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Techniques of strategic political communication: the persuasive devices of the two most followed political YouTubers in the Chinese community

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Techniques of strategic political communication: the persuasive devices of the two most followed political YouTubers in the Chinese community

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Content TECHNIQUES OF STRATEGIC POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: THE PERSUASIVE
DEVICES OF THE TWO MOST FOLLOWED POLITICAL YOUTUBERS IN THE CHINESE
COMMUNITY

by

Weidong Wang

A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC DORNSIFE COLLEGE OF LETTERS, ARTS AND SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES

December 2021

Copyright 2021 Weidong Wang

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract .............................................................................................................................................................. iii
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 1
Literature Review: .............................................................................................................................................2
Attributes of Agenda-Setting Theory and Its Effects ..................................................... 2
Immigrants from China and Their Political Talk on YouTube ..................................... 5
Persuasive Communication Techniques ............................................................................7
1. Conspiracy Theories ..........................................................................................8
2. Reductio ad Hitlerum ......................................................................................10
3. Plain Folks .........................................................................................................11
4. Logos, Pathos, and Ethos ...............................................................................12
Method: .............................................................................................................................................................15
Data Sample ..........................................................................................................................15
Coding ....................................................................................................................................16
Reliability ...............................................................................................................................18
Analytic Procedures .............................................................................................................18
Results: ..............................................................................................................................................................18
Conspiracy Theories ............................................................................................................19
Reductio ad Hitlerum ..........................................................................................................19
Plain Folks .............................................................................................................................20
Logos .....................................................................................................................................20
Pathos ....................................................................................................................................21
Ethos ......................................................................................................................................21
Discussion: .......................................................................................................................................................22
Conspiracy Theories ............................................................................................................23
Reductio ad Hitlerum ..........................................................................................................24
Plain Folks.............................................................................................................................26
Logos......................................................................................................................................26
Pathos.....................................................................................................................................28
Ethos .....................................................................................................................................29
Conclusion: ......................................................................................................................................................30
References: .......................................................................................................................................................35
Appendices........................................................................................................................................................45
Appendix A: ..........................................................................................................................45
Appendix B: ...........................................................................................................................45
Appendix C: ..........................................................................................................................46
Appendix D: ..........................................................................................................................50
Appendix E: ..........................................................................................................................54
iii

Abstract
Revolving around the 2020 U.S. presidential election topic, this research analyzes how
the two most popular Chinese political YouTubers have sought to present their rhetorical
discourse and whether the relationships between persuasive devices and audience reactions differ
between them. Using the attributes of agenda-setting and effects theory as a theoretical
framework and creating a new set of persuasive techniques as a deductive tool, this study
identifies the attributes that differentiate the two YouTubers from each other and studied the
statistical relationships between persuasive techniques and audience reactions (the number of
thumbs-up, thumbs-down, comments). This content analysis contributes to the attributes of
agenda-setting and its effects theory by predetermining the salient issues in the light of political
communication and suggesting that an innovative set of persuasive techniques (e.g., the inclusion
of Conspiracy Theories and Reductio ad Hitlerum) can unveil how the most successful Chinese-
speaking political influencers on YouTube persuade their followers. The set of persuasive
techniques in this case study also points out a possibility that it may be thought of as a common
approach of analyzing political influencers and activists on various social media platforms.
1

Introduction
In the circle of Chinese-language political influencers on YouTube, Jiang Feng Times ( 江
峰时刻, Jiang Feng Shi Ke) and Wenzhao Discussing the Past and the Present ( 文昭谈古论今,
Wen Zhao Tan Gu Lun Jin) are arguably the two most influential channels. As of July 2021,
Jiang Feng Times, with 759,000 subscribers, steadily ranks as the most-followed YouTube
political channel in the Chinese-speaking community, and Wen Zhao comes in a close second as
the second most popular Chinese-language political channel with 715,000 subscribers.
In addition to being the most successful political influencers, Jiang Feng and Wen Zhao
represent a group of Chinese intellectuals who are strongly critical of the Chinese Communist
Party, idolize Donald Trump, and champion the ideologies of Trump (Lin, 2021). Considering
that Jiang Feng and Wen Zhao's respective target audiences on YouTube consist mainly of first-
generation Chinese immigrants and internet users who can bypass the Chinese government's
internet censorship, it is important to examine the persuasive devices in their videos to
understand the media selection and consumption of diaspora Chinese audiences. According to
Tai (2016), new immigrants from a developing country can exert heavy influence on issues of
their home countries, no matter in politics or economics. In other words, for the ever-growing
Chinese immigrant community across the world, these new immigrants can incrementally change
not only the political environment in their host country but also shape many issues in their home
country. Besides, Chinese netizens who tend to read reports by bypassing the authority's
censorship and view otherwise blocked websites are also potential immigrant groups, as they
tend to be the better-off group in mainland China but in the meantime are skeptical of the ruling
party's propaganda-driven news (Zhang, 2020).
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Research on how the influential political influencers among the Chinese community
advance their political agenda remains scarce, even though some literature attempts to make
sense of the puzzling phenomenon in a qualitative way (e.g., Lin, 2021). The existing scholarship
offers some explanations ideologically and historically, yet fails to present how these political
influencers advance their agenda and convince their audiences through a range of persuasive
techniques and whether the relationships between persuasive techniques and audience reactions
vary between Youtubers with different styles. To fill the aforementioned gaps in literature, this
study adopts agenda-setting theory as an overarching theoretical framework and uses content
analysis to advance the scholarship on the political communication of the Chinese-speaking
political influencers from three dimensions. Firstly, it explores the new employment of second-
level agenda-setting theory (i.e., attributes of agenda-setting) by introducing a new set of
persuasive techniques as a toolkit to track how the salient issue is framed and communicated. For
example, this research incorporated Conspiracy Theories and Reductio ad Hitlerum as persuasive
devices that the influencers actively adopted to convey their messages. Secondly, drawing on the
fifth-level agenda-setting theory (i.e., consequences of agenda-setting effects), this study
elucidates the shifting relationships between persuasive devices and audience reactions by
examining Youtubers with distinct attributes. Last but not least, results of this study help
promote the media literacy of audiences on social media to be more conscious of mixed strategic
communication (Spiller & Bergner, 2011).
Literature Review
Attributes of Agenda-Setting Theory and Its Effects
In the classical definition, agenda-setting theory explores how the salience of objects in
the news is transferred to target audiences (McCombs & Reynolds, 2002). The theory validates
3

Lippmann's idea that media build pictures in the audience's heads about the world around them
(Lippmann, 1946). The critical proposition of the theory lies in the transfer of salience from one
agenda to another agenda. McCombs, Lopez-Escobar, and Llamas (2000) have pointed out that,
in addition to the agenda of objects, another fundamental aspect of communication content is that
each object has various attributes such as characteristics and traits that fill out the picture of each
object. When media describe an object, they also tell recipients something about the attributes of
the object:

Just as objects vary in salience, so do the attributes of each object. Just as there is an
agenda of public issues, political candidates, or some other set of objects, there also is an
agenda of attributes for each object. Both the selection by journalists of objects for
attention and the selection of attributes for detailing the pictures of these objects are
powerful agenda-setting roles. (McCombes et al., 2000, p. 78)

As a result, agenda-setting theory has expanded its scope from the first-level agenda-
setting theory to the second-level theory (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Roberts et al., 2002), from
focusing on the salience of objects (such as candidates in political campaigns) to the salience of
objects' attributes. Second-level study entails both substantive attributes (such as candidates'
characters) and affective attributes (e.g., the tone that media use when they portray candidates)
(Takeshita, 1997, 2007; Weaver et al., 2004). In other words, second-level agenda-setting theory
usually scrutinizes the features related to an object or a specific issue and how the issue is framed
to the public (Golan & Wanta, 2001; Koa, 2018; M. E. McCombs & Shaw, 1993; M. McCombs
& Evatt, 1995).
Many scholars posited that second-level agenda-setting is equivalent to framing theory
because both explore more how issues or objects are presented by media and communicators
than which issues or objects are exceptionally presented (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2014; D. H.
4

