a 50 user license of $3,000. Other incidental software, including the operating systems and network software may reasonably be expected to double or triple this amount. It is assumed under this option that a manual forms system which parallels the automated design will serve as the redundant backup in the event of system failure. r 62 l , ;, DHcripti~n Pri~ &tim•t• Workstation Procurement Ul,596 Lotus Notes Groupware $52,000 Lotus Notes Server $20,000 LAN Upgrades, Software ,s.ooo Modem/FAX Hardware '2,800 TOTAL $163.396 Option B Table s.d.s-3 Information System Cost Summary ✓ l ,. 4.3.8 Telecommunications Systems - Option B As a result of our analysis, · VSP 1 s recommendations . for the upgrade of the telecommunications systems under Option B include the following general capabilities and strategies: * * * * * * * * * * * Increase the number of telephone lines available to users at each workstation to ensure access when needed. Install ringdown-type voice circuits between each department operating in the EOC and that department's remote departmental EOC, and other key operational points, such as police stations. Install at least one individual line of the backup emergency telephone system at each operational position in the EOC. Install enhanced facsimile capabilities in the EOC. Install Transportation Department 800 MHz radio system capability in the EOC. Install additional radio systems to permit interoperation with other levels of government. Install both Police and Fire Mobile Data Terminals with printers in the EOC. Install conduit to roof level to permit the installation of antennas and limited transmitter capability in the EOC itself. Develop a City-wide integrated RACES plan and program, based on the State of California's "Santa Luisa" model program. Install additional Amateur Radio capabilities in the EOC. Improve access to the City's SNA mainframe computer network, using the Local Area Network described in the Information Systems Section of_ this report. Incorporate systems in the EOC for the more effective distribution of general interest audio to EOC participants. Improve the EOC's Emergency Public Information distribution capability. Specific recommendations regarding each of these, along with an explanation of the supporting rationale, are provided below. Where appropriate, estimates of pricing and implementation costs for each component have been provided. A cost summary is provided is provided at the conclusion of the recommendations. l t.. Increase In Telephone Capacity Access to telephone circuits for all EOC participants· must be improved. VSP . recommends that 20 button 1 A2-type key telephones be installed at each operating position. Some positions, such as SITSTAT and Police, may require 30 button sets. These telephones will offer substantial additional line capacity over the 6 button sets which currently make up the preponderance of EOC telephones, while still operating with the existing key telephone service units (KSUs) which "drive" the individual sets. Only the sets need be replaced: the existing KSUs can be reused. Cabling will need to be redone. An additional 25 Pair cable must be run to each station to support the additional lines. Those stations with 30 button sets will require three 25 Pair cables. 20 button sets cost approximately $260.00 each; 30 button sets about $400.00. Additional KSUs will likely be required: they cost $200.00 each. 150 additional line cards will be required to drive the additional lines called for later in this report. These cards are $20.00 each. The additional 25 pair cables should cost $60.00 each. We estimate the labor required to install this equipment at under $8,500. Therefore, the total cost of implementing this r~commendation will be approximately $24, 100. In the area of the lines themselves, each telephone should be equipped with two Centrex lines, and a regular business line. If a particular division has more than one telephone allocated to it, all lines used in the division must appear on all of the telephones used by that division. The additional Centrex lines are $15.00 each per month, plus installation of $71. The regular business lines are $12 each per month, plus installation of $71. This totals a $1,140 monthly recurring cost, and a one-time installation cost of $5,320. Install Ringdown Circuits Ringdown circuits should be installed between each remote departmental EOC and the City EOC. Other vital locations such as police stations and other major City facilities should be identified, and ringdown circuits installed to those points as well. This will permit reliable, direct voice communications between key individuals at these disparate locations. VSP Associates recommends that at least two of these circuits be installed to · each EOC, to provide backup and extra capacity. These circuits can be terminated on the distant end on either the phone system in use at the EOC location, or on dedicated instruments, at the City's option. The EOC end would terminate on the 20/30 button 1 A2 key telephones to be installed at each operating position. Again, if multiple operating positions exist for a given division, all ringdowns in use for that division must appear on all stations used by that division. It is difficult to provide exact pricing for this recommendation, as specific quotes for the cost of each circuit must be obtained from Pacific Bell once exact locations have been determined. We have obtained the costs for circuits to the Harbor area, the Wilshire district, and the Van Nuys area for estimation and budgeting purposes. A ringdown to the Van Nuys area costs $190 monthly, and $660 to install. The Wilshire district circuit is priced at $87 monthly, and $720 initially~ - The Harbor area circuit is priced at $194 per month, and $660 to inst~II. Therefore, if we assume 50 ringdown circuits, with 6 to the Harbor, 24 to the Van Nuys area, and 20 to the Wilshire district, we· obtain a monthly cost of $6,864 and an installation cost of $34,200 for budgetary purposes. Costs. at the remote sites should average under $200.00 for equipment, and $100.00 for labor to . implement these circuits. Costs for the EOC end have been previously accounted for under another item. It is possible that these services could be provided at lower costs with the intelligent use of current communications technologies, such as integrated voice/data service. Install Additional Backup System Lines A single line from the backup Mite! telephone switch should be installed at each operating position. This will permit all operating divisions access to this system, which is likely to be the only switched telephone service working to the EOC in a large-scale disaster, when the traffic demands placed upon the public switched network by the emergency have caused the telephone company switch providing the City's Centrex and regular business line service to slow to a crawl, or halt. Assuming the system has some unutilized capacity remaining, the cost of the growth necessary to implement this recommendation will be under $5,000, including labor. Again, the cost of support the lines on the EOC station side have been previously accounted for. · Enhance Facsimile Capabilities The Information Systems Section of this report recommended the installation of modem and internal fax cards into selected computers on the network. This section suggests the city consider the installation of a "Communications Server'' on the network which would contain both fax and modem cards. This would permit all stations on the network to have full access to this vital resource. Most fax transmissions are created on a word processor, printed out, and then trasnsmitted by fax. A network communications server would eliminate the need to print documents, an efficiency in a situation where all printers will undoubtedly be running at full· speed to keep up · with other demand. The installation of a communications server in a Novell Netware environment does not require a complex computer. A smaller system can be used to good effect. In this environment, a single operator can view the cover sheets of incoming faxes, and route them electronically to the intended recipient, where they may be viewed electronically. If a hard copy is required, it may be routed by the user to a printer for printing at any time. We estimate the cost to implement this communications server at $6,000, including all software, 4 fax boards, and a 4 port modem card. Install Transportation Dept. 800 MHz System Installation of a Transportation Department 800 MHz system radio will permit direct EOC access to the Traffic Control officers -- certainly a key resource as well as a potentially important source of intelligence. This radio will also serve as a backup communications link to the Transportation Department EOC located in the Valley. The implementation of this recommendation will require a control station on this system. This should cost under $4,000 to implement. Install Interoperation Radio Systems The EOC currently has installed a number of intersystem radios. These include the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Radio System, the California Law Enforcement Radio System, Fire White 1, and the Hospital Emergency Administrative Radio System, it would also be useful to install some important additional systems. One of these is the California Emergency Services Radio System (CESRS), used for direction and coordination with the State of California, Governor's Office of Emergency Services. The . other is a High Frequency (HF) radio to permit operation on a variety of systems, I I . . . including County, State and Federal networks. An HF radio permits long-distance direct radio-to-radio communications over hundreds or even thousands of miles, and will be of critical importance in the early hours of a major disaster. The involvement of the City of Los Angeles in these HF networks could improve the speed with which aid comes toward the City by a matter of hours, and could directly save lives. The cost of implementing a CESRS radio would be under $6,000. The cost to install an . HF radio would be under $5,000. Additional costs required for the installation of conduit to support this radio are discussed in detail further in this document. Install Police and Fire MDTs in EOC Mobile Data Terminals on BOTH the Police and Fire systems should be installed in the EOC. These MDTs should have printers attached to them for archival record-keeping purposes. By the same token, key Police and Fire command vehicles should have · MDTs installed on both systems, again with printers for archival purposes. Ideally, of course a message switch could exist which would permit transmissions to occur between the systems. While a technical evaluation of these systems to permit a detailed evaluation of the potential costs of such an item is beyond the scope of this project, VSP "guesstimates" that this message switch could be constructed for $25-30,000. An MDT, including radio, costs $5,500 on the Police system, and $3,700 on the Fire system. Install Conduit To Roof Level VSP strongly recommends the EOC reduce its total reliance on remotely controlled radio equipment, and install at least a limited local radio capability in the EOC itself. This might include a frequency agile Police Radio, a frequency agile Fire radio, the CESRS . radio, the HF radio, a cellular telephone, a Civil Defense radio and Amateur Radios on HF, 52 MHz, 144 MHz, 222 MHz, 440 MHz, and 1296 MHz. When the new 800 MHz trunked radio system is completed and operational, two base stations on this system should be considered. This conduit need not run to the roof of City Hall East. In fact, this would likely not be desirable due to large losses incurred in lengthy transmission lines. We suggest this conduit run to the roof of the Mall next to CHE. While this will not provide the height which would be desirable, the losses which would be incurred in a long run to the roof of CHE will not be present either. VSP estimates the costs of installing adequately sized conduits between the roof of the Mall and the EOC at-approximately $30,000. Develop City-Wide RACES Program As noted in a March 2t 1992 critique of the February Flood Operations by Bill Russell of the Personnel Department, Amateur Radio support to the City in time of emergency in the current environment is undependable, at best. Yet, this need not be the case. The current city environment does not pay sufficient attention to the Amateur Radio resource. The City does not expect reserve police officers to just appear in time of emergency: it recruits them, screens them, trains them, equips them, drills them, supervises them, and acknowledges them on