Weaver, 2007). Besides, both are involved with ways of thinking and with detailed attributes in
the audience's minds (D. H. Weaver, 2015). Nevertheless, some would argue that the primary
difference between framing and the second-level agenda-setting theory is that framing studies
have been principally concerned with how the media or communicators depict numerous
subjects, while the second-level agenda-setting emphasizes more on the correlation between
media or communicators’ and recipients' ways of thinking (Koa, 2018; D. H. Weaver, 2015).
Since the 1980s, the agenda-setting theory has called attention to how politicians' images
or attributes are established (Baumann et al., 2018). Since then, many agenda-setting pieces of
research have been concerned with attributes of agenda-setting and the effects of media coverage
on public opinion (e.g., King, 1997; McCombs et al., 1981, 1997). For example, McCombs and
Estrada (1997) declared that Bernard Cohen's well-known summary statement of the media's
power should be reframed to suggest that "the media may not only tell us what to think about,
they may also tell us how and what to think about it, and even what to do about it" (p. 247).
More recent studies tend to place the study of agenda-setting effects in the context of democratic
elections. For example, Adriaansen and colleagues (2012) investigated whether different kinds of
campaign coverage could switch an individual’s vote decision.
The existing literature on agenda-setting mainly addressed issues or objects in a
traditional background such as television and newspaper coverage or political candidates'
speeches in campaigns. However, with the emergence of social media as a platform for news and
political discourse over the past two decades (West, 2017), political actors have intensively
employed the new digital outlets to hit wider audiences, promote their point of view, mobilize
supporters, and receive instant feedback (Kapko, 2016; Lee & Xu, 2018). Capitalizing on these
powerful new communication structures, YouTubers talking about political issues have
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challenged conventional media outlets. Noting the scarcity of studies that apply agenda-setting
theory to the research of YouTube, this paper investigates the content of the two most followed
political channels in the Chinese-language community on YouTube and uncovers how the
Chinese-speaking political influencers seek to persuade their followers and how their followers
react.
Accordingly, second-level agenda-setting theory serves as a valuable framework to
examine how popular political YouTubers convey their content and eventually influence target
audiences. Another branch of the agenda-setting theory (fifth-level agenda-setting) investigates
the relationship between a communicator’s utilization of persuasive devices and audiences'
attitudes toward them. The study of consequences of agenda-setting effects comprising attitudes,
opinions, and behavior is also one of the seven distinct evolved agenda-setting theories
(McCombs et al., 2014). To have a comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms through
which agendas are set to work (Chen & Eraslan, 2017; Moy et al., 2016; Rashi & McCombs,
2015), this study singled out six persuasive techniques from existing propaganda and persuasion
research as an instrument to identify the substantive and the affective attributes in the two most
popular Chinese-speaking political influencers on YouTube as well as to make sense of their
subscribers' responses (e.g., Thumbs-up, Thumbs-down, and Comments) when a salient issue —
the 2020 U.S. presidential election in this case — has been discussed.
Immigrants from China and their political talk on YouTube
As is known to many, China's propaganda apparatus has long prohibited its citizens'
access to Western news websites that report topics defined as taboo by the Chinese government
(Tai, 2016). Website officials have put the most advanced Artificial Intelligence technologies
and a multitude of human censors in service to filter news content and delete messages that may
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mobilize the public to attend any large-scale collective activities (G. King et al., 2013). However,
the mastery of the Chinese authority to control information is constantly challenged (Tai, 2016).
For example, Falun Gong practitioners whose activities have been intensely prohibited by
Communist Party since 1999 have initiated a collection of anti-censorship services and software
from 2001 (Shirk, 2007; Tong, 2009), which enable internet users from autocratic countries
worldwide to access websites and software banned in their home country. At the same time,
scholarship has argued that internet users who can bypass internet censorship in mainland China
and view foreign websites are more likely to be better off socioeconomically (Zhang, 2020).
Consequently, Chinese immigrants in countries without internet censorship and netizens in
mainland China who can bypass the internet firewall constitute the primary users of the Chinese-
speaking community on YouTube, which is the most dominant social media platform across the
globe. Nearly 75% of adults in America use YouTube (Ryoo et al., 2021). People watched over
110 million hours of U.S. presidential election-related content on YouTube from April 2015 to
March 2016. The total amount of time people took to watch YouTube is a hundred times more
than they do on Fox News, C-Span, MSNBC, and CNN combined (Stanford, 2016). However, it
is worth noting that a large part of the reason for the explosion of political channels on YouTube
is the extensive distrust against the traditional, mainstream media (Ryoo et al., 2021). This
skepticism makes disillusioned news consumers resort to YouTube, seeking more telling and
accurate news and political commentary.
This situation also happens with the Chinese community. Chinese-speaking users on
YouTube consist mainly of first-generation immigrants and citizens in mainland China who can
bypass internet censorship. However, as nearly 58 percent of Chinese immigrants five years old
and older reported limited English proficiency (Hooper & Batalova, 2015), a large portion of
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these Chinese-speaking users who have access to Western websites are unable to read English
news reports from mainstream Western media that undergo rigorous fact-checking before
releasing news. Thus, these netizens turn to political YouTubers who produce videos in Chinese.
In this case study, the two YouTubers, Jiang Feng and Wen Zhao, are the first and second
most subscribed Chinese-speaking political influencers respectively on the platform. Both Jiang
Feng and Wen Zhao used to affiliate with media groups established by Falun Gong practitioners
who, since 1999, have been convicted by the Chinese Communist Party of being an illegal
organization that endangers the regime. Inevitably, they both hold a hardline anti-communist
ideology. Capitalizing on the minimal startup costs and efficacy for producing political YouTube
content and the auto-recommendation algorithm, these political influencers have actively utilized
their own channels to advance their political agenda outside the confines of traditional media
formats (Ryoo et al., 2021).
Persuasive Communication Techniques
Persuasive techniques come in many forms, but they can be identified by their persuasive
function, target audience, the use of reasoning and/or emotional appeals, and the representation
of a particular group's or organization's agenda (Miller, 1939). Also, it can be any message that is
designed to shape, reinforce, or change the responses of its target audience (Stiff & Mongeau,
2016). The Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) is a schema created in 1937 aiming at
offering the public the skills required to be aware of misleading messages from information by
spotting specific techniques prevalent in propaganda messaging, hence raising the alarm that the
public is vulnerable to extremist propagandists (Sproule, 2001). Similar fears to this day have
been articulated by academics (e.g., Badawy & Ferrara, 2018; Houck et al., 2017), governments,
8

and media platforms as more transmissible tools like social media are being exploited to
propagandize reactionary politics.
Examination of such techniques allows us to recognize how the two YouTubers intended
to shape their followers' perceptions. This study can evaluate followers' awareness to pinpoint
and evaluate the persuasive techniques that political communicators used to affect them (Koa,
2018). The literature also points out that once the audience could identify the persuasive
techniques, the effective degree of those techniques would have diminished (Jowett &
O’Donnell, 2018). Therefore, the audience can decide whether to accept the content or reject it.
The existing category of persuasive techniques varies between studies. For example, the
Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) in 1937 designated seven primary devices — "name-
calling," "glittering generality," "transfer," "testimonial," "plain folks," "card stacking," and
"bandwagon" (Koa, 2018, p. 575), whereas Weston (2018) marks at least 24 types of techniques.
The differences are primarily attributable to some scholars trimming off some techniques or
subsuming similar definitions to accommodate their own studies (Da San Martino et al., 2019).
The current research curated a list of six persuasive techniques derived from the aforementioned
studies as an instrument to analyze how the two political YouTubers communicate to their
audiences. These six persuasive techniques comprise Conspiracy Theories, Reductio ad
Hitlerum, Plain Folks, Logos, Pathos, and Ethos. The list only involves techniques that are
assessed as salient attributes of the two Youtubers and can be judged unambiguously by coders.
Conspiracy Theories
Conspiracy theories aim to interpret the ultimate causes of significant social and political
events and circumstances with claims of behind-the-scenes plots by two or more powerful actors
(Dentith & Orr, 2017; Douglas et al., 2019). Conspiracy Theories believers refers to individuals who
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have belief in a specific conspiracy theory or the whole set of conspiracy theories (Douglas et al.,
2019). For example, approximately 60% of Americans believe that it was the CIA that killed
President John F. Kennedy (Enders & Smallpage, 2018), and in the run-up to the 2016 European
Union membership referendum in the United Kingdom, nearly 46% of those planning to vote
"leave" believed that the vote would be rigged (Drochon, 2018). Many social scientific studies
on conspiracy theories center on conspiracy theories believers' narratives such as the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy (McCauley & Jacques, 1979), the death of Diana,
Princess of Wales (Douglas & Sutton, 2008), 9/11 "Truther" theories (Laine & Parakkal, 2017;
Stempel et al., 2007), "chemtrail" conspiracy theory (Mahajan et al., 2019), false claims about
Geroge Soros (Juhász & Szicherle, 2017; Langer, 2021; Oliver & Wood, 2014; Plenta, 2020),
secrets about Barack Obama's citizenship (Lupton et al., 2020), and the "deep state" theory
(Braun, 2019; Horwitz, 2021; Douglas et al., 2019, p. 4).
The study of conspiracy theories matters not only because they can exert influence on
people's thoughts, experiences, feelings, and behaviors but because they can potentially shape
broader social and political realities (Plenta, 2020). For example, Hamzawy (2018) found that the
new authoritarian regime in Egypt strategically propagated conspiracy theories for strengthening
its control of society. By focusing on the political realm, Douglas and colleagues (2019) assessed
the effects of conspiracy theories and argued that conspiracy theories "do more harm than good"
(p. 3). Plenta (2020) suggested that political leaders in Slovakia and Hungary had used
conspiracy theories regarding George Soros in moments of crisis to promote the public to
support their ideas and policies. However, few prior studies have used conspiracy theories to
investigate Chinese-speaking political influencers on YouTube in particular as a technique.
10

Based on such a situation, this research utilizes conspiracy theories as a persuasive technique to
examine how the two YouTubers convince their followers.
Therefore, the following hypothesis is rendered:
H1a-c: The use of Conspiracy Theory will be (a) positively associated with the number of
Thumbs-up, (b) negatively associated with the number of Thumbs-down, and (c)
positively associated with the number of comments.
Reductio ad Hitlerum
Reductio ad Hitlerum, also known as playing the Nazi card, initially was used to
invalidate someone else's position or argument on the basis that the same view was held by
Adolf Hitler or the Nazi party (Laruelle, 2019). Coined by Leo Strauss in 1951, Reductio ad
Hitlerum evolves its name from the term utilized in logic, reductio ad absurdum, and is a
member of the ad hominem argumentation (Samoilenko et al., 2016), a logical fallacy in which
an argument is refuted by attacking the character of its supporter rather than the argument itself.
The allegation of Reductio ad Hitlerum is established on guilt by association — the alleged
similarity of an argument or an action to those lined up with Hitler and the Nazis (Jaki & De
Smedt, 2019).
For instance, one would argue that the Nazis executed euthanasia, and therefore even
voluntary forms of euthanasia might lead to extermination camps. Just as many slippery slope
arguments usually do, this would have been shirking from arguing directly against voluntary
euthanasia, instead attacking that it may lead to some widely acknowledged bad things
happening, as Hitler did at the time (Curtis & Curtis, 2004). According to Laruelle (2019), the
deployment of these notions has more to do with emotion than analytical thinking because being
categorized as a fascist or a Nazi would always mean being denied the moral right to announce
11

one's convictions. As a result, allegations of reductio ad Hitlerum can be exploited as a technique
through which to make accusations against political rivals, regardless of whether the rivals have
certainly made those allegations in truth.
There is burgeoning research that recognizes the severe effect of reductio ad Hitlerum.
Teninbaum (2009) investigated the theory behind classical logic, recommended techniques for
identifying the fallacies, and suggested methods for rebelling against them once found out.
Laruelle (2019) has been focusing on the growing trend of the reductio ad Hitlerum in character
assassination in domestic US politics and international affairs, analyzing the contentions of
"fascism" used to delegitimize political enemies and tarnish the political agendas and
personalities of politicians (p. 308). Nevertheless, a literature gap remains between Reductio ad
Hitlerum and the employment of political talk on YouTube. Therefore, this study chose reductio
ad Hitlerum as one of the persuasive techniques innovatively to measure the agenda-setting
effects, and the following hypothesis was proposed:
H2a-c: The use of Reductio ad Hitlerum will be (a) positively associated with the number
of Thumbs-up, (b) negatively associated with the number of Thumbs-down, and
(c) positively associated with the number of comments.
Plain Folks
A Plain Folks argument means that a communicator depicts themselves as an ordinary
person who can sympathize with the audience's concerns (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2018). The most
crucial part of this technique is that the communicator strives to create a casual atmosphere:
supporting (or opposing) one thing (or one person) not because it is of interest, but because they
had the same experience, confusion, and mindset as the audience, and that is why they are finally
for (or against) something or someone. In this way, the communicator creates a sense of trust and
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comfort for audiences. Thus, audiences start believing that they share common goals with the
speaker and should support them. In political campaigns, politicians attempt to persuade their
target audiences through behavior or language that implies that their ideas are great because they
are "of the people," allowing them to have a common touch with their target audiences (Koa,
2018, p. 576). They strive to perform as if they originated from a humble background and are
deeply committed to the people's interests and, as a result, should be trusted and accepted
(Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 2003; Severin & Tankard, 2013).
Plain Folks belongs to the seven propaganda techniques categorized by the Institute for
Propaganda Analysis (IPA) established in 1937. That taxonomy of techniques is a popular tool to
explain how communication subjects advance their agenda. For example, Koa and colleagues
(2018) rejuvenate the seven devices to measure the frequency of each technique in the whole
range of Arabic language communiques issued by the Muslim Brotherhood from 2013 to 2017.
Hamdani (2018) aimed to spot the seven propaganda devices in both pro-Polisario and pro-
Morocco websites based on the Western Sahara conflict case. However, the taxonomy of IPA's
persuasive techniques has seldom been used to study Chinese-speaking political videos on
YouTube. Due to the relevancy to the current research, this study selected the Plain Folks to
examine the attributes and effects of agenda-setting, and therefore the hypotheses are:
H3a-c: The use of plain folks will be (a) positively associated with the number of
Thumbs-up, (b) negatively associated with the number of Thumbs-down, and (c)
positively associated with the number of comments.
Logos, Pathos, and Ethos
Logos, Pathos, and Ethos are three Greek words. The Greek city-states underwent a long
history of democratic forms of government whereby individuals had the right to freely express
13

their opinions on all sorts of social issues (Demirdöğen, 2010). Greek philosophers endeavored
to discover what happens when persuasion occurred, and Aristotle was the first person who
developed his theory by empirically observing persuaders in the law courts and the government
(Demirdöğen, 2010). In his book Rhetoric, Aristotle built a whole lexicon of persuasive
principles, consisting of three modes of persuasion: Logos, Pathos, and Ethos (Cothran, 2016).
Logos convinces the audience by using logical reasoning, which depends heavily on the
audience's capability to process information logically. The principle of this technique rests in the
rational, logical, and argumentative discourse (Mshvenieradze, 2013). In the words of Rahe
(1994), Logos is something that enables the human being to perform as no other animal can; it
makes it possible for the orator to make clear to others by logical arguments the difference
between what is good and what is wrong, though the judgment might be very subjective.
Pathos is the mood or tone of the communication that appeals to the feelings or emotions
such as happiness, sadness, pleasure, outrage, pity, or fear (Aho, 1985; Demirdöğen, 2010). After
triggering emotion, the communicator can move the audience to the communicator's desirable
emotional agenda (Enos, 1991). According to Hartley (1937), emotions drive individuals to react
to appeals based on circumstances and passions made up of cognitive impulses. Furthermore,
scholars have found that belief and persuasion rely heavily on the force of an appeal of emotions
and demonstrate that the audience's imagination and will on emotional persuasion are as essential
as the basic perception of an argument (Golden & Corbett, 1990).
Ethos, originally referring to the power of music to affect emotions, behaviors, and even
morals (Weiss & Taruskin, 2007), denotes an appeal to the authority or credibility of the speaker
(Demirdöğen, 2010). It is associated with how the speaker persuades the audience that the
speaker is qualified to talk about the subject matter. As Aristotle had written in the 4th century
14