an ongoing basis. Yet the City DOES expect its reserve · t . ., communicators to just appear because a "contract" exists. If the City expects its reserve communicator (i.e. Amateur Radio) program to be successful, it must pay the communications program the same kind of attention paid to reserve police officers, or other such volunteers: recruiting, training, equipping, exercising, supervision,· and recognition. The City currently has several elements of a potentially successful program in place. The Police Department has a "Hamwatch" program in which Amateur Radio operators assist the police with surveillance communications; a memorandum of understanding exists between .the American Radio Relay League's Amateur·Radio Emergency Service (ARES) and the Fire Department; and Amateur Radio clubs exist in both the DWP and General Services Department. These components need to be integrated under a single umbrella, such as the model "Santa Luisa" Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) plan developed by the · State of California, Governor's Office of Emergency Services. It is important to note that the Fire Department's Memorandum Of Understanding is with the Amateur Radio Emergency Service of the American . Radio Relay League. In the State of California, all Amateur Radio efforts in support of governmental operations are, by definition, RACES operations. ARES, also by definition, supports non-governmental operations such as the American Red Cross, hospitals, the Salvation Army, and other such private sector response efforts. The City must develop its own cadre of trained personnel to assist the City in time of emergency, instead of depending on a large group that may have many other committments, including the County, the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, local hospitals, broadcasters, and many other diverse assignments. VSP also recommends the City provide Amateur Radio equipment in the EOC. This -equipment should operate on HF, 52 MHz, 144 MHz, 222 MHz, 440 MHz, and 1296 MHz. These radios, transmission line, and antennas should represent a combined investment to the City of approximately $6,000. This is an important investment for the City in interagency communications. The success of both the County and State in developing their Amateur Radio resources have led them to place many Emergency Management functions on Amateur Radio. For the City to successfully interoperate with these agencies, it too must maintain an effective Amateur Radio presence. Professionals in the development of the Amateur Radio resource from both the State of California, Governor's Office of Emergency Services and County of Los Angeles Sheriff's Department stand ready to assist the City in the development of a RACES plan to properly meet the needs of the City in time of emergency. All the City need do to obtain their services is ask. · Improve SNA Network Access The City maintains a large mainframe network utilizing IBM computers and IBM's System Network Architecture (SNA) for the City's data processing needs. This network contains essentially all of the on-line information that exists about the City, its operations, and its resources. VSP suggests that access to this network be provided through the Local Area Network proposed in the Information Systems Section of this "report. Currently, only one terminal exists in the EOC, and it is reportedly not functional. The infonnation base held by the SNA network is huge, and could prove invaluable in an emergency. Tools to provide this connection are readily available commercially, and are in wide use today. Providing connectivity to this network should cost approximately $8,000. , , , ,._ Improve Audio Distribution Systems There are two aspects to this recommendation: First, EOC staff need to be able to move around the EOC while continuing to monitor one of several audio sources, such as a radio channel, or television audio. In the current environment, this results in a high noise level in the EOC, and difficult to understand audio. VSP recommends the installation of a 12 channel infrared cordless headphone system. This system will pennit EOC staff to move around the room and listen to any one of 12 channels without increasing room noise. The 12 channel transmitter costs $12,500, and each headset is priced at $400. With 50 headsets and chargers, this system should cost approximately $38,000 to implement. The other aspect is the consoles for providing commuications and broadcast radio audio to EOC positions. The systems in place are a good start, but they should be adapted to provide additional flexibility in the assignment of channels to individual consoles. Additionally, a small public address system to cover the EOC and surrounding rooms would be appropriate. This system should cost no more than $2,000 to install. Improve EPI Capabilities The Emergency Public Information distribution capabilit'ies of the EOC can be improved by incorporating access provisions for the State of California's Emergency Digital Information System. This system permits the transmission of text messages to the media via the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS). All that is required for access to the system is a CLETS terminal, which is certainly present in the Police communications center next to the EOC. With EDIS, transmissions made by governmental entities are carried over CLETS to Sacramento, where they are routed out to the EDIS network and the appropriate local area. This transmission is formatted by the EDIS network to appear to newsroom computers as a wire service feed. Many television broadcasters can feed these reports out directly as a screen crawl, or as closed-captioned text for the hearing impaired. Agencies are provided EDIS access by the California Office of Emergency Services at no charge. Various methods may be used to implement a CLETS terminal presence in the EOC. None of these should cost over $2,000. OPTION B COST SUMMARY: Install 20 & 30 button telephones: Add Centrex & Regular Business Lines: Install Ringdown Circuits: Install Backup System Lines: Enhanced Facsimile & Modem Capabilities: Install Transportation Dept 800 MHz System: Install lnteroper~tion Radio Systems: Install Police and Fire MDTs in EOC: Install Conduit To Roof Level: Develop City-Wide RACES Program: Improve SNA Network Access: Improve