B.C., "persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s character when the speech is so spoken as to make
us think him credible...." (Roberts, 1954, translation of Rhetoric, Aristotle, p.191).
The existing literature on political persuasion and rhetoric has long demonstrated the
salience of Aristotelian three modes of persuasion (Logos, Pathos, Ethos). For example,
Gerodimos and Justinussen (2015) have suggested that emotive language emphatically
dominates much of Obama's 2012 Facebook Campaign. That is, the use of Pathos appears to
have struck a chord with the Obama campaign followers. Also, drawing on linguistic indicators,
Reyes (2014) compared the stylistic differences in speeches delivered by George W. Bush and
Barack Obama to rationalize escalating troops in the respective conflicts of Iraq (2007) and
Afghanistan (2009). Additionally, some scholar did a comparative study of the three persuasive
strategies (i.e., Logos, Pathos, Ethos) used by candidates who were in televised pre-election
debates in Poland and the United States between 1995 and 2016, and calculated the frequency of
which the Aristotelian Triad are employed by each candidate (Hinton & Budzyńska-Daca, 2019).
However, few studies have exercised Aristotle's concepts to examine the emerging political
influencers other than political leaders, especially in the Chinese-language community.
Accordingly, this study adds the three rhetorical strategies into the toolkit to investigate
the relationship between the frequency of the use of Logos, Pothos and Ethos and how well the
analyzed YouTubers affect their followers. The following hypotheses are offered:
H4a-c: The use of Logos will be (a) positively associated with the number of Thumbs-up,
(b) negatively associated with the number of Thumbs-down, and (c) positively
associated with the number of comments.
15

H5a-c: The use of Pathos will be (a) positively associated with the number of Thumbs-
up, (b) negatively associated with the number of Thumbs-down, and (c) positively
associated with the number of comments.
H6a-c: The use of Ethos will be (a) positively associated with the number of Thumbs-up,
(b) negatively associated with the number of Thumbs-down, and (c) positively
associated with the number of comments.
Method
Data sample
Using MAXQDA2020 software, this research executed a computer-assisted content
analysis to make the process of structuring and collecting the research data as organizational as
possible. MAXQDA is professional software that collects and analyzes data in qualitative,
quantitative, or mixed methods (Koa, 2018). MAXQDA2020 is the most advanced version of all
MAXQDA products as it developed a statistical analysis module for qualitative data.
A total of 64 videos with their text scripts were selected as data samples for this content
analysis study, of which 30 videos were from Jiang Feng's YouTube channel, named Jiang Feng
Times, and another 34 videos were from Wen Zhao's YouTube channel, known as Wen Zhao
Talks About The Past And The Present. These two channels were chosen because they are the
two most subscribed, viewed Chinese-language political channels on YouTube. Specifically, as
of July 2021, Jiang Feng's channel has accumulated 759,000 subscribers, ranking first among the
entire Chinese-speaking channels related to political topics. The total number of views for all of
his videos was 288,824,128, ranking second in the category. As a comparison, Wen Zhao has
715,000 subscribers, ranking second in this collection. His videos have been viewed a
cumulative total of 310,143,397 times, surpassing Jiang Feng's channel and ranking first.
16

The topic of all these videos analyzed was the 2020 U.S. presidential election. The
subject matter was chosen for two main reasons: 1) the 2020 U.S. presidential election was
arguably the most burning political issue in 2020 among the whole Chinese-speaking community
worldwide. It initiated immense discussion on Chinese social media platforms such as Weibo
and WeChat. For instance, the hashtag "U.S. Election" (# 美国大选#) was used by 14.3 million
netizens to give rise to an original post or comments on Weibo, garnered 9.65 billion views, and
was discussed over 1.68 million times, as of 8th November 2020; both of the hashtag "Georgia
will recount" and "Trump campaign sues in 3 swing states" went so far as to rise to the number
one trending hashtag on Weibo on November 5th and 6th (Brar, 2020); 2) This also ensures the
homogeneity of the sample.
Coding
In content analysis, two approaches are employed to build categories: inductive and
deductive categorizing (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). Inductive content analysis is an approach in which
data moves from the specific to the general with the intention that particular instances can be
observed and therefore combined into a more general statement (Chinn & Kramer, 1999). In
contrast, the deductive approach is developed on an earlier theory or model; the purpose of the
study is theory testing, thereby moving from the general to the specific (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008).
For example, a deductive analysis may retest existing categories, concepts, or hypotheses in a
new context (Catanzaro, 1988). Consequently, this study chose deductive content analysis on the
grounds of the definitions as mentioned above.
The process of deductive analysis consists of three fundamental phases: preparation,
organizing, and reporting (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). Once a deductive content analysis has been
chosen, the next step is to construct a categorization matrix and then code the selected data
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according to the categories (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). In the current study, the predetermined
taxonomy of the six persuasive techniques was employed to create the code system (codebook)
in the MAXQDA2020 software. Next, all the text scripts of 64 videos in our data sample were
reviewed sentence by sentence and coded for corresponding with the code system (Koa, 2018).
For example, the following content is an excerpt from Jiang Feng's video issued on 28
November 2020, entitled "Trump's two fronts: the bright line — the legal battle, the
Pennsylvania case appealed to the high court; the dark line — clean up the Washington swamp,
the meeting with the Department of Defense, remove the Chinese Communist Party' s
undercover Kissinger and Albright."

First, we know,
Who chanted the slogan "Smash an old world and build a new China"?
That was the slogan of the Chinese Communist Party when it usurped power.
Communists!
From the Paris Commune onwards, it was "Smash everything and build a new order."
This is the standard communist symbol.
Before the election, major cities in the United States
In San Francisco, New York, Chicago, there were massive riots.
Seattle, Portland, the whole city was paralyzed.
What was the slogan of the rioters?
That's the slogan, "You can't rebuild until you break it," right?
You cannot rebuild until you break it all the way down
And what's behind them?
The Antifa and Hei ming gui movement (Black Lives Matter movement) have made it
clear that the Chinese Communist Party is supporting them (Pos. 195-208).

To code for each persuasive technique in the above excerpt, coders scrutinized the
availability of each technique several times. For instance, Jiang Feng used the word "first" as a
logical conjunction initially, and then the coder would mark in the MAXQDA2020 Jiang Feng's
use of the persuasive technique of Logos one time. He also tried to appeal to trigger a guilt
association by alleging that the slogan in Americans' protests was lined up with the Communists'
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movements. As a result, it would be registered as the technique of Reductio ad Hitlerum.
Reliability
An intercoder reliability was employed to ensure the reliability of results in this study.
There is not much general agreement on the amount of data that has to be coded by the coders
(Koa, 2018). Wimmer & Dominick (2013) suggest that the scope of a sub-sample for intercoder
reliability should be between 10% and 25% of the whole data set. Some scholars propose 10% of
the total sample (Lombard et al., 2010). Others think that a sub-sample between 5% and 7% can
be sufficient (Kaid & Wadsworth, 1989). In this research, 9.375% of the total sample (6 videos)
were coded by two coders to measure intercoder reliability. The Inter-Coder Coefficient Kappa
(k) average was 0.86, which can be assessed as a perfect intercoder agreement (Burla et al.,
2008). Coefficient Kappa is also known as Cohen's Kappa Coefficient (k), a statistic frequently
used to test intercoder reliability. According to McHugh (2012), the significance of coder
reliability rests in the fact that it describes the extent to which the total data samples "collected in
the study are accurate representations of the variables measured" (p. 276).
Analytic Procedures
Multiple regression analyses were performed to investigate the relationship between the
use of persuasive techniques and audiences’ reactions, controlling for the word count of each
video script. The frequency of each persuasive technique can be found in Appendix A.
Intercorrelations among critical variables can be found in Appendix B. Results of multiple
regressions with all the videos included can be found in Appendix C. Results of multiple
regressions with only Wen Zhao’s videos included can be found in Appendix D. Results of
multiple regressions with only Jiang Feng’s videos included can be found in Appendix E.
Results
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Conspiracy Theories
Of all the videos analyzed, the Conspiracy Theory technique appeared a total of 229
times. In particular, Wen Zhao used it 50 times cumulatively, while in Jiang Feng's videos,
conspiracy theories were found as many as 179 times. H1a-c predicted that the use of Conspiracy
Theory would elicit more thumbs-up, less thumbs-down, and more comments. Controlling for
the word count, the regression model (see Table C1) performed on all videos showed that the use
of Conspiracy Theory was positively related to the number of thumbs-up (β = .43, p < .001),
thumbs-down (β = .25, p = .050), but not comments (β = .16, p = .218). For Jiang Feng (see
Table D1), the use of Conspiracy Theory was positively related to the number of thumbs-up (β
= .36, p = .060) and comments (β = .49, p = .012), but not thumbs-down (β = .27, p = .177). For
Wen Zhao (see Table E1), the use of Conspiracy Theory had no significant relationship with the
number of thumbs-up, thumbs-down, and comments (all p > .05). Therefore, H1 was partially
supported.
Reductio ad Hitlerum
The technique of Reductio ad Hitlerum appears 92 times in all the videos analyzed.
Among them, Jiang Feng employed it 51 times, and Wen Zhao used it 41 times. H2a-c predicted
that the use of Reductio ad Hitlerum would elicit more thumbs-up, less thumbs-down, and more
comments. Controlling for the word count, the regression model (see Table C2) performed on all
videos showed that the use of Reductio ad Hitlerum was positively related to the number of
thumbs-up (β = .29, p = .020), thumbs-down (β = .29, p = .021), and comments (β = .28, p
= .020). For Jiang Feng (see Table D2), the use of Reductio ad Hitlerum showed no significant
relationship with the number of thumbs-up, thumbs-down, and comments (all p > .050). For Wen
Zhao (see Table E2), the use of Reductio ad Hitlerum showed a positive relationship with the
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number of comments (β = .40, p = .025) and thumbs-down (β = .31, p = .086), but not thumbs-up
(β = .27, p = .101). Therefore, H2 was partially supported.
Plain Folks
In all videos that were measured, Plain Folks as a persuasive technique occurred 124
times in total. Specifically, Jiang Feng used it 77 times in his 30 videos, and Wen Zhao used it 47
times in his 34 videos. H3a-c predicted that the use of Plain Folks would elicit more thumbs-up,
less thumbs-down, and more comments. Controlling for the word count, the regression model
(see Table C3) performed on all videos showed that the use of Plain Folks was positively related
to the number comments (β = .35, p = .025), but not the number of thumbs-up (β = .18, p = .258)
and thumbs-down (β = .16, p = .336). For Jiang Feng (see Table D3), the use of Plain Folks
showed no significant relationship with the number of thumbs-up, thumbs-down, and comments
(all p > .050). For Wen Zhao (see Table E3), the use of Plain Folks showed a positive
relationship with the number of comments (β = .52, p = .003) and thumbs-down (β = .31, p
= .095), but not thumbs-up (β = .03, p = .863). Therefore, H3 was partially supported.
Logos
In total, the frequency of Logos utilized by them was up to 661 times. Among them,
Jiang Feng used Logos as many as 438 times, and Wen Zhao, in his videos analyzed, used it 223
times. H4a-c predicted that the use of Logos would elicit more thumbs-up, less thumbs-down,
and more comments. Controlling for the word count, the regression model (see Table C4)
performed on all videos showed that the use of Logos was negatively related to the number
thumbs-up (β = -.79, p = .001), the number of thumbs-down (β = -.50, p = .048), and comments
(β = -.48, p = .050). For Jiang Feng (see Table D4), the use of Logos was negatively related to
the number thumbs-up (β = -.98, p < .001), the number of thumbs-down (β = -.82, p = .009), and
21

comments (β = -.99, p = .001). For Wen Zhao (see Table E4), the use of Logos showed no
significant relationship with the number of thumbs-up (β = .12, p = .496) and comments (β = .24,
p = .229), and a marginal positive relationship with the number of thumbs-down (β = .33, p
= .089). Therefore, H4 was partially supported.
Pathos
Of all the videos measured, Pathos was utilized 210 times. Using Pathos for Jiang Feng is
up to 156 times, while Wen Zhao used it only 54 times. H5a-c predicted that the use of Pathos
would elicit more thumbs-up, less thumbs-down, and more comments. Controlling for the word
count, the regression model (see Table C5) performed on all videos showed that the use of
Pathos was positively related to the number thumbs-up (β = .45, p = .001), the number of
thumbs-down (β = .25, p = .077), and comments (β = .26, p = .060). For Jiang Feng (see Table
D5), the use of Pathos was positively related to the number comments (β = .48, p = .008) and
thumbs-up (β = .34, p = .066), but not the number of thumbs-down (β = .27, p = .156). For Wen
Zhao (see Table E5), the use of Pathos was positively related to the number thumbs-up (β = .40,
p = .009), but not the number of thumbs-down (β = .02, p = .906) and comments (β = .25, p
= .169). Therefore, H5 was partially supported.
Ethos
Of all the videos analyzed, the technique of Ethos was used 226 times. Among them,
Jiang Feng appealed to Ethos 116 times, and Wen Zhao appealed to the technique 110 times.
H6a-c predicted that the use of Ethos would elicit more thumbs-up, less thumbs-down, and more
comments. Controlling for the word count, the regression model (see Table C6) performed on all
videos showed that the use of Ethos showed a marginal negative relationship with the number
thumbs-down (β = -.26, p = .073), but no significant relationship with the number of thumbs-up
22

(β = -.10, p = .483) and comments (β = -.08, p = .552). For Jiang Feng (see Table D6), the use of
Ethos showed no significant relationship with the number of thumbs-up, thumbs-down, and
comments (all p > .050). For Wen Zhao (see Table E6), the use of Ethos was negatively related
to the number thumbs-down (β = -.49, p = .005) and comments (β = -.37, p = .041), but not the
number of thumbs-up (β = -.10, p = .542). Therefore, H6 was partially supported.
Discussion
With a total of over 288 million views in Jiang Feng's YouTube channel and over 310
million views in Wen Zhao's channel, Jiang Feng and Wen Zhao are the two most successful,
influential political YouTubers across the whole Chinese community. This study presents how
Jiang Feng and Wen Zhao take advantage of diverse persuasive techniques to develop their
narratives and convince their respective audiences. Advancing the second-level of agenda-setting
theory and its branch theory for consequences of agenda-setting effects through the innovative
instrument of persuasive techniques, this case study has suggested that even though virtually all
the content of their videos can essentially be categorized into these six persuasive techniques,
their attributes (personalities and narrative styles) remain very distinct. Not only did this study
display how the two most influential Chinese-speaking political YouTubers communicate their
agenda respectively, but it also identified the attributes that distinguish them from each other and
revealed the statistical relationships between persuasive techniques and audience reactions.
Put specifically, the multiple regression analyses showed that, without separating Jiang
Feng and Wen Zhao, the inclusion of Conspiracy Theories in videos can significantly boost the
likelihood of receiving more thumbs-up and thumbs-down. It implies that the likelihood of
gaining thumbs-up and thumbs-down is independent from each other. Furthermore, the
regression model run on all videos suggested that the persuasive technique of Reductio ad
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Hitlerum was positively related to the number of thumbs-up, thumbs-down, and comments. Also,
the regression analysis on all 64 videos showed that employing Plain Folks in narratives was
positively related to the number of comments a video received. However, the regression model
performed on all 64 videos determined that the use of Logos would significantly reduce the
number of thumbs-up. Finally, the regression model performed on all 64 videos validated that the
use of Pathos (emotions) can significantly increase the likelihood of a video receiving more
thumbs-up. These patterns did not necessarily hold for Jiang Feng and Wen Zhao separately, and
even diverge. These findings are explained next.
Conspiracy theories
Performed all of 64 videos together, the results exhibited that the use of Conspiracy
Theories was positively relevant to the number of both thumbs-up and thumbs-down. It should
be noted that thumbs-up and thumbs-down are independent from each other. According to Lewis
(2018) and Ryoo et al. (2021), this is because the loose regulations and auto-recommendation
algorithm on YouTube facilitate fake news and conspiracy theories-oriented content garner more
exposure and therefore receive more likes and dislikes.
The following sentence can be quintessentially considered a use, wittingly or unwittingly,
of the Conspiracy Theories technique. The example is excerpted from the Jiang Feng Times'
video issued on January 21, 2021, entitled "17 Executive orders on the day one show the Biden
administration's eagerness to build totalitarian politics; the deeper game behind the South
American migrant and refugee caravans."