Audio Distribution System: Improve EPI Capabilities: Total Initial Cost: Total Recurring Monthly Cost: --- --- $24,100 $5,320 NRC / $1, 140 Monthly $49,200 NRC / $6,864 Monthly $5,000 $6,000 $4,000 $11,000 $9,200 $30,000 $6,000 $8,000 $40,500 $2,000 $199,820 $8,004 ... given the· overall scope of this option. Expansion and integration into City department ECCs would also be feasible. Other possible applications include establishment of direct linkages for database exchange to the Fire and Police ·Dispatch systems. Video capture and display boards could be incorporated into individual PCs at workstations to provide".linkage with TV broadcasts and rooftop cameras supporting the Transportation Department. · 4.3.9 Staffing Option B allows for current staffing patterns except in two areas: The Situation Status Function (Intelligence) will reQuire additional personnel to process. analyze, and post the information received. VSP recommends that this unit be expanded to include participation from other departments - particularly Fire, Public works, Transportation and DWP. The redesign of the room allows for a better staffing of outside agency liaison positions - e.g. Sheriff, CHP, CAL TRANS, ARC, State OES etc. The layout should be reviewed, and identified agencies contacted for commitment of personnel to these positions. The additional staff has been accommodated at working positions rather to a "stand-up" position. This approach should allow for more effective coordination. All departments must be prepared to provide relief teams for protracted emergency operations 4.3. 10 Training Implementation of Option B will require: The rewrite of the "Red Book" on internal EOC Operations Jnstructions to reflect the internal changes to the EOC design, organization, message routing procedures, situation status operations, display needs, internal briefing procedures and briefing data requirements. Scheduling of a class room orientation for EOC assigned personnel to update them on changes prior to the scheduling of any new exercise. VSP recommends that it would be appropriate at this session for representatives of each department to describe their departments concept of operations, operating locations and coordination requirements. Implementation of a periodic exercise schedule with changing events and sufficient challenging message inputs to require effective problem solving and decision making. 64 .. More involvement in exercise with department ECC and/or field command post locations. More involvement in exercises with the EOB (at least annually) to include presentation of situations, recommended action plan and to require Board determination of policy and priorities based on information provided. VSP also recommends that a more definitive EOC activation process is required to integrate the city departments into emergency events even though they may appear to be normal emergency operations restricted to selected departments. This process will further educate the staff and prepare it for major events. Any training program should include individual department internal training requirements to support the city overall emergency management operation. 4.4 Option C - Expand Existing Facility 4.4.1 Introduction The. intent of Option - C, is to provide improvements to the existing EOC which could be implemented within a three-year time period. VSP recommends that Option C be the preferred option, if Option A - A New EOC, is not selected by the City. If Option C was preferred by the City, VSP recommends that before proceeding with the work a review of the City Hall East structural safety be made by _ a structural engineering firm that is familiar with seismic design engineering. The structural safety assessment should be based upon a requirement for the continued access to and operability of the EOC facility in a post-earthquake environment. Under Option C, the improvements described under Option B are included, but would be considerably _ expanded. Several additional wall changes and removals would be made. In addition the EOO Board Room (E-148) would also be enlarged to provide needed meeting and conference space. Option C plan for space allocation is shown in the following Figure. 4.4.2 Seismic Hazard Mitigation [Hazard mitigation steps recommended under Option B would be expanded, to include the additional space brought in under this option. That would include rooms 144, 146, the EOC storage Area and room 148. The additional cost for this must be included]. (Also this may be the place to further discuss overall CHE seismic safety.] 4.4.3 Facility Use Under Option C, the existing facility would be expanded by removing the EOC south wall and expanding into the· rooms E-144 and E-146. This expansion would provide 65 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER OPTION GENERAL FLOOR PLAN - S II UA I II:;;:;--- ,---r-::~'\-- AS S( S SHEM I I .. .,._ - -L t-4 --··- · ·- -·---·-·- ·1 UIMMUMICA T IIJNS -I ~T __ J C[lrlRDINAT 11.JN r:r_ N· r [f~ Bl IM?IJ RIIIIM IIIREC J(IR AMI) SUPPi II~ I SI ll£Rl If IM SPACE NOT[S, I. H•avy line lndlcahs loGd bearing wolt 2, Colunns slz~s ar~ oppro)(lna te • ·--- --,-- . - - --- -- -,--" ---- · - - · - --,---· --· ·---------------------------- - · EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER AREA P-4 CITY HALL EAST, LOS ANGELES DATE• 5-7-92 PROJECT NUMBER• 913 1 1 VSP ASSOCIATES AGBAB[AN ASSOCIATES Socroriento, CA Posadeno, CA - "' . l { approximately 1100 square feet of additional floor space. This resulting EOC facility would provide a relatively large open area, with only one major column to obstruct vision. Space directly allocated to EOC operations (excluding sideroom) would then be approximately 3400 square feet. Under federal guidelines this would accommodate sixty-two people. This is approximately the number of people who currently operate within the existing facility during full scale activations. In addition, the north wall of the boardroom would be removed. This would enlarge the Board room by roughly one-third. The Board room and the Coordination Center then would be contiguous. An entrance to the Board Room would be provided in the common wall. Division Work stations would continue to be around the peripheral walls. Work Stations would expand in size to include more counter and storage work space, additional wall space for