Big media like NBC and the New York Times beat the welcoming drums for him (Geroge
Soros) and gave him a shout-out. He's (Geroge Soros) also the owner of the Black Lives
Matter organization, which deliberately intensifies racial and social tensions in America.
(Jiang, 2021, Pos. 305-308)

24

Many scholars assert that being exposed to more extremist political information on
YouTube, users are more likely to shift their political leanings to the far right or left (Lewis,
2018). It seems to explain why Conspiracy Theories can simultaneously elicit more attitudes of
likes and dislikes. Because if a viewer with a right-wing position comes across a conspiracy
theory that is identical to his or her position, he or she may be more likely to thumbs it up, while
a viewer with a left-wing position might immediately thumbs it down. Under Conspiracy
Theories, Jiang Feng's videos can receive more thumbs-up and induce viewers to write more
comments. It confirms that Jiang Feng's audiences are prone to believe in various conspiracy
theories. Furthermore, Ryoo and colleagues (2021) have demonstrated that when political
YouTubers can provide in-depth commentary and detailed explanations about various
complicated political issues with their novel perspectives, ignoring truthfulness, audiences would
believe that YouTube channels are bravely unveiling political secrets concealed by high-ranked
people or groups in politics and traditional mainstream media.
Reductio ad Hitlerum
Taken Jiang Feng and Wen Zhao together, the regression model showed that the use of
Reductio ad Hitlerum is positively associated with the number of thumbs-up, thumbs-down, and
comments. It is worth noting that thumbs-up and thumbs-down are independent from each other.
Also, it appears that employing the technique of Reductio ad Hitlerum is not only more likely to
create more empathy (thumbs-up) or repugnance (thumbs-down) in their respective audiences
but also to stimulate more discussion in the section of comments.
Jiang Feng and Wen Zhao appeal to Reductio ad Hitlerum for arousing their target
audiences' hatred of communism and socialism, particularly of China's Communist Party, as well
25

as any word, phrase, or denotation associated with the party. For example, Wen Zhao said in his
video of 19 November 2020:

The difference in political stance will lead to being doxxed online, even implicate family
members, and silence you, which is what happened in Iran and China. If people do not
wake up and fight back, the United States will quickly follow China's path. (Wen, 2020,
Pos. 19-20)

In the video posted on November 28, 2020, entitled "Trump's two fronts: the bright line -
the legal battle, the Pennsylvania case appealed to the high court; the dark line - clean up the
Washington swamp, the meeting with the Department of Defense, remove the Chinese
Communist Party' s undercover Kissinger and Albright," Jiang Feng (2020) declared:

This America has not yet become a Communist America
And already there's this….
New York Pravda, isn't it? Washington Pravda?
This situation where the American Xinhua News Agency oversees the whole world has
emerged! (Pos. 153-156)

He attempted to go against the Biden administration and the Democratic Party by placing
the word "Communist" in front of "America," and refers to the New York Times and the
Washington Post as "Pravda" which is formerly the official newspaper of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union. Also, the Xinhua News Agency is the most influential media organization in
China, an effective channel for distributing news associated with China's Communist Party
(CCP) and the Chinese central government.
This persuasive technique can be very productive in resonating with their viewers who
are generally pro-democracy and oppose to authoritarianism, provided that there are a handful of
terms in the contemporary vernacular that bear as many derogatory connotations as fascism,
communist, and socialism (Laruelle, 2019). In the meantime, Reductio ad Hitlerum can also be
26

considered appealing to hatred, making some audiences go for a thumbs-down. For example, the
results show that the use of Reductio ad Hitlerum by Wen Zhao is positively correlated with the
number of thumbs-down (marginally significant). It may imply that Wen Zhao's followers have
more trouble tolerating his appeal to hatred than Jiang Feng's followers.
Plain Folks
Performed on all the 64 videos from Jiang Feng and Wen Zhao, the regression model
showed that making use of Plain Folks was positively related to the number comments, but not
the number of thumbs-up and thumbs-down.
For Wenzhao, the act of using Plain Folks in videos dramatically boosts the likelihood of
attracting more viewers leaving comments. Wen Zhao has been actively keeping restrained in his
videos talking about things other than facts and logic. The technique of Plain folks emphasizes
the notion that communicators are "of the people" (Koa, 2018, p. 576) and can empathize with
audiences so that it can be viewed as appealing to emotions. It became apparent that the scarcity
of appealing to emotions, in turn, allowed Wen Zhao to secure more trust from audiences
whenever he was talking about political issues in an emotional approach.
For example, in the video of 11 November 2020, titled "Four 'very bullshit' indicators
have left Biden hanging; Pompeo is not backing down and vows to "tear down the wall" for the
Chinese; U.S. truck drivers started a strike yesterday," Wen Zhao said:

a friend asked in the comment area: which Mr. Big is convenient to explain why Wen
Zhao supports Trump? I replied, "I better make a confession without duress, explain it by
myself, and do not want to bother any Mr. Big to dig for Wen Zhao's secret." (Wen,
2020, Pos. 4)

Logos
27

Taken 64 videos together, the regression model displayed that the use of Logos (logic,
facts, figures) is negatively correlated with the number of thumbs-up, thumbs-down, and
comments. It indicates that appealing to logic and facts will drastically downgrade the likelihood
of audiences responding to the content of videos.
Prior study has demonstrated that the reason for the rise of YouTube as an alternative
media is not just due to the easier accessibility to get political information but due to an
extensive distrust of mainstream media among audiences (Lewis, 2018; Munger & Phillips,
2019). However, because of the apparent limitation, all the facts, figures, and logics that
YouTube influences can tell are still from traditional media conglomerates. Audiences on
YouTube may feel that listening to these influences talk about facts and logic is like watching
TV and reading newspapers so that there would be less incentive to develop an intimate
connection with influencers.
Speaking of Wenzhao, the inclusion of Logos in narratives would galvanize more
thumbs-down. For example, in his video of 16 November 2020, entitled "Trump team says they
have the hammer in their hands and will thunderously fight back! People show strength as Biden
'inaugurated under suspicion'? Beijing launches mega free-trade circle, globalization backfires?"
Wen Zhao said:

Texas refused to adopt Dominion three times because of concerns about the software's
security, but the software is used in 2,000 counties and cities in 30 states, including all six
of the states currently in dispute. (Wen, 2020, Pos. 15)

A good result for Wen Zhao is that although his viewers dislike hearing logic, facts, and
figures, it does not hurt the number of thumbs-up.
28

Nevertheless, for Jiangfeng, employing Logos (logic, facts, figures) would significantly
hurt his video's number of thumbs-up, thumbs-down, and comments. The following is an
example of Logos used by Jiang Feng. In his video of 21 October 2020, entitled "'Win
Pennsylvania, we win everything' Trump's final sprint and Biden's basement credo; common
sense in the election, swinging the world!" Jiang Feng mentioned:
Early voting rate is very high
Currently 30 million votes have been received
The media did a simple count and opened 10 millions of them
It turns out that only about 26% of them voted for the Republican Party.
(Jiang, 2020, Pos. 1-7)

In short, turning to logic, facts, and figures would impressively prevent viewers in Jiang
Feng's channel from thumbs-upping and thumbs-downing his videos and responding to
something about the content of his videos.
Pathos
Taking all videos together, the regression analysis found that practicing Pathos is
positively pertinent to the number of thumbs-up. For example, in the video posted on November
3, 2020, entitled "Open the ballot! Trump's two last-minute moves to seal the deal?", Wen Zhao
sentimentally said:

The United States of America is a new nation, though its mission is old. It is a country
that is only 200 years old, but it is the realization of the ideals that coalesced many
generations in a new world. This is the true American dream. I prepared this episode
while the voting and counting were in progress, so I won't say much more. America also
stands at a crossroads in history today, and hopefully, America will remain the land that
has united the dreams of countless generations and turned it into the land of fulfillment.
That's all for today, see you tomorrow.