displays, and positions for auxiliary personnel. The display orientation in the Center could be accomplished in several ways. This will depend on nature of the display .system, and either rear or f,ront projection requirements. The east wall could be utilized for use of rear projection by extending the wall on the east end of the room. This would allow for space behind the viewing screens for rear projection. A sample floor plan for the room is shown. Liaison Work Stations would be relocated from Option B locations to be more centered within the expanded space. The computer floor would be .retained under Option C. A coordinator kiosk position could be placed in the room. In addition · / tables, chairs would be added in the center to allow for inter-divisional coordination ... More internal storage for resources data, maps, and reference materials etc. would be a. dded. Siderooms Sideroom space allocated under Option B would be retained until it is determined through exercises or actual operations that is either no longer required or could be reduced . .J EMERGENCY OPERATION CENTER -- OPTION c SI TU/\ T IUN ASSESSM[NT ---·--•� COMM~NICATl[JNS [~ COORDINATION CENTER CONFIGURATION EOC DIVISIONS AND SUPPORT POSITIONS ---- - - ---·\_ GUARD ---n -- · -·H -- --- ~1· · I \ I \ I \ I \ • \ • \ ______ ___.__.__.._, _,.__._, -----, r -::-:. Cf.N 11~/\L DI SPLAY P/\NU. v, - I n :.<,.,_ __ ,... • 0 0 ~I -- - 0 0 0 g[ 0 . 0 [IT~ 0 0 l [}"ABLES I l3� AR D RrHJM CI.IN rT I< [ NC E I TH T L F~ ~I -- 0 0 0 0 - -- l~I l -~t ooo L_J~•L_J-u ·--------,----------·-------··-- ···· ·· NOTES• I. tleavy llne 1ndlco tes load bearing wott 2. ColuMnS sizes ore opproxlno te EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER AREA P-4 CITY HALL EAST, LOS ANGELES D/\TE• 5-7-'92 PROJECT NUMBER• 91 J4 ----------------------- VSP ASSOCJATES AGBABIAN ASSOCJAlES SacroMento, CA Posodeno, CA - I ., l '• Tele_ communications Systems ~ Option C In this scenario, where substantial physical growth is available, our recommendations focus in two areas: increasing the availability of telephone lines, and implementing high capacity links to remote Departmental EOC locations to permit their inciusion in the EOC data network. To' improve the· availability .of telephone . lines, we recommend the installation of turret type telephones at all workstations. These telephones permit a large number of lines to appear on a single phone -- 200 or more, if required. These sets, frequently found in financial and trading applications, operate in essentially .the same manner as the 1 A2 key telephones currently in use, but permit many more lines to be terminated in only slightly more space. These sets also operate .with reduced cable requirements. No matter how many lines appear on the phones, they require only 6 to 12 pair cable per station. These sets will permit all lines in the EOC to appear on all sets in the EOC. By having all lines appearing on all phones, information transfer and coordination is greatly simplified · during operations. If the CLA representative requires a conversation with the Recreation and Parks EOC, the CLA rep can simply press the key on their telephone for the ringdown to the Recreation and Parks EOC, and be in instant direct contact. These sets typically cost $5,000 to $8,000 per position, representing an expense of $225,000 to $360,000 if implemented in our Option A configuration. VSP also recommends the remote Departmental EOCs be tied into the EOC n· etwork. This will require the installation of remote Token-Ring bridges, and hfgh-speed digital circuits between each Departmental EOC and the City EOC downtown. Implementing this technology will bring the remote Departmental facilities "into" the EOC. They will have the same access to the network as any user physically in the EOC. This electronic 11 closeness" should materially simplify operations in an otherwise difficult environment. It is difficult to provide exact pricing for this recommendation, as specific quotes for the cost of each circuit must be obtained from Pacific Bell - once exact locations have been determined. The remote bridging equipment costs approximately $7,500 per location, with the same amount required on the EOC end. For the transmission capacity, we have obtained . the costs for circuits to the Harbor area, the Wilshire district, and the Van Nuys area for estimation and budgeting purposes. A special circuit of the type required, (capable of carrying over 56,000 bits per second, and so named a "56Kb circuit") to the Harbor costs $215 monthly, and $1,240 to install. The Wilshire district circuit is priced at $112 monthly, and $1,240 initially. A circuit to Van Nuys costs $200 monthly, and $1,135 to install. Therefore, if we assume 10 56K circuits, with 1 to the Harbor, 3 to the Van Nuys area, and 6 to the Wilshire district, we obtain a monthly cost of $1,487 and an installation cost of $12,085 for budgetary purposes. It is possible that these services could be provided at lower costs with the intelligent use of current communications technologies, such as integrated voice/data service. ' .. ,, Information Systems - Option ·c Under the more significant physical expansions provided by this option, recommendations relating to the information systems involves corresponding expansion of the Option S design to meet an increased demand for LAN and database access. This incremental cost would however be considered minor as no major reconfiguration would be necessary. It would be necessary to procure additional fully-configured computer workstations to the expanded areas at an estimated cost of $5,000 per station. Costs for physical LAN expansion and software upgrades would be less than $10,000. It may be necessary to add additional disk capacity to the server ($5,000 - $8,000) and possible optical disk storage for fu. 11 implementation of mapping functionality ($5,000 - $10,000). At this level of facility expansion and over the time frame projected, resolution of the GIS an mapping capability issues should be completed. It is not possible to project the cost of full GIS implementation at all workstations. Expansion to a NOTES based system as described in Option & with the addition of a large back projected map display for full ·room viewing could be estimated at about the $20,000 range. VSP would also recommend procurement of an additional Lotus Notes Server supported by an independent uninterruptable power supply. This configuration would supply full system redundancy to protect against sys~em failure. Under this option, it would also be financially feasible to provide expanded system linkages to areas outside of the EOC. This could conceivably include direct links via~ · the NOTES capabilities to state and federal agencies, city agency offices, media, hospitals and disaster support agencies such as the Red Cross. Pricing of these options is highly variable but are not considered to be unrealistic / / . '-. ; •• l 5.0 The Mobile Emergency Operating Center 5. 1 Analysis of the Mobile Emergency Operating Center (MEOC) 5. 1. 1 Description VSP had only one opportunity to see the MEOC set up in an operational_ setting during the contract period. That was on March 17-18 when the MEOC was at Dodger Stadium for Department orientation and familiarization training. The MEOC was also used on a limited basis on March 18th as a part of an earthquake exercise involving the Police Department's Field Command Post. We did not have the opportunity to see the MEOC in full operation for an exercise or actual occurrence. The MEOC consists of three vans and a generator truck. Two of the vans are used for operations, and the other is for communications. When not in use, the equipment is stored at a Department of Animal Regulation shelter at 3201 Lacy Street. The MEOC equipment is essentially self supporting and can be operated at any location that is accessible by the vans. The use of telephone (other- than cellular) requires the addition of a city microwave vehicle (which is not housed with the MEOC), and/or access to commercial telephone dial tone. A pre-designated location for the MEOC is in Parking Lot #32 at Dodger Stadium. This location provides good microwave access to Mt. Lee, and also has a twenty five pair telephone cable stored in a locked box below the hill at the parking lot. Currently, there is no commercial power available for use by the MEOC at this site. Power is supplied by a 30 KW truck mounted generator. In addition, each of the motorhome vans has an on-board 6.5 KW generator. When set up, the two thirty-five foot motorhome type vans are parked in parallel approximately twenty feet apart. Each of the motorhome vans is equipped with an · external canopy. When extended, these provide some protection from the sun. The supporting Communications Van and generator truck are parked nearby and cabled to the two MEOC units. The general configuration is as shown in the attached figure taken from the City's Communications Manual. The concept of operations for operators in the vans is quite similar to that of the main EOC. Each van has sixteen operator positions. Personnel from each Division and support agencies are assigned to small work station carells located along the interior walls of the vans. Each carell is 28 inches wide and 1 2 inches deep. For the most part the stations are all similar, and each has full access to telephone, radio, and monitoring for on-board TV audio. Each position is equipped with a headset and footswitc_ h. __ Each van has one cellular phone. · During operations, the personnel assigned to Division work stations can communicate by telephone and/or radio with their respective department emergency command centers (ECC's), dispatch centers and field command posts. To communicate with each other's location at the MEOC, they can use the 68 1 .., , ' '. J ....,. , . , , telephone system, or use the standard message form used in the main EOC. MEOC # 1 has an intelligence position which contains map and status boards and MEOC #2 has a position for a computer terminal and printer and a central switchboard for routing incoming calls. 5. 1 .2" Operations Analysis Operator instructions for the communications system have been prepared by the Communications Services Division of the Department of General Services and are clear and up-to-date. When the vans are fully occupied, there is little room for a person to move about, virtually no center aisle, and the passing of written messages is a difficult process. Communications within the vans is difficult unless done with the immediate neighbor or by telephone. The use of the on-board communications equipment is not self-evident. However, after a few minutes briefing all of the personnel were able to perform all communications related tasks satisfactorily in the training session VSP attended. The single operator used during the March 18th drill involving the Police Department had difficulty in processing incoming calls. Partially this was caused by lack of familiarity, and also because the system was not functioning properly. Given an event where there were multiple incoming calfs, a single operator would be quickly inundated. The greatest obstacles to operation in the MEOC would appear to be very limited work space at all locations, interior congestion, difficulty in interacting between locations within the same van or between vans (except by telephone) and the lack of an adequately sized central coordination and planning location. Operation of the MEOC under any kind of· adverse weather conditions, such as rain, wind, or temperature extremes would be possible but uncomfortable. Operation at night would benefit from auxiliary exterior lighting which would have to be requested and transported separately. Access to the vans during the training and the Police Department drill was virtually unlimited. Under actual conditions, some form of restrictive barrier and controlled access would be required. 5.2 Communications The MEOC provides a superior capability to the main EOC for its ability to provide off-site communications. 69 , , ' t.. 5.2. 