29

in the video issued on January 11, 2021, entitled "The Chinese Communist Party returns
the favor in the US election? Biden had sent Xi Jinping a gift to protect the throne; Pompeo did
not resign but made a big move," Jiang Feng said:

Will the old friends be sad? Will definitely be sad. There is definitely sadness.
But we never need to create illusions and delusions to heal
The real miracle will only appear in the midst of all our despair
In the midst of all our despair, in the midst of our faith in God.
Miracles will appear!

The result from the regression model is consistent with the contention that "the emotional
dimension of rhetoric is an increasingly vital part of contemporary political communication"
(Gerodimos & Justinussen, 2015, p. 126). When Wen Zhao employed Pathos, this type of
discourse significantly influenced how many viewers thumbs-up his videos, and the extent of
correlation is more significant than that in Jiang Feng's videos. It might be since Wen Zhao is
less likely to resort to emotions, but once he has an emotional expression, the audience is
exceptionally likely to accept it.
Ethos
Ethos (credibility) is negatively correlated with the number of thumbs-down (marginally
significant). For example, in Jiang Feng's video of 27 October 2020 (entitled "Justices take office
overnight! The U.S. political ecology has changed, preserving the conservative course for the
next few decades; common sense: what exactly is the election about and how to elect it?"), he
claimed that:

This news happened last Wednesday. But the mainstream media did not report. How did I
know about this yesterday? It was a newspaper called DJHJ Media that brought it out.

In Wen Zhao's video on November 27, 2020 (entitled "Trump's duel with the Supreme Court has
30

finally begun! The justices' one decision shows their true characters; Powell's "sea monster"
looks like this; the U.S. version of "The Eastern Expedition of Zhou Gong''), he stated that:

Princeton University computer science professor and election security expert Dr. Andrew
Appel said, "it only takes seven minutes and a screwdriver to hack into this kind of voting
machine to modify the statistics of the ballot." This is in addition to the testimony of
several experts in the field of intelligence and cybersecurity cited.

The correlation result for Ethos is interesting as it revealed that appealing to credibility
helps protect these popular influencers' videos from being disliked by their audiences at a
minimum. However, for Wenzhao, even though the inclusion of Ethos can reduce the likelihood
of receiving a thumbs-down from viewers, it inhibits their desire to comment on videos at the
same time.
Conclusion
By introducing the agenda-setting theory, this study can systematically examine how the
two representative political YouTubers have sought to present their rhetorical discourse
respectively and whether the relationships between persuasive devices and audience reactions
differ between them with different styles. The basic agenda-setting theory was employed to
determine the salient issues in the light of political communication; the second-level agenda-
setting study was often used to get the picture of how these salient issues were presented;
furthermore, the fifth-level agenda-setting lies in the consequences of agenda-setting effects at
three dimensions: attitudes, opinions, and behavior.
Formulated on an existing range of studies on strategic communication and propaganda
techniques, this study creatively developed a new category of persuasive techniques —
Conspiracy Theories, Reductio ad Hitlerum, Plain Folks, Logos, Pathos, and Ethos. Apart from
the classic Aristotle's three modes of persuasion (Logos, Pathos, Ethos) and Plain Folks
31

originating from the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA), this study uniquely introduced
Conspiracy Theories and Reductio ad Hitlerum. The former is now commonly found in cutting
edge social media platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, where loose regulations auto-
recommendation algorithms empower fake news propagators and conspiracy theorists towards
producing more extremist content, promoting their political positions, causing a sensation for
attracting more exposure, and eventually radicalizing the political environment. Reductio ad
Hitlerum is specifically designed for anyone who, regardless of the argument in itself, tends to
deny his or her opponent's moral right to announce the opponent's convictions. In contemporary
political discourse, a community in diaspora is more likely to become the target whom
politicians convince by labeling opponents as something or someone awful in the diaspora's
home country. For example, an overwhelming majority of Cuban-American voters in Florida
were supportive of the Republic Party in the state, as Republicans have successfully slammed
Democrats as socialists during the 2020 U.S. election (Fineout, 2021). This is illustratively
appealing to the Reductio ad Hitlerum because it reminds Cuban-Americans of the fear of being
ruled by dictators in the birthplace they managed to escape.
This innovative taxonomy of persuasive techniques was utilized as the groundwork for
the current content analysis index to analyze the practice of these techniques, thereby
understanding how Jiang Feng and Wen Zhao fulfill the second-level agenda-setting theory.
Next, drawing on the respective frequency of appearance of the six persuasive techniques and
considering the frequency distribution as the independent variable, this paper further explored
the audiences' reaction in their videos at three important social buttons on YouTube (thumbs-up,
thumbs-down, and comment) through employing the fifth-level agenda-setting theory (the
consequences of agenda-setting effects).
32

The results from the regression model display that the extensive and intensive use of the six
persuasive techniques by Jiang Feng and Wen Zhao has suggested that although having roughly
identical political positions such as embracing the conservatism and Trumpism, they both have
different tactics in political communication and capture subscribers with diverse attributes. Jiang
Feng and Wen Zhao both rely heavily on logos in their videos as a dominated persuasive
technique, but their second most frequent device is different from each other. Besides Logos,
Jiang Feng often relies on Conspiracy Theory, followed by Pathos, to convince his subscribers
and viewers, whereas Wen Zhao prefers Ethos, followed by Pathos to convince them. According
to this, Jiang Feng's audience's political views are similar to Wen Zhao's, but Jiang Feng's
viewers seem to be more irrational than Wen Zhao's.
However, there are still several limitations to this study: 1) Jiang Feng and Wen Zhao are
indeed the two most subscribed Chinese-speaking political YouTubers, yet, to acquire a
panorama of the Chinese-speaking political talk on YouTube, two YouTubers are not enough; 2)
although this study only analyzed a total of 64 videos in the context of a single topic (2020 U.S.
presidential election), 30 videos from Jiang Feng and 34 videos from Wen Zhao, each of them
has talked about large-scale topics over the past few years and issued thousands of videos on
their YouTube channels; 3) this study was short of the virtual communication-related analysis,
given that video better enables individuals to perceive the nuances of messages than text and is
more potent at amplifying audiences' emotional responses (Houwer & Hermans, 1994; Paivio,
1990); 4) this study has not yet to establish a notable cause and effect by conducting a range of
experimental researches to confirm that the change of a variable (e.g. the number of thumbs-up)
is dependent solely on the manipulation of the constant variable (e.g. a given persuasive
technique).
33