1 Telephone Systems The MEOC is provided telephone service by a Mitel SX-200 Electronic Private Branch Exchange }PBX) located _ in the Communications Support Unit. Pre connected multi-pair cables connect the Operations units with the Communications Support unit, providing for simple. straightforward setup. This switch is of the same type which provides the emergency three digit intercom in the City EOC. The Mitel SX-200 permits 31 simultaneous conversations, assuming the Music-On Hold option has been turned off in programming. This means that any combination of up to 31 internal and external telephone calls m.ay be occurring simultaneously. As far as actual line and trunk capacity inside the switch, no one with a key was available to unlock the secured system cabinet to permit direct physical inspection. However, given that the Dodger Stadium parking lot setup location is served by only a single twenty-five pair cable, each trunk requires one cable pair, and the Mite trunk cards are four ports each, it may be reasonably assumed that no more than 24 trunks are installed in the system. Therefore, a reasonable conjecture of typical system capacity might be 24 outside calls and seven internal calls occurring simultaneously. · This capacity must be shared among all of the _ operating positions in the MEOC. It should be noted that the maximum trunk capacity of this system is thirty-two. This system is equipped with a single operator position which must process all incoming calls to the MEOC. Subsidiary to the MEOC Complex is a van-type mobile microwave unit. This unit can provide up to twenty City Centrex lines extended from the Mt. Lee . communications facility. It was not determinable from our inspections of this unit if connection to the Communications Support unit was via plug-in connectors, or if other methodologies were in use. The twenty-five pair cable mentioned previously which provides telephone service to the Dodger Stadium location is not buried -- it is run up the side of a hill, laid out exposed on the earth. It is cable of the type normally used for inside wiring, and is totally unsuitable for installation in an unprotected, outdoor environment. 5.2.~ Radio Communications Systems The MEOC Communications Support unit is equipped with a broad variety of radios which cover most, if not all of the systems in use by the City. No High Frequency radio equipment was noted. No Amateur Radio facilities were noted. · Audio distribution and radio control is e.f.fected by a series of small consoles. These units are essentially the same devices utilized for radio control and audio distribution in the · city EOC. Connection of individual consoles to particular radio channels is accomplished by cables in a patch bay. 70 , I .• --~---- ---------------------------- · Only the old City Fire Radio System (Low Band) was installed in the Communications Support unit at the time of our review. Despite the new 800 MHz system's having been in service for several years, no date was scheduled for the installation of a Fire radio in the unit. 5.2.3 Data Communications Systems Only a single IBM-PC type computer exists in the MEOC. No one was available to VSP wh. o understood its intended function or the ·software in use on the system. 5.3 · Analysis of Communications Systems The level of telephone switching capacity seems somewhat on the low side, given thirty-two operating positions in the MEOC . . The thirty-one simultaneous conversations maximum could be reached very easily under any type of emergency activation requiring t~e MEOC. The cable providing telephone service to the Dodger Stadium location is of an inappropriate type, and is poorly installed as well. ?This installation is highly vulnerable_ to damage and failure. Only a single operator is equipped in the telephone system. · Given that all incoming telephone traffic to the MEOC Complex must be filtered through this point, this poses a considerable limit to the Complex's call processing capability. As of the time VSP inspected the MEOC Complex in March, 1 992, no 800 MHz Fire Radio capability had been installed in the Communications Support unit. Only the old Low Band system was present, and the GSD personnel present indicated there was no schedule to install this vital capability. In the current environment, Fire Department operations would be seriously handicapped by this deficiency. As in the city EOC, _ the MEOC lacks adequate radio communications facilities for the facilitation of interoperation with other levels of government, as well as for coordination and control of incoming mutual aid resources. No real data communications facilities exist in the MEOC.. In an activation, the MEOC would · effectively be denied access to any City information resources. 5.4 Improvements to the Mobile Emergency Operating Center - {MEOC) . 5.4.1 Facility Use and Operations As pointed out in Section _, there are several factors which inhibit effective operation at the MEOC. These include: limited work space, difficulty in moving about and coordinating ~ith others except by phone or message, and lack of a suitably sized central. location for situation analysis, coordination and planning. _ To increase the ability of the staff to develo_ p a full situation assessment, and to 71 ,. , r()I have space to plan and coordinate, VSP recommends that the City procure a towed trailer approximately It>' x 20'. The trailer would be towed behind the MEOC Generator Truck and would be a permanent part of the MEOC facilities. The trailer would function as a third element in the operational facility configuration. It would house the Emergency Coordination Center Director (CCD), the Situation Analysis Unit (Intelligence function), and be the location for the conduct of staff action planning meetings. The coordination, planning and SITST AT trailer would be placed as shown in the illustration below. The trailer would contain a variety of stored displays that could be mounted on extended aluminum racks on the outside of the trailer. It would also contain a number of tables and chairs that could be removed and set up in the area under the canopie· s between the motorized vans. 1. SITSTAT Unit - Similar to the recommendation for the EOC under Option A, a multi-department Situation Status Unit (SITST AT} would be formed to gather, analyze, process, and display operational information at the MEOC. This team should include representatives from the Police, Fire, Public Works, Transportation and Water and Power. Other Departments could be added or substituted depending upon the situation. Displays would be mounted on the outside of the trailer on a folding aluminum frame which can be rapidly attached to the outside of the trailer. Lightweight shower boards (white boards} formatted and striped for the various kinds of status displays would be used for status keeping (see examples below). When not in use, all of the displays, pole framework, and tables and chairs for use under the canopies and in the trailer would be folded and stored in the trailer. Many types of displays could be used at the MEOC. Many of these are similar to those found in the central EOC either on manual displays or as a part of the computer assisted system. Important status boards would include: Priorities and objectives Major incidents and actions Shelter locations and occupancy Casualty collection points and status Casualties Summary Hospital Status Key Agency contact persons 72 i V ,. -. ·-. r• •• ,-~ MM/TRUCK I I I UNIT# 1 � . i � D D ----- ------- _______ · _____ j GEN. UNIT I LA CITY MOBILE EOC ACCESS ~: CONTROL ,. - .. ·- _, DRAFT TH 4-2-92 Status of external resource requests MEOC shift organization General announcements - e.g. weather forecasts, latest public information bulletins etc. · 2. Message Forms General Messages The hardcopy message form used at the MEOC should be the same as used at the EOC as it is now. VSP recommends that four part NCR three/quarter or full page · form be used rather than the current 1 /2 page. This would allow space for both a message and for a response. The design of these forms should be done by persons who will be using them, and have knowledge of the distribution and routing procedures. · The distribution of the form would be: Two copies to the "action" designee (one is for the return if appropriate) One copy to the MEOC Director and then to the journal for information and recording. One copy to SITST AT for possible use in updating situation displays. 3. Resource Requests Open text or unformatted forms do n· ot work well for resource ordering, especially in emergency conditions. Therefore,• VSP recommends that all resource requests whether internal to the city or for outside resources be placed on a separate form that is formatted especially for this activity. The form would indicate in addition to the normal heading material: a request number that clearly identifies requester, kind, type (capabiJity) and quantity of resources, when needed, where needed, person or title to be delivered to, and any special considerations. 5.4.2 Communications and Support Systems 1. Telephone Systems The Mitel SX-200 PBX installed in the MEOC is capable of using two attendant consoles. This second console should be equipped. While this is still inad~quate to meet the MEOC's call processing needs in a real activation, it is far better than. the existing single console environment. Additional cabling ·should-.be added to the operations units to permit direct terminal of Centrex or regular business lines at the operating positions. This can be used to supplement the limited capacity of the PBX in operations. 73 If the Dodger Stadium location is viewed as a seriously planned location for activation of the MEOC, then the incoming telephone service should be hardened. Appropriate cable should be installed, either by direct burial or in conduit, with adequate ca pacity to meet the needs of the large operation which will quickly spring up around the MEOC complex. . 2. Radio Communications Systems A Fire Department 800 MHz radio should be installed in the Communications Support unit immediately, and a Fire MDT installed in one of the Operations units~ Priority in new system ins~allations should be given to the MEOC Complex, to ensure that this facility is useful in time of emergency. In the current environment, the MEOC is not considered an installation priority. The same recommendations for interoperation communications system are made here as are made for the City EOC. Federal, State, County and Mutual Aid radios are essential presences in the MEOC, especially given the gravity of the typical situation which would require MEOC activation. At these times, mutual aid and intergovernmental coordination is essential, and the current environment does not foster this· vital communication. The MEOC does not take advantage of Amateur Radio resources. Amateur Radio equipment should be installed in the MEOC Complex, and the MEOC Comple-x should be integrated into the City RACES plan we previously recommended be developed. 3. Data Communications Systems A means to link the MEOC into City information resources should be implemented. This could be effected by expanding the mobile microwave resource to include digital-radios, and installing supporting circuits ·and other required connections to the Mt. Lee microwave hub. As for information processing needs, the same system we have recommended for the City EOC could be implemented in the MEOC. While physical space is an issue, it would be possible to implement. Given the nature of the MEOC operations as previously described, the implementation of automated information processing tools could be a boon. 4. General Recommendations As in the City EOC, the MEOC is poorly suited to work in the dispersed Departmental EOC environment which exists in the City. · Systems to permit the effective transfer of information between the far-flung D_ epartmental EOCs and the MEOC Complex must be implemented. These systems should implement both voice and data communications, as massive amounts of information will need to be transferred. 74 The satellite system envisioned in our Option A recommendation for the City EOC would resolve this problem completely. Massive external communications facilities could be brought in to the MEOC Complex very quickly, and communications could be maintained with ·the dispersed Departmental EOCs. 75

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Description

Materials pertaining to the City of Los Angeles's Emergency Operations Organization (EOO), the local agency responsible for coordinating a response to a major disaster or emergency, 1992

Asset Metadata

Core Title Inter-Agency Team Final Report, City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Center, 1992

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 222 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), official reports (aat)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-38535

Unique identifier UC11424381

Identifier box 23 (box),web-box23-04-02.pdf (filename),folder 4 (folder),webster-c100-38535 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier web-box23-04/web-box23-04-02.pdf

Dmrecord 38535

Format 222 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),official reports (aat)

Type texts