As a result, future research can be conducted with a broader and more diverse selection of
data samples. For example, in the circle of YouTube political influencers in the Chinese
community, YouTubers are classified into five groups: the most influential is the Falun Gong
group that both Jiang Feng and Wen Zhao belong to, followed by the liberal camp, which mainly
consists of new Chinese immigrants and has no apparent interest affiliation with any political
group, then the exiled Chinese real estate tycoon Guo Wengui's group, the next is the Ming Jing
(Transparent Mirror) Media Group, and finally the student movement leaders who were
persecuted in Tiananmen Square in 1989. In addition, future studies can explore political
influencers by measuring the correlation between video covers and views or by coding the five
or ten top comments from audiences in the section of comments and recording which comments
the official YouTuber gives the Heart beneath a comment to show appreciation.
Theoretically, this content analysis is conducive to the second-level agenda-setting theory
by proposing that the new set of persuasive techniques, in particular with the inclusion of
Conspiracy Theories and Reductio ad Hitlerum, functions as an underused tool to identify the
substantive and affective attributes based on a predetermined salient object, thus bringing
political influencers like Jiang Feng and Wen Zhao's respective discursive system to light. The
taxonomy of six persuasive techniques also offers a possibility that it can be considered a
common means of investigating political influencers on today's variety of social media platforms
and tracking the attributes of political leaders and activists throughout the immigrant community
or diaspora. Furthermore, this study contributes to the fifth-level agenda-setting theory by
measuring the correlation between diverse attributes of two communicators and audiences'
responses. The study of the consequences of agenda-setting effects (the fifth-level agenda-
setting) presents a middle path outside of previous studies that primarily consider high-profile
34

politicians and conventional mainstream media as the subjects of agenda-setting effects. That is,
these influential political influencers, as an object of study regarding agenda-setting theory, can
fill a gap of research between political leaders and ordinary audiences.

35

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45

Appendix A
Table A1. Frequency of Appearance of the Persuasive Techniques
Persuasive
Techniques
Frequency of each
technique in all of
the videos
Frequency of each
technique in Wen
Zhao’s videos
Frequency of each
technique in Jiang
Feng’s videos
Conspiracy Theory 229 50 179
Reductio ad Hitlerum 92 41 51
Logos 661 223 438
Pathos 210 54 156
Ethos 226 110 116
Plain Folks 124 47 77
Total 1,799 576 1,223
Appendix B
Table B1. Intercorrelations among Key Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. word count
2. Conspiracy Theory .26*
3. Reductio ad
Hitlerum
.10 .36**
4. Logos .87** .16 .00
5. Pathos .45** .54** .30* .29*
6. Ethos .48** -.04 -.07 .43** .16
7. Plain Folks .62** .08 .05 .39** .22 .36**
8. Thumbs-up -.08 .38** .28* -.26* .32** -.12 .07
9. Thumbs-down -.13 .20 .27* -.24 .14 -.26* .02 .71**
10. Comments -.27* .08 .25* -.35** .09 -.19 .05 .57** .77**
Note. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
46

Appendix C
Results of multiple regressions for the use of persuasive techniques on audiences’
reactions with all of the videos included.
Table C1. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Conspiracy Theory on Audience
Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Conspiracy Theory .43*** 124.16 .25† 10.79 .16 24.77
Control variable
word count -.19 .17 -.20 .01 -.31* .03
Total R² .18 .08 .09
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table C2. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Reductio ad Hitlerum on Audience
Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Reductio ad Hitlerum .29* 409.78 .29* 33.47 .28* 75.36
47

Control variable
word count -.11 .17 -.16 .01 -.30* .03
Total R² .09 .10 .15
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table C3. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Plain Folks on Audience Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Plain Folks .18 307.05 .16 25.14 .35* 54.74
Control variable
word count -.19 .22 -.23 .02 -.48** .04
Total R² .03 .03 .15
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table C4. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Logos on Audience Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Logos -.79** 144.34 -.50* 12.42 -.48* 28.00
Control variable
48

word count .61* .32 .30 .03 .15 .06
Total R² .16 .08 .13
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table C5. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Pathos on Audience Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Pathos .45** 176.21 .25† 15.29 .26† 34.33
Control variable
word count -.28* .18 -.24† .02 -.38** .04
Total R² .17 .07 .12
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table C6. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Ethos on Audience Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Ethos -.10 221.38 -.26† 17.67 -.08 40.76
Control variable
word count -.03 .20 -.01 .02 -.23 .04
49

Total R² .01 .07 .08
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

50

Appendix D
Results of multiple regressions for the use of persuasive techniques on audiences’
reactions with only Jiang Feng’s videos included.
Table D1. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Conspiracy Theory on Audience
Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Conspiracy Theory .36† 223.86 .27 18.02 .49* 31.10
Control variable
word count -.14 .34 -.10 .03 .10 .05
Total R² .18 .03 .22
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table D2. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Reductio ad Hitlerum on Audience
Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Reductio ad Hitlerum .23 856.81 .27 66.15 .31 122.86
Control variable
51

word count -.23 .33 -.15 .03 -.01 .05
Total R² .12 .11 .10
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table D3. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Plain Folks on Audience Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Plain Folks .35 465.11 .15 37.45 .15 70.36
Control variable
word count -.49* .44 -.29 .03 -.16 .07
Total R² .14 .05 .02
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table D4. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Logos on Audience Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Logos -.98*** 200.73 -.82** 16.87 -.99** 29.64
Control variable
word count .54† .48 .48 .04 .76* .07
52

Total R² .38 .26 .33
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table D5. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Pathos on Audience Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Pathos .34† 297.45 .27 23.80 .48** 40.67
Control variable
word count -.27 .32 -.20 .03 -.07 .04
Total R² .18 .11 .24
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table D6. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Ethos on Audience Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Ethos -.00 476.68 -.06 37.13 .03 69.85
Control variable
word count -.26 .48 -.14 .04 -.08 .07
Total R² .07 .04 .00
53

Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

54

Appendix E
Results of multiple regressions for the use of persuasive techniques on audiences’
reactions with only Wen Zhao’s videos included.
Table E1. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Conspiracy Theory on Audience
Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Conspiracy Theory .25 260.93 .19 31.32 .21 89.47
Control variable
word count .35* .88 .00 .11 -.04 .30
Total R² .26 .04 .04
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table E2. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Reductio ad Hitlerum on Audience
Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Reductio ad Hitlerum .27 299.08 .31† 35.03 .40* 97.16
Control variable
55

word count .38* .84 -.01 .10 -.06 .27
Total R² .27 .10 .15
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table E3. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Plain Folks on Audience Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Plain Folks .03 367.80 .31† 41.35 .52** 107.64
Control variable
word count .44* .88 -.01 .10 -.10 .26
Total R² .20 .09 .25
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table E4. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Logos on Audience Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Logos .12 151.48 .33† 17.12 .24 53.32
Control variable
word count .40* .93 -.07 .11 -.06 .31
56

Total R² .21 .10 .05
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table E5. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Pathos on Audience Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Pathos .40** 227.02 .02 29.85 .25 83.05
Control variable
word count .46** .76 .07 .10 .05 .28
Total R² .36 .01 .06
Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table E6. Results of Multiple Regressions for the Use of Ethos on Audience Reactions
Thumbs-up Thumbs-down Comments
β SE β SE β SE
Predictor
Ethos -.10 166.49 -.49** 17.29 -.37* 52.81
Control variable
word count .47** .87 .20 .09 .14 .28
Total R² .21 .23 .13
57

Note. Coefficients are standardized. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

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Asset Metadata

Creator Wang, Weidong (author)

Core Title Techniques of strategic political communication: the persuasive devices of the two most followed political YouTubers in the Chinese community

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Degree Conferral Date 2021-12

Publication Date 10/08/2021

Defense Date 10/07/2021

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag agenda-setting theories,Chinese first-generation immigrants,conspiracy theories,OAI-PMH Harvest,persuasive techniques,political influencers,YouTube

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Sheehan, Brett (committee chair), Goldstein, Joshua (committee member), Heikkila, Eric J. (committee member)

Creator Email wangweidong0613@gmail.com,weidongw@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC16022634

Unique identifier UC16022634

Legacy Identifier etd-WangWeidon-10145

Document Type Thesis

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Wang, Weidong

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the author, as the original true and official version of the work, but does not grant the reader permission to use the work if the desired use is covered by copyright. It is the author, as rights holder, who must provide use permission if such use is covered by copyright. The original signature page accompanying the original submission of the work to the USC Libraries is retained by the USC Libraries and a copy of it may be obtained by authorized requesters contacting the repository e-mail address